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„The Barcelona Process
a result of postcolonial politics?“

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ABBREVIATIONS

APS	Annual Policy Strategy
ASS./DISS	Associative/ dissociative
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CLWP	Commission legislative and work program
COREPER	Comité des représentants permanents
CSCM	Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
DG	Directorarte – General
EAEC	European Atomic Energy Community
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EIB	European Investment Bank
EMWIS	Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERE	former abbreviation for Euro
EU	European Union
EUMEDIS	Development Society Information in the Mediterranean Region
EUROMESCO	Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
FAZ	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
FEMISE	Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes
FOROMED	Mediterranean Forum
GMP	Global Mediterranean Policy
GNSS	Global Navigation Satellite System
IEEI	Lisbon Institute of International Studies
IVW	Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern
MEDAC	Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies
MEDSTAT	Mediterranean countries
MEEP	Middle East Peace Process
MMPOL	Mediterranean Policy
MMR	Mediterranean region
MNC	Mediterranean non member countries
MU	Mediterranean Union

NATP	New Approaches Regarding Telecommunication Policy among Mediterranean Partners
NZZ	Neue Zürcher Zeitung
OI	Own Illustration
PJCCM	Police and Juridical Cooperation in Criminal Matters
RELEX	Directorate for External Relations
SEA	Single European Act
SMAP	Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme
SME	Small and Medium-sized enterprises
SN	Salzburger Nachrichten
SZ	Süddeutsche Zeitung
TAZ	Tageszeitung
WP	Workingpaper

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INTRODUCTION

"Ziel und Zweck der engeren ökonomischen Bande besteht aus EU Sicht darin, im südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeerraum den Wohlstand zu mehren und damit dort letztlich eine Zone politischer Stabilität und regionaler Integration zu erreichen. Es dürften mit anderen Worten – abgesehen von den wirtschaftlichen Interessen – eher sicherheitspolitische Motive für die ambitiöser gewordene EU-Mittelmeerpolitik maßgebend gewesen sein."[1]

~

The European Union currently constitutes the most sustainable peace project on the European continent. The countries of the Union (today twenty-seven) have coexisted in peace for more than sixty years. A glance at the history of Europe proves that this is all but a matter of course. Romano Prodi commented this joyful situation as follows: "The European Union can be seen in many ways. But to me it is one thing above all others: the fostering and flourishing of peace. We should never forget that the basic reason for the European integration process – and the European Union – is peace"[2]

The European ambitions are innumerable and great. In the Mediterranean, Europe wants to demonstrate political foresight and to establish a new form of relations across the entire region, thus to break new grounds in history. The preliminary motivation therefore is based on security concerns. It is the aim of the present work to examine this thematic field within the limits of a historic scope. As the thematic context suggests, the focus is not on renarrating the chronological or developmental steps of the European Mediterranean Policy, describing the innumerable programs and projects that have been persecuted within this policy frame, analysing the socio-economic determinates in-depth and emphasising the political positions regarding the Middle East Peace Process; it is rather aspired to scrutinize the European position in the context of the Mediterranean Affairs. What does the European discourse reveal according to its establishment, implementation and, in the cross-check, its perception? And what does that reveal about the European Union?

What is the European Union?

Each attempt to define the European Union, to stress its conceptual or cultural significance, inevitably leads to mazes of possible interpretations, because all arising questions finally result in one simple, essential question: what is the European Union? In regard to the foreign policy, the conception of the European Union is crucial concerning its conceivability. Two important aspects can be distinguished in this context: the definitional difficulty which threatens the credibility of each policy approach and the, despite of the inherent struggle, existing point of attraction for other countries.

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1 GEMPERLE, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

2 Romano PRODI, Europe and peace (University of Ulster 1st April 2004), 2. Available online: www.ulster.ac.uk/news/prodi-magee-visit.pdf (26.09.2008).

First, based on the **terminological conception** which is suggested by the denomination "union", several possibilities of interpretation appear, which indicate the internal and external difficulties to conceive the European Union as a whole. The term "union" might suggest on the one hand a "confederation of states" or an "institutionalised negotiation system", which implies the conceivability of an entity; on the other hand, it can be attributed a process-related character when referring to "intergovernmentalism" or to a European "project"; another interpretation of the European Union perceives it as a community of values and peace, which is based upon definite social, religious or economic philosophies. The self-determined denomination of the European Union is, despite all definitional struggles, a term that can easy be handled and inheres, from a psychological point of view, a possible emotive quality which can possibly lead to the evolvement of a European identity.[3] All of the outlined perceptions might be applicable to the conceivability of the European Union, depending on the ambit it is stressed for. However, it is assured that the definitional struggle is perceived internally rather than externally. In respect of the foreign policy, the discrepancy between what the European Union aspires to represent and how it is actually perceived is crucial in terms of credibility and sustainability of its policy.

The second issue concerns **the attraction of the European Union** as a contractual and cooperation partner. According to Mark Leonard, the continuous attraction of the European Union is based on the fact that it represents the *most exclusive club ever*[4]. He argues that its norms and guidelines dispose of a standard, which has not been reached so far; that its system of rules, which are both stringent and well-thought, has also a great appeal abroad and contributes to the definition of international standards. Concerning the foreign policy he further states that if a hegemonial power offers benefits for changing its attitude, this approach is normally regarded as imperial, but if a club calls on certain countries to act according to the same rules like the other members, this is considered to be part of the loyalty of principles. Leonard believes that the latter is what makes the European Union irresistible; Europe possesses the power to change systems, because it benefits reformers and rejects privileges to those, who are not willing to alter.[5] This attraction and the convenient interpretation of the European approach might indeed be perceived as a chance to consolidate the European thought, also as far as the foreign policy is concerned because the countries dealing with the European Union might search for the European intention. However, is this approach less imperialistic indeed or did it just change its facade?

The European Union and the Mediterranean: part and neighbour?

Since the treaties of Rome in 1957, the European Union has steadily grown regarding activities, members and institutions. Therefore, the structure, which the Union is based on, is immense, similar to the

3 Comp. Wolfgang SCHMALE, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität (Stuttgart 2008), 132f.
4 Mark LEONARD, Warum Europa die Zukunft gehört (München 2006), 74.
5 Comp. Ibid. 74f.

internal and external challenges it has to face. The Mediterranean has continuously advanced to a challenge for the European Union. What actually is the Mediterranean?

A simple answer, which contains the essence of the European necessity of a consistent policy in the Mediterranean, is stressed by Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Janning, stating that the *Mediterranean is at the same time part and neighbour of Europe*[6]. This statement comprises a lot of what the European Union has to deal with when turning its interests towards the Mediterranean. On the one hand, it implies that member countries of the European Union border the Mediterranean, which per definition is not yet significant. It only becomes an important issue at the moment when these countries have strong socio-economical or even cultural bonds in the Mediterranean ambit and therefore pursue individual interests. This implies that within the European Union certain interests of the member countries must find consideration in the EU policy. On the other hand, the Mediterranean belongs to the European neighbourhood, which suggests an ambit that is near but not inherent. According to this, there exists a predefined border which separates Europe from its neighbours. Hence, there is a frontier issue and at the same time a requirement of establishing rules of coexistence. Both aspects converge to the necessity of defining a policy which covers the interests of the European Mediterranean member countries and of those that do not belong to the European Union. How does the European Union respond to this necessity?

Beside all the developmental steps of the European Foreign Policy, the European approach in the Mediterranean started with the treaties of Rome in 1957. Due to the preferential treatment of the French protectorates, Morocco and Tunis, the European Union[7] was obliged to include a "Mediterranean perspective" from the very beginning of its existence, especially as the preferential treating fomented feelings of discrimination among the other Mediterranean countries. This led to the conclusion of several association agreements. By 1972, the European Union had obtained a dense network of commercial relations across the Mediterranean but still lacked a coherent conception. Within the framework of the "Global Mediterranean Policy" (GMP) it was the aim to implement the creation of a Mediterranean free-trade area for industrial goods, an easing of custom restrictions for agrarian products within the preferential system and a closer cooperation in financial, technical and social matters[8]. The reception of this approach was remarkable, but the policy reached its economic limits with the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 and its political limits due to the dual alignment and the interference on the

6 Werner WEIDENFELD, Josef JANNING, Herausforderung Mittelmeer – die europäische Antwort. In: Werner WEIDENFELD (Hg.), Herausforderung Mittelmeer: Aufgaben, Ziele und Strategien europäischer Politik. Vorträge, Debatten und Dokumente der internationalen Konferenz in Barcelona 7.-8. Oktober 1991 (Eine Veröffentlichung der Bertelsmann Stiftung innerhalb der Reihe „Strategien und Optionen für die Zukunft Europas", Gütersloh 1992), 34-68, 35.

7 The reference to the European Union at this point is synonymously used for all the denominations which the "European Project" has passed through in its earlier stages.

8 Babak KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, Nordafrika und die EU im 21. Jahrhundert. Die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit (Wiesbaden 2004), 9.

part of the European Commission and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which resulted to be counterproductive.[9] Until 1995, several further attempts of establishing a coherent Mediterranean Policy were undertaken. The increasing intents of evolving a consistent policy were due to the arising necessity because between 1981 and 1986 three decisive Mediterranean countries (GR,E, P) became members of the European Union, which caused a significant loss of export volume to the MNC; neither the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the New Mediterranean Policy (NMP), nor the initiatives launched by the member countries, like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) and 5+5, constituted promising policy frames. In November 1995, the Barcelona Process, synonymously denominated as Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, was initiated. For the first time, the European member countries, at that time the EU-15, and eleven Mediterranean non-member countries signed a declaration which marked the starting point of a new dimension of cooperation. The novelty and diplomatic achievement of the Barcelona Process is the combination of a bilateral and a multilateral dimension. The cooperation areas are defined in three baskets: a) political and security dialogue to achieve a common area of peace and stability, based on respect for human rights and democracy; b) economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area to create a zone of shared prosperity and to support an economic transition in the partner states; c) social, cultural and human partnership to encourage the understanding between peoples and cultures and the exchanges between civil societies.[10] This ambitious approach was launched in 1995; since then, the Barcelona Process has been seriously criticised and has even been considered as a failure. Nevertheless, the importance and urgency of a European Mediterranean Policy remains unbroken and was politically confirmed with the successful manifestation of the commitment of forty-three European and Mediterranean countries at the Paris Summit in 2008. At the Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles in November 2008 it was decided to rename the Barcelona Process as Union for the Mediterranean.[11]

The European Mediterranean Policy constitutes the main bridge across the Mediterranean and disposes of a strong unifying claim. How can this approach be classified?

The historical interlacing between Europe and the Mediterranean

The apparent historical interlacing between Europe and the Mediterranean refers to colonial times. Three basic assumptions legitimate the application of this historical scope to the contemporary situation: the novelty character of the European approach, the notable European predominance within the

9 Anette JÜNEMANN, Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und politischen Wandel: Interessen und Zielkonflikte. In: Wulfdiether ZIPPEL (Hrsg.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU (Baden-Baden 1999), 29-64, 40.

10 Comp. the description of all three baskets www.euromedinfo.eu (23.09.2008)

11 „Ministers propose that as from Marseille the 'Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean' should be called 'Union for the Mediterranean'" Comp. Council of the European Union, Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Ministerial Conference. Final declaration. (Marseilles, 3-4 November 2008), 3. Available online: http://consilium.europea.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/misc/103733.pdf (21.11.2008)

policy frame and the inherent region-building character. In the context of an evident unequal partnership, despite mutual interests in the region and the one-sided imposition of reforms, the main research aim alludes to the question if the Barcelona Process is a result of postcolonial politics. This, at least to some extent, provocative question targets at assessing the European attempt to establish new diplomatic relations with countries which were formally dependent on European states. Is it possible to establish such a 'partnership', detached from old roles and attitudes?

In his book "Geschichte Europas", Wolfgang Schmale refers to five distinctive symbolic sceneries of appropriation of land and the claim for power in the non-European world: to Christopher Columbus, who set the banner of the Catholic Monarchs on the earth of the reached island, the Bahamas; to the Portuguese, who legitimated their appropriation of the land in Brasilia by means of astrologic calculations; to Sir Henry Gilbert, who delivered earth and a stick from St. John's Harbor, Newfoundland; to the French, who held a procession on the island Maragnan, on the Brazilian coast, with the result that the Indians set the French flag and declared their land to be French property; and to the Dutch Cornelius Hendrickson, who elaborated a first descriptive geographical map of the discovered land in 1616.[12] Is it possible to transport this kind of approach to the 20th/21st century, the contextual setting of the Barcelona Process? What would be the symbolic reference in case of an appropriation in the broadest sense?

The source corpus for the analysis and the structural outline

Based on the assumption that language has become a primary medium of social control and power in the 20th/ 21st century[13], the present work aims to stress possible colonial remains in the European Mediterranean Policy discourse. Three kinds of sources have been identified, which aspire to cover the establishment, implementation and reception of the European discourse:

a) **documents** assigned to the European Commission and the European Council
b) **speeches** of representative of the European Commission and the European Council
c) **articles** of mayor opinion-forming newspapers of Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland

In order to provide the greatest possible comparability of the results of the discourse analysis, all sources are stressed under the premise of the same analytical categories (chapter VIII).

The present work is basically divided into four parts: introduction, theoretical part, empirical analysis and conclusion. The theoretical frame (chapter I-VIII) forms the thematic introduction on the topic and emphasises both, the development of the hypothesis and the methodological procedure. The heart of the work constitutes the empirical analysis (chapter IX-XXII). Based on the three distinctive types of sources, it is the aim to assess the establishment, implementation and perception of the European dis-

12 Comp. Wolfgang SCHMALE, Geschichte Europas (Wien 2001), 209.
13 Norman FAIRCLOUGH, Language and power (London 1998), 3.

course in regard to the Mediterranean Affairs. In consideration of the introductory outlined research question, the results will be summarised and interpreted at the end of the work. A special concern will be paid to answering the question whether the Barcelona Process is a result of postcolonial politics or not.

THEORETICAL FRAME

The introductive remarks on the theoretical frame form the contextual setting of the present work. Putting the Barcelona Process in a historical context means to give a temporal guideline, an overview on the conceptual categorization and an assumption concerning the actual role of the European policy in the Mediterranean. The linkage between content and research aim constitutes the claim of a substantial thematic examination. By phrasing the hypothesis and definitional concretions regarding the operational terminology in reference with indications of the research interest, general information on the scientific placement of the thesis is provided. Annotations on the methodological background and the characterization of the consulted sources explain the particular procedure of the analysis.

THEMATIC INTRODUCTION: THE BARCELONA PROCESS

Introductive remarks on the Mediterranean and its historical and contemporary dimension mark the beginning of this chapter. In its nature and its background root the reasons for the current European policy in the Mediterranean. The outline of the Mediterranean policy, from the treaties of Rome 1957 to the Conference of Barcelona, explains the preliminary steps and decisions which resulted in the Declaration of Barcelona in 1995. This date marked the beginning of a new form of diplomatic relations over the Mediterranean. At the same time the paradigm of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership was established. Discussing this denomination, specifying the Barcelona Process within the European neighbourhood policy and giving an outlook on the strengths and weaknesses of the European policy form the conclusion of this thematic introduction.

I THE MEDITERRANEAN

The denomination, which most likely describes what can be imagined by discussing the Mediterranean, is “richness in all respects”. The consequence of an approach on the singularity of this geographical region, which encompasses thousands of years of history, an unbelievable dimension of culture and uncountable developments either in a technical, economical, political or social sense, always lacks completeness. To give an idea on the complexity of the chosen study field, I shall recall the words of Fernand Braudel who concluded that the Mediterranean is a thousand things at the same time.[14]

The focus of my introductive approach is on the interaction between commerce and politics in a historical perspective. A connection between this historical references and the present hypothesis seems

14 Comp. Fernand BRAUDEL (Hg.), Georges DUBY, Maurice AYMARD, Die Welt des Mittelmeers. Zur Geschichte und Geographie kultureller Lebensformen (Frankfurt am Main 1987), 7.

to be constructive at this point because socioeconomic aspects appear to be among the driving motors for European Mediterranean politics. The information provided in this chapter is based on my diploma thesis[15]. Therefore, the temporal setting of an exemplary extract of the abundance of historical events in the Mediterranean takes place with the advent of modern times, in the 15th and 16th century.

1 Linkage between politics and economy exemplified on the cross over to the modern times

According to the premises of technical advancements, people living along the Mediterranean coast early set sail in order to improve or guarantee sources for subsistence. Although the main focus of the happenings in the Mediterranean relate to socio-economic phenomena, from the very beginning intercultural contacts enriched the Mediterranean life; it is thus no coincidence that we characterize the Mediterranean as an intercultural bridge and the cultural cradle of the three main philosophies (Christian, Islamic and Jewish). Throughout many centuries merchants were the bearer of maintaining subsidence and affected the intercultural exchange. The development and the extension of commerce were followed by the establishment of regular transport routes. A series of predominant positions of merchants can be highlighted in the Mediterranean; exemplary is the domination of the Roman Empire, followed by a period of Arab and Byzantine merchants dominating the Mediterranean. Then the Italian sea republics Pisa, Genoa, Venice and Amalfi formed a strong group of merchants and introduced centuries of commercial predominance of Italian merchants until the significance of other trading nations was enhanced due to technological advances and the Atlantic expansion. The hard-fought competitions among the Italian sea republics exemplarily demonstrate the strong linkage between politics and economy, especially considering the cases of Genoa and Venice.

From the initially four competing sea powers only two should remain at the beginning of the 14th century: the Normans took over the rule of Amalfi already in 1131, which implicated severe consequences for the Amalfian fleet, being decisively defeated by the Pisans in 1137. Pisa, on the other hand, always had a strong rival in Genoa due to the geographical nearness. Genoa took advantage of the political and economical weakness of Pisa and destroyed the Pisan fleet in 1284. Although the Pisan merchants remained important in the regional commerce, they never managed to recover their interregional significance.[16] The Genoese, for their concerns, were seriously weakened by their defeat at Chiogga (1376-81) by the Venetians. Unlike the Amalfian and Pisan merchants, the Genoese merchants, who until then had held a strong position in the Eastern Mediterranean and Orient commerce, performed an exemplary shift of interests. They adjusted their commercial activity and assortment to their ship ca-

15 Stefanie STEINBICHLER, Die Genuesen in Spanien 1450-1550 (ungedr. Geisteswiss. Dipl. Wien 2005), 28-41.

16 John MORRISSEY, Die italienischen Seerepubliken. In: Peter FELDBAUER, Gottfried LIEDL, John MORRISEY (Hrsg.), Mediterraner Kolonialismus. Expansion und Kulturaustausch im Mittelalter (Essen 2005), 111-131, here 112-119.

pacity[17] and turned their main interest towards Northern Europe. With an increasing focus on the trade with mass products and a significant higher shipping capacity than its rival Venice[18], Genoa managed to position itself strategically better than any other Mediterranean sea power in the early modern world. Thanks to the outstanding refinement of the Genoese merchants and financiers, they took the lead in the European and, in consequence, in the world economy. Thus, the period between 1550 and 1650 is often referred to as the "century of the Genoese".[19]

A plea on the outstanding flexibility, the keen sense for the developments of their times and the ability to react to changing conditions, which is characteristic for the Mediterranean merchants, can be extended in any order. The given example indicates that the Mediterranean region was not only involved in significant developments on the European continent, especially as the outreach of the Italian merchants, who dominated the Mediterranean to the Northern shores of Europe, benefited the economical and cultural prosperity substantially. It was also the origin of many attributes, which were necessary to support these developments, like ships with an outstanding loading capacity, advanced financial know-how and a highly developed network all over the known places.

The impact of political developments on the conditions of commerce is illustrated by the example that after roughly thirty years beneath French rule, the town Genoa committed itself to an alliance with Spain. This decision, which is controversially debated in literature, is to an important degree linked to the personage of Andrea Doria (1468-1560). Militarily well-trained, he served not only the pope, but also during a long period the French King Francis I., always with the conviction to act in the interest of his home town.[20] It is a fact that in 1528 Andrea Doria conquered Genoa with his troops and formed an alliance with Charles V. of Spain. While Enrique Otte explains this transition with economical considerations and that this happening only constituted a political consequence[21], Arturo Pacini states that it is important to consider the profound institutional crisis of the town Genoa, which was due to the multitude of social and political crises.[22]

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17 With masts over 45 meters and an extraordinary capacity Jacques Heers states that the Genoese possessed the most imposing ships of that time. Comp.: Jacques HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle: civilisation méditerranéenne, grand capitalisme et capitalisme populaire (Paris 1971), 206; Richard Unger states more precisely: "In the middle of the fifteenth century, Genoese carracks of 500 tons, with an over-all length of almost 40 meters and a breadth of slightly over ten metres, were making direct voyages from the eastern Mediterranean to the north ports. There were larger carracks too, reaching 1000 to 1400 tons." Richard UNGER, The ship in the Medieval Economy 600-1600 (London 1980), 221.

18 "Les grosses galées vénitiennes ne portent au maximum que 200 à 300 tonnes, contre 700 et parfois 1000 tonnes pour ces 'navi''. HEERES, Gênes, 209.

19 Fernand BRAUDEL, Modell Italien 1450-1650, (Berlin 2003), 14.

20 Enciclopedia universal ilustrada Europea-Americana, (Tomo XVIII, Madrid 1980), 2017-2025.

21 "Il decisivo cambiamento di fronte di Genova nel 1528 fue solo la consequenza politica di una decisione economica presa già all'inizio degli anni venti." Enrique OTTE, Il ruolo dei Genovesi nella Spagna del XV e XVI secolo. In: La repubblica internazionale del denaro tra XV e XVII secolo. A cura di Aldo De Maddalena e Hermann Kellenbenz, Annali dell'Instituto storico italo-germano, Quaderno 20 (Bologna 1986), 17-121, 33.

22 Pacini refers to Aenas Silvius Piccolomini as contemporary witness in the past for the instability in Genoa and cites that the social and political conflicts are an "unsustainable threat to the very existence of the Genoese state with the beginning of the struggle between France and Spain for the hegemony in the peninsula." Arturo PACINI, La Genova di Andrea Doria nell'Imperio di Carlo V.(Firenze 1999), 168.

In fact, both France and Spain had deep-rooted relations to Genoa and both constituted an attractive alliance partner. Due to its strategic favourable position, great financial resources, a highly developed information system and the capacity to build and charge ships, Genoa was of inestimable value for both powers, French and Spain, which struggled for the hegemony in Italy and Europe. The decision why Genoa formed an alliance with Spain is not mono causally explainable, but two mayor reasons can be extracted. Firstly, France already had a predominant position over Genoa via Milan, but internal struggles in Genoa concerning how to retain autonomy and stay political well positioned increasingly led to conflicts about this dominant position. Hence, the atmosphere was tense. Secondly, the personage of Andrea Doria played a crucial role. Although his intentions are not totally clear nowadays, Vincente de Cadenas assumes that the disregarded personal concessions of France disappointed Doria. In addition, Cadenas is convinced that Doria acted with the personal conviction to do the best for his patria.[23] Either way, Andrea Doria had already negotiated the alliance with Spain before he took Genoa and ejected the French. The new political constellation was based on the treaty which guarantees "loyality for protection, the loyality of Genoa towards the Imperial alliance in the greatest struggle with France, protection and safeguard of the city's freedom on Charles V's side. And the guarantee of loyalty of Genoa's key sectors of its economy: ships and credit."[24] These decisive developments supported the strengthening of the Spanish hegemony, not only in the Mediterranean, but also in Europe. For the merchants outside Genoa the new alliance with Spain also happened to be advantageous; the Genoese merchants consolidated their predominant position in Spain at the beginning of the 16th century. Provided with a series of privileges, they not only extended their commercial activities in Seville, which advanced to the turning platform of goods all over the world, but they also managed to get decisively involved in the silver commerce in Europe and became the royal financiers for nearly a century.

These examples explicitly demonstrate the linkage between economy and politics. Obviously, there are innumerable histories to tell, but what can be deduced is quite significant for the base of the present hypothesis. Economic considerations played a central role throughout the Mediterranean history and the reciprocal influence between economy and politics can be traced throughout the centuries. The intensity and dependence varied. On the one hand, the political changeover of power generated a shift of economical interests, which contained an important developmental potential in many aspects. On the other hand, a change of political alliances implied an advantageous support to strengthen the predominant position of the merchants outside the hometown. In the case of the Genoese, Braudel found

23 "En general la mayor parte de los historiadores se inclinan a estimar que el acto de Doria fue natural ante las circunstancias, que si no le obligaban a cambiar su servicio tampoco tenía necesidad de quedar retenido con quien no le proporcionaba satisfacciones debidas, ni siquiera le saldaba las deudas que había contraído para llevarlo a efecto." And: "(...) la volubilidad de los italianos y la invocación que en nombre de su Patria siempre llevó delante Doria al efectuar el cambio. A ello indudablemente se unió la conveniencia personal y, porque no, la perspicacia política (...)" Vincente VICENTE DE CADENAS, El protectorado de Carlos V. en Génova (Madrid 1977),43.

24 PACINI, Genoa, 175.

the right words saying that over time they understood to rule over the richness of Europe and that way over the richness of the world.[25]

Another important aspect can be deduced from these two examples: the actors who are involved in the Mediterranean history act in defence of their own interest. This can be retained for the terrestrial powers as well as for the sea powers and the merchants. Interestingly, the defence of interests comes along with the intension of extending, maintaining or defending power.

2 Colonialism in the Mediterranean

Political and economic interlaces played a crucial role in the relations across the Mediterranean, not only in the cross over to the modern times. Hence, it is not the aim to provide a detailed historical setting of the Euro-Mediterranean relations over the centuries, which would justify a separate examination. At this point, the thematical relevant focus is on the common historic denominator in the European relations with Mediterranean and also African countries; thus, colonialism is in the centre of investigation here.

Colonialism is a crucial element in the Mediterranean history, if one heads out for examples which correspond to specifications on the definition of colonialism of Jürgen Osterhammel. He mentions three conditions which allow the contextualisation of happenings within the colonial definition: First, the relation between the dominator and the domineered targets on the completion of the colonizers' necessities and interests, whereby the consideration of the development of the colonized society lacks a significant meaning and is often negated. Second, cultural foreignness is expressed in hierarchal structures and an acculturation of the colonized is demanded. The third definition refers to colonialism as a matter of consciousness; hence, the domination of other cultures bears the conviction of a cultural superiority.[26] Colonial events can be traced back to the antique world (Greeks and the Romans), to mediaeval or modern times (crusades or sea powers) and to the contemporary history considering all the actors of the period of Imperialism and Second World War. The colonial history can not be classified as a uniform pattern of action, which is continuous over the centuries. The first transcontinental expeditions of the Spanish and Portuguese marked a crucial change and introduced a new dimension of relating with other cultures. Also the expansion of the Northwest-European countries contributed to a shift of power and strategic interests. At the beginning, this happened parallel to the predominant Spanish and Portuguese role overseas, but then finally displaced these predominating powers. Thus, national European conflicts were often transported abroad to the colonies all over the world. By taking a closer look at the European colonial actors in the Mediterranean countries, which contemporarily participate in the Barcelona Process, one identifies France, Italy, Spain and Great Britain as the most decisive colonial powers in these countries. From the 17th century onwards, the rivalry between France

25 BRAUDEL, Modell Italien,14.
26 Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL, Kolonialismus (München 2006), 19-21.

and Great Britain constituted the determining factor of the relations between the European powers, which was reflected in their colonial activities.[27] While both nations were predominantly interested in economic advantages, which consequentially would better the positions in the struggle regarding the demand of hegemony, Great Britain's interest in colonies on the African continent was predominantly due to strategic considerations, namely better access to routes to America and Asia. France, on the other hand, was never willing to accept the Iberian hegemony and aimed for more influence in the world power concert. In the 18th and 19th century Great Britain was the main rival in regard to the colonies abroad. Conflicts concerned, for example, zones of fishery, settlement areas and shares of trade companies. Whenever there was the possibility one nation aimed to harm the influence of the other party; in the end, Great Britain became the main European hegemonial power. France was not able to decide the conflicts in the Americas and India in its favour and lost its bases on Mauritius, la Reunion, and the Seychelles to Great Britain. Towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century there was hardly any space which was not either directly or indirectly dependent on European influences. The European influence in African countries, which later participated in the Barcelona Process, was still apparent in the mid of the 20th century: parts of Morocco formed part of the Spanish protectorate, France maintained its colonial influence in French North Africa (parts of Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) and Egypt was still influenced by Great Britain. The Suez Crisis in 1956 marked the beginning of the end of the European predominant influence because it was one of the last times Great Britain and France tried to assure their strategic interests within the sovereignty of Mediterranean countries with military forces.[28]

In the 70ies, the last colony which belonged to France became independent. Nevertheless, the relations between former colonizers and colonies are politically, socio-culturally and economically significant until nowadays. At this point one could raise the question if colonialism, once started, ever ended? What is sure is that form and intensity of colonialism varied throughout history. Regarding the linkage between the Mediterranean and colonialism, Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou pointed out accurately that all, "the Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek and Persian civilisation and later the Roman Empire, have found their way to the Mediterranean and sought to use it as a means of extending their power- base."[29] The abundance of historical experiences of colonialism and the interest-oriented effort of political powers in the Mediterranean underline the legitimacy of the present undertaking to interrogate the extent of the political shift of interests of the European Union towards the Mediterranean.

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27 According to Reinhard Wendt the British and French power conflicts form the third dimension beside the Iberian expansion and its displacement by the the North-Western European powers. Comp. Reinhard WENDT, Vom Kolonialismus zur Globalisierung. Europa und die Welt seit 1500 (Paderborn 2007), 132.

28 Comp. Ibid, 57-60, 107-113,123-140, 221- 231.

29 Dimitris K. XENAKIS, Dimistris N. CHRYSSOCHOOU, The emerging Euro-Mediterranean System (Manchester 2001), 28.

3 Contemporary challenges in the Mediterranean

From the European point of view, the challenges in the Mediterranean can strikingly be summed up by the populist quote of Nicolas Sarkozy during the French presidential elections. He stated that the South sets the future course of the European Union and that in this concern a new strategy must be found.[30] One can or cannot believe the end time connotation that Sarkozy points out, but the Mediterranean region faces a lot of complex challenges which underline the significance of Mediterranean politics for the European Union.

Firstly, the strong interlacement of Europe and the Mediterranean illustrates the fateful connection and shows the impossibility of an abnegation of the consequences of the developments in this region: [31]

- The Mediterranean region encompasses commercial routes, which are of central meaning for the European Union because there are essential energy sources in this area. Especially Western Europe is still dependent on the oil production of some of the Mediterranean countries.
- While the MNC of the European Union forms the third largest market for the European Union, the EU itself is most important purchaser of products of this region.
- Additionally to the export revenue, the remittance of migrant workers in Europe forms the most important source of foreign currency for the Mediterranean countries. The main profiteer from the purchasing power of the foreign currency is the European Union.
- The demographic growth in the South and the migration pressure heading North in the Mediterranean region has continuously more influence on the socio-cultural stability on the European continent.

Secondly, numerous complex issues stress the difficulty which each kind of foreign policy has to face in the Mediterranean:[32]

- The difference in the standard of living between the North and the South, Europe and the Mediterranean non-member states, is one of the most precarious consequences of the developments in this region. The economical efficiency of the countries of the southern shores is considerably beneath the Western European average. The agricultural harvest does not nourish the local population, the industrialisation is either partly focused on the internal structure or has failed and the dependency on financial and property aid is dominant in all Mediterranean non member states, except the countries with high revenues by means of oil export like Libya.
- The demographic explosion in the southern Mediterranean, especially on the African continent, is opposed by a stagnating demographic development in Europe. This discrepancy is ac-

30 Editorial, (08.02.2007) FAZ.

31 The punctual approach is mainly based on: WEIDENFELD (ed.), Herausforderung Mittelmeer, 35f; Pangagiotis PANOTOPOULOS, Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union, (ungedr. Grund- und Integrationswiss. Dipl. Wien 2000),32; Roberto ALBIONI, Südmediterrane Herausforderungen. Antworten sind gefragt (Internationale Politik 1/1996), 9-14.

32 WEIDENFELD, Herausforderung Mittelmeer,38-51; PANOTOPOULOS, Mittelmeerpolitik, 33-44.

companied by the fact that the lack of a future perspective in their home countries pushes the migration movements towards the North. The demographic prospect, the increasing migration pressure, the illegal immigration and the missing integration plans for those, who entered the European continent, are factors which constitute mayor difficulties. The European Union has to face these concerns nowadays.

- Social tensions and instable governmental structures dominate the domestic political situation in nearly all European neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean. An intensification of these dynamics is provoked by the increasing demographic growth. The severe economical and political frictions burden the development of democratic structures; hence, the low level of constitutional culture contributes to the threat of political instability in the Mediterranean.
- Vaclav Havel, Jacques Delors and Samuel Huntington are all convinced that the most dangerous conflicts are those which affect the break lines between cultures.[33] Encompassing the three main civilising spaces and bearing the roots of the European and Arabic culture, the Mediterranean holds a historic tradition of cultural conflicts. Due to the increasing terrorist threat, the relation between the Christian based culture in Europe and the Islamic based culture in the Arabian countries of the Mediterranean is nowadays more sensitive than ever. It culminated so far in the terrorist attacks of Madrid 2004 and London 2005 and the American invasion in Iraq in 2003.
- Due to the high degree of pollution, the Mediterranean Sea ranks among the most threatened seas of the world. The area suffers from contamination caused by the leakage of oil, industrial and domestic waste and agricultural residua, soil pollution, a loss of soil through erosion and an increasing desertification. The impact of the advancing contamination of the region has severe consequences for both, the already mainly agricultural oriented countries in the Mediterranean and Europe.

Thirdly, subsuming the following conflict potential, which accompanies any Mediterranean policy, the subsequent remarks can be stated:[34]

- Conflicts of dominance: the Gulf War 1990/91, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the continuing struggle with the destabilized country show an apparent conflict of dominance, which further reached the Arabian region.
- Territorial conflicts: due to the lack of a clear demarcation in the Mediterranean, ethnic, political or economic tensions might easily transform into territorial conflicts.

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33 „‘Kulturelle Konflikte‘, hat Vaclav Havel erkannt ‚greifen um sich und sind heute gefährlicher denn je zuvor,‘ und Jacques Delors pflichtet ihm bei: ‚Künftige Konflikte werden sich nicht an den wirtschaftlichen oder ideologischen, sondern an den kulturellen Faktoren entzünden.‘ Die gefährlichsten Konflikte aber sind jene an den Bruchlinien zwischen Kulturen.“ Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, Kampf der Kulturen. Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert (München 1998), 24.

34 WEIDENFELD, Herausforderung Mittelmeer, 48-51.

- Ethnic conflicts: throughout the Mediterranean different ways of life, moral concepts and religious groups are continuously confronted with each other.
- Conflicts concerning raw materials and recourses: the inhomogeneous apportionment of raw materials is among the specific causes for crisis and wars in the Mediterranean region.

II THE EUROPEAN MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

Facing these challenges, the importance of a stable and constructive policy seems evident. In the following chapters the current policy will be contextualized in order to provide the thematic background for the present work.

1 Determining factors for a coherent Mediterranean Policy

The Barcelona Process did not rise like a phoenix or, as Carlo Masala said, out of a "tabula rasa."[35] It is linked to a series of European attempts of dealing with Mediterranean affairs, which started with the treaties of Rome in 1957.

The determining factors which facilitated the development of a coherent multilateral policy in the Mediterranean have been broadly discussed, mainly by political scientists.[36] Hence, it is not surprising that the main arguments focus on the state and change of the international system, the European integration process, the national interests and the political, economical and cultural developments in the southern Mediterranean. From the point of a view of a historian, these aspects, which need to find consideration here, can be amplified by a further point which looks on the historical frame as a determining factor. The focus on the historical past refers to the linkage of economical, political and cultural relations and aims to provide an additional comprehension of the boundaries between certain countries and an explanation of a certain positioning of some nations in the European Union.

Consecutively follows an approach on the main determining factors, which facilitated the development of the current European Mediterranean policy. Thereby, the focus is on specifications of the European system because it builds the political frame of the Barcelona Process. Other aspects, like the issue of national interests or socio-economical developments as determining factors, will be briefly outlined at this point, but in conjunction with the broadly designed analysis will be extensively treated further on.

1.1 European Foreign Policy within the international system

Before the exterior developments which influence the positioning of the European politics will find consideration, it is necessary to comment on interior specifications of the European Union within the international system. An exemplary approximation to the evolutionary nature, to the dualism of the European system and to the restricted predominance of the European member states gives information

35 Carlo MASALA, Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft. Geschichte- Struktur- Prozess (Center for European Integration Studies/Discussion Paper C68, Bonn 2000), 4. Available online: www.zei.de.

36 Annette JÜNEMANN, Stephen C. Calleya, Babak KHALATBARI, Carlo MASALA, Christoph BRUNERS, aa.

about the European system, which Jörg Monar constitutes as an exceptional form in the area of international relations.[37]

Firstly, the development of an institutional frame of the European foreign policy explains the nature of the European system. The European foundation treaties of 1951 and 1957, which formed the base of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), did not consider a common authority concerning foreign affairs. The first plan of a European defence community, which failed to be ratified, was made by the French Prime Minister René Pleven in 1952. The first initiative containing concrete steps for the political implementation of a common foreign policy was provided by the Belgian diplomat Etienne Davignon. The so-called "Davignon Report," which was enacted in 1970 in Luxembourg, initiated the development of the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the forerunner cooperation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The main concern in Luxembourg was to initiate a consolidation mechanism in order to establish a common foreign policy. The intergovernmental co-operation should be achieved through meetings of the foreign ministers in periodic intervals and through the establishment of a political committee. Some of the regulations defined in Luxembourg still form an essential part of the current foreign policy as, for example, the principal of intergovernmental organisation.[38] The advancements of the regulations of Luxembourg are based upon the Reports of Copenhagen 1973 and London 1981, both acting on the aim to strengthen the EPC. A formal consolidation of the EPC followed within the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, where the so far three European treaties (ECSC, EAEC and EEC) were adopted and the co-operation in foreign policy matters was contractually assigned. By means of the SEA, the European foreign policy contained important improvements, from a concerted European foreign policy with the EPC towards a coordinated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was established with the treaty of the European Union in Maastricht in 1992.[39] The evolutionary nature of the system of the European Union roots in the interaction between "common" external economic relations and an intergovernmental co-operation in foreign policy.[40]

Considering the achievement in the development to give the economical based European Union a consolidated common voice in foreign affairs indicated a system based on a certain dualism. Generally, there are two different levels of dualism: the relation with non member states and the decision-making process. In all kind of negotiations with European non member states the European Union is represented by the European Commission, but in all affairs concerning the CFSP the member state, which holds the current presidency, represents the European Union and is responsible for common decisions.[41] This entails a communication effort between the Commission and the presidency of the CFSP,

37 Jörg MONAR, Die interne Dimension der Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union: Institutionelle und verfahrensmäßige Probleme. In: Wulfdiether ZIPPEL (Hrsg.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU (Baden-Baden 1999), 65-90, 66.

38 Comp. Ibid. 230-247.

39 MONAR, interne Dimension, 68.

40 Ibid. 68f and PFRETSCH, Europäische Union, 244.

41 Frank PFETSCH, Die Europäische Union (München 2005), 232.

which is not only costly in terms of labour and time, but also confusing, as European non member states often confer with different European representatives concerning the same negotiation. Regarding the decision-making process, the mentioned dualism refers to the different competences between the European Commission and the CFSP. The European decision-making process is generally based on two methodological proceedings: the community and the intergovernmental method. The community method, meaning the institutional operation mode, is set up in the first pillar of the European Union and encompasses the following features: Commission monopoly of the right of initiative, widespread use of qualified majority voting in the Council, an active role of the European Parliament and a uniform interpretation of Community law by the Court of Justice.[42] In contrast, the intergovernmental method of operation is set up in the second and third pillars, proceeds from an intergovernmental logic of cooperation and has the following salient features: the Commission's right of initiative is shared with the member states or confined to specific areas of activity, the Council generally acts unanimously, the European Parliament has a purely consultative role and the Court of Justice plays only a minor role.[43] The Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is regulated in the second pillar, mainly follows the intergovernmental method, while the European Commission, defending the European Union's interests as a whole, sets its standards primarily within the community method. The outcome of this is that the European Commission not only negotiates with non member states, but has to consider the positions and divergences of interests of all European member states simultaneously.[44]
This leads to the third specification of the European system, the restricted predominance of the European member states. Formally, all foreign affairs concern the four mayor organs of the European Union: the European Council, the (Ministerial) Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament. However, the primary decision-making competence is hold by the member states, which are represented in the European Council and in the Ministerial Council, respectively. While the member states dispose in the CFSP of a considerable free space for separate national actions, of an unlimited right of initiation and of a consensus bounded veto right, their action field in the Community is rather restricted because their decision power is based on the recommendation of the European Commission. Another restrictive factor, which has to be considered, is the strength of the political and economical relations among the member states. Weighing the costs of national unilateral approaches or blockade politics mostly favours the disposition of compromises.[45]

Focussing on the exterior influences of the European Unions' positioning makes it necessary to provide beforehand a theoretical approach on the constants of the international system, in which the Mediterranean is imbedded.

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42 www.europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/foreign_security_policy_en.htm (4.08.2008).
43 Ibid.
44 MONAR, interne Dimension, 73.
45 Ibid. 69.

Babak Khalatbari locates the interfering constants in the Mediterranean within the theory of realism, neorealism, liberalism and institutionalism.[46] The mechanisms of the international system, following the theory of realism and neorealism, emerge from an anarchical world perspective which supposes the dominance of the states. Hence, competitiveness forms the main characteristic of the international system. Beside the special awareness of potential national security threats, the legitimacy of maintenance and the expansion of existence are the driving motors of the competing states.[47] John Herz explains this mechanism with the reciprocal fear and distrust, which aliments an inherent sentiment of uncertainty. Therefore, it is the principal aim to constantly gain more power in order to prevent security threats.[48] This often criticized world view and interpretation of international politics as surviving assurance counters the voluntary association of cooperating states, which act on agreed principals, norms, rules and procedures; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) serve as examples here.[49] The theory of liberalism emanates from a three-world model that defines classifications and belongings and supposes strong relations between the domestic political order and the foreign policy where democracy is the ruling maxim. The central argument of the theory of institutionalism states that peace-keeping can be granted via institutionalized forms of cooperation and conflict settlements between nations. In contrast to the theory of neo-/realism, institutionalism considers the possibility of cooperation of egoistical actors.[50] These three theories, selected by Babak Khalatbari in order to provide a theoretical frame for the Mediterranean policy, should be extended by the theory of interdependence. The world view of reciprocal interdependence, meaning that a decision or happening in one state can consecutively affect another state, emanates from the assumptions that states are neither cohesive entities nor single actors in worlds politics, that military power obtains a subordinated significance as a political instrument and that there is no purported hierarchy in the ranking of goals in international politics.[51]

On the basis of this brief description of relevant mechanisms affecting the Mediterranean policy, theoretically superordinated aspects derive, which find consideration in the present work:

- Although the mechanism of surviving assurance is strongly debated within the political theory of realism and neorealism and debilitated by the fact of voluntary associations of nations, it ought to be considered that a supranational formation as the European Union might overtake characteristics and maintenance mechanisms over the years, which are appropriate to a single

46 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 24-28.

47 Comp. Ibid. 25.

48 „...ein aus gegenseitiger Furcht und gegenseitigem Misstrauen geborenes Unsicherheitsgefühl die Einheiten in einem Wettstreit um die Macht dazu [treibt], ihrer Sicherheit halber immer mehr Macht anzuhäufen, ein Streben das unerfüllbar bleibt, weil sich vollkommene Sicherheit nie erreichen lässt.“ John HERZ, Weltpolitik im Atomzeitalter (Stuttgart 1961), 130f.

49 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 26.

50 Ibid. 26-27.

51 Manuela SPINDLER, Interdependenz. In: Siegfried SCHIEDER, Manuela SPINDLER (Hrsg.), Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen (Opladen 2003), 89-117, 89-98.

nation. The positioning and driving motors of the European Union in the Mediterranean will be analysed further on.

- The three world perception will play a mayor role in the discourse analysis as the view of the "other", the so-called partner within the Mediterranean partnership, is a central concern of this work.
- Democracy as a guiding principal of liberal approaches also plays an official argumentative role for the engagement of the European Union in Mediterranean affairs. The extent and reasons behind this position will also be discussed in ensuing chapters.
- The mentioned role of the theory of interdependence shall be generally assessed because it is to expect that significant results can be gained in reference with the socio-economic analysis.

The Cold War was the dominating external factor in the international system until 1989. Although the Mediterranean also happened to be the setting of a bipolar blockade confrontation, there was no absolute dominance of super powers or a related subordination of the Middle East client states. The regional actors rather attempted to benefit from the rivalry of the super powers in order to form possible alliances according to their economical and military interests.[52] The global zero-sum game guaranteed the regional actors political motivated development aids from the competing powers and implied the possibility of playing them off against each other.[53] The regional influence of the European Community during the Cold War was rather moderate. All the more, Europe asserted its power after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989; nevertheless, it was not achieved to displace the USA from its predominant position in the Mediterranean.[54] For the developments in the Mediterranean the year 1989 is a decisive one in a double sense: Firstly, the end of the East-West conflict involved a mayor transformation of the international system concerning the polarity and distribution of power. And secondly, the loss of the external principal order with the end of the Cold War emphasised the local, ethnic and religious conflicts. This generated new conflict structures, which, from a European perspective, were attributed to an increasingly politicised Islam.[55] The question whether the thesis of the substitutive character of the Islam after communism as concept of enemy is classified in its reduction banal[56] or not, is not relevant. Fact is that over the last decades the Islam took over a significant role in the discussion about concepts of enemies. Resentments against the Islam increased notably, especially since the Gulf War in 1991 and the wave of terrorism since 2001.

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52 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 27f.

53 „Das globale Nullsummenspiel garantierte den MDL politisch motivierte Entwicklungshilfe seitens der konkurrierenden Supermächte und erlaubte es ihnen überdies, beide gegebenenfalls auch gegeneinander auszuspielen." JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 35.

54 Comp. Ibid.6; and Majorie LISTER, The European Union and the South. Relations with developing countries (London 1997), 70.

55 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 32.

56 JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpoltik, 35f.

1.2 European integration process

From the point of view of a political scientist, Annette Jünemann states that each integration process inevitably enforces the sentiment of exclusion and defines this as a basic mechanism which also influences the developments in the Mediterranean policy. Although it is possible to qualify this effect by means of adapting and shaping the foreign policy, it can not be totally distinguished.[57] Hence, the developments of the European integration process affect the relation to the MNC. In this sense, two further mechanisms exemplify this effect. Firstly, any intensification of the European integration process involves that more decision-making authorities are transferred from the national to the supranational level, which in turn implicates that bilateral relations between single EU countries and single MNC become less important. Secondly, the enlargement of the European Union constitutes a significant determining factor for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership: the southern enlargement of the EU in 1986 (Spain and Portugal) had negative consequences for the MNC, especially concerning their trading interests; the northern and eastern enlargements fomented the fear of a marginalisation of the concerns of the MNC.[58]

The development of a common foreign policy, as described beforehand, shows a gradually advancing integration process that directly affects the MNC. Its progress and improvement are vital concerns on both sides of the Mediterranean. The European integration in general is still referred to as a process and its final form has not yet been reached. The integration debate is in theory and practice a very sensitive and prevailing concern of European politics and there are thus many possible interpretations. A common tenor in the debate constitutes the argument that the goal of the European integration process is only vaguely designed.[59] Concerning the European Mediterranean policy, this opinion can also be deduced from literature and the discussion of participants at the Conference "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP): Perspectives from the Mediterranean EU Countries," which took place between the 25th and 27th of October 2007, in Rethimnon, Crete.

1.3 National interests

Despite all endeavours to push the European integration process, the European politics show an increasing conflict with a re-nationalisation tendency, as the recent debate on the ratification of the treaty of Lisbon demonstrates.[60] Additionally, the intergovernmental character of the CFSP supports national ambitions in foreign affairs. Concerning the Barcelona Process, the interests of the southern European countries were predominant from the very beginning. Europe's motivation for the launch of the Barcelona Process was the fear that the decline of North Africa would be a recipe for the rise of Islamist regimes and a major exodus of economic migrants and political refugees to Europe would

57 Ibid. 31.
58 Ibid. 31.
59 PANOTOPOULOS, Mittelmeerpolitik, 29.
60 See further information and the debate which can be deduced from the ratification and endorsement efforts of the European member countries: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (18.8.2008).

take place; on the other hand, the southern Mediterranean member countries were strongly concerned with a more even-handed distribution of European economic support, they feared to be marginalized compared to their eastern or southern neighbours and they aimed to sustain their interests in the Mediterranean region.[61] Especially the concerns of the southern European countries (France, Spain and Italy) root not only in the strong historical and cultural bonds, which go beyond colonial times, but also in the conflict of interests regarding the competition of typical Mediterranean products or in the privileges of fishery in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is therefore shaped by interests of the southern European countries, which are expressed either in a bilateral or multilateral way. Altogether, the image of the European Mediterranean policy appears to be little coherent.[62] This is also explained with the competing interests among the European member states. Thus, France, Spain and Italy struggle among each other and with the European Commission for a leading role in Mediterranean affairs. Additionally, it must be considered that the former practice of political task sharing - Germany being occupied with eastern and central European affairs and France being concerned with the Mediterranean as a national zone of influence - has changed. Both countries claim a voice in the affairs which historically belonged to the political environment of the other. The most recent example of such a claim was raised by Germany, namely when Nicolas Sarkozy tried to debar non-Mediterranean European countries from Mediterranean affairs and attempted to launch the Mediterranean Union just with the countries bordering the Mediterranean. Germany claimed the Mediterranean region to be a European affair and therewith trimmed the aspired consolidation of the French national power in the Mediterranean.

1.4 Economical, political and social developments in the southern Mediterranean

The impossibility to comprise the whole Mediterranean region regarding its economical, political and cultural development roots first of all in the heterogeneity of the countries which are referred to in this thematic approach.[63]

The socio-economic developments of the referred region will be discussed and analysed in detail further on. For the present concern it is important to state that the socio-economic disparities are among the main concerns of the Mediterranean affairs and involve both sides of the Mediterranean decisively. Politically, the Barcelona Process remains a unique initiative to face the challenges in the Mediterranean. Hence, difficult regional conflicts like the Middle East conflict are among the determining factors which designate success and failure of the Euro-Mediterranean relations.[64] Culturally, religious and ethnic conflicts are complex and often grave, as there are signs of a radicalisation of the ruling regime in some countries. The democratization level is one of the most sensitive cultural and therefore

61 GILLESPIE, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 1.
62 JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 32.
63 "Ein Versuch, die Mittelmeerregion analog zur EG/EU zu analysieren, muss schon an der Heterogenität dieser Region scheitern." JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 33.
64 Ibid. 33.

political aspects and hardly one MNC fulfils the democratic standard which is presupposed by the EU. One of the official aims of the Barcelona Process is to encourage the MNC to an advancing democratization process. It is a fact that the same political base of operation is advantageous for the implementation of commonly agreed goals, but it is doubtable whether the democratization claim of the European Union in the Mediterranean region is among the primary preferences for the initiation of the Barcelona Process.

From an analytical point of view, economic, political and cultural developments appear in different levels and paces. Socio-economic and cultural developments are long term developments, while political developments tend to be short term developments. Long term developments are historically more significant, but, nevertheless, it remains highly interesting to embed short term developments in long term perspectives in order to analyse the decision-making scope of a certain moment in history.

1.5 Historical relations over the Mediterranean

In ancient times, the maritime trading culture facilitated relations across the Mediterranean; over the centuries the different continents were connected, especially by merchants, who cultivated the cultural transfer. The Mediterranean accommodated civilisations, which aspired to extend their power base, already very early. The Greeks, Romans and Arabs built empires of distinctive characters, sizes, significance and persistency, which strode country, regional and even continental boundaries. The appropriation of the Mediterranean Sea dates back to these times. In the later medieval and in modern times, maritime powers utilized the Mediterranean as crossroads for economic relations or for the implementation of ideological convictions in order to expand their influences. However, the sea itself was to a lesser extent dominated by any single power. This persisted until the times of Imperialism; the sea was not occupied by a single power because too many competed for it in order to take advantages of new conquered towns or regions.

The period from the 19th century until now is thematically the most relevant period to conceive the present relations across the Mediterranean. During these centuries the Mediterranean experienced the imperial and industrial competition of the European great powers, the First and the Second World War and the consolidation phase of the present world order, which was achieved by overcoming the Cold War and the foundation of the European Union. As a regional conception, the Mediterranean unifies a bundle of complex historical experiences, which influenced the cultural developments of the three mayor cultures that are located by the sea. This historical diversity constitutes the background of any contemporary policy and must form the base of any long-term promising policy, as Françoise Duchêne accurately states.[65]

65 Françoise DUCHÊNE, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und der Mittelmeerraum (Europäische Dokumentation 3-4, Luxemburg 1985), 11.

2 Chronological development of political initiatives in the Mediterranean

With the treaty of Rome in 1957 started a new period of international relations between Europe and its neighbour countries. Therefore, the year 1957 marks the beginning of a way which culminated in the Barcelona Process in 1995. The nearly forty years of the development of a coherent Mediterranean policy are marked by several phases and initiatives. These developments serve as an important background for the intended analysis and will thus be described in detail. Main elements of the Barcelona Process were politically considered much earlier than in 1995.

2.1 Bilateral association agreements 1957-1972

The former French protectorates, Morocco and Tunis, automatically received preferential commercial conventions with the new founded European Economic Community in 1957. Their exceptional relations to the EEC were designated in the additional protocols within the treaty of Rome[66]; Algeria was not mentioned separately as it still belonged to the foreign department of France.[67] The consequence of this historically based reason for the preferential treatment of the former French colonies was an arising discrimination claim of the other Mediterranean countries, especially of the Southern European Mediterranean Countries (SEMC). In order to prevent an economic and political marginalisation of the other Mediterranean countries, the EEC granted numerous association agreements. These conventions are, from the point of view of a political scientist, critically classified because they assume that many of them were based on political short-term considerations. Consequently, this led to new claims due to unequally distributed vantages.[68]

Although the EEC obtained a dense network of commercial relations across the Mediterranean, the political approach appeared in its characteristics to be rather a "Stückwerk- Politik"[69] or a "politisches Flickwerk"[70] than a coherent policy.

2.2 Global Mediterranean Policy 1972

Encouraged from a continuous economic growth and the global relaxation process, the European Community had the possibility to design 'unconventional concepts'[71] regarding their foreign policy.

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66 See additional protocols: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/de/treaties/dat/11957E/tif/11957E.html (27.02.2009).

67 "In dem Bewusstsein, dass die Bestimmungen dieses Vertrags über Algerien und die überseeischen Departments der Französischen Republik das Problem aufwerfen, welche Regelung hinsichtlich Algerien und dieser Departments für die Waren zu treffen ist, die Gegenstand des Vertrags der Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl sind, in dem Wunsch, eine geeignete Lösung im Einklang mit den Grundsätzen der beiden Verträge zu finden, werden diese Frage im Geiste gegenseitiger Zusammenarbeit so bald wie möglich, spätestens jedoch bei der ersten Veränderung des Vertrags der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, regeln." Comp. Treaty of Rome: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/de/treaties/dat/11957E/tif/TRAITES_1957_CEE_1_XM_0946_x1919x.pdf (27.02.2009).

68 JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 37; KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 7; MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 6.

69 Detlef PUHL, Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EG. Strukturschwächen des EG-Systems bei der Verwirklichung des Globalkonzepts (Kehl am Rhein 1982), XI.

70 JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 38.

71 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten,8.

The growing political weight increased the necessity of an individual profile in foreign affairs, which was not only based on economic motivated conventions, but additionally guided by shared political interests.[72]

According to Carlo Masala, the main impulse of a coherent concept regarding the policy towards the MNC came from outside; the North African states demanded a coherent policy for compensation to the domestic policy.[73] Internally, the EC, who needed to extent the existing cooperation agreements to the new member states (Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark), replied on the external demands with the development of a new policy approach regarding the Mediterranean affairs. Federica Bicchi ascribes the internal driving motor of this new policy direction to France, which apparently received a hint by the Netherlands and suggested a "full-fledged approach envisaging a free trade area between the EEC and all the Mediterranean countries."[74] The proposal of "une approche globale avec un orientation commune" as an idea of a developmental approach was supported by parts of the Commission and the European Parliament.[75] On this base, the EEC presented a proposal in order to reform the current conventions with the MNC within the scope of a 'Global Mediterranean Policy' (GMP).
The developed proposal, confirmed in Paris in 1972, encompassed three mayor areas: the creation of a Mediterranean free-trade area for industrial goods, an easing of custom restrictions for some agrarian products within the preferential system and a closer cooperation in financial, technical and social affairs.[76] Based on this concept, a series of new cooperation agreements marked the Mediterranean policy of the European Community (EC) in the 1970ies. In this sense the EC maintained contractual relations to Spain, Portugal, Malta, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Jordanian, Israel, Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco. Spain and Portugal were excluded from the Mediterranean policy just at the moment when a member perspective was conceded by the Council; eleven out of twelve of the remaining Mediterranean countries concluded agreements based on the 'global approach' with the EC.[77] Despite a similar structure of the agreements and a common denominator in order to deepen the relations across the Mediterranean, the conventions show a certain discrepancy regarding their significance:[78]

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72 JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 38.
73 MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 6.
74 Federica Bicchi assumption of a hint of the Netherlands which France followed is a singular position in literature. Although there is no further reference of this circumstances and France obtains a strong position in Mediterranean Affairs since the very beginning due to its historical relation, I shall leave this hint at this point as it might be encouraging for further investigations. See: Federica BICCHI, The European Origins of Euro-Mediterranean Practices (Institute of European Studies/ paper 040612/ 2004), 4. Available online: http://repositories.cdib.org/ies/040612/ (2.9.2008).
75 Ibid. 4.
76 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 9.
77 PUHL, Mittelmeerpolitik, 31.
78 Ibid. 31-36. Additionally must be added that with the exception of the conventions with Malta, Israel, Cyprus and Turkey all agreements were non-reciprocal preferential agreements Comp. MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 7.

- The Maghreb and Mashreq conventions encompass seven countries that ensure their will for a new model of relations. In this sense, the conventions contain a broad catalogue of areas of economic, technical and financial cooperation; furthermore, they take the individual development degree of each country into account in order provide a balanced goods traffic, to encourage the economic growth and to improve the access of the goods to the common market.
- The Israel convention was the first convention signed as "global Mediterranean convention" in 1975. The fact that its duration was only foreseen until 1977 demonstrates the sensitive relation between the EC to Israel and the Arab states. The EC was keen to maintain even relations among these countries, which has been, facing the Middle East, a conflictive political undertaking until nowadays.
- The Yugoslavia convention, signed in 1980, was the last "global Mediterranean" convention. Although its structure is similar to the Maghreb and Masrique conventions, it explicitly relates to the world political position of Yugoslavia, which, as a developing country, continues to participate in the general preferential system of the European Community. The higher developing degree of the Yugoslavian economy is cited as the reason for a less distinctive economical and financial support from the European side.
- The Malta and Cyprus conventions, which were already established before Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark became members of the European Community, are in its nature association agreements. They do not only foresee a free-trade area like the Israel convention and in a long-term perspective also other conventions, but also foresee a tariff union. Due to the strategic positions of Malta and Cyprus, their association agreements are characterised by the perspective of a future membership, a feature, which is lacking in the conventions of Greece (in the beginning) and Turkey.[79]

Turkey and the European Community hold association agreements since 1963, in which both sides declare to establish a tariff union at the moment the preparation phase ends. In the additional protocol from 1970 they founded the base for this tariff union, which would have foreseen an accession to the EC as a third step. Due to the increasing violence and the political instability, the EC provoked the freezing of the association agreements in 1979. Since then, the membership issue of Turkey has remained ambiguous, despite the economic and political developments over the last years.

The "globalisation of the Mare Nostrum"[80] as Khalatbari titled the corresponding chapter in his book, early reached its limits, especially as far as the economy was concerned due to the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979. The total financial expenses for the Global Mediterranean Policy approach mounted up to 1.8 billion ERE for the diverse countries in the Mediterranean until 1981. This was a considerable

79 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 7.
80 Ibid.8.

amount even though 510 millions were dedicated to Greece and Portugal, whose membership was already initiated, and 310 millions were designated for Turkey, who attempted to intensify the economic relations to the EC in prospective of a membership.[81]

Nevertheless, the limits of the global approach in the Mediterranean were also of political nature. The dual alignment and the interference of competences of the European Commission and the CFSP proved to be counterproductive due to the divergent national interest.[82]

Evaluating the Global Mediterranean Policy approach shows two new elements regarding a Mediterranean policy, which are crucial in two different ways. Firstly, despite its strong economical orientation, the concept of a coherent foreign policy in the Mediterranean continuously gained a majority among European politicians. Although the implementation did not succeed until 1995, the first strep towards a multilateral approach happened to take place with the Global Mediterranean Policy. Secondly, more important is the region building aspect, which is adherent to the approach of a GMP. Identifying the Global Mediterranean Policy approach as a crucial period in which the idea of a Mediterranean took hold, Federica Bicchi states that from then onwards, in Eurospeak the Mediterranean was no longer a generic geographical expression and, more than that, from the perspective of the EC/EU a new region was born.[83] The political construct of a Mediterranean region was initiated with the GMP, but was formally implemented with the launch of the Barcelona Process and the foundation of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, respectively.[84]

Although the EC started a first attempt towards a coherent Mediterranean policy, the success of a new policy approach did neither cross the conceptual boarder nor enabled a more standardised structure of conventions. Nevertheless, the Global Mediterranean Policy marks the beginning of a consolidation process of a coherent Mediterranean policy which led to the declaration of Barcelona in 1995.

2.3 New approaches since the 1980ies until 1995

Although the Global Mediterranean Policy was a first attempt of replacing an inhomogeneous patchwork of agreements with the MNC through a global framework, its limits were soon reached and the policy failed due to contradictory interests regarding the political positioning of the EC. Concerning the Mediterranean affairs, the 1980ies were characterised by the European southern enlargement. In consequence of the accession of Greece (1981), Spain (1986) and Portugal (1986) to the European Community, the MNC experienced a severe loss of their export volume; until then, their products were protected from southern European Mediterranean products by the preferential system and association agreements. The increasing competition of Mediterranean agrarian products on European markets led

81 PUHL, Mittelmeerpolitik, 41.
82 JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 40.
83 BICCHI, European Origins, 2.
84 Comp. JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 33.

to a commotion of the commercial policy[85] due to the fact that the principal aim of the European Community was to equate national economies of the new member states to the EC average. Thus, the concerns of the MNC were of second rank. Given the increasing fear of the consequences of the European southern enlargement of the MNC, the European Community realized the necessity of action and closed additional (financial) protocols in 1987/88. According to Carlo Masala, the EC had become conscious of the need of an independent and offensive policy because the problems in the southern Mediterranean countries and, to the same extent, the possible threats for the member states of the European Community had apparently grown towards the late 80ies.[86] Beside the socio-economic considerations, the security concerns range among the principal motivations of the EC to intensify the relation with the MNC. Among the initiatives, which took place until 1995, one must separate two action levels: firstly, the political initiatives of the European Community and secondly, the national initiatives of European member states, which demonstrated that the interests of some countries were reaching further than the European course.

a) Initiatives of the European Community[87]

- As the GMP, the Euro-Arab Dialog (EAD) constituted an attempt to regulate the North-South conflict via cooperative and integrative elements. It formed a second political initiative beside the, until then, strong economically based Mediterranean policy. The impulse for the EAD came from the Arabian side because they regarded an alliance with the EC as beneficial for the Arabian-Israelian conflict. From the European side, some states, especially Italy and France, favoured the institutionalisation of the European-Arabian relations to strengthen the European position in the Middle East. Moreover, the significance of cooperative relations to the Arabian oil producing states was undoubted after the oil crisis of 1973. At the beginning of the negotiations both sides accorded that the Arabian-Israelian conflict should not be part of the EAD. Demonstrating the European ambition to maintain an equal distance policy to both conflict parties in the Middle East, parallel negotiations with Israel were started, which resulted in closing the commercial conventions one year later due to the lack of future success of the EAD initiative. The failed expectancy to exploit Europe as a counterbalance to the American dominance in the Middle East led to the exposure of the EAD in 1979, only three years after its formation, when Egypt resigned its membership in the EAD with the peace of Camp

85 KHALTBARI, Naher Osten, 11.

86 Comp. MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 8.

87 Especially for the EAD, GCC see Comp. Ibid 8-10; KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 12-13; Regarding the NMP see JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeepolitik, 41-43; Sieghild KERSCHBAUMER, Die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des politischen und sicherheitspolitischen Aspekts (ungedr. Politikwiss. Dipl. Innsbruck 2005), 19-21; Martin BIEDERMANN, Die MIttelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union (Gemeinschaft) von 1987 biis 1997. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von EU Dokumenten (ungedr. Wirtschaftswiss. Dipl. Wien 1997); Klaus PIRKER, Mittelmeerpolitik der EU. Der Barcelona Process (ungedr. Rechtswiss. Dipl. Graz 2003)

David. It was retaken in 1983, but lacked of attractiveness as the foundation of the Gulf Cooperation Council formed a pleasing alternative to the EAD.

- The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was initiated in the early 1980ies and was more promising regarding an effective interregional cooperation because it consisted of a smaller committee and all oil producing countries took part in it.
- The New Mediterranean Policy (NMP), which formerly constituted the official Mediterranean policy of the EC, substituted the GMP in 1990. The central aim was the replacement of the policy of developmental cooperation and the implementation of a newly designed 'neighbourhood policy', denominated as 'New Mediterranean Policy'. In 1992, the EC extended the new policy approach to a 'partnership policy', reasoning the need of a new base of the euro-maghrebinian relations. For the first time security policy concerns found consideration within the cooperation agreements. In 1993, the European Commission started an initiative for the regional integration in the Middle East and emphasised the need of a regional negotiation frame. In the communication paper of the European Commission of 1994, the Commission, aware that the region is of crucial interest regarding security and social stability and aware of the reciprocal dependency in many aspects, proposed the extension of the partnership model to the Mediterranean region with the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean zone of peace and stability.[88]

b) Initiatives of southern European member countries

At the end of the 80ies and the beginning of the 90ies the 'southern threat'[89] became a central concern of the southern member states of the EC/EU. The notably increasing number of North African migrants in France, Italy and Spain was the main indicator for the associated threat. The aim of the following initiatives was on the one hand to sensitise the EC/EU of the significance of the Mediterranean affairs and, on the other hand, to achieve a balance to the Eastern policy of the EG/EU.[90] Two approaches with multilateral characteristics marked the years before the launch of the Barcelona Process.

- The Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), which was initiated by Spain and Italy in 1989, aimed to overcome the economic and social discrepancies of the northern and southern Mediterranean countries; at the beginning only the Maghreb countries were addressed. Under the mantle of several catchwords like globality, progressiveness and integrity, the CSCM was structured on the basis of three baskets, namely 'regional stability, 'economical cooperation' and 'dialogue among civilisations and human rights'. Despite all endeavours the CSCM failed. With the Gulf Crisis in 1990 the objective of the CSCM

88 COM(94) 427 endg., 2.

89 The term 'Southern threat' (Südbedrohung) was firstly mentioned in the Italian white paper of defence in 1981 Comp. Annette JÜNEMANN, Italiens Nahostpolitik von 1980-1990. Handlungsspielräume einer national eigenständigen Interessenspolitik (Baden-Baden 1993), 86f.

90 Comp. KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 14.

changed; from then on the principal ambition was to gain a regulatory voice in the region. In consequence of the European political positioning several problems occurred. First of all, the ambition to transfer the CSCM concept to the Mediterranean region was not possible due to the inequality and the distinctive problem structure among the partners and due to the lack of a block structure and leadership, which would have guaranteed successful negotiations, especially in the sub-regions of the Mediterranean. Thus stated Babak Khaltbari: "quantity destroyed quality".[91] Second, with the European ambition for a regulatory power arose a competitive position to the USA, which perceived a threat to its unilateral policy in the Middle East.[92]

- The French initiative 5+5 constituted the French moment to launch an own Mediterranean Policy in 1990, after the failure of the CSCM. The reduced number of participating countries[93] should guarantee the success of this initiative. The main focus was directed on economic issues, although the structural organisation was based on the three baskets of the CSCM and a fourth basket of environmental concerns was added. The initiative failed due to the unclear position regarding the political relation with Libya, the discrepancy concerning the security issue and the related role of the NATO and WEU and, as Anette Jünemann states, due to a lack of political will regarding the interregional cooperation, because the southern European countries could not agree on a common procedure; the CSCM and the 5+5 initiative demonstrated the competitive positions among France, Italy and Spain concerning a Mediterranean policy.[94]

2.4 Success and failure of the European Mediterranean Policy since 1957

The way of standardising the bilateral agreements with the Mediterranean non member countries marks the first step towards a coherent Mediterranean policy. The European member states, being themselves in a decisive integration process, have distinctive positions regarding the direction of the European foreign policy. Although the discrepancy of national interests ranges among the principal causes for the failure of all initiatives before 1995, they also constitute a crucial driving motor.

The economic relations across the Mediterranean are of vital importance, mainly for the southern European states, but also for Europe. Not surprisingly, the beginning phase of the political relations after 1957 was economically based. The enlargement of the European Union changed the conditions of economical relations to the foreign trading partner and encouraged a new political assertiveness of a

91 Ibid. 15.

92 Comp. Ibid. 14-17; JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 39f; KERSCHBAUMER, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 15-17; for further information regarding the conclusions of the CSCM meetings and conderences see: http://ipu.org/iss-e/cscm.htm (18.9.2008).

93 The ten countries which formed the 5+5 were the members of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauretania, Morocco and Tunisia) as well as France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Malta as a associate participant until Malta became a full member in 1991.

94 JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 40f; KERSCHBAUMER, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 17f; KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 16f.

growing power. These two levels of concerns dominate the success and the failure of European foreign policy issues in the Mediterranean. On the one hand, the EEC/EC/EU was created in order to balance the changes and economic consequences due to the European enlargement policy. On the other hand, there was a growing regulatory policy demand, especially regarding the Middle East. Starting on a bilateral base and an ambitious attempt to harmonize the agreed conventions with the MNC within the limits of a Global Mediterranean Policy, the EC/EU continuously noticed the reciprocal dependency, the consequences of a socio-economic discrepancy and the need of action. Although the GMP was ostensibly dominated by economic considerations, it was an initial point of a coherent policy in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, its conceptual approach is crucial in terms of region building aspects and, in the same way, internally as externally significant to establish a reference area in order to create a common reference. The GMP failed due to the divergence of interests and, as far as foreign policy is concerned, the lack of an advantageous developed dual European system. The following initiatives on the national superordinated level, the EC/EU, were direct forerunners of the Barcelona Process and demonstrate the process within the EC/EU to develop a coherent Mediterranean policy. The multilateral initiatives of the member countries France, Italy and Spain show, especially in its structural organisation, elements which have been overtaken later on. The extension to a fourth basket of the French initiative 5+5, containing environmental concerns, was a crucial element of the recently launched Mediterranean Union (MU). The attempt to limit the MU to only Mediterranean countries, as it was originally suggested by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, failed due to the intervention of Germany, which claimed that Mediterranean affairs were of European concern. This demonstrates nothing less than the still persisting national competitions to dominate the direction of the European policy, which were also the reasons for the failure of the CSCM and the 5+5.

3 The Barcelona Process

The Barcelona Process represents a novelty among the diplomatic relations over the Mediterranean, because it brings thirty-nine countries[95] of different historical, political and economical backgrounds under the mantle of a common mission together: to improve the political stability, to establish an economic partnership and to enhance the reciprocal cultural understanding. The following chapter deals with the most relevant aspects in order to provide a thematic setting for the consecutive discourse analysis. In contrast to the period before 1995, many happenings, features and particularities will not be specified in-depth as they will be revived and discussed further on.

95 The EU-27 (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and twelve Southern Mediterranean countries (Albania, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Maurentania, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey). Comp: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (19.9.2008).

3.1 The declaration of Barcelona

With the intention to initiate a new dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the Barcelona Declaration was signed by the former EU-15 and eleven southern Mediterranean states on November 27/28, 1995.[96] It was a symbolic date which received a new historical meaning because it was exactly nine hundred years after Pope Urban II called on the first Crusade.[97] The choice of Barcelona as the venue for the launch of the conference and the naming of the follow-up committee called "Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process" was subsequent to the recognition of Spain's new predominance as a leading player in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership initiative.[98] Richard Gillespie also correctly states that Spain has not been the only influential player in the development process before 1995; France, Morocco, Portugal and Algeria contributed essential inputs to the policy development, but the nomenclature of the process was allowed to Spain.[99] Beside national engagements, the European Commission gave the decisive impetus for developing a coherent Mediterranean policy and acted as an intermediator among the differing interests of the European member states in order to facilitate a successful conference meeting.

In its communication to the Council in 1990, the Commission stressed the importance of a close cooperation of all involved countries and repeated the already voiced conviction that "there is little choice but to continue and intensify the process of economic reform and to bring about a considerable improvement in the volume and methods available to finance reform and growth."[100] In 1994, the Commission emphasised that the Mediterranean is of great interest to the European Union regarding security concerns and social stability and stressed the reciprocal dependency in many ambits; furthermore, the Commission phrased the need to develop a Europe-Mediterranean partnership and approved a Europe-Mediterranean conference in order to covenant common political and economical guidelines.[101] At the meeting of the EU-15 in Cannes at the end of June 1995 the basic questions of internal and external confrontations have been the thematic concern. The European Council stressed the official side of the European Union regarding the Mediterranean and "proposes that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership should be put into practice with the adoption of a declaration of principals by all the partners at the conference in Barcelona this autumn, setting a number of objectives common

96 The former EU-15 and eleven Southern Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority) signed the Barcelona Declaration. See: Barcelona declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean conference 27-28/11/95 http://ec.europa.eu/comm.external_relations/ euromed/bd/htm (25.6.2006). The literature mostly alludes to the EU-15 and twelve Southern Mediterranean countries because Libya, which obtains an observer status since 1999, is also taken into account. According to the official document of the Barcelona declaration of 1995 only eleven countries signed.

97 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 43.

98 Richard GILLESPIE, Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med Partnership Initiative. In: Richard GILLESPIE (ed.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: political ad economic perspectives (London 1997), 33-49, 33.

99 Ibid. 33f.

100 SEC(90) 812 final (Brussels 1.06.1990), 3 [Comp. 1.1 and 1.2 of chapter 1. A general framework for Community operations in the Mediterranean].

101 COM(94)427endg. (Brüssel 19.10.1994) [Compare point 1,4,5 and 10 of the abstract].

to the parties with regard to internal and external security."[102] Therewith, from the European point of view, the way to the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona was paved. It was the intention "to establish a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean partnership in order to turn the Mediterranean into a common area of peace, stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue and security, an economic and financial partnership and a social, cultural and human partnership." [103]
Due to the European enlargement policy, thirty-nine countries[104] participate in the Barcelona Process today. Their sustained interest to cooperate was recently demonstrated with the sign of the declaration to revitalize the Barcelona Process under a new political mantle: the Mediterranean Union.

3.3 Structural elements of the Barcelona Process

Two principal structural elements have to be considered when discussing the Barcelona Process: First, the inherent structure which is based on three baskets in order to organize the ambits treated within the Mediterranean policy. Deriving from this structure, the working base corresponding to a bilateral and regional (multilateral) cooperation level of the Barcelona Process can be deduced. Second, the decision-making process which is essential to apprehend the implementation competence of this political constellation.

a) Inherent structure of the Barcelona Process

Although the Spanish-Italian initiative, CSCM, was not successful, some structural elements can be retrieved in the new Mediterranean policy launched in 1995. The Barcelona Declaration can be classified as ambitious attempt to create a catalogue of principals based on three baskets:
The first basket concerns the partnership area of a "political and security dialogue to achieve a common area of peace and stability based on respect for human rights and democracy."[105] The responsible senior officials meet four times a year in matters concerning the first basket. Regarding the goals of the first basket, the declaration of Barcelona corresponds rather to a charter than to a legally binding document; up to now, the agreements on the first basket are based upon commitments, wherefore the results have to be considered as marginal. Nevertheless, four 'confidence-building measures' and

102 Cannes European Council, Presidency conclusions (26-27 June 1995) [Compare quote from PART A, chapter "Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona position of the European Union", Sub-chapter II. Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability"] Available online: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data /docs/pressData/en/ec/00211-C.EN5.htm (18.9.2008).

103 Official formulation of the aim of the Barcelona declaration. See Barcelona declaration according to the summaries of legislation: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r15001.htm (19.9.2008).

104 The EU-27 (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and twelve Southern Mediterranean countries (Albania, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauretania, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey) comp: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (19.9.2008).

105 www.euromedinfo.eu (18.9.2008).

'partnership-building measures, respectively'[106] were established in the first basket: the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC)[107], the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EUROMESCO)[108], the Cooperation among institutions of civil protection[109] and the MEDA democracy programme.[110]

With the new Mediterranean policy it was "not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives in the interest of peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success."[111] Therein originates the reason for the coexistence of several initiatives such as the Mediterranean Forum (FOROMED)[112], the EAD or the multilateral Arabian-Israelian working group Middle East Peace Process (MEEP), which is supported by the European Union.

In the declaration of Barcelona the participants agreed on an intensified contact among parliamentarians and regional and local authorities. The right of initiative concerning the implementation was granted to the European Union, as the formal statement within the declaration suggests: "The European Parliament is invited to take the initiative with other parliaments concerning the future EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue, which could enable the elected representatives of the partners to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues."[113]

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106 Comp. KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 47.

107 Twice a year the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies organizes an information and discussion forum with the ambition to encourage an informal contact network among diplomats and support the setting up of a Euro-Mediterranean network. http://home.um.edu.mt/medac/ (22.9.2008); among the activities the Euro-Mediterranean seminars must find a special consideration because they encourage the debate by inviting independent experts and scientist. In November 2008 the 25th Seminar was held. For participants, programmes and papers see: http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/ (22.9.2008).

108 In 1996 the EuroMeSCo network was launched under the coordination of the Lisbon Institute of International Studies (IEEI). Two working groups, one focusing on studies of political and security co-operations and the other working on confidential-building measures, disarmament and preventive diplomacy, were established http://www.euromesco.net/ (22.9.2008).

109 This cooperation concerns the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean system for catastrophe prevention as well as the reduction and management natural disasters. The project was launched in 1998 due to the initiative of Egypt and Italy. On the basis of a five year working program, the field of action encompasses experience and technique transfer, cooperation as well as training sessions among Euro-Mediterranean civil protection boards. The project, which is coordinated by a steering committee, consists of ten training sessions and the exchange of hundred and fifty experts of ten scientific and technical missions; the financial budget mounts up to 1.9 million EUR. Comp: KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 49.

110 The MEDA democracy programme forms a part of the European initiative for democracy and human rights launched of the European Parliament in 1994. Since first established, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) follows the developments of the MEDA democracy programme which since 1996 holds a proper budget line (B-7050) to support non-profit-making associations (NGOs), universities, research canters and public bodies. Comp:http://www.euromedrights.net/usr/00000026/00000027/00000028/00000239.pdf (22.9.2008).

111 Barcelona declaration http://ec.europa.eu/ comm.external_relations/euromed/bd/htm (25.6.2006) [fifth point of the abstract of the declaration].

112 On an initiative of France and Egypt the Mediterranean Forum was launched in 1994 and predated the Barcelona Process. The participating countries Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey meet annually. Since 1997 it was commonly agreed that the informal nature ought to be protected and that the forum ought to concentrate their activities on developing ways of preventive diplomacy, for a continuous dialogue and understanding of each other. See http://www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/31052007_McC1615.htm (23.9.2008) and for presidency conclusions until 2003 http://www.maec.gov.ma/en/forum/ mediteraneEN.htm (23.9.2008).

113 Barcelona declaration http://ec.europa.eu/ comm.external_relations/euromed/bd/htm (25.6.2006) [See Annex: Work Programme, chapter V. "Institutional Contacts" consecutive paragraph, EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue].

The aim of the second basket is an "economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area to create a zone of shared prosperity and to support economic transition in the partner states."[114] Babak Khalatbari tried to identify the mayor regional cooperation programmes in the non-transparent information supply of the European Union, which are established within the margin of the second basket:[115]

- The systematic support of the private enterprise sector is crucial for a successful establishment of a free-trade area. The European strategy of implementing business centres relates to the concerns of the installation of the free-trade area, the transformation of the economic focus of the single MNC and the facilitation of interior and exterior private investment.
- Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and business co-operations form an essential part at the moment of implementation of political matters. In 1998, the programme of a "Euro-Mediterranean Co-operation between SMEs" was launched. Its aim is to provide a multi-sectoral platform for companies and to encourage the exchange of expertise in general or for regional and country specific concerns. The success of this programme especially depends on the cooperation disposition of European enterprises due to the fact that the legal security in most MNC is still uncertain.
- From the aim to improve the reciprocal understanding and to encourage the exchange of information emanates the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean economic network, which comprises a scientific and a practical component. On the scientific level, the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes (FEMISE) was founded. It currently involves more than sixty independent economic research institutes which represent the thirty-seven partners of the Barcelona Process. The principal issues of the socio-economic research on topics defined as priority for the future of the EMP concern: agricultural questions; development and the poverty treatment; policies regarding health and work; education, training and the role of women in the company; integration and cooperation between the countries of the south of the Mediterranean; the role of the state.[116] The practical level of the Euro-Mediterranean Economic Network concerns those industry associations which enhance the practical exchange. Since 2000 the project is known as "UNIMED Business Network"[117], its working programme is based on the 'Brussels Declaration on Euro-Mediterranean Industrial Cooperation' which foresees periodical conference meetings and summits.
- Infrastructural programmes, which support the development of an economic and financial partnership, constitute the statistical co-operation with Mediterranean countries (MED-

114 www.euromedinfo.eu (18.9.2008).
115 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 57-73.
116 http://www.femise.org/Presentation/presentation_gb.html (23.9.2008).
117 http://www.unimedbn.org/ (23.9.2008).

STAT)[118], the Development Society Information in the Mediterranean Region (EUMEDIS)[119] and a project called 'New Approaches Regarding Telecommunication Policy among Mediterranean Partners' (NATP). The last mentioned project aims to vitalize the opened and changing telecommunication sector of the MNC and therewith the adjunctive participation of private sectors in the infrastructural renovations. Regarding the transportation system, a Euro-Mediterranean Transport Forum was convoked in 1998. Since then, the NATP works on a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), a transport network for citizens of the partner countries, transport security, sea transport, and topic relevant science and development and statistics.

- Environmental programs in the second basket are for example 'The Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme' (SMAP), encompassing five priority fields of action: additional water management, additional wastage management, hot spots (urgent problems in urban areas, industrial sites etc.), management of the coastal zone, combating the desertification; the Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System (EMWIS) emphasises the cooperation need in a sector which is threatened by scarcity; and the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum aims to bring forward the cooperative attitude on the political, administrative and industrial level.
- The Euro-Arab Management School was founded as a partner project with the Arab League[120] and the European Commission in 1995 in order to support teaching and training processes as well as future services in the margin of business developments between Arabian and European enterprises.
- The third basket concerns a "social, cultural and human partnership to encourage understanding between peoples and cultures and exchanges between civil societies."[121] In the declaration of Barcelona in 1995 the ambition of a cultural cooperation was consolidated for the first time. The cultural dimension aspires to improve the respect of the cultures and religions involved in the Mediterranean policy, to strengthen intercultural exchange, to combat racism and xenophobia and to ameliorate the possibilities of education. The programs which are embedded within the third basket are the following:

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118 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=2313,59852546,2313_65332058&_dad=portal&_ schema=PORTAL (23.9.2008).

119 The support and development of investigation and technology societies in the MNC and the encouragement of the advancement and modernisation of the local telecommunication infrastructure is stressed among the crucial elements for the success of the Barcelona Process. Comp. KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 69. For further information on EUMEDIS see: http://www.eumedis.net/ (23.9.2008).

120 The Arab League, founded in 1945, is the "informal name of the League of Arab States, a voluntary association of independent countries whose peoples are mainly Arabic speaking. Its stated purposes are to strengthen ties among the member states, coordinate their policies, and promote their common interests." http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/league.htm (23.9.2008) Today 22 countries form the Arab League (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Somalia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Sudan, Yemen, Comoros, Jordan, Mauretania, Qatar, Syria, Djibouti, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia).

121 www.euromedinfo.eu (23.9.2008).

- The Euromed Heritage-Program, launched in 1998, pursues the conservation and evolvement of the Euro-Mediterranean heritage.
- The Euromed Audivisual Programm targets new forms of cooperation between European and Mediterranean operators in the audiovisual sector (broadcast, television and cinema) regarding technology and knowledge transfer.
- The cooperation with civil societies attaches importance because it is apprehended as a targeted support of democratisation forces in less democratic Mediterranean non-member countries.[122] Med-programs like Med Campus, Med Media, Med Migration and Med Urbs are based on two principals: the Commission selects its partners without consulting the national governments and each Med-program ought to create a network that brings together at least three countries of both regions (EU and Mediterranean).[123]
- The Euromed Youth programme is based on exchange programs which aim to facilitate the integration process in society and profession of young people, to encourage a closer cooperation among the generations and to enhance democratisation tendencies in civil societies.
- The Barcelona Process comprises a bilateral and a multilateral dimension of actions within the thematic arrangement of the three basket-structure. The bilateral cooperation concerns bilateral activities between the EU and each country on the base of association agreements which are negotiated individually. Although the agreements vary from one country to another, they have certain aspects in common such as a "political dialogue, respect for human rights and democracy, establishing a free trade zone, provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public procurement, competition rules, state aids and monopolies, and economic, social and cultural cooperation including migration."[124] The bilateral agreements with the MNC must be ratified by the national parliaments of the EU member states. The multilateral dimension represents an innovative element of the established Mediterranean policy because it tackles "political, economic and cultural issues such as industry, energy, the environment, finance and agriculture important to many of the Mediterranean Partners."[125] In its function, the multilateral and the regional cooperation target at the support and complementation of bilateral activities.
- The principal economic and financial instrument for warranting the agreed goals of the Barcelona Process is the MEDA programme, launched in 1997 (MEDA I), amended in 2000 (MEDA II) and incorporated in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) in 2007. Since 1995, the European Commission supported initiatives within the cooperation frame with about € 16 billions from the Community budget. Furthermore, € 2 million

122 The democratisation issue of the Barcelona Process, which is often discussed in relation with the third basket, will be omitted at this point as it constitutes an essential element in the foreseen discourse analysis and will be treated extensively further on.

123 JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 49.

124 www.euromedinfo.eu (18.9.2008).

125 Ibid.

annual loans of the European Investment Bank (EIB) have been granted within the MEDA margin.[126] Project-supported concerns are the economic transition of Mediterranean non-member countries (MNCs), the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area, sustainable socio-economic developments and regional, sub-regional and cross-boarder co-operations. Funds are allocated in form of grants managed by the European Commission and used for financing or co-financing projects, which contribute to the realisation of the agreed objectives; risk capital provided and managed by the EIB to strengthen the private sector; and interest rate subsidies for EIB loans within the framework of environmental cooperation, not exceeding a subsidiary rate of 3%.[127] MEDA expenditures are subjected to strict control mechanisms, an overall assessment report and mid-term evaluations. The European Commission submits in collaboration with the EIB an annual report to the European Parliament and the Council.[128] In 2007, the financial instruments of the European regional cooperation initiative MEDA and TACIS[129] have been incorporated in the ENPI, which, from an official side, is argued to represent a "widened strategic continuation"[130] of the previous financial and technical instruments. The funds allocated to the Mediterranean policy agreements persist as before with the amendment that "the ENPI will be policy driven, supporting the implementation of agreed ENP."[131]

b) Decision making process and the distribution of competences

The Barcelona Process is formally characterized as an intergovernmental process and works on the principal of coordination and consensus. This presupposes that all states are considered as sovereign contractual parties and, in addition, each country obtains the right of veto independently of the political weight.[132] The main decision-making body constitutes the annual meeting of the foreign ministers.[133] So far, nine Ministerial Conferences and six Interim Ministerial Meetings have taken place:

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126 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (24.8.2008).

127 See legislation summary on the MEDA Regulation: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r15006.htm (24.9.2008).

128 Comp.Ibid.

129 The TACIS programme concerned the strategic aim to encourage democratization, to strengthen the rule of law and to support the transition of the New Independent States (NIS) to a market economy. The participating countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. TACIS comprised a financial volume of EUR 3.138 billion between 2000- 2006. See the summary of legislation: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r17003.htm (24.9.2008)

130 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/how-does-enpi-work_en.htm (24.9.2008)

131 Comp. Ibid.

132 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 80f.

133 "Wichtigste Entscheidungsgremium ist das jährliche Treffen der Außenminister." Jörg SCHNEIDER, Schwerpunktthemen der deutschen EU-Ratspräsidentschaft im südlichen Mittelmeerraum. Eine Bestandaufnahme. In: Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, Europa Nr.4/07, (1. Februar 2007) Available online: http://www.bundestag.de/wissen/analysen/2007/Schwerpunktthemen_der_deutschen_EU-Ratspraesidentschaft_im_suedlichen_Mittelmeerraum-_Eine_Bestandsaufnahme.pdf (18.9.2008).

Ministerial Conference	Interim Ministerial Meetings
1st Barcelona 1995	Interim 1: Palermo 1998
2nd Malta 1997	Interim 2: Lisbon 2000
3rd Stuttgart 1999	Interim 3: Brussels 2001
4th Marseilles 2000	Interim 4: Crete 2003
5th Valencia 2002	Interim 5: Dublin 2004
6th Naples 2003	Interim 6: The Hague 2004
7th Luxembourg 2005	
8th Tampere 2006	
9th Lisbon 2007	

Graph 1: Overview of the Ministerial Conferences and the Interim Ministerial Meetings[134]

The preparation of these meetings is organised by the Euro-Mediterranean committee, which meets in regular intervals. At a ministerial, administrative or expert level occur further technical and civil coordination processes as well as ad-hoc meetings like workshops and seminars.[135] The implementation of the decisions agreed at the Foreign Minister Meetings is delegated to the European Commission, which is responsible for the preparation and post-processing of the Conferences. On the one hand, the national ministerial offices and the General Secretariat of the European Council experienced a relief; on the other hand, the European Commission had difficulties to cope with the additional responsibilities in the beginning.[136] Despite restructuring measures, this demonstrates significant organisational coordination problems of the European system.[137] The coordination problems result from the conflictive internal allocation of rights and duties, the European Commission is formally responsible for the Foreign Minister Meetings, but the presidency of the Meetings can either be held by the corresponding nation, which holds the presidency of the European Council, or by the Commission, which increases the internal coordination effort and problems regarding a coherent internal communication.[138] The dominant position of the European Union and the presidency of the Council in the Foreign Minister Meetings indicate a stronger agenda-setting position than the MNC's. The Mediterranean policy is not only conditioned by the European Union, which follows its beforehand agreed agenda, but also by possible block buildings among the Arabian countries because some of them participate in the Arab League (AL) or in the Arab Maghrebian Union (AMU) [139] Despite the possibility of regional groupings to influence the proceedings, the block formation among the MNCs has never been complemented. According to Anette Jünemann, the regularly meetings created a kind of "socialising" effect

134 The conclusions of these Ministerial conferences and meetings constitute the sources for the discourse analysis of the European documentation.

135 Andreas MAURER, Max HAEDER, Alternatives to Full Membership oft he EU. In: Johannes VARWICK, Kai Olaf LANG (eds.), European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the New Neighbours (Leverkusen Opladen 2007), 197-219, 202.

136 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 81.

137 MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partnershaft, 18.

138 MONAR, interne Dimension, 83f.

139 Impeding factors of a stronger lobby within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are the facts that not all countries of the AL and AMU are participants of the Barcelona Process and that bilateral conflicts on the regional level averts closed positioning. Comp. MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 19.

and a "spirit of partnership," respectively. Although this effect is less intensive among the MNCs than between the North-South[140], it gives indication of an advancing cooperating sense.

3.3 The establishment of a new paradigm – the issue of a common space

With the establishment of the paradigm of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership political representatives of all member states, who signed the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, appointed to transmit a sign of unity and good will to achieve the defined goals.[141] Officially, the European Union stresses that the initiation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership represents the new dimension of the future relations in the Mediterranean and emphasizes the need of a superordinated coordination of the challenges both sides of the Mediterranean Sea have to deal with.[142] Beside the official definition of the ambitious Mediterranean policy, there is a legitimate space for questioning these developments. What about the paradigm of the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? Irrespective whether the partnership is counterbalanced, equal or the right fundament for a successful policy or not, there is one crucial aspect that the denomination 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' contains, namely the suggestion of a common space. What is the nature of such a common space, what are its frontiers and what about its functionality? Is there an identification criteria implied? The paradigm of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership undoubtedly contains a certain eurocentrism; hence, the prefix of the denotation of the political partnership refers to Europe. In the 21st century, the frontiers of the European Union are, despite the enlargement policy, quite clear. But what about the so-called Mediterranean?

In reference to the scientific debates over the last years, defining the Mediterranean space is anything but easy. The historical importance of the Mediterranean as a cross-road and bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa is undoubted. What keeps scientists of distinctive disciplines in check is rather the immeasurable complexity of the Mediterranean world.

Following the consideration of the ethnologist Christian Giordano, there is an atmosphere of disappointment and helplessness in the scientific approach on the Mediterranean. The lack of finding a "reasonable synthesis" for the necessity of a conceptualization of the Mediterranean as an object of investigation for the matters of sociology and anthropology leads to a fragmentation and encapsulation of research topics.[143] It is true that subsequent to the debate of the "entity" or "unity" of the Mediterranean, which constitutes an open-ended debate in the scientific discourse, there have not been any new approaches on the matter. Recently, with the shift of the political interest after launching the Barcelona Process in 1995, there is a new concern about the Mediterranean.

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140 Anette JÜNEMANN, Zehn Jahre (2005), 8.

141 For the content of the Barcelona Declaration see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm (25.06.2006).

142 Ibid. 2.

143 Christian GIORDANO, Die Betrogenen der Geschichte. Überlagerungsmentalität und Überlagerungs-rationalität in mediterranen Gesellschaften, Frankfurt am Main 1992,17.

The implicated suggestion of a common space in the term "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" recommends tracing back in history in reference to the apprehension of the Mediterranean. It is beyond all questions that early considerations of the Mediterranean space refer to its geographical nature, which can be reconstructed by early cartography and nominations in historical sources. The first linguistic reference of the term "Great Sea," whose roots can probably be found in the Semitic language, is made by the Hecataeus of Miletus in Greek around 500 B.C. The Mediterranean Sea certainly influenced the imagination of poets and literates and it formed the world and life vision of human beings, but the main function of the sea was the communication. Sea transport and navigation influenced the Mediterranean life in its earliest days. Therefore, the development in the cartography not only reflects the grade of evolution in navigation, but also answers questions concerning the perception of the shape of the Mediterranean Sea. When the coastline voyages dominated the sailing method, people believed that the Mediterranean was a great river, as gathered from an early Roman map, the Peutinger Table. With the advancement in navigation, like the sophisticated direction-finding art based on segmenting the discernible horizon according to the names of prevailing winds (wind rose), the conception of the Mediterranean Sea as a space improved as well. Hence, scholars like Herodotus already had a clear idea of the geographical space, body and positioning of the Sea and of the knowledge how to sail across.[144]

The early geographical knowledge, which was accompanied by the achievements in navigation, contributed to the implicitness of acquaintance and perception of the sea in times of the Roman Empire. Romans considered the Mediterranean Sea as "Our Sea", *Mare Nostrum*. With the thought of appropriation by denominating the sea as "their sea," the Romans demonstrated the tangibility of the Mediterranean Sea. Hence, it illustrated that the Mediterranean Sea was not only important for transportation, communications and commerce and supply purposes, but also for the representation of political power. Following the concerns of Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, all civilizations which had access to the Mediterranean Sea, attempted to use it to extent their power-base.[145]

As a crosspoint between Europe, Africa and Asia, the history of the Mediterranean is an abundance of study worthy phenomena. Unequal cultural and economic developments throughout history not only allude to the complexity of the study case "Mediterranean," but also advert to the fragmentation into regional entities, which is often used in matters of an orientation guide. Due to the interpretation of Herzfeld's theory on the Mediterranean in the work of Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, the term "Mediterranean" is far from being a convenient geographical designation and retrieves a none too subtle political weapon, namely to distinguish between "us" – northern European, advanced, diverse – and "them" – southern, backward, uniform.[146] Although the long given major cultural dissonance between the northern and the southern shores of the Mediterranean influenced the discussion, focuses on

144 P. HORDEN and N. PURCELL, The Corrupting Sea. A Study of Mediterranean History (Oxford 2001), 10f.
145 Xenakis, Euro-Mediterranean System, 28.
146 Horden, Corrupting Sea, 20.

longitudinal divisions regarding the perception of the region, the understanding of north – south divisions in relation to the grade of cultural and economic development varied depending on the point of view: "Unlike most northern Europeans, who generally regard North Africa as an incongruent and 'backward region' of no great strategic interest, Italy, Spain, France, Portugal and Greece hold a different view. Likewise, for many North Africans, the dividing line between Europe and Africa lies in the Sahara and not in the Mediterranean, as is usually the case with Western perceptions."[147]
The question is to which common space did the European Union refer to while establishing the paradigm of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? Are there historical references of a shared cultural space? Is not a common cultural denominator the essential base for the definition of a common space? The ethnologist Christian Giordano, who concedes the point to Fernand Braudel in matter of the possibility to perceive the Mediterranean as a unity, adheres to the aspect that despite unmistakable contrasts, there are many evident communalities and assigns to the dictum of Goldstein that problems stay constant, but not the socio-cultural institutions dealing with them.[148] Thus, there might be a common Euro-Mediterranean space, but what are the common cultural denominators of the political paradigm that have been established in 1995?

The initiation of the Barcelona Process certainly provoked a change in the attitude of the European policy. Although evaluations of the Euro-Mediterranean policy, which were discussed at the 10th anniversary in 2005, turned out to be very critical, the scientific approach was topped by political voices. Essential for the present research aim is the fact that with the establishment of the paradigm of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the European policy in the Mediterranean occupies a strong region building aspect. It is to expect that the results of the discourse analysis provide a useful frame to assess the region building intention within the European Mediterranean policy.

3.4 The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy

From the beginning, the European Communities followed a considered neighbourhood policy, cultivating close relations to countries that have no joining perspective and an open-minded policy towards possible members. The launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 was a result of the European Union's enlargement of the same year. The requirement for a reformed neighbourhood policy, which equally addresses the neighbours of the eastern and southern shores after the enlargement of 2004, derived from counterbalancing the eastern-southern competition, from the experience that "old concepts of cooperation have not generated substantial transformation effects" and from the

147 XENAKIS, Euro-Mediterranean System 27.
148 Giordano, Betrogenen, 19.

fact that the integration capacity of the European Union was exhausted.[149] Thus, the ENP constitutes at the same time a "strategy compensating for enlargement" and a "substitute for or alternative to enlargement", as the policy is directed to countries which have an accession perspective.[150]

The new policy approach results from the concern to stabilise the boarder periphery and the awareness of the need of an effective and coherent common policy to deal with its neighbours strategically.[151] The official reasoning of the European Commission comprises duty concerns "towards its citizens and those of new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism" as well as the "determination to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union."[152] Regarding the political promotion of the ENP, Romano Prodi stated that it is the aim "to create a ring of friends around the Union – stretching from Russia right around the Mediterranean to Morocco – and to share peace, stability prosperity."[153]

On the base that the ENP builds on existing contractual relations and does not foresee an accession perspective, the policy is directed to the following countries on eastern and southern borders of the European Union: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Countries, with which contractual relations can be established, like Belarus, Turkey and the Western Balkans (except Moldova) are recognised as candidates. Countries with which contractual relations already exist, like Libya, which would have to participate in the Barcelona Process first, or Syria, where Association Agreements would be the contractual base for the ENP, are excluded. A special case constitutes Russia, which is the largest neighbour of the EU and requires different policy approaches. Nevertheless, with the end of TACIS the strategic partnership will also be funded from the ENPI as cross-boarder cooperation. [154] The main instrument of the ENP proceeding, which is basically bilateral, constitutes action plans that are negotiated individually on the preconditions of each country with a duration of three to four years. Multilateral contexts result from already existing regional and sub-regional co-operations or from projects that will to be realised in this context. On a shared basis, the bilateral association agreements and common goals to enhance formal and civil dialogues on various levels, the European Neighbourhood Policy constitutes the bilateral frame, while the Barcelona Process, for ex-

149 Kai-Olaf LANG, European Neighbourhood Policy: Where do we Stand – Where are we Heading? In: Johannes VARWICK, Kai Olaf LANG (eds.), European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the New Neighbours (Leverkusen Opladen 2007), 15-25, 15f.

150 Ibid. 21.

151 Kai-Olaf LANG, Johannes VARWICK, Introduction. In: Johannes VARWICK, Kai Olaf LANG (eds.), European Neighbourhood Policy. Challenges for the EU-Policy Towards the New Neighbours (Leverkusen Opladen 2007), 9-12, 9.

152 COM(2003)104 final, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours (Brüssels 11.3.2003) [quotes to be found in the first chapter „Wider Europe: Accepting the Callenge"].

153 Romano PRODI, Europe and peace, (Speech, University of Ulster, 1st April 2004). Available online: www.ulster.ac.uk/news/prodi-magee-vistit.pdf [pfd page. 9].

154 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/faq_en.htm#2.1 (26.9.2008).

ample, forms the multilateral context for the cooperation with the Mediterranean non-member countries. With the incorporation of the Barcelona Process in the ENP the European- Mediterranean relations should be strengthened because bilateral cooperations are considered to be "more suitable for internal advancement initiations in the neighbour countries."[155] Since 2007, the regional financial instruments MEDA and TACIS have been replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The ENPI as "a much more flexible and policy driven instrument" with a budget of €12 billion (32% increase in real terms) is designed to target sustainable developments and approximations to the EU policy and standards as well as agreed priorities in the ENP Actions plans.[156]
Evaluating the ENP Policy so far leaves the impression of a meagre advancement regarding the general intention and agreements based on the Action Plans. Common criticism concern the deficiently defined goals and measures, the missing newness component of objectives, the lack of compatibility of measures regarding the economic and social conditions, especially in the MNCs, and the security concerns, which are more ostensibly formulated, as, for example, within the margin of the Barcelona Process.[157] Criticisms concerning the established action plans refer to the high grade of complexity and the low juridical commitment. Regarding the Mediterranean policy, it is an impeding factor that not all countries participate in the ENP. Libya and Syria still lack the contractual requirements, Albania and Turkey are considered accession candidates and Algeria, which disposes of the necessary requirements, did not yet decide on a participation in the ENP.[158] Beside the participation issue, the fact that "old" barriers like the Middle East conflict could not be solved, the lack of integration among the MNCs could not be averted, improving solutions regarding the liberalisation of the agrarian and service sector and the market accession for Mediterranean products could not be achieved, led to the apprehension that the focus on bilateral cooperation not only enhances asymmetric relations across the Mediterranean and the fragmentation of the region, but abates the regional (multilateral) approach.[159]
In 2007, the Commission satisfactory listed results in general, but proposed additional developmental steps, as the understanding of the ENP as a motor of cooperation with its neighbour countries comprised a type of partnership which followed the maxim "the more – the better," i.e. the more partners approach to the European Union, more opportunities regarding political, economical, financial and

155 „(...) die bilateralen Regelungen eignen sich besser für die Förderung innerstaatlicher Reformen (...)" Comp. KOM(2007)774 endgültig, Mitteilung der Kommission an das Europäische Parlament und den Rat. Für eine starke Nachbarschaftpolitik (Brüssel, 5.12.2007) [Comp. 2.3 „Regionale Prozesse"].

156 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/funding_en.htm (26.9.2008).

157 Anja ZOROB, Europäische Nachbarschaftpolitik: Eine erste Bilanz (Institut für Nahost- Studien, GIGA Focus 1/2007) Available online: www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus (26.9.2008) [Comp. End of chapter 2 „Stand der Implementierung der ENP"].

158 Anja ZOROB, Projekt "Mittelmeerunion" – "neuer Schub" für die EU-Mittelmeerpolitik? (Institut für Nahost- Studien, GIGA Focus 5/2008). Available online: www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus (26.9.2008) [Comp. Chapter 1 „Rückblick: Fortschritte und Hemmfaktoren des Barcelona Processes"].

159 ZOROB, Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik (1/2007) [Comp. Chapter 3 "ENP=EMP+? Oder: Welchen Mehrwert hat die ENP].

technical support an cooperation can be provided by the European Union."[160] In the same communication, the Commission granted its support to further regional initiatives to strengthen the already existing process and alluded in the same context to the French invitation in June 2008 to negotiate new impulses for the Mediterranean region.[161]

3.5 The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

"Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government meeting in Paris on 13 July 2008, inspired by the shares political will to revitalise efforts to transform the Mediterranean into an area of peace, democracy and prosperity, agree to adopt the following joint declaration:

The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean building in the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to increase the potential for the regional integration and cohesion. Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries. They stress the need for a better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance and visibility for the citizens.

They share the conviction that the initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development; world food security crisis, degradation of environment, including climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; terrorism and extremism; as well as promoting dialogue between cultures.

It will encompass all EU Member States and the European Commission, together with the other States (members and observers) of the Barcelona Process. The Arab League shall be invited to the meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, in pursuance of its participation in the Barcelona Process. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean welcomes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro which have accepted the acquis of the Barcelona Process."[162]

The conclusion of this declaration is based on the proposal of the former French presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, who advanced the idea of a "Union of the Mediterranean" during his election night press conference on May 6, 2007.[163] His discourse related from declarations of the failure of the Barcelona Process to the conviction that the time had come for "the Mediterranean and Europe to realise

160 KOM(2007)774 endgültig [First paragraph of the introduction].

161 Ibid. [Comp. 2.3 „Regionale Prozesse"].

162 Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean (Paris, 13 July 2008) Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (18.9.2008) [First chapter "Draft Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean Paris, 13 July 2008)].

163 The author claims that the initiative was first called "Union of (rather that for) the Mediterranean", the change apparently signals that a less ambitious institutionalisation is now envisaged. Comp. Michael EMERSON, Making sense of Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean (CEPS Policy brief No.155/ March 2008), 1; Available Online: http://www.ceps.eu.

that their destinies are tied together"[164] and that it must be the aim to build a political, economic and cultural union "of which our children will be proud of."[165] He also compared a possible initiation of the Mediterranean Union with the moment of the foundation of the European Union.[166] The original idea, limiting the Mediterranean Union just to countries bordering the Mediterranean, provoked criticism at the highest governmental level and in the scientific debate.

When France indented to assign Turkey a strong position within the Mediterranean Union as an alternative to a European membership, Turkey immediately rejected the idea. A far-reaching criticism was to be expected from Germany, which was not willing to except the French attempt to "sideline existing EU policies and hijack European funds to support French Foreign Policy initiatives."[167] The modification of the French proposal to the whole European Union happened due to the vehement intervention of Germany, which determined to prevent a division of competences regarding the political responsibility within the European foreign policy. The position of Great Britain was all but supportive and Spain and Italy expressed their concerns as they feared constraints of the existing Barcelona Process and a decline of their influence within the European Mediterranean policy. The reaction of the Mediterranean partners reflected a certain attitude of expectation regarding a concretion of the French proposal and the apprehension of a limitation of the positive aspects of the Barcelona Process.[168]

Encouraged by the political reaction, the experts and scientists working on the Mediterranean policy appraised the debate about Mediterranean issues and discussed the French motive of initiation and possible outcomes. The discussion on the reaction about the French single-handed initiative focuses on two crucial elements of the Mediterranean policy: on the competition among European national interests, which manifest the European disunity regarding the foreign policy direction; and on the Euro-Mediterranean policy so far. The widespread criticism of the Barcelona Process regarding its bureaucratic ponderosity, its lack of transparency and its "confusing combination" with the European neighbourhood policy found ample consideration. In respect of the actual proposal of a Mediterranean Union, the debates resembled the process of the development of the French proposal; the spectrum reached from the initial idea of limiting a possible Mediterranean Union to the Mediterranean countries and its historical reference, the French initiative of 5+5, to the decision of involving the whole European Union and countries willing to participate in the Barcelona Process and to questions regarding the working process and the institutional structure. What came and what was left from the switch

164 Rosa BALFOUR, Dorothée SCHMID, Union for the Mediterranean, disunity for the EU? (EPC Policy Brief/ February 2008), 1. Available online: http://www.epc.eu/TEWN/pdf/235206674_Union%20for% 20the%20Mediterranean.pdf (27.9.2008).

165 EMERSON, Sarkozy's Union, 1.

166 Dorothée SCHMID, Die Mittelmeerunion- ein neuer französischer Motor für die Europäische Mittelmeer-Politik? (Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik DGAPanylse Frankreich Nr. 1/Januar 2008),5; Available online: http://83.138.170.194/images/mittelmeerunion.pdf (2.6.2008).

167 BALFOUR, Union for the Mediterranean (2008), 1.

168 EMERSON, Sarkozy's Union, 3.

of Sarkozy's "rhetoric from a turning point to an increasing pragmatism"?[169] Where does the proposal of the Mediterranean Union stand today?

With the recognition of the need of "further and faster reforms" and a "qualitative and quantitative change" for the relations across the Mediterranean, the European Commission suggested to "reinforce the successful elements of the existing Barcelona Process" referring to its goals and cooperation areas.[170] "The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" remains a multilateral partnership which focuses on regional and trans-regional projects. In three concrete aspects the new initiatives give a new impulse to the Barcelona Process:[171]

- Upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners;
- Providing more co-ownership to the multilateral relations;
- Making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.

Especially the intended upgrading of the political level leads to some renewals of the institutional cooperation. It has been agreed to hold biennial summits by the heads of state and government, the conclusions constitute a two-year working programme. The annual foreign minister meetings are responsible to review the implementation progress of the summit conclusions, the preparation of upcoming summit meetings and possible approvals of new projects. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly constitutes the legitimate parliamentary expression and the Anna Lindt Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures covers the cultural dimension on the institutionalized level. New elements of cooperation concern the alternate host of the summits either in a European or in a Mediterranean partner country, the establishment of a co-presidency applied to all meetings, the creation of a joint secretariat which shall play a key role in the institutional character and the foundation of a joint permanent committee. This committee, based in Brussels, will assist, prepare and ensure the follow-ups of the meeting of the senior officials, which keep their responsibility to prepare the Ministerial Meetings.[172]

169 SCHMID, Mittelmeerunion (Januar 2008), 5.

170 COM(2008)319 final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean (Brussels, 20.5.2008) 3f. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/docs/com08_319_en.pdf (13.7.2008).

171 Ibid. 4f.

172 Joint Declaration oft he Paris Summit for the Mediterranean (July 2008), 13-17.

III CONCLUDING REMARKS

Without anticipating an overall evaluation of the European Mediterranean policy, some mayor aspects can conclusively be singled out to approach on the success and failure of the Barcelona Process in order to build a bridge to the attempted empirical research.

The Barcelona Process truly constitutes a new form of diplomatic relations across the Mediterranean and provides a coherent concept of a Mediterranean policy approach for the first time since the foundation of the European Union. It represents a partnership, which currently brings together thirty-nine governments and seven hundred million people[173] of different political, economical, social and cultural backgrounds. Not to forget the common agreed declarations of Barcelona 1995 and the summit in Paris 2008, which especially the southern governments involved in regional conflicts to overcome local policy boundaries in order to participate in a cross-border European initiative under the mantle of a common mission. This alone can be credited to be an achievement. The multilateral approach certainly comprises a new issue within Euro-Mediterranean relations and openes a new spectrum of regional cooperation. Another aspect of the success list regarding the Barcelona Process concerns the cultural dimension, the human aspect. Although it is broadly discussed in literature that the agreements regarding democratic values and protection of human rights within the Barcelona Process are not legally binding and that the European Union could do more to support these initiative, it has to be stated that within such a sensitive area, where cultural differences dominate the world conception and easily lead to wars (Afghanistan, Iraq), it has to be considered as an achievement to bring all countries to a table of dialogue.

However, there are impeding factors that limit the success of the European Mediterranean cooperation. As a matter of fact the Mediterranean basin experiences a multitude of challenges, which the countries are not able to face alone. Nevertheless, after reading the literature and documents one receives the impression that the cooperation across the Mediterranean is more than only agreements, forced by external factors. Mediterranean non-member countries hope that Europe constitutes a confidant in geostrategic world policy concerns and their precariousness regarding too much intervention in domestic affairs can be equally perceived. Europe's principal impression is struggle, struggle for a political identity within the immense and fast integration process which it is experiencing.

The mayor criticism of the Barcelona Process concerns its bureaucratic ponderosity and lack of transparency. These kinds of problems constitute structural problems, which are reflected by the European endeavour to establish a right framework for its enlargement policy. The developmental process of the European Mediterranean policy demonstrates the struggle with structural components accurately. From the beginning of bilateral association agreements and first attempts of a global Mediterranean policy to the Barcelona Process and its incorporation in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Union always responded to changes on the European map. Beside the French interests of

173 Ibid.9.

playing a key role in Mediterranean affairs, the Mediterranean Union constitutes a reform of a reform. The Barcelona Process literally dozed off with its incorporation in the ENP. Primary to the socio-economic developments, the need of an efficient Mediterranean policy is required, as can be deduced from the communications of the Commission.[174] The structural struggle does not only concern the setting of the policy framework, but also the internal processes of the European Union. The stressed dualism of the European system regarding the common foreign policy complicates the internal communication and consecutively paralyses the advancement of possibly successful initiatives. This dual structure bears another impeding factor, the divergence of the European national interests. On the one hand, there is a great effort to accord the distinctive interests; on the other hand, the European Union needs to counterbalance the national competitions and possible block constructions as well as to avoid division lines, like inherent North-South or East-South divergences. Regarding the Mediterranean policy, the European Union demonstrates an internal struggle to build a common structure. In foreign affairs it demonstrates the lack of a role identity.

Questioning the postcolonial remains within the European Mediterranean policy provides information about the continuity/discontinuity of imperial claims. This indicates nothing less than the grade of national dominances within a common policy, the motivation and concerns beside the official discourse and, in the best case, provides an additional perspective in order to read the European history and apprehend the current Mediterranean policy.

RESEARCH QUESTION

In the following chapter both, the backgrounds which lead to the formulation of the present research question and the concretions on the definition of the concept of postcolonialism will be highlighted. The approach to the central hypothesis focuses on the preliminary assumptions and on a schematic display of the research aim of this work. Consecutively follows a discussion of the concept of postcolonialism and a definition regarding the applicability of the term.

IV HYPOTHESIS

The approach to the hypothesis of the present work is exposed with an introductive depiction concerning preliminary assumptions on the topic and concludes with a schematic display of the development of the central question of the present analysis.

174 Comp. COM (2008)319 final and KOM (2007) 774 endg.

1 Preliminary assumptions

The hypothesis of the present work is developed from two elementary thoughts regarding current European politics in the Mediterranean region.

The first aspect, which raises further questions, relates to the intention of the initiation of the Barcelona Process. Where does the necessity for this multilateral convention accrue? Which interests follow the countries which participate in the first multilateral approach of a Mediterranean policy? And what does this mean for the European foreign policy - can it be understood as a continuity of the historical interests in the Mediterranean or is it a new way for countries with an obvious economical, political and social discrepancy to deal with each other? The second fascinating issue concerns the fact that the Barcelona Process is synonymously used with the term Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.[175] The establishment of the 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' as political paradigm took place at the very beginning of the Barcelona Process. Challenging this paradigm leads to the following questions: What are the references of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? Which historical concepts stand behind "Euro-Mediterranean"? To what kind of partnership does it refer to? Who or what are the motors for this new political approach? What does it mean for the initiated process? How do the political powers face the apparent inequality among the participants in regard to the distinctive economical, political, social and cultural backgrounds? And what does it mean for the European political understanding of the Mediterranean?

Both, questioning the initiation and challenging the established paradigm of a "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" converge to the same aim: to scrutinise the European position in Mediterranean affairs.

The conflictive discrepancy among the so-called "partners" in the Euro-Mediterranean policy is commonly known and often stressed in the media, as the press articles, which will later be analysed, will demonstrate. The literature explains that the European initiative was mainly based on socio-economic considerations and on the increasing security concern regarding the developments in the Mediterranean non-member countries (MNC). On the other hand, the non-European participants of the Barcelona Process need a reliable linkage with Europe because their economies are more dependent and they face severe challenges, like handling the strong demographic growth with a significant weaker economic, political and social situation compared to Europe. Considering that these are the apparent arguments which may describe the political reason for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it is historically interesting to question the level beneath the official discourse and the explanation of political scientists.

175 The synonymously use of 'Barcelona Process' and 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' is especially common in the political scientist literature and also a common undertaking from the European official side. In the present work the synonymous application of the two terms is not questioned and, if thematically not misleading, occasionally also exercised. Nevertheless, from a historical point of view and the basal placement of the central research aim of this work, the Barcelona Process is understood as a developing process in time, while the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership differs in its conceptuality, as it refers to a political paradigm.

Before the main aspects which legitimate a historical investigation will be discussed, it is necessary to illuminate the high degree of complexity, which the contemporary politics face in the Mediterranean. A punctual approach on the vast topic which encompasses the Mediterranean Policy gives an idea about the actual controversy of the subject matter and clarifies the necessity of limiting the investigation area to the focus of a concrete research aim. The interlacing issues, which mark the topical complexity, are the following[176]:

(1) The initiation of the Barcelona Process took place in 1995, which was no coincidence. (2) Therefore, there is a historical background. (3) The Barcelona Declaration was firmed freely by all participants. (4) Thus, there must be political, economical and cultural interests on both sides of the Mediterranean. (5) But the Mediterranean issue does not engage all European countries the same way. (6) This leads to the assumption of distinctive interests among the European Countries, especially of those which are not tightly linked to the Mediterranean Affairs. (7) Europe has a migration concern regarding the illegal immigration and even a security concern, thus one reason for the initiation of the Barcelona Process could be to legitimate a monitoring position. (8) This would mean the Barcelona Process is an adequate diplomatic instrument to guarantee political allies on both sides of the Mediterranean to secure individual interests. (9) The synonymous use of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Barcelona Process indicates a region-building aspect from the European side as it stresses a reference to a common space. (10) Additional dynamic components of the European Mediterranean Policy lie, for instance, in the increasing cultural challenges which concern this geographical region (terrorist attacks, sensitive religious atmosphere between Christians and Islamists) as well as (11) the political instability (Middle East conflict, radicalisation of political regimes). (12) Other conflictive aspects concern the fact that the mayor financial support of the Barcelona Process is provided by the European Union[177] or (13) that in European tradition the Barcelona Process is highly bureaucratic, which involves (14) a certain ponderosity and opacity in its structure and operation. (15) Consecutively, it makes the whole process all but transparent. (16) Although the official documentation is publicly accessible, it has to be stated that it is the European Union who hosts the archives and reports. (17) The ten-year resume of the Barcelona Process lead from critical voices to the opinion of its failure. (18) The failure was firstly proclaimed by a high political representative in the French presidential elections of 2007. (19) Since then, France took over the political initiative in the Mediterranean Policy which (20) gives the topic a very newsworthy character, especially (21) as the French president succeeded to launch the Mediterra-

176 As it is the aim of the work to scrutinize the attitude and position of the European Union, the punctual approach concerning the complexity of the topic also focuses on European concerns.

177 Since 1957 and the development of a coherent Mediterranean Policy in 1995, the European Union experienced several developmental steps which are also reflected in its denomination. If thematically not misleading, "European Union" is applied as superordinated denomination.

nean Union.[178] (22) The fact that Germany thwarted the French initiative to limit the Mediterranean Union to the countries which boarder the Mediterranean demonstrates the struggle of differing interests among mayor European nations, which not only indicate diverging ambitions regarding their political self-understanding within the EU but, historically explained, root in times of colonialism.

Deriving from this punctual approach on the topical complexity it is necessary to identify aspects which substantiate the legitimacy of a historical investigation. Within the historical scope three common denominators can be deduced from this vast topic: firstly, the novelty-character of the political initiative in the Mediterranean; secondly, the apparent predominant position of the European Union within the Barcelona Process; and thirdly, the European initiated, region-building aspect of the European Mediterranean Policy.

1.1 Novelty character

In the long time of Mediterranean history, it was the first time that the countries involved in the Barcelona Process signed a common declaration. Its historical value goes further than the mutual agreed political, economical and cultural partnership – it actual attempts to guarantee political stability, which inheres nothing less than the character of a treaty of peace. In a historical perspective, this political attitude is a new way to deal with potential conflicts and to face current challenges. In times of globalization, common challenges cannot be solved alone due to the geographical nearness and economical enmeshment of the southern European countries in the Mediterranean area.

In literature, the consensus about the novelty character of the Barcelona Process is dominating. While Richard Gillespie is convinced that it "marked the start of a new chapter in the relations"[179] over the Mediterranean, Stephen C. Calleya calls it even a "unique opportunity to strengthen political, economic and cultural ties across the Euro-Mediterranean area."[180] Annette Jünemann states that never before existed a multilateral forum of dialogue, including the parties involved in the Middle East conflict, which discussed political and security themes regarding the region.[181]

The development of the diplomatic relations across the Mediterranean constitutes de facto a novelty. From a historical point of view, the existence of a commonly agreed Mediterranean Policy, which brings together European countries and Mediterranean non-member countries, may not be underestimated. Questioning the novelty character seems to be a useful undertaking when considering if there is a possible discrepancy between the official European position, which attempts to herald a new politi-

178 Originally, Nicolas Sarkozy planned to launch a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the Mediterranean. Due to the conviction that the Mediterranean concerns the whole European Union, Germany intervened the way that the Mediterranean Union just constitutes a reaffirmation on the Barcelona Process and can be defined as a revitalization of the aims formulated in 1995.

179 Richard GILLESPIE, Introduction: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative. In: Richard GILLESPIE (ed.), The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: political and economic perspectives (London 1997), 1-9, here 1.

180 Stephen C. CALLEYA, Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Mediterranean. In: (Center for European Integration Studies/Discussion Paper C75, Bonn 2000), 39. Available online: www.zei.de.

181 Anette JÜNEMANN, Zehn Jahre Barcelona Prozess: Eine gemeinsame Geschichte. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, APuZ 45/2005 (7.November 2005), 7-13,7.

cal era of Mediterranean Policies, and the actual content of the Mediterranean Policy. The discrepancy between statement and practice indicates in which way the European attitude relates to its past. Has the Union of European states overcome its imperial pretensions, its colonial past? Ruptures, continuities within or a real new era of relations across the Mediterranean are central concerns when questioning the novelty character of the Barcelona Process.

In times of increasing fast-paced developments, the reflection on the Barcelona Process and the European positioning with the knowledge of the Mediterranean and the European history may not only be an interesting undertaking but – in the best case – may inclusively be useful for broadening the discussion field.

1.2 Predominant European positioning

Several aspects of the Barcelona Process show an apparent dominant position of the European Union. At this point three examples shall underline this argument.

First, the initiation: Although the Southern Mediterranean countries were afraid of a cutback of their economic relation to the European market due to the European enlargement policy and demanded compensation, the decisive request for the initiation of the Barcelona Process was made by the southern European Countries. Barcelona hosted the conference where the common declaration was signed and forms part of the nomenclature of the new Mediterranean Policy; this manifests the impression that Europe has been the leading voice for the initiation of the process.

Second, the predominant information position: The procedure and kind of the establishment and implementation of the policy indicate a mainly one-sided knowledge transfer. The negotiation of the framing of the Barcelona Process was a purely European matter. Stephen C. Calleya states that the "Euro-Med process has been essentially EU driven" and argues for a stronger involvement of the MNCs.[182] The discrepancy between a rather dominant position of the European Union and the contribution of the MNCs appears crucial in order to evaluate Europe's position. Another aspect of a predominant information position concerns the documentation of the policy development. The documental access to former meetings, the status of the working process, the agenda, etc. can be obtained from the Web domain of the European Union, which is all but clearly laid out.[183]

The third apparent aspect of a predominant European role in the Mediterranean policy pertains to the financial level: Among the principal concerns for the initiation of the Barcelona Process and the participation in it range socio-economic considerations; the European Union's interest to guarantee the stability on its boarder shores is opposed by the high dependency of the MNC economies on the European market. This motivational dialectic, which facilitated the launch of the Barcelona Process, de-

182 Stephen C. CALLEYA, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process. An Evaluation (Discussion Paper for the Eleventh Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminar, November 16th -17th 2001) Available online: http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/ (24.9.2008).

183 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (24.9.2008).

pends on the European financial support. Without European funds there would be no Mediterranean policy of this kind. This raises a strong concern on deepening the question of the European interests in the Mediterranean. How does Europe deal with its responsibility towards the Mediterranean countries? In which way does the European domination influence the ambitious Mediterranean project? What about the consciousness of this domination? All these questions justify a profound historical analysis, not only because the historical perspective obtains a large knowledge about power and its forms, but also because of its contextual setting. The historical analysis may provide conclusions on how and to what extent power and domination is important for the positioning in the Mediterranean affairs.

1.3 Region-building aspect

The definition of the Mediterranean within the Barcelona Process does not refer to a geographical definition, but constitutes a political construction encompassing the following states and sub-regions: Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, which build the core states of the Maghreb; the Mashreq states Egypt, Israel, Lebanon and Syria, Jordan (which is no Mediterranean country, but was included due to its significance in the Middle East conflict); the Palestinian Authority and Turkey.[184]

One way to detect region-building intentions is to focus on the nomenclature of the Mediterranean Policy. The synonymous use of Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) demonstrates the region-building intention even more accurately than the denomination of "Euro-Mediterranean" indicates a reference to a common space. Even more evident appears the recent revitalisation of the Barcelona Process under the mantle of the "Mediterranean Union".

Another way of approaching the region-building issue of the Barcelona Process is questioning the measures that have been taken for it. Richard Gillespie, who apprehends democratisation as one of the instruments of Euro-Mediterranean region-building, states that "there is a certain plausibility to the argument that an effective international promotion of shared values may contribute to region-building, and may even be a viable form of region building itself, to the extent that the normative effects of the activity become translated into common practices and purposeful interaction between states."[185] By contrast, Stephen C. Calleya refers to the international trend of regionalism when he comprises region-building as a possibility to encourage regional relations. He is convinced that the reactivation of sub-regional initiatives has helped to improve regional relations across the Mediterranean[186] and states that "the main challenge facing the EMP is to try to nurture closer political and economic ties between the

184 Anette JÜNEMANN, Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und politischen Wandel: Interessen und Zielkonflikte. In: Wulfdiether ZIPPEL (Hrsg.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU (Baden-Baden 1999), 29-64.32.

185 Richard GILLESPIE, A Political Agenda for Region-building? The EMP and Democracy Promotion in North Africa. (Institute of European Studies/ Paper 040530, 2004), 2. Available online: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040530 (24.9.2008).

186 Stephen C. CALLEYA, The Euro-Med Partnership and Sub Regionalism: A Case of Region Building? (Institute of European Studies/ Paper 040424, 2004) Available online: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040424 (24.9.2008).

different sub-regions of the Mediterranean that largely continue to follow different evolutionary patterns (…)"[187]

Enhancing region-building measures is no accidental act, but pursues certain intentions. Hence, questioning the European motivation in the Mediterranean and challenging the effort "to promote the construction of a Mediterranean 'region' of stability and peace via the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona Process" seem to be essential.[188] For the present analysis of the historical dimension the following questions are crucial: What are the intentions of a political construct of a "Mediterranean region"? Does the region-building effort in the Mediterranean influence the building of a proper identity as regulatory/hegemonial power within the international power concert? Or from another perspective, how does the regionalism in the Mediterranean enhance or harm the European Mediterranean Policy? And what is the significance of the region-building issue for the relations across the Mediterranean?

2 Schematic display on the development of the central hypothesis

Considering the novelty, the sensitive point of an apparent European domination and the region-building aspect of the Barcelona process, what are the historical denominators which can be referred to analytically? The proposal of the schematic alignment is to refer to the times of colonialism as an obvious link across the Mediterranean as a common historical denominator.



Graph 2: „Development of the hypothesis"; own illustration

187 Stephen C. CALLEYA, Region-building in the Mediterranean: Recent developments in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, (EuroMeSCo E-news Nr.21/February 2008), 4. Available online: http://www.euromesco.net/ images/enews21_en.pdf The sub-regions Calleya refers to are: Southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb and the Mashreq.

188 Emanuel ADLER, Beverly CRAWFORD, Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Building and the Case oft he Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (Institute of European Studies/ Paper 040400, 2004), 2. Available online: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040400 (24.9.2008).

In the last one hundred and fifty years the European powers experienced mayor changes, which influenced both their domestic sphere and their scope of foreign relations. However, the predominant cultural position of the European powers over the last five hundred years seems to be even more relevant. The colonization as a form of expression of the worldwide dominating role of Europe finally found its end in the third quarter of the 20th century[189], at a time when the collaborative thought disembogued in the gradually proceeding formation of the European Union. In the light of the ambitious European project to create a European Union and, therewith, the attempt to herald a new historical period for the European continent, the title of the present work and the question whether the Barcelona Process is a result of postcolonial politics implies a certain provocative aspect. The aim to create something new is challenged by exterior influences to path a new way of political relations and to try to achieve a regulatory power, as for example, in the Middle East Peace Process. Moreover, to remain credible at the same time is a hard undertaking as it can be deduced from the contemporary Mediterranean Policy. The decisive questions, which underline the objective of the present work when questioning the Barcelona Process, are: What is new and what is old? How are new elements and old elements related with each other? Where are ruptures and continuities among policy directions? And where does the official intention differ from the practice? By scrutinising the Barcelona Process as a result of postcolonial politics, it is the preliminary intention to focus on the questions to what extent the European project (EU) has emancipated itself from its past and what are the so-called postcolonial remains, if there are any.

The one hundred and fifty years when the major European nations experienced their climax of imperial power and the fifty years since the official end of colonialism constitute a relative short period in human history. Thus, the question of the nature of the European motivation regarding its Mediterranean Policy seems a relevant undertaking, especially as Europe deduces its experience of over five hundred years of hegemony. Significant results of an evaluation of the nature of the European policy in the Mediterranean can not be gained by analysing circumstantial events of political successes and failures, but by an empirically exercised discourse analysis. By applying discourse analytical methods on sources, which carry distinctive purposes of discourses, the colonial remains within the contemporary European policy in the Mediterranean can be evaluated and classified. It is the central concern of the present thesis to provide a distinctive reading of the European history by means of a particular definition of the postcolonial concept, applying the postcolonial terminology according to a self-reflection of the contemporary European position in the Mediterranean.

3 Research interest

The debate on the contemporary European Mediterranean Policy is obviously dominated by political scientists. The quantity of published works was subjected to the developmental process of the Mediter-

189 Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL, Kolonialismus. Geschichte. Formen. Folgen (München 2003), 124.

ranean Policy. Before 1995, with the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) approach or the Spanish and Italian initiative of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), numerous articles were published and the scientific debate was lit up timely on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process and also since 2007, the year when the former French presidential candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, declared the failure of the Barcelona Process and announced the foundation of a Mediterranean Union. Not surprisingly, the inflationary publication of works indicates the mayor development steps of such a, from a historical point of view, young process.

Among the authors, who can be considered as specialists on the topic range, outstanding approaches can be found. For example, the articles of Annette Jünemann, who focuses on the democratisation aspect as a normative goal of the European Mediterranean Policy and serves as an idea contributor for many other works. Another author which should be highlighted is Stephen Calleya, who accurately analyses the assets and hindrances of the Barcelona Process by consistently remaining inventive. Among several authors, who worked on the Barcelona Process, there are hardly any profound historical reflections considered in the main arguments.

Crucial for the present undertaking is the question of the possible contribution of the historical perspective to the thematic discussion of the Barcelona Process. Approaches of a contemporary setting often face harsh criticism for not exercising real historical research. The European history as an established discipline requires historical approaches in order to support and encourage the reflection on the European project (EU). Questioning the European attitude towards its historical past regarding its contemporary relations across the Mediterranean through discourse analytical methods aspires to provide a different reading of history by widening the focus of the debate; this constitutes a great contribution to a self-reflective European history.

V DEFINING "POSTCOLONIAL"

The term "postcolonial" encompasses a broad range of scientific debates; hence, it is not the aim to give a complete outline of the implementation of "post-colonialism" in humanities by defining the operational use for the present work, but to highlight arguments on specific aspects of the concept in order to justify their appropriation for this selection of topics. In a first step, the thematic diversity and interdisciplinary approach, which postcolonial studies deal with, are discussed. The second step follows with an etymological definition of the term "postcolonial" by important restrictions regarding the use of the term "postcolonial".

1 Thematic diversity and interdisciplinarity

The term "postcolonial", which came up in the 1970s, enjoys great popularity in a broad range of scientific fields which thematically treat political, social, cultural and literary issues in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Arab world, and to lesser or different extents Latin America, Aus-

tralia, Canada, Ireland, and even the United States.[190] Explaining the abundance of possible perspectives of postcolonial studies, David Chioni Moore states that in literature there is “a rough consensus that the cultures of postcolonial lands are characterized by tensions between the desire autonomy and a history of dependence, between the desire for autochthony and the fact of hybrid, part-colonial origin, between resistance and complicity, and between imitation (or mimicry) and originality.”[191] However, not only former colonies entered the room of postcolonial reflection – the cultural impact on the colonizers has also been discussed, although this undertaking has been frequently criticised. According to Bart Moore-Gilbert, there has been a “violent disagreement” among commentators of post-colonialism whether the postcolonial analysis should only treat postcolonial cultures or whether there is an existence of legitimacy – and if yes to what extent – to focus on the culture of the colonizing nations as well.[192] As the colonialist action is based upon a colonizing and a colonized side, there are two positions to refer to. The legitimacy to focus on the colonizer roots not only in the fact that he is decisively involved in the colonialist act, but also that former colonialist relations did not end with the decolonization in many cases.

Nevertheless, the appraisal of the magnitude of issues treated in reference with the postcolonial concept is rather divided. While one side claims its accomplishment regarding the indefinite applicability, the other side criticizes its loss of efficacy as an analytical concept through its overstretched use.[193] Moore Gilbert attributes the elasticity of the concept „postcolonial“ to the fact that the term itself has been applied to many different kinds of historical moments, geographical regions, cultural identities, political predicaments and affiliations, and reading practices.[194] Going through postcolonial literature leaves the impression that despite all attempts of defining the term “postcolonial” it remains ambiguous and diffuse, which leads to permanent debates whenever it is applied. According to Chioni Moore, the auto-critical debate is not only a “remarkabe” achievement within postcolonial studies, but also strengthened the field’s hold.[195] At this point the successful conjunction of the thematic diversity and its interdisciplinary approach can be understood; hence, the different guises in which postcolonial studies treat a variety of topics derive from its interdisciplinary accession, which the concept managed to develop over the time.

One of the outstanding accomplishments, which have been achieved in the context of postcolonial discussions, is that the concept of postcolonialism, which has its origin in the field of English litera-

190 David CHIONI MOORE, Is the Post-in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Toward a Global Postcolonial Critique. In: Gaurav DESAI, Supriya NAIR (eds.), Postcolonialisms. An Anthology of Cultural Theory and Criticism (Oxford 2005),514-538, 541.

191 Ibid. 515.

192 Bart MOORE-GILBERT, Postcolonial Theory. Contexts, Practices, Politics (London/ New York 1997), 11.

193 Maria DO MAR CASTRO VARELA, Nikita DHAWAN (eds.), Postkoloniale Theorie. Eine kritische Einführung (Bielefeld 2005), 112.

194 MOORE-GILBERT, Postcolonial Theory, 11.

195 CHIONI MOORE, Post- in Postcolonial, 515.

ture, has managed to cross traditional boundaries of scientific disciplines in a short time.[196] The provenance of postcolonial studies is rooted in the “Commonwealth Literary Studies”, which originally examined the literature of colonies belonging to the British Empire. In a relative short time, a deeper examination of the culture and structure of the predominance proved to be needful. After the publication of Edward Saids’ book “Orientalism,” the methodological approach of a decided postcolonial discourse analysis enriched the scope of postcolonial studies. While the term “Postcolonial Studies” was synonymously used with “Commonwealth Literature Studies” before 1978, it found its own place within humanities after the publication of Saids’ pioneering work.[197] The interdisciplinary claim arises with configurations such as “colonial discourse analysis,” which insists upon the entanglement between literature, history, politics, sociology and other disciplines.[198] Ato Quayson, who analyses the dimension of interdisciplinarity in postcolonial studies, differentiates between instrumental interdisciplinarity, which is designed to intervene in specific problems in the world outside academia, and synoptic interdisciplinarity, which collates ideas either for the constitution of different disciplines or for the application of synthetic theory across disciplines.[199] According to Quayson, postcolonial studies are highly interdisciplinary in the synoptic sense; in order to comprehend the complex relations, which underlie the process of colonialism, and the consequences, there is a necessity to cross disciplinary adhered boundaries.[200]

Although postcolonial studies mainly focus on the former colonies as object of investigation and the analysis towards the opposite direction, the colonizers, is critically viewed, it is the purpose of the present work to provide a thematic amplification. The central hypothesis does not deal with the influences and consequences of colonialism on the culture of the colonizers, but tries to give answers to the colonial remains in the current Mediterranean politics. The postcolonial theory enables to widen the analytic scope to contemporary European politics due to its inherent ambition to examine complex structures not in a linear way and its search to cross traditional boundaries either in a thematically or disciplinary sense in order to find new approaches. Consequentially, every use of postcolonial theory and methodology takes place under the critical eyes of scientific authorities of the distinctive disciplines. For me, the elasticity of the concept of postcolonialism can not be valued as weakness, but as strength instead as long as methodological guidelines are respectively considered. The examination of the colonial act remains in the current European politics in the Mediterranean attempts to point out patterns of actions, intersections of interests, diverse political positioning and hidden conceptual perceptions of political allies in order to provide a self-reflective analysis of the history of the European

196 MOORE-GILBERT, Postcolonial Theory, 8.
197 DO MAR CASTRO VARELA, DHAWAN (eds.), Postkoloniale Theorien, 22f.
198 MOORE- GILBERT, Postcolonial Theory, 8. See also DO MAR CASTRO VARELA, DHAWAN (eds.) Postkoloniale Theorien, 24f.
199 Ato QUAYSON, Instrumental and Synoptic Dimensions of Interdisciplinarity in Postcolonial Studies. In: Laura CHRISMAN, Benita PARRY (eds.), Postcolonial Theory and Criticism, (Camebridge 2000), 75-95, 75.
200 Ibid. 76.

Union. The methodological concern of applying a colonial discourse analysis and aiming for a well-founded interdisciplinary approach is therefore based within the tradition of postcolonial theory.

2 Etymological approach

The etymological provenience of the composite term “postcolonial” derives from Latin. The prefix “post” refers to two different meanings: first, the utilisation as adverb and preposition concerning spacious specifications expresses “back” or “behind,” while its second significance derives from its use as temporal preposition meaning “after” and “since” respectively.[201] Colonialism traces back in its substantive meaning to 1. *colōnia, -ae (f.):* settlement, colony as well as settler, cultivator and its verbal denotation 2. *colō 3. coloī cultus:* cultivate*,* settle but also to feed, adorn, educate, conduct, exercise, admire and appraise.[202]

In its conceptual meaning the sentiments vary and focus on different positions and perceptions of history. Stuart Hall, an often quoted author in regard to the definition and appointment of the meaning of the term postcolonial, questions the references of postcolonial times. He argues that if the postcolonial time refers to the time after colonialism and if colonialism is defined trough the binary differentiation between colonizers and colonized, one has to interrogate the matter and character of differences.[203] Hence, important guidelines of intellectual reflectiveness derive which question changes and break lines throughout history, especially in the period of decolonization. It is to say that instead of interpreting history as a linear process, postcolonial theory allocates itself in the examination of inconsistencies in historical processes.[204] Although the postcolonial concept is often criticised due to its theoretical and political ambivalent positioning regarding a clear division between colonizer and colonized and also due to its temporal ambiguity, as there is no apparent separation between an epistemological or chronological periodisation, Hall nevertheless states that the term might be useful to explain the change in global relations which marks the transition from the times of Empires to post-dependency and post- decolonization.[205] He ascribes the capability of analysing the new relations and distributions of power, which emerge in new constellations, to the fact that the postcolonial concept contains a great level of abstraction. At the same time, he emphasises that the intersection from one conception of difference to another marks the focus of the “postcolonial” and this change encourages reading the colo-

201 J.M STOWASSER, M. PETSCHENIG, F. SKUTSCH, Stowasser. Lateinisch – deutsches Schulwörterbuch (Zug 1997), 391.

202 Ibid. 97 and also Friedrich KLUGE, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache (Berlin²³ 1999), 463.

203 Stuart HALL, Wann gab es ‘das Postkoloniale’? Denken an der Grenze. In: Sebastian CONRAD, Shalini RANDERIA (eds.), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt/New York 2002), 217-246, 217.

204 DO MAR CASTRO VARELA, DHAWAN (eds.), Postkoloniale Theorien, 24.

205 Ibid. 225.

nial encounter, which so far focused on binary oppositions in a new way.[206]

David Chioni Moore starts his reflection on the terminology of “postcolonial” with the conclusive statement that “it is no doubt true that there is, on this planet, not a single square meter of inhabited land that has not been, at one time or another, colonized and then postcolonial.”[207] Chioni Moore, being not such a representative spokesman of postcolonial theory as Stuart Hall, convinces with his reflection of postcolonialism in reference with the former Soviet Union not only because of the thematically new approach, but also with the analysis of a supranational, multi-ethnical state as object of research. He points out that the term “postcolonial” was invented in order to replace termini which forfeit precision regarding the political correctness such as “non- Western”, “Third World”, “minority” and “emergent”.[208] Chioni Moore emphasizes that the concept of “postcolonial” apparently worked better than all the other terms: “it lacked the derogations of former labels, it specified what unified its compass (a former subjugated relation to Western powers), it embodied a historical dimension, and it opened analytic windows onto common features of peoples who had only recently, and to the extent possible, thrown off their European chains.”[209]

Not the replacement of conceptual terminology, but the appraisal of the multitude of things which are treated beneath the wording “postcolonial” come in valuation with the approach of Gaurav Desai and Supriya Nair. It is their suggestion to precise the terminology of postcolonial theory by using the term’s plural “postcolonialisms.” Hence, they aim to grant respect to the multitude of historical experiences of colonialism and to highlight the variety of work which is carried out under the term “postcolonialism(s)”.[210]

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206 “(…) Doch eine vorbehaltlose Rückkehr zu einem reinen und unverfälschten Ursprung erwies sich als unmöglich, da die langfristigen historischen Auswirkungen der ‘Transkulturation‘, die für die koloniale Erfahrung charakteristisch waren, meiner Ansicht nach irreversibel waren. Die Unterschiede zwischen kolonisierten und kolonisierenden Kulturen bleiben natürlich fundamental. Doch beruhten sie nie auf einer reinen binären Opposition und tun das auch heute nicht. Ja, ich würde sogar den Wandel seit den Konstellationen, in denen die antikoloniale Auseinandersetzungen scheinbar in einer binären Form dargestellt werden konnten, bis heute, wo das nicht mehr möglich ist, als Übergang von einer Konzeption der Differenz zu einer anderen bezeichnen, von der Differenz zur *differance*; und es ist eben dieser Wandel, der den periodischen oder versetzt erfolgenden Übergang zum ‚Postkolonialen‘ kennzeichnet (vgl. S. Hall 1992). Er markiert ihn jedoch nicht nur im Sinne von ‚damals‘ und ‚jetzt‘. Er verpflichtet uns auch, die binäre Form selbst in der die koloniale Begegnung so lange dargestellt wurde, neu zu lesen. Er verpflichtet uns, die binären Oppositionen als Formen der Transkulturation, der kulturellen Übersetzung neu zu lesen, die unweigerlich dazu führen, die kulturelle Dichotomie von hier und jetzt permanent in Frage zu stellen.“ Ibid. 226.

