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Accession of Turkey to the European Union? EU
Community Interests vs. National Political Reality-
The Case of Austria.

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— *“Love what you do”* —

Never had this saying more significance for me than when I was writing this thesis. I have become so interested in this topic that I feel I could spend years researching it.

Now I want to thank the people who have made this possible.

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my grandma, Anna Frühwirth, for the person she is and for the person she taught me to be.

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I could not be any happier because having such great people around me just puts a smile on my face. What more could I really need in life?

Abstract

The founder of the modern Turkish nation, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk once said “do not be afraid of telling the truth.” In Turkey, many doubt whether the European Union has been true to this principle and suspect that the member states will always find new excuses to deny their country membership to the EU. In this paper, the major arguments against Turkey’s accession are reviewed and put in perspective. Is Turkey part of Europe and will it join the European Union? In order to answer these questions, the national debate on Turkey’s EU accession in Austria is put in contrast with a strategic view on European interests. It appears that in the context of unanimous decision-making and the politically highly salient issue of Turkey’s bid for membership, national self-interests and public opinion-based politics within each member state take precedence over EU interests and a fact-based discussion on the consequences of a Turkish EU membership. However, the fate of EU member states seems inextricably tied together, as the economic and financial crisis has exemplified, and thus in the long-run the well-being of the community will be at the center of national foreign policy considerations.

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1. Introduction

“What's called a difficult decision is a difficult decision because either way you go there are penalties.” Interestingly, this statement was made by Academy Award winner Elia Kazan who had actually been born as İlyas Kazancıoğlu in Turkey to a Greek family and later emigrated to the United States. It is as if he had foreseen the difficulties that his country of birth would later encounter in its quest to prove its European credentials. The decision whether the current member states of the European Union will accept Turkey into their club is a decision of great magnitude, as it will have tremendous repercussions on the future of “Project Europe”, its identity and structure. Europe is clearly at a crossroads. This partly explains why the accession talks with Turkey have received such large media attention and are subject of extensive public discussion within the EU member states. Public opinion is divided over the issue, but is currently clearly leaning towards rejecting Turkey's aspirations to become an EU member. The aim of this paper is thus to analyze the validity of several key arguments against Turkey's accession. The focus of this paper will lie on arguments that play a large role in public debates within the EU, as public perception will ultimately determine whether Turkey qualifies for accession. In the introduction to “Talking Turkey in Europe: Towards a differentiated communication strategy” (2008), Nathalie Tocci raised the point that in the context of Turkey's bid for membership, certain issues prevail in particular national debates while they play only a minor role in others and that therefore a differentiated analysis of national debates on the subject is needed. This argument adequately reflects the dominance of national constituencies and discourses within the EU framework and is remarkably helpful to identify national stakeholders and their underlying motives. It also highlights the fact that not all countries will be equally affected by Turkey's accession. A differentiated picture of the European public, divided along national borders, certainly needs to be taken into account, as it will ultimately be the nation states which have the last word on the decision for or against accession. Yet, the future well-being and prosperity of “Project Europe”, also requires us to assess the arguments made against an accession of Turkey in national debates from a “community perspective” and with a focus on the strategic interests of the EU as a community. It appears that in the context of unanimous decision-making and the politically highly salient issue of Turkey's bid for membership, national self-interests and public opinion-based politics within each member state take precedence over EU interests and a fact-

based discussion on the consequences of a Turkish EU membership (see Scharpf 1998, see also Elgström & Jönsson p. 690). However, the financial and economic crisis and its effects on the European Union, in particular the Euro Zone, have once again highlighted the already high level of interdependence between member states. It has reminded Europeans that the transfer of authority to supra-national institutions and the membership in the European community has intrinsically tied the fates of European states together. It has also made national governments once again painfully aware that negative developments in one member state could have adverse consequences for all others, and that the quality of decisions taken on a European level are also decisive for the future development of each member state. The financial rescue package for Greece and Ireland and the European Financial Stability Facility for other member states that could potentially require financial assistance in the future were not merely an act of solidarity or even charity- they were rooted in the recognition of a fundamental interdependence as a consequence of increased functional integration within the EU. Thus, the well-being of the community at some point converged with the self-interests of member-states (while this was initially highly disputed, the necessity for a concerted response soon became widely acknowledged) and moved into the center of national policy considerations. This has not yet been reflected to the same extent in other political debates within EU member states, such as the largely nationally framed discourses on future enlargement rounds and more specifically the prospective accession of Turkey to the EU. Community interests have not figured prominently in national debates on Turkey's accession which have largely been dominated by national self-interests and negative public perceptions. Undoubtedly, the successful implementation of the financial rescue measures in the context of the economic crisis has been contingent on implying a sense of urgency on a national level and on the fact that public opinion has deemed the EU more capable of dealing with the more severe effects of the economic crisis than individual member states (see Eurobarometer 71 & 72). On the other hand, it could also be pointed out that nation states have been extraordinarily reluctant to even engage in any type of cooperative behavior and only self-interests, namely the fear of devastating consequences for their own respective economies have prompted member states to pursue a coordinated approach. However, the underlying realization that "we are all in the same boat" and that community interests in the long-run are at the core of each member state's self-interest has once again become evident, which may also have implications for other policy domains such

as enlargement.

Lendvai has distinguished between “an ‘Enlargement literature’, which takes the perspective of the EU, and speaks from ‘within’, and an ‘Accession literature’ which looks at things from the point of view of the candidate countries (Lendvai, p.320). I argue that there is yet another set of literature which focuses on enlargement specifically from a national perspective. This paper seeks to contrast the two dimensions “from within the EU” with each other. On the one hand, this paper will thus address concerns and negative attitudes about Turkey on an aggregated European level. This must be seen against the backdrop that all of these single issues have the potential to disrupt the accession process in each one of the national political arenas and are thus relevant in this context. Moreover, it is time to intensify the Europe-wide discussion and explore whether arguments against Turkish accession that are framed in national discourses will lead to similar conclusions on an aggregated level of analysis. This will help to add considerations on a community level to peculiar national debates and make it increasingly possible for outside actors to give input on national discussions. I will specifically analyze the consequences of Turkey’s accession for European identity and put emphasis on the economic dimension of accession, as these two issues can be found on the two extremes of the subjectivity-rationality spectrum in public debate and assessing the chances of success of Turkey’s bid for EU membership requires addressing both subjective and fairly rational concerns.

On the other hand, this paper will also explore a second dimension, which focuses on some of the peculiarities of the Austrian debate on Turkey's accession in order to identify which arguments are of relevance in the Austrian context and explain why they have become politically salient. The country's position seems particularly interesting in light of the fact that the Austrian economy has been one of the main beneficiaries of the last rounds of Eastern enlargements (see Breuss 2006). At the same time, public opinion is adamantly opposed to a next round of enlargement in general and specifically one including Turkey. It seems as if public opinion in this context has been primarily driven by perceived national self-interest. Thus, it seems important to get a detailed account of the prevailing opinions within the Austrian discourse. These results will in turn be linked with the arguments made in the first section of the paper and could perhaps be useful in identifying gaps in the information and communication flows between the Austrian public and other stakeholders. This information will help to better address the

arguments corresponding to some of the legitimate concerns, while it will expose unfounded fears, exaggerations and flaws in argumentation in other instances.

It has to be kept in mind that the EU has traditionally been perceived as an elite project that has only been marginally responsive to public opinion. In recent times, however, the democratic deficit of the EU has been subject to renewed debate following the first, failed attempt to ratify the new EU Constitution (an adapted version was later ratified as the Treaty of Lisbon) and has led to increased awareness within European political elites that the public must be won over before major endeavors on the European level are undertaken. Politicians in the EU are thus more likely to take public opinion within their national electorates into consideration when deciding on Turkey's bid and the picture that the public holds of Turkey will undoubtedly play a decisive role in Turkey's accession process. Dobson (2008) has argued that "no amount of consulting the many aesthetic or sociological or religious or linguistic mythologies that underpin and color our personal and ethnic and national self-definitions will help us discover exactly which set of values defines the EU" (p.6). Yet, in political reality, it may be precisely these mythologies that ultimately drive public opinion and political decision-making and thus merit a more thorough analysis.

Emphasis should thus be put on the political narratives that dominate the discourse on Turkey's EU ambitions. These narratives should be screened for the validity of their core arguments and it should be analyzed how they evolve over time. As mentioned above, the focus will turn to the Austrian public and its interpretation of various key issues surrounding Turkey's bid for EU-membership. It is of particular interest how much background information is available to the Austrian public when it comes to precisely these key arguments that figure prominently in public discourse. The aim is to uncover the core of several arguments and contrast them with contradicting factors. In this process, the punctuated equilibrium model will be taken into account in order to explain sudden spikes in public interest and the debate that has taken place in Austria as a consequence of domestic political changes, previous EU enlargement rounds and external events, such as economic crisis. Results will indicate whether an information campaign to highlight existing misperceptions and provide the public with more in-depth information on the issue is promising at all or whether the public is already knowledgeable about the circumstances surrounding Turkey's bid for EU accession. It

is also of great interest to explore which factors could potentially form an irrevocable core of beliefs that would make a full accession of Turkey seem unlikely.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Integration Theories

The theoretical framework of this paper is rooted in integration theory. There exist a variety of theories that are applied to analyze and explain European integration. A small selection of integration theories will subsequently be introduced in order to put the issue of Turkey's prospective EU accession and EU enlargement into the wider context of European integration and to illustrate why this particular issue is of such relevance to the future of the European integration process. Moreover, this will serve as a starting point to discuss the increased importance of analyzing public opinions on European issues and illuminate the differences between competing theoretical approaches in explaining the relationship and interactions between the different spatial levels within the European Union, mainly the national and the supranational ones. Two theories have clearly dominated scholarly debates on European integration, namely neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. Both theories inherently support "the assumption of functionalism that the sheer existence of a mismatch between the territorial scale of human problems and of political authority generates pressures for jurisdictional reform" (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.3), although they come to quite different conclusions about the underlying drivers and consequences of integration.

2.1.1 Neofunctionalism

According to neofunctionalism, European integration can be defined as "a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones" (Haas, 1968, p. 16). Haas defines political community in terms of "loyalty of citizens to their government or set of institutions" (Haas 1964). "In contrast to traditional realist theories, neofunctionalism contests both that states are single

unified actors and that states are the only relevant actors in international relations” (Niemann 2006, p. 15).

“Neofunctionalism rests on three main propositions: that positive spillover from new economic integration will provide for social, cultural, and national integration; that this process will gather pace, spurring the creation of a new supranational identity; and technocrats (or non-state actors) that help in the transition will eventually replace heads of states and hold the reigns of power” (White 2010, p. 14; see also Haas 1964). It focuses on technocratic decision-making, concentrates on incremental change rather than institutional change brought about by the treaties and implicates learning processes by political elites (Niemann 2006, p.12).

In neofunctionalism the supranational institutions of the EU are the main drivers of further integration. “The advance of European integration is both indexed by and contained within the expanding authority, competence and jurisdiction of supranational institutions, accompanied conversely by the constrained autonomy, diminishing competence and contracting exclusive jurisdiction of national governments” (Puchala 1999, p.318). In addition, integrationist momentum is of course also created by the insight of national elites that national solutions may carry considerable limitations and may not be suitable to address issues that arise as a consequence of previous (mainly economic) integration (see Niemann 2006, p. 16).

Neofunctionalism is based on the assumption that functional integration in one policy domain would entail pressures for integration in other areas. As more issues shifted to the European level, the ensuing “webs of interconnectivity” would make spillovers inevitable. Subsequently, elite decision making would eventually give way to a process of politicization in which European issues would engage mass publics, but Haas also believed that politicization would actually lead national governments towards further integration (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.20; White 2010, p 14). However, in light of the negative sentiment of national constituencies with regard to ever-more functional integration, this assumption has not (yet) proved to be adequately reflected in empirical findings and does especially not seem applicable to the domain of EU enlargement.

It needs to be kept in mind that neofunctionalism in its essence does not attach significant importance to public opinion, as it assumes a “permissive consensus” in favor of European integration and views European integration as an elite-driven project. Consequently, the focus lies on the change of elite attitudes rather than changes in public opinion (Niemann 2006, p.15). Another underlying assumption of neofunctionalism is that “citizens and political actors will increasingly shift their loyalties to the new supra-national institutions and consequently to a center which supersedes the pre-existing one” (Haas 1968, p. 5). This transfer of allegiance which also entails a certain shift in identity has been highly disputed. In an analysis of comitology committees within the administrative system of the EU, Wessels, for example, did not detect such a transfer of loyalty. Consequently, he hypothesized that while national political actors (in this case national civil servants) are drawn and integrated into the supra-national political system of the EU, their allegiances did not shift towards a “European center”, but remained firmly responsive to their national “clientèle” (Wessels 1998, p.227)

2.1.2 Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism is a theory firmly rooted in a realist perspective on European integration. It is based on the premise that the nation state is at the center of the decision-making process throughout all phases of the “policy life cycle” within the European Union and that European states would continue to control the pace of integration (see White 2010, p. 15). Intergovernmentalism thus conceives regional integration as an outcome of bargaining among national states. Adherents of the intergovernmental theory of European integration identify converging national interests of states (economic interests in particular) emerging out of the currents and pressures of national politics as the key driver behind closer international co-operation in Europe (Puchala 1999, p. 319). Similarly, Moravcsik (1998) argued that states would only cooperate if they had similar interests and that the institutions they created had no life of their own. As an adherent and main proponent of liberal intergovernmentalism, Moravcsik claims “that the theory is able to explain the major turning points” in the history of European integration more convincingly than alternative theories” (Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 48). According to Elgström & Jönsson (2006, p.686) “from an intergovernmental and state-centric perspective on the character of EU negotiations,

EU decisions are determined by bargaining among state executives and generally reflect the lowest common denominator (see Moravcsik 1993; Marks et al. 1996, p. 345). Each government is primarily concerned with its own self-interests. No executive is willing to accept policies which carry negative consequences for its respective country. Apart from their own self-interests member states also have a collective interest in pursuing politics that preserve their status as “the masters of the treaty” and their power vis-à-vis supranational institutions (see Ipsen 1994). The intergovernmentalist claim that nation states are the only relevant actors in international relations has been repeatedly questioned in the context of European integration. Throughout their research endeavor on the European political framework, Hooghe & Marks for example argue to have “detected direct connections between domestic groups and European actors, which led them to reject the claim that states monopolize the representation of their citizens in international relations” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.2).

A comparison between the two theoretical streams of neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism led Hooghe & Marks (2008, p.4) to conclude that “neofunctionalists are most concerned with day-to-day policy making, in which transnational groups played a large role (see Stone Sweet & Brunell 1998), while intergovernmentalists are most concerned with the major treaties (see Moravcsik 1998).” However, within the complex system of the European Union and the myriad shapes that European integration has taken in various policy areas it should be considered that European integration actually has come to encompass “both the sophisticated accommodation of converged national interests via the construction of governance regimes and the consolidation of a supranational polity” (Puchala 1999, p.329). In the context of Turkey’s accession process to the EU, an intergovernmentalist viewpoint is often the point of departure, as the final decision for or against Turkish EU membership constitutes a decision of great magnitude and requires a unanimous decision taken by the European Council (thus by the member states), which additionally has to be ratified by each member state. This is exacerbated by the fact that public discourse on Turkey’s prospective EU accession is taking place within the context of national political arenas and continued by inter-state negotiations at the European level. However, intergovernmentalists have been largely disregarding the pressure of public opinion on the national positions within the EU framework, public contestation and intra-state

opinion formation. Moreover, the influence of supra-national institutions such as the EU Commission on this issue cannot be disregarded. Thus, it should be considered that an intergovernmentalist viewpoint may not be exclusively able to explain the complex decision-making process in this case and needs to be complemented by neofunctionalist interpretations of several steps within the “policy life cycle”. In fact, even a different set of theories may be needed to grasp the mere complexity and importance of this decision for the European Union and explain the underlying drivers of opinion formation with regard to the Turkish accession process or at least complement assumptions directly derived from intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism.

2.1.3 The Postfunctional Theory of European Integration and the Concept of Multi-Level Governance

The multi-level governance approach to European integration of Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, as outlined in “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus“, provides valuable insights into the nature of European integration and will in this paper be applied to the policy domain of EU enlargement. The basic premise of this theory is that the interaction and interdependence between the European supranational and intergovernmental level, the respective national political systems and other spatial levels of political governance has created a complex system of governance with increasingly blurred lines between these political arenas. The authors explain regional integration as a discrepancy between the need to efficiently tackle problems on the best-suited spatial level and the pre-existing structure of political authority. They emphasize the importance to understand the mobilization of identity and the politicization of specific policy issues. This is attributed to the fact that according to them „the challenge for a theory of multi-level governance is that the functional need for human co-operation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community. Communities demand self rule, and the preference for self rule is almost always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority” (2008, p.2). Hooghe and Marks point to the non-coercive nature of European identity formation and contrast it to the forces that have marked traditional identity formation in nations and states and also highlight the need to thoroughly investigate the role of newly emerging multi-level social identities in the European context. They argue that “Europe is faced with a tension between rapid jurisdictional change and relatively stable

identities”. However, they emphasize that a strong national identity does not *per se* correlate with a negative perception of European integration and “what matters is whether a person conceives of her national identity as exclusive or inclusive of other territorial identities” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.13). The authors cite Thomas Risse (2002) who states that “Europeanness or ‘becoming European’ is gradually being embedded in understandings of national identities” and observes that “Europe” has increasingly formed part of national politics and national politics have become more relevant to decision making on Europe. It is the assumption that the politicization of European issues in national politics leads to the development of a “European layer of identity” complementing national identity which distinguishes the postfunctionalist theory from the fusion theory developed by Wessels. The fusion theory similarly stresses a Europeanization process of national political systems. Wessels defines this Europeanization “as a process by which governmental, parliamentary and non-governmental actors shift their attention to the Brussels arena, involve their resources and invest ‘time’ to participate” (Wessels 1997, p. 36). This theory stresses “the ‘checks and balances’ between the national and the European institutions in preparing, making, taking, implementing and controlling EC/EU binding decisions” (European Commission Report 2002, p.58), and thus places emphasis on institutional fusion processes and new forms of institutional arrangements, in which national actors become engaged at a European level.

