

The International History Review

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20

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To cite this article: Tobias Völker (2020): Holding High the Hanseatic Cross in the Levant: Andreas David Mordtmann and the Diplomatic Milieu of Istanbul, The International History Review, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2020.1791223

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2020.1791223

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Published online: 23 Jul 2020.

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THE INTERNATIONAL HISTORY REVIEW
https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2020.1791223

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Holding High the Hanseatic Cross in the Levant: Andreas David Mordtmann and the Diplomatic Milieu of Istanbul

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ABSTRACT

This article unearths the little-known history of the Hanseatic legation in mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Istanbul through a close reading of the career and writings of its head of mission Andreas David Mordtmann. A trained Orientalist, Mordtmann ventured well beyond the social and spatial boundaries that seemed to confine the select and inward-looking diplomatic milieu of Pera. He travelled extensively throughout Anatolia and had close relationships with notable Ottoman high-officials and intellectuals. After the legation was disbanded in 1859, these contacts secured him employment in the Ottoman state service. Applying a transcultural approach, the article examines Mordtmann's overlapping and often conflicting roles of diplomat and scholar in the light of recent scholarship on nineteenth century diplomatic culture and (German) Orientalism, paying particular attention to his complex position as an observer with multiple and shifting political, cultural, and professional affinities. Uncovering the mental and material worlds of this Orientalist-turned-diplomat-turned-Ottoman will not only shed new light on some of the intricacies of diplomatic life in Istanbul, but also show how it was ultimately more 'locally embedded' than previously presumed in the literature.

KEYWORDS

Late Ottoman Istanbul; Hanseatic Cities; diplomatic corps; Tanzimat reforms; German Orientalism; transcultural history

The fate of the Hanseatic legation that existed in Istanbul from 1842 to 1859 was inextricably linked to the personal career of its head of mission, the German Orientalist Andreas David Mordtmann (1811–79). As representative of three northern German city states, he represented a fairly new type of diplomat: a civil servant of middle class background with republican beliefs among the diplomatic corps made up predominantly of aristocratic members; an academic who had been given his job because of his Orientalist expertise rather than through family ties and class privilege; an intellectual who did not shy away from getting involved with local culture, and who used the acquired skills and personal contacts for a career in the Ottoman state service.

A parallel reading of the legation's history with Mordtmann's eventful biography provides an illuminating case study of the policies pursued, and the administrational challenges faced, by diplomatic representations of small, politically neutral states in the highly dynamic political environment that was mid-nineteenth-century Istanbul. On the level of diplomatic practice, an examination of how Mordtmann sought to combine his roles as Orientalist and diplomat, and what

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that meant for his scholarship and his conduct in office, has wider implications for the meaning of diplomatic professionalism and the way it changed over time. Tracing Mordtmann's cultural and political networks that included a wide spectrum of Ottoman intellectuals also highlights the often undervalued local dimension of diplomatic life in Istanbul. Finally, located in the larger history of German Oriental studies, Mordtmann's example illustrates how the 'autodidacts and travellers'[1] with their ethnographic and socio-political findings were increasingly marginalized within the mainly philologically oriented Academy, while the more practice-oriented Orientalist knowledge they produced was in high demand with Foreign Ministries and newspaper editors.

The first part of the article will trace the history of the legation and discuss its particularities in the context of recent scholarship on diplomatic culture, diplomatic actors, and diplomacy as social practice.[2] The logistics of running a small but fully functioning mission and the material aspects of Mordtmann's existence are explored, and his subsequent career as a 'Western expert' in the Ottoman service is analysed in the light of his manifold involvement with intellectual life in mid-nineteenth-century Istanbul. The article then addresses Mordtmann's overlapping roles of diplomat and Orientalist, assessing how ethnographic research, intelligence gathering, and journalism intersected in his writings and what this meant for his Orientalist work and his professional self-perception. Finally, through an analysis of his attitude towards the diplomatic milieu in Pera, and his discursive stance on Ottoman reform and the Eastern Question paradigm, Mordtmann is framed within the transcultural reference field of his manifold affiliations and shifting loyalties, locating his views and actions in the broader context of Orientalist knowledge production and Euro-Ottoman diplomatic history.

The Istanbul mission in the context of Hanseatic foreign policy

The implementation of the Hanseatic mission in Istanbul was part of a coordinated foreign policy of the northern German city-states of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck. After the slow dissolution of the Hanseatic League in the seventeenth century,[3] the three cities had maintained diplomatic relations with several European powers to advocate their commercial interests and defend their sovereignty against the encroachment of neighbouring German principalities.[4] This network of representation was massively expanded in the early nineteenth century, when mercantilist restrictions on overseas trade were eased.[5] The more than 200 new Hanseatic outposts in Europe, Asia and the Americas served primarily commercial needs and were run almost exclusively by honorary consuls, but in the Ottoman case the Porte insisted on a diplomatic representation in Istanbul as a prerequisite for opening consulates in other port cities of the Empire.[6] The negotiations were initiated in 1836,[7] leading up to an Agreement of Friendship, Trade and Shipping that was signed in London in 1839, one year after the British treaty of Baltalimanı on which it was largely based.[8] In 1842, the formal requirement of a diplomatic representation was met by the assignment of the Spanish minister resident Antonio López de Córdoba (1799-1854) as Hanseatic chargé d'affaires.[9] Yet, while Córdoba's chancellery could have attended to the needs of the Hanseatic ships, the Cities decided to appoint a German-speaking chancellor, thereby establishing the Hanseatic mission as a separate administrative unit.[10] In 1845, they commissioned their candidate of choice, the Orientalist Andreas David Mordtmann.[11]

Born in Hamburg in 1811 into an impoverished middle-class family, Mordtmann's main qualification for the job was his proficiency in Oriental languages that he had acquired autodidactically as he could not afford a formal academic training.[12] In 1839, these language skills attracted the attention of the influential Hamburg politician Karl Sieveking (1787-1847),[13] who conducted the negotiations with the Porte. He took Mordtmann under his wing and in 1845 suggested him for the newly created post in Istanbul. For Mordtmann, the appointment represented an opportunity to finally see the 'Orient', improve his Turkish and do research on the ground.

For the Hanseatic Cities the mission constituted an experiment as their only outpost with full diplomatic character outside Europe. Unlike earlier maritime republics, most notably Venice,[14] the Hanseatic Cities did not have the intention nor the power to play an active role in Ottoman high politics. Instead, they promoted neutrality, freedom of trade and republicanism as mutually dependent corner stones of their foreign policy, stressing their role as warrantor of international commercial exchange in times of Great Power conflict.[15] This reiteration of old tropes about the survival of small republics in times of imperialist competition seemed – after the Napoleonic occupation and in face of continuing challenges to their independence within the German confederation – like the proverbial whistle in the dark. The Cities, however, relied on the relative stability of the Vienna system and the rivalry between the Great Powers to protect them.[16] Unlike other small states whose claim to neutrality often got into conflict with their colonial aspirations,[17] the Hanseatic Cities' activities in the Eastern Mediterranean did not pose a threat to any of the bigger players, and for several years, they managed to manoeuvre successfully along the fault lines of imperial politics as a confederation of exclusively trade-oriented free towns.[18] Mordtmann as their representative acted as a full member of the diplomatic corps, and even though his actual tasks were not that different from those of European consuls in the Ottoman Empire, his diplomatic rank granted him access to information channels that otherwise would have been barred to him.[19] The detailed dispatches he was thus able to produce were repeatedly praised by his employers, and intensely missed after 1859 when the Hanseatic representation had been transferred to the Prussian minister who provided scarce and inconclusive reports.[20]

The costly logistics of diplomacy

After his arrival in Istanbul in January 1846, Mordtmann rented a small room in a side street off the Grande Rue de Péra (today's İstiklal Caddesi).[21] . De Córdoba resided in remote Büyükdere and confined himself to representative tasks while leaving the daily grind to Mordtmann. In October 1847, the Spanish minister was called back to Madrid and appointed Mordtmann as Hanseatic chargé d'affaires ad interim,[22] a provisional arrangement that would last for four full years. The Cities approved of the assignment, but did not amend Mordtmann's contract or his salary. In politically turbulent times, with the prospect of the foundation of a German nation state within reach, they were happy to refrain from a permanent commitment and hence avoid additional expenses.[23] Every autumn, Mordtmann's contract was renewed for another year,[24] and it was only in 1851 that he received a permanent contract and was officially promoted to the rank of chargé d'affaires, with the chancellery raised to the status of a consulate general.[25]

Markus Mösslang and Torsten Riotte considered the geographical expansion of the European diplomatic system to include non-European, often overseas territories as one of the major structural changes transforming diplomatic culture and practice in the nineteenth century.[26] While for bigger European states, the actual impact of this expansion on the size of the services was surprisingly modest,[27] for minor powers the massive extension of their consular network often meant an extraordinary financial and logistical burden. One factor that made diplomatic administration particularly time-consuming and costly in the Hanseatic case was the political structure of the federation. Every decision had to be approved by three senates and three chambers of commerce, which for the senators in charge meant a lot of tactical manoeuvring and financial bargaining. The resulting cumbersome and often erratic nature of Hanseatic foreign policy for Mordtmann meant permanent job insecurity and a very weak position in terms of salary negotiations.

The legation's tight financial constraints forced Mordtmann to restructure the service after his promotion without actually spending more money. He insisted that under the specific conditions in Istanbul, a mission had to consist of at least two members of staff, as the minister could not perform 'decreeing' as well as 'executive' functions.[28] A head of mission might act as his own

dragoman, as, according to Mordtmann, was common practice in Istanbul,[29] but a chancellor seemed indispensable. Mordtmann was aware that a second salary far exceeded what the Cites were willing to spend, so he came up with the proposition of appointing a nominal chancellor, a 'stage extra' (*Figurant*) as he called it.[30] He claimed that the actual work was easily manageable by one person, while the chancellor only had to provide his signature when prompted to do so. In the following years, he installed several of these nominal chancellors who in exchange for their services received free board and lodging at the legation premises that were actually the Mordtmann family home.[31]

The whole set-up was highly unusual even for a small diplomatic mission. It is understandable why Mordtmann, with his exceptional language skills, thought he could act as his own interpreter, but his claim that this was 'common practice' is highly doubtful. Far more problematic however, was the transfer of the legation to Mordtmann's private quarters. It was not unusual for the family of a diplomat, and for members of staff such as the chancellor to live at the premises of the mission, but primarily the site had to serve representational purposes.[32] In the Hanseatic case, it was a petty bourgeois home in a medium-sized flat that was used as a diplomatic venue, a mission 'run from the parental bedroom' as some scornful members of the German community in Istanbul commented.[33]

Finding appropriate candidates for the chancellery also turned out to be more difficult than expected as in Mordtmann's view none proved 'morally' adequate to live under the same roof as his wife and children. One incurred considerable debts, another had to be dismissed when it became clear that he had been found guilty of 'pederasty' by a German court.[34] A third one sent defamatory letters about Mordtmann to the Cities, discrediting him as morally and personally inept with the obvious intention of taking over his post.[35] Eventually, in 1858, Mordtmann resorted to appointing his nineteen-year old son, turning the legation entirely into a family business.[36]

By that time, however, the initial high esteem of his employers had given way to growing discontent over his permanent pleas for more money and the poor performance of the legation.[37] Hanseatic decision-makers were quite aware of the direct relation between the constant underfunding of the mission and its lack of respectability, and in 1859 therefore decided to permanently close the legation, assigning the representation of the Cities to the Prussian minister instead.[38]

The material world of a 'Middle-Class' diplomat

A study interested in diplomatic culture should also address what Jennifer Mori has called the 'realities behind diplomacy at the grassroots level: housing, pay, marriage'.[39] Mordtmann had been married to Christine Brandemann since 1836 and was the father of four children when he left Hamburg in 1845.[40] He took his eldest son with him to Istanbul.[41] His wife followed with the remaining three children in December 1847.[42] It is hard to believe that the family all lived in one room, with the father also working from there, but he does not mention moving house until half a year later when their home burned down.[43] Mordtmann managed to find a bigger flat for the same rent,[44] overlooking the Russian diplomatic mission on the Grande Rue de Péra.[45] His wife was pregnant at that time with her fifth child, a sixth one followed in 1852.[46] When in 1855 the lease ran out and the family was faced with a huge rent increase, they were forced to move to a place 'several minutes away from the centre of affairs'.[47]

Throughout his entire diplomatic career, Mordtmann always struggled to make ends meet and accumulated substantial debts, repeatedly having to request extraordinary allocations from the Cities to cover for him.[48] In an 1857 letter, he provided a detailed account of his finances.[49] His main income was his salary, the equivalent of 40,000 piasters per annum. Rent and subsistence amounted to 67,000 piasters, with an additional 15,000 piasters for the education of his children, which meant that he spent twice as much as he actually earned. Mordtmann insisted

on sending his sons to prestigious German universities, providing them with the higher education he himself had been denied, while his daughters were instructed by a private teacher in Istanbul.[50]

The emerging image is that of a middle-class family devoting a major part of the family income to allow for the upward social mobility of their children. To encounter such a social setting within the upper echelons of the diplomatic corps illustrates that, even though the nineteenth-century diplomatic world was still 'restricted to a relatively small and exclusive group of (…) predominantly aristocratic members',[51] at the margins new actors appeared, bringing with them social change, and social tensions.

Mordtmann's financial worries compelled him to look for other sources of income. Initially he had thought it appropriate to refrain from journalistic activity while in diplomatic service. In 1855, however, he reactivated his contact with the publisher von Cotta and began to write for two of his papers.[52] In the geographical review *Das Ausland*, Mordtmann published the journals of his Anatolian travels,[53] and for [Augsburger] *Allgemeine Zeitung*, one of the most influential German newspapers, he contributed background reportages about Ottoman political affairs.[54] While these journalistic undertakings were scarce,[55] and only marginally contributed to the family income,[56] they put into relief how diplomatic practice in the nineteenth century could open up to new fields of professional activity. Mordtmann kept writing for *Allgemeine Zeitung* after he left diplomatic service, eventually becoming their main Istanbul correspondent and making journalism his main source of income in the 1870s. For diplomats, the transformation of the public sphere through the rise of mass media meant they had to monitor the press, while international correspondents challenged the monopoly on information of traditional diplomatic networks.[57] Mordtmann's manner of recycling and adapting the content of his dispatches for his newspaper articles shows how 'news' reporting and diplomatic intelligence gathering in some cases could become closely linked and how, after leaving diplomatic service, using one's expertise for a journalistic career was a viable option.

Life after diplomacy

There were other skills Mordtmann had acquired during his years as a Hanseatic representative that in his later professional life turned out to be door openers. In 1860, he used his good connections with Ottoman high officials to secure himself a position as a judge at one of the mixed commercial courts (*ticaret mahkemesi*).[58] The Minister of Trade İbrahim Edhem Pasha (1818-93),[59] in the petition that proposed Mordtmann's appointment, praised him as a renowned specialist in European commercial law.[60]

In fact, Mordtmann had no legal training whatsoever and had learned everything he knew about international law from his previous diplomatic employment. Foreigners living in the Ottoman Empire enjoyed, due to a system of treaties known as capitulations, extraterritorial privileges, the most important of which was a special jurisdictional status.[61] For Mordtmann this meant that it was part of his official duties to try his Hanseatic compatriots. In the nineteenth century, Britain in particular had established an elaborate system of hierarchically arranged consular courts,[62] but Mordtmann functioned, according to need, as prosecutor, lawyer, judge, or court of appeal. He had to handle cases of insolvency, lawsuits about liabilities and fraud, inheritance disputes, acts of marriage and matters of citizenship. As with the study of languages, he proved to be a staunch autodidact and a fast learner. Soon he caused his superiors legislatorial headaches by pointing out inconsistencies between legal practice in the Cities and the particularities of extraterritorial jurisdiction.[63]

His expertise enabled him, after 1860, to become an active participant of the Ottoman reform process he hitherto had only commented upon. As part of his employment at the commercial court, he got appointed to several important commissions drafting new legislation,[64] most

notably a new maritime law that was promulgated in 1863.[65] Mariya Tait Slys has pointed out that the re-codification of Ottoman law according to European standards was part of an exportation of hegemonic legal cultures and ideas that went along with the strong impetus of a civilizing mission,[66] a notion Mordtmann confirmed when he claimed to join the Ottoman administrative elite in its fight against 'ignorance and fanaticism'.[67] Indeed, legal experts not only played an important role in influencing the perception of 'Oriental' legality in Europe,[68] but also, like Mordtmann, as consultants or even active participators in Ottoman reform processes.[69]

In 1871, Mordtmann was removed from his post by the new grand vizier Mahmud Nedim Pasha (1818-1883) who purged the ranks of the administrative elite after taking office.[70] In the following years, he intensified his journalistic and academic activities. Finally, in 1877, the expertise he had acquired through his ethnographic fieldwork earned him an appointment as lecturer for geography, ethnography, and statistics at the prestigious School of Civil Service (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*), a professional college that attended to the education of the administrative elite.[71] He held that position for only eighteen months before he died in Istanbul on 31 December 1879.

Territorial demarcations: Orientalist learning in a diplomatic setting

How did Mordtmann attempt to reconcile his overlapping roles as diplomat and Orientalist? To answer this question, a brief consideration of his pursuits as an Orientalist scholar is necessary. Every summer, Mordtmann took time off from his diplomatic post and set out for several weeks of exploratory travels throughout Anatolia, visiting excavation sites and conducting ethnographic investigations. His perceived familiarity with local customs and languages made him a sought-after contact person, and sometimes tour guide for German travellers passing through Istanbul. The diaries of his trips that he prepared for publication in *Das Ausland* constitute an interesting example of the Western travelogue genre as they reflect the author's intense engagement with local society and culture.[72] His mode of travelling followed a pattern established by other Western Orientalists of his time who saw themselves as explorers rather than tourists. Like the famed Victorian adventurer and ethnographer Richard Burton (1821-1890) before him,[73] Mordtmann tried to blend in with the local population, sitting 'quietly among the peasants or nomads, listening to their talk and often pretending not to understand their language'. [74] On such occasions he 'travelled in strictest incognito', but when investigating the administrational practices of the political elites, he used his 'official position to get access to the pashas, preferably surprising them in the middle of their daily duties'.[75]

Mordtmann's bold quest to know, as he calls it, 'the plain bare truth about the Turkish conditions'[76] needs to be put in perspective: how did he relate to the larger Orientalist body of work produced in European learned circles? How were his efforts regarded by scholars in Germany? How did they influence his diplomatic practice? And how did they differ from the Orientalist learning acquired by other diplomats? The mid-nineteenth century was a time of consolidation and institutionalization of the discipline of Oriental studies in Germany.[77] The *Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft* (DGM) was founded in 1845,[78] the same year Mordtmann went to Istanbul, and Orientalist institutes were established at several German universities.[79] The concept of 'Wissenschaftlichkeit' – translated by Wokoek as 'scientific rigueur' –[80] prevailed as a hegemonic epistemological paradigm, and in the case of German Oriental studies this was tantamount to a strict philological project of making accessible those sources that were considered the basic literary canon of the discipline.[81] Back in Hamburg, Mordtmann had engaged in this type of scholarship himself, receiving an honorary doctorate for a translation of a work by the Arab geographer al-Istakhri.[82] In Istanbul, after turning his interest to political and ethnographic matters, he found himself increasingly marginalized. On the one hand, the editors of the *DMG*'s journal were pleased to print Mordtmann's letters about his research 'on the ground', praising him as 'our man in Istanbul'.[83] On the other hand, Emil Rödinger who held one of the newly

created chairs for Oriental studies in Halle snubbed Mordtmann's travel accounts in a review, denying them any scientific valour.[84] The allegation of '*Unwissenschaftlichkeit*' constituted a positive knockout argument, and Mordtmann issued a harsh reply in return, accusing Rödiger's scholarship of bookish escapism ('Stubengelehrsamkeit').[85]

If Mordtmann's ethnographical research interest went against the general trend in German Orientalist scholarship it was nevertheless appreciated by several respected geographers of his time. He was asked by Carl Ritter (1779-1859) to contribute to his monumental *Erdkunde von Asien* by translating relevant source materials.[86] He also corresponded – and on one occasion even travelled – with the famous explorer Heinrich Barth (1821-65).[87] Unlike remoter areas then being objected to the scrutinizing gaze of the new 'Physical Geography' promoted by Ritter and Alexander von Humboldt,[88] Anatolia was no *terra incognita*. Mordtmann was aware that other Europeans – missionaries, consuls, traders – had lived and travelled in the regions he traversed, and he repeatedly referred to their descriptions and gave updates on the demographic and socio-economic data found therein. The main focus of his travelogues tended to be on the political situation in the provinces, agricultural production and transportation infrastructure.

At this point, some pertinent comparative remarks can be made with regard to the aforementioned British explorer Richard Burton, another 'Orient lover' of humble social origin who aspired to gain recognition through his scholarly ambitions. Like Mordtmann, Burton immersed himself intensely into the cultural environments he was describing, and he combined this pursuit of Orientalist knowledge with a career in the foreign service, first serving in the army of the East India Company, later as a consul at various posts. Edward Said has famously described Burton as the epitome of the nineteenth-century 'Orientalist' whose intimate familiarity with the 'East' ultimately served the interests of British imperialism.[89] This verdict has been repeatedly contested,[90] but as Jenna Larson Boyle points out, most of Burton's work was indeed produced in the context and the interests of the imperial project.[91] This certainly holds true for his travel writings that usually included appendices with surveys of natural resources and local economies. In Mordtmann's travelogues such ethnographic data took centre stage in the form of statistics about land usage, regional commodities, and the ethnic and religious composition of the local population.

Moritz von Brescius has recently argued that German scientific travellers in mid-nineteenth century, lacking a formal empire of their own, nevertheless actively contributed to the 'archive of imperial knowledge',[92] often working within other imperial systems to conduct their research.[93] This certainly, in complex ways, also applies to Mordtmann who recycled the content of his travel journals in diplomatic dispatches and newspaper articles. When editing the material for his Hanseatic employers, he added asides on potentially profitable investment opportunities to be passed on to merchants operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. His political commentaries that featured prominently in the *Allgemeine Zeitung* reached a much broader audience. How on such occasions diplomatic intelligence and ethnographic research fed into journalism that aimed to influence German public opinion can be illustrated by the way Mordtmann dealt with a widely debated issue of his time: the prospects of German settlement in the 'Orient'.

The Hanseatic Cities were major gateways for poverty driven mass emigration, a profitable business that became one of the staples of their blooming economy from the 1830s onwards.[94] The politicians in charge therefore actively participated in public discussions on German settlement abroad, claiming to act out of a combination of patriotic, mercantile and philanthropic interests.[95] One major strand in these debates were fantasies about the Ottoman Balkans and Anatolia - 'our hinterland', as the economist Friedrich List famously stated –[96] as more easily accessible alternatives to the Americas.[97] After the Crimean War, the discussion was rekindled as the Ottoman government in the major reform edict of 1856 (Hatt-ı Hümayun) promised to allow the acquisition of land by foreigners and in a subsequent decree in March 1857 stipulated the terms for permanent settlement of 'colonists'. Mordtmann had closely monitored the debate

since the early 1840s and felt compelled to comment on what in Germany became known as the Ottoman 'colonization law'.[98]

He provided a detailed discussion of German colonization prospects for his Hanseatic employers, and wrote an extended piece on it for *Allgemeine Zeitung*.[99] He praised the moderate climate and fertility of the land, but stressed the imperative of further reforms, especially of the judicial system. A second major obstacle Mordtmann identified in what he considered common German character traits, namely a proneness to brooding, hesitancy and hubris that would put the immigrants at a disadvantage to the enterprising spirit and the frugality of 'the Oriental'. He therefore recommended centrally organized settlement in large numbers, which would provide a structure to protect and accommodate the colonists. His call for a government-initiated colonization of Anatolia went unheeded at the time, but, in unison with similar voices, it prepared the ground for later attempts at implementing Bismarck's policy of strengthening German culture abroad ('Stärkung des Deutschtums') through the establishment of 'Oriental colonies'.[100]

On an individual level, Mordtmann's preoccupation with the settler question had more immediate repercussions as he was asked by Edhem Pasha in 1858 to render an expert opinion on the issue of immigration for the Tanzimat counsel.[101] Towards the end of the same year, he was again confronted with the topic. While on his Anatolian trip with Heinrich Barth, he was repeatedly asked by local dignitaries why the Germans were not following the Porte's 'invitation'.[102] With this mention of the 'colonization law' in the travelogues, the dynamic interplay of gathering and disseminating information that connected Mordtmann's different professional spheres had come full circle. The ethnographic data collected on his field trips had been merged with political analysis to form the basis for diplomatic intelligence for the Hanseatic governments, as well as for leading articles in one of the most widely read German newspapers. Such public exposure, far from causing suspicion among his Ottoman contacts, endorsed his reputation as a European expert and respected man of learning and turned him into a consultant for the Porte while still in diplomatic service. Finally, when later travelling the provinces of the Empire again, he reflected on the reception of the imperial policies that he had sought to influence as adviser for the Ottoman and Hanseatic governments and as political commentator in the press.

Neither Mordtmann's Hanseatic superiors nor his Ottoman interlocutors seemed to perceive of a 'conflict of interests' between his diplomatic position and his journalistic activities even though he often adopted a highly polemical stance in articles on 'Turkish decay and European corruption'.[103] The scholar-traveller claimed that it was his particular position as a diplomat representing a minor, politically neutral power that gave him relative freedom to conduct his researches. After all, he was 'close enough to the leading persons to observe them, without being distinguished enough to engender their distrust.'[104] Yet, when it came to publicizing his findings, it was not so much his low diplomatic profile but his presumed high repute as an Orientalist that provided him with the liberty for frankly expressing his views. The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, in a footnote to one of his articles, praised the 'Hanseatic chargé d'affaires' as the 'best authority on the state of things in the Orient', implying that even when Mordtmann was commenting on diplomatic or political matters, he was not only speaking as a diplomat but as a scholar as well.[105]

Mordtmann's self-perception as an intellectual who held a diplomatic position, rather than vice-versa, was closely related to his conviction that his Orientalist expertise actually made him a better diplomat. He accused his colleagues of being conceited and self-absorbed about matters of protocol while having 'nothing to say about the truly serious questions, about the situation of the country'.[106] Such outbursts of intellectual snobbery clearly compensated for a feeling of social inferiority within the highly elitist diplomatic milieu. Mordtmann used his scholarly presumptions to distinguish himself from his colleagues whom he depicted as ignorant and pretentious sycophants. When he bragged about the sacrifices he had made in the name of 'the truth' on his 'arduous' field trips into the Anatolian hinterlands,[107] he was actually sugar-coating the fact that the hardships of his travels were the direct result of their poor funding. Nevertheless,

the insights into the social realities of the Ottoman lands he traversed differed significantly from the Orientalist learning acquired by the majority of his colleagues during their own professional or recreational journeys.

Travelling for educational purposes, and writing about it, was not unusual for members of the diplomatic establishment, many of whom had undertaken extended journeys in their youth in search of cultural improvement. The exclusively aristocratic institution of the *Grand Tour* – or, in the German context, *Kavalierstour* –[108] had by the mid-nineteenth century given way to a large variety of 'travels of learning'[109] that were now also practised by educated members of the bourgeoisie.[110] With new modes of passenger transportation available, the horizon of these journeys expanded to destinations beyond western and southern Europe,[111] the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece, the 'Holy Land' and Egypt being particularly popular.[112] At the same time, travelogues were in great demand on the rapidly expanding book market.[113]

Diplomats were part of this boom in travel.Their journeys tended to follow conventionalized cultural patterns and well-established routes that were tailored, above all, to the convenience of the traveller.[114] The Orientalist learning that came out of such trips was equally standardized and stereotypical, and much more aesthetic than practical, while the accounts of these experiences were expected to satisfy a voyeuristic desire for 'the marvellous, the romantic, and the picturesque'.[115] In deliberate opposition to such dilettantish forms of knowledge acquisition, Mordtmann saw himself in the tradition of what has been termed 'scientific travellers',[116] albeit without the financial backing some of the famed explorers of his time disposed of for their expeditions. His frugal, solitary excursions brought him very close to local inhabitants of different social backgrounds, however, which added an almost anthropological quality to the descriptions of these encounters. His political commentary, on the other hand, was informed by his proximity to Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals. Such personal involvement with local culture ran counter to the diplomatic common sense that a diplomat should not compromise his impartiality by 'going native',[117] but Mordtmann held the firm conviction that the men who provided the intelligence foreign policy was built upon should enquire into the unvarnished realities of the country of their assignment. He sharply criticized the travelling practices of his diplomatic colleagues, blaming them for accepting decorations and gifts from the Ottoman government while falling for a Potemkin illusion, having seen nothing of the country but 'painted villages'.[118]

Negotiating diplomatic fictions and realities in Pera

In his dispatches, Mordtmann delivered scathing descriptions of the small diplomatic community in Pera as indolent, vain, and full of elitism. He sneered about the 'small-town attitude' and the ubiquity of gossip and overblown etiquette,[119] making it clear to his superiors that he played the game but was not part of it and intended to 'throw overboard the perotic ballast and steer [his] own course',[120] as he announced in maritime terms befitting his Hanseatic provenance. His reservations about the society in Pera in many ways mirrored the stereotypes commonly held by other Europeans travelling or living in Istanbul.[121] The main source of the dreadful state of affairs, according to Mordtmann, was a social species he called the 'Perotians' – the 'offspring of the old Levantine families in Pera', neither subjects of the sultan nor Europeans but under the protection of some European power as *berat* holders[122] or indirectly through family ties. He portrayed them as inbred, uneducated, bigoted, nonetheless convinced they represented the 'crème de la crème of Levantine aristocracy'.[123] 'And the superlative of Perotian is Perotian lady!'[124] To highlight the hypocrisy of these society ladies, Mordtmann, in sardonic confidentiality, conveyed an encounter he had had on the shores of the Bosporus. A group of fifty females, the same women who would coyly blush at the sight of an uncovered hand at a diplomatic reception were, so he claimed, lined up on a slope descending down to the Straits, lusting shamelessly at a group of bathing Ottoman soldiers.[125]

Such evocations of Oriental lewdness and moral decay were very much in line with what Oliver Jens Schmitt has termed the 'European Levantine discourse',[126] a set of derogatory assumptions about the habits and character traits of this highly influential social group in Pera.[127] The rich scholarly literature on the 'Levantines' has described them as an 'ethno-confessional group', 'defined by catholicism' but 'ethnically diverse',[128] a 'group with fluid contours (…) a pure product of mixture' mainly through 'matrimonial alliances between families of European descent and the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire',[129] or a '(socio-economic) community (…) operating between the state and the world economy', a 'historically evolving, regionally bounded instantiation of transimperialism'.[130] For Mordtmann, as for other foreign observers, their supposed decadence and moral corruption seemed to arise directly out of their hybrid status, neither European nor Ottoman, but with privileges grounded in birth and the special historical status of Pera. They impersonated, in the words of Schmitt, 'all the negative qualities of Occident *and* Orient', appearing as people 'with no fatherland, morally dubious, conniving'.[131]

Yet, apart from these cultural preconceptions, Mordtmann had very practical reasons for not liking the 'Perotians'. Many of them worked as dragomans or legation secretaries at European missions. Schmitt has shown that members of what he calls 'dragoman-dynasties' could exert considerable political influence when they joined forces.[132] Their language skills, their transimperial connections, and their familiarity with local conditions served as powerful social, political, and cultural capital and made them indispensable for European diplomats. They were the ones who stayed while the heads of mission came and went.[133] For Mordtmann, they represented if not a threat then at least a nuisance. As a full rank diplomat, he felt superior to what he considered the ordinary staff of the other missions. Yet their social status in Pera was higher than his own, and to make matters worse, he was new to the job and depended on their help. In his dispatches, he ranted about the incompetence and condescending attitude of the chancellor and the dragoman of the Spanish mission, father and son Radovani,[134] who supposedly gave him incorrect information about the operational procedures of clearing a ship through customs and obtaining the necessary firmans.[135]

It was out of a mixture of social envy and personal resentment then, that Mordtmann repeatedly warned his employers about the 'Perotian' personnel of the other missions, urging them to set up educational programs for *Jeunes de langues* who could replace the Levantine dragomans in the representation of a future German state.[136] Similar considerations were in circulation among other European diplomats, especially at the British embassy,[137] and it is highly ironic that Mordtmann, in his effort to distance himself from the diplomatic milieu, was actually just reproducing its cultural prejudices.

Mordtmann's tirades against the dragomans and other 'Perotians', who usually belonged to the lower diplomatic ranks, had a clear element of social demarcation. His attitude towards the higher diplomatic echelons with their aristocratic or distinctive upper-class background was characterized by a different strategy of discursive dissociation. As noted earlier, Mordtmann made up for social inferiority by portraying himself as a free thinker surrounded by ignorant courtiers, and this self-image was closely linked to his pride in being a republican citizen. He boasted about him and the American minister being the only republicans within the diplomatic corps, elaborating in a joking manner that 'brother Jonathan' was still in his adolescence and prone to 'loutish behaviour' while the Hanseatic Cities, with their centuries-old tradition of republicanism, were watching him with the forbearance of loving grandparents.[138] This mocking aside referred to a conflict about etiquette within the diplomatic world as 'a series of populist [US] presidents, most of them professional politicians closely attuned to the self-confident nationalism of the American public, challenged a diplomatic culture that they perceived as effete, aristocratic, and immoral.'[139] In practice, the only visible expression of these ideological differences, according to Mordtmann, was that he and his American counterpart were the only 'not decorated' persons at official receptions.[140] Nevertheless, the idea of republicanism was central to his personal and professional self-image. He even claimed that the 'republican civil service' required a particular

work ethic and conduct as he was looking after 'burghers [...] with a well-grounded self-confidence' rather than 'Bavarian peons and peasants'.[141] This claim to the mental superiority of citizens over subjects, brought forward with a condescending attitude that betrayed his own class background, was reciprocated by the monarchist beliefs of his Prussian colleague Louis von Wildenbruch (1803-1874).[142] In a barely veiled affront against Mordtmann who presided over the parish counsel of the Protestant congregation, Wildenbruch vilified the chairmen of the German cultural associations in Istanbul as 'republican agitators' while Mordtmann scoffed at Wildenbruch's political ignorance and commented that after the revolutionary unrest of 1848 the republican idea seemed to have turned into a proper 'bugaboo' for the reactionary Prussian 'with princely Hohenzollern blood in his veins'.[143] These snide remarks illustrate that even if on an operational level, a pragmatic handling of ideological differences within the diplomatic corps helped to avoid open conflict, the tensions between the monarchical system of Vienna and the ideals of republicanism, liberalism, and nationalism were palpable and could be translated by the individual actors into competing narratives of moral and intellectual appropriation.

Precarious acculturations of a German Orientalist

If Mordtmann felt that his position as a scholar set him apart from the majority of the diplomatic corps, this position simultaneously brought him closer to Ottoman intellectuals interested in the scientific advancement of the Empire. The regular exchange of ideas with these men from a wide spectrum of political and ethnic backgrounds familiarized him with different rivalling narratives about the possible social and political futures of the Empire and significantly informed his outlook. Mordtmann's contacts included several high-ranking dignitaries, most notably the subsequent Grand Viziers Mehmed Emin Ali Pasha (1815-1871) and Mehmed Fuad Pasha (1814-1869), both of whom he had met in private audiences when they were acting as Minister of Foreign Affairs.[144] In other cases, the relationship was centred around a shared interest in academic research, as with the later minister of Education (*maarif nazırı*) Abdüllatif Subhi Pasha (1818-1886).[145] Mordtmann befriended him at the literary salon the Pasha was hosting,[146] entered into a long-running exchange on matters of numismatics and historiography, and eventually even tutored the Pasha's children as a private teacher in history, philosophy, and law.[147] That this engagement with the emerging Ottoman academic scene went beyond individual contacts is best illustrated by Mordtmann's involvement with two highly influential learned societies that were founded around that time: the Ottoman Scientific Society (*Cemiyet-i İlmiye-yi Osmaniye*) and its Ottoman Greek counterpart, the Philological Association in Istanbul Syllogos. [148] Mordtmann was one of the eight founding members of the *Cemiyet-i İlmiye* and for some time co-edited their Journal of Sciences (*Mecmua-i Fünun*)[149] that for more than twenty years shaped the discourse about the 'spread of science' and closely followed the efforts to establish new educational disciplines and institutions.[150] The meetings of Syllogos where he gave several lectures brought Mordtmann into contact with the Ottoman Greek intellectual elite.[151] In his dispatches, he occasionally referred to these well-connected literati as his Greek 'informants' who in 'unguarded statements' instructed him on the 'general sentiment among the local population'.[152]

The wide range of Mordtmann's political and intellectual network made him very difficult to pigeonhole for his contemporaries. At first glance, when considering Mordtmann's complex and often ambiguous patterns of cultural and political affiliation, it might seem that the professional shift from Hanseatic diplomat to Ottoman civil servant constituted the decisive biographical turning point, a sort of symbolic change of sides within the Orientalist paradigm. On closer inspection, the all-embracing dichotomy of *Europe* versus *Orient* disguises a multitude of identifications, self-ascribed as well as externally attributed. Other European expatriates perceived him as primarily German, while within the German community he identified as Hanseatic and distanced

himself vehemently from the Prussians and their embassy.[153] There were Ottoman pashas who considered him a Philhellene,[154] Greek nationalists who resented him taking sides with the Bulgarian cause,[155] Western diplomats who took him for a secret supporter of the Russian side,[156] and a grand vizier with strong pro-Russian inclinations (Mahmud Nedim Pasha) who sacked him because he was not Russian-friendly enough.[157]

All these cultural and political framings influenced the way Mordtmann perceived of the Ottoman world around him. In what follows, I will trace the evolution of Mordtmann's political thinking, as exemplified in his views on Ottoman reform and the so-called Eastern Question. His opinions on these issues, I will argue, reflected both his engagement with Ottoman intellectual debates *and* European Orientalist discourses, illustrating the ambivalent, transcultural perspective Mordtmann adopted as political commentator and cultural critic.

The 'Eastern Question' paradigm, one of the most influential diplomatic fictions of the nineteenth century, pitted the Ottomans against an imaginary West and took the presumed 'decline' of the empire as an excuse for European political interference and economic penetration. Recent revisionist literature has criticized the Eurocentric bias of most historical work on the Eastern Question,[158] questioning the notion of Ottoman decline[159] and pointing out that for the Ottomans the Eastern Question mirrored (and complicated) their own 'Western Question'.[160] Two main strands of the Eastern Question narrative revolved around the imperative for Ottoman reform – especially regarding the rights of the empire's Christian populations – and the amount of European 'intervention' necessary to guarantee these rights. Mordtmann repeatedly commented on both these issues, and it is interesting to trace how over the years his outlook changed until eventually Eastern and Western questions had become two sides of the same coin for him.

When Mordtmann first arrived in Istanbul in 1846, he commented very positively on the state of Ottoman reform.[161] Sultan Mahmud II, according to him, had undertaken a Herculean effort to modernize the empire, 'restructuring the entire machinery of government' while 'fighting against national and religious prejudices', and the current sultan Abdülmecid was set to continue this course.[162] Western critics who portrayed the character of 'the Oriental' as inept for modern civilization and the rulers as barbaric tyrants had simply never been to Istanbul, he claimed.[163]

Ten years later, looking back, he appeared disillusioned: 'I arrived just a few days after Reshid Pasha [Grand Vizier 1846-57] who back then was being welcomed as the new messiah of Turkey. Everyone considered him the beginning of a new era of reform, of the fundamental bettering of rotten conditions that had been recognized as such – and now! what a series of disappointments.'[164] 'The Tanzimat is dead',[165] he proclaimed, the promises of the edict of Gülhane had remained 'a dead letter'.[166] Central to Mordtmann's frustration was his conviction that the Ottoman government was not delivering on its promises of religious tolerance and equality before the law.[167] The principal reorganization of the religious communities, their administrational structures and rights, was a heavily contested issue throughout the whole Tanzimat period.[168] But Mordtmann, in complete disregard of these complex inner-Ottoman debates, came up with one of the most reductionist leitmotifs of Orientalist discourse,[169] namely that the main hindrance for implementing effective reform lay in the very nature of Islam that he considered irreconcilable with modern statehood.[170]

Another line of Mordtmann's argumentation was more unusual in the context of contemporary diplomatic reasoning. In 1853, explicitly speaking as a representative of a small, politically neutral country, he commented on the debates over the infringement of Ottoman sovereignty by the European powers.[171] He thought it highly hypocritical of Britain and France that by entering the Crimean War they claimed to defend Ottoman integrity against Russian encroachment when they themselves on various occasions had bullied the Porte into complying with their demands.[172] As an example of their double standards, he recalled how the French ambassador Charles de La Valette only one year earlier, in 1852, threatened to bombard Jaffa to enforce Louis Napoleon's claims in the very same matter that now served the Russians as a bargaining

chip, namely the issue of the Holy Places.[173] This episode for Mordtmann demonstrated vividly that the Ottoman integrity the Great Powers had vouched to guarantee in 1840 was, and had always been, a 'diplomatic fiction'.[174]

If this, in the eyes of many Western European diplomats, came close to taking sides with the Russian enemy, Mordtmann radicalized his critique by stating that the very existence of the capitulation treaties effectively undermined the sovereignty of the Ottoman state.[175] Recent studies have emphasized that in the nineteenth century the stipulations of the capitulations had indeed turned into an 'instrument of European imperialism',[176] but in Mordtmann's time this idea represented a fundamental questioning of one of the corner stones of European diplomacy in the Ottoman empire. Mordtmann also took a decisive stance on what he called the 'protection malpractice' ('*Schutzunwesen*').[177] Maurits H. Van den Boogert has illustrated how in many cases criminal offenders holding a *berat* were withheld from the Ottoman judiciary.[178] This corresponds with Mordtmann's claim that effective law enforcement was 'paralyzed by the abuse of the protégé system and the jurisdiction of the missions'[179] – a statement very much in line with Ali Pasha's reasoning when he tried to negotiate the abolition of the capitulations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1856.[180] In spite of such a fundamental critique of the capitulatory system, however, Mordtmann maintained that extraterritoriality was indispensable 'as long as the Quran is the highest code of law in the Ottoman Empire'.[181] He was aware that, by the time he was writing this, secular legal structures were being established alongside the traditional sharia courts,[182] and that even before these reforms, Ottoman jurisprudence had never been exclusively based on Islamic law.[183] Still he resorted to central tropes of European Orientalist narratives while simultaneously criticizing European duplicity and imperialism. Such discursive oscillation is typical of Mordtmann's pattern of transcultural negotiating at this particular biographical moment: still operating in, and speaking to a mainly European context but increasingly familiarizing himself with the Ottoman side of the story.

When Mordtmann entered the Ottoman state service five years later he expressed, in a letter to the editor of *Allgemeine Zeitung*, his conviction that British, French and Russian interference had been mostly detrimental and that for the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire 'change has to come from within'. He declared his resolve to 'join in this fight' as 'these lands' had become 'something like a new homeland' to him.[184] A thorough exploration of the further development of Mordtmann's political thinking is beyond the scope of this study. Christoph K. Neumann has shown that his ambivalent stance persisted until the end of his life, although under a different banner since he was now part of the Ottoman administrative elite he was writing about.[185] He still addressed a German audience and measured Ottoman politics by standards at least partly borrowed from Western European discourses. At the same time, however, he expressed a sense of affiliation, even belonging, so that he voiced his criticisms as somebody personally involved rather than a dispassionate external observer.[186] This 'peculiar liminal position'[187] is exemplified in the final passage of his book *Stambul*,[188] where he accused the Europeans of having thrown the 'stone of religious fanaticism' between the peoples of the Orient and called on them to 'leave us Orientals in peace' to 'arrange our affairs solely according to our own needs, without bothering about the interests of gold-greedy Europe'.[189] These closing words, after two volumes of unsparing criticism against the protagonists of the Tanzimat, seem to arise out of the urgent wish to frame his polemic in the wider context of Great Power imperialism. He was still convinced that the state of affairs in the Empire was very bad indeed, but his vision of the 'Orientals' regenerating by their own effort now explicitly included himself.

Conclusion

Throughout the nineteenth century, Istanbul was one of the most dynamic political venues in the wider Mediterranean, and a key location in the European diplomatic system. And yet,

European observers imagined it as belonging to a different cultural sphere, the 'World of Islam', essentially distinct from 'Western Christendom'. Diplomatic practice in this environment supposedly required a more than average level of cultural mediation, and Mordtmann's expertise in Oriental studies therefore served as a major qualification for his appointment. As a scholar-turned-diplomat, Mordtmann extensively investigated Ottoman socio-political conditions and engaged in an exchange of ideas with a wide spectrum of Ottoman intellectuals.

Mordtmann stood out from the majority of the diplomatic milieu in Pera due to his middle-class background, his republican convictions, his political and popularizing journalism, and his position as an established (if not uncontroversial) Orientalist scholar and travel writer. He extensively broached these differences in his dispatches, making up for social inferiority by presenting himself as an independent-minded intellectual surrounded by sycophants. His criticism of the Perotian milieu, however, were in marked compliance with the cultural preconceptions prevalent within Istanbul's European circles, while his comments on Ottoman politics tended to be more ambivalent, vacillating between ideas borrowed from European Orientalist discourses, and statements that were clearly informed by his familiarity with contemporary debates of the Ottoman intelligentsia.

Mordtmann framed his Orientalist expertise in different contexts: in scientific articles, journalistic commentaries, and diplomatic reports. Importantly, such blurring of the boundary between reportage and diplomatic intelligence, self-confidently presented as being in line with his diplomatic duties, demonstrates how diplomatic practice was re-interpreted and refashioned with the appearance of new actors in the field. The relative relaxation of social mores within the diplomatic milieu was another side effect of this development. There were more and more non-aristocrats in the service, and quite a few Orientalists. So instead of presenting Mordtmann as a unique case, this analysis largely confirms that in the nineteenth century, to quote Mösslang and Riotte, 'the diplomats' world was less secluded than it seemed'.[190] The relative unconventionality of his life and diplomatic career lay rather in his 'choosing sides', investing himself in an Ottoman civil career, and ultimately naturalizing. And yet, the 'Ottoman turn' of this former Hanseatic diplomat appears less unconventional and 'unexpected' when, as I have shown in this article, the extent of his local Ottoman network is exposed. Indeed, if anything, his example points to the possibility that the life and doings of Western diplomats in Istanbul were often more 'locally embedded' than previously presumed in the literature.

Notes

1. Sabine Mangold, *Eine weltbürgerliche Wissenschaft. Die deutsche Orientalistik im 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2004), 89.
2. See Markus Mösslang & Torsten Riotte (eds.), *The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), and the new journal *Diplomatica. A Journal of Diplomacy and Society*. For an overview of the different strands of research see Houssine Alloul & Michael Auwers, 'What is (New in) New Diplomatic History?', *Journal of Belgian History*, 48, 4 (2018), 112-22.
3. Michael Hundt, 'Von der halbvergessenen Antiquität zum modernen Staatenbund? Bedingungen, Ziele und Wirkungen hanseatischer Politik zwischen altem Reich und Wiener Ordnung (1795-1815)' in Antjekathrin Graßmann (ed.), *Ausklang und Nachklang der Hanse im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Trier: Porta Alba Verlag, 2001), 1-30.
4. Indravati Félicité, *Négocier pour exister. Les villes et duchés du nord de l'Empire face à la France 1650-1730* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016).
5. Eva S. Fiebig, *Hanseatenkreuz und Halbmond. Die hanseatischen Konsulate in der Levante im 19. Jahrhundert* (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2005).
6. Mordtmann to Merck, 11 Febr. 1859, St[aats]A[rchiv] H[ansestadt] H[amburg] 111-1_46192, fo. 37.
7. On the negotiations see Onur İnal, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Hansa Tüccarları (1839-1867)', *Toplumsal Tarih,* 167 (2007), 60-7.
8. On the treaty of Baltalimanı see Necdet Kurdakul, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Ticaret Antlaşmaları ve Kapitülasyonlar* (Istanbul: Döler Neşriyat, 1981), 231-4.
9. Rodrigo Lucía Castejón, 'Antonio López de Córdoba. Otro Héroe Anónimo', *Isimu*, 7 (2004), 33-46.

10. Fiebig, *Hanseatenkreuz*, 122-4.
11. Resolution concerning Mordtmann's appointment, 27 Oct. 1845, StAHH 111-1_46168.
12. On Mordtmann's life see Franz Babinger, ' Andreas David Mordtmann' s Leben und Schriften' in A. D. Mordtmann, *Anatolien. Skizzen und Reisebriefe aus Kleinasien 1850-1859* (Hannover: Heinz Lafaire Orientbuchhandlung, 1925), VII-XXXIV; Hans Georg Majer, 'Mordtmann, Andreas David', *Neue Deutsche Biografie*, 18 (1997), 92-3; Tobias Völker, 'Vom Johanneum an die Hohe Pforte. Das Leben und Wirken des Hamburger Orientalisten und Diplomaten Andreas David Mordtmann' in Yavuz Köse (ed.), *Osmanen in Hamburg – eine Beziehungsgeschichte zur Zeit des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Hamburg: Hamburg University Press, 2016), 25-44.
13. Heinrich Sieveking, *Karl Sieveking 1787-1847: Lebensbild eines hamburgischen Diplomaten aus dem Zeitalter der Romantik*, 3 vol. (Hamburg: Alster-Verlag, 1923-1928).
14. Recent literature on Ottoman-Venetian interactions has stressed the complex dynamics of transcultural negotiating at work; see Karen-edis Barzman, *The Limits of Identity: Early Modern Venice, Dalmatia, and the Representation of Difference* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2017); Eric R. Dursteler, *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Nathalie Rothman, *Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2012).
15. Hundt, 'Halbvergessene Antiquität', 5-10.
16. See Jürgen Angelow, *Der deutsche Bund* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 11-4 and 148-54.
17. The case of Belgium is particularly well researched. For the period in question see Jan Anckaer, *Small Power Diplomacy and Commerce: Belgium and the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Leopold I (1831-1865)* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2013).
18. For an evaluation of the costs and benefits of the Hanseatic engagement in the Eastern Mediterranean see Eva Fiebig, 'Hanseaten am Bosporus? Die Levantekonsulate der Hansestädte Lübeck, Bremen und Hamburg', *Zeitschrift des Vereins für Lübeckische Geschichte und Altertumskunde*, 87 (2007), 119-33.
19. See Mordtmann' s reflections on the nature of his tasks and his representational duties: Mordtmann to Merck, 17 Nov. 1847, StAHH 111-1_46169, fo. 181-2.
20. Memorandum Smidt 1862, StAHH 111-1_46165.
21. Mordtmann to Sieveking, 19 March 1846, StAHH 111-1_46169, fo. 15-17; Mordtmann to Sieveking, 26 June 1846, StAHH 111-1_46169, fo. 42-45.
22. Mordtmann to Merck, 13 Oct. 1847, StAHH 111-1_46169, fo. 178.
23. See correspondence between the Cities on this issue, StAHH 111-1_46172.
24. Ibid.
25. Mordtmann to Hude, 2 Aug. 1851, and following correspondence between the Cities, StAHH 111-1_46174.
26. Mösslang & Riotte, *Diplomats' World*, 2-5.
27. Ibid., 3.
28. Mordtmann to Merck, 13 Oct. 1847, StAHH 111-1_46169, fo. 178.
29. Ibid.
30. Mordtmann to Merck, 17 Nov. 1847, StAHH 111-1_46169, fo. 181-2.
31. Mordtmann to Merck, 12 Febr. 1855, StAHH 111-1_46184, fo. 1.
32. Jennifer Mori, *The Culture of Diplomacy: Britain in Europe c. 1750-1830* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2010), 62f.
33. Smidt to Merck, 8 Jan. 1858, StAHH 111-1_46191, fo. 8.
34. Mordtmann to Merck, 12 Febr. 1855, StAHH 111-1_46184, fo. 1.
35. Camerloher (Hanseatic chancellor) to Smidt, 19 June 1857, StAHH 111-1_46184, fo. 28; Mordtmann to Smidt, 16 July 1858, St[aats]A[rchiv der Freien und] H[ansestadt] B[remen] 2-C.9.a.3.b.3; letter of 'Hanseatic citizens living in Istanbul' asking to replace Mordtmann by Camerloher, 4 Sept. 1858, StAHH 111-1_46191, fo. 15.
36. Mordtmann to Merck, 24 March 1858, StAHH 111-1_46189.
37. See extensive correspondence between the Cities about this matter: StAHH 111-1_46191.
38. See correspondence 5 March 1859 until 11 June 1859: StAHH 111-1_46191, fo. 32-65.
39. Mori, *Culture*, 1.
40. Babinger, 'Mordtmann's Leben', X-XI.
41. Mordtmann to Sieveking, 22 Dec. 1845, StAHH 622-1/90, E2_3, fo. 6.
42. Mordtmann to Smidt, 15 March 1848, StAHB 2-C.9.a.3.b.3.
43. Mordtmann to Merck, 13 Sept. 1848, StAHH 111-1_46173, fo. 69-78.
44. Mordtmann to Smidt, 27 Aug. 1855, StAHB 2-C.9.a.3.b.3.
45. Mordtmann to Merck, 12 May 1853, StAHH 111-1_46177.
46. Babinger, 'Mordtmann's Leben', XI-XII.
47. Mordtmann to Smidt, 27 Aug. 1855, StAHB 2-C.9.a.3.b.3.
48. Mordtmann to Merck, 3 Dec. 1856, StAHH 111-1_46183, fo. 13.
49. Mordtmann to Smidt, 22 July 1857, StAHB 2-C.9.a.3.b.3.

50. Mordtmann to Merck, 12 Feb. 1851, StAHH 111-1_46173, fo. 259-62.
51. Mösslang & Riotte, *Diplomats' World*, 3.
52. D[eutsches] L[iteraturarchiv] M[arbach] Cotta [Archiv] portfolio 'Briefe Mordtmann'.
53. These travelogues were collected and edited by Franz Babinger in 1925: A. D. Mordtmann d. Ä, *Anatolien. Skizzen und Reisebriefe aus Kleinasien 1850-1859* (Hannover: Heinz Lafaire Orientbuchhandlung 1925).
54. Günter Müchler, *Wie ein treuer Spiegel. Die Geschichte der Cotta'schen Allgemeinen Zeitung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998). On news coverage of the Ottoman Empire see Steffen Schwartz, *Despoten – Barbaren – Wirtschaftspartner. Die Allgemeine Zeitung und der Diskurs über das Osmanische Reich 1821-1840* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2016).
55. Less than forty articles in *Allgemeine Zeitung*, plus seven contributions to *Das Ausland*; see Bernhard Fischer, *Die Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung 1798-1866. Register der Beiträger*, Vol. 3 (München: Saur, 2005), 320.
56. Even in the best year, 1857, Mordtmann earned only the equivalent of 3000 piasters through journalism; see list of royalty statements 1852-59, DLM Cotta.
57. Dominik Geppert, 'The Public Challenge to Diplomacy: German and British Ways of Dealing with the Press, 1890-1914' in Mösslang & Riotte, *Diplomats' World*, 167-94.
58. On the history of these courts see Gülnihal Bozkurt, *Batı Hukukunun Türkiye' de benimsenmesi. Osmanlı Devleti' nden Türkiye Cumhurriyeti' ne Resepsiyon Süreci (1839-1939)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1996), 155-9.
59. On Edhem Pasha see Mahir Aydın, 'Edhem Paşa, İbrahim', *[Türkiye] D[iyanet Vakfı] İ[slam] A[nsiklopedisi]*, 10 (1994), 418-20.
60. The petition is dated 19 Şaban 1276 (12 March 1860), the consequent *irade* 5 Ramazan 1276 (18 March 1860), B[aşbakanlık] O[smanlı] A[rşivleri], İ.HR 174/9557.
61. Mauritz H. van den Boogert, *The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls, and Beraths in the 18th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 19-42.
62. Johannes Berchtold, *Recht und Gerechtigkeit in der Konsulargerichtsbarkeit. Britische Exterritorialität im Osmanischen Reich 1825-1914* (München: De Gruyter, 2009).
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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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