207 CHIONI MOORE, Post- in Postcolonial, 515.

208 “The notion ‘non-Western’ was a sham since it lumped four billion people under a single name and privileged the fragment called West. ‘Emerged’ worked no better, since the cultures and peoples so described had been producing literature for millennia before most Europeans stopped wearing bearskins or began to read; even Goethe was aware of that. ’Minority’ was even worse. And ‘Third World’, though honourable, even revolutionary, birth and still with strong defenders also seem to have flaws: the tertiary status; the recent disappearance of the Second World; the presence of Third Worlds within the First; the odd lumping of, say, Singapore and Mali, and more.” Ibid., 517.

209 Ibid., 517.

210 Gaurav DESAI, Supriya NAIR (eds.), Postcolonialisms. An Anthology of Cultural Theory and Criticism (Oxford 2005), 2.

These ways of reflections on the terminology of postcolonialism, which have been singled out from the multitude of approaches, demonstrate despite their different focuses that the definition of the postcolonial concept has to do a lot with constructed and implemented perceptions in history. Postcolonialism in its primary meaning refers to the time “after” colonialism, the time of decolonization. From its basal concept, there is no indication of an explicit geographical or temporal reference; therefore, there are no specific restrictions on its applicability. Consequentially, there are no arguments against its focus on European politics in the Mediterranean and its contemporary frame. Concerning the term postcolonialism in this work, the prefix ‘post’ does not implicate that colonial relations vanished with the official end of the colonial period in the 1970s. In this sense I follow Padmini Mongia, arguing that the ‘post’ in postcolonial can be read as a reference to both changes in power and structure after the end of colonialism and the continuing effects, particularly as they are discursively manifested.[211] Hence, postcolonialism functions as an umbrella term, which covers different critical approaches in order to deconstruct the European thought.[212]

Concerning the concepts of binary oppositions (now – then, they – us…), it is important to underline that they can be useful analytical parameters in a restricted sense, but they never give comprehensive information about any moment in history. The achievement within the postcolonial theory lies in the approach to try to overcome these polarities with a different look on history, not in the way to accentuate linearity, but to accentuate the changes and break lines. Regarding the history of the European Union, ruptures and repetitions in common historical patterns seem to be a very important issue, especially as all member countries refer to a different colonial past. To examine the new positioning in the world power concert, politics in a supposed new mantle and hidden paradigms are central concerns. Within the postcolonial theory a transnational historiography can take place as well as an attempt to reread the colonial history by applying a colonial discourse analysis.

3 Restriction

Among the criticism concerning the postcolonial theory there are two reproaches I conclusively want to comment on.

One is the intense criticism on Eurocentric positions, which also takes an ample place in postcolonial debates. Following Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, who both define Eurocentrism as a model on which the histories and social formations of all societies can be measured and evaluated,[213] the disaggregation of this approach also has to find room in the scientific tradition. Although the claim to overcome Eurocentric visions in the defined sense is comprehensive and needful, it is important to be aware of the provenience of this conception and its supposed legitimacy until now. Europe, a continent

211 Padmini MONGIA, Postcolonial Theory. A Reader (New York 1996), 2.
212 Ibid. 2.
213 Sebastian CONRAD, Shalini RANDERIA (eds.), Jenseits des Eurozentrismus. Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften (Frankfurt/New York 2002), 12.

whose history was determined by hegemony over the last centuries, looks retrospectively back on an assertiveness which is profoundly rooted in its culture. Hence, a hypothesis, which questions the colonial and imperial leftovers within a newly designed Mediterranean politics, needs a Eurocentric reference in order to reach significant results on a self- reflective European history. The focus on European history regarding a colonial discourse analysis does not, at any point, want to raise the impression of negating room in the debate to the ones, who were domineered by European powers, especially as there is still the need for a lot of historical work. A self-reflective analysis of the European history may inclusively provide an additional perspective to the debate.

Another point, which demands clarification, results from critical statements. For example, Ania Loombia appoints that using "postcolonial" as a term implicates the abnegation of the richness of the indigenous culture before the colonization.[214] Such convictions make it necessary to straighten out a sensitive point, which inevitably comes along with working on historical relations of predominance and suppression in contemporary nearness. The attention, which focuses on the utilization of the term "postcolonial" in the present work, does not pretend a valuation of the history of colonialism to any extent.[215] A political instrumentalisation of this sensitive topic in scientific debates, based in declaredly hard times, has to be strictly rejected. This investigation may aim to contribute to a wider perspective on political relevant fields, but should take place in a well considered way.

METHOD

The following remarks aim to illustrate the methodological outline of this doctoral thesis. In this sense, explanations on the structural composition are important as introductive annotations on both, the methodology of historical discourse analysis and the nature of sources, which build the fundament of the analysis.

VI STRUCTURE OF THE WORK

The structural setting of the present work, which is schematically outlined in the graph below, is basically arranged in two parts, an introductive oriented part and an empirically based part. The first part, the theoretical frame, provides a scientific and thematic introduction. For both concerns secondary literature is the main base for arguing development-orientated remarks on the hypothesis, terminological concretions, methodological specifications and topical contextualization. The second part, the em-

214 DO MAR CASTRO VARELA, DHawan, Postkoloniale Theorie, 23.

215 This includes the actor's as victim's perspective; therefore, an eventual overestimation of the former colonial powers or an assumed depreciation of the situation of colonized cultures does not at any moment form a part of this assignment.

pirical investigation, represents the analytical heart of this doctoral thesis. The discourse analysis, applied on three different kinds of sources (European documents, speeches of political personages and articles published in the European press media), shall provide the analytical results to respond to the hypothesis. The introduction and especially the conclusion, which aims to provide a confirmatory trial by means of considering institutional structures and socio-economic developments, round the work off.

Graph 3: Structural alignment of the present work, own Illustration

While the introduction fulfils its assignment through introductive remarks on the topic, the theoretical frame provides the thematic and methodological background to put the aim and conduction of the empirical analysis across. The descriptions of the thematic introduction and the development of the hypothesis, the applied methodology form the setting of the analysis of the present work. Outlining the research question, method and thematic introduction will roughly form a bit less than a third of the entire work.

As already mentioned before, the empirical part forms the heart of the present work. It is the aim to give an overview of the establishment, implementation and the perception of the official discourse of the European Union regarding the Mediterranean policy by an accurately applied methodology. Therefore, the emphasis is on an examination of three different types of primary sources: documents of the European Union, speeches of personages of political or public weight and articles published by the European Media[216]. While the analysis of documents of the European Union interrogates the political discourse in its establishment function, the analysis of speeches shows the intended discourse regarding its persuasive implementation and the analysis of the articles demonstrates the public perception in different European countries. Hence, the discourse analysis targets to achieve results on the kind of discourse Europe is basing its Mediterranean policy on. Concerning the extensiveness of this examination, the discourse analysis constitutes about two-thirds of the entire work.

216 Note: Newspapers and magazines which are published in English, German, Spanish, French and Italian find consideration. The selection is based on the languages skills of the author.

The conclusion completes the work. In accordance to the focus of the present research aim, the crucial aspects will be subsumed and assessed in regard to the gained results.

The covered aspects shall give a detailed valuation of the European Mediterranean policy. They shall provide a comprehensive classification of the historical relations over the Mediterranean. At this point it is important to emphasis that the discourse analysis constitutes the most promising method to evaluate postcolonial remains in current Mediterranean politics.

VII Sources

The discourse analysis will be exercised on the basis of three different types of sources: documents of the European Union, speeches of political personages and articles published by the press media in Austria, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. The following schematic alignment demonstrates the corpus of sources and the analytical considerations regarding the selection:



Graph 4: OI, schematic alignment and analytical consideration of the selection of sources, own illustration

The divergence and amplitude of sources aims to provide a broad coverage of different discourses regarding the Mediterranean policy. Hence, the European documentation reflects the official institutional discourse of establishing a certain policy direction, while the speeches of politicians show the intention of implementing the discourse publicly; the press gives indications on the general perception, offers reactions on the discourse and expresses its own attitude. Consequentially, the analysis takes place on three distinctive levels of the discourse: on the institutional, political and public level. These three distinctive but interlaced levels constitute different discursive performances due to the fact that the official discourse is actively expressed on both the institutional level (EU documentation) and on

the political level (speeches). The European documents refer to the process of establishing a discourse concerning the Mediterranean policy. Considering both, the policy proposals of the European Commission and the conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings, it is possible to analyse an important spectrum of discourses of the European institutions.[217] Analysing speeches of political representatives of the European Commission and Council also constitutes an active step as the discourse targets to persuade and convince, respectively the public of the motives and push the implementation of the intended policy direction forward. It is to expect that the speeches give clearer expressions of the motivation and functionality of the discourse than the official documents because they follow a more standardised expressed discourse. A comparison of both discourses will be interesting as both kinds of sources correspond to the same side of action. The reaction on the political discourse of the European Union can be evaluated by analysing the public level. The articles of the mayor quality newspapers of Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland shall provide an idea on the public perception of the Mediterranean policy per se and on the country specific importance of Mediterranean affairs. The country selection, which is based on language skills, provides a significant choice of member states of the European Union. Countries with a mayor political weight in European affairs (D, GB, F) and the Western European Mediterranean countries (E, I, F), who decisively influence the direction of the Mediterranean policy, are considered as well as a small European member country (A) and a non-European member state (CH). The selection of newspapers was oriented on agenda setting aspects and the balance between more conservative and liberal political orientations.

The temporal setting of the sources concerns the period between the initiation of the Barcelona Process in 1995 and the Conference in Paris in 2008 where an anew declaration was signed in order to revitalize the process. Concerning the quantity of sources that are considered in the analysis, Achim Landwehr already noted that it is quite hard to define the moment of reaching the adequate and reliable amount of results to begin with the discourse analysis.[218] Of course, this personal decision, which disrupts a possible endless work, bears the criticism of imprecision or incompleteness. The question is how the significance of results can be guaranteed by the amount of sources and temporal preconditions of writing a doctoral thesis. The roughly five hundred sources – all of different length – can not raise the claim of completeness, but they have been selected with the largest possible amount of comparability und accurateness. Similar to the importance of random samples in sociology it can be argued that drawing the main argumentative streams of the political discourse of the European Union will not denote a kind of deficiency for the present work. It will rather contribute a new approach to the scien-

217 The discourse spectrum of the selected sources is comprehensive considering the decision making process within institutional frame. The European Commission elaborates proposals and communications, respectively to the European Council and to the European Parliament regarding the content and direction of – in this case – the Mediterranean policy. The decision making authority is held by the European Council and the Foreign Ministerial Council, respectively, who is represented in the Foreign Minister meetings. Therefore, the selected documents represent the spectrum of the internal process of policy development and a formal process of an agreed policy which is designated by the member of the Barcelona Process.

218 LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren. Einführung in die historische Diskursanalyse (Tübingen 2001), 131.

tific debate as both the methodological and thematic approach constitute a singularity beneath the works on the Barcelona Process and leave – in the best and the worst case – further challenges.

VIII METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURE

The methodological approach of the empirical analysis is based on the historical discourse analysis with a thematic focus on the current European Mediterranean policy. A short introduction on the method, the procedure and the development of the investigation criteria as well as the questionnaire, which will be applied, is provided in the following chapter.

1 Historical discourse analysis

The displacement of historicism in thought and methodology facilitated an approach on history with the guiding idea to understand the aim of the science, namely to bring the enlightenment forward. A reconstruction of the so far teleological based mission statement lead to a science of history, whose characteristics originate in an open attitude towards modernity, criticism, a theory based approach and an enlightened-emancipatory function. This reconfiguration of a disciplinary understanding disembogued in the establishment of the historical social science. A newly reformation of the historical undertaking began in the 1980ies with amplified theoretical, methodological and thematically approaches towards gender studies, historical studies of everyday life, micro history, historical anthropology and cultural studies. Therewith, not only a self-critical attitude within the science of history came along, but also an amplification of the historical horizon.[219]

Improvements of this kind shall not happen without severe disputes and defences of the actual status. This of course implies critical debates whenever new methodological approaches occur. The historical discourse analysis, which in the meanwhile advanced to a method belonging to the "state of the art" in history, encompasses a wide range of methodological and empirical studies. Thus, the attempt to give an overall explanatory definition of this methodological approach has become a difficult undertaking. This is the reason why the focus at this point is not on the various concepts and outstanding approaches of scientists (like the representatives of the Annales School, the Historical Semantic Approach, the Intellectual History and the Cambridge School respectively, the Narrative Approach, Linguistic turn, New Historicism), who encouraged the development of the discourse analysis, nor will the single approaches of Michael Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bordieux or Jacques Derrida come into the fore because they would disrupt the context. I will rather give attention to some work relevant aspects, such as the definition of the term "discourse" itself and the relation between language, history and power.

219 Comp. Michael MASET, Diskurs, Macht und Geschichte. Foucaults Analysetechniken und die historische Forschung (Frankfurt/New York 2002), 9-11.

The matter of defining "discourse" as a term shows that there are not only controversies regarding its methodological use. It occurred that the term "discourse" advanced to an everyday-word and inclusively experienced an inflationary use as nearly every scientific paper claims a discursive denomination. Therefore, one can understand "discourse" as an umbrella term, which covers distinctive theoretical concepts of different disciplinary approaches.[220] In addition, this imprecision is amended with the matter of linguistic determinations depending in which language "discourse" is applied. There is, for instance, a significant discrepancy between the applicability of the German word "Diskurs" and the English word "discourse", in the sense that in German "Diskurs" has no connotation of an everyday utility.[221] Hence, the English term "discourse" remains vague to a certain extent. Its significance regarding the applicability in a historical use demands an individual specification.

History and language are tightly linked to each other as history relays on sources produced and shared by human beings, whose explicit communication channel is language per se. Therefore, language is conceived as a social act with an interactive character. Regarding a historical discourse analysis, this implies that in the first place the examination is based on historical methods and sources which mainly constitute texts and images, in contemporary matters also recorded spoken language. In the second place, the historical discourse analysis understands language as interaction and converts this assumption to the central focus of its work.[222] Thus, the historical discourse analysis acts on the assumption that to a certain historical moment there is just a limited amount of statements related to a certain topic, although in a linguistic sense there is an infinite amount possible. Hence, it is the discourse which controls the possibilities of statements of a certain subject and organizes what is said and thought.[223] Thus, the discourse analysis constitutes a method which examines the status, the appearance, the conditions of exercising, the functioning, the institutionalizing and the transformation of discourses in history, but also the conditions, techniques and regularities which have to exist in a certain moment and context so that a statement can be taken as truth; the central aim of the discourse analytic method is not the legitimacy, but the lighting of the conditions for gaining acceptance of statements .[224]

At the time a discourse analysis takes place in a historical perspective and both the term and the methods are defined, one inevitably crosses Michael Foucault. In this work the utilisation and comprehension of a discourse analysis happens in great nearness to Foucault. Firstly, his definition of discourse corresponds to a great extent to the aim of the present work. Foucault remarks that a discourse can be defined regarding its order of symbols, meaning that our understanding of the world occurs in a way

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220 Comp. Achim LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 66.

221 Ibid. 67.

222 Ibid. 71.

223 „Die historische Diskursanalyse geht von der Beobachtung aus, dass zu einem bestimmten historischen Zeitpunkt nur eine begrenzte Menge von Aussagen zu einem bestimmten Thema gemacht werden kann, obwohl rein sprachlich gesehen eine unendliche Menge von möglichen Aussage existiert. Es ist der Diskurs, der die Möglichkeiten von Aussagen zu einem bestimmten Gegenstand regelt, der das Sagbare und denkbare organisiert." Ibid.7.

224 MASET, Diskurs, 132-137.

that our thoughts correspond to a certain order of symbols, which can be examined. He ascertains a discursive formation, when a certain amount of utterances in a similar system of diffusion with certain regularity can be detected. In this way, a discourse is a mode of speaking, which is or can be institutionalized, and whose rules and mechanisms of functionality can be equally identified. Thereby, the importance is not in what was actually meant to express, but in the difference between what could have been said, following the rules of grammar and logic in a certain moment of time and what has been said. So, the essential questions are how certain statements repeatedly appear on a certain position and why this happens in a certain moment in history. [225] Secondly, his awareness of the relation between power and language is especially important at the time of a discourse analysis in the historical context of colonialism. An attitude, which understands power as 'always present,'[226] accomplishes different requirements concerning the development of a methodological approach as, for example, the contemporary colleague of Foucault, Jürgen Habermas. Habermas, known for his opposing position to Foucault's understanding of discourse, offers an interesting approach on the topic. However, his theory is more concerned with the political ideal[227] of democracy than with the offering of methodological approaches on how to deconstruct a discourse in order to detect certain features like power relations. Consequentially, the methodological concern is of central meaning for the reflection of topic relevant literature; the nearness to Foucault rather results from his extensive argument on methodological proceeding than from his philosophical view of the world. This nearness can be also explained on the basis of the definition of three forms of discourse analysis by Phillip Sarasin. He states that the first form of discourse analysis is the etymological analysis based on conceptual history and lexicon; the second form defines the term "discourse" according to the theory of Derrida and Lacan and finds its application close to texts and words; the third form finally operates with Foucaults' understanding of discourse detached from words and objects.[228] Unlike others Foucault targets on the historical narrowness, the factual shortness of single statements and speech acts, respectively; following Sarasin, discourses according to Foucault move in an intermediate space between words and objects, where they compose a compact materiality with inherent, describable rules to control social constructions of objects in the same way as to assign a location to the speaking subject, where the speaking and its language can develop.[229]

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225 LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 77-82.

226 Bent FLYVBJERG, Habermas and Foucault: thinking for civil society? In: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol.49/2 (June 1998), 210-233, here 216.

227 Ibid. 219.

228 Phillip SARASIN, Diskurstheorie und Geschichtswissenschaft. In: Reiner KELLER, Andreas HIRSELAND, Werner SCHNEIDER, Willy VIEHÖVER (Hrsg.), Handbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse, (Bd. 1 ,Opladen 2001), 53-79, 60.

229 „Diskurse bewegen sich nach Foucault in einem ‚Zwischenbereich' zwischen Worten und Dingen, wo diese eine kompakte Materialität mit eigenen, beschreibbaren Regeln darstellen, um auf diese Weise die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Dinge ebenso zu steuern wie dem sprechenden Subjekt einen Ort zuzuweisen, an dem sich sein Sprechen und seine Sprache erst entfalten können." Ibid. 61.

The decision of an historical discourse analysis with the consideration of the methodological approaches of Michael Foucault is both a personal choice and a topical requirement; the political discourse of the European Union in the Mediterranean is a) temporally limited as it started in 1995 when, for the first time, bilateral treaties were extended by a multilateral dimension and b) strongly influenced by power interests which ought to be dismantled in order to examine the current politics on continuities and discontinuities of colonialism.

Due to the fact that discursive elements are never neutral[230] and language has become a primary medium of social control and power,[231] the development of the criteria for of the present discourse analysis will be explicated in detail. However, before the illustration of this outline, the question of the situation of the so-called colonial discourse analysis has to be resolved.

Colonial discourse analysis

What are the specifications in the treatment of a discourse analysis and colonialism? What does that mean for the present work? According to María do Mar Castro Varela and Nikita Dhawan, a colonial discourse analysis constitutes an important part of postcolonial theory and represents a new way of reading colonial history because cultural and economical processes are considered as reciprocally determining formations of colonialism.[232] Furthermore, Do Mar Castro Varela and Dhawan identify two aims of a colonial discourse analysis[233]; first, to target the overlapping of ideas and institutions between knowledge and power in the sense of Foucault in order to widen the perspective of colonial studies; beside the apparent manifested side of colonial dominance, the examination focuses on the mighty power of representation; second, in this undertaking the colonial discourse analysis acts on the assumption that literature can only be understood when it finds a combined consideration of the disciplines history, politics, philosophy, social studies and others.

2 Methodological procedure

As it is the aim of the historical discourse analysis to demonstrate how our "reality" became historic, this method exposes the implicitness and obviousness, exhibits options for actions and willingly questions accepted evidences.[234] How is it possible to suffice these claims and to detect historical realities within the political, economical, social and cultural contexts? The methodological procedure takes place according to the general proceeding of Archim Landwehr regarding the processing of discourse

230 Ibid. 66.

231 Norman FAIRCLOUGH, Language and power (London 1998), 3.

232 "Die koloniale Diskursanalyse als wichtiger Teil postkolonialer Theorie repräsentiert einen neuen Weg Kolonialgeschichte zu lesen, werden hier doch sowohl kulturelle als auch ökonomische Prozesse als sich bedingende Formationen des Kolonialismus betrachtet." DO MAR CASTRO VARELA, DHAWAN, Postkoloniale Theorie (2005), 24.

233 Ibid. 24f.

234 „Indem die historische Diskursanalyse zeigen kann, inwiefern unsere Wirklichkeit historisch ‚gemacht' ist, deckt sie Selbstverständlichkeiten auf, weist auf Handlungsmöglichkeiten hin und stellt allzu bereitwillig hingenommene Evidenzen in Frage." LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren (2001), 172.

analysis; this approach refers to the structural proceeding rather than to the conceptual meaning of the discourse analysis provided by Foucault[235]:

- The first step is the identification of these sources which form the material corpus of the examination. The nature and specific characteristics as well as quantitative aspects find consideration here.
- The next undertaking corresponds to the analysis of the context. Therefore, four different aspects come into consideration: the *situational context,* which questions who does what where in a certain moment; the *medial context,* which appoints the form of media where texts occur; the *institutional context,* which focuses on the manner and structure of the institution as well as on the role of certain personages dealing with it; and the *historical context,* which deals with the political, social, economical and cultural overall situation.
- The third step is the text analysis where the macro and micro structure find separate consideration. Both are important sources of information for a wider historical context of the discourse.[236] The macro structure concentrates on aspects which constitute the level of meaning like texture, graphic design, paragraphs, introduction, conclusion and passages of transition or the relation between speech and writing as well as the presentation principals. The micro structure focuses on aspects like argumentation, stylistics and rhetoric, which can analysed by considering the textual level and the specific application of sentences and words.
- The last step is the discourse analysis itself. After dealing with step one to three follows the combination of the results because the handling of the discourse makes it necessary to refer to concrete statements, as discourse and statements determine each other. By means of outstanding singular traits within the texts, it is possible to (re)design argumentative lines which cross the corpus of sources. For a continuative evaluation of the discourse it is necessary to define adequate categories of perception, constructions of significance and contributions to the construction of identity in order to examine its historical mutability.

These four steps form the methodological frame of the discourse analysis. The criteria for the composition of the sources have shortly been outlined in the preceding chapter; as the discourse analysis plans to consider basically three different types of sources (documents of the European Union, speeches and articles), the examination of the context and the macro structure have to be individually identified for each category of sources. Specifications regarding the assessment of the context, the macro and micro structure and the discourse analysis will be argued for each category in the corresponding chapter.

235 The punctual steps are defined on the basis of LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren (2001), 106-134.
236 Ibid. 113f.

Thematic implementation

After having outlined the theoretical setting and the adequate methodology, it is the aim to expound the aspired thematic implementation regarding the empirical realisation at this point.

The four steps suggested by Achim Landwehr constitute the basic guideline of the analytical proceeding. In accordance with the useful implementation regarding the research aim and the different nature of the sources they might be differently weighted.

As there will be three different sources considered in the present analysis, the assessment of the "identification of the sources", step 1 according to Landwehr, will accurately be stressed for each source. The context analysis, step 2, of the regarded sources will be examined according to the necessity of completion after the detailed contextual setting of chapter one by each source. Regarding the European documents and the speeches of the representatives of the European Commission and the European Council, further contextual information on the institutional frame of the European Union and the procedure of evolving the official documents will be provided. Concerning the analysis of the public discourse, additional information on the considered country might be useful.

Step 3, the macro and micro structural analysis, will be carried out for the documents assigned to the European Commission and the European Council, because they provide a high level of standardisation which facilitates such an undertaking. However, the macro and micro structural analysis of the 36 speeches and more than 400 articles would exceed the scope of the present work. Style, wording and structure of both speeches and articles are dependent on the individual, who elaborates them. The present work concentrates on the evaluation of the overall discourse; this constitutes the main argument for the consideration of such a large number of sources. Nevertheless, a profound analysis, especially of the micro-structural elements of the discourses of certain politicians, like Manuel Marín, Javier Solana, Benita Ferrero-Waldner or Nicolas Sarkozy, or of single newspapers with a stronger focus on the political inclination, would be an interesting undertaking for further investigation.

The discourse analysis, step four by Landwehr, is carried out with the greatest possible accurateness.

For scrutinizing the discursive elements of colonial characteristics or colonial remains, two superordinated categories can be identified in order to establish argumentative streams. The first category questions the possible "colonial" power regarding **expression** and **purpose.** The second category questions the determining factor of any kind of policy, namely **identity**. These constitute the three superordinate analytical categories which will be applied on each type of source:



Graph 5: Overlook of the analytical categories applied in the discourse analysis, own illustration.

The category "expression" aims to highlight statements which implicitly or explicitly refer to putative colonial remains within the European position and attitude. The references, which at the same time constitute the sub-ordinated categories, concern the question of the "other", associative and/or dissociative elements between the so-called partners, the references to a Mediterranean region, European dominance and the perception of the Mediterranean Policy. The questions guiding the procedure at the time of analysis of the sources are the following: What kind of terminology, situations are referred to when talking about "the other", the Mediterranean non-member countries? Which kind of associative and/or dissociative elements are mentioned in the context of the cooperation within the Barcelona Process? At the moment of defining the Mediterranean as a space, and establishing a political paradigm like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, what are the applied references in the discourses of the distinctive sources? Are there reasons for a suggested common Mediterranean space which could lead to a so-called common, a Euro-Mediterranean identity? Where is the European predominance obvious and at what point does it seem apparent? What kind of rhetoric does the European Union refer to in relation to claims of power? Does this occur in an obvious, hidden or suggestive way? Are there explicit or implicit references to colonialism? Which denominations, conceptions, changeability regarding the terminology can be detected with respect to the European policy apprehension? How is the Mediterranean Policy perceived?

These questions relate to a maximum of five sub-categories: a) "the other", b) "associative/dissociative elements", c) Mediterranean region, d) Mediterranean Policy and e) European dominance. According to each type of source these may be treated separately, sub-summed or in a reduced way.

The second category which enables to question supposed colonial remains within the European discourse is the "purpose". The main research aim within this category intends to assess possible reasons for the maintenance of certain hierarchies and the motivation for the Mediterranean Policy.

It is to expect that within the discourses there is a difference between the intention of the policy and the officially stated "aim". While the "purpose" indicated the motivation, the actual purpose of the Mediterranean Policy, the officially stated aim pretends to convince the audience of the policy and searches for legitimation. The two sub-categories, which pretend to provide results on the stated concerns, are titled with "purpose" on the one hand, and with "aim" on the other hand.

The third category, which analytically does not question assumed remains of colonial power, but which constitutes a crucial determining factor, deals with statements referring to the European Union as a whole. Beneath the super-ordinated denomination "identity", this category aspires to detect a reference to the political ambition, the internal struggle, the role perception or self-reflection of the European Union in its political and economic conception. With regard to the two sub-categories "EU" and "role", it is the aim to provide answers to the following relevant questions of the present undertaking: What kind of statements refer to the European Union as a whole? Which kind of denominations and conceptions are stressed? What constitutes the political ambition of the European Union in the Mediterranean? Are there references which concern a certain role perception? And what about the internal

struggle? Which statements refer to the internal forces within the European Union? One of the expectations due to the determination of the three different types of sources is the aim to provide, at the end of the work, results on the discrepancy between the consciousness of the proper attitude and role and the external perception of the same. How does the European Union perceive itself and its policy and how is it regarded from an external, a public point of view.

All in all, these categories represent a single approach among multiple other possibilities. There was a strong emphasis on developing a consistent analytical concept in order to stress the topic in accordance with the research aim. The empirical analysis will prove whether this approach produces right and satisfactory results.

EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

The official discourse level concerns two kinds of sources which have been identified as relevant for the present thematic approach: the EU documents and speeches of various personages of official interest. The documents refer to two different communication levels. The communications of the European Commission are directed to the European Council and the European Parliament. They propose a certain political direction and therefore constitute the base for decisions of the Council as decision-making organ in foreign policy affairs. Furthermore, the communications of the Commission give the most precise indications of the internal discourse within the European institutions, as they are directed towards both, the European Council and the European Parliament. The conclusions of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers form the second source among the European documents. Although the meetings include the representatives of the Mediterranean non-member countries (MNCs), the documents will be discussed in the context of the European documents because the European Foreign Ministers embody the position of the European Council as the decision-making power. Therefore, the documents of the Foreign Minister Meetings form the base of the agreed discourse among the members of the Barcelona Process and demonstrate the extent of the transferred directives of the European Commission. This does not only provide the opportunity to analyse the establishment of the official European discourse in Mediterranean affairs, but also indicates the degree of European dominance.

If the EU documents correspond to the establishment of the official discourse, the speeches of personages of official interest indicate the implementation of the official discourse. In order to provide the greatest possible convergence with the analysis of the EU documents, a selected amount of speeches can be assigned to representatives of the European Commission and the European Council. The present considerations evaluate the speeches as complementary sources to the European documents. The speakers per se are thus not of ostensible significance, their functions, which can be assigned either to the Commission or the Council, are more meaningful for the current research aim. Based on the nature of the sources it is to expect that the discourses of representatives of the Commission and the Council demonstrate a greater explicitness regarding the European position.

Both kinds of sources are expected to provide a solid base for a profound assessment of the analytical "active" level, the establishment and implementation of the European discourse in the Mediterranean.

EU DOCUMENTS

The EU documents concern two kinds of sources in a time span between 1995 and 2008: the Communications of the European Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament, and the conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings in the context of the Barcelona Process. Context, structure and discourse of both source types are discussed in the following chapter. While the context analysis is considered to be valid for both kinds of documents, the structural and discourse analyses are carried out for each kind of documents separately; here, the main emphasis is placed on the discourse analysis.

IX IDENTIFICATION OF THE SOURCES

The central criteria of the selection of references among the sources are based on the characteristics of repetition and equability of both, said and written statements. According to Achim Landwehr, it is this certain character of diachronic sequences and synchronic accumulation which empirically legitimates the discourse analysis.[237]

According to the thematic approach of the present work, two different kinds of sources have been identified among the European documents. In order to assess convergences or possible discrepancies among discourses, it was the aim to combine sources, which offer an internal perspective of the communication among European institutions, and documents, which give an idea of the official statements from the European side. Hence, the selection of sources focused on the communications of the European Commission and the conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings, representing the authority of the European Council, in the context of the Barcelona Process. The time span of the documents is situated from the foundation of the Barcelona Process until its revitalisation in 2008. The temporal limitation and the identical character of the documents within its temporal appearance constitute an important frame for undertaking a discourse analysis. When referring to the identification of sources, the issue of completeness is essential to be discussed. In the present undertaking, both the concept of the work and the applied method do not necessarily request a complete consideration of all possible sources. The greatest possible sample of statements of an accurately limited portfolio of sources, which, in its relevancy, can be equalized with what Foucault stresses as archive, defines the system of what can be expressed in equal measure.[238] Therefore, the crucial point is not to discuss the possible or impossible completeness, but how representative the selection of sources in the context of a certain discourse is.

Analytically, the selected sources represent two different levels of discourses within the EU documents: the predominantly internal discourse, which refers to documents assigned to the European

237 Comp. LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 106.
238 Comp. FOUCAULT, Archäologie des Wissens, 188.

Commission; and the predominantly official discourse of the European Union, which refers to documents assigned to the institutional level of the European Council.

In order to further explain the identification of sources in the following chapter, the types of documents, their thematic aim and the temporal dispersion are quantitatively discussed.

1 List of the documents assigned to the European Commission

The following table shows the identified documents which find consideration in the discourse analysis:

Documents assigned to the European Commission		
19.10.1994	COM(94)427 endg.	Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parlament. Stärkung der Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union: Entwicklung einer Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer
08.03.1995	COM(95)72 final	Communication from the Commission, Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Proposals for implementing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
19.02.1997	COM(97)68 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Progress report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and preparations for the second conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers
06.09.2000	KOM(2000)497 endg.	Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parlament zur Vorbereitung der vierten Europa-Mittelmeer-Tagung der Außenminister: "Intensivierung des Barcelona-Prozesses"
13.02.2002	SEC(2002)159 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, to prepare the meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers Valencia, 22-23 April, 2002
2003	Working paper	Commission services working document to prepare the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Crete 26-27 May 2003
21.05.2003	COM(2003)294 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratisation with Mediterranean Partners. Strategic guideline
11.03.2003	COM(2003)104 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours
24.06.2003	COM(2003) 376 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, on the development of a Euro-Mediterranean transport network
15.10.2003	COM(2003)610 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, to prepare the VI Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Naples, 2-3 December 2003 (Barcelona VI)
12.04.2005	COM(2005)139 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Tenth Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: A work programme to meet the challenges of the next five years
05.09.2006	COM(2006)475 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. Establishing an Environment Strategy for the Mediterranean
17.10.2006	COM(2006)592 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council. Assessment of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) and Future Options

25.10.2006	COM(2006)620 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, on the preparation of the Tampere Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference (27-28 November 2006). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Time to deliver
17.10.2007	COM(2007)598 final	Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, on the preparation of the Lisbon Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Conference (5-6 November 2007). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Advancing Regional Cooperation to support peace, progress and inter-cultural dialogue
20.05.2008	COM(2008)319 (Final)	Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean

These just mentioned sixteen documents assigned to the European Commission are identified by code, year and version. Fourteen of them correspond to documents which are designated with the code "COM". According to the General Secretariat of the European Commission, COM documents "proposed legislation and other Commission communications to the Council and/or the other institutions, and their preparatory papers."[239] One document corresponds to SEC, which identifies documents as "internal documents associated with the decision-making process and the general operation of Commission departments"[240] and the other document is considered as a working document in order to prepare a Foreign Minister Meeting, it does not correspond to a certain code.

The aims of the documents can be grouped in three different categories: documents aiming to define the Mediterranean Policy, documents setting the path for the Foreign Minister Meetings and documents treating special topics regarding the Mediterranean Policy:

Aim of the documents	how many	Which
Defining the Mediterranean Policy	6	COM(94)437 endg, COM(95)72 final, COM(97) 68 final, COM(2003)104 final, COM(2005)139 final, COM(2008)319 final
Preparing Foreign Minister Meetings	6	COM(2000) 497 endg, SEC(2002)159 final, working doc(Crete 03),COM(2003)610 final, COM(2006)620 final, COM(2007)598 final
Specialized topics	4	COM (2003)294 final, COM(2003)376 final, COM(2006)475 final, COM(592) final
Total	**16**	

Regarding the thematic approach on the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union and the preparation of the Foreign Minister Meetings, there is almost an even distribution. The distinctive aims of the documents can be considered as thematically important because they allow an explorative approach on the continuity and discrepancy of discourses. Those three documents, which treat specialised topics within the Mediterranean Union, have been selected in order to provide a possible cross-check to the other document types.

239 http://europa.eu/documents/comm/index_en.htm (21.11.2008)
240 Ibid. (21.11.2008)

The temporal distribution of the selected documents shows that the majority of them are dated within the last six years:

Aim of the paper	94	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08
define policy	x	x		x						x		x			x
prepare meetings							x		x	xx			x	x	
treat special topics										xx			xx		

The step marks of the documents which aim to assess the Mediterranean Policy itself are clearly linked to external events. In 1994/1995 it was important to assess the significance of a Mediterranean Policy in order to prepare and found the Barcelona Process. In 2003, the consequences of the EU enlargement of 2004 for the Mediterranean Policy had to be discussed. 2005, the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, was the moment to recapitalize the past ten years and to set the path for the future. In 2008, the Commission discussed the plan to revitalize the Barcelona Process due to the external impetus of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Similar relatable are the documents which focus to prepare the Foreign Minister Meetings. Interestingly, the accessibility to the documents before 2000 is not transparently archived to the same extent.[241] In particular, the lack of transparency concerns the institutional development of the European Union rather than it is significance for the discourse analysis, because the European Foreign Policy, especially in the 90ies, still had to find its course, in general and in the Mediterranean. The temporal distribution of the documents, which treat special topics within the Mediterranean Policy, has no significance due to the fact that they were selected under the premise of providing samples in order to gain possible cross-checking arguments.

2 List of documents assigned to the European Council

The following table shows the documents which have been identified for the discourse analysis:

Documents assigned to the European Council		
27./28.11.1995	Barcelona	Barcelona declaration
15./16.04.1997	Malta	Conclusions of the second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference
03./04.06.1998	Palermo	Euromed ad hoc ministerial meeting
15./16.04.1999	Stuttgart	Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers
15./16.11.2000	Marseilles	Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers
05./06.10.2001	Brussels	Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
22./23.04.2002	Valencia	Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers
26/27.05.2003	Crete	The Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers

241 The document service of the European Commission is perfectly organized and all existing documents can be ordered. The lack of completeness at this point refers to the argument beforehand – in the present work it is the aim to treat the greatest amount of possible sources. Due to work economy, this would not be possible; nevertheless, an analysis of certain sources taken out, are worth to be studied with the aim of completeness.

02./03.12.2003	Naples	Sixth Euro-Med Ministerial Conference: reinforcing and bringing the Partnership forward
05./06.05.2004	Dublin	Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
29./30.11.2004	The Hague	Presidency conclusions for the Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
30./31.5.2005	Luxembourg	Conclusions for the VIIth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
27./28.11.2006	Tampere	8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
05./06.11.2007	Lisbon	Agreed Conclusion of the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
13.07.2008	Paris	Joint declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean
03./04.11.2008	Marseille	Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean ministerial conference. Final declaration

These sixteen documents can be distinguished by the following types:

kind of documents	**how many**	**which documents** (date)
Declarations	2	1995,2008
Concl. Foreign Minister Meetings	10	1997,1999,2000,2002,2003,2005,2006,2007
Interim Meetings	4	2001,2003,2004,2004
Total	**16**	

The classification regarding the document types might be confusing to some extent because both declarations are considered to be conclusions of the Ministerial Meetings. Thus, the Ministerial Meetings are: 1. Barcelona (1995), 2. Malta (1997), 3. Stuttgart (1999), 4. Marseille (2000), 5. Valencia (2002), 6. Naples (2003), 7. Luxembourg (2005), 8. Tampere (2006), 9. Lisbon (2007), 10. Paris (2008), 11. Marseille (2008). The Interim Meetings were held in Palermo (1998), Lisbon (2000)[242], Crete (2003), Dublin (2004), The Hague (2004).

X CONTEXT ANALYSIS

The first chapter consists of an introduction, which aims to contextualize the intended research aim thematically. The following context analysis focuses on the specific context regarding the EU documents and discusses only those aspects which are relevant for the consecutive analysis.

1 Situational context

The situational contexts of the two types of European documents, which are considered in this analysis, differ with regard to personages, institutional context and location where they are produced.

1.1 Communications from the European Commission

Since 1995 there have been four European Commission cabinets: Jacques Delors III (1993-1995), Jacques Santer/ Manuel Marín (1995-1999), Romano Prodi (1999-2004) and José Barroso (2004-).

242 There was no document available for the interim meeting in Lisbon 2000.

While the cabinet of Jacques Delors III comprised seventeen Commissioners, there are currently twenty-seven Commissioners in Barroso's cabinet. The following table indicates the distribution of charges per countries and political orientation:

Distribution of charges per countries and political orientation since 1995[243]				
EU ENLARGEMENT				
1950	F,D,B,L,NL			
1952	I			
1973	UK,DK,IRL			
1981	GR			
1986	E,P			
1995	A,FIN,S			
2004	CZ,EST,H,LT,LV,PL,SK,SL,M,CY			
2007	RO,BG			
COMMISSION	**1993-1995**	**1995-1999**	**1999-2004**	**2004-**
Charges	17	20	20	27
EU -members at beginning	12	15	15	25[244]
Countries double charges	F,D,UK,E,I	F,D,UK,E,I	D,UK,E	
Countries tripple charges			FIN	
Distribution per political orientation				
Left-leaning	6	9	12/9	6
Center	2	2	2/3	8
Right-leaning	7	7	6/6	9
Independent	1	2	0/1	3
Green			1/1	

Until 2004, five countries of each Commission obtained two charges. In both, the cabinet Delors III and Santer and Marin, respectively, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy were represented by two Commissioners. In the cabinet of Romano Prodi Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain had two Commissioners, while Finland was represented by three. Since Barroso took over the leading position in the European Commission, the Commissioners are evenly distributed – each member state has one Commissioner. Consecutively, two new Commissioners were appointed when Romania and Bulgaria entered the European Union in 2007.[245]

According to the distribution of the political orientation of the Commissions since 1995, it can be stated that, until 2004, the main part of the Commissioners either belonged to the more left-leaning or the more right-leaning parties in Europe. Since Barroso, there is a statistically more even distribution

243 Sources: own illustration, http://ec.europa.eu , www.wikipedia.org. .

244 When the Commission of Barroso started its work, the EU mounted up to 25 member states due to the EU enlargement in 2004. On January 1st 2007 also Bulgaria and Romania became part of the European Union, thus the Commission up to date counts 27 members.

245 Bulgaria: Commissioner for Consumer Affairs, Meglena Kuneva; Romania: Commissioner for Multilingualism, Leonard Orban. http://ec.europa.eu (19.12.2008).

regarding the political orientation: six Commissioners can be appointed to the Party of European Socialists (left-leaning), eight are close to the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (center) and nine can be appointed to the European People's Party and the Alliance for Europe of the Nations, respectively (right-leaning).

Since 1995, the European Commission experienced several developments, which reflect the aim to build a well functioning institutional frame that represents the ambition of the European project: to be a union of common values and policies in order to guarantee peace. After the last mayor enlargement in 2004, when the European Union grew by ten countries, the European Commission is not predominantly represented by five countries anymore, but by all member countries; furthermore, the political orientations of the Commissioners are basically evenly distributed. These developments indicate the chosen way of the European Union and its institutions. With the treaty of Lisbon, which still has to be ratified in all member countries, further changes in the institutional organisation of the EU, also within the European Commission, have to be expected.

Another relevant aspect in order to assess the situational context of the European documents assigned to the Commission is the process concerning the development of the documents. Considering that the current Commission of president Barroso employs a regular staff of over 20,000 people in some forty Directorate-Generals (DGs), there is a vital need for an effective coordination between all departments. Regarding the evolvement of the documents which are dealt with in the present analysis, the highly complex administration process of the Commission can be highlighted as follows:[246]

- According to the five-year working program, which is established at the moment the Commission is appointed, the Commission formulates an "annual policy strategy" (APS) and the "Commission legislative and work programme" (CLWP). For each field the Commission works on, there is a designated Directorate-General (DG), which draws an "annual management plan" that is in line with the Commission's prior objectives. Although there is a close cooperation between the directorates in order to evolve the communications of the Commission, it is to suppose that the main Directorate, which coordinates the Mediterranean Policy Affairs, is the so-called RELEX (Directorate for External Relations).
- When a document has to be developed, the responsible DG drafts the documents and consults other DGS and services before the approval for the initiative can be secured in the College of the Commissioners (body of the Commissioners).
- The four decision procedures of the Commission are: oral procedure (documents with major political or financial implication, no agreement among DGs during the interservice consultation stage, need for discussion during a Commission meeting); written procedure (prior agreement of all departments consulted – except in the case of finalisation, written procedures

246 The information is based on a telephone call with the Information Service of the European Commission in Austria on December 17, 2008 and the confidentially transmitted "Commission Close up Nov.2008" in pdf format, 1-48.

where the agreement of the chefs de cabinets is given during their weekly meeting, no need for discussion at a Commission meeting); empowerment procedure (management or administrative measures, exercising a mandate under an earlier – general or ad hoc – empowerment decision, prior agreements of all departments consulted); and delegation procedure (management or administrative measures, exercising a mandate under an earlier delegation decision, prior agreement of all the departments consulted). To get an impression, the Commission took more than 10,000 decisions in 2006.[247]

- In the case of the communications of the Commission, the documents, which have been prepared by the responsible DGs, are passed on to the cabinet of the responsible Commissioner. The cabinet assists the Commissioner in analysing and responding to the prepared proposals. The positions taken by the College (body of the Commissioners) are based on the preparatory work done by the heads of each Commissioner's cabinet in their weekly meeting (usually every Monday).
- The Commission usually meets every Wednesday in Brussels or Tuesdays in Strasbourg. In urgent matters there can be special reunions called by the President. The proposals, which have been revised by the heads of cabinets, can be marked with an "A", meaning that they can be adopted without discussion or with a "B" in case there has been no agreement and therefore further discussion is required.
- Among the Commissioners, the President can set up working groups, which are not empowered to take decisions on behalf of the College. However, if a consensus is reached, the President may decide that an agreed initiative can be presented directly to the College which then adjudicates on it. The responsible working group for Mediterranean Affairs is the "External Relations Group" (CG3), presided over by the Commissioner for External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy.

This is the procedure which leads to the development of the documents that are signalised with the code COM or SEC. These documents are considered in the consecutive analysis.

1.2 Conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings

Regarding the meetings of the Foreign Minister, the most important situational component refers to the procedure of the evolvement of the conclusion of the Foreign Minister Meetings which is documented in Article 13 of the Council's Rules of Procedure[248]. According to this, minutes, which are drawn up for each meeting, have to be approved by the signature of the Secretary General/ High Representative for the Common Foreign Security Policy or the Deputy Secretary General, who may dele-

247 Commission close up Nov. 2008, 30.

248 Council's Rules of Procedure are available online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:285:0047:0071:EN:PDF (6.1.2008)

gate his power of signature to Directors-General or the General Secretariat. The minutes shall include, as a general rule indicates, each of the following items on the agenda:

- The documents submitted to the Council
- The decisions taken or the conclusions reached by the Council
- The Statements made by the Council and those, whose entry has been requested by a Member of the Council or the Commission

The draft minutes shall be drawn up by the General Secretariat within fifteen days and submitted for approval to the Councils or the Coreper (Comité des représentants permanents). Before the approval takes place, any member of the Council may request to insert more details in the minutes regarding any item of the agenda.[249]

The conclusions of the Foreign Ministers Meetings have to pass this procedure before they become accessible for the public.

2 Medial context

Considering that the media do not only fulfil formal and informative objectives, but also influence and create a certain space, time and subject perception[250], it is essential to assess this context regarding the EU documents.

The communications of the European Commission constitute an essential base of their functionality and therefore of the policy making. There is no periodical publication of such communications, but a publication due to requirements. Thus, communications of the European Commission refer to all fields treated by the Commission - there have been around 860 communications in 2007[251].

For an individual researcher there are various possibilities to access the documents: via the Information Service of the European Commission, via the homepage of the European Union or other institutions linked to the policy of the European Commission and, if there is a need for hard copies and not for web formats, there are library inventories. The same procedures are valid for the accessibility of the conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings.

It is notable that the crucial aspect of accessing documents is not whether it is possible to get them or not, but how to get them in a certain continuity, as it was necessary for the present work. The EU, which is considered to provide the greatest possible transparency, has developed a system that reflects the high degree of bureaucracy, which is fundamental for the policy method it succeeds with. It creates distance and provokes renouncement via incomprehensible paths, in this case in order to gain information. Searching per catchword, reference lists of thematically related homepages do not offer the possibility to access all relevant documents. Thus, cross-checking in numerous archives, home-pages etc.

249 Comp. Councils Rules of Procedure, Article 13.
250 Comp. LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 110.
251 http://ec.europa.eu (18.12.2008)

becomes necessary in order to find essential homepages that have been restructured without previous document links.[252]

In absolutist times, emperors impressed people with insuperable appearing stairs to keep them distant and obedient. One can argue that nowadays the same tactic is applied: an enormous appliance of bureaucracy with intransparent ways of accessing a continuity of information resembles the historic example to keep the people distant and obedient.

3 Institutional context

The institutional context is of special relevance when considering documents of the European Commission and documents that are assigned to the European Council because both institutions are driving forces for the European Foreign Policy and reflect in respect to the differing competences the institutional dualism, which has been discussed earlier in this work.

The temporal setting of the present work corresponds to the period of 1957-2008. Within this time span the European Union, as an actor in the Mediterranean Affairs, has experienced several developmental steps. The territorial enlargement and the extension of competences of the European Union required a solid institutional framework in order to represent a reliable administrator of the delegated national competences of the member states and a trustworthy contract party in Foreign Affairs. Regarding the institutional frame, which integrates the Mediterranean Policy, it is needful to comment on some concretions and specifications of the European system in order to contextualize and comprehend the nature of the selected documents.

The present institutional organisation of the European Union consists of three pillars; hereby, the denomination of the European Union constitutes the superordinated frame.[253] The first pillar (EC, EAEC and until its expiration the ECSC) represents the supranational part of the European Union[254]. Since its

252 This happened to the homepage of the Barcelona Process http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ euromed/index_en.htm (17.12.2008), which has been restructured in the course of the successful meeting in Paris in July 2008 and some documents, as the Declaration of the Conference in Barcelona in November 1995, are now accessible in different formats and are differing in content. In contrast to the current version, the document I printed from the same page a year before still contained the names of all participants.

253 The applicability of the term „European Union“ often appears to be little precise, as there is, especially in juridical matters, a necessity of clarification regarding the denomination due to the fact that the European Union, as a political construct, lacks of legal personality. „In der Praxis wird der Begriff der EU aber auch dann verwendet, wenn nur ein Teil der Europäischen Union, zum Beispiel die Erste Säule gemeint ist. Die häufige Verwendung des Überbegriffes der Europäischen Union ist auf Grund der mühsam rechtlichen Abgrenzung zwischen den Gebilden zu erklären. Da der Überbegriff der Europäischen Union aber zweifelsohne auch den Unterbegriff abdeckt, wird die Verwendung toleriert. Rechtlich problematisch wird es erst, wenn man mit dem Begriff der EU eigentlich die drei Europäischen Gemeinschaften umschreibt, da diese über eine eigene Rechtspersönlichkeit verfügen, die der EU weder als gemeinsames Dach der drei Säulen der EU, noch als Gesamtgebilde zukommt.“ Christoph THUN-HOHENSTEIN, Franz CEDE, Europarecht. Das Recht der Europäischen Union unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der EU-Mitgliedschaft Österreichs (Wien³ 1999), 31.

254 „Im Unterschied zu Art.281 EGV fehlt eine Bestimmung über die Rechtspersönlichkeit der Europäischen Union als solcher. Ihre Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit ist streitig. Gleichwohl hat die Europäische Union mittlerweile bereits mehrfach Völkerrechtliche Verträge mit Drittstaaten zumindest formal im eigenen Namen geschlossen. Der Verfassungsvertrag sieht im Art. 1-7 EVV vor, der durch den EVV neugegründeten und damit einheitlichen ‚Europäischen Union‘ Rechtspersönlichkeit zuzusprechen“ Rudolf STREINZ, Europarecht (München[7] 2005), 252.

foundation, the European Community disposes of all attributes of a supranational organisation (law-making power with the right of execution, majority decision in law-making issues in the Council and in the Commission, autonomous law-making authorized organs like the Commission, an own jurisdiction, which is represented by the European Court of Justice). The singularity of the EC lies in the combination of all these elements and the amplitude of its field of activity.[255] Thus, the EC represents its members as a legal personality and unifies the laws of the member states in the delegated fields (directives and regulations). The core competence of the first pillar is the ability to sign contracts with NMC and other supranational organisations. Neither the second pillar, which represents the collaboration in Foreign Affairs (Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSC), nor the third pillar, which regulates the cooperation in judiciary matters (Police and Juridical Cooperation in Criminal Matters – PJCCM) dispose of a legal personality or supranationality. Therewith, the institutional organisation of the European Union is based on two mayor principals: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.[256] The coexistence of supranational and intergovernmental elements determines the common negotiation processes in distinctive ways. The function and fields of action of the European organs are crucial for this inherent dualism in the European system.

From a juridical perspective, the institution system of the European Union consists of five organs: (1) The Ministerial Council and Council of the European Union, which are centralised in one institution, (2) the European Commission, (3) the European Parliament, (4) the European Court of Justice and (5) the European Court of Auditors. Before the interaction between these organs will be described in order to justify the selection of the sources, the main functions will be listed in special consideration of their authority regarding Foreign Affairs:

- The Council of the European Union: The Council is the main decision making organ of the European Union. Depending on the subject, ministers of each member state are delegated to meet within the Council (Ministerial Council). The heads of the states and governments meet twice a year to mark the guideline of the Common Policy. The European Council is presided by turns of six months by a European member state in accordance with a pre-established rota. Resolutions of the European Council often form orders for the Ministerial Council. Regarding the Foreign Policy, the Council is in charge of effecting treaties with MNC or association agreements.[257]
- The European Commission: Representing the community as a whole, the Commission has the right of initiation (propositions for a new European legislation to the Council and the Parliament). In its function it manages and implements EU policies and budgets and enforces them as well together with the Court of Justice, the European law. In Foreign Affairs, it is the

255 Klaus PIRKER, Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union. Der Barcelona Prozess (ungedr. Rechtswiss. Diplom. Graz 2003), 7.

256 Frank R. PFRETSCH, Die Europäische Union (München³ 2005), 133f.

257 Comp. http://consilium.europa.eu; STREINZ, Europarecht, 102; PFRETSCH, Europäische Union, 144; http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=242&lang=en&mode=g (28.8.2008).

Commission's competence to negotiate commercial and other conventions and to represent the Community in international meetings. Regarding the areas that are treated by the CSFC, the Commission is involved to the same extent.[258]

- The European Parliament: Elected by the European citizens, the European Parliament is not bound by instructions of institutions or politicians. It represents the democratic European will. In its function the European Parliament exercises a democratic supervision of the other European institutions, passes the European laws and shares the authority over the EU budget with the Council.[259]
- The European Court of Justice: Its field of functions encompasses the duty to guarantee that the EU legislation is interpreted and applied in a similar manner in all European member states, the ensuring of the law concerning the interpretation and application of treaties and the right for hearing of the European citizens, member states or other institutions.[260]
- The European Court of Auditors: In its functions the Court ensures that the European funds, which come from the taxpayers, are properly collected and spend legally, economically and for the intended purpose.[261]

4 Historical context

The historical context, which has been outlined in detail in the first chapters of the present work, constitutes the frame of all considered documents. The most relevant argument for the consecutive analysis can be demonstrated by means of the following graph, which shows the temporal dispersion of the documents in relation to external influences:



Graph 6: The temporal dispersion of the documents in relation with external influences

The graph illustrates the temporal distribution of the selected documents (green stars= Council level, yellow stars= Commission level) in relation with the mayor external influences (red stars). Apart from

258 Comp. STREINZ, Europarecht, 120; and http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index_en.htm (28.8.2008)
259 Comp. PFRETSCH, Europäische Union, 144f; and http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/index_en.htm (28.8.2008).
260 Comp. Ibid. 145; and http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index_en.htm (28.8.2008)
261 Comp. http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/auditors/index_en.htm (28.8.2008)

the continuously influencing factor, the Middle East Conflict, the most outranging events affecting the European Policy in the Mediterranean happened in three years: in 2001, 2003 and 2004.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 called for a vote of confidence among the established partnership between Europe and the MNCs. The reinforced commitment to the Barcelona Process after 9/11 gave a new impetus to the development of a common strategy. The high number of documents, which have been evolved in 2003, indicates the European ambition to retain the positive political climate among the partners of the Barcelona Process and to resolve all doubts about the enlargement of the European Union by ten new member countries in 2004. The US invasion in Irak is hardly commented in the documents of these years.

XI EU DOCUMENTS ASSIGNED TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

As it is not the aim of a historical discourse analysis to enhance text and language of sources to an end in itself, but to combine both information carriers in order to identify and assess a broader context, the following chapter deals with aspects of the macro and micro structure of the analysed texts.[262] Although the analysis is basically oriented on the guidelines proposed by Achim Landwehr, it has to be stated that, due to the number of documents considered in the work, the macro and micro structure of the texts is of secondary significance, as the corpus of sources targets different types of documents. Aspects of the macro and micro structural analysis, which are relevant for the present research aim, are definitely considered, but the main focus of the assessment is directed towards the discourse analysis.

1 Macro and micro structure

A schematic display of macro structural elements is highlighted in the following table:

	Document	Theme	Structure	Pages	Annex (pages)
1	COM(94)427 endg.	development partnership	numbered headlines	38	19
2	COM(95)72 final	implementing a EMP	numbered headlines	10	
3	COM(97)68 final	preparing FMM	numbered headlines	10	
4	KOM(2000)497 endg.	intensivation BP	headlines, numb. Paragraphs	31	13
5	SEC(2002)	preparing FMM (Valencia)	numbered headlines	26	8
6	WP(2003)	preparing FMM (Crete)	headlines, numb. Paragraphs	27	17
7	COM(2003)294 final	strateg. guidelines democracy, HR	numbered headlines	19	
8	COM(2003)104 final	Neighbourhood Policy	numbered headlines	25	6
9	COM(2003)376 final	transport network	numbered headlines	27	8
10	COM(2003)610 final	preparing FMM (Naples)	headlines, numb. Paragraphs	12	

262 See: LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 113f.

11	COM(2005)139 final	10th anniversary, working program	numbered headlines	27	9
12	COM(2006)475 final	environment strategy	numbered headlines	10	
13	COM(2006)592 final	FEMIP	numbered headlines	12	
14	COM(2006)620 final	preparing FMM	numbered headlines	13	
15	COM(2007)598 final	advancing regional cooperation	headlines, numb. Paragraphs	10	
16	COM (2008)319 final	BP: Union for the Mediterranean	headlines, numb. Paragraphs	13	3

The thematic approach accentuates what has been stated before: six documents refer to attempts of the Commission to define the Mediterranean Policy, six documents set the preparatory guidelines for the Foreign Minister Meetings and four documents represent special reports on issues treated by the Commission in the context of the Mediterranean Policy.

Concerning the texture of the documents assigned to the European Commission, it has to be stated that the formal structure is basically standardised. There are two different organisational forms: the documents are either structured by numbered headlines, which usually do not exceed four points with additional subheadings, or the headings, indicating the thematic classifications and the paragraphs, are numbered[263]. Eight of the sixteen documents (fifty percent) have an annex, which gives more detailed background information, also in statistical and graphic formats. This is not an outstanding aspect but, nevertheless, necessary to be mentioned, because the annexes are independent of the temporal moment or the thematic aim of the documents. They just inform other decision-making institutions like the European Parliament and the European Council.

Considering the whole text, the introductions and conclusions have a similar aim, unimportant of the formal structure regarding, for example, the headings and the numerological proceeding: the first and the last chapter transmit the essence of the document. The introduction gives more contextual information, while the conclusion shortly delivers the message of the document. The chapters in between are standardised and show frequent repetitions when treating, for instance, the Middle East Peace Process, the multilateral dimension or the confirmation concerning the commitment to the Mediterranean Policy. Textual transitions do not show special significance, which is due to the highly standardised format of the documents.

Regarding the presentation principles, the tonality of the texts is surprisingly casual. From the strict formal criteria and the institutional marathon that the documents have passed through, it was to expect that, by the moment they are officially accessible, they comprise a more standardised phraseology. Two reasons can be identified for the relative low degree of standardisation. First, the texts represent the interinstitutional communication among European institutions; they thus have a strong informative character on an internal level. Second, they aim to convince decision-making organs to decide on be-

263 For example the Working paper on the preparation of the Ministerial Meeting in Crete 2003 contains unnumbered headings but thirty-three paragraphs.

half of their thematic outline, their background information. Therefore, apprehensible and direct formulations of the purpose of the recommended policy direction are essential within the documents assigned to the European Commission.

Crucially seems the fact that the speech of the Commission varies from time to time in the use of the 1st and the 3rd plural in respect of references in context with the partnership. This was first noticed in the preparation document of the meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in Valencia (April 22-23, 2002). For instance, the Commission states that *the countries of the Mediterranean region are bound together by geography, but we are near neighbours too*[264], or *we face innumerable common challenges* [265]and *we need to work closely*[266]. Elsewhere in the same document the Commission denominates the "other" as *our partners*[267] and establishes associative links by referring to *our populations*[268]. These changes of the tonality can be explained with the high sensitive political parquet concerning the relations with Islamic countries after the terror attacks of 9/11. However, it has to be stated that these intermixture of the 3rd and 1st person does not occur frequently and is only used to convince the Member States of the importance of the Barcelona Process.

The micro structural analysis aims to assess the level of the text, sentences and words and analyses the rhetoric and the lexical aspects of the documents. Due to the numerous documents that are considered in the present work, the micro structural analysis will rather focus on the most relevant aspects regarding the discourse than on an overall assessment in-depth. The consecutive analysis focuses on aspects which aim to explain the link between text and discourse by referring to the textual level, to some examples of wording and to the structural frame of the alignment of the sentences.

Concerning the textual level, the argumentation may follow two different aims: the factual and logic argumentation, which nurtures the rational level, and the argumentation, which targets the emotional level. Predominantly, the communications of the Commission aim to use rational argumentation, but at some points there are indications of arguments that correspond to the affected argumentation, like when the Commission expresses its concern about the developments in the Mediterranean and underlines the importance of the Barcelona Process. The Commission then uses terms like "urgency, threats, strategic importance etc". The use of words containing emotional transmitters is placed with the aim to sensitize the European decision-making organs of the importance which the Commission adhered to the Mediterranean Policy.

The structural alignment of the sentences can be summed up by the conclusion that they are of medium length, meaning that they are extended by subordinated clauses over three to four lines. Although there are some references to emotive arguments, the documents assigned to the Commission

264 Comp. "the countries of the Mediterranean region are bound together by geography, but we are near neighbours too" SEC (2002) 159 final, 2.

265 Comp. "we face innumerable common challenges (…)" SEC (2002) 159 final, 2.

266 Comp. "we need to work closely (…)"SEC (2002) 159 final, 2.

267 Comp. "our partners" SEC (2002) 159 final, 3.

268 Comp. "our populations" SEC (2002) 159 final, 6.

contain over the years formulaic repetitions, which are only expressed in the context of declarative sentences.

2 Discourse analysis – Expression

Within the analytical category "Expression" statements have been considered which concern:

- "the other" regarding the denomination of the MNCs, the description of their situation and the cooperative character of the apparent policy in partnership;
- "MMPOL" , the Mediterranean Policy, pertaining to the designation of the Policy itself as well as the factual cooperation on a political level;
- "associational/dissasociative" elements among the members of the Mediterranean Policy
- "MMR", the Mediterranean Region, concerning its denotation from European side;
- and implicit or explicit indications of European "predominance"

Here, it has to be stated that this is a gross categorisation aiming to group the statements. The delimitations between the statements (135 in total) are obviously fluent.

COMM-DOCS: Number of statements assigned to the analytical category "Expression"[269]

	"The other"	"MMPOL"	"ass./diss."	"MMR"	"predominance"	**Total**
EXPRESSION	40	59	10	8	18	**135**

More than three quarters of the statements concern the categories of the other and the Mediterranean Policy, very few refer to associational and dissasociative elements and the Mediterranean region.

COMM-DOCS: Distribution of statements ("Expression") per year

	94	**95**	**97**	**00**	**02**	**03**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	**Total**
Expression	23	5	9	19	18	24	16	11	4	6	**135**

The selected statements show a quite balanced distribution over the years, although the early document of 1994 and the one before the EU enlargement in 2004 can be highlighted with over twenty statements.

2.1 The view of the "other"

The supposed "other" concerns all member countries of the Barcelona Process which do not belong to the European Union. The denomination of the "other" varies over the years. In the early documents, the characterisation of the "other" still contains a component of strangeness, as there are expressions like *these countries*, *the concerned countries*[270] *or these individuals* [271] which can not be found in later

269 MMPOL= Mediterranean Policy, ass./diss.= associational/dissociative, MMR= Mediterranean Region
270 Comp. „diese Länder", „betreffenden Länder" COM 94 (427) final, 3,8;
271 Comp. „these Individuals" COM 95 (68) final, 1.

documents, in which the MNCs are predominantly called *the Mediterranean Partners*[272], *our partners*[273] or just *partners*[274]. Remarkable seems the fact that the tone of the Commission is particularly associational in the years after 9/11 when the discussion is centred upon *our partners in the Mediterranean*[275] or even *a ring of friends*[276]

In few occasions the "others" are commented in reference to their number. In some documents there are introductive listings regarding the participating countries, but in the document of 1997 there is a numeric reference for the first time, namely *twelve Mediterranean Partners*[277]. In later documents, unifying characteristics regarding the number of the "others" are kept general: *Euro-Med partners*[278], *all Mediterranean Partners*[279] or even with EU reference *all of the EU's Mediterranean partners*[280].

A large number of denominations regarding the "other" concern the situation of the participating countries. In this respect general considerations vary from simple differentiations like *the countries of the region are (...) very different*[281] to explicit denominations of a lower development status like *their general development level is a lot lower*[282], which has been expressed in reference to *the high population growth*[283] they have to fight with or *the lack of well formed craftsmen*[284]. According to the course of the 20th century, which implies the possibility of progress, the Commission states that *these forces have not led to greater convergence*[285] among the Mediterranean countries and further mentions reasons like *a very poor rate of growth in the GDP per capita*[286]. These simple appearing determinations implicitly contain the superior cultural comprehension which is inherent in the European position.

In general, the Commission respects that *the partner countries are at different stages of developments*[287], but stresses the different level of progress among the partners in nearly the same breath. In this respect it is outlined that *the greatest proceedings* can be noticed in the cases of *Cyprus, Malta, Turkey and Israel*[288]. Although the Commission considered the different situation among the MNC as it constitutes that *the situation*, in respect of human rights and democracy, *varies from one partner to*

272 Comp. „Mediterranean Partners" in for example COM 97 (68) final, 6;
273 Comp. „our partners" COM 2002 (159), 3;
274 Among the numerous denominations of „partner" compare two examples in COM 2000 (497) final, 9; and COM 2005 (139) final, 3.
275 Comp. „our partners in the Mediterranean" COM 2003 (294), 19.
276 Comp. „a ring of friends" COM 2003 (104), 4.
277 Comp. „twelve Mediterranean Partners" COM 97 (68) final, 1.
278 Comp. „all Euro-Med partners" 2006 (620) final, 10.
279 Comp. „all Mediterranean Partners" COM 2007 (598) final, 2.
280 Comp. „all oft he EU's Mediterranean partners" COM 2008 (319) final, 4.
281 Comp. „die Länder der Region sind (...) sehr unterschiedlich" COM 2000 (497) final, 4.
282 Comp. „Ihr allgemeines Entwicklungsniveau ist sehr viel niedriger" COM 94 (427) final, 10.
283 Comp. „Sie haben mit einem hohen Bevölkerungswachstum zu kämpfen" COM 94 (427) final, 10.
284 Comp. "Sie besitzen keine gut ausgebildeten Facharbeiter" COM 94 (427) final, 11.
285 Comp. „These forces have not necessarily led to greater convergence." COM 2003 (104), 4.
286 Comp. „What is perhaps less known is that the Mediterranean has also had a very poor rate of growth in GDP per capita" COM 2003 (104) final, 7.
287 Comp. „the partner countries are at different stages of development" COM 97 (68) final, 6.
288 Comp. „Zypern, Malta, Türkei, Israel (...) die größten Fortschritte" COM 94 (427) final, 12.

the other[289], there is a clear distinction among the so-called partner. For instance, it is stressed that *with the exception of Cyprus and Malta none of the Mediterranean partners has an entirely satisfactory record in this respect*[290]. Regarding the differentiations made by the Commission, it is remarkable that it mainly concerns countries which have a privileged relation to the European Union, either because of their historical linkage, like it is the case in Israel, or because they have a candidate status like Turkey or even a clear accession perspective like Cyprus and Malta, who both joined the European Union in 2004. In this respect, the differentiation made by the Commission can not to be classified as a simple distinction. Instead, it must be taken as an example of a distinguishing discourse, which implies a non conquerable determination because none of the MNCs has the perspective to become a member country. By this means, a retained differentiation is possible despite a cooperative policy.

In terms of the political cooperation, the Commission's expectation is linked to the situational valuation, as it considers that the *partners will start from variable, in some cases limited, capacity to undertake rapid reform and comprehensive transition*[291] and that *certain partners are more interested than others*[292]. Differentiations expressed in reference to the political cooperation can be of a general nature as, for example, when referring to obvious differences regarding the political system in comparison with the EU: *the EU has internal mechanism for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice while the differences between the Mediterranean partners have to date prevented them from having similar co-ordination mechanisms on their side*[293]. This comparison with the EU indicates both an inequality among the partnership and a European superiority. This is particularly indicative of the predominant position of the European Union within the institutional framework of the Barcelona Process when it is stated that *as long as this situation prevails it is difficult to see how co-chairmanship arrangements could work effectively*[294]. Regarding the cooperation, the Commission values the *participation by the Mediterranean partners* as *extremely good, regular and at a high level*[295], although there exists the consciousness concerning the evolvement of the Barcelona Process that it can *only reach its full potential if there is an awareness of a joint responsibility in the region*[296].

The latter implies that the "other" is not completely aware of the dimension and the aim of the policy. Therewith, the differentiation is related to the view that only Europe is conscious of the importance of

289 Comp. „the situation varies from one partner to the another" COM 2002 (159) final, 5.

290 Comp. „with the exception of Cyprus and Malta none of the Mediterranean partners has an entirely satisfactory record in this respect" COM 2002 (159) final 5.

291 Comp. „partners will start from variable, in some cases limited, capacity to undertake rapid reform and comprehensive transition" COM 2003 (104) final, 16.

292 Comp. „certain partner are more interested than others" WP 2003, 5.

293 Comp. „The EU has internal mechanism for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice while the differences between the Mediterranean partners have to date prevented them from having similar co-ordination mechanisms on their side" COM 2002 (159) final, 17.

294 Comp. "As long as this situation prevails it is difficult to see how co-chairmanship arrangements could work effectively" COM 2002 (159) final, 17.

295 Comp. „participation by the Mediterranean partners has been extremely good, regular and at a high level" COM 97 (68) final, 6.

296 Comp. „Der Barcelona Prozess kann sein volles Potential nur dann entfalten, wenn man sich in der Region der ‚Mitverantwortung' für den Prozess bewusst ist" COM 2000 (497) final, 16.

the measures that have to be undertaken in order to reach the goal of transforming the Mediterranean into a region of prosperity and wealth. In 2005, the year of the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the apparent lack of commitment of the Mediterranean partners has been excused by *the continuing conflicts in the region and because the search for consensus has sometimes acted as a break on those wishing to move forward more rapidly*[297]. This expression already belongs to the evaluative way of describing the situation of the "other". Backed by the supposed consciousness *of the desire of our partners for a closer and deeper relation with the EU*[298], the Commission assesses the situation as follows: N*early all Mediterranean partners have corrected their imbalance but which is considered to be insufficient and instable*[299] or *the political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not progressed as quickly as desired*[300]. These evaluative discourses can be classified as justifications for knowing what the "other" needs, which is, for example, expressed in concrete terms when stressing the *need* of *a dynamic growth*[301] or in an indirect way by means of callings, like the invitations to sign association agreements, which form the Commission's only way of directly addressing the "other" in documents.[302]

2.2 Associational and dissociative elements

Until the terror attacks of 9/11, the European discourse did not imply apparent associative elements. After 9/11, it is remarkable that within the documents of the European Commission, which represent the inner European discourse, clear references of common ties are made. The most striking statement to signalise the conjunction between Europe and the Mediterranean can be classified as an attempt to encourage the view of association with the MNC within Europe: *The countries of the Mediterranean region are bound together by geography, but we are near neighbours in many other ways, too*[303]. Further expressions underline this impression, as the Commission speaks of *innumerable common challenges, we face*[304] or *we need to work closely together to help achieve lasting peace in the Middle*

297 Comp. „Partners have at times not appears wholy commited to implementing the principals to which they signed up, partly because of the difficulties caused by the continuing conflicts in the region and because the search for consensus has sometimes acted as a break on those wishing to move forward more rapidly" COM 2005 (139) final, 3.

298 Comp. „Conscious(…) of the desire of our partners for a closer and deeper relation with the EU" COM 2002 (159) final, 5.

299 Comp. „fast alle Mittelmeerpartner (haben) iher Ungleichgewichte nun korrigiert, (...) diese Fortschritte sind jedoch unzureichend und instabil" COM 2000 (497) final, 3.

300 Comp. "Yet the political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not progressed as quickly as desired" COM 2003 (104) final, 7.

301 Comp. "Die Mittelmeerpartner brauchen dynamisches Wachstum, das sie nur erreichen können, wenn sie eine doppelte Strategie verfolgen (...)" COM 2000 (497) final, 3.

302 The Commission calls on Egypt and Jordanian to sign association agreements and further cooperation of Lebanon, Syria and Egypt with the EU COM 2000 (497) final, 6f.

303 Comp. „The countries of the Mediterranean region are bound together by geography, but we are near neighbours in many other ways, too" COM 2002 (159) final,2.

304 Comp. „We face innummerable common challenges" COM 2002 (159) final, 2.

East[305] and *only by working together we can hope to protect our common Mediterranean heritage*[306]. True, 9/11 constituted a major challenge to the diplomatic relations across the Mediterranean; hence, it is not surprising that there was a major effort within the European Union to keep the member countries on course. A recall on the close historical linkage between the countries was again necessary when Nicolas Sarkozy spread separate forces within Europe with the proposal to establish a Mediterranean Union just for European countries bordering the Mediterranean: *all of the EU' Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with Europe*[307].

2.3 References to a Mediterranean region

There have been little references to the Mediterranean itself. When there was a reference to its geographical characteristics, the denomination by the Commission referred to the *Mediterranean basin*[308] or a *European-Mediterranean zone*[309]. The most striking statement, which forms a singular happening in my research, demonstrates a European appropriation of the Mediterranean when the Commission describes *the Mediterranean* as *the largest European sea*[310]. This is a clear indication that the Roman "Mare nostrum" is still perceived by some means or other in the European consciousness.

2.4 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

The definitions of the Mediterranean Policy provided by the Commission refer on the one hand to the policy itself and on the other hand to its significance for Europe.

The expressions used by the Commission to describe the European Mediterranean Policy range from community, partnership, forum and instrument to framework and a new start. The discursive distinction lies in the denomination. When the Commission refers in early documents to a *community with the Mediterranean countries* or *its southern neighbours*[311]or partnership and forum, these terms indicate an associative discourse that lacks a hierarchy. The description of a *partnership* between *Europe and the Mediterranean*[312], which in its meaning refers to geographical entities, does not imply any sort of superiority. Furthermore, the comparison with a *permanent forum of dialogue*[313], a *unique forum*[314]

305 Comp. „we need to work closely together to help achieve lasting peace in the Middle East" COM 2002 (159) final, 2.
306 Comp. „only by working together we can hope to protect our common Mediterranean heritage" COM 2006 (475) final, 10.
307 Comp. „all of the EU' Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with Europe" COM 2008 (319) final, 2.
308 Comp. „Mittelmeerbecken" COM 94 (427) final, 5.
309 Comp. „Europäisch-mediterrane Zone" COM 94 (427) final, 12.
310 Comp. „The Mediterranean is the largest European sea (...)" COM 2006 (475) final, 2.
311 Comp. „Gemeinschaft (...) mit den südlichen Mittelmeerländern" COM 94 (427) final, 3; and „Gemeinschaft (...) südlichen Nachbarn" COM 94 (427) final, 6.
312 Comp. „Partnerschaft Europa- Mittelmeer" COM 94 (427) final, 7.
313 Comp. „a permanent forum for dialogue" COM 95 (72) final, 9.
314 Comp. „ das einzige Forum, in dem Israel, Syrien und der Libanon auf Ministerebene zusammentreffen" COM 2000 (159) final, 4.

or *the only regional forum*[315] when referring to the Barcelona Process does not give a reason to interpret hegemonial pretensions. The only remarkable issue is that the description as a singular and only forum implies a certain inner European legitimacy of its policy. Differently to interpret is the description of *an indispensible instrument*[316] or a *unique* or *strong policy framework*[317] when referring to the Barcelona Process. There is a clear reference to a political space or medium which is necessary to impose policy intentions. The indication of the Barcelona Process representing a *recommencement*[318] constitutes one of the rare moments in which the discourse of the Commission suggests that the Mediterranean Policy has opened a new chapter in history since 1995 and figures as a symbol of overcoming history. Although this intention can be repetitiously manifested by single statements, the significance, which the Commission adheres to the Barcelona Process for Europe, demonstrates that there is still a lot of the historical predominance rooted in European positions, at least on a subconscious level. The significance of the Barcelona Process as it is expressed by the European Commission refers on the one hand to a strategic significance and classification and on the other hand to operational indicators and the strategic implementation, respectively. When the Barcelona Process is linked to expressions like *Europe's priority*[319], *the European Union's strategic approach*[320], *a major strategic political and economic asset*[321] or *a unique asset*[322], the strategic importance of the policy launched in the Mediterranean is beyond question. When the Commission comments on its policies in the Mediterranean, one can deduce the intention of strategic classifications. In the context of the Barcelona Process the implementation of the ENP required a significant strategic coordination within Europe, but also in front of the MNC partners. Arguments, which indicate these strategic considerations, are for example: *the new neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework*[323] or *the new Neighbourhood Policy sets out a means to reinforce the Barcelona Process*[324] and *the ENP and the Barcelona Process will work in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way*[325]. Both, the operational level and the strategic implementation of the European Policy is highlighted by the Commission's statement that *the process in practice is already irreversible*[326] or *the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is entering a critically important new phase*[327].

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315 Comp. „(...) the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remains the only regional forum where political and security dialogue among all Euro-Mediterranean partner is possible" COM 2006 (620) final, 3.
316 Comp. „ Barcelona process (...) an indispensible instrument" COM 97 (68) final, 1.
317 Comp. „partnership as a unique framework" COM 2002 (159) final, 9; and „the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership offers a strong policy framework" COM 2003 (104) final, 8.
318 Comp. „stellt (...) einen Neuanfang dar" COM 2000 (497), 2.
319 Comp. „Europe's priority" COM 95 (72) final, 1.
320 Comp. „The European Union's strategic approach" COM 97 (68) final, 1.
321 Comp. „The Barcelona Process has become a major strategic political and economic asset" COM 2002 (159) final, 2.
322 Comp. „EMP presents a unique asset" COM 2002 (159) final, 7.
323 Comp. „the new neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework" COM 2003 (104) final, 15.
324 Comp. „the new Neighbourhood Policy sets out a means to reinforce the Barcelona Process" WP 2003, 4.
325 Comp. „In this way the ENP and the Barcelona Process will work in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way" COM 2005 (139) final, 3.
326 Comp. „the process in practice is already irreversible" COM 2003 (610) final, 4.
327 Comp. „the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is entering a critically important new phase" COM 2006 (620) final, 3.

The importance of the Mediterranean Policy for Europe could not be better expressed than when the Commission stated that the relations between the European and the MNC countries reflect the political and strategic importance which Europe admits to the Mediterranean.[328]

2.5 Perception of the cooperation among the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

In the Commission's discourse the cooperation, which takes place between *the northern and southern Mediterranean countries*[329], *the Union and the Mediterranean partners*[330] or between *Europe and the Mediterranean countries*[331], which has also been described as cooperation between *the partners in Europe and the Mediterranean*[332], focuses either on characteristics of the policy or on thematic elements. *The spins of partnership*[333], the Mediterranean Policy, is identified to *be comprehensive in its geographical coverage* as well as *in its sectoral scope and forward looking in its political, economic and social ambitions*[334]. *Working together* according to the objectives of the Barcelona Process, especially in the areas of freedom, justice and governance is perceived as *a sign of a new maturity and closeness in the EMP*[335], despite the existing awareness that a further development regarding the conceptual and institutional approach is required. The aim of the policy is *not* characterised to be *new*[336] and the common position is reflected when stating that *only by working together* there is a hope to *protect* the *common Mediterranean heritage.*[337]

The thematic references constitute the major amount of statements. They can not be extensively discussed at this point, as it is not the aim of the present work to provide an analysis of the working plans within the Barcelona Process, but to discuss the European discourse in the context of the Barcelona Process. Hence, it is noticeable what kind of topics it is referred to when talking about vital importance, cornerstones or essential elements. For example, the topic of migration and human exchanges is considered to be *of vital importance to the Partnership*[338]*;* human rights and democracy are perceived as *essential elements*[339] of the Barcelona process; and *the Association Process remains at the core of*

328 Comp. „(Die Beziehungen der EU spiegeln wider), von welcher politischen und strategischen Bedeutung dieser Region für die EU ist" COM 2000 (497) final, 2.
329 Comp. „Zusammenarbeit zwischen den nördlichen und südlichen Mittelmeerländern" COM 94 (427) final, 7.
330 Comp. „Union und den Mittelmeerpartnern" COM 94 (427) final, 8.
331 Comp. „Europa und die Mittelmeerländer" COM 94 (427) final, 9.
332 Comp. „Die Partner in Europa und im Mittelmeerraum" COM 94 (427) final, 13.
333 Comp. „in the spins of partnership" COM 97 (68) final, 2.
334 Comp. „A partnership was launched which is comprehensive, both in its geographical coverage and its sectoral scope, and forward looking in its political, economic and social ambition" COM 2005 (139) final, 2.
335 Comp. „working together in these areas [freedom, justice] is not only a sign of a new maturity and closeness in the EMP, (…)" COM 2002 (159) final, 6.
336 Comp. „The political desire to develop a special relationship of cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean basis is not new, (...)" COM 2003 (376) final, 3.
337 Comp. "Only by working together can we hope to protect our common Mediterranean heritage" COM 2006 (620) final, 10.
338 Comp. „[migration and human exchanges] are of vital importance to the Partnership" COM 2002 (159) final, 6.
339 Comp. „Since 1992 (…) Human Rights and democracy as 'essential elements'" COM 2003 (294) final, 8.

the Partnership[340]. The regional integration aspect can be found among other topical key features. Thus, it can be highlighted to be a major concern of the Commission as it states that a *South-South regional integration, in partnership with consolidated North-South links, is key to achieving dynamic and diversified economies in Mediterranean countries*[341]*;* hence, it is considered *an indispensable component of the Barcelona Process to strengthen trade ties between Mediterranean countries themselves.*[342] These thematic priorities can be illuminated from the multitude of issues that are aimed to be covered by the Barcelona Process. In its self-interest, the preliminary concern of Europe is to cope with the challenges of migration and social pressures and therefore to aspire a close cooperation on the executive level. Other subjects like democracy and human rights belong to a certain mission statement, which Europe, as hegemonial power, tries to assume and forces the way that the launched policy requires, because there is a need for a common base of values in order to achieve the defined goals.

2.6 References of European predominance

In the discourse of the European Commission, the references of the European dominance can be manifested via indications of material instruments or immaterial media like advantages in knowledge and via demonstrations of power.

The Community has two main kinds of instruments to achieve the objectives (...), namely budget resources and EIB loans[343]. Due to the economical weaker MNCs, these are potential material instruments the European Union can revert to in order to influence the direction of their policies. However, the power of the knowledge advantage of the European Union must not be neglected. In the Commission's discourse this becomes either explicitly or implicitly obvious.

Statements like *common rules and standards are vital to ensure that our neighbours can access and reap the benefits of the enlarged EU internal market*[344] explicitly indicate the knowledge advantage of Europe. In contrast, references suggesting that *successful economic policies will require bolder reforms*[345] or calls on the *partners should now take the necessary measures are more implicit*[346]. These statements imply a knowledge advantage, because Europe knows, due to its experience[347], how bolder reforms and necessary measures can successfully be implemented. At the same time, Europe makes

340 Comp. „the Association Process remains at the core of the Partnership" WP 2003, 4.

341 Comp. „South-South regional integration, in partnership with consolidated North-South links, is key to achieving dynamic and diversified economies in Mediterranean countries" COM 2005 (139) final, 9.

342 Comp. "an indispensable component of the Barcelona Process to strengthen trade ties between Mediterranean countries themselves" COM 2005 (139) final, 8.

343 Comp. „The Community has two main kinds of instruments to achieve the objectives (…), namely budget resources and EIB loans" COM 95 (72) final, 8.

344 Comp. „common rules and standards are vital to ensure that our neighbours can access and reap the benefits of the enlarged EU internal market (…)" COM 2003 (104) final, 14.

345 Comp. „successful economic policies will require bolder reforms in Mediterranean partners" COM 2003 (610) final, 7.

346 Comp. „partners should consider now take the necessary measures to expand the scope (…)" COM 2005 (139) final, 5.

347 Comp. „die Erfahrung Europas (...)" COM 94 (427) final, 12.

clear that it is difficult to overcome the knowledge gap between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, when the Commission states that *they will need to show a strong commitment to build up their administrative institutional and legal capacity*[348].

Demonstrations of European dominance can be deduced from statements, which include certain evaluations of the "other" and conditions imposed on the "other". For instance, evaluative statements can be highlighted in the context of financial aid provided by the EU. Here, the Commission suggests to *evaluate the readiness of the partners of demonstrating their decisiveness regarding an intensification of the regional trade and economic cooperation as well as economic reforms*[349] or that *future apportionments of funds should be oriented on the preparedness of the partners to carry into effect the accorded goals*[350] within the Barcelona Process. At the moment conditions are formulated, the European dominance appears to be even more explicit, like *the benefits to be obtained from the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area will only be released if the Mediterranean partners continue their efforts to improve the framework conditions for attracting investment, including foreign investment, and helping create and develop business*[351]*;* or when the Commission suggests to implement reforms so that just some of the partner countries benefit from them: *those countries that show the greatest readiness to work with the EU on environment issues should be those with whom the Commission moves ahead first*[352].

3 Discourse analysis – Purpose

The analytical category "purpose" encompasses statements, which refer to the motivation, the purpose, of the Mediterranean policy and the policy's aim.

In total, there have been hundred and seven statements identified for this category.

Documents assigned to the European Commission			
	"Aim"	"Purpose"	**Total**
PURPOSE	52	55	**107**

348 Comp. „they will need to show a strong commitment to build up their administrative institutional and legal capacity" COM 2003 (610) final, 16.

349 Comp. „wird sich die künftige Programmierung schwerpunktmäßig auf eine geringere Anzahl unmittelbar mit den Abkommen verknüpfter Prioritäten konzentrieren und stärker berücksichtigen, inwieweit die Partner bereit sind ihre Entschlossenheit zur Intensivierung des regionalen Handels und der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit sowie zu den notwendigen Wirtschaftsreformen, vor allem den im Finanzsektor, durch Taten zu untermauern, um den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Übergang zu vollenden" COM 2000 (497) final, 10.

350 Comp. „(…) muss sich in künftigen Mittelszuweisungen die Bereitschaft der Partner zur Verwirklichung der Ziele der Abkommen – vor allem zur Beschleunigung der Wirtschaftsreformen – und zur Ausweitung ihrer Aufnahmekapazitäten" COM 2000 (497) 10.

351 Comp. „the benefits to be obtained from the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area will only be released if the Mediterranean partners continue their efforts to improve the framework conditions for attracting investment, including foreign investment, and helping create and develop business" COM 2002 (159) final, 14.

352 Comp. „Those countries that show the greatest readiness to work with the EU on environment issues should be those with whom the Commission moves ahead first" COM 2006 (475) final, 10.

As illustrated in the table below, the distribution per category is almost even. Although there has been the greatest number of statements in the first years after the foundation of the Barcelona Process, the distribution per year does not indicate outstanding patterns.

COMM - DOCS: Distribution of statements per year											
	94	**95**	**97**	**00**	**02**	**03**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	**Total**
PURPOSE	25	12	11	14	5	14	9	6	5	6	**107**

3.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy

The statements assigned to the category "purpose" refer to the strategy that is designed by the Commission in its discourse concerning the European Union in the Mediterranean. The distinctions have been set in regard to statements reasoning the strategy of the Mediterranean Policy in general, mid-term strategies having a more operative character and certain thematic references that predominantly appeared in the lecture of the sources.

In general, the Commission states that the *Mediterranean is strategically important to the European Union*[353], which is explained by the fact that *the geographical territories are, concerning security and social stability, of great interest to the European Union*[354] and that there exist *reciprocal dependences*[355] in many aspects. These few statements of the early documents indicate that the fundamental purpose of the European Union in the Mediterranean is based on security concerns. The argument is underlined by further statements, which express a certain fear of an instable neighbourhood in the Mediterranean. This is proved by the consideration that *negative effects of conflicts on economic and political development, especially where sustained over a long period, cannot be over-estimated*[356]. In the same context, the Commission states that *the EU has a clear interest in ensuring that these common challenges are addressed*[357] by the Mediterranean Policy. There is a certain urgency expressed by the Commission at many stages. Especially in the preparation document of the Barcelona Conference it is stated that *time rushes*[358] and that it is *on time to reveal possibilities for the advancement of peace by cooperation and mutual understanding*[359]. After having expressed the need for a long-term policy[360] in 1994, the Commission argues in 2002 that *the terrible events of 11 September*

353 Comp. „ Mediterranean is strategically important to the European Union" COM 95 (72) final, 1.
354 Comp. „(...) geographischen Gebiete, die für die Union hinsichtlich Sicherheit und sozialer Stabilität von großem Interesse sind" COM 94 (427)final, 2 and 4.
355 Comp. „ (...) in vielen Bereichen eine gegenseitige Abhängigkeit" COM 94 (427) final, 5.
356 Comp. „the negative effects of conflicts on economic and political development, especially where sustained over a long period, cannot be over-estimated" COM 2003 (104) final, 9.
357 Comp. „the EU has a clear interest in ensuring that these common challenges are addressed" COM 2003 (104) final, 9.
358 Comp. „Die Zeit drängt (...)" COM 94 (427) final, 6.
359 Comp. „(...) ist es an der Zeit, Möglichkeiten für die Förderung des Friedens über Zusammenarbeit und beidseitiges Verständnis aufzuzeigen" COM 94 (427) final, 6.
360 Comp. „benötigt wird eine langfristige Strategie" COM 94 (427) final, 7.

have imparted new urgency and even greater importance to the efforts[361] of establishing a successful policy in the Mediterranean.

As it is the purpose to *raise the awareness*[362] of the challenges which have to be faced in the Mediterranean, the Commission is convinced *that shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights will open the way for closer and more open dialogue on the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)*[363]. From the statement that *the situation in the region with regard to respect for human rights and democracy continues to give cause for concern*[364] derives the conclusion that the transmission of European values, which are considered to be of international standards, is one of the continuative purposes of the European policy in the Mediterranean. In the context of the establishment of the Mediterranean Union, the Commission identifies the *Mediterranean as key region*[365] *once more* and declares that *there is a need to reassert in political terms the central importance of the Mediterranean in the political agenda of all participants*[366].

According to these statements, the strategic purpose of the European Union is in the conservation of peace and stability, in the enhancement of security and in the missionary attempt of transporting European values and know-how to the neighbouring states. This conclusion seems valid despite attempts to trivialise the political purpose by statements like: *the policy of the Union attempts to help them to cope with the challenges*[367]*;* or *all member states would benefit from an improvement in the region's stability and prosperity*[368]*;* and *the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU*[369].

The Commission argues in its discourse that the mid-term strategy ranges from simple evidences, like *strengthening the Mediterranean Policy in a short- and medium- term*[370]*, demands on intensifying the political dialogue*[371] to stressing *the need to continue and even accelerate the pace of economic mod-*

361 Comp. „the terrible events of 11 September have imparted new urgency and even greater importance to the efforts" COM 2002 (159) final, 5.

362 Comp. „raise the awareness" COM 2005 (139) final, 5.

363 Comp. „that shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights will open the way for closer and more open dialogue on the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)" COM 2003 (104) final, 12.

364 Comp. „the situation in the region with regard to respect for human rights and democracy continues to give cause for concern" COM 2002 (159) final, 5.

365 Comp. „(...) the Commission identifies Mediterranean as key region (…)" COM 2007 (598) final, 7.

366 Comp. „there is a need to reassert in political terms the central importance of the Mediterranean in the political agenda of all participants" COM 2008 (319) final, 4.

367 Comp. „(...) die Gemeinschaft eine Politik verfolgt, um ihnen zu helfen (…) Herausforderungen zu bewältigen" COM 94 (427) final, 6.

368 Comp. „all the member states would benefit from an improvement in the region's stability and prosperity, (…)" COM 95 (72) final, 4.

369 Comp. „(…) the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU" COM 2003 (104) final, 10.

370 Comp. „(...) kurzfristige und mittelfristige Stärkung der Mittelmeerpolitik" COM 94 (427) final, 4.

371 Comp. „Der politische Dialog mit den Mittelmeerpartnern der Union sollte daher intensiviert und auf Sicherheitsfragen ausgedehnt werden" COM 94 (427) final, 9.

ernisations[372], to *confirm and reinforce the commitment to the Barcelona Process*[373] and to *emphasise the willingness to continue with the process*[374].

The predominant thematic references regarding statements, which indicate the purpose of the Mediterranean Policy, surprisingly correspond to the European interests, defined by the Commission: *energy supply, migration, trade and investment*[375]. Hence, the Commission states that *making European investment in energy easier and involving the MNC in the European Energy Charter would have positive consequences for cooperation.*[376] Or, the expressed concern regarding the migration pressure that *if it will not be controlled it could easily lead to tensions*[377]. With respect to trade the Commission states that the realisation of the free-trade area constitutes one of the major ambitions of the Barcelona process, which aims to minimize the prosperity gap. Other thematic references concern the preoccupation of the Commission regarding the dispersion of unconventional weapons, human rights, democratic values and also environmental matters.

3.2 About the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy

The aim expressed in the discourse of the Commission concerns both, general formulations and specific statements. The latter ones are directed towards the aim and towards the operative issues of the European Mediterranean Policy.

The Commission's formulaic stated aims pertain to general formulations such as establishing *a closer cooperation*[378]or *a Euro-Mediterranean area which is politically stable and safe*[379].

A reference to stability and security can also be found in the general definition of the main aims. In the early documents *the main aim of the Mediterranean Policy of the Union* is highlighted to constitute *the assurance of peace and stability in the region* and that it should be reached *with all available media*[380]. More concretely, *the three main aims of the Mediterranean policy of the EU are: creation of a space of peace and stability, creation of a space of common prosperity through the stepwise established free-trade area, and the improvement of the reciprocal understanding of the peoples and the development*

372 Comp. „The pace of economic modernisation should continue and will even need to accelerate in order to produce the expected results in terms of economic growth and increased industrial competitiveness" COM 2002 (159) final, 10.

373 Comp. „The meeting should confirm and reinforce this commitment (…)" WP 2003, 1.

374 Comp. „All partners should emphasise their willingness to continue with this process" COM 2002 (159) final, 18.

375 Comp. „Die Interessen Europas in der Region sind sehr vielfältig und betreffen Bereiche wie Energieversorgung, Migration, Handel, und Investitionen" COM 94 (427) final, 5.

376 Comp. „Making European investment in energy easier and involving MNC in the European Energy Charter would have positive consequences for cooperation" COM 95 (72) final, 4.

377 Comp. „Wird der Migrationsdruck nicht (...) gesteuert, so könnte es nur zu leicht zu Spannungen kommen, (...)" COM 94 (427) final, 6.

378 Comp. „(...) eine engere Zusammenarbeit" COM 94(427) final, 7.

379 Comp. „(...) the Community expressed the view that the key objective oft he European Community's Mediterranean policy, the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean area which is politically stable and safe (...)" COM 95 (72) final, 2.

380 Comp. „Das Hauptziel der Mittelmeerpolitik der Union ist die Sicherung von Frieden und Stabilität in der Region. Dieses Ziel sollte mit allen der Union zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln (...) verfolgt werden" COM 94 (427) final, 8.

of an active civil society[381]. In 2006, the reference to the main aims is more precise: *to advance political dialogue and reform, tackle the regional and global threats to security and stability, support sustainable socio-economic development, accelerate moves towards free trade area, works towards the de-pollution of the Mediterranean, increase cooperation in the field of education and culture, and address migratory flows by the way of a comprehensive and integrated approach*[382].

Other references determine the Barcelona Process as an *indispensable instrument for the achievement of a common area of peace and stability*[383] or that it is its aim *to bring the historic and political bindings between Europe and the Mediterranean countries to a full evolvement.*[384] For these more general statements it can be said that it is indicative that peace and stability range among the most explicitly expressed aims.

More specifically, the aims of the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union can be highlighted as follows:

- *To encourage the political dialogue between the European Union and the Mediterranean partners*[385].
- *To be aware of the reasons for destabilisation and potential conflicts at an early stage*[386].
- *To improve the effectiveness of all actions and to achieve a more visible impact on the wellbeing of the people concerned*[387].
- *To increase the European awareness of the challenges facing the people of the South and to land impetus to North-South relations*[388].
- *To develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood*[389].
- *To advance political reforms towards human rights, democracy, peace and security*[390].

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381 Comp. „Die drei Hauptzeile der Mittelmeerpolitik der EU sind: Schaffung eines Raumes des Friedens und der Stabilität (…); Schaffung eines Raumes des gemeinsamen Wohlstands durch die schrittweise Errichtung einer Freihandelszone (…); Verbesserung des gegenseitigen Verständnisses der Völker in der Region und Aufbau einer aktiven Zivilgesellschaft“ COM 2000 (497) final, 2.

382 Comp. „to advance political dialogue and reform, tackle the regional and global threats to security and stability, support sustainable socio-economic development, accelerate moves towards free trade area, works towards the de-pollution of the Mediterranean, increase cooperation in the field of education and culture, and address migratory flows by the way of a comprehensive and integrated approach” COM 2006 (620) final, 2.

383 Comp. „The European Union’s strategic approach (…) was defined in the (…) Barcelona Process, which is seen as an indispensable instrument for the achievement of a common area of peace and stability” COM 97 (68) final, 1.

384 Comp. „(...) die historischen und politischen Bindungen zwischen der EU und den Mittelmeerländern zur vollen Entfaltung bringen“ COM 2000 (497) final, 2.

385 Comp. „Vorrangig sollte daher der politische Dialog zwischen der Union und den Mittelmeerpartnern gefördert werden“ COM 94 (427) final, 8.

386 Comp. „(...) um frühzeitig die Ursachen von Destabilisierung und potentiellen Konflikten zu erkennen” COM 94 (427) final, 8.

387 Comp. „It must strive to improve the effectiveness of all these actions and to achieve a more visible impact on the wellbeing of the people concerned“ COM 95 (72) final, 6.

388 Comp. „These actions and others like them, will not only increase the awareness of the challenges facing the peoples in the South, but will also land impetus to North-South relations by encouraging the direct participation of key players among those peoples” COM 95(72) final, 7.

389 Comp. „the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood (...)“

390 Comp. „The aim is to advance political reforms towards human rights, democracy, peace and security (…)“ COM 2005 (139) final, 4.

This representative selection of statements of the European Commission again indicates the strong concern to assure peace and stability by enhancing mainly economic reforms.

Operative aims to accomplish the aims of the policy are diverse and concern, for example, the proposition of a quick closure[391] of the proceedings of the Barcelona Process *to conduct all activities with a view of guaranteeing the interaction and synergies between bilateral and regional schemes*[392] and that *the process should be facilitated by economic adjustment policies based on market economy principals*[393]. Therefore, the operative aim is *to set up an area of shared prosperity and to give firm impetus to the establishment of free trade*[394] in order *to get rid of existing barriers in transport*[395]*; European private investment in the region should be promoted*[396] and several recommendations to the partner countries are made; for instance, those countries *which so far did not access the WTO should catch up*[397] or *each country which closed an association agreement with the European Union should aim to sign free trade agreements with other countries which hold association agreements with the EU within five years*[398]. Concerning other areas of the Mediterranean Policy like the multilateral dimension, the Commission suggests at one point to make greater use of the cooperation programs by involving fewer partners[399]. This indicates that the policy struggles with the successful implementation of their objectives in this dimension of the Barcelona Process and that the European vision of *a region which should be a source of dynamism, creativity and exchange* is much harder to achieve, even if it is considered to be *the harvest of cultural diversity through the ages*[400].

Numerous references have been identified that illustrate the European ambition to change the Mediterranean according to their policy convictions. The Commission urges the need to bring new initiatives forward, which aim to increase the Euro-Mediterranean wealth and prosperity[401]; in 2008, the proac-

391 Comp. „rascher Abschluss“ COM 94 (427) final, 3.

392 Comp „ all activities must be conducted with a view to guaranteeing the interaction and synergies between bilateral and regional schemes” COM 97 (68) final, 6.

393 Comp. „It will be a gradual process and should be facilitated by economic adjustment policies based on market economy principals” COM 97(68) final, 3.

394 Comp. „(…) that the first objective of the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers should be to emphasize the will and desire of the 27 Partners to set up an area of shared prosperity and to give firm impetus to the establishment of free trade (…)” COM 97 (68) final, 6.

395 Comp. „The establishment of free trade area would moreover get rid of existing barriers in transport (…)” COM 95 (72) final, 3.

396 Comp. „A systematic effort should be made to promote European private investment in the region” COM 97 (68) final, 7.

397 Comp. „Die Partner, die den Beitritt zur WTO noch nicht beantragt haben, sollte die (...) nachholen (...)“ COM 2000 (497) final, 9.

398 Comp. „Jedes Land, das ein Assoziationsabkommen mit der EU unterzeichnet, sollte spätestens innerhalb von fünf Jahren danach Freihandelsabkommen mit allen übrigen Unterzeichnern von Assoziationsabkommen schließen“ COM 2000 (497) final, 9.

399 Comp. „Die Kommission schlägt vor, die multilaterale Dimension der regionalen Kooperationsprogramme stärker zu nutzen, indem Projekte mit einer geringeren Anzahl von Mitgliedstaaten und Mittelmeerpartnern ausgearbeitet werden können (...)“ COM 2000 (497) final, 12.

400 Comp. „the region must be a source of dynamism, creativity and exchange, which has been the harvest of cultural diversity through the ages” COM 2002 (159) final, 2.

401 Comp. „It is now the moment to deepen and strengthen Marseilles’ decisions and also to put forwards new initiatives aimed at increasing Euro-Mediterranean wealth and prosperity” COM 2002 (159) final, 3.

tive attitude is even more explicit: *more engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform the objectives of the Barcelona Process into tangible realities*[402], especially as *it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stranger partnership*[403].

Furthermore, the operative aims make references where humanitarian aims regarding illegal migration are ostensible, for example, when the Commission states that *preventing further loss of life needs to be a clear priority in the framework of the partnership*[404]; they also indicate Europe's awareness that *no single country can protect the Mediterranean environment by acting alone*[405]*;* thus, the European policy is based on certain self-perceptions and role claims which influence the often positively perceived intentions.

4 Discourse analysis – Identity

The discourse of the European Commission regarding references to the European identity deals with aspects like self-reflection, the role of the European Union and the legitimation of the political mandate, which Europe has assumed in the Mediterranean.

In total, seventy statements which correspond to this analytical category have been identified.

Documents assigned to the European Commission			
	"EU"	"Auftrag"	**Total**
IDENTITY	48	22	**70**

The distribution per years indicates that more than half of the statements have been identified in the years before 2000. Remarkable is the low number of statements which refer to the European identity in the years between 2006 and 2008.

COMM – DOCS: Distribution of statements per year											
	94	**95**	**97**	**00**	**02**	**03**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	**Total**
IDENTITY	19	12	9	7	7	10	4	1	1		**70**

The lack of significant statements concerning the identity of the EU in the discourse of the Commission indicates that more attention is paid on defining the Mediterranean Policy, especially in 2007 and 2008 with the proposal of Nicolas Sarkozy to found a Mediterranean Union. It further has to be inves-

402 Comp. „more engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform the objectives of the Barcelona Process into tangible realities" COM 2008 (319) final, 4.

403 Comp. „(…) it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stronger partnership (…)" COM 2008 (319) final, 5.

404 Comp. „preventing further loss of life needs to be a clear priority in the framework of the partnership" COM 2005 (139) final, 13.

405 Comp. „As no single country can be held responsible for the deterioration of the Mediterranean environment, no single country can protect it by acting alone" COM 2006 (475) final, 2.

tigated whether this suggests a changing self-assurance of Europe or whether it has to be evaluated differently.

4.1 The self-perception of the European Union

Self-reflecting statements within the documents assigned to the European Commission facilitate the deduction of characteristics which the European Union is ascribing itself to. The attributes identified concern statements, which aim to recall open-mindness, to guard values of human rights and freedom, to assure the knowledge advantage, to preserve the image both internally and externally, and to demonstrate power and generosity. Although no specific pattern regarding the temporal appearance of the statements can be found, they refer to an image, which the European Union aspires to represent. The factual image regarding the political identity will be discussed in the consecutive chapter.

The discursive recall of open-mindness is confirmed with statements, in which the Commission reproves that *the Union herself should be prepared for a regular dialogue*[406] and act *with sufficient flexibility and efficiency*[407]. When the Commission reminds that the *respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is at the heart of the EU's international policy*[408], it manifests what implicitly is of mayor political interest and can be classified as extended mission statement. This is underlined by certain references to the knowledge superiority, which Europe claims for itself when stating *experience has shown*[409] or *the European experience should be used*[410]. Nevertheless, the position of the Commission contains internal criticism and reprimands to some extent: for instance, the Commission states that the necessary and quick closure of Association Agreements *will require a certain flexibility of the Council*[411], or that if a document *is signed by Ministers there must be a commitment to gradually deepen its content*[412].This severe appearing internal discourse is also given when constituting that *no moves have been made in a certain direction since the Barcelona Conference and that the Commission strongly urges the European Parliament to take initiative*[413]. While the Commission is pressuring advancement in the Mediterranean Policy when it states that *the Council has multiple times demanded an*

406 Comp. „Die Union sollte ihrerseits zu einem regelmäßigen politischen Dialog (...) bereit sein" COM 94 (427) final, 15.

407 Comp. „Experience has shown that centrally managed programs have not always been able to respond with sufficient flexibility and efficiency to facilitate dynamic, timely exchange" COM 2002 (159) final, 7.

408 Comp. „respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is at the heart of the EU's international policy" COM 97 (68) final, 5.

409 Comp. „Experience has shown that centrally managed programs have not always been able to respond with sufficient flexibility and efficiency to facilitate dynamic, timely exchange" COM 2002 (159) final, 7.

410 Comp. „Die Europäische Erfahrung mit der Errichtung eines Binnenmarktest sollte genutzt werden (...)" COM 2000 (497) final, 8.

411 Comp. „[rascher Abschluss der Verhandlungen über neue Abkommen] Dies wird eine gewisse Flexibilität auf Seiten des Rates erfordern, (...)" COM 94 (427) final, 15.

412 Comp. „If a document is signed by Ministers there must also be a commitment to gradually deepen its content" COM 97 (68) final, 5.

413 Comp. "no moves have been made in this direction since the Barcelona Conference and the Commission strongly urges the European Parliament to take initiative" COM 97 (68) final, 10.

intensification of the European–Mediterranean– Partnership[414],it also self-critically assesses that *important internal reform have to be carried out within the Commission regarding external aid and that the Council and the Parliament should agree on a more effective handling regarding the financial instrument of the Barcelona Process*[415] Further criticism towards other European institutions can be retained when the Commission constitutes that it has *made a number of recommendations on a subject which have not been adequately followed up*[416]. These internal pressures confirm the position that the Commission adheres to its discourse. The Barcelona Process is considered to be of strategic importance and the Commission's c*ommunications focus on proposals to strengthen and deepen the partnership in the future,*[417] which in its opinion *requires that the European Union and the European institutions are fully involved in this collective effort*[418].

Especially the priorities of the Mediterranean Policy have not been properly focused and the content of the dialogue has proved to be difficult to define in the opinion of the Commission. It recalls several times that *the EU needs to make a greater effort to create a positive image in the neighbourhood and act to combat stereotypes which affect perceptions of neighbouring countries within the EU*[419]. Although it is postulated that *the EU has internal mechanisms for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice*[420] in regard to the analysis of the statements, it seems necessary for the Commission to improve the collective position of the EU. Consequently, this means that a stronger collective identity has to be built up.

4.2 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean

Regarding the political role, which the Commission ascribes to the EU, several aspects discussed beforehand might seem repetitive. While the characteristics refer to the internal view of the EU, the aspects assessed at this point correspond to the externally aspired image.

Generally speaking, the conviction that Europe knows what "the other" needs is dominating, especially when it is stated that *the relations to each region are based on the specific needs and capaci-*

414 Comp. „Der Rat hat mehrfach eine Intensivierung der Europa-Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft gefordert" COM 2000 (497) final, 5.

415 Comp. "Die Kommission muss eine wichtige interne Reform in Bezug auf die Erbringung der Auslandshilfe durchführen und das Parlament und der Rat müssen der EU eine wirksamere MEDA- Verordnung an die Hand geben" COM 2000 (497) final, 10.

416 Comp. "The Commission made a number of recommendations on this subject (…) which have not been adequately followed up" COM 2002 (159) final, 5.

417 Comp. „It should be stressed that the Communications focus on proposals to strengthen and deepen the partnership in the future" COM 2005 (139) final, 3.

418 Comp. "For the Commission it is essential that the European Union and the European institutions are fully involved in this collective effort" COM 2006 (475) final, 10.

419 Comp. „the EU needs also to make a greater effort to create a positive image in the neighbourhood and act to combat stereotypes which affect perceptions of neighbouring countries within the EU" COM 2003 (104) final, 12.

420 Comp. „the EU has internal mechanisms for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice (…)" COM 2002 (159) final, 17.

ties[421]. Beside this reference of almighty knowledge, the Commission perceives the European Union as pacifier, guardian of the prosperity and defender in times of major threat. Europe, as a politically young entity, aspires to be a hegemonial power and assumes all these roles. It is a fact that the discourse suggests at some points such behaviour to be legitimate. Peace, which is also central for the foundation of the European Union, is an additional motivating factor for the policy in the Mediterranean. Therefore, the Commission is convinced *that the dialogue of cultures and civilisation instituted by the Barcelona Process is one of the EU's major contributions to the promotion of mutual understanding and the opposing interpretations of present events as a conflict between Western society and Islam.*[422] Hence, Europe assumes the role of a pacifier, especially in times when prosperity must be guarded and brought to those that do not dispose of it. *A Mediterranean space where stability and prosperity dominates* is considered to be *advantageous for all member states*[423]. In order to reach this aim, the European Union is aware that it *must make clear its wish to see the countries in question enter into similar negotiations with each other and with European countries which are not members of the Community*[424]. Moreover, the Union states that *Association Agreements offer possibilities, but no guarantees and that all advantages can only unlimited be used by those countries, which are ready to modernise and open their economies*[425]. *The medium scaled perspective of the EU in the Mediterranean is to change the region into a zone of relative prosperity*[426]. Therefore, it can be stated that the Commission urges a policy, which is proactive and clear in its position to encourage changes in the Mediterranean region according to its measures.

Hence, the maintenance of peace is one of the roles the EU has ascribed itself to, another one is the prevention of the continent of threats caused in the Mediterranean. The identified threats also form a part of the legitimation of the European Policy in the Mediterranean. Threats, such as cultural incomprehension, socio-economic instability and the Middle East Conflict, are considered to be major motivations for this kind of policy that has been established in 1995. Beside the Middle East Peace Process, which is extensively discussed in the documents concerning the discourse of the Commission, it is the basic opinion that nowadays, the political, economical and social conditions in most of the countries threaten the stability and lead to mass emigrations, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism, drug

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421 Comp. „Die Beziehungen zu jeder Region basieren auf den jeweiligen spezifischen Bedürfnissen und Kapazitäten" COM 94 (427) final, 2.

422 Comp. „that the dialogue of cultures and civilisation instituted by the Barcelona Process is one of the EU's major contributions to the promotion of mutual understanding and the opposing interpretations of present events as a conflict between Western society and Islam" WP 2003, 6.

423 Comp. „Dagegen wäre ein Mittelmeerraum, in dem Stabilität und Wohlstand herrschen, für alle Mitgliedstaaten von Vorteil" COM 94 (427) final, 6.

424 Comp. „(…) the community must make clear its wish to see the countries in question enter into similar negotiations with each other and with European countries which are not members of the Community" COM 95 (72) final, 4.

425 Comp. „Die Assoziationsabkommen bieten Möglichkeiten, jedoch keine Garantien, und ihre Vorteile können nur von denjenigen Ländern uneingeschränkt ausgeschöpft werden, die bereit sind, ihre Wirtschaft zu modernisieren und zu öffnen" COM 2000 (497) final, 5.

426 Comp. „Mittelfristig wird die Umwandlung des Mittelmeerraumes in eine Zone relativen Wohlstands (...)" COM 94 (72) final, 15.

abuse and organised crime[427]. Regarding the organised crime and drug traffic, the Commission is concerned about the *necessity of a cooperation improvement as these subjects bear the possibility of reciprocal accusations*[428]. The migration pressure provokes similar concerns: *if it would not be coordinated accurately and systematically with the concerned countries, this could easily lead to tensions which affect international relations and it could damage the immigrants themselves*[429]. Concrete actions have been proposed in this context: *in the view of the high rates of population growth in the Mediterranean it must be a priority for the relationship to inject a new dynamism into the market integration, with the view of generating more investment, higher growth rates and job creation*[430]. Here, the European Unions fears that *a massive and uncontrolled rural exodus could have disastrous social, political and environmental consequences for the countries of the region and for the Community*.[431] In the context of these subjects, which constitute major concerns in the discourse of the Commission, the attitude, which is proposed in order to deal with such matters, is broadly discussed and indicates Europe's difficulties to dispose a homogenous image. By recalling the priorities of Europe in the region, the Commission also reproves that *the Community must give its unreserved backing*[432], that *the EU should be prepared to invite its Mediterranean partners to embark on new chapters of integration*[433] and that *the community must be prepared to provide large-scale technical assistance*[434]. These ways of encouraging a common position within the EU suggest the existing difficulties to speak with one voice. These difficulties can especially be found in an area with a known limitation to the aspired European superiority - *the Community can not solve these problems alone*[435]. This explains why the discourse of the Commission puts a special concern to remind that *in order to be successful the European Union must represent an entity as far as possible and avoid single initiatives*[436].

427 Comp. „Heute gefährden die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen in vielen dieser Länder die Stabilität und führen zu Massenauswanderungen, fundamentalistischem Extremismus, Terrorismus, Drogensucht und organisiertem Verbrechen" COM 94 (427) final, 8.

428 Comp. „da hier die Gefahr besteht, dass sie Anlass zu gegenseitigen Beschuldigen geben" COM 94 (427) final, 6.

429 Comp. „Wird der Migrationsdruck nicht sorgfältig über eine gezielte Zusammenarbeit mit den betreffenden Ländern gesteuert, so könnte es nur leicht zu Spannungen kommen, die sowohl den internationalen Beziehungen als auch den Einwandern selbst schaden." COM 94 (427) final, 6.

430 Comp. „in the view of the high rates of population growth in the Mediterranean, injecting a new dynamism into the market integration, with the view of generating more investment, higher growth rates and job creation must be a priority for the relationship" COM 2005 (139) final, 6.

431 Comp. „a massive and uncontrolled rural exodus could have disastrous social, political and environmental consequences for the countries of the region and for the Community" COM 95 (72) final, 6.

432 Comp. „the Community must give its unreserved backing (…)" COM 95 (72) final, 3.

433 Comp. „Against this background, the EU should be prepared to invite its Mediterranean partners to embark on new chapters of integration by engaging negotiations not on the traditional 'hub and spoke' model that has been followed since 1995, but in a way that would combine North – South and South – South integration" COM 2005 (139) final, 7.

434 Comp. „the community must be prepared to provide large-scale technical assistance (…)" COM 95 (72) final, 4.

435 Comp. „Die Gemeinschaft kann diese Probleme natürlich nicht alle alleine lösen" COM 94 (427) final, 13.

436 Comp. „Um erfolgreich zu sein, sollte die Union so weit wie möglich als Ganzes auftreten und Einzelinitiativen vermeiden" COM 94 (427) final, 8.

4.3 The assumed mandate in the Mediterranean

It is repetitively stated that *Europe's interests in the region are many and varied*[437]*;* therefore, the discourse about the nature of the mandate, which Europe has assumed in the Mediterranean by launching its policy, is not monocausally explainable. Within the discourse of the European Commission it is possible to distinguish between statements, which relate to the way Europe wants to create its policy, the way this policy can be pushed and who is legitimated. By this means, the comprehension of the political mandate in the Mediterranean can be filtered.

The design of the policy is preliminary declared to be *conceptualized as an evolutionary framework*[438]*,* which is supposed to form a *dynamic process*[439]. Hence, *on the Union's part, the Partnership is a sign of willingness to play an increasing active role in the region on the political, economic and social front*[440]. In addition, a *greater EU involvement in crisis management in responds to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU's willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries*[441]. Now, the conclusion can be drawn that the EU's effort of a new policy with the MNC is based on the wish to be a political player in the region and on the conviction that this role is welcomed by the others.

The ways how to fulfil this charge in the frame of the developed policy concern distinctive levels. In general, the policy should *encourage the regional cooperation*[442].The necessary requirements on the European side are defined as the obligation to *share its experience*[443] and the need to *translate its wishes into a form of action which produces benefits for the people on both sides of the Mediterranean*[444]. In order to successfully implement the European policy, the Commission formulates the conviction that with *an explicit commitment of the MNC to conduct the economic reforms, it is possible to raise the level of employment and to minimize the prosperity gap as well*[445]. With the conviction that *the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of a closer economic integration with the EU*[446]*,* the Commission states that, due to *the lack of acceptance of the European traditional approach*

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437 Comp. „Europe's interests in the region are many and varied" COM 95 (72) final, 2.

438 Comp. „Die Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer, die als evolutives Rahmenwerk konzipiert werden muss (…)" COM 94 (427) final, 7.

439 Comp. „Die Gemeinschaft sollte jedoch schon jetzt eindeutig zu verstehen geben, dass sie einen dynamischen Prozess wünscht" COM 94 (427) final, 13.

440 Comp. „on the Union's part, the Partnership is a sign of willingness to play an increasing active role in the region on the political, economic and social front" COM 97 (68) final, 1.

441 Comp. „greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU's willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries" COM 2003 (104) final, 12.

442 Comp. „(...) sollte die Union die regionale Zusammenarbeit (...)fördern" COM 94 (427) final, 15.

443 Comp. „ (...) Community will have to share its experience in this field with its partners" COM 95 (72) final, 5.

444 Comp. „the community must translate its wishes into a form of action which produces benefits for the people on both sides of the Mediterranean" COM 95 (72) final, 5.

445 Comp. „Mit einer eindeutigen Verpflichtung zur Durchführung der wirtschaftlichen Reformen könnten die betreffenden Länder die Beschäftigung erhöhen und das Wohlstandsgefälle gegenüber der Union verringern" COM 94 (427) final, 8.

446 Comp. „the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of a closer economic integration with the EU" COM 2003 (104) final, 9.

by the local regimes, it has to be done more[447] to convince the partner countries of the positive intentions of the EU in the Mediterranean.

Concerning the legitimation of the policy, the Commission states that *the EU can and should work to spread the benefits of enlargement for political and economic stability in the neighbouring countries*[448]. The assumed mission derives from the conviction of being *conscious of the desire of our partners for a closer and deeper relationship with the EU*[449] and that the mandate derives from the vision *to establish a good relation with the neighbourhood, to minimize the prosperity gap between the North and the South and to bring the people of the region closer to each other*[450].

XII EU DOCUMENTS ASSIGNED TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The analysis of the documents assigned to the European Council follows a similar pattern as the EU documents assigned to the Commission. The macro and micro analyses form additional contributions to the discourse analysis, which constitutes the main focus of the assessment.

1 Macro and micro structure

A schematic display on macro structural elements is highlighted in the following table:

	Document	Theme	Structure	Pages	Annex (pages)
1	D (95) Barcelona	Initiation of the Barcelona Process	unnumbered headlines, paragraphs	19	9
2	MC (97) Malta	recalling the declaration, reaffirm commitment	numbered headlines	10	4
3	IM (98) Palermo	*Speech*			
4	MC (99) Stuttgart	balancing the last years, reaffirm commitment	numbered paragraphs	6	
5	IM (00) Lisbon	*not available*			
6	MC (00) Marseilles	reinvigorate the EMP	numbered paragraphs	8	
7	IM (01) Brussels	confirmation of the importance of the policy	numbered paragraphs	17	
8	MC (02) Valencia	formulates the need for an increased dialogue	numbered paragraphs	16	10
9	IM (03) Crete	take stock of the progress, discuss the future developments	numbered paragraphs	17	
10	MC (03) Naples	reaffirm willingness to strengthen the partnership	numbered paragraphs	18	2

447 Comp. „Der traditionelle Ansatz der EU, (...) wurde nicht immer von den lokalen Regierungen mitgetragen. Es muss noch mehr getan werden (...)“ COM 2000 (497) final, 4.

448 Comp. „the EU can and should work to spread the benefits of enlargement for political and economic stability in the neighbouring countries (…)” COM 2003 (104) final, 9.

449 Comp. „Conscious of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and of the desire of our partners for a closer and deeper relationship with the EU” COM 2002 (159) final, 3.

450 Comp. „Allgemeiner sollte sich die Union darum bemühen, (...) gute nachbarschaftliche Beziehungen herzustellen und ein noch stärkeres Nord-Süd-Gefälle zwischen der Union und ihren Partnern im Mittelmeerraum zu verhindern und stattdessen die Länder und Völker dieser Region einander näher zu bringen. COM 94 (427) final,8.

11	IM (04) Dublin	reaffirmation of the common commitment	numbered paragraphs	15	
12	IM (04) The Hague	BP enhanced by the ENP	numbered paragraphs	23	
13	MC (05) Luxembourg	assessment of achievements and set guidelines	numbered headlines	20	6
14	MC (05) Barcelona	*Anniversary - speech and comm doc*			
15	MC (06) Tampere	renew commitment to implement 5 year working program	numbered paragraphs	11	3
16	MC (07) Lisbon	assess progress and agree on upcoming priorities	numbered paragraphs	21	1
17	D (08) Paris	Union for the Mediterranean	numbered paragraphs	20	3
18	MC (08) Marseilles	reinforce MMPOL, upgrade relations, define institutional changes	numbered paragraphs	28	16

From these eighteen documents one document is not available (IM (00) Lisbon), and two documents, the Interim Meeting in Palermo 1998 and the Foreign Minister Meeting on the occasion of the tenth anniversary, are speeches. Thus, fifteen documents remain, which can be assigned to the political level of the European Council. Two of them, the document of the Barcelona Conference in 1995 and the Paris Summit in 2008, are considered as declarations. Except the documents that are not available, there are four documents dealing with the Interim Ministerial Meetings and nine documents contain the conclusions of the Ministerial Meetings.

Apart from the declaration of 1995, all documents are structured by numbered paragraphs. Each paragraph either deals with new aspects or with thematic different considerations, which are indicated by unnumbered headlines. Beside this, only the declaration possesses a list of the participating Foreign Ministers and Heads of State, respectively at the Paris Summit in 2008. More than fifty percent of the considered documents possess an annex, which either provides further information on the developments of the Barcelona Process (for example MC (2005) Luxembourg), a detailed Action Plan (MC (2002) Valencia) or summaries of the initiative for the upcoming period (MC (2006) Tampere).

The first paragraphs largely refer to a summary of the Conference and highlight the most important issues that have been agreed on, discussed or assessed during the meeting. Not surprisingly, most statements which are relevant for the established categories of the analysis have been identified on the first page. Further paragraphs deal with issues corresponding to the interests of the meeting. These might concern concrete happenings (earthquakes, wars, conflicts, terrorist attacks), the situation in the Middle East Peace Process as all countries involved in the Barcelona Process are interested in the progress, but also concerns of single countries, financial issues and commitments to further cooperations. There are no concluding statements; the whole document represents the conclusions of the Meetings.

Regarding the presentation principles, it has to be stated that the documents are predominantly formulaic. The results concerning the nature of the document evolve from the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers participating in the Barcelona Process; thus, the Ministers of the Mediterranean countries are also represented at the Conference. Therefore, the tonality and formulations are subject to the diplomatic standards.

In respect of the micro structure, the textual level of the documents that are assigned to the European Commission is dominated by factually logic arguments. There are hardly any references regarding emotive statements. Only when the Ministers *express their total condemnation of terrorism*[451] or *the Ministers insist on the unique contribution of the Barcelona Process to peace, stability and development in the region*[452] emotive arguments can be deduced. In the context of the Middle East Conflict, the statement *it urges both sides to bring an end to violence*[453] apparently indicates the same. These just mentioned statements mark emotions, but this shall not be the norm.

The analysis of the formulaic repetitions that can be found at the beginning of the sentences "Ministers/Participants/ Heads of States + verb" do not show a significant pattern over time; neither does the denomination of the subjects, namely the Ministers themselves; nor the verbal conjunctions, which give indication to their common interests, can be consulted to draw meaningful conclusions. The verbs used for common positions are: develop, respect, give, refrain, promote, affirm, encourage, stress, recognize, take note, reiterate, agree, consider, recall, express, welcome etc. The verbs welcome, recognize and agree are the most frequent formulations.

In general, the structure of those sentences, which are between medium and long (three to five lines), are stretched by numerous subordinated clauses. Similar to the documents of the European Commission, the discourse of the Ministers is only expressed by declarative sentences.

2 Discourse analysis – Expression

The statements which have been allocated to the category "expression" concern denominations of "the other", associative and dissociative elements, references to the Mediterranean Policy and indications about the European predominance.

Within the discourse of the Foreign Ministers eighty six corresponding statements have been detected:

Documents assigned to the European Council					
	"The Other"	"MMPOL"	"ass./diss."	"predominance"	**Total**
EXPRESSION	14	53	17	2	**86**

The distribution of the same over the years:

COUNCIL - DOCS: Distribution of statements per year													
	95	**97**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	**Total**
EXPRESSION	6	2	4	2	3	7	15	15	12	3	3	14	**86**

451 Comp. „express their total condemnation of terrorism" IM (2001) Brussels, 1.

452 Comp. „the Ministers insist on the unique contribution of the Barcelona Process to peace, stability and development in the region" MC (2002) Marseilles, 1.

453 Comp. „it urges both sides to bring an end to violence" IM (2001) Brussels, 3.

2.1 The view of the "other"

According to the discourse of the Foreign Minister Meetings in the framework of the Barcelona Process, which includes the ministers of the MNCs, there are hardly any explicit denominations of "the other". Harmless references like partners or Euromed partners do not indicate a distinguishing view of the "other". In contrast, references, which contain a direct request from the European side, indicate a predominating attitude and a certain inhomogeneity of the so-called partnership. At the Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart in 1999, for example, the "other" was directly addressed when stating that *the progress achieved by the Partners in this respect was welcomed and Partners were strongly encouraged to follow this road and reinforce South-South cooperation in general*[454]. At another time the Mediterranean partners are advised that *successful economic policies will require bolder reforms*[455]. *This* indicates the knowledge advancement of the European side.

Other statements including references to countries, which are not members of the European Union, can be considered as common statements about the situation in one or the other country. For example, this took place in 1999, when the admission of Libya to the Barcelona Process was discussed: *Ministers agreed that Libya, which participated as guest of the Presidency, will become a full member of the Barcelona Process as soon as the UN Security Council sanctions have been lifted and Libya has accepted the whole Barcelona acquis*[456]. The same problem was again emphasised in 2005, when the *Ministers underlined that Libya should be included in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership*[457]. The participation of new members in the Barcelona Process was also stressed in 2008, when the revitalisation of the Mediterranean Policy disembogued in the foundation of the Mediterranean Union: *the Ministers welcome the dedication and the interest expressed by three new members of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Montenegro, together with Albania, to add their efforts in contributing to successful integration of the Adriatic countries in the existing and future initiatives and projects in the Euro-Mediterranean region*[458].

Concerning the Middle East Peace Process, the document of the Interim Meeting in Dublin, where the *Ministers discussed the recent developments in the Middle East*[459], also includes an example of a reference that evaluates the positive cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and Israel: *they welcomed the important initiative of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate in the framework of*

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454 Comp. „the progress achieved by the Partners in this respect was welcomed and Partners were strongly encouraged to follow this road and reinforce South-South cooperation in general" MC (1999) Stuttgart, 4.

455 Comp. „successful economic policies will require bolder reforms in Mediterranean partners" MC (2003) Naples, 9.

456 Comp. „Ministers agreed that Libya, which participated as guest of the Presidency, will become a full member of the Barcelona Process as soon as the UN Security Council sanctions have been lifted and Libya has accepted the whole Barcelona acquis" MC (1999) Stuttgart, 6.

457 Comp. „Ministers underlined that Libya should be included in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 6.

458 Comp. „The Ministers welcome the dedication and the interest expressed by three new members of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Montenegro, together with Albania, to add their efforts in contributing to successful integration of the Adriatic countries in the existing and future initiatives and projects in the Euro-Mediterranean region" MC (2008) Marseilles, 5.

459 Comp. „Ministers discussed the recent developments in the Middle East" IM (2003) Dublin, 1.

Technical Working Group open to Mediterranean Partners with a view to identifying and promoting inter-connexion projects of common interests to be integrated into the framework of the Euromediterranean partnership[460].

Although the discourse of the Foreign Minister Meetings hardly allows any conclusions concerning a specific European view of the "other", the diplomatically standardised formulations still indicate a certain European elevation in the context of knowledge advancement.

2.2 Associative and dissociative elements

Associative and dissociative elements are, as it lies in the nature of the sources, part of the common diplomatic discourse; nevertheless, the topics which the statements refer to indicate those areas, in which a special treatment among the partners is necessitated.

There are general formulations which stress the ambition of how to respect each other in the moment of cooperation. In the declaration of Barcelona in 1995, the official statement says that *the participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilisation throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other*[461]. The ambition to create a policy of associative character is underlined in the same document, namely that there is a demand to *respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners*[462]. This kind of demand is unique within all the analysed documents. In 2003, the unifying formulations regarding the mutual respect are stated as follows: *the Euromed Partners are encouraged to consider how to make progress in these areas, including developing policies to promote gender equality, pluralism, institution building and how to better associate and engage social partners and civil societies as well as encourage its development, while adhering and accordance with the rules of international law to the principal on non-intervention, directly and indirectly, in internal affairs of another partner and while recognising the specifity of each society*[463]. In the declaration of Paris 2008, the conviction is stated that *Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography*

460 Comp. „they welcomed the important initiative of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate in the framework of Technical Working Group open to Mediterranean Partners with a view to identifying and promoting inter-connexion projects of common interests to be integrated into the framework of the Euromediterranean partnership" IM (2003) Dublin, 7.

461 Comp. „the participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilisation throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other" D (1995) Barcelona, 2.

462 Comp. „respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners" D (1995) Barcelona, 2.

463 Comp. „The Euromed Partners are encouraged to consider how to make progress in these areas, including developing policies to promote gender equality, pluralism, institution building and how to better associate and engage social partners and civil societies as well as encourage its development, while adhering and accordance with the rules of international law to the principal on non-intervention, directly and indirectly, in internal affairs of another partner and while recognising the specifity of each society" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 6.

and culture[464] and further that *they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding*[465]. These general kept attempts to consolidate the laces of cooperation already reached their climax at the Ministerial Meeting in 2000. There, it was declared that *a Euro-Mediterranean label will be established*[466], which indicates the required effort to establish a common identity.

At the beginning of the Barcelona Process common positions are quite generally formulated, as the following statement of 1995 suggests: *the participants express their conviction that peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are common assets*[467]. However, declarations of common positions may also refer to thematically highly significant subjects, as the following statement, taken from the Interim Meeting in Dublin, demonstrates: the Ministers declared that *such close and co-operative relations will depend on a better mutual understanding of security concerns and the strengthening of commitments to common values and common principals, such as promoting human rights, combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction*[468]. A careful statement regarding a common position can be detected in the declaration of 1995 concerning the Middle East Peace Process: *the participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principals mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace with all that this implies*[469]. In 2008, the tone regarding the Middle Eastern Conflict is already more direct: *Ministers call on both parties to respect their commitment to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based Roadmap to a permanent two state solution to the Israel- Palestinian conflict*[470]. Concerning the condemnation of terrorism, the common statements are even more decisive. In 2001, it was stated at the Interim Meeting in Brussels that *Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks and that in this connection they expressed their total condemnation of terrorism everywhere in the world and their solidarity*[471].

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464 Comp. „Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography and culture" D (2008) Paris, 9.

465 Comp. „they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding" D (2008) Paris, 9.

466 Comp. „a Euro-Mediterranean label will be established" MC (2000) Marseilles, 8.

467 Comp. „the participants express their conviction that peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are common assets" D (1995) Barcelona, 2.

468 Comp. „such close and co-operative relations will depend on a better mutual understanding of security concerns and the strengthening of commitments to common values and common principals, such as promoting human rights, combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" IM (2004) Dublin, 2.

469 Comp. „the participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principals mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace with all that this implies" D (1995) Barcelona, 2.

470 Comp. „Ministers call on both parties to respect their commitment to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based Roadmap to a permanent two state solution to the Israel- Palestinian conflict" MC (2008) Marseilles, 4.

471 Comp. „Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks (…). In this connection they expressed their total condemnation of terrorism everywhere in the world and their solidarity" IM (2001) Brussels, 1.

Also in 2002 *they expressed their condemnation of terrorism and violence*[472]. In addition, in 2004 *the Ministers called on all states in the region to exert every effort to promote peace and urged all states to act to combat terrorism*[473]. The issue terrorism contains a strong separative component; nevertheless, there is an endeavour at the Ministerial Conferences to attain a common position when it is stated that *differences regarding the definition of terrorism should not prevent partners from identifying areas where they can cooperate*[474].

The common position regarding migration is remarkable because it is positively formulated, despite the fact that the matter is one of the mayor European concerns: *the Ministers reaffirmed the importance of migration and expressed the view that, if carefully managed, migration can be a positive factor for the socio-economic growth of the whole region*[475].

Other statements refer to associative positions, especially expressing compassion with conflictive situations in one of the participating countries of the Barcelona Process. Hence, in 2003 *the Ministers expressed their deep sorrow, sincere sympathy and full support to the Algerian government and people alike for the unspeakable human and material losses caused by the last earthquake's catastrophe*[476]. In the same document they also *expressed their full solidarity with Morocco*[477]. A statement of 2004 offers another example; the Euro Mediterranean partners expressed their common position, which includes their determination to assist the Iraqi people on their way to a new era in the history of their country. The only reference which can be regarded as a comment to the situation of a European country can be found in the document of the Interim Meeting in Dublin in 2003; there it was stated that *the Ministers noted with interest the initiatives undertaken by the Greek Presidency on the issue of sustainable development such as the convening of the International Conference on Sustainable Development and Lasting Peace*[478].

Within the general formulations regarding the values the cooperation should be based on, a strong call on reciprocal respect is contained. Hence, there implicitly derives a mutual concern on possible infractions, which indicate dissociative ambitions among the so-called partners. Also the attempt of finding common positions regarding the Middle Eastern Conflict, terrorism and migration demonstrates that

472 Comp. „they expressed their condemnation of terrorism and violence" MC (2002) Valencia, 3.

473 Comp. „the Ministers called on all states in the region to exert every effort to promote peace and urged all states to act to combat terrorism" IM (2004) The Hague, 6.

474 Comp. „differences regarding the definition of terrorism should not prevent partners from identifying areas where they can cooperate" IM (2003) Dublin, 4.

475 Comp. „the Ministers reaffirmed the importance of migration and expressed the view that, if carefully managed, migration can be a positive factor for the socio-economic growth of the whole region" IM (2004) Dublin, 14.

476 Comp. „the Ministers expressed their deep sorrow, sincere sympathy and full support to the Algerian government and people alike for the unspeakable human and material losses caused by the last earthquake's catastrophe" IM (2003) Crete, 1.

477 Comp. „the Ministers expressed their full solidarity with Morocco" IM (2003) Dublin, 1.

478 Comp. „the Ministers noted with interest the initiatives undertaken by the Greek Presidency on the issue of sustainable development such as the convening of the International Conference on Sustainable Development and Lasting Peace" IM (2003) Crete, 8.

these subjects include a strong separative character, which is aimed to be countervailed on diplomatic ground.

2.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

Within the discourse of the Ministerial Conferences the references, which concern the nature of the Mediterranean Policy, use a similar terminology as the Commission. As the aim of the documents is different, the used expressions do not refer to the internal perception of the policy, but explain how the policy wants to be perceived in an external ambit. Thus, the known expressions like "partnership" transport the connotation of an equalised policy, references such as "framework" and "forum" establish the allusion to a constitutional significance, while the terms "initiative" and "instrument" deliver the message of a proactive policy. It is important to analyse these descriptions together with the applied attributes because the assumption of the significance of the words sometimes have a different meaning. As the Ministers act in representation of their countries and allude to the public, certain adulations concerning their agreed policy must be included.

Although the applied terminology suggests references that correspond to the perception of an equalised policy only few of them can be found. The term "partnership" is explicitly used to describe the Mediterranean Policy as *EU Strategic Partnership with regard to its Mediterranean dimension*[479]. At another time, in 2005, the description states that it *is a mutually beneficial partnership*[480]. And in the declaration of Paris in 2008, the statements refer to *a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for a regional integration and cohesion*[481]. According to the references that are linked to the denomination partnership, one deduces rather ambitious and strategic aims and not an equalised policy of all participating countries.

The constitutional significance, which is linked to the terms "framework" and "forum", mainly refer to the urgency that the Ministers ascribe to the policy. Thus, the policy is described as *vital and preferred framework for dialogue and cooperation,*[482] as *essential framework*[483] and as *the main framework for a coherent set of privileged relations with the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood*[484]. The policy, which *has provided a framework for continued engagement and development*[485], is also denominated in relation to the terminology "forum". The attributes given in this context underline the singular political

479 Comp. „EU Strategic Partnership with regard to its Mediterranean dimension" IM (2004) Dublin, 3.

480 Comp. „This is a mutually beneficial partnership" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 3.

481 Comp. „The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for a regional integration and cohesion" D (2008) Paris, 8.

482 Comp. „Vital and preferred framework for dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and the countries of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean" IM (2001) Brussels, 1.

483 Comp. „(...) as an essential framework for dialogue and cooperation, a true meeting point of cultures and civilisations" MC (2002) Valencia, 1.

484 Comp. „The Barcelona Process as the main framework for a coherent set of privileged relations with the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood within the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood" IM (2004) Dublin, 1.

485 Comp. „(…) it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development" D (2008) Paris, 9.

significance that the Barcelona Process legitimately obtains: It *is the only forum within all Euro-Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in a constructive dialogue in spite of the persisting conflict in the Middle East and in other parts of the region*[486].

The proactive character of the Mediterranean Policy is expressed when the terminology refers to an initiative or instrument. In the declaration of 1995, the Ministers referred to *this Euro-Mediterranean initiative*[487]. In 2004, the initiative was attributed as *the main initiative for the Mediterranean in which the EU and the Mediterranean partners jointly participate*[488]. The proactive significance is also expressed when the Barcelona Process is described as *central instrument for partnership and dialogue for the Mediterranean*[489].

The Ministers' special appraisals of the policy vary from the geographical reference that the policy encompasses an area of relation *from Mauritania to the Iran – the Mediterranean and the Middle East*[490] to avowals of the outranging significance. Including the historic connotation, the Ministers stated in the year of the 10th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process that *1995 marked a turning-point in relations between the European Union and its neighbours on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean*[491]. In the context of the foundation of the Mediterranean Union, the Ministers stressed that this was *an historic opportunity to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process and upgrade it to a new level*[492]. Its character is repetitively referred to as being *unique in its scope*[493] and that its finality is *to make a distinct contribution to encouraging a process of political and economic progress for the peoples of the region*[494]. Moreover, it *provides an important contribution to promoting progress and to furthering mutual understanding*[495].

This leads to another important aspect that the statements regarding the analytical category "Mediterranean Policy" refer to: the strategic significance which the Ministers ascribe to the Barcelona Process. This is expressed through the way that the Ministers repeat the statement of their commitment to the Mediterranean Policy throughout the documents. Thus, they state for example in 1999 that *all mem-*

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486 Comp. „The Barcelona Process is the only forum within all Euro-Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in a constructive dialogue in spite of the persisting conflict in the Middle East and in other parts of the region" D (2008) Paris, 8 and 9.

487 Comp. „this Euro-Mediterranean initiative" D (1995) Barcelona, 2.

488 Comp. „(...) the Barcelona Process enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy is the main initiative for the Mediterranean in which the EU and the Mediterranean partners jointly participate" IM (2004) The Hague, 1.

489 Comp. „(…) the Barcelona Process enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy central instrument for partnership and dialogue for the Mediterranean" IM (2004) The Hague, 1.

490 Comp. „(...) relations with an area which extends from Mauritania to the Iran – the Mediterranean an the Middle East" IM (2004) Dublin, 1.

491 Comp. „1995 marked a turning-point in relations between the European Union and its neighbours on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 1.

492 Comp. „The Participants stress that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is an historic opportunity to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process and upgrade it to a new level" D (2008) Paris, 17.

493 Comp. „(...) a Partnership which is unique in its scope" MC (2007) Lisbon, 4.

494 Comp. „(…) the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership makes a distinct contribution to encouraging a process of political and economic progress for the peoples of the region" IM (2004) Dublin, 15.

495 Comp. „The Barcelona Process provides an important contribution to promoting progress and to furthering mutual understanding" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 6.

bers remain fully committed to all objectives and principles of the Barcelona Process and have reaffirmed their resolve to take forward the Partnership into a new millennium[496]. Also in 2003 *they reaffirmed their joint interest*[497]. Moreover, at the Paris Summit of the Barcelona Process in 2008 *they injected a renewed political momentum into the Euro-Mediterranean relation*[498] and commented on the *unwavering commitment and common political will to make the goals of the Barcelona Declaration a reality*[499]. Ministers are convinced that the Barcelona Process *is solid and lasting*[500] and, at the Ministerial Conference in Marseilles, they *insisted on its unique contribution to peace, stability and development in the* Mediterranean *region*[501]. In 2002, the Ministers further expressed their belief that *the Barcelona Process is now sufficiently well established and resilient for the participants to be able to engage in an open dialogue on all issues of mutual concern*[502]. In 2005, the year of anniversary, the Ministers self-critically stated that the principals of the partnership *are actually more relevant than ever*[503] and that *its vast potential is far from being exhausted*[504]. The strategic ambition, expressed in 2008, stresses that *this initiative is also the expression of a common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security*[505].

These continuous affirmations of the importance of the Mediterranean Policy do, on the one hand, indicate the significance and the necessity the Ministers ascribe to the Barcelona Process; and, on the other hand, the statements appear in a light of adulation and innate persuasion, as there are only few critical references.

2.4 References on European predominance

Only one statement can be identified which explicitly indicates a dominant European attitude. It concerns the Middle Eastern Conflict, when *the Presidency called on the authorities of Israel to halt its military operations, to immediately withdraw its military forces from Palestinian cities*[506] at the Con-

496 Comp. „all members remain fully committed to all objectives and principles of the Barcelona Process and have reaffirmed their resolve to take forward the Partnership into a new millennium" MC (1999) Stuttgart, 1.

497 Comp. „they reaffirmed their joint interest" MC (2003) Crete, 1.

498 Comp. „they injected a renewed political momentum into the Euro-Mediterranean relation" MC (2008) Marseilles, 3.

499 Comp. „(…)unwavering commitment and common political will to make the goals of the Barcelona Declaration a reality" MC (2008) Marseilles, 3.

500 Comp. „The discussions have shown that the Partnership is solid and lasting" MC (1999) Stuttgart, 1.

501 Comp. „(...)the Ministers insisted on its unique contribution to peace, stability and development in the region" MC (2000) Marseilles, 1.

502 Comp. „the Barcelona Process is now sufficiently well established and resilient for the participants to be able to engage in an open dialogue on all issues of mutual concern" MC (2002) Valencia, 5.

503 Comp. „The Barcelona Declaration is still the cornerstone oft he partnership and is actually more relevant than ever " MC (2005) Luxembourg, 1.

504 Comp. „its vast potential is far from being exhausted and sets objectives for many years to come" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 1.

505 Comp. „this initiative is also the expression of a common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security (…)" D (2008) Paris, 9.

506 Comp. „the Presidency called on the authorities of Israel to halt its military operations, to immediately withdraw its military forces from Palestinian cities" MC (2002) Valencia, 4.

ference in Valencia in 2002. This is the only reference of a European demand which denotes Europe as a big power, in other words, as a relevant political player in the region.