Hooghe & Marks postulate that “the European system of multi-level governance has become more tightly coupled”. Partly, they attribute this to public referenda that have become a tool in national political arenas to legitimize European treaties and tackle the EU’s alleged “democratic deficit” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.13ff). In recent years, several of these referenda have yielded negative responses and led to a number of severe crises within the EU. The outcome of the recent referendum in Switzerland on the ban of minarets has once more exemplified that direct democracy in which public opinion is the predominant factor can at times yield surprisingly different results than previously expected by political elites.

2.2 The Importance of Public Opinion

Politicians in national governments throughout Europe have started to worry about the electoral consequences of their European policies on a national level. The mobilization of exclusive national identity among mass publics by right-wing parties has induced “a deep reluctance on the part of governments to hazard public debate on further integration” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.21). According to Schoen (2008, p. 345) “some studies suggest that European issues do indeed play a role in shaping vote choice in national elections” (e.g. Evans, 1998, 1999b, see Carrubba and Timpone, 2005). In his study on Germany’s federal election in 2005, he analyzed if attitudes towards Turkey’s entry into the European Union affected voters’ choice in this election. The evidence showed that citizens’ opinions about Turkey’s accession to the European Union are only mildly shaped but by no means determined by group memberships and long-term political predispositions (p. 351).

Mair (2000) argues that the lack of congruence between the electoral and the decision-making arenas in the multi-level governance system of Europe leads to a “localization” of the European integration process at the level of national politics. “Public responses to Europe are refracted through national institutions and patterns of discourse that reflect distinct historical trajectories” (Hooghe & Marks 2008, p.13). This argument holds particular truth in the context of European enlargement, as it points to national peculiarities which underpin the enlargement debates in each member state. The perhaps most intriguing aspect of this theoretical framework with regard to this particular research paper is thus built on the assumption that public opinion and national constituencies are playing an increasingly important role within the European context and that European issues have reached national political arenas, acquire local relevance and are re-framed or “localized”. Hooghe and Marks hypothesize that “a brake on European integration has been imposed not because people have changed their minds, but because, on a range of vital issues, legitimate decision making has shifted from an insulated elite to mass politics” (2008, p.13). It has to be kept in mind that “enlargement is unpopular with EU voters, many of whom associate it with rising illegal immigration, international crime and unemployment” (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003, p.14).

In the case of EU enlargement, the EU member states, at least formally, dispose of the ultimate decision-making authority, putting national political arenas into the focus of attention. However, this is preceded by comprehensive bargaining processes at all levels of the European political system and accompanied by mutual influence between the various levels of political action. Intergovernmental interaction within the EU framework and supranational elements in the process cannot easily be detached from national discourses. In this context, bargaining theory can provide a valuable contribution to the analysis of the EU's decision-making framework with regard to Turkey's bid for accession. A decision to accept Turkey into the European Union requires unanimity by the member states. Thus, the bargaining power of each country increases and especially small countries can exploit this situation to extract concession from its EU partners (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003, p.14). As argued by Scharpf, this naturally raises the likelihood that member states engage in behavior that focuses on their respective self-interests. This in turn comes at the expense of common benefits to the EU (Scharpf 1998, see also Elgström & Jönsson 2000, p.690) and common interests affecting the European Union on an aggregated level, which fall behind and are often neglected. According to Elgström & Jönsson (2000, p.2) bargaining processes in this context are characterized by every member-state's insistence on getting as much as possible for itself, without caring about the consequences for other players. The authors also emphasize that within bargaining structures with a veto option for individual member states "the benefits received under the present policy become the base line below which nobody will settle" (p. 264). Unanimous voting requirements thus foster structural inertia in which "it will be very difficult to obtain major changes; in fact, there is a strong inclination to preserve existing rules" (see Scharpf 1988; Elgström & Jönsson 2000, p. 686).

Viewed from this theoretical perspective, Austria's position on Turkey's EU accession should be predominantly driven by Austrian national self-interests. However, this may seriously underestimate the impact of public opinion on the position of any Austrian government towards enlargement, as national positions are often not fact-based, but rather opinion-based. Thus, an analysis of public opinion will provide valuable insights into the future disposition of Austrian foreign policy. However, it is vital to question the validity of this argument in the context of EU enlargement. In Austria, for example, it can be observed that public support of an accession of Croatia has risen from 34% in

2002 to 55% in 2005, while simultaneously support of Turkey's membership has decreased from 32% to 10% (ESI Report 2008, p.6). Can this be attributed to accentuated opinions representing actual preferences of an informed public? Does this adequately reflect differing circumstances of these two candidate countries or is this shift in public support simply a product of elite-decisions and strategic choices, as basically argued in a report of the European Stability Initiative on the Austrian debate on Turkey's accession bid (ESI Report 2008)?

As indicated above, public opinion is not a static phenomenon and can be subject to change over time. The concept of deliberative bias (see Fishkin 1997) is based on the underlying assumption that deliberations on a specific issue improve the level of information and reduce error. Thus, according to this concept, a well-informed public will make more sound judgments than a "pre-deliberative" public (p.40). In the case of deciding on Turkey's accession bid to the EU, it would mean that extensive public discourse would lead to a more informed decision. By screening several arguments frequently made against an accession of Turkey for their validity, this paper also seeks to make a contribution towards an informed public, although the sheer complexity of several issues at hand might not in all cases allow to scratch far below the surface, as this would by far exceed the scope of my research. However, it is supposed to serve as a valuable overview of the issues and link a fact-based community perspective with an assessment of Austrian national public opinion and political discourse.

2.3 How can the term „public opinion” be defined?

It is important to clarify which concept of public opinion is applied in this paper, as the lack of a clear definition of this term would induce a certain degree of ambiguity into the research framework. There has been a variety of definitions of the term public opinion and it is perhaps one of the most contested terms in social sciences. Several attempts to define public opinion have centered on an elite-based view. Hennis (1957), for example, argues that only the opinions of the "relatively best-informed, most intelligent and most ethical citizens" form public opinion, if they are publicly expressed. Luhmann (1974) conceptualizes public opinion in his systems theory as "thematic structure of public communication". It serves as a filter through which societal needs and expectations are selected as political issue and become part of the political

discourse. This implies a certain preponderance of political elites in the context of agenda-setting. Others have argued that public discourse has to be widely accessible, as public opinion serves as oversight over governing individuals and entities. It should thus be regarded as legitimizing power within a democratic, political system (see Nohlen, Dieter- Lexikon der Politik, Band 7, Politische Begriffe). In the course of this thesis, a focus is also put on a democratic, political system whose protagonists are driven by opinion polls and whose primary aim consists in maximizing their votes. It should be kept in mind that generally, every vote counts for the same in a democracy. Consequently, elements that introduce a hierarchical order between individual opinions to the term “public opinion” are largely discarded in this context, although it is acknowledged that opinion leaders and elites will in many cases exert disproportionate influence on public opinion (see Entman 2004, p.14), especially in terms of agenda setting. Thus, the concept of public opinion that is applied carries resemblance to the term “mass public”. The expression “public opinion” will be used specifically to include all citizens- also in the event of silent majorities or unqualified or in extreme cases, even unvoiced opinions.

2.4 How does elite manipulation take place?

The increasing importance of public opinion polls and the newly-found enthusiasm for decision-making by referendum has seemingly made European politics more susceptible to distortions in mass opinion in recent years. It has opened the door for political elites or certain political parties to intensify the influence of symbolism, emotional memories, and other sources of error and use these phenomena to their own advantage. It has to be kept in mind that elite manipulation of public opinion does not *per se* imply that the public will be completely uninformed about a specific issue. Rather, “public opinion on Europe is particularly susceptible to construction: i.e. priming (making a consideration salient), framing (connecting a particular consideration to a political object) and cueing (instilling a bias)”, according to Hooghe and Marks (2008, p. 14). These tools are applied by members of the political elites to shape public opinion in their favour. Often, politicians and other members of the political elite “present isolated, unrepresentative facts, frame issues tendentiously and seek to evoke an emotional response rather than encourage rational deliberation” (Kuklinski & Quirk 1998, p.24). This may lead some to argue that the information people receive is *per se* sketchy, misleading, or manipulative.

However, this is not necessarily the case, as information provided by elites can offer important cues to a public that is not inclined to be fully informed on a particular issue. Mondak (1993) argues that “heuristic processing, reliance on simple rules of judgment, provides a cognitive mechanism that may enable citizens to advance informed yet efficient issue appraisals” (p.167). Thus, citizens can use political heuristics to reduce the complexity of their political judgments (see Lupia 1994). According to Kuklinski & Quirk, citizens with little knowledge on a particular subject can draw on statements of certain members of the political elite who they generally trust or deem knowledgeable on this particular issue to shape their own opinion (Kuklinski & Quirk 1998, p.5; see also Carmines and Kuklinski 1990). One of the most common political cues in a modern democratic society is the political party: “By merely attending to party labels, voters can compensate for a lack of reliable information on the candidates’ policy positions” (p.8). Alternatively, the public can use the positions of interest groups whose policy preferences they generally support as cue. In this respect, the role of the media consists in providing citizens with statements and positions of these groups or political leaders on specific issues.

Chaiken (1987) argues that in heuristic processing receivers rely on simple decision rules to judge the validity of persuasive claims. In this context, it seems helpful to make the distinction between “hard” and “easy arguments”. When hard arguments are used, reasoning or evidence support claims about the consequences of a proposal. Easy arguments, on the other hand, convey a simpler message, relying more on symbolic language and are aimed at generating an emotional response without providing significant background information to substantiate the claims. “Pure assertion, which can evoke emotion and is easily represented in memory, is what most readily changes opinion. The preference for easy arguments will often affect collective opinion. It will cause distortion whenever one side in a debate can appeal to easy arguments, even if largely misleading, while the other side has more to explain” (Kuklinski & Quirk 1998, p.32).

As argued in Kuklinski & Quirk (1998), psychologists distinguish between "central" and "peripheral" processing (p.17) - a distinction which can also be applied when analyzing public opinion formation. According to the literature, decisions are exclusively based on heuristics when people are in conditions of low cognitive ability

and motivation, and both on heuristics and information processing when people are in condition of high cognitive ability and motivation (see Roccato et al. 2006). According to Fiske & Taylor (1991) people use central processing particularly when attention and motivation are high: “they employ substantially more mental resources, think more systematically, and allow data to shape inferences” (pp. 475-480). Similarly, Petty and Caccioppo (1986) find that heavy involvement in an issue triggers a process in which arguments are processed centrally, and persuasion will depend on their relevance and quality. “When attention and motivation are low, however, peripheral processing leads to people employing fewer resources, relying on simple heuristics, and using top-down, stereotypic inferences” (Fiske and Taylor 1991, pp. 475-480). Low personal involvement prompts people not to pay full attention to messages. Thereby persuasion becomes contingent upon such peripheral cues as the source's expertise (see Hass 1981), trustworthiness (see Eagly, Wood, & Chaiken 1978;), attractiveness (see Eagly & Chaiken 1975), and similarity to the self (see Goethals & Nelson 1973).

2.5 The dynamics of policy development

Another interesting question in the context of assessing Turkey's bid for EU membership is the dynamics of policy development within the EU. The punctuated equilibrium theory, originating from the field of paleontology, is applied to political processes and policy change (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones 2001). It can be used to explain incremental policy development, which is punctuated by non-incremental policy change. Moreover, the theory describes how long periods of inactivity in politics and decision-making are punctuated by brief periods of rapid policy change (see Robinson et al. 2004). This assumption seems especially applicable to the framework of the European Union, and – if linked to the level of politicization of a particular issue – can provide valuable insights into the decision-making process within the system of multi-level governance. Particularly, EU enlargement rounds should be considered triggers of policy change, especially with regard to the institutional set-up within the Union. Moreover, the punctuated equilibrium model is particularly interesting if put into the context of multilevel governance and Turkey's accession bid, as it helps to analyze the interplay between various levels of governance. In the case of Turkey's application process for EU membership, the underlying driver of non-incremental policy change is rooted in an, at least temporarily, increased level of

political salience of this issue in national political arenas. Thus, spikes in public interest and rises in the intensity of public debate concerning Turkey's EU accession constitute a variable that could help determining the pathway of future decision-making processes regarding Turkey's bid for membership within the EU framework. Most of the time supranational institutions (particularly the EU commission) take the lead in monitoring and assessing the progress of applicant states, funding and implementing concrete policies as well as interacting with local policy makers within the member states. At crucial points however, the discussion is taken to national political arenas and the member states become the dominant actors within the framework, at which point politicians seek to capitalize on sudden spikes in public interest, or to exploit thematically controversial issues (see Elgström & Jönsson 2000, p.692). Therefore, the continuous work of EU institutions is occasionally interrupted and at times overruled and redirected by member states that have the ultimate decision-making authority on the issue of enlargement. This seems to coincide with the trajectory of the issue of Turkey's accession bid to the EU in the minds of the public. Long periods during which the issue remains below the surface of public attention and is practically dormant within public discourse, are interrupted by brief periods or milestones during which the issue suddenly attains high political salience. Whereas citizens apply peripheral processing throughout these dormant stages of the political debate on Turkey's EU accession bid, they resort to central processing during stages of political contestation. This is also line with the expectations of Elgström & Jönsson (2000, p. 692) who observe "state predominance and competition in areas where important national interests are at stake and more co-operative behavior in less politicized surroundings of a technical nature". However, the argument is extended to include a dynamic perspective throughout the "policy life cycle" with a focus on a specific issue rather than a classification of a variety of issues.

3. The Austrian Debate on Turkey's Accession Bid to the European Union

In the case of Austria, the concept of multi-level governance can be used to explain a remarkable turn of political elites with regard to the question whether Turkey should join the EU.

The two major parties, the conservative ÖVP (Austrian People's Party) and to some degree the social democratic SPÖ (Austrian Social Democratic Party), had been rather

strong proponents of Turkey’s accession prior to 1999. However, the tide shifted towards an outright rejection of Turkey’s EU ambitions by 2004 at the latest. What had happened meanwhile that would cause such a dramatic change in opinion? The campaign for the 2004 elections to the European parliament was dominated by anti-immigrant rhetoric by the right-wing FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party) which emphasizes more strongly than other parties the cultural-linguistical basis of the Austrian identity (Spohn 2003, p.20). In this context it seems worthwhile to explore what perception Austrians actually have of Austrian identity. Haller (1996) tried to illuminate the key features that Austrians assign to a “true Austrian”. It is interesting that “being born in Austria” is important to 71% of the respondents and only for 53% “being a Christian” is a precondition for being considered a “true Austrian”, but that the dimensions “speaking German” and “feeling as Austrian” rank considerably higher and are important to 92% of the respondents, with “being an Austrian citizen (90%) ranking only slightly lower. This could perhaps indicate a slow and gradual departure from the prevailing notion of *ius sanguinis* to a more civic perception of nationality. These findings however seem to stand in stark contrast to the tone in political debates and election campaigns and to some extent also to recent election results in Austria.

Fig. 1 Features of a “true Austrian” in the opinion of interviewed person (%)

	Feel as Austrian	Speak German	Austrian Citizen	Austrian Laws	Live in Austria	Born in Austria	Be a Christian
Very important	68	67	66	54	49	45	31
Rather important	24	25	24	35	29	26	22

(source: Haller & Ressler 2006)

Compared to other right-wing or populist parties in other European countries, the FPÖ is well entrenched within the national political system and has been able to secure a significant share of the votes in public elections throughout recent decades. The discussion on Turkey’s EU accession was and still is to a large degree embedded in the discourses on immigration, immigrant integration and public security (see Röhrlich, 2009), which have been predominantly shaped by the FPÖ, or at least in which it has taken the lead over time. The party has managed to link these issues intrinsically together in public perception, forming a complex set of issues, to which the FPÖ offers

simple, straight-forward solutions that might not take all the complexity of the matter fully into account, but explain complex cause-effect relationships in a politically utilizable way. Minkenberg (2001) explained the rise of the FPÖ “with its ability to mobilize the ethno-cultural and xenophobic layers of an Austrian national identity”.

The FPÖ has aimed at capitalizing on the negative overall public sentiment towards immigration which is expressed in the findings of an analysis of the Austrian dataset of the European Social Survey. This data depicts the prevalent negative attitude towards immigrants. Despite the fact that most respondents (28.6%) were undecided on whether immigrant make the country a better or worse place to live 48.8% had a slightly or strongly negative attitude (7.8% believed strongly that immigrants make the country a worse place to live), while only 21.1% displayed a positive attitude towards the immigrants’ contribution to the living conditions within the country and only 2.2% firmly believed that immigrants make the country a better place to live.

Fig. 2 Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Worse place to live	179	7.4	7.8	7.8
	1	143	5.9	6.3	14.1
	2	215	8.9	9.4	23.5
	3	283	11.8	12.4	35.9
	4	294	12.2	12.9	48.8
	5	689	28.6	30.2	78.9
	6	154	6.4	6.7	85.6
	7	145	6.0	6.3	92.0
	8	101	4.2	4.4	96.4
	9	31	1.3	1.4	97.8
	Better place to live	51	2.1	2.2	100.0
Total	2285	95.0	100.0		
Missing	Refusal	15	.6		
	Don't know	105	4.4		
	Total	120	5.0		
Total		2405	100.0		

(source: European Social Survey 2006)

This development was exacerbated by the most influential newspaper Kronen Zeitung, which is said to mirror Austrian public opinion, while also directly shaping popular views and putting certain issues into the spotlight of public scrutiny (see Filzmaier & Hajek 2004). The newspaper has pursued a largely anti-immigration policy and has

repeatedly denounced Turkish EU membership (see Röhrlich 2009; Günay 2008). The influence of the *Kronen Zeitung* is widely recognized by Austrian political elites, thereby further magnifying it. It has to be taken into account, however, that the concentration in the media sector is even higher in other countries, which obviously does not necessarily lead to such low approval rates in the context of Turkey's accession bid.

So what other factors, except the existence of a remarkably accepted right-wing party, have contributed to the reservations against Turkish accession? Another dimension which could help to shed some light on the rather sudden shift in party opinions lies in the interrelation between the question of EU enlargement and the more general discourse on the European Union and its "democratic deficit" in Austria. The decision of an EU accession of a candidate country as well as the decision to start accession negotiations with a particular country are ultimately made in a European context and require unanimous agreement of all the member states in the Council of the European Union. According to Marckhgott (2007) this entails that single national political parties and other actors on a national level are not necessarily expected to assert their opinion on a European level by their constituencies, which causes them to adopt a position that shapes its political profile and maximizes the political capital of the corresponding actor domestically and is firmly rooted in opinion polls. Consequently, parties are keen on proving responsiveness to the public will in European matters. The consequence is a governmental position characterized by populism whose actual successful assertion on a European level remains highly doubtful to the constituency. In the view of this author, this applies particularly to the Austrian enlargement discourse.

From 2004 onwards, the SPÖ, as opposition party to the ruling ÖVP/FPÖ coalition used the issue of Turkey's accession bid to criticize the ruling parties for their inadequate response to public concerns and their inactivity in Brussels in preventing negotiations (see ESI Report 2006b). This was done to in order to shape the SPÖ's profile in domestic politics. The issue of Turkey's application to join the EU was thus one of the first European issues, which has been effectively transformed into an issue of salience within the national realm. As predicted by Hooghe and Marks, the major parties at the center of the political spectrum were in a generally defensive position and over time lost control of the public discourse (see Hooghe & Marks 2008). After a certain point they

tried to counter the FPÖ by imitating the party's statements and views, albeit in a more moderate and constructive form. However, they had lost political initiative and were clearly lacking the ability to defend a project that they perhaps were not so convinced of to begin with. Whereas EU enlargement to include Eastern European countries was a project of the grand coalition in Austria that was tangible, concrete and with immediate effects and the Balkan states were traditionally within the sphere of interest for Austrian politicians due to strong historical ties, Turkey's EU accession was seen as a long-term project whose implications would not become effective until some distant time in the future. Therefore, prior to 2004, it seemed that supporting Turkey's accession would fit well into an overall strategy of visible support of EU enlargement in general. Yet, while various government statements underlined the common cultural heritage of the Danube region (see Streitenberger 1997), Turkey's membership perspective was not similarly endorsed by Austrian elites. According to Esra LaGro (2006, p.12) "the [Eastern] enlargement process was and still is a window of opportunity for Austria because the formerly peripheral member state of the EU found that its place was shifting towards the centre of Europe and the EU."

Only in 2004 did the picture become more differentiated and the membership perspective of candidates was assessed on an individual basis. Once the distant prospect of Turkey's eventual accession received a more immediate perspective, as negotiations were set to begin later that year, negative sentiment rose considerably and erupted into a heated public debate. Interestingly, this debate had not taken place in 1999, when Turkey was granted official candidate status. At the European Council in Helsinki it was decided that "Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States" (The Council of the European Union, Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, "Presidency Conclusions", Chapter I, Article 12) Similarly, in 2002, the EU promised to open accession negotiations "without delay" at the end of 2004, provided that the Commission would conclude that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen Criteria (see The Council of the European Union, Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002, "Presidency Conclusions"). As late as in 1998, Viktor Klima (SPÖ), at that time Prime Minister of Austria, expressed a favorable view on Turkey's accession perspective: "Turkey has an accession perspective; it has the 'eligibility', which needs to be confirmed. We want the dialogue with Turkey, we have to be a fair partner and can thus for example not block

the financial support package or have the Customs Union, with significant advantages for the EU and major disadvantages for Turkey, remain in effect indefinitely” (Subcommittee on the European Union, Austrian National Council, June 3, 1998).

This is a clear sign that European issues- and Turkey’s EU accession had previously been considered to be only an issue at the European level- have received increasing importance in national political contestations and are actively used to shape the political profile of political parties. The political elites pursued opinion-polls driven politics and gave way to short-term political considerations that have so far prevented a rational debate on the merits and short-comings of a full membership of Turkey. This view is reflected in a statement of an ÖVP strategist in interviews to the European Stability Initiative, arguing that “changing public opinion on Turkey is a steeper challenge than convincing Austrians to vote for EU-accession in 1994, or getting them on board for the 2004-enlargement round. Our primary task is to win elections” (ESI Briefing 2006b, p.6).

According to Mayer & Rosenberger (2008), it was the FPÖ which has made the question of Turkey’s EU accession a highly politicized issue in Austria. It picked up on the negative notion and inertia to change the status quo within the Austrian public and included it in its campaign “Austria First”. With regard to the two mainstream parties ÖVP and SPÖ they generally observe a de-politicization strategy concerning EU topics and emphasize that they (the ÖVP even more so than the SPÖ) manage this by anchoring its argumentation in European affairs in abstract concepts such as “Europe as a peace project”, which do not lend themselves to daily political contestation. In Kritzinger & Steinbauer’s view (2005, p. 116), ÖVP and SPÖ both deny „any particular emotional involvement, based on ethnic or religious arguments and claim to assess Turkey’s bid for membership solely on the basis of a rational analysis of economic and political factors.” Representatives of the SPÖ have stressed the importance of the EU’s ability to incorporate new member states from 2004 onward. The influential SPÖ politician Josef Cap, for example, publicly opposed Turkey’s membership on several occasions stating that “consolidation needs to come first” (Plenary of the Austrian National Council, October 21, 2004), that “when the EU will soon have 27 member states, the functioning of existing institutions will have to be insured” (Plenary of the Austrian National Council, June 21. 2006) or that “an accession of Turkey would

“overwhelm the European Union” (Subcommittee on the European Union, Austrian National Council, December 12, 2007).

In order to de-emotionalize public debate, the two main political parties picked up the concept of a public referendum (see Günay 2008, p.74). It was argued that this referendum would give the decision the necessary democratic legitimacy and would prove that the concerns of the Austrian public are adequately taken into account. Interestingly, it seemed that the latter point had gained in relative importance. (Gaulhofer in Die Presse, January 30, 2008). The ÖVP only demands a referendum in the specific case of Turkey, “reflecting the particular sensitivities of the Austrian public on this particular subject” (MEP Othmar Karas, ÖVP), while it retains the general strategy of ruling out similar referenda in the case of other accession candidates. The SPÖ has shifted its strategy towards demanding public referenda whenever a decision on a European level will considerably alter the face of the European Union, which includes important treaties and enlargement rounds (Günay 2008, p.74). In fact, Austria is the only European country whose political elite has pledged its continued commitment to adopt the policy instrument of a public referendum in the case of Turkey’s accession bid. France, which also stated that Turkey’s accession would be subject to a national referendum, initially tied the referendum to the more generally formulated condition “that a referendum be held prior to a country's EU accession if it represents more than 5% of the overall EU population.” (Euractiv, June 25, 2008). However, the constitutional amendment that was introduced in 2005 under former President Jacques Chirac has, in the meantime, been revoked by the French senate.

The policy measure of a public referendum has achieved that the discussion about Turkey’s accession to the EU has subsided in Austria, albeit it seems to have been only postponed to a distant point in the future. In the meantime, it looks as if only little, if any, political capital could be gained from once again inciting the debate on Turkey’s EU membership. The ruling parties could in this case always counter with the argument of having already established that the Austrian public will have the last say on this. The unpopularity, however, remains and agreement to Turkey’s EU accession has been steady at exceptionally low numbers. Thus, despite of the return to pragmatic negotiations for now, it has to be kept in mind that every Austrian government will be aware of the negative sentiment within the Austrian electorate and could therefore be

tempted to play a passive, if not outright destructive role throughout the negotiations. Kayalar rightfully states that “government preferences do not take shape in a vacuum but public opinion sets the borders of how far the governments can go” (Kayalar 2006, p.74). The boundaries of any Austrian government therefore seem to have become irrevocably determined by domestically motivated political considerations. More generally, the question remains when and how instruments of direct democracy should be applied, but this would definitely go beyond the scope of this paper. However it needs to be borne in mind that the Austrian public was also outright opposed to Eastern EU enlargement prior to the accession of the Central- and Eastern European countries (see e.g. Eurobarometer 53, spring 2000). Krausneker et al. (2001) analyzed the enlargement discourse in Austria prior to the Eastern enlargement round. The results of their media analysis suggest that the enlargement discourse was strongly influenced by the discourse on employment and more specifically the fear of unemployment and that the impact of enlargement was largely set in a negative context. The authors point out that negative cues were over-represented in the enlargement discourse and that “insecurity” in a wider sense is one of the recurring themes within the debate. Yet, Austria seems to be among the main economic beneficiaries of this enlargement round (see Breuss 2006).

There seems to be yet another dimension that may have an effect on the Austrian position on Turkey’s bid for EU membership. After the end of the Cold War, Austrian foreign policy had been subject to a fundamental reorientation, which was shaped by an “Europeanization” of its foreign policy and culminated in the subsequent accession to the European Union. Austria got relegated to a small country that was no longer granted the same special role within the realm of international relations that it used to enjoy before the fall of the Iron Curtain. During the Cold War period, Austria had managed to position itself as a neutral location for negotiations and Vienna still is the seat of several international organizations such as the IAEA, UNIDO, UNODC and OSCE. Its active foreign policy had helped to built up an excellent reputation in the realm of international relations from the 1960s and especially the 1970s onward, which prompted Henry Kissinger to comment that “Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had parlayed his country’s formal neutrality into a position of influence beyond its strength” (Kissinger 1979, p.1204). This role as mediator and the corresponding status on the international parquet were however, out of proportion with the actual size and relevance of the country and

thus Austria's importance somewhat declined (see Gärtner et al. 2005; see Busek 1998, p.431). The public referendum on Turkey's EU accession could once again, if only briefly, put Austria in the spotlight of the international community and would entail a privileged role within the European Union. In the aftermath of its accession to the European Union, Austria has become painfully aware of its relative insignificance in a club, in which the largest members seem to be "calling the shots" (Günay 2008, p.68). This fear of insignificance and the need for a recognized and inflated share-of-voice may also be behind the Austrians' relatively strong preference for unanimous decision-making in the Eurobarometer 53 (Spring 2000) survey (when this question was asked for the last time). The EU-15 results show support for majority voting in the EU, with 45% of respondents opting for this choice over 38% who prefer unanimous decision-making in the European Council. In Austria, however, only 31% favors majority voting procedures, while 52% support unanimous decision-making processes. Intuitively this would be explained with a general tendency towards unanimous voting structures by smaller states. However, this is not reflected in the data, as only in Greece and Austria there is a majority for such voting procedures.

Austrian political elites often are under the impression that public referenda which had a negative outcome in individual member states, such as in the case of Ireland, France and the Netherlands, actually enhanced the bargaining position of precisely these states and led to concessions that would prove beneficial to the respective countries and increase their visibility and importance. The political elites understand that Austria may not be able to sustain prolonged pressure by the other EU member states if negotiations with Turkey have been successfully concluded and all other member states have ratified the accession. However, the public referendum on Turkey's accession would in their view signal Austria's exceptionality and could be used as a bargaining chip to extract concessions from the other member states (see Elgström & Jönsson 2000, p.694). Also, this would move Austria back into the focus of international affairs. Fittingly, the former President of the Austrian Parliament, Andreas Khol, concluded that Austria was "the voice of the EU's silent public", indicating that Austrian political elites only expressed what seemed to be a wide consensus not only in their own country but throughout Europe. This would imply that either political elites in other countries were too timid to outright oppose Turkey's accession or that these elites were too detached from public opinion to understand or care about the needs and concerns of their

constituencies. In certain ways, this statement also portrays Austria as the underdog that is willing to stand up against the almighty “bureaucrats in Brussels”, which is positively perceived by Austrian voters. This is underlined by the fierce resistance of the Austrian government against the opening of negotiations which would explicitly state the goal of accession. During an emergency meeting of the EU’s foreign ministers this prompted Luxemburg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn to say that “the ratio remains unchanged at 24 to 1” (Focus Online, October 03, 2005), referring to Austria’s isolated position among the EU member states. However, domestically this was exploited as a big win of Austrian foreign policy. The relatively negative sentiment towards the EU and its institutions in Austria can mainly be attributed to the fact that Austrian politicians have excessively used the EU as “scapegoat” to justify unpopular political decisions and actions in the past years (see European Commission Report 2002, p. 225).

In order to comprehend the twists and turns of the Austrian public debate on Turkey’s EU accession it seems vital to look into the conception of history that is prevalent in Austria with regard to Turkey. The fear of the Turks has been widespread and pronounced in Austria throughout the past centuries. In its most extreme form this is reflected in a fresco, to be found on the outer wall of the dome in Graz, a city of Austria, dating back to 1485, which displays “the three plagues of God”: locusts, the pest and the Turks (Polenz 2010, p.9). Kritzinger and Steinbauer (2005) identify two central elements that dominate the Austrian historical narrative on Turkey. The first element consists of the sieges of Vienna, or more accurately the reconstruction of these events in the minds of Austrians. These collective memories have found their way into schoolbooks, popular legends and have given names to several public places, especially in Vienna. The image of the Turk resembles that of a savage, barbaric warrior with a culture full of greed and insidiousness, which poses a threat to the Christian Occident. In contrast, the corresponding construction of the “Austrian/Viennese self” seeks to carve out heroic and noble characteristics thus portraying the typical Austrian personality as antagonistic to the allegedly inherent Turkish personality traits. The construction of Austrian historical narrative is predominantly shaped by the two sieges, while, by and large, centuries of cooperation between the Austrian-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empire or periods of Habsburg predominance over the Ottomans on the Balkans are neglected (p.109). It is also frequently forgotten that some Protestant Hungarians (a linguistic reminiscent can be found in the German expression

“Kruzitürken”- its literal meaning “Turks of the Cross”- or an amalgamation of the word Kuruzen- Hungarian rebels to the Habsburg- and Turks, which is used as a swearword) fought along-side the Muslim Turks during the siege of Vienna because they enjoyed a higher degree of tolerance under Ottoman rule than as subjects of the Catholic Habsburgs (Polenz 2010, p.9).

The second element that has decisively shaped the Turkish image in Austria is the discourse on Turkish guest workers. The Austrian population has perceived cultural differences between itself and Turkish immigrants significantly stronger as compared to other immigrant groups. Turkish immigration is perceived as a prolonged threat to Austrian culture and viewed as a continuation of Turkish attempts to conquer Austrian territory. Right-wing politicians often refer to Turkish migration flows as the “3rd siege of Vienna”, but Kritzinger and Steinbauer (2005) argue that this belief has, albeit more subtly expressed, been widely incorporated into mainstream Austrian beliefs.

4. Austrian Public Opinion

Austrian public opinion is, with the exception of Croatia, strongly opposed to any further enlargement of the EU. 62% of the Austrian respondents of the Eurobarometer survey in 2006 were against the accession of Macedonia, 73% opposed the accession of Albania, 59% did not want Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the EU and 65% negated the accession perspective of Serbia (Eurobarometer 66, 2006). This skeptical attitude towards enlargement is also confirmed by a survey conducted by the Austrian Society for European Politics in 2005 (different levels of opposition and support can be attributed to a time component and especially to different wordings in the respective surveys). According to this study, only an accession of Croatia would currently find a majority in Austria (52% in favor, 21% against), whereas an accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina is only supported by 29% of respondents (44% against), an accession of Montenegro would be rejected by 45% (28% in favour) and also the accession of Macedonia (24% in favour, 50% against), Serbia (25% in favour, 52% against), Kosovo (20% in favour, 57% against) or Albania (19% in favour, 59% against) would be clearly rejected. A survey in November 2010, again conducted by the Austrian Society for European Politics found that 68% of the 1004 respondents would support an accession of Croatia, while only 18% rejected it. This shows that Austrian favor Croatia’s

accession considerably more than in 2005, which also reflects the progress that has been made in accession negotiations. In the case of Macedonia 39% of respondents are in favor, while 37% are against an accession of this country, which shows increasing support for the accession perspective of Macedonia. Support for an accession of Turkey is at comparatively low levels with only 17% of respondents supporting its accession bid, while 69% reject an admission of Turkey into the EU.


The Eurobarometer survey of fall 2009 indicates that 28% of the Austrian respondents could envision the accession of new member states, while 65% reject this idea categorically. In comparison, an average of 46% of the European respondents are in favor of further enlargement steps, while 43% dismiss the idea of further enlargement rounds. The case of Croatia is yet another example that proves how quickly public opinion can turn or can be influenced on this issue. The approval rates regarding an EU accession of Croatia rose from 34% in 2002 to 55% in 2005 (ESI Report 2008, p.6) and to 68% in 2010 (survey of the Austrian Society for European Politics). Within the same period, support for Turkey's accession fell from 32% to 10% in 2005 and according to the survey of the Austrian Society for European Politics in 2010 stabilized at relatively low levels of 17% of respondent supporting Turkish accession (mind differently phrased questions, which could distort findings and limit comparability). It also needs to be kept in mind that Austrian public opinion has traditionally been skeptical towards EU enlargement. According to Eurobarometer 53, conducted in the spring of 2000, only 30 % of the Austrian respondents were in favor of accession of the 13 mostly Central- and Eastern European applicant countries. A study conducted on behalf of the Austrian Society for European Politics in March 2010, exploring the attitudes of 752 respondents towards Austria's membership in the EU and enlargement, found that in hindsight, a majority of Austrians now takes a positive stand on the EU-accession of the neighboring countries Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 56% of the respondents think that the accession of these countries was "a good decision", whereas only 19% offered a negative opinion. In July 2003, 40% of the respondents had rejected the accession of the Czech Republic, 38% the accession of Slovakia, 25% the accession Slovenia and 21% were opposed to an accession of Hungary.

The negative sentiment towards enlargement is also accompanied by a rather negative image of the European Union itself in Austria. 73 % of the respondents in a survey

conducted on behalf of the Austrian Society for European Politics in March 2010 think that Austria should remain a member of the EU, while 21 % are in favour of a withdrawal. This number is particularly high among poorly educated people (34%) and older segments of the population (66+ yrs. - 27%). Only 65% of the respondents think that the decision to join the EU was right, whereas 30% are of the opinion that Austria made a mistake by joining the EU. It also needs to be taken into account that 21% of respondents have experienced personal disadvantages (for 47% EU accession has had personal advantages) as a consequence of EU membership and 24% argue that the country has suffered from disadvantages following EU accession (for 58%, Austria has benefited from EU accession). Moreover, the Eurobarometer survey 73 in spring 2010 revealed that 48% of the Austrian respondents felt that the country has overall not benefited from EU accession (EU-27 average: 35%). These results only briefly touch upon the general opinion on the European Union in Austria and a more thorough investigation of attitudes towards the EU is not within the scope of this paper. They are merely included here to highlight the fact that the discourse on enlargement and Turkey's accession bid in particular cannot be entirely detached from the general discourse on the European Union. However, this does not explain the particularly negative sentiment towards an accession of Turkey compared to other accession candidates.

According to a survey conducted by the Austrian Society of European Politics in 2005, 8% of the respondents already regarded Turkey as ready to join the EU, 28% saw this perspective within 10 years, 22% thought Turkey would be in a position to join the EU within the next 20 years and 32% dismissed Turkey's accession perspective altogether (see Marckhgott 2007). In the Eurobarometer survey 69 in 2008, it was asked, whether the respondents would be "strongly in favor", "fairly in favor", "fairly opposed" or "strongly opposed" to an accession of Turkey if the country fulfilled all the official criteria set by the EU.

Fig. 3 Attitudes of Europeans towards Turkey’s EU accession per nationality (%)



(source: Eurobarometer survey 69, 2008)

With only 16% of the Austrian respondents “strongly in favor” or “fairly in favor”, Austria ranks last among the member states in support of Turkish membership.

The Eurobarometer survey 66 in 2006 affirms the image of Austria as a country that is adamantly opposed to Turkey’s EU accession. 84% of the Austrian respondents view the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states as too significant for Turkey to join the EU. This perception of an unbridgeable cultural gap is only similarly strong in Germany (74%). The EU average lies at 61% and – with the exception of the UK (46%) and Spain (49%) – a majority of the respondents in each member state supported the claim. In the case of Austria, this result clearly indicates the importance of cultural and religious elements in the Austrian debate on Turkey’s EU accession. According to the Eurobarometer survey 66 in 2006, Austrians (84%) are in line with overall public opinion in the EU (85%) that Turkey will need to systematically respect human rights in order to become an EU member. Moreover, 81% of the Austrians were concerned about substantial migration flows into the wealthy EU member states upon Turkey’s accession. Albeit well above the EU average of 66%, the results in some of the other European societies were comparably negative. The statement “to join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy” was

apart from Austria (83%) also supported by a solid majority in other affluent European societies, the net contributor states of the EU, such as Germany (83%), the Netherlands (84%) and Sweden (81%). The highest level of agreement to this statement could however be found in Greece with 94% of respondents in support.

The potentially positive effects of Turkish membership do not seem to be widely acknowledged by the Austrian public. Austrians seem among the least inclined to support statements emphasizing Turkey's European credentials or indicate potentially positive effects of an EU accession of Turkey. Only 18% of Austrian respondents agreed that the accession of Turkey could positively impact on the security situation in the region and only 24% see the positive demographic impact that a relatively young Turkish population could potentially have on the EU with its ageing societies. With regard to the question whether Turkey at least partly belongs to Europe by its geography, only 42% of the Austrian respondents gave a positive answer, while 56% did not think Turkey even partly belonged to Europe. In contrast an average of 56% of European respondents considered Turkey a part of Europe by its geography. Only Greece (40%) and Cyprus (35%) have had lower scores than Austria on this question. Asked whether Turkey historically at least partly belongs to Europe, only 33% of the Austrian respondents agreed to that statement, while an average of 40% of the European respondents saw Turkey historically anchored in Europe. Greece (15%) and Cyprus (8%) negate the historical "Europeanness" of Turkey even more clearly. This time, also French respondents (30%) were more negative than Austrians. In three countries, however, the historic European credentials of Turkey seem undoubted: in Poland (61%), Sweden (63%) and Hungary (73%) there seems to be a wide consensus that Turkey is historically a part of Europe.


% Agree	Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography	Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history	Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region	The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow it to join the EU	Turkey accession would favour rejuvenating an ageing European population	Turkey's joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries in the EU	To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Human Rights	To join the EU in about ten years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy
EU25	56%	40%	33%	61%	29%	66%	85%	77%
BE	60%	42%	34%	64%	31%	69%	94%	89%
CZ	59%	40%	33%	69%	22%	77%	92%	84%
DK	57%	32%	39%	64%	32%	71%	97%	84%
DE	59%	40%	22%	74%	32%	78%	93%	83%
EE	58%	46%	41%	65%	28%	77%	82%	77%
EL	40%	17%	41%	79%	33%	82%	96%	94%
ES	50%	37%	30%	46%	30%	55%	70%	63%
FR	47%	30%	30%	65%	27%	67%	89%	77%
IE	57%	39%	31%	51%	26%	56%	75%	67%
IT	56%	41%	42%	64%	32%	60%	75%	74%
CV	35%	8%	30%	75%	25%	87%	65%	75%
LV	55%	37%	37%	62%	23%	73%	79%	78%
LT	54%	41%	34%	55%	22%	55%	75%	72%
LU	53%	33%	19%	77%	21%	46%	90%	81%
HU	71%	73%	36%	51%	29%	63%	79%	72%
MT	53%	43%	26%	66%	21%	66%	81%	76%
NL	57%	35%	37%	55%	28%	59%	96%	84%
AT	42%	33%	18%	84%	24%	81%	84%	83%
PL	73%	61%	42%	56%	29%	69%	85%	81%
PT	46%	37%	40%	49%	36%	53%	76%	70%
SI	57%	43%	33%	64%	32%	76%	95%	91%
SK	70%	57%	31%	64%	22%	74%	88%	78%
FI	62%	48%	33%	69%	27%	82%	96%	90%
SE	79%	63%	59%	52%	28%	55%	97%	82%
UK	49%	36%	31%	47%	24%	58%	82%	71%
CV(ccc)	61%	57%	68%	52%	72%	61%	69%	70%
BG	68%	49%	43%	48%	29%	56%	79%	66%
RO	59%	56%	45%	32%	24%	43%	66%	62%

Fig. 4 Attitudes regarding arguments for and against Turkey's accession
(source: Eurobarometer survey 66)

A Eurobarometer Flash survey in February 2009 asked respondents to rank the importance of the dimensions “Freedom and Democracy”, “Immigration issues“, “Ageing of European population“, “EU’s role in the world“, “Economic issues“,

“Stability at European Union's borders“ and “Cultural and religious issues“ for future enlargement rounds. 51% of Austrian respondents thought “Freedom and Democracy” to be one of the two most important issues to be considered for future enlargement rounds, 37% ranked “Economic issues” among the top two issues, for 33% “Immigration” is one of the top two priorities, followed by 24% for whom “cultural and religious issues” are a major factor. 16% of the Austrian respondents emphasized “stability at European Union's borders“, 11% the “EU’s global role” and 7% gave priority to the issue of “ageing of European population“. The survey reveals that compared to the European average, the Austrians attach particularly high importance to the dimensions of “immigration” and “cultural/religious issues”, as well as “freedom and democracy”, whereas demographic, geo-strategic or even economic considerations are less significant relative to the EU average in the context of enlargement. It has to be kept in mind that this survey rated dimensions for future enlargements in general. However, it allows drawing important conclusions for the specific case of Turkey and the overall results might in turn be significantly influenced by this case which is the most visible and most widely discussed enlargement option within the public realm.

Fig. 5 Considerations for future enlargements Issue relevance compared to EU average




(source: Eurobaromet Flash Survey 257, February 2009)

The Flash Eurobarometer also offers important insights on the multilevel governance system of the EU as perceived by its citizens. “The survey asked respondents for their views on which issues should be taken into account prior to future EU enlargements; they were asked to give their opinions from a personal, national and EU-level viewpoint” (Flash Eurobarometer No.257, 2009, p.36). The results indicate the different

importance that is assigned to several issues by respondents with regard to different levels of analysis. Cultural and religious issues were more important for Austrian respondents on a personal level than viewed from a national or European perspective. This may remind us how important this dimension really is for Austrians and how prominently it figures in public discourse. Despite the fact that this assumption may be somewhat thwarted by the data specified above, which displays other dimensions with much higher levels of importance to Austrian respondents, it is clearly a sign of the relevance that the cultural dimension unfolds within the personal realm. Personal considerations are often at the center of voting decisions and thus indirectly influence political discourse. At the same time, it is difficult to engage in a rational discourse on issues that seemingly touch the core of people’s lives and are thus subject to a large degree of subjectivity.

Fig. 6 Considerations for future enlargements: Cultural and religious issues
Issue relevance on different levels, compared to within-country average of the three levels



(source: Flash Eurobarometer No.257, p.45)

In contrast, high importance is attached to the immigration issue on a national level, whereas it is viewed less important on a European or personal level by Austrian respondents. The Eurobarometer survey 72 in 2009 shows that 29% of the Austrian respondents associate the EU with cultural diversity. At the same time, however, 23% fear the loss of Austrian cultural identity. These findings are complemented by the results of a survey conducted on behalf of the Austrian Society for European Politics conducted in 2010. According to its findings, only 48% of the respondents feel that the

„Austrian way” has not been compromised by the country’s EU-accession, which constitutes a significant increase from 32% in 2005. Still, these results also indicate the prevailing distrust towards the perceived “cultural interference” by the EU. Is it perhaps this fear that causes Austrians to assign such high value to the immigration issue on the national level? And how can it then be explained that the dimension of “cultural and religious issues” does not produce similar results? This could be explained by the fact that immigration is an issue that not only encompasses a cultural and identity component, but is among other factors also strongly influenced by economic considerations. However, this assumption is contradicted by an analysis of a representative sample of the Austrian population (European Social Survey dataset on Austria), which reveals that a clear majority sees the national economy benefit from immigration, while a 48.8% of responds to some degree feel that immigrants make the country a worse place to live in.

Fig. 7 Responses of Austrians on the question whether immigration is good or bad for the country's economy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Bad for the economy	118	4.9	5.2	5.2
	1	93	3.9	4.1	9.3
	2	132	5.5	5.8	15.2
	3	182	7.6	8.0	23.2
	4	199	8.3	8.8	32.0
	5	545	22.7	24.1	56.1
	6	250	10.4	11.1	67.2
	7	298	12.4	13.2	80.4
	8	242	10.1	10.7	91.1
	9	92	3.8	4.1	95.1
	Good for the economy	110	4.6	4.9	100.0
	Total	2261	94.0	100.0	
Missing	Refusal	8	.3		
	Don't know	136	5.7		
	Total	144	6.0		
Total		2405	100.0		


(source: analysis of the author, raw data- ESS Austria)

Fig. 8 Responses of Austrians on the question whether Immigrants make country worse or better place to live

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Worse place to live	179	7.4	7.8	7.8
	1	143	5.9	6.3	14.1
	2	215	8.9	9.4	23.5
	3	283	11.8	12.4	35.9
	4	294	12.2	12.9	48.8
	5	689	28.6	30.2	78.9
	6	154	6.4	6.7	85.6
	7	145	6.0	6.3	92.0
	8	101	4.2	4.4	96.4
	9	31	1.3	1.4	97.8
	Better place to live	51	2.1	2.2	100.0
Missing	Refusal	15	.6		
	Don't know	105	4.4		
	Total	120	5.0		
Total		2405	100.0		

(source: analysis of the author, raw data- ESS Austria)

Fig. 9 Considerations for future enlargements: Immigration
Issue relevance on different levels, compared to within-country average of the three levels




(source: Flash Eurobarometer No.257, p.44)

The Eurobarometer survey 72 in 2009 revealed that Austrians “do not have the feeling that the European Union through its actions has a significant influence on their actual living conditions”. Only 13% of the respondents thought that the EU constitutes the biggest single political factor with influence on their lives, whereas 43% see the national political institutions as the main source of influence with relevance for their personal lives. In order to keep things in perspective, however, it is necessary to look at

the European average, which is leaning even more towards the national level (45%) and assigns even lower value to the EU realm (11%). The Eurobarometer survey 73 in 2010 measured trust in political institutions. As displayed below, Austrian respondents are in line with the European average in trusting the EU as an institution. However, in Austria there is a comparably high trust in national political institutions.

Fig. 10 Trust in the EU and national institutions

QA14. I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.



(source: Eurobarometer 73, spring 2010)

This once again underlines the continued dominance of national political arenas within the system of multi-level governance but does not undermine one of the basic assumptions of this paper, namely that European issues have often become so closely intertwined with issues at the national levels that they cannot be decoupled from each other. However, these findings indicate on which level political contestation of salient issues will take place in Austria.

5. An Assessment of Arguments against Turkey's EU Accession from a Community Perspective

5.1 Rounds of European Enlargement

There have always been critical, cautious and outright opposing voices with regard to more or less intense enlargement debates before each accession round in the past. A report of the European Stability Initiative, looking into the enlargement debate (ESI Report 2006a, "Beyond Enlargement Fatigue"), cites Francois Mitterrand as an example, who at the time was still the leading opposition politician in France and would later go on to become long-term president under whose aegis precisely the countries mentioned below later joined the EU. In 1977, he told the magazine *Nouvel Observateur*: "One has to be careful not to turn the common market into a mere free trade zone. Neither Greece nor Spain are in a position to join the Community. Accession is neither in their interest nor is it in our interest. Interim steps are desirable." The report also mentions Perry Anderson, a renowned scholar on European affairs, who noted in 1996 prior to the eastern enlargement round that enlargement was posing a threat to the achievements of European integration. "The most immediate effect of any extension to the east, even of modest scope, would be a financial crisis of heroic proportions." Eastern enlargement would "cripple the existing institutions of the Union" and derail the introduction of a single European currency. Yet, what later caused the financial and ensuing economic crisis did certainly not originate from Eastern European countries but was rooted in what became largely known as "subprime mortgage crisis" in the U.S. real estate market. However, some of the Eastern European countries turned out to be highly affected by the economic downturn. This has been somewhat overshadowed by the events in Greece and other Mediterranean countries.

Anderson argued that "the cost of integrating Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland "would mean an increase of 60 percent in the Union budget today and that there was no chance of the existing member states accepting such a burden." (Anderson 1997, p.126; see ESI Report 2006a). The European budget, however, has not increased by 60% as will be further elaborated on later in this paper (see p.114 ff). These statements should merely underline the need to include a certain level of uncertainty

into the model of analysis. What seemed inconceivable 10 years ago is now a reality. It can be observed that even though Anderson's interjections may have been legitimate concerns at the time they were made, they quickly proved irrelevant in light of the ensuing dynamism that the prospect of enlargement induced into the European framework. It needs to be acknowledged that such objections serve its main purpose in the pre-accession state with the aim of shaping public discourse. At that stage they are certainly important to inspire the ensuing reforms of the EU institutions needed to accommodate the altered needs of a growing and deepening Union. What is interesting in any case is that enlargement has always entailed considerable transformation processes within the EU, thus leading to an adaptation of existing structures. Therefore, an enlargement round should also be viewed as external event that challenges entrenched patterns. Consequently, the transformational dimension of the enlargement process within the EU cannot be overstated.

The economist Joseph Schumpeter centered one of his theories on the concept of "creative destruction"- a term he used to describe the transformation accompanying innovation processes. According to him, innovation is the driving force behind sustained long-term economic growth and predominantly shapes the evolutionary character of the capitalist system (Schumpeter 1942, pp. 82-85). It can be argued that creative destruction cannot be solely confined to a narrow concept of economic activity, as the institutional framework of the EU has become a main influence on economic activity in Europe. When applied to the dimension of EU enlargement, it can be hypothesized that enlargement tends to trigger a process of creative destruction of previously existing institutional agreements. Without any doubt, a core set of values and beliefs continues to reflect onto European political life, while other, less distinctive values may disappear or be replaced by newly arising value conceptions. Most changes in fact take place on a procedural level. EU enlargement thus mainly induces dynamic change to the set of values, changing its composition while not changing most of the main ingredients. This view is in some ways disputed by Dannreuther (2009, p. 201) who associates "profound changes with the EU's eastward enlargement, which developed an internal dynamic and momentum, transforming the very nature and self-identity of the Union in the process." Another interesting aspect with regard to European enlargement rounds is mentioned by Richard Baldwin stated in his book *"Expanding Membership in the European Union"*. He argues that "there is reason to

suspect that economic integration of Europe may actually increase the temptation among existing EU members to keep potential entrants out so as not to spread the gains from membership too widely” (Baldwin 1995, p.50; see Pegram 2009).

5.2 “Turkey's accession is incompatible with Europe's identity”

Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), revised in the Treaty of Lisbon, forms the legal basis of enlargement and states that “*any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2*”, which cover freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, “*may apply to become a member of the Union*”. It is the word “European” that is source of some confusion, as the EU has never actually specified which countries qualify as European and on what grounds. From a geographical point of view, Cyprus, for example, would most likely not meet this criterion. In the case of Turkey, it has often been argued that the country is not part of Europe – neither geographically, nor culturally or historically. In fact, 54% of European citizens that were interviewed in Eurobarometer 63 in spring 2005 identify Turkey as too culturally different to join the EU (Balytska 2006, p. 17). In the Transatlantic Trends survey of 2008, 57% of Europeans and even 55% of Turkish respondents agreed that Turkey has such different values that it was not part of the West, with the highest agreement in Germany (76%), France (68%), and Italy (61%) (see GMF Transatlantic Trends 2008, p. 21). By 2010 the number for Turkey had dropped to 48% in Turkey (still only 30% see Turkey as part of the West based on common values) but for Europe the number even went up slightly to 58%. However, while a membership application of Morocco was outright dismissed as coming from a non-European country (see Independent Commission Report 2004, p. 13), the EU has considerably struggled with the question whether Turkey is a European country or not, which signals that the situation may not be as clear cut as it may appear at first sight. A brief look at the historical relationship between Turkey and Europe will help to reveal the nature of the relationship, although a thorough analysis of Ottoman influence on Europe and centuries of distinct interdependencies as well as fierce conflict would by far exceed the scope of this paper. Yet, it should be kept in mind that the dividing line between “Occident” and the “Orient” has been fairly porous and that cultural exchange, the transfer and fusion of ideas has been the norm rather than the exception throughout history (see Str ath 1999). Interestingly, ancient Greece is often portrayed and mystified as the cradle of European or Western civilization. What is often not mentioned, however, is that the Aegean coast

of Turkey was part of this ancient Greece (Ignacio Ramonet in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, November 2004) and that Greek thought, science and philosophy as well as literary and other accomplishments have to a large degree reached Europe by way of the Islamic world. There, works were translated from Greek into Arabic, nurtured and preserved from destruction and negligence that doomed their faith in the Byzantine Empire. They actually “re-entered” the “European conscience” in Spain during Islamic rule. One of the centers, where Hellenistic ideas had survived was Haran in Mesopotamia, today in the province of Şanlıurfa in South-Eastern Turkey. This is not meant to claim in any way the European credentials of several countries en route but merely to illustrate how someone could challenge the arbitrariness with which the borders of an allegedly closed cultural circle have been drawn (Gutas 1998, p.14).

Ottoman history is closely intertwined with the history of Europe. This alone does not answer the question, however, if the Ottoman Empire traditionally constituted a part of Europe or was merely an external influence. While at times it was specifically included in the European framework of powers, at other times it served as the embodiment of the “other” and was portrayed as a common enemy to Europe (Independent Commission Report 2004, p. 10). From a political point of view, a rather steady path towards inclusion of the Ottoman Empire into the European context can be observed along which cultural exchange and blending has taken place. Until its defeat in the battle of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman Empire had been preoccupied with advancing further into Europe and had deliberately drawn a line between itself and all the European powers – a line that was also readily reinforced from the other side on the grounds of a cultural and religious chasm. It was by far not the only power that was pursuing an expansionist policy, however. After this battle, the Ottoman Empire increasingly came to acknowledge the rules of the “European game” and accepted the *jus publicum Europeum*, thus becoming much more responsive to inner-European dynamics (see Adanir 2005). The Treaty of Paris in 1856 accepted the Ottoman Empire as part of the European state system (Aydin 2005, p.218). The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the European context is associated with a concurrent rise of the concept of nation states and competing national interests that largely replaced a previously reigning sense of European brotherhood that was founded upon Christianity as unifying factor. The Ottoman Empire was never officially recognized as “essential to European balance”, as this explicit wording would have entailed an agreement to grant compensatory gains to


balance any gains made by other major powers. Still, it was for centuries a part of the European alliance systems, was invited to join the European Concert in the 19th century and took part in WWI (see Adanir 2005). It should be mentioned that the conflicts between the Turks and the Europeans can hardly be said to have been any more belligerent than intra-European conflicts. Despite the fact that the Ottoman armies were often the adversaries of European powers on the battlefield and that the Ottomans served as the projection of largely unfounded fears in Europe, the same could be said about the Germans in France and the French in Britain at some point in the not so distant past. It has to be acknowledged, however, that this view on European political reality throughout history would consequently also open up a long-term accession perspective for Russia as a formerly major player in European power politics and essential part of the European balance of power system, although it is doubtful that this would ever be desired by Russia, which has its own super-power ambitions. Aydin argues that the Ottoman Empire continued to be excluded from European identity, as this identity used to be increasingly framed in terms of “being civilized”, a status that was not granted to the Ottomans in the minds of Europeans from the 19th century onwards (Aydin, 2005, p.218). After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the newly founded Turkish Republic under Ataturk aimed at modernizing and “Europeanizing” Turkish society and moved the country culturally closer to Europe, precisely to “make it civilized” and transfer the achievements of European societies to Turkey. It is widely perceived that EU accession would constitute the pinnacle of Ataturk’s modernization project that would ultimately anchor Turkey in the community of “developed nations” (Flam 2003, p.4).

5.2.1 Cultural Comparability

Numerous researchers from a variety of fields have been trying to measure cultural proximity between countries, to assess and understand cultural differences or to chart or group national cultures on a map of cultural characteristics. These studies could perhaps provide a first starting point from which to explore the question of cultural proximity between Turkey and the EU member states. Yet, it has to be kept in mind that these studies have often evolved out of an analysis of work-related aspects and that without a detailed account of the context of a specific relationship between countries, such cultural maps and indices do not constitute an adequate tool to make overarching

assumptions on cultural proximity. They can, however, be useful to get a first grasp of the differences and similarities that often drive cultural relations.

Fig. 11 The Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map



(source: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>)

In his study of national work related values, Geert Hofstede distinguishes four dimensions to help characterize and differentiate cultures: power distance, individualism, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. In order to complement his model he later also incorporated a 5th dimension at a later stage, Long-Term Orientation.


- The **Power Distance Index** (PDI) measures the extent to which the less powerful members of organizations, institutions and the family accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.
- **Individualism** (IDV) on the one side versus its opposite, collectivism, is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups and to what extent they build their identity on collective.
- The dimension of **Masculinity** (MAS) versus its opposite, femininity, refers to the distribution of roles between the genders. It measures whether men’s values within a culture lean towards an assertive and competitive pole, which has been labeled “masculine” or to a modest and caring pole, which Hofstede labeled


“feminine”. The higher the country ranks on this masculinity dimension, the wider is the gap between the values of men and women within this culture.

- The **Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI)** seeks to measure a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. It indicates to what extent a culture causes its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations.

Hofstede's work has been repeatedly criticized for oversimplifying, unjustly associating cultures with nations and building on the assumption that each nation inherently has one uniform culture. Moreover, it is argued that the main sample he used to develop his theory is comprised of IBM employees worldwide. Thus his model may be distorted by the influence of corporate and organizational culture (for a detailed review see for example McSweeney 2002). This needs to be kept in mind, when his framework is used to measure cultural proximity. A look at the scores of several European states reveals the striking discrepancies between the different EU countries with a great variance on all four dimensions of the model. It also shows that the profile of Greece and Turkey converge on all dimensions and that according to Hofstede’s model these two countries show a higher level of cultural proximity than for instance Austria and Germany.

Fig. 12 Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions






(source: www.geert-hofstede.com)


Results taken from the European Social Survey indicate the generally high level of involvement in politics in European societies and again underline the variance of national preferences within the EU. They also show the prevailing dichotomy in Turkish society. While a relatively high number of Turkish respondents assign a high importance to politics in their lives, the results for European countries are comparatively low. Interestingly, though, when Austrian and Turkish responses are compared on the question how often respondents discuss political matters with friends, it turns out that Austrians are more engaged in political discussions with their peers. This could be explained by the fact that politics may be a more private matter in Turkey or that political contestation in Turkey is more salient, underlining the dichotomy within Turkish society.

Fig. 13 Importance of politics in life (%)



(source: ESS- European Social Survey)


Fig. 14 How often do political discussions with friends take place?



(source: ESS- European Social Survey)

In comparison to Austrian respondents, Turkish respondents are strongly divided over the question whether they have freedom of choice and control over their lives. In Turkey about a quarter of respondents said that they have no control at all over their life, meaning that what they do has in their opinion no real effect on what happens to them. This could potentially be attributed to religious believes regarding “kismet” or to the hierarchical structure of Turkish society.


Fig. 15 Freedom of choice and control in and over one’s life?



(source: ESS- European Social Survey)

It is relatively more important for Turkish respondents that they can achieve something in their job, which supports the findings of the Inglehart-Wetzel Cultural Map that links Turkey closer to survival values, rather than values of self-expression. These results may be fueled by economic circumstances; however, they also indicate a high performance orientation of Turkish society.


Fig. 16 Important in a job: that you can achieve something



(source: ESS- European Social Survey)

With regard to the concept of family, Turkish respondents seem to be more traditional and show respect and love for their parents unconditionally, while relatively more Austrian respondents think that their parents have to earn this respect. The underlying factor could be rooted in the more traditional values within Turkish society that put emphasis on the authority of the institution of family.

Fig. 17 Respect and love for parents (always vs. earned)



(source: ESS- European Social Survey)

5.2.2 What is Europe?

European borders can be defined along geographical, economic, ethnic, ideological and cultural lines. The European Union has traditionally defined itself as an organization in which all member states share common values, but national identities continue to play the dominating role within the mindset of Europeans. An explicit aim of the European Union is thus to preserve differences in national identities of member states, while emphasizing similarities, which is expressed in the term “unity in diversity”. It is not unreasonable to speak of “European cultural pluralism”(Yukleyen 2008, p. 123) and the analogy between the EU and an orchestra in which several distinct instruments form an ensemble (see Johnson 1991, 9-10) is certainly apposite (interestingly, the percussion section in the modern orchestra is actually owed to Ottoman influence- Quataert 2000, p.8). On 25 March 2007, the Berlin Declaration, marking the EU’s 50th anniversary, underlined its “common ideals”: the individual, human dignity and equality of men and women. Other values stressed by the declaration are peace and freedom, democracy and the rule of law, as well as tolerance and solidarity (see Euractiv, “European Values and Identity”). There has been criticism that the universal values, which have been portrayed as the foundation of the EU, have at best at times served as a marker of European identity and are only the tip of the iceberg. Without any doubt, they cannot conclusively establish credible boundaries for “European civilization” throughout history, as the existence of fascist and autocratic regimes in various countries has shown. They can, however, serve as a marker of EU membership and thus EU institutions have figured prominently in defining the foundation of Europe as a (political) project since WWII (see Yukleyen 2008, p.120). Some have stressed the importance of “a common cultural heritage, with foundations in ancient Greece, Christianity, and Europe of the Enlightenment” (Müftüler-Baç 2000, p.26) as the dominant drivers of European values, which are thus only applicable to countries that have historically been exposed to these influences. Despite the fact that the terms stated in the Berlin Declaration have provided a framework for universal values, these values have deliberately been kept ambiguous, thus open to different interpretations. They have allowed Europeans to avoid the question what it means to be European for some time. Interestingly, it is the accession process of Turkey that has ultimately forced Europeans to confront the question which universal values the EU actually represents, what constitutes Europe and what defines its borders. Thus, Turkey’s membership bid in itself has already left a profound impact

on European identity and self-perception. It should be kept in mind that universal values challenge existing identities as a process of transcendence is likely to lead to more self-consciousness and self-awareness (see Park 1914). Without an understanding of one's own identity, it is unlikely that anybody will subscribe to these values. National identities in Europe have thus changed as a consequence of mental interaction with the "European space". A new national identity is created, incorporating universal and particular elements, universal European values and emphasized particular national traditions, which may however have been transformed compared to the stage prior to the formation of the EU. European self-definition has changed as a result of the process and development of the European Union, which is one of the most coherent arguments in defiance of an essentialist view on European identity. As an essentialist view implies inherent traits and inalterability (see Yukleyen 2008, p.117), it does not seem well suited to explain the identity of a group of countries that has been subject to such profound and transformational change throughout the last century.

5.2.3 Accession Talks with Turkey already Challenge European Identity

It should be taken into account that Turkey's bid for membership has already led Europe to confront the question what defines the nature of European identity. In the absence of a clear, positively formulated vision of European identity, Europe has for a long time resorted to rather diffuse, negative boundaries to define "what Europe is not". The accession talks with Turkey have created a certain pressure to specify and explain existing demarcations and to respond to accusations of prejudice on religious, cultural or ethnic grounds. This challenges entrenched patterns of demonizing Turks and merely referring to Turkey as the "other" and "outsider". (Erzan & Kirişçi, 2004, p. 5). Many important scholars have taken on the task of defining Europe and the Turks or Ottomans have often served as a negative marker to identify the boundaries of Europe throughout the centuries. "Montesquieu defined the features of Europe, namely law, morality, aristocracy, monarchy and liberty by contrasting them with Asian despotism" (Yapp 1992, pp.147). Quataert points out, however, that Machiavelli and later Montesquieu and Bodin also used the example of effective, incorrupt and disciplined Ottoman administration to inspire European monarchs, their soldiers and administrators to better behavior in times when criticism of monarchs still posed a danger for one's life (Quataert 2000, p.7). "Montesquieu was one of the first to express the notion of Europe

as a geographical, cultural, political and intellectual entity with its own history and its own distinctive features. In substituting secular for religious distinctions Montesquieu helped to invent Europe” (Yapp 1992, pp.147ff). In contrast, Leibniz's ideal resembled the medieval concept of the *respublica Christiana* represented by the Holy Roman Empire and the Christian church. Thus, it quickly becomes evident how different ideas on European identity coexist at the same time and compete for public support. In “Essai sur les moeurs”, Voltaire argued that the Ottomans were not especially despotic and that their government was no more arbitrary than those of many European states, and he preferred to describe the Ottoman state as democratic. Voltaire saw the causes of difference between Turks and Europeans in climate, government and religion, with the treatment of women constituting the most decisive difference (Voltaire 1833, p. 1532; cited in Yapp 1992, pp.147ff).

In light of the fact that several member states have announced that a Turkish accession will be subject to a public referendum, analyzing public perception of Turkey in EU member states seems vital, as it will ultimately influence the outcome of the accession talks. Opponents of Turkey's accession often raise the argument of negative public sentiment in a number of member states and the importance of the EU's responsiveness to the people's will. They emphasize the democratic deficits of the EU and their desire to strengthen the power of the electorate in the decision making process. Certainly, opponents of Turkish accession rely on public referenda as a roadblock of last resort to prevent Turkey from becoming an EU member state. Indeed, a negative attitude towards Turkey's accession to the EU persists among the population in several European countries, which could have serious consequences for Turkey's EU ambitions. For example, according to a poll conducted by Le Figaro newspaper (April 08, 2009), 82% of the French citizens oppose accession of Turkey to the European Union. France originally pledged that Turkey's accession will be subject to a public referendum (Barysch, August 24, 2007) but by now it seems uncertain whether this referendum will ever take place at all. More generally, a certain resistance to change can be observed among national constituencies within the member states, as Europe has experienced the immediate economic and social pressures, that globalization and the current recession has put on them in recent years. Former EU trade-commissioner Peter Mandelson emphasized in a speech given to a Turkish audience during his tenure that “in the EU many of the dissenting voices on Turkish membership are the same voices raised

against globalization. They reflect wider questions in European society: unemployment, migration, social tensions. Genuine anxieties that need to be addressed. It is hard to have a rational debate on Turkey and the EU while Turkey is the projected image of everything we fear about a changing world” (speech by Peter Mandelson at the Centre for European Reform Bosphorus Conference, 2006).

More generally, Oscar Handlin referred to this phenomenon in his essay “Group Life within the American Pattern” by arguing that “fear in periods of hazardous changes, gives rise to the reluctance to tolerate dissent and further encourages the concept of an assimilating society” (p. 412). Sometimes Turkey’s accession is perceived as unwelcome but inevitable change by national constituencies, who clearly see the EU as elite project and criticize its “democratic deficit”. According to the Transatlantic Trends Survey 2010, conducted by the German Marshall Fund, only 23% of European respondents currently support an accession of Turkey. Yet, 51% of the respondents think that Turkey is likely to join the EU, which could either mean considerable disillusionment with democratic decision-making in the EU and a perceived lack of responsiveness of EU institutions and national governments to the public will or the acknowledgement of strategic interests and more informed decision-making on the part of European politicians. It could also be explained by the fact that respondents could be simply underestimating how widespread the rejection of Turkey’s EU ambitions actually is among European constituencies.

5.2.4 Ethnic homogeneity in European Societies?

European societies function under the premise of a dominant ethnic majority and thus implicitly exert pressure on ethnic minorities to assimilate to a mainstream culture. But is this assumption necessarily valid? In “Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups”, Robert E. Park (1914) highlights the fact that the “homogeneity that individuals of the same nationality exhibit have been greatly exaggerated...neither inbreeding nor interaction has created a more than superficial likeness or like-mindedness (p. 606). What has been labeled as solid, even primordial national identity in many European societies could also be regarded as an unstable composite of different ethnicities and distinct regional stocks. In “Human Migration and the Marginal Man”, Park (1928) quotes Griffith Taylor, who states that “the whole teaching of ethnology shows that peoples of mixed race are the rule and not the exception [and that] every nation, upon

examination, turns out to have been a more or less successful melting pot.” Members of a nation which is perceived to be founded upon homogeneous ethnicity have been subject to superficial uniformity. It is the same uniformity that is often presupposed with regard to immigrant groups whose members might in fact have widely varying backgrounds, beliefs, values and outlooks, as is the case with Turkish minority groups. Certainly, in European societies this perceived homogeneity has been compounded by the fact that these processes started several decades and sometimes even centuries ago and thus different views, values and ethnic backgrounds have been allowed to fuse to a certain extent; however, in many cases, it is not a centuries-old ethnic identity, but a mindset that has developed fairly recently. Breuilly (1996) argued that “the myths of common descent, which often surround claims of ethnic homogeneity, are often who selected, modified or even fabricated by nationalist elites who use them to forge a sense of loyalty to the national community they claim to represent” (pp. 150-152). In the case of Austria, a country with a strong sense of ethnic identity – a fact that is reflected in a very stringent citizenship regime based on ethnicity – it has to be taken into account that the country’s identity has evolved out of an identity that for centuries had been embedded into the context of the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the turn of the 19th century, the percentage of foreign born inhabitants in Vienna, then the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was considerable. “Dotted with Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, and Polish family names, Vienna's telephone directory is a testimony to immigration's impact on Austria” (Jandl & Kraler, International Centre for Migration Policy Development). Roughly 30% of the Viennese population around 1900 had originally been born in “non-German” parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and another 10% were born in foreign countries. Despite the fact that substantial return migration took place after the dissolution of the Empire following WWI into the newly formed successor states, a large number of first and second generation immigrants remained in the city, thus permanently altering its ethnic composition (Fassmann & Muenz 1995, p. 166). Granted, it has to be acknowledged that the fluidity of Viennese (and for that matter Austrian) identity at that point is rooted in the phenomena of industrialization and rapid urbanization and was facilitated by Vienna’s position at the core of a multi-ethnic empire. These conditions entailed social and cultural changes of great magnitude and have changed the spatial and societal framework within which identity is forged in a somewhat revolutionary way. It could be argued that only colossal social developments will trigger such a profound change in identity and disrupt

entrenched traits. While this may very well be the case, it seems to me that such events rather serve as a magnifying glass through which one can observe changes in an accelerated way that would otherwise stay beneath the surface and occur at a much slower pace. The people from all parts of the Empire that migrated into Austria have by now, of course, blended into the “new Austrian ethnicity” beyond recognition. It should be mentioned that this ethnicity has been transformed and thus does not resemble Austrian ethnicity prior to these immigration flows. This clearly supports the argument that ethnicity is always in flux and is not a static phenomenon. Thus, the notion to preserve homogeneity at the status quo can be seen as an entirely arbitrary decision and a deliberate effort to “declare” homogeneity from a certain point onwards. Also, the EU as mosaic of member states with distinct national identities is at best subject to rather superficial homogeneity. Even one of the most fervent Europeans, Jean Monnet, was of the opinion that “Europe has never existed – one has genuinely to create Europe.” (Jean Monnet, quoted by Anthony Sampson, *The New Europeans*, 1968, p. 6), thus taking a distinctly constructivist view on Europe. The existing level of uniformity that has been achieved ultimately seems derived from universally applicable values. If Turkey adheres to these values an accession of Turkey will transform but not generally challenge the European framework within which national identities are interpreted. It will also highlight Europe’s need to address the question of how it wants to deal with diversity in general.

5.2.5 Copenhagen Criteria

The Copenhagen Criteria that were laid out by the European Council in 1993 establish general requirements that an aspiring country must meet in order to become eligible for accession to the European Union. These accession criteria constitute the target that stands at the end of an individual accession process. To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria:

- political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and

monetary union.

For the European Council to decide to open negotiations, the political criteria must be satisfied (Europa Glossary “Copenhagen Criteria”). The specific road-map towards accession varies from country to country, as individual problems have to be addressed and the timeframe of negotiations may vary according to difficulties encountered in the process. Also, the speed at which a country progresses towards meeting the Copenhagen Criteria will vary due to the conditions within a candidate country, which will speed up or delay accession talks. However, in principle, Turkey is subject to the same criteria that apply to other prospective member states. This was emphasized by the Helsinki European Council of December 11, 1999 which concluded that “Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.” Many politicians, other decision-makers and scholars emphasize the need for the EU to honor the principle of “pacta sunt servanda” especially in the domain of enlargement. They argue that if explicit rules are laid out, they have to be generally applied or the EU runs the risk of being regarded as unreliable, inconsistent and driven by double-standards in its policies, which may have severe repercussions with regard to its credibility and influence in international affairs (see Balytska 2006, p.7).

5.2.6 Europe as a Christian Club?

Repeatedly, the argument is being brought forward that the “European civilization” is based on a solid Christian core and that Turkey as a majority Muslim nation will have no space in Europe. The European cultural landscape seems thickly permeated by Christian roots. Universal values that constitute a major building block of the European Union are predominantly based on the thoughts of Enlightenment, but certainly have some of their origins in Christian principles and morals. Also, Christianity has, over centuries, undoubtedly been the single most influential contributor to European arts, architecture and law systems. Major historical events have been shaped by Christianity and have left a footprint in the collective memory of European states (see Huber 2004). Most Europeans affiliate themselves culturally with Christianity, and even if they do not actively practice their religion or attend church regularly, religion continues to play an important role in people’s lives. According to the Bertelsmann ReligionsMonitor in 2008, 75% of Europeans can be considered religious, with 25% of the respondents

rating themselves to be even highly religious. In this survey, 57% also report that they attend church services more or less regularly. The European Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer in spring 2004, however, asking respondents to indicate weekly attendance of religious service, found that only roughly 20% of Europeans do so. What seems important with regard to Turkey's accession bid is that Europeans seem to be strikingly tolerant in their religious views. 92% of respondents agreed that "every religion is likely to contain a kernel of truth" and that "it is important to be open to all religions" (67% strongly, 25% somewhat). Particularly, Italian respondents were extremely tolerant (71% agree strongly, 22% somewhat). This is interestingly in light of the fact that Italians were also the most religious throughout Europe (44 % highly religious, 45% somewhat religious). However, the "Immigration Trends 2008" survey came to the result that 39 percent of European and 43 percent of Italian respondents think that Western European way of life and Islam are not reconcilable. This points to a generally tolerant attitude towards other religions. But when scratching the surface and asking more concrete questions regarding the compatibility of other religions with the allegedly open Western societies, a tougher stance, particularly towards Islam is revealed. In the same survey, about a third of the respondents also want to make the origin from a country with a Christian heritage the decisive accession criterion for immigrants to Europe (p.12). Yet, in order to keep these results in perspective, it needs to be mentioned that also 42% of respondents in the U.S. supported the same statement. It can thus be argued that the perception of the irreconcilability between Christian and Muslim ways of life is widespread throughout the Western world. Is this a new phenomenon that is a direct consequence of the events of 9/11 and the threat of further terrorist attacks by Islamic extremists? This claim can hardly be substantiated in light of the fact that for centuries similar opinions have been prevailing in public discourse throughout Europe. Turkish and Ottomans have often been demonized and were attributed an image of blood-thirsty savages. The word "infidel" that is nowadays used by Islamic terrorists to refer to Europeans and Americans and which carries a highly negative connotation influenced by a sense of religious supremacy, was in the past often used by Europeans to refer to the Ottomans who were depicted as the incorporation of evil (see Delanty 1995; Yapp 1992; Quataert 2000).

The religious relief in Europe is undoubtedly highly diverse and the picture that is painted by several studies looking into the nature of religious beliefs in Europe appears

to be fairly complex. Member states are comprised of either an Orthodox, Protestant or Roman Catholic majority population. Additionally, there are sizeable Muslim populations in numerous European countries. It would be misleading to label them as part of a pan-European Muslim minority, however, and European Muslims can hardly be viewed as a homogenous group, as minorities in each country are confronted with different national circumstances and have entirely different ethnic backgrounds. Despite the fact that Europe's secularization is widely taken for granted, 27% of the respondents in the Bertelsmann ReligionsMonitor indicated that religion has a major influence on their political views. While in a large number of member states a more or less strict separation between church and state has been implemented on an institutional level, religious undercurrents continue to impact on public opinion. Granted, levels of religiosity may not be comparable to other parts of the world and religiosity is certainly not as openly displayed as in the US; however, religion's impact on society has not disappeared but has rather been transformed, as it has grown more subtle and is now more related to indirectly shaping values and opinions. There exist large variations between countries, with Poland, Ireland and Italy being the most and France as well as the Nordic countries being among the least religious. Differences between Protestant and Catholic Europe are striking when it comes to religious participation and the predominantly Protestant countries seem to be much more secularized than their Catholic counterparts. It may be argued that the divide between Christianity and Islam is not comparable to the cleavage between different Christian confessions, such as between Roman Catholics and Protestants, but it should be acknowledged that faith-based homogeneity has increasingly proved to be an illusion – a “relic from ancient times”. Religious homogeneity has perhaps occurred on a much smaller spatial level but certainly not on a European scale. While European politicians (perhaps justifiably) stress the Christian nature of Europe, the separation between church and state is ubiquitous, despite the fact that several countries officially recognize one strain of Christianity as state religion. Christian morals also seem to have lost its monopoly in public debate. Abortions, for instance, have been legal in most European countries for years and divorces are widespread throughout the continent. However, Europe's Christian credentials have implicitly been deeply entrenched in the rules that form the foundation of the EU and no single country would be able to change that (see Huber 2004). Just as minority groups have not jeopardized national frameworks based on Christian values that are upheld by a majority, one country in the EU alone will not be

able to jeopardize Europe's Christian roots and orientation. It is true that the integration of immigrant groups may pose a serious challenge to liberal democracies. As pointed out by Jenkins "after centuries of rebelling against religious authority, the coming of Islam is also reviving political issues most thought extinct in Europe, including debates about the limits of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the right to proselytize" (Jenkins 2007). Issues such as women's rights, the burkha or even forced marriages and honor killings are testing the limits of European liberal values and tolerance. This is emphasized by Russell Hardin (2004) who posed the question of "where an otherwise liberal state should stand on its dealings with illiberal immigrant groups?" (see also Wikan 2004, p.194). Thus, discourse about the integration of (especially Muslim) minority groups with hierarchical and patriarchal structures could – apart from all its difficulties – actually strengthen Europe's value base, as it causes Europe to specify the nature and the extent of individual and political freedoms that are part of the foundation of the EU.

Repeatedly, the concern has been voiced that Muslim minorities in some European countries could at some point become a majority within their respective national constituency. These countries could then join forces with Turkey to revert some of these fundamental European values. This claim, however, is not supported by factual data and simply based on exaggeration, as Muslim minorities will certainly not become a majority in any European country within the next decades. Islam is the largest religious minority in Austria with 338,988 Muslims, which represents 4.22% of the population according to the 2001 census (source: Statistik Austria). In 1971 only 0.3% of the Austrian population was registered officially as Muslims. And even in 1991, only 158,776 Muslims were counted in the same survey (2% of the population). The duplication of Muslims in Austria within 10 years has also in part been explained by a growing willingness of Muslims to speak publicly about their religion, in particular of those from Turkey. A recent study by the Fund for Integration estimated that the number of Muslims in Austria has risen further to 515.914 people, constituting 6.2% of the population. This number comprises 252.845 Muslims with Austrian citizenship and 263.069 citizens of a foreign country (Marik-Lebeck 2010, pp. 5-6). In comparison, there are approximately 3.5-5 million Muslims in France, representing 6.0-8.5% of the total population (58.5 million). Germany has the largest Muslim population in Western Europe after France. Approximately 4 million Muslims live in Germany (see Study of

the Pew Research Center in 2009 for a comprehensive account of Muslim populations worldwide). The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office estimates that 825,000 Muslims live in Italy, of which between 140,000 and 160,000 are Italian born. A 2006 report by the US Department of State on religious freedom estimated that approximately one million of Italy's 58.5 million residents were Muslim, roughly 1.7% of the entire population. There are almost one million Muslims in the Netherlands, representing 5.8% of the population. It has been argued that the accession of Turkey might leave the EU better prepared for embracing its already existing diversity. Above all, if a country whose population mainly adheres to another religion, such as Turkey, agrees to honor the principles of the EU, it would further contribute to their moral validity.

The argument that Europe is essentially based on the notion of Christendom has been repeatedly brought forward throughout history. The German historian Heinrich Sybel (1858), for example, stressed the central role of the crusades in forging European identity. It is often argued that religious markers of identity served as the single most important unifying factor in European self-consciousness until well into the seventeenth century, and the narrative of Christendom and a Europe which is historically firmly rooted in a Christian community has been persistently brought forward throughout the centuries (for a detailed account see Perkins 2004). Similarly, in the Ottoman Empire a faith-based identity prevailed. Politically the Muslims divided the world into lands under Muslim rule (the "Dar al-Islam") and lands under non-Muslim rule (the "Dar al-Harb"). Rather than using the category of "Europe", the division into a southern "Rum" and a northern "Firangistan" retained popularity until long into the seventeenth century, emphasizing the Ottoman perception that the Carolingian Empire in conjunction with the Roman heritage and especially Christianity, or more narrowly the Roman Catholic Church, was culturally at the center of the European continent. Both expressions actually represent a view previously articulated by the Byzantines and thus did not represent a revolutionary concept to describe the political landscape of Europe (Yapp 1992, 142 ff). It should be noted that an East-West Schism in 1054 caused a religious split within the territories of the former Roman Empire and established two power centers of Christianity, with Constantinople as the center of the Eastern Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire and Rome as the base of the Roman Catholic Church in the former Western Roman Empire (see Encyclopedia Britannica). Goffman (2002) emphasizes the Byzantine heritage that served as a legacy to the Ottoman Empire. The

Ottomans largely adopted the Byzantine tax structure and – similar to the Byzantine Empire – anchored identity in a common religious ideology in order to rule the often very same territories that had previously made up the Byzantine Empire. In certain ways, the impression of the Ottoman Empire was that of a successor of the Byzantine Empire, albeit it constituted an “evil version” in the eyes of many Europeans. However, Goffman does not leave out other main sources of cultural influence, such as Turkic, Persian, Seljuk and Arab elements.

5.2.7 A Historical Relationship

It would by far exceed the focus of this paper to give a detailed account of the events and circumstances that led to the formation and rise of the Ottoman Empire. However, for the sake of completeness, it is necessary to briefly touch upon the developments that paved the way for the Ottoman Empire to emerge as the most powerful player in the Eastern Mediterranean. This may also shed some light on the roots that would later shape Ottoman society and could help to answer the question to what extent their empire was founded upon markers of “European influence”. The rise of the Ottoman Empire dates back to a period largely marked by anarchy and interregnum in Anatolia. The Battle of Manzikert between the Byzantine Empire and the Great Seljuk Empire under Sultan Alp Arslan in 1071 permanently weakened the Byzantine Empire and limited its influence within the region. Several principalities in Anatolia were established by Turkoman tribes and originally virtually all of them were vassals or had pledged allegiance to the Great Seljuk Empire and subsequently the Seljuk Sultanate of Rûm, the remnants of the Great Seljuk Empire in Anatolia. However, after the defeat against the Mongols in the Battle of Köse Dağ in 1243, the Seljuk Empire lost much of its power base and had to further loosen its already weak grip of the border regions to the West of its territory. It was not until about 1300 that the Ottoman Empire was founded by Osman I. It evolved out of the Beylik Osmanoğlu that had initially been granted as dominion to Osman’s father Ertuğrul and constituted one of the Turkoman principalities, which subsequently struggled for power in the power vacuum in the border regions between the Byzantine and the Seljuk Empire. During these times, the Ottomans labeled themselves as “ghazi warriors” – warriors of Islam – who sought to expand the dominions of Islam at the expense of the infidels. Quataert (2000, p.6) points out that the Ottomans used this identity to attract fighters in the name of Islam, thus

fortifying their claim to certain frontier territories and establishing a firm power base (for more detailed accounts see Matuz 2006, pp.23-34; Shaw 1976, pp.12 ff).

Many historical events can be drawn upon to explain the fear and loathing that the Ottomans have evoked throughout Europe. More precisely, these feelings have often been framed in religious terms and were universally applied to describe the Muslim world. They can be traced back beyond the siege of Vienna in 1683 to the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 - or even to the battle of Kosovo in 1389 or in Malazgirt in 1071 and became more pronounced since the Ottomans' suppression of a revolt in Bulgaria in 1875 and 1876 which has sometimes been labeled "the Bulgarian massacres" (Mansel 1989, p.35). More recently, the alleged genocide of Armenians during WWI has fortified the image of the Turks as a savage and violent society, although these events, despite having been brought to the attention of Western publics largely through the accounts of Christian missionaries, have generally been framed in secular terms.

In the eyes of the Ottomans, the "Holy Roman Empire" left a lasting and defining footprint on European identity even beyond its actual existence. In Ottoman jargon, Franks were often equated with "Europeans" and Christianity remained the principal anchor of identity in the eyes of the Ottoman Muslims. "The Franks no more resemble the Turks than night resembles day", reported an Ottoman ambassador sent to the court of Louis XV, and added that "if you turned a Turk upside down you got a Frank." Statements like these indicate the cultural distance and the perception of cultural superiority on the part of many Ottomans. This perception changed at the end of the eighteenth and in particular during the nineteenth century, which cannot only be attributed to losses on the battlefield and a subsequent shift in the power balance in favor of European countries or because the Ottomans began to see Europe as a distinct entity of nations with specific characteristics. This change in perception also reflected a changed European self-perception. It had shifted from the formerly prevailing idea of Christendom towards the more secularly framed notion of "les affaires d'europe" which became evident in several statements from the end of the seventeenth century onwards (Yapp 1992, 142 ff). Similarly, Delanty (1995, p.37) argues that with the beginning of the seventeenth century "the idea of Europe began to replace Christendom as a cultural frame of reference for the construction of new forms of identification" and that "in this transformation Europe no longer signified a geographical area but a system of values".

Neumann (1999, p.46) even argues that already “by the end of the 14th century the ‘Turk’ was seen more as a secular and cultural menace than as a religious or ideological threat.”

Austria retained “the language of Christianity” when referring to the Ottomans longer than most other European powers, as Christian rhetoric could be used to rally support in Germany against the Ottoman invader and provide an excuse for building up a strong central government in Vienna. Throughout the centuries, the Austro-Hungarian branch of the Habsburgs (as well as the Spanish branch) and France repeatedly used the Christian-framed discourse as a diplomatic weapon of reproach against each other in their struggle for power and influence, arguing that the other's approach was contrary to “true” christian beliefs (Ladurie 1998, p.59). France under Francois I was the first nation to use a more secular approach partner in its foreign policy deliberations regarding the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the sixteenth century and view the relations with the Ottoman Empire strategically rather than religiously motivated. “The main object of these contacts was political - to use the Ottomans to keep the Habsburgs in check - but the unpopularity of this policy, regarded as a betrayal of Christendom, compelled French rulers to disguise the nature of their proceeding. Thus, in its external communications, the state always emphasized France’s first priority of protecting of the holy places and Latin Christians, followed by the promotion of commerce. Until the eighteenth century, the political aim was relegated to third place” (Yapp 1992, p.143). This is interesting in light of the fact that European governments have in recent years often been criticized that they would hide their true thoughts and intentions regarding Turkey’s accession bid, albeit against the backdrop of religious considerations. It also shows that historically elite interests and public opinion on Turkey have continuously been diverging.

France viewed the Austrian engagement against the Ottomans in the name of Christendom favorably as it committed Austrian resources which it feared could otherwise be employed in Italy and Germany. Clearly, the diversion of resources on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire served France’s strategic interest in counterbalancing the Habsburgs in Europe. It was argued that “nothing better contributes to maintain the peace between the Christian princes (the “tranquility” of Europe) than the fear which the Turkish forces can inspire in their neighbors” (Duparc

1969, pp. 229-231; cited in Yapp 1992, p.144). For several centuries Islam had been the principal rival and threat to Latin Christendom. This was not only evident in religious domains but since the Catholic Church was also a formidable political power this threat also figured prominently in military considerations. When Mehmet II, “The Conqueror”, conquered Constantinople in 1453 and made it the new Ottoman capital, Istanbul, this ended a long period of crusades. It gave rise to widespread fear of Ottoman expansion into Europe, which in turn influenced public perception and entailed propaganda that sought to promote the image of the Turks as barbaric, blood-thirsty and savage (see Bartholomew Georgiewitz 1553, cited in Yapp 1992, p. 144). Delanty emphasizes the important role that “the fall of Constantinople” and the following periods of fear and defeat played in the formation of European modernity. He argues that “the origins of European identity can be found in the sixteenth century resistance to the Turks” and that “this was a consciousness that was sustained by the principle of exclusivity rather than on any immanent collective cohesion and buttressed by the image of the Orient as the common enemy” (Delanty 1995, pp.36-37).

This image was gradually replaced over the centuries, as the threat of Ottoman conquest declined and “although few eighteenth century western European referred any longer to the Ottomans as the terror of Europe, as had Richard Knolles in the late sixteenth century, the image that replaced it – the sick man of Europe – was hardly any more positive and more inclusive only in a negative sense. Not respect or inclusion but contempt replaced fear in the minds of many Christian Europeans” (Goffman 2002, p.19). However, Quataert also describes another prevalent picture of the Ottomans in Europe “in which the Ottomans were not only terrible, savage and ‘unspeakable’, but also sex-crazed, harem-driven and debauched [...] and the Ottoman East [served] as the degenerate site of pleasures supposedly absent or forbidden in the civilized vigorous West where Europeans by contrast allegedly were restrained, sober, just, sexually controlled, moderate and rational” (Quataert 2000, p.7). Interestingly, nowadays the views of debauchery and promiscuity are sometimes expressed by Muslims with regard to modern European societies. Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq, in his book *Turcicae legationes epistolae quatuor* (1589), carves out an entirely different image of Ottoman society with an emphasis on “military and administrative skills, a tolerant government, a system of justice which was simpler, quicker and less corrupt than that of Europe, a stable social order and personal characteristics such as endurance, sobriety, cleanliness,

politeness and hospitality” (see also Yapp 1992).

Some people argue that the customs union between the EU and Turkey has already anticipated a large share of the positive economic benefits that could be reaped in the event of Turkey’s accession. Sometimes, it has been questioned whether Turkey’s choice to engage in such a customs union has actually served its strategic interests and strengthened its bargaining position with regard to the enlargement process. It has made the Turkish market largely accessible for European businesses and put Europe in a privileged position compared to other global business partners. Thus, the Turkish bargaining chip of granting access to a large, emerging market has in some ways been prematurely given up. Besides the benefits for Turkey of getting privileged access to the vast European market, the behavior of the Ottoman Empire a few centuries ago may also shed some light on this decision. In this context it seems important to review one of the strategic instruments that were employed by the Ottoman Empire to strengthen its relations with Europe. The system of capitulations, granting privileged access to the Ottoman market for French, Dutch and English merchants, had “both political and economic aims, such as coalition formation in the West, protection of traditional trade routes, securing strategic goods, supporting economy and maximizing the revenue from tax collection. The main logic behind this measure was that these privileges would attract new merchants from these countries, thus increasing trade and business between the Levant and Western Europe” (Bulut 2008, 259). The capitulations were assumed to boost economic development within the Empire and strengthen existing trade routes and economic relations. Particularly the importance of coalition formation should not be underestimated in this context. States such as the Netherlands, England or France that pursued a less religious foreign policy course or at least stated their religious motives less explicitly, were favored and thus strengthened in an inner-European context. Similarly, it could be argued that the Turkish agreement to the customs union was also meant to strengthen pro-Turkish forces within the EU. It becomes evident that the system of capitulations in the Ottoman time worked largely in favor of Protestant countries, which could be rooted in their more pragmatic foreign policy, their tradition in trade, but could also merely signal the antagonistic position of the Ottoman Sultan and the Pope.

5.2.8 Turkey- a Unique Case?

A regression model by Basak Yavcan, exploring European public opinion towards an accession of Turkey, comes to the conclusion that resentment of Turkey's membership to the EU stems from fear with regard to Europe's identity and is mostly not founded upon tangible economic concerns (p. 20). This is interesting in light of the fact that the Eurobarometer Flash survey 257 (February 2009), aimed at assessing general attitudes towards EU enlargement and not specifically towards Turkey's accession, paints a different picture. According to this survey, populations in member states attach high importance to "freedom and democratic values" (49.7%) and "economic issues" (39.7%), while "cultural and religious issues" (20.7%) rank surprisingly low. Only in Italy, the cultural and religious issues (39.8%) take precedence over other considerations. Italy also scored particularly high on "immigration issues", as did Austria, Ireland and the UK. The diverging results of these two studies could be an indicator of the uniqueness of Turkey's case but perhaps also reflects a shift in priorities given the changed economic climate between 2006 and 2009. In times of a recession, economic considerations are assigned more weight than in times of a booming economy. In Yavcan's study, non-urban residents seem to be less inclined to reject Turkey's accession than urban residents. This could be attributed to the fact that the fear of immigration is more pronounced in urban conglomerations that have traditionally been the destination of migratory flows (Yavcan, 2006, p. 17). Again, this is not supported by the recent Eurobarometer survey (February 2009), as no significant differences between the urban and rural population were detected on whether they attached any importance to immigration issues when it comes to future EU enlargement in general. This leads to the assumption that the Turkish case indeed constitutes a special case that is fairly detached from general opinions on future enlargement, but could also highlight the importance of phrasing survey questions on such a sensitive issue carefully, as different wording may result in completely different responses. In her inquiry into the comparability of the Turkish accession bid vis-à-vis the applications of previous accession candidates, McLaren (2007) finds similar sources and patterns of opposition of EU constituencies towards an accession of Turkey and the accession of CEE countries prior to their accession in 2004. She emphasizes, however, that tremendously high levels of rejection of Turkey's membership by far exceed the levels of rejection experienced by previous accession candidates; a fact which she mainly

attributes to contextual factors such as large Turkish immigrant communities within individual member states: “that experience with migration from Turkey may be a key contextual explanation for hostility to this candidacy. Instead of creating a ‘we-feeling’ and empathy for the Turkish candidacy, such migration appears to be having counterproductive effects” (p. 273).

McLaren also renounces the argument of Jones & van der Bijl (2004) who hypothesize “that greater geographical proximity promotes a stronger ‘we-feeling’ between the candidate and the member state. Thus, the greater the geographical proximity is, the greater the support for a candidate country will be.” In the case of Turkey this argument does not prove to be valid, as some of the most adamant opponents of Turkey’s accession, such as Germany and Austria are geographically closer to Turkey than its most outspoken supporters, such as the UK, Sweden and Spain. Also Greece, the neighbor of Turkey, cannot be said to be an enthusiastic supporter of Turkey’s EU ambitions. But then, perhaps closer cultural interaction could serve as an indicator of more support for Turkey’s accession? Viewed from this point, frequent interaction with a relatively large Turkish immigrant community within a particular country, should lead to decreased prejudices. Jan Dirk Kemming and Özlem Sandikci (2007) paint an ambiguous picture in their findings regarding the question whether familiarity and close contact with a large Turkish immigrant community impacts positively or negatively on the general sentiment towards Turkey's accession. They find that the effect strongly varies with the degree of integration of these communities into mainstream society, which for example results in stronger support for Turkey's accession in the Netherlands or the UK, as opposed to France and Germany where close interaction has essentially resulted in more prejudices and thus had a rather negative effect. It should be kept in mind that the mere existence of large immigrant communities does not necessarily translate into significant interaction between the majority population and ethnic minorities and thus does not in itself lead to closer cultural proximity and familiarity. Furthermore, it has to be acknowledged that the national discourses on immigrant integration are framed in different ways and within them cultural exchange may carry a positive or negative connotation, which often shapes the perception and interpretation of cultural interaction by individuals.

Kemming & Sandikci also conclude that the perception that religion plays a more important role in Turkey than in “secularized Europe” seems to weigh more heavily on public opinion, than the mere fact that a majority of Turkish nationals are Muslims. It is thus the perceived impact of religion on the country’s posture rather than the nominal affiliation of Turkish citizens to Islam that European citizens seem to reject. This is interesting in light of the fact that Turkey is perhaps one of the most secularized states and has for decades excluded any form of political Islam from the public domain, which should be emphasized by its leadership. However, this currently seems unlikely, as the current leadership to the contrary is rather keen on expanding the role of religion in society and in political considerations. All in all, it certainly becomes evident that Turkey could make use of a coherent nation brand management strategy, in order to positively reshape public sentiment towards Turkey within the EU (see Kemming & Sandikci 2007). This leads us to the next major argument that has figured prominently in the debate on Turkey’s accession and is viewed by many scholars as the main differentiating element between Turkey’s accession bid and the bid of other current or previous accession candidates.

5.3 “A Membership of Turkey will Result in Uncontrollable Migration Flows”

It is often argued that Turkey’s accession to the EU will result in considerable migratory flows from Turkey into the current member states of the European Union. Sometimes this is linked with the argument that Turkey’s accession will erode Europe’s Christian heritage. Occasionally, fears have been voiced that massive Turkish immigration following the accession will dramatically increase the leverage of Muslim voters within the political systems of current member states, which in turn could dilute many rules, laws and even values that have been characteristic of Europe. Discourse on immigration from Turkey in the aftermath of an accession is closely connected with the more general discourse on immigrant integration. Avcı & Kirişci (2008) accurately point out that “the image of Turkey in the minds of many Europeans has been formed by their encounter with Turkish immigrants. This encounter by and large has been a negative one and exacerbates European fears that Turks will actually invade their societies if Turkey was to become a member of the European Union. It is very telling that the representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (supported by the Christian Democrats in Germany), in

Turkey, Frank Spengler, argued that Turkey's membership went not through Diyarbakır but Kreuzberg" (p. 167). In this chapter, however, I will argue that a certain degree of distinction between these two largely separate issues, one being Turkey's EU accession and the other being immigrant integration in European societies, seems important in order to adequately assess the actual impact of a potential Turkish membership.

In assessing the issue of migratory flows into the EU, one has to consider that the magnitude of migration flows will depend on the economic factors of income disparity and unemployment rate in both the EU27 and Turkey at the point of accession. The existing income differential between Turkey and the European Union will certainly offer an important incentive for Turkish citizens to migrate into more affluent EU member states. It has to be remembered that past migration of Turkish citizens into Western Europe was the consequence of increased demand for cheap labor in various European economies and active recruitment efforts on the part of these host countries. Indeed, economic growth and development in the country of origin will lead to some return-migration and reduce the incentive to emigrate (see Grabbe 2004). The experience of USA with Mexico in the NAFTA context, however, indicates that from a short- to medium-term perspective economic development could initially actually lead to an intensification of migratory flows, as relative improvements in economic prosperity create more incentives for outward migration, reduce barriers for migration and will only in the long run reduce migratory flows (see Skeldon 1997).

Erzan et al. (2005) emulated the actual experience of EU countries with free movement of labour in the context of previous enlargement rounds for Turkey, and projected net immigration flows of 1.1 million. When they additionally took past Turkish guest worker data into account and emulated it for Turkey in 2015, they arrived at net immigration flows of 1.8 million until 2030. In both scenarios immigration subsided after an initial hike following EU accession and the implementation of free movement of labor (p.117). When they confined free labor movement trends to the free labour mobility experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain and applied these trends to Turkey, they projected net immigration flows until 2030 did not exceed 1 million. Combining data of the Southern Europe sample with past Turkish guest worker data led to total net immigration until 2030 of slightly below 2 million, doubling the forecast based on the actual membership experience of the Southern European member states (Erzan et al.

2005, p.120). According to a study conducted by Lejour et al. (2004), a maximum of 2.7 million Turkish nationals are expected to migrate to the EU. This is within the range of 1.3 and 2.7 million of potential immigrant stock that was put forth by Erzan & Kirişçi (2004, p.2) and also within the estimates of the Impact Study of the European Commission in 2004, which projected migratory flows between 0.5 and 4.4 million until 2030 (COM (2004) 656). Also, these figures have to be seen in comparison with a long-term immigration potential of 2.9 million people from the new CEE member states to the former EU15 countries which De Mooij and Tang (2003) concluded in their study. A migratory flow of this magnitude would equal approximately 0.54% of the EU27 population. These estimates have to be viewed with great caution, as factors such as the income gap, the standard of living, educational opportunities and geopolitical stability cannot be adequately assessed at a point where there is not even a realistic prediction of an eventual accession date. There is yet another fact that cannot be disregarded in this context. The Accession Negotiation Framework between Turkey and the EU which was adopted in 2005 specifically allows for “long transition periods” and “permanent safeguard clauses” by member states to restrict the freedom of movement of people from Turkey in the aftermath of Turkish accession (Article 12). This in turn means that the member states will actually be in a much better position to manage migratory flows, as push factors within Turkey are internalized and can thus be addressed through EU policies; thus, they will be in more control to decide what level of migration they are willing to accept.

It is certain that Turkish immigrants will not proportionately disperse over EU territory, which is why some member states will be more affected by these migration flows than others. It has to be taken into account that migration is influenced by network effects in their ethnic community, which leads to the conclusion that countries with an already considerable Turkish immigrant community will receive a disproportionate share of these new immigrants (Lejour et al. 2004, p. 35). Germany is thus expected to receive 2 million of these potential 2.7 million people, which would constitute a considerable share of the overall population. The prospect of immigration flows at such a large scale induces negative public sentiment towards Turkey’s accession in Germany and other highly affected countries. It is, however, not inconceivable that immigration will be tackled on a European level in the future to ensure that the short-term burdens of large immigration waves are shared more evenly. In fact, according to the “Immigration

Trends 2008” survey of the German Marshall Fund (p.31), 53% of the respondents wish for a close cooperation between the member states to come up with a coordinated, common immigration policy, instead of individual action by each state. It was not specified, however, how far this coordination should go and in light of the recent financial crisis it becomes evident that such burden-sharing would currently find no majority among national constituencies.

In terms of the effects on national economies, the skill distribution of Turkish immigrants will be of interest. Turkish immigrants to the EU have traditionally been competing for low-skilled jobs. Lejour et al. argue that an increase in the prospective labor force within the EU will increase the bargaining power of employers vis-à-vis unions and especially increase pressure on low-wage workers, thus lowering overall wages. Consequently, they state that according to their model, “wages for low-skilled workers in the EU will fall by 0.9% more, relative to those for high-skilled workers as immigrants compete for low-skilled jobs” (Lejour et al. 2004, p. 11). Flam (2003) attributes this to the fact that “in a country in which immigrants complement the existing skill structure rather than stand in direct competition to it, productivity and wages will generally benefit from or at least be less affected by immigration. If a country’s workforce is thus highly skilled, influx of low skilled immigrants will have a more positive economic impact” (p.14). This should be kept in mind, when the different countries’ positions towards low-skilled immigration are assessed. Also, the level of education of Turkish immigrants may change and Europe may increasingly be able to attract highly skilled immigrants from Turkey. The “Immigration Trends 2008” survey shows that 64% of the respondents did not think that “immigrants take jobs away from native born” and even 77% agree that “immigrants generally help to fill jobs where there are shortages of workers”. The overall effects on GDP of Turkish immigration are estimated to be positive for the EU (0.5%), while they are negative for Turkey (1.8%) (see also Lejour et al. 2004, p. 11). The social costs of immigration, however, are far more difficult to measure than purely economic costs. Increased criminality, “ghettoization” in cities and social tensions weigh heavily on public perception of immigration and can impose considerable costs upon society. Therefore, they are highly relevant problems that need to be addressed by the member states (Flam 2003, p.16). Immigration is not the most pressing issue that Europeans are concerned with at the moment, according to one of the last Eurobarometer surveys (Eurobarometer 71). Only

4% of the respondents identified it as the most pressing issue while other issues that are directly related to immigration in public discourse, such as unemployment, crime, and several institutions of the welfare state have ranked considerably higher.

The immigration and integration debate in many member states seems inextricably linked with the debate on Turkey's accession. Yet, from an analytical perspective, there are good arguments to partly detach the strings of argumentation from each other. Solely additional migratory flows that can be directly attributed to Turkey joining the EU and the accession's impact on overall immigrant integration should form part of the debate on Turkish accession. Fundamental questions as to what extent and how existing ethnic minorities should integrate and be integrated into mainstream society and which adequate integration measures are at the disposal of member states to meet their goals will have to be addressed in any case. These questions will persist no matter how the relations between Turkey and the EU evolve and existing Turkish immigrant communities in European countries are highly improbable to become any smaller if Turkey's bid for EU membership is rejected. This is supported by an econometric study by Erzan et al. (2006), also cited by Avcı & Kirişçi (2008, p. 158), "which analyzes different possible scenarios of immigration from Turkey to EU member countries between 2004 and 2030. Interestingly it suggests that less Turks are likely to immigrate if Turkey becomes a member than if Turkey is left out of the EU. The scenario is based on the assumption that past trends of Turkish immigration will continue and that Turkish membership will occur in 2015. It will be accompanied by unhindered freedom of movement with accession and it is forecasted that 2.1 million Turks will have migrated by the year 2030 under these circumstances. In the opposite scenario which assumes no membership hence no free movement of labor and also a slow down in the Turkish economy the numbers would be 2.7 million." It should perhaps be specified what is meant by "a slow down in the Turkish economy". The last scenario assumes that Turkey's EU accession is suspended, which leads to a situation in which high growth cannot be sustained (meaning that urban GDP would grow at 4% annually with 1.5% productivity increase and rural GDP would stagnate) and unemployment climbs (approaching 20%) while the prevailing EU visa regulations are retained. The numbers in both scenarios are exclusively based on past immigration trends from Turkey only in order to factor in the prejudice that "Turkey is not any other South European Country

and that unlike Greece, Portugal and Spain, Turkey has a nomadic tradition” (Erzan et al. 2005, p.120).

The entanglement of Turkey’s membership bid and immigrant integration issues will, at least for some time to come, continue to occur in public debate and thus the success of integration measures will in some member states directly correlate with the acceptance of Turkey’s EU bid in the eyes of the general public. Still, in light of the need for a more informed discussion on Turkey’s prospective membership from a European perspective, it seems important to highlight the short-falls of a public debate that does not distinguish between these separate issues. Moreover, it needs to be emphasized that many of the problems in connection with immigrant integration can be traced back to failed policies of immigrant-absorbing states and are not inevitable byproducts of immigration. In addition, the up-side potential of an accession of Turkey should not be completely discarded, as it will most likely alter the identity and the composition of these immigrant communities and may impact on the integration of Turkish immigrants into European societies (see Avci & Kirişçi 2008, p.161). An accession of Turkey could also contribute to ease these pressures rather than aggravating them, as it would serve as a gesture of inclusion, thus creating a more favorable climate for integration, especially for Turkish immigrants. Similarly, a rejection would also prove to have an effect on the integration of Turkish minorities. It could cause serious repercussions by further alienating these minority groups from “the project Europe”.

Migration can be displayed as the product of “push and pull factors” and an assessment of the economic and geopolitical situation at the time of accession will offer more accurate insights into the size of migratory flows than the mere projection of past trends into the future. Also, it should be noted that the demographic structure of Europe with an increasingly aging population will require substantial immigration influx to complement policies designed to sustain current economic levels and the structures of welfare states (Erzan & Kirişçi, 2004, p.3). In the “Immigration Trends 2008” survey by the German Marshall Fund (pp. 50-53), 52% of the respondents actually recognized the need to “encourage immigration for employment purposes” as viable measure to tackle the problem of an aging society, whereas 44% gave a negative response. This measure was thus favored over “raising the legal retirement age” (23% positive) and

“encouraging people to have more children” (44% positive). However, it needs to be kept in mind that in several states, such as Poland, Italy and Germany measures designed to increase of the natural birth rate are favored over additional migration and public opinion in some countries can be far less favorable towards migration than the EU average. In any case, a membership of Turkey would certainly positively impact on the EU’s overall age structure (Hughes, 2004, p. 16). However, immigration can only be a part of a more comprehensive solution to the ageing problem in Europe as “migration is likely to only make a small contribution [...], since the immigration levels needed to fully counteract ageing would be extremely large. Moreover, the demographic benefit of immigration is a short-term one, because immigrant fertility behavior tends to take on the patterns of the host society in the long run” (see Castles & Miller 2009, pp. 223-224). In this context, it is perhaps interesting to highlight that a regional survey conducted in Turkey by Hacettepe University, Ankara, jointly with the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and Eurostat (2000) revealed that the migration tendency of people aged and above was extremely low (see Oztas-Ayhan et al. 2000) and that according to the UN projections, the share of people aged 55 and above will have nearly doubled by 2030 in Turkey. Applied to their net immigration projections for Turkish migration into the EU until 2030, Erzan et al. found that they had to scale down their existing numbers by about 300,000 (Erzan et al. 2005, p.124).

5.4 “The Cyprus issue is unresolved and Turkey still does not recognize Cyprus”

One of the key issues that has repeatedly clouded the relations between Turkey and the European Union and still proves to be one of the main obstacles on the way towards Turkey’s accession to the EU is the unresolved situation of the island of Cyprus which is still divided along ethnic lines between the roughly 80% majority Greek Cypriot and 20% minority Turkish Cypriot communities. The island has been “divided politically since 1963 and militarily since 1974” (Akyel 2010). The southern Greek Republic of Cyprus has been separated from the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The latter however, is not recognized by any state other than Turkey. Consequently, the Republic of Cyprus enjoys *de jure* sovereignty over the whole territory of the island. This is also reflected in the fact that “the entire island entered the EU on 1 May 2004, although the EU *acquis* - the body of common rights and

obligations - applies only to the areas under the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot Government, and is suspended in the areas administered by Turkish Cypriots” (source: CIA Factbook 2010).

In 2002, negotiations under the auspices of the UN were supposed to lead to an agreement and reunite the island before Cyprus was to sign the Treaty of Accession at the beginning of 2003. However, the proposed settlement was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side. In 2004, there was a last attempt to ensure reunification before an EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus. “Greek and Turkish Cypriots held referendums on the UN-sponsored plan to re-unite their island. While the Turkish Cypriots accepted this latest proposal, the so-called Annan plan, the Greek Cypriot side rejected it” (Hannay 2006). The decision to allow the Greek part of Cyprus to join the EU before a permanent settlement on reunification had been reached has been widely criticized throughout Europe (see Tocci 2004, p.174). Clearly, a window of opportunity has been lost and the EU as foreign policy actor has thereby given up some of its leverage to resolve the underlying issues that are preventing a permanent solution. Despite initial objections from France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the negotiation process for Cyprus was started with only the Greek part of Cyprus, without any binding commitments towards unification. This happened against the backdrop that Greece managed to link Cypriot accession with the Eastern enlargement and threatened to boycott the Eastern enlargement as well as the Customs Union with Turkey (Friis 2002, p.28). At the point of accession, one of the conflict parties became a member of the EU and thus disposes of veto rights with regard to Turkey’s accession bid with tremendous repercussions for this ongoing process.

It is actually the UN which holds the central mediator role in the Cyprus conflict and the EU has not, at least officially, taken the lead in drafting an agreement that would entail a reunification of the island (see Tocci 2004). However, in the context of its relationship with Turkey, the European Union undoubtedly has a special interest in resolving the Cyprus issue. David Hannay, the former UK Special Representative for Cyprus from 1996 until 2003, has pointed out the basic predicament that the EU is facing with regard to a settlement in Cyprus and the Turkish accession bid: “The best illustration of the centrality of the EU dimension to the chances of success or failure in this negotiating phase is to pose two questions. Is it even remotely conceivable that Turkey could be

accepted into an EU of which Cyprus is already a member, if the status quo on the island remained and no settlement of the Cyprus problem had been reached? And secondly, is it even remotely conceivable that a Turkey, definitively rebuffed by the EU, would strike a deal on Cyprus which the Greek Cypriots could accept?" (Hannay 2009, p. 2). In his book, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, he gives a detailed account of the Turkish involvement in the negotiations of a settlement in Cyprus and emphasizes the Turkish leverage over the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community (see Hannay 2005). Thus, he argues that a failure of the accession process of Turkey would put an end to the aspirations for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus between the two ethnic communities.

A study, conducted by Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci, exploring public opinion in both Cypriot communities with regard to the peace process, concluded that "64% of the Greek Cypriots and 65% of the Turkish Cypriots desire a mutually acceptable settlement to emerge from the peace process and 67% of the Turkish Cypriots and 90% of the Greek Cypriots either reject or find the status quo merely tolerable" (Lordos, Kaymak & Tocci 2009, p.5). Yet, both communities are highly pessimistic about the outcome of current negotiations. 56% of the Greek Cypriots and 61% of the Turkish Cypriots do not think that the peace process will result in a settlement (Lordos, Kaymak & Tocci 2009, p.4). It thus becomes evident that although there is a desire for the successful conclusion of negotiations and dissatisfaction with the status quo, both communities are highly pessimistic and do not think that a settlement will take place in the near future (p.6).

This is also reflected in their anticipated voting choices, with 34% of Greek Cypriots and 37% of Turkish Cypriots determined or leaning towards casting a "no" vote, while only a mere 23% of Greek Cypriots and 41% of Turkish Cypriots are definitely or at least leaning towards voting "yes". Particularly the Greek Cypriots display high levels of undecided voters (44%), but also the Turkish Cypriot community seems largely undecided (22%), which is why the authors seek to uncover the determining factors that will be relevant to the decision-making process for these swing voters (Lordos, Kaymak & Tocci 2009, p. 12, 13). For Greek Cypriot swing voters, the security and guarantees provisions in the plan, which influence 85% of swing voters, are the most important element of a future settlement, followed by territory (60%), citizenship (57%), property (53%) and governance (39%), whereas Turkish Cypriot swing voters will look at

security and guarantees (66%), property (49%), power-sharing (44%), the economy (39%) and the legal status of sovereignty (34%) to decide whether to support an agreement (p. 27). Results reveal that these voters will “above all look into the substance of the plan, rather than be influenced by the positions of particular actors, such as their family, friends, and the political party they are affiliated with, their president or their motherland” (p.26). However, the authors found the position of Turkey to be highly relevant and Turkey’s influence to be evident, as 28 percent of the Turkish Cypriot swing voters assigned importance to Turkey’s position on the negotiated settlement. Furthermore, they note “that the Greek Cypriot swing vote is highly sensitive to the perceptions of Turkey’s post-settlement intentions, that is, ‘whether Turkey will have convinced me that it intends to honor the agreement’ (45%). Thus, taken together, these two findings highlight the critical role that Turkey will play in securing a Cyprus settlement” (Lordos, Kaymak & Tocci 2009, p. 12-13).

In 2009, during his visit to Cyprus, the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou stated that “the goal is for Turkey to become a full member”. He elaborated that he was not in favor of a special association of Turkey with the EU, as long as it fulfilled its obligations, but he also emphasized that “it cannot be permitted for Turkey to have occupation troops in an EU member state, specially for a candidate country”. According to the president of the Republic of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, it is imperative that “Turkey must not only honor the customs protocol but should recognize the administration in Nicosia and normalize relations” and added that “Turkey has obligations it must comply with or it will not be able to continue on its accession course without obstruction” (SETimes, October 20, 2009). It was precisely the failure on the part of Turkey to open up its ports to Cypriots ships that has prompted the EU to suspend 8 of the 35 negotiation chapters that form part of Turkey’s accession package.

5.5 “Turkey is violating human right, disregarding minority rights and lacking liberal democratic values”

It is often emphasized that Turkish society does not adhere to Europe’s core values as expressed in the Berlin Declaration. Human rights violations are in fact still common, and freedom of press and expression are clearly impeded by Article 301 of the Turkish Constitution, that in its amended version prohibits “denigrating the Turkish nation”.

There have been attempts to establish that Turkey's poor record on human rights and its political and social authoritarianism is inextricably linked with its cultural and religious traditions (Dobson 2004, p.4). However, various institutions also report a number of human rights violations in the existing member states (see address by Holly Cartner, Human Rights Watch, 06/24/2009). In some areas, Turkey's progress towards a more stringent human rights regime is clearly visible. Turkey has, for instance, abolished the death penalty, shortened permissible pre-trial detention periods (see European Commission: 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, p. 166; p.55) and it looks as if the position of the military within the political system may be curbed after all. In other areas, however, much needs to be done and considerable tasks still await the government. One problem is that even in areas where legislative and administrative reforms have been announced, the actual implementation of these reforms has often been slow and largely insufficient as a result of a lack of commitment, financial resources and a bureaucratic structure, which has opened the door for continued human rights violations (see Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, p.18).

5.5.1 Religious Minorities

In the case of Turkey, Christian minority rights in its Muslim majority society could perhaps serve as barometer for its commitment to religious tolerance. Non-Muslim minorities (0.2% of the population), are overall not sufficiently protected in Turkey. Religious identity is still displayed on every Turkish ID card, thus exposing worshipers of other religions. However, the same provision also still exists in most EU passports. The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 that formally established the Republic of Turkey has granted specific protections to all non-Muslim religious minorities. This preferential treatment has subsequently been confined to the Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and the Jewish communities (see Annual Report of USCIRF 2009). However, even these communities face considerable obstacles when it comes to their legal personalities, property ownership, educating their clerics and maintaining other educational institutions. The Greek Orthodox seminary on Halki that was closed in 1971 still has not been re-opened and remains a symbol of discrimination against Christians in Turkey (Chislett 2009, p. 15). Some difficulties for non-Muslim communities also derive from the fact that most of them also constitute ethnic minority groups, which

further raises suspicions regarding their allegiance to the state and Turkey's territorial integrity.

5.5.2 Freedom of expression

The harsh reaction and outrage in Turkey following the publication of Mohammed caricatures in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands Posten* in 2006 has aggravated suspicions in Europe that "freedom of expression" is not adequately valued in Turkish society. The initial Turkish rejection of former Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, who Turkey held accountable for not dealing adequately with this insult, as NATO secretary general in 2009 has renewed these concerns in the eyes of the European public. Throughout this conflict, the Danish government had argued that it could not limit freedom of expression, as there was no legal grounds to do so and as this represented a fundamental freedom, upheld and cherished by Danish society. In Turkey, however, there is a legal basis to restrict freedom of speech. The ban of numerous websites (as many as 1,874 in June 2009) speaks volumes. The recent ban of internet video platform YouTube that a Turkish court ordered is in fact based on this article 301 in conjunction with law 5816 covering crimes committed against Kemal Atatürk (Chislett 2009, p.11). It was originally issued in 2007 after videos that had been uploaded in Greece were found to insult "Turkishness". After Google, the corporation behind YouTube, prevented customers in Turkey from accessing videos that clearly violated Turkish law the platform was allowed to go online again. When a Turkish prosecutor, however, demanded that Google should delete this content worldwide, Google refused on the grounds that these videos should not be subject to Turkish law outside of the country, as one country should not be able to dictate video content for YouTube users worldwide and undermine freedom of speech on the internet. The ban of YouTube was briefly lifted in October 2010 but was reinstated only days later by a court in Ankara over an old video purportedly rather explicitly displaying an act of adultery by former opposition leader Deniz Baykal (Toksabay 2010 on Reuters). According to a report of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media on Turkey and Internet Censorship, access to approximately 3700 websites (among them also websites of the gay community and websites informing about the situation in South-East Turkey) have been blocked under Law No. 5651 (the ensuing legal basis for blocking websites passed in 2007) until December 2009. Statements of Reporters sans Frontières (RSF) speak of over 5000 banned websites by November, "in most cases for criticizing Ataturk or the

army, for perceived attacks on the nation's 'dignity' or for referring to Turkey's Kurdish and Armenian minorities, taboo subjects in Turkey” (Reporters sans Frontiers, November 03, 2010). The ban of YouTube and other websites is symptomatic of the restricted freