DISSERTATION

Titel der Dissertation

Dignāga's Philosophy of Language
Dignāga on anyāpoha

Pramāṇasamuccaya V
Texts, Translation, and Annotation

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Acknowledgements

Introduction

1   Purpose and scope

1.1   This dissertation is centred on presenting an annotated English translation of chapter five of the seventh century A.D. Buddhist philosopher Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV V). In this important chapter Dignāga expounds his philosophy of language known as the *apoha* theory or thesis of *anyāpoha* "exclusion of other referents,"[1] which affected post-Dignāga philosophical debate in India for centuries. The original Sanskrit version of *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV) is no longer extant. Except for a few Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature, the only comprehensive sources available for the study of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine are two mediocre Tibetan translations of PSV included in the Tibetan *bsTan 'gyur* and a small number of Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature. Thus, the English translation of PSV V is based upon its two Tibetan versions and Sanskrit fragments published in *Hattori* 1982, including Sanskrit fragments I have traced to other sources. The translation is accompanied and supported by a critical edition[2] of the bulk of the corresponding fifth chapter of the single Sanskrit manuscript of *Viśālāmalavatī ṭīkā* (hence PSṬ V). This unique *ṭīkā* attributed to Jinendrabuddhi, a central eighth century A.D. Indian grammarian and philosopher, is the only extant commentary on PSV and thus an important source of information on the philosophical context in which Dignāga propagated his work, and the Sanskrit text of PSV as known to Jinendrabuddhi.

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[1] Essential means for studying Dignāga's *apoha* theory were published in 1976 by Muni Jambuvijayaji in the second volume of his monumental edition of Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādi's Dvādaśāraṃ Nayacakram. This volume includes Sanskrit restorations of crucial passages of PSV V based upon the evidence presented in Siṃhasūri's work and the Tibetan translations of PSV V, as well as the Tibetan translation of Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ V included in the bStan gyur. These brilliant reconstructions have served many scholars as the only trustworthy introduction to essential aspects of the *apoha* theory as presented in PSV V. An annotated English translation of selected passages of the fifth chapter based upon its Tibetan translations and Sanskrit fragments is published in *Hayes* 1988.
[2] The critical edition leaves out a few insignificant passages and Jinendrabuddhi's erudite comment on *upacāra;* independent paragraphs are edited separately; see **4.** below.

1.2   The purpose of the translation is to present a faithful English version of the Tibetan and Sanskrit sources. All crucial paragraphs of PSṬ V and other chapters of Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā* are translated in the annotations, as well as citations of Sanskrit or Tibetan sources if they are important for understanding Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine. Sanskrit or Tibetan quotations are rendered into English with the background of current knowledge of the vocabulary and technical terms of classical Indian grammatical and philosophical literature.[3] Sanskrit terms inserted in round brackets reflect the vocabulary of the Sanskrit sources. Those marked with an asterisk are hypothetical restorations suggested by the Tibetan translations and the context as presented in the Sanskrit vocabulary reflected in PSṬ. In order to avoid ambiguity a limited number of exegetical additions are added in square brackets if suggested by the context and Jinendrabuddhi's exegesis. The annotations are intended to explain in exacting detail the philological evidence contained in *Hattori* 1982, PSṬ V, and other relevant Sanskrit or Tibetan sources.

1.3   The difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations of PSV are well known and in some cases almost insuperable. I have therefore taken advantage of the Sanskrit evidence embodied in PSṬ V and restored into Sanskrit many paragraphs of the presumably original version of PSV V if the Sanskrit evidence of PSṬ V is matched by the Tibetan translations of PSV V. Crucial passages from other chapters of PSV are also restored if they shed light on the philosophical issues addressed in PSV V. The restorations are primarily established on the basis of *pratīka*s quoted in PSṬ and Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases of Dignāga's presentation of his philosophy in PSV. Independent Sanskrit sources that corroborate the restorations are quoted too. The method applied to restore the Sanskrit text of PSV V and other relevant sections of PSV is outlined below (see **5.1-9**). The Sanskrit restorations are presented in separate annotations that lay out their sources in a straightforward and comprehensive way.

1.4   Dignāga's "*apoha* theory" is an essential complement to his theory of knowledge and logic. Since it generated an incessant debate among contemporary and subsequent generations of Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian philosophers, and continues to elicit questions among Dignāga's modern Western interpreters about the meaning and

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[3] Cf. *Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastic in Indien,* Band I-III, Wien 1991-2008; Abhyankar, *Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar.* 1961. Renou, *Terminologie.* 1957.

purpose of *anyāpoha,* this work includes a fresh study of its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V.[4] The objective is to clarify fundamental theoretical issues in the light of the Sanskrit evidence of Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ V, as it is no longer necessary to address the inherent ambiguities of the opaque Tibetan sources.[5]

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[4] The *apoha* theory was interpreted by Th. Stcherbatsky as presupposing "The Law of Double Negation," which has left its indelible mark on Western interpretations of the *apoha* thesis, cf. *Buddhist Logic,* Volume one p. 417 under the heading "The Law of Double Negation."

[5] I addressed essential features of Dignāga's *apoha* theory in my published papers on the subject. See *Pind* 1991, and *Pind* 1999.

2   *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* V

The Purpose of PSV V

2.1   The fifth chapter on exclusion follows the crucial chapter on the role of the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) in inference, succeeded by the final chapter six on the *jāti*s "sophistical reasons." Its place in Dignāga's treatise is undoubtedly motivated by the frequent reference to "exclusion" (*vyavaccheda*, *apoha*) or "preclusion" (*nivṛtti)* in the preceding chapters. Thus the aim of PSV V, which presents the essentials of the *apoha* thesis, is to supplement previous statements about exclusion or preclusion with an exposition of the *apoha* doctrine itself.

2.2   As the title *Pramāṇasamuccaya* indicates, Dignāga composed PSV as a compendium (*samuccaya*) of his works on epistemology and logic, the intention being to provide scholars and students with a summary of his philosophy on the assumption that if needed they would refer to the detailed expositions of his other works. Thus, PSV is marked by extreme economy of presentation and tantalizing ellipsis. Given the limited number of extant works by Dignāga it is not possible to place PSV in the context of Dignāga's philosophical oeuvre, as all of his works on logic and epistemology except PSV and the Chinese versions of *Nyāyamukha* (hence NM) are no longer extant.[6] Dignāga must have regarded NM as a current exposition of his philosophy of inference when he composed PSV because he always mentions this work first when referring to his works on epistemology and logic.[7] Indeed, there is not a single quotable instance in all of PSV where it is not mentioned first. In the final chapter six of PSV Dignāga mentions *Nyāyaparīkṣā, Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā,* and *Sāṃkhyāparīkṣā;*[8] and *Nyāyamukha* refers once to *Sāṃkhyāparīkṣā.*[9] This makes it possible to conclude that most if not all of the Parīkṣās including *Sāmānya-parīkṣāvyāsa* (hence SPVy)—apparently the main source of PSV V (see **2.3**)—were written before Dignāga composed PSV to summarize his works on epistemology and logic.

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[6] A Sanskrit manuscript of *Nyāyamukha* is found among the Sanskrit manuscripts stored in Potala; see Steinkellner-Much *1995* p. xix.
[7] The references are usually presented as *Nyāyamukha* and so on.
[8] He refers to *Nyāyaparīkṣā* in PSV VI; cf. *Hattori* 1968: Introduction no. 51; *Pind* 2001 p. 157 no. 30; v. next.
[9] Cf. *Hattori* 1968 no. 53.

2.3   It is commonly assumed that PSV records the final stage of development of Dignāga's thought. However, we cannot *a priori* exclude the possibility that Dignāga composed other works after PSV, which presupposes and presumably to a large extent is based upon earlier works. He exploited the SPVy for the crucial fifth chapter. Jinendrabuddhi quotes two passages from this work, and he refers to it once (see **5.13**). It is thus certain that PSV V is based upon the earlier work. It is doubtless SPVy to which Yijin refers in *Nan hai ji gui hei fa zhuan* (T 2125: 230a6) under the title *Guan zong xiang lun *Sāmānya(lakṣaṇa)parīkṣā*[10] of which only a fragment of eleven verses are included in the Chinese Buddhist canon (T 1623) under the same title.[11] As the qualification *vyāsa* added to the original Sanskrit title indicates, it must have been a comprehensive treatise. Uddyotakara is no doubt addressing statements from this work in his criticism of the *apoha* theory. For instance, he closes his presentation of Dignāga's arguments by quoting an important prose fragment which cannot be traced to PSV V. It seems, however, to belong in the same context as PSV V: 11d that ends the first section of PSV V[12].

2.4   Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the scope of the philosophical issues which Dignāga addresses in PSV V to a large extent reflects the philosophical discourse of SPVy, although the treatment of the subjects in SPVy undoubtedly would mirror the qualification *vyāsa* appended to the title of the treatise: it must have been a full and comprehensive treatment of its subject matter. Although the evidence shows that Uddyotakara addresses issues identical with those presented in PSV V: 1-11, there are nonetheless conspicuous differences. As mentioned above, he quotes a prose fragment that would seem to belong in the context of the final statement of PS V: 11d,[13] but there is nothing comparable in PSV V: 11d, which one would expect. Moreover, there is a particular quotation that Uddyotakara attributes to Dignāga and rejects as untenable in his *apoha* critique, which has no parallel in PSV V, cf. *Nyāyavārttika* (hence NV) 325,14-15: *yac cedam ucyate tvayā: parikalpitāḥ sattāśabdā iti tad api na.* He also

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[10] Cf. *Pind* 1999 no.3. The Chinese translation would indicate that the term *lakṣaṇa* was part of the original title, which is unlikely. Siṃhasūri refers to Dignāga as *Sāmānyaparīkṣākāra* at NCV 628, 8 and indicates that Mallavādi was using this work in his presentation of Dignāga's arguments, which are also presented in PSV V although in an abbreviated form.
[11] The title also occurs in verse two of the Chinese fragment.
[12] See *Translation* no. 182.
[13] See *Translation* no. 182.

quotes a slightly edited version of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (hence VP) III 14:8,[14] which belongs in the context of an argument similar to the one presented at PSV V: 3, where Dignāga cites the original version to substantiate his criticism.

2.5 Dignāga apparently wrote similar extensive studies like, for instance, *Nyāyaparīkṣā*, which is referred to in later philosophical literature as *mahatī*,[15] "comprehensive." It is uncertain if the *Dvādaśa-śatikā* which presupposes the *apoha* theory belongs among Dignāga's pre-PSV works like the SPVy. It must have been considered an important Dignāga oeuvre because Dharmakīrti quotes a short prose passage from it in PVSV.[16] The significance of the title "The twelve Hundred" is uncertain. It may refer to the number of verses (*kārikā*s) of the work. As only a prose passage is quoted, it may have been a work of considerable size, consisting of *kārikā*s embedded in a prose commentary like other Indian philosophical literature. It is regrettable that Dignāga's works on epistemology and logic are no longer extant, as the somewhat truncated discourse of PSV contains very little information on contemporary scholars, whose works and philosophical doctrines Dignāga addresses in PSV.

2.6 Fortunately PSV has survived the ravages of time albeit in two mediocre Tibetan versions and a few Sanskrit fragments. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the main reason why PSV is still extant although in Tibetan translation is because its relative brevity made it an ideal work to comment on for generations of post-Dignāga buddhist philosophers, who could use it as a pretext for introducing views of later philosophers as if they were Dignāga's own, while not addressing views that had become controversial or out of date in the context of post-Dignāga philosophy. For instance, Jinendrabuddhi refrains deliberately from addressing the implications of Dignāga's use of the term *arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*,[17] "qualified by the preclusion of other referents," which according to Dignāgan epistemology distinguishes the referents (*bhāva*) of any word from the referents of other words. However, the evidence indicates that Dignāga introduced this term, since he conceived *anyāpoha* as a substitute for real universals, as opposed to his non-Buddhist contemporaries, who

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[14] Cf. **2.28** below.
[15] Cf. *Vādanyāyaṭīkā* 142,13-15: *mahatyāṃ Nyāyaparīkṣāyāmācārya-Dignāgapa-daiḥ.*
[16] Cf. *Pind* 1991 p. 269 no. 1.
[17] See *Translation* no. 466.

regarded real universals as qualifiers of things and thus as *pravṛtti-nimitta* of denotation.

2.7   Whatever may have been the cause, a substantial part of Dignāga's work is irretrievably lost, and PSV V is the only extant exposition of his philosophy of language. Since Jinendrabuddhi does not identify the scholars whose views Dignāga rejects in this chapter, it is difficult to place PSV V in a well-defined historical context. Dignāga's *apoha* theory was known among contemporary thinkers before he wrote the fifth chapter of PSV V because he addresses the *sāṅkhyanāśaka*[18] philosopher Mādhava's criticism of the *apoha* doctrine in a fairly long and difficult section of PSV V: 39ff.[19] Dignāga's answer includes slightly edited quotations of Mādhava's critical remarks.[20] Fortunately Jinendrabuddhi provides the Sanskrit original of Dignāga's source, although he does not mention its title. Mādhava evidently criticized the *apoha* theory as presented in another work by Dignāga, presumably the no longer extant SPVy, and Dignāga answers his criticism in PSV V. In the same context Dignāga also answers a Jaina philosopher's critical remarks about his *apoha* thesis at PSV V: 41. Jinendrabuddhi quotes the relevant passage from his work, but he does not mention its title or the name of its author, who is styled *vaibhāgika* "distinctionist." This section is especialy crucial for understanding Dignāga's *apoha* thesis as it shows unambiguously that his theory of exclusion pivots on non-existence (*abhāva*) of other things in the locus of any referent, namely their mutual non-existence, which Dignāga appears to regard as a general qualifier like real general properties.

Dignāga's presentation of the *apoha* doctrine in PSV V

2.8   Dignāga's presentation in PSV V of the fundamental tenets of his philosophy of language is marked by tantalizing ellipsis and appears to be remarkably lax, which affects understanding the philoso-phy of *anyāpoha*. Important theoretical statements are restricted to a few highly condensed paragraphs of the entire chapter, which is pri-marily concerned with refuting contemporary theories of meaning

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[18] See *Steinkellner* 2005 p. 17: *sāṅkhyanāśako mādhavas tv āha.*
[19] Dignāga mentions Mādhava's views on *pratyakṣa* in the Sāṃkhya section of PSV I; cf. PSV I 28, Steinkellner 2005 p. 17; *Hattori* 1968, *Translation* p. 57f.
[20] Mādhava's knowledge of the *apoha* theory necessitates re-thinking his and Dignāga's dates.

based on the assumption that the semantic condition of the application of words are real universals inherent in things. In contrast to other chapters of PSV, Dignāga does not attempt to present or justify in any detail his own view on the subject of *apoha* in the first part of the chapter, which is primarily devoted to criticizing doctrines that Dignāga rejects as untenable. In fact, crucial statements about *anyāpoha* are only presented at PSV V: 34-50, the final third of PSV V. The fifth chapter starts by presenting the thesis that verbal knowledge does not differ from inference, as any word like "existing" (*sat*) denotes its referent by excluding other referents in the same way as the logical indicator "being produced" (*kṛtakatva*), which presupposes that there be invariable connection (*avinābhāvasambandha*) between the word and its referent similar to that of the inferential indicator (*liṅga, hetu*) and the indicated. Dignāga continues immediately thereafter by criticizing in some detail views he rejects as untenable. The identities of most of the philosophers whose theses Dignāga analyses and confounds remain unknown, as Jinendrabuddhi rarely identifies any of Dignāga's protagonists.

2.9   Thus the exact philosophical context of the relentless criticism which Dignāga levels at the philosophy of language of contemporary philosophers remains obscure, except when he answers the criticism of the *apoha* doctrine formulated by the Sāṅkhya philosopher Mādhava (see **2.7**). In general the order of presentation of the philosophical issues discussed in the chapter does not appear to be well organised as many of the subjects under discussion appear to be addressed haphazardly. This no doubt reflects Dignāga's attempt to summarize, in the fifth chapter, the content of the more comprehensive work, SPVy, and possibly to address reactions to his major work. Important concepts are sometimes introduced abruptly without explaining their connection to the context in which they are introduced. This has left a noticeable mark of lack of coherence on the discourse of this crucial chapter. For instance, it is not clear why Dignāga addresses the semantics of compounds in the light of the general *apoha* thesis immediately after the first central section PSV V: 1-13, although the analysis of the relation between the terms of a compound like *nīlotpala* is no doubt motivated by the attempt to analyse the semantic relation between general and particular terms in the context of the *apoha* theory, which in a way mirrors the relation between the terms of a sentence (*vākya*).

2.10   The first part of PSV V:1-11 (+12-13), however, is a well-defined and independent section of the chapter. In this section Dignāga analyses and rejects four theories of denotation: that a general term denotes (1) individuals (*bheda*), (2) general properties (*jāti*), (3) the connection between general properties and the thing in which they inhere (*tadyoga*), and (4) the general property possessor (*tadvat*). It ends with the claim that the thesis that a word excludes other referents is settled (*sthitam), although no formal proof has been presented to substantiate the claim. It would thus seem that the untenability of the rejected views serves as a means of bolstering the *apoha* doctrine through *via negationis*. Although Dignāga presents a fairly detailed analysis of the last mentioned theory, he never addresses this thesis again, except in the important paragraphs at PSV V: 34-36 which present a brief account of why the problems of the four theses analysed at PSV V 2-4a do not obtain according to the *apoha* thesis. For instance, the main problem of the *tadvad* thesis, namely the impossibility of direct (*sākṣāt*) reference, is briefly mentioned at PSV V: 36c, where Dignāga claims that the *apoha* thesis does not entail this problem, since exclusion of other referents applies directly (*sākṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhāt*).

2.11   However, the immediately following *kārikā*s at PSV V: 12-13 introduce subjects that have not been addressed previously in the chapter and in one case only once in the entire treatise. For instance, the implication of the concept of *svasambandhānurūpya* introduced at PS V: 12 is explained in a theoretically charged passage at PSV II: 13, which is the only passage of the entire PSV where it occurs. It is obvious that the two verses must have been copied from another of Dignāga's works—perhaps the SPVy—in which the implication of the term was treated in detail and its denotation explained. There are also noticeable inconsistencies in the chapter that are difficult to understand. For instance, the fairly long exposition at PSV: 25-30 explains that exclusion of other referents is caused by conflict or opposition (*virodha*) between properties occurring in a tree of categories and the terms that denote them. The tree presupposes a logically ordered hierarchy of properties, which ultimately is derived from Vaiśeṣika taxonomy.

2.12   But Dignāga apparently invalidates *virodha* as cause of exclusion at PSV V: 31a by introducing non-observation (*adṛṣṭa*) as a justifiable substitute, and explains at PSV V: 34 that mere non-observation (*adarśanamātra*) of any given word's application to

things other than its own referent establishes exclusion and verbal knowledge as inference. This discussion together with the following paragraphs at PSV V: 35-36 are the only passages specifically devoted to presenting the philosophy of *apoha*. Dignāga apparently did not attempt to integrate the two mutually incompatible causes of exclusion into a logically coherent theory, and the crucial paragraphs PSV V: 34-36 only presents the bare essentials of his *apoha* theory leaving a number of important philosophical issues unanswered.

2.13   Other information that is essential to our understanding of the rationale of the *apoha* doctrine is mentioned incidentally, for instance, the crucial information that the general property of any given referent or word that is defined as exclusion of other referents or words is located *in* the referent (*arthe*) or *in* the word (*śabde*). Since the evidence shows that *anyāpoha* pivots on exclusion interpreted as non-existence or negation (*abhāva*) of other referents (*artha*) or other words (*śabda*) in any given referent or word, it raises a number of intriguing questions about what justifies exclusion: *apoha* is evidently not related to negation in its well-established Western sense because ultimately the *apoha* theory is not centred on the notion of negation as the act of denying a word or statement, but rather on the notion of non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent of any word (see **6.1** ff). Dignāga conceived *anyāpoha* as a qualifier of the referent of the word, evidently imitating contemporary usage among Sanskrit grammarians and non-buddhist philosophers. The introduction of the locative to denote the referents of the word as loci of *anyāpoha* would otherwise be incomprehensible: *anyāpoha* is presented as qualifying the referent as if it were a real general property, which is corroborated by Dignāga's use of the locative to designate the referent as locus of *anyāpoha*, which is understandable with the background of Dignāga's statement at PSV V: 36d that exclusion of other referents has all the acknowledged properties of a general property (*jāti*).

The title of PSV V

2.14   The Tibetan translation of PSV V attributed to Vasudharakṣita and Seṅ rgyal (hence V),[21] reproduces the title of the fifth chapter as *tshad ma kun las btus pa las gźan sel ba brtag pa'i le'u ste lṅa pa 'o.* This would indicate that the original Sanskrit title of the chapter was

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[21] K appears to have been completed in the 11th or by the beginning of the 12th century A.D. and V towards the end of the 11th century A.D. See *Mejor* 1991: 179.

anyāpohaparīkṣā. The question is whether it is rightly so named. In fact, the Tibetan version attributed to Kanakavarman and Dad pa'i śes rab (hence K) does not record any title, but merely refers to the chapter as "the fifth chapter" (*le 'u lṅa pa 'o*). Unfortunately the Sanskrit colophon of the fifth chapter of PSṬ is missing. Its Tibetan translation, however, corroborates K by reading *le'u lṅa pa 'o* (= *pañcamaḥ paricchedaḥ*). As Ms B of PSṬ V omits the colophon we are forced to restore its title by extrapolating from the colophon of chapters like that of the first one, which reads *prathamaḥ paricchedaḥ* (*samāptaḥ*).[22]

2.15   PSV V is, of course, a *parīkṣā* in the sense that it analyses and refutes views which Dignāga considers untenable, but it is certainly not a critical examination of *anyāpoha*. This would contradict the purpose of the chapter, which is to justify why exclusion of other words and speech units or other referents does not entail the problems that follow from the assumption that real general properties inherent in words and speech units or things constitute the semantic condition of denotation. Originally individual chapters of PSV did not bear any title, as indicated by the translation of PSV attributed to Kanaka-varman and his collaborator. Their translation of PSV merely enumerates the number of the individual chapters, in contrast to the version attributed to Vasudharakṣita and his assistant, which adds information about the number and subject matter of the first three chapters, namely PSV I *pratyakṣa* (*mṅon sum gyi le 'u ste daṅ po 'o*),[23] PSV II *svārthānumāna* (*raṅ gi don gyi rjes su dpag pa ste le 'u gñis pa 'o*),[24] and PSV III *parārthānumāna* (*gźan gyi don rjes su dpag pa'i le 'u*), adding the term *parīkṣā* (*brtag pa*) after the title of the remaining three chapters like those of PSV IV: *dṛṣṭāntadṛṣṭāntā-bhāṣaparīkṣā* (*dpe daṅ dpe ltar snaṅ ba brtag pa'i le 'u ste bźi pa 'o*),[25] PSV V: *anyāpohaparīkṣā* (*gźan sel ba brtag pa'i le 'u ste lṅa pa 'o*), and PSV VI: *jātiparīkṣā* (*lhag gcod brtag pa'i le 'u ste drug pa 'o*).[26] Since the title *anyāpohaparīkṣā* is only recorded in V, it is reasonable to conclude that the Sanskrit title *anyāpohaparīkṣā* is spurious, and in all likelihood so are the titles of PSV IV and VI. It is

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[22] The Tibetan version of PSṬ V does not corroborate the reading *samāptaḥ* which may be an interpolation. It is occasionally found in contemporary colophons, but it is evidently redundant.
[23] Cf. P 27b6.
[24] Cf. P 42b7.
[25] Cf. P 70a8.
[26] Cf. P 93a8.

impossible to decide why the term *parīkṣā* was added to the colophons of the last three chapters.

The format of PSV V

2.16   The format of the two Tibetan translations of PSV V reflects well established classical Indian literary standards. It consists formally of 49½ *kārikā*s embedded in a prose commentary. Oddly, in both K and V verse 43 only consists of two *pāda*s as opposed to the well-established pattern of four *pāda*s to a *śloka,* which Tibetan translators reproduce as four times seven syllables. The reason for this anomaly is unknown as the Tibetan versions of PSV V and the separate version of the verses included in the *bsTan 'gyur*[27] do not imply that originally verse 43 consisted of just two *pāda*s as one would expect, nor that the identification or numbering of the verses of PSV V is wrong if compared to the order and number of the verses of PSV in general.

2.17   As Jinendrabuddhi's explanation indicates the two *pāda*s of verse 43 are introduced by slightly edited quotations from the source Dignāga criticizes; and there is nothing that indicates that K and V in this particular instance misinterpreted two *pāda*s as prose, which otherwise might explain the apparent irregularity. In view of this peculiar problem it is noticeable that the translators of V interpreted the sentence that closes PSV V:3 as two *śloka pāda*s: *l 'di yi rigs kyi sgra yis ni // brjod par bya ba ñid mi 'thad l*, which reads in the Sanskrit phrase that closes the paragraph: *naivāsya jātiśabdena< /> vācyatvam upapadyate*. If this interpretation is correct, and it is certainly metrically possible, it would solve the riddle of the two missing *pāda*s of PSV V: 43.[28] The distribution of the two hundred *pāda*s among the fifty *kārikā*s merely has to be adjusted accordingly,[29] that is, *pāda*s 4ab are to be converted to 4bc, and so on, and *pāda*s 43ab to 43bc.

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[27] The separate version of the verses is extracted from K and is therefore without independent value.
[28] See *Translation* no. [15] (4).
[29] See *Translation* no. [15] no. (4).

The Tibetan translations of PSV V

2.18   The two Tibetan translations of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamucca-yavṛtti* are maddeningly difficult as they are peppered with textual problems of every kind conceivable. Many sentences are extremely difficult to construe, and so far scholars have been forced to study PSV V supported by the generally excellent Tibetan version of Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ V included in the *bsTan 'gyur* and published in *Hattori* 1982. Thus the problem of construing the two Tibetan renderings of PSV V is a major obstacle to understanding Dignāga's thought.

2.19   Although K as a rule appears to be more reliable than V, there are nonetheless passages that make better sense in the version recorded in V, whose translation occasionally is corroborated by the Sanskrit sources as opposed to that of K. Indeed, at the present juncture of Dignāga studies there appears to be no justification for preferring one version to the other. Only when the two Tibetan versions of PSV have been studied carefully in the light of the information of the presumably original Sanskrit version of PSV that can be restored on the basis of PSṬ will it be possible to decide which of the two versions is more trustworthy than the other, and, last but not least, to determine to what extent the occasional differences between the two Tibetan translations of Dignāga's work are attributable to different versions of it or just illegible Sanskrit manuscripts (see **2.21-32**), rather than to translation mistakes or mere differences of interpretation of the syntax and vocabulary of the Sanskrit original.

2.20   The erratic and occasionally nonsensical character of K or V would indicate that the two translator teams may not have had sufficient expertise in Indian or Dignāgan philosophy of logic and language. It is hard to believe, however, that insufficient knowledge of Dignāga's philosophy would explain the tantalizing difficulties of reading the translators' efforts as not all passages of K and V present similar obstacles. This makes one wonder if there may have been other reasons for the inferior quality of their translations than mere incompetence.

2.21   Vasudharakṣita is only credited with the translation of PSV, so it is impossible to ascertain whether he was a poorly educated scholar in the field of Indian philosophy. Kanakavarman, on the other hand, is credited with the excellent revision of the Tibetan translation of

Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra,[30] which is a demanding treatise to translate into Tibetan; in addition he also produced a superb Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā.[31] He can hardly be considered incompetent. Even if the two translators were not specialists of classical Indian epistemology and logic, we must assume that they would be able to construe Dignāga's Sanskrit *kārikā*s and prose, which in general is comparatively simple and devoid of syntactical complexities of the kind we encounter in, for instance, the contemporary grammarian Bhartṛhari's prose, which Dignāga knew and in a few cases exploited.[32]

2.22   It is impossible to explain the poor quality of the Tibetan translations unless one assumes that somehow it reflects the two translator team's inability correctly to interpret the readings of their Sanskrit manuscripts. It is therefore noteworthy that Kanakavarman or Vasudharakṣita misinterpreted words and phrases, which should not present any difficulty of interpretation to scholars with traditional Indian background, provided that the Sanskrit manuscripts were readable. Indeed, the evidence supports the conclusion that the difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations are at least to some extent due to the translators' attempt to render Sanskrit corruptions into Tibetan, even if the readings were meaningless and the Tibetan translations in consequence incomprehensible.

2.23   For instance, the reading at PSV II 4d: *śugs kyis* K : *don yod pa'i* V[33] is utterly incomprehensible. *śugs kyis* sometimes reproduces Sanskrit *arthāpattyā,* which regularly is translated as *don gyi śugs kyis.* However, the translator team responsible for V could not identify the last word of the compound, which they may have interpreted as a form of Sanskrit *sattā* as the Tibetan term *yod* would indicate. However, the Tibetan term *don* which is commonly used to translate Sanskrit *artha* shows that the first word of the compound was easy for them to identify, which thus corroborates the suggested Sanskrit restoration **arthāpattyā.*

2.24   Kanakavarman and his assistant must have read the noun phrase *tadvān artho* at PS V 9c as if the reading were **tadvad artho*

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[30] Cf. *Louis de la Vallée Poussin's* Preface to his edition of *Madhyamakāvatāra,* Bibliotheca Indica IX (Reprint 1970).
[31] Cf. *Mejor* 1991: 178.
[32] Cf. e.g. PSV V: 46; *Pind* 2003.
[33] Cf. *Translation* no. 2.

because they reproduce it as *de ltar don.* The Tibetan translation *de ltar* presupposes a regular sandhi form of the Sanskrit adverb **tadvat* before vowel. The Tibetan translation is, of course, incomprehensible in the context, and one can only conclude from examples like this, of which unfortunately there are several instances, that indigenous Tibetan scholars and students of Indian logic and epistemology were ill served by the Tibetan translations of PSV that eventually were included in the Tibetan bsTan 'gyur.

2.25   Fortunately, the Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā* makes it possible to identify the causes of some of the translation mistakes. The Sanskrit evidence indicates that one of them was the not uncommon problem of disjoining morphemes in the process of copying, another that of *scriptura continua,* of which there are several examples in the Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā,* which occasionally made the competent Tibetan translator suggest implausible translations because he did not notice that he was translating an instance of *scriptura continua.* However, without the original Sanskrit sources the causes of such errors are difficult to detect.

2.26   A characteristic example of a translation based upon Sanskrit text with disjoined morphemes is Vasudharakṣita and his collaborator's reproduction of the term *ūrdhvatāvat* at PSV V 31d. The Tibetan translation *re źig greṅ ba la* presupposes apparently a reading like **ūrdhve tāvat,* which is totally meaningless in the context. Although Tibetan translators are not known to make conjectures, one cannot, of course, exclude the possibility that the translation *greṅ ba la* which would seem to presuppose Sanskrit **ūrdhve,* is, in fact, an emendation intended to correct the false reading *ūrdhva tāvat,* which any translator with knowledge of Sanskrit would consider dubious and perhaps attempt to "correct."

2.27   In any case, one should not overlook the fact that Tibetan translators tend to translate what they read in their Sanskrit manuscripts and do not attempt to make conjectures or emendations. Thus some of the apparent absurdities of the Tibetan translations of V and K stem in the final analysis from PSV manuscripts that were carelessly or badly copied and therefore difficult to interpret. The vagaries of the transmission of the original Sanskrit version of PSV are in places evident. For instance, K and V concur in not translating into Tibetan the crucial apodosis required by the context at PSV V

32d: *tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya prayogaḥ sambhavati.* This clause, however, was evidently part of Dignāga's original text, as Jinendrabuddhi incorporated it into his paraphrase of the paragraph he was commenting on.[34] This indicates that the otherwise divergent manuscripts used by the two translator teams descend from an archetype in which this particular sentence was missing. There is no doubt, however, that the phrase was an integral part of the original version of PSV V: 32d as Dignāga's exposition would be incomprehensible without it. In addition, there are no quotable examples in PSV V of phrases beginning with *yadā* that are not syntactically followed by the corresponding apodosis of *tadā.*

2.28   Some passages appear to reproduce corruptions like PSV V: 33d, which is impossible to construe in the versions presented in K and V. The readings *yod pa la sogs par* K : *sogs par* V translate in all likelihood *śatrantādau as Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā* indicates. The translator team responsible for K, however, could not identify the first term of the compound correctly, but apparently read it as *sattā + ādau,* the translation not leaving any trace whatsoever of the term *anta*. The scholars credited with V apparently could not even identify the word *śatranta*, although they correctly identified the last word of the compound as the locative of *ādi.* With this background the student of the Tibetan version of PSṬ V: 33d, which correctly reproduces and comments upon the passage, will find it impossible to identify the context of the discussion, much less understand the argument presented at PSV V: 33d. The few examples cited above–they are not isolated instances–show the type of philological problems that students of the Tibetan translations of PSV have to resolve in order to make sense of Dignāga's text.

2.29   There are sometimes considerable differences between the Tibetan translations and the Sanskrit evidence of PSṬ, which shows that the manuscript transmission of PSV is not uniform. In contrast to minor differences between K and V with regard to translation of individual verses of PSV V, their versions of PSV V: 2c-d differ in several respects. For instance, only V reproduces Dignāga's quotation of Bhartṛhari's VP III 14:8. This citation, however, is essential to Dignāga's argument and crucial for understanding it; and it is not clear why it is not found in K. Jinendrabuddhi does not explain its implications, which is remarkable as he usually addresses grammatical

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[34] Cf. Ms B 225a2 quoted ad loc.

issues. This would indicate that he did not find it in his copy of PSV V, assuming that he would check the original source when writing his *ṭīkā*. Dignāga, however, quotes the Bhartṛhari verse in support of his argument, and we have no reason to assume that it was interpolated because parallels in works by Dignāga's opponents show that the verse belongs in the context of this particular argument. Uddyotakara cites an edited version of the same verse addressing a similar argument in his criticism of Dignāga's *apoha* theory. It stems in all likelihood from Dignāga's no longer extant SPVy.

2.30   In a few instances the difference between K and V is inexplicable, unless we assume that the Tibetan versions presuppose different readings and not just corrupt text or misinterpretations. For instance, the Tibetan conversions of the paragraph that follows immediately after PSV V: 3 are mutually divergent and incompatible with the Sanskrit evidence of PSṬ Ms B 195a1ff. Thus the term *āśaṃkitam* at Ms B 195a6 and the phrase *idaṃ tad iti* recorded at Ms B 195b1 have no identifiable translations in K or V, although Jinendrabuddhi's exegesis indicates that he quotes the source he is explaining. I have therefore adopted the Sanskrit readings of PSṬ as I think that they are preferable to the confused translations of K and V, although neither K nor V corroborate the readings presented in PSṬ.

2.31   In other cases the translators appear to have rendered glosses interpolated into the verses, as it is sometimes impossible to fit the terms reproduced in the Tibetan translation of a particular verse into the metrical constraints of a Sanskrit *śloka* of thirty two syllables. For instance, the Tibetan translation of PSV V: 48a-d contains the compound *ṅag gi don* V : *ṅag don* K, evidently rendering Sanskrit **vākyārtha*. However, it is impossible to fit **vākyārtha* into the Sanskrit restoration with the background of the readings of the verse recorded in PSṬ V. **vākyārtha* is probably a marginal gloss introduced as a synonym of *pratibhā* (f.) in order to explain the reference of the demonstrative pronoun *sā* (f.) at 48a. As the Tibetan equivalent of Sanskrit *vākyārtha* is found in both K and V, which represent different manuscript transmissions of PSV, it is possible to conclude that the term was interpolated into the verse of the Sanskrit original or perhaps earlier Tibetan attempts to translate Dignāga's work before the translations recorded in K and V were executed.

2.32   There are noteworthy divergences between K and V with regard to which *ślokas* are *saṃgrahaślokas*. In PSV *saṃgrahaśloka*s

occur sparingly and they invariably summarize issues treated in the preceding paragraphs. However, in Vasudharakṣita's translation of PSV V 12-13 the two verses are designated as *saṃgrahaślokas*, despite the fact that they do not summarize the preceding exposition, but quite unexpectedly introduce entirely new topics.[35] In K, on the other hand, they are rendered as ordinary *śloka*s. Similarly, the two verses at PSV V 26-27 are *saṃgrahaśloka*s according to V, although they do not summarize the content of the preceding paragraphs, but rather add some general remarks about the logico-semantic relation between general terms. K does not identify the verses as *saṃgrahaśloka*s, nor does Jinendrabuddhi in any way suggest that they are inserted in order to summarize the content of the preceding discussion. The conclusion is inevitable: these stylistic qualifications were added at a later time. They were inserted for no obvious reason as the nature of Dignāga's exposition does not *per se* qualify them as *saṃgrahaśloka*s.

2.33   Thus the evidence indicates that corruptions of the Sanskrit manuscripts of PSV no doubt are one of the main causes of the difficulties of understanding Dignāga's thought through the Tibetan translations of PSV. When all the linguistic information contained in PST has been studied with the background of the Tibetan translations of K and V we shall be in a much better position to ascertain whether or not the many philological problems of the two versions, which force any scholar into hairsplitting arguments *pro et contra* regarding possible solutions to almost insoluble philological problems, are caused by textual corruptions of the original Sanskrit manuscripts, which the translators attempted to render into Tibetan, or just random instances of incompetence on their part. Even the highly competent Tibetan translator of PST, dPaṅ lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa, occasionally produced passages that are entirely incomprehensibe in the context of the subject matter because he faithfully translated a string of corruptions exactly as he read and interpreted them. In one case he even appears to have made a conjecture, although it is meaningless in the context.[36] Finally, it is necessary to investigate whether the

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[35] Cf. e.g. *Translation* no. 188.

[36] For instance, the Tibetan translation of PST Ms B 211a1 which quotes PS V: 46, is incomprehensible because Blo gros brtan pa reproduced text that is full of curruptions and in principle untranslatable. For instance PST loc. cit. reads *apodvāre* for *apoddhāre,* which Blo gros brtan pa translated as *sel ba'i sgo la* as if the reading of the Sanskrit Ms was *apohadvāre.* He apparently conjectured that *apo* was a mistake for *apoha.* See *Translation* no. 221.

occasional textual divergences between the Tibetan translations of PSV and the readings quoted in the Sanskrit manuscript of PSṬ reflect actual differences of transmission of Dignāga's work and not chance corruptions or interpolations.

3   *Viśālamālavatī ṭīkā* V and the commentator Jinendrabuddhi

3.1   The Viśālamālavatī *ṭīkā* attributed to Jinendrabuddhi is the only extant commentary on Dignāga's PSV. As I shall show below, PSṬ is not the only commentary devoted to commenting upon PSV. The evidence indicates that it is dependent upon other sources, some of which were known to Dignāga's critics Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri (see **4.13**), who quote them in their criticism of Dignāga's logic and *apoha* thesis. This makes Jinendrabuddhi's work an important source of information not only on the Sanskrit text of Dignāga's work, as it makes it possible to restore substantial sections of PSV V, but also to some extent on the nature of the earlier commentaries devoted to explaining PSV and the philosophical issues Dignāga discusses throughout his work.

3.2   Jinendrabuddhi is in all likelihood identical with Nyāsakāra, the author of Nyāsa, an important commentary on the Kāśikā known as the Kāśikāvivaraṇapañjikā. The date of the Nyāsakāra has been the subject of continuous debate. Consensus is that the reference to Nyāsa in Māgha's Śiśupālavadha is indeed to Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the Kāśikā; and therefore it is likely that Jinendrabuddhi was active as a scholar around 700 A.D.[37] Since he quotes Tattvasaṅgraha verses 1241, 1263, and 2811 in PSṬ I pp. 43 and 54, Jinendrabuddhi and Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725-788 A.D) must have been contemporaries. Since Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla refer to Jinendrabuddhi's view of *pratyakṣa* as shown by Funayama,[38] he may therefore have been an older contemporary of this eminent Buddhist scholar. Thus it is reasonable to assume that he was active as a writer in the first half of 8th century A.D. Apparently Jinendrabuddhi does not quote Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (hence TSP). This would indicate that copies of Kamalaśīla's TSP may not yet have been in circulation among Buddhist philosophers before Jinendrabuddhi composed PSṬ.

3.3   Jinendrabuddhi was evidently conversant with the sources addressed by Śantarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, as appears from the discussion in TSP and PSṬ V of Kumārila's criticism of the Dignāga's view that verbal communication is subject to the constraints of the

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[37] Cf. the discussion in George Cardona, *Pāṇini. A Survey of Research.* Delhi 1997 (Reprint), p. 280-81.
[38] Cf. *Funayama* 1999.

logical canon of *trairūpya.*[39] However, the treatment recorded in PSṬ V differs from that of TSP, which therefore may not have been known to Jinendrabuddhi. The source that Kamalaśīla and Jinendrabuddhi address criticizes the theory that the inferential nature of verbal communication consists in its indicating the intention of the speaker. This view was presented by Dharmakīrti, and the unknown source specifically subjects Dharmakīrti's view to criticism. Śāntarakśita and Kamalaśīla address the criticism of Dharmakīrti's view in the context of Kumārila's critique of the assumption that verbal communication is subject to the constraints of the *trairūpya.* It is therefore reasonable to assume that the source which Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla address may be Kumārila's Bṛhaṭṭīkā,[40] which unfortunately has never been recovered.

3.4   The colophons of PSṬ and Nyāsa refer to Jinendrabuddhi as Bodhisattvadeśīya. As the copyist of PSṬ supports this attribution by honouring Jinendrabuddhi as an erudite grammarian, there is no cogent reason for doubting that the colophons refer to the same author.[41] On the other hand, it is difficult to corroborate the attribution of PSṬ and Nyāsa to the same person on the basis of internal evidence. It is evident, though, that the author of PSṬ was an expert in Sanskrit grammatical literature, as appears from his concise explanation of Dignāga's quotation at PSV V 9ab of a well-known grammatical definition–allegedly from Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā– of the semantic conditions for introducing the abstract affixes *tā* and *tva,* which are claimed to denote either the relation (*sambandha*) or general property (*jāti*).[42] One would therefore assume that Jinendrabuddhi's exegesis of A V 1:119 defining the semantics of the abstract affixes would quote and comment upon the same crucial definition of their usage, as does Kaiyaṭa, who quotes and explains it in his Pradīpa on A V 1:119.

3.5   The Nyāsakāra evidently knew the above-mentioned definition as he quotes it elsewhere in the Nyāsa.[43] However, he limits himself to

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[39] Cf. Appendix III.

[40] For the sources of this discussion, cf. Appendix II

[41] Cf. PSṬ I *Introduction* p. xxxii foll.; *Nyāsa or Pañcikā of Ācārya Jinendrabuddhipāda.* Critically edited by Swāmi Dwārikadas Shastri Vol. VI. Varanasi 1967, p. 670.

[42] See, for instance, Prabhat Chandra Chrakavarti, *The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar.* University of Calcutta, 1930, p. 207ff (with note 3.).

[43] Cf. Nyāsa Vol. I: 610, 28-29; *Translation* no. [40].

the barest essentials when commenting on A V 1:119, although he mentions the view of some who claim that the cause of application of speech units denoting an action is the relation (*sambandha*) between the action and the agent of that action (*kecit tu kriyākārakasambandhaṃ kriyāśabdānāṃ pravṛttinimittaṃ icchanti*). The thesis that speech units denote *sambandha* is mentioned by Dignāga at PSV I: 3d. The example of such *kriyāśabda*s is *pācakatva,* which illustrates the rule that the introduction of the abstract affix after *pācaka* serves the purpose of denoting the relation. Jinendrabuddhi presents a concise exegesis of Dignāga's quotation of the grammatical definition that in essence is similar to the one found in Kaiyaṭa's Pradīpa on Mahābhāṣya explaining A V.1:119, although Jinendrabuddhi mentions additional instances of compounds (*samāsa*), and *kṛt* and *taddhita* derivatives. The only instance that would corroborate the alleged identity of the Nyāsakāra and Jinendrabuddhi is the remarkable similarity between Jinendrabuddhi's exegesis of A II.1:57 and his exegesis of PSV V: 14 and 27.[44]

3.6 The writer Bhāmaha, author of Kāvyālaṅkāra, a well-known treatise on poetics, refers to some Nyāsakāra at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 36 where Bhāmaha rejects the Nyāsakāra's description of a particular type of compound formation as contradicting Pāṇini's grammar. The question is whether the Nyāsakāra, whose view Bhāmaha rejects, is identical with Jinendrabuddhi, the author of Nyāsa. Bhāmaha mentions the word *vṛtrahantṛ* as an example of a term accepted by the Nyāsakāra, although it is excluded by the relevant Pāṇinian rules. In this connection Bhāmaha refers to A III 1.133, which introduces the affix *tṛc* to denote the agent of an action, and A II 2.15, which disallows the introduction of this affix to form a genitive *tatpuruṣa* (*ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa*) compound like *vṛtrahantṛ*. This compound, however, is recorded in the Mahābhārata;[45] and post-Pāṇinian grammarians tried to accomodate the Pāṇinian rules to recorded usage. But nowhere does Nyāsa mention *vṛtrahantṛ* together with other non-Pāṇinian compounds as examples of legitimate derivations under the Sanskrit grammarians' attempt at accomodating the linguistic evidence to the relevant Pāṇinian rules.[46] We are evidently faced with another Nyāsakāra, several of whom are mentioned in Sanskrit

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[44] Cf. *Translation*, notes 203 and 357.
[45] Cf. PW s.v.
[46] For a recent discussion of the evidence, cf. *Kāvyālaṅkāra of Bhāmaha. Edited with Introduction etc. by Batuk Nāth Śarmā and Baldeva Upādhyāya.* The Kashi Sanskrit Series 61 (Third Edition). Varanasi 2002.

grammatical literature, among others by Bhartṛhari in his Mahā-
bhāṣyaṭīkā.[47]

3.7   The date of Bhāmaha has been the subject of a never-ending
debate. G. Tucci, for instance, concluded on the basis of references to
Dignāga's philosophy in Kāvyālaṅkāra, that Bhāmaha must have been
a pre-Dharmakīrti scholar because he does not mention Dharmakīrti's
philosophy anywhere.[48] This is certainly true. The question is whether
the absence of references to Dharmakīrti's works corroborates the
conclusion as it is based upon an argument *e silentio*. The evidence,
however, supports Tucci's conclusion. Indeed, Bhāmaha must have
been either a pre-Dharmakīrti writer or one of Dharmakīrti's contem-
poraries as Dharmakīrti addresses his criticism of Dignāga's *apoha*
theory at PVSV 63,12ff. This conclusion is corroborated by Jinendra-
buddhi's presentation of Dharmakīrti's views on *anyāpoha* in an
excursus inserted immediately after his comment on PSV V: 13.[49] In
this excursus Jinendrabuddhi quotes a slightly edited version of
Bhāmaha's objection to Dignāga's *apoha* theory at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI
17, which states that according to the *apoha* theory a word must have
two separate functions, namely that of affirmation and that of
exclusion.

3.8   In Jinendrabuddhi's exposition this objection is followed by a
quotation of Dharmakīrti's PVSV 63,12ff, which he interprets as
Dharmakīrti's answer to Bhāmaha's objection. Otherwise it would be
difficult to understand why Jinendrabuddhi would quote a slightly
edited version of Kāvyālaṅkāra VI 17 in this particular context. The
above-mentioned passage of PVSV addresses among other issues
Dharmakīrti's statement at PV I 127ab: *na cāpi śabdo dvayakṛd
anyonyābhāva ity asau* that a word does not effect two things viz.
affirmation and exclusion–which reproduces Bhamaha's objection to
Dignāga's *apoha* thesis, since the connection between the referent
posited by the word and the thing excluded is one of mutual non-
existence; and affirmation implies *per se* negation which merely
reflects non-existence of one of the elements of the relation of mutual
non-existence.

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[47] Cf. *Cardona* 1997 no. 453.
[48] Cf. Guiseppe Tucci, "Bhāmaha and Diṅnāga" in *The Indian Antiquary* LIX (1930)
pp. 142-47.
[49] Cf. Appendix 2.

3.9   Jinendrabuddhi's identification of the target of Dharmakīrti's argument with Bhāmaha is not an isolated instance in post-Dharmakīrti philosophical literature. Other contemporary scholars like Śāntarakṣita, who quotes Bhāmaha's objection at TS 911, shows a marked dependence on Dharmakīrti's rejection of Bhāmaha's criticism when presenting at TS 1019 his own refutation of Bhāmaha's arguments. This corroborates Jinendrabuddhi's identification of the target of Dharmakīrti's criticism with Bhāmaha. Moreover, Karṇakagomin quotes in PVSṬ 250,19-22 the relevant verses from Kāvyālaṅkāra followed by the observation that Bhāmaha's claim is rejected by Dharmakīrti's argument at PVSV 63,12ff, which both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla at TSP 395,18 take to address Bhāmaha's objection to the *apoha* theory.[50] With this observation I think we can safely put the debate about Bhāmaha's date to rest.

The sources of Viśālamālavatī V

3.10   The impression one gets from reading Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā* is that he rewrote older material with the intention of making his own ṭīkā *au courant* with the latest development in epistemology, logic and philosophy of language. Jinendrabuddhi's dependence on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti,* which contains an important section devoted to the philosophy of *anyāpoha,* is evident throughout his commentary on PSV V. Thus, PSṬ V reflects Dharmakīrti's position in the process of explaining Dignāga's *apoha* thesis. Consequently Jinendrabuddhi is not a reliable exegete of Dignāga's thought in every respect. His main objective is evidently to show that Dignāga's views are compatible with Dharmakīrti's philosophy. This attempt makes him gloss over controversial aspects of Dignāga's philosophy.

3.11   For instance, Dharmakīrti attempt to re-interpret the rationale of Dignāga's claim that words denote things (*bhāva*) or entities (*vastu*) qualified by exclusion or absence of other things from the referent in the light of his own philosophy;[51] and he re-interprets Dignāga's claim that verbal cognition does not differ from inference; according to Dharmakīrti's interpretation, the inferential nature of verbal cognition means that the thing inferred is not the referent of the verbal expression, as Dignāga claims, but the *vivakṣā* of the speaker, whose

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[50] Cf. the evidence traced in Appendix 2.
[51] Cf. *Pind* 1999.

intention is inferable through the speaker's words. Jinendrabuddhi
follows this re-interpretation as appears from his gloss on the term
nivṛttiviśiṣṭa "qualified by exclusion," which he maintains qualifies
the person speaking. This understanding departs completely from the
rationale of the original *apoha* theory, which aims at substituting
exclusion of other referents for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika universal as a
real entity inherent in things and the justification for the application of
words to things. As already mentioned, according to Dignāga
exclusion of other referents comes with all the attributes of the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika universal as resident in things and words. Thus Jinendra-
buddhi's explanation is not true to the rationale of Dignāga's *apoha*
thesis.

3.12   Although Dharmakīrti's philosophy is the main source of
Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* theory, it is, on
the other hand, evident that Jinendrabuddhi had access to and made
use of already existing commentaries on PSV. For instance, he must
have used the same source as the Jain philosopher Siṃhasūri, who
wrote a detailed commentary of Mallavādi's criticism of Dignāga's
apoha thesis, because there are several cases where Jinendrabuddhi's
glosses and explanations are almost identical with those found in
Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādi's work. Indeed, there is every
reason to believe that Siṃhasūri's explanations of theoretically crucial
passages of PSV V are more reliable reproductions of Dignāga's
original view than those found in PSṬ. This remarkable similarity is
difficult to explain unless we assume that Jinendrabuddhi had access
to and copied or slightly rephrased explanations found in an older
commentary on PSV.

3.13   It is not possible to identify the source with absolute certainty,
because Siṃhasūri merely identify certain explanations occurring in
Mallavādi's work as presented by the *ṭīkākārāḥ*.[52] Given the authority
of the source, as indicated by the fact that Mallavādi in several cases
conflates Dignāga's text with that of the *ṭīkā*, and further indicated by
Jinendrabuddhi's use of the same source as a valid explanation of
Dignāga's view on a particular issue, it is not unreasonable to assume
that the work may be identical with the *ṭīkā*, which Devendrabuddhi
composed according to the Tibetan Buddhist scholar Bu sTon. Thus it
is not unlikely that it is this work to which Siṃhasūri refers and quotes
as one of Mallavādi's sources. Mallavādi probably made extensive use

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[52] Cf. NCV 621, 25. The plural *ṭīkākāraiḥ* is in all likelihood to be interpreted as
respect language. Cf. Renou, *Grammaire* § 207.

of the *ṭīkā* even without indicating that he was quoting or slightly rephrasing it. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why the phrase : *tato naiva prakāśakaṃ syāt* that occurs in Mallavādi's work as quoted at NCV 708,13-14, surfaces in Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā* Ms B 71a7 as *tataś ca naiva prakāśayeta.* The sentence belongs in the context of explaining PSV II: 15. The similarity of phrasing and syntax is striking and undeniable. In any case, Jinendrabuddhi must have considered the unknown commentary a valid source of information on Dignāga's philosophy, as appears from the fact that he, Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri used it and apparently made no attempt to distinguish between Dignāga's own statements and the explanations attributed to the *ṭīkā.*

3.14   I quote below selected passages from Siṃhasūri's Nayacakra-vṛtti juxtaposed with those of PSṬ V; they illustrate Jinendrabuddhi's dependence on the source used by Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri: he apparently either quotes or edits it slightly to fit it into his own exposition. The quotations—often *verbatim*—are such that there can be no doubt that both authors rely on the same source, in all likelihood an old and authoritative *ṭīkā,* although it remains an open question whose work it is. As already mentioned it may be identical with the *ṭīkā* attributed to Devendrabuddhi. The following examples show beyond doubt that we are not presented with chance similarities: in spite of minor differences of expression, Jinendrabuddhi evidently utilized the same source as Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri. The collection of examples is not exhaustive:

  1. PSṬ Ms B 193b1: *ānantyād ity upapattiḥ. kasyānantyāt? prakṛtatvād bhedānām eva;* cf. NCV 627, 14-15: *ānantyād iti hetuḥ. kasyānantyāt? bhedānām, yasmāt te pūrvaṃ prakṛtā na cānyaḥ śrūyate.*
  2. PSṬ Ms B 193, 2: *ākhyātuṃ; karoter anekārthatvāt;* cf. NCV 627, 17: *kartum ākhyātum; karoter anekārthatvāt.*
  3. Ms B 193b2: *tad etad dhetudvayam uktaṃ: ānantyaṃ sambandhāśakyatve hetuḥ, anākhyātasambandhatvam punar anabhidhāne;* cf. NCV 627, 22: *atra cānāntyam pāramparye-ṇānabhidhānahetuḥ. tato hi sambandhāśakyatā, sambandhā-vyutpatter anabhidhānam.*
  4. Ms B 193b6: *mlecchaśabde hi śabdasvarūpamātram eva pratīyate, nārthaḥ;* cf. NCV 627, 23-68,7: *yatra śabdas-yārthena sambandho 'vyutpanno yathā mlecchaśabdānāṃ tatra śabdamātraṃ pratīyate nārtha ityādi.*
  5. Ms B 226b1: *syād etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatirekā-khyānasyāpi sarvatrāsambhava,* cf. NCV 652, 16: *syād etadvyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ iti.*
  6. Ms B 208a7: *tathā hi te vināpi vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṛṣṭāḥ, na vṛkṣaśabdatvādikaṃ sāmānyaṃ,* cf. NCV

653,18ff: *tathā hi te vināpi vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṛṣṭāḥ, na tu vṛkṣaśabdo 'nyatra dṛṣṭaḥ, tasmād vṛkṣaśabdenaiva pratyāyanam upapannam.*

7. Ms B 226b1: *syād etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatirekākhyānasyāpi sarvatrāsambhava iti,* cf. NCV 652,16: *syād etad vyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ.*

Ms B 226b4: *yasmād darśanasya tattulye sarvatrāsambhavo 'tattulye tu sambhavo 'darśanasya,* cf. NCV 652,17-18: *yasmād darśanasya sarvatrāsambhavaḥ. saty api darśane sarvathānumānāsambhavaḥ.*

8. Ms B 228a7-B 228b1: *tad eva tu vastv asadvyāvṛttaṃ sākṣād abhidhīyate. tatas tasya ye viśeṣās te tadavyatirekān na pratikṣipyante,* cf. NCV 733,14: *atra punar asatpratiṣedhena sākṣād vartata iti tasya ye viśeṣās tān na pratikṣepati.*

9. Ms B 228b1-2: *ata eva bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti. na hy anyatra mukhyavṛttiḥ śabdo dravyādiṣūpacaryate,* cf. NCV 733,16-17: *bhāktadoṣo 'py ata eva nāsti, na hy anyatra mukhyā vṛttir dravyādiṣūpacaryate.*

Apart from PSV and other works by Dignāga, Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri had access to Dignāga's SPVy from which they presumably quote the *lakṣaṇavākya* on *apoha,* cf. NCV 611,5ff,[53] as well as works by *ṭīkākārā*s, cf. NCV 621,25ff. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi too had access to other works by Dignāga or his commentators when he wrote PSṬ. For instance, he either quotes or refers to Dignāga's SPVy three times.[54] Judging from the parallel passages found in PSV V the passages from SPVy represent a more discursive treatment of the same subject, although the vocabulary is basically the same. The fragmentary Chinese translation of a few of the introductory verses of this treatise makes it impossible to infer its scope.

4   The Critical Edition of PSṬ V

4.1   The Sanskrit manuscript of PSṬ V comprises Ms B 191a7-242b7. The objective of the critical edition of PSṬ V presented in the apparatus as an integral part of the annotation is to establish a readable version of the unique manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ V. The edition occasionally leaves out brief sentences that are not important for understanding Dignāga's thought or restoring PSV V into Sanskrit. Jinendrabuddhi's erudite remarks on *upacāra* (transference) recorded at Ms B 198a-198b have been left out too, as they add nothing

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[53] Cf. *Translation* no.182.
[54] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b1-2, *Translation* no. 465; PSṬ Ms B 239a1-2, *Translation* no. [301]; PSṬ Ms B 238b7-239a2, *Translation* no. 608.

theoretically important to the grammatical and philosophical issues of
upacāra. His excursus on central philosophical issues of the *apoha*
theory are edited separately and included in the four Appendixes. In
all, well over 90 percent of PSṬ V is edited and included in the
annotation and Appendixes. The main purpose of the edition is to e-
mend obvious scribal mistakes and occasionally to suggest
conjectures. This has in general proved to be unproblematic as scribal
errors in most cases are easy to identify and correct. The generally
excellent Tibetan translation of PSṬ edited in *Hattori* 1982 has been
helpful as it is useful for corroborating the suggested emendations.
Jinendrabuddhi occasionally quotes original Sanskrit sources in PSṬ V
in support of his commentary. Where possible I have identified the
sources of the quotations and if necessary corrected the readings of
PSṬ on the basis of the published editions of these works. A few
passages of Ms B are unreadable as are the corresponding Tibetan
conversions (see **4.3**f). Fortunately, it is possible to solve most of
these problems. There are a few lacunae and missing phrases in the
manuscript—mirrored in the Tibetan translation—which in a few
instances make it impossible to understand the intended argument.
Other passages are unreadable as words or lines were distorted beyond
recognition in the process of copying the manuscript, with the result
that it is impossible to construe a few paragraphs, and the Tibetan
version which evidently reflects a manuscript containing the same
omissions does not help solving the problem. In a few cases
difficulties of construing Jinendrabuddhi's text is caused by *scriptura
continua*, which also made the highly competent Tibetan translator
suggest an implausible Tibetan rendering of the Sanskrit text he at-
tempted to reproduce.

4.2   I have punctuated the critical edition without regard for the
occasionally meaningful punctuation of Ms B as I consider the use of
comma, semicolon, and full stop to be more helpful for the reader of
an occasionally complicated text than traditional indigenous punc-
tuation. The punctuation marks reflect my interpretation of the syntax
of the Sanskrit original and are primarily intended to present a version
of Jinendrabuddhi's work that is syntactically understandable to a
modern reader. Sandhi has been adjusted accordingly. The manuscript
has proved to be an invaluable source of information on the Sanskrit
version of PSV which Jinendrabuddhi commented upon. Apart from
the substantial number of *pratīka*s quoted from the original source or
the sources Jinendrabuddhi consulted for his *ṭīkā,* his paraphrases of
the Sanskrit text of PSV V have proved to be an excellent means for

restoring a substantial number of paragraphs of PSV V into Sanskrit, as they contain important information on the syntax of phrases of PSV V. In one instance Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase includes a crucial phrase that for unknown reasons was missing in the manuscripts used by the two Tibetan translator teams (see **2.8** and **2.6**).

The Tibetan translation of PSṬ

4.3 The Tibetan translation of PSṬ (hence T) attributed to lotsāva Blo gros brtan pa is generally of a high standard and an important source of information on the readings of the Sanskrit manuscript of PSṬ used by the translator. It is therefore of considerable value for text critical purposes. It contains nonetheless a number of passages that are impossible to construe and understand. In most cases they are either due to misinterpretations of the original Sanskrit ms caused by *scriptura continua* or due to wrong readings found in the manuscript upon which the translator relied. Although the Tibetan sources indicate that the translation is based upon another Sanskrit manuscript than Ms B, it is evident that it must have been based upon a manuscript with similar readings, because T reflects wrong readings which also occur in Ms B.

4.4 For instance, Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V 46ab at PSṬ Ms B 211a1-2 in this form*: apodvāre yad anyāṣ?aṃ vākṣād arthe vikalpita iti.* This clause is reproduced in T 177, 36-37 as: *'di ni sel ba'i sgo la gaṅ 'di'i 'di dag las don du brtags pa 'o źes 'chad par 'gyur ro.* The translation is meaningless. It is evidently based upon a corrupt text like the one found in Ms B. One wonders if the translator himself could make sense of it. There is no reason to assume, however, that the reading of the translator's manuscript differed essentially from that of Ms B on this particular point. The most likely explanation is that originally the corruption was introduced because of a misreading or misreproduction of the ligature /ddh/ that at some point in the transmission of the manuscript was read as /dv/, which would yield *apodvāre* as we find in Ms B. It is therefore likely that the translator attempted to emend the reading of his manuscript because *apodvāre* is reproduced as *sel ba'i sgo la* corresponding to Sanskrit **apohadvāre,* which has no support in Ms B. The translator may have conjectured that the meaningless *apodvāre* was to be emended to read *apohadvāre* and inserted an extra syllable /ha/ in a desparate attempt to make sense of the compound.

4.5   In one case the translator misinterpreted the phrase *cādyupādā-naḥ < cādi < ca + ādi + upā°* as derived from *vādin + upā°*. This appears from the translation *rgol pas ñe bar len pa* T 155,15, which is utterly meaningless.[55] The reading *sāmānyaviśeṣāvastvavaccheda-hetutvāt* recorded at Ms B 215a2 is translated in T as *spyi daṅ khyad par gyi dṅos po ma yin pa gcod pa'i rgyu ñid kyi phyir*. The otherwise meticulous translator evidently read *sāmānyaviśeṣāvastvavacchedahe-tutvāt* as a compound and translated it accordingly in spite of the fact that it is incomprehensible. He assumed that /ā/ of *viśeṣāvastu°* was due to sandhi: the result of *sāmānyaviśeṣa- + avastu (= dṅos po ma yin pa)*. Apparently he did not reflect upon whether his understanding of the compound made sense in the context of the argument: he merely translated the text as he read it. Fortunately it is easy to emend the reading by inserting the space that was deleted by the copyist: the correct reading is, of course, *sāmānyaviśeṣā vastvavacchedahetutvāt* which is easy to construe with the rest of the clause. The reading of Ms B illustrates once again the common error introduced by *scriptura continua,* forgetting to mark syntactical word boundaries in the process of copying a manuscript; and without the Sanskrit text it is virtually impossible to identify the cause of a meaningless Tibetan translation because of the structural difference of the two languages. The example illustrates once again that Tibetan translators tend to render what they read in their Sanskrit manuscripts, in spite of the fact that it makes no sense in the context; and without the original Sanskrit source it is difficult to infer what the cause of similar philological problems might be.

4.6   Although the number of translation mistakes appears to be limited—most of them are due to scribal errors introduced into the Sanskrit manuscript on which T is based—the translation is sometimes difficult to understand and invariably leads to wrong conclusions about the context of a particular argument. For instance, at Ms B 242b5 we find the reading *nirdiṣṭapravartakaṃ*. The same reading was evidently found in the manuscript used by Blo gros brtan pa, because he reproduces the term as *ṅes par bstan pa 'jug par byed pa*. The translation, however, makes no sense in the context, and any reader, who is unaware of the fact that Jinendrabuddhi quotes a passage from Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya (hence NBh), is left with the impression that he has missed the point. Jinendrabuddhi is merely

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[55] Cf. *Translation* no. 44.

quoting Vātsyāyana's use of the term *nirdiṣṭapravaktṛka* in NBh on
NS II.2:1: *anirdiṣṭapravaktṛkam pravādapāramparyamaitihyam.* The
error is presumably an old one, but without tracing the correct Sanskrit
reading to the original source, it would have been difficult to identify
the error and emend the text.

4.7   It is difficult to explain why Blo gros brtan pa would translate
the term *samākhyāsambandhapratīti* (Ms B 241a6)[56] as *mtshuṅs pa
ñid ces bya ba'i 'brel pa rtogs pa* unless we assume that his
manuscript erroneously left a space between *samākhyā* and the rest of
the compound, which is likely to be true. Consequently he must have
interpreted *samākhyā* as a qualifier of *sambandhapratīti* (f.).
Moreover, he appears to have read *samākhyā* as a derivative of
samāna, or he may have conjectured that the correct reading should be
samānya. It is not clear why Blo gros brtan pa, employs the speech
units *ñid* and *ces bya ba*. No matter what motivated the translation, it
is utterly incomprehensible in the context. The term *samākhyā-
sambandhapratīti,* however, is found in Vātsyāyana's commentary on
the same sūtra, namely NS II.2:1. These examples illustrate the nature
of the philological problems involved in studying the Sanskrit and
Tibetan versions of PST. In spite of the fact that the Tibetan
translation of PST is excellent it is clear that without having recourse
to the original Sanskrit version it is difficult to understand why certain
Tibetan passages are meaningless, unless one is in a position to
identify the cause of the philological problem as being based upon a
faulty Sanskrit manuscript or misinterpretation of its readings.

4.8   In spite of its occasional faults the Sanskrit manuscript shows
that the Tibetan version of PST V reflects a Sanskrit version that in
general appears to have been similar to the one recorded by the scribe
who copied Ms B. In a few places there are minor gaps in PSV V.
Since they also occur in T, which for this reason is impossible to
construe, it is obvious that the Sanskrit source on which T is based
descends from a similar Ms. Apart from minor gaps in Ms B as
reflected in T, it is possible to infer from the Tibetan translation that
there is one of approximately seven lines between Ms B 237a7 and
238a1. The missing passage is part of Jinendrabuddhi's comment
upon PSV V 46. The commentary of the entire paragraph is repro-
duced in T, which contains several *pratīka*s; and there is no reason to
assume that in the process of the manuscript transmission seven lines

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[56] Cf. Appendix 3 where the Sanskrit phrase is edited.

of text were suddenly deleted. As the folios contain seven lines recto and verso the conclusion seems inevitable: the otherwise conscientious scribe who copied his manuscript as far as Ms B 237a7 forgot to turn the folio and copy 237b1f; instead he continued copying 238a1f.

4.9   This paragraph is particularly important as it presents Dignāga's view on *pratibhā,* which is influenced by Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. The Sanskrit restoration of this crucial paragraph is therefore not fully supported by Sanskrit *pratīka*s, which is a minor problem as it is written with the background of Bhartṛhari's vocabulary and philosophy of language. It has not been possible to trace the Sanskrit equivalent to the Tibetan term *lcags kyu med pa* to any of Bhartṛhari's extant works or his commentators' explanations. The Tibetan translations *lcags kyu med pa yin pa'i phyir ro* V : *lcags kyu med pa'i phyir ro* K reproduce in all likelihod the expression *niraṅkuśatvāt.* Surprisingly, I have succeded in tracing the term to Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II.1.3:11. Addressing the nature of *utprekṣā* Śaṅkara describes it as unfettered, like Dignāga. There is no reason to assume that Śaṅkara's use of the expression *niraṅkuśa* stems from Dignāga's work. On the contrary, it mirrors undoubtedly Bhartṛhari's vocabulary and an aspect of his philosophy of language about which we are not well informed.[57]

5   The Sanskrit Restoration of PSV V

5.1   Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā* is a valuable source of information on the original Sanskrit version of PSV. With the background of the Sanskrit evidence it is possible to solve many of the nearly inextricable philological difficulties that beset the study of the Tibetan translations of PSV, assuming that Jinendrabuddhi quotes and comments upon the original Sanskrit version of the treatise. This, however, is not absolutely certain as he relied upon information contained in at least one earlier *ṭīkā* on PSV as I have shown (see **3.14**), and he may therefore not always quote from the original Sanskrit version of PSV, but rather from whatever material he found included in the sources that he was using when writing his *ṭīkā.*

5.2   PSṬ contains a considerable number of *pratīkas,* which are of inestimable importance for interpreting the vocabulary and syntax of

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[57] Cf. *Translation* no.s 574-75.

the Tibetan translations of PSV V: the Sanskrit evidence indicates that Jinendrabuddhi in many cases chose to paraphrase Dignāga's original Sanskrit exposition in order to present his views in his own words, adding glosses in the well-established manner of Indian commentators, as a means of explaining his terse statements. Thus they are helpful in restoring the Sanskrit text underlying its Tibetan conversions. Jinendrabuddhi also quotes passages from works written by Dignāga's contemporary opponents like the Sāṅkhya philosopher Mādhava and an unknown Jaina *vaibhāgika* "distinctionist", who criticised the *apoha* theory. These examples would indicate that Dignāga in general incorporated into his own presentation, although in slightly edited form, quotations from works written by authors, whose views he addressed. For instance, when writing the important paragraph on *pratibhā* at PSV V: 46, which reflects Dignāga's intimate knowledge of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language, he quotes a slightly edited version of one of Bhartṛhari's own satements on the topic of *pratibhā* recorded in Vākyapadīyasvavṛtti I; Dignāga even incorporates into the *pratibhā* section of PSV V pāda*s* lifted from Vākyapadīya. Thus, PSV V: 47 quotes pāda *d* and *c* of VP II 134-35, respectively.[58] And in the passage at PSV V: 50a where Dignāga quotes two verses from VP II: 155-56 he incorporates edited extracts from Bhartṛhari's *svavṛtti* on these verses.[59]

5.3   Under these circumstances, I have attempted *exempli gratia* to restore as much as possible of PSV V into Sanskrit.[60] I think it is necessary to emphasize, though, that the proposed restorations reflect the nature of their primary sources viz. PSṬ and the limited number of quotations of PSV V recorded in independent Sanskrit sources. From a strictly philological point of view all of these are secondary sources. As the occasional differences between the text upon which Jinendrabuddhi comments and the versions recorded in K and V would indicate, the transmission of PSV may not have been uniform, and the fifth chapter is no exception, as the evidence from other chapters of PSV would indicate. This divergence is difficult to understand, unless we assume that the Sanskrit manuscripts of PSV that were in circulation at the time when the two translator teams completed their efforts had been subject to textual changes and interpolations. The difference of readings is reflected, for instance, in the Tibetan versions of the *vṛtti* on PSV V: 3 upon which

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[58] See *Translation* no.s 580-81.
[59] See *Pind* 2003.
[60] The first chapter of PSV is restored by Ernst Steinkellner and published online.

Jinendrabuddhi comments (see **2.14**). This paragraph differs markedly from the Tibetan translations of K and V, which, moreover, exhibit individual differences that cannot merely be attributed to incorrect renderings of the Sanskrit manuscripts that Kanakavarman and Vasudharakṣita were translating into Tibetan. In cases like this I have adopted the readings suggested by PSṬ, except when K and V support each other against the readings of PSṬ.

5.4   The Sanskrit restoration is one *strictu sensu:* the restored paragraphs only comprise those parts of PSV V which PSṬ V and independent sources make it possible to reconstruct with reasonable certainty. I have only attempted to fill in the lacunae in a limited number of cases, where the context and parallels make it possible to suggest a hypothetical restoration that is beyond doubt. These passages are enclosed in < >. As part of the annotations I have also restored passages from other chapters of Dignāga's PSV based upon critically edited versions of the corresponding paragraphs of Jinendrabuddhi's PSṬ, when they shed light on issues which Dignāga addresses in PSV V. The text of the restored Sanskrit passages is presented in separate annotations, indicated by square brackets in bold, numbered 1 through 320. For each note, the relevant *pratīkā*s and paraphrases found in PSṬ as well as quotations traced to independent Sanskrit philosophical literature are quoted. In the apparatus I have underlined all words and passages of Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases that match the Tibetan versions of K or V. It is thus possible to follow how I interpret the Sanskrit evidence of PSṬ in the light of the Tibetan evidence of K and V, and linguistically justify the proposed Sanskrit restorations. All of the restored *kārikā*s and prose passages of PSV V are combined in a separate Appendix to make it possible to read the restoration without the philological apparatus and text critical remarks. In all, it has been possible to restore approximately eighty percent of the fifty *kārikā*s of PS V and approximately seventy five percent of PSV V.

5.5   The Sanskrit restoration is based upon the following sources:

1. The Tibetan translations recorded in K and V as mentioned above.
2. Sanskrit verse and prose fragments of PS and PSV V quoted as *pratīkas* in Ms B of PSṬ V.

3. Sanskrit paraphrases of PSV V traced to Ms B of PSṬ V.

4. Sanskrit verse and prose fragments of PSV V quoted in Sanskrit philosophical literature.

Sanskrit quotations or *pratīkas* embedded in PSṬ V do not constitute a philological problem *per se* unless they are contradicted by other sources. If more than one source contradicts a particular reading there is reason to assume that it is dubious. For instance, the reading *vivecitaḥ* that occur in the quotation of PS V 46b at TSP 363,15-16 is contradicted by three sources viz. PSṬ V which reads *vikalpitaḥ* for *vivecitaḥ,* and KV which read *rnam par brtags,* thus corroborating PSṬ V. Whatever the source of this reading might have been, it is clearly secondary and should be rejected as spurious.[61] In a similar case Ms B reads *iṣṭā* at PS V 27d as opposed to *tulyā,* the reading recorded at NCV 649,11, which both K and V corroborate. The reading *tulyā* is therefore preferable, especially as the reading *iṣṭā* necessitates a forced and dubious interpretation of the verse in which it occurs.

5.6   In the case of *pratīka*s or Sanskrit quotations from other sources the principle has been to identify the Tibetan words or phrases of K and V that match the Sanskrit quotations. It is sometimes difficult to identify Sanskrit matches, as the syntax of Dignāga's original Sanskrit writing and relevant terms are not always correctly reproduced in K and V, since the translators were having difficulties interpreting the Sanskrit manuscripts they were translating (see **2.1-15**). For instance, the term *kṛtam,* which is syntactically important for understanding the argument at PSV V: 28c-d, is only translated in K.[62] It occurs, however, in the paraphrase recorded in Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā*.[63] In a few instances PSṬ V makes it possible to identify a clause that is missing in both K and V, although it is crucial for understanding Dignāga's thought (see **2.8**).

5.7   If the Sanskrit restoration is based exclusively upon Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases of Dignāga's Sanskrit original, the problem of identifying suitable Sanskrit matches is sometimes considerable, especially when the Tibetan readings of K and V are problematic. In such cases the proposed Sanskrit restoration reflects

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[61] Abhayadevasūri, who relied on TSP, quotes the verse with the reading *vivecitaḥ* in his commentary on Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇam Vol. I: 188, 9. Thus, it is not a recent corruption.
[62] Cf. *Translation* no.s [189] and 368.
[63] Cf PSṬ Ms B 221a3-7 quoted ad loc.

the principle followed by Indian commentators when quoting and commenting on a passage that needs to be elucidated: the terms of the quotation are *followed* by their glosses. For example, the paraphrase of PSV V: 36ab at PSṬ Ms B 227b5ff reads *sāmānyaśabdasya yat kṛtyaṃ pratyāyyam. tat punaḥ kīdṛśam? arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāpratikṣepeṇa.* The Tibetan translations show that this paraphrase is basically a verbatim reproduction of the first sentence of Dignāga's prose commentary on PS V: 36ab including an explanatory gloss *pratyāyyam* followed by the rhetorical question *tat punaḥ kīdṛśam?* In the present case K and V do not contain identifiable matches for *kṛtyam,* which Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase would seem to presuppose. Instead of the expected Tibetan reading *bya ba* both K and V read *byas pa* (= *kṛtam*), and one cannot exclude the possibility that this translation reflects the Sanskrit reading of their manuscripts, although it is incomprehensible in the context, unless *kṛtam* is interpreted as a neuter *ta*-participle which is well established as an action noun[64] similar to *kṛtyam* in terms of its semantics.

5.8 Fortunately the reading *kṛtyaṃ* is quoted by Siṃhasūri at NCV 730,1ff followed by the gloss *vyāpāraḥ*: *sāmānyaśabdasya hi sadāder yo 'rthāntaravyudāso "asan na bhavati" iti kṛtyaṃ vyāpāraḥ sa tvayettham avadhāritaḥ svabhedāpratikṣepeṇeti.* In this case the gloss *vyāpāraḥ* "function" covers as a matter of fact the denotation of *kṛtyam* much better than Jinendrabuddhi's gloss *pratyāyyam.* Siṃhasūri's quotation contains the crucial particle *hi,* which is to be construed with *iti.* But Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase omits *hi.* As *kṛtyam*[65] occurs in an identical context in PSṬ and NCV the reading is beyond doubt and we can safely adopt it for the purpose of restoring the original Sanskrit phrase. If Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases do not contain any identifiable glosses and his exposition matches the Tibetan translations of V or K, it is reasonable to assume that he reproduces the Sanskrit version of PSV V in the form that was known to him with minor syntactical adjustments to his own presentation, like the omission of the particle *hi.*

5.9 Sometimes Jinendrabuddhi resorts to the use of analytical strings (*vigraha*) as commentators often do in order to explain the scope of technical terms. For instance, the term *naimittika* that occurs in the restored phrase *naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu* at PSV V: 50a is explained

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[64] Cf. A III 3:114: *bhāve napuṃsake ktaḥ.*
[65] The semantics of *kṛtyam* encountered in Buddhist Sanskrit literature imitates MI *kiccam.*

at MS B 238b2-3 as follows: *naimittikā jātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdāḥ. teṣu ... anyāpohena sāmānyarūpeṇābhidhānaṃ sambhavati.* The first sentence presents a gloss explaining what constitutes *nimittikāḥ śabdāḥ.* The Tibetan versions of K and V would seem to presuppose a phrase like **naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu,* which Jinendrabuddhi's explanation corroborates. The original loc. pl. of the Sanskrit phrase is reproduced in the following explanation which introduces the loc. pl. *teṣu.* This pronominal locative merely has the function of imitating the original locative pl. of the definition of *naimittikā °śabdāḥ,* from which we only have to extract the term *śabdāḥ* in order to restore the original Sanskrit phrase. Thus the grammatical structure of Dignāga's text is carefully reflected in Jinendrabuddhi's explanation, which makes it possible to restore the original sentence complement in the locative: *naimittikeṣu śabdeṣu.* This restoration matches the syntax of the Tibetan translations of K and V and is mirrored in the subsequent noun phrase *yādṛcchikeṣu tu katham,* which Jinendrabuddhi subsequently quotes.

6 Dignāga's philosophy of *anyāpoha*

6.1 The objective of this study is to present an analysis of the essential features of Dignāga's *apoha* thesis as expounded in PSV V,[66] which is a crucial complement to Dignāga's philosophy of inference as it presents the only definite exposition of his theory of induction. Dignāga develops in this central chapter the idea that joint absence (*vyatiraka*) of word and referent in contrast to their joint presence (*anvaya*) defines exclusion of other referents and simultaneously justifies the invariable concomitance of word or speech element and the thing denoted. Thus, by extension, joint absence establishes the invariable connection between the logical indicator (*liṅga*) and the thing indicated (*liṅgin*) because Dignāga claims that verbal cognition is subject to the same constraints as those that characterize knowledge obtained through inference.[67]

6.2 All sources indicate that *anyāpoha* was conceived as a substitute for real general properties. Kumārila claims, for instance, in the first *śloka* of his *apoha* critique, that exclusion of non-cows as *sāmānya* in principle does not differ from the general property cowhood (*gotva*) as real entity (*vastu*), and Dignāga rejects the assumption that real general properties are real entities. Kamalaśīla explains that Kumārila's use of the term *sāmānya* in his presentation of the *apoha* doctrine presupposes Dignāga's thesis that the general property (*sāmānya*) as denotable object is characterized by exclusion (*apohalakṣaṇam*).[68] The question is, however, in what way *apoha* could be presented as a general property like *sāmānya,* which contemporary Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers assumed is the semantic condition for the application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). As the Buddhists reject as untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in the object of denotation are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence

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[66] The analysis draws on the explanations of crucial paragraphs of PSV V presented in the annotations to the *translation*.

[67] Cf. the frequently quoted statement, which Buddhist writers attribute to Dignāga: *apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām eva pratipādyate.* See PVSV 25,27f; TSP 367, 17 commenting on Kumārila's statement at ŚV Apohavāda 73ab: *na cānyavyāvṛtti-muktā pravṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ.*

[68] Cf. TSP p. 360, 15: *apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyam vācyatvenābhidhīyamānam.*

(*sattā*) and substanceness (*dravyatva*) or the like. The *apoha* theory is thus very much part of the contemporary Indian philosophical scene at the time when Dignāga propounded his *apoha* doctrine. He addresses the inherent ontological difficulties that attach to the thesis of real general properties in the second chapter of PSV II:16[69] and substitutes *anyāpoha* for real general properties, claiming at PSV V: 36d that *anyāpoha* has the same properties as real general properties without being subject to the same absurd consequences as the thesis that real general properties constitute the semantic condition for denotation.

6.3   In PSV V Dignāga also claims that words denote things (*bhāva*) as qualified by preclusion (*nivṛtti*) of other referents (*arthān-taranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*).[70] In a theoretically related fragment—presumably from the SPVy—we find a similar phrase which substitutes *vastu* for *bhāva,* claiming that the referent is a real object qualified by preclusion: *nivṛttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ.*[71] It is thus clear that the *śabdārtha* qualified by *nivṛtti* is conceived as a real object (*vastu*) or entity (*bhāva*). These definitions of denotation and the concomitant function of *nivṛtti* raise the obvious question of what a term like *nivṛtti* denotes in this particular context. Neither *nivṛtti* nor its synonyms have verbal implications *per se*. In grammatical contexts *nivṛtti* is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal and is thus semantically related to *apoha* in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V.

6.4   Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine and its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V were never adopted by post-Dignāga Buddhist scholars without modifications. Their views on *anyāpoha* were inevitably influenced by the works of the central Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti, and post-Dharmakīrti thinkers. In fact, the theory of knowledge underlying the original version of the *apoha* doctrine as expounded in PSV V is incompatible with its subsequent elaboration by Dharmakīrti. In spite of an undeniable family likeness between Dignāga's original theory and Dharmakīrti's version of it, there are substantial differences between them, and we must differentiate between Dignāga's views and those of Dharmakīrti and later generations of Buddhist thinkers. Thus it is obvious that the

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[69] Cf. PSV II: 16 restored and translated no. 504.
[70] Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V: 36d.
[71] Cf. *Translation* no. 182.

expression "*apoha* theory" does not designate a uniform theory with an invariable set of theoretical presuppositions. This study therefore aims at shedding light on the theoretical obsqurities of the *apoha* theory by focussing on some of Dignāga's statements in PSV V, which are crucial to our understanding of its basic presuppostions, and hopefully thereby paving the way for an in-depth study of what suggested to Dharmakīrti to reformulate, in his remarkable œuvre, some of the basic presuppositions of the *apoha* doctrine in the light of the criticism it met with.

Verbal knowledge as inference

6.5 There is one assumption whose importance far outweighs all other elements of the *apoha* theory: Dignāga's claim that verbal knowledge (*śābda*) and inference (*anumāna*) share the same properties. He rejects the commonly acknowledged doctrine that verbal knowledge presupposes the existence of real general properties inherent in things. In PSV II:16[72] he addresses its absurd consequences and substitutes *anyāpoha* for real general properties, claiming that exclusion has the same properties as real general properties without being subject to the same consequences. Thus Dignāga presents the *apoha* theory as a theoretical achievement superior to the doctrine of real general properties.[73] The question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that there is a functional homology of exclusion or preclusion of other referents and real general properties without generating an ontological *aporia* similar to the one he has shown pertains to the thesis of real general properties. In the first paragraph of PSV V:1 Dignāga propounds the fundamental hypothesis of the *apoha* theory, that verbal knowledge (*śābda*) does not differ from inference (*anumāna*)[74] since a word denotes its referent (*artha*) by means of exclusion of other referents (*anyāpoha*) in the same way as indicators like "being produced" (*kṛtakatva*). And Dignāga continues explaining that when a word is

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[72] Cf. *Translation* no. 504 where PSV II: 16 is restored and translated.
[73] Cf. PSV V: 36d where its superior merits (*guṇotkarṣa*) are mentioned; cf. *Translation*.
[74] This assumption, however, was re-interpreted by Dignāga's influential commentator, Dharmakīrti, whose work was to dominate Buddhist epistemology and logic for centuries. Dharmakīrti's work shows that the inferential nature of verbal cognition was no longer of any theoretical concern because he re-interprets Dignāga's original statement about the inferential nature of verbal cognition in such a way that the inference is presented as one of the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*) and not the referent (*artha*) as Dignāga originally assumed. Cf. *Translation* no. 9.

applied to an object (*viṣaya*) it denotes any given part or attribute (*aṃśa*) of it by exclusion of other referents (*artha*), like the general property "being produced",[75] which excludes things that are not produced (*akṛtaka*).[76]

6.5   The reason why Dignāga introduces the abstract term *kṛtakatva* in the context of explaining that verbal cognition is inferential, is to show that exclusion of other referents (*anyāpoha*) is in fact equivalent to a general property (*sāmānya*). This is shown by an important passage at PSV V:33ab in which Dignāga explains that:

> In the exact same way as the general property (*sāmānyam*) 'being produced' (*kṛtakatvam*) is [explained] to indicate 'impermanence' (*anityatvagamakam*) through its exclusion of what is not a product (*akṛtakavyudāsena*), the general property in a word (*śabde*) is explained [to be] due to its exclusion of other words (*śabdāntaravyavacchedena*); and only through this (*tenaiva ca*) does it indicate its referent (*arthapratyāyakaḥ*).

Although this explanation is intended to describe what constitutes the general property in a word (*śabde*) the explanation is evidently presented on the analogy of the general property in a referent (*arthe*), which by definition is characterized as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Thus, Dignāga's explanation makes it possible to conclude that the general property "being produced" (*kṛtakatva*) qualifies produced things (*kṛtaka*) by excluding them from things that are not produced (*akṛtaka*). Dignāga rejects the view that general properties are ontologically singular entities inherent in things, but he does not reject the idea that there are general properties, although of a different order. In fact, he defines general properties as exclusion of other, which leads to the question of how he justifies establishing an invariable connection between indicator and indicated and word and referent with the background of preclusion or exclusion of other.

6.7   Dignāga's theory of knowledge is characterised by a well-known set of dichotomies. The object of immediate sensation (*pratyakṣa*) is the *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e. the individual character of things, which by definition is beyond linguistic representation. The object of the indicator or the word and the thing indicated or the referent is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, i.e. the general character of things, and the

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[75] Cf. *Translation* PSV V: 33ab.
[76] For the implications of Dignāga's introduction of the abstract affix *tva* after *kṛtaka*, cf. *Translation* no. 14.

sāmānyalakṣaṇa is according to Dignāgan epistemology the domain of inference and language. The term *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is rarely used in PSV and Dignāga never defines its exact scope, but limits himself to state without any qualifications that it is the object of inference and verbal communication. However, the explanation at PSV I 2c$_2$-d$_1$ is in a way an implicit definition of the content of the term:

> *svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇādi gṛhītvā nityatayā cānityaṃ varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte.*[77]

> "For having perceived a colour or the like through its individual and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and colourness, [respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, one combines [the two] at the thought: "Colour, etc., is impermanent.""

In this phrase we notice the distinction Dignāga makes between the general property *varṇatva,* i.e. colourness and the term *varṇa* denoting a particular colour. He also introduces the abstract term *anityatā* in order to explain the judgement "colour or the like (*varṇādi*) is impermanent (*anityam*)." Although Dignāga never defines *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* and the implications of this term in the context of Dignāga's ontology and theory of knowledge have never been answered, it is clear as shown by PSV V:33ab quoted above that *sāmānya* is defined in terms of exclusion of other referents.

6.8   Exclusion of other referents presupposes that the relation (*sambandha*) between the word and the thing it denotes is subject to the constraints of invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*): they are supposed to be invariably concomitant (*avinābhāvin*) in the same way as the logical indicator and the indicated. Dignāga assumes that the relation (*sambandha*) between the word and its referent is comparable to that of the inferential sign (*hetu* or *liṅga*) and the thing it indicates, which shows that Dignāga established his philosophy of language on the basis of his logical theory. This is confirmed by a passage in the chapter on the role of exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta*) presented at PSV IV:5[78] in which he explains the connection between the word and its referent in terms of the rules that must be observed for establishing the connection between the indicator and the thing indicated. In other words, they are subject to the triple constraints of the *trairūpya*.[79] The

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[77] For a translation and analysis of this phrase, cf. *Translation* no. 1.
[78] Cf. *Translation* no. 9.
[79] Cf. *Translation* no. 9.

severe criticism which Kumārila, for instance, levelled at Dignāga's
view of *śabda* as similar to the logical reason of an inference takes this
assumption for granted,[80] and PSV V and contemporary sources
indicate beyond doubt that Dignāga established the *apoha* theory on
the analogy of his philosophy of logic.

6.9   Thus the postulated similarity of the logical indicator and the
word are fundamental to the *apoha* theory. The question is how
Dignāga avoids the absurd implication that the word occurs *at* the
thing it indicates in the same way, for instance, as the logical indicator
smoke, which could justifiably be said to occur *at* the thing it indicates
viz. fire. His presentation and vocabulary makes constant use of the
locative to denote the referent, which any word denotes. However,
words do not occur *at* their referents like logical indicators. The word
'smoke,' for instance, does not occur *at* smoke, nor *at* fire. The theory
would thus seem to be based upon patently absurd assumptions.
Dignāga's critic, Kumārila, subjected this apparent absurdity to a
thorough examination in the Śabdapariccheda chapter of his Śloka-
vārttika. The problem relates to the semantics of the locative and the
ambiguities entailed by the application of the *trairūpya* to the presup-
positions of verbal knowledge without adjusting the expressions of the
theory of logic to a different although comparable context, that of
verbal knowledge.[81]

6.10   Since Dignāga elaborated the *apoha* thesis on the basis of his
philosophy of logic, it is essential to understand how the connection
(*sambandha*) between a term and the thing it denotes is established as
invariably connected (*avinābhāvin*). In PSV V: 50b towards the very
end of the chapter, Dignāga describes how the connection between the
word *"panasa"*, breadfruit tree, and a prototypical instance of a
breadfruit tree is taught. The discussion centres on the question of
whether or not verbal cognition is comparable to inference in the
situation where someone is taught the denotation of words. Dignāga
answers that learning the denotation of a word is not inference because
learning the denotation of a word is the condition of *apoha* and thus of
verbal cognition as inference. This paragraph addresses the process of

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[80] See Kumārila's criticism at ŚV Śabdapariccheda 68-98. Cf. 6.9 below.
[81] Dignāga's statements are ambiguous as their interpretation depends upon the
meaning of his use of the locative. See PSV V: 34 and *Translation* no.s 416, 419
where I suggest that it is possible to interpret the use of the locative in terms that are
compatible with its use in Sanskrit grammatical literature and lexicography.

vyutpatti: teaching the denotation of a word by ostentation (*hastasaṃjñā*).

6.11 Dignāga's description of *vyutpatti* assumes that someone points to a prototypical example of a breadfruit tree, and explains "this is a breadfruit tree" (*ayaṃ panasa*). Thereby the learner understands the connection between the term "panasa" and the thing it denotes. Dignāga puts weight on the deitic function of the demonstrative pronoun "this" (*ayaṃ*) which accompanies the ostentation because the syntactical agreement between the pronoun and the term *"panasa,"* the name of the object, secures the grammatical validity of the reference. In PSV V: 50c Dignāga continues explaining that the connection (*sambandha*) between the word and its referent is mentally constructed at the thought "this is the word for that thing." *Vyutpatti* thus implicates two separate moments: first, the moment of learning how a term is used by observing its application to its referent, and second, the subsequent moment of constructing the connection in the mind (*manas*).[82] Dignāga closes the paragraph by pointing out that the connection between any term and the thing it denotes is similar to the connection between inference and inferred (*anumānānumeya-sambandha*).

6.12 However, the mentally constructed connection needs to be reified. That is, the person who is learning the denotation of a name like the word "panasa" or any other term through *vyutpatti* must ascertain that it refers to *all* instances of the breadfruit tree and not only to the prototype, which his teacher is showing him. However, it is impossible to justify the invariable connection of the term *panasa* and its referent, the breadfruit tree, by showing how it applies to every single instance as instances are infinite. Dignāga addresses the problem at PSV V:2b that a general term like "existent" does not denote all particulars (*bheda*) because

> it is impossible (*aśakyaḥ*) to tell (*kartum*) the connection (*sambandhaḥ*) of particulars [with a general term like 'existent'] when they are infinite; and as the connection of the word [with particulars] is not told (*akṛtasambandhe śabde*), it is not justified that it denote its referent because merely its own form is cognized (*svarūpamātrapratīteḥ*).

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[82] In a different context Dignāga explains that *vyutpatti* relates to observed instances of referents (*dṛṣṭārtha*), in other instances to those that are not observed (*adṛṣṭārtha*). Cf. *Translation* no. 631.

Denotation thus presupposes that the connection of a term like "existent" and its referent is established, which is not possible on the assumption that its connection with every particular instance is ascertained by enumeration showing every single referent, as particulars are infinite. In addition the use of the word "existent" is ambiguous as it denotes many different things like substances or qualities and so on. As mentioned above Dignāga addresses the problem of infinity of particulars at PSV V:2ab and presents at PSV V: 34 a solution to this classical problem of induction.

6.13   He explains at that

> the word's connection is feasible (*sambandhasaukaryam*) and there is no ambiguity (*vyabhicāritā*) as it is not observed (*adṛṣṭeḥ*) [to apply] to the referent of other words and is also (*api*) observed (*darśanāt*) [to apply] to a member (*aṃśe*) of its own referent.

The explanation pivots on the implication of "observation" (*darśana*) and "non-observation" (*adṛṣṭi*) because Dignāga claims that the feasibility of the connection (*sambandhasaukarya*) depends upon the application of e.g. the term "existent" to an example of its referent and non-observation of its application to the referent of other words. The question is what the two terms imply in terms of theory of cognition. The following explanation gives the answer: Dignāga assumes that non-observation is the fundamental element of the process of reification. In fact, he equates non-observation to joint absence of word and referent and observation to their joint presence:

> For (*hi*) joint presence and joint absence (*anvayavyatirekau*) are a means (*dvāram*) to the word's denoting its referent. And these two are its application to what is similar and its non-application to what is dissimilar. In this case, however (*tu*), application to all that is similar is by necessity not statable with regard to any [referent] whatsoever (*kva cit*) because stating it is impossible (*ākhyānāsambhavāt*) as the referent is infinite (*arthasyānantye*). On the other hand, stating its non-application to what is dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite (*atulye saty apy ānantye*), through mere non-observation (*adarśanamātrena*); and just therefore (*ata eva ca*) it has been explained that [the word's] denoting its own referent (*svārthābhdhānam*) is an inference from [its own referent's] exclusion from these [other referents] (*tadvyavacchedānumānam*), from its not being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata (*svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt*).

6.14   Dignāga thus claims that it is easy to justify the connection by means of joint presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*) but he omits

addressing the implications of the term (*saukarya*). We must therefore assume that the meaning of the term was evident to contemporary philosophers and that there was no need for explaining its implications. Dignāga's presentation shows that the feasibility of the connection (*sambandhasaukaryam*) depends on the fact that the word is observed to apply to an instance of its referent and not observed to apply to the referents of other words. Non-observation, however, is of a different order than that of temporarily not observing a referent that is not where it would be expected to be, because it has been removed from its locus. It is noteworthy that Dignāga's use of non-observation does not address non-observation of things that have been temporarily removed from their expected place, but rather the universal non-existence in time and space of other things in the locus of the thing to which the indicator refers, and the same goes for the word and its denotation. Thus non-obervation ascertains the non-occurrence of other words or indicators in a context where the observer is able to perceive that e.g. the word "tree" denotes a tree and not any other thing with which it is incompatible in terms of its nature and the word used to denote it, and on the basis of this observation to generalize the non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent, and thereby to ascertain the invariable concomitance of word and referent.

6.15   Dignāga's use of the term "feasibility" becomes clear from the writings of non-buddhist philosophers, who address the implications of *sambandhasaukarya.* Dignāga presupposes that a person who is being taught the connection of word and referent (*vyutptti*) by ostentation (*hastasaṃjñā*) is standing in some place (*ekadeśastha*) next to a prototypical instance of the referent (*artha*), i.e., a member (*aṃśa*) of the domain of similar referents. A knowledgeable person points to the referent explaining that "this *x* is *y*". As the referent thus defined occurs in a particular locus and no special conditions apply to it and its locus, the *ekadeśastha* may reify the application of *y* to any given *x* through the means of their joint presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*), their joint absence being ascertained merely through not observing (*adarśanamātra*) the application of *y* to any other thing but the referent *x,* inferring that *y* denotes all instances of similar things to the exclusion of all things occurring in the domain of dissimilar things.

6.16   As mere non-observation of other things in the locus of the prototypical *aṃśa* is easily performed, Dignāga assumes that the reification of the connection between *y* and *x* is feasible on the basis of

mere non-observation, emphasizing the role of *vyatireka,* joint absence, as the primary means of establishing the connection, the object of non-observation being the non-existence (*abhāva*) of other referents in the locus of the prototypical example. It is therefore understandable that *vyatireka* was interpreted as the primary cause of exclusion being supported by mere non-observation of the word's application to the referents of other words. It is obvious that non-observation in this case does not refer to temporary non-observation of referents that might have been observed to occur in the locus of the taught referent on other occasions. The absense of other referents is substantial: no non-tree (*avṛkṣa*) is ever observed where a tree (*vṛkṣa*) is found. It is therefore possible to conclude from the use of any given term that the referents of other words are not found in the locus of the referent of a particular word which therefore excludes them from its scope. It is thus obvious that verbal knowledge as inference is based upon joint absence of word and referent, which presupposes the non-existence (*abhāva*) of other things in the locus of the thing inferred.

6.17   Only on this assumption is it possible to avoid the paradox of uncertainty and the ensuing doubt about the nature of the referent. As Dignāga explains:

> If, however, the inference were by means of joint presence (*anvayadvāreṇa*), the word 'tree' should not give rise to doubt (*saṃśayaḥ*) appearing as *śiṃśapā,* etc. (*śiṃśapādyābhāsaḥ*), about one and the same entity (*ekasmiṃ vastuni*). Yet, in the same way as there is doubt about it, there will also be doubt appearing as earthenness and substanceness, etc. However, since the word 'tree' is not observed to denote what is non-earthen, etc., the inference is only by means of joint absence (*vyatirekamukhenaiva*).

In this explanation Dignāga addresses the implications of verbal knowledge as inference. The explanation addresses the extension of individual terms. The term "tree," for instance, denotes different kinds of trees such as the *śiṃśapā* or the like. The argument addresses the logical implications of basic predication: a *śiṃśapā* is a tree, and a tree is an earthen object, and a substance, and so on. As there are more trees than *śiṃśapā*s, and more earthen things than trees, and more substances than earthen things, the individual terms are related in a logical hierarchy according to their individual extension, which makes it possible to infer from the application of the term *śiṃśapā* that it is a tree (*vṛkṣa*), earthen (*pārthiva*), and a substance (*dravya*), and existent (*san*) and knowable (*jñeya*). Consequently the inference is based upon joint absence as it presupposes the exclusion of all non-trees from any

tree, which is the function of the word "tree," and only exclusion of non-trees ascertains the validity of the inference. This raises the question of the purpose of a term like "non-tree."

6.18 Dignāga addresses this question in the commentary on PSV V:43b, which is a crucial paragraph of the *apoha* chapter:

> For the [word] does not exclude a different general property (*anyāṃ jātim*) for each individual substance (*pratidravyam*), but rather (*kiṃ tarhi*) with the intention of denoting the things to be excluded (*vyavacchedyavivakṣayā*) by means of a single general property (*ekena sāmānyadharmena*). And on this point it has been explained (*uktaṃ cātra*) that the inference [of the referent] is from mere non-observation [of the word's application] to what belongs to the class of dissimilar things (*vijātīye 'darśanamātreṇānumnam*).

Any word or speech element is thus seen to denote a prototypical observed instance of the referent but not to denote things that fall outside the scope of denotation of the word whose connection is being taught, i.e. anything that is dissimilar to the referent. Thus observation is context bound, as learning the denotation of any term relates to observation of individual instances of the referent and individual instances of the word applied to denote the referent. However, an inferential rule has to be established which makes it possible to infer that the word "tree" denotes the referent tree irrespective of its individual character. Whatever is dissimilar to the prototypical object is characterized by a single property (*ekadharman*) which is its being *non-x*. In order to express the absence of the property of being *non-x* in things that are *x* Dignāga coined the negative term *non-x,* which has the purpose to denote the single property (*dharma*) of things that are *non-x*. Thus the term *non-x* is derived from the positive term *x* by means of *vivakṣā* as a convenient means for denoting things that are dissimilar to any *x*. The terms "tree" and "non-tree" mirror a privative relation that concerns the non-existence of *non-x* in the locus of any *x*. Although Dignāga does not attribute reality to things that are aggregates of atoms, which are the only ultimate things that are ontologically real, it is obvious nonetheless that objects have a derived secondary reality, in spite of which it is still possible to maintain that cows or trees are discernible entities to which one may refer by the word "cow" or "tree".

6.19 This leads inevitably to the conclusion that the inferential status of verbal cognition is based upon the fact that any instance of a thing is dually marked: by its individual character which is only

accessible through perception and as such inexpressible and by its
general character which is defined by exclusion, as the identity of any
given cow as the referent of the word "cow" is due to the fact that it
excludes non-cows. It is not possible to construe non-existence of non-
cows in the locus of any cow as an instance of double negation on
which many discussions about *apoha* pivot. However, double negation
does not exist. The word non-cow for instance is merely a secondary
derivative of the word cow. It has been coined to denote anything that
is not a cow: a typical *apoha* inference therefore reads "it is a cow as it
is not a non-cow." Non-cow, however, is only a generalized referent
denoting the single property (*ekadharma*) that defines the negated
referent of the word cow.

6.20   Dignāga equates verbal cognition to inference by means of
joint absence (*vyatirekamukha*),[83] which explains why commentators
compare *apoha* to *vyatireka* and unanimously refer to Dignāga´s
apoha theory as "having joint absence as the chief thing"
(*vyatirekapradhāna*).[84] Classical Indian scholars interpret *vyatireka* as
characterized by non-existence (*abhāvalakṣaṇa*),[85] and Dignāga
assumes that joint absence of word (*śabda*) and referent (*artha*) is
equivalent to mutual non-existence of any speech unit and non-speech
unit and any referent and non-referent, which is implied by his claim
that existence of the nature of one thing presupposes the non-existence
of the nature of other things.[86] Jayamiśra, Kumārila's commentator,
interprets *apoha* in terms of *itaretarābhāva* "mutual non-existence,"
which mirrors Dignāga's basic assumption that *apoha* presupposes
mutual non-existence of excluded and not excluded.[87] With this
background this study will address Dignāga's attribution of all the
commonly acknowledged features of real general properties to
exclusion.

6.21   Dignāga evidently conceived *apoha* as a substitute for real
general properties. As mentioned above (**5.2**) the remarkable mīmaṃ-
saka philosopher Kumārila attributes the view to Dignāga that
exclusion of non-cows (*agonivṛtti*) is equivalent to a general property

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[83] Cf. PSV V: 34: *vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam.*
[84] Cf. *Translation* no 188; *Pind* 1999: § 8. Kumārila´s commentator Jayamiśra refers
to followers of Dignāga´s *apoha* theory as *vyatirekavādin*s, cf. ŚVṬ 46, 18.
[85] Cf. *Translation* no 425.
[86] Cf. *Translation* PSV V: 45 and the statement: *ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti.*
[87] Cf. e.g. *Translation* no.s 466, 517, 523.

(*sāmānya*).[88] Śāntarakṣita quotes the verse at TS 914 and his commentator Kamalaśīla explains that exclusion of non-cows as general property means general property as qualified by exclusion[89] (*apohalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyam*), and elsewhere he expressly equates *apoha* to non-existence (*abhāva*).[90] This interpretation of the underlying purpose of the *apoha* theory is, for instance, confirmed by Kumārila, who states loc. cit. that "it is obvious that those who imagine that exclusion of non-cows (*agonivṛtti*) is the denotable general property (*sāmānya*) have designated by the term "exclusion of non-cows" (*agopohagir*) nothing else but [the general property] cowhood (*gotva*) which is a real object (*vastu*)." Kumārila's conclusion is clear: *apoha* is just another name for *sāmānya,* general property. Thus he indirectly corroborates the assumption that *apoha* is a substitute for general properties. However, the role of *apoha* as semantic justification for denotation similar to that of real general properties leaves many questions unanswered.

6.22   Kumārila continues his criticism asking Dignāga to explain "what the entities (*bhāva*) [viz. cows] are, whose nature consists in exclusion of horses or the like (*aśvādinivṛttyātma*), as it has been explained [viz. by me, Kumārila] that a non-entity (*abhāva*) is equivalent to another entity (*bhāvāntaram*)." Thus, Kumārila, on the one hand, equates preclusion or exclusion, *nivṛtti* or *apoha,* with the category of general property (*sāmānya*), on the other hand, he interprets Dignāga's view of exclusion as involving nothing but the privative opposition between different entities (*bhāva*), one being the negation of the other and thus a non-entity (*abhāva*), which Kumārila interpets as just a different entity (*bhāvāntaram*).[91] Kumārila's observation is not invented *ad hoc.* Indeed, there are statements in the fifth chapter of PSV that corroborate Kumārila's introductory remarks of the *apohavāda* chapter of Ślokavārttika; and Dharmakīrti, for instance, addresses the question of how the general property is exclusion of other referents (*katham idānīm anyāpohaḥ sāmānyam*) at PVSV 39,1ff in an important and theoretically charged paragraph of the

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[88] Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1*: agonivṛttiḥ sāmānyaṃ vācyaṃ yaiḥ parikalpitam / gotvaṃ vastv eva tair uktam apogohagirā sphuṭam.*

[89] Cf. Dharmakīrti's definition of the general property of referents as qualified by exclusion: *arthānāṃ yac ca sāmānyam anyavyāvṛttilakṣaṇam, yanniṣṭhās ta ime śabdā, na rūpaṃ tasya kiñcana,* PV II 30ab.

[90] Cf. TSP p. 960,15.

[91] Cf. ŚV Apohavāda 1-2. Kumārila connects elsewhere in ŚV *apoha* as *sāmānya* to *abhāva;* cf. the important discusion in Śūnyavāda 135ff.

apoha section of PVSV.[92] And the assumption that *anyāpoha* is
equivalent to *sāmānya* is mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi too in an
interesting discussion recorded in PSV II:4c.[93] However, the question
is, in what way *apoha* could be presented as a general property in
contrast to real general properties as semantic condition for the
application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). Since the Buddhists rejected as
untenable the idea that extramental real general properties inherent in
things are grounds of application of words, they were somehow forced
to present a theoretically consistent explanation of the cause of
denotation, which dispenses with real general properties like existence
(*sattā*) and substanceness (*dravyatva*) or the like.

6.23   The *apoha* thesis is centred on exclusion as qualifier of the
referent of any word. In a central passage Dignāga claims that words
denote things (*bhāva*) as qualified by preclusion (*nivṛtti*) of other
referents (*arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa*).[94]   In a   theoretically related
fragment—presumably from the SPVy—we find a similar phrase
which substitutes *vastu* for *bhāva*, claiming that the referent is a real

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[92] I made the following observation in *Pind* 1991 p. 271-72:"One thing is clear: the
apoha theory represents Dignāga's solution to the epistemological problem raised by
his denial of the existence of universals (*jāti* or *sāmānya*). As is well-known, they
were conceived by the Nyāyavaiśeṣika tradition as ubiquitous entities inherent in
substances (*dravya*), thereby differentiating them (*viśiṣṭa*) as belonging to a certain
class of things having certain definable features. In fact, Dignāga's *apoha* theory
only becomes fully understandable when we realize that he used it as a substitute for
universals, in contexts where the Nyāyavaiśeṣika school of philosophy would
formulate its theories with reference to the existence of universals. Thus, for
instance, the Dignāgan expression *arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭa* is the exact equivalent of
the Nyāyavaiśeṣika *jātiviśiṣṭa*. Moreover, in the important section of the *vṛtti* on PS
V 36d [q.v.], he explicitly attributes the properties of the Nyāyavaiśeṣika universal
(*jāti*) to the *apoha* ... It appears from a revealing passage in the *vṛtti* ad PS II 16, in
which Dignāga shows the consequences of the assumption that universals are real
entities, that certain philosophers attempted to solve the problem of how to justify
the existence of universally valid connections between properties [e.g., between
smoke and fire], by claiming that knowing the universal in a single substratum is
equivalent to knowing it in all. This claim is understandable since it was tacitly
assumed that universals would always instantiate in the same way. Hence they could
serve as a means of establishing universally valid connections of the kind that was
required by the development of contemporary logical theory. However, if one rejects
the idea of the universal as untenable, one is left with the problem of accounting for
the possibility of universally valid connections. Dignāga evidently solved this
fundamental epistemological problem with reference to the *apoha* theory."
[93] Cf. *Translation* no. 2.2 (1) where Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is quoted and
translated.
[94] Cf. the crucial paragraph PSV V: 36d.

object qualified by preclusion: *nivṛttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ.*[95] It is thus clear that the *śabdārtha* is conceived as a real object (*vastu*) or entity (*bhāva*) qualified by *nivṛtti*. These definitions of denotation and the concomitant function of *nivṛtti* raise the obvious question of what a term like *nivṛtti* denotes in this particular context. Neither *nivṛtti* nor its synonyms have verbal implications *per se*. In grammatical contexts *nivṛtti* is recorded in the sense of cessation or removal, which implies preclusion and is thus semantically related to *apoha* in the sense of exclusion. It is difficult, however, to relate these terms and their well attested denotations to verbal knowledge and inference as described by Dignāga in PSV V. In order to understand the implications of Dignāga´s statements it is necessary to review each of his claims. In the first place it is necessary to address the claim that verbal knowledge is inferential, because it presupposes invariable connection, i.e. concomitance between the word and its referent.

6.24   The evidence recorded in PSV V clarifies the issue. It shows unexpectedly that the *apoha* theory pivots on the concept of non-existence (*abhāva*) and describes non-existence of other referents or words *in* the referent (*arthe*) or *in* the word (*śabde)* as the foundation of preclusion of things and words, thus seemingly imitating well-established philosophical usage among Sanskrit grammarians and non-Buddhist philosophers: it is not inherent real general properties in things or words that are the causes of application of words and identity of words, but rather non-existence or preclusion of other, whether things or words. Thus Dignāga attributes the properties of real general properties to exclusion of other referents. A crucial passage at PSV V: 45 explains that the statement that "the nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of other things" (*ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti*), has been formulated with regard to (*prati*) the denotable [object]." Thus the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* lies outside the domain of perception and must be considered an abstract entity comparable to a type.

6.25   The main question is in what way it is possible for Dignāga to maintain that non-existence of other things understood as exclusion or preclusion of other referents and real general properties are homologous without generating an *aporia* similar to the one that pertains to the thesis that each general property inherent in every single object of denotation is the cause of application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). Dignāga's claim at PSV V: 36d that properties

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[95] Cf. *Translation* no. 182.

(*dharma*) of exclusion like "being one, eternity, and extension to each single particular" (*ekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāpti*) are similar to those of real general properties (*jāti*)[96] is difficult to understand with the background of *apoha* as characterized by joint absence (*vyatireka*) or non-existence (*abhāva*). Dignāga's justification for this claim is particularly illuminating.

6.26   He explains that these properties are confined to exclusion

> because (1) [exclusion of other referents] is not a particular (*abhedāt*), because (2) its substratum is not discontinued (*āśrayasyāvicchedāt*), and because (3) its referent is cognized completely (*kṛtsnārthapratīteḥ*).

The explanation first addresses the question of the distribution of *apoha* among the particulars like a real general property whose postulated oneness (*ekatva*) is transformed into a particular because of its distribution among the particulars. This argument is only understandable with the background of the postulate that "exclusion of other referents," *anyāpoha* is qualified by non-existence (*abhāva*) of other referents in the referent. And non-existence is not, like real general properties, divisible because mere non-existence as qualifier of things implies absence of other things from their substrata. It is noteworthy that Dignāga introduces the term *āśraya,* substratum, to justify that *anyāpoha* is eternal like general properties, because this term was commonly used among contemporary grammarians and philosophers to denote the substratum of real general properties. The argument seems obscure, but Dignāga intends to explain that since *apoha* has substrates and as substrates of non-existence are not discontinued, *anyāpoha* is eternal. The substratum of *anyāpoha* thus mirrors the objects (*vastu*) or things (*bhāva*) which according to Dignāga are qualified by preclusion of other referents (*anyārtha-nivṛttiviśiṣṭa*). As all substrata of the same kind are qualified by non-existence of other referents Dignāga concludes that their knowledge is comprised by exclusion of other referents. It is noteworthy that Dignāga takes care to emphaʑise that exclusion is not just another type of general property (*bhāva*)[97]. However, non-existence *per se* is an

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[96] Cf. PSV V: 36d.

[97] Cf. PSV V: 36c; 38d; cf. Siṃhasūri's critique at NCV 735,17-18: *abhāvāntara-tvād arthāntarāpohasyāpohavān arthaḥ śabdavācyo na bhavati, ato nāpoho viśeṣaṇaṃ nāpohavān so 'rtha iti yadi tvayeṣṭam:* "If you claim that since the exclusion of other referents is not a different [kind of] entity, exclusion is not a qualifier and the referent is not exclusion possessing." NCV 734,20: *atha svamatena brūṣe na sāmānyaṃ na vyāvṛttimad iti kutas tadviśiṣṭavastvabhidhānam. khapuṣpa-*

indivisible absence, and the universal non-existence of other referents in any particular referent, e.g. a tree, is the object of inference which qualifies verbal knowledge (*śabda*) as not different from inference.

6.27 As shown in PSV V: 34 Dignāga claims that the inference is based upon joint absence which he qualifies as inference from exclusion of what is other than the referent. Dignāga never presents an *apoha* inference, but Mallavādi's commentator Siṃhasūri gives an example of such inference at NCV 732,10-13:

> *arthāntarāpohaḥ sad ity asan na bhavatīti nāsadbhāvamātram evocyate, kiṃ tarhi, arthāntarāpohena viśiṣṭaṃ vastv eva sad ity ucyate, yasmin vastuni so 'pohaḥ kriyate, tac ca dravyaṃ śabdārthaḥ, nāpohamātram. sa cāpohaviśiṣṭo 'rtho dravyādiḥ sacchabdena vyāpto 'parityāgāt, na tu sākṣād uktaḥ:*

> "Exclusion of other referents as in the statement "it is existent as it is not non-existent" does not merely express its being non-existent, but rather, that the entity for whose sake the exclusion is effected, is indeed an entity which, being qualified by exclusion of other referents, is said to be "existent." And this substance is the referent of the word, not mere exclusion. And the referent that is qualified by exclusion viz. a substance, etc., is encompassed by the word "existent" because it is not rejected by it, but it is not denoted directly."

At 752,21-22 he presents a similar example of an *apoha* inference[98]:

> *yatraivādarśanam uktaṃ vṛkṣābhāve 'vṛkṣe, tato vyavacchedānumānam 'avṛkṣo na bhavati' iti. evaṃ ca kṛtvā vṛkṣaśabdād dravyatvādyanu-mānam upapannam bhavati:*

> "Only with regard to the thing about which non-observation is stated, i.e. with regard to the non-existence of a tree which is a non-tree, the inference is from its exclusion from this [non-tree] at the thought "it is not a non-tree"; and on such grounds the inference of substanceness, etc., from the word "tree" is justified."

Verbal cognition as inference is thus based upon what the inferred thing is not e.g. a tree which is not a non-tree. The latter term is as

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śekharaviśiṣṭavandhyāputrābhidhānavat: "Now, if you say in accordance with your own theory that [exclusion of other] is neither a general property, nor is [the referent] exclusion possessing, then how could the [word] denote a thing as qualified by it [viz. exclusion]. It is like denoting the son of a barren woman as qualified by a wreath of sky flowers"!
[98] Cf. *Translation* no. 427.

mentioned above an instance of what Dignāga designates as *vyavac-chedyavivakṣā* intention to denote the excluded objects, "non-tree" denoting things as qualified by the single property (*ekadharma*), non-existence of trees, and the term "tree" as excluding these. As appears from Siṃhasūri's presentation of an *apoha* inference the negation "is not" (*na bhavati*) merely conveys the notion of negation of non-existence (*abhāva*), and in the present context the notion of negation of non-existence of non-trees. An *apoha* inference would thus seem to be an instance of the type of inference known as *kevalavyatirekin* which is a purely negative type.[99]

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[99] Cf. *Randle* 1930, 241ff.

Conclusion

6.28   Dignāga attempted to show that observation of a prototype of the referent of a word teaches the relation of the word to its referent, which is reified by mere non-observation, i.e. by not observing that the word denotes other things. Thus the *apoha* doctrine pivots on non-existence (*abhāva*) of other things in the referent. Exclusion is thus in the final analysis a matter of ontology. The theory, so it seems, presupposes an extreme ontological parsimony: things are aggregates of atoms which by definition are beyond perception. Dignāga quotes a sāmkhya verse to the effect that atoms are not perceptible. Thus words denote things as aggregates of atoms, and the aggregates are the things that exclude other things in accordance with their nature. What Dignāga's critics found unaceptable was the idea that an absence may qualify things like a general property. The qualifying function however, is constructed on an absence of other things from the referent. It is in the nature of the referent to exclude from its locus any other referent. The absence is thus basically inscribed in the nature of the referent as a defining property. The idea appears to have been that the absence of other things from any particular referent is equivalent to a general property and as absence is indivisible, the *apoha* theory avoids the ontological problems of the view that denotation presupposes real general properties inherent in things.

6.29   Dignāga established the *apoha* theory on the analogy of real general properties. As he rejects the assumption that denotation presupposes that real general properties inherent in the objects of denotation define the identity of verbal denotation and cognition, he must have realised that a possible way of accounting for the identity and difference of things as referents, i.e. as denotable objects, would be to start from the principle of the mutual absence of any given x from the loci of all non-*x*. This could be formalised by means of joint presence and absence (*anvayavyatireka*) as a qualifier-qualified relation in which the predominant joint absence of all *non-x* from any given locus of *x* qualifies the latter as *x*. Induction presupposes, of course, *vyutpatti,* teaching the connection of any given word to the thing it denotes, which involves identification of the referent by ostentation accompanied by the use of the demonstrative pronoun "this," as Dignāga explains at PSV V 50b-c.

6.30   Dignāga conceived exclusion or preclusion as a generalized absence of all *non-x* from all *x.* Thus the inferential component of the

theory is based on the principle that since no *non-x* is found in the
locus of any *x* it is safe to conclude that the term used to denote *x*
accomplishes this through joint absence (*vyatireka*). The connection
established presupposes observing a knowledgable person who
teaches the denotation by pointing at the referent (if the referent is an
observable entity) saying this is *x,* the use of the demonstartive
pronoun ascertaining through co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) the
linguistic validity of the reference. Since non-existence of other things
in the referent is indivisible, non-existence does not entail the usual
problems that attach to the theory of real universals. If they are
singular real entities they become particulars when divided among the
infinite number of individual referents. This problem, however, does
not affect non-existence which being indivisible is adduced by Dignā-
ga for defining the identity of things. If any *x* is not *non-x,* and *non-x*
as already mentioned is not to be understood as anything but a term
derived from the positive term for the purpose of denoting things that
are not *x,* it becomes easy to understand why Dignāga thought it
would be possible to interpret any statement like the referent (*artha*)
of the word 'tree' as not a 'non-tree' to one implicating the non-
existence of non-trees at any tree.

6.31   It is not clear how Dignāga understood the qualifying function
of non-existence as it is nothing but an absence. However, it is an
absence of something from something else: non-trees are absent from
trees. Dignāga apparently thought that this would define trees in
general and that this universally applicable observation would qualify
as a substitute for real general properties and thus constitute the
ground of application of words. Thus, in the final analysis the
inferential component of the theory concerns the possibility of
establishing an inferential canon that involves non-existence as a
premise: the use of the word tree leads to the inference: it is a tree
because it is not a non-tree. The inference, however, is about things
and exclusion is exclusion of other referents or other speech units, not
denotations or representations.

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NVTṬ. Vacaspatimiśra's Tātparyatīkā on Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttikam. In *Nyāyadarśana of Gotama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, the Vārttika of Uddyotakara, the Tātparytīkā of Vacaspati & the Pariśuddhi of Udayana.* Vol. I. Ed Anantalal Thakur. Mithila Institute Series, Varanasi 1967.

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PBh. *Praśastapādabhāṣyam* of Praśastapāda. See Kiraṇāvalī.

Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṃgraha of Dignāga. Ed. In *Frauwallner* 816-20.

PS. Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga.

PSV. Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga.

PSṬ. The Sanskrit *codex unicus* of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā Viśālāmalavatī*.

PVBh. *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* or *Vārttikālaṃkāra* of *Prajākaragupta*. Ed. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. I. Patna 1953.

PVV. *Pramāṇavārtikavṛtti of Manorathanandin.* In *Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti with the commentary "Vṛtti" of Acharya Manorathanandin.* Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1968.

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ŚBh. *Śabarasvāmin's Bhāṣyam zu den Mīmāṃsāsūtren* I,1,1-5. See Erich *Frauwallner* 1968,

ŚV. Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra. Ed. By D. Shāstrī. Prāchyabharatī Series 10. Tara Publications, Varanasi 1978.

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STP. *Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa of Siddhasena Divākara with Abhaya-devasūri's Commentary Tattvabodhavidhāyinī.* Vol. I-II. Rinsen Book Co. 1984.

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T. Tibetan translation PSṬ V as edited in *Hattori* 1982.

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TS. *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita. In *Tattvasaṃgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the commentary 'Pañjikā' of Śrī Kamalaśīla.* Ed. Dwarikadas. Shastri. Varanasi 1981.

TSP. *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjika of Kamalaśīla.* See TS.

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VNṬ. Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Acharya Dharmakirtti with the Commentary Vipañcitārthā ṭīkā of Acharya Śāntarakṣita. Ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri. Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi 1972.

VP I. Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and svavṛtti Kāṇḍa I. In *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentaries Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva.* Kānda I. Ed. K. A. Subrahmaniya Iyer. Poona 1966.

VP II. Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya and svavṛtti Kāṇḍa II. In *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari Kāṇḍa II with the Commentary of Puṇyāraja and the ancient Vṛtti.* Ed. K. A. Subrahmaniya Iyer. Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi 1983.

VPV I. Bhartṛhari's svavṛtti on VP I. See VP I.

VPV II. Bhartṛhari's svavṛtti on VP II. See VP II.

VPP I. Helarāja's commentary Prakīrṇaprakāśa on Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya III. In *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja Kāṇḍa III, Part 1.* Ed. K. A. Subrahmaniya Iyer. Poona 1963.

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VPṬ. Puṇyāraja's ṭīkā on Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* II. See VP II.

VS. Vaiśeṣikasūtras of Kaṇāda, with Candrānanda's Vṛtti. Ed. By Muni Jambuvijaya. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 136. Baroda 1961.

VSV. *Candrānanda's vṛtti on* VS. See VS.

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Translation

§ 1. [1] It has been explained that there are two means of cognition (*pramāṇadvayam*).[1] But some[2] think that verbal cognition (*śābdam*)[3] is a separate means of cognition (*pramāṇāntaram*) too.[4] Now (**tatra*)[5]

[2] verbal cognition is not a means of cognition separate from inference (*anumānāt*).[6] That is, a [word] denotes[7] (*bhāṣate*) its own referent (*svārtham*)[8] by exclusion of other [referents] (*anyāpohena*) like [the general property] 'being produced,' and the like.[9] [1]

[3] Since (*hi*)[10] a word[11] (*śabdaḥ*) indicates (*dyotayati*)[12] through exclusion of other referents[13] (*arthāntaravyavacchedena*), that part (*aṃśa*)[14] of the object (*viṣayaḥ*)[15] to which (*yatra*) it is applied (*prayujyate*), being connected [to it] as invariaby concomitant (*avinābhāvitvasambandhaḥ*),[16] (**tasmāt*) [verbal cognition] does not differ from inference.

§ 2. [4] On the other hand, some claim[17] that a general term[18] (*jātiśabdaḥ*) denotes *all* its own particulars[19] (*svabhedān sarvān evāha*). But when they are denoted a particular term serves the purpose of restriction (*niyamārthaṃ viśeṣaśrutiḥ*).[20]

[5] To this it is replied that

a general term (*jātiśabdaḥ*) does not (*na*)

'denote' (*vācaka iti*), as [$2c_1$] will state (*vakṣyate*),

particulars (*bhedānām*).[21] [2a]

[6] In the first place, a general term like 'existent' (*jātiśabdas tāvat sadādiḥ*) does not denote substances, etc.

[7] because they are infinite (*ānantyāt*).[22] [$2b_1$]

For (*hi*) it is impossible (*aśakyaḥ*) to tell (*kartum*)[23] the connection (*sambandhaḥ*) of particulars [with a general term like 'existent'] when they are infinite;[24] and as the connection of the word [with particulars] is not told (*akṛtasambandhe śabde*),[25] it is not justified that it denote its referent[26] because merely its own form[27] is cognized (*svarūpamātrapratīteḥ*).[28]

§ 3. [8] Moreover, [a general term like 'existent' does not denote particulars]

because of ambiguity (*vyabhicārataḥ*). [2b$_2$]

For just as (*yathā hi*) the word 'existent' applies to substance (*dravye*), so it also [applies] to quality, and so on (*guṇādiṣv api*); consequently (*iti*) there will be doubt (*saṃśayaḥ syāt*) because of ambiguity (*vyabhicārāt*), but there will be no denotation (*nābhidhānam*).[29]

§ 4. [9] Someone believes (*yo 'pi manyate*) that the general term ['existent'], on the other hand, is used to denote the mere general property (**jātimātre*) or its mere inherence relation (**tadyogamātre vā*)[30] because the connection is feasible and because there is no ambiguity (*sambandhasaukaryād avyabhicārāc ceti*).[31] This is not justified[32] (*tad ayuktam*); for [the general term 'existent'] does not [denote] these two either (**na hi tayor api*),[33]

[10] (*vācakaḥ*) neither the general property nor the inherence relation, because it is not "heard apart"[34] (*apṛthakśruteḥ*) from [words] whose referents[35] (*bhedārthaiḥ*) are particular [general properties]. [2cd]

[11] That is (*tathā hi*), there would be no co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam na syāt*) with words like 'substance' (**dravyādiśabdaiḥ*) whose referents are particular [general properties] (**bhedārthaiḥ*), like, for instance, 'existent substance' (**sad dravyam*), 'existent quality' (**san guṇaḥ*), and 'existent action' (**sat karma*); but this is observed (*tac ca dṛṣṭam*).[36] [12]For existence (*sattā*) or its inherence relation (*tadyogaḥ*) is neither a substance (*dravyam*) nor a quality (*guṇaḥ*),[37] but is rather (*kiṃ tarhi*) *of* a substance (*dravyasya*) or *of* a quality (*guṇasya*).[38] [13]It is, moreover, explained that (*āha ca*)[39]

[a word] denoting a quality and one denoting the bearer of that quality (*guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ*) have different case affixes (*vibhaktibhedaḥ*) because of a restrictive rule. However, for two words that denote a substance (*dravyaśabdayoḥ*) co-reference is acknowledged (*sāmānyādhikaraṇyasya prasiddhiḥ*).[40] (VP III 14:8)

[14] And in this context it is explained that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum (*sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate*).[41] That is, it [viz. the connection] is denoted on the assumption that it is a state of action (*bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ*);[42] and a state of action is connected with the other [relatum] (*bhāvaś cānyena yujyate*).[43] **[3]**

[15] For connection means 'state of connecting':[44] it [namely the state of connecting] is connected to the other [relatum][45] in the same way as the state of colouring (*rāgādivat*), etc.[46] Therefore, assuming (*iti kṛtvā*) that the connection is denotable through the property of the relatum, doubt (*āśaṅkitam*)[47] about (*prati*) the claim (*idan tat*) that a word, on the other hand, does not denote the connection by its own property (*svadharmeṇa*)[48] is meaningless (*nāsti*). Consequently (*ataḥ*) its [viz. the connection's] denotability (*vācyatvam*) by a general term is not at all (*naiva*) justified (*upapadyate*).

§ 5. [16] Some claim[49] (*ye tv āhuḥ),[50] on the other hand, that [the general term 'existent' denotes] the mere general property possessor as intended object (*jātimadmātraṃ *vivakṣitam*) because it is co-referential with particular terms (*viśeṣaśabdaiḥ *sāmānādhikaraṇyāt*), because the connection is feasible (**sambandhasaukāryāt*), and because there is no ambiguity (*avyabhicārāc ca). Now (*tatra)[51]

[17] it does not (*na*) [denote][52] the general property possessor (*tadvataḥ*)[53] because it is not self-dependent (*asvatantratvāt*).[54] **[4a]**

[18] For even in these circumstances (*evam api hi*) the word 'existent' (*sacchabdaḥ*) denotes (*āha*) a substance whose general property and the word's own form are merely subordinate (*jātisvarūpamātropasarjanam*),[55] but [it does] not [denote the substance] directly (*na sākṣāt*).[56] Consequently (*iti*) there is no co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ*)[57] as it is without particulars (*atadbhedatve*) because it does not imply particulars like pots that are included in it[58] [namely existence] (*tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepāt*); for when there is no pervasion (*na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau*) [of particulars by the word 'existent'], there is no co-reference.[59] **[19]**For instance, since the word 'white' denotes a substance as merely qualified by its own referent, namely the quality [whiteness], it does not imply the sweet quality, and so on, even if it exists in the substance.[60] And therefore it is without particulars (*atadbhedatvam*).[61] The [absurd]

consequence is the same in the present case too (*evam atrāpy prasaṅgaḥ*).[62]

§ 6. Moreover, [the general term 'existent' does not denote the general property possessor]

[20] because of transfer (*upacārāt*).[63] [4b₁]

[21] For (*hi*) the word 'existent' denotes (*āha*) in terms of a real referent (*bhūtārthena*) either its own form (*svarūpaṃ vā*) or the general property (*jātiṃ vā*).[64] As it is applied to these [two] (*tatra pravṛttaḥ*), it is transferred (*upacaryate*) to the general property possessor (*tadvati*).[65] For a [word] that is transferred [to its referent] does not denote this referent (*artham*) as its primary referent[66] (*paramārthenāha*).

§ 7. [22] And [the general term 'existent' does not denote the general property possessor] because resemblance (**sārūpyasya*) is

impossible (*asambhavāt*).[67] [4b₂]

[23] And resemblance with the property (*guṇasārūpyam*) in the general property possessor (*tadvati ca*) is neither possible through transfer of notion (*pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ*) nor through influence of the property[68] (*guṇopakārāt*).

§ 8. [24] Why is it not [possible] through transfer of notion? Because when there is transfer (*upacāre sati*),

[such] idea's form is different[69] (*buddhirūpasya bhinnatvāt*), like, for instance, the transfer of [the notion] 'king' to the servant (*rājño bhṛtyopacāravat*).[70] [4cd]

[25] For instance (*tadyathā*), when[71] the word 'master' is used of the servant at the thought[72] 'the servant is master' (**yo bhṛtyaḥ, sa svāmī*),[73] an identical notion of king and servant does not arise.[74] [26] And the general term is transferred to the general property possessor.[75]

§ 9. [27] And[76] because [the general property and general property possessor] are not denoted successively (*krameṇa*)[77] like [in the statement] "jasmine, conch shell, and so on, are white." [5ab]

For (*hi*)[78] things about which (*yatra*) the cognition is the same, (*tatra*) are observed (*dṛṣṭam*) to be denoted in succession (*krameṇābhidhānam*[79]) like, for instance, [in the statement] "the jasmine, the nightlotus and the conch shell are white" (*śuklaṃ kundaṃ kumudaṃ śaṅkham iti*).[80] **[28]** And the word is applied simultaneously (*sakṛt*] to the general property and the general property possessor. Consequently (*iti*) similarity due to transfer of notion does not exist.[81]

§ 10. **[29]** If[82] [the general property possessor] were similar to [the property] because of the influence of the property (*guṇopakārāt tādrūpye*) [on a substance], there would be [perception of] degree of intensity[83] [of a quality] without its perception (*prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā*).[84] **[5cd]**

[30] If the general property possessor were to have the nature of the property as a consequence of the influence of the property (*guṇopakārāt*) [on the substance], like, for instance, [the influence of the red colour on] a crystal (*sphaṭikavat*), in that case there would be a perception of degree of intensity [of the red colour] (*prakarṣabuddhiḥ*) that is not dependent upon the perception of degree of intensity of the quality[85] (*guṇaprakarṣabuddhyanapekṣā*)[86] in the substance (*dravye*). **[31]** For (*hi*) the perception of the red colour (*raktabuddhiḥ*) in a crystal does not occur as dependent upon the perception of the proximate substrate[87] (*upadhānabuddhyapekṣā*) because someone who has not been taught [about it] (*avyutpannasya*) does not perceive the difference.[88] [between the crystal and the proximate substrate] (*bhedbuddhyabhāvāt*).

§ 11. Moreover,

[32] due to the form of the merged property (*saṃsargirūpāt*),[89] it follows [absurdly] that there would be false knowledge about all [referents][90] (*sarvatra mithyājñānam prasajyate*). **[6ab]**

[33] Since (*hi*) every verbal cognition is separated from its referent (*arthe*) by the form of the merged property[91] (*saṃsargirūpavyavahitaḥ*), (*tataḥ*) it will be false (*ayathārthaḥ*) in the same way as [the cognition of the red] crystal.[92]

§ 12. Furthermore,

[34] if the general properties, and so on,[93] are many (*sāmānyādibahutve*) and the listeners apprehend (*grāhakeṣu*)[94] them simultaneously[95] (*yugapat*), the influence (*upakāraḥ*) [of the properties] will be in conflict[96] (*virudhyeta*). [6c-7a]

[35] And when (*yadā ca*) the possessor of the properties (*guṇavataś śuklādeḥ*) that is white, and so on, has many apprehending listeners (*grahītāraḥ*) because of qualifiers like 'pot', 'earthen', 'substance', 'existent,' 'white', 'sweet', 'odorous,'[97] (*tadā*) the influence of the properties is in conflict. For then it would not be possible[98] to define a substance in the form of a single property (*ekaguṇarūpeṇa*) because of absence of difference (*aviśeṣāt*).[99] Nor would it be possible partially (*ekadeśena*) to obtain knowledge (*anubhāvitum*) about the form of its properties (*guṇarūpam*) because the [substance] as a whole[100] (*kṛtsnasya*) is apprehended[101] in the form of 'pot', and so on. (*ghaṭādirūpapratīteḥ*).

[36] Or if [the influence] is through all [the properties], there will be a confused perception (*mecakekṣaṇam*).[102] [7b]

[37] If, on the other hand, all [the general properties] like potness simultaneously exert their influence on the [substance as a] whole (*upakāro yugapat kṛtsnasya kriyate*), (*tataḥ*) there will be a confused perception[103] (*mecakadarśanam*) because it is impossible to apprehend them one by one (*pratyekam*) in the form of 'pot', and so on, (*ghaṭādirūpagrahaṇābhāvāt*) and because [the substance] simultaneously assumes the form of all[104] [of its general properties] (*yugapat sarvarūpāpatteḥ*).[105]

§ 13. [38] As regards the particulars, the general property, and its connection the fault is the same,[106] because also with respect to these the [form of the] general property (**jātiḥ*), the own form [of the word] (**svarūpam*), or [the form of the general property as] connected with the latter are not justified.[107] [7c-8b]

For even though they are denoted in the form of particulars (**bhedarūpena*),[108] the particulars are [39] necessarily[109] (*avaśyam*) to be denoted in the form of the general property (**jātirūpeṇa*) on the grounds that [40] [the word] primarily denotes the general property[110] and is transferred to the particulars[111] (*jātau mukhyo bhedeṣūpacārita iti*). Thus all the problems (**doṣāḥ*) like those that were asserted with regard to the general property possessor,[112] are to be asserted[113]

(*vācyāḥ*). Moreover, **[41]** because of the possibility (*sambhavataḥ*)[114] that (*iti*)[115] [the word] denotes the general property (*jāter vācakaḥ)[116] having superimposed (*adhyāropya) the word's own form (*śabdasvarūpam) upon the general property (*jātau) as its denotable object (*abhidheyāyām),[117] the relation of the general property (*jātiyogaḥ) is to be denoted in the form of the general property, namely [in the form of] existence (*sattā), etc. Thus also in this case (*atrāpi) the problem is to be asserted respectively (*yathāsambhavam).

§ 14. **[42]** The general property possessor, moreover, (*tadvāṃś ca*) is claimed to be a particular only (*bheda eva iṣṭaḥ*), and this has already been repudiated previously (*sa ca pūrvaṃ nirākṛtaḥ*). **[8cd]**

For concerning a general term (*jātiśabde) it[118] has already been refuted above (*prāg niṣiddhaḥ)[119] stating that

"a general term does not denote particulars."[120] **[2a]**

And this is also said of the general property possessor (*jātivataḥ).[121]

§ 15. **[43]** It has certainly been explained (*nanu coktam*) that the general term (*jātiśabdaḥ*)[122] denotes the mere general property possessor[123] (**jātimanmātrasya vācakaḥ*), but not (*na tu*) in the form of a particular (*bhedarūpena).[124]

[44] If this is the case (*yady evaṃ*),[125]

[45] the mere general property possessor (*tadvadmātran tu*), nevertheless, has already been considered (*vicāritam*) as it is either the relation or the [general property] existence (*sambandhaḥ sattā veti*) [that is denoted].[126] **[9ab]**

For (*hi)[127] 'mere general property possessor' (*tadvadmātram) means 'the property of being a general property possessor' (*tadvattvam);[128] and (*ca), the *bhāva* affix (*bhāvapratyayaḥ) is used to denote a connection or a property (**sambandhe guṇe vā*).[129] Thus, for instance, it is said (*yathāha):[130]

[46] "[The *bhāva* affixes *tva* and *tā*] denote a connection[131] (*sambandhābhidhānam*) when [introduced] after compounds, [words] ending in *kṛt* and *taddhita* affixes (*samāsakṛttaddhiteṣu*),

except (*anyatra*) when [introduced] after idiomatic expressions, [words] whose form is not distinct, and [words] whose connection is invariable (*rūḍhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicāritasambandhebhyaḥ*)."[132]

And in this context (**tatra*) it has already been explained[133] that "[a general term] does not (**na*)

denote (*vācakaḥ*) either the general property or [its] relation (*yogajātyoḥ*) [with the general property] because it is not "heard apart" (*apṛthakśruteḥ*) from [words] whose referents are particular [general properties] (*bhedārthaiḥ*)." **[2cd]**

§ 16. **[47]** If the referent that is the property possessor (*tadvān*), namely a [single] pot and so on, (*ghaṭādiḥ*) does not reside in cloth and so on, (*na paṭādiṣu vartate*), how can this referent be a general property ?![134] **[9cd-10a]**

[48] For (*hi*) a general property is resident in many[135] [objects] (*anekavṛtti*); **[49]** and if[136] (*tac ca*) this [general property] is a [single] general property possessor (**sāmānyavān*) like a pot, how **[50]** (*katham*) can it be justified to claim, when this [namely the pot] does not reside in cloth,[137] and so on, that it is their general property?[138]

§ 17. **[51]** It certainly (*nanu ca*) denotes the general property possessor, **[52]** so what purpose does it serve (*kimartham*) to attribute to this (**tatra*) [namely the general property possessor] the property of a general property (**sāmānyatādhyāropeṇa*)?[139]
Since (*yasmāt*) the word 'existent' does not denote the general property possessor (**tadvato na vācakaḥ*),[140] as it has been asserted that it denotes the general property,[141] **[53]** and [the general property] existence, and so on, does not exist at [general properties] such as existence,[142] **[54]** (*tasmāt*) it is necessarily (**avaśyam*) to be assumed, that it is the referent[143] that has the property of a general property (*arthasya *sāmānyatā*).[144] **[55]** And the referent is not a [general property] because (*yasmāt*)

with regard to it (**atra*)[145] the word alone (**kevalaḥ*)[146] is the same (**samaḥ*).[147] **[10b]**

For (**hi*) general property possessors like pots are the same[148] because they are denotable (**vācyaḥ*) by the word 'existent,' **[56]** but not because of some general property possessor (*kenacit tadvatā*);[149]

[57] and [the general property] existence and its relation (*sattāyogau ca*) have been rejected previously.[150]

§ 18. **[58]** And it [namely a word] is not thought to be without a cause of application (*animittaḥ*). **[10c]**

And a word (**śabdaḥ*) is not observed (**dṛṣṭaḥ*)[151] to be the same (**abhinnaḥ*)[152] with respect to different things (**bhinneṣu*) without a cause of application.[153] Therefore it is not justified that it [namely the word] be [their] general property[154] (**sāmānyam*);[155] **[59]** and therefore there is no qualifier-qualified relation[156] (**viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā*).

§ 19. **[60]** Suppose, on the other hand,[157] that [a thing like a pot] possessing the general property existence (*sadguṇam*) is resident in the same (*ananyasmim*) substance,[158] there will be a qualifier-qualified relation as the word 'existent' causes the expectation of a complement like 'pot,' in the same way as [the complement] 'bluer,' and so on, (*nīlatarādivat*).[159]

[61] If [the the general property existence is resident] in one and the same (*ekatra*) [property possessor] in the same way as, 'blue,' and so on,[160] **[10d]**,

it will be used to denote the connection or the property (**sambandhe guṇe vā syāt*),[161]

[62] and this is not the case. **[11a₁]**

[63] For the word 'blue' (*nīlaśabdo hi*) <denotes a substance that has the property blueness>. Since it [namely the substance] does not exist in another [substance] that is bluer, and so on, (**nīlatarādāv anyatrāsati*) it is not justified (**na yujyate*) that [the substance] is a general property possessor (**tadvat*).[162] For it has already been explained[163] that blueness and its connection (**nīlatvatatsambandhau*) are not the referents of the word (**śabdārthau*).[164]

§ 20. Moreover (**kiṃ ca*),

[64] even if[165] it were assumed (*upetyāpi*)[166] [to be the case], it is not so (*naitad*)[167] because a general property is without general properties[168] (*jāter ajātitaḥ*). **[11a₂-b]**[169]

Even though it were assumed that the general property blueness
(*nīlasāmānyam*) is [resident] in [substances] that are bluer, and so
on, (*nīlatarādiṣu*) nevertheless (*tathāpi*) the general property
existence is not found to be possessed of the general property potness,
and so on. [65] (*naivaṃ sattājātir ghaṭatvādijātimatī*) in the same way
as the quality blue (*nīlaguṇaḥ*) which is divided into three kinds [is
possessed of the general property blueness], [66] so that, when it
resides in a substance, having appropriated these particular [general
properties] (*yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye <vṛttau>*), one would
expect a particular [term] like 'pot' as a complement.[170] Therefore
this [example) is not to be considered either.

§ 21. [67] In these circumstances it is then (*evaṃ tarhi*) said that
although [particulars] are not expressly denotable (*aśabdavācyā*),
there will nevertheless be the expectation of a particular [term]
(*bhedākāṅkṣā*) as 'pot', and so on, are implied[171] (*ghaṭādiṣv
arthākṣipteṣu*). For the referent possessing the general property
[existence] (*tadvān hy arthaḥ*)[172] is necessarily (*avaśyam*) connected
to some general property (*kenacit sāmānyenānubaddhaḥ*) from
among potness, etc.[173] (*ghaṭatvādīnām*).[174]

[68] Even in the case of implication (*arthākṣepe 'pi*), there is
uncertainty (*anekāntaḥ*).[175] [11c]

[69] For implication (*arthākṣepaḥ*) means obtainment of certainty
according to the state of the case[176] (*yasminn arthād niścayotpattiḥ*),
[70] like, for instance, the certainty that NN is eating at night (*rātri-
bhojane*) on the basis of [the statement] that he does not eat during the
day (*divā na bhuṅkta iti*).[177] In the present context, however, [71] (*iha
punaḥ*), when one says 'existent' (*sad ity ukte*) there is no certainty
about 'pot', etc. Therefore (*iti*) there is no implication (*nāsty
arthākṣepaḥ*) as there is doubt.

§ 22. Since[178] (*yasmāt*) it is not justified under any circumstances
(*na katham api*)[179] that a general term (*jātiśabdaḥ*) denotes particu-
lars, a general property, the connection [with a general property], or
the general property possessor[180] (*bhedasāmānyasambandhajāti-
madvācakaḥ*),

[72] (*tena*) a word (*śrutiḥ*) excludes other (*anyāpohakṛt*) [refer-
ents].[181] [11d]

[73] Therefore, what was stated previously namely that

> it, [i.e a word] denotes its own referent through exclusion of other [referents] like [the inferential indicator] 'being a product,' etc. [1cd],

is settled[182] (*tad eva sthitam*).[183]

§ 23. [74] It is, moreover, explained[184] that

> a word does not indicate [its referent] *in toto,* although it is denotable in many ways.[185] On the contrary (*tu*), it performs its purpose which is exclusion[186] in accordance with its own connection (*svasambandhānurūpyāt*).[187] [12]

> [75] Even though a word has many properties[188] it only indicates by means of that [property] by virtue of which it does not deviate[189] from its referent,[190] but not by virtue of the word's being a quality [of ether], etc.[191] (*śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ*).[192] [13][193]

§ 24. [76] If the word's referent (*śabdārthaḥ*) is merely exclusion of other (*anyāpohamātram*) [referents], how then (*katham*) could words like 'blue' and 'lotus' (*nīlotpalādiśadānām*) be co-referential (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) and related as qualifier and qualified (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ*)?
And why would that not be the case?
Because (*yasmāt*) the excluded object (*apohyam*) of general and particular terms (*sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām*) is different (*bhinnam*).[194]
[77]This problem does not exist. For even though they (*te 'pi hi*)

> [78] have separate referents (*bhinnārthāḥ*) because of difference of excluded [objects] (*apohyabhedāt*), they are [each][195] incapable (*jaḍāḥ*) of indicating the particulars of their own referent (*svārthabhedagatau*).[196] But they are [each] qualifier and qualified because together their effects are not separate (*ekatrābhinnakāryatvāt*). [14]

[79] For words like 'blue' and 'lotus' (*nīlotpālādiśabdā hi*), although their excluded objects are different, become co-referential (*samānādhikaraṇāḥ*) by combining[197] (*upasaṃharantaḥ*) their own *apoha* referent[198] (*svam apohārtham*) into one (*ekatra*) [referent] for the sake of disclosing the particulars of their own referent[199] (*svārthabheda-*

vyañjanārtham), in the same way as 'uprightness' and 'crow's nest' (*ūrdhvatākākanilayavat*).[200] That is (*tathā hi*), they are each (*pratyekaṃ*) a cause of doubt as to the particulars of their own referent.[201] And since a referent that is to be manifested as associated with another word is impossible[202] (*śabdāntarasahitavyaṅgyārthā-sambhavāc ca*), they are [each] like qualifier and qualified[203] (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhūtāḥ*).

§ 25. [80] Then, why is it that this [namely the term 'blue lotus'] has one and the same object (*ekādhikaraṇam*) as 'blue lotus' means that it is neither [just] blue nor [just] lotus, but it is both blue and lotus (**nīlaṃ ca tad utpalaṃ ceti nīlotpalam iti*)?[204]

[81]It [namely the object] is neither blue alone (*kevalaṃ nīlam*) nor lotus alone (*kevalam utpalam*)[205] because the denotable [object] is [their] aggregate (*samudāyābhidheyatvāt*).[206] [15a-c]

[82]For (**hi*) it[207] [namely the referent blue lotus] is indicated by the words 'blue' and 'lotus' (*nīlotpalaśabdābhyām*) when combined (*sahitābhyām*), but not alone (*na kevalābhyām*). [83] For alone (**kevalau hi*),[208]

they are as meaningless[209] as the phonemes. [15d]

[84]For just as (*yathaiva hi*) the speech unit *nī* and the speech unit *la,* even though they exist, are meaningless with regard to the articulation *'nīla'* ['blue'],[210] so also in this case (**evam atrāpi*).[211]

§ 26. [85]This is an inadequate illustration (*viṣama upanyāsa*). For no (*na hi*) referent whatsoever is indicated, when the [individual] phonemes are articulated.[212] It is indicated, however, when they are combined as *'nīla'* ['blue'].

[86]If no referent is understood on the basis of the phoneme (*varṇe*) whereas [it is understood] on the basis of the two syntactical words (*padadvaye*), the [referent] is still on this [assumption] (*tatrāpi*) indicated alone (*kevalam*) since it is its denotable [object] (*tadvācya iti*).[213] [16]

[87]For just as[214] (*yathaiva hi*) the speech units *nī* and *la* (**nīlaśabdau*) are empty of the referent blue (**nīlārthaśūnyau*), so the words 'lotus' and 'blue' are empty of an aggregate referent (**samudāyārtha-*

śūnyau); [88]and with regard to the claim that the speech units *nī* and *la* do not indicate any referent whatsoever,[215] the denotable object (*vācyaḥ*) of the word 'blue' is the general property [blueness].[216] Consequently (*iti*) it is indicated alone (*kevalam*);[217] and since it is not justified that its denotable object be [the general property blueness] as connected to the quality [blue] as connected to the substance [lotus],[218] it is indicated by [89]aggregates that are empty of referents (*arthaśūnyair samudayair*) in the manner of the phonemes. [90]Because [their] referent is denotable by separate[219] words (*bhinna-śabdavācyenārthena*), they are said to have separate referents (*bhinnārthāḥ*). Therefore it is justified that there be co-referentiality and a qualifier-qualified relation, if the referent of a word is exclusion of other [referents][220] (*anyāpohe śabdārthe*).

§ 27. [91]For (*hi*) it is not justified that the word's referent (*śabdārthaḥ*) is another referent[221] (*arthāntaraḥ*).
On what grounds?
[92]Because (*hi*), the object[222] of the two component referents[223] (*avayavārthayor adhikaraṇam*) may either be different or not different[224] from these[225] (*tato bhinnaṃ syād abhinnaṃ vā*). [93]Now (*tatra*), in the first place (*tāvat*), it is not different because (*yasmāt*)[226]

> there is no singularity of the aggregate (*samudāyaikatā*) since mutual non-difference follows [absurdly] (*mitho 'bhedaprasaṅgataḥ*).[227] [17ab]

[94]For if (*yadi hi*) the aggregate is one, the two referents, namely lotus and blue are not different.[228] And therefore it follows[229] [absurdly] that they are mutually (*parasparam*) non-different because they are not different from the one[230] [aggregate]. Moreover,

> [95]because plurality of the aggregate follows [absurdly] (*samūhā-nekatāsakteḥ*). [17c]

[96]Because the aggregate is not different from the many [parts], the [absurd] consequence is that it is plural (*anekatāprasaṅgaḥ*), and therefore it does not exist. Even if it is assumed that the aggregate exist, there is no co-reference of [97]the [two words] whose referents are the blue [quality] and [the object] lotus[231] (*nīlotpalārthayoḥ*) because [98]when they occur in one [word][232] (*ekatrāpi vartamānau*),

> the two words do not reject their own referent. [17d]

The referents of the words 'blue' and 'lotus' in isolation are their own general properties, and these [referents] are the same [99]even when [the two words] are combined (*samuditayor api*). Therefore (**iti*), [100]how could there be co-reference[233] (*kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam*)?! [101]This problem does not exist. Both of them (*dvāv api*) have particulars as their referent (**viśeṣārthau*) because particulars are included in the general property[234] (*sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvāt*). They have a form that is identical with having the general property as their referent (*tulyarūpau sāmānyārthena*). [102]The application of the second word is for the purpose of making known the fact that they have a particular as their referent[235] (*viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanarthaṃ dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ*). In these circumstances the two [words] (**dvāv api*) are co-referential because they have the aggregate as referent.
[103]Here, in the first place (*atra tāvat*), the word 'blue' (*nīlaśabdena*) denotes [the general property blueness or the blue quality] without distinction (**abhedena*),

but not the general property[236] [substanceness] (*na jātiḥ*). [18a₁]

[104]For (**hi*) the word 'blue' does not denote in a general way[237] (*sāmānyenāha*) the general property substanceness (*dravyajātim*), so how (**kutaḥ*) could the particular be imagined to be included in the general property substanceness (**dravyajātau*)?
[105]It certainly (*nanu ca*) denotes in a general way the substance which possesses [the] blue [quality], and its particulars such as cranes[238] (*balākādayaḥ*) and lotuses[239] are included in it.[240]
[106]It is not justified that this is the case (*ayuktam evam bhavitum*).
[107]Why[241] (**kasmāt*)?

Because it already has been explained above.[242] [18a₂]

[108]For (**hi*) the denotation of the general property possessor (**tadvadabhidhānam*) has already been rejected above (*pūrvam eva niṣiddham*) by [the statement]

"[a general term does] not [denote] the general property possessor because it is not self-dependent" [4a], etc.

The claim that it is because a particular is included in the general property (**sāmānye viśeṣasyāntarbhūtatvāt*), [109]is not justified[243] (*tad ayuktam*).

[110]Why?

Because of doubt (*saṃśayāt*). **[18b₁]**

[111]For it is observed that a general term causes (**sāmānyaśabdāt*) doubt about the particulars; [112]and it is not justified that [a term] which causes doubt denote. [113]By implication,[244] however (*syāt tv arthataḥ*), the particular term would cause (**viśeṣaśabdāt*) a cognition of the general property (**sāmānyapratītiḥ*) because it does not deviate from [it] (**avyabhicārāt*).[245]

[114]In that case (*tarhi*), the claim that particulars are included in the general property is not set forth because [particulars] are denotable objects, but rather (**kiṃ tarhi*),

[115]because of not being excluded (**anapohanāt*). **[18b₂]**

Since (**yasmāt*) the word 'blue' does not exclude sesamum, and so on,[246] (**tilādim*) in the same way as [it excludes] jasmine (**kundādivat*), and so on, (**tasmāt*) [sesamum, and so on,] is said to be included in it. And on this assumption they are included among the denotable objects [of the word 'blue'].

If both [words, namely 'blue' and 'lotus'] have paticulars as their referents (**bhedārthau*), the two words would become synonyms. And it is observed that

[116]with regard to a synonym, [the referent] is understood from a single one.[247] **[18c]**

[117]For (*hi*) the addition of another synonym to a synonym whose referent is not understood or whose referents are many (*anirjñā-tānekārthe*) serves the purpose of making known the same referent as the first-mentioned.[248] [118]For this surely is the raison d'être[249] of synonyms[250]: [119]They denote their referents successively, not simultaneously;[251] [120]and thus no qualifier-qualified relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ*) exists because the word 'blue' alone indicates the referent lotus.[252] Therefore, in the first place, there is a

problem with regard to [the aggregate's] not being different [from its parts].

§ 28. [121]And just as [there is a problem] if it [namely the aggregate] is not different [from its parts] (*yathābhede*), so also if it is different [from its parts] (*tathā bhede 'pi*): The difference of the aggregate from the members of the aggregate (*samudāyibhyaḥ*) is to be proved. For it is not possible that it [namely the aggregate] resides in these (*teṣu*) [namely the members], or these in it (*tatra*), whether completely (*kārtsnyena*) or partially[253] (*ekadeśena*); and even if it were assumed

> that [the aggregate] is different [from its parts], both [co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] are non-existent. **[18d]**

Also in this case co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation are impossible. [122]For this[254] will either be of the two referents or of the two words; and[255] it has already been examined that with regard to the two referents it [namely co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] will either be of the quality and the general property, or of the general property possessor; and similarly with regard to the two words, it [namely co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] will either be of the two words denoting the quality and the general property, or of the two words denoting the general property possessor. Now (*tatra*),

> [123]even if the two referents, namely the general property and the quality were to reside in one and the same referent (*ekārthavṛttitā*), there is no general-particular property relationship between them[256] (*sāmānyaviśeṣatvam*). **[19a-c]**

[124]For even if the quality blue and the general property lotus were co-referential because they reside in one and the same substance (*ekatra dravye vṛtteḥ*), they are not related as qualifier and qualified.[257] [125]For[258] the quality blue (*nīlaguṇasya*) has no relation to the general property lotusness (*utpalajātiyogaḥ*), nor has the general property lotusness (*utpalajāteḥ*) any relation to the quality blue (*nīlaguṇayogaḥ*).

> [126]And both [co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation] do not exist with regard to the two general property possessors[259] (*tadvatoḥ*). **[19d]**

When (*yadā*) the quality blue (*nīlaguṇaḥ*) and the general property
lotusness (*utpalajātiḥ*) reside[260] in the referent (*arthe*) that is the
property possessor[261] (*tadvati*), (*tadā*) they are not co-referential
[127]because the two substances do not reside elsewhere (*dravyayor
anyatrāvṛtteḥ*).[262] Nor can they be related as qualifier-and qualified
[128]because of the impossibility that both or one of them possess the
general and the particular property (*dvayor ekasya vā sāmānyaviśe-
ṣavattvāyogāt*).[263] Thus, in the first place, both [co-reference and
qualifier-qualified relation] are impossible with regard to the two
referents.[264] And just as they are [impossible] with regard to the two
referents,

> so also with respect to the two words that denote the mere general
> property and the mere quality. [20ab]

[129]Since (*hi*)[265] the two words that denote the general property and
the quality (*jātiguṇābhidhāyakau*) are entirely different[266] (*atyanta-
bhinnau*), (*tasmāt*) they are not co-referential (*tayoḥ sāmānādhi-
karaṇyābhāvaḥ*);[267] and since the two [properties] are not connected
[with one another], there is no qualifier-qualified relation between the
two words denoting them[268] (*tacchabdayoḥ*).[269] Thus, in the first
place, these two [namely co-reference and qualifier-qualified relation]
do not to exist[270] when [the two words] denote the mere general
property[271] and the mere quality (*jātiguṇamātrābhidhāyakatve*).[272]

> And if they denote the general property possessor, [130]the conse-
> quence is that [the substratum] is similar and dissimilar
> (*tulyātulyam*).[273] [20cd]

Since[274] (*yasmāt*) the two words denote one and the same substance
(*ekaṃ dravyam*) as qualified by a general property[275] [namely lotus-
ness] and a quality [namely blueness] (*jātiguṇaviśiṣṭam*), (*tasmāt*)
the referent (*adhikaraṇam*) is similar (*tulyam*); and since they
denote a substance while denoting two different qualifiers, it is
dissimilar (*atulyam*). Therefore it is not ascertained that they are co-
referential.

> § 29. [131]If [it is objected that] there is no intention to express the
> dissimilarity (*atulyatvāvivakṣā*) [of substratum]. [21a]

[132]Suppose you think: "Since the difference that is caused by the relata is not intended to be denoted (*sambandhikṛtabhedā-vivakṣāyām*) there will be co-reference on the basis of such similarity [of substratum] (*tulyatvam tāvad upādāya*).[276] [133]For also in the case where (*yatrāpi hi*)[277] ['blue' and 'lotus'] are said to be co-referential because they are causes of a cognition having the same form[278] [134](*tulyākārabuddhihetutvāt*), (*tatra*) the other differences like the lotus buds are not intended to be denoted, although they do in fact exist."[279]

This is an inadequate illustration (*viṣama upanyāsaḥ*).[280] [135]The function of the expression ['blue lotus'] is to denote the (*tatra*) [referent of the expression 'blue lotus'] to the extent that it is apprehended [136]when supported by the exclusions of both [terms] (*ubhayavyudāsānugṛhīte*).[281] Thus the intention to denote this much[282] is justified (*tadmātrasya vivakṣā prayujyate*).[283] [137]But if the difference that is caused by the relata (*sambandhikṛte*) is not intended to be denoted, how could this entity (*vastu*) be the denotable object?[284]

In addition,

[138]there would be similarity of cow and horse, etc.[285] [21b]

And if the difference between a cow and a horse,[286] and so on, that is caused by the relata [the general properties] cowhood and horsehood , and so on, is not intended to be denoted, [139]there is similarity of the entity because of its not being the denotable object[287] (*anabhidheya-tvena*). Therefore the [absurd] consequence is that 'cow' and 'horse' become co-referential in the same way as 'lotus' and 'blue.'[288]

§ 30. [140]Suppose [you think that] there is a difference of [generic] form in these[289] (*tatrākṛtiviśeṣaś cet*). [21c]

Suppose you think (*yadi manyate*):[290] "Since the difference of material shape[291] (*saṃsthānaviśeṣa*) in a cow and a horse is explained to be [their generic] form (*ākṛti*),[292] this [generic form] exists.[293] [141]Since (*hi*) the two denotations of these two [namely as 'cow' and 'horse,' respectively] are caused in this way by the [generic form], which is the cause of the manifestation of their own general properties,[294] why would there be no intention to denote this difference [of generic form],[295] [142]but not [no intention to denote a difference of generic form] of a referent (*arthasya*) that has the properties blueness and lotusness (*nīlotpalatvavataḥ*)? Therefore (*iti*)

[the words 'cow' and 'horse'] are not co-referential in the same way [as the words 'blue' and 'lotus']."[296]

In that case,

> [143]the many [generic] forms become commingled (*anekākṛtisaṅ-karaḥ*). [21d]

[144]Many material shapes would co-occur (*anekasaṃsthānasamā-veśaḥ*) in one entity because it manifests many general properties; [145]and this is not observed.[297]

§ 31. [146]In addition (*api ca*),

> [their substance would be] similar (**tulyam*). [22a$_1$]

[147]Moreover, [the words] 'cow' and 'horse' and so on would have a similar or dissimilar referent (*adhikaraṇam*) because it is not denotable, and because it manifests [the general properties] existence, and so on, and cowhood, etc.[298] [148]Also in this case co-reference obtains [absurdly], as the dissimilarity is not intended to be expressed.

> § 32. [149]And even if it is claimed, it is not the case. [22a$_2$]

[150]Even in the case where (*yatrāpi*) 'existent', 'lotus', and 'substance', and so on, are claimed to be co-referential, (**tatra*) [co-reference] does not obtain. [151]For if (*yadi*) 'cow' and 'horse' are not co-referential [152]because [a cow and a horse] manifest different general properties, [153]in the same way also a lotus is observed to manifest [the general properties] existence (*sattā*) and substanceness (*dravyatva*), etc.

§ 33. Moreover,

> [154]Quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*) do not manifest [general properties].[299] [22b]

[155]For the [absurd] consequence is that quality and action, since they do not possess material shape (*asaṃsthānavattvāt*), do not manifest the general properties contained in them (*tadgatasāmānyānabhi-vyaktiprasaṅgaḥ*). If it is claimed that [156]the difference between substance, and so on, is due to the fact that they manifest their own

general properties because of difference of power (*śaktibhedena*), but not because of difference of material shape,[300] this [claim] is not justified[301] because it is assumed that the powers are different, even though an entity is devoid of difference, like, for instance, the entity lotus. And as regards the statement that it is because [the powers] are the causes of manifestation of different general properties, [157]it is to be explained whereby the difference between [the general properties] cowhood and horsehood is established.[302]

§ 34. Here we shall explain how: [158]In the first place, for the grammarians (*śābdānām*) [the difference between the general properties] is caused by the words that denote [them] (*abhidhāyaka-śabdakṛtaḥ*). For their difference is the one between arbitrary terms (*yadṛcchāśabdeṣu*) because they [namely the general properties] are their objects of denotation.[303]
Now (*tatra*),

[159]if the difference is due to the difference of [the words that] denote [the general properties], the difference does not exist *per se* (*svataḥ**).[304] [22cd]

For (*hi*) in those circumstances the mere verbal difference (*śabda-mātrabhedaḥ*) of the different general properties (*viśiṣṭasāmānyā-nām*) is not intrinsic (*svābhāvikaḥ*). [160]For one should not say as a consequence of transfer in terms of identity [of the general property] with the word that denotes [it] to the non-different [general] entity (*aviśiṣṭe ... vastuni*), that cows, and so on, are different because they are causes of manifestation of different general properties (*viśiṣṭa-sāmānyābhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭāḥ*). Suppose [it is objected that] difference is also observed because of difference of denotation, like [the proper name] Caitra, etc. This [objection], however, is not justified (*na*) because exactly this is subject to [the above-mentioned] criticism,[305] and because one and the same [referent] is the denotable object of several synonyms.[306] Just as it [applies] to this, so the [proposition] "the difference does not exist *per se* (*svataḥ*)" applies to the word (*śabde*). Also in a word (*śabde*) like 'cow' there is no difference that is cognized *per se,* but rather (*kiṃ tarhi*), [161]with regard to it [viz. the word] the analysis is like that concerning the referent (*arthe*), namely that the difference (*bhedaḥ*) is caused by the general property (*sāmānyakṛtaḥ*)[307] [in the word].[308]
Certainly, (*nanu ca*) a word-particular (*śabdaviśeṣaḥ*) such as 'cow' is perceptible (*pratyakṣaḥ*)!

Even though a [word] particular is perceptible (*pratyakṣe saty api viśeṣe*), [162]it does not, however, denote (*sa tu nābhidhāyakaḥ*) because it is not observed together with the referent (*arthena sahādṛṣṭavāt*),[309] and because a [word] like [163]*śākaṭika*[310] [i.e., 'carter'] denotes the same referent[311] when it is used by children,[312] etc. Therefore the difference between words is caused by the general property.

§ 35. The Vaiśeṣikas, however (*tu*), claim that the general properties (*sāmānyānām*) that are manifested by the material shapes of their own substrata (*svāśrayasaṃsthānebhir abhivyaṅgyānām*) also have an intrinsic difference (*svābhāviko bhedaḥ*) because it is, for instance, said [at VS X.11] that "[the cognition] 'head', 'back', 'stomach', and 'hand' is due to their particular[313] [general properties]."[314] As far as they are concerned, however,[315]

> [164]circularity follows [absurdly], if the difference is due to the manifestation [effected] by the manifesting [substance] (*vyañjaka-vyaktito bhede*).[316] **[23ab]**

For on their explanation circularity obtains: [165]What is the intrinsic nature of a substance (*dravyasvabhāvaḥ*)? The fact that it manifests its own general property (*svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvam*). And what is the intrinsic nature of the general property (*sāmānyasvabhāvaḥ*)? The fact that it is manifested by its own substance (*svadravyābhivyaṅgyatvam*). Thus (*iti*) it has no force (*asāmarthyam*).

§ 36. Moreover (*kiṃ ca*),

> [166]a single (*ekasya*) [substance and general property] would have a multitude of intrinsic natures[317] (*svabhāvānaikatā*) because of mutual 'multi-manifestation'[318] (*bahuvyakteḥ parasparam*). **[23cd]**

It is called 'multi-manifestation' because of the manifestation of many as well as the manifestation by many.[319] [167]For (*hi*) many general properties such as existence[320] (*sattādeḥ*) are manifested by a substance (*dravyāt*).[321] Thus (*iti*) a single substance (*ekasya dravyasya*) would have many intrinsic natures (*anekasvabhāvaḥ syāt*); and because existence is manifested by many substances (*anekadravyāt*) that are earthen, etc. (*pārthivādeḥ*),[322] existence would have many intrinsic natures; [168]and if the difference altogether (*sarvathā*) is assumed to be due to difference of relation to a [general]

property[323] (*guṇasambandhabhedāt*), difference of power[324] (*śakti-bhedāt*), and difference of denotation[325] (*abhidhānabhedāt*), the [absurd] consequence is that a single (*ekasyāpi*) [substance or general property] would have a multitude (*anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ*) [of intrinsic natures].[326] An inserted verse (*antaraślokaḥ*) states:

> If one imagines that the difference is due to difference of [general] property, power, and denotation, the [absurd] consequence is that a single [substance or general property] will have a multitude [of intrinsic natures] because it possesses many [intrinsic natures]. [24]

Thus, in the first place, there is no co-reference (*evaṃ tāvat sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ*).[327]

§ 37. [169]The qualifier-qualified relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam*) has already been explained above on the grounds that it is not self-dependent (*asvātantryāt*).[328] [25ab]

For the impossibility of the qualifier-qualified relation (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyatvāsambhavaḥ*) has already been explained if the general property possessor is denoted (*tadvadabhidhāne*). Thus co-reference and qualifierqualified relation are only justified when exclusion of other referents is the referent of the word, but not otherwise.

§ 38. Now (*tatra*)

> [170]the denotable objects of general terms, particular [general] terms, and synonyms are not excluded (*na sāmānyabhedaparyāya-vācyanut*), although they are different.[329] [25cd]

[171]For even though [the referents'] being different is the same (*tulye 'pi hi anyatve*), the word does not exclude the referents of general terms, particular [general] terms, and synonyms.
How can this be?
[172]Because they are not in conflict (*avirodhāt*).[330] In the first place (*tāvat*), the excluded object (*apohyam*) of a synonym is the same because [synonyms] are not applied simultaneously (*yugapad aprayogāt*).[331] And it is not justified that it rejects its own referent (*na ca svārthapratikṣepo yuktaḥ*).[332] [173]A particular [general] term,[333] moreover, approves (*anumodate*) that the general term[334] has excluded another referent[335] (*arthāntaraṃ vyudastam*) for the sake of its own particulars[336] (*svabhedeṣu*) because they are in need of it (*arthi-*

tvāt).[337] [174]For just as (*yathā hi*) a *śiṃśapā* [tree] is not a *palāśa* [tree], and so on,[338] it is not a pot, and so on, either.[339] [175]Thereby (*etena*) it is also explained why it does not reject the referent of a general term's general term (*sāmānyasāmānyaśabdārthāpratikṣepa uktaḥ*).[340] [176]Similarly, why would a general term (*sāmānyaśabdaḥ*) not tolerate that its own referent[341] is being restricted to the intended referent[342] (*abhiprete viṣaye vyavasthāpyamānam*) by a particular [general] term or a particular [general] term's particular [general] term?[343] Thus, since they are not in conflict (**avirodhāt*), the exclusion of the referent of a general term, and so on, is not justified (**na sāmānyādiśabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ*).[344] [177]And an aggregate[345] (*samūhaḥ*) denotes a separate referent (*arthāntaravācakaḥ*) in the same way.[346] [178]And thus it is justified, in the manner explained previously (*yathoktam prāk*)[347] that a general term and a particular [general] term, whether they are two[348] or many[349] (*dvayor bahūnāṃ vā*), denote a separate referent that is qualified by these (*tadviśiṣṭārthāntaravācakatvam*), while being applied to the general property which is their own referent.

§ 39. [179]It is, moreover, explained that

> a[350] particular [term] is not rejected (*nojjhitaḥ*) by its own general [term] because that alone is expected as a complement (*tadmātrākāṅkṣaṇāt*)[351] nor is it included (*nopāttaḥ*) [by it] because doubt arises (*saṃśayotpatteḥ*). But in case of identity [of referent] (*sāmye*), they have the same reference (*ekārthatā*).[352] [26]

> [180]A[353] general property, even if there are several (*anekam api*), is included by a particular general [term][354] because it does not deviate [from the general property],[355] but their qualifier and qualified relation is not symmetrical (*tulyā*).[356] [27]

§ 40. [181]In this context, moreover, what is the reason[357] why a particular [general] term (**bhedaśabdaḥ*) excludes the referent of other particular [general] terms (**bhedāntaraśabdārtham apohate*)?

> [182]A particular (*bhedaḥ*) [general] term certainly excludes the referent of other particular [general terms] because they are in conflict [with one another][358] (*virodhitvāt*). [28ab]

[183]For words whose referents are particulars are in conflict with one another (*parasparavirodhino*) because they are appropriating [their] common property[359] (*sāmānyārthāpahāritvād*), in the same way as the sons of a king [are appropriating their common property]; and therefore they do not tolerate (*kṣamante*) one another's property.[360] [184]For instance,[361] when the word *'śiṃśapā'* is used together with (*saha) the word 'tree' in [the statement] "this tree is a *śiṃśapā*" (*vṛkṣo 'yaṃ śiṃśapā*), it confines (*vyavasthāpayati*) treeness (*vṛkṣatvam*) to its own object (*svaviṣaye*) by excluding (*vyavac-chidya*) it from *khadira,* etc.; and likewise with regard to the remaining [particular terms]. Thus, in the first place (*tāvat*), it is justified that a particular term excludes the referents of other particular terms because they are appropriating one and the same property[362] (*ekadravyāpahāritvāt*).

§ 41. [185]But why does the [word *'śiṃśapā'*] exclude a referent that is the particular of a different general property (*sāmānyāntarabhedā-rtham*), namely a pot, and so on, (*ghaṭādim*) which is without connection (*asambaddham*) [to the word *'śiṃśapā'*]?[363]
Because

> [186]referents that are particulars of other general properties (*sāmānyāntarabhedarthāḥ*) are in conflict about its [i.e., *śiṃśapā's*] own general property (*svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ*).[364] **[28cd]**

[187]For there is conflict (*virodhaḥ*) between the word 'tree' and 'pot', etc. because they are appropriating earthenness, etc. (*pārthivatvād-yapahāritvāt*). For the [word *'śiṃśapā'*] approves (*abhyanumodate*) that [pot, etc.] is being excluded (*nirākriyamāṇam*) by the [word 'tree'], in the same way as [one approves that] the enemy of a friend [is being excluded] (*mitraśatruvat*);[365] [188]and it is understood by implication (*arthāt*) that it [namely pot, etc.] is excluded by the (word *'śiṃśapā'*).[366] [189]Thereby [*etena*] one is to understand that the exclusion (*nirākaraṇam*) and the toleration (*upekṣaṇam*) of the particulars of another general property such as quality and of their particulars such as colour is caused by a connection series (*sambandhasambandhataḥ kṛtam*), in the same way as [the exclusion of] the enemy of a friend's friend (*mitramitraśatruvat*) and [the toleration of] the friend of the enemy of a friend (*mitraśatru-mitravat*).[367]

§ 42. [190]In this context,[368] however,

they are not its excluded [referents] directly (*sākṣāt*). **[29a]**

[191]For the word *'śiṃśapā'* does not exclude pot, and so on, directly. Why?

There must be no identity [of referent] with [that of] the general [term] (*sāmānyatulyatā*). **[29b]**

[192]For if it were to exclude directly, it would have a referent (*tulyārthaḥ*) identical with [that of] the word 'tree.'

[193]In those circumstances there would be no exclusion of other particulars [by the word *'śiṃśapā'*], just as [there is no exclusion of the particulars] by this (*teneva*) [namely the word 'tree'].[369] **[29cd]**

[194]For in the exact same way as (*yathaiva hi*) the word 'tree' would not exclude *palāśa,* and so on,[370] the word *'śiṃśapā'* would not exclude (*palāśa,* etc.) either because of identity [of referent]. [195]If it is [objected] that this problem does not exist because [the word 'tree' and the word *'śiṃśapā'*] are different as they exclude few and more referents,[371] such [an objection] is not justified (*ayuktam*). [196]For just as the words 'tree' and *'śiṃśapā,'* when denoting an entity (*vastu*) as qualified by treeness and *śiṃśapā*ness (**vṛkṣatvaśiṃśapātvaviśiṣṭam*), [in your system] denote an entirely different referent (**atyantabhinnārtham*), in the same way the referent must not be confused (*asaṅkīrṇenārthena*) in our system (*iha*) either.[372] However, by implication (*arthāt*) there will be exclusion of few and more [referents].[373]

§ 43. [197]If a particular [term] excludes the referents of other particular [terms], how then could there be co-reference of a quality with other qualities like in [the statement]: "The sweet taste is sticky, cool, and heavy (*madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruś ceti*)?[374] There is no conflict (*virodhaḥ) in this case because [198]the co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) of [one] quality with other qualities consists in their not being in conflict with its substratum (**āśrayeṇāvirodhitvam*) because they are resident in the same substance (**ekadravya-vṛttitvāt*).[375] **[30]**

Because they inhere in the same referent (*ekārthasamavāyāt), a quality like stickiness (**snigdhatvādiguṇaḥ*) is transferred to the

sweet taste (*madhure rase*) that is found in the substance.[376] Thus (*iti*)[377] there is no problem.

§ 44. [199]Or rather,[378] the exclusion is due to not being observed (*adṛṣṭatvāt*). **[31a]**

[200]Or rather, a particular term excludes because it is not observed to denote the referent of another particular term (*bhedāntarārthe*).
But why [do you say] 'not observed' (*na dṛṣṭa iti*)?[379]
Because being in conflict (*virodhitvāt*) with some (*kaiścit*),[380] [201]although the referent [of the word] is natural (*svabhāvike 'py arthe*), is understood as boasting of one's manliness (*āhopuruṣikā pratipannā*).[381]

§ 45. [202]In these circumstances (*evaṃ tarhi*)

a general [term] would exclude its own particulars[382] (*svabhedanut*). **[31b]**

[203]If [a particular term] excludes [the referents of other particular terms] because of not being observed (*adarśanena*) [to denote these], [their] exclusion would follow [absurdly] since also a general term (*sāmānyaśabdasya*) is not observed to denote its own particulars (*svabhedeṣu*).[383]

[204]This is not the case (*na*) because [a general term] is observed [to denote its own particulars] when it is connected with other [factors][384] (*anyayuktasya*). **[31c]**

[205]For a general term indicates a particular, when it is observed together with motive and context, etc.[385] (*arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ*)[386].

[206]Thus doubt (*saṃśayaḥ*) reflects these (*tadābhaḥ*). **[31d]**

In these circumstances it is justified that doubt caused by a general term[387] reflects its particulars (*sāmānyaśabdād bhedābhāsaḥ*[388] *saṃ-śayo yuktaḥ*), even though it has previously been observed to denote these[389] [particulars], in the same way as uprightness[390] (*teṣv api dṛṣṭapūrvaḥ, ūrdhvatāvat*[391]).[392]

[207]If [it is claimed that] it is not justified that there be doubt. **[32a]**

The following is meant: If the idea is that the [general term] is perceived [as denoting its own particulars] only as accompanied by motive and context, and so on, (*arthaprakaraṇādisahita eva*), then how could there be doubt"?

> [208]If [the particular] is ascertaineded (*niścite*), the [doubt] is caused by [the general term] alone. **[32b]**

It is not claimed that the doubt is caused by [the general term] as accompanied by motive, etc. (*arthādisahitāt*), but rather that if [the particular] is ascertained [by the general term] as accompanied by motive, and so on, there is subsequently doubt caused by the [general term] alone[393] (*kevalāt*).

> [209]If [it is objected that a general term] alone (*kevalaḥ*) is not found to denote a particular (*bhede*).[394] **[32c]**

Suppose it is objected: In your system[395] (**iha*) a general term[396] alone is not observed to denote particulars. It is, for instance, claimed (**yathoktam*) that

> a general term does not denote particulars. **[2a]**

> [210]It is observed with regard to the listener (*śrotṛvyapekṣayā*). **[32d]**

[211]For when (*yadā hi*) the listener asks for[397] the exclusion of other general properties, like, for instance, when he asks: "Is a tree earthen (*pārthivaḥ*) or does it consist of the five principal elements (*pañcama-hābhautikaḥ*)," (*tadā*) the application of the [word] 'earthen' alone is possible.
[212]How then could he be in doubt becauser of the application of the word 'earthen' when the tree has been ascertained?
[213]When [the tree] has been ascertained, he is in doubt about the other [word] due to [the general term] alone. He hears the word 'earthen' alone; and so (**iti*), in the first place (**tāvat*), there is an application [of a general term] alone. Consequently (**iti*) there is no problem (**doṣaḥ*).

§ 46. [214]And just as[398] (*yathā ca*) the general property (**sāmānyam*) in the referent[399] (**arthe*) is its exclusion of other referents, in the same way (**tathā*)

[215]the general property in a word (*śabde sāmānyam*) is explained (*ucyate*) as its exclusion of other words. **[33ab]**

[216]In the exact same way as the general property (*sāmānyam*) 'being produced' (*kṛtakatvam*) is [said] to indicate 'impermanence' (*anitya-tvagamakam*) by exclusion of what is not a product (*akṛtakavyudā-sena*),[400] the general property in a word (*śabde*) is said to be its exclusion of other words (*śabdāntaravyavacchedena*); and only through this (*tenaiva ca*) does it indicate its referent (*arthapratyāyakaḥ*).[401] With regard to this [viz. the speech unit],[402] moreover,[403] [217](*tatrāpi*)

there is identity when there is doubt about the referent. **[33c]**

[218]When (*yatra*) a word like *'akṣa'* [404] causes doubt about its referent, namely a part of a cart, etc.[405] (*śakaṭāṅgādau*), (*tatra*) there is identity of speech unit[406] (*śabdasyaikyam*).

[219]However, when there is doubt about it, there is difference (*anekatā*) [of speech unit]. **[33d]**

[220]When (*yatra*) there is doubt about whether a speech unit like *'bhavati,'* (*bhavatiśabdādau*) is ending in [the *taddhita* affix] *śatṛ,* and so on,[407] (*tatra*) it is to be regarded as difference of speech unit (*śabdabhedaḥ*), in spite of the identity of sound[408] (*śrutisāmye 'pi*), like, for instance, *'ka iha.'* [409]

§ 47. [221]Again, why does the first-mentioned problem[410] not follow [absurdly] if the word's denoting its own referent is through exclusion of other referents?
Because (*yasmāt*)[411]

[222]the word's connection is feasible[412] (*sambandhasaukaryam*) and there is no ambiguity[413] (*vyabhicāritā*) as it is not observed (*adṛṣṭeḥ*) [to apply] to the referent of other words[414] and is also (*api*) observed (*darśanāt*) [to apply] to a member[415] (*aṃśe*) of its own referent.[416] **[34]**

[223]For (*hi*) joint presence and joint absence (*anvayavyatirekau*) are a means (*dvāram*) to the word's denoting its referent.[417] And these two are its application[418] to what is similar and its non-application to what is dissimilar.[419] [224]In this case, however (*tu*), application to all that is

similar is by necessity not statable with regard to any [referent] whatever[420] (*kva cit*) because stating it is impossible (*ākhyānāsambhavāt*) as the referent is infinite (*arthasyānantye*).[421] On the other hand,[422] stating its non-application to what is dissimilar is possible, even though it is infinite[423] (*atulye saty apy ānantye*), through mere non-observation[424] (*adarśanamātrena*); and just therefore[425] (*ata eva ca*) it has been explained that [the word's] denoting its own referent (*svārthābhidhānam*) is an inference from [its own referent's] exclusion from these[426] [other referents] (*tadvyavacchedānumānam*), from its not being observed [to apply] to other [referents] than its own relata[427] (*svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt*). [225]If, however,[428] the inference were by means of joint presence (*anvayadvārena*), the word 'tree' should not give rise to doubt (*samśayah*) appearing as *śimśapā*, etc. (*śimśapādyābhāsah*), about one and the same entity (*ekasmim vastuni*). Yet, in the same way as there is doubt about it, there will also be doubt appearing as earthenness and substanceness, etc. However, since the word 'tree' is not observed to denote what is non-earthen, and so on, the inference is only by means of joint absence (*vyatirekamukhenaiva*).

[226]Moreover it is explained that (**āha ca*)

> 'treeness', 'earthen', 'substance', 'existent', and 'knowable' are [each] a cause of doubt, in reverse order (*pratilomyatah*), about four, three, two, and one [properties]. In opposite order (*anyathā*) they serve the purpose of ascertainment (*niścaye*).[429] **[35]**

This is an inserted verse[430] (**ity antaraślokah*).

§ 48. [227]And without the means of connection[431] (*sambandhadvāram muktvā*) the word (*śabdasya*) or[432] the inferential indicator (*lingasya vā*) is incapable of indicating its own referent (*svārthakhyāpanaśaktir asti*), [228]because it is impossible to indicate it in toto (*sarvathā*) as it has a multitude of properties (*dharmabahutve*).[433] And because it does not denote particulars[434] (*bhedānabhidhānāt*) there is no ambiguity about its own referent. [229]Thus, in the first place (*evam tāvat*), the first mentioned problem does not exist[435] (**pūrvoktadosābhāvah*).

§ 49. [230]Nor does the immediately following [problem] exist.[436]
Why?
Because (**yasmād*)

[231]there is agreement (*abhinnatā*) [of the general term 'existent'] with [words] whose referents are its particulars[437] (*tadbhedārthaiḥ*) as the rejection of other referents (*vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya*)[438] pervades [the particulars]. **[36ab]**

[232]Since (*hi*) the function (*kṛtyam*) of the general term (*sāmānyaśabdasya*) ['existent'], namely exclusion of other referents (*arthāntaravyudāsaḥ*), is through not rejecting its own particulars[439] (*svabhedāpratikṣepeṇa*), (*iti*) co-reference with a particular term is justified (*bhedaśrutyā saha sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapannam*).[440] [233]Therefore the problem of being "heard apart" from [words] whose referents are its own particulars does not exist (*svabhedārthaiḥ pṛthakśrutidoṣo nāsti*).[441] For it is co-referential [with the particular term] as regards the other referent that is denotable by both terms.[442] [234]That is (*tathā hi*), there is no ambiguity with regard to its own referent[443] (*svārthāvyabhicāraḥ*) because alone it does not denote the other (*kevalasyānyatrāvṛtteḥ*).[444]

§ 50. [235] Nor does the last mentioned problem[445] exist. Why?

[236]Because [exclusion of other referents] applies directly[446] (*sākṣād vṛtteḥ*), and because [exclusion of other referents] it is not a particular[447] (*abhedāc ca*). **[36c]**

[237]For (*hi*) a word does not apply to its own particulars (*svabhedeṣu*) while being dependent upon another referent[448] (*arthāntaram upādāya*). Therefore the problem of not implying its own particulars (*svabhedānākṣepadoṣaḥ*) because of its dependence[449] (*pāratantryeṇa*) does not exist, nor does the problem of transfer of denotation (*bhāktadoṣaḥ*) exist,[450] nor the problem of not denoting because the particulars are infinite (*nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ*),[451] nor the problem of not being a general property because of not pervading [the particulars][452] (*avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣaḥ*), because the mere exclusion of other referents is without division[453] (*arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvāt*) and because it is not a substance[454] (*adravyatvāc ca*). Precisely therefore[455] (*ata eva*) one does not have to pursue its relation to other particular general properties (*sāmānyaviśeṣāntarayogānusaraṇam*) because it excludes other referents directly[456] (*sākṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhāt*). [238]Thus, since the above-mentioned problems do not exist, only exclusion of other referents is the proper (*sādhuḥ*) referent of the word.

§ 51. [239]And [the last-mentioned problem does not exist]

because the attributes of a general property are confined (*jātidhar-mavyavasthiteḥ*) **[36d]**

to it[457] (**atra*).

[240]Moreover, the attributes of a general property (*jātidharmāś ca*), which are characterized by being one,[458] permanence, and extension to each single[459] [particular] (*ekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāpti-lakṣaṇā*), are confined to it only[460] (*atraiva vyavatiṣṭhante*) because [exclusion of other] is not a particular[461] (*abhedāt*) because its sub-stratum is not discontinued[462] (*āśayasyāvicchedāt*), and because its referent is cognized completely[463] (*kṛtsnārthapratītеḥ*). [241]Thus, since the said problems do not exist and the merits [of exclusion of other referents] are superior[464] (*guṇotkarṣāt*), a word denotes (*āha*) things (*bhāvān*) exclusively (*eva*) as qualified by preclusion of other referents[465] (*arthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān*).

§ 52. If so,

[242]whereby[466] is the restriction of exclusion [of other referents effected] (*apohaniyamaḥ kasmāt*)? **[37a]**

[243]If some asserts: "The word 'colour' excludes taste, and so on, but not the rest of the colours when it denotes either colour (*anyatama-varṇābhidhāne*) even though they are completely different (**atyanta-bhinnāpi*). Whereby is this [restriction] effected (*kiṃkṛtaḥ*)?
On the other hand, such a problem does not exist for some who claims that [the general property] colourness is the same (*abhinnam*) only in [the colour] blue, and so on, but not in taste, etc."[467]

[244] This problem does not exist because

[what is] current in the world (*lokarūḍhaḥ*) is not adhered (*na mṛśyate*) to.[468] **[37b]**

[245]For Bhagavat has said: "One should not become attached to a regional expression,[469] nor should one disregard a name (*sañjñām*) of the world."[470] Therefore we too do not adhere to expressions current in the world[471] (*lokavyavahārāḥ*) whether they have a cause of

application (*naimittikāḥ) or are technical designations[472] (pāribhāṣi-kāḥ) as having real referents[473] (bhūtārthatvena), but observe them (anugamyante) exactly as the world does[474] (lokavad eva). And in the world (loke) the word 'colour' is only acknowledged (siddhaḥ) to denote [the colour] blue, and so on, but not to denote taste, etc.[475]

§ 53. [246]And with respect to [the general property] colourness (rūpatve) this [questioning] is the same.[476] **[37c]**

[247]And what is the reason why colourness does not reside in taste, and so on, according some who is of the opinion that it resides in entirely different [colours like] blue, etc.?[477] Or, just as it does not reside in taste, and so on, it does not reside in yellow, etc. [248]There is a reason for this.[478] In that the essential nature [of blue, etc.] is different,[479] visibility (*cākṣuṣatvam) is only the same in blue, and so on, but not in taste, etc.

[249]If visibility [is the cause of restriction], [the application of the word 'colour'] is caused by an action (kriyākṛtaḥ).[480] **[37d]**

[250]For visibility means perceptible by the eye (cakṣuṣā *grāhyam). And thus the word 'colour' would be used to denote blue, and so on, having an action as its cause of application[481] (kriyānimittaḥ), but not having a general property as its cause of application (jātinimittaḥ).[482] [251]For what purpose does [the general property] colourness serve, if visibility is the same [in the blue colour, and so on, but not in taste, etc.]?[483] [252]If, on the other hand (atha), the cause of the connection[484] of colourness is said to be visibility,[485] [253]even so (evam api) it follows [absurdly] with respect to visibility that the inherence (sama-vāyaḥ) [of colourness] is caused by an action[486] (kriyākṛtah), or that the manifestation of colourness[487] (rūpatvābhivyaktir vā) [is caused by an action]. [254]Or again, whereby (kasmāt) is the restriction (niyamaḥ) [effected] with respect to visibility?[488] [255]Therefore one must by necessity rely upon [visibility's] being essential [to the blue colour, etc.].[489]

[256]And [colourness] follows [absurdly] in substance, etc.[490] **[38a]**

[257]And because substance (dravya-), number (saṅkhyā-), and size (parimāṇa-), and so on, are visible (cākṣuṣatvāt), colourness in these would follow [absurdly].[491] Moreover,

[258]there would be no difference between white, etc.[492] **[38b]**

[259]As visibility is uniform there will be no difference between blue and yellow, and bluer and bluest.[493] Therefore, without visibility the word 'colour' is necessarily[494] to be observed (*anugantavyaḥ*) as denoting blue and yellow, and so on, even though they are entirely different because it is current usage[495] in the world (*loke rūḍheḥ*), but not to denote taste, etc. Therefore, what is to be determined, namely the exclusion of other [referents] is restricted.

§ 54. [260]And if[496] the word denotes its referent without dependence upon preclusion of other referents, then (**tarhi*)

> [261]its validity (*siddhiḥ*) [for denoting its referent] would only be by means of joint presence (*anvayād eva*), **[38c]**

[262]but the word's [validity][497] for denoting its referent (*arthābhidhā-ne*) would not be by means of joint presence and joint absence (*anvayavyatirekābhyām*), and this is maintained.[498] [263]Yet, since the denotation fulfills its purpose[499] by means of restriction of either [term] or both [terms of a statement],[500] the denotation of the referent is also by means of joint absence, like, for instance, "[the technical term] *karman* denotes what the agent (*kartuḥ*) most wants to obtain (*īpsitatamam*) [by his action][501] [A I.4.49].

§ 55. [264]It is certainly the case (*nanu ca*) that if the word's referent is merely exclusion of other [referents], it would only (*eva*) denote its referent by means of joint absence (*vyatirekāt*).
Such would be the case (*syād etad evam*) if joint presence were not maintained. [265]However,

> [the word's] concomitance (**vyāpti*) is not claimed to be with a principal (*mukhyena*) **[38d]**

entity[502] (*bhāvena*). [266]For (*hi*) it has been stated that "it is impossible that a general property (*jātiḥ*) occur in entities, whether it be separate (**vyatiriktā*) or not separate (**avyatiriktā*) [from its sub-strata]."[503] But if the referent is qualified by the exclusion of other referents[504] (*arthāntarāpohaviśiṣṭe 'rthe*) without the general proper-ty,[505] the word's joint presence and joint absence do not have different referents in accordance with the [statement at PS V 34a:] "since it is not observed [to apply] to the referent of other words."

§ 56. [267]Someone, however, objects[506] that if[507] everything manifest like a cow is a modification that is due to something non-existent (*gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ*), it follows [absurdly] that [everything manifest] has an existent nature (*prayuktam asataḥ sad-ātmakatvam*) that is due to something non-existent because of the [absurd] consequence of its being the nature of everything (*sārvāt-myaprasaṅgāt*)."[508] Regarding this (*tatra*) [we ask you],

> [268]wherewith is existence (*sattvam*) connected,[509] according to [you] who assume (*abhyupagacchataḥ*) that everything is continuously connected with what is non-existent (*asatsamanvitaṃ sarvam*) because [existence] is the nature of many things? [39]

[269]If it is assumed that everything is continuously connected with something non-existent, in that case, what other non-existent things such as cows will be the objects of attribution of existence on account of which nature?[510] For while [you] assume that all cows, and so on, are continuously connected with something non-existent, the rejoinder (*uttaram*) that their having an existent nature follows [absurdly] from what is non-existent (*asataḥ sadātmakatvam prāptam*), is not justified. [270]Moreover, as regards [the] claim that there would be no difference of notion (*pratyayābhedaḥ*) with regard to something existent and something non-existent, for the notion of primordial materiality (*prakṛtipratyayaḥ*) is observed with regard to a modi-fication, like, for instance, the notion of clay with regard to a plate, and so on,[511] (*tatra*) [we ask you],

> [271]how is the cognition of difference established, although there is no difference of what is non-existent,[512] if you maintain that there is a cognition of the difference of plate, and so on, although they are not different from clay? [40]

[272]For just as the difference of cognition of a plate, and so on, is assumed to be due to some means or other (*kenāpi vidhinā*)[513]– although [plates, etc.] are not different from clay (*mṛdbhyo 'bhinnatve 'pi*)–when the [absurd] consequence is that there is only a ['clay'] cognition, (*tathā*) in the same way, why is it not maintained that the difference of cognition of what is existent and what is non-existent is due to the residual traces of verbal difference (*śabdabheda-bhāvānāvaśāt*]?[514] For in your opinion too (*tavāpi hi*),

the ultimate form of the constituents is beyond the reach of vision. What has come within the reach of vision, however, is void like an illusion (*māyā*).[515]

§ 57. [273]The example[516] [you have] adduced, namely that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of dewlap, and so on, is in conflict with your own theory.[517] On the contrary, they have mutually different excluded referents.[518] [41]

[274]For how could someone,[519] to whom the cognition of a cow (**go-pratyayaḥ*) as precluded from non-cows (**agonivṛttaḥ*), assert that it is caused by the observation of dewlap, etc. (**sāsnādidarśana-nimittaḥ*)? [275]Having assumed [this],[520] the example is in conflict even with your own theory (*svamataviruddhaḥ*).[521] For the excluded [object] is different with regard to a cow and a dewlap because of verbal difference[522] (*śabdabhedāt*).

[276]The idea, however, that this [namely the cognition of one thing (*ātmāntara*)] is not dependent [upon the observation of non-existence of other things],[523] is created out of your own imagina-tion,[524] for the word does not denote any individual form (**sva-rūpam*) whatsoever that is exempt from exclusion (*nirapoham*) [of other referents]. [42]

[277]For it has previously been demonstrated that the general form in a dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādiṣu*), does not exist without dependence upon the non-existence of other referents (**sāmānyarūpam arthāntarābhāva-nirapekṣam na bhavati*).[525] The[526] individual form,[527] however, (*sva-rūpam tu*) is not denotable (**vyāvahārikam*) in this (*tena*) [form] because it is inexpressible (*anabhilāpyatvāt*).

§ 58. [278]And as to the objection that there is no first cognition (*ādyapratyayaḥ*),[528]

[279]our view is established because there is no beginning.[529] [43a]

For (**hi*) there is no first cognition since the transmission of the cause and effect of discourse is without beginning (**vyavahārakāryakāra-ṇapāramparyānāditvāt*).[530] [280]However, the following two problems concern someone who recognizes first cognition,[531] namely that [281]neither is it [namely the word] capable of universally pervading the general property possessors,[532] nor[533] is the general property

(**jātiḥ*) capable [of pervading the general property possessors][534] as resident in a single or in all [general property possessors] (**eka-samastavṛttiḥ*) whether it is separate (**vyatiriktā vā*) or not separate (**avyatiriktā vā*) from the general property possessors.[535]

§ 59. [282]Nor is the claim justified that no cognition occurs at all (*pratyayavṛttir eva nāsti*).[536]

> because exclusion is [in the form of a single] common [property][537] (*sāmānyena nirākṛteḥ*). **[43b]**

[283]For the [word] (*saḥ*) does not exclude a different general property (*anyāṃ jātim*) for each individual substance[538] (*pratidravyam*), but rather (*kiṃ tarhi*) with the intention of denoting the things to be excluded[539] (*vyavacchedyavivakṣayā*) by means of a single common property (*ekena sāmānyadharmena*).[540] And on this point it has been explained (*uktaṃ cātra*) that the inference [of the referent] is from mere non-observation [of the word's application] to what belongs to the class of dissimilar things (*vijātīye 'darśanamātreṇānumānam*).[541] However, this problem[542] concerns only you (*tavaiva*): if [the word] were to apply by universally pervading [the referents] pertaining to its own class of similar things (*svajātīyavyāptyā varteta*), the pervaded[543] would be infinite (**vyāpyasyānantyam*). Therefore, like in the statement "It is a non-horse because it is horned" (**viṣāṇitvād anaśva iti*), the inference is from its exclusion from this [namely a horse] (*tadvyavacchedānumānam*)[544] because of not observing the general property of being horned in a horse (*aśve viṣāṇitvādarśanena*), but the white horses, etc. (**karkādīn*) are not excluded each separately (*pratyekam*), nor is every single cow, etc. (**ekaikagavādīn*)[545] apprehended.[546] Also you maintain the theory that cognitions are based upon exclusion and continuous application[547] (**vyāvṛttyanuvṛtti-buddhimatam*); and the principle (*nyāyaḥ*) in this treatise (*atra*) is the same (*tathā*).

§ 60. [284]The notion of identity and difference (*ekānekatvakalpanā*) is not justified on the assumption (*upetya*) of non-existence of the nature of other things since (*hi*) it is concerned with an entity.[548] **[44a-c]**

[285]For (*hi*) it is justified to conceive of the identity and difference of a thing whose nature is existent (**sadātma*), but not on the assump-

tion of non-existence of the nature of other things (*ātmāntarābhāv-
am abhyupetya*).[549]

[286]The consequence is the same for

you too, as regards the powers in the unmanifest. **[44d]**

[287]For if (**hi*) the powers of the modifications are identical (*vikāra-
śaktīnām aikye*) in the unmanifest, there would be no difference
between the modifications. If, on the other hand, they are different,
that would be in conflict with the unity of primordial materiality
(*pradhānasya*) because it is not different from the powers.

[288]This theory (*cintā*), moreover, concerns the denotable object of
the word, not the domain of the senses (**indriyagocare*). Since it
[namely the denotable object] is not included (**prakṣiptaḥ*)[550] in
[what is perceptible such as] words, and so on, it does not have
different sensefaculties [for cognizing it] (**bhinnendriyaḥ*).[551] **[45]**

[289]For the object of sensation is not denotable[552] (*anirdeśyaḥ*). The
statement "the nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of
other things" (*ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti*),[553] has been formula-
ted with regard to (*prati*) the denotable [object]. Therefore it [namely
the denotable object] is not included in what is perceptible (*pratyakṣe
prakṣepaḥ*).

§ 61. In this context, moreover (**atra ca*),

[290]the referent[554] of the syntactical word (*padasya*) is imagined[555]
(*vikalpitaḥ*) when abstracted (*apoddhāre*)[556] from the sentence
(*vākyāt*). Yet the referent of the sentence which is called intuition
(*pratibhā*) is in the beginning (*ādau*) produced by that [namely the
syntactical word].[557] **[46]**

[291]Even though the syntactical word is unreal (*asat*)[558] as abstracted
from the sentence, its referent is determined by invention[559]
(*utprekṣayā*)[560] according to the [grammatical] tradition,[561] because it
is not used in isolation[562] (*kevalasyāprayogāt*) in the same way as a
stem and an affix (*prakṛtipratyayavat*) [are not used in isolation].[563]
And this invention apprehends a referent that is not justified
(*ayuktārthagrahaṇī*)[564] in other traditions.[565] Therefore this different
referent[566] (*arthāntaram*) has been brought forward (*utkṣiptam*);

[567]because for those who have not repeatedly experienced the connection between the word and its referent (*anabhyastaśabdārtha-sambandhānām*) the intuition of the referent of the sentence (*vākyārthapratibhā*) has in the beginning (*ādau*) the syntactical word[568] as a means of apprehension of the referent (*padārthagra-haṇopāyā*). [292]Yet only (*eva*) the sentence and its referent are the principal speech unit and the principal referent[569] (*mukhyau śabdār-thau*) because they are indivisible (*tayor abhinnatvāt*).[570] The other belief in apprehending speech units and [their] referents (*śabdārtha-grahaṇābhimānaḥ*) in the interval between them[571] (*tadantarāle*) is due to invention[572] (*utprekṣayā*), for [invention] is unfettered[573] (*niraṅkuśatvāt*).[574]

§ 62. [293]Those who reject intuition of the referents (*artheṣu ... pratibhāṃ hitvā*) and imagine that the referent of the sentence (*vākyārtham*) is something different, namely an external referent[575] (*bāhyam artham*) or their connection[576] (*tatsambandhaṃ vā*), their [view] is also (*teṣām api*) mere imagination (*kalpanāmātram*).[577] Why?

> [294]Because (*hi*) even without an external referent, according to repeated practice[578] (*yathābhyāsam*) a cognition (*pratipatti*) is produced in various ways (*anekadhā*)[579] by sentences in imitation of one's own ideas[580] (*svapratyayānukāreṇa*). [47]

[295]Although the external referent does not exist,[581] a cognition about purposeful action[582] (*arthakriyāpratipattiḥ*) that has various forms (*nānārūpā*) arises from a sentence, as well as representations by imitation of one's own ideas[583] (*svapratyayānurūpyeṇa*) dependent upon latent impressions from repeated practice[584] [in a former existence] with regard to the referents[585] [of a sentence] (*arthābhyā-savāsanāpekṣā*),[586] like hearing [the sentence] "The tiger [is near by]," or the like (*vyāghrādiśrutivat*).[587] Or, even if its [referent] is the same[588] (*tadaviśeṣe vā*), nevertheless, in those who are impassioned (*rāgiṇām*) a cognition (*pratītiḥ*) arises from hearing a love poem[589] (*śṛṅgārakāvyasya śravaṇāt*) that reflects their passion (*rāgānurūpā*), but in those who are devoid of passion (*vītarāgāṇām*) it reflects their aversion (*saṃvegānurūpā*).

> § 63. [296]Moreover, the [intuition] of some who knows the connection (*sambandhābhijñasya*) [between the word and its referent][590] is claimed to be [intuition] of a referent (*arthe*) as

excluded (*vyavacchinne*) from the referents of other sentences (*vākyāntarārthebhyaḥ*)[591] Therefore it [namely intuition] does not differ from inference.[592] **[48]**

Moreover, the intuition of someone who knows the connection [between the word and its referent] is different for each sentence (*pratyekam vākye*) in the same way as for [each referent of] the syntactical words (*padārthavat*).[593] Therefore it [namely intuition] does not differ from inference.

[297]However, the cognition (*pratipattiḥ*), entailing different repre-sentations, that arise due to a sentence[594] does not transgress[595] (*nātivartate*) [the domain of] sensation (*pratyakṣam*) either, as it is self-awareness.[596] **[49]**

Intuition[597] (*pratibhā*), however,[598] is sensation (*pratyakṣam*) as it is self-awareness[599] (*svasaṃvedanam*). Consequently it does not transgress [the domain of] this [namely sensation].

§ 64. [298]If, in the first place, it is justified, in the case of words having a cause of application (*naimittikeṣu*),[600] that they denote their referents (*arthābhidhānam*) through exclusion of other referents (*anyāpohena*), how then [is it justified] in the case of those that are arbitrary (*yādṛcchikeṣu*)?[601]

[299][it is] also [justified] in the case of arbitrary terms because their referents are without distinction[602] (*arthābhedāt*). **[50a]**

[300]For (*hi*) an arbitrary term like the word '*ḍittha*', which denotes an aggregate (*samudāyavācī*),[603] denotes the members of the aggregate (*samudāyinaḥ*)[604] without distinction[604] (*abhedenāha*).
[301]What then is the difference between a general term and an aggre-gate term?[605]
[There is] none whatsoever![606] According to acknowledged usage[607] (*prasiddhivaśāt*) a general term in some cases (*kvacit*) is transferred to each single (*pratyekam*) part (*avayaveṣu*), as, for instance, in the statement: "one should not eat the village swine"[608] (*abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara iti*). In other cases (*kvacit*) it [applies] directly (*mukhyaḥ*) [to the parts]. [302]It is, for example, said that

without reference to number, quantity, and material shape the denoting [word] (*vācakaḥ*) applies to water, or the like,[609] whether a [single] drop or a multitude [of drops].[610] (VP II 156)

In certain cases (**kvacit*) it does not refer to a part (**avayave*)[611] [of a referent]. For instance,

> [303]the word which applies to [a referent] that is qualified by material shape, colour, and parts, is not recognized to apply to [each single] component [of these]. (VP II 155)

When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by material shape (**saṃsthānaviśiṣṭa*) [the terms] 'circular' (**vṛtta*), 'spherical' (*parimaṇḍala*), 'oblong' (*dīrgha*), and quadrangular (*caturaśra*), and in the same way 'fist' (*muṣṭi*), 'knot' (*granthi*), 'wreath' (**mālā*), and 'ear-ring' (*kuṇḍalaka*) do not denote the parts.[612] [304]When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by colour (*varṇaviśiṣṭe*): [the terms] 'speckled' (*citraḥ*) and 'variegated'(*kalmāṣaḥ*), and so on,[613] [do not denote the parts]. [305]When [applied] to [a referent] that is qualified by parts (*avayavaviśiṣṭe*): [the terms] 'hndred' (*śatam*), 'thousand' (*sahasram*), 'prastha',[614] 'droṇa',[615] 'month' (*māsa*), 'year' (*saṃvatsara*), and 'weight' (*tulā*) do not apply to the parts.[616] [306]And in some cases an aggregate term (*samudāyaśabdaḥ*) comprises each single [part][617] (*pratyekam parisamāpyate*), as, for instance, [in the statement]: "The village came back" (*grāma āgataḥ*).[618] [307]In some cases it is transferred (*upacaritaḥ*) [to each single part], like [VS V.2:18]: "The action of the *ātman* is explained by the action of the body" (*kāyakarmaṇā 'tmakārma vyākhyātam*).[619] In some cases it does not refer to the parts [of the aggregate], as for instance, [the words] 'troop' (*yūtham*), and forest[620] (*vanam*).[621]

§ 65. [308]Now how could the cognition of a referent (*arthapratītiḥ*) from a word whose connection has not been told (**akṛtasambandha-śabdāt*)[622] be an inference about it like, for instance, from [the statement] 'this is a Jack-fruit tree' (*ayam panasa iti*)?[623]
[309]In that case there is no cognition of the referent from the word 'Jack-fruit tree.'
Why?

> [310]Because [it's] referent is shown (**arthadarśanāt*) (?) by someone to whom [its connection] is known (*pratītena*).[624] [50b]

Since the [word's] referent is established[625] (*arthasiddhatvāt*) by an acknowledged authority (*vṛddhena*) to whom the connection is known (*pratītasambandhena*)[626] [311]by means of the demonstrative pronoun 'this'[627] (*ayaṃśabdena*) and ostentation[628] (*hastasaṃ-jñayā*),[629] there is no cognition of the referent (*arthapratītiḥ*) due to the word 'Jack-fruit tree,' [312]but rather, it is the name [of the referent] that is taught (*saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ*).[630] [313]The co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*) of this [namely the word 'Jack-fruit tree'], whose purpose is that of [teaching] a name,[631] with the demonstrative pronoun 'this' is just[632] for the purpose of showing the connection (*sambandhapradarśanārthaṃ tu*),[633] [314]on the assumption (*iti kṛtvā*) that [the connection] is the denotable object of both [terms].[634] [315]And since the word 'Jack-fruit tree' does not have this [namely the Jack-fruit tree] as its referent, its purpose is that of [teaching] a name.[635]

§ 66. [316]Then (*tarhi*) only the connection will be the word's object of cognition (*prameyam*).[636]

> The connection is not (*na*) [the word's object of cognition] because it is imagined.[637] **[50c]**

[317]Since (*hi*) the connection is created in the mind (*manasā kalpyate*), after having perceived the referent Jack-fruit tree and the word 'Jack-fruit tree' by the other means of cognition [namely sensation],[638] at the thought: "This [word] is [the denotation] of that [referent]" (*asyāyam iti*), in the same way as the inference-inferendum connection (*anumānānumeyasambandhavat*),[639] (*tataḥ*) verbal cognition (*śābdam*) is not a separate means of cognition.

§ 67. [318]Now why is it that the remaining [means of cognition] namely comparison (*upamānādi*), and so on,[640] are not separate means of cognition?

> [319]The remaining [means of cognition] are explained in the [previously prescribed] manner.[641] **[50d]**

[320]Firstly, comparison has the purpose of cognizing the similarity[642] in a cow and a gayal, and so on. In this context (*tatra*) the cognition that results from listening to another[643] (*parata upaśrutya*) is verbal cognition (*śābdam*). And when (*yadā*) one imagines (*kalpayati*)[644] the similarity in the mind (*manasā*) after having apprehended the two

referents by means of the other means of cognition (*pramāṇāntareṇa*) [namely sensation], (*tadā*) it is not a separate means of cognition either.[645] Nor is similarity when apprehended in this way an object of cognition (*prameyam*).[646] In the same way also the other [means of cognition] are to be rejected (*parikṣiptavyāni*) since they are not separate from inferential representation (*anumānavikalpāvyatirikta-tvāt*).[647]

[End of] Chapter Five[648]

[1] *uktaṃ pramāṇadvayam*[(1)]. *kecic chābdam api <pramāṇāntaraṃ manyante>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191a7: *pramāṇāntaracodanāvakāśadānāyāha: uktaṃ pramāṇadvayam iti;* 191b1: *kecic chābdam apīti.*

[(1)] Cf. *tshad ma gñis su brjod pa la* V : *tshad ma gñis bśad pa yin no* K. This nominal sentence is syntactically ambiguous and open to interpretation. V translates: "the means of cognition are explained as [i.e. to be] two;" K: "The two means of cognition are [already] explained."

[1] Jinendrabuddhi explains this statement with reference to Dignāga's definition of the means of cognition at PSV I:2ab. The purpose is to present the greater merit of Dignāga's theory of the actual means of cognition and to refute the views presented by other philosophers, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191a7-191b1: *yat prāk pratijñātaṃ "pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe dve eva" iti tad uktaṃ pramāṇadvayam iti svapramāṇaguṇodbhāvanataḥ parapramāṇapratiṣedhataś ca.* See *Hattori* 1968: 24, 76 no. 1.11.

In the first chapter of PSV Dignāga sets forth his theory of sensation (*pratyakṣa*) introducing the crucial distinction between *svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣana. Svalakṣaṇa* denotes the individual character of any given thing as observable through sensation, which Dignāga claims is beyond linguistic representation, whereas *sāmānyalakṣana* designates the general character of things as known either by means of an inferential indicator (*liṅga*) or communicated through language. Although Dignāga never explicitly defines *sāmānyalakṣaṇa,* it appears indirectly from a passage recorded at PSV I $2c_2$-d_1 that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is comparable to general properties like colorness (*varṇatva*) and impermanence (*anityatā*): *svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ hy avyapadeśyavarṇatvābhyāṃ varṇādi gṛhītvānityatayā cānityaṃ varṇādīti manasā saṃdhatte:* "For having apprehended a color and so on through its individual and general characters, i.e., through what is not denotable and colorness, [respectively], as well as through [the general property] impermanence, one combines [the two] at the thought: "Color, and so on, is impermanent."

This passage shows unequivocally that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is equivalent to *sāmānya* "general property," which contemporary grammarians and philosophers claimed to be a real singular property inherent in things and the cause of application of words (*pravṛttinimitta*). Dignāga, however, rejects the theory of real universals and substitutes *anyāpoha* "exclusion of other [referents]" for real general properties. He defines *apoha* as equivalent to preclusion (*nivṛtti*) or non-existence (*abhāva*) of all instances of non-x in all instances of x, thereby qualifying any instance of x as x(excluded from non-x). See PSV V 34ff, and cf. no. 9 below on Dignāga's introduction of the abstract affixes *tva* or *tā* to denote *anyāpoha* as the general property of things and as cause of application of words.

[2] Jinendrabuddhi does not identify any of the contemporary scholars whose philosophy of verbal cognition Dignāga addresses in this paragraph, but merely identifies his protagonists as Sāṅkhya, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b1: *Kapilādayaḥ.* It is noteworthy, however, that Dignāga, in the crucial paragraph at PSV II:4c, mentions the views of contemporary philosophers who claim that there is a difference between *śabda* and *anumāna* as

1. No example is mentioned because any given example is already well known to the listener (*prasiddhivaśena*);

2. The word and its referent are identified in verbal cognition in terms of *abhedopacāra*. That is, the cognition of the word (*śabdajñāna*) and that of the referent (*arthajñāna*) become fused. This, on the other hand, is not the case with the relation that holds between the logical indicator and the thing it indicates. Consequently it is impossible to assert that the word and the inferential indicator are similar;

3. Only the sentence (*vākya*) has status as an independent speech unit, and a sentence cannot be an inferential indicator (cf., however, PS V:48-49 § 63 below).

The two Tibetan versions of PSV II:4c diverge semantically and syntactically from each other, and the limited number of *pratīkas* quoted by Jinendrabuddhi at PTS Ms B 60b4-61a1 are not in every case sufficient for restoring the Sanskrit original of this important paragraph. It is obvious that the translator of V was uncertain about some of the readings of his manuscript. For instance, *śugs kyis* K : *don yod pa'i* V of the following passage must translate *arthāpattyā* because K in general renders Sanskrit *arthāpatti* by Tibetan *śugs*. The noun phrase *don yod pa'i*, however, shows that the translators of V identified the first lexeme of this compound as Sanskrit *artha*, but could not correctly identify the second term on the basis of their manuscript and presumably interpreted it as a form of *sattā* (?) to be construed with the following word, otherwise the Tibetan reading of V: *don yod pa'i* is inexplicable. Whatever the reading of the Sanskrit manuscript may have been, the incomprehensible translation of V shows that the first word of the compound must have been equivalent to Sanskrit *artha*, and in this way V corroborates, although indirectly, the suggested interpretation of *śugs kyis* K as equivalent to Sanskrit *arthāpattyā*.

1. Dignāga addresses the first view in the following passage:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 453b2-10 = P 110b2-5): *grags pa'i dbaṅ gi rjes su dpag pa las sgra las byuṅ ba tha dad par yaṅ grub bo ǁ kha cig dpe ma bstan pa las khyad par yod do źes zer ro ǁ de lta na yaṅ gaṅ du rtogs pa'i phyir dpe gcig gam gñis ma bstan pa der sgra las byuṅ ba ni dper na du ba las me byuṅ ba'i rjes su dpag pa lta bur śugs kyi rjes su dpag par thal bar 'gyur ro ǁ*

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 453a2-9 = P 29a6-8): *rab tu grags pa'i dbaṅ gis dpe ni bstan par mi bya'o źes kha cig gis rjes su dpag pa las sgra tha dad du 'byed par byed do ǁ de ltar grags pa'i phyir dpe bstan par mi bya ba yin na ni dper na dud pa las me rjes su dpog pa lta bu der don yod pa'i rjes su dpog pa yaṅ sgrar thal bar 'gyur ro ǁ:*

"Some assert that verbal cognition is different from inference as no example is stated (*dṛṣṭāntānabhidhānam*) because [the word's application to similar instances and non-application to dissimilar instances] is well known (*prasiddhivaśena*) [to the listener]. Even so (*evam api*), in which case one (*dṛṣṭāntasyaikasya*) or two examples (*dvayor vā*) are not stated because [the positive and negative examples] are well-known [to the listener], it follows by implication (*arthāpattyā) that inference like, for instance, inference of fire from smoke (**dhūmād agnyanumānavat*), is [absurdly] verbal cognition (*śabdaprasaṅgaḥ*)." [1]

[1] For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PST Ms B 60b3-60a1: *prasiddhivaśeneti ... dṛṣṭāntānabhidhānam ... evam apīti ... dṛṣṭāntasyaikasyeti ...*

dvayor veti ... śabdaprasaṅga iti. Jinendrabuddhi explains at PSṬ Ms B 60b3-4 that the reason why *śabda* is not inferential is that [the word's] existence to denote similar things and its non-existence to denote dissimilar things is an established fact to the listener, for which reason examples are not stated: *sapakṣavipakṣayoḥ sadasattve śrotuḥ siddhe iti* <u>*dṛṣṭāntānabhidhānam.*</u> The remaining part of his explanation, however, sheds no further light on the topic.

Kumārila presents this view in similar terms at ŚV Śabda° 33: *dṛṣṭāntāna-bhidhānaṃ ca dhūmādau vyabhicāritam, prasiddhatvād dhi tatrāpi na dṛṣṭānto 'bhidhīyate:* "The not stating an example, moreover, is ambiguous in the case of smoke, and so on, for also in that case an example is not stated since it is well known."

Cf. also Śabda° 35cd: *śabdānumānayor aikyaṃ dhūmād agnyānumānavat:* "language and inference become identical just as the inference of fire from smoke;"

The writer Bhāmaha, who composed Kāvyālaṅkāra, a treatise on poetics, was evidently familiar with an argument similar to the one Dignāga is addressing. This appears from his exposition at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.7: *pratītir artheṣu yatas taṃ śabdaṃ bruvate apare, dhūmabhāsor api prāptā śabdatāgnyanumāṃ prati:* "Other [scholars] claim that a word is that due to which there is a cognition of objects; but it follows [absurdly] that also smoke and light [from fire] have status as words."

2. Dignāga mentions the second view in the following paragraph:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 453b2-10 = P 110b2-5):
gźan ni sgra las byuṅ ba la sgra daṅ don tha mi dad par ñe bar btags pa yin te │ de ltar don las rjes su dpag pa las ni ma yin no źes bya ba ni khyad par yin no źes zer ro ‖ sgra daṅ tha mi dad pa ñe bar btags pa de lta na yaṅ ji ltar don la rjes su dpag pa yin źes brjod par bya ste │

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 453a2-9 = P 29a6-8):
gźan dag ni don gyi sgra la tha mi dad kyi │ sgras ñe bar brtags pa ste don de ñid rjes su dpog pa ni ma yin no źes bya ba ni khyad par ro źes zer ro ‖ de lta na yaṅ sgras tha mi dad du ñe bar brtags pa las don rjes su dpog go źes ji lta brjod par bya │:

"Other [scholars], however, argue (*anye tv āhuḥ*) that the difference (**viśeṣaḥ*) [between inference and verbal cognition] is that in verbal cognition (**śabde*) the word is transferred to the referent in terms of non-difference (**śabdenārthābhedopacāraḥ*) [of the referent] from the word. Thus, there is no inference of the referent (**evaṃ nārthe 'numānam*). Consequently (**iti*) there is a difference. As this is the case, it is to be explained (**vaktavyam*) how it is inference of the referent (*katham arthe 'numānam*), since the word is transferred [to it] in terms of non-difference [from it]?"[1]

[1] For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PSṬ Ms B 61a1-2: *anye tv āhur ityādi ... katham arthe 'numānam iti;* cf. loc. cit. below.

In this short passage Dignāga presumably addresses Bhartṛhari's view that in verbal cognition any given word and its referent become fused in terms of *abhedopacāra;* cf. Bhartṛhari's use of the phrase *so 'yam* to illustrate *abhedopacāra* (cf. *Iyer* 1969: 206), e.g., at VPV I 101,3: *so 'yam iti vyapadeśena sambandhopa-yogasya śakyatvāt;* VPV 105,3-4; VPV I 126,4-5: *so 'yam iti sañjñinā śaktyavac-chedalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho niyamyate;* VP II:128. Kumārila addresses the implica-

tions of *abhedopacāra* several times in ŚV, cf. Pratyakṣa° 171: *nanu jātyādirūpe 'pi śabdābhedopacārataḥ, pravartamānā mithyā syād buddhī rūpeṣu buddhivat.* 186: *yadi cābhedarūpeṇa śabdenārthaḥ pratīyate, ekarūpatvam akṣādau devanādeḥ prasajyate.* Śabda° 26: *tulyākāratayāpy atra śabdajñānārthataddhiyām, agnidhūme-ṣv adṛṣṭatvān na bhedas tannivāraṇāt.*

Jinendrabuddhi explains the view Dignāga is criticizing in a interesting passage at PSṬ Ms B 61a1: *śabdo hi svarūpeṇābhinnarūpam evārthaṃ pratyāpayati. na tv evaṃ dhūmādayaḥ. na hi dhūmād agniṃ pratyayati pratyāpayati vā.* <u>*katham arthe 'numānam*</u> *ity arthasyānekarūpatvāt. tatra hi kiṃ svarūpeṇa so 'rtho gamyate uta sāmānyarūpeṇa? sarvathaivānupapattiṃ manyate. tathā hi yadi vṛkṣādayaḥ śabdāḥ sattvādibhiḥ sāmānyākārair vṛkṣādikam arthaṃ pratipādayeyuḥ sarvaśabdānām ekārthatā prasajyeta sāmānyākārānām anekārthasādhāraṇatvāt. atha viśeṣarūpeṇa tad ayuktam, asādhāraṇasya rūpasya pratipādayitum aśakyatvād iti sarvathā śabdārthatvābhāvaḥ:* "For a word makes its referent known only in a form that is identical with its own form, but smoke and so on does not. For [in verbal cognition] fire is not known or made known from smoke. So how is there inference of the referent? Because the referent has numerous forms. Is the referent in that case understood in its own form or in the form of [its] general properties? In every single case there is thought to be no justification. That is, if a word like 'tree' were to indicate a referent like a tree by means of the forms of its general properties such as existence, the [absurd] consequence would be that all words have one and the same referent because the forms of the general properties are common to many referents. If, on the other hand, it is understood in its own form, that would be unjustified because it is impossible to convey knowledge of an individual referent. Consequently the word has in every single case no referent."

Before addressing the third view Dignāga answers a question his opponent is asking about how the referent is inferred, when the word is transferred to it in terms of non-difference. This passage is important for understanding the rationale of the *apoha* theory:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 453b13-454b4 = P 110b5-8): *śiṅ gi sgra'i brjod par bya ba ni don gźan ma yin no* ‖ *gal te yaṅ rdzas kyi sgras ni don de ñid go bar byed pa yin la* | *raṅ bźin gźan gyis ni rdzas ma yin pa las ldog pas so* ‖ *'on te śiṅ gi sgras kyaṅ rdzas ma yin pa las ldog pa go bar byed do źe na* | *gal te go bar byed kyaṅ don gyis yin gyis* | *sgras ni ma yin pas ñes pa med do źe na* | *gal te śiṅ la sogs pa' i śiṅ tshig kho na la tshad ma brjod na ni ñes pa med par 'gyur na* | *a khya ta la sogs pa'i sgra rnams de'i raṅ bźin ma yin pas kyaṅ don go bar byed pa yin no* ‖.

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 453a11-454a1 = P 29b1-3): *śiṅ gi sgra'i brjod bya' i don gźan ma yin pas rdzas kyi sgras don de ñid go ru zin kyaṅ tsul gzan gyi sgo nas rdzas gźan ma yin pa las bzlog pa go ba yin no* ‖ *gal te śiṅ gi sgras rdzas ma yin pa las log pa go bar byed du zin mod kyis kyaṅ don las yin gyi sgras las ni ma yin no* ‖ *de' phyir skyon med de źe na* | *skyon du ni mi 'gyur la rag la* | *śiṅ la sogs pa'i tshig las gźan pa'i sgra ñid tshad mar brjod par bya ste* | *bya ba brjod pa'i sgras kyaṅ don gyi tshul de ñid go bar byed do* ‖:

"The referent that is the denotable object of the word 'tree' is not a different [referent from a substance] (*vṛkṣaśabdābhidheyo 'nyo 'rtho na bhavati*). Even though the word 'substance' denotes the same referent (as the word 'tree'), it

indicates a different form [of it] (*rūpāntaram*) by excluding it from non-substances (*adravyanivṛttyā*).

Surely (*nanu ca*) also the word 'tree' (*vṛkṣaśabdenāpi*) indicates its exclusion from non-substances.

Even so, it does so by implication, not explicitly (*arthāt, na śabdāt*), therefore there is no problem.

If only syntactical words like 'tree' were claimed to be a means of cognition (*yadi vṛkṣādipādāny eva pramāṇam ucyeran*), there would be no problem (*na syād doṣaḥ*), but also verbs (*ākhyātaśabdair api*) that do not have their form (**atadrūpaiḥ*) [i.e. they end in a *tiṅ* affix in contrast to nouns that end in a *sup* affix] indicate the object."[1]

[1]The inserted Sanskrit fragments stem from PST Ms B 61a4ff, q.v. below. The theoretical implications of this paragraph are difficult to assess because Dignāga's exposition is concise and difficult to contextualise as he never explains in detail how he understands the denotation of verbs and verbal inflectional affixes with the background of the *apoha* thesis. I assume that Dignāga would analyse any finite or non-finite verbal form on the analogy of the *apoha* thesis–like his analysis of the function of nominal affixes (cf. no. 349 below)–as consisting of a verbal root denoting the action itself and a *tiṅ* affix denoting person, temporal, and modal aspects of the action, each form excluding its complement. Such verbal forms are considered to denote a not finished action (*apariniṣpanna*) in contrast to nouns that denote finished referents (*pariniṣpanna*). In view of the importance of this paragraph I reproduce Jinendrabuddhi's interesting exegesis of it at PST Ms B 61a4-62a3, omitting a few insignificant phrases indicated by ... . The historical context of this debate is obscure, but the claim that general property (*sāmānaya*) is exclusion of other referents (*śabdārthānyāpoha*), which is Dignāga's assumption too, appears to mirror the view of his opponent, whereas Jinendrabuddhi's exegesis aims at explaining the difference between the two versions of the *apoha* doctrine: *yathaiva tava śabdārthānyāpohaḥ sāmānyam tathā mamāpi. etāvaṃs tu viśeṣo mayā tac chabdākāroparaktaṃ pratīyata ity abhyupagatam iti darśayate.* vṛkṣaśabdābhidheyo *yo 'rthaḥ so 'nyo ghaṭādir* na *bhavati. anyaśabdārthābhāvenātra vṛkṣaśabdābhidhe-yo bhāgo lakṣyate. etad uktaṃ bhavati: "arthāntaravyāvṛttyupalakṣito yo vastuno bhāgaḥ sa eva vṛkṣaśabdasyārtha" iti. tenaiva tasya sārūpyāt, na tu sattvādibhiḥ sādharaṇair ākārair asādhāraṇena vā rūpeṇeti manyate .*

nanu ca dravyaśabdenāpi śākhādimān arthaḥ pratyāpyate. na cāsau tadrūpaḥ. tataś cāsārūpye 'py abhidheyatvadarśanāt, na śabdasārūpyenārthapratyāyanam iti.

ata āha: yady apītyādi. apiśabdena dravyaśabdo dravyabhedānāṃ vyabhicārān na vācikaḥ. abhyupetyottaram ucyata ity artham āviṣkaroti. rūpāntaram *ākāran-taram. "tasyaiva vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgaḥ."* [a] *tena ca saha dravyaśabdasya sārūp-yam asty evety abhiprāyaḥ. tat punā rūpāntaram adravyanivṛttyupalakṣitavastuno rūpāntaraṃ dravyanivṛttyopalakṣyata iti darśayitum idam uktam: adravyanivṛttyeti. nanu cetyādi. na kevalaṃ dravyaśabdenādravyanivṛttyupalakṣitavastuno rūpānta-raṃ dravyaśabdasārūpyaprāptiyogyaṃ gamyate, api tu vṛkṣaśabdenāpi. tathā hi sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ dṛśyate: dravyaṃ vṛkṣa iti, na hi bhinnārthayos tad upapad-yate. na ca tena saha tasya sārūpyam iṣyate. tatas sa eva doṣo 'sārūpye 'pi śabdārthatvadarśanāt, nābhidhānasvasārūpye nārthābhidhānam ity abhiprāyaḥ. arthāt, na śabdād iti. vṛkṣaśabdād evādravyanivṛttir avinābhāvinaḥ sā pratīyate. mūḍhas tu śabdād eva gamyata iti manyate. sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tu viśeṣasahitasya viśeṣe vartamānāt, na tu vṛkṣaśabdenādravyanivṛttir abhidhīyate. yadi vṛkṣādipādā-*

ny evetyādi. subantāny eva padāni. <u>*yadi śabdanibandhane*</u> <u>*pramāṇam*</u> <u>*ucyeran, na*</u>
<u>*syād doṣaḥ.*</u> *tathā hi teṣāṃ pariniṣpannarūpo 'rtha "idam tad" iti pratyavamarśa-*
yogyo buddhau sanniviśata iti. tena sahābhedopacāraḥ sambhavati śabdasya, na tu
nāmapadāny eva pariniṣpannārthabhidhāyīny ucyante, kiṃ tarhi tiṅantāny api. yad
āha: ākhyātaśabdair apītyādi. ākhyātaśabdaiḥ pacati paṭhati evamādibhiḥ. aliṅgā
asaṃkhyāpūrvāparībhūtāvayavāpariniṣpannasvarūpā kriyocyate. na ca tathāvi-
dhasya idaṃ tad ity agṛhītasya buddhyā śakyo 'bhedopacāraḥ kartum. nāpi pariniṣ-
pannarūpaḥ śabdātmā sādhyamānākāratāṃ pratipadya(n)te:

    "Just as general property according to you is exclusion of other referents so it is
according to me too. However, the difference is of such kind that I assume that the
[general property] is understood as 'coloured' by the form of its word. This is what
he illustrates. The referent that is the denotable object of the word 'tree' is not a
different one like a pot. The part that is the denotable object of the word 'tree' is in
this case implied by its not being the referent of other words. That is, only that part
of the object that is indirectly indicated through negation of other referents is the
referent of the word 'tree' because it agrees with that only, but not with common
forms like existence or a not common shape. Such is the idea ... .

    The word 'substance' certainly also indicates a referent on which there are
branches, and so on, and this [word] does not agree with that [referent]; and
therefore there is no indication of the referent due to the word's being in agreement
because it is observed to be denotable, even though there is no agreement.

    Therefore he says 'even though' and so forth. By the word 'though' he makes the
issue clear, namely that the word 'substance' does not denote particular substances
because of uncertainty. Having assumed [that it does], a rejoinder is formulated. A
different form means a different aspect namely a certain part of the same object, and
the word 'substance' is only in agreement with this [aspect]. Such is the underlying
opinion. In order to show that this different form is indirectly indicated by negation
of non-substance, the following is stated: "by negation of non-substance."

    "Certainly," and so on. Not only does the word 'substance' imply another form
of the object through negation of non-substance, which is capable of being in
agreement with the word 'substance', but the word 'tree' does so too. That is, one
observes that they are coreferential as in the statement: "a tree is a substance," for
this is not justified of two different referents. And it is not claimed that one is in
agreement with the other. Therefore the problem is precisely this, that since one
observes that [a tree] is a referent [of the word 'substance'], even though there is no
agreement [of the word 'substance' with the referent tree], there is no denotation of
the referent when there is no proper agreement with the denotation. Such is the
underlying intention.

    "By implication, not explicitly." Due to the word 'tree' alone one understands
the negation of non-substance because a tree is invariably connected to [substance].
A fool, however, believes that it is understood explicitly. However, there is co-
reference of [the word 'substance'] when combined with the particular [term 'tree']
because it applies to a particular [namely a tree], but the word 'tree' does not
express the negation of non-substance.

    "If only syntactical words like 'tree,' etc." Syntactical words that are nouns
terminate exclusively in the affixes denoted *sup.* If they were said to be a means of
verbal construction, there would be no problem. That is, their referent, whose form
is finished, is absorbed into the mind as capable of the identification "this is such
and such [a thing]." The word's transfer in terms of non-difference from that is

possible, but not only syntactical words that denote a finished referent are said [to be a means of verbal cognition], also syntactical words that end in the affixes denoted *tiṅ*. As he explains: "also by means of verbs, etc." i.e. by verbs such as "he is cooking," "he is reading." An action is said to be without gender and number, and to have a form that is not finished in terms of anterior and posterior parts, and [a syntactical word] like this is not capable of being transferred in terms of non-difference from [the action], as it is not perceived by the mind as "this is such and such [an action]." Nor does the nature of a speech unit whose form is finished indicate the appearance of [the action] that is in the process of being realised."

The last paragraph is particularly interesting because Dignāga does not address in PSV V the question of how the thesis of *anyāpoha* applies to denotation of verbal action (*kriyā*) like *pacati* "he is cooking." Kumārila addresses the question in a few kārikā*s* at ŚV Apoha° 139f qu. TS 973f; cf. the discussion at TS 1143f with TSP ad loc.

(a) Jinendrabuddhi alludes to a statement found in Dignāga's lost Dvādaśaśatikā: *tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo ' rthāntaravyāvṛttyā loke gamyate;* cf. *Pind* 1991 no. 1. For the term "part," cf. no. 15 below.

3. After this discussion Dignāga continues addressing the third view according to which only a sentence (*vākya*) is the principal speech unit. He has Bhartṛhari's position in mind, cf. PS V:46-47 §§ 61-62. Both Tibetan translations of this passage diverge considerably from each other. In general K appears to be more reliable than V, but not in every case. Thus, for instance, the crucial term *tshig* 'syntactical word' (= Sanskrit *padam,* cf. A I.4:14] is missing in K.

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 454b4-8 = P 110b8-111a1]) *gaṅ źig ṅag kho na sgra yin la de rtogs pa'i thabs ni 'dod pa de dag gi sgra daṅ mthun par don rtogs pa yod pa ma yin te | de ltar khyad par gyi cha ñe bar bzuṅ nas rjes su dpag pa las sgra las byuṅ ba tha dad do źes brjod do ‖*;

V (Kitagawa 1973 454a1-5 = P 29b3-4): *gaṅ dag ṅag kho na sgra yin te | tshig ni de rtog par byed pa'i rgyu ma* (sic) *yin la | sgra de'i ṅo bo tsam las don rtogs pa'i phyir ro źes khyad par can gźan tsam ñe bar blaṅs nas rjes su dpag pa las sgra tha dad du brjod ces brjod do ‖*:

"According to those who claim that only the sentence is the speech unit (*yeṣāṃ ca vākyam eva śabdaḥ*), and that the syntactical word (**padam*) is a means of understanding it (*tadadhigamopāyaś ca*), there is no (*teṣāṃ nāsti*) cognition of the referent in agreement with the words (**śabdānurūpeṇa*). Thus, having assumed a slight difference (*viśeṣaleśam*) they assert that verbal cognition is different from inference."[1]

[1] For the Sanskrit fragments of this paragraph, cf. PSṬ Ms B 62a3-5: *yeṣāṃ ca vākyam eva śabda iti ... tadadhigamopāyaś cetyādi ... teṣāṃ nāstītyādi ... iti viśeṣaleśa iti.* (°*leśa* em. [cf. Ms 62a7: *viśeṣaleśaḥ*] : °*veṣaṇam* Ms).

Dignāga is addressing Bhartṛhari's view. This is underlined by Jinendrabuddhi who introduces Bhartṛhari's concept of *sādhanaśakti* (for which cf. Vākyapadīya III.7:2), cf. PSṬ Ms B 62a5-6: *vākyārtho hi bāhyo vā syāt <sādhya>sādhanasambandhātmā,*(a) *sādhanaśaktiniveśānugṛhītā niravayavā kriyā vā, āntaro vā pratibhālakṣaṇaḥ, trayam api caitad asattvabhūtam "idaṃ tad" iti pratyavamarśātikrāntam, na ca tathābhūtenārthena "so 'yam" ity abhedopacāraḥ śakyaḥ kartum:* "For whether the reference of the sentence is external, being of the nature of a connection

between the means of accomplishment [of an action, i.e., any given *kāraka*] and [the action] to be accomplished, or whether it is the partless action assisted by the residence of the powers in the means of accomplishment [of the action], or whether it is internal characterized by intuition, these three things, however, are unreal, transcending the identification judgement (*pratyavamarśa*) "this is such and such a thing;" and it is impossible to state a transfer in terms of identity like "this is such and such a thing" with a referent of this kind."

[a]*sādhya°* conj. (cf. *bsgrub par bya ba* T) : om. Ms

3 Cf. the definition of *śābdam* at PSṬ Ms B 191b1: *śabdād upajātam asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe jñānaṃ śābdam:* "Verbal cognition is an awareness, which follows from a word, about a referent with which one is not in [direct] sense contact." ŚBh 32,3: *śāstraṃ śabdavijñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe vijñānam;* ŚV Śabda° 3; TSP 530,22ff.

4 That is, not only implication (*arthāpatti*) and the rest are separate means of cognition, but also *śābdam,* cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b1: *na kevalam arthāpattyādīnīty apy arthaḥ.* For the nature and number of *pramāṇa*s admitted by the various Indian schools of philosophy, cf. *Hattori* 1968: 78 no. 1.12.

5 Cf. *de la* V : om. K.

[2] *na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam anumānāt. tathā hi saḥ*[1] *kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate.* Qu. TSP 589,17-18, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b1-2: *na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam ity āha. tathā hi sa ityādi ... kṛtakatvādivad iti;* 191b6: *anyāpohena bhāṣata iti.*

[1]*saḥ* Ms B 191b2 and v.l. at TSP : *tat* TSP, cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b2, claiming that *saḥ* by force of implication is to be construed with an implicit *śabdaḥ: sa iti sāmarthyaprāptaḥ śabde sambadhyate.* The variant *tat,* referring to *śābdam,* is meaningless in the context because verbal cognition does not function as an indicator according to Dignāgan epistemology. The reading *tat* is not recent, however, since Mallavādi's rephrasing of PS V:1 reads *tat* for *saḥ,* cf. NCV 674,17-18.

6 For Dignāga's explanation of what constitutes the inferential nature of verbal cognition, cf. the theoretically important passage at PSV V:34 and no. 9 below. Kumārila contrasts at ŚV Śabda° 15 the views of Sāṅkhya and other schools on *śābda* with those of the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas who include verbal cognition in inference: *tatrānumānam evedam bauddhair vaiśeṣikaiḥ śritam bhedaḥ sāṅkhyādibhis tv iṣṭo na tūktaṃ bhedakāraṇam.* For the Vaiśeṣika definition, cf. Candrānanda ad VS IX:19: *yathā kāryādismṛtisavyapekṣam anumānaṃ trikālaviṣayam atīndriyārtham ca tathaiva śābdaṃ saṅketasmṛtyapekṣaṃ trikālaviṣayam atīndriyārthaṃ ca. ato 'numānenaikayogakṣematvād anumānam evety uktaṃ bhavati.* In contrast to this explanation, the statement at PBh § 256 shows that Praśastapāda regards the word as an indicator like the inferential indicator (*liṅga*) and thus subject to the constraints of the triple format of inference (for which, cf. PBh § 247: *śabdādīnām apy anumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ, samānavidhitvāt. yathā prasiddhasamayasya liṅgadarśanaprasiddhyanusmaraṇābhyām atīndriye 'rthe bhavaty anumānam, evaṃ śabdādibhyo 'pīti*). For the relation between the *trairūpya* and *śābda,* cf. no. 9 below. The Vaiśeṣika view that verbal cognition is inference (*anumāna*) because a

word (*śabda*) functions in the same way as an inferential indicator (*liṅga*), is also propounded at NS II.1:50-52; cf., e.g., NSBh ad NS 50: *yathānupalabhyamāno liṅgī mitena liṅgena paścān mīyata iti anumānam. evam mitena śabdena paścān mīyate 'rtho 'nupalabhyamāna ity anumānaṃ śabdaḥ.* See *Biardeau* 1964: 127; 205.

[7] According to Kamalaśīla, Dignāga is using *bhāṣate* with the same value as *dyotayati* (for which, see no. 12 below), cf. TSP 540,7f, equating *bhāṣaṇam* with *dyotanam,* i.e., the act of indicating, making known: *tatra bhāṣaṇam = dyotanam, jñāpanam iti yāvat;* Ms B 191b5-6: *bhāṣaṇasya śabdadharmatvena rūḍhatvād dṛṣṭāntadārṣṭāntikayor vaiṣamyaṃ mā bhūd iti dyotayatīty āha.*

[8] Throughout PSV V Dignāga uses the term *artha* of the thing or referent denoted by the following classes of speech units: 1. affixes (*pratyaya*), to which Pāṇinian grammar attributes distinct denotations, 2. words (*śabda*) [usually common nouns or adjectives in the nominative, cf. the Pāṇinian definition of the nominative as denoting the mere referent of the nominal stem (*prātipadikārthamātra,* cf. A II 3:46); this class also includes the referents of proper nouns], 3. compounds (*samāsa*), and 4. sentences (*vākya*), utterances or judgments. The referents (*artha*) of words are infinite, cf. PSV V:2b above and the expression *arthasyānantye* at PSV V:34 below. Dignāga does not address the *artha* of verbs in PSV V, but mentions *ākhyātaśabda* at PSV II:4c; cf. no. 2. above and the passages quoted at paragraph **2.**, especially Jinendrabuddhi's interesting explanation of Dignāga's introduction of the denotation of verbs in the context of the *apoha* thesis.

[9] Cf. PST Ms B 191b2: *yathā kṛtakatvādi liṅgaṃ trairūpyayogāt svārthaṃ prakāśayati, tathā śabdo 'pīty arthaḥ. anena dṛṣṭāntena śabdasya liṅgatvaṃ paridī-payan śabdasyānumānatvalakṣaṇam udbhāvayati:* "The meaning is as follows: just as the indicator [the general property] 'being produced', and so on, indicates its own referent because of being connected with the triple form [of the indicator], so also the word. While illustrating the word's being an indicator by means of this example he explains the definition of verbal cognition as being one of inference."

For Dignāga's description of the logical property of *kṛtakatva* in inference, cf. PSV II:23, q.v. infra no. 14.

Dignāga's mention of the logical indicator *kṛtakatva* to illustrate his claim about the inferential nature of *śabda* would indicate that verbal cognition is assumed to be subject to the constraints of the *trairūpya* as defined at PSV II:5cd: *anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo, nāstitāsati.*[1] (PS II:5cd) *anumeyo hi dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī. tatra darśanaṃ pratyakṣato 'numānato vā*[2]. *uttarakālaṃ dharmasya sāmānyarū-peṇa tajjātiye ca sarvatraikadeśe <vā> sadbhāvaḥ <siddhaḥ>. kuta etad iti? tattulya eva sadbhāva <ity> avadhāraṇāt. na tarhi vaktavyam: <atattulye nāstitaiveti>. etat punar niyam<ārtham>: asaty eva nāstitā, nānyatra, na viruddha iti.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 64b1-66b6: *anumeye 'tha tattulya iti ... nāstitāsatīti ... anumeyo hītyādi ... dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmīti. tatra darśanam iti ... pratyakṣata iti ... anumānato veti ... uttarakālam iti ... dharmasya sāmānyarūpeṇeti ... tajjātiye ceti ... kuta etad iti ... ___sarvatra sadbhāvo___ 'nyatr___aikadeśe___ 'pīti ... vyavacchedaphalatvād vākyānām. iṣṭataś ___cāvadhāraṇād___ etad labhyata ity āha: tattulya evetyādi ... na tarhi vaktavyam iti ... etat punar ityādi ... niyamaḥ. asaty eva nāstiteti ... nānyatreti ... na viruddha iti.*

The Tibetan versions of this crucial passage diverge from each other and the Sanskrit evidence:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 455b9ff = P 111a6-111b1): *rjes dpag bya daṅ de mtshuṅs la ‖ yod daṅ med la med pa ’o ‖* (PS II:5cd) *rjes su dpag pa ni chos khyad par can gyi chos can yin te | de la dus phyis chos kyi spyi’i tshul gyis mṅon sum nam rjes su dpag pas mthoṅ ba ’o ‖ de’i rigs la yaṅ mtha’ dag gam phyogs cig yod pa ñid do ‖ de gaṅ las źe na | de daṅ mtshuṅs pa kho na la yod źes ṅes par gzuṅ ba’i phyir yin gyi yod pa kno na źes ma yin no ‖ de ltar na med pa lam med do źes brjod pas mi byo ’o źe na | ’di ni med pa ñid la med pa yin gyi | gźan pa la ’aṅ ma yin ’gal ba la ma yin no źes ṅes pa’i don du ’gyur ro ‖.*

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 455a9ff = P 30a1-4): *rjes dpag bya daṅ de mthun la ‖ yod daṅ med ñid la med pa ’o ‖* (PS II:5cd) *rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyi khyad par du byas pa’i chos can no ‖ de la mṅon sum mam rjes su dpag pas mthoṅ gi rjes la de’i rigs daṅ mthun pa la yaṅ spyi’i tshul gyis phyogs thams cad dam phyogs gcig la yod par grub pa ’o ‖ ci’i phyir źe na | de daṅ mthun pa kho na la yod ces ṅes par gzuṅ ba’i phyir ro ‖ de daṅ mthun pa la yod pa kho na’o źes ni brjod par mi bya ba’i phyir ro ‖ med pa ñid las med pa źes pas ni slar yaṅ de ñid ṅes par bya ba’i don du ste | med pa ñid la med pa ñid yin gyi gźan la yaṅ ma yin la ’gal ba la yaṅ ma yin no źes pa’i don to ‖.*

As PSV V:1 shows, Dignāga primarily mentions *kṛtakatva* in order to emphasise that the logical indicator and the word share the function of indicating through exclusion of other referents. He defines at PSV V:34 (for which, see below § 46) the inferential nature of verbal cognition as *tadvyavacchedānumānaṃ svārthābhidhānam* without any reference to the canonical format of the *trairūpya*. There is, however, a passage in PSV IV where Dignāga explicitly draws a parallel between the role of *trairūpya* in inference (*anumāna*) and verbal cognition (*śabda*). Commenting at PSV IV:5 on the role of the explicit formulation, in *parārthānumāna,* of the second and third criteria of the *trairūpya,* Dignāga compares their role in *svārthānumāna* to that of verbal cognition (*śābda*). As Jinendrabuddhi observes in his comment at Ms B 178a4-7 (see below), the ascertainment obtained through *svārthānumāna* presupposes recollection of the two states of affair as defined by the second and third criteria of the *trairūpya,* without being dependent upon their explicit formulation (*arthadvayaparāmarśapūrvako hy abhidhānānapekṣaḥ svārthānumānaniścayaḥ*). Dignāga continues asserting that after one has apprehended a word through immediate sensation (*pratyakṣa*), the mere fact that one recollects the second and third criteria of the *trairūpya* is sufficient for knowing the referent denoted by it (*tathā hi śabdaṃ pratyakṣata upalabhya tasy"ānyatra sajātīye sattāṃ smarati, asati cāsattām." tāvataiva cābhidheyaṃ pratipadyate*).

The Tibetan versions of PSV IV:5 diverge from each other, and, moreover, interpret the crucial phrase *śābda iva* as if the actual reading were *śabda* (loc.) *eva* K : *śabda* (nom. sic) *iva* V.

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 521b4-8 = P 150b4-7): *gaṅ źig la cuṅ zad rab tu grub pa yin pa’i phyir gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba brjod pa yaṅ sgrub byed yin no ‖ sgra kho na la don gñis rtogs pa’i phyir ram gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ bas źugs kyis gñi ga bstan pa’i phyir gñi ga brjod par mi bya ’o ‖ rjes su dpag pa la yaṅ tshul ’di yin par mthoṅ ste | gal te rtags ’di rjes su dpag par bya ba la ṅes par bzuṅ na gźan du de daṅ rigs mthun pa la yod pa ñid daṅ | med pa la med pa ñid dran par byed pa de’i phyir ’di’i ṅes pa bskyed par yin no ‖.*

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 521a4-10 = P 65b2-4): *'ba' źig tu cuṅ zad grub pa ñid du 'gyur ba yin no ‖ gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba gcig brjod pas kyaṅ sgrub byed du 'gyur te | sgra bźin du don gñis rtogs pa'i phyir gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba gcig gis gñis ka bstan pa'i phyir don gyi śugs kyis gñis brjod pa yin no ‖ don rjes su dpog pa la yaṅ rigs pa de ñid blta'o | gaṅ rjes su dpag par bya ba la rtags 'di ṅes par gzuṅ bar byas nas gźan la de'i rigs yod pa dran par byas te | med pa la med pa ñid kyis bdag ñid kyis ṅes par skyed par byed do ‖:*

"Since some [example] is well-known (**prasiddhatvāt*) to someone (*kasyacit*) the formulation of one or the other [example] is also a means of proof (*anyataroktir api sādhanam*); Since the two states of affair are already known (**arthadvayapra-tītatvāt*) in the same way as in verbal cognition (*śabda iva*) or since they both are shown implicitly (**arthāpattyā*) by one or the other (**anyatareṇa*), both of them are not stated (*ubhayānabhidhānam*). This is also observed to be the method in the case of inference: If the logical indicator is ascertained at the object of inference (*anumeye*), one recalls [its] existence elsewhere at what is similar and [its] non-existence where [what is similar] is absent (*anyatra sajātīye sattāṃ smarati, asati cāsattām*). Therefore one realises oneself its ascertainment (**niścayaḥ*)."

The inserted Sanskrit equivalents and phrases have been extracted from Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 178a4-7: *kasyacid ityādi. Parāvabodhanār-thaṃ parārtham anumānam. parasya ced anyataradṛṣṭāntapratipādyo 'rthaḥ prasiddhaḥ, 'nyataroktir api sādhanaṃ prasiddhokter anarthakatvāt. apiśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ. śabda ivetyādi. pratītatvamātraṃ sādharmyam upādāya śabda iveti dṛṣṭānto veditavyaḥ, nānabhidhānam. anyathā śābdasya svārthānumānatvād ayuktam etad nidarśanaṃ syāt, prasaṅgābhāvāt. na hi svārthānumāne dṛṣṭānta-prasaṅgo 'sti, arthātmakatvāt. arthadvayaparāmarśapūrvako hy abhidhānānapek-ṣaḥ svārthānumānaniścayaḥ. tathā hi śabdaṃ pratyakṣata upalabhya tasya "anya-tra sajātīye sattāṃ smarati, asati cāsattām." tāvataiva cābhidheyaṃ pratipadyate. tasmāt pratītatvamātram upā<dā>ya dṛṣṭāntaḥ kṛta iti. ubhayānabhidhānam iti.*

Dignāga's claim about the inferential nature of verbal cognition was interpreted by his contemporaries as well as later writers as a statement about the word's being subject to the constraints of the *trairūpya*. The view that the word indicates its referent in accordance with the canon of the *trairūpya* was addressed and severely criticized by Kumārila in ŚV Śabda° 68-98, who asks whether it makes sense to apply the canon of the *trairūpya* to describe verbal cognition as the second and third member of the logical canon are presented in terms of existence of the logical indicator at some instance of the indicated and its non-existence at all dissimilar instances. The criticism evidently centres on whether it makes sense that the locative denotes a word's existence or non-existence at something. However, there is no reason to assume that Dignāga's use of the locative indicates that he believed that the denotation of words or utterances is dependent on their being observable at the objects or state of affairs they denote like any inferential indicator, but rather that they are observed to denote their referents at the time of *vyutpatti* (cf. PSV V:50c below), the locative being used to introduce their denotation like in traditional Sanskrit and lexicographical literature. The use of the locative at PSV V:34 is to be interpreted with this background. An extract of Kumārila's criticism is quoted at TS 1490-97.

Related discussions about *trilakṣaṇa śabda* are found in Mallavādi's NC, cf. NCV 666,12ff (*kṛtakatvādiliṅgavac chabdas trilakṣaṇo 'nyāpohena svārthaṃ gamayatīti*), and in YD 101,8ff. Jinendrabuddhi summarises some of Kumārila's critical observations, namely that it is incorrect to talk about the referent of the word as a property possessor because the fact of being a property possessor does not fit the referent of the word since it is the thing to be indicated, like impermanence, and, moreover, one does not observe the *pakṣa* of the word at the referent, but rather at the speaker as he speaks, which goes to show that *śabda* is a separate means of cognition, cf. PST Ms B 192a2-4: *kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasya trairūpyam? kathaṃ ca na syāt? dharmiṇo 'yogāt. tathā hi śabdārthasya na dharmitvam upapadyate pratyāyyatvād anityatvavat. na cārthe śabdasya pakṣadarśanaṃ vaktari sthitatvāt tatraivopalabdheḥ. tasmāt pramāṇāntaram evedaṃ yathāsamayam arthapratipatti-hetutvāt.*

Jinendrabuddhi's answer to this critique is influenced by Dharmakīrtian and post-Dharmakīrtian philosophy, in which the question of whether or not the alleged inferential nature of verbal cognition reflects the canon of the *trairūpya* is answered by claiming that verbal cognition is subject to the constraints of the *trairūpya* because words indicate the intention (*vivakṣā*) of the speaker. Thus the speaker is the *dharmin,* any given word is the *pakṣadharma,* the *sapakṣa* is any previously perceived possessor of *vivakṣā* (*vivakṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ*), and *vipakṣa* its exclusion (*tadvyatirekaḥ*).

Cf. the discussion Ms B 192a4-6: *tad etac chābdasya prāmāṇyaviṣayāparijñā-nād evam ucyate. na hi tasya bāhye 'rthe prāmāṇyaṃ ... kva tarhi? vivakṣāyām. tatra cāsty*[3] *eva śabdasya trairūpyam. tathā hi vivakṣāvān puruṣo dharmī, vivakṣā sādhyadharmaḥ. vivakṣāvaty evopalambhanāc chabdasya pakṣadharmatvam. vivak-ṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ sapakṣaḥ. tadvyatireko vipakṣa iti kathaṃ trairūpyaṃ na sambhavati?* For the unabridged text of this discussion, cf. Appendix 2.

The view that a speaker's words make it possible to infer his underlying inten-tion (*vivakṣā*) can be traced to Bhartṛhari, cf. VP III.14:197cd: *anumānaṃ vivak-ṣāyāḥ śabdād anyaṃ na vidyate;* TS 906, TSP 357,8ff; cf. Kamalaśīla's answer to Kumārila's criticism at TS 1514-24, and the related statement at PVSV 107,22-24: *na hi śabdā yathābhāvaṃ vartante yatas tebhyo 'rthaprakṛtir niścīyeta. te hi vaktur vivakṣāvṛttaya iti tannānāntarīyakāḥ. tām eva gamayeyuḥ.*

[1]Qu. NV 301,2, cf. PVin II Vol. I: 31.
[2]*tatra ... vā* qu. ŚVṬ (Umveka) 142,8; PVin II Vol. I: 30,4-5.
[3]*cāsty* em. : *cājjhy* Ms

[3] *śabdo hi yatra viṣaye prayujyate tasya yenāṃśenāvinābhāvitvasambandhas taṃ kṛtakatvādivad arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati*[1], *<tasmād anumānān> na bhidyate*[2]. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 191b3-6: *śabdo hi yatra viṣaye prayujyata iti ... tasya yenāṃśeneti ... vṛkṣādiśabdasyāvinābhāvitvasambandhaḥ*[3]. *yena tu samban-dhas taṃ kṛtakatvādivad arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati ... na tat tato bhid-yate.*

[1]Cf. TSP 540,3-4: *tat (sic) kṛtakatvādivad arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati.*
[2]Cf. PST Ms B 192a1-2: *tasmād eva viśeṣāc chābdam anumānād bhidyata iti.*
[3]°*tvasambandhaḥ* em. : *tvaṃ sambandho* Ms

10 The particle *hi* (cf. *ni* VT : *yaṅ* K) is syntactically equivalent to Sanskrit *yasmāt*. It is to be construed with the restored **tasmāt* < T *de'i phyir* VK; cf. the

gloss *hiśabdo yasmādarthe* inserted by Dignāga in a Sanskrit fragment from Sāmānyaparīksāvyāsa, q.v. no. 182. As a rule the translators of KV render Sanskrit *hi* by the Tibetan topicalization particle *ni;* cf. *Obermiller*, Indexes II 71a.

[11] The term *śabda* is somewhat ambiguous: It denotes any given speech unit posited by the Sanskrit grammarians through grammatical analysis, from phonemes through syllables to affixes and finished words. Most of the examples mentioned by Dignāga belongs to the last-mentioned category, but he evidently regards phonemes and affixes to be definable within the theoretical framework of the *apoha* theory, cf. *Pind* 1991 and no. 349 below. Like Bhartṛhari Dignāga considers any given speech unit posited apart from a sentence as a useful grammatical fiction, the sentence being the principal speech unit, cf. § 61 below.

[12] Dignāga uses *dyotayati* with the same value as *prakāśayati or prakāśaka,* the function of the logical indicator (*hetu, liṅga*) and the word (*śabda*) being structurally similar; cf. the use of the cpd. *dyotakadyotya* at PS II:33a-c: *liṅgasyānyena sāmānyaṃ viśeṣāś ca liṅgino na dyotakadyotyam,* qu. Ms B 81b5. This is the only instance where Dignāga uses the verb *dyotayati* of the action of denoting. Cf. the similar use at YSBh 139,2-3 (ad YS III.17): *sarvābhidhānaśaktiparihṛtā gakārau-kāravisarjanīyāḥ sāsnādimantam arthaṃ dyotayantīti.*
   For the use of *dyotana, dyotaka, dyotya* in Sanskrit grammar, cf. DSG s.vv. *dyotaka;* Renou, *Terminologie* s.v. *dyut.*

[13] For a contemporary definition of *apoha,* cf. Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.16: *anyāpohena   śabdo   'rtham   āhety   anye   pracakṣate,   anyāpohaś   ca nāmānyapadārthāpākrtiḥ kila:* "Other [scholars] explain that a word denotes its referent through exclusion of other referents; and the name "exclusion of other referents" means, as it is reported (*kila*), the removal (*apākrti*) of other referents (*padārtha*)."
   Exclusion or negation, i.e., *apoha, nirākaraṇa, nivṛtti, pratikṣepa, pratiṣedha, vyāvṛtti, vyavaccheda, vyudāsa*—Dignāga uses these terms indiscriminately—which presupposes the predominance of joint absence (*vyatireka*) over joint presence (*anvyaya*), contrasts with *vidhi,* i.e., an affirmative statement, which presupposes joint presence of the word and an observed instance of its referent, cf. NCV 668,17: *anyāpoho hi vyatirekamātram:* "For exclusion of other referents is nothing but joint absence"; PST Ms B 191b3: *anyapohenety arthāntaravyāvṛttyā, na dṛṣṭavad vidhirūpeṇa:* "Through exclusion of other [referents], that is, by means of exclusion of other referents, not in an affirmative form like the way in which it is observed."
   The term *dṛṣṭavat* denotes, as Jinendrabuddhi explains in his comment on PS II:15 (cf. below) the referent as observed at the time when the connection (*sambandhakāla*) is being taught. He is referring to the process of *vyutpatti,* namely teaching someone the connection (*sambandha*) between word and referent by *hastasañjñā* and *ayaṃśabda.* This implies that someone is confronting a particular object or state of affairs/action through direct sensation (*pratyakṣa*) while being taught the connection, which implies an affirmative statement like "this *x* is *y*." Thus, it constitutes an instance of joint presence (*anvaya*) as opposed to joint absence (*vyatireka*). For Dignāga's view of *vyutpatti,* cf. §§ 65-66 below.
   Dignāga will address the fundamental assymmetry of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* at PSV V:34-35, q.v. below with no.s 185, 421, 423-425. For his view of what

constitutes the difference between affirmation and exclusion or negation, cf. the exposition at PS II:15: *dṛṣṭavad vidhirūpena yadi liṅgaṃ prakāśayet, sarvatrādarśanān na syāt sarvathā vā gatir bhavet*[1].

   For the Tibetan versions of PS II:15 and PSV ad loc., cf. K (*Kitagawa* 1973 463b6-464b4 = P 113a4-8): *mthoṅ bźin bsgrub pa'i raṅ bźin gyis ‖ gal te rtags ni gsal byed na ‖ thams cad rtogs par mi 'gyur ba 'am ‖ yaṅ na thams cad rtogs par 'gyur ‖* (PS II:15) *gal te ji ltar me la du ba mthoṅ de ltar dus phyis gsal bar byed na 'gar yaṅ gsal bar byed pa ñid du mi 'gyur te ǀ ci ltar me med thams cad la ma mthoṅ ba de bźin du de me thams cad la mthoṅ ba ma yin no ‖ gal te yaṅ ci ltar mthoṅ ba de ltar gsal bar byed pa yin na ǀ 'bar ba daṅ rno ba la sogs pa'i khyad par daṅ ldan par yaṅ gsal bar byed pa'i gyur ro ‖ gaṅ gi phyir spyi'i raṅ bźin ñid kyis me ma yin pa bkag nas gsal bar byed pa de'i phyir ǀ bsgrub pas kyaṅ 'di'i raṅ bźin de ñid mthoṅ ṅo źes rtogs pa yin gyi khyad par gyi raṅ bźin ni ma yin no ‖*.
   V (*Kitagawa* 1973 463a8-464a3 = P 31b7-32a3): *gal te mthoṅ ba bźin gtan tshigs ‖ sgrub pa'i sgo nas 'jug pa ni ‖ thams cad rtogs par mi 'gyur ram ‖ yaṅ na thams cad rtogs par 'gyur ‖* (PS II:15) *gal te yaṅ dper na me la dud pa mthoṅ ba bźin du phyis kyi tshe yaṅ 'jug par byed na ni nam yaṅ rtogs par mi 'gyur te ǀ dper na me mtha' dag la ma mthoṅ ba bźin du me 'di yaṅ mi rtogs par 'gyur ro ‖ gal te ji ltar mthoṅ ba bźin du rtogs par byed na ni gsal ba daṅ rno ba la sogs pa'i bye brag rnams kyaṅ rtogs par 'gyur ro ‖ gal te me ma yin pa rnam par bkag ste spyi'i tshul gyis 'jug par byed na ni de'i phyir sgrub pa'i sgo nas 'jug pa la yaṅ tshul de ñid blta'o źes śes par bya'o ‖*:

"If the indicator were to indicate in an affirmative form in the way in which it was observed [previously], there would be no [indication] because of [the indicator's] not being observed at all [instances of the indicated], or there would be a cognition [of the indicated] *in toto* (PS II:15).
   For (*hi*) if smoke (**dhūmaḥ*) subsequently (**paścāt*) were to indicate in the way in which it was [previously] observed at fire (*yadi hi yathāgnau dṛṣṭaḥ*)[2] it would never indicate. For just as it has not been observed at all (**sarvatra*) [instances of] absence of fire (**agnyabhāve*), so also it has not been observed at all (**sarvatra*) [instances of] fire (**agnau*). And if (*yadi ca*)[3] it were to indicate in the way in which it was observed [previously], it should also indicate its [namely the fire's] particular features such as its flames and temperature, etc. [4]However, since (*yatas tu*) it only indicates in a general form (*sāmānyarūpeṇaiva*) by excluding non-fire, (**tatas*) it is understood that it is only this form of it that is observed, although in an affirmative form, not the form of the particular features (*vidhināpi tad evāsya rūpaṃ dṛṣṭam iti gamyate, na viśeṣarūpam*)."
   [1]*pāda*s abc have been restored on the basis of Ms B 71a5-6: *dṛṣṭena tulyaṃ dṛṣṭavat. yathā sambandhakāle liṅgam upalabdhaṃ tathā yadi prakāśayed ity arthaḥ. vidhimukhenāgnir atra bhavatīti, na vyāvṛttimukhenāgnir evātra nānagnir evaṃ sarvatrādarśanān na syāt prakāśanavidhir iti prakāśayed iti prakrāntatvāt; pāda* d is restored on the basis of the parallel at NCV 707,12: *agatir vā sarvathā bhavet.*
   For the use of *dṛṣṭavat* in a similar context, cf. PS III:44 quoted at NVC 727,9-10: *dṛṣṭavad yadi siddhiḥ syāc chaukhyarūpaguṇāśritāt, kramavat prātilomye 'pi dvitryekārthagatir bhavet,* and the untraced quotation (from Dignāga?) at NCV 678,13-14: *sarvatra liṅginy adarśanāt, na dṛṣṭavat pratipattiḥ.*
   [2]Qu. Ms B 71a6.

[3]Qu. Ms B 71b1.

[4]This clause has been restored on the basis of the *pratīka* and the subsequent paraphrase at Ms B 71b3-4: *yatas tv ityādi. etad darśayati: yasmād dhūmo 'gniṃ sāmānyarūpeṇaiva prakāśayati ... tasmād ... vidhināpi tad evāsya rūpaṃ dṛṣṭam iti gamyate.*

As Jinendrabuddhi points out in his commentary, cf. note[1] above, the difference between *vidhi* and *vyāvṛtti* is that a statement affirming the presence of fire would be 'here is fire' (*agnir atra bhavati*), as opposed to a statement having the canonical exclusion form 'here is fire only, not non-fire' (*agnir evātra, nānagniḥ*)."

Śāntarakṣita quotes a fragment on *vidhi* from Dignāga's Hetumukha at TS 1096a: *"asambhavo vidher" uktaḥ sāmānyāder asambhavāt. śabdānāṃ ca vikalpā-nāṃ ca vastuno 'viṣayatvataḥ*[1]: "Affirmation is impossible," as it has been stated, since general properties, and so on, are impossible because words and representations do not have an entity (*vastu* = general property) as object."

For Dharmakīrti's related view of *vidhi,* cf. his statements at PVSV 27,8-12: *vastugrahe anumānāc ca dharmasya ekasya niścaye, sarvadharmagraho 'pohe na ayam doṣaḥ prasajyate.* (PV I 46). *na kevalaṃ pratyakṣadṛṣṭe pramāṇāntarāvṛttiḥ kvacit. yadānumānam api vastu vidhinā pratyāyayati na vyavacchedakṛt, tadā ekadharmaniścaye tadavyatirekāt sarvadharmaniścaya iti pramāṇāntarāvṛttiḥ.* PVSV 65,19-22: *yadi hi vidhirūpeṇa vastv eva śabdair vikalpair vāpi viṣayīkriyeta so 'yaṃ sarvārthasarvākārapratītiprasaṅgo 'sāmānādhikaraṇyādayaś ceti manyamānaḥ praṇetā nyāyaśāstrasyānyāpoha viṣayāv etau prāha.*

[1] *avisayatvataḥ* conj : *viṣayatvataḥ* TS. The conj is corroborated by TSP ad loc. TSP however, presupposes the reading *vastutaḥ = paramārthataḥ* (sic), for *vastunaḥ.* Cf. TSP 417,8: *yady vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho 'bhyupagamyate, kathaṃ tarhi Hetumukhe lakṣaṇakāreṇa "asambhavo vidheḥ" ity uktam ... sāmānyalakṣaṇāder vācyasya vācakasya ca paramārthato 'sambhavāc chabdānāṃ vikalpānāṃ ca vastutaḥ paramārthato viṣayāsambhavāt paramārtham āśritya "vidher asambhava" ukta ācāryeṇa.*

Jinendrabuddhi continues addressing at Ms B 191b6-192a2 an objector's question regarding the statement *'anyāpohena bhāṣate kṛtakatvādivat'* and the contrast between *vidhi* and *apoha*: *athānyāpohena bhāṣata ity etat kimartham? yāvatā kṛtakatvādivad bhāṣata ity anenaiva anumānāc chābdasyābhedaḥ pratipā-ditaḥ. asti prayojanam. kṛtakatvādikaṃ hi liṅgam arthāntaravyavacchedena svārthaṃ pratipādayatīti prāg etad upapāditam. tato yad anyāpohenety etan nocyeta, tadā pramāṇāntaravādināṃ iyaṃ kalpanā syāt: kṛtakatvādiliṅgam arthāntaravyāvṛttyā svārthaṃ pratyāpayati, śabdas tu vidhimukhena. tasmād eva viśeṣāc chābdam anumānād bhidyata iti. atas tannirāsārtham etad uktam:* "Suppose someone asks: "What purpose does the statement 'it [namely a word] denotes (*bhāṣate*) its own referent (*svārtham*) through exclusion of other [referents]' serve insofar as a word's non-difference from inference already is indicated by the statement "in the same way as the [inferential indicator, the general property] 'being produced, etc.'"? There is a purpose. For it has already been justified previously that the logical indicator 'being produced,' and so on, indicates its referent through exclusion of other referents. Consequently, if he did not say 'through exclusion of other [referents],' the adherents of the theory that [verbal cognition] is a means of cognition separate [from inference] might imagine that an inferential indicator like

'being produced' indicates its own referent through exclusion of other referents, whereas a word does so through affirmation (*vidhimukhena*). Because of this difference, verbal cognition differs from inference." Therefore, in order to rebut this [view] this is stated."

[14] The technical term *aṃśa* 'part' or attribute denotes any given general property as defined by exclusion of other referents. Things are qualified by a multitude of properties constituting a logical hierarchy, whose characteristics are defined by their position in the hierarchy. These properties, however, are not real general properties that are resident in the things they qualify, but are, according to Dignāgan epistemology, defined by exclusion of other things; cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b4-5: *bahavo hy abhidheyasyārthasyāṃśāḥ sattvajñeyatvādayo na ca taiḥ sarvair vṛkṣādiśab-dasyāvinābhāvitvasambandhaḥ:* "For the denotable object has a multitude of parts such as 'existence', 'knowability', and so on, and the word 'tree' is not connected with all of these as invariably concomitant." Cf. PS V:12-13, 34 with PSV V ad loc.

A similar use of *aṃśa* to denote any given part of the referent occurs in the alleged fragment from Dignāga's Hetumukha: *grāhyadharmas tadaṃśena vyāpto hetus tridhaiva saḥ,* Frauwallner 1982: 840; for the Dignāgan use of *grāhya,* cf. Dharmakīrti's PV I 89 with Manorathanandin's PVV ad loc.

Dignāga uses the synonymous term *bhāga* 'part' in the Sanskrit fragment from Dignāga's Dvādaśaśatikā quoted in Siddhasenagaṇin's Tattvārthabhāṣyavyākhya V 24: *yathāha Dvādaśaśatikāyām: yady apy uktam aprasaktasya kimarthaṃ prati-ṣedhaḥ? iti naivaitat pratiṣedhamātram ucyate, kin tu tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaravyāvṛttyā loke gamyate yathā viṣāṇitvād anaśva iti:* "As he claims in the Dvādaśaśatikā: Even though it is objected: What purpose does the negation of what is not applicable [e.g. the term *anaśva*] serve ? [We answer that] it is not mere negation that is expressed, but rather a certain part of the object in question is inferred in ordinary language (*loke*) through exclusion of other referents like, for instance, in the inference: it is a non-horse because it is horned." Cf. *Pind* 1991: 269 no. 1.

Dharmakīrti quotes a slightly edited version of it at PVSV 62,26: *arthāntara-vyāvṛttyā tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo gamyate;* cf. PSṬ Ms B 205a3: *tasya vastunaḥ kaścit bhāgo 'rthāntaranivṛttyā gamyate.* Jinendrabuddhi seems to quote a similar passage from Dignāga at PTS Ms B 61a6: *etad uktaṃ bhavati: arthāntara-vyāvṛttyupalakṣito yo vastuno bhāgaḥ sa eva vṛkṣaśabdasyārtha iti:* "Only that part of the object that is implied by exclusion of other referents is the referent of the word 'tree'."

[15] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 191b3-4: *yasyārthasya pratyāyanārtham*[(1)] *uccāryate, sa tasya viṣayaḥ pratyāyyatvāt*[(2)]*, yathā*[(3)] *liṅgasya liṅgī:* "the referent for the sake of indicating which [the word] is articulated, is its object (*viṣaya*) because it is the thing to be indicated, in the same way as the bearer of the inferential indicator (*liṅgī*) is [the object] of the inferential indicator (*liṅga*).
[(1)]em. (cf. *go bar byed pa* T) : *prayatvāyāyanārtham* Ms
[(2)]em. (cf. *go bar bya* T) : °*āpya* Ms
[(3)]em. : *ayamā?* Ms

[16] *avinābhāvitva* "the being invariably concomitant" defines the *sambandha* "connection" between any given word (*śabda*) or logical indicator (*liṅga,* etc.) and

the thing indicated viz. the referent (*artha*) or the thing inferred. Dignāga addresses the fundamental assymmetry that holds between the two relata of the indicator-indicated connection in a crucial passage at PS II 19-20 that fortunately is extant in Sanskrit:

nanu dvigatatvāt sambandhasya saṃyogivad liṅgidharmanā liṅgena bhavi-tavyam. naitad asti.

sambandho yady api dviṣṭhaḥ sahabhāvyaṅgaliṅginoḥ
ādhārādheyavad vṛttis tasya saṃyogivad na tu. [19]

yathā hi saty api dvigatatve sambandhasya, na kadācid ādhāra ādheyadharmā bhavati nāpy ādheya ādhāradharmā, tathā na kadācil liṅgaṃ liṅgi bhavati liṅgi vā liṅgam. saṃyogī yathaikas tathā dvitīya iti na tadvad iha. tathā hi

liṅge liṅgi bhavaty eva liṅginy evetarat punaḥ
niyamasya viparyase 'sambandho liṅgaliṅginoḥ. [20]

yasmāl liṅge liṅgi bhavati eva, tasmād yuktaṃ yad agnivad dhūmo dravyatvā-dīnām api prakāśakaḥ, na taikṣṇyādīnām. yasmāc ca liṅginy eva liṅgaṃ bhavati, nānyatra, tasmād yuktaṃ yad dhūmo dhūmatveneva pāṇḍutvādibhir api prakāśa-yati, na dravyatvādibhir iti. evaṃ hi avadhāraṇavaiparītyena sambandho liṅgaliṅ-ginoḥ:[1]

"Certainly the indicator (*liṅga*) will have the property of the indicated (*liṅgidharman*) because the connection (*sambandha*) relates to both [the indicator and the indicated] in the same way as [a conjunction relates to its two] conjuncts (*saṃyogivat*)! This is not the case.

Even though the relation between the together connected indicator and indicated resides in both, [nevertheless] its mode of existence is like [that of] a container and the contained, but not like [that of] conjuncts. [19]

Because, just as the contained never has the property of the container or the container never has the property of the contained, even though the relation is found to be resident in both, so also the indicator is never the indicated, nor is the indicated ever the indicator. In the case of a conjunct, however, one is just like the other. Therefore the case is not the same in this context.

That is,

The indicated only exists at the indicator; and the latter, in turn, exists only at the indicated. If the restriction is inverted, there is no connection of indicator to indicated. [20]

Since the indicated necessarily exists at the indicator, it is correct that smoke, in the same way as [it indicates] fire, also indicates substanceness, and so on, but [it is] not [correct] that it indicates [fire's] temperature, etc.; and since the indicator exists only at the indicated, and not elsewhere, it is correct that smoke, in the same way as

it [indicates] through smokeness, also indicates through the property of being smoke-coloured, and so on, but [it is] not [correct] that it indicates] through substanceness. Therefore, if the restriction is transposed there is no relation of indicator to indicated."

Dignāga apparently never defines *sambandha* in terms of *avinābhāvitva* in PS or PSV, but Siṃhasūri takes it for granted at NCV 627,21-22, q.v. below no. 26. Jinendrabuddhi's gloss at PSṬ II Ms B 72b6 *avinābhāvitvaṃ sambandhaḥ* explains Dignāga's use of the term *sambandha* at PS II 20a: *sambandho yady api dviṣṭhaḥ;* cf. the definition of *sambandha* at Ms B 183a7: *avinābhāvitvaṃ hi sambandha iti.*
   [1]For the Sanskrit fragments, cf. 1. NCV: 678,5ff; 2. NCV: 699,18; 3. NCV: 678,18–679,19; 4. PM: 43; NCV: 679,16 (pāda a).

   [4] *ye tv āhur: jātiśabdaḥ svabhedān sarvān evāha, ukteṣu tu niyamārthaṃ viśeṣaśrutir <iti>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 193a4-7: *ye tv āhur jātiśabda ityādi ... jātiśabda iti. svabhedān iti ... sarvān evāheti ... ukteṣu tu niyamārthaṃ viśeṣaśrutir iti.*

   [17] Here as elsewhere Dignāga seems to quote the work he is addressing. It is not possible to ascertain the identity of the work and its author. It is noteworthy, however, that the term *niyama* is used by Bhartṛhari in a similar context, cf. no. 21 below.

   [18] The theory of denotation to which Dignāga refers is based upon the assumption that a general term denotes all particulars through transfer of the general property to every individual substance in the form of non-difference (*abhedopacāra*). That is, the general property and the thing in which it is claimed to be instantiated become identified through co-reference, in the same way as when one transfers the properties of a lion to a *brāhmaṇa* boy like in the statement "the *brāhmaṇa* boy is a lion."
   Cf. Siṃhasūri's lucid exposition of the view Dignāga is addressing at NCV 627,11-13: *yasmāt sacchabdo jātisambandhino jātim upādāyātmarūpeṇa dravyādīn abhedopacārād āha, tasmād abhedopacārahetunā vyapadiśyate jātiśabda iti. yathā siṃho māṇavaka iti siṃhaśabdo māṇavakaguṇān upādāyābhedopacārapravṛtter abhedopacārahetunā vyapadiśyate guṇaśabda iti:* "Since the word 'existent,' while being based upon the general property, in its own form denotes substances, and so on, that are the relata of the general property due to transfer in the form of non-difference, it is designated as 'general term' on account of transfer in the form of non-difference. Just as the word 'lion' in the statement 'the young brāhmaṇa is a lion', while being based upon the qualities of the young brāhmaṇa is designated as 'quality word' on account of transfer in the form of non-difference because it applies by transfer in the form of non-difference."
   Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of the view at Ms B 193a2-3 is similar: *kathaṃ punar anabhidheyā satī jātir vyapadeśahetuḥ? abhedopacārahetutvād guṇavat. yathā "siṃho māṇavaka" iti śauryādiguṇaviśeṣaḥ siṃhamāṇavakayor abhedopacārahetur bhavan vyapadeśahetur bhavati, guṇaśabda iti, tathā jātir api śabdasya bhedair abhedopacārahetur iti sādhyavyapadeśahetuḥ:* "How, moreover, is the general property the cause of designation (*vyapadeśahetu*), when it is not denotable? Because it is the cause of transfer in the form of non-difference in the same way as a

quality (*guṇavat*). For instance, in the statement 'the young *brāhmaṇa* is a lion,' a particular quality like bravery, being the cause of transfer in the form of non-difference of the lion with the young brahmin, is the cause of designation; in the same way the general property is the cause of transfer of the term [denoting it] in the form of non-difference of [the general property] with the particulars. Thus it is the cause of designation of that which is to be indicated."

The subsequent explanation at NCV and PSṬ would indicate that Dignāga addresses views comparable to those traditionally ascribed to Vyājapyāyana by Kātyāyana at vārt 35-44 on A I.2:64, namely that a term denotes a class property as resident in individual substances; cf. no. 21 below.

Dignāga's well-known definition of *pratyakṣa* at NM (T 1628 3b15-17; T 1629 8c9-11) is terminologically indebted to this view, although this does not imply that he considers qualifiers to be real entities rather than products of *kalpanā,* cf. TSP 456,15-19 quoting and explaining the passage: *"yaj jñānam arthe rūpādau* (so read) *viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpakam tad akṣam akṣam prati vartata iti pratyakṣam" iti. viśeṣaṇam jātyādi, abhidhāyakam nāma, tayor abhedopacāro jātyādimadbhiḥ sañjñinā ca. abhedopacāragrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam yatrāpi bhedena grahaṇam: asya gotvam asyedam nāmeti, tatrāpi kalpaneṣyaita eva.*

Notice that throughout PSV V Dignāga uses the terms *jāti* and *sāmānya* interchangeably to denote any given general property.

[19] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 193a4-5: *svasyā jāter bhedān*[1]. *yā jātir yasya śabdasya vyapadeśahetuḥ, sā tasya svam bhavati. bhidyante parasparato viśiṣyanta iti bhedāḥ. yathā jāter dravyaguṇakarmāṇi.*
[1]em. : *°ām* Ms

[20] Jinendrabuddhi addresses the implications of the expression *sarvān eva* at PSṬ Ms B 193a: *sarvān evāha, na kiñcid eva. tathā hi brāhmaṇo na hantavya ity ukte sarve brāhmaṇajātibhedā Māṭharādayo na hanyanti. yadi jātiśabdo niravaśeṣān svabhedān āha, kimartham tarhi brāhmaṇaḥ Kauṇḍinya ānīyatām iti viśeṣaśrutiḥ? yāvatā brāhmaṇaśabdenaiva Kauṇḍinyo 'bhihita iti:* denotes *all,* i.e., not just some. That is, when it is said that one should not kill a *brāhmaṇa,* all individuals of the *brāhmaṇa* class like the son of Maṭhara are not to be killed. If a general term denotes all its particulars without exception, then what purpose does a particular term serve, like when it is said 'bring the *brāhmaṇa,* son of Kuṇḍina' inasmuch as the son of Kuṇḍina is denoted by the word *'brāhmaṇa*?'"

The example *brāhmaṇo na hantavya* is taken from Patañjali's comment at Mahā-bh I 242,24f on vārttika 39: *dharmaśāstram ca tathā,* whose implications Patañjali explains in the following way: *evam ca kṛtvā dharmaśāstram pravṛttam: Brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ ... brāhmaṇamātram na hanyate ... yadi dravyam padārthaḥ syād ekam brāhmaṇam ahatvā ... anyatra kāmacāraḥ syāt:* "And on this assumption [viz. that a term denotes a class property] the *dharmaśāstra* proceeds: [The injunction] 'one should not kill a *'brāhmaṇa''* means 'one does not kill any *brāhmaṇa* at all' ... If an individual substance were the referent denoted by the word one could do as one pleased by abstaining from killing one brāhmaṇa;" cf. *Scharff* 1996: 118-19.

Mallavādi alludes to the view that the application of a term denoting particulars merely has the purpose of restricting the scope of the general term; he presents his view at in a *kārikā* based upon PS V 2: *na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyād vyabhicārataḥ, vācako niyamārthokter jātimadvad apohavān;* cf. NCV 606,21-22

and the passage op. cit. 606,10-13 in which Siṃhasūri explains that every new term that is added to the preceding general term, like for instance *'brāhmaṇa,'* has the purpose of restricting the scope of the general term in accordance with the intended meaning. Thus any term that is articulated subsequently to the general term with the function of restricting its scope is a particular term. Consequently restriction is the establishing of its own referent, i.e., it is a restriction with respect to the referent: *niyamārthā punaḥpunaḥśrutir vivakṣitārthā, kasmāt? tadarthatvād viśeṣārthatvād viśeṣaṇārthatvāt pūrvaśruteḥ sāmānyaśruter brāhmaṇādeḥ. tasmāc chravaṇakāla-krameṇa punaḥśrutir iti viśeṣaśabda ucyate. ko 'sau niyamo nāma? ity ucyate: niyamaḥ svārthavyavasthāpanaṃ vivakṣite 'rthe 'vadhāraṇam.*

Cf. also Bhartṛhari's discussion of the restrictive function of *punaḥśrutiḥ* at VP II:64ff (cf. the expression *niyamārthā punaḥśrutiḥ,* 64b).

Jinendrabuddhi comments briefly on the subject of restriction at Ms B 193a7 by introducing the delimitative/restrictive particle (*avadhāraṇa*) *eva,* which Siṃha-sūris's explanation presupposes*: Kauṇḍinya eva na Māṭhara iti yathā kriyā hi dravyaṃ ninayatīti ukte punar nādravyam iti niyamārtham ucyate yathā gamyeta dravyam eveti:* "Only (*eva*) Kauṇḍinya, not *Māṭhara.* Just as when it is said "for an ation moves a substance (towards something)," and, in addition, it is said for the sake of restriction, "not a non-substance," so that one understands "only a substance."

For Dignāga's use of *eva* as semantically equivalent to *vyatireka* "joint absence" or exclusion, cf. PSV V 38c § 54 below.

[5] *<tatrocyate:> na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka iti vakṣyate*[1]. Restored, cf. NCV 627,10-11: *na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācaka iti vakṣyate;* PSṬ Ms B 193a7: *vācaka iti vakṣyata iti;* NV 326,10; TSP 342,12-13.
[1]Cf. *rjod par byed pa źes brjod par bya 'o* V : *brjod par byed pa ma yin no* K.

[21] Dignāga refers to the occurrence of *vācakaḥ* in pāda 2c, which is to be construed with 2a; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 193b: *sākāṅkṣatvād aparisamāptaṃ vākyam iti vakṣyamāṇena padenākāṅkṣāvicchedaṃ darśayati:* "Thinking that the clause is incomplete because it entails expectation of a sentence complement (*sākāṅkṣatvāt*) he excludes the expectation of a sentence complement by means of the syntactical word that is going to be used (i.e., *vācakaḥ*)."

The problems which PS V 2a-c caused its Tibetan translators are basically due to the fact that in Sanskrit the negation does not cliticise on the verb like in classical Tibetan. This excludes the possibility of using it as a morpheme syntactically independent of the verb unlike the negation *na* in Sanskrit. In the present case the negation *na* of 2a has to be construed twice with *vācakaḥ*. Since the translators of K and V have followed the common practice of translating 2a as a syntactically independent clause, they were unable to construct the negation with *rjod par byed pa = vācakaḥ* twice. Although V loc. cit. reproduces correctly the sentence complement *vācaka iti vakṣyati* as *rjod par byed pa źes brjod par bya'o,* the introduction of *med* before the complement is syntactically and semantically impossible, whereas the use of *mi* would have been syntactically correct. K, on the other hand, uses *min,* and, moreover, correctly adds, as if to compensate for the syntactical ambiguity of *min,* another negation after the sentence complement, so that K reads *brjod par byed pa ma yin no,* although it occurs in the wrong place after

2b$_1$ *mtha' yas phyir daṅ* (= *ānantyāt*) without any syntactical connection with 2a. V introduces correctly the negation *min* in 2d*,* cf. no. 34 below.

[6] *jātiśabdas tāvat sadādir <dravyādīnāṃ na vācakaḥ>.* Restored, cf. NCV 627,11: *jātiśabdas tāvat sadādir iti,* cf. *re źig rigs kyi sgra yod pa la sogs pa rdzas la sogs pa rnams kyi brjod par byed pa ma yin te* V : om. K.

[7] *ānantyāt. ānantye hi bhedānām aśakyaḥ sambandhaḥ kartum. na cākṛtasambandhe śabde 'rthābhidhānaṃ yuktaṃ svarūpamātrapratīteḥ.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 193b1: *ānantyāt;* NCV 627,14: *ānantyād iti hetuḥ;* TSP 342,13; NCV 606,21-22; Ms B 193b1-3: *ānantye hi bhedānām ityādi. aśakyaḥ sambandhaḥ kartum iti ... na cākṛtasambandhe śabde 'rthābhidhānaṃ yuktam iti;* 193b6: *svarūpamātrapratīter iti;* NCV 627,14-16;21;23. NCV 706,21: *ānantye hi bhedānām ityādi granthavyākhyānanyāyavat.*

^{22} Cf. PST Ms B 193b1: *ānantyād ity upapattiḥ. kasyānantyāt? prakṛtatvād bhedānām eva;* cf. the similar explanation at NCV 627,14-15, indicating that it is based upon the same source as Jinendrabuddhi's ṭīkā: *ānantyād iti hetuḥ. kasyānantyāt? bhedānām, yasmāt te pūrvaṃ prakṛtā na cānyaḥ śrūyate;* TSP 342,12-14: *ayam eva ca akṛtasamayatvād iti hetur ācāryadiṅnāgena "na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ vācakaḥ, ānantyād" ity anena nirdiṣṭaḥ. tathā hi "ānantyād" ity anena samayāsambhava eva nirdiṣṭaḥ.* Uddyotakara presents the argument at NV 324,3-4 as follows: *sacchabdaḥ piṇḍānāṃ vācako bhaviṣyatīti na yuktaṃ piṇḍānām ānantyāt;* cf. no. 29 below for Uddyotakara's reproduction of Dignāga's argument.

^{23} Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's gloss at PST Ms B 193,2: *ākhyātum: karoter anekārthatvāt;* cf. the identical gloss at NCV 627,17: *kartum ākhyātum; karoter anekārthatvāt.*

^{24} Siṃhasūri interprets *ānantya* as denoting: **1.** spatial remoteness, cf. NCV 627,16: *na hi pāṭaliputrādisthā dravyādaya ihasthena sacchabdena sahākhyātuṃ śakyāḥ:* "For it is not possible for one who is situated here simultaneously to denote substances, and so on, that are situated in Pāṭaliputra, and so on, by means of the word 'existent;'" cf. Jinendrabuddhi's similar explanation at Ms B 193b3-4: *ye vidūradeśavartino na ta ihasthānāṃ svasya pratiyoginaḥ sambandhitvenākhyātuṃ śakyaḥ;* **2.** infinity in terms of the variety of particulars, cf. NCV 627,16: *ānantyād vā dravyādīnām. tathā hi te ghaṭapaṭarathādibhedenānantāḥ. evaṃ tāvat sambandhibhedād bhedam abhyupagamyedam ucyate, na tu tasya vastunaḥ svagato bhedo 'sti. tatredam eva kāraṇaṃ yat sambandhāntaraviśiṣṭābhidhāyī śabdaḥ sambandhāntaraviśiṣṭaśabdavācyam asamartho vaktum, gavāśvādivat. tasmād bhedānām avācakaḥ:* "Or because substances, and so on, are infinite. That is, they are infinite because of the difference between pot, cloth, wagon, etc. Thus, in the first place, this is said on the assumption that the difference is due to difference of the relata. The difference of the entity [from other entities], however, is not understood per se. This then is the reason why a denoting word which is qualified by one connection is incapable of denoting the [entity] that is the denotable object of a word that is qualified by another connection, like [the words] 'cow' and 'horse,' etc. Therefore it does not denote the particulars."

Siṃhasūri's use of the term *sambandhibheda* would seem to allude to VP III.1:33: *sambandhibhedāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu jātir ity ucyate. tasyāṃ sarve śabdā vyavasthitāḥ.* One cannot therefore exclude the possibility that Dignāga has Bhartṛhari's view of *sattā* in mind.

[25] Cf. PST Ms B 193b6: *yo bhedair anākhyātasambandho na sa teṣāṃ vācako mlecchaśabdavat.*

Siṃhasūri explains *sambandha* in terms of *avinābhāvitva,* cf. NCV 627,21-22: *akṛtasambandha ity anākhyātasambandhe śabda iti dviṣṭhatve 'pi sambandhasya śabdasyaivāvinābhāvitvād arthapratyāyakatvaṃ darśayati:* "By the statement 'as the connection [of the word] has not been told' viz. as the connection of the word has not been stated, he shows that although the connection is resident in two things [viz. the word and the thing it denotes] the word exclusively indicates its referent because of being invariably concomitant with it."

For the technical term *avinābhāvitva* as defining the scope of *sambandha,* cf. Dignāga's use above of the term *avinabhāvitvasambandha* for defining the nature of the relation between a word and its denotation at PSV V §1 with no. 17. The term *akṛtasambandha* refers to the situation before the denotation of any given word has been taught by pointing at its referent (*vyutpatti*). Dignāga addresses the theoretical implications of *vyutpatti* below at PSV V 50bc (§ 65). The term *akṛtasambandha* occurs once in Bhartṛhari's VP III 166c.

[26] Cf. PST Ms B 193b 2: *tad etad dhetudvayam uktam: ānantyaṃ sambandhāśakyatve*[(1)] *hetuḥ, anākhyātasambandhatvaṃ punar anabhidhāne*[(2)]: "The following two reasons are formulated: infinity is the reason for the impossibility of connection; the reason, moreover, for not denoting is the fact that the connection is not told."

A similar explanation is found at NCV 627,22: *atra cānantyaṃ pāramparyeṇānabhidhānahetuḥ: tato hi sambandhāśakyatā, sambandhāvyutpatter anabhidhānam:* "And in this case infinity is indirectly the reason for not denoting. For because of this [infinity] the connection is impossible, and as a consequence of not teaching the connection there is no denotation."

Dharmakīrti argues in the same way at PVSV 47,7-10: *syād etad ānantyād vyaktīnām aśakyaḥ śabdena sambandhaḥ kartum. evaṃ satīdam ānantyaṃ tadvaty api samānam. jātyāpihi viśiṣṭā vyaktaya eva vaktavyā ity akṛtasambandhasyānabhidhānād avaśyaṃ tatra sambandhaḥ karaṇīyaḥ. sa ca na śakyate.*
[(1)]*°tve hetuḥ* em. : *°tvahetuḥ* Ms
[(2)]*°āne* em. : *°āno* Ms

[27] The technical term *svarūpa* denotes the phonetic form of any linguistic item without reference to its denotation. It is used by Pāṇini at A I.1:68: *svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya śabdasañjñā* to indicate that the own form of a linguistic item refers to that element itself, and not to the thing it denotes. The term was interpreted differently in the grammatical tradition. Some considered the *svarūpa* to be any particular instance of any given linguistic item, whereas others considered it to be identical with the word type, cf. Bhartṛhari's exposition at VP I:68-69, 83; *Pind 1991.* See DSG, Renou, *Terminologie* s.v.

In the present case Dignāga is using the term in the original sense, cf. NCV 627,23-68,7: *yatra śabdasyārthena sambandho 'vyutpanno yathā mlecchaśabdānāṃ tatra śabdamātraṃ pratīyate nārtha ityādi:* "When the connection of the word with [its] referent has not been taught as in the case of the words of non-Aryans, only the speech unit is understood, not the referent." A similar explanation, presumably based on the same source, in all likelihood SPVy, is given at Ms B 193b6: *mlecchaśabde hi śabdasvarūpamātram eva pratīyate, nārthaḥ.*

[28] Uddyotakara reproduces almost verbatim the content of this paragraph at NV 324,4-6: *sacchabdaḥ piṇḍānāṃ vācako bhaviṣyatīti na yuktaṃ piṇḍānām ānantyāt. na hy ekasya śabdasyānekadravyaguṇaprapañcena sambandha ākhyātuṃ śakyaḥ. na cānākhyāte śabdārthasambandhe śabdād arthapratipattir yuktā, svarūpamātrapratīteḥ:* "It is not justified to claim that the word 'existent' will denote the particulars because they are infinie. For it is impossible to tell the connection of a single word with a multitude of many substances and qualities. And in that the connection of the word with its referent is not told it is not justified that the cognition of the referent follows from the word because it is merely the own form of the word that is cognized."

Uddotakara may have used the infinitive *ākhyātum* because he found it in the source he was quoting, which in all likelihood is Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa cf. no. 30 below.

[8] *kiṃ ca, vyabhicārataḥ. yathā hi sacchabdo dravye vartate tathā guṇādiṣv*[(1)] *apīti. vyabhicārāt saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 193b7: *kiñceti;* 194a1-2: *vyabhicārata iti,* NCV 661,13: *yat tūktan tvayā: vyabhicarata iti;* Ms B 193b7: *yathā hītyādi;* NCV 661,14: *sacchabdo hi yathā dravye vartate*[(1)] *tathā guṇādiṣv*[(2)] *apīti. Vyabhicārāt saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam*[(3)]; Ms B 194a1: *dravyābhāve 'pi guṇe darśanāt. tadabhāve 'pi ca dravyakarmaṇor iti; sarvatra vyabhicārataḥ*[(4)] *saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam.*

[(1)]Cf. *'jug pa* V : *yin pa* K.

[(2)]*guṇā°* em. : *ghaṭādiṣu* NCV.

[(3)]Cf. *'khrul pa'i phyir the tshom du 'gyur gyi, rjod par byed pa ni ma yin no* V : *brjod par byed pa ni ma yin gyi 'khrul pa'i phyir the tshom za bar 'gyur ro* K.

[(4)]*°cārataḥ* em. : *cāraḥ* Ms

[29] Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga's argument in a more elaborate form at NV 324,6-9, presumably on the basis of Dignāga's lost Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa: *vyabhicārāc ca. sacchabdaśravaṇāc ca dravyaguṇakarmāṇīti pariplavamānā buddhir avatiṣṭhate; na ca yasmād abhidhānāt pariplavate buddhis tad abhidhānam iti yuktam vaktum. tasmāt sacchabdo bhedānāṃ na vācaka iti:* "Moreover, [the general term 'existent' does not denote the particulars] because of ambiguity. Moreover, from hearing the word 'existent' the mind remains in a state of confusion as to substance, quality, or action; and it is not justified to claim that the denotation due to which the mind is confused is denotation. Therefore the word 'existent' does not denote the particulars."

Dignāga's arguments for the impossibility that general terms denote the particulars are mentioned by Kumārila at Tantravārttikam on MS III 1:12 p. 39,16ff: *nanu vyaktīnām ānantyavyabhicārābhyām anabhidhānam uktam.*

Jinendrabuddhi closes his exegesis of this paragraph with the following discussion at Ms B 194a2-5, which presupposes Dharmakīrtian philosophy: *nanu ca jātiśabdāt sarvasvabhedapratītiḥ. na hi sarveṣu saṃśaya upajāyate. na ca sarvasvabhedābhāve kadācij jātiśabdasya kvacid arthāntaravṛttir upalabdhā; tat kuto vyabhicāraḥ? naiṣa doṣaḥ. na hi jātiśabdena bhedābhedarūpasaṃsparśena pratyāyayate. na ca samastabhedarūpaṃ nāma teṣāṃ sāmānyam asti yac chabdenābhidhīyeta, bhedarūpaparityāge teṣām eva jātitvaprasaṅgāt. na ca bhedarūpeṇa vyāptir asti, parasparavyāvṛttatvād*[(1)] *bhedarūpasyeti, nāsty asiddhiḥ.*
      [(1)]Cf. PV I 40-42 and PVSV 24,24 ad loc.

[9]   *yo 'pi manyate <jātiśabdas*[(1)] *tu jātimātre*[(2)] *tadyogamātre*[(3)] *vā> sambandhasaukaryād avyabhicārāc ceti, tad ayuktam*[(4)]. *<tayoś ca na>*.[(5)] Restored, cf. PST Ms B 194a5-7: *yo 'pi manyata iti … sambandhasaukaryād avyabhicārāc ceti … tad ayuktam iti.*
      [(1)]Cf. *rigs kyi sgra tsam* V : *sgra de* K.
      [(2)]*rigs tsam* K : om. V.
      [(3)]*de daṅ ldan pa tsam la ni* V : *de daṅ ldan pa'i* K. Ms B does not make it possible to resolve the question of which version is preferable. From the point of view of syntax and content V is better than K. I assume that the affix *la* V is used to reproduce the Sanskrit locative. The reading *'brel pa can yin te | sla ba'i phyir* K is, I assume, a mistake for *'brel pa sla ba'i phyir* based on a faulty manuscript reading.
      [(4)]This clause is not reproduced in VK. Assuming that it is an integral part of the original Sanskrit version of this paragraph, it presumably belongs here.
      [(5)]For this restoration, cf. no. 34 below.

[30] The two locatives are used to express "in the sense of" or "to denote," a usage that is well known in Sanskrit grammatical literature. For *tadyoga = tayā = jātyā yogaḥ = sambandhaḥ,* cf. TSP 340,23; NSBh ad NS II 2:62: *yasya jātyā yogas tad atra jātiviśiṣṭam abhidhīyate gaur iti;* cf. the reference to *tadyoga* at PV III 173: *tasmād jātyāditadyogā nārthe teṣu ca na śrutiḥ.*
      The relation to which Dignāga's opponent is referring is *samavāya* 'inherence,' which is defined at PBh §§ 373 as follows: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ;* cf. TSP 313,15: *samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ* (quoting an unidentified work by Uddyotakara).
      PBh § 384 uses the expression *sattāyogaḥ* to denote the inherence of the general property existence in substances, qualities, and actions: *yathā dravyaguṇakarmaṇāṃ sadātmakasya bhāvasya nānyaḥ sattāyogo 'sti, evam avibhāgino vṛttyātmakasya samavāyasya nānyā vṛttir asti.*
      Bhartṛhari mentions the view at VP II 126 that a general term denotes the inherence relation (*saṃsarga*). The underlying assumption is that since the inherence relation is not perceived apart from its relata i.e. the general property and the thing in which it inheres through the inherence relation, it is unreal (*asatya*) as the denotatum of any given general term as only the object as related to the general property's (*saṃsṛṣṭa*) through the inherence relation is real. Since Bhartṛhari's *svavṛtti* on VP II 126 is no longer extant, I quote Puṇyarāja's *ṭīkā* ad loc.: *atha jātiguṇakriyātmakasyārthasyāsatyabhūtaḥ saṃsarga eva śabdārtha iti pañcamam pakṣaṃ darśayitum āha: asatyo vāpi saṃsargaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścid iṣyate* (VP II 126). *ghaṭādibhiḥ śabdair ghaṭādīnāṃ jātyādisaṃsarga ucyate. sa cātra*

tadvyatirekeṇānupalabhād asatyabhūta evocyate. tasmāt saṃsṛṣṭaḥ padārtha eva satyabhūta iti.

[31] The expression *yo 'pi* no doubt refers to a particular philosopher, whose view Dignāga briefly mentions. Although it is not possible to identify him, he must have been a Vaiśeṣika because the doctrine Dignāga addresses in this paragraph is characteristic of Vaiśeṣika philosophy: the claim that a general term like *sat* denotes either the mere general property or the mere inherence relation of the general property is only understandable with the background of Vaiśeṣika ontology. When Dignāga's opponent claims that the connection is easy to establish with the general property existence, it is because it is conceived as one and indivisible. The same is true of the connection of the general property to the thing in which it resides because the connection or inherence is one and indivisible like the general property existence. Since general properties instantiate identically giving rise to the same cognition in each individual instance, and the connection which connects by way of inherence (*sambandha = samavāya*) any given substance to the general property is one and the same like the general property itself, it follows that the problems of the individuals being infinite and the ambiguity of the denotation of the word 'existent' do not obtain. The unity of existence is explained at VS I.2:18: *salliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣāliṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāva iti;* Praśastapāda explains the unity (*ekatva*) of general properties as such at the related paragraph PBh § 367: *dravyādiṣu vṛttiniyamāt pratyayabhedāc ca parasparataś cānyatvaṃ pratyekaṃ svāśrayeṣu lakṣaṇaviśeṣād viśeṣalakṣaṇābhāvāc ca ekatvam;* cf. also §§ 361ff; and he deduces the unity of inherence at PBh § 377: *na ca saṃyogavan nānātvaṃ bhāvaliṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣāliṅgābhāvāc ca bhāvavat sarvatraikaḥ samavāyaḥ;* cf. also §§ 373ff.

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of the opponent's claim at Ms B 194a5-7 presupposes this theoretical background: *sukaro hi jāter ekatvāt, saty api bahuviṣayatve pratyekaṃ sarvātmanā parisamāptatvāt, sāmīpyāc cāśrayasamīpatayā sambandhaḥ. sambandhasya ca svāśrayasamavāyasya vyabhicāro 'pi nāsty eva. bhedānāṃ hy anekatvāt parasparam abhāve tu bhāvād vyabhicāro yujyate, na tu jātau yoge vā tayor abhedāt tadabhāve ca śabdasyāvṛtteḥ:* "For the connection (*sambandhaḥ*) is feasible (*sukara*) due to the unity of the general property because it pervades every single entity completely, although the referents are many, and because of [its] proximity due to the proximity of [its] substrate. Nor is there ambiguity with regard to the relation, i.e., its inherence in its own substrate. For it is correct that there is ambiguity with regard to the particulars because they are many, and, moreover because they occur as mutually non-existent, but not with regard to the general property or the relation because they are not particulars and because the word would not apply if they did not exist."

[32] Cf. PST Ms B 194a7-194b1: *yuktyā na sambandhyata ity arthaḥ. kā punar atra yuktiḥ? āgamākhyaṃ pramāṇam. kathaṃ tayā na sambadhyate: "bhedārthair apṛthakśruteḥ:"* "The meaning is that it is not in agreement with reasoning. What, moreover, is reasoning in this case? It is the means of knowledge called *āgama* (received doctrine). In what way is it not in agreement with this [reasoning]? "Because it is not "heard apart" from [words] having particular [general properties] as referents [2cd].""

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation connects the phrase *tad ayuktam* with PS V 2d, as if the latter followed immediately after it. It is not possible to decide if his explanation reflects the readings of the Ms he was using for his *ṭīkā*.

[33] The negation *na* of PS V 2a has to be construed with *vācakaḥ* of 2c, cf. NMañjGBh 137,15-16: *atra na jātiśabdo yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apṛthakśrutair* (sic) *ity ato vācaka iti sambadhyate.*

V 106,29-30 has placed the negation *min* after *rjod byed*. This is correct from the point of view of Tibetan syntax in that the negation in Tibetan necessarily cliticizes on the verb, although strictly speaking it is not part of the original Sanskrit version of 2cd. The negation necessarily carries over from 2a to 2c, and Dignāga therefore had to incorporate it as part of the *vṛtti* on 2cd. K, on the other hand, reproduces the negation *ma yin te* immediately before *rjod byed* that translates *vācakaḥ,* evidently imitating the syntax of the underlying Sanskrit at the cost of producing a syntactically and semantically misleading Tibetan translation. However, the negation preceding *vācakaḥ* is correctly reproduced in K § 15, where 2cd is quoted in the following form without consideration for the usual metrical constraints: *ldan pa daṅ rigs rjod par byed pa ma yin te | khyad par gyi don daṅ tha mi dad pas thos pa'i phyir ro.*

The demonstrative pronouns *de dag gi* K : *de dag* V probably render Sanskrit *tayoḥ* in agreement with *yogajātyoḥ* of 2c. There is no reason to assume that *de dag* and *de dag gi* reproduce the correlative **tasya* of *yo 'pi* because both K and V usually distinguish between singular and plural/dual. For such constructions, cf., e.g., PVSV 29,7: *yo 'pi manyate ... tasyāpi* (+ PV I 52); 66,7: *yo 'pi ... āha tasyāpi;* 67,1-6: *yo 'pi manyate ... iti, tasyāpi.* 78,24-26: *yo 'pi ... tasyāpi.*

[10] *vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apṛthakśruteḥ.* Qu. Ms B 194b1; ŚVṬ 49,25; NR 422,8; NMañjGBh 137,16.

[34] Dignāga is using the technical term *apṛthakśruti* as a synonym of co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), which entails inflectional identity of case affixes. It refers to the fact that there is no auditive perception of difference of case affix (*vibhakti*) between that of the term *sat* and the term it qualifies, e.g., *dravya* (n.) or *guṇa* (m.); cf. the mention of *apṛthakśrutidoṣa* at PSV V:36ab. Kumārila uses the term *pṛthak* 'apart' (= *vaiyadhikaraṇya*) as opposed to *abhinna* 'one with' (= *sāmānadhikaraṇya*) at ŚV Anumāna°: 25b (cf. *Randle* 1930: 270). The somewhat odd term *(a)pṛthakśruti* is known from indigeneous Sanskrit phonology, cf. Renou, *Terminologie* s.vv. *pṛthak-,* and *śruti.* Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga's argument at NV 323,17-18 (cf. op. cit 325,19-20) as follows: *bhedārthair abhinnavibhaktikatvāt,* cf. no. 37 below.

[35] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 194b1: *bhedā arthā yeṣām iti bhedārthā viśeṣaśabdās; tair apṛthakśrutiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam. apṛthag ekasminn adhikaraṇe śrutir iti kṛtvā:* "'Having particular [general properties]' as referents' means 'whose referents are particular [general properties],' namely particular terms. 'Not hearing apart' from these means 'co-reference' in that the hearing is not separate with regard to one and the same referent (*adhikaraṇa*)."

[11] *tathā hi <sad dravyam, san guṇaḥ, sat karmeti*[(1)] *bhedārthair dravyādiśabdaiḥ> sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt. tac ca dṛṣṭam.* Restored, cf. NCV 730,26: *tathaiva hi dārṣṭāntikatvena tvanmataṃ pradarśanam eva yāvat sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt;* Ms B 194b2: *tac ca dṛṣṭam iti.*
[(1)]Cf. Candrānanda in Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti 3,12: *sad dravyaṃ san guṇaḥ sat karma iti* and no. 37 below.

³⁶ The opponent assumes that the word '*sat*' exclusively denotes *sattā* or the relation of *sattā* to the thing it qualifies as distinct from the substance, quality or action in which it inheres. Dignāga therefore concludes that observable instances of co-reference like the phrase *"sad dravyam"* are in conflict with the theory of denotation to which the opponent is subscribing. The phrases *sad dravyam,* and so on, are syntactically similar to compounds and Dignāga and his commentators therefore interpret them as as if they were compounds. This appears from his statements at PSV V:35ab addressing the above-mentioned problems.

The content of this paragraph presupposes Vaiśeṣika philosophy, cf. PST Ms B 194b1: *dṛṣṭā hy āptebhyo 'pṛthakśrutiḥ sad dravyam ityādi tad na syāt:* "For co-reference as in *sad dravyam*, and so on, that is observed from trustworthy authorities would not occur," and ibid. 194b2: *jātisambandhābhidhānapratijñā śāstradṛṣṭena sāmānādhikaraṇyena bādhyata ity arthaḥ:* "The thesis that it denotes the connection of the general property is in conflict with the co-reference that is observed in *śāstra;*"cf. Candrānanda ad VS I.1:7: *sad dravyaṃ san guṇaḥ sat karma iti sattā trayāṇām aviśeṣaḥ,* and ad VS I.2:7: *"sad iti yato dravyaguṇakarmasu." bhinneṣu dravyādiṣu triṣu yato jāyate 'sat sat' iti buddhiḥ sā sattā.*

Uddyotakara reproduces Dignāga's argument as *pūrvapakṣa* at NV 223,17-21: *tatra na tāvaj jātir abhidhīyate bhedārthair abhinnavibhaktikatvāt. yady ayaṃ jātivācakaḥ sacchabdo bhavati sad dravyam iti bhedavācinā dravyaśabdena saha sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na prāpnoti, na hi bhinnārthavācakānāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ paśyāmaḥ, na hi gavāśvam iti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ dṛṣṭam:* "In the first place, [the word 'existent'] does not denote the general property because it has case affix in common with [words] whose referents are particular [general properties]. If the word 'existent' denotes the general property, co-reference with the word 'substance' that denotes a particular [general property] as in [the statement] 'a substance is existent' does not obtain. For we do not observe that [words] denoting different referents are co-referential, for co-reference is not observed like [it is not observed] in [the dvandva compound] 'cows and horses' (cf. A II 4:11)."

[12] *na hi sattā <tadyogo*[(1)] *vā> dravyaṃ guṇo vā bhavati, kiṃ tarhi, dravyasya guṇasya vā.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 194b3-4: *na hi sattā ... kiṃ tarhi, dravyasya guṇasya veti;* see parallel at NCV 730,25-28: *yathā na hi sattā dravyaṃ guṇo vā bhavati ... kiṃ tarhi dravyasya guṇasya vā.*
[(1)]Cf. *de daṅ ldan pa la* (sic) V : *ldan pa* K.

³⁷ According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga alludes to the definition of *sattā* at VS I 1:8-10: *dravyaguṇakarmabhyo 'rthāntaraṃ sattā. ekadravyavattvān na dravyam. guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇaḥ:* "Existence is a different thing from substance, quality, and action. It is not a substance because it is possessed by a substance. Because [existence] is resident in qualities and actions, it is neither a quality nor an action;" and *samavāya* at VS VII 2:31:

dravyatvaguṇatvakarmatvapratiṣedho bhāvena vyākhyātaḥ: "The negation of being a substance, a quality, and an action is explained in accordance with [the general property] existence;" cf. PST Ms B 194b4: *yasmād dravyaguṇakarmabhyo 'rthāntaraṃ sattety uktam. sambandhasya ca dravyādipratiṣedho*[1] *bhāvena*[2] *vyākhyātaḥ:* "Since it is explained that "existence is a different thing from substance, quality, and action," and that the negation *of the inherence relation's* being a substance, etc. (*dravyatvādi*), is explained in accordance with existence."

Candrānanda explains at VSV 61,18: *yathaikadravyavattvān na dravyaṃ bhāvo guṇakarmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇa evaṃ samavāyo 'pi:* "Just as existence is not a substance because it is possessed by a substance, and it is not a quality or an action because it is resident in qualities and actions, so also inherence."

[1] Although T corroborates the reading *dravyādi°* the correct reading must be *dravyatvādi°.*

[2] *bhāvena* conj : *bhāve tu* Ms. The reading *bhāve tu* is meticulously reproduced at T 154,35 as *dṅos po la ni bśad pa 'o,* although it is meaningless in the context. In spite of that the Tibetan translator evidently preferred to translate what he read in his Ms, and made no attempt to "correct" it.

[38] Jinendrabuddhi limits himself to explaining at Ms B 194b4-5 that the meaning is that a sixth triplet. whose charateristic is to indicate a relation should be introduced: *sambandhalakṣaṇayā*[1] *ṣaṣṭhyā bhavitavyam ity arthaḥ.* The Sanskrit grammarians attribute to the sixth triplet the semantic function of indicating a relation (*sambandha*); cf. CV II.1:95: *ṣaṣṭhī sambandhe.* VP III.7:143: *sambandhaḥ kārakebhyo 'nyaḥ kriyākārakapūrvakaḥ śrutāyām aśrutāyāṃ vā kriyāyāṃ so 'bhidhīyate.* DSG s.v. *ṣaṣṭhī.* Jinendrabuddhi's remark, although basically correct, does not bring out all the grammatical implications of Dignāga's concise statement. As the following quotation of VP III.14:8 indicates, Dignāga wants to point out that co-reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) is impossible if it is assumed that the word *'sat'* denotes the relation of the general property existence (*sattā*) to any given substance, quality or action. For in such a case the grammarians prescribe the introduction of the sixth triplet after the term that denotes the item with which it is connected, that is, one would expect a phrase like *sad dravyasya* showing the difference (*bheda*) as opposed to the phrase *sad dravyam* where the two relata coalesce through *abhedopacāra.* Dignāga addresses the grammatical implications of the concept of relation at PS I:22ab (v. *Hattori* 1968: 43-44, 138 4.17), cf. PS II:10b, where he objects to those who consider *sambandha* to be *anumeya* that one would expect that the sixth triplet is introduced after the term denoting the item that possesses the relation: *ṣaṣṭhī srūyeta tadvati;* cf. PST Ms B 68b2-3: *sambandhavivakṣāyāṃ hy agniśabdaḥ ṣaṣṭhyantaḥ syāt:* "For if the relation were intended to be expressed the word 'fire' should end in the sixth triplet."

Uddyotakara reproduces a more explicit version of Dignāga's argument as *pūrvapakṣa* at NV 323,21-324,3: *atha dravyādivṛttitvāt sattāyā eva dravyādiśabdaiḥ saha sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tathāpi pāratantryāt sattāyā guṇatvam, guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoś ca śabdayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na dṛṣṭam iti yathā śaṅkhasya śauklyam iti. etena sambandho vyākhyātaḥ:* "If, on the other hand, existence is co-referential with words like 'substance' because existence is resident in substances, and so on, nevertheless because of its dependence [upon the general property existence] existence has status as a property (*guṇatvam*) and two words that denote a property and a bearer of that property, [respectively], are not observed to be

co-referential, like, for instance, [the statement]: 'Whiteness of conch-shell'. Hereby the relation is explained."

⁽¹⁾em. (cf. *'brel pa'i mtshad ñid* T) : *svasaṃ°* Ms

[13] *āha ca: vibhaktibhedo niyamād guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyasya prasiddhir dravyaśabdayoḥ* (VP III.14:8). Restored, cf. the parallel at NCV 631,9-10: *āha ca: vibhaktibhedo niyamād ityādi.*

³⁹ The Vākyapadīya quotation is missing in K. Moreover, Jinendrabuddhi does not comment upon it, which might indicate that it was not included in the material he used for his *ṭīkā*. There is no reason to believe, however, that it has been interpolated because Mallavādi quotes a similar verse in the same context as appears from Siṃhasūri's quotation at NCV 631,9-10, q.v. above no. [13]. An edited version of the verse, presumably by Dignāga, was known to Uddyotakara, cf. no. 41 below.

⁴⁰ As mentioned above Dignāga quotes this verse with the intention of corroborating his analysis, namely that the introduction of the sixth triplet after the word denoting a substance as connected with the property existence is required by a grammatical rule. The verse constitutes part of Bhartṛhari's reflections on the problems discussed by Patañjali at Mahā-bh I 399,4ff. (ad A II 1:57), which Helarāja explains thus at VPP Vol. II 154,1-5: *paṭasya śukla iti dravyaguṇābhidhāyipadaprayoge śābdo guṇapradhānabhāvaḥ. tathā hy atropasarjanaṃ pradhānopakārapariṇataṃ svārtham ācaṣṭa iti guṇavibhaktiṃ ṣaṣṭhīm upādatte. pradhānaṃ tu svātmany avasthitam aparopakārīti prathamayā yujyata iti niyato vibhaktibhedo vyadhikaraṇe viṣaye. vīraḥ puruṣa ityādau tu sāmānādhikaraṇe viṣaye dvāv api dravyaśabdau svaniṣṭhaṃ svārtham ācakṣate. tathā ca prathamaiva:* "When syntactical nominals denoting a substance and a quality are used, like in the expression 'white colour of cloth,' the relation between the secondary and the principal item (*pradhāna*) is verbal. That is, in the present case the subordinate item denotes its own referent as brought into the service of the principal item. Thus it assumes the sixth triplet which is the affix of the subordinate item. The principal item, however, being confined to itself is not subsidiary to the other. Therefore it is constructed with the first triplet. Thus the difference of nominal affix is restricted to the domain where there is no co-reference. However, in the domain where there is co-reference, as in an expression like 'the man that is a hero' even two words that [each] denote a substance denote their own referent as selfcontained. And thus only the first triplet [is used]."

Uddyotakara quotes at NV 326,5-6 a similar but slightly revised version of VP III.14:8. Dignāga must have edited it with the intention of adapting Bhartṛhari's analysis to his own treatment of the question of *sambandhaḥ*. It is quoted towards the end of Uddyotakara's rebuttal of Dignāga's argument. Since Uddyotakara apparently used the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa for his criticism of the *apoha* theory, the verse no doubt stems from this work: *tasmāt sāmānādhikaraṇyānupapattir adoṣaḥ: "vibhaktibhedo⁽¹⁾ niyamād guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ, sāmānādhikaraṇyasyāsiddhiḥ saddravyaśabdayor" iti etad anena pratyuktam:* "Therefore it is not a problem that there is no justification for co-reference. Hereby [the verse claiming that] "[A word] denoting a quality and one denoting the bearer of that quality have different case affixes because of a restrictive rule. For the two words 'existent' and 'substance' co-reference is not established," is answered."

Jinendrabuddhi closes his exegesis of this paragraph with a brief discussion of the problem of the denotation of general terms like *dravya* in relation to expressions showing *vaiyadhikaraṇya* like *sad dravyasya,* in which one general property seemingly is connected with another, which contradicts the assumption that general properties are not connected with one another, cf. PST Ms B 194b5-7: *nanu ca dravyādiśabdair api jātimātraṃ dravyatvādy ucyata iti. tatra kaḥ sambandho jāter jātyantareṇa yataḥ ṣaṣṭhy ucyeta*(1)? *naiṣa doṣaḥ. dravyatvavad dravyam iha matvarthīyalopaṃ kṛtvā darśitaṃ vaiyadhikaraṇyapradarśanārtham. yady evaṃ sacchabde 'pi matvarthīyalopāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati. yadā tarhi matvarthīyo notpadyate sattāmātravivakṣitatvāt, tadā na prāpnoti; na ca tadā sad dravyasyetīṣyate:* "It is certainly the case that terms like ´substance´ also denotes the mere general property such as substanceness. In that case what kind of connection to another general property does the general property have so that one would use the sixth triplet? There is no problem. In this case the general property possessor of substanceness is referred to as 'substance' by eliding the affix denoting possession in order to illustrate absence of co-reference. If that is the case, there will be co-reference even in the case of the word 'existent' as a consequence of the elision of the affix denoting possession. When in that case the affix denoting possession is not introduced because the mere general property existence is intended to be denoted, it does not obtain; and then the clause *"sad dravyasya"* is not called for."

(1)°*o ni*° conj. : °*ani*°.
(2)em. : °*ata* Ms

[14] *sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate. tathā hi bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ, bhāvaś cānyena yujyate.* Restored, cf. Ms 195a1: *sambandhaś cātretyādi. naiva hi svadharmeṇābhidheyatvāt sambandho* vācya ucyate, *kiṃ tarhi,* sambandhidharmeṇa. ... *tathā hītyādi.* 195a3: *bhāvaś cānyena yujyata iti;* 195a5: *bhāvaḥ kṛtvokta iti.*

41 A Connection is basically *dviṣṭha,* that is, it involves two terms namely the state of connecting and the thing that is being connected to something else. Thereby it only becomes denotable through the introduction of the sixth triplet after the word denoting the other relatum.

Dignāga addresses the question of the denotability of *sambandha* in his criticism at PS II:10cd of the view that the object of inference (*anumeya*) is the connection; cf. PS II:10c$_1$;

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 459b16-460b3 = P 112a7-8): *gaṅ gi phyir yaṅ 'brel pa ni | brjod min | (10c$_1$) raṅ gi chos daṅ 'brel pa ni gźan la brjod par bya yin la | de lta bu la rjes su dpag par bya ma yin gyi |.*

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 459a18-460a3 = P 31a3-4): *raṅ gi chos kyi<s> 'brel par ni ‖ brjod par mi bya'o ‖ gźan ma brjod pa ni de ltar rjes su dpag par bya ba ma yin te:*

"For the connection (**sambandho hi*) is not denotable by virtue of its own property (*avācyaḥ svadharmeṇa*),(1) but is denotable with respect to something else [viz. its relatum], and thus it [i.e. the relation] is not the inferendum (*na caivam anumeyaḥ*)."(2)

Jinendrabuddhi comments upon the phrase *avācyaḥ svadharmeṇa* in a way that is reminiscent of Dignāga's explanation at PSV V:3, cf. PST Ms B 68b7: *sambandhanaṃ hi sambandha iti bhāvarūpeṇa sambandhaśabdenābhidhānāt. bhāvaś cānyena sambandhinā yujyata iti. sambandhyantarākāṅkṣā*(3) *jāyate: kasya*

sambandha iti. tataś ca sambandhy eva sa bhavatīti na svarūpeṇa sambandho abhidhīyate: "For connection means the action of connecting because [the connection] is denoted by the word 'connection' in the form of a state of action; and a state of action is connected with the other relatum. Thus the expectation of the complementation of the other relatum arises at the thought: connection of what? And therefore it [viz. the connection] is only a relatum. Thus the connecion is not denoted in its own form."

The idea that *sambandha* is only understood as an entity that connects relata is formulated by Bhartṛhari in his description of *samavāya* at VPV II 435: *sambandhidharmā saṃyogaḥ svaśabdenābhidhīyate | sambandhaḥ samavāyas tu sambandhitvena gamyate ||*; cf. Dharmakīrti's explanation at PVSV 92,4-8: *sambandhasya tu svarūpeṇa anabhidhānam uktam. abhidhāne sambandhitvena buddhāv upasthānāt:* "The relation is said not to be denoted in its own form because when denoted it becomes present to the mind as having relata." Karṇakagomin explains at PVSVṬ 345,19 the crucial last clause as follows: *tatra rājapuruṣayoḥ sambandha ity ucyamāne rajñaḥ puruṣa*[4] *ity asya vyatirekasya hetuḥ sambandhaḥ, tadā sa sambandhaḥ sambandhirūpeṇa pratīyate:* "When in this case it is said that there is a relation between the king and the servant the relation is the cause of the difference [of case affix] as in the expression 'king's man.' Then this relation is understood in the form of its relata;" Karṇakagomin mentions, at PVSVṬ 345,16, Dignāga as Dharmakīrti's authority for claiming that *sambandha* is not denotable: *kathaṃ tarhy ācāryadiṅnāgena tasyāvācyatvam uktam.* To support the analysis he quotes the following verse 348,31-346,2: *asattvabhūtas sambandho rūpaṃ tasya na gṛhyate. nābhidhānaṃ svarūpeṇa sambandhasya kathañcaneti:* "The relation is not a thing. Its form is not apprehended. The relation is in no way whatsoever denoted in its own form." This verse may stem from one of Dignāga's lost works. If so, the most likely source would be the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. It is closely related to Bhartṛhari's VP II:46: *kāryānumeyaḥ sambandho rūpaṃ tasya na dṛśyate asattvabhūtam atyantam atas taṃ pratijñāyate:* "The relation is something that is to be inferred from its effects. Its form is not observed. Therefore it is recognized that it is not at all a thing."

[1]qu. Ms B 68b7.
[2]qu. Ms B 69a1.
[3]em. : *sambandhyantarā kākhyā* Ms
[4]PVSVṬ *rājapuruṣayor* which, evidently, is a mistake for *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ.*

[42] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a5: *bhāva ity abhiprāyeṇoktaḥ.* The techical term *bhāva* denotes the state of action expressed by action nouns like *pāka* or *sambandha;* cf. *Rocher* 1966; 1968: 23 § 13; Renou, *Terminologie* s.v.

[43] Connection means that of any given *x* to any given *y*. The two terms of the relation constitute its relata (*sambandhin*). Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a1-3: *iha kaścic chabdārthaḥ kenacic chabdenābhidhīyamānaḥ sambandhyantarākāṅkṣopajanahetuḥ. tathā hi samuccayaḥ sam-uccayaśabdābhidhāne parākāṅkṣopajanahetur bhavati. sa eva cādyupādānaḥ*[1] *kasyeti ākāṅkṣām upajanayati*[2]. *bhāvaś ca bhāvasādhanena śabdenābhidhīyamāno niyatam anyaviṣayām ākāṅkṣāṃ janayatīti:* "In this case when a certain word referent is being denoted by a certain word it is the cause of generating expectation [of the complementation of] the other relatum. Like, for instance, an accumulation is

the cause of generating expectation [of the complementation] of the correlate when being denoted by a word denoting accumulation. The [word denoting accumulation] comprising [the word] 'and', and so on, with certainty generates expectation [of complementation] at the thought '[accumulation] of what'? [3] And a state that is denoted by a word having a state [of action] as its means of realisation[4] necessarily generates expectation concerning the other relatum."

After this explanation Jinendrabuddhi addresses the additional question of whether or not the analysis of the relation applies to the general property, like when one talks about the general property of a horse, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a3-5: *nanu ca jātāv apy evaṃ yuktam abhidhātum. jātir api hi jātiśabdenābhidhīyamānā sambandhirūpeṇābhidhīyate: jātir aśvasya gor veti. naitad asti. saty api sambandhitve jāter jātirūpaṃ nāvahīyate. sambandhasya punaḥ sambandhitve rūpahānir eva, asati sambandhāntare sambandhitvānupapatteḥ. tathā cānavasthāprasaṅgaḥ.*

[1]The translator of T has misunderstood the cpd. *cādyupādāna < cādi < ca + ādi + upā°* as *vādin + upā°*, cf. the translation *rgol pas ñe bar len pa* 155,16.

[2]em. : *°āṃ nopaja°* Ms

[3]Cf. Patañjali's illustration of the concept of accumulation at Mahā-bh I 434,10: *samuccayaḥ: plakṣaś cety ukte gamyate etan nyagrodhaś ceti.*

[4]For the concept of *bhāvasādhana,* cf. Renou, *Terminologie* s.v. *bhāva.*

[15] *sambandhanaṃ hi sambandhaḥ*[1]: *<so 'nyena yujyate> rāgā<di>vat. tasmāt sambandhidharmeṇa sambandho vācya iti kṛtvāśaṅkitaṃ*[2] *svadharmeṇa tu nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda ity idan tat*[3] *prati nāsti. ato naivāsya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyate*[4]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a5-195b1: *sambandhanaṃ hi sambandha iti ... rāgavat ... tasmāt sambandhidharmeṇa sambandho vācya iti kṛtvāśaṅkitam iti ... svadharmeṇa tv iti. svarūpeṇa nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda iti. idaṃ tad iti pratyavamarśāyogyarūpatvenāsattvabhūtatvāt svarūpābhidhānaṃ praty āśaṅkaiva nāsti. ato naivāsya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyata iti.*

[1]Cf.*'brel par byed pas 'brel pa ste* K : *brel pa ni* V, after which V adds *gdon mi za bar 'brel par 'gyur ba'i ṅes pa med de:* "For the connection is necessarily without certainty as to what is to be connected." This phrase has no counterpart in K except perhaps the final *de* that may correspond to the demonstrative *de* (= *saḥ*) of K. PSṬ is of no help in settling the problem.

[2]The word *āśaṅkitam* has no identifiable counterpart in VK; the immediately preceding absolutive *kṛtvā* is perhaps reproduced by *phyir,* which could be justified semantically considering the usage of Sanskrit *kṛtvā,* cf. V 108,9, K 109,9.

[3]VK do not reproduce the expression *idaṃ tad prati* that is to be construed with *āśaṅkitam.* In view of the uncertainty of the readings of KV and the apparent discrepancy between PSṬ and the text reflected in the Tibetan translations of KV, the suggested Sanskrit restoration of this paragraph, although it is corroborated by Jinendrabuddhi's *ṭīkā,* may not in every detail reflect the original version.

[4] The phrase *naivāsya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyata iti* introduced by *ataḥ* is reproduced as two śloka pādas in V: *'di yi rigs kyi sgra yis ni // brjod par bya ba ñid mi 'thad /.* K translates as prose omitting the negation *ma* before *yin no.* If indeed the phrase consists of two pāda*s,* which one cannot reject offhand because Jinendrabuddhi's use of *iti* indicates that the phrase is part of a quotation and the phrase seemingly does not deviate from the *śloka* metrics of PS, their existence would solve the riddle of the missing two pāda*s* of verse 43.

[44] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a5: *bhāvatvam asya darśayati.*

[45] Cf. ’*brel par byed pa yin te* K : ’*gegs byed pa srid do* V.

[46] K misunderstands the purport of the example and translates ’*dod chags* = Sanskrit *rāga* "passion;" V translates correctly *kha ba sgyur ba* = *rāga* "the action of colouring," cf. PSṬ Ms B 195a6: *rāgavat* (*chos bźin* sic T). *rāgaḥ* is quoted as an example of action nouns (*bhāva*) derived by the affix *ghañ* in Kāśikā on A III 3:18: *bhāve vācye dhātor ghañ pratyayo bhavati: pākas tyāgā rāgaḥ.*

[47] I interpret *āśaṅkitam* in accordance with A III 3:111: *napuṃsake bhāve ktaḥ.*

[48] For Dignāga's use of rthe technical term *svadharma,* cf. VP III.3:4 *nābhidhānaṃ svadharmeṇa sambandhasyāsti vācakam atyantaparatantratvād rūpaṃ nāsyāpadiśyate.* The term applies to any given noun that is not subject to the grammatical operation of introducing the sixth triplet that denotes the relation (*nanu ṣaṣṭhī sambandhasya kāryam,* Helarāja introducing loc.cit.), cf. VPP Vol. I 128,10-11: *tatra svena asādhāraṇena dharmeṇa svabhāvenopalakṣitasya vācakaṃ pratyāyakam abhidhānaṃ ṣaṣṭhīvyatiriktaṃ nāsti, idantayā svarūpānavadhāraṇāt.*

[16] <*ye tv āhur*> *viśeṣaśabdaiḥ* <*sāmānādhikaraṇyāt sambandhasaukāryād avyabhicārāc ca*> *jātimadmātraṃ* <*vivakṣitam*(1) *iti*>. Restored, cf. *viśeṣaśabdair ityādi ... jātimadmātraṃ sāmānyarūpam,* PSṬ Ms B 195b2-4, cf. no. 50 below.
(1)*brjod par ’dod pa yin no* K : *brjod par bya ’o* V. The Sanskrit restauration suggested by K is not supported by PSṬ. V appears to presuppose the reading *abhidheyam.*

[49] Jinendrabuddhi introduces the opponents' theory at Ms B 195b2-5 as follows: *pūrvadoṣābhāvāt pakṣāntaropanyāsaḥ: dravyādayo viśeṣaśabdāḥ. taiḥ sāmānadhikaraṇyam ekārthavṛttitvāt. yatraiva hi dravye sattāṃ pravṛttinimittam upādāya sacchabdo vartate. dravyaśabdo ’pi dravyatvanimittas tatraiva. tasmāt sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapadyate tadvadabhidhāne ‘sad dravyam’ iti. na ca sambandhāśakyatā tanmātrasyābhinnatvāt. na hy atra bhedā ucyante, kin tu yat teṣāṃ jātimadmātraṃ sāmānyarūpam. tasya ca ekatvāt sukaraḥ sambandho vyabhicārābhavaś ca. tadabhāve śabdasyāpravṛtteḥ:* "Another thesis is exemplified since it is without the previous faults: Particular general terms are 'substance,' etc. Since they refer to the same referent (*ekārtha*) it is co-referential with these. For the word 'existent,' being based upon its cause of application viz. the general property existence, applies to the same substance as the word 'substance' whose cause of application is substanceness. Therefore co-reference like in the statement 'existent substance' is justified if it denotes the possessor of the general properties. Nor is there any impossibility of relation because that alone (*tadmātra*) is without division. In this case the particulars are not denoted, but rather that which is their general form viz. the mere fact of possessing the general property (*jātimadmātra*). And as this is one the relation is feasible and there is no ambiguity because without this [viz. the relation] the word does not apply."
Cf. the similar explanation at NMañjGBh 137,9-11: *sacchabdaḥ sattāṃ pravṛttinimittam āśṛtya tadvati dravye pravṛttaḥ śuklaśabdaś ca guṇam pravṛttinimittam āśṛtya tatraiveti mukhyayā vṛttyā sāmānādhikaraṇyam bhavati:* "The word

'existent,' by being based upon existence as its cause of application, is applied to a substance as possessed of this [viz. existence], and the word 'white,' by being based upon a quality as its cause of application, is applied to the same thing (*tatraiva*). Thus there is co-reference by virtue of direct application."

⁵⁰ I assume that *la la dag ni … zer ro* V : *gaṅ yaṅ zer ba'i* K is equivalent to *gaṅ la la dag ni* of V 106,10 = *ye tv āhuḥ*.

⁵¹ Cf. *de la* V : om. K.

[17] *tadvato nāsvatantratvāt.* Qu. NCV 623,17; ŚVṬ 60,3; NR 423,10; PVSVṬ 200,11-12; NMañj 296,6; NMañjGBhg 137,13 and 138,8-9, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b5: *asvatantratvād iti.*

⁵² The re-occurrence of *vācakaḥ* follows from 2c, cf. TSP 382,8: *tadvato na vācakaḥ śabdo 'svatantratvāt.*

⁵³ The term *tadvat* is used as a technical term for *jātimat*, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b5: *tadvad iti jātimad ity arthaḥ;* NMañj 295,31: *nanu ko 'yaṃ tadvān nāma: tad asyāstīti tadvān iti:* "Now what is this thing called *tadvān: tadvān* means that *'x has y';*" cf. A V 2:94: *tad asyāsty asminn iti matup.*

⁵⁴ Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b5: *asvatantratvād iti parāpekṣatvād iti.* Siṃhasūri quotes a verse from another source, possibly from Dignāga's Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, in which the same argument occurs, cf. NCV 735,24: *asvātantryād, bhedāj, jāter ajātitaḥ* (cf. PS V:11b).

[18] *evam api hi sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasarjanaṃ*⁽¹⁾ *dravyam āha, na sākṣād iti tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ. na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau <sāmāṇādhikaraṇyabhāvaḥ>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b6: *evam api hītyādi;* TSP 382,8-11: *sacchabdo jātisvarūpopasarjanaṃ dravyam āha, na sākṣād iti tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaprasaṅga uktaḥ;* cf. Ms B 196a2: *na sakṣād iti … tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād iti;* Ms 196a6: *sa evātadbhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ,* cf. NCV 616,24: *atadbhedatve sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ;* NCV 618,16: *atra bhāṣyeṇa para evottaram āha: na hy asatyāṃ vyāptāv ityādi,* cf. PSṬ Ms B 196a7: *na hy asatyām ityādi.*

⁽¹⁾°*mātra*° em. (cf. *tsam* KV; Ms B 195b6: *mātragrahaṇam*) : om. TSP.

⁵⁵ Cf. PSṬ Ms B 195b6-7: *jātiś ca svarūpaṃ ceti dvandvaḥ*⁽¹⁾*. svarūpaśrutyā śabdasvarūpam uktam. te upasarjanam apradhānam*⁽²⁾ *yasya tat tathoktam. Mātragrahaṇaṃ dravyagatadharmāntaraviśeṣapratiṣedhārtham. kathaṃ punaḥ svarūpaṃ dravyasyopasarjanam. yavatā jātir eva tadupasarjanam. śabdo hi svarūpaviśiṣṭāṃ jātim abhidhatte taduttarakālaṃ śabdasvarūpaviśiṣṭajātiviśiṣṭaṃ dravyam. naiṣa doṣaḥ. upakārakopakāriṇo 'pi hi bhavanty upakāriṇaḥ svaviśeṣaṇā-pekṣyasya viśeṣaṇasya pradhānopakāre mahati vartamānatvāt:* "'General property' and 'own form' is a *dvandva* compound. By the word 'own form' is meant the word's own form. That of which these two are subsidiary members (*upasarjanam*), i.e., not primary members (*apradhānam*) is named thus. The use of the word 'mere'

has the purpose of negating particulars viz. the other properties that occur in a substance.

But how can the [word's] own form be a subsidiary member of the substance insofar as only the general property is its [viz. the substance's] subsidiary member? For the word denotes the general property as qualified by its own form, and thereafter it denotes the substance as qualified by the general property as qualified by the word's own form.

This is not a fault. For they are also assisting and assisted because the assisted that is dependent upon the qualifier, being dependent upon its own qualified, is of great service to the primary thing [viz. the qualified]."

The view which Dignāga addresses and Jinendrabuddhi explains is related to a view which Bhartṛhari expounds at VP III.1:6: *svā jātiḥ prathamaṃ śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate, tato 'rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā.*

(1)em. : *ta dvaṇṭhaḥ* Ms
(2)For *upasarjana = apradhāna,* cf. Renou, *Terminologie* s.v.

56 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196a2-3: *na sākṣāt = nāvyavadhānena. jātisvarūpagrahaṇam ubhayavyavadhānenādhikapāratantryopadarśanārtham*(1): "Not directly, i.e., indirectly. The use of 'general property' and 'own form' is for the purpose of showing that the dependence is excessive because of the intervention of both."

(1)For the Ms B 196a2-3: *nāvyavadhānena. tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād iti. yat tajjātimat tadgatā ye viśeṣā ghaṭādayas teṣām anākṣepād ity arthaḥ. Jāt-isvarūpagrahaṇam ubhayavyavadhānenādhikapāratantryopadarśanārthaṃ* read: *nāvyavadhānena. jātisvarūpagrahaṇam ubhayavyavadhānenādhikapāratantryopa-darśanārthaṃ tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād iti. yat tajjātimat tadgatā ye viśeṣā ghaṭādayas teṣām anākṣepād ity arthaḥ.* In Ms the clause *jātisvarūp°,* and so on, has by mistake been separated from the word it comments upon, with the result that the explanation becomes incomprehensible. The error is also found in the corresponding passage at T 156,33-34.

57 Cf. Uddyotakara's reproduction of Dignāga's argument at NV 324,9-12: *jātimanmātrābhidhāyako 'pi sacchabdo na bhavati. kasmāt? asvatantratvāt. na hi sacchabdāt tadbhedā ghaṭādayo gamyanta iti tadvadghaṭādibhedānākṣepāt sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ:* "Nor does the word 'existent' denote the mere general property possessor. Why? Because it is not self-dependent. For one does not get to know its particulars such as 'pot,' etc. Thus there is no co-reference as it does not imply the particulars of the general property possessor such as 'pot.'" The analogous exposition of Dignāga's argument at ŚVṬ 60,7ff appears to be a verbatim quotation from another Dignāgan text: *atra bhikṣur āha: jātiśabdaḥ sadādi tadviśiṣṭam eva dravyam abhidadham na tadgatam eva ghaṭādiviśeṣarūpam ākṣipati. paratantro hy asau sattāṃ nimittīkṛtya dravye pravartate, na tu svatantraḥ. sarvaviśeṣaṇāviśiṣṭaṃ dravyaṃ vakti. tataś ca ghaṭādes tena sacchabdenānākṣepān nāsti tadvācinā sāmānādhikaraṇyam. na hy ekopādhiviśiṣṭe dravye 'bhihite paropādhinā sāmā-nādhikaraṇyaṃ bhavati:* "Here the monk objects: The general term 'existent', and so on, while denoting a substance as qualified by this [viz. existence] only, does not imply the form of the particulars like pots that are included in it. For it [viz. the general term 'existent'] is dependent since it applies to the substance by making the general property 'existence' its cause of application, but it is not self-dependent. It denotes the substance as not qualified by all its properties, and therefore there is no

co-reference with the word denoting it [viz. 'pot'] since the word 'existent' does not imply 'pot,' etc. For when a substance that is qualified by one attribute is denoted, there is no co-reference with another attribute."

Cf. the succinct paraphrase of Dignāga's objection at NCV 648,7-8: *yad uktaṃ tvayā: ghaṭādibhedānākṣepitvāt sacchabdasya jātisvarūpopasarjanadravyamātrā-bhidhānāt pāratantryād ghaṭādibhedābhedatvāt taiḥ saha sāmānādhikaraṇyābhā-vaḥ:* "As you have objected: Since it does not imply particulars like pot because the word 'existent' only denotes substances having as subordinate members the general property and the (word's) own form because it is dependent, and because particulars like pot are not its particulars, there is no co-reference with these" (this quotation may stem from Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa). PVSVṬ 153,21 (ad PVSV 34,19: *tadvatpakṣoditaḥ*): *yathā kila sāmānyam abhidhāya tadvati vartamānaḥ śabdo 'svatantraḥ syāt tataś ca śabdapravṛttinimittabhūtena sāmānyena vaśīkṛtasya śab-dasya vyaktigataparasparabhedānākṣepāt taiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt.*

[58] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196a2-3: *yat tajjātimat tadgatā ye viśeṣā ghaṭādayas teṣām anākṣepād ity arthaḥ.* Jinendrabuddhi continues addressing the meaning of *ākṣepa* at 196b3-6: *atha ko 'yam ākṣepo nāma: atyāgaḥ. nanu ca ghaṭādayo 'py atyaktā eva sattāśrayatvāt tadāśrayasya cābhidhānāt. na, ghaṭatvādīnām anākṣepāt. sacchabdo hi sattāpāratantryāt tato bhinnarūpān ghaṭatvādīn nākṣipati, ghaṭatvādirūpa-sanniveśāc ca tad vastu ghaṭaḥ paṭo*[1] *vā bhavati, na svato vastumātrasya viśeṣā-bhāvāt. tasmād yathaiva paṭaśabdena*[2] *ghaṭatvādyasaṃsargād ghaṭādayo nākṣip-yante, tathā sacchabdenāpi. tataḥ kim? tataḥ sa evātadbhedatve sāmānādhi-karaṇyābhāvaḥ. kathaṃ kṛtvā? yad iha sacchabdena ghaṭādayo nākṣipyante, tato na tasya te bhedāḥ. na hy anākṣiptā bhedā dṛṣṭāḥ:* "Now what is this so-called implication? It is the not leaving out. Certainly also pots, and so on, are not left out because they are the substrata of existence, and because [the word 'existent'] denotes its substrate. No, because potness, and so on, is not implied. For the word 'existent' since it is dependent upon existence does not imply potness, and so on, whose nature is different from it [viz. existence]. A thing may be either a pot or a piece of cloth because the nature of general properties like potness are resident in it, but is is not [a pot or a piece of cloth] *per se*[3] because a mere thing is without distinction. Therefore, just as a pot, and so on, is not implied by the word 'cloth' because the general properties like potness are not connected [with cloth], it is not implied by the word 'existent' either. What follows from that? Therefore there is no co-reference in that it is without its particulars. On what grounds? If pot, and so on, are not implied by the word 'existent,' then these are not its particulars insofar as particulars that are not implied are not observed. And because they are not its particulars it cannot be co-referential with the words denoting these."

[1]em. (cf. *snam bu* T) : *ghaṭo* Ms
[2]em. : *ghaṭa°* Ms T.
[3]Cf the well-known statement ascribed to Bhartṛhari: *na hi gauḥ svarūpena gauḥ, nāpy agauḥ, gotvābhisambandhat tu gauḥ;* cf. Rau 1977, WSt II´ 3: 123; Rau 1981: 95 no. 6.

[59] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196a7-196b1: *vyāptir ākṣepaḥ. yathā rūpaśabdenānākṣepe madhurādīnām atadbhedatvād na tacchabdaiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam bhavati. na hi bhavati rūpam amlam iti. vyāptau tu bhavati rūpaṃ nīlam iti:* "Implication means pervasion. For instance, in that the word 'colour' does not imply things that are

sweet, etc. because they are not its particulars, there is no co-reference with words denoting these. For the expression 'sour colour' is impossible. But when there is pervasion the expression 'blue colour' is possible."

The two examples mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi were also used by Mallavādi who appears to have copied them from a *ṭīkā,* cf. NCV 618,14ff. Mallavādi incorporates part of Dignāga's formulation into his own exposition, cf. NCV 618,16: *na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau,* and apparently also part of the *ṭīkā,* of which Siṃhasūri has preserved a fragment addressing the question of the impossibility of co-reference due to lack of pervasion (*vyāpti*), cf. NCV 618,14-15: *ṭīkāyāṃ coditam "anākṣiptair avyāptair api sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati vivakṣāvaśād 'idaṃ viśeṣyam idaṃ viśeṣaṇam" iti:* "In the *ṭīkā* it is objected: there will be co-reference with [words] that are not implied, i.e., not pervaded [e.g., by the word 'existent'] by virtue of the intention to state 'this is the thing to be qualified, this is the qualifier.'"

[19] *tadyathā <śuklaśabdaḥ> svābhidheyaguṇamātraviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt saty api dravye madhurādīn nākṣipati. tataś cātadbhedatvam. evam atrāpi prasaṅgaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b1-3: *tad yathetyādi ... śuklaśabdasya svābhidheyo guṇaḥ pravṛttinimittatvāc chuklatvam. sa tanmātraviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt saty api*[(1)] *tasmin dravyātmani madhurādīn nākṣipati ... tataś cātadbhedatvam iti ... evam atrāpi prasaṅga iti,* cf. NCV 619,18-19: *tataś cātadbhedatvam ... evam ihāpi.*
    [(1)]*api* em. (cf. *yod kyaṅ* T) : *tat(au?) pi* Ms

[60] Cf. ŚVṬ 60,7-14: *yathā madhuraśabdena mādhuryopādhiviśiṣṭaṃ khaṇḍadravyam abhidadhatā tadgatāparaśuklādyanākṣepāt tena na sāmānādhika-raṇyaṃ yathaitan madhuraṃ śvetam iti tathaitenāpi na bhāvyaṃ san ghaṭa iti:* "Just as there is no co-reference with the word 'sweet' denoting the substance sugar as qualified by the attribute sweetness because of not implying other [qualities] like [the quality] white that is included in it. Like, for instance, the [co-reference] 'this [substance] is sweet and white' will not be possible, so also the [co-reference] 'existent pot.'"

[61] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b2-3: *na hi tasya śuklatvavad madhuratvādayaḥ pravṛttikāraṇam:* "For the general property sweetness is not the cause of application of the [word 'white'] as is the general property whiteness."

[62] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b4: *sacchabdena*[(1)] *ghaṭādīnām anākṣepaḥ, anākṣepāc cātadbhedatvam ity arthaḥ:* "The meaning is this: The word 'existent' does not imply pots, etc.; and since it does not imply (pots, etc.), it has no particulars." The idea that the denotation of one term does not imply the denotation of other terms has a parallel in Bhartṛhari's claim at VP III.3:4, in the context of a discussion of *prakarṣa,* that the different distinguishing properties that are found in substances are not denoted by any given particular term that denotes its referent as excluded from other referents and thus does not imply the denotation of other terms: *vidyāmānāḥ pradhāneṣu na sarve bhedahetavaḥ. viśeṣaśabdair ucyante vyāvṛttārthābhidhāyi-bhiḥ.* Mallavādi appears to quote this verse (or a version of it) in his rebuttal of Dignāga's argument (it may, in fact, have made up part of Dignāga's own argument), cf. the explanation at NCV 622,23-27: *pradhāneṣu viśeṣyeṣu vidyamānā api bhedahetavo dharmāḥ sarve nocyante, kaścid eva viśiṣṭo vivakṣitaḥ kenacid viśeṣaṇena tadvācinā viśeṣaśabdenocyate 'rtho viśeṣāntaravyāpāreṇa, tatraiva*

caritārthatvāt tasya guṇabhūtatvāt. ata eva ca te viśeṣaśabdā ity ucyante <u>*vyāvṛttār-*</u>
<u>*thābhidhāyitvād iti*</u> (my underlining)*;* cf. also Helarāja ad loc. VVP I 205,15ff.
   [1]*sac*° em. (cf. *yod pa'i* T) : *tac*° Ms

[20] *upacārāt.* Qu. Ms B 197a2; NMañjGBh 137,13.

   63 Jinendrabuddhi explains that Dignāga introduces this argument in order to
show that in the case of *abhedopacāra* it is impossible that the general property
possessor be the denotable object because the word only denotes the form of the
general property existence upon which it is imposed, cf. PSṬ Ms B 196b7-197a1-2:
ihedam uktaṃ jātiśabdena tadvato 'bhidhānam iti. tadvati ca śabdasya matuplopād
abhedopacārād vā vṛttiḥ. tatra matuppakṣe śuklādivad abhidhānaṃ sambhavatīti
sati vācyatve doṣa uktaḥ. abhedopacāre tu tasyaiva samāropitasya sattārūpasyābh-
idhānād vācyatvam eva tadvato na sambhavatīti darśayitum āha: "Here it is argued:
The general term denotes the posessor of the general property. And the word applies
to the general property possessor through elision of the *matup* affix or through
transfer in terms of non-difference. Denotation is possible on the theory of elision of
the *matup* affix, in the same way as the elision of the matup affix after [the word]
'white.'

   [21] *sacchabdo hi*[1] *bhūtārthena svarūpaṃ vā jātiṃ vāha. tatra pravṛttas tadvaty*
upacaryate. na hi[2] *yo yatropacaryate sa tam arthaṃ bhūtārthenāha.* Restored, cf.
PSṬ Ms B 197a2-4: *svarūpaṃ veti ... jātiṃ veti ... tadvaty upacaryata iti ... na tu yo*
yatrety ... <u>*yo yatropacaryate na sa tam arthaṃ bhūtārthenāha;*</u> ŚVṬ 61,20-21:
<u>*sacchabdo 'pi bhūtārthena svarūpaṃ jātiṃ vāha. tatra pravṛttas tadvaty*</u>
<u>*upacaryamāne gauṇaḥ syāt;*</u> NCV 624,12: *na hi yo yatropacaryate sa tam arthaṃ*
bhūtārthenāha.
   [1]*hi* conj. (cf. *yod pa'i sgra ni* K : *sgra ni* V) : *'pi* ŚVṬ (*'pi* is probably w.r. for
hi) [2]So read with NCV (cf. *ni* KV) and NMañjGBh 138,6, q.v. no. 67 below : *tu*
Ms

   64 Jinendrabuddhi explains that Dignāga mentions *svarūpa* in accordance with
the view of those who claim that the own form of a word (*śabdasvarūpaṃ*) is
denotable, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197a2: *ye śabdasvarūpaṃ vācyam icchanti, tanmatena.*
The reason why Dignāga alludes to this view is undoubtedly because Bhartṛhari
claims that the word denotes its *svarūpa* before its connection with the referent, cf.
VP I:66: *prāk sañjñinābhisambandhāt sañjñā rūpapadārthikā,* cf. VPV 125,5-6 ad
loc.: *yāvat sañjñinā tu saṃjñā na sambaddhā tāvan na saṃjñipadārtheti;* VP
III.1:6ab *svā jātiḥ prathamaṃ śabdair sarvair evābhidhīyate;* Helarāja Vol. I 17,8
ad loc. quotes VP I:66ab. For the alternative view that the word denotes the general
property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197a2: *ye jātim, na tu svarūpam* (scil. *icchanti*).

   65 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 197a3: *jātimati. svarūpābhidheyavādināṃ tu jātāv apy*
upacaryate.

   66 Jinendrabuddhi illustrates this statement by quoting the example of the transfer
of the word 'king' to the servant, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197,4: *tadyathā rājaśabdaḥ puruṣa*
upacaryate ca jātiśabdaṃ tadvatīti. Other paraphrases of Dignāga's argument do not

include *svarūpa* among the principal denotata of the word 'existent,' cf. NMañjGBh 138,3-6: *sacchabdena jātiḥ khyāpyate sattālakṣaṇaḥ. tatra pravṛttas tadvaty upacaryate 'sau. na ca yaḥ śabdo yatropacaryate sa tasya vācakaḥ. na hi yo yatropacārato vartate sa tam arthaṃ paramārthato bravīti yathā siṃhaśabdo māṇavakam.* NV 324,12-14: *atha vā, asvatantratvād iti sacchabdaḥ prādhānyena sattāyāṃ vartate. tatra vartamānas tadvaty upacaryate, yac ca yatra vartamānam anyatropacaryate na tat tasyābhidhāyakaṃ mañcaśabdavad iti:* "Alternatively, 'because of not being self-dependent': The word 'existent' applies principally to [the general property] existence. While being applied to this it is transferred to the possessor of the general property, and that which, while being applied to one thing, is transferred to some other thing does not denote this [other thing], like the word 'seats' [which stands metonymically for the persons sitting on them][1]"

As an illustration of the view which Dignāga criticizes Jinendrabuddhi quotes VP III.14:347 at Ms B 197a5: *mañcaśabdo yathādheyaṃ mañceṣv eva vyavasthitaḥ tattvenāha tathā jātiśabdo dravyeṣu vartate:* "A general term applies to substances in the same way as the word 'seats' which being restricted to the seats only denotes what is supported [by the seats] as identical [with them]," and he continues at 197a5ff: *so rājety[2] upacaryamāno rājaśabdo bhūtārthena <na> bhṛtyam abhidhatte ... sa eva tu rājārtho bhinnādhikaraṇa ucyate.* Helarāja explains loc.cit at VPP Vol. II 310,27f: *mañcāḥ krośantīti kriyāsambandhasyādheye mañcasthe prāṇiny upapatter ādhārarūpābhedenādhāravacano 'pi mañcaśabdas tadādheya-vacana iti niścīyate';* cf. NCV 624,14-15: *mañcaśabdo mañcasthān mañcasvarūpā-pannān eva brūte na puruṣatvāpannān iti.* Dignāga may therefore have had Bhartṛhari's position in mind. Since Mallavādi quotes VP III.14:347 in the same context (cf. NCV 624,13), it is highly likely that Dignāga either quoted it or alluded to in the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, the work that Mallavādi together with other Dignāgan works relied upon for his criticism. Dignāga's crtitique of the theory of transfer of the general term to the general property possessor is alluded to at PVSVṬ 153,23-24 (ad PVSV 34,19: *tadvatpakṣoditaḥ*): *upacaritā ca tadvati śabdapravṛttir ityādiko dosa iti.*

[1]For this example, cf. NSBh ad NS II 2:62: *sthānāt: mañcāḥ krośanti iti mañcasthāḥ puruṣāḥ abhidhīyante:* "Due to placement like [the statement] "the stages are shouting," by which the people located on the stages are denoted;" see also Karṇakagomin's PVSVṬ 153,17–20 and Manorathanandin's PVV 280,4–10 ad PV I 64, respectively.

[2]*so rājety* conj : (*s*)*a jyeyarājyety* Ms

[22] *<sārūpyasya cā>sambhavāt.* Restored, cf. NMañjGBh 137,13: *asambhavāt;* ibid. 138,9.

67 Cf. NMañjGBh 138,8-13: *atha sattoparaktatatsvarūpe dravye sārūpyāc chabdasya vṛttir bhaviṣyatīti ced āha – "asambhavād" iti tatsārūpyasyāsambhavād ity arthaḥ. na hi sattayā sārūpyaṃ dravyasya nīlena yathā sphaṭikasya nīrūpatvāt tasyāḥ. atha yathā ākṛtau pratyayasaṅkrāntyā 'gavayo 'yam' ityādau tathā ghaṭā-dau satpratyayasaṅkrāntyā 'san ghaṭaḥ' iti bhaviṣyati. tad api na. kutaḥ? Asam-bhavāt. katham asambhavaḥ? dravyasya sattākṛtyasambhavād dravye satpratyaya-saṅkrāntyabhāvaḥ:* "If is is claimed that the word will apply by virtue of resemblance [of the substance with the general property] to a substance whose own form is influenced by (the general property) existence, he referents "because it is

impossible," that is, the resemblance [of the substance with the general property] is impossible. For a substance does not resemble [the general property] existence in the same way as a crystal [resembles] the blue colour because [the general property existence] is colourless. If, on the other hand, the expression 'a pot is existent' will be due to transfer of the notion 'existent' to the pot in the same way as in the expression 'this is a gavaya' by way of transfer of notion to the form, that too is not justified. How can that be? Because it is impossible. Why is it not possible? There is no transfer of the notion 'existent' because it is impossible that a substance has the form of existence"

The view which Dignāga criticizes is related to Bhartṛhari's description of *sattaupacārikā* at VP III.3:40: *sphaṭikādi yathā dravyaṃ bhinnair upāśrayaiḥ, svaśaktiyogāt sambandhaṃ tādrūpyeṇopagacchati;* cf. no. 88 below.

[23] *tadvati*(1) *ca <guṇasārūpyaṃ> na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sambhavati, nāpi guṇopakārāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197a6: *syād upacāraḥ. upacārasya sārūpyanibandhanatvāt. sārūpyanirūpanāya tadvati cetyādinā vivaraṇam ārabhyate,* 197b2-3: *na pratyayasaṅkrāntita ity ... nāpi guṇopakārād ity ... sambhavati.*
(1)Cf. *ldan pa las* K, for which read *ldan pa la.*

[68] Siṃhasūri explains at NCV 622,25ff that there are two types of transfer, one based upon similarity (*sārūpya*) and one based upon influence of the attribute (*guṇopakāra*): *dvayī hi upacārasya gatiḥ: sārūpyāt: yathā yamalayor anyatarasmin 'sa evāyam' iti pratyayasaṅkrānteḥ, rājño bhṛtye 'mātyādau 'rājā' iti vā pratyayaḥ. guṇopakārād vā, upadhānānurāgād iva sphaṭike raktatvādibuddhiḥ:* "There are two ways of transfer: **1.** through similarity, like, for instance, from transfer of notion to either one of two twins thinking 'one is just like the other', or the notion 'king' to the kings servant viz. the minister, and so on, or **2.** due to the influence of a quality like, for instance the perception of redness, and so on, in a crystal due to the influence of [the red colour of] a proximate substrate." Dignāga addresses both types in the following paragraphs.

[24] *kathaṃ na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ? upacāre sati, buddhirūpasya bhinnatvād rājño bhṛtyopacāravat.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197b6-7: *kathaṃ na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ? upacāre sati buddhirūpasya bhinnatvād iti. ... rājño bhṛtyopacāravad iti;* cf. the parallel version at NMañjGBh 137,14: *vṛttirūpasya bhinnatvād rājñi bhṛtyopacāravat.*

[69] Cf. NMañjGBh 138,18-20: *nanūpacārād anyaviṣayaḥ pratyayo 'nyatra saṅkrāman dṛśyata ity āha: "vṛttirūpasya bhinnatvād" bhedenopalabhyamānatvād iti:* "It is certainly the case that due to transfer a cognition that is concerned with one thing is observed in the sense of something else by being transferred. With this [objection] in mind he says: "Because the form of the application is different," i.e. because it is observed to be different."

[70] The parallel version quoted at NMañjGBh 137,14 (q.v. above no. [24])—it probably stems from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa—expresses the opposite idea, the transfer of the notion 'servant' to the king; Bhartṛhari makes use of the same simile at VP III.7:121: *rājñi bhṛtyatvam āpanne yathā.* Jinendrabuddhi does not comment

on the simile as such, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197b6: *jātau vṛttaḥ śabdas tadvaty upacaryate. na copacāre sati tulyākāro buddhir bhavati. etad dṛṣṭāntena pratipādayati:* "While being applied to the general property, the word is transferred to the general property possessor. And in the case of transfer the cognition does not have the same form. This he shows by means of an example." In Uddyotakara's exposition of the argument at NV the relation between the two terms is not inverted, cf. NV 324,15-16: *tadvati na ca guṇasārūpyāt pratyayasaṅkrāntiḥ, yathā svāmiśabdasya bhṛtye:* "And there is no transfer of cognition to the general property possessor due to similarity of property, like [the transfer] of the word 'master' to the servant."

[25] *tadyathā.* Qu. Ms B 197b7.

[71]*źes bya ba la* K, would indicate the presence of a Sanskrit locative.

[72] Cf. *bran la raṅ gi sgrar brjod pa ni* V : om. K.

[73] Cf. *gaṅ mi de ni ṅa raṅ ṅo* V : *ṅa[(1)] gaṅ yin pa de ni bran yin no* K. In contrast to KV supports the statement of *pāda* d.
   [(1)]*ṅa* em. : *ṅag* K.

[74] Cf. *blo mtshuṅs par skye ba ni ma yin no* V : *blo mtshuṅs par 'gyur ba ma yin no* K. Although the translation of this paragraph is tentative as neither KV nor Ms makes it possible to form a clear idea of its syntax and vocabulary, the gist of it seems clear enough: Dignāga wants to point out that the assumption that the alleged transfer of the idea of the general property existence to its possessor (*tadvat*) due to similarity is impossible because in secondary usage the transfer of one term to something else, like when a king refers to his minister as 'master' or 'king', does not entail that the cognitions of the two things to which the term is applied directly and secondarily coalesce: they are still separate, like the notions of 'king' and 'servant;' cf. NCV 624,24-25: *tatra na tāvat pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sārūpyād upacāraḥ sambhavati sārūpyāsambhave pratyayasaṅkrāntyabhāvāt svāmibhṛtyayor bhinnatvāt:* "In this case, in the first place, transfer is impossible through transfer of notion due to resemblance because there is no transfer of notion in that there is no resemblance because the master and the servant are different." NMañjGBh 138,13-17 explains the parallel as an illustration of the transfer of the word 'king' to the servant: *upacāre hi 'yo 'haṃ sa evāyam', 'rājā bhṛtyaḥ' ity upacārād lokasya rājādau pravṛttiḥ pratyayabhedenopalabhyata iti tad iha bhākta(ḥ) "vṛttirūpasya bhinnatvād rājñi bhṛtyopacāravad" iti:* "For in the case of transfer like "he is what I am: the servant is king," it is observed that people's usage with regard to the king, and so on, is accompanied by difference of notion."

[26] *upacaryate ca <jātiśabdas tadvati>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 197b: *upacaryate cetyādi.*

[75] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 197b7-198a1: *tad evaṃ tadvaty upacāravacanāj jātau mukhya ity uktam bhavati. tad etena yau mukhyopacaritaśabdābhidheyau, na tayoḥ sārūpyaṃ: tadyathā rājabhṛtyayoḥ:* "Thus, on account of the statement about transfer to the general property possessor it is [*eo ipso*] stated that [the general term] applies directly to the general property. Therefore, on this account there is no

similarity of the two denotable objects of a word that applies directly and in a transferred sense, like for instance [the lack of similarity] of a king and his servant."

[27] *krameṇānabhidhānāc ca kundaśaṅkhādiśuklavat.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 199a2-3: *krameṇānabhidhānāc ceti ... kundaśaṅkhādiśuklavad iti*[1].
   [1]em. : *°khyā°* Ms

[76] Jinendrabuddhi introduces this paragraph by clarifying the concept of similarity, cf. PSṬ Ms B 198b6-199a2: *sārūpyam indriyapratyayasaṅkrāntyā vā paricchidyeta śabdapratyayasaṅkrāntyā vā. tatrendriyapratyayasaṅkrāntyā jātitadvatoḥ sārūpyaṃ nāvāsīyata iti pratipāditaṃ prāyam etat sāmānyasyadar-śanaṃ pratipādayat* "*sāmānyaṃ yady api syāt tu tatrānyat tasya darśanam āśra-yādarśanān na syād*" (PS II:16abc) *ityādinā. na hy adr̥śyena saha kasyacit sārūpyaṃ śakyate pratyetum. śabdapratyayasaṅkrāntyāpi nāvasīyata iti darśayann āha:* "Similarity may either be defined through transfer of sense cognition or through transfer of verbal cognition. Now, it has already been shown in outline by PS II:16abc[1], showing that the general property cannot be observed, that the similarity of the general property and the general property possessor is not to be determined through transfer of sense cognition. For it is impossible to cognize the similarity of something with something that is not observable. Showing that it is not ascertained by transfer of verbal cognition either, he formulates (PS V:5a)."
   [1]For a translation of PSV II:16, cf. no. 500 on PSV V:38d.

[77] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 199a2-3: *jātitadvatoḥ krameṇa śabdaprayogasyābhāvād ity arthaḥ. yadi jātau tadvati ca krameṇa śabdaprayogaḥ syāt, tato yādr̥śaḥ śabdāj*[1] *jātau pratyayo bhavati tādr̥śa eva tadvatīti syāt pratyayasaṅkrāntiḥ. na ca krameṇa śabdaprayogaḥ, kiṃ tarhi sakr̥d eva. tataś caika eva pratyaya iti. kutaḥ pratyayasaṅkrāntir iti:* "The meaning is this: Because there is no application of the word to the general property and the general property possessor in succession. If the word were to be applied successively to the general property and the general property possessor, the notion about the general property that is due to the word would be exactly like the notion about the general property possessor. Thus there would be transfer of notion. Yet, the word is not applied in succession, but rather, it is applied simultaneously. And therefore there is only one notion. So how could there be transfer of notion?." Uddyotakara and Mallavādi appear to quote Dignāga's argument from another source, probably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, cf. NV 324,17 = NCV 625,10: *kramavr̥ttyabhavāt:* "because [the general term] does not apply in succession." Although Mallavādi applies the argument to Dignāga's own theory, the subsequent explanation loc. cit. no doubt imitates the original Dignāgan formulation: *na hi krameṇa sakr̥d uccaritaḥ śabdaḥ ... tadvati vartate.* Uddyotakara, however, does not explain the argument.
   [1]*°āj* em. : *°ā* Ms

[78] For the semantics of the topicalisation particle *ni* VK, cf. no. 10 above.

[79] Cf. *rim gyis brjod par mthoṅ ste* V : *rim pa yin par brjod pa de mthoṅ ste* K.

[80] Cf. *kun da daṅ ku mu ta daṅ duṅ dkar po* K : *me tog kun da daṅ me tog ku mu ta daṅ du duṅ gi*[1] *dkar po 'o* V.

[1]The use of the morpheme *gi* after *duṅ* would indicate the presence of the sixth triplet after each of the terms (in the manner of expressions like *'paṭasya śuklaḥ'*); it is not corroborated, however, by K and the parallel at Ms B 235b6-7: *yathā śuklatvaviśeṣaṇasyābhinnatvāt kumudādayo 'bhinnākāreṇa pratyayena pratīyante: "śuklaṃ kumudaṃ kundaṃ śaṅkham" iti,* which is adopted here.

[28] *sakṛc ca jātitadvatoḥ śabda<prayoga iti>*[1] *nāsti pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sārūpyam.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 199a4,6: *sakṛc ca jātitadvatoḥ sabda<prayoga>*[1] *iti ... nāsti pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sārūpyam.*
[1]°*<prayoga iti>* conj., cf. *sbyor ba'i phyir* K : om. VT; cf. the use of *śabdaprayoga* at Ms B 199a2-3, q.v. above.

[81] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 199a6: *pratyayasaṅkrāntito yad avasīyate, nisargasiddhaṃ sārūpyaṃ tan nāstīty arthaḥ.*

[29] *guṇopakārāt tādrūpye prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā.* Restored, cf. Ms 199a7-199b1: *guṇopakārāt tādrūpye prakarṣaḥ syād iti ... vinādhiyeti;* qu. ŚVṬ 66,3 with w.r. °*opakārato dravye.*

[82] Jinendrabuddhi introduces the argument at Ms B 199a6-7as follows: *mā bhūt svataḥ sārūpyam, jātyuparāgāt tu tad dravyaṃ svayam atadrūpam api tathā prakāśate. yathā sphaṭika upadhānāvaśāt svayam atadrūpo 'pi tadrūpatayā:* "Let there not be similarity *per se*. However, because of the influence of the general property a substance appears in this way, even though it is not identical with the general property *per se*, in the same way as a clear crystal by dint of a proximate substrate appears as if it were similar to it, even though it is not similar to it;" cf. NCV 625,12-14: *syān matam: guṇopakārād iti. tan nāpi guṇopakārāt sphaṭikavad viśeṣaṇaprakarṣam agṛhītvā viśeṣye pratyayaprasaṅgāt:* "Suppose the idea is that it is due to influence of the property. However, it is not due to influence of the property in the same way as a crystal because the [absurd] consequence is that there would be a notion of the qualified without having perceived the degree of the qualifier." Uddyotakara relates briefly the argument at NV 324,17: *guṇoparāgāt. yathā nīlaḥ sphaṭika iti.*

[83] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 199b1: *prakarṣa iti viṣayeṇa viṣayiṇyāḥ prakarṣabuddher nirdeśaḥ. prakarṣabuddhiḥ syād ity arthaḥ. kasmāt punar ayaṃ doṣa upanyasyati? yāvad dṛṣṭaiva dravye prakarṣabuddhiḥ.*

[84] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 199b1-2: *guṇaprakarṣabuddhyā vinety arthaḥ.*

[30] *yadi sphaṭikavad guṇoparāgāt tadvān guṇasvarūpo bhaved, evaṃ sati dravye <guṇa>prakarṣabuddhyanapekṣā*[1] *prakarṣabuddhiḥ syāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 199b2: *yadi sphaṭikavad guṇoparāgāt tadvān guṇasvarūpo bhaved, evaṃ sati līlataraḥ paṭa iti dravye viśeṣaṇaprakarṣabuddhyanapekṣā prakarṣabuddhiḥ syāt.*
[1]Cf. *yon tan 'phel ba'i blo* K.

[85] The argument that the perception of *prakarṣa* presupposes perception of *prakarṣa* of the quality is remarkable in that *prakarṣa*, at least in the grammatical tradition represented by Bhartṛhari, whose work, for all we know, was well-known

to Dignāga, is said to rely on other properties that inhere in the substance, such as luminousity (*bhāsvaratva*), whereas *prakarṣa* is not supposed to be a property of the general property as such; cf. VPV I 122,5ff with Paddhati ad loc.; *Iyer* 1969: 271f; Helarāja on VP III.3:3ff. However, as Jinendrabuddhi explains at Ms B 199b2-4, in this context the term *guṇa* denotes the quality as merged with the substrate (*saṃsargiguṇa*)[1], but not the quality as such, e.g., whiteness; cf. no. 87 below. Jinendrabuddhi's discourse on the use of the term *prakarṣa* at Ms B 199b7-200a4 addresses the apparent ambiguity of its use in the context of Dignāga's argument. For, as the fictitious opponent observes, general properties do not possess *prakarṣa*: *prakarṣagrahaṇaṃ guṇāpekṣapratyayasamarthanārtham anyathāvasīyamānāpi jātir jātimato 'rthasyopakāriṇī[2] vartate. tatas tadupakārāt tathā bhāsata iti kaścit pratyavatiṣṭheta. prakarṣas tu niyogatas tadavasāyāpekṣapratyayaparicchedya eva, dravyasya svataḥ prakarṣābhāvāt. na hi dravyaṃ svato dravyāntaram atiśayitum alaṃ svarūpamātreṇa vaktuṃ boddhuṃ vāśakyatvāt. nanu ca jāteḥ prakarṣābhāvāt tadanapekṣaviśeṣapratyayaḥ. naiṣa doṣaḥ. viśeṣapratyayo nīlādau viśeṣaṇāpek-ṣaḥ. tat sadādiviśeṣaṇāpekṣo[3] viśeṣye sadityādipratyayo nīlādipratyayavad ity uk-tam bhavati. anyathā yady agṛhītāpi svāśraye gotvādikā jātir gavādipratyayaṃ kuryeta. yadā kim apy etad dravyam iti dravyamātropalabdhau gotvādayo na gṛh-yante tadāpi gavādiniścayaḥ syān, na ca bhavati. tasmān na jātinirapekṣas tadvati pratyayaḥ.*

[1]For the term *saṃsargin*, cf. no. 90 below.
[2]em. : °*kāri* Ms
[3]em. : °*au* Ms

86 Cf. NCV 625,13-15: *yathā sphaṭike raktatvādipratyaya upadhānaprakarṣam agṛhītvā bhavati tathā viśeṣaṇaprakarṣam agṛhītvā viśeṣye pratyayaḥ syāt. na tu syāt:* "Just as the cognition of redness in the crystal exists without having apprehended the degree (of redness) of the proximate substrate, there would be a notion of the qualified without having perceived the degree of the qualifier. This, however, would not happen."

PST Ms B 199b2-4: *na ca viśeṣaṇaprakarṣe gṛhīte viśeṣye prakarṣabuddhir bhavati, dravyasya svataḥ prakarṣāpakarṣābhāvāt. na hi svata eva paṭaḥ paṭāntarāt kṛṣyate, api tu nīlatvāder āśritād guṇāt, nirupadhānasya vasturūpasya jñānāsam-bhavāt. guṇaśrutiś ceha saṃsargiguṇābhidhāyinī, na tu śuklatvādayas tayā guṇā vivakṣitāḥ:* "And there is no cognition of degree with respect to the qualified, when the degree of the qualifier has not been apprehended because increase and decrease [of the property] of a substance does not exist *per se.* For one piece of cloth is not *per se* set off from another piece of cloth, but rather because of the property that is resident in it viz. blueness, for it is impossible to get to know the form of a referent that is without an property. And in this case the word 'property' denotes the property as merged [with the substance], whereas [the general property] whiteness, and so on, are not intended to be denoted by it [viz. the term 'property'] as properties."

[31]   *na hi sphaṭike upadhāna<buddhy>apekṣā pravartate raktabuddhiḥ, avyutpannasya bhedabuddh<-abhāvāt>.* Restored, cf. Ms 199b5-6: *na hītyādi. upadhānena hi tadrūpatām āpādite sphaṭike nopāśrayādhigamāpekṣā pravartate raktabuddhiḥ. kasmād ity āha: avyutpannasyetyādi. na hy avyutpannasya sphaṭiko-padhānayor bhedabuddhir bhavati.*

[87] The example of a crystal[(1)] reflecting the colour of a proximate substrate is also mentioned by Bhartṛhari in a similar context at VP III.3:40, describing the apparent *tādrūpya* of a crystal with variously coloured proximate substrates: *sphaṭikādi yathā dravyaṃ bhinnarūpair upāśrayaiḥ, svaśaktiyogāt sambandhaṃ tādrūpyeṇeva[(2)] gacchati:* "Just as a substance like a crystal comes into connection as if by way of similarity, with variously coloured proximate subtrates due to the fitness of its own powers;" cf. the similar use of *iva* at VPV I 147,3-4 relating various views about the relation between *śabda* and *dhvani: śabdena saṃsṛṣṭo dhvanir upāśrayānurāga iva sphaṭikādīnām avibhakta upalabhyate;* in his comment Vṛṣabhadeva substitutes *upadhāna* for *upāśraya,* cf. Paddhati 147,11-13: *yathopadhānoparakto raktasphaṭiko na tato vivekenāvadhārayituṃ śakyaḥ tathā sphoṭena saṃsṛṣṭo dhvanir na vivekenāvadhāryata ity apare.*

One cannot exclude the possibility that Dignāga in rejecting this view has Bhatṛhari's position in mind.

[(1)]For the simile of the crystal, cf. *Houben* 1995: 261-62 (with references).

[(2)]On the reading of this verse, cf. *Houben* 1995: 257 no. 406.

[88] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 199b6-7: *na hy avyutpannasya sphaṭikopadhānayor bhedabuddhir bhavati. sa hi sphaṭika evāyam etadākāra iti vyavasyati. vyutpannasya tu rakto 'yam sphaṭika iti niścayānupapattir eva:* "For someone who has not been taught [about it] has no idea of the difference between the crystal and the proximate substrate. For he will ascertain: 'It is the crystal alone that has such and such an appearance'. But for someone who has been taught [about it] there is no justification for the ascertainment: 'This crystal is read'."

A similar argument is mentioned by Kumārila at ŚV Pratyakṣa° 143: *sphaṭikādau tu lākṣādisvarūpā yā matir bhavet, avyutpannasya sā mithyā vyutpannānāṃ hi bhedadhīḥ.*

[32] *saṃsargirūpāt sarvatra mithyājñānaṃ prasajyate.* Qu. Ms B 200a5.

[89] Dignāga is using the term *saṃsargin* to denote a property (*guṇa*) as merged with its substrate, cf. its use by Bhartṛhari, e.g., at VPV I 123,3, and VP III.5:1, with Helarāja's explanation VPP Vol. I 192,5: *saṃsargi ādhāreṇa saṃsṛṣṭaṃ rūpasambhedena vartamānam, na sambandhamātram;* Iyer 1969: 270. According to Jinendrabuddhi *saṃsargin* = *viśeṣaṇa* or *guṇa,* cf. PSṬ Ms B 200a6: *saṃsargi viśeṣaṇaṃ guṇa ity eko 'rthaḥ.*

[90] That is, if one assumes that similarity is due to influence of the property on the substance, cf. PSṬ Ms B 200a5f: *guṇopakārāt tādrūpyābhyupagame.*

[33] *sarvo hi śabdaḥ pratyayo 'rthe[(1)] saṃsargirūpavyavahitas, tataḥ <sphaṭikavad> ayathārthaḥ syāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 200a6-7: *sarvo hītyādi ... sarvo hi śabdaḥ pratyayo 'rtheṣu[(2)] saṃsargirūpavyavahitaḥ. tato ... yathā nīlaḥ sphaṭika iti gṛhṇato 'yathārthaḥ pratyayaḥ ... tathā ... ayathārthaḥ syāt.*

[(1)]Cf. *don la* K : *don daṅ* V.

[(2)]em. : *pratyayārth°* Ms

[91] The cognition is separated from its referent (*arthe vyavahitaḥ*) insofar as the real referent of the word is the property, not its reflected form.

[92] Uddyotakara and Mallavādi apparently use the same source, presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, for their exposition of the *pūrvapakṣa,* cf. NV 324,18: *ayathārthajñānotpattiprasaṅgāc ca:* "And because it follows (absurdly) that false knowledge would arise; NCV 625,14ff *ayathārthajñānotpatteḥ, yathā sphaṭike raktatvādipratyaya mithyāpratyayas tathā viśeṣaṇasarūpapratyayo viśeṣye syāt:* "Because false knowledge originates. Just as the notion of redness, and so on, in the crystal is a false notion, the notion about the qualified that is similar to the qualifier will be [a false notion] about the qualified." Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 200a6-200b1: *yadi guṇopakārād guṇini tādrūpyaṃ syāt, evaṃ sati yathā nīlaḥ sphaṭika iti gṛhṇato 'yathārthaḥ pratyayaḥ, sphaṭikasya svato 'nīlatvāt, tathā sarva eva ghaṭaḥ paṭa ityādiḥ*[1] *śābdaḥ pratyayo 'yathārthaḥ syāt, dravyasya svato ghaṭādirūpābhāvāt; na ceṣyate:* "If there be similarity in the qualified because of the influence of the property, this being the case, just as the notion of the one who apprehends that 'the crystal is blue' is false because the crystal is not blue *per se,* every verbal notion like 'pot' and 'cloth' will be false because the substance does not *per se* have the form of a pot, and so on, nor is it claimed [to be the case]."
[1]em. : °*ādiśāb°.*

[34] *sāmānyādibahutve ca yugapad grāhakeṣu ca, upakāro virudhyeta.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 200b1-2: *sāmānyādibahutve cetyādi ... yugapad grāhakeṣu ceti ... tadopakāro virudhyeta guṇakṛtaḥ.*

[93] According to Jinendrabuddhi *ādi* implies quality (*guṇa*), and action (*kriyā*), cf. PST Ms B 200b2: *ādigrahaṇād*[1] *guṇakriyāgrahaṇam.*
[1] *ādi°* em. : *ā°* Ms

[94] Dignāga uses the term *grāhaka* with the same value as *grahītṛ = pratipattṛ,* for which, cf. VP I:53c with VPV ad loc.

[95] For this argument, cf. NV 325,17-18: *yugapadasambhavāc ca,* and NCV 625,16: *yugapadasambhavāc ca.* Once again Uddyotakara and Mallavādi seem to quote from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa.

[96] Cf. PST Ms B 200b2: *yadaikakālaṃ bahavaḥ pratipattāro bhinnair viśeṣaṇair ekam arthaṃ pratipadyante tadopakāro virudhyeta guṇakṛtaḥ:* "When many listeners at the same time understand the same referent by means of different qualifiers, the influence [on the general property possessor] that is effectuated by the properties will be in conflict." Cf. Dharmakīrti's related criticism at PV I:54-55 and PVSV p.30 ad loc.

[35] *yadā ca bahavo grahītāro bhavanti guṇavataḥ śuklādeḥ tadyathā ghaṭaḥ, pārthivo, dravyaṃ, sañ, chuklo, madhuraḥ, surabhir ityevamādiviśeṣaiḥ, tadā guṇo-pakāro virudhyate. na hi śakyaṃ tadā dravyena ekaguṇarūpeṇa sthātum aviśeṣāt*[1]. *nāpy ekadeśena guṇarūpam anubhāvitum śakyam, kṛtsnasya ghaṭādirūpapratīteḥ.* Restored, cf. NCV 625,16-19: <u>yadā ca bahavo grahītāro bhavanti guṇavataḥ</u> <u>śuklādeḥ tadyathā ghaṭaḥ, pārthivo, dravyaṃ, sañ, chuklo, madhuraḥ, surabhir</u> <u>ityevamādiviśeṣaiḥ, tadā guṇopakāro virudhyate. na hi śakyaṃ tadā dravyena</u> <u>ekaguṇarūpeṇa sthātum anekātmakasyāviśiṣṭatvāt. nāpy ekadeśena guṇarūpam</u>

anubhāvituṃ śakyam, kṛtsnasya ghaṭādirūpapratīteḥ; Ms B 200b3-5: *tadyatheti ... na hi śakyam ityādi. ... aviśeṣāt ... nāpy ekadeśena guṇarūpam anubhāvituṃ śakyam ... kṛtsnasyetyādi.*

[1]Cf. *khyad par med pa'i phyir ro* V 110,28 : *khyad par med pa'i phyir* K 111,28.

97 Since any given referent has a multitude of properties, it would require a multitude of speakers to convey them at the same time and therefore, by implication, a multitude of listeners for decoding what the speakers say. This is inconsistent with the way in which verbal knowledge is conveyed; cf. NCV 633,11ff where Siṃhasūri explains Dignāga's argument with reference to the speaker (*vaktṛ*) as opposed to the *grahītṛ* decoding what the speaker says: *ekasminn arthe ghaṭādau ghaṭatvapṛthivītvadravyatvasattvādibhinneṣu vaktṛṣu kaścid ghaṭa iti brūte kaścit pṛthivītyādi yāvat san iti. tatra ghaṭābhidhāne so 'rtho ghaṭarūpeṇa kṛtsno vābhidhīyate ekadeśena vā? na tāvat kṛtsnaḥ, tasminn eva kāle vaktrantarasya pārthivatvenābhidhānāsambhavaprasaṅgāt:* "When someone among the speakers that are divided between potness, earthness, substanceness, existence, and so on, says 'pot', about the same referent viz a pot, and so on, and some says 'earth', and so on, up to 'existent', in that case, is this referent denoted in toto in the form of 'pot' or is it denoted partially? In the first place it is not denoted in toto because the [absurd] consequense is that it would be impossible for another speaker at the same time to denote is as 'earthen';" cf. NCV 634,5-6: *yathā paraṃ prati tvadudāhṛta-ghaṭapārthivatvoktau "yadi ghaṭatvena samastaṃ vastu viśiṣṭaṃ tataḥ pārthivatvas-yāvakāśābhāvān na yujyate" iti iṣṭo doṣaḥ:* "Like the mistake you have pointed out, in opposition to the opponent, in your statement about potness and earthenness which you have quoted as examples, namely that if the entity as a whole is qualified by means of potness it is not justified because there is no room for earthenness."

98 There are three ways (*trayī gatiḥ*) in which one might cognize a thing as Jinendrabuddhi explains: **1.** cognition of the form of any property among the many that define an entity; **2.** cognition of the form of all (its qualities) partially, i.e., one by one; **3.** cognition of the form of all qualities in toto, cf. PST Ms B 200b3-4: *atra trayī gatiḥ. anyatarasyaiva vā guṇasya rūpaṃ pratipadyeta, sarveṣām api vā ekadeśaḥ, sarvātmanā vā sarveṣām eveti.*

99 Cf. PST Ms B 200b4-5: *tatra na tāvad ekaikasyaiva, aviśeṣāt. na hi sattādīnāṃ kaścid viśeṣo 'sti, yata ekasyaiva rūpaṃ pratipadyeta, nānyasya:* "In the first place, there is no [cognition] of each single [property] because of absence of difference. For there is no difference whatever between the [general property] existence, and so on, so that the form of only one would be cognized, but not that of another."

100 Cf. PST Ms B 200b5-6: *yadi hy ekadeśena viśeṣaṇarūpaṃ pratipadyeta, tadaikadeśo 'sya ghaṭa iti pratīyeta, tathā pārthivo dravyam ityādi:* "For if one were to cognize the form of the qualifiers partially, one would cognize one part of its as 'pot', similarly one part as 'earthen', 'substance', and so on."

101 V 110,29 adds *lan cig tu* (= *yugapat*) : om. K. The reading of V is doubtful as it does not occur in the corresponding passage at NCV 625,19, q.v. no. [35] above.

[36] *sarvair vā mecakekṣaṇam.* Qu. Ms B 200b6.

[102] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 200b6-201a1: *sarvair ghaṭatvapārthivatvādibhir viśeṣaṇaiḥ samastasya vastuno yugapad upakāre tadrūpāpattau ghaṭādirūpasya vibhāgena grahaṇābhāvād avibhāgenānyonyam abhinnānekarūpagrahaṇaṃ syāt, na vibhāgena ghaṭo 'yaṃ pārthivo vetyādikam:* "If such qualifiers as potness and earthenness, and so on, at the same time were to exert their influence on the entity as a whole, then, in that it assumes [all] their forms because there is no apprehension of it by way of distinction between the form of 'pot', and so on, there will be an undifferentiated apprehension of their various forms because they are not mutually differentiated due to lack of distinction [between them], but there would not be [an apprehension of it] by means of distinction [into] 'this is a pot', or 'this is earthen,' etc."

[37] *atha punaḥ sarvair ghaṭatvādibhir upakāro yugapat kṛtsnasya kriyate, tataḥ pratyekaṃ ghaṭādirūpagrahaṇābhāvād mecakadarśanaṃ yugapat sarvarūpāpatteḥ syāt.* Restored, cf. NCV 625,19-20: <u>atha punaḥ sarvair ghaṭatvādibhir upakāro yugapat kṛtsnasya kriyate, tataḥ sarveṣāṃ pratyekaṃ grahītṝṇāṃ ghaṭādirūpagrahaṇābhāvāt sarvaguṇasaṅkareṇa mecakadarśanaṃ yugapat sarvarūpāpatteḥ syāt;</u> Ms 201a1: *yugapat sarvarūpāpatter*[(1)] *iti.*
[(1)]Cf. *dṅos po thams cad cig car du thob pa yin no* V : *ṅo bo thams cad gcig par mthoṅ ba'i phyir* K.

[103] Cf. the use of *mecakavarṇa* at TSP 350,22-23 (ad TS 887 = VP II:126): *yad vā tapaḥśrutādīnām mecakavarṇavad aikyena bhāsanād eṣām eva parasparam asatyaḥ saṃsargaḥ. tathā hi ete pratyekaṃ samuditā vā na svena rūpeṇopalabhyate, kiṃ tu alātacakravad eṣāṃ samūhaḥ svarūpam utkrāmyāvabhāsata iti.* VP loc. cit and the exposition at TSP are related to the discussion at Mahā-bh I 411,15ff. Amarakośa I.4:14 defines *mecaka* as black: *kṛṣṇe nīlāsitaśyāmakālaśyāmala-mecakāḥ.* Ct. ad loc. explains *mecaka* as *miśrībhavati,* being mixed together, variegated.

[104] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a1-2: *yatas tad dravyaṃ sarveṣāṃ rūpaṃ yugapad āpadyate. tad evam upakāravirodhād ghaṭādirūpeṇa grahaṇaṃ na syāt. asti ca tat:* "Because the substance at the same time assumes the form of all [of its general properties]. Thus there would be no apprehension in the form of 'pot', etc. because the influence [of the general properties] is in conflict [with linguistic experience]. And yet this [apprehension] exists."

[105] For this paragraph, cf. the quotation at NCV 625,19-20 (cf. no. **[37]** above): "If, on the other hand, all [of the general properties] such as potness, and so on, simultaneously assist the [substance as a] whole, there would be a confused perception due to the mixing together of all the properties in it because [the substance] simultaneously assumes the form of all [of the general properties] and because the listeners do not apprehend them all, one by one, in the form of 'pot', etc."

[38] *bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaś ca teṣv api*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a2-3: *bhedeṣv ityādinā;* Ms B 202b5-6: *bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaś ca teṣv apītyādinā prāg eva nirākṛtam.*

[106] According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga extends the problems of the theory of the general property possessor to the other theses mentioned in the first half of the verse, formulating the corresponding reasons in the second half, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a2-3: *bhedeṣv ityādinā tadvatpakṣoditaṃ doṣaṃ pakṣāntareṣv atidiśati. uttarārdhena tv atraivopapattim āha.*

[107] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 201a3: *jātirūpam bhedeṣu na*[(1)] *yujyate, śabdasvarūpaṃ*[(2)] *jātau, śabdasvarūpayuktajātirūpaṃ sambandhe:* "The form of the general property is not justified with regard to the particulars, the own form of the word is not justified with regard to the general property, and the form of the general property as connected with the own form of the word is not justified with respect to the relation."
[(1)]*eṣu na yuj°* em. : *°eṣv ayam ayuj°* Ms
[(2)]*°svarūp°* em. : *°rūp°* Ms

[108] Cf. *tha dad pa'i*[(1)] *ṅo bos* K : *tha dad pa'i ṅo bo la* V.
[(1)]*tha da pa'i* em. : *tha da pa'i raṅ gi* K.

[39] *avaśyam.* Qu. Ms B 201a4.

[109] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a4: *sambandhirūpaviviktasyārthātmano vācā viṣayīkartum aśakyatvād avaśyam ity āha:* "Since it is impossible for an expression to take as its referent the nature of a thing as dissociated from the form of its relatum, he says 'necessarily.'"

[40] <*jātau*> *mukhyaḥ,*[(1)] *bhedeṣūpacarita iti*[(2)]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a5: *dravyatvādiṣu mukhyo bhedeṣūpacarita iti.*
[(1)]Cf. *rigs la gtso bo* K : *dṅos kyi* (sic) *rigs dag la* V.
[(2)]Cf. *źes* V : *phyir* K.

[110] That is, general properties like substanceness, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a5: *dravyatvādiṣu.*

[111] For Jinendrabuddhi's remarks on what distinguishes the *bhedapakṣa* from the *tadvatpakṣa,* cf. no. 113 below.

[112] These problems comprise **1.** direct and transferred application, **2.** no denotation in succession, and **3.** incompatibilty of the influence of the general properties [with verbal distinctions], cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a4-6: *kas tarhi tadvatpakṣād bhedapakṣasya viśeṣaḥ? tadvatpakṣe sajjātirūpeṇa sacchabdo 'bhidhāyakaḥ, bhedapakṣe tu dravyādirūpeṇa. evaṃ hi bhedarūpeṇābhihitā bhavantīty eṣa viśeṣaḥ. tatrāpi dravyatvādiṣu mukhyo bhedeṣūpacarita iti pūrvavad eva doṣā vācyāḥ: mukhyopacaritavṛttitvam, krameṇānabhidhānam, guṇopakāravirodhaś ca:* "Then what is the difference of the thesis about the particulars [being the denotable objects] from the thesis about the general property possessors [being the denotable objects]?

On the thesis about the general property possessors [being the denotable objects] the word 'existent' denotes in the form of the general property existence, but on the thesis about the particulars [being the denotable objects] it denotes in the form of substances, etc. For in this way they are denoted in the form of particulars. Such is the difference. And also in that case the problems are to be stated exactly as before, on the grounds that (*iti*) it denotes substanceness, and so on, directly and is transferred to the particulars, namely, direct and transferred application, no denotation in succession, and incompatibility with the influence of the general properties."

[113] Cf. *de daṅ ldan pa la brjod pa bźin du skyon thams cad brjod par bya 'o* [1] V : *de daṅ ldan pa bźin du thams cad la ñes pa brjod par bya 'o* K.
[1]Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a5: *pūrvavad doṣā vācyāḥ.*

[41] *sambhavataḥ*[1]. Qu. Ms B 201a6.
[1]Cf. *srid pas* V : *srid pa yin no* (sic) K.

[114] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of Dignāga's use of the word 'possibility' at Ms B 201a6: *jātyabhidhāne "prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā"* (PS V 5d) *ity asyāsambhavāt, sambandhābhidhāne 'py, ata eva sambhavagrahaṇam:* "Since it is impossible that 'there would be [perception of] degree of intensity [of the general property possessor] without perception (*prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā*) (of the degree of intensity of the property)' (PS V:5d) if the general property as well as the relation are denoted, precicely therefore he uses [the word] 'possibility.'" After this explanation he continues addressing qestions regarding the problems of the denotation of the relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a7-201b3: *nanu ca pūrvaṃ sambandhasyānabhidheyataivoktā*[1]. *tat katham idānīṃ sadrūpeṇābhidhānam āśrīyate? kathaṃ cātrābhedopacāraḥ sambandhasyāṅgīkriyate? pūrvaṃ hy asattva-bhūtatvād ākhyātārthasya śabdābhedopacārānupapatter anabhidhānam uktam. sambandho 'py asattvabhūta*[2] *eva. tat kutas tasyābhedopacāraḥ? sattayā sacchab-dena vā? asati cābhedopacāre kutaḥ pūrvoktadoṣaprasaṃgaḥ? atha sattābhedopa-cāreṇa sa ucyate, kathaṃ sadyogaśabdayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyānupapattiḥ? naiṣa doṣaḥ, abhyupetya sambandhābhidhānam asya doṣasyābhidhānāt. yady api sambandho 'bhidhīyate, tathāpi tadvatpakṣadoṣānatipattir jātimattulyakakṣatvād*[3] *iti pradarśanārtham idam uktam.*
[1]em. : °*dhasyābhi*° Ms
[2]em. : '*pi vā satva*° Ms
[3]em. : °*tūlya*° Ms

[115] For Sanskrit *iti*, cf. *źes srid pas*[1] V : *phyir srid pa yin no* (sic) K.
[1]Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201a6: *ity asambhavāt,* q.v. above no. 114.

[116] Cf. *rigs brjod pa'i* (*phyir*) K : *rdzas su brjod pa* V.

[117] Cf. *rigs kyaṅ mṅon par brjod par bya ba la* K : *brjod par bya ba'i rigs dag la* V. For the assumption that the own form (*svarūpa*) of the word is superimposed upon the *jāti* as its referent (*artha*), cf. no. 304 below.

[42] *tadvāṃs ca*[(1)] *bheda eveṣṭaḥ sa ca pūrvaṃ nirākṛtaḥ.* Qu. ŚVṬ 62,11; NR 425,8; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b3: *tadvāṃś cetyādinā pakṣāntaratvam evāsya nirākaroti.*
[(1)]*ca* ŚVṬ Ms : *tu* NR.

[118] Cf. *rigs kyi sgra ru 'o*[(1)] V : om. K.
[(1)]Although V is syntactically akward, I assume that this phrase translates Sanskrit *jātiśabde,* which makes sense in the present context.

[119] Cf. *sñar spaṅs pa yin no* K : *bsal źes pa ni sñar* V (this translation is akward).

[120] Unlike the previous translation of 2a K is not syntactically confused this time. V repeats the syntactically impossible first translation adding *par* (DC om. in accordance with the previous translation) after *med.* The qu. of 2a involves the reasons given at 2b viz. *ānantyād vyabhicārataḥ* as indicated by ŚVṬ 62,8f on ŚV Apoha° 128, introducing Dignāga's argument as follows: *yat punar etasminn eva pakṣe bhikṣuṇoktam: jātiviśiṣṭeṣu abhidhīyamāneṣu svalakṣaṇāny evābhidheyāni prāpnuvanti, teṣām ānantyavyabhicārābhyām avācyatvam uktam iti:* "With regard to this thesis the monk has explained: 'When they are denoted as qualified by the general property, it follows [absurdly] that only the individual entities are denotable, and they are explained not to be denotable because they are infinite and because of ambiguity'."

[121] Cf. *de yaṅ*[(1)] *rigs daṅ ldan pa la yaṅ brjod pa yin no* V : *de yaṅ rigs daṅ ldan pa yin no* K.
[(1)]*yaṅ* em., cf. K : *daṅ* V.

[43] *nanu coktam.* Qu. Ms B 201b3.

[122] Cf. *rigs kyi sgra* K : om. V (PN so; D conj. *rigs ni*).

[123] Cf. *rigs daṅ ldan pa tsam brjod par byed pa* K : *rigs daṅ ldan pa tsam gyi*[(1)] *brjod par byed pa* V.
[(1)]*gyi* em. : *gyis* V.

[124] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b4-5: *na hy atra bhedābhedarūpeṇābhidhīyante, kiṃ tarhi teṣāṃ jātimatāṃ yad aviśiṣṭaṃ rūpaṃ sattāsamāropitaṃ tad eva bhedarūpāsaṃsparśenābhidhīyate. tathā ca bhedapakṣāt pakṣāntaram evedam iti manyate:* "For in this case it is neither denotable in the form of various kinds of particulars,[(1)] but rather, it is only the undifferentiated form of the general property possessors as transposed to the general property existence that is being denoted without touching on the form of the particulars. And thus this is a different thesis from the thesis about the particulars. This is what is meant."
[(1)] I regard *bhedābheda* as an instance of a reduplicated cpd. from < *bheda* + *bheda* with rythmical lenghthening, denoting "various kinds of particulars." Cf. AiGr II.1 p. 148; Nachträge zu II.1 p. 44.

[44] *yady evam.* Qu. Ms 201b5.

[125] Dignāga is going to show that the opponent's theory does not differ in substance from the views that the denotation of the word is the general property or the relation of the general property: the mere general property possessor will either be the general property as such or its relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b5-6: *yady evam ityādinā jātiyogapakṣayor asyāntarbhāvāt pakṣāntaratvaṃ pratiṣedhayati. kathaṃ punas tadvanmātraṃ sattā sambandho vā syād ity āha: tadvanmātraṃ tv ityādi:* "By the words "if this is the case, and so on," he denies that it is a different thesis since it is included in the theses of the general property and its relation. To the question "in what way then would the mere property possessor be [the general property] existence or its relation," he answers "the mere property possessor, nevertheless, etc."

ŚVṬ 62,18-19: *yac cātra bhikṣuṇā jātimattvamātraṃ vācyaṃ bhaviṣyatīty āśaṅkya vikalpitam: atha jātimattvaṃ, kiṃ jātitadvatos sambandhaḥ kiṃ vā sāmānyarūpam iti. evaṃ ca vikalpya pūrvoktajātisambandhābhidhānadoṣo yojanīyaḥ ity uktvoktam:* "Moreover, the monk supposes that the denotable object will be the mere property of being a general property possessor and conjectures: "Suppose [the denotable object] is the property of being a property possessor, is it the relation of the general property and the general property possessor or the form of the general property [that is the denotable object]?" And having conjectured thus he objects as follows, thinking that the previously mentioned problem of the denotation of the general property and the relation is applicable to the case.

[45] *tadvanmātraṃ tu*[(1)] *sambandhaḥ sattā veti vicāritam.* Qu. ŚVṬ 63,22; NR 425,29; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b5: *tadvanmātraṃ tv ityādi.*
[(1)]°*mātraṃ tu* Ms : °*mātre 'pi* ŚVṬ NR, cf. *de ldan tsam ni* K : *de ldan tsam yaṅ* V : *de daṅ ldan pa tsam ni* T; V is ambiguous as *yaṅ* is used to translate not only Sanskrit *api,* but also *ca* and *tu;* cf. Obermiller, Indices s.vv. *ni* and *yaṅ.*

[126] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b6-7: *mātraśabdena bhedanirākaraṇe sāmānyaṃ sarvānugataṃ rūpaṃ śabdārtha ity uktaṃ bhavati. tac ca pravṛttinimittatvād bhāvapratyayenābhidheyam. na sattāṃ sambandhaṃ vā muktvānyad upalabhyate bhāvapratyayasya tatraiva vidhānāt:* "The word 'mere' is for the sake of excluding the particulars, and it means that the referent of the word is the general property, which is the form that is continuously present in everything. And since this is the cause of application, it is is to be denoted by means of the *bhāva* affix. Apart from the general property existence or the relation [of the general property existence] no other [cause of application] is found because the *bhāva* affix is prescribed for denoting this only."

[127] Cf. *ni* K : *yaṅ* V.

[128] Cf. *de ldan ñid* K : *de daṅ ldan pa* V; cf. ŚVṬ 63,9ff: *matubantād ayam bhāvapratyayaḥ kṛtaḥ, sa ca sambandhavācy api smaryate:* "This *bhāva* affix is introduced after a word ending in a *matup* affix, and it is also traditionally thought to denote the relation."

[129] This clause is syntactically confused in KV: *'brel pa 'am yon tan la 'gyur* K probably translates *sambandhe guṇe vā bhavati; nam 'brel pa'i yon tan du 'gyur ro* V is comparable to *brel pa'i yon tan du 'gyur ro* V (114,9), which, as indicated by

the context, must be interpreted in the same way. The term 'property' (*guṇa*) denotes any given general property (*jāti, sāmānya*).

[130] Dignāga supports his analysis with a well-known grammatical quotation whose source Jinendrabuddhi omits identifying, cf. PSṬ Ms B 201b7: *etad āgamena darśayitum āha: samāsakṛttaddhiteṣv ityādi. sambandhābhidheyatāyāṃ āgamaḥ.* The Sanskrit grammarian Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita claims that the quotation stems from Bhartṛhari's Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā, cf. Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā 49: *kṛttaddhitasamā-sebhyo matabhedanibandhanam, tvatalor arthakathanaṃ ṭīkāyāṃ Hariṇā kṛtam.* Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa explains in Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra ad loc. that the mention of *Hari* and *ṭīkā* serves to rebut the erroneous view current among Mīmāṃsakas and other scholars (= Naiyāyikas) that this definition of the function of *tvatal* is a vārttika and thus by implication to be attributed to Kātyāyana[1]: *kṛttaddhitasamāsebhyaḥ* (sic) *sambandhābhidhānaṃ bhāvapratyayenānyatra rūḍhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicaritasam-bandhebhya iti vārtikavacam iti mīmāṃsakādīnāṃ bhramam apākurvann āha tīkā-yāṃ, Bhartṛhariṇā Mahābhāṣyaṭīkāyām ity arthaḥ.* It is, of course, an open question if the attribution to Bhartṛhari is trustworthy because the attribution of the quote to Bhartṛhari is very late. On the other hand, the claim that the abstract affixes *tva* and *tā* denote the general property (*jāti*), when introduced after idiomatic expressions and words whose connection (to existence) is invariable, is only known from Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya; cf. Jātisamuddeśa VP III 1:48: *asvaśabdābhidhānās tu narasiṃhādijātayaḥ sarūpāvayavevānyā tāsu śrutir avasthitā;* and VP III 14 39cd where Bhartṛhari explains that in the case of terms like *gaurakhara* the *jāti* is not expressed prior to the formation of the compound (*prāg vṛtter jātivācitvaṃ na gaurakharādiṣu*). The view that the abstract affixes denote existence (*sattā*) is essential to Bhartṛhari's metaphysics, cf., e.g., Jātisamuddesa 34: *sā nityā sā mahān ātmā, tām āhus tvatalādayaḥ.*

The idea of the invariability of connection (*avyabhicaritasambandha*) of existence to things ultimately derive from Mahābhāṣya, cf. no. 133[1] below, but Bhartṛhari has elaborated the idea with the background of his metaphysics of existence (*sattā*).

[1]Cf., e.g., NVṬ 52,4: *iti Kātyāyanīyavacanāt;* Nyāyakaṇikā: 20,19: *iti vārtikakāravacanāt.*

[46] *samāsakṛttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhidhānaṃ anyatra rūḍhyabhinnarūpā-vyabhicaritasambandhebhyaḥ.* Qu., e.g., Nyāsa Vol. I: 610,28-29; Mahā-bh-P Vol. IV: 342,2-3; VPP Vol. I 194,15 (reading *abhinnayoga* for *abhinnarūpa* with Ms C; Helarāja, however, only addresses the meaning of the term *abhinnarūpa* op. cit. 197,8; Bhartṛhari mentions *abhinnarūpatva* in a similar grammatical context at VP III 837c); cf. PSṬ 38, on PSV I:3d: *yathoktam: samāsakṛttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhi-dhānam iti; Hayes* 1988: 713f.

[131] Dignāga mentions at PSV I:3d the view that words like *daṇḍin* and *viṣāṇin* that terminate in *taddhita* affixes denote their referents as qualified by a connection (*sambandhaviśiṣṭa*). This view is characteristic of Bhartṛhari's analysis of *taddhita* forms and compounds in general, cf. VP III 912, 920, 922; 933ff; no.s 132 and 596 below.

[132] For a concise explanation of the grammatical implications of the statement, cf. PST Ms B 201b7-202a3: *rājapuruṣatvaṃ pācakatvam aupagavatvam iti teṣu samāsādiṣu svasvāmikriyākārakāpatyāpatyavatsambandhā ucyante yathākramam. tad atrāpi sacchabdasya kṛdantatvāt sambandhābhidhānaṃ syāt. anye tv asyaivā-pavādam āhuḥ: anyatretyādi. eṣa guṇābhidhāyitāyām āgamaḥ. rūḍhāt samāsāt: gaurakharatvaṃ srmaratvaṃ, taddhitāt: hastitvam. atra jātimātram ucyate, na sambandhaḥ. taddhitād abhinnarūpāt: śuklatvam. śuklaśabdasya matvarthīyān-tasyāpi prakṛtyā tulyarpatvāt. atrāpi guṇa evābhidhīyate. avyabhicaritasambandhāt kutaḥ sattvam. na tu sattāṃ padārtho vyabhicaratīti*[(1)]. *atra saiva sattābhidhīyate na sambandhaḥ:* "When [the *bhāva* affixes] are introduced after these viz. *rājapuruṣatvaṃ pācakatvam aupagavatvam,* then, beginning with the compound, a master servant relation, an agent action relation, and a descendant originator relation are denoted, respectively. In this context therefore also the word *'sat'* would denote a relation because it ends in a *kṛt* affix. Others formulate an exception to this viz.: *Apart from,* etc. This is the received tradition about denoting a property: [apart from] when it is introduced after a conventional term, viz. a compound: *gaurakharatvam,* after a [conventional term] ending in a *kṛt* affix: *srmaratvam,* and after a [conventional term] ending in a *taddhita* affix: *hastitvam.* In these [instances] (*atra*) the mere *jāti* is denoted, not the relation. When introduced after [a word] ending in a *taddhita* affix whose form is not distinct[(2)]: *śuklatvam* because the word *śukla* has the same form although in its original state it ends in the (*taddhita*) affix denoting possession [i.e., *matup*]. In this case too, it is only the property that is denoted. [Apart from] when it is introduced after [a term] whose relation is invariable. Why is it existence? "Certainly, a thing does not deviate from existence. In this case it is only existence that is denoted."

Cf. PST I 38,12-17 on PSV I:3d: *kriyādravyābhyāṃ tadvatāṃ yaḥ sambandhaḥ sa śabdapravṛttinimittam. tathā hi kārakatvaṃ*[(3)] *daṇḍitvam iti bhāvapratyayaḥ kriyākārakādisambandhe bhavati. yathoktam: samāsakṛttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhi-dhānam iti. śabdapravṛttinimitte ca bhāvapratyayo bhavati. tathā cāhur: "yasya guṇasya hi bhāvād dravye śabdaniveśaḥ, tadabhidhāne tvatalāv"*(vārtt 5 on A V 1:119) *iti. pācako daṇḍīti ca kṛttaddhitau. tasmād atra sambandhe bhāvapratyayaḥ.*

[(1)] For this statement, cf. Mahābhāṣya ad A II.3:1 vārtt 11, Vol. I 443,5-8; VP III.3:51.

[(2)] For the grammatical implications of the term *abhinnarūpa,* cf., e.g., Helarāja on VP III.14:136c: *vṛtter abhinnarūpatvāt;* Kaiyaṭa's lucid remarks on Mahābhāṣya ad A V 2:94, vārtt 3: *"guṇavacanebhyo matupo luk." śuklādaya evābhinnarūpā guṇe tadvati ca dravye vartamānā gṛhyante;* and on A V 2:94, vārtika 4: *avyati-rekād iti guṇaguṇinoḥ so 'yam ity abhisambandhād abhedādhyavasāyād utpattir eva matupo nāstīty arthaḥ.*

[(3)] The reading *kārakatvaṃ* is odd. One would expect *pācakatvaṃ* followed by *daṇḍitvaṃ* as examples of the rule that the abstract affixes *tā* and *tvam* denote the relation, when introduced after *kṛt* and *taddhita* derivatives like *pācaka* and *daṇḍī,* mentioned a few lines below. Cf. Padamañjarī Vol. IV 106,8 (ad A V 1:119): *pācakatvam iti kriyākārakasambandhaḥ.*

[133] Cf. *źes brjod zin to* V : om. K.

[47] *tadvān artho ghaṭādiś cen*[1] *na paṭādiṣu*[2] *vartate, sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham?* Qu. ŚVṬ 63,17-18; NR 426,8-9; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a3-4: *tadvān ʼrtho ghaṭādiś cetyādinā ... sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham iti.*
[1]*cen na* ŚVṬ 63,17-18; NR 426,8-9 : *ca* Ms
[2]em. : *ghaṭādiṣu* NR, cf. *snam bu sogs pa* (sic) V : *bum pa la sogs rnams la* K.

[134] NCV 733,19 quotes a couple of similar *pāda*s that probably stem from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa: *satvān artho ghaṭādir na paṭādiṣu na vartate:* "Suppose the referent that is the possessor of the [general property] existence is a [single] pot, etc. That is not the case, for it [viz. the pot] does not reside in cloth, etc."

Dignāga addresses in this paragraph the assumption that the denotation of the word ʼexistentʼ is a single instantiation of existence such as a pot. As Dignāga points out this contradicts the assumption that the general property existence is present in every single of its instantiations. For if the instantiation is restricted to a single referent like a pot in which the general property is resident to the exclusion of other referents, the idea of the general property residing in each single instantiation becomes untenable, if the pot does not reside in other things like cloth.

Jinendrabuddhi explains that *tadvān artho ghaṭādiḥ,* and so on, states the reason why a single possessor of the general property existence does not reside in the many instantiations of existence. *sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham* is the *prāmāṇaphala,* i.e., the result of the proof: that which does not reside in *aneka,* cannot be a general property, like an individual entity (*svalakṣaṇa*), cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a3-4: *tadvān ʼrtho ghaṭādiś cetyādnānekatrāvṛttitvahetuḥ sūcitaḥ. sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham iti pramāṇaphalam. yad anekatra na vartate, na tat sāmānyaṃ svalakṣaṇavat, tathā ca tadvān. vyāpakbhāvaḥ.*

Kumārila applies Dignāgaʼs argument to a hypothetical exclusion possessor at ŚV Apoha° 131ab: *na caikāpohavān artho vartate ʼrthāntare kvacit;* cf. also NCV 635,10: *yady api tāvad ghaṭādi paṭādiṣu na vartate.*

ŚVṬ on ŚV Apoha° 131 introduces Dignāgaʼs argument in this way: *yadā gotvaviśiṣṭaḥ śābaleyo gośabdasya vācyatvam aṅgīkṛtaṃ tadāsau bāhuleye nāstīti tatra gośabdapravṛttir na syād iti:* "When it is agreed that the object of denotation of the word 'cow' is the brindled cow as qualified by the general property cowhood, this [brindled cow] does not exist in the speckled cow. Consequently the word 'cow' would not refer to this."

K and V differ in their interpretation of the syntax of pādas 9c-10a. If we disregard the syntactical problems of V 112,21-23 the Tibetan reproduction of the verse runs: "If the property possessor viz. a [single] referent like a pot does not reside in cloth, and so on, how could this referent be the general property," whereas K (quite apart from its many inaccuracies: such as interpreting *tadvān* as if it were the particle *tadvat = de bźin*) construes *sāmānyam* with *vartate.* On this interpretation the verse says: "If a [single] referent like a pot is the property possessor and the general property does not reside in cloth, and so on, how could this be the referent."

[48] *anekavṛtti*[1] *hi sāmānyam.* Qu. Ms B 202a4.
[1]°*ti* em. : °*tir* Ms

[135] For the qualification of the general property as *anekavṛtti,* cf. the definition of *sāmānya* at PBh § 361: *svaviṣayasarvagatam abhedātmakam anekavṛtti.*

[49] *tac ca.* Qu. Ms B 202a5.

[136] Cf. *gal te* K : *gaṅ*[1] V.
[1]The reading *gaṅ* is presumably based upon a misreading of *yadi* as *yad.*

[50] *kathaṃ <teṣām sāmānyam iti yujyate>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a5:
katham iti.

[137] Cf. *snam bu la sogs pa la jug pa yin nam* (sic) V : *bum pa la sogs pa rnams la
'jug pa ma yin na* K.

[138] Cf. the phrase at 10a: *sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham.*

[51] *nanu ca*[1]. Qu. Ms B 202a.
[1] Cf.*'on te yaṅ* K : *spyi ste* V (for which read *ci ste*).

[52] *kimartham*[1]. Qu. Ms B 202a6.
[1]Cf. *ci'i don du* K : *don spyi yin* V (for which read *don ci yin*).

[139] The opponent objects to Dignāga's attributing the form of the general
property to the general property possessor, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a5-6: *nanu cetyādinā
siddhasādhyatām āha tadvataḥ sāmānyarūpatayāniṣtatvāt. tad aniṣṭaṃ sāmānya-
rūpādhyāropeṇa sūcayann āha: kimartham ityādi.* In the light of this explanation the
reading *de la ci'i don du spyi med par sgro 'dogs par byed źe na* K must be
corrected to read *de la ci'i don du spyi ñid du sgro 'dogs par byed źe na,* cf. *de spyi
ñid du sgro btags pa'i don ci*[1] *yin* V.
[1]So read, cf. no. **[52]**.

[140] Cf. *de daṅ ldan par brjod pa ma yin te* K : *de la 'jug pas ni brjod par mi
bya'o* V.

[141] Jinendrabuddhi points out that Dignāga presupposes that the opponent
assumes that the word 'existent' denotes a real general property, when he talks about
the feasibility of the connection and lack of ambiguity. In addition he assumes that
(a general term) is co-referential with particular terms, which presupposes a relation
between general and particular properties, which would be impossible if general
properties did not exist, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202a6-202b1: *evam manyate: sambandha-
saukaryam avyabhicāraṃ ca bruvatā sacchabdasya sāmānyābhidhāyitvam āśritam
... viśeṣaśabdaiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyābhyupagamāc ca.*[1] *na hy asati sāmānyaviśe-
ṣabhāve sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapadyate. tathā hi sāmānyaśabdād aviśeṣeṇa
pravartamānā buddhir viśeṣaśabdair viśeṣāntarebhyo vyavacchidya viśiṣṭe viṣaye
vyavasthāpyate. tad asati sāmānye nopapadyate:* "The idea is as follows: someone
who claims that the connection is feasible and that there is no ambiguity relies on
the fact that the word 'existent' denotes the general property [existence] ... and
because of the assumption that [the word 'existent'] is co-referential with words
denoting particular [general properties].[1] For co-reference is not justified when
there is no general-particular relation. That is, an idea that arises without
differentiation because of a general term is restricted to a distinct object by terms

denoting particular [general properties] by being excluded from other particular [general properties]. This is not justified when there is no general property."

[1]It is difficult to construe this clause with the preceding and following; some part of the argument appears to be missing. T corrobotates the reading of Ms

[53] *sattādiṣu ca <sattādir nāsti>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b2: *sattādiṣu cetyādi.*

[142] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b1-3: *atra ca sāmānyaṃ tadvad ity abhyupagame dvidhā vikalpaḥ. sāmānyasya vā sattādeḥ tatvattā syāt, tadvato vā ghaṭādeḥ sāmānate[1]ti. tatra pūrvaṃ na sambhavatīti darśayann āha: sattādiṣu cetyādi. na hi sattādiṣu jātyantaram asti niḥsāmānyatvāt sāmānyānām. tad avaśyaṃ dvitīyo vikalpo 'bhyupeya iti:* "And if, in this case, a general property and a general property possessor are assumed [to exist], there are two options: either the general property existence, and so on, will be the general property possessor, or the possessor of the general property like a pot will be the general property. Now, in the present case the first [option] is impossible. This he shows explaining: "And at existence, etc." For there are not other general properties at existence, etc. because general properties are without general properties[2]. Therefore one is forced to adopt the second option."

[1]The reading *sāmānatā* (cf. *mtshuṅs pa ñid* T) is undoubtedly an error for *sāmānyatā,* cf. the remark attributed to the opponent about the attribution of *sāmānyatā* to the general property possessor.

[2]Cf. the statement *jāter ajātitaḥ,* PS V:11b, q.v.; v. no. 166.

[54] *tasmād <avaśyam>[1] arthasya <sāmānyatābhyupeyā>[1]*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b3: *tasmād ityādi. arthasyeti.*

[1]Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b2: *tad avaśyaṃ dvitīyo vikalpo 'bhyupeya iti.*

[143] That is, a single general property possessor like a pot, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b3: *arthasyeti: prakṛtatvāt tadvato ghaṭādeḥ.*

[144] In spite of the reading *spyi khas blaṅ bar bya 'o* K : *spyi'i don khas blaṅ bar bya* V the reading must have been *sāmānyatā* as indicated by the pronoun *sā* quoted in *pratīka* at Ms B 202b3, cf. the objection that Dignāga superimposes the property of being a general property upon the general property possessor.

[55] *sā ca <nāsty arthasya>[1] yasmāt[2]*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b3: *sā cetyādi;* Ms B 202b3: *yasmād ityādi.*

[1]Cf. *de yaṅ don la yod pa ma yin pa* K : *de yaṅ don la yod pa la* (sic om. DC) *ma yin pa* V.

[2]*de'i phyir* KV.

[145] *'dir* K : om. V probably reproduces Sanskrit *atra,* which I interpret as an anaphor referring back to *arthasya.*

[146] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 202b3-4: *kevalagrahaṇena vācyasya tulyasya nirāsaṃ karoti. śabda eva vācaka eṣāṃ tulyo, na tu vācyaṃ kiṃcit tadvad ity arthaḥ:* "By using [the word] alone he denies that the denotable object is the same. The meaning is this:

Only the term that denotes them is the same, but no general property possessor whatsoever is the denotable object."

[147] Cf. *'dir ni sgra mtshuṅs 'ba'*(1) *źig go* K : *sgra don 'ba' źig pa daṅ mtshuṅs* V.
(1)em. : *pa* K. PS V:10b may be restored as *śabdo 'tra kevalaḥ samaḥ.*

[148] Cf. *'dra ba yin gyi* K : om. V.

[56] *na tu kenacit tadvatā.* Qu. Ms B 202b4.

[149] Cf. PST Ms B 202b4-5: *vācakatulyatayaivaiṣāṃ tulyatvaṃ, na tu vācyena tadvatā kenacid vasturūpeṇety arthaḥ:* "The meaning is that they are only the same because the word denoting them is the same, but not because of any denotable general property possessor whatsoever having the form of a real entity."

[57] *sattāyogau ca <prāg nirākṛtau>*(1). Restored, cf. PST Ms B 202b5: *sattāyogau cetyādi.*
(1)Cf. *sṅar bkag pa yin no* K (Ms B 202b5: *prāg eva nirākṛtaṃ*) : *sṅar cuṅ zad kyaṅ grub pa med do* V.

[150] That is above at 7cd, cf. PST Ms B 202b5-6: *na sattā śabdasvarūpeṇa tadvatā vācyā, sambandho 'pi sattārūpeṇa. ataḥ sattvena sambandhena vā vācyena tadvatā tulyā bhaviṣyatīty āha: sattāyogau cetyādi. "bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaś, ca teṣv apī"tyādinā prāg eva nirākṛtaṃ jātiyogayos tatvattayābhidhānam.*

[58] *nānimittaḥ sa ca mataḥ.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 203b2: *tato 'trāpi "nānimittaḥ sa <ca>*(1) *mataḥ,"* cf. 202b7: *nānimittaḥ.*
(1)*ca* em. (cf. *de yaṅ rgyu mtshan med mi 'dod* K : *de yaṅ rgyu mtshan med par 'dod* V : *rgyu mtshan med min' de yaṅ dod* T).

[151] That is, in the opponent's *śāstra.* cf. no. 37.

[152] Cf. *tha mi dad par* K : *gźan* V (read *gźan ma yin par?*).

[153] Cf. *rgyu mtshan med par* K : *tha mi dad kyi rgyu mtshan* V.

[154] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 202b6-203a1: *yadi ghaṭādiṣu śabdaḥ samaḥ sa eva tarhi śabdaḥ śabdatvena tadvāṃs teṣāṃ sāmānyam bhaviṣyatī ti. āha: "nānimitta" (10c) ityādi. śabdo hi teṣāṃ vācakatayā sambandhī. tad eva tu sambandhitvam ekanimittam antareṇa nopapadyate yasya naimittiko jātiśabda ity abhyupagamaḥ, etena naimittikasya yasya śabdasya yatra nimittaṃ nāsti na sa tatra prayogam arhati. tadyathā daṇḍiśabdo daṇḍarahite puṃsi. nāsti ca naimittasya jātiśabdasya ghaṭādiṣu nimittam iti:* "If the word is the same with regard to pot, and so on, then the word as such, which is a general property possessor due to [its] property of being a word, will be their general property. With this in mind he says "not without a cause of application, etc." For the word is their relatum because of its denoting them. This very property of being a relatum, however, is not justified without a cause of application for someone whose assumption it is that a general

term has a cause of application. Therefore the word that has a cause of application is not capable of being applied to the thing in which there is no cause of application, just like [the application of] the expression 'possessing a staff' to a man who has no staff. And the general term that has a cause of application does not have a cause of application in the pot, etc."

[155] Cf. *de'i phyir de yaṅ spyi ru sbyar bar mi bya'o* V : *de'i phyir yaṅ ci*[1] *rigs pa ma yin no* K.
[1]*ci* is a misspelling for *spyi(r).*

[59] *tataś ca.* Qu. Ms B 203a1.

[156] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a1-2: *yadi hi sacchabdena sāmānyam ucyeta, tatas tadviśeṣaṇārtham ghaṭa iti ucyeteti syāt sāmānādhikaraṇyam. asati tu sāmānyā-bhidhāne kiṃ kena viśiṣyate. tataś cābhyupetahānam:* "For if the general property were to be denoted by the word 'existent', then one could say 'pot' for the sake of qualifying it. Thus there would be co-reference. But when there is no denotation of a general property, what then is qualified by what? And therefore the assumption is given up."

[60] *atha punar ananyasmin dravye vartate sadguṇam,*[1] *sacchabdād ghaṭādyākāṅkṣāyāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ syāt, nīlatarādivat.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a2-4: *atha punar iti ... ananyasmin*[2] *dravye vartata iti ... sacchabdād ghaṭādyākāṅkṣāyāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ syāt, nīlatarādivat.*
[1] Cf. the reading *sadguṇam* of paraphrase at Ms B 203a3 below no. 159 indicating that syntactically the term belongs after *vartate.*
[2] em., cf. *gźan ma yin pa'i rdzas la* V : *nānyasmin* Ms, cf. *rdzas gźan la 'jug pa ma yin pa* T, corroborated by *rdzas gźan la 'jug pa ma yin la* K; cf. the reading *ananyatra* no. 159 below.

[157] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a3: *saty api sāmānyaviśeṣabhāve 'nyathā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvaṃ samarthayate.*

[158] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a3: *ananyatra dravye varti*[1] *sadguṇam ghaṭādidravyam. sadguṇa iti sattāguṇa ity arthaḥ. sattāguṇo 'syeti kṛtvā:* "The [thing] possessing the general property existence viz. a substance like a pot residing in the same substance. The expression *'sadguṇa'* means 'having the general property existence' on the ground that is has the general property existence."
[1] em., cf. *gźan ma yin pa'i rdzas la 'jug pa'i* T : *anyatra dravyavarti* Ms

[159] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a4-7: *yathā nīlaguṇaṃ dravyam anyatra nīlatarādau dravye 'tadguṇe ca na vartata iti, na tat sāmānyam. tathāpi nīlam ity ukte nīla-śabdād bhedākāṅkṣā bhavati: yad etan nīlam ity uktam, tat kiṃ nīlataram atha nīlatamam iti. tato bhedaśabdair viśeṣyate nīlataro nīlatamo veti. evaṃ sann ity ukte sattāyā anekārthavṛttitvād ghaṭādyākāṅkṣā bhavati: yo 'yaṃ san sa kiṃ ghaṭo 'tha paṭa iti. tatas tacchabdair viśeṣayiṣyāmaḥ: ghaṭaḥ paṭo veti:* "For instance, the substance that posseses the quality blue does not reside in another substance that is bluer, and so on, and in one that does not possess this quality. Thus it is not a general property. Nevertheless, when it is said 'blue', the word 'blue' causes the

expectation of a complement: That thing called blue is it bluer or bluest? Therefore it is qualified by particular terms viz. 'bluer' or 'bluest'. In the same way, when one says 'existent' there is the expectation of a complement like 'pot' because existence resides in many referents: that existent thing is it a pot or cloth? Therefore we shall qualify them by means of the terms denoting them viz. 'pot' or 'cloth.'"

ŚVṬ 64,4-8: *yad api bhikṣuṇā śaṅkitam: mā bhūt piṇḍāntareṇa viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-bhāvaḥ. tasminn eva piṇḍe sattādiviśiṣṭe 'bhihite paratadgataviśeṣākāṅkṣāyāṃ viśeṣaṇādivyavahāro bhaviṣyati san ghaṭaḥ iti. yathā nīlaśabdena nīlaguṇe 'bhihite tadgataviśeṣāpekṣayā tarabādiviśeṣaṇaṃ bhavati nīlatara nīlatamaḥ iti:* "the monk [viz. Dignāga] subjects the following argument to criticism: let there be no qualifier-qualified relation without a particular substance (*piṇḍa*). When the same (*tasminn eva*) particular substance that is qualified by the general property existence, and so on, has been denoted, qualifiers, and so on, will be used because of the expectation of complementation of further distinctions that pertain to it, such as 'a pot is existent.' In the same way, when the blue quality has been denoted by the word 'blue', a qualifier like *'tara'* is used with regard to the differences that pertain to it, such as 'bluer,' bluest.'"

[61] *yady ekatrāsitādivat.* Qu. Ms B 203a7, ŚVṬ 64,9; NR 426,14.

[160] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203a7-203b1: *yady ekatrāsādhāraṇarūpe jātimati dravye sādhāraṇī sattā vartata iti, tatra sann ity ukte ghaṭādyākāṅkṣā bhavati. yathā nīla ity ukte nīlatarādyākāṅkṣā. tataś ca viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva iṣyate:* "If existence that is common to many things resides in one general property possessing substance having a singular form, in that case there is the expectation of a complement like 'pot,' when it is said 'existent'. In the same way as the expectation of the complement 'bluer,' when it is said 'blue'; and therefore there is claimed to be a qualifier-qualified relation."

[161] Cf.*'brel pa'i yon tan du 'gyur ro*[(1)] V : om. K.
[(1)]Cf. the related expression*'brel pa 'am yon tan la 'gyur te* K 113,15-16; I assume that V is based upon a misreading of the original Sanskrit, which, I believe, constitutes an exact parallel to the above-mentioned quotation from K, and thus probably reproduces **sambandhe guṇe vā syāt;* this suggestion fits in with the syntax, and, moreover, is supported by PSV on 11a$_1$ and Ms B 203b2-3, q.v. below no. 163.

[62] *<etac ca nāsti>*[(1)]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b1: *tan naitad*[(2)]*apy asti.*
[(1)]Cf. *'di yaṅ yod min* K : *de lta la 'aṅ min* V.
[(2)]em : *na etad* Ms

[63] *nīlaśabdo hi*[(1)] *<nīlaguṇaṃ dravyam abhidhatte. nīlatarādāv anyatrāsati*[(2)] *tadvan na yujyate*[(3)]*>*[(4)]. Restored, cf. PṬS Ms B 203b1: *nīlaśabdo hītyādi;* Ms B 203b1-3, q.v. below no. 163.
[(1)] Cf. *sṅon po'i sgra ni* V : *sṅon po'i sgra la* (sic) *ni* K.
[(2)] Cf. *śin tu sṅo ba la sogs pa rnams la gźan* (sic) *med na* K : *śin tu sṅo ba la sogs pa med par gźan gyis* V.
[(3)] Cf. *de daṅ ldan par 'thad pa ma yin no* V : *de daṅ ldan pa rigs pa ma yin te* K.

$^{(4)}$ For the suggested restoration, cf. no. 163 below.

^{162} It is quite impossible to construe this paragraph as it has been transmitted in KV, and Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase suggests that a crucial part of the original text is missing in both versions. I have inserted the missing part on the basis of the paraphrase, which no doubt reflects Dignāga's original text fairly accurately, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b1-3: *nīlaśabdo hi nīlaguṇaṃ dravyam abhidhatte. tac cānyatra nīlatarādau*$^{(1)}$ *dravye na vartate. yac ca vartate nīlatvaṃ tatsambandho vā sa śabdārtha eva na bhavati. tato 'trāpi "nānimittaḥ sa <ca>mata"* (PS V:10c) *iti etat samānam iti:* "For the word 'blue' denotes a substance possessing the quality blue. And this [substance] does not reside in another substance that is bluer, etc. And that which resides in it viz. the property blueness or its relation is not the referent of the word. Therefore also in this case [the statement] is the same viz. "it is, moreover, not considered to be without a cause of application" (PS V:10c)."
$^{(1)}$Cf. *śin tu sṅo ba la sogs pa rnams la gźan med na* K : *śin tu sṅo ba la sogs pa la med par gźan gyis* V.

^{163} That is, at PSV V:10c.

^{164} Cf. *sṅon po ñid daṅ ldan pa*$^{(1)}$ *'brel pa dag ni* K : *sṅon po ñid daṅ 'brel*$^{(1)}$ *pa ni sgra'i don ma yin no* V.
$^{(1)}$Probably read *de daṅ 'brel = tatsambandha,* cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b3: *nīlatvaṃ tatsambandho vā sa śabdārtha eva na bhavati.*

$^{[64]}$ *upetyāpi naitaj jāter ajātitaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b3: *upetyāpīti* ... *naitaj jāter ajātitaḥ;* cf. NCV 636,10-11: *upetyāpi tu* ... *jāter ajātitaḥ,* 733,13; ŚVṬ 64,14; NR 426,15 (reading *naivam* for *naitat*). For 11b cf. Dharmakīrti's PV II 156d: *kathaṃ jāter ajātitaḥ.*

^{165} Cf. *ci de* V (DC em. mistakenly *spyi de,* presumably on the basis of the first line of the *vṛtti,* cf. V 114,16, K 115,16) : om. K; read *ci ste* corresponding to Sanskrit *yady api,* cf. *Obermiller* Index II s.v.

^{166} Cf. *upetyāpi tu:* NCV 636,10.

^{167} Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b3: *yady api dṛṣṭānte siddhiḥ syāt tathāpi <satvataḥ?>*$^{(1)}$ *tena sāmānyaṃ nāsti:* "Even though it were assumed [*to be the case*], i.e., even if it were taken for granted with respect to the example, nevertheless there is no similarity between it with regard to the general property existence."
$^{(1)}$ The reading *satvataḥ* is problematic, cf. *yod pa ñid la* T, which suggest that the translator either interpreted his Ms reading as a locative or a genitive of *sattva* or *sattā.*

^{168} Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b3-4: *nāsyāṃ sajjātau ghaṭatvādijātir astīti ajātiḥ:* "Without general property means that there is no general property like potness in the general property existence." NCV 636,11-12: *jāter ajātitaḥ, nāsyāṃ jātir vidyata iti ajātir iti vigrahāt sāmānyānām asāmānyādhāratāṃ darśayati:* "'Because a general property is without general properties'. In accordance with the analytical string 'without general property' = 'a general property does not reside in it' [viz. in

existence], he shows that general properties are not containers of general properties." Cf. the well-known *nyāya "niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyāni,"* e.g., at TSP 728,13.

[169] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b4-6: *sattāyāṃ ghaṭatvādayo na santi jātiviśeṣā yathā nīlaguṇasya nīlatarādayo viśeṣāḥ, yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye varteta. tadanupādāne ca tadvastusampramukharūpaṃ na ghaṭo na paṭaḥ. tasmān na sacchabdād ghaṭādiviśeṣākāṅkṣā yuktā. nīlaguṇa hy anekabhedaḥ. sa ekatrāpi dravye vartamānaḥ svabhedān upādāya yathābhisambhavaṃ vartata iti yujyate. tadabhidhāyino nīlaśabdān nīlatarādyākāṅkṣeti darśayati:* "That is, there are no particular general properties like potness in the general property existence in the same way as the quality blue has particulars such as bluer, and so on, so that it would reside in a substance together with these particular [general properties]. And in that it does not appropriate these the chief form of their referent is neither a pot nor cloth. Therefore it is not justified that one expects the complement of a particular like 'pot' from the word 'existent'. For the quality blue is divided into many kinds. When it is resident in one substance it resides in it after having appropriated, according to circumstances, its own kinds. He illustrates the blue words that denote these [different kinds] by means of "expectation of the complement 'bluer', etc." A related explanation is found at ŚVṬ 64,10-13: *yuktaṃ nīle tatra nīlo guṇaḥ prakarṣāprakarṣādibhedabhinnas tarabādibhir viśiṣyate. sattājātis tu ghaṭādiśūnyā svātmaviśiṣṭaṃ padārthaṃ pratipādayantī naiva ghaṭatvādīn ākāṅkṣatīti na tatra viśeṣaṇābhidhānam bhavati.*

[65] *naivaṃ sajjātir ghaṭādijātimatī.* Qu. Ms B 203b4.

[66] *yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye <vṛttau ghaṭādiviśeṣākāṅkṣā syāt>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b4-5: *sattāyāṃ ghaṭatvādayo na santi jātiviśeṣā ... yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye varteta.*[(1)] Cf. NCV 636,15 levels Dignāga's *apoha* theory with a similar argument: *yato 'satsatvato vastunaḥ aghaṭābhāvaghaṭatvādīn upādāya pravarteta.*
  [(1)]Cf. *gaṅ las khyad par de ñe bar blaṅs nas rdzas la 'jug pa na* K.

[170] I assume that the reading *bum pa ñid la sogs pa'i khyad par 'dod pa yin no* V, is preferable to *bum pa la sogs pa'i khyad par la 'jug par dogs par 'gyur pa* K, provided that *bum pa ñid* is corrected to read *bum pa.* The technical term *ākāṅkṣā* is never used in PS V in connection with the residence of general properties in their loci, but always in the context of expecting the introduction of a complement to another term. In fact, Ms uses the term *ghaṭādiviśeṣākaṅkṣā* (cf. no. 167) in this particular context, which corroborates the readings of V.

[67] *evaṃ tarhi <ucyate> yady apy aśabdavācyā, tathāpi ghaṭādiṣv arthākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyati, tadvān hy artho 'vaśyaṃ ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmān-yenānubaddha <iti>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b7-204a2: *evaṃ tarhīti ... yady api ghaṭatvādayaḥ sacchabdavācyā na bhavanti tathāpi sattāvatārthena ghaṭādiṣv ākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyati. ... tadvān hy artho 'vaśyam ityādi ... ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyenānubaddhaḥ;* cf. ŚVṬ 64,20-21 ad ŚV Apoha° 132: *aśabdavācyair eva ghaṭādibhiḥ sajjātyākṣiptair* (read *sajjātiśabdā°?*) *viśeṣaṇādivyavahāro bhaviṣyati:* "On account of 'pot', and so on, being implied by

the general term 'existent' without at all being expressly denotable by it, a qualifier, and so on, is going to be used."

[171] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 203b6-204a1: *śabdo hi paratantro guṇāpekṣapravṛttitvāt tadākṣepāsamarthaḥ. <arthas> tu prayojanatvāt*[(1)] *pradhānaḥ. tena jātimān artha eva sarvabhedān ākṣipya vartate tataś ca yady api ghaṭatvādayaḥ saccabdavācyā na bhavanti tathāpi sattāvatārthena ghaṭādiṣv ākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyati. tato nāsti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ:* "For the word is dependent (*paratantra*), and because it applies in dependence upon a property it is not capable of implying these. The referent, however, is primary because of being the purpose [of the word]. Therefore the very referent that is the general property possessor occurs by implying all the particulars. And therefore, *although potness, and so on, are not denotable* by the word 'existent', *there will, nevertheless, be the expectation of a particular in that 'pot', and so on, are implied* by the referent possessing the general property existence. Therefore it is not the case that there is no qualifier-qualified relationship."

[(1)] *<arthas> tu prayojanatvāt* conj. : *avastu prayojanutvāt* Ms, cf. T *don ni dgos* (so read with CD, ed. *dogs so*) *pa ñid kyi phyir gtso bo 'o.*

[172] Cf. *de* (*red* P 73a1) *daṅ ldan pa'i don* V : *yod pa daṅ ldan pa'i don* K (= *sattāvān*). Cf. Ms B 204a2: *jātimān arthaḥ śabdenopādīyate. sa ca niyogataḥ eva ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyenānubaddhaḥ. tataś ca tatsāmānyabhedākṣepe ghaṭādibhedākṣepa iti.*

[173] Cf. *bum pa ñid*[(1)] *la sogs pa'i* V : *bum pa ñid la sogs pa* K.
[(1)]*ñid* em. : om. V.

[174] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 204a2: *jātimān arthaḥ śabdenopādīyate. sa ca niyogata eva ghaṭatvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyenānubaddhaḥ. tataś ca tatsāmānyabhedākṣepe ghaṭādibhedākṣepa iti:* "The referent that is the possessor of the general property is assumed by the word, and this [referent] is by necessity connected to some general property from among potness, etc. And therefore it implies a particular like a pot in that it implies a particular general property."

[68] *arthākṣepe 'py anekāntaḥ.* Qu Ms B 204a3, cf. NCV 637,6: *ṇaitad asti, arthākṣepe 'py anekāntaḥ.* NR 426,26 *arthākṣepe 'py anaikāntaḥ.* ŚVṬ 64,24: *arthākṣepo 'py anaikāntaḥ,* cf. ŚV Apoha° 133ab: *arthākṣepo 'pi nāsty eva.*

[175] This statement introduces the rebuttal of the preceding argument, cf. PSṬ Ms B 204a2-3: *imām api kalpanāṃ nirākaryann āha.*

[69] *arthākṣepo hi.* Qu. Ms B 204a3.

[176] Cf. *gaṅ la don gyi śugs kyis* V : *don gaṅ la* K. Since the traditional understanding of *arthāpatti* is that it is something that obtains according to the state of the case (cf., e.g., NBh 573,3: *arthād āpattir arthāpatti*), it is reasonable to assume that V has recorded a word that is missing in K.

[70] *tadyathā divā na bhuṅkta iti rātribhojane*[(1)] *<niścayaḥ>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 204a3-4: *tadyathā divā na bhuṅkta iti ... tadyathā divā na bhuṅkta ity atra rātribhojane.*

[(1)]Cf. *nub mo za bar* V : *mtshan mo* K.

[177] This example belongs to the category of *śrutārthāpatti,* i.e., implication of an oral statement, cf. ŚBh 32,6: *arthāpattir api dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vā 'rtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā;* cf. the discussion at ŚV Arthāpatti° 51 in the context of the criticism of Dignāga's attempt to include *arthāpatti* in *anumāna: pīno divā na bhuṅkte cety evamādivacaḥ śrutau rātribhojanavijñānaṃ śrutārthāpattir ucyate:* "When hearing a statement like '(NN) is fat, and yet he does not eat during the day time', the knowledge that he is eating at night is what is called implication of an oral statement."

[71] *iha punaḥ sad ity ukte na ghaṭādiṣu niścayaḥ. <iti*[(1)] *saṃśaye sati> nāsty <arth>ākṣepaḥ*[(2)]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 204a3-5: *iha punar ityādi ... nāsty ākṣepa iti pramāṇaphalaṃ ... na ca sad ity ukte ghaṭādiṣu niścayaḥ. kiṃ tarhi saṃśaya iti*[(1)].

[(1)]V seems to presuppose a reading like *... niścaya iti saṃśaye sati,* cf. *ma ṅes pa'i phyir the tshom za ba yin pas* V: *ma ṅes pa'i phyir* (sic) K. In the present context *saṃśayaḥ* that is missing in K would correspond to *anekāntaḥ* of PS V:11c. The reading *kiṃ tarhi* of Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase is not corroborated by the readings of KV which usually render this adverbial complement as *'on kyaṅ.* It is therefore reasonable to conclude that *kiṃ tarhi* was not part of the original Sanskrit text.

[(2)]em., cf. *don gyis phaṅs pa* (= *arthākṣepaḥ*) KV : *ākṣepaḥ* (cf. *'phaṅs pa* T) Ms

[178] Cf. *gaṅ gi phyir* K : *de'i phyir* V. *gaṅ gi phyir* = *yasmāt* correlates with *tena* of PS V:11d; the readings of K suggest the following restoration: *yasmāt sa jātiśabdo na katham api bhedasāmānyasambandhajātimadvācako yujyate,* cf. no.s 181-82 below.

[179] The reading *ji ltar yaṅ ... rigs pa ma yin no* K would translate Sanskrit *na katham api ... yujyate.* V is entirely confused. In addition to misconstruing the *dvanda* compound *khyad par daṅ spyi daṅ daṅ 'brel pa daṅ rigs daṅ ldan pa* K for which V reads *tha dad 'brel pa'i spyi* (NP *ci*) *rigs daṅ ldan pa,* the translators misunderstood the expression *na katham api,* construing *katham* as acc. of *kathā* in dependence on the verb. Thus the adverbial complement *katham api* is reproduced as the noun phrase *lan 'ga' yaṅ.*

[180] Cf. NCV 609,19f: *tathā ca jātisambandhajātimadabhidhānānām asambhavād 'anyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ'.*

[72] *tenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ.* Qu. Ms B 205a4; NCV 611,21; cf. NV 324,20-21: *tasmād 'anyāpohakṛc chrutir' iti;* PV III:164cd: *tato 'nyāpohaniṣṭhatvād uktā 'anyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ';* TS 1237.

[181] Siṃhasūri regards the *śloka pāda* PS V:11d as *anyāpohalakṣaṇavākyam,* cf. NCV 611,20 and explains it ibid. line 21ff: *tasya vyākhyā: śabdāntarārthāpohaṃ hi*

svārthe kurvatī śrutir abhidhatta ity ucyate ... tadanuvṛttyā vyāvṛttir yasmin vidyate svārthe sa gṛhyate na vyāvṛttimātram. The first line of the explanation is the beginning of a well-known prose fragment defining *apoha,* which evidently belongs in a similar context. The same fragment is also addressed by Mallavādi, cf. NCV 612,5ff, just as Uddyotakara in his critique of Dignāga's *apoha* theory quotes the śloka pāda followed by the first line of its explanation as the conclusion of the *pūrvapakṣa,* cf. NV 324,20f. The prose fragment, which was known to all contemporary scholars, stems in all likelihood from Dignāga's SPVy. For the sources of this fragment, which I quote here in extenso, cf. NCV loc.cit., and *Pind* 1999: 318-19: *atha ca jātisambandhajātimadabhidhānānām asambhavāt "tenānyā-pohakṛc chrutiḥ." śabdāntarārthāpohaṃ*[1] *hi svārthe kurvatī śrutir abhidhatta' ity ucyate; hiśabdo yasmādarthe. yasmād vṛkśaśabdo 'vṛkṣanivṛttiṃ*[2] *svārthe kurvan svārthaṃ vṛkṣalakṣaṇaṃ pratyāyayatīti ucyate, evaṃ nivṛttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ, 'dravyādi san', na nivṛttimātram, alakṣaṇīyam eva ca syān nivṛtti-mātram, avastutvāt, kharaviṣāṇakuṇṭhatīkṣṇatādivarṇanāvat:* "And since the denotations of the general property, of the relation, and of the general property possessor are impossible, the word excludes other [referents]. For (*hi*) it is claimed that the word 'denotes' in that it excludes the referents of other words for the sake of its own referent. The word *hi* is used in the sense of 'because': Because it is claimed that the word 'tree' while precluding the word 'non-tree' [2] for the sake of its own referent indicates its own referent as having the character of a tree. Thus the word's referent is a thing (*vastu*) as qualified by preclusion, [i.e.] an existent thing like a substance, but not mere preclusion; for (*ca*) mere preclusion would indeed be indefinable because it is an unreal thing, like [the unreal referents of] descriptions like bluntness or sharpness of hare's horns."

For the referent as an entity (*vastu*) qualified by the non-existence or exclusion of other things from its locus, cf. PSV V:34-36.

[1] Cf. the reading at NCV 640,7: *śabdāntarārthāpohaṃ svārthe kurvatī,* which in all likelihood imitates Dignāga's original formulation; The definition was well-known, cf. e.g. TS 1015 and TSP 394,8ff.

[2] According to the *apoha* thesis words exclude other words as well as referents of other words. Exclusion defines the general property in words and referents. Cf. e.g. Translation of PSV V:33ab.

[73] *tasmād <yad*[1] *uktaṃ prāk>*[2] *"kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāsate," <tad eva*[3] *sthitam>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 204b6: *tasmādityādinā.*

[1]Cf. *gaṅ yin pa* K : om. V.

[2]Cf. *sṅar brjod pa ltar* V : om. K.

[3]Cf. *de ñid* K : om. V.

[182] This paragraph marks the end of the first section of PSV V. Dignāga concludes that the validity of his own thesis is established because there is no other theoretically justifiable solution to the problem of the denotation of words. The two verses that follow PS V:11 introduce topics that are unrelated to those introduced in the previous paragraphs, cf. no. 194 below. Uddyotakara closes his exposition of Dignāga's view in a similar way at NV 324,20-21: *anyatra pratyayābhāvapra-saṅgāc ca, na ca anyā gatir asti, tasmād anyāpohakṛc chrutir iti:* "And because it follows [absurdly] that there is no cognition otherwise, and there is no other way, the word excludes other [referents]." As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi's remarks

on this paragraph, other Indian scholars did not fail to notice that Dignāga seems to corroborate the validity of the *apoha* theory merely by debunking the opponents' theories without corroborating in detail its epistemological framework, cf. PST Ms B 204b6-205a2: *yathoktajātyādyabhidhānapratiṣedhopasaṃhāreṇa svayam eva sthirīkaroti. nanu ca "parapakṣapratiṣedhena svapakṣasiddhir alabhyā"* [1] *yathok-tam āvītapratiṣedhe. naiva doṣaḥ. pūrvam evātra "kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣata"* (PS V:1cd) *iti pratipāditaṃ śabdasyānumānād abhinnatvam. tatra kevalaṃ pramāṇāntaravādibhir vidhimukhena jātyādaya ucyante ity uktam. tasmin pratiṣiddhe sa evārtho vyavatiṣṭhate. vakṣyamāṇāṃ ca svapakṣasādhanaṃ hṛdi kṛtvaivam uktam:* "He corroborates his own theory by means of summarizing debunking [the views] that the word denotes the general property, etc. But is it not so that "establishing one's own thesis by means of debunking the opponent's thesis is inadmissible" as it has been formulated in the [chapter on the] rejection of the *āvīta* inference? There is no fault at all. The fact that verbal cognition is not different from inference has previously been explained in the [statement]: "It [i.e., a word] denotes its own referent through exclusion of other referents in the same way as 'the being produced'" (PS V:1cd). In this context it has been said by those who claim that [verbal cognition] is a separate means of cognition that general properties, and so on, are denoted in an affimative form. In that this has been debunked only this referent is settled. And he has formulated it in this way while keeping in mind the proof of his own thesis that is going to be explained."

After this comment Jinendrabuddhi inserts an excursus on the *apoha* doctrine It reflects Dharmakīrti's *apoha* theory and includes many quotations from Dharma-kīrti's Pramāṇavārtikasvavṛtti. For the Sanskrit text of the excursus, see Appendix 2.

[1] Jinendrabuddhi appears to quote a passage from PSV III where Dignāga debunks the Sāṃkhyā opponents view of indirect proof (*āvīta*) as that of the action of establishing one's own thesis through negation of the thesis of the opponent, cf. Ms B 122a5: *parapakṣapratiṣedhena svapakṣasthāpanakriyā āvītaḥ.*

[183]*de ñid = tad eva,* cf. the phrase *sa evārtho vyavatiṣṭhate* at Ms B 205a1, which probably imitates the original Dignāgan formulation.

[74] *āha ca: bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ svasambandhā-nurūpyāt*[1] *tu vyavacchedārthakāry*[2] *asau.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 208a1 *āha ceti* = NCV 653,15; verse qu. ŚVṬ 46,7-8, cf. PST Ms B 208a2-3: *bahudheti ... abhidheyasyeti ... svasambandhānurūpyād ityādi;* NCV 653,15-16: *bahudhāpyabhi-dheyasyeti ... svasambandhānurūpyāt tv iti. āha ca* would indicate that Dignāga quotes from another work, possibly the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa.

[1]*°anurūpeṇa* ŚVṬ.

[2]*don la rnam bcod byed* K : *don rnam gcod ṅag gi 'bras bu yin* V, for which, cf. *vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyam,* PV IV 192a.

[184] According to Jinendrabuddhi this verse settles that only exclusion of other (referents) is the word's referent by showing that it constitues a part of the referent to be indicated, cf Ms B 208a1-2: *āha cety arthasya pratyāyyasyāṅga*[1]*saṃ-darśanenānyāpoham eva śabdārthaṃ samarthayate.*

[1]*pratyāyyasyāṅga°* conj. (cf. *rtogs par bya ba'i cha* T) : *pratyāsyaṃgi°* Ms

[185] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a2-3: *śiṃśapādibhedena puṣphitaphalitādibhedena ca bahuprakāratve 'pīty arthaḥ. abhidheyasyeti vṛkṣāder arthasya. tasyaivam aneka-prakāratve 'pi śabdāt sarvaprakāreṇa pratītir nāsti:* "The meaning is as follows: even though it has many modes because of particulars like *śiṃśapā* and particulars such as having flowers and fruits. The denotable object means a referent like a tree. Thus, although it has many modes, there is no cognition of it from the word in all its modes." Siṃhasūri explains 12a with the theoretical background of PSV V:34 (q.v.), cf. NCV 653,15ff: *bahudhāpy abhidheyasyeti śiṃśapādibhedā atrābhipretā na dravyādayaḥ; tathā hi vṛkṣavad bhedeṣu saṃśayo dṛṣṭo 'rthatas tu dravyādiṣu niścayaḥ:* "In the present context a particular like *śiṃśapā* is intended, not [particulars] like substance. That is, there is observed to be doubt about the particulars in the same way as there is doubt about [the particulars of] tree, whereas, by implication, there is certainty about substance, etc."

[186] This verse has a close parallel at PS II:13: <*anekadharmaṇo 'rthasya na liṅgāt sarvathā gatiḥ*>, *anubaddhasya vicchedaṃ tasyānyato gamayati.*[(1)]
K (*Kitagawa* 1973 462b2-5 = P 112b 7-8): *don gyi chos rnams du ma ni thams cad rtags las rtogs ma yin no. gaṅ źig rjes 'brel gźan la ni ldog pa rtogs par byed pa yin no.*
V (*Kitagawa* 1973 462a3-6 = P 31b 3): *chos don du ma gtan tshigs kyis rnam pa thams cad du rtogs min no. gaṅ daṅ 'brel pa yoṅs bcad nas chos gźan daṅ bral thob par byed:*
"The indicator does not indicate in toto the referent with its many properties. It indicates, however, the exclusion from other [properties], of that [property] that is concomitant with it."
[(1)]For the restored *pādas* ab, cf. PSV V:12b and the parallel formulation at PS I:5ab: *dharmino 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ,* on which, v. *Hattori* 1968: 27, 91 no. I.43; *pādas* cd are restored on the basis of *pratīka* and paraphrase at Ms B 70a4: *anubaddhasya vicchedam iti ... tasyānyato vivakṣād vicchedaṃ vyāvṛttiṃ gamayati;* PS II:13 also occurs in NM as verse 17, cf. T 1628 3c10-1113, T 1629 8a4-5; *Frauwallner* 1982: 778.

[187] The technical term *svasambandha* denotes the invariable connection between any given word or indicator and the thing it denotes or indicates. Such connection is, according to Dignāgan epistemology, based upon the word's or indicator's application to, or presence at some similar instances of the referent and indicated, respectively, and their absolute non-application to or absence from all instances of the absence of the referent and indicated, respectively. Dignāga's concept of *svasambandha* is thus a function of the epistemological considerations underlying the second and third member of the *trilakṣaṇa hetu.* This is evident from his use of the expression *svasambandhānurūpyāt* at PSV II:13:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 462b6-14 = P 112b7-113a2): *me'i 'bar ba daṅ rno ba'i khyad par ci lta ba de rnams ni du ma las rtogs pa ma yin te 'khrul ba'i phyir ro. gaṅ yaṅ 'brel ba ni gaṅ med par me med pa' rdzas ma yin daṅ yon tan ñid la sogs pa'i rdzas de dag rdzas ma yin la sogs pa las ldog pa ñid rtogs pa yin te, dper na me'i me ma yin pa las ldog pa tsam raṅ daṅ 'brel ba'i rjes su mthun pa rtogs de bźin du 'di yin te, thams cad du me med pa la ma mthoṅ ba gźan la yaṅ mthoṅ ba yin no.*

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 462a7-15 = P 31b3-5): *dper na me la 'bar ba daṅ rno ba la sogs pa du ma yod kyaṅ dud pas bye brag de go bar mi byed de 'khrul ba'i phyir ro. gaṅ daṅ rjes su 'brel pa de las gźan pa ni ma yin te, rdzas ñid daṅ yon tan ñid la sogs pa de dag gis rdzas ma yin pa la sogs pa las log pa tsam 'ba' źig thob par byed pa ste, dper na mes me yin pa las log pa'i raṅ daṅ 'brel pa tsam thob par byed pa de bźin du 'di yaṅ me ma yin pa thams cad la mthoṅ ba ñid gźan la ni mthoṅ ba yin no:*

   "Smoke does not indicate the many particular features that are found in fire such as its flames, temperature, and so on, even though they exist in it because of ambiguity (**vyabhicārāt*). It indicates, however, the mere exclusion of those (particular properties) that are concomitant [with fire] (*ye tv anubaddhā*), without which fire does not exist (*yān antareṇāgnir na bhavati*), such as substanceness, qualityness, and so on, from non-substanceness, and so on, in the same way as it merely [indicates] fire's preclusion of non-fires (*yathāgner anagnivṛttimātram*) in accordance with its own connection (*svasambandhānurūpyāt*), namely, that 'it is not observed at all non-fires, and observed elsewhere" (*tathā hy asau sarvatrānagnau na dṛṣṭaḥ, anyatrāpi ca dṛṣṭaḥ*).[(1)]'"

   Jinendrabuddhi explains at Ms B 70b1-3 that Dignāga's concluding statement emphasizes the predominance (*prādhānya*) of *vyatireka* over *anvaya* for ascertaining the relation (*sambandha*). Joint absence (*vyatireka*) presupposes non-observation of the probandum at all of the *vipakṣa,* whereas *anvaya* only has a subsidiary role (*aprādhānyam*): *sarvatrānagnau na dṛṣṭa ity anena vyatirekasya prādhānyaṃ vipakṣe sarvatrādarśanena khyāpayati. anyatrāpi ca dṛṣṭa iti. apiśabdena kvacin na dṛṣṭo 'pīti dyotayann anvayasyāprādhānyam.* After these introductory remarks Jinendrabuddhi continues: *tad evaṃ: yasmād anvayopasarjano vyatirekapradhānaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa ca sāmānyenaiva sambhavati, na viśeṣena, tasmāt tadānurūpyād vyatirekamukhenāgnir evātrānagnir na bhavatīty anagninivṛttimātraṃ pratipādayati, na viśeṣam:* "It is as follows: since the relation has joint presence as its subsidiary feature and joint absence as its chief feature, and this [namely the relation] only is possible in a general form, not in a particular form, [smoke] indicates, in conformity with this, by means of joint absence, the mere preclusion of non-fire, at the thought: "only fire is here, not non-fire," but [it does] not [indicate] a particular."

   These remarks merely expound what Dignāga states at PSV V:34 (q.v. below with no.s 421, 423, and 425), namely that it is only possible to ground the invariable connection on joint absence (*vyatireka*) of word and referent based upon non-observation of its application to dissimilar instances, which is generalized to apply to all dissimilar instances as opposed to joint presence (*anvyaya*) which is based upon observation of its application to some similar instances. Thus *anvyaya* and *vyatireka* are not equipollent, which is essential for understanding Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine.
   Jinendrabuddhi and Siṃhasūri explains the term *svasambandhānurūpyād* at PS V:12 accordingly:
   1. PSṬ Ms B 208a3-4: *svasambandhānurūpyād ityādi. svasambandho 'vinābhāvitvam anvayavyatirekalakṣaṇaṃ tac ca tasya sāmānyāpekṣayā, na viśeṣā-pekṣayā. ato yādṛśo 'sya sambandhaḥ, gamakatvam api tādṛśam eva yuktam. etad uktam bhavati: sāmānyāpekṣayāsya sambandhaḥ. sāmānyaṃ ca vyavacchedarūpam*

eva yathopavarṇitam, anyasyāyogāt. tasmāt vyavacchedam eva kārī[(2)] *pratyāyayatīti:* "In accordance with its own connection, etc. Own connection means its being invariably concomitant, which is characterized by joint presence and joint absence; and this [viz. its being invariably concomitant] is through dependence upon the general feature, but not in dependence upon particular features. Consequently it is justified that it [viz. the word] also has exactly the kind of indicator property that corresponds to its relation. What is meant is as follows: its relation is through dependence on [its] general property, and the general property has only the form of exclusion such as it has been explained because another [possibility] is not justified. Therefore it only indicates while performing exclusion."

2. NCV 653,17-18: *sambandhānurūpyāt tv iti. yasmād asau tajjātiye dṛśyamāno 'rthāntaranivṛttidvāreṇaiva dṛṣṭo prāg evānyatrādṛśyamānaḥ, tasmāt sambandhā-nurūpyāt tadviśiṣṭam evārtham āha:* "*'On the contrary, in accordance with its own connection'*. Since it [namely the word] while being observed to denote the similar instance is observed [to denote the similar instance] by means of preclusion of other referents first of all by not being observed to denote other [referents], it denotes the referent as qualified by that [namely exclusion of other referents] in accordance with the connection."

The term *svasambandha* also occurs in a related passage at PSV III:45:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 508b11-13 = P 136a4): *raṅ daṅ 'brel pa med par gźan du rtags can rtogs par nus pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro* ‖.

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 508b12-14 = P 53a2): *gtan tshigs la ni raṅ daṅ 'brel pa bor nas gźan du rtags can gyi śes pa bskyed pa'i nus pa yaṅ yod pa ma yin no* ‖:

"For without its own connection the indicator is incapable of indicating the indicated elsewhere (*anyatra)."

[(1)]Sanskrit fragments inserted on the basis of *pratīka*s quoted at Ms B 70a5-7: *yān antareṇāgnir na bhavatīti. ... ye tv anubaddhā iti ... yathāgner anagninivṛtti-mātram iti;* 70b1-2: *svasambandhānurūpyād ityādi ... tathā hy asāv iti ... sarvatrā-nagnau na dṛṣṭa iti.*
[(2)]em. : *karo Ms*

[75] *anekadharmā śabdo 'pi yenārthaṃ nātivartate, pratyāyayati tenaiva, na śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a5-6: *anekadharmā śabdo 'pītyādi ... yenārthaṃ nātivartata iti ... pratyāyayati tenaiveti ... na śabdaguṇatādibhir iti;* cf. NCV 653,18: *anekadharmā śabdo 'pi.*

[188] Cf. NCV 653,18ff: *sāmānyadharmaiḥ khaguṇatvādibhir vṛkṣārthaṃ tasmin vastuni nābhidhatte, tathā hi te vināpy vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṛṣṭāḥ, na tu vṛkṣaśabdo 'nyatra dṛṣṭaḥ, tasmād vṛkṣaśabdenaiva pratyāyanam upapannam:* "It does not, for the sake of this object, denote the referent tree by means of general properties like being an attribute of space, etc. For they are, for instance, observed at taste, and so on, even in the absence of the referent tree. The word 'tree', however, is not observed to apply to other things (*anyatra*). Therefore it is justified that only the word 'tree' indicates." Ms B 208a4-5: *atha śabdasya ko 'ṃśo gamaka ity āha. anekadharmā śabdo pītyādi. svasāmānyadharmair anekadharmā;* cf. the phrase at VP II:253: *śabdasya anekadharmaṇaḥ.*

[189] Like Bhartṛhari Dignāga uses *ativartate* as a synonym of *vyabhicarati;* cf. VP III.3:51: *etāṃ sattāṃ padārtho hi na kaścid ativartate. sā ca sampratisattāyāḥ pṛthag bhāṣye nirdiśitā,* alluding to Mahā-bh Vol. II 391,7 (ad A V 2:94): *na sattāṃ padārtho vyabhicarati;* cf. the use of *ativartate* at PS II:17, q.v. no. 193.

[190] The property to which Dignāga alludes is the general property of the word, e.g., treewordness, which is defined by exclusion of other words, in the same way as the referent of the word. Dignāga addresses this aspect of the general *apoha* theory at PS V:22c § 35, 33ab § 47, qq.v; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a5-6: *sāmānyadharmeṇa vṛkṣaśabdatvādinā yena na vyabhicarati pratyayāyati tenaiveti. sa evāsya dharmo gamaka ity arthaḥ. evaśabdena yad vyavachinnaṃ tad darśayati:* "The meaning is this: It only indicates by means of that (property) due to which it does not deviate viz. the general property treewordness, etc. Only that property of it indicates. The word 'only' indicates that which is excluded." As will become clear later in the chapter, the general property of the word, namely exclusion of other words, is intrinsic to the word (*śabde*) in the same way as it is intrinsic to the referent (*arthe*). Consequently exclusion is an inherent property of words or referents. Cf. the crucial statements of PSV V 22cd above and 33ab below.

[191] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a: *ādiśabdena śabdajñeyatvādīnāṃ grahaṇam. apratyayakatvaṃ punas teṣāṃ vyabhicāritvāt. tathā hi te vināpi vṛkṣārthena rasādiṣu dṛṣṭāḥ, na vṛkṣaśabdatvādikaṃ sāmānyam:* "By the expression 'etc.' is included the word's being knowable, etc. These, however, do not indicate because they are ambiguous. That is, even without the referent tree these are also observed to denote taste, and so on, but the general property treewordness is not" (cf. the similar explanation at NCV 653,18ff, q.v. no. 189 above).
    Dignāga's statement is similar to the view which Bhartṛhari propounds at VPV I 53,2-3: *yathā hi ghaṭe dravyatvapṛthvītvaghaṭatvādīnām aviruddhaḥ samavāyaḥ, tathā vṛkṣaśabde 'pi guṇatvaśabdatvavṛkṣaśabdatvādīnām ākṛtiviśeṣānām aviruddhaḥ samavāyaḥ:* "Just as the inherence in a pot of general properties such as substanceness, earthness, potness, and so on, is not in conflict, so also the inherence in the word 'tree' of such particular universals as qualityness, wordness, treewordness, and so on, is not in conflict."
    Dignāga's point is that the word's being a quality (*guṇatā*) of ether (cf. VS II 1:5; PBh § 61) is irrelevant to its semantic properties. This is also emphasised by Bhartṛhari's commentator Vṛṣabhadeva at VPṬ 52,23: *guṇatvaṃ tv anabhidhā-yakaṃ pratītam eva rūpādiṣv api samavāyāt:* "But qualityness is understood not to denote because it also inheres in colour, etc."

[192] PS V:13 has a close parallel at PS II:17: *tathāṅgaṃ yena rūpeṇa liṅginaṃ nātivartate* | *tenaivānekadharmāpi <gamayati netarais tu>*[(1)].
    K (*Kitagawa* 1973 465b1-8 = P 113b3) *de ltar yan lag gaṅ ṅo bos rtags can las ni mi 'da' ba de ñid kyi chos du ma yaṅ rtogs par byed kyi gźan gyi min* (PS II:17) ‖ *du ba yaṅ du ba ñid daṅ skya ba ñid la sogs pa'i cha nas gaṅ gis me la mi 'khrul ba de ñid ñid kyis rtogs par byed pa yin gyis rdzas ñid la sogs pa ni ma yin te 'khrul ba'i phyir ro* ‖ (PSV II:17).
    V (*Kitagawa* 1973 465a1-8 = P 32a6): *cha śas 'di lta bu'i tshul nas* | *rtags can la ni mi 'gyur źiṅ* ‖*de ñid kyi chos du ma na 'aṅ* | *cig śos thob par byed pa yin* (PS

II:17) ‖ *dud pa ni cha śas 'ba' źig mi las mi 'khrul ba yin no* ‖ *dud pa ñid daṅ skya bo ñid la sogs pa ni* ⎮ *de ñid thob par byed pa yin gyi* ⎮ *rdzas ñid la sogs pas ni ma yin te* ⎮ *'khrul pa'i phyir ro* ‖ (PSV II:17):

"Thus the indicator, although it has many properties[(2)], only indicates in the form due to which it does not deviate from the indicated, but not due to other (properties). (PS II:17) For smoke indicates only by means of that indicator (**aṅgena*) namely smokeness, whitishness, and so on, (*dhūmatvapāṇḍutvādinā*), which does not deviate from fire, but not by means of substanceness, etc. (*dravyatvādibhiḥ*)"[(3)] (PSV:II 17).

NCV 674,23ff is considerably more explicit than Jinendrabuddhi as to the implications of PS II:17: *liṅgaṃ aṅgam dhūmakṛtakatvādi liṅginam agnyanitya-tvādiviśiṣṭaṃ deśaśabdādim arthaṃ nātikramya vartate yena rūpeṇa. kena ca nāti-vartate? "dhūma ity adhūmo na bhavati, kṛtaka ity akṛtaka na bhavati" ity adhūmā-kṛtakanivṛttyātmanā nātikrāmati, tenaiva ca rūpeṇānyato vyāvṛttyātmakena gama-yati, sattvadravyādyanekadharmāpi saṃs tais tu vyabhicārān na gamayati sattvādi-sāmānyānyadharmair iti. eṣa tāvad gamakaniyamaḥ:*

"In which form the *aṅgaṃ, i.e.,* the indicator (*liṅgaṃ*) namely smoke or being produced does not occur by transgressing the indicated (*liṅginaṃ*) that is qualified by fire or impermanence, etc. namely the referent (*artham*) which is place or sound (*deśaśabdādim*) and so on. And in which [form] does it not transgress? It does not transgress having the nature of preclusion of non-smoke and not being produced (*adhūmākṛtakanivṛttyātmanā*) like [the statements] "it is smoke (*dhūma*) thus (*iti*) it is not non-smoke (*adhūma*)," "it is a product (*kṛtaka*) thus (*iti*) it is not a non-product (*akṛtaka*)." And it only indicates in that very form whose nature is exclusion from other [things]. Even though it [viz. the indicator] has many properties such as existence or substanceness it does not, however, indicate by means of these, that is, general properties like existence because of ambiguity. This is the restriction with regard to the indicator."

[(1)]*pādas* abc are quoted in the original Sanskrit at NCV 674,23ff (*yat tvayoktam*), cf. PSṬ Ms B 72a5-6: *tathetyādinā ... nātivartata iti na vyabhicaratīty arthaḥ.* PS II:17 also occurs in NM as verse 18, cf. T 1628 3c12-13, T 1629 8a6-7; *Frauwallner* 1982: 778.

[(2)]That is, general and particular properties, cf. PSṬ Ms B 72a6: *sāmānyaviśeṣa-dharmāḥ.*

[(3)]Sanskrit equivalents inserted according to Ms B 72a6, 72b1.

[193] The reading *źes bya ba bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcad pa 'o* V 116,3 indicating that PS V 12-13 are *saṅgrahaślokas* is dubious because these verses introduce topics that have not been dealt with in any of the preceding paragraphs. The purpose of a *saṅgrahaśloka* is to summarize the discussion of topics that have been addressed previously, and this is, to the best of my knowledge, how they are used by Dignāga in other sections of PSV. The introduction of the term in V therefore contradicts its use in PSV in general, and thus corroborates its omission in K, which I have decided to follow. In addition, Mallavādi quotes the verses immediately after citing PSV V:34-35 §§ 47-48 (cf. NCV 652-53), and Siṃhasūri merely restricts himself to explaining that Dignāga indicates the purpose of the preceding exposition in two *ślokas* (cf. NCV 653,15: *āha cety etam arthaṃ ślokadvayena darśayati*), thus connecting them to PSV V:34-35, without even hinting at their being *saṅgraha-*

ślokas. The introductory *āha ca* seems to indicate that Dignāga quotes them from another treatise (presumably the *Sāmānyaparīksāvyāsa*) to corroborate his conclusion at PS V:11d because, as indicated above, they presuppose some of the fundamental theoretical issues of the *apoha* theory, which he will address at PSV V:34f.

[76] *yady anyāpohamātram* <*śabdārthaḥ*>, *katham* <*nīlotpalādiśabdānām*[1] *sāmānādhikaraṇyam syād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaś ca*>. *katham ca na syāt? yasmād bhinnam* <*apohyam sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām*>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208a7: *yady anyāpohamātram ityādi;* 208b1: *katham iti ... katham ca na syāt.*
   [1]*sgra rnams la* K : *sgra la* V.

[194] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208b1-2: *apohyabhedena sāhacaryād arthabhedam darśayati. eṣa hetuḥ: ye bhinnārthā na te samānādhikaraṇā nāpi viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhūtāḥ, ghaṭapaṭādiśabdavat. tathā ca nīlotpalādayaḥ śabdāḥ:* "He shows that difference of referent is due to its concomitance with difference of excluded referent. The reason is as follows: [Words] whose referents are different are neither co-referential nor related as qualifier and qualified, like words such as 'pot' or 'cloth'. And expressions like 'blue lotus' are the same."

Uddyotakara's criticism of Dignāga's view at NV 334,6-12 sheds more light on the assumptions that may have motivated the opponent's criticism: *nīlotpalaśabdayoḥ ca pradhānatvād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvānupapattāv viśeṣaṇasya pūrvanipāta ity ubhayoḥ pradhānatvād na prāptiḥ. ... samānādhikaraṇārthaś ca anyāpohavādinā vācyaḥ. yasya ca anyāpohaḥ śabdārthas tena anīlānutpalavyudāsau katham samānādhikaraṇau iti vaktavyaḥ:* "And in that the qualifier-qualified relation of the words 'blue' and 'lotus' is not justified because they are [both] primary, it does not follow that the qualifier is placed first in the compound[1] because both are primary ... And the upholder of the theory of exclusion should explain what co-referential means. For one who claims that the referent of a word is exclusion of other [referents] should explain how the two exclusions of non-blue and non-lotus are co-referential." And Uddyotakara continues explaining that it only makes sense to talk about co-reference on the assumption that the two words denote a substance as qualified by a general property and a quality because a general property and a quality are resident in it, whereas this is not the case with the two exclusions of non-blue and non-lotus. Consequently there is no referent with regard to which the two exclusions are co-referential, cf. op. cit. 334,10-12: *yasya punar vidhīyamānaḥ śabdārthas tasya jātiguṇaviśiṣṭam nīlotpalaśabdābhyām dravyam abhidhīyate jātiguṇau ca dravye vartete na punar anīlānutpalavyudāsau. tasmāt samānādhikaraṇārtho nāsti.* It is thus clear that Uddyotakara assumes that Dignāga considers the relation between *nīla* and *utpala* to be symmetrical, both terms being primary, cf. vārtt 1 ad A II 1:57 according to which each term is qualifier as well as qualified (on this view, v. below no. 203). Thus the distinction between primary and secondary terms in a compound is obliterated, and thus *pūrvanipāta* of the qualifier does not entail[2]. A similar view is expressed by Kumārila, who objects that the qualifier-qualified relation is impossible because the exclusion of non-lotus is not implicit in the negation of non-blue and vice versa, and because the two words that function as qualifier and qualified are without denotable object. Moreover, co-reference is impossible because of the difference of the exclusions, and co-reference presupposes identity of the referent to which the two terms refer. If it is claimed that there is co-reference it is necessary to answer the question of the nature of the substrate of the

two exclusions because it is assumed that only *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is denotable; cf. ŚV Apoha° 115cd-18ab: *nīlotpalādiśabdeṣu śabalārthābhidhāyiṣu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatva-sāmānādhikaraṇyayoḥ na siddhiḥ, na hy anīlatvavyudāse 'nutpalacyutiḥ. nāpi tatre-taras tasmān na viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇe śabdayor nāpi te syātām abhidheyānapekṣayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam ca na bhinnatvād apohayoḥ.* Karṇakagomin expounds Kumā-rila's objections in a prose version at PVVṬ 188,8ff. For this criticism, cf. PV I 131-133; TS 966-970; TS 1097.

[1]For the technical term *pūrvanipāta,* cf. DSG s.v., Renou, *Terminologie* s.v. *pūrva.*

[2]Karṇakagomin quotes Uddyotakara's objection at PVVṬ 261,27ff on PVSV 65,10ff.

[77] <*eṣa doṣo nāsti*>[1]*te 'pi hi.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208b2: *te pi hītyādi.*
[1]Cf. *ñes pa 'di ni med de de dag kyaṅ* K : *ñes pa de dag ni yod pa ma yin te* V, conflating two separate clauses.

[78] *apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jaḍāḥ, ekatrābhinnakārya-tvād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyakāḥ*[1]. Qu. NCV 732,21-22, TSP 397,5-6, cf. PSṬ Ms B 208b2-3: *yady apy apohyabhedād bhinnārthās tathāpi viśeṣo 'sti, yasmāt svārthabheda-gatau jaḍāḥ ... ata ekatrābhinnakāryatvāt sāmānādhikaraṇam.*
[1]°*viśeṣyakāḥ* NCV :°*viśeṣyatāḥ* TSP.

[195] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 208b3: *pratyekam iti śeṣaḥ.*

[196] Cf. T 174,19-13 (om. Ms B 208b3f): "'Own referent' means the general property (*sāmānyam*). For the referent of the word 'lotus' is the mere lotus (*utpalamātram*). Its particulars are the red lotuses (**raktotpala*), etc. And the referent of the word 'blue' is only a blue thing (**nīlamātram*), and its particulars are bees (**bhramara*), etc. 'Incapable of' (*jaḍāḥ*), means that they are causes of doubt (**saṃśayahetavaḥ*).

[79] <*nīlotpalādiśabdā hi*> *saty apy apohyabhede svārthaviśeṣavyañjanārtham ūrdhvatākākanilayavat svam apohārtham ekatropasaṃharantaḥ* <*samānādhi-karaṇā bhavanti*>. *tathā hi te pratyekaṃ svārthaviśeṣe saṃśayahetavaḥ, śabdān-tarasahitavyaṅgyārthāsambhavāc ca* <*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya*>*bhūtāḥ*[2]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 209a5-209b: *saty api apohyabheda ity atrāpi pūrvavad apohayabhe-denārthabheda darśayati. svārthaviśeṣavyaṅgyārtham ... ūrdhvatākākanilayavat svam apohārtham iti ... ekatropasaṃharanta iti ... tathā hi ta*[1] *iti ... pratyekaṃ ... svārthaviśeṣe saṃśayahetavaḥ ... śabdāntarasahitavyaṅgyārthāsambhavāc cetyādi.*
[1] *ta* em. : *taṃ* Ms
[2] For *bhūtāḥ,* cf. no. 204 below.

[197] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209a6-209b1: *nīlotpalādāv arthaviśeṣe viśeṣaṇatvena khyāpayantaḥ nīlotpalādayo hi śabdāḥ saha prayujyamānā nīlotpalādipratibhāsam vijñāne 'rpayanto nīlotpalādāv arthe svārthasāmānyaṃ nīlotpalādiviśeṣaṇatveno-pasaṃharantaḥ pratipattṛbhiḥ pratīyante. tatas tatpratītivaśād evam uktaṃ.* Kumārila and Dharmakīrti use the term *upasaṃhāra* in similar contexts at ŚV Pratyakṣa° 195cd: *ekatra copasaṃhāro na buddhyor nirvikalpake,* and at PVSV

44,2-5, respectively: *tadabhinnam ekākāraviṣayīkaraṇe apy aniścitānyākāram ākārāntarasākāṅkṣabuddhigrāhyaṃ bhinnaśabdārthopasaṃhāre apy abhinnaṃ buddhau pratibhāti iti sāmānyaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva sāmānādhikaraṇyāni yathāpratīti na virudhyante.*

Cf. the related discussion at PSṬ Ms B 208b5-209a5, which is written with the background of Dharmakīrti's philosophy: *utpalaśabdena svārthaviśeṣasaṃśayahetunā svārthasāmānye buddhāv āropite, so 'rtho paricchinnānyākāratvād ākārāntarasākāṅkṣayā buddhyā paricchidyate: yad etad utpalaṃ kim etad nīlam uta raktam iti? ata ākāṅkṣāvicchedāya nīlaśabdaḥ prayujyamānas tatra svārtham upasaṃharaṇa utpalārthaṃ viśinaṣṭi: yad etad utpalaṃ nīlam etat, na raktam iti bhavati viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ. ayam atrārthaḥ: śabdānāṃ yad abhidheyaṃ buddhipratibhāsātmakam apy adhyavasitabāhyārthasvabhāvam. tad bhinnaśabdārthopasaṃhāre 'py anekadharmānuyatam abhinnam iva pratibhāsate tataś ca nīlotpalādayaḥ śabdās tathāvidham arthapratibimbakam buddhāv arpayanta ekam eva vastu nīlotpalatvādyanekadharmakaṃ prakāśayantīti bhrāntair vyavahartṛbhiḥ pratīyante. tato yathāpratīti teṣāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na virudhyate. evaṃ ca bauddhaḥ śabdārtho nīlādyekataraśabdaprayogād avasitaikanīlādyākāro 'py aniścitāparaviśeṣatvād viśeṣāntarasākāṅkṣāyā buddhyā paricchidyate: yad etan nīlam kim idam utpalam utānyad bhramarādikam ity evamādikayā. ata ākāṅkṣāvicchedāya nīlaśabdena sahotpalādayaḥ śabdāḥ prayujyamānā nīlotpalādipratibhāsavijñānaṃ janayanto nīlādyākāraṃ vastv anutpalāder arthāmtarād vyavacchindantīty adhyavasīyante. tataḥ pratītyanurodhena viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo 'py upapadyata iti.*

[198] That is, the general properties blueness and lotushood, cf. PSṬ Ms B 209a6: *nīlasāmānyam utpalasāmānyaṃ ca.*

[199] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209a5-6: *svārthaviśeṣo nīlotpalādiśabdānāṃ nīlotpalādiḥ. tadabhivyaṅgyartham anenābhinnakāryatvam āha.*

[200] Dignāga mentions this example to explain how the two terms 'nīla' and 'utpala' whose scope each separately differ completely, generates certainty about the referent, when they are combined as *nīlotpala*. The general property uprightness in itself does not generate certainty about which referent is qualified. Without context it is a cause of doubt because uprightness applies to different referents like humans or trunks. If, however, it is combined with the term 'crow's nest' the applicability of 'uprightness' is by implication limited to trunks; Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209b1-3: *ūrdhvatānūrdhvavyavacchedenordhvasāmānyaṃ pratipādayantī sthāṇupuruṣādyūrdhva<tā>bhede saṃśayahetuḥ. kākanīlayanam apy akākāspadayogyavastuvyavacchedena kākāvasihānayogyavastumātraṃ pratyāyayat tadviśeṣeṣu sthāṇusthaṇḍilādiṣu sandehahetuḥ sahitayos tu tayor apuruṣarūpa ūrdhvatāviśeṣe niścayahetutvāt sāmānādhikaraṇyam. yathā tathā nīlotpalādiśabdānām ekasminn arthe pūrvoktena vidhinā tad bhavati:* "'Uprightness' which communicates knowledge about the general property of being upright by excluding [things that are] not upright is a cause of doubt with respect to the difference of the uprightness of a trunk or a human being, etc. 'Crow's nest' which only imparts knowledge about a referent that is suitable as the habitat of a crow by excluding such referents that are not suitable as the abode of a crow is also a cause of doubt as to its particulars like a trunk or a landmark, but the two are co-referential when combined because they are

a cause of ascertainment with regard to the particular of uprightness that has the form of something non-human. It is the same in every case with regard to a single object of expressions like 'blue lotus' in accordance with the abovementioned rule."

Dignāga mentions the same example at PSV III 44ff:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 505,16f = P 135a6): *dper na mtho yor la 'greṅ ba daṅ bya rog la gnas pa dag bsdoms pa ltu bu 'o.*

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 505,17f = P 49a7): *dper na bslaṅ ba'i rnam pa daṅ bya babs pa gñis gcig tu 'dus pa las mtho yor du śes pa lta bu 'o?*

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 509,7-8 = P 136b2): *de ltar yaṅ 'greṅ ba yin la bya rog gnas pa'i phyir mtho yor du rtogs* (P *gtogs*) *pa mthoṅ gi, 'ba'* (P *'ga'*) *źig pa la mi nus pa med pa'phyir ro.*

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 509,8-9 = P 53a5-6): *'di ltar 'greṅ ba daṅ bya ba babs pa las mtho yor du rtogs pa mthoṅ ba ni kha yar ba las ñes par mi nus pa'i phyir ro.*

Cf. NCV 722,25-26: *yathā ūrdhvatvaṃ sāmānyaṃ "sthāṇuḥ syāt, puruṣaḥ syāt" iti saṃśayahetuḥ, śakunanilayanaṃ "sthāṇur eva" iti niścayahetur viśiṣṭatvāt, vastrasaṃyamanaṃ vā "puruṣa eva" iti:* For instance, the general property uprightness is a cause of doubt "maybe it is a trunk or a human being"? 'Bird's nest' is a cause of ascertainment "it is definitely a human being" because of being qualified, or 'clothing' [is a cause of ascertainment]: "It is definitely a human being"! Cf. also NCV 605,15; 677,29-678,7-10; PSṬ Ms B 142a7: *kākanilayanaṃ hi puruṣādibhyo vyavacchidya sthāṇusthaṇḍilayoḥ kevalaṃ saṃśayahetuḥ. Ūrdhvatāsahitaṃ tu sthāṇau <so read : ˚o Ms> niścayahet<ur> dṛṣṭaṃ (so read : ˚udṛṣ° Ms). sthāṇu-grahaṇaṃ cātrāpu<ru>ṣasyordhvatā sāmānyasyopalakṣaṇārthaṃ;* ŚV Anumāna° 94cd-95ab: *kvacit saṃśayahetū yau pratyekatvena lakṣitau. saṅghāte nirṇayas tābhyām ūrdhvatākākavattvavat.* ŚVṬ (Umveka) 328,18-19 (ad loc.): *sthāṇur ayam ūrdhvatve sati kākanilayanāt.* ŚV Vākya° 363: *padārthā gamayanty etam pratyekaṃ saṃśaye sati. sāmastye nirṇayotpādāt sthāṇumūrddhasthakākavat.*

[201] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209b3: *pratyekaṃ*[(1)] *svārthaviśeṣe saṃśayahetutvam arthāpattyā ca sahitānāṃ niścayahetutvam āha.*
   [(1)]°*aṃ* em. : °*a Ms*

[202] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209b5-7: *śabdāntareṇa nīlaśabdena sahitasyotpalaśabdasya vyaṅgyo yo viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ, sa kevalasyotpalaśabdasya na sambhavati. evaṃ nīlaśabdasyāpy utpalaśabdasahitasya yo vyaṅgyaḥ, sa kevalasya na sambhavatīti. śabdāntarasannidhānena viśiṣṭārthavṛtteḥ parasparaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ yathordhvatākākanīlayanayoḥ sahitayor eva viśiṣṭārthapratyāyane:* "The specific referent of the word 'lotus' that is to be manifested when [the word 'lotus' is] associated with another word such as the word 'blue' is not possible for the word 'lotus' in isolation. In the same way [the particular referent] of the word 'blue' that is to be manifested in association with the word 'lotus' is not possible for it in isolation either. Thus, since they refer to a distinct referent because of being juxtaposed with another word they are mutually related as qualifier and qualified in the same way as 'uprightness' and 'crow's nest' only indicate a distinct referent when they are associated."

Dignāga's view that each term in a compound like *nīlotpala* is related to the other as qualifier and qualified is historically related to the view Patañjali expounds at Mahā-bh I 399,4ff on vārtt 1 ad A II.1:57, according to which both terms in a compound like *kṛṣṇatila* are related as qualifier and qualified: *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayor*

ubhayaviśeṣaṇatvād ubhayoś ca viśeṣyatvād upasarjanasyāprasiddhiḥ. kṛṣṇatilā iti. kṛṣṇaśabdo 'yaṃ tilaśabdenābhisambadhyamāno viśeṣyavacanaḥ sampadyate. tathā tilaśabdaḥ kṛṣṇaśabdenābhisambadhyamāno viśeṣyavacanaḥ sampadyate. tad ubhayaṃ viśeṣaṇam bhavaty ubhayaṃ ca viśeṣyam. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Nyāsa Vol. 2: 76,19-22 reflects the Buddhist Dignāgan point of view: *atra nīlārtho bhramarādibhyo vyāvartyotpalārthenotpale vyavasthāpyate. utpalārtho 'pi raktot-palādibhyo vyāvartya nīlārthena nīle vyavasthāpyata ity asti pratyekaṃ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvaḥ. sa yatra nāsti tatra tu na samāsaḥ. yathā vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapeti:* "In this case the referent of 'blue' is restricted to lotus together with the referent of 'lotus', having been excluded from bees, etc. The referent of 'lotus' too is restricted to blue together with the referent of 'blue,' having been excluded from red lotus, etc. Thus each is related [to the other] as qualifier and qualified. Where this is not the case, there is no compound, like *śiṃśapā* is a tree." Dignāga's view that each of the terms generates doubt as to the particular referent it denotes and that only their combined exclusions manifest the referent is related to a similar discussion at VP III.14:10-11 which addresses the problems discussed at Mahā-bh loc. cit.: *sāmānyānām asambandhāt tau viśeṣe vyavasthitau, rūpābhedād viśeṣaṃ tam abhivyaṅktuṃ na śaknutaḥ. tāv evaṃ sannipatitau bhedena pratipādane, avacchedam ivādhāya saṃśayaṃ vyapakarṣataḥ.*

[203] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 209b7: *arthānām eva parasparaṃ viśeṣyabhāvo loke pratītaḥ, na śabdānām. tat kathaṃ sa teṣāṃ teṣāṃ vyavasthāpyate, ity āśaṃkhyamānasya* <u>*bhūtagrahaṇam. bhūtaśabda upamānavācī.*</u>

[80] *yat tarhi tad ekādhikaraṇaṃ*[1]. Qu. Ms B 210a2.
[1]*ekādhi°* em. (cf. *gźi cig pa can* T; *gźi gcig pa yin* K : *gźi gcig la* [sic] V) : *ekaṃ adhi°* Ms

[204] The opponent addresses Dignāga's assumption that the two terms 'blue' and 'lotus' together manifest the denoted referent blue lotus, by pointing out that this claim is in conflict with the well-known use of analytical strings (*vigraha*) in grammatical literature to explain the meaning of compounds like *nīlotpalam* as *nīlaṃ ca tad utpalaṃ ca,* which isolates the two terms as well as their denotations showing their syntactical agreement, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a2-3: *vigrahakāle nīlaṃ ca tad utpalaṃ ceti kriyate. ataḥ praśnaḥ. etena yad uktaṃ "śabdāntarasahitenaiva śabdena viśiṣṭo 'rtho 'bhivyaṅgya" ity*[1] *atrābhyupetabādhām āha.*
The term *adhikaraṇa* is used in this context and throughout in the following discussion to denote a concrete object (*dravya*) like in Mahā-bh, cf. *Renou, Terminologie,* s.v.
[1]*'rtho 'bhivyaṅgya ity* conj. : *°ṭor ty Ms*

[81] *na ca*[1] *tat kevalaṃ nīlaṃ na ca kevalam utpalam, samudāyābhidheyatvāt.* Qu. TSP 379,22-23, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a3-5: *na ca tat kevalaṃ nīlam iti ... na ca kevalam utpalam iti ... samudāyābhidheyatvād iti.*
[1]*ca Ms* (*de ni* T) : *hi* TSP.

[205] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a4: *tathā hi nīlaśabdena kevalenotpalaśabdena ca kevalena yad abhidhīyate, tad loke kevalaṃ nīlaṃ ca kevalam*[1] *utpalam iti ca pratītam.*

[1]*nīlaṃ ca kevalam* conj. (cf. *snoṅ po 'ba' źig pa daṅ u tpal la 'ba' źig pa* T) : om. Ms

206 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a5-6: *yasmāt sahitābhyām eva nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṃ so 'rtho 'bhidheyo na kevalābhyām. anyathaikasya tadarthābhidhāyitve paryāyaśabda-vat dvayoḥ sahaprayogo nopapadyeta. tad etena vigrahakāle 'pi sahitābhyām eva nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṃ tadvācyam ity abhyupagamān nābhyupetabādheti darśayati.*

[82] *nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṃ <hi> sahitābhyāṃ sa <pratīyate>*[1], *na kevalābhyām.*[2] Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a5, q.v. above no 207.
[1]Cf. *de ... rtogs pa yin gyi* K : *sbyar bar bya ba'i* V.
[2]K and V are syntacticaly confused, cf. *bsdus pa dag* K : *mtha' dag la* V. In any case, it is clear from the paraphrase at Ms B 210a5 that either expression qualifies *snoṅ po daṅ u tpala la'i sgra dag las* V : *u tpala daṅ snoṅ po'i sgra dag las* K.

207 Cf. *de* K : om. V (PN so; DC conjecture *de,* presumably on the basis of K).

[83] *<kevalau hi> varṇavat tau nirarthakau.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a7: *varṇavat tau*[1] *nirarthakau.*
[1]*varṇavat tau* conj. (cf. *yi ge bźin du* TK, *kha dog bźin du* V) : *varṇṇāvarṇṇau* Ms

208 Cf. *kha yar ba ni* V : *'ba' źig pa dag la* K.

209 Cf. the discussion at Mahā-bh I 31,11-12 on vārtt 14 ad Śivasūtra 5: *anarthakās tu prativarṇam arthānupalabdheḥ. anarthakās tu varṇāḥ. kutaḥ? prativarṇam arthānupalabdheḥ. na hi prativarṇam arthā upalabhyante. kim idaṃ prativarṇam? varṇam varṇaṃ prati prativarṇam.*

[84] *yathaiva hi.* Qu. Ms B 210a7.

210 Cf. *ni la brjod pa la* V : *sṅon pa brjod* (so read with P; ed. *yod*) *pa* K.

211 Cf. *de bźin du 'di la yaṅ ṅo* V : *de bźin du 'dir yin no* K.

[85] *viṣama upanyāsaḥ*[1]. *na hi ....* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a7: *viṣama upanyāsa iti.* Ms B 210b1: *na hītyādi.*
[1]Cf. *mi mtshuṅs pa bkod pa yin te* K : om. V.

212 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210a7-210b1: *dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyam āha. kathaṃ viṣama iti? āha: na hītyādi. etenābhyupetahānim āha. nīlaśabdasya kevalasyāpy arthavattvenābhyupagamāt.*

[86] *varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye, tadvācya iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b1-2: *varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye. naiṣa doṣaḥ. yasmāt tadvācya iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate.*

[213]Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b2: *tatrāpi nīlaśabde yo 'rtho gamyate sa nīlaśabdavācya iti kevalaṃ pratīyate, na tu samudāyārtho nīlaśabdavācyatvena pratīyata ity arthaḥ:*

[87] *yathaiva hi.* Qu. Ms B 210b3.

[214] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b2-3: *ata eva samudāyārthaśūnyatāṃ kevalayor darśayann āha: yathaiva hītyādi.*

[88] *yat tūktaṃ ... tatrāpi.* Qu. Ms B 210b3: *yat tūktam ityādinā ... tatrāpītyādinā.*

[215] Since Jinendrabuddhi explains that the sentence beginning with *yat tūktam* repeats the *pūrvapakṣa,* it is obvious that the readings *ji skad du ni daṅ la'i sgra cuṅ zad kyaṅ don gyi rtogs* (so read) *pa mi bskyed do źes pa bźin no źe na* V are preferable to *sṅon po'i sgras don 'ga źig rtogs pa yin no* K; cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b3-5: *yat tūktam ityādinā pūrvapakṣaṃ pratyuccārya tatrāpītyādinā tadvācya ityāder uttarārdhasyārtham ācaṣṭe.*

[216] Cf. *de la yaṅ rigs sṅon po'i* (so read : V *po ni*) *sgra'i brjod bya'o źes yaṅ gar ba rtogs par bya ste* V : *de la yaṅ rigs 'ba' źig sṅon po'i sgras brjod pa'i phyir 'ba' źig rtogs pa yin no* K.

[217] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b3-4: *jātir nīlaguṇasamavāyinī nīlatvam. kevalagrahaṇena samudāyārthaśūnyatām āha:* "The general property inherent in the blue quality is blueness. By using the [word] 'alone' he explains that it is empty of the referent of the aggregate."

[218] The Tibetan translations of this clause in KV are syntactically ambiguous, cf. *de'i yon tan daṅ ldan pa daṅ rdzas daṅ ldan par brjod par bya ba yin par rigs pa'i phyir* K : *yon tan de'i brjod bya daṅ ldan pa yin na ni rdzas ldan pa'i ldan pa yaṅ yin pas* V. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation, however, leaves no doubt about the nature of the argument, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b4-5: *nīlaśabdavācyayā jātyā yukto guṇo vā yatra sā samavetā, jātiyuktena guṇena yuktaṃ dravyaṃ vā yatra nīlaguṇaḥ samavetaḥ: sarvaṃ cedaṃ na samudāyasyārthaḥ:* "The quality as connected to the general property [blueness] that is denotable by the word 'blue' or [the quality] in which [the general property blueness] is inherent, the substance as connected to the quality as connected to the general property [blueness] or [the substance] in which the blue quality is inherent: all of this is not the referent of the aggregate."
Dignāga evidently wants to point out that the denotation of the word *'nīla'* is neither the blue quality as connected to the general property blueness nor the substance as connected to the blue quality. On this interpretation it seems reasonable to assume that a negation is missing in KV. The suggested translation is based on the conj. *mi rigs pa'i phyir* : *rigs pa'i phyir* K.

[89] *arthaśūnyaiḥ samudayair.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b6: *arthaśūnyair iti ... samudayair iti.*

[90] *bhinnaśabdavācyenārthena*[(1)] *bhinnārthā ity ucyante.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b6-7: *kathaṃ tarhy "apohyabhedāt bhinnārthā"* (14a) *ity ucyanta ity āha: bhinnaśabdavācyenetyādi   ...   etad   uktaṃ   bhavati:*

kevalanīlādiśabdarthavācyenārthena   *bhinnārthā*   *ity*   *ucyante.*   *na*   *tu*
samudāyārtheneti.

[1]V misinterprets *arthena* as *don gyi śugs kyis, i.e.,* "by implication."

219 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b6-7: *bhinnaḥ pṛthagbhūtaḥ kevala iti yāvat.*

220 Jinendrabuddhi closes his comment on this paragraph with a brief discussion of the implications of Dignāga's view of co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 210b7-211a2: *yadi tarhi samudāyavācya eva viśiṣṭo 'rthaḥ, tat katham sāmānādhikaraṇyam viśeṣa<ṇa>viśeṣyabhāvo vā yavatā bhedādhiṣṭhānam. ubhayam apīdam*[1] *bhinnāśrayam*[2] *samudāyaś caikaḥ? Parikalpasamāropitāvayavasadbhāvād ubhayam vyavasthāpyate. vakṣyate caitad "apoddhāre padasyāyam artho vikalpita"*[2] (= PS V 46ab) *iti. pratipattrabhiprāyavaśena vā. pratipattāro hy ubhayaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭasyaikasyaivārthasya dvāv imau śabdau pratyekam vācakāv iti manyante. tatas tadabhiprāyavaśāt tathā vyavasthāpyate*[2].

[1]Ms so, but *'di gñis ka ni* T would suggest reading *hīdam* as Tib. *ni* generally translates Sanskrit *hi.*

[2] *bhinnāśrayam* conj (cf. *tha dad pa'i rten can* T) : om. Ms

[2]em. (cf. PS V 46ab) : *apodvāre yad anyāṣ?am vākṣād arthe vikalpita* Ms. T is based upon a similarly corrupted text and the translation is consequently incomprehensible. One wonders if the translator himself could make sense of it, cf. 177,36-37: *'di ni sel ba'i sgo la gaṅ 'di'i 'di dag las don du brtags pa 'o źes 'chad par 'gyur ro.*

[2]em. : °*sthā kriyam* Ms

[91] *arthāntaro hi*[1] *<śabdārtho nopapadyate. katham kṛtvā?>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: *arthantaretyādi.*

[1]°*aro hi* conj., cf. *don gźan ni* K : *don gźan la ni* V, which suggests the reading *arthāntare.*

221 That is, something different from 'exclusion of other (referents)' like a general property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: *yad anyāpohād anyaj jātyādikam abhidheyam iṣyate.*

[92] *<tayor hy> avayavārthayor*[1] *adhikaraṇam tato bhinnam syād abhinnam vā.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3-4: *avayavārhayor iti ... tayor adhikaraṇam ... tata iti ... bhinnam syād abhinnam veti.*

[1]Cf. *de'i yan lag gi don dag* K : *de la ni yan lag daṅ yan lag can gyi don dag* V.

222 Namely the aggregate as object, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: *samudāyābhidheyo yo 'rthas.*

223That is, the denotable objects of the separate terms *'nīla',* and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a3: *kevalanīlādiśabdavācyayoḥ.*

224 That is, because there is no third option with regard to a substantially existent general property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a4: *dravyasatas tṛtīyavikalpābhāvāt.*

[225] Namely, from the two component referents consisting of the two general properties, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a4: *jātyām avayavārthābhyām.* According to the translations of KV—both equally confused—it is the general properties as referents that may or may not be different from the referent (*adhikaraṇa*).

[93] <*tatra tāvad na bhinnam, yasmāt*> *samudāyaikatā*[1] *nāsti mitho 'bheda-prasaṅgataḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a4: *tatrābhedapakṣe doṣāpadarśanāyāha samudāyaikatā*[1] *nāstīti. kuta ity āha: mitho bhedaprasaṅgata iti.*
[1]°*aikatā* em. (cf. *gcig ñid* V Ms T: *gcig ni* K) : °*aika* Ms

[226] Cf. *gaṅ gi phyir* K : *'di ltar* V.

[227] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a5: *samudāyinoḥ parasparam abhedaprasaṅga ity arthaḥ.*

[94] *yadi hi.* Qu. Ms B 211a5.

[228] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b1: *yad anekasamudāyo na sa vastutaḥ, kalpita eva tu ṣaṇṇagarīvat*[1].
[1]Cf. A II 1:51.

[229] Cf. *thal bar 'gyur ro* K : om. V.

[230] Cf. *gcig las* K : *don gcig las* V.

[95] *samūhānekatāsakteḥ*[1]. Qu. Ms B 211a7.
[1]Cf. *'gyur* (sic.; read *thal*) *phyir* K : *thal bar 'gyur* V.

[96] *samūhasya* <*cā*>[1]*nekasmād abhedād anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ.* <*tataś ca nāsti*>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211a7-211b1: *samūhasya jātiguṇasamudāyasyānekasmād avayavād abhedād anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ.*
[1]Cf. *yaṅ* K : om. V.

[97] *nīlotpalārthayoḥ.* Qu. Ms B 211a7.

[231] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b1: *nīlotpalārthayor iti bahuvrīhiḥ. nīlotpalābhidhāyinoḥ śabdayor ity arthaḥ.*

[98] *ekatrāpi vartamānau* <*śabdau svārthaṃ na tyajataḥ*>[1]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b1: *ekatrāpi vartamānāv iti.*
[1]or: *hāyakau.*

[232]That is, in the compound *'nīlotpala,'* cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b1-2: *ekaminn api śabdasamudāye 'vayavabhāvena vartamānāv ity arthaḥ.*

[99] *samuditayor api.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b2: *nīlotpalaśabdayoḥ samuditayor apīti.*

[100] *kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam.* Qu. Ms B 211b2.

[233] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b2: *bhinnārthatvāt. yathā ghaṭapaṭaśabdayoḥ sāmānā-dhikaraṇyaṃ nāsti, tathā nīlotpalaśabdayoḥ samuditayor apīti.*

[101] *<eṣa doṣo nāsti>. dvāv api <viśeṣārthau> sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvāt. tulyarūpau <sāmānyārthena>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b3: *sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvād iti;* 211b4: <u>*dvāv api*</u> *nīlotpalaśabdau;* Ms B 211b5: *tulyarūpāv* [1]*ityādi.*

[1]em. : *tulyarūpetvityādi* Ms

[234] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b3-5: *nīlam iti sāmānyaṃ; tadviśeṣā utpalādayaḥ; te tatrāntarbhūtāḥ*[1]. *nīlotpalaśabdau hi sāmānyābhidhānau viśeṣam antarbhāvya vartete, tasmāt sāmānye viśeṣā antarbhūtā iti. te 'pi nīlotpalaśabdayor arthāḥ. tad evaṃ dvāv api nīlotpalaśabdau nīlotpalārthavantau*[3]. *tataś ca svārthāparityāge 'pi na kaścid doṣaḥ:* "Blue is a general property; its particulars are lotus, etc.; they are included in that. For the words 'blue' and 'lotus' that denote two general properties apply by including the particular. Therefore the particulars are included in the general; for they too are the referents of the words 'blue' and 'lotus'. In those circumstances both of them viz. the words 'blue' and 'lotus' have as their referent the blue lotus. And therefore there is no problem even if they give up their own referent."

[1]°*āntar*° em. : °*āṃr*° Ms

[2]°*ānyābhi*° em. : °*am abhi*°.

[3]°*palārthavantau* em. (cf.*u tpal la sṅon po don daṅ ldan pa dag go* T) : *palenāvyavṃtau* Ms

[102] *viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanārthaṃ*[1] *dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b6, q.v. no. 236.

[1]Cf. *don gyi bye brag daṅ ldan pa śes par bya ba' i phyir* V : *khyad par gyi don śes par bya ba'i don du* K.

[235] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b5-6: *yadi tarhi sāmānyaśabdo 'pi viśeṣārthas tata eva viśeṣāvagamāt dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ kimartham? ity āha: tulyarūpāv ityādi. yenaiva rūpeṇa nīlaśabdo nīlatvam āha, tenaiva nīlotpalam ity api. atas tasya <tulya>rūpatvān*[1] *na jñāyate: kim ayaṃ sāmānyārtha eva atha*[2] *viśeṣārtho 'pīti*[3]; <u>*viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanārthaṃ dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ*</u>: "In that case, if it has a particular as its referent even though it is a general term, what is the reason why the second word is applied since the particular is understood from this? To this [question] he answers: "*They have a form that is identical with,*" etc. The word 'blue' also denotes the blue lotus in the same form in which it denotes blueness. Therefore one does not know whether it only has the general property as its referent or whether it also has a particular as its referent because its form is the same. Thus the application of the second word is for the purpose of making known the fact that they have a particular as their referent."

[1]*tulya*° conj. (cf. *ṅo bo mtshuṅs pa* T) : om. Ms

[2]*atha* em. : *hata* Ms

[3]°*īti* em. : °*īhi* Ms

[103] *atra tāvad nīlaśabden<ābheden>ābhidhīyate, na jātiḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b6-7: *atra tāvad ityādi;* Ms B 211b7f, q.v. no. 237 below.

[236] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 211b7-212a1: <u>nīlaśabdena hi nīlajātir abhidhīyate</u> tadyukto vā guṇaḥ, <u>na</u> tūtpalādidravyajā<u>tiḥ</u>. tasyā<u>s</u>[1] ca viśeṣā raktotpalādayaḥ, na nīlaguṇasya tatsamavāyino vā nīlatvasya, tataḥ kathaṃ nīlaśabdārthe nīlotpalādīnām antar-bhāvaḥ syāt: "For the word 'blue' denotes the general property blueness or the quality connected to it, but not the general property substanceness of a lotus and so on; and the red lotus, and so on, are its [viz. the general property substanceness], [they are] not [particulars] of the blue quality or the blueness inherent in it. Therefore, how could the blue lotus, and so on, be included in the referent of the word 'blue'?"

[1]T reproduces *tasyās* as *de las* sic.

[104] <na hi nīlaśabdo dravyajātiṃ> sāmānyenāha, <kuto viśeṣasya dravyajātāv antarbhūtaḥ kalpyeta[1]>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a1: sāmānyenāhety; 211b7-212a1, q.v. no. 237 above.

[1]brtag V : brtags pa K.

[237] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a1: abhinnaśabdasyārtham ācaṣṭe. tad etena ye nīla-śabdārthasya bhedā na bhavanti, na te tatrāntarbhavanti, tadyathā balākādayaḥ. tathā ca nīlotpalādayo dravyajātiviśeṣā iti.

[105] nanu ca nīlavad dravyaṃ sāmānyen<āha>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a2, q.v. no. 241 below.

[238] The reading *balāka* is supported by Ms, cf. no. 238 above. K and V are utterly confused, cf. *ha li daṅ lā ba la sogs pa* K : *lā ba daṅ u tpa la dag kyaṅ* V.

[239] Cf. *u tpa la dag kyaṅ* V : om. K.

[240] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a2: <u>naiva hi nīlaśabdena</u> nīlo guṇas tajjātir vā<u>bhidhīyate</u>, kiṃ tarhi nī<u>laguṇavat sāmānyena dravyam</u>; tadbhedāś ca nīlotpalādaya ity anavadyam: "For the word 'blue' does not denote the blue quality or its general property, but rather [it denotes] in a general way the substance that possesses the blue quality; and the blue lotus, and so on, are its particulars. Thus it is unobjectionable."

[106] ayuktam evaṃ bhavitum. Qu. Ms B 212a3.

[107] <kasmāt?> pūrvam uktatvāt. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a3-4: pūrvam uktatvād ityādi.

[241] Cf. *ci'i phyir* V : *gaṅ gi phyir* K.

[242] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a3-4: tadvatpakṣadarśanaṃ hīdam upanyastam. tac ca <u>pūrvam eva niṣiddham</u> iti kṛtvā tad eva pūrvaniṣiddhatvaṃ darśayann āha: purvam uktatvād ityādi.

[108] <*tadvadabhidhānaṃ hi*(1) "*tadvato nāsvatantratvād*" (PS V:4a) *ityevamādinā*> *pūrvam eva niṣiddham*(2). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a3-4, q.v. above no. 243.
(1)K and V are syntactically confused, cf. *de daṅ ldan par brjod pa la* (sic) *ni* V : *de daṅ ldan pa ni* K, and, subsequently *de daṅ ldan par brjod pa ni*.
(2)Cf. *sṅar ñid du bkag pa yin no* K : *sṅar ñid du … ma grub par brjod do* V.

[109] *tad ayuktam.* Qu. Ms B 212a4.

243 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a4: *abhidheyatvena hy antarbhāva iṣṭaḥ, na ca viśeṣāṇāṃ sāmānyaśabdābhidheyatvaṃ sambhavati:* "For it is claimed that [the particulars'] are included [in the general property] as denotable objects. And it is not possible that the particulars are the denotable objects of the general term."

[110] <*kasmāt?*> *saṃśayāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a4: *atra hetum āha: saṃśayād iti.*

[111] *saṃśayo hi* <*sāmānyaśabdād viśeṣeṣu*(1) *dṛṣṭaḥ*>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a4: *saṃśayo hītyādikam asyaiva vivaraṇam.*
(1)Cf. *khyad par rnams la* K : *bye brag gi sgra rnams la* (*viśeṣaśabdeṣu* sic)V.

[112] *na ca yataḥ saṃśayas* <*tenābhidhānaṃ yuktam*>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a5: *na ca yataḥ saṃśaya ityādy anvayasyopadarśanam.*
(1)Cf. *de yis brjod par rigs pa ma yin no* V : *de ni brjod par mi rigs so* K.

[113] *syāt tv arthato* <*viśeṣaśabdāt sāmānyapratītiḥ, avyabhicārāt*(1)>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a5: *syāt tv arthata ityādi vyatirekasya.*
(1)Cf. *mi 'khrul pa'i phyir* V : *'khrul pa med par 'gyur ro* K. V construes *sāmānyapratītiḥ* with *avyabhicārāt,* cf. *spyi rtogs pa la mi 'khrul pa'i phyir* V.

244 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a6: *arthata iti grahaṇaṃ sākṣād abhidhānasyābhimatatvāt:* "The use of the expression 'by implication' is due to the fact that it is believed that it denotes directly."

245 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212a5: *śiṃśapāśabdārtho hi vṛkṣasāmānyāvyabhicārīti śiṃśapāśabdād arthato*(1) *vṛkṣasāmānyapratītir bhavati:* "Since the referent of the word '*śiṃśapā*' does not deviate from the general property tree, there is a cognition of the general property tree, which is caused by the word '*śiṃśapā*' by implication."
(1) *śabdād arthato* em. (cf. *sgra las don gyis* T) : *śabdārthato* Ms

[114] *yat tarhīdam* <*uktam "antarbhūtaviśeṣaṃ sāmānyam" iti*>, *naitad* <*uktam abhidheyatvāt, kiṃ tarhi*>(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b1: *yat tarhīdam ityādi. yadi nāntarbhūtaviśeṣaṃ sāmānyam, tat katham ayam āgamo na virudhyata ity abhiprāyaḥ. naitad ityādināgamaṃ gamayati.*
(1)*etad* is the correlative of *yat.* KV translate as if the relative clause represents a statement made by the opponent.

[115] <*anapohanāt*>. Restored.

[246] Cf. *til la sogs pa* K : *sṅon po la sogs pa la* V.

[116] *paryāye gatir ekasmāt.* Qu Ms B 212b1.

[247] Cf. PST Ms B 212b1-2: *paryāyaśabdeṣu hi ekasmād eva paryāyaśabdād vivakṣitārthapratītir bhavati. tataś ca dvitīyasya prayogābhāva eveti kathaṃ sāmā-nādhikaraṇyaṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo veti manyate:* "For in the case of synonyms a single synonym causes the cognition of the intended referent. And therefore the application of a second [synonym] is not met with. So how could there be co-reference or a qualifier-qualified relation. This is how he is thinking."

[117] *paryāyaśabde hy anirjñātānekārthe*[1] *paryāyāntarasya*[2] *prayogas tat<pūrvā>rthapratītaye.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 212b3: *paryāyaśabde hītyādi;* B 213b3-4, q.v. below no. 249.
    [1]Cf. *don du ma ma rtogs pa la* K : *ma rtogs pa daṅ don du ma la ma* (sic; *ma* om. DC) *yin gyi* V.
    [2]Cf. *rnam graṅs gźan gyi* (so read; ed. *gyis*) *sbyor ba* K : *rnam graṅs gźan sbyor ba* V.

[248] Cf. PST Ms B 212b3-4: *tatrānirjñātārthe*[1] *paryāyāntarasya prayogo*[2] *bhavati: yathā kasyacit pikaśabde 'nirjñātārthe tadarthapratītaye kokilaśabdasya, anekārthe vā arthāntaravyavacchedena viśiṣṭārthapratītaye: yathākṣaśabde vibhīta-kaśabdasya. na cātrāyaṃ prakāro 'sti. tasmād ayukto dvitīyasya prayoga ity abhi-prāyaḥ:* "In this context there is an addition of another synonym to [a synonym] whose referent is not understood, like, for instance, someone's addition of the word *kokila* to the word *pika* whose referent is not understood, so that its referent may be understood, or to one that has many referents so that a specific referent may be known by excluding other referents, like, for instance, the word *vibhītaka* to the word *akṣa*. And this kind [of addition] is not found in the present case. Therefore the addition of a second [synonym] is not justified. Such is the opinion."
    Thus the use of a second term in addition to the one already mentioned is only justified if the meaning is not clearly understood. Otherwise it is not. And in the present case it must be assumed that if *nīla* and *utpala* denote the same referent they are synonyms, and thus the addition of one to the other is meaningless because one does not apply a second term in addition to one whose meaning is understood. Dignāga apparently alludes in this paragraph to the principle that 'one does not use words whose referents have already been denoted,' which Patañjali explains at Mahā-bh I 105,2-3: *arthagatyarthas śabdaprayogaḥ. arthaṃ sampratyāyayiṣyāmīti śabdaḥ prayujyate. tatraikenoktatvāt tasyārthasya dvitīyasya prayogeṇa na bhavi-tavyam uktārthānām aprayoga iti:* "The use of words is for the purpose of comprehending their referents. A word is used at the thought "I shall make [its] referent understood." In that case one should not use a second word because the referent has already been denoted by a single one, for 'one does not use [words] whose referents have already been denoted';" cf. Mahā-bh I 240,24-25.
    [1]*°ānirjñātā°* em. : *°ātā° Ms*
    [2]*°sya pra°* em. : *°syāpra° Ms*

[118] *etad eva hi <paryāyaśabdānāṃ> paryāyatvam*[1]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b4-5: *kasmāt punar ekasya paryāyasya prayoge dvitīyasya tatrāprayoga ity āha: etad eva hītyādi.* 212b6: *paryāyatvam iti.*
[1]*rnam graṅs pa'i sgra ñid* K : *sgra ñid* V.

249 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b5: *paryāyeṇārtham abhidadhatīti paryāyaḥ. na so 'sti*[2] *yugapatprayoge svanimittābhāvāt.*
[1]*°aḥ.* em. : *°yā* Ms
[2] *na so 'sti* conj. (cf. *de cig car sbyor ba la med de* T) : *na sā Ms*

250 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b5: *anvarthasaṃjñā hīyam.*

[119] *paryāyeṇārtham abhidadhati, <na yugapat>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b5: *paryāyeṇārtham abhidadhatīti.*

251 Cf. Bhartṛhari's VP II:251: *yaugapadyam atikramya paryāye vyavatiṣṭhate.*

[120] *tathā ca utpalārthasya nīlaśabdenaivāvagater viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b6: *tathā cetyādi … utpalaśabdasahitavyaṅgyasyārthas-ya nīlaśabdenaiva kevalenāvagater … viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ.*

252 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b6-7: *yataḥ paryāyaśabda eka evābhidhānāyālam, ata utpalaśabdasahitavyaṅgyasyārthasya nīlaśabdenaiva kevalenāvagater vyavacched-yatvam eva nāstīti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ:* "Since only a single synonym is sufficient for denoting, the referent that is manifested together with the word 'lotus' does not have an excluded referent because it is understood from the word 'blue' alone. Thus there is no qualifier-qualified relation."

[121] *<yathābhede> tathā bhede 'pi: <samudāyibhyaḥ> samudāyasyānyatvaṃ sādhyam. na hi tasya teṣu teṣāṃ vā tatra kārtsnyenaikadeśena vā vṛttiḥ sambhavati.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 212b7-213a2: *tathā bhede 'pīti doṣa iti vartate. kathaṃ punar doṣa ity āha: samudāyasyānyatvaṃ sādhyam iti. na siddham ity arthaḥ. kathaṃ sādhyam ity āha: na hītyādi. na hi tasyāvayavinas teṣv avayaveṣu teṣāṃ vāvayavānāṃ tatra samudāye*[1] *kārtsnyena sarvātmanā ekadeśena vā bhāgena vā vṛttiḥ sambhavati;* cf. no. 254 below.
[1]*°e* em. : *°o Ms*

253 Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's lenghthy elaboration of Dignāga's argument at PSṬ Ms B 213a2-213b1: *yadi hy avayavy avayaveṣv ekadeśena vartetāvayavānavasthā syāt. tathā hi yair avayavair avayavī samavāyikāraṇe avayaveṣu vartate, teṣv api tenāvayavabhedenaiva vārtitavyam. punas teṣv apy evam ity anavasthā. na ca tadvṛttāv avayavino vṛttir asti teṣām anavayavitvāt. atha kārtsnyena vartate tadā-vayavino bahutvaprasaṅgo 'vayavānāṃ bahutvāt teṣu ca pratyekaṃ sarvātmanā parisamāptatvāt. abhinnadeśatvāc cāvayavinā sarve 'vayavāḥ saṃyogideśenābhin-nadeśāḥ syuḥ. atha nābhinnadeśā iṣyante, evaṃ tarhy ekadravyo 'vayavī syād ity evamādayaḥ kārtsnyena vṛttau doṣās teṣām api tatra yadi sarvātmani vṛttir avayavinaṃ vyāpya tatas tasya niravayavatvāt sarveṣām ekadeśatā. tataś ca yatra pāṇiḥ, tatra pādādayo 'pīti. mecakekṣaṇaprasaṃgo vibhāgena grahaṇāsambhavāt. athaikadeśeṣu vṛttiḥ saivāvayavo 'navasthā. yeṣu hy avayavā ekadeśeṣu vartante,*

tair apy apareṣu vartitavyam, tair apy evam ity anavasthā. yac ca nīlaṃ tan notpalaṃ syāt, yad apy utpalaṃ tan na nīlam ityādi. yad evaṃ <u>*kārtsnyenaikadeśena vā vṛttir na saṃbhavati,*</u> *tasmān nāvayavyatiriktaḥ samudāyaḥ sidhyati.*

[122] *tad dhy arthayor vā bhavec <chabdayor vā>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1: *tad dhy arthayor vā bhaved iti.*

[254] Namely co-reference and the qualifier-qualified relation, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1: *tad ity ubhayaṃ sambadhyate.*

[255] I assume that the syntax of this clause has to be interpreted in the light of the previous sentence.

[123] *yady apy ekārthavṛttitā <jātiguṇayoś cārthayor> na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1-2: *yady apy ekārthavṛttitety etat ... na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam iti.*

[256] That is, there is no qualifier-qualified relation between them. In this context the term is equivalent to *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ.*

[124] *yady api hi <nīlaguṇotpalajātyor ekatra dravye vṛtteḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhavet, na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1: *yady api hītyādinā vyācaṣṭe;* Ms B 213b1-2 q.v. below no. 258.

[257] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b1-2: <u>*ekatra dravye dvayor api samavāyād upapadyate sāmānādhikaraṇyam, jātiguṇayor na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ:*</u> "Even if co-reference is justified because they both inhere in the same substance, a general property and an quality are not related as qualifier and qualified."

[125] *na hi.* Qu. Ms B 213b2.

[258] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b2: *etena parasparaṃ sambandhābhāvam āha. etac ca "na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam"* (PS V:19b) *ity asya vivaraṇam. yeṣāṃ parasparaṃ sambandho nāsti na teṣāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ, ghaṭapaṭādivat. nāsti ca jāti-guṇayoḥ parasparaṃ sambandhaḥ:* "Thereby he explains the absence of a mutual relation; and this is the explication of the statement "there is no general-particular property relation between them" (PS V:19b). [General and particular properties] that have no mutual relation are not related as qualifier and qualified like a pot and cloth [are not related as qualifier and qualified]; and a general property and a quality do not have a mutual relation."

[126] *tadvatoḥ.* Qu. Ms B 213b5.

[259] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b4-5: *kathaṃ punas tadvator ity ucyate. yāvataikam eva tad dravyam ubhayaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭam. ekasyāpi guṇabhedād bhedam āśrityaivam uktam ity adoṣaḥ:* "However, why is the expression "of the two property possessors" used, in so far as this substance is one only, being qualified by both qualifiers? It is used in this way with reference to the difference [of the qualifiers] because although it [viz. the substance] is one, it has different properties."

[260] Cf. *'jug pa* V (DC conj. *ldan pa* sic) : om. K.

[261] The translation of the prodosis is conjectural as K and V are confused, diverging in terms of syntax and vocabulary, cf. *de*[1] *daṅ ldan pa'i don* K (cf. *tadvatoḥ* 19d) : *spyi'i* (sic) *don la* V.
[1]*de* conj. : om. K.

[127] *dravyayor anyatrāvṛtteḥ*[1]. Qu. Ms B 213b3.
[1]Cf. *gźan la 'jug pa'i rdzas dag la* V : *rdzas daṅ yon tan dag gźan du mi 'jug pa'i phyir* K.

[262] That is, they do not have any other locus than the one in which they are already resident, cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b3-4: *yasmāj jātiguṇaviśiṣṭayor dravyayor nāparam adhikaraṇam asti yatra bhedena*[1] *varteyātām. ata ekatra vṛttyabhāvād digākāśayor iva nāsti sāmānādhikaraṇyam iti:* "Because two substances that are qualified by a general property and a quality do not have another locus, in which they might reside separately." Therefore, since they do not reside in one and the same [thing] they are not co-referential in the same way as a quarter of the sky and the sky."
[1]°*ena* conj. : *bhede* Ms : om. T.

[128] *dvayor ekasya vā sāmānyaviśeṣavattvāyogāt.* Qu. Ms B 213b5-6.

[263] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b6: *na hi nīladravyasya bhramarāder utpaladravyasya ca sāmānyaviśeṣavattvam asti. ato nānayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā, jātidvayavat. ekasya yatra jātiguṇau saha vartete, na hi tad eva tasya sāmānyaṃ viśeṣo vā bhavati. ato 'trāpi nāsti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo yathaikasya ghaṭasya:* "For an indigo-blue substance like a bee and the substance lotus do not possess the general property [lotusness] and the particular property [blueness]. Therefore the two are not related as qualifier and qualified, like a couple of general properties. The same [substance] in which the general property and the quality reside together is not the general property or the quality of one of them. Therefore there is no qualifier-qualified relation in this case either, like [there is no qualifier-qualified relation] of one pot."

[264] Cf. *de ltar na re źig don la gñis srid pa ma yin no* V : *de ltar re źig* sic K (text corresponding to *don la gñis srid pa ma yin no* V is missing).

[129] *atyantabhinnau*[1] *hi <śabdau jātiguṇābhidhāyakau, tasmāt tayoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms Ḃ 213b7: *atyantabhinnau hīti.*
[1]Cf. *śin tu tha da pa ni* V : *gźan la* (sic) *tha dad pa* K.

[265] The syntactic function of the particle *hi* is in this case equivalent to *yasmāt*.

[266] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 213b7-214a1: *sāmānyaviśeṣayor bhedo 'sti tadatadviṣayatayā, nātyantam. atas tadvyavacchedāyātyantagrahaṇam.*

[267] Cf. *de'i phyir*[1] *gźi mthun pa yod pa ma yin no* K : *de yaṅ yod pa ma yin no. de dag gi gźi mthun pa la yaṅ* V.

[1]Read *de'i phyir de dag gi.*

268 Cf. *de'i sgra dag la yaṅ* V : *de'i sgra dag kyaṅ* K.

269 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a1-2: *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo 'pi jātiguṇavācinoḥ śabdayor nopapadyate. arthadvārako hi tayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ. tadarthayoś ca jāti-guṇayor na kaścanābhisambandhaḥ:* "A qualifier-qualified relation between two words that denote a general property and a quality is not justified. For the qualifier-qualified relation of the two [words] is caused by [their] referents. And there is no relation between their two referents viz. the general property and the quality."

270 Cf. *de dag med do* K : om. V.

271 Cf. *rigs* V : *rdzas* K.

272 Cf. *rigs* (em. : K *rdzas*) *daṅ yon tan tsam rjod par byed pa ñid la* K : *rigs daṅ yon tan tsam brjod pa ñid yin no* V.

[130] *tulyātulyaṃ prasajyate.* Qu. Ms B 214a2.

273 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a 2-3: *tulyaśabdo 'traikaparyāyaḥ.*[1] *ekam anekaṃ vādhi-karaṇaṃ prasajyata ity arthaḥ. tataś ca sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ samānam evādhikaraṇaṃ na bhavatīti kṛtvā:* "The word 'similar' is in this context a synonym of one. The meaning is this: The [absurd] consequence is that the substance is [either] one or many. And therefore there is no co-reference on the grounds that the substance is not the same."
[1]°*aḥ* em. : °*a* Ms

274 Cf. *gaṅ gi phyir* K : *gal te* V.

275 Cf. *sgra dag gis* (em. : *gi* K) *yon tan daṅ rigs* (em. : *rdzas* K) *kyis* (em. : *kyi* K) *khyad par can rdzas gcig brjod par bya ba* K : *rigs daṅ yon tan gyi sgra dag rdzas kyi khyad pa gcig la brjod pa* V.

[131] *atulyatvāvivakṣā cet.* Qu. Ms B 214a3.

[132] <*yadi manyate: sambandhikṛtabhedāvivakṣāyāṃ*> *tulyatvaṃ tāvad upādāya sāmānādhikaraṇyam bhaviṣyati.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms 214a4-5: <u>*tulyatvaṃ tāvad upādāya sāmānādhikaraṇyam bhaviṣyati.*</u>

276 The opponent objects that what defines the similarity (*tulyatvam*) of the substance to which the words 'blue' and 'lotus' refer is the fact that the speaker does not intend to refer to the difference that is caused by the relata viz. the general properties blueness and lotusness, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a3-5: *samānāsamānādhikaraṇa-sambhave samānam adhikaraṇam āśritya sāmānādhikaraṇyam ucyate vidhinā sāmānādhikāraṇyavacanāt. na hi bhinnam adhikaraṇaṃ pratiṣidhyate, kiṃ tarhy abhinnaṃ vidhīyate. tena tāvanmātravivakṣayā tulyatvaṃ tāvad*[1]*upādāya sāmā-nādhikaraṇyam bhaviṣyati. yas tu vastunaḥ sambandhikṛto bhedaḥ, sa vivakṣayā-nupasthāpitatvād na bhinnādhikaraṇatvāya kalpata ity aparasyābhiprāyam āviṣ-*

karoti: "If there is the possibility that the substance is either the same or not the same one speaks about co-reference with reference to the same substance because co-reference is expressed in an affirmative form. For it is not denied that the substance is different, but rather is is prescribed that it is not different. Therefore since only that much is intended to be expressed, there will be co-reference based upon such similarity. But the difference of referent that is caused by the relatum [i.e., the general property] does not effect that the substance is different because it is not presented according to the intention [of the speaker]. In this way he shows the opponent's opinion."

[1]Notice the wrong punctuation *'dra ba ñid de, de srid la brten nas* T.

[133] *yatrāpi hi.* Qu. Ms B 214a6.

277 The opponent continues arguing that the same principle holds even on the *apoha* theory, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a6: *apohapakṣe 'py eṣa nyāya āśrayaṇīya iti darśayati.*

278 Cf. T 182,26ff: "The meaning is 'because they are the causes of a cognition that appear as having the same reference (*sāmānādhikaraṇābhāsabuddhihetutvāt)'. There is a minor gap in Ms corresponding to T 182,26-28, after which Ms continues at B 214a6-7: ... *śabdopajanitā darśayati. tanmātram āśritya tvayāpi sāmānādhikaraṇyavyavasthā kriyata iti.*

[134] *tulyākārabuddhihetutvāt.* Qu. Ms B 214a6: *tulyākārabuddhihetutvāt*[1].

[1]°*tvāt* conj. (cf. *blo mtshuṅs pa'i rgyu yin pa'i <phyir>*[2] K : *blo mtshuṅs pa'i rgyu yod pa ñid* [sic] V) : *tulyākārabuddhi* Ms (some lines are missing, cf. *blo rnam pa mtshuṅs pa'i rgyu ñid kyi phyir źes pa* T). For the reading *tulyākārabuddhihetu°* which is not corroborated by K and V, cf. expressions like *bhinnākārā buddhi* and *abhinnākārā buddhiḥ* in Dharmakīrti's PVV: 65,25f: *tad ekam anaṃśaṃ vastu kathaṃ bhinnākārābhir buddhibhir viṣayīkriyate;* 39,15: *kevalam abhinnākārā buddhir utpadyate;* 55,7: *kathaṃ tāsv abhinnākārā buddhir iti.* One cannot therefore exclude the possibility that *ākāra* has been interpolated in the light of Dharmakīrti's usage.

[2]*phyir* conj. (cf. *rgyu ñid kyi phyir* T) : om. KV.

279 Cf. *yod du zin kyaṅ* V : *med pa ñid ma yin gyi* K.

280 Cf. *mi tshuṅs pa bkod pa ste* K : *'di ni mi zad par brgal ba ste* V.

[135] *tatra śabdavyāparaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b1-2: *tatraiva nīlotpalaśabdavyāparo.*

[136] *ubhayavyudāsānugṛhīte. tanmātrasya vivakṣā prayujyate.* Restored, cf. Ms 214a7: *ubhayavyudāsānugṛhīta iti;* Ms B 214b1: *tanmātrasyaiva vivakṣā prayujyate.*

281 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214a7-214b1: *ubhayavyudāso 'nīlānutpalavyāvṛttiḥ. sā ca vyāvṛttimataḥ paramārthato nānyeti. tad evānīlānutpalavyāvṛttaṃ nīlotpalākhyaṃ vastu tathocyate. tenānugṛhītaḥ.*[1] *anugrahaḥ*[2] *punas tasya bauddhasya śabdār-*

thasyopajana eva; cf. Manorathanandin's explanation at PVV 298,22: *nīlotpalam ity ubhayavyāvṛttiviśiṣṭaikavastuvyavasāyikāyā buddher anurodhataḥ,* ad PV I 131-32ab: *vicchedaṃ sūcayan ekam apratikṣipya vartate yadānyaṃ tena sa vyāpta ekatvena ca bhāsate sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syāt, tadā buddhyanurodhataḥ.* TS 1097: *nīlotpālaśabdebhyo ekam evāvasīyate anīlānutpālādibhyo vyāvṛttaṃ pratibim-bakam.*

[1]T punctuates wrongly: *des rjes su bzuṅ źiṅ phan btags pa ni.*

[2]*anu°* em. : *jānu° Ms*

282 That is to the exclusion of particular distinctive properties like *mukulatva,* cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b1-2: *nānyeṣām mukulatvādīnām.*

283 The apprehension of the meaning of the expression 'blue lotus' only presupposes the combined exclusions of the neganda of 'blue' and 'lotus' viz. 'non-blue', and 'non-lotus', it is not assisted by other exclusions like the exclusion of the neganda of 'lotus bud', and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b1: *tatraiva nīlotpalaśabda-vyāparo, na mukulādivyudāsānugṛhīta iti.*

[137] *sambandhikṛte tv <viśeṣe 'vivakṣite >, tad vastu kathaṃ vācyam.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b2: *sambandhikṛte tv iti;* Ms B 214b2-3, q.v. below no. 285.

284 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b2-3: *nīlotpalaśabdau hi nīlaguṇotpalajātibhyāṃ vyavac-chinna eva vastuni tannibandhanau pravṛttau. tatra yadi viśeṣaṇakṛto viśeṣo na vivakṣyate, <anarth?>arūpaṃ*[1] *tad vastu kathaṃ vācyam. na hi vastunaḥ svato nīlotpalādisvabhāvatā bhavatīty asaṃvyavahāryam eva syāt:* "For the words 'blue' and 'lotus' are applied to an object as defined by the quality blue and the general property lotus, having these as their cause. If in this case the difference that is caused by the qualifiers is not intended to be expressed, how could this thing be denotable, having a form which is not the referent? For the thing does not *per se* have the nature of a blue lotus, etc. Thus it could not be made subject of verbal designation."

[1]*don med pa'i ṅo bo'i* T.

[138] *gavāśvasamānatā.* Qu. Ms B 214b3.

285 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b3-4: *yadi śabdaviṣayīkṛtasyāpi viśeṣasyāvivakṣā gaur aśva ity atrāpi samānatā syāt:* "If the difference is not intended to be expressed although it is made the object of the word, there would be similarity even in the case of [the entities called] 'cow' and 'horse'."

286 *yod pa* V : *rta ñid* K would indicate that the translators of V read *astitva* for *aśvatva.*

[139] *<tasya vastuno> 'nabhidheyatvena <samānateti gavāśva iti> nīlotpalādivat sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅgaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b4-5: *anabhidheya-tveneti*[1] *... nīlotpalādivat sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅga iti.*

[1]*°eya°* em. : *°e°* Ms

[287] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b4-5: *yat tat sāmānyaviśeṣarahitaṃ vastumātraṃ tad avisayam eva śabdānāṃ saṃsargipadārthopapāditavastuviśeṣaviṣayatvāt. tataś ca gavāśvasya samānatā bhedābhāvaḥ syāt:* "The mere thing without a particular general property is not the referent of words because their object is a particular thing effected by an inherent object of reference [i.e., a general property]. And therefore there will be similarity of cow and horse, i.e., absence of difference [between them]."

[288] Cf Ms B 214b5-7: *evaṃ manyate: nīlotpalam ity atrāpi naiva kiṃcid ekam abhidheyam asti nīlaguṇotpalajātisamparkaprāptarūpabhedavyatirekeṇa nīlotpalasya rūpāntarābhāvāt. <a>tas tadāpy anabhidheyatvena vastusamānataiva sāmānādhikaraṇyahetuḥ. tad gavāśve 'py anabhidheyatvam aviśiṣṭam iti sāmānādhikaraṇyāpattiḥ:* "The idea is as follows: Also in the case of [the word] 'blue lotus' there is not a single denotable object because a blue lotus does not have another form apart from the particular form that obtains from a conjunction of the quality blue and the general property lotus. Therefore, even then the similarity of things as such is the cause of co-reference because of not being denotable. Therefore the not being denotable is not distinct even with respect to 'cow' and 'horse.' Thus their co-reference obtains [absurdly]."

[140] *tatrākṛtiviśeṣaś*[1] *cet.*[2] Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b7: *tatrākṛtiviśeṣaś ceti.*
[1] Cf. *khyad rnam pas* (sic) *yin* K : *bye brag tu ma* (sic) *byas* V. Both versions are impossible to construe.
[2] *cet* em. (cf. *gal te … śe* V : *źe na* K : *der rnam pa'i khyad par yin na* T 183,22) : *ceti* Ms

[289] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 214b7-215a1: *gotvāśvatvādisambandhibhedāhitaviśeṣāsam*[1]*bhavenāpi svata eva gavāśvasya viśeṣo 'sti, yadabhivyaktasya sāmānyasya gotvādeḥ śabdenopādānam. tato yuktam*[2] *etad yad gavāśve gotvāśvatvayor vivakṣitatvaṃ śabdena viṣayīkṛtatvāt. anyathā tadabhidhānam eva na syāt:* "Even because of the impossibility of a difference effected by the difference of the relata cowhood and horsehood, and so on, the difference between a horse and a cow exists *per se,* manifested by which the general property cowhood, and so on, is appropriated by the word. Therefore it is correct that cowhood and horsehood in a cow and a horse are intended to be denoted because the word takes them as its objects. Otherwise they could not be denoted at all."
[1]*°āsam°* em. (cf. *med par yaṅ* T) : *°asaṃ°* Ms
[2]*mi rigs* (= **ayuktam* sic) T.

[290] Cf. *gal te 'di snam du* V : om. K.

[291] The view that the manifestation of a given general property is due to the particular material shape of the object that manifests it, and to which its occurrence is restricted, is briefly mentioned by Helarāja Prakīrṇaprakāśa Vol I 94: 8-11 (on VP III.1:93-94); he attributes it to the Vaiśeṣikas (loc.cit. line one): *nanu ca sāpi* (scil. *jāti) katham anavayavena vyaktiṃ nānuyāyāt. tathā ca gavāśvādau sāṅkaryaprasaṅgaḥ. naitad evam, pratiniyatāśrayavṛttitvāt sāmānyānām. kim atra nimittam*

cet? viśiṣṭasaṃsthānayogitvaṃ vyaktīnām. anyo hy avayavasanniveśo gavām, anyas tv aśvānām iti gotvāśvatvayor ādhāraniyamasiddhiḥ.

[292] Cf. *dbyibs kyi khyad par* (= *saṃsthānaviśeṣa*) *rnam par* (= *ākṛti*) *brjod pas* K : *dbyibs kyi bye brag tu byas te* V, which is difficult to construe and must be based upon a flawed reading, cf. 21c *der bye brag tu ma* (sic) *byas te* V.

[293] Cf. *'di yod pa yin te* K : *yod par ma brjod do* V; for brjod V, cf. K, q.v. no. 291.

[141] *svasāmānyābhivyaktihetur* <*viśeṣas*>. *tatkṛte hi tayos tathābhidhāne katham avivakṣā.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 215a1: *svasāmānyābhivyaktihetur iti;* Ms B 215a3: *tatkṛte hi tayos tathābhidhāne katham avivakṣeti*; cf. quotation no. 296 below.

[294] Cf. PST Ms B 215a1-2: *anena tadastitvāvagater*[(1)] *nibandhanam āha. kāryaviśeṣāt saṃsthānam avayavasanniveśātmakam anumīyata ity arthaḥ. nanu cāśritadharmabheda evāyam. yathaiva hi gotvāśvatvādayaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣā vastva-vacchedahetutvād*[(2)] *anātmabhūtā vastunaḥ,*[(2)] *tathā saṃsthānam api. tathā ca tadupamarde vastvātmaivāvaśiṣyate. satyam etat. doṣāntarābhidhitsayā tv etad avyapekṣitam*[(4)]*:* "Hereby he formulates the cause for ascertaining its existence. The meaning is that due to a particular effect the [difference of material] shape whose nature consists in a collocation of parts is inferred. But surely this is only a difference of dependent properties. For in the exact same way as particular general properties such as cowhood and horsehood do not have status as essential natures of material objects (*vastu*) because they are causes of delimiting objects, so also the material shape; and thus, when it is destroyed nothing but the nature of a material object is left. This is true. However, this is not taken into consideration with a wish to present other problems."

[(1)] °*āva*<*ga*>*ter* em. : °*ā{y}vater* Ms

[(2)] T translates in accordance with Ms *sāmānyaviśeṣāvastvavacchedahetutvāt* as *spyi daṅ khyad par gyi dṅos po ma yin pa gcod pa'i rgyu ñid kyi phyir* which is meaningless in the context. T reflects a common translation error caused by *scriptura continua*.

[(3)] T 183,33 interprets gen. sg. *vastunaḥ* as nom. pl., cf. loc.cit. *dṅos po rnams.*

[(4)] *'di la bltos par byas pa* T 183,35 for *etad avyapekṣitam.*

[295] Cf. Ms 215a3-4: *saṃsthānaviśeṣakṛte gaur aśva ity evam abhidhāne sati katham bhedasyāvivakṣā. athavā* tatkṛte hi tayos tathābhidhāne[(1)] *iti dvivacanam evaitat. abhidhānaṃ śabdo 'bhidīyate 'neneti kṛtvā:* "When there is a denotation like 'cow' or 'horse' which is caused by difference of material shape, why would there be no intention to express the difference [of material shape]? Or rather, [in the phrase] "since the two denotations of these two in this way [viz. as 'cow' and 'horse', respectively] is caused by this [difference of material shape] [the expression *abhidhāne*] is definitely a dual form. A word is a 'denotation' (*abhidhānam*) on the grounds that it denotes."

[(1)] Cf. no. [141] above.

[142] *na tu nīlotpalatvavato*[(1)]*'rthasy<eti>*[(2)] *na tadvat sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ iti.* Restored, cf. Ms 215a4-5: *na tu nīlotpalatvavato 'rthasyetyādi.*

[(1)]*u tpa la daṅ sṅon po bźin no* V would indicate that the translators read °*vat* and interpreted it accordingly instead of *vato. u tpa la sṅon po la sogs pa'i don la* K shows no trace of the possessive suffix *vat.* Neither version reproduces the affix *tva,* although it is crucial for understanding the argument.

[(2)]Cf. *phyir* K and the syntactically analogous use of *tato* in the paraphrase of the argument at Ms B 215a5 below no. 297.

[296] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215a5: *nīlaguṇotpalajātiviśeṣamato*[(1)] *'rthasya na gavāśvavat saṃsthānabhedas tato na tadvad nīlotpalādiśabdavat sāmānādhikaraṇyam gavāśvā-diśabdānām:* "The referent that is possessed of the quality blueness and the particular general property lotusness has no difference of material shape like a cow and a horse. Therefore words like 'cow' and 'horse' are not co-referential in the same way as these viz. words like 'blue' and 'lotus'."

[(1)] °*viśeṣamato* em. : °*viśemato Ms*

[143] *anekākṛtisaṅkaraḥ.* Qu. Ms B 215a5-6.

[144] *ekasmin vastuni <anekasāmānyā>bhivyakter anekasaṃsthānasamāveśaḥ <syāt>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215a6: *yadi saṃsthānabhedād bhinnasāmānyā-bhivyaktir ekasmin vastuni ghaṭatvasattvadravyatvādyabhivyakter anekasamsthāna-samāveśaḥ prasajyate:* "If different general properties are manifested because of difference of material shape, it follows [absurdly] that many material shapes would co-occur in one entity because it manifests such general properties as potness, existence, and substanceness."

[145] *na ca dṛṣṭam.* Qu. Ms B 215a6.

[297] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215a7-215b1: *na hi dīrghaparimaṇḍalādīny ekatra samā-viṣṭāni. etena tadabhāvyavahārasiddhyai svabhāvānupalambham āha. caśabdo na ceṣṭam bhavato 'pīty arthadyotanāya*[(1)]*, ghaṭādyaikākārābhidhānapratyayā-bhāvaprasaṅgāt. na hy anekasaṃsthāne vastuni tadāyattayor abhidhānapratyayayor ekākāratvam upapadyate, tadvaśena vastunas tadrūpāvasāyābhāvaprasaṅgāt. Tas-mān na saṃsthānabhedād bhinnasāmānyābhivyaktir abhyupeyā:* "For being oblong and circular and so on are not collocated in one and the same thing. Therefore he mentions non-perception of their essential nature in order to prove its being treated as non-existent. The word 'and' is to clarify the meaning viz. that you too do not claim it because of the [absurd] consequence that the denotation and idea of a pot and so on that has a single form would be non-existent. For when an entity has a multitude of material shapes it is not justified that the denotation and the idea that are based upon this [entity] have a single form because the [absurd] consequence would be that the form of the entity could not be ascertained. Therefore one is not to assume that the manifestation of different general properties is due to difference of material shape."

[(1)] *arthadyotanāya* em. : *arthaḥ | dyotanāya Ms*

[146] *api ca <tulyam>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b1: *api cetyādi.*

[147] *<gavaśvādīnāṃ punaḥ> tulyātulyam adhikaraṇaṃ <syād> anabhidheyatvāt sattādivyañjakatvāc ca gotvādivyañjakatvāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b2-3: *idānīṃ tv <u>anabhidheyatvāt</u> <u>sattā</u>dravyatvā<u>divyañjakatvāc</u> <u>ca</u> tulyaṃ <u>gotvāśvatva-</u><u>vyañjakatvāc</u> cātulyam iti <u>tulyātulyam</u> <u>adhikaraṇam.</u>*

298 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b1-3: *pūrvaṃ gotvāśvatvābhyām*[1] *viśeṣo 'nabhidheyatvāc cāviśeṣa iti tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam uktam. idānīṃ tv anabhidheyatvāt sattā-dravyatvādivyañjakatvāc ca tulyaṃ gotvāśvatvavyañjakatvāc cātulyam iti tulyātul-yam adhikaraṇam:* "Previously the substance was said to be similar and dissimilar on the assumption that the difference is due to cowhood and horsehood, and the non-difference is due to not being the denotable object. Now, on the other hand, the substance is similar and dissimilar on the assumption (*iti*) that it is similar because of not being denotable, and because of manifesting existence and substanceness, and so on, and dissimilar because of manifesting cowhood and horsehood."
[1]*gotvāśvatvā°* em. (cf. *rta ñid* T) : *gotvā° Ms*

[148] *tatrāpy atulyatvāvivakṣāyāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅgaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b3: *<u>tatrāpy</u> <u>atulyatvāvivakṣāyāṃ</u> nīlotpalādivat <u>sāmānādhikaraṇya-</u><u>prasaṅga</u> iti.*

[149] *iṣṭe 'pi cābhāvaḥ.* Qu. Ms B 215b3.

[150] *yatrāpi.* Qu. Ms B 215b3.

[151] *yadi.* Qu. Ms B 215b3.

[152] *sāmānyabhedābhivyañjakatvāt*[1]. Qu. Ms B 217b2.
[1]*°bhedābhi°* em. (cf. *tha dad pa'i spyi mṅon par gsal bar byed pa'i phyir* K : *spyi tha dad par gsal bar byed pa yin pa'i phyir* V) : *°ā[bh]i° Ms* (cf. *spyi tha dad pa mṅon par gsal bar byed pa ñid kyi phyir* T).

[153] *tathā hi.* Qu. Ms B 215b3.

[154] *na vyaktir guṇakarmaṇoḥ.* Qu. Ms 215b4.

299 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b5: *yadi saṃsthānam eva sāmānyasyābhivyañjakam abhyupeyate, guṇatvakarmatvādīnām anabhivyaktiprasaṅgaḥ, teṣām asaṃsthāna-vattvāt:* "If it is assumed that the material shape alone manifests the general property, it has the [absurd] consequence that there is no manifestation of qualityness and actionness because they do not possess material shape."

[155] *<guṇakarmaṇor hy> asaṃsthānavattvāt <tadgatasāmānyā>nabhivyakti-prasaṅgaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b5: *<u>anabhivyaktiprasaṅgaḥ, teṣām</u> <u>asaṃsthānavattvāt.</u>*

[156] *bhedena svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvād dravyādiṣu bheda iti.* Qu. Ms B 217b3, cf. 215b6: *śaktibhedena.*

[300] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b6-7: *saṃsthānapakṣasya duṣṭatvāt tam utsṛjya pakṣāntaram avalambate: dravyaguṇakarmasu dravyatvādivyaktihetuḥ śaktiviśeṣo 'sti. tato na guṇakarmagatasāmānyānām abhivyaktidoṣaḥ:* "Since the theory of material is faulty he gives it up and clings to another theory, namely that there is a particular power in substances, qualities, and actions, which is the cause of manifestation of substanceness, etc. Therefore there is no problem concerning the manifestation of general properties included in quality and action." For the Vaiśeṣika concept of *śaktibheda,* cf. PBh § 381: *yathā kuṇḍadadhnoḥ saṃyogai-katve bhavaty āśrayāśrayibhāvaniyamaḥ, tathā dravyatvādīnām api samavāyaikatve 'pi vyaṅgyavyañjakaśaktibhedād ādhārādheyaniyamaḥ.* Mallavādi discusses this view at NC, cf. NCV 533,9ff. For the concept of *śakti,* cf. *Halbfass* 1992: 72f, and passim.

[301] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 215b7-216a1: *naitad evam anekāntāt. tathā hi ghaṭasyānekasāmānyavattvāt tadvyaktau śaktibhedo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ. tataś caikasyāpi śaktibhedadarśanāt, nālaṃ śaktibhedo bhedapratipādanāya:* "This is not the case because of uncertainty. That is, since a pot possesses many general properties difference of power is to be assumed with respect to their manifestation. And therefore difference of power is not sufficient for explaining difference [of substance and the rest] because even a single [substance] is observed to have different powers."

[157] <*gotvāśvatvayoḥ*> *kiṃkṛto viśeṣa iti* <*vaktavyam*>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a1: *kiṃkṛto viśeṣa iti.*

[302] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a1-2: *bhinnaṃ hi viśeṣaṇaṃ viśeṣyasya bhedaprati-pādanāyālam iti tayor eva bhedaṃ paryanuyuṅkte:* "For a distinct qualifier is sufficient for explaining the difference of the qualified. With this in mind he enquires about the difference between the two."

[158] *śābdānāṃ tāvad abhidhāyakaśabdakṛtaḥ. teṣāṃ hi yadṛcchāśabdeṣu viśe-ṣaḥ,*[1] *tadabhidheyatvāt*[2]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b3: *yathoktaṃ: śābdānāṃ tāvad abhidhāyakaśabdakṛta iti;* 216a2: *teṣāṃ hi yadṛcchāśabdeṣv iti.*
[1]Cf. *brjod par bya ba ñid las* (cf. the syntactical parallel *gavādiśabda-vācyatayaiva,* q.v. below no. 304) K : *raṅ raṅ gi sgras* (sic) *brjod par bya ba de dag* V.
[2]Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a2-3, q.v. no. 304 below.

[303] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a2-3: *svarūpamātranimittapravṛttayo yadṛcchāśabdā ḍitthaśabdādayaḥ. gavādiśabdāś ca gotvādiṣu bāhyapravṛttinimittābhāvād yadṛc-chāśabdāḥ. tadabhidheyatvam eva*[1] *teṣāṃ viśeṣaḥ. gotvādayo hi yadṛcchāśabda-viṣayā gavādiśabdavācyatayaiva vastvantarād viśiṣyanta iti śābdā manyante:* "Words like *'ḍittha'* are arbitrary terms whose cause of application is their mere own form. And words like 'cow' are arbitrary terms with regard to cowhood, etc. because they are without external cause of application. Their difference is the mere fact that they are their denotable objects. For [general properties] like cowhood that are the objects of arbitrary terms are differentiated from other [general] entities (*vastvantarāt*) merely by being the denotable objects of words like 'cow'. This is what the grammarians think."

The only property that characterizes general properties is that they are entities (*vastutva*) devoid of any other distinguishing property. Since general properties as entities per definition are devoid of other general properties (*niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyāni*), their denotation is without cause of application. Consequently the semantic condition for their denotation is similar to that of arbitrary terms whose cause of application is their own form (*svarūpa*).

It has not been possible to trace an explicit statement of the view which Dignāga's opponent mentions, to Sanskrit grammatical literature, although related views of the function of *svarūpa* as cause of application, when denoting a general property, are taken for granted by Bhartṛhari, cf., e.g., VP III.1:6f; Kaiyaṭa at Mahā-bh-Pr IV p. 341,11-13: *gavādayo yadā jātimātravācinas tadā tebhyaḥ śabdasvarūpe pratyayaḥ. tathā hi arthe jātau*[2] *śabdasvarūpam adhyaste, yo gośabdaḥ sa evārtha iti, tataḥ śabdasvarūpam eva tatra pravṛttinimittam, nānyat:* "When [words] like "cow" denote the mere general property, the (*bhāva*) affix [cf. A V.1:119] serves to denote the own form of the words when introduced after these. That is, the own form of the word is superimposed upon the general property in the referent at the thought "the word 'cow' is the same as the referent." Therefore only the own form of the word is the cause of application to it, nothing else."

For Dignāga's treatment of the semantic conditions of arbitrary terms, cf. § 64 and no. 597.

After explaining the view of the grammarians, Jinendrabuddhi addresses the objection that the difference between '*ḍittha*,' etc. exists *per se,* cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a3-5: *nanu ca ḍitthādīnāṃ svato 'py asti viśeṣaḥ. śabdamātrāhite hi viśeṣe 'nāhitasaṃjñayos tadaharajātayor viśeṣo nopapadyeta. naiṣa doṣaḥ. śabdavyāpāre bhedo 'yaṃ cintyate, na tu darśane*[3]. *na ca śabdavyāpāre ḍitthāder viśeṣaṇam aparam asti:* "Certainly the difference between '*ḍittha*,' etc. also exists *per se.* For if the difference were merely effected by the word, it would not be justified that there is difference between two [persons] born at the same day, who have not yet been given a name. This is not a problem. The difference is conceived with regard to the function of the word, not with regard to observation. And with regard to the function of the word its qualification is not other than that of [proper names like] '*ḍittha*,' etc."

[1]*°tvam eva* em. : *°(tvaṃ e?)va* Ms

[2]Cf. the use of the term *arthajāti* in Bhartṛhari's VP I 15a, III.1:6c, 8c, 11a which denotes the "general property inherent in a referent upon which the general property inherent in a word is superimposed as its cause of application;" cf. Helarāja VPPr Vol. I p. 8,1-3 ad VP III.1: 8cd): *niḥsāmānyāni sāmānyānīty arthajātīnāṃ svato jātirahitatve tatkāryaṃ śabdapratyayānuvṛttilakṣaṇaṃ śabdārthayoḥ so 'yam ity abhedena sambandhāc chabdasamavāyinī jātir arthenādhyāropitābhedā sampā-dayantī tadātmanā sampadyata ity upacaryate.*

[3]*na tu darśane* conj. (*ma mthoṅ ba la ni ma yin no* (?) T) : *na utpaladarśane°* Ms T would seem to presuppose the reading *adarśane* which makes no sense in the present context.

[159] *bhedo vācakabhedāc cet*[1]. Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a5: *cetyādi.*
[1]*cet* conj (cf. *źe na* K : *śes na* V) : *ca* Ms (*ces* T).

304 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 216a5: *śabdasyaivāntar bhedo nārthasyeti yāvat.*

[160] *aviśiṣṭe hi vastuni abhidhāyakena śabdenābhedopacārād na vaktavyaṃ viśiṣṭasāmānyābhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭāḥ. abhidhānabhedād api dṛṣṭo bhedaś caitrādivad <iti cet>. na, tasyaiva parīkṣyatvād, ekasyāpi <cā>*[(1)]*nekaparyā-yaśabdhābhidheyatvāt.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 216a5-6: <u>*aviśiṣṭe hi vastuni abhidhāyakena śabdenābhedopacārāt*</u>[(2)] *tataś ca* <u>*na vaktavyaṃ viśiṣṭasāmānyā-bhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭā iti;*</u> 217b3-4: *abhidhānabhedād api dṛṣṭo bhedaś caitrādivad iti;* 216a6: *na tasyaiva parīkṣyatvād iti;* 216a7: *ekasyāpītyādi;* 216b3: *ekasyāpi anekaparyāyaśabdābhidheyatvād iti.*
[(1)]*ca* conj.
[(2)]*°ābhed°* em. (cf. *tha mi dad pa ñe bar btags pa'i phyir* T) : *°ena bhed°* Ms

[305] Cf. PST Ms B 216b6-7: *tasyaivābhidhānakṛtasya bhedasya caitrādiṣv api gotvādiṣv iva parīkṣyatvāt: kiṃ caitramaitrayoḥ svato bhedaḥ, āhosvid abhidhāna-bhedād iti:* "Because the difference that is made by the denotation is subject to criticism also in the case of Caitra, like in the case of cowhood, etc.: Is the difference between Caitra and Maitra *per se* or is it due to difference of denotation?"

[306] Cf. PST Ms B 216b7: *paryāyaśabdair anekāntād na tato bhedaḥ pratīyate ity arthaḥ.*

[161] *tatrārtha iva vicāraḥ*[(1)]. Qu. Ms B 216a7-216b1.
[(1)]Cf. *de la ni de bźin du rnam par brtag go* V : *de kho na la rnam par* (sic) K.

[307] Cf. *'on kyaṅ spyi las bye brag tu byas par zad na* V : *spyi daṅ khyad par gyis byas pas yin no* K.
    The general property of any given referent (*artha*) or speech unit (*śabda*), its *sāmānyalakṣaṇa,* is constituted by exclusion of other referents or speech units, the referent or speech unit being the substrate of exclusion of other referents or speech units, cf. PSV V 36d with note 460.

[308] Cf. PST Ms B 216b1-4: *gośabdāśvaśabdayoḥ* <u>*kiṃkṛto viśeṣa*</u> *ity ukte 'vaśyam*[(1)] *vaktavyaṃ svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvena viśeṣa iti. tathā hi gośabdo gośabdatvasya vyañjako 'śvaśabdas tv aśvaśabda<tva>syeti. evaṃ yadi bhinna-sāmānyābhivyañjakatvād gavādiśabdabheda iṣyate, svato 'bhedaprasaṅgaḥ. tathā hi sāmānyaviśeṣeṇa gośabdatvādinā sahābhedopacārāt, upacārato bhedo, na tu vāstavaḥ. ekasyāpi ca gośabdasya śabdatvagośabdatvaguṇatvādīnāṃ vyañjakatvād anekaprasaṅgaḥ. athābhidhānakṛto viśeṣaḥ, tad ayuktaṃ* "ekasyāpy anekaparyā-yaśabdābhidheyatvād" *ity eṣo* <u>*'rtha*</u>[(2)] <u>*iva vicāraḥ;*</u> *athavā* <u>*tatrārtha iva vicāra iti*</u> *śabdasāmānye:* <u>*kiṃkṛto 'sya bheda iti*</u> *pūrvavad vicāraḥ kartavyaḥ:* "When it is asked how the difference between the word 'cow' and the word 'horse' is caused, it is necessarily to be answered that the difference is due to their manifesting their own general properties. That is, the word 'cow' manifests [the general property] cow-wordness, the word 'horse', on the other hand, manifests [the general property] horse-wordness. Thus, if it is claimed that words like 'cow' are different because they manifest different general properties it follows [absurdly] that the difference is not *per se.* That is, on account of transfer [of the word 'cow' to cow-wordness] in the form of identity with the particular general property cow-wordness, the difference is due to transfer, but it is not a substantial one. And because a single word 'cow' manifests [the general properties] wordness, cow-wordness, qualityness,

and so on, it follows [absurdly] that it is many. If, on the other hand, the difference is caused by the denotation, this is not justified because one [referent] is denotable by many synonyms. Thus the analysis is like that of the referent. Or [alternatively], in this case the statement "the analysis is like that of the referent" means like that of the general property of the word: the analysis is to be performed like before [asking] 'whereby is the difference caused'"?

(1) *'vaśyaṃ* em. : *'vaśya°* Ms

(2)em. : *arthaḥ | iva* Ms

[162] *sa tu nābhidhāyakaḥ.* Qu. Ms B 216b4.

309 Cf. PST Ms B 216b4-5: *svalakṣaṇaṃ pratyakṣyasya viṣayaḥ. tac cāsādha-raṇatvād nārthena saha prāg dṛṣṭam. na ca pūrvam agṛhītasambandhasya vācaka-tvaṃ samasti:* "The object of immediate sensation is the individual [word]. And this has not been observed previously together with its referent because it is not common. And a word whose connection with [its referent] has not been appre-hended does not denote." For the implications of this discussion, cf. no. 401 below.

[163] *śākaṭikā<der> <bāla>prayuktasya ca <ekārthābhidhāyakatvāt>.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 216b5: *śākaṭikādiprayuktasya* (?) *ceti = śiṅ rta la sogs pas rab tu sbyar ba yaṅ* T. This quotation appears to be defective, cf. *blun po la sogs pa rnams kyi sbyor ba ni don cig brjod par byed pa'i phyir ro* K : *śiṅ rta la sogs pa rmoṅs pa rnams kyi tha sñad kyaṅ don rjod par byed pa ma yin pa'i phyir te* V. KV make it possible to identify the following items: *śiṅ rta la sogs pa* V corresponding to *śākaṭikādi* : om. K; *blun po la sogs pa rnams kyi sbyor ba* K : *rmoṅs pa rnams kyi tha sñad* V corresponding to **bālaprayuktasya*(1). This would suggest the following restoration of the phrase: *śākaṭikāder bālaprayuktasya ca ekārthābhidhāyakatvāt.*

(1)This term is used by Bhartṛhari in a similar context at VPV I 232,5, q.v.

310 For this word, cf. pw, MW s.v.

311 Dignāga points out that even the perceptible difference between the usage of educated people and that of children and uneducated ones does not involve any difference of referent. His argument no doubt reflects similar discussions in Bhartṛhari's VP; cf., e.g., VPV I 228,7ff where Bhartṛhari addresses the question of the denotation of so-called corrupted speech forms (*apabhraṃśa*), among which he mentions *gāvī* and *goṇī* that are used to denote the object to which educated (*śiṣṭa*) people refer as *'gauḥ'*. Since Dignāga claims that only the general speech form (*sāmānya*), i.e., the word type, denotes, the question arises as to how he understands the difference between forms like *goṇī* and *gauḥ* in terms of the alleged denotative function of the general property. Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's statement at Ms B 216b5-7: *yam evārthaṃ śiṣṭaprayuktaḥ śabda āha, tam evāśiṣṭaprayukto 'pi. yadi ca svalakṣaṇabhedena bhidyamānāḥ śabdās tasya tasyārthasya vācakāḥ syuḥ, tato goṇyādiśābdaiḥ sa evārtho na gamyeta, gamyate ca. tasmād viśeṣo na vācakaḥ, sāmānyam eva vācakam. evam aśiṣṭaprayuktād api śabdāt tasyaivārthasyāvagatir bhavati sāmānyasyābhinnatvād, nānyathā:* "The word that is used by an uneducated person denotes the same referent even when it is used by an educated one. If the words that differ because of difference of the individual [words] were to denote this or that referent, the same referent would not be understood from words like *goṇī*,

etc. Yet it is understood. Therefore the particular does not denote, only the general property denotes. Thus a word, even when it is used by an uneducated person, causes understanding of the same referent because the general property [of the word] is the same, but not otherwise."

As it appears Jinendrabuddhi's commentary is not particularly clear on the question of how the *sāmānya* is involved in the denotation of the word *goṇī*, but since forms like *goṇī* are described as particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*), it seems natural to conclude that he assumes that the denotation of the so-called *apabhraṃśa* forms is mediated through the general property of the alleged correct form viz. *gauḥ*. This view apparently presupposes that *apabhraṃśa* forms are ultimately based upon so-called correct (*sādhu*) forms (cf. VPV I 229,1f), incorrect forms denotingby means of inference of the correct underlying form, cf. VP I:141ab: *te* (scil. *apabhraṃśāḥ*) *sādhuṣv anumānena pratyayotpattihetavaḥ;* VP III.3:30: *asādhur anumānena vācakaḥ kaiścid iṣyate, vācakatvāviśeṣe vā niyamaḥ puṇyapāpāyoḥ.* Cf. Helarāja ad loc. VPP Vol. I 143,12ff (quoting on p. 144,5 the relevant passage from Mahā-bh Vol I 8,21: *evam ihāpi samānāyām arthagatau śabdena cāpaśabdena dharmaniyamaḥ kriyate, śabdenaivārtho 'bhidheyo nāpaśabdenety evaṃ kriyamāṇam abhyudayakāri bhavatīti*); cf. the important passage at VPV I 72,2-3: *viśiṣṭapratyayotpattau ca pratyakṣeṇa vyavasthāṃ prakalpayati. anumānapakṣeṇa tu sambandhi-sambandhād akṣinikocādivad apabhraṃśāḥ pratyayaviśeṣv aṅgabhāvam upagacchanti;* cf. Paddhati ad loc.: *sādhuśabdā arthasya sambandhād viśiṣṭaṃ jñānaṃ janayantīti aviśeṣam āha pratyakṣapakṣeṇa iti: yathā pratyakṣam avyavahitaṃ jñānāntareṇa svaviṣayam bodhayati tathā sādhuśabdasambandhaḥ śabdāntarāvyavahitaḥ. anumānapakṣeṇa dvitīyaḥ: yathā liṅgaṃ svajñānavyavadhānena liṅginam anumāpayati. yathā vā anumeyajñānaṃ sāmānyākāravyavadhānena svalakṣaṇam. apabhraṃśā iti: tathā goṇyādayaḥ śabdā gośabdavyavadhānena. yatra śrotur evaṃ buddhir bhavati gośabdo 'syābhidhitsataḥ pramādād aśakter vā goṇīśabdam uccārayati;* VPV I 233,1-4; VP III.3:55: *rūpaṇavyapadeśābhyāṃ laukike vartmani sthitau, jñānam praty abhilāpaṃ ca sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau.* This verse is the third in Dignāga's Traikālyaparīkṣā; cf. Helarāja VPP Vol. I: 163: 9-10: *yathā bālo vikalpayaty artham abhidhatte ca, evam paramārthadarśanā vidvāṃso 'pi.* The problem of the relation between correct and incorrect forms is addressed by Dharmakīrti at VN I 44,12ff, cf. VN II 82ff.

[312] Children's usage involves morpho-phonetic distortion, cf. *ambāmbā iti prayoktavye bāla ambaketi prabhāṣate,* Paddhati 232,13 ad VP I:179.

[313] Cf. *bye brag de dag las* V : om. K.

[314] Dignāga quotes VS X.11: *śiraḥ pṛṣṭham udaram pāṇir iti tadviśeṣebhyaḥ,* for which, cf. Candrānanda ad loc.: *svasāmānyaviśeṣebhyaḥ śirastvādibhyo yeṣu jñānaṃ jāyate* (*te*) *śiraādayo 'vayavā ity arthaḥ;* Ms B 216b7- 217a1: *śira iti jñānaṃ yāvat pāṇir iti yaj jñānaṃ tad avayavasaṃsthānaviśeṣebhya ity arthaḥ. tathā hi yadā śirastvaṃ svāśrayasaṃsthānenābhivyajyate, tadā tataḥ śira iti jñānam bhavati:* "The meaning is this: The cognition 'head' up to the cognition 'hand' is due to the differences of of the parts. That is, when the property headhood is manifested by the of its own substrate, the cognition 'head' is due to that [viz. headhood]."

[315] Cf. *de dag gi ltar na yaṅ* V : *de yi khyad par de dag kyaṅ* K.

[164] *vyañjakavyaktito bhede <prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayaṃ>*[1]. Restored, cf. PSṬ
Ms B 217a1: *vyañjakavyaktito bheda ityādi.*
[1]For 23b, cf. ŚV Ākṛti° 50b: *prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayam,* no. 317 below.

[316] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a1-2: *vyañjakadravyakṛtā vyaktiḥ svasāmānyasvarūpapra-
kāśanam. tato bhede*[1] *sāmānyasyeṣyamāna itaretarāśrayaṃ vyākhyānaṃ prāpnoti,
anyatarasyāpy apratītatvāt. tataś ca na parasparabhedapratipādanāyālaṃ*[2]: "The
manifestation that is effected by the manifesting substance means the act of bringing
to light the own form of its own general property. If the difference of the general
property is claimed to be due to that, the explanation becomes necessarily circular
because [the difference] of the other is not cognized. And therefore it is not capable
of explaining their mutual difference."
Dignāga's argument is reproduced in similar terms by Kumārila in ŚV Ākṛti°
49b-50b, although with a different intention: *vyañjakasya tu kiṃkṛtaḥ │ bhedo
hastyādipiṇḍebhyaḥ? svataś cet, iha tatsamam ║ vyaṅgyajātiviśeṣāc cet, prāptam
anyonyasaṃśrayam│.*
[1]°*e* em. : °*a* Ms
[2] *na ... *°*āyālaṃ* em. (for *alam* 'capable of', 'able to' constructed with the
dative, cf. A II.3 [13+]: 16, cf. *nus pa ma yin* T) : °*āyāṃ* Ms

[165] *dravyasvabhāvaḥ ka iti? svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvam. sāmānyasvabhāvaḥ
ka iti? svadravyābhivyaṅgyatvam.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a2-3:
*dravyasvabhāvaḥ ka ityādinā tad itaretarāśrayatvaṃ darśayati. dravyasvabhāvaḥ
ka ity uktiḥ svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvaṃ goḥ svabhāva ity ākhyāyate. Sāmānya-
svabhāvaḥ ka ity uktiḥ svadravyābhivyaṅgyatvam.*

[166] *svabhāvānaikataikasya bahuvyakteḥ parasparam.* Qu. Ms B 217a4.

[317] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a4: *dravyasya sattādeś cānekasvabhāvatvaṃ syāt:* "The
substance and [the property] existence, and so on, would have many intrinsic
natures."

[318] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a5 on 23cd: *bahūnāṃ vyakter bahubhiś ca vyakter iti.*

[319] Cf. *maṅ po gsal bar byed pa'i phyir daṅ maṅ po rnams kyis gsal ba'i phyir
maṅ po gsal ba yin no* K : *gsal ba maṅ po źes bya ba ni maṅ po rnams kyi gsal ba
daṅ maṅ po rnams kyi gsal ba ste* V.

[167] *dravyād dhi <bahusāmānyasya> sattāder <vyaktiḥ>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B
217a5: *dravyād dhīti ... sattāder iti.*

[320] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a5-6: *ādiśabdena ghaṭatvapārthivatvādīni gṛhyante.*

[321] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217a5: *ghaṭādikāt.*

[322] Cf. PSṬ on the use of *ādi* no. 321 above.

[168] *sarvathā ca guṇasambandhabhedāc ca śaktibhedāc cābhidhānabhedāc ca bhedābhyupagame <ekasyāpy> anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b1-3: *sarvathā cetyādinā ... guṇasambandhabhedād iti ...* bhedābhyupagame *drav-yasyānekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. śaktibhedāt ... abhidhānabhedāt.*

[323] The term *guṇa* is here as elsewhere used of the general properties that are supposed to inhere in substances, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b2: *guṇaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣa ihābhipretaḥ. tena sambandhaḥ. tadbhedāt.* Jinendrabuddhi refers to PS V:22a$_2$ at Ms 217b2: *yathoktaṃ: sāmānyabhedābhivyañjakatvāt.*

[324] Jinendrabuddhi refers to PSV V:22b, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b3: *yathoktaṃ: śaktibhedena svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvād dravyādiṣu bheda iti.*

[325] Jinendrabuddhi refers to PSV V:22cd, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b3: *yathoktaṃ: śābdānāṃ tāvad abhidhāyakaśabdakṛta iti. yathoktam: abhidhānabhedād api dṛṣṭo bhedaś caitrādivad iti.*

[326] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase of Dignāga's argument Ms B 217a6-217b1: *tad evam ekaṃ ghaṭādidravyam anekeṣāṃ pārthivatvādīnāṃ vyañjakam iti tasyāne-kasvabhāvatvaprasaṅgaḥ. yadi vyaṅgyasāmānyabhedād dravyabhedaḥ, tathā sattā-disāmānyam anekena pārthivādīnāṃ dravyeṇa vyajyata iti tasyāpy anekasvabhāvatā prasajyate. yadi vyañjakadravyabhedāt sāmānyabhedo 'bhyupeyate. tasmān na vyañjakadravyabhedāt sāmānyabhedo nāpi vyaṅgyasāmānyabhedād dravyabhedo 'nekāntād iti.*

[327] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b4: *evaṃ tadvadabhidhānapakṣe sāmānādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ.*

[169] *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam asvātantryāt puroditam.* Qu. PSṬ Ms B 217b4.

[328] Cf. PS V:4a above with PSV ad loc.; PSṬ Ms B 217b4-5: *"tadvato nāsvata-ntratvād"* (4a) *ity atra hy etadbhedatvam uktam. atadbhedatve ca yathā sāmānādhi-karaṇyaṃ na sambhavati, tathā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo 'pi. bhedena hi sāmānyaṃ viśeṣyate, nābhedena.*

[170] *anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācyanut.* Qu. NCV 638,2, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b6: *anyatve 'pi.*

[329] According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga is now introducing an exception to the general rule of exclusion formulated at the beginning of the *apoha* chapter, so as to avoid the conclusion that the general rule also applies to the referents of general terms, particular terms, and synonyms, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b6-7: *śabdasya pravṛttinivṛttyarthatvād anvayavyatirekacodanāyā vyahārāṅgatā, na*[(1)] *tv anyathā iti darśayitum pūrvaṃ kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena śabdo bhāṣata* (cf. PS V:1cd above) *ity uktam. tasyedānīm anyatve 'pītyādināpavādam āha. yad utsṛṣṭam "anyāpohena bhāṣata"* (PS V:1d above) *iti tat sāmānyaviśeṣaparyāyaśabdārtha-parihāreṇeti.*
   [(1)]*na* conj. (cf. *ma yin* T) : om. Ms

[171] *tulye 'pi hy anyatve.* Qu. PSṬ Ms B 217b7.

[172] *avirodhāt. paryāyaśabdasya* <*tāvat*>[(1)] *tulyaṃ apohyaṃ yugapad aprayogāt, na ca svārthapratikṣepo yuktaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a1-2, 4: *avirodhād iti ... paryāyaśabdasyetyādi. tulyam apohyam iti ... yugapad aprayogād iti ... na ca svārthapratikṣepo yukta iti.*
[(1)]Cf. *re źig* KV.

[330] Since the property of being other is the cause of exclusion, not being in conflict, i.e., not being other, explains why the referents of general terms, particular terms, and synonyms are not excluded, cf. PSṬ Ms B 217b7-218a1: *anyatvaṃ cāpohe nimittam. avirodhād iti anapohyatāyāṃ hetuḥ. yā*[(1)] *hy aviruddhā na te parasparebhyo druhyanti nāpohanti, yathā rūpādayo dravye.* NCV 637,15-16: *anyatve sāmānyabhedaparyāyaśabdānām arthaṃ vṛkṣaśrutir nāpohate pṛthivīśiṃ-śapātarvādiśabdānām avirodhāt, virodhāc ca paṭādīn apohata iti:* "The word 'tree' does not exclude the referent of a general terms, a particular terms, and a synonym although they are different because terms like 'earth,' *'śiṃśapā,'* and *'taru'* (tree) are not in conflict; and it excludes cloth, etc. because of conflict."

ŚVṬ 69,27-70,1 on ŚV Apoha° 148: *atra bhikṣuṇā vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapeti sāmānādhi-karaṇyaṃ darśayatoktam: vṛkṣas tarur iti paryāyānāṃ ca parasparam anapohya-tvam. anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācinām avirodhāt – iti:* "While illu-strating co-reference such as "*śiṃśapā* is a tree" the monk explains: Synonyms like *'vṛkṣa'* and *'taru'* do not have excluded referents one another because general terms, particular terms, and synonyms are not in conflict, although they are different."

Cf. NR 429,32: *yad api sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānāṃ śiṃśapāvṛkṣādīnāṃ paryāyā-nāṃ ca taruvṛkṣādīnām avirodhenānapohakatvam uktam: anyatve 'pi na sāmānya-bhedaparyāyavācinā* <*m avirodhād*>[(1)]*iti.*
[(1)] *yā* em. : *yo* Ms
[(1)]So probably read: om. NR.

[331] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a2-3: *ekena tasyārthasya kṛtakatvān na dvitīyaḥ prasajyate. sati ca sāmarthye yatra dvitīyasyāprayogaḥ, tayor ekārthatā yathā* <*taruvṛkṣa*>*yoḥ*[(1)]*:* "Since the referent is dealt with by a single [synonym] a second one is not required; and when a second one is not applied as they have the same capability, the two of them have the same reference, like [the synonyms] *'taru'* and *'vṛksa'.*"
[(1)] *yathā taruvṛkṣa*° conj. : *yasthā* [*prasth*?]*ayoḥ* Ms (*dper na bye brag dag bźin no* T, which is incomprehensible in the context; the the translator may have had difficulties interpreting the Sanskrit Ms; the proposed conj. is based on the examples mentioned at NR 429,32 q.v. no. 331 above).

[332] Another reason for non-exclusion according to Jinendrabuddhi, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a4: *anapohyatāyāṃ hetvantaram āha.*

[173] *sāmānyaśabdenāpi svabhedeṣu arthāntaraṃ vyudastam bhedaśabdo 'numodate,*[(1)] *arthitvāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a5-6: *sāmānyaśabdenāpītyādi ... svabhedāḥ śiṃśapādayaḥ teṣu arthāntaraṃ ghaṭādi vyudastaṃ vṛkṣaśabdena bhedaśabdaḥ śiṃśapāśabdo 'numodata evārthitvāt.*

[(1)]The readings of V *ched cher mi 'dzin pa yaṅ ma yin te* V ("does not not admit to") are preferable in the present context to *bzod pa ma yin te* K ("does not tolerate" = Sanskrit *na kṣamate,* cf. below no. **[183]**), although it is rather a paraphrase than a translation of Sanskrit *anumodate.*

[333] For instance the word *'śiṃśapā'*.

[334] That is, the term 'tree' (*vṛkṣa*).

[335] Such as pot, etc. (*ghaṭādi*).

[336] That is *śiṃśapā* and the rest, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a5-6: *sāmānyaśabdasya vṛkṣaśabdasya yat svavṛkṣatvasāmānyaṃ tasya bhedāḥ svabhedāḥ śiṃśapādayaḥ.*

[337] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a6: *arthī hi śiṃśapāśabdo ghaṭādivyudāsena:* "For the word *'śiṃśapā'* is in need of the exclusion of pot, etc."

[174] *yathā hi śiṃśapā na palāś<ādi>, evaṃ na <ghaṭādy api*[(1)]*>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a6: *yathā hītyādi.*
[(1)] *palāś<ādi> ... <ghaṭādy api>* conj. (cf. *'di ltar śiṅ śa pa ni pa la śa la sogs pa ma yin pa de bźin du bum pa la sogs pa yaṅ ma yin no* V : *dper na śiṅ śa pa ni pa la sogs pa de bźin du bum pa la sogs pa yaṅ ma yin no* K) : *yathā hi śiṃśapā na palāśaś cevaṃ nāpārthivādy api* PSṬ Ms B 218b2.

[338] Cf. *śiṅ śa pa ni pa la śa la sogs pa* V : *śiṅ śa pa ni pa la sogs pa* K.

[339] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218a6-218b1: *etena ghaṭādyapohenārthitvād ekārthakāritām udbhāvayan bhedaśabdaḥ sāmānyaśabdena na virudhyata iti darśayati. tathā hi pālāśādirūpaḥ śiṃśapāśabdasyārtho na bhavatīti. tasya palāśādayo 'pohyāḥ. tathā ghaṭādirūpo 'pi na bhavatīti. ghaṭādayo 'py apohyāḥ. te ca vṛkṣaśabdenāpohyante:* "Thereby, arguing that they have the same purpose because they are in need of the exclusion of pot, and so on, he shows that a particular term is not in conflict with a general term. That is, the referent of the word *'śiṃśapā'* does not have the form of *palāśa,* etc. Thus its excluded referents are *palāśa,* etc. In the same way it does not have the form of pot, etc. Thus its excluded referents are also pot, etc. And these are excluded by the word 'tree'."

[175] *etena <sāmānyasāmānyaśabdārthāpratikṣepo 'py uktaḥ>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b1: *etenetyādi.*

[340] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b1-3: *svasya sāmānyasya vṛkṣatvasya yat sāmānyaṃ pārthivatvaṃ tacchabdaḥ pārthivaśabdaḥ sāmānyasāmānyaśabdaḥ. tena yat vyudasyam apārthivādi tac chiṃśapāśabdo 'numanyate 'rthitvāt.* yathā hi śiṃśapā na palāśaḥ, evaṃ[(2)] nāpārthivādy[(3)] api. *evam āvṛttyā adravyasyāsataś ca dravya-sacchabdābhyāṃ nirākriyamānasyārthitvād abhyanumodanaṃ yojyaṃ:* "The word 'earthen' denoting the general property earthenness that is the general property of its own general property, is a general term's general term. The word *'śiṃśapā'* approves that non-earthern things, and so on, are to be excluded by it because it is in need of it. For just as a *śiṃśapā* [tree] is not a *palāśa* [tree], so it is not not

[something] earthen, and so on, either. Thus the approval is to be applied by recursion because it needs that non-substances and non-existent things are excluded by the words 'substance' and 'existent'."

(2)°*palāśaḥ, ev*° conj. : °*palāśaś cev*° Ms

(3)*nāpārthivādy* conj. : *nāpādivādy* Ms (cf. *chu las ma gyur pa ñid la sogs* T = *āpāditvādi;* the translator of T evidently read *āpāditvādi* as translated. However, it makes no sense in the context).

[176] *tathā sāmānyaśabdaḥ svārtham abhiprete viṣaye vyavasthāpyamānam viśeṣaśabdena viśeṣaviśeṣaśabdena vā kathaṃ nopekṣate. <evaṃ avirodhāt sāmānyādiśabdārthāpoho na yujyate>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b3-5: *tathā sāmānyaśabda ityādi ... s̲v̲ā̲r̲t̲h̲a̲ṃ̲*(1) *s̲a̲t̲t̲ā̲d̲i̲k̲a̲ṃ̲ a̲b̲h̲i̲p̲r̲e̲t̲e̲ v̲i̲ṣ̲a̲y̲e̲ v̲y̲a̲v̲a̲s̲t̲h̲ā̲p̲y̲a̲-̲ m̲ā̲n̲a̲m̲ i̲t̲i̲ ... v̲i̲ś̲e̲ṣ̲a̲ś̲a̲b̲d̲e̲n̲a̲ ... v̲i̲ś̲e̲ṣ̲a̲v̲i̲ś̲e̲ṣ̲a̲ś̲a̲b̲d̲e̲n̲a̲ v̲ā̲ ... k̲a̲t̲h̲a̲ṃ̲ n̲o̲p̲e̲k̲ṣ̲a̲t̲e̲.*

(1)°*aṃ sat*° em. : °*asat*° Ms

[341] That is, for instance, the word 'existent' and its own referent existence, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b3: *sāmānyaśabdo 'pi sadādiḥ. svārthaṃ sattādikam.*

[342] That is, e.g., a substance as defined by a property, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b4: *guṇādivyavacchinne*(1) *dravyādau.*

(1)°*vyavacchinne* em. (cf. *rnam par bcad pa'i* T) : *vyavasthinne* Ms

[343] A particular term is a term like 'substance', and a particular term's particular term comprises in descending order terms like 'earthen,' 'tree,' *'śiṃśapā',* and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b5: *viśeṣaśabdena dravyādinā, viśeṣaviśeṣaśabdena vā pārthivavṛkṣaśiṃśapāśabdādinā.*

[344] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b5-6: *arthī hi svaviṣayāvasthānena*(1) *nirviṣayasya svār- thasyānupapatteḥ. anenābhiṣṭārthasampādanād viśeṣaśabdaḥ sāmānyaśabdasyopa- kārī, tataś ca sāmānyaśabdas tena na virudhyata iti darśayati:* "For [the general term] is in need of being confined to its proper domain since it is not justified if its proper referent is without domain. Since the intended referent is realised by means of it [viz. the general term], the particular term is assisting the general term; and therefore he points out that the general term is not in conflict with it."

(1) *svaviṣayāva*° em. (cf. *raṅ gi yul la gnas pas* T) : *sasvaviṣayāva*° Ms

[177] *samūhaś ca tathārthāntaravācakaḥ.* Qu. NCV 647,14-15.

[345] Although Dignāga does not explain the linguistic implications of the term *samūha,* it is clear from Jinendrabuddhi and Siṃhasūri's explanations in PSṬ and NCV, respectively, that *samūha* in the present context denotes any given string consisting of **1.** two speech units such as stem (*prakṛti*) and affix (*pratyaya*), **2.** two speech units constituting a compound (*samāsa*), **3.** two speech units (i.e., syntactical words) constituting a sentence (*vākya*); and **4.** a sentence consisting of more than two syntactical words. According to Dignāgan theory, the sentence is the principal speech unit, cf. PSV V:46 § 61.

[346] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 218b6-7: *avirodhād apratikṣepe guṇotkarṣaṃ darśayati. atha-vā parasparārthāpratikṣepe hetvantaram āha. parasparārthāpratikṣepe hi svārtha-viśiṣṭasyārthasya* <u>*vācakatvam*</u> <u>*upapadyate,*</u> *nānyathā.*

[178] *evaṃ ca sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor svārthe sāmānye* <*vartamānayor*> *dvayor bahūnāṃ vā* <*tad*>*viśiṣṭārthāntarasya vācakatvam* <*upapadyate*> *yathoktam prāk.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 219a1-2: *evaṃ ceti ... dvayor iti ...* <u>*svārthe vṛkṣasāmānye*</u> <u>*vārtamānam;*</u> 219a6-7: *bahūnam vā ... sarveṣāṃ svārthasāmānye vartamānānām ...* <u>*vācakatvam ... arthāntarasya*</u> *cābhidhānam;* parallel at NCV 647,14-15: *evaṃ ca ... sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor ityādi yāvad vākyārtha*<u>*vācakatvam;*</u> Ms B 218b6-7, q.v. no. 347 above; 219b1: *yathoktam prāg iti.*

[347] Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V:15ac explaining that while it shows that the words *'nīla'* and *'utpala'* each separately are without referent in terms of the referent of their aggregate, it also explains that the aggregate denotes a separate referent (*arthāntara*), cf. PSṬ Ms B 219b1: *samudāyārthena pratyekam ānarthakyaṃ nīlotpalaśabdayor darśayatā samudāyasyārthāntarābhidhāyitvam uktam.*

[348] Jinendrabuddhi quotes as an example of a string consisting of stem and affix the syntactical word *vṛkṣam* (PSṬ Ms B 219a1: *dvayor iti yathā vṛkṣam iti prakṛtipratyayoḥ*), which he analyses at PSṬ Ms B 219a1-3 as a combination of the denotation of the nominal stem *vṛkṣa* and the affix *am* denoting the direct object (*karma*): *atra hi prātipadikaṃ svārthe vṛkṣasāmānye vartamānaṃ karmādivibhak-tyarthān na pratikṣipati. am ity api pratyayaḥ karmasāmānye 'vasthito vṛkṣādīn prātipadikārthān nāpohate. evaṃ parasparārthāpratikṣepe tayor yaḥ samūho vṛkṣam iti so 'vayavārthaviśiṣṭasyārthasya*[1] *vācaka upapannaḥ:* "For in this case the nominal stem[a] does not reject the referent of the direct object case affix, and so on, while being applied to the general property treeness. And the affix *am* which is restricted to the general property of being a direct object does not exclude the referents of nominal stems like 'tree', etc.; thus, in that there is no mutual rejection of their referents, it is justified that the aggregate of the two viz. *vṛkṣa* + *am* denotes a referent that is qualified by the referents of the [two] constituents."

Jinendrabuddhi continues extending the analysis to the compound *nīlotpala* at 219a3-6: *tathā nīlotpalam*[2] *iti nīlotpalaśabdayoḥ samāsapadayoḥ samāsārtha-vācakatvam anyonyārthāvyudāse sati yujyata iti yojyam. tathā hi nīlaśabdasya nīla-viśeṣān anutpalādīn*[3] *apratikṣipata*[4] *utpalānutpalavṛttir arthaḥ. utpalaśabdas-yāpy utpalaviśeṣān anīlādīn*[5] *apratikṣipato*[6] *nīlānīlavṛttiḥ. samudāyas*[7] *tv avayavārthābhyāṃ viśiṣṭaḥ:* "It is to be construed thus: In the same way as it is justified that the words 'blue' and 'lotus' viz. the two compounded words of the expression 'blue lotus' express a compounded referent in that they do not exclude one another's referent. That is, although the word 'blue' is not rejecting particulars of blue such as non-lotuses, and so on, it has a referent that occurs among lotuses as well as non-lotuses. And although the word 'lotus' too is not rejecting particulars of lotus such as [those that are] non-blue, it [has a referent that] occurs among blue as well as non-blue things. The compound, however, is qualified by the referents of the two constitutive parts."

[a]For the definition of *prātipadikam,* cf. A I 2:45: *arthavad adhātur apratyayaḥ prātipadikam.* The first triplet (*prathamā*) serves the purpose of denoting the referent of a mere nominal stem (*prātipadikārtha*[*mātra*]), cf. A II 2:46.

(1) *'vayavā°* em. (cf. *yan lag gi* T) : *pacā°* Ms
(2) *nīlot°* em. : *lot°* Ms
(3) *anutpalā°* em. : *utpalā°* Ms
(4) *apratikṣipata* em. : *pratikṣipataḥ* Ms
(5) *anīlādīn* em. : *na nīlādīn* Ms
(6) *apratikṣipato* em. : *pratikṣipate* Ms
(7) *samudāyas* em. : *samudāyasya* Ms

[349] The commentator mentions as an example of the combination of more than two terms the example *rājapuruṣa abhirūpamān āgaccheti*:(1) "let the handsome prince come." (PSṬ Ms B 219a7), cf. NCV 647,18-20 which develops more fully the implications of Dignāga's concise statement: *devadatta tiṣṭhati, devadatto gehe tiṣṭhati, devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām ityādidvitricatuḥpañcādipadasamūhānāṃ vākyārthavācakatvam.*
(1) *āgaccheti* conj (< *āgaccha + iti*, cf. *śog ces pa* T) : *apeti* Ms

[179] <*āha ca*>(1) *tanmātrākaṅkṣaṇād bhedaḥ svasāmānyena nojjhitaḥ, nopāttaḥ saṃśayotpatteḥ, sāmye caikārthatā tayoḥ.* Qu. TSP 379,7-8; Ms B 219b2–6: *tanmātrākāṅkṣaṇād iti ... nopātta ityādi ... sāmye caikārthatā tayor iti;* NCV 648,18 (PS V:27cd).
(1) Cf. *yaṅ brjod pa* V : om. K.

[350] Jinendrabuddhi explains that since general and particular terms are not in conflict, Dignāga formulates this verse with reference to the fact that a general term does not exclude (*atyāga*) the particulars nor does it include them (*anupādāna*), cf. PSṬ Ms B 219b1-2: *sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor avirodhe sāmānyaśabdena bhedānām atyāgam anupādānāṃ cādhikṛtya ślokam āha.*

[351] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 219b3: *svabhedamātrākāṅkṣaṇād ity arthaḥ. ākāṅkṣā punas teṣu saṃśayānasya vyavacchedaprārthanā. mātraśabdo viśeṣāntarākāṅkṣanirāsāya. tathā hi vṛkṣaśabdāt palāśādiviṣayaivākāṅkṣā jāyate, na*(1) *ghaṭādiviṣayā. yadi ca ghaṭādivat palāśadayo 'pi tyaktāḥ syuḥ, tatrāpi ghaṭādivad ākāṅkṣā na syāt. bhavati ca tato na tyaktāḥ:* "The meaning is 'because only its own particulars are expected as a complement.' The expectation of a complement, moreover, is the request for exclusion made by somebody, who is in doubt about these [particulars]. The word 'only' is for the sake of excluding the expectation of other particulars as complements. That is, due to the word 'tree' the expectation of a complement that only concerns *palāśa,* and so on, arises, but not one that concerns pot, etc. And if *palāśa,* and so on, were rejected in the same way as pot, and so on, there would be no expectation of a complement with regard to these in the same way as [there would be no expectation of a complement with regard to] pot, etc. And this is the case. Therefore they are not excluded."
(1) *na* conj : om. Ms

[352] The identity to which Dignāga refers is the identity of the referent of the general term 'tree' and any of its particulars, e.g., the term, *'palāśa,'* which is the presupposition of their being co-referential. Mallavādi substitutes the term *tattva* for *sāmya* in his edited version of PS V:27, cf. NCV 648,15. Jinendrabuddhi does not expressly comment upon the concept of *sāmya,* but limits himself to explaining that

the co-reference of the general and particular term consists in their not excluding and not including, cf. PST Ms B 219b6: *yatraitayoḥ sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor atyāgo 'nupādānaṃ ca, tatraikārthatā sāmānādhikaraṇyam ity arthaḥ:* "The meaning is this: When the general and the particular term neither exclude nor include, they have the same reference, i.e., they are co-referential."

[180] *anekam api sāmānyam bhedenāvyabhicāriṇā, upāttaṃ na tayos tulyā*[1] *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā.* [2] Restored, Ms 219b7-220a2: *anekam apītyādi ... avyabhicā-riṇeti*[3] *... na tayor iṣṭā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyateti;* cf. parallel at NCV 648,24-25: <u>anekaṃ ca sāmānyam ... upāttam avyabhicāriṇā bhedena</u>; NCV 649,11: *yathocyate tvayā: na tayos tulyā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā.*

[1] *tulyā* (cf. *mtshuṅs* KV) : *iṣṭā* Ms 220a2.

[2] In V this verse is followed by the phrase *źes bya ba bsdu ba'i tshigs su bcad pa dag go* : om. K. However, the subject matter of the verses as well as PST do not corroborate that formally they are *saṃgrahaślokas;* for a similar example of a non-standard use of the term, cf. the verses at PS V 12-13 that V also identifies as *saṃgrahaślokas* in contrast to K.

[3] °*eti* em. (cf. NCV 648,24: *avyabhicāriṇā*) : °*o hi* Ms

[353] The preceding verse addresses the relationship between a general term and its particulars, which is defined by the general term's neither excluding nor including the particulars. In the immediately following one Dignāga answers the question of whether the relation between a particular general term and its general property is the same as that between a general terms and its particulars; cf. the introduction to the verse at Ms B 219b7: *yathā sāmānyaśabdena*[1] *svabhedānāṃ na tyāgo nopādānaṃ, kiṃ tathā viśeṣaśabdenāpi sāmānyasyeti? praśnaprasargam*[2] *āha.*

[1] *sāmānya*° em. : *sāmānyādhikara*° Ms

[2] *praśnaprasargaṃ* conj (cf. *dri ba spoṅ bar byed pa* T) : *prannaprasaṃgā* Ms

[354] Cf. the paraphrase at PST Ms B 219b7-220a1: *yady apy anekaṃ sāmānyaṃ tathāpi tad bhedaśabdenopāttam pratyāyitam ity arthaḥ; pratyāpanavyatirekeṇopā-dānāsambhavāt. yathā śiṃśapāśabdenārthato*[1] *vṛkṣapārthivadravyasatsāmānyam upāttam, na kevalam atyaktam eva.* "Even though there are several general proper-ties, nevertheless they are included by the particular [general] term, that is, they are indicated by it because inclusion is impossible without the action of indicating, like the inclusion by implication through the word *'śiṃśapā'* of the general property of a tree, an earthen thing, a substance, and something existent, not merely of [the general property] as not excluded.

[1] °*to* em. : °*aḥ* Ms

[355] Cf. PST Ms B 220a1-2: *kasmāt punaḥ sāmānyānām upādānam bhedaśabde-netyādi? "avyabhicāriṇeti." yasmād bhedaḥ sāmānyāvyabhicārī sāmānyābhāve bhedābhāvāt, tasmāt tena tadupādānaṃ:* "Why is it, moreover, that general proper-ties are included by a particular [general] term, etc.? [The answer is:] "Because it does not deviate." Since the particular [general property] does not deviate from the general property in that the particular [general property] would not exist if the general property did not exist, the [general property] is included by the [particular general property]."

[356] The point is that the relation between the terms *'vṛkṣa'* and *'śiṃśapā'* is not symmetrical as neither one is related to the other as qualifier and qualified because every *śiṃśapā* is a tree, whereas every tree is not necessarily a *śiṃśapā*. Thus the term *'śiṃśapā'* may qualify the term 'tree' but not vice versa as *'śiṃśapā'* does not deviate from the general property treeness and the hierarchy of other general properties that together define the entity 'tree;' cf. the succinct explanation at PSṬ Ms B 220a2-5: *vṛkṣo hi śiṃśapādīn vyabhicaran vyavacchedam apekṣata ity asti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ. śiṃśapā tu vṛkṣasāmānyam avyabhicarantī nāpekṣata ity nāsti. vyabhicarinos tu bhedayor viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ tulyaḥ. tadyathā nīlotpala-yoḥ:* "For 'tree', not being restricted to '*śiṃśapā*', and so on, depends upon exclusion. Thus there is a qualifier-qualified relation. '*śiṃśapā*', on the other hand, being restricted to the general property treeness, does not depend upon it. Thus there is none. Two particulars, however, that are not restricted have a symmetrical qualifier-qualified relation, like, for instance, 'blue' and 'lotus.'"

The problem Dignāga discusses is ultimately derived from a discussion at Mahā-bh in which Patañjali addresses the question of how two words that each denote a substance (*dravya*) and therefore are principal (*pradhāna*) relate to one another, cf. Mahā-bh I 399,25-26 (ad A II 1:57 vārt 2): *kathaṃ tarhīmau dvau pradhānaśabdāv ekasminn arthe yugapad avarundhyete: vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapeti. naitayor avaśyakaḥ samāveśaḥ, na hy avṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapāsti: vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśapā:* "How then are these two principal words simultaneously confined to the same referent like [in the statement]: "The *śiṃśapā* is a tree." The conjunction of these two is not necessary because the *śiṃśapā* is not a non-tree." This statement is explained as follows by Jinendrabuddhi in Nyāsa ad A II.1:57: *vṛkṣo hi śiṃśapātvaṃ vyabhicarati, śiṃśapā tu na vṛkṣatvam. atas tatprakārāntarebhyaḥ palāśādibhyaḥ taṃ vyavacchinattīti śiṃśapā tasya viśeṣaṇam bhavati, na tu viśeṣyam. vṛkṣas tu viśeṣyaḥ. śiṃśapārthas tu vṛkṣatvaṃ na vyabhicaratīti na tasyāsau viśeṣaṇam bhavati:* "For 'tree' deviates from *śiṃśapā*ness, whereas '*śiṃśapā*' does not deviate from treeness. Therefore, as it excludes this from *palāśa* (trees), and so on, whose attributes differ from those of the former, '*śiṃśapā*' is its qualifier, but not the qualified. 'Tree,' (*vṛkṣa*) on the other hand, is the qualified. The referent of *'śiṃśapā,'* however, does not deviate from treeness. Thus the latter is not its qualifier."

[181] *kim punar atra <kāraṇaṃ yena bhedaśabdo bhedāntaraśabdārtham apohate>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a5: *kim punar atretyādi.*

[357] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's introductory remark at PSṬ Ms B 220a4-5: *sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayoḥ parasparārthapratikṣepapratiṣedhe*[1] *dvayoḥ sāmānyaśab-dayoḥ dvayoś ca bhedaśabdayoḥ parasparārthapratikṣepaḥ siddha iti etad aprati-pādyam eva, kāraṇam eva tu pratipādyam iti. atas tad eva pṛcchati "kim punar atre"tyādi. sāmānyayos tu svasāmānyāpekṣayā bhedatvān na pṛthag upādānam.*
   [1] Cf. the use of the term *parasparārthāpratikṣepa* no. 347 above.

[182] *bhedo bhedāntarārthaṃ tu virodhitvād apohate.* Qu. NCV 649,14; ŚVṬ 69,5 and 71,4; NR 429,14; cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a6-7: *bhedo bhedāntarārtham iti ... virodhitvād iti;* NCV 613,26: *bhedo bhedāntaretyādi.*

[358] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a6-7: *vṛkṣatvasya śiṃśapādir bhedaḥ parasparato bhidyata iti kṛtvā sa eva khadirādyapekṣayānyo bhedaś ceti bhedāntaram. iha tu viṣayasya*[1]

viṣayiṇo nirdeśāc chabdo bhedo bhedāntaraṃ ceti vijñeyam. bhedaśabdo bhedān-taraśabdārtham ity arthaḥ. virodhitvād (PS V:28b1) *iti hetuḥ:* "*śiṃśapā,* and so on, is a particular of treeness in that [*śiṃśapā,* etc.] differ mutually. 'Different particular' means that the same thing is different with regard to *khadira,* and so on, as well as [being] a particular. In this case, however, one has to understand that the word is the particular as well as a different particular since that which has reference to a given thing is specified as the thing [in question]. The meaning is: A particular term [excludes] the referent of different particular terms. The reason is 'because they are in conflict [with one another]';" Cf. ŚVṬ 69,3 introducing 28ab: *atra bhikṣuṇā palāśaḥ śiṃśapeti sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na bhavatīti darśayatoktam.* Kumārila addresses the content of 28ab at Apoha° 147: *virodhitvena bhedānām apoho yadi kalpyate, virodho 'pohatas tatra, virodhāc cāpy apohanam.* Pārthasārathimiśra ad loc. explains *apoha* as mutual non-existence (*itaretarābhāvaś cāpohaḥ,* NR 429,16), which is an undeniable aspect of Dignāga's *apoha* thesis, cf. PSV V: 45 below.

(1)°*yesya* em. : *yeśa* Ms

[183] *bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat parasparaviro-dhinaḥ. tataś ca na parasparārthaṃ kṣamante*(1). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 223a7: *bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat parasparavirodhina iti etad eva tāvad ayuktam;* 220a7: *sāmānyārthāpahāritvād iti ... rājaputravad iti;* 220b1: <u>*tataś ca na parasparārthaṃ kṣamante;*</u> cf. the paraphrase at ŚVṬ 69,3ff: *bhedaśabdā hi palāśaśiṃśapādaya ekaṃ vrkṣatvasāmānyam anyonyam apahrtya rājyam iva rājaputrāḥ svaviṣaye sthāpayantaḥ parasparavirodhino vartante.*

(1)*bzod* (so read, ed. *brjod*) *pa ma yin te* K : *bzod par mi nus te* V.

359 Cf. Kumārila's use of the same expression at ŚV Apoha° 148: *na sāmānyāpa-hāritvaṃ vidhirūpeṇa tatra te, palāśādīn apohyāto vrkṣaṃ harati śiṃśapā.*

360 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 220a7-220b1: *rājaputrāṇāṃ hi pitary uparate sāmānyārtho rājyam. tasya te sarve yathābalam apahāritvād virodhinaḥ:* "For when their father is deceased, the kingdom is the common property of the king's sons. They are all of them in conflict [with each other] because they are appropriating it with all their might." Cf. *Buddhist Logic* Vol. I: 492 no. 3; 493 no. 4.

[184] *tadyathā <'ayaṃ vrkṣaḥ śiṃśape'ti*(1) *śiṃśapāśabdo vrkṣaśabdena saha pra-yujyamānaḥ khadirādibhyo vyavacchidya*(2) *vrkṣatvaṃ svaviṣaye vyavasthāpayati. tathetaratrāpi*(3). *evaṃ tāvad bhedaśabdasyai>kadravyāpahāritvād*(4) *<bhedāntara-śabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ*(5)*>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b2: *tadyatheteti ... ekadravyāpahāritvād iti.*

(1)*śiṅ 'di śiṅ śa pa yin no źes* em. : *śiṅ 'dis* (NP so; *'di śiṅ* ed.) *śa pa yin no* V : *śiṅ śa pa zes bya ba la* K.

(2)Cf. *rnam par bcad nas* V : *bśad nas* K.

(3)Cf. *cig śos la* V : *gźan la* K.

(4)*rdzas gcig btaṅ sñoms su byed pa'i phyir ro* V : *rdzas gcig la 'jug pa'i phyir* K.

(5)Cf. *rigs pa yin no* V : *rigs pa ma yin no* K.

361 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b2: *tadyatheti sāmānyāpahāritvaṃ darśayati.*

[362] According to Jinendrabuddhi the reason *ekadravyāpahāritvāt* is just a repetition of the reason *sāmānyarthāpahāritvāt,* cf. Ms 220b2: *ekadravyāpahāritvād iti sāmānyāpahāritvasyaivānuvādaḥ.*

[185] *atha* <*sāmānyāntarabhedārtham*[(1)] *ghaṭādim asambaddhaṃ*> *kasmād apohata* <*iti. yasmāt*>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b5: *athetyādi;* 220b5-6, q.v. no. 364 below.
   [(1)]Cf. *spyi gźan* V : *phyir* (sic) *gźan* K.

[363] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi sets forth the assumptions underlying the opponents objection at PSṬ Ms B 220b3-6: *nanu caitad virodhitvasya hetuḥ, na bhedāntarārthāpohasya. tat kimiti tataḥ sa prayukta ucyate. tad api tasya pāram-paryeṇa hetur ity adoṣaḥ. virodhaḥ pratikṣepahetur uktaḥ. sa ca sāmānyārthāpa-hāritvāt. na ca sāmānyāntarasya pārthivatvāder ye bhedā ghaṭādayas tadvācibhiḥ saha śiṃśapāśabdasyaikārthāpahāritvaṃ, kiṃ tarhi vṛkṣaśabdena. ataḥ*[(1)] *prati-kṣepakāraṇābhāvād nāpoha iti manyamāna āha: athetyādi. śiṃśapāyāḥ sāmānyaṃ vṛkṣatvam. tato 'nyatvāt pārthivatvaṃ sāmānyāntaram. tadbhedo ghaṭādiḥ. so 'sambandhaḥ śiṃśapāśabdena virodhābhāvāt, na hi tacchabdena śiṃśapāśab-dasyaikadravyāpahāritvam. atas taṃ kasmād apohate virodhābhāvāt. naivāsāv apohyata ity arthaḥ:* "Certainly this [viz. appropriating the common property] is the reason for being in conflict, but not for the exclusion of the referent of other particular [terms]. So how is it justified thereby? This too is indirectly the reason for it. Thus there is no problem. Being in conflict is said to be the reason for negation. And this [viz. being in conflict] is due to appropriating the common property. And the word *'śiṃśapā'* does not appropriate the one property together with words denoting particulars like pots that are particulars of other general properties like earthenness, but rather [it does so] together with the word 'tree'. Therefore there is no exclusion since the reason for the negation does not exist. With this in mind he says: 'But', etc. Treeness is the general property of *śiṃśapā*. Earthenness is a different general property because it is different from that [viz. treeness]. Its particular such as a pot is without connection with the word *'śiṃśapā'* because there is no conflict. For the word denoting it does not appropriate the same property as that of the word *'śiṃśapā'*. So why does it exclude this since there is no conflict? The meaning is: It does not exclude at all."
   [(1)]°*a. ataḥ* em. : °*ātaḥ* Ms

[186] *sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ.* Qu. NCV 613,27, 649,15; cf. PSṬ Ms B B 220b6-7: *sāmānyāntarabhedārthā iti.*

[364] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b7: *tad evaṃ virodham apohanibandhanaṃ darśayati. virodhasāmānyam apohahetuḥ. iha ca yady api sākṣād virodho nāsti pāraṃparyeṇa tv asty eva:* "In this way he shows that hostility is the cause of exclusion. The cause of exclusion is the general property hostility. And even though the hostility does not exist directly, it exists, however, indirectly."

[187] *vṛkṣaśabdena hi* <*ghaṭādīnāṃ pārthivādyapahāritvād virodhaḥ*>. *tena hi nirākriyamāṇam abhyanumodate*[(1)] *mitraśatruvat.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 220b7: *vṛkṣaśabdena hītyādi;* Ms B 221a1: *tena hītyādi;* 221a1-2, q.v., no. 366 below.
   [(1)]Cf. *rjes su yi raṅ bar byed* VK.

[365] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a1-2: *śiṃśapāśabdasya mitraṃ vṛkṣaśabdaḥ tadartha-sāmānyavācitvāt. tacchatravo ghaṭādiśabdāḥ pārthivatvāpahāritvāt*[1]. *tatas tena vṛkṣaśabdena* *nirākriyamāṇaṃ*[2] *ghaṭādikaṃ śiṃśapāśabdo 'bhyanumodate mitra-śatrum iva:* "The word 'tree' is the friend of the word *'śiṃśapā'* because it denotes the general property of its referent. Its enemies are words like 'pot' because they are appropriating earthenness. Therefore the word *'śiṃśapā'* approves that pot, and so on, is being excluded by the word 'tree' in the same way as [one approves that] the enemy of a friend [is being excluded]."

[1]°*vatvāpa*° conj. : °*vāpa*° Ms
[2]*nirā*° conj. : °*enāvākri*° Ms

[188] *arthāc ca tena sa nirasta iti pratīyate.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a2-3: *arthāt*[1]... *tena śiṃśapāśabdena ghaṭādir nirasta iti pratīyate.*
[1]Cf. *don las* (so read : *don la* V) *yaṅ de des spaṅs so źes śes par bya 'o* V : *des kyaṅ de bsal lo źes bya bar rtogs pa yin no* K.

[366] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a2-3: *śiṃśapāśabdasya siṃśapāsāmānyam arthaḥ. tasya cāghaṭādirūpatvād ghaṭādivyāvṛttis tata evārthāt pratīyate. na punaḥ śiṃśapāśab-dasya tatra vyāpāraḥ, tathāpi tena śiṃśapāśabdena ghaṭādir nirasta iti pratīyate tatpratyāyitenārthena tasya nirastvāt:* "The referent of the word *'śiṃśapā'* is the general property of a *śiṃśapā*. And since this has the form of non-pot, and so on, the exclusion of pot, and so on, from the same (*tata eva*) is understood by implication. Although the word *'śiṃśapā'* is not concerned with this [exclusion], nevertheless it is understood that pot, and so on, is excluded by the word *'śiṃśapā* because it is excluded by the referent that is indicated by it."

[189] *etena <sāmānyāntarabhedānāṃ guṇādīnāṃ tadbhedānāṃ ca rūpādīnāṃ> nirākaraṇam upekṣaṇam ca*[1] *sambandhasambandhataḥ*[2] *kṛtaṃ*[3] *veditavyaṃ*[4] *mitramitraśatruvat, mitraśatrumitravat.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a3-7 q.v. no. 368 below.
[1]Cf. *sel bar byed pa daṅ btaṅ snoms su byed* V : *sel bar byed par bltos par* (sic) K.
[2]Cf. *'brel pa las 'brel pa* K : *'brel pa can daṅ 'brel pa can ma yin pa yaṅ* V.
[3] *kṛtaṃ* is only translated in K; cf. *byas par* next.
[4]Cf. *byas par rigs par bya 'o* K : *rigs par bya 'o* V.

[367] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a3-7: *anena nyāyena pārthivasāmānyād anyat sāmānyaṃ dravyatvam. tasya sāmānyaṃ sattvam. tasya bhedā guṇāḥ karmāṇi ca teṣām api bhedā rūpādaya utkṣepaṇādayaś ca yathākramam. nirākaraṇam ca svavirodhinā śabdena upekṣaṇaṃ*[1] *ca viśeṣaśabdena sambandhasambandhataḥ*[2] *kṛtaṃ*[3] *veditavyam. katham ity āha: mitramitraśatruvad ityādi. atra mitramitreti dviruktiḥ pāramparyeṇa mitrapratipādanaparā veditavyā. anyathaikamitravyavahitam eva mitram pratīyeta. tatra guṇaṃ karma ca śiṃśapāśabdo dravyaśabdena nirākriya-māṇam mitramitraśatruvad abhyanumodate. guṇaviśeṣān*[4] *rūpādīn karmaviśeṣān cotkṣepaṇādīn śiṃśapāśabdo mitraśatrumitravat dravyaśabdena rūpādyutkṣepaṇā-diśabdānāṃ cānyatareṇa nirākriyamāṇān upekṣate:* "In accordance with this principle substanceness is another general property than the general property earthen. The general property of this [viz. substanceness] is existence. The

particulars of this [viz. existence] are qualities and actions, and their particulars, moreover, are colour, and so on, and the action of throwing upward, and so on, respectively. And the exclusion by a term with which itself is hostile and the toleration by a particular term should be understood as caused by a connection series. In what way? Like the enemy of a friend's friend, etc. In this case the repetition 'friend's friend' is to be understood as having the objective of indicating a friend in a series, otherwise the friend would be understood as completely separated from one friend. In this context the word *'śiṃśapā'* approves that quality and action is being excluded by the word 'substance' like the enemy of a friend's friend. And the word *'śiṃśapā'* tolerates like the friend of the enemy's friend that particular qualities like colour and particular actions such as throwing upward, and so on, is being excluded by the word 'substance' as well as by one or other among the words 'colour', and so on, and 'throwing upward', etc."

[1] *upekṣaṇaṃ* em. : utkṣepanañ Ms
[2]*sambandhasam°* em. : *sambandhaḥ kṛtaṃ sam°* Ms
[3]*kṛtaṃ* is not translated in T.
[4]*°ān* em. : *°ād* Ms

[190] *tatra tu*[1] *na sākṣāt tasya te 'pohyāḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b1: *tatra tu na sākṣāt tasya ta ityādi;* 223b6: *yad apy uktam: "na sākṣāt tasya te 'pohyāḥ"*[2].
[1]*de la yaṅ* V : *de la yaṅ de ni* K.
[2]*°āḥ* em. : *°ā(rth)* Ms

368 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221a7-221b1: *nanu ca śiṃśapāśabdenaiva ghaṭādīnāṃ nirākaraṇam. tathā śiṃśapāśabdād evoccaritāt tadapohaḥ pratīyate:* "Is it not so that pot, and so on, is only excluded by the word *'śiṃśapā'*? Thus its exclusion is understood from the word *'śiṃśapā'* alone as soon as it is articulated."

[191] *<na hi śiṃśapāśabdo ghaṭādīn sākṣād apohate. kasmāt?>* mā bhūt sāmānyatulyatā.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b1: *mā bhūd ityādi;* 223b6: *<m>ā bhūt sāmānyatulyatā.*

[192] *yadi hi*[1] *sākṣād apoheta, vṛkṣaśabdena tulyārthaḥ*[2] *syāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b1-2: *yadi hi sākṣād apoheta rūpaśabdavat,*[3] *vṛkṣaśabdena tulyārthaḥ syāt;* 223b6-7: *yadi hi sākṣād apoheta*[4] *vṛkṣaśabdenāviśiṣṭaḥ syād ityādi.*
[1]Cf. *ni* V : om. K.
[2]Cf. *śiṅ gi sgra daṅ mtshuṅs pa'i don can du 'gyur* K : *śiṅ gi sgra daṅ don mthuṅs pa 'gyur* V. Thus KV do not corroborate the reading *vṛkṣaśabdenāviśiṣṭaḥ* at 223b6-7.
[3]*rūpa°* em. : *rūpo ś°* Ms : *sṅon po'i sgra* T.
[4]*°eta* em. : *°e tu* Ms

[193] *tathā bhedāntarāṇām <tu teneva>*[1] *na syād apohaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b2: *tathā bhedāntarāṇām ityādi.*
[1]The particle *iva,* which is crucial for understanding the argument, is found in the paraphrase of the argument at Ms 221b2, q.v. below no. 370. It is not reproduced in KV, cf. *des ni* K : *de yis* V.

[369] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b2: *tathā sati palāśādīnāṃ vṛkṣaśabd<u>eneva</u> śiṃśapā-śabdena <u>na</u> syād <u>apohaḥ</u>:* "In those circumstances *palāśa,* and so on, would not be excluded by the word *'śiṃśapā'* just as it is not excluded by the word 'tree'."

[194] *yathaiva hi vṛkṣaśabdaḥ palāśādīn*[(1)] *nāpoheta, tathā śiṃśapāśabdo 'pi nāpoheta <tena tulyatvāt>*[(2)]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b2-3: <u>*yathaiva hi vṛkṣaśabdaḥ palāśādīn nāpoheta*</u>[(3)] ... <u>*tathā śiṃśapāśabdo 'pi nāpoheta.*</u>
[(1)]Cf. *pa la śa la sogs pa* V : *śiṅ śa pa la sogs pa rnams* K.
[(2)]Cf. *de daṅ mtshuṅs pa'i phyir* K : *des mtshuṅs par bya ba'i phyir* V.
[(3)] *apoheta* em. : *apohate Ms*

[370] That is, because *'palāśa',* and so on, include 'tree' because the latter negates pot, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b3: *ghaṭādipratikṣepeṇa vṛkṣopādānāt.*

[195] *<yadi nāsti sa doṣo>'lpabahvarthāpohatvena bhinnatvād <ity evam>, ayuktam.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b4: *alpabahvarthāpohyatvena bhinnatvād iti;* Ms B 221b7: *ayuktam iti.*

[371] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's exposition of the opponent's view at PSṬ Ms B 221b4-7: *śiṃśapāśabdasya bahutaram apohyam palāśādipratikṣepād alpataraṃ vṛkṣaśabdasya palāśādyanapohāt. ataś cātulyāpohyatvān na vṛkṣaśabdena tulyārthaḥ śiṃśapāśabdaḥ. tathā hi vṛkṣaśabdasya vṛkṣatvam arthaḥ. śiṃśapāśabdasya tu tac ca śiṃśapātvam. ato 'lpabahutvāpohyatvena*[(1)] *bhinnatvān naiva doṣaḥ. etad uktam bhavati: yady api śiṃśapāśabdasya vṛkṣaśabdasya ca vṛkṣatvam arthaḥ, tathāpi śiṃśapāśabdasya śiṃśapārthavatvalakṣaṇo 'sti viśeṣaḥ. tena saty api vṛkṣārthopādāne na bhavati palāśādyanapohaprasaṅga iti:* "The word *'śiṃśapā'* has more excluded referents because it excludes *palāśa,* and so on, the word 'tree' has fewer because it does not exclude *palāśa,* etc. And therefore the word *'śiṃśapā'* does not have a referent in common with the word 'tree' as its excluded referents are not the same. That is, the referent of the word 'tree' is the property treeness. That of the word *'śiṃśapā',* however, is the same as well as *śiṃśapā*ness. Therefore, since they are different as their excluded referents are few and many there is no problem. What is meant is this: even though the referent of the word *'śiṃśapā'* and the word 'tree' is the property treeness, nevertheless the difference of the word *'śiṃśapā'* is that it is characterized by the fact of having the *śiṃśapā* as its referent. Therefore, even though it includes the referent tree the [absurd] consequence of not excluding the *palāśa,* and so on, does not exist."
[(1)] *ato 'lpabahutvā°* conj (cf. *de'i phyir bsal bar bya ba ñuṅ ṅu daṅ maṅ po ñid kyis ni* T) : *cātolyabahutvā° Ms* (cf. *ataś cātulyāpohyatvāt* above, *de'i phyir yaṅ* etc. T).

[196] *yathaiva hi vṛkṣaśiṃśapāśabdau*[(1)] *<vṛkṣatvaśiṃśapātvaviśiṣṭaṃ vastu bruvāṇāv atyantabhinnārthaṃ> brūtaḥ, tathehāpy <asaṅkīrṇenārthena> bhavitavyam. arthāt tu syād alpabahutarāpohaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 221b7-222a1: <u>*yathaiva hi parasya vṛkṣaśiṃśapāśabdāv asaṅkīrṇam*</u>[(2)] <u>*artham brūtaḥ, tathehāpi bhavitavyam iti samānārthaḥ;*</u> 222a2-3: *arthāt tu syād ityādi,* cf. 224a1: *yad apīdam "arthāt tu syād*[(3)] *alpabahutarāpoha" ity etad apy anyāyam eva.*
[(1)]Cf. *śiṅ daṅ śiṅ śa pa'i sgra dag ni* V : *śiṅ daṅ śiṅ śa pa'i sgra dag gis* K.
[(2)]*°āv a°* em. : *°āc ca° Ms*

(3)*tu syād* em. : *tasmāt* Ms

372 Dignāga points out that he basically follows the same principle as the opponent who, while accepting conventional usage, differentiates between the referents of the words *'śiṃśapā'* and 'tree' as the referents of general terms and particular general terms are not confused in common usage, cf. PST Ms B 222a1-2: <*kutaḥ*>(1) *punar ayaṃ niyamo yat parasyaiva bhavitavyam iti? na*(2) *kutaścit. yathaiva tu pareṇa laukikīm*(3) *pratītim anurakṣatā loke sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor asaṅkīrṇārthatvāc chiṃśapāvṛkṣaśabdayor arthabhedo vyavasthāpyate, tathāsmābhir apīty etāvad ucyate.*

(1)*kutaḥ* conj. (cf. *ci las* T) : om. Ms
(2)*na kha(lu?)* Ms
(3)*lau°* em. : *lo° Ms*

373 Cf. PST Ms B 222a2-4: *kathaṃ tarhi śiṃśapāśabdād bahutarāpohaḥ pratīyate yadi sa tena na kriyata ity āha: arthāt tu syād ityādi. śiṃśapāśabdena hi śiṃśapārthe pratyāyite śiṃśapāyā*(1) *vṛkṣatvenāvinābhāvitvāt sāmarthyāt vṛkṣatvāvagatiḥ. atas tenārthena nirākriyamāṇaṃ*(2) *ghaṭādikam mūḍhaḥ śabdakṛtam manyate:* "How then is the exclusion of more understood from the word *'śiṃśapā'* if it is not effected by this? With this in mind he says: "Yet, by implication there will be," etc. For when the word *'śiṃśapā'* has indicated the referent *śiṃśapā,* treeness is understood by implication because a *śiṃśapā* is invariably connected with treeness. Therefore a fool believes that when a pot, and so on, is implicitly excluded by it [viz. the word *'śiṃśapā'*], it is done explicitly."

In the immediately following excursus Jinendrabuddhi addresses the question of why the word *'śiṃśapā'* only indicates *śiṃśapā*ness directly, whereas it indicates by implication all the other properties that define the *śiṃśapā.* For Dignāga has claimed in a *saṅgrahaśloka* at PS II:18ab that the logical indicator indicates the concomitant properties (the so-called *anubandhinaḥ*) of the indicated. And the logical property of the word *'śiṃśapā'* would constitute a parallel instance, cf. PST Ms B 222a4-222b2: *katham punas tulye liṅgatve dhūmādi sākṣād evānalādau dravyatvādy avagamayati. yad āha: "gamyante liṅgatas te 'pi liṅgino ye 'nubandhinaḥ"* (PS II:18ab) *iti. śiṃśapāśabdaḥ punaḥ sākṣāc chiṃśapātvam eva pratyāyayati, sāmānyantarāṇi tu sāmarthyāt. api cānvayavyatirekalakṣaṇasambandhāpekṣayā śabdaḥ svārthāvagatihetur iṣyate. tat kathaṃ na dravyasattvādīni gamayeta? na hi tadabhāve śabda upalabhyate. naiṣa doṣaḥ. tatra na hy arthasya puruṣakṛtaḥ sambandho, 'pi tu svabhāvataḥ. sa yena yenāvinābhūtaḥ svabhāvataḥ, taṃ tam eva pratyāyayati. śabdasya tu puruṣakṛtasaṅketopanītaḥ sambandhaḥ, na ca dravyatvādau vṛkṣaśabdaḥ saṅketitaḥ. tat kutas tadapekṣayānvayavyatirekau. tato na dravy<atv>ādīnāṃ*(3) *sa gamakaḥ. nanu ca, śabdasyāpy apauruṣeya eva sambandho vivakṣāyām. tatra tajjanyaviśeṣagrahaṇe*(4) *sāmānyāntarāvagatihetutvaṃ tasyeṣṭam eva, aviśeṣagrahaṇe*(5) *vyabhicārān neṣyate. dhūmādāv api liṅga etad tulyam eva. na hi tad api dīptatvādisāmānyaviśeṣam analādau gamayitum alam. tatra ko 'yaṃ śabda eva codyānurāgaḥ:* "How then, as its being an indicator is similar, does smoke, and so on, directly indicate substanceness, and so on, in the case of fire, etc. For as (Dignāga) says: "The concomitants of the indicated are also indicated by the indicator." (PS II:18ab). The word *'śiṃśapā'*, however, indicates *śiṃśapā*ness directly, but [indicates] the other general properties by implication. In addition, it is claimed that a word is the cause of the cognition of its own referent by virtue of its

dependence upon its connection, which is characterized by joint presence and joint absence (cf. PSV V:34). Therefore, why would it not indicate substanceness, etc.? For the word is not apprehended in the absence of these. This is not a problem. For in this case the connection of the referent is not manmade, but rather, it is due to the essential nature [of the referent]. Whatever [referent] with which it is invariably connected, that alone it indicates. The word's connection, however, is brought about by a convention that is manmade. And the word 'tree' is not agreed to denote substanceness. Therefore, how could there be joint presence and joint absence with respect to this [viz. the word 'tree' as denoting substanceness]? Consequently, it does not indicate substanceness, etc.

Certainly, even the word's connection for the sake of denoting the intension [of the speaker] (*vivakṣā*) is by no means due to human agents. In the present context it is claimed that it [viz. the word 'tree'] is a cause of the cognition of other general properties, when the particular [general properties] that are occasioned by it are apprehended, but it is not claimed, when the particular [general properties] are not apprehended because of uncertainty. [6]

The case is the exact same with regard to the logical indicator smoke, etc. For this too is not capable of indicating particular general properties like the radiance in fire, etc. In those circumstances, why this passion for raising questions about the word only?"

The technical term *anubandhin* also occurs in PS II:18-19. It is possible to restore both verses on the basis of quotations and paraphrases at NCV 675,11-16, YD 86,20 (PS II:19cd), and PSṬ Ms B 72b1-3: *gamyante liṅgatas te 'pi liṅgino ye 'nubandhinaḥ, viśeṣā na <tu> gamyante tasyaiva, vyabhicāriṇaḥ.* (PS II:18) *liṅgānubandhinas tv arthā gamayanti na <liṅginam> vyabhicārād, viśeṣās tu pratītāḥ pratipādakāḥ.* (PS II:19): "The concomitants of the indicated are also indicated by the indicator, but its particulars are not indicated at all as they are deviating. (18) The referents that are the concomitants of the indicator, however, do not indicate the indicated on account of deviation. The particulars, however, are indicating insofar as they are cognized" (19).

The commentary on these verses at NCV loc. cit. is far more explicit than Ms B ad loc., and is therefore worthwhile quoting in full: <u>viśeṣās tauṣakārīṣādayo na gamyante tasyaiva, vyabhicāritvād</u> liṅgasya viśeṣaiḥ sahādṛṣṭatvāt. evaṃ liṅgasyānyavyāvṛttaṃ sāmānyaṃ gamakam, nāvyāvṛtam anyataḥ sattvādi. liṅginaḥ sāmānyaṃ gamyaṃ nivṛttam anagnyādibhyo 'gnitvaṃ sattvādi cāgnitvānubaddham avyabhicāritvād iti. liṅge tv ayaṃ punar viśeṣaḥ: <u>liṅgānubandhinas tv arthā</u> ityādiślokaḥ. pūrvodāhṛtāḥ sāmānyadharmāḥ sattvādayo liṅgasya dhūmasya na gamayanti, uktakāraṇatvāt. <u>viśeṣās tu</u> kecid liṅgyavinābhāvinaḥ <u>pratītāḥ pratipādakāḥ</u> pāṇḍutvabahulatvādaya iti. For the *pratīka*s at Ms B loc.cit., cf.: *gamyante liṅgatas te 'pīti ... vyabhicariṇa iti ... liṅgānubandhinas tv arthā iti ... viśiṣṭās* (sic) *tv iti.*

[1]T translates erroneously *śiṅ śa pa'i don rtogs par byas pa na śiṅ śa pa ñid kyaṅ ṅo.*

[2]°*ena nirākri*° conj. : °*enākri*° Ms

[3]°*yatvā*° conj. : °*yā*° *Ms*

[4]°*aṇe sām*° em. : °*aṇasām*° Ms

[5]*eva, avi*° em. : *evāvi*° Ms

[6] The opponent appears to object that even in the case of *vivakṣā,* which is claimed to be indicated by any given word [see note 9 above and Appendix I below], the logical connection is not conventional and manmade, but rather

transcends human agency (*apauruṣeya*). The rest of the argument appears to take for granted that general properties are real things that presuppose observation. Even though the word 'tree' denotes an object which is a substance, the inference of substanceness is only valid if backed by observation of the particular general properties that the object includes.

[197] *yadi bhedo bhedāntarārtham <apoheta, madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruś*[1] *ceti yad etad guṇasya guṇāntaraiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam,> tat katham?* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 222b2-3: *yadi bhedo bhedāntarārtham it … tat katham iti.*

[1]The same example is quoted at TSP 312,25: *tadyathā: madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruś ceti,* cf. *ro mṅar po snum pa graṅ ba lci ba źes bya ba'i yon tan 'di yon tan gźan daṅ gźi mthun pa źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa der ci ltar 'gyur źe na* K : *gaṅ 'di yon tan daṅ yon tan gźan gyis gźi mthun pa ste, ro mṅar pa la snum pa daṅ bsil ba daṅ lci ba ñid do źes pa de ji ltar źe na* V.

374 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 222b2-3: *guṇabhedā hi madhurasnigdhatvādayaḥ. tatraiṣāṃ parasparāpohe sāmānādhikaraṇyena na bhavitavyam. asti ca tat*[1]. *tathā hi madhurarasasya*[1] *guṇāntaraiḥ snigdhatvādibhiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam upalabhyate:* "For sweetness and stickiness, and so on, are different qualities. Under these circumstances there is no co-reference as they exclude one another. And [co-reference] does exist. For instance one observes the co-reference of the sweet taste with other qualitites such as stickiness." And Jinendrabuddhi continues commenting upon the phrase *tat katham* at Ms B 222b3-4: *na kathañcid yujyata iti manyate. anena sāmānādhikaraṇyād madhurādīnāṃ kṛṣṇatilakavad anapoham anumāya virodhasya hetor anekāntikatvam udbhāvayati, apohābhāve 'pi bhāvāt. Madhurasnigdha-śaityādāv*[2] *akāraṇatvaṃ vāpoham prati virodhasya, saty api tasminn avikalpye*[3] *tadabhāvād iti.*

[1] *tat* em. : *tataḥ* Ms

[2]*madhurarasasya* conj. : *carakerasasya* Ms

[3]*mtshaṅ na* (sic) T.

[198] *sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tu.* Qu. Ms B 222b5.

375 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 222b5–223a1: *yad etat sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ guṇabhedānāṃ tadāśrayeṇāvirodhāt. madhurādīnāṃ yad āśrayabhūtaṃ dravyaṃ tena teṣāṃ avirodhaḥ, na hi guṇāḥ svāśrayeṇa virudhyante*[1]. *dravyam eva ca madhuraguṇam, tasyaiva ca śītasnigdhādayo guṇāḥ, na rasasya guṇasya. atas tatra dravye vṛttā rasa upacaryante. upacāranibandhanam punar ekārthasāmāvāyaḥ. upacāraphalaṃ tu mādhuryasya snehādibhiḥ sāhacaryakhyāpanam. tataś ca yathā teṣāṃ mukhya āśrayo dravyaṃ madhurādiguṇayogād "madhuraṃ dravyaṃ śītaṃ guru" cety ucyate, tathopacarito 'py āśrayo madhurākhyo rasaḥ snigdhatvādiguṇayogād "madhuro rasaḥ snigdho guruś" cety ucyate. tad evaṃ gauṇam atra sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ kalpitam ity uktam bhavati. na ca kalpitārthavaśād vastunaḥ tādātmyaṃ sidhyatīti. nāsti yathoktadoṣaḥ:* "The co-reference of the various qualities is due to their not being in contradiciton with their substrate. That is, the [quality] sweet [taste] and the rest, are not in contradiction with the substance that is their substrate. For qualitites are not in contradiction with their own substrate. And only the substance has the quality sweet [taste], and only this [viz. the substance] has such qualities as cold and sticky, but the quality taste does not. Therefore they are

transferred to [the sweet] taste as resident in the substance. The cause of transfer, moreover, is [their] inherence in one and the same referent. The effect of transfer, however, is the enunciation of the concomitance of sweetness with stickiness and the rest. And therefore, just as their primary substrate viz. the substance is said to be a substance that is sweet, cool, and heavy because it is connected with the quality sweet, and so on, in the same way the taste called sweet, although it is substrate in a transferred sense, is said to be a sweet sticky and heavy taste because of the connection with the quality stickiness, etc. Thus the co-reference which in this case is secondary is said to be imaginary;" cf. TSP (ad TS 781) 312,26ff: *yatraiva hi dravye mādhuryaṃ samavetaṃ tatraiva śītatvādayo 'pīty ekārthasamavāyabalād atra bhavati sāmānādhikaraṇyam.*

(1)*vi°* em. : *ni° Ms*

376 I assume that *rdzas yod la ni* V : *rdzas* K translates Sanskrit **dravye sati.*

377 Cf. *źes pa'i* V : *phyir* K.

[199] *adṛṣṭatvād vyudāso vā.* Qu. Ms B 223a1; ŚVṬ 71,6, NR 431,1.

378 In PSV V:25cd Dignāga introduces conflict (*virodha*) as the cause of exclusion and makes use of this term throughout the following paragraphs to describe the action of exclusion of other referents. However, Dignāga's use of the disjunction *vā* at this juncture serves the purpose of introducing an epistemologically valid alternative to *virodhitva* as the cause of exclusion. Dignāga's statement at PS V:31a invalidates the previous discussion, and makes it look problematic, if not entirely superfluous.

Bhaṭṭaputra Jayamiśra correctly interpreted the introduction of non-observation (*adṛṣṭatva, adarśana*) as another cause of exclusion than conflict (*virodha*) or being in conflict (*virodhitva*), which Dignāga introduces at PS V:25a above. Cf. his introduction to the quotation of PS V:31a at ŚVṬ 71,5: *bhikṣuṇāparaṃ kāraṇam uktam,* and the explanation at NR 431,1-2: *adṛṣṭatvād vyudāso vā bhedānām itaretaram iti śiṃśapāśabdaḥ palāśādāv adṛṣṭaḥ tasyāpohaṃ karotīti.*

Jinendrabuddhi interprets *vā* in the sense of *eva,* which excludes *virodha* and *virodhitva* as the cause of *apoha,* cf. Ms B 223a2: *vāśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ. adṛṣṭatvād eva vyudāsaḥ, na virodhitvād ity arthaḥ. yathā kṛtakatvaṃ nityeṣv adarśanāt*(1) *tadapohaṃ karoti, tathā bhedaśabdo bhedāntareṣv adarśanāt tadapo-ham karoti:* "The word *vā* has a restrictive meaning. The meaning is this: exclusion is only due to not being observed, not due to being hostile. Just as the general property being produced excludes permanent [things] because of not being observed in these, a particular term excludes other particulars because of not being observed to denote these." Although the interpretation of *vā* as *avadhāraṇa* is supported by the indigenous Sanskrit lexicographers, cf., e.g., Amarakośa IV.16cd: *vai vety avadhāraṇavācakaḥ,* Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation is formally correct in the context of Dignāga's exposition at PSV V:34 below. However, *vā* which is repeated in the *vṛtti* where evidently it has no restrictive function merely serves the purpose of introducing the only valid reason of exclusion. It marks the introduction of the *siddhānta* as is generally the case in Indian *śāstra* literature, and leaves the impression that Dignāga depends on earlier sources, which explained exclusion in

terms of *virodha,* and now introduces non-observation as the real cause of exclusion of other referents, which ultimately reflects his own epistemology and logic.

　[1] °*eṣv adarśa*° em. : °*eṣu darśa*° Ms

[200] <*atha vā*>[1]*yasmād bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārthe*[2] *na dṛṣṭaḥ, tasmād apohate. kasmāt tu na dṛṣṭa iti*[3]*?* Restored, cf. ŚVṬ 71,6-7: *yasmād bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārthe na dṛṣṭaḥ, tasmād apohate;* PSṬ Ms B 223a2-3: *kasmāt tu na dṛṣṭa iti.*

　[1] *yaṅ na* K : om. V.
　[2] °*arthe* conj. : °*artho* ŚVṬ.
　[1] For *iti, cf. źe na* K : *ci ste ... źes bya* V.

[379] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 223a3: *śiṃśapāśabdasya palāśādāv adarśanasya kāraṇam pṛcchati:* "He asks for the reason why the word *'śiṃśapā'* is not observed to denote a *palaśa,* etc."

[380] Cf. *kha cig gis 'gal ba'i phyir* K : *kho bo cag gis ... bkag pa'i phyir ro* V.

[201] *svābhāvike 'py arthe ... āhopuruṣikā pratipannā*; cf. PSṬ Ms B 223a3: *svābhāvike 'py artha iti.* 223a7: *āhopuruṣikā pratipanneti.* Cf. 224a4: *kiṃ punaḥ kāraṇam ācāryenāhopuruṣikā pratipannā.*

[381] The extant Sanskrit fragments of this sentence do not, unfortunately, clarify the divergent translations of K and V. Although Jinendrabuddhi comments on Dignāga's statement with the background of Dharmakīrtian and post-Dharmakīrtian philosophy, the introductory part of his explanation presumably reflects Dignāga's own view. I have therefore adopted the readings of K that seem to fit Jinendrabuddhi's explanation. According to Jinendrabuddhi Dignāga introduces non-observation (*adarśana*) as the cause of exclusion because being in conflict (*virodhitva*) is merely an implied feature (*upalakṣaṇamātram*), cf. PSṬ Ms B 223a3-6: *hetupratyayasvabhāvapratibaddhatayā svābhāvikaḥ śabdalakṣaṇo 'rtha itīhābhipretaḥ. śiṃśapādiśabdo hi śiṃśapādivivakṣayaiva prayujyate, na palāśādivivakṣayā. ataḥ śiṃśapāvivakṣāsvabhāve pratibaddhatvāt palāśādiṣu śiṃśapāśabdasya prayogo na bhavati. tataś ca tatrādarśanam. tad etasmiṃ svābhāvike*[1] *'rthe tasyādarśanam bhedāntarāpohasamartham utsṛjya yad virodhitvaṃ pratikṣepakāraṇam uktam, tad nyāyamuktasyāhopuruṣike*[2]*ty arthaḥ. virodhitvam upalakṣaṇamātram. anyad api yat tadadhikāraṇam uktaṃ tad api veditavyam. "aho aham" iti yo*[3] *manyate, so 'hopuruṣaḥ. tadbhāva āhopuruṣikā. sā punar abhimānaḥ, sa hy ahopuruṣaśabdasya prayojakaḥ:* "What is intended here is that the referent as characterized by the word is natural on account of its being dependent upon the inherent nature of its causes and conditions. For the word '*śiṃśapā*', and so on, is only applied with the intention to denote the *śiṃśapā,* but not with the intention to denote the '*palāśa',* etc. Therefore, since it is dependent upon the inherent nature of the intention to denote the *śiṃśapā,* the word '*śiṃśapā*' is not applied to the *palāśa* tree, etc.; and therefore it is not observed to denote these. Consequently, when some reject that the fact that it is not observed to denote this natural referent is incapable of excluding other particulars, and claims that being in conflict is the cause of exclusion, [this claim] is [an expression of] the conceit of some who has abandoned logic. Such is the meaning. Being in conflict is merely a secondary feature. One

should also know the other cause transcending this, which has been set forth. The person who thinks, 'Ah! What a person I am,' is a conceited person (*ahopuruṣa*); as an essential state (*tadbhāva*) [cf. A V 1:119] *āhopuruṣikā* is 'personal conceitedness.' Moreover, it is haughtiness (*abhimāna*), for this prompts the application of the word *ahopuruṣa.*"

The following excursus at Ms 223a7-224a5 contains an explicit criticism of Dignāga's position. It is indebted to Dharmakīrtian philosophy: *kim punar atrāyuktaṃ yenaivam āha: "āhopuruṣikā pratipanne"ti. "bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpahāritvāt rājaputravat parasparavirodhinā"* (= PSV V:28ab) *iti. etad eva tāvad ayuktam. tathā hi sāmānyārthāpahāritvaṃ virodhasya hetutvenopāttaṃ, tac ca śabdānāṃ viśiṣṭe viṣaye sāmānyārthapratyāyanalakṣaṇaṃ rājaputrāṇāṃ tadvijātīyaṃ rājyasvīkaraṇalakṣaṇam, yasmin sati svasmin vijite dānādikriyāsu svatantro bhavati. tatra yadi śabdagataṃ sāmānyārthāpahāritvaṃ hetutvenopā-dīyate*[4], *dṛṣṭānto*[5] *hetuvikalaḥ syāt. atha rājaputragataṃ hetor asiddhatā. śabdamātraṃ hi tatrābhinnam, nārthaḥ kaścit. na ca tato 'rthasiddhiḥ. na hy anapekṣitavastukaṃ śabdamātram icchāmātrabhāvi vidyata iti. vastugamyaṃ vastu sidhyati. yathoktam: "vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdasāmyād abhedinaḥ, na yuktānumitiḥ pāṇḍudravyādivad dhutāśane* (= PV II:12). *jātyantare prasiddhasya śabdasāmyadarśanāt, na yuktaṃ sādhanaṃ gotvād vāgavādīnāṃ viṣāṇivad"* (= PV II:15) *iti. na ca bhedaśabdena kevalena sāmānyārtho viśiṣṭe viṣaye pratyāpyate, kiṃ tarhi sāmānyaśabdasahitena. tataś cobhābhyāṃ saṃhatya*[6] *sāmānyārthāpahārād bhedaśabdasya yadi tato bhedāntaraśabdena virodhaḥ sāmānyaśabdasyāpi syāt. na cāsti. tasmād ayuktam etat. yad apy uktaṃ "na sākṣāt tasya te 'pohyā. mā bhūt sāmānyatulyatā"* (PSV V:29ab). *"yadi hi sākṣād apoheta*[7] *vṛkṣaśabdenāviśiṣṭaḥ syād ityādi* (PSV V:29cd). *tad apy asad eva. yatra hi śabdaḥ saṅketyate, tam evāha. śiṃśapāśabdaś ca śiṃśapāyām eva saṅketyate na vṛkṣasāmānye. tato yady api tena sakṣād ghaṭādayo 'pohyante, tathāpi naiva vṛkṣatvam upādīyate. yad apīdam "arthāt tu syāt*[8] *alpabahutarāpoha"* (PSV V:29cd) *ity etad apy anyāyam eva, bhedasyobhayagatatvāt, svārthasya ca bhedarūpatvāt. anyatarabhedacodane 'py ubhayagato bhedo* (cf. PVSV 63,3f) *'numīyate*[9]. *yathā devadatto yajñadattasya bhrātety ukte yajñadattasyāpi bhrātṛtvam. na hy ayam asti sambhavo yat devadatto yajñadattasya bhrātā syāt, na tu yajñadattas tasyety. uktam etat: yathā ca śiṃśa-pāyāḥ palāśādibhyo bhedas tathā ghaṭādibhyo 'pi, tataś ca śiṃśapācodane yathā palāśādyapohaḥ pratīyata evaṃ ghaṭādyapoho 'pi. tat kuto 'yaṃ vibhāgo labhyate: palāśādayas tasya sākṣad apohyā ghaṭādayas tv arthata iti. kim punaḥ kāraṇam ācāryeṇ"āhopuruṣikā pratipannā," punaś ca tāṃ vihāya nyāya*[11] *evāvalambitaḥ? yuktyapetam bahv api ghoṣayadbhir na śakyate vastutatvaṃ vyavasthāpayitum. tasmān nyāyam abhisandhāya*[12] *vastunas tattvam āhopuruṣikayā ye pratipāda-yitum icchanti tais tān*[13] *tyaktvā yuktir evānusartavyeti sūcanārtham.*

[1] *etasmiṃ svā°* em. : *tasmin asvā°* Ms

[2] *°e* em. : *°am* Ms

[3] *yo* em. : *yo na* Ms

[4] *hetutve°* em. : *hetve°* Ms

[5] *°ānto* em. : *°ānte* Ms

[7] *saṃha°* conj. (cf. *'dus nas* T) : *ha°* Ms

[8] *°eta* em. : *°e tu* Ms

[9] *tu syāt* em. : *tasmād* Ms

[10] *'nu°* em. : *vamīyate* Ms

[11] *°laṃbi°* em. : *°laṃpi°* Ms

(12) *abhisandhāya* conj. (cf. *dgoṅs nas* T) : (*unn?*)*aṃ*(*gh?*)*ya* Ms

[202] *evaṃ tarhi sāmānyaṃ syāt svabhedanut.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 224a5: *evaṃ tarhītyādinā;* ŚVṬ 71,15: *sāmānyaṃ syāt svabhedanut,* cf. NR 431,5-6: *tatra bhikṣuṇā coditam: sāmānyaṃ syād viśeṣāpohāt.*

382 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 224a5-6: *evaṃ tarhītyādinā sāmānyaśabdasya viśeṣeṣv adarśane saty apy apohasyābhāvād*(1) *apohasyātaddhetukatvam.*
(1)*apy apo*° em. : *avy ahopuruṣik{ā}? apo*° Ms

[203] *yady adarśanenāpohate,* <*sāmānyaśabdasyāpi svabhedeṣv adarśanād*(1) *apohaprasaṅgaḥ*(2) *syāt*>. Restored, cf. ŚVṬ 71,12f: *yady adarśanena bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārtham apohate.*
(1)*phyir* K. : *źes* V.
(2)*sel bar* K : *gźan sel bar* V.

383 Cf. the parallel objection reproduced as *pūrvapakṣa* at ŚVṬ 71,12-14: *yady adarśanena bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārtham apohate. atha kasmāt sāmānyaśabdo 'pi bhedārthaṃ nāpohate, so 'pi hi na tatra dṛṣṭa eveti:* "If a particular term excludes the referent of other particular terms, then why does a general term not exclude the referent of a particular term too? For this [viz. the general term] too is not observed to denote these."

[204] *nānyayuktasya dṛṣṭatvāt.* Qu. Ms B 224a6; ŚVṬ 71,22; NR 431,11.

384 That is, contextual factors like motive and context. One cannot exclude the possibility that *anya* = *anyaśabda,* cf. the parallel at VP II:264: *arthaprakaraṇāpekṣo yo vā śabdāntaraiḥ saha yuktaḥ, pratyāyaty arthaṃ taṃ gauṇam apare viduḥ;* VP II:251cd, q.v. below no. 386.

[205] *dṛṣṭo hy arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 224a6-7: *dṛṣṭo hy arthaprakaraṇādibhir*(1) *iti ... sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati;* cf. ŚVṬ 71,19-20: *yaḥ punar asyāṃ paricodanāyāṃ bhikṣuṇā parihāro dattaḥ: arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣeṣu dṛśyate. ato nāsty adarśanam iti.*
(1)°*ādibh*° em. : °*ābh*° Ms

385 Cf. VP II:251cd: *arthaprakaraṇābhyāṃ vā yogāc chabdāntareṇa vā;* VPV II 255,9-12 ad loc.: *arthaprakaraṇaśabdāntarasambandhādīni pravibhāge nimittāni. arthena añjalinā juhoti ... prakaraṇena tu bhojanādinā saindhavādīnāṃ śabdānām arthaviśeṣāvacchedāḥ kriyante. śabdāntareṇābhisambandhenāgnir māṇavako gaur vāhika iti;* see also VP II:314-316 with VPV ad loc. Ms B 224a6-224b1: *ādiśabdena saṃsargādayo gṛhyante. tatra sāmārthyena sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣam pratipādayati. tadyathābhirūpāya kanyā deyeti. antareṇāpi vacanam abhirūpāyaiva kanyādānaṃ siddham eva. vacanasāmarthyād abhirūpatamāyeti*(1) *gamyate*(2). *prakaraṇena bhojanaṃ gopasaṃhāraprakaraṇe saindhavam ānayety ukte lavaṇa eva pratyayo bhavati*(3). *saṃsargeṇa savatsā dhenur ānīyatām ity ukte godhenur eva pratīyate*(4). For the treatment of contextual factors in Sanskrit grammatical lit., cf. *Raja* 1963: 48f.

(1) *°rūpat°* em. : *°rūta°* Ms

(2)Cf. Mahā-bh I 331,17-18 (ad A I.4:42): *tadyathā loke ... abhirūpāya kanyā deye ti na cānabhirūpe pravṛttir asti tatrābhirūpātamāyeti gamyate.* VPV II 275,23f (ad 315-16): *abhirūpāya kanyā dīyatām ... na cānabhirūpe pravṛttir asti. Tatrābhirūpatarāyeti vijñāyate.*

(3)Cf. VPV II 274,13f (ad loc. cit.): *arthāt prakaraṇād vā loke viśeṣagatir iti ... saindhavam ānaya mṛgayāṃ ca kariṣyāmīti ... tadyathāntareṇa śabdam bhujyaṅge saṃhriyamāṇe saindhavam ānāyeti nāśve sampratyayo bhavati.*

(4)Cf. VPV II 273,18f (ad loc. cit.): *saṃsargād dhenur ānīyatām ... vyavasthitasya viśeṣasyāsampratyayaḥ ... savatseti.*

386 Cf. Mahā-bh I 220,5-6 : *sāmānyaśabdāś ca nāntareṇa viśeṣam prakaraṇaṃ vā viśeṣeṣv avatiṣṭhante.* VP II:214; VNṬ 7,24-25: *yad āha: na hi viśeṣa-śabdasannidhir eva śabdānāṃ viśeṣāvāsthitihetuḥ, api tu prakaraṇasāmarthyādikam api.*

[206] *ta<dābhaḥ>*(1) *saṃśayas tathā.* Qu. Ms B 224b1-2.
(1)*°dābhaḥ* conj. (cf. *der snaṅ* K : *de snaṅ* V) : *tan nitaḥ* Ms

387 Cf. *spyi'i sgra <las>*(1) V : *spyi'i las* K.
(1)*las* conj, cf. K above : om. V.

388 T *snaṅ ba* translates in this case Sanskrit *ābhāsaḥ.* For a similar use of *ābhāsa* qualifying *saṃśaya,* cf. PSV V:34 below.

389 Cf. *de rnams la yaṅ* V : *de yod pa rnams kyaṅ* K.

390 That is, even though the general term previously has been observed to denote its particulars, the use of it without the necessary restriction of its scope is similar to the use of the term uprightness whose scope is restricted to denote the uprightness of a tree by the addition of the term 'crows nest', cf. PSV V:14 above.

391 Cf. the absurd translation *re źig 'greṅ ba la* V (= *ūrdhve* [?] *tāvat* sic).

392 Although KV are syntactically confused and the readings diverge, the *svabhāvahetu* formulated by Jinendrabuddhi gives a sufficiently clear indication of its context, so that it is possible to eliminate the errors, cf. PSṬ Ms B 224b2-3: *sāmānyaśabdasya viśeṣeṣu darśane hetvantaram āha. na hi caitraśabdasya madhurādiṣv adṛṣṭapūrvasya tadākārasaṃśayahetutvam. etena yaḥ svabhedākārasaṃśayahetuḥ sa svabhedeṣu dṛṣṭapūrvaḥ, ūrdhvatāvat. tathā ca sāmānyaśabda iti svabhāvam āha:* "He formulates another reason for the observation of a general term at the particulars. For the word *caitra*(1) is not a cause of doubt about its mental picture when it has not previously been observed to denote sweet things (*madhura*), etc. Therefore, that which is a cause of doubt about the mental picture of its own particulars has been observed previously to denote its own particulars, in the same way as 'uprightness'. And a general term is like that." After this explanation Jinendrabuddhi adds a brief discussion with reference to the general term *śrāvaṇatva,* cf. 224b3-5: *nanu ca śrāvaṇatvenānekāntaḥ. tad dhi na kvacit dṛśyate saṃśayahetuś ca. naitad asti. śravaṇatvasya hi śrāvaṇaviśeṣātmakā eva svabhedāḥ.*

tatra ca tat dṛṣṭam eva, na tu punar nityādayaḥ padārthāḥ. tasya bhedā yeṣu tan na dṛṣṭam ity acodyam etat. sāmānyatve vā satīti viśeṣaṇam atra draṣṭavyam. tac ca sāmānyaśabdādhikārād labhyate.
[1]Cf. Amarakośa III.15.

[207] *saṃśayo 'yukta iti cet. <idaṃ> manyate: yady arthaprakaraṇādisahita <ev*[1]*opalabdhaḥ> syāt, tataḥ <kathaṃ saṃśaya> iti.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 224b5: *saṃśayo 'yukta iti ced iti;* B 224b5-6: <u>yady arthaprakaraṇādisahitaḥ</u>[2] <u>syāt, saṃśayahetur na syāt, kākanilayanasahitordhvatāvat. asti ca saṃśayaḥ. tato yathā svabhedeṣūpalabdhapūrvatā tathārthādisahitatvābhāvo 'pīti viruddho hetur iti manyate.</u>
[1]Cf. *kho na* K : om. V.
[2] °*śayo* em. : °*śaye* Ms

[208] *niścite kevalāt tu saḥ. naiva arthādisahitāc chaṃśaya ity ucyate*[1], *kiṃ tarhy arthādisahitāt. niścita uttarakālaṃ kevalāt saṃśayaḥ.* Restored, cf. Ms 224b6: *niścite kevalāt tu sa ityādi;* B 224b6-7: <u>naiva viśeṣasahitāt saṃśaya ucyate, kiṃ tarhy arthaprakaraṇādisahitāt sāmānyaśabdāc chiṃśapādau viśeṣe niścita uttarakālaṃ kevalād viśeṣeṣu saṃśayaḥ.</u>
[1]*brjod par mi bya ste* V : *brjod pa* K.

393 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 224b7-225a1: *etenārthādisahitopalabdhikāle saṃśayahetutvāsiddheḥ, yadā ca saṃśayahetutvaṃ tadārthādisahitatvāpratijñānād nāsti viruddhateti darśayati.*

[209] *bhede <na kevalo 'sti> cet.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a1: *bhede ced iti*[1].
[1]Ms so, but T reproduces 32c in toto.

394 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a1: *kevalasya bhedeṣu prayoga eva nāsti tadanabhidhāyitvāc*[1] *chabdāntaravat. na vāprayuktasya saṃśayahetutvam upapadyate iti. evam apy asiddhaṃ svabhedākārasaṃśayahetutvam.*
[1]°*anabhi*° em. : °*abhi*°.

395 Cf. *'dir* K : om. V.

396 Cf. *spyi'i sgra* V : *ci'i sgra* K.

[210] *dṛṣṭaḥ śrotṛvyapekṣayā.* Qu Ms B 225a2.

[211] *yadā hi śrotānyasāmānyavyudāsenārthībhavati, <tadyathā> kiṃ vṛkṣaḥ pārthiva uta pañcamahābhautika ity <ukte>, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya prayogaḥ sambhavati.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a2: *yadā hītyādi*[1]. <u>yadā hi śrotrā ... tadanyasāmānyavyudāsenārthībhavati, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya pārthivaśabdasya prayogaḥ sambhavati.</u> Ms B 225a4: *kiṃ vṛkṣaḥ pārthiva uta pañcamahābhautika iti.*
The translations of this clause in KV deviate considerably in terms of syntax and meaning from the paraphrase at Ms B 225a2-3 and appear to have been based upon a corrupt text. K and V state: For when (*yadā hi*) the listener, after having excluded another general property, is in need of [a word] alone, like, for instance, the answer

'earthen,' when he asks "is a tree earthen (*pārthiva*) or does it consist of the five principal elements (*pañcamahābhautika*)?" Cf. Ms loc. cit.: *yadā hi śrotrā vṛkṣasvabhāvam prati saṃśayitaḥ, pārthivatvadīnāṃ sāmānyānāṃ anyatamasvabhāvapratipattyarthaṃ tadanyasāmānyavyudāsenārthībhavati, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya pārthivaśabdasya prayogaḥ sambhavati:* "For when (*yadā*) the listener who is in doubt about the essential nature of a tree in order to get to know either nature of [its] general properties such as earthenness, and so on, asks for the exclusion of its other general, (*tadā*) it is possible to apply 'earthen' alone saying 'earthen' (*pārthiva iti*)."

When juxtaposing the two Tibetan translations and Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase it is obvious that neither K nor V reproduce the expected apodosis, which is introduced by *tadā* in the paraphrase. K, on the one hand, reproduces Sanskrit *yadā* by *gaṅ gi tshe* : om. V, but neither K nor V translate *tadā*. In addition, they both seem to have misundertood the syntax of Sanskrit *arthībhavati* = *don du gñer bar 'gyur te* K : *don du gñer ba yin te* V, which is constructed with instr. of the thing requested/asked for. It is highly likely that Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase: *tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya pārthivaśabdasya prayogaḥ sambhavati* incorporates the original apodosis because it contains a gloss *pārthivaśabdasya* on *pārthiva iti kevalasya* that otherwise would seem unnecessary. KV may have preserved part of the apodosis in the clause *sa las gyur pa 'o źes smras pa lta bu 'o* K : *sa la byuṅ ba' o źes brjod pa bźin no* V, which, however, was interpreted as part of the sentence illustrating the use of the word *pārthiva* alone. A trace of the word *kevala* is probably found in *yaṅ gar ba don du gñer ba* V : *'ba' źig kho na don du gñer bar 'gyur te* K.

(1) *hī°* em. : *pī°* Ms

[397] Cf. Bhartṛhari's use of the term *arthitvam* at VPV II 323,16-17: *yathaiva prayoktur abhidhānam arthāvacchedanimittaṃ tathaiva pratipattur apy arthitvam ... tathā "kiṃvarṇaḥ," "kutaḥ krānta" iti praśne "śveto dhāvati, atikrānta" ityevamādy api sambhavati:* "Just as the intention of the speaker is a cause of determining the meaning, so also the request of the listener ... For instance, at the question "of what colour," "from where did he run away" [answers like 'the white horse is galopping away (*śveto dhāvati*)/the dog ran away from here'(1) (< *śvā + itaḥ + dhāvati*) are also possible."

(1)This example is recorded at Mahā-bh I 14,14.

[212] *niścite tarhi <tasya> vṛkṣe*(1)*kutaḥ pārthivaśabdaprayogāt*(2) *saṃśaya iti <cet>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a3-4: *niścite tarhītyādinā saṃśayānupapattiṃ darśayati ... niścite praṣṭur vṛkṣe kutaḥ kevalāt sāmānyaśabdāt saṃśayaḥ.*

(1)Cf. *gal te de'i śiṅ ṅes pa la* K : *de ṅes pa'i ltar na ni de'i śiṅ la* V.

(2)Cf. *sa las gyur pa'i sgra sbyor ba'i phyir* K : *sa las byuṅ ba'i sgra sbyor ro źes pa'i* V.

[213] *tasya niścite 'nyasya <kevalāt saṃśayaḥ>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a4: *tasya niścite 'nyasyeti.*

[214] *yathā cā<rthāntarāpoho 'rthe*(1) *sāmānyaṃ, tathā>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225a6: *yathā cetyādi.*

[1]Cf. *ci ltar don la don gźan gsal ba spyi yin pa de bźin du* K : *ji ltar don gźan sel ba de bźin du spyi yaṅ* V. K would seem to translate a text like **arthāntarāpoho 'rthe sāmānyam:* "The general property in the referent is exclusion of other referents." This translation reflects the content of § 46 which is to show that the *sāmānya* in *śabda* is similar to that in *artha* namely exclusion of other speech units and other referents. The locative evidently imitates contemporary usage, which is based upon the assumption that that general properties are inherent in the objects they qualify.

398 In this paragraph Dignāga introduces the concept of general word property *śabdasāmānya,* which he defines as exclusion of other words, analogous to the definition of the general property of the referent viz. *arthasāmānya,* which is exclusion of other referents cf. PST Ms B 225a5-6: *evam arthasāmānyaṃ vyutpādya śabdasāmānyaṃ vyutpādayitum āha: yathā cetyādi;* cf. *Pind* 1991.

The subsequent exposition at Ms B 225a6-225b1 is strongly influenced by Dharmakīrtian philosophy (cf., e.g., the discussion at PVSV 38,17ff), although the concept of *śabdasāmānya* never occurs in Dharmakīrti's works: *yathārtheṣv ekārthakriyākārivyaktibhedānubhavadvārāyāto buddhau viparivartamāmaḥ sāmānyākāro vyavahārānuyātibhir bāhyarūpatayā vyavasīyamāno 'rthāntaravyudāsākhyaṃ*[1] *sāmānyaṃ gamakaṃ, tathā śabdeṣv atatkāryavyāvṛttaśabdasvalakṣaṇānubhavāhitavibhramavāsanopanītajanmā*[2] *bauddhaḥ sāmānyākāro vyavahārānuyātibhir bahiḥ śabdamātrāṃ upāyitvenāvyavasitaḥ śabdāntaravyavacchedākhyaṃ*[1] *sāmānyaṃ vyavasthāpyate.*
   [1] em. : °*aḥ* Ms
   [2] °*vibhrama*° em. : °*vidrama*° Ms

399 This paragraph is important for understanding the rationale of the *apoha* theory. Dignāga's use of the locative imitates contemporary philosophical usage. The schools of thought, whose views Dignāga analyses and rejects as untenable, considered general properties as a real entities resident in any given referent (*arthe*) or word (*śabde*). They were considered as constituting the semantic justification for the application of words. Dignāga, however, rejects that there are general properties in things or words, and he maintains that exclusion of other referents or other words is equivalent to the function of real general properties as maintained e.g. by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. Exclusion of other is like the opponents' real general properties assumed to be an inherent property of things and words, which means that Dignāga regarded exclusion as an inherent natural property of things and words: they exclude other things by their very nature. Exclusion thus defines in a general way their difference from other things and words, in spite of the fact that the individual differences of things and words (their *svalakṣaṇa*) is beyond linguistic representation. This explains why Dignāga introduces the concept of substrate (*āśraya*) of exclusion in § 51 below. This term only makes sense if one interprets it as referring to an actual substrate. As will become clear in the crucial paragraphs starting with PSV V:34, exclusion is equivalent to the non-existence (*abhāva*) or absence of other things from the locus of the referent of any given word, exclusion being an inherent property of the excluding word and thing. This explains why Dignāga claims that a word denotes its referent as qualified by preclusion or negation of other (referents). In other words, any given word excludes other words and the referents of other words in the same way as its own referent inherently

excludes other things. The referent is supposed to be a real entity (*vastu*) qualified by preclusion as appears from the important fragment from Sāmānyaparīksāvyāsa quoted no. 182 above, which states that the referent is an object (*vastu*) qualified by preclusion (*nivrttiviśiṣṭaṃ vastu śabdārthaḥ*) i.e. non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent.

[215] <*śabdāntaravyavacchedaḥ*> *śabde sāmānyam ucyate*[1]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b1-3, q.v. below no. **[216]**.

[1]Cf. *sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa ni sgra la spyir ni brjod pa yin* K : *sgra gźan rnam par bcad nas ni sgra'i spyi rjod par byed pa yin* V. K presupposes the reading **śabdāntaravyavacchedaḥ.* V is impossible to construe.

[216] *yathaiva akrtakavyudāsena*[1] *yat krtakatvaṃ*[2] *tat sāmānyam anityatvādi-gamakam, tathā śabdāntaravyavacchedena śabde sāmānyam ucyate. tenaiva cārtha-pratyāyakaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b1-3: <u>*yathaivetyādinā kārikārtham ācaṣṭe … akrtakavyudāsena hetunā yat krtakatvam*</u>[2] *buddhipratibhāsaviśeṣaḥ.* <u>*yathaiva tat sāmānyaṃ krtakavyaktisādhāraṇatvād anityatvādigamakaṃ tathā śabdāntara-vyavacchedena*</u>[3] *hetunā vijñānākāraviśeṣarūpaṃ* <u>*śabde svasāmānyam*</u>[4] <u>*ucyate. tenaiva cārthapratyāyakaḥ śabdaḥ.*</u>

[1]Cf. *ma byas pa rnam par bsal ba'i spyi yis mi rtag pa la sogs pa go bar byed pa* (sic) V : *ma byas pa bsal ba'i phyir mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa go bar byed pa* K.

[2] °*katvam* em. (cf. *byas pa ñid* T, *byas pa ñid* K : *byas pas* V) : °*kaṃ* Ms

[3]Cf. *sgra gźan rnam par gcod pa'i sgra la spyir brjod pa* K : *sgra gźan rnam par bcad pa'i sgra'i spyis brod par byed do* V. KV do not corroborate °*vyavacchedena* Ms.

[4] *śabde sāmānyam* conj (cf. *sgra la raṅ gi spyi* T) : *śabdeṣu sāmānyam* Ms. In contrast to T, Ms and KV do not corroborate *svasāmānyam.*

[400] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b1-2: *hetau trtīyā. akrtakatvavyudāsaḥ krtakaṃ vastūcyate, na hi vyāvrtti vyāvrttimato* (cf. PVSV 32,15ff) *'nyety uktam. vyāvrtti vyudāso vyavaccheda iti hi paryāyāḥ:* the thrid triplet is to denote the cause. The exclusion of not-produced [things] is explained to be an object (*vastu*] that is produced; cf. Dignāga's exposition of what constitutes the indicative function of *krtakatva* at PSV II:22, v. above no.s 13 and 400. Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase of the argument at Ms B 225b1-3 (cf. no. [216] above) explains that the general property in a word is its exclusion of other words, the general property itself having the appearence of a particular form in consciousness. It is remarkable, though, that it is impossible to trace a single passage in PSV V, in which Dignāga makes clear that general properties are mental constructs located in consciousness.

[401] That is, only the word type, which is qualified by exclusion of other words denotes, in contrast to its individual instantiations, the *svalakṣaṇas* because they have not been observed before; cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 225b4, quoting a ślokapāda: *na tu svalakṣaṇena "tasya pūrvam adrṣtatvād" iti* that stems from a well-known verse in which Dignāga explains that the relation between signifier and signified can only be established in terms of their types, the underlying supposition being that these two types are each defined by exclusion of other: *nārthaśabdaviśeṣasya vācyavācakatesyate | tasya pūrvam adrṣtatvāt; sāmānyaṃ tūpadekṣyate:* "It is not claimed that there is a signifier-signified relationship

between an individual referent and an individual word (*arthaśabdaviśeṣa*) because they have not previously been observed (together); their general property, however, will be taught." Cf. Kumārila's statement at ŚV Apoha° 102: *bhavadbhiḥ śabda-bhedo 'pi tannimitto na labhyate, na hy asādhāraṇaḥ śabdo vācakaḥ prāg adṛṣṭitaḥ:* "Nor do you assume that the difference between words is caused by the (*vāsanā*s), for [according to your theory] an individual (*asādhāraṇaḥ*) word does not denote because of not being previously observed [together with its referent]." ŚV Apoha° 104 equating *śabdāntarāpoha* with *śabdasāmānya* corroborates the assumption that the verse is from one of Dignāga's works. Kamalaśīla quotes it explaining at TSP 377,18 that the general property of the word that denotes (*śabdasāmānyaṃ vācakaṃ*) is exclusion of other words (*śabdāntarāpohaḥ*), which he compares to the general property of the referent (*arthasāmānyam*), defined as exclusion of other referents (*arthāntarāpohaḥ*). The verse is inter alia quoted at NCV p. 615,12–13 with the introductory remark: *arthaviśeṣaś ca tavāvācya eva;* Siṃhasūri quotes at NCV 616,10-11 a short prose passage from the same work (presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa) stating that the word denotes the general feature (*sāmānya*): *yad apy uktaṃ: pūrvadṛṣṭasāmānyena dhūmenāgnyanumānavad abhidhānaṃ sāmānyasya śabdena na viśeṣasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvād iti:* "Just as fire is inferred by means of smoke whose general property [viz. exclusion of other] has been observed previously, the general property is denoted by the word, but not the individual because it has not previously been observed. Jinendrabuddhi also quotes the ślokapāda at Ms B 62b5-6 in the context of discussing how the relation between the word and its referent is established with reference to a perceptible particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) at the time of *saṅketa* (i.e., the time when the relation between the word and the thing it denotes is taught) when the word by definition does not denote individuals, but only their general property: *saṅketakāle śabdārthasambandhābhijño hi saṅketakālānubhūtārthasāmānyam eva pratipādyate śabdān, na svalakṣaṇaṃ, "tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt." prayogakāle viśeṣaviṣayatvāśaṅkā na bhavaty eva. saṅketakāle tu pratyakṣaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti.*

Vṛṣabhadeva's statement at Paddhati 52,13-15 is closely related to Dignāga's view: *śabdasvalakṣaṇāni paricchidyamānodayavyayāni kathaṃ nityāni syuḥ. svalakṣaṇāni ca na vācakāni. sāmānyam eva vacakam iti jātiḥ śabdaḥ:* "How could the individual words that originate and vanish in the process of being delimited be eternal. The individuals do not denote. Only the general property denotes. Thus (*iti*) the word [as conveyor of meaning] is the general property." Cf. *Pind* 1991.

Interestingly, Dignāga's reason for denying word-particulars' capability of denotation re-surfaces unexpectedly in Vinītadeva's *Santānāntarasiddhiṭīkā* 3,13-16: *'di ltar saṅs rgyas pa thams cad ni brjod par byed pa'i sgra'i rnam pa can gyi śes pa yin par 'dod kyi, sgra'i khyad par ni yod kyaṅ ma yin te, de ni sṅon ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir źes bya ba la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs kyi khyad par brjod par byed pa yin pa bkag pa'i phyir ro:* That is, all Buddhas maintain that a cognition (**jñāna*) has the form of the word that denotes (**vācaka*), but it does not have that of a word-particular (**viśeṣaśabda*) because it has been refuted that a [word] particular denotes, the reason being "because it has not been observed previously (**pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt*)," and so on.

[402] Namely the word as type, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b4: *tatrāpi śabde idam aparaṃ veditavyam.*

[403] In this paragraph Dignāga discusses, although very briefly, a problem to which the Sanskrit grammarians usually refer as *ekaśabdadarśana* and *anekaśabdadarśana,* cf. Puṇyarāja's VPṬ 103,21 (ad VP II:250): *atraikaśabdadarśanam anekaśabdadarśanaṃ ceti dvau pakṣau;* Ms B 225b3-4: *ekānekatvaṃ śabdasya vyutpādayitum āha: tatrāpītyādi.* According to the first theory the same speech unit has various meanings depending on whether the usage is primary or secondary. The second theory stresses the fact that some speech units are identical in terms of the string of phonemes that constitute them, but different in terms of their derivation, the ambiguity of denotation being resolved by contextual factors. Thus the first theory focuses primarily on ambiguities of reference (*artha*), whereas the second is concerned with ambiguities of single speech units like words or sentences. Both of them are mentioned by Bhartṛhari, cf. e.g. VPV I 139,8-9: *śrutyabhedād anekārthatve 'py ekaśabdatvam, arthabhedād ekaśrutitve' py anekaśabdatvam. tatra caikeṣām aupacāriko bhedo mukhyam ekatvam. anyeṣām tu pṛthaktvaṃ mukhyaṃ vyāvaharikam ekatvam iti;* VP II:257; VP II:314-17; 405, 407; VPV I 206,2-5: *vākyānāṃ hi tulyarūpatve 'pi sati nimittāntarāc chaktir bhidyate. tatra yo rūpād eva kevalād vākyārthaṃ pratipadyate prakaraṇasāmarthyādi nāpekṣate sa vivakṣitāvivakṣitayoḥ saṃmoham āpādyate.*

[217] *tatrāpi.* Qu. Ms 225b4.

[218] *yatrākṣādiśabdād*[(1)] *arthe śakaṭāṅgādau*[(2)] *saṃśaya <utpadyate>, tatra śabdasyaikyam.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b4-5: <u>*yatrākṣādiśabdaśravaṇād abhidheye śakaṭāṅgādau ... saṃśayo bhavati, tatra śabdasyaikyam.*</u>
[(1)]For *yatra,* cf. *gaṅ du* V : om. K.
[(2)]Cf. *don śiṅ rta'i gśol mda' la sogs pa la* V : *śiṅ rta'i yan lag la sogs pa'i don* K.

[404] The word *akṣa* is a well-known example of a homonym in Sanskrit grammatical literature, cf. Mahā-bh I 220,2: *bahavo śabdā ekārthā bhavanti, tadyathā indraḥ śakraḥ + ... ekaś ca śabdo bahvarthas tadyathā akṣāḥ pādāḥ māṣāḥ iti.* VPV II 255,2-3 (ad VP II:250): *yathaiva śabdabhede 'pi hastaḥ karaḥ pāṇir ity arthasyaikatvaṃ na nivartate, tathaivārthabhede 'py akṣāḥ pādā māṣā ity ekatvaṃ* (so read; ed. *tva°*) *śabdasya na nivartate:* "Just as *hasta, kara, pāṇi* do not abandon their identity of reference although the words are different, so *akṣā pādā māṣā* do not abandon their [phonic] identity of word although their [individual] referents are different."

[405] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b4-5: *ādigrahaṇād vibhītakādau.*

[406] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b5: *ekasya hy anekārthasambandhiṣu saṃśayakāraṇatvam prasiddham ataḥ prameyatvavad anekasambandhisaṃśayahetutvād eka iti pratīyate:* "For it is acknowledged that a single [word] is a cause of doubt about relata that are different referents. Therefore it is understood that it is one because it is a cause of doubt about different relata in the same way as 'being an object of cognition'."

[219] *tatsandehe tv anekatā.* Qu. Ms B 225b5.

[220] <yatra> bhavatiśabdādau <śatrantādau> [1] saṃśayaḥ[2], <tatra> śruti-
sāmye[3] 'pi śabdabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ, tadyathā ka iheti. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B
225b6-7: <u>śrutisāmye 'pi śabdabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ</u> ... tadyathā[4] ka iheti.

[1]śatrantādau conj. (Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b6: kim idaṃ śatrantasya saptamyeka-
vacane sati). The two Tibetan transations of this paragraph are utterly confused.
bhavatiśabdādau is translated (partly in translitterated form) in K as bhabate'i sgra
la sogs par, but V contains no trace of this term. yod pa la sogs par K : sogs par V
are incomprehensible. Perhaps Kanakavarman read the first term of the compound
as sattā°; the crucial lexeme anta, however, is not reproduced. Vasudharakṣita may
not even have been able to identify in his exemplar the first two terms of this
compound. DC add absurdly sgra la before sogs par V.

[2]Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b5f: bhavatiśabdādau sādṛśyāt saṃśayaḥ.

[3]Cf. sgra spyi K : ñan pa pos (sic) spyi la V.

[4] °yathā em. °yatha Ms

407 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b6: yathā bhavatiśabdādau sādṛśyāt saṃśayaḥ: kim idaṃ
śatrantasya saptamyekavacane sati rūpam āhosvit tiṅantam utāmantraṇam. evam
asyety ukte sandehaḥ: kim idaṃ ṣaṣṭhyantaṃ padam uta loṭmadhyamapuruṣaika-
vacanāntam? "Like the doubt about the word 'bhavati', etc. because of similarity:
"Is this the form of [a word] ending in the affix śatṛ [i.e., the affix of the present
participle] ending in the seventh triplet in the singular, or is it [a word] ending in a
tiṅ affix [i.e., pr. 3 sg. < √bhū], or is it a vocative [< bhavatī]? In the same way,
when one says asya, there is doubt about whether it is a syntactical word ending in
the sixth triplet [i.e., gen. mn. < idam] or whether it is ending in second person
singular of the affix loṭ [i.e., imp. < √as "throw"]."

Kumārila mentions the same example at ŚV Pratyakṣa° 191: bhavatyādau ca
bhinne 'pi nāmākhyātatvasaṃjñayā, rūpaikatvena cādhyāse tulyārthatvaṃ prasaj-
yate.

408 The technical term śrutisāmya is well known from the Kāśikā, cf. Kāś on A
IV.1:103; VIII.2:18; 2:42; 4:1. V. Cf. Renou, Terminologie s.v. śravaṇa; cf.
Bhartṛhari's use of the term tulyaśruti at VPV II 273,14 (ad VP II:315-16).

409 The clause ka iha is ambiguous: due to sandhi it may be interpreted either as
a combination of the syntactical words kaḥ + iha > ka iha: "Who is here" or ke
[locative of kam (m. or n.)] + iha > ka iha: "Here at Ka [i.e., Prajāpati], or "Here in
ka [i.e., water]," Cf. PSṬ Ms B 225b7-226a1: atra hi saṃhitāyāṃ śabdarūpagataḥ
saṃśayaḥ. kim ayaṃ prathamānta uta saptamyanta ity anekatvaṃ ca prasiddham.
evaṃ lokasyārthe śabde ca sandehād abhedo bhedaś ca veditavyaḥ: "For in this
case the doubt relates to the form of the word in connected speech: Does it end in
the first triplet or does it end in the seventh triplet? And thus its manifoldness is
acknowledged. In this way identity and difference are to be viewed since people are
in doubt about the referent and the word, respectively." Examples of such
ambiguities are mentioned at VPV I 135,6-7: vākyeṣu vā praviveki nirjñātārtha-
bhedaṃ vā yāvat tulyarūpaṃ padaṃ gaur akṣa iti sarvaṃ tad ekam. nāmākhyāta-
bhede 'pi caikam evākṣaśva ityevamprakāraṃ padam. VPV II 259,16-17 (ad VP
II:268): tathā vāyur vāyuḥ, aśvo 'śvaḥ, tena tena, iti nāmākhyātānāṃ tulyarūpatve
viṣayāntarasyāsaṃsparśān na gauṇamukhyavyavahāro 'sti; cf. VPV II 304,12 (ad
VP II:405).

[221] *katham punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrvadoṣāprasaṅgaḥ.* Restored, cf. NCV 650,9: *katham punaḥ śabdasyārthāntaretyādi;* Ms B 226a1: *katham punar ityādi;* NCV 658,15: *arthāntarāpohena svārthabhidhāne;* NCV 651,3: *pūrvadoṣāprasaṅgaś ca kathaṃ arthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne;* NCV 658,10: *pūrvadoṣāprasaṅga iti.*

410 Dignāga's opponent asks why the consequences–*anabhidhāna* and *vyabhicāra*–that follow from the first theory, the so-called *bhedapakṣa* introduced and explained at PSV V:2ab do not apply to the *apoha* theory; cf. NCV 728,20: *bhedapakṣe param praty uktayor ānantyā(d) anuktivyabhicāradoṣayor "adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe"* PSV V:34a *ityādināpyaparihṛtatvāt;* Ms B 226a1: *śabdārthāntaravyavacchedena yathoktasya svārthasyābhidhāyaka ity asmim pakṣe caturṣu pakṣeṣu pūrvaṃ ya uktā doṣās teṣāṃ katham abhāvaḥ.* Cf. NCV 650,10-651,1: *bhedajātitatsambandhatadvatpakṣagatā doṣās tavāpi ānantyavyabhicārādayaḥ kathaṃ na syuḥ?*

411 Cf. *gaṅ gi phyir* K : *'di ltar* V.

[222] *adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi darśanāt, śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryaṃ na cāsti vyabhicāritā.* Qu. TSP 378,17-18; Ms B 226a2: 34ab, 226a4-5: 34cd; NCV 652,8: 34ab: 660,25: 34cd; 661,10: 34abc; 728,20: 34a.

412 The feasibility of the connection (*sambandhasaukaryam*) depends on the word's being observed to apply to an instance of its referent and its not being observed to apply to the referents of other words. It is clear from the writings of non-buddhist philosophers who address the implications of *sambandhasaukaryam* that Dignāga presupposes that the person who is taught the connection of word and referent (*vyutpatti*) is standing in some place (*ekadeśastha*) next to the referent (*artha*). A knowledgeable person points to a prototypical instance of the referent, i.e., a member (*aṃśa*) of the domain of similar referents, explaining that "this (thing) *x* is *y*" (cf. §§ 65-66 below). As the referent thus defined occurs in a particular locus and no special conditions apply to it and its locus, the *ekadeśastha* may reify the application of *y* to any given *x* through the means of their joint presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*), their joint absence being ascertained merely through not observing (*adarśanamātra*) the application of *y* to any other thing but the referent *x*, inferring that *y* denotes all instances of similar things to the exclusion of all things occurring in other loci than that of the referent. As non-observation of the absence of other things in the locus of the prototypical *aṃśa* is easily ascertained, the object of non-observation being the non-existence (*abhāva*) of some other referent in the locus of the prototypical example (cf. no. 428 below), Dignāga assumes that reification of the connection between *y* and *x* is feasible on the basis of mere non-observation, emphasizing the predominance of *vyatireka* over joint presence as the means of establishing the invariable concomitance of *y* and *x*, the foundation of any valid connection.

Dignāga's view was well known to Kumārila, who addresses it at ŚV Anumāna° 131cd–132:

> *aśeṣāpekṣitatvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt* [131cd]
> *sādhane yady apīṣṭo 'tra vyatireko 'numām prati*

tāvatā na hy anaṅgatvaṃ yuktiṃ śābde hi vakṣyate [132]

"Although joint absence (*vyatireka*) is claimed to establish [universal concomitance] because it is dependent upon [joint absence of] all [of the dissimilar instances] and because [the connection] is easy [to establish] since [the indicator or the word] is not observed [to apply to dissimilar instances], it is by no means the case that joint presence (*yukti*) on that account is not a factor when it comes to inference, as will be explained in the chapter on verbal knowledge (*śābda*)."

Umveka introduces Kumārila's succinct statement of the rationale of Dignāga's theory of the feasibility of the connection as follows:

sādhyena vyāptisiddhyai ca vyatireko 'tra kathyate [ŚV Anumāna˚ 128c-d] *ity uktam, tad anupapannam ity āśaṅkyate: aśeṣavipakṣāpekṣitvenādarśanamātrāvase-yetvena ca sukhagrāhyatvād anvayanirapekṣasya vyatirekasyaivāṅgatvāt; anvayas tu darśanād avaseyaḥ; na ca tat sarvatra sapakṣe saṃbhavati sakalasapakṣagraha-ṇābhāvena:*

"It is said: "In order to establish the universal concomitance with the probandum joint absence (*vyatireka*) is stated for that purpose" [ŚV Anumāna˚ 128c-d]. This is unjustified he thinks and argues: Because only joint absence without dependence upon joint presence is a factor because it is easy to apprehend as dependent on the *vipakṣa* as a whole and as ascertainable through mere non-observation; joint presence on the other hand, is ascertainable through observation; and that is not possible for all of the *sapakṣa* because there is no apprehension of all of the *sapakṣa*."

Sucaritamiśra's Kāśikā ad ŚV loc. cit. supports Umveka's interpretation:

atra bauddhā vadanti kim idaṃ "vyāptyā sādharmya ukte ca na vaidharmyam apekṣyate" [ŚV anumāna˚ 118ab] *ity ucyate ? na hi śatāṃśenāpi hetor vipakṣād vyatireke śaṅkhyamāne gamakatvam astīty aśeṣavipakṣo 'numātur vyatirekaṃ grahītum apekṣitaḥ, na cāsau duradhigamaṃ, ekadeśasthasyāpi sarvādarśanasau-kāryāt. darśanaṃ hi sarvavipakṣāṇāṃ duṣkaram, tadabhāvas tu saukāryaprāpta eva:*

"In this context the Buddhists argue: what is meant by saying that "when the positive example has been formulated in connection with the [formulation of the] universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) there is no need for the negative example" [ŚV anumāna˚ 118ab]? For the reason is not probative if there is even the least bit of doubt about its difference from the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*). Consequently the person who is inferring has to depend on all of the dissimilar instances for discerning the joint absence [of the *hetu* from the dissimilar instances]. This, however, is not difficult to realise because it is feasible even for someone who is standing in one place (*ekastha*) to not observe [the application of the *hetu*] to all [of the dissimilar instances]. For the observation of all the things that are dissimilar is not feasible, whereas their absense is easily obtained (*saukāryaprāpta*)."

Pārthasārathimiśra corroborates the analysis in Nyāyaratnāka ad loc.:

śākyās tu vaidharmyavacanasya pākṣikatvam asahamānā vaidharmyam eva sarvadā vaktavyaṃ na sādharmyam ity āhuḥ ... te kila manyate: yasyāpi sādhyā-nvayo liṅgasyānumānāṅgaṃ yasya vā vipakṣavyatirekaṃ tayor ubhayor api tāvad aśeṣāpekṣitatvam avivādam. tatra yady anvayo 'ṅgam iṣyate, tato 'vaśyaṃ sarveṣām atītānāgatānām api dhūmānām agnibhiḥ sarvaiḥ samanvayo gṛhītavyaḥ. na cāsāv īśvareṇāpi grahituṃ śakyate; na ca keṣāñcid anvaye gṛhīte 'nyair agṛhītānvayair anumānaṃ sambhavati. vahnimattvasāmānyena dhūmattvasāmānyasyānvayo gṛhīta iti cet? na, sāmānyasya svalakṣaṇavyatirekavikalpasahanāsambhavāt. astu vā

sāmānyam, tathāpi tadīyāśeṣadeśakālānvayo 'gner durgraha eva. vipakṣavyatirekas tu sujñānaḥ, sa hy adarśanamātragamyaḥ, sukaraṃ ca sarvadhūmānām apy eka-deśasthenaivānagniṣv adarśanam. tasmāt anagnibhyo vyaticecyamāno dhūmo 'nagnivyāvṛttimukhenāgniṃ gamayati. ata evātadvyāvṛttiviṣayatvaṃ liṅgaśabdayoḥ. tasmād vipakṣavyāvṛttipradarśanārthaṃ vaidharmyam eva vaktavyam, na sādharm-yam iti:

"The Buddhists, however, being unable to accept that the formulation of the negative example [only] has status as a corollary [to the positive example] claim that only the negative example should always be formulated, not the positive one; they are reported (*kila*) to argue as follows: whoever is of the opinion that the indicator's agreement with the probandum is a factor in inference or whoever is of the opinion that [its] difference from the heterologous [is a factor in inference] they necessarily have to agree on its being dependent on the exhaustion [of all of the homologous and the heterologous]. If, in the present case, agreement is taken to be a factor, it will be necessary to perceive the agreement of all past and future [instances of] smoke with all [past and future instances of] fire, but not even the Lord is capable of doing that ! And inference is not possible when joint presence of some has been apprehended because of other joint presences that have not been perceived. Suppose it is objected that what is perceived is the agreement of the property of being smoky with the property of being fiery. Such objection, however, is impossible because the universal cannot stand [the criticism] of the alternatives of its being [identical or] different from the particular [in which it inheres]. On the other hand, let us assume that the universal exists. But even so fire's agreement with such a thing [as a universal] at all places and modes of time is certainly difficult to perceive. However, its difference from the dissimilar [instances] is easy to know, for this can be known merely through [the reason] not being observed [at the dissimilar (instances)]. Indeed, it is feasible even for someone who is standing in a some place (*ekadeśastha*) not to observe all [instances of] smoke at non-fires. Therefore when smoke is differentiated from non-fires it makes fire known by means of excluding it from non-fires. Consequently the scope of the indicator or the word is to exclude what is other (*atad*). Therefore only the dissimilar example is to be formulated for the sake of exemplifying the exclusion [of the *hetu*] from dissimilar [instances], but not from the similar ones."

[413] Cf. the related formulation of Kumārila's solution to the problems of infinity and ambiguity at Tantravārtikam ad III 1:12 where he rejects Dignāga's two arguments against the possibility of denoting the particulars by claiming that although entities are infinite, the relation of the word to the thing it denotes is feasible and that there will be no ambiguity if one takes a single among them as indicative [of the residence in it of the general property],[1] cf. loc.cit. p. 39,16ff: *nanu vyaktīnām ānantyavyabhicārābhyām anabhidhānam uktam. naiṣa doṣaḥ: ānantye 'pi hi bhāvānām ekaṃ kṛtvopalakṣaṇam. śabdaḥ sukarasambandhaḥ na ca vyabhicariṣyati.*
[1]Kumārila assumes by implication that the universal resides identically in each particular and therefore justifies the application of a general term to each instance.

[414] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a2: *śabdārthagrahaṇaṃ vipakṣopalakṣaṇam. vipakṣe 'darśanād ity arthaḥ:* "The use of 'referent of the word' is an implicit indication of

the *vipakṣa*. The meaning is this: because of not being observed to apply to the *vipakṣa*;" cf. no.s [224] and 420 below.

[415] The locative is used to introduce the reference of any given term as in Sanskrit grammatical literature in which *x*(loc.) generally means "to denote *x*" or "applies to *x*," cf. no. 419 below on the use of *vṛtti*.

[416] Cf. NCV 652,8-9: *atrocyate tvayā: adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṃśe 'pi darśanāt, anyāpohenārthābhidhānasiddhir iti vākyaśeṣaḥ;* op.cit. 728,20-21: *"adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe" ityādināpy aparihṛtatvāt.*

Jinendrabuddhi deviates completely from the theoretical framework of Dignāga's *apoha* theory by claiming that the *svārtha* is the aggregate of persons as possessed of intention *vivakṣāvatpuruṣasamūha,* the term 'part' (*aṃśa*) denoting a single such person, cf. PST Ms B 226a2-4: *svo 'rtho 'sminn iti svārthaḥ. kaḥ punar asau? vivakṣāvatpuruṣasamūhaḥ. tasyāṃśo 'vayavaḥ vivakṣāvān puruṣaḥ. aṃśe 'pīti ca vivakṣavata iyaṃ saṅkhyā.* This interpretation is indebted to Dharmakīrtian and post-Dharmakīrtian philosophy according to which one infers a speaker's *vivakṣā* from the words he is using, cf. no. 9 above. In spite of this deviation from Dignāgan doctrine the subsequent presentation reproduces fairly accurately the underlying rationale of Dignāga's theory of induction: Jinendrabuddhi states that although the members of the own referent of the word as explained above are infinite, nevertheless the word indicates its referent because it is observed to denote a single instance; to which Jinendrabuddhi adds that the use of *api* indicates that it is observed to denote several instances as well[1]; and he concludes his exposition by explaining that Dignāga uses the word 'member' because the pervasion of the *sapakṣa* [i.e., everything similar to the indicated referent] is without [all] the members in the case of the act of indicating; for the word indicates even though it does not pervade (the *sapakṣa*), cf. PST Ms B 226a3-4 : *etad uktam bhavati: yady api yathoktasya svārthasyāṅgānām ānantyam, tathāpi tatraikatrāpi darśanād iti. apiśabdo 'nekatrāpīti dyotayati. sapakṣavyāpteḥ pratyāyanāyām anaṃśatvād aṃśa-grahaṇam. avyāpake 'pi hi gamakaḥ.*

[1]Jinendrabuddhi alludes to the well-known use of *api* after numerals to indicate the notion of totality, cf. Renou, *Grammaire Sanscrite* § 382 p. 517.

[223] *anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasyārthābhidhāne*[1] *dvāram, tau ca tulyātulyayor vṛttyavṛttī.* Qu. NCV 660,21, cf. PST Ms B 226a5-6: *anvayavyatirekau hi ... dvāram ... tau ca.*

[1]*śabdasyārtha°* em. : *śabdārthasya* NCV; cf. NCV loc. cit. no. 8; NCV 652,10-11: *śabdasyānvayavyatirekau arthābhidhāne dvāram. tau ca tulyatulyayor vṛttyavṛttī;* NCV 664,10-11: *śabdasyānvayavyatirekau arthābhidhāne dvāram.*

[417] Joint presence and joint absence are a means (*dvāram*) in the sense that the word has the property of an indicator and as such it indicates by virtue of its connection, which is established through joint presence and joint absence, cf. PST Ms B 226a5-6: *dvāram upāyaḥ. śabdasya liṅgatvāt tasya cānvayavyatirekalakṣaṇa-sambandhabalena gamakatvāt.* Dignāga's view of joint presence and absence differs from the traditional view of the Sanskrit grammarians by its emphasis on the impossibility of *anvaya* for every single item to which a term refers as opposed to joint absence *vyatireka*.

For an analysis of the procedure of induction through *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in the context of the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, cf. *Cardona* 1980.

[418] For the implications of the use of *(a)dṛṣṭi/(a)darśana* and *vṛtti* in the context of Sanskrit grammatical literature, cf. the references in Renou, *Terminologie* s.vv. *dṛś-* and *vṛt-*. Dignāga's use of these terms is ambiguous because it is open to a localistic interpretation as in the case of the canon of the *trairūpya,* which is concerned with the occurrence of the indicator *at* the indicated and the *sapakṣa* and its absolute non-occurrence *at* the *vipakṣa.* Although Dignāga undoubtedly assumes that the logical indicator and the verbal indicator are homologous in the sense that they are subject to identical constraints, it is hard to believe that he would have described verbal usage in terms of the occurrence of the verbal sign *at* the referent(s) it denotes and its absolute non-occurrence at dissimilar referents. The use of *vṛtti* with the locative like that of *(a)dṛṣṭi/(a)darśana* rather reflects the common usage in traditional Indian semantics of introducing the locative in order to indicate the denotation of any given term, and this is in perfect agreement with Dignāga's description in §66 below of teaching the denotation by pointing at the referent. However, Dignāga's critics evidently interpreted his formulation in a localistic sense as appears from Kumārila's criticism at ŚV Śabda° 86, where he addresses the second member of the *trairūpya,* namely the *sapakṣānvaya: yatra dhūmo 'sti tatrāgner astitvenānvayaḥ sphuṭaḥ. na tv evaṃ yatra śabdo 'sti tatrārtho 'stīti niścayaḥ:* "It is obvious that wherever there is smoke, there it is continually accompanied by the existence of fire. However, an ascertainment like "the referent is wherever the word is" is not in the same way obvious. Some buddhists apparently attempted to reinterpret joint presence in terms of joint presence of verbal cognition (*śabdajñāna*) and cognition of the referent (*arthajñāna*), cf. Umveka's introductory remarks to ŚV Śabda° 89 p. 368,21-22: *kaścid āha: vināpy śabdasvarūpasyārthasvarūpeṇānvayaṃ śabdajñānasyārthajñānenānvyayo bhaviṣyati. yatra yatra gośabdajñānaṃ tatra tatra gojñānam iti.*

[419] Cf. Siṃhasūri's exegesis at NCV 652,9-11 explaining the homology between the logical and verbal indicator: *anumānānumeyasambandho hy abhidhānābhidheyasambandhaḥ. tatra yathā dhūmasya ekadeśe darśanād agneḥ anagnau cādarśanād anagnivyudāsenāgnipratītis tathā anvayavyatirekāv arthābhidhāne dvāram:* "For the connection between signifier and signified is an inference-inferendum connection. Just as fire in this case is cognized through exclusion of non-fire because smoke is observed at some place where there is fire and because it is not observed at non-fire, joint presence and joint absence are a means to denoting the referent."

Jinendrabuddhi also connects induction by means of joint presence and joint absence to Dignāga's view of the purpose of the second and third member of the canon of *trairūpya,* cf. PSṬ Ms B 226a6: *anvayavyatirekarūpopavarṇanaṃ: tattulya eva vṛttis tadatulye 'vṛttir eva liṅgasyeti. etat svarūpam anvayavyatirekayoḥ:* "The description of the form of joint presence and joint absence is [as follows]: the indicator's occurrence at what is similar exclusively, and its absolute non-occurrence at what is dissimilar. This is the essential nature of joint presence and joint absence;" cf. Dignāga's definition at PSV II:5cd (q.v. no. 9 above) of the three criteria any valid indicator must fulfil.

YD alludes to Dignāga's description of induction by means of joint presence and joint absence at 100,13-16: *na, anvyavyatirekābhyām adhigamahetutvāt. yathā kṛtakatvādir dharmo 'nityādau* [1] *viṣaye dṛṣṭaḥ tadabhāve cādṛṣṭa ity anitye 'rthe niścayam ādadhāty evaṃ śabdo 'pi svārthe dṛṣṭo 'nyatra cātajjātīye* [2] *na dṛṣṭaḥ pratipattihetur bhavati. tasmād anumānād abhinna evāyam iti:* "No, [*āgama,* i.e., verbal communication, is not something different] because it is a cause of cognition through joint presence and joint absence. Just as a general property like being produced is observed at an object that is impermanent, but not observed at its absence, and thus instills certainty about the referent as impermanent, the word too becomes a cause of cognition, when it has been observed to apply to its own referent and not observed to apply to something else that is not of the same kind. Therefore it is not at all distinct from inference."

[1]*'anityādau* conj. : ed. *anityatvādau;* however, according to Dignāgan epistemology general properties do not occur at other general properties as in Vaiśeṣika ontology, but only as mediated through the objects/referents in which they occur.

[2]so read with A; ed. *anyatra tajjātiye.*

[224] *tatra tu*[1] *tulye*[2] *nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vṛttir ākhyeyā kva cid, ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇā-vṛtter*[3] *ākhyānam. ata eva ca svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt tadvyavacchedā-numānaṃ svārthābhidhānam*[4] *ity ucyate.* Restored, cf. NCV 652,11-21: *tatra tulye nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vṛttir ākhyeyā kva cid, ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt ... atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam adarśanamātreṇādarśane 'pravṛtter ākhyānam ... ata eva ceti ... sambandhibhya iti ... anyatrādarśanāt iti ... tadvyavacchedānumānam;* NCV 718,14: *ata eva cedam ityādi etatpakṣasaṃśrayadarśanārtham bhāṣyagranthaṃ āha: svasambandhibhyo 'nyatrādarśanāt ityādi;* Ms B 226a6-7: *tatra tu tattulye nāvaśyam iti. nāyaṃ niyamo yat sarvasmin sajātīye* vṛttir ākhyeyā *... kvacid ityādi;* 226b1-5: *atulye tu saty apy ānantya iti ... ata eveti ...* svasam-bandhibhyaḥ *sajātīyebhyo* 'nyatra vipakṣe adarśanāt tadvyavacchedānumānam[5] *iti. yatrādarśanaṃ svārthābhāve* tadvyavacchedānām anumānam *anumitiḥ* svārthe 'bhidhānam ity ucyate[6].

[1]*tu* Ms (cf. *de la '... ni* V : *de la '... ni* K : om. NCV.
[2]*tulye* (cf. *dra ba la* V : *dra ba* K) NCV : *tattulye* Ms
[3]°*mātreṇāvṛtter* conj. : °*mātreṇā ...'pravṛtter* NCV.
[4]°*ābhi*° em. (cf. *raṅ gi don rjod par byed pa* V : °*e 'bhi*° (cf. *raṅ gi don la ... brjod pa* KT = *svārthe 'bhidhānam*).
[5]*tad*° em. (cf. *de* T) : *tatra vya*° Ms
[6]Cf. *źes brjod par bya 'o* V : *bśad pa yin no* K.

[420] The adverbial complement *kvacit* is here syntactically equivalent to *kasmiṃś-cit.* There is no doubt that *kvacit* is to be construed with the preceding negation *na.* Jinendrabuddhi, however, interprets *kvacit* as if it constitute a separate clause, syntactically independent of the preceding clause, cf. PST Ms B 226a7f: *yadṛcchā-śabdānāṃ sambhavati sarvatra darśanaṃ tadviṣayasyaikatvād iti. ataḥ "kvacid" ity āha:* "It is possible to observe arbitrary terms [denoting] every [referent] because their referent is singular. Therefore he says 'to any [referent] whatever.'"

This interpretation is evidently motivated by the view that arbitrary terms (= proper nouns) denote a single referent and that the problem of the particulars being

infinite therefore does not apply to the referents of proper nouns. It may have been motivated by the exposition of an (old?) *ṭīkā* on PS which both Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri quote, cf. below no.s 422-23.

Elsewhere Siṃhasūri cites a passage (from the *ṭīkā*) in which it is argued that it is impossible to state the joint presence (*anvaya*) of parts like being one-eyed and dwarfish, and so on, with respect to the aggregate of attributes that constitute the object denoted by the proper name *ḍittha,* consequently one might draw the conclusion that joint absence (*vyatireka*) like joint presence is impossible too, cf. NCV 706,13-15: *tvayā anvayavyatirekāv arthānumāne dvāram ity uktvā guṇa-samudāye ḍitthākhye 'rthe kāṇakuṇṭādyavayānvayānabhidhānād anvayāsambhavaṃ niruktīkṛtya anvayāsambhavād vyatirekāsambhavam āśaṅkyoktaṃ syād etad vyati-rekasyāsambhava iti.* NCV 652,12-15, q.v. below no. 422.

For Dignāga's analysis of proper nouns with the background of the *apoha* theory, cf. PS V 50a.

[421] Cf. NCV 652,12-15: *na hi sambhavo 'sti vṛkṣaśabdasya sarvavṛkṣeṣu dar-śane, nāpi sarvatra liṅgini sarvaliṅgasya sambhavo 'gnidhūmādivat. yady api kvacid asti ḍitthādiṣu sambhavas tathāpi na taddvāreṇānumānam, sarvātmanāpratī-teḥ. guṇasamudāyo hi ḍitthākhyo 'rthaḥ, na ca sarve kāṇakuṇṭādayo ḍitthaśabdād gamyate. evam anvayadvāreṇānumānāsambhavaḥ:* "For it is not possible to observe that the word 'tree' denotes all trees, nor is it possible to observe every indicator at every indicated, in the same way as it is not possible to observe every smoke at every fire. Even though it is possible at some such as *ḍittha,* nevertheless there is no inference by means of that because it is not cognized *in toto.* For the referent that is termed *ḍittha* is an aggregate of attributes, and they, e.g., his being one-eyed, dwarfish, and so on, are not all of them understood from the word '*ḍittha*'. Thus inference by means of joint presence is impossible;" NCV 675,20-21: *yat svār-thasyāṃśe 'pi darśanād gamakatvaṃ samarthayatoktam: na sarvatra liṅgini liṅgaṃ sambhavati;* cf. NCV 678,13-14: *bhrāntavacanam etad: "sarvatra liṅginy adar-śanān na dṛṣṭavat pratipattiḥ;"* for the epistemological implications of the term *dṛṣṭavat*, cf. PS II:15 with PSV ad loc. no. 13 above.

Siṃhasūri's explanation at NCV 652,12-15 appears to be an almost verbatim reproduction of the passage of the (old?) *ṭīkā* on PSV, cf. NCV 662,11,14: *vṛkṣaśab-dasyāvṛkṣetyādi yāvad darśane nāsti sambhavaḥ, nāpi sarvatra liṅginītyādi ... yady api kvacid ityādi sa eva ṭīkāgrantho yāvad anumānāsambhava iti;* cf. NCV 716,18-19: *guṇasamudāyamātrasya kāṇakuṇṭāder darśanāsambhavaḥ, saty api darśane sarvathānumānāsambhavaḥ sarvaprakāreṇādṛṣṭatvāt:* "It is impossible to observe the mere aggregate of attributes such as being one-eyed, dwarfish, etc.; even though they are observed, it is impossible to infer them *in toto* because [the aggregate] has not been observed in every possible way."

[422] Since Siṃhasūri introduces his exegesis of this phrase at NCV 652,16 by stating *syād etad vyatirekasyāpy asambhavaḥ,* it is highly likely that this sentence and the following exegesis is indebted to the *ṭīkā* he was using because the remaining part of his explanation is identified by Siṃhasūri at NCV 662,10,14 as quoted by Mallavādi from the *ṭīkā*. Siṃhasūri repeats the sentence at NCV 706,15 immediately after addressing the impossibility of *anvaya* as applied to any referent of proper nouns, cf. above no. 421. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi made use of the

same source because his introductory remark is similar, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226b1: *syād etad atulyānām ānantyād vyatirekākhyānasyāpi sarvatrāsambhava iti.*

[423] Cf. Siṃhasūri's lucid exposition of Dignāga's standpoint at NCV 707,8-10: *anvayagatadoṣabhāvaṃ*[1] *vyatirekagataṃ guṇaṃ ca darśayati granthaḥ: "atulye saty apy ānantye"*[2] *ityādi. tato anyasyābhāvamātraṃ sāmānyato vyatirecanīyaṃ tadbhedarūpāṇi asaṃspṛśatā śabdena liṅgena vā. tasmād adoṣa iti parihāraḥ:* "The text (*granthaḥ*) shows the that joint presence is problematic and joint absence preferable, namely 'non-occurrence at what is dissimilar, even though it is infinite', and so forth. Therefore the mere non-existence of other [referents] is to be excluded in a general way (*sāmānyato*) by the word or the logical indicator without [its] being in contact[3] with the forms of its particulars [i.e., the particulars constituting the excluded other referents][4]. Therefore there is no problem. Such is [Dignāga's] rebuttal."

[1] So read : ed. *°ābhāvam.*
[2] For this citation, cf. no. [224].
[3] No speech unit is in direct touch with its referent beyond the fact that it denotes it as excluded from its non-referents, irrespective of the individual features of the non-referents; the idea that speech is not in direct touch with reality but transcends it due of its generalising representation of things, is also expressed in a well-known verse ascribed to Dignāga viz. *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdaḥ,* etc, for which cf. no. 531 below.
[4] For this, cf. the exposition of the theoretically crucial § 60.

[424] Dignāga's introduction of *adarśanamātra* to justify *vyatireka–anyāpoha* is equivalent to mere joint absence (*vyatirekamātra,* cf. no. 13) – reflects the treatment of *lopa* in Sanskrit grammatical litterature, cf. Patañjali's explanation of vārtt 2 (on A I.1:60: *adarśanaṃ lopaḥ*) at Mahā-bh I 158:10f: *sarvasyādarśanasya lopasaṃjñā prāpnoti. kiṃ kāraṇam? sarvasyānyatrādṛṣṭatvāt. sarvo hi śabdo yo yasya prayogaviṣayaḥ sa tato 'nyatra na dṛṣyate.* Cf. no. 419 above and the related statement at PSV V:1.

Jinendrabuddhi explains *vyatireka* as characterized by non-existence, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226b2-4: *teṣām ānantye saty api svārthābhāve śruter abhāvalakṣaṇo vyatirekaḥ śakyate darśayituṃ adarśanasyābhāvamātratvāt. śabdārthayor hi kāryakāraṇabhā-ve siddhe kāraṇasyārthasyābhāve tatkāryaṃ śabdo na bhavatīti. etāvatā adarśanaṃ pratyāyitam bhavati. tatrāśrayādarśanam*[1] *aprayojanam, vināpi tena vyatireka-niścayāt. na hi kāraṇābhāve kāryasaṃbhava iti. ato vyatirekasyāpi sukaram ākhyā-nam:* "Even though there is an infinity of these [referents] it is possible to show joint absence, which is characterized by non-existence when the word's own referent does not exist because non-observation is nothing but non-existence. For in that it is recognized that word and referent are related as cause and effect, the effect of the referent namely the word does not exist when its cause viz. the referent does not exist. That much explains non-observation. In this context non-observation of the substrate has no purpose because joint absence is ascertained even without it. For there is no possibility of an effect when there is no cause. Therefore it is also feasible to tell the joint absense [of the word and its referent]."

On the subject of *adarśanamātra,* Siṃhasūri limits himself to explaining that non-observation is nothing but absense of observation, cf. NCV 652,17: *adarśanaṃ hi darśanābhāvamātram.* Kumārila mentions, ŚV Anumāna° 131cd-132ab,

Dignāga's view that it is feasible to establish the connection through non-observation as it relates to the dissimilar without exeption and connects non-observation and joint absence *vyatireka*: *aśeṣāpekṣitatvāc ca saukaryāc cāpy adarśanāt, sādhane yady apīṣṭo 'tra vyatireko 'numāṃ prati;* cf. the criticism of *adarśanamātra* Apoha° 75: *na cādarśanamātreṇa tābhyāṃ pratyāyanaṃ bhavet | sarvatraiva hy adṛṣṭatvāt pratyāyyaṃ nāvaśiṣyate* ‖.

Dignāga's view that mere non-observation of the word's application to dissimilar instances establishes the connection between the word and its referent is reflected in his alleged pupil Īśvarasena's theory of *upalambhābhāvamātram*, cf. E. Steinkellner: "Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund," WZKS 10 pp. 73-85; cf. HB II p. 154 foll.. Dharmakīrti's theory of *anupalabdhi* breaks with the Dignāgan tradition.

Cf. Dharmakīrti's implicit criticism of Dignāga's view of *adarśanamātra* as the principal means of establishing *apoha* at PV III Pratyakṣapariccheda 172a-c: *anyatrādṛṣṭyapekṣatvāt kvacit taddṛṣṭyapekṣaṇāt śrutau sambadhyate 'poho.* This criticism, which treats observation and non-observation as equipollent, is implicit in the clause *anyatrādṛṣṭyapekṣatvāt,* for which Dignāga would have *sarvatra* for *anyatra,* i.e., in the *atulya* in toto; v. PVBh p. 264,30 foll. ad loc. cit.: *śabdasya hy anyatra vijātīye 'dṛṣṭatvāt*[2], *kvacit tu tajjātīye darśanād apoha eva saṅketa iti jñāyate;* note especially the following reference to Dignāga's view loc. op. cit. p. 265,23: *anye tu punaḥ sarvato vijātyād vyāvṛttiṃ, kvacid vidheye vṛttim apekṣata iti vyatireke tātparyam*[3] *anvaye tu neti, vyatireka eva prādhānyena pratyāyate:* "Others, on the other hand, claim that [a word] depends on exclusion from all dissimilar instances, and on its application to some thing to be shown. Thus the reference is to joint absence, but not to joint presence. Therefore (*iti*) joint absence is understood as the primary thing." A similar statement is quoted in Jñānaśrīmitra's Apohaprakaraṇa 207,10-11: *tathā hi vijātīye sarvatrādṛṣṭyapekṣatvāt, kvacit tu apekṣaṇātmajātīye śrutau sambadhyate 'poha iti śāstram.* The *śāstra* to which Jñānaśrīmitra refers is as one can see the above-mentioned passage from Dharmakīrti's PV III 172. However—and this is remarkable—it breaks completely with Dharmakīrti's view by substituting *sarvatra* for *anyatra,* thus apparently returning to Dignāga's original justification of *apoha* by stating that *apoha* depends on non-observation of the referent in all (*sarvatra*) of the domain of the dissimilar and dependence on some instance (*kvacit*) of the referent in the domain of the referent. Cf. Dignāga's use of *sarvatra* at PSV II:13 quoted no. 188 above, q.v.

For a discussion of the theoretical implications of Dignāga's view of *adarśanamātra,* cf. *Pind* 1999.

[1] °*ādarśanaṃ* conj. : °*adarśanaṃ* Ms (cf. *mthoṅ ba* T). The conj. is required by the context as the argument otherwise would seem incomprehensible.

[2] *'dṛṣṭatvāt* em. : *dṛṣṭatvāt* PvBh

[3] *vyatireke tātparyam* conj. : *vyatirekitātparyam* PvBh

[425] Cf. NCV 652,17-18: *yasmād darśanasya sarvatrāsambhavaḥ. saty api darśane sarvathānumānāsambhavaḥ:* "Because observation to denote all [that is similar to it] is impossible. Even if it were observed [to denote all that is similar to it], inference *in toto* is impossible." Jinendrabuddhi must have used the same source as Siṃhasūri, as appears from the parallel explanation at Ms B 226b4: *yasmād darśanasya tattulye sarvatrāsambhavo 'tattulye tu sambhavo 'darśanasya:* "because observation to denote all that is similar to it is impossible, whereas non-observation

to denote all that is dissimilar to it is possible." Dignāga also mentions at PSV III:45 the impossibility of observing the indicated at all that is similar. Both versions deviate from each other, cf. K (*Kitagawa* 1973 508b7-11): *'di rigs pa yaṅ yin te | gaṅ rigs mi mthun pa thams cad las ldog pa'i phyir daṅ | de'i sgo nas bsgrub bya thams cad la rtogs par byed pa'i phyir ro ‖ 'di ni bsgrub bya daṅ rigs mthun pa | thams cad la gdon mi za bar yod pa ma yin la | thams cad la 'dzin pa srid pa ma yin źiṅ.* — V (*Kitagawa* 1973 508a7-12): *gaṅ rigs mi mthun mtha' dag las log pa de'i sgo nas bsgrub bya la śes pa 'jug par byed pa de dag ni rigs kyi | 'dir gor ma chags par mthun phyogs mtha' dag la yod pa'o źes pa ni ma yin źiṅ | thams cad la yod par 'dzin pa yaṅ mi srid do ‖:* "And this is justified because [the indicator] is excluded from all that is dissimilar and because it indicates every probandum by means of that (**taddvāreṇa*). For it is necessarily not the case that it is found at all that is similar to the probandum, it being impossible to apprehend its existence at all [that is similar to the probandum]."

[426] The compound *tadvyavacchedānumāna* is syntactically equivalent to *tato vyavacchedānumāna,* cf. NCV paraphrasing the (old?) *ṭīkā* (cf. no.s 421-23 above) 752,21-22: *yatraivādarśanam uktaṃ vṛkṣābhāve 'vṛkṣe, tato vyavacchedānumānaṃ 'avṛkṣo na bhavati' iti. evaṃ ca kṛtvā vṛkṣaśabdād dravyatvādyanumānam upapannam bhavati:* "Only with regard to which non-observation is stated i.e. with regard to the absence of a tree which is a non-tree, the inference from its exclusion from this [non-tree] is 'it is not a non-tree'; and on such grounds the inference of substanceness, and so on, from the word 'tree' is justified." Thus, the inferential component of Dignāga's *apoha* theory presupposes that it is possible to draw valid inferences from negative evidence based upon non-observation.

Jinendrabuddhi's gloss at Ms B 226b1-5 is syntactically ambiguous: *yatrādarśanaṃ svārthābhāve tadvyavacchedānām anumānam:* "The inference is of exclusions of/from that to which it is not observed to apply when its own referent is absent."

It is evident that the inference to which Dignāga refers amounts to the judgement that e.g. the referent of the word "tree" is not a non-tree, which means that no entity that is not a tree occurs in the locus of the referent tree. From this follows that the relation between the referents of the words "tree" and "non-tree" is one of privative opposition between any given tree and any given non-tree, the latter qualifying the former by its absence from its locus. This constitutes Dignāga's solution to the problem of the universal: the reference of a word does not depend upon the presence of a universal inhering in the referent as its cause of application, but rather upon the fact that any given tree is not primarily qualified by its individual characteristics, but rather, it is universally qualified by the non-existence in its locus of things that are not trees, the relation between the referents being one of privative opposition between two types of objects, namely trees and non-trees. This is the reason why Dignāga emphasises the predominant role of joint absence (*vyatireka*) i the process of exclusion. For Dignāga's view of terms like 'non-tree,' whose purpose is to denote as non-existing the single (*eka*) general property (*sāmānyadharma*) that distinguishes non-trees from trees, cf. the important paragraph PSV V:43b below.

For the qualifying role of negation or exclusion as equivalent to the non-existence or absence (*abhāva*) of other things from the locus of the referent, cf. no. 466 below, and Jinendrabuddhi's remarks on the predominance (*prādhānya*) of *vyatireka* (cf. no.s 13, 188, and 426 above, no. 428 below) over *anvaya* at Ms B 226b5-6: *etena yady apy anvayavyatirekayor ubhayor apy anumitāv aṅgatvam,*

tathāpi vyatirekasya prādhānyāt tadvāreṇaiva gamakatvam iti darśayati: "Thereby he shows that even though both joint presence as well as joint absence are factors with regard to inference, nevertheless, since joint absence is predominant, it is only by means of that [the word] indicates."

[427] The technical term *svasambandhin* denotes any of the general properties that together define an entity. Thus the referent tree is defined by the general properties treeness, substanceness, earthenness, etc. Not all of these properties are connected to the word 'tree' in terms of being invariably connected with it. The word 'tree' is only invariably connected to the general property treeness. The other relata, however, are inferable from the word 'tree' because they form a hierarchy of properties, whose logical characteristics are determined by their position in the hierarchy, which is defined in terms of the extension of the terms that constitute it; cf. the explanation at NCV 652,18-20: *svasambandhibhya iti. yatra dṛṣṭaḥ so 'tra sambandhī abhipretaḥ, na tu avinābhāvitvasambandhena. anyatrādarśanād iti abhi-dheyābhāve 'darśanāt, anyathā hi vṛkṣaśabdasya tasmin vastuni pṛthivīdravyādya-bhāve 'pi darśanaṃ vaktavyaṃ syāt:* "*Than its own relata:* The thing to which it is observed to apply is in this context considered a relatum, but not due to a connection in terms of being invariably concomitant. *Because of not being observed to apply to other* [*referents*]: Because of not being observed to apply when the denoted is not present. For otherwise observation of the word 'tree' to apply to this object (*vastu*) would have to be stated even in the absence of earth and substance, etc."

In his exegesis Siṃhasūri appears to reproduce more or less verbatim an old *ṭīkā* on PSV on the concept of *svasambandhin,* which Mallavādi evidently combined with extracts from Dignāga's PSV, cf. NCV 718,15-16: *"ata eva cedam" ityādi etatpakṣasaṃśrayadarśanārtham bhāṣyagrantham āha "svasambandhibhyo 'nya-trādarśanād" ityādi. asya vyākhyā ṭīkāgrantho "yatra dṛṣṭa "ityādi yāvad "avṛkṣo 'nagnir vā na bhavatī"ti gatārthaḥ. evaṃ ca kṛtvetyādi yāvad upapannam bhavati;* the explanation at NCV 718,16-22 is probably a paraphrase, if not a verbatim reproduction, of the corresponding exposition of the *ṭīkā: anekāvinābhāvinām pṛthivīdravyatvādīnāṃ vṛkṣaśabdād dhūmāc cānubandhinām anumānam yujyate taddarśasparśanena, vṛkṣatvāt pṛthivī dravyaṃ sac ca dhūmatvāc ca vṛkṣavad agnivac ceti. itarathā tv ityādi. atyantavyatireke sambandhitvābhāve 'nubandhināṃ dravyādīnām apy anyatvād atulye vipakṣa eva vṛtter apakṣadharmatvānai-kāntikatvaviruddhatvānumānābhāvadoṣāḥ syuḥ. Anubandhināṃ dravyādīnāṃ tyāge tadavinābhāvino vṛkṣasya svārthasyāsambhava eveti ca doṣaḥ. tataḥ pratyāyya-pratyāyanayor anupapattiḥ. tasmāt svasambandhyābhāvetyādy uktopasaṃhāraḥ, sambandhino 'rthāntarasya bhāve darśanāt sambandhina eva bhāvābhāve 'darśa-nāc cānumānasyābhipretasya siddhir iti:* "The inference of the invariable concomi-tants such as earthenness, substanceness, and so on, from the word 'tree' and the concomitants[1] from smoke is justified due to their observation or touch: from treeness, earth, substance, and 'existent', and from smokeness in the same way as tree and fire. *Otherwise, however,* etc.: if they were completely disconnected, i.e., if they did not have the property of being a relatum, then, because of the occurrence of the adjuncts viz. substance, and so on, in what is dissimilar viz. the *vipakṣa,* as also they are different, there would be the faults of not being inference viz. not being a property of the probandum, being ambiguous, and being contradictory; and if the concomitants viz. substance, and so on, are taken away, there would be the problem that its own referent tree that has these as its concomitants were impossible.

Therefore indicated and indication are not justified. This is recapitulated in the words beginning: *therefore, if the relata do not exist:* because of observing a relatum viz. another thing at an entity and because of not observing the same relatum when the entity does not exist the meant inference is realised."

[1]For the term *anubandhin,* cf. PS II:18-19, q.v. no. 374 above.

[225] *anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne vṛkṣaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śiṃṣapādyābhāsaḥ saṃśayo na syāt. tatsaṃśayavat*[1] *pārthivatvadravyatvādyābhāso 'pi*[2] *saṃśayaḥ syāt. yatas tu*[3] *<vṛkṣaśabdo 'pārthivādiṣu na dṛṣṭaḥ>, ato vyatirekamukhenaivā-numānam.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 226b6-227a2: *anvayadvāreṇa cetyādi ... yady anvayadvāreṇaivābhidhānam iṣyate, evaṃ sati vṛkṣaśabdasyārthādisahitasya śiṃ-śapādiṣv anvayo 'stīti kevalāt* vṛkṣaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śiṃṣapādyābhāsaḥ saṃ-śayo na syāt, *api tu niścaya eva syāt. athānekatra darśanāt saṃśayaḥ. evaṃ tarhi* tatsaṃśayavat pārthivatvadravyatvādyābhāso 'pi saṃśayaḥ syāt *pārthivatvādyan-ekadarśanāt. niścayas tu dṛṣṭo. yato 'nekatrāpi vartamāno yasyābhāve na bhavati tad gamayati, netaram*[4], ato vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam. *etad eva darśayann āha: yatas tv ityādi.*

[1]Cf. *the tshom de bźin du* V : *the tshom za ba bźin du* K.
[2]Cf. *snaṅ ba* V : *snaṅ ba la yaṅ* K.
[3] Cf. *gaṅ gi phyir* K : *gaṅ du* V (Sanskrit *tu* is not translated).
[4] *netaram* em. (cf. *cig śos* T) : *netarata* Ms

428 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 226b6-227a2: *caśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ.* Siṃhasūri's explanation of the passage beginning *anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne* is related to the corresponding passage of Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms B 226b6-227a1-2 quoted above no. [225], cf. NCV 652,23–653,12 *anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne 'yaṃ doṣaḥ: yasmād anugamo 'sti vṛkṣaśabdasyārthādisahitasya śiṃṣapādiṣu, tasmāt ke-valenāpy anumānam prāpnoti. atha bahuṣu palāśādiṣv api dṛṣṭa iti saṃśayo bha-vati. evaṃ sati vṛkṣārthe pārthivatvadravyārthasattārthāḥ*[1] *santi teṣu vṛkṣaśab-dasya samānatvāt saṃśayaḥ syāt, niścayas tu dṛṣṭaḥ śabdāt:* "If, however, the inference were by means of joint presence the problem is as follows: since there is joint presence of the word 'tree' accompanied by the referent, and so on, with *śiṃṣapā,* and so on, it follows [absurdly] that the inference is through that alone. But it is also observed to denote the *palāśa,* etc. Thus there is doubt. In those circumstances there would be doubt about the referent of earthenness, substance[-ness?], and existence that are found in the referent tree because the word 'tree' is the same with regards to these. However, it is observed that the word causes ascertainment explicitly."

[1]One would expect the reading *dravyatvārtha* instead of *dravyārtha.*

[226] <*āha ca> vṛkṣatvapārthivadravyasajjñeyāḥ prātilomyataḥ catustridvyeka-sandehe nimittam, niścaye*[1] *'nyathā.* Qu. ŚVṬ 72,1-2; Ms B 227a3 (*pāda d*); NR 432,8-9. Cf. ŚV Apoha° 158.
[1]*niścaye* NR Ms : *niścayo* ŚVṬ.

429 This verse is related to PS II 14, which Siṃhasūri quotes at NCV 724,22-24 to illustrate the predominance of joint absence (*vyāvṛttiprādhānya*) over joint presence: *guṇatvagandhasaurabhyatadviśeṣair anukramāt, adravyādivyavaccheda ekavṛddhyotpalādivat.* (PS II:14)

*guṇatvenādravyād gandhatvenāpārthivād adravyāc ca saurabhyeṇāsurabhi-
sādhāraṇāt surabhiviśeṣeṇa cotpalādiṣu vyavaccheda ekaikavṛddhyā kriyate* (PSV
II:14): [1]

"Like with respect to a lotus, and so on, the possessing a quality, aroma, sweet
fragrance, and its particular [i.e., a particular sweet fragrance], excludes [it] in due
order from being a non-substance, and so on, by augmentation [of the exclusions]
one by one. (PS II:14)

The possessing a quality effects with respect to a lotus, and so on, its exclusion
from being a non-substance, the possessing aroma from its being non-earthen as
well as being a non-substance, sweet fragrance from what does not possess the
common property of sweet fragrance [namely aroma (*gandhatva*)], as well as a
particular sweet fragrance, and so on, by augment-ing [the exclusions] one by one."
(PSV II:14).

[1]It is possible to restore PSV II:14 from the *pratīka*s and Jinendrabuddhi's
paraphrase at PST Ms B 70b6-71a3: *guṇatvenādravyatvād ity uktam. ata eva
guṇatvasyāpy ekavṛddhyā vyavacchedakaraṇam praty aṃśabhāvo 'sti. yadi hi
tenādravyavyavacchedo vidhīyata evaṃ gandhe 'naikavṛddhyā vyavacchedaḥ kri-
yate ... gandhatvenāpārthivād adravyāc ceti pārthivam idaṃ dravyaṃ ca
gandhavatvād ity apārthivād adravyāc ca vyavacchedaḥ kriyate. saurabhyenā-
surabhisādhāraṇād iti gandhavad etat saurabhyena pūrvakābhyām asurabhisādhā-
raṇāc ca vyavacchedaḥ kriyate surabher gandhaviśeṣasya sādhāraṇam sāmānyaṃ
surabhisādhāraṇaḥ gandhatvamātram iha vivakṣitam. Avidyamānaḥ surabhisādhā-
raṇaḥ yasya tat tathoktaṃ nisṛṣṭam ity arthaḥ.*

Jinendrabuddhi's concluding remark at PTS Ms B 71a4, addressing the
opponents question why the logical reason indicates through joint absence only, is a
precise characterization of the rationale of the Dignāga argument: *surabhiviśeṣa
utpalādigandhaviśeṣaḥ. tad evam adravyādivyavaccheda ekaikavṛddhyotpalādiṣu
guṇatvādibhiḥ kriyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ, sa kathaṃ yujyate yadi vipakṣyavyāvṛttimukhena
hetuḥ pratyāpayati, nānyathā? dṛṣṭavad vidhimukhena hi sarveṣu sarveṣāṃ darśa-
nasyāviśiṣṭatvāt tulyā pratītiḥ syāt. tasmād vyāvṛttidvāreṇaiva hetur gamayatīty
abhyupeyam:* "A particular sweet fragrance is a particular aroma of a lotus.
Therefore, when in this way the property of being a quality etc. is observed to effect
the exclusion from non-substances etc. with regard to a lotus etc. by augmentation
[of the exclusions] one by one, how could that be justified if the logical indicator
indicates through exclusion from what is dissimilar, but not otherwise? Because (*hi*)
through affirmation in the way it has been observed [previously] the cognition of all
[properties] would be the same since the observation of all [properties] is not
differentiated. Therefore it is to be accepted that the logical reason indicates
exclusively by means of exclusion."

Siṃhasūri quotes PS III:44 at NCV 727,9-10 as yet another example of the pre-
dominance of exclusion over joint presence, which presupposes affirmation of the
presence of the indicator at some indicated or observation of the word's application
to its referent: *anyathā hi dṛṣṭavad yadi siddhiḥ syāc chauklyarūpaguṇāśritāt,
kramavat prātilomye 'pi dvitryekārthagatir bhavet*[1].

[1] Cf. PST Ms B 139b4-140a1: *yasmād vyacchedadvāreṇa hetur gamakaḥ.
tasmād ekasmāt saurabhyād dhetor utpalasya gandhādīni siddhyanti. saurabhyasya
yatra gandhatvādim tatra bhāvāt, tadabhāve vābhāvāt. nanu ca saurabhyasya*

gandhatvādiṣu darśanād darśanadvāreṇaiva gandhatvādisiddhir iti. āha: anyathā hītyādi. yadi yathādṛṣṭaṃ tathā pratyāyayet, na vyacacchedadvāreṇa, yathākrameṇa śauklyāt trayāṇāṃ rūpatvaguṇatvāśritatvānām avagatiḥ. rūpatvād dvayor guṇāśritatvayor, guṇatvād ekasyāśritatvasya, evaṃ prātilomyenāpy āśritatvāt trayāṇāṃ guṇatvarūpatvaśuklatvānāṃ syāt, guṇatvād rūpatvaśukratvayor dvayo rūpatvād ekasya śuklatvasyaiva. na hy āśritatvādīni guṇatvādiṣu na dṛṣṭāni. atha yathā-śritatvaṃ guṇatvādiṣu dṛṣṭaṃ tathā kṛṣṇādiṣv[a] apīti saṃśayo bhavati. śauklyam api rūpaguṇāśritatveṣu dṛṣṭam iti. tatas teṣu sāmānyāt saṃśayaḥ syāt. vyāvṛttidvāreṇa tu pratyāyane na doṣaḥ. yathā rūpatvābhāve 'bhāvāt śaulyaṃ rūpavahetuḥ. tathā guṇatvāśritatvayor api tadabhāve 'bhāvād iti. āśritatvaṃ tu guṇatvādyabhāve 'pi dṛṣṭam iti nāsti. tasmād guṇatvādiniścayaḥ.

·[a] *kṛṣṇādiṣu* conj. : *tasmādiṣu* Ms

[430] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of the *antaraśloka* at PST Ms B 227a2-6: vyatirekamukhenaiva pratyāyanam ity etat sambandhayitum antaraślokam āha. jñeyaśabdaḥ satdravyapārthivavṛkṣatveṣu caturṣu saṃśayahetur, yataḥ sa tadabhā-ve 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ. evaṃ[1] uttaratrāpi vācyaṃ: sacchabdo dravyapārthivavṛkṣatveṣu triṣu, dravyaśabdaḥ pārthivavṛkṣatvayor dvayoḥ, pārthivaśabdaḥ ekasmin vṛkṣatve. niścaye 'nyatheti nimittam iti vartate. anyathety ānulomyena vṛkṣaśabdaḥ pārthiva-dravyasajjñeyatveṣu caturṣu niścayahetuḥ. tathā hi sa tatra ca dṛṣṭaḥ, tadabhāve ca na dṛṣṭaḥ[2]. evam uttaratrāpi vākyaṃ: pārthivaśabdādayo 'py evam ekaikahānyā[3] dravyatvādiṣu niścayahetavo jñeyāḥ. yadi ca dṛṣṭavad vidhinā pratyāyanaṃ syād yathākrameṇa catustridvyekārthaniścayaḥ. tathā prātilomyenāpi ta<t?> syāj jñeya-śabdādīnāṃ sattvādiṣu darśanāt. yatas tadabhāve 'pi dṛṣṭatvāt saṃśayaḥ, tasmād vyatirekadvāreṇaiva gamakatvam iti: "In order to bring it into connection with the idea that the indication is only through joint absence he formulates an inserted *śloka*. The word 'knowable' is a cause of doubt about four viz. existence, substanceness, earthenness, and treeness since it is also observed where they are absent. The same is to be formulated with regard those that follow: the word 'existent' [is a cause of doubt] about three viz. substanceness, earthenness, and treeness, the word 'substance' about two viz. earthenness and treeness, and the word 'earthen' about one viz. treeness. In the statement *otherwise* [*they are a cause*] *of* the word 'cause' is to be supplied from what precedes. *Otherwise,* i.e., the word 'substance' is a cause of about four viz. earthenness, substanceness, existence, and knowability. That is, it is, on the one hand, observed when they are present, and, on the other hand, not observed when they are absent. The same is to be formulated with regard to those that follow: also the words 'earthen', and so on, are in the same way to be considered causes of about substanceness, and so on, by deducting one after another[4]. But if the indication were in an affirmative form in the way [the referent] has been observed [previously] there would be about four, three, two, and one referent in direct order. This would also be the case in reverse order because the words 'knowable', and so on, are observed to apply when existence, etc. is present. Since there is doubt because they are also observed where these are absent, the property of indicating is only through joint absence."

Cf. also NCV 653,12-14: *vṛkṣaśabdo 'vṛkṣanivṛttyaikārthako 'pārthivavyāvṛt-tyāpi svārthe vartate, tathā hi vṛkṣapārthivadravyasacchabdā ānulomyena tridvye-kārthaniścayahetavaḥ. evam arthāntaravyudāsenārthāntarābhidhānam upapannam:* "The word 'tree' which has a single referent by means of preclusion of non-trees also applies to its own referent through exclusion of non-earthen things. That is, the

words 'tree,' 'earthen,' 'substance,' and 'existent,' are in direct order causes of ascertainment of three, two and one referent, [respectively]. Thus, the denotation of some referents (*arthāntara*) is by means of exclusion of other referents (*arthāntara*)."

Similarly ŚVṬ 72,20-25 who interprets the verse in the light of Dignāga's rejection of *vidhi* as it necessarily is a cause of doubt: *yat punaḥ parapakṣe vidhimukhena śabde pravartamāne sarvātmakārthagrahaṇaṃ prāpnoti, tataś ca yathānulomyena vṛkṣapārthivadravyasajjñeyaśabdebhyaś catustridvyekaniścayo bhavati, tathā prātilomyenāpi niścayena bhavitavyam. na ca tathā dṛśyate. jñeyaśabdāc caturṣu sattādiṣu sandehāt, sacchabdāt triṣu dravyādiṣu, dravyaśabdāt dvayoḥ pārthivavṛkṣatvayoḥ, pārthivaśabdād ekatra vṛkṣatve. tasmān na vidhimukhena pravṛttāḥ śabdāḥ.*

(1)*evam* em. (cf. *de bźin du* T) : *etam* Ms

(2) *dṛṣṭaḥ* em. : *dṛṣṭa* Ms

(3) *ekaika°* em. : *ekekai°* Ms

4)As opposed to adding them, cf. PSV II:14, q.v. no. 430 above.

[227] *na ca sambandhadvāraṃ muktvā śabdasya liṅgasya vā*(1) *svārthakhyāpanaśaktir asti.* Qu. NCV 663,9-10 (*iti tvayaivokto 'yaṃ nyāya iti darśayati*); cf. PSṬ Ms B 227a6: *na ca sambandhadvāram muktvetyādi. sambandho 'vinābhāvaḥ sa eva dvāraṃ nimittam anumiteḥ. tatra parityajya śabdasya liṅgasyeva* (sic) *nāsti svārthapratyāyanaśaktiḥ;* cf. Ms 227a7-227b1, q.v. no. 432 below.

(1) Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227a7: *vāśabda aupamye,* which explains the reading *liṅgasyeva* of the paraphrase.

431 The necessary means of connection is *vyatireka* whose predominance over *anvyaya* for establishing the *avinābhāvasambandha* was explained at PSV V:34, cf. Ms B 227a7-227b1: *yathārthātmakaṃ liṅgam avinābhāvasambandhadvāreṇa pratyāyayat svārthaṃ vyatirekadvāreṇa pratyāyayati, tathā śabdo 'pīti pratipādanāya "liṅgasya ve"ti vacanam:* "Just as a logical indicator indicates its proper object that has the nature of a referent through joint absence by indicating it through the relation which is constituted by the invariable relation [between indicator and indicated], so also a word. Therefore, in order to make that clear he uses the expression "or the inferential indicator.""

Dignāga's view that the invariable relation of the word (*śabda*) or the logical indicator (*liṅga*) to the referent or the indicated is grounded on exclusion underlies Kumārila's statement at ŚV Apoha° 92: *yady apy apohanirmukte na vṛttiḥ śabdaliṅgayoḥ yuktā, tathāpi buddhis tu jñātur vastv avalambhate;* cf. also ŚV Apoha° 73 qu. TS 933, commenting on which Kamalaśīla quotes a Sanskrit fragment at TSP 367,11: *apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām eva pratipādyate,* which probably stems from one of Dignāga's lost works; cf. Manorathanandin at PVV 299,14-15 ad PV I 134cd-135ab: *sāmānyagocārāś śabdā buddhayaḥ kalpikā anyāpohaviṣayā ācāryeṇa proktāḥ: apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām pratipādyate;* Dharmakīrti would seem to incorporate more of this fragment in the following statement: at PVSV 25,27-28: *katham punar etad gamyate: "vyavacchedaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyām pratipādyate vidhinā na vasturūpam eve"ti.* Hemacandra on Syādvādamañjarī 14 p. 94:248 quotes the following two ślokapāda*s: apohaḥ śabdaliṅgābhyāṃ na vastu vidhinocyate;* cf. also PV I 47: *apohaviṣayam iti liṅgam prakīrtitam,* ascribed to *ācārya,* i.e., Dignāga by Manorathanandin ad loc. For the implications of *vidhi,* cf. no 13 above.

[432] Jinendrabuddhi interprets *vā* in the sense of *iva*[1], cf. Ms 227a7: *vāśabda aupamye.*
    [1]Cf. Amarakośa III.4:9: *va vā ... sāmye.* However, *vā* in the sense of *iva* is only recorded in verse. Dignāga evidently does not distinguish between the function of the logical indicator and the word in terms of their connection and indicative funktion.

[228] *tasyānekadharmatve sarvathā pratyāyanāsambhavāt,* <*svārthāvyabhicāraś ca*>[1] *bhedānabhidhānāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b1-3: *tasyānekadharmatva iti śiṃśapādibhedena puṣpitaphalitatvādibhedena ca vṛkṣāder arthasyānekadharmatve sarvathā pratyāyanāsambhavād iti ... bhedānabhidhānād iti;* cf. the quotation at NCV 663,11-12: *yad uktaṃ tvayā. "na cāsti vyabhicāritādoṣaḥ, bhedānabhidhā-nād" iti,* which may stem from a different source, presumably the Sāmānyaparīkṣā-vyāsa.
    [1]Cf. the use of *svārthāvyabhicāraḥ* at § 49, cf. no. [234] below.

[433] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b1-3: *yadi sarveṇa prakāreṇa puṣpitaphalitatvādinā pratyāyanaṃ syāt, tadā yathoktaṃ sambandham antareṇa syāt. vidhinaiva pratyā-yanaṃ, tac ca na sambhavati, puṣpitatvādibhedeṣu vyabhicārāt. yathādarśanaṃ ca pratyāyanaṃ vidhiḥ. tasmān na vidhinā pratyāyanatvam api tv arthāntaravyāvṛtti-dvāreṇa:* "If the indication were in every form such as [the tree's] being in flower or having fruits, it would be without the previously explained connection: the indication would only be through affirmation, and this is not possible because of ambiguity with regard to its particular features like its being in flower, etc. And affirmation is an indication reflecting observation. Therefore the fact of indicating is not through affirmation, but rather through exclusion of other referents." Cf. Dharmakīrti's analogous statement with reference to Dignāga at PVSV 65,19-22 ad PV I 134, q.v. above no. 432: *yadi hi vidhirūpeṇa vastv eva śabdair vikalpair vāpi viṣayīkriyeta, so 'yaṃ sarvārthasarvākārapratītiprasaṅgo 'sāmānādhikaraṇyādayaś ceti manyamānaḥ praṇetā nyāyaśastrayānyapohaviṣayāv etau prāha.* For the impli-cations of the expression *sarvathā,* cf. PSV II:15, q.v. no. 13 above.

[434] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b3: *teṣāṃ parasparābhāve 'pi bhāvād vyabhicāraḥ syāt, na sāmānye 'bhidheye, tasyābhedāt. tadabhāve cābhāvāc chabdasya:* "Because the [particulars] exist although they are mutually non-existent, there will be ambiguity, but not if the general property is the denotable object because it is without division, and because the word would not exist if [the general property] did not exist."

[229] *evaṃ tāvat* <*pūrvoktadoṣābhāvaḥ*>[1]. Restored, cf. NCV 728,20: *evaṃ tāvad ityādi;* cf. NCV 653,22: *evaṃ tāvad bhedābhidhāne ye doṣā uktāḥ.* NCV 728,20: *evaṃ tāvad ityādi.*
    [1]Cf. *sṅar bśad pa'i skyon* K : *ñes pa sṅa ma* V.

[435] That is, the problem of not denoting as explained at PSV V:2ab. Siṃhasūri quotes a similar argument interspersed with his own glosses at NCV 653,20-22 *pūrvadoṣābhāvaś ca yasmāc chruteḥ sambandhasaukaryam bahutve 'pi tulyātulya-yor vṛttyavṛttī, sambandhasaukaryād na cāpi vyabhicāritā bhedānabhidhānāt. evaṃ tāvad bhedābhidhāne ye doṣā uktās te parihṛtā iti anyāpohavādipakṣaḥ:* "And the previous faults do not exist since the word's connection is feasible, i.e., [its]

occurrence and non-occurrence at the similar and dissimilar, [respectively], although [the particulars] are many. Because of the feasibility [of the connection] there is no ambiguity either since the particulars are not denoted. Thus in the first place the faults that have been mentioned with regard to the denotation of the particulars are avoided. This is the thesis of the upholder of the *apoha* theory.”

[230] *anantarasyāpy abhāvaḥ. <katham? yasmāt*[1]*>.* Restored, cf. NCV 728,22-730,11: *yad apy uktam: anantarasyāpi ... (a)bhāva iti.*
[1]Cf. *gaṅ gi phyir* K : *’di ltar* V.

[436] That is, the absurd consequence that co-reference becomes impossible if the word ‘existent’ is supposed to denote the general property or the connection as Dignāga explains at PSV V:2cd, cf. NCV loc. cit.: *jātisambandhābhidhānapakṣayor uktasya sāmānādhikaraṇābhāvaprasaṅgadoṣajātasya (abhāvaḥ).*

[231] *vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya tadbhedārthair abhinnatā.* Qu. NCV 730,11-13, cf. PSṬ Ms B 277b3-5: *vyāpter anyaniṣedhasyeti ... tadbhedārthair abhinnateti.*

[437] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b5: *anyāpohavācibhir dravyādiśabdaiḥ sadādeḥ śabdasya sāmānādhikaraṇyam ity arthaḥ:* “The meaning is that a word like ‘existent’ is co-referential with words like ‘substance’ that denote exclusion of other [referents].”

[438] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 277b4-5: *vyāptiḥ svabhedāpratikṣepaḥ. anyaniṣedho yathok-taṃ sāmānyam. tasya vyāpteḥ: svabhedānāṃ vyāpakatvād ity arthaḥ. anyaniṣedhas-yeti hi kṛtyogalakṣaṇakartarīyaṃ ṣaṣṭhī:* “Pervasion means not rejecting its own particulars. Negation of other [referents] means the general property such as it has been explained. ’Since [it viz. the general property negation of other referents] pervades’ means ’since it pervades its own particulars.’ For in the expression “*anyaniṣedhasya*” the sixth triplet is introduced to indicate the agent who is characterized by construction with [a verbal stem] ending in a *kṛt* affix[1].”
The explanation of the verse at NCV 730,12-13 is more explicit: *’sad ity asad na bhavati’ ity asato nivṛttiḥ sarvadravyaguṇakarmaghaṭarūpotkṣepaṇādibhedavyāpi-nī. tasyā asannivṛtteḥ sarvabhedavyāpitvāt tair abhinnārthatvāt sāmānādhikaraṇ-yam upapannam:* “The preclusion of the non-existent as expressed in the statement “‘it is existent because (*iti*) it is not non-existent’ pervades all particulars such as substances, qualities, actions, pots, colours, and upward movements, etc. Since the preclusion of non-existent things pervades all the particulars, co-reference is justified as its referents are not distinct from these.”
[1]Jinendrabuddhi analyses *vyāpti* as *vi* +√*āp* + *kṛt* affix *ti,* and construes the phrase *vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya* with reference to A II.3:65: *kartṛkarmaṇoḥ kṛti:* “(The sixth triplet is introduced) to denote the agent or the direct object (in construction with a verbal stem) ending in a *kṛt* affix;” v. Kāś ad loc.

[232] *sāmānyaśabdasya hi yat kṛtyam*[1] *arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāprati-kṣepeṇeti bhedaśrutyā saha*[2] *sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapannam.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 227b5–228a1: *sāmānyaśabdasya hītyādiḥ. sāmānyaśabdasya yat kṛtyam pratyāyyam. tat punaḥ kīdṛśam? arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāpratikṣepeṇa;* NCV 730,14-15: *sāmānyaśabdasya hi sadāder yo ’rthāntaravyudāso “asan na bhavati” iti kṛtyaṃ vyāpāraḥ sa tvayettham avadhāritaḥ svabhedāpratikṣepeṇeti;*

NCV 730,20: *tataś ca* <u>*bhedaśrutyā*</u> *dravyaguṇādikayā ghaṭapaṭādikayā* <u>*saha*</u>
<u>*sāmānādhikaraṇyam*</u> *anupapannam.*
[1]The Tibetan translations are syntactically confused and, moreover, reproduce
kṛtyam as *byas pa,* cf. *spyi'i sgras gaṅ don gźan rnam par gsal bar byas pa* V : *don*
gźan bsal ba byas pa'i spyi'i sgra K.
[2]Cf. *khyad par gyi sgra daṅ lhan cig* K : *tha dad pa'i sgra daṅ gźi mthun pa*
daṅ lhan cig par (sic) V.

[439] Cf. PV IV 178: *sa ca bhedo 'pratikṣepāt sāmānyānāṃ na vidyate, vṛkṣo na*
śiṃśapaiveti yathā prakaraṇe kvacit; see Manorathanandin's commentary PVV
422,10-15 ad loc.

[440] Cf. PST Ms B 227b6-228a1: *anena vyāpakatvam āha. na hi yathā*
jātyabhidhāne jātyantarāṇāṃ parityāgas tathārthāntarāpohābhidhāne dravyatvādī-
nāṃ bhedānām, abhinnasya vastunaḥ sacchabdād apratikṣiptadravyatvādyākārasya
buddhau pratibhāsanāt. hiśabdo yasmādarthaḥ. itiśabdas tasmādarthaḥ. yata evaṃ,
tasmāt bhedārthair dravyādiśabdaiḥ sacchruteḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapannaṃ:
"Hereby he explains that [the negation of other referents] pervades [the particulars].
For particular [general properties] like substanceness, and so on, are not omitted,
when the exclusion of other referents is denoted, in the same way as the other
general properties are omitted when the general property is denoted because due to
the word 'existent' a non-different entity, from whose form substanceness, and so
on, is not omitted, is reflected in the mind. The word 'for' has the meaning of
'since'. The word 'thus' has the meaning of 'therefore'. Since this is the case, it is
justified that the word 'existent' is co-referential with words like 'substance' whose
referents are particulars."
Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is influenced by Dharmakīrtian philosophy and the
subsequent discourse at Ms B 228a1-4 is an adaptation of Dharmakīrti's PVSV
42,13ff applied to the question of the co-reference of the two terms *'sad'* and
'dravya': kathaṃ kṛtvā? yad etaj jñānaṃ vastusvabhāvagrāhiṇānubhāvenāhitāṃ
vāsanām āśrityotpadyate abāhyārthaviṣayam api tadviṣayam ivābhinnakārya-
padārthaprasūtatvād abhinnārthagrāhīva vikalpakam. tatra yo 'rthākāraḥ pratibhā-
sate vyavahartṛbhir bāhyavastutvenādhyavasitas[1] *tatra sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ*
vyavasthāpyate, na svalakṣaṇe, buddhāv apratibhāsanāt. sa hy asadvyāvṛttena rūpe-
ṇa pratibhāsamāno 'bhinnasadākārānugataḥ pratibhāsate. sa evāsato vyāvṛttaḥ,
punar adravyatvāder api vyāvṛtto dvitīyena dravyatvādyākāreṇānugato 'bhinnaś ca
pratibhāti. ata ekaṃ vastusatvena dravyatvena ca prakāśamānaṃ saddravyam iti
saddravyaśabdābhyām abhidhīyata iti sāmānādhikaraṇyavyavasthā kriyate.
[1]em. (cf. *phyi rol gyi don ñid du lhag par źen pa* T) : *bāhyavākṣavastu-*
tvenāvyavasitas Ms

[233] <*tasmāt svabhedārthair*[1] *pṛthakśrutidoṣo*[2] *nāsti*>. Restored, cf. the
parallel at NCV 730,24: *tasmād apṛthakśrutidoṣo 'sty eva,* which undoubtedly
reflects Dignāga's own formulation. The Tibetan translations of this clause are
problematic.
[1]Cf. *raṅ gi khyad par gyi don* K : *'di'i tha dad pa'i don* V (= *tadbhedārthair*).
[2]Cf. *sgra tha dad pa'i ñes pa* V : *tha dad pa'i rgyur gyur pa'i ñes pa* K.

[441] Dignāga refers to the problem mentioned at PS V 2d: *bhedarthair apṛthakśruteḥ;* cf. Siṃhasūri's explanation at NCV 731,11-732,10: *sattāsamban-dhābhidhānapakṣayor apṛthakśrutidoṣo 'sti, nāpohapakṣe viśeṣahetusadbhāvād iti. tasya viśeṣahetoḥ pratipādanārtham uktam – tatra hītyādi. sattāsambandhābhi-dhānapakṣayor guṇau sattāsambandhau viśeṣaṇatvāt, tadvastu guṇīty ataḥ sāmānā-dhikaraṇyābhāvo yukto:* "The problem of not being "heard apart" [from words whose referents are particular general properties] [that attaches] to the theses of the denotation of existence or its connection, does not [attach] to the theory of exclusion because there is a special reason [for it]. In order to explain this special reason it is said: *For on these two,* etc. On the two theses of the denotation of existence or its connection existence and the connection are properties because they are qualifiers. Their object is the property bearer. Therefore it is justified that there is no co-reference."

For the implications of this explanation, cf. the exposition at PSV V:2cd-3 above § 4.

[442] The translation of this clause is tentative, as the Tibetan translations differ considerably from one another, cf. *don gaṅ gñi ga'i sgras brjod par byed pa yaṅ don gźan la gźi mthun pa yin no* K : *de ni mthun pa'i sgra daṅ don gźan sel ba'i don gñis ka sgra'i brjod bya 'o* V. Only the phrases *don gaṅ gñi ga'i sgras brjod par byed pa* K : *don gñis ka sgra'i brjod bya 'o* V are comparable to one another. It is clear, however, that the content of the clause must be related to the explanation at PSṬ Ms 228a4-5 and NCV 732,14ff (for which, cf. no. 445 below), which is concerned with explaining that the [absurd] consequence that general and particular terms are not co-referential does not arise on the *apoha* theory. When the two terms 'existent' and 'substance' are combined in the phrase 'existent substance' they form an aggregate that is syntactically similar to a compound and thus subject to the same inter-pretation. As it appears from Siṃhasūri's exposition, Dignāga's statement is parallel to the *apoha* theory of compound formation, for which, cf. PSV V:15 § 25 above.

[234] *tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāraḥ <kevalasyānyatrāvṛtteḥ>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a4: *tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāra iti;* NCV 732,16: *tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāro viśeṣasahitasyeti.*

[443] That is, there is no ambiguity as regards the denotation of the general term *'sat'* when it is accompanied by the particular term *'dravya';* cf. the exposition at NCV 732,14ff, q.v. no. 445 below.

[444] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a4-5: *samudāyārtho hi viśiṣṭas. tasya yadi padaṃ vācakaṃ syāt, tadā tadabhāve 'pi padasya vṛtter na tad gamayet. yatas tu samudāyaḥ śabdāntaram eva tasya vācakam, ato na vyabhicāraḥ:* "For the referent of an aggregate is distinct [from the referents of the individual components]. If the syntactical word were to denote it, it would not indicate because the syntactical word applies even in its [viz. the referent of the aggregate's] absence. But since the aggregate, i.e., a different expression, denotes it, there is no ambiguity."

The exposition of the *pūrvapakṣa* at NCV 732,14ff is far more explicit as to the question Dignāga addresses: *kasmād anabhidhānam iti cet, saṃśayotpatteḥ, <an>upāttatve*[1] *sati anabhihite saṃśayaḥ syāt. tasmāt sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ viśe-ṣārthair dravyādiśabdaiḥ sacchabdasya vākyārthe yuktam, na padārthe. tad*

darśayati – sad dravyaṃ san guṇa ityādi. <u>*tathā hi svārthāvyabhicāro*</u> *viśeṣasahitas-*
yeti viśeṣaśabdaprayogaḥ. ko 'sau vākyārtha ity ata āha – yasmād avayavaśab-
dārthābhyām anyaḥ samudāyārthaḥ, saddravyaśabdārthāv avayavāv asadadravya-
nivṛttyupalakṣitau, tābhyām anya ubhayaśabdavyudāsānugṛhītaḥ samudāyārthaḥ,
tasya ca vācakau tau samuditau na viparītārthau, tad darśayati – na tu sacchabdo
dravyārtham āha, na dravyaśabdaḥ sadartham: "If it is asked: "Why is there no
denotation [of its own particulars by the general term]"? [Answer:] Because doubt
arises. There will be doubt in that it is not included [by the general term][3], i.e., in
that it is not denoted. Therefore it is correct that the word 'existent' is co-referential
with words like 'substance,' whose referents are particulars, with regard to the
referent of a sentence, but not with regard to the referent of the syntactical word. He
shows that in the examples: 'existent substance', ' existent quality', etc. That is,
there is no ambiguity as regards the denotation of the general term, when it is
accompanied by a particular. Thus a particular term is applied. What is this referent
of the sentence? Therefore he says: Because the referent of the aggregate is other
than the referents of the two words that constitute the parts; the two parts viz. the
referents of the words 'existent' and 'substance' are characterized by negation of
what is non-existent and what is a non-substance; the aggregate referent that is
assisted by the exclusions [effected by] both words is other than these two; and the
two that denote this [referent] do not have opposite referents when combined; this he
shows [in the statement] 'but the word 'existent' does not denote the referent that is
a substance, nor does the word 'substance' denote the referent that is existent.""

At this point Siṃhasūri quotes PS V:15, after which he continues: *atra codyam –*
kathaṃ tarhīti 'yat sat tad dravyam, yad dravyaṃ tat sat' iti bhinnārthatve na[2]
yuktam? iti. atra tenaivocyate – ubhayaśabdavyudāsānugṛhītasya asadadravyanivṛt-
tyanugṛhītasya saṃhataśabdadvayābhidheyasya samudāyārthasyaikatvāt tathocya-
te, na tu sadarthasya dravyaśabdenābhidhānād iti pūrvapakṣaḥ: "Here the follow-
ing question is to be raised: In this case, how is not correct to say 'whatever is
existent is a substance' and 'whatever is a substance is existent' as the referents are
different? Here he says: since the referent of the aggregate that is denotable by the
two words together assisted by negation of non-existent things and non-substances is
a unity, it is said to be so, but not because the referent that is existent is denoted by
the word 'substance.' Thus the *pūrvapakṣa.*"

[1]em., cf. NCV 732 no.8.
[2]°*tve na* conj. : °*tvena* NCV, cf. op.cit. 732 no. 10.
[3]Cf. PS V 26 § 40.

[235] *paścimasyāpi doṣasyā<bhāvaḥ. kasmāt?>.* Restored, cf. NCV 733,12:
paścimasyāpi doṣasya bhāva eva; Ms B 228a5: *paścimasyāpi.*

[445] That is, the problem explained at PSV V 4a, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a5-6: *tadvato*
nāsvatantratvād ity asya. Siṃhasūri quotes a similar verse, presumably from the
Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, as an introduction to his exposition of Dignāga's argument,
cf. NCV 733,13: *yad uktaṃ jātimatpakṣe "tadvato nāsvatantratvād bhedāj jāter*
ajātitaḥ" ityādi doṣajātam. The phrase *sākṣād vṛtteḥ* of PS V 36c is related to
Dignāga's observation at PSV V 4a: *sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasarjanaṃ*
dravyam āha, na sākṣād iti.

[236] *sākṣād vṛtter abhedāc ca.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a6: *sākṣād vṛtter iti;* NCV 733,14: *sākṣād vṛtteḥ;* Ms B 228b3: *anenābhedāc cety etad vivṛtam.*

[446] The word applies directly to its referent through exclusion of other referents without its denotation being mediated by the word's dependence upon a real general property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a6: *na hi tadvatpakṣa iva*[1] *guṇarūpopakṛtaṃ vastu śabdenābhidhīyate. tatra hi guṇāntaropakārasya virodhāt tyāgaḥ. iha tu sattvādikaṃ guṇāntaram anapekṣyāsadvyudaste vastuni śabdo vartate:* "For it is not, like in the case of the thesis of the general property possessor, a referent under the imfluence of the form of a general property (*guṇa*) that is denoted by the word. For on this [theory viz. the *apoha* theory] there is omission of the influence of other general properties because it is in conflict[2]. However, on this [theory viz. the *apoha* theory] the word applies to an object (*vastu*) from which what is non-existent is excluded without being dependent upon a different general property like existence."

For Siṃhasūri's explanation of the statement *sākṣād vṛtteḥ,* cf. no.s 450, 456 below.
[1]*iva* conj. (cf. *de daṅ ldan pa'i phyogs bźin du* T) : *tadvatpakṣabhāvaguṇa°* Ms
[2]Cf PSV V:6c-7a § 12.

[447] For the implications of this argument, cf. no.s 452, 462 below.

[237] *na hy arthāntaram upādāya <śabdaḥ svabhedeṣu vartate>. tasmāt pāratantryeṇa <svabhed>ānākṣepadoṣo nāsti*[1]*. bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti*[2]*, nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ*[3]*, avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsty arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād adravyatvāc ca. ata eva <sāmānyaviśeṣāntarayogānusaraṇaṃ na kartavyaṃ> sākṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228a7, *na hy arthāntaram upādāyetyādi. tasmāt pāratantryeṇeti;* 228b1-7 *ata eva bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti ... nāpītyādi. bhedānavasthānam ānantyam. na tasmād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ ... avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti ... arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād iti ... adravyatvād ceti ...ata eveti;* 229a2: *sākṣād arthāntarapratiṣedhād iti.*
[1]Cf. NCV 733,16: *anākṣepadoṣo nāsti.*
[2]Cf. NCV 733,16: *bhāktadoṣo 'py ata eva nāsti.*
[3]Cf. NCV 733,17: *nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ.*

[448] Mallavādi applies the term *bhāvāntara* in a similar context, cf. NCV 734,16 and 735,7,16-17. Dharmakīrti alludes to Dignāga's formulation at PVSV 34,21-23: *tatra hy arthāntaram upādāya anyatra vartamāno dhvanir asvātantryādidoṣair upadrūyate. na ca arthātaram anyasmād vyāvṛttir vyāvṛttād dvayor ekābhidhānād ity uktam:* "For in this case (viz. in case exclusion of other is considered a property like a general property) the word, while being applied to one thing in dependence upon another referent, is afflicted with such problems as not being independent. And it has already been explained (at PVSV 34,15-20) that the exclusion from other is not a referent that is different from the excluded because both (viz. the term denoting the property exclusion of other and the term denoting the property possessor as qualified by exclusion of other) denote the same thing."

Cf. PVSV 62,26ff; *Pind* 1999.

[449] Cf. Siṃhasūri's lucid exposition at NCV 733,14: *tasyābhāvo 'nyāpohapakṣe sākṣād vṛtteḥ. tatra hi sacchabdaḥ sattām upādāya dravye vartamānas tadbhedān ghaṭādīn ākṣeptum asamarthaḥ. atra punar asatpratiṣedhena sākṣād vartata iti tasya ye viśeṣās tān na pratikṣepati. tasmād ihānākṣepadoṣo nāsti:* "This (kind of problem, cf. the verse quoted at NCV 733,13, q.v. no. 30 above) does not exist on the *apoha* theory. For on this (theory) the word 'existent,' while applying to a substance in dependence upon (the general property) existence, is incapable of implicitly referring to its particulars such as pots. But here (viz. on the *apoha* theory), on the other hand, it applies directly by negation of the non-existent. Thus it does not negate its particulars. Therefore the problem of not implicitly referring (to the particulars) does not exist here (viz. on the *apoha* theory)."

Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's argument in similar terms at PSṬ Ms B 228a7-B 228b1: *na hy apoho nāma jātyādivat kiñcid arthāntaraṃ yad upādāya śabdo dravye varteta. tato vyavadhānābhāvāt kutaḥ pāratantryam. tad eva tu vastv asadvyāvṛttaṃ sākṣād abhidhīyate. tatas tasya ye viśeṣās te tadavyatirekād na pratikṣipyante:* "For the so-called exclusion is not some different sort of referent like a general property, and so on, in dependence on which the word applies to a substance. Therefore, since no intermediary entity exists how could there be dependence? This very object, however, is denoted directly as excluded from the non-existent. Therefore its particulars are not rejected because they are not distinct from it."

[450] Cf. NCV 733,16-17: *bhāktadoṣo 'py ata eva nāsti. na hy anyatra mukhyā vṛttir dravyādiṣūpacaryate:* "Precisely therefore the problem of transfer of denotation does not exist either. For (the word's) primary application to something else is not transferred to substances, etc." Cf. the almost identical explanation at PSṬ Ms B 228b1-2: *ata eva bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti. na hy anyatra*[1] *mukhyavṛttiḥ śabdo dravyādiṣūpacaryate:* "Precisely therefore the problem of transfer of denotation does not exist either. For a word that primarily applies to something else is not transferred to substances, etc."

[1] *na hy an°* conj. : *na nyatra* Ms

[451] Siṃhasūri's explanation at NCV 733,17-18 sheds more light on the issue than Jinendrabuddhi's exegesis (on which see below): *nāpi bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ. kasmāt? abhedāt. na hy arthāntarāpoho bhedeṣu bhidyate, abhāvāt. tanmātraṃ ca śabdenocyate, na bhedāḥ:* "Nor does the problem of not denoting exist, which is due to the particulars being infinite. Why? Because [exclusion] is not a particular (*abheda*). For exclusion of other referents (*arthāntarāpoha*) is not divided among the particulars because it is non-existence (*abhāva*);[1] and this alone is denoted by the word, not the particulars."

Jinendrabuddhi identifies this problem with the argument at PS V:8cd, cf. PSṬ Ms B 228b2: *bhedānavasthānam ānantyam. na tasmād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ. "tadvāṃś ca bheda evoktaḥ, sa ca pūrvaṃ nirākṛta"* (PS V:8cd) *ity anena yad uktam*[2].

[1] Exclusion of other referents is equivalent to non-existence of other referents in the locus of the referent of any given word. Non-existence is *eo ipso* indivisible and therefore not subject to the absurd consequences that the theory of real universals entails. Cf. Translation § 51.

[2] em. : *°taḥ* Ms

[452] Jinendrabuddhi identifies this problem with the discussion at PS V:9c, cf. PST Ms B 228b2-3: *avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti. yad uktam "tadvān artho ghaṭādiś ce"* (PS V:9c) *tyādinā.* This is indirectly confirmed by Siṃhasūri who deals with Mallavādi's criticism of Dignāga's argument at NCV 733,19, quoting a similar verse, presumably from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. According to Siṃhasūri Dignāga's claim that a problem similar to the one of assuming that general properties are real entities does not exist on the *apoha* theory, presupposes that it denotes the exclusion of other referents directly, cf. NCV 733,20: *sākṣād ghaṭapaṭādiṣv asatpratikṣepād iti:* "Because it negates directly non-existent [things] with respect to pot or cloth, etc.;" NCV 735,15 (*yad apy uktam*): *arthāntarāpoho 'sadaghaṭanivṛttiḥ san ghaṭa iti, tasmāt sāmānyadoṣo 'pohapakṣe nāstīti:* "Exclusion of other referents is the preclusion of non-existent things and non-pots such as 'existent pot'. Therefore the problem of the general property does not exist on the *apoha* theory."

Cf. Dharmakīrti's reference, in a similar context, to *asāmānyadoṣa* at PVSV 66,13-14 (cf. PV I 136): *yathā hy ekas tasmād bhinnas tathānyo 'pi iti bhedasyā-sāmānyadoṣo 'pi nāsti.*

[453] As Jinendrabuddhi notices at PST Ms B 228b3, this explains 36c$_2$ *anenābhedāc ce* (36c$_2$) *ty etad vivṛtam,* and he continues explaining the argument at 228b3-4: *bhede hi saty ānantyadoṣo bhavaty asāmānyadoṣaś ca, anyasyānyatrā-vṛtteḥ.*[1] *arthāntarāpohamātraṃ tv abhinnam. tatra kuto 'sya doṣasyāvakāśaḥ:* "If [exclusion of other] were a particular there would be the problem of infinity and the problem of not being a general property because one thing does not reside in the other [as mentioned at PS V 9c-10a]. The mere exclusion of other referents, however, is not divided [among the referents]. So how could there be an opportunity for [introducing] this problem;" cf. Dharmakīrti's statement at PVSV 48,14, q.v. no. 459 below.

[1]em. : *anyasyānyatre vṛtter* Ms

[454] The argument that the *sāmānyadoṣa* does not exist because exclusion of other is not a substance (*adravyatvāt*) elaborates the point that it is not a different sort of referent (*arthāntara*) like the general property existence, and that it is without division. The reason is that exclusion of other things *anyāpoha* is equivalent to non-existence of other things in the locus of the referent, and non-existence which is the mere absense of something from something else, does not have status as a thing, which by implication excludes that it is qualified by the kind of properties that define things. Dharmakīrti formulates a similar view at PV I 169ab and PVSV 85,21-23 ad loc.: *nivṛtter niḥsvabhāvatvān na sthānāsthānakalpanā. na hy anyāpoho nāma kiṃcit tasya ca svabhāvānuṣaṅgiṇyaḥ svabhāvasthitipracyutikal-panā na kalpante:* "Since negation is without essential nature the idea of permanence or non-permanence does not (fit). For negation of other is nothing whatsoever, so the notions of the duration and disappearence of the essential nature that are the concomitants of an essential nature do not fit it."

As indicated by Siṃhasūri's exegesis at NCV 734,13-16 Mallavādi quotes two *ślokapāda*s to the same effect, presumably from the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa. Unfortunately NCV does not quote Mallavādi's exposition of Dignāga's view in full, cf. NCV loc. cit.: *adravyatvāc ca bhedāc ceti kārikāyāṃ* (so read) *caśabdā(d*

*bhā)ṣye likhitam. tadvyākhyā: nāpy arthāntarāpoho nāmetyādi yāvan nāsti sāmān-
yadoṣa ityapohapakṣe jātimatpakṣagatadoṣābhāvapratipādanaṃ viśeṣapradarśanād
iti tvadabhiprāyam pradarśya.*

Cf. the parallel at *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā* V 64 [for which, cf. no. 458 below]
where Bhavya explains, in his criticism of Dignāga's *apoha* theory, that the reason
why a general property is resident in many things is that is not a substance, cf.
Tarkajvālā ad loc.: *rdzas thams cad kyi khoṅs su gtogs pas rdzas su med pa'i phyir
du mar 'jug pa yin no:* "Since [the general property] does not exist as a substance
(*dravya*) in that it is inherent in all substances (**sarvadravyāntargata*) it is resident
in many (**anekavṛtti*). Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 228b4-7 with
reference to Dharmakīrti's view, as it is expounded at PV I 70-72 and PVSV ad loc.,
that the general property is a mental category, not a thing: *nanu ca jñānasya yaḥ
sāmānyākāraḥ sāmānyavyavasthāpitam, sa ca jñānād avyatiriktatvād* (cf. PV I 71c)
*anyatrāvartamānaḥ kathaṃ sāmānyam ity āha. adravyatvāc cetyādi. vijñānākā-
rasyāpi sāmānyarūpeṇāpariniṣpannatvāt sāmānyam adravyasad eva naiva aniṣṭam.
etad uktam bhavati "mithyāvikalpa evāyam artheṣv ekātmatāgrahaḥ*[(1)]" (PV I
72ab). *vastutaḥ sāmānyan nāma nāsty eva. bhrāntajanābhiprāyavaśāt*[(2)] *kevalam
iyaṃ sāmānyavyavasthā kriyate. bhrāntā hi vyavahartāraḥ svajñānapratibhāsa-
viśeṣam eva bahir vyaktibhedānuyātam iva sāmānyam manyanta iti kṛtveti*[(3)].

[(1)]°*tāgrahaḥ* em. : °*nāgraho* Ms

[(2)]*bhrāntajanā*° em. : *bhrāṃjanā*° Ms

[(3)]Jinendrabuddhi's exposition is an epitome of Dharmakīrti's discourse on the
problem at PVSV 38,17ff.

[455] Cf. PST Ms B 228b7–229a2: *sākṣād vṛtteḥ* (PS V 36c). *tatra hi sattāviśeṣaṇa-
rūpeṇābhidhānād vastunaḥ svarūpaṃ vyavadhīyate. tatsambandhinaś ca ghaṭatvā-
dayo na sattāsambandhino "jāter ajātitaḥ"* (PS V 11b₂). *tato na tadmukhe-
nānekārthākāṅkṣāhetuḥ. iha tu sākṣād asatpratiṣedhena śabdaḥ svārthe pravartate.
tatas tadbhedākāṅkṣāhetutvam upapadyate vināpi jātyantarayogena:* "That is,
"because it applies directly." For in this context (i.e., the context of the existence of
general properties) the own form of an entity is defined by a word denoting it in the
form of the qualifier "existence." And its relata viz. potness, and so on, are not the
relata of existence "because a general property is without (other) general properties"
(PS V 11b₂). Therefore it is not on that account a cause of the expectation of many
referents. Whereas here [viz. on the *apoha* theory], on the other hand, the word
['existent'] applies directly to its own referent through negation of what is non-
existent. Therefore it is justified that it is a cause of expectation of its particulars
even without the connection to other general properties."

[456] Cf. PST Ms B 229a2-4: *arthāntarapratiṣedhopāyalabhyaṃ svārthābhidhā-
nam evam uktam. sākṣāt svārthābhidhānād ity arthaḥ. etenāta evety asyārtho
darśitaḥ. atra ca vastusajjātyantarayogapratiṣedho vivakṣito, na tu kalpitajātyanta-
rayogo 'pi. tathā hi yat sad ity ucyate, tad eva tatas tato vyāvṛttam ākārāntareṇa
pratibhāsamānaṃ kalpitasāmānyāntarayogena tathā tathā vibhajyate:* "The
(word's) denoting its own referent is is to be understood by means of negation of
other referents, as it has been explained. The meaning is: Because it denotes its own
referent directly. Thereby the meaning of "precisely therefore" is shown. And in this
context the negation of connection to other real general properties is intended, but
not the connection to other imagined general properties too. That is, the same thing

that is said to be 'existent', being reflected in the mind in a different form as excluded from this or that is differentiated in this or that way by being connected to other imagined general properties."

This exegesis is strongly influenced by Dharmakīrtian philosophy, cf., e.g., PVSV 54,18ff.

[238] <*evam pūrvadoṣābhāvād*> *arthāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ sādhuḥ.* Restored, cf. TSP 389,11-12: *tasmād guṇotkarṣād apy arthāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ sādhuḥ;* cf. no. [241] below.

[239] <*atra ca*>[1] *jātidharmavyavasthiteḥ.* Qu. ŚVṬ 74,8; NR 433,4; TSP 728,16, 776,8. °*teḥ* NR, TSP : °*tiḥ* ŚVṬ.
[1] '*di las* (read '*di la* = Sanskrit *atra*) *kyaṅ* K (cf. the PSV ad loc. *atraiva vyavatiṣṭhante*) : *gaṅ las śe na* V (this translation is incomprehensible in the context and presupposes a different reading).

[457] It is interesting that Bhavya, in his criticism of the *apoha* theory at Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā V:64 describes the general property, which he defines at V:62 as a property that is absent from dissimilar things (*vijātīyena śūnyatvam ... sāmānyam iti niścitam*) in terms that are related to Dignāga's exposition at PSV V:36cd, cf. loc. cit.: *abhedādravyasattvābhyām ekam anekavṛtty api, tadvināśe 'vināśāc ca nānyasmin tanmatir na ca:* "Since by nature it is not a particular and not a substance, it is one as well as resident in many; and in that it is not annihilated when its [substrate] is annihilated, it is not the case that the cognition of it does not [apply] to another [instantiation of it]."

[240] *jātidharmāś caiketvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva vyavatiṣṭhante, abhedāt, āśrayāvicchedāt, kṛtsnārthapratīteḥ.* Restored, cf. ŚVṬ 74,9: *jātidharmāś caikatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva tiṣṭhanti;* TSP 389,9-11 qu. STP I 201,13-14: *sarvatrābhedād āśrayasyānucchedāt kṛtsnārthaparisamāpteś ca yathākramaṃ jātidharmā ekatvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā[1] apoha evāvatiṣṭhante;* cf. PSṬ Ms B 229a4-7: *atraiva vyavatiṣṭhanta iti ... abhedād ekatvam ... āśrayāvicchedān nityatvam ... pratyekaparisamāptiḥ kṛtsnārthapratīteḥ.* Kumārila mentions the properties that Dignāga attributes to *apoha* at ŚV Apoha° 163ab: *api caikatvanityatvapratyekasamavāyitāḥ.*
[1] °*nityatva*° STP so : om. TSP.

[458] Exclusion of other referents that is equivalent to non-existence (*abhāva*) of other referents in the locus of the referent, is not a particular (*abheda*) and is therefore characterized by property of being one (*ekatva*) like real general properties postulated by other schools of thought. For Dharmakīrti's interpretation at PVSV 48,14-16: cf. no. 462 below.

[459] Dharmakīrti rejects these properties commonly attributed to real general properties (*jāti*) at PVSV 39,13-15: *vyaktivyatiriktāvyatiriktaikanityavyāpitādyākārair api naiva pratipattiḥ. kevalam abhinnākārā buddhir[1] utpadyate.* According to Karṇakagomin the argument at PVSV 48,18: *yathākalpanam asyāyogāt:* "because it [viz. the general property] is not connected [with attributes such as eternity and

pervasiveness] the way they are imagined," alludes to Dignāga's exposition in this paragraph[2].

[1] Cf. no. 463 below on the notion of substrate (*āśraya*) of *buddhi*.

[2] Cf. PVSVṬ 202,25-26: *yathākalpanam nityavyāpitādyākārair asya sāmānyas-yāyogād ity anyavyāvṛttyabhidhāne 'yam abhiprāya ācāryadignāgasya.*

460 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229a4: *yujyanta ity arthaḥ*[1]. Jayamiśra quotes Dignāga's enumeration of properties with the following observation on Kumarila's ŚV Apoha 163 at ŚVṬ 74:7-9: *atra bhikṣuṇāpohapakṣe jātipakṣatulyatvam atidiṣṭam* (quoting first paragraph of PSV:36d) *... te ime vastudharmā avastuny atidiśyamānā asūtra-paṭakāritvam sūcayantīty arthaḥ.* In short, transferring properties of real things to an unreal thing like exclusion is like making yarnless cloth.

[1] Cf. *rigs śiṅ* (sic) *ldan no źes pa'i don to* T; *rigs śiṅ* translates *yujyante*, although not in the sense of "being connected to" as required by the context; *ldan no* = *yuktāḥ* (?) has no equivalent in Ms. One cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the translator attempted to convey the idea of the properties of exclusion being logically justified (*yujyante*) as well as connected to exclusion.

461 Exclusion's property of being one (*ekatva*) follows from its not being a particular (*bheda*), cf. PSV V: 36c with no. 452 above. The scope of the term *bheda* appears from its use in Dignāga's analysis of the view current among contemporary non-Buddhist philosophers that general properties are real single entities that inhere in their substrates. See PSV II:16 q.v. no. 504 below.

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation reflects Dharmakīrti's view on the issue, cf. PSṬ Ms B 229a4-5: *abhedād ekatvam. arthāntaravyudāso hi buddhāv abhinnarūpatayā pratibhāsamāno vyavahārānuyātibhir ekatvena vyavasīyate ity ekatvaṃ tasya vyavasthāpyate:* "Its being one follows from its not being a particular[1]. For the exclusion of other referents, when appearing in the mind in identical form, is determined as being one and the same by those who are engaged in verbal exchange[2]. Thus its being one is defined."

[1]For the implications of this argument, cf. PS V 36c no. [236] above with no. 448.

[2]This explanation is evidently dependent upon Dharmakīrtian philosophy; cf. Dharmakīrti's reference to the unity of exclusion at PVSV 48,14-16: *tasmād avaśyaṃ śabdena vyavacchedaś codanīyaḥ. sa ca abhinnas tadanyeṣv iti jātidharmo apy asti:* "Therefore exclusion is necessarily to be enjoined by the word. And this [exclusion of other referents] is identical with respect to those (effects) that are different from those (that are the same;" cf. PVSVṬ 202,17-19 explaining that being identical (*abhinna*) relates to things that have the same effct and those that differ from them in terms of effect. Thus the *jātidharma* is the property of excluding many referents (*anekārthavyāvṛttitva*): *sa cety anyavyavacchedaḥ. tadanyeṣv iti tasmād atatkāryād anyeṣv ekakāryeṣv abhinnaḥ. Sarveṣāṃ vyāvṛttatvāt. iti kṛtvānekārtha-vyāvṛttitvaṃ jātidharmo 'py asti).*

462 Dignāga's introduction of the concept of *āśraya* as denoting the substrate of *anyāpoha* as opposed to the view of its being the bearer of real general properties is related to similar views on the permanence of the general property formulated by Bhartṛhari; cf. VP III.1:41cd: *anucchinnāśrayāj*[3] *jātir anitye 'py āśraye sthitā:*

"Since [its] substrate is not discontinued the general property remains, although [its] substrate is impermanent."

Cf. Candrānanda's remarks ad VS I.2:8 on the notion (*buddhi*) 'existent' (*sat*) as not being annihilated because the general property existence is separate from substances, and so on, whose destruction does not affect its being permanent: *āśrayavināśād asyā* (scil. *buddher*) *vināśa iti cet, na yataḥ "dravyaguṇakarmabhyo 'rthāntaraṃ sattā* (= VS I.2:8).*" yasmād dravyādibhyo vyatiriktā sattā tasmān na dravyādivināśe sattā vinaśyatīti.*

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of this term is indebted to Dharmakīrti's philosophy, cf. PST Ms B 229a5-7: *āśrayāvicchedān nityatvam. āśrayās tadartha-kriyākāritayātatkāribhyo vyāvṛttā bhedāḥ, te hi svānubhavadvāreṇa śabdārthasya nimittaṃ bhavanti yathoktam prāk; teṣāṃ cānantyāt ucchedo nāsti. ato yāvat te tāvat sa iti nityatvam api kalpitam upapadyate:* "The property of being eternal follows from the substratas' not being discontinued. The substrata are the particulars that are excluded due to their effecting a [specific] purposeful action, from those that do not effect it, for (*hi*) they are the cause of the word's reference based upon one's own experience, as explained previously[1]; and since they are infinite there is no discontinuation. Therefore, as long as they exist, this exists. Thus, (*iti*) also an imagined (*kalpitam*) infinity (*nityatvam*) is justified."

Interestingly, Jinendrabuddhi does not explain the introduction of the concept of substrate (*āśraya*) in the light of its use at the crucial passage PVSV 39,13ff; cf. e.g. the statement concerning the substrate of *buddhi* loc.cit. lines 15-17 in which Dharmakīrti explains that the substrate of *buddhi* is exclusion of other referents (*anyāpoha*) because it exists in the entities (sic) (*vastuṣu bhāvāt*): *tasyāḥ ka āśraya ity anyāpoha ucyate. tasya vastuṣu bhāvāt, avirodhāt*[2] *vyavahārasya, ca śabdāśra-yasya tathādarśanāt. na punar vastubhūtaṃ kiṃcit sāmānyaṃ nāmāsti yatheyaṃ buddhiḥ pratibhāti.*

[1]Jinendrabuddhi is referring to his excursus at PST Ms B 206b2, for which, cf. Appendix II. The introduction of the notion of *arthakriyākāritā* is, of course, an anachronism that is indebted to Dharmakīrtian philosophy.

[2] Cf. Karṇakagomin's exegesis at PVSVṬ 171,22ff, which clarifies in what way *anyāpoha* is resident in things (*vastuṣu*) thereby causing a mental representation that has the same appearance (*ekākārā buddhiḥ*): *tasya vijātīyavirahalakṣaṇasyān-yāpohasya bhinneṣv apy sarvatra vastuṣu bhāvāt tathābhūtasya cānyāpohasya sāmānyabuddhihetutvam praty avirodhāt. tathā hi yathaikam vṛkṣam avṛkṣād vyā-vṛttaṃ paśyaty evam anyam apy atas tatraikākārā buddhir utpadyate.* Dharmakīrti's statements as explained by Karṇakagomin evidently presupposes Dignāga's view that the general property (*sāmānya*) in any given referent [*arthe,* cf. PSV V §34, §46 above] or speech unit [*śabde,* cf. PSV V §34, §46 above] is defined by exclusion of other referents or speech units. Dignāga, on the other hand, does not address the question of the mental representation of *anyāpoha,* but restricts himself to explaining that exclusion of other referents or speech units is a function of the referents or speech units belonging to the same class, which qualifies them as tokens of the same type.

[3] Cf. Helarāja's commentary ad loc. VPP Vol. I 48,13: *anucchinnāśrayāt = āśrayād ucchedo 'syā nāyāti, āśrayo 'syā nocchedahetur ity arthaḥ. āśrayaś ca vinaśyann ucchedahetuḥ sambhāvyata iti nāśrayavināśyād asyā vināśa ity arthaḥ.*

[463] Cf. PST Ms B 229a7-229b1: *pratyekaparisamāptiḥ kṛtsnārthapratīteḥ. arthāntaravyudāso hi palāśādau pratyekam buddhiparivartini*[(1)] *vyavahārāvasāri- bhiḥ pratipattṛbhiḥ sarvātmanā pratīyata iti tatpratītyanurodhena vyavasthāpyamā- nā kṛtsnārthaparisamāptir na*[(2)] *virudhyate:* "Extension to each single follows from cognizing the referent completely. For the exclusion of other referents is cognized completely by the listeners who are engaged in discourse with regard to each single [tree] such as a *palāśa,* and so on, that revolve in the mind. Thus, when it is defined in accordance with this cognition the extension to the complete referent is not in conflict."

[(1)]Dharmakīrti uses this term in a related passage of PVSV, cf. op. cit. 38,24ff: *tad eṣām buddhipratibhāsam anurundhānair buddhiparivartinām eva bhāvānām ākāraviśeṣaparigrahād bahir iva parisphuratāṃ sāmānyam ity ucyate.*

[(2)]*na* conj (cf. *mi 'gal* T) : om. Ms

[241] <*evam pūrvoktadoṣābhāvād*> *guṇotkarṣāc ca śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 229b1: *guṇotkarṣāc ceti;* TSP 389,11: *tasmād guṇotkarṣād api;* PVSV 62,27-63,1: *śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha.*

[464] It appears from Jinendrabuddhi's concluding remark that Dignāga must have contrasted, in the SPVy, his own view of the general properties that attach to the exclusion of other with those of the upholders of real general properties, cf. PST Ms B 229b1-2: *jātidharmavyavasthāyā atraiva yuktatvāt. vastusajjātipakṣe tu yathā sā nopapadyate, tathā Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāse*[(1)] *veditavyam:* "That is, because the definition of the attributes of a general property is only connected to this [viz. exclusion of other referents]. However, the way in which it [namely the definition of the properties of a general property] is not justified on the theory of objectively real general properties, should be known from the SPVy."

[(1)]Translated erroneously as *spyi brtag pa'i skabs su* T; elsewhere SPVy is correctly translated as *spyi brtags pa rgyas par.*

[465] Jinendrabuddhi seems consciously to avoid commenting upon the idea of referents being qualified by exclusion of other referents because of the controversies attached to it. Elsewhere, however, he interprets the term *arthāntarāpohaviśiṣṭe* as *vivakṣāvati puruṣe* (cf. no. 505 below), which is a complete departure from the rationale of Dignāga's use of the term, being based upon Dharmakīrtian and post-Dharmakīrtian philosophy (cf. no. 9 above).

Mallavādi and Siṃhasūri allude to Dignāga's claim that the word denotes things (*vastu*) as qualified by exclusion of other referents at NCV 732,10-13: *arthāntarā- pohaḥ sad ity asan na bhavatīti nāsadbhāvamātram evocyate, kiṃ tarhi, arthāntarā- pohena viśiṣṭaṃ vastv eva sad ity ucyate, yasmin vastuni so 'pohaḥ kriyate, tac ca dravyaṃ śabdārthaḥ, nāpohamātram. sa cāpohaviśiṣṭo 'rtho dravyādiḥ sacchab- dena vyāpto 'parityāgāt, na tu sākṣād uktaḥ:* "Exclusion of other referents as in the statement 'existent means it is not non-existent' does not merely express its being non-existent, but rather, that the entity for the sake of which the exclusion is effected, is indeed an entity which, being qualified by exclusion of other referents, is said to be 'existent.' And this substance is the referent of the word, not mere exclusion. And the referent that is qualified by exclusion viz. a substance, and so on, is encompassed by the word 'existent' because it is not rejected by it, but it is not

denoted directly." Cf. the related Sanskrit fragment, possibly from Dignāga's SPVy, quoted no. 182 above.

Siṃhasūri's remark at NCV 734,20 exposes the difficulties of the notion of exclusion of other referents as qualification of things: *atha svamatena brūṣe na sāmānyaṃ na vyāvṛttimad iti kutas tadviśiṣṭavastvabhidhānam. khapuṣpaśekhara-viśiṣiṣṭavandhyāputrābhidhānavat:* "Now, if you say in accordance with your own theory that [exclusion of other] is neither a general property, nor is [the referent] exclusion possessing, then how could the [word] denote a thing as qualified by it [viz. exclusion]. It is like denoting the son of a barren woman as qualified by a wreath of sky flowers"!

Siṃhasūri also attributes to Dignāga the view that in spite of his use of the phrase "qualified by exclusion of other referents," exclusion of other referents is not to be understood as another kind of qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) like the general properties posited by Nyāyavaiśeṣika philosophy, cf. NCV 735,17-18: *abhāvāntaratvād arthāntarāpohasyāpohavān arthaḥ śabdavācyo na bhavati. ato nāpoho viśeṣaṇaṃ nāpohavān so 'rtha iti yadi tvayeṣṭam:* "If you claim that since the exclusion of other referents is not a different [kind of] entity, the denotable object of the word is not a referent that is exclusion possessing. Hence exclusion is not a qualifier and the referent is not exclusion possessing."

The thought underlying Dignāga's claim that a word denotes things as qualified by negation of other referents becomes clear, I believe, in the light of the debate with the Sāṅkhyavaināśika Mādhava recorded at PSV V:39ff. This interesting discussion shows that the idea of exclusion or negation presupposes the notion of mutual absence (*itaretarābhāva*). Things as denotable objects are defined by the absence in their loci of the nature of other things (*ātmāntarābhāva*). As Dignāga states at PSV V:45: "The nature of one thing is the non-existence of the nature of other things" (*ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram iti*). He appears to interpret this mutual absence as a qualifier-qualified relation: the absence of all non-*x* from any given locus of *x* qualifies *x* as denotable, the absence of non-*x* from the locus of *x* being the qualifier and *x* the qualified.

The idea that absences are related to the loci from which they are absent as qualifier to qualified can be traced to a short fragment from an unknown work by Uddyotakara which Kamalaśīla quotes in TSP ad TS 782ab; and there is no reason to assume that Uddyotakara does not rely on earlier views about absences as qualifiers of the loci from which they are absent. In the above-mentioned fragment Uddyotakara states that the relation of general properties like potness to things like pots is characterized by inherence, whereas (the relation to them) of negations (i.e., absences) is characterized by a qualifier-qualified relation, cf. TSP 313,15-16: *ghaṭatādīnāṃ sāmānyānāṃ ghaṭādibhiḥ samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, abhāvā-nāṃ tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ.*

Since Dignāga rejects the assumption that *pravṛttinimitta* is real general properties inherent in things as not tenable, he must have realised that a possible way of accounting for the identity and difference of things as referents i.e. as denotable objects would be to start from the principle of the mutual absence of any *x* from the loci of all non-*x*. This could be formalised through joint presence and absence (*anvayavyatireka*) as a qualifier-qualified relation in which the predominant joint absence of all non-*x* from any given locus of *x* qualifies the latter as *x*. Induction by means of joint absence and presence of any word and referent presupposes, of course, *vyutpatti,* teaching the connection of any word to the thing it

denotes. This implies identifying the referent by pointing at a prototypical instance of it accompanied by the demonstrative pronoun "this," as Dignāga explains at PSV V 50b-c; cf. no. 413 above.

[242] *apohaniyamaḥ*[1] *kasmāt.* Qu. Ms B 229b2.
[1]*apoha°* em. (cf. *gźan sel* T) : *apohyaniyaḥ* Ms

[466] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b2: *na kutaścid api hetor ity arthaḥ.*

[243] *rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante, na punar anyatamavarṇābhidhāne śeṣā varṇā <atyantabhinnā api. sa kiṃkṛtaḥ>? yasya tu rūpatvam abhinnaṃ nīlādiṣv evāsti*[1]*, na rasādiṣv <ity evam eṣa doṣo nāstīti cet>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b3-5: *tatra tulye bhede rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante*[2] *na*[3] *punar anyatama-varṇābhidhāne śeṣāvarṇā ... yasya tv ityādi. yasya tu rūpatvam abhinnam*[4] *dravyasatsāmānyam tasya tatkṛto niyamo ... tac ca nīlādiṣv evāsti na rasādiṣu.*
[1]*eva* is reproduced by *ñid* in V, cf. *sṅon po la sogs pa ñid* V : *sṅon po la sogs pa rnams* K.
[2] *apohyante* em. : *hyante* Ms
[3] *na* em. : *na na* Ms
[4] *abhinnaṃ* em. : *ā{nna}bhinnaṃ* Ms

[467] This paragraph introduces a discussion of how the scope of exclusion is restricted. Dignāga's opponent points out that since a *quality* (*guṇa*) like the blue color differs from other colors as well as from the quality taste (*rasa*) and the remaining qualities, it is necessary to explain the cause of restriction. As he asserts, this restriction can only be accounted for by assuming that a real general property colourness is found in each particular colour as opposed to taste, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b2-3: *nīlādīnāṃ paraspararūpasamanvayābhāvāt*[1] *rasādivat te 'pi bhid-yante. tatra tulye bhede rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante, na punar anyatama-varṇābhidhāne śeṣāvarṇā ity atra na kaścin niyamahetuḥ. anenābhyupagama-virodham āha.*
[1]*°samanvayā°* em. : *°samarthayā°.*

[244] *<eṣa doṣo nāsti, yasmād*[1]*> lokarūḍho*[2] *na mṛśyate*[3]*.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b5-6: *lokarūḍho na mṛśyata iti.*
[1]Cf. *gaṅ gi phyir* K : *'di ltar* V.
[2]This adjective qualifies an implicit *vyavahāra.*
[3]Cf. Buddhist Sanskrit *parāmṛśyati;* cf. Pāli *Tathāgato voharati aparāmasan ti* no. 472 below.

[468] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b6: *anekārthatvād dhātūnāṃ nābhiviśyata ity arthaḥ.*

[245] *uktaṃ hi Bhagavatā: "janapadaniruktiṃ nābhiniviśeta saṃjñāṃ ca lokasya nābhidhāvet*[1]*." tasmād asmābhir api <lokavyavahārā naimittikā vā> pāribhāṣikā <vā> bhūtārthatvena na mṛśyante, lokavad evānugamyante. siddhaś ca rūpaśabdo loke nīlādiṣv eva, na rasādiṣu.* Restored, cf. Ms B 229b-230a4: *uktaṃ hītyādi. janapadaniruktir lokavyavahāraḥ ... pāribhāṣikāḥ ... saṃjñāṃ cetyādi ... tasmād iti ... bhūtārthatveneti ... tena na mṛśyante nābhiniviśyante ... lokavad evānugamyanta*

iti ... tathāsmābhir apy anugamyante ... ata āha siddhaś cetyādi ... rūpaśabdo loke nīlādiṣv eva siddho na rasādiṣu.

[1]The Sanskrit version of this Madhyama-āgama quotation is found at Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 31,14-15, cf. Taishō 1,701c6. For the original Pāli version, cf. no. 471 below.

469 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 229b6: *janapadaniruktir lokavyavahāraḥ.*

470 In the Buddhist tradition this passage is quoted to show that one should not become attached to conventional usage, cf., e.g., Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 31,15: *cakṣuḥ paśyati vijñānaṃ vijānātīti nātrābhiniveṣṭavyam.* Buddhist Sanskrit *nirukti* translates Pāli *nirutti* and is not related to Sanskrit *nirukti* "etymology." The original Pāli version of the quotation is found at Majjhimanikāya III 230,20-21: *janapada-niruttiṃ nābhiniveseyya, samaññaṃ nātidhāveyyā ti* (Papañcasūdanī V 30,23f: *nābhiniseyyā ti na adhiṭṭhahitvā ādāya vohareyya. samaññaṃ ti lokasamaññaṃ lokapaññattiṃ nātidhāveyyā ti nātikkameyya*). The use in the Pāli canon of *atidhāvati* (= Buddhist Sanskrit *abhidhāvati*) is highly restricted; cf. Saṃyuttanikāya IV 230,23-25: *yaṃ ca sāmaṃ ñātaṃ taṃ ca atidhāvanti. yaṃ ca loke saccasam-mataṃ taṃ ca atidhāvanti;* in postcanonical Pāli literature it is used in descriptions of how the teaching of the ultimate truth should not disregard conventional usage, cf., e.g., Visuddhimagga 522,15: *janapadaniruttiyā anabhiniveso samaññāya anati-dhāvanan ti ayaṃ ñāyo paridīpito hoti,* and Mohavicchedanī 267,7-9: *paññattiṃ anatikamma paramattho pakāsito vināyakena so yasmā. tasmā añño pi paṇḍito paramatthaṃ pakāsento samaññaṃ nātidhāvaye.*

471 Cf. the canonical formulation at Dīghanikāya I 202,7-9: *itimā kho Citta loka-samaññā lokaniruttiyo lokavohārā lokapaññattiyo yāhi Tathāgato voharati aparāmasan ti.*

472 The underlying assumption is that terms denoting things in which any given general property is resident have this general property as their cause of application (*naimittika*), whereas terms like 'existence' (*sattā*) do not have a cause of application because any given general property is by definition a not repeatable singularity. They are therefore similar to such items that are denoted by proper nouns or by technical terms like those of Pāṇinian grammar; cf. PSṬ Ms B B 229b6-230a1: *samudāyaśabdāḥ sattādikaṃ vastusatsāmānyam pravṛttinimittam upādāya tadvati vartante. sattādau tu dravyasati sāmānye nimittāntarābhāvāt pāribhāṣikāḥ yādṛcchikā ity evaṃ nābhiniveśaṃ kuryāt vastusataḥ sāmānyasyāyogāt:* "Words that denote a collection [of things] in dependence upon a real general property like existence as their cause of application viz., apply to the general property possessor. However, since there is no other cause of application with regard to a general property such as existence as a real object, they are technical designations, i.e., proper nouns. Thus one should not become attached since it is untenable that a general property is a real object."

For the term *pāribhāṣika,* v. Renou, *Terminologie,* DSG s.v.

473 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a1-2: *bhūto 'rtho vastusatsāmānyam pravṛttinimittaṃ viṣayo vā yeṣāṃ te tathocyante. tadbhāvo bhūtārthatvaṃ*[1]*... itthambhūtalakṣaṇe tṛtīyā*[2].

[1]Cf. A V I 1:119.
[2]Cf. A II 3:21.

[474] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a2: *yathā loko 'nabhiniviśyānugacchati.* The idea of observing the constraints of conventional usage on the level of *saṃvṛti* is also emphasized by Dignāga in Hastavālaprakaraṇa, cf. verse 6ab: *'jig rten pa yi don rtogs pas │ 'jig rten bźin du śes par bya │.* The *vṛtti* explains this statement as follows: *ji ltar 'jig rten pa dag bum pa la sogs pa'i don la yod pa'i ṅo bor rtogs pas │ 'di ni bum pa 'o ‖ snam bu 'o ‖ śiṅ rta 'o źes tha sñad 'dogs pa de bźin du jig rten bźin du sṅon gyi sgrub pas tha sñad du bya 'o ‖.*

[475] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a: *syād etad: vastusatā sāmānyena vinā loke 'pi naiva sidhyati, rūpaśabdo nīlādiṣu rasādiṣv iveti. ata āha: siddhaś cetyādi. vastusat-sāmānyam antareṇāpi saṃvṛtisata eva sāmānyād <u>rūpaśabdo loke nīlādiṣv</u>[1] <u>eva siddhaḥ, na rasādiṣu.</u> tad dhi nīlādiṣv eva vartate, na rasādiṣu. tathā hi nīlādaya eva prakṛtyā svānubhavadvāreṇa tathāvidhaṃ vikalpabuddhau sāmānyākāram arpayati.*[2] *yena lokas tatraiva rūpavyavahāraṃ karoti, netaratra.*
[1]em. : *loke'pi naiva* Ms
[2]The vocabulary is strongly influenced by Dharmakīrti's PVSV, cf., e.g., the use of *arpayati* at PVSV 37,26; 54,19.

[246] *rūpatve tulyam etac ca.* Qu. Ms B 230a6.

[476] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a7: *tathāpi tulyo paryanuyoga ity arthaḥ.*

[247] <*yasya ca atyantabhinnanīlādiṣu rūpatvavṛttiḥ*[1]*, tasya kena rasādyavṛttiḥ?*> *rasādyavṛttivad vā pītādyavṛttiḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a6: *rasādyavṛttivad vā pītādyavṛttir iti.*
[1]Cf. *'jug pa'i gzugs ñid* V : *gzugs 'jug pa* K.

[477] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a5-6: *tatrait syāt: bhaved rūpaśabdasya nīlādāv eva siddhir yadi tatpravṛttinimittasya saṃvṛtisataḥ samānyasya nīlādāv eva vṛttiḥ syāt. sā ca nāsti. tulye hy atyantabhede nīlādāv eva tad vartate, na rasādāv iti kuta etat?*

[248] *asty atra <kāraṇam>. sati svabhāvabhede nīlādiṣv eva cākṣuṣatvam abhin-nam, na tu rasādiṣu.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a7: *asty atreti ... sati svabhā-vabheda iti;* Ms B 230b2-3: *yadi ca <u>nīlādiṣu cākṣuṣatvam</u>[1] <u>abhinnam</u> iṣyate.* For the readings *nīlādiṣv eva* and *na tu rasādiṣu,* cf. Ms B 230b6, q.v. below no. 489.
[1]°*tvam* em. (cf. *gzuṅ bya ñid* T) : °*am* Ms

[478] The opponent rejects that his own questions can be turned against himself, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a7: *tulyaparyanuyogatām pariharati.*

[479] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230a7: <u>*saty api nīlādīnāṃ*</u> <u>*svabhāvabheda*</u> *ity arthaḥ.*

[249] *cākṣuṣatve kriyākṛtaḥ.* Qu. Ms B 230a7-230b1.

[480] If the use of the word 'colour' were restricted by visibility, it would have an action as it cause of application, but not the alleged general property colourness, cf.

PSṬ Ms B 230a: *cākṣuṣatve niyamahetāv iṣyamāṇe kriyānimitto rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimitta iti.*

[250] *cākṣuṣā <grāhyaṃ hi cākṣuṣatvam>. <evaṃ ca nīlādiṣu> kriyānimitto rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimittaḥ*[(1)]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b1: *kriyānimittaṃ darśayati cakṣuṣetyādi; cf.* PSṬ Ms B 230b1: *kriyānimitto rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimitta ity abhyupetabādhatām āha.*

[(1)]Cf. *rigs kyi rgyu mtshan nas ni ma yin no* V 138,23 : *rigs tha mi dad pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis ni ma yin no* K.

[481] Cf. the definition of colour as perceptible by the eye at PBh § 117: *tatra rūpaṃ cakṣurgrāhyam.*

[482] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b1-2: *nanu caivaṃ rūpatvasamavāyaḥ kriyākṛtaḥ syāt. śabdasvajātinimitta eva tat kim ucyate kriyākṛta iti?*

[251] *cākṣuṣatvābhede hi kim punā rūpatvena.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b2-3: *cākṣuṣatvābhede hītyādi ... yadi ca nīlādiṣu cākṣuṣatvam abhinnam iṣyate ... kim punā rūpatveneti.*

[483] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b2-3: *evam manyate: bhinneṣv abhinnapravṛttyayogād rūpatvam abhinnaṃ nimittaṃ kalpyate. yadi ca nīlādiṣu cākṣuṣatvam abhinnam iṣyate. tata evāstv abhinnaṃ rūpam ity abhidhānaṃ, kim punā rūpatveneti:* "The idea is as follows: since it is not justified that the application is the same with regard to different [colours] colourness is imagined to be the same cause. And if it is claimed that visibility is the same in the blue [colour], and so on, then let us concede that the expression 'colour' is the same for that reason only, but what purpose, then, does [the general property] colourness serve?"

[252] *atha rūpatvasambandhasya nimittaṃ*[(1)] *cākṣuṣatvam <uktam iti cet>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b3-4: *athetyādi ... rūpatvam abhinnābhidhānasya pravṛttinimittaṃ cākṣuṣatvaṃ tu rūpatvasambandhasyeti.*

[(1)]*rgyu mtshan* V : *rgyu mtshan gyis* K.

[484] The term connnection (*sambandha*) denotes the category of inherence (*samavāya*).

[485] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b3-4: *ayam abhiprāyaḥ: bhinnā hi bhāvaśaktayaḥ, tato rūpatvam abhinnābhidhānasya pravṛttinimittaṃ, cākṣuṣatvaṃ tu rūpatvasamban-dhasyeti:* "The opinion is this: Since the powers of entities are different, colourness is the cause of application of the same word, but visibility [is the cause] of the connection of colourness."

[253] *evam api <cākṣuṣatve samavāyaḥ> kriyākṛtaḥ*[(1)] *prāpnoti, rūpatvābhivyaktir vā.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 230b4-5: *evam apītyādinā ... ata āha: rūpatvābhivyaktir veti: kriyākṛtā prāpnotīti sambandhanīyam.*

[(1)]Cf. *bya bar byas pa pas* V : *byas pa'i* K.

[486] This consequence contradicts the opponent's assumption that inherence is invariably the same and thus by implication is not subject to action, cf. PST Ms B 230b4: *evam apītyādināpy abhyupetabādhām āha, nityatvābhyupagamāt samavā-yasya.*

[487] This [absurd] consequence is the result of the assumption that visibility is not the cause of the inherence of colourness in any given colour, but rather that it causes its manifestation as inherent in any given colour. This, however, contradicts the assumption that colourness, and so on, is to be manifested by its own substrate, and thus it cannot be caused by an action, cf. PST Ms B 230b4-5: *syād etad, na brūmaś cākṣuṣatvād rūpatvasya samavāyaḥ, 'pi tu samavetasyābhivyaktir iti. ata āha rūpatvābhivyaktir veti ... anenāpy abhyupetabādhatām āha: svāśrayavyaṅgyatvā-bhyupagamād rūpatvādīnām.*

[254] *cākṣuṣatve 'pi vā <niyamaḥ kasmāt>.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 230b6: *cākṣuṣatve 'pi veti.*

[488] Cf. PST Ms B 230b6: *sati svabhāvabhede kasmān nīlādiṣv eva cākṣuṣatvaṃ vartate, na tu rasādiṣv apīty atrāpi niyamahetur vaktavyaḥ:* "When there is a difference of nature, why does visibility only occur in the blue [colour], and so on, but not in taste too. Thus also in this case the cause of restriction is to be explained."

[255] *tasmād avaśyaṃ svabhāvikatvam āśrayaṇīyam.* Restored, cf. Ms 230b6: *tasmād avaśyaṃ sudūram api gatvā svabhāvikatvam āśrayaṇīyam.*

[489] Cf. PST Ms B 230b6-7: *tādṛśo nīlādīnāṃ svabhāvo*[(1)] *yena tatraiva cākṣuṣa-tvam bhavati, na rasādiṣv iti:* "The [colour] blue, and so on, have such a nature that visibility exists in these only, but not in taste, etc.
[(1)]*°īnāṃ sva°* em. : *°īnasva°* Ms

[256] *dravyādiṣu prasaṅgaś ca.* Qu. Ms B 230b,7.

[490] Cf. Ms 230b7-231a1: *yadi yatra cākṣuṣatvaṃ tatra rūpatvam, dravyādiṣv api rūpatvaṃ syāt, teṣāṃ cākṣuṣatvāt:* "If there is colourness where there is visibility, there would also be colourness in substances, etc. because they are visible."

[257] *<dravyasaṅkhyāparimāṇādīnāṃ ca cākṣuṣatvāt teṣv api rūpatvaprasaṅgaḥ syāt. kiṃ ca>.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 230b7-231a1, q.v. no. 491 above.

[491] Jinendrabuddhi corroborates this conclusion by quoting VS IV 1:12 at PST Ms B 231a1: *dravyatvaṃ "saṅkhyā parimāṇāni pṛthaktvaṃ saṃyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve karma ca rūpisamavāyāc*[(1)] *cākṣuṣāṇī"ti vacanāt.*
[(1)]*°samavāyāc* em. : *°samavāc* Ms

[258] *bhedābhāvaḥ*[(1)] *sitādiṣu*[(2)]. Qu. Ms B 231a1.
[(1)]*°vaḥ* em. : *°vo* Ms
[(2)]Cf. *dkar sogs* K : *dkar min sogs la* V.

[492] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a1-2: *cākṣuṣatvasya niyamahetor aviśeṣāt, niyamahe-tvantarābhāvāc ca rūpam ity abhidhānapratyayasāmyād nīlapītādibhedo*[(1)] *na syāt:* "Because the cause of restriction viz. visibility is uniform and since the identity of the cognition due to the word 'colour' is the same because there is no other cause of restriction, there will be no difference between blue or yellow, etc."

[(1)]*°pītādi°* em. : *°pātīdi°* Ms

[259] <*cākṣuṣatvāviśeṣe nīlapītanīlataranīlatamādibhedo na syāt*>. *tasmād avaś-yam cākṣuṣatvavyatirekeṇa* <*nīlapītādiṣu bhinnesv api*> *rūpaśabdo loke*[(1)] *rūḍher anugantavyo, na rasādiṣu.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a1-2, q.v. no. 489 above; Ms B 231a4-5: *tasmād avaśyam iti … <u>cākṣuṣatvavyatirekeṇa niyogato nīlādiṣv eva</u> <u>rūpaśabdo loke rūḍher anugantavyo, na rasādiṣu.</u>*

[(1)]*°do lok°* em. : *°dalok°* Ms

[493] Before commenting upon Dignāga's conclusion, Jinendra relates the following discussion at PSṬ Ms B 231a2-4: *yadi cākṣuṣatvān nīlādīnāṃ rūpatvenā-bheda iṣyate, tatra saty api cākṣuṣatvāt tasyāviśeṣe nīlatvādibhir yogād viśeṣaḥ syāt. na, tasyaivāyogāt. na hi nīlādiṣu kāraṇaṃ kiṃcid asti pratiniyatam, yato nīla-tvādisamavāyaniścayaḥ syāt. śaktibhedaḥ kāraṇam astīti ced tatrāpi ko hetuḥ, yatas tasya kasmiṃścid*[(1)] *eva vṛtti na sarvatreti. anuttaram etat:* "If it is maintained that due to visibility there is no difference between blue, and so on, in terms of [their] colourness, in that case, even though this [colourness] is the same due to visibility, there will be a difference [between the various colours] because of the connection with [the general properties] blueness, etc. This is not the case because it is not connected. For there is no cause whatsoever in blue, and so on, that is restricted to each single [colour] so that one could ascertain the inherence of blueness, etc. If it is asserted that the cause is the difference of power (*śaktibhedaḥ*), also in this case [the question arises]: What is the reason why it only occurs in a certain thing and not in all. Thus this is not an answer [to our criticism]."

[(1)]*kasmiṃś°* em. (cf. *'ga' źig kho na la* T) : *kacid* Ms

[494] That is, because it is not justified that visibility is the cause with regard to the connection with colourness, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a4: *yasmāc cākṣuṣatvasya rūpatva-yogam prati hetutvaṃ na yujyate.*

[495] Current usage is based upon general properties that only exist conventionally, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a5: *rūḍheś ca nimittaṃ saṃvṛtisad eva sāmānyam, na tu dravya-sad ity abhiprāyaḥ:* "The opinion is that the cause of current usage is a general property that only exists conventionally, but not as something that exists substan-tially."

[260] *yadi cārthāntaranivṛttyanapekṣatāyāṃ* <*śabdasyārthābhidhānaṃ, tarhi*>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a6: *yadi cetyādi… <u>arthāntaranivṛttyanapekṣatāyām.</u>*

[496] The purpose of this paragraph is to address once again the thesis that the word denotes its own referent by means of exclusion of other referents, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a5-6: *punar arthāntaravyāvṛttidvāreṇa śabdaḥ svārtham pratyāyayatīty etad darśayitum*[(1)] *āha: yadi cetyādi.*

[(1)]*darśayitum* conj. : *dra(?)yi{ti}* | *tum* Ms

[261] *anvayād eva siddhiḥ syāt.* Qu. Ms B 231a6, cf. 231a7: <u>anvayād</u> <u>eva</u> kevalād viśiṣṭābhidheyaniścayaḥ <u>syāt</u>.

[262] *na tu <śabdasyārthābhidhāne>*[(1)] *'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ syāt, iṣyate ca.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a6-7: <u>na tv</u> <u>anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ</u> sahitābhyāṃ <u>syād</u> ... *iṣyate cetyādi.*

[(1)]Cf. *sgra'i don rjod par byed pa'i lta na ni* V : *sgra'i don brjod pa la* K.

[497] It is not possible to construe this sentence unless one assumes that the grammatical subject is *siddhiḥ* that is to be supplied from 38c.

[498]Cf. PSV V:34 at § 47 above.

[263] *anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇenābhidhānasāphalyād*[(1)] *vyatirekato 'py arthābhidhānam, <tadyathā> "kartur īpsitatamaṃ <karma>* (A I.4.49)." Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231b2: <u>anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇenābhidhānasāphalyād</u> <u>vyatirekato 'pi</u> viśiṣṭārthābhidhānam iṣyate ; 231a7: <u>kartur īpsitatamam.</u>

[(1)]Cf. *gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba daṅ gñi gar ṅes par bzuṅ ba brjod pa 'bras bu daṅ bcas pa'i phyir* K : *khyad par gźan gñis ka ṅes par bzuṅ bas rjod par byed pa 'bras bu daṅ bcas pa'i phyir ro* V.

[499] Cf. the statement at PV IV 192a = PVin II 11a: *vyavacchedaphalaṃ vākyaṃ,* which belongs in the context of the logical properties of restriction and thus by implication the semantic function of the restrictive particle *eva,* cf. *Steinkellner* 1979 (PVin II Teil II): 33 no. 66, and no.s 497-98 below. Dhammapāla's statement at Udānaṭṭhakathā 12,23ff (= Itivuttakaṭṭhakathā I 23,22ff): *sabbāni hi vakyāni evakāratthasahitāni yeva avadhāraṇaphalattā,* evidently belongs in the same context; see *Pind* 1997: 523ff; cf. also the related discussion of restriction as a concomitant property of verbal discourse at PVSV 61,16ff: *śabdaṃ hi prayuñjānaḥ sarvo 'nvayavyatirekau nātivartate, tasya pravṛttinivṛttyarthatvāt. yadi hy ayaṃ na kasyacit kutaścin nivartayet pravartayed vā buddhiṃ yathābhūtānujñānāt sarva-vyavahāreṣu na kiṃcid vyāharet, vyāhārasyāvadhāraṇanāntarīyakatvāt: yathā gha-ṭena udakam ānayeti. yadi ghaṭena añjalinā vā udakānayanaṃ yathākathaṃcid abhimataṃ syāt, udakam ānayety eva vaktavyaṃ syāt, na ghaṭena iti.* It is interesting in the present context that *Mādhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* uses the *avadhāraṇa eva* to illustrate how the denotation of a particular term is taught to the exclusion of other referents, cf. op.cit. 97,14-15: *yasmin vastuni saṅketasaṃstavānupraviṣṭayā bud-dhyā sarveṣāṃ laukikānāṃ darśanatulyatā*[(1)] *bhavati: pṛthivy eveyaṃ nāgnī, rūpam evedaṃ na śabda ityevamādi.*

[(1)] For this view, cf. VP III.3:55 and no. 312 above.

[500]The concept of *anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇa* belongs in the context of subject-predicate sentences like "x(+ *avadhāraṇa*) is y(+ *avadhāraṇa*)," the resultant cognition being said to depend upon whether the scope of the predicate or the subject, or both, is restricted by implicit *avadhāraṇas.* For the use of the term *anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇa,* cf. Dignāga's criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of *pratijñā* at NS I.1.33: *sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā* as entailing absurdities when interpreted by means of *avadhāraṇas.* His criticism is addressed at length at NV

514,14ff: *ubhayāvadhāraṇaprāptāv anyatarāvadhāraṇe ca doṣaḥ. yadi sādhya-nirdeśaḥ pratijñeti pratijñālakṣaṇam, tataḥ pūrvottare dve avadhāraṇe na kalpyete,* etc; cf. PSV III:4cd (*Kitagawa* 1973 473,11ff): *pūrvāvadhāraṇaṃ vyartham aniṣṭam itaratra tu* (qu. PVBh 560,4; 562,28). For the role of *avadhāraṇas* in discourse, cf. Dharmakīrti's statement at PVSV 61,19-20: *vyāhārasyāvadhāraṇanāntarīyakatvāt.*

[501] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 231a7-231b2: *kartur eva nākartuḥ. kartṛśabdo 'kartāraṃ vyavacchindan īpsitatamaṃ svārthe na sambadhnāti. evam īpsitatamam eva nānīp-sitatamam. īpsitatamaśabdo 'py anīpsitatamaṃ*[1] *vyudasya*[2] *na kartṛśabdārthaṃ svārthena yojayati. evam ubhayāvadhāraṇena viśiṣṭārthaniścayād abhidhānasā-phalyam. anyatarāvadhāraṇena yathā satsu megheṣu vṛṣṭir bhavatīti. satsv eva nāsatsu, na tu bhavaty eveti:* "The agent only, not the non-agent. The word agent does not connect "most wants to obtain" to its own referent while excluding non-agent. In the same way "most wants to obtain" only, not "not most wants to obtain." The expression 'most wants to obtain' too does not connect the referent of the word agent with its own referent by excluding "not most wants to obtain." Thus the denotation fulfills its purpose because of ascertaining its specific referent by means of a restriction of both terms. By means of restriction of either term [means], for instance, "there is rain when clouds are found," i.e., only when they are found, not when they are not found, but not "there is only [rain]". Jinendrabuddhi then continues explaining the implications of lack of restriction at PSṬ Ms B 231b2-4: *tad arthāntaranivṛttyanapekṣatāyāṃ śabdasya na prāpnotīti. tathā hi yady akartur anīpsitatamaṃ karma, kartṛśabdoccāraṇam apārthakaṃ syāt. tathā yady anīpsitata-mam api karma, īpsitatamam ity abhidhānaṃ niṣphalaṃ syāt. tasmād arthāntara-nivṛttidvāreṇa śabdo 'rthaṃ gamayatīty abhyupeyam:* "This does not obtain when the word is not dependent upon negation of other referents. That is, if *karman* is what a non-agent does not most want to obtain, the articulation of the word *karman* would be purposeless. Thus, if *karman* is also what [the agent] does not most want to obtain, the expression 'most wants to obtain' would not fulfil its purpose. Therefore the word indicates its referent by means of negation of other referents." There is no indication in the grammatical literature that Pāṇini's definition of the *karmakāraka* was interpreted by means of *avadhāraṇas* in the way Dignāga's formulation suggests, and the quotation as well as the interpretation may well have been motivated by a wish to extend the use of *avadhāraṇas* to the Pāṇinian sūtra, since the Naiyāyika definition of *pratijñā* as *sādhyanirdeśaḥ,* involves the introduction of a *kṛtya* affix which, according to the Pāṇinian derivational system, denotes *karma,* and thus involves the Pāṇinian definition, cf. Jinendrabuddhi's remarks MS B 113b6 ad PSV III:3cd: *karmaṇi cāyaṃ kṛtyapratyayaḥ. tena na karmābhidhāyinā sādhyaśabdenāsādhyasyākṣepaḥ: kartur īpsitatamaṃ hi karma;* Uddyotakara quotes A I 4.49 at NV 516,13f in his rebuttal of Dignāga's objections and explains: *karmanirdeśaś cāyaṃ sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñeti.*

[1] *nānīpsitatamam. īpsitatamaśabdo* em. (*śin tu thob par 'dod pa min pa ni ma yin, śin tu thob par 'dod pa'i sgra* T) : *nānīpsitatamaśabdo* Ms

[2] *vyudasya* em. : (*rnam par bsal nas* T) : *vudasya* Ms

[264] *nanu cā<pohamātre śabdārthe> vyatirekād evābhidhānāṃ syāt. syād etad evaṃ <yady anvayo neṣyeta>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 231b4-6: *nanu cetyādi ... vyatirekād evābhidhānaṃ syāt ... syād etad evam ityādi. bhāvena*[1] *tu mukhyeneti.*

[265] *bhāvena tu mukhyena*[(1)] *< neṣyate vyāptiḥ*[(2)]*>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b6: *bhāvena*[(1)] *tu mukhyeneti.*

[(1)]*bhāvena* conj. (cf. *dṅos pos ni* K : *dṅos po'i phyogs nas ni* V) : *bhāve* (cf. *dṅos po yis* [em. *yi* T] *ni gtso bor* T) Ms

[(2)]Cf. *khyab pa* VK. It appears from Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase of the verse (cf. no. 496 below) that *vyāpti* corresponds to *anvaya,* as Dignāga's own commentary indicates.

[502] That is, concomitance with a real general property that is assumed to be the principal referent denoted by the word, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b6: *vastusatsāmānyā-khyena*[(1)] *śabdasyānvayo neṣyate:* "The word's joint presence is not claimed to be with a so-called substantially existent general property."

[(1)] *vastusat°* em. : *vastusattā°* Ms

[266] *na hi bhāveṣu <jātiḥ sambhavati vyatiriktā vā syād avyatiriktā vety>*[(1)] *uktam. jātivyatirekeṇa tv <"adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārtha" ity etenā>rthāntarapohaviśiṣṭe 'rthe <śabda-syānvayavyatirekau na bhinnārthau>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b7-232a1: *na hi bhāveṣv ityādinā uktam iti ... jātivyatirekeṇa tv iti ... arthāntarapoha-viśiṣṭe 'rtha iti.*

[(1)]Cf. *tha dad pa 'am tha mi dad par 'gyur ba'i* V : *gźan daṅ gźan ma yin pa'i* K.

[503] According to Jinendrabuddhi Dignāga quotes this statement from another of his treatises (*prakaraṇāntare*). He continues explaining that in the context of the present treatise (*iha*) this problem has been dealt with at PS II 16, of which he quotes the first pāda followed by a fragment of an important passage that occur in the Vaiśeṣika section of PSV I:23b (v. *Hattori* 1968: 205-6), cf. PSṬ Ms B 231b7: *na hi bhāveṣv ityādinā uktam iti prakaraṇāntare. iha ca "sāmānyaṃ yady api syād"* (PS II:16a) *ityādinā. "tathā viśeṣān svair indriyair upalabhye"tyādinā ca. pāda*s abc of PS II:16 are recorded at Ms B 199a1: *sāmānyaṃ yady api syāt tu tatrānyat, tasya darśanam | āśrayādarśanān na syād*; cf. PSṬ Ms B 71b7: *sāmānyaṃ yady api syāt* = Ms B 231b7. The Tibetan renderings of PSV II:16 are incompatible with the Sanskrit evidence presented in PSṬ and appear to render corrupt readings as they are impossible to construe:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 464b5-16 = P 113a8-113b2): *spyi ni yod pa ma yin na yaṅ ‖ rten ni mthoṅ ba med pa'i phyir ‖ de las gźan te mthoṅ mi 'gyur ‖ gcig la mthoṅ phyir tha dad pa 'am ‖* (PS II:16)
re źig me la me ñīd kyi spyi gźan ni yod pa ma yin no ‖ yod kyaṅ de la mthoṅ ba ni mi srid de rten thams cad ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro ‖ gñis ñid la sogs pa du ma daṅ ‖ thun moṅ ba rnams kyi rten ma bzuṅ bar 'dzin pa ni mthoṅ ṅo ‖ gaṅ dag 'dra ba phyir smra ba'i 'dra ba 'aṅ ma yin no. ci ste spyi gcig la brten par gzuṅ na yaṅ thams cad gzuṅ ba yin no źe na de la brten bźin du du bar 'gyur ro ‖.

V (Kitagawa 1973 464a4-16 = P 32a3-5): *gal te spyi las yin graṅ na ‖ de ni de las gźan du 'gyur ‖ rten rnams ma mthoṅ ba yi phyir ‖ tha dad min gcig mthoṅ mi 'gyur ‖* (PS II:16)
re źig me las gźan pa'i me ñid ces pa'i spyi ni yod pa ma yin no ‖ yod du chug na yaṅ de mthoṅ ba ni mi srid do ‖ rten mtha' dag ma mthoṅ ba'i phyir du ma rnams las gñis ñid la sogs pa'i thun moṅ ba ni yod pa ma yin no ‖ gaṅ dag s pyi mthoṅ źiṅ

*gzuṅ ba po yaṅ rten ma bzuṅ ba po daṅ mtshuṅs śiṅ 'dra bar 'gyur ro ‖ gal te rten
gcig bzuṅ bas kyaṅ thams cad gzuṅ ba yin na ni │ de yaṅ rten bźin du du mar 'gyur
ro ‖:*

"Even if the general property were to exist in this[1] [viz. fire] as different [from
its substrate] (*sāmānyaṃ yady api syāt tu tatrānyat*), there would be no observation
of it because it is not observed in [all its] substrata; or [the general property] would
be a particular (**bhedaḥ*) because it is observed [completely] in a single (**ekatra*)
[substrate] (PS II:16).

In the first place, fireness does not exist (*na tāvad agnitvam asti*) as a general
property separate from fire (*agner anyat sāmānyam*). For even if it were to exist
(*saty api tasmin*) it would be impossible to observe it (**darśanāsambhavaḥ*) because
all its substrates have not been observed (*sakalāśrayādarśanāt*). For perception of
[the general property] twoness, and so on, (*dvitvādīnām*) that is common to many
[substrates] (*anekasādhāraṇānām*) does not exist, when all its substrates have not
been perceived (*agṛhītasakalāśrayānām*).[2] Nor [does observation] of similarity
(*nāpi sādṛśyasya*) exist on the view of someone (**kasyacid*) who claims that
similarity is the general property (**sāmānyaṃ sādṛśyam iti vādinaḥ*), being the same
in substrates that have already been perceived as well as in those that have not yet
been perceived (**gṛhītāgṛhītāśrayasamam*).[3] If, on the other hand, it is claimed
that the universal is apprehended completely even though [only] a single substrate is
apprehended (*athaikāśrayanagrahaṇe 'pi samantaṃ gṛhyate*), it would have the
property of being manifold ([**tasya*] *anekatvaṃ syāt*)."

The following *pratīka*s are quoted at Ms B 71b7: *na tāvad agnitvam astīti;* 72a2-
4: *saty api tasminn ityādi ... nāpi sādṛśyasyeti ... athaikāśrayagrahaṇe 'pi
samantaṃ gṛhyate ... anekatvaṃ syāt.*

Jinendrabuddhi introduces his exegesis of PSV II 16 as follows: *syād etat:
sāmānyavastv ekam eva vyaktiṣu, tad vyatiriktam avyatiriktaṃ vāsti; tasya ca prati-
vyakti sarvātmanā parisamāptatvād ekasya <sarv>ātmanāgnivyaktau darśano-
papattiḥ, tasmāt sarvatrādarśanān na syāt prakāśanam ity ayuktam etad ity āha.*

[1]Dignāga's analysis, at PS II:16, of the view that real general properties are
resident in things, addresses the underlying assumption that the indicator-indicated
relation is based upon real general properties that instantiate identically in any
particular instance of, e.g., fire and smoke. The discussion presupposes PS II:15,
q.v. no. 13 above.

[2]For the inserted Sanskrit terms, cf. the exegesis at PSṬ Ms B 72a2: *yad
anekāśrayasādharaṇam agṛhītasakalāśrayaṃ na tad draṣṭuṃ śakyam, yathāgṛhīta-
sakalāśrayaṃ dvitvādi. tathā cāgnitvam.*

[3]This brief statement apparently alludes to Vindhyavāsin's claim about the
inseparability of the general property similarity from the individuals that instantiate
it, cf. the alleged quotation from Vindhyavāsin at Śṛṅgāraprakāśa Vol. IV 786,12-
14: *āha ca vindhyavāsī: śabdasya sāmānyaṃ vācyam. tac ca sādṛśyarūpam iti.
sāmānyaṃ ca pūrvavyaktyavacchinnam apūrvavyaktau pratīyamānaṃ tad uktaṃ
sādṛśyam:* "Vindhyavāsin says: The word's denotable object is the general property;
and this has the form of similarity; and the general property that has been

distinguished in a former individual and is cognized in a new individual is called similarity."

Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's remark, at PSṬ Ms B 72a3, about the claim that similarity (*sādṛśyam*) has been put forward separately because it is not distinct from the substrate: *āśrayād avyatirekitvāt sādṛśyam pṛthag upanyastam. atrāpy ayam eva prayogo vācyaḥ.*

Kumārila criticizes Vindhyavāsin's view at ŚV Ākṛti° 75-76: *vyaktitaś cātireko 'sya syān na veti vicārite, sāmānyam eva sādṛśyam bhaved vā vyaktimātrakam. tena nātyantabhinno 'rthaḥ sārūpyam iti varṇitam granthe vindhyanivāsena bhrānteḥ sādṛśyam ucyate.*

[504] Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of this crucial term is indebted to the view that a verbal uttarance indicates the speaker's intention (*vivakṣā*), and that which is qualified by exclusion of other referents is in fact the person who is qualified by *vivakṣā* because he is the substrate (*āśraya*) of the referent of the word, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232a1: *vivakṣāvati puruṣe. sa hi śabdārthasyāśraya iti tadviśiṣṭa ucyate.* For the interpretation of *śabda* as indicating *vivakṣā,* cf. no. 9. above. For the implications of the expression 'qualified by exclusion of other referents,' cf. the remarks under no. 466 above.

[505] That is without a substantially real (*vastusatī*) general property (*jātiḥ*), cf. PSṬ Ms B 231b7: *vinā hi jātyā vastusatyeti yāvat.*

[267] *yas tv āha "yadi gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ*[(1)]*, sarvātmyaprasaṅgāt prayuktam*[(2)] *asataḥ sadātmakatvam*[(3)]*" iti. <tatra>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232a1: *yas tv āhetyādi ... 232a6: yadi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ sādhyate. evaṃ sati sārvātmyaprasaṅgāt prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam iti;* cf. 232b1: *yadi gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāra iti bruvāṇaḥ.*
(1) *asato vikāraḥ* : *med pa las rnam par 'gyur ba/pa* KV
(2) Cf. *rab tu thob pa ñid do* V : *thal lo* K.
(3) *asataḥ sadātmakatvam* : *med pa las yod pa'i bdag ñid can* K : *yod pa ma yin pa'i bdag ñid* V (= *asadātmakatvam < a(sataḥ)sad°*).

[506] This paragraph introduces a lenghthy discussion, covering § 56 through § 60, with the Sāṅkhyavaināśika Mādhava[(1)], who, as it appears, addresses Dignāga's criticism of his proof of the existence of *pradhāna,* in connection with his own rebuttal of the *apoha* theory. Dignāga now answers his criticism. According to Jinendrabuddhi, Mādhava addresses Dignāga's objection immediately after dealing with the direct proofs of the continuous connection of the particulars with primordial materiality, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232a1-2: *arthāntarābhāvalakṣaṇam asatsamanvayam 'bhyupetya gavādīnām asataḥ sadātmakatvam pratipādayituṃ ayuktam. Arthāntarato hy arthāntaravyudāsa iti. etāvatāyam upanyāso anvayavītoktisamanantaraṃ vaināśikenoktaḥ*[(2)]*, so 'sataḥ sūcaka iti vākyaśeṣaḥ* "Having assumed that continuous connection with what is non-existent is characterized by non-existence of other referents, it is not possible to indicate the existent nature of cows, and so on, on account of what is non-existent. For exclusion is of one referent from other referents. In so many words the illustration, which the Vaināśika has set forth immediately after the formulation of the direct proof of the joint presence [of the

particulars with primordial materiality], indicates [that the primordial materiality] is non-existent, such is the sentence complement."

Mādhava's argument is related to an objection, evidently put forward by Dignāga in another work (Sāṅkhyaparīkṣā or Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa ?) in which he appears to argue that what Mādhava considers to be proof of the existence of *pradhāna,* equally well establishes its non-exsistence. The argument focuses on the implications of the concept of *samanvaya,* the main point being that everything manifest is continuously connected with what is non-existent in that manifest things are mutually non-existent, and thus is defined by continuous non-existence of all other things.

Jinendrabuddhi presents Dignāga's argument as *pūrvapakṣa* followed by Mādhava's response at Ms B 232a2-4: *yo 'yam bhavatā vyaktasya ekajātisaman-vayaḥ pradhānasiddhyartham*[3] *uktaḥ, sa asatsiddhim api sūcayati. kasmāt? Asat-samanvayāt. asatsamanvitaṃ hīdaṃ vyaktam. na pṛthivyādayo na gavādayaḥ paras-parātmasu santi. yac ca yena samanvitaṃ tasyāsau vikāraḥ: tadyathā dadhi kṣīreṇa samanvitaṃ kṣīravikāraḥ. asatsamanvitaṃ cedaṃ vyaktam. tasmād idaṃ vyaktam asato vikāra iti:* "The continuous connection of the manifest with a single genus which you have propounded in order to establish primordial materiality[4] also presents the proof of [its being] non-existent. Why? Because of [its] continuous connection with what is non-existent. For the manifest is continuously connected with what is non-existent. Neither the earth, and so on, nor a cow, and so on, exist in one another's nature. And that with which something is continuously connected is a modification of that. For instance yoghurt which is continuously connected with milk is a modification of milk. And the manifest is continuously connected with what is non-existent. Therefore the manifest is a modification of what is non-existent."

This argument shows that Dignāga relies on the idea of things being excluded from each other through mutual non-existence, a view he is going to elaborate in the following. Cf., e.g., the classical formulation of the implications of mutual non-existence at ŚV Abhāva° 12a-c: *svarūpapararūpābhyāṃ nityaṃ sadasadātmake vastuni*[5].

[1]Dignāga also refers to and discusses other of Mādhava's views at PS I section 5; 3d2-7cd, cf. *Hattori* 1968: 57-59, 155 no. 5.40. See *Steinkellner* 2005 ad loc.

[2]So probably read : *pratipādayituṃ ayuktam ity etāvātāyam upanyāsaḥ. arthān-tarato hy arthāntaravyudāsaḥ. anvayavītoktisamanantaraṃ vaināśikenoktam* Ms and T. I assume that the clause *arthāntarato ... °vyudāsa* originally followed after *ayuktam* as part of Mādhava's objection since he interprets exclusion of other referents as an instance of connection of any given thing with what is non-existent, in other words, as an instance of mutual non-existence.

[3]°*am* em. : °*a* Ms

[4]For a related argument from the Ṣaṣṭitantra, cf. *Frauwallner* 1982: 264,16-17: *asti pradhānam bhedānām anvayadarśanāt. ādhyātmikānāṃ bhedānāṃ kāryakara-ṇātmakānām ekajātisamanvayo dṛṣṭaḥ.*

[5]For an overview of the concept of *abhāva,* cf. *Steinkellner* 1967 II: 160ff.

[507] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b2: *yadiśabdo hy abhyupagamaṃ paridīpayati.*

[508] As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi's reproduction of Mādhava's objection, Dignāga quotes it in a slightly abbreviated form, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232a6: *etasmin*

pūrvapakṣe sāṅkhyenoktaṃ "yadi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ sādhyate, evaṃ sati sārvātmyaprasaṅgāt prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam."

Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 232a6-232b1: *sarvavikāra-svarūpatā sārvātmyaṃ, vikārasvarūpadarśanāc ca prakṛtes tatsvarūpānumānam*[(1)]. *tathā hi kṣīravikārā dadhyādayas tadātmakāḥ. tadātmakaprakṛtaya eva sarvātmakā vikārāḥ. tataḥ prakṛter api sarvātmakatvam. sarvātmakatvāc ca sattvaprasaṅgaḥ*[(1)]. *na asat sarvātmakam upadyate. tataś ca siddhasādhanam asatpūrvakā bhedā iti.*

[(1)]°*ānumā*° em. : °*āmā*° Ms

[(2)]°*aḥ* em. : °*ā* Ms

[268] *asatsamanvitaṃ sarvaṃ <yasya*[(1)] *tv> abhyupagacchataḥ*[(2)]*, sattvam anekāt-makatvād iti kiṃ kena yujyate.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b1-2: *asatsamanvitaṃ sarvam iti ... evaṃ* tasya sāṅkhyasy*ābhyupagacchataḥ. sattvam anekātmakatvād iti kiṃ kena yujyate.*

[(1)]Cf. *gaṅ źig* V : *gaṅ yin* K.

[(2)]*pāda* b om. Ms; recorded T, cf. paraphrase above.

[509] The question relates to the fact that the answer to Dignāga's objection is inconsistent with the opponent's own assumption, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b2: *nābhyupagamenottaraṃ sambadhyata ity arthaḥ.*

[269] *<yadi sarvam asatsamanvitam ity abhyupagamyeta>, tatra katame 'nye gavādayo <'santaḥ kena svabhāvena sattvādhyaropyāḥ syuḥ>. sarvān hi gavādīn <asatsamanvitān> abhyupagacchato 'sataḥ sadātmakatvaṃ prāptam ity uttaraṃ na yujyate*[(1)]*. <tatra>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b2-4: *tatra katame 'nye gavādaya iti ... sarvān hītyādi ... na hi gavādīn sadātmakān abhyupagacchataḥ tādātmyād asataḥ sadātmakatvam prāptam ity uttaraṃ yujyate.*

[(1)]Cf. *lan 'di ni sbyar bar mi bya 'o* V : *lan 'di rigs pa yin nam* K.

[510] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b3: *itaretarābhāva eva hi vyāvahārikā gavādayaḥ, na tu tadvyatirekeṇānye santi. itaretarābhāvaś cāvastu kalpitatvāt. tatas tatsvabhāvatve katham asataḥ sattvaprasaṅgaḥ:* "For cows, and so on, are denotable only on account of mutual non-existence, they are not different without this [mutual non-existence]. And mutual non-existence is not an entity because it is imagined. Therefore, in that it has this nature, how could the [absurd] consequence be that their being existent is due to what is non-existent?"

[270] *yad apy uktam "pratyayābhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ, prakṛtipratyayo hi vikāre dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mṛtpratyayaḥ śarāvādāv iti*[(1)]*."* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 232b4-5: *yad apy uktam iti. ... pratyayābhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ. kasmāt? prakṛtipratyayo hi vikāre dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mṛtpratyayaḥ śarāva" iti.*

[(1)] *śarāvādāv* em. (cf. *kham por la sogs pa la* KV) : *śarāva* (cf. *kham por la* T) Ms

[511] Dignāga reproduces Mādhava's objection with some omissions as appears from Jinendrabuddhi's exposition at Ms B 232b4-5: *tatroktaṃ "yadi gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ, pratyayābhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ. kasmāt? prakṛti-pratyayo hi vikāre dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mṛtpratyayaḥ śarāva" iti:* "In this context it is objected: If everything manifest like a cow is a modification due to what is non-

existent there will be no difference of cognition relative to what is existent and what is non-existent. Why? Because the cognition of primordial materiality is observed with regard to a modification, like, for instance, the cognition of clay with regard to a plate." Jinendrabuddhi explains the argument at Ms B 232b5-6: *etad uktam bhavati: asatsamanvite tadākāra eva pratyayaḥ syāt, na tu gaur aśva iti vastubhedākāro bhavet, bhavati ca. tasmān na vyaktasyāsatsamanvayaḥ:* "This is what is meant: If the cognition is continuously present with what is non-existent it will only have the form of this, it would not have the form of different referents called 'cow' or 'horse', and yet this is the case. Therefore the manifest is not continuously present with what is non-existent."

[271] *mṛdabhede śaravādibhedadhīr yadi cesyate*[(1)], *asadabhede 'pi bhedadhīḥ kim iti nidhāryate*. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 232b7: *mṛdabhede śaravādibhedadhīr yadi ceṣyata iti;* 233a1-2: *evaṃ saty asadabhede*[(2)] *'pi ... bhedadhīḥ ... kim iti nidhāryate*[(3)].

[(1)]The readings *gźan ñid min na 'aṅ* K : *gźan min yaṅ* V of the Tibetan versions of PS V 40ab are not corroborated by the Sanskrit evidence of Ms B, and, moreover, do not fit metrically into the restored Sanskrit version of the two pādas. The readings may be due to a gloss based upon the parallel expression of the *vṛtti* ad loc., cf. *gźan ñid ma yin yaṅ* K : *gźan ma yin na ni* V.

[(2)] *asadabhede* conj. (cf. *med khyad med* KT) : *asat bhede* Ms

[(3)] *bsal* K : *dgag* V : *bzlog* T would indicate that the translators interpreted *nidhāryate* as *nivāryate* ("excluded" sic), which is impossible as the causative of *ni* + √*dhṛ* is not recorded in the sense "to exclude." The mistake is incomprehensible as Ms leaves no doubt about the reading.

[512] Cf. PST Ms B 232b7-233a1: *mṛdbhyo hi śaravādayo 'bhinnāḥ. tatrābhinnākārapratyaya<pra>saṅge yadi pratyayabheda iṣyate: mṛdi mṛtpratyayaḥ, śaravādau śaravādipratyayaḥ, evaṃ saty asadabhede*[(1)] *'py, asataḥ*[(2)] *kāraṇasyābhede*[(3)] *'pi, gavādivyakte asatsamanvite*[(4)] *'pi bhedadhīḥ gaur aśva ityevamādipratyayabhedaḥ kim iti nidhāryate:* "For plates, and so on, are not diffferent from clay. If it is claimed that there is difference of cognition: clay cognition with respect to clay, and plate cognition with respect to plate, in that the [absurd] consequence in this case is that the cognitions of these would have the same form, in those circumstances, although there is no difference of what is non-existent, i.e., although there is no difference of a cause that is non-existent, i.e., although a manifested thing like a cow is continuously connected with what is non-existent, then how is the cognition of difference, i.e., the difference of cognitions like 'cow' and 'horse' established.

[(1)]*asada°* em. (cf. *med khyad med* T) : *asat°* Ms

[(2)]*asataḥ* conj. (cf. *med pa'i* T) : *tās{ā}taḥ* Ms

[(3)]*°ṇasyābhe°* em. (cf. *tha dad med* T) : *°ṇasya bhe°* Ms

[(4)] *asatsamanvite* em. (cf. *med pa daṅ ldan pa la* T) : *asatsamarthite* Ms

[272] *<yathā hi mṛdbhyo 'bhinnatve 'pi tadmātrapratyayaprasaṅge> kenāpi vidhena <śaravādipratyayabhedo 'bhyupagamyate, tathā> śabdabhedabhāvanāvaśāt <sadasatoḥ pratyayabhedaḥ kiṃ neṣyate>. tavāpi hi guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛṣṭipatham ṛcchati, yat tu dṛṣṭipathaprāptaṃ tan māyeva sutucchakam.* Restored, cf. Ms 233a1-5: *kenāpi vidhineti ... śabdabhedabhāvanāvaśād iti ... tavāpi hītyādi;*

Ms B 232b7-233a1, q.v. above no. 509 above. The verse stems from Ṣaṣṭitantra, cf. YSBh ad YS IV.13; Frauwallner, *Kleine Schriften* 1982: 277-78.

[513] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a2: *saṃsthānādibhedena vā puruṣārthavaśena vā.*

[514] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a2-5: *anādau śabdavyavahāraparamparāyāṃ śabdaviśeṣā-hitā*[(1)] *tadākārapratyayotpattaye yā vāsanā, sā śabdabhedabhāvanā. tadvaśād bhinnākārapratyayaprasūtir bhavati. etena tadātmakatve 'pi tato bhinnākārapratya-yāvaseyatvasya śarāvādiṣu darśanād anaikāntikatvam āha. tato nāsatsamanva-yasyāsiddhatā. yuktaṃ yad sadavyatireke 'pi vastusattvāt pratyakṣeṇa paricchinnā gavādayaḥ śabdā bhāvanāvaśāt tathā paricchidyante. pratyakṣīkṛte hi vastuni śabdasaṅketaḥ śakyate kartuṃ nānyathā. asattve tu teṣām iṣyamāṇe kathaṃ bhinnākārapratyayāvaseyatvam iti.* This is the only context in which Dignāga refers to the residual traces of words (*bhāvanā*) as causes of verbal difference. He must have dealt more fully with this question elsewhere because Kumārila rejects the view at ŚV Apoha° 100a-c (= TS 959) that the difference between the *vāsanā*s explain the difference of the exclusions: *na cāpi vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatāpi vā, apohānāṃ prakalpyate na hy avastuni vāsanā.* Kamalaśīla quotes, in TSP 376,12ff ad loc., a passage from a work expressing views, which he attributes to certain Buddhists (*kecid bauddhāḥ*), who evidently tried to answer Kumārila's criticism: *na khalv apohyabhedād ādhārabhedād vāpohānāṃ bhedaḥ, api tv anādi-kālapravṛttavicitravitattvārthavikalpavāsanābhedānvayais tattvato nirviṣayair api bhinnaviṣayālambibhir iva pratyayair bhinneṣv artheṣu bāhyeṣu bhinnā ivārthāt-māna ivāsvabhāvā apy apohāḥ samāropyante. te ca tathā taiḥ samāropitā bhinnāḥ santaś ca pratibhāsante, tena vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatā cāpohānāṃ bhaviṣ-yati:* "The difference of the exclusions is certainly not due to difference of the excluded or difference of the substrate, but rather, the exclusions, although they are without self-dependent nature, are superimposed, as if they were different and of the nature of the referents, upon external referents that are differentiated through notions that seemingly (*iva*) rely upon different objects, although they are essentially without objects, being accompanied by difference of (karmic) impressions, in circulation in the beginningless time, which are due to various representations of unreal referents." This text is strikingly reminisent of Dharmakīrti's explanation at PVSV 38,17ff; cf. the similar "de-realizing" use of *iva* ibid. 42,12-22.

(1)°*viśeṣā*° conj : °*viśeṣaṇā*° Ms

[515] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a5-7: *sāmyāvasthāyāṃ yo 'viparītaḥ svabhāvaḥ, so 'tīndriyatvān na dṛṣṭer viṣayabhāvam anuyāti*[(1)]. *yat tu rūpaṃ teṣāṃ vyaktāva-sthāyāṃ tan "māyeva sutucchakaṃ;" svabhāvaśūnyam ity arthaḥ. tataś ca tvayāpy avastutattvanibandhana eva vyavahāro 'bhyupeya iti:* "Their true essential nature in the state of homogeneous equilibrium[(2)] does not enter the domain of vision because it is beyond the [visual] sense. On the other hand, their form in their manifest state is 'void like an illusion', that is, 'empty of essential nature'. And therefore you too should accept that discourse is conditioned by non-material properties."

(1)°*āti* em. : °*aiti* Ms

(2) Jinendrabuddhi's use of this term shows that the concept of *sāmyāvasthā* did not originate with Vijñānabhikṣu (ca. 16th c. AD) as claimed in *Larson & Bhattacharya* 1987: 37.

[273] *sāsnādidarśanād <gopratyayo*[(1)] *yo*[(2)] *'yam udāhṛtaḥ, so> viruddho bhavanmatyā. bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a7: *sāsnādidarśanād ityādi;* 233b4: *viruddha iti ... bhavanmatyeti ... asmanmatena tu* <u>*bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ.*</u>
[(1)]Cf. *ba laṅ rtogs pa'i* K : *de blo* V;
[(2)]Cf. *gaṅ* K : om. V.

[516] According to Jinendrabuddhi this paragraph introduces Mādhava's discussion with an unknown Jain "distinctionist," a Vaibhāgika, who describes the cognition of certain things as due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature (*ātman*) of other things, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233a7-233b1: *tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktaṃ: "yasya darśanād yad iti*[(1)] *loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati, tadyathā sāsnādidarśanād*[(2)] *gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gaur. ātmāntarābhāvadarśānāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇīti:* "For in this context the Vaibhāgika has stated: "In this world whatever cognition is due to the observation of whatever thing: this is such and such a thing only. For instance, the cognition 'cow' is due to the observation of dewlap, etc. A cow is only dewlap, etc. And the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things. Therefore the nature of some things are nothing but the non-existence of the nature of other things." After having summarised the Vaibhāgika's argument at Ms B 233b1-2: *etena yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tadyathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gaur, ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti kāryam āha*, Jinendrabuddhi continues quoting Mādhava's answer to his Vaibhāgika opponent at Ms B 233b2-3: *atra sāṅkhyena pratividhānam uktaṃ "yadi sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati, evaṃ sati yad uktam: "ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavatī"ti tad ayuktam" iti. ātmānantarābhāvanimittasarvapratyayābhyupagame kathaṃ sāsnādinimittatvaṃ gopratyayasyeti. yāvad ātmanābhyupetahānir uktā dṛṣṭānte svapakṣatyāgāt:* "In this context the Sāṅkhya has formulated the following counter-offensive: "If the cognition of a cow is due to observation of the dewlap, and so on, in that case the claim that the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things, is not justified. If is is assumed that all cognitions are caused by the non-existence of the nature of other things, how then could the cause of the cognition of a cow be the dewlap, etc.? That is, you yourself have formulated the abandonment of what you have admitted since you give up your own thesis for the sake of the example."

The peculiar term *ātmāntara* which may be specific to the Vaibhāgika argument; it is also used by Dignāga in the important paragraph PSV V:45, q.v. below.
[(1)]Cf. *źes* DC : *źig* P.
[(2)]°*ād* em.: °*āṃ* Ms

[517] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b4: *bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti mataṃ:* "Because your view is that a cow is nothing but dewlap, etc."

[518] According to Jinendrabuddhi, this statement sets forth Mādhava's own view, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b4-5: *asmanmatena tu "bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ." gosāsnāda-yo,* <u>*bhinnam apohyam eṣv*</u> *iti kṛtvā:* "But in our view their excluded referents are

mutually different, that is, cow and dewlap, and so on, on the ground that with regard to these the excluded referent is different."

[274] *yasya hi.* Qu. Ms B 233b5.

[519] That is, the one who subscribes to the theory of exclusion, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b5: *apohavādinaḥ.*

[275] *abhyupagamyā*[1]*yaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddho 'pi*[2]. *śabdabhedād dhi gosāsnād<iṣu> bhinnam apohyam*[3]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b5: *abhyupagam-yetyādi ... atas tad abhyupagamyāyaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddho 'py uktaḥ;* Ms B 233b6: *śabdabhedād dhītyādi.*
[1]Cf. *khas blaṅs nas* V : *khas blaṅs kyaṅ* K;
[2]Cf. *yaṅ* KV;
[3]Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b5, q.v. above no. 519.

[520] Namely, that a cow is nothing but an aggregate of dewlap, and so on, cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b5: *bhavato hi sāsnādisamūha eva gaur iti.*

[521] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b5-6: *etad uktam bhavati: yathā tava sāsnādisamūha-darśanād gopratyayas tathā mamāpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyaya iti:* "What is meant is the following: just as you are of the opinion that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the aggregate of dewlap, and so on, I am of the opinion too that the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things."

[522] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 233b7-234a1: *sāsnādiśabdasyāsāsnādyapohyaṃ sāsnādiṣu, gośabdasyāpy agaur gavi*[1]. *yata evam bhinnam apohyam, ataḥ sāsnādiṣv asāsnā-dyapohena sāsnādipratyayaḥ, gavy agovyavacchedena gopratyayaḥ. evaṃ cātrāpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād evātmāntare pratyayaḥ*[2]: "that is, the excluded [referent] non-dewlap, and so on, of the word 'dewlap', and so on, with regard to a dewlap, and so on, and non-cow of the word 'cow' with regard to a cow. Since the excluded referent is different in this way, the cognition 'dewlap,' and so on, with regard to a dewlap, and so on, is due to the exclusion of non-dewlaps, and so on, and the cognition 'cow' with regard to a cow is due to the exclusion of non-cows. And thus, in this case too the cognition of the nature of one thing is only due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things."
[1]*a°...°vi* em. : *agau javi* Ms
[2]*pratyayaḥ* em. : *ṣityayaḥ* Ms

[276] *"so 'napekṣa" <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam>*[1], *nirapoham (...).* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a1-3: *so 'napekṣa ityādi ... svavikalpavinirmitam*[1] *iti ... nirapoham ityādi.*
[1]*vinirmitam* conj. (cf. *sprul* K : *spros pa zad* V) : *°vi{kṛ?}titam* Ms (*sprul* T), cf. the expression *avidyāvinirmitam* at Dignāga's *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthaḥ* 42.

[523] Jinendrabuddhi quotes the passage from Mādhava's work which Dignāga addresses in this paragraph, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a1-2: *sāṅkhyena hy ātmāntarābhāva-darśanāc cātmantare pratyayo bhavatīty asiddhatām udbhāvayitum uktaṃ: "so*

'*napekṣa ātmāntarapratyayaḥ. kasmāt? na hi naḥ pratyayo bhavaty ātmāntarābhā-
vadarśanād ātmāntare, kiṃ tarhi, vidhirūpeṇaiva gaur iti*": "for the *Sāṅkhya* has
asserted in order to explain that the statement "and the cognition of the nature of one
thing (*ātmāntara*) is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of
other things (*ātmāntara*)," is unproved, and that the cognition of the nature of one
thing is independent, Why is that? Because in our opinion the cognition of the nature
of one thing is not due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature other
things, but rather, [the cognition] 'cow' is exclusively in the form of an
affirmation[1]."

[1]For the implications of the concept of *vidhi,* cf. no. 13 above.

[524]Although the reading of Jinendrabuddhi's gloss *svavikalpavibhājitam* is not
beyond doubt, I assume that is was intended as a pun on the term Vaibhāgika*,* cf.
PST Ms B 234a2-3: *svavikalpavibhājitam*[1] *etat. etad uktam bhavati:
svavikalpavaśād evam ucyate.*

[1]°*vibhājitam* conj. (cf. *dbye bar byas pa* T) : *svavikalpavi(syāddhi?)tam* Ms

[277] *sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavatīti
pūrvam evopapāditam. svarūpaṃ tv ten<āvyāvahārikaṃ> anabhilāpyatvāt.*
Restored, cf. PST Ms B 234a3-5: *sāsnādiṣu hītyādy asyaiva vivaraṇam ... <u>arthān-
tarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavatīti pūrvam evopapāditam</u> ... <u>svarūpaṃ tv ityādi</u> ...
<u>tena nāma tasyānabhilāpyatvāt</u> ... <u>vyāvahārikaṃ</u> ....*

[525] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase at Ms B 234a3-4: *sāsnādiśabdo hi sāmān-
yarūpeṇa svārthaṃ pratyāyayati. tac ca sāmānyarūpapratītāv arthāntarābhāvanir-
apekṣaṃ na bhavatīti pūrvam evopapāditam:* "for the word 'dewlap', and so on,
indicates its own referent in the form of its general property, and concerning this it
has previously been argued that with regard to the cognition of the general form this
[general form] does not exist independently of the non-existence of other referents."

It is not quite clear how to interpret Dignāga's remark about having
demonstrated earlier that the general form i.e. the abstract type, presupposes the
non-existence of other referents in the locus of the referent of any given term or
indicator because Dignāga only introduces the idea that the denotable general form
depends upon non-existence of other referents in the context of his discussion with
Mādhava and the unknown Vaibhāgika.

It is clear, however, that within the conceptual framework of the *apoha* theory
non-existence of other referents in the locus of the referent is instrumental in
establishing the generalized form of invariable connection between indicator and
indicated as appears from Dignāga's theory of induction expounded at PSV V:34,
q.v. above. It is thus understandable that he introduces the concept of mutual non-
existence of any given x and non-x in the context of *apoha.* This corresponds to the
connection of any indicator—a word or speech unit, or a logical indicator like 'being
produced'—to the indicated, which is reified through non-observation of the
indicator where the indicated is non-existent.

[526] Jinendrabuddhi introduces the concluding statement of this paragraph by
presenting the opponents view that individuals are denotable in an affirmative form,
cf. PST Ms B 234a: *nanu ca bhāvasvalakṣaṇādhigatir arthāntarābhāvapratītinir-
apekṣā. gaur iti vidhinaiva bhavatīti:* "certainly the cognition of the individual

character of an entity is independent of the cognition of the non-existence of other referents. It is exclusively found in an affirmative form as 'cow.'"

[527] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a5-6: *svarūpaṃ svalakṣaṇam. tatpratītau yady arthān-tarābhāvo nāpekṣeta nāma*[1]*, tasyānabhilāpyatvāt. abhilāpyaṃ tu vyāvahārikaṃ rūpaṃ gavādīnāṃ nārthāntarāpohanirapekṣam pratīyate:* "the own form is the individual character. If the non-existence of other referents does not depend on the cognition of this [individual character], it is because it is not denotable. However, the form of a cow, and so on, that is denotable, i.e., the one that is subject to designation, is not cognized as exempt from exclusion of other referents."

[1] *nāpekṣeta nāma* conj (cf. *ltos par bya ba ma yin mod* T) : *sāpekṣ(?)na nāma* Ms. For the underlying syntax of this clause, cf. the compound *arthāntarābhāva-pratītinirapekṣa,* q.v. no.s 526-27.

[278] *yac coktam ādyapratyay<o> nāstīti, <tatra>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234a6: *yac coktam iti … ādyapratyayasaṃvṛttir eva nāsti;* cf. no. [282] below.

[528] Dignāga addresses in this paragraph an objection made by Mādhava, which Jinendrabuddhi quotes in extenso and explains at Ms B 234a6-234b1: *evaṃ hy uktam: "yady ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati, ādyapratya-yasaṃvṛttir eva nāsti. kasmāt? na hi tadātmāntarābhāvadarśanam astī" ti. atrādyaḥ pratyayo yaḥ saṃsāre prathama utpadyate, tasyābhāvaḥ. tadānīm aparasyātmano 'darśanād ātmāntaraṃ cāgṛhītvā tadabhāvopalakṣitam ātmāntaraṃ grahītum aśakyam ity abhyupetahāniḥ*[1]: "for it has been objected as follows: "if the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to observation of the non-existence of the nature of another thing, there is no occurrence of a first cognition. Why? Because then there is no observation of the non-existence of the nature of things that are different from it."

In this context the first cognition, i.e., the one that arises as the first one in the round of transmigration does not exist. And then, not having apprehended the nature of one thing because of not observing the nature of another thing, it becomes impossible to apprehend the nature of the one thing that is implied by its non-existence. Thus you give up what you have assumed.

A related objection is put forward by Uddyotakara who maintains that negation presupposes an act of affirmation defining the content of a first cognition. The assumption underlying Uddyotakara's argument is that since *apoha* is nothing but negation without any positive content, there cannot be a first cognition on the basis of which negation becomes meaningful; cf. NV 331,19-332,3: *vidhānaśabdārtha-sambhave sati ādyā pratipattiḥ. yadi vidhānaśabdārtho bhavati, yasya* (so read) *vidhīyamānaśabdārthapratipattāv satyāṃ tasyānyatra pratiṣedha ity upapannaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ. yasya punar vidhīyamānaḥ padārtho nāsti, tasyādyāṃ pratipattim antareṇa katham pratiṣedhaḥ:* "the first cognition is when the referent of the word is present in terms of affirmation. If the referent of the word exists in terms of affirmation, someone who has a cognition of the referent of the word that is being affirmed, can negate it elsewhere. Thus negation is justified. But how could someone, according to whom the thing that is in the process of being affirmed does not exist, negate without a first cognition?"

[1]°*hāniḥ* em. : °*hāniṃ* Ms

[279] *iṣṭisiddhir anāditvāt.* Qu. Ms B 234b1.

⁵²⁹ Cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b1: *iṣṭam evaitad ādyapratyayānabhyupagamāt. ato nābhyupetahānir ity arthaḥ.*

⁵³⁰ The view that the transmission (*pāramparya*) of *vyavahāra* is beginningless is related to similar formulations by Bhartṛhari, cf. VPV I 58,3-4: *apara āhuḥ: pāramparyāvicchedān nityapravṛtteḥ prayoktṛbhir utpattāv alabdhaprāthamyā vyavahāranityatayā nityāḥ śabdāḥ;* cf. Vṛsabhadeva's Paddhati ad loc. VPV I 58,22-23: *na śabdavyavahārasya vicchedo 'sti, anādau saṃsāre pāramparyeṇa vyava-sthito 'yaṃ śabdvyavahāra iti na kūṭasthanityatā, kin tu prayogāvicchedaḥ:* "there is no interruption of the use of words. The use of words is confined by way of transmission to the beginningless transmigration, thus there is no invariability in terms of being immutable, but rather, there is no interruption of usage." The causal relationship to which Dignāga refers is the causal relationship between the word and its mental representation. In this regard he appears to be influenced by Bhartṛhari, cf. VP III.2:32: *śabdaḥ kāraṇam arthasya sa hi tenopajanyate, tathā ca buddhiviṣayād arthāc chabdaḥ pratīyate;* cf. VPV I 42,12-3: *tathā eke kārya-kāraṇabhāvam eva śabdārthayoḥ sambandham manyante:* "Some think that the relation between the word and its referent is a causal relationship." VPV I 61,1-2: *nityam avicchinnapāramparyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ:* "The relation between the word and its referent is a causal relationship whose transmission is invariably uninterrupted." VPV I 71,4-5 (ad I 25): *kāryakāraṇa-bhāvenārthākāranirbhāsamātrānugatasya pratyayasyārtheṣu pratyastarūpasyār-thatvenādhyavasāye tasyarthātmanaḥ śabdo nimittam. tathārthāvagrahadarśanam so 'yam iti śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaprasiddher nādābhivyaktasyāntaḥkaraṇasaṃ-niveśinaḥ śabdasya pravṛttau kāraṇam.*

For the notion of *śabda* being the cause of the cognition of *artha,* cf., e.g., Candrānanda's vṛtti on VS IX.21: *arthasya pratipattāv iyaṃ hastaceṣṭā kāraṇam pratipattavyā iti vṛttasaṅketaḥ tāṃ hastaceṣṭāṃ dṛṣṭvā tataḥ śabdāt kāraṇād artham pratipadyate evam asyārthasya pratipattāv ayaṃ śabdaḥ kāraṇam.*

In the present context it is significant that Helarāja in his comment on VP III.2:54 quotes pādas ab of a verse commonly attributed to Dignāga. Siṃhasūri quotes the verse at NCV 547,7-8: *vikalpayonayaḥ śabdā vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ, teṣām atyantasambandho nārthāñ śabdāḥ spṛśanty api:* "Words have their origin in representations and representations have their origin in words. They are interrelated. Nor are words in direct contact with their referents." The fact that the term *atyantasambandha* is to be interpreted in terms of mutual connection appears from the variant of pādas cd quoted, e.g., at <mark>SVṬ</mark> Vol. II 620,2: *teṣām anyonyasambandho nārthān śabdāḥ spṛśanty amī.* The mutual connection of word and representation was correctly interpreted as a causal relation as another variant recorded, e.g., at Syādvādamañjarī 91,5 indicates: *kāryakāraṇatā teṣāṃ nārthaṃ śabdāḥ spṛśanty api.* Vacaspatimiśra allludes to this verse at NVTṬ Vol. I 241,10-12: *vikalpayonayo hi śabdās tadgocaram abhiniviśante. yad vikalpā gṛhṇanti yac cādhyavasyati tad ubhayam apy anyavyāvṛttirūpam avastu, tasmān na avikalpikaṃ jñānaṃ tadgoca-raṃ vā paramārthasad gocarayanti vikalpāḥ śabdāś cety ayam abhisandhiḥ.* This explanation presupposes that the object of *śabda* or *vikalpa* is not a real object (*avastu*) although it is interpreted as having the form of exclusion of other

(*anyavyāvṛttirūpam avastu*), which contradicts Dignāgan doctrine as presented in PSV V and the Sanskrit fragment from SPVy, cf. no. 182 above.

[280] <*na hy ādyapratyayo 'sty eva vyavahārakāryakaraṇapāramparyānāditvāt*>. *yasya tu* <*ādyapratyayam icchataḥ*>. Restored cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b1: *yasya tv ityādinā parasyaivemaṃ doṣaṃ praty āsañjayate.*

531 Cf. *daṅ po'i rtogs pa 'dod pa* K : *daṅ po'i śes pa med na* V.

[281] <*tasya*> *na ca śakyaṃ jātimad vyāptum, na ca śakyate jātir* <*eka*>*samasta-vṛttiḥ*[1], <*jātimadbhyo*> *vyatiriktā vāvyatiriktā ve*<*tīmau doṣau staḥ*>[2]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b2-3: *na ca śakyaṃ jātimad vyāptum iti*; PSṬ Ms B 234,3-6 q.v. no. 536 below.
[1]Cf. *gcig mtha' dag la 'jug pa ni ma yin no* V, for which read *gcig mtha' dag la 'jug pa ni yin no*, cf. *cig mtha' dag la 'jug par* K.
[2] Cf. *źes bya ba'i skyon de dag yod do* V : *'di skyon yin no* K.

532 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b2-3: *yadi sarvabhedeṣu śabdo niyoktuṃ śakyeta, evaṃ jātimad vastu śabdena vyāptuṃ śakyeta, na caitat sambhavati, jātimatām ānantyāt. na cākṛtasambandhaḥ śabdaḥ pratyāyayituṃ samarthaḥ:* "If it were possible to apply the word to all particulars, then it would be possible for the word to universally pervade an object that is a general property possessor. And this is not possible because the general property possessors are infinite. And a word whose connection [to its referent] has not been established is not capable of indicating [it]."

533 The translation of this clause is, with a minor emendation, based upon V whose readings are supported by Ms, for which, cf. no.s [281] above and 536 below.

534 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b3: *śakyate vyāptum iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ.*

535 According to Jinendrabuddhi, Dignāga addresses the assumption that because of the unity (*ekatva*) of the general property it is capable of pervading its substrates, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b3: *syād etad ekatvāj jātiḥ śakyate vyāptum iti.* The subsequent exposition at PSṬ Ms B 234b3-6 is indebted to Dignāga's analysis, at PSV II:16 (for which, cf. no. 504 above), of the problems that entail from the assumption that general properties are real entities: *yadi tāvad āśrayāt vyatiriktā jātiḥ samastā-śrayavṛttiḥ kalpyate, tadā dvitvādivad āśrayadarśanapuraḥsaraṃ tasya darśanam*[1] *syāt. na cāśrayāṇām ānantyād darśanaṃ sambhavati. atha pratyāśrayaṃ sarvāt-manā parisamāptatvād ekāśrayadarśane 'pi grahaṇam iṣyate, tadā bhedaḥ syāt. tataś cāśrayavad ānantyāt sambandhābhāvaḥ. athāśrayād avyatiriktaivam api bhedavad doṣaḥ, bhedebhyo 'vyatiriktāyās*[2] *tadvad evānantyād iti. jātivādina evādyapratyayābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ:* "If, in the first place, it is imagined that the general property is resident in all its substrata as separate from [any given] substrate, then its observation would presuppose the observation of the substrata in the same way as the [general] property twoness, etc. And the observation is not possible because the substrata are infinite. If, on the other hand, it is maintained that it is apprehended even if a single substrate is observed because it is contained completely in each single substrate, then it would be a particular, and therefore there is no connection because it is infinite in the same way as the substrata. If, moreover,

it is not separate from the substrate, even so the problem is similar to that of the particular because, when it is not separate from the particulars, it is infinite in the exact same way as these. Thus the [absurd] consequence that there is no first cognition only concerns one who opholds the doctrine of general properties."

(1) *darśanaṃ* em. :°*ādarśanaṃ* Ms

(2) °*āyās* em. (gen. sg. f. qualifying an implicit *jāteḥ* in construction with *ānantyāt*) : °*āyos* Ms

[282] *yad apy uktam pratyayavṛttir eva nāstīti*(1) *tad apy ayuktam, sāmānyena nir-ākṛteḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 234b6-7, 235a2: *yad apy uktam iti ... pratyayavṛttir eva*(2) *nāsti ... tad apy ayuktaṃ;* Ms B 235a2: *sāmānyena nirākṛteḥ.*

(1) The phrase *yad apy uktam pratyayavṛttir eva nāstīti* is not reproduced in T, cf. T 212,25.

(2) °*vṛttir* em. : °*vṛddhir* Ms; cf. *'jug pa ñid yod pa ma yin no* K : *yaṅ dag par rab tu 'jug pa ñid med do* V; V presupposes the reading *pratyayasampravṛttir eva,* cf. no. [278] above.

536 Jinendrabuddhi quotes Dignāga's source at Ms B 234b6-235a1: *"pratyaya-vṛttir eva nāsti. kasmāt? vyudasyātmāntarānantyāt. na hi sarvātmāntarābhāvadar-śanam astīti."* *etad uktam bhavati: yadi sarvātmāntarāṇām apohena pratyayaḥ, teṣām agavarthānām ānantyād adarśanaṃ gobhedavat. tataś ca na tadapohena*(1) *gopratyayas, tadvad eveti:* "There is no cognition occurs at all. Why? Because of the infinity of the nature of the other things that are to be excluded. For there is no observation of the non-existence of all the things that are different."

What is meant is this: If the cognition is through exclusion of the nature of all things that are different there is no observation of these because the referents that are non-cows are infinite in the same way as the particular cows. And therefore the cognition 'cow' is not due to the exclusion of these infinite particulars, in the exact same way."

This objection resurfaces in the discussion at ŚV Apoha° 58, where Kumārila addresses the question of how to define the excluded (*apohya*) if it is claimed that it consists of everything that is defined as non-x as opposed to x. For if it consists of each single non-x the problem of the excluded referent's being infinite arises: *sarvāpoho yadīṣyeta, sa vaktavyaḥ kathaṃ punaḥ, yadi pratyekarūpeṇa nāpohyā-nantyato bhavet:* "If exclusion of all [non-cows by the word 'cow'] is asserted, it is to be explained in what way [all non-cows are excluded]. If [they are excluded] in the form of each single [non-cow], there can be no [exclusion of all non-cows] because of the infinity of the excluded." Kumārila's discussion ŚV Apoha° 58 through 72 is primarily concerned with the views that Dignāga propounds in PSV V:43d.

(1) *tadapo*° em. : *tadāpo*° Ms

537 Ms B 235a2: *avṛkṣo*(1) *na bhavatīty evaṃ sāmānyarūpeṇa nirākaraṇāt:* "Because exclusion is in a general form such as, 'it is not a non-tree';" cf. ŚV Apoha° 63cd: *yadi sāmānyarūpeṇa te 'pohyante, na vastutā*(2): "If [all non-cows] are excluded in a general the form [i.e. in the general form of being non-cows, this general form] is not a real object."

(1) *avṛkṣo* em. : *avṛhye* Ms

[2]Cf. Śarkarikā introducing ŚV loc.cit.: *yadi tu pratyekasamudāyaparihāreṇa agorūpeṇa sarvasādhāraṇenāpohyata ity ucyate; tathā sati tasya tvanmatena vastutvaṃ nāstīty avasturūpeṇāpohyatvam aṅgīkṛtaṃ syāt:* "suppose, however, it is explained that [the excluded] is excluded through exclusion of the aggregate of each single [thing to be excluded] having the form of non-cow which is common to all [the things to be excluded]; this being the case, the property of being a thing to be excluded would be due to the form of an unreal object as (*iti*) the thing to be excluded does not, on your theory, have the property of being a real object."

[283] *na hi so 'nyāṃ jātim pratidravyam apohate, kiṃ tarhi vyavacchedyavivak-ṣayaikena sāmānyadharmeṇa. uktaṃ cātra vijātīye 'darśanamātreṇānumānam. tavaiva tv eṣa doṣaḥ: yadi svajātīyavyāptyā*[1] *<varteta, vyāpyasyānantyaṃ syāt*[2]*>. tasmād yathā <viṣāṇitvād anaśva ity ukte 'śve viṣāṇitvādarśanena tadvyavacche-dānumānam>, <na tu karkādīn> pratyekam apohate, <nāpy ekaikagavādiṣv anuvartate.*[3]*tavaivāpi vyāvṛttibuddhir anuvṛttibuddhiś ceṣṭā. tathā <cā>tra*[4] *nyāyaḥ.* Restored, cf Ms B 235a2-235b5: *na hi so 'nyām ityādi ... jātim pratidravyam apohate ... kiṃ tarhi vyavacchedyavivakṣayaikena sāmānyadharmeṇa ... uktaṃ cātretyadi ... vijātīye adarśanamātreṇānumānam iti ... tavaiva tv eṣa doṣa iti ... yadi svajātīyavyāptyetyādi ... tasmād yathetyādi ... ye 'pi te 'naśvā gavādayaḥ, tān api viṣāṇitvaṃ na pratyekaṃ vyāpnoti, ye 'pi tadvijātīyā aśvās tān api naiva pratyekam apohate ... gavādiṣv anuvṛttibuddhir agavādiṣu ca vyāvṛttibuddhir bhavati ... tathātra nyāyaḥ.*

[1]KV erroneously construes this cpd. as a locative syntactically dependent on the verb **varteta,* instead of taking it as an instrumental form, cf. *raṅ gi rigs khyab par bya ba la 'jug pa yin na* K : *rigs mthun la khyab pa 'jug pa'i lta na* V; cf. no. 540 below.

[2]Cf. *khyab pa* (read *khyab par bya ba*) *la ni mtha' yod pa ma yin no* V : *khyab par bya ba mtha' med pa yin no* K.

[3]Cf. *ba laṅ la sogs pa so so la yaṅ 'jug pa ma yin no* V : *ba laṅ la sogs pa re re 'dzin pa ma yin no.* V is preferable to K because *'jug pa* (presumably corresponding to Sanskrit **anuvartate* because V translates *anuvṛtti* as *'jug pa*) anticipates the subsequent introduction of the technical term *anuvṛtti.* Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at no. 542 below, which uses *vyāpnoti* with a similar intention.

[4]Cf. *'di la yaṅ* V : *'dir yaṅ* K.

538 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 235a2-3: *na*[1] *yasmāt so vṛkṣaśabdo 'nyāṃ ghaṭatvādikāṃ*[2] *jātim pratidravyam apohate ghaṭo na bhavatīty evaṃ:* "Because the word 'tree' does not exclude a different general property like potness for each substance such as 'it is not a pot.'" Dignāga's statement presupposes an objection according to which the word 'tree', for instance, should exclude every single different general property for every single substance, which entails that each thing is qualified by innumerable exclusions corresponding to the innumerable general properties that define it. Not surprisingly one finds the same objection at ŚV Apoha° 59: *bhinnatvāc cāpy apohyānāṃ bhinno 'pohaḥ prasajyate, tatraikasmin bhavet piṇḍe 'nantajātisaman-vayaḥ:* "And because the excluded things are different it follows [absurdly] that the exclusion is different. In that case there would be a continuous connection of innumerable general properties to one particular entity."

[1] The akward position of the negation *na* is motivated by the paraphrase, yasmāt being intended as a gloss on *hi*.

(2)*ghaṭatvā°* conj. : *ghaṭā°* (cf. *bum pa la sogs pa* T) Ms

[539] An example of *vyavacchedavivakṣā* is found in a Sanskrit fragment from Dignāga's no longer extant *Hetumukham* quoted at TSP 385,11-12: *ajñeyaṃ kalpitaṃ kṛtvā tadvyavacchedena jñeye 'numānam:* "By positing what is not knowable as imagined the inference of what is knowable is [performed] by means of exclusion of that."

[540] According to Jinendrabuddhi's explanation Dignāga must have dealt more fully with the crucial concept of *ekadharma* in another treatise, cf. PST Ms B 235a3-5: <u>*ekena sāmānyadharmeṇa vyavacchedasya yā vivakṣā, tayā*</u> *hetubhūtayāpohate. kena kāreṇāpohate? prakaraṇāntaranirdeśāt*(1) *tenaiva* <u>*sāmānyadharmeṇeti vijñā-yate. etad uktam bhavati:* <u>*sāmānyadharmeṇa vyavacchedavivakṣayā prāpitābhe-darūpeṇa*</u>(2) *vṛkṣo na bhavatīti. evaṃ ghaṭādīn vyavacchedyān apohata iti. tato 'siddham ānantyam avṛkṣādeḥ sāmānyarūpasyābhinnatvāt:* "The intention of denoting the excluded by a single general property–i.e. with that (intention) as cause. Whereby does it exclude? According to the description in another treatise one understands that it excludes by means of this only namely by means of the [single] general property. This means: by a general property whose identical form is obtained through the intention of denoting the excluded at the thought 'it is not a tree.' In this way a word excludes objects to be excluded (*vyavacchedyān*) like pots and so on. Therefore infinity [of the things to be excluded] is not established because the form of the general property of non-trees, and so on, is one and the same."

In other words, a negated term like non-tree (*avṛkṣa*) presupposes an observation statement like "x is not a tree (= non-tree)." The negated term non-tree denotes in a general way (*sāmānyena*) all things that are not trees. It is thus clear that the term *avṛkṣa* is secondary and derived from the primary term *vṛkṣa* with the sole intention of denoting all objects to be excluded (*vyavacchedyavivakṣā*) by their shared general property (*sāmānyadharma*), the so-called single property (*ekadharma*), namely that of not being trees whereby they form an aggregate (*samudāya*) of non-trees that is to be excluded. Kumārila addresses the content of PSV V:43b in ŚV Apoha° 61ff: *samudāyātmanā nāpi bhaved eṣām apohyatā, samudāyo hi naikena vinā dharmeṇa jāyate.* He refers twice to the concept of *ekadharma* "single property" in his criticism of the *apoha* thesis without connecting it to Dignāga's concept of *apohyavivakṣā,* which emphasizes the secondary and derivative character of the negated term. Cf. ŚV ibid. 72: *apohyān api cāśvādīn ekadharmānvayād ṛte, na nirūpayituṃ śaktis tatrāpoho na siddhyati.* TS 932 and TSP 367,11-15; TS 1049-50 and TSP 404,17-21.

(1) *°taranirdeśāt* em. : *°tarānirdeśās* Ms
(2) *°rūpeṇa* em. : *°rūpānā* Ms

[541] Jinendrabuddhi refers in his explanation at Ms B 235a6-7 to the pivotal justification of exclusion at PSV V:34: *adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārtha* (PS V:34a) *ity atroktaṃ vijātīye adarśanamātreṇānumānam iti,* and continues explaining: *yo hi yatra <na>*(1) *dṛṣṭaḥ, sa tam apohate. vṛkṣaśabdaś ca svārthābhāve vijātīye na dṛṣ-ṭaḥ. kāraṇābhāve kāryābhāvāt. ataḥ saty apy ānantye 'numitir upapadyate:* "For [the word] excludes that to which it is not observed to apply. And the word 'tree' is not observed to apply to what is dissimilar i.e. where its own referent it not found

because where the cause is not found, [there] the effect is not found. Therefore the result of inference is justified, even though [that which is dissimilar] is infinite."

    [(1)]*na* em., cf. *ma mthoṅ ba* T : om. Ms

[542] That is, the problem that no cognition occurs, cf. PSṬ Ms B 235a7: *pratyayasaṃvṛttyabhāvadoṣaḥ;* cf. the discussion above PSV 43b.

[543] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 235a7-235b1: *yasya hi vidhinā pratyāyanaṃ tasyānvayaḥ pradhānam iti sakalasvajātīyavyāptyā śabdena vartitavyam, etac ca na sambhavati, sajātīyānām ānantyāt, tadavyatirekāc ca jāter iti:* "For joint presence is the primary thing according to someone who is of the opinion that [the word] indicates in an affirmative form. Thus the word is to apply by pervading all the referents that pertain to the kind that is proper to it, and this is not possible because of the infinity of the things belonging to the same class and because the general property is not separated from these."

[544] Cf. the exegesis of the term *tadvyavacchedānumāna* at PSV V:34.

[545] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 235b1-3: *viṣāṇitvam aśvād vyāvartamānam anaśvatvaṃ gamayati. tac ca vastusatsāmānyavādibhir api na kiñcid anaśvatvaṃ nāma sāmān-yaṃ vastusat pratijñātam. ye 'pi te 'naśvā gavādayaḥ, tān api viṣāṇitvaṃ na pratye-kaṃ vyāpnoti; ye 'pi tadvijātīyā aśvās, tān api naiva pratyekam apohate:* "The being horned, as it is excluded from a horse, indicates not being a horse. And concerning this not even those who accept the theory that general properties are real objects claim that not being a horse is a general property that is a real object. Neither does hornedness pervade non-horses such as cows each singly, nor does it exclude horses that are dissimilar from these each singly."
    Dignāga addresses a similar problem in the only surviving Sanskrit fragment from his *Dvādaśaśatikā: yathāha Dvādaśaśatikāyām: yady apy uktam "aprasak-tasya kimartham pratiṣedhaḥ" iti ? naivaitat pratiṣedhamātram ucyate, kin tu tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaranivṛttyā loke gamyate yathā viṣāṇitvād anaśva iti* (qu. NCV Vol 2 548,25-25): "As he claims in the *Dvādaśaśatikā:* Even though it is objected: What purpose does the negation of what is not applicable [e.g., the term *anaśva*] serve? [we answer that] it is not mere negation that is expressed, but rather a certain part of the referent in question is inferred in ordinary language (*loke*) through exclusion of other referents like, for instance, in the inference: it is a non-horse because it is horned."

[546] *re re 'dzin pa* K : *so so la yaṅ 'jug pa ma yin no* V. Since the passage describes to two types of cognitions, I have concluded that K is preferable to V. *'jug pa* translates Sanskrit **anuvṛtti* occurring in the immediately following sentence.

[547] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 235b3-4: *atha ca tato yathā vipakṣavyāvṛttibuddhir bhavati sāmānyena vijātīyatiraskārād aśvo na bhavatīti, anuvṛttibuddhiś cāśvavyāvṛtteṣu gavādiṣu sāmānyākāreṇānaśva iti,* <u>*tathātra*</u> <u>*nyāyaḥ*</u>[(1)]. *śabdo 'pi hi liṅgam. ato*[(2)] *gāvādiśabdād api gavādiṣv anuvṛttibuddhir agavādiṣu ca vyāvṛttibuddhir bhavati:* "And therefore: Just as there is a cognition in terms of exclusion from the *vipakṣa* because of separating it in a general way from dissimilar things viz. [the cognition] 'it is not a horse', as well as a cognition in terms of continuous application in a

general form viz. 'non-horse' with regard to cows, and so on, as excluded from horses, so is the principle in this context. For also the word is an indicator. Therefore the word 'cow', and so on, causes a cognition in terms of continuous application with regard to cows, and so on, and a cognition in terms of exclusion with regard to non-cows, etc."

Cf. the use of terms *anuvṛttipratyaya* and *vyāvṛttipratyaya* in Praśastapāda's PBh §7 and §361ff; the term *vyāvṛttibuddhi* occurs op.cit. §369. Siṃhasūri quotes a related passage from an unknown Vaiśeṣika treatise at NCV 29,22-23: *yathoktam: anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇaṃ sāmānyam, vyāvṛttibuddhihetur viśeṣaḥ iti.*

(1) °*ātra nyāyaḥ* conj. (cf. *de ltar 'dir rigs pa ste* T): °*ā dravyādayaḥ* Ms
(2) *rtags daṅ ldan pa las* T reading *liṅgam ato* Ms as *liṅgamato* sic

[284] *upetyātmāntarābhavam ekānekatvakalpanā | na yuktā vastuni hy eṣā.* Qu. Ms B 236a1.

[548] This interesting paragraph continues addressing the question about what constitutes the excluded referents of a negative term like non-cow if the referents of the positive term cow are defined as identically the same because of non-existence of non-cows in cows. Dignāga responds to an argument by Mādhava, which Jinendrabuddhi quotes at Ms B 235b5-236a1: *"yady ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati, ekaś cātmāntarābhāvaḥ, tataḥ sarvātmāntareṣv eka-pratyayaprasaṅgaḥ. sarvam ekarūpeṇa pratyayena pratīyeta viśeṣaṇasyaikatvāt. yathā śuklatvaviśeṣaṇasyābhinnatvāt kumudādayo 'bhinnākāreṇa pratyayena pratī-yante, śuklaṃ kumudaṃ kundaṃ śaṅkham iti. atha naika ātmāntarābhāvaḥ, tataḥ pratyātmaṃ pratyayanānātvaprasaṅgaḥ śabdavṛttinimittasya bhinnatvāt, śukla-madhurasurabhiśītaṃ kaṇḍam iti yathā. na caitad ubhayam iṣyata iti abhyu-petahānam"* iti: "If the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things and the non-existence of the nature of other things is one, the [absurd] consequence is that there is one cognition about the nature of all the other things. Everything would be cognized by a cognition that has the same form because of the unity of the attribute, just as the white lotus, and so on, is cognized through a notion that has the same form because of the unity of the attribute whiteness as in the statement "the lotus is white, the jasmine is (white), and the mother of pearl is (white)." If, on the other hand, non-existence of the nature of other things is not the same, then the [absurd] consequence is that there is difference of notion for each thing because the cause of application of the word is different as in the statement "sugar is white, sweet, fragrant, and cool." And both [consequen-ces] are unwanted. Therefore (*iti*) you give up what you have assumed."

[285] <*vastu*> hi <*yat sadātma*>(1), <*tasya*> *yuktam*(2) *ekānekatvaṃ kalpayitum, na tu ātmāntarābhāvam*(3) *abhyupetya*>. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236a1-2, q.v. below no. 550.
(1)Cf. *dṅos po yod pa'i bdag ñid can* K : *gal te bdag dṅos po la yod na ni* (sic) V.
(2)Cf. *rigs pa yin gyi* K : *mi rigs so* V.
(3)Cf. *bdag gźan med pa* K : *bdag gźan yod par* V.

[549] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 236a1-2: *vāstavaṃ hy ekānekatvaṃ vastuna eva sambhavati, na tv avastunaḥ. tad arthāntarābhāvam abhyupetya na yuktam ekānekatvaṃ kalpayituṃ:* "For a factually existent identity or difference is only possible of an

entity. Thus it is not justified to imagine identity or difference on the assumption of non-existence of other referents."

[286] *tavāpy avyaktavyaktiṣu tulyaḥ prasaṅgaḥ.* Qu. Ms B 236a2-3.

[287] *<avyakte hi> vikāraśaktīnām aikye vikārabhedo na syāt. nānātve tu pradhānasyaikatvavirodhaḥ śaktibhyo 'nanyatvāt.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236a3-4: *mahadādivikāraśaktīnām aikye kāraṇasyābhinnatvād vikārabhedo na syāt, nānātve tu pradhānasyaikatvavirodhaḥ śaktibhyo 'nanyatvāt.*

[288] *iyaṃ ca śabdavācye 'rthe cintā <nendriyagocare>.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236a6: *iyaṃ ca śabdavācye 'rthe cintetyādi.*

[550] Cf. *'phaṅs* K : *'jug pa* V. Both terms presumably render past participles like *prakṣipta,* cf. the related use of *prakṣepa* PSV V:45, q.v. below no. [289].

[551] Dignāga addresses an objection by Mādhava, which Jinendrabuddhi quotes at Ms B 236a4-6: *yad apy uktaṃ "yady ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati, aindriyakaś cātmāntare pratyaya ity abhāvaḥ śabdādīnām anyatamaḥ prāptaḥ śrotrādigrāhyatvāt. atha śabdādīnāṃ nānyatamaḥ ṣaṣṭhaṃ cāsya grāhakam indriyaṃ astīty etad āpannam, aniṣṭaṃ caitad ubhayam" iti. tasyaidam uttaram:* "Moreover, it is also claimed that 'if the notion of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things and the notion of the nature of one thing is effected by the [visual] sensefaculty, non-existence of any among words, and so on, follows [absurdly] because they [viz. words, and so on,] are cognizable by the ear, etc. If, on the other hand, non-existence of any among word, and so on, does not [follow absurdly], the [absurd] consequence is that it is the sixth sensefaculty [viz. the mind] that cognizes it. And both of these [consequenses] are unwanted." The following is the answer to that statement."

[289] *anirdeśyo hi pratyakṣārthaḥ. "ātmāntarābhāva*[1] *ātmāntaram" iti nirdeś- yam praty uktam. tasmān nāsya pratyakṣe prakṣepaḥ*[2]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236a6-7: *anirdeśyo hi pratyakṣārtha iti ... yad etad uktam ātmāntarābhāva ātmānta- ram iti tan nirdeśyam abhilāpyam artham praty uktam, nendriyagocaram. tasmān nāsya pratyakṣa indriyagocare prakṣepo yuktaḥ.*
[1]Cf. *bdag gźan med pa bdag gźan yin no* V : *bdag ñid gźan la* (sic; the translator appears to have read *ātmāntara* as a sandhi form of the locative *ātmāntare* instead of *ātmāntaram*) *bdag ñid gźan med pa* K.
[2]Cf. *'jug pa* V (= *prakṣepa*) : *ṅes pa* (sic) K, and no.s 547 and 551 above. *bstan par bya ba ni* K : *bstan du med pa'i lta ba na* V probably reproduce the noun phrase *nirdeśyam prati.*

[552] For this axiomatic statement, cf. PS I 5cd: *svasaṃvedyam hy anirdeśyaṃ rūpaṃ indriyagocaraḥ. Hattori* 1968 I. 43; cf. Ms B 236a6: *svasaṃvedyo 'nabhilāpyaḥ. nirdeśyā ca pratītiḥ.*
    The object of sensation is the *svalakṣaṇa,* cf. PSV II.2: *atha kasmād anumānam eva dvidhā bhidyate? yasmāt "svalakṣaṇam anirdeśyam, grāhyabhedāt"* (PS II:2). *bhinnaṃ hi pratyakṣānumayoḥ svātmavad grāhyam. yadi ca <pratyakṣārtho nirdeśyaḥ syāt,> sa tenaiva śabdenānumeyaḥ syāt.* [1]

(1) Restored on the basis of PSṬ Ms B 56a1-56b4.

553 This statement is strikingly similar to the Vaibhāgika's statement of his own view as related by Jinendrabuddhi viz. *ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇīti,* cf. no. 517 above.

[290] *apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ,*(1) *vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate.*
Qu. TSP 363,15-16; Ms B 236a7-236b1 (*pāda* a); cf. 236b2: *ata evāha: vikalpita iti; kiṃkāraṇaṃ vikalpa ityāha: vākyārtha ityādi;* 236b4 (*pāda* c-d).
(1)*vikalpitaḥ* Ms (cf. *rnam par brtags* VK) : *vivecitaḥ* TSP.

554 That is, exclusion of other referents, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b1: *ayam ity anyāpohaḥ.*

555 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b1-2: *katham punar avibhaktāvayavād ekasmād vākyāt padam apoddhartuṃ śakyate? utprekṣitāvayavasārūpyeṇa*(2) *buddhyā vibhajanāt, ata evāha "vikalpita" iti:* "How, moreover, is it possible to abstract the syntactical word from a single sentence from which the [individual] parts are not separated? Because they are separated by the mind in conformity with invented parts precisely therefore he says 'imagined'."
As Jinendrabuddhi's explanation indicates *vikalpita* is = *utprekṣita,* This is corroborated by the parallel expression *utprekṣayā ... vyavasthāpyate* at PSV V:46. The reading *vivecitaḥ* TSP does not make sense in the context since *viveka* or the verb *vi + √vic* is exclusively used of the process of isolating imagined speech units through grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*), cf., e.g., VP II:266ab: *vākyasyārthāt padārthānām apoddhāre prakalpite.*
(1) em. : *tata prekṣitāvayavasārūpeṇa* Ms; T translates as if this term qualify *buddhyā,* cf. T 214,28: *yan lag rab tu brtags pa daṅ tshul mthun pa'i blos.*

556 Ms B 236b1: *apoddhāraḥ pṛthakkaraṇam. kṛtaḥ punar apoddhāro vākyāt.*

557 Cf. Bhartrhari's statement VP II:143: *vicchedagrahaṇe 'rthānāṃ pratibhān-yaiva jāyate, vākyārtha iti tām āhuḥ pādārthair upapāditam.*
Jinendrabuddhi explains the verse at PSṬ Ms B 236b2-3: *kiṃkāraṇaṃ vikalpita ity āha: vākyārtha ityādi. yasmād vākyārthaḥ pratibhāsaṃjñākaḥ tena padārthena prathamam avyutpannānām utpādyate. na hy aviditapadārthaḥ pūrvaṃ dhiyā vākyārtham*(1) *adhigantum utsahate, ato niravayavavākyārthapratipattyupāyatvāt prakṛtipratyayavad vācakatvenāsato 'pi padasyārtha <ut>prekṣyate.*(2) *sā punar vākyārthapratibhā, śrotṛsantānabhāvinī ca yā vākyāc chrotur upajanyate,*(3) *vaktṛ-santānabhāvinī ca yā vākyasya samutthāpikā. tatra pūrvām adhikṛtya "vākyārthaḥ ... upajanyata"* [PS V 46d] *ity etad uktam. vākyārthatvaṃ punaḥ tasyāḥ prayo-jakatvāt, tadarthaṃ hi vaktā vākyaṃ prayuṅkte: "api nāma dhiyā*(4) *vākyāt parasya vākyārthaviṣayā pratibhā syāt." iti yā punar vākyasya samutthāpikā, tāṃ "vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdāv ity atra vakṣyati. vākyārthatvaṃ tu tasyāḥ prameyatvāt, sā hi vākyena kāryaliṅgenānumīyate dhūmenevagniḥ:* "Why is it imagined? He explains: "The referent of the sentence," etc. Since the referent of the sentence technically called intuition at first is caused to arise in those that have not been informed about it by means of the referent of the syntactical word, in that (*hi*)

someone who has no knowledge of the referent of the syntactical word is incapable
of understanding in his mind right away (*pūrvam*) the referent of the sentence;
therefore, since the syntactical word is a means of understanding the partless
sentence referent in the same way as a stem and an affix, its referent is invented,
although the syntactical word is unreal (*asat*) as denoting (*vācaka*) [its referent]."
This intuition as sentence referent, moreover, is both the one that arises in the
listener from the sentence, being attached to the existence continuum of the listener,
and the one that causes the sentence to become manifest, being attached to the
existence continuum of the speaker. Of these [two] (*tatra*) it is explained with regard
to the first mentioned: "Yet, the referent of the sentence which is called intuition
(*pratibhā*) is in the beginning (*ādau*) produced by it [namely the syntactical word]."
Moreover, [the intuition's] being the sentence referent is due to the fact that it
prompts it [i.e. intuition]. For a speaker applies a sentence to that purpose, thinking:
"Hopefully the other will get in his mind an intuition concerning the referent of the
sentence." Moreover, the one [i.e. intuition] that causes the sentence to become
manifest he is going to explain in the statement "only (*eva*) the sentence and its
referent are the principal speech unit and the principal referent." However, [the
intuition's] being the sentence referent is due to the fact that it is an object of
cognition, for it is inferred from the sentence as an indicator of its effect, just as fire
[is infered] from smoke."

   [1] em. (cf. *blos ṅag gi don* T) : *dhīvākṣārtham* Ms
   [2] em. (cf. *brtags* T) : *padasyārthavata prekṣyate* Ms
   [3] em. : *uparśayate* Ms
   [4] conj. : *dīpād* Ms (cf. *ṅag gi sgron ma las* sic T).

   [291] *padasyāsato <'pi>*[1] *vākyād apoddhṛtasya yathāgamaṃ utprekṣayārtho
vyavasthāpyate kevalasyāprayogāt prakṛtipratyayavat. sā cotprekṣānyeṣv āgameṣv
ayuktārthagrahaṇī*[2]. *tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam, <yasmād*[3] *ādāv ana-
bhyastaśabdārthasambandhānām padārthagrahaṇopāyā*[4] *vākyārthapratibhā>.*
Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b6-237a7: *padasyāsata*[5] *iti ... tasya padasya vākyāt
kāryārtham apoddhṛtasya yathāgamam utprekṣayārtho vyavasthāpyata iti ... keva-
lasyāprayogād iti ... prakṛtipratyayavad iti ... sā cotprekṣetyādi ... asmād āgamād
anyeṣv āgameṣv ayuktārthagrāhaṇī ... tasmād idam arthāntaram yuktimad utkṣip-
tam.*
   [1] Cf. *kyaṅ* KV, Ms B 236b3: *asato 'pi padasya,* cf. no. 553 above;
   [2] *ayuktārthagrahaṇī* qualifies *utprekṣā;* K translates as if *ayukta* qualifies
utprekṣā, cf. *ñe bar dpyod pa de yaṅ ... don 'dzin pa mi rigs pa'i phyir;* V is
syntactically ambiguous as it does not translate *artha,* cf. *luṅ nas bźag pa de yaṅ ...
mi rigs par 'dzin pa'i phyir.* Both versions appear to reproduce *tasmāt* by means of
phyir, which is incompatible with the syntax of the *pratīka* quoted in PSṬ ad loc. T
reproduces correctly the compound as *mi rigs pa'i don 'dzin pa.*
   [3] Cf. *gaṅ gi phyir* KT : *de'i phyir* V.
   [4] Cf. *tshig gi don 'dzin pa'i thabs can* T.
   [5] em. : *yadasyāsata* Ms

   558 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b6-237a1 quoting VP I:81: *padasyāsata iti vācaka-
tvenāsataḥ. yato vākyam eva mukhyaḥ śabdaḥ tasyaivārthena sambandhād vācaka-
tvaṃ, na padānāṃ, varṇavad vyavahārāṅgena vākyārthena śūnyatvāt. yad āha:
"asataś cāntarāle yān śabdān astīti manyate, pratipattur aśaktiḥ sā grahaṇopāya*

eva sa" (VP I:85) *iti:* "the syntactical word being unreal" means being unreal as denoting [its referent]. Since only the sentence is the principal speech unit, that alone has the property of denoting on account of its relation to the thnig meant, but not the syntactical words because like the phonemes they are empty of the meaning of the sentence as a part of discourse. As [Bhartṛhari] explains: And [the listener] who thinks of the speech units that are unreal in the interval[1] [between a first element heard and the grasping of an entire sound, word or sentence] as real,[2] this is the listeners incapacity. It is only a means of apprehension (VP I 85)."

[1] Cf. no. 567 below.
[2] Cf. VPV 152,1: *astitvenābhimanyante.*

[559] The introductory clause is particularly interesting because Dignāga introduces the technical term *utprekṣā,* which plays an important role in Bhartṛhari's VP and VPV. Bhartṛhari's commentator, Vṛṣabhadeva, explains *tarka,* which is mentioned together with *āgama* and *anumāna* at VPV I 10,4, as *liṅgam antareṇa svayam-utprekṣāpratibhānaṃ tarkaḥ,* cf. VPV I 10,20. It is thus clear that *utprekṣā* is used to denote invention as not dependent upon an inferential indicator (*liṅga*) like in inference (*anumāna*). Although Bhartṛhari rarely uses it, its importance appears from a central passage at VPV I 65,1-6 (ad VP I:24), which undoubtedly must have been known to Dignāga because his own formulation would seem to imitate it (cf. *Pind* 2003): *tatrāpoddhārapadārtho nāmātyantasaṃsṛṣṭaḥ saṃsargād anumeyena parikalpitena rūpeṇa prakṛtivekaḥ sann apoddhriyate. praviviktasya hi tasya vastuno vyavahārātītaṃ rūpam. tat tu svapratyayānukāreṇa yathāgamam bhāvanā-bhyāsavaśād utprekṣayā prāyeṇa vyavasthāpyate*[1]. *tathaiva cāpravibhāge śabdāt-mani kāryārtham anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ rūpasamanugamakalpanayā samudāyād apoddhṛtānāṃ śabdānām abhidheyatvenāśriyate:* "Now, what is called the referent of the syntactical word obtained by means of abstraction, is abstracted from its connection [with the other syntactical words] although it is closely connected [with them], its separation [from them] being accomplished in an inferred conceptually constructed form. For the form of this object in its isolated state is beyond common usage. In general, however, it is defined by way of invention in accordance with one's own ideas, under the influence of residual memory traces due to repeated practice according to this or that *āgama.* And thus in the segmentless speech unit it is taken as the denotable object of the speech units as isolated from their aggregate through grammatical analysis by way of constructing conceptually the recurrence of their form through joint presence and joint absence for the sake of the grammatical operations."

It is thus clear that for Bhartṛhari invention in this particular context is similar to systematic deliberation, which involves the inductive process of generalisation through joint presence and joint absence. Notice Bhartṛhari's use of the term *svapratyaya,* which Dignāga introduces in the following kārikā PS V:47.

Another parallel occurs at NCV 549,2-3: *vākyārthapratipattyupāyaḥ padārtho 'san vākyād apoddhṛtya utprekṣayā vyākhyāyate:* "The meaning of the syntactical word that is a means of cognizing the meaning of the sentence is explained by way of deliberation, having abtracted it from the sentence."

The term *utprekṣā* occurs once at VP III 241c, where it appears to denote the action of imagining (something unreal), cf. Helarāja Vol. I 180,9-10 ad VP III.2:86: *evam "aṅgulyagre kariyūthaśatam āsta" ityādi cotprekṣayābhidhīyamānaṃ dṛśyate.*

In his criticism of Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language at NC 581,1f, Mallavādi states immediately after quoting VP II:129-31 that according to Bhartṛhari the referent of a speech unit is grasped by means of *darśana,* a particular doctrine or *utprekṣā,* deliberation. Siṃhasūri explains that it is grasped as the denotable object by means of the doctrine about primordial materiality (*pradhāna*), and so on, or by the deliberation of a person, cf. NCV 581,21ff: *darśanotprekṣābhyām ityādi: pradhānādidarśanena puruṣasya utprekṣāyā vārtham abhidheyatvena upagrahya.*

Bhartṛhari is also using the verb *utprekṣate* at VP II:236 in the sense of 'to think up' i.e., 'to deliberate.' Since PS V 46 describes exclusion of other [referents] as imagined *vikalpitaḥ,* the parallel statement of the *vṛtti* that the "referent of the syntactical word is determined by way of deliberation" would indicate that *utprekṣā* in this particular context is used of a similar type of conceptualisation of the reference of individual speech units. It would seem from Dignāga's subsequent rejection of the use of deliberation in other traditions as not founded on justified procedures that he is using it with the background of Bhartṛhari's view of induction through joint presence and absence. Exclusion of other [referents] as a means of positing the referent of any given speech unit is ultimately based upon the inductive procedure of joint presence and joint absence (v. PS V:34 above), which could be described as an instance of *tarka* as suggested by Vṛṣabhadeva's gloss. But in contrast to the grammatical tradition represented by Bhartṛhari, the Dignāgan version of this procedure emphasises the predominance of joint absence over joint presence. In the passage from VPV quoted above Bhatṛhari refers expressly to *anvyayavyatireka* as the means of positing thought up speech units as referents for the sake of explaining the relevant grammatical operations. It seems therefore clear that he uses *utprekṣā* along with *kalpanā* to describe the nature of this procedure, one he himself endorses elsewhere in VP as a natural extension of its use in Mahābhāṣya, e.g., at VP II:166: *ye śabdā nityasambandhā jñātaśaktayaḥ, anvaya-vyatirekābhyāṃ teṣām artho vibhajyate.* This procedure, however, introduces speech units that although valuable in *śāstra*ic discourse are ultimately thought up, cf. *svavṛtti* 249,6-8 ad VP II:233: *iha sarveṣv eva śāstreṣu trayyāntavādino manyante: sarvaśaktim artham utprekṣayā pravibhajyāvidyām anuvartayanto prāyeṇa pṛthak tīrthapravādāḥ pratāyante.* In these circumstances it is understandable why Dignāga introduces the concept of *utprekṣā* and at the same time describes the referent defined by means of *apoddhāra* as imagined.

[1]Cf. Paddhati 65,20-21: *etad āha: taṃ tam āgamam āśṛtya tadabhyāsāt svayam pratyayam anugacchanta utprekṣayā vyavasthāpayantīti.*

560 Cf. *ñe bar dpyad nas* K : om. V.

561 As opposed to other traditions according to which the particulars, the general property, the relation, and the general property possessor are the referents of the syntactical word, cf. PST Ms B 237a1-2: *yasya (scil. padasya) ya āgamaḥ: keṣāṃ cid bhedā vācyāḥ, padasyārtha ity āgamaḥ,* [1] *pareṣāṃ jātir, anyeṣāṃ sambandhaḥ, keṣāṃ cit tadvad iti.*

[1] This phrase appears to be misplaced. T reads *gaṅ gi luṅ gaṅ yin pa 'ga' źig rnams kyis (sic) brjod par bya ba tha dad pa'i tshig gi don can no źes pa luṅ ste,* which does not reproduce the syntax of the Sanskrit version. It should probably follow the phrase, *keṣāṃ cit tadvad iti.* The passage as a whole would then read:

yasya (scil. padasya) ya āgamaḥ: keṣāṃ cid bhedā vācyāḥ, pareṣāṃ jātir, anyeṣāṃ sambandhaḥ, keṣāṃ cit tadvad iti padasyārtha ity āgamaḥ.

[562] As an example of the impossibility of using a syntactical word in isolation Jinendrabuddhi quotes a version of an often quoted vārttika stating that when no other syntactical verb is heard, 3. sg. pr. of the root √as 'to be, to exist' is understood. The quotation is followed by the citation of VP II:271. It is interesting in this particular context that the explanation is related to similar statements in VPV I 65,7ff (ad VP I:24), cf. Ms 237a2-3: *laukikāt viprayogāc chabdānām artho nirdhāryate. na ca loke kevalasya padasya prayogo 'sti. "yatrāpi hy anyat kriyāpa-dam na śrūyate vṛkṣaḥ plakṣa iti, tatrāpy astir bhavantīparaḥ prathamapuruṣo*[1] *'prayujyamāno 'stīti gamyate*[2]*." tathā coktaṃ "yac ca ko 'yam iti praśne gaur aśva iti cocyate, praśna eva kriyā tatra prakrāntā darśanād<ike">*[3] (VP II:271) *ti:* "The referent of speech units is ascertained by departing from common usage; for among people a syntactical word is not used in isolation. For even when a different syntactical word denoting an action is not heard like in the statement "plakṣa is a tree,"[4] even in that case, without the the verb AS being applied in present, first person singular, one understands "is;" and similarly it is said: and when someone answers the question "what is that" by saying "a cow" or "a horse," an action like observing is resorted to in the question (VP II:271)."

[1] em. : °*puruṣe* Ms

[2] Cf. the discussion at Mahābhāṣya Vol. I 443,5-8 on vārtt 11 ad A II 3:1 as well as Kaiyaṭa's statement at Mahābhāṣyapradīpa Vol. V 402,6-7: *anye tu varṇayanti: yatra kriyāpadaṃ na śrūyate tatrāstir bhavantīparaḥ prathamapuruṣo 'prayujyamāno 'py astī ti gamyata iti.*

[3] em. : °*ād iti* Ms (cf. *mthoṅ ba'i phyir* T).

[4] The discussion evidently centres on the syntactical peculiarity of nominal sentences like "*plakṣa* (is) a tree," in which no verb is expressly stated, and addresses the rationale of supplementing copula. Bhartṛhari reinterprets the discussion in the light of his metaphysics of being, cf. VPV I 66,2-3: *yāvac cāpavāda-bhūtāḥ kriyāviśeṣāḥ śabdapravṛttikāraṇam astitvam na nivartayanti tāvad astir bhavantīparaḥ prathamapuruṣo 'prayujyamāno 'pi vṛkṣādibhiḥ padair ākṣiptaḥ pratīyate.*

[563] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 236b4-6: *padavādino hi padam avidyamānaprakṛtyādivibhā-gam arthe prayujyate. prakṛtipratyayau tu kevalam padārtham āśrīyete, na tu kevalau prayujyete. na cāprayujyamānayoḥ sattvam avadhārayituṃ śakyam. ato na sta eva tau. tathāpi yathā tayor artha utprekṣayocyate tathā padasya:* "For according to some who adheres to the idea of the syntactical word, the syntactical word in which there is no division into stem and affix is applied to the referent. Stem and affix, however, rely merely on the meaning of the syntactical word, they are not applied alone; and it is impossible to decide upon the existence of the two, when they are not applied [alone]. Therefore they do not exist. Nevertheless, their referent is told by means of invention,[1] in the same way as [the referent] of the syntactical word;" cf. the discussion of *kevalasyāprayogaḥ* at Mahā-bh I 219,10-18 (vārt 7-8); VP II:194ab: *pratyayo vācakatve 'pi kevalo na prayujyate* (cf. *vyapekṣāpadasya kevalasyāprayogāt*, ct. ad loc.).

[1]The fact that Jinendrabuddhi is using the term *utprekṣā* in this context supports the above conclusion (cf. no. 560 above) that it denotes deliberation by means of

anvaya and *vyatireka*. In fact, Patañjali introduces the description of how to determine the denotation of any given affix by means of joint presence and joint absence immediately after having addressed the question at Mahā-bh loc. cit. of whether or not it is meaningful to talk about referents of affixes that do not exist apart from the syntactical word.

⁵⁶⁴ KV translates this compound differently, v. no. **[291]** above.

⁵⁶⁵ That is, in other traditions than the present one, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a6: *asmād āgamād anyeṣv āgameṣu.* Jinendrabuddhi quotes PS V 2a as an illustration of the unjustified views about the referent current in other schools, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a7: *yathā tathoktaṃ "na jātiśabdo bhedānām" ityādinā.*

⁵⁶⁶ That is, exclusion of other referents, which is based upon systematic and logical thinking (*yukti*), cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a7: *yuktimad ... anyāpohākhyam.* As an example of the logical thinking involved in exclusion of other referents Jinendra-buddhi continues quoting PS V:34: *yuktimattvaṃ cāsya pratipāditam "adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe"* (lacuna in Ms B corresponding to text translated in T 216,6-33, ending with *brjod ʾdod kyaṅ ʾphen te = vivakṣāpy ākṣipyate* Ms B 237a7-237b1).

⁵⁶⁷ This clause explains according to T 216,7 the purpose of the imagined referent of the syntactical word ([*vi*]*kalpitapadārthaprayojanam*).

⁵⁶⁸ Cf. T 216,16-20: Those who have not repeatedly experienced the connection between the word and its referent (**anabhyastaśabdārthasambandhāḥ*) they cognize the referent of the sentence as having as its means the apprehension of the referent of the syntactical word. But those who happen to be knowledgeable about the meaning of the sentence due to repeated experience of the connection between the word and its referent (**śabdārthasambandhābhyāsāt*), their intuition, which is concerned with a sentence referent without parts, is due to a partless sentence only."

[292] *vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthau, tayor abhinnatvāt. <yas tv anyas tadantarāle*⁽¹⁾ *śabdārthagrahaṇābhimānaḥ, sa utprekṣayā, niraṅkuśatvāt>*⁽²⁾. Restored, cf. Ms B 236b6: *vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthāv*⁽³⁾ *ity atra vakṣyati;* YD 96,21: *vākyam eva*⁽⁴⁾ *tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthau, tayor abhin-natvāt*⁽⁴⁾.
⁽¹⁾Cf. *de'i naṅ nas* K : *phyis* (sic) V.
⁽²⁾As it appears from Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase at T 216,26-29, he quotes this clause interspersed with glosses. For Sanskrit parallels to *niraṅkuśatvāt,* cf. no.s 574-75 below.
⁽³⁾°*ārthāv* em. (cf. *sgra'i don* T) : *śabdau ity* Ms
⁽⁴⁾So read; KPD *evaṃ ca,* A *eca,* ed. *ekaṃ ca;*
⁽⁵⁾So read with Dkha, ed. *abhinnārthatvāt* (cf. *tha mi dad pa'i phyir* K : *tha dad med pa'i phyir* V).

⁵⁶⁹ Cf. Kaiyaṭa's similar explanation of Patañjali's definition of the meaning of a sentence (cf. Mbh I 218,10: *eṣāṃ padānāṃ sāmānye vartamānānāṃ yadviśeṣe 'vasthānaṃ sa vākyārthaḥ*) at Mahā-bh-P Vol. II 60,13f: *yadviśeṣe pādārthasaṃsar-garūpe vākyārtha ity arthaḥ. ata eva vākyam eva mukhyaḥ śabdaḥ, vākyārtha eva*

mukhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ. Dignāga refers briefly at PSV II:4c to those who assert that only the sentence is a speech unit, evidently with Bhartṛhari's standpoint in mind, cf. no. 2 above.

[570] Cf. T 216,24-26: "The syntactical words, and so on, are not like segments (*bhāgabhūtāḥ*) in the sentence, nor are the referents of the syntactical words [like segments] in the referent of the sentence because they are invented (*utprekṣitatvāt*). Their referent is like the referent of a stem and an affix."

[571] That is, "the interval between a first element heard and the grasping of an entire sound, word or sentence," cf. *Cardona* 1999: 314 no. 165. Dignāga evidently has VP I:85 in mind, q.v. above no. 559.

[572] Cf. T 216,26-28: "The other belief in apprehending a speech unit (*śabdagra-haṇābhimānaḥ*) in the syntactical nominal (*pade*) and a referent of the speech unit in the syntactical nominal is mistaken" (*viparītaḥ*).

[573] That is, *utprekṣā* is an independent unstoppable mental force capable of conjuring up entities like "a hundred herds of elephants sitting on the tip of a finger," cf. VP III.2:86 (with Helarāja's VPP Vol. I p. 180,9 ad loc.): *avastuṣv api notprekṣā kasya cit pratibadhyate,* which Dignāga obviously has in mind. It is remarkable in this context that the Tibetan version of Dignāga's *Traikālyaparīkṣā,* which largely consists of verses lifted from VP III.2, omits this verse. Jinendra-buddhi comments at T 216,29f: "The meaning is 'because it is self-dependent' (*svātantryāt*); and its selfdependence is due to its not being dependent upon a referent; and for this very reason it is impossible to stop it when it is found to venture beyond real things (*vastu*)."

It has not been possible to trace similar statements about the nature of *utprekṣā* to Bhartṛhari's VPV I or the fragmentary VPV II, but Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II.1.3:11, offers a striking parallel to Dignāga's description of *utprekṣā* as unfettered: *yasmān nirāgamāḥ puruṣotprekṣāmātranibandhanās tarkā apratiṣṭhitā bhavanti, utprekṣāyā niraṅkuśatvāt.* The vocabulary and the sceptical attitude towards the validity of *tarka* is reminiscent of Bhartṛhari; interestingly Vacaspati's Bhāmatī ad loc. quotes Bhartṛhari's VP I:34, which places Śaṅkara's vocabulary in the context of the Vedānta tradition to which Bhartṛhari sometimes refers, e.g., in the crucial passage at VPV II 249,6ff in which the concept of *utprekṣā* occupies a prominent place.

[574] Cf. *lcags kyu med pa yin pa'i phyir ro* V : *lcags kyu med pa'i phyir ro* K : *lcags kyu med pa ñid kyi phyir* T, which translates Sanskrit *niraṅkuśatvāt,* cf. Mhvyut 4981 and Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II.3:11 q.v. no. 573 above.

[293] <ye 'py artheṣu> pratibhām hitvā anyam bāhyam artham <tatsam-bandhaṃ>[(1)] vā vākyārthaṃ kalpayanti, teṣām api tat kalpanāmātram. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b1.: <u>pratibhām vivakṣāṃ ca hitvety arthaḥ. tato 'nyam bāhyam artham gavādikaṃ, bāhyārthānāṃ sambandham</u> <vā>[(2)], <u>parasparopakāralak-ṣaṇaṃ (vāky)ārthaṃ</u>[(3)] <u>kalpayanti, teṣām api tat kalpanāmātram.</u>

(1)Cf. *de daṅ ’brel pa* V (Ms B 237b3: *tato na bāhyo ’rthaḥ* tatsambandho vā *vākyārtha upapadyate*) : *’brel pa* K.
(2)*vā* em., cf. *’am* T 216,35: om. Ms; cf., however, Ms B 237b3 above.
(3)*vākyā°* conj. (cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b3 above): *śabdā°* Ms

575 Ms B 237b1.: *gavādikam;* cf. VP II:132: *yo vārtho buddhiviṣayo bāhyavastunibandhanaḥ, sa bāhyavastv iti jñātaḥ śabdārtha iti gamyate.*(1)
(1)The ct. attributed to Puṇyarāja comments upon this verse in the light of Dharmakīrti's philosophy, cf. PVSV pp. 38-39.

576 That is, the connection that is characterized by the mutual assistance of the external referents, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b 1.: *bāhyārthānāṃ sambandhaṃ <vā>*(1) *parasparopakāralakṣaṇam.* The emphasis is probably on the co-operation of the external referents as means of realisation (*sādhana*) of a particular action; cf. Jinendrabuddhi's remarks at Ms B 62a5-6 on the statement *vākyam eva śabdaḥ,* q.v. above no. 2. Cf. NMañj 300,11: *anye vāstavaḥ padārthānām parasparasaṃsargo bāhya eva vākyārtha ity āhuḥ.*
(1)Cf. no. [293] above.

577 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237a1: *niryuktikam arthaśūnyam ity arthaḥ.*

[294] *yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate, svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā.* Qu. YD 75,5-6, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b2: *yathābhyāsaṃ hītyādi ... svapratyayānukāreṇeti.*

578 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b2: *yo yo ’bhyāso yathābhyāsam.*

579 Pāda d *pratipattir anekadhā* is lifted from VP II:134: *yathendriyasannipatad vaicitryeṇopadarśakam, tathaiva śabdād arthasya pratipattir anekadhā;* cf. ŚV Vākyādhikaraṇa 325cd-326ab: *pratibhānekadhā puṃsāṃ yady apy artheṣu jāyate, tathāpi bāhya evārthas tasya vākyasya ceṣyate.*

580 PS V 47c *svapratyayānukāreṇa* is identical with VP II:135c. Dignāga undoubtedly uses the term in the same sense as Bhartṛhari who applies it in the sense of 'own idea,' cf. VP II:135: *vaktrānyathaiva prakrānto bhinneṣu pratipattṛṣu, svapratyayānukāreṇa śabdārthaḥ pravibhajyate:* "The denotation to which a speaker has resorted in another way is differentiated among different listeners in accordance with their own ideas." Puṇyarāja explains ad loc.: *tathā vaiśeṣikeṇāvayavinam pratipādayituṃ ghaṭaśabdaḥ prayuktaḥ sāṅkhyair guṇasāmaharamātram abhimanyate, jainasaugataiḥ paramāṇusañcayamātram iti:* "For instance, the word 'pot' that is applied by a Vaiśeṣika to make people understand that it is a whole consisting of parts, is considered by the Sāṅkhyas to be a mere aggregate of the *guṇas,* by the Jains and Buddhists a mere collection of atoms." This explanation is corroborated by Vṛṣabhadeva's Paddhati 199,17-8 (on VPV I 199,4: *pratipattir upapadyate*): *yathā vaiśeṣikasya ghaṭaśrutāv avayavini pratipattir apareṣāṃ saṅghamātre.* Vṛṣabhadeva mentions *svapratyaya* as a factor in the listener's decoding of a sentence at Paddhati 75,7-8: *sa hi pratipattā krameṇārtham pratipadyamānaḥ svapratyayānusāreṇa śabdagatām abhidhāṃ kramavatīṃ vyavasthāpayati:* "For the listener who understands the referent progressively in

accordance with his own ideas establishes that the denotation inherent in the speech unit involves progression."

The term *svapratyaya* in the sense of 'own idea' is also found at Mahāyanasūtrālaṅkāra I 20: *yathārute 'rthe parikalpyamāne, svapratyayo hānim upaiti buddheḥ:* "When the referent is imagined according to the word that expresses it, one's own ideas ruins one's understanding." Vasubhandhu's gloss *svapratyaya iti svayandṛṣṭiparāmarśakaḥ:* "*svapratyaya* means reflection upon one's own views," leaves no doubt about the meaning.

Jinendrabuddhi, on the other hand, interprets *svapratyaya* in the sense of 'own cause' which he understands as a *vāsanā,* i.e., a 'latent impression' whose substrate is *vijñāna,* explaining that in conformity with this cause a cognition of different aspects arises in conformity with repeated practice [in a former existence] even without an outer referent. Consequently it is not justified to assume that the meaning of a sentence is the outer referent or its relation [with another referent], cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b2-3: *svapratyayo vijñānādhārā vāsanā tadanurūpyeṇa vināpi bāhyenārthena yato yathābhyāsam pratipattir anekākārotpadyate, tato na bāhyo 'rthaḥ tatsambandho vā vākyārtha upapadyate.*

[295] <*asaty api bāhye 'rthe*> *vākyāt svapratyayānurūpyeṇārthābhyāsavasanā-pekṣā- rthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate*[(1)] *vikalpaś ca,*[(2)] *vyāghrādiśrutivat. tadaviśeṣe vā*[(3)] *śṛṅgarakāvyasya śravaṇād rāgiṇāṃ rāgānurūpā pratītir bhavati, vītarāgāṇāṃ tu vegānurūpā.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b4-238a1: <u>*arthābhyāsa-vāsanā tadapekṣā tannimittārthakriyāpratipattiḥ nānārūpotpadyate,*</u> ... *vākyasya vāsanāprabodhanimittatāṃ darśayituṃ vākyād ity uktam. svapratyayānurūpyeṇeti* ... *vyāghrādiśrutivad iti* ... <u>*tadaviśeṣe vā vākyārthasyāviśeṣeṣv arthakriyāprati-pattir*</u>[(4)] <u>*vikalpaś cotpadyata iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ. śṛṅgarakāvyasya śravaṇād iti.*</u> ... *abhinne 'pi vastuni* <u>*rāgiṇāṃ rāgānurūpā pratītir bhavati*</u> *manojñākāratvāt,* <u>*vītarāgāṇāṃ tu saṃvegānurūpā.*</u>

[(1)] For a similar phrase, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b4-5: *arthakriyām pratipattā yayā pratibhayotpannayā pratipadyate sārthakriyāpratipattir* <u>*nānārūpotpadyate.*</u>

[(2)] Cf. the above syntactical remark: <u>*vikalpaś cotpadyata iti prakṛtena samban-dhaḥ,*</u> which shows that the phrase *vikalpaś ca* must have been an integral part of the original formulation of the preceding sentence that applies similarly to the subject matter of the following one. The proposed restoration is corroborated by K and V, although the latter confuses the argument completely by taking *tadaviśeṣe* as part of the phrase, presumably because of a wrong punctuation, cf. *rnam par rtog pa sna tshogs pa skyed par byed do* V : *don bya ba* (so read : *don* K, cf. *don byed pa ltar rtogs pa* V) *rtogs pa'i rtog pa* K.

[(3)] K reproduces *vā* by *yaṅ.*

[(4)] *arthakriyā°* em. (*don bya ba* T) : *kriyā°* Ms

[581] Cf. the analogous expression at ŚV Apoha° 40ab: *asaty api ca bāhye 'rthe vākyārthapratibhā tathā, padārthe 'pi tathaiva syāt kim apohaḥ prakalpyate.*

[582] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b4-5: *arthakriyām pratipattā yayā pratibhayotpannayā pratipadyate sārthakriyāpratipattir* <u>*nānārūpotpadyate.*</u> [(1)]

The intimate connection between *pratibhā* and *arthakriyā* is also stressed by Bhartṛhari, cf. VPV I 75,4: *arthakriyāviṣayā pratibhā* (ad VP I:24-26): "*pratibhā* 'intuition' has purposeful action as its domain."

[1]Cf. no. [295] above.

583 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b5-6: *yasya yādṛśī vāsanā tasya tadanurūpaiva pratibho-pajāyata ity arthaḥ.*

584 Repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) is mentioned by Bhartṛhari as one of the six causes of *pratibhā,* cf. VP II:152; cf. *Iyer* 1969: 88ff.

585 Cf. Bhartṛhari's description, at VPV I (ad VP I:113) 186,5 foll., of how the impulses and dispositions that the use of language leaves in babies in their former lives determine their cognitions relative to this or that purposeful action: *samāviṣṭa-vācāṃ ca svajātiṣu bālānām api pūrvaśabdāveśabhāvānāsaṃskārādhānāt tāsu tāsv arthakriyāsv anākhyeyaśabdanibandhanā pratipattir utpadyate.*
   YD 75,8-9: *yena hi yo 'rtho 'bhyastaḥ sukhāditvena tasya vināpi tenārthena śabdamātrāt pratipattir utpadyate:* "The cognition of someone about a referent he has learnt from repeated practice to be pleasant, and so on, arises from the mere word even without the referent."

586 Dignāga's formulation is similar to Bhartṛhari's statement at VPV I 199,3-4: *pratipuruṣaṃ tu bhāvanānuvidhāyinī saty asati vārthe svapratyayānukāreṇa bhinna-rūpā śabdebhyaḥ pratipattir upapadyate:* "It is rather the case that for each person words give rise to different cognitions of the referent irrespective of whether it exists or not, [cognitions] that reflect his *bhāvanā* [i.e., the residual traces left by usage in former lives of the said person][1] in accordance with his own ideas."
   See *Pind* 2003.
   [1]For the concept of *bhāvanā,* cf. *Iyer* 1969: 90ff. *Biardeau* 1964: 317-18; 333-34.

587 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b6-7: *asaty api vyāghre vyāghras tiṣṭhatīty ukte vyāghrasādhanasthānakriyāpratibhāsā pratītir upajāyate. ādiśabdena nadyastīre guḍaśakaṭaṃ paryastam ityādi grahaṇam:* "Although there is no tiger, when it is said 'a tiger is near by' a cognition arises that is reflected as the means [of effecting an action] viz. a tiger and the action of standing near by. By the word 'etc.' is meant [statements] like 'a wagon load of molasses lies overturned at the river bank.'"
   Cf. NCV 548,2–549,1: *śabdābhyāsavāsanājanitārtheṣu pratibhā vākyebhyo jāyate tiraścāṃ manuṣyāṇāṃ[1] ca yathābhyāsaṃ svajātiniyatā svapratyayānukāre-ṇa[2] śūrakātarādīnām iva vyāghrādiśabdaśravaṇāt kopaharṣabhayādinimittetyādi yathāvad[3] anugantavyam:* "In animals and human beings an intuition that is restricted to their own class in accordance with practice and according to their own ideas arises from sentences about referents that are generated by latent impressions due to verbal practice. As for instance, that of heroes or cowards, which because of hearing the expression 'the tiger [is here]', and so on, are motivated by anger, excitement, or fear, etc."
   [1]Cf. VP II:117.
   [2]Cf. VPṬ II 57,18-19: *tena pratiniyatajātyanusāreṇaiva niyataiva kācit pratibhā prabodhyate.*
   [3]YD 75,9-11: *tadyathā vyāghro 'tra prativasatīty ukte vināpi bāhyenārthenā-bhyāsavaśād eva svedavepathuprabhṛtayo bhavanti:* "For instance, when someone says "a tiger is living here," such things as sweat and trembling arise merely because

of practice [with regard to the referent of the sentence], even without the outer referent;" cf. ibid. 76,9-10 which apears to paraphrase Dignāga's statement: *arthā-bhyāsavāsanāpekṣāsatsv api vyāghrādiṣu pratipattir utpadyata iti:* "A cognition about tigers and so on arises, although they are non-existent, dependent upon the latent impressions [that result] from repeated practice [in a former existence]."

The example of the tiger is also mentioned by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his criticism of the concept of *pratibhā* at NMañj 335,28-30: *yo 'pi vyāghra āyāta ity ukte śūra-kātaranarādhikaraṇanānāprakārakāryotpādaḥ sa bāhye 'rthe vyāghrāgamanādau pratipanne vāsanānusārena bhavan, na pratibhāmātrahetuko bhavati;* cf. op.cit. 336,2-3: *tathā śabdārthe 'pi vyāghrāgamane 'vagate śurāṇām utsahāḥ katarāṇām bhayam ityādi kāryam bhavati.*

Kumārila alludes to it at ŚV Vākyā° 329cd-330ab: *anekākāratā yāpi śūra-bhīrudhiyam prati vāsanānugrahāt soktā kuṇapādimater iva;* cf., although in a different context, VP II:321: *vyāghrādivyapadeśena yathā nivartyate asatyo 'pi tathā kaścit pratyavāyo vidhīyate.*

⁵⁸⁸ That is, the referent of the sentence, cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b7: *vākyārthasyāviśeṣeṣu.* The author of YD explains the determining force of the *vāsanā*s on the way in which individuals interpret the same utterance by alluding to the well-known example of a woman that gives rise to different ideas depending upon whether it is a lover, an ascetic, or a dog that is "thinking" of her, cf. op.cit. 75,1-3: *āha yo 'nādau saṃsāre devamanuṣyatiraścām*⁽¹⁾ *abhinne 'rthe bāhye stryādau pratyaye pūrvābhyāsavāsanāpekṣaḥ kuṇapakāminībhakṣyādyākārabhinna-pratyaya itikartavyatāṅgam utpadyate sā hi pratibhā.*

Kumārila alludes to the same example in the pūrvapakṣa of ŚV Śūnya° 58-61cd: *nakṣatraṃ tārakā tiṣyo dārā ityevamādiṣu | naikatrārthe viruddhatvāl liṅgānekatva-sambhavaḥ, parivrāṭkāmukaśunāṃ kuṇapādimatis tathā;* cf. the rebuttal introducing the term *svapratyayānukāra* at 215ab-216ab: *kuṇapādimatau caivaṃ sārvarūpye vyavasthite vāsanāḥ sahakāriṇyo vyavasthākāradarśane. svapratyayānukāro hi bahvākāreṣu vastuṣu.*

It is also mentioned by Dharmakīrti at PVSV 32,6-7: *yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe 'pi kuṇapakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ,* and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa at NMañj 335,32–336,3: *yathāvasthite vanitātmani bāhye 'rthe vāsanānusāreṇa kuṇapa iti kāminīti bhak-ṣyam iti pratibhā bhavanti.*

The fixed order of the examles presupposes that they were quoted from a verse text, as the three terms *kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhakṣya* constitute a *śloka pāda* like *parivrāṭkāmukaśunāṃ* quoted by Kumārila. This being the case, Bodhicittavivaraṇa 20 seems to be a likely source, as *parivrāṭkāmukaśunāṃ ekasyāṃ pramādatanau kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhakṣya iti tisro vikalpanāḥ* is meant to illustrate the statement of verse 19 that there are different views about an object in the outer world (**bāh-yārtha*) that has one and the same appeearance (**ekākāra*), which is the subject matter of this paragraph.

⁵⁸⁹ Cf. PSṬ Ms B 237b7-238a1: *adharapayodharādisaṃvarṇanāvākyaśravaṇāt:* "From hearing sentences in which lips and breasts, or the like, are eulogized."

[296] *sāpi vākyāntarārthebhyo <vyavacchinne> 'rtha iṣyate sambandhābhijñasya. <tasmāt sānumānān na bhidyate>.*⁽¹⁾ Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238a4-5: *idānīm*

pratibhāyāḥ pratyakṣānumānayor antarbhāvaṃ darśayitum āha: sāpītyādi; B
238a5-6 q.v. no. 592 below; 238a7: *sambandhābhijñasyeti.*
   [1]Pāda *d* of the Tibetan versions of PS V 48 contain the compound *ṅag gi don* V
: *ṅag don* K = Sanskrit **vākyārthaḥ.* However, this term is metrically inconsistent
with *pāda d* of the verse. It is most likely a gloss on *pratibhā* that was interpolated
into the verse to identify the referent of the pronoun *sā* at pāda *a.* For **sā,* cf. *'di yaṅ*
V : om. K; the reading of PS V 48d *gźan min* KV is a semantic substitute m.c. for
tha dad min = na bhidyate, which occurs in the subsequent *vṛtti* of PSV V 48 (*tha
dad pa ma yin no* K : *gźan ma yin no* V).

   590 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238a7: *yaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaṃ jānāti,*

   591 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238a5-6: *Devadatta gām abhyāja śuklām ityāder vākyād yā
śrotuḥ pratibhopajāyate <u>sā</u> Yajñadatta Pāṭaliputraṃ gacchetyādīnāṃ <u>vākyāntarā-
nāṃ</u> ye 'rthās tebhyo vyāvṛtte <u>'rthe</u> pratibhāsāmānyaviśeṣa*[1] *iṣyate:* "The intuition
that arises in the listener because of a sentence like 'Devadatta, bring a white cow'[2]
is claimed to be of a referent, that is of a particular general type of intuition, as
excluded from the referents of other sentences like 'Yajñadatta, go to Pāṭaliputra'."
   [1]Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at Ms 238a6-7 of the reason for using the
term *pratibhāsāmānyaviśeṣa: tad evaṃ yāvanti vākyāni tāvanty eva pratibhās tadar-
thaviṣayā ity uktam bhavati. etena pratibhānekatvaṃ darśayān pratibhāsāmānyaṃ
vākyasamutthāyāḥ pratīter viṣayo 'stīti sūcayati. anekaviṣayādhāraṃ hi sāmānyaṃ
pratītam:* "What is meant is as follows: there are just as many intuitions, whose
objects are the referents of the [sentences], as there are sentences. Showing thereby
that there are many intuitions he indicates that the general property intuition is the
object of a cognition that originates from a sentence. For it is understood that the
general property is the container of many objects."
   The introduction of the term *pratibhāsāmānyaviśeṣa* reflects the discussion about
whether or not verbal communication complies with the canon of the *trairūpya,* cf.
no. 9 above and Appendix 1.
   [2]Cf. Mahā-bh I 217,25.

   592 Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238a7-238b1: *etena vākyaṃ liṅgam*[1] *iti manyamāno yā
sāmānyarūpe 'rthe sambandhābhijñasya liṅgāt pratītir bhavati, sānumānaṃ dhū-
māgnipratītivat. tathā ca śrotur vaktrpratibhāyām pratibheti:* "Therefore, in that he
takes the sentence as an indicator (*liṅgam*), the cognition that someone who knows
the connection (between the word and its referent) gets from the indicator about the
referent in a general form, is inference like the inference of fire from smoke; and in
the same way the listener has an intuition of the intuition of the speaker."
   [1]*liṅgam* conj. (cf. *rtags* T) : om. Ms

   593The Tibetan translations of PSV V 48 recorded in K and V differ considerably,
and PSṬ contains nothing that would make it possible to infer the readings of the
underlying Sanskrit text. The translation is based upon K, which unlike V is not
syntactically confused. For *ṅag so so la tha dad* (**pratyekaṃ vākye bhidyate*) K, V
reads *ṅag gźan las tha dad* (**vākyāntarād bhidyate*); for *tsig gi don bźin du*
(**padārthavat*) K, V reads *rdzas bźin* (*dravyavat* [sic]).

   [297] *pratipattis tu yā vākyāt.* Qu. Ms B 238b1.

[594] Cf. *gaṅ źig ṅag las rtogs pa ni | sna tshogs rtog pa* (so read with PN) *skye 'gyur ba* K : *gaṅ źig ṅag las skyes pa yi | rnam rtog sna tshogs śes pa ni* V. The expression *sna tshogs rtog pa* K : *rnam rtog sna tshogs* = **nānākalpikā.* (?) is related to the statement at PSV V:47 (q.v. above) about *arthakriyāpratipattiḥ* (*rtogs pa* K : *śes pa* V) and *vikalpaḥ* (*rnam rtog* V : *rtog* K) of various forms (*nānārūpā, sna tshogs* KV) that arise due to a sentence.

[595] Cf. *'das ma yin* K : *gźan ma yin* V.

[596] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b1-2: *yat svasaṃvedyaṃ tat saṃvedane pratyakṣe 'ntarbhavati, rāgādivat. pratibhā* belongs to the category of mental perception (*mānasaṃ pratyakṣam*) as defined by Dignāga at PS I 6ab: *mānasaṃ cārtharāgādisvasaṃvittir akalpikā;* cf. PS I 7ab: *kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt. Hattori* 1968: 92 (I.45), 94 (I.47), 95 (I.51).

[597] Cf. *spobs pa* K : *rtogs pa* V.

[598] Cf. *ni* (= Sanskrit *tu,* cf. PS V 49a, q.v. above) V : *yaṅ* K.

[599] Cf. *rig pa yin pas* K : *raṅ rig yin pa'i phyir* V.

[298] *yuktaṃ tāvad <naimittikeṣu śabdeṣv> anyāpohenārthābhidhānam, yādṛcchikeṣu tu katham.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b2-3: *yuktaṃ tāvad ityādi.* naimittikā jātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdāḥ. teṣu ... anyāpohena sāmānyarūpeṇābhidhānam sambhavati. yādṛcchikeṣu tv ekavastūpanipātiṣu katham.

[600] That is, words denoting a general property, a quality, an action, or a substance, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b2: *naimittikā jātiguṇakriyādravyaśabdāḥ.* This classification corresponds to the semantic conditions mentioned at PSV I:3d: *jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gaur iti. guṇaśabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti. kriyāśabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti. dravyaśabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viśāṇīti;* cf. *Hattori* 1968: 83 no. 1.27. Prominent Sanskrit grammarians like Bhartṛhari did not accept this classification. Bhartṛhari, for instance, explains terms like *pācaka* and *daṇḍin* as *kṛt* and *taddhita* derivatives, respectively, whose cause of application (*pravṛttinimitta*) is a syntactical relation (*sambandha*) that is expressible by means of the abstract affixes *tvatalau;* this view is mentioned by Dignāga who writes: *atra kecid āhuḥ - sambandhaviśiṣṭa iti.*[1] For the idea of *sambandha* as *pravṛttinimitta,* cf. PSV V 9ab §15 above with no. 133 ad loc.
[1] Cf. Kāśikāvṛtti vol. IV p. 105,30: *kecit tu kriyākārakasambandhaṃ kriyāśabdānāṃ pravṛttinimittam icchanti.* Like Dignāga, Jinendrabuddhi probably has Bhartṛhari's view in mind.

[601] According to the theory to which Dignāga's opponent alludes, arbitrary terms are characterized by being applied to a single (*eka*) not common (*asādharaṇa*) entities (*vastu*) (Cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b3': *yādṛcchikeṣu tv ekavastūpanipātiṣu katham?*). Consequently the semantic conditions of such terms differ from those of words whose causes of application (*pravṛttinimitta*) are general properties, qualities, or actions that are supposed to reside in their substrata[1]. Since Dignāga's *apoha*

theory presupposes the existence of general properties, although not as real entities, but as defined by exclusion of other referents—equivalent to the absence from the locus of the referent of its complement)—the question arises whether proper nouns are subsumed under the general *apoha* theory, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4: *na hi teṣāṃ sāmānyam abhidheyam samasty anekādhāratvāt sāmānyasya. etena yādṛcchikeṣu sāmānyārthānabhidhānād abhyupetahānam:* "For their denotable object is not the general property because the general property has a multitude of substrata. Therefore, since the general property as referent is not denoted in the case of arbitrary terms you abandon your thesis."

Dignāga describes very briefly at PSV I:3d the characteristic of proper nouns as that of qualifying a referent by means of a name: *yadṛcchāśabdeṣu hi nāmnā viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate ḍittheti;* Jinendrabuddhi explains at PSṬ I 38,4 that proper nouns are not dependent upon such causes of application as general properties, cf. Ms loc. cit.: *anapekṣitajātyādipravṛttinimittā yādṛcchāśabdāḥ;* NCV 60,5-6: *nimittanirapekṣaṃ nāma yādṛcchikam 'ḍittho', 'ḍavittha' ityādi.*

Yuktidīpikā is the only non-Buddhist source that alludes to Dignāga's view of the cause of application of arbitrary terms, cf. YD 100,17-20, q.v. below no. 604 below.

[1]Cf., e.g., Patañjali's statement at Mahā-bh I: 19,20: *catūṣṭayī śabdānāṃ pravṛttiḥ: jātiśabdā guṇaśabdāḥ kriyāśabdā yadṛcchaśabdāś caturthāḥ.* The view that arbitrary terms are without cause of application can be traced to the debate at Mahā-bh II 367,18ff (ad A V.1:119), where Patañjali discusses the problem of what accounts for the introduction of the *bhāvapratyaya tā* or *tva* after arbitrary terms like *'ḍittha,'* when there is no subsisting property (*vartin*) *ḍittha*ness in persons like *ḍittha*: *ḍitthādiṣu tarhi vartyabhāvāt vṛttir na prāpnoti: ḍitthatvam, ḍitthatā;* Kaiyaṭa explains that proper names are not dependent upon a cause of application inherent in the object because they apply according to a persons wish, cf. Mahā-bh-P Vol. V: 348,17-18: *ḍitthādayo yadṛcchaśabdā arthagataṃ na kiṃcit pravṛttinimittam apekṣante, puruṣecchāvaśena pravartanāt;* cf. PVVṬ 419,18-19 (ad PVSV 115,19-20): *bāhyaṃ nimittam antareṇa śabdaprayogecchā yadṛcchā. tasyāṃ bhāvād yādṛcchikāḥ. teṣu devadattādiṣu vyaktiṣu.*

[299] *yādṛcchike 'py <arthābhedāt>*[1]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4: *yādṛcchike 'pītyādinā.*

[1] *don tha dad phyir* K : *don bye bas* V which translate **arthabhedāt*. Dignāga's argument, however, presupposes the suggested emendation *'py arthābhedāt,* which is consistent with the metre, cf. e.g. PSV V:7c above. For a related error, cf. the prose commentary at [300] below.

602 Arbitrary terms like *ḍittha* denote referents that consist of an aggregate of separate properties. Consequently such referents are plural like the referents of general terms and thus comparable to those of general terms, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4: *ḍitthādīnām anekatvaṃ darśayan, tatrāpi sāmānyam astīti pratipādayati.*

[300] *yādṛcchiko hi samudāyavācī ḍitthādiśabdaḥ <samudāyino> 'bhedenāha.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4-6: *yādṛcchiko hītyādi ... kāṇakuṇṭādiguṇasamudāya-vācī yādṛcchiko ḍitthādiśabdaḥ. tasya samudāyasya ye 'vayavāḥ ..., tān abhede-na*[1]*sāmānyenāha.*

(1) *tha dad par* K : *bye bas* V = *bhedena* sic. The translations of KV are probably due to a misinterpretation of the *sandhi* of the underlying noun phrase <*samudā-yino*> *'bhedena.* Jinendrabuddhi's gloss *sāmānyena* 'in a general way' explains *abhedena,* which occurs in a similar context at Ms B 239b4: *vijātīyān sajātīyāṃś cābhedenāha.*

603 A word like *'ḍittha'* denotes an aggregate of qualities like being blind on one eye or being dwarfish, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b4-6: *kāṇakuṇṭādiguṇasamudāyavācī yādṛcchiko ḍitthādiśabdaḥ.* The same examples are mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi and Siṃhasūri in their explanations of PSV V:34, v. above no.s 421-22 where the relevant texts are quoted and translated. YD relates Dignāga's view at 100,17-20: *candrādiṣv idānīm asādhāraṇaviṣayeṣu kā pratipattiḥ syād iti. āha: āha: avayavā-pekṣatvāt. Candraśabdo hy anekeṣv avayaveṣu vartate jātidravyaguṇakriyāsu ca. tathā ḍitthādiśabdaḥ. tasmād evaṃjātīyakānām api cānumānād abhedaḥ:* "Now, what sort of cognition would there be with regard to the [word] 'moon', and so on, whose referent is not common"? He explains: because it depends upon parts. For the word 'moon' refers to many parts as well as to general property, substance, quality, and action. The same does the word *'ḍittha'.* Therefore, for [words] belonging to this class there is no difference from inference either." Jinendrabuddhi mentions the question concerning the semantic conditions of application of terms like 'sun' at Ms B 239b4-5: *ye tarhy ete sūryādayaḥ śabdāḥ ekavyaktyupanipātinaḥ, te kathaṃ sāmānyavacanāḥ. tatrāpi sūryādīnām avasthābhedena bhedād anekatvam astīty adoṣaḥ:* "How then do words like 'sun', which apply to a single particular, denote a general property. Also in this case the sun, and so on, is plural because of internal distinction due to difference of state. Consequently (*iti*) there is no problem;" cf. PVSVṬ 419,21f (ad PVSV 115,19f): *atha devadattaśabdo 'py avasthābhedena jātivācaka iṣyate;* a similar discussion is related at TSP 453,14-18 (ad TS 1225): *ye 'py ete ḍitthādayaḥ śabdā yadṛcchaśabdatvena pratītāḥ, te 'pi janmanaḥ prabhṛ-tyāmaraṇakṣaṇād anuvartamānāḥ pratikṣaṇabhedabhinnam asādhāraṇabhedena vastu gamayitum aśaktāḥ kālaprakarṣamaryādāvacchinnavastusamavetāṃ jātim abhidheyatvenopādadate:* "Also words like *'ḍittha'* that are known as proper nouns depend upon a general property inherent in the referent delimited by the bounds of timespan as their denotable object, being incapable of making a referent that is differentiated by differences every moment known by means of a non-common difference, as they apply to it continually from birth to the moment of death."

604 That is, in a general form without distinguishing between the many parts that constitute the aggregate, which is also the property of the so-called aggregate terms (*samudāyaśabda*), cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b5-6: *tasya samudāyasya ye 'vayavāḥ kāṇa-kuṇṭādayaḥ, tān abhedena* (so read, Ms *bhed°*) *sāmānyenāha. tato yathā vṛkṣaśab-daḥ śiṃśapādīn viśeṣān abhedenābhidadhat sāmānyavācī tathā samudāyaśabdo 'pi ḍitthādiśabdaḥ:* "The parts of the aggregate are the [properties of] being blind on one eye and being dwarfish, and so on, It denotes these without distinction, i.e., in a general form. Therefore, just as the word 'tree,' while denoting without distinction particulars like *śiṃśapā,* denotes the general property, in the same way also an aggregate term like *'ḍittha'.*"

[301] *kas tarhi jātisamudāyaśabdayor viśeṣa iti. na kaścit. prasiddhivaśāj jātiśab-daḥ <kvacit> pratyekam apy avayaveṣūpacaryate, tadyathā hy abhakṣyo grāmyasū-*

kara iti. kvacid mukhyaḥ. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b6-7: *kas tarhītyādi ... <u>kas tarhi jātisamudāyaśabdayor viśeṣaḥ</u> ... na kaścid iti*; 239a1-3: *yathoktaṃ Sāmānya-parīkṣāvyāse ... <u>prasiddhivaśāj</u>*[(1)] <u>*jātiśabdaḥ*</u> <u>*pratyekam*</u> <u>*api*</u> *samudāyiṣu vartate ... ata āha prasiddhivaśād ityādi ... <u>tadyathā</u> <u>hy</u> <u>abhakṣyo</u> <u>grāmyasūkara</u> ity ukte ... <u>kvacid</u> <u>mukhyo</u> 'vayaveṣu vartate.*
   [(1)]em. : *prasiddha°* Ms

[605] That is, if both terms denote a general property, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b6: *yady ubhāv api sāmānyavācinau.*

[606] Jinendrabuddhi qualifies this statement at PSṬ Ms B 238b7 with the subsequent exposition in mind: *etāvatā leśena nāsty eva viśeṣa ity abhiprāyaḥ, na tu sarvathā nāsty eveti. anyathāyaṃ jātiśabdo 'yaṃ samudāyaśabda iti bhedo na syāt:* "Thus the opinion is that because it is such a minor point, there really is no difference, but it is not the case that there is no [difference] at all. Otherwise there would be no distinction, like when one says 'this is a general term', 'this is an aggregate term.'"

[607] Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's statement with reference to a similar exposition in Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa, cf. PSṬ Ms B 238b7-239a2: *nanu cāvayaveṣu mukhyopacaritavṛttitvena viśeṣo bhavati. jātiśabdasya hi pratyekam avayaveṣu mukhyā vṛttiḥ samudāyaśabdasya tūpacaritā. yathoktaṃ Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāse: ayaṃ tu jātisamudāyaśabdayor viśeṣaḥ prasiddhivaśāj*[(1)] *jātiśabdaḥ pratyekam api samudāyiṣu vartate, samudāyaśabdas tu pratyekaṃ samudāyiṣūpacaryata iti:* "Certainly the difference is due to direct and transferred application to the parts. For the application of a general term to each of the parts is direct, whereas that of an aggregate term is transferred. As it is explained in Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa: "This, however, is the difference between general and aggregate terms: According to acknowledged usage a general term, on the one hand, applies to each member of the aggregate, whereas an aggregate term is transferred to each member of the aggregate."
   [(1)]em. : *prasiddha°* Ms

[608] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a2-3: *sūkaravyaktyavayaveṣv api sūkakaraśabda upacārāt pravartate. tadyathā hy "abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara"*[(1)] *ity ukte, avayavā api na bhakṣyante:* "The word 'swine' is also applied in a transferred sense to the parts of the individual swine. For when, for instance, it is said that one should not eat the village swine, parts of it are not to be eaten either."
   Bhartṛhari mentions the same example at VPV II 224,16-17 with reference to the parts of a swine: *abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara iti. atra bhakṣayatikriyā tathābhūtam eva sādhana(bhūtaṃ dravyāvayavam apekṣate) ... avayave ca samudāye ca samudāya-śabdapravṛttir iti.*
   [(1)]Cf. Mahā-bh Vol. I: 5,16-17: *abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara ity ukte gamyata etad āraṇyo bhakṣya iti.*

[302] *yathāha: sāṅkhyāpramāṇasaṃsthānanirapekṣaḥ pravartate, bindau ca samudāye ca vācakaḥ salilādiṣu.* (VP II 156). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a3: <u>*yathāha*</u> *bhartṛhariḥ.*

[609] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a3-4: *ādiśabdena pṛthivyādiparigrahaḥ.*

[610] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a4-6: *saṅkhyādyanapekṣatvenāvayaveṣu mukhyavṛttitvaṃ darśayati. saṅkhyādisāpekṣatve kārṣāpaṇayojanacaturaśrādiśabdavad ekadeśa-vṛttitvaṃ na syāt. tatra saṅkhyānapekṣo bindumuṣṭikādisaṅkhyānapekṣatvād*[(1)] *ekas-minn api hi bindau*[(2)] *vartate. anekasminn api salilaśabdaḥ. pramāṇanirapekṣo nābhyūrujānumātratvādyanapekṣaṇāt.*
[(1)]*muṣṭikā* conj. (cf. T 219,9: *khyor pa gaṅ*) : *mukā°* Ms
[(2)]*°au* em. : *°or* Ms

[611]*yan lag la* K : *yan lag 'ba' źig la* V ("a part alone").

[303] *saṃsthānavarṇāvayavair viśiṣṭe yaḥ prayujyate, śabdo na tasyāvayave pravṛttir upalabhyate.* VP II:155.

[612] Cf. VPV II 223,5-6: *saṃsthānaviśiṣṭopakramaḥ parimaṇḍalo dīrghaś caturaśra iti tadavayavo nābhidhīyate. tathā muṣṭigranthi(ktala? read mālā?)-kuṇḍalakādayaḥ śabdās tadavayaveṣu na prayujyante.*

[304] *varṇaviśiṣṭe citraḥ kalmāṣaḥ.*[(1)] Qu. Ms B 239a7.
[(1)] Cf. *yan lag can gyi khyad par* V : *yan lag khyad par can la 'jug pa ni* K; V corroborates PSṬ; *'jug pa* K (= **vṛtti*) is probably an interpolation; it is reasonable to conclude that all similar occurrences in this paragraph of *'jug pa* K that are not found in V are interpolations too.

[613] Cf. VPV II 223,7-8: *varṇaśabdānāṃ citraḥ kalmāṣaḥ sāraṅga iti tadava-yaveṣv apravṛttiḥ:* "Words denoting colour such as 'speckled', 'variegated', 'dapled' do not apply to their parts;" Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a: *nīle rakte vā citrāvayave na vartante:* "They do not refer to a part of the speckled whether it is blue or red."

[305] *avayavaviśiṣṭe.* Qu. Ms B 239a6.

[614] The Tibetan translations *bre* V 148,7 : *bre phyed* (= *ardhaprastha/droṇa*) K 149,7 are ambiguous since *bre* is used to render both Sanskrit *prastha* and *droṇa,* cf. the dictionary by *Che riṅ dbaṅ rgyal* s.v. In view of the fact that Dignāga quotes the examples in the order of the VPV II 223,7-8 (q.v. no. 614 above), it is reasonable to assume that he is doing the same in this case too.

[615] Cf. *bre gaṅ* K 149,7 : *khal* (= *kharī*) V 148,7.

[616] Cf. VPV II 223,7-8: *avayavaśabdena śataṃ sahasram prastho droṇo māsaḥ saṃvatsaraḥ* (*ityādayo gṛhyante*?). Ms B 239a6-7: *niyatāvayavaviśiṣṭaṃ samudā-yam abhidadhataḥ śatādiśabdā avayave na vartante:* "Words like 'a hundred' that denote an aggregate qualified by fixed parts do not apply to a part."

[306] <*samudāyaśabdaś ca kvacit*> *pratyekam parisamāpyate.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a7: *pratyekam parisamāpyata iti.*

[617] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239a7-239b1: *pratyekam avayave mukhyaḥ prayujyata ity arthaḥ. mukhya ity etat kutaḥ? uttaratropacarita iti vacanāt:* "The meaning is that it applies directly to each part. What is the reason for [using] the expression 'directly'. Because of the expression 'transferred' in what follows."

[618] Cf. *groṅ 'oṅs* V : *'gro* K; PSṬ Ms B 239b1-2: *grāmaśabdo gṛhakṣetra-vāṭapuruṣādisamudāyavācakas*[(1)] *tadekadeśeṣu puruṣeṣu vartate:* "The word 'village' that denotes the collection of houses, fields, enclosure, people, and so on, refers to parts of these viz. the people;" Mahā-bh I 59,20-22: *grāmaśabdo 'yam bahvarthaḥ. asty eva sālāsamudāye vartate, tadyathā: grāmo dagdha iti. asti vāṭa-parikṣepe vartate, tadyathā: grāmām praviṣṭa iti. asti manuṣyeṣu vartate, tadyathā: grāmo gato, grāma āgata iti:* "The word 'village' has many referents. It happens that it refers to the collection of houses, for instance: "the village burned down." It happens that it refers to the enclosure and surroundings (i.e. the arable land), for instance: "He entered the village." It happens that it refers to the people, for instance: "the village went away, the village came back.""
[(1)]There is no word in this definition that matches *lam* T.

[307] <*kvacid*> *upacaritaḥ*[(1)], <*tadyathā*> "*kāyakarmaṇā 'tmakarma vyākhyātam*" (VS V.2.18). Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b1: *kāyakarmaṇā* <*'tmakarma*>[(2)] *vyākhyātam* iti.
[(1)]Cf. Ms B 239b1: *uttaratropacarita iti vacanāt.*
[(2)]*'tmakarma* em. (cf. *bdag gi las* T) : om. Ms

[619] Dignāga quotes as an example of this usage VS V.2.18. Jinendrabuddhi explains it at PSṬ Ms B 239b2 as follows: *atra kāyaśabdaḥ karacaraṇādisamudaye vartamānas tadavayava eva upacaryate:* "In the present case the word body while applying to the aggregate of hands and feet, and so on, is transferred to a part of it." Cf. Candrānanda's exegesis at VSV 43,3-4 in which *kāya* stands for *hasta: iha ātmaśabdena vāyuḥ, yathātmasaṃyogaprayatnābhyāṃ haste karma tathātmavāyu-saṃyogāt prayatnāc ca prāṇāyāmakarma.*

[620] Cf. *khyu źes bya ba daṅ nags źes bya ba* V : *kho bo cag źes bya ba* K; Mahā-bh I 239,24-25: *ekārthā samudāyā bhavanti tadyathā yūthaṃ śatam vanam iti;* ibid. 426,21.

[621] Jinendrabuddhi attempts to clarify the actual difference between words belonging to the class of general terms and those belonging to the class of aggregate terms in the following pasage at Ms B 239b2-4, quoting a brief definition from Dignāga's Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa: *Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāse tu avayaveṣūpacarita-vṛttitvam bhūyastvena dṛṣṭam iti jātiśabdāt samudāyaśabdasya viśeṣaṇatvenoktam. diṅmātradarśanaṃ caitat. ayam punar atra sphuṭo viśeṣo jātisamudāyaśabdayoḥ: samudāyaśabda ekasamudāyāntovartino*[(1)] *vijātīyān sajātīyāṃś cābhedenāha. Jāti-śabdas tu tatsamānajātīyān eva samudāyān asamudāyāṃś ceti:* "In Sāmānya-parīkṣāvyāsa, however, the difference of an aggregate term from a general term is said to be that "its application as transferred to the components is observed to be preponderant." This view is just a hint. This, however, is the obvious difference between a general term and an aggregate term, namely: the aggregate term denotes without distinction the [properties] belonging to similar as well as dissimilar things

that reside in a single aggregate, whereas a general term [denotes] aggregates and non-aggregates that are of the same kind."

(1) °*āntovartino* conj. : °*āntaḥ (j?)ātino* Ms

[308] *<ath>ākṛtasambandhaśabdād*[(1)] *yā<rtha>pratītis,*[(2)] *<tadyathā yad uktam 'ayaṃ panasa' iti tatra>* *katham anumānam iti.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b5-6: *akṛtasambandha iti ... katham anumānam iti.*

(1)Cf. *'brel par ma byas pa'i sgra las* K (translating *akṛtasambandhe śabde* at PSV V 2ab₁) : *'brel pas ma byas pa sgra'i don* V. The paraphrase with °*ja* 'originating from' at PSṬ Ms B 239b6: *akṛtasambandhaśabdajā yā pratītiḥ* (see below no.624) would indicate that the case morpheme *las* translates a Sanskrit ablative as suggested in the restoration above.

(2)Cf. *don rtogs pa* K : *don ston par byed pa* V; paraphrase at PSṬ Ms B 239b6 below no. 624.

[622] Jinendrabuddhi interprets the term *akṛtasambandha* as referring to a person who does not know the connection of a word to its referent, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b5: *akṛtasambandha iti sambandhānabhijñaḥ pratipattā.* This interpretation is possible, but it makes no sense in the context and may be due to carelesness. Jinendrabuddhi may not always have compared his explanations to the original he commented upon.

[623] Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at PSṬ Ms B 239b6: *akṛtasambandha-śabdajā yā pratītir na sānumānaṃ, tadyathā yasya mlecchaśabdajaḥ saṃśayaḥ. tathāvidhā sambandhakāle 'yaṃ panasa ity atrāpi pratī<tir i>ti:* "The cognition that originates from a word whose connection to [its referent] has not been told is not inference, like the doubt that originates from the words of a non-Sanskrit speaker. At the time of [teaching] the connection through the statement "this is a Jack-fruit tree," the cognition is also in that case of the same kind."

[309] *na tatra <panasaśabdād arthapratītiḥ. kasmāt>?* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b7: *na tatretyādinārthasiddhatām āha.*

[310] *pratīten*[(1)]*<ārthadarśanāt?>*[(2)]. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b7: *pratīteneti.*
(1)Cf. *rtogs pa'i* V : *so sos* (sic) K.
(2)Cf. *don ni bstan phyir ro* V : *don mthoṅ ba yi phyir* K. The reading **arthadarśanāt* suggested by V and K is peculiar and non-standard in this context. The purpose of the 50b is to explain, as the context indicates, that the relation (*sambandha*) between any given word and its referent is shown to somebody by someone to whom it is known (*pratīta*). This is the rationale for Dignāga's use of the expression *sambandhapradarśanārtham* which occurs in the *vṛtti*. I believe that Tib. *don* corresponding to Sanskrit *artha* is an interpolation based upon the expression *arthasiddhatvāt* that occurs in the *vṛtti*. Consequently I would suggest restoring 50b as *pratītena *pradarśanāt*. On this assumption we must translate 50b as: "Because [the relation] is shown by someone to whom [it] is known."

[624] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b7: *pratītasambandhenety arthaḥ.* For a different translation of 50b, cf. note [310] note 2. above.

[625] Cf. *don grub pa'i phyir* K : om. V.

[626] It is not possible to decide with absolute certainty what the original Sankrit version of the first sentence of PSV V:50 might have been: KV are syntactically confused and both versions omit crucial words. The term *grags pa rñiṅ pa* V : om. K, corresponds probably to Sanskrit *vṛddha.* This term is commonly used in descriptions of how children learn the connection between a word and the referent from the discourse of grown ups (*vṛddhavyavahāra,* cf. ŚBh 46,7); cf., for instance, the explanation at ŚBh 46,2-4: *vṛddhānaṃ svārthena vyavaharamānām upaśṛṇvanto bālāḥ pratyakṣam arthaṃ pratipadyamānā dṛśyante.* See also Kumārila's related discussion at ŚV Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 138ff. *Raja* 1963: 26ff. I assume that *'brel pa bstan pas* K :*'brel pas rab tu rtogs pa* V correspond to Sanskrit *pratīta-sambandhena,* cf. the use of *pratītena* at PS V 50b.

[311] *ayaṃśabdena.* Qu. Ms B 239b7.

[627] At this point Jinendrabuddhi addresses the question of the denotation of the demonstrative pronoun, cf. PSṬ Ms B 239b7-240a2: *nanu cāyaṃśabdo 'py āsannapratyakṣavastusāmānyavacanaḥ, kutas*[(1)] *tena panasārthasiddhiḥ? naiṣa doṣaḥ. yathā pratītasambandho vṛkṣaśabdaḥ sāmānyavacano 'pi yadā purovartini palāśādau prayujyate 'yaṃ vṛkṣaś chidyātām iti, tadā vṛkṣaviśeṣa eva vartate. tathāyaṃśabdo 'pi:* "Certainly, also the demonstrative pronoun 'this' denotes the general property of a proximate perceptible object, so how can it establish the referent 'Jack-fruit tree'? This is not a problem! In the same way as the word 'tree' whose relation is known: When it is applied, although it denotes the general property, to the present *palāśa,* and so on, as in [the statement] 'this tree is to be cut down,' it is used to denote a particular tree only, so also the demonstrative pronoun 'this'.
[(1)]*kutas* conj. : *tatas* Ms

[628] Cf. *lag pa'i brda'* V : *lag brda'i.* For Dignāga's use of *hastasaṃjñā,* cf. ŚV Śabda° 20: *hastasaṃjñādayao ye 'ye pi yadarthapratipādane bhaveyuḥ kṛtasaṅketās te na liṅgam iti sthitaḥ.* Sambandhākṣepa: 139; PVSV 134,9.

[629] I assume that the introduction of the particle *'am* after *yan lag brda'* V (om. K) reproduces Sanskrit *ca.*

[312] *kiṃ tarhi samjñāvyutpattiḥ*[(1)]. Qu. Ms B 240a2.
[(1)]Cf. *'on kyaṅ miṅ* (so read; ed. *mi*) *rtogs pa* K 149,18 : *śiṅ tog pa na sa'i sgra don rtogs pa* V 148,19. For *rtogs pa = vyutpatti,* cf. Mhvyut 7495-96.

[630] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2: *panasaśabdena tatra samjñāvyutpattimātraṃ kriyata ity arthaḥ.* In the case of *samjñāvyutpatti* the relation between any given word and the thing it denotes is taught by pointing at a prototypical instance of the referent and thus presupposes a visible referent. Consequently there is no inference in the case of *samjñāvyutpatti.* Dignāga addresses briefly the implications of *samjñāvyut-patti* at PSV II:5: *śabdam api tu <asādhāraṇena viṣayena> sambandhābhāve <dvidhānumānaṃ parīkṣyeta> dṛṣṭārtham adṛṣṭārthaṃ <ca>. <tatra> dṛṣṭārthe samjñāvyutpattiḥ. adṛṣṭārthe 'rthavikalpamātraṃ, na viśiṣṭārthāpratītiḥ.* Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 62b5: *śabdam api tv ityādi. sambandhābhāva iti.* 62b6-7: *dṛṣṭārthaṃ*

... adṛṣṭārtham. 62b7: *dṛṣṭārthe saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ. adṛṣṭārthe 'rthavikalpamātram* (qu. PVSV 37,26); 63b5: *na viśiṣṭārthāpratītiḥ.*

The two Tibetan versions translate this crucial passage as follows:

K (*Kitagawa* 1973 454b8f = P 111a1-3): *sgra las byuṅ ba yaṅ 'brel pa med par thun moṅ ma yin pa'i yul mthoṅ ba daṅ ma mthoṅ ba las rjes su dpag pa rnam pa gñis su brtag par bya 'o ‖ de la mthoṅ ba'i don la miṅ bstan pa 'o ‖ ma mthoṅ ba'i don la rnam pa rtog pa tsam yin gyi, don gyi khyad par rtogs pa ma yin no ‖.*

V (*Kitagawa* 1973 454a5f = P 29b4-6): *sgra yaṅ yul thun moṅ ma yin pa daṅ 'brel ba yod pa ma yin pas rnam pa gñis ka rjes su dpag par brtag par bya ste | mthoṅ ba'i don daṅ ma mthoṅ ba'i don no ‖ de la mthoṅ ba'i don la ni mi gsal bar byed pa 'o ‖ ma mthoṅ ba'i don la ni rnam par rtog pa tsam 'ba' źig ste | don gyi bye brag rtogs par byed pa ni ma yin no ‖:*

"However, when there is no connection [of any given word] with an individual referent, it should also be investigated whether verbal cognition is inference in two ways, namely (1) as having a visible referent and (2) as having an invisible referent. Now, with regard to the one having a visible referent, it is teaching a name [and thus it is not inference]. With regard to the one having an invisible referent, it is nothing but representation of the referent. There is no cognition of a distinct referent [and thus it is not inference either]."[1]

[1]Jinendrabuddhi's explanation at PST Ms B 62b5-7 is deeply indebted to Dharmakīrti's PVSV 37,24ff; text lifted from PVSV is printed in roman: *"sambandhābhave" saṃketakāle. śabdārthasambandhābhijño hi saṃketakālānubhūtārthasāmānyam eva pratipādyate śabdāt, na svalakṣaṇam, tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭatvāt. prayogakāle viśeṣaviśayatvāśaṃkā na bhavaty eva. saṃketakāle tu pratyakṣaṃ svalakṣaṇam iti, saṃbhavati tadviṣayatvāśaṃkā. ataḥ "sambandhābhava" ity āha. "dṛṣṭārtham" yatrārthaḥ pratyakṣeṇa dṛśyate. "adṛṣṭārtham" viparyayāt. "dṛṣṭārthe saṃjñāvyutpattir" iti. yathāyaṃ panasa iti. atra sambandhavyutpattir eva bhavati, nānumānam, arthasya pratyakṣatvāt. adṛṣṭārthe svargādāv arthavikalpamātram iti. na hi svargādiśabdāḥ svargādīnāṃ saṃketakāle 'nyadā vā svalakṣaṇam* buddhāv *arpanti,* anatīndriyatvaprasaṃgāt (cf. PVSV 37,24-25). Kevalam *tatpratipādanābhiprāyaiḥ prayuktāḥ.* śrotary *apratibhāsamāna*tatsvabhāvam *artha*bimbam arpayanti (cf. PVSV 37-25-27): *asti kaścit surādhivāsaviśeṣa*[1] *ity evamādikam.* naivaṃ svalakṣaṇam pratipannam bhavati pratipāditam vā: svargādiśravaṇe tadanubhāvinām iva pratibhāsābhedaprasaṃgāt[2]. apratipadyamāno 'pi ca tatsvabhāvaṃ tathābhūta eva vikalpapratibimbe tadadhyavasāyī saṃtuṣyati, tathābhūtvād eva śabdārthapratipatteḥ (cf. PVSV 37,27-38,5). *atra ca sambandhābhāva iti etad nāpekṣyate, kiṃ tu dṛṣṭārtheṣv eva. tatra hi dṛṣṭatvād viśeṣ<as>ya, tasyaiva vācyatāśaṃket<a>. tataḥ tannivṛttyartham uktam samjñāvyutpattir iti:* "When there is no connection" that is, at the time when the language convention is taught (*saṃketakāle*). For the one who knows the connection of a word to its referent understands from a word merely the general property of the referent he experienced at the time when the language convention was taught, but not the individual because it has not been observed previously. At the time when the language convention is put into practice doubt about whether a particular is the object does not exist at all. However, because (*iti*) the individual is visible at the time of teaching the

convention, doubt about whether it is its [i.e. the words] object is possible. Therefore he says "when there is no connection. "Having a visible referent" means "when the referent is observed by sensation." "Having an invisible referent" means in the diametrically opposite case. "With regard to the one having a visible referent, it is teaching a name," like, for instance: "this is a Panasa." In that case it is nothing but teaching the relation, but it is not inference because the referent is visible. "With regard to the one having an invisible referent" like heaven "it is a mere representation of the referent." For words like heaven do not at the time when the language convention is taught or on other occasions convey the particular to the mind because the [absurd] consequence is that it would not transcend the senses. They are merely used with intentions of teaching about them. They convey to the listener a mental picture of the referent whose essential nature is not clear [to him] in words like "it is a particular kind of dwelling place for gods and so on." A particular is not understood or explained in this way because the [absurd] consequence is that there would be no difference of mental picture from hearing [words] like "heaven" in those who in a way would experience it directly. Although [the listener] does not understand its essential nature he takes pleasure in a representation picture of exactly this nature, identifying it as that [namely a particular] because the cognition of the referent of a word is precisely of this nature. And in this context the expression "when there is no connection" has no relation to that, but rather to visible referents only. Since a particular among these is observed, one would expect it to be the denotable object. Therefore it is said: "teaching a name" in order to exclude this."

[313] *sambandhapradarśanārtham tu <tasya saṃjñārthasy*[(1)]*āyaṃśabdena sāmā-nādhikaraṇyam>*. Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2: *sambandhapradarśanārtham*[(1)] *tv ityādi*.

  [(1)] For this term, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2f, q.v. no. 632 below.

  [(1)]em. (cf. *'brel pa rab tu bstan pa'i don* T; Ms B 240a3: *sambandhapradar-śanārtham*) : *sambandha* om. Ms

  [631] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2f.: *saṃjñārtho yasya sa tathocyate*.

  [632] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a2: *tuśabdo 'vadhāraṇārthaḥ*.

  [633] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a3: *yad etad ayaṃśabdena panasārthena panasaśabdasya sāmānādhikaraṇyam tat sambandhapradarśanārtham:* "The co-reference of the word *'panasa'*"with the demonstrative pronoun 'this' whose referent is the *panasa* has the purpose of showing the connection."

Umveka eloborates on the issue at ŚVṬ (Umveka) 371,12-14 (on Śabda° 102): *ayaṃ panasa iti vā prayujyamāne vācyavācakalakṣaṇasambandhāvagatiḥ. na ca sa eva panasaśabdavācyaḥ, ayamitiprasiddhārthapadasāmānādhikaraṇyāvaseyatvāt:* "Or, when one makes use of the statement 'this is a Jack-fruit tree' one understands the connection that is characterized as one of the denotable object with the denoting term. And it [viz. the connection] is not only denotable by the word 'Jack-fruit tree' because it is to be ascertained by the co-reference of the syntactical word whose referent is well known with [the demonstrative pronoun] 'this'."[(1)]

Jinendrabuddhi continues the discussion of the role of co-reference in establishing the connection at PSṬ Ms B 240a 3-5: *nanu caikatrābhidheye śabdayor*

vṛttiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam. tadā cānirjñātasambandhatvād eva nāsti panasaśab-
dasyārthas[(2)], *tat kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam? saṅketayitrā saṃjñātvena panasār-*
thavṛtteḥ[(3)], *tadā ayaṃśabdasyārthe sa niyuktaḥ, tatas tatra tasya vṛttir ity adoṣaḥ.*
ayam atrārthaḥ: saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhavyutpattimātrārtha eva tadā panasaśab-
dasyāyaṃśabdaviṣaye panase saṃjñārthena niyoga iti: "Co-reference is certainly
the application of two words to a single denotable object. And at this point (*tadā*)
the word *'panasa'* has no referent because its relation [to the referent it denotes] is
not known, so how could there be co-reference? Because the person who teaches the
conventional denotation applies it [viz. the word *'panasa'*] to the referent *panasa* as
its name, it is at this point applied to the referent of the demonstrative pronoun
'this', therefore its application to this is not a problem. The meaning in the present
case is this: At this point the application of the word *'panasa'* that has the purpose
of being a name of the *panasa* that is the referent of the demonstrative pronoun
'this' has merely the purpose of teaching the relation between the name and the
thing named."

For Dharmakīrti's view of *pradarśana* in relation to *vyutpatti,* cf. the discussion
at PV I 117ff with PVSV ad loc.

[(1)] Dignāga's view on the role of the demontrative pronoun for establishing the
relation between the vocal sign and its referent is closely related to Bhartṛhari's
view, cf. the quotation from the Saṅgraha at VPV I 101,3: *so 'yam iti vyapadeśena*
sambandhopayogasya śakyatvāt; VPV 105,3-4; VPV I 126,4-5: *so 'yam iti saṃjñinā*
śaktyavacchedalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho niyamyate; VP II:128.

[(2)] °*śabdasyārthaḥ* em. (cf. T *sgra'i don*) : °*asya* Ms
[(3)] *panasārtha*° em. (cf. *pa na sa'i don* T) : *palāsārtha*° Ms

[314] *ubhayor abhidheya iti kṛtvā*[(1)]. Qu. Ms B 240a6.
[(1)]Cf. *gñis ka brjod par bya ba yin no źes byas nas* V : *gñi ga'i brjod par bya ba*
yin pa'i phyir K.

[634] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240a5-6: *kathaṃ punas tena sambandhaḥ śakyate pradarśa-*
yitum, yāvatā nāsya tatra kiñcit pravṛttinimittaṃ vastusat bhavadbhir iṣyata ity āha:
"ubhayor abhidheya iti kṛtvā" iti. panasāyaṃśabdayor dvayor apy abhidhānār-
haḥ,[(1)] *tābhyāṃ vā śakyo 'bhidhātum ity arthaḥ. etad uktam bhavati: śabdānāṃ*
icchāmātravṛttitvāt sarva evārthā yogyāḥ. tasmād vināpy anyena pravṛttinimittena
śakyate sambandho darśayitum iti: "But how, moreover, is it possible to show the
relation with it [viz. the Jack-fruit tree], insofar as you claim that it [viz. the word
'Jack-fruit tree'] has no real cause of application whatsoever in it [viz. Jack-fruit
tree]? He answers: "On the assumption that [the connection] is the denotable object
of both." The meaning is that both the word 'Jack-fruit tree' and the demonstrative
pronoun 'this' are capable of denoting it [viz. the connection], or, that it can be
denoted by both of them. What is meant is this: Since words apply by the mere wish,
all referents are fit [as referents]. Therefore it is possible to show the connection
even without something else as cause of application."

[(1)]°*as* em. : °*aṃ* Ms

[315] *atādarthyāc*[(1)] *ca saṃjñārthaḥ panasaśabdaḥ*[(2)]. Qu. Ms B 240a7.
[(1)]*atādarthyāc* em. (cf. *de'i don ñid ma yin pa'i phyir* T) : *atārth*° Ms
[(2)]Cf. *de'i don las ni miṅ gi don pa na sa'i sgra yin no* K : *de'i don du brda'i don*
byas pa ni ma yin no V.

[635] Cf. PST Ms B 240a7-240b1: *tena panasenānarthavattvāt*[1] *panasaśabdaḥ samjñāvyutpattiprayojana ity arthaḥ:* "The meaning is this: Since it is does not have a referent because of the Jack-fruit tree, the word 'Jack-fruit tree' has the purpose of teaching the name."

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation is concise to the point of being obscure. The underlying intention is that until the connection between the name (*samjñā*) '*panasa*' and its referent is established, the term *per se* has no referent and only denotes its own form (*svarūpa*). Its sole purpose is that of being a name whose relation to its referent has to be taught by pointing to a prototypical instance of it, and the use of the demonstrative pronoun "this" as mentioned by Dignāga.

Cf. Bhartrhari's explanation at VPV ad VP I 66a-b: *prāk samjñinābhisam-bandhāt samjñā rūpapādārthikā, ṣaṣṭhyāś ca prathamāyāś ca nimittatvāya kalpate. ... yāvat samjñinā tu samjñā na sambaddhā tāvan na samjñipadārthiketi:* "Before [its] connection with the thing named, the name has [its own] form as referent and is fit for being the cause [of application] of the sixth triplet or the first triplet."

Cf. VPT (Paddhati) 125,22 ad loc.: *samjñāsamjñisambandhavyutpattikāle 'ayaṃ panasaḥ' iti. na hi samjñāyās tadā so 'rthaḥ:* "Like at the time of teaching the connection between a name and the thing named in the words "this is a Jack-fruit tree." For this is not the referent of the name at that time."

[316] <(*yo 'yaṃ*?) *sambandhaḥ*> *sa eva tarhi śabdasya* <*prameyam*>[1] *bhaviṣyati.* Restored, cf. PST Ms B 240b1: *sa eva tarhītyādi. yo 'yaṃ śabdārthayoḥ samban-dhaḥ sa eva śabdasya ... abhidheyo bhaviṣyati.*
[1]Cf. *'o na 'brel pa de ñid sgra'i gźal byar 'gyur ro* K : *śiṅ tog pa na sa'i sgra de ñid daṅ* (sic) *'brel pa ltar sgra'i gźal byar 'gyur ba yin no* V.

[636] The introduction of the term **prameya* (Tib. *gźal bya*) is motivated by the opponent's view that *śabda* is a separate mans of cognition (*pramāṇa*) having as object of cognition (*prameya*) a connection like that of the word '*panasa*' with the object it denotes. It is uncertain why Jinendrabuddhi substitutes *abhidheya* for *prameya,* cf. PST Ms B 240b1: *yo 'yaṃ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ sa eva śabdasya vidhirūpeṇābhidheyo bhaviṣyati, tataś cānenaiva viśeṣeṇa śābdam anumānāt pramāṇāntaram bhaviṣyatīti manyate:* "The idea is that only the relation between the word and its referent will be the denotable object of the word in an affirmative form, and therefore, i.e., because of this difference, verbal cognition will be a separate means of cognition from inference."

[637] The *kārikā* may be restored as: *na sambandhaḥ, kalpitatvāt*[1]. Cf. Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase at Ms B 240b3-5 no. 640 below.
[1] *brtags pa'i phyir* V presupposes the reading **kalpitatvāt* : *rnam rtog yin phyir* K **vikalpitatvāt* (?), which is ummetrical.

[317] *sambandho hi* <*panasaśabdārthau*> *pramāṇāntareṇopalabhy*<*āsyāyam'* [1]*iti*> *manasā kalpyate*[2], *anumānānumeyasambandhavat, tato* <*na*> *śābdaṃ pramāṇāntaram*. Restored, cf. PST Ms B 240b1-5: *pramāṇāntareṇopalabhyeti ... manasā kalpyata iti... anumānānumeyasambandhavat;* cf. Jinendrabuddhi's para-phrase no.s 637 above and 640 below.

[^1]Cf. *'di 'di'i yin no* V : *'di ni 'di 'o* K; for the semantics of the use of the sixth triplet, cf. VP III.3:3: *asyāyaṃ vācako vācya iti ṣaṣṭhyā pratīyate.* VPV I 125-126 ad VP I 66-67; PV III:129: *asyedam iti sambandhe.*

[^2]Cf. *yid kyi<s> 'brel pa rtogs par byed pa* K : *śiṅ tog pa na sa daṅ* (sic) *'brel par rtogs pa* V.

638 Cf. PṢṬ Ms B 240b2: *pratyākṣādinā.* Jinendrabuddhi continues addressing the question of how the relation between the two relata, i.e., the word and the referent, is established by means of sensation, when the forms of the word and its referent are defined by their general properties viz. exclusion of other words and other referents, respectively, and sensation does not have general properties as its field of operation. The answer is that the term 'other means of cognition' denotes the knowledge that arises as the immediate result of the other means of cognition because the cause has been transferred to the effect, cf. PṢṬ Ms B 240b2-3: *kathaṃ punaḥ pratyakṣeṇa sambandhinor upalambho yavatā sāmānyarūpau śabdārthāv iti pratipāditam? na ca pratyakṣaṃ sāmānyaviṣayam. paramatenaivam uktam. Pramā-ṇāntarapṛṣṭhabhāvi vā jñānaṃ kārye kāraṇopacārāt pramāṇāntaraśabdeno[^1]ktam ity adoṣaḥ.*

[^1]°*deno*° em. : °*do no*° Ms

639 Cf. PṢṬ Ms B 240b3-5: <u>*sambandho hi sambandhivyatirekeṇa nāsty eva,*</u> *kevalaṃ sambandhinoḥ[^1] parasparāpekṣāvaśād vikalpyate, yac ca kalpitaṃ na tat kvacid[^2] arthakriyāyām upayujyate. arthakriyārthaś ca sarvaḥ prekṣāvatām āram-bha iti na sambandho 'numānārhaḥ. yat kalpitaṃ na tad anumānārham.* <u>*anumā-nānumeyasambandhavat. tathā ca śabdārthasambandhaḥ:*</u> "For the connection does not exist independently of the relatum. It is merely imagined because of the mutual dependence of the two relata. And that which is imagined is under no circumstances fit for purposeful action; and every undertaking of intelligent persons has as its objective purposeful action. Thus the relation is not capable of being inferred. For that which is imagined is not capable of being inferred in the same way as the inference-inferendum relation. And so is the relation between the word and its referent."

This explanation is evidently influenced by Dharmakīrtian thought. For the concept of *parasparāpekṣā* cf., e.g., Dharmakīrti's Sambandhaparīkṣā verse 3. For the term *arthakriyārtha,* cf. e.g. *arthakriyārthin* at PVSV 89,19.

[^1]°*noḥ* em. (cf. *'brel pa can dag* T) : °*inaḥ* Ms
[^2] *kvacid* em. (cf. *'ga' źig tu* T) : *kecid* Ms

[318] *atha śeṣam upamānādi kathaṃ <na pramāṇāntaram>.* Restored, cf. PṢṬ Ms B 240b5: *atha śeṣam upamānādi kathaṃ iti.*

640 That is, *sambhava* and the rest, cf. PṢṬ Ms B 240b6: *ādiśabdena ... sambhavādayo gṛhyante.* For *sambhava* and the other means of knowledge, cf. *Randle* 1930: 326ff.

[319] *śeṣam uktaṃ diśānayā.* Qu. Ms B 240b6.

641 Cf. PṢṬ Ms B 240b6: *yathoktayaiva diśopamānādīnāṃ yathāsambhavam apramāṇatvam apramāṇāntaratvaṃ coktaṃ veditavyam.*

[320] *upamānaṃ tāvad gogavayādiṣu sārūpyapratipattyartham. tatra parata upaśrutya yā pratītiḥ sā śābdam. svayaṃ tu dvyārthaṃ pramāṇantareṇādhigamya manasā sārūpyaṃ yadā kalpayati, tadā*[^1] *tad api na pramāṇāntaram. nāpy evam adhigamyamānaṃ sārūpyaṃ prameyam. evam anyāny apy anumānavikalpāvyati-riktatvāt parikṣiptavyāni.*[^2] Restored, cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b7-241a5: *upamānaṃ tāvad ityādi. gogavayādiṣv iti viṣayaṃ darśayati. sārūpyapratipattyartham iti … tatra parata upaśrutyeti … yā pratītiḥ sā śābdam. … svayaṃ tu dvyārtham iti. svayam eva gāṃ gavayaṃ cādhigamya pratyakṣeṇa manasā sārūpyaṃ yadānayoḥ kalpayati tadānubhūtārthaviṣayatvāt … pramāṇam eva na bhavati … anyathā gāṃ mahiṣaṃ ca pratyakṣeṇa dṛṣṭvā yadā tayor visadṛśatvaṃ kalpayati: asmād ayaṃ visadṛśam iti, tadā tad api <na>*[^3] *pramāṇāntaraṃ syād ity abhiprāyaḥ. nāpy evam adhigam-yamānam iti … sārūpyaṃ prameyam;* 242b4-5: *evam ityādi. anyāny api yāni pra-māṇāni pramāṇāntaratvena kalpitāni, tāny apy anumānavikalpāvyatiriktatvāt pramāṇāntaratvena parikṣeptavyāni;* for the reading *pramāṇantareṇa,* cf. YD 72,18 q.v. below no. 646.

[^1]: Cf. *bsal bar bya ba ñid yin no* V 148,36-37 : *gźan sel ba'i tshul yin no* K 149,35.

[^2]: Although neither V nor K reproduce *yadā* and the apodosis *tadā,* their presence may be inferred from their occurrence in Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrase; the use of the case marker *la* in the phrase *yid kyis rtogs par byed pa yin la* K 149,33 may be an attempt to translate *yadā;* cf. the use of *yadā* and *tadā* in Uddyotakara's reproduction of Dignāga's view of *upamāna,* for which see no. 647 below.

[^3]: *na* conj. (cf. *de ni tshad ma gźan ma yin no* V : *tshad ma gźan ma yin te* K) : Ms and T om.

[642] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b7: *sārūpyapratipattyartham iti sādṛśyaniścayanimittam ity arthaḥ.* Jinendrabuddhi then continues quoting the definition of *upamāna* at NS I.1:6 *prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam* followed by a short explanatory gloss, cf. B 241a1: *etat tasya lakṣaṇam: prasiddhapramāṇaniścito gavādiḥ; tena sādharmyaṃ samānadharmatvaṃ prasiddhasādharmyam. tasmād gavādyapekṣayā gavayādisārūpyasya yat sādhanaṃ siddhiḥ, tad upamānam:* "The following is its definition: A cow, and so on, is ascertained by means of an acknowledged means of cognition. Acknowledged common property means having properties in common with this, i.e., having the same property [as this]. Therefore the establishing, i.e., *siddhi* of the similarity of the gayal, and so on, with reference to a cow, and so on, is *upamāna.*"

[643] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 240b1-3: *gaur iva gavaya ityādy āptavacanaśravaṇapūrvikā gavayādisārūpyasya vivakṣārūḍhasya yā pratītiḥ, sā śābdam eva śabdaprabhava-tvāt. śābdasya cānumāne 'ntarbhāvitatvād na pramāṇāntaram. bāhye tv arthe visaṃvāditvāt tasyāḥ prāmāṇyam eva nāstīty abhiprāyaḥ:* "The cognition of the similarity of a gayal [to a cow], and so on,—(the similarity) being imposed by (someone's) intention to speak—which presupposes hearing the words of an authority such as "the gayal is like a cow," is nothing but verbal cognition in that it stems from words; and since verbal cognition is included in (the category of) inference, it is not a separate means of cognition. However, since there is disagreement about an external referent, this [cognition] has no cognitive validity. Such is [Dignāga's] opinion."

[644] Cf. Ms B 241a4: *tatkalpanaṃ smṛtyādivat. pramāṇam eva na bhavati. kutaḥ punaḥ pramāṇāntaraṃ bhaviṣyati.*

[645] Yuktidīpikā reproduces almost verbatim Dignāga's view at YD 72,17-18: *na tāvat parata <upaśrutya?> upamānaṃ pramāṇāntaram. yadā svayam eva gāṃ gavayaṃ copalabhya vikalpayati "yathāyam tathāyam" iti tadā tasyārthasya pramāṇāntareṇādhigamāt pramāṇam eva tan na bhavatīti.*

[646] Cf. PSṬ Ms B 241a5: *apramāṇenādhigamyamānam. smṛtyādi adhigamyamānam iva na sārūpyaṃ prameyam ity arthaḥ.* In the immediately following excursus at Ms B 241a5-242b4 Jinendrabuddhi discusses Vātsyāyana's interpretation of *upamāna* in his commentary on NS I.1:6, and that of Śabara on MS I.1:5. For this section, cf. Appendix 3.
  The view that similarity is an object of cognition would imply that is is a perceptible general property (*vastu*). Kumārila addresses Dignāga's rejection of this view at ŚV Upamāna° 17ff: *pratyakṣābhāsam etat tu nirvikalpavādinām, prame-yavastvabhāvāc ca nābhipretā pramāṇatā.*
  Apart from Dignāga's remark at Nyāyamukha 3b.10-11 about the inclusion of *upamāna* in *anumāna* his view of *upamāna* is only known from PS V § 67 and the more explicit passage at NV 60,16-61,1 in which Uddyotakara appears to reproduce Dignāga's view as *pūrvapakṣa*. It is evidently not based upon PS V § 67. Uddyotakara is therefore addressing the discussion found in another Dignāgan work, presumably the lost Nyāyaparīkṣā: *pratyakṣāgamābhyāṃ nopamānam bhidyate. katham iti. yadā tāv ubhau gogavayau pratyakṣena paśyati tadā hy ayam anena sarūpa iti pratyakṣataḥ pratipadyate. yadāpi śṛṇoti "yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya" iti tadāsya śṛṇvata eva buddhir upajāyate kecid gor dharmā gavaye 'nvayina upalabhyante kecid vyatirekiṇa iti, anyathā hi yathā tathety eva na syāt. bhūyas tu sārūpyaṃ gavā gavayasya ity evaṃ pratipadyate. tasmād nopamānaṃ pratyakṣā-gamābhyāṃ bhidyate iti:* "Comparison is not distinct from sensation and testimony. In what way? Because when a person sees both the cow and the gayal, in that case it is by immediate sensation that he apprehends that one is like the other; and when he is told that the gayal is like the cow, in that case it is just on hearing of this that the knowledge arises in his mind that some of the qualities of the cow are found in the *gayal* and others are not: as otherwise the word 'like' would not have been used by the speaker; and he apprehends a preponderant sameness of the qualities of the gayal with those of the cow. For this reason comparison is not distinct from immediate sensation and testimony;" cf. *Randle* 1926: 49. As mentioned by *Randle* op. cit. 50-51, Dignāga's criticism does not address Vātsyāyana's interpretation of NS I.1:6, and he may in fact have had another interpretation of the *sūtra* in mind. Kumārila does not expressly mention Dignāga's view, but his criticism of the attempt to include *upamāna* in *anumāna* at ŚV Upamāna° 43ff is no doubt directed at Dignāga.

[647] Dignāga's inclusion of *arthāpatti,* implication, and *abhāva,* non-existence, in *anumāna* is known from PSV II:51, for which, cf. *Frauwallner* 1968: 90-91. See also YD 73,1-18; 74,9-16. Jinendrabuddhi mentions, in addition, *aitihya* (tradition) and *sambhava* (inclusion), and closes his commentary on chapter five by quoting PSV I:2ab like in the beginning of the chapter, cf. Ms B 242b5-7: *tatraitihyam*[(1)] *iti hocur ity*[(2)] *anirdiṣṭapravaktṛkaṃ*[(3)] *paramparāgataṃ vacanam. yatheha vane*[(4)] *yak-ṣaḥ prativasatīti. etad api vivakṣāyāṃ śābdān na bhidyate. bāhye 'rthe tv asya*

prāmāṇyam eva nāsti. sambhavo nāma yatra yasya sambhavaḥ tadgrahaṇāt[(5)] *sam-*
bhavisattāgrahaṇaṃ: yathā droṇagrahaṇād ādhakasya sattā gṛhyate. etad api sam-
udāyavyavasthāpāḥ samudāyinaḥ kāraṇam iti droṇāt kāryaliṅgād eva grahaṇam.
tato 'numāna antargataḥ arthāpattyādīni pūrvam eva kṛtābhividhānānīti sthitam
etat "pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇe dve eve"ti.

Cf. the somewhat different presentation at YD 73,19-74,3 of Dignāga's (?) inter-
pretation of *sambhava* as an instance of presumption and therefore by definition
included in the category of inference.

The compound *anumānavikalpa*—grammatically a *karmadhāraya* "the repre-
sentation which is inference"—is not recorded elsewhere in PSV and Jinendrabuddhi
does not comment upon it.

[(1)] em. : *tatreti hyam iti* Ms

[(2)] em. : *dobu ritya* Ms (*źes drag ciṅ brjod nas* sic T)

[(3)] em. : *nirdiṣṭapravarttakam* Ms, cf. T *ṅes par bstan pa 'jug par byed pa*
indicating that T presupposes the same wrong reading; Jinendrabuddhi alludes to
Vātsyāyana's formulation, cf. Nyāyabhāṣya on NS II.2:1: *iti hocur ity anirdiṣṭapra-*
vaktṛkaṃ pravādapāramparyam aitihyam; cf. Kiraṇāvalī on PBh § 263.

[(4)] conj. (*dper na nags 'di na gnod sbyin* T) : *yahivathehavaṭe* Ms

[(5)] em. : *tatagrahaṇāt* Ms

[648] Cf. *le'u lṅa pa 'o* K : *tsad ma kun las btus pa las gźan sel ba brtag pa'i le'u*
ste lṅa pa 'o V.

Appendix 1

Restored Sanskrit Text of
Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti V §§1-66

§1. uktam pramāṇadvayam. kecic chābdam api <pramāṇāntaram manyante>.

> na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdam anumānāt. tathā hi saḥ |
> kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate ‖ **[1]**

śabdo hi yatra viṣaye prayujyate tasya yenāṃśenāvinābhāvitvasambandhaḥ, taṃ kṛtakatvādivad arthāntaravyavacchedena dyotayati, <tasmād anumānān> na bhidyate.

§2. ye tv āhuḥ: jātiśabdaḥ svabhedān sarvān evāha, ukteṣu tu niyamārtham viśaṣaśrutir <iti>. <tatrocyate>

> na jātiśabdo bhedānāṃ **[2a]**

"vācaka" iti vakṣyate. jātiśabdas tāvat sadādir <dravyādīnāṃ na vācakaḥ>,

> ānantyāt. **[2b$_1$]**

ānantye hi bhedānām aśakyaḥ sambandhaḥ kartum. na cākṛtasambandhe śabde 'rthābhidhānaṃ yuktaṃ svarūpamātrapratīteḥ.

§3. kiṃ ca,
> vyabhicārataḥ. **[2b$_2$]**

yathā hi sacchabdo dravye vartate tathā guṇādiṣv apīti vyabhicārāt saṃśayaḥ syāt, nābhidhānam.

§4. yo 'pi manyate: <jātiśabdo jātimātre tadyogamātre vā> sambandhasaukaryād avyabhicārāc ceti. tad ayuktam, <na hi tayor api>

> vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apṛthakśruteḥ. **[2cd]**

tathā hi <sad dravyam, san guṇaḥ, sat karmeti bhedārthair dravyādi-
śabdaiḥ> sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ na syāt. tac ca dṛṣṭam. na hi sattā <tad-
yogo vā> dravyaṃ guṇo vā bhavati, kiṃ tarhi, dravyasya guṇasya vā.
āha ca:

> vibhaktibhedo niyamād guṇaguṇyabhidhāyinoḥ
> sāmānādhikaraṇyasya prasiddhir dravyaśabdayoḥ.
> [VP III.14:8]

> sambandhaś cātra sambandhidharmeṇa vācya ucyate:
> tathā hi bhāvaḥ kṛtvoktaḥ, bhāvaś cānyena yujyate. **[3]**

sambandhanaṃ hi sambandhaḥ. <so 'nyena yujyate rāgādivat>. tasmāt
sambandhidharmeṇa sambandho vācya iti kṛtvāśaṅkitam svadharmeṇa
tu nāsti sambandhasya vācakaḥ śabda ity idaṃ tat prati nāsti. ato nai-
vasya jātiśabdena vācyatvam upapadyate.

§5. <ye tv āhuḥ>: viśeṣaśabdaiḥ <sāmānādhikaraṇyāt sambandha-
saukāryād avyabhicārāc ca jātimanmātraṃ vivakṣitam iti. tatra>

> tadvato nāsvatantratvāt. **[4a]**

evam api hi sacchabdo jātisvarūpamātropasarjanaṃ dravyam āha, na
sākṣād iti tadgataghaṭādibhedānākṣepād atadbhedatve sāmānādhika-
raṇyābhāvaḥ. na hy asatyāṃ vyāptau <sāmānādhikaraṇyabhāvaḥ>.
tadyathā śuklaśabdaḥ svābhidheyaguṇamātraviśiṣṭadravyābhidhānāt,
saty api dravye madhurādīn nākṣipati. tataś cātadbhedatvam. evam
atrāpi prasaṅgaḥ.

§6. <kiṃ ca>,

> upacārāt. **[4b₁]**

sacchabdo hi bhūtārthena svarūpaṃ vā jātiṃ vāha. tatra pravṛttas tad-
vaty upacaryate. na tu yo yatropacaryate, sa tam artham bhūtārthe-
nāha.

§7. <sārūpyasya ca>

> asambhavāt. **[4b₂]**

tadvati ca <guṇasārūpyaṃ> na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ <sambhavati>, nāpi guṇopakārāt.

§8. kathaṃ na pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ? upacāre sati

buddhirūpasya bhinnatvād rājño bhṛtyopacāravat. **[4cd]**

tadyathā […]. upacaryate ca <jātiśabdas tadvati>.

§9. krameṇānabhidhānāc ca kundaśaṅkhādiśuklavat. **[5ab]**

<yatra hi samānapratītis tatra krameṇābhidhānam, tadyathā> śuklaṃ kundam, kumudam, śaṅkham iti; sakṛc ca jātitadvatoḥ śabda<prayoga iti> nāsti pratyayasaṅkrāntitaḥ sārūpyam.

§10. guṇopakārāt tādrūpye prakarṣaḥ syād vinā dhiyā. **[5cd]**

yadi sphaṭikavad guṇoparāgāt tadvān guṇasvarūpo bhavet, evaṃ sati dravye guṇaprakarṣabuddhyanapekṣ<āpi> prakarṣabuddhiḥ syāt. na hi sphaṭika upadhānabuddhyapekṣā pravartate raktabuddhiḥ, avyutpannasya bhedabuddhy<abhāvāt>.

§11. <kiṃ ca>,

saṃsargirūpāt sarvatra mithyājñānam prasajyate. **[6ab]**

sarvo hi śābdaḥ pratyayo 'rthe saṃsargirūpavyavahitaḥ, tataḥ <sphaṭikavad> ayathārthaḥ syāt.

§12. <kiṃ ca>

sāmānyādibahutve ca yugapad grāhakeṣu ca
upakāro virudhyeta. **[6cd-7a]**

yadā ca bahavo grahītāro bhavanti guṇavataḥ śuklādes tadyathā ghaṭaḥ, pārthivaḥ, dravyam, san, śuklaḥ, madhuraḥ, surabhir ityevamādiviśeṣaiḥ, tadā guṇopakāro virudhyate. na hi śakyaṃ tadā dravyeṇa ekaguṇarūpeṇa sthātum, aviśeṣāt, nāpy ekadeśena guṇarūpam anubhāvituṃ śakyam, kṛtsnasya ghaṭādirūpapratīteḥ.

sarvair vā mecakekṣaṇam. **[7b]**

atha punaḥ sarvair ghaṭatvādibhir upakāro yugapat kṛtsnasya kriyate, tataḥ pratyekaṃ ghaṭādirūpagrahaṇābhāvād mecakadarśanaṃ yugapat sarvarūpāpatteḥ syāt.

§13.bhedeṣu jātau tadyoge tulyo doṣaś ca teṣv api. **[7cd]**
[...]
[...] <jātau> mukhyo bhedeṣūpacāritaḥ. [...] avaśyam [...] sambhavataḥ [...].

§14. tadvāṃs ca bheda eveṣṭaḥ sa ca pūrvaṃ nirākṛtaḥ. **[8cd]**
[...]

§15. nanu coktam [...]. yady evaṃ

tadvanmātraṃ tu sambandhaḥ sattā veti vicāritam. **[9ab]**

[...] <yathāha:> samāsakṛttaddhiteṣu sambandhābhidhānam anyatra rūḍhyabhinnarūpāvyabhicāritasambandhebhya <iti. tatra ca na>

vācako yogajātyor vā bhedārthair apṛthakśruteḥ **[2cd]**

<ity uktam>.

§16. tadvān artho ghaṭādiś cen na paṭādiṣu vartate.
sāmānyam arthaḥ sa katham. **[9cd-10a]**

anekavṛtti hi sāmānyam [...] tac ca [...] katham [...].

§17. nanu ca [...]. sattādiṣu ca ... tasmāt [...]. sā ca <nāsty arthasya>, yasmāt [...]. [...], na tu kenacit tadvatā; sattāyogau ca <pūrvaṃ nirākṛtau>.

§18. nānimittaḥ sa <ca> mataḥ. **[10c]**

[...] tataś ca [...].

§19. atha punar ananyasmiṃ dravye vartate sadguṇaṃ,, sacchabdād ghaṭādyākāṅkṣāyāṃ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ syāt, nīlatarādivat.

yady ekatrāsitādivat. **[10d]**

<sambandhe guṇe vā syāt>,

<naitad apy asti>. **[11a₁]**

nīlaśabdo hi [...].

§20. <kiṃ ca,>

upetyāpi naitaj jāter ajātitaḥ. **[11a₂-b]**

[...] naivaṃ sajjātir ghaṭādijātimatī yatas tān viśeṣān upādāya dravye varteta. [...]

§21. evaṃ tarhy <ucyate> yady apy aśabdavācyā, tathāpi ghaṭādiṣv arthākṣipteṣu bhedākāṅkṣā bhaviṣyati. tadvān hy artho 'vaśyaṃ ghaṭa-tvādīnāṃ kenacit sāmānyenānubaddha <iti>.

arthākṣepe 'pi anekāntaḥ. **[11c]**

arthākṣepo hi <yasminn arthe niścayotpattiḥ>, tadyathā divā na bhuṅkta iti rātribhojane <niścayaḥ>. iha punaḥ sad ity ukte na ghaṭādiṣu niścayaḥ. <iti saṃśaye sati> nāsty <arthā>kṣepaḥ.

§22. <yasmāj jātiśabdo na katham api bhedasāmānyasambandha-jātimadvācakaḥ,>

tenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ. **[11d]**

tasmād <yad uktam prāk>:

kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate **[1cd]**

<iti tad eva sthitam>.

§23. āha ca:

bahudhāpy abhidheyasya na śabdāt sarvathā gatiḥ
svasambandhānurūpyāt tu vyavacchedārthakāry asau. **[12]**

anekadharmā śabdo 'pi yenārthaṃ nātivartate
pratyāyayati tenaiva na śabdaguṇatādibhiḥ. **[13]**

§24. yady anyāpohamātraṃ <śabdārthaḥ>, kathaṃ <nīlotpalādiśabdā-nāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ syād, viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaś ca>. kathaṃ ca

na syāt? yasmād bhinnam <apohyaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdānām. eṣa doṣo nāsti>, te 'pi hi

> apohyabhedād bhinnārthāḥ svārthabhedagatau jaḍāḥ
> ekatrābhinnakāryatvād viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyakāḥ. **[14]**

<nīlotpālādiśabdā hi> saty apy apohyabhede svārthaviśeṣavyañjanārtham ūrdhvatākākanilayavat svam apohārtham ekatropasaṃharantaḥ <samānādhikaraṇā bhavanti>. tathā hi te pratyekaṃ svārthaviśeṣe saṃśayahetavaḥ, śabdāntarasahitavyaṅgyārthāsambhavāc ca <viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya>bhūtāḥ.

§25. yat tarhi tad ekādhikaraṇam [...].

> na ca tat kevalaṃ nīlaṃ na ca kevalam utpalam
> samudāyābhidheyatvāt. **[15a-c]**

nīlotpalaśabdābhyāṃ <hi> sahitābhyāṃ sa <pratīyate>, na kevalābhyām. <kevalau hi>

> varṇa<vat tau> nirarthakau. **[15d]**

yathaiva hi [...]

§26. viṣama upanyāsaḥ. na hi [...]

> varṇe na kaścid arthaś ced gamyate tu padadvaye
> tadvācya iti tatrāpi kevalaṃ sa pratīyate. **[16]**

yathaiva hi [...]. yat tūktam [...] tatrāpi [...] arthaśūnyaiḥ samudayaiḥ [...]. bhinnaśabdavācyenārthena bhinnārthā ity ucyante. [...].

§27. [...] <etayor hy> avayavārthayor adhikaraṇaṃ tato bhinnaṃ syād abhinnaṃ vā. [...]

> samudāyaikatā nāsti mitho 'bhedaprasaṅgataḥ. **[17ab]**

yadi hi [...].

> samūhānekatāsakteḥ. **[17c]**

samūhasyānekasmād abhedād anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ. [...] nīlotpalārtha-
yoḥ [...], ekatrāpi vartamānau

<śabdau svārthaṃ na tyajataḥ>. [17d]

[...] samuditayor api [...] kutaḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam? <eṣa doṣo nāsti>
dvāv api <viśeṣārthau>, sāmānye viśeṣāntarbhāvāt. tulyarūpau <sā-
mānyārthena>. viśeṣārthavattvajñāpanārthaṃ dvitīyaśabdaprayogaḥ.
[...].

atra tāvad nīlaśabden<ābhedenā>bhidhīyate,

na jātiḥ. [18a$_1$]

<na hi nīlaśabdo dravyajātiṃ> sāmānyenāha, <kuto viśeṣo dravya-
jātāv antarbhūtaḥ kalpyeta?>

nanu ca <nīlavad dravyaṃ sāmānyenāha>, [...]. ayuktam evaṃ bhavi-
tum. <kasmāt>?

pūrvam uktatvāt. [18a$_2$]

<tadvadabhidhānaṃ hi "tadvato nāsvatantratvād" [4a] ityevamādinā>
pūrvam eva niṣiddham.

[...] tad ayuktam. <kasmāt>?

saṃśayāt. [18b$_1$]

saṃśayo hi <sāmānyaśabdād viśeṣeṣu dṛṣṭaḥ>. na ca yataḥ saṃśayaḥ
<tenābhidhānaṃ yuktam>. syāt tv arthato <viśeṣaśabdāt sāmānya-
pratītir avyabhicārāt>.

yat tarhīdam <uktam "antarbhūtaviśeṣaṃ sāmānyam" iti>, naitad <uk-
tam abhidheyatvāt, kiṃ tarhi,

anapohanāt>. [18b$_2$]
[...]

paryāye gatir ekasmāt. [18c].

paryāyaśabde hy anirjñātānekārthe paryāyāntarasya prayogas tat<pūr-
vā>rthapratītaye. etad eva hi <paryāyaśabdānām> paryāyavam: paryā-

yeṇārtham abhidadhati, <na yugapat>. tathā cotpalārthasya nīlaśab-
denaivāvagater viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvābhāvaḥ. [...]

§28. <yathābhede> tathā bhede 'pi: <samudāyibhyaḥ> samudāyasyā-
nyatvam sādhyam. na hi tasya teṣu teṣāṃ vā tatra kārtsnyenaikadeśena
vā vṛttiḥ sambhavati. [...]

[...]. tad dhy arthayor vā bhavec <chabdayor vā>. [...].

> yady apy ekārthavṛttitā <jātiguṇayoś cārthayoḥ>
> na sāmānyaviśeṣatvam. **[19a-c]**

yady api hi <nīlaguṇotpalajātyor ekatra dravye vṛtteḥ sāmānādhika-
raṇyaṃ syāt, na viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ>. na hi [...]

> tadvatoḥ [...] **[19d]**

[...] dravyayor anyatrāvṛtteḥ. [...] dvayor ekasya vā sāmānya-
viśeṣavattvāyogāt. [...].

> [...] **[20ab]**

atyantabhinnau hi <śabdau jātiguṇābhidhāyakau, tasmāt tayoḥ sāmā-
nādhikaraṇyābhāvaḥ> [...].

> [...]

> tulyātulyam prasajyate. **[20cd]**
[...].

§29. atulyatvāvivakṣā cet. **[21a]**

<yadi manyate: sambandhikṛtabhedāvivakṣāyāṃ> tulyatvaṃ tāvad
upādāya sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ bhaviṣyati. yatrāpi hi [...] tulyākāra-
buddhi <hetutvāt>. ubhayavyudāsānugṛhīte [...] tatra śabdavyāparaḥ.
tanmātrasya vivakṣā prayujyate. sambandhikṛte tv <viśeṣe 'vivakṣite
>, tad vastu kathaṃ vācyam?

<kiṃ ca>

> gavāśvasamānatā. **[21b]**

[…] <tasya vastuno> ’nabhidheyatvena <samānateti> nīlotpalādivat sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅgaḥ.

§30. tatrākṛtiviśeṣaś ca. **[21c]**

[…] svasāmānyābhivyaktihetor <bhedasya> tatkṛte hi tayos tathā-bhidhāne katham avivakṣā, na tu nīlotpalatvavato ’rthasya.

anekākṛtisaṅkaraḥ. **[21d]**

ekasmin vastuni <anekasāmānyā>bhivyakter anekasaṃsthānasamā-veśaḥ <syāt>, na ca dṛṣṭam.

§31. api ca,

<tulyam>. **[22a₁]**

<gavaśvādīnāṃ hi> tulyātulyam adhikaraṇam anabhidheyatvāt sattādi-vyañjakatvāc ca gotvādivyañjakatvāt. tatrāpy atulyatvāvivakṣāyāṃ sāmānādhikaraṇyaprasaṅgaḥ.

§32. iṣṭe ’pi cābhāvaḥ. **[22a₂]**

yatrāpi […]. yadi […]. tathā hi […].

§33. […]

na vyaktir guṇakarmaṇoḥ. **[22b]**

<guṇakarmaṇor hy> asaṃsthānavattvāt <tadgatasāmānyā>nabhivyak-tiprasaṅgaḥ. śaktibhedena svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvād dravyādiṣu bheda iti […].

§34. […]. śābdānāṃ tāvad abhidhāyakaśabdakṛtaḥ. teṣāṃ hi yadṛcchā-śabdeṣu tadabhidheyatvaṃ viśeṣaḥ.

bhedo vācakabhedāc ca […]. **[22c]**

[…]. aviśiṣṭe hi vastuny abhidhāyakena śabdenābhedopacārān na vak-tavyaṃ viśiṣṭasāmānyābhivyaktihetutvād gavādayo viśiṣṭāḥ. abhidhā-nabhedād api dṛṣṭo bhedaś caitrādivad <iti cet>. na, tasyaiva parīkṣ-yatvāc <cai>kasyāpi anekaparyāyaśabdābhidheyatvāc <ca>. […] tatrā-

rtha iva vicāraḥ. [...] sa tu nābhidhāyakaḥ [...] śākaṭikā<der> <bāla>-prayuktasya ca <ekārthābhidhyakatvāt>.

§35. [...] <tadyathā> śiraḥ pṛṣṭham udaraṃ pāṇir iti tadviśeṣebhya [VS X.11] <ity uktam>.

> vyañjakavyaktito bhede <prāptam anyonyasaṃśrayaṃ> [23ab]

[...]. dravyasvabhāvaḥ kaḥ? svasāmānyābhivyañjakatvam. sāmānya-svabhāvaḥ kaḥ? svadravyābhivyaṅgyatvam. [...].

§36. <kiṃ ca>

> svabhāvānaikataikasya bahuvyakteḥ parasparam. [23cd]

[...]. dravyād dhi <bahusāmānyasya> sattāder <vyaktiḥ>. [...]. sarva-thā ca guṇasambandhabhedāc ca śaktibhedāc cābhidhānabhedāc ca bhedābhyupagame <ekasyāpy> anekatvaprasaṅgaḥ.

[...]   [24]
[...].

§37. viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvam asvātantryāt puroditam. [25ab]

[...].

§38. tatra,

> anyatve 'pi na sāmānyabhedaparyāyavācyanut. [25cd]

tulye 'pi hi anyatve <śabdo na sāmānyabhedaparyāyaśabdānām ar-tham apohate. kuta iti cet?> avirodhāt. paryāyaśabdasya <tāvat> tul-yam apohyaṃ yugapad aprayogāt, na ca svārthapratikṣepo yuktaḥ. sāmānyaśabdenāpi svabhedeṣu arthāntaraṃ vyudastaṃ bhedaśabdo 'numodate, arthitvāt. yathā hi śiṃśapā na palāś<ādi>, evaṃ na <ghaṭā-dy> api. etena <sāmānyasāmānyaśabdārthāpratikṣepo 'py uktaḥ>. ta-thā sāmānyaśabdaḥ svārtham abhiprete viṣaye vyavasthāpyamānam viśeṣaśabdena viśeṣaviśeṣaśabdena vā kathaṃ nopekṣate? <evam avi-rodhād na sāmānyādiśabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ>. samūhaś ca tathār-thāntaravācakaḥ. evaṃ ca sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayor svārthasāmānye vartamānāyor dvayor bahūnāṃ vā tadviśiṣṭārthāntaravācakatvam upa-padyate yathoktam prāk.

§39. <āha ca>

> tanmātrākaṅkṣaṇād bhedaḥ svasāmānyena nojjhitaḥ
> nopāttaḥ saṃśayotpatteḥ, sāmye caikārthatā tayoḥ [26]

> anekam api sāmānyam bhedenāvyabhicāriṇā
> upāttaṃ na tayor tulyā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā [27]

§40. kim punar atra <kāraṇaṃ yena bhedaśabdo bhedāntaraśabdārtham apohate?>

> bhedo bhedāntarārthaṃ tu virodhitvād apohate [28ab]

bhedārthā hi śabdāḥ sāmānyārthāpaharitvād rājaputravat paraspara-
virodhinaḥ. tataś ca na parasparārthaṃ kṣamante. tadyathā <'ayaṃ
vṛkṣaḥ śiṃśape'ti śiṃśapāśabdo vṛkṣaśabdena saha prayujyamānaḥ
khadirādibhyo vṛkṣatvaṃ vyavacchidya svaviṣaye vyavasthāpayati.
tathetaratrāpi. evaṃ tāvad bhedaśabdasyai>kadravyāpahāritvād <bhe-
dāntaraśabdārthāpoho yuktaḥ>.

§41. atha sāmānyāntarabhed<ārthaṃ> ghaṭādim asambandhaṃ>
kasmād apohata <iti. yasmād>

> sāmānyāntarabhedārthāḥ svasāmānyavirodhinaḥ [28cd]

vṛkṣaśabdena hi <ghaṭādayaḥ pārthivādyapahāritvād virodhinaḥ>. tena
hi nirākriyamāṇam abhyanumodate mitraśatruvat. arthāc ca tena sa
nirasta iti pratīyate. etena <sāmānyāntarabhedānāṃ guṇādīnāṃ tad-
bhedānāṃ ca rūpādīnāṃ> nirākaraṇam upekṣaṇam ca sambandhasam-
bandhataḥ kṛtaṃ veditavyaṃ <mitramitraśatruvat, mitraśatrumitra-
vat>.

§42. tatra tu

> na sākṣāt tasya te 'pohyāḥ. [29a]

[...]

> mā bhūt sāmānyatulyatā. [29b]

yadi hi sākṣād apoheta, vṛkṣaśabdena tulyārthaḥ syāt.

> tathā bhedāntarāṇāṃ <tu teneva> na syād apohaḥ. [29cd]

yathaiva hi vṛkṣaśabdaḥ palāśādīn nāpoheta, tathā śiṃśapāśabdo 'pi nāpoheta <tena tulyatvāt>. <yadi nāsti sa doṣo>'lpabahvarthāpohatvena bhinnatvād <ity evam> ayuktam. yathaiva hi vṛkṣaśiṃśapāśabdau <vṛkṣatvaśiṃśapātvaviśiṣṭaṃ vastu bruvāṇāv atyantabhinnārtham> brūtaḥ, tathehāpy <asaṅkīrṇenārthena> bhavitavyam. arthāt tu syād alpabahutarāpohaḥ.

§43. yadi bhedo bhedāntarārtham <apoheta, madhuro rasaḥ snigdhaḥ śīto guruś ceti yad etad guṇasya guṇāntaraiḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ,> tat katham? [...]

> sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ tu <guṇasya yad guṇāntaraiḥ
> tasyaikadravyavṛttatvād āśrayeṇāvirodhatvāt> **[30]**

[...].

§44. adṛṣṭatvād vyudāso vā. **[31a]**

<atha vā> yasmād bhedaśabdo bhedāntarārthe na dṛṣṭaḥ, tasmād apohate. kasmāt tu na dṛṣṭaḥ? svābhāvike 'py arthe [...] āhopuruṣikā pratipannā [...].

§45. evaṃ tarhi

> sāmānyaṃ syāt svabhedanut. **[31b]**

yady adarśanenāpohate, <sāmānyaśabdasyāpi svabhedeṣv adarśanād apohaprasaṅgaḥ syāt>.

> nānyayuktasya dṛṣṭatvāt. **[31c]**

dṛṣṭo hy arthaprakaraṇādibhiḥ sāmānyaśabdo viśeṣaṃ pratipādayati.

> ta<dābhaḥ> saṃśayas tathā. **[31d]**

<evaṃ tarhi> sāmānyaśabdād bhedābhāsaḥ saṃśayo yuktaḥ,> teṣv api dṛṣṭapūrvaḥ, ūrdhvatāvat.

> saṃśayo 'yukta iti cet. **[32a]**

<idaṃ> manyate: yady arthaprakaraṇādisahita evopalabdhaḥ syāt, tataḥ <kathaṃ saṃśaya> iti.

niścite kevalāt tu saḥ. **[32b]**

naiva <arthādi>sahitāt saṃśaya ity ucyate>, kiṃ tarhi arthādisahitād niścita uttarakālaṃ kevalāt saṃśayaḥ.

bhede cen nāsti kevalaḥ. **[32c]**

[...]

dṛṣṭaḥ śrotṛvyapekṣayā. **[32d]**

yadā hi śrotānyasāmānyavyudāsenārthībhavati, <tadyathā> kiṃ vṛkṣaḥ pārthiva uta pañcamahābhautika ity <ukte>, tadā pārthiva iti kevalasya prayoga sambhavati. niścite tarhi <tasya> vṛkṣe kutaḥ pārthivaśabda-prayogāt saṃśaya iti <cet>, tasya niścite 'nyasya <kevalāt saṃśayaḥ>. [...].

§46. yathā cārthāntarāpohenārthe sāmānyam, tathā>

<śabdāntaravyudāsena śabde sāmānyam ucyate>. **[33ab]**

yathaivākṛtakavyudāsena yat kṛtakatvaṃ tat sāmānyam anityatvādi-gamakam, tathā śabdāntaravyavacchedena śabde sāmānyam ucyate. tenaiva cārthapratyāyakaḥ. tatrāpi

<aikyaṃ yatrārthasaṃśayaḥ>. **[33c]**

yatrākṣādiśabdād arthe śakaṭāṅgādau saṃśaya <utpadyate>, tatra śab-dasyaikyam.

tatsandehe tv anekatā. **[33d]**

<yatra> bhavatiśabdādau śatrantādau saṃśayaḥ, <tatra> śrutisāmye 'pi śabdabhedo draṣṭavyaḥ, tadyathā ka iheti.

§47. katham punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrva-doṣāprasaṅgaḥ? <yasmād>

adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāmśe 'pi darśanāt
śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryaṃ na cāsti vyabhicāritā. **[34]**

anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasyārthābhidhāne dvāram, tau ca tulyātulya-yor vṛttyavṛttī. tatra tu tulye nāvaśyam sarvatra vṛttir ākhyeyā kva cid,

ānantye 'rthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānantye śakyam
adarśanamātreṇāvṛtter ākhyānam. ata eva ca svasambandhibhyo 'nya-
trādarśanāt tadvyavacchedānumānaṃ svārthābhidhānam ity ucyate.
anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne vṛkṣaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śiṃśapādyā-
bhāsaḥ saṃśayo na syāt. tatsaṃśayavat pārthivatvadravyatvādyābhāso
'pi saṃśayaḥ syāt. yatas tu <vṛkṣaśabdo 'pārthivādiṣu na dṛṣṭaḥ>, ato
vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam. <āha ca>

> vṛkṣatvapārthivadravyasajjñeyāḥ prātilomyataḥ
> catustridvyeka sandehe nimittam, niścaye 'nyathā [35]

<ity antaraślokaḥ>.

§48. na ca sambandhadvāraṃ muktvā śabdasya liṅgasya vā svārtha-
khyāpanaśaktir asti, tasyānekadharmatve sarvathā pratyāyanāsambha-
vāt, <svārthāvyabhicāraś ca> bhedānabhidhānāt. evaṃ tāvat pūrvok-
tadoṣasyābhāvaḥ.

§49. anantarasyāpy abhāvaḥ. <katham? yasmād>

> vyāpter anyaniṣedhasya tadbhedārthair abhinnatā. [36ab]

sāmānyaśabdasya hi yat kṛtyam arthāntaravyudāsaḥ sa svabhedāprati-
kṣepeṇeti bhedaśrutyā saha sāmānādhikaraṇyam upapannam. <tasmāt
svabhedārthair pṛthakśrutidoṣo nāsti>. [...] tathā hi svārthāvyabhi-
cāraḥ <kevalasyānyatrāvṛtteḥ>.

§50. paścimasyāpi doṣasyā<bhāvaḥ>,

> sākṣād vṛtter abhedāc ca. [36c]

na hy arthāntaram upādāya <śabdaḥ svabhedeṣu vartate>. tasmāt pāra-
tantryeṇa <svabhedānākṣepadoṣo nāsti>. bhāktadoṣo 'pi nāsti, nāpi
bhedānavasthānād anabhidhānadoṣaḥ. avyāpakatvāc cāsāmānyadoṣo
'pi nāsti, arthāntarāpohamātrasyābhinnatvād adravyatvāc ca. ata eva
<sāmānyaviśeṣāntarayogānusaraṇaṃ na kartavyam>, sākṣād arthānta-
rapratiṣedhāt. <evaṃ pūrvadoṣābhāvād> arthāntarāpoha eva śabdār-
thaḥ sādhuḥ.

§51. <atra ca>

> jātidharmavyavasthiteḥ. [36d]

jātidharmāś caiketvanityatvapratyekaparisamāptilakṣaṇā atraiva vya-
vatiṣṭhante, abhedāt, āśrayāvicchedāt, kṛtsnārthapratīteḥ. <evam pūr-
voktadoṣābhāvād> guṇotkarṣāc ca śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān
āha.

§52. <evaṃ sati>,

apohaniyamaḥ kasmāt? [37a]

rūpaśabdena rasādayo apohyante, na punar anyatamavarṇābhidhāne
śeṣā varṇā <atyantabhinnā api. sa kiṅkṛtaḥ>? yasya tu rūpatvam abhin-
naṃ nīlādiṣv evāsti, na rasādiṣv <ity evam eṣa doṣo nāstīti cet>. [...]

lokarūḍho na mṛśyate. [37b]

uktaṃ hi <Bhagavatā>: "janapadaniruktiṃ nābhiniviśeta saṃjñāṃ ca
lokasya nābhidhāvet." tasmād asmābhir api <lokavyavahārā naimittikā
vā> pāribhāṣikā <vā> bhūtārthatvena na mṛśyante, lokavad evānu-
gamyante. siddhaś ca rūpaśabdo loke nīlādiṣv eva, na rasādiṣu.

§53. rūpatve tulyam etac ca. [37c]

<yasya ca atyantabhinneṣu nīlādiṣu rūpatvavṛttiḥ, tasya kena rasā-
dyavṛttiḥ?> rasādyavṛttivad vā pītādyavṛttiḥ?
asty atra <kāraṇam>. sati svabhāvabhede <nīlādiṣv eva cākṣuṣatvam
abhinnaṃ, na rasādiṣu>.

cākṣuṣatve kriyākṛtaḥ. [37d]

cākṣuṣā <hi grāhyaṃ cākṣuṣatvam; <evaṃ ca> kriyānimitto <nīlā-
diṣu> rūpaśabdaḥ syāt, na tu jātinimittaḥ. cākṣuṣatvābhede hi kim
punā rūpatvena? atha rūpatvasambandhasya nimittaṃ cākṣuṣatvam
<uktam iti cet>, evam api <cākṣuṣatve samavāyaḥ> kriyākṛtaḥ prāp-
noti, rūpatvābhivyaktir vā. cākṣuṣatve 'pi vā <niyamaḥ kasmāt>?
tasmād avaśyaṃ svabhāvikatvam āśrayaṇīyam.

dravyādiṣu prasaṅgaś ca. [38a]

<dravyasaṅkhyāparimāṇādīnāṃ cākṣuṣatvāt teṣv api rūpatvaprasaṅgaḥ
syāt>. <kiṃ ca>

bhedābhāvaḥ sitādiṣu. **[38b]**

<cākṣuṣatvāviśeṣe nīlapītanīlataranīlatamāder bhedo na syāt>. tasmād avaśyaṃ cākṣuṣatvavyatirekeṇa <nīlapītādiṣu bhinneṣv api> rūpaśabdo loke rūḍher anugantavyaḥ, na rasādiṣu.

§54. yadi cārthāntaranivṛttyanapekṣatāyāṃ <śabdasyārthābhidhānaṃ syāt, tarhy>

anvayād eva siddhiḥ syāt, **[38c]**

na tu <śabdasyārthābhidhāne> 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ syāt; iṣyate ca. anyatarobhayāvadhāraṇenābhidhānasāphalyād vyatirekato 'py arthābhidhānam, <tadyathā> "kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma."

§55. nanu cā<pohamātre śabdārthe> vyatirekād evābhidhānāṃ syāt. syād etad evaṃ <yady anvayo neṣyeta>, bhāvena tu

mukhyena <vyāptir neṣyate>. **[38d]**

na hi bhāveṣu <jātiḥ sambhavati vyatiriktā vā syād avyatiriktā vety> uktam. jātivyatirekeṇa tv <"adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārtha" ity etenā>rthāntarāpohaviśiṣṭe 'rthe <śabdasyānvayavyatirekau na bhinnārthau>.

§56. yas tv āha "yadi gavādi vyaktaṃ sarvam asato vikāraḥ, sarvātmyaprasaṅgāt prayuktam asataḥ sadātmakatvam" iti.

asatsamanvitaṃ sarvam <yasya tv abhyupagacchataḥ> sattvam anekātmakatvād iti kiṃ kena yujyate? **[39]**

<yadi sarvam asatsamanvitam ity abhyupagamyeta>, tatra katame 'nye gavādayo <'santaḥ kena svabhāvena sattvādhyaropyāḥ syuḥ?>. sarvān hi gavādīn <asatsamanvitān> abhyupagacchato 'sataḥ sadātmakatvaṃ prāptam ity uttaraṃ na yujyate. yad apy uktam "pratyayābhedaḥ syād asatsatoḥ, prakṛtipratyayo hi vikāre dṛṣṭaḥ, tadyathā mṛtpratyayaḥ śarāvādau," <tatra>,

mṛdabhede śarāvādibhedadhī yadi ceṣyate asadabhede bhedadhīḥ kim iti <sā> nidhāryate? **[40]**

<yathā hi mṛdbhyo 'bhinnatve 'pi tadmātrapratyayaprasaṅge> kenāpi vidhena <śaravādipratyayabhedo 'bhyupagamyate, tathā> śabdabhedabhāvanāvaśāt <sadasatoḥ pratyayabhedaḥ kiṃ neṣyate>. tavāpi hi

> guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛṣṭipatham ṛcchati
> yat tu dṛṣṭipathaprāptaṃ tan māyeva sutucchakam

§57. sāsnādidarśanād <gopratyayo yo 'yam udāhṛtaḥ
so> viruddho bhavanmatyā. bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ [41]

yasya hi [...] abhyupagamyāyaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddhaḥ. śabdabhedād dhi <gosāsnādiṣu bhinnam apohyam>.

> "so 'napekṣa" <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam>
> nirapoham [...]. [42]

sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavatīti pūrvam evopapāditam. svarūpaṃ tv ten<āvyāvahārikam> anabhilāpyatvāt.

§58. yac coktam <ādyapratyayo> nāstīti, <tatra>

> iṣṭisiddhir anāditvāt. [43a]

[...]. yasya tu [...] na ca śakyaṃ jātimad vyāptum, na ca [...].

§59. yad apy uktaṃ pratyayavṛttir eva nāsti, tad apy ayuktam.

> sāmānyena nirākṛteḥ. [43b]

na hi so 'nyāṃ jātiṃ pratidravyam apohate, kiṃ tarhi vyavacchedyavivakṣayaikena sāmānyadharmeṇa. uktaṃ cātra vijātīye 'darśanamātreṇānumānam. tavaiva tv eṣa doṣaḥ. yadi svajātīyavyāptyā <varteta, vyāpyasyānantyaṃ syāt>. tasmād yathā <viṣāṇitvād anaśva ity vacane 'śve viṣāṇitvādarśanena tadvyavacchedānumānam>, na tu <karkādīn> pratyekam apohate, <nāpy ekaikeṣu gavādiṣu vartate. tavāpi vyāvṛttyanuvṛttibuddhimatam>. tathā <cā>tra nyāyaḥ.

§60. upetyātmāntarābhavam ekānekatvakalpanā

> na yuktā vastuni hy eṣā. [44a-c]

<vastu hi yat sadātma, tasya> yuktam ekānekatvaṃ kalpayitum, na tv ātmāntarābhāvam abhyupetya.

> tavāpy avyaktavyaktiṣu. **[44d]**

tulyaḥ prasaṅgaḥ. <avyakte hi> vikāraśaktīnām aikye vikārabhedo na syāt. nānātve tu pradhānasyaikatvavirodhaḥ śaktibhyo 'nanyatvāt.

> iyaṃ ca śabdavācye 'rthe cintā <nedriyagocare>. **[45ab]**
> [...]

anirdeśyo hi pratyakṣārthaḥ. "ātmāntarābhāva ātmāntaram" iti nirdeśyam praty uktam. tasmān nāsya pratyakṣe prakṣepaḥ.

§61. atra ca

> apoddhāre padasyāyaṃ vākyād artho vikalpitaḥ
> vākyārthaḥ pratibhākhyo 'yaṃ tenādāv upajanyate. **[46]**

padasyāsato <'pi> vākyād apoddhṛtasya yathāgamaṃ utprekṣayārtho vyavasthāpyate kevalasyāprayogāt prakṛtipratyayavat. sā cotprekṣā-nyeṣv āgameṣv ayuktārthagrahaṇī. tasmād idam arthāntaram utkṣiptam, <yasmād ādāv anabhyastaśabdārthasambandhānām padārthagrahaṇopāyā vākyārthapratibhā>. vākyam eva tadarthaś ca mukhyau śabdārthau, tayor abhinnatvāt. <yo hy anyaḥ tadantarāle śabdārthagrahaṇābhimānaḥ, sa utprekṣayā, niraṅkuśatvāt>.

§62. <ye 'py artheṣu> pratibhāṃ hitvā anyam bāhyam arthaṃ <tat-sambandhaṃ> vā vākyārthaṃ kalpayanti, teṣām api tat kalpanāmā-tram. <kasmāt?>

> yathābhyāsaṃ hi vākyebhyo vināpy arthena jāyate
> svapratyayānukāreṇa pratipattir anekadhā. **[47]**

<asaty api bāhye 'rthe> svapratyayānurūpyeṇārthābhyāsavāsanāpekṣā vākyād arthakriyāpratipattir nānārūpotpadyate vikalpaś ca, vyāghrā-diśrutivat. tadaviśeṣe vā śṛṅgārakāvyasya śravaṇavād rāgiṇāṃ rāgānu-rūpā pratītir bhavati, vītarāgāṇāṃ tu saṃvegānurūpā.

§63. sāpi vākyāntarārthebhyo <vyavacchinne> 'rtha iṣyate
sambandhābhijñasya. <tasmāt sānumānād na bhidyate> **[48]**

[...]
   pratipattis tu yā vākyād [...] **[49]**
[...].

§64. yuktaṃ tāvan <naimittikeṣu śabdeṣv> anyāpohenārthābhidhā-
nām, yādṛcchikeṣu tu katham?

   yādṛcchike 'py <arthābhedāt>. **[50a]**

yādṛcchiko hi samudāyavācī ditthādiśabdaḥ <samudāyino> 'bhedenā-
ha. kas tarhi jātisamudāyaśabdayor viśeṣa iti. na kaścit. prasiddhivaśāj
jātiśabdaḥ <kvacit> pratyekam apy avayaveṣūpacaryate. tadyathā
abhakṣyo grāmyasūkara iti. kvacin mukhyaḥ. yathā

   sāṃkhyāpramāṇasaṃsthānanirapekṣaḥ pravartate
   bindau ca samudāye ca vācakaḥ salilādiṣu
                              [VP II 156]

<ity uktam>.

   saṃsthānavarṇāvayavair viśiṣṭe yaḥ prayujyate
   śabdo na tasyāvayave pravṛttir upalabhyate
                              [VP II 155]

[...] varṇaviśiṣṭe citraḥ kalmāṣaḥ. avayavaviśiṣṭe [...] pratyekam pari-
samāpyate [...] upacaritaḥ. [...] <tadyathā> "kāyakarmaṇā 'tmakārma
vyākhyātam" (VS V.2:18). [...]

§65. <ath>ākṛtasambandhaśabd<ād> yā pratītiḥ, <tadyathā yad uktaṃ
'ayam panasa' iti, tatra> katham anumānam? iti. na tatra <panasa-
śabdād arthapratītiḥ. kasmāt>?

   pratīten<ārthadarśanāt>. **[50b]**

[...] ayaṃśabdena [...] kim tarhi saṃjñāvyutpattiḥ. sambandhapradar-
śanārthaṃ tu <tasya saṃjñārthasyāyaṃśabdena sāmānādhikaraṇyam>
ubhayor abhidheya iti kṛtvā. atādarthyāc ca saṃjñārthaḥ panasa-
śabdaḥ.

§66. yo 'yaṃ sambandhaḥ sa eva tarhi śabdasya <prameyam> bhaviṣ-
yati.

<na, sambandho vikalpitāt>. **[50c]**

sambandho hi <panasaśabdārthau> pramāṇāntareṇopalabhya '<asyā-
yam' iti> manasā kalpyate, anumānānumeyasambandhavat, <tato na
śābdam pramāṇāntaram>.

§67. atha śeṣam upamānādi kathaṃ <na pramāṇāntaram>?

śeṣam uktam diśānayā **[50d]**

upamānaṃ tāvad gogavayādiṣu sārūpyapratipattyartham. tatra parata
upaśrutya yā pratītiḥ sā śābdam. svayaṃ tu dvayārtham <pramāṇan-
tareṇā>dhigamya manasā sārūpyaṃ <yadā> kalpayati, <tadā> tad api
na pramāṇāntaram. nāpy evam adhigamyamānam sārūpyam prame-
yam. evam anyāny apy anumānavikalpāvyatiriktatvāt parikṣiptavyāni.

Appendix 2

Ms B 192a2-193a1 contains Jinendrabuddhi's discussion of whether
or not the logical canon of the *trairūpya* applies to the verbal sign
(*śabda*), and if so, in what way. The discussion is closely related to a
similar debate that follows the quotation of PS V 1 at TŚP 539,22-23
on TS 1514. It is obvious that Jinendrabuddhi's discussion presup-
poses the same arguments as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, even
though his formulation of the *pūrvapakṣa* in spite of conspicuous
similarities differs somewhat in detail from the one presented in TS
and TSP. The historically interesting question is whether it is possible
to identify the author of the arguments that Jinendrabuddhi attempts to
answer. Kumārila criticized Dignāga's view that the verbal sign–the
syntactical word (*pada*) or other speech units–is subject to the con-
straints of the triple format of the *trairūpya* in ŚV Śabdapariccheda,
which contains an essential part of his criticism of the *apoha* thesis.
His main arguments are presented by Śāntarakṣita at TS 1490ff
quoting the relevant passages from ŚV Śabdapariccheda verses 56, 83
through 88, and 98. As mentioned in the English translation note 9
above, Dharmakīrti introduced the idea that the inferential nature of
the verbal sign consists in its indicating the speaker's intention
(*vivakṣā*)–a view that can be traced to the grammarian-philosopher
Bhartṛhari–and Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla address
the criticism levelled at Dharmakīrti's view. Who was this scholar? It
is possible to suggest a plausible identification on the basis of two
ślokas, which Kamalaśīla quotes in the course of his presentation of
the opponent's view. The first reads: *saṅketāpekṣayā tasya hṛdi kṛtvā
prakāśanam, anumānatvam uddiṣṭaṃ na tu tattvavyapekṣayā.* This
verse would seem to address a statement at PV I 327: *vivakṣā niyame
hetuḥ saṅketas tatprakāśanaḥ,* cf. PVSV ad loc. If we take into con-
sideration that Kamalaśīla in the same context quotes ŚV Codanā-
sūtram 138[1] which has a close parallel in verses from Kumārila's
Bṛhattīkā quoted at Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali 24,27ff it is highly likely
that Jinendrabuddhi and his younger contemporaries, Śāntarakṣita and
Kamalaśīla, address Kumārila's criticism of Dharmakīrti's view. The
pūrvapakṣa includes as indicated below quotations from Dharma-
kīrti's PVin and PVSV. They must have been embedded in the source
Jinendrabuddhi used as basis for his rebuttal. If the identification of
the work as Kumārila's *Bṛhattīkā* is correct we must conclude that this
work like his other *ṭīkās* on the Jaiminīyasūtras formally consisted of

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[1] I am indebted to Helmut Krasser for this reference.

verses embedded in a prose commentary, and, moreover, that the anonymous author, who as suggested may be Kumārila, knew Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya.* There is no doubt that Kumārila addressed
Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's *apoha* theory because the
views mentioned at TS 901-4 are quoted by Karṇakagomin (PVSVT
131,16ff) as refuted by Dharmakīrti. Karṇakagomin's claim is, of
course, an anachronism because Dharmakīrti never managed to
address Kumārila's criticism of his philosophy. I assume, for instance,
that Śāntarakṣita lifted, from the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā,* the criticism aimed at the
apoha theory, which he quotes at TS 901-4, since the critique quoted
at TS 904cd incorporates a citation of PV I 72c as part of his criticism:
itaretarabhedo 'sya bījaṃ cet pakṣa eṣa naḥ, which is in line with the
quotations from Dharmakīrti's works found in the passage from PSṬ
edited below. Quotations from Dharmakīrti's works are printed in
roman as well as those passages that PSṬ and TSP have in common.

*kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasya trairūpyam? kathaṃ ca na syāt. dharmiṇo
'yogāt. tathā hi śabdārthasya na dharmitvam upapadyate, pratyāyyatvād anityatvavat. na cārthe śabdasya pakṣadarśanam, vaktari sthitatvāt, tatraivopalabdheḥ. tasmāt pramāṇāntaram evedam, yathāsamayam arthapratipattiheṭtvāt. tad etac chābdasya prāmāṇyaviṣayāparijñānād evam ucyate. na hi tasya bāhye 'rthe prāmāṇyam. tathā hi na
tad tasya bhāva eva bhavati.*
kva tarhi?
*vivakṣāyām. tatra cāsty eva śabdasya trairūpyam. tathā hi vivakṣāvān
puruṣo dharmī, vivakṣā sādhyadharmaḥ, vivakṣāvaty evopalambhanāt, śabdasya pakṣadharmatvam, vivakṣāvān pūrvānubhūtaḥ sapak
ṣaḥ, tadvyatireko vipakṣa iti. kathaṃ trairūpyaṃ na sambhavati?*
nanu ca vivakṣāyām api naivetasya prāmāṇyaṃ yujyate. tathā hi (cf.
TSP 540,13ff) *vivakṣāsāmānye vā prāmāṇyaṃ syāt, vivakṣāviśeṣe vā.*
na tāvat *sāmānye. tena vyavahārāyogāt. yadi hi vivakṣāsāmānyaṃ
śabdasyārthaḥ syāt, gaur ity ukte nav<āva>dhāritavarṇavibhāgaḥ
kim ayam āha? iti, na paryanuyuñjīte, śabdoccāraṇamātrād eva
vivakṣāsāmānyasya vijñātatvāt. vivakṣāsāmānyārthavattv<ān> <na>
śabdāḥ pravṛttihetavo bhaveyuḥ. na hi vivakṣāsāmānyena kaścid
arthī; pravṛttyaṅga<ñ ca> pramāṇam,* "na hy ābhyām artham paricchidya pravartamāno 'rthakriyāyāṃ visamvādyata" *(PVin I.1) ity
abhidhānāt. tad evaṃ na vivakṣāsāmānye prāmāṇyam, nāpi* viśeṣe,
vyabhicārāt. *sa punar... vivakṣāviśeṣavataḥ śabdāntaropalabdheḥ.*²
tathā hy uktaṃ yathā rakto bravīti, tathā virakto 'pīti (cf. PVSV 9,7-

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² This clause is evidently incomplete and impossible to construe.

8).[3] *śabda*vyavahārā *hi* buddhipūrvam anyathāpi śakyante kartum (cf. PVSV 110,13). *tato na śabdebhyo viśeṣaniścayaḥ, viśeṣa eva ca vyavahārāṅgam, tasya cāvadhārayitum aśakyatvāt kutaḥ śābdasya prāmāṇyam.*

tatra yad uktaṃ na vivakṣāsāmānyam avyabhicāre 'pi śabdārthaḥ, tena vyavahārāyogād iti, tad ayuktam. yo hi santānāntaramātrasādh-yārthakriyārthī, tasya kathaṃ na vivakṣāsāmānyaṃ vyavahārāṅgam, na hy asau śabdād vivakṣāsāmānyam paricchidya pravartamānaḥ santānāntaramātrasādhyāyām arthakriyāyāṃ visaṃvādyate. yad apy uktaṃ nāpi viśeṣe prāmāṇyam, vyabhicārād iti, tad apy asat, viśe-ṣasyaiva hetutvāt. viśeṣasya duranvayatvād ayuktaṃ hetutvam iti cet. dhūmasyāpi tarhi hetutvaṃ na syāt. na hy asāv api māyākāranirmitād dhūmābhāsād <bh>ūtasaṅghātād anyavyāvṛttena rūpeṇa sarveṇa pratipattrāvadhārayituṃ śaktaḥ. taṃ prati tasyānumānāṃgatvam. tad etad itaratrāpi samānaṃ; atha vā, pratipattāvisaṃvādivacanaḥ khalv ayam īdṛśo yatrābhiniveśa<ḥ>. tadvacanasyāvisaṃvādatulyatām adhyāropyānumānaṃ karoti. ataḥ pratipattur abhidhānaprāyo viśeṣa-vaśād viśeṣeśabdasyānumānatvam uktam, na punaḥ paramārthataḥ.

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[3] Cf. Karṇakagomi's PVSVṬ 397, 19: *tathā hi sarāgā api vītarāgavad ātmānan darśayanti vītarāgāś ca sārāgavat.*

Appendix 3

After having addressed the problem that Dignāga has not substantiated the *apoha* theory when making the bold claim at PSV V:11d that his theory stands unchallenged, Jinendrabuddhi continues expounding in an excursus some of the theoretical issues which Dharmakīti addressed in his own exposition of the *apoha* theory in PVSV. Jinendrabuddhi's excursus consists to a large extent of quotations or slightly edited quotations from Dharmakīrti's PVSV interspersed with his own explanations inserted in order to contextualise the topics that he addresses. This section was translated into English by Th. Stcherbatsky from the Tibetan version of PSṬ as "Jinendrabuddhi on the Theory of the Negative Meaning of Names" (cf. *Buddhist logic* I: 461-471) without recognizing that Jinendrabuddhi's exposition is indebted to Dharmakīrtian philosophy. On account of the historical interest of this excursus it is here reproduced from Ms B 205a2-208a1. The quotations from PVSV are printed in roman and traced to their context. It is historically interesting that Jinendrabuddhi connects Dharmakīrti's rejection of the view that the *apoha* theory entails that any given word has two functions (*dvau vyāparau*) namely affirmation and negation to Bhāmaha's criticism of Dignāga's *apoha* theory at Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.17-18, as do Śāntarakṣita at TS 911-12 (cf. TSP 359,15-17 ad loc.) and TS 1019d. The identification is corroborated by Karṇakagomi at PVSVṬ 250,19-22 on PV I 127ab: *na cāpi śabdo dvayakṛd anyonyābhābhāva ity asau.*[4] It is significant that Karṇakagomin in his comment on this line quotes Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.17-18 with the remark that this objection is hereby rejected (*iti nirastam*). Śāntarakṣita's critique of Bhāmaha's objection at TS 1019d: *nānvayo 'vyatirekavān* repeats Dharmakīrti's own argument at PVSV 63,14-15: *na hy anvayo 'vyatireko 'nanvayo vā vyatirekaḥ,* which explains the statement *anyonyābhābhāva ity asau* of PV I 127b. This shows that these important writers agreed on the philosophical context of Dharmakīrti's argument. Their identification of Bhāmaha as the target of Dharmakīrti's rebuttal solves the much discussed problem of

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[4] Śākyamati appears to believe that Dharmakīrti answers objections made by Kumārila and others. As all commentators agree in identifying the addressee of Dharmakīrti's remarks with Bhāmaha, Śākyamati's identification is peculiar, in particular as the objection Dharmakīrti addresses is not found in Kumārila's Ślokavārttika. Cf. Śākyamati's remarks on the relevant passage of PVSV: *gźan bzlog pa ni śugs kyis yin pas sgra la bya ba gñis ni med do, de bas na gŹon nu ma len pa la sogs pas* (Kumārila etc.) *sgra gcig gis bya ba gñis mi nus pa'i phyir thams cad du sgra gñis brjod par thal bar 'gyur ro źes smras pa gaṅ yin pa de spaṅs pa yin no.*

Bhāmaha's date as there is no reason to believe that the view that PV I 127b addresses Bhāmaha's objection only originated with Śānta-rakṣita, Jinendrabuddhi, and Karṇakagomin who are fairly close in time to Dharmakīrti and therefore must have been in contact with the tradition of the Dharmakīrti circle of students. Bhāmaha's views are not mentioned or presumed by Kumārila and Uddyotakara, whose criticism of the *apoha* theory was addressed by Dharmakīrti. Bhāmaha's Kāvyālaṅkāra may therefore have been i circulation after the composition of Ślokavārttika and Nyāyavārttika. Thus the evidence makes it possible to conclude that Bhāmaha may have been an older contemporary of Dharmakīrti. This conclusion is not contradicted by Bhāmaha's mention of some Nyāsakāra at Kāvyālaṅ-kāra VI 36. For even though Jinendrabuddhi is known as the Nyāsa-kāra par excellence, the examples attributed by Bhāmaha to the Nyāsakāra are not mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi in the Nyāsa under the Pāṇinian rules to which Bhāmaha refers. On the other hand, Sanskrit grammatical literature mention other Nyāsakāras than Jinen-drabuddhi. We must therefore conlude that Bhāmaha is referring to one of the unknown Nyāsakāras.[5]

Quotations from PVSV are printed in Roman and traced to their context in Dharmakīrti's work.

kim punar atrāpohamātram abhidheytvenābhihitam atha tadviśiṣṭam. kiṃ cātaḥ? yady anyāpohamātraṃ "svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣata" (PS V:1cd) *iti granthavirodhaḥ, svārthād bhedenānyāpohasyāśrita-tvāt. tathā* "tasya vastunaḥ kaścid bhāgo 'rthāntaranivṛttyā gamyate (Dvādaśaśatikā)," "śabdo arthāntarnivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āhe"tyādayo (PSV V:36d) *nirdeśās tadvatpakṣasya sūcakā virudh-yante. atha tadviśiṣṭan* "tenānyāpohakṛc chrutir" iti (PS V:11d) *vyāhanyate. yasmād anyāpohaṃ karotīti, abhyāpayatīty arthaḥ. yathā nañpratiṣedhaṃ karotīty atra. na hi śabdasyānyakaraṇaṃ sambha-vati. tadvatpakṣaś ca syād, na pakṣāntaram. tataś ca tadvatpakṣoditā doṣā ihāpi prasajyeran. naiṣa doṣaḥ. anyāpoha eva hi śabdārtho, na ca virodhaḥ. yato yo 'sau svārthaḥ sa evānyāpohakṛd ity atrānyā-pohaśabdenoktaḥ.* "anyāpohena bhāṣata" (PS V:1d) *ity asya tu pra-yojanam uktam. api caikabhedacodane 'py <anya>vyāvṛttigater[6] anvayavyatirekacodan<ay>ā vyavahārāṅgatāṃ[7] śabdānāṃ darśayan* "anyāpohena bhāṣate," "tasya vastunaḥ kaścit bhāgo 'rthāntarani-vṛttyā gamyate" (Dvādaśaśatikā), "śabdo 'rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva

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[5]Cf. Introduction 5.6-8.
[6]em. (cf. *gźan las ldog pa rtogs pa* T) : *avyāvṛttigater* Ms.
[7]em. : °*āṃ matāṃ* Ms.

bhāvān āhe" tyādy[8](3) (PSV V:36d) *āha,* na *tu* viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvam (cf. PVSV 62,26-63,1, 63,9). *nanu* cānvayamātracodanayaiva vyatirekamātracodanayaiva vā śabdasya vyavahārāṅgatā bhaviṣyati. *naitad asti.* ekānvayasya parihāryābhāve niṣphalacodanatvāt tathaiva parihāryasya kvacit sthityabhāve, na cānvayo 'vyatireko nāpi vyatire-ko 'nanvayaḥ (cf. PVSV 63,10-15). *svārthasyaiva hi pratyāyanam anvayaḥ. na cāsau vyatirekam antareṇa sambhavati. svārthād arthān-tarasyaiva vyavacchedo vyatirekaḥ. so 'pi na vinānvayenāvakalpate.* ata eva ca śabdasya na dvau vyāpārau tadanyavyāvartanaṃ ca svārthā-bhidhānaṃ ca svārthasya bhedarūpatvāt, tadabhidhānād eva tadanya-vyāvṛttigateḥ (cf. PVSV 63,13-14). *yath"āyam asya bhrāte"ty ukte bhrātṛtvasyobhayagatatvād ekasyāpi bhrātṛtvābhidhāne nāntarīyaka-tvād itarasyāpi bhrātṛtvaṃ gamyate. tathā dvayor bhidyamānayor bhedasyobhayagatatvāt, ekabhedacodane 'pi nāntarīyakatvāt tadanya-vyāvṛttiḥ* (cf. PVSV 63,7-8). *tataś ca yad ucyate: "yady arthānta-rāpohaṃ śrutiḥ karoti tasyāḥ pratiṣedha eva caritārthatvāt svārtha-pratyāyanāya śabdāntaram mṛgyatām"[9] iti, tad asaṅgatam. yataḥ śabdaḥ svārtham eva pratyāyayati, tasmin tu pratīyamāne nāntarīya-katvād arthāntaravyāvṛttir gamyata iti. tad evam apoha eva śab-dārthaḥ, na ca kaścit virodha iti. kaḥ punar asau śabdasyārthaḥ? yo 'sau vivakṣāyāḥ sāmānyākāraḥ. sa ca vivakṣāyām ananya[10] iti vivak-ṣāyāṃ śabdasya prāmāṇyam uktam. nanu ca sāmānyaṃ śabdārthaḥ; tataḥ katham buddhipratibhāsaḥ śabdasya viṣaya ucyate. sa eva khalu sāmānyaṃ vyavasthāpyate. kathaṃ?* ihendriyālokamanaskārā ātmen-driyamanorthasannikarṣā vā yathā asaty api sāmānye bhinnā api rūpa-jñānam ekaṃ jananti, tathā śiṃśapādayo 'pi bhedāḥ parasparānvaye 'pi svānubhavadvāreṇa vikalpavāsanām prabodhayantaḥ prakṛtyaiva vikalpakam ekam abhinnapratibhāsam jñānaṃ janayanti (cf. PVSV 41,1-4). sā caikasādhyasādhanatayā anyavivekinām vikalpavāsanāyā api prakṛtir[11] yat tadvaśena tadutpadyamānaṃ (cf. PVSV 38,20-22) bhinnam eṣāṃ rūpam tirodhāya pratibhāsam vābhinnam ātmīyam eṣv adhyāropya (cf. PVV 38,18-19) bhinnān api tān abhinnān iva kenacid ākāreṇa darśayati. tasya yo bhinnaḥ pratibhāso bāhya ivārthakri-yākārīva vyaktibhedānuyāyī ca bhrāntaiḥ pratipattṛbhir bāhyatvenā-dhyavasitaḥ. sa bhāvanām buddhiparvartinām eva bahir iva parisphu-ratām pratipattur abhiprāyānurodhena sāmānyaṃ vyavasthāpyate (cf.

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[8]em. : *āheyody* Ms.
[9]Cf. Kāvyālaṅkāra VI.17d: *yadi gaur ity ayaṃ śabdaḥ kṛtārtho 'nyanirākṛtau, janako gavi gobuddher mṛgyatām aparo dhvaniḥ,* and the parallel at TS 911, PVSVṬ 250,19-22.
[10]*ananya* Ms (cf. *mi 'khrul* T).
[11]em. : *apy aprakṛtir* Ms

PVSV 38,25-39,1). katham idānīm anyāpohaḥ sāmānya\<m\> śabdārtha
ity ucyate. sa eva khalv anyāpohaḥ (cf. PVSV 39,1-2). katham? sa eva
yāvatā bāhyānām arthāntaravyāvṛttir anyāpohaḥ. vyāvṛttir anyāpoho
'rthāntaravyavaccheda ityādayo hi paryāyāḥ. na ca vyāvṛttir vyāvṛtti-
mato 'nyābhimatā. tataḥ katham bāhyasvalakṣaṇātmako 'nyāpoho jñā-
nākārasvabhāvaḥ syāt (cf. PVSV 39,4-5). naiṣa doṣaḥ. tattvam vicāra-
yanto vyākhyātāraḥ khalv evaṃvivekaṃ kurvanto, netare. te tu tam
eva bauddham ākāram arthakriyāyogyam manyamānāḥ saṅketavya-
vahārakālayor dṛśyavikalpāv arthāv ekatvenādhyavasyanti. atas tad-
abhiprāyavaśād bāhyārthaviṣayo 'nyāpoha ity ucyate (cf. PVSV 39,5-
8). pratibhāsabhedādibhyas tu tatvacintāyāṃ vipaścito nābhedam
anumanyante (cf. PVSV 39,9-10). kiṃ cāyam abhinnākārā buddhir
utpadyate tasyā anyāpoha evāśraya iti (cf. PVSV 39,14-15) darśayi-
tuṃ śabdasya viṣayo 'nyāpoha ity uktam. tasya vastuṣu bhāvāt aviro-
dhāc ca, (PVSV 39,15-16) samānabuddhir hy āśrayabhāvo 'nyāpo-
hasyāviruddhaḥ. tathā hi bhedā ekakāryatayātatkāryebhyo vyāvarta-
mānāḥ svānubhavadvāreṇa vibhramaphalavāsānāṃ[12] yā hetavo bha-
vantaḥ sāmānyākārānuraktāṃ buddhiṃ janayantīti darśitam etat. atra
sāmānyavādinaś codayanti: yady avṛkṣebhyo bhedo vṛkṣaḥ saṅketa-
kāle tasyā vṛkṣagrahaṇa\<m a\>ntareṇa tathā grahītum aśakyatvāt;
avijñātavṛkṣeṇāvṛkṣasyāpi tadvyavacchedarūpasyāparijñānād (cf.
PVSV 58,22-24) itaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ. ko 'vṛkṣa? iti praśne prāha[13] yo
na vṛkṣa iti. vṛkṣaḥ kaḥ? yo nāvṛkṣa iti. tataś ca buddhāv anārūḍhe
'rthe 'nyavyavacchedena na saṅketaḥ kartuṃ śakyata iti (cf. PVSV
58,24-25). teṣāṃ sāmānye 'pi saṅketakaraṇe avṛkṣāvyavacchinnā na
vā "yadi vyavacchinnāḥ katham prāg vṛkṣagrahaṇād ṛte jñātā" (PV I
115b$_2$-d) na hi tadā pratipattā vṛkṣaṃ vetti vṛkṣāvṛkṣaparijñānāyaiva
tadarthitayopagamāt. so 'jānānaḥ katham avṛkṣavyavaccheddam
pratipadyeta saṅkete. apratipattau ca (cf. PVV 59,3-9) parāvyavac-
chedena niveśitāc chabdāt tatparihāreṇa vyavahāre pravṛttir ayuktā,
śimśapādibhedavat (cf. PVSV 59,13-14). yadavyavacchedena yatra
saṅketitaḥ śabdaḥ, na tatra tatparihāreṇa pravartayati. tadyathā
vṛkṣatve śimśapādibhedāvyavacchedena saṅketito vṛkṣaśabdo na
tatparihāreṇa pravartayati. avṛkṣāvyavacchedena ca saṅketito vṛkṣatve
vṛkṣaśabdaḥ. viruddhavyāptaḥ. syād etan, na vastusāmānyavādinā
kasyacid vyavacchedena kiṃcid vidhīyate, kiṃ tarhy, ekam agrato
'vasthitaṃ vastu sandarśya vṛkṣo 'yam iti saṅketaḥ kriyate. tathā saṅ-
ketakāle dṛṣṭam eva sāmānyaṃ tatsambandhinaṃ vā vyavahāre 'pi
pratipadyata iti. asamānaḥ prasaṅga iti. nāsamāno yasmād (cf. PVSV

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[12]em. : °*phalāvāvāsanaṃ* Ms
[13]em. : *prāya* Ms

59,18-60,1) ekam pradarśyāyam vṛkṣa iti bruvāno (PVSV 60,4) 'va-
dhārya vā saṅketaṃ kuryād anavadhārya vā. yady avadhāryāyam eva
vṛkṣo nānya iti prāg vṛkṣagrahaṇam antareṇāparijñānann avṛkṣān
katham tadvyavacchedam pratipadyeta saṅkete. athānavadhāryāyam
api vṛkṣo 'nyo pīti. katham vyavahārakāle[14] 'nyaparihāreṇa[15] pravar-
teta pratipatteti. sa eva doṣaḥ. na doṣaḥ, dṛṣṭaviparyāyasya sujñāna-
tvāt. evaṃ hi kiṃcid dṛṣṭavato 'nyatra tadvilakṣaṇākārāṃ buddhim
anubhavataḥ, tataḥ saṅketakālagṛhītād vastunaḥ tadviparītākāram idam
anyad iti vaidharmyaniścayo bhavati. sa hy ayam eva vṛkṣa iti pra-
darśya vyutpādito yatraiva tan na paśyati tad evāvṛkṣaṃ svayam eva[16]
pratipadyate. nedam vyavacchedavādinaḥ sambhavati. ekatra dṛṣṭasya
rūpasya kvacid ananvayāt pratyakṣeṇa saṅketakālagṛhītasyordhvam[17]
apratipattiḥ satyām api pratipattau saṅketakālagṛhītā yā vyaktir vyak-
tyantare 'pi sa evāyam iti pratītir na syāt (cf. PVSV 60,5-13). tathā hi
tato yathā ghaṭo vilakṣaṇas tathā palāśādibhedo 'py anvayino rūpasyā-
nabhyupagamāt. evaṃ tarhy apohavādino 'pi tulyam etat. yasmād (cf.
PVSV 60,13) ete bhāvā bhedino 'pi pratyavamarśañānādikam ekaṃ
kāryam prakṛtyā kecit kurvanti nānye[18] (cf. PVSV 60,16-17). tān
dṛṣṭvā pratipattā ete taddhetavo nānya iti buddhyā vibhajya rāśidva-
yaṃ vyavasthāpayati. tatrāsya parasparayā eka kāryapadārthaprasūteḥ.
abhinnārthagrāhiṇī ca tadanubhavaprabhavaprakṛter avyavasitabāh-
yārthasvarūpe sāmānyākāravati pratyavamarśajñāne ya ekakāryahetu-
tvena vibhaktā bāhyā ivārthakriyākāriṇa ivānvayinā kenacid rūpe-
ṇānugatā iva pratyavabhāsyante. tān avyavasitabāhyasvabhāvān prati-
pādya pratipādavikalpeṣv abhinnapratibhāsāms taimirikadvayadvican-
dradarśanavat. svasvapratibhāsānubhave 'py ekatvenāvyavasitān dar-
śya ete vṛkṣā iti kṛte saṅkete sa bhrāntaḥ. tatraikam ivānuyāyirūpaṃ
dṛṣṭvā ataddhetutvena vibhaktān atadviparītākārān avṛkṣatvena sukh-
yam evādhyavasyati. na punar ekaṃ vastu tatrābhinnam dṛśyam asti
yasya darśanādarśanābhyāṃ bhinnadarśane 'py eva vṛkṣavibhāgaṃ
kurvīta. tasya vibhāgena daṇḍavat daṇḍinyagrahaṇāt. agṛhītasya cānu-
palakṣaṇāt. ākṛter apy ekatra dṛṣṭāyā anyatra tu draṣṭum aśakyatvāt.
tadatadvator vṛkṣāvṛkṣatve vyaktir ekaiva vṛkṣaḥ syāt (cf. PVSV 61,3-
8). *iha cāpohasvarūpavidvadbhir abhāvamātram anyāpoha ity adhyā-
ropya dūṣaṇābhidhitsayā yat paraiḥ pralapitaṃ tad anyāpohasvarū-
pasaṃvartanenaivāpakṛtam parākrāntaṃ ca tannirākaraṇāya mahāt-
mabhir ity alam atiprasaṅgena.*

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[14]em. (cf. *tha sñad kyi tshe* T) : *vyavahāra* Ms
[15]em. (cf. *yoṅs su spaṅs pas* T) : °*vyavahāreṇa* Ms
[16] (10) em. (cf. *raṅ ñid kyis*) : *ena* Ms
[17] (11) em. : °*uttare* Ms
[18](cf. *gźan rnams* T) : °*nyo* Ms

Appendix 4

Immediately after his comment on Dignāga's criticism of the view that *upamāna* is an independent means of cognition, Jinendrabuddhi inserts an excursus at Ms B 241a5-242b4 on the latest developments in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā philosophy concerning *upamāna*. Jinendra-buddhi's sources are no longer available and the names of the philosophers whose views are mentioned and criticized are not known. As is obvious from a comparison of PSṬ, TS, and TSP, the sources and presumably also their authors were known to Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla. I have traced parallels to Sanmati-tarkaprakaraṇa. The quotations are printed in roman.

Pakṣilas tv āha: āgamāhitasaṃskārasmṛtyapekṣāt sādharmyajñānāt [= NV 356,5] samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānārtha [= NBh 355,18-19] iti [= TSP 551,25-552,10] *gaur iva gavaya ity anenā-gamenāhito yaḥ saṃskāraḥ smṛtijñānahetuḥ. tasmād yā smṛtis tad-apekṣāt sādharmyajñānāt, yā sāmākhyāsambandhapratipattiḥ saṃ-jñāsaṃjñisambandhaparicchedaḥ, sa upamānasya viṣayaḥ. etad uk-tam bhavati: prathamaṃ tāvad "gaur iva gavaya" iti śabdena paric-chinatti, tato gavayaṃ dṛṣṭvā smṛtyapekṣāt sādharmyajñānād evaṃ vyavasyaty "ayaṃ sa gavaya" iti.*
etad api yadi yathāgamāt paricchinnas tathāpaśyann api paricchi-natti. tataḥ smṛtir eva, na pramāṇam. ath'āyam ('di'i sic T) *<asāv>"* iti *viśeṣapratyavamarśād viśeṣeṇa pratipadyate. tato 'numānam eva, <na> pramāṇāntaram. tathā hi yo gosadṛśaḥ, sa gavaya iti vyavasthā-yāṃ sādṛśyāl liṅgād viśiṣṭā pratītiḥ. etad uktam bhavati: dṛśyamānaḥ piṇḍo dharmī; "ayaṃ gavaya" iti saṃjñā sādhyadharmaḥ; śabdānu-bhūtapurovasthitayor yat sāmānyaṃ gogavayasādṛśyam, tat pakṣa-dharmaḥ; āgamānubhūtabuddhivyavasthito gavayo dṛṣṭānta iti. anan-topāyā ca samākhyāsambandhapratipattir iti. ka upamāna evānu-rodhaḥ (ṅor dga' ba* sic T), *tadyathā yas tuṅganāsaḥ, sa Caitro; yo 'śve, sa Maitra iti; na c' evaṃ pramāṇam.*

Śabaras tv āha: upamānam api sādṛśyam asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe buddhim utpādayati: yathā gavayadarśanaṃ gosmaraṇasyeti (MS I.1:5).
tasyāpi gṛhītaviṣayatvāt smṛtyādivat pramāṇatvaṃ anupapannam[19]*. syād etat, nānugṛhītamātrasyaiva grahaṇe 'sty upamānasya pramāṇ-yam, kiṃ tarhi sādṛśyaviśiṣṭasya; na ca tat tathā pūrvaṃ gṛhītam; ato gṛhītaviṣayatvam asiddham iti.*

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[19]*pramāṇatvaṃ anupapannam* conj. : *pramāṇyaṃ anupa* Ms

*ayuktam etat, pratyakṣata etadadhigamāt. sādṛśyaviśiṣṭam eva hi tat
pūrvam api paricchinnaṃ; avaśyaṃ caitad abhyupagantavyam, anya-
thā hi pūrvaṃ gāṃ dṛṣṭvā paścād mahiṣam api paśyate, gavi sadṛśa-
buddhiḥ syāt, na ca bhavati. tasmāt sādṛśyaviśiṣṭam api vastu gṛhya-
mānaṃ nālaṃ pramāṇāntarakalpanāyeti.*

*athaivam api tasyāpi kayācit mātrayā viśiṣṭasya grahaṇam iti pra-
māṇāntaratvaṃ kalpyate, pratyakṣataḥ paricchinne nīlotpaladravye
yad uttarakālabhāvinīlotpalam iti grahaṇam, tad api nāma pramā-
ṇāntaraṃ kalpanīyam. atrāpi hi naiva tat pūrvam nīlam utpalam ity
anenākāreṇa pratyakṣataḥ paricchinnam avikalpakatvāt. syād etad,
indriyajatvāt tasya pratyakṣa evāntarbhāvaḥ. indriyajñānam api
vyavahārakuśalasya savikalpakas bhavati. ato 'yam prasaṅga iti.*

*ayuktam etat, samayāpekṣatvāt anyathā samayānabhijño 'pi tathā
paricchindyāt; na cendriyaṃ samayam apekṣate. mā bhūd vastunaḥ
svabhāvānavasthitiḥ. tathā hi nīlotpalātmanā yad vastu vyavasthitaṃ
tatraivecchātaḥ pītaśabdasaṃkete kaścin nīlam ity adhyavasyati, kaś-
cit pītam iti. tato na jñāyeta: "kathaṃ tadvastu vyavasthitam"? iti. na
hi yathāvastusamayas tasyecchānn <apy?> avidhānāt, icchāyāś
cāvastuniyatatvāt.*

kiñ ca, yadi dṛśyamānād anyatra parokṣe *anena tat sadṛśam iti* sā-
dṛśyabuddhiḥ pramāṇāntaraṃ *kalpyate. dṛśyamānād anyatra parokṣe
anena tat visadṛśam iti visadṛśatvadhīr api pramāṇāntaraṃ sapta-
maṃ kim iti na kalpyate.*[20] *abhāvapramāṇābahirbhāvād iti cet. na,
bhāvaviṣayatvād asyāḥ. syād etad, itaretarābhāvarūpatayā visadṛśa-
buddher yo viṣayaḥ, so bhāvaviṣaya eva. tataś cātrāvaviṣayatvam
upapannam iti. yady evaṃ sadṛśabuddhiviṣaye 'py eṣa nyāyo 'stīti
sadṛśabuddher apy abhāvapramāṇābahirbhāvaprasaṅgaḥ. atha sā-
dṛśyaviśeṣaṇāpekṣam aviśeṣeṇaiva dṛśyamānāpekṣa<ṃ> pūrvadṛṣṭe
jñānam upamānam iti kalpyate. evam api Caitram paricchidya tad-
uttarakālaṃ ca tatputram avagamya evam adhyavasyati: "asya sa
pite"ti. tatrāpi sambhavaty eva: pūrvagṛhīte Caitre paścād dṛśya-
mānaputrāpekṣaḥ pitṛtvāyasāyaḥ. tathā sopānamālām ākrāmataḥ*[21]
prathamaphalakātikrame[22] *dvitīyaphalakaprāptāv abhikrānte phalake
bhavati jñānaṃ "tasyās tat pūrvam" iti dṛśyamānaphalakāpekṣa<m>,*

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[20]Cf. the verse qu. STP Vol II 583,15-16: *dṛṣyāt parokṣe sādṛśyadhīḥ
pramāṇāntaraṃ yadi, vaidharmyamatir apy eva pramāṇaṃ kiṃ na saptamam.*
[21] Cf. ŚTP Vol II 583, 17-18: *tathā sopānamālām ākrāmataḥ prathamākrāntaṃ
paścād ākrāntād dīrghaṃ mahad hrasvaṃ cetyādy anekaṃ pramāṇaṃ prasaktam
iti;* TSP 550,18-19: *"asmāt pūrvaṃ idaṃ paścād dīrghaṃ hrasvaṃ idaṃ mahat, ity
evamādivijñāne pramā 'niṣṭā prasajyate," iti vaktavyam.*
[22]*phalakātikrame* conj. : *phalaka ti krame* Ms

tasyāpy upamānatvaṃ syāt, na cābhimatasyāpi. tasmād ayuktam asya prāmāṇyam.

Abstract

Die vorliegende Dissertation präsentiert eine annotierte englische Übersetzung des fünften Kapitels der *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (PSV V) des buddhistischen Philosophen Dignāga (6. Jh. n.u.Z.), in dem Dignāga seine Sprachphilosophie (*apoha*-Theorie) darlegt, die den philosophischen Diskurs in Indien nach Dignāga für Jahrhunderte beeinflußt hat. Die originale Sanskritfassung des Textes ist nicht mehr erhalten. Abgesehen von einigen Fragmenten in Sanskrit aus der nach-Dignāgeischen philosophischen Literatur stehen als einzige vollständige Quellen für die Untersuchung von Dignāgas *apoha*-Lehre zwei schlechte, im tibetischen Kanon überlieferte Übersetzungen des Textes zur Verfügung. Die englische Übersetzung der PSV V beruht daher auf diesen beiden tibetischen Übersetzungen und den in Hattori 1982 publizierten Sanskrit Fragmenten, sowie weiteren Fragmenten, die ich in anderen Quellen gefunden habe.

Die Übersetzung wird durch eine kritische Edition großer Teile des entsprechenden fünften Kapitels des einzigen erhaltenen Sanskrit Manuskripts der *Viśālāmalavatīṭīkā* (PSṬ V) ergänzt und gestützt. Dieser Jinendrabuddhi, einem indischen Grammatiker und Philosophen der Mitte des achten Jh., zugeschriebene Kommentar ist der einzige erhaltene Kommentar zur PSV und daher eine wichtige Quelle für Informationen zum philosophischen Kontext, in dem Dignāga sein Werk verfaßt hat.

Da die Schwierigkeiten für das sprachliche und inhaltliche Verständnis der tibetischen Übersetzungen fast unüberwindbar sind, habe ich das Zeugnis des in die PSṬ V eingebetteten Sanskrit-Wortlauts dazu genutzt, viele der Abschnitte der PSV V in das Sanskrit zu rekonstruieren, soweit diese Zeugnisse sich mit den tibetischen Übersetzungen decken. Diese Rekonstruktionen beruhen auf den Zitaten der PSV V in der PSṬ und den Paraphrasen von Dignāgas originalem Sanskrit-Text durch Jinendrabuddhi.
Da Dignāgas *apoha*-Theorie eine andauernde Debatte unter den Zeitgenossen und folgenden Generationen buddhistischer und nicht-buddhistischer indischer Philosophen initiiert hat und weiterhin unter seinen modernen westlichen Interpreten Fragen und Probleme in bezug auf Bedeutung und Zweck seiner zentralen Theorie auslöst, bietet die vorgelegte Arbeit auch eine neuerliche Untersuchung der grundlegenden Voraussetzungen dieser Theorie, wie sie in PSV V dargelegt worden ist.

Abstract

This dissertation is centred on presenting an annotated English translation of chapter five of the seventh century A.D. Buddhist philosopher Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV V), in which Dignāga expounds his philosophy of language known as the *apoha* theory, which affected post-Dignāga philosophical debate in India for centuries. The original Sanskrit version of *Pramāṇa-samuccayavṛtti* (hence PSV) is no longer extant. Except for a few Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature, the only comprehensive sources available for the study of Dignāga's *apoha* doctrine are two mediocre Tibetan translations of PSV included in the Tibetan *bsTan 'gyur* and a small number of Sanskrit fragments traced to post-Dignāga philosophical literature. Thus, the English translation of PSV V is based upon its two Tibetan versions and Sanskrit fragments published in *Hattori* 1982, including Sanskrit fragments I have traced to other sources. The translation is accompanied and supported by a critical edition of the bulk of the corresponding fifth chapter of the single Sanskrit manuscript of *Viśālāmalavatī ṭīkā* (hence PSṬ V). This unique *ṭīkā* attributed to Jinendrabuddhi, a central eighth century A.D. Indian grammarian and philosopher, is the only extant commentary on PSV and thus an important source of information on the philosophical context in which Dignāga propagated his work. As the difficulties of construing the Tibetan translations are almost insuperable, I have taken advantage of the Sanskrit evidence embodied in PSṬ V and restored into Sanskrit many paragraphs PSV V, if the Sanskrit evidence is matched by the Tibetan translations. The restorations are established on the basis of quotations from PSV V presented in PSṬ and Jinendrabuddhi's paraphrases of Dignāga's original Sanskrit presentation. Since Dignāga's "*apoha* theory" generated an incessant debate among contemporary and subsequent generations of Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian philosophers, and continues to elicit questions among Dignāga's modern Western interpreters about the meaning and purpose of *anyāpoha,* this work includes a fresh study of its basic presuppositions as presented in PSV V.

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                     Japan. Topic: *Dignāga's Apoha Theory, its
                     Presuppositions and Main Theoretical
                     Implications.*

October 1991   Guest Lecturer, Aichi Gakuin University,
                     Nagoya, Japan. Topic: *The History of A
                     Critical Pāli Dictionary.*

October, 1989   Guest Lecturer, University of Vienna, Austria,
                     Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismus-
                     kunde. Presented paper: *Aspects of Dignāga's
                     Apoha Theory.*

May, 1989   Guest Lecturer, University of Hamburg,
                     Germany, Insitut für Kultur und Geschichte
                     Indiens und Tibets. Presented paper:
                     *Mahānāma on the Interpretation of Emptiness.
                     Mahānāma's reference to Ñāyagantha and
                     Saddagantha in his Commentary on the
                     Suññakathā of Paṭisambhida-magga.*

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June 1982	Guest Lecturer, University of Hamburg, Germany, Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibet. Lecture series encompassing: [1] *The Semiotics of Emptiness in Madhyamaka discourse.* [2] *Buddhism and the Question of Nibbāna. Notes on* Udāna VIII. 1–4. [3] *On the Morphology of the Tibetan Verb.*
August 1982	Lecturer, Fifth Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, The University of Oxford, England. Title: *Negation and Difference. Notes on the Semiotic Function of Negation in Dignāga's Apoha Theory.*
September 1981	Invited Lecturer, Csoma de Körös Symposium, Velm–Vienna, Austria. Presented Paper: *Emptiness – Towards a Semiotic Determination of Emptiness in Mādhyamika Discourse.*

EDUCATION

| Ph.D dissertation submitted October 2009 | Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, University of Vienna. October 2009. "Dignāga's Philosophy of Language. Texts, Translation, Annotation." |

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Cand. mag. Degree (equivalent to an M.A. Degree)	University of Århus, Denmark, 1978. History of Religion and Indology. Preliminary exam in Theology.
Additional Graduate coursework	Old Indian Society and Religion/Buddhism, Indian Philosophy. Phenomenology of Religion, Linguistics/Textual analysis/Semiotics.
Language mastery	Full command of Sanskrit, Pāli, Prakrit, Classical Tibetan, Classical Greek, Latin, English, German, French, Danish. Working knowledge of Buddhist Chinese, Japanese, Ancient Hebrew, Classical Arabic, Assyrian/Babylonian.

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LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

"The Sanskrit Version of the Pabbajjāsutta and the question as to why names of the janapadas are invariably quoted in the plural in the Pāli Canon", in The Mahachulalongkorn Journal of Buddhist Studies, Volume I 2008: 45-51.

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"Dignāga on *śabdasāmānya and śabdaviśeṣa,"* in Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, 1991: 269-280.

"Studies in the Pāli Grammarians II.1," in Journal of the Pali Text Society, XIII 1990: 175–218.
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