Implicitly, European dominance can be perceived between the lines concerning knowledge advancement and financial support. For instance, the statement saying that *the EU will establish substantial financial facility to support willing Mediterranean Partners in carrying out their reforms taking into account that successful reforms must develop from within the societies of the region*[507] indicates the principal of carrot and stick, inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, there is a reserved generosity when it is stated that reform must be encouraged within the societies; on the other hand, however, the willing countries are promised substantial financial facilities, which they receive after the reforms have been characterised as "valid" according to European standards. Thus, this can be classified as an implicit example of European predominance.

3 Discourse analysis – Purpose

Within the category "purpose" fifty-eight statements have been identified. Slightly more references can be ascribed to the rubric concerning the aim of the Mediterranean policy.

Documents assigned to the European Council			
	"Aim"	"Purpose"	**Total**
PURPOSE	34	23	**57**

The distribution per year indicates that in the documents of the years 2003, 2004 and 2008 more than ten statements contain references which belong to the analytical category "purpose". Indicators might be that 2003 was the preparation year of the EU enlargement and the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy; 2004 was the year before the anniversary and in 2008 the revitalisation of the Barcelona Process took place on French request.

COUNCIL - DOCS: Distribution of statements per year													
	95	**97**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	**Total**
PURPOSE	2	1	4	4	4	1	11	13	3	1	1	12	**58**

3.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy

References, ascribed to the rubric "purpose", deal with the strategic ambition which forms the basis of the Barcelona Process. Due to the highly standardised documents of the Ministerial conferences, there have only been few statements identified which explicitly mention the reasons for establishing such a Mediterranean Policy. In 1995, the Ministers *stressed the strategic importance of the Mediterranean*

507 Comp. „the EU will establish substantial financial facility to support willing Mediterranean Partners in carrying out their reforms taking into account that successful reforms must develop from within the societies of the region" MC (2006) Tampere, 2.

and stated that they are moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension[508]. Since then, the formulations which indicate strategic consideration, concern the recognition of the *serious threat that terrorism poses to the objectives of the Partnership*[509] and that it *remains of key importance to tackle illegal immigration via the Mediterranean Sea as well as associated criminal offences, including cross-boarder human trafficking*[510]. It can be deduced from these statements that socio-economic considerations form the main strategic concern of the participating countries. The fact that the purpose concerns also control mechanism is documented by the following statement: *Ministers confirmed that the dialogue could deal inter alia with the following issues: monitoring the economic situation in the region, monitoring structural reforms in Partner countries and the implementation of Association Agreements and assessing the economic impact of the Association process by using precise and measurable indicators including poverty issues and poverty*[511]. Thus, monitoring, which is probably strongly enhanced by the European countries, forms a considerable part of the strategic motivation to initiate the Barcelona Process.

According to the purpose, the vision of the Ministers concerning the cooperation in the Mediterranean is based on the need to improve the outcome of the Barcelona Process. Therefore, the Ministers express in their discourse *the need to strengthen the intercultural dialogue*[512] and the need *to contribute to clear up misunderstanding, foster approximation of analysis and perceptions and make it possible subsequently to agree on measures to strengthen confidence and transparency*[513]. Hence, *still greater efforts are needed to translate words into actions and to demonstrate genuine political will to implement the commitments*[514]. Although the official purpose and aim is to bring people closer together, to promote understanding and to improve the mutual perception, the dominating impression of the purpose of the Barcelona Process lies in socio-economic concerns, like *preventing the transporting of illegal immigrants by sea*[515] and to *make sure that extremis and radicalisation, racism and discrimina-*

508 Comp. „stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and stated that they are moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension (…)" D (1995) Barcelona, 2.

509 Comp. „They recognized the serious threat that terrorism poses to the objectives of the Partnership" MC (1999) Stuttgart, 3.

510 Comp. „It remains of key importance to tackle illegal immigration via the Mediterranean Sea as well as associated criminal offences, including cross-boarder human trafficking" IM (2004) Dublin, 14.

511 Comp. „Ministers confirmed that the dialogue could deal inter alia with the following issues: monitoring the economic situation in the region, monitoring structural reforms in Partner countries and the implementation of Association Agreements and assessing the economic impact of the Association process by using precise and measurable indicators including poverty issues and poverty" MC (2003) Naples, 7.

512 Comp. „the need to further strengthen the intercultural dialogue" MC (2006) Tampere, 7.

513 Comp. „(…) to contribute to clear up misunderstanding, foster approximation of analysis and perceptions and make it possible subsequently to agree on measures to strengthen confidence and transparency" MC (2000) Marseilles, 3.

514 Comp. „still greater efforts are needed to translate words into actions and to demonstrate genuine political will to implement the commitments jointly entered into the Valencia Action Plan" IM (2004) The Hague, 3.

515 Comp. „Concerted efforts by all members of the Barcelona Process should lead to a prevention of the transporting illegal immigrants by sea" IM (2004) Dublin, 14.

tion and xenophobia do not gain the upper hand[516]. The stated aims indicate how these ambitions should be achieved.

3.2 About the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy

Concerning the stated aims, declarations can be found which refer to general formulations and which provide further details on the goals and how to achieve them.

From the beginning onwards, it was the aim *to establish a comprehensive partnership through strengthening political dialogue on a regular basis*[517] with the finality *to establish a common area of peace and stability to create an area of shared prosperity and to develop a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs.*[518] At the Paris Summit dominated the conviction that *this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development, world food security crisis, degradation of environment, including climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development, energy, migration, terrorism and extremis, as well as promoting dialogue between cultures.*[519]

In order to achieve this general aims, the Ministers mention numerous measures, such as:

- *To make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a still more efficient and credible preferential instrument for upgrading economies*[520].
- To *reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in all its chapters*[521].
- *To reinvigorate the Barcelona Process while seeking ways of improving the sense of co-ownership of the process*[522].
- *To speed up the process of implementation of commitments*[523].
- *To upgrade the activities of the Partnership*[524].
- *To provide continued support for the cooperation among the parties*[525].

516 Comp. „They stressed the need to make sure that extremis and radicalisation, racism and discrimination and xenophobia do not gain the upper hand over the majority of the population that wants to live peacefully." IM (2004) The Hague, 12.

517 Comp. „to establish a comprehensive partnership through strengthening political dialogue on a regular basis" D (1995) Barcelona, 2.

518 Comp. „to establish a common area of peace and stability to create an area of shared prosperity and to develop a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs" MC (2007) Lisbon, 1.

519 Comp. „this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development, world food security crisis, degradation of environment, including climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development, energy, migration, terrorism and extremis, as well as promoting dialogue between cultures" D (2008) Paris, 8.

520 Comp. „To make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a still more efficient and credible preferential instrument for upgrading economies" MC (2000) Marseilles, 5.

521 Comp. „reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in all its chapters" MC (2003) Naples, 2

522 Comp. „(…)to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process while seeking ways of improving the sense of co-ownership of the process" IM (2004) Dublin, 1.

523 Comp. „(…)to speed up the process of implementation of commitments" IM (2004) Dublin, 15.

524 Comp. „(…) to upgrade the activities of the Partnership" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 5.

525 Comp. „(…)provide continued support for the cooperation among the parties" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 6.

With the conviction that *by enhancing comprehensive stability the Barcelona Process will contribute to the solution of tensions and crises in the area*[526], the ministers aim to reach a level of cooperation that lacks any taboos concerning questions of mutual interest and the dialogue may be extended to other conflictive topics[527]. In all these statements, which are, due to their standardised form, well-known at this stage of this work, it has to be added that no remarkable statements, indicating further aims on the general level, or operative aims are explicitly mentioned. Between the lines, there is the persisting concern to implement measures to assure peace and security in the Mediterranean region, which indicates that the governments are moved by considerable worries.

4 Discourse analysis – Identity

The statements which refer to the analytical category "identity" aim to accentuate a possible European self-perception and to illustrate Europe's assumed role in the Mediterranean. In total, thirty-seven statements, which fulfil these requirements, have been identified. Due to the high standardised character of the documents and the fact that the Ministerial Conferences are assisted by all ministers of the countries participating in the Barcelona Process, thus also the MNCs, there is obviously a certain reservation regarding too many references to the image, role and mandate from the European side.

Documents assigned to the European Council			
	"EU"	"Auftrag"	**Total**
IDENTITY	26	11	**37**

Apart from the anniversary year 2005, the statements are spread quite evenly over the years. A reason for the outstanding number of statements in the years 2005 can be found in the fact that it constituted the year of an overall assessment of the success and failure of the European initiative.

COUNCIL - DOCS: Distribution of statements per year													
	95	**97**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	**Total**
IDENTITY	2	2	2	3		4	7	10	5	1		1	**37**

4.1 The self-perception of the European Union

Due to the nature of the documents there are hardly any explicit statements referring to a possible self-perception of the European Union. The references of the European Union, its policy understanding and the support provided by the EU are omnipresent in all documents. The important role that the Euro-

526 Comp. „by enhancing comprehensive stability the Barcelona Process will contribute to the solution of tensions and crises in the area" MC (1999) Stuttgart, 2.

527 Comp. „They took the view that there should no longer be any taboos where questions of mutual interest were concerned, and expressed a desire to extend the dialogue to other topics (...)" MC (2000) Marseilles, 3.

pean Union aspires to play in the region is noticeably expressed in the documents as well as in the mandate which the EU has assumed.

4.2 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean

The role of the European Union, which can be perceived in the documents of the Ministerial Conferences, is obviously focused on supportive elements and does not indicate further pretensions because it has to be conformable with the MNCs. Thus, there are statements concerning the substantiation of the European willingness to provide support for the region, there are references indicating the resources allocated and there are evidences evaluating the European role in the Mediterranean.

In the document of the Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart in 1999, the Ministers recorded that *the European Union confirmed its assistance for the period 2000-2006, which reflects the high priority that the EU attaches to the relations with its Mediterranean Partners*[528]. The EU continuously reaffirms *its offer to provide technical assistance and support*[529]. In 2000, the EU offered its support in the context of the Middle East Peace Process, when it *reiterated its willingness to put its efforts at the service of the parties in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements and to help implement them*[530]. The apparent omnipresence of the European offer for assistance is explained by a fact which is included in the document of 2005: *the EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods and services*[531]. From the European side, there is a cooperation disposition also *with other partners, notably with the US, the G8 and the NATO*[532]*;* the unique position of the EU as appreciated in the way that *within a differentiated approach, the EU can offer a mire intensive political dialogue and greater access to EU programs and policies, including their gradual participation in the four freedoms particularly the Single Market, as well as reinforced co-operation on justice and home affairs*[533]. Therewith, *the Ministers agreed that the EU regional policy could serve, among other policies, as a source of inspiration for regional development in the Mediterranean countries, in collaboration with the relevant regional structures*[534]. In general, the role of the European Union is per-

528 Comp. „The European Union confirmed that its assistance for the period 2000-2006 will again reflect the high priority that it attaches to relations with its Mediterranean Partners in the context of its overall external commitments." MC (1999) Stuttgart, 6.

529 For example in 2002 Comp. „The EU renewed its offer to provide technical assistance to these initiatives" MC (2002) Valencia, 2; and in 2003 Comp. „ (…)the Commission will provide technical support" IM (2003) Crete, 6.

530 Comp. „The European Union reiterated its willingness to put its efforts at the service of the parties in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements and to help implement them" MC (2000) Marseilles, 2.

531 Comp. „The EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods and services" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 3.

532 Comp. „The EU has stated its readiness to cooperate with other actors (…), notably with the US (…), the G8 and the NATO" IM (2004) Dublin, 3.

533 Comp. „within a differentiated approach, the EU can offer a mire intensive political dialogue and greater access to EU programs and policies, including their gradual participation in the four freedoms particularly the Single Market, as well as reinforced co-operation on justice and home affairs" IM (2004) Dublin, 1.

534 Comp. „the Ministers agreed that the EU regional policy could serve, among other policies, as a source of inspiration for regional development in the Mediterranean countries, in collaboration with the relevant regional structures" MC (2005) Luxembourg, 9.

ceived as useful and accepted from all participating countries which are not member countries. The evaluation of the European dedication in the Mediterranean is especially positive in the most conflictive subject of the Barcelona Process: the Middle East Peace Process. Thus, the Ministers stated that they *welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East*[535] and *the Middle East Peace Process*[536].

4.3 The assumed mandate in the Mediterranean

In the Barcelona Declaration, the Ministers stated that they were *convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social developments, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures*[537]. This was basically the mandate that the European Union assumed at the moment of launching the Barcelona Process. The legitimation of the proceeding can be traced back several years. In 1999, for instance, *the Ministers encouraged the European Union to continue increasing its role in support of the Middle East Peace Process*[538]*;* or, in the proximate year, *the Ministers called for a greater involvement of the European Union vis-à-vis all parties to foster dialogue and restore trust and confidence*[539]. At another point in 2003, *the Ministers encouraged the Commission to continue its efforts to strengthen, in cooperation with Member States and Partner countries, the coordination of programs financed by MEDA, Member States, EIB and international organisations.*[540] In the same document the Commission was further *invited to explore how, within the existing MEDA framework, a more substantial involvement of the Mediterranean partner in the relevant EU programs could be achieved*[541]. Finally, in 2004, *the Ministers welcomed the EU willingness to support indigenous programs for development and reform emanating from within the countries of the Mediterranean*[542].

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535 Comp. „Ministers welcomed the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East (…)" MC (2006) Tampere, 1.

536 Comp. „Ministers welcomed the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East Peace Process, notably in the framework of the Quartet" MC (2008) Marseilles, 4.

537 Comp. „convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social developments, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures" D (1995) Barcelona, 2.

538 Comp. „the Ministers encouraged the European Union to continue increasing its role in support of the Middle East Peace Process" MC (1999) Stuttgart, 2.

539 Comp. „the Ministers called for a greater involvement of the European Union vis-à-vis all parties to foster dialogue and restore trust and confidence" MC (2000) Marseilles, 2.

540 Comp. „the Ministers encouraged the Commission to continue its efforts to strengthen, in cooperation with Member States and Partner countries, the coordination of programs financed by MEDA, Member States, EIB and international organisations" IM (2003) Crete, 8.

541 Comp. „invited to explore how, within the existing MEDA framework, a more substantial involvement of the Mediterranean partner in the relevant EU programs could be achieved" IM (2003) Crete, 10.

542 Comp. „the Ministers welcomed the EU willingness to support indigenous programs for development and reform emanating from within the countries of the Mediterranean" IM (2004) The Hague, 2.

It seems evident that the mandate assumed by Europe in the Mediterranean is broadly accepted and backed by the MNC. In this context, the most remarkable issue is the support of the European role in the Middle East Peace Process, which reflects the wish of the MNC to become more autonomous from US interventions. For further research proposals it would be interesting to examine if the European mandate in the Mediterranean is of sincere concern to the MNC or just tolerated as a lesser evil.

XIII INTERINSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS – CONCLUDING REMARKS "EU DOCUMENTS"

Both, the documents assigned to the European Commission and those assigned to the European Council assess the official discourse of the European Union in the Mediterranean. With regard to the Barcelona Process, initiated in 1995 and reinvigorated in 2008 with the renaming of the policy in Mediterranean Union[543], the discourse of the EU documents concern the active level, the establishment of the official discourse. By this means, the documents of the European Commission refer to the internal discourse within the European institutions. According to that, the communications of the Commission are addressed to the European Parliament and to the European Council. The communications aim to provide background information, set the path for the Foreign Policy and coordinate the internal sentiments. Thus, the significance of the documents assigned to the Commission predominately lies in its nature of representing the internal, interinstitutional discourse. The conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings are formally assigned to the European Council, which represents the European Member States and possesses decision-making power regarding the Common Foreign Security Policy. Therefore, the documents which are evolved in presence of all representatives of the participating countries in the Barcelona Process, including the MNCs, give reference to the official agreed discourse. Hence, the declared discourse of the Foreign Minister Meetings is the agreed result of what has been internally stressed, for example, on behalf of the European Commission. Thus, the analytical sequence/ of the concerns of the present analysis can be simplified as follows: from the internal discourse results the agreed discourse, which represents the official discourse of the European Union.
492 statements have been identified in both kinds of sources:

Total number of statements			
	Commission	**Council**	
EXPRESSION	135	86	
PURPOSE	107	37	
IDENTITY	70	57	
Total	**312**	**177**	**492**

543 This was accorded on the Ministerial Conference in Marseilles, November 2008.

Nearly twice as many statements have been selected in regard to documents assigned to the European Commission. This is due to the fact that these documents are in its nature less formulaic. Their finality is in convincing the internal forces within the EU, providing background information, stressing the motivation for policy efforts, combining visionary and assumed realistic ambitions, and developing the base for the decision-making. The Foreign Ministers, who dispose of decision-making power, are on the other hand bound to diplomatic proceedings, which, in the context of defining the Mediterranean Policy, concern determining, negotiating and reaching a consensus. Thus, the conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings are more formulaic and less informative concerning the established criteria of analysis. This explains the lower number of identified statements.

Concerning the identification of the sources, their accessibility and the context analysis, there are no noteworthy discrepancies that would enrich the present research question. Similarly, regarding the macro and the micro structural analysis, the essential aspects relate again to the already stressed conclusion that the documents differ in their degree of standardisation although both are significantly involved in the Foreign Policy development.

With respect to the discourse analysis itself and the analytical category “expression”, the discrepancy between the number of statements is 49 (Commission: 135 - Council: 86). In the subcategory the “other”, the discrepancy is even more explicit, as 40 statements have been identified in the documents assigned to the Commission and less than the half, namely 14, in the Conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings. As a matter of fact, hardly any explicit references of the “other” can be found because the partner countries assist the conferences. Nevertheless, the statements concerning the “other” occur when there is a direct request on a certain subject as, for example, the encouragement to implement certain reforms suggested by the European Union. The references in the documents of the Commission, on the other hand, show an explicit temporal development (expression of strangeness in the beginning of the Barcelona Process), strong influence of external events (associative tonality after 9/11) and an articulated estimation that their development is significantly inferior to the European one. From this derives the self-legitimated mandate which is assumed by the European Union in the Mediterranean, a so called mission statement. For example, the inferior development, which derives from the socio-economic discrepancy and the lack of implementation of international values (e.g. Human Rights), served as legitimation for the European predominance in the institutional organisation of the Barcelona Process over the years and the assumption of the appropriate reforms for the MNC. The subcategory “associative/dissociative” represents the only rubric, where the Council documents provide more statements than those of the Commission (17:10). This is explained by the, generally speaking, consensus oriented diplomatic procedure. The statements of the Ministerial Meetings mention common positions, stress reciprocal solidarity and demand for respect, while the discourse of the European Commission aims to bridge dissociative forces, such as terror attacks with increasing associative formulations; for example, references to a common cultural heritage or the taking of a “we” and “our” in the context of the cooperation aims. Concerning the subcategory “Mediterranean Policy,”

the number of statements is nearly equally proportioned 59 (Commission): 53 (Council). While both institutions use similar expressions like “forum”, “framework” and “partnership”, the main part of the statements assigned to the Commission describe the policy with adjectives, which refer to its singularity and strategic significance. The Ministerial discourse, on the other hand, is less focused on the internal persuasion, but on how the policy is externally perceived. At this point, the discourses meet each other because both aim to convince the parties (internally as well as externally) of the strategic importance and the essential need of the initiative (which in its terminology is equivalent to a proactive policy). Again, a noticeable discrepancy in the amount of identified statements can be highlighted within the subcategory “European predominance”, namely 18 (Commission): 2 (Council). While the Ministerial discourse obviously preserves cautiousness, the references in the documents of the European Commission indicate a clear awareness of the own predominant position.

In the context of the analytical category “purpose,” the total number of selected statements amounts to 164, 107 to the Commission and 57 to the Council. The reason for the discrepancy can be found in the more standardised and formulaic discourse of the documents assigned to the Council. Although in the subcategory “aim”, where 52 statements belong to the document of the Commission and 34 to the Council, the wording concerning the aim of the three areas of cooperation is quite similar, the discourse of the Commission provided more variety, which, at this point is not really significant. Some terminological discrepancies can be identified regarding the verbal constructions. Within the discourse of the Commission verbs like “encourage”, “be aware”, “develop” and “increase” appear in the context of a certain apprehensibility and atmosphere of departure, namely to mobilise forces to change the status quo. In contrast, the Ministerial discourse, including verbs like “make”, “reinvigorate”, “speed up” and “upgrade”, indicates the wish to become more active, more successful and more decisive in implementing the policy. At this point of the discourse, Europe’s interests appear as a strong driving motor. In the subcategory “purpose” 55 statements have been identified in the documents assigned to the Commission and 23 in those assigned to the Council. Although there are more statements on the Commission’s side, more significant references have been identified in the Ministerial discourses. At the Ministerial Conferences strategic considerations and the need for improved control mechanism are openly stressed so that they represent a common concern. Thus, the Ministerial discourse postulates a so called win-win situation; however, after examining them in-depth and comparing them with the statements of the Commission’s discourse, one finds out that what is really meant is the European’s fear and threat towards an instable Mediterranean boarder.

The discrepancy of statements concerning the category “identity”, 70 (Commission) : 37 (Council), is likewise due to the fact that there are hardly any references of a European self-perception and role understanding in the documents of the Foreign Minister Meetings. In the discourse of the Commission the EU refers to its open-mindedness, its knowledge advancement and its assumed mandate to guard the international standards regarding democracy and human rights. The role the Commission ascribes to the EU is that its approach is legitimated by the superior knowledge; in other words, the EU knows

what the "other" needs. There are also self-critical references which stress the fact that a successful and coherent policy demands a European Unions that speaks with one voice. Nevertheless, the Commission assumes that the EU has a clear mandate in the Mediterranean, as the policy is based on the premise that it is also their, the "other's", wish that the EU becomes more proactive and that its finality is a benefit for all participants. Within the Ministerial discourse the beneficial aspect is less argued than the aspiration of acceptance as an important political player. The support and the positive feedback regarding the involvement of the European Union can clearly be deduced from the statements within the document of the Ministerial Conferences. It is to suspect that the motivation of the support of the MNC happens because they prefer Europe to the USA and Russia as a player in the region and that Europe represents the lesser evil. A further analysis of this support would definitely be a promising research aim and a very interesting undertaking.

OFFICIAL DISCOURSE - SPEECHES

The speeches complete the analysis of the European discourse in this thesis because they represent its implementation. Due to the nature of the sources, the speeches constitute an important contribution to the analysis, since the discourse expressed by the high representatives of the European institutions aspired to be more direct and less formulaic.

It is to expect that the speeches assigned to the European Commission are less diverse because the speakers all represent a single political institution, namely the European Commission. The speeches assigned to the European Council, on the other hand, are held by politicians who also represent the opinion and interests of their home countries.

XIV IDENTIFICATION OF THE SOURCES

In order to provide the greatest possible comparability with the analysis of the European documents which stress the establishment of the European discourse, the selected speeches have also been grouped into those that can be assigned to the European Commission and those assigned to the European Council. The speakers have been selected in regard to their political functionality within the European institutions. In total, there have been thirty-six speeches concerning Mediterranean Policy Affairs identified.

1 List of speeches assigned to the European Commission

Twenty one documents can be assigned to the European Commission. The listing below gives an overview of date, location and the person who held the speech. Additionally, there is also a reference to the nationality and the political function of the speaker.

Date	Location	Who	Nat.	Function	Title
15./17.11.1997	Euromed-seminars	Pier Paolo Merolla	I	Directorate General III, Head of Unit - A2 - Industrial Co-operation	Status of Euro- Med sectorial policy discussions (Industry and Energy)
23.05.1997	Oslo	Manuel Marin	E	Vice- president of the European Commission	The European Union's Mediterranean Policy
22./26.04.1999	Euromed-seminars	Jacques Giraudon	F	Member of the Commission, DG 1B A.4, Méditerranée du Sud, Moyen et Proche- Orient, Unité Programmation, et coopération économique	Coopération décentralisée et société civile en Méditerranée
31.01.2001	Brussels	Rt Hon Chris Patten	UK	Commissioner for External Relations	Joint debate on common strategy for the Mediterranean and reinvigorating the Barcelona process
18.06.2001	Rabat	Rt Hon Chris Patten	UK	Commissioner for External Relations	The EU and Morocco - close partners in regional leadership
19.06.2001	Puglia	António Vitorino	P	European Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs	The European Dimension of Immigration, Policing and Crime
26.11.2002	Louvaine-la-Neuve,	Romano Prodi	I	President of the European Commission	Europe and the Mediterranean: time for action
23.02.2005	Strasbourg	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	Euro- Mediterranean Relations
14.03.2005	Cairo	Margot Wallström	S	Vice President of the European Union responsible for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy	The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Euro- Mediterranean partnership
07.04.2005	Brussels	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	Ten years after the Barcelona Process: Empowering Women as a Catalyst for Economic Development
24.11.2005	Madrid	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	El proceso de Barcelona: Un puente sobre el Mediterráneo
25.11.2005	Barcelona	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	Euromed and the Media
03.02.2006	Warsaw	Danuta Hübner	PL	Member of the European Commission responsible for Regional Policy	The borders of Europe
15.03.2006	Strasbourg	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	Euro-Mediterranean Policy / Preparation of APEM

07.04.2006	Wien	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	Islam in Europa: Vom Dialog zum Handeln
02.06.2006	Hamburg	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: A Partnership for Reform
06.06.2006	Brussels	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	The European Neighbourhood Policy: bringing our neighbours closer
03.09.2007	Brussels, European Neighbourhood Policy Conference	José Manuel Durão Barroso	P	President of the European Commission	Shared Challenges, shared futures: Taking the neighbourhood policy forward
05./06.11.2007	Lisbon	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	Address to Euromed Ministerial Plenary Session
03.04.2008	Fez	Joe Borg	M	Member of the European Commission responsible for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs	EU initiatives on tourism in the Mediterranean region
07.04.2008	Bruges	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	A	Member of the Commission for Foreign Affairs and European Neighbourhood Policy	The European Union and its place in the world - the current agenda

The relative high number of documents results of the fact that more speeches haven been available of the European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. The twenty-one documents correspond to eleven different speakers. By nationality, the distribution accounts as follows: 2x Italy, 1x Spain, 1x France, 2x Great Britain, 2x Portugal, 1x Sweden, 1x Poland, 1x Malta and 10x Austria. Thus, a third (7) of the speeches where held by representatives of Mediterranean countries. These statistical concretions are relevant in a complementary sense, but they do not have any further influence on the discourse analysis, because the functionality of the speakers is considered as more important. Therefore, the discourse and the results of the discourse analysis can rather be attributed to the European institutions; thus, the results are expected to reflect the distinctive European positions rather than special national, political or gender related statements.

The distribution of the statements per year shows a slight accumulation of statements in 1997, in 2001 and in 2007/2008 and the greatest accumulation in 2005 and 2006. Considering the ten speeches of Ferrero-Waldner, which falsify the statistical distribution after 2004, it has to be stated that most speeches of distinctive representatives of the Commission took place before 2004, thus, at a time, when the testing of persistency at the beginning of the policy and the terror attacks of 2001 challenged the Barcelona Process in its existence. The gender distribution is also statistically adulterated: ten speeches correspond to the same female speaker and the relation between male and female speaker is

nine to three for the male speakers. The female quotient only comes to the fore after 2004, in the Commission of José Manuel Barroso.[544]

	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	total
Distribution			xx		x		xxx	x			xxxxx	xxxxx	xx	xx	**21**
Male			xx		x		xxx	x					x	x	9
Female											xxxxx	xxxxx	x	x	12

2 List of speeches assigned to the European Council

There are fifteen documents which can be assigned to the European Council. The context also refers to the date, location, nationality and function of the speaker.

Date	Location	Who	Nat.	Function	Title
3./4.06.1998	Palermo	Robin Cook	UK	Representative of the UK presidency	Concluding statement
13.11.1998	Malta	Herbert Kröll	A	Ambassador, Austrian Presidency	Perspectives of the Euro-med Partnership of the Barcelona Process
19./22.11.1999	Malta	Lisa Valjento	FIN	Ministry for Foreign Affairs Finland	Status of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Priorities of the Finnish Presidency
02.07.2003	Strasbourg	Silvio Berlusconi	I		Speech to the European Parliament
31.05.2005	Luxembourg	Jean Asselborn	L	General Affairs and External Relations, Luxembourg Presidency	
June 2005	Spain	José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	E	Presidente del Gobierno espanol	Entrevista "Afka/ideas", El Mediterráneo propicia el acercamento entre los pueblos
28.11.2005	Spain	José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, Tony Blair	E, UK	Head of States	Articulo de Zapatero y Blair en El Pais, Una cumbre para el futuro
28.11.2005	Spain	Tony Blair	UK	Chairman of the Summit, Prime Minister Tony Blair	Chairman's statement 10th anniversary Euro-Mediterranean summit
22.05.2006	Vienna	Hans Winkler	A	State Secretary, Austrian presidency	Racism, Xenophobia and the Media: Towards respect and understanding of all religions
16.03.2007	Berlin	Frank-Walter Steinmeier	D	Federal Foreign Minister, German Presidency	
27./30.04.2007	Malta	Renate Schimkoreit	D	Euromed-Coordinator, German Presidency	
04.10.2007	Portugal	José Magalhães	P	Secretário de Estado Adjunto	Migrantes, Expressão do Pilar Humano do Processo de Barcelo-

544 At this point it might be relevant to state that the results are not to be considered in absolute numbers. They indicate a pattern due to the research results gained in the present work.

				e da Admins-tração Interna	na
23.10.2007	Tangiers	Nicolas Sarkozy	F	President of the Republic	State visit to Morocco
30.04.2008	Tunis	Nicolas Sarkozy	F	President of the Republic	Speech before the students of the National Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology
16.06.2008		Anita Pipan	SLO	Member Foreign Ministry, Slovenian Presidency	Opening remarks at the Euro-Mediterranean Seminar "Ensuring Respect for Human Rights While Countering Terrorism in Accordance with International Law"

Most of the speeches were held by Heads of State of European Member Countries that referred to the Mediterranean Policy at the time when they presided the European Council.[545] Thus, there is a greater distribution per nationality than in the speeches assigned to the Commission. The distribution per nationality shows that only representatives of Great Britain, Austria, Germany and France held two speeches regarding Mediterranean affairs. Zapatero and Blair, who wrote an article together, constitute an exception and are not considered in this nomination.[546]

The temporal distribution shows that more speeches took place after 2004. This might be due to the fact that the Mediterranean Policy reached more urgency in the consciousness of the politicians since 2004. In contrast to the documents of the Commission, the gender distributions can be valued as accurate because there are no striking repetitions among the speakers. Not surprisingly, it indicates that there are predominantly male speakers.

	95	96	97	98	99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	Total
Distribution				xx	x				x		xxxx	x	xxxx	xx	**15**
Male				xx					x		xxxx	x	xxx		**12**
Female					x								x	xx	**3**

XV CONTEXT ANALYSIS

It has also been distinguished between speeches that can be assigned to the European Commission and those that can be assigned to the European Council. In the context of the present research undertaking, the role of the speaker is limited to its function within the predefined structures of the institution he represents. The analysis is carried out to demonstrate how the European discourse is transported to the

545 Some high representatives as, for example, Nicolas Sarkozy did not preside the Council when the speeches were held; however, he presided it shortly afterwards and, in case of Nicolas Sarkozy, his contribution to the Mediterranean Policy was essentially the input which led to the foundation of the Mediterranean Union.

546 Of the 15 documents, two documents were published in the media (one interview and one article by Zapatero/Blair). There were considered because only few speeches of the Spanish president Zapatero are available and the articles, although they were published in the media, only express the opinion/message of these two politicians and are not further commented.

public. Hence, the speeches of representatives of the Commission and of the Council aim to implement the previously established discourse. Thus, the contextual analysis of the previous chapter is also valid for the ensuing assessment of the speeches.

XVI Speeches assigned to the European Commission

These speeches constitute the discourse that is allocated to the European Commission. The politicians who deliver the speeches act in their function within the European institution. It is to expect that their opinions correspond to the official position of the Commission, which sets the path for the European Policy in the Mediterranean.

1 Discourse analysis – Expression

The statements, which have been grouped into the same categories as in the previous chapter, mount up to a total of 89 in the category "expression". Far the most can be assigned to the rubric "Mediterranean Policy", while there are hardly any explicit references to the European "predominance".

Speeches assigned to the European Commission						
	"The Other"	"MMPOL"	"Ass./Diss."	"MMR"	"Predominance"	**Total**
EXPRESSION	5	46	17	18	3	**89**

1.1 The view of the "other"

Within the speeches of the representatives of the European Commission the "other" is addressed with a lot of respect; thus, the "other" is conceded a special position in the relations with the European Union. This is shown by a statement of Chris Patten, who said in 2001 that *our partners of the southern flank of the Mediterranean have a privileged place in our external relations*[547]. Romano Prodi addressed "the other" in a similar way when he stated that *apart from the current candidate countries, the Mediterranean countries may be the only ones with such strong links to Europe*[548]. The importance and closeness was even more explicitly expressed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner in 2006 who referred to the significance of the Barcelona Process: *Because our neighbours are important to us. You are our closest partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals and aspirations, and we face common challenges like security, the environment, jobs and migration. We want a relationship which better reflects that*[549].

547 Comp. „our partners of the southern flank of the Mediterranean have a privileged place in our external relations" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.

548 Comp. „apart from the current candidate countries, the Mediterranean countries may be the only ones with such strong links to Europe" Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med Report.

549 Comp. „Because our neighbours are important to us. You are our closest partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals and aspirations, and we face common challenges like security, the environment, jobs and migration. We want a relationship which better reflects that" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Brussels.

Of course, this position can be explained due to the fact that *the Union is the Mediterranean countries' main trading partner*[550]*;* however, the emphasis of the special position in the political discourse indicates a strong persuasive connotation. This is notable because it offers several interpretations like appeasing the partner regarding the European enlargement policy and the European engagement in the East; or suggesting that everything proposed by the Union happens in the best interest for the "other", which is not only persuasive, but manipulative in implementing one's own interests.

1.2 Associative and dissociative elements

Associative and dissociative aspects of the discourse concern statements indicating positions, which are applied to transcend implied discrepancies and conflictive circumstances among the partners. These are also identified with the aim to show how possible differences are expressed.

In the earliest document, a speech of Manuel Marín in 1997, the differences are attempted to be overcome by calling for cooperation on both sides. First, concerning the Mediterranean countries: *we ask the Mediterranean partner to run the risk of abolishing their tariff barriers to exports from the Union, while benefiting from the existence of Common Market*[551]. And second, concerning the European countries: *we ask the Member States of the Union not only to improve trade concessions, but to make a major effort to help Mediterranean countries cope with the adjustments needed for modernizing their economies*[552]. These two requests exemplify the attempt to overcome barriers of cooperation by a direct appeal.

Another way to transcend differences is the creation of a common position, thus referring to shared interests. Chris Patten stated in 2001 that *the EU and the Mediterranean Partners share many common interests: from trade and investment, through safeguarding the environment and energy supply, to maintaining regional peace and stability*[553]. The references to a common base are often done similar as Benita Ferrero-Waldner did it in February 2005 in Strasbourg: *we share common bonds of geography, history, trade, migration and culture*[554]. Although this is a repeated argument regarding the ambition of the Mediterranean Policy, there are sometimes frank concessions, such as *it is also a question of mutual interests*[555].

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550 Comp. „the Union is the Mediterranean countries' main trading partner" Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med Report.

551 Comp. „we ask the Mediterranean partner to run the risk of abolishing their tariff barriers to exports from the Union, while benefiting from the existence of Common Market" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

552 Comp. „we ask the Member States of the Union not only to improve trade concessions, but to make a major effort to help Mediterranean countries cope with the adjustments needed for modernizing their economies" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

553 Comp. „the EU and the Mediterranean Partners share many common interests: from trade and investment, through safeguarding the environment and energy supply, to maintaining regional peace and stability" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

554 Comp. „we share common bonds of geography, history, trade, migration and culture" Ferreo-Waldner, (February 2005) Madrid.

555 Comp. „it is also a question of mutual interests" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona.

A conflictive statement regarding the reference to common bonds has been identified in the speech of Chris Patten in 2001 in Rabat. He stated that *thanks to history, politics and geography, the EU has always enjoyed an extremely close relationship with Morocco*[556]. Without underestimating the need of positive rhetoric, the reference suggests a questionable belittlement of the Moroccan history in the 19th and 20th century, especially as Morocco became politically independent from France only in 1956. Despite this more or less explicit belittlement of the colonial past, the appreciation of the addressed country was clearly ostensible: *We study with great interest the ideas of the Moroccan government for a deeper association among us. They are full of good ideas and contain a lot of common sense*[557]. Thus, the question arises if the implicitly stated belittlement of the historical past indicates either suppression or an overcoming of the colonial past. This can only be satisfyingly assessed in an overall conclusion.

Concerning the dissociative elements of discourse, it has to be stated that there is quite a frank handling regarding different perceptions and problems that could arise in such a political partnership. Hence, Manuel Marín stated in 1997 that *both North and South of the Mediterranean: we must look to the problems of 'image' we have of each other*[558]. And Chris Patten mentioned that *of course arguments will always arise between close trading partners with a mature relationship. They arise in our relationships with the US just as they arise in our relation with Mediterranean partners*[559].

Benita Ferrero-Waldner even referred to such a sensitive topic as the clash of civilisations, which *she denoted as misnomer and stated that we are not confronted with a clash of civilisations, but with a clash of ignorance*[560]. According to her conviction, expressed in 2005, there is *a necessity of retrieving the values of the age of exchange which took place in the renaissance*[561]. This wish for less conflictive relations with the countries over the Mediterranean is real and finally implies that there are more differences and conflicts among the participants than wanted.

Another dissociative aspect, which also concerns a highly conflictive and sensitive topic, is the immigration to Europe. Romano Prodi stated in 2002: *let us not forget that certain European capitals such as Paris and London have become centres for major Mediterranean social, economic and cultural*

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556 Comp. „thanks to history, politics and geography, the EU has always enjoyed an extremely close relationship with Morocco" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.

557 Comp. „We study with great interest the ideas of the Moroccan government for a deeper association among us. They are full of good ideas and contain a lot of common sense" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.

558 Comp. „both North and South of the Mediterranean: we must look to the problems of 'image' we have of each other" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

559 Comp. „of course arguments will always arise between close trading partners with a mature relationship. They arise in our relationships with the US just as they arise in our relation with Mediterranean partners" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.

560 Comp. „(...) weil der Begriff 'Clash of Civilisation' eine Fehlbezeichnung ist. Wir sind nicht mit einem Aufeinanderprallen der Zivilisationen konfrontiert, sondern mit einem aufeinanderprallen von Ignoranz" Ferrero-Waldner (April 2007), Wien.

561 Comp. „Necesitamos redescubrir la época de los intercambios que dieron lugar al Renacimiento" Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Madrid.

developments[562], and further that *it is now within our societies, in our countries, that the communities that came from the south long ago or more recently are developing new ways of living together. These dynamics have nothing to do with security or the prosecution of illegality. Rather they hold out promise of new vibrant forms of social behaviour*[563]. From this discourse it can be deduced that the migration issue from Mediterranean countries to Europe inheres a strong dissociative component and has to be treated in a sensitive way. Here, it has to be positively highlighted that these problems are explicitly expressed by politicians.

1.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

The statements referring to the Mediterranean Policy can further be assigned to references concerning the definitional or the functional level.

In respect of the definition of the Mediterranean Policy, the statements either refer to expressions which describe the policy per se, in other words which indicate the instrumental character, or they refer to the pretensions of the same. In this context, the European Commission perceives that *the European Union, and the governments of the Mediterranean countries, has established a variety of shared actions in order to guarantee a common area of peace and stability, to consolidate an area of shared prosperity and to promote partnerships on the social and humanistic spheres*[564]. There exists the conviction that with the Barcelona Process *an entirely new era*[565] in the relations over the Mediterranean was launched. Comparisons referring to a counterbalanced partnership are attributed to the Barcelona Process, which is *not* seen as an *isolated political and diplomatic event*[566]. These comparisons include "forum" or "partnership" or indicate the instrumental character when using a terminology like "instrument" or "framework".

In the discourse, the references indicate the singularity and uniqueness which the Commission ascribes to the European Mediterranean Policy throughout all investigated documents. It is stated that the Barcelona Process is a *unique regional forum*[567], an *important multilateral forum*[568] or a *solid and durable*

562 Comp. „let us not forget that certain European capitals such as Paris and London have become centres for major Mediterranean social, economic and cultural developments" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report

563 Comp. „it is now within our societies, in our countries, that the communities that came from the south long ago or more recently are developing new ways of living together. These dynamics have nothing to do with security or the prosecution of illegality. Rather they hold out promise of new vibrant forms of social behaviour" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

564 Comp. „the European Union, and the governments of the Mediterranean countries, has established a variety of shared actions in order to guarantee a common area of peace and stability, to consolidate an area of shared prosperity and to promote partnerships on the social and humanistic spheres" Merolla, (March 1997), Brussels.

565 Comp „(...) launched an entirely new era in their relations" Marin, (May 1997), Oslo.

566 Comp. „(...) we proved that Barcelona was not simply and isolated political and diplomatic event" Marin, (May 1997), Oslo.

567 Comp. „The Barcelona Process is a unique regional forum" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg.

568 Comp. „Barcelona is an important multilateral forum for the Euro-Mediterranean area (...)" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006), Brussels.

partnership[569]. With the understanding that the Mediterranean is *a long term agenda*[570] and that the establishment of *the Barcelona Process has marked a turning point*[571], as it constitutes *a network of exchanges of views and initiatives*[572], the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Benita Ferrero- Waldner stated in 2005 that *we are on the eve of a historic occasion*[573]. From this comprehension derives the instrumental demand on the Barcelona Process that has explicitly been stated in Rabat in 2001: *Our Euro-Mediterranean agreement ought to be a dynamic instrument*[574]. According to Romano Prodi in 2002, the *Barcelona Process remains the instrument on which Europe can base its actions*[575]. The singularity that the Commission ascribes to the Mediterranean Policy is not only expressed in the definitional or instrumental characteristics, but also in the pretensions which are interpreted. Therefore, the Barcelona Process represents *the only attempt ever made to address instability and diversity in the Mediterranean multilaterally and from a long-term perspective*[576].

Concerning the attributed functionality of the Mediterranean Policy, the statements refer to both, missionary and visionary expressions and to operational issues and pretensions. The missionary character is perceived when references indicate that common values can be transmitted via the Mediterranean Policy. This is suggested by statements which, for example, constitute that *the joint Declaration establishes the common principles of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, pluralism and tolerance, as the core of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation and dialogue*[577]. The designed long term policy is considered as *main priority of the European Commission*[578]. In expressing the importance of the Barcelona Process, the Commission uses phrases like *Barcelona was just the beginning of a process*[579] or *Barcelona is here to stay*[580] and *the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is as important as ever as it is the cornerstone of the regional dialogue*[581]. There is also a valuation of the achievement that *even against the background of difficulties in the region,* there was the possibility *to pursue a frank political*

569 Comp. "[achievements] they have made our partnership solid and durable" Patten, (April 2002), Brussels.
570 Comp. „Ours is a long term agenda" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.
571 Comp. „the Partnership established in 1995 marked a turning point in that relationship" Patten, (January 2001), Brussels.
572 Comp. „(...) a network of exchanges of views and initiatives has been established, and an unprecedented habit of dialogue has been created" Marin, (May 1997) Oslo.
573 Comp. „Estamos en vísperas de una ocasión histórica" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid.
574 Comp. „Our Euro-Mediterranean agreement ought to be a dynamic instrument" Patten, (June 2001), Rabat.
575 Comp. „The Barcelona Process, which got going in 1995, remains the instrument on which Europe can base its actions" Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med Report.
576 Comp. „the Barcelona Process is still fully valid because it is the only attempt ever made to address instability and diversity in the Mediterranean multilaterally and from a long-term perspective" Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med Report.
577 Comp. „the joint Declaration establishes the common principles of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, pluralism and tolerance, as the core of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation and dialogue" Marin, (May 1997), Oslo.
578 Comp. „main priority of the European Commission" Marin, (May 1997), Oslo.
579 Comp. „Barcelona was just the beginning of a process" Marin, (May 1997) Oslo.
580 Comp. „Barcelona is here to stay" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005), Barcelona.
581 Comp. „the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is as important - is the cornerstone of the regional dialogue (…)" Barroso, (September 2007), Brussels.

dialogue and to make substantial progress on crucial issues in the partnership[582]. The visionary components of the Commission's discourse concern, for instance, the belief that the policy is *most likely to have a direct effect on individuals both in the Union and in the Mediterranean partners*[583], which is a necessary circumstance considering the purpose of the initiation of the policy. Another statement stresses the aim to *recover the antique concept of a Euro-Mediterranean region in which the reciprocal understanding of our common identity roots*[584] and constitutes the base for a successful policy.

Beside these high exigencies which are expressed by the representatives of the Commission, the coordination of the Barcelona Process on an operative level is also stressed. Since its implementation in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), there have been many references which repetitively state that *the Neighbourhood Policy does not replace the Barcelona Process; it reinforces it*[585] or that *the European Neighbourhood Policy does not make Barcelona more remote, rather it brings it into a sharper focus*[586]. In 2008, the ENP is naturally perceived as a complementary and reinforced frame for the Barcelona Process. The significance of the European Mediterranean Policy is explicitly expressed in the following statement: the *ENP continues to prove its worth – showing that our policy of encouraging and rewarding reform does have an impact on our neighbours and is bringing them closer to us*[587]. Despite the fact that the discourses of the politicians of the Commission are dominated by the conviction that the Mediterranean Policy is *capable to unify countries* like *the Arabians and Israel*[588], and that *it creates a win-win situation*[589] for all participants, there are also voices which bring up certain critical self-reflections, like *the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has not yet fulfilled its entire potential*[590] or *the ENP is not, and never has been, a one-size-fits-all policy*[591]. This implicates something which is not explicitly stated most of the time: although there is the aim to establish an equitable partnership, not all interests can be addressed in the same way.

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582 Comp. „even against the background of difficulties in the region we were able to pursue a frank political dialogue and to make substantial progress on crucial issues in the partnership" Patten, (January 2001), Brussels.

583 Comp. „(…) most likely to have a direct effect on individuals both in the Union and in the Mediterranean partners" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

584 Comp. „La respuesta reside en el redescubrimiento de un antiguo concepto de la región euromediterránea, cuya raíz sería el entendimiento mutuo de nuestra común identidad" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona.

585 Comp. „the Neighbourhood Policy does not replace the Barcelona Process; it reinforces it" Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg.

586 Comp. „the European Neighbourhood Policy does not make Barcelona more remote, rather it brings it into a sharper focus" Wallström, (March 2005) Cairo.

587 Comp. „ENP continues to prove its worth – showing that our policy of encouraging and rewarding reform does have an impact on our neighbours and is bringing them closer to us" Ferrero- Waldner, (April 2008) Bruges.

588 Comp. „el unico foro capaz the reunir en un marco común a las naciones árabes y a Israel" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona.

589 Comp. „The Neighbourhood Policy creates a ‚win-win situation'" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg.

590 Comp. „But let us be frank, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has not yet fulfilled its entire potential" Ferrero-Waldner (November 2007) Lisbon.

591 Comp. „the ENP is not, and never has been, a one-size-fits-all policy" Barroso, (September 2007) Brussels.

1.4 References on European predominance

There have been few references dealing with a European predominance within the speeches of representatives of the European Commission. The first opportunity to address the European predominance is to indirectly encourage the partner countries to undertake further reforms. For instance, Romano Prodi stated in 2002 that *the incentives are needed to provide greater encouragement for the internal reforms that are vital if the Mediterranean countries are to benefit fully from bilateral relations with the Union and from the open-up of economies and trade*[592]. This leads to the second form of mentioning the dominance: via attractants in combination with conditions. This was done by Benita Ferro-Waldner in 2005, when she said that *those countries which adopt the brave and difficult decisions and express clearly their will to accomplish the reforms will receive a generous response from the European Union*[593]. And in 2007 she directly addressed the MNC by stating that *the closer you want to be in the EU, and the greater your commitment to reform, the more we will offer you in terms of both assistance to reach those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations*[594].

These examples show that Europe assumes a predominant position within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and that this predominance is mentioned by some means or other from time to time. The predominance is based on the supposed knowledge advancement and the economic margin of the European Union.

1.5 References to a Mediterranean region

The perception of the Mediterranean in the discourse of the representatives of the European Commission concern on the one hand the description and symbolic perception of the Mediterranean Sea per se and on the other hand the situational characterisation.

Surprisingly, the rhetoric of representatives of the Commission, especially of Romano Prodi, frequently includes philosophical references in order to reflect on what the Mediterranean is. So it is, for example, the region's diversity which makes the definition of the Mediterranean particularly difficult. *We might even wonder whether the Mediterranean really exists, politically and economically*[595]. He further stresses the denomination in regard to the denomination of the Mediterranean, for which he quotes Mercator who wrote that *the Mediterranean was given different names depending on the shores it washed up against*; he then refers to the Bible which *also gives the Mediterranean various names*

592 Comp. „the incentives are needed to provide greater encouragement for the internal reforms that are vital if the Mediterranean countries are to benefit fully from bilateral relations with the Union and from the open-up of economies and trade" Prodi (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

593 Comp. „Aquellos que adopten decisiones valientes y deficiles y expresan claramente su voluntad de llevar a cabo la reforma resibirán una respuesta generosa de la UE" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005)

594 Comp. „the closer you want to be in the EU, and the greater your commitment to reform, the more we will offer you in terms of both assistance to reach those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations" Ferrero-Waldner, (September 2007) Brussels.

595 Comp. „But the region's diversity makes the task particularly difficult. We might even wonder weather the Mediterranean really exists, politically and economically" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

and the diversity was also great when we called it mare nostrum[596]. Finally, he concludes with a famous reference to Fernand Braudel when stressing, *perhaps there is no single Mediterranean. Perhaps there are lots of Mediterraneans*[597]. Here, Prodi reflects on what many philosophers and historians did before him - he questions what the Mediterranean really is. Later in the same document he brings the discussion to the political level and concludes *that there is a human, social and historic reality called Mediterranean – a reality that ever more urgently demands courageous, long-term action*[598]. In the same context he stresses that *between 1994 and 2000 the Euro-Mediterranean trade doubled. And yet, the Mediterranean region is still unable to develop its own personality*[599]. Therewith, he appoints a decisive problem which the European Policy faces in the Mediterranean: the establishment of a common identity when implementing a reference such as Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Hence, when the Mediterranean per se is not tangible, what is the Mediterranean that the MNC should appoint to?

The less philosophic definitions in the speeches of the representatives of the European Commission refer to a Mediterranean which is *our 'near abroad' on our Southern flank*[600], *our neighbourhood*[601] and *not a barrier which separates the peoples of its shores, but a medium which facilitates the exchange on an economic, social and cultural level*[602]. The definition per se says that *the Mediterranean in all its diversity is seen as a girdle of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and economic region stretching from Spain to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf*[603]. And in consideration of Europe, *to build a new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, Europe's cradle, would be a grave mistake*[604].

The perception of the Mediterranean often occurs in the context of the historic reference of a "mare nostrum". Hence, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, states that *precisely what we perceive as mare nostrum refers to a shared space, physically and psychologically, where we all have the right to navigate*[605]. Although intended, this statement does not minimize the appropriat-

596 Comp. „the Mediterranean, wrote Mercator, was given different names depending on the shores it washed up against. The Bible also gives the Mediterranean various names and the diversity was also great when we called it mare nostrum" Prodi, (November 2001) Euro-Med Report.

597 Comp. „perhaps there is no single Mediterranean. Perhaps there are lots of Mediterraneans" Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med Report.

598 Comp. „that there is a human, social and historic reality called Mediterranean – a reality that ever more urgently demands courageous, long-term action" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

599 Comp. „between 1994 and 2000 the Euro-Mediterranean trade doubled. And yet, the Mediterranean region is still unable to develop its own personality" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

600 Comp. „the Mediterranean is our 'near abroad' on our Southern flank." Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

601 Comp. „(...) it is also our neighbourhood" Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg.

602 Comp. „Esta idea contempla el Mediterráneo no como una barrera que separa a los pueblos de sus orillas sino como un medio que facilita los intercambios comerciales, sociales y culturales" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid.

603 Comp. „the Mediterranean in all its diversity is seen as a girdle of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and economic region stretching from Spain to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

604 Comp. „To build a new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, Europe's cradle, would be a grave mistake" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

605 Comp. „Es preciso que concibamos el Mare Nostrum precisamente de ese modo, como un espacio compartido, tanto física como psicológicamente, en el que todos tenemos derecho a navegar" Ferrero-Waldner, (April 2008) Bruges.

ing character which is implied in the expression "mare nostrum", especially as it contains an implicit legitimation that the Mediterranean Policy is carried on by the European Union. This is underlined by a statement of Ferrero-Waldner in 2008: *after all, our common objective is to strengthen our relations across and around our "mare nostrum", the Mediterranean we all share*[606].

2 Discourse analysis – Purpose

Within the category "purpose" the identified statements are almost uniformly distributed among both subcategories. The here found forty-seven statements are almost only half of the statements identified for the category expression and identity.

Speeches assigned to the European Commission			
	"Aim"	"Purpose"	**Total**
PURPOSE	22	25	**47**

2.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy

The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy is either defined very general, including special thematic approaches, or in a persuasive way which is also addressed to the European member states. The main difference regarding the stated aims is that the statements, which refer to the purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy, indicate the basal motivation for the establishment of the policy.

The general formulations refer to *the establishment of a relationship of close association, and at the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010*[607]. Another purpose is *to create a region of shared peace and wealth* and a close cooperation on a social and cultural level in order to improve the reciprocal understanding[608].

More specifically, the purposes are stressed as follows:

- *To combat the instability of economic and social policy in the Mediterranean*[609]
- *To reinvigorate democracy within the Mediterranean societies and to improve a better understanding between the two shores of the Mediterranean*[610]

606 Comp. „after all, our common objective is to strengthen our relations across and around our "mare nostrum", the Mediterranean we all share" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid.

607 Comp. „the establishment of a relationship of close association, and at the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

608 Comp. „Su objetivo era crear a través del libre comercio una región de paz y prosperidad compartida y una asociación de amplio alcance social y cultural que propiciara un mejor conocimienti recíproco de los pueblos" Ferrero-Waldner, (Noviember 2005) Madrid.

609 Comp. „Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial cooperation is key to combat the instability of economic and social policy in the Mediterranean" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

610 Comp. „C'est là un moyen essentiel de renforcer la démocratie à l'intérieur des sociétés méditerranéennes et également un moyen essentiel de favoriser une meilleure compréhension mutuelle entre deux rives de la Méditerrannée (…)" Giraudon, (April 1999), Malta.

- *To increase the impact of our policies, so contributing to the pursuit of reform, peace and stability in the region*[611]
- *To bring the partnership closer to our citizens' concerns*[612]
- *To work together with our partners to reduce poverty, create a space of prosperity and shared values, based on free trade, increased economic integration, stronger political and cultural ties, greater cross-boarder cooperation and shared responsibilities in the prevention and resolution of conflicts*[613]
- *To expand the prosperity, stability and security enjoyed by the EU's members to our neighbours*[614]

What derives from these statements is that Europe is concerned with guaranteeing peace and stability in the Mediterranean region, which, coherent to the European method, is only possible by additionally strengthening the cultural issues. Still, *economic and financial matters are of course at the heart of the partnership*[615]. Romano Prodi clarified the methodological purpose of the Mediterranean Policy: *Multilateralism rather than unilateralism, and persuasion rather than coercion are the watchwords that will guide our actions in the world and particularly in the Mediterranean*[616].

The necessity which is expressed in the discourse of representatives of the European Commission is underlined by several statements, showing a certain self-motivation:

- *We should continue working towards Barcelona regardless of difficulties on the Middle East*[617]
- *Forge new ways of working together, in a regional partnership*[618]
- *There we see all the biggest challenges for peace, security and the fight against terrorism above all – for development, for respect of human rights, for the safeguarding of the environment, sustainable growth and education – particularly for women and for positive governance of immigration*[619]

611 Comp. „(…) to increase the impact of our policies, so contributing to the pursuit of reform, peace and stability in the region" Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg.

612 Comp. „To bring the partnership closer to our citizens' concerns" Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg.

613 Comp. „To work together with our partners to reduce poverty, create a space of prosperity and shared values, based on free trade, increased economic integration, stronger political and cultural ties, greater cross-boarder cooperation and shared responsibilities in the prevention and resolution of conflicts" Wallström, (March 2005) Cairo.

614 Comp. „(…) to expand the prosperity, stability and security enjoyed by the EU's members to our neighbours" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Brussels.

615 Comp. „economic and financial matters are of course at the heart of the partnership" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

616 Comp. „Multilateralism rather than unilateralism, and persuasion rather than coercion are the watchwords that will guide our actions in the world and particularly in the Mediterranean" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

617 Comp. „We should continue working towards Barcelona regardless of difficulties on the Middle East" Patten, (January 2001) Brussles.

618 Comp. „Forge new ways of working together, in a regional partnership" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.

619 Comp. „There we see all the biggest challenges for peace, security and the fight against terrorism above all – for development, for respect of human rights, for the safeguarding of the environment, sustainable growth and education – particularly for women and for positive governance of immigration" Ferrero- Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona.

- *We need to counter the risk of mutual incomprehension through an improved dialogue of civilisations*[620]

From the European's side, one is convinced that the time has come to be decisive, to implement and to strengthen the Mediterranean Policy. While the purpose is explicitly linked to the necessity which derived from the, for Europe perturbing, socio-economic developments, the expressed aims may indicate the strategic vision of the Barcelona Process in a more detailed and precise manner.

2.2 About the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy

The general definition of the aims of the European Mediterranean Policy is similarly expressed as the purpose: *working together for peace and stability, creating shared prosperity through establishing free trade and providing the economic and financial assistance to meet the challenges which that implies, and helping to improve mutual understanding and tolerance among peoples of differing cultures and traditions*[621]. In a short version: *working together for peace and stability, improving mutual understanding and tolerance and creating shared prosperity*[622].

The aims of certain aspects of the Barcelona Process are stated explicitly. For example, in the context of the cultural cooperation it is the formulated aim *to improve mutual understanding in the region through intellectual, cultural and personal exchanges*[623]. Concerning security, the strategic aim is to *create a zone of prosperity, special security and stability outside Europe's frontiers*[624].

In regard to the strategic finality of the Mediterranean Policy, the representatives of the European Commission repetitively appoint to the urgency of the matters in the region and the significance of the policy. On the operative side the exigency is expressed in connection with signing the Association Agreements: *We must speed up the negotiation, signature and ratification of the Association Agreements*[625]. In respect of the financial instrument of the Barcelona Process, the MEDA, it is stated that *it needs a better use of targeting*[626]. The success of the Mediterranean Policy is often linked to the regional integration among the MNC; this can also be seen in the speeches of representatives of the Commission, who explicitly express the *need to deepen the South-South relationship*[627].

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620 Comp. „We need to counter the risk of mutual incomprehension through an improved dialogue of civilisations" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg.

621 Comp. „working together for peace and stability, creating shared prosperity through establishing free trade and providing the economic and financial assistance to meet the challenges which that implies, and helping to improve mutual understanding and tolerance among peoples of differing cultures and traditions" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

622 Comp. „(…) working together for peace and stability, improving mutual understanding and tolerance and creating shared prosperity" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.

623 Comp. „(…) to improve mutual understanding in the region through intellectual, cultural and personal exchanges" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

624 Comp. „Nuestro objetivo estratégico es proyectar una zona de prosperidad, y especialmente la seguridad y estabilidad más allá de nuestras fronteras" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid.

625 Comp. „We must speed up the negotiation, signature and ratification of the Association Agreements" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

626 Comp. „(...) a better use of targeting of MEDA" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.

627 Comp. „(...) we need to deepen the South-South relationship" Patten, (April 2002) Brussels.

However, most of the concerns refer to the human, the cultural level. For example, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner stated in Strasbourg in 2005 that *it is high time that we ask ourselves what the partnership can do to meet the concerns of the people*[628]. Her concern is also expressed several months later in the same year when she emphasises the necessity *to get to know each other better*[629], meaning that the differences among the partners of the Barcelona Process may not be underestimated. She further believes that *a clash of ignorance constitutes the mayor threat of a common future*[630] and that *a common understanding of a common region and future is essential*[631].

In 2005, the anniversary of the Barcelona Process, Margot Wallström evaluated the European Mediterranean Policy as follows: *It is not matter of recasting Barcelona but rather rereading it, rediscovering it and realising, as certain analysts have said, its potential*[632]. In the speech of Ferrero-Waldner in April 2008 one perceives that the realisation of the potential was incorporated, but the search of the best way to achieve all officially stated aims has not yet been concluded: *the aim is to build on the achievements of the Barcelona Process to intensify our cooperation with the region and strengthen key bilateral relationships*[633]

3 Discourse analysis – Identity

Within the speeches of the representatives of the European Commission, statements, which belong to the analytical category "identity", refer to expressions stressing the self-perception of the European Union and its role in the Mediterranean. In total, ninety-one statements have been identified:

Speeches assigned to the European Commission			
	"EU"	"Role"	**Total**
IDENTITY	54	37	**91**

3.1 The self-perception of the European Union

Due to the nature of the sources, the speeches constitute a medium to implement, among others, a certain perspective or image. Within the discourses of representatives of the European Commission in the context of the Mediterranean Affairs, the statements that indicate a European self-reference concern

628 Comp. „it is high time that we ask ourselves what the partnership can do to meet the concerns of the people" Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg.

629 Comp. „(...) debemos conocernos mejor unos a otros" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid.

630 Comp. „(...) tenemos que encontrar caminos paa superar el ‚choque de ignorancias' quem mucho más que el 'choque de civilizaciones', es una de las mayores amenazas para nuestro futuro común" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid.

631 Comp. „(...)cque necesitamos un entendimiento común de nuestra región y nuestro futuro" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid.

632 Comp. „It is not matter of recasting Barcelona but rather rereading it, rediscovering it and realising, as certain analysts have said, its potential" Wallström, (March 2005) Cairo.

633 Comp. „the aim is to build on the achievements of the Barcelona Process to intensify our cooperation with the region and strengthen key bilateral relationships.

statements which discuss the own political approach in regard to the significance of the Foreign Policy and various positions providing feedback. There are also statements which refer to Europe and its power position and others which indicate a vision of Europe.

Concerning the Mediterranean Policy in 1997, Manuel Marín admitted *that the EU only recently realised the importance of its external relations*[634], it defined *for the first time a comprehensive framework for relations with its Mediterranean neighbours*[635]. This indicates something which he has already pointed out before, namely that the European Union itself is a profound cognitive process, which, over the years, rendered the possibility to define a Foreign Policy, in the current case also in regard to the Mediterranean Policy. A decisive aspect, especially at the beginning of the Barcelona Process, was the establishment of a balance between the policies in the East and the South; this was particularly due to the fact that the internal enlargement policy caused an increasing competition between these two borders. Thus, Marin stated in 1997 that the European Union *defined the concepts of parallelism and equilibrium between the Union's Eastern and Southern borders and called it a significant achievement in itself*[636]. One is able to perceive a certain pride among the speakers about the achievements of the European Union.

In the context of stressing the achievements in regard to a Mediterranean Policy, there are also statements which will value the approach later on. For instance, Chris Patten referred in 2001 to the Union's effort of establishing a counterbalanced partnership: *It recognized that common objectives and common interests need to be addressed in a spirit of co-responsibility leaving behind the more 'patronising' approach which often marked our policy in the past*[637]. Therewith, an attempt of overcoming the past can be constituted.

Europe is struggling to structure and define its approach in the Mediterranean. A permanent problem concerns the fact that *it is very difficult to make out the Union's new frontiers*[638], because for *thousands of years it has been hard to decide how far Europe stretches*[639] and that it is not possible to *draw a neat demarcation line, as some Mediterranean countries – Malta and Cyprus – are preparing to become members of the Union, other – Turkey- are candidates for membership, and all are linked to Europe by ties of tradition, special situations and interests*[640]. The Barcelona Process facilitated an

634 Comp. „(…) that the EU only recently realised the importance of its external relations" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

635 Comp.. „(...) for the first time a comprehensive framework for relations with its Mediterranean neighbours" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

636 Comp. „(...) defined the concepts of parallelism and equilibrium between the Union's Eastern and Southern borders and called it a significant achievement in itself" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

637 Comp. „It recognized that common objectives and common interests need to be addressed in a spirit of co-responsibility leaving behind the more 'patronising' approach which often marked our policy in the past" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

638 Comp. „it is very difficult to make out the Union's new frontiers" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

639 Comp. „thousands of years it has been hard to decide how far Europe stretches (...)" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

640 Comp. „(…) draw a neat demarcation line, as some Mediterranean countries – Malta and Cyprus – are preparing to become members of the Union, other – Turkey- are candidates for membership, and all are linked to Europe by ties of tradition, special situations and interests" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

approach which made cooperation within a new frame possible. Sometimes there are expressions of gratification for the acceptance of the European approach. One of those is included in a statement of Chris Patten, who conceded after a Meeting in Marseilles that *our ideas fell on fertile ground*[641]. Prodi stated in 2002 that *Europeans are learning the importance of intercultural dialogue, and that is a powerful instrument for integrating and including millions of immigrants in Europe, not just for another aspect of foreign policy*[642]. Nevertheless, the Barcelona Process stagnated and did not progress as it could have; hence, proposals such as reinvigorating the Barcelona Process by founding a Mediterranean Union were positively received within the European Commission: *Ideas such as the Euro-Mediterranean Union proposed by President Sarkozy, could add political momentum for regional cooperation and are welcome*[643].

There are a numerous statements which refer to the European Union as a power in the context of possible threats. One was explicitly stated by Romano Prodi, stressing that in the case of the EU enlargement it involves *viewing the Mediterranean primarily as a question of security. In this case, The Mediterranean becomes the southern border of the Union, where we must take up position to manage the flows of migrants, combat any form of international terrorism and encourage a development policy heavily geared towards cooperation in the fight against unlawful activities*[644]. The security considerations can also be identified in the discourse of Manuel Marín in 1997. He stated that *Europe cannot ignore the fact that there are more than ten million Muslims resident in the Union*[645] and thus indirectly referred to an internal threat. The global view of the European situation was explicitly expressed by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner: *Europe cannot assure its won stability, security and prosperity without helping our neighbours achieve similar and relative levels of security, stability and prosperity*[646]. Even more directly formulated in a speech in Madrid in 1995, she said that *only if we increase the wealth, the security and the stability in those countries we are able to maintain the same in ours*[647]. Hence, she further reasoned, *the interest of European and the Mediterranean are inevitably interweaved and that it is now the opportunity to find a common response and a euro-mediterranean*

641 Comp. „(…) in Marseilles last November our ideas fell on fertile ground" Patten, (June 2001) Rabat.

642 Comp. „Europeans are learning the importance of intercultural dialogue, and that is a powerful instrument for integrating and including millions of immigrants in Europe, not just for another aspect of foreign policy" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

643 Comp. „Ideas such as the Euro-Mediterranean Union proposed by President Sarkozy, could add political momentum for regional cooperation and are welcome (…) The Commission should be fully associated and we are ready to cooperate." Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2007) Lisbon.

644 Comp. „viewing the Mediterranean primarily as a question of security. In this case, The Mediterranean becomes the southern border of the Union, where we must take up position to manage the flows of migrants, combat any form of international terrorism and encourage a development policy heavily geared towards cooperation in the fight against unlawful activities" Prodi (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

645 Comp. „Europe cannot ignore the fact that there are more than ten million Muslims resident in the Union" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

646 Comp. „Europe cannot assure its won stability, security and prosperity without helping our neighbours achieve similar and relative levels of security, stability and prosperity" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona.

647 Comp. „Porque solo si implusamos la prosperidad, la seguridad y la estabilidad en esos paises podremos mantenerlas en los nuestros" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Mardid.

focus on these problems[648]. Over the years this perspective notably comes to a head. Ferrero-Waldner stressed in 2006 that it *is not just a political imperative, but a matter of self-interest. If Europe did not 'export' stability, it would 'import' instability*[649]. And further, *it is in our European interest that our neighbourhood is well-governed and prosperous. It is in our interest that conflicts in our vicinity are resolved and issues like migration, organised crime and terrorism are tackled more effectively*[650]. In 2007, she stated that *if we are able to muster the sufficient political will to tackle these challenges and make more of the Euro-Med Partnership I am certain it will stand us in good stead for tackling the challenges that lie ahead*[651]. The reason for this was explicitly expressed in 2008: *our goal of promoting stability, security and prosperity for our neighbours, and thus for ourselves, is more relevant than ever*[652].

Beside these clear threat-scenarios, out of which Europe apparently explains its actions, there are several statements which directly refer to self-definitions of Europe:

- *The great difference of course between 'Europe' and the 'European Union' is that one is defined by culture, history and geography, the second is defined by treaties, policies and laws*[653].
- *Europe can not be an 'introspective bystander'. On contrary, we are and must remain key actor in the region; a political and economic partner who supports and managed change and who helps reap the opportunities that flow from it*[654].
- *The European Union is neither an island nor a fortress*[655].

These three examples show the struggle of Europe to find its identity. Correctly, one needs to distinguish between continental and cultural Europe and its political entity; however, Europe is and wants to become a serious player on the stage of world politics. As a political entity one carries cultural values; the values that the European Union wants to carry in the Mediterranean are clearly expressed, the struggle remains in the efficiency of the way how to do it. Of course, Europe is confronted with the burden of history, but much-talk- about- nothing does not produce results. The most important aspect

648 Comp. „Nuestros intereses están tan inextricablemente ligados entre sí que nuestra única oportunidad es una respuesta común y un enfoque euromediterráneo específico de nuestros problemas" Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona.

649 Comp. „is not just a political imperative, but a matter of self-interest. If Europe did not 'export' stability, it would 'import' instability" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg.

650 Comp. „it is in our European interest that our neighbourhood is well-governed and prosperous. It is in our interest that conflicts in our vicinity are resolved and issues like migration, organised crime and terrorism are tackled more effectively" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg.

651 Comp. „if we are able to muster the sufficient political will to tackle these challenges and make more of the Euro-Med Partnership I am certain it will stand us in good stead for tackling the challenges that lie ahead" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg.

652 Comp. „our goal of promoting stability, security and prosperity for our neighbours, and thus for ourselves, is more relevant than ever" Ferrero-Waldner, (April 2008) Bruges.

653 Comp. „The great difference of course between 'Europe' and the 'European Union' is that one is defined by culture, history and geography, the second is defined by treaties, policies and laws" Hübner, (February 2006) Warsaw.

654 Comp. „Europe can not be an 'introspective bystander'. On contrary, we are and must remain key actor in the region; a political and economic partner who supports and managed change and who helps reap the opportunities that flow from it" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg.

655 Comp. „The European Union is neither an island nor a fortress" Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg.

of developing an identity is one's own vision; these visions can be found on the Commission's side: *At a time when we are building a new Europe, a united European continent, when we are seeking to work out new ways for people of different cultures to live and work together, when we are creating a new unity within diversity, when the EU's borders are expanding, we must also develop our strategy towards the regions closest to Europe and, above all, we must be decisive in our Mediterranean policy*[656].

3.2 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean

The statements which refer to the role of the European Union in the Mediterranean mostly stress the EU as a political power, its disposition of action, its method and a certain self-criticism. There are also references that identify the EU as one great power, compared to other powers like the United States of America.

From the Commission's side it is stated that Europe is a great power, a political entity. Concerning its engagement in the Mediterranean, Manuel Marín said in 1997 *that the European Union has already shown its readiness to encourage and help*[657]. Beside the power status of Europe in the discourse of representatives of the European Commission, there are numerous statements indicating that the aspired method is shared responsibility. Thus, the limitation of the possibilities that Europe possesses is stressed: *the Union's aid and technical assistance can act only as a catalyst: they will have an effort only if made in conjunction with the political will and modernisation efforts of the Mediterranean Partners themselves*[658]. In 2001, Chris Patten also stressed the necessity *to increase the sense of co-ownership of the partnership among the Med partners*[659]. Co-ownership is a particular sensitive aspect in the organisation of the Barcelona Process, but it is repetitively stated from the European side that it is an essential part for the success of the Barcelona Process. Shared responsibility seems to be one of Europe's concerns and therefore there are repetitive references which assure the European awareness regarding the differences among the partners. The president of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, addressed the participants of the Barcelona Process by explicitly expressing the position of the European Union: *We (Europe) stand firm on the principal that this is not about forcing any country in particular direction. It is about responding to the decisions you make towards realising our*

656 Comp. „At a time when we are building a new Europe, a united European continent, when we are seeking to work out new ways for people of different cultures to live and work together, when we are creating a new unity within diversity, when the EU's borders are expanding, we must also develop our strategy towards the regions closest to Europe and, above all, we must be decisive in our Mediterranean policy" Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report.

657 Comp. „the European Union has already shown its readiness to encourage and help." Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

658 Comp. „the Union's aid and technical assistance can act only as a catalyst: they will have an effort only if made in conjunction with the political will and modernisation efforts of the Mediterranean Partners themselves" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

659 Comp. „(…) to increase the sense of co-ownership of the partnership among the Med partners" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

common vision of a zone of stability and prosperity[660]. He further stated that *we (Europe) are committed to the idea that each country shapes its relationship with us individually*[661]. And, especially because *differentiation is vital*[662], *we (Europe) are not trying to force artificial links between countries with very different interests and needs*[663]. This discourse shows both, what the European Union aspires to represent and what its reality is. The discrepancy results from the fact that the will to share responsibility is only realisable if all countries are equally perceived. The original idea and the wish of a co-ownership could not be implemented; it became increasingly difficult over the years, especially as the EU offers the MNC the realisation of reforms with different velocities. The recent restructuring of the Barcelona Process, the currently denominated Mediterranean Union, tries to avoid this duality of approaches. Its success has to be proved in the future.

As far as the strategic approach is concerned, the European Union presents itself as a proactive and comprehensive power, especially in concerns of the Middle East Peace Process. Chris Patten *noted the calls in both reports for the EU to play a more active role in the Peace Process and states, let us not underestimate our contribution*[664]. He further stresses that *of course we should not be naïve, we cannot expect wholesale changes to cultural traditions overnight. But we should aim for a structural approach leading to improvement over time*[665]. In financial matters of the Mediterranean Policy the EU figures as a donor with knowledge advance. Thus, Chris Patten states that he is *convinced that the effectiveness of MEDA depends on keeping a tight focus on the key priorities of the partnership even if this means that others call on our assistance*[666].

As the US also holds a strong position in the Mediterranean, especially in concerns of the Middle East Peace Process, it is important for Europe to position itself. The few statements which refer to this matter indicate a precautious approach of Europe. Thus, Manuel Marin stated in 1997: *We do not see the Union's role as an alternative to the role of the United States, but as complement to it*[667]. In 2005, Ferrero- Waldner stated that *many of the EU's objectives for the region are shared by the US, and we are more likely to achieve them together. Working in parallel, reinforcing our common objectives, the EU and US will have a greater degree of persuasion and political influence in the region than we*

660 Comp. „We stand firm on the principal that this is not about forcing any country in particular direction. It is about responding to the decisions you make towards realising our common vision of a zone of stability and prosperity" Barroso, (September 2007) Brussels.

661 Comp. „we are committed to the idea that each country shapes its relationship with us individually" Barroso, (September 2007) Brussels.

662 Comp. „differentiation is vital" Barroso, (September 2007) Brussels.

663 Comp. „we are not trying to force artificial links between countries with very different interests and needs" Barroso, (September 2007) Brussels.

664 Comp. „noted the calls in both reports for the EU to play a more active role in the Peace Process and states, let us not underestimate our contribution" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

665 Comp. „of course we should not be naïve, we cannot expect wholesale changes to cultural traditions overnight. But we should aim for a structural approach leading to improvement over time" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

666 Comp. „convinced that the effectiveness of MEDA depends on keeping a tight focus on the key priorities of the partnership even if this means that others call on our assistance" Patten, (January 2001) Brussels.

667 Comp. „We do not see the Union's role as an alternative to the role of the United States, but as complement to it" Marín, (May 1997) Oslo.

would separately[668]. These examples demonstrate the will to become a decisive power in the region, but also indicate the predominant cooperative approach, the working together with other great powers like the United States. The European Union wants to sway politics in the Mediterranean, but it is edentulous at the moment of action.

XVII Speeches assigned to the European Council

The speeches which can be assigned to the European Council are held by European politicians, who are either representatives of their national presidency or are heads of state and thus members of the Council. Therewith, the discourse assigned to the European Council contains a strong intergovernmental element and appears to be the most diverse discourse of all analysed documents so far.

1 Discourse analysis – Expression

From the fifty statements which have been identified for the known subcategories, far the most pertain to the category "Mediterranean Policy", only few of them deal with "associative and dissociative elements", "the other" or the "Mediterranean region".

Speeches assigned to the European Council						
	"The Other"	"MMPOL"	"ass./diss."	"MMR"	"predominace"	**Total**
EXPRESSION	3	38	3	5	1	**50**

1.1 The view of "the other"

Within the discourse of representatives of the European Council, the "other" receives no other denomination as in the other documents. They are partners and partner countries. There are examples indicating how to proceed with conflictive countries like Libya. Thus, it is stated in 1998 that *Libya for its part has not been forgotten. Libya is an integral part of the Med, it is considered to be a natural partner in the Euro-Med Partnership on the very day when UN sanctions will be lifted*[669]. The relations with Libya, who received an observer status in the Barcelona Process in 1999, remain conflictive to this day. Europe, who as a long-term objective wanted Libya to become a full member of the Barcelona Process, only managed to reach a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in July 2007. The conflictive aspect is that "if Libya fails to join, the E.U. would be accused of double standards for punish-

668 Comp. „many of the EU's objectives for the region are shared by the US, and we are more likely to achieve them together. Working in parallel, reinforcing our common objectives, the EU and US will have a greater degree of persuasion and political influence in the region than we would separately" Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg.

669 Comp. "Libya for its part has not been forgotten. Libya is an integral part of the Med, it is considered to be a natural partner in the Euro-Med Partnership on the very day when UN sanctions will be lifted" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

ing member Arab states for authoritarian behaviour while leaving Libya alone".[670] This would have serious consequences regarding Europe's consistency in terms of credibility. Thus, the Commission proposed a negotiation mandate for a framework agreement in February 2008, which Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner commented as *"this is a historic decision. Libya is an important player in the Mediterranean region and in Africa, and so far has no framework for relations with the EU. The launching of negotiations for a new agreement is the successful result of the reciprocal dialogue and engagement started in 2004. I am confident that the agreement will create solid and long lasting relations between Libya and the EU."*[671] Beside this consideration, the situation concerning Libya remains complicated, because the multilateral character of the Barcelona Process and the recently renamed Mediterranean Union require too many suggestions for reforms and it is doubtable if Libya is willing to concede them[672]. It was just recently that Moamer Ghaddafi rejected the French proposed Euro-Mediterranean Union[673] and did not participate at a meeting on the 13th of July 2008, where the Heads of State and high representatives of all participating countries decided on the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean[674].

Other references of the "other" in the discourse of representatives of the European Council demonstrate the conviction that all participating countries support the European way. In order to underline this position, one speaks of *a wide consensus in the Arab world about the necessity of intensifying the pace of modernisation and gradually adapting the legal frames and administrative practices to the necessities of the citizens and to the national and foreign investors*[675]. Another way to signal the shared commitment is expressed by Nicolas Sarkozy, who addressed them directly: *It is Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the civilisations and religions will wage the most terrible of wars. Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the North and the South are going to clash, Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not terrorism and fundamentalism will succeed in imposing on the world their violence and intolerance*[676]. Therewith, the French President calls on the shared responsibility by involving the "other" as a decisive factor on issues that especially Europe is afraid of.

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670 Dana MOSS, Libya and the European Union: How Far Can Relations Go?, (Arab Reform Bulletin/ 6.2.2008); Available Online: http://www.transatlanticinstitute.org/html/pu_articles.html?id=412 (22.1.2009).

671 IP/08/308 (27. February 2008) Brussels; Available online: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/308&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (22.1.2008)

672 Comp. Dana MOSS, Libya and the European Union: How Far Can Relations Go?, (6.2.2008/ Arab Reform Bulletin); Available Online: http://www.transatlanticinstitute.org/html/pu_articles.html?id=412 (22.1.2009).

673 http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/06/libya_rejects_p.php (22.1.2009)

674 Comp. Meessen, NZZ (5.11.2008)

675 Comp. "Hay un amplio consensus en el mundo árabe sobre la necesidad de intensificar el paso a la modernidad y adaptar gradualmente los marcos legales y las practicas administrativas a las necesidades de sus cuidadanos, así como a las incersores nacionales y extranjeros" Zapatero/Blair (28.11.2005) El País.

676 Comp. „It is Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the civilisations and religions will wage the most terrible of wars. Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the North and the South are going to clash, Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not terrorism and fundamentalism will succeed in imposing on the world their violence and intolerance" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

1.2 Associative and dissociative elements

The few statements which can be allocated to the subcategory "associative and dissociative elements" show that the postulated differences facilitate a common position. Notably, the differences are not specifically assigned to the "other", but they refer to the socio-economic challenges which all countries are concerned with. Associatively expressed and addressed to all participating countries, Jean Asselborn stated that *in 1995 through a major political initiative and by common agreement, we decided to combine our efforts to help the spirit of solidarity and cooperation take root in the Mediterranean*[677]. Frank – Walter Steinmeier, Federal Foreign Minister and representative of the German Presidency, expressed the perceived associative character even more explicitly: *We all face the same problems: multiple risks and the potential for international conflict, such as the crisis in the Middle East, the threat of terrorism, the challenges of climate change and concerns about the security of energy supplies. These problems require urgent responses which we will find only if we work together*[678]. He further accentuated that *this is in the interest of us all*[679]. The discursive strategy therewith is to advance association by bridging the socio-economic concern via a direct advice regarding a shared "destiny".

1.3 Reference to a Mediterranean region

The significance of the Mediterranean Region is mentioned in the context of opposed shores, the dialectic between frontier and bridge and its future-critical connotation.

The Spanish President José Luis Zapatero comments, for instance, that the connection with the Mediterranean is evident because it constitutes an ambit which enables the approach of the peoples of the shores. José Magalhães, on the other hand, states that the Mediterranean can be either perceived as a frontier between Europe and the African continent or as a bridge, across which one could reach a global cooperation and solidarity. The outcome of this is that the definition of the Mediterranean is continuously linked to conceptions and wishes. The discourse transports the vision of belonging together, which enables to "heal" the world. This is supported by statements of the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy: *it is there (the Mediterranean) that everything will be won or everything lost*[680]. From an analytical point of view, whether this is political exaggeration or not, what seems to be fact is that from the European side, and even more explicitly from the intergovernmental level of the European Council, the opinion is pushed that the Mediterranean better belongs close to Europe and that it has a future-critical significance.

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677 Comp. „in 1995 through a major political initiative and by common agreement, we decided to combine our efforts to help the spirit of solidarity and cooperation take root in the Mediterranean" Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg.

678 Comp. „We all face the same problems: multiple risks and the potential for international conflict, such as the crisis in the Middle East, the threat of terrorism, the challenges of climate change and concerns about the security of energy supplies. These problems require urgent responses which we will find only if we work together" Steinmeier, (March 2007) Berlin.

679 Comp. „this is in the interest of us all" Steinmeier, (March 2007) Berlin.

680 Comp. „it is there that everything will be won or everything lost" Sarkozy, (April 2007) Tangiers.

1.4 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

The statements which refer to the Mediterranean Policy itself aim to define or to characterise it. In the speeches assigned to the European Council, especially towards the end of the considered temporal bracket, there are strong critical voices concerning the Barcelona Process. This criticism concerns the policy itself, but it also gives indication of the European struggle to speak with one voice.

In 1998, Herbert Kröll, ambassador in function of the representation of the Austrian presidency, stated that *the most ambitious and best progressing Mediterranean initiative is the (European Union's) Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in November 1995 – also knows as the 'Barcelona Process'*[681]. He further explained that *the EMP is to be seen as a comprehensive EU foreign policy approach towards the Mediterranean*[682], and even more precisely it *is a long-term and comprehensive approach, virtually non-existent in previous European efforts in that region*[683]. The pride of the singularity of the European Mediterranean Policy can explicitly be perceived in these statements. Within the perception of most of the speakers the Barcelona Process is the result of long European endeavours. In connection with the initiation of the Barcelona Process, this is even explicitly mentioned: *The Barcelona Conference represents the pinnacle of a year-long effort by the EU to give the partnership with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority a solid foundation*[684].

Concerning further terms of defining the Mediterranean Policy, the discourse of representatives of the European Council does not differ from the discourse within the other analysed documents. Thus, *the Barcelona Process is the only multilateral forum to deal with the problems of the region in a comprehensive way*[685] and *it provides a crucial framework for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation*[686]. In contrast to other documents, there are more statements that evaluate the Mediterranean Policy. It is either stated that it represents a challenge for the European Union with its wide scope and ambitious objectives or it is expressed from the European's side that *we are privileged to have a forum like our Euro-Mediterranean partnership and we should make full use of it*[687]. Among the European side, one

681 Comp. „the most ambitious and best progressing Mediterranean initiative is the (European Union's) Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in November 1995 – also knows as the 'Barcelona Process'" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

682 Comp. „the EMP is to be seen as a comprehensive EU foreign policy approach towards the Mediterranean" Kröll (November 1998) Malta.

683 Comp. „(...) is a long-term and comprehensive approach, virtually non-existent in previous European efforts in that region" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

684 Comp. „The Barcelona Conference represents the pinnacle of a year-long effort by the EU to give the partnership with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority a solid foundation" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

685 Comp. „the Barcelona Process is the only multilateral forum to deal with the problems of the region in a comprehensive way (…)" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

686 Comp. „it provides a crucial framework for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation" Winkler, (May 2006) Vienna.

687 Comp. „we are privileged to have a forum like our Euro-Mediterranean partnership and we should make full use of it" Winkler, (May 2006) Vienna.

is aware of *the enormous strategic importance of the Mediterranean Region*[688] and *the relevance of the Barcelona Process which cannot be understated*[689]. The evaluation of the Barcelona Process on the occasion of its tenth anniversary demonstrated the historic significance, the need for action and the will to succeed with this policy. Thus, Jean Asselborn, who is responsible for General Affairs and External Relations and a representative of the Luxembourg Presidency, stated that *the Barcelona Process was an innovative concept which, in the context of the post-Cold War period and successive enlargements, was to prove central in consolidating our links of solidarity and in supporting the major changes that have affected our region*[690]. He further stressed that *the Barcelona Declaration was born of this common vision and this sense of shared responsibility*[691] and that today *this fundamental and unique text has not lost any of its urgency. More than ever, it constitutes the frame of reference for cooperative relations and links of solidarity between the European Union and Mediterranean partner countries*[692].

An even clearer claim of historic significance was expressed by Nicolas Sarkozy in the context of restructuring the Barcelona Process and promoting his idea of a Mediterranean Union: *This is what the Mediterranean Union is: a break with the past – a break with attitudes. Ways of thinking, playing safe, a state of mind opposed to audacity and courage*[693]. And with its concrete definition he stated in 2008 that *the Union for the Mediterranean is a political project because it is one of that entails political will, without which nothing is possible, and it is a project that will allow the Mediterranean to shake off all that is keeping it from looking to the future*[694]. In respect of launching the Mediterranean Union under the premise of reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, the Mediterranean Policy has strongly been criticised so far, especially by the French President Nicolas Sarkory. He denounced Europe's predominant position when stating that *in Barcelona everything came from the North. By that I mean north of the Mediterranean. In Barcelona, Europe decided first*[695]. He valued the European's effort, but commented on their failures in the same breath: *Barcelona was not bad, because it signalled*

688 Comp. „é enorme a importância estratégica da região mediterrânica para a União Europeia para Portugal (...)" Magalhães, (October 2007) Portugal.

689 Comp. "the relevance of the Barcelona Process cannot be understated" Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta.

690 Comp. „the Barcelona Process was an innovative concept which, in the context of the post-Cold War period and successive enlargements, was to prove central in consolidating our links of solidarity and in supporting the major changes that have affected our region" Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg.

691 Comp. „the Barcelona Declaration was born of this common vision and this sense of shared responsibility" Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg.

692 Comp. „this fundamental and unique text has not lost any of its urgency. More than ever, it constitutes the frame of reference for cooperative relations and links of solidarity between the European Union and Mediterranean partner countries" Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg.

693 Comp. „This is what the Mediterranean Union is: a break with the past – a break with attitudes. Ways of thinking, playing safe, a state of mind opposed to audacity and courage" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

694 Comp. „the Union for the Mediterranean is a political project because it is one of that entails political will, without which nothing is possible, and it is a project that will allow the Mediterranean to shake off all that is keeping it from looking to the future" Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis.

695 Comp. „in Barcelona everything came from the North. By that I mean north of the Mediterranean. In Barcelona, Europe decided first" Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis.

Europe's salutary recognition that part of its destiny was in the hands of the South[696]*. Barcelona was an error, because it continued along a path of North-South dialogue as it arose after decolonisation – that is, dialogue based on an unequal relationship where one decides and the other receives*[697]. Moreover, Nicolas Sarkozy talked about the base of many assumptions in the discussion of the Barcelona Process: *Barcelona was the North helping the South, but Barcelona, I am sorry to say, was not a partnership between peoples*[698].

Therewith, the president of France explicitly claims that Europe has a predominant position in the Barcelona Process, which is far from resembling an equal partnership. Although there is an acceptable component in the discourse of Nicolas Sarkozy, especially in concerns of the present research undertaking as it refers to the same conclusion, one may not forget the background of this explicit French position. With the proposal of a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the Mediterranean, France reorganised the Mediterranean Policy in order to strengthen its position within Europe and to minimize the influence of other powerful member states like Germany or Great Britain.

2 Discourse analysis – Purpose

Within the speeches of representatives of the European Council there are few references on the actual purpose or the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy. Interestingly, two-thirds of the statements concern the actual purpose and only one-third the aim. This indicates that the discourse aims rather to explain than to persuade.

Speeches assigned to the European Council			
	"Aim"	"Purpose"	**Total**
PURPOSE	11	22	**33**

2.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy

The purpose of the European policy in the Mediterranean concerns both, the need of action, which implies an interest on socio-economic developments, and the attempt to evolve something meaningful, something of lasting significance.

The need of action is expressed when the speakers refer to:

- *There is a need for rapid progress*[699]

696 Comp. „Barcelona was not bad, because it signalled Europe's salutary recognition that part of its destiny was in the hands of the South" Sarkory, (April 2008) Tunis.

697 Comp. „Barcelona was an error, because it continued along a path of North-South dialogue as it arose after decolonisation – that is, dialogue based on an unequal relationship where one decides and the other receives" Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis.

698 Comp. „Barcelona was the North helping the South, but Barcelona, I am sorry to say, was not a partnership between peoples" Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis.

699 Comp. „There is a need for rapid progress in the negotiations of the Association Agreements" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

- *It is important to encourage Med Partners to reinforce their mutual relations*[700]
- *It is vital that we have success*[701]
- *We have to act more rapidly*[702]

These statements exemplify the urgency and the necessity which are expressed by the representatives of the European Council. The reasons are of distinctive nature. Jean Asselborn, representative of the Luxembourg Presidency, stated: *Our ambition was to identify together the great political, economic and social challenges faced by the Mediterranean region*[703]. José Luis Zapatero, the Spanish president, reasoned that *he believes that the Mediterranean inheres, more than any other zone of the world, the risk of a conflict between civilisations and also the enormous potential of an alliance*[704]. Therewith, he referred to the high sensitiveness of conflicts in the region, the repetitively stated risk of instability and the possibility to overcome these threats, which are considered to affect both sides of the Mediterranean equally by means of a political alliance that goes beyond diplomatic relations. Further reasons are that *we are confronted with shared challenges and new threats*[705] and that *the prosperity gap between the European Union and its neighbours in the south, which is one of the hugest in the world, did not decrease but increase and that this augments the frustration and the emigration of the south*[706].

Regarding the Mediterranean Policy, the European politicians are convinced that *they have to continue their work in a balanced way in all three dimensions of the Barcelona Declaration to attain the objectives of peace, stability and prosperity* and that *they should concentrate their efforts to develop new partnership building measures to gradually increase mutual confidence*[707].

The French proposal facilitated the implementation of a European and French, respectively vision about how the Mediterranean Policy should evolve itself in the future. Nicolas Sarkozy addressed all Mediterranean countries when he stated: *I want to say that the time has come to move from dialogue to politics, that the moment has come to stop discussion and start building*[708]. He corroborated his opinion by stressing the significance of the Mediterranean for Europe saying that *it is in the Mediterranean*

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700 Comp. „It is important to encourage Med Partners to reinforce their mutual relations" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

701 Comp. „Es vital que tengamos éxtio" Zapatero/Blair, (28.11.2005) El País.

702 Comp. „Pero deemos hacer más rápidamente" Zapatero/Blair, (28.11.2005) El País.

703 Comp. „Our ambition was to identify together the great political, economic and social challenges faced by the Mediterranean region" Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg.

704 Comp. „Creo que el Mediterráneo encarna, mejor que ninguna zona en el mundo, los riesgos inherentes a un conflicto de civilisacioones y, al mismo tiempo, las enormes potencialidades de una Alianza." Zapatero, (June 2005) Afkar/ideas.

705 Comp. "Afrontamos retos compartidos y nuevas amenazas" Zapatero/Blair, (28.11.2005) El País.

706 Comp. „the prosperity gap between the European Union and its neighbours in the south, which is one of the hugest in the world, did not decrease but increase and that this augments the frustration and the emigration of the south" Zapatero/Blair, (28.11.2005) El País.

707 Comp. „we have to continue our work in a balanced way in all three dimensions of the Barcelona Declaration to attain the objectives of peace, stability and prosperity. (…) we should concentrate our efforts to develop new partnership building measures to gradually increase mutual confidence" Valjento, (November 1999) Malta.

708 Comp. „To all Mediterranean (…) I want to say that the time has come to move from dialogue to politics, that the moment has come to stop discussion and start building" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

that Europe will secure its prosperity, ensure its security[709]. He further stressed *the European position and its policy so far when he states that when Europe launched the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in 1995, in Barcelona, it wanted to demonstrate its interest in a South that it had neglected for too long. (...) And quite frankly, the Mediterranean has never been at the centre of Europe's concern to this extent*[710]. Whether he wanted to make good-weather policy, so that the Mediterranean can expect greater attention now in terms of aid from the European Union, or he wanted to present his policy purpose in a shinier light, is questionable. Especially when he continued stating that *it's not only our political but moral responsibility to take up this challenge* and that *the single goal is to make the Mediterranean the world's largest testing ground for co-development, where development is decided on together and managed together, where freedom of movement of people is built together and managed together, and where security is organized together and guaranteed together*[711]. The latter sentence contains the key purpose of the European Union. It is mantled in nice words, but still explicitly stated: bringing reforms and freedom to the people and assuring security. Sarkozy topped the discourse of beautiful words by formulating his demand: *let us make this great Mediterranean dream our dream, one that has waited centuries for a youth worthy of its great past to size the dream and make it a reality*[712]. He continued his persuasive discourse: *And I promise you this: that if this Union for the Mediterranean becomes a reality, this union will change the world*[713].

With this visionary approach Nicolas Sarkozy implemented a big thought to a big project. He mantled the European interests into a common vision, a shared future. His approach is coherent to the European policy approach, but what he explicitly did is augmenting the expectations of success of such a sensitive policy area.

2.2 About the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy

Within the discourse of representatives of the European Council there are little references to the official aim. General formulations like it is the aim *to promote long-term stability through economic development and liberalisation*[714] do not contribute to new findings.

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709 Comp. „it is in the Mediterranean that Europe will secure its prosperity, ensure its security" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

710 Comp. „the European position and its policy so far when he states that when Europe launched the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in 1995, in Barcelona, it wanted to demonstrate its interest in a South that it had neglected for too long. (…) And quite frankly, the Mediterranean has never been at the centre of Europe's concern to this extent" Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis.

711 Comp. „it's not only our political but moral responsibility to take up this challenge and that the single goal is to make the Mediterranean the world's largest testing ground for co-development, where development is decided on together and managed together, where freedom of movement of people is built together and managed together, and where security is organized together and guaranteed together" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

712 Comp. „let us make this great Mediterranean dream our dream, one that has waited centuries for a youth worthy of its great past to size the dream and make it a reality" Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis.

713 Comp. „And I promise you this: that if this Union for the Mediterranean becomes a reality, this union will change the world" Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis.

714 Comp. to promote long-term stability through economic development and liberalisation" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

Interestingly, there are some statements which reflect the European's aim how to handle the Mediterranean Policy. For instance, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Foreign Minister and representative of the German Presidency stated: *We remain committed to expanding and strengthening the foundations which we have built together*[715]. Renate Schimkoreit, Euromed-Coordinator of the German Presidency, said: *We have no other option than to do our best – or at least, what we consider to be our best – to improve the prevailing situation in the interest of all of us*[716].

The official aim refers to a commitment to the European Policy expressed by the Member States and to the implicit necessity to succeed.

3 Discourse analysis – Identity

Forty-seven statements have been identified that refer to the identity of the European Union concerning the Mediterranean Policy. Similar to the chapters before, the selected amount of references was divided into those which refer to the European Union in a wider context (self-denomination, self-perception, vision) and those which refer to the political role of the European Union. More than half of the statements have been allocated to the sub-category "EU".

Speeches assigned to the European Council			
	"EU"	"Role"	**Total**
IDENTITY	34	13	**47**

3.1 The self-perception of the European Union

Among the speeches of representatives of the European Council the self-perception of the European Union can not be reduced to single images or contexts because the Council also represents the intergovernmental level of the European Union, namely the voices of all Member States. The references, which refer to the Mediterranean Policy, rather aspire to guarantee the backing position to the European Policy or contribute to the vision of a united Europe.

Concerning the acceptance of the Mediterranean Policy, the countries underline their own position, especially as *now all EU member states have become fully aware that the Mediterranean region as a single geopolitical entity is too important to be neglected*[717]. In 1998, one was convinced that *to the EU the whole Mediterranean Area matters and there is no EU-fragmentation policy*[718]. This conviction is currently not valid anymore, as especially the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union has

715 Comp. „We remain committed to expanding and strengthening the foundations which we have built together" Steinmeier, (March 2007) Berlin.

716 Comp. „We have no other option than to do our best – or at least, what we consider to be our best – to improve the prevailing situation in the interest of all of us" Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta.

717 Comp. „Now all EU member states have become fully aware that the Mediterranean region as a single geopolitical entity is too important to be neglected" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

718 Comp. „To the EU the whole Mediterranean Area matters and there is no EU-fragmentation policy. By no means a fault-line should develop between a prosperous north and a poor south" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

demonstrated the enormous fragmentation potential within Europe. Nevertheless, the countries declare their cooperation and commitment to the European approach in the Mediterranean. The earliest reference in the document of 1998 concerned Austria and Germany: *Austria sees its Southern Mediterranean partners as neighbours, even more so with the entry to force of the Schengen Agreement (...) I think the Austrian Presidency has made clear that Europe as a whole – not just the southern parts of Europe – stands firm behind the Euro-Med Partnership (...) Austria is the first EU-Presidency of a "northern" country to hold a Euro-Med Ministerial Meeting in its own country (...) Germany will follow that line by holding the Barcelona III Conference during its Presidency in Stuttgart in April 1999*[719]. Finland also expressed its commitment to the European Mediterranean Policy when stating that *even if Finland is situated geographically far away from the Mediterranean, the border of the Mediterranean is our common border and we are convinced of the need to cooperate with our neighbours beyond it everywhere*[720]. Italy made a more implicit reference by expressing its vision for the European Foreign Policy, which can be allocated to the wish of a more proactive role in the Mediterranean: *Europe can be cured of its Hamlet syndrome and wholeheartedly decide to become an active placer on the world stage; it can acquire the diplomatic, economic and military means to fulfil that role convincingly, without calling into question its autonomy, its roots or the freedom-giving structures defended over the years in the framework of its Western alliances*[721]. In 2007, the Euromed-Coordinator of the German Presidency, Renate Schimkoreit, took a stand to the reproach *whether Germany would attach enough importance to the Mediterranean region* as there were *rumours that the German Presidency would turn its back to the Euromed and focus on Eastern Europe*[722]. She undermined the position by appreciating the Barcelona Process and made use of the opportunity to voice certain criticism: *Germany is convinced that the potential of the Barcelona Process. At the same time – we think – this potential has not been exploit accordingly*[723]. While many EU member states are encouraged to back the European Policy, France challenged Europe with its own proposal of a Mediterranean Policy, the Mediterranean Union, and thus demonstrated the great fragmentation potential of

719 Comp. „Austria sees its Southern Mediterranean partners as neighbours, even more so with the entry to force of the Schengen Agreement (…) I think the Austrian Presidency has made clear that Europe as a whole – not just the southern parts of Europe – stands firm behind the Euro-Med Partnership (…) Austria is the first EU-Presidency of a "northern" country to hold a Euro-Med Ministerial Meeting in its own country (…) Germany will follow that line by holding the Barcelona III Conference during its Presidency in Stuttgart in April 1999" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

720 Comp. „even if Finland is situated geographically far away from the Mediterranean, the border of the Mediterranean is our common border and we are convinced of the need to cooperate with our neighbours beyond it everywhere" Valjento, (November 1999) Strasbourg.

721 Comp. „Europe can be cured of its Hamlet syndrome and wholeheartedly decide to become an active placer on the world stage; it can acquire the diplomatic, economic and military means to fulfil that role convincingly, without calling into question its autonomy, its roots or the freedom-giving structures defended over the years in the framework of its Western alliances" Berlusconi, (July 2003) Strasbourg.

722 Comp. „There was the doubt *whether Germany would attach enough importance to the Mediterranean region.* Rumours had it that the German Presidency would turn its back to the Euromed and focus on Eastern Europe" Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta.

723 Comp. „Germany is convinced that the potential of the Barcelona Process. At the same time – we think – this potential has not been exploit accordingly" Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta.

Europe. France aspired to overtake the direction imposing force in the Mediterranean when stating for example: *for France, the Mediterranean Union is quite different from the Euro-Mediterranean process; it will not be built to the detriment of either Africa or Europe. It will be built with them, with Europe and Africa (...) for France, the Mediterranean Union's remit is not to take the place of all the already existing initiatives and projects, but to give them fresh impetus, a new lease of life*[724]. Although Sarkozy stated that this Mediterranean Union will not be France's project, that it will be everyone's project, developed by everyone, and that it will succeed only if everyone commits to it and makes an own individual contribution, France adopted a leading role and centred its position in the Mediterranean Union by speaking in the name of France instead of Europe: *In the name of France (...) I invite all the heads of States and governments of the Mediterranean rim countries to meet France in June 2008 to lay the foundations of a political, economic and cultural union founded on the principle strict equality between the nations bordering the same sea: the Mediterranean Union. I invite all States which don't border the Mediterranean but are concerned by what is happening to it, to participate, as observers, in this first summit and contribute to its success*[725]. Therewith, France not only assumed the European key role, but also attempted to exclude most of the European countries from Mediterranean Affairs. This explicit fragmentation attempt aroused a stern debate on principles, especially between Germany and France. Sarkozy, who searched for the support of other European countries bordering the Mediterranean, commented on this debate and the agreed solution: *In Rome, this initiative has become a common one for Italy, Spain and France. A major debate was launched (...) This debate was first needed between France and Germany. We reached out to one another and made an agreement. And finally, we arrived at a sharing responsibilities with a Union for the Mediterranean that will be headed by a rotating co-presidency exercised simultaneously by a country from the northern shore and a country from the southern shore, who together will incarnate the general interest of the Union for the Mediterranean*[726]. Generally speaking, this outcome could be seen as victory for Europe and the European project.

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724 Comp. „for France, the Mediterranean Union is quite different from the Euro-Mediterranean process; it will not be built to the detriment of either Africa or Europe. It will be built with them, with Europe and Africa (…) for France, the Mediterranean Union's remit is not to take the place of all the already existing initiatives and projects, but to give them fresh impetus, a new lease of life" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

725 Comp. „In the name of France (…) I invite all the heads of States and governments of the Mediterranean rim countries to meet France in June 2008 to lay the foundations of a political, economic and cultural union founded on the principle strict equality between the nations bordering the same sea: the Mediterranean Union. I invite all States which don't border the Mediterranean but are concerned by what is happening to it, to participate, as observers, in this first summit and contribute to its success" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

726 Comp. „In Rome, this initiative has become a common one for Italy, Spain and France. A major debate was launched (…) This debate was first needed between France and Germany. We reached out to one another and made an agreement. And finally, we arrived at a sharing responsibilities with a Union for the Mediterranean that will be headed by a rotating co-presidency exercised simultaneously by a country from the northern shore and a country from the southern shore, who together will incarnate the general interest of the Union for the Mediterranean" Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis.

3.2 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean

Europe aspires to become a political heavyweight, which is able to measure itself with the other great powers. An indication for this ambition can be deduced from a statement by Herbert Kröll who commented on this European aspiration: *it is clear therefore that although Russia and the US wanted to be included they are not*[727]. Within the discourse of representatives of the European Council, it becomes obvious that Europe wanted and still wants to break new grounds. This approach requires courage. Courageous in the sense of becoming *less paternalistic on the EU side*[728] and bringing up sensitive points: *We should not dominate the EMP, but move a genuine partnership relationship and discuss also sensitive issues (...) we should not be shy to discuss terrorism, agriculture problems, migration and excessive population growth, even the dept issue. We must further develop a genuine spirit of partnership*[729].

The mandate that the European Union assumes in the Mediterranean is based on the certainty that *the EU is based in the values of democracy and human rights. It proposes these values also in its foreign policy and external action as it believes that the promotion and protection of human rights is the cornerstone of peace and security and sustainable development*[730]. Therefore, there exists *the conviction that the EU has to take and takes on the responsibility for its neighbouring countries, since this is the very essence of its raison t'etre which is first of all a political one, to create a zone of peace and stability as big as possible*[731]. Nicolas Sarkozy spoke about the same, but in a more vivid way: *By turning its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral and spiritual sources, but also from its future*[732]. For the political identity of Europe, the Middle East Peace Process constitutes a major challenge, virtually a mission. On the one hand, certain limitations of the European influence are repetitively expressed such as: *We cannot replace the desire of the conflicting parties to engage in dialogue, nor can we issue an order for peace. However we can – and must – support and promote this desire to engage in dialogue and give the parties assistance when they are unable to make progress on their own*[733]. On the other hand, the urgency that is ascribed to the

727 Comp. „it is clear therefore that although Russia and the US wanted to be included they are not" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

728 Comp. „to become less paternalistic on the EU side" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

729 Comp. „We should not dominate the EMP, but move a genuine partnership relationship and discuss also sensitive issues (…) we should not be shy to discuss terrorism, agriculture problems, migration and excessive population growth, even the dept issue. We must further develop a genuine spirit of partnership" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta

730 Comp. „the EU is based in the values of democracy and human rights. It proposes these values also in its foreign policy and external action as it believes that the promotion and protection of human rights is the cornerstone of peace and security and sustainable development" Pipan, (June 2008) Slovenia.

731 Comp. „the conviction that the EU has to take and takes on the responsibility for its neighbouring countries, since this is the very essence of its raison t'etre which is first of all a political one, to create a zone of peace and stability as big as possible" Kröll, (November 1998) Malta.

732 Comp. „By turning its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral and spiritual sources, but also from its future" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

733 Comp. „We cannot replace the desire of the conflicting parties to engage in dialogue, nor can we issue an order for peace. However we can – and must – support and promote this desire to engage in dialogue and give the parties assistance when they are unable to make progress on their own" Steinmeir, (March 2007) Berlin.

development in the Mediterranean, leads to the following statements: *we are obliged to succeed*[734] or *it is essential that we succeed in making people understand that we cannot solve key issues of the future by cutting ourselves off from each other, but only by interacting with each other*[735].

In this context, Europe perceives itself as *a factor of international stability and its responsibility in this respect starts at its immediate borders and depends on its capacity to become involved in increasingly advanced forms of cooperation with neighbouring countries*[736]. And especially with the newly constituted way of cooperation Europe aims to *set off on the path of peace and fraternity*[737].

XVIII INTERINSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE – CONCLUDING REMARKS "SPEECHES"

In its methodological consideration the speeches of representatives of the European Commission and the European Council complement the analysis of the official discourse of the European Union. While the EU documents at first provoke the establishment of the discourse in their finality, the speeches constitute a measure to implement the official discourse. Thus, the speakers per se are not as relevant as the political function they represent. The speeches assigned to the European Commission represent the institution, which sets the path for the European approach in the Mediterranean; the representatives of the European Council represent not only the mayor decision-making organ of the European Union, but also the intergovernmental level within the European Union because they act on the mandate of their home-countries.

In total, 357 statements have been considered in the analysis of the speeches:

Speeches: total number of statements

	Commission	Council	Total
EXPRESSION	89	50	**139**
PURPOSE	47	33	**80**
IDENTITY	91	47	**138**
	227	**130**	**357**

The fact that within the speeches that have been assigned to the European Commission nearly fifty percent more statements could be identified is due to the uneven number of speeches between the European Commission and the European Council. As the European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs,

734 Comp. „we are obliged to succeed" Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta.

735 Comp. „it is essential that we succeed in making people understand that we cannot solve key issues of the future by cutting ourselves off from each other, but only by interacting with each other" Steinmeier, (March 2007) Berlin.

736 Comp. „The European Union is also a factor of international stability and its responsibility in this respect starts at its immediate borders and depends on its capacity to become involved in increasingly advanced forms of cooperation with neighbouring countries" Berlusconi, (July 2003) Strasbourg.

737 Comp. „Europe set off on the path of peace and fraternity" Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers.

Ferrero-Waldner, has been very active regarding the implementation of the Mediterranean Policy, the numbers do not suggest a statistical balance; however, this is not thematically relevant.

Concerning the analytical category “expression”, 89 statements corresponding to the Commission and 50 to the Council could be identified in the course of the discourse analysis. The statements concerning the “other” (Commission: 5 – Council: 3) show that the Commission addresses the “other” more often, very respectfully and positions itself with an explanatory, convincing discourse in order to calm the “other” regarding the European intentions (enlargement, Eastern policy). The Council does not refer to the other with concrete descriptions; the references rather concentrate on the association with each other. The discourse expresses the conviction to support the “other” regarding the European approach and, especially since 2008, forces the claim of a shared responsibility. In order to overcome dissociative elements within the partnership, the Commission (17 statements) discursively encourages associative relations by directly appealing to the participating countries, by referring to common ties or shared interests and experiences or by directly addressing dissociative issues. In the discourse among representatives of the European Council, dissociative elements are not associated with the “other” per se, but ascribed to the socio-economic situation. Hence, the discursive strategy further leads to an association by bridging the socio-economic concern via a direct advice regarding a shared “destiny”. Therewith, it can be concluded that the Commission follows a more direct approach on a co-operational level, while the Council focuses on establishing relations via the bonds of a common destiny. In respect of the perception of the Mediterranean Policy (Commission: 46 – Council: 38), the Commission mostly refers to the singularity and uniqueness of the political initiative and only in few occasions to missionary and visionary components of the discourse. The statements allocated to the representatives of the European Council also refer in their perception of the Barcelona Process to a certain pride and singularity. Although they exclusively ascribe its existence to European endeavours and give room to their conviction of its historic significance and need, the references also contain criticism, especially in the last years. The harshest criticism was, not surprisingly, expressed by Nicolas Sarkozy. Even if he aspired to push the French approach in the Mediterranean and challenged the unity of the European Union, his unmasked criticism was surprising. He explicitly mentioned the failures of the Barcelona Process and underlined the lack of partnership by demanding the predominance within the European approach. Concerning the last subcategory of this rubric, the “Mediterranean region”, 11 statements assigned to the Commission oppose 5 assigned to the European Council. While representatives of the Commission stress the challenge of defining a common identity by recalling on philosophers and humanists, the references of representatives of the Council link their perception of a Mediterranean region to the conception and wish of belonging together in order to “heal” the world.

In the second category “purpose” a total number of 80 statements (Commission: 47 – Council: 33) have been identified. Within the 25 statements which assess the purpose and the motivation for the Mediterranean Policy, the established discourse uses verbs like: combat, reinvigorate, increase, bring, work and expand. These are verbs of action, expressing the European motivation to assure security

and stability as it has repetitively been stated. The discourse of the representatives of the Commission also contains a component of self-motivation/ self-persuasion, which is expressed by applying phrases like “should continue working”, “forge new ways of working together” or “we need to” etc. In the same context, the discourse assigned to the European Council (22 statements) expresses the need of action in regard to its concern of the socio-economic situation and the wish to evolve something meaningful. The necessity is expressed by enhancing adjectives like “rapid”, “vital” and “important” or verbal constructions like “have to”, “need for”, “important to encourage”. Concerning the officially stated aim, the Commission (22 statements) stresses the cooperative character of the Barcelona Process and the improvement of the same by emphasizing the human and cultural aspect. The few references allocated to the Council (11 statements) refer to the commitment of the EU countries to the Mediterranean Policy and implicitly to the necessity to succeed.

Within the third category “identity” the total number of statements amounts 138, 91 on the Commission’s side and 47 on the Council’s side. The discourse by the representatives of the European Commission stresses on the one hand the political ambition of the EU by referring to its success and the proudness of the achievements. On the other hand, the discourse gives insight into the struggle of the European Union for a consistent policy orientation and the vision to build a new Europe, which was challenged in connection with the outcome of the Barcelona Process. The main difference of the Council regarding the Commission’s position is that there is not a single discourse or approach on the political ambition of the European Union. At this point the discourses contain a strong intergovernmental component, as the single representatives also express their positions, which is mostly acceptance. Regarding the commitment to the European policy, Austria and Germany expressed that they stand behind the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Finland is also convinced of the need for cooperation and Italy stresses the possibility for Europe to become a player on the world stage. While most countries back the European policy and just express national positions to a low degree, France caused a sever debate with its proposal to found a Mediterranean Union, on the principals Europe was found, just for countries bordering the Mediterranean. This provocative proposal inhered a strong fragmentation potential for the European Union. In respect to the history of the European Union, the separative forces, based on profound national interests, would be a study-worth undertaking for further research aspirations. For the present context it is meaningful as it illustrates the internal struggle of the European Union to gain a consistent and credible profile in its external relations. The statements, which refer to the role of the European Union in the Mediterranean, constitute a total number of 50 (Commission: 37 – Council: 13). The discourse of the representatives of the Commission describes the EU as a proactive, comprehensive and foreseeing power, acting on the base of a donor who disposes of knowledge advancement. In regard to a possible competitive position to the USA in the Mediterranean, the Commission expresses a precautious approach which suggests a cooperative attitude. The message stated by the representatives of the Council is decisive; Europe aspires to become a political heavyweight, which assumes responsibility, which can be equalised with mission, for its neighbours.

PUBLIC DISCOURSE

The public discourse constitutes the third analytical level of challenging the European discourse in the Mediterranean: the reception of the discourse. Journalists report and comment on the decisions and speeches of politicians representing European institutions. Therefore, the public discourse can be regarded as a public corrective because it evaluates certain happenings and then expresses agreement or disagreement about them. Thus, the analysis of the public discourse completes, from an analytical point of view, the empirical analysis proposed in the present work.

In order to provide the biggest possible sample of the European public discourse, articles of seven countries have been considered in this research undertaking. The selection of the countries is only based on my language skills, not on any further considerations. Although the historic key players of Europe, decisive Mediterranean countries and all German speaking countries, even Switzerland as not being a member state of the European Union, has been regarded, an extension of the analysis of the public discourse to other European countries, especially the Eastern countries or even Mediterranean No-Member Countries, would be an interesting and probably fructuous undertaking. The present analysis constitutes a first step and hopefully sets the path for further investigations.

The discourse within the considered countries is analysed by means of the previously assigned categories in order to provide the greatest possible comparability. Newspapers create publicity; they explain, comment or question certain happenings. Sometimes they concede their voice to politicians and intellectuals, working on the Mediterranean Policy, and to other people who are no professional journalists. In the present investigation, the focus is on the transmitted message to the public rather than on the person who has composed it. Concentrating on the authors of the messages would definitely be an interesting undertaking for further and more profound discourse analyses, but would be misleading for the actual research question.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

In the following chapter newspaper articles of Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland are assessed by means of the same methodological procedure as in the previous chapters. A special emphasis is placed on the identification of the sources, the context analysis in regard to the selected newspapers and, of course, to the discourse analysis itself.

XIX IDENTIFICATION OF THE SOURCES

The identification of the sources was based on several criteria to provide the greatest possible comparability of the sources. According to recent developments, especially the identification of the newspaper articles was throughout the entire work a necessary concern. The accessibility was mainly provided via internet and the online archives of the corresponding newspapers. Unfortunately, since 1995,

most archives do not provide articles. However, the following ways made it possible to overcome trans-national source collecting:

For the German speaking countries (A, CH, D) I received the generous support of the Salzburger Nachrichten; I was permitted to use this database for identifying and printing the newspaper articles. In the case of Spain and Italy, the online research offer was sufficient. This was only partly true for France; thus it was necessary to use paying-modalities or even to become a contemporary subscriber for using their archives. The selected British newspapers only offer parts of their articles for free; but thanks to the discourse analytical procedure, it is not necessary to possess the entire article as long as there is enough text which facilitates the identification of discourse relevant statements.

The area of interest for the public discourse analysis (A, CH, D, E, F, GB, I) demonstrates the necessity of a systematic search profile to be able to select relevant articles. Obviously, it is not possible to provide completeness among all published articles in the newspapers. Thus, the systematic search was based on certain key words which correspond to the topical interest. These were for example: Barcelona Process, Conference of Barcelona, Barcelona Declaration, Euro-Mediterranean, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Mediterranean Policy, Mediterranean Union, and compositions or slight deviations in the particular languages. In total, there have been 404 articles identified as relevant sources.

Country	Press	No. of Articles	Total
AUSTRIA	Salzburger Nachrichten	15	
	Presse	22	
	Standard	22	**59**
SWITZERLAND	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	26	**26**
FRANCE	Le Monde	25	
	Le Figaro	31	**56**
GERMANY	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	57	
	Süddeutsche Zeitung	21	
	die Welt	13	
	TAZ	9	
	Financial Times Deutschland	18	**118**
GREATBRITAIN	The Independent	10	
	The Guardian	19	**29**
ITALY	la Repubblica	25	
	Corriere della Sierra	37	**62**
SPAIN	el Mundo	22	
	el País	32	**54**
Total		**404**	**404**

At a first glance, Germany constitutes a statistical outlier, not only because of the higher number of newspapers, but also because of the great number of articles that have been considered. The decision to aim at the greatest possible coverage of opinion-forming quality papers in German speaking

countries is based on the facilitated access to the data-base of the Salzburger Nachrichten. The result of the apprehended chance produces a statistical deviation, but has no significant bias on the results of the discourse analysis because the main strains of the discourse remain the same by a higher number of statements. The only deviation concerns the number of details which can be taken into consideration.

Of the 404 newspaper articles which have been considered, 1152 statements could be identified as relevant for the established analytical categories:

Country	Articles	Statements
Austria	59	141
France	56	151
Germany	118	402
Great Britain	29	49
Italy	62	128
Spain	54	138
Switzerland	26	143
	404	**1152**

The distribution of articles and statements per country indicates several notable aspects regarding the number of articles and the quality of the statements. Remarkable is the fact that within the newspapers of two small countries, Austria and Switzerland, a similar amount of statements could be identified, but, compared to Austria, only half as many articles concerned the Mediterranean Affairs in the Swiss newspaper. A further comparison with Great Britain indicates a similar image, but with an even greater significance. Although Great Britain is one of the leading countries in the European Union and a similar amount of articles like for Switzerland was consulted, only a third of the statements could be evaluated as relevant. Another interesting matter concerns the relative counterbalance of articles and statements among the Mediterranean countries. The indicated balance leads to the assumption that concern and quality of the newspapers are comparable.

Among the selected countries several variants of the distribution of statements regarding the grouping of the countries offer several possible interpretations:

Possible distributions of statements

Options		No. Statements	Total
Variant 1:	MC	417	
	NMC	735	**1152**
Variant 2:	F,D,GB	602	
	E,I	266	
	A	141	
	CH	143	**1152**
Variant 3:	EU	1009	
	no - EU	143	**1152**

Variant 1 concerns the distribution of statements between the Mediterranean countries (MC), France, Italy and Spain, and the non Mediterranean countries (NMC), Austria, Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland. The relation of three countries (MC) compared to four countries (NMC) would preliminarily suggest a higher number of statements on the side of the NMC. However, the argument appears to be relative due to the fact that for Germany nearly as many statements have been identified as for the Mediterranean countries together. Variant 2 also delivers a quite surprising result. For France, Germany and Great Britain, all three political heavyweights in Europe, could only be as many statements identified as for the other countries together. Disregarding Germany, the combined French and British press only offered 200 statements, which is considerable less than in Italy and Spain or in Austria and Germany. Variant 3 illustrates the relation between statements belonging to member states of the EU compared to the non-member Switzerland. In this regard, the discourse represented by the Swiss press will be taken into special consideration.

XX CONTEXT ANALYSIS

The context analysis regarding the examination of the newspaper articles aims to provide an overview about the newspapers considered in the present work. The following table lists the selected media per country, refers to the year of the first publication, indicates the political inclination, provides numbers regarding the edition and states the editorial. Therewith, the major situational aspects in respect to the placing of the newspapers are provided[738]:

country	name of the newspaper	since	political inclination	edition		editorial
A	Die Presse	1848	conservative	(mid-year 08)	83.315	Styria Media AG
	Der Standard	1988	left-liberal	(mid-year 08)	76.775	Standard Verlagsgesellschaft
	Salzburger Nachtichten	1945	liberal (center)	(mid-year 08)	69.702	SN Verlagsgesellschaft
F	Le Monde	1944	left-liberal	05/06	353.000	Group La Vie-Le-Monde
	Le Figaro	1866 (daily)	liberal-conservative	2007	339.236	Socpresse-Verlag
D	Süddeutsche Zeitung	1945	moderate liberal	(IVW)3rdQ/08	457.353	Süddeutsche Verlag
	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	1949	liberal-conservative	(IVW)3rdQ/08	387.064	FAZ- Stiftung
	Welt	1946	conservative	(IVW)3rdQ/08	279.004	Axel Springer AG
	Financial Times Deutschland	2001	centre (ten.conservative)	(IVW)3rdQ/08	104.101	Gruner+Jahr
	Tageszeitung	1978	traditionally left	(IVW)3rdQ/08	53.964	die Tageszeitung Verlagsgenossenschaft

738 The data are taken from http://de.wikipedia.org, where a substantial overview on the data is provided per newspaper.

GB	The Guardian	1821	liberal (ten. conservative)	2005	380.000	Guardian News & Media Ltd.
	The Independent	1986	moderate liberal	2006	253.737	Independent News & Media
I	Corriere della Sera	1876	centre (ten.conservative)	2005	843.111	RCS Media Group
	La Repubblica	1976	moderate left-liberal	2005	636.577	Grupo editoriale L'Espresso
E	EL Pais	1976	left-liberal	2006-2007	560.176	Grupo Prisa
	El Mundo	1989	conservative	2006	330.634	RCS Media Group
CH	Neue Zürcher Zeitung	1780	liberal (ten. conservative)		147.000	Neue Zürcher Zeitung

The selection of newspapers is based on recommendations of an expert of the European newspaper scenery, namely Dr. Martin Stricker, who is a journalist and an expert for foreign policy affairs at the Salzburger Nachrichten. The main selection criteria for the newspapers concerned high coverage regarding opinion-forming and trans-national publicity. Additional attention was paid to a relative balanced assortment concerning the political inclination of the newspapers.

Among the seventeen selected newspapers range some of the eldest newspapers of Europe. The Swiss newspaper "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" (NZZ) was first published in 1780 and is one of the oldest newspapers in the German speaking ambit, the British newspaper "the Guardian" was first published in 1821 and the Austrian newspaper "die Presse" dates back to 1848. Of the considered newspapers seven were first published before and in 1945 and ten afterwards.

Concerning the edition, the ranking of the ten biggest newspapers would be: 1. Corriere della Sera (I), 2. La Repubblica (I), 3. El País (E), 4. Süddeutsche Zeitung (D), 5. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (D), 6. The Guardian (GB), 7. Le Monde (F), 8. Le Figaro (F), 9. El Mundo (E) and 10. die Welt (D). Therewith, all newspapers which have been considered of Mediterranean Countries range among the ten biggest newspapers regarding their edition.

To add a notable circumstance at the end of this chapter, the Italian newspaper "Corriere della Sera" and the Spanish "El Mundo" belong to the same editorial.

XXI Discourse analysis

The discourse analysis of the corresponding articles is carried out in the following chapters, which are alphabetically listed per country. The methodological procedure is applied upon the established analytical categories and related sub-categories. Subjected to the differing number of relevant statements, the remarks on the results of more than one sub-category can be summed-up under one heading. At the beginning of the analysis of each country, some facts about the individual characteristics of the country, the selected newspapers and the statistical information concerning the discourse will be given.

At the end of the chapter a detailed comparison of the discourses of the distinctive countries constitutes the conclusion. Further results, which are related to the present research-question, will be stressed in the final conclusion.

1 Austria

For the Austrian public discourse analysis three mayor newspapers have been considered: the Standard, the Salzburger Nachrichten (SN) and the Presse. Therewith, the political spectrum from left (Standard), liberal (SN) and centre right, conservative (Presse) has been covered. A quite equal amount of statements has been considered from each newspaper: Standard (49), Presse (49) and Salzburger Nachrichten (43):

AUSTRIA	**number of articles per category and newspaper**			
	Standard	**Presse**	**SN**	Total
Expression	20	26	21	67
Purpose	9	4	8	21
Identity	20	19	14	53
	49	**49**	**43**	**141**

From the total number of 141 statements, 67 were assigned to the analytical category "expression", 21 to "purpose" and 53 to "identity". The detailed distribution concerning the sub-categories is illustrated in the following table:

AUSTRIA	**number of statements per category**				
	the "other"	ass./diss.	mmr	mmpol	total
Expression	2	22	5	38	**67**
	purpose	aim			
Purpose	10	11			**21**
	EU				
Identity	53				**53**

The distribution of statements per year shows the following pattern:

AUSTRIA	**Distribution of the statements per category and year**														
	95	**96**	**97**	**98**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	Total
Expression	13		2	4	2			5		4	7	1	3	26	67
Purpose	11		1					2		1			1	5	21
Identity	8		2	2	1			5		1	1		4	29	53
Total	**32**		**5**	**6**	**3**			**12**		**6**	**8**	**1**	**8**	**60**	**141**

The years 1995, 2002 and 2008 constitute culminations concerning the number of statements considered in the present analysis. Hence, 1995, the initiation year, 2002, the year after the terror attacks in the United States, and 2008, the year when Nicolas Sarkozy set the path for the revival of the Barcelona Process by founding the Mediterranean Union, constitute significant moments in the reporting of the Mediterranean Affairs.

1.1 Discourse analysis – Expression

The analyses of the statements which refer to the analytical category "expression" are basically the same as in the previous chapters. In case it is not misleading for the thematic approach, statements of the subcategories can be assembled if there are only few statements.

1.1.1 The view of the "other", associative/dissociative elements of the partnership

While there are few statements which refer to the "other" and few associative elements, there are numerous statements which concern dissociative elements within the European Policy in the Mediterranean.

Statements which explicitly refer to a view of the "other" are rare in the Austrian press. The earliest reference can be found in the Standard in 1995. It insinuated that the MNC countries, which originally had considerable concerns about the European initiative, *only assisted because of the announced bonus*[739]. Therewith, the journalist refers to a problem which can be found time and again throughout the entire Barcelona Process. Another problem is addressed with the second reference to the "other", when describing that *many representatives of the partner countries have not been elected democratically and that their political, unionised or human rights opponents are rather imprisoned than consulted for dialogue*[740]. These statements refer to distinctions among the partners and demonstrate the sensitiveness of the diplomatic undertaking of the Barcelona Process.

In the discourse of the Austrian press there are only few associative references. One concerns the fact that the whole initiative is *based on a mutual interest to succeed. The South does not refrain from the offered money and the north hopes for more stability*[741]. While this statement concerns the outcome of the Barcelona Process, the other one refers to a more practical matter, which indicates an implicitly stated associative element. In 1995, the Presse commented on the facts that *Barak and Jassir Arafat emphasised that they are convinced to continue the peace process in the Middle East and that the, in Barcelona, accorded paths should be implemented. Another success was achieved in the relations between Israel and Mauritania, which acknowledged each other*[742]. The integrative character of the Barcelona Process in offering countries that are in conflict with each other, a diplomatic frame for dialogue is probably one of the most outranging successes. Nevertheless, this success may not be one-

739 Comp. „Dass sie trotz solcher Bedenken nach Barcelona kamen, liegt an der ausgelobten Prämie (...)" Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard.

740 Comp. „Andererseits ist unübersehbar, dass es die neue Organisation auf der südlichen Mittelmeerseite mit Partnern zu tun hat, von denen viele weder demokratisch gewählt noch repräsentativ für ihre Länder sind und ihre politischen, gewerkschaftlichen und menschenrechtlichen Gegner eher hinter Gitter bringen, als mit ihnen Gespräche zu führen" Hahn, (14.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

741 Comp. „Beide Seiten sind am Erfolg interessiert. Der Süden will auf die angebotenen Gelder nicht verzichten, der Norden hofft auf mehr Stabilität" Stackl, (29.11.1995) Standard.

742 Comp. „Barak und PLO-Chef Jassir Arafat betonten, sie seien entschlossen, den Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten fortzusetzen. Die in Barcelona vereinbarten Schritte sollten "in vollem Umfang umgesetzt" werden. Einen Erfolg gab es auch in den Beziehungen zwischen Israel und Mauretanien, die einander anerkannten." Krotky, (29.11.1995) Presse.

sided examined, the conflictive relations, especially between the Palestinian Authorities and Israel, are often the reason for difficult outcomes of the Ministerial Meetings. For instance, this is demonstrated by a recent reference in the Presse, stating that *Israel and Palestine strongly disagreed in the concluding text on the terminology "national state" in the context with Israel*[743].

From the beginning of the Barcelona Process there are explicitly stated contentious issues by the Austrian press on the level of dissociative elements. The press commented on the outcome of the Conference in Barcelona in 1995 that the controversial subjects concerned the handling with *democratic freedoms and that the aspired free-trade area should imply the agrarian products*[744]. The latter was a special concern of Egypt and Syria[745]. Another conflictive issue, which dominated the Mediterranean relations from its very beginning, concerns the definition of terrorism. Already in 1995, *the Arabian Delegation did not agree on the suggested definition of terrorism because it would not have guaranteed the Palestinian self-determination and its right to continue the fight for its own state*[746]. Although there were considerable differences concerning the definition of terrorism the declaration of Barcelona was signed[747]. That signing of a concluding statement of a conference may contain strong dissociative tendencies and even challenge the continuity of the Barcelona Process, as a reference in the Salzburger Nachrichten in 1997 suggested. It was stated that *with the justification "the need to bring something home", Arabian Foreign Ministers demanded an annex in the conclusions of Malta, stating that one-sided initiatives of violating international conventions have to be desisted. The Arabian Ministers were irritated that the EU countries agreed on this behalf but did not accept the annex in the conclusion of the meeting*[748]. Even ten years after the launch of the Barcelona Process *the concerns about terrorism have not diminished*[749] and the *struggle of a commonly accepted definition of the term terrorism is as conflictive as ever, especially because the European countries do not want to distinguish between*

743 Comp. „(…) gerieten einander Israel und die Palästinenser in die Haare. Es spießte sich im Text an dem Wort "Nationalstaat" im Zusammenhang mit Israel. Dies bereite Schwierigkeiten für die Rückkehr palästinensischer Flüchtlinge nach Israel." Editorial, (14.07.2008) Presse.

744 Comp. „Wichtige Streitpunkte waren die Forderung nordafrikanischer Länder, die Garantie demokratischer Freiheiten von deren "legitimen Ausübung" abhängig zu machen (für die EU unakzeptabel), sowie der Wunsch des Südens, die kommende Freihandelszone solle auch Agrarprodukte beinhalten." Stackl, (28.11.1995), Standard.

745 Comp. „Ägypten, das eben so ein Abkommen aushandelt, wehrte sich gegen den EU-Vorschlag, Agrarprodukte vom Freihandel auszunehmen." Stackl, (28.11.1995), Standard and „Insbesondere Ägypten und Syrien drängten nach Angaben von Diplomaten darauf, daß der Wegfall der Handelshemmnisse bei der Einrichtung der geplanten Freihandelszone im Jahr 2010 auch für landwirtschaftliche Produkte gelten müsse" Editorial, (28.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten.

746 Comp. „Arabische Delegationen waren mit dem Formulierungsvorschlag über die Terrorismusbekämpfung nicht einverstanden, weil er das Recht der Palästinenser auf Selbstbestimmung und auf die Fortsetzung des Kampfes für einen eigenen Palästinenserstaat nicht garantiere" Editorial, (28.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten.

747 Comp. „Trotz Differenzen (...) ist am Dienstag eine Schlusserklärung unterzeichnet worden" Krotky, (29.11.1995) Presse.

748 Comp. „Mit der Begründung, "etwas mit nach Hause bringen zu müssen", verlangten arabische Außenminister in der Schlußerklärung von Malta einen Zusatz, daß einseitige Initiativen zur Verletzung internationaler Abmachungen unterlassen werden sollten. Die Betreiber dieser Ergänzung wunderten sich sehr darüber, daß EU-Länder dies zwar auch sagten, aber nicht in der Erklärung haben wollten." Arens, (17.04.1997) Salzburger Nachrichten.

749 Comp. „Die Terrorsorgen scheinen nach zehn Jahren nach Beginn der ersten Mittelmeer- Konferenz („Barcelona-Prozess") keineswegs geringer geworden zu sein" Schulze, (28.11.2005) Salzburger Nachrichten.

"good" and "bad" terrorists[750]. These issues include a dynamic so that summits *could fail on old conflicts and new quarrels*[751].

Another sensitive topic concerns the *regulation of the migration flows, where the North and the South have different interests*[752]. In this regard, the European concern is explicitly expressed by the Presse in 1998: *The real threat of a mass immigration does not menace from the eastern, but the southern border where the per-capita income mount just a twelfth from the European's and the discrepancy is continuously rising*[753].

The politicians continue with their policy in the Mediterranean although there is the awareness that *conflicts can not be solved by projects, it is to hope that with the realisation of concrete actions some barriers can be overcome*[754], as the Salzburger Nachrichten quoted the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. This approach demonstrates the will to overcome dissociative issues in order to implement more associative elements.

1.1.2 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

The statements, which refer to the Mediterranean Policy, concern either a definitional approach, a reference to its functionality or an evaluation of the policy.

In regard to the definition of the Mediterranean Policy, journalists of the Standard described the *Barcelona Process as a big political impulse,* which *can be compared to the Helsinki Conference in 1975 because it also offers great chances*[755]. At another time the Barcelona Process was denominated as *promising instrument*[756], standing for the huge expectations which are repetitively expressed. Concerning the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union, journalists describe the French approach as a *diplomatic Club Mediterranée*[757] or an *exclusive club*[758]. When the proposal was implemented with the

750 Comp. „(…) Streit um eine gemeinsame Definition des Terrors (…). Die Europäer wollen diese Unterscheidung zwischen "guten und schlechten Terroristen", wie es ein EU-Diplomat nannte, nicht hinnehmen." Schulze, (28.11.2005) Salzburger Nachrichten.

751 Comp. „Doch dann drohte der Gipfel an altem Streit und neuem Zank zu scheitern." Eberling, (29.11.2005) Salzburger Nachrichten.

752 Comp. „Auch bei der Regelung der Migrationsströme sind die Interessen von Süd und Nord nicht völlig parallel." Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard.

753 Comp. „Denn die wahre Gefahr der Massenimmigration droht der Union nicht von ihrem östlichen, sondern von ihrem südlichen Rand, wo das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen gerade ein Zwölftel des EU-Durchschnitts beträgt - und diese Schere geht stetig weiter auf" Kraus, (24.09.1998) Presse.

754 Comp. „"Konflikte werden durch Projekte nicht behoben. Das war ja leider beim Barcelona-Prozess schon so", räumte Ferrero-Waldner bei der Präsentation des Konzepts im EU-Parlament ein. Sie hofft aber, dass durch die Verwirklichung konkreter Vorhaben so manche Barriere überwunden werden kann" Stoiber, (26.05.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

755 Comp. „(…) ein "großer politischer Impuls" vom Kaliber der Helsinki-Konferenz 1975,(…)" and „Trotzdem bietet der in Barcelona eingeleitete Prozess ähnlich große Chancen, wie sie die Helsinki-Konferenzen für Osteuropa hatten." Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard.

756 Comp. „(…) Barcelona-Prozess (…) ein vielversprechendes Instrument" Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard.

757 Comp. „(…) diplomatischen 'Club Méditerranée' " Brändle, (11.07.2008) Standard.

758 Comp. „Ursprünglich als exklusiver Club geplant" gs, (14.03.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

support of the other European countries, the public voices quoted *Angela Merkel who stated that the Child will be called Mediterranean Union*[759] and spoke of a *historic*[760] event.

The finality and function of the Barcelona Process is referred to quite distinctly over the years. In the beginning, in 1995, the Salzburger Nachrichten stated that *the EU is confident that the reached involvement of the people in the south can improve their economic situation*[761]. In the following years the opinions are more critical. Thus, the Presse quoted that *the Barcelona declaration was signed at a moment when everyone was optimistic regarding the peace process. Today* (meaning 1998), *such a declaration would fall through. Neither the Arabs nor Israel would agree on it*[762]. In the consecutive year the Standard quoted George Joffe, who stated that the *Barcelona Process was only introduced to keep the North African countries on distance to the EU*[763]. Another statement of 2002 implicitly implied the European purpose of the European Union: *Who enhances the economic development, the evolvement of a civil society and the cultural exchange not only protects himself from the immigration flows of the southern Mediterranean, but possibly brings the partners closer to each other – in a long-term perspective maybe also with Israel*[764]. Although these statements illustrate a critical approach regarding the European Policy in the Mediterranean, they also express hope and expectations. Ambivalent positions are also expressed in respect of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. The Presse stated on the one hand that *despite the intention of the Barcelona Process, the economic gap between both sides of the Mediterranean increased to a considerable degree;* on the other hand, it was conceded that *without such a partnership the situation would probably be even worse*[765].

In 2008, the Presse quoted the Slovenian EU-President Janez Jansa, who assured that *the Barcelona Process will not be replaced*[766], but rather *up-graded*[767]. With the implementation of the Mediterranean Union the statements refer not as critical as expected to the vision, which especially the French President Nicolas Sarkozy attempted to transmit. The Standard, for instance, stated *that the Mediterranean*

759 Comp. „[Merkel] "Das Kind soll Mittelmeerunion genannt werden" Vieregge, (04.03.2008) Presse.

760 Comp. „Historisch“ Hahn, (13.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

761 Comp. „Dennoch ist die EU zuversichtlich, daß die in Barcelona erzielte "Einbindung" den Menschen an der Südflanke bessere wirtschaftliche Perspektive bieten kann“ Editorial, (29.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten.

762 Comp.“ Die Barcelona-Erklärung wurde zu einem Zeitpunkt unterschrieben, als alle voller Hoffnung für den Friedensprozeß waren. Heute könnten wir sie nicht mehr abschließen. Weder die Araber noch Israel würden sie mittragen“ Kraus, (24.09.1998) Presse.

763 Comp. „Der 1995 begonnene "Barcelona-Prozess" diene lediglich dazu, die nordafrikanischen Länder von der EU abzuschotten“ Adams, (18.10.1999) Standard.

764 Comp. „Wer die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, den Aufbau einer Zivilgesellschaft und den demokratischen Austausch fördert, schützt nicht nur sich selbst vor Strömen von Immigranten aus dem südlichen Mittelmeerraum. Er bringt vielleicht auch seine Partner untereinander näher - längerfristig sogar mit Israel“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard.

765 Comp. „Seit Beginn der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft vor zehn Jahren unter dem Namen "Barcelona-Prozess" ist die wirtschaftliche Kluft zwischen beiden Seiten des Meeres gewachsen“ and „Trotzdem sprechen die Diplomaten nicht von einem Scheitern des Barcelona-Prozesses: Ohne die angeschobene Partnerschaft zwischen den beiden Regionen, die ja nun weiter mit wirtschaftlicher und politischer Hilfe ausgebaut werden soll, "wäre die Situation wohl noch schlimmer" Schulze, (29.11.2005) Presse.

766 Comp. „Wir ersetzen keineswegs den Barcelona-Prozess, wir erweitern ihn nur", sagte Jansa“ Editorial, (14.03.2008) Presse.

767 Comp. „Es ist ein Upgrade des Barcelona-Prozesses", so beurteilte der slowenische EU-Präsident Janez Jansa die neue Mittelmeer-Union“ Pöll, (15.03.2008) Presse.

peoples should, how Sarkozy full-bodied explained it, realise a "dream of peace and civilisation"[768]. The Salzburger Nachrichten just quoted the French Foreign Minister, who stated that a dream for 800 million people is becoming true. The Presse, on the other hand, regarded the French idea as a big dream, which is able to change the world, but stated in the same context that it is to prove whether the Mediterranean Union is just a new edition of the Barcelona Process or something new indeed. The reception of the finality and function of the Mediterranean Policy was ambivalent. The reporting concentrated on current events, quotes critical point of views and referred to the potential and expectations which lie within this policy. However, the press voices transmitted the impression that the Barcelona Process was not tangible and aloof of reality.

More concrete are the references evaluating the Barcelona Process. The few positive arguments are opposed by numerous critical ones. A positive statement on the Barcelona Process was reported by the Standard in 2002, which *quoted Gunnar Wiegand, the spokesman of the EU Foreign Minister Chris Patten,* who stated that *it is a main achievement of the Barcelona Process that it has overcome each Middle East Crisis since 1995*[769]. Another positive evaluation was stressed in connection with the discussion of the Mediterranean Union in the Salzburger Nachichten in 2007: I*f the Mediterranean Union as independent consortium is necessary still has to be proved. After all, many ties across the Mediterranean have been established thanks to the Barcelona Process*[770]. Among the other references, some claims on the Barcelona Process contain a positive connotation. One of them was expressed in 2008 concerning the discussion of the Mediterranean Union: *the Barcelona Process ought to remain the lynchpin of the Mediterranean Policy of the twenty-seven countries*[771]. Another aspect was stressed by the Salzburger Nachrichten in respect of the summit in Paris in July 2008. It stated that *if the Mediterranean Union aspires to become more than the Barcelona Process, the real work begins only now*[772]. Although the basic tenor remains critical, the statements contain the perspective of a positive outcome.

In the very beginning of the Barcelona Process, the result of the conference in Barcelona was very critically commented: *The summit in Barcelona will not change anything of the dissent regarding the human rights among the participating countries, it will not take the security in the Middle East area one step further, it will not reach a footstep towards the apparently aspired free-trade zone, and in regard to bridging – for instance between a secular world here and a world, where religion and state*

768 Comp. „Die mediterranen Völker des Mittelmeeres sollen, wie er vollmundig erklärt, einen "Traum von Frieden und Zivilisation" verwirklichen" Brändle, (11.07.2008) Standard.

769 Comp. „[Gunnar Wiegand, der Sprecher von EU-Außenkommissar Chris Patten] Es ist eine der Haupterrungenschaften des Barcelona-Prozesses, dass er seit 1995 noch jede Nahost-Krise überstanden hat" Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard.

770 Comp. „Ob die "Mittelmeerunion" als eigenständiger Zusammenschluss überhaupt notwendig ist, muss sich freilich erst noch erweisen. Immerhin sind dank des 1995 begonnenen "Barcelona-Prozesses" der EU bereits zahlreiche Bande über das Meer geknüpft worden, (…)" Schulze, (22.12.2007) Salzburger Nachrichten.

771 Comp. „Doch der Barcelona-Prozess müsse "Dreh- und Angelpunkt" der Mittelmeer-Politik der 27 bleiben" as/pra, (14.03.2008) Standard.

772 Comp. „Wenn die Mittelmeerunion mehr werden soll, als es der "Barcelona-Prozess" war, der 13 Jahre lang ein Schattendasein führte - wenn sie mehr bieten soll als einen ehemaligen großen und internationalen Auftrieb, dann beginnt die eigentliche Arbeit der Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten erst jetzt" Hahn, (14.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

come even closer –,information campaigns and tolerance are required and not big conferences, where results never exceed the so-called "atmospheric gain" and beforehand written conclusions[773]. Therewith, a positive outcome was more than questionable in the perception of the Austrian press. Over the following years the tonality in the Austrian press was reserved, almost distant. The descriptions stated that *the Barcelona Process has stagnated*[774] and *never gained momentum*[775] or *that a lot within the Barcelona Process proceeds only tenaciously*[776]. *Due to a lack of results, the Barcelona Process was also regarded as etiquette of failure*[777]. Additionally, the Presse stated that *the Foreign Ministers regarded the Barcelona Process as dead, but this did not impede them to revive it hectically after the terror attacks in New York in 2001*[778]. In almost the same manner, severely questioning the policy so far, a journalist of the Presse asked in July 2008 *if the Mediterranean Union is just a neat version of the Barcelona Process*[779].

The Austrian Press perceives the European Mediterranean Policy quite critically and often does not take it seriously. The Barcelona Process is conceded as a positive objective, but the realistic outcome is perceived very critically.

1.1.3 References to a Mediterranean region

In the Austrian press, the references to a Mediterranean region contain a connotation, which implies a conflictive conception. Thus, the statements referred to a southern *Mediterranean region which has evolved to a point of attraction for potential terrorists*[780] or which continuously *develops to a frontier between the poor and the rich world*[781]. The latter statement was underlined by a quote of Josep

773 Comp. „Der Gipfel in Barcelona hingegen wird nichts an den "Meinungsunterschieden" einiger Teilnehmer in Sachen Menschenrechte ändern; er wird nicht einen Beistrich im Bereich Nahost-Sicherheit weiterbringen; er wird nicht einen Schritt in Richtung angeblich angestrebter "Freihandelszone" setzen; und was den Brückenschlag betrifft - etwa zwischen einer säkularisierten Welt hier und einer, in der Verschmelzung von Staat und Religion immer drängender wird -, da braucht es Aufklärung und Toleranz mehr als Großkonferenzen, deren Ergebnis nie über den sogenannten "atmosphärischen Gewinn" und vorher festgeschriebene Schlußerklärungen hinausgeht" Schwarz, (27.11.1995) Presse.

774 Comp. „(…) um einen Versuch, den ins Stocken geratenen "Barcelona-Prozess" zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten neu zu beleben, (…)" as/pra, (14.03.2008) Standard.

775 Comp. „(…) "Barcelona Prozess". Das Programm kam nie richtig in Schwung, (…)" gs, (14.03.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

776 Comp. „Vieles geht nur zäh voran im Barcelona-Prozess" Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard.

777 Comp. „(…) braucht der Barcelona-Prozeß aber dringendst Erfolge, um das Etikett "Mißerfolg" loszuwerden" Kraus, (24.09.1998) Presse.

778 Comp. „Fünf Jahre später wurde er von den EU-Außenministern für "tot" erklärt, was diese aber nicht daran hinderte, ihn 2001 nach den Anschlägen in New York hektisch wieder beleben zu wollen" Rohrer, (17.03.2004) Presse.

779 Comp. „Ist die Mittelmeer-Union nur eine behübschte Version des Barcelona-Prozesses?" Pöll, (15.03.2008) Presse.

780 Comp. „Die südliche Mittelmeerregion hat sich - seit 1999 auch mit starker finanzieller Hilfe Saudi-Arabiens - trotz (oder wegen) aller Repression der Regime dort zum Anziehungspunkt für potentielle Terroristen entwickelt" Rohrer, (17.03.2004) Presse.

781 Comp. „Das Mittelmeer wird immer mehr zu einer Grenze zwischen der armen und der reichen Welt" Schulze, (29.11.2005) Presse.

Borell, the designated president of the European Parliament, who stated in 2005 that *the Mediterranean is nowadays the world's biggest frontier of inequality*[782].

In the Salzburger Nachrichten, the Mediterranean was described as *the place where two civilisations clash, the rich Europe and the, in comparison, poor North Africa, Christianity and Islam and where it is necessary to work together for peace*[783]. Also the Standard referred to the high sensitiveness of the region, implying the potential of conflict; it described the Mediterranean *as an extremely sensitive gateway*[784].

At this point it is doubtable whether this conflictive connotation of the Mediterranean is an inherent position of the Austrian perception; it is to assume that beside the conflicts, which might belong to the reporting of Mediterranean Affairs, it has proceeded to the stylistic description of the journalists.

1.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose

The statements which have been assigned to the analytical category "purpose" distinguish between the purpose of the Barcelona Process, which is perceived externally, and the officially stated aim of the policy.

1.2.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy

In the Austrian newspapers the references concerning the purpose of the Barcelona Process are linked to the European fear of insecurity, namely the immigration issue.

In 1995, on the occasion of the Conference in Barcelona, the Standard stated that although *it is not said aloud in Barcelona, it is the purpose of the rich North to establish a barrier against the flood of immigrations*[785]. The Salzburger Nachrichten quoted the Spanish King Juan Carlos I, *who expressed his conviction that with the meeting in Barcelona a crucial challenge, the unity of the Mediterranean, is targeted in the interest of the future generations*[786]. It was further added that *the purpose of this initiative is to stop mass-emigration and the militant Islamic fundamentalism*[787]. The press reported that *in Barcelona, where the politicians aim to demonstrate unity concerning the issues peace, stability and*

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782 Comp. „'Das Mittelmeer ist heute weltweit die größte Grenze der Ungleichheit', bilanziert Josep Borrell, Präsident des Europaparlamentes" Schulze, (29.11.2005) Presse.

783 Comp. „Dort, wo zwei Zivilisationen zusammenstoßen, das reiche Europa und das vergleichsweise arme Nordafrika, Christentum und Islam, müsse gemeinsam für den Frieden gearbeitet werden" Schulze, (22.12.2007) Salzburger Nachrichten.

784 Comp. „Die Mittelmeerunion sei eine wichtige Initiative an einer "überaus sensible Schnittstelle" der Weltpolitik, (…)" Brändle/Moravec, (14.07.2008) Standard.

785 Comp. „In Barcelona wird es nicht laut gesagt, aber dem reichen Norden geht es darum, Barrieren gegen eine Flut von Einwanderern zu errichten" Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard.

786 Comp. „Der spanische König Juan Carlos sagte zur Eröffnung der zweitägigen Beratungen, er sei überzeugt, dass mit dem Treffen eine entscheidende Aufgabe im Interesse der künftigen Generationen angepackt werde: die Einheit des Mittelmeer-Raumes" Editorial, (28.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten.

787 Comp. „Damit könnte die Massenemigration gestoppt und dem militanten islamischen Fundamentalismus auf Dauer der Nährboden entzogen werden" Editorial, (28.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten.

economy and let the cultural bridging appear very simple[788], it is the purpose *to encourage the development in the South via economic reforms and the planned free-trade area and to stop the flood of immigrants to Europe*[789]. Although there is a triple partnership, in a political, economic and social sense, formulated as a goal, the statements of the following years continue to refer to the threats which are perceived in Europe. Hence, the Standard stated in 2002 that *the finality of the Barcelona Process is to enhance the economic and political development in the southern Mediterranean non member countries, not least because of the fear of the immigration flows from this region towards the North*[790]. In 2008, it said that *among the prior-ranking purposes of the Barcelona Process ranges the combat against illegal immigration, terrorism and criminality as well as the enhancement of economic development in the partner countries*[791]. In total, *the main aim is to prevent wars*[792], as stated in the Salzburger Nachrichten.

Therewith, within the Austrian press the European intention of the Barcelona Process is clearly linked to the perceived threats from Europe.

1.2.2 About the officially stated aim

The statements which refer to the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy are less explicit regarding the European purpose and demonstrate the officially alleviated versions. Thus, the aims of the Barcelona Process are:

- *to establish a Euro-Med-free-trade-zone with 800 million inhabitants*[793]
- *to initiate a peace process*[794]
- *to encourage peace and prosperity*[795]
- *to conclude association agreements*[796]

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788 Comp. „Jetzt also Barcelona, wo sich die Staaten der Europäischen Union mit (nicht allen) Mittelmeeranrainern treffen, um Einigkeit über Sicherheit, Stabilität und Wirtschaft zu demonstrieren und nebst her den kulturellen Brückenschlag wie einen Klacks aussehen zu lassen“ Schwarz, (27.11.1995) Presse.

789 Comp. „Der Norden setzt den Akzent dafür auf die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte des Treffens: Bis zum Jahr 2010 soll ein Freihandelsabkommen die Grenzen der Mittelmeerstaaten für intensiven Austausch öffnen. Daraus soll dann die Entwicklung des Südens folgen, die der Flut von Einwanderern nach Europa Einhalt bieten kann“ tau, (27.11.1995) Presse.

790 Comp. „[BP] Sein Ziel ist, die wirtschaftliche - und politische - Entwicklung in den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten zu fördern - nicht zuletzt auch aus Angst vor Migrationsströmen aus der Region in Richtung Norden“ Wojahn, (28.02.2002) Standard.

791 Comp. „(…) Barcelona Prozess (…), zu dessen vorrangigen Zielen die Bekämpfung von illegaler Zuwanderung, Terrorismus und Kriminalität sowie die Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in den Partnerländern zählen“ Moravec, (11.03.2008) Standard.

792 Comp. „(...) und es gelte, Kriege zu verhindern“ Schulze, (22.12.2007) Salzburger Nachrichten.

793 Comp. „(…), soll ebenfalls einen Prozeß einleiten, der bis zum Jahr 2010 eine Euro-Med-Freihandelszone mit 800 Millionen Einwohnern bringen soll“ Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard.

794 Comp. „Die EU-Mittelmeerkonferenz solle dagegen einen Friedensprozeß auslösen“ Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard.

795 Comp. „(…) Verabschiedung einer Deklaration zur Förderung von Frieden und Wohlstand sowie des Planes der Errichtung einer Freihandelszone bis zum Jahr 2010 (…)“ Editorial, (29.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten.

796 Comp. „Bis zum Jahr 2010 ist die Schaffung einer euro-mediterranen Freihandelszone geplant. Unabhängig davon sollen mit den 12 eingeladenen Ländern EU-Assoziierungsverträge abgeschlossen werden“ Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard.

- *to change many economic, social and cultural aspects to the better*[797]

In the discussion of the Mediterranean Union the discourse in the press also varied. Thus, the Standard stated that *the Mediterranean Union has ambitious plans, like building a highway from Morocco to Egypt or the ecological decontamination of the Mediterranean Sea*[798]. The Salzburger Nachrichten reported that *the plans of the Mediterranean Union are immense*[799]. It further stated that *the dream*, referring to the diction of Nicolas Sarkozy, *foresees a joint decontamination of the sea, an intensification of the entrepreneurial cooperation and that the main threats of internal security, such as uncontrolled migration, drug traffic and terrorism are faced together*[800]. The Presse, on the other hand, just stated that it *is the aim to revive the stagnated Barcelona Process*[801].

The officially stated aims are taken as they are, namely as a make-up for the public. Criticism is expressed, and not too less, in the context of the Mediterranean Policy.

1.3 Discourse analysis – Identity

The statements allocated to the analytical category identity refer by some means or other to the European Union because it is the aim to challenge its identity, both in the context of its political side, its internal struggle and its role perception.

1.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition and internal struggle

There are many distinctive references to the political approach of the European Union; moreover, nearly the same amount of references can be found that manifest the internal struggle which Europe experiences in the context of Mediterranean Affairs.

At the beginning of the Barcelona Process the Standard referred to *a European vision of a common economic space for 800 million consumers*[802], while the Salzburger Nachrichten postulated that *the European Union pays for its vital interest concerning stability at its entry door with a transfer of billions and the opening of its markets. On the other hand, the EU assures itself a better economic acces-*

797 Comp. „Ihr Projekt der Euromed-Kooperation soll wirtschaftlich, sozial, kulturell und damit auf lange Sicht auch politisch in den Staaten südlich des Mittelmeeres manches zum Besseren verändern“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard.

798 Comp. „Die (…) Mittelmeer-Union hat ehrgeizige Pläne. Eine Autobahn von Marokko bis Ägypten zählt ebenso dazu wie die ökologische Sanierung des Mittelmeers, (…)“ Moravec, (21.05.2008) Standard.

799 Comp. „Die Pläne der "Union für das Mittelmeer", (…), sind gewaltig“ Stoiber, (26.05.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

800 Comp. „Der "Traum" sieht vor, dass die Anrainerstaaten sich gemeinsam um die "Entgiftung" des Meeres kümmern werden, dass sie ihre unternehmerische Zusammenarbeit intensivieren und dass sie gemeinsam gegen die vermeintlich größten Gefahren für die Innere Sicherheit kämpfen werden: unkontrollierte Migration, Drogenhandel und Terrorismus“ Hahn, (13.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

801 Comp. „(...) ein Versuch, den ins Stocken geratenen "Barcelona-Prozess" zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten neu zu beleben“ Editorial, (13.03.2008) Presse.

802 Comp. „Europa setzt dem die Vision eines gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraumes für 800 Millionen Verbraucher entgegen“ Stackl, (29.11.1995) Standard.

sion and continuous energy supply[803]. A political vision with concrete intentions is expressed by these two newspapers. The Presse accentuated its criticism regarding the implementation of the policy. Thus, it stressed the opinion *that big conferences happen more often when insufficient results are deplored and suggests that, even if it is not altruistic, small conferences would be more efficient*[804]. This argument was underlined by a quote of the Parisian Professor Kebabdjian, who *attests the European concept a lack of ideas*[805].

Therewith, the Austrian public discourse certified the European Policy in its initial phase not only a lack of ideas, a spare outcome and a marginal form of implementation, but also a concrete intention. In the upcoming years, the public opinion in Austrian did not change notably. In 1998, the Presse stressed that *the denomination "fortress Europe" is not willingly applied, neither internally nor externally; notwithstanding, it is the fear of migrations flows from poor neighbouring countries which is the motor behind many initiatives - this is explicitly demonstrated in the Barcelona Process*[806] and that *within the EU nobody cherished the illusion of its efficiency*[807]. Therefore, the Presse attested the European vision a rejection in terms of lack of commitment and motivation to succeed with the proper policy. In 2004, a similar position was stated: *one has forgotten how many people hope that the Barcelona Process makes a start; if the European Union did not tranquilise itself with some million of Euros, one would have been more decisive regarding the entry of radicals in Europe*[808]. A lack of initiative and a lack of consciousness about the own policy was also stressed by the Standard in 2008 in the context of the Mediterranean Union: *a new project including new institutions will be launched in Europe, although many member states do not know the sense of the cause*[809]. The new policy direction is attested *a pompous staging, but with a lot of improvisation behind the scenery*[810].

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803 Comp. „Die EU bezahlt ihr vitales Interesse an Stabilität vor der Haustür mit einem Milliardentransfer und einer Öffnung seiner Märkte. Andererseits sicherte sich die EU verbesserten wirtschaftlichen Zugang und laufende Energieversorgung" Editorial, (29.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten.

804 Comp. „Es hat den Anschein, als fänden internationale Großkonferenzen umso häufiger statt, je eindringlicher ihre mangelnden Ergebnisse beklagt werden (...)Nun ist fraglos das Bemühen Europas, vor allem in Nahost den Wirtschaftsaufbau zu puschen, ein hehres (wenngleich nicht selbstloses), das in kleineren Konferenzen weit effizienter vorangebracht wird" Schwarz, (27.11.1995) Presse.

805 Comp. „Für (…) Pariser Professor Kebabdjian aber beweist das Konzept nur Ideenarmut: ‚Es gibt kein europäisches Projekt für die armen Völker, die sich an Europas Türen drängen.'" tau, (27.11.1995) Presse.

806 Comp. „Das Schlagwort von der "Festung Europa" wird nirgends gerne gehört - weder innerhalb der EU noch außerhalb. Dennoch aber ist die Angst vor Migrationswellen aus armen Nachbarländern die treibende Kraft hinter vielen Initiativen der Gemeinschaft - und dies zeigt sich nirgends deutlicher als im "Barcelona-Prozeß", (...)" Kraus, (24.09.1998) Presse.

807 Comp. „Trotz dieses Vertrauensvorschusses für den Barcelona-Prozess macht sich aber auch in EU-Kreisen niemand Illusionen über die Wirksamkeit dieses Instruments für den Frieden in Nahost" Kraus, (24.09.1998) Presse.

808 Comp. „Dort hat man vergessen, wie viele Menschen darauf hofften, dass der Barcelona-Prozess in Gang kommt. Hätte sich die EU nicht selbst mit ein paar Millionen Euro beruhigt, wäre man gegen das Einsickern der Radikalen nach Europa entschlossener vorgegangen" Rohrer, (17.03.2004) Presse.

809 Comp. „Ein neues Projekt samt neuer Institution wird in der EU aus der Taufe gehoben, ohne dass den meisten Mitgliedstaaten der Sinn der Sache klar wäre" as/pra, (14.03.2008) Standard.

810 Comp. „Eine pompöse Inszenierung, hinter den Kulissen aber viel Improvisation: (…)" Moravec/Brändle, (14.07.2008) Standard.

Concerning interior European tendencies, two statements, which refer to the interest of a single Member State, have been identified in regard to the Barcelona Process. It was reported that *Spain wanted to use its EU-Presidency to realise its project of a EU-Mediterranean cooperation and that in 2002 it was worried about the success of the efforts*[811]. This demonstrates nothing less than that Spain claims to be the initiation force for the Barcelona Process.

The references, which indicate the distinctive positions of the member states regarding the Mediterranean Policy, were especially numerous in the discussion of the Mediterranean Union, because it provoked a trial of strength, particularly between France and Germany. *During its EU- Presidency, France wants to organise a foundation summit in Marseilles in 2008 in order to overtake the so-called Barcelona Process of the EU*[812]. Therewith, it was implicitly stated that France wanted to establish its own Mediterranean Policy which apparently provoked certain reactions. *The French idea of an exclusive club of Mediterranean States failed due to Germany*[813]. The dissent about the French solo attempt was not harmed by the fact that Sarkozy was supported by Italy and Spain and that the Spanish President Zapatero tried to calm the other states, saying that the proposal *comes from the EU and serves the EU*[814]. The Standard stated quite unvarnished *that in reality the fifty-three year old Frenchman dreams of becoming a great power and that it is his purpose to position his country better internationally by means of the Mediterranean Union*[815]. *Due to the pressure of Berlin, Sarkozy had to curtail his proposal considerably*[816]. The quarrel concerning the direction of the Mediterranean Policy comprised a strong fragmentation potential and, according to the stated view in the Austrian press, the internal struggle for a common position and the limitation of the European Union were clearly manifested. Thus, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel accomplished that all European Member States are able to participate in the Mediterranean Union. The Presse quoted Angela Merkel, saying that *Europe has become more complicated and that it is not sufficient anymore that Germany and France agree on certain issues. However, if they disagree it will be difficult in Europe to reach an agreement*[817]. Sa-

811 Comp. „Dennoch bangen die Spanier, die 1995 in Barcelona das Projekt der EU-Mittelmeerkooperation auf den Weg gebracht hatten, dieses Mal um den Erfolg ihrer Bemühungen“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard.

812 Comp. „Frankreich will während seiner EU-Ratspräsidentschaft im Juli 2008 in Marseille einen Gründungsgipfel der Mittelmeer-Union organisieren und damit wohl den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess der EU überholen“ Editorial, (24.01.2007) Standard.

813 Comp. „Sarkozy verfolgte zunächst die Idee eines exklusiven Clubs der Mittelmeer-Staaten, was Deutschland aber ablehnte (...)“ as/pra, (14.03.2008) Standard.

814 Comp. „‘Mittelmeerunion‘ heißt das politische Projekt von Nicolas Sarkozy, dem sich nun in einem gemeinsamen "Aufruf von Rom", der italienische Ministerpräsident Romano Prodi und Spaniens Regierungschef José Luis Zapatero angeschlossen haben. Aber dieses Vorhaben löst bei manchen nördlichen EU-Mitgliedern nicht wenig Argwohn aus“ and „Die Initiative, so beruhigt Spaniens Ministerpräsident Zapatero die Zweifler, "kommt aus der EU und dient der EU" Schulze, (22.12.2007) Salzburger Nachrichten.

815 Comp. „In Wahrheit hegt der 53-jährige Franzose vor allem Großmachtträume. Mit der Mittelmeerunion will er sein Land international besser positionieren“ Brändle, (11.07.2008) Standard.

816 Comp. „(…) musste Sarkozy sein Vorhaben besonders auf Druck Berlins gewaltig zusammenstreichen“ gs, (14.03.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

817 Comp. „[Merkel] "Europa ist komplizierter geworden, und es reicht nicht mehr aus, dass Deutschland und Frankreich etwas vereinbaren. Aber wenn beide Länder sich nicht einig sind, wird es in Europa schwierig, eine Einigung zu bekommen“.“ Vieregge, (04.03.2008) Presse.

kozy also admitted that *Europe can not afford a disagreement between Germany and France*[818]. These examples tell more about the real power of the national states and the limitations of Europe than any other statement. So, *Germany prevailed over France, but complied in the denomination of the revived Barcelona Process*[819]. Although other European politicians, like the *Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer warned that the Union for the Mediterranean must not become a separate event to the Barcelona Process*[820], and *Jean Claude Junker expressed his doubt by stating that it still needs to be proved which surplus value the Mediterranean Union might have over the Barcelona Process*[821], the Austrian press concordantly reported on the diplomatic victory of Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris. For example, the Salzburger Nachrichten stated that *at the foundation summit of the Mediterranean Union in Paris Sarkozy achieved something that appeared to be impossible for a long time: after overcoming all barriers within Europe, he united nearly all Heads of State of the Mediterranean ambit and the European Union*[822].

Although the Austrian press is quite critically regarding European initiatives in the Mediterranean, and reports the internal struggle unvarnished, the tonality concerning the French breath to achieve its ambitions has the aftertaste of being impressed.

1.3.2 The role of the European Union

The European Union is perceived as being not proactive enough and weak, which is indicated by the following statements:

- *The European Union must not longer ignore that there is a time bomb ticking beyond the Mediterranean Sea* [823].
- *If the project is not to remain a "fata morgana", the EU must be ready to open their markets to the South*[824].

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818 Comp. „[Sarkozy] "Europa kann sich keine Kluft zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich leisten"." Vieregge, (04.03.2008) Presse.

819 Comp. „Merkel setzte sich in der Sache durch, fügte sich aber bei der Namensgebung" Vieregge, (04.03.2008) Presse.

820 Comp. „Bundeskanzler Gusenbauer warnte, die "Union für das Mittelmeer" dürfe keine "Separatveranstaltung" werden" Editorial, (13.03.2008) Presse.

821 Comp. „[Jean-Claude Juncker] Man müsse sehen, welchen Mehrwert eine "Mittelmeer-Union" im Vergleich zum bestehenden Barcelona-Prozess in der Zusammenarbeit der Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten habe" Editorial, (13.03.2008) Presse.

822 Comp. „Keine Frage: Nicolas Sarkozy hat am Sonntag in Paris einen diplomatischen Erfolg davon getragen. Mit dem Gründungsgipfel der Mittelmeerunion ist ihm etwas gelungen, was lange unerreichbar zu sein schien: Nachdem er die (hohen) Hindernisse innerhalb der Europäischen Union überwunden hatte, hat er fast alle Staats- und Regierungschefs des Mittelmeerraums plus jene aus den EU-Ländern zusammengebracht" Hahn, (14.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

823 Comp. „Die EU darf nicht länger ignorieren, dass jenseits des Mittelmeers eine "Zeitbombe" tickt" Egger, (05.04.1997) Salzburger Nachrichten.

824 Comp. „Wenn das Projekt keine Fata Morgana bleiben soll, muß die EU aber auch bereit sein, ihre Märkte für den Süden zu öffnen" Stackl, (29.11.1995) Standard.

- *The EU can not reach a quick peace between the Israelis and the Arabs. To do so, it is too weak externally*[825].
- *Although there is no military threat, the situation in the Mediterranean states is highly significant for the European domestic security. After all, Europe depends on the raw material supply of its southern neighbours.*[826]

The last mentioned statement indirectly forces the European Union to become more active. A more explicit example of a mission demand was expressed in an article, published in the Salzburger Nachrichten, which stated that *progress only can be facilitated in combination with democracy and therefore the Mediterranean Union ought to strengthen the civil societies in the South and involve them in the process*[827]. Whether correct or incorrect, the thought remains euro-centric because it implies that via knowledge and experience one knows what to do. Can the European way to guarantee and assure democracy be applied to the Islamic world, which corresponds to another reality and other dynamics?

On the other hand, Europe is ascribed an initiator role. The Standard quoted Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who *stressed that the most important issue is the achievement of giving a crucial regional initiative new political impetus*[828]. Also the former Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik *referred to the numerous instruments that Europe disposes in the Mediterranean*[829].

2. France

France not only belongs to the strong political forces within Europe, it also constitutes a decisive player in Mediterranean Affairs, even more since the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy.

The newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro are supra-national quality papers, which represent both the centre-left (Le Monde) and the centre-right (Le Figaro). In total, 151 statements have been considered, 80 of them can be assigned to le Monde and 71 to le Figaro. This indicates that the distribution per newspaper is quite even:

825 Comp. „Die EU kann zwischen Israelis und Arabern nicht den schnellen Frieden schaffen. Dazu ist sie außenpolitisch viel zu schwach“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard.

826 Comp. „Es drohe zwar keine militärische Gefahr, doch die Verhältnisse in den Staaten des Mittelmeerraumes seien von großer Bedeutung für die innere Sicherheit Europas. Immerhin sei Europa von den Rohstofflieferungen der südlichen Nachbarn abhängig“ Adams, (18.10.1999) Standard.

827 Comp. „Doch Fortschritt kann immer nur in Kombination mit Demokratie funktionieren. Deswegen muss die Mittelmeerunion darauf bestehen, die Zivilgesellschaften im Süden zu stärken und in den Prozess einzubeziehen“ Hahn, (14.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten.

828 Comp. „Ferrero-Waldner: Das Wichtigste ist, dass es uns jetzt gelungen ist, eine ganz wichtige regionale Initiative mit einem neuen politischen Impuls zu versehen“ Standard Interview, (11.07.2008) Standard.

829 Comp. „Eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit den Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten außerhalb der EU ist sicher wünschenswert. Aber um das zu erreichen, hat die EU bereits eine Reihe von Instrumenten wie die Nachbarschaftspolitik und den Barcelona-Prozess“ Moravec, (11.03.2008) Standard.

FRANCE	number of articles per category and newspaper		
	le Monde	**le Figaro**	Total
Expression	41	37	78
Purpose	10	6	16
Identity	29	28	57
	80	**71**	**151**

From the total amount of statements, the majority refers to the analytical category "expression" (78), followed by "identity" (57) and "purpose" (16). The detailed illustration including the sub-categories is shown in the following table:

FRANCE	number of statements per category				
	the „other"	ass./diss.	mmr	mmpol	total
Expression	4	8	12	54	**78**
	purpose	aim			
Purpose	7	9			**16**
	EU				
Identity	57				**57**

The distribution of the statements per year indicates the following pattern:

FRANCE	distribution of the statements per category and year														
	90	**95**	**97**	**98**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	Total
Expression	2	6		1	3	14	1	4	3	6	17		3	18	78
Purpose		3			1	3			1	1	4			3	16
Identity	4	1	1		1	5			5	5	4		10	21	57
total	**6**	**10**	**1**	**1**	**5**	**22**	**1**	**4**	**9**	**12**	**25**		**13**	**42**	**151**

The peak years concerning the number of considered statements are 1995, 2000, 2005 and, above all, 2008; 1995 was the initiation year, 2000 was the year when Marseilles hosted the conference of the Foreign Ministers, 2005 was the tenth anniversary and 2008 was the year when France dominated the events taking place within the scope of the Barcelona Process.

2.1 Discourse analysis – Expression

Within the French press 78 statements could be assigned to the analytical category "expression". They refer to the "other", to associative and dissociative forces within the partnership and to the Mediterranean region; additionally, they indicate the public perception of the Mediterranean Policy.

2.1.1 The view of the "other", associative/dissociative elements of the partnership

Only few of the statements dealing with one of these sub-categories explicitly refer to the "other"; most of the statements concern associative and dissociative elements of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. This is the reason why both are conjointly regarded.

An associative statement, which was stressed in November 1995 in le Monde, is the following: *The Europeans, particularly France, argued that the new partnership does not pretend to become a new forum for the advancement of peace between Israelis and Arabs; these assurances were necessary, as, for one part, Syria and the Lebanon would not have assisted peace negotiations and, for the other part, in order to reassure the United States, which perceived the conference in Barcelona as a competing initiative. This precaution was also necessary to guarantee the long-term project a minimum of success*.[830] The associative character lies in the considerateness concerning the tensions among the participants and the external relations. Foresightedness is one of the basal requirements to assure a fructuous cooperation.

Dissociative forces repetitively occur in the context of national moods. The most cited example constitutes Libya, which follows a kind of a hot-cold policy towards the European Union and its Mediterranean approach. It occurred in 2000 that *Libya officially announces to boycott the Euro-Mediterranean conference and appeals to other Arab countries to follow its example*[831]. In 2003, it was stated that Gaddafi anew *expressed his refusal with ostentation because he was the only one who did not applaud after the speech of Chirac; in this speech, Chirac stressed the providential circumstance of France to be able to establish a relation of confidence with Libya*[832]. Libya is up to now the only country which has continuously, but temporarily varying in its decisiveness, rejected the European approach towards cooperation. Another example was reported in 2000 in le Figaro, when a *Turkish representative stressed that in reality the only and unique goal of Turkey constitutes the integration into the European Union*[833]. The distinctive national motivations for participating or not participating in the Barcelona Process are numerous and legitimate, but they indicate dissociative forces. In 1995, le Monde quoted an *Algerian representative* under the premise to accept his opinion as true that *most countries in the southern Mediterranean were looking for the highest possible benefit of the new cooperation*

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830 Comp. « Les Européens, la France en particulier, disent sur tous les tons que ce nouveau partenariat ne vise pas à s'ouvrir un nouveau forum pour favoriser l'instauration de la paix israélo-arabe. Ces assurances étaient nécessaires, d'une part pour que la Syrie et le Liban dont les négociations de paix avec Israël n'avancent pas acceptent de venir, et d'autre part pour rasséréner les Etats-Unis, qui voyaient dans la conférence de Barcelone une initiative concurrente de la leur. Cette précaution était aussi nécessaire pour garantir un minimum de succès à un projet à long terme » Naim, (28.11.1995) Le Monde.

831 Comp. « Alors que la Libye a officiellement annoncé hier qu'elle boycottait la conférence euro-méditerranéenne (Euromed) et a appelé les pays arabes à ne pas y participer (…) » Oualalou, (13.11.2000) Le Figaro.

832 Comp. « Le colonel Khadafi s'est à nouveau distingué en refusant de s'exprimer et en étant le seul à ne pas applaudir le discours du président Chirac qui venait d'exprimer le souhait de la France 'de pouvoir établir une relation de confiance avec la Libye' » Rousselin, (06.12.2003) Le Figaro.

833 Comp. « 'Notre principal but, pour ne pas dire unique, c'est l'intégration à l'Union européenne', affirme Cavit Dagdas, secrétaire d'État au Trésor turc » Bele, (17.11.2003) Le Figaro.

with the European Union[834]. The fact that the interest decreased over the years was indicated by the low participation of Arab countries at the anniversary conference in 2005. Some argued that this was *the fault of the British presidency*[835], others stated that the *general indifference*[836] reached an impressive level.

In 2008, when the revitalisation of the Barcelona Process was commonly decided, le Monde stated that *the perspective of peace in the Middle East has moved far away and that the prosperity gap between the North and the South has increased*[837]. This clearly points out that the dissociative forces are far from being diminished and that they will give source to further individual national concerns.

2.1.2 References to a Mediterranean region

The French press is concerned with the tangibility of the Mediterranean; this is proved by the number of statements which could be identified in this context.

The discourse illustrates the struggle for a definition and the continuous effort to relate the Mediterranean to France. In 1990, five years before the Barcelona Process was launched, le Monde stressed that *if the Mediterranean is the garden of Europe, there will be no security in the common house, if there is no security in the garden*[838]. Further*, the Mediterranean today is not much larger than the Rhine and the occidental basin constitutes a huge basis of employment; the demographic, economic, social and cultural development in the Maghreb renders more and more our dependency*[839]. Thus, already before the initiation of the Barcelona Process and the establishment of the Euro-Mediterraneann paradigm, the French press dealt with the conception of the Mediterranean. This did not change in the early years of the Barcelona Process. In 1999, Le Figaro stated that *the Mediterranean is a paradox place, which separates and unites at the same time through wars and exchange*[840]. The same article referred to *Amin Maalouf*, an Egyptian journalist and author living in Paris, who *perceives that in the Mediterranean two principal lines, which fracture the word, coincide: "The line which separates the industrial world from the third world, and the line which separates the Occidental-Christian world from the*

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834 Comp. « S'il est vrai, comme l'a souligné un diplomate algérien, que chaque pays du sud et de la Méditerranée voit midi à sa porte et cherche à bénéficier au maximum de cette nouvelle coopération avec l'UE » Bole/Naim, (30.11.1995) Le Monde.

835 Comp. « Ce premier sommet de l'histoire du partenariat euro-méditerranéen lancé en 1995 à Barcelone a été entaché par le faible niveau de représentation arabe et marqué par les frictions entre pays européens. Ces tensions ont été avivées du fait de la conduite des travaux par la présidence britannique, jugée particulièrement rigide par plusieurs délégations, ont indiqué plusieurs sources » Editorial, (28.11.2005) Le Monde.

836 Comp. « Ce qui est encore plus impressionnant dans ce naufrage, c'est qu'il se produit dans une indifférence quasi générale »Fabre, (03.12.2005) Le Monde.

837 Comp. « Les perspectives de paix au Proche-Orient se sont éloignées. Les écarts de richesse entre le Nord et le Sud se sont accrus » Beaugé, (12.07.2008) Le Monde.

838 Comp. « Si la Méditerranée est le jardin de l'Europe, il n'y a pas de sécurité pour la « maison commune » s'il n'y pas de sécurité dans le jardin » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Figaro.

839 Comp. « La Méditerranée n'est pas beaucoup plus large aujourd'hui que le Rhin. Son bassin occidental constitue de fait un seul et même gigantesque bassin d'emploi. L'évolution démographique, économique, sociale et culturelle du Maghreb nous en rend de plus en plus dépendants » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde.

840 Comp. « La Méditerranée est un lieu paradoxal qui sépare et rassemble à la fois un nœud de guerres mais aussi d'échanges » Larminat, (29.07.1999) Le Figaro.

Arabian –Muslim one"[841]. The description of *Miguel Nadal, the Spanish Minister for European Affairs, was quoted in le Figaro: The Mediterranean continues to be a sea of division rather than a sea of integration*[842]. Therewith, the dissociative character, which is often stressed in the context of the Mediterranean, also plays a role in the French press.

Other statements concern the visionary and fateful connotations which are mostly expressed by politicians; however, they are published by the newspapers and therefore form part of their discourse.

Le Monde published the perception of the Mediterranean *of Chris Patten*, European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs between 1999 and 2004: *It is mare nostrum, a sea between countries, a matrix of grand civilisations, a place of exchange and division with the South*[843]. The most flaming speech about the fateful connotation of the Mediterranean was held by Nicolas Sarkozy. It was stated by le Monde that he largely exaggerated the challenges: *it is there, where we win or loose everything*[844]. In 2008, le Monde quoted from Sarkozy's discourse, stating that he is *right that the 'clash of civilisations' menaces the rapprochement between the North and the South*[845]. In addition, the French Foreign Minister was given the voice in le Monde in 2008, stating that *the Mediterranean is in the centre of all huge problems of this century; development, migration, peace, dialogue among civilisations, access to water and energy, environment, climate change: it's in the south of Europe where our future is put at stake*[846].

In summary, it can be stated that the discourse within the French press concerning the Mediterranean region is predominated by political voices, using the media to transport the fateful connotation of the Mediterranean in order to create a positive public atmosphere for the legitimation of their policy.

2.1.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

Statements regarding the European Mediterranean Policy within the French press concern both, definitional references and evaluative statements.

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841 Comp. « Elle concentre deux de principales lignes de fracture du monde, explique Amin Maalouf : « La ligne qui sépare le monde industrialisé des pays du tiers-monde, et la ligne qui sépare l'Occident chrétien du monde arabo-musulman. » » Larminat, (29.07.1999) Le Figaro.

842 Comp. « « La Méditerranée continue à être une mer de divisions plutôt qu'une mer d'intégration » a admis le ministre espagnole des Affaires européennes, Miguel Nadal »Gelie, (23.04.2002) Le Figaro.

843 Comp. « Elle est mare nostrum, mer à l'intérieur des terres, matrice de grandes civilisations, lieu d'échange et ligne de partage avec le Sud » Patten, (14.11.2000) Le Monde.

844 Comp. « Et le président français de dramatiser l'enjeu : « Ici [en Méditerranée], nous gagnerons tout ou nous perdrons tout. » Beaugé/ Ridet, (25.10.2007) Le Monde.

845 Comp. « M. Sarkozy a souligné avec raison, dans son discours de Tanger, en octobre 2007, que le monde méditerranéen n'a pas cessé, depuis des siècles, d'être « écartelé » entre « l'esprit des croisades » et « l'esprit du dialogue ». Aujourd'hui, les divisions, voire les haines, l'emportent sur les solidarités. Le « choc des civilisations » menace le rapprochement entre le Nord et le Sud. Le Sud lui-même est déchiré. Le conflit israélo-palestinien est l'expression exacerbée de ces discordes, dont la persistance a fait échouer les précédents efforts de coopération » Ferenczi, (21.03.2008) Le Monde.

846 Comp. « La Méditerranée est au cœur de toutes les grandes problématiques de ce début de siècle. Développement, migrations, paix, dialogue des civilisations, accès à l'eau et la énergie, environnement, changement climatique : c'est au sud de l'Europe que notre avenir se joue » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde.

The definitions range from an unemotional description like *another of the economic and political programmes*[847] to the ironic comparison of an *economic manna*[848], or simply to an *innovative process*[849], an *ambitious project*[850], *an original initiative*[851] and, to the truly outstanding accomplishment that it *constitutes the only space of cooperation where Israel and Arab countries meet*[852]. The singular character concerning the political cooperation level between Israel and the Arab countries is repetitively stated: the Barcelona Process *constitutes the only institutional frame which permits Israelis and Palestinians to meet*[853]. It was further stated in this article of 2005 that *the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership defines an ambitious and also coherent policy; it is based on intense economic, political, historic and cultural ponds, which have the aim to advance the common project of development and cooperation*[854]. At the time of the summit in Paris, the Mediterranean Union was regarded as *Union, which will be a multilateral partnership based on the shared political will to revitalise the efforts to transform the Mediterranean into a space of peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity*[855]. The quoted statement of Bernard Kouchner, saying that the summit of Paris constituted an *historic success*[856] was at least not differently commented by the French press. There was a positive tenor about the French success in respect of the high participation of Heads of State in July 2008: *for the first time, all the countries bordering the Mediterranean have been united at a summit; from the forty-four invited Heads of State, forty-one turned up*[857]. W*ith the exception of the Libyan president Mummer Al- Gaddafi all accepted the French invitation* [858]. Beside these statements, there were only few positive evaluations of the European Mediterranean Policy. The only notable fact, which was at least partly positive, concerned

847 Comp. « Le processus de Barcelone (…) outre des programmes économiques et politiques (…) » Marminat, (29.07.1999) Le Figaro.

848 Comp. „le partenariat euro-méditerranéen reste essentiellement perçu comme une manne économique » Barluet, (30.11.2005) Le Figaro.

849 Comp. « (...) le processus se veut novateur » Tuqoui, (26.11.1995) Le Monde.

850 Comp. « (...) annonçant l'ambitieux projet d' « un partenariat global » euro-méditerranéen (…) » Cressard, (15.11.1998) Le Monde.

851 Comp. „Une initiative originale voyait enfin le jour : le partenariat euro-méditerranéen » Fabre, (03.12.2005) Le Monde.

852 Comp. « (…) la Conférence euro-méditerranéenne reste le seul espace de coopération où l'on puisse à la fois rencontrer Israël et les pays arabes » Gelie, (23.04.2002) Le Figaro.

853 Comp. « Barcelone constitue le seul cadre institutionnel permettant aux Israéliens et aux Palestiniens de siéger ensemble » Patrie, (15.03.2005) Le Figaro.

854 Comp. « Le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen, (…) définit une politique ambitieuse mais fondamentalement cohérente, en s'appuyant sur l'intensité des liens économiques, politiques, historiques et culturels, afin de faire avancer un projet commun de développement et de coopération » Charrette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro.

855 Comp. « (…) l'Union sera « un partenariat multilatéral » basé sur « une volonté politique partagée de revitaliser les efforts visant à transformer la Méditerranée en un espace de paix, démocratie, coopération et prospérité » Nougayrède/Ricard, (12.07.2008) Le Monde.

856 Comp. « Kouchner) (…) le sommet sera un « succès historique » » Nougayrède/Ricard, (12.07.2008) Le Monde.

857 Comp. « (…) pour la première fois, tous les pays riverains de la Méditerranée sont regroupés dans un sommet. Sur 44 chefs d'État de gouvernement conviés, 41 devraient être présents » Nougayrède/Ricard, (12.07.2008) Le Monde ; and also « Pour la première fois de l'histoire de la Méditerranée, une quarantaine de pays de l'Union européenne et de la Méditerranée se rassemblent le 13 juillet à Paris au plus haut niveau, représentés par leur chef d'État ou gouvernement » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde.

858 Comp. «Les chefs d'État ou de gouvernement de touts les pays d'Europe et du pourtour méditerranéen ont accepté l'invitation française à l'issue de difficiles tractations. Tous, à l'exception du dirigeant libyen Mouammar Kadhafi » Oberlé, (13.07.2008) Le Figaro.

the matter that *despite the conflicts, the cooperation continued*[859]; in other words, it had *survived*[860]. D*espite these undeniable difficulties, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership had not died*[861].

However, the overall tenor attested the Barcelona Process a meagre result:

- *The difficulty of the project is decisive for its ambition.*[862]
- *The Barcelona Process is basically a failure in regard to its initial ambitions (...).*[863]
- *[Anniversary] The evaluation is at least ambiguous*[864].
- *The results of the Euro-Med are rather meagre*[865]*; the balance can be judged as very meagre*[866].
- [Conference in Marseille, after the Paris Summit in 2008] *In three months nothing, or nearly nothing, has advanced.*[867]

Beside the latter, the most engrained criticism concerned a comment in le Monde in 2000, when it was stated that only 26% of the provided European funds have been triggered.[868] Therewith, two fundamental successes within the Mediterranean initiative have been assigned server, and comprehensible, critics. The first concerns the success of bringing nearly all Heads of State together in order to revitalise the cooperation and until the meeting in Barcelona, three months later there are hardly any visible advancements? This falls severely back on the credibility of the renewed Mediterranean initiative. The second concerns another fundamental achievement, namely the provision of a multi-billion fund in order to implement the accorded programs and only 26% have been accessed? This resembles severe structural problems within the institutional setting of the Barcelona Process. Both critiques concern crucial and therefore vital issues of the European approach.

The particular French perception of the Mediterranean Policy, based on the statements of the two newspapers, is quite distant and unemotional; surprisingly, this is also true at the time, when the French president pretended a change of the course of the Mediterranean Policy for the benefit of the French national interests. It seems as if the French Mediterranean policy has been introduced from above with no further consequences among the public. In general, the policy is critically perceived, but at the same time steps towards a cultural approximation are benevolently considered.

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859 Comp. « Pendant le conflit, la coopération continue » Gelie, (23.04.2002) Le Figaro.

860 Comp. « (…) « processus de Barcelone » (…) peut se targuer d'un résultat positif : avoir survécu » Gelie, (23.04.2002) Le Figaro.

861 Comp. « Malgré ces difficultés indéniables, le Partenariat euroméditerranéen n'a pas succombé » Charrette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro.

862 Comp. « La difficulté du projet est à la mesure de son ambition » Naim, (28.11.1995) Le Monde.

863 Comp. « Le processus de Barcelone est globalement en échec au regard de ses ambitions initiales » Zecchini, (17.06.2003) Le Monde.

864 Comp. « De part et d'autre, on reconnaît aujourd'hui que le bilan est pour le moins mitigé » Ferenci, (27.11.2005) Le Monde.

865 Comp. « …le bilan d'Euromed est plutôt maigre » Beaugé, (12.07.2008) Le Monde.

866 Comp. « (…) le bilan peut être jugé comme trop maigre » Patrie, (15.03.2005) Le Figaro.

867 Comp. « En trois mois, rien, ou presque, n'a avancé » Barluet, (04.11.2008) Le Figaro.

868 Comp. « Le bras séculier du processus de Barcelone est le programme communautaire MEDA. Son premier exercice couvrait la période 1995-1999, et son application a été exécrable : seuls 26% des aides ont été effectivement versés aux intéressés. » Zecchini, (17.06.2003) Le Monde.

2.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose

The statements which refer to the analytical category "purpose" indicate the motivation behind the Barcelona Process and the officially stated aim. Interestingly, the discrepancy within the French discourse is minimal.

The purpose and the officially stated aim of the European Mediterranean Policy

The most explicit reference to the purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy was stated five years before the launch of the Barcelona Process. The following security concern was expressed: *the immigration which accrues from the Mediterranean countries will, without any doubt, increase and evolve more severe problems for the French internal policy; and for the other part, the menace of fundamentalism could evolve a zone of instability, insecurity, and even hostility at our southern frontiers*[869]. In the same article it was stated that *there is no future for the "Grand Europe"; it will be only simple "Europe" if peace, security, economic and social developments, respect of the human rights, democratic ideals and cultural identity will not be assured in the Mediterranean*[870]. These are the only references which indicate an unmasked motivation of the European Union to establish a Mediterranean Policy, like the Barcelona Process. From the moment of its initiation, the discourse in this context is quite general. It underlines the outstanding ambition of the initiative and repeats the European intention to promote peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. Thus, it was reported in 1995, for instance, that *the ambitions are immense*, namely *to counterbalance the relations between the European Union and the South*[871]; or some years later it was stated that *the objective* of the Barcelona Process *constitutes the reduction of the fosse between the two shores of the Mediterranean*[872]. Additionally, Bernhard Kouchner expressed the intention of the Barcelona Process in le Monde in 2008 as follows: *the idea is evident, namely to finally reconcile the two shores of this sea, which is at the same time united and divided by thousands of historical battles and nowadays confronted with the same hopes and dangers; the idea is evident and that is its grandeur*[873].

Within the discourse in the French newspapers the officially stated aim does not differ explicitly. The statements are kept even more general and refer to the ambitions of all three baskets of the Barcelona Process, which concern *politics and security, economy with the perspective of the creation of a free-*

869 Comp. « L'immigration en provenance de ces pays va sans doute accroître et poser à la France des problèmes de politique intérieure de plus en plus graves. D'autre part, la menace de l'intégrisme peut créer à nos frontières sud une zone d'instabilité et insécurité, sinon d'hostilité » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde.

870 Comp. « Il n'y a pas d'avenir pour la „Grande Europe", qui est tout simplement « l'Europe », si la paix et la sécurité, le développement économique et social, le respect des droits de l'homme, des idéaux démocratiques et des identités culturelles ne sont pas assurés en Méditerranée » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde.

871 Comp. « Son ambition est immense : rééquilibrer les relations de l'Union européenne vers le Sud » Tuquoi, (26.11.1995) Le Monde.

872 Comp. « L'objectif : réduire le fossé entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée avec pour horizon, en 2010-2012, l'instauration d'une vaste zone de libre-échange » Oualalou, (13.11.2000) Le Figaro.

873 Comp. « Le projet pour la Méditerranée (…) L'idée est évidente : réconcilier enfin les deux rives de cette mer, unies et déchirées par mille soubresauts de l'histoire, aujourd'hui confrontées aux mêmes espérances et aux mêmes dangers. L'idée est évidente et c'est là sa grandeur » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde.

trade-zone until 2010, and social, cultural and human matters with the idea to approach the different cultures and societies[874].

Although mainly implicitly expressed, the purpose and the officially stated aim of the European Union in the French press suggest further motivations than the mentioned ones. The security concern, which is masked by a discourse enhancing the terminology of peace and stability, can equally be perceived as the implicit wish to change the Mediterranean region according to the European convictions, even if based on international standards.

2.3 Discourse analysis – Identity

In total, 57 references could be assigned to the analytical category "identity". They refer to the political ambition of the European Union, indicate a certain role-perception in the Mediterranean and stress the internal forces within the European Union.

2.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition

Few statements explicitly treat the political ambition or the European role perception. Implicitly, however, there are numerous references. Interestingly, the French press concedes within its discourse quite a lot space to references dealing with a possible Mediterranean identity.

Five years before the Barcelona Process was launched le Monde stressed the importance of a European Mediterranean policy by *demanding a sustained apprehension of an entity of a Euro-Mediterranean space and stressed the need to gradually found a common policy, based on political, demographic, economic and cultural principals, which is powerful enough to form an essential element in the necessitated equilibrium in order to defend peace and liberty in the world*[875]. It was further stated that *the European engagement in the Mediterranean is essential for the proper future and that for France this challenge is vital*[876]. This indicates that the awareness of the necessity of a coherent Mediterranean Policy had to be aroused within the European consciousness and that France defended its position in this regard.

Shortly before the conference in Barcelona took place, the fateful linkage between the two shores of the Mediterranean was stressed. *If the European countries have an interest in the development of a zone of peace and wealth, the enterprises follow different objectives*, but in any case, *the outcome has an effect on the future of the countries in the South and therefore also on the neighbours in the*

874 Comp. « (…) politique et de sécurité ; économique, avec en perspective la mise en place d'une zone de libre-échange à l'horizon 2010 ; social, culturel et humain, avec l'idée de rapprocher les cultures et les sociétés » Fabre, (03.12.2005) Le Monde.

875 Comp. « Il faut au-delà des discours, concevoir effectivement comme une entité l'espace euro-méditerranéen. Il faut fonder peu à peu un ensemble politique, démographique, économique, et culturel assez puissant pour former un élément essentiel des grands équilibres nécessaires à la défense de la paix et de la liberté dans le monde » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde.

876 Comp. «Au contraire, il s'agit pour l'Europe du Sud d'obtenir de l'Europe tout entière qu'elle prenne conscience de ses responsabilités vis-à-vis du monde méditerranéen et de ce que l'avenir de la Méditerranée est essentiel à son propre avenir. Pour la France, l'enjeu est vital » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde.

North[877]. Although the European initiative per se is positively regarded, as stressed beforehand, the criticism about the European procedure is characteristic. On the one hand, the tardiness of Europe is postulated. *The slowness of the European Union to relate with the people and to provide the promised assistance for the concerned countries is chronic*[878], as it was stated by le Monde in 2000. Le Figaro stressed the same criticism in 2004, stating that *the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is a long-term project for the European Union, which is based on solidarity rather than mistrust and confrontation*[879]. The whole initiative is considered *very encouraging and is perceived as a proof of the significance of the southern countries for Europe; this is why it is essential not to disappoint them and that we must consequentially pass to a higher velocity*[880] concerning the progress. Beside this tardiness, which is regarded as a structural problem, further criticism concerns the factual significance of the Mediterranean for the European Union: *the difficulties of the European Union to revive the partnership fortifies the impression that Europe is tired of defining the desirable relations with its neighbours*[881]. In the same context, le Figaro expressed even more accentuated that *the Euro-Mediterranean Policy, which is limited in numerous ways and currently (2004) of little efficiency, is reproached to focus too often on the security approach, to provide unequal financial instruments for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the MNC, and to have a lack of an adequate political organisation, including a permanent secretary for the administration of the Euro-Mediterranean concerns, which makes all dependent on the EU's administration; eventually, the partnership is predominated by the Eurocentric vision, the centre dominates and the neighbouring countries remain in the periphery*[882]. Here, it was repetitively referred to the possibility that Europe might forget about the Mediterranean in the context of its enlargement policy[883] or its engagement in the East[884].

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877 Comp. « De fait, si les États européens ont intérêt à la création d'une zone de paix et de prospérité au sud du continent, les entreprises poursuivent des objectifs différents. Pourquoi investir dans le Sud quand les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, demain, seront membres de l'Union européenne ? Pourquoi opter pour le pourtour méditerranéen quand les salaires asiatiques sont deux à trois fois plus bas ? C'est de la réponse à ces questions que dépendra l'avenir des pays du sud de la Méditerranée. Et, pour partie, celui de leur voisin du Nord. » Turquoi, (26.11.1995) Le Monde.

878 Comp. « La lenteur avec laquelle l'Union européenne achemine aux populations et aux pays concernés l'assistance promise est chronique » Zecchini, (16.11.2000) Le Monde.

879 Comp. « La coopération euro-méditerranéenne est pour l'Europe un projet porteur d'une vision politique à long terme, faisant primer la solidarité sur le repli, la méfiance ou la confrontation » Charette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro.

880 Comp. « Tout cela est très encourageant et montre combien les pays du Sud sont en demande d'Europe. Il est essentiel de ne pas les décevoir : il nous faut donc passer la vitesse supérieure! » Charette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro.

881 Comp. « Car les difficultés de l'UE pour donner vie au partenariat euroméditerranéen concourent à renforcer l'impression que l'Europe peine à définir le type de relations qu'elle souhaite avoir ses voisins » Zecchini, (17.06.2003) Le Monde.

882 Comp. «Cela étant, la politique européenne en Méditerranée souffre de nombreuses limites qui la rendent, actuellement, peu efficace. L'approche sécuritaire prédomine trop souvent ; les instruments financiers (Meda) mis en place ne sont pas à la hauteur puisque, en comparaison pour la période 2000-2006, l'Union européenne aura alloué trente euros par habitant aux Peco contre quatre pour les douze pays partenaires de la Méditerranée ; l'absence d'organisation politique adéquate et de secrétariat permanent rend le processus de coopération tributaire de l'administration de la Communauté européenne. Enfin, la vision euro centrique prime sur le partenariat, le centre domine et les pays voisins restent périphériques » Guigou, (12.10.2004) Le Figaro.

883 Comp. « L'élargissement de l'Union européenne (…). Il est aussi vécu comme une menace potentielle pour les pays en développement du pourtour méditerranéen » Marti, (02.12.2003) Le Monde.

884 Comp. « L'Est ne doit pas faire oublier le Sud à l'Europe » Bele, (17.11.2003) Le Figaro.

This criticism attests the European Union severe conceptual difficulties concerning its political ambition in the Mediterranean. In the last years le Figaro stated in the context of the Mediterranean Union that *the way of the anew policy is sowed by entrapments; without the substitution of the search for peace in the Middle East and the resolution of the other conflicts, it merits to be challenged by the hope to enhance harmony between the North and the South of the mare nostrum*[885]. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, stated in le Figaro that the European Union has taken the choice to approach the Mediterranean. And shortly before the Paris summit took place, le Monde commented the up-coming happening as follows: *we live in a moment of a very particular equilibrium in the world, where for the first time since very long ago, Europe returns to the scenery*[886]. Within the French discourse there have surprisingly been several references to a possible Mediterranean identity. Most of them relate to a common destiny, which serves as an association reference. In 2000, le Figaro commented that *our destinies are aligned*[887]. Le Monde conceded its voice at the same time to Chris Patten, saying that *the Mediterranean is in need of Europe, and Europe is in need of the Mediterranean; it is about our common interest*[888]. Another statement stressed that *we are "condemned" to cooperate within a win-win situation*[889]. And in addition, *the actuality does not cease to demonstrate that the destiny of Europe and its southern neighbours is henceforth inseparable*[890]. In 2008, the reaffirmation of a common Mediterranean identity reached its climax when stating that the *European civilisation evolved from the Mediterranean*[891]. Bernard Kouchner similarly stated that *we are all Mediterraneans in the heart and in peace*[892].

2.3.2 The European Union – its internal struggle

The statements which refer to the internal struggle of the European Union mainly concern the French role and do not offer a diverse insight into the power struggle among the Member states.

The distinctive national positions within the French press mainly refer to the events after the French proposal to found a Mediterranean Union. The only statement beforehand concerns the estimation of the Quai d'Orsay[893], stated in le Monde in 1997: *in future Europe there will be a special role for those*

885 Comp. « La voie de l'Union méditerranéenne sera semée d'embûches. Sans se substituer à la recherche de la paix au Proche-Orient ou à la résolution des autres conflits, elle mérite d'être tentée, dans l'espoir de trouver l'harmonie au nord comme au sud de cette Mare Nostrum » Rousselin, (14.10.2007) Le Figaro.

886 Comp. « Nous vivons un moment très particulier de l'équilibre mondial, où pour la première fois depuis bien longtemps, l'Europe revient sur le devant de la scène » Adler, (11.07.2008) Le Figaro.

887 Comp. « On réalise que nos destins sont liés (…) » Oualalou, (13.11.2000) Le Figaro.

888 Comp. « les Méditerranéens ont besoin de l'Europe, et l'Europe a besoin des Méditerranéens. Il en va de notre intérêt commun » Patten, (14.11.2000) Le Monde.

889 Comp. « Nous sommes « condamnés » à coopérer dans un rapport gagnant-gagnant » Guigou, (12.10.2004) Le Figaro.

890 Comp. « L'actualité ne cesse de le montrer, le destin de l'Europe est désormais inséparable de celui de ses voisins du Sud » Charlette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro.

891 Comp. « La civilisation européenne est née de la Méditerranée » Ferenczi, (21.03.2008) Le Monde.

892 Comp. « Nous sommes tous des Méditerranéens de cœur et de paix » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde.

893 Quai d'Orsay is the denomination for the French Foreign Ministry. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/mae/visite_orsay/ind_orsay.de.html (10.02.2008)

countries that demonstrated a stronger determination than others and that France aspires to be among those countries[894]. This indicates the official position of the French foreign policy, which Nicolas Sarkozy proved to be true, also in the context of the Mediterranean Policy.

Interestingly, the controversial debate of Sarkozy's original proposal to found a Mediterranean Union only for countries bordering the Mediterranean after the model of Europe has not occupied an obvious place in the French press. Indeed, it was stated that proposals of these dimension do not scarce scepticism[895], but the severe debate, especially with Germany, was hardly mentioned; this is additionally remarkable due to the, at least in the German speaking media persisting, competition between France and Germany . The only reference to the German rejection of the French proposal was expressed a day before the Paris summit in 2008 by le Monde, stating that *Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, opposed the French project because it excluded the countries which do not border the Mediterranean; she therefore perceived a strong division potential for the proper European Union*[896]. Before the publication of this statement, Bernard Kouchner wrote in le Monde that *it was necessary to convince the Spanish and Italian partners that France will not make a clean sweep with the Barcelona Process, but contrarily wants to revive it; (...) to convince Germany that it was not the aim of the project to turn away from Europe*[897].

Other statements in the same context only refer to the French intentions, like the proposal has the finality to give the initiative a *new élan*[898]. At the same time, these honourable intentions are overlapped by unmasked statements like: *in order to contribute to the normalisation of the relations between the countries in the Middle East, Paris aspires to become again an influent actor in the region where the role of the European Union had decreased*[899]. Even though the competition between France and Germany did not find attention in the public discourse, the ambitions of France to become a more decisive player on the international stage and the apparent lack of awe to interfere in the ambit of the European

894 Comp. « [Quai d'Orsay] Il est claire que, dans l'Europe de demain, il y aura un rôle particulier pour les pays qui veulent afficher une détermination plus forte que les autres. La France est au nombre de ces pays » Frachon/Vernet, (02.03.1997) le Monde.

895 Comp. « [MU] Face à une entreprise aussi grandiose, le scepticisme est de mise » Rousselin, (14.10.2007) Le Figaro.

896 Comp. « Angela Merkel, la chancelière allemande, s'oppose au projet français car il exclut les pays non riverains de la Méditerranée. Elle y voit un fermement de division au sein de l'UE » Beaugé, (12.07.2008) Le Monde.

897 Comp. « Il fallut convaincre nos partenaires espagnoles et italiens que la France ne faisait pas table rase du Processus de Barcelone mais souhaitait au contraire le relancer; nous nous y sommes employés dès les premiers jours, à Rome comme à Portoroz lors de la rencontre des dix Européens de la Méditerranée. Convaincre l'Allemagne que ce projet n'était pas tourné contre l'Europe » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde.

898 Comp. « le projet se contente de prendre appui sur le processus de Barcelone, forum de coopération inter méditerranéen lancé en 1995, aujourd'hui ensablé, et auquel la France souhaite donner un « nouvel élan » » Avril, (14.03.2008) Le Figaro.

899 Comp. « En contribuant à normaliser les relations entre les nations du Proche-Orient, Paris espère redevenir un acteur influent dans la région où le rôle de l'Europe s'amenuise » Oberlé, (13.07.2008) Le Figaro.

foreign policy were unambiguously expressed[900].

3 Germany

Germany is the country where the most newspapers have been considered: the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), the Welt, The Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Financial Times Germany (FTD) and the Tageszeitung (TAZ). At the centre-right of the political spectrum are the FAZ, the Welt and the Financial Times Germany, while the SZ and the TZ are considered as left.

From the 404 statements which have been identified in the German newspapers, far the most can be assigned to the FAZ, which has great news coverage on Mediterranean Affairs. The amount of the reporting in the SZ and the FTD is on average; a lower amount can be allocated to the Welt and the TAZ.

GERMANY	**number of articles per category and newspaper**					
	FAZ	**Welt**	**SZ**	**FTD**	**TAZ**	total
Expression	133	10	34	18	9	204
Purpose	43	4	6	9	4	66
Identity	77	14	15	17	9	132
	253	**28**	**55**	**44**	**22**	**402**

Concerning the distribution of the statements per category, most statements have been identified for the category "expression" and the sub-category referring to the perception of the Mediterranean policy (mmpol).

GERMANY	**number of statements per category**				
	the other	ass./diss.	mmr	mmpol	total
Expression	25	57	14	108	**204**
	purpose	aim			
Purpose	37	29			**66**
	EU				
Identity	132				**132**

The distribution of the considered statements per year indicates the following pattern:

900 This can be additionally traced in the references in the run-up to the Paris Summit where the invitation of the Heads of States by Sarkozy is stressed [Comp. "[Sarkozy] (…) il a invité tous les dirigeants méditerranéens à participer, « sur un pied d'égalité », à une conférence à Paris en juin 2008 » Editorial, 25.10.2007 le Monde] and the French role at the proper summit [Comp. « Même si le sommet du 13 s'appelle « sommet de Paris pour la Méditerranée », ce qui met un accent net sur le rôle de la France, le projet de Déclaration, lui, fait la part belle au processus européen dit « de Barcelone » (Euromed), lancé en 1995 et dont il s'agit de « renforcer les accomplissements et les éléments de succès » » Nougayrède/Ricard, (12.07.2008) Le Monde].

GERMANY	distribution of the statements per category and year														
	95	**96**	**97**	**98**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	Total
Expression	36		17	1	18	15	9	9	2	7	28	1	13	48	204
Purpose	23	1	6		9	12	2	4	1	6	16		20	32	132
Identity	17		2		9	5	1	2	1		12		4	13	66
Total	**76**	**1**	**25**	**1**	**36**	**32**	**12**	**15**	**4**	**13**	**56**	**1**	**37**	**93**	**402**

The years in which an outstanding amount of statements has been identified are 1995, 2005 and 2008 for obvious reasons. Notably, there are also high numbers of statements in 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2007. In 1997 the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers after the initiation conference took place, in 1999 Germany hosted the consecutive conference in Stuttgart, already a year later the next Foreign Minister Meeting place, and in 2007 the press reported on the severe debate between Germany and France on the occasion of the French proposal to found a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the Mediterranean.

3.1 Discourse analysis – Expression

In total, there have been 203 statements identified which can be assigned to the analytical category "expression".

3.1.1 The view of the "other"

In the German press the statements, which refer to the "other", describe their situation regarding the participation in the Barcelona Process. They contain the claims for a compensation of the predominantly Eastern policy of the EU, the legitimate scepticism, the difficult arrangement among the "other" and the partnership attitude.

The initiation year of the Barcelona Process was marked by the demand for a coherent Mediterranean Policy of the European Union by the Mediterranean non-member countries. Thus, it was reported in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) that *the southern Mediterranean riparian states, especially the Maghreb countries, have already demanded more attention from Brussels for a long time and that it is supportive for their request that in the correspondent year France and Spain, two Mediterranean states, preside the European Council*[901]. Furthermore, the "others" think *that the European Union has forgotten its southern border, due to its intense engagement in Middle and Eastern Europe*[902]. Corresponding to the foundation moment the same newspaper stated that *the North African states and those*

901 Comp. „Die südlichen Anrainer des Mittelmeers, vor allem die Maghreb Staaten, fordern schon seit langem mehr Brüsseler Aufmerksamkeit. Es kommt ihren Wünschen zugute, dass in diesem Jahr mit Frankreich und Spanien zwei Mittelmeerstaaten die EU-Präsidentschaft innehaben" wha, (07.02.1995) FAZ.

902 Comp. „Vergessen, so meinen sie, habe die Europäische Union ihre Südgrenze, da sie vornehmlich mit der Entwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa beschäftigt sei" wha, (07.02.1995) FAZ.

in the Middle East preliminary hope for a multi-billion auxiliary programme from the EU[903]. Therewith, the German discourse of the FAZ suggested that the motivation from the MNC countries was financially directed. Nevertheless, there were also references concerning the distrust of the "others". One of them was stated in 1997: *The distrust of the southern countries is the result of the pedantic bargaining for import guidelines for some tons of potatoes, rice, tomatoes and cut flowers by the European Union, including Germany*[904]. *At the conference* (Malta), *the Maghreb-partners demonstrated their legitimate expectations towards the countries of the European Union concerning their ambivalent position, as they plea for an unlimited access for industrial products and services in the southern markets while rejecting the free-trade for Agrarian products*[905]. The FAZ conceded the voice to *Adel Tilli, board member of the Tunisian Agrar- and Fishery Association, who expressed his concern about the difficulty to explain the domestic farmers how to become competitive when there are no additional markets*[906]. He further stated that *this does not only lead to sentiments of repudiation, but also handicaps the economic opening;* the FAZ interpreted *Tilli's statement as a clear warning for Europe*[907].

The relations among the Mediterranean partners were considered as *complicated, especially because of the difficult relations among the Arab countries and notably with Israel*[908]. Even *Tunisia, which is considered as a model student concerning the economic opening compared to other Mediterranean countries, has apparent difficulties with the economic and political liberalisation*[909]. Although the latter is not surprising, it is the only reference within the German press which deals with the expectations and the demanded reforms in the partner countries.

Concerning the European role in the Middle East conflict, the FAZ reported that *it is apparently expected that Europe obtains a counter-balanced position to the United States of America, which in the*

903 Comp. „Die Staaten Nordafrikas und des Nahen Ostens machen sich vor allem große Hoffnungen auf ein Milliardenschweres Hilfsprogramm aus Europa" Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ.

904 Comp. „Der Argwohn in den südlichen Ländern wird nicht zuletzt durch das kleinliche Feilschen von EU-Ländern, darunter auch Deutschland, um die Einfuhr einiger hundert Tonnen Kartoffeln, Reis Tomaten oder Schnittblumen genährt" Stabenow, (14.04.1997) FAZ.

905 Comp. „Die Konferenz verdeutlichte, dass auch die Maghreb-Partner ebenfalls legitime Erwartungen an die EU-Länder haben. Dies gilt besonders für die zwiespältige EU-Haltung, ungehindert Zugang für Industrieprodukte und Dienstleistungen zu den südlichen Märkten zu verlangen, andererseits aber Freihandel für Agrarprodukte zu verweigern" Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ.

906 Comp. „Wie solle man es den eigenen Bauern vermitteln, wettbewerbsfähig zu werden, wenn es keine neuen Absatzmärkte gebe, fragt der Adel Tilli, Vorstandmitglied der tunesischen Agrar- und Fischervereinigung" Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ.

907 Comp. „Dies sorge nicht nur für ein "Gefühl der Zurückweisung", sondern erschwere die wirtschaftliche Öffnung. Tillis Warnung an die Europäer war knapp, aber eindeutig: "Achtung, Gefahr!"" Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ.

908 Comp. „Kompliziert wird das labile Gefüge in der Region zudem durch die schwierigen Beziehungen der arabischen Staaten untereinander und besonders zu Israel" Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ.

909 Comp. „Selbst Tunesien, das Köhler im Vergleich mit anderen südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern als "Musterschüler" bei der wirtschaftlichen Öffnung betrachtet, tut sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen ökonomischer und politischer Liberalisierung offenbar noch schwer" Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ.

view of many Arab countries have taken sides with Israel[910]. The FTD even stressed that *the European Union is forced to engage itself more in the Middle East peace process and possibly take initiative for the Palestinian side*[911]. A year later, in 2001, another journalist of the same newspaper uttered exactly the same: *the Arab world pushes the EU to position itself on the Palestinian side*[912]. These statements underline the expectations of the Arab countries concerning the role of the European Union in the Middle East. The demand to form a counter-balance to the USA must not be underestimated.

Concerning the "other" within the partnership, critical voices can be found in the German press when dealing with the Mediterranean partner countries. The Welt, for instance, stated that *money flows from the North to the South, but politically there are few returns, because there is often a lack of partners*[913]. Therewith, the lack of partnership within the Barcelona Process was also ascribed to the "other". The SZ also referred to insufficient partnership tendencies among the "others". In 2005, the anniversary year of the Barcelona Process, it was stated in the SZ: *If the Southern border-countries continue to treat the partnership with the EU slovenly, the EU should cause them a painful awakening, for example through turning off the cash-flow*[914]. In the moderate-liberal newspaper the consideration of the "other" was consistently critical, which is proved by two other examples of 2007: *the Moroccans, who demonstrated sympathy for the Mediterranean Union, have no high expectations regarding its success*[915]*; Algerians are figuratively satisfied with the numerous programs offered by the EU and is not willing to give them up for something that is still to define*[916]. The latter implies that the southern countries are also acting with foresight and individual purposes. So far, this has rarely been expressed in the analysed documents.

3.1.2 Associative and dissociative elements

The statements allocated to this category treat few associative issues and numerous dissociative matters of the Mediterranean Policy. Notably, the German press focuses on the events at the Ministerial conferences and therewith enables an additional perspective on the workings of the Barcelona Process.

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910 Comp. „Von den Europäern wird offenbar erwartet, dass sie ein gewissen Gegengewicht zu den Vereinigten Staaten bilden, die in den Augen vieler arabischer Länder bei ihren Vermittlungsbemühungen zu sehr auf der Seite Israels stehen" bc, (17.11.2000) FAZ.

911 Comp. „Die arabische Welt drängt die Europäische Union (EU), sich stärker für den Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten zu engagieren und zudem möglichst Partei für die Seite der Palästinenser zu ergreifen" Knust, (17.11.2001) FDT.

912 Comp. „Die arabische Welt drängt die EU, sich eindeutig auf die Seite der Palästinenser zu schlagen" Jennen, (05.11.2001) FTD.

913 Comp. „Geld fließt von Nord nach Süd, aber es kommt politisch wenig zurück, weil es oft an Partnern mangelt" Lau, (04.03.2008) Welt.

914 Comp. „Wenn die südlichen Anlieger des Mittelmeeres ihre Partnerschaft mit der EU weiterhin so schludrig behandeln, sollte die EU ihnen ein böses Erwachen bereiten. Etwa durch Drehen am Geldhahn" wtr, (28.11.2005) SZ.

915 Comp. „Für einen Lieblingsplan des Präsidenten, die Mittelmeer-Union, haben die Marokkaner viel Sympathie. Aber sie schätzen deren Aussichten nicht hoch ein" chi, (24.10.2007) SZ.

916 Comp. „Vor allem wollen die Algerier wissen, was der neue Pakt ihnen brächte. Immerhin gibt es bereits jetzt eine Reihe von Bündnissen: die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft (Barcelona-Prozess) zwischen der EU und ihren südlichen Nachbarn sowie das Mittelmeer-Forum und den Fünf-plus-Fünf-Dialog der Außenminister als informelle Konferenzen. Diese Spatzen in der Hand will Algerien für keine Taube auf dem noch nicht gebauten Dach über dem Mittelmeer aufgeben" Chimelli, (07.12.2007) SZ.

The SZ stated in 2008 that *when neighbours come closer to each other, there is both attraction and threat*[917]. The few associative issues concerned for example the complaisant appraisal that *if trusting the politicians' avowals, the approach towards the rules which determine modern capitalism has changed. The other side of the Mediterranean appears to have conceived its position within a globalised economy, and the investors do not come to their country because of colonial ponds or new friendships, but because of the perspective of chances of profit*[918]. Additionally, the reputed change of attitude in the MNC is due to the European influence and both can and should be questioned; as a matter of fact, the stated change contributes to a better working climate.

The 11.09.2001 provoked another associative element within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It manifested the necessity of cooperation between Europe and the MNC. The FAZ constituted that *due to the Islamic attacks, the riparian states in the southern Mediterranean again gained importance for the European Union*[919] and that *the Maghreb States and the Arab countries did what had been expected: they supported the fight against terrorism and took care of the stability in their own countries*[920].

Within the discourse of the German press the dissociative issues are diverse. They concern:

- Different perceptions on a certain topic. For example, it was stated in the FAZ at the beginning of the Barcelona Process: *in European countries circulates the fear that a close cooperation with the Arab countries and Europe could strengthen the fundamentalist groups. In contrast, the Islamic participants in Barcelona stressed their conviction that radical fundamentalism is primarily nourished by poverty and underdevelopment. The FAZ added that there were no fundamentalists in Barcelona, however*[921].
- Different perceptions regarding the cooperation level. In 1999, the FAZ stated that *it belongs to the Mediterranean tradition, equally on the southern and on the northern shore, not to talk*

917 Comp. „Nachbarn kommen sich nahe, darin liegen Reiz wie Gefahr" Schlötzer, (23.01.2008) SZ.

918 Comp. „Geändert hat sich, wenn man den Politiker-Bekenntnissen trauen darf, auch die Einstellung zu den Regeln, nach denen der moderne Kapitalismus funktioniert (...)Jedenfalls scheint man auf der anderen Seite des Mittelmeers inzwischen begriffen zu haben, dass man in der globalisierten Wirtschaft in einem Standortwettbewerb steht und dass Investoren nicht wegen alter kolonialer Verbindungen oder neuer Freundschaften ins Land kommen, sondern auch die Aussicht auf Gewinnchancen angezogen werden müssen" Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ.

919 Comp. „Die Anschläge islamistischer Terroristen haben die Nachbarländer der Europäischen Union (EU) am südlichen Ufer des Mittelmeeres wieder an Bedeutung gewinnen lassen -nachdem bei der letzten Außenministerkonferenz in Marseille im vergangenen November die EU-Mittelmeer-Zusammenarbeit von vielen für "tot" erklärt worden war" Rößler, (05.11.2001) FAZ.

920 Comp. „Die Regierung der Maghreb-Staaten wie die der arabischen Mittelmeeranrainer haben in den vergangenen Wochen das getan, was in Europa von ihnen erwartet wurde: Sie unterstützten den Kampf gegen den Terror und sorgten für Stabilität im Inneren ihrer Länder" Rößler, (05.11.2001) FAZ.

921 Comp. „In europäischen Ländern hört man häufig die Befürchtung, eine enge Zusammenarbeit der islamischen Staaten am südlichen Mittelmeer mit Europa könne dort die fundamentalistischen Gruppen stärken. Die Teilnehmer aus den islamischen Ländern waren in Barcelona anderer Ansicht: Der radikale Fundamentalismus nähre sich vorwiegend aus Armut und Unterentwicklung. Allerdings waren auch keine Fundamentalisten in Barcelona dabei" wha, (07.02.1995) FAZ.

about inconvenient issues or disarm them with flowery phrases[922]. A year later, the German Foreign Minister Joschka *Fischer praised the impressive debate between Israeli and Palestinian representatives, who defined their position in the "spirit of dialogue"*[923].

- The increasing economic gap across the Mediterranean: *The economic gap towards the south is a lot higher than towards the countries in Central and Eastern Europe; the average income in Europe is approximately twenty times higher than in the Arab countries in North Africa*[924]. In 2008, the Welt stated that *according to the Commission, the prosperity gap between the European Union and the Mediterranean countries has increased over the last years*[925].
- The lack of interest concerning the Mediterranean Policy. It was stated by the Welt in 2008 that *there is an apparent lack of interest among the Heads of State as the provided billions have not been completely retrieved*[926]. The TAZ stated that even *in Europe, the interest concerning the Mediterranean Policy is weighted differently*[927].
- Mistrust. The SZ stated in the anniversary year of the Barcelona Process that *the North African participants reacted sensitive on the suspicion that the European already feared Islamism and immigration at the moment of the initiation of the Barcelona Process*[928]. It further expressed the opinion that *the hugest barrier for a notable progress of the Mediterranean Policy is the lack of confidence*[929] among the partners.
- The conflicts in the Mediterranean region. The SZ stated in 2007 that *never before existed more conflicts in the region*[930]. Another conclusion of the German press was that *the problems of the Barcelona Process were not so much based on its structure, but on the discord among the southern and eastern MNCs*[931]. The FTD stated that the reason for the stagnation of the

922 Comp. „Zur kulturellen Tradition des Mittelmeerraumes gehört es, übrigens am südlichen wie am nördlichen Ufer, über unangenehme Dinge wenn möglich nicht zu sprechen, oder sie mit höflichen Floskeln zu entschärfen" Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ.

923 Comp. „(Marseille) Außenminister Fischer lobte die "beeindruckende Aussprache" bei der vor allem der israelische Außenminister Ben-Ami und der Vertreter der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde, Schaath, offen, "aber im Geist des Dialogs" die Standpunkte beider Seiten dargelegt hätten" bc, (17.11.2000) FAZ.

924 Comp. „Das wirtschaftliche Gefälle zum Süden hin ist viel größer als das zu den Reformländern Mittel- und Osteuropas; das Durchschnittseinkommen in der EU ist etwa zwanzigmal so hoch wie das in der arabischen Staaten Nordafrikas" Brender, (21.03.1995) NZZ.

925 Comp. „Das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen der EU und den Mittelmeerländern ist laut Kommission in den vergangenen Jahren noch gewachsen" Schiltz, (19.05.2008) Welt.

926 Comp. „Das Interesse der Regierungschefs war gering, die von der EU bereitgestellten Milliarden wurden nicht vollständig abgerufen (...)" Schiltz, (19.05.2008), Welt.

927 Comp. „Einmal ist das Interesse im Inneren der EU durchwachsen" Hahn, (13.07.2008) TAZ.

928 Comp. „Empfindlich reagierten die nordafrikanischen Teilnehmer auch auf den Verdacht, schon bei der Gründungskonferenz in Barcelona vor zehn Jahren hätten die Ängste der Europäer vor Islamismus und Einwanderung nach Europa Paten gestanden" Chimelli, (03.11.2005) SZ.

929 Comp. „Das größte Hindernis für nennenswerte Fortschritte ist der Mangel an Vertrauen" wtr, (28.11.2005) SZ.

930 Comp. „Nie gab es mehr Konflikte in der Region" chi, (24.10.2007) SZ.

931 Comp. „Europäische Diplomaten hoffen, dass die Mittelmeerpolitik nun einen "neuen Schub" bekommt. Allerdings weisen sie auch darauf hin, dass deren bisherige Probleme weniger mit den Strukturen des Barcelona-Prozesses zu tun hätten als damit, dass die südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeeranrainer untereinander zerstritten und an einer engeren Bindung an Europa nicht immer interessiert seien" Winter, (13.03.2008) SZ.

> Barcelona Process lies, *beside the unsolved Middle East Conflict, in the continuous jealousy between the northern and southern engagement within the European Union*[932].

Within the German press numerous statements refer to happenings at the Ministerial conferences which manifest the difficulties at the working level of the Barcelona Process. Thus, they represent a possible dissociative dynamic because it was more than once that the cooperation nearly failed. There was the matter of agreeing on a common definition and on certain terms or formulations of the concluding statement. Already in 1995 there were *references to the Middle Eastern Peace Process and the treaty on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while by contrast the formulations regarding human rights and democracy are generally kept so that there is no offence*[933]. Most of the times, also in 1995, the *participants agreed on a compromise*[934]. At the conference in Malta the situation was even more precarious because the *Arab participants threatened for hours to refuse to agree on a common statement in case the Europeans did not include a moderate, but definite, criticism on the Israeli settlement policy*[935]. The Stuttgart conference also demonstrated *the difficulties of the participants to act in concert*[936]. The FAZ reported that the *Syrian Foreign Minister, the spokesman of the Arab States, did not want to appear in public together with the Israeli representative*[937]. *Nevertheless, this conflict did not have a stagnating consequence for the conference itself and, beside some expressed dissonances of diplomats, the results have been considered as positive*[938]. In 2002, the *expected commotion between the Arab States and Israel already took place at the opening session when the Arab representatives left the room*[939]. In 2004, the FAZ quoted *a participant, who stated that at the*

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932 Comp. „Nicht nur der ungelöste Nahostkonflikt wirft die Annäherungsbemühungen zwischen beiden Seiten immer wieder zurück. Die Förderung des Mittelmeerraumes ist Gegenstand ständiger Eifersüchteleien zwischen der Nord- und Südschiene in der Europäischen Union selbst“ Koch, (14.11.2000) FTD.

933 Comp. „Als heikel hatten sich zuletzt besonders die politischen Passagen zum Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten und zum Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen erwiesen. Dagegen scheinen die vorbereiteten Klauseln zu Menschenrechten und Demokratie so allgemein gehalten zu sein, daß sie keinem Teilnehmer unüberwindbare Probleme bereiten dürften“ now/wha, (27.11.1995) FAZ.

934 Comp. „Die Teilnehmer verständigten sich schließlich auf Kompromißformeln“ now, (29.11.1995) FAZ.

935 Comp. „Die arabischen Teilnehmer hatten stundenlang damit gedroht, keinerlei gemeinsamen Erklärung ihre Zustimmung zu geben, falls die Europäer nicht zu einer zwar im Ton gemäßigten, aber dennoch eindeutigen Kritik an der israelischen Siedlungspolitik bereit sein sollten“ Stabenow, (17.04.1997) FAZ.

936 Comp. „Auch die Stuttgarter Konferenz dürfte jedoch zeigen, wie schwer sich die Nachbarn beiderseits des Mittelmeers tun, an einem Strang zu ziehen“ Stabenow, (15.04.1999) FAZ.

937 Comp. „Schwierig war es in Stuttgart geworden, nachdem Israel offenbar den syrischen Außenminister, der zugleich Sprecher der arabischen Staaten ist, nicht ohne israelische Beteiligung vor den Journalisten auftreten lassen wollte. Mit dem Israeli Scharon zusammen wollte wiederum al Scharaa nicht auf die Bühne treten“ Rößler, (17.04.1999) FAZ.

938 Comp. „Im Gegensatz zu der Außenministerkonferenz im April 1997 auf Malta, als der Streit um die israelische Siedlungspolitik sogar die Verständigung über eine Abschlusserklärung vereitelte, wirkte sich der Konflikt im Nahen Osten auf der Stuttgarter Konferenz nicht lähmend aus (...)Ungeachtet der zum Ende der Konferenz aufgetretenen Misstöne zogen Diplomaten aus der EU, aber auch aus den südlichen Partnerländern am Freitag eine positive Bilanz“ now, (17.04.1999) FAZ.

939 Comp. „Zum ersten erwarteten Eklat kam es schon bei der Eröffnungssitzung: Arabische Außenminister verließen für einige Minuten den Raum, nachdem der stellvertretende Außenminister Melchior (…) das Wort ergriffen hatte. Die Organisation hat Araber und Israelis über 40 Kilometer voneinander entfernt untergebracht“ Haubich, (24.04.2002) FAZ.

two-day meeting, the severe dispute between the two parties contributed to a general exhaustion, because the same arguments were repeated as ever[940]. Anyhow, *it was a value per se that representatives of the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority met and talked to each other, as it was stated by the German Foreign Minister*[941]. In the anniversary year of the Barcelona Process it was stated that *not everyone was in the mood for celebration*[942]. *The tenth anniversary should have been the first occasion of a meeting of all Heads of State, but most of them sent their Foreign Ministers again*[943]. The SZ moaned that *the summit called and nobody of the invited appeared*[944]. The FAZ also stated that *open and stern disputes between representatives of Israel and Palestine already belong to the ritual of the meetings*[945].

3.1.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

The statements which refer to the perception of the European Mediterranean Policy concern definitional statements, references regarding its significance and functionality and evaluative considerations. Distinctive definition statements refer to the European Mediterranean Policy as follows:

- *The Mediterranean forum wants to be perceived as a regional cooperation body and appears as a new lobby for the Mediterranean region*[946].
- [Mediterranean Policy before Barcelona] *A patchwork of relations in the south*[947].
- *The only forum where Israelis and Arabs continue to sit on one table*[948].
- *Almost over night the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership advanced to the prime example of the European fight against terrorism*[949].

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940 Comp. „Während des zweitägigen Treffens war es zu hitzigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen dem israelischen Außenminister Silvan Schalom und dem Chefunterhändler der Palästinenser im Nahost-Konflikt, Nabil Schaath, gekommen. Beide hätten zur allgemeinen Ermüdung die "seit langem bekannten Positionen vorgetragen", berichtete ein Teilnehmer“ bc, (07.05.2004) FAZ.

941 Comp. „Außenminister Fischer sagte, obwohl beide Seiten an ihren Positionen festgehalten hätten, bleibe es doch "ein Wert an sich", wenn sich hohe Vertreter der israelischen Regierung, der Palästinenser und der arabischen Staaten treffen und miteinander reden könnten. Außerhalb der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft der EU gebe es kein anderes Forum, auf dem das möglich sei“ bc, (07.05.2004) FAZ.

942 Comp. „Nicht allen, scheint es, ist nach Feiern zumute“ Bacia, (28.11.2005) FAZ.

943 Comp. „Diesmal sollte es ein Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs werden, das erste überhaupt. Doch viele der Geladenen aus den Partnerländern hatten anscheinend Wichtigeres zu tun. Die meißten schickten wieder ihre Außenminister“ Bacia, (28.11.1995) FAZ.

944 Comp. „Der Gipfel ruft und fast keiner der Eingeladenen erscheint“ wtr, (28.11.2005) SZ.

945 Comp. „Ein offener, harter Schlagabtausch zwischen den Vertretern Israels und der arabischen Länder gehört indessen immer noch zum Ritual der Euromed-Außenministertreffen“ Bacia, (28.11.1995) FAZ.

946 Comp. „Das Mittelmeer-Forum sieht sich als regionales Kooperationsgremium, will aber auch als neue Lobbygruppe für den mediterranen Raum auftreten“ wwe, (31.07.1995) FAZ.

947 Comp. „das Beziehungs-Flickwerk im Süden“ wwe, (31.07.1995) FAZ.

948 Comp. „Der Barcelona-Prozess ist das einzige Forum, an dem Israelis und Araber weiterhin an einem Tisch sitzen“ Rößler, (05.11.2000) FAZ and „Mittlerweile ist der Barcelona-Prozess praktisch das einzige Forum, wo, wie jetzt wieder in Valencia, Israelis und Araber noch an einem Tisch sitzen“ Rößler, (24.04.2002) FAZ and Die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft ist das einzige Forum, in dem regelmäßig Regierungsvertreter Israels und der arabischen Staaten zusammenkommen“ bc, (05.05.2004) FAZ.

949 Fast über Nacht wurde deshalb ein bis dahin wenig beachtetes Kooperationsprogramm der Europäischen Union (EU) die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft zum Musterbeispiel europäischer Terroristenbekämpfung“ Busse, (11.01.2005) FAZ.

- *A European approach*[950].
- [Solana in the FAZ] *An integral component of our response to the end of the Cold War and the globalisation challenges*[951].
- [Solana in the FAZ] *First and foremost a project of hope and a medium to banish desperation*[952].
- *A policy of empty chairs*[953].
- [the foundation of the Mediterranean Union] *a rare historic event*[954].

These definitions demonstrate that the Mediterranean Policy is perceived as a forum, fulfilling peace-making tasks concerning the diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab countries and as a European dominated initiative, which is not explicitly successful.

The significance of the Mediterranean Policy was expressed in the FAZ, for example, stating that the conference in Barcelona *took place in the very own interest of the EU*[955]. In 2001, the significance was argued in respect of the terror attacks in the US, saying that *since the 11th of September, the purpose of establishing a space of stability and peace is not a vision of imperturbable optimists anymore, but an urgent necessity*[956]. In 2002, the importance was based on facts, stating that *an overall cooperation across the Mediterranean is not needless, as the newest numbers demonstrate* [957]. Javier Solana also referred in the FAZ to the significance of the Barcelona Process because it *is based in our common interest and responsibility to display the whole potential of this policy*[958]. In 2008, the newspaper reported *that the Union will change the world and avoid a confrontation between the cultures*[959]. The SZ stated that *although the Union for the Mediterranean is actually something different than the Mediterranean Union, it still remains important*[960]. Concerning the functionality, the press voices were mea-

950 Comp. „Leider wird immer deutlicher, dass dieser "europäische Ansatz" keine Früchte trägt“ Busse, (11.01.2005) FAZ.

951 Comp. „Der Barcelona-Prozess war ein integraler Bestandteil unserer Antwort auf das Ende des Kalten Krieges und die Herausforderungen der Globalisierung“ Solana, (28.11.2005) FAZ.

952 Comp. „Für mich ist der Barcelona-Prozess in erster Linie ein Projekt der Hoffnung und ein Mittel, die Hoffnungslosigkeit endgültig zu verbannen“ Solana, (28.11.2005) FAZ.

953 Comp. „Diese Politik der leeren Stühle zeigt, wie es wirklich steht um das ehrgeizige Projekt der EU, am Mittelmeer eine Zone des Friedens und der Partnerschaft zu bauen“ wtr, (28.11.2005) SZ.

954 Comp. „(...)die für den 13. Juli geplante Gründung der Mittelmeerunion als "seltenes historisches Ereignis"(...)“ Editorial, (02.05.2008) FAZ.

955 Comp. „Die Konferenz in Barcelona wird Zeichen zur Stabilisierung eines Unruheherds vor der Haustür Europas setzen - im ureigenen Interesse der Gemeinschaft“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ.

956 Comp. „Seit dem 11. September ist ihr Ziel, einen Raum für Stabilität und des Friedens auf beiden Seiten des Mittelmeers zu schaffen, nicht mehr nur eine Vision für unerschütterliche Optimisten, sondern eine dringende Notwendigkeit“ Rößler, (05.11.2001) FAZ.

957 Comp. „Überflüssig ist die das Mittelmeer übergreifende Zusammenarbeit jedoch nicht geworden -im Gegenteil das illustrieren neue Zahlen“ Rößler, (22.04.2002) FAZ.

958 Comp. „Es liegt in unserem gemeinsamen Interesse und in unserer Verpflichtung, das gesamte Potential des Barcelona-Prozesses zu entfalten“ Solana (28.11.2005) FAZ.

959 Comp. „Die Union werde "die Welt verändern" und eine Konfrontation der Kulturen verhindern“ Editorial, (02.05.2008) FAZ.

960 Comp. „Union für das Mittelmeer ist tatsächlich etwas anderes als eine Mittelmeerunion - aber trotzdem sehr wichtig“ Jouyet, (02.02.2008) SZ.

gre, saying that the *states of the Mediterranean come closer*[961], that the policy *contains brave projects and fantasies*[962] or that there are *concrete measures for the handling of the southern neighbours*[963]. The perception of the significance and the functionality of the Barcelona Process are not really rich as far as the content is concerned. Beside the confession of the need and certain formulations, which trace back to politicians, the public opinion seems to be more indifferent than engaged. A more emotional debate can be expected regarding the evaluation of the Mediterranean Policy, which contains few positive statements but a number of diverse criticisms.

The few positive voices perceived the Barcelona Process as a *starting signal for the departure in a new region and as the first occasion that so many states demonstrate a common sense of community*[964]. In 1999, a journalist of the FAZ stated that *step by step the mosaic of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is taking form*[965]. Another expressed that in *Stuttgart it was definitely proved that the partnership is sustainable, despite precarious and difficult circumstances*[966]. The SZ contained the last positive statement in 2005: *on that day the Barcelona Process is considered a success story*[967]. In contrast, there were many other negative voices:

- *At the Barcelona conference much will be said but few decided*[968].
- *Critical observers predict that Barcelona will be a fata morgana summit, where castles in the air are built with a lot of EU-money, while there is hardly any entrepreneur who wants to invest in this crisis region*[969].
- *Also the conventional exaggeration can not delude that the Partnership is just at the beginning*[970].
- *The atmosphere of departure has already gone long ago*[971].

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961 Comp. „Die Staaten des Mittelmeerraums rücken enger zusammen“ wwe, (31.07.1995) FAZ.

962 Comp. „Kühne Projekte und Phantasien“ Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ.

963 Comp. „Hinter diesem sperrigen Begriff verbirgt sich ein Bündel von Maßnahmen der EU im Umgang mit ihren südlichen Nachbarn - über Migrationsfragen und Anti-Terror-Politik bis hin zu Strukturhilfen“ Kornelius, (06.03.2008) SZ.

964 Comp. „Die Optimisten dagegen sehen in Barcelona den Startschuss zu einem Aufbruch in der Region. Erstmals kämen alle Staaten an einen Tisch und demonstrierten damit ein regionales Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein“ Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ.

965 Comp. „Stück für Stück nimmt dennoch das Mosaik der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft Gestalt an“ Stabenow, (15.04.1999) FAZ.

966 Comp. „(…), in Stuttgart sei der "eindeutige Nachweis erbracht worden, dass die Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft "auch unter manchmal heiklen und schwierigen Umständen tragfähig ist"“ Rößler, (17.04.1999) FAZ.

967 Comp. „Heute ist der "Barcelona-Prozess", wie er in dem unausrottbaren Hang der EU zu sperrigen Begriffen heißt, durchaus eine Erfolgsgeschichte“ Winter, (26.11.2005) SZ.

968 Comp. „(...)in Barcelona dürfte viel gesagt und wenig entschieden werden“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ.

969 Comp. „Kritische Beobachter unken schon im voraus etwas von Fata-Morgana-Gipfel; mit dem großen EU-Geldtropf am Horizont würden Luftschlösser gebaut, eigene Finanzmittel wolle dagegen kaum ein Unternehmer in der Krisenregion investieren“ Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ.

970 Comp. „Auch die übliche Schönfärberei wird nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen können, dass die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft erst am Anfang steht“ Stabenow, (14.04.1997) FAZ.

971 Comp. „Die Aufbruchsstimmung, (…), ist längst verflogen“ Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ.

- *The Barcelona Process has hardly advanced*[972]; *the Barcelona Process is stuck*[973].
- *The greatest weakness of the auxiliary programmes (MEDA I) is that between 1995 and 1999 only 26% of the granted funds have been triggered*[974]. *In this context, further programs which aimed to enhance trade and cultural exchange did not advance; funds have not been triggered and no summit has dealt with this issue for years*[975].
- *A glance on the agenda of the conference in Valencia indicates the threat that the EU is going to get lost in its numerous projects*[976].
- *The meetings in Barcelona and Valencia did not come up with brilliant results; the outcomes of this conference will be similar*[977].
- *The Barcelona Process remains without notable political success*[978]; n*ice in its formulation, but mediocre in its success*[979].
- *All three cooperation areas obtain incompleteness*[980].
- *In Paris, the results of the Barcelona Process will be regarded as disappointing*[981].
- *Migration, fight against terrorism, energy supply, traffic or climatic policy – these were the only more or less successful political projects, but which lacked of a big political bracket*[982].
- *Nobody has nightmares if he does not know anything about the Barcelona Process*[983].
- *Sarkozy stated that the Barcelona Process was not successful because it was based on the inequality between the North and the South*[984].
- *Instead of a regrouping of the states, the Union just accepted a new etiquette for an old thing, now called "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean". The existing cooperation*

972 Comp. „Die in Barcelona anvisierte engere politische Zusammenarbeit ist kaum vorangekommen" Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ.
973 Comp. „Der 1995 beschlossene Barcelona-Prozess steckt fest" chi, (24.10.2007) SZ.
974 Comp. „Die größte Schwäche des bisherigen Hilfsprogramms (Meda I) ist, dass im Zeitraum 1995 bis 1999 nur 26 Prozent der von der EU zugesagten Mittel abgerufen wurden" Bc, (17.11.2000) FAZ.
975 Comp. „Die Programme, die Handel und kulturellen Austausch fördern sollen, kamen aber nicht recht voran. Finanzmittel wurden nicht abgerufen, seit Jahren befasste sich kein Gipfel mehr mit der Sache" Busse, (15.03.2008) FAZ.
976 Comp. „Geht es um die eigentliche Gestaltung der Partnerschaft, die die Ost-Erweiterung der EU zumindest ansatzweise ergänzen soll, laufen sie Gefahr, sich mit ihren zahllosen Vorhaben zu verzetteln, wie auch ein Blick auf die Tagesordnung des Treffens in Spanien verdeutlicht" Rößler, (22.04.2002) FAZ.
977 Comp. „Nachdem die Treffen zwischen Barcelona 1995 und Valencia 2002 nicht gerade glanzvolle Ergebnisse gezeitigt hatten, wird auch diese Konferenz nur wenige konkrete Resultate erreichen" Haubrich, (24.04.2002) FAZ.
978 Comp. „Der "Barcelona-Prozess" wurde 1995 gegründet und hatte keinen Erfolg" Schlitz, (19.05.2008) Welt.
979 Comp. „Schön die Formulierungen, mäßig jedoch der Erfolg bislang" Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ.
980 Comp. „Auf allen drei Partnerschaftsgebieten bestünden "Unvollkommenheiten"" Chimelli, (03.11.2005) SZ.
981 Comp. „In Paris werden die Ergebnisse des Barcelona-Prozesses als enttäuschend bewertet" mic, (22.12.2007) FAZ.
982 Comp. „Migration, Terrorbekämpfung, Energieversorgung, Verkehr oder Klimapolitik - das waren einzelne mehr oder weniger erfolgreiche Projekte, denen aber die große politische Klammer fehlte" Lau, (04.03.2008) Welt.
983 Comp. „Niemand schläft schlecht wenn er nichts vom Barcelona-Prozess weiß" Lau, (04.03.2008) Welt.
984 Comp. „Sarkozy sage in Tunis, der 1995 vereinbarte Barcelona-Prozess habe nicht funktioniert, weil er "auf der Ungleichheit von Nord und Süd" gründete" Editorial, (02.05.2008) FAZ.

programs have been upgraded, but nothing more[985].

- *At least the name is a progress. "Mediterranean Union" is more appealing than "Barcelona Process"*[986].

The criticism concerning the European Mediterranean Policy is numerous and pertains to many distinctive aspects. On the one hand, the actual content and outcome is regarded as incomplete, not nameable and without any recorded progress. The political ambition of the European Union is perceived as reaction to security concerns and other strategic considerations, but lacks both concept and consistency. On the other hand, the apparent failure – due to only few results – is postulated and stressed in different ways. Notably, the fact that only one-third of the multi-billion auxiliary programs have been triggered emphasises the low progress and probably also the need for this kind of policy. Among the German speaking press, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was the only newspaper that commented on this crucial matter. The confidence in the success of the recently launched Mediterranean Union is rather marginal than enthusiastic, which can also be stated for the European Mediterranean Policy in general.

3.1.4 References to a Mediterranean region

Within the German press the references to a Mediterranean region mainly concern the often stressed frontier issue and security matters.

In 2007, the TAZ published a long description of the Mediterranean: *looking at the globe, the Mediterranean appears to be a small inland sea. But its shores are densely populated and a prosperity gap, even a civilisation gap, forms a strong border, which one would like to make impassable for the shabby masses that are coming from Africa. But the system of the North is increasingly challenged. In the South there is chaos – in the best case, hostile and violent groups, which are disposed to war, form up in the name of Islam*[987]. This perception reflects the frontier issue as well as the security concern.

The frontier issue has continuously been dealt with since 1995. In that year the FAZ stated that *the Mediterranean is and remains a huge prosperity frontier*[988]. In 1999, the FAZ considered *the Mediterranean to be more a frontier than a bridge*[989]. And in 2008, the SZ voiced the *French Foreign Minister, stating that since the 11th of September 2001, the Mediterranean is the main break line between*

985 Comp. „Statt einer neuen Staaten-Gruppierung akzeptierte die Gemeinschaft nur ein anderes Etikett für eine alte Sache, nunmehr "Barcelona-Prozess: Union für das Mittelmeer" genannt. Die bestehenden Kooperations-Programme zwischen Nord und Süd wurden damit aufgewertet, nicht mehr" chi, (21.05.2008) SZ.

986 Comp. „Zumindest der Name ist ein Fortschritt. Eine "Mittelmeer-Union" ist anschaulicher als ein "Barcelona-Prozess"" Weingärtner, (15.03.2008) TAZ.

987 Comp. „Schaut man auf den Globus, dann ist das Mittelmeer nur ein kleines Binnenmeer. Aber seine Ufer sind dicht besiedelt, und ein Wohlstands-, ja Zivilisationsgefälle schafft mittendurch eine harte Grenze, die man gerne unpassierbar machen würde für die verwahrlosten Massen aus Afrika. Doch die Ordnung des Nordens wird zunehmend herausgefordert. Im Süden herrscht Chaos - dort organisiert sich bestenfalls eine feindliche, kriegslüsterne, gewaltbereite Ordnung im Namen des Islam" Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ.

988 Comp. „Das Mittelmeer ist und bleibt wohl auf absehbare Zeit eine scharfe Wohlstandsgrenze" Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ.

989 Comp. „Noch ist das Mittelmeer mehr eine Grenze als eine Brücke" Behrendt/Hanelt, (16.04.1999) FAZ.

two worlds. This is why we need bridges between the European Union and North Africa as well as the African Union[990]. The latter expressed vision is diametric to the security concern which is widely spread in Europe. According to the FTD in 2000, *the Mediterranean is conceived through the lens of security policy not only by the USA, but also by the three European great powers, France, Germany and Great Britain*[991].

In 2005, Javier Solana stated in the FAZ that *in many ways the Mediterranean is exposed to become a dangerous gateway for the threats of the modern world, namely poverty, governments in need of improvement, terrorism, human trafficking and political extremism*[992]. In the same year the SZ considered *the Mediterranean having become a problematic region for Europe*[993]. And in 2008, the SZ quoted the author *Predrag Matvejevic, who perceives the Mediterranean as a sea of neighbourhood, while the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are seas of distance*[994].

From these partly distinctive references to a Mediterranean region derives the impression that the Mediterranean space, in other words the politically established Mediterranean region, is not yet tangible. Within the German press there is no clear position about the conception of the Mediterranean; there is only a distant and diffuse perception, which is linked to political events and persons.

3.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose

The statements that have been allocated to the category "purpose" focus on the European motivation for the Mediterranean Policy and the officially stated aim.

3.2.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy

Within the German press the purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy is strongly linked to the security concern. In 1995, regarding *the political partnership, the considerations of Brussels implied security issues*[995] and the *significance of the meeting in Barcelona was explained by the FAZ with a statement of Alfred Sauvy, French scientist in the field of demography, saying that if richness does not*

990 Comp. „[Kouchner] Das Mittelmeer ist seit dem 11. September 2001 die wichtigste Bruchlinie zwischen zwei Welten. Deshalb brauchen wir Brücken zwischen der Europäischen Union und Nordafrika sowie der Afrikanischen Union" Kornelius, (24.01.2008) SZ.

991 Comp. „Diesen Raum betrachten nicht nur die USA, sondern auch die drei EU-Großmächte, Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien überwiegend durch das Brennglas der Sicherheitspolitik" Koch, (01.03.2000) FTD.

992 Comp. „In vielerlei Hinsicht droht die Mittelmeerregion zu einer gefährlichen Schnittstelle der Gefahren der modernen Welt zu werden: Armut, verbesserungswürdige Regierungsführung, Terrorismus, Menschenhandel und politischer Extremismus. Gleichzeitig bildet die Region unser gemeinsames Erbe und eine einmalige Plattform für Kooperation" Solana, (28.11.2005) FAZ

993 Comp. „Mittelmeer zu einer Problemregion (für Europa) geworden war" Chimelli, (03.11.2005) SZ.

994 Comp. „Das "Meer der Nachbarschaft" nennt Predrag Matvejevic das Mittelmeer, Atlantik und Pazifik sind für den Autor hingegen Meere der Distanz" Schlötzer, (23.01.2008) SZ.

995 Comp. „Die politische Partnerschaft soll nach Brüsseler Vorstellungen Fragen der "Sicherheit" einschließen" Brender, (21.03.1995) FAZ.

come to the people, the people will go to the rich[996]. Therewith, it is unmistakably noticed that the Barcelona Process is based on security issues. In this context the purpose was explicitly expressed to enhance *a greater political stability and an increase of prosperity*[997]. W*ho wants to assure lasting security and prosperity, needs a close partnership with the neighbours in the South*[998]. It was the aim to *disarm the potential of crisis*[999] in the region. In order to reach this purpose, the following expressions were used: *enhance the creation of a zone of economic and political stability*[1000]; *give impetus to the case of peace in the Mediterranean*[1001]; *strengthen democracy, enhancement of education and liberalisation of trade and services*[1002]; *enhance security, political and economic exchange and cultural cooperation*[1003]; *better cooperation*[1004].

Beside this approach, based on economic relations and exchange, and a dialogue, which should facilitate the understanding at some rare occasions, the German press dealt with the political visions which are expressed in the context of the Mediterranean Policy. For example, with this initiative *one of the biggest economic spaces of the world, with thirty states and 800 million consumers could be created*[1005]; or, the new policy should be *a complete new model of association of third countries*[1006]; and further, the effort of a new Mediterranean Policy is to *overcome the historically evolved differences between Europe and many of its neighbours*[1007]. The press utters the vision to create a common space of peace, prosperity and respect of the human rights. Therewith, the approach of the European Union is not only classified as being a reaction towards the challenges that it is facing in the South, but also as an integral part of its world-power vision to become/remain a decisive power.

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996 Comp. „Wer angesichts des erwarteten Medienspektakels nach dem Sinn des Treffens fragt, sollte sich eines Satzes des französischen Bevölkerungswissenschaftlers Alfred Sauvy entsinnen: "Wenn der Reichtum nicht zu den Menschen kommt, werden die Menschen zum Reichtum gehen."“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ.

997 Comp. „Ziel der zweitägigen Konferenz ist es, die Herausbildung einer Zone politischer und wirtschaftlicher Stabilität rings um das Mittelmeer zu erleichtern“ now/wha, (27.11.1995) FAZ.

998 Comp. „Wer dauerhaft Sicherheit und Wohlstand garantieren wolle, benötige eine enge Partnerschaft auch mit den Nachbarn südlich des Mittelmeers“ now, (17.04.1999) FAZ.

999 Comp. „(BP) (…),sollte dabei helfen, am südlichen Ufer des Mittelmeers ein Krisenpotenzial zu entschärfen“ Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ.

1000 Comp. „(...)der zu größerer politischer Stabilität und zu einem Zugewinn an Wohlstand insbesondere in den südlichen Anrainerstaaten führt“ Behrendt/Hanelt, (16.04.1999) FAZ.

1001 Comp. „Ziel aller Teilnehmer sei es, "der Sache des Friedens im Mittelmeerraum einen großen Impuls zu geben"“ now, (29.11.1995) FAZ.

1002 Comp. „(…), bei der Unterstützung politischer Reformen zur Stärkung der Demokratie, der Förderung der Bildung, sowie der Liberalisierung des Handels und der Dienstleistungen neue Schwerpunkte zu setzen“ bc, (13.04.2005) FAZ.

1003 Comp. „Ziel ist es, durch sicherheitspolitische und wirtschaftliche Kooperation sowie kulturelle Zusammenarbeit die Stabilität der Region zu fördern“ Behrent/Handelt, (11.09.2000) FTD.

1004 Comp. „Die EU und die südlichen Mittelmeeranrainer hatten 1995 den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess initiiert, um die Kooperation in der Region zu verbessern“ Finkenzeller, (29.11.2005) FTD.

1005 Comp. „Damit könne einer der größten Wirtschaftsräume der Welt mit 30 Staaten und 800 Millionen Konsumenten geschaffen werden“ wwe, (27.10.1995) FAZ.

1006 Comp. „Die Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft soll ein neues Modell der Assoziierung von Drittstaaten mit der Gemeinschaft sein“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ.

1007 Comp. „Dies soll zur Überwindung der im Lauf der Geschichte entstandenen Gegensätze zwischen Europa und vielen seiner Nachbarn, aber nicht zuletzt auch zwischen den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern beitragen“ now, (29.11.1995) FAZ.

3.2.2 About the officially stated aim

The officially stated aim does not greatly differ from the purpose; however, it is less expressive regarding the motivation behind. The newspapers also referred to the policy's aim *to enhance a regular political dialogue, an economic cooperation and an exchange of experiences*[1008] and that it *is the ambitious goal to create a zone of political and economic stability*[1009]. These kinds of statements are highly repetitive and have a strong persuasive connotation. The press covers the aims, but rarely comments on them. At some points there are indications which again refer to a security concern or to ambitions that have been introduced on the political level. The aim to *decrease the prosperity gap should end up in the containment of the flood of immigrants*[1010] exemplarily referred to the security concern, while there was also the EU's ambition expressed to *counteract the separative force among the cultures after the 11th of September*[1011] or *to banish the inequality between the North and South*[1012]. According to the German press, the European Union moves towards the ambivalent ambition to assure peace by monitoring and to enhance peace by transforming the world.

The only statement which implies a certain reference to the European predominance and the territorial appropriation was stated in the run-up to the Barcelona Process: *The Romans called the Mediterranean Sea Mare nostrum, our sea. This is what it should be again for the southern Europeans, who saw its Mediterranean space disregarded due to the opening towards the East and the northern enlargement of the EU*[1013].

3.3 Discourse analysis – Identity

Concerning the discourse witch targets at the identity of the European Union, namely its political ambition, its internal struggle, its role perception and assumed mandate (mission statement), about 139 statements could be identified within the German press.

3.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition

The references which correspond to the European political ambition deal with the European policy approach in the Mediterranean, its proceeding and its strategic considerations.

1008 Comp. „Die Partnerschaft soll auf drei Säulen beruhen: regelmäßiger politischer Dialog, wirtschaftliche Kooperation sowie Erfahrungsaustausch" Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ.

1009 Comp. „Ehrgeiziges Ziel ist es, den Mittelmeerraum in eine Zone politischer und wirtschaftlicher Stabilität zu verwandeln" now, (28.11.1995) FAZ.

1010 Comp. „Das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen Nord und Süd, das sich zur Zeit noch in Disparitäten wie ein Verhältnis von zehn zu eins in den Pro-Kopf-Einkommen niederschlägt, soll dadurch abgebaut werden -nicht zuletzt in der Absicht, die Flüchtlingswelle in die Union über Marokko, Tunesien und die Türkei einzudämmen" Behrendt/Hanelt, (16.04.1999) FAZ.

1011 Comp. „Die EU will der Spaltung der Kulturen nach dem 11. September entgegenwirken und ihrerseits ein Signal der Solidarität mit der arabischen Welt setzen" Jennen, (05.11.2001) FTD.

1012 Comp. „[Jouyet] Wir wollen damit das Ungleichgewicht zwischen Nord und Süd beseitigen" Jouyet, (02.02.2008) SZ.

1013 Comp. „Die Römer nannten das Mittelmeer Mare nostrum, unser Meer. Das soll es für die Südeuropäer wieder werden, die ihren mediterranen Raum nach der Ostöffnung und Norderweiterung an den Rand des neuen Europas gedrängt sehen" Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ.

In the run-up to the Barcelona Conference in 1995, the journalists in the German press stressed the launch of a new Mediterranean Policy as the purpose of the European Union. The press commented that *Europe must turn towards the Mediterranean, if it wants to banish the threats based in that region, namely the prosperity gap and the migration pressure*[1014]. The FAZ also agreed upon the fact *that the EU finally requires a mature Mediterranean Policy*[1015] and emphasised *that this represents an important test of the will of all Europeans to establish a common Foreign Policy*[1016]. Nevertheless, the main voices within the German press focused on emphasising the intended approach. T*he patronising chequebook diplomacy with semi-colonial attitudes is perceived as a threat that nourishes Islamic fundamentalism*[1017] and *due to the consolidation need of the northern enlargement, the European Union can not afford expensive developmental projects*[1018]. The FAZ further stated that *the watering-can principle is the wrong approach; multi-billion governmental auxiliary programmes are the invention of politicians and diplomats*[1019]*; with money alone problems can not be solved*[1020]*; in Brussels, there exists the ambition to act on the principle of carrot and stick; the one who introduces reforms early will receive more financial benefits than the agreed basal amount. However, it seems doubtable if former colonial rulers should behave like taskmasters. More promising seems to be the consideration to make free access to the EU-market, dependent on the willingness for a regional cooperation*[1021]. At the time when the conference in Barcelona took place, the FAZ repeated that *the EU is again subject to the fallacy of regularising everything with its chequebook; indeed, security is not for free, but it can neither be bought only with money*[1022]. From the European side it was stated that *the meeting alone was perceived as success*[1023]. These statements show that the European approach was already critically perceived in the run-up to the Barcelona Process. In 1999, on the occasion of the conference in Stutt-

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1014 Comp. „Inzwischen zeigt sich, dass sich Europa auch dem Süden stärker zuwenden muss, wenn es die von dort ausgehenden Gefahren bannen will“ and „Wenn das Wohlstandsgefälle nicht abgebaut werde, drohten breite Wanderungsströme, begründete die Kommission ihre Vorstellungen“ Brender, (21.03.1995) FAZ.

1015 Comp. „Richtig an der neuen Südinitiative ist, dass Europa endlich eine durchdachte Mittelmeerpolitik braucht“ Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ.

1016 Comp. „Die Mittelmeer-Konferenz Ende November in Barcelona kann nach spanischer Auffassung eine wichtige Probe sein für den Willen aller Europäer -ohne Ausnahme-, eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik zu finden“ Haubrich, (22.09.1995) FAZ.

1017 Comp. „Eine gönnerhafte Scheckbuch-Diplomatie der Europäer mit semikolonialen Attitüden kann dabei dem islamischen Fundamentalismus sogar neuen Nährboden geben“ Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ.

1018 Comp. „Die EU hat auf der anderen Seite nach ihrer Nord-Erweiterung Konsolidierungsbedarf und kann sich kostspielige Entwicklungsprojekte im Süden gar nicht leisten“ Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ.

1019 Comp. „Allerdings - die Gießkanne ist dazu das falsche Instrument. Milliardenschwere staatliche Hilfsprogramme sind die schnellen Einfälle von Politikern und Diplomaten“ Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ.

1020 Comp. „Mit Geld allein lassen sich die Probleme nicht lösen“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ.

1021 Comp. „In Brüssel gibt es Bestrebungen, dabei mit Zuckerbrot und Peitsche zu verfahren. Wer schneller Reformen einführe, solle über einen festgelegten Sockelbetrag hinaus in den Genuss weiterer finanzieller Hilfen kommen. Ob sich die ehemaligen Kolonialherren aus Europa als Zuchtmeister aufführen sollten, lässt sich bezweifeln. Erfolgsversprechender erscheint da schon die Überlegung, den freien Zugang zum EU-Markt von der Bereitschaft zur regionalen Kooperation abhängig zu machen“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ.

1022 Comp. „Die EU unterliegt auch hier wieder dem Trugschluss, dass mit dem Scheckbuch alles zu regeln sei. Sicherheit ist zwar nicht gratis zu haben, doch auch nicht mit Geld allein“ Editorial/“Berliner Zeitung“, (29.11.1995) FAZ.

1023 Comp. „Dass es überhaupt zu dem Treffen kam, mag man schon als Erfolg der Europäischen Union anerkennen“ wha, (29.11.1995) FAZ.

gart, it was stated that *the MNC partner countries demanded a signal of the European countries to demonstrate that the historic changes in the East will not provoke the turning away from the South*[1024]. Concerning the European ambition, it was reflected that *the European Union has its reasons for resuming the dialogue with its southern neighbours, especially as the chances for a long-term and stable improvement of the political situation have not been so promising for a long time*[1025]. In 2004, the political ambition of the European Union was described as follows: *the EU supports projects in the MNCs to enhance democratisation, the constitutional conditions and the evolvement of civil societies. With some of these countries even the combat against terrorism and migration issues are discussed*[1026]. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the FAZ gave voice to Javier Solana, who stated that *the enhancement of democracy, pluralism and human rights constitutes an integral part of the Barcelona initiative and that for the Europeans these are fundamental values, which they try to advance abroad*[1027]. Therewith, the newspaper gave room to a political mission statement, which was not further treated, commented or emphasised by the press. Around the same time, other newspapers commented on the European motivation for the Mediterranean Policy in connection with security concerns and stressed criticism about the approach. For example, it was stated in the SZ that *long before the pictures of African boat people and migrants in the barbwire of Ceuta and Melilla awaked the European consciousness, the European Union had conceived that the Mediterranean, the former mare nostrum of the Romans, had become a problematic region*[1028]. The SZ further noted that *the European policy in the Mediterranean yields unexpected fruits; in the beginning, the European calculus was simple: people who are doing business together can more easily be convinced to reconcile; to discuss with these people issues like democracy, human rights, refugees or the combat against terrorism was not thought of at that time*[1029]. Concerning the actual interest in the region, the FTD critically stated that the *EU-northern-lights conceive the Mediterranean as a vacation destination*

1024 Comp. „Außerdem forderten die Mittelmeeranrainer unter den EU-Staaten, es müsse ein Signal gesetzt werden, um zu zeigen, dass Europa sich, nach dem historischen Umbruch in seinem Osten, nicht vom Süden abwenden werde“ Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ.

1025 Comp. „Doch solche Schwierigkeiten ändern nichts daran, dass die Europäische Union allen Grund hat, den Dialog mit ihren Nachbarn am südlichen Mittelmeerufer neu aufzunehmen. Schon lange nicht mehr waren die Chancen so gut, dass sich die politische Lage dort langfristig und stabil verbessern könnte“ Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ.

1026 Comp. „Die EU unterstützt in diesen Staaten auch Projekte zur Demokratisierung, zur Verbesserung der rechtsstaatlichen Verhältnisse und zur Förderung der Zivilgesellschaft. Mit einigen von ihnen wird auch über die Bekämpfung des Terrorismus und Fragen der Migration gesprochen“ bc, (01.12.2004) FAZ.

1027 Comp. „Die Förderung von Demokratie, Pluralismus und Menschenrechte war schon immer Teil der Barcelona-Initiative. Für uns Europäer sind dies fundamentale Werte, weshalb wir diese auch im Ausland zu fördern suchen“ Solana, (28.11.2005) FAZ.

1028 Comp. „Lange bevor die Bilder afrikanischer Boat People oder von Migranten im Stacheldraht der spanischen Exklaven Ceuta und Melilla die Nordeuropäer aufschreckten, hatte die Europäische Union begriffen, dass das Mittelmeer, das einstige Mare Nostrum der Römer, für sie zu einer Problem-Region geworden war“ Chimelli, (03.11.2005) SZ.

1029 Comp. „Die europäische Politik für das Mittelmeer trägt Früchte, die sich die EU am Anfang gar nicht gewünscht hatte (...)Das europäische Kalkül war schlicht: Wer miteinander Handel treibt, lässt sich eher zur Beilegung von Konflikten bewegen. Daran, mit diesen Ländern auch ein Gespräch über Demokratie, Menschenrechte, Flüchtlinge oder den Kampf gegen den Terrorismus einzutreten, dachte damals noch keiner“ Winter, (26.11.2005) SZ.

rather than anything else[1030] and that *the Europeans have not reached their goal to bind the MNC politically and economically closer to them*[1031]. The FTD additionally expressed the conviction that *Europe should accompany the development in the Arab countries as a partner rather than a conductor*[1032]. It infers from this that the perception of the European approach is everything but altruistic, even predominant. Concerning the official political ambition to transport European values, the TAZ stated that *it is not in the preliminary interest of the European Union to export democracy, but to assure security in its own territory*[1033]. In the concrete context of the foundation of the Mediterranean Union, the SZ attested Europe a *strategic confusion*[1034] and stated that the *problems all have the same root: Europe lacks of orientation, it misses a final profile, a concrete goal*[1035].

Although the need for a political approach in the Mediterranean is recognized and the European effort is considered to point towards the right direction, the methodological approach and the strategic consideration are critically stressed.

3.3.2 The European Union – its internal struggle

Although the articles in the German press also stress the time span before the conference in Barcelona, the statements, which refer to the internal struggle, mainly treat the separative character which is inherent in the original French proposal of a Mediterranean Union only for countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea.

The FAZ stated that *only after the criticism of the German Chancellor Merkel, saying that a Mediterranean Union without a great part of the European countries would be a severe test for the European Union, Sarkozy conceded the perspective of a Mediterranean Union in which all EU-countries are participating*[1036]. Beforehand, Sarkozy tried to find a majority for his project and could win Spain and Italy for his position. Spain expressed that *it wants the Mediterranean countries to become decisive protagonists parallel to the EU*[1037]; and Italy stated that *the war of cultures can only be won with concrete initiatives*[1038]. Anyhow, Sarkozy accepted that his Mediterranean Union could only be launched

1030 Comp. „Die EU-Nordlichter betrachten das Mittelmeer eher als Urlaubsgegend“ Koch, (01.03.2000) FTD.

1031 Comp. „Die Europäer sind ihrem Ziel, die Mittelmeerstaaten politisch und wirtschaftlich näher an sich zu binden, nicht viel näher gekommen“ Koch, (14.11.2000) FTD.

1032 Comp. „Europa hat das Ziel ihre Entwicklung [arab. Länder] als Partner nicht als Dirigent zu begleiten“ Hanelt, (25.11.2005) FTD.

1033 Comp. „Europa geht es bislang nicht darum, Demokratie zu exportieren, sondern in erster Linie um die Sicherung eigener Hoheitsgebiete. Das sind Ausbesserungsarbeiten an der Festung Europa“ Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ.

1034 Comp. „Europa ist strategisch verwirrt“ Weidenfeld, (8.11.2008) SZ.

1035 Comp. „All die Probleme deuten auf eine gemeinsame Wurzel: Europa fehlt die Orientierung, es fehlt ein finales Profil, ein eindeutiges Ziel“ (08.11.2008) SZ.

1036 Comp. „Erst nach der Kritik von Kanzlerin Merkel, dass eine Mittelmeer-Union unter Ausschluss eines Teils der EU-Mitgliedstaaten eine schwere Belastungsprobe für die EU darstellen würde, hat Sarkozy in Aussicht gestellt, die Mittelmeer-Union anderen Mitgliedsstaaten zu öffnen“ Wiegel, (08.12.2007) FAZ.

1037 Comp. „[Zapatero] "Wir wollen, dass die Länder des Mittelmeers parallel zur EU entscheidende Protagonisten werden"“ mic, (22.12.2007) FAZ.

1038 Comp. „[Prodi] "Der Krieg der Kulturen kann nur mit konkreten Initiativen gewonnen werden", (…)“ mic, (22.12.2007) FAZ.

within the scope of the Barcelona Process.[1039] He was quoted in the FAZ, stating that *Angela wanted all European countries to have the possibility to participate. In contrast, he thought that the process, launched in 1995, was stuck and that one would have to evolve a real partnership with the countries of the South*[1040]. It was a long struggle and the German government finally achieved that the French project was imbedded in the already existing structures.[1041]

Nevertheless, the dissociative character of this debate was also subject of the German newspapers. Bernard Kouchner stated in an interview in the Welt that France *has demonstrated that it had found back to the diplomatic way of dialogue*[1042] and that *France today is playing a proactive role in the world*[1043]. The Welt further commented that *France wants to be bigger as it is*[1044]. The TAZ also accentuated the French position critically, stating that *in reality Sarkozy incorporates the decline of the model of a visionary European statesman*[1045]; in the context of the Mediterranean Policy, *Sarkozy was never really concerned with the EU and Turkey; his concerns are the French national interests, which he wants to appear more valuable as they are by mantling them with the etiquette of modernisation*[1046]. The criticism on the French procedure was less discussed than expected. The historic rivalry between Germany and France did not dominate the articles in the considered newspapers. The criticism was objective and the tonality concerning Angela Merkel benevolent but not exuberant, although it was her reaction that forced Sarkozy to change his mind.

3.3.3 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean

The statements assigned to this category within the German press concern, on the one hand, the different roles the European Union assumes in the Mediterranean and stress, on the other hand, the EU as a counter-balance to the United States.

The most decisive role of the EU in the Mediterranean is the one as a financier and an investor. In 2005, the FAZ reported that in the past ten years *a total of 6.2 billion Euro had been paid to the partner countries, which makes the European Union the largest non-military auxiliary donor in the Middle*

1039 Comp. „Sarkozy hat offenbar akzeptiert, dass seine Mittelmeerunion nur unter dem Dach des Barcelona-Prozesses gebildet werden darf“ Schmiese, (04.03.2008) FAZ.

1040 Comp. „(Sarkozy) "Angela wollte, dass alle europäischen Länder im Rahmen des Barcelona-Prozesses mitmachen können. Und ich dachte, dass dieser Prozess, 1995 begonnen, stecken geblieben sei und dass man eine wirkliche Partnerschaft mit den Ländern des Südens schaffen müsse"“ flf, (07.03.2008) FAZ.

1041 Comp. „Nach einigem Hin und Her gelang es der Bundesregierung schließlich, dem französischen Projekt die Spitze zu nehmen, in dem sie dessen Einbettung in die bestehenden Strukturen der EU durchsetzte“ Busse, (15.03.2008) FAZ.

1042 Comp. „Bernard Kouchner: Wir haben gezeigt, dass Frankreich zu einer Diplomatie des Dialogs zurückgefunden hat“ Hehn, (20.07.2008) Welt.

1043 Comp. „(B. Kouchner): Frankreich spielt heute weltweit eine aktive Rolle“ Hehn, (20.07.2008) Welt.

1044 Comp. „Frankreich will größer sein, als es ist“ Schmid, (31.07.2007) Welt.

1045 Comp. „In Wirklichkeit verkörpert Sarkozy den Niedergang der Figur des visionären europäischen Staatsmanns“ Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ.

1046 Comp. „Nein, Sarkozy geht es weder um Europa noch um die Türkei. Ihm geht es um scheinbare französische Nationalinteressen, die er mit dem Etikett der Modernisierung wertvoller zu machen versucht, als sie es in Wirklichkeit sind“ Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ.

East[1047]. Of course, this aspect provokes reactions on the public level, which have already been mentioned before to a certain extent. At this point, not the fact per se shall be stressed, but the reactions which relate to the EU's actual role as a main financier in the region. The SZ, for example, indirectly referred to the power that this role implicates and the lack of results on the MNC side, stating that *the patience of the Europeans is big, but may not be endless*[1048]. In another context, the fact that the European Union put conditions on its auxiliary programmes was stressed with the following question: *what would the EU be if it renounced to combine aid and credits with the demand for democracy and transparency in the South?*[1049] It was commented in the FAZ that the *EU-offices know about the reciprocal dependences, which is why it may not comport itself like a schoolmaster*[1050]. The ambivalent application and endorsement of conditions in connection with the role of being the mayor financier reflects the ambivalent position regarding a more proactive or distant role of the European Union abroad in the German press.

Other references demand a more proactive role of the European Union. If this concerns the fact that the EU should *make more use of the existing instruments of the Barcelona Process*[1051], in the context of the closure of association agreements it is *suggested that the EU should be more convincing*[1052]. The proactive role was also repetitively stressed in connection with the Middle East Peace Process, where *the EU is among the players in the peace process as it is a member of the Middle East quartet*[1053]. The request to become more proactive and play a more effective role in the Middle East is a central aim of the European Foreign Policy, to a great extent due to distinguishing itself. This appears to be difficult, as from time to time the lack of concept becomes obvious. Thus, it was stated in 2000 in the FTD that *the European Mediterranean strategy to enhance prosperity in the eastern Mediterranean region is not linked to the Gulf region. This demonstrates a lack of concept how the Iran and the Iraq could peacefully be integrated in the region*[1054]. The FTD further accentuated that *the European Union must ascertain its priorities and conduct them consequently*[1055].

1047 Comp. „(…) Seit 1995 insgesamt 6,2 Milliarden Euro an die Partnerländer gezahlt. (…) Das macht die EU zum größten nicht militärischen Hilfegeber im Mittelmeerraum und im Nahen Osten" Busse, (11.01.2005) FAZ.

1048 Comp. „Die Geduld der Europäer ist groß, aber sie darf nicht unendlich sein." Wtr, (28.11.2005) FTD.

1049 Comp. „Was aber wäre die EU, wenn sie im Süden darauf verzichten würde, Hilfen und Kredite mit Ansprüchen nach Demokratie und Transparenz zu verbinden?" Schlötzer, (23.01.2008) SZ.

1050 Comp. „Am EU-Sitz weiß man jedoch, daß sich Europa angesichts der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit nicht als Schulmeister gebärden darf" Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ.

1051 Comp. „Zudem habe man durch den Barcelona-Prozess bereits ein Instrumentarium, das genutzt werden müsse" Caceres, (01.02.2008) SZ.

1052 Comp. „Hier muss die EU Überzeugungsarbeit leisten" Berenth/Hanelt, (11.09.2000) FTD.

1053 Comp. „(...)ist die EU heute als Mitglied des Nahost-Quartetts ein Mitspieler im Friedensprozeß" Bacia, (28.11.2005) FAZ.

1054 Comp. „Außerdem fällt auf, dass die Mittelmeerstrategie Wohlstand und Sicherheit im östlichen Mittelmeerraum nicht mit den Entwicklungen in der Golfregion verknüpft. Es fehlt ein Konzept wie Iran und Irak in Zukunft friedlich an die Region angeschlossen werden können" Berenth/Hanelt, (11.09.2000) FTD.

1055 Comp. „Die Europäische Union muss in ihrer Mittelmeerstrategie Prioritäten setzen und diese konsequent verfolgen" Berenth/Hanelt, (11.09.2000) FTD.

Especially in respect of the Middle East the role of Europe in the world power concert has to be stressed. For years the EU has been requested to obtain a more proactive role in the Mediterranean, also for the reason that the Arab countries seek for a counter-balance to the United States. Concerning the Mediterranean Affairs, the relation to the USA is also treated in the German press; for example, in the run-up of the Barcelona Process, where *the main dissent, especially between Spain and France, concerned the participation of the United States and Russia at the conference in Barcelona*[1056]. It was obvious for all that there *was no protagonist role conceded to the USA*[1057]. In 1996, the EU made an effort to explain its position that *neither the USA nor Europe should aim for a false protagonism in the Middle East and that both powers could complement each other well in their work*[1058]. In 1997, it was stated that *the absence of representatives of the United States minimises the hope to implement a new dynamic in the Middle East Peace Process*[1059]. At the same time *the EU remained unimpressed in regard to the US-warning not to mix the Middle East Conflict with the process of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*[1060]. In 2003, it was stated that the *USA hopes to avoid through their concept similar problems which are contained in the European approach*[1061]. Additionally, in 2004 the European Union apparently *made clear that it wanted to contribute a proper approach to the, from the United States, suggested initiative to democratise and modernise the Middle East*[1062].

These statements indicate the aim of the European Union to advance to a serious world power. Although it struggles with its concept, coherence and consistency, the EU tries to self-confidently position itself opposed to the predominating United States. The German Press relates to these happenings and basically finds an encouraging tone.

4 Great Britain

Far the fewest statements have been identified in the British Press, in the Guardian (liberal with conservative tendency) and in the Independent (moderate liberal). The distribution of statements per

1056 Comp. „Über die Teilnahme der Vereinigten Staaten und Russlands an der Mittelmeerkonferenz der Europäischen Union und der südlichen Mittelmeeranrainer in Barcelona (27. und 28. November) gibt es noch Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen Frankreich und dem Veranstalterland Spanien“ wha, (07.10.1995) FAZ.

1057 Comp. „Eine Protagonistenrolle hätten wir den Vereinigten Staaten sicher nicht zugestanden“ wha, (07.10.1995) FAZ.

1058 Comp. „Es sollte im Nahen Osten kein falscher Protagonismus gesucht werden, weder von den Vereinigten Staaten noch von Europa. Beide Mächte können sich dort in ihrer Arbeit sehr gut ergänzen“ Haubrich, (08.11.1996) FAZ.

1059 Comp. „Da die Konferenz ohne amerikanische Präsenz stattfindet, sind die Hoffnungen auf eine von der Mittelmeerinsel ausgehende neue Dynamik im nahöstlichen Friedensprozess gering“ Stabenow, (17.04.1997) FAZ.

1060 Comp. „Unbeeindruckt blieben die Europäer durch die jüngsten Mahnungen aus Washington, die Nahost-Problematik nicht mit dem Prozess der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft zu vermischen“ Stabenow, (17.04.1997) FAZ.

1061 Comp. „Die USA hoffen, dass durch ihr Konzept Probleme, mit denen die EU-Initiative zu kämpfen hat, vermieden werden“ Alden/Khalaf, (12.05.2003) FTD.

1062 Comp. „An der von den Vereinigten Staaten vorgeschlagenen Initiative zur Demokratisierung und Modernisierung des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens will sich die Europäische Union mit einem eigenständigen Ansatz beteiligen“ Bc, (06.03.2004) FAZ.

newspaper shows that more statements could be identified in the regarded articles of the Guardian (30) than in the Independent (19):

GREAT BRITAIN	number of articles per category and newspaper		
	Independent	**Guardian**	Total
Expression	9	4	13
Purpose	2	3	5
Identity	8	23	31
	19	**30**	**49**

The distribution per category indicates that by far the most statements have been allocated to "identity" (31). Only five statements gave an insight into the purpose/aim of the European Mediterranean Policy:

GREAT BRITAIN	number of statements per category				
	the other	**ass./diss.**	**mmr**	**mmpol**	total
Expression	1	6	0	6	**13**
	purpose	aim			
Purpose	2	3			**5**
	EU				
Identity	31				**31**

The distribution of the statements per year indicates the following pattern:

GREAT BRITAIN	distribution of the statements per category and year														
	95	**96**	**97**	**98**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	Total
Expression						1				2	7			3	13
Purpose											3			2	5
Identity										4	4		4	19	31
Total						**1**				**6**	**14**		**4**	**24**	**49**

Within the British press articles were found from the year 2000 onwards[1063]. Not surprisingly, in the years 2005 and 2008 the highest density of considered statements was noted.

4.1 Discourse analysis - Expression

The few statements which have been assigned to this category concern the British perception of associative and dissociative elements within the co-operational relations with the MNC and the European Mediterranean Policy per se.

1063 Due to the fact that there were a higher number of articles identified, for example, in Switzerland, the lack of accession to previous articles, which would have been an expensive undertaking, was regarded as not predominantly significant.

4.1.1 The view of the "other", associative/dissociative elements of the partnership

Considering the identified statements, both subcategories melt to a single examination, as the messages of the discourse largely interfere. Basically, the British press focuses on four aspects, dealing with the "other" in reference to associative and dissociative, respectively elements of cooperation.

The first aspect concerns the reported conviction that the *Arab countries are desperate for a strong European role*[1064] in the Mediterranean. From this derives the basal consideration of the British discourse that the European engagement finds support in the Arab world; hence, the associative issue would be a voluntary and volitional position, a consent, regarding the European engagement.

The second element refers to *the Turkish request to join the European Union*[1065] and the British conviction that the Barcelona Process needs to play a major role in supporting Turkish aspirations to join the EU. This position indicates the possibility of an associative, an integrative element of the cooperation, which the British newspaper the Independent supports.

A dissociative character and third issue is mentioned in connection with the definition of terrorism. The Independent, which published the speech of the secretary general of the League of Arab States, quoted: *no, we don't believe and we refuse to accept the superficial and bad faith interpretations of the origins of terrorism as a product of Islamic thought and education*[1066].This statement constitutes one of the rare occasions that facilitates an insight into the "other". As it was already stated in the context of the analysis of other documents, the agreement on a common formulation and on the definition of terms like "terrorism" is a sensitive part among the partners. Therefore, it is remarkable that the secretary of the Arab League was given the voice in the British press.

The last aspect in the British discourse concerning these categories can be found at the time of the Paris summit in 2008, where the partner countries raised their concerns over the Mediterranean Union: *Libya and Algeria expressed fears that the new union was just a means of reasserting French colonial ambitions in North Africa and of keeping the pressures of immigration into southern Europe at bay. Other Arabs were suspicious that, by inviting Israel, the project was a mean to push Mr Sarkozy's hopes of integrating Israel into a wider Europe. Human rights remain conspicuous by their absence from the agenda. And worries that this was all a French plot under European disguise were hardly allayed by the choice of initial co-operation schemes – solar power, nuclear energy and cleaning up*

1064 Comp. „And since the Arabs are desperate for a strong European role – and maybe a European multilateral force – that left the Israelis with their usual veto" Fisk, (17.11.2000) the Independent.

1065 Comp. „The same could also be said on the issue of the Turkish request to join the European Union. This issue has cultural and civilisational dimensions" Secretary general of the League of Arab States, (14.09.2005) Independent.

1066 Comp. „No, we don't believe and we refuse to accept the superficial and bad faith interpretations of the origins of terrorism as a product of Islamic thought and education" Secretary general of the League of Arab States, (14.09.2005) Independent.

the sea – in all of which French industrial presence is strong[1067]. Another statement, published in the Guardian, deals with the reaction of the Libyan president Muammar al-Gaddafi: *Gaddafi dismissed a French proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean alliance as an insult to Arabs and Africans. "This is taking us for fools," he said. "We do not belong to Brussels. Our Arab League is located in Cairo and the African Union is located in Addis Ababa. If they want cooperation they have to go through Cairo an Addis Ababa."*[1068]

These statements are remarkable insofar, as they again provide a rare insight into the concern of the "other". The expressed incommodities of course inhere also a strong dissociative character, because they indicate a predominant European position and an uncertainty regarding the intentions of the European Union. The best example in this respect is Libya, which currently still rejects the cooperation within the existing political frame.

4.1.2 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

Less statements than expected refer to the Mediterranean Policy. Beside some definitional references, there is clear request on what the Mediterranean policy should fulfil and there are also evaluative statements.

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary, a general definition of the Mediterranean Policy was published in the Guardian: *an ambitious attempt to strengthen links with the countries on its southern flank, from Morocco in the west to Syria and Jordan in the Middle East proper, boldly taking in Israel and the Palestinian territories*[1069]. However, in the same context the policy was also defined as *lopsided partnership*[1070]*, including* certain criticism about the poor outcome so far. Anyhow, in 2004 an unambiguous positive statement regarding the Barcelona Process could also be found. It stressed that *it's not dramatic and its progress has been somewhat stuttering to date. But it is working, as recent developments in Iran and North Africa have shown, because it offers inducement without*

1067 Comp. „Libya and Algeria expressed fears that the new union was just a means of reasserting French colonial ambitions in North Africa and of keeping the pressures of immigration into southern Europe at bay. Other Arabs were suspicious that, by inviting Israel, the project was a mean to push Mr Sarkozy's hopes of integrating Israel into a wider Europe. Human rights remain conspicuous by their absence from the agenda. And worries that this was all a French plot under European disguise were hardly allayed by the choice of initial co-operation schemes – solar power, nuclear energy and cleaning up the sea – in all of which French industrial presence is strong" Editorial, (12.07.2008) Independent.

1068 Comp. „dismissed a French proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean alliance as an insult to Arabs and Africans. "This is taking us for fools," he said. "We do not belong to Brussels. Our Arab League is located in Cairo and the African Union is located in Addis Ababa. If they want cooperation they have to go through Cairo an Addis Ababa."" Black, (12.06.2008) Guardian.

1069 Comp. "(…) launched an ambitious attempt to strengthen links with the countries on its southern flank, from Morocco in the west to Syria and Jordan in the Middle East proper, boldly taking in Israel and the Palestinian territories" Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian.

1070 Comp. „Europeans must try harder to overcome the obstacles and turn this lopsided partnership into a more constructive one" Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian.

imposition[1071].

Concerning critical evaluations of the Barcelona Process, there are several statements which stress its failure. One was published on the occasion of the anniversary conference in 2005, when it was denounced that at *least eight of the non-EU 10 failed to send their leaders*[1072]. This constituted an herb reversal for the Barcelona Process and indicated the unmasked support of the initiative among the participating countries. The Middle East conflict is also perceived as a harming factor for the initiative[1073], due to the fact that the lack of efficiency in general is critically evaluated and seen as a reason why *the Barcelona Process has run into the sands*[1074].

The British discourse mentions the predominant European role in the Barcelona Process; moreover, it values its positive effects and its final aim despite the poor results.

4.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose

The fewest statements have been identified for the analytical category "purpose".

The purpose and the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy

Within the British press the purpose of the Mediterranean Policy is assigned to security concerns and the wish to define the European Foreign Policy. The security concern can be derived from statements like: *self-interest and altruism coincided in a plan to export stability into Europe's "Club Med" backyard or see instability imported into the EU's own house*[1075]*;* or, the policy seeks *to align governments with the concerns of a myopic global security agenda*[1076]. Therewith, the ambivalence of the European purpose is made clear. On the one hand, there is the security concern which forms the main motivation, namely the self-interest; on the other hand, there is the wish to fulfil a properly assumed mission. Criticism becomes also apparent when it is stated that the policy is regarded to be myopic.

The officially stated aim mainly expresses the European altruistic plan, as it was formulated in 2005: *the launching of the Barcelona Process in 1995 was aimed at forming a new community of nations with their Mediterranean identity as the common denominator and the dialogue between its several*

1071 Comp. „It's not dramatic and its progress has been somewhat stuttering to date. But it is working, as recent developments in Iran and North Africa have shown, because it offers inducement without imposition" Hamilton, (18.03.2004) Independent.

1072 Comp. „European leaders turned out in force, including Tony Blair, but at least eight of the non-EU 10 failed to send their leaders" MacAskill, (28.11.2005) Guardian.

1073 Comp. „(…) the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to haunt the scene because biased policies have pushed the conflict into a dead end" secretary general of the League of Arab State, (14.09.2005) Independent.

1074 Comp. „The existing drive towards closer relationship with North Africa in the Barcelona process of 1995 has run into the sands" Editorial, (12.07.2008) Independent.

1075 Comp. „Self-interest and altruism coincided in a plan to export stability into Europe's "Club Med" backyard or see instability imported into the EU's own house." Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian.

1076 Comp. „(…) seeks to align governments with the concerns of a myopic global security agenda" Bin Talal, (06.02.2008) Guardian.

civilisations a priority item, along with security, culture and social development[1077]*; o*r in 2008: t*he new Union for the Mediterranean will attempt to set up common approaches to, among other things, global warming, investment, solar energy, water shortages, illegal immigration, maritime pollution, road and sea transport and university exchange programmes*[1078]. These statements indicate a lot of the will and the ambitions, which make the Mediterranean Union attractive for the co-operating countries; however, the actual purpose of the European Union is difficult to be deduced.

4.3 Discourse analysis – Identity

The statements regarding the analytical category "identity" concern references to the political ambition and role of the European Union and also to the internal forces and national interests of the member states.

4.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition

All thirty-one statements which refer to this category have been published after 2004. Concerning the European political ambition, this means that the EU enlargement of 2004 had already been taken place, the ENP had already been introduced and the Barcelona Process was confronted with its most criticised moment in the anniversary year 2005, three years before Sarkozy expressed its vision of a Mediterranean Union.

The European political ambition was stressed in connection with its approach in the Mediterranean. In the Guardian, it was stated that *the European Union has pressurised Maghreb countries into economic liberalisation to create opportunities for European business, but these have not improved the lives of the majority*[1079]. This statement implicitly scrutinized the efficiency of the European method. The Guardian further stated that *the expanded EU is offering its new neighbours greater cooperation and assistance – but also keeping them at arm's length*[1080]. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary, the Guardian expressed the following in a less metaphoric way, but with a remarkable portion of criticism: *EU financial aid has not been made conditional on reforms, giving little incentive for Arab regimes, scaremongering about Islamists, to democratise. Still, it would be quite wrong to write off the*

1077 Comp. „The launching of the Barcelona Process in 1995 was aimed at forming a new community of nations with their Mediterranean identity as the common denominator and the dialogue between its several civilisations a priority item, along with security, culture and social development" secretary general of the League of Arab States, (14.09.2005) Independent.

1078 Comp. „The new Union for the Mediterranean will attempt to set up common approaches to, among other things, global warming, investment, solar energy, water shortages, illegal immigration, maritime pollution, road and sea transport and university exchange programmes" Lichfield, (14.07.2008) Independent.

1079 Comp. „The European Union has pressurised Maghreb countries into economic liberalisation to create opportunities for European business, but these have not improved the lives of the majority" Landor, (07.03.2004) Guardian.

1080 Comp. „The expanded EU is offering its new neighbours greater cooperation and assistance – but also keeping them at arm's length" Black, (13.05.2004) Guardian.

Euro-Med dialogue[1081].

In the same context a concrete request was expressed, stating that *Europeans must try harder to overcome the obstacles and turn this lopsided partnership into a more constructive one*[1082].

Thus, the European Union is dedicated to a political ambition in the Mediterranean, which the Independent described as *a perfectly sensible course of its own through the Barcelona process which tries to bring North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel) closer to Europe through trade and investment agreements tempered by human rights requirements*[1083]; but the criticism, which had been directed towards the efficiency of the initiative in the Mediterranean, was also perceived as challenge for the entire concept of the European Foreign Policy: *in one sense for Europe to go along with the Greater Middle East initiative requires no more than melding this policy with US might. But in another sense, it wraps a policy of patient diplomacy in a new language of demand which could bring about the very conditions of conflict that it seeks to resolve*[1084]. In addition, it was even more explicitly stated in 2007: *the European Union's policy in the Middle East is the litmus test of its common foreign and security policy*[1085].

Beside the threat, which a project of such an immense dimension always might to entail for the initiator, the European role in the Mediterranean is positively perceived by the British press: *funding from the EU and from member states has helped to alleviate suffering, while compassionate community-building efforts by European individuals and organisations have highlighted the true closeness of all who share a common Mediterranean history. It is vital that Europe's experience, commitment and heritage of hope be framed in a vision for the Middle East that becomes a model for its future*[1086]. This implies a mission character and aims to legitimate the European approach to represent a role-model, beside the technical and co-operational assistance.

1081 Comp. „EU financial aid has not been made conditional on reforms, giving little incentive for Arab regimes, scaremongering about Islamists, to democratise. Still, it would be quite wrong to write off the Euro-Med dialogue" Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian.

1082 Comp. „Europeans must try harder to overcome the obstacles and turn this lopsided partnership into a more constructive one" Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian.

1083 Comp. „The European Union has so far pursued a perfectly sensible course of its own through the Barcelona process which tries to bring North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel) closer to Europe through trade and investment agreements tempered by human rights requirements" Hamilton, (18.03.2004) Independent.

1084 Comp. „In one sense for Europe to go along with the Greater Middle East initiative requires no more than melding this policy with US might. But in another sense, it wraps a policy of patient diplomacy in a new language of demand which could bring about the very conditions of conflict that it seeks to resolve" Hamilton, (18.02.2004) Independent.

1085 Comp. „The European Union's policy in the Middle East is the litmus test of its common foreign and security policy" Bin Talal, (21.10.2007) Guardian.

1086 Comp. „Funding from the EU and from member states has helped to alleviate suffering, while compassionate community-building efforts by European individuals and organisations have highlighted the true closeness of all who share a common Mediterranean history. It is vital that Europe's experience, commitment and heritage of hope be framed in a vision for the Middle East that becomes a model for its future" Bin Talal, (21.10.2007) Guardian.

4.3.2 The European Union – its internal struggle

The distinctive forces within the European Union are based on the individual interests of the member states. In respect of the Mediterranean Policy, the British press outlined that *France, Spain and Italy had long looked across the Mediterranean to their old Maghreb colonies; Britain's role stretched back decades; all Europeans share interests in the region*[1087]. Therewith, the internal struggle was pre-programmed. The most determined phase within the discourse of the British press was the time after the original French proposal to found a Mediterranean Union only with countries bordering the Mediterranean. The following debate was mainly conducted by France and Germany. Germany, *the EU paymaster, balked at that and also suspected a Sarkozy scheme to divide the EU into zones of influence where Berlin would take charge to its east and Paris would play the main role in the south*[1088]. The Independent commented on the German rejection of Sarkozy's plan as follows: *Berlin has been especially annoyed by M. Sarkozy's determination to push ahead with a so-called "Club Med" or formal union of countries on the shores of the Mediterranean. Chancellor Merkel believes that such an organisation would be either a pointless distraction or a threat to the unity of the EU*[1089]. Great Britain also opposed the French plan, less because of the threat to the conception of Europe, but because of the question concerning the Turkish integration: *Britain also opposed the plan, suspecting it was designed to wreck any chance of Turkey joining the EU. Britain is Turkey's biggest supporter in the EU, while Sarkozy is outspokenly opposed to Ankara joining*[1090].

Beside this clear statement, the British press also commented on the suggested policy direction, stating that *the idea is to create a permanent institutional link between Europe and all countries with Mediterranean coastlines, including such odd bedfellows as Israel, Palestine, Syria and Libya. The hope is that the union will boost economic and security cooperation*[1091]. And further: *Despite the fanfare in Paris, Sarkozy's new "Club Med" will be a long haul if it is to amount too much beyond a talking shop and a channel for transferring EU funds to the Maghreb and the Middle East*[1092]. These critical voices imply a distant and irritated position regarding the French proposal because of the uncertainty

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1087 Comp. „France, Spain and Italy had long looked across the Mediterranean to their old Maghreb colonies; Britain's role stretched back decades; all Europeans shared interests in the region" Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian.

1088 Comp. „Germany, the EU paymaster, balked at that and also suspected a Sarkozy scheme to divide the EU into zones of influence where Berlin would take charge to its east and Paris would play the main role in the south" Traynor, (14.07.2008) Guardian.

1089 Comp. „Berlin has been especially annoyed by M. Sarkozy's determination to push ahead with a so-called "Club Med" or formal union of countries on the shores of the Mediterranean. Chancellor Merkel believes that such an organisation would be either a pointless distraction or a threat to the unity of the EU" Lichfield/Paterson, (28.02.2008) Independent.

1090 Comp. „Britain also opposed the plan, suspecting it was designed to wreck any chance of Turkey joining the EU. Britain is Turkey's biggest supporter in the EU, while Sarkozy is outspokenly opposed to Ankara joining" Traynor, (14.03.2008) Guardian.

1091 Comp. „The idea is to create a permanent institutional link between Europe and all countries with Mediterranean coastlines, including such odd bedfellows as Israel, Palestine, Syria and Libya. The hope is that the union will boost economic and security cooperation" Tisdall, (10.07.2008) Guardian.

1092 Comp. „Despite the fanfare in Paris, Sarkozy's new "Club Med" will be a long haul if it is to amount too much beyond a talking shop and a channel for transferring EU funds to the Maghreb and the Middle East" Traynor, (14.07.2008) Guardian.

concerning the expectations and because of the fact that main issues, like the Turkish question, are not in line with the British official policy.

Within the British press, the handling of the French proposal concerned, on the one hand, statements which aimed to stress the French purpose. For example, the following was commented on the French attempt to position itself well within the European power concert: *(...) Sarkozy's grand initiative is acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign policy-marking after years of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south*[1093]. It was further stated that, according to critical voices, *Sarkozy's grand project is a vainglorious attempt to increase French influence in a region it has manipulated and exploited since Napoleonic times. They say Sarkozy is merely trying to boost his own battered standing and France's EU presidency*[1094].

On the other hand, the matter was stressed in connection with the strategic aim of the French proposed Mediterranean Union. In this regard the French initiative was classified as follows: *(...) Sarkozy's grand initiative is acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign policy-marking after years of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south*[1095]. And, combined with a historic reference: *Sarkozy's big idea is to use imperial Rome's centre of the world as a unifying factor linking 44 countries that are home to 800 million people*[1096].

Beside all these reactions on the French proposals, the discourse in the British press regarding the British position within the European Union is remarkable low-key. Nevertheless, it offers a clear confirmation on the existence of an internal struggle within the European Union due to the national interests of the member states.

5 Italy

The analysis of statements published in la Repubblica (moderate liberal) and the Corriere della Serra (liberal with conservative tendency) represents the Italian public discourse in the present work. These newspapers range on the first and second place, respectively in the ranking of the newspapers, which have been considered in this thesis, with the highest circulation.

In the newspaper la Repubblica (72) slightly more statements have been considered than in the Corriere della Serra (56).

1093 Comp. „(…) Sarkozy's grand initiative is acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign policy-marking after years of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south" Traynor, (14.07.2008) Guardian.

1094 Comp. „Critics – (…) – say Sarkozy's grand project is a vainglorious attempt to increase French influence in a region it has manipulated and exploited since Napoleonic times. They say Sarkozy is merely trying to boost his own battered standing and France's EU presidency – (…)" Tisdall, (10.07.2008) Guardian.

1095 Comp. "(…) Sarkozy's grand initiative is acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign policy-marking after years of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south" Traynor, (14.07.2008) Guardian.

1096 Comp. „Sarkozy's big idea is to use imperial Rome's centre of the world as a unifying factor linking 44 countries that are home to 800 million people." Traynor, (14.07.2008) Guardian.

ITALY	number of articles per category and newspaper		
	la Repubblica	**Corriere della Sera**	Total
Expression	26	16	42
Purpose	14	9	23
Identity	32	31	63
	72	**56**	**128**

Most statements have been assigned to the category "identity" (63), followed by "expression" (42) and "purpose" (23).

ITALY	number of statements per category				
	the other	ass./diss.	mmr	Mmpol	Total
Expression	1	6	7	28	**42**
	purpose	aim			
Purpose	12	11			**23**
	EU				
Identity	63				**63**

The distribution of the statements per year indicates the following pattern:

ITALY	distribution of the statements per category and year														
	95	**96**	**97**	**98**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	Total
Expression	9	1		4	1				3	3	11	6	4		42
Purpose	8	3		2	1					5	2		2		23
Identity	10	2	3	9					4	5	7	8	14	1	63
total	**27**	**6**	**3**	**15**	**2**				**7**	**13**	**20**	**14**	**20**	**1**	**128**

By far the most statements have been considered as relevant in 1995, the initiation year of the Barcelona Process. Many statements can be found in 2005, the anniversary year, and, surprisingly, also in 2007, while there has only one statement been identified in 2008. The reason therefore partly lies in the position Italy that wants to aspire in Mediterranean Affairs. This is why the debate before the 13.07.2008, the Paris Summit, is more significant for the Italian discourse than the current reporting of the events.

5.1 Discourse analysis – Expression

Statements, which are assigned to the analytical category "expression", give indications for the co-operational level by stressing associative and dissociative elements and for the perception of the Mediterranean as a region; moreover, some of them define and evaluate the European Mediterranean Policy.

5.1.1 The view of the "other", associative/dissociative elements of the partnership

Interestingly, there are no significant statements which indicate a special image of the "other" within the Italian press. The references to the "other" and to associative or dissociative elements mainly concern situational difficulties, which contain dissociative elements for the cooperation. The main issue that has been stressed within the articles refers to the immigration concern. In 1996, it was stated that *due to the overt position towards Libya, the clandestine immigration could lead in Italy and in any of the other Mediterranean countries to the severe risk of provoking incidents within the public order*[1097]. This explicit reference and other implicit ones indicate that Italy is worried about a possible instability in the Mediterranean region and that there is the need to take measures against these developments.

The reason for the lack of explicit statements at this point can be found in the fact that Italy considers its identity to belong to the Mediterranean, sometimes even more than to Europe. This issue will be investigated in the chapter about the European Union and its internal struggle.

5.1.2 References to a Mediterranean region

The statements which deal with the Mediterranean are quite inhomogeneous. They refer to its significance for the European future, stating that *the Mediterranean could return to being useful for Europe*[1098]. The frontier issue is stressed when it is said that *the Mediterranean constitutes, and it is unavailing to negate, a southern frontier of the European Union*[1099]. Another reference deals with the situational context in the Mediterranean: *the southern shore of the Mediterranean experiences indeed a precautious situation which is caused by the economic underdevelopment and the adjoined menace of religious fundamentalism having violent tendencies*[1100]. The strategic importance of the Mediterranean is also stressed: *for Italy and Spain the principal ambit of interest abroad constitutes the Mediterranean; the geo-strategic location of this region contains challenges of such relevance that it urges a major commitment on the part of the Union*[1101]. One metaphor unmistakably describes the significance and the relevance that the Mediterranean has for Italy: "*il Mediterraneo lambisce il duomo*"[1102].

The few but very distinctive messages of the statements indicate that the Mediterranean occupies a central concern within the Italian discourse.

1097 Comp. „Dalla apertura alla Libia ai problemi dell'immigrazione clandestina che in Italia e negli altri paesi del Mediterraneo rischia seriamente di provocare incidenti di ordine pubblico" Zinti, (10.11.1996) la Repubblica.

1098 Comp. „(…) il Mediterraneo può ritornare utile anche all'Europa del futuro" Cassano, (31.01.1998) la Repubblica.

1099 Comp. „Il Mediterraneo constituisce - è inutile negarlo - la frontiera meridionale dell' intera Unione europea" Cangelosi, (5.02.1998) la Repubblica.

1100 Comp. „La sponda Sud del Mediterraneo vive infatti una situazione preoccupante, in cui ai problemi causati dal sottosviluppo economico si aggiunge la minaccia di un fondamentalismo religioso incline all'uso della violenza" Carioti, (19.02.2006) Corriere della Sera.

1101 Comp. „Per Italia e Spagna il primo ambito di proiezione esterna è la regione mediterranea. La centralità geostrategica di quest' area comporta sfide di una rilevanza tale da rendere necessario un impegno maggiore da parte dell' Unione" Prodi/Zapatero, (20.02.2007) la Repubblica.

1102 Comp. „Il Mediterraneo lambisce il Duomo" Querze', (17.07.2007) Corriere della Sera.

5.1.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

Beside numerous evaluative statements, there are only few statements within the Italian press which concern a definitional description of the European Mediterranean Policy.

A general definition about the European policy was published in the Corriere della Sera on the occasion of the conference in 1995: *it is an event of great symbolic value which should have concrete effects*[1103]. The *meeting is difficult, but very important, as it is the first time that the countries of Europe and the so-called Mare Nostrum meet in order to find a common way to improve the rules of cohabiting*[1104]. Beside these descriptions, which primarily stressed the necessity and the difficulty of the undertaking, the definitional references assigned the Barcelona Process to be a predominant European initiative, stating that *it is a European project*[1105] or referred to its outstanding achievement as a *forum which also includes the dialogue with Israel*[1106]. The forum character was also stressed in connection with its instrumental finality by Romano Prodi and José Luis Zapatero, who were quoted by la Repubblica: *the Barcelona Process is further an excellent forum where the common challenges of high significance, like the menace of terrorism or the intensification of the migration flow, can be faced*[1107]. These latter definitions provide an implicit reference to the purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy. The fact that its success has been critically perceived over the years is implicit inherent in the, to this day, latest definitional reference by the Corriere della Sera, which denominated the Barcelona Process as *Euro-Mediterranean laboratory*[1108].

In the thirteen years of its existence, the initiatives and the outcome of the Barcelona Process have, most of the time, critically been evaluated by the Italian press. In the year of its foundation, the Corriere della Sera argued that the initiative *will only be successful if it is a long-term project*[1109]. Even more critically, it was stated that *the agreed denomination was bureaucratically defined as "partnership": in fact, it is all but less than an association and more than a traditional, infamous cooperation*[1110]. In 1998, la Repubblica stated that *until now* the Barcelona Process *persists on a pure formal level, because the European non-Mediterranean countries have little to no interest in the Mediterra-*

1103 Comp. „Si tratta di un evento di grande valore simbolico che dovrebbe produrre effetti concreti" Guiseppe, (22.11.1995) Corriere della Sera.

1104 Comp. „E' un appuntamento difficile, ma molto importante. Per la prima volta l' Europa e i Paesi al di là del cosiddetto Mare nostrum si trovano insieme per fissare migliori regole di convivenza" Botti, (27.11.1995) Corrriere della Sera.

1105 Comp. „Il progetto dell' Europa (…)" Tropea, (19.10.1999) la Repubblica.

1106 Comp. „Il "processo di Barcellona" è il foro di dialogo che include anche Israele, ma Israele è prigioniero di un'altra formula, il "processo di pace", ovvero la "road map", ovvero lo scontro con i palestinesi" Nigro, (19.11.2004) la Repubblica.

1107 Comp. „Il Processo di Barcellona è altresì un eccellente foro nel quale affrontare sfide comuni di grande importanza come la minaccia del terrorismo o l'intensificazione dei flussi migratori" Prodi/Zapatero, (20.02.2007) la Repubblica.

1108 Comp. „"Laboratorio Euro-Mediterraneo", cercando un approccio sociale "non solo il punto di vista economico ma culturale, religioso, artistico"" Jacchia, (16.07.2006) Corriere della Sera.

1109 Comp. "È solo a lungo termine che l'operazione potrà funzionare" Stefanelli, (29.09.1995) Corriere della Sera.

1110 Comp. „La formula da raggiungere viene burocraticamente definita "partenariato": in realtà si tratta di qualcosa di meno di un'associazione e qualcosa di più della tradizionale, malfamata cooperazione" Botti, (27.11.1995) Corriere della Sera.

nean Affairs; it is time to move together from the theory to the operation, or to retract it and organise another, more serious and cohesive, initiative[1111]. This criticism, which attested the Barcelona Process already in 1998 a lack of efficiency, has repetitively been stressed in similar ways over the years, as the following statements indicate: *problems in the region have even augmented*[1112]; the initiative is *semi-paralysed*[1113] or simply *thin* (in content) *and insufficient*[1114]*;* or, the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership does not pass a felicitous moment*[1115]. These statements all lead to the same conclusion, namely that the Barcelona Process is a failure.

Notably, there are hardly any positive references regarding the European Mediterranean Policy within the Italian press discourse. Beside the implicitly expressed necessity of an efficient policy in the Mediterranean, the Italian perception is rather critical in regard to the European purpose.

5.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose

Within the Italian press discourse the statements, which refer to the analytical category "purpose", give an indication of the European motivation for the Barcelona Process. The references of this chapter display whether there is a discrepancy between the officially stated aim and the implicit purpose.

The purpose and the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy

The statements assigned to these categories are less numerous and explicit than expected. Regarding the purpose of the Barcelona Process, the Italian press implicitly reduces the European motivation for its engagement in the Mediterranean to security concerns, primarily caused by the demographic development. The policy, which constitutes a *"pact of stability"*[1116]*,* is perceived as an answer to the multiple challenges in the Mediterranean, which could threaten the security and stability within Italy and also within Europe. In 1998, la Repubblica stressed the demographic issue by raising the question whether *the "fortress Europe" will be able to resist such a strong demographic pressure, which is accompanied by the challenges of the globalisation and the economy*[1117]. Some years later, in 2004, la Repubblica quoted Romano Prodi, stating that *it has to be considered that within the next generation,*

1111 Comp. „Ma finora è rimasta a livello di pura accademia, anche perché ai paesi non mediterranei dell'Unione europea interessa poco o nulla. Ora è giunto il momento di passare dall'accademia all'operatività; oppure di disdirla e organizzarne un'altra, più seria e più serrata" Garimberti, (30.07.1998) le Republicca.

1112 Comp. „Il processo di Barcellona non ha quasi inciso su queste tendenze: anzi, i problemi sono aumentati, mentre la questione della sicurezza è diventata il tema centrale nell'approccio alle questioni mediterranee" Foud Allam, (5.12.2003) la Repubblica.

1113 Comp. „ci punta perché un'altra formula, "il processo di Barcellona", da tempo è semi-paralizzato" Nigro, (19.11.2004) la Repubblica.

1114 Comp. „La politica da sviluppare è quella delle reti, ancora troppo esili e insufficienti" Pitella, (24.01.2004) la Repubblica.

1115 Comp. "Il partenariato euro-mediterraneo non attraversa un momento felice" Crioti, (19.02.2006) Corriere della Sera.

1116 Comp. „L'intesa, che prevede di lavorare per la costituzione di una grande area di libero scambio entro il 2010 e per la creazione di un nuovo "Patto di stabilità", era rimasta impigliata su alcuni punti della dichiarazione politica" Tedeschini Lalli, (29.11.1995) la Repubblica.

1117 Comp. „Ma quale "fortezza Europa" potrebbe resistere a una così forte pressione demografica accompagnata dalla sfida della globalizzazione dell'economia?" Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica.

the population at the shore of the southern Mediterranean will be superior to the one at the shore of Europe[1118]. It was considered as important that the policy alludes to crucial issues like economy, security, cultural dialogue etc. in order to be prepared for the challenges which have to be faced in the future.[1119] Thus, it was indicative that the discourse repetitively stressed that *a future in peace favours Europe*[1120]. This emphasises the fact that security and stability concerns are the main purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy.

Regarding the officially stated aim, general formulations were stressed that have already been extensively mentioned in the previous discourse analysis: *to make of the Mediterranean a common space of peace, stability and a zone of shared prosperity*[1121]. Or, as Romano Prodi and José Luis Zapatero were quoted in la Repubblica: *the intercultural dialogue constitutes the primary channel to reach the objective to change the Mediterranean into a space of peace, security, stability and shared prosperity*[1122]. Other references referred to the aim of establishing a free-trade area until 2010; in 2007, the Italian press modified the aspired date: *it will not be 2010, as indicated, but 2012 that a market for 600 million people is aspired*[1123]. Therewith, the perception of the officially stated aim does not largely deviate from the references to the purpose of the Mediterranean Policy. They are only more generally expressed.

5.3 Discourse analysis – Identity

The statements concerning the category "identity" within the Italian press refer to the perception of the political ambition of the European Union and to its internal struggle, namely the internal forces within its member states.

5.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition

The political ambition of the European Union in the Mediterranean is regarded in connection with its attention to the eastern countries, with the strategic importance of the Mediterranean for the European Union and with few statements that also refer to the conception of the European Union as a whole. Thus, the Italian discourse evaluates the political ambition from both, an internal and an external perspective.

1118 Comp. "Senza contare che, nello spazio di una generazione, la sponda sud del Mediterraneo avrà una popolazione superiore a quella della sponda europea" Bonanni, (28.04.2004) la Repubblica.

1119 Comp. „In realtà a ben guardare l'iniziativa tocca settori cruciali come l'economia, la sicurezza, il dialogo culturale e perfino la difesa su uno scacchiere geopolitico essenziale sia per la crisi mediorientale sia per la sfida dell'islamismo radicale" Dal nostro inviato, (17.06.2006) la Repubblica.

1120 Comp. „Un futuro di pace favorisce l'Europa" Stefanelli, (29.09.1995) Corriere della Sera.

1121 Comp. "(…) a fare del Mediterraneo "uno spazio comune di pace e stabilità" e una "zona di prosperità condivisa"" Tedeschini Lalli, (29.11.1995) la Repubblica.

1122 Comp. „Il dialogo interculturale è un canale prioritario per il conseguimento dell'obiettivo di fare del Mediterraneo uno spazio di pace, sicurezza, stabilità e prosperità condivise" Prodi/Zapatero, (20.02.2007) la Repubblica.

1123 Comp. „Non sarà il 2010 come indicato ma dal 2012 si aprirà un mercato di 600 milioni di persone » Jacchia, Antonia, (30.03.2007) Corriere della Sera.

In 1995, the Corriere della Sera stated that *the importance of the conference in Barcelona lies in the assumption that it represents the cornerstone for the advancement of the relations*[1124] with the MNC. Consecutively, it was mentioned that *the European Union identifies itself a bit less in the north and a bit more in the Mediterranean*[1125]. Thus, the Italian public perceived that the European identity is linked to the Mediterranean. The argument was emphasised by the statement that the Mediterranean policy constitutes a *"common destiny"*[1126], or when la Repubblica conceded the voice to *Pedrag Matvejevic, who enjoys stating that Europe without the Mediterranean is like a man without childhood*[1127]. In this context the discourse also included a persuasive character, which was proved by a statement in la Repubblica in 1998, saying that the *stability, prosperity and peace is not solely an Italian problem, it concerns the entire Europe*[1128]; *if the necessity – for Europe – to build a bridge over the respective sea is ignored, it means negating the geography, history and politics*[1129].

The European engagement in the Mediterranean was also stressed in combination with the assurance of peace and stability, which consequentially implies a certain security issue. First, it was stated that *Europe's preliminary motivation in the Mediterranean is to protect itself from the immense migration flow or the recurrent terrorist menaces. The equation "the Mediterranean represents a defensive frontier" is just one aspect of the euro-mediterranean policy*[1130]. Second, the European Union is, as it was stated by Tony Blair and José Luis Zapatero, *despite all the thwarted obstacles, strongly committed to enhance its ambition for assuring peace*[1131].

Another aspect within the Italian discourse concerns the EU's political ambition in connection with an implicit criticism of the conception of Europe as a whole. For example, la Repubblica stated in 2003 that the *European Union is divided: regarding the Iraqi question, the quasi not existing peace process between Israel and Palestine and the constant asymmetry to the United States*[1132]. Further criticism of the European conception was expressed in 2006, saying that *Europe is a complex machinery, which*

1124 Comp. „l'importanza della Conferenza Euro-Mediterranea che si svolgerà a Barcellona il 27 e 28 Novembre e che servirà proprio a chiarire gli indirizzi politici dell'UE verso il lato Sud. "Nella nostra visione, Barcellona dovrebbe già porre. Ha spiegato. le basi per l'ulteriore sviluppo delle relazioni"" Editorial, (9.11.1995) Corriere della Sera.

1125 Comp. „(…), l'Europa si ritrova " un po' meno nordica e un po' più mediterranea"" Vignolo, (29.11.1005) Corriere della Sera.

1126 Comp. „[MMPOL] (…) c' è un "destino comune"" Taino, (19.1.1997) Corriere della Sera.

1127 Comp. „Pedrag Matvejevic ama dire che un'Europa senza Mediterraneo è come un uomo senza infanzia" Cassano, (31.01.1998) la Repubblica. Pedrag Matvejevic is a contemporary intellectual with Croatian and Russian roots, living in Italy and France.

1128 Comp. „La stabilità, la prosperità, la pace di questo "lago interno", per ripetere la citazione di Braudel, non è solamente un problema italiano. Riguarda tutta l'Europa" Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica.

1129 Comp. "Ignorare quindi la necessità - per l'Europa - di "creare ponti" su questo mare è ignorare la geografia, la storia, la politica" Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica.

1130 Comp. „(…) cui all'Europa interessa prevalentemente premunirsi dagli ingenti flussi migratori o dalle ricorrenti minacce terroristiche. L'equazione "Mediterraneo uguale frontiera difensiva", è solo una faccia della politica euro-mediterranea" Pitella, (24.01.2004) la Repubblica.

1131 Comp. „L'Ue, nonostante tutti gli ostacoli frapposti, rimane fortemente impegnata a supportare la loro ambizione di pace » Blair/Zapatero, (28.11.2005) la Repubblica.

1132 Comp. „Perché ritraggono un'Europa doppiamente divisa: spaccata sulla questione irachena, quasi assente nel processo di pace israelo-palestinense, e sempre più asimmetrica rispetto agli Stati Uniti" Fouad Allam, (05.12.2003) la Repubblica.

continuously is penetrated through subterraneous tensions concerning both, its dynamics and its static status[1133].

Within the Italian discourse the internal and external influences on the political ambition of the European Union are critically perceived. Thus, the significance of the Mediterranean is beyond question, the strategic considerations of the approach are not exposed to explicit criticism, and only the ailing overall conception of the European Union is challenged at some points.

5.3.2 The European Union – the internal struggle

The statements which refer to the internal struggle of the European Union, based on the individual interests of the Member States, concern the Italian position regarding the Mediterranean and the EU; in addition, to a lesser extent, they comment on the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union and its consequences.

Shortly before the conference in Barcelona took place, the Corriere della Sera stated that it was impossible that *Rome could not have been selected to host the conference, which unites all countries of the inland sea*[1134]. The implied deception was comprehensible considering the strong Italian interests in the Mediterranean Affairs, which have explicitly been demonstrated. In May 1995, in the run-up to the Conference, la Repubblica stated that the proposal for strengthening the relations with the Mediterranean countries was provided by Spain and Italy. While in literature and in the public perception the initiation of the Barcelona Process is preliminarily allocated to Spanish efforts, the Italian press clearly sticks to an Italian participation. At the moment of the conference la Repubblica quoted the former Foreign Minister *Susanna Agnelli*, saying that *it's a big satisfaction that Europe turns a bit less towards the north and a bit more towards the Mediterranean*[1135]. The chronological consecutive statements assured the Italian position, stating that *Italy is a peninsula which is enclosed by the Mediterranean*[1136], or that *the role of Italy is not to serve as a sentinel, but as a bridge between Europe and the Mediterranean*[1137]. An even more explicit reference to the Italian struggle to defend its position was expressed by means of a mixture of frustration due to power rejection and a certain power request: *an Italy, which rejects its historic and political rule in the Mediterranean, is destined for a marginal position on the European continent, and searches for the benevolent acceptation of the powers in the*

1133 Comp. „Ma l'Europa è una macchina complessa, continuamente percorsa da tensioni sotterranee sia nella sua dinamica sia nella sua statica" Dal nostro inviato, (17.06.2006) la Repubblica.

1134 Comp. „E Roma non poteva non essere scelta come la sede di una conferenza che unisce proprio tutti i Paesi del Mare Interno" Pullara, (22.11.1995) Corriere della Sera.

1135 Comp. "„Un altro aspetto di quell'attenzione al sud del mondo che Paesi come l'Italia chiedevano da tempo ai partner e che oggi fa dire a Susanna Agnelli con "grande soddisfazione" che "l'Europa è diventata un po' meno nordica e un po' più mediterranea"" Teteschini Lalli, (29.11.1995) le Repubblica.

1136 Comp. „L'Italia è una penisola tuffata nel Mediterraneo (...)" Cassano, (31.01.1998) la Repubblica.

1137 Comp. "In questo contesto il ruolo dell'Italia non è quello di sentinella, ma di "ponte" tra Europa e Mediterraneo" Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica.

North[1138]. Similar statements were also expressed within the discourse of the Corriere della Sera, which, in the anniversary year, mentioned that *our (the Italian) economic development, the recuperation of the competitiveness of our system we owe the Mediterranean, where we could achieve the protagonist role, even more than France and Spain*[1139]. Furthermore, in 2006 it was repetitively stated that *Italy confirms its leadership in the Mediterranean*[1140], *in the Mare Nostrum*[1141]. In the same context the Italian position and power request was defended by stating that it *constitutes a natural bridge between Europe and the southern Mediterranean, a secure port for commercial exchange; Italy is the leader in Europe in regard to the exchange with the countries of North Africa*[1142]. Defending its influence in the Mediterranean, the public discourse also saw the United States as a role model: *even the United States have positioned themselves well in Morocco. Italy may not lose that train; it could play an essential part*[1143]. This hard struggle to defend and retrieve a significant position within the Mediterranean or even within the European Union demonstrates that the Italian public is strongly concerned with the foreign policy of the country. According to the analysed statements, Italy should aim to play a more influential role and has implicitly been provided with a public mandate to do so.

At the time when the French overtook the decisive role in guiding the European Mediterranean Policy, the Italian press commented initially that the Mediterranean Union *is above all an ambitious plan of the Foreign Policy of Nicolas Sarkozy and that (originally) it is not about a simple partnership between the shores of the Mediterranean, but about a very concrete one. Something is proposed that is not identical but similar to the existing instrument of the European states in the Mediterranean*[1144]. The German reaction was unemotionally commented as follows: the *criticism was very clearly and directly expressed by Angela Merkel*[1145], *who rejected the Mediterranean Union*[1146]. The Italian position regarding the redefinition was unambiguously expressed by the statement that *for Italy and Spain it is important to be protagonists of the Mediterranean troika*[1147]. Thus, further happenings are in their interest. This demonstrates that, sooner or later, the European Union will have to deal with the strong

1138 Comp. „Un'Italia che abdichi al suo ruolo storico e politico nel Mediterraneo è destinata a posizioni marginali nel contesto europeo, alla ricerca della benevola accettazione dei potenti del Nord" Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica.

1139 Comp. „Il nostro sviluppo economico, lo stesso recupero di competitività del nostro sistema, passa dal Mediterraneo, dove possiamo avere un ruolo da protagonista più di quanto non lo siano Francia e Spagna" Radice, (05.07.2005) Corriere della Sera.

1140 Comp. „Italia, Paese leader del Mediterraneo" Jacchia, (16.07.2006) Corriere della Sera.

1141 Comp. „l'Italia si conferma Paese leader del Mare Nostrum" Jacchia, (18.07.2006) Corriere della Sera.

1142 Comp. „Un ponte naturale tra l'Europa e il Sud del Mediterraneo. E un porto sicuro per gli scambi commerciali. L'Italia è leader in Europa per l'interscambio con i Paesi del Nord Africa" Jacchia, (30.03.2007) Corriere della Sera.

1143 Comp. „Persino gli Stati Uniti si stanno ben posizionando in Marocco. L'Italia non può perdere questo treno. E i media possono giocare un ruolo fondamentale" Jacchia, (30.03.2007) Corriere della Sera.

1144 Comp. „(…), l'Unione mediterranea è senz'altro il disegno di politica estera più ambizioso di Nicolas Sarkozy. Non si tratta di un semplice partenariato tra le due sponde (come quello previsto dal cosiddetto "processo di Barcellona" nato dodici anni fa e mai seriamente decollato), ma qualcosa di molto più concreto ed esteso. Il progetto propone relazioni non identiche ma simili a quelle esistenti tra i membri dell'Unione europea" Valli, (10.12.2007) la Repubblica.

1145 Comp. „Ma le critiche più nette, più dirette sono state espresse da Angela Merkel" Valli, (10.12.2007) la Repubblica.

1146 Comp. „Angela Merkel rifiutava l'Unione mediterranea" Valli, (10.12.2007) la Repubblica.

1147 Comp. „Per Italia e Spagna è importante essere i protagonisti della troika mediterranea" Fregonara, (21.12.2007) Corriere della Sera.

national interests of its member countries; in regard to a Common Foreign Policy it will especially have to struggle with three countries, namely with France, Italy and Spain.

6 Spain

Spain is also a European country which has strong historic, cultural and economic relations to the MNC countries, primarily to the North African countries. The discourse analysis focuses on articles of the newspapers el País (left) and el Mundo (conservative). The distribution of the statements within both newspapers is quite even: 73 could be assigned to el País and 65 to el Mundo.

SPAIN	**number of articles per category and newspaper**		
	El Pais	**El Mundo**	Total
Expression	28	30	58
Purpose	14	10	24
Identity	31	25	56
	73	**65**	**138**

From the 138 statements which have been considered in total, nearly the same amount concerns the categories “expression” and “identity”.

SPAIN	**Number of statements per category**				
	the other	ass./diss.	mmr	mmpol	total
Expression	3	18	1	36	**58**
	purpose	aim			
Purpose	14	10			**24**
	EU				
Identity	56				**56**

The distribution of the statements per year illustrates the following pattern:

SPAIN	**distribution of the statements per category and year**														
	95	**96**	**97**	**98**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	Total
Expression	13		2			7		1		1	10			24	58
Purpose	6				2		3			2	3			8	24
Identity	15				1		3			3	2			32	56
total	**34**		**2**		**3**	**7**	**6**	**1**		**6**	**15**			**64**	**138**

The years 1995, 2005 and 2008 constitute the main years regarding the number of statements. By far the most statements date in 2008 which is explained with the strong engagement of France in the Mediterranean Policy. Until 2007 Spain considered itself as a decisive driving force in the Barcelona

Process; the rivalry with France is also symbolically expressed by the number of identified statements in that year.

6.1 Discourse analysis – Expression

Within the Spanish press a total number of 58 statements point to the discourse regarding the perception of the "other", associative/dissociative elements within the partnership and the perception of the Mediterranean Policy.

6.1.1 The view of the "other , associative/dissociative elements of the partnership

The few statements which refer to the "other" concern the level of cooperation and do not indicate a certain image of the "other". The non-European countries are perceived as being cooperative, which is exemplified by a reference of the newspaper el Mundo in 2000, where it was stated that *the African countries agreed nearly on the whole document of the conference, which is interpreted by the assumption that compromises concerning the paper will never be accomplished*[1148]. Another indication for the cooperative aspect of the description of the "other" is based on the *integration of the Arab League in the Mediterranean Union*[1149]. The form of this project still has to be found, but the fact that the matter appears in the Spanish discourse indicates an openness towards the integration of further representatives, whether politically grouped or not, into the Mediterranean Policy.

The statements, which refer to associative and dissociative elements within the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, are also focused on the co-operational aspect. Among the dissociative issues, the conflictive relation with Libya was extensively stressed in 2000. The basic opinion of the *Libyan president, Muammar Al Gaddafi, was stressed in el Mundo, saying that he considers the relation between Europe and Africa to be necessary and therefore a mutual confidence is also necessary*[1150]. *At the same time he delivered an eccentric speech full of anti-occident, anti-colonial and anti-American issues and actually demonstrated scarce interest in the existing co-operational frame, the Barcelona Process, when he apparently stated that "in the name of Barcelona you can not unite North Africa with Europe, don't come to separate us with the excuse of Barcelona", as it was commented by*

1148 Comp. „Los países africanos han dado el visto bueno a la casi totalidad del documento, asumiendo, al menos sobre el papel, compromisos que nunca cumplirán" Cruz, (03.04.2000) El Mundo.

1149 Comp. „La propuesta también introduce una "fórmula" para la participación de la Liga Árabe en el proyecto, según indicaron fuentes diplomáticas que, sin embargo, evitaron aclarar en qué grado asistiría esta organización. Hasta ahora, la Liga Árabe ha practicado como 'observador' en reuniones de Exteriores y países árabes han defendido una presencia mayor de este órgano, especialmente en otras reuniones de ministros sectoriales" Europa press, (04.11.2008) El Mundo.

1150 Comp. „El presidente libio, Muamar Al Gadafi, ha indicado al presidente en funciones español, José María Aznar, que la cooperación entre Europa y Africa es "necessaria" y que, para ello, debe existir "la confianza mutua que no ha existido en el pasado"." EFE, (04.04.2000) El Mundo.

testimonials[1151]. A general separative issue, which has been existing since the beginning of the discourse, constitutes the fact of the economic disparity between the North and the South. El País expressed it as follows: *Economically, the difference between the North and the South is enormous: more than 87% of the gross domestic product of the Mediterranean basin is concentrated on the northern shore*[1152]. The European economic policy approach continued being a fact in the discourse of the media, which was criticised by el Mundo in 2005, saying *that the economic agricultural trade agreements in the Mediterranean can not be reciprocal from equal to equal between countries, which are apparently unequal, as it is internationally based in the standards of the World Trade Organisation*[1153]. Therewith, the Spanish public opinion takes a clear position in regard to the European approach and reasons based on facts.

On the occasion of the revitalisation of the Barcelona Process and its renaming as Mediterranean Union, el País expressed the probably strongest existing associative argument: a*ll European and southern Mediterranean countries have affirmed their will of reorienting the process in question and deepen it*[1154].

6.1.2 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

The statements which refer to the European Mediterranean Policy constitute definitional references and provide an evaluative insight into the Spanish perception.

Interestingly, the definitional references are in its form of expression mostly linked to the significance which the Spanish press ascribes to the Barcelona Process. In the run-up to the conference of Barcelona in 1995, El País stated that *it will all be about a development, based on the reciprocal will of large-scaled interests of both sides of the Mediterranean*[1155] and that *although the idea did not emerge in the last months, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference will probably constitute the most important*

1151 Comp. "(…), el coronel Gadafi ha tomado la palabra en la primera sesión de trabajo de la cumbre euro-africana para pronunciar un "discurso excéntrico, repleto de todos los tópicos antioccidentales, anticoloniales y antiamericanos". Al parecer, el discurso no contenía ninguna de las aperturas solicitadas por la Ue, es decir, mención alguna a la aceptación por Tripoli de los principios de la Declaración de Barcelona, por la que se regula desde 1995 el diálogo euro-mediterráneo. Todo lo contrario, Gadafi ha mostrado escaso interés por lo que representa el proceso de Barcelona. (...)"Ustedes no pueden en nombre de Barcelona unir el norte de Africa con Europa, No vengan a dividirnos con la excusa de Barcelona", ha afirmado Gadafi, según testigos de su intervención, celebrada a puerta cerrada" EFE, (04.04.2000) El Mundo.

1152 Comp. „Económicamente, la diferencia entre el Norte y el Sur es enorme: más del 87% del producto interior bruto total de la cuenca mediterránea está concentrado en la orilla norte" Naïr, (08.08.1995) El País.

1153 Comp. „Los acuerdos comerciales agrícolas dentro de la cuenca del Mediterráneo no pueden ser recíprocos de igual a igual entre países desiguales-, tal y como marcan los estándares de la Organización Mundial del Comercio. Si las negociaciones impiden a los países del sur del Mediterráneo proteger sus sectores más vulnerables, especialmente para defenderse de las exportaciones agrícolas subsidiadas de la Ue, la producción agrícola podría caer alrededor de un 2% y, al mismo tiempo, se reducirían los ingresos de la población que depende de la agricultura para su subsistencia" Edirotial, (29.11.2005) El Mundo.

1154 Comp. „Todos los países europeos y mediterráneos del sur han afirmado su voluntad de reorientar dicho proceso y profundizarlo" Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País.

1155 Comp. „se trata de un desarollo basado en la complementariedad voluntaria de los intereses a largo plazo de las dos orillas" Naïr, (08.03.1995) El País.

event of the Spanish presidency[1156]. At the time the conference took place, the press classified the Barcelona Process to be *a very important novelty*[1157]. The significance of the Barcelona Process for Spain was again explicitly stated in 2004, when el Mundo announced that *the process is considered as vital for Spain and its interests and that in the upcoming year an important commemoration on the occasion of its tenth anniversary will be taking place*[1158]. Beside the expressed importance for the Spanish interests, the Barcelona Process was considered as *a forum, which unites the countries of the European Union with those of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean*[1159]. It was also considered as *an alliance, which means that the countries respect the requirements of those who are most needy*[1160]. Therewith, the Spanish press unmistakably establishes a strong linkage between the Barcelona Process and the national policy and emphasises the approach that the European policy in the Mediterranean is able to change the situation for the better.

In 2008, el País stated that *anyhow, the new policy is on the political agenda as a continuation of the Barcelona Process*[1161]. On the occasion of the conference in Marseille, it was recapitulated in el País that *the Barcelona Process in question was a first step to unite one part of the world, the Mediterranean, which forms a major mergence of different cultures, great contrasted identities and contrary religious roots*[1162]. This positive evaluated ambition of the European Mediterranean Policy was one of the few positive statements regarding the Barcelona Process in the Spanish press. Another one was the acknowledgement that the Barcelona Process had *initiated a constructive debate in three fundamental areas: politics and security, economics and finance, and social and cultural issues*[1163]. Other positive statements, which indicate the strong national relation of Spain to the Barcelona Process, have been stated in 2008. At the time of the Paris Summit, it was said that *it had given an important historic and positive impulse, similar to the contribution of the Conference of Barcelona thirteen years before*[1164]. Another reference stated that the positive effect of the Mediterranean Union *is the consciousness of the*

1156 Comp. „La Conferencia Euromediterránea es, probablemente, el acontecimiento más llamativo del semestre español al frente de la UE, pero no es una idea nueva surgida en los últimos meses" Cembrero, (01.07.1995) El País.

1157 Comp. „Esto es una novedad muy significativa" Altable, (27.11.1995) El País.

1158 Comp. „[BP] Ese proceso es considerado vital por parte de España para sus intereses en la zona y pretende que el próximo año haya una significativa conmemoración de su décimo aniversario" EFE, (08.09.2004) El Mundo.

1159 Comp. „(…) 'Proceso de Barcelona', es un foro que reúne a los países de la Ue y a los de las orillas sur y este del Mediterráneo (…)" EFE, (25.11.2005) El Mundo.

1160 Comp. „[Ariane Arpa] (…) "el acuerdo se llama a sí mismo una 'alianza', lo que significa que los países tienen que tener en cuenta las necesidades de los que más lo necesitan." Editorial, (29.11.2005) El Mundo.

1161 Comp. „En cualquier caso, ya está en la agenda política europea como una continuación del Proceso de Barcelona" Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País.

1162 Comp. „El denominado Proceso de Barcelona era una primera piedra para unir alrededor del Mediterráneo una de las partes del mundo con mayor confluencia cultural diferente, grandes identidades contrastadas y raíces religiosas opuestas" Foguet, (05.11.2008) El País.

1163 Comp. „(…) el proceso de Barcelona, (…), "ha propiciado un productivo debate en los tres ámbitos fundamentales que cubre esta iniciativa: el político y de seguridad, el económico y financiero y el social y cultural"" EFE, (25.11.2005) El Mundo.

1164 Comp. „"Se ha dado un impulso cualitativo importante, histórico y positivo a lo que fue la Conferencia de Barcelona hace trece años", resumió (…) Moratinos" Editorial, (13.07.2008) El Mundo.

deceleration and stagnation of the Barcelona Process[1165]. This illustrates that the return of politics to the real status quo of the policy, including all its failures, was rewarded by the Spanish press.

Anyhow, most of the statements express criticism. Already in 1995, the glamour of a successful positive launch of the Barcelona Process did not avoid critical press voices. It was stated that the policy *is far from being a real strategy of cooperation and development between the Mediterranean shores and that it rather appears as a clever costume for a simple opening of the southern markets*[1166]. In 2000, it was stated in el Mundo that the European implicitly admitted their failure to provide effective aid for the MNC countries. In summary, there is a notable ambivalent position regarding the Mediterranean in the Spanish press. There is a strong national association to the Barcelona Process, but, at the moment of failure, the distant tonality in the public discourse could suggest that Spain is not an integrated part of Europe.

The prosperity gap and the poverty issue is also criticised in connection with the Barcelona Process, which is considered as not being an effective instrument against poverty. It is lamented that ten years after Barcelona little has changed for the people in the south. This expresses the Spanish press' humanitarian request concerning the policy.

By far the most criticism occurred in 2008, when the frank evaluation of the Barcelona Process was provoked by the French proposal to found a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the Mediterranean. It was stated in el Mundo that *the Summit in Barcelona in 2005 was the beginning of the end*[1167]; *the moribund Barcelona Process received its deathblow in 2005, when numerous representatives of the Arab countries were absent at the conference and no substantial agreement could be reached*[1168]. Further criticism arose with the new French proposal, which *some diplomats depreciatingly called "Club Med" in reference to the French hotel chain*[1169]. Others stressed that *the only thing which has changed was the etiquette*[1170], while *the important thing is not the renaming but the content*[1171]. After recalling the already often stressed criticism of Nicolas Sarkozy, a journalist stated in el Mundo that *after twelve years of ups and downs, nearly 20.000 million Euro, few results and some*

1165 Comp. "En primer lugar, implicaba una toma de conciencia de la ralentización y el estancamiento del proyecto estratégico de Barcelona" Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País.

1166 Comp. „Lejos de constituir una verdadera estrategia de cod'esarrollo entre las dos riberas, resulta ser sobre todo un hábil disfraz de una mera apertura de los mercados del Sur" Naïr, (20.09.1995) El País.

1167 Comp. „La cumbre de noviembre de 2005 en Barcelona fue el principio del fin del proceso que lleva su nombre para el diálogo de la UE con los países árabes" Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo.

1168 Comp. „(...) la creación de una nueva organización para firmar acuerdos comerciales o migratorios con los países del sur del Mediterráneo, en sustitución del moribundo Proceso de Barcelona, cuyo golpe de gracia fue la reunión aquel cálido otoño de 2005 donde fallaron numerosos líderes árabes y no se llegó a ningún acuerdo sustancial" Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo.

1169 Comp. „(...) esta nueva organización el 'Club Med', el apodo despreciativo que utilizan algunos diplomáticos en referencia a una cadena de hoteles francesa- (...)" Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo.

1170 Comp. „Lo primero que se ve es que cambia la etiqueta: de proceso de Barelona a Unión para el Mediterráneo" Missé/ Rituerto, (13.03.2008) El País.

1171 Comp. „Lo importante no debería ser el nombre, sino el contenido." Editorial, (15.03.2008) El País.

failed summits, the Barcelona Process has been converted into the Mediterranean Union, an invention of Paris with an uncertain future in the hands of Nicolas Sarkozy[1172].

The discourse of the Spanish press leaves the mark that the Barcelona Process belongs to the national competence of Spain. Although in case of severe criticism, it raises the impression that with the French initiative the discourse is quite disappointed and distant regarding its outcome. A more reconciliatory discourse within the Spanish press could be perceived from the moment onwards, when Barcelona was elected to be the domicile of the Mediterranean Policy and was thus denominated as the E*uro-Mediterranean capital*[1173].

6.2 Discourse analysis - Purpose

The statements which have been assigned to the analytical category "purpose" refer to the European motivation for the Mediterranean Policy and the officially stated aim. As there are relative few statements allocated to this category, the two aspects are summed up in the following sub-chapter.

The purpose and the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy

The most general references regarding the purpose of the Barcelona Process are implicitly related to the European security concern. One of them was expressed in the run-up to the Barcelona Process, when the principal ambition was *to exchange cooperation for stability*[1174]. It is the aim to establish *a free-trade area until 2010, encouraged by the motivation to support the elimination of the socio-economic imbalance of the countries in the South and to stimulate the regional integration*[1175]. This was generally and extensively expressed in an article in el Mundo in 2001: *One goal is "to create a Euro-Mediterranean zone of security, stability and wealth", a second is "to enhance social, cultural and human contacts in a wide range of ambits with the full respect of the cultures, religions, costumes and traditions", and the last is "to progress with the perspective of a common vision for the future of the region, which is essential for all of us"*[1176]. In 2004, it was stated that in order to assure peace, *the*

1172 Comp. „El Proceso de Barcelona, tras más de 12 años de altibajos, cerca de 20.000 millones de euros invertidos, pocos resultados y alguna cumbre fallida, se convirtió anoche en la Unión para el Mediterráneo, un invento de París con un futuro incierto en manos de Nicolas Sarkozy" Ramírez, (14.03.2008) El Mundo.

1173 Comp. „El proceso euromediterráneo, que lleva 13 años de resultados muy mejorables, necesitaba una sede permanente y un organismo impulsor, equitativamente representativo de todas las partes, que lo visualizase." Editorial, (07.11.2008) El País; and comp. "[el principe Felipe] esta iniciativa, que data de 1982, de "audaz y valiente", y afirmó que supuso una gran visión de futuro, porque después dio paso al denominado Proceso de Barcelona y ahora a la designación de Barcelona como capital euromediterránea" Editorial, (13.11.2008) El País.

1174 Comp. „Cooperación a cambio de estabilidad" Cembrero, (01.07.1995) El País.

1175 Comp. „Su objetivo se define claramente: "La creación de un espacio euromediterráneo en el horizonte del 2010". También sus ejes centrales: apoyo a la transición economica para establecer una zona de libre comercio de aquí a 10 o 15 años (...) apoyo para un mejor equilibrio socio-economico en las sociedades del Sur (...), y, por último, apoyo a la integración regional" Naïr, (20.09.1995) El País.

1176 Comp. „Uno es "constituir una zona Euromediterránea de seguridad, de esabilidad y de bienestar"; el segundo, "favorecer los contactos sociales, culturales y humanos en una amplia gama de ámbitos y con el pleno respeto de cultura, religiones, costumbres y tradiciones respectivas" y, por último, "progresar con la perspectiva de una visión común por el futuro de la región que, para todos nosotros es esencial"" EFE, (06.11.2001) El Mundo.

dialogue between both shores has to be reinforced[1177]. In the anniversary year of the Barcelona Process it was further stated that *peace and security have been the objectives of the meeting and it contains the purpose to unite the occidental countries with the Arabs and Muslims, which is an attempt to fight together against terrorism*[1178]. In 2008, the principal stated purpose regarding the Mediterranean Policy was *to inject a new and forceful impulse*[1179]. Within the Spanish press the following demand was expressed: *reorient it and deepen it!*[1180] It is remarkable that within the Spanish public discourse the statements regarding the purpose do not refer to the Middle East Peace Process or provide no explicit indication of the threats perceived from the Mediterranean, which would explain the security concern. Most references indirectly deal with the security concern and mainly handle peace and stability issues. Is not the repetitive argument of the purpose to assure peace and stability just an implicit reference to the assumption of the threat of a destabilizing Mediterranean region? Why are altruistic arguments more obviously stated than the explicit motivation for the Mediterranean Policy? However, the statements referring to the officially stated aims do not provide any further insights into the Spanish discourse.

6.3 Discourse analysis – Identity

Within the Spanish public discourse few statements refer explicitly to the European political ambition, the possible self-perception or, figuratively, to the European identity. Implicitly, the Spanish press discourse indicates the importance of the Mediterranean Policy in relation to the national interests and therefore to the position of France in the European Union. The total number of selected statements (56) indicates that the Mediterranean is essential to Spain – that it is a vital concern.

6.3.1 The European Union – the political ambition

The political ambition and role of the European Union is ambivalently perceived in the Spanish press. In the run-up to the conference in Barcelona, el Pais stated that *this initiative constitutes a new impulse, for this time a decisive impulse*[1181]. This attested the European approach a positive perception, although it was at the same time said that *the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean space remains extremely nebulous and ambiguous*[1182]. Therefore, the *question if Europe is now discovering the Mediterranean*

1177 Comp. „(…) al 'Proceso de Barcelona' que nació para reforzar el dialogo entre las dos orillas del Mediterráneo y que en noviembre de 2005 cumpirá diez años" Europe Press, (02.10.2004) El Mundo.

1178 Comp. „La paz y la seguridad son los objetivos fijados en esta propuesta que pretenden unir a los países occidentales con los árabes y musulmanes en un intento de luchar conjuntamente contra el terrorismo" Taules, (25.11.2005) El Mundo.

1179 Comp. „(…) de inyectar un nuevo y vigoroso impulso al proceso iniciado en Barcelona en 1995" Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País.

1180 Comp. „Reorientar y profundizar!" Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País.

1181 Comp. „Ahora se habla de un nuevo impulso, esta vez decisivo, de la Unión Europea al refuerzo de la política mediterránea" Naïr, (20.09.1995) El País.

1182 Comp. „„ la idea de espacio euromediterráneo es extremadamente borrosa y ambigua" Naïr, (20.09.1995) El País.

has to be answered with "nearly"[1183]. To put it in a nutshell, Europe's political ambition and engagement in the Mediterranean was benevolently perceived.

It was considered to be a *big challenge for Europe to debate with the countries of the southern Mediterranean*[1184]. At the tenth anniversary, el Mundo commented the political ambitions above all critically: Europe is perceived as a *rich country which exploits its poor neighbours and does not offer anything more than empty words and promises*[1185]. Therewith, the political ambition of Europe is seen as predominant and selfish. What constitutes the ambivalence of the Spanish press discourse?

In 2000, Europe was described as *a country of rich people, a country which is alarmed by the floods of immigrants, a country which disingenuously competes on the international markets, a country which is horrified by television programmes showing images of death and destruction far away, which calls on programmes for a macroeconomic adjustment, compromises on the liberal market and plans of political stability*[1186]. This was one of the rare statements which described a conception of what Europe possibly is. Due to the results of the present analysis, the ambivalent perception of the Spanish discourse regarding the European engagement in the Mediterranean leads to a crucial question: what is Spain's position within Europe? The results so far suggest that in the public perception the European Mediterranean approach is assimilated to the national concerns of the Spanish interests. It would indeed be a study-worth undertaking to assess the roots of the ambivalent position of Spain in regard to the European Mediterranean Policy in combination with its predominant linkage to the Mediterranean.

6.3.2 The European Union – its internal struggle

In the perception of the Spanish press, the internal struggle is not that much focused on the French-German confrontation regarding the proposal of the Mediterranean Union. It rather offers a storyline of the positioning of Spain within the European discussion to find a way towards a coherent Mediterranean Policy.

Previous to the Barcelona Process, the Spanish press made clear that the existence of the initiative was based on the interference of Spain: *Spain demanded, through Javier Solana, that a principle of equilibrium was ratified between the East and the South*[1187]. In 2004, el Mundo reported that *Zapatero*

1183 Comp. „Descubre ahora Europa el Mediterráneo? Casi" Vidal-Floch, (20.11.1995) El País.

1184 Comp. „(…) el gran reto de Europa es el diálogo con los países del sur del Mediterráneo, (…)" Europa press, (02.10.2004) El Mundo.

1185 Comp. „De lo contrario nos encontraremos con un nuevo ejemplo en el que un país rico, en este caso la UE, se lleva todo lo que quiere de sus vecinos más pobres y no les ofrece a cambio nada más que palabras y promesas vacías" Editorial, (29.11.2005) El Mundo.

1186 Comp. „La Europa de los ricos, la que vive alarmada por el flujo de inmigrantes del sur, la que compite deslealmente en los mercados internacionales, la que se horroriza frente al televisor contemplando lejanas imágenes de muerte y destrucción, reclama de Africa programas de ajuste macroeconómico, compromisos con el libre mercado y planes de estabilidad política" Cruz, (03.04.2000) El Mundo.

1187 Comp. „España exigía, por boca del ministro Javier Solana, que se ratificase el principio de "equilibrio" entre el Este y el Sur aprobado en Essen" Vidal – Folch, (13.06.1995) El País.

travelled to Tunisia in order to find consent for reactivating the Barcelona Process[1188]. Some months later, el Mundo quoted *Miguel Angel Moratinos, the Spanish Foreign Minister, who apparently solicited not to forget about the Mediterranean and that they will do everything necessary so that the Mediterranean receives enough funds to face the future challenges*[1189]. Therewith, the continuous Spanish effort to support the Barcelona Process was unmistakeably demonstrated.

More subtle, but not less explicit, are the press voices at the moment of the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union. The first reaction within the identified statements was in the beginning of 2008, when it was stated that *an alternative to the Barcelona Process would be negative for Spain and the European Union as whole*[1190]. After a severe debate between Germany, supported by the other member states, and France, Sarkozy was forced to reduce its ambitious plan.[1191]

El Mundo further uttered that *for Spain, the French- German alliance was a surprise coup, "un golpe de mano", with which France could overtake the control of the forum (Barcelona Process); according to diplomats, Zapatero agreed on the idea as long as it included the name of the Barcelona Process*[1192]. With a certain satisfaction it was further stated that *the French have to face similar fundamental problems like the Spanish, namely the participation*[1193]. Finally, Spain supported the French proposal: *Spain wants to reinforce this process, as it was us, who had created it (...)*[1194] and demonstrated a certain acknowledgement, expressing that *all the problems can not be solved that night* (at the Paris summit), *but that this meeting is a step in the right direction*[1195]. About the summit in Paris it was commented that the French president *celebrated it like a victory, despite the lack of concretions regarding its content*[1196]. Anyhow, the *Spanish government demonstrated satisfaction regarding the*

1188 Comp. „Rodríguez Zapatero viajará hoy a Túnez (…) compromiso con el Maghreb y pedirá colaboración para reactivar el Proceso de Barcelona" EFE, (02.10.2004) El Mundo.

1189 Comp. „Moratinos, (…) ha pedido que "el Mediterráneo no sea un mar olvidado". "Necesita recuperar la atención y el esfuerzo financiero de los 25. En ese sentido haremos todo lo necesario para que, dentro de los capítulos que se negocien en las diferentes estructuras de la UE, el Mediterráneo obtenga los recursos suficientes para afrontar los retos y desafíos del futuro"" Europa Press, (02.10.2004) El Mundo.

1190 Comp. „(…), una alternativa al Proceso de Barcelona "sería negativa para España y para la Unión en su conjunto"" Missé, (11.01.2008) El País; Notably Spain is chronologically quoted before the European Union.

1191 Comp. „El gran plan inicial de Sarkozy -que soñaba con crear una "unión política, económica y cultural" entre ambas orillas mediterráneas cerrada a los demás socios comunitarios- ha quedado reducido a la mínima expresión en una tarea de zapa ejecutada por la Alemania de Angela Merkel con el apoyo de todos los demás" Rituerto/Missé, (14.03.2008) El País.

1192 Comp. „Para Espana, la alianza galo-germana es un golpe de mano por el que Francia toma el control del foro, pero, según fuentes diplomáticas españolas, Zapatero está dispuesto a aceptar la ldea mientras se incluya en el nombre Proceso de Barcelona -un subtítulo formal, que, de todas formas, se evaporará rápidamente- en la nueva Unión Mediterránea" Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo.

1193 Comp. „(…) Kouchner, promete un formidable puente entre las dos orillas, el mundo occidental y el mundo árabe", pero los galos se encontrarán con los mismos problemas básicos que sufrían los españoles, como la participación" Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo.

1194 Comp. „"España quiere reforzar este Proceso. Fuimos los que lo creamos…" Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo.

1195 Comp. „Todos los problemas no se van a solucionar esta noche, pero esto ya es un paso" Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo.

1196 Comp. „Con todo, el presidente francés celebró la creación de la Unión como un éxito, a la vez que rechazó críticas sobre la falta de definición en la cuestión del financiamiento del nuevo bloque, uno de los aspectos de la UPM que todavía necesita concreción" Editorial, (13.07.2008) El Mundo.

success of the meeting in Paris and conceded that its effect has been an historic impulse[1197]. This conciliatoriness was honoured by making Barcelona the permanent domicile of the Euro-Mediterranean affairs. El Mundo stated that *beside all received strokes, Barcelona reached to deliver - with the French impulse – an important symbolic achievement; even if it is more symbolic than efficient*[1198].
With all these statements the strong linkage between the Spanish national interests and the Mediterranean Affairs seems evident. Nevertheless, a few questions still have to be assessed: What are the contemporary driving forces for such a strong commitment to the Mediterranean Policy? In the same context, what is the relation between historic and economic interests? Do the national interests in the Mediterranean influence the Spanish position within the European Union, and, if yes, to what extent? What about the dialectic between national interests and being committed to a supra-national project?

7 Switzerland

Switzerland is the only non-EU country which has been considered in the present research undertaking. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung (liberal with conservative tendency) is not only a leading Swiss newspaper, but also represents an important opinion leader in the German speaking ambit and in Europe. From the 26 articles, which have been considered from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), a total of 143 statements have been identified as being appropriate for the present analysis.

SWITZERLAND	**number of articles per category and newspaper**
	NZZ
Expression	83
Purpose	41
Identity	19
	143

By far the most statements concern the category “expression” (83), followed by “identity” (41) and the “purpose/aim” (19) of the European Mediterranean Policy:

SWITZERLAND	**number of statements per category**				
	the other	ass./diss.	mmr	mmpol	total
Expression	14	24	2	43	**83**
	Purpose	aim			
Purpose	10	9			**19**

1197 Comp. „En cualquier caso, el gobierno español se ha mostrado hoy "muy satisfecho" con el éxito que, a su juicio, ha tenido la reunión de Paris para el Mediterráneo, al considerar que da un "impulso histórico" al Proceso de Barcelona” Editorial, (13.07.2008) El Mundo.

1198 Comp. „Ahora Barcelona, pese a todos los golpes recibidos, ha logrado redimirse - con el impulso de Francia - al obtener un éxito de mayor peso simbólico que efectivo en la realidad” Oms, (04.11.2008) El Mundo.

	EU	
Identity	41	**41**

The distribution of the selected statements per year indicates the following pattern:

SWITZERLAND	**distribution of the statements per category and year**														
	95	**96**	**97**	**98**	**99**	**00**	**01**	**02**	**03**	**04**	**05**	**06**	**07**	**08**	Total
Expression	27		5	1		13	4	6			2			25	83
Purpose	8			1		3		1			1		1	4	19
Identity	11		2			2		1					2	23	41
total	**46**		**7**	**2**		**18**	**4**	**8**			**3**		**3**	**52**	**143**

Most of the statements have been considered in 1995 and 2008. The remarkable high number of statements in these years is due to repetitively stressed reasons: the Barcelona Conference in 1995 and the Paris Summit in 2008.

7.1 Discourse analysis – Expression

Considering the same subcategories as in the previous analysis, there have been 83 statements identified in the Swiss newspaper.

7.1.1 The view of the "other", associative/dissociative elements of the partnership

Concerning the "other", the Swiss press explicitly referred to the situation of the Arab countries, Israel, Syria and Libya. There were only implicit interpretations how the "other" per se is perceived. In this context it was reported that *the interest on the part of the Arabs is demonstrated by the participation of representatives of the Arab League and the Maghreb-Union*[1199]. It was also commented that *the Arab countries had less reservations at the Conference in Barcelona than at the summit on economy in Amman a month earlier*[1200]. Syria was also *reproached of boycotting the meeting in Amman, while negotiating with Israel even questions of security in Barcelona*[1201]. The reason therefore was stated by *the Syrian representative: in contrast to the meeting in Amman, the conference in Barcelona does not take place within the limits of multilateral peace negotiations*[1202]. It was generally stated that *the Arab countries expect a counterbalance to the predominance of the USA from the European engagement in*

1199 Comp. „Das Interesse der Arabischen Welt wird, neben der Präsenz der jeweiligen Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten, durch die Teilnahme von Vertretern der arabischen Liga und der Maghreb-Union dokumentiert" Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1200 Comp. „Die arabischen Länder sind mit weniger Vorbehalten zur Mittelmeerkonferenz in Barcelona aufgebrochen als einen Monat zuvor zum Wirtschaftsgipfel in Amman" Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1201 Comp. „Damaskus musste sich am Rande der Konferenz von Amman vorwerfen lassen, sein Boykott dieser Wirtschaftsveranstaltung sei unverständlich, zumal es in Barcelona am gleichen Tisch wie die Israeli nicht nur ökonomische, sondern auch Sicherheitsfragen diskutieren werde" Kocher, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1202 Comp. „Die etwas papierene syrische Rechtfertigung ist, dass die Konferenz in Barcelona im Gegensatz zu derjenigen in Amman nicht im Rahmen der multilateralen Friedensverhandlungen stehe, welche die frühzeitige Normalisierung mit dem jüdischen Staat betrieben" Kocher, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

the Mediterranean[1203]. Nevertheless, reaching a consensus is often very difficult, as it was reported in 2008 *that the Arab countries are not yet disposed to agree on a charter on security concerning security issues in the Mediterranean*[1204]. The Libyan representative Ghadhafi stated, referring to Libya's exclusion of participating at the conference in Barcelona in 1995 that *he would not have assisted either way, because in Barcelona the predominant North will repetitively impose its will on the weaker southern countries*[1205]. Ghadhafi has not changed his opinion over the years; he did not participate at the Paris Summit and at the conference in Marseilles in 2008 either. According to the estimation of the Swiss press, *the absence of Libya* (at the conference in Marseilles) *contributed to a surprising harmonic progress of the meeting*[1206].

A difficulty for the relations across the Mediterranean was explicitly stated early in 2008: *it must have attracted the attention of Sarkozy*, but figuratively also Europe, *that the Mediterranean countries became increasingly less interested in the multi-billion offer of the EU in the last years*[1207]. A dissociative issue of the Mediterranean relations was stated in 2008 in connection with the "other" , when the Swiss newspaper argued that the "other" *countries are economically weak and additionally at odds with each other, not only with Israel: Algeria with Morocco, Syria with Lebanon and Libya with all the others*[1208].

Remarkably, the Swiss press voices did not explicitly mention associative elements of the relations across the Mediterranean. Thus, it was stated in 1995 that *while the economic guidelines were beyond controversy, the political formulations regarding terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process and regarding the refugee issue were part of severe negotiations*[1209]. Especially the dissent according the migration concern, which was expressed within the scope of a meeting after Barcelona in 1995, was extensively dealt with in the Swiss press. Thus, it was commented that a *Tunisian participant reproached the impression that Europe seems to perceive immigration in the same way as the (pseudo) religious motivated terrorism and the drug traffic*[1210]. And further, that *the image, whereupon each*

1203 Comp. „Die Araber erhoffen sich von Engagements der Europäer ein Gegengewicht zur Dominanz der USA" Kocher, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1204 Comp. „Die arabischen Staaten sind offenbar noch nicht bereit, sich in einer Grundsatzakte über die Sicherheitsbeziehungen im Mittelmeergebiet festzulegen" Foreign Authors/AA, (08.07.2008) NZZ.

1205 Comp. „[Ausschluß Libyen] Der Revolutionsführer Ghadhafi versicherte einem Radioreporter, er hätte ohnehin nicht teilgenommen, weil in Barcelona erneut der dominante Norden den schwachen Ländern des Südens seinen Willen aufzwingen wolle" Kocher, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1206 Comp. „Nur Libyen war nicht vertreten und hat auf diese Weise zum überraschend harmonischen Verlauf der Begegnung beigetragen" Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

1207 Comp. „Doch es hätte auch Sarkozy auffallen müssen, dass das Interesse der Mittelmeeranrainer an den milliardenschweren Angeboten der EU über die Jahre erlahmte" win, (14.03.2008) NZZ.

1208 Comp. „Diese Staaten sind wirtschaftlich schwach und noch dazu untereinander nicht nur mit Israel, sondern auch sonst zerstritten: Algerien mit Marokko, Syrien mit Libanon und Libyen mit allen übrigen" Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

1209 Comp. „Während die Leitlinien für die wirtschaftliche Kooperation unbestritten sind, sorgen politische Formulierungen zum Terrorismus und zum Nahost-Friedensprozess sowie Flüchtlingsfragen für Verhandlungsstoff" Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1210 Comp. „(Ein Diskussionsteilnehmer aus Tunesien beklagte), dass in Europa die Immigration im selben Licht gesehen werde wie der (pseudo)religiös motivierte Terrorismus oder der Drogenhandel" Ammann B, (01.12.1995) NZZ.

North African and each Turk wants to live in an EU country is wrong[1211]. As far as Europe was concerned, it was stated *that the southern and eastern countries have to understand that Europe may not permit an uncontrolled immigration*[1212]. In the last years, the migration issue has remained and still remains one of the central concerns of the Mediterranean Policy.

Other reasons for dissociative elements within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership have been stressed in connection with an explanation about why the Barcelona Process has not succeeded so far. For example, the press commented in 2000 that *the goals were not reachable and the economic, political and military asymmetries were underestimated*[1213]. Also the conviction that the *partnership can only progress when the Arabian-Israeli conflict is succeeding is postulated as an excuse*[1214]. Also *the ponderosity of the bureaucratic structures, the reciprocal mistrust and the diverging interests*[1215] were repetitively stressed as dissociative matters.

In 2008, the discourse also in the Swiss media stressed the evaluation and revitalisation of a Mediterranean Policy. The NZZ stated that *primarily the Middle East Conflict and also the old rivalries among the Maghreb countries turned out to be insuperable barriers for a real, multilateral Mediterranean Policy*[1216]. Whether these, other or new dissociative elements will disturb the progress of the direction, agreed in November in Marseille, has to be proved.

7.1.2 How the Mediterranean Policy is described

In the Swiss press the description of the Mediterranean Policy concerns either definitional or evaluative statements.

At the beginning of the Barcelona Process in 1995, the definitional statements referred to *a joint declaration which founds the base for a new multilateral policy* and represents *a formal begin for a new cooperation between the European Union and the Mediterranean non member countries and also the Palestinian Authority*[1217]. At this moment, *the Mediterranean Policy is regarded as a promising reori-*

1211 Comp. „(es)wurde auch gesagt, die Vorstellung sei falsch, jeder Nordafrikaner oder jeder Türke wolle nichts anderes als in einem EU Land leben“ Ammann B, (01.12.1995) NZZ.

1212 Comp. „(es)wurde auch gesagt, die Vorstellung sei falsch, jeder Nordafrikaner oder jeder Türke wolle nichts anderes als in einem EU Land leben“ Ammann B, (01.12.1995) NZZ.

1213 Comp. „Die Ziele seien am Anfang zu hoch gesteckt, die wirtschaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Asymmetrien unterschätzt worden, konstatierte Roberto Aliboni, der Direktor des Instituto Affari Internationali“ iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ.

1214 Comp. „Das verbreitete Argument, mit der Partnerschaft könne es nur vorangehen, wenn der arabisch-israelische Friedensprozess erfolgreich verlaufe, sei ein Ausrede“ iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ.

1215 Comp. „Dass der "Barcelona-Prozess" ungeachtet der nach jeder Euromed-Konferenz offiziell beschworenen Fortschritte in der Praxis so harzig verläuft, liegt sicher an den hüben und drüben schwerfälligen bürokratischen Strukturen, am gegenseitigen Misstrauen und, wie das gescheiterte Fischereiabkommen zwischen der EU und Marokko illustrierte, auch an unterschiedlich wahrgenommenen Interessen“ Lautenschütz, (07.11.2001) NZZ.

1216 Comp. „In erster Linie der Nahost-Konflikt und alte Rivalitäten zwischen den Maghreb-Staaten erwiesen sich als unüberwindbare Hindernisse für das Formulieren einer echten, multilateralen Mittelmeerpolitik“ win, (21.05.2008) NZZ.

1217 Comp. „Eine gemeinsame Erklärung, die die Basis für eine neue multilaterale Mittelmeerpolitik legt,(…) Sie verkörpert im Urteil der Teilnehmerstaaten den formellen Beginn einer neuen Kooperation zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten sowie den palästinensischen Autonomiegebieten“ Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

entation of the EU Foreign Policy[1218]. Later, in 2000, the Barcelona Process was described as a *new chapter in the economic, security-political and social cooperation*[1219]. In 2008, the agreement on the French proposal was denominated as a *German-French compromise proposal*[1220]. The European politicians, who wanted to revive the Barcelona Process, agreed at the Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles in November 2008 that the *term "Barcelona-Process" will be eliminated as the denomination of the Mediterranean Policy and that Union for the Mediterranean will be the official appellation*[1221]. Therewith, the definitional statements in the Swiss press are basically inoffensive, as they do neither refer to the aspired novelty character of the Barcelona Process in an exaggerated way, nor do they indicate any strategic finality.

The evaluative references are predominantly negative. The few positive statements only referred to the *Mediterranean Union,* which *appears to have started off well*[1222], and to the fact that *the successful kick-off concerning the implementation of the Mediterranean Union has inspired the fantasy*[1223]. The claim of the Mediterranean Policy already contained certain criticism, because it was stated that *it should revive the Barcelona Process, and not reinvent it*[1224].

Critical voices already mentioned in 1997 that *the intended intensification of a cooperation of all countries in the Mediterranean stagnated due to the paralysis of the Israeli – Palestinian peace process* and *was even threatened by an abrupt end as the Middle East conflict got worse, which attested the Barcelona Process an uncertain future*[1225].The stagnation of the Barcelona Process was also stressed in 1998[1226] and in 2001, when it was reported that *the integration among the Mediterranean countries is not advancing*[1227]. The reasons for this were assumed to result from the *differing expecta-*

1218 Comp. „Die angestrebte Partnerschaft wird (…) als vielversprechende Neuorientierung der EU-Aussenpolitik gewertet!" Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1219 Comp. „(…) euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft ein neues Kapitel in der ökonomischen, sicherheitspolitischen und sozialen Kooperation zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern(…)" iwe, (28.06.2008) NZZ.

1220 Comp. „Der neueste deutsch-französische Kompromissvorschlag zu dieser Union (...)" win, (14.03.2008) NZZ.

1221 Comp. „Die Diplomaten hätten sich ausserdem geeinigt, das Wort Barcelona-Prozess aus dem Namen zu streichen und nur von der Union für das Mittelmeer zusprechen" Editorial, (04.11.2008) NZZ.

1222 Comp. „Die Mittelmeer-Union sei "sehr gut gestartet", bescheinigte Kanzlerin Merkel am Sonntag -nachdem sie zu Beginn die schärfste Kritikerin des Projektes war" ap, (14.07.2008) NZZ.

1223 Comp. „Der auch sonst gelungene Auftakt zur Errichtung der Mittelmeerunion hat die politische Phantasie beflügelt" Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

1224 Comp. „Neu beleben, nicht neu erfinden" win, (21.05.2008).

1225 Comp. „Die beabsichtigte Intensivierung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen allen Ländern des Mittelmeerraumes kommt seit der weitgehenden Lähmung des israelischen-palästinensischen Friedensprozesses nicht mehr voran (...)Die Verschärfung der Nahostkrise führte aber die Konferenz und den gesamten Barcelona-Prozess gefährlich nahe an ein abruptes Ende (...)Die Zukunft der Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und dem Mittelmeerraum ist ungewiss" Foreign Authors/AA, (08.07.1997) NZZ.

1226 Comp. „(…)Bestrebungen waren wegen der Probleme bei den Friedensverhandlungen im Nahen Osten ins Stocken geraten" ap, (04.06.1998)NZZ.

1227 Comp. „Kaum voran kommt hingegen die Integration der Mittelmeeranrainer unter sich" Lautenschütz, (07.11.2001) NZZ.

tions of the participants[1228], *the insufficient infrastructure in the region and the political tensions*[1229]. Furthermore, the moderate success of the Barcelona Process was explained by *the lack of verve and visions among the partners*[1230]. Thus, in 2008, *the only way was to re-launch the Barcelona Process*[1231] . In this context the NZZ reported that the EU Commissioner of Foreign Affairs *Ferrero-Waldner indirectly admitted that the Barcelona Process could not fulfil the expectations*[1232]. In regard to a revival of the Barcelona Process within the limits of a Union for the Mediterranean, the Swiss press repetitively stated *that forms seem more important than content*[1233] and added with a certain irony its own perception that *maybe it would be enough to develop the Mediterranean Union to a kind of club*, *because in a club style and conventions are more important than common rules and empowerments of enacting binding decisions.*[1234]

By and large, the criticism of the Swiss press in this respect appears to be quite harmless and unemotional.

7.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose

Due to the low number of references concerning the actual purpose of the European Policy in the Mediterranean and the officially stated aim, both aspects are treated under a single subheading.

The purpose and the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy

Within the Swiss Press the purpose of the European Policy in the Mediterranean includes the assurance of peace and stability and also the amalgamation of the peoples. On the occasion of the initiation of the Barcelona Process, the NZZ stated that nearly all speakers *on the conference expressed their belief that without a peaceful partnership in the Mediterranean it will be impossible to assure peace in Europe*[1235] and that *it is the purpose to increase prosperity and wealth in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, in order to enhance a zone of political stability and regional integration*[1236]. The

1228 Comp. „Das Kernproblem der Partnerschaft ortete George Joffe von der London School of Economics bei den unterschiedlichen Erwartungen der Partner“ iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ.

1229 Comp. „Die Bilanz der bisherigen Zusammenarbeit ist bescheiden. Erste Integrationsschritte haben die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Disparitäten nicht vermindert“ pgp, (28.11.2005) NZZ.

1230 Comp. „Fünf Jahre nach der Konferenz von Barcelona (…) ist (…) nur noch wenig von den einstmals großen Euromed-Perspektiven zu entdecken gewesen“ Müller, (17.11.2000) NZZ.

1231 Comp. „(…) es nur noch darum gehe, eine vor 13 Jahren in Barcelona beschlossene Strategie der EU zum Einbezug der Mittelmeeranrainer -im EU-Jargon "Barcelona-Prozess"genannt- neu zu lancieren“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ.

1232 Comp. „Ferrero-Waldner gab indirekt zu, dass die bald 13 Jahre dauernde Erfahrung mit diesem Barcelona-Prozess die Erwartungen nicht erfüllen konnte“ win, (21.05.2008) NZZ.

1233 Comp. „Formen statt Inhalte“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ.

1234 Comp. „Vielleich genügt es, die Mittelmeerunion zu einer Art Klub zu entwickeln (...)In einem Klub sind Stil und Konvention wichtiger als für alle geltende Regeln und Ermächtigungen zum Erlass verbindlicher Entscheidungen“ Meesse, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

1235 Comp. „In nahezu allen Grußadressen (…) kam zum Ausdruck, dass ohne eine friedliche Partnerschaft rund ums Mittelmeer in Europa kein dauerhafter Frieden herrschen könne“ Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1236 Comp. „Ziel und Zweck der engeren ökonomischen Bande besteht aus EU-Sicht darin, im südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeerraum den Wohlstand zu mehren und damit dort letztlich eine Zone politischer Stabilität und regionaler Integration zu erreichen“ Gemperle, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

Swiss press attested the multilateral aspect of the initiative the *purpose of merging the peoples by explicitly respecting traditions and national singularities*[1237]. The purpose to *assure peace and stability via economic support and a cultural dialogue*[1238] was continuously stressed in the discourse over the years.

Other arguments, which refer to the European purpose, expressed the wish *to enhance the policy with a new impetus*[1239] and to *intensify the Mediterranean Policy*[1240]. The identified statements in the Swiss newspaper were similar to the official statements and only to a moderate extent self-reflective, also when it was reported that the French President *demands more effort for an early recognition and arbitration of conflicts, but also wants to strengthen the civil and military means for fending off unwanted consequences of climatic changes and also the millions of immigrants in Europe*[1241].

The officially stated aims that have been identified in the Swiss press are uncontroversial. Thus, it was stated in 1995 that it is the aim *to initiate a closer economic and political cooperation*[1242] and to *support the partner countries with high donated funds*[1243]. The only deviance of the common formulations concerned the consideration that *the aims can be regarded as ambitious*[1244] and, as it was critically stated in 2008, that *the Barcelona Process must exceed a one-sided implemented and bureaucratic operated auxiliary programme and must embody an equitable partnership*[1245]. And further, that *the structure of the Mediterranean policy should be in accordance with its challenges*[1246]. Therewith, a self-reflective argument concerning the officially stated aim was stressed.

7.3 Discourse analysis – Identity

The statements which are allocated to the analytical category "identity" in the Swiss Press refer to the political ambition of the European Union, its internal struggle and its role perception.

1237 Comp. „Das dritte Element des kooperativen Geistes, der in Barcelona geherrscht hat, schlägt sich in einem umfangreichen Katalog von Absichtserklärungen nieder, der letztlich das Zusammenführen der Völker bezweckt, ausdrücklich aber Traditionen und nationale Eigenheiten respektiert" Rist, (29.11.1995) NZZ.

1238 Comp. „(…) "Barcelona-Prozess" genannte Euromed-Initiative sollte den Mittelmeerraum dank europäischer Wirtschaftshilfe und einem Dialog der Kulturen zu einer Zone des Friedens und der Stabilität machen" Editorial, (24.04.2002) NZZ.

1239 Comp. „[Palermo] Das informelle Treffen soll dem sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess neuen Auftrieb geben" Editorial, (04.06.1998) NZZ.

1240 Comp. „[F] Frankreich möchte die im Jahr 1995 mit der Konferenz in Barcelona begonnene EU-Mittelmeerpolitik intensivieren, über die vor kurzem selbst Bundeskanzlerin Merkel sagte, diese bleibe weit hinter den Erwartungen zurück" eg, (04.08.2007) NZZ.

1241 Comp. „(…) ruft er zu mehr Anstrengung bei der Früherkennung, Verhütung und Schlichtung von Konflikten auf, aber auch zur Stärkung der zivilen und militärischen Mittel zur Abwehr unerwünschter Folgen des Klimawandels. Dazu gehören auch Migrationsströme in Millionenstärke in Richtung Europa" win, (14.03.2008) NZZ.

1242 Comp. „(…) eine engere wirtschaftliche und politische Kooperation initiiert werden" Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1243 Comp. „(...), sowie die Verpflichtung der EU, den Partnerstaaten milliardenhohe Finanzhilfen zu gewähren" Gemperle, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1244 Comp. „(…) Ziele können tatsächlich als sehr ehrgeizig bezeichnet werden" iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ.

1245 Comp. „Der von der EU 1995 initiierte Barcelona-Prozess muss über ein einseitig verordnetes und bürokratisch gesteuertes Hilfsprogramm hinausführen und partnerschaftlicher Parität Ausdruck geben" Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

1246 Comp. „Die Struktur sollte den Aufgaben entsprechen" Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

7.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition and its internal struggle

In 1995, a Swiss journalist stated that *the new Mediterranean policy is a reaction on the European policy in eastern and middle Europe* and *that beside economic interests, the main motivation is based on security-political concerns*[1247]. *Although Europe is –at least demographically – in a declining position and Europe therefore depends on immigrants, the conference in Barcelona can be considered to have been part of a defence strategy*[1248]. Therewith, the European political intention in the Mediterranean was unmistakably expressed.

Nevertheless, the outcome of the Swiss perception of the European political ambition is very critical. For instance, the NZZ stated in 1997 that *the European Union does not dispose of a real common Foreign and Security Policy and that the Union is still incapable to deal with acute crisis*[1249]. Hence, the European Union is implicitly assessed as being weak and not having a coordinated Foreign Policy. At another moment, in 2002, in the context of a Ministerial Conference in Valencia, the Swiss newspaper remarked quite ironically that *due to the European perception, it is already considered to be a success that the Conference even took place*[1250]. This statement does not implicate a confidential opinion regarding the European policy approach. In 2008, it was stated in regard to the discussion of the Mediterranean Union that *the fundamental question why the Barcelona Process failed was not even raised*[1251]. And that *beside the festiveness which was demonstrated at the Paris Summit the essential political massage was missed*[1252]. Therewith, the Swiss press unambiguously expresses its opinion of the European Policy in the Mediterranean; that it is of questionable seriousness, that it lacks of content and, implicitly, that the European Union is too weak to change this circumstance.

Concerning the internal struggle, the different national interests, the Swiss press is equally discerning. The particular national positions regarding the Mediterranean Policy were stressed for two occasions: the initiation in 1995, and 2007 and 2008, respectively in connection with the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union. In 1995, the Spanish position was ostensibly emphasised, namely that *the Mediterranean constitutes a special concern of Spain regarding the European Foreign Policy and that Madrid is emphasising the position that Europe does not only have precarious frontiers in the East,*

1247 Comp. „Die von der EU angestrebte sogenannte Neue Mittelmeerpolitik ist zu einem guten Teil die Reaktion der EU auf ihre Öffnung gegenüber Ost- und Mitteleuropa (...)Es dürfen mit anderen Worten -abgesehen von den wirtschaftlichen Interessen- eher sicherheits- als entwicklungspolitische Motive für die ambitiöser gewordene EU-Mittelmeerpolitik maßgebend gewesen sein“ Gemperle, (28.11.1995) NZZ.

1248 Comp. „(…),dass Europa -zumindest demographisch- gleichsam auf dem absteigenden Ast sei, weswegen der alte Kontinent auf Einwanderer angewiesen sei (...)Die Euro-mediterrane Konferenz der Minister war aus europäischer Sicht Teil einer Abwehrstrategie“ Ammann, (01.12.1995) NZZ.

1249 Comp. „Es gibt gegenwärtig noch keine wirkliche gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU, und die Union ist nach wie vor unfähig, akute Krisen zu meistern“ Foreign Authors/AA, (08.07.1997) NZZ.

1250 Comp. „Nach Ansicht der europäischen Union ist es deshalb schon ein Erfolg, dass sie überhaupt stattgefunden hat“ Editorial, (24.04.2002) NZZ.

1251 Comp. „Doch die Grundfrage, warum denn der "Barcelona-Prozess" derart Rost ansetzte, kommt nicht zur Sprache“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ.

1252 Comp. „Bei aller zur Schau gestellten Fröhlichkeit ging eine wichtige politische Botschaft aus“ Editorial, (14.07.2008) NZZ.

but also in the South[1253]. Further, that t*he Conference of Barcelona represents a core element of the Spanish policy, which is explained with the apparent interests due to its geographical location*[1254]. Therewith, *the Spanish claim to belong to Europe's voice leading countries is unambiguous*[1255].

Nevertheless, Spain is not the only country which tries to gain profile over issues of the Mediterranean Policy. The Swiss newspaper also extensively referred to the French and German power struggle, which took place on the occasion of the French proposal to build a Mediterranean Union just for the countries bordering the Mediterranean. The consecutive struggle for a common position contained a considerable separative force and demonstrated the frailness of the European Foreign Policy, and thus figuratively of the European Union. *In its external affairs France and Germany focus of differing priorities*[1256], namely France is more linked to the South, while Germany is more inclined to the East. However, the initial French proposal provoked a notable *malaise between Paris and Berlin*[1257]. *Germany was not amused about the French initiative and was not only alarmed by the separative character, which the French proposal could have entailed, but also that Sarkozy is about to create an instrument to establish the French claim for the leading position within Europe*[1258]. Even clearer expressed a month later, the NZZ stated that *the background of the dissent between France and Germany is the concern that France aspires to build itself a new scenario with EU-funds, where it would doubtless assume the chief part*[1259]. The next statement which indicated the internal struggle attested *a symbolic stage win for France*[1260], despite the reduced concept and the participation of all European countries, as Sarkozy organised the Paris Summit around the national holiday.

The Swiss perception of the differing national interests can be summed up with the still valid statement of 2000, saying that *within Europe, France attempts to distinguish itself in the role of the procurator for the Mediterranean countries, Germany makes an effort to demonstrate its compromise to lip*

1253 Comp. „Ein besonderes Anliegen Spaniens stellt die Außenpolitik der EU im Mittelmeerraum dar (...)Madrid will seinen Partnern zu verstehen geben, dass Europa nicht nur im Osten, sondern auch im Süden eine heikle Grenze hat" Ammann, (05.07.1995) NZZ.

1254 Comp. „Die im November in Barcelona vorgesehene Konferenz (…) stellt einen Kernpunkt der spanischen Politik (…)dar" und „wegen seiner geographischen Lage hat Spanien ein offensichtliches Interesse daran(…)" Ammann, (05.07.1995) NZZ.

1255 Comp. „Der Anspruch Madrids, zu den führenden Ländern der EU zu zählen, ist unzweideutig" Ammann, (05.07.1995) NZZ.

1256 Comp. „Was die Politik der EU gegenüber ihren Nachbarn im Osten und im Süden angeht, setzen Deutschland und Frankreich inzwischen recht unterschiedliche Prioritäten" eg, (24.04.2002) NZZ.

1257 Comp. „Zwischen Paris und Berlin herrscht ein Malaise(…)" cm, (27.02.2008) NZZ.

1258 Comp. „Von dem Projekt, das mittlerweile nun auch Union für das Mittelmeer genannt wird, sind die Deutschen alles andere als angetan, da sie eine tendenzielle Spaltung der EU befürchten und zudem den Verdacht hegen, Sarkozy wolle sich vor allem ein Instrument zur Durchsetzung des französischen Führungsanspruchs in Europa schaffen" cm, (27.02.2008) NZZ.

1259 Comp. „Von dem Projekt, das mittlerweile nun auch Union für das Mittelmeer genannt wird, sind die Deutschen alles andere als angetan, da sie eine tendenzielle Spaltung der EU befürchten und zudem den Verdacht hegen, Sarkozy wolle sich vor allem ein Instrument zur Durchsetzung des französischen Führungsanspruchs in Europa schaffen" cm, (27.02.2008) NZZ

1260 Comp. „Frankreichs Präsident Sarkozy hat den Nationalfeiertag in einen diplomatischen Coup verwandelt" Editorial, (14.07.2008) NZZ.

services of the same direction, while Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries have a lack of enthusiasm for a cooperation with the Mediterranean countries[1261].

7.3.2 The role of the European Union

The evaluation of the role of the European Union in the Mediterranean contains a lot of criticism from the Swiss press. One of the stressed points of criticism concerned Europe's role as a sponsor and financier. In this context it was stated in 1997 that the *relative strength of the European Union in the Mediterranean is clearly based on the economic dimensions*[1262] and, in 2008, that *the influence of the EU is based on the "soft power" of money*[1263]. The latter suggests that the role as a financier is not always altruistic, which in regard to the Mediterranean Policy, has to be affirmed. This was clearly expressed in 2000, when it was stated *that the EU acted on behalf of security-political and strategic interests; the EU wanted to stop migration and oppose the American predominance in the Middle East and, additionally, it wanted to calm the southern neighbours because of the conducted eastern policy*[1264]. Concerning the competing position with the United States in the Mediterranean, the NZZ stated in 2008 that *the French President made use of the political vacuum after the presidential elections in the United States in order to redefine the international role of France and the European Union*[1265]. The concluding evaluation, on the other hand, expressed that *the United States maintain, despite all awkwardness and severe mistakes, the leading power in the Middle East*[1266]. The criticism concerning the European politics mentions the assumption that *Europe is used to act on a short-term base, instead of act foresighted and on a long-term base*[1267]. In regard to the predominant French role within the revive of the Barcelona Process, the Swiss press acknowledged *the strong governmental influence within the European Foreign Policy as counterproductive to the European Union's attempt to speak with one voice and represent a coherent political entity*[1268].

1261 Comp. „Innerhalb der EU sucht Frankreich sich stets in seiner Sachwalterrolle zugunsten der Mittelmeeranrainer zu profilieren. Deutschland bemüht sich zumindest um in die gleiche Richtung weisende Lippenbekenntnisse, während Großbritannien und die skandinavischen Mitgliedstaaten der EU nach französischer Ansicht es weiterhin in hohem Masse an Enthusiasmus für die Kooperation mit den Mittelmeerstaaten fehlen lassen" Müller, (17.11.2000) NZZ.

1262 Comp. „Die relative Stärke der EU im Mittelmeerraum fusst eindeutig in der wirtschaftlichen Dimension" Foreign Authors/AA, (08.07.1997) NZZ.

1263 Comp. „Natürlich stützt sich der Einfluss der EU auf die "sanfte Gewalt" des Geldes, im Gegensatz etwa zur militärischen Macht" win, (14.03.2008) NZZ.

1264 Comp. „(…)die EU habe aus sicherheitspolitischen und strategischen Interessen gehandelt. Ihr sei es darum gegangen der Migration einen Riegel zu schieben und der amerikanischen Dominanz im Nahen Osten etwas entgegenzusetzen. Zudem habe man im Auge des nach Osten wandernden europäischen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interesses die südlichen Nachbarn besänftigen wollen" iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ.

1265 Comp. „Der französische Staatschef nutzt das Vakuum, das durch die amerikanische Präsidentschaftswahl entsteht, geschickt aus, um die internationale Rolle Frankreichs und der EU neu zu definieren" Editorial, (14.07.2008) NZZ.

1266 Comp. „Allen Ungeschicklichkeiten, ja groben Missgriffen zum Trotz sind die Vereinigten Staaten im Nahen Osten weiterhin die führende Macht" Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

1267 Comp. „Europa pflegt bestenfalls kurzatmig zu reagieren, anstatt langfristig vorausschauend zu agieren" Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

1268 Comp. „Der Rückgriff auf mitgliedstaatliche Aussenpolitik läuft jedoch den Bemühungen der europäischen Union, in der Aussenpolitik mit einer Stimme zu sprechen, diametral entgegen" Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ.

XXII CROSS-COUNTRY DISCOURSES - CONCLUDING REMARKS

The discourse analysis of each country provides a detailed characterisation of the specific perception of the European Union and its Mediterranean Policy in each of the considered countries. The concluding reflection is divided into two parts: the non-Mediterranean countries and the Mediterranean EU countries. Additionally, the possible distinctions of the discourse of the German speaking ambit and the discourse of a non-EU country, Switzerland, can be considered. The analysis of the British, French, German, and Italian public perception of the Global Mediterranean Policy between 1972 and 1979 constitute a promising opportunity to stress the results of the discourse analysis between 1995-2008 in regard to continuity and discontinuity.

The non-Mediterranean countries

Among the considered non-Mediterranean countries are Austria, Germany, Great Britain and Switzerland.

Austria represents the smallest of the European member countries. Within the three selected newspapers, 59 articles have been considered as relevant and a total of 141 statements have been identified. Within the Austrian discourse the MNC partner countries are considered with few statements. These statements indicate that the participation of the MNC countries in the Barcelona Process is due to the promised benefits and that the continuous dissent among the "other" displays the high degree of sensitiveness of the process. Although the "other" per se is not mentioned, a distant and mistrusting attitude can be perceived. Associative elements of the cooperation are mentioned in connection with determining mutual interests and the special integrative character of the Barcelona Process. The difficulties which occur on the operative level are considered as the main dissociative forces. The public opinion can be subsumed by the following statement: *summits can fail on old or new quarrels*[1269]. In general, by emphasising its singular character, the Mediterranean Policy is considered to be a "promising instrument". Nevertheless, its functionality regarding the efficiency is critically perceived, although the discourse is nourished by expectations concerning what the Barcelona Process could achieve. The overall estimation of the Mediterranean Policy within the Austria discourse conveys the impression that the Barcelona Process is aloof of reality. In the Austrian opinion, the European "purpose" for this kind of policy is strongly linked to European fears, like insecurity due to immigration, while the reported official aim is a stylistic make-up rather than a meaningful aspect. The political ambition of the European Union, and therefore the Austrian perception of the EU as a whole, is attested a lack of ideas, meagre outcomes and few implementations. This can be reduced to the estimation of a lack of commitment and initiative to succeed. Overall, the Austrian discourse regarding the Mediterranean Affairs can be considered as distant and quite unemotional. It is rather reporting than commenting,

1269 Comp. „Doch dann drohte der Gipfel an altem Streit und neuem Zank zu scheitern." Eberling, (29.11.2005) Salzburger Nachrichten.

although it has to be said that the extent of the coverage is surprisingly large. The discourse is relatively balanced among all three newspapers; the political inclination of the newspapers is not important for the weighting of certain issues.

Within the five newspapers which represent the **German public discourse** in this thesis, 118 articles and 404 statements have been identified. Among the newspapers, most articles with extraordinary coverage derive from the FAZ. The SZ, FTD and Welt contribute relevant statements, but the sharpest objections are formulated by the left inclining TAZ. Germany is the biggest non-Mediterranean country which is also notable in the press discourses. Detailed coverage with a focus on the conception of the European policy suggests that the German discourse is one of a voice-leading power. Within the discourse of all four newspapers, the MNC are covered by estimations on their positions, concerning whether they want the EU engagement in the Mediterranean region as a counterbalance, or concerning their motivation, which is considered as insufficient for a partnership and that the calculus on benefits constitutes the decisive driving motor for them. Associative elements are especially claimed in connection with the combat against terrorism. Differences are perceived regarding the consistent dissent on certain topics, the increasing prosperity gap, the regional conflicts and the general mistrust. A singularity of the German discourse is the insight into the co-operational level at several Ministerial conferences, which have mostly been considered in order to ascertain the associative and dissociative elements of cooperation. The importance of the Mediterranean Policy is repetitively highlighted in the context of stressing terrorism. Positive evaluative statements concern the novelty aspect of the policy and its significance regarding the cooperation on sensitive challenges of our times; however, most of the statements express criticism. The numerous common criticisms can be reduced to the German evaluative perception that much has been said, but few has been done, which is considered to be a substantial problem on the part of the EU. The purpose for the policy is regarded as a reaction to the challenges and as a part of the European world power vision to become/remain a decisive power. The officially stated aim is less explicit regarding the purpose, saying that peace has to be assured by transforming the world. This explicitly stated aim deduces a strong need for recognition of the EU. The German public discourse criticises the European check-book diplomacy in the same way than its mission statement. Additionally, the EU is attested a strategic confusion because of its lack of concept. The internal struggle within the European Union covers a special position in the German public discourse, as it was due to Angela Merkel that the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the Mediterranean was rejected. Concerning this debate, Germany is regarded as "guardian of Europe, the European thought", while France is perceived as a "greedy separatist". Anyway, the criticism of France is less pronounced than expected and the role of Angela Merkel is just commented in a benevolent and not exuberant way. Overall, the German discourse resembles the discourse of a great power, as it is actively concerned with security considerations of Europe and places its criticism regarding the overall conception of the European Union and less on singular aspects. A similar consideration was already made by Detlef Puhl, who evaluated the German press coverage for

the period of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). He lined out that the criticism on the EEC mainly concerned its limited action-ability due to its long-winded search for compromises. He further concluded that although Germany is not directly socio-economically affected by the Mediterranean affairs, the German press is less distant than, for example, the French one; moreover, at most points it is even more critically because its concerns are focused on the development of the EEC. The detailed German press coverage paid the main attention to the conception and the factual based happenings and Puhl thus concluded that "for Germany it is more a Mediterranean POLICY than a MEDITERRANEAN policy".[1270]

Switzerland, as the only non-European country, is regarded with one press, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung; within 26 articles a total of 143 statements have been considered for the discourse analysis. The Swiss discourse completes the preliminary expectations because it offers a more accentuated evaluation of the European Union within the limits of an external scope. The MNC as cooperation partners are only stressed in their situational context, with no references of certain associative elements within the partnership. A special emphasis is on the dissociative forces among the European and Mediterranean participating countries, like the increasing lack of interest of the MNC on multi-billion offers, the economic disparities, the multiple conflict potential in the region, the ponderosity of the European Union and the miss-leading reciprocal perception of both sides; for example, the MNC reject the European perception that their countries are a real threat for Europe. The definitional description of the Mediterranean Policy is basically inoffensive, while the evaluation of the Barcelona Process is predominantly negative. The process is critically perceived in connection with stagnation, the different expectations and the lack of enthusiasm among the partners. Concerning the Mediterranean Union it is stated that forms appear to be more important than context; this consideration can be overtaken for the whole European Mediterranean Policy within the Swiss public discourse. The reflection on the purpose of the European engagement in the Mediterranean is less accentuated than expected; the comments seem to be overtaken of press agencies and official statements from the EU side rather than self-reflective. The purpose is assigned to both, the European will of assuring peace and stability and the coalescence of peoples. In general, the outcome of the European Mediterranean Policy is regarded as questionable because it lacks of content and the European Union is considered as too weak to change this circumstance. According to the Swiss perception, the weakness of the EU is due to its inability to implement a coordinated foreign policy. Its role as a primary financier in the Mediterranean and its "soft power" (money) approach is critically contextualised, especially as it seems obvious that the EU acts on the basis of strategic considerations. Overall, the Swiss public discourse is quite unemotional towards the Barcelona Process and, based on its status as non-European member, provides accentuated criticism on the European Union.

1270 Comp. PUHL, Mittelmeer, 220f. The following German newspapers have been considered in his analysis: Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit, Handelsblatt, General-Anzeiger, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Der Spiegel, Stuttgarter Zeitung. Comp. Ibid. 215.

For assessing the public opinion in **Great Britain,** two newspapers, 29 articles and 49 statements have been considered. The British public perception of the European Mediterranean policy is in general rather unemotional, even demonstrating little interest. This is additionally underlined by the fact that although the same amount of articles has been considered for the British press than for Switzerland, only about one-third of the statements have been identified as relevant. Due to the British perception, the Mediterranean countries search for a greater EU engagement in the Mediterranean. Despite all difficulties (reach an agreement, regional conflicts), which are perceived as dissociative elements of the cooperation, the British newspapers suggest that the Barcelona Process, which up to date is considered as little effective, should play a major role in supporting Turkey to become a European member. The actual purpose of the EU policy in the Mediterranean is discursively related to the European security concerns, which are seen as the main motivation, but also the European attempt of defining its performance in foreign policy affairs. Beside all the criticism regarding the Barcelona Process and its efficiency, it is considered to be a challenge for the whole EU to define its foreign policy conception. Further it is suggested that the EU should, additionally to its technical and financial assistance, act as a role model in the Mediterranean. Interestingly, the British press does not really participate in the debate concerning the Mediterranean Union and the German-French dissent. The British rejection of the French proposal is due to its individual-national support of an entry of Turkey; to impede such an entry was one of the crucial points of the French argumentation to found a Mediterranean Union on the example of the European Union, but just for countries bordering the Mediterranean. Detlev Puhl stressed also the British public opinion in the context of the GMP. The press coverage was predominately based on a chronological reporting of the facts, which left the impression of a distant and contained British approach towards the GMP and the Mediterranean Policy. Puhl suggested that this attitude is based on the fact that its conception took place before Great Britain became a member of the European Union.[1271] Between 1995 and 2008, the British discourse is also evaluated as unemotional, but not contained because the British press follows decided political interests in the region, such as the Turkish entry into the European Union. Britain participates and, at the same time, does not participate, it is part and its not. This is also an explanation why the public attention often refers to the role of the USA in the Middle East.

The Mediterranean Countries

The European Mediterranean countries which have been considered in the present discourse analysis are France, Italy and Spain.

The **French perception** of the Barcelona Process is based on the consideration of 59 articles and 151 statements in two newspapers. The cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean non-member

1271 Comp. Puhl, Mittelmeerpolitik, 222f. The British newspapers which were considered by Puhl were: Financial Times, The Times, The Economist, Guardian, Daily Telegraph. Comp. Ibid. 221.

countries is generally regarded as difficult, due to the national moods, especially of Libya, the Middle Eastern Conflict, the distinctive motivations for the participation and the increasing economic gap. Associatively regarded is the mutual considerateness of the tensions among the partner; this kind of foresightedness is especially important at the time of the ministerial conferences. Overall dominate the critical evaluations of the Barcelona Process. Although the French newspapers consider it as an accomplishment of the Barcelona Process to have survived despite the conflicts, the prevailing evaluations stress its meagre results, its stagnation and even its failure; that only 26% of the provided EU funds have been drawn on implies severe structural criticism on the European Union. Nevertheless, the engagement of the EU in the Mediterranean, which implicitly is admitted to be due to security concerns, is considered to be vital for France; not its existence but the European procedure and inefficiency are criticised. Concerning the distinctive internal forces in the EU in regard to the Mediterranean affairs, the French press mainly focuses, not surprisingly, on the French position. The opposition and the debate on Nicolas Sarkozy's proposal are not conceded as much room in the discourse as expected. In fact, the debate rather gives reason to criticise the own government and to stress the general French ambition to become an even more decisive player in Europe and the world, which is unmistakably supported by the French press in both newspapers.

Detlev Puhl stressed the French public voice regarding the Global Mediterranean Policy and concluded that the concept of the GMP was never adopted by the French and was therefore not absorbed in the public discourse. The public opinion seemed to have been critical, distant and little sensitised regarding the European Mediterranean policy approach.[1272] Since 1995 the French public discourse has also been perceived as distant and the Mediterranean Policy has seemed to be rather introduced from "above" than publicly supported. The latter derives from the exemplar struggle regarding a possible Mediterranean identity. Within the French discourse, the definitions regarding the Mediterranean region and its significance are not clearly defined; the discourse is based on the political voice which aims to legitimate rather than to establish a relation. Consequentially, the struggle to handle the definitions of a possible common identity related to a common destiny is overtaken in the discourse.

For the present discourse analysis two newspapers of **Italy** have been considered; in them, 62 articles and 128 statements enhance the impression that the Italian public discourse is strongly linked to the Mediterranean affairs because it considers Italy to be a part of the Mediterranean. The cooperation with the MNC is perceived as especially difficult due to the immigration issue, which also constitutes the mayor dissociative element of the Barcelona Process. The Italian press unmistakably expresses the need of a European Mediterranean Policy although it is admitted that this is a difficult undertaking. Hence, the purpose of the policy approach is reasoned with the general security concern due to the demographic development and the high diversity of challenges in the region. The European ambition

1272 Comp. Puhl, Mittelmeerpolitik, 214f. Puhl regarded to the following French newspapers: Le Monde, La Croix, Vision, Le Quotidien de Paris, Le Nouvel Observateur, Combat, L'Humanité , Le Matin de Paris, La Nation, Le Fiagro, France-Soir, Le Point, Le Nouvel Economiste, Les Echos, L'Aurore. Comp. Ibid. 209.

to intensify its engagement in the South is benevolently perceived because it is interpreted as an act of Europe to become "a bit less north and a bit more south". Regarding the overall conceptual perception of the European Union, the Italian press stresses the inherent struggle of the EU to define its position in crucial questions of the foreign policy. The Italian position in Europe is of significant concern among the Italian public. Both newspapers contain the claim to defend the Italian position in the Mediterranean and in the European Union; at this point it is ambiguous what constitutes the preferential option. Nevertheless, it is determinately requested that Italy should be more engaged and "may not loose the train", even if that means a stronger cooperation with the USA. According to Puhl, the Italian press preliminary concentrated on the specific national interests and a stronger position in the EC already in the analysis of the Italian public opinion regarding the GMP.[1273]

Spain is represented by the consideration of two newspapers, 54 articles and 138 statements, which unmistakably consider the Mediterranean Policy as a national policy concern. The cooperation level of the Barcelona Process is basically regarded to be difficult. It includes a strong dissociative element, which is determined by the increasing socio-economic disparity; the most significant associative issue concerns the reaffirmation of the commitment to the Mediterranean Policy in 2008. The definitional references to the European Mediterranean Policy are linked to its significance, which is considered as vital for Spain. Within the Spanish discourse there is a remarkable linkage between the Barcelona Process and national politics - the Barcelona Process is seen as it belongs to the Spanish policy. When France proposed the Mediterranean Union, the Spanish public discourse signalised disappointment and affected proud. Nevertheless, Zapatero supported the French proposal due to the determined interests in the region. The discourse was reconciling when Barcelona was elected to be the host town of the newly established permanent institutions, which were set up at the Ministerial Conference in November 2008. Overall, the European engagement in the Mediterranean is considered as a necessity because its purpose is interpreted to be based on security concerns, thus non-altruistic motives.

Among the Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean country discourses the most remarkable distinguishing features concern the significance of the European Mediterranean Policy approach and the relation of the countries to the European Union.

The Mediterranean countries are closely involved in the Mediterranean Policy, as its finality and success is regarded to be vital for their nation. Due to the interference of their socio-economies, the existence of the Barcelona Process is beyond question. On the other hand, its evaluation and poor results, so far, are worth debating. The destiny approach of the Mediterranean for their countries is in Italy unmistakably expressed and in Spain even linked to domestic affairs; in France, the public opinion is

1273 Comp. Ibid. 208f. Puhl considered the following Italian newpapers: Il Sole 24, Il Tempo, La Voce Repubblicana, Gazetta del Mezzogiorno, La Stampa, La Nazione, La Repubblica, Il Mesaggero, Gazetta del Popolo, Paese Sera, Il Giorno, Il Globo, Corriere della Sera, Mondo Economico, L'Unità, Il Giornale, Il Giornale d'Italia, Il Popolo, Avanti. Comp. Ibid. 200.

quite distant regarding a possible identity-building in and with the Mediterranean. A possible reason therefore constitutes the position of these countries in the Mediterranean. While Spain and especially Italy, aim for a more decisive role in the Mediterranean and fear a marginalisation of their influence within Europe, France's ambitions go further: France aspires a leading role within the European Union and even in the world.

The non-Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, take the Barcelona Process as an integral part of the European foreign policy approach and focus on its conceptual consistency rather than on its actual significance for their countries. This is apparently due to the lack of dependency of their national economies. Germany stands out because it is the only of all considered countries, which disposes of a discourse that equals to a discourse of a great power. Its conceptual approaches concern the European approach as a whole. Austria and Germany, countries of central Europe, do not at any moment reflect on their position within the European Union, they take it for granted. The British public opinion is generally more distant towards the Mediterranean Policy and rather concerned about assuring their national policy interests, which in regard to Mediterranean affairs is the admission of Turkey to the European Union and the solution of the Middle East Peace conflict; in this concern, the British position is also willing to cooperate with other powers, like the United States of America, to achieve their interests. This observed dynamics leave the question open if the countries, which are predominately situated at the continent borders, do have fewer sentiments to form a part of the European unity – also in a political sense.

The non-European voice of the Swiss public also stresses the Mediterranean Policy in a distant and conceptual approach. What distinguishes the Swiss discourse from the other non-Mediterranean country discourses is that its criticism regarding the European Union is, not surprisingly, more accentuated.

Above all it can be stated that the discourse analysis of the public perception in the Mediterranean indicates the struggle of the European Union to actually form a union. The lack of commitment, trust and the sense of forming an integral part of the European policy do not only paralyse the progress of the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Union, respectively, but also of the European Union as a whole.

CONCLUSION

Many questions have been raised, many issues have been stressed and 2001 statements have been analysed.[1274] The approach of the European Union to launch the Barcelona Process, which in literature is severely criticised most of the time, can be considered as basically correct[1275] and even as a promising attempt. As initially stated, the focus of the present work is not on stressing the detailed content of the Barcelona Process or its political context regarding the Middle East Peace Process, but on emphasising the European discourse in the context of its policy approach in the Mediterranean. The following questions have been raised throughout the work:

Where does the necessity for the initiation of the Barcelona Process accrue? Which interests pursue the participating countries? Does this approach mean a continuity of historic interests in the Mediterranean or is it a new way of dealing with each other? What kind of partnership does the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership refer to? How do the political powers face the apparent inequality among the participants? What does that mean for the European political understanding in the Mediterranean? Which kind of political role does the European Union aspire in the Mediterranean? How does the EU deal with its 'responsibility' in the Mediterranean? What about the consciousness of its predominance? Is there a power claim? What is the significance of the region building issue? Thus, is the Barcelona Process a result of post colonial politics?

The answers to these questions are based on the results of the discourse analysis and will be stressed in the following three sub-chapters. The concluding remarks concern the suggestion on further research proposals.

The reasons for this effort - what is the purpose of the Barcelona Process?

The response to this crucial question is simple as in both, the official discourse and the public perception there is one constant: the main purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy is determinately linked to European security concerns, basically in respect of terrorism and demographically caused migration. Another important motivation concerns a so-called mission statement, which is due to an inherent wish of the European Union to transport its values and change the world for the 'better' in the name of peace.

The consecutive considerations stress the analytical results of the level of the discourse establishment and implementation for the European discourse and also its perception according to the public level.

1274 Of the 2001 statements belong 492 to the European Documents, 357 to the speeches and 1152 to the newspaper articles.

1275 This consideration is shared with the assumption of Stephen Calleya who stated that „The EU approach therefore seems to be basically correct." Comp. Stephen C. CALLEYA, Eberhard RHEIN, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership needs a strong push. In: Andreas JACOBS (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean co-operation: enlarging and widening the perspective (Center for European Integration Studies/Discussion Paper C131, Bonn 2004) 16-35, 33.

Subsequently, some argumentation streams which could explain the European position will be outlined. The latter just forms a suggestion of an approach which should encourage further research because there are a lot of valuable and promising approaches in this field.

The establishment of the discourse is empirically represented by the documents assigned to the European Commission and the European Council. Regarding the security concern, it is unmistakably stated that the Mediterranean Policy, the Barcelona Process, is of strategic importance and that the consequences of instability in the regarded region may not be under-estimated (Commission). The Council is even more explicit, stating that a serious threat emanates from terrorism and illegal immigration and that the main strategic concern for the Barcelona Process is based on the socio-economic disparities. The so-called mission statement rather accrues from the security concern, as the motives are regarded as noble. The Commission and the Council suggest that shared values enhance the cultural dialogue and that the Union is disposed to contribute to the solution of the tensions in that area. Therewith, the participating countries and the public should be discursively convinced of the necessity of the European approach in the Mediterranean. The implementation of this discourse is carried out by representatives of the European Commission and Council who hold speeches in distinctive contexts. Regarding the security concern as a driving force for the Barcelona Process, the analysis of these documents has shown that another discursive component is added: urgency. Both, Commission and Council stress that the advancement of the policy is timely urgent, that there is a need of action and that there is a need to speed up on the operational level by means of concluding Association Agreements. The legitimation for this policy approach is in the fact that a common understanding of a common region and future is regarded as essential, that the EU disposes of not only a political but also a moral responsibility and that there is a common destiny, which very expressively has recently been mentioned by Nicolas Sarkozy. The public perception, based on the analysis of several European (Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean) countries, indicates that the European motivation for this kind of policy approach is unambiguously linked to its security concerns. While this is especially in Italy and Spain an inherent aspect of their domestic policy, France is more concerned with positioning itself well. The German speaking countries (Austria, Germany and Switzerland) and Great Britain contribute more conceptual considerations than stressing individual security concerns. Another noticeable circumstance, which underlines the argument of the security concern as a preliminary purpose, constitutes a fact that is unique for the Barcelona Process, namely that the multilateral – cultural – dimension is only marginally stressed in the public discourse.[1276]

From this short outline of the research results derives that the security issue is the preliminary concern for the European engagement in the Mediterranean. The so-called mission statement has two kinds of fins: the legitimation of the proceeding, which is internally than externally relevant, and the inherent

1276 Comp. Ludger KÜHNHARDT, 10 years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: The Human Dimension. In: Andreas MARCHETTI (ed.), Ten Years Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Defending European Interests for the Next Decade (Center for European Integration Studies/Disscussion Paper C154, Bonn 2005), 83-96, 83.

wish of the European Union to evolve something meaningful. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is considered as an important and, due to the increasing regional and global problems, indispensable instrument for the European security policy in the Mediterranean region.[1277] An assessment of the consistency of this argument can not be provided at this point because there have been no verifying results; nevertheless, the need for a security approach in the Mediterranean appears to be evident.[1278]

Basal indications for the apparent European security issue derive from socio-economic developments. The crucial point accrues from the demographic dynamic: Europe lacks of a demographic motor, while the population in the MNC is exploding and lacks of a future perspective; this is nourished by the high discrepancy of the GDP between Europe and the MNC.

The pessimistic demographic prognosis in Europe relates to the proceeding demographic decline, caused by a low birth rate next to a simultaneous over-aging of the society. In a notification of the European Commission on the demographic alteration in 2005, a clear picture of the demographic challenge was portrayed.

Basic Scenario Eurostat. EU-25 (in %)	**2005-2050**	**2005-2010**	**2010-2030**	**2030-2050**
Total population	**-2,1%**	**+1,2%**	**+1,1%**	**-4,3%**
Children (0-14)	**-19,4%**	-3,2%	-8,9%	-8,6%
Adolescent (15-24)	**-25,0%**	-4,3%	-12,3%	-10,6%
Young adults (25-39)	**-25,8%**	-4,1%	-16,0%	-8,0%
Adults (40-54)	**-19,5%**	+4,2%	-10,0%	-14,1%
"Elder Employee" (55-64)	**+8,7%**	+9,6%	+15,5%	-14,1%
"Seniors" (65-79)	**+44,1%**	+3,4%	+37,4%	+1,5%
Very old persons (80 and older)	**+180,5%**	+17,1%	+57,1%	+52,4%

Source: KOM(2005)94

According to Eurostat, the total population will decrease by 2.1% until 2050. This does not appear to be dramatic at a first glance but contains trend-setting developments. The demographic contrasts will be intensified with regard to the demographic prognosis in the candidate and acceding countries: While the estimation for Bulgaria, Rumania and Croatia assumes a demographic decrease between 11 and 21% until 2030, the forecast for Turkey anticipates a population increase of 25% which is equivalent to 19 million people.[1279] From the same thematic context derives the immigration concern of the European Union, which is also considered as a security issue. The European Union is more than ever confronted with the dilemma of needing immigration and facing a continuously growing migration

1277 Comp. Christoph BRUNERS, Die Euro-Mediterranean Partnerschaft als Instrument einer europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie (Kölner Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik/ Nr.52005), 88. See: http://www.jaeger.uni-koeln.de/index.php?id=282.

1278 This necessity is also claimed by Arad BENKÖ, Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union (Arbeitspapier des Österreichischen Instituts für internationale Politik/26.07.2000), 23. See: www.oiip.at.

1279 Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Mitteilung der Kommission. Grünbuch „Angesichts des demographischen Wandels – eine neue Solidarität zwischen den Generationen (KOM(2005)94, Brüssel 2005),5. Available Online: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/news/2005/mar/comm2005-94_de.pdf (18.02.2009).

pressure of poor people from the south. It was estimated that in the year 2004 there were 20-50 million potential migrants. Of this sum 16.3 million were supposed to be Africans. According to estimations in 2005, one of ten people wants to emigrate from Africa.[1280] Even though the numbers seem relatively low, it has to be considered that the tendency is increasing. The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) states that annually about 100,000 – 120,000 people illegally cross the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe. Their origin is assumed to be apportioned as follows: 35,000 people emanate from the Sub-Saharan region, 55,000 originate from the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean and 30,000 come from other countries – for example from Asia.[1281]

This short insight on numbers and socio-economic developmental tendencies attempts to provide an approximation of the European motivation to develop an efficient policy for the Mediterranean. Regarding the socio-economic developments in Europe and in the Mediterranean, Europe has become vulnerable because there is a necessity to adequately respond to the present challenges. The conception of the Barcelona Process seems correct; it is questionable if it is enough to promote European standards in the MNC and export financial assistance and 'western' know-how or if it also urges to reassess some basic values on the European side as well. With a glance at the family and integration policy in the European countries it is doubtable whether the countries of the European Union have an adequate approach for themselves and therefore for the European Union.

The European Union in the Mediterranean – an imperialistic approach?

Stressing the European role as crucial constitutes the putative predominant role of the European Union in the Mediterranean, which reminds of imperialistic patterns. Is it possible that the former 'colonial' claim has changed among the former colonial empires which are now associated in a political union, where the assurance of peace is regarded as the preliminary premise? Maybe the maintenance of power does not align to the direct predominance in an imperial sense, but build on the experience of dominance. The actions of the EU in the Mediterranean non-member countries are based on the experience that not long ago it domineered over these countries. Europe looks at the Mediterranean with a new appearance, a new mask - a different intention than in former imperial times. It relies on power and dominance, which aspire to suggest trust. For the European Union this is not only a matter of predominance and power maintenance but also a crucial moment of proving credibility – in front of its internal criticism and the international political scenery.

Herfried Münkler raised the question how Europe must be characterised to defend the status of a self-consistent political power beside the USA on the one hand and to be able to secure its instable and overwhelming borders on the other hand; he concluded that Europe can not avoid to overtake imperial

1280 Comp. Ninna NYBERG SORENSEN, Mediterranean Transit Migration and development. Experience and Policy Options. In: Ninna NYBERG SORENSEN (ed.), Mediterranean Transit Migration (Copenhagen 2006), 5-25, 7. Available online: http://www.diis.dk/sw2438.asp (18.02.2009).

1281 Comp. Martin BALDWIN-EDWARDS, Migration in the Middle East and Mediterranean, Athens 2005, 18. Online verfügbar: http://www.gcim.org/attachements/RS5.pdf (18.02.2009).

characteristics and develop imperial features and, if looking closely, this has already begun.[1282] Does this resist verification on the gained results?

According to the Barcelona Process, the frontier issue of the imperialistic theory has to be assessed at this point. In this concern, imperial frontiers constitute a graduation of power and influence and are semi-permeable in the sense that a) who enters the imperial space has to fulfil other requirements than those who leave it and b) more people aim to immigrate, which has a consequence on the frontier-regime.[1283] The increasing frontier-policy-concern in Europe, which starts to resemble the United States in respect of their distinction of who may access and who may not, indicates that there are increasing imperial tendencies. The most recent example forms the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which was introduced in 2004 to better coordinate the border situations after the enlargement. The Barcelona Process was included in the super-ordinated structures of the ENP.

On the co-operation level of the partnership, are there also indicators of such a predominant European role? Three different aspects shall be highlighted in this examination: the perception of the "other", associative and dissociative elements among the partners and the perception of the European role. Within the official European discourse, on the level of its establishment, there are references to the non-European partner countries, which indicate a change of attitude; in the beginning, the discursive statements were quite distant (these individuals), over the time the denomination inhered even an associative character because they are described as partners or even friends (European documents of the Commission). The Council, on the other hand, disposes of an elevated discourse, which perceives that the cooperation with countries requires reforms. The discourse changes at the implementation level. In the speeches of representatives of the Commission and the Council the "other" is addressed with respect and considerateness; their importance for Europe is explicitly expressed. A very inhomogeneous image of the "other" can be deduced from the cross-country analysis of the public opinion: Austria perceives the MNC as searcher for benefits, Germany constitutes a lack of partnership sense due to - even comprehensible - legitimate scepticism, Switzerland relates to the conflictive situations of the countries and the region, Great Britain emphasises the incommodities of certain countries like Libya, France stresses the considerate handling of tensions with the "other", Spain perceives the partner countries to be cooperative and Italy hardly refers to the "other", as the public discourse assumes that Italy forms a part of them.

In the discourse the Commission and the Council stress common challenges in order to suggest a common identity. On the implementation level, there exists the conviction to overcome barriers by addressing them directly. Within the public discourse, EU documents and speeches, the discourse emphasises the commitment to respect each other, even if the most dissociative issue is regarded to be the socio-economic disparity. Concerning associative and dissociative issues among the partners, the re-

1282 Herfried Münkler, Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten (Berlin 2005), 9f.

1283 Comp. Ibid. 16.

sults of the discourse analysis show that the public discourse mainly focuses on situational arguments which inhere a dissociative element or the lack of conception and consistency of the European policy abroad.

Even if "most peoples and most governments on both sides of this sea have come to the conclusion that Europe needs the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean needs Europe"[1284], the assessment of the European role indicates the degree of consciousness of its predominance and consequentially its approach. Regarding the European self-perception, which forms a part of the discourse of the European Commission and European Council, the EU is seen as a pacifier, a guardian of prosperity and a defender in times of threat. Beside its urges to become proactive and its assumed responsibility – the EU is a power which cannot ignore threats –, it is its inherent wish to become a decisive player in the world and also in the Mediterranean. This wish is supported by the aspirations of the member states and by the proper ambition to break new grounds. The latter derives from the belief in the dialogue as a possibility to solve conflicts and the conviction that there is a need for interaction with each other in the Mediterranean. Discursively manifested, there exists the vision to build a new Europe. At the same time, there are self-critical connotations, which suggest the difficulties to break with former patterns. The official discourse deals with the expressed necessity to recall on the open-mindedness, the human rights and values, to assure its knowledge advancement, to preserve the image internally and externally and to demonstrate both power and generosity. Although there is an attempt to overcome the past, the European Union still struggles with the internal and conceptual problems. This does not only harm the outcome of policies like the Barcelona Process, but does also negatively affect its credibility within Europe and in the world. The clearly traceable high degree of individual interests of the member states, which contain a strong dissociative force, constituted an unexpected result. Concerning the European role in the Mediterranean, the results of the public discourse analysis show that the countries attest the European approach a right direction, but a questionable procedure. Austria is convinced that the European vision lacks of commitment; France perceives the conceptual difficulties of the European approach similar to Italy; Switzerland even considers the EU as too weak to develop a proper foreign policy concept; Great Britain basically supports the European approach by putting a special emphasize on its support of the entry of Turkey into the European Union; Germany perceives the European check-book policy and the water-can principle as even dangerous; and in Spain the public discourse leaves open whether Spain is closer to Europe or to the Mediterranean. Regarding possible imperialistic indicators on the co-operational level of the Barcelona Process, it can be stated that explicit imperialistic signs are deducible. If Europe has imperialistic tendencies, in the best case it constitutes an imperial power that is desperate to define its political identity.

1284 Guido DE MARCO, The Future oft he Euro-Mediterranean Relations: the vison of Malta. In: Andreas JACOBS (ed.) Euro-Mediterranean co-operation: enlarging and widening the perspective (Center for Integration Studies/C131 2004),8-15, 13.

According to Münkel, imperialism means that there is a will for an empire, no matter if it is nourished by political or economical motives.[1285] Hans-Heinrich Nolte stresses the European position within the world system, saying that there are no indicators that the EU will become a political opponent or challenger of the USA. He further argues that the European enlargement policy does not reflect an aspiration to grow to a superpower: "If the EU aimed at growing into a power capable of counterbalancing the USA in the new political concert of powers, the Community would have tried, after 1991, to enlarge till it included Russia."[1286] In regard to the conclusions of the present analysis, there is an ambivalent evaluation of the European ambitions. First, there are discursive indicators which suggest an inherent wish of becoming a decisive political actor on the world power stage. This is again based on the political vision of a 'new Europe' that is able to change the world, as suggested by Nicolas Sarkozy when he promoted his policy approach in the Mediterranean and on the remaining power interests of former political leaders, who now are a part of the European Union. The challenge of an unsure outcome of the European project must not be under-estimated. Second, the main purpose for the European Neighbourhood Policy is based on security concerns, which aspire to assure peace, stability and wealth. If the main intension cannot be regarded as imperialistic, but the approach is questionable, what does this mean? The conclusion at this point considers that the European Union represents a power which searches for its political identity, which aspires to become a serious player, which feels encouraged by the Arab world wishing Europe to turn into a counter-balance to the US policy in the Middle East, but which also struggles in respect of the concept and the internal support. The attempt, or more concrete the procedure, might be imperialistic, but in the end the European Union faces the severe problem of lacking a cultural denominator, namely an identity. In the words of Hans-Heinrich Nolte: "Today there is no superpower without identity and cultural influence".[1287]

Is the Barcelona Process a result of postcolonial politics?

This question, which also titles the present work, is provocative to some extent because it suggests that the Barcelona Process could be a result of postcolonial politics. The reason why it is formulated as a question relates to the discrepancy between the approach and the implementation, which is inherent in the Barcelona Process and represents the essence of the actual research undertaking: to scrutinize the European approach towards its historic continuity or discontinuity.

Doing a discourse analysis in the context of postcolonial theories was thematically determined because it forms the historic bridge across the Mediterranean and it constitutes a new approach on the topic. The elasticity of the postcolonial concept allowed the thematic extension to focus on the European side, as former colonial rulers, and the temporal transport to a contemporary setting. According to the

1285 Comp. Münkel, Imperien (2005), 20.

1286 Comp. Hans-Heinrich NOLTE, The European Union within the Modern World-System. In: Ryszard STEMPLOWSKI, The European Union in the World System Perspective (Warsaw 2002), 9-44, 36f.

1287 Comp. Nolte, European Union (2002), 37.

empirically gained results, it was possible to highlight intersections of interest, diverse political positions and perceptions within the European Union and to provide an estimation of the European role in the Mediterranean. In order to relate to the initial question, the main focus was on outlining the pattern of the European approach regarding possible ruptures or continuities. As the term "postcolonial" conceptually suggests when reading it in two ways, one concern focused on a possible change in power and structure after the end of colonialism, while the other stressed its continuing effects. To this point of the research it must be concluded that since 1957, the European powers have experienced a profound change in the power perception and the structure. The foundation of the European Union, which relates to the premise of peace as its highest principle, clearly constitutes a rupture within the so-called postcolonial time. The point of departure, the setting and the actors appear differently associated. Thus, the crucial question of possible continuities must refer to the level of the policy approach. In this context three main issues could be identified: appropriation, dominance and mission statement. All three constitute super-ordinated categories, which could easily be amplified with numerous details that have been extensively outlined in the course of the present work. Here, possible dynamic regarding the continuity or discontinuity of the approaches within these ambits shall be sketched.

The appropriation issue is related to the European region-building approach within the frame of the Barcelona Process. Since its foundation, the synonymously denomination of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has suggested references to a common space, and further even to a common identity. It has been previously concluded that the Mediterranean region per se constitutes a European political construct, which the discourse of a common destiny, a common responsibility and even a common identity is built on. The discursively argued references form historic and socio-economic interlaces, which in all three stages of the discourse analysis are not considered as sufficient to legitimate the European region-building. Within the European discourse the so-determined common challenges (security concerns) legitimate the European approach. Therewith, the question is if the political construct and the establishment of a political-paradigm, which aim to suggest a common identity, are more of the old, but newly dressed. The security and monitoring approach per definition do not have the finality of a territorial appropriation. This is tried to be achieved and can be considered as a form of appropriation because it aspires to bind the countries closer to the European Union in order to influence, and maybe even control, their transformation.

The predominant position of the European approach accrues from their superior understanding of the socio-economic development and their superior presumed know-how advance. Money and knowledge are the main instruments which the European Union uses when dealing with other countries with a lower socio-economic standard. According to the research results, the predominant position of the European Union compared to the Mediterranean non-member countries is beyond question. The structure of the Barcelona Process is dominated by the Europeans due to the knowledge advantage Europe believes to have. An indicator for the argument that the European approach really constitutes a new way of relating with other countries is the fact that the Union for the Mediterranean was successfully

launched in 2008. Anyhow, it is the attempt to reform the structures of the Barcelona Process regarding an increasing co-responsibility of the MNC. If the Barcelona Process was a first step in the right direction and the Union for the Mediterranean forms a second one still has to be proved.

The mission statement refers to the European approach to stress the ambition of enhancing democracy and human rights in the Mediterranean non-member countries. The approach to better the world in Europe's sole discretion is often traceable in European history. In the contemporary context the missionary approach has two main connotations: firstly, the inherent reference that Europe, the European Union, is the guardian of peace, stability and wealth, which has to be defended regarding its credibility; and secondly, the whish that the European vision and values are spread among other countries. Both aspects have been an integral part of the discourse analysis, and both, the defence of a self-perception and the implementation of a vision, can be considered as patterns which have already been known before the foundation of the European Union. What has changed is the disposition to reach its goals; however, they might be defined, not with military measures, but based on a dialogue. One of the most outstanding accomplishments of the Barcelona Process is that it constitutes a forum where representatives of the Arab countries, the Palestinian Territories and Israel continuously meet. In a short term perspective, peace could not have been reached, as it is anyhow aloof of the Barcelona Process; but in a long term perspective, the approximation of these countries will enhance the international and trans-cultural dialogue.

The attempt to transport the differing sceneries of appropriation and power claims by nations to the 20th/21st century, which Wolfgang Schmale referred to, lacks of apparent comparability, but draws a conclusion of the results of the present work: the European Union approached the Mediterranean which has been politically defined beforehand, under the premise to assure security and peace. The Barcelona Process was launched in 1995 and revitalised in 2008 under the symbolic mantle of peace and cooperation. The Mediterranean non-member countries voluntarily participate and have already signed two declarations of their commitment to the European Policy until now. They agreed to cooperate under the label of a "Euro-Mediterranean" denominator. The mission of the European Union is clear, to transform the Mediterranean in a zone of peace, stability and wealth based on mainly European conceptions. The legitimacy of this approach is based on the free participation of all countries and on the socio-economic challenges which can not be longer ignored.

According to the present results, the Barcelona Process constitutes a postcolonial policy. With its approach the European Union interrupts historical ponds and sets the path for a new way of relating with each other. Nevertheless, the European Union stumbles across "old" conceptions and approaches, which mark a continuing effect of the times of imperialism and colonialism. But the successful revival of the Barcelona Process and the proposed structural changes support the belief that there is a process of change, which permits the assumption of a continuous dissociation of the European approach of the postcolonial context. This optimistic consideration has to be proved in upcoming years.

FURTHER RESEARCH PROPOSALS

The present work has offered a historic approach on the Barcelona Process. During the working process several aspects and further leading questions have been come across, which would be a study-worth undertaking. The following outline is provided in order to encourage further research on this fascinating topic. The issues concern the socio-economic dimension, the methodological procedure and the Barcelona Process as a whole.

The socio-economic context

The present discourse analysis has shown that socio-economic concerns mark the preliminary motivation for the European approach in the Mediterranean. It would be a promising undertaking to design a research project which focuses on the socio-economic development in the context of the Barcelona Process. Up to date, no work covers the economic and demographic indicators on a sustainable comparative base for all participating countries. This mainly sociological approach could be an enriching contribution to the numerous socio-political works and even further historic approaches. Such an undertaking would reassess the real dimension of the European security concern.

The dimension of the methodological scope "discourse analysis"

The discourse analysis constitutes a promising undertaking regarding the bridging of contemporary settings and a historic scope. The present approach is a first attempt to assess the main discursive streams of the EU in respect of its policy in the Mediterranean. The next step demands a further, deepening assessment, meaning a narrower thematic scope or source sample.

Possible approaches could be:

- Assessing the discourse in the Euro-Mediterranean countries concerning their ambivalent situation in regard to their socio-economic dependency in the Mediterranean and their position within Europe. This would be especially interesting for countries which formerly were among the leading nations like France and Spain. Thanks to the analysis of the public discourse, the insight into the struggle of their positioning provides one of the most surprising results of the present work.
- In order to complete the discursive perception of the Mediterranean Policy, a profound examination of the public opinion of the eastern European countries or even of the non-European participating countries of the, now called, Union for the Mediterranean would be an especially interesting undertaking.
- Surprisingly, there was hardly any distinction among the different political inclinations of the newspapers regarding their consideration of the Barcelona Process. It would be study-worth to

expand the scope to an analysis, which compares the political positioning of the newspapers with the opinion of the different political parties.

The Barcelona Process and its revived form, the Union for the Mediterranean

Assessing the Barcelona Process regarding the consistency of the innumerable ambits it aspires to affect and the projects it has initiated or aims to launch under the premise of evaluating the costs and the implementation status. Sketching the money flow in regard to the outcome could be a meaningful undertaking, as it would highlight the structural deficits of the European Union and provide substantial indicators of the efficiency of the Barcelona Process.

With clear words Nicolas Sarkozy declared the failure of the Barcelona Process with its lack of partnership and the predominant European position, which was manifested in the structure of the policy frame. The launch of the Union for the Mediterranean attempted to correct this asymmetry by introducing the principle of co-presidency in order to implement a higher degree of structure-based shared responsibility. If this approach is followed up, it would be interesting question if the European Union continues the path of embarking new grounds of relations or if it is not able to continue to disrupt old habits/structures.

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EU DOCUMENTS

1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (COMM)

COMM – EXPRESSION

(COMM) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

94(427)	3	Gemeinschaft .. mit den Mittelmeerländern
94(427)	6	Gemeinschaft.. Ihre(r) südlichen Nachbarn
94(427)	7	Zusammenarbeit zwischen den nördlichen und südlichen Mittelmeerländern
94(427)	7	Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer
94(427)	8	Union und den Mittelmeerpartnern
94(427)	9	Zusammen mit der EU und den interessierten Mittelmeerpartnern
94(427)	11	Europa und die Mittelmeerländer
94(427)	12	Zwischen unseren Partnern und den ärmeren Mitgliedstaaten der Gemeinschaft im Mittelmeer
94(427)	13	Die Partner in Europa und im Mittelmeerraum
95(72)	1	Europe's priorities
95(72)	9	a permanent forum for dialogue
97(68)	1	The European Union's strategic approach
97(68)	1	Barcelona Process...an indispensable instrument
97(68)	2	in the spins of partnership
97(68)	5	[political and security dialogue] an entirely new area of cooperation
97(68)	8	Progress is largely contingent upon the willingness of the Mediterranean Partners themselves
97(68)	8	the promotion of mutual understanding between the peoples of the region is one of the cornerstones of the BP
2000(497)	2	[Die Beziehungen der EU spiegel wider], von welcher politischen und strategischen Bedeutung diese Region für die EU ist
2000(497)	2	stellt (...) einen Neuanfang dar
2000(497)	4	das einzige Forum, in dem Israel, Syrien und der Libanon auf Ministerebene zusammentreffen
2002(159)	2	The Barcelona Process has become a major strategic political and economic asset
2002(159)	6	[freedom, justice and governance] working together in these areas is not only a sign of a new maturity and closeness in the EMP, but will also require new approaches between administrations
2002(159)	6	[migration and human exchanges]are of vital importance to the Partnership
2002(159)	7	EMP presents a unique asset
2002(159)	9	EMP suffers from los visibility and a leak of understanding including by the media
2002(159)	9	Partnership as a unique framework
2002(159)	10	[conclusion of eleven of twelve AA] opens a new chapter in the Euro-Mediterranean relations
2002(159)	17	One of the unique features of the process, and ist strengh, has been ist inclusive nature, bringing together all twenty seven partners to work together regionally
2003(WP)	1	[Valencia Action Plan] agreed unanimously
2003(WP)	4	The new Neighbourhood Policy sets out a means to reinforce the Barcelona Process
2003(WP)	4	the Association Process remains at the core of the Partnership

2003(294)	8	Since 1992(…)Human Rights and democracy as "essential elements"
2003(104)	6	If the EU is to work with its neighbourhood to create an area of shared prosperity and stability, proximity policy must go hand-in-hand with action to tackle the root causes of the political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies, conflict and poverty and social exclusion.
2003(104)	8	The Euro-Mediterranean partnership offers a strong policy framework(…)
2003(104)	15	the new neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework for EU relations(…)
2003(376)	3	The political desire to develop a special relationship of cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean basin is not new, but the specific issue of extending the trans-European network to these countries is very new.
2003(610)	4	These process is in practice already irreversible.
2005(139)	2	(…)European Union and its neighbours on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.
2005(139)	2	A partnership was launched which is comprehensive, both in its geographical coverage and in its sectoral scope, and forward-looking in its political, economic and social ambitions.
2005(139)	2	The Barcelona Process has developed a strong partnership on a basis of joint ownership, dialogue and cooperation.
2005(139)	3	In this way the ENP and the Barcelona Process will work in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way.
2005(139)	7	This clause will ensure that all Mediterranean partners are guaranteed to get the best offer made by the EU in any sector to any country. In return the participating countries will open their sectors to each other as well as to the EU.
2005(139)	8	An indispensable component of the Barcelona Pocess is to strenghen trade ties between Mediterranean countries themselves.
2005(139)	9	South-South regional integration, in partnership with consolidated North-South links, is key to achieving dynamic and diversified economies in Mediterranean counties.
2006(475)	10	Only by working together can we hope to protect our common Mediterranean heritage.
2006(620)	2	For more then ten years the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been a central framework of relations between Europe and Southern Mediterranean Partners.
2006(620)	2	(…)the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership assumes even greater importance as an inclusive structure of regional cooperation.
2006(620)	3	The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is entering a critically important new phase(…)
2006(620)	3	(…)the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remains the only regional forum where political and security dialogue among all Euro-Mediterranean partners is possible.
2006(620)	12	The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been successful in creating long-term political and institutional links between Europe and its Mediterranean Partners in two complementary dimensions: a) a multilateral dimension(…) b) a bilateral dimension(…)
2006(620)	12	(…)it is widely recognised that the regional and multilateral dimensions(…)
2007(598)	2	(…)the Barcelona Process has developed into a comprehensive and encompassing regional partnership.
2007(598)	2	The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a key feature (…)
2007(598)	5, 6	The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is the only forum within which all Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in a constructive dialogue in spite of the persisting conflict in the Middle East and in other parts of the region.
2008(319)	2	The Commission has consulted with all partners involved in the European Union and the Mediterranean(…)
2008(319)	2	The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue(…)
2008(319)	4	The "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" will be a multilateral partnership.
2008(319)	4	There is mutual concern about the perceived lack of co-ownership by Mediterranean partners.

(COMM) Expression – the "other"

94(427)	3,7	Diese Länder
94(427)	5	Den Mittelmeerpartnern
94(427)	2x8	Betreffenden Länder
95(72)	1	These individuals
97(68)	1	twelve Mediterranean Partners (1st time the number is quoted)
2000(497)	4	die Länder der Region sind (...) sehr unterschiedlich
2000(497)	16	Der Barcelona Process kann sein volles Potential nur dann entfalten, wenn man sich in der Region der "Mitverantwortung" für den Prozess bewusst ist (impliziert, dass der Partner sich nicht gänzlich der Wichtigkeit der EU Initiative bewusst ist
2003(WP)	5	certain partners are more interested that others, co-operation should be developed with those most willing, a non-exclusive basis, with others welcome to join at a later stage
2003(294)	19	our partners in the Mediterranean
2003(104)	4	neighbourhood- a "ring of friends"
2003(104)	16	Partners will start from variable, in some cases limited, capacity to undertake rapid reform and comprehensive transition.
2006(475)	3	Countries bordering the Mediterranean can be grouped according to their political raltionship to the EU.
2006(620)	10	All Euro-Med partners(…)
2007(598)	2	All Mediterranean Partners consider the Barcelona Process to be te cornerstone of their collective relations with the EU.
2008(319)	2	All of the EU's Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with Europe.
2008(319)	4	Another area to be addressed is the lack of institutional balance between the weight of the EU on one side, and the Mediterranean partners on the other.
94(427)	10	Ihr allgemeines Entwicklungsniveau ist sehr viel niedriger
94(427)	10	Sie haben mit einem hohen Bevölkerungswachstum zu kämpfen
94(427)	11	Sie besitzen keine gut ausgebildeten Facharbeiter
94(427)	11	Hinzu kommen Unterschiede in den kulturekken und sozialen Traditionen, die Veränderungen erschweren
94(427)	12	Zypern, Malta, die Türkei, Israel ... die größten Fortschritte machen
97(68)	3	the partner countries are at different stages of development
97(68)	6	Participation by the Mediterranean Partners has been extremely good, regular and at a high level
2000(497)	3	fast alle Mittelmeerpartner (haben) ihre Ungleichgewichte nun korrigiert,...diese Fortschritte sind jedoch unzureichend und instabil
2000(497)	3	die Mittelmeerpartner brauchen ein dynamisches Wachstum, das sie nur erreichen können, wenn sie...
2002(159)	3	Consious (...) of the desire of our partners for a closer and deeper relationship with the EU
2002(159)	5	[human rights and democracy]With the exception of Cyprus and Malta none of the Mediterranean partners has an entirely satisfactory record in this respect.
2002(159)	5	[human rights and democracy] the situation avries from one partner to another
2002(159)	17	The EU has internal mechanisms for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice while the differences between Mediterranean partners have to date prevented them from having similar co-ordination mechanisms on their side.
2002(159)	17	As long as this situation prevails it is difficult to see how co-chairmanship arrangements could work effectively.
2003(WP)	1	an extremly difficult situation in the region
2003(104)	4	[The course of the 20th century] These forces have not necessarily led to greater convergence.

2003(104)	7	What is perhaps less known is that the Mediterranean has also had a very poor rate of growth in GDP per capita.
2003(104)	7	Yet political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not progressed as quickly as desired.
2003(376)	17	As in the past, the Mediterranean has the potential for being a crossroads of transport and trade.
2005(139)	2	The enduring fragmentation of Southern Mediterranean markets is holding back significant investment, both domestic and foreign.
2005(139)	3	Partners have at times not appeared wholly commited to implementing the principles to which they have signed up, partly also because of the difficulties caused by the continuing conflicts in the region, and because the search for consensus has sometimes acted as a brake on those wishing to move forward more rapidly.
2005(139)	6	In view of the high rates of population growth in the Mediterranean(…)
2005(139)	7	In return the participating countries will open their sectors to each other as well as to the EU.
2005(139)	9	In this context Mediterranean Partners are encouraged to make full use of the Economic Dialogues provided for (…)[A sound macroeconomic environment]
2000(497)	3	(…)da fast alle Mittelmeerpartner ihre Ungleichgewichte nun korrigiert haben. Darüber hinaus hat seit 1992 eine gewisse Öffnung ihres Handels stattgefunden, wobei ihre In- und Exporte rascher stiegen als ihr BSP. Diese Fortschritte sind jedoch unzureichend und instabil.
2000(497)	3	Die Mittelmeerpartner brauchen dynamisches Wachstum, das sie nur erreichen können, wenn sie eine doppelte Strategie verfolgen: Beschleunigung der Reformen(…)
2000(497)	8	(…)fordert die Kommission die Mittelmeerpartner auf, das harmonisierte Protokoll über die Ursprungskumulierung anzunehmen(…)
2000(497)	9	Die Partner, die den Beitritt zur WTO noch nicht beantragt haben, sollten dies (…)nachholen(…)
2000(497)	9	Jedes Land, das ein Assoziationsabkommen mit der EU unterzeichnet, sollte spätestens innerhalb von fünf Jahren danach Freihandelsabkommen mit allen übrigen Unterzeichnern von Assoziationsabkommen schließen.
2000(497)	6	Die Kommission fordert Ägypten auf, das Assoziationsabkommen zu unterzeichnen, und ersucht den Libanon, Syrien und Ägypten, mit der Union zusammenzuarbeiten,(…)
2000(497)	7	Die Kommission fordert die Mitgliedstaaten auf, Maßnahmen zur Beschleunigung der Ratifizierung des Abkommens mit Jordanien zu ergreifen und sicherzustellen, dass künftige Abkommen innerhalb von zwei Jahren nach der Unterzeichung ratifiziert werden.

(COMM) Expression – Mediterranean region

94(427)	2,8,9	Südlichen und östlichen Randregionen des Mittelmeers
94(427)	5	Mittelmeerbecken
94(427)	6	Drittländern im Mittelmeerraum
94(427)	6	Dieser Region
94(427)	12	Europäisch- mediterrane Zone
2006(475)	2	The Mediterranean is the largest European sea, uniting the peoples of the countries that share its waters.
2000(497)	2	diese Region
2003 (WP)	1	An extremely difficult situation

(COMM) Expression – associative/dissociative elements

2002(159)	2	The countries of the Mediterranean region are bound together by geography, but **we** are near neighbours in many other ways, **too**.
2002(159)	2	We face innummerable common challenges
2002(159)	2	We need to work closely together to help achieve lasting peace in the Middle East
2002(159)	4	to intensify this process, concrete follow up should be given to Tunisia's request
2002(159)	6	[9/11] all of these areas directly affect our populations
2003(WP)	6	While the major effort to improve the region's attractiveness to investors needs to come from the partners themselves, the EU should explore what further initiatives it can take (Arbeitsteilung)
2005(139)	12	(…)we should work together to develop a system of recognition of both academic and vocational qualifications.
2002(159)	7	(…)of our common cultural heritage;
2003(294)	18	The EU and its Mediterranean partners have an impressive array of instruments at their disposal to allow them to persue their shared, core objectives of promotion of the rule of law, democratisation and the respect of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. This Communication has identified ten areas where these existing instruments can be more effectively put to use:(...)

(COMM) Expression – European predominance

95(72)	8	The Community has two main kinds of instruments to achieve the objectives outlined above, namely budget resourses and EIB loans
2000(497)	10	Auch die Mittelmeerländer müssen jedoch ihren Beitrag leisten, indem sie sich im Programmierungsdialog stärker engagieren und glaubwürdige und ausgereifte Projektvorschläge vorlegen
2000(497)	10	[finanzielle Hilfe], wird sich die künftige Programmierung schwerpunktmäßig auf eine geringe Anzahl unmittelbar mit den Abkommen verknüpfter Prioritäten konzentrieren und stärker berücksichtigen, inwieweit die Partner bereit sind, ihre Entschlossenheit zru Intensivierung des regionalen Handels und der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit sowie zu den notwenigen Wirtschaftsreformen, vor allem den im Finanzsektor, durch Taten zu untermauern, um den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Übergang zu vollenden
2000(497)	10	, dass sie maßgeblich Bereitschaft zeigen, die Verhandlungen über die Assoziationsabkommen zum Abschluss zu bringen
2000(497)	11	muss sich in künftigen Mittelszuweisungen die Bereitschaft der Partner zur Verwirklichung der Ziele der Abkommen - vor allem zur Beschleunigung der Wirtschaftsreformen - und zur Ausweitung ihrer Aufnahmekapazitäten
2002(159)	14	the benefits to be obtained from the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area will only be relaised if the Mediterranean partners continue their efforts to improve the framework consitions for attracting investment, including foreign investment, and helping create and develop business
2003(104)	10	Common rules and standarts are vital to ensure that our neighbours can access and reap the benefits of the enlarged EU internal market as well as to create a more stable environment for economic activity.
2003(104)	16	They will need to show a strong commitment to building up their administrative, institutional and legal capacity.
2003(104)	16	In the absence of progress, partners will not be offered these opportunities.
2003(610)	7	The region must be made more attractive to investors by the maintenance of a stable macroeconomic framework, substantial regulatory and institutional reforms and aproximation with iternational best practices.
2003(610)	7	Successful economic policies will require bolder reforms in Mediterranean partners.
2005(139)	5	Partners should consider how to pursue this, including developing policies to promote gender equality, fundamental and social rights, and to associate and engage social partners and civil society, as well as incourage its development.

2005(139)	6	Partners should now take the necessary measures to expand the scope of this core free trade area, in deepening trade liberalisation in agriculture and fish products and in further opening markets to new areas such as services and establishment.
2005(139)	9	The Mediterranean countries should therefore accelerate the conclusion of genuine Free Trade Agreements between themselves, in order to achieve the objective of a wide Euro Mediterranean free trade area by 2010,(…)
2005(139)	12	(…)Mediterranean partners have an interest in deepening knowledge of European integration.
2006(475)	10	Those partner countries that show the greatest readiness to work with the EU on environment issues should be those with whom the Commission moves ahead first.
95(72)	3	The effectiveness of such action will increase in proportion to the MNC's readiness to implement appropriate social and economic policies.
94(427)	12	Wie die Erfahrung Europas(…)

COMM – PURPOSE

(COMM) Purpose – purpose

94(427)	2, 4	...geographischen Gebieten, die für die Union hinsichtlich Sicherheit und sozialer Stabilität von großem Interesse sind.
94(427)	3	Der Dialog sollte sich auch auf Sicherheitsfragen erstrecken und Maßnamen zur Festigung des Friedens ermöglichen.
94(427)	3	...weitreichende Zusammenarbeit…
94(427)	4	...kurz- und mittelfristige Stärkung der Mittelmeerpolitik...
94(427)	5	(…)in vielen Bereichen eine gegenseitige Abhängigkeit,(…)
94(427)	5	Die Interessen Europas in der Region sind sehr vielfältig und betreffen Bereiche wie Energieversorgung, Migration, Handel, und Investitionen.
94(427)	6	(…)die Gemeinschaft eine Politik verfolgt, um ihnen zu helfen(…) Herausforderungen zu bewältigen
94(427)	6	Wird der Migrationsdruck nicht(…)gesteuert, so könnte es nur zu leicht zu Spannungen kommen,(…)
94(427)	6	(…)ist es an der Zeit, Möglichkeiten für die Förderung des Friedens über Zusammenarbeit und beiderseitiges Verständnis aufzuzeigen.
94(427)	6	Die Zeit drängt(…)
94(427)	7	[Leitlinien für die künftigen Beziehungen] Benötigt wird eine langfristige Strategie.
94(427)	9	[im Sicherheitsbereich] ist die Verbreitung nichtkonventioneller Waffen für uns Anlass zu großer Sorge.
94(427)	9	Der politische Dialog mit den Mittelmeerpartnern der Union sollte daher intensiviert und auf Sicherheitsfragen ausgedehnt werden.
94(427)	9	Ein Verhaltenskodex der Mittelmeerländer zur Streitbeilegung wäre ebenfalls eine nützliche Initiative,(…)
94(427)	12	Die Zone wird schrittweise, flexibel und auf freiwilliger Basis geschaffen.
94(427)	12	…Verwirklichung der Freihandelszone Europa-Mittelmeer wird(…)zu einer kräftigen Intensivierung des Handels führen, und zwar sowohl zwischen Europa und den Mittelmeerländern, als auch- und dies ist mindestens ebenso wichtig- zwischen den Mittelmeerländern untereinander.
94(427)	17	Eine derartige Ministerkonferenz sollte ein Forum für eine intensive Erörterung der langfristigen Aussichten einer Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer für die wirtschaftliche und politische Zusammenarbeit(…)bieten.
95(72)	1	The Mediterranean is strategically important to the European Union.
95(72)	1	All the Member States would benefit from an improvement in the region's stability and prosperity,(…)
95(72)	2	The Commission takes the view that the new direction of financial and technical cooperation should first and foremost benefit the MNC embarking on modernizing and reforming

		their economies to culminate in free trade, which is the key stage in establishing true Euro-Mediterranean economic area,(...)
95(72)	4	The prospect of the emergence of an area of free trade between Europe and the Mediterranean naturally makes the latter more attractive to European private investment.
95(72)	4	Making European investment in energy easier and involving the MNC in the European Energy Charter would have positive consequences for cooperation.
95(72)	5	However, the scale of the financial needs and the problems that would result for the Community if the social situation worsened mean that it will have to help stop the decline by providing financial support, know how and exchanges of experience.
97(68)	8	The strengthening of links between the Mediterranean Partners themselves through the establishment of free trade should be regarded as a top priority.
2002(159)	2	(…)the terrible events of 11 September 2001 have imparted new urgency and even greater importance to those efforts.
2002(159)	5	The situation in the region with regard to respect for human rights and democracy continues to give cause for concern.
2002(159)	6	The events of 11 September have dramatically highlighted vulnerability to acts of terrorism and the need for close international co-operation to combat it.
2002(159)	10	The pace of economic modernisation should continue and will even need to accelerate in order to produce the expected results in terms of economic growth and increased industrial competitiveness.
2002(159)	10	The challenges facing the Mediterranean in the coming years are considerable.
2002(159)	15	More generally, as the economic and financial partnership progresses there is an increasing need to develop environmental integration strategies for the different sectoral priorities in order to promote sustainable development.
2002(159)	18	All partners should emphasise their willingness to continue with this process.
2003(WP)	1	The meeting should confirm and reinforce this commitment in the light of "Wider Europe", which should be seen as a deepening and strengthening of the Barcelona Process(…)
2003(294)	19	The practical measures proposed in this Communication will achieve greater coherence and consistency between Community actions and CFSP, and allow synergies to be realised on all levels of action:(…)
2003(104)	6	The EU and the neighbours have a mutual interest in cooperating, both bilaterally and regionally,(…)
2003(104)	9	The negative effects of conflict on economic and political development, especially where sustained over a long period, cannot be over-estimated.
2003(104)	9	The EU has a clear interest in ensuring that these common challenges are addressed.
2003(104)	9	The establishment at pan-European level of an open and integrated market functioning on the basis of compatible or harmonised rules and further liberalisation would bring significant economic and other benefits to both the EU and the neighbourhood.
2003(104)	10	(…)the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU.
2003(104)	12	Shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights will open the way for closer and more open dialogue on the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
2003(104)	16	Engagement should therefore be introduced progressively, and be conditional on meeting agreed targets for reform. New benefits should only be offered to reflect the progress made by the partner countries in political and economic reform.
2003(610)	2	Furthering a process of dialogue and co-operation in order to improve mutual understanding (…)
2003(610)	3	In addition, the Partners willing to implement such plans would receive a premium in their national allocations under MEDA.
2005(139)	2	the partnership has been driven by a common political will to build togeher a space of dialogue, peace, security and shared prosperity.
2005(139)	3	The UNDP(…)and the declarations of(…)in Tunis in 2004 have all stressed the need to move forward in areas such as political and economic reform, women's rights and education if the region is not to lag behind.
2005(139)	5	(…)to raise awareness
2005(139)	5	The Commission urges Partners to mobilise governmental and non-governmental channels(…)

2005(139)	14	(…)there remains much to be done to build the confidence necessary to step up exchanges of information on the threat from organisations and individuals.
2006(475)	10	The Mediterranean Sea can only be properly protected if all bordering countries assume their responsibilities to protect it and restore its ecosystems to the extent possible.
2006(620)	11	The political commitments undertaken at the Barcelona Summit must be translated into concrete measures and actions(…)
2007(598)	4	A new partnership on tourism
2007(598)	4	Developing a more systematic approach to cooperation in the field of employment
2007(598)	6	The Commission believes it is of paramount importance to further deepen practical steps to implement the jointly agreed Code of Conduct on countering terrorism.
2007(598)	7	(..)the Commission identifies the Mediterranean as a key region in respect of cooperation towards resource management and maritime governance on account of the common responsibility over the seas, which Europe shares with its closest neighbours.
2008(319)	4	There is a need to reassert in political terms the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all participants.
2008(319)	4	By focusing on regional and trans-national projects it should increase the potential for regional integration and cohesion.
94(427)	15	…die Umwandlung des Mittelmeerraumes in eine Zone relativen Wohlstands(…)erfordern.
94(427)	2	In vielen Bereichen besteht(…) eine gegenseitige Abhängigkeit.
94(427)	4	(…)hat die Gemeinschaft in Folge der raschen geopolitischen Veränderungen ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf die politischen Maßnahmen konzentriert,(…)
94(427)	5	Das Mittelmeerbecken stellt einen Raum von strategischer Bedeutungfür die Gemeinschaft dar. Frieden und Stabilität in dieser Region sind für Europa von grundlegendem Interesse.
95(72)	1	Instability in the region cannot fail to have negative consequences for all the countries of the European Community.
95(72)	2	(…)bringing about paece, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region is one of Europe's first priorities.
2000(497)	16	Um die Sichtbarkeit der im Rahmen der Partnerschaft geförderten Projekte zu erhöhen, werden alle Projekte mit dem Label "Europa-Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft" versehen.
2002(159)	2	(…)recognising the potential still locked up in the Euro-Mediterranean area, and the need to generate new momentum.
2003(104)	6	Geographical proximity presents opportunities and challenges for both the EU and for its neighbours
95(72)	9	This approach will also give impetues to rapid and harmonious economic and social development in the countries concerned, thus closing the "prosperity gap" between the nothern and southern shores of the Mediterranean.

(COMM) Purpose – aim

94(427)	2	Das Ziel sollte darin bestehen, eine Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer zu entwickeln.
94(427)	3	rascher Abschluss
94(427)	6	(…)gemeinsam gelöst werden müssen, da hier die Gefahr besteht, dass sie Anlass zu gegenseitigen Beschuldigungen geben.
94(427)	7	Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Gemeinschaft sollte "multidimensional"sein, und viele Bereiche der beiderseitigen Interdependenz abdecken.
94(427)	8	(…)eine engere Zusammenabeit(…)
94(427)	8	Das Hauptziel der Mittelmeerpolitik der Union ist die Sicherung von Frieden und Stabilität in der Region. Dieses Ziel sollte mit allen der Union zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln(…)verfolgt werden.
94(427)	8	Vorrangig sollte daher der politische Dialog zwischen der Union und den Mittelmeerpartnern gefördert werden,(…)
94(427)	9	(…)um frühzeitig die Ursachen von Destabilisierung und potentiellen Konflikten zu erkennen.
95(72)	2	(…)the Commission expressed the view that the key objective of the European Commu-

		nity's Mediterranean policy, the establishement of a Euro.Mediterranean area which is politically stable and safe(…)
95(72)	3	The establishement of a free trade area would moreover entail getting rid of existing barriers in transport(…)
95(72)	6	the Community must take integrated steps to back rural development.
95(72)	6	It must strive to improve the effectiveness of all actions and to achieve a more visible impact on the wellbeing of the people concerned.
95(72)	7	These actions and others like them, will not only increase European awareness of the challenges facing the peoples of the South, but will also land impetues to North-South relations by encouraging the direct participation of key players among those peoples.
95(72)	7	There can be no question of creating a Mediterranean economic area in any real sense without a major integration drive among the Mediterranean countries themselves, not to mention greater intergration between Europe and those countries.
97(68)	1	The Partnership was created in a spirit of equality, cooperationand solidarity, the aim being to bring the Partners closer together and so reduce sources of conflict.
97(68)	1	The European Union's strategic approach(…)was defined in the(…)Barcelona Process, which is seen as an indispensable instrument for the achievement of a common area of peace and stability.
97(68)	3	It will be a gradual process and should be facilitated by economic adjustment policies based on market economy principles.
97(68)	4	Talks between the Mediterranean Partners themselves should be stepped up and financial support from the Union, whether from budget funds or via the European Investment Bank, should be fully exploited by the Mediterranean Partners in order to quicken the pace of reform.
97(68)	5	(…)it would be appropriate to improve the visibility of national efforts to control the export of sensitive products through the exchange of information.
97(68)	6	All activities must be conducted with a view to guaranteeing interaction and synergies between bilateral and regional schemes.
97(68)	6	(…)that the first objective of the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers should be to emphasize the will and desire of the 27 Partners to set up an area of shared prosperity and to give firm impetus to the establishment of free trade(…)
97(68)	7	A second objective should be the adoption of a targeted approach to intensify the harmonization of policies (…)
97(68)	7	A third objective should consist of actively preparing the Mediterranean Partners for the changes under way in the Union, to enable them, as our Partners, to adjust their economic policies accordingly, should they so wish, and to air their views.
97(68)	7	A systematic effort should be made to promote European private investment in the region,(…)
2000(497)	2	(…)die historischen und politischen Bindungen zwischen der EU und den Mittelmeerländern zur vollen Entfaltung zu bringen.
2000(497)	2	Die drei Hauptziele der Mittelmeerpolitik der EU sind: [Schaffung eines Raumesdes Friedens und der Stabilität(…); Schaffung eines Raumes des gemeinsamen Wohlstands durch die schrittweise Errichtung einer Freihandelszone(…);Verbesserung des gegenseitigen Verständnisses der Völker in der Region und Aufbau einer aktiven Zivilgesellschaft.]
2000(497)	9	Die diagonale Kumulierung sollte unverzüglich zwischen allen Partnern eingeführt werden, die untereinander den Freihandel und identische Ursprungsregeln anwenden.
2000(497)	9	(…)sollte bis 2002 ein Zeitplan für die binnenmarktähnlichen Harmonisierungsmaßnahmen(…)festgelegt werden.
2000(497)	12	Die Kommission schlägt vor, die multilaterale Dimension der regionalen Kooperationsprogramme stärker zu nutzen, indem Projekte mit einer geringeren Anzahl von Mitgliedstaaten und Mittelmeerpartnern ausgearbeitet werden können,(…).
2002(159)	2	(…)the region must be a source of dynamism, creativity and exchange, which has been the harvest of cultural diversity through the ages.
2002(159)	3	It is now the moment to deepen and strengthen Marseilles' decisions and also to put forward new initiatives aimed at increasing Euro Mediterranean wealth and prosperity.
2002(159)	5	In current circumstances, a key element of the dialogue should be the fight against terrorism.
2002(159)	6	The political and security dialogue between partners relates not only to external policy

		but increasingly requires close co-operation on the cross border dimension of issues(…)
2002(159)	6	The EU is seeking to develop two way channels of communication which will enable it to take account of the needs and aspirations of its partners as well as its own developing policies(…)
2003(104)	4	(…)the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood -a ring of friends- with whom the EU enjoys close, peaseful and co-operative relations.
2003(104)	10	all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of - persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).
2003(610)	10	The common goal of the Partnership is a stable, more prosperous Southern Mediterranean in close, positive interdependence with Europe.
2005(139)	4	The aim is to advance political reforms towards human rights, democracy, peace and security(…)
2005(139)	5	Raising visibility requires a number of jointly agreed, clear and consistent messages(…)
2005(139)	12	To facilitate exchange of people between the EU and partner countries(…)
2005(139)	13	Preventing further loss of life needs to be a clear priority in the framework of the partnership.
2006(475)	2	As no single country can be held responsible for the deterioration of the Mediterranean environment, no single country can protect it by acting alone.
2006(620)	2	to advance political dialogue and reform; tackle the regional and global threats to security and stability; support sustainable socio-economic development; accelerate moves towards a free trade area; work toward the de-pollution of the Mediterranean; increase cooperation in the field of education and culture; and address migratory flows by way of a comprehensive and integrated approach.
2006(620)	3	The priority of the Barcelona Process is to develop the regional dimension of a comprehensive Partnership between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean based on the result-oriented European Neighbourhood Policy.
2006(620)	11	In terms of intercultural dialogue the Barcelona Process should be capable of delivering a series of new actions designed to act as a pole of attraction and to counteract attempts to drive a wedge between our cultures and societies.
2007(598)	5	As a complementary partnership building measure, the Commission is offering to establish a partnership between the Comission and Mediterranean partner country administrations in the exchange of professional experience.
2008(319)	2	(…)the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe, the importance of our links, the depth of our cultural and historical relations and the urgency of the strategic common challenges we face, needs to be revisited and given greater political prominence.
2008(319)	4	More engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into tangible realities.
2008(319)	5	(…)it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stronger partnership that should come through greater co-ownership of the different processes.
2008(319)	5	Establishing a co-presidency will increase and improve the balance and the joint ownership of our cooperation.
94(427)	10	[Integration dieser Länder in das] paneuropäische Freihandelsnetz
94(427)	17,18	Die Konferenz sollte (…)dazu beitragen, unter den Führungskräften in Politik und Wirtschaft weltweit stärker das Bewusstsein dafür zu wecken, dass der Mittelmeerraum bereit ist, sich auf eine gewagte Reise zu begeben, die ihn schrittweise in eine Region von Stabilität und Frieden, von raschem Wirtschaftswachstum, sozialen Veränderungen und auch von politischen Pluralismus verwandeln wird.

COMM – IDENTITY

(COMM) Identity – EU

94(427)	15	Die Union sollte ihrerseits zu einem regelmäßigen politischen Dialog(…)bereit sein.
94(427)	15	[rascher Abschluss der Verhandlungen über neue Abkommen] Dies wird eine gewisse Flexibilität auf seiten des Rates erfordern,(…)
94(427)	2	Die Beziehungen zu jeder Region basieren auf den jeweiligen spezifischen Bedürfnissen und Kapazitäten
94(427)	6	Dagegen wäre ein Mittelmeerraum, in dem Stabilität und Wohlstand herrschen, für alle Mitgliedstaaten von Vorteil
94(427)	6	(…) da hier die Gefahr besteht, dass sie Anlass zu gegenseitigen Beschuldigungen geben. [zB. drogenprobleme, die gemeinsam gelöst werden müssen]
94(427)	6	Wird der Migrationsdruck nicht sorgfältig über eine gezielte Zusammenarbeit mit den betreffenden Ländern gesteuert, so könnte es nur leicht zu Spannungen kommen, die sowohl den internationalen Beziehungen als auch den Einwanderern selbst schaden.
95(72)	3	The comunity must make clear its wish to see the countries in question enter into similar negotiations with each other and with European countries which are not members of the Comunity.
95(72)	3	To offer incouragement, the comunity should propose that there be a comulation of origin and that identical rules of origin apply to all countries entering into agreements of that type. In order to maximize the economic benefit to all the parties involved, (...)
95(72)	4	…the comunity must be prepared to provide large-scale technical assistance (particularly for SME)in order to improve the quality of products and services (including tourism), the organisation of production, the techinical abilities of the staff, etc.
95(72)	6	the Commission is trying to encourage a policy of efficient fishery management in the region.
95(72)	8	To improve the efficiency of cooperation, the Commission proposes that the annual meetings of the cooperation councils should henceforth be held at technical level, while at political level the Community and the body of MNC should hold an annual ministerial meeting covering issues of common interest.
97(68)	5	If a document is signed by Ministers there must also be a commitment to gradually deepen its content.
97(68)	5	(…) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is at the heart of the EU's international policy.
97(68)	10	No moves have been made in this direction since the Barcelona Conference and the Commission strongly urges the European Parliament to take the initiative. Dialogue between social partners should also be encouraged.
2000(497)	5	Der Rat hat mehrfach eine weitere Intensivierung der Europa-Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft gefordert.
2000(497)	10	Die Kommission muss eine wichtige interne Reform in Bezug auf die Erbringung der Auslandshilfe durchführen und das Parlament und der Rat müssen der EU eine wirksamere MEDA-Verordnung an die Hand geben.
2000(497)	5	Die Assoziationsabkommen bieten Möglichkeiten, jedoch keine Garantien, und ihre Vorteile können nur von denjenigen Ländern uneingeschränkt ausgeschöpft werden, die bereit sind, ihre Wirtschaft zu modernisieren und zu öffnen.
2000(497)	8	Die europäische Erfahrung mit der Errichtung eines Binnenmarktes sollte genutzt werden(…)
2002(159)	6	The Comission will provide technical assistance [to the Mediterranean partners to improve information and statistics as part of ongoing co-operation on legal migration(…)
2002(159)	7	Experience has shown that centrally managed programms have not always been able to respond with sufficient flexibility and efficiency to facilitate dynamic, timely exchange.
2002(159)	17	The EU has internal mechanisms for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice while the differences between Mediterranean partners have to date prevented them from having similar co-ordinations mechanisms on their side.
2002(159)	5	The Commission made a number of recommendations on this subject to(…) which have not been adequately followed up.
2003(104)	12	The EU also needs to make a greater effort to create a positive image in the neighbourhood and act to combat stereotypes which affect perceptions of the neighbouring countries within

		the EU.
2003(104)	14	The EU's cooperation insruments must be sufficiently flexible to address the entire range of needs.
2005(139)	3	It should be stressed that the Communication focuses on proposals to stregthen and deepen the partnership in the future.
2005(139)	7	Against this backround, the EU should be prepared to invite its Mediterranean partners to embark on a new chapter of integration by engaging negotiations not on the traditional ("hub and spoke") model that has been followed since 1995, but in a way that would combine North.South and South-South trade integration.
2005(139)	6	In view of the high rates of population growth in the Mediterranean, injecting a new dynamism into market integration, with a view to generating more investment, higher growth rates and job cration must be a priority for the reltionship(…)
2006(475)	10	The Commission cannot take over the environment responsibilities of its partners but it can assist them to meet those responsibilities.
2007(598)	2	For the Commission it is essential that the European Union and the European institutions are fully involved in this collective effort.
94(427)	6	Die Integration muss den Bedürfnissen der ärmeren Regionen der Gemeinschaft Rechnung tragen, von denen viele zu den Mittelmeerländern gehören.
94(427)	8	Um erfolgreich zu sein, sollte die Union so weit wie möglich als Ganzes auftreten und Einzelinitiativen vermeiden.
94(427)	8	Heute gefährden die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen in vielen dieser Länder die Stabilität und führen zu Massenauswanderungen, fundamentalistischem Extremismus, Terrorismus, Drogensucht und organisiertem Verbrechen.
94(427)	13	Die Gemeinschaft kann diese Probleme natürlich nicht alle alleine lösen.
94(427)	17	[Komission ist der Auffassung], dass das Endergebnis ein angemessenes Gleichgewicht zwischen den beiden Regionen, die für die Union die höchste Priorität darstellen, wiederspiegeln und einen Ausbau der betreffenden Politik und damit eine ausreichende Antwort auf den Bedarf ermöglichen muss, der im Zuge der Durchführung dieser Politik zuttage tritt, damit die Union bei ihren Partnern glaubwürdig bleibt.
95(72)	3	The Comunity must give its unreserved backing to progress down this path by promoting:(…)
95(72)	6	A massive and uncontrolled rural exodus could have disastrous social, political and environmental consequences for the country of the region and for the Community.
97(68)	4	The Commission will continue to take the ncessary measures to fulfil the undertakings given in the Cannes agreement and the Barcelona Declaration.
97(68)	6	Priorities have not, however, been properly focused and the content of the dialogue has proved difficult to define.
2002(159)	6	The EU is willing to provide financial assistance through the MEDA programme for technical assistance(…)
2003(WP)	1	(…)the Union's continuing common commitment to the Barcelona Process as a demonstration(…)
2003(WP)	6	The dialogue of cultures and civilisations instituted by the Barcelona Process is one of the EU's major contributions to the promotion of mutual understanding and to opposing interpretations of present events as a conflict between Western society and Islam.
2003(294)	5	This will require a special effort by the EU and the setting up of an appropriate strategy.
94(427)	15	Gleichzeitig muss die Gemeinschaft eine Vielzahl von Maßnahmen auf dem Gebiet(…)durchführen.
94(427)	15	Kurzfristig hofft die Komission auf einen raschen Abschluss der Verhandlungen über neue Abkommen(…)
94(427)	15	Mittelfristig wird die Umwandlung des Mittelmeerraums in eine Zone relativen Wohlstands(…)erfordern.
95(72)	1	Europe's interests in the region are many and varied,(…)
95(72)	2	The European Community's activities in the region should now be brought into line with that priority,(…)
2000(497)	14	(…)in dem der Mittelmeerraum als eine der vorrangigen Regionen für die Zusammenarbeit genannt wurde.

(COMM) Identity – role

94(427)	6	In einer Zeit der Mundialisierung und des verstärkten Regionalismus in Nordamerika und in Asien kann die Gemeinschaft nicht auf die Vorteile verzichten(…)
94(427)	6	Die Gemeinschaft hat bereits wichtige politische Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung (…) in die Wege geleitet.
94(427)	7	Die Erfahrung hat gezeigt, dass die bisherigen Instrumente und Politiken zu eng konzipiert waren(…)
94(427)	10	Die Verwirklichung der Ziele der Mittelmeerpolitik der Gemeinschaft setzt ein viel umfassenderes und aktiveres Engagement der Gemeinschaft für die wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung der Partnerländer voraus.
94(427)	16	Die regionale Zuammenarbeit der Mittelmeerländer wird inhaltende Unterstützung von seiten der Union erfordern.
95(72)	7	The Community is happy to put its experience at the disposal of its Mediterranean partners, while taking care to ensure that the partners' cultural identities are mutually respected.
95(72)	9	The Commission, convinced that both donors and beneficiaries would greatly benefit from improved strategic and operational coordination, will seek energetically to promote that objective.
97(68)	6	Care must be taken to ensure that the Partnership develops evenly, which will in particular involve gauging its economic and social impact on the region.
2000(497)	2	(…)spiegelt den Wunsch der Eu wider, mit ihren Partnern zusammenzuarbeiten und über das Stadium hinauszukommen, in dem die EU Vorschläge unterbreitete, die dann von den Mittelmeerpartnern entweder angenommen, oder abgelehnt wurden.
2000(497)	4	Die Menschenrechtspolitik der EU in der Region war nicht kohärent genug.
2000(497)	8	Die Länder der Region müssen für sich selbst entscheiden, ob sie ihre Wirtschaft für den Handel mit ihren Nachbarn öffnen, doch die Kommission kann diesen Prozess erleichtern, indem sie technische Hilfe bei den Maßnahmen leistet, die für ein Funktionieren des Süd-Süd-Handels erforderlich sind.
2000(497)	12	Die EU kann zu diesem Prozess jedoch durch ihre eigenen Erfahrungen und durch finanzielle Unterstützung aus dem Programm MEDA beitragen. In diesem Zusammenhang wird im MEDA-Kontext ein regionaler Finanzrahmen entwickelt(…).
2002(159)	2	In the first half of the 21st Century it must be a cardinal European objective that the Mediterranean region does not come to represent a new fault-line.
2002(159)	9	It may be useful to make a link with the EU's own experiences of promoting employability, particularly in the context of European Employment Strategy and the European Social Fund.
2003(WP)	6	While the major effort to improve the region's attractiveness to investors needs to come from the partners themselves, the EU should explore what further initiatives it can take.
2003(104)	3	The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism.
2003(104)	6	(…) it is clear that a new EU approach cannot be a one-size-fits-all policy.
2003(104)	6	A new EU approach to its neighbouring countries cannot be confined to the border regions alone.
2003(104)	10	If a country has reached this level, it has come as close to the Union as it can be without being a member.
2003(104)	12	The EU should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Palestine, the Western Sahara and Transdniestria.
2005(139)	2	(…) the EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods and services.
2005(139)	2	Europe is the largest direct foreign investor (…) and the EU is the region's largest provider of financial assistance and funding.
2005(139)	2	The EU is also the main source of tourism and the first destination for migrants.
2005(139)	7	The principle of voluntary participation must be clearly inscribed and fully respected.
2005(139)	11	The guiding principle of the EU strategy is the ownership of the partner government and the need to ensure a balanced approach, which will guarantee the sustainability of the reforms in the long term.

2005(139)	15	(…) the EU should show its willingness to help resolve other conflicts in the region (…)
2006(475)	2	As a major regional player the European Union (EU) must play its role in protecting this common heritage (…)
2006(620)	2	The European contribution to the implementation of UNSCR 1701 is significant, as was the Em's rapid reaction to humanitarian and environmental needs during and after the conflict.
2006(620)	2	Events in the Palestinian territories underline the importance of EU assistance in the provision of essential services to the Palestinian population, as well as the need to remain engaged on issues of movement and access.
2006(620)	2	The EU remains convinced that there are no military or unilateral solutions to the challenges in Middle East. Lasting peace and security in the region can only be ensured by a comprehensive settlement with a negotiated two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict at its core.
2008(319)	6	The establishment of a co-presidency from the EU side must be compatible with the provisions on the external representation of the European Union in the Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.

2. EUROPEAN COUNCIL (CC)

CC – EXPRESSION

(CC) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

D	1995	2	(…) this EuroMediterranean initiative
MC	1997	6	The Participants reaffirm the role of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process as a central forum for providing impetus, monitoring and following up actions and initiatives within the framework of the Partnership.
MC	1997	2	Reiterating that this Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interest of peace, stability and development in the region, but (…)
MC	1999	1	The discussions have shown that the Partnership is solid and lasting
MC	1999	1	All members remain fully committed to all its objectives and principles and have reaffirmed their resolve to take forward the Partnership into the new millennium.
MC	2000	1	(…) the Ministers insisted on its unique contribution to peace, stability and development in the region.
IM	2001	1	(…) a vital and preferred framework for dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and the countries of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean.
IM	2001	6	[Social, cultural and human Partnership] The Ministers reiterated the importance and uniqueness of this chapter and the need to combat all forms of racism and any cultural or religious prejudices or stereotyping which may occur.
MC	2002	1	(…)Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as an essential framework of dialogue and cooperation, a tue meeting point of different cultures and civilisations.
MC	2002	5	The Barcelona Process is now sufficiently well established and resilient for the participants to be able to engage in an open dialogue on all issues of mutual concern.
MC	2002	5	(…) the Valencia Conference provided the opportunity for a full, frank and constructive discussion of what has been achieved since Barcelona, what problems have been encountered and what solutions found.
IM	2003	1	The Ministers also expressed their full solidarity with Morocco
IM	2003	1	The Ministers discussed the recent developments in the Middle East…
IM	2003	2	The Ministers warmly welcomed the decision of the Palestinian Authority and Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas to adopt the Road Map. They were equally con-

			vinced that the Road Map serves the interest of the Israeli people to live in security and in this context, they welcomed the acceptance by Prime Minister Sharon and the Government of Israel on 25 May 2003.
IM	2003	4	Differences regarding the definition of terrorism should not prevent partners from identifying areas where they can cooperate.
IM	2003	6	As regard South-South trades and integration the Ministers welcomed the initialling of the Agadir Agreement (…)
IM	2003	7	They welcomed the important initiative of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate in the framework of a Technical Working Group open to other Mediterranean Partners with a view to identifying and promoting inter-connexion projects of common interest to be integrated into the framework of the Euro Mediterranean partnership.
IM	2003	8	Besides, the contribution of the Ministerial Conference on the Environment in Helsinki in 1997 on cooperation between the Mediterranean and the Baltic and the launching in Athens of the cooperation initiative on sustainable development between the Mediterranean and the Baltic, enable the two regions to benefit from each other's experience.
IM	2003	8	The Ministers noted with interest the initiatives undertaken by the Greek Presidency on the issue of sustainable development such as the convening of the International Conference on Sustainable Development and Lasting Peace
MC	2003	1	(…) the Ministers reaffirmed their shared willingness to strengthening their partnership, (…)
MC	2003	1	They reaffirmed their joint interest (…)
MC	2003	1	These challenges call for a reinvigorated and renewed partnership, based on a stronger commitment both of the European Union and the Mediterranean countries to common values and objectives.
MC	2003	4	The Association process remains at the core of the Partnership.
MC	2003	7	The Ministers confirmed that (…) the dialogue could deal inter alia with the following issues: monitoring the economic situation in the region; monitoring the structural reforms in Partner countries and the implementation of Association Agreements and assessing the economic impact of the Association process by using precise and measurable indicators including poverty issues and policies.
IM	2004	1	The Union has proposed to include Mediterranean partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy
IM	2004	1	(…) relations with an area which extends from Mauritania to Iran - the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
IM	2004	3	The EU presented an overview of its internal discussions on its proposed Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East and encouraged partners to make comments and suggestions on the Strategic Partnership and follow up actions relating to it.
IM8,5	2004	10	The main reasons for this success are the deepening of the Partnership, the better appropriation of programmes and projects by all Mediterranean partners, and the devolution of decisions and implementation to the EU Delegation.
IM	2004	1	(…) the framework for solidarity and co-operation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners in tackling common security threats.
IM	2004	1	(…) the Barcelona Process as the main framework for a coherent set of privileged relations within the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood.
IM	2004	3	(…)EU Strategic Partnership with regard to its Mediterranean dimension (…)
IM	2004	15	(…) the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership makes a distinct contribution to encouraging a process of political and economic progress for the benefit of the peoples of the region.
IM8,5	2004	1	(…) the Barcelona Process enhanced by the European Neighbourhood policy, is the main initiative for the Mediterranean in which the EU and the Mediterranean partners jointly participate.
IM8,5	2004	1	The Barcelona Process, enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy, is the central instrument for partnership and dialogue for the Mediterranean…
IM8,5	2004	2	The meeting has sent a strong message of the shared commitment of Europe and the Mediterranean partners to the Barcelona Process, enhanced by the European Neigh-

			bourhood policy…
MC	2005	1	1995 marked a turning-point in relations between the European Union and its neighbours on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean
MC	2005	1	A partnership was launched which is unique in its scope.
MC	2005	1	The Barcelona Declaration is still the cornerstone of the partnership and is actually more relevant than ever.
MC	2005	1	Its vast potential is far from being exhausted and sets the objectives for many years to come.
MC	2005	2	The centrality of the Barcelona Process is an unanimously accepted principle, (…)
MC	2005	2	The process has also been a catalyst to encourage coordination among the partners themselves.
MC	2005	3	This is a mutually beneficial partnership.
MC	2005	6	The Barcelona Process provides an important contribution to promoting progress and to furthering mutual understanding, even if it is not the forum in which a settlement will be reached.
MC	2005	1	Arab partners have circulated a paper with their views which has provided a very useful contribution to the exercise and reinforced the sense of joint ownership. Other partners have also submitted ideas and suggestions.
MC	2006	1	The importance of co-ownership and co-responsibility of the Process, which remains the cornerstone of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
MC	2006	2	(…) the European Neighbourhood Policy as an important tool which contributes to reinforcing and complementing the Barcelona Process through the implementation of the Association Agreements and the Action Plans.
MC	2007	2	Ministers emphasise the important role that the Barcelona Process can play in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as: economic and social development, climate change and energy, civil protection, migration, and countering terrorism and extremism.
MC	2007	4	The Barcelona Declaration launched a partnership which is unique in its scope.
MC	2007	4	Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Euro-Med partners exchange views and engage in a constructive dialogue in spite of the persisting conflict in the Middle East and in the other parts of the region.
D	2008	8	The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for a regional integration and cohesion.
D	2008	9	The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro Mediterranean relations.
D	2008	9	(…) it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development.
D	2008	9	The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Euro-Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue.
D	2008	9	It represents a strong commitment to peace, democracy, regional stability and security through regional cooperation and integration.
D	2008	9	[A strategic ambition for the Mediterranean] This initiative is also the expression of a common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security according to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, (…)
D	2008	11	The Euro-Mediterranean partnership continues to be an inclusive process driven in all its aspects by the principle of consensus, (…)
D	2008	17	The Participants stress that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is an historic opportunity to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process and upgrade it to a new level.
MC	2008	3	The Paris Summit of the Barcelona Process :(…) injected a renewed political momentum into Euro-Mediterranean relations.
MC	2008	3	This first Summit marked an important step forward for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership while also highlighting the EU and Mediterranean partners' unwavering commitment and common political will to make the goals of the Barcelona Declaration -(…)- a reality

(CC) Expression – the "other"

MC	1999	4	Progress achieved by Partners in this respect was welcomed and Partners were strongly encouraged to follow this road and reinforce South-South cooperation in general.
MC	1999	6	Ministers agreed that Libya, which participated as guest of the Presidency, will become a full member of the Barcelona Process as soon as the UN Security Council sanctions have been lifted and Libya has accepted the whole Barcelona acquis.
MC	2002	3	They expressed their grave concern at the present situation, which involves serious risks for regional security and is leading to a grave humanitarian crisis.
IM	2003	1	The Ministers expressed their deep sorrow, sincere sympathy and full support to the Algerian government and people alike for the unspeakable human and material losses caused by the last earthquake's catastrophe.
MC	2003	9	Successful economic policies will require bolder reforms in Mediterranean partners.
MC	2005	2	Compared to 1995 Euro-Mediterranean relations now have a solid framework where only an intermittent pattern of contacts existed before.
MC	2005	6	The Euro med Partners are encouraged to consider how to make progress in these areas, including developing policies to promote gender equality, pluralism, institution building and how to better associate and engage social partners and civil society as well as encourage its development, while adhering and accordance with the rules of international law to the principal of non-intervention, directly and indirectly, in the internal affairs of another partner and while recognising the specifity of each society.
MC	2005	6	Ministers underlined that Libya should be included in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership
MC	2008	5	The Ministers welcome the dedication and interest expressed by three new members of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Montenegro, together with Albania, to add their efforts in contributing to a successful integration of the Adriatic countries in the existing and future initiatives and projects in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

(CC) Expression – associative/dissociative elements

D	1995	2	The participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principles mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace, with all that this implies;
D	1995	2	The participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset (…)
D	1995	3	respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;
D	1995	7	The participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other.
MC	2000	8	(…) and a Euro-Mediterranean "label" will be established.
IM	2001	1	The Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks (…). In this connection they expressed their total condemnation of terrorism everywhere in the world and their solidarity.
MC	2002	3	They expressed their condemnation of terrorism and violence (…)
MC	2002	4	Different views on the possibility of an international conference were expressed.
IM	2004	5	The Euro Mediterranean partners stated their determination to assist the Iraqi people as they enter a new era in the history of their country.
IM	2004	14	The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of migration and expressed the view that, if carefully managed migration, can be a positive factor for the socio-economic growth of the whole region.

IM8,5	2004	6	Ministers called on all states in the region to exert every effort to promote peace and urged all states to act to combat terrorism.
D	2008	9	Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography and culture.
D	2008	9	(…) they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding.

(CC) Expression – European predominance

MC	2002	4	In conclusion of the debate, the Presidency called on the authorities of Israel to halt its military operations, to immediately withdraw its military forces from Palestinian cities, (…)
MC	2006	2	The EU will establish a substantial financial Facility to support willing Mediterranean Partners in carrying out their reforms taking into account that successful reforms must develop from within the societies of the region.

CC – PURPOSE

(CC) Purpose – Purpose

IM	2003	10	They underlined the need to continue a common reflexion on these issues.
MC	2003	1	on the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue as the key element for their respective relationship, they underlined the need for enhanced efforts at increasing its effectiveness.
IM	2004	1	The Dublin Mid-Term meeting (…) reaffirmation of the Partner's continuing commitment to the Barcelona Process.
IM	2004	1	It confirmed the importance of partnership and co-ownership as essential elements of the process.
IM	2004	14	Concerted efforts by all members of the Barcelona Process should lead to a prevention of transporting illegal immigrant by sea…
IM8,5	2004	3	The challenge as far as the Mediterranean is concerned will be to improve the efficiency of the Barcelona Process enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy as an instrument to this end. Still greater efforts are needed to translate words into actions and to demonstrate genuine political will to implement the commitments jointly entered into in the Valencia Action Plan.
IM8,5	2004	12	They stressed the need for to make sure that extremism and radicalization, racism and discrimination and xenophobia do not gain the upper hand over the majority of the population that wants to live peacefully.
MC	2006	7	The need to further strengthen the intercultural dialogue…
D	2008	8	Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries.
D	2008	8	They stress the need for better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance and visibility for the citizens.
D	2008	9	(…)Heads of State and Government decide to launch a reinforced partnership

D	1995	2	Stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension, (…)
MC	1999	3	They recognised the serious threat that terrorism poses to the objectives of the Partnership.
MC	1999	4	Ministers stressed that free trade agreements among Mediterranean Partners are essential for the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area.
MC	2000	3	The Ministers reaffirmed the need, without waiting for the Charter to be adopted, to enhance the political dialogue, at their level too, in order to contribute to clearing up misunderstandings, foster the approximation of analyses and perceptions and make it possible subsequently to agree on measures to strengthen confidence and transparency.

IM	2001	1	(…) the Barcelona Process as a relevant and recognised instrument for promoting a dialogue of equals between cultures and civilisations was emphasised by all.
IM	2001	1	They reaffirmed their determination to play their full part in a coordinated manner in the coalition against terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations.
IM	2001	2	Pointing out that the integration of all countries into a fair global system of prosperity and development should help to strengthen the stability of the international community; the Euro-Mediterranean partners reiterated their attachment to the objectives spelt out in the three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration and to a balanced treatment of those three chapters.
MC	2002	1	(…) the need for an increased dialogue and the relevance of the principles and objectives agreed in the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 to make the Mediterranean a region of peace and stability, development and common prosperity, cooperation and understanding between cultures and civilisations.
IM	2003	6	They underlined the importance they attach to the development of sub-regional integration.
IM	2003	9	(…) the dialogue of cultures and civilisations instituted by the Barcelona Process is one of the major contributions to bring peoples closer and promote understanding and improve mutual perceptions.
IM	2004	1	These events reinforced the relevance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (…)
IM	2004	14	It remains of key importance to tackle illegal migration via the Mediterranean Sea as well as associated criminal offences, including cross-boarder human trafficking.

(CC) Purpose – aim

D	1995	2	to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants the Euro Mediterranean partnership through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, (…)
MC	1997	5	The Participants recall that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other.
MC	1999	2	By enhancing comprehensive stability the Barcelona Process will furthermore contribute to the solution of tensions and crises in the area.
MC	1999	3	Ministers expressed their determination to counter this threat by strengthening cooperation.
MC	2000	1	The fourth Conference (…), held in Marseilles five years after the inaugural Barcelona meeting, bore witness to the desire of all partners to reinvigorate the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
MC	2000	3	They took the view that there should no longer be any taboos where questions of mutual interest were concerned, and expressed a desire to extend the dialogue to other topics (…)
MC	2000	5	(…) make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a still more efficient and credible preferential instrument for upgrading economies (…)
IM	2001	4	They called for an examination of any new initiatives which could be taken to improve the attractiveness of the region for foreign direct investment (…)
IM	2003	2	Peace in the Middle East should be restored on the basis of UNSCR 242, 338 and 1397. The Peace Process should lead to the creation of a democratic, viable and independent State of Palestine, (…)
IM	2003	2	The Road Map adopted by the Quartet is a great opportunity to bring back substantial peace negotiations, which should not be missed.
IM	2003	2	(…) the Middle East Peace Process and the Barcelona Process are complementary, and expressed their readiness to use fully the potential of the Barcelona Process to make a positive contribution to the stabilisation of the Mediterranean region.
IM	2003	6	The issue should be studied jointly
MC	2003	1	(…) that furthering the process of dialogue and co-operation in order to improve mutual understanding is essential to the vision of the Barcelona Process, (…)

MC	2003	2	(…) reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in all its chapters (…)
MC	2003	7	(…) should aim at supporting and accompanying an acceleration of reforms necessary to overcome those challenges.
IM	2004	1	(…) to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process while seeking ways of improving the sense of co-ownership of the process.
IM	2004	10	The need to establish closer cross-boarder relations and to create closer sub-regional links, institutional and in infrastructure both in the Maghreb and the Mashraq, should become an increasingly high priority in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
IM	2004	14	(…) it is an area which needs to be pursued urgently.
IM	2004	14	The dialogue should cover possibilities for intensified cooperation regarding the root causes of migration and the fight against illegal migration.
IM	2004	15	(…) to speed up the process of implementation of the commitments (…)
IM8,5	2004	7	Cooperation should be developed using a comprehensive approach based on international commitments leading to concrete activities in the fight against terrorism, notably by preventing the financing of terrorism, as well as a dialogue on the underlying factors relating to the recruitment for terrorism.
IM8,5	2004	12	They underlined that the Barcelona Process, and in particular the Dialogue between Cultures, should be used to the fullest to promote understanding between and among the people living in EU and around the Mediterranean and to create conditions in which freedom and initiative can flourish.
MC	2005	5	(...) the need to upgrade the activities of the Partnership…
MC	2005	6	(…) provide continued support for cooperation among the parties…
MC	2005	9	Ministers recognised that the expansion of South-South trade links in the region is of vital economic interest for the Mediterranean countries.
MC	2007	1	(…) to establish a common area of peace and stability, to create an area of shared prosperity and to develop a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs.
D	2008	8	(…) this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development; world food security crisis; degradation of the environment, including climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; terrorism and extremism; as well as promoting dialogue between cultures.
D	2008	9	(…) to build on that consensus to pursue cooperation, political and socio-economic reform and modernisation on the basis of equality and mutual respect for each other's sovereignty.
D	2008	10	They also affirm their ambition to build a common future based on the full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in international human rights law, such as the promotion of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, strengthening the role of women in society, the respect of minorities, the fight against racism and xenophobia and the advancement of cultural dialogue and mutual understanding.
D	2008	11	(…) challenge of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is to enhance multilateral relations, increase co-ownership of the process, set governance on the basis of equal footing and translate it into concrete projects, more visible to citizens.
D	2008	11	Now is the time to inject a new and continuing momentum into the Barcelona Process.
D	2008	12	(…) to achieve a future of peace and shared prosperity in the entire region by implementing projects that will enhance the flow of exchanges among the people of the whole region.
MC	2008	5	Ministers reaffirm their common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security according to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which, inter alia, promotes regional security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT, and/or regional arrangements such as weapons-free zones, including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.
MC	2008	5	The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.

(CC) Purpose – Mission statement

D	1995	2	aware that the new political, economic and social issues on both sides (…) constitute common challenges calling for a coordinated overall response;
IM	2004	2	Such close and co-operative relations will depend on a better mutual understanding of security concerns and the strengthening of commitments to common values and common principles, such as promoting human rights, combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

CC – IDENTITY

(CC) Identity – EU

MC	2000	2	The Ministers of the European Union reiterated their common position based on the Declaration adopted in Berlin on 25 March 1999
MC	2005	9	Provided adequate management structures are put in place, the Commission should examine weather the methodology of EU regional policy instruments could be applied in pilot-regions in the South of the Mediterranean from 2007, also taking into account the aim of the South-South and cross-boarder cooperation, as well as cooperation between regions.
IM	2003	3	The EU Presidency welcomed the Libyan delegation (…)
IM	2003	3	the EU Presidency believes that Libya could positively contribute to the strengthening of the Euro Mediterranean cooperation.
IM	2004	7	The EU in the European Security Strategy adopted at the European Council in December 2003 identified terrorism as one of the key threats to EU interests.
IM	2004	14	Migration can have an impact on the recipient society and on migrants themselves.
MC	2006	1	Ministers welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East..

(CC) Identity – role

D	1995	9	(…), the partners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation. To that end, the Member States of the European Union take citizens to mean nationals of the Member States, as defined for Community purposes;
MC	1997	6	They also agree that the role of the Committee would be enhanced by the presence of the representatives of all Member States of the European Union.
MC	1997	6	They welcome the fact that the European Parliament has taken the initiative with other Parliaments to begin the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary dialogue.
MC	1999	3	The European Union confirmed that its assistance for the period 2000-2006 will again reflect the high priority that it attaches to relations with its Mediterranean Partners in the context of its overall external commitments.
MC	2000	2	The European Union reiterated its willingness to put its efforts at the service of the parties in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements and to help implement them.
MC	2002	2	The EU renewed its offer to provide technical assistance to these initiatives.
MC	2002	5	(…) the EU Presidency hopes Libya will fully contribute to the relaunching of the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. It also welcomed the presence of other Special guests of the Presidency: Arab League, UMA and Mauritania.
IM	2003	6	(…) the Commission will provide technical support.
IM	2003	9	The EU recalled that the necessary steps had been taken in order to facilitate the issuing of visas to Mediterranean representatives attending bilateral and multilateral meetings as part of the Barcelona Process. Some Mediterranean Partners complained about their inclusion in the list of countries for which a consultation (up to 14 days) is required for the issuance

			of Schengen visas.
IM	2004	1	Within a differentiated approach, the EU can offer a more intensive political dialogue and greater access to EU programs and policies, including their gradual participation in the four freedoms particularly the Single Market, as well as reinforced co-operation on justice and home affairs.
IM	2004	2	The ratification processes of the agreements with Lebanon and Algeria are also well underway. All partners were again encouraged to expedite the ratification process of those Association Agreements not yet in force. The EU is also encouraged by the progress made towards concluding an Association Agreement with Syria, and is hopeful that the few outstanding points will be resolved soon, allowing Syria to join the group of Euro-Mediterranean countries which have signed Association or Interim Agreements with the Union, thus completing the network of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.
IM	2004	3	The EU stressed that the most recent European Council underlined the importance of intensive consultation with the countries involved.
IM	2004	3	The EU also stated its readiness to cooperate with other actors, (…) notably with the US(…) the G8 and NATO
IM8,5	2004	2	It reiterated that within this partnership the EU will give further focussed support to reform undertaken by partners according to agreed priorities and based on shared values as endorsed by the Barcelona Declaration.
MC	2005	1	Indeed, while the world has undergone major changes, while the European Union's institutions have continued to evolve, (…)
MC	2005	2	This structure also provides a solid basis for the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which enhances the Barcelona Process. Mutually, Ministers, Senior officials and experts meet regularly...
MC	2005	3	The EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods and services.
MC	2005	9	Ministers agreed that EU regional policy could serve, among other policies, as a source of inspiration for regional development in Mediterranean countries, in collaboration with the relevant regional structures.
MC	2008	4	Ministers welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East Peace Process, notably in the framework of the Quartet. They reaffirm their commitment to support the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (…)

(CC) Identity - mandate

D	1995	2	convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership
MC	1999	2	Ministers encouraged the European Union to continue increasing its role in support of the Middle East Peace Process.
MC	2000	2	The Ministers called for greater involvement of the European-Union vis-à-vis all parties to foster dialogue and restore trust and confidence.
MC	2002	1	(…) the tragic situation in the Middle East demands to be addressed both in an urgent manner and with a longer term perspective.
MC	2002	1	The challenges of the EU enlargement, the events of September 11 and the serious developments in the Middle East and other structural changes in the international scene make the Barcelona Process more necessary than ever.
IM	2003	8	The Ministers encouraged the Commission to continue its efforts to strengthen, in cooperation with Member States and Partner countries, the coordination of programmes financed by MEDA, Member States, EIB and international organisations.
IM	2003	10	The Ministers invited the Commission to explore how, within the existing MEDA framework; a more substantial involvement of the Mediterranean partners in the relevant EU programmes could be achieved.
MC	2003	1	They also agreed that the process of enlargement of the EU on one side and the current

			situation in the Middle East on the other, have given rise to a greater demand for Europe on the Southern and Eastern rim of the Mediterranean.
IM	2004	3	The EU indicated that it will continue to pursue its specific EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, based on the existing frameworks and in particular the Barcelona Process as far as the Mediterranean is concerned, and aiming for the appropriate articulation between the different frameworks.
IM8,5	2004	2	(…)Ministers welcomed the EU willingness to support indigenous programmes for development and reform emanating from within the countries of the Mediterranean.
IM8,5	2004	11	(…)and that there is a common interest in fighting illegal migration within the context of a comprehensive approach, in particular in upholding respect for the rule of law and the rights of asylum-seekers and legal migrants.

SPEECHES

1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (COMM)

COMM – EXPRESSION

(COMM) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

Mr. Pier Paolo Merolla	15-17th March, 1997	European Commission-Directorate General III	The European Union, and the governments of the Mediterranean countries, has established a variety of shared actions in order to guarantee a common area of peace and stability, to consolidate an area of share prosperity and to promote partnerships in the social, cultural and humanistic spheres.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) launched an entirely new era in their relations.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) created an unprecedented framework for close political, economic, cultural and social ties between the partners.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) this joint Declaration establishes the common principles of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, pluralism and tolerance, as the core of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation and dialogue.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	Of course, in these matters it would be naïve to expect that long-standing conflicts and problems in the region can be solved, just because the Barcelona Declaration was adopted.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	Barcelona was just the beginning of a process.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) the Barcelona process has been the only forum where all the actors of the region have worked constructively.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(EU) main priority of the European Commission.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) we have a consolidated and stable process: we proved that Barcelona was not simply an isolated political and diplomatic event.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) a network of exchanges of views and initiatives has been established, and an unprecedented habit of dialogue has been created.
M. Jacques Giraudon	26th April 1999	Commission européenne, DG 1B A.4	(…) la coopération décentralisée en Méditerrané.
M. Jacques Giraudon	26th April 1999	Commission européenne, DG 1B A.4	(…) la coopération décentralisée, comme toute politique nouvelle, ne dispose pas d'une définition juridique satisfaisante ou unique.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	The Partnership established at Barcelona in November 1995 marked a turning point in that relationship.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	One of the achievements of Marseille was precisely to demonstrate the resilience of the Barcelona process: even against the background of difficulties in the region we were able to pursue a frank political dialogue and to make substantial progress on other crucial issues in the partnership.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	(…) the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. Activities in these sectors are the ones most likely to have a direct effect on individuals both in the Union and in the Mediterranean partners.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 june 2001	Rabat	Ours is a long term and agenda.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	Actions speak louder than words. It is no longer enough that our partnership is important, it is time for it to deliver con-

			crete results.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	Our Euro-Mediterranean agreement ought to be a dynamic instrument
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	[Prodi] (…) relations between Europe and the Mediterranean are central to my concerns, my thoughts and my political actions.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	The Barcelona process, which got going in 1995, remains the instrument on which we can base our actions.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	the Barcelona process is still fully valid because it is the only attempt ever made to address instability and diversity in the Mediterranean multilaterally and from a long-term perspective.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	This is why we have launched the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Neighbourhood Policy does not replace the Barcelona Process; it reinforces it. It builds on the Process' objectives and instruments, in particular developing the EU's bilateral relations with each partner.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	The Barcelona Process has, to a large extent, been an intergovernmental process.
Margot Wallström	14 March 2005	Cairo	[ENP] (…)the European Neighbourhood Policy(…) to enhance relations with the neighbouring countries on the basis of shared values and avoid the creation of new divides within Europe.
Margot Wallström	14 March 2005	Cairo	(…) the Barcelona Process remains key to relations between the European Union and the southern Mediterranean.
Margot Wallström	14 March 2005	Cairo	The European Neighbourhood Policy does not make Barcelona more remote, rather it brings it into sharper focus.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Estamon en vísperas de una ocasión histórica.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	La respuesta reside en el redescubimiento de un antiguo concepto de la región euromediterránea, cuya raíz sería el entendimiento mutuo de nuestra común identidad.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	El Proceso de Barcelona, que es la denominación con la que se dió a conocer el Partenariado Euromediterráneo, ha constituido una magnífica base para ello durante sus primeros diez años de andadura.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	(…) el único foro capaz de reunir en un marco común a las naciones árabes y a Israel.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	El Proceso de Barcelona, reforzado por la política Europea de Vecindad, tiene que servir de puente para el intercambio, el respeto y el descubrimiento en todo el Mediterráneo.
Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner	25. Nov 05	Barcelona	It is important to understand that the Mediterranean represents for Europe, even more today then before, an absolute priority.
Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner	25. Nov 05	Barcelona	Make no mistake ladies and gentlemen, Barcelona is here to stay, and now coupled and mutually reinforced by the Neighbourhood policy there is a fresh air of optimism and determination as we move into the next phase of relations with our Southern partners.
Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner	25. Nov 05	Barcelona	If we see the Barcelona process as a bridge over the Mediterranean (…)
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2 June 2006	Hamburg	The Barcelona Process is a unique regional forum.
Benita Fer-	2 June 2006	Hamburg	The Neighbourhood Policy creates a "win-win" situation.

rero-Waldner			
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	6 June 2006	Brussels	Barcelona is an important multilateral forum for the Euro-mediterranean area, and will continue to be so. ENP complements this by strengthening our bilateral relations. It offers individual countries the opportunity to build a qualitatively better relationship with the EU.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	5-6 November 2007	Lisbon	But let us be frank, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has not yet fulfilled its entire potential.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	The ENP is not, and never has been, a one-size-fits-all policy.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is as important as ever - the cornerstone of our regional dialogue between the EU and our Mediterranean partners.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	07. Apr 08	Bruges	ENP continues to prove its worth - showing that our policy of encouraging and rewarding reform does have an impact on our neighbours and is bringing them closer to us.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) we also adapted: the sovereign equality of States; non interference in internal affairs; respect for territorial integrity; the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the rejection of the use of force.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	Furthermore, common commitments were decided (…)
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	The agriculture negotiations between the EU and Morocco, due to start later this month, will provide the forum for frank and honest discussion on this sensitive sector.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	24. Apr 02	Brussels	Some may find it unrealistic to speak about the Barcelona Process when the Middle East is in flames and that view is not entirely unfounded. Yet it confirms at once the need for the Barcelona enterprise, and its resilience.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	5-6 November 2007	Lisbon	These are not achievements to be taken lightly. They have made our partnership solid and durable. And set a high standart for the future.

(COMM) Expression – the "other"

Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	Our partners of the southern flank of the Mediterranean have a privileged place in our external relations.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	The countries of the region are increasingly calling on the EU to play its role as a political partner and to move beyond its traditional function as a provider of "trade and aid"
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Apart from the current candidate countries, the Mediterranean countries may be the only ones with such strong links to Europe.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	The Union is the Mediterranean countries' main trading partner.
Margot Wallström	14 March 2005	Cairo	On the geo-political level, despite the differences that exist within the area, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership encompasses countries which geographically the Mediterranean draws closer together more then it divides them. Historically these countries have seen their destinies intertwined, even if this was sometimes through conflict.

(COMM) Expression – European predominance

Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	The incentives are needed to provide greater encouragement for the internal reforms that are vital if the Mediterranean countries are to benefit fully from bilateral relations with the Union and from the opening-up of economies and trade.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Aquellos que adopten decisiones valientes y dificiles y expresan claramente su voluntad de llevar a cabo la reforma resibirán una respuesta generosa de la UE.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	The closer you want to be in the EU, and the greater your commitment to reform, the more we will offer you in terms of both assistance to reach those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations.

(COMM) Expression – associative/dissociative elements

Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	In a nutshell, we ask the Mediterranean partners to run the risk of abolishing their tariff barriers to exports from the Union, while benefiting from the existence of a Common Market.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	We ask the Member States of the Union not only to improve trade concessions, but to make a major effort or help Mediterranean countries cope with the adjustments needed for modernizing their economies.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) both North and South of the Mediterranean: we must look to the problems of "image" we have of each other.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	The EU and its Mediterranean partners share many common interests: from trade and investment, through safeguarding the environment and energy supply, to maintaining regional peace and stability.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	(…)I found a certaindissatisfaction that more had not been done.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	(…) the main input for the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers meeting in Marseille last November where our ideas were overwhelmingly endorsed.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	Of course arguments will always arise between close trading partners with a mature relationship. They arise in our relationship with the US just as they arise in our relation with Mediterranean partners.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	But there are some further obstacles which prevent us from harvesting the full benefits of the Barcelona process. Let me mention the most worrying one: the paucity of south-south investment and trade.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	[Morocco] Thanks to history, politics and geography, the EU has always enjoyed an extremely close relationship with Morocco. We are now acting as partners, with both of us spearheading efforts at regional integration among our neighbours as a precursor to the ultimate goal of a Euro-Med free trade area.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	[Morocco] And if this close partnership enables us to do even more together, within the context of the Barcelona process, then why not try? We are studying with great interest the ideas of the Moroccan government for a deeper association among us. They are full of good ideas and contain a lot of common sense.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Let us not forget that certain European capitals such as Paris and London have become centres for major Mediterranean social, economic and cultural developments.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	It is now within our societies, in our countries, that the communities that came from the south long ago or more recently are developing new ways of living together. These dynamics have nothing to do with security or the prosecution of illegality. Rather they hold out the promise of new vibrant forms of social behaviour.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	We share common bonds of geography, history, trade, migration and culture.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Necesitamos redescubrir la época de los intercambios que dieron lugar al Renacimiento. En esto España tiene una gran ventaja sobre otros países.
Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner	25. Nov 05	Barcelona	It is also a question of mutual interests.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	07. Apr 06	Wien	(…)weil der Begriff "Clash and civilisations" eine Fehlbezeichnung ist. Wir sind nicht mit einem Aufeinanderprallen der Zivilisationen konfrontiert, sondern mit einem aufeinanderprallen von Ignoranz.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	6 June 2006	Brussels	Because our neighbours are important to us. You are our closest partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals and aspirations, and we face common challenges like security, the environment, jobs and migration. We want a relationship which better reflects that.

(COMM) Expression – Mediterranean region

Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	The Mediterranean is our "near abroad" on our Southern flank. Thus it should enjoy a special place in our external relations.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	24. Apr 02	Brussels	The prosperity gap between the North and South of the Mediterranean is not diminishing.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	To build the new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, Europe's cradle, would clearly be a grave mistake.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	But the region's diversity makes the task particularly difficult. We might even wonder whether the Mediterranean really exists, politically and economically.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	(…)Mediterranean is marked by deep differences and devided by lasting conflicts.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	There is a human, social and historical reality called the Mediterranean -- a reality that ever more urgently demands courageous, long-term action.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	(…) the Mediterranean in all its diversity is seen as a girdle of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and economic region stretching from Spain to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Between 1994 and 2000, for example, Euro-Mediterranean trade doubled. And yet the Mediterranean region is still unable to develop its own personality on the world stage.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	One of the causes of the region's backwardness and the slowness of the reform process is the weakness of civil society in Mediterranean countries.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Today, the frontier world between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean no longer lies on the other side of the sea.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	The Mediterranean, wrote Mercator, was given different names depending upon the shores it washed up against. The Bible also gives the Mediterranean various names. And diversity was also great when we called it mare nostrum.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Perhaps there is no single Mediterranean. Perhaps there are lots of Mediterraneans.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	(…) it is also our neighbourhood.
Benita	24 de no-	Madrid	Esta zona del mundo ha sido llamada «la más inestable región del

Ferrero-Waldner	viembre de 2005		planeta»
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	No sind razón ha sido descrita como la«encrucijada de los peligros del mundo moderno».
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Esta idea contempla el Mediterráneo no como una barrera que separa a los pueblos de sus orillas sino como un medio que facilita los intercambios comerciales, sociales y culturales.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Es preciso que concibamos el Mare Nostrum precisamente de ese modo, como un espacio compartido, tanto física como psicológicamente, en el que todos tenemos derecho a navegar.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	07. Apr 08	Bruges	After all, our common objective is to strengthen our relations across and around our "mare nostrum", the Mediterranean region that we all share.

COMM – PURPOSE

(COMM) Purpose – purpose

Mr. Pier Paolo Merolla	15-17th March, 1997	European Commission-Directorate General III	On the other hand, it has to be kept in minds of the beneficiaries, that no public money will ever be enough to palliate their structural problems, Public and European funds are scarce and have to be used as an "effect de levier" that will help in modernising and upgrading the industrial basis.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	The Union's strategy regarding the Middle East and North Africa aims at the establishment of a relationship of close association, and at the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial co-operation is the key to combat the instability of economic and social policy in the Mediterranean.
M. Jacques Giraudon	26th April 1999	Commission européenne, DG 1B A.4	C'est là un moyen essentiel de renforcer la démocratie à l'intérieur des sociétés méditerranéennes et également un moyen essentiel de favoriser une meilleure compréhension mutuelle entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée par un contact direct entre personnes exerçant des responsabilités similaires dans leur pays respectif.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	But we should continue working towards Barcelona regardless of difficulties on the Middle East.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	Economic and financial matters are of course at the heart of the partnership.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	(…) to forge new ways of working together, in a regional partnership.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	This is why the time has come to be decisive and implement and strengthen our Mediterranean policy.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Multilateralism rather than unilateralism, and persuasion rather then coercion are the watchwords that will guide our actions in the world and particularly in the Mediterranean.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	The objective is not simply to increase the competitiveness of these countries and trade with the Union, but also to further regional cooperation between the countries of the south.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	The first is to increase the impact of our policies, so contributing to the pursuit of reform, peace and stability in the region.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	The second is to bring the partnership closer to our citizens' concerns.
Margot Wallström	14 March 2005	Cairo	The European Neighbourhood Policy has general objectives which are similar to the Mediterranean partnership and based on it, namely to work together with our partners to reduce poverty, create a space of prosperity and shared values, based on free trade, increased economic integration, stronger political and cultural ties, greater cross-border cooperation and shared responsibilities in the prevention and resolution of conflicts.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Su objetivo era crear a través del libre comercio una región de paz y prosperidad compartida y una asociación de amplio alcance social y cultural que propiciara un mejor conocimiento recíproco de los pueblos.
Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner	25. Nov 05	Barcelona	There we see all the biggest challenges for peace - security and the fight against terrorism above all - for development, for respect of human rights, for the safeguarding of the environment, sustainable growth, education - particularly for women and for positive governance of immigration.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2 June 2006	Hamburg	We need to counter the risk of mutual incomprehension through an improved dialogue of civilizations.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	6 June 2006	Brussels	The core principle of the European Neighbourhood Policy is very simple - we want to extend the prosperity, stability and security enjoyed by the EU's members to our neighbours.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	The ENP has spurred the Member States to think harder about the future of the whole of this corner of our planet, and the need to address our common challenges now.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) the Partnership is an instrument to help Mediterranean countries, in their adoption to the inevitable consequences of a global economy.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Su misión era transformar toda la cuenca del Mediterráneo en una zona de intercambio en la que los estereotipos étnicos y culturales se desvanecerían a medida que crecían las raíces del respeto mutuo.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	La ola de democracia que viene barriendo el globo durante los últimos treinta años, y cuyo resultado es que más de la mitad de los Estados del mundo son ahora democracias, solamente ha afectado parcialmente al sur y al este del Mediterráneo.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…)the sooner it is started, the sooner positive economic results will be obtained
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	A real dialogue between civilizations and religions will be necessary; the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations will depend, to a large degree, on the understanding between peoples of the Christian, Islamic and Jewish faiths.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	La UE cree que la única vía para enfrenarse con exito a esos desafíos es impulsar la prosperidad, la seguridad y la estabilidad en todo el mundo.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	La cooperación también es necesaria para hacer frente a las condiciones que formentan, el apoyo, tácito o no, a las actividades terroristas.

(COMM) Purpose – aim

Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	Although the Peace Process and Euro-Mediterranean partnership are two distinct and separate processes, eventually the latter cannot fully succeed without the success of the former.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(MEPP) The Euro-Mediterranean partnership provides the legal and financial instruments to pursue these policy objectives.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	working together for peace and stability; creating shared prosperity through establishing free trade and providing the economic and financial assistance to meet the challenges which that implies; and helping to improve mutual understanding and tolerance among peoples of differing cultures and traditions.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	We must speed up the negotiation, signature and ratification of the Association Agreements.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	We also need to tackle the issue of agricultural trade.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	Developing South-South trade and cooperation including on a sub-regional basis :(…)
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	Working together for peace and stability; improving mutual understanding and tolerance; and creating shared prosperity.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	Nothing would provide a more positive sign of our mutual determination to make the Barcelona Process work than a concerted effort to speed up the negotiation, signature and ratification of the Association Agreements.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	And ambitious they are: together we are starting to lay the foundations for a vast free trade area which spans both sides of the Mediterranean.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	(…) a better use of targeting of MEDA.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	24. Apr 02	Brussels	Much remains to be done.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	24. Apr 02	Brussels	(…) we need to deepen the South-South relationship.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Making the Barcelona process more flexible also means encouraging cooperation between groups of countries, at least in the beginning.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	In future, we must further strengthen the political and institutional dimension of the process.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	The aim of the European-Mediterranean Foundation for dialogue between cultures and civilisations that we proposed in Valencia is to improve mutual understanding in the region through intellectual, cultural and personal exchanges.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	It is high time we ask ourselves what the partnership can do to meet the concerns of the people.
Margot Wallström	14 March 2005	Cairo	It is not matter of recasting Barcelona but rather rereading it, rediscovering it and realising, as certain analysts have said, its potential.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Nuestro objetivo estratégico es proyectar una zona de prosperidad, y especialmente la seguridad y estabilidad más allá de nuestras fronteras.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	(…)debemos conocernos mejor unos a otros.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	tenemos que encontrar caminos para superar el «choque de ignorancias» que, mucho más que el «choque de civilizaciones», es una de las mayores amenazas para nuestro futuro común.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	(…)que necesitamos un entendimiento común de nuestra región y nuestro futuro.
Benita	07. Apr 08	Bruges	The aim is to build on the achievements of the Barcelona Process to

Ferrero-Waldner			intensify our cooperation with the region and strengthen key bilateral relationships.

COMM – IDENTITY

(COMM) Identity – EU

Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) the EU only recently realised the importance of its external relations.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…) it defined the concepts of parallelism and equilibrium between the Union's Eastern and Southern borders.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	A significant achievement in itself (…)
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	Europe cannot ignore the fact that there is more then ten million Muslims resident in the Union.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	Many of our initiatives, in the Middle East and elsewhere, are undermined because our partners do not see Europe speaking with one voice.
Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	With the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the European Union has acquired, for the first time, a comprehensive framework for relations with its Mediterranean neighbours.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	It recognised that common objectives and common interests need to addressed in a spirit of co-responsibility leaving behind the more "patronising" approach which often marked our policy in the past.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	(…)political situation in the region. Both reports note the considerable significance of the Middle East Peace Process for EU policy in the Mediterranean.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	(…)in Mareseille last November our ideas fell on fertile ground.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	At a time when we are building a new Europe, a united European continent, when we are seeking to work out new ways for people of different cultures to live and work together, when we are creating an new unity within diversity, when the EU's borders are expanding, we must also develop our strategy towards the regions closest to Europe and, above all, we must be decisive in our Mediterranean policy.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	To build te new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, Europe's cradle, would clearly be a grave mistake.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	[EU enlargement] The first involves viewing the Mediterranean primarily as a question of security. In this case, the Mediterranean becomes the southern border of the Union, where we must take up position to manage the flows of migrants, combat any forms of international terrorism there and encourage a development policy heavily geared towards cooperation in the fight against unlawful activities.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	The second option involves viewing the Mediterranean as a new area of cooperation, where a special relationship can be established within the context of a broader proximity policy, which will need to address the whole band of regions around the Union, streching from the Maghreb to Russia.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	It is very difficult to make out the Union's new frontiers.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	for thousends of years it has been hard to decide how far Europe streches in these two directions. But this does not mean the Union can just keep on enlarging. The cost would

			be too great, since it would effectively mean abandoning the European political project.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	At the same time we cannot draw a neat demarcation line, as some Mediterranean countries --Malta and Cyprus-- are preparing to become members of the Union, others --Turkey-- are candidates for membership, and all are linked to Europe by ties of tradition, special situations and interests.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Europeans are learning the importance of intercultural dialogue, and that it is a powerful instrument for integrating and including millions of immigrants in Europe, not just another aspect of foreign policy.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	(..)Europe needs to make even better use of the external potential of its various common policies, from the single marked to the single currency, from the environment to research and education.
Margot Wallström	14 March 2005	Cairo	There is no need for me to stress the importance the Commission attaches to the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	[E] (…)sino por el importante papel que España ha desempeñado siempre en las relaciones euromediterráneas.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	[E] Y no me refiero únicamente a la época moderna.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	[E] España tiene una cultura y una Historia extraordinariamente ricas a las que recurrir para impulsar mejores vínculos con otras naciones de las orillas del Mediterráneo, y siempre ha tenido un papel destacado a la hora de orientar a la Unión Europea en esa dirección.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Porque solo si impulsamos la prosperidad, la seguridad y la estabilidad en esos países podremos mantenerlas en los nuestros.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	la UE dispone ahora de un nuevo instrumento que le perimte contribuir más eficazmente a la reforma, la Política Europea de Vecindad. [ENP]
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	Nuestros intereses están tan inextricablemente ligados entre sí que nuestra única oportunidad es una respuesta común y un enfoque euromediterráneo específico de nuestros problemas.
Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner	25. Nov 05	Barcelona	Europe cannot assure its own stability, security and prosperity without helping our neighbours achieve similar and relative levels of security, stability and prosperity.
Danuta Hübner	3-February 2006	Warsaw	The great difference of course between 'Europe' and the 'European Union' is that one is defined by culture, history and geography, the second is defined by treaties, policies and laws.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	07. Apr 06	Wien	(…)dass die Europäische Kommission völlig dem Grundsatz der Forderung des Dialogs mit Europas Hauptreligionen und Glaubensgemeinschaften verpflichtet ist.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	07. Apr 06	Wien	In einer Zeit in der der sogenannte "Clash of civilisations" erneut Aufwind bekommt, ist es von größter Wichtigkeit, dass die islamischen Gemeinden in Europa diese Botschaft vernehmen.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	07. Apr 06	Wien	Letzten Endes wurzeln unsere Ursprünge doch in der gleichen Zivilisation.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2 June 2006	Hamburg	Europe cannot be an "introspective bystander". On the contrary, we are and must remain a key actor in the region; a political and economic partner who supports and manages change and who helps reap the opportunities that flow from it.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2 June 2006	Hamburg	This is not just a political imperative, but a matter of self-interest. If Europe did not "export" stability, it would "import" instability.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2 June 2006	Hamburg	The European Union is neither an island nor a fortress.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2 June 2006	Hamburg	It is in our European interest that our neighbourhood is well-governed and prosperous. It is in our interest that conflicts in our vicinity are resolved and issues like migration, organised crime and terrorism are tackled more effectively.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	5-6 November 2007	Lisbon	(Intern) Ideas such as the Euro-Mediterranean Union proposed by Presidenet Sarkozy, could add political monumentum for regional cooperation and are welcome. They should build up an experience gathered and structures established by the existing regional policies like the Barcelona Process, Euromed and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Commission should be fully associated and we are ready to cooperate.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	5-6 November 2007	Lisbon	If we are able to muster the sufficient political will to tackle these challenges and make more of the Euro-Med Partnership I am certain it will stand us in good stead for tackling the challenges that lie ahead.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	Five years ago, the European Union had a vision. On the eve of the biggest enlargement in its history, it dreamed of a zone of stability, prosperity and cooperation shared with all its 'new' neighbours-to-be.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	(Intern) I know that some have questioned the logic behind the ENP, questioned whether countries with such different societies, histories and traditions should, or even can, be brought together in one policy approach.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	We cannot and do not wish to ignore the differences between our partners.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	07. Apr 08	Bruges	Our goal of promoting stability, security and prosperity for our neighbours, and thus also for ourselves, is more relevant than ever.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	[MEDA] We are in the process of implementing two reforms: the revised MEDA Regulation will streamline decision-making procedures in the Union, lead to a more strategic approach and improve coordination between the Commission, Member States and other donors; and the International Commission reform which I have announced will rationalise and speed up Commission pocedures to deliver external assistance.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	I have noted the calls to increase the numbers of Commission staff available to work on this sector.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	Having excluded the posibility of integrating them in the Union's institutions, we must clarify our joint objectives in the Mediterranean.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	The European Parliament has always been a strong supporter of the Barcelona Process.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	But the Commission is also aware of the importance of having sufficient resources to support EU policies.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	It aims at opening the economic structures of our partners, within the framework of modernisation and competition on a world-wide scale, to allow the creation of a broad Free Trade Area between now and the year 2010.
Rt Hon	31. January	Brussels	Our Commuincation is unequivocal on this subject: the Eu

Chris Patten	2001		should use all appropriate fora to press for progress on these issues;
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	And yet we sense the need for a common approach, an approach that allows us --both Europeans and Mediterraneans-- to decide together the future of a region whose destiny has all too often depended solely on desicions taken elsewhere.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	But I am convinced that the course I have suggested today is the only real way to ensure peace, stability and mutual understanding.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23.02.2005	Strasbourg	The EU has an impresive record in democracy building, including in those countries which are now new member states. We should use this experience to help build stable democacies in the Mediterranean.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24.11.2005	Madrid	La UE está dispuesta a poner su parte.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24.11.2005	Madrid	Deberíamos impulsar la positiva visión universal del Mediterráneo «espaciosísimo y largo» que vio Don Quijote y que comparto cuando miro el Mediterráneo desde mi casa de Jávea.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2411.2005	Madrid	Hemos de unirnos, tomando como punto de partida la Cumbre del lunes, para volver a descubrir aquel antiguo concepto del Mediterráneo como una extensión de agua que une a nuestros pueblos, como fuente de vigor y enriquecimiento para todas nuestras civilizaciones, y como depósito de magníficas tradiciones religiosas y filosóficas que se han ido alimentando unas a otras a lo largo de generaciones.
Dr Benita Ferrero-Waldner	25.11.2005	Barcelona	We believe that democracy and good governance are essential for stability and prosperity.

(COMM) Identity – role

Mr. Pier Paolo Merolla	15-17th March, 1997	European Commission-Directorate General III	(Institut. Comm) The role of the European Commission as regards industrial cooperation is to promote the competitiveness of the European industry but, at the same time, also foster the industrial development of third countries. Basically the role of the Commission should be to facilitate and/or support the private initiative, creating the grounds for cooperation.
Mr. Pier Paolo Merolla	15-17th March, 1997	European Commission-Directorate General III	(Comm) The Commission is responsible for the general management of the Working Groups.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	The European Union has already shown its readiness to encourage and help these changes.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…)I must stress that the Union's aid and technical assistance can act only as a catalyst:they will have an effort only if made in conjunction with the political will and modernisation efforts of Mediterranean partners themselves.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	Our position is simple: the Oslo agreements have to be respected and implemented in full. There is no credible alternative to the Oslo blueprint.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…)we believe that the Union can and should play a more important role, in accordance to its economic contribution to the Middle East region.

Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	We do not see the Union's role as an alternative to the role of the United States, but as a comlement to it.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	("Friedensstifter")The Palestinians share the same economic and trade provisions of other Partners, including Israel, and the Union as a whole is now legally committed to ensure the economic, social and political development.
Mr. Manuel Marin	May 23, 1997	Oslo	(…)if the Union wants to fully use its political potential, it must improve the coherence of its common foreign policy.
M. Jacques Giraudon	26th April 1999	Commission européenne, DG 1B A.4	(…)Cour des Comtes sur les programmes Med, c'est la dimension politique: faute de pouvoir coopérer de manière efficace et souple avec les «nouveaux acteurs» du développement que sont la société civile, le secteur privé ou le secteur associatif, l'Union européenne, et donc la commission, se priverait d'un instrument clé du changement politique et social qu'elle recherche chez ses partenaires.
M. Jacques Giraudon	26th April 1999	Commission européenne, DG 1B A.4	c'est un des messages forts lancés a Barcelone car jusque là, dans la région mediterranéenne, la coopération européenne s'etait limitée jusqu'en 1991, date de mise en place de la Politique Mediterranéenne Rénovée (PMR), au seul secteur gouvernemental.
M. Jacques Giraudon	26th April 1999	Commission européenne, DG 1B A.4	Nous avons mis en évidence ce volet important lorsque nous avons parlé de la valeur ajoutée de la coopération décentralisée. C'est ce rôle clé de la société civile qui a été reconnu par les 27 gouvernements réunis en 1995 à Barcelone et confirmé depuis, jusque'à Stuttgart la semaine dernière; la société civile est reconnue pour la première fois, comme un véhicule important du partenariat euro-méditerranéen.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	My overriding approach has been to see how we could focus the partnership on a clear set of short and medium term goals -ambitious but achievable; and, also, how to increase the sense of "ownership" of the partnership among our Med partners.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	I note the calls in both reports for the EU to play a more active role in the Peace Process. Let us not underestimate our contribution. We are the major donor of the Palestinian Authority.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	We should make sure that we can capitalise on that progress when the time is right so that it becomes a genuinely meaningful document reflecting the EU's active commitment to maintaining regional peace and stability.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	(…) we should not wait for the Charter to be in force to make more efforts to promote respects for human rights and democratic freedoms in the region.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	of course we should not be naïve: we cannot expect wholesale changes to cultural traditions overnight. But we should aim for a structural approach leading to improvements over time. I welcome the Parliament's backing on this and I hope that the Council will also react positively
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	We want all countries signing an Association Agreement with us to conclude free trade agreements among themselves within five years. This is the only manner to prepare our already agreed objective of an overall EU-MED free trade area by 2010.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	31. January 2001	Brussels	I am convinced that the effectiveness of MEDA depends on keeping a tight focus on the key priorities of the partnership even if this means that other calls on our assistance, -worthy in themselves as they may be-, have to be deferred or dismissed.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	And we want to respond positively to this call, to re-affirm the importance of the Mediterranean region for the EU and to find new ways of giving visible and concrete expression to our partnership.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	The important thing is that we do not let these minor spats interfere with our overall relationship which is of far greater and longer term importance. All that this requires is good will and a joint determina-

			tion to keep occasional trade disputes in perspective. And to try hart to manage and solve them.
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	We fully support your efforts. And we stand ready to assist you in this process in any way we can, political, technical and financial :(…)
Rt Hon Chris Patten	18 Juni 2001	Rabat	We are looking for partners who share our goals. Partners who are willing to take a lead in integrating with their own neighbours. Who can join us in creating a network which reflects the full diversity of human cultures, while encouraging prosperity and protecting the values we all hold dear. I believe Morocco is such a partner.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	At the same time we cannot draw a neat demarcation line, as some Mediterranean countries --Malta and Cyprus-- are preparing to become members of the Union, others --Turkey-- are candidates for membership, and all are linked to Europe by ties of tradition, special situations and interests.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	We must not start, however, from a closed, one-sided Eurocentric position. We must base our approach on a certain idea of belonging together.
Romano Prodi	26. Nov 02	EuroMed Report	After 26 years of close cooperation between the European Union and the Maghreb countries, for example, I believe the time has come to think about developing new forms of sub-regional integration among the countries in the area in specific sectors (…)
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	23 February 2005	Strasbourg	Many of the EU's objectives for the region are shared by the US, and we are more likely to achieve them together. Working in parallel, reinforcing our common objectives, the EU and US will have a greater degree of persuasion and political influence in the region than we would seperately.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	24 de noviembre de 2005	Madrid	El principio básico sigue siendo apoyar, y no imponer.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2 June 2006	Hamburg	Generally, the EU is the biggest donor in the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	2 June 2006	Hamburg	We are now further refinig our incentives for this good governance project. Our strategy for the Mediterranean and the Middle East in particular is not a "one-size-fits-all" policy, but on the contrary a tailor-made, targeted approach.
Benita Ferrero-Waldner	6 June 2006	Brussels	But our role is to support changes, not impose them.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	No longer is the level of attention paid to one country or region dependent on the special interest of whatever EU Member State happens to be holding the Council Presidency at the time.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	Let me repeat: we stand firm on the principle that this is not about forcing any country in a particular direction. It is about responding to the decisions you make towards realising our common vision of a zone of stability and prosperity.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	And we are committed to the idea that each country shapes its relationship with us individually.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	Differentiation is vital, then.
José Manuel Durão Barroso	03. Sep 07	Brussels	We are not trying to force artificial links between countries with very different interests and needs.

Benita Ferrero-Waldner	07. Apr 08	Bruges	The French Presidency has already made clear its desire to reinforce th multilateral element of our relations in the South.

2. EUROPEAN COUNCIL (CC)

CC – EXPRESSION

(CC) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

Robin Cook	3rd- 4th June 1998	Palermo	[MEPP] The Barcelona Declaration made clear that these processes should be regarded as complementary.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	The most ambitious and best progressing Mediterranean initiative is the (European Union's) Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launchend in Barcelona in November 1995 -also known as the "Barcelona process".
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	The EMP is to be seen as a comprehensive EU foreign policy approach towards the Mediterranean.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	The Barcelona Conference represented the pinnacle of a year-long effort by the EU to give the partnership with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunesia, Turkey, and the Palestinian National Authority a solid foundation.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	To date the Euro-med Partnership remains the only multilateral forum to deal with the problems of the region in a comprehensive way with the participation of Arab countries and Israel.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	Although the EMP has its roots in the MEPP and the Madrid Conference, this partnership must not be allowed to depend on the ups and downs of the MEPP.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	This means: the Barcelona Process cannot and shall not be used as leverage in the MEPP.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	The most remarkable aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is its long-term and comprehensive approach, virtually non-existent in previous European efforts in that region.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	Today, especially since the successful Palermo Conference, The EMP is less fragile, it is a reality which nobody wants to miss.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	The Barcelona Process presents a challenge to the European Union with its wide scope and ambitious objectives.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	The start of the Process at the Barcelona Conference meant a qualitative and quantitative change in Euro-Mediterranean relations.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	The Middle East Peace Process, as a parallel track, has affected the developments also in the Barcelona Process.
Jean Asselborn	31.05.2005	Luxembourg	Launched in 1995 in a context of hope and peace, our partnership has seen some very difficult times over the past ten years. But our dialogue has never ceased.
Jean Asselborn	31.05.2005	Luxembourg	This was an innovative concept which, in the context of the post-Cold War period and successive enlargements, was to prove central in consolidating our links

			of solidarity and in supporting the major changes that have affected our region.
Jean Assel-born	31.05.2005	Luxembourg	The Barcelona Declaration was born of this common vision and this sense of shared responsibility.
Jean Assel-born	31.05.2005	Luxembourg	Today, this fundamental and unique text has not lost any of its urgency.
Jean Assel-born	31.05.2005	Luxembourg	More than ever, it constitutes the frame of reference for cooperative relations and links of solidarity between the European Union and Mediterranean partner countries.
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	junio de 2005	revista "af-kar/ideas"	El marco creado en Barcelona se ha convertido en una referencia insustituible.
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	junio de 2005	revista "af-kar/ideas"	Ni un solo Gobierno participante, ni siquiera los que vives más de cerca las tensiones de Oriente Medio, ha cuestionado su presencia en el proceso euromediterráneo.
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	junio de 2005	revista "af-kar/ideas"	Está en nuestras manos decidir si queremos para el futuro un mar qe nos una o que nos separe.
Zapatero & Blair	28 de noviembre 2005	periódico El País	La ampliación de la UE, la Nueva Política de Vecinidad y el Proceso de Barcelona han construido relaciones políticas y comerciales más fuertes entre las dos orillas del Mediterráneo.
Tony Blair	28.11.2008	Chairman's Statement 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit	The Barcelona Process provides an important contribution to promoting progress in the Middle East Peace Process and to furthering mutual understanding, even if it is not the forum in which settlement will be reached.
Hans Winkler	22.05.2006	Vienna	The Barcelona Process provides, indeed, a crucial framework for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the field of migration and, most particular, by serving as a tool for the promotion of mutual respect and understanding, for the interaction of civil societies and for the creation of a dialogue between cultures on the basis of an equal partnership
Hans Winkler	22.05.2006	Vienna	This partnership between the EU and the countries around the Mediterranean - including Israel - is of particular relevance not only in general political, economic and cultures terms, but in particular in the context of the fight against racism and tolerance
Hans Winkler	22.05.2006	Vienna	we are privileged to have a forum like our Euro-Mediterranean partnership and we should make full use of it
Frank- Walter Steinmeier	16.03.2007	Berlin	interaction between civil society and government. This interaction is crucial to socicio-political progress in all societies and is a key element for element for peace, security and prosperity
Frank- Walter Steinmeier	16.03.2007	Berlin	Of course, we can view this coming-closer-together as a threat, as an invasive trend - but in it, we can also see an opportunity for our common future. "What belongs together is now growing together" - this applies not only to Berlin, or to Germany. It also applies to the Mediterranean region, where we want to expand and intensify cooperation and exchange.
Frank- Walter Steinmeier	16.03.2007	Berline	In this context, the relevance of the Barcelona Process cannot be understated
Renate Schimkoreit	27-30.04.2007	Malta	The "Barcelona Process" offers many chances on a broad scale. It is ambitious in ist objectives and

			sounded from the very beginning - that is already in the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 - quite promising
José Magalhães	04.10.2007	Portugal	é enorme a importância estratégica da região mediterrânica para a União Europeia para Portugal
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	I call on all those who can do so to join the Mediterranean Union because it will be the linchpin of Eurafrica, the great dream capable of enthusing the world
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	This is what the Mediterranean Union is: a break with the past- A break with attitudes, ways of thinking, playing safe, a state of mind opposed to audacity and courage
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	The Mediterranean Union will first of all be a project-based union
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	Because in Barcelona, everything came from the North. By that I mean north of the Mediterranean. In Barcelona, Europe decided first
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	Barcelona was not bad, because it signalled Europe's salutary recognition that part of its destiny was in the hands of the South.
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	Barcelona was an error, because it continued along a path of North-South dialogue as it arose after decolonisation - that is, dialogue based on an unequal relationship where one decides and the other receives.
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	(...) the Union for the Mediterranean is a political project because it is one of that entails political will, without which nothing is possible, and it is a project that will allow the Mediterranean to shake off all that is keeping it from looking to the future
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	Barcelona was the North helping the South, but Barcelona, I am sorry to say, was not a partnership between peoples

(CC) Expression – associative/dissociative

Jean Asselborn	31.05.2005	Luxembourg	In 1995, through a major political initiative and by common agreement, we decided to combine our efforts to help the spirit of solidarity and cooperation take root in the Mediterranean.
Frank- Walter Steinmeier	16.03.2007	Berlin	We all face the same problems: multiple risks and the potential for international conflict, such as the crisis in the Middle East, the threat of terrorism, the challenges of climate change and concerns about the security of energy supplies. These problems require urgent responses which we will find only if we work together
Frank- Walter Steinmeier	16.03.2007	Berlin	This is in the interest of us all

(CC) Expression – the "other"

Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	Libya for its part has not been forgotten. Lybia is an integral part of the Med, it is considered to be a natural partner in the Euro-med Partnership on the very day when UN sanctions will be lifted.
Zapatero & Blair	28 de noviembre 2005	periódico El País	Hay un amplio consenso en el mundo árabe sobre la necesidad de intensificar el paso a la modernidad y adaptar gradualmente los marcos legales y las practicas administrativas a las necesidades de sus ciudadanos, así como a los inversores nacionales y extranjeros.
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	It is Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the civilisations and religions will wage the most terrible of wars. Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the North and South are going to clash, Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not terrorism and fundamentalism will succeed in imposing on the world their violence and intolerance

(CC) Experssion – Mediterranean region

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	junio de 2005	revista "afkar/ideas"	La connexión con el Mediterráneo es evidente porque se trata de un ámbito que propicia el acercamiento entre los pueblos ribereños.
José Magalhães	04.10.2007	Portugal	Mil vezes se disse e se dirá que o Mediterrâneo é fronteira entre a Europa e o Continente Africano e pode ser uma ponte se conseguirmos uma cooperação global e solidária, consolidada através de parcerias
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	It' there that everything will be won or everything lost
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	What is at stake in the Mediterranean is the survival of a certain vision of the human person, a vision that remains alive in the hearts and souls of all those living on the shores of the Mediterranean sea, and who cannot help but share the same dream of unity for the past 15 centuries
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	We know that this Mediterranean unity, this friendship and fraternity between the Mediterranean people, will not be achieved by conquest, nor by crusade

(CC) Expression – European predominance

Zapatero & Blair	28 de noviembre 2005	periódico El País	El Proceso de Barcelona puso en marcha el proceso de reforma política y económica en la región, pero los derechos humanos deben todavía ser respetados plenamente en todas partes y la sociedad civil debe aún florecer tal y como pretendíamos.

CC – PURPOSE

(CC) Purpose - purpose

Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	(…)there is a need for rapid progress in the negotiations of the Association Agreements.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	It is important to encourage Med. Partners to reinforce their mutual relations. Strengthening intra-regional trade and regional cooperation, especially in key areas such as industry, transport, energy, environment, telecommunication etc is important.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	We have to continue our work in a balanced way in all three dimensions of the Barcelona Declaration to attain the objective of peace, stability and prosperity.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	We should concentrate our efforts to develop new partnership-building measures to gradually increase mutual confidence.
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	(…)cultivate the European dialogue(…)
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	(…)during this Presidency as a mark of a constant commitment to dialogue between Europe and the countries of the Mediterranean seaboard.
Jean Asselborn	31.05.2005	Luxembourg	Our common ambition was to identify together the great political, economic and social challenges faced by the Euro-Mediterranean region.
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	junio de 2005	revista "afkar/ideas"	Creo que el Mediterráneo encarna, mejor que ninguna otra zona en el mundo, los riesgos inherentes a un conflicto de civilizaciones y, al mismo tiempo, las enormes potencialidades de una Alianza.
Zapatero & Blair	28.11.2005	El País	[Cumbre 2005] Es vital que tengamos éxito.
Zapatero & Blair	28.11.2005	El País	Afrontamos retos compartidos y nuevas amenazas.
Zapatero & Blair	28.11.2005	periódico El País	Subrayaremos los progresos realizados en la última década, que hacen que Europa ahora mire más hacia fuera y reconoceremos que todos ganamos con una mayor seguridad y prosperidad en la región Euromediterránea.
Zapatero & Blair	28.11.2005	periódico El País	[E/GB] Pero debemos hacer más rápidamente.
Zapatero & Blair	28.11.2005	periódico El País	La brecha la prosperidad entre la UE y sus vecinos del sur -de las más intensas del mundo- no ha disminuido sino aumentado, lo que alimenta la frustración y emigración del sur.
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	To all Mediterranean (...) I want to say that the time has come to move from dialogue to politics, that the moment has come to stop discussing and start building.
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	Since it's in the Mediterranean that Europe will secure its prosperity, ensure ist security, that it will regain the momentum given it by its founding fathers
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	When Europe launched the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in 1995, in Barcelona, it wanted to demonstrate its interest in a South that it had neglected for too long
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	And quite frankly, the Mediterranean has never been at the centre of Europe's concerns to this extent
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	Establishing conditions for international security today represents a key task for countries sharing a system of univers values based on freedom, democracy and peace.

Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	It's not only our political, but our moral responsibility to take up this challenge which so many people, even a short time ago, still deemed impossible, unreasonable, and which so many people around the Mediterranean are now ready to commit to
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	But with a single goal: to make the Mediterranean the world's largest testing ground for co-development where development is decided on together and managed together, where freedom of movement of people is built together and managed together, and where security is organized together and guaranteed together
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	Let us make this great Mediterranean dream our dream, one that has waited centuries for a youth worthy of its great past to seize the dream and make it a reality
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	And I promise you this: that if this Union for the Mediterranean becomes a reality, this union will change the world

(CC) Purpose – aim

Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	(…)to promote long-term stability through economic development and liberalisation.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	The economic partnership should be mutual beneficial.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	The Euro-Mediterranean partnership should define its role in relation to them for better coordination and for avoiding duplication of activities.
Frank- Walter Steinmeier	16.03.2007	Berlin	We remain committed to expanding and strengthening the foundations which we have built together
Renate Schimkoreit	27-30.04.2007	Malta	We have no other option than to do our best - or at least, what we consider to be our best - to improve the prevailing situation in the interest of all of us
José Magalhães	04.10.2007	Portugal	Devemos fazar este debate de forma objetiva e sem números inventados, jogados na arena pública para excitar medos e provocar conflito artificiais
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	We will build the Mediterranean Union, as Europe's union was build, on the basis of political determination stronger than the memory of suffering, on the basis of the conviction that the future counts for more than the past.
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	It means taking history from the point it's reached and continuing it, instead of forever going back over it
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	Let's forge between us ever-closer practical solidarity on pragmatic projects which involve all our peoples' vital interests
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	The Mediterranean Union must be pragmatic: it will be a union embracing variable geometry, with members joining together on projects and when they wish
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	[Sarkozy] I expressed my conviction that this union could only succeed if it was founded on a true partnership with an equal sharing of responsibilities between North and South

CC – IDENTITY

(CC) Identity – EU

Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	The EMP reflects a desire to redress a marked imbalance in the allocation of resources between Eastern European and the Southern Mediterranean countries.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	Now all EU member states have become fully aware that the Mediterranean region as a single geopolitical entity is too important to be neglected.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	[A] Austria sees its Southern Mediterranean partners as neighbours, even more so with the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	To the EU the whole Mediterranean Area matters and there is no EU-fragmentation policy. By no means a fault-line should develop between a prosperous north and a poor south.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	[A] I think the Austrian Presidency has made it clear that Europe as a whole - not just the southern parts of Europe-stands firm behind the Euro-med Partnership.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	[A] Austria is the first EU-Presidency of a "Northern" country to hold a Euro-med Ministerial Meeting in its own country.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	[Intern] Germany will follow that line by holding the Barcelona III Conference during its Presidency in Stuttgart in April 1999.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	There also needs to be a greater emphasis on the output of initiatives and on how this is measured. The Commission should also offer more detailed information on its own activities in the framework of the Euro-med process to the Euro-med Committee.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	We hope to be able to do our share in consolidating the Partnership during our Presidency.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	The high priority of this area is also reflected in the fact that the EU is elaborating a common strategy for the Mediterranean as it is for some other priority areas. This is an internal exercise of the EU which will hopefully make the EU's approach to the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the future more
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	[I] Italy will therefore do everything in its power and everything it feels is right to provide this Parliament, the Commission and the governments in the European Council with the environment most conducive to taking informed, calm and responsible political decisions on our future.
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	[I] If the world calls for Europe to act authoritatively in tackling today's major challenges -the fight against terrorism, the reduction of inequalities and imbalances, world economic recovery- it is our duty to respond with a Union which can act decisively and therefore exert influence, a Union whose decisions can betaken loud and clear on the basis of a clear grasp of the common interest and commonly held convictions which are above particularism in whatever form.
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	[Intern] In the Commission, and its President Romano Prodi, we see the essential link ensuring continuity in the administration and day-to-day coordination of our institutional system. And the European Council, whether in imparting fresh impetus into the plan for growth based on large-scale investment in civil infrastructure, or engaged

			in the constitutional opportunity of the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference, will be the forum in which this Union Presidency, which falls to Italy, will seek to define a bold but not a reckless agreement on the major issues of institutional arrangements, the extension of qualified majority voting, the limits of the common foreign and security policy, and the European judicial area.
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	Our Union has become much stouter, and weighed down with responsibilities and duties towards its partners and the rest of the world.
Renate Schimkoreit	27-30.04.2007	Malta	[D]When we first circulated our program, we were confronted with suspicion by some of our Euromed-partners. There was doubt whether Germany would attach enough importance to the Mediterranean region. rumours had it that the German Presidency would turn its back to Euromed and focus on Eastern Europe
Renate Schimkoreit	27-30.04.2007	Malta	[D] Germany is convinced that the potential of the Barcelona Process is high. At the same time - we think - this potential has not been exploit accordingly
José Magalhães	04.10.2007	Portugal	[P] Foi nessa sede que soaram as primeiras vozes a favor de projectos de gestão commum das migrações no Mediterrâneo, assentes na união de edforços tanto para regular tanta a imigração legal, como para enfrentar a realidade da imigração ilegal
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	[F] For France, the Mediterranean Union is quite different from the Euro-Mediterranean process; it will not be built to the detriment of either Africa or Europe. It will be built with them, with Europe and with Africa
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	[F] For France, the Mediterranean Union's remit is not to take the place of all the already existing initiatives and projects, but to give them fresh impetus, a new lease of life
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	[F] In the name of France (...) I invite all the heads of States and government of the Mediterranean rim countries to meet in France in June 2008 to lay the foundations of a political, economic and cultural union founded on the principle of strict equality between the nations bordering the same sea: the Mediterranean Union.
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	[F] I invite all States which don't border the Mediterranean but are concerned by what is happening to it, to participate, as observers, in this first summit and contribute to its success.
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	[F] This Mediterranean Union won't be France's project. It will be everyone's project. Developed by everyone. It will succeed only if everyone commits to it and makes their own individual contribution
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	[F] Since Europe's future - I have no hesitation in saying - is in the South.
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	For too long Europe believed that its future lay in the North or the East, and this was a mistake.
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	[F] France therefore proposed the idea of a union between all nations in the Mediterranean, founded on equal rights and equal responsibilities. This is the difference
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	In Rome, this intiative has become a common one for Italy, Spain and France. A major debate was launched
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	This debate was first needed between France and Germany. We reached out to one another and made an agreement. And finally, we arrived at a sharing responsibilities with a Union for the Mediterranean that will be headed by a rotating co-presidency exercised simul-

			taneaously by a country from the northern shore and a country from the southern shore, who together will incarnate the general interest of the Union for the Mediterranean
Anita Pipan	16.06.2008		The EU is based on values of democracy and human rights. It proposes these values also in its foreign policy and external action as it believes that the promotion and protection of human rights is the cornerstone of peace and security and sustainable development
Anita Pipan	16.06.2008		[SLO]Intercultural dialogue is one of the priorities of the Slovenian Presidency. Just a week ago there was solemn inauguration of a Euro-Mediterranean university with its seat in Slovenia. It was originally Slovenian idea, now enthusiastically endorsed by all Euromed partners.
Robin Cook	3rd- 4th June 1998	Palermo	The enhanced EU role in the Peace Process was noted and welcomed.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	As a reaction to the EU's involvement in Eastern Europe the Southern European countries demanded the recognition of their strategic and economic interests in the south. Moreover, poor economic performance of some Med countries has gradually raised concern in the EU.
Frank- Walter Steinmeier	16.03.2007	Berlin	We cannot replace the desire of the conflicting parties to engage in dialogue, nor can we issue an order for peace. However, we can - and must - support and promote this desire to engage in dialogue and give the parties assistance when they are unable to make progress on their own
Renate Schimkoreit	27-30.04.2007	Malta	We are obliged to succeed
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	By turning its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral and spiritual sources, but also from its future
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(CC) Identity – role

Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	[MMPOL] It is clear therefore that although Russia and the US wanted to be included they are not.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	The time of a strengthened EMP is the moment to become less paternalistic on the EU-side. We should not dominate the EMP, but move to a genuine partnership relationship and discuss and address also sensitive is-

			sues.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	We should not be shy to discuss terrorism, agriculture problems, migration and excessive population growth, even the dept issue. We must further develop a genuine spirit of partnership.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	Some partnership countries believe that the EU is more interested in stemming the influx of economic migrants, terrorists as well as the shipping of drugs across the Mediterranean to Europe, than in promoting the region's economic development. Such scepticism is unwarranted.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	The EU has to take and takes on responsibility for its neighbouring countries, since this is the very essence of it's raison d'etre which is first of all a political one, to create a zone of peace and stability as big as possible.
Dr. Herbert Kröll	13. Nov 98	Malta	Progress with EU-enlargement towards the East will most likely bring more process in the South too.
Liisa Valjento	November 19-22, 1999	Malta	[Fin] Even if Finland is situated geographically far away from the Mediterranean, the border of the Mediterranean is our common border and we are convinced of the need to cooperate with our neighbours beyond it everywhere.
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	[I] Europe can be coured of its Hamlet syndrome and wholeheartedly decide to become an active player on the world stage.; it can acquire the diplomatic, economic and military means to fulfil that role convincingly, without calling into question its autonomy, its roots or the freedom-giving structures defended oder the years in the framework of its Western alliances.
Silvio Berlusconi	2 July 2003	Strasbourg	The European Union is also a factor of international stability and its responsibility in this respect starts at its immediate borders and depends on its capacity to become involved in increasingly advanced forms of cooperation with neighbouring countries.
Frank- Walter Steinmeier	16.03.2007	Berlin	It is essential that we succeed in making people understand that we cannot solve the key issues of the future by cutting ourselves off from each other, but only by interacting with each other
Nicolas Sarkozy	23.10.2007	Tangiers	Europe set off on the path of peace and fratemity
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	This union will not come about through domination. It will not come about by force, nor by violence. This union that we need, we Tunisians and French alike, just like all the people of the Mediterranean, this union will only come about with comprehension, with respect, with solidarity
Nicolas Sarkozy	30.04.2008	Tunis	Instead of imposing, let us propose. Instead of getting exasperated, let us explain

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

1. AUSTRIA

AUSTRIA - EXPRESSION

(A) Expression – the other

Der Standard	27.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Daß sie trotz solcher Bedenken nach Barcelona kamen, liegt an der ausgelobten Prämie:(…)

(A) Expression – associative/dissociative

Der Standard	28.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Wichtige Streitpunkte waren die Forderung nordafrikanischer Länder, die Garantie demokratischer Freiheiten von deren "legitimen Ausübung" abhängig zu machen (für die EU unakzeptabel), sowie der Wunsch des Südens, die kommende Freihandelszone solle auch Agrarprodukte beinhalten.
Der Standard	29.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Ägypten, das eben so ein Abkommen aushandelt, wehrte sich gegen den EU-Vorschlag, Agrarprodukte vom Freihandel auszunehmen.
Der Standard	29.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Hinter den solemnen Erklärungen, in denen die Außenminister der Europäischen Union ihren armen Mediterranen Nachbarn in Barcelona ein Meer des Friedens und der Prosperität verhießen,(…)
Der Standard	29.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Beide Seiten sind am Erfolg interessiert. Der Süden will auf die angebotenen Gelder nicht verzichten, der Norden hofft auf mehr Stabilität.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	Das langfristige Ziel, bis 2010 eine mediterrane Freihandelszone zu schaffen, erscheint da noch vergleichsweise leicht zu erreichen.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	Viel schwieriger dürfte die Einigung auf mehr Kooperation bei der Bekämpfung des Terrorismus werden, denn schon auf eine gemeinsame Definition des Begriffs kann man sich nicht einigen. Auch bei der Regelung der Migrationsströme sind die Interessen von Süd und Nord nicht völlig parallel.
Der Standard	11.03.2008	Michael Moravec	Neben Österreich und Deutschland haben sich auch arabische Staaten gegen diese Union ausgesprochen.
SN	28.11.1995	(SN, Reuter, AFP)	Insbesondere Ägypten und Syrien drängten nach Angaben von Diplomaten darauf, daß der Wegfall der Handelshemmnisse bei der Einrichtung der geplanten Freihandelszone im Jahr 2010 auch für landwirtschaftliche Produkte gelten müsse. Arabische Delegationen waren mit dem Formulierungsvorschlag über die Terrorismusbekämpfung nicht einverstanden, weil er das Recht der Palästinenser auf Selbstbestimmung und auf die Fortsetzung des Kampfes für einen eigenen Palästinenserstaat nicht garantiere.
SN	17.04.1997	Roman Arens	Der syrische Außenminister al-Shara nehm kein Blatt vor den Mund: Ein Zusammenbruch des Friedensprozesses im Nahen Osten werde wahrscheinlich den "Barcelona-Prozeß" zusammenbrechen lassen. Bei der Partnerschaft rund ums

			Mittelmeer hielt er sich jedenfalls nicht auf; er forderte statt dessen den israelischen Rückzug von den Golan-Höhen, aus dem Südlibanon und den besetzten palästinensischen Gebieten, einschließlich Jerusalems.
SN	17.04.1997	Roman Arens	Mit der Begründung, "etwas mit nach Hause bringen zu müssen", verlangten arabische Außenminister in der Schlußerklärung von Malta einen Zusatz, daß einseitige Initiativen zur Verletzung internationaler Abmachungen unterlassen werden sollten. Die Betreiber dieser Ergänzung wunderten sich sehr darüber, daß EU-Länder dies zwar auch sagten, aber nicht in der Erklärung haben wollten. Es wurde dann lange darüber verhandelt, ob es überhaupt ein Schlußdokument geben solle.
Salzburger Nachrichten	28.11.2005	Ralph Schulze (SN)	Die Terrorsorgen scheinen zehn Jahre nach Beginn der ersten Mittelmeer-Konferenz ("Barcelona-Prozess") keineswegs geringer geworden zu sein.
Salzburger Nachrichten	28.11.2005	Ralph Schulze (SN)	(…) Streit um eine gemeinsame Definition des Terrors (…). Die Europäer wollen diese Unterscheidung zwischen "guten und schlechten Terroristen", wie es ein EU-Diplomat nannte, nicht hinnehmen.
Salzburger Nachrichten	29.11.2005	Dieter Eberling (SN, dpa)	Doch dann drohte der Gipfel an altem Streit und neuem Zank zu scheitern.
Salzburger Nachrichten	22.12.2007	Ralph Schulze (SN)	Dennoch wird der Wohlstandsgraben zwischen Europa und Afrika immer größer.
Salzburger Nachrichten	26.05.2008	Gerald Stoiber (SN)	Eine gemeinsame Linie ist bei 27 EU-Staaten schon oft recht schwierig, duch die Hereinnahme der Anrainerstaaten des Mittelmeers wird sie wohl nicht einfacher.
Salzburger Nachrichten	26.05.2008	Gerald Stoiber (SN)	"Konflikte werden durch Projekte nicht behoben. Das war ja leider beim Barcelona-Prozess schon so", räumte Ferrero-Waldner bei der Präsentation des Konzepts im EU-Parlament ein. Sie hofft aber, dass durch die Verwirklichung konkreter Vorhaben so manche Barriere überwunden werden kann.
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	Dabei türmen sich zahlreiche neue Hindernisse auf. Einerseits ist das Interesse an der Mittelmeerunion im Inneren der EU sehr durchwachsen bis gering. (…) Andererseits ist unübersehbar, dass es die neue Organisation auf der südlichen Mittelmeerseite mit Partnern zu tun hat, von denen viele weder demokratisch gewählt noch repräsentativ für ihre Länder sind und ihre politischen, gewerkschaftlichen und menschenrechtlichen Gegner eher hinter Gitter bringen, als mit ihnen Gespräche zu führen.
Salzburger Nachrichten	13.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn (SN)	Fast alle, die Nicolas Sarkozy eingeladen hat, sind gekommen und zeigen sich gut gelaunt. (…) Bloß Libyens Gaddafi lässt den französischen Präsidenten abblitzen. Für ihn ist die Mittelmeerunion ein "schauderliches Vorhaben". Marokkos Könik Hassan VI., gewöhnlich ein treuer Verbündeter von Paris, hat plötzlich "Terminschwierigkeiten" und schickt seinen Bruder nach Paris.
Die Presse	28.11.1995	Andreas Schwarz (as)	Wie es hieß, gab es bei den Vorbereitungsgesprächen für die am Dienstag zu verabschiedende Erklärung am Wochenende weiterhin Differenzen über die Definition von Terrorismus.

Die Presse	29.11.1995	Peter Krotky (kro)	Trotz Differenzen (…) ist am Dienstag eine Schlußerklärung unterzeichnet worden, (…)
Die Presse	29.11.1995	Peter Krotky (kro)	Barak und PLO-Chef Jassir Arafat betonten, sie seien entschlossen, den Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten fortzusetzen. Die in Barcelona vereinbarten Schritte sollten "in vollem Umfang umgesetzt" werden. Einen Erfolg gab es auch in den Beziehungen zwischen Israel und Mauretanien, die einander anerkannten.
Die Presse	24.09.1998	Doris Kraus	Denn die wahre Gefahr der Massenimmigration droht der Union nicht von ihrem östlichen, sondern von ihrem südlichen Rand, wo das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen gerade ein Zwölftel des EU-Durchschnitts beträgt - und diese Schere geht stetig weiter auf.
Die Presse	14.07.2008	(…) gerieten einander Israel und die Palästinenser in die Haare. Es spießte sich im Text an dem Wort "Nationalstaat" im Zusammenhang mit Israel. Dies bereite Schwierigkeiten für die Rückkehr palästinensischer Flüchtlinge nach Israel.	

(A) Expression -MMR

Salzburger Nachrichten	22.12.2007	Ralph Schulze (SN)	Dort, wo zwei Zivilisationen zusammenstoßen, das reiche Europa und das verleichsweise arme Nordafrika, Christentum und Islam, müsse gemeinsam für den Frieden gearbeitet werden.
Die Presse	17.03.2004	Anneliese Rohrer	Die südliche Mittelmeerregion hat sich - seit 1999 auch mit starker finanzieller Hilfe Saudiarabiens - trotz (oder wegen) aller Repression der Regime dort zum Anziehungspunkt für potentielle Terroristen entwickelt.
Die Presse	17.03.2004	Anneliese Rohrer	Mit Blick auf ein Europa.
Die Presse	29.11.2005	Ralph Schulze	Das Mittelmeer wird immer mehr zu einer Grenze zwischen der armen und der reichen Welt.
Die Presse	29.11.2005	Ralph Schulze	"Das Mittelmeer ist heute weltweit die größte Grenze der Ungleichheit", bilanziert Josep Borrell, Präsident des Europaparlamentes.
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	[Ohne Einbeziehen der Demokratie] Andernfalls bleibt sie ein Club zum geschäftlichen und polizeilichen Austausch zwischen Nord und Süd. Mit vielen Diktatoren. Und ohne Menschenrechte und Demokratie.

(A) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

Der Standard	27.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	(…) ein "großer politischer Impuls" vom Kaliber der Helsinki-Konferenz 1975,(…)
Der Standard	29.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Trotzdem bietet der in Barcelona eingeleitete Prozess ähnlich große Chancen, wie sie die Helsinki-Konferenzen für Osteuropa hatten.
Der Standard	18.10.1999	Samuel Adams	[George Joffe] Der 1995 begonnene "Barcelona-Prozess" diene lediglich dazu, die nordafrikanischen Länder von

			der EU abzuschotten.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	[Gunnar Wiegand, der Sprecher von EU-Außenkommissar Chris Patten] "Es ist eine der Haupterrungenschaften des Barcelona-Prozesses, dass er seit 1995 noch jede Nahost-Kriese überstanden hat"
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	(…) Barcelona-Prozess (…) ein vielversprechendes Instrument: Wer die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, den Aufbau einer Zivilgesellschaft und den demokratischen Austausch fördert, schützt nicht nur sich selbst vor Strömen von Immigranten aus dem südlichen Mittelmeerraum. Er bringt vielleicht auch seine Partner untereinander näher - längerfristig sogar mit Israel.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	Vieles geht nur zäh voran im Barcelona-Prozess.
Der Standard	14.03.2008	(as, pra)	(…)um einen Versuch, den ins Stocken geratenen "Barcelona-Prozess" zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten neu zu beleben, (…)
Der Standard	14.03.2008	(as, pra)	Doch der Barcelona-Prozess müsse "Dreh- und Angelpunkt" der Mittelmeer-Politik der 27 bleiben.
derStandart.at	11.07.2008	Stefan Brändle	(…) diplomatischen "Club Méditerranée"
derStandart.at	11.07.2008	Stefan Brändle	Die mediterranen Völker des Mittelmeeres sollen, wie er vollmundig erklärt, einen "Traum von Frieden und Zivilisation" verwirklichen.
derStandart.at	14.07.2008	Stefan Brändle, Michael Moravec	Die Mittelmeerunion sei eine wichtige Initiative an einer "überaus sensible Schnittstelle" der Weltpolitik, (…)
derStandart.at	14.07.2008	Stefan Brändle, Michael Moravec	(…) Plassnik nannte die Mittelmeerunion einen "Vitaminstoß" für die Region rund um das Mittelmeer.
SN	29.11.1995	(SN, Reuter, AFP, dpa)	Dennoch ist die EU zuversichtlich, daß die in Barcelona erzielte "Einbindung" den Menschen an der Südflanke bessere wirtschaftliche Perspektive bieten kann.
Salzburger Nachrichten	22.12.2007	Ralph Schulze (SN)	Ob die "Mittelmeerunion" als eigenständiger Zusammenschluss überhaupt notwendig ist, muss sich freilich erst noch erweisen. Immerhin sind dank des 1995 begonnenen "Barcelona-Prozesses" der EU bereits zahlreiche Bande über das Meer geknüpft worden, (…)
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.03.2008	(SN-gs)	Ursprünglich als exklusiver Club geplant, (…)
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.03.2008	(SN-gs)	(…) "Barcelona Prozess". Das Programm kam nie richtig in Schwung, (…)
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.03.2008	(SN-gs)	[Plassnik] die Sache gehe nun "in die richtige Richtung", weil es "nur eine gemeinsame Mittelmeerpolitik aller 27 Mitgliedstaaten geben kann".
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	Wenn die Mittelmeerunion mehr werden soll, als es der "Barcelona-Prozess" war, der 13 Jahre lang ein Schattendasein führte - wenn sie mehr bieten soll als einen ehemaligen großen und internationalen Auftrieb, dann beginnt die eigentlich Arbeit der Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten erst jetzt.
Salzburger Nachrichten	18.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	"Frieden" war das meistgenutzte Wort bei der Gründung der Mittelmeerunion in Paris.
Salzburger	13.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	[Ereignis] "Historisch"

Nachrichten		(SN)	
Salzburger Nachrichten	13.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn (SN)	[Kouchner] "Ein Traum für 800 Millionen Menschen wird wahr."
Die Presse	27.11.1995	Andreas Schwarz (as)	Der Gipfel in Barcelona hingegen wird nichts an den "Meinungsunterschieden" einiger Teilnehmer in Sachen Menschenrechte ändern; er wird nicht einen Beistrich im Bereich Nahost-Sicherheit weiterbringen; er wird nicht einen Schritt in Richtung angeblich angestrebter "Freihandelszone" setzen; und was den Brückenschlag betrifft - etwa zwischen eine säkularisierten Welt hie und einer, in der Verschmelzung von Staat und Religion immer drängender wird -, da braucht es Aufklärung und Toleranz mehr als Großkonferenzen, deren Ergebnis nie über den sogenannten "atmosphärischen Gewinn" und vorher festgeschriebene Schlußerklärungen hinausgeht.
Die Presse	24.09.1998	Doris Kraus	[BP], dem Mittelmeer-Projekt der EU
Die Presse	24.09.1998	Doris Kraus	(…) braucht der Barcelona-Prozeß aber dringendst Erfolge, um das Etikett "Mißerfolg" loszuwerden.
Die Presse	24.09.1998	Doris Kraus	"Die Barceloa-Erklärung wurde zu einem Zeitpunkt unterschrieben, als alle voller Hoffnung für den Friedensprozeß waren. Heute könnten wir sie nicht mehr abschließen. Weder die Araber noch Israel würden sie mittragen."
Die Presse	17.03.2004	Anneliese Rohrer	Kennen sie den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess?
Die Presse	17.03.2004	Anneliese Rohrer	Fünf Jahre später wurde er von den EU-Außenministern für "tot" erklärt, was diese aber nicht daran hinderte, ihn 2001 nach den Anschlägen in New York hektisch wieder beleben zu wollen.
Die Presse	29.11.2005	Ralph Schulze	Seit Beginn der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft vor zehn Jahren unter dem Namen "Barcelona-Prozess" ist die wirtschaftliche Kluft zwischen beiden Seiten des Meeres gewachsen.
Die Presse	29.11.2005	Ralph Schulze	Trotzdem sprechen die Diplomaten nicht von einem Scheitern des Barcelona-Prozesses: Ohne die angeschobene Partnerschaft zwischen den beiden Regionen, die ja nun weiter mit wirtschaftlicher und politischer Hilfe ausgebaut werden soll, "wäre die Situation wohl noch schlimmer".
Die Presse	17.02.2006	Thomas Seifert	Der "Barcelona-Prozess" - die engere Anbindung Nordafrikas an die EU - wurde von Plassnik als ein Ansatz genannt, (…)
Die Presse	04.03.2008	Thomas Vieregge	[Merkel] "Das Kind soll Mittelmeerunion gennant werden."
Die Presse	13.03.2008	(APA)	Doch der Barcelona-Prozess müsse "Dreh- und Angelpunkt" der Mittelmeer-Politik der 27 bleiben.
Die Presse	14.03.2008	(APA)	"Wir ersetzen keineswegs den Barcelona-Prozess, wir erweitern ihn nur", sagte Jansa.
Die Presse	15.03.2008	Regina Pöll	"Es ist ein Upgrade des Barcelona-Prozesses", so beurteilte der slowenische EU-Präsident Janez Jansa die neue Mittelmeer-Union.
Die Presse	15.03.2008	Regina Pöll	Der Barcelona-Prozess war in den Vorjahren ins Stocken

			geraten, die geplante Freihandelszone ist nie Wirklichkeit geworden.
Die Presse	15.03.2008	Regina Pöll	Ist die Mittelmeer-Union nur eine behübschte Version des Barcelona-Prozesses?
Die Presse	11.07.2008	Rudolf Balmer	Als "großen Traum, der in der Lage ist, die Welt zu bewegen", hatte der neugewählte Präsident Sarkozy seine Idee bezeichnet, (…)
Die Presse	11.07.2008	Rudolf Balmer	(…), dass seine "Mittelmeerunion" zu einer bloßen Neuauflage des bestehenden "Barcelona-Prozesses" reduziert wurde.

AUSTRIAN – PURPOSE

(A) Purpose – purpose

Der Standard	27.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	In Barcelona wird es nicht laut gesagt, aber dem reichen Norden geht es darum, Barrieren gegen eine Flut von Einwanderern zu errichten.
Der Standard	28.02.2002	Jörg Wojahn	[BP] Sein Ziel ist, die wirtschaftliche - und politische - Entwicklung in den südlichen Mitelmeeranrainerstaaten zu fördern - nicht zuletzt auch aus Angst vor Migrationsströmen aus der Region in Richtung Norden.
Der Standard	11.03.2008	Michael Moravec	(…) Barcelona Prozess (…), zu dessen vorrangigen Zielen die Bekämpfung von illegaler Zuwanderung, Terrorismus und Kriminalität sowie die Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in den Partnerländern zählen.
SN	28.11.1995	(SN, Reuter, AFP)	Der spanische König Juan Carlos sagte zur Eröffnung der zweitägigen Beratungen, er sei überzeugt, daß mit dem Treffen eine entscheidene Aufgabe im Interesse der künftigen Generationen angepackt werde: die Einheit des Mittelmeer-Raumes.
SN	29.11.1995	(SN, Reuter, AFP, dpa)	Damit könnte die Massenemigration gestoppt und dem militanten islamischen Fundamentalismus auf Dauer der Nährboden entzogen werden.
SN	05.04.1997	Barbara Egger	In Barcelona wurde eine dreifache Partnerschaft - politisch, wirtschaftlich und sozial - als Ziel formuliert.
Salzburger Nachrichten	22.12.2007	Ralph Schulze (SN)	(…) und es gelte, Kriege zu verhindern.
Die Presse	27.11.1995	Andreas Schwarz (as)	Jetzt also Barcelona, wo sich die Staaten der Europäischen Union mit (nicht allen) Mitelmeeranrainern treffen, um Einigkeit über Sicherheit, Stabilität und Wirtschaft zu demonstrieren und nebsther den kulturellen Brückenschlag wie einen Klacks aussehen zu lassen.
Die Presse	27.11.1995	tau	Der Norden setzt den Akzent dafür auf die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte des Treffens: Bis zum Jahr 2010 soll ein Freihandelsabkommen die Grenzen der Mittelmeerstaaten für intensiven Austausch öffnen. Daraus soll dann die Entwicklung des Südens folgen, die der Flut von Einwanderern nach Europa Einhalt bieten kann.

Die Presse	17.03.2004	Anneliese Rohrer	(…) hätte (…) mehr Demokratie, Pluralismus, bessere Bildungschancen, stärkere Wirtschaftsentwicklung bringen sollen.

(A) Purpose –aim

Der Standard	27.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	(…), soll ebenfalls einen Prozeß einleiten, der bis zum Jahr 2010 eine Euro-Med-Freihandelszone mit 800 Millionen Einwohnern bringen soll.
Der Standard	28.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Das Treffen begann exakt 900 Jahre nach dem Tag, an dem Papst Urban II. zum ersten Kreuzzug aufrief, sagte der für den Mittelmeerraum zuständige EU-Kommissar Manuel Marini. Damals sei eine lange Geschichte von Intoleranz, Unverständnis und Konflikten die Folge gewesen. Die EU-Mittelmeerkonferenz solle dagegen einen Friedensprozeß auslösen.
Der Standard	28.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Hauptziel ist die ökonomische Stabilisierung der armen Länder, um einen Massenexodus zu verhindern.
Der Standard	29.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Bis zum Jahr 2010 ist die Schaffung einer euro-mediterranen Freihandelszone geplant. Unabhängig davon sollen mit den 12 eingeladenen Ländern EU-Assoziierungsverträge abgeschlossen werden.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	Ihr Projekt der Euromed-Kooperation soll wirtschaftlich, sozial, kulturell und damit auf lange Sicht auch politisch in den Staaten südlich des Mittelmeeres manches zum Besseren verändern.
derStandard.at	21.05.2008	Michael Moravec	Die (…) Mittelmeer-Union hat ehrgeizige Pläne. Eine Autobahn von Marokko bis Ägypten zählt ebenso dazu wie die ökologische Sanierung des Mittelmeers, (…)
SN	28.11.1995	(SN, Reuter, AFP)	(…) u. a. eine europäische Finanzhilfe von mehr als 60 Mrd. S, die Schaffung einer gemeinsamen Freihandelszone bis zum Jahr 2010 und ein dauerhafter politischer Dialog.
SN	29.11.1995	(SN, Reuter, AFP, dpa)	(…) Verabschiedung einer Deklaration zur Förderung von Frieden und Wohlstand sowie des Planes der Errichtung einer Freihandelszone bis zum Jahr 2010 (…)
Salzburger Nachrichten	26.05.2008	Gerald Stoiber (SN)	Die Pläne der "Union für das Mittelmeer", (…), sind gewaltig. Nicht weniger als die Sanierung des Mittelmeers oder eine durchgehende Autobahn quer durch Norafrika zählen zur Liste der möglichen Projekte.
Salzburger Nachrichten	13.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn (SN)	Der "Traum" sieht vor, dass die Anrainerstaaten sich gemeinsam um die "Entgiftung" des Meeres kümmern werden, dass sie ihre unternehmerische Zusammenarbeit intensivieren und dass sie gemeinsam gegen die vermeintlich größten Gefahren für die Innere Sicherheit kämpfen werden: unkontrollierte Migration, Drogenhandel und Terrorismus.
Die Presse	13.03.2008	(APA)	(…), sein ein Versuch, den ins Stocken geratenen "Barcelona-Prozess" zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten neu zu beleben.

AUSTRIA - IDENTITY

(A) Identity – Rolle

derStandart.at	14.07.2008	Stefan Brändle, Michael Moravec	Die Union gäbe nur Leitlinien für die Wirtschaft vor.
SN	05.04.1997	Barbara Egger	Die EU darf nicht länger ignorieren, daß jenseits des Mittelmeers eine "Zeitbombe" tickt.
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	Doch Fortschritt kann immer nur in Kombination mit Demokratie funktionieren. Deswegen muss die Mittelmeerunion darauf bestehen, die Zivilgesellschaften im Süden zu stärken und in den Prozess einzubeziehen.

(A) Identity - EU

Der Standard	29.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Europa setzt dem die Vision eines gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraumes für 800 Millionen Verbraucher entgegen.
Der Standard	29.11.1995	Erhard Stackl	Wenn das Projekt keine Fata Morgana bleiben soll, muß die EU aber auch bereit sein, ihre Märkte für den Süden zu öffnen. Und sie muss darauf achten, daß es Stabilität letztlich nur dort gibt, wo die Rechte und Freiheiten des Individuums gewährleistet sind.
Der Standard	18.10.1999	Samuel Adams	Es drohe zwar keine militärische Gefahr, doch die Verhältnisse in den Staaten des Mittelmeerraumes seien von großer Bedeutung für die innere Sicherheit Europas. Immerhin sei Europa von den Rohstofflieferungen der südlichen Nachbarn abhängig.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	Dennoch bangen die Spanier, die 1995 in Barcelona das Projekt der EU-Mittelmeerkooperation auf den Weg gebracht hatten, dieses Mal um den Erfolg ihrer Bemühungen.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	Bei der EU-Mittelmeerpartnerschaft versuchen sich die Europäer in einem Bereich, von dem sie etwas verstehen.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	Wandel durch Annäherung heißt das Motto, mehrfach erprobt auf dem Alten Kontinent, manchmal erfolgreich.
Der Standard	22.04.2002	Jörg Wojahn	Die EU kann zwischen Israelis und Arabern nicht den schnellen Frieden schaffen. Dazu ist sie außenpolitisch viel zu schwach -
Der Standard	24.10.2007	Reuters, red	Frankreich will während seiner EU-Ratspräsidentschaft im Juli 2008 in Marseille einen Gründungsgipfel der Mittelmeer-Union organisieren und damit wohl den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess der EU überholen.
Der Standard	11.03.2008	Michael Moravec	Österreich stellt sich in der EU gegen die Pläne des französischen Präsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy,(…)
Der Standard	11.03.2008	Michael Moravec	[Ursula Plassnik] "Eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit den Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten außerhalb der EU ist sicher wünschenswert. Aber um das zu erreichen, hat die EU bereits eine Reihe von Instrumenten wie die Nachbarschaftspolitik und den Barcelona-Prozess".
Der Standard	11.03.2008	Michael Mora-	Dieser Barcelona-Prozess soll nun nach dem Willen der

		vec	slowenischen Präsidentschaft und vor allem Frankreichs in eine Mittelmeer-Union übergehen, wobei aber ziemlich unklar ist, welche Rolle hier die EU-Staaten spielen, die nicht an das Mittelmeer grenzen.
Der Standard	14.03.2008	(as, pra)	Ein neues Projekt samt neuer Institution wird in der EU aus der Taufe gehoben, ohne dass den meisten Mitgliedstaaten der Sinn der Sache klar wäre.
Der Standard	14.03.2008	(as, pra)	Sarkozy verfolgte zunächst die Idee eines exklusiven Clubs der Mittelmeer-Staaten, was Deutschland aber ablehnte, ehe zwischen beiden Staaten ein Kompromiss erzielt wurde.
derStandard.at	11.07.2008	Standart-Interview	Ferrero-Waldner: Das Wichtigste ist, dass es uns jetzt gelungen ist, eine ganz wichtige regionale Initiative mit einem neuen politischen Impuls zu versehen.
derStandard.at	11.07.2008	Stefan Brändle	[F] In Wahrheit hegt der 53-jährige Franzose vor allem Großmachtträume. Mit der Mittelmeerunion will er sein Land international besser positionieren.
derStandard.at	11.07.2008	Stefan Brändle	Die deutsche Kanzlerin setzte durch, dass alle EU-Länder teilnehmen können - also sogar Ostseeanrainer wie Schweden oder Polen. Die "Mittelmeerunion" musste deshalb in "Union für das Mittelmeer" (MFU) umgetauft werden.
derStandard.at	14.07.2008	Stefan Brändle	Eines muss man Nicolas Sarkozy lassen: Es ist ihm gelungen, "seine" Mittelmeerunion gegen den Widerstand von allen Seiten durchzudrücken.
derStandard.at	14.07.2008	Stefan Brändle	Es geht um Geostrategie und Wirtschaftsinteressen. Frankreich, durch die EU-Erweiterung an den Westrand des Kontinents gedrängt, soll wieder zu einer zentralen Stellung zwischen Europa und dem nordafrikanischen Maghreb finden.
derStandard.at	14.07.2008	Stefan Brändle, Michael Moravec	Eine pompöse Inszenierung, hinter den Kulissen aber viel Improvisation: (…)
SN	24.06.1995	Linde Hermann	Spanien will seine historische, kulturelle und sprachliche Brückenposition zwischen Europa und Lateinamerika zur Verwirklichung seines eigenen Großraumkonzepts während seines EU-Vorsitzes benutzen.
SN	29.11.1995	(SN, Reuter, AFP, dpa)	Die EU bezahlt ihr vitales Interesse an Stabilität vor der Haustür mit einem Milliardentransfer und einer Öffnung seiner Märkte. Andererseits sicherte sich die EU verbesserten wirtschaftlichen Zugang und laufende Energieversorgung.
SN	05.04.1997	Barbara Egger	Die südeuropäischen EU-Mitglieder warnen davor, dass die Union im Hinblick auf die geplante Ost-Erweiterung ihre "Südflanke" aus den Augen verlieren könnte.
Salzburger Nachrichten	29.11.2005	Dieter Eberling (SN, dpa)	Solana zeigte sich "erleichtert, dass der Barcelona-Prozess konsolidiert worden ist".
Salzburger Nachrichten	22.12.2007	Ralph Schulze (SN)	Im Mittelmeer-Raum, so wirbt Frankreichs Präsident für sein neues Lieblingskind, werde auch über Europas Zukunft entschieden.
Salzburger Nachrichten	22.12.2007	Ralph Schulze (SN)	"Mittelmeerunion" heißt das politische Projekt von Nicolas Sarkozy, dem sich nun in einem gemeinsamen "Aufruf von Rom", der italienische Ministerpräsident Romano

			Prodi und Spaniens Regierungschef José Luis Zapatero angeschlossen haben. Aber dieses Vorhaben löst bei manchen nördlichen EU-Mitgliedern nicht wenig Argwohn aus.
Salzburger Nachrichten	22.12.2007	Ralph Schulze (SN)	Die Initiative, so beruhigt Spaniens Ministerpräsident Zapatero die Zweifler, "kommt aus der EU und dient der EU".
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.03.2008	(SN-gs)	(…) musste Sarkozy sein Vorhaben besonders auf Druck Berlins gewaltig zusammenstreichen.
Salzburger Nachrichten	12.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn (SN)	Es wird ein "historischer Erfolg".
Salzburger Nachrichten	12.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn (SN)	Dazu reicht seiner Ansicht nach bereits die Tatsache, dass einander Abgesandte aus 44 Staaten treffen, darunter der Präsident von Syrien und der Regierungschef aus Israel - Vertretern von zwei Ländern die nie Frieden geschlossen haben.
Salzburger Nachrichten	14.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	Keine Frage: Nicolas Sarkozy hat am Sonntag in Paris einen diplomatischen Erfolg davon getragen. Mit dem Gründungsgipfel der Mittelmeerunion ist ihm etwas gelungen, was lange unerreichbar zu sein schien: Nachdem er die (hohen) Hindernisse innerhalb der Europäischen Union überwunden hatte, hat er fast alle Staats- und Regierungschefs des Mittelmeerraums plus jene aus den EU-Ländern zusammengebracht.
Salzburger Nachrichten	18.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	Ob der nie zuvor da gewesenen Zahl hochkarätiger Gäste auf seiner Ehrentribüne konnte Nicolas Sarkozy den Feiertag als Erfolg verbuchen.
Die Presse	27.11.1995	Andreas Schwarz (as)	Es hat den Anschein, als fänden internationale Großkonferenzen umso häufiger statt, je eindringlicher ihre mangelnden Ergebnisse beklagt werden.
Die Presse	27.11.1995	Andreas Schwarz (as)	Nun ist fraglos das Bemühen Europas, vor allem in Nahost den Wirtschaftsaufbau zu puschen, ein hehres (wenngleich nicht selbstloses), das in kleineren Konferenzen weit effizienter vorangebracht wird.
Die Presse	27.11.1995	tau	Für (…) Pariser Professor Kebabdjian aber beweist das Konzept nur Ideenarmut: "Es gibt kein europäisches Projekt für die armen Völker, die sich an Europas Türen drängen."
Die Presse	27.11.1995	tau	Der Austausch mit dem Südrand des Mittelmeeres macht vier Prozent des Welthandels aus. Vor allem aber will Brüssel die eigenen Bauern schützen und die Landwirtschaft des Südens vorläufig aus dem Freihandel ausschließen.
Die Presse	24.09.1998	Doris Kraus	Das Schlagwort von der "Festung Europa" wird nirgends gerne gehört - weder innerhalb der EU noch außerhalb. Dennoch aber ist die Angst vor Migrationswellen aus armen Nachbarländern die treibende Kraft hinter vielen Initiativen der Gemeinschaft - und dies zeigt sich nirgends deutlicher als im "Barcelona-Prozeß", (...)
Die Presse	24.09.1998	Doris Kraus	Trotz dieses Vertrauensvorschusses für den Barcelona-Prozeß macht sich aber auch in EU-Kreisen niemand Illusionen über die Wirksamkeit dieses Instruments für den Frieden in Nahost.

Die Presse	12.06.2002	smo	Ein ganz offensichtliches Interesse verfolgt die Europäische Union freilich mit dem Vorschlag, zu einer "gemeinsamen Verantwortung für die Steuerung der Migrationsströme" zu gelangen. Denn die illegale Einwanderung aus Nordafrika hatte bereits die derzeitige spanische EU-Präsidentschaft dazu bewegt, diese Frage zu einer der Prioritäten ihrer Vorsitzperiode zu erheben.
Die Presse	17.03.2004	Anneliese Rohrer	Dort hat man vergessen, wie viele Menschen darauf hofften, dass der Barcelona-Prozess in Gang kommt. Hätte sich die EU nicht selbst mit ein paar Millionen Euro beruhigt, wäre man gegen das Einsickern der Radikalen nach Europa entschlossener vorgegangen.
Die Presse	04.03.2008	Thomas Vieregge	[Sarkozy] "Europa kann sich keine Kluft zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich leisten."
Die Presse	04.03.2008	Thomas Vieregge	[Merkel] "Europa ist komplizierter geworden, und es reicht nicht mehr aus, dass Deutschland und Frankreich etwas vereinbaren. Aber wenn beide Länder sich nicht einig sind, wird es in Europa schwierig, eine Einigung zu bekommen."
Die Presse	04.03.2008	Thomas Vieregge	Merkel setzte sich in der Sache durch, fügte sich aber bei der Namensgebung: (…)
Die Presse	13.03.2008	(APA)	EU-Kommissionspräsident Barroso sagte: "Wir unterstützen die Mittelmeer-Union voll."
Die Presse	13.03.2008	(APA)	Bundeskanzler Gusenbauer warnte, die "Union für das Mittelmeer" dürfe keine "Separatveranstaltung" werden.
Die Presse	13.03.2008	(APA)	[Jean-Claude Juncker] Man müsse sehen, welchen Mehrwert eine "Mittelmeer-Union" im Vergleich zum bestehenden Barcelona-Prozess in der Zusammenarbeit der Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten habe.
Die Presse	13.03.2008	(APA)	Sarkozy verfolgte zunächst die Idee eines exklusiven Clubs der Mittelmeer-Staaten, was Deutschland aber ablehnte, ehe zwischen beiden Staaten ein Kompromiss erzielt wurde.
Die Presse	14.03.2008	(APA)	[Sarkozy] "Europa dreht den Mittelmeerländern nicht mehr den Rücken zu"
Die Presse	15.03.2008	Regina Pöll	Die Mittelmeer-Union, die er seit dem Vorjahr propagiert, wurde endlich von den EU-Partnern abgesegnet.
Die Presse	21.05.2008	Regina Pöll	Der EU-Kommission schweben Großprojekte mit den Partnern vor, mit denen die EU schon bisher eher lose über den "Barcelona-Prozess" verbunden war: (…)
Die Presse	11.07.2008	Rudolf Balmer	Dass nach langem Hin und Her, Bitten und Mahnen nun doch praktisch alle der Einladung Folge leisten wollen, darf der Initiator, der gegenwärtige EU-Ratspräsident Nicolas Sarkozy bereits als Erfolg verbuchen.

2. FRANCE

FRANCE – EXPRESSION

(F) Expression – the other

Le Monde	30.11.1995	Michel Bole-Richard et Mouna Naim	S'il est vrai, comme l'a souligné un diplomate algérien, que chaque pays du sud et de la Méditerranée voit midi à sa porte et cherche à bénéficier au maximum de cette nouvelle coopération avec l'UE, les États du pourtour méditerranéens n'en sont pas moins conscients que leur proximité les places devant des « défis communs ».
Le Figaro	06.12.2003	Pierre Rousselin	Le colonel Khadafi s'est à nouveau distingué en refusant de s'exprimer et en étant le seul à ne pas applaudir le discours du président Chirac qui venait d'exprimer le souhait de la France « de pouvoir établir une relation de confiance » avec la Libye.
Le Figaro	17.11.2003	Patrick Bele	« Notre principal but, pour ne pas dire unique, c'est l'intégration à l'Union européenne", affirme Cavit Dagdas, secrétaire d'État au Trésor turc.
Le Figaro	15.11.2000	Javier Solana	Certains de nos actuels partenaires ont vocation à rejoindre l'Union dans quelques années; Mais tous les États de la rive sud ne sont pas confrontés au même effort d'ajustement structurel…

(F) Expression – associative/dissociative

Le Monde	12.07.2008	Florence Beaugé	Les perspectives de paix au Proche-Orient se sont éloignées. Les écarts de richesse entre le Nord et le Sud se sont accrus. Quant au partenariat culturel et humaine, il a souffert des restrictions croissantes à la circulation des personnes.
Le Monde	21.03.2008	Thomas Ferenczi	Du côté européen, l'ouverture vers des pays du Sud ne dit pas se réaliser au détriment des pays de l'Est, comme l'a fait craindre à plusieurs États membre la première version du projet français. De l'autre côté de la Méditerranée, rien ne sera possible tant que la question palestinienne n'aura pas trouvé un commencement de réponse. Le processus de paix au Proche-Orient devrait être la priorité des priorités pour la diplomatie européenne.
Le Monde	03.12.2005	Thierry Fabre	Ce qui est encore plus impressionnant dans ce naufrage, c'est qu'il se produit dans une indifférence quasi générale. Notre avenir vient d'être amputé d'une part significative, une question stratégique majeur va rester pour longtemps sans réponse, et cela glisse dans le flot des nouvelles comme si de rien n'était.
Le Monde	28.11.2005	?	Ce premier sommet de l'histoire du partenariat euro-méditerranéen lancé en 1995 à Barcelone a été entaché par le faible niveau de représentation arabe et marqué par les frictions entre pays européens. Ces tensions ont été avivées du fait de la conduite des travaux par la présidence britannique, jugée particulièrement rigide par plusieurs délégations, ont

			indiqué plusieurs sources.
Le Monde	27.11.2005	Thomas Ferenczi	Il est vrai que l'initiative a pris naissance au moment où le processus de paix semblait bien engagé au Proche-Orient.
Le Monde	27.11.2005	Thomas Ferenczi	« Les partenaires euroméditerranéens doivent moderniser leur économie pour tirer parti des possibilités qu'offrent la mondialisation et le libre échange avec l'Europe », souligne la Commission, qui note que « la fragmentation persistante des marchés du sud de la Méditerranée entrave les investissements importants tant nationaux qu'étrangers ».
Le Monde	28.11.1995	Mouna Naim	Les Européens, la France en particulier, disent sur tous les tons que ce nouveau partenariat ne vise pas à s'ouvrir un nouveau forum pour favoriser l'instauration de la paix israélo-arabe. Ces assurances étaient nécessaires, d'une part pour que la Syrie et le Liban dont les négociations de paix avec Israël n'avancent pas acceptent de venir, et d'autre part pour rasséréner les États-Unis, qui voyaient dans la conférence de Barcelone une initiative concurrente de la leur. Cette précaution était aussi nécessaire pour garantir un minimum de succès à un projet à long terme.
Le Figaro	13.11.2000	Lamia Oualalou	Alors que la Libye a officiellement annoncé hier qu'elle boycottait la conférence euro-méditerranéenne (Euromed) et a appelé les pays arabes à ne pas y participer, patrons et experts craignent que la France ne profite guère de sa présidence de l'Union pour donner un nouveau souffle à ce partenariat, pour se borner à célébrer « l'esprit de Barcelone ».

(F) Expression – Mediterranean region

Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	La Méditerranée est au cœur de toutes les grandes problématiques de ce début de siècle. Développement, migrations, paix, dialogue des civilisations, accès à l'eau et la énergie, environnement, changement climatique : c'est au sud de l'Europe que notre avenir se joue.
Le Monde	21.03.2008	Thomas Ferenczi	M. Sarkozy a souligné avec raison, dans son discours de Tanger, en octobre 2007, que le monde méditerranéen n'a pas cessé, depuis des siècles, d'être « écartelé » entre « l'esprit des croisades » et « l'esprit du dialogue ». Aujourd'hui, les divisions, voire les haines, l'emportent sur les solidarités. Le « choc des civilisations » menace le rapprochement entre le Nord et le Sud. Le Sud lui-même est déchiré. Le conflit israélo-palestinien est l'expression exacerbée de ces discordes, dont la persistance a fait échouer les précédents efforts de coopération.
Le Monde	25.10.2007	Florence Beaugé et Philippe Ridet	Et le président français de dramatiser l'enjeu : « Ici [en Méditerranée], nous gagnerons tout ou nous perdrons tout. »
Le Monde	14.11.2000	Chris Patten	Nous le savons : la Méditerranée entretient avec l'Europe des relations singulières, souvent passionnées. Elle est mare nostrum, mer à l'intérieur des terres, matrice de grandes civilisations, lieu d'échange et ligne de partage avec le Sud.
Le Monde	11.05.1990	Vauzelle Michel	La Méditerranée n'est pas beaucoup plus large aujourd'hui

			que le Rhin. Son bassin occidental constitue de fait un seul et même gigantesque bassin d'emploi. L'évolution démographique, économique, sociale et culturelle du Maghreb nous en rend de plus en plus dépendants.
Le Monde	11.05.1990	Vauzelle Michel	Si la Méditerranée est le jardin de l'Europe, il n'y a pas de sécurité pour la « maison commune » s'il n'y pas de sécurité dans le jardin .
Le Figaro	23.06.2008	Mezri Haddad	La Mare Nostrum a été, en effet, un carrefour de civilisations et le berceau des trois grandes religions monothéistes. Cette « machine à civilisations », selon Paul Valéry, peut redevenir un grand bassin d'échange interculturel et de dialogue interreligieux, la source d'une civilisation résolument humaniste et universaliste, radical antidote au choc des civilisations conjecturé par Huntington.
Le Figaro	14.10.2007	Pierre Rousselin	La Méditerranée fut le berceau de notre civilisation.
Le Figaro	12.10.2004	Jean-Louis Guigou	La zone méditerranéenne est source d'inquiétudes et d'espérances.
Le Figaro	23.04.2002	Philippe Gelie	« La Méditerranée continue à être une mer de divisions plutôt qu'une mer d'intégration » a admis le ministre espagnole des Affaires européennes, Miguel Nadal.
Le Figaro	29.07.1999	Astrid de Larminat	La Méditerranée est un lieu paradoxal qui sépare et rassemble à la fois un nœud de guerres mais aussi d'échanges.
Le Figaro	29.07.1999	Astrid de Larminat	Elle concentre deux de principales lignes de fracture du monde, explique Amin Maalouf : « La ligne qui sépare le monde industrialisé des pays du tiers-monde, et la ligne qui sépare l'Occident chrétien du monde arabo-musulman. »

(F) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	Ce partenariat euroméditerranéen nouvelle version, après le processus de Barcelone initié en 1995, (…)
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	…pour la première fois, tous les pays riverains de la Méditerranée sont regroupés dans un sommet. Sur 44 chefs d'État de gouvernement conviés, 41 devraient être présents.
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	(Sarkozy) L'Union pour la Méditerranée est « la meilleur nouvelle pour la paix du Proche-Orient »
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	(Kouchner) (…) le sommet sera un « succès historique ».
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	…l'Union sera « un partenariat multilatéral » basé sur « une volonté politique partagée de revitaliser les efforts visant à transformer la Méditerranée en un espace de paix, démocratie, coopération et prospérité.
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Florence Beaugé	…le bilan d'Euromed est plutôt maigre.
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Florence Beaugé	Puisque le processus de Barcelone s'enlise, (…)
Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	L'idée est évidente, mais elle fut longue à mettre en place. Dès 1995, le processus lancé à Barcelone apportait une première réponse. Ses acquis sont loin d'être négligeables, mais

			il ne répondait plus aux attentes et donnait l'impression d'avoir été confisqué par les Européens
Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	Pour la première fois de l'histoire de la Méditerranée, une quarantaine de pays de l'Union européenne et de la Méditerranée se rassemblent le 13 juillet à Paris au plus haut niveau, représentés par leur chef d'État ou gouvernement.
Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	Mais l'UpM sera déjà lancée autour de trois principes : une impulsion au plus haut niveau avec des sommets tous les deux ans ; (…)
Le Monde	03.12.2005	Thierry Fabre	Une initiative originale voyait enfin le jour : le partenariat euroméditerranéen.
Le Monde	03.12.2005	Thierry Fabre	Dix ans après la première conférence, il était en effet prévu un sommet en présence de tous les chefs d'État pour relancer le processus de Barcelone.
Le Monde	03.12.2005	Thierry Fabre	(…) qui a osé parler d'un « succès significatif » … Pas de déclaration finale, un vague « code de conduit contre le terrorisme » et un plan d'action à cinq ans sans portée politique comme relance, voire comme refondation du partenariat euroméditerranéen, on peut difficilement faire pire !
Le Monde	28.11.2005	?	« L'Euromed ne ´résoudra pas le processus de pais au Proche-Orient, pas à cette conférence en tout cas », a ajouté M. Blair.
Le Monde	27.11.2005	Thomas Ferenczi	De part et d'autre, on reconnaît aujourd'hui que le bilan est pour le moins mitigé. Sur le plan économique, l'aide européenne n'a pas permis le décollage attendu. Sur le plan politique, la démocratie n'a pas connue les avancées espérées.
Le Monde	17.06.2003	Laurent Zecchini	Le processus de Barcelone est globalement en échec au regard de ses ambitions initiales, notamment parce que, comme l'ont constatés les ministres des affaires étrangères du partenariat euroméditerranéen réunis le 27 mai en Crète, « la violence, les destructions, les violations des droits de l'homme et les massacres se sont poursuivis dans la région ». Les États riverains de la Méditerranée échangent et coopèrent peu entre eux, préférant un rapport bilatéral avec l'UE, réputé plus avantageux. Le partenariat euroméditerranéen est en principe une incitation pour corriger cette habitude, et l'Europe de son côté, a besoin d'un forum pour dialoguer et coopérer avec ses voisins du Sud.
Le Monde	24.01.2001	Laurent Zecchini	Quel est le bilan des « stratégies communes » de l'Union européen, (…) La réponse est claire : accablant, selon Javier Solana.
Le Monde	16.11.2000	Laurent Zecchini	(…) d'un « processus de Barcelone » plutôt mal en point, mais elle sait déjà que la crise arabo-israélienne constitue une hypothèque majeur : parler de transformer la zone méditerranée en un espace de « stabilité et de prospérité », voire, ultérieurement, en une vaste zone de libre-échange, ressemble à ce stade, à un objectif chimérique, plus encore si l'on se rappelle que le processus de Barcelone a été lancé en novembre 1995, c'est-à-dire après les accords d'Oslo.
Le Monde	16.11.2000	Laurent Zecchini	(…) l'accusation selon laquelle le processus de Barcelone est l'otage du processus de paix au Proche-Orient ne tient pas, puisque la réunion de Marseille a lieu.
Le Monde	16.11.2000	Laurent Zecchini	Mais il est d'autres incertitudes. Le bras séculier du processus de Barcelone est le programme communautaire MEDA. Son

			premier exercice couvrait la période 1995-1999, et son application a été exécrable : seuls 26% des aides ont été effectivement versés aux intéressés.
Le Monde	14.11.2000	Chris Patten	Nous les encourageons à progresser encore sur la route tracée depuis Barcelone, même si certains chemins sont parfois difficiles à emprunter.
Le Monde	14.11.2000	Chris Patten	L'esprit de partenariat, en outre, aurait pu conduire à des résultats plus rapides, s'agissant de questions aussi importantes que les droits de l'homme, la prévention du terrorisme, les migrations ou l'implication de la société civile dans un processus qui doit lui offrir de larges opportunités.
Le Monde	15.11.1998	Armelle Cressard	[EU] Elle s'était achevée par l'adoption d'une déclaration annonçant l'ambitieux projet d' « un partenariat global » euroméditerranéen pour les dix ans à venir et la création d'une zone de libre-échange en 2010.
Le Monde	28.11.1995	Mouna Naim	La difficulté du projet est à la mesure de son ambition.
Le Monde	26.11.1995	Jean-Pierre Tuquoi	(…) le document final de Barcelone, est pour le moins prématuré.
Le Monde	26.11.1995	Jean-Pierre Tuquoi	Le dialogue euro-méditerranéen actuel privilégie la coopération entre gouvernants.
Le Monde	26.11.1995	Jean-Pierre Tuquoi	En fait, c'est sur le plan économique que le processus se veut novateur.
Le Figaro	14.11.2008	?	(…) Jacques Chirac a suggéré que l'Union pour la Méditerranée (UPM) se penche sur la question « névralgique » de la gestion des eaux du Jourdain.
Le Figaro	04.11.2008	Alain Barluet	En trois mois, rien, ou presque, n'a avancé.
Le Figaro	13.07.2008	Thierry Oberlé	Les chefs d'État ou de gouvernement de touts les pays d'Europe et du pourtour méditerranéen ont accepté l'invitation française à l'issue de difficiles tractations. Tous, à l'exception du dirigeant libyen Mouammar Kadhafi.
Le Figaro	21.12.2007	Alain Barluet	Barcelone et la politique de voisinage resteront « centraux ».
Le Figaro	30.11.2005	Alain Barluet	Pour ces derniers, le partenariat euro-méditerranéen reste essentiellement perçu comme une manne économique.
Le Figaro	30.11.2005	Alain Barluet	Que de désillusions! À se demander si ce qui divise les riverains de la « mare nostrum » n'est pas plus fort que ce qui les rapproche.
Le Figaro	30.11.2005	Alain Barluet	Cette illusion-là, pour ceux qui l'auraient encore conservée, est morte à Barcelone.
Le Figaro	30.11.2005	Alain Barluet	Il ambitionnait rien moins, avec son « discours magique », que de « ré-enchanter les relations euro-méditerranéennes » (…)
Le Figaro	15.03.2005	Béatrice Patrie	En 1995, la conférence de Barcelone a ouvert la voie d'un long processus de rapprochement entre les peuples des deux rives de la Méditerranée.
Le Figaro	15.03.2005	Béatrice Patrie	(…) le bilan peut être jugé comme trop maigre : les dizaines de conférences ministérielles, l'installation d'un « Parlement de la Méditerranée », la mobilisation de milliard d'Euros destinés à financer les programmes de développement Meda, ou la mise en place par la Banque européenne d'investissement (BEI) d'une « facilité euro-méditerranéenne d'investissement » n'auront pas suffi à atteindre, loin s'en faut, les objectifs de Barcelone.

Le Figaro	15.03.2005	Béatrice Patrie	Pourtant, le processus reste porteur de grands espoirs liés, (…)
Le Figaro	15.03.2005	Béatrice Patrie	Barcelone constitue le seul cadre institutionnel permettant aux Israéliens et aux Palestiniens de siéger ensemble ?
Le Figaro	07.12.2004	Hervé de Charette	Le Partenariat euroméditerranéen, (…) définit une politique ambitieuse mais fondamentalement cohérente, en s'appuyant sur l'intensité des liens économiques, politiques, historiques et culturels, afin de faire avancer un projet commun de développement et de coopération.
Le Figaro	07.12.2004	Hervé de Charette	Le processus de paix au Proche-Orient a fait long feu.
Le Figaro	07.12.2004	Hervé de Charette	Malgré ces difficultés indéniables, le Partenariat euroméditerranéen n'a pas succombé. C'est dire sa valeur et son intérêt. Au contraire, des avancées notables ont été faites.
Le Figaro	07.12.2004	Hervé de Charette	(…) et c'est essentiel, le processus de Barcelone s'est élargi à la société civile (…)
Le Figaro	07.12.2004	Hervé de Charette	Le partenariat doit servir de catalyser aux réformes. C'est pourquoi il mérite que des déclarations de principes suivies d'une gestion bureaucratique ! En un mot, il convient de consacrer à la réussite de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne autant d'énergie que celle déployée lors de l'élargissement de l'Union à l'Est.
Le Figaro	23.04.2002	Philippe Gelie	Pendant le conflit, la coopération continue.
Le Figaro	23.04.2002	Philippe Gelie	(…) « processus de Barcelone » (…) peut se targuer d'un résultat positif : avoir survécu. Non seulement ce forum a traversé les diverses crises régionales mais la tenue de ce cinquième rendez-vous montre qu'il pourrait survivre à la mort même du processus d'Oslo.
Le Figaro	23.04.2002	Philippe Gelie	(…) la Conférence euro-méditerranéenne reste le seul espace de coopération où l'on puisse à la fois rencontrer Israël et les pays arabes.
Le Figaro	15.11.2000	Javier Solana	Cette approche prospective doit prendre en compte toutes les évolutions.
Le Figaro	15.11.2000	Javier Solana	« L'esprit de Barcelone prend aussi en compte le fait que l'Europe est le partenaire économique naturel des pays de la rive sud de la Méditerranée (…)
Le Figaro	15.11.2000	Javier Solana	Enfin, c'est un processus qui veut intégrer la dimension humaine.
Le Figaro	15.11.2000	Javier Solana	Au moment où nous l'avons lancé, en 1995, il n'était pas évident de réussir ce partenariat avec nos amis et voisins méditerranéens.
Le Figaro	13.11.2000	Lamia Oualalou	« Cette démarche, originale et généreuse, s'inscrivait dans le contexte favorable des accords d'Oslo », rappelle Jean Claude Pasty (…)
Le Figaro	13.11.2000	Lamia Oualalou	L'explication de cet enlisement est en partie politique : gel du processus de paix au Moyen-Orient, conflit gréco-turc sur Chypre, climat de violence continu en Algérie… Par ailleurs, ces derniers temps, les préoccupations de l'UE se sont plutôt focalisées sur son élargissement à l'est et sur les crises qui ont ensanglanté les Balkans. Aucune institution n'est venue sceller le partenariat euro-méditerranéen (…)
Le Figaro	29.07.1999	Astrid de Larminat	Le processus de Barcelone (…) outre des programmes économiques et politiques (…)

FRANCE – PURPOSE

(F) Purpose – purpose

Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	Le projet pour la Méditerranée (…) L'idée est évidente : réconcilier enfin les deux rives de cette mer, unies et déchirées par mille soubresauts de l'histoire, aujourd'hui confrontées aux mêmes espérances et aux mêmes dangers. L'idée est évidente et c'est là sa grandeur.
Le Monde	27.02.2004	P/	Ce partenariat a pour objectif général la paix et la prospérité de la région, par le dialogue politique, le développement économique et la réforme des sociétés civiles.
Le Monde	14.11.2000	Chris Patten	Car l'objectif de Barcelone est à la fois simple et ambitieux : une région de paix, bénéficiant d'une prospérité partagée, favorisant la vitalité de la société civile dans le respect des droits de l'homme et la compréhension mutuelle des civilisations.
Le Monde	26.11.1995	Jean-Pierre Tuquoi	Son ambition est immense : rééquilibrer les relations de l'Union européenne vers le Sud ; amorcer un partenariat entre les Quinze et les pays de la Méditerranée, sur le modèle de celui en cours avec les anciens pays de l'Est tout en sachant qu'une intégration est exclue.
Le Figaro	17.11.2003	Patrick Bele	Reste l'ambition finale fixée à l'époque : la création d'une zone de libre échange entre l'Union et les pays méditerranées en 2010.
Le Figaro	13.11.2000	Lamia Oualalou	L'objectif : réduire le fossé entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée avec pour horizon, en 2010-2012, l'instauration d'une vaste zone de libre-échange.
Le Figaro	29.07.1999	Astrid de Larminat	(…), il développe un ambitieux projet culturel qui finance des opérations de réhabilitation du patrimoine et des initiatives comme celle de la Maison méditerranéenne d'Aix-Provence.

(F) Purpose -aim

Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	(…) à « jouer un rôle important pour faire face aux défis de la région » : « La crise de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale », « la désertification », les questions de migration, d'énergie, de « terrorisme et [d'] extrémisme ».
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	Six projets régionaux sont envisagés : la dépollution de la Méditerranée, les « autoroutes » maritimes et terrestres, la protection civile, l'énergie solaire, une universitaire méditerranéenne et un soutien aux PME.
Le Monde	03.12.2005	Thierry Fabre	(…) l'idée était enfin apparue qu'il fallait donner un cadre institutionnel aux relations entre l'Europe et la Méditerranée. Les accordes de Barcelone étaient signés autour de trois principaux volets : politique et de sécurité ; économique, avec en perspective la mise en place d'une zone de libre-échange à l'horizon 2010 ; social, culturel et humain, avec l'idée de rapprocher les cultures et les sociétés.
Le Monde	14.11.2000	Chris Patten	Relancer le partenariat euro-méditerranéen, en dépassant les facteurs de fragmentation et en développant l'intégration :

			c'est l'ambition de ces pistes de réflexion, qui devront être explorées lors de la rencontre de Marseille.
Le Monde	28.11.1995	Mouna Naim	Ambitieux, le projet l'est par sa prétention à englober tous les aspects des échanges entre les deux partenaires, puisqu'il concerne les questions politiques et de sécurité, l'économie et les finances, et les domaines sociale, culturel et humain.
Le Monde	26.11.1995	Jean-Pierre Tu-quoi	L'Union propose d'instaurer une zone de libre-échange avec les pays méditerranéens d'ici à l'an 2010, autrement dit de créer « un espace économique euro-méditerranéen ». L'ancrage existe déjà. Depuis la fin des années 60, toute une panoplie d'accords lie l'Europe aux pays méditerranéens. Ils se voulaient ambitieux. Avec le recul, force est de reconnaître qu'ils n'ont pas tenu leurs promesses. Depuis une vingtaine d'années, la part de la Communauté dans les échanges des pays méditerranéens piétine.
Le Figaro	15.03.2005	Béatrice Patrie	(…) il devient urgent de se doter d'une vision stratégique commune, qui à ce stade n'existe pas.
Le Figaro	15.03.2005	Béatrice Patrie	(…) le partenariat euro-méditerranéen doit se bâtir sur la base de valeurs universelles, susceptibles de garantir un minimum de cohérence et de crédibilité à un projet complexe.
Le Figaro	15.03.2005	Béatrice Patrie	En troisième lieu, la création d'une zone de prospérité partagée allant de plaire avec un développement économique et social durable est le meilleur gage de stabilité.

FRANCE – IDENTITY

(F) Identity – role

Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	La France entend s'y employer activement lors du sommet et en faire une des priorités de sa présidence européenne car le processus de paix est menacé. L'Union Européenne doit jouer sans complexe tout le rôle qui lui revient au Proche-Orient. Ce sommet se veut celui de la paix entre tous les Méditerranéens.

(F) Identity - EU

Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	Signe de l'exercice d'équilibriste que constitue cet événement, plusieurs points de la déclaration finale ne seront sans doute clarifiés qu'à la dernière minute – raison pour laquelle des réunions ultimes sont prévus, samedi, entre hautes fonctionnaires, des « quarante-quatre », et entre ministres arabes. Le nom même du projet est en discussion ! Les responsables français voudraient éliminer la référence au processus de Barcelone. Ils seraient prêts, pour cela, à accepter que le secrétariat de l'Union soit situé à Barcelone, ce qui réjouirait les Espagnols.
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	Même si le sommet du 13 s'appelle « sommet de Paris pour la Méditerranée », ce qui met un accent net sur le

			rôle de la France, le projet de Déclaration, lui, fait la part belle au processus européen dit « de Barcelone » (Euro-med), lancé en 1995 et dont il s'agit de « renforcer les accomplissements et les éléments de succès ».
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	Dans l'annexe à la Déclaration, il est stipulé que « toute contribution » de l'Union européenne aux projets régionaux (…)
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Natalie Nougayrède et Philippe Ricard	Autant de jalons posés pour tenter de répéter, en Méditerranée, « ce qui a été fait pour l'Union de l'Europe, il y a soixante ans », comme l'a espéré M. Sarkozy, le 6 mai 2007.
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Florence Beaugé	Angela Merkel, la chancelière allemande, s'oppose au projet français car il exclut les pays non riverains de la Méditerranée. Elle y voit un fermement de division au sein de l'UE.
Le Monde	12.07.2008	Florence Beaugé	(…) il accepte d'associer ses partenaires européens non à son projet, version améliorée du processus de Barcelone. Le nom change. Ce sera désormais l'Union pour la Méditerranée (UPM). S'y joignent l'Albanie, la Croatie, la Bosnie-Herzégovine, le Monténégro et Monaco.
Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	Il fallut convaincre nos partenaires espagnoles et italiens que la France ne faisait pas table rase du Processus de Barcelone mais souhaitait au contraire le relancer ; nous nous y sommes employés dès les premiers jours, à Rome comme à Portoroz lors de la rencontre des dix Européens de la Méditerranée. Convaincre l'Allemagne que ce projet n'était pas tourné contre l'Europe ; (…)
Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	Pour qui connaît les ressentiments de ces peuples enchevêtrés, cette rencontre est déjà un succès historique.
Le Monde	11.07.2008	Bernard Kouchner	Nous sommes tous des Méditerranéens de cœur et de paix.
Le Monde	21.03.2008	Thomas Ferenczi	La civilisation européenne est née de la Méditerranée.
Le Monde	21.03.2008	Thomas Ferenczi	L'écrivain Paul Valéry définissait les Européens comme les héritiers de trois grandes cultures du monde antique – grecque, romaine et chrétienne – dont chacune appartenait à l'espace méditerranéen.
Le Monde	21.03.2008	Thomas Ferenczi	L'Europe a refusé l'affrontement en appelant à l'union entre les deux rives. Les dirigeants de l'UE ont écarté du projet français ce qui paraissait de la nature à diviser les Européens en donnant à Paris un rôle prééminent. Ils en ont retenue l'essentiel, c'est-à-dire la volonté de recréer sur le pourtour de la Méditerranée un espace politique commun.
Le Monde	25.10.2007	Florence Beaugé et Philippe Ridet	Le chef de l'État n'a cependant pas caché la difficulté de la tache. il a évoqué, à des nombreuses reprises, « un rêve de paix et de justice et non pas de conquête », « un grand rêve de civilisation », « un grand rêve capable de soulever le monde », comme s'il doutait lui-même de pouvoir l'attendre.
Le Monde	25.10.2007	?	[Sarkozy] (…) il a invité tous les dirigeants méditerranéens à participer, « sur un pied d'égalité », à une conférence à Paris en juin 2008.

Le Monde	03.12.2005	Thierry Fabre	Le vide annonciateur d'une grand violence, la citadelle Europe serait à peu près aussi efficace que la ligne Maginot hier. Reste donc à imaginer et à bâtir une véritable Communauté euroméditerranéenne.
Le Monde	28.11.2005	?	[Solana] « l'important ce n'est pas le porte parole, c'est ce qu'il a à dire ».
Le Monde	27.11.2005	Thomas Ferenczi	L'UE entend les aider à assurer le contrôle des frontières, la protection des réfugiés, la gestion de l'immigration clandestine, notamment pour « éviter les tragédies humaines » qui surviennent régulièrement en Méditerranée.
Le Monde	02.12.2003	Serge Marti	L'élargissement de l'Union européenne (…). Il est aussi vécu comme une menace potentielle pour les pays en développement du pourtour méditerranéen.
Le Monde	17.06.2003	Laurent Zecchini	Il ne s'agit pas de comptes d'apothicaires : outre que le scandale des « projets dormants » européens (de l'aide promise mais jamais déboursée) se dissipe, les valeurs démocratiques de l'UE sont d'autant mieux acceptées sur la rive de la Méditerranée qu'elles ont une traduction financière. Car les difficultés de l'UE pour donner vie au partenariat euroméditerranéen concourent à renforcer l'impression que l'Europe peine à définir le type de relations qu'elle souhaite avoir ses voisins.
Le Monde	16.11.2000	Laurent Zecchini	La lenteur avec laquelle l'Union européenne achemine aux populations et aux pays concernés l'assistance promise est chronique
Le Monde	14.11.2000	Chris Patten	Parce que l'Europe ne saurait se placer à l'écart de cette stratégique, en se résignant à n'être que le témoin passif d'un spectacle tragique. Plus que jamais, les Méditerranéens ont besoin de l'Europe, et l'Europe a besoin des Méditerranéens. Il en va de notre intérêt commun.
Le Monde	14.11.2000	Chris Patten	L'Union européenne accorde à cette politique un caractère prioritaire. Il faut souligner, à cet égard, que l'attention portée à nos voisins d'Europe centrale et orientale, dans la perspective de l'élargissement de l'Union, ne l'est pas au détriment des relations avec nos voisins du Sud.
Le Monde	02.03.1997	Propos Recueillis Par Alain Frachon et Daniel Vernet	[Quai d'Orsay] Il est claire que, dans l'Europe de demain, il y aura un rôle particulier pour les pays qui veulent afficher une détermination plus forte que les autres. La France est au nombre de ces pays.
Le Monde	26.11.1995	Jean-Pierre Tuquoi	De fait, si les États européens ont intérêt à la création d'une zone de paix et de prospérité au sud du continent, les entreprises poursuivent des objectifs différents. Pourquoi investir dans le Sud quand les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale, demain, seront membres de l'Union européenne ? Pourquoi opter pour le pourtour méditerranéen quand les salaires asiatiques sont deux à trois fois plus bas ? C'est de la réponse à ces questions que dépendra l'avenir des pays du sud de la Méditerranée. Et, pour partie, celui de leur voisin du Nord.
Le Monde	11.05.1990	Vauzelle Michel	L'immigration en provenance de ces pays va sans doute accroître et poser à la France des problèmes de politique intérieure de plus en plus graves. D'autre part, la menace

			de l'intégrisme peut créer à nos frontières sud une zone d'instabilité et insécurité, sinon d'hostilité.
Le Monde	11.05.1990	Vauzelle Michel	Il n'y a pas d'avenir pour la „Grande Europe", qui est tout simplement « l'Europe », si la paix et la sécurité, le développement économique et social, le respect des droits de l'homme, des idéaux démocratiques et des identités culturelles ne sont pas assurés en Méditerranée.
Le Monde	11.05.1990	Vauzelle Michel	Il faut au-delà des discours, concevoir effectivement comme une entité l'espace euro-méditerranéen. Il faut fonder peu à peu un ensemble politique, démographique, économique, et culturel assez puissant pour former un élément essentiel des grands équilibres nécessaires à la défense de la paix et de la liberté dans le monde.
Le Monde	11.05.1990	Vauzelle Michel	Au contraire, il s'agit pour l'Europe du Sud d'obtenir de l'Europe tout entière qu'elle prenne conscience de ses responsabilités vis-à-vis du monde méditerranéen et de ce que l'avenir de la Méditerranée est essentiel à son propre avenir. Pour la France, l'enjeu est vital.
Le Figaro	13.07.2008	Thierry Oberlé	En contribuant à normaliser les relations entre les nations du Proche-Orient, Paris espère redevenir un acteur influent dans la région où le rôle de l'Europe s'amenuise.
Le Figaro	11.07.2008	Alexandre Adler	Nous vivons un moment très particulier de l'équilibre mondial, où pour la première fois depuis bien longtemps, l'Europe revient sur le devant de la scène.
Le Figaro	11.07.2008	Alexandre Adler	(…), le processus, dit de Barcelone, de dialogue entre l'Europe latine et le Maghreb est arrivé à une situation de panne presque totale, à laquelle il faut, à présent, remédier sans délai.
Le Figaro	23.05.2008	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	L'Union européenne a fait le choix de se rapprocher de la Méditerranée.
Le Figaro	14.03.2008	Pierre Avril	Au lieu de créer ex nihilo une nouvelle union, le projet se contente de prendre appui sur le processus de Barcelone, forum de coopération interméditerranéen lancé en 1995, aujourd'hui ensablé, et auquel la France souhaite donner un « nouvel élan ».
Le Figaro	12.03.2008	Pierre Avril	Le 23 octobre à Tanger, le chef de l'État français avait invité les États côtiers de la Mare Nostrum á créer une « Union économique, politique et culturelle, dont nos enfants seront fiers. »
Le Figaro	26.02.2008	Pierre Rousselin	L'Espagne est très attachée au « processus de Barcelone » initié en 1995 en direction des pays du Sud, mais sans grand résultat, tandis que la « politique de voisinage » reste l'autre instrument de la coopération européenne.
Le Figaro	21.12.2007	Alain Barluet	« L'Union pour la Méditerranée aura vocation à être le cœur et le moteur de la coopération en Méditerranée et pour la Méditerranée », ont souligné les trois dirigeants dans leur appel.
Le Figaro	21.12.2007	Alain Barluet	Elle traduit le souci hautement politique de prendre en compte les réticences qui s'étaient fait jour à l'égard de ce chantier, notamment de la part de l'Allemagne, mais aussi, à moindre degré, de l'Espagne et de l'Italie.
Le Figaro	21.12.2007	Alain Barluet	L' « appel de Rome » souligne que « l'Union n'a pas

			vocation à se substituer aux procédures de coopération et de dialogue qui réunissent déjà les pays de la Méditerranée, mais à les compléter ».
Le Figaro	14.10.2007	Alain Barluet	Ce projet, ajoute-t-il, vise à créer « un espace de solidarité et de coopération » (...)
Le Figaro	14.10.2007	Alain Barluet	Nicolas Sarkozy a lancé un vibrant « appel à tous les peuples de la Méditerranée ». Le temps est venu de bâtir ensemble une Union méditerranéenne qui sera un trait d'union entre l'Europe et l'Afrique », (…)
Le Figaro	14.10.2007	Alain Barluet	Selon Jean-Louis Guigou, l'occasion est « historique » (…)
Le Figaro	14.10.2007	Pierre Rousselin	[MU] Face à une entreprise aussi grandiose, le scepticisme est de mise.
Le Figaro	14.10.2007	Pierre Rousselin	La voie de l'Union méditerranéenne sera semée d'embûches. Sans se substituer à la recherche de la paix au Proche-Orient ou à la résolution des autres conflits, elle mérite d'être tentée, dans l'espoir de trouver l'harmonie au nord comme au sud de cette Mare Nostrum.
Le Figaro	30.11.2005	Alain Barluet	Dans l'euphorie de l'après communisme à l'Est, l'Union européenne voulait, en 1995, « sécuriser » son voisinage méridional. Une décennie plus tard, cette priorité s'est affirmée. En coopérant avec le Sud, les Européens attendent de pouvoir lutter plus efficacement contre le terrorisme et de mieux réguler l'immigration. Sur ces deux volets, les Européens ont obtenu à Barcelone un « code de conduite » et un « plan d'action » malgré les réticences de leurs interlocuteurs du Sud.
Le Figaro	07.12.2004	Hervé de Charette	(…) il est essentiel pour l'Europe de se tourner vers ses voisins de la Méditerranée. L'actualité ne cesse de le montrer, le destin de l'Europe est désormais inséparable de celui de ses voisins du Sud. La coopération euroméditerranéenne est pour l'Europe un projet porteur d'une vision politique à long terme, faisant primer la solidarité sur le repli, la méfiance ou la confrontation.
Le Figaro	07.12.2004	Hervé de Charette	Tout cela est très encourageant et montre combien les pays du Sud sont en demande d'Europe. Il est essentiel de ne pas les décevoir : il nous faut donc passer la vitesse supérieure!
Le Figaro	12.10.2004	Jean-Louis Guigou	Cela étant, la politique européenne en Méditerranée souffre de nombreuses limites qui la rendent, actuellement, peu efficace. L'approche sécuritaire prédomine trop souvent ; les instruments financiers (Meda) mis en place ne sont pas à la hauteur puisque, en comparaison pour la période 2000-2006, l'Union européenne aura alloué trente euros par habitant aux Peco contre quatre pour les douze pays partenaires de la Méditerranée ; l'absence d'organisation politique adéquate et de secrétariat permanent rend le processus de coopération tributaire de l'administration de la Communauté européenne. Enfin, la vision eurocentrique prime sur le partenariat, le centre domine et les pays voisins restent périphériques.
Le Figaro	12.10.2004	Jean-Louis Guigou	Le projet de voisinage de l'Union européenne nous fait

			progresser de quelques mètres alors qu'il faudrait avancer de plusieurs kilomètres. Le temps nous est compté.
Le Figaro	12.10.2004	Jean-Louis Guigou	Considérant que l'Europe a, dans les années à venir, besoin des pays de la rive sud de la Méditerranée pour se développer (…) et que, réciproquement, les pays de la rive du Sud ont eux aussi besoin d'une Europe forte, dans la mesure où ils vont être confrontés à des chocs (…) d'une ampleur telle qu'ils ne peuvent, seuls, y faire face. Nous sommes « condamnés » à coopérer dans un rapport gagnant-gagnant.
Le Figaro	06.12.2003	Pierre Rousselin	Le président Chirac a souligné que les pays européens présents à Tunis partageaient « le même sentiment d'urgence, la même volonté de faire de la Méditerranée un espace de solidarité et de paix, et la même ambition : celle de favoriser l'intégration régionale du Maghreb et le développement économique qui l'accompagne ».
Le Figaro	17.11.2003	Patrick Bele	L'Est ne doit pas faire oublier le Sud à l'Europe : (…)
Le Figaro	17.11.2003	Patrick Bele	Pourtant l'Europe a accru ses efforts financiers à l'égard de la région.
Le Figaro	15.11.2000	Javier Solana	(…) : l'Union s'est donc engagée à aider à la mise à niveau des économies de ses amis du Sud dans l'objectif de construire, à l'horizon 2010, une vaste zone de libre-échange.
Le Figaro	13.11.2000	Lamia Oualalou	On réalise que nos destins sont liés, ne serait-ce que du fait de l'équation démographique ».
Le Figaro	14.03.2008	Pierre Avril	Nicolas Sarkozy a répété hier son souhait que les Vingt-Sept « établissent » l'Union pour la Méditerranée « sur un pied d'égalité »
Le Figaro	29.07.1999	Astrid de Larminat	A Bruxelles, d'ailleurs, on n'oublie pas la Méditerranée.

3. GERMANY

GERMANY - EXPRESSION

(D) Expression – the other

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 32	07.02.1995	wha.	Die südlichen Anrainer des Mittelmeers, vor allem die Maghreb Staaten, fordern schon seit langem mehr Brüsseler Aufmerksamkeit. Es kommt ihren Wünschen zugute, dass in diesem Jahr mit Frankreich und Spanien zwei Mittelmeerstaaten die EU-Präsidentschaft innehaben.
FAZ Nr. 32	07.02.1995	wha.	Vergessen, so meinen sie, habe die Europäische Union ihre Südgrenze, da sie vornehmlich mit der Entwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa beschäftigt sei.
FAZ Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	Europas Nachbarn im Süden beanspruchen immer mehr Aufmerksamkeit.
FAZ Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Eine Reihe von Staaten der Region suchen engere Anlehnung an Europa.
FAZ Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Die Staaten Nordafrikas und des Nahen Ostens machen sich vor allem große Hoffnungen auf ein Milliardenschweres Hilfsprogramm aus Europa.

FAZ Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Kompliziert wird das labile Gefüge in der Region zudem durch die schwierigen Beziehungen der arabischen Staaten untereinander und besonders zu Israel.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	wha.	Der israelische Außenminister hatte eine in Inhalt und Form konziliante und vorwiegend an seinen syrischen Amtskollegen gerichtete Rede vorgetragen; der Syrer antwortete auf das Friedensangebot mit den üblichen Vorbehalten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 86	14.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die mit der EU durch eine Zollunion verbundene Türkei sowie nordafrikanische Länder befürchten, daß von der Marktöffnung in erster Linie die wettbewerbsfähigeren Produkte Europas profitieren könnten. Der Argwohn in den südlichen Ländern wird nicht zuletzt durch das kleinliche Feilschen von EU-Ländern, darunter auch Deutschland, um die Einfuhr einiger hundert Tonnen Kartoffeln, Reis Tomaten oder Schnittblumen genährt.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die Unnachgiebigkeit, mit der die arabischen Delegierten in Malta auf einer-wenn auch verklausuliert Formulierten- Verurteilung der israelischen Siedlungspolitik bestanden, belastet auch die Fortentwicklung der Euromediterranen Partnerschaft.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Staben	Die arabischen Teilnehmerländer hätten allerdings zugesichert, so Van Mierlo noch vor Wochenfrist, daß dadurch die Weiterentwicklung der Ende 1995 in Barcelona feierlich besiegelten vertraglichen Partnerschaft mit den südlichen Anrainern des Mittelmeers nicht beeinträchtigt werde.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Vorerst gilt, was der ägyptische Außenminister Moussa und andere arabische Teilnehmer in Malta klargestellt haben: Es sei sinnlos große Projekte für die Stabilität im Mittelmeer zu schmieden, solange der Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten stocke.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 218	19.09.1997	Michael Stabenow	Selbst Tunesien, das Köhler im Vergleich mit anderen südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern als "Musterschüler" bei der wirtschaftlichen Öffnung betrachtet, tut sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen ökonomischer und politischer Liberalisierung offenbar noch schwer.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 218	19.09.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die Konferenz verdeutlichte, dass auch die Maghreb-Partner ebenfalls legitime Erwartungen an die EU-Länder haben. Dies gilt besonders für die zwiespältige EU-Haltung, ungehindert Zugang für Industrieprodukte und Dienstleistungen zu den südlichen Märkten zu verlangen, andererseits aber Freihandel für Agrarprodukte zu verweigern.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 218	19.09.1997	Michael Stabenow	Wie solle man es den eigenen Bauern vermitteln, wettbewerbsfähig zu werden, wenn es keine neuen Absatzmärkte gebe, fragt der Adel Tilli, Vorstandmitglied der tunesischen Agrar- und Fischervereinigung. Dies sorge nicht nur für ein "Gefühl der Zurückweisung", sondern erschwere die wirtschaftliche Öffnung. Tillis Warnung an die Europäer war knapp, aber eindeutig: "Achtung, Gefahr!"
Frankfurter	17.11.2000	Bc.	Von den Europäern wird offenbar erwartet, daß sie ein

Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268			gewisses Gegengewicht zu den Vereinigten Staaten bilden, die in den Augen vieler arabischer Länder bei ihren Vermittlungsbemühungen zu sehr auf der Seite Israels stehen.
FAZ Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Die Partnerländer hätten zugestimmt, hieß es, daß auch sie eine Verantwortung für einen besseren Einsatz der Mittel trügen.
Die Welt Nr. 54	04.03.2008	Mariam Lau	Obendrein sind viele der Akteure im Süden wegen des schwelenden Nahost-Konflikts nicht in der Lage, sich an einen Tisch zu setzen. Geld fließt von Nord nach Süd, aber es kommt politisch wenig zurück, weil es oft an Partnern mangelt.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	28.11.2005	wtr	Die Chance, dieses gegenseitige Misstrauen auf höchster Ebene abzubauen, haben die nordafrikanischen Führer vertan. Klug war das nicht, denn eine neue Gelegenheit wird es so bald nicht wieder geben.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	28.11.2005	wtr	Wenn die südlichen Anlieger des Mittelmeeres ihre Partnerschaft mit der EU weiterhin so schludrig behandeln, sollte die EU ihnen ein böses Erwachen bereiten. Etwa durch Drehen am Geldhahn.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	24.10.2007	chi.	Für einen Lieblingsplan des Präsidenten, die Mittelmeer-Union, haben die Marokkaner viel Sympathie. Aber sie schätzen deren Aussichten nicht hoch ein.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	07.12.2007	Rudolph Chimelli	Vor allem wollen die Algerier wissen, was der neue Pakt ihnen brächte. Immerhin gibt es bereits jetzt eine Reihe von Bündnissen: die Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft (Barcelona-Prozess) zwischen der EU und ihren südlichen Nachbarn sowie das Mittelmeer-Forum und den Fünf-plus-Fünf-Dialog der Außenminister als informelle Konferenzen. Diese Spatzen in der Hand will Algerien für keine Taube auf dem noch nicht gebauten Dach über dem Mittelmeer aufgeben.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	11.09.2000	Sven Behrendt und Christian-Peter Hanelt	Von den acht arabischen Mitgliedsstaaten des Barcelona-Prozesses haben bislang nur vier - Tunesien, Marokko, Jordanien sowie die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde - Assoziierungsabkommen mit der EU abgeschlossen und treiben die Transformation ihrer Wirtschaft zumindest ansatzweise voran. Andere, wie Ägypten, haben ihr bereits verhandeltes Abkommen auf Eis gelegt - sie werden sich der tiefgreifenden Veränderungen bewusst, die der Freihandel erfordert.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	17.11.2000	Cornelia Knust	Die arabische Welt drängt die Europäische Union (EU), sich stärker für den Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten zu engagieren und zudem möglichst Partei für die Seite der Palästinenser zu ergreifen.
FTD	05.11.2001	Birgit Jennen	Die arabische Welt drängt die EU, sich eindeutig auf die Seite der Palästinenser zu schlagen.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	25.11.2005	Christian Hanelt	Sorgenkinder sind die arabischen Partnerländer: Bevölkerungswachstum, mangelnde Demokratie, Armut und Perspektivlosigkeit sind gerade bei ihnen hoch - ebenso hoch ist der Wunsch, in Europa das Glück zu suchen.

(D) Expression – associative/dissociative

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 32	07.02.1995	wha.	In europäischen Ländern hört man häufig die Befürchtung, eine enge Zusammenarbeit der islamischen Staaten am südlichen Mittelmeer mit Europa könne dort die fundamentalistischen Gruppen stärken. Die Teilnehmer aus den islamischen Ländern waren in Barcelona anderer Ansicht: Der radikale Fundamentalismus nähre sich vorwiegend aus Armut und Unterentwicklung. Allerdings waren auch keine Fundamentalisten in Barcelona dabei.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	Die leistungsstarke Türkei wird anderer Hilfe bedürfen als das geschwächte Algerien.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	Das wirtschaftliche Gefälle zum Süden hin ist viel größer als das zu den Reformländern Mittel- und Osteuropas; das Durchschnittseinkommen in der EU ist etwa zwanzigmal so hoch wie das in der arabischen Staaten Nordafrikas.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 221	22.09.1995	Walter Haubrich	Die Schwierigkeit, gerade die in Konferenzen mit viel Rhetorik und wenig konkreten Inhalten erfahrenen arabischen Politiker zur Sachlichkeit zu bewegen, wird nicht gering sein. König Hassan II. hat das Spiel jetzt schon begonnen: Aus Ärger über die deutliche Reaktion der Union auf die marokkanische Hinhaltetaktik bei den Fischereiverhandlungen überlege er sich, ob er überhaupt nach Barcelona fahre.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	now./wha.	Als heikel hatten sich zuletzt besonders die politischen Passagen zum Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten und zum Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen erwiesen. Dagegen scheinen die vorbereiteten Klauseln zu Menschenrechten und Demokratie so allgemein gehalten zu sein, daß sie keinem Teilnehmer unüberwindbare Probleme bereiten dürften.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Trotz der Mittelmeer-Euphorie, die sich von Barcelona ausgehend nun breitmacht, bleibt der Wirtschaftsraum ein äußerst heikles Gebilde.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	now.	Die Teilnehmer verständigten sich schließlich auf Kompromißformeln.
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.1995	wha.	Am schnellsten wurde man sich in Barcelona über die wirtschaftlichen Themen einig.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Statt positiver Bilanzen und ehrgeiziger Pläne zum Ausbau der Ende 1995 in Barcelona besiegelten "Euromediterranen Partnerschaft" zwischen den nördlichen und südlichen Anrainern des Mittelmeers beherrschten die jüngsten Spannungen im Nahen Osten das Konferenzgeschehen in einem ehemaligen Hospital des Johanniterordens in der maltesischen Hauptstadt.
Frankfurter Allgemeine	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die arabischen Teilnehmer hatten stundenlang damit gedroht, keinerlei gemeinsamen Erklärung ihre Zustim-

Zeitung Nr. 89			mung zu geben, falls die Europäer nicht zu einer zwar im Ton gemäßigten, aber dennoch eindeutigen Kritik an der israelischen Siedlungspolitik bereit sein sollten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die arabische Warnung vor den Folgen einer Politik "vollendeter Tatsachen" und vor einseitigen Verstößen gegen die seit 1991 zwischen Israel und seinen arabischen Nachbarn getroffenen Vereinbarungen ließ sich inhaltlich zwar durchaus mit der Position der meisten EU-Staaten vereinbaren.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Andererseits konnten und wollten es die Europäer nicht riskieren, im Kreis der 27 Staaten Israel politisch zu isolieren und somit die Glaubwürdigkeit der "Euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft" zu erschüttern.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 218	19.09.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die Verschuldungsprobleme, das Wohlstandsgefälle und ein daraus erwachsender Migrationsdruck sind weitere Gründe, an Wohlstand und politischer Stabilität rings um das Mittelmeer ureigenes Interesse zu zeigen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 44	21.02.1998	Prof. Dr. Helmut Hubel	Aber gerade darin beruht eine charakteristische Differenz zwischen Europa und dem Nahen Osten: Anders als in Europa wo ein blutiger Erster und ein "totaler", mörderischer Zweiter Weltkrieg tiefe Spuren und einen praktisch allseitigen Willen zum Frieden hinterlassen haben, gilt den Mächtigen im Nahes Osten vielfach bis heute ein (begrenzter) Krieg als legitim oder gar bisweilen notwendig.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 87	15.04.1999	Michael Stabenow	Auch die Stuttgarter Konferenz dürfte jedoch zeigen, wie schwer sich die Nachbarn beiderseits des Mittelmeers tun, an einem Strang zu ziehen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1999	Hans Christian Rößler	Schwierig war es in Stuttgart geworden, nachdem Israel offenbar den syrischen Außenminister, der zugleich Sprecher der arabischen Staaten ist, nicht ohne israelische Beteiligung vor den Journalisten auftreten lassen wollte. Mit dem Israeli Scharon zusammen wollte wiederum al Scharaa nicht auf die Bühne treten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1999	now.	Im Gegensatz zu der Außenministerkonferenz im April 1997 auf Malta, als der Streit um die israelische Siedlungspolitik sogar die Verständigung über eine Abschlußerklärung vereitelte, wirkte sich der Konflikt im Nahen Osten auf der Stuttgarter Konferenz nicht lähmend aus.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1999	now.	Während der Plenarsitzung am Donnerstag war es zu einem kurzen Wortwechsel zwischen Scharon und al Scharaa gekommen. Zur Verbesserung der Stimmung des Treffens hatte beigetragen, daß auf Einladung Fischers erstmal ein Vertreter Libyens, wenn auch ohne Rederecht, als Gast an einer Mittelmeerkonferenz teilnehmen konnte.
FAZ Nr. 89	17.04.1999	now.	Ungeachtet der zum Ende der Konferenz aufgetretenen Misstöne zogen Diplomaten aus der EU, aber auch aus den südlichen Partnerländern am Freitag eine positive Bilanz.
Frankfurter Allgemeine	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	Weil dafür kein institutioneller Rahmen gefunden wurde, ist es im Grunde bei dem alten Bilaterismus geblieben.

Zeitung Nr. 269			Die Lähmung des Nahost-Friedensprozesses zu Zeiten der israelischen Regierung Netanjahu war dafür ein Grund, der Bürgerkrieg in Algerien war ein anderer, die sich nun langsam lösende Isolierung Libyens ein dritter.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnen-macher	Auch auf dem Gebiet der kulturellen Zusammenarbeit ist wenig geschehen, weil zu wenig Kontakte zwischen möglichen Partnern aus der "Zivilgesellschaft", etwa zwischen Hochschulen und Bildungseinrichtungen, entstanden sind.
FAZ Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnen-macher	Geändert hat sich, wenn man den Politiker-Bekenntnissen trauen darf, auch die Einstellung zu den Regeln, nach denen der moderne Kapitalismus funktioniert.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnen-macher	Jedenfalls scheint man auf der anderen Seite des Mittelmeers inzwischen begriffen zu haben, dass man in der globalisierten Wirtschaft in einem Standortwettbewerb steht und dass Investoren nicht wegen alter kolonialer Verbindungen oder neuer Freundschaften ins Land kommen, sondern auch die Aussicht auf Gewinnchancen angezogen werden müssen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnen-macher	Natürlich kann es kein Treffen im Mittelmeerraum geben, ohne dass die Geschichte gegenseitiger kultureller Befruchtungen beschworen und das gemeinsame jüdisch-christlich-islamische Erbe als Grundlage künftiger Zusammenarbeit ausgerufen wird.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnen-macher	Zur kulturellen Tradition des Mittelmeerraumes gehört es, übrigens am südlichen wie am nördlichen Ufer, über unangenehme Dinge wenn möglich nicht zu sprechen, oder sie mit höflichen Floskeln zu entschärfen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	(Marseille) Außenminister Fischer lobte die "beeindruckende Aussprache" bei der vor allem der israelische Außenminister Ben-Ami und der Vertreter der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde, Schaath, offen, "aber im Geist des Dialogs" die Standpunkte beider Seiten dargelegt hätten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Daß auf diesem Gebiet vorerst kaum Fortschritte zu erwarten sind, kam auch in der Entscheidung der französischen Präsidentschaft zum Ausdruck, auf eine Beratung über den Entwurf einer Euro-mediterranen Charta für Frieden und Sicherheit, die in den vergangenen Monaten intensiv verhandelt worden war, zu verzichten. Dafür sollen günstiger politische Umstände abgewartet werden.
FAZ Nr. 257	05.11.2001	Hans Christian Rößler	Soviel Besuch aus Europa kam selten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 257	05.11.2001	Hans Christian Rößler	Die Anschläge islamistischer Terroristen haben die Nachbarländer der Europäischen Union (EU) am südlichen Ufer des Mittelmeeres wieder an Bedeutung gewinnen lassen -nachdem bei der letzten Außenministerkonferenz in Marseille im vergangenen November die EU-Mittelmeer-Zusammenarbeit von vielen für "tot" erklärt worden war.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr.	05.11.2001	Hans Christian Rößler	Die Regierung der Maghreb-Staaten wie die der arabischen Mittelmeeranrainer haben in den vergangenen Wochen das getan, was in Europa von ihnen erwartet

257			wurde: Sie unterstützten den Kampf gegen den Terror und sorgten für Stabilität im Inneren ihrer Länder.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 257	05.11.2001	Hans Christian Rößler	Doch die erwünschte Stabilität hat einen Preis. Mit ihr vertieft sich ein Grundproblem der europäischen Mittelmeerpolitik, wie bei einer Konferenz der Bertelsmann-Stiftung zu diesem Thema deutlich wurde: Auf der einen Seite will die EU bei den Partnerländern Demokratie und Pluralismus fördern. Das haben die Staats- und Regierungschefs auf beiden Seiten des Mittelmeers eindeutig als Ziel der Mittelmeerpartnerschaft des sogenannten Barcelona-Prozesses, festgeschrieben. Im Zweifelsfall verlassen sich die EU und ihre Mitglieder lieber auf die meisten autoritär regierenden Regime in der Region. Diese Zusammenarbeit hilf ihnen letztlich ihre Macht zu erhalten und sogar noch auszubauen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 257	05.11.2001	Hans Christian Rößler	Seit dem 11. September würden dagegen in den südlichen Mittelmeerländern plötzlich Finanzströme auf der Suche nach den Attentätern und ihren Auftraggebern überwacht und Konten gesperrt. Die Empörung über solche Beispiele westlicher Doppelmoral trägt dazu bei, daß Islamisten wie Bin Ladin Sympathien in der Bevölkerung gewinnen konnten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 93	22.04.2002	Hans Christian Rößler	Aus Protest gegen die Teilnahme Israels wollen Syrien und der Libanon die Konferenz boykottieren. Die Europäische Kommission und die spanische Ratspräsidentschaft scheint das aber nicht zu schrecken: Mehr als ein Dutzend Empfehlungen und mindestens so viele Vorschläge hat die Kommission (...) -sie reichen von Frauenförderung bis zum Dialog der Zivilisation.
FAZ Nr. 95	24.04.2002	Walter Haubrich	Die militärischen Aktionen Israels in Palästina und die Attentate von Palästinensern hatten die EU sogar eine Absage einer Konferenz erwägen lassen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 95	24.04.2002	Walter Haubrich	Zum ersten erwarteten Eklat kam es schon bei der Eröffnungssitzung: Arabische Außenminister verließen für einige Minuten den Raum, nachdem der stellvertretende Außenminister Melchior (…) das Wort ergriffen hatte. Die Organisation hat Araber und Israelis über 40 Kilometer voneinander entfernt untergebracht: (...)
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 104	05.05.2004	Bc.	Alle Partnerländer mit Ausnahme Syriens sind der EU durch Assoziierungsabkommen verbunden, die nicht nur die Handelsbeziehungen regeln, sondern auch die Bedingungen für einen regelmäßigen politischen Dialog festlegen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 106	07.05.2004	Bc.	Während des zweitägigen Treffens war es zu hetzigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen dem israelischen Außenminister Silvan Schalom und dem Chefunterhändler der Palästinenser im Nahost-Konflikt, Nabil Schaath, gekommen. Beide hätten zur allgemeinen Ermüdung die "seit langem bekannten Positionen vorgetragen", berichtete ein Teilnehmer.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr.	07.05.2004	Bc.	Außenminister Fischer sagte, obwohl beide Seiten an ihren Positionen festgehalten hätten, bleibe es doch "ein Wert an sich", wenn sich hohe Vertreter der israelischen

106			Regierung, der Palästinenser und der arabischen Staaten treffen und miteinander reden könnten. Außerhalb der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft der EU gebe es kein anderes Forum, auf dem das möglich sei.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 281	01.12.2004	Bc.	Vor dem gemeinsamen Essen am Montag Abend bei dem es traditionsgemäß zu einer offenen und lebhaften Aussprache über die Lage im Nahen Osten kommt, hatten der israelische Außenminister Silvan Shalom und der Vertreter der palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde Nabil Schaath bei einem bilateralen Treffen für ein wohlwollendes Gesprächsthema gesorgt.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 8	11.01.2005	Nikolas Busse	Der Austausch sei "elitenzentriert" geblieben, und die Regierungen seien nun einmal nur an der Stabilität ihrer Regime interessiert. Ein Mitarbeiter einer deutschen Stiftung formulierte es so: "Der Ansatz vom Trojanischen Pferd hat nicht funktioniert. Die Regime haben kein Interesse daran sich selbst abzuschaffen."
FAZ Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Nicht allen, scheint es, ist nach Feiern zumute.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Die Euro-Mediterrane Zusammenarbeit -im EU-Jargon auch als Barcelona-Prozeß bekannt- wurde 1995 auf einer Konferenz der Außenminister ins Leben gerufen. Diesmal sollte es ein Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs werden, das erste überhaupt. Doch viele der Geladenen aus den Partnerländern hatten anscheinend Wichtigeres zu tun. Die meisten schickten wieder ihre Außenminister.
FAZ Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Ein offener, harter Schlagabtausch zwischen den Vertretern Israels und der arabischen Länder gehört indessen immer noch zum Ritual der Euromed-Außenministertreffen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.2005	Horst Bacia	(…) mit mehr als hundert Einzelpunkten akzeptieren die Partnerländer der EU gemeinsame Prinzipien wie die Achtung der Menschenrechte, die Stärkung der Demokratie, die bessere Beteiligung der Bürger wie der Zivilgesellschaft an politischen Entscheidungen, die Gleichbehandlung von Männern und Frauen sowie die Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit. Im Gegenzug sagt die EU den Staaten, die zu umfassenden Reformen bereit sind, mehr praktische Hilfe und finanzielle Unterstützung zu.
FAZ Nr. 136	13.06.2008	Pariser Zeitung "Le Monde"	Es gibt die Befürchtung, dass die Union für das Mittelmeer über dieselben Probleme strauchelt wie der 'Barcelona Prozess', der nach den israelisch-palästinensischen Abkommen von 1993 neuen Schwung bekommen sollte, aber im Laufe der Jahre gescheitert ist. Die Demontage von Sarkozys ursprünglichem Projekt der Mittelmeerunion, die nur die Anrainerstaaten vereinen sollte, durch Deutschland hatte Folgen für die Wahrnehmung des Projektes durch die arabischen Führer. Sie sehen ihren Rang vermindert.
Die Welt Nr. 115	19.05.2008	Christoph B. Schiltz	Das Interesse der Regierungschefs war gering, die von der EU bereitgestellten Milliarden wurden nicht vollständig abgerufen, und die regionalen Konflikte verhinderten eine echte Zusammenarbeit.

Die Welt Nr. 115	19.05.2008	Christoph B. Schiltz	Das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen der EU und den Mittelmeerländern ist laut Kommission in den vergangenen Jahren noch gewachsen.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	03.11.2005	Rudolph Chimelli	Empfindlich reagierten die nordafrikanischen Teilnehmer auch auf den Verdacht, schon bei der Gründungskonferenz in Barcelona vor zehn Jahren hätten die Ängste der Europäer vor Islamismus und Einwanderung nach Europa Paten gestanden. Damals seien auf beiden Seiten alle von Hoffnung getragen worden, protestierten auch Kommissionsvertreter.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	28.11.2005	wtr	Der Gipfel ruft und fast keiner der Eingeladenen erscheint.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	28.11.2005	wtr	Das größte Hindernis für nennenswerte Fortschritte ist der Mangel an Vertrauen.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	24.10.2007	chi.	Nie gab es mehr Konflikte in der Region.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	23.01.2008	Christiane Schlötzer	Nachbarn kommen sich nahe, darin liegen Reiz wie Gefahr.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	13.03.2008	Martin Winter	Europäische Diplomaten hoffen, dass die Mittelmeerpolitik nun einen "neuen Schub" bekommt. Allerdings weisen sie auch darauf hin, dass deren bisherige Probleme weniger mit den Strukturen des Barcelona-Prozesses zu tun hätten als damit, dass die südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeeranrainer untereinander zerstritten und an einer engeren Bindung an Europa nicht immer interessiert seien.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	29.04.2008	Rudolph Chimelli	Die Skepsis, die Union werde nichts weiter als eine Neuauflage des Barcelona-Prozesses, ist jedoch nicht überwunden.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	14.11.2000	Rainer Koch	Nicht nur der ungelöste Nahostkonflikt wirft die Annäherungsbemühungen zwischen beiden Seiten immer wieder zurück. Die Förderung des Mittelmeerraumes ist Gegenstand ständiger Eifersüchteleien zwischen der Nord- und Südschiene in der Europäischen Union selbst.
taz	15.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	Das zeigt, dass der Barcelona-Prozess nicht nur an seinem einstigen Namen krankte, sondern vor allem an den unvereinbaren Interessen seiner Mitglieder. Da ihr so ungleiche Partner wie die palästinensische Autonomiebehörde, Israel, Algerien und Albanien angehören, kommen gemeinsame Projekte nicht in Gang. Die Fördermittel wurden bislang nur zu zwei Dritteln abgerufen.
taz.de	13.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	Einmal ist das Interesse im Inneren der EU durchwachsen. (…) Gleichzeitig ist klar, dass es die neue Organisation auf der südlichen Mittelmeerseite mit zahlreichen Partnern zu tun hat, die weder demokratisch gewählt wurden, noch viel mit Demokratie anfangen können.

(D) Expression – Mediterranean Region

FAZ Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Das Mittelmeer ist und bleibt wohl auf absehbare Zeit eine scharfe Wohlstandsgrenze.
FAZ Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Die gewaltige wirtschaftliche Kluft wird durch kulturelle, religiöse und politische Differenzen verstärkt.
FAZ Nr. 88	16.04.1999	Sven Behrendt/ Christian-Peter Hanelt	Noch ist das Mittelmeer mehr eine Grenze als eine Brücke.
FAZ Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	In vielerlei Hinsicht droht die Mittelmeerregion zu einer gefährlichen Schnittstelle der Gefahren der modernen Welt zu werden: Armut, verbesserungswürdige Regierungsführung, Terrorismus, Menschenhandel und politischer Extremismus. Gleichzeitig bildet die Region unser gemeinsames Erbe und eine einmalige Plattform für Kooperation.
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Die Abschlußerklärung der britischen Präsidentschaft bekräftigt das Ziel, die Mittelmeerregion zu einem "gemeinsamen Raum des Friedens, der Stabilität und des Wohlstands" zu gestalten.
Welt Online	05.08.2008	Wolf Lepenies	Nicolas Sarkozys Mittelmeer-Union hat gezeigt, wie wichtig der Raum ist, der rund um das Mittelmeer entsteht.
Welt Online	05.08.2008	Wolf Lepenies	(noch Braudel) Die Spannungen zwischen Europa und dem Mittelmeer bleiben: "Das Mittelmeer, das den Süden Europas schon immer stark beeinflusst hat, hat nicht wenig dazu beigetragen, eine europäische Einheit zu verhindern. Es zieht Europa in seinen Bann, sprengt seinen Zusammenhalt zugunsten eigener Interessen."
Süddeutsche Zeitung	03.11.2005	Rudolph Chimelli	[Mittelmeer zu einer Problemregion (für Europa) geworden war]
Süddeutsche Zeitung	23.01.2008	Christiane Schlötzer	Das "Meer der Nachbarschaft" nennt Predrag Matvejevic das Mittelmeer, Atlantik und Pazifik sind für den Autor hingegen Meere der Distanz.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	23.01.2008	Christiane Schlötzer	"Wenn wir von menschlicher Vervollkommnung träumen", schrieb der französische Historiker George Duby, "dann wendet sich unser Blick dem Mittelmeer zu."
Süddeutsche Zeitung	24.01.2008	Interview: Stefan Kornelius	[Kouchner] Das Mittelmeer ist seit dem 11. September 2001 die wichtigste Bruchlinie zwischen zwei Welten. Deshalb brauchen wir Brücken zwischen der Europäischen Union und Nordafrika sowie der Afrikanischen Union.
FTD	01.03.2000	Rainer Koch	Diesen Raum betrachten nicht nur die USA, sondern auch die drei EU-Großmächte, Frankreich, Deutschland und Großbritannien überwiegend durch das Brennglas der Sicherheitspolitik.
FTD	12.05.2003	Edward Alden, Roula Khalaf	Kaum eine Region der Welt ist schlechter auf die ehrgeizigen Wirtschaftsreformen vorbereitet, die eine Freihandelszone begleiten müsste.
taz	06.08.2007	Zafer Senocak	Schaut man auf den Globus, dann ist das Mittelmeer nur ein kleines Binnenmeer. Aber seine Ufer sind

			dicht besiedelt, und ein Wohlstands-, ja Zivilisationsgefälle schafft mittendurch eine harte Grenze, die man gerne unpassierbar machen würde für die verwahrlosten Massen aus Afrika. Doch die Ordnung des Nordens wird zunehmend herausgefordert. Im Süden herrscht Chaos - dort organisiert sich bestenfalls eine feindliche, kriegslüsterne, gewaltbereite Ordnung im Namen des Islam.

(D) EXPRESSION – Mediterranean Policy

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Das Mare nostrum mag für die Wirtschaft Europas langfristig zu einem Binnensee werden. Brüsseler Milliarden braucht es dafür aber weniger als Brüsseler Freiheiten.
FAZ Nr. 175	31.07.1995	wwe.	Die Staaten des Mittelmeerraums rücken enger zusammen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 175	31.07.1995	wwe.	Das Mittelmeer-Forum sieht sich als regionales Kooperationsgremium, will aber auch als neue Lobbygruppe für den mediterranen Raum auftreten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 175	31.07.1995	wwe.	Das Forum sieht den Mittelmeerraum nach der Ostöffnung und Norderweiterung an den Rand des neuen Europas gedrängt.
FAZ Nr. 175	31.07.1995	wwe.	Jetzt verlange das Beziehungs-Flickwerk im Süden nach Revision.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	Auch bei der Konferenz ranghoher Regierungsmitglieder der Europäischen Union sowie zwölf südlicher und östlicher Mittelmeeranrainer Anfang kommender Woche in Barcelona dürfte viel gesagt und wenig entschieden werden.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	Die Konferenz in Barcelona wird Zeichen zur Stabilisierung eines Unruheherds vor der Haustür Europas setzen - im ureigenen Interesse der Gemeinschaft.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	now./wha.	Die Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union (EU) und ihren Nachbarn im südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeerraum treten an diesem Montag in eine neue Phase.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Eine Freihandelszone rund um das Mittelmeer wird die zentrale Vision der an diesem Monat in Barcelona beginnenden Gipfelkonferenz.
FAZ Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Kühne Projekte und Phantasien
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Kritische Beobachter unken schon im Voraus etwas von Fata-Morgana-Gipfel; mit dem großen EU-Geldtropf am Horizont würden Luftschlösser gebaut, eigene Finanzmittel wolle dagegen kaum ein Unternehmer in der Krisenregion investieren.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Konkrete Erfolge jenseits einer unverbindlichen Deklaration und bequemer Scheckbuchdiplomatie seien wohl kaum zu erreichen.
Frankfurter All-	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Die Optimisten dagegen sehen in Barcelona den

gemeine Zeitung Nr. 276			Startschuss zu einem Aufbruch in der Region. Erstmals kämen alle Staaten an einen Tisch und demonstrierten damit ein regionales Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	"Berliner Zeitung"	"Der Konflikt des EU-Nordens mit den besorgten Mittelmeer-Staaten der Union hat mittlerweile zur Zerreißprobe in der Wohlstandsgemeinschaft geführt. Das Ergebnis ist ein fadenscheiniger Kompromiss, wonach Osteuropa rund zwei Drittel der Brüsseler Hilfen zustehen, den Mittelmeeranrainern der Rest.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	now.	(…)daß in Barcelona nur ein erster Schritt auf dem Wege zu einer umfassenden Partnerschaft getan worden sei, dem weiter folgen müßten.
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.1995	now.	Die Konferenz markierte den Beginn eines Prozesses.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	wha.	Um die Mittelmeerkonferenz zu würdigen, braucht man nicht, wie es der Vizepräsident der Europäischen Union, Marín, in seiner Einführungsrede tat, zurückzugreifen auf den 27. November 1095. Damals rief Papst Urban II. zum ersten Kreuzzug auf. Zum ersten Mal setzten sich jetzt nach einem von Intoleranz geprägten Jahrtausend Europäer, Araber und Juden, die Regierungen der Staaten rund um das MIttelmeer und aus der nördlichen Europäischen Union zu Verhandlungen zusammen.
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.1995	wha.	Von der Zusammenarbeit, die es im Norden gibt, ist der Süden noch meilenweit entfernt.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 86	14.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Auch die übliche Schönfärberei wird nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen können, dass die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft erst am Anfang steht.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die Verquickung der Nahost-Kriese mit der Konferenz hat schon in Malta dafür gesorgt, dass das ehrgeizige Projekt einer Stabilitätscharta für den Mittelmeerraum bis auf weiteres auf Eis gelegt wurde.
FAZ Nr. 218	19.09.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die Aufbruchsstimmung, (…), ist längst verflogen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 218	19.09.1997	Michael Stabenow	Der frühere Parlamentarische Staatssekretär im Bonner Entwicklungsministerium Köhler (CDU) warnte davor, den Prozeß der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Öffnung gewollt oder ungewollt als Bevormundung erscheinen zu lassen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 218	19.09.1997	Michael Stabenow	Auch der frühere französische Abgeordnete Dimeglio, Maghreb-Experte der bürgerlichen Sammlungsbewegung UDF meinte, die Erklärung von Barcelona sei ein "wertloses Stück Papier", wenn die Demokratie-und Menschenrechtsklauseln nicht ernst genommen würde.
FAZ Nr. 87	15.04.1999	Michael Stabenow	Stück für Stück nimmt dennoch das Mosaik der euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft Gestalt an.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1999	Hans Christian Rößler	(…), in Stuttgart sei der "eindeutige Nachweis erbracht worden, daß die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft "auch unter manchmal heiklen und schwierigen Umständen tragfähig ist".

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1999	now.	Die 1995 begründete Partnerschaft zwischen den 15 Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union (EU) und zwölf südlichen Anrainern des Mittelmeers soll in eine neue Phase treten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1999	now.	In der deutschen Delegation hieß es, die Debatte sei engagiert und sehr offen geführt worden. Dies zeigt, daß der Barcelona-Prozess zu einer "wirklichen Partnerschaft" geworden sei.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	Der sogenannte Barcelona-Prozess, maßgeblich von der damaligen spanischen EU-Präsidentschaft gefordert und gefördert, (…)
FAZ Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	Die in Barcelona anvisierte engere politische Zusammenarbeit ist kaum vorangekommen:
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Fischer sagte, erst nach einer Lösung des Nahost-Konflikts werde der Barcelona-Prozess mit all seinen an die KSZE in Europa erinnernden Elementen seine volle Wirkung entfalten können.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Die größte Schwäche des bisherigen Hilfsprogramms (Meda I) ist, daß im Zeitraum 1995 bis 1999 nur 26 Prozent der von der EU zugesagten Mittel abgerufen wurden.
FAZ Nr. 257	05.11.2001	Hans Christian Rößler	Der Barcelona-Prozeß ist das einzige Forum, an dem Israelis und Araber weiterhin an einem Tisch sitzen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 257	05.11.2001	Hans Christian Rößler	Die vor einem guten Jahr auf der Außenministerkonferenz in Marseille schon fast für gescheitert erklärte Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft ist nocht nicht am Ende. Seit dem 11. September ist ihr Ziel, eien Raum für Stabilität und des Friedens auf beiden Seiten des Mittelmeers zu schaffen, nicht mehr nur eine Vision für unerschütterliche Optimisten, sondern eine dringende Notwendigkeit.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 93	22.04.2002	Hans Christian Rößler	Auch im siebten Jahr seines Bestehens leidet der Barcelona-Prozeß an zwei Grundproblemen: Im Nahost-Konflikt überfordern sich die Mittelmeerpartner mit Fragen, die sie nicht lösen können. Geht es um die eigentliche Gestaltung der Partnerschaft, die die Ost-Erweiterung der EU zumindest ansatzweise ergänzen soll, laufen sie Gefahr, sich mit ihren zahllosen Vorhaben zu verzetteln, wie auch ein Blick auf die Tagesordnung des Treffens in Spanien verdeutlicht.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 93	22.04.2002	Hans Christian Rößler	Überflüssig ist die das Mittelmeer übergreifende Zusammenarbeit jedoch nicht geworden -im Gegenteil das ilustrieren neue Zahlen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 93	22.04.2002	Hans Christian Rößler	Mittlerweile ist der Barcelona-Prozeß praktisch das einzige Forum, wo, wie jetzt wieder in Valencia, Israelis und Araber noch an einem Tisch sitzen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 95	24.04.2002	Walter Haubrich	Der sogenannte "Barcelona-Prozeß" der Annäherung zwischen den Ländern auf beiden Seiten des Mittelmeers hatte auf spanischer Initiative 1995 mit der Mittelmeerkonferenz in Barcelona begonnen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	24.04.2002	Walter Haubrich	Nachdem die Treffen zwischen Barcelona 1995 und Valencia 2002 nicht gerade glanzvolle Ergebnisse

Nr. 95			gezeitigt hatten, wird auch diese Konferenz nur wenige konkrete Resultate erreichen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 104	05.05.2004	Bc.	Die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft ist das einzige Forum, in dem regelmäßig Regierungsvertreter Israels und der arabischen Staaten zusammenkommen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 104	05.05.2004	Bc.	Der Meinungsaustausch ist jedoch siet Jahre vom Nahost-Konflikt überschattet und hat zu seiner Lösung nichts beitragen können.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 281	01.12.2004	Bc.	(EMP) Noch in diesem Jahr will die Kommission individuelle Aktionspläne für die Nachbarn veröffentlichen; dazu gehören auch die Länder der euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 8	11.01.2005	Nikolas Busse	Fast über Nacht wurde deshalb ein bis dahin wenig beachtetes Kooperationsprogramm der Europäischen Union (EU) die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft zum Musterbeispiel europäischer Terroristenbekämpfung.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 8	11.01.2005	Nikolas Busse	Leider wird immer deutlicher, dass dieser "europäische Ansatz" keine Früchte trägt. Im zehnten Jahr seines Bestehens sagen Diplomaten offen, dass der Barcelona-Prozeß politisch ohne Erfolg geblieben ist.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 8	11.01.2005	Nikolas Busse	Eine nüchternde Bilanz wird zu dem Schluss gelangen, daß messbare Fortschritte nur auf dem Gebiet der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit erreicht worden sind:
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Schon an der immer kürzer werdenden Gästeliste [Regierungschefs] ließ sich ablesen, daß die Euro-med-Partnerschaft noch ein gutes Stück von dem erklärten Ziel entfernt ist, rund um das Mittelmeer einen gemeinsamen "Raum des Friedens, der Stabilität und des Wohlstands" zu schaffen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Die Mittelmeerpolitik wird jetzt durch die neue Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik, der die Euromed-Partner ebenfalls zugerechnet werden, ergänzt und überwölbt.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Der Barcelona-Prozeß war ein integraler Bestandteil unserer Antwort auf das Ende des Kalten Krieges und die Herausforderungen der Globalisierung.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft ist nicht der einzige Rahmen multilateraler Kooperation in dieser Region. Dennoch ist es der am weitesten entwickelte und in vielerlei Hinsicht bevorzugte.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Es ist wahr, daß der Barcelona-Prozeß aus den Hoffnungen der Osloer Friedensgespräche geboren wurde. In diesem Zusammenhang wirft die Abwesenheit von Frieden zwischen Insraelis und Palästinensern einen Schatten auf unsere Arbeit. Und dennoch, Barcelona verfolgt das Ziel, den Friedensprozeß zu unterstützen, nicht, ihn zu ersetzen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Für mich ist der Barcelona-Prozeß in erster Linie ein Projekt der Hoffnung und ein Mittel, die Hoffnungslosigkeit endgültig zu verbannen. Es liegt in unserem gemeinsamen Interesse und in unserer Verpflich-

			tung, das gesamte Potential des Barcelona-Prozesses zu entfalten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 283	05.12.2006	Bc.	Für die weitere Stärkung der Beziehungen soll der Grundsatz gelten: "Je mehr Fortschritte ein Partnerland bei der Verwirklichung von Reformen erreicht, desto enger kann die Beziehung werden, und desto mehr Unterstützung sollte die EU leisten.
FAZ.NET	08.02.2007		Das Bündniss solle keine Alternative zur EU werden, sondern es sollten gemeinsame Institutionen aufgebaut werden.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 249	26.10.2007	Die französische Tageszeitung "Le Monde"	"Um die möglichen Teilnehmer einer solchen Union zu überzeugen, hat Nicolas Sarkozy das übertrieben, was auf dem Spiel steht. Ihm zufolge ist die Kooperation im Mittelmeer ein Gegengift gegen die Zivilisations- und Religionskriege, die entscheidende Waffe gegen den Terrorismus und den Fundamentalismus... (....)"
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 286	08.12.2007	Michaela Wiegel	(…)hatte sich die im Februar in Toulon erstmals vorgestellte Initiative einer mediterranen Schicksalsgemeinschft als Wählermagnet erwiesen, (…)
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 286	08.12.2007	Michaela Wiegel	Ein Kooperationsbündniss der europäischen Mittelmeeranrainer mit den nordafrikanischen Mittelmeeranrainern, insgeamt 25 Staaten (…)
FAZ Nr. 298	22.12.2007	mic.	Sarkozy: "dies ist ein großer Traum, und ich bin sicher, dass wir ihn verwirklichen können".
FAZ Nr. 298	22.12.2007	mic.	In Paris werden die Ergebnisse des Barcelona-Prozesses als enttäuschend bewertet.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 54	04.03.2008	Wulf Schmiese	Nun geht es darum, wie sehr sich eine Mittelmeerunion überhaupt noch vom Barcelona-Prozess unterscheiden könnte.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 62	13.03.2008	Wulf Schmiese	"Der Barcelona-Prozeß erhält die Bezeichnung, Union für das Mittelmeer", heißt es in dem Vorschlag. Damit hat Frau Merkel erreicht, dass die Mittelmeerunion kein Unterverbund von jenen neuen EU-Ländern und zwölf Nicht-EU-Staaten ist, die am Mittelmeer liegen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 62	13.03.2008	Wulf Schmiese	"Die Union für das Mittelmeer soll eine neue Etappe der Zusammenarbeit und damit dem 1995 in Barcelona vereinbarten Prozess einen neuen Schwung verleihen", (…)
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 64	15.03.2008	Nikolas Busse	Die Programme, die Handel und kulturellen Austausch fördern sollen, kamen aber nicht recht voran. Finanzmittel wurden nicht abgerufen, seit Jahren befasste sich kein Gipfel mehr mit der Sache.
FAZ Nr. 64	15.03.2008	Nikolas Busse	Der deutsch-französische Kompromiss bestand nun im Wesentlichen darin, den Barcelona-Prozess in Mittelmeerunion umzubenennen, woraus in Brüssel "Barcelona-Prozess: Union für das Mittelmeer wurde".
FAZ Nr. 64	15.03.2008	Nikolas Busse	Auf dem EU-Gipfel in Paris am 13. Juli soll die Mittelmeerunion formal beschlossen werden.
FAZ Nr. 102	02.05.2008	(dpa)	Zum Abschluss eines Staatsbesuches in Tunis bezeichnete er am Mittwoch die für den 13. Juli ge-

			plante Gründung der Mittelmeerunion als "seltenes historisches Ereignis". Die Union werde "die Welt verändern" und eine Konfrontation der Kulturen verhindern.
FAZ Nr. 102	02.05.2008	(dpa)	Sarkozy sage in Tunis, der 1995 vereinbarte Barcelona-Prozess habe nicht funktioniert, weil er "auf der Ungleicheit von Nord und Süd" gründete. Deshalb habe Frankreich eine Union "auf der Basis gleicher Rechte und Macht" vorgeschlagen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 116	20.05.2008	Nm.	Die zuvor im Barcelona-Prozess institutionalisierte Mittelmeerpolitik der EU ist nicht gerade eine Erfolgsgeschichte.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 116	20.05.2008	Nm.	Die "Union für das Mittelmeer" wäre ein tot geborenes EU-Kind, Paris würde wieder auf die bilaterale Karte setzen.
Die Welt Nr. 54	04.03.2008	Mariam Lau	Migration, Terrorbekämpfung, Energieversorgung, Verkehr oder Klimapolitik - das waren einzelne mehr oder weniger erfolgreiche Projekte, denen aber die große politische Klammer fehlte.
Die Welt Nr. 54	04.03.2008	Mariam Lau	Niemand schläft schlecht wenn er nichts vom Barcelona-Prozess weiß.
Die Welt Nr. 115	19.05.2008	Christoph B. Schiltz	Der "Barcelona-Prozess" wurde 1995 gegründet und hatte keinen Erfolg.
Die Welt Nr. 133	09.06.2008	Jochen Hehn	(…)die "Union für das Mittelmeer" -so der neue Name- die Aufgabe haben soll, den erschlafften Barcelona-Pozess wiederzubeleben.
Welt Online	05.08.2008	Wolf Lepenies	[Sarkozy] "Davon haben wir geträumt. Die Union für das Mittelmeer ist Wrklichkeit geworden."
Süddeutsche Zeitung	03.11.2005	Rudolph Chimelli	Im November 1995 setzten die Europäer folglich den Barcelona-Prozess in Gang,(…)
Süddeutsche Zeitung	03.11.2005	Rudolph Chimelli	Auf allen drei Partnerschaftsgebieten bestünden "Unvollkommenheiten".
Süddeutsche Zeitung	26.11.2005	Martin Winter	(…)von der niemand wusste, ob je etwas daraus werden würde.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	26.11.2005	Martin Winter	Heute ist der "Barcelona-Prozess", wie er in dem unausrottbaren Hang der EU zu sperrigen Begriffen heißt, durchaus eine Erfolgsgeschichte.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	28.11.2005	wtr	Diese Politik der leeren Stühle zeigt, wie es wirklich steht um das ehrgeizige Projekt der EU, am Mittelmeer eine Zone des Friedens und der Partnerschaft zu bauen.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	24.10.2007	chi.	Der 1995 beschlossene Barcelona-Prozess steckt fest.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	07.12.2007	Rudolph Chimelli	Eine Zugehörigkeit aller zu einer Union ist ein Traum, dessen Zukunft noch nicht einmal begonnen hat.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	23.01.2008	Christiane Schlötzer	Die bisherige Nachbarschaftspolitik der EU für die Südseite des Mittelmeers funktioniert nicht. Eine schon 1995 in Barcelona ausgerufene Partnerschaft schlitterte rasch gegen nahöstliche Friedensblockaden, dann vertiefte der 11. September 2001 die Kluft zwischen Nord und Süd. Die bescheidene Barcelona-Prozess genannte Initiative hat nie Schlagzeilen

			gemacht.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	24.01.2008	Interview: Stefan Kornelius	[Kouchner] Diese Union ist ja keine neue Idee. Der Barcelona-Prozess befasst sich bereits damit.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	01.02.2008	csc.	Barcelona-Prozess nannte die EU schon 1995 ein Förderprogramm für das südliche Mittelmeer.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	01.02.2008	Javier Caceres	[Merkel] Sie gestand allerdings ein, dass der 1995 angestoßene "Barcelona-Prozess" zu bürokratisch sei, der bislang den institutionellen Rahmen für die Mittelmeer-Politik der EU absteckt. In Palma erklärte sie, "der Barcelona-Prozess könnte etwas lebendiger sein, intensiviert werden". Dies sei von großer Bedeutung für die gesamte EU, so Merkel.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	02.02.2008	Frankreichs Europaminister Jean-Pierre Jouyet	[Jouyet]: Union für das Mittelmeer ist tatsächlich etwas anderes als eine Mittelmeerunion - aber trotzdem sehr wichtig.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	04.03.2008	Stefan Braun	So könnte Sarkozys Mittelmeerunion neue Impulse und eine neue Überschrift liefern, aber als Teil der EU-Politik unter dem Dach des Barcelona-Prozesses bleiben.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	05.03.2008	Gerd Kröncke	Nun zeichnet sich eine Fortsetzung des "Barcelona-Prozesses" ab,(…)
Süddeutsche Zeitung	06.03.2008	Stefan Kornelius	Das neue Projekt wird also Mittelmeerunion heißen, aber dabei handelt es sich um nichts anderes als eine Umbenennung des bereits bestehenden Barcelona-Prozesses.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	06.03.2008	Stefan Kornelius	Hinter diesem sperrigen Begriff verbirgt sich ein Bündel von Maßnahmen der EU im Umgang mit ihren südlichen Nachbarn - über Migrationsfragen und Anti-Terror-Politik bis hin zu Strukturhilfen.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	13.03.2008	Martin Winter	Er sieht im Kern vor, dass die seit 1996 als "Barcelona-Prozess" firmierende und sich dahin schleppende europäische Mittelmeerpolitik unter neuem Namen belebt werden soll.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	21.05.2008	chi.	Statt einer neuen Staaten-Gruppierung akzeptierte die Gemeinschaft nur ein anderes Etikett für eine alte Sache, nunmehr "Barcelona-Prozess: Union für das Mittelmeer" genannt. Die bestehenden Kooperations-Programme zwischen Nord und Süd wurden damit aufgewertet, nicht mehr.
sueddeutsche.de	14.03.2008	dpa??	[BP] Er soll nun zu einer "Union für das Mittelmeer" weiterentwickelt werden.
FTD	01.03.2000	Rainer Koch	So begann unter spanischer Ägide 1995 das, was heute als "Barcelona-Prozess" durch das an Wort-Ungetümen ohnehin reiche Vokabular des EU Ministerrats geistert.
FTD	01.03.2000	Rainer Koch	Wie so häufig folgt den großartigen Absichtserklärungen die Ernüchterung.
FTD	11.09.2000	Sven Behrendtund Christian-Peter Hanelt	Seit der Barcelona-Konferenz im November 1995 steht sie mit zwölf Ländern (…) im Dialog.
FTD	14.11.2000	Rainer Koch	Die Bilanz des fünjährigen "Barcelona-Prozesses" - (…) - fällt ernüchternd aus.

FTD	16.11.2000	Roula Khalaf	Seit dem Beginn 1995 ist der sogenannte Barcelona-Prozess ohnehin wenig erfolgreich.
FTD	05.11.2001	Birgit Jennen	Zum Problem wurde hier vor allem die schleppende Auszahlung der zugesagten Gelder. Aus Diplomatenkreisen heißt es, die EU sei bis zu acht Jahre im Verzug.
FTD	28.02.2002	Rainer Koch	(…)diese Kooperationspolitik mit den Anrainerstaaten des Mittelmeeres begonnen,(…)
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	12.05.2003	Edward Alden, Roula Khalaf	Der US-Plan ähnelt der euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft (Euromed) von 1995, die bis 2010 zwischen der EU und zwölf Mittelmeer-Anrainern eine Freihandelszone schaffen soll. Durch das Scheitern des Nahost-Friedensprozesses ist dieser Plan allerdings ins Stocken geraten. Zudem hat Euromed sich zu sehr auf den Handel mit der EU konzentriert und den Austausch zwischen den südlichen Mittelmeer-Anrainern kaum in Schwung gebracht.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	25.11.2005	Christian Hanelt	Seit zehn Jahren arbeiten die 35 Partnerländer daran, das Mittelmeer in einen Wirtschafts- und Kulturraum zu verwandeln.
FTD	05.03.2008	Birgit Marschall	Es gehe um die Weiterentwicklung des Barcelona-Prozesses, der 1995 von der EU gestartet worden war und in der jüngeren Vergangenheit ins Stocken geraten ist, sagt Merkel.
FTD	12.03.2008	Sarkozy argumentierte dagegen, der Barcelona-Prozess habe seine Dynamik verloren.	
taz	06.08.2007	Zafer Senocak	Schön die Formulierungen, mäßig jedoch der Erfolg bislang.
taz	05.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	Mit dem Scheitern des Friedensprozesses in Nahost geriet der Barcelona-Prozess jedoch in eine Kriese - (…)
taz	15.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	Zumindest der Name ist ein Fortschritt. Eine "Mittelmeer-Union" ist anschaulicher als ein "Barcelona-Prozess"
taz	20.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	[Barcelona Prozess] Seither dümpelt er vor sich hin.
taz	20.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	Zum zehnjährigen Geburtstag des Barcelona-Prozesses blieben die europäischen Gastgeber nämlich fast unter sich.
taz.de	13.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	Wenn die Mittelmeerunion mehr bieten soll als einen ehemaligen großen, internationalen und selbstredend medienwirksamen Auftrieb, dann beginnt die eigentliche Arbeit der Mittelmeerunion erst jetzt.

GERMANY – PURPOSE

(D) Purpose – purpose

FAZ Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	Die politische Partnerschaft soll nach Brüsseler Vorstellungen Fragen der "Sicherheit" einschließen.
FAZ Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	(…)sollen die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen -dies ist der Kern des Vorschlags- ausgebaut werden.
FAZ Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	Austausch und Dialog könnten die Verständigung mit der islamischen Welt erleichtern
FAZ Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	Eine Kooperation auf Feldern, die alle Mittelmeeranrainer interessieren (…), soll die Partnerschaft abstützen.
FAZ Nr. 250	27.10.1995	wwe.	Damit könne einer der größten Wirtschaftsräume der Welt mit 30 Staaten und 800 Millionen Konsumenten geschaffen werden.
FAZ Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	(Deklaration) Sie soll auch dabei helfen, den Weg zur politischen und wirtschaftlichen Verständigung der Nachbarn von Marokko über Ägypten, Israel und Syrien bis hin zur Türkei zu ebnen.
FAZ Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	Die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft soll ein neues Modell der Assoziierung von Drittstaaten mit der Gemeinschaft sein.
FAZ Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	Wer angesichts des erwarteten Medienspektakels nach dem Sinn des Treffens fragt, sollte sich eines Satzes des französischen Bevölkerungswissenschaftlers Alfred Sauvy entsinnen: "Wenn der Reichtum nicht zu den Menschen kommt, werden die Menschen zum Reichtum gehen."
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	now./wha.	Ziel der zweitägigen Konferenz ist es, die Herausbildung einer Zone politischer und wirtschaftlicher Stabilität rings um das Mittelmeer zu erleichtern.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	now./wha.	Nicht zuletzt wegen des Wohlstandsgefälles und der rasanten Bevölkerungsentwicklung in enigen Ländern der Region ist den EU-Staaten an engeren politischen Beziehungen gelegen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	now.	Freihandelszone(…) politischer Dialog und ein intensiverer kutureller Austausch. Dies soll zur Überwindung der im Lauf der Geschichte entstandenen Gegensätze zwischen Europa und vielen seiner Nachbarn, aber nicht zuletzt auch zwischen den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern beitragen.
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.1995	now.	Ziel aller Teilnehmer sei es, "der Sache des Friedens im Mittelmeerraum einen großen Impuls zu geben".
FAZ Nr. 87	15.04.1999	Michael Stabenow	Rund um das Mittelmeer soll ein gemeinsamer Raum des Friedens, des Wohlstands und der Achtung der Menschenrecht entstehen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 88	16.04.1999	Sven Behrendt und Christian-Peter Hanelt	[EU] Ihr strategischer Ansatz basiert auf der Errichtung stabiler politischer Strukturen, die Frieden und Sicherheit garantieren (das ist Korb I der verabredeten Kooperation), dem Aufbau einer Freihandelszone und der Finanzierung dringend notwendiger wirtschaftlicher Transformationsprozesse (Korb II) sowie der Intensivierung des Dialoges über Demokratie und Menschenrechte, aber auch über Ausgrenzung und Rassismus (Korb III).

FAZ Nr. 88	16.04.1999	Sven Behrendt und Christian-Peter Hanelt	(Freihandelszone) In einem weiteren Schritt wären sogar die sechs ölreichen arabischen Golfstaaten in den transmediterranen Wirtschaftsraum einzubinden.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 88	16.04.1999	Sven Behrendt und Christian-Peter Hanelt	Der auf ein Partnerland beschränkte nationale Ansatz verfolgt den kontinuierlichen Umbau von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft; der regional Anatz stärkt die intraregionalen und transmediterranen arbeitsteiligen Produktions- und Handelsbeziehungen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 88	16.04.1999	Sven Behrendt und Christian-Peter Hanelt	Doch was im November 1995 in Barcelona begonnen worden ist, soll in einem euro.mediterranen Wirtschaftsraum Gestalt annehmen, der zu größerer politischer Stabilität und zu einem Zugewinn an Wohlstand insbesondere in den südlichen Anrainderstaaten führt.
FAZ Nr. 89	17.04.1999	now.	Wer dauerhaft Sicherheit und Wohlstand garantieren wolle, benötige eine enge Partnerschaft auch mit den Nachbarn südlich des Mittelmeers.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	(BP) (…),sollte dabei helfen, am südlichen Ufer des Mittelmeers ein Krisenpotenzial zu entschärfen, dessen mögliche negative Auswirkungen auf dem anderen Ufer des antiken "mare nostrum" unmittelbar zu spüren sind.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Alle Länder, mit denen eine Assoziierungsvereinbarung besteht, sollen nach dem Wunsch der EU innerhalb von fünf Jahren untereinander Freihnadelsabkommen abschließen, um die Süd- Süd- Beziehungen zu intensivieren. Fernziel der EU ist die Schaffung einer euro-mediterranen Freihandelszone bis zum Jahr 2010.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 93	22.04.2002	Hans Christian Rößler	Es klingt wie ein Wunschtraum. Eine Zone des Friedens und der Stabilität soll das Mittelmeerprogramm der Europäischen Union (EU) schaffen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 8	11.01.2005	Nikolas Busse	Das Programm, besser bekannt als Barcelona-Prozeß, zielt darauf, Nachbarstaaten im Süden der EU durch Handel und Dialog einer demokratischen Entwicklung näher zu bringen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 85	13.04.2005	Bc.	Nach einem Jahrzehnt de Zusammenarbeit mit den südlichen und östliche Anrainern des Mittelmeers, bei der sich manche Erwartungen nicht erfüllt haben, will die Europäische Union der euro.mediterranen Partnerschaft "neue Impulse" geben.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 85	13.04.2005	Bc.	(…), bei der Unterstützung politischer Reformen zur Stärkung der Demokratie, der Förderung der Bildung, sowie der Liberalisierung des Handels und der Dienstleistungen neue Schwerpunkte zu setzen.
FAZ Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Bildung ist die Wunderwaffe.
FAZ Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Ob wir gemeinsam den wachsenden Herausforderungen der Migration begegnen können, wird ein weiterer Test für unsere Partnerschaft werden. Legale Migration ist ein ökonomischer und demographischer Imperativ für Europa.
FAZ.NET	08.02.2007		Der französische Innenminister und Präsidentschaftskandidat Nicolas Sarkozy will eine Mittelmeer-Union nach Vorbild der EU gründen.
Die Welt	12.03.2008	Ansgar Graw	Gemeinsam mit Merkel kündigte er anschließend an, man

Nr. 61			wolle den Barcelona-Prozess neu organisieren in Form eines Projekts aller 27 EU-Staaten.
Die Welt Nr. 115	19.05.2008	Christoph B. Schiltz	Die Europäische Union (EU) will die lahmenden Beziehungen zu den Mittelmeeranrainern im Nahen Osten und Afrika mit der Gründung einer sogenannten Union für das Mittelmeer deutlich verbessern.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	03.11.2005	Rudolph Chimelli	Dieser Prozess sollte in Vereinbarung mit den südlichen und östlichen Anrainerstaaten des Binnenmeeres eine Partnerschaft errichten, um den Zusammenhalt und die Stabilität der Region zu fördern.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	23.01.2008	Christiane Schlötzer	Sarkozy hat keineswegs vor, Maghreb-Staaten in die EU zu hieven, im Gegenteil. Seine Mittelmeergemeinschaft soll gerade dazu dienen, einen Bewerber fernzuhalten: die Türkei.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	05.03.2008	Gerd Kröncke	Die Mittelmeer-Union - mit der die nordafrikanischen und nahöstlichen Anrainer-Staaten enger an Europa gebunden werden sollen- (…)
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	11.09.2000	Sven Behrendtund Christian-Peter Hanelt	Ziel ist es, duch sicherheitspolitische und wirtschaftliche Kooperation sowie kulturelle Zusammenarbeit die Stabilität der Region zu fördern.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	26.05.2003	Judy Dempsey	(…)"Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft", das 1995 in Barcelona ins Leben gerufen wurde, um die wirtschaftliche Lage rund um das Mittelmeer zu fördern und politische Reformen auf den Weg zu bringen. Bis 2010 sollte eine Freihandelszone unter den Mittelmeerstaaten entstehen, so das Gründungsziel.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	29.11.2005	Karin Finkenzeller	Die EU und die südlichen Mittelmeeranrainer hatten 1995 den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess initiiert, um die Kooperation in der Region zu verbessern.
taz	05.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	(…) Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft (EMP), die offiziell zum Ziel hat, Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in der Region zu fördern.
taz.de	14.07.2008	Bernhard Schmid	(…) Union für das Mittelmeer (Union pour la Méditerranée, UPM) sagen: Sie ist ein Instrument, um Frankreich in der Mitte, den Sürdrand des Mittelmeers und Afrika unten sowie die unerwünschten Migranten draußen zu halten.

(D) Purpose – aim

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Die Römer nannten das Mittelmeer Mare nostrum, unser Meer. Das soll es für die Südeuropäer wieder werden, die ihren mediterranen Raum nach der Ostöffnung und Norderweiterung an den Rand des neuen Europas gedrängt sehen.
FAZ Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	(Varb |d EU?) Die Partnerschaft soll auf drei Säulen beruhen: regelmäßiger politischer Dialog, wirtschaftliche Kooperation sowie Erfahrungsaustausch.
FAZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	now.	Mit der "Erklärung von Barcelona" wollen die Teilnehmer der Konferenz sich dazu verpflichten,

			bis zum Jahr 2010 eine gemeinsame Freihandelszone zu errichten und die politischen sowie kulturellen Bande zu stärken. Ehrgeiziges Ziel ist es, den Mittelmeerraum in eine Zone politischer und wirtschaftlicher Stabilität zu verwandeln.
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.1995	wha.	Barcelona soll nur der Beginn eines Prozesses der engeren Zusammenarbeit zwischen den südlichen und nördlichen Anrainern des Mittelmeers sein.
FAZ Nr. 86	14.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Dennoch wollen die EU-Partner in Malta der handelspolitischen Zusammenarbeit weiter Impulse geben.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 86	14.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Ein das Mittelmeer umspannender Verbund außenpolitischer Fachinstitute befindet sich im Aufbau; in Malta soll es sogar erste Gehversuche auf dem Weg zu einer "Charta des Friedens und der Stabilität" geben. Auch Terrorismusbekämpfung, Rauschgiftproblematik und Wanderungsdruck sollen stärker zur Sprache kommen.
FAZ Nr. 88	16.04.1999	Sven Behrendt und Christian-Peter Hanelt	Zentrales Element des Prozesses ist die Errichtung einer Freihandelszone für Industrieprodukte im Mittelmeerraum, von der man sich all die positiven wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Folgen erhofft, (…)
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 88	16.04.1999	Sven Behrendt und Christian-Peter Hanelt	Das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen Nord und Süd, das sich zur Zeit noch in Disparitäten wie ein Verhältnis von zehn zu eins in den Pro-Kopf-Einkommen niederschlägt, soll dadurch abgebaut werden -nicht zuletzt in der Absicht, die Flüchtlingswelle in die Union über MArokko, Tunesien und die Türkei einzudemmen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Anlaß des Treffens war eigentlich die von der EU vorgeschlagene Überprüfung und Belebung ihrer ehrgeizigen, vor fünf Jahren in Barcelona ins Leben gerufenen Politik für den Mittelmeerraum, die im Rahmen einer umfassenden Partnerschaft langfristig die Voraussetzungen für Frieden, Stabilität und Wohlstand in der Region schaffen soll.
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Auf einem zum zehnten Jahrestag der Zusammenarbeit einberufenen Gipfeltreffen in Barcelona verständigten sich die 35 Euromed-Staaten, ihrer bisher auf Handel, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und kulturelle Beziehungen gegründeten Partnerschaft eine stärkere politische Ausrichtung zu geben.
FAZ Nr. 286	08.12.2007	Michaela Wiegel	(Sarkozy) Die Zeit sei gekommen, gemeinsam eine Mittelmeer-Union aufzubauen, die als Bindeglied zwischen Europa und Afrika diene.
FAZ Nr. 286	08.12.2007	Michaela Wiegel	Die deutsch-französische Vereinbarung ziele darauf ab, die bisherige Mittelmeepolitik der EU im Rahmen des Barcelona-Prozesses mit neuem Leben zu erfüllen.
FAZ Nr. 298	22.12.2007	mic.	Sarkozy will die Strukturen der Mittelmeer-Union nach dem Vorbild der G-8-Treffen aufbauen: es soll ein kleines Generalsekretariat mit begrenztem Personal geschaffen werden.

Die Welt Nr. 133	09.06.2008	Jochen Hehn	(also keine wichtigen/ kauf… Themen!) Am 13. Juli soll das Projekt auf einem Sondergipfel in Paris aus der Taufe gehoben werden und sich zunächst auf vier Projekte konzentrieren: die Entgiftung des Mittelmeeres, den Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung, auf Energie und Verkehr.
Welt Online	05.08.2008	Wolf Lepenies	Die von Sarkozy entworfene Mittelmeerunion sollte die euromediterrane Nachbarschaft beleben.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	24.01.2008	Interview: Stefan Kornelius	[Kouchner] Diese Brücken sollen - und das ist der Unterschied zum Barcelona-Prozess - in Form von Projekten entstehen, zum Beispiel zum Thema Energie oder Hochschule.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	01.02.2008	csc.	Diese alte Partnerschaft sollte wiederbelebt werden, sagen Merkel und Zapatero.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	02.02.2008	Frankreichs Europaminister Jean-Pierre Jouyet	[Jouyet] Wir wollen damit das Ungleichgewicht zwischen Nord und Süd beseitigen.
FTD	01.03.2000	Rainer Koch	In Barcelona verabredeten 15 EU-Länder und zwölf Mittelmeer-Anrainer, ihre wirtschaftlichen, politischen und kulturellen Beziehungen zu intensivieren. Erklärtes Ziel ist die Schaffung einer gemeinsamen Freihandelszone bis 2010.
FTD	11.09.2000	Sven Behrend-tund Christian-Peter Hanelt	Die Liste der europäischen Vorhaben für die Mittelmeer-Region ist lang.
FTD	05.11.2001	Birgit Jennen	Die EU will der Spaltung der Kulturen nach dem 11. September entgegenwirken und ihrerseits ein Signal der Solidarität mit der arabischen Welt setzen.
FTD	28.02.2002	Rainer Koch	(…)um die Region politisch und wirtschaftlich zu stabilisieren.
FTD	25.11.2005	Christian Hanelt	Die Liste der Probleme und Projekte ist lang, daher sollte der Fokus auf Bildung, Demokratie und einem flexibleren Agrarmarkt liegen:(…)
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	25.11.2005	Christian Hanelt	Neben der regionalen Komponente braucht die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft für die kommenden Jahre (…)zwei neue Impulse: Erstens müssen die arabischen Staaten die Hilfe der EU nutzen, politische Reformen voranzutreiben. Zweitens sollte die EU ihren Agrarmarkt so öffnen, dass die Mittelmeerpartner mehr landwirtschaftliche Produkte in Europa verkaufen können.
taz.de	13.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	(…), dass die Feindseligkeiten in der Mittelmeerregion gebannt werden.
taz.de	13.07.2008	Dorothea Hahn	Auch die Intensivierung von Wirtschaftszusammenarbeit und das gemeinsame Vorgehen gegen Klimakatastrophe und Wasserverschmutzung sind überzeugende Gründe für eine bessere Zusammenarbeit.
FAZ Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Eine Art Marshallplan für den Mittelmeerraum ist das erklärte Ziel einer Initiative südeuropäischer Staaten unter Führung Frankreichs, Spaniens und

			Italiens.
FAZ Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Eine Art Marshallplan für den Mittelmeerraum ist das erklärte Ziel einer Initiative südeuropäischer Staaten unter Führung Frankreichs, Spaniens und Italiens.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 247	24.10.2005	wie.	(BP) Er könne das Nord-Süd-Verhältnis der Nachbarn um das Mittelmeer durch die Schaffung neuer Mechanismen, wie zum Beispiel einer regionalen Entwicklungsbank, stimulieren.
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Neu ist auch der Schwerpunkt Migration und illegale Einwanderung im Arbeitsprogramm.

GERMAN – IDENTITY

(D) Identity – EU

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 32	07.02.1995	wha.	Nach der Ostgrenze will die Europäische Union (EU) in diesem Jahr die Südgrenze zum wichtigen Thema ihrer Außenbeziehungen machen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 32	07.02.1995	wha.	(Jordi Pujol, Präsident von Katalonien und derzeit Schiedsrichter der gesamtspanischen Politik), stellte in seiner in drei Sprachen vorgetragenen Schlußrede das Fehlen einer Mittelmeerpolitik in den meißten europäischen Hauptstädten fest. Nicht nur im nördlichen Europa. Italien existiere außenpolitisch seit Monaten überhaupt nicht mehr. Frankreich halte sich in Mittelmeerfragen zurück. Spanien allein sei nicht stark genug.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	Nach dem weltpolitischen Umbruch in den Jahren nach 1989 hatte die Europäische Gemeinschaft in der Stabilisierung Ost- und Mitteleuropas ihre vordringliche Aufgabe erkannt. Inzwischen zeigt sich, daß sich Europa auch dem Süden stärker zuwenden muß, wenn es die von dort ausgehenden Gefahren bannen will.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 68	21.03.1995	Reinhold Brender	Wenn das Wohlstandsgefälle nicht abgebaut werde, drohten breite Wanderungsströme, begründete die Kommission ihre Vorstellungen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Nun ist Lobbyismus eine erlaubte Technik des politischen Verteilungs-Wettbewerbs in Europa. Nur sollte man ihm nicht blindlings folgen. Richtig an der neuen Südinitiative ist, daß Europa endlich eine durchdachte Mittelmeerpolitik braucht.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Allerdings - die Gießkanne ist dazu das falsche Instrument. Milliardenschwere staatliche Hilfsprogramme sind die schnellen Einfälle von Politikern und Diplomaten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	22.09.1995	Walter Haubrich	Die Mittelmeer-Konferenz Ende November in Barcelona kann nach spanischer Auffassung

Nr. 221			eine wichtige Probe sein für den Willen aller Europäer -ohne Ausnahme-, eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik zu finden.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	Fast noch mehr Furcht löst in Europa das Schreckgespenst einer durch das rasche Bevölkerungswachstum bedingten Zuwanderung aus.
FAZ Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	Mit Geld allein lassen sich die Probleme nicht lösen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	Ebensowenig reicht die blose Ankündigung, innerhalb von fünfzehn Jahren den Freihandel zu verwirklichen. Nutznießer einer Marktöffnung dürfen zunächst ohnehin die Europäer sein.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 274	24.11.1995	Michael Stabenow	In Brüssel gibt es Bestrebungen, dabei mit Zuckerbrot und Peitsche zu verfahren. Wer schneller Reformen einführe, solle über einen festgelegten Sockelbetrag hinaus in den Genuß weiterer finanzieller Hilfen kommen. Ob sich die ehemaligen Kolonialherren aus Europa als Zuchtmeister aufführen sollten, läßt sich bezweifeln. Erfolgsversprechender erscheint da schon die Überlegung, den freien Zugang zum EU-Markt von der Bereitschaft zur regionalen Kooperation abhängig zu machen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 274	24.11.1995	wha.	Barcelona streitet sich noch mit Athen um den Platz der größten Stadt am Mittelmeer.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 276	27.11.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Europas Furcht vor einer größeren Wanderungsbewegung aus den Armenhäusern am südlichen Mittelmeer ist daher groß.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	"Berliner Zeitung"	Die EU unterliegt auch hier wieder dem Trugschluß, daß mit dem Scheckbuch alles zu regeln sei. Sicherheit ist zwar nicht gratis zu haben, doch auch nicht mit Geld allein. Die Gemeinschaft wird endlich ans Eingemachte gehen müssen, um ihren Nachbarn auf die Beine zu helfen. Dazu gehört die überfällige Öffnung ihrer Märkte ebenso wie eine kontrollierte Einwanderungspolitik."
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	now.	Unter dem Druck der südeuropäischen Länder zeigten sich die EU-Partner nur zu einer zaghaften Öffnung der Märkte durch Präferenzabkommen bereit. Staatsminister Hoyer sagte dennoch, die EU sei "an die Grenze des für sie Möglichen gegangen".
FAZ Nr. 278	29.11.1995	wha.	Daß es überhaupt zu dem Treffen kam, mag man schon als Erfolg der Europäischen Union anerkennen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	wha.	(Stärker Anwesenheit der EU) Davon kann die europäische Wirtschaft profitieren.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 86	14.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Ohne Marktöffnung und Unterstützung aus dem Norden werde das Durchschnittseinkommen in Europa im Jahr 2010 nicht -wie 1995- zwölf-,

			sonder zwanzigmal so hoch wie in den südlichen Mittelmeerländern liegen, fürchtet die Europäische Kommission.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 87	15.04.1999	Michael Stabenow	Auch die nördlichen EU-Regierungen wissen, daß Wohlstand und Stabilität am Mittelmeer in ihrem ureigenen Interesse liegen. Nach wie vor erscheint ein Satz hoch aktuell, den der französische Bevölkerungswissenschaftler Alfred Sauvy schon vor Jahrzehnten formuliert hat: "Wenn der Reichtum nicht zu den Menschen kommt, werden die Menschen zum Reichtum gehen."
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	Außerdem forderten die Mittelmeeranrainer unter den EU-Staaten, es müsse ein Signal gesetzt werden, um zu zeigen, dass Europa sich, nach dem historischen Umbruch in seinem Osten, nicht vom Süden abwenden werde.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	Doch solche Schwierigkeiten ändern nichts daran, dass die Europäische Union allen Grund hat, den Dialog mit ihren Nachbarn am südlichen Mittelmeerufer neu aufzunehmen. Schon lange nicht mehr waren die Chancen so gut, dass sich die politische Lage dort langfristig und stabil verbessern könnte.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	Womöglich müssen die südeuropäischen Länder, denen dieser Dialog aus naheliegenden Gründen besonders am Herzen liegt, auch über ihren eigenen Schatten springen, sprich: nicht nur Finanzmittel aus dem nördlichen Europa verlangen, sondern auch eigene Interessen zurückstellen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	Denn wirtschaftlich -man braucht nur an die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik der EU zu denken- wäre sie von Konkurenz aus dem Maghreb und Nordafrika am stärksten betroffen. Alledings wären sie auch die ersten, die den Funkenflug zu spüren bekämen, wenn am anderen Ufer des Mittelmeers neue Brände ausbrächen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Daß die Konferenz in Marseille unter so schwierigen politischen Umständen überhaupt habe stattfinden können, so der deutsche Außenminister sei schon ein großer Erfolg.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Eu-Kommissar Patten, der wiederholt seine Enttäuschung über die bisher erzielten Erfolge geäußert und den europäischen Entscheidungsinstanzen Vorschläge zu einer Stärkung des Barcelona-Prozesses unterbreitet hatte, gehörte nach Angaben seines Sprechers selbst zu den schärfsten Kritikern.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Eine unlängst von der EU beschlossene Entbürokratisierung der Genehmigungs- und Prüfungsverfahren soll das in Zukunft ändern.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	05.11.2001	Hans Christian Rößler	Aus der Region wurde auch auf die Folgen einer verfehlten europäischen Asylpolitik hingewie-

Nr. 257			sen. Islamistische Radikale hätten in Europa Unterschlupf gefunden. Sie hätten von dort aus ihre Aktivitäten fortgesetzt. Nach den offenbar auch in Europa vorbereiteten jüngsten Anschlägen bekomme man nun dort selbst due Folgen dieser falsch verstandenen Großzügigkeit zu spüren.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 95	24.04.2002	Walter Haubrich	Die Konferenz und die Probleme im Nahen Osten sind auch Themen der innenpolitischen Auseinandersetzung: So wirft der frühere spanische Ministerpräsident Gonzáles jetzt seinem Nachfolger Aznar vor, das Kaptal, das Spanien für Gastgeber der großen Nahost-Konferenz 1991 in Madrid und der ersten Mittelmeerkonferenz 1995 in Barcelona erworben habe, leichtfertig zu vertun.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 106	07.05.2004	Bc.	Zum Abschluss eines zweitägigen Außenministertreffens im Rahmen der euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft (Euromed) sagt der irische Außenminister und amtierende EU-Ratsvorsitzende Brian Cowen, die Union sei bereit, sich an der Überwachung eines Waffenstillstands zu beteiligen und in jeder anderen denkbaren Weise dazu beizutragen, daß die beiden Konfliktparteien ihren im Friedensplan beschreibenen Verpflichtungen nachkommen. "Es gibt nur die Road Map als Weg der Hoffnung und des Friedens", sagte Cowen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 281	01.12.2004	Bc.	Die EU unterstützt in diesen Staaten auch Projekte zur Demokratisierung, zur Verbesserung der rechtsstaatlichen Verhältnisse und zur Förderung der Zivilgesellschaft. Mit einigen von ihnen wird auch über die Bekämpfung des Terrorismus und Fragen der Migration gesprochen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 85	13.04.2005	Bc.	Da ein Drittel der Menschen in den Mittelmeer-Partnerländern unter fünfzehn Jahre alt sei, komme dem Ausbau des Bildungswesens eine "zentrale Bedeutung" bei der Entwicklung zu. Die Kommission will daher die Mittel zur Förderung des allgemeinen und beruflichen Bildungswesens in diesen Ländern "um mindestens 50 Prozent erhöhen".
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Die Förderung von Demokratie, Pluralismus und Menschenrechte war schon immer Teil der Barcelona-Initiative. Für uns Europäer sind dies fundamentale Werte, weshalb wir diese auch im Ausland zu fördern suchen. Wir sind froh, daß unsere Mittelmeerpartner ihre Wichtigkeit in gleichem Maße anerkennen. Wir alle wissen, daß erfolgreiche Regierungen den Erwartungen ihrer Bürger entsprechen müssen.
FAZ.NET	08.02.2007		"Die Zukunft Europas liegt im Süden", sagte Sarkozy.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 286	08.12.2007	Michaela Wiegel	Sarkozy erhob die französisch-algerische Aussöhnung zum Grundstein und Motor der Mittelmeer-Union. Er zog bewusst den Vergleich zu den Anfängen Europas und der deutsch-französischen Versöhnung.
FAZ Nr. 286	08.12.2007	Michaela Wiegel	Eine Einbettung der Mittelmeer-Union in die EU suchte Sarkozy nicht.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 286	08.12.2007	Michaela Wiegel	Erst nach der Kritik von Kanzlerin Merkel, dass eine Mittelmeer-Union unter Ausschluss eines Teils der EU-Mitgliedstaaten eine schwere Belastungsprobe für die EU darstellen würde, hat Sarkozy in Aussicht gestellt, die Mittelmeer-Union anderen Mitgliedsstaaten zu öffnen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 286	08.12.2007	Michaela Wiegel	[Merkel] (…),dass "eine eigenständige Mittelmeer-Union unter französischer Führung kein Thema mehr sei".
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 298	22.12.2007	mic.	Er versicherte sich der Unterstützung der bislang zaudernden Ministerpräidenten Spaniens und Italiens, Zapatero und Prodi, für das außerhalb der EU-Strukturen geplante Unionsvorhaben.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 298	22.12.2007	mic.	Das politische Gewicht, das Sarkozy der Mittelmeer-Union beimisst, lässt sich auch am vereinbarten Gipfeldatum ablesen: Am 13. Juli in Paris, (…)
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 298	22.12.2007	mic.	"Wir drei haben entschieden, dass es einen geeinigten Mittelmeerraum gegen Krieg und gegen Hoffnungslosigkeit geben soll", (…)
FAZ Nr. 298	22.12.2007	mic.	[Zapatero] "Wir wollen, dass die Länder des Mittelmeers parallel zur EU entscheidende Protagonisten werden".
FAZ Nr. 298	22.12.2007	mic.	[Prodi] "Der Krieg der Kulturen kann nur mit konkreten Initiativen gewonnen werden", (…)
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 20	24.01.2008	Martin Schulz	Sarkozy will sichtlich eine eigene Organisation mit eigenen Institutionen. Deutschland könne da einen Beobachterstatus haben, sagte er. Das sprengt den institutionellen Rahmen der EU, und da muss man die Franzosen schon fragen, ob sie die Union in ihrer Präsidentschaft in ihre Einzelteile zerlegen wollen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 54	04.03.2008	Wulf Schmiese	Sarkozy hat offenbar akzeptiert, dass seine Mittelmeerunion nur unter dem Dach des Barcelona-Prozesses gebildet werden darf.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 57	07.03.2008	flf.	(Sarkozy) "Angela wollte, dass alle europäischen Länder im Rahmen des Barcelona-Prozesses mitmachen können. Und ich dachte, dass dieser Prozess, 1995 begonnen, stecken geblieben sei und dass man eine wirkliche Partnerschaft mit den Ländern des Südens schaffen müsse".
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 64	15.03.2008	Nikolas Busse	Nach einigem Hin und Her gelang es der Bundesregierung schließlich, dem französischen Projekt die Spitze zu nehmen, in dem sie dessen Einbettung in die bestehenden Strukturen der

			EU durchsetzte.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 64	15.03.2008	Nikolas Busse	Auf die war Europa einmal sehr stolz, weil hier nicht nur viel Geld für die Entwicklung einer Kriesenanfälligen Nachbarschaft zur Verfügung gestellt wurde, sondern vor allem Israel und die Palästinenser an einem Tisch saßen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 116	20.05.2008	Nm.	Die vom französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy propagierte Mittelmeeunion entwickelt sich zum permanenten Zankapfel in der EU.
Die Welt Nr. 176	31.07.2007	Thomas Schmid	Frankreich will größer sein, als es ist.
Die Welt Nr. 287	08.12.2007	Jochen Hehn	Merkel hatte am Vortag vor der Sprengwirkung für die Einheit der EU gewarnt, sollte Frankreich mit der Mittelmeerunion einen exklusiven Klub aufbauen wollen.
Die Welt Nr. 54	04.03.2008	Mariam Lau	durch den 1995 auf Anregung der Deutschen von der EU begonnenden Barcelona-Prozess,(…)
Die Welt Nr. 64	15.03.2008	Hannelore Crolly und Christoph Schiltz	"Wir haben jetzt alle Chancen, dem Mittelmeerprozess wirklich eine neue Dynamik zu geben", sagte Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel. Die Begeisterung bei den osteuropäischen Staaten ist allerdings verhalten.
Die Welt Nr. 133	09.06.2008	Jochen Hehn	("Le Monde") "Misstrauen und vor allem eine stumme Rivalität um die Führung Europas" zu entdecken.
Welt Online	20.07.2008	Jochen Hehn	Bernard Kouchner: Wir haben gezeigt, dass Frankreich zu einer Diplomatie des Dialogs zurückgefunden hat.
Welt Online	20.07.2008	Jochen Hehn	(B. Kouchner): Frankreich spielt heute weltweit eine aktive Rolle.
Welt Online	20.07.2008	Jochen Hehn	(B. Kouchner): Es war nicht leicht, Spanien zur Teilnahme zu bewegen, das den Gipfel als Konkurrenzveranstaltung zum Barcelona-Prozess gesehen hat.
Welt Online	20.07.2008	Jochen Hehn	Wird Frankreich die Europäer mit Europa versöhnen? Kouchner: Ich würde gern sagen, dass eine Versöhnung stattgefunden hat. Aber daran muss noch hart gearbeitet werden. Weil es hier keine Sehnsucht mehr nach Europa gibt
Welt Online	20.07.2008	Jochen Hehn	(B. Kouchner): Die Europäer sind sich nicht bewusst, dass all die Fortschritte eng mit Europa verbunden sind und dass kein Land allein in der Lage wäre, die Herausforderungen der Globalisierung zu meistern.
Welt Online	05.08.2008	Wolf Lepenies	Der Gründung der Union pour la Méditerrannée gingen heftige Konflikte innerhalb der Europäischen Union voraus.
Welt Online	05.08.2008	Wolf Lepenies	Und zum Architekten der Mittelmeerunion wurde Sarkozys Berater Henri Guaino, ein Euroskeptiker, der nicht aufhört, gegen das "bürokratische Monster" zu wettern, das sich in Brüssel breit gemacht hat. Guaino ist in Arles aufge-

			wachsen und hat eine spanische Mutter - er ist stolz drauf, ein Mann des Midi zu sein.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	03.11.2005	Rudolph Chimelli	Lange bevor die Bilder afrikanischer Boat People oder von Migranten im Stacheldraht der spanischen Exklaven Ceuta und Melilla die Nordeuropäer aufschreckten, hatte die Europäische Union begriffen, dass das Mittelmeer, das einstige Mare Nostrum der Römer, für sie zu einer Problem-Region geworden war:
Süddeutsche Zeitung	26.11.2005	Martin Winter	Die europäische Politik für das Mittelmeer trägt Früchte, die sich die EU am Anfang gar nicht gewünscht hatte.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	26.11.2005	Martin Winter	Das europäische Kalkül war schlicht: Wer miteinander Handel treibt, lässt sich eher zur Beilegung von Konflikten bewegen. Daran, mit diesen Ländern auch ein Gespräch über Demokratie, Menschenrechte, Flüchtlinge oder den Kampf gegen den Terrorismus einzutreten, dachte damals noch keiner.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	26.11.2005	Martin Winter	(…)zwei Probleme, die die Europäer besonders bewegen. Zum einen wollen sie Algerien, Ägypten, Israel, Jordanien, den Libanon, Marokko, die Palästinenser, Syrien, Tunesien und den "Beobachter" Libyen zu einem gemeinsamen "Verhaltenskodex" im Kampf gegen den Terror bewegen. Die EU erhofft sich davon eine bessere Kooperation bei Abwehr und Aufklärung von Anschlägen. Zum anderen entsteht das Flüchtlingsproblem aus Schwarzafrika auf der TAgesordnung, das die Maghreb-Satten als Durchgangsgeländer als Erste zu spüren bekommen.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	07.12.2007	Rudolph Chimelli	Die Mittelmeerunion, ein Wunschkind des französischen Präsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy, findet kaum freundlich gesinnte Paten.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	07.12.2007	Rudolph Chimelli	Seine Existenz so fürchtet sie [Merkel], brachte die Gefahr einer Spaltung der EU mit sich, denn den Deutschen steht Osteuropa näher als das Mittelmeer.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	23.01.2008	Christiane Schlötzer	Die EU fürchtet Spaltung, aber wie versponnen die Vision von der eurabischen Gemeinschaft auch sein mag, Sarkozy hat Geister geweckt und Erwartungen gezeugt, die nur schwer zu bändigen sind -an den Küsten des Südens.
sueddeutsche.de	14.03.2008	dpa??	"Wir haben uns heute geeinigt, dass es gut ist, wenn der Barcelona-Prozess gestärkt wird"
sueddeutsche.de	14.03.2008	dpa??	Sarkozy nannte die grundsätzliche Einigung der EU auf die Mittelmeerunion einen Erfolg für Frankreich und Europa. "Das ist eine sehr wichtige Etappe", sagte Sarkozy. "Europa kehrt dem Mittelmeer nicht mehr den Rücken zu."
sueddeutsche.de	08.11.2008	Werner Weidenfeld	Europa ist strategisch verwirrt.
sueddeutsche.de	08.11.2008	Werner Weidenfeld	All die Probleme deuten auf eine gemeinsame Wurzel: Europa fehlt die Orientierung, es fehlt

			ein finales Profil, ein eindeutiges Ziel.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	01.03.2000	Rainer Koch	Die wirtschaftlich schwächere Südschiene der EU fand bisher wenig Gehör mit der Klage, ihr "Hinterhof" am Mittelmeer werde einfach vergessen.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	01.03.2000	Rainer Koch	Die EU-Nordlichter betrachten das Mittelmeer eher als Urlaubsgegend.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	14.11.2000	Rainer Koch	Die Europäer sind ihrem Ziel, die Mittelmeerstaaten politisch und wirtschaftlich näher an sich zu binden, nicht viel näher gekommen.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	05.11.2001	Birgit Jennen	"Es ist bereits ein Erfolg, dass unter diesen schwierigen politischen Umständen das Mittelmeertreffen stattfindet",(…)
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	25.11.2005	Christian Hanelt	Europa hat das Ziel ihre Entwicklung [arab. Länder] als Partner nicht als Dirigent zu begleiten.
FTD Financial Times Deutschland	15.02.2008	Peter Ehrlich	Barosso hat viele Arbeitgeber: Das Europäische Parlament und 27 Regierungen. "Wenn es ernst wird ruft er in Berlin und Paris an", heißt es aber in deutschen Regierungskreisen. Viele andere können in der EU Prozesse aufhalten oder blockieren, aber nur mit Zustimmung der deutschen und der französischen Regierung können Ende des Jahres die Posten des neuen EU-Außenministers und des neuen Ratspräsidenten besetzt werden. Auch Barosso selbst könnte sich die angestrebte zweite Amtszeit abschminken, wenn die beiden ihn fallen lassen.
FTD.de	14.07.2008	Lutz Meier, Wolfgang Proissl	Lange war Nicolas Sarkozys Initiative auf viel Widerstand gestoßen, nach der die Staaten von Nordafrika, des Nahen Ostens und des Balkans mit den Ländern der Europäischen Union eine neue Kooperation eingehen sollen. Nun hat der Gipfel auch nach Aussage von anfänglichen Kritikern -wie etwa Bundekanzlerin Angela Merkel - (...)
taz	06.08.2007	Zafer Senocak	In Wirklichkeit verkörpert Sarkozy den Niedergang der Figur des visionären europäischen Staatsmanns.
taz	06.08.2007	Zafer Senocak	Nein, Sarkozy geht es weder um Europa noch um die Türkei. Ihm geht es um scheinbare französische Nationalinteressen, die er mit dem Etikett der Modernisierung wertvoller zu machen versucht, als sie es in Wirklichkeit sind.
taz	06.08.2007	Zafer Senocak	Europa geht es bislang nicht darum, Demokratie zu exportieren, sondern in erster Linie um die Sicherung eigener Hoheitsgebiete. Das sind Ausbesserungsarbeiten an der Festung Europa.
taz	05.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	[Sarkozys MU] Doch nicht einmal in Spanien und Italien stieß der Plan auf Begeisterung.
taz	20.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	Das Konzept ist immer das gleiche: Finanzielle Hilfe, Förderung der staatlichen Strukturen und

			des regionalen Dialogs im Austausch gegen mehr Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Verbrechensbekämpfung, Rücknahme von Flüchtlingen und Grenzsicherung.
taz	20.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	Trotzdem hat Sarkozys diese Woche vorgelegte Operetteninszenierung mit dem Titel "Mittelmeerunion" zumindest ein Gutes: Die Tatsache, dass die Europäische Union auch im Süden Nachbarn hat, rückt wieder mehr ins Bewusstsein.
taz	20.03.2008	Daniela Weingärtner	Für die Mittelmeerregion aber fühlte sich schon länger keine Präsidentschaft mehr zuständig.

Auftrag

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Der ägyptische Außenminister Musa und andere Vertreter der arabischen Staaten forderten die Europäische Union abermals auf, sich im Friedensprozeß stärker zu engagieren und auch eindeutiger Partei zu ergreufen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Viele Mittelmeerländer wollen den Pfad der politischen Reform weiterverfolgen, möchten diesen Prozeß jedoch selbst gestalten und suchen dazu unsere Unterstützung. Wir befürworten dies; die EU wird daher ein sogenanntes "Governance-Facility"-Programm starten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 175	31.07.1995	wwe.	Frankreich, Spanien und Italien wollen sich für eine stärkere Hinwendung der EU nach Süden stark machen. Die neue Südtriade signalisiert mit dem Forum, daß sich Europa in den Jahren nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges unter der Führung des vereinten Deutschlands zu stark nach Osten gewandt habe.
FAZ Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Javier Solana	Wir Europäer haben unaufhörlich daran gearbeitet, ein Friedensabkommen zu erreichen.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	28.11.2005	Martin Winter	Die EU bot dagegen fast alle ihre Staats- und Regierungschefs auf.

(D) Identity – Role

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Eine gönnerhafte Scheckbuch-Diplomatie der Europäer mit semikolonialen Attitüden kann dabei dem islamischen Fundamentalismus sogar neuen Nährboden geben.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 131	08.06.1995	Wolfram Weimer	Die EU hat auf der anderen Seite nach ihrer Nord-Erweiterung Konsolidierungsbedarf und kann sich kostspielige Entwicklungsprojekte im Süden gar nicht leisten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 233	07.10.1995	wha.	Über die Teilnahme der Vereinigten Staaten und Rußlands an der Mittelmeerkonferenz der Europäischen Union und der südlichen Mittelmeeranrainer in Barcelona (27. und 28. November) gibt es noch Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen Frank-

			reich und dem Veranstalterland Spanien.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 233	07.10.1995	wha.	(Teilnahme USA --> BP) Eine Protagonistenrolle wir den Vereinigten Staaten sicher nicht zugestanden. Es wird in Barcelona schließlich zum großen Teil um die Verwendung von europäischen Geldern in den südlichen Anrainerstaaten gehen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 278	29.11.1995	wha.	Die Europäische Union hat ihren Willen demonstriert, in Zukunft in der südlichen Nachbarregion weitaus stärker anwesend zu sein.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 261	08.11.1996	Walter Haubrich	(Moratinos) "Die europäische Politik ist in Israel nicht gut erklärt worden; es sollte im Nahen Osten kein falscher Protagonismus gesucht werden, weder von den Vereinigten Staaten noch von Europa. Beide Mächte können sich dort in ihrer Arbeit sehr gut ergänzen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 86	14.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Da die Konferenz ohne ameikanische Präsenz stattfindet, sind die Hoffnungen auf eine von der Mittelmeerinsel ausgehende neue Dynamik im nahöstlichen Friedensprozeß gering.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die in vielen europäischen Hauptstädten gehegte Hoffnung, die Gemeinschaft könne mit dem Rahmen der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft die Annäherung zwischen Israel und seinen arabischen Nachbarn schnell voranbringen, droht sich sogar in das Gegenteil zu wenden:
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Die jetzt offensichtlich gewordene Taktik der Europäer, das euro-mediterrane Forum für weitere Impulse für den Friedensprozeß zu nutzen, erwies sich jedoch als riskant. Vielleicht war es kein Zufall, daß die Stühle der Delegierten im großen Konferenzsaal in der Form eines Bummerangs angeordnet waren.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1997	Michael Stabenow	Unbeeidruckt blieben die Europäer durch die jüngsten Mahnungen aus Washington, die Nahost-Problematik nicht mit dem Prozeß der euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft zu vermischen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 218	19.09.1997	Michael Stabenow	Am EU-Sitz weiß man jedoch, daß sich Europa angesichts der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit nicht als Schulmeister gebärden darf.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 87	15.04.1999	Michael Stabenow	So verlockend es auch für die EU-Partner erscheinen mag, die Mittelmeerpartnerschaft als politisches Instrument zur Förderung des Friedensprozesses im Nahes Osten zu nutzen, so riskant kann sich dies in der Praxis erweisen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 88	16.04.1999	Sven Behrendt und Christian-Peter Hanelt	Der den Umbau der einzelnen Folgswirtschaften in den Partnerstaaten des südlichen Mittelmeerraums ergänzende regionale Ansatz des Barcelona-Prozesses geht von dem Grundgedanken aus, daß sich Kapital und Handel im globalen Zeitalter große und stabile Märkte suchen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 89	17.04.1999	now.	Das entscheidende Zeichen der Konferenz sei, daß die Europäische Union nicht nur nach Osten, sondern auch nach Süden blicke, sagt Fischers Spre-

			cher Erdmann.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 269	18.11.1999	Günther Nonnenmacher	Die EU und ihre Mitgliedländer, Spanien voran, das bei diesem Dialog federführend war und ist, müssen jetzt ausloten, auf welchen Gebieten die Kooperation vorangetrieben werden kann.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 268	17.11.2000	Bc.	Fischer stellte klar, dass die EU bereit sei, eine "effektive Rolle" im Friedensprozeß zu spielen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 93	22.04.2002	Hans Christian Rößler	Die spanische Ratspräsidentschaft will sich nebenbei noch als Vermittlerin im Nahost-Konflikt versuchen: Trotz der Kritik an den jüngsten Militäraktionen und angesicht europäischer Forderungen nach Sanktionen wird der israelische Außenminister Peres an diesem Montag in Spanien erwartet.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 56	06.03.2004	Bc.	An der von den Vereinigten Staaten vorgeschlagenen Initiative zur Demokratisierung und Modernisierung des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens will sich die Europäische Union mit einem eigenständigen Ansatz beteiligen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 56	06.03.2004	Bc.	Fischer hatte damals unter anderem von einem "gemeinsamen Mittelmeer-Prozeß der Nato und der Europäischen Union" gesprochen.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 56	06.03.2004	Bc.	Das von den Außenministerien in Berlin und Paris ausgearbeitete "non-paper" hebt nun aber deutlich hervor, daß "die EU einen ausgeprägten eigenen Ansatz" verfolgen solle, der den der Vereinigten Staaten zwar ergänze, aber mit den EU eigenen Institutionen und Instrumenten arbeite. Besonders verwiesen wird auf die politische und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit den südlichen Anrainern des Mittelmeers im sogenannten Barcelona-Prozeß seit 1995 und den schon bestehenden Dialog mit dem Golf-Kooperationsrat.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 106	07.05.2004	Bc.	Ein dritter Themenschwerpunkt des Treffens war das Angebot der EU an die Partnerländer im sogenannten Barcelona-Prozeß, politische Reformen bei der Demokratisierung und der Achtung der Menschenrechte zu unterstützen. Dabei erwarte die EU von den Ländern der Region vorschläge, sagt der EU-Kommissar Patten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 8	11.01.2005	Nikolas Busse	(…) Seit 1995 insgesamt 6,2 Milliarden Euro an die Partnerländer gezahlt. (…) Das macht die EU zum größten nicht militärischen Hilfegeber im Mittelmeerraum und im Nahen Osten.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 8	11.01.2005	Nikolas Busse	(Manche Diplomaten): Entweder die EU konzentriere sich nur noch auf die wirtschaftliche Seite der Zusammenarbeit, oder sie konzipiere die politische Dimension des Prozesses neu.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 277	28.11.2005	Horst Bacia	Nicht zuletzt dank der Initiativen ihres Chefdiplomaten Solana, der beim ersten Barcelona-Treffen als spanischer Außenminister den Vorsitz führte, ist die EU heute als Mitglied des Nahost-Quartetts ein Mitspieler im Friedensprozeß.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Nr. 102	02.05.2008	(dpa)	Die von ihm vorangetriebene Mittelmeerunion trägt nach Auffassung des französischen Präsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy entscheidend zur Verbesserung der Beziehungen des Westens zur arabisch-muslimischen Welt bei.
Die Welt Nr. 176	31.07.2007	Thomas Schmid	Für eine EU, die sich mit der Osterweiterung verausgabt und den Mittelmeerraum sträflich vernachlässigt - einen Raum, der historisch für Europa konstitutiv war und der heute als Nahstelle zu Afrika und zur arabischen Welt von mehr als strategischer Bedeutung ist.
Welt Online	20.07.2008	Jochen Hehn	(B. Kouchner): Die Anwesenheit von 43 Staats- und Regierungschefs ist schon ein Erfolg für sich.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	28.11.2005	wtr	Die Geduld der Europäer ist groß, aber sie darf nicht unendlich sein.
Süddeutsche Zeitung	23.01.2008	Christiane Schlötzer	Was aber wäre die EU, wenn sie im Süden darauf verzichten würde, Hilfen und Kredite mit Ansprüchen nach Demokratie und Transparenz zu verbinden?
Süddeutsche Zeitung	01.02.2008	Javier Caceres	Zudem habe man durch den Barcelona-Prozess bereits ein Instrumentarium, das genutzt werden müsse.
FTD	11.09.2000	Sven Behrendtund Christian-Peter Hanelt	Doch das Vorgehen der EU hat nicht nur Stärken. Es beruht auf der zu pauschalen Sichtweise, dass sich die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Probleme des Mittelmeerraums gleichen und dass die Region als einheitlicher Sicherheitskomplex zu verstehen ist. Nur zögerlich werden unterschiedliche Geschwindigkeiten und Erfolge der Reformen anerkannt.
FTD	11.09.2000	Sven Behrendtund Christian-Peter Hanelt	[Transformationen durch AA] Hier muss die EU Überzeugungsarbeit leisten.
FTD	11.09.2000	Sven Behrendtund Christian-Peter Hanelt	Außerdem fällt auf, dass die Mittelmeerstrategie Wohlstand und Sicherheit im östlichen Mittelmeerraum nicht mit den Entwicklungen in der Golfregion verknüpft. Es fehlt ein Konzept wie Iran und Irak in Zukunft friedlich an die Region angeschlossen werden können.
FTD	11.09.2000	Sven Behrendtund Christian-Peter Hanelt	Die Europäische Union muss in ihrer Mittelmeerstrategie Prioritäten setzen und diese konsequent verfolgen.
FTD	23.04.2002	Rainer Koch, Judy Dempsey	Die Europäische Union gibt trotz kaum überbrückbarer Differenzen mit Tel Aviv ihre Versuche nicht auf, als Vermittler im Konflikt mit den Palästinensern zu wirken.
FTD	23.04.2002	Rainer Koch, Judy Dempsey	Für die Europäische Union steht mit der inzwischen fünften Ministerkonferenz des sogenannten "Barcelona-Prozesses" die gesamte Strategie auf dem Spiel, mit welcher die EU ihre südliche Nachbarregion stabilisieren und damit auch eine zentrale Rolle im Nahost-Friedensprozess einnehmen will.

FTD	12.05.2003	Edward Alden, Roula Khalaf	Die USA hoffen, dass durch ihr Konzept Probleme, mit denen die EU-Initiative zu kämpfen hat, vermieden werden.
FTD	25.11.2005	Christian Hanelt	Die EU sollte klarer als bisher Reformen in den arabischen Partnerländern unterstützen.
FTD	25.11.2005	Christian Hanelt	Die arabischen Partner, die glaubhaft und intensiv ar Reformen arbeiten, sollte Europa mit seinen Hilfspro grammen stärker fördern.
FTD	05.03.2008	Birgit Marschall	Mit den Anrainerstaaten des Mittelmeers will die EU intensiver ins Gespräch kommen, die Wirtschaft dort ankurbeln und Know-how exportieren.
taz	06.08.2007	Zafer Senocak	Europa braucht eine glaubwürdige, gut durchdachte Mittelmeerpolitik.
taz	06.08.2007	Zafer Senocak	Es ist also höchste Zeit, endlich über eine echte europäische Mittelmeerpolitik nachzudenken, die diesen Namen verdient.

4. GREAT BRITAIN

GREAT BRITAIN – EXPRESSION

(GB) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

Independent.co-uk	12.07.2008	?	The existing drive towards closer realtionship with North Africa in the Barcelona process of 1995 has run into the sands.
Independent.co-uk	14.09.2005	from a speech by the secretary general of the League of Arab States, given at the Euro-Med Networks conference at Chatham House, London	(…) the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to haunt the scene because biased policies have pushed the conflict into a dead end. (…) we have new agenda items like Iraq, whose shadows and repercussions weigh heavily on the security and stability of many Mediterranean countiers.
Independent.co-uk	18.03.2004	Adrian Hamilton	What we need is to make the present structures like Barcelona effective, not distort everything to the domestic plitical imperatives of Bush and Blair.
Guardian	29.11.2005	Leader	(…) launched an ambitious attempt to strengthen links with the countries on its southern flank, from Morocco in the west to Syria and Jordan in the Middle East proper, boldly taking in Israel and the Palestinian territories.
Guardian	28.11.2005	Ewen MacAskill	European leaders turned out in force, including Tony Blair, but at least eight of the non-EU 10 failed to send their leaders.
Guardian	13.05.2004	Ian Black	[ENP] In the south, the policy will apply to (…) – all partners in the Barcelona process of "euro-Mediterranean dialogue".

(GB) Expressioon – the other

Independent.co-uk	17.11.2000	Robert Fisk	And since the Arabs are desperate for a strong European role – and maybe a European multilateral force – that left the Israelis with their usual veto.

(GB) Expression – associative/dissociative

Independent.co-uk	12.07.2008	?	Libya and Algeria expressed fears that the new union was just a means of reasserting French colonial ambitions in North Africa and of keeping the pressures of immigration into southern Europe at bay. Other Arabs were suspicious that, by inviting Israel, the project was a mean to push Mr Sarkozy's hopes of integrating Israel into a wider Europe. Human rights remain conspicuous by their absence from the agenda. And worries that this was all a French plot under European disguise were hardly allayed by the choice of initial co-operation schemes – solar power, nuclear energy and claening up the sea – in all of which French industrial presence is strong.
Independent.co-uk	14.09.2005	from a speech by the secretary general of the League of Arab States, given at the Euro-Med Networks conference at Chatham House, London	The same could also be said on the issue of the Turkish request to join the European Union. This issue has cultural and civilisational dimensions.
Independent.co-uk	14.09.2005	from a speech by the secretary general of the League of Arab States, given at the Euro-Med Networks conference at Chatham House, London	The Barcelona process needs to play a bigger role in supporting Turkey joining the EU.
Independent.co-uk	14.09.2005	from a speech by the secretary general of the League of Arab States, given at the Euro-Med Networks conference at Chatham House, London	I mean, are we of the same opinion about it in the Mediterranean community? Yes, we are all on the same side when it comes to combating international terrorism, which is enemy to all our societies.
Independent.co-uk	14.09.2005	from a speech by the secretary general of the League of Arab States, given at the Euro-Med Networks conference at Chatham House, London	No, we don't believe and we refuse to accept the superficial and bad faith interpretations of the origins of terrorism as a product of Islamic thought and education.

Guardian	12.06.2008	Ian Black	(…) Gadafy dismissed a French proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean alliance as an insult to Arabs and Africans. “This is taking us for fools,” he said. “We do not belong to Brussels. Our Arab League is located in Cairo and the African Union is located in Addis Ababa. If they want cooperation they have to go through Cairo an Addis Ababa.”

GREAT BRITAIN – PURPOSE

(GB) purpose – purpose

Independent.co-uk	14.09.2005	speech by the secretary general of the League of Arab States,	The launching of the Barcelona Process in 1995 was aimed at forming a new community of nations with their Mediterranean identity as the common denominator and the dialogue between its several civilisations a priority item, along with security, culture and social development.
Guardian	29.11.2005	Leader	The initiative was intended to balance the EU’s enlargement to the former communist east.

(GB) purpose -aim

Independent.co-uk	14.07.2008	John Lichfield	The new Union for the Mediterranean will attempt to set up common approaches to, among other things, global warming, investment, solar energy, water shortages, illegal immigration, maritime pollution, road and sea transport and university exchange programmes.
Guardian	06.02.2008	El Hassan bin Talal	(…) seeks to align governments with the concerns of a myopic global security agenda.
Guardian	29.11.2005	Leader	Self-interest and altruism coincided in a plan to export stability into Europe’s “Club Med” backyard or see instability imported into the EU’s own house. Membership, a huge carrot for Turkey, was not on offer, but more trade and investment, the theory went, would promote economic growth, democracy and human rights as well as reduce conflict and terrorism.

GREAT BRITAIN – IDENTITY

(GB) Identity – role

Independent.co-uk	18.03.2004	Adrian Hamilton	In one sense for Europe to go along with the Greater Middle East initiative requires no more than melding this policy with US might. But in another sense, it wraps a policy of patient di-

			plomacy in a new language of demand which could bring about the very conditions of conflict that it seeks to resolve.
Guardian	21.10.2007	El Hassan bin Talal	Yet Europe's potential contribution should not be underestimated. Europe's financial contribution to the Middle East has been consistent and impressive.
Guardian	29.11.2005	Leader	Europeans must try harder to overcome the obstacles and turn this lopsided partnership into a more constructive one.

(GB) Identity - EU

Independent.co-uk	12.07.2008	?	Just after he was elected, M. Sarkozy outlined his plan for a "great dream of peace and a great dream of civilisation" among all countries with a Mediterranean coastline.
Independent.co-uk	12.07.2008	?	But his idea of an EU-funded club that did not include EU states without a Mediterranean coast angered Germany in particular.
Independent.co-uk	14.07.2008	John Lichfield	"The European and the Mediterranean dreams are inseparable," he said. "We will build peace in the Mediterranean together, like yesterday we built peace in Europe …We will succeed together; or we will fail together."
Independent.co-uk	12.07.2008	?	The idea of a new Union for the Mediterranean combining the Europe of the south with the Arabs of North Africa and the Turks, Israelis and Levantines of the East was Mr Sarkozy's prime foreign policy proposal during the French presidential campaign. Now he has made it his first initiative of France's turn as president of Europe.
Independent.co-uk	18.03.2004	Adrian Hamilton	The European Union has so far pursued a perfectly sensible course of its own through the Barcelona process which tries to bring North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel) closer to Europe through trade and investment agreements tempered by human rights requirements. It's not dramatic and its progress has been somewhat stuttering to date. But it is working, as recent developments in Iran and North Africa have shown, because it offers inducement without imposition.
Independent.co-uk	28.02.2008	John Lichfield, Tony Paterson	Berlin has been especially annoyed by M. Sarkozy's determination to push ahead with a so-called "Club Med" or formal union of countries on the shores of the Mediterranean. Chancellor Merkel believes that such an organisation would be either a pointless distraction or a thread to the unity of the EU.
Independent.co-uk	28.02.2008	John Lichfield, Tony Paterson	At the heart of the quarrel – not yet an overt crisis – is the strained relationship between the two leaders.

Guardian	20.08.2008	David Gow	It can count on support from its "Club Med" partners in Italy and Spain but Germany, determined to maintain fiscal discipline and avoid a repeat of the 1970s, is resolutely opposed. And so is the European commission.
Guardian	14.07.2008	Ian Traynor	President Nocolas Sarkozy yesterday sought to shift Europe's strategic focus towards the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans, hosting 42 heads of state and government at a summit in Paris to launch a new Mediterranean Union.
Guardian	14.07.2008	Ian Traynor	(…) Sarkozy's grand initiative is acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign policy-marking after years of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south.
Guardian	14.07.2008	Ian Traynor	[Sarkozy] He delivered a message of peace to a suspicious audience of leaders more noted for their backstabbing rivalries and conflicts.
Guardian	14.07.2008	Ian Traynor	"The goal of the summit is to learn how to love each other in the Mediterranean, instead of continuing to hate and wage war," said Sarkozy. "We will build peace in the Mediterranean together."
Guardian	14.07.2008	Ian Traynor	Sarkozy's big idea is to use imperial Rome's centre of the world as a unifying factor linking 44 countries that are home to 800 million people. But the plan has been pilloried by such diverse sources as Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and Colonel Muammar Gadafy of Libya.
Guardian	14.07.2008	Ian Traynor	Despite the fanfare in Paris, Sarkozy's new "Club Med" will be a long haul if it is to amount to much beyond a talking shop and a channel for transferring EU funds to the Maghreb and the Middle East.
Guardian	14.07.2008	Ian Traynor	Germany, the EU paymaster, balked at that and also suspected a Sarkozy scheme to devide the EU into zones of influence where Berlin would take charge to its east and Paris would play the main role in the south.
Guardian	10.07.2008	Simon Tisdall	The idea is to create a permanent institutional link between Europe and all countries with Mediterranean coastlines, including such odd bedfellows as Israel, Palestine, Syria and Libya. The hope is that the union will boost economic and security cooperation.
Guardian	10.07.2008	Simon Tisdall	Critics – (…) – say Sarkozy's grand projet is a vainglorious attempt to increase French influence in a region it has manipulated and exploited since Napoleonic times. They say Sarkozy is merely trying to boost his own battered standing and France's EU presidency – (…)
Guardian	14.03.2008	Ian Traynor	Sarkozy has planned to launch the bold new union when France took over the presidency of the EU in July, but climed down after fierce opposition from Angela Merkel, the German chancellor.

Guardian	14.03.2008	Ian Traynor	Britain also opposed the plan, suspecting it was designed to wreck any chance of Turkey joining the EU. Britain is Turkey's biggest supporter in the EU, while Sarkozy is outspokenly opposed to Ankara joining.
Guardian	14.03.2008	Ian Traynor	While backtracking, however, Sarkozy has succeeded in pushing the Mediterranean issue up the EU agenda and establishing new structures and positions to bolster his ideas, diplomats said. There are to be Mediterranean summits every two years, and two co-president of the new union.
Guardian	21.10.2007	El Hassan bin Talal	The European Union's policy in the Middle East is the litmus test of its common foreign and security policy.
Guardian	21.10.2007	El Hassan bin Talal	Europe's contributions to the Middle East have been great. Funding from the EU and from member states has helped to alleviate suffering, while compassionate community-building efforts by European individuals and organisations have highlighted the true closeness of all who share a common Mediterranean history. It is vital that Europe's experience, commitment and heritage of hope be framed in a vision for the Middle East that becomes a model for its future.
Guardian	15.06.2007	Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, Antoine Reverchon	Mr Sarkozy wants to set up a five-plus-five partnership involving southern European countries (…) in direct cooperation with their North African neighbours (…). The plan is to develop links, then use the EU as a blueprint for setting up an institutional framework focusing on economic issues. There is nothing new about this idea.
Guardian	29.11.2005	Leader	France, Spain and Italy had long looked across the Mediterranean to their old Maghreb colonies; Britain's role stretched back decades; all Europeans shared interests in the region.
Guardian	29.11.2005	Leader	EU financial aid has not been made conditional on reforms, giving little incentive for Arab regimes, scaremongering about Islamists, to democratise. Still, it would be quite wrong to write off the Euro-Med dialogue.
Guardian	28.11.2005	Ewen MacAskill	"We will have a good conference nonetheless," Mr Blair said.
Guardian	13.05.2004	Ian Black	The expanded EU is offering its new neighbours greater cooperation and assistance – but also keeping them at arm's length.
Guardian	07.03.2004	Jeremy Landor	The European Union has pressurised Maghreb countries into economic liberalisation to create opportunities for European business, but these have not improved the lives of the majority.

5. ITALY

ITALY – EXPRESSION

(I) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

la Repubblica	31 gennaio 1998	Franco Cassano	Del resto la Cee, con la Conferenza di Barcellona del `95, aveva iniziato a muoversi in questa direzione, ma le esitazioni in primis dei tedeschi che antepongono l'est al sud hanno rallentato questo cammino.
la Repubblica	30 luglio 1998	Paolo Garimberti	Ma finora è rimasta a livello di pura accademia, anche perché ai paesi non mediterranei dell'Unione europea interessa poco o nulla. Ora è giunto il momento di passare dall'accademia all' operatività; oppure di disdirla e organizzarne un'altra, più seria e più serrata.
la Repubblica	19.10.1999	Salvatore Tropea	Il progetto del Europa (…)
la Repubblica	05 dicembre 2003	Khaled Fouad Allam	In realtà l'impasse irachena, la paralisi del processo di pace israelo-palestinense e l'incessante flusso di navi cariche di migranti che cercano di raggiungere la sponda nord del Mediterraneo attraversando il canale si Sicilia o il canale di Otranto, mettono l'Europa a nudo.
la Repubblica	05 dicembre 2003	Khaled Fouad Allam	Questa visione sostanzialmente riduttiva del mondo arabo ha favorito un approccio regionale (…), ma allo stesso tempo ha impedito un approccio globale alle questioni relative alle relazioni tra Europa e mondo arabo.
la Repubblica	05 dicembre 2003	Khaled Fouad Allam	Il processo di Barcellona non ha quasi inciso su queste tendenze: anzi, i problemi sono aumentati, mentre la questione della sicurezza è diventata il tema centrale nell'approccio alle questioni mediterranee.
la Repubblica	24 gennaio 2004	Gianni Pittella	La politica da sviluppare è quella delle reti, ancora troppo esili e insufficienti.
la Repubblica	19 novembre 2004	Vincenzo Nigro	Ci punta perché un'altra formula, "il processo di Barcellona", da tempo è semi-paralizzato. Il "processo di Barcellona" è il foro di dialogo che include anche Israele, ma l'Israele è prigioniero di un'atra formula, il "processo di pace", ovvero la "road map", ovvero lo scontro con i palestinesi.
la Repubblica	27 novembre 2005	Alessandro Oppes	Amputato da un'ondata di defezioni, il vertice euro-mediterraneo di Barcellona parte oggi sotto i peggiori auspici e sullo sfondo di un fitto programma di manifestazioni dei gruppi no global.
la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Tony Blaire e Jose Zapatero	Dieci anni fa a Barcellona i rappresentanti dei Paesi dell'Unione Europea e del bacino del Mediterraneo si diedero appuntamento per dar vita alla nuova Euromed Partnership (partenariato euro-mediterraneo, ndt).
la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Tony Blaire e Jose Zapatero	Il Barcelona Process ha contribuito sì ad innescare il processo di riforme politico-economiche, ma i diritti umani ancora non sono rispettati appieno ovunque e in tutta l'area del Mediterraneo la società civile deve ancora evolversi come auspicato.
la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Tony Blaire e Jose Zapatero	Al pari di ogni autentica forma di partenariato, il Barcelona Process impone di essere d'accordo per procedere: ed è essenziale andare avanti.

la Repubblica	29 novembre 2005	Andrea Bonanni	Il vertice euro-mediterraneo di Barcellona, (…), si è chiuso senza una dichiarazione comune su terrorismo e crisi mediorientale.
la Repubblica	29 novembre 2005	Alessandro Oppes	Un compromesso di basso profilo, raggiunto in extremis dopo ore di snervante trattativa, che ha permesso di scongiurare il fallimento della conferenza di Barcellona.
la Repubblica	29 novembre 2005	Alessandro Oppes	Di fronte all'impossibilità di arrivare a un accordo sottoscritto da tutti i partecipanti, il documento conclusivo è una dichiarazione della presidenza, che il premier britannico Tony Blair, scegliendo la definizione di "visione comune", ha provato a gestire - con un ampio sorriso a denti stretti - come una dimostrazione di pieno successo.
la Repubblica	17 giugno 2006	Dal Nostro Inviato	Il processo euro-mediterraneo lanciato a Barcellona era arrivato ad un punto di stallo perché in troppi avevano interesse a che l'Europa non prendesse iniziative politiche che avrebbero potuto avere ricadute sul Medio Oriente e su un'altra regione strategicamente importante come il Nord Africa.
la Repubblica	20 febbraio 2007	Romano Prodi e Josè Luis Zapatero	A tale scopo possiamo fare affidamento sul processo di Barcellona.
la Repubblica	20 febbraio 2007	Romano Prodi e Josè Luis Zapatero	Il Processo di Barcellona è altresì un eccellente foro nel quale affrontare sfide comuni di grande importanza come la minaccia del terrorismo o l'intensificazione dei flussi migratori.
Corriere della Sera	29 settembre 1995	Stefanelli Barbara	E' solo a lungo termine che l'operazione potrà funzionare.
Corriere della Sera	9 novembre 1995		"Partnerariato euro-mediterraneo"
Corriere della Sera	22 novembre 1995	Pullara Giuseppe	Si tratta di un evento di grande valore simbolico che dovrebbe produrre effetti concreti. Solo ai tempi dell'impero romano il Mediterraneo ha rappresentato un'unità geo politica essendo stato attraversato, prima e dopo quell'epoca, da profonde divisioni che non sono però riuscite a cancellare un continuo fitto dialogo tra diverse economie, civiltà, culture.
Corriere della Sera	27 novembre 1995	Botti Ettore	E' un appuntamento difficile, ma molto importante. Per la prima volta l'Europa e i Paesi al di là del cosiddetto Mare nostrum si trovano insieme per fissare migliori regole di convivenza.
Corriere della Sera	27 novembre 1995	Botti Ettore	La formula da raggiungere viene burocraticamente definita "partenariato": in realtà si tratta di qualcosa di meno di un'associazione e qualcosa di più della tradizionale, malfamata cooperazione.
Corriere della Sera	29 novembre 1995	Vignolo Mino	Il documento, nell'intento dei firmatari è la prima pietra di una futura associazione politica, economica e culturale fra le due sponde del Mediterraneo che contribuirà a combattere l'instabilità e la povertà sulla riva Sud bloccando migrazioni massicce verso l'Europa.
Corriere della Sera	12 luglio 2005	Radice Giancarlo	"Dichiarazione di Barcellona" sono ancora un miraggio: sarà molto difficile, in primo luogo, che quella che s' affaccia al Mediterraneo diventi un'area di libero scambio entro il 2010.

Corriere della Sera	19 gennaio 2006	Taino Danilo	la Conferenza di Barcellona del 1995 ha indicato nel 2010 il termine per la creazione di una zona di libero scambio euro-mediterranea, altra opportunità di crescita sia per il lato Sud sia per il lato Nord del Mediterraneo.
Corriere della Sera	19 febbraio 2006	Carioti Antonio	(…) euro-mediterranea, avviata nel 1995 a Barcellona, e propone il suo rilancio come preziosa opportunità di crescita per le regioni meridionali del nostro Paese. Il partenariato euro-mediterraneo non attraversa un momento felice.
Corriere della Sera	16 luglio 2006	Jacchia Antonia	"Laboratorio Euro-Mediterraneo", cercando un approccio sociale "non solo il punto di vista economico ma culturale, religioso, artistico".

(I) Expression – the other

la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Tony Blaire e Jose Zapatero	Nel mondo arabo è unanime il consenso per quanto riguarda la necessità di incrementare la modernizzazione e adattare progressivamente la struttura legale e le pratiche amministrative alle esigenze dei cittadini, così come degli investitori stranieri e locali.

(I) Expression – associative/dissociative

la Repubblica	10 novembre 1996	Alessandra Ziniti	Dall'apertura alla Libia ai problemi dell'immigrazione clandestina che in Italia e negli altri paesi del Mediterraneo rischia seriamente di provocare incidenti di ordine pubblico.
la Repubblica	16 gennaio 2004	Patrizia Capua	"Un'occasione importante d'incontro fra Unione europea e i partner della sponda sud del Mediterraneo. L'esigenza di dialogo fra di loro trova in questo evento espressione concreta". è stato il messaggio del presidente Ciampi, a dare il via ai lavori del seminario Euro-mediterraneo (...)
la Repubblica	27 novembre 2005	Alessandro Oppes	(…), la maggior parte degli obiettivi allora enunciati è rimasta lontana dall'essere compiuta. In particolare, il varo di riforme liberali e democratiche nei paesi arabi e la creazione di una zona di libero commercio nel Mediterraneo. Già allora, nel 1995, si parlava della necessità di rafforzare la cooperazione per ridurre le migrazioni illegali: l'auspicio di allora è diventato oggi un'esigenza impellente.
la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Alessandro Oppes	Dalla prima bozza di documento finale è stato eliminato un paragrafo sulla possibile creazione di una zona medio - orientale libera da armi di distruzione di massa, nucleari, chimiche e biologiche.
Corriere della Sera	27 novembre 1995	Botti Ettore	Le Organizzazioni non governative, riunite in un congresso parallelo, hanno affidato il loro scetticismo a uno slogan: "Mediterraneo: mare o muro?" - In effetti, il lavoro preparatorio della Conferenza ha dovuto affrontare un'infinità di ostacoli.
Corriere	28 novem-	Botti Ettore	Nella stesura finale e' scritto: "Coscienti delle loro responsabi-

della Sera	bre 1995		lità, i partner si dichiarano d'accordo nell'adottare misure appropriate per la riammissione dei loro connazionali in situazine illegale". (…) sull'importanza "del ruolo delle migrazioni nelle reciproche relazioni", sulla necessità di incrementare la cooperazione "per ridurre le pressioni migratorie attraverso programmi di formazione professionale e di assistenza alla creazione di posti di lavoro (...), sul mantenimento "dei diritti riconosciuti agli immigrati legalmente residenti". E rimane la decisione di stabilire "una cooperazione più stretta" in materia. Le resistenze dall'altro fronte, sembra specialmente da parte di Marocco, Algeria e Turchia, si sono però rivelate insormontabili.

(I) Expression –Mediterranean region

la Repubblica	31 gennaio 1998	Franco Cassano	(…) il Mediterraneo può ritornare utile anche all'Europa del futuro.
la Repubblica	5 febbraio 1998	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi	Il Mediterraneo costituisce - è inutile negarlo - la frontiera meridionale dell'intera Unione europea.
la Repubblica	20 febbraio 2007	Romano Prodi e Josè Luis Zapatero	Per Italia e Spagna il primo ambito di proiezione esterna è la regione mediterranea. La centralità geostrategica di quest'area comporta sfide di una rilevanza tale da rendere necessario un impegno maggiore da parte dell'Unione.
Corriere della Sera	22 novembre 1995	Pullara Giuseppe	Quattrocento milioni di persone concentrate in un centinaio di centri urbani più o meno rivieraschi del Mare Nostrum, come dicevano orgogliosamente i Romani.
Corriere della Sera	19 gennaio 2006	Taino Danilo	[Rossi] Il Sud, dice, è "un'area relativamente omogenea al centro del Mediterraneo e caratterizzata da problemi massimamente e inevitabilmente sovraregionali".
Corriere della Sera	19 febbraio 2006	Carioti Antonio	La sponda Sud del Mediterraneo vive, infatti, una situazione preoccupante, in cui ai problemi causati dal sottosviluppo economico si aggiunge la minaccia di un fondamentalismo religioso incline all'uso della violenza.
Corriere della Sera	17 luglio 2007	Querze' Rita	Il Mediterraneo lambisce il Duomo.

ITALY – PURPOSE

(I) Purpose- purpose

la Repubblica	10 novembre 1996	Alessandra Ziniti	Un vertice, che fa seguito alla conferenza di Barcellona, convocato per discutere della creazione, entro il 2001, di una zona di libero scambio, ma che ha finito con l'aprirsi ai temi più ampi di una politica di collaborazione nel Mediterraneo.

la Repubblica	29 novembre 1995	Mario Tedeschini Lalli	L'intesa, che prevede di lavorare per la costituzione di una grande area di libero scambio entro il 2010 e per la creazione di un nuovo "Patto di stabilità", era rimasta impigliata su alcuni punti della dichiarazione politica. Ombre lunghe del conflitto mediorientale che si sono stese fino a Barcellona: la questione della lotta al terrorismo, appunto (...); la non proliferazione nucleare (...); il concetto di uno scambio dei territori occupati contro la pace, ecc.
la Repubblica	5 febbraio 1998	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi	Ne è una testimonianza il Processo di Barcellona nel quale - Unione europea si è impegnata con ingenti risorse finanziarie (…) per avviare un dialogo fra le due sponde di un bacino percorso da forti tensioni politiche provocate da problemi di ordine economico e sociale, emarginazione culturale, fanatismo religioso, terrorismo.
la Repubblica	5 febbraio 1998	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi	Ma quale "fortezza Europa" potrebbe resistere a una così forte pressione demografica accompagnata dalla sfida della globalizzazione dell'economia? (…) la sola risposta possibile è invece la cooperazione e la partnership tra le due sponde, la ricerca congiunta di nuove forme di integrazione socio-economica, di scambi di idee e di cultura. Un'integrazione progressiva e controllata che presupponga la creazione di poli di sviluppo nel Mediterraneo tesi ad arginare e rallentare la pressione demografica verso l'Europa, e la creazione di una vasta area di libero scambio, dalla quale tutti traggano beneficio, aperta ai traffici provenienti dall'Africa e dall'Asia.
la Repubblica	24 gennaio 2004	Gianni Pittella	Da questo punto di vista vi sono tre appuntamenti da non perdere e una politica da sviluppare. Il primo appuntamento si chiama fondazione per il dialogo interreligioso; il secondo, Banca Euromediterranea e il terzo è l'istituzione di un parlamento del Mediterraneo.
la Repubblica	28 aprile 2004	Nostro inviato Andrea Bonanni	"L'Asia, in pieno boom, arriva all'Europa attraverso il Canale di Suez. L'importanza economica del Mediterraneo sta crescendo rapidamente e dobbiamo costruire le condizioni politiche perché quest'area possa continuare a prosperare. Senza contare che, nello spazio di una generazione, la sponda sud del Mediterraneo avrà una popolazione superiore a quella della sponda europea". E' con questa filosofia in testa, spiega adesso, che cinque anni fa Romano Prodi, (...)
la Repubblica	17 giugno 2006	Dal Nostro Inviato	Gli obiettivi della cooperazione rafforzata sono solo apparentemente modesti: l'istituzione di una Banca del Mediterraneo al cui capitale partecipino anche i Paesi della riva Sud; la gestione congiunta dei flussi migratori; la creazione di istituti universitari comuni tra Europa, Medio Oriente e Nord Africa. In realtà a ben guardare l'iniziativa tocca settori cruciali come l'economia, la sicurezza, il dialogo culturale e perfino la difesa su uno scacchiere geopolitico essenziale sia per la crisi mediorientale sia per la sfida dell'islamismo radicale.

Corriere della Sera	29 settembre 1995	Stefanelli Barbara	"Un futuro di pace favorisce l'Europa. (…)"
Corriere della Sera	9 novembre 1995		… dell'Ue: l'educazione e la formazione professionale, il recupero della comune eredità culturale mediterranea; la cooperazione industriale; lo sviluppo dell'imprenditoria privata e del ruolo delle piccole e medie imprese; lo studio dei flussi migratori.
Corriere della Sera	22 novembre 1995	Pullara Giuseppe	Un tale squilibrio nella distribuzione della popolazione e' destinato a produrre un dissesto irreversibile delle condizioni ambientali.
Corriere della Sera	27 novembre 1995	Botti Ettore	Le basi restano economiche: oltre 11 mila miliardi di lire che l'Ue promette di distribuire ai Paesi del Sud. Ma gli aiuti non vengono legati soltanto a clausole tecniche, poiché si cerca un allargamento del dialogo alla sfera politica e culturale.
Corriere della Sera	29 novembre 1995	Vignolo Mino	(…) creare uno "spazio comune di pace e di stabilità", (…)

(I) Purpose -aim

La Repubblica	29 novembre 1995	Mario Tedeschini Lalli	(…) a fare del Mediterraneo "uno spazio comune di pace e stabilità" e una "zona di prosperità condivisa".
la Repubblica	19 ottobre 1999	Salvatore Tropea	…) che è pronta a mettere sul tavolo un bel mucchio di miliardi per un piano strategico sull'utilizzo dell'acqua che potrebbe sembrare ambizioso non tanto per la sua entità quanto per la sua finalità politica.
la Repubblica	04 marzo 2004	Dal Nostro Corrispondente Franco Papitto	La "nuova Nato" di Frattini deve diventare "simbolo e sede" di un "dialogo nuovo e più forte con i paesi dell'area mediterranea e mediorientale". Occorre "rafforzare la dimensione politica dell'Alleanza" per "delineare una strategia di lungo periodo" nei confronti dei paesi che si trovano a sud e a sud-est dell'Europa.
la Repubblica	04 marzo 2004	Dal Nostro Corrispondente Franco Papitto	Nella visione di Frattini, questo dialogo va sviluppato nei settori della sicurezza, della politica, dell'economia e della cultura.
la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Tony Blair e Jose Zapatero	Ci stiamo adoperando per migliorare le prospettive economiche dei palestinesi, per creare le istituzioni dello Stato palestinese, ivi inclusi il supporto alle elezioni e le riforme del settore pubblico. Abbiamo da poco preso la decisione di mettere a disposizione una missione di monitoraggio della frontiera tra Gaza e l'Egitto al di sopra delle parti.
la Repubblica	29 novembre 2005	Alessandro Oppes	Il vertice euro-mediterraneo ha anche varato un "piano di lavoro" quinquennale per estendere i tradizionali ambiti di cooperazione economica, politica e culturale a temi di fondamentale importanza per i paesi dell'area come la sicurezza alla lotta contro l'immigrazione illegale.
la Repubblica	20 febbraio 2007	Romano Prodi e Josè Luis Zapatero	Il dialogo interculturale è un canale prioritario per il conseguimento dell'obiettivo di fare del Mediterraneo uno spazio di pace, sicurezza, stabilità e prosperità

			condivise.
Corriere della Sera	29 settembre 1995	Stefanelli Barbara	Con l'obiettivo di arrivare a un'area di libero scambio nel 2000.
Corriere della Sera	15 maggio 1996	(d.ma)	Quel Mediterraneo che dovrebbe arrivare a essere nel 2010 una zona di libero scambio: un mercato di 600 milioni di persone.
Corriere della Sera	2 luglio 2004	Panza Pierluigi	La seconda conferenza Euro-Mediterraneo dovrebbe avviare altri interventi, come la creazione di una più diffusa rete di uffici della Camera di commercio di Milano nelle capitali del Mediterraneo e offrire alle Camere di questi Paesi uno spazio a Milano.
Corriere della Sera	30 marzo 2007	Jacchia Antonia	"Non sarà il 2010 come indicato ma dal 2012 si aprirà un mercato di 600 milioni di persone.

ITALY – IDENTITY

(I) Identity - role

Corriere della Sera	29 settembre 1995	Stefanelli Barbara	E' necessario intervenire a tre livelli: aiuti strutturali ai governi, investimenti privati, realizzazione dell'area di libero scambio.

(I) Identity - EU

la Repubblica	23 maggio 1995	di Dino Frescobaldi	I ministri degli Esteri italiani, Susanna Agnelli, e spagnolo, Xavier Solana Madariaga, hanno lanciato una proposta per il rafforzamento del rapporto in tutti i campi fra l'Europa e i paesi del Mediterraneo, in particolare quelli della sponda sud. Questo in un tempo in cui a fronte di fatti positivi, cioè il processo di pace nel Medio Oriente, si manifestano tendenze a dir poco inquietanti, come la diffusione di fenomeni di certo radicalismo religioso con relativo terrorismo. Anche in questo caso saremmo tentati di dire: finalmente.
la Repubblica	10 novembre 1996	Alessandra Ziniti	"Una strada lunga che necessita di tolleranza delle diversità e non di interventi di polizia - (…)
la Repubblica	29 novembre 1995	Mario Tedeschini Lalli	Era la prima volta dall'apertura della conferenza di pace di Madrid, quattro anni fa. C'era chi sperava in un incontro a quattr' occhi. Spagnoli ed egiziani si sono dati molto da fare, ma i siriani non hanno voluto saperne. Delusione? "Neanche un po' - dice Solana - sono felice: li ho visti che si parlavano e li ho visti votare insieme".
la Repubblica	29 novembre 1995	Mario Tedeschini Lalli	Un altro aspetto di quell'attenzione al sud del mondo che Paesi come l'Italia chiedevano da tempo ai partner e che oggi fa dire a Susanna Agnelli con "grande soddisfazione" che "l'Europa è diventata un po' meno nordica e un po' più mediterranea".-
la Repubblica	31 gennaio 1998	Franco Cassano	l'Italia è una penisola tuffata nel Mediterraneo (come abbiamo tutti imparato a scuola) e non esistono al momento tecnologie che permettano di spostarla altrove, nel mare del Nord o di

			fonderla nel cuore continentale d'Europa.
la Repubblica	31 gennaio 1998	Franco Cassano	Questo scontro di opzioni e di concezioni dell'Europa è una cosa seria perché è fuori discussione che se prevalesse la vecchia immagine del Mediterraneo come palude e "buco nero", a pagarne le spese sarebbe in primo luogo l'Italia. LUNGI dall'essere retorica l'insistenza sulla dimensione mediterranea dell'Europa (fenomeno che non è solo italiano) è importante per almeno due ragioni. In primo luogo perché cambierebbe il ruolo del sud e dell'Italia non più appendice remota, molle e sperduta del corpo massiccio d'Europa, ma cuore di una nuova fase della storia continentale.
la Repubblica	31 gennaio 1998	Franco Cassano	Pedrag Matvejevic ama dire che un'Europa senza Mediterraneo è come un uomo senza infanzia.
la Repubblica	5 febbraio 1998	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi	La stabilità, la prosperità, la pace di questo "lago interno", per ripetere la citazione di Braudel, non è solamente un problema italiano. Riguarda tutta l'Europa.
la Repubblica	5 febbraio 1998	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi	Ignorare quindi la necessità - per l'Europa - di "creare ponti" su questo mare è ignorare la geografia, la storia, la politica.
la Repubblica	5 febbraio 1998	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi	In questo contesto il ruolo dell'Italia non è quello di sentinella, ma di "ponte" tra Europa e Mediterraneo.
la Repubblica	5 febbraio 1998	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi	Un'Italia che abdichi al suo ruolo storico e politico nel Mediterraneo è destinata a posizioni marginali nel contesto europeo, alla ricerca della benevola accettazione dei potenti del Nord.
la Repubblica	5 febbraio 1998	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi	Una politica italiana senza una visione mediterranea è un nonsenso storico, inevitabilmente destinata a impoverirci politicamente e culturalmente e quindi a ridurre il nostro peso specifico condannandoci ineluttabilmente all'emarginazione in Europa.
la Repubblica	30 luglio 1998	Paolo Garimberti	In fondo trattasi di un tipico problema comunitario, che ha molteplici aspetti: politici di sicurezza, economici di aiuto allo sviluppo, e umanitari. Un paese da solo non può risolverli, può al massimo tamponarli, perché alla base c'è l'enorme divario socio-economico, ma anche culturale, tra le due sponde del Mediterraneo, che richiede una soluzione collegiale.
la Repubblica	05 dicembre 2003	Khaled Fouad Allam	Perché ritraggono un'Europa doppiamente divisa: spaccata sulla questione irachena, quasi assente nel processo di pace israelo-palestinense, e sempre più asimmetrica rispetto agli Stati Uniti.
la Repubblica	05 dicembre 2003	Khaled Fouad Allam	L'Ue sta cercando di fornire un nuovo approccio a tali questioni, attraverso un ruolo più incisivo delle regioni confinanti: si pensa che la prossimità possa aiutare a realizzare nuove politiche nelle relazioni mediterranee. Certo, la regione può dare un impulso in più, può avviare processi innovativi: ma purtroppo non esistono simmetrie fra istanze regionali come quelle spagnole o italiane e quelle dei paesi arabi in cui lo stato spesso rimane di tipo giacobino, fortemente centralizzato: vale a dire che un presidente di regione in Italia o in Spagna non è equiparabile al presidente di una regione in Siria o in Egitto.
la Repubblica	24 gennaio 2004	Gianni Pittella	(…) cui all'Europa interessa prevalentemente premunirsi dagli ingenti flussi migratori o dalle ricorrenti minacce terroristiche. L'equazione "Mediterraneo uguale frontiera difensi-

			va", è solo una faccia della politica euro-mediterranea.
la Repubblica	28 aprile 2004	Nostro inviato Andrea Bonanni	La mossa di Prodi fu accolta, allora, con un misto di sarcasmo e indignazione e il riavvicinamento libico venne bocciato dai governi europei.
la Repubblica	28 aprile 2004	Nostro inviato Andrea Bonanni	Un lavoro diplomatico paziente, di cui la Commissione ha costantemente ma discretamente tenuto informate le principali capitali europee. Ora la visita di Gheddafi a Bruxelles apre la strada alla partecipazione della Libia al processo di Barcellona, con gli europei, gli israeliani e gli stati arabi rivieraschi del Mediterraneo.
la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Tony Blair e Jose Zapatero	L'Europa e il mondo sono sempre più strettamente interconnessi: il flagello del terrorismo ci ha colpiti tutti, (…). L'immigrazione è apportatrice di nuove energie quando è legale, ma è deleteria allorché è incontrollata o, ancora peggio, orchestrata da gang del crimine. Il traffico di uomini, (...)
la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Tony Blair e Jose Zapatero	L'Ue, nonostante tutti gli ostacoli frapposti, rimane fortemente impegnata a supportare la loro ambizione di pace.
la Repubblica	28 novembre 2005	Alessandro Oppes	(…) l'Unione europea prevede la creazione di un "meccanismo finanziario sostanziale" per offrire maggiore assistenza ai paesi che portino a compimento riforme democratiche.
la Repubblica	29 novembre 2005	Andrea Bonanni	Un fallimento annunciato, se si vuole, ma che spieghi la ragioni dell'assenza dei principali leader arabi. Si tratti del processo di pace in Medio Oriente o della lotta al terrorismo, due temi di interesse vitale per tutti gli europei, il ruolo dell'Unione resta marginale.
la Repubblica	17 giugno 2006	Dal Nostro Inviato	La mossa di Prodi ha due facce. Da una parte risponde alla sua vecchia idea della "politica di vicinato" grazie alla quale l'Europa dovrebbe tessere una fitta rete di rapporti politici ed economici con i Paesi limitrofi, e rilancia un altro criterio caro al Professore: la ritrovata centralità del Mediterraneo come snodo commerciale verso le rampanti potenze asiatiche. Dall'altra parte, mettendo sul tavolo per la prima volta l'idea di una cooperazione rafforzata, cioè di un'iniziativa politica ristretta ai soli Paesi che la condividono, Prodi manda un preciso messaggio all'Europa.
la Repubblica	17 giugno 2006	Dal Nostro Inviato	L'Europa è da tempo bloccata da due tipi di veti: quelli espliciti e quelli impliciti, esercitati attraverso l'inerzia. Se si apre una stagione di cooperazioni rafforzate, almeno quest'ultima arma, la più sottile, finirà per risultare spuntata.
la Repubblica	17 giugno 2006	Dal Nostro Inviato	L'Unione europea è un terreno insidioso e nessun uomo politico può illudersi di rilanciare da solo processi che sono stati bloccati con il concorso di molti.
la Repubblica	17 giugno 2006	Dal Nostro Inviato	Ma l'Europa è una macchina complessa, continuamente percorsa da tensioni sotterranee sia nella sua dinamica sia nella sua statica.
la Repubblica	20 febbraio 2007	Romano Prodi e Josè Luis Zapatero	[Frieden im Nahen Osten] E lo faremo con la convinzione che l'Italia e la Spagna hanno molto da offrire, sia in seno all'Unione Europea che nell'ambito del Processo di Barcellona, per essere realmente in grado di passare da una visione ossessionata dal passato ad una volontà animata dal futuro.
la Repubblica	10 dicembre 2007	Bernardo Valli	(…), l'Unione mediterranea è senz'altro il disegno di politica estera più ambizioso di Nicolas Sarkozy. Non si tratta di un semplice partenariato tra le due sponde (come quello previsto

			dal cosiddetto "processo di Barcellona" nato dodici anni fa e mai seriamente decollato), ma qualcosa di molto più concreto ed esteso. Il progetto propone relazioni non identiche ma simili a quelle esistenti tra i membri dell'Unione europea.
la Repubblica	10 dicembre 2007	Bernardo Valli	Ma le critiche più nette, più dirette sono state espresse da Angela Merkel.
la Repubblica	10 dicembre 2007	Bernardo Valli	Angela Merkel rifiutava l'Unione mediterranea.
la Repubblica	10 dicembre 2007	Bernardo Valli	Due caratteri, due politiche di due personaggi ideologicamente vicini.
la Repubblica	26 febbraio 2008	Giampiero Martinotti	(…) l'Unione mediterranea (…). Un progetto voluto da Sarkozy e osteggiato dai tedeschi, che considerano quell'idea in totale contraddizione con l'Unione europea. Secondo Berlino, i rapporti con l'altra sponda del Mediterraneo devono avvenire all'interno del processo di Barcellona, lanciato nel 1995, e coinvolgere tutti i Ventisette. Un'idea condivisa anche dai diplomatici italiani e spagnoli, che si guardano bene dal dirlo pubblicamente: (...)
Corriere della Sera	29 settembre 1995	Stefanelli Barbara	L'Ue presenterà un programma di collaborazione su tre piani: sicurezza, accordi politici e culturali, rapporti economici e finanziari.
Corriere della Sera	9 novembre 1995		(…) l'importanza della Conferenza Euro mediterranea che si svolgerà a Barcellona il 27 e 28 novembre e che servirà proprio a chiarire gli indirizzi politici dell'Ue verso il lato Sud. " Nella nostra visione, Barcellona dovrebbe già porre. ha spiegato. le basi per l'ulteriore sviluppo delle relazioni"
Corriere della Sera	22 novembre 1995	Pullara Giuseppe	E Roma non poteva non essere scelta come la sede di una conferenza che unisce proprio tutti i Paesi del Mare Interno.
Corriere della Sera	27 novembre 1995	Botti Ettore	Un fiume di soldi, a patto che ci siano dall'altro lato garanzie di stabilità e rispetto dei diritti umani.
Corriere della Sera	29 novembre 1995	Vignolo Mino	(…), l'Europa si ritrova " un po' meno nordica e un po' più mediterranea".
Corriere della Sera	15 maggio 1996	(d.ma)	Una pressione che per un'Europa malata di disoccupazione, con i suoi oltre 18 milioni di senza lavoro, potrebbe diventare ancora più dolorosa.
Corriere della Sera	19 gennaio 1997	Taino Danilo	Ma, alla fine, Prodi ha voluto dichiarare che si e' trattato di una discussione utile per "portare avanti insieme la politica del Mediterraneo nei confronti degli altri Paesi dell'Unione europea". Per ora, non c' è un asse Italia - Spagna e, ufficialmente, nemmeno iniziative politiche comuni.
Corriere della Sera	19 gennaio 1997	Taino Danilo	"Per ora - ha aggiunto Prodi - e' importante che due Paesi come Spagna e Italia si coordinino sui tempi della Conferenza intergovernativa europea: nulla di ufficiale, di concreto", ma un coordinamento su cose importanti.
Corriere della Sera	19 gennaio 1997	Taino Danilo	[MMPOL] (…) c' è un "destino comune".
Corriere della Sera	30 maggio 2003		Malta ha una conoscenza particolare dell'area euro-mediterranea; la conferenza per la sicurezza e la cooperazione in Europa, conosciuta come "teorema codificato a Helsinki", stabilisce che non può esserci stabilità in Europa se non c'è stabilità nel Mediterraneo.
Corriere della Sera	14 giugno 2003	Querze' Rita	(…), "l'Europa guarda troppo a Nord e ad Est, mentre dovrebbe considerare di più il Mediterraneo".

Corriere della Sera	10 febbraio 2004	Allam Magdi	"Un'Europa che si allarga e che ha scenari di sicurezza che ormai riguardano gli svedesi così come i ciprioti non può non avere nel Mediterraneo un partenariato forte per la sicurezza e per lo sviluppo sostenibile. Quello che abbiamo fatto col processo di Barcellona in termini di partenario economico lo vogliamo realizzare in sede Nato con quei Paesi della sponda Sud del Mediterraneo che ormai condividono il nostro medesimo obiettivo".
Corriere della Sera	2 luglio 2004	Panza Pierluigi	La strategia del progetto è chiara. L'apertura dell'Europa ai 10 Paesi dell'Est favorisce, dal punto di vista commerciale, la più vicina Germania. L'Italia e Milano possono battere la concorrenza di Francia e Spagna nel Nord Africa. Non a caso, in un momento di contrazione economica, i Paesi in cui salgono le nostre esportazioni sono quelli del Mediterraneo, con in testa la Turchia.
Corriere della Sera	5 luglio 2005	Radice Giancarlo	Il nostro sviluppo economico, lo stesso recupero di competitività del nostro sistema, passa dal Mediterraneo, dove possiamo avere un ruolo da protagonista più di quanto non lo siano Francia e Spagna".
Corriere della Sera	12 luglio 2005	Radice Giancarlo	In Italia, però, dal mondo della politica come della cultura e dell'imprenditoria arrivano segni di un'accelerazione del processo di integrazione.
Corriere della Sera	12 luglio 2005	Querze' Rita	L'arma migliore contro il terrorismo? Non fucili e cannoni, ma l'integrazione economica.
Corriere della Sera	19 febbraio 2006	Carioti Antonio	Se l'Europa non riuscirà a diffondere benessere e democrazia nel Mediterraneo, rischia di ritrovarsi in casa propria le terribili piaghe che affliggono quei Paesi.
Corriere della Sera	16 luglio 2006	Jacchia Antonia	Italia, Paese leader del Mediterraneo.
Corriere della Sera	18 luglio 2006	Jacchia Antonia	In un momento drammatico per il Medio Oriente, Milano lancia un messaggio di speranza "una maggior pace ai confini è una condizione indispensabile per la crescita, ma l'Italia è già il primo partner commerciale dei Paesi che si affacciano nel Sud del Mediterraneo.
Corriere della Sera	18 luglio 2006	Jacchia Antonia	(…), l'Italia si conferma Paese leader del Mare Nostrum: (…)
Corriere della Sera	30 marzo 2007	Jacchia Antonia	Un ponte naturale tra l'Europa e il Sud del Mediterraneo. E un porto sicuro per gli scambi commerciali. L'Italia è leader in Europa per l'interscambio con i Paesi del Nord Africa.
Corriere della Sera	30 marzo 2007	Jacchia Antonia	Persino gli Stati Uniti si stanno ben posizionando in Marocco. L'Italia non può perdere questo treno. E i media possono giocare un ruolo fondamentale.
Corriere della Sera	7 luglio 2007	Jacchia Antonia	E di fronte a questa audience Promos lancerà una proposta per affrontare uno dei problemi che più limita lo sviluppo economico del Mediterraneo, il nodo delle infrastrutture. Due strumenti che dovrebbero operare in tandem: un osservatorio che identifichi i progetti prioritari (porti, autostrade, ferrovie) e un Fondo ad hoc, per la loro realizzazione. Un progetto ambizioso, ma come pensate di organizzarlo perché non faccia la fine della Banca mediterranea promessa a Barcellona e mai realizzata? (...) Un veicolo per sostenere le imprese italiane eventualmente incaricate di realizzare le opere.
Corriere	17 luglio	Querze' Rita	Niente nuotate e bagni di sole: sotto la Madonnina le acque

della Sera	2007		del mare nostrum portano ricchi affari, Non deve stupire, perciò, che Milano punzecchi l'Italia (e l'Europa) perché si rinsaldino i rapporti con i Paesi affacciati sul Mare Nostrum.
Corriere della Sera	17 luglio 2007	Querze' Rita	L'Unione mediterranea proposta dal presidente francese, Nicolas Sarkozy, è un obiettivo conseguente". Milano non si accontenta. "L'intento è condivisibile ma è necessario porsi obiettivi concreti. Per questo serve una conferenza programmatica con tutti i Paesi che intendono far parte del progetto - propone il presidente di Promos, Bruno Ermolli -. Una conferenza da organizzare a Milano: qui abbiamo un'esperienza d'ascolto nei confronti dei Paesi dell'area.
Corriere della Sera	17 luglio 2007	Stringa Giovanni	"Se le opportunità economiche ci sono - ha commentato Prodi -, è la politica che manca".
Corriere della Sera	21 dicembre 2007	Fregonara Gianna	"Un grande sogno", ha detto Sarkozy, che è il promotore dell'iniziativa, anche se molto c' è ancora da fare perché quello di luglio sia un successo. In realtà l'Appello siglato ieri è molto più "rassicurante" di quanto Sarkozy non abbia annunciato e destinato a sciogliere ambiguità e dubbi dei Paesi dell'Unione europea e dei Paesi della riva Sud del Mediterraneo.
Corriere della Sera	21 dicembre 2007	Fregonara Gianna	Per Italia e Spagna è importante essere i protagonisti della troika mediterranea.
Corriere della Sera	21 dicembre 2007	Fregonara Gianna	(…) e vero punto di discordia con gli altri Paesi dell'Ue: "Il futuro che abbiamo davanti nel Mediterraneo è una scelta tra la peggiore delle guerre o la migliore delle paci".
Corriere della Sera	9 novembre 1995		"l'obbligo storico di aiutare quella parte di Europa esclusa per oltre quarant' anni dai benefici della democrazia politica". Ma "e' tempo per l'Unione di adempiere ad un obbligo storico altrettanto importante: la creazione di uno Spazio comune euro mediterraneo".

6. SPAIN

SPAIN – EXPRESSION

(E) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

El Mundo	03.04.2000	Marisa Cruz	A falta de limar las últimas aristas, de declaración de la primera Cumbre de El Cairo (…) es una receta elaborada íntegramente por los europeos en la que éstos admiten implícitamente su fracaso a la hora de prestar ayuda con eficacia.
El Mundo	01.06.2002	EFE	Bruselas recuerda que, desde la suspensión en 1997 por problemas de gestión del programa "Med-Campus", no ha habido en el Mediterráneo ningún programa comunitario que financiara proyectos descentralizados de cooperación gestionados por redes univeritarias.
El Mundo	08.09.2004	EFE	[BP] Ese proceso es considerado vital por parte de España para sus intereses en la zona y pretende que el próximo año haya una significativa conmemoración de su décimo aniversario.
El Mundo	25.11.2005	Silvia Taules	A partir de la cumbre de Barcelona de 1995 se diseñaron una

			serie de acuerdos bilaterales entre la Unión Europea y cada uno de los países mediterráneos.
El Mundo	25.11.2005	EFE	(…) 'Proceso de Barcelona', es un foro que reúne a los países de la Ue y a los de las orillas sur y este del Mediterráneo (…)
El Mundo	25.11.2005	EFE	(…) el proceso de Barcelona, (…), "ha propiciado un productivo debate en los tres ámbitos fundamentales que cubre esta iniciativa: el político y de seguridad, el económico y financiero y el social y cultural".
El Mundo	29.11.2005	?	(…) la 'Declaración de Barcelona' (…), lejos de convertirse en una herramienta efectiva contra la pobreza, (…)
El Mundo	29.11.2005	?	(…), el 'Proceso de Barcelona' o Allianza Euromediterránea, (…), ha hecho muy poco para mejorar la vida de las personas del sur.
El Mundo	29.11.2005	?	(…), la pobreza en la región aún es profunda y es de vital importancia que se aprueben medidas que tengan un impacto real en la vida de las personas con menos recursos.
El Mundo	29.11.2005	?	[Ariane Arpa] (…) "el acuerdo se llama a sí mismo una 'alianza', lo que significa que los países tienen que tener en cuenta las necesidades de los que más lo necesitan.
El Mundo	13.03.2008	María Ramírez	La cumbre de noviembre de 2005 en Barcelona fue el principio del fin del proceso que lleva su nombre para el diálogo de la UE con los países árabes.
El Mundo	13.03.2008	María Ramírez	(...) la creación de una nueva organización para firmar acuerdos comerciales o migratorios con los países del sur del Mediterráneo, en sustitución del moribundo Proceso de Barcelona, cuyo golpe de gracia fue la reunión aquel cálido otoño de 2005 donde fallaron numerosos líderes árabes y no se llegó a ningún acuerdo sustancial.
El Mundo	13.03.2008	María Ramírez	Las tribulaciones del Proceso de Barcelona, que ha gastado en la última década cerca de 20.000 miliones de euros en asistencia y cooperación con pocos resultados, le ha dado la ocasión perfecta a Sarkozy para apoderarse de la apetitosa relación con los países mediterráneos.
El Mundo	13.03.2008	María Ramírez	(...) esta nueva organización el 'Club Med', el apodo despreciativo que utilizan algunos diplomáticos en referencia a una cadena de hoteles francesa- (...)
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	El Proceso de Barcelona, tras más de 12 años de altibajos, cerca de 20.000 millones de euros invertidos, pocos resultados y alguna cumbre fallida, se convirtió anoche en la Unión para el Mediterráneo, un invento de París con un futuro incierto en manos de Nicolas Sarkozy.
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	[Sarkozy] "Barcelona no ha funcionado. Si hubiera funcionado se sabría"
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	[Sarkozy] "Barcelona era buena idea, una buena intuición, pero no ha producido todos los frutos que esperábamos"
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	(…) la ambiciosa idea del presidente francés (…)
El Mundo	13.07.2008	?	"Se ha dado un impulso cualitativo importante, histórico y positivo a lo que fue la Conferencia de Barcelona hace trece años", resumió (…) Moratinos.
El PAÍS	08.03.1995	Sami Naïr	se trata de un desarollo basado en la complementariedad voluntaria de los intereses a largo plazo de las dos orillas.
El PAÍS	01.07.1995	Ignacio	La Conferencia Euromediterránea es, probablemente, el acon-

		Cembrero	tecimiento más llamativo del semestre español al frente de la UE, pero no es una idea nueva surgida en los últimos meses.
El PAÍS	20.09.1995	Sami Naïr	Tiene la Unión Europea una política para el Mediteráneo?
El PAÍS	20.09.1995	Sami Naïr	Lejos de constituir una verdadera estrategia de cod'esarrollo entre las dos riberas, resulta ser sobre todo un hábil disfraz de una mera apertura de los mercados del Sur.
El PAÍS	27.11.1995	Juan Altable	Esto es una novedad muy significativa.
El PAÍS	13.03.2008	Andreu Missé/R. M. de Rituerto	"Lo primero que se ve es que cambia la etiqueta: de proceso de Barelona a Unión para el Mediterráneo. Es el mínimo común denominador", apunta Michael Emerson, (…) (CEPS)
El PAÍS	14.03.2008	R. M. de Rituerto/A. Missé	Proceso que todos ven necesitado de una moderización para responder a las expectativas creadas en su nacimiento de 1995 y hoy defraudadas.
El PAÍS	15.03.2008	?	(…) cambiar la etiqueta de la cooperación con los países de la ribera sur mediterránea por el farragoso título de Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo. Lo importante no debería ser el nombre, sino el contenido.
El PAÍS	15.03.2008	?	La iniciativa, (…), no ha logrado del todo despegar, pese a los 20.000 millones de euros invertidos por Bruselas a lo largo de este tiempo.
El PAÍS	15.03.2008	?	El diálogo euromediterráneo ha fracasado en uno de sus principales objetivos: la integración y la cooperación entre sí de los países de la cuenca sur del Mediterráneo. Pero sobre todo se ha visto contaminado por la crisis de Oriente Próximo.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	El 13 de julio de 2008, al mismo tiempo que la recesión norteamericana se dejaba sentir sobre el resto del mundo, se anunciaba en París, coincidiendo con el inicio de la Presidencia francesa de la UE, el nacimiento oficial del Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	En primer lugar, implicaba una toma de conciencia de la ralentización y el estancamiento del proyecto estratégico de Barcelona.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	En cualquier caso, ya está en la agenda política europea como una continuación del Proceso de Barcelona.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	Pero una cosa está clara: se seguirá trabajando dentro del marco estratégico establecido por el acuerdo de 1995.
El PAÍS	05.11.2008	Joan Foguet	El denominado Proceso de Barcelona era una primera piedra para unir alrededor del Mediterráneo una de las partes del mundo con mayor confluencia cultural diferente, grandes identidades contrastadas y raíces religiosas opuestas.
El PAÍS	07.11.2008	?	El proceso euromediterráneo, que lleva 13 años de resultados muy mejorables, necesitaba una sede permanente y un organismo impulsor, equitativamente representativo de todas las partes, que lo visualizase.
El PAÍS	13.11.2008	?	[el principe Felipe] esta iniciativa, que data de 1982, de "audaz y valiente", y afirmó que supuso una gran visión de futuro, porque después dio paso al denominado Proceso de Barcelona y ahora a la designación de Barcelona como capital euromediterránea.

(E) Expression – the other

El Mundo	03.04.2000	Marisa Cruz	Los países africanos han dado el visto bueno a la casi totalidad del documento, asumiendo, al menos sobre el papel, compromisos que nunca cumplirán.
El Mundo	04.11.2008	Europa Press	La propuesta también introduce una "fórmula" para la participación de la Liga Árabe en el proyecto, según indicaron fuentes diplomáticas que, sin embargo, evitaron aclarar en qué grado asistiría esta organización. Hasta ahora, la Liga Árabe ha practicado como 'observador' en reuniones de Exteriores y países árabes han defendido una presencia mayor de este órgano, especialmente en otras reuniones de ministros sectoriales.
El PAÍS	20.11.1995	Xavier Vidal-Folch	Crecía en la cuenca sur la angustia por la atención de Bruselas hacia el Este y el temor a quedar marginada del único imán moderizador cercano.

(E) Expression – associative/dissociative

El Mundo	04.04.2000	EFE	El presidente libio, Muamar Al Gadafi, ha indicado al presidente en funciones español, José María Aznar, que la cooperación entre Europa y Africa es "necessaria" y que, para ello, debe existir "la confianza mutua que no ha existido en el pasado".
El Mundo	04.04.2000	EFE	Todas las esperanzas de normalización de las relaciones entre Libia y la Ue se han perdido, (…)
El Mundo	04.04.2000	EFE	(…), el coronel Gadafi ha tomado la palabra en la primera sesión de trabajo de la cumbre euro-africana para pronunciar un "discurso excéntrico, repleto de todos los tópicos antioccidentales, anticoloniales y antiamericanos". Al parecer, el discurso no contenía ninguna de las aperturas solicitadas por la Ue, es decir, mención alguna a la aceptación por Tripoli de los principios de la Declaración de Barcelona, por la que se regula desde 1995 el diálogo euro-mediterráneo. Todo lo contrario, Gadafi ha mostrado escaso interés por lo que representa el proceso de Barcelona.
El Mundo	04.04.2000	EFE	"Ustedes no pueden en nombre de Barcelona unir el norte de Africa con Europa, No vengan a dividirnos con la excusa de Barcelona", ha afirmado Gadafi, según testigos de su intervención, celebrada a puerta cerrada.
El Mundo	04.04.2000	EFE	"El deseo que todos tenemos es que Gadafi acepte los resultados de la conferencia de Barcelona para que se pueda incorporar al diálogo euro-mediterráneo. Hasta ahora no ha sido así", puntualizó Solana.
El Mundo	25.11.2005	(CET)	(…) que la cumbre de Barcelona se celebrará en un momento esperanzador para Oriente Medio, tras la apertura del paso de Rafah entre Gaza y Egipto.
El Mundo	29.11.2005	?	Los acuerdos comerciales agrícolas dentro de la cuenca del Mediterráneo no pueden ser recíprocos de igual a igual entre países desiguales-, tal y como marcan los estándares de la Organización Mundial del Comercio. Si las negociaciones impiden a los países del sur del Mediterráneo proteger sus sectores más vulnerables, especialmente para defenderse de las exportaciones agrícolas subsidiadas de la Ue, la producción agrícola podría caer alrededor de

			un 2% y, al mismo tiempo, se reducirían los ingresos de la población que depende de la agricultura para su subsistencia.
El Mundo	29.11.2005	?	Este acuerdo, alcanzado después de largas y arduas negociaciones en Barcelona, suponen la primera declaración de condena al terrorismo que suscriben árabes e israelíes. "Se trata de una demostración de lucidez y hasta de valentía, una apuesta mayoritaria por el diálogo y la cooperación", afirmó Zapatero.
El Mundo	13.07.2008	?	En la declaración final no figura, sin embargo, la referencia que había en el borrador a una "visión de los Estados, un Israel seguro y un Estado palestino viable, soberano y democrático conviviendo en paz y seguridad".
El PAÍS	08.03.1995	Sami Naïr	Someten a las naciones a la arbitrariedad de las relaciones de fuerza en el mercado internacionalizado.
El PAÍS	08.03.1995	Sami Naïr	Económicamente, la diferencia entre el Norte y el Sur es enorme: más del 87% del producto interior bruto total de la cuenca mediterránea está concentrado en la orilla norte.
El PAÍS	08.03.1995	Sami Naïr	Para Europa se trata de saber si va a construirse contra el Sur o con él. Para el Sur se trata de saber si va a sumirse en el subdesarrolllo y las nuevas formas de colonialismo o si va a recuperarse y convertirse en un elemento constitutivo del conjunto euromediterráneo.
El PAÍS	01.07.1995	Ignacio Cembrero	Éste es el apartado que más reticencias ha suscitado en las capitales árabes, que consideran desmesurada la preocupación europea por la seguridad. Cada una, sin embargo, alberga temores específicos. El Cairo, por ejemplo, no desea adquirir grandes compromisos en materia de derechos humanos cuando está enfrascado en una lucha sin cuartel contra los islamistas, y Damasco y Beirut recelan de un foro del que sospechan que pueda ser utilizado por Israel para discutir de cooperación regional. Argelia, el país árabe en el que el Estado tiene más peso en la economía, está inquieta por verse obligada a avanzar a un ritmo demasiado rápido hacia el libre comercio. Marruecos, por fin, teme que la relación específica que busca con la UE quede diluida en el revoltijo de Barcelona.
El PAÍS	23.11.1995	Sami Naïr	Ve los movimientos migratorios como una coacción negantiva para las relaciones entre las dos riberas, mientras que las migraciones del Sur al Norte han contribuido en gran medida al desarrollo de las sociedades del Norte. Pretende imponer a los países del Sur la obligación de readmitir a sus súbditos sin pronunciarse claramente acerca de los derechos imprescriptibles de aquellos que están instalados legalmente en Europa.
El PAÍS	28.11.1995	X. V. -F./ I. C.	Egipto levantó su reserva sobre la zona de libre comercio -la clave del proyecto-, al obtener garantías de que no prejuzga su acuerdo de asociación. Turquía logró eliminar la referencia a la ampliación de la UE hacia el sur (Chipre y Malta). Y se halló una fórmula de compromiso sobre la no proliferación nuclear, pero Israel se negó a que se hiciera pública hasta que se cerrase todo el paquete. Quedaba el último escollo que enfrenta a árabes e israelíes, la frase que añade a la condena del terrorismo una defensa de la autodeterminación de los pueblos, en lucha contra los invasores.
El PAÍS	17.04.1997	S. G. -D.	El ministro explicó que no habia sido posible finalizar el texto "por problemas políticos sobre la medida en que debía quedar reflejado la situación del proceso de paz en Oriente Próximo".
El PAÍS	16.04.1997	S. G. -D.	La II Conferencia Euromediterránea se desarrolla en dos escena-

			rios distintos. En uno, los europeos intentan desempeñar un papel mediador en el fuego cruzado árabe-israelí. En otro, más oscuro, pero igualmente importante, europeos, isrealíes y árabes intentan mantener a flote e, incluso, avanzar en una serie de acuerdos de política económica y social, que son los que constituyen el núcleo duro del proceso de cooperación entre la UE y la ribera sur del Mediterráneo iniciado en Barcelona hace 17 meses.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	Todos los países europeos y mediterráneos del sur han afirmado su voluntad de reorientar dicho proceso y profundizarlo.

(E) Expression – Mediterranean region

El PAÍS	27.11.1995	Juan Altable	[Isaac Siboni] (…) el Mediterráneo es un solo mar con tres religiones. Me parece un buen punto de partida.

SPAIN – PURPOSE

(E) Purpose - purpose

El Mundo	06.11.2001	EFE	Uno es "constituir una zona Euromediterránea de seguridad, de esabilidad y de bienestar"; el segundo, "favorecer los contactos sociales, culturales y humanos en una amplia gama de ámbitos y con el pleno respeto de cultura, religiones, costumbres y tradiciones respectivas" y, por último, "progresar con la perspectiva de una visión común por el futuro de la región que, para todos nosotros es esencial".
El Mundo	02.10.2004	Europa Press	(…) al 'Proceso de Barcelona' que nació para reforzar el dialogo entre las dos orillas del Mediterráneo y que en noviembre de 2005 cumpirá diez años.
El Mundo	25.11.2005	Silvia Taules	La paz y la seguridad son los objetivos fijados en esta propuesta que pretenden unir a los países occidentales con los árabes y musulmanes en un intento de luchar conjuntamente contra el terrorismo.
El Mundo	25.11.2005	EFE	"(…) con el objetico de establecer un espacio común de paz, estabilidad, prosperidad y seguridad".
El PAÍS	08.03.1995	Sami Naïr	En lugar de estabilizar las sociedades, estas relaciones las perturban al reproducir y ahondar los efectos ya existentes de los desequilibrios demográfico, económico, financiero y cultural.
El PAÍS	08.03.1995	Sami Naïr	La conferencia prevista en Barcelona para noviembre de 1995 podría constituir, en efecto, un giro en el porvenir de las dos orillas.
El PAÍS	01.07.1995	Ignacio Cembrero	Cooperación a cambio de estabilidad. Esta es, en resumen, la oferta que la Unión Europea (UE) hará a finales de noviembre en la Conferencia Euromediterránea de Barcelona a sus 12 socios ribereños del Mare Nostrum.
El PAÍS	20.09.1995	Sami Naïr	Su objetivo se define claramente: "La creación de un espacio euromediterráneo en el horizonte del 2010". También sus ejes centrales: apoyo a la transición economica para establecer una zona de libre comercio de aquí a 10 o 15 años (...) apoyo para un mejor equilibrio socio-economico en las sociedades del Sur (...), y, por

			último, apoyo a la integración regional.
El PAÍS	23.11.1995	Sami Naïr	La creación de una zona de libre comercio de aquí al 2010 no deja de plantear serios problemas, pero la Conferencia de Barcelona abarca otros dos aspectos importantes: el de la seguridad y el de la democratización y desarrollo de la sociedad civil.
El PAÍS	05.12.1999	?	La declaración expresa el deseo de "aprobar a la mayor brevedad posible" la Estrategia Común sobre el Mediterraneo.
El PAÍS	13.03.2008	Andreu Missé/R. M. de Rituerto	(…) crear una Unión para el Mediterráneo que dé nuevo impulso al proceso de cooperación entre ambas orillas lanzado en 1995 en Barcelona.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	(…) de inyectar un nuevo y vigoroso impulso al proceso iniciado en Barcelona en 1995.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	Éste pretendía no solamente crear las condiciones para la puesta en marcha de una zona de libre comercio entre las dos riberas del Mediterráneo en el 2010, sino también desarrollar una cooperación estructural en los campos de la seguridad y de la paz, así como, last but not least, favorecer de manera significativa las relaciones entre las sociedades civiles de ambas riberas.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	Reorientar y profundizar!

(E) Purpose - aim

El Mundo	06.11.2001	EFE	(…) hay que actuar en el marco del respeto del derecho internacional y en el de "nuestra oposición al uso de la violencia y nuestra aspiración a privilegiar sistemáticamente la resolución pacífica y política de las diferencias".
El Mundo	06.11.2001	EFE	El dirigente europeo destacó la importancia de "intensificar nuestra colaboración política", lo que significa "hablar de todo" y "por supuesto vamos a hablar de la situación internacional pero también de la situación regional en Oriente Medio" porque, en su opinión, es necesario que los principios del Proceso de Barcelona sean los medios para "encontrar uns perspectiva de paz".
El Mundo	02.10.2004	Europa Press	(…) decidido poner su empeño para que podamos dar contenido e impulso a una nueva relación entre el norte y el sur del Mediterráneo"
El Mundo	27.11.2005	EFE	(…), para que los terrenos político, social y cultural se sumen en igualdad de condiciones al ámbito puramente económico, informa Marisa Cruz.
El Mundo	13.07.2008	?	En el texto final, (…), se comprometen a considerar "pasos prácticos" para prevenir la proliferación de armas nucleares, químicas y biológicas, según reza el texto.
El Mundo	13.07.2008	?	Los impulsores de la UPM esperan ahora garantizar el éxito de la Unión concentrándose en grandes proyectos concretos (no relacionados con los procesos de paz) como es la limpieza de la contaminación del Mediterráneo y la energía solar.
El PAÍS	08.03.1995	Sami Naïr	Todos esos programas parecen girar alrededor de una idea básica: la de la cooperación descentralizada.
El PAÍS	21.11.1999	EFE	(…) de que el fondo se destinaría adquirir zonas de gran valor ecologico, cultural y paisajistico con fines de conservación, protección, educación y uso social sostenible, y "adoptará formas organizativas

			adaptadas a la realidad de cada país, pero deberá ser gestionado por la sociedad civil y contar con apoyo institucional y privado". Asimismo propone que se establezcan normas que "exijan necesariamente" la evaluación del impacto de todo desarrollo urbanístico, de las infraestructuras y del turismo sobre los ecosistemas protegidos, que deberán incluir "mecanismos de vigilancia".
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	si de lo que se trata es de profundizar en los Acuerdos de 1995 (…), es preciso valerse de la experiencia histórica que posee Barcelona para liderar tal reorientación.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	1) rechazar la marginalización del sur a la hora de ampliar hacia el este (…) 2) crear un cuadro de reflexión y de propuestas para una gran política de cooperación económica entre las dos riberas (...) (…) 3) ayudar a cambiar la mirada europea sobre las migraciones destacando el aspecto positivo de las mismas. (...) 4) contribuir, finalmente, a acercar a las sociedades civiles: (...)

SPAIN – IDENTITY

(E) Identity – role

El PAÍS	20.11.1995	Xavier Vidal-Folch	la UE trataría a los pecos (países de Europa Central y Oriental) "de región a región, y estimularía sus relaciones mutuas mediante el establecimiento de una zona de libre cambio. Pero no a secas, como ocurrió entre EE UU, Canadá y México, sino con medidas políticas –el llamado diálogo estructurado- y financieras -se previeron 7.000 millones de ecus (1,12 billones de pesetas) hasta 1999- que suavizaran los costes del proceso. EI esquema desembocaria en su integración a la UE para el año 2000.
El PAÍS	05.11.2008	Joan Foguet	El Mediterráneo era una de las grandes asignaturas pendientes de la UE y se logró sentar las bases de un espacio de paz y estabilidad, económico, político y humano que comprendía a 800 millones de personas.

(E) Identity - EU

El Mundo	03.04.2000	Marisa Cruz	La Europa de los ricos, la que vive alarmada por el flujo de inmigrantes del sur, la que compite deslealmente en los mercados internacionales, la que se horroriza frente al televisor contemplando lejanas imágenes de muerte y destrucción, reclama de Africa programas de ajuste macroeconómico, compromisos con el libre mercado y planes de estabilidad política.
El Mundo	03.04.2000	Marisa Cruz	En ninguno de los dos documentos, la Ue se compromete a dar más dinero a Africa, aunque el objetivo que se espera conseguir es el de reducir a la mitad el nivel de pobreza del continente de aquí al 2015.
El Mundo	04.04.2000	EFE	"La Unión Europea va a dedicar un billión de euros para la condonación de la deuda del grupo de países más pobre y, al mismo tiempo, varios países han hecho anuncios de lo que pretenden hacer", como Francia y Alemania, e incluso España, según ha

			explicado a Radio Nacional el secretario de Estado.
El Mundo	08.09.2004	EFE	Rodríguez Zapatero viajará hoy a Túnez (…) compromiso con el Maghreb y pedirá colaboración para reactivar el Proceso de Barcelona.
El Mundo	02.10.2004	Europa Press	Moratinos, (…) ha pedido que "el Mediterráneo no sea un mar olvidado". "Necesita recuperar la atención y el esfuerzo financiero de los 25. En ese sentido haremos todo lo necesario para que, dentro de los capítulos que se negocien en las diferentes estructuras de la UE, el Mediterráneo obtenga los recursos suficientes para afrontar los retos y desafíos del futuro".
El Mundo	02.10.2004	Europa Press	(…) el gran reto de Europa es el diálogo con los países del sur del Mediterráneo, (…)
El Mundo	25.11.2005	(CET)	[Solana] 'Hoy estamos en una situación de de optimismo"
El Mundo	29.11.2005	?	De lo contrario nos encontraremos con un nuevo ejemplo en el que un país rico, en este caso la UE, se lleva todo lo que quiere de sus vecinos más pobres y no les ofrece a cambio nada más que palabras y promesas vacías".
El Mundo	13.03.2008	María Ramírez	El invento español será liquidado, de hecho, esta noche con la presentación de la Union Mediterránea de " Nicolas Sarkozy, que ha Iogrado embarcar en su Idea a Angela Merkel.
El Mundo	13.03.2008	María Ramírez	José Manuel Durão Barroso, comentó por la mañana que la Unión Mediterránea tiene su "apoyo real", aunque aún falten algunos "detaIles".
El Mundo	13.03.2008	María Ramírez	Para Espana, la alianza galo-germana es un golpe de mano por el que Francia toma el control del foro, pero, según fuentes diplomáticas españolas, Zapatero está dispuesto a aceptar la Idea mientras se incluya en el nombre Proceso de Barcelona -un subtítulo formal, que, de todas formas, se evaporará rápidamente- en la nueva Unión Mediterránea.
El Mundo	13.03.2008	María Ramírez	(…) Kouchner, promete un formidable puente entre las dos orillas, el mundo occidental y el mundo árabe", pero los galos se encontrarán con los mismos problemas básicos que sufrían los españoles, como la participación.
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	Europa ha tenido hasta ahora "poca visibilidad política" en la región.
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	[Solana] "Todo lo que se pueda hacer para que las relaciones entre Europa y los países de la cuenca mediterránea sean mejores y más profundas, se debe hacer"
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	"España quiere reforzar este Proceso. Fuimos los que lo creamos… Ahora se trata de dar un salto cualitativo", aseguró Alberto Navarro, secretario de Estado para la UE (…)
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	Hasta ahora, sólo la Comisión Europea se ocupaba de gestionar el dinero y los foros junto con las presidencias de turno de la Ue: Sin embargo, con el nuevo sistema, habrá una fuerza permanente de personal de Estados miembros y del Consejo que los representa.
El Mundo	14.03.2008	María Ramírez	"Todos los problemas no se van a solucionar esta noche, pero esto ya es un paso".
El Mundo	13.07.2008	?	[Sarkozy] "Todos lo habíamos soñado, ahora la Unión por el Mediterráneo es una realidad"
El Mundo	13.07.2008	?	Con todo, el presidente francés celebró la creación de la Unión como un éxito, a la vez que rechazó críticas sobre la falta de

			definición en la cuestión del financiamiento del nuevo bloque, uno de los aspectos de la UPM que todavía necesita concreción.
El Mundo	13.07.2008	?	En cualquier caso, el gobierno español se ha mostrado hoy "muy satisfecho" con el éxito que, a su juicio, ha tenido la reunión de Paris para el Mediterráneo, al considerar que da un "impulso histórico" al Proceso de Barcelona.
El Mundo	13.07.2008	?	"Para España se han alcanzado todos los objetivos", insistó Moratinos quien resaltó que el Gobierno está "muy satisfecho del éxito de París porque el éxito de París es el de Barcelona" y del proceso que España quiere que se convierta en una auténtica 'Unión por el Mediterráneo'.
El Mundo	04.11.2008	Europa Press	El acuerdo incluye a Barcelona como ciudad para albergar la sede permanente del proyecto euromediterráneo y deberá ser discutido formalmente por los ministros de Exeriores en la mañana de este martes.
El Mundo	04.11.2008	Javier Oms	Barcelona ha logrado(…): convertirse en abanderado permanente de las relaciones euromediterráneas.
El Mundo	04.11.2008	Javier Oms	Ahora Barcelona, pese a todos los golpes recibidos, ha logrado redimirse - con el impulso de Francia - al obtener un éxito de mayor peso simbólico que efectivo en la realidad.
El Mundo	04.11.2008	EFE	La adjudicación de la sede de la Unión por el Mediterráneo (UpM) no irá acompañada de la visita de el presidente del Gobierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, a Barcelona.
El PAÍS	08.03.1995	Sami Naïr	Esta diferencia, que se acentuará en los próximos años, es especialmente alarmante porque los países del Norte invierten cada vez menos en el Sur.
El PAÍS	13.06.1995	Xavier Vidal-Folch	España exigía, por boca del ministro Javier Solana, que se ratificase el principio de "equilibrio" entre el Este y el Sur aprobado en Essen.
El PAÍS	01.07.1995	Ignacio Cembrero	Numerosos países terceros han solicitado estar presentes al menos como convidados. En la lista de aspirantes a sentarse en segunda fila figuran desde Estados Unidos y Rusia hasta Suráfrica, pasando por Arabia Saudí, Albania y todos los países del Este de Europa y los bálticos.
El PAÍS	20.09.1995	Sami Naïr	De ahí el tercer ajuste, realizado a comienzos de 1995. Ahora se habla de un nuevo impulso, esta vez decisivo, de la Unión Europea al refuerzo de la política mediterránea.
El PAÍS	20.09.1995	Sami Naïr	En primer lugar, la idea de espacio euromediterráneo es extremadamente borrosa y ambigua: no afirma nada en cuanto al contenido y la naturaleza de ese espacio. Al contrario que la estrategia de cooperación desplegada para los paises de Europa central y del Este, en este caso no se anuncia ningún objetivo de integración. Tampoco hay ningún concepto sólido de asociación, ninguna pro yección concreta de colaboracion.
El PAÍS	20.09.1995	Sami Naïr	En segundo lugar, todo parece indicar que la zona de libre comercio que se desea beneficiará sobre todo a Europa.
El PAÍS	20.09.1995	Sami Naïr	Pero el proyecto europeo, tan elocuente en lo relativo a. la apertura de los mercados y la libre circulación de los capitales, se muestra curiosamente silencioso en cuanto a la de las personas. Bueno, en realidad, no pide a los países del Sur que reacojan a los emigrantes clandestinos expulsados de Europa.
El PAÍS	20.11.1995	Xavier Vidal-Folch	Por vez primera se juntarán los ministros de Exteriores de los Quince que asoman a la ribera norte y de los Doce -de Marruecos

			a Turquía- que flanquean la cuenca sur. La convocatoria, lanzada por iniciativa de la Union Europea (UE), pretende dar fe de una voluntad común, organizar ese espacio y desencadenar una dinámica de inédita asociación multilateral.
El PAÍS	20.11.1995	Xavier Vidal-Folch	Descubre ahora Europa el Mediterráneo? Casi.
El PAÍS	20.11.1995	Xavier Vidal-Folch	Hasta hace muy poco la UE mantenía unas relaciones bilaterales con casi todos los países ribereños, sin ambicion de estructurar una región, pese a que esta política se llamaba global: (...)
El PAÍS	20.11.1995	Xavier Vidal-Folch	Pero los nuevos conceptos -abandonar la cooperacion clásica para pasar a una verdadera asociación, primar lo multilateral sobre lo bilateral- no empezaron a tomar cuerpo hasta "que España retoma la idea y propone una asociación euromagrebí", destaca Bichara Jader, profesor en Lovaina y apóstol del mediterranismo.
El PAÍS	23.11.1995	Sami Naïr	A partir de esta estrategia de estabilización -crucial para Europa-, debe plantearse la relación entre ayuda económica y desarrollo de Estados de derecho en la orilla sur.
El PAÍS	27.11.1995	Predrag Matvejevic	[Pedrag Matvejevic] Me ha quejado tantas vezes de que la Unión Europea se hiciera sin el Mediterráneo!: Europa sin la cuna de Europa.
El PAÍS	05.12.1999	Peru Egurbide (Enviado especial)	España quiere reforzar un eje meridional Madrid-Roma que compense el protagonismo que Sarkozy, con el que Zapatero se reunirá en París el 10 de enero, tiende a asumir en el Mediterráneo. Además, desea que Italia se comprometa con el Proceso de Barcelona, la iniciativa española de diálogo entre las dos orillas del Mediterráneo, frente a la Unión Mediterránea que con similares fines promueve Sarkozy.
El PAÍS	11.01.2008	(…), una alternativa al Proceso de Barcelona "sería negativa para España y para la Unión en su conjunto".	
El PAÍS	05.03.2008	J. M. Martí Font	El ambicioso proyecto de la Unión Mediterránea del presidente frances Nicolas Sarkozy sigue deshinchándose.
El PAÍS	05.03.2008	J. M. Martí Font	En cualquier caso, las diferencias entre Sarkozy y Merkel no sólo se centran en el proyecto de Unión Mediterránea, aunque éste haya sido una piedra de toque muy simbólica.
El PAÍS	13.03.2008	Andreu Missé/R. M. de Rituerto	El gran plan inicial de Sarkozy -que soñaba con crear una "unión política, económica y cultural" entre ambas orillas mediterráneas cerrada a los demás socios comunitarios- ha quedado reducido a la mínima expresión en una tarea de zapa ejecutada por la Alemania de Angela Merkel con el apoyo de todos los demás.
El PAÍS	14.03.2008	R. M. de Rituerto/A. Missé	Los líderes desactivaron los planes del presidente fancés Nicolas Sarkozy de la Unión por el Mediterráneo que había despertado temores de desestabilización.
El PAÍS	14.03.2008	R. M. de Rituerto/A. Missé	Mientras algunos, como España, confían en "dar un salto cualitativo que refuerce el proceso", otros dudan de la conveniencia de crear nuevas estructuras que dupliquen las ya existentes, como es el caso de la propia presidencia eslovena, y otros temen que desestabilice el marco de relaciones entre los vecinos(...)
El PAÍS	14.03.2008	R. M. de Rituerto/A. Missé	El drástico recorte del ambicioso plan inicial de Nicolas Sarkozy, rebautizado ahora como Unión para el Mediterráneo, hizo que la canciller germana, Angela Merkel, hablara ayer de que el proceso "será elevado de nivel, pero se tratará esencialmente del mismo instrumento", (...)

El PAÍS	15.03.2008	?	Pero dicho esto, lo que hay que augurar es que se llame como se llame la iniciativa funcione mejor, porque va en provecho de todos la cooperación en asuntos tan serios como la migración o las amenazas del terrorismo islamista.
El PAÍS	10.05.2008	Jaques Barrot	Con este ánimo, fiel a la visión de Jean Monnet, he presentado un proyecto de mandato para una comunidad de los transportes entre la Unión Europea y los países de los Balcanes occidentales. Es con este ánimo que la Comisión Europea podría estudiar la viabilidad de un proyecto similar ampliado a todo el Mediterráneo.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	Dicho proyecto era el resultado de la voluntad, en principio francesa, pero más tarde asumida de manera conjunta por la UE, (…)
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	La iniciativa francesa respondía también a la preocupación de que el Mediterráneo pasara a un segundo plano, en un momento en el que la UE se enfrentaba a los desafíos que conlleva su ampliación hacia el este. Más aún, Francia -al igual que España e Italia- era consciente de que había llegado el momento de pasar a una fase superior an las relaciones euromediterráneas, después de la creación de un espacio común de intercambios y de la conclusión de acuerdos de asociación con todos los países de la región de la ribera sur (salvo Libia y Siria).
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	Infraestructuras ya existentes, disponibilidad del magnífico Palacio de Pedralbes, asunción de los gastos de instalación y mantenimiento por las autoridades locales, capacidad comercial y económica en el campo de las relaciones entre las dos riberas, experiencia en los contactos euro-árabes, banco de datos para las redes de cooperación en el Mediterráneo, etc. Es dificil encontrar, en el Mediterráneo, un lugar dotado de tanto atributos a la vez. En segundo lugar , por coherencia política de la UE.
El PAÍS	16.10.2008	Sami Naïr	(…) la elección de Barcelona se presenta como un asunto de coherencia estratégica, puesto que implica la continuidad del proyecto de 1995 y su renovación al mismo tiempo.
El PAÍS	13.11.2008	?	Recordó que España siempre ha concebido el Mediterráneo como "una de las máximas prioridades de su política exterior" y ha logrado la "ambiciosa" implicación de la Unión Europea.
El PAÍS	11.06.1995	Manuel Bustos	[José Borrell] "El mar Mediterráneo está herido, pero todavía estamos a tiempo de salvarlo de la muerte".

7. SWITZERLAND

SWITZERLAND – EXPRESSION

(CH) Expression – the other

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	Das Interesse der Arabischen Welt wird, neben der Präsenz der jeweiligen Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten, durch die Teilnahme von Vertretern der arabischen Liga und der Maghreb-Union dokumentiert. Aus dem Mittelmeerraum sind lediglich Lybien, Albanien, und die angrenenden Länder Ex-Jugoslaviens nicht vertreten.
"Neue Zürcher	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	Aber der neue israelische Aussenminister Barak nutzte die Gelegenheit, um sich am Konferenztisch direkt an seinen

Zeitung" Nr. 277			syrischen Amtskollegen zu wenden und ihn zum Friedensschluss aufzufordern.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Gemperle, R. (rg)	(…)den Ländern ihrer besonderen Einflusssphäre(…)
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	vk Victor Kocher	Die arabischen Länder sind mit weniger Vorbehalten zur Mittelmeerkonferenz in Barcelona aufgebrochen als einen Monat zuvor zum Wirtschaftsgipfel in Amman.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	vk Victor Kocher	Die Araber erhoffen sich von Engagements der Europäer ein Gegengewicht zur Dominanz der USA. Lybien wurde von der Teilnahme ausgeschlossen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	vk Victor Kocher	Damaskus musste sich am Rande der Konferenz von Amman vorwerfen lassen, sein Boykott dieser Wirtschaftsveranstaltung sein unverständlich, zumal es in Barcelona am gleichen Tisch wie die Israeli nicht nur ökonomische, sondern auch Sicherheitsfragen diskutieren werde.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	vk Victor Kocher	Die etwas papierene syrische Rechtfertigung ist, dass die Konferenz in Barcelona im Gegensatz zu derjenigen in Amman nicht im Rahmen der multilateralen Friedensverhandlungen stehe, welche die frühzeitige Normalisierung mit dem jüdischen Staat betrieben.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	vk Victor Kocher	Arabische Diplomaten betonen, dass sie in der Mittelmeerkonferenz nicht ein Surrogat für die Nahostverhandlungen suchen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	vk Victor Kocher	[Ausschluß Libyen] Der Revolutionsführer Ghadhafi versicherte einem Radioreporter, er hätte ohnehin nicht teilgenommen, weil in Barcelona erneut der dominante Norden den schwachen Ländern des Südens seinen Willen aufzwingen wolle.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 155	08.07.1997	AA Auswärtige Autoren	Die arabischen Staaten sind offenbar noch nicht bereit, sich in einer Grundsatzakte über die Sicherheitsbeziehungen im Mittelmeergebiet festzulegen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Doch es hätte auch Sarkozy auffallen müssen, dass das Interesse der Mittelmeeranrainer an den milliardenschweren Angeboten der EU über die Jahre erlahmte.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Nur Libyen war nicht vertreten und hat auf diese Weise zum überraschend harmonischen Verlauf der Begegnung beigetragen.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Syrien fand sich sogar bereit, die Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen mit Libanon ins Auge zu fassen.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Diese Staaten sind wirtschaftlich schwach und noch dazu untereinander nicht nur mit Israel, sondern auch sonst zerstritten: Algerien mit Marokko, Syrien mit Libanon und Libyen mit allen übrigen.

(CH) Expression –associative/dissociative

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	Während die Leitlinien für die wirtschaftliche Kooperation unbestritten sind, sorgen politische Formulierungen zum Terrorismus und zum Nahost-Friedensprozess sowie Flüchtlingsfragen für Verhandlungsstoff.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 278	29.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	[Das Ziel einer Stabilitätszone] Letztere Idee -eine französische Anregung, die schon einmal mit Blick auf Osteuropa lanciert worden war -sorgte indessen für einige Interpretationsdifferenzen und wurde nicht näher präzisiert.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(Agnelli sagte), die geplante Freihandelszone biete grosse Möglichkeiten, doch bestünden Risikofaktoren, die nicht nur verhindern könnten, dass man an diesem Ziel anlange, sondern sogar das bisher Erreichte gefährdeten. Er nannte den Nahost-Konflikt und die Spannungen, welche die Migrationsströme von Süden nach Norden hervorriefen.
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(Ein Diskussionsteilnehmer aus Tunesien beklagte), dass in Europa die Immigration im selben Licht gesehen werde wie der (pseudo)religiös motivierte Terrorismus oder der Drogenhandel.
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(es)wurde auch gesagt, die Vorstellung sei falsch, jeder Nordafrikaner oder jeder Türke wolle nichts anderes als in einem EU Land leben.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(Ein französischer Sozialwissenschaftler) Die Integration von Ausländern in Europa sei im Grunde nicht wegen der Differenzen, sondern wegen der Ähnlichkeiten schwierig. Letztere befähigen die Ausländer dazu, zu den Einheimischen in Konkurrenz zu treten, etwa am Arbeitsmarkt, was Konflikte schaffe.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(Die marokkanische Soziologin Fatima Mernissi) Europa sei der Harem-Mentalität verfallen, weswegen es sich abschotte. Die Araber seien universeller in ihrer Weltsicht, da sie in Ländern lebten, wo der Staat schwach sei. Deshalb sähen sie den Mittelmeerraum als eine Einheit.
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(Agnelli) (…)die Länder am Süd- und am Ostufer des Mittelmeeres müssten begreifen, dass Europa eine unkontrollierte Einwanderung nicht zulassen könne.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	Dieser Süden hat sich nun -übers Mittelmeer- weiter nach Süden verschoben; der Norden allerdings auch, wenn auch weniger weit, sind doch Italien und Spanien nun ihrerseits zu Ländern der Einwanderung geworden.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 155	08.07.1997	AA Auswärtige Autoren	Die syrische und die libanesische Delegation erhoben bei allen Massnahmen Einspruch, die zu militärischen Kontakten oder sicherheitspolitischer Zusammenarbeit unter den 27 Partnerstaaten -also auch mit Israel- geführt hätten.
NZZ Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	(…)von arabischer Enttäuschung und von Asymmetrien zwischen der EU und ihren Partnern,(…)
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung"	28.06.2000	iwe	Die Ziele seien am Anfang zu hoch gesteckt, die wirtschaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Asymmetrien unterschätzt worden, konstatierte Roberto Aliboni, der

Nr. 148			Direktor des Instituto Affari Internationali.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	Das verbreitete Argument, mit der Partnerschaft könne es nur vorangehen, wenn der arabisch-israelische Friedensprozess erfolgreich verlaufe, sei ein Ausrede.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	Andere Teilnehmer befürchteten, dass Einmischungen dieser Art nicht nur bei den Regierungen, sondern auch bei der Bevölkerung auf Widerstand stossen würden; man dürfe die koloniale Erbschaft nicht vergessen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	(Mustafa Hamarneh) (…)mokierte sich über in der EU kursierende Vorstellungen, mittels politischer Einflussnahme könnten die undemokratischen Regime Jordaniens und Syriens zu Fall gebracht werden wie einst die spanischen und portugiesischen Diktaturen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	Mit einer EU-Mitgliedschaft Bosniens, so der Syrien Experte Volker Perthes von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, würde ein seit Jahrhunderten in Europa beheimateter und tief verwurzelter Islam zur EU gehören. Dieser könnte dazu beitragen, Brücken zu den Muslimen im südlichen Mittelmeerraum zu bauen und die Entwicklung gemeinsamer Werte im euro-mediterranen Raum voranzutreiben.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 269	17.11.2000	Christian Müller	Diesmal stand indes das Treffen nicht wegen europäischer Bedenken, sondern wegen der neuen nahöstlichen Gewalteruption und zudem wegen zweifelhafter Kooperationsfähigkeit einiger Anrainerstaaten unter einem Unstern.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 259	07.11.2001	Raul Lautenschütz	Dass der "Barcelona-Prozess" ungeachtet der nach jeder Euromed-Konferenz offiziell beschworenen Fortschritte in der Praxis so harzig verläuft, liegt sicher an den hüben und drüben schwerfälligen bürokratischen Strukturen, am gegenseitigen Misstrauen und, wie das gescheiterte Fischereiabkommen zwischen der EU und Marokko illustrierte, auch an unterschiedlich wahrgenommenen Interessen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 94	24.04.2002	Mr. Valencia	Der spanische Aussenminister Pique erklärte ihm, dass legitime Kritik an der Politik der Regierung Sharon nicht mit Antisemitismus verwechselt werden dürfe. Peres äusserte sich an einer Pressekonferenz anschliessend sehr hart über europäische "Stimmen", die Verständnis für den palästinensischen Terrorismus äussern, und über die antisemitischen Ausschreitungen in europäischen Ländern.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 94	24.04.2002	Mr. Valencia	Der Nahostkonflikt und bürokratische Hindernisse wegen zu vieler und unausgereifter Projekte haben greifbare Fortschritte verhindert. Der soziale Graben zwischen den beiden Küsten hat sich sogar verschärft.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 94	24.04.2002	Mr. Valencia	Aznar lobte, dass erstmals die Terrorismusbekämpfung in einem solchen Abkommen ausdrücklich erwähnt worden sei. Die Verpflichtung auf Einhaltung der Menschenrechte war schon immer erwähnt, aber von der EU bisher gegenüber ihren Partnern nie mit Nachdruck eingefordert worden. Bouteflika rechtfertigte dagegen die

			palästinensischen Selbstmordattentate als legitime Widerstandsakte, was im offenen Gegensatz zur Verurteilung jeglichen Terrorismus durch Spanien und die EU steht.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Da wäre man auf heikle Probleme gestossen, etwa darauf, dass einige der Angesprochenen sich untereinander im Kriegszustand befinden, während andere zwar vor diesem letzten Schritt zurückschreckten, zu ihren Nachbarn aber dennoch äusserst schwierige Beziehungen haben.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 116	21.05.2008	win.	In erster Linie der Nahost-Konflikt und alte Rivalitäten zwischen den Maghreb-Staaten erwiesen sich als unüberwindbare Hindernisse für das Formulieren einer echten, multilateralen Mittelmeerpolitik.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	Zwischenfälle blieben aus. Als der französische Schauspieler Kad Merad einen Auszug aus der Erklärung der Menschenrechte vorlas, zeigte der autoritäre syrische Regent hinter seinen dunklen Brillengläsern keine Regung.

(CH) Expression – Mediterranean region

NZZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	Der Mittelmeerraum, aus EU-Sicht als Hinterhof Europas eingestuft(…)
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	"Das Mittelmeer ist zu klein, um klar zu trennen, aber zu gross, um zusammenzuschweissen." Dies sagt der palästinensische Akademiker Bihara Khader,(..)

(CH) Expression – Mediterranean Policy

NZZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	Eine gemeinsame Erklärung, die die Basis für eine neue multilaterale Mittelmeerpolitik legt,(…)
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	[BP] Sie verkörpert im Urteil der Teilnehmerstaaten den formellen Beginn einer neuen Kooperation zwischen der Europäischen Union und den Mittelmeernrainerstaaten sowie den palestinänsischen Autonomiegebieten.
NZZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	Die angestrebte Partnerschaft wird (…) als vielversprechende Neuorientierung der EU-Aussenpolitik gewertet.
NZZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Gemperle, R. (rg)	Zwar drängen die Mittelmeerpartner auf deutlich substaniellere Marktöffnungen, sind aber mir solchen Forderungen in Barcelona auf Granit gestossen.
NZZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Gemperle, R. (rg)	Vor diesem Hintergrund wird das in der Deklaration von Barcelona zelebrierte "freihändlerische Credo" relativiert.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 278	29.11.1995	rt Manfred Rist	Die Mittelmeerkonferenz, die (ausserhalb der UNO) erstmals 27 Partner des euro-arabischen Raums am Verhandlungstisch zusammengeführt hat, ist am Dienstag mit etlicher Verzögerung aber dennoch viel Applaus für den gastgebenden spanischen Aussenminister Javier Solana zu Ende

			gegangen.
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(…)der euro-mediterranen Konferenz,(…), an der ohne viel politischen Druck über die Beziehungen diskutiert wird, dank denen die Anrainer-Staaten einander näher kommen sollen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 155	08.07.1997	AA Auswärtige Autoren	Die beabsichtigte Intensivierung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen allen Ländern des Mittelmeerraumes kommt seit der weitgehenden Lähmung des israelischen-palästinensischen Friedensprozesses nicht mehr voran.
NZZ Nr. 155	08.07.1997	AA Auswärtige Autoren	Die Verschärfung der Nahostkrise führte aber die Konferenz und den gesamten Barcelona-Prozess gefährlich nahe an ein apruptes Ende.
NZZNr. 155	08.07.1997	AA Auswärtige Autoren	Die Zukunft der Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und dem Mittelmeerraum ist ungewiss.
NZZ Nr. 126	04.06.1998	ap Associated Press	(…)Bestrebungen waren wegen der Probleme bei den Friedensverhandlungen im Nahen Osten ins Stocken geraten.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	(…)euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft ein neues Kapitel in der ökonomischen, sicherheitspolitischen und sozialen Kooperation zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern(…)
NZZ Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	Das Kernproblem der Partnerschaft ortete George Joffe von der London School of Economics bei den unterschiedlichen Erwartungen der Partner.
NZZ Nr. 269	17.11.2000	Christian Müller	Während Syrien und Libanon das Treffen boykottierten, wertete die französische Diplomatie das Erscheinen der Israeli und der Palästinenser als Erfolg.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 269	17.11.2000	Christian Müller	Fünf Jahre nach der Konferenz von Barcelona (…)ist(…)nur noch wenig von den einstmals grossen Euromed-Perspektiven zu entdecken gewesen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 269	17.11.2000	Christian Müller	Ein neuer Elan welche der Euromed-Idee mit dem Ziel einer in einem Jahrzehnt zu schaffenden Freihandelszone hätte verliehen werden sollen, war unter diesen Umständen nicht mehr zu erwarten.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 269	17.11.2000	Christian Müller	(F) Aussenminister Vidrine mass der europäisch-mediterranen Zusammenarbeit eine Bedeutung zu, die ihre Fortführung unumgänglich mache, unabhängig von den neuen Gefahren für den Nahost-Friedensprozess.
NZZ Nr. 259	07.11.2001	Raul Lautenschütz	Dieser Dialog warf aber noch keine Dividenden ab.
NZZ Nr. 259	07.11.2001	Raul Lautenschütz	Kaum voran kommt hingegen die Integration der Mittelmeeranrainer unter sich.
NZZ Nr. 259	07.11.2001	Raul Lautenschütz	Die EU und Algerien haben am Mittwoch in Brüssel ein bilaterales Assoziationsabkommen paraphiert.
NZZ Nr. 63	16.03.2002	Ht.	Die EU-Finanzminister haben sich in der Nacht zum Freitag in einer Sondersitzung in Barcelona nach stundenlangem Ringen darauf geeinigt(…)
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 94	24.04.2002	Mr. Valencia	In Valencia hat am Montag und Dienstag die fünfte Euromed-Konferenz zwischen der europäischen Union und zwölf Mittelmeerstaaten angesichts arabischer und israelische Proteste vergeblich versucht, Minimallösungen für den Nahostkonflikt zu finden.

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 94	24.04.2002	Mr. Valencia	Der Spanische Aussenminister Pique hätte gerne bereits in Valencia konkrete Lösungen angekündigt, aber die Konferenz musste sich mit der Verabschiedung eines neuen Aktionsplans begnügen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 278	28.11.2005	pgp.	Die Bilanz der bisherigen Zusammenarbeit ist bescheiden. Erste Integrationsschritte haben die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Disparitäten nicht vermindert.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 278	28.11.2005	pgp.	Divergierende nationale Interessen, die mangelhafte Infrastruktur der Region und politische Spannungen standen weiteren Zusammenschlüssen im Weg.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 48	27.02.2008	Ch. M.	Wie verhält sich der Vorschlag einer Mittelmeer-Union zum festgefahrenen Barcelona-Prozess der EU?
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	(ap)	Am Freitag werde "förmlich die Entscheidung zur Umwandlung des Barcelona Prozesses in der Mittelmeer-Union getroffen", sagte Sarkozy in der Nacht zum Freitag an einer Pressekonferenz.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Dieser Plan, den Sarkozy zusammen mit der deutschen Bundeskanzlerin Merkel der versammelten Runde vorstellte, hat eine bemerkenswerte Geschichte hinter sich.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Der neueste deutsch-französische Kompromissvorschlag zu dieser Union wurde in stark geraffter Form vor einigen Tagen den 27 Hauptstädten zugestellt, auf dass sich die Staats- und Regierungschefs auf die Debatte während des Abendessens vorbereiten konnten.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	(…)es nur noch darum gehe, eine vor 13 Jahren in Barcelona beschlossene Strategie der EU zum Einbezug der Mittelmeeranrainer -im EU-Jargon "Barcelona-Prozess"genannt- neu zu lancieren.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Dazu wird ein Sekretariat mit 20 Mitarbeitern eingerichtet, dem eine wohl nicht sehr effiziente, aber "politisch korrekte" Doppelführung aufgepfropft wird.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Formen statt Inhalte
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 115	20.05.2008	(dpa)	Sarkozy hat zu einem Gipfeltreffen am 13. Juli nach Paris eingeladen, bei dem die Staats- und Regierungsschefs der EU und der Mittelmeerländer gemeinsam dem 1995 gegründeten "Barcelona-Prozess" neues Leben einhauchen wollen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 116	21.05.2008	win.	Neu beleben, nicht neu erfinden
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung"	21.05.2008	win.	Das ganze Projekt soll laut der Aussenkommissarin Ferrero-Waldner den bereits bestehenden Rahmen für die Zusammenarbeit der EU mit den Mittelmeer-Anrainern neu

Nr. 116			beleben und durch konkrete Resultate sichtbarer machen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 116	21.05.2008	win.	Ferrero-Waldner gab indirekt zu, dass die bald 13 Jahre dauernde Erfahrung mit diesem Barcelona-Prozess die Erwartungen nicht erfüllen konnte.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	(Merkel) Die Mittelmeer-Union sei "sehr gut gestartet", bescheinigte Kanzlerin Merkel am Sonntag -nachdem sie zu Beginn die schärfste Kritikerin des Projektes war.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	(Steinmeier) Ob die Union eine neue Plattform werde, könne er noch nicht sagen.
NZZ online	04. Nov	(sda/dpa)	Die Diplomaten hätten sich ausserdem geeinigt, das Wort Barcelona-Prozess aus dem Namen zu streichen und nur von der Union für das Mittelmeer zusprechen.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Der auch sonst gelungene Auftakt zur Errichtung der Mittelmeerunion hat die politische Phantasie beflügelt. Ihre Struktur beginnt sich aber erst allmählich abzuzeichnen.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Vielleich genügt es, die Mittelmeerunion zu einer Art Klub zu entwickeln.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	In einem Klub sind Stil und Konvention wichtiger als für alle geltende Regeln und Ermächtigungen zum Erlass verbindlicher Entscheidungen.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	In der lockeren Form eines "Club Med" könnte daher sogar eine besondere Chance liegen. Wenn man sie ernsthaft nutzen will, sollte man sich allerdings auf höchster Ebene häufiger treffen als, wie dies bis jetzt geplant ist, nur alle zwei Jahre.

SWITZERLAND – PURPOSE

(CH) Purpose - purpose

NZZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	In nahezu allen Grußadressen (…) kam zum Ausdruck, dass ohne eine friedliche Partnerschaft rund ums Mittelmeer in Europa kein dauerhafter Frieden herrschen könne.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Gemperle, R. (rg)	[EU] Ziel und Zweck der engeren ökonomischen Bande besteht aus EU-Sicht darin, im südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeerraum den Wohlstand zu mehren und damit dort letztlich eine Zone politischer Stabilität und regionaler Integration zu erreichen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 278	29.11.1995	rt Manfred Rist	Das dritte Element des kooperativen Geistes, der in Barcelona geherrscht hat, schlägt sich in einem umfangreichen Katalog von Absichtserklärungen nieder, der letztlich das Zusammenführen der Völker bezweckt, ausdrücklich aber Traditionen und nationale Eigenheiten respektiert.
NZZ Nr. 126	04.06.1998	ap Associated Press	(Palermo) Das informelle Treffen soll dem sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess neuen Auftrieb geben.
NZZ Nr. 269	17.11.2000	Christian Müller	[F] Frankreich, das zurzeit den EU-Ratsvorsitz innehat, hatte ursprünglich beträchtliche Ambitionen für dieses am Donnerstag zu Ende gegangene Treffen entwickelt.
"Neue	17.11.2000	Christian Müller	Innerhalb der EU sucht Frankreich sich stets in seiner

Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 269			Sachwalterrolle zugunsten der Mittelmeeranrainer zu profilieren. Deutschland bemüht sich zumindest um in die gleiche Richtung weisende Lippenbekenntnisse, während Grossbritannien und die skandinavischen Mitgliedstaaten der EU nach französischer Ansicht es weiterhin in hohem Masse an Enthusiasmus für die Kooperation mit den Mittelmeerstaaten fehlen lassen.
NZZ Nr. 94	24.04.2002	Mr. Valencia	(…)"Bacelona-Prozess" genannte Euromed-Initiative sollte den Mittelmeerraum dank europäischer Wirtschaftshilfe und einem Dialog der Kulturen zu einer Zone des Friedens und der Stabilität machen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 278	28.11.2005	pgp.	Weitgehend ein Traum blieb die engere wirtschaftliche Verbindung der südlichen Mittelmeerländer untereinander mit Ausnahme des 2004 in Agadir geschlossenen Freihandelsabkommens zwischen Ägypten, Jordanien, Marokko und Tunesien.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 178	04.08.2007	eg.	[F] Frankreich möchte die im Jahr 1995 mit der Konferenz in Barcelona begonnene EU-Mittelmeerpolitik intensivieren, über die vor kurzem selbst Bundeskanzlerin Merkel sagte, diese bleibe weit hinter den Erwartungen zurück.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	(…)ruft er zu mehr Anstrengung bei der Früherkennung, Verhütung und Schlichtung von Konflikten auf, aber auch zur Stärkung der zivilen und militärischen Mittel zur Abwehr unerwünschter Folgen des Klimawandels. Dazu gehören auch Migrationsströme in Millionenstärke in Richtung Europa.

(CH) Purpose -aim

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	(…)eine engere wirtschaftliche und politische Kooperation initiiert werden.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Gemperle, R. (rg)	(…)zwischen der EU und den elf südlichen Mittelmeerländern, zuzüglich der palestinänsischen Autonomiegebiete, bis zum Jahr 2010 eine Freihandelszone zu schaffen, sowie die Verpflichtung der EU, den Partnerstaaten milliardenhohe Finanzhilfen zu gewähren.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 278	29.11.1995	Manfred Rist(rt)	Das eigentliche Ziel der Konferenz, die vorbehaltlose Einigung aller Teilnehmerstaaten auf die Barcelona-Deklaration, ein Dokument mit weltreichenden Absichtserklärungen für eine neue Ära der Zusammenarbeit, ist aber erreicht worden.
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	Die Absicht besteht darin, das Geflecht von Kontakten, Strukturen und Organisationen zu stärken, welche die Triebkräfte gesellschaftlicher Modernisierung sind.
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(…)eine engere Nachbarschaft der Länder im Süden untereinander, gleichsam auf horizontaler Ebene, zu fördern.
NZZ Nr. 148	28.06.2000	Iwe	(…)Ziele können tatsächlich als sehr ehrgeizig bezeichnet werden:(..)
NZZ Nr. 62	14.03.2008	Win.	(…)mit dem Projekt des französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy für eine Mittelmeer-Union, die eine stärkere Zuwendung der

			EU zu ihren südlichen Nachbarn ermöglichte.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Der von der EU 1995 initiierte Barcelona-Prozess muss über ein einseitig verordnetes und bürokratisch gesteuertes Hilfsprogramm hinausführen und partnerschaftlicher Parität Ausdruck geben.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Die Struktur sollte den Aufgaben entsprechen.

SWITZERLAND – IDENTITY

(CH) Identity – role

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 153	05.07.1995	BA Beat Ammann	Er wolle in den nächsten Monaten dabei mitwirken, dass die EU dereinst zu einer "echten politischen Grösse" ausgebaut werden könne, die politisch auf der Höhe ihrer wirtschaftlichen Macht stehe und fähig sei, weitere Mitglieder aufzunehmen.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 155	08.07.1997	AA Auswärtige Autoren	Die relative Stärke der EU im Mittelmeerraum fusst eindeutig in der wirtschaftlichen Dimension.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Natürlich stützt sich der Einfluss der EU auf die "sanfte Gewalt" des Geldes, im Gegensatz etwa zur militärischen Macht.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	Wer fehlte bei der Sarko-Show, war ein ranghoher Vertreter der USA.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	Der französische Staatschef nutzt das Vakuum, das durch die amerikanische Präsidentschaftswahl entsteht, geschickt aus, um die internationale Rolle Frankreichs und der EU neu zu definieren.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Allen Ungeschicklichkeiten, ja groben Missgriffen zum Trotz sind die Vereinigten Staaten im Nahen Osten weiterhin die führende Macht.

(CH) Identity - EU

NZZ Nr. 153	05.07.1995	BA Beat Ammann	Ein besonderes Anliegen Spaniens stellt die Außenpolitik der EU im Mittelmeerraum dar.
NZZ Nr. 153	05.07.1995	BA Beat Ammann	Madrid will seinen Partnern zu verstehen geben, dass Europa nicht nur im Osten, sondern auch im Süden eine heikle Grenze hat.
NZZ Nr. 153	05.07.1995	BA Beat Ammann	(Solana) (…)es gehe darum, der Union klarzumachen, dass sie heikle Grenzen nicht nur im Osten, sondern auch im Süden habe.
NZZ Nr. 153	05.07.1995	BA Beat Ammann	Die im November in Barcelona vorgesehene Konferenz (…) stellt einen Kernpunkt der spanischen Politik (…)dar.
NZZ Nr.	05.07.1995	BA Beat Ammann	Wegen seiner geographischen Lage hat Spanien ein of-

153			fensichtliches Interesse daran(…)
NZZ Nr. 153	05.07.1995	BA Beat Ammann	Der Anspruch Madrids, zu den führenden Ländern der EU zu zählen, ist unzweideutig.
NZZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Gemperle, R. (rg)	Die von der EU angestrebte sogenannte Neue Mittelmeerpolitik ist zu einem guten Teil die Reaktion der EU auf ihre Öffnung gegenüber Ost- und Mitteleuropa.
NZZ Nr. 277	28.11.1995	Gemperle, R. (rg)	Es dürfen mit anderen Worten -abgesehen von den wirtschaftlichen Interessen- eher sicherheits- als entwicklungspolitische Motive für die ambitiöser gewordene EU-Mittelmeerpolitik maßgebend gewesen sein.
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	(…),dass Europa -zumindest demographisch- gleichsam auf dem absteigenden Ast sei, weswegen der alte Kontinent auf Einwanderer angewiesen sei.
NZZ Nr. 280	01.12.1995	BA Ammann, B.	Die Euro-mediterrane Konferenz der Minister war aus europäischer Sicht Teil einer Abwehrstrategie.
NZZ Nr. 155	08.07.1997	AA Auswärtige Autoren	Es gibt gegenwärtig noch keine wirkliche gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU, und die Union ist nach wie vor unfähig, akute Krisen zu meistern.
NZZ Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	Von europäischem Desinteresse war die Rede(…)
NZZ Nr. 148	28.06.2000	iwe	(…)die EU habe aus sicherheitspolitischen und strategischen Interessen gehandelt. Ihr sei es darum gegangen der Migration einen Riegel zu schieben und der amerikanischen Dominanz im Nahen Osten etwas entgegenzusetzen. Zudem habe man im Auge des nach Osten wandernden europäischen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interesses die südlichen Nachbarn besänftigen wollen.
NZZ Nr. 94	24.04.2002	Mr. Valencia	[Konferenz] Nach Ansicht der europäischen Union ist es deshalb schon ein Erfolg, dass sie überhaupt stattgefunden hat.
NZZ Nr. 178	04.08.2007	eg.	Was die Politik der EU gegenüber ihren Nachbarn im Osten und im Süden angeht, setzen Deutschland und Frankreich inzwischen recht unterschiedliche Prioritäten.
NZZ Nr. 178	04.08.2007	eg.	Zugleich verfolgt Berlin aber seine "neue Ostpolitik".
NZZ Nr. 48	27.02.2008	Ch. M.	Zwischen Paris und Berlin herrscht ein Malaise(…)
NZZ Nr. 48	27.02.2008	Ch. M.	Sichtbarster Stein des Anstosses zwischen Paris und Berlin ist weiterhin Sarkozys Ambition einer Mittelmeer-Union.
NZZ Nr. 48	27.02.2008	Ch. M.	Von dem Projekt, das mittlerweile nun auch Union für das Mittelmeer genannt wird, sind die Deutschen alles andere als angetan, da sie eine tendenzielle Spaltung der EU befürchten und zudem den Verdacht hegen, Sarkozy wolle sich vor allem ein Instrument zur Durchsetzung des französischen Führungsanspruchs in Europa schaffen.
NZZ Nr. 48	27.02.2008	Ch. M.	Ungeachtet dessen hält Frankreich an der Absicht fest, unter seiner EU-Präsidentschaft am 13. Juli eine grosse Runde mit Mittelmeeranrainern in Paris zu veranstalten und am Tage darauf, dem französischen Nationalfeiertag, den versammelten Gipfelreigen aller EU-Mitgliedstaaten mit der solchermassen proklamierten Mittelmehr-Union zu konfrontieren.

"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 48	27.02.2008	Ch. M.	Eine solche Mittelmeerpolitik dürfe auf keinen Fall zu einer zu Recht von Frankreichs Partnern abgelehnten Verwässerung der EU in einem schemenhaften neuen Gebilde führen, ermahnte Balladur.
NZZ Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Im Hintergrund stand sicher auch die Sorge, Paris wolle sich in der Mittelmeer-Union mit EU-Geldern eine neue Bühne zimmern, auf der es dann die unbestrittene Hauptrolle spielen könnte.
NZZ Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Doch die Grundfrage, warum denn der "Barcelona-Prozess" derart Rost ansetzte, kommt nicht zur Sprache.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 62	14.03.2008	win.	Statt über Wege nachzudenken, wie neue Milliarden südwerts über das Meer geworfen werden könnten, müssten wohl die Ursachen für dieses Desinteresse untersucht werden.
NZZ Nr. 116	21.05.2008	win.	Das Prestigeprojekt des französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy für eine Union der EU und der Mittelmeer-Anrainer ist im Vorschlag der EU-Kommission nochmals zusammengestrichen worden.
"Neue Zürcher Zeitung" Nr. 116	21.05.2008	win.	Im Vergleich zu den hochfliegenden Plänen des französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy, der die Idee dazu im letzten Dezember während eines Besuchs in Algerien lanciert hatte, steht der Kommissionsvorschlag nun fest auf dem Boden der Realität, nach einer recht unsanften Landung.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	Frankreichs Präsident Sarkozy hat den Nationalfeiertag in einen diplomatischen Coup verwandelt.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	Bei aller zur Schau gestellten Fröhlichkeit ging eine wichtige politische Botschaft aus.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	"Ich wünsche das Frankreich die EU-Politik im Nahen Osten leitet, weil es die Region geographisch, kuturell und politisch gut kennt."
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Europa pflegt bestenfalls kurzatmig zu reagieren, anstatt langfristig vorausschauend zu agieren. Dabei ist es höchste Zeit, dass sich Europa seiner südlichen Nachbarn erinnert.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Der Rückgriff auf mitgliedstaatliche Aussenpolitik läuft jedoch den Bemühungen der europäischen Union, in der Aussenpolitik mit einer Stimme zu sprechen, diametral entgegen.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Um keine Hindernisse in den Weg zu einer gemeinsamen Aussenpolitik zu legen, wurde im Frühjahr vereinbart, die geplante "Union des Mittelmeeres" in "Union für das Mittelmeer" umzubenennen und an ihr auch die nicht an das Mittelmeer angrenzenden Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union zu beteiligen.
NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	Der ohnehin fernliegenden Vorstellung institutioneller Gleichrangigkeit mit der Europäischen Union wurde zusätzlich dadurch entgegengewirkt, dass auch noch das -wenig wirksame- Vorläuferprogramm in die Projektbezeichnung aufgenommen wurde. Die Schlusserklärung von Paris verwendete daher das Wortungetüm "Barcelona-Prozess: Union für das Mittelmeer". Dies lässt offen, ob es sich um eine internationale Organisation oder wie bisher nur um ein politisches Programm handelt.

NZZ online	05.11.2008	Karl M. Meessen	(Dilemma Sarkozy): Durch Erzwingung der Annahme des Lissabonner Vertrags würde er die Mitgliedstaaten ihrer massgeblichen Kompetenzen zur Verwirklichung seiner Idee einer hauptsächlich von Frankreich und anderen nördlichen Anrainerstaaten getragenen Mittelmeerunion berauben.
NZZ online	14. Jul 08	(ap)	"Fordern reicht nicht", lautet Sarkozys Motto. "Wer den Frieden voranbringen will, muss Initiativen ergreifen."

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1. EU Documents 419

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Additional sources considered:

4. Documents: 434

5. Secondary Literature 434

6. Unprinted texts 441

7. Websites 442

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EL MUNDO		
03.04.2000	El continente más pobre no logrará en El Cairo que la UE aumente su ayuda	Marisa Cruz
03.04.2000	Romano Prodi se entrevista con Gadafi para establecer relaciónes con Libia	EFE
04.04.2000	Gadafi pide a Aznar la cooperación y confianza que no ha existido en el pasado	EFE
04.04.2000	Gadafi sorprende a la UE con un discurso contra Occidente	EFE
29.05.2000	Mubarak y Aznar analizarán el proceso de paz en Priente Medio	EFE
06.11.2001	La Conferencia Mediterránea se abre en un ambiente de tensión	EFE
22.04.2002	El Líbano boicotea la Conferencia Euromediterránea en protesta por la participación de Israel	EFE
01.06.2002	La Unión Europea cooperará con los países del Mediterráneo en materia de Educación	EFE
08.09.2004	Zapatero viaja a Túnez para reiterar su compromiso con el Magreb	EFE

02.10.2004	Moratinos pide que la Unión Europea no olvide el área del Mediterráneo	Europa Press
25.11.2005	Algunas pistas ante la Cumbre Euromediterránea	Silvia Taules
25.11.2005	Los presidentes de Parlamentos Euromediterráneos se reúnen en Barcelona en la víspera de la Cumbre	EFE
25.11.2005	Barcelona ultima los preparativos para la Cumbre	Agencias
25.11.2005	Merkel acudirá el próximo domingo a la Cumbre de Barcelona, su primera reunión mulitlateral	EFE
27.11.2005	La Cumbre Euromediterránea arranca hoy en Barcelona con dificultades para alcanzar acuerdos	EFE
29.11.2005	La Alianza Euromediterránea no ha reducido la pobreza en los países del sur del Mediterráneo	Elmundo.es
29.11.2005	La Cumbre Euromediterránea no logra consenso total pero sí un código de conducta antiterrorista	Agencias
13.03.2008	Sarkozy y Merkel liquidan el Proceso de Barcelona y venden hoy su Unión Mediterránea	María Ramírez
14.03.2008	Nicolas Sarkozy consigue sacar adelante 'su Unión Mediterránea' con el apoyo de Merkel	María Ramírez
13.07.2008	Sarkozy: 'Todos lo habíamos soñado, ahora la Unión por el Mediterráneo es una realidad'	Editorial
04.11.2008	Barcelona, cerca de convertirse en el puente entre todos los países del Mediteráneo	Editorial
04.11.2008	La gran victoria simbólica de Barcelona	Javier Oms
LA REPUBLICCA		
23.05.1995	L'Italia si muove	Dino Frescobaldi
10.11.1996	I parlamenti d'Europa aprono alla Libia	Alessandra Ziniti
29.11.1995	Pace, disarmo, commerci intesa sul Mediterraneo	Mario Tedeschini Lalli
31.01.1998	Ma il Mediterraneo non è un 'buco nero'	Franco Cassano
05.02.1998	Italia, un 'ponte' nel Mediterraneo	Rocco Antonio Cangelosi
29.07.1998	Clandestini caso europeo	Paolo Garimberti
19.10.1999	Emergenza acqua l'incubo del 2000	Salvatore Tropea
02.09.2003	La Banca Mediterranea diventa società finanziaria	Guiseppe Salmè
05.12.2003	L'Europa, il mondo arabo e il ruolo del Mediterraneo	Khaled Fouad Allam
16.01.2004	Ciampi: I benefici dell' euro sono gli occhi di tutti	Patrizia Capua
24.01.2004	Poniamo il Mare Nostrum al centro dell' Unione europea	Gianni Pittella
03.02.2004	Puglia crocevia di scambi una sfida tutta da vincere	Enzo Lavara
28.04.2004	Da Lockerbie a Bruxelles la lunga marcia del Colonnello	Andrea Bonanni
04.03.2004	Nato e Ue per il Medio Oriente Frattini appoggia il piano Bush	Franco Papitto
19.11.2004	E la prima sfida per il neoministro sará ricucire il rapporto con gli arabi	Vincenzo Nigro
27.11.2005	Barcellona, il vertice delle diserzioni	Alessandro Oppes
28.11.2005	La Ue avvicini öle sponde del Mediterraneo/ L' europa e i migranti	Tony Blair e Jose Zapatero
28.11.2005	Euromed, il vertice si divide sulla definzione di terrorismo	Alessandro Oppes
29.11.2005	Il vuoto europeo	Andrea Bonanni
29.11.2005	Euromed condanna il terrorismo ma tace sul diritto di 'resistenza'	Alessandro Oppes
10.04.2006	Formazione per la logistica sul Mediterraneo	red.
17.06.2006	Mediterraneo, la carta di Prodi per rafforzare la cooperazione	dal nostro inviato

20.02.2007	L'Europa e il ruolo del Mediterraneo	Romano Prodi e Jose Zapatero
10.12.2007	La cordiale discordia tra Merkel e Sarkozy	Bernardo Valli
26.02.2008	Francia-Germania, il grande freddo	Giampiero Martinotti
CORRIERE DELLA SERA		
29.09.1995	"Investite sulla riva Sud"	Stefanelli Barbara
09.11.1995	Roma proponde: allargare l'Europa verso il Mediterraneo	Corriere della Sera
22.11.1995	100 citta'unite per difendere l'equilibrio Mediterraneo	Pullara Guiseppe
27.11.1995	Vertice tra due Mediterranei	Botti Ettore
28.11.1995	Gli immigranti dividono il Mediterraneo	Botti Ettore
29.11.1995	L'Europa si allunga nel Mediterraneo	Vignolo Mino
15.05.1996	Abete: Europa Stai attenta sfide del Mediterraneo	Corriere della Sera
19.01.1997	E il Professore fa pace con Aznar	Taino Danilo
05.06.1998	Al vertice del Mediterraneo una "Carta per la Pace" cerca di rilanciare il dialogo	Vignolo Mino
02.03.1999	Impresse, si' a Osservatorio euromediterraneo	Corriere della Sera
10.05.1999	E'l' Africa del Nord il nuovo che emerge	Zallio Franco
19.06.1999	Il prossimo passo e'il patto di stabilita' per il Mediterraneo	Jean Carlo
18.10.1999	Torino, leader mediorientali a convegno su risorse idriche	Corriere della Sera
31.01.2000	Mediterraneo alla riscossa	Zallio Franco
09.01.2002	Aznar e Prodi, fiducia nell'europeismo dell'Italia	Caizzi Ivo
09.05.2003	Per lo sviluppo e la cooperazione	Corriere della Sera
30.05.2003	"Dialoghi tra due sponde del Mediterraneo"	Corriere della Sera
14.06.2003	"Mediterraneo, un patto di sviluppo"	Querze' Rita
08.02.2004	Si studia il clima mediterraneo	Foresta Martin Franco
10.04.2004	"Un patto strategico fra Nato e Sud del Mediterraneo"	Allam Magdi
25.06.2004	Ciampi: "Serve un impegno convinto dell'Onu sul terreno"	Breda Marzio
02.07.2004	Ermolli: il nostro futuro è nel Mediterraneo	Panza Pierluigi
05.07.2005	Ermolli: sul rilancio nel Mediterraneo L'Italia può battere Francia e Spagna	Radice Giancarlo
12.07.2005	City del Mediterraneo: Milano rilancia la sfide	Radice Giancarlo
12.07.2005	Milano e il Mediterraneo "Contro il terrorismo integrazione e sviluppo"	Querze' Rita
19.01.2006	E se ci rituffassimo nel Mediterraneo?	Taino Danilo
19.02.2006	Venti da sud nel Mediterraneo	Carioti Antonio
14.07.2006	Convegno sull'economia mediterranea	Corriere della Sera
16.07.2006	"Milano ponte dell'Europa sui Paesi dem Mediterraneo"	Jacchia Antonia
18.07.2006	Scambi, Milano capitale nell' area mediterranea	Jacchia Antonia
19.07.2006	Un premio per chi aiuta il dialogo	Corriere della Sera
30.03.2007	E per i Paesi Mediterraneo l'Italia diventa il primo partner	Jacchia Antonia
07.07.2007	Ermolli: Mediterraneo, l'italia sfidi la Francia	Jacchia Antonia
17.07.2007	"A Milano gli stati generali del Mediterraneo"	Querze' Rita
17.07.2007	E Prodi rilancia la banca del Mediterraneo	Stringa Giovanni
21.12.2007	Unione Mediterranea, atto primo	Fregonara Gianni
09.06.2008	Ha ragione Sarkozy facciamo un "Club Med"	Ferrero Waldnder Benita
DIE PRESSE		

27.11.1995	Amtosphäre in Barcelona	Andreas Schwarz
27.11.1995	Ehrgeiziges Programm des Mittelmeer-Anrainer	tau
28.11.1995	Barcelona-Konferenz streitet über Terror	Andreas Schwarz
29.11.1995	Europa und das Mittelmeer: Fortschritte trotz einiger Differenzen	Peter Krotky
24.09.1998	Österreich forciert Mittelmeer-Projekt	Doris Kraus
12.06.2002	EU-Parlament für gemeinsamen Kampf mit Maghreb-Staaten gegen illegale Migration	smo
15.03.2002	Gipfel Themen	diepresse
17.03.2004	Der vergessene Schlafraum	Anneliese Rohrer
22.07.2004	Das Eurobarometer	Dr. Harald Fiegl
29.11.2005	Gipfel: Kluft zwischen EU & arabischer Welt	Ralph Schulze
17.02.2006	Karikaturen Gipfel: Dialog der Kulturen	Thomas Seifert
01.03.2008	Die bösen Souffleure des Präsidenten	Rudolf Balmer
04.03.2008	Angela und Nicolas versuchen es nocheinmal	Thomas Vieregge
13.03.2008	Barroso unterstützt Sarkozys "Mittelmeer-Union"	APA
14.03.2008	EU: Einigung über Mittelmeerunion und Klimaschutz	diepresse
15.03.2008	Mittelmeer-Union: Die Show des Monsieur Sarkozy	Regina Pöll
21.05.2008	Mittelmeer-Union: EU plant Großprojekte	Regina Pöll
30.06.2008	Am EU-Tisch hartes Brot für Monsieur Sarkozy	Paul Schulmeister
11.07.2008	EU-Vorsitz: Treffen der zerstrittenen Mittelmeer-Familie	Rudolf Balmer
14.07.2008	Internationale Pressestimmen	APA
14.07.2008	Mittelmeer-Union: Turbulenzen im "Club Med"	diepresse
14.07.2008	"Club Med" für ungleiche Partner	Rudolf Balmer
SALZBURGER NACHRICHTEN		
24.06.1995	Europas Süden konkurriert mit dem Osten	Linde Hermann
28.11.1995	Mittelmeer soll Zone des Friedens sein EU stärkt Kooperation mit Nordafrika und Nahost	Redaktion
29.11.1995	Einer Flüchtlingswelle vorbeugen	Redaktion
05.04.1997	Dicke Luft im Maghreb Nordafrika braucht dringend die Hilfe Europas	Barbara Egger
17.04.1997	Ein kleiner Prestige-Erfolg für die EU	Roman Arens
05.09.1998	Schüssel: "Partnerschaft für Europa"	spu,hkk
28.11.2005	Brücken übers Mittelmeer	Ralph Schulze
29.11.2005	Am Mittelmeer herrscht Missmut und Misstrauen	Dieter Ebeling
22.12.2007	Südeuropäer werben für eine Mittelmeerunion	Ralph Schulze
14.03.2008	Mittelmeerunion ist noch nicht auf Kurs	gs
26.05.2008	Eine Mittelmeerunion mit Vetorecht	Gerald Stoiber
12.07.2008	Frankreich blickt nach Nordafrika	Dorothea Hahn
14.07.2008	Herausforderungen für die Mittelmeerunion	Dorothea Hahn
15.07.2008	Erste Worte des Friedens, dann Parade	Dorothea Hahn
13.07.2008	Gipfel mit Nebenwirkungen	Dorothea Hahn
DER STANDARD		
19.06.1995	Gefahrenherd Mittelmeerraum	Josef Manola
27.11.1995	"Ein Helsinki-Prozeß für den Süden"	Erhard Stackl
28.11.1995	Statt Kreuzzügen ein Dialog der Kulturen	Erhard Stackl
29.11.1995	Die Kunst des Kompromisses	Erhard Stackl

29.11.1995	Der Barcelona-Prozeß	Erhard Stackl
18.10.1999	"EU braucht Zuwanderung"	Samuel Adams
22.04.2002	Nahostkrise beherrscht Euromed- Treffen	Jörg Wojahn
22.04.2002	Ideengeber am Mittelmeer	Jörg Wojahn
28.02.2002	EU-Pläne für eine neue Mittelmeerbank	Jörg Wojahn
29.11.2005	Euromed-Gipfel, und keiner geht hin	Reiner Wandler
24.10.2007	Sarkozy wirbt für Mittelmeer-Union Frankreichs Staatschef lanciert neue Idee	Redaktion
11.03.2008	Österreich ist gegen die "Mittelmeer-Union" Sarkozys Plassnik: Bestehende EU-Instrumente nutzen	Michael Moavec
14.03.2008	Sturm im Meeres-Glas Sarkozys Union mit Anrainerstaaten stößt auf Zustimmung und Skepsis	as, pra
21.05.2008	Afrika-Autobahn und Mittelmeer-Rettung	Michael Moavec
30.06.2008	Mittelmeer-Union lässt Sarkzy zittern	Mimo
12./13.7.2008	Sarkozy eröffnet seinen "Club Med"	Stefan Brändle
11.07.2008	Ferrero-Waldner: "Neue politische Impulse für die Region"	Redaktion
13.07.2008	Arabaische Liga erhält Beobachterstatur	APA
13.07.2008	Zapatero für Barcelona als Sekretariats-Sitz	APA
14.07.2008	Schöen Worte im "Club Med"	Stefan Brändle
14.07.2008	Pressestimmen	Redaktion
14.07.2008	Mittelmeerunion von 43 Staaten aus der Taufe gehoben	Stefan Brändle, Michael Moravec
NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG		
05.07.1995	Spaniens Präferenzen an der Spitz der EU	Beat Ammann
28.11.1995	Anlauf zu einer neuen Mittelmeerpolitik der EU	Manfred Rist
28.11.1995	Vor engeren euromediterranen Beziehungen?	Gemperle, R
28.11.1995	Arabische Beiträge zur Mittelmeer-Konferenz	Victor Kocher
29.11.1995	Kooperations-Vorsätze für den Mittelmeerraum	Manfred Rist
01.12.1995	Barcelona als "Zentrum" des Mittelmeers	Beat Ammann
08.07.1997	Der Barcelona- Prozess	Auswärtige Autoren
08.07.1997	Die Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft der Europäischen Union in der Krise	Auswärtige Autoren
22.04.1998	Mittelmeer-Forum für die Bekämpfung des Terrorismus	Ulrich Meister
04.06.1998	Beratungen über eine Freihandelszone im Mittelmeer	Associated Press
28.06.2000	Gibt es die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft?	iwe
17.11.2000	Unstern über der Euromed-Konferenz	Christian Müller
07.11.2001	"Euromed" im Schatten des Nahostkonflikts...	Raul Lautenschütz
20.12.2001	Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und Algerien	Raul Lautenschütz
28.02.2002	Die Kommission für eine EU-Mittelmeerbank	Höltschi, R
16.03.2002	Kreditfenster statt Mittelmeerbank	Höltschi, R
24.04.2002	Die EU kündigt weitere Nahostmission an	Mr
28.11.2005	Mässige Bilanz der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft	pgp
04.08.2007	Deutschaland rügt seine Verbündeten	eg
27.02.2008	Schlechte Stimmung zwischen Paris und Berlin	Ch.M
14.03.2008	Sarkozys Mittelmeer-Union gestutzt	win
20.05.2008	Sarkozy nur kurz Präsident der Mittelmeerunion	dpa
21.05.2008	Harte Landung für Sarkozys Mittelmeer-Union	win

14.07.2008	Frankreich gefällt sich in der Vermittlerrolle	ap
04.11.2008	Barcelona soll Sitz der Mittelmeerunion werden	sda/apa
05.11.2008	Die Mittelmeerunion - mehr Klub als Organisation	Karl M. Meessen
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG		
07.02.1995	Die südlichen Nachbarn der Europäischen Unio sollen wieder mehr Beachtung finden	wha
21.03.1995	Eine neue Strategie für den Süden	Reinhold Brender
08.06.1995	Der Mittelmeerraum braucht Beistand	Wolfram Weimer
31.07.1995	Mittelmeeranrainer fordern stärkere Südausrichtung der EU	wwe
22.09.1995	González' letzte Arbeit für Europa	Walter Haubich
07.10.1995	Dissens zwischen Spanien und Frankreich	wha
24.10.1995	Spanien will Marokko in EU wie Türkei behandeln	wie
27.10.1995	"Wir wollen eine Freihandelszone rund ums Mittelmeer"	wwe
24.11.1995	An Europas Haustür	Michael Stabenow
24.11.1995	Mittelmeerkonferenz in Barcelona	wha
24.11.1995	Barcelona soll zum Symbol werden	wha
27.11.1995	Eine "euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft"	now./wha.
27.11.1995	Die große Vison- eine Freihandelszone rund um das Mittelmeer	Wolfram Weimer
28.11.1995	Aufruf zu einer gemeinsamen Zukunft aller Mittelmeerländer	now
29.11.1995	Nicht mit Geld allein	Redaktion
29.11.1995	Frieden, Wohlstand und Menschenrechte rund ums Mittelmeer	now
29.11.1995	Erste Schritte nach hohen Erwartungen	wha
08.11.1996	Ein Ideengeber	Walter Haubich
14.04.1997	Von Barcelona nach Malta	Michael Stabenow
17.04.1997	Belastungsprobe für die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft	Michael Stabenow
19.09.1997	Partnerschaft mit Tücken	Michael Stabenow
21.02.1998	Nichts Neues im Nahen Osten?	Prof. Dr. Helmut Hubel
15.04.1999	Schwierige Nachbarschft	Michael Stabenow
16.04.1999	Ein euro-mediterraner Wirtschaftsraum nützt allen	Sven Beh-rendt,Christian-Peter Hanelt
16.04.1999	Die Partner am Mittelmeer trennen noch immer viele Schranken	now
17.04.1999	Schwierige Annäherungsversuche	Hans-Christian Rößler
17.04.1999	Euro-Mediterrane Charta für Frieden und Stabilität	now
18.11.1999	Neue Chancen am Mittelmeer	Günther Nonnenmacher
17.11.2000	Der "Geist des Dialogs"	Bc
05.11.2001	Chance für den Barcelona-Prozess"	Hans-Christian Rößler
22.04.2002	Verzettelung in Valencia	Hans-Christian Rößler
23.04.2002	Eklat am ersten Tag der Mittelmeer-Konferenz	Hans-Christian Rößler
24.04.2002	Spanisches Prestigeobjekt	Walter Haubich
06.03.2004	Eigene EU-Strategie für Nahost	Bc
05.05.2004	Kommission sagt 1,2 Milliarden Euro zu	Bc
07.05.2004	EU zu Überwachunhe von Waffenstillstand bereit	Bc
01.12.2004	"Es gibt ein Fenster der Möglichkeiten"	Bc
11.01.2005	Kein Trojanisches Pferd	Nikolas Busse
13.04.2005	Stärkung der Demokratie	Bc

28.11.2005	Besseres zu tun	Horst Bacia
28.11.2005	Neue Impulse für eine langfristige Partnerschaft	Javier Solana
29.11.2005	Verhaltenskodex gegen Terrorismus	Horst Bacia
05.12.2006	Mehr Geld für Europas Nachbarn	Bc
08.02.2007	"Die Zukunft Europas liegt im Süden"	Redaktion
26.10.2007	Gegengift gegen Religionskriege	Redaktion
08.12.2007	Mediterrane Interpretation	Michaela Wiegel
22.12.2007	Gipfel zur Mittelmeer-Union im Juli in Paris	Mic
24.01.2008	"Politik ist nicht Privatleben"	Martin Schulz
04.03.2008	"Ein Projekt aller EU-Mitglieder"	Wulf Schmiese
07.03.2008	Details zur Mittelmeer-Union	flf
13.03.2008	Deutsch-französische Einigkeit	Wulf Schmiese
15.03.2008	Die freundschaftliche Zähmung des Nicolas Sarkozy	Nikolas Busse
23.03.2008	Der Nebel ist weg, aber die Sich bleibt schlecht	Eckart Lohse
02.05.2008	"Ausgleich durch Mittelmeerunion"	dpa
20.05.2008	Zankapfel	Nm
20.05.2008	Vorschlag zur Mittelmeer-Union	nbu
13.06.2008	Das Scheitern programmiert?	Redaktion
DIE WELT		
31.07.2007	Vorschnelle Kritik an Frankreichs Präsident. Mehr Srakozy wagen?	Thomas Schmid
08.12.2007	Geplante Mittelmeerunion soll un mit allen EU-Staaten kooperieren. Sarkozy und Merkel: keine zweite EU vorgesehen	Jochen Hehn
04.03.2008	Beziehungskrise zwischen Merkel und Sarkozy? Kanzlerin und Frankreichs Präsident legen Streit über Mittelmeerunion beiandere Differenzen bleiben	Mariam Lau
12.03.2008	Streit um Mittelmeer-Union rechtzeitig vor EU-Gipfel beendet. Einigung zur Doppelspitze liegt allen Ländern vor	Ansgar Graw
15.03.2008	Streit über Mittelmeerunion hat zwei Sieger. Sarkozy und Merkel finden in Brüssel Kompromiss	Hannelore Crolly, Christoph Schiltz
19.05.2008	EU lässt sich die Mittelmeer-Union 16 Milliarden Euro kosten. Regionale Projekte sollen politische und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung fördern - Strategie-Papier liegt der WELT vor	Christoph Schiltz
09.06.2008	"Auf persönlichem Gebiet läuft nichts" Deutsch-französischer Gipfel in Straubing- Sarkozy bereitet französische EU-Präsidentschaft vor - Dissens über Klimaschutzziele	Jochen Hehn
20.07.2008	Sarkozys Außenminister verrät die nächsten Pläne	Jochen Hehn
20.07.2008	"Madame Merkel hat uns eine Blamage erspart"	Jochen Hehn
04.08.2008	Sarkozy, ein Jago Frankreichs	Dominique Moisi
05.08.2008	Mare nostrum	Wolf Lepenies
05.08.2008	Fernand Braudel und die Wege ans Mittelmeer	Wolf Lepenies
03.11.2008	Der französische Feuerwehrmann	Günther Nonnenmacher
DIE SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG		
03.11.2005	Millionen über das Mittelmeer	Rudolph Chimelli
26.11.2005	Die EU und das Meer	Martin Winter
28.11.2005	Misstrauen am Mittelmeer	wtr
28.11.2005	Ärger um Terror-Bekämpfung	Martin Winter

24.10.2007	Wunschtraum Mittelmeer-Union	chi
07.12.2007	Bündnis ohne Zukunft	Rudolph Chimelli
23.01.2008	Euer Eurabien	Christiane Schlötzer
24.01.2008	"Nehmen Sie usn mit Humor - und mit Ernst"	Stefan Kornelius, Jeanne Rubner
01.02.2008	Ein Meer von Fragen	csc
01.02.2008	Merkel will Mittelmeer-Politik der EU stärken	Javier Caceres
02.02.2008	"Wir werden nicht ohne unsere Partner tun"	Jeanne Rubner
23.02.3008	Umstrittene Mittelmeer-Union	Nico Fried
04.03.2008	Treffen in Zeiten der Irritationen	Stefan Braun
05.03.2008	Henri Guaino Pariser Skeptiker und Erfinder der Mittelmeer-Union	Gerd Kröncke
06.03.2008	Neuer Name für eine alter Politik	Stafan Kornelius
13.03.2008	Sarkozy gibt im Streit um Mittelmeer-Union nach	Martin Winter
29.04.2008	Zu Gast beim geschätzen Partner	Rudolph Chimelli
21.05.2008	Allein in Paris	chi
21.05.2008	Brüssel bremst Sarkozy	Martin Winter
14.03.2008	Die Mittelmeerunion kommt	Redaktion
08.11.2008	Die Kraft der großen Ideed	Werner Weidenfeld
DIE TAGESZEITUNG		
23.03.2007	Nachhaltig träumen. Das erfolgreiche Projekt EU feiert 50. Geburtstag. Damit es noch besser wird, muss die Energiepolitik in die gemeinsame Außen- und Sicheheitspolitik integriert werden	Daniel Cohn-Bendit
06.08.2007	Europas Abgrund. Mit seinen Initiativen wirbelt Frankreichs Präsident Nicolas Sarkozy die Szenerie auf. Es wäre höchste Zeit, mal über eine gesamteuropäische Mittelmeer-Politik nachzudenken	Zafer Senocak
19.09.2007	Stimmen der Jugend	Kerstin Fritzsche
05.03.2008	Mist. Deutschland liegt nicht am Mittelmeer. Frankreich und Deutschaland sagen beide, sie hätten ihre konträren Ideen zu Sarkozys "Mittelmeeunion" durchgesetzt	Daniela Weingärtner
05.05.2008	die anderen über das Vorbild Merkel und über gordon brown	Redaktion
20.03.2008	Operettenpolitik. Die EU will sich in einen wirtschaftlich und sicherheitstechnisch funktionierenden Kokon einhüllen - und scheitert systematisch. Auch Nicolas Sarkozys Mittelmeerunion ist falsch	Daniela Weingärtner
15.03.2008	Springteufelchen wieder in der Kiste - Merkel hat Sarkozys "Mittelmeer-Union" erst mal gestutzt	Daniela Weingärtner
13.07.2008	Mittelmeerunion, au travail!	Dorothea Hahn
14.07.2008	Unser Gorilla	Bernhard Schmid
FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND		
01.03.2000	Europa spielt nicht mit den Schulkindern	Rainer Koch
11.09.2000	Alles von Casablanca bis Tel Aviv	Sven Behrendt, Christian-Peter Hanelt
14.11.2000	Brüssel beim Mittelmeer-Gipfel ohne Hoffnung	Rainer Koch
16.11.2000	Libanon und Syrien stellen sich quer	Roula Khalaf
17.11.2000	Araber drängen EU zu neuer Rolle in Nahost	Cornelia Knust
05.11.2001	EU sucht Einigkeit mit arabischer Welt	Birgit Jennen

28.02.2002	Keine eigene Bank der EU für Mittelmeerländer	Rainer Koch
23.04.2002	EU versucht sich als Vermittler in Nahost	Rainer Koch, Judy Dempsey
12.05.2003	Bush bietet Nahost-Region Freihandel an	Ewars Alden, Roula Khalaf
26.05.2003	Verunsicherte Mittelmeerländer scheuen Reformen	Judy Dempsey
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ABSTRACT

The Barcelona Process – A Result of Postcolonial Politics?

In contrast to former Mediterranean Policy initiatives the Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, constitutes a coherent Policy with a multilateral dimension. Twenty-six countries signed the declaration of Barcelona and agreed on the ambitious goal to guarantee: political stability, an economic partnership and reciprocal cultural dialogue. Due to the European enlargement policy since 1995 the members of the Barcelona Process today mount up to forty-three countries. Recently the Barcelona Process was revitalized by the launch of the Mediterranean Union in July 2008 due to the moderate response on its success at the tenth anniversary.

The novelty character of such diplomatic relations, the apparent predominant position of the European Union within the Barcelona process and the region- building aspect through the establishment of a new paradigm by denominating the Barcelona Process synonymously "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership" constitute three arguments to legitimate a historical analysis. The analytical common denominator of these aspects refer to the colonial past as the mayor European powers which remain decisive driving motors in the European Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean were interlaced with the histories of the Southern Mediterranean countries across sea.

The sources are settled in the temporal bracket of the initiation of the Barcelona Process in 1995 and its revitalisation with the launch of the Mediterranean Union which cumulated in an anew declaration in 2008. The discourse analytical method is applied on three types of sources (European documentation, speeches and press articles) which correspond to three distinctive levels of analysis: the institutional, political and public level. Within this setting the discourse analysis focuses on three dynamic stages of the European political discourse: the establishment (European documentation), the implementation (speeches) and the perception (press articles). It is to expect that considering the action and reaction mechanism of the European discourse gives information about the extent of the European dominance and their domination claim in the Mediterranean.

In this context it is the aim of the present doctoral thesis if the Barcelona Process is a result of postcolonial politics. By questioning the continuity and discontinuity of colonial remains in the European discourse it is to expect that significant results can be deduced regarding the self-understanding of the European Union regarding its identity building as political power.

Der Barcelona Prozess – ein Ergebnis postkolonialer Politik?

Der Barcelona Prozess, der 1995 initiiert wurde, verkörpert den ersten kohärenten politischen Ansatz der Europäischen Union im Mittelmeerraum. Die gemeinsame Deklaration, mitgetragen von anfänglich siebenundzwanzig Ländern, umfasst folgende ambitionierte Zielesetzungen: politische Stabilität, Wirtschaftspartnerschaft und die Förderung des gegenseitigen kulturellen Austauschs. Mit der Gründung der Union für das Mittelmeer im Juli 2008, wurden die Ziele und der politische Rahmen von Barcelona bekräftigt. Dreiundvierzig Länder unterschrieben die gemeinsame Deklaration von Paris 2008.

Der Neuwert diese politischen Initiative, die augenscheinliche Europäische Dominanz und der politischen Definition eines gemeinsamen Raums, wie die synonyme Bezeichnung Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft suggeriert, stellen drei Argumente dar, die eine historische Untersuchung rechtfertigen. Der größte gemeinsame Nenner, analytisch betrachtet, stellt die koloniale Vergangenheit der Europäischen Staaten dar, die bis heute maßgebliche Antriebskräfte der bestehenden Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union sind.

Mit Hilfe eines diskursanalytischen Ansatzes soll in der vorliegenden Arbeit der Diskurs der Europäischen Union im Zusammenhang der Mittelmeerpolitik seit 1995 untersucht werden.

Die Quellen, die die Grundlage der empirischen Analyse darstellen, sind in der Zeitspanne von dem Gründungsmoment im Jahr 1995 und der Revitalisierung 2008 situiert. Die Diskursanalyse basiert auf drei unterschiedlichen Dokumentenarten (EU Dokumente, Reden, Zeitungsartikel), die wiederum drei unterschiedliche Analyseebenen repräsentieren: die Etablierung (EU Dokument), Implementierung (Reden) und Rezeption (Zeitungsartikel) des Europäischen Diskurses. Die Berücksichtigung der aktiven sowie reaktiven Ebene des Diskurses soll das Ausmaß der angestrebten und wahrgenommenen Dominanz der Europäischen Union darstellen.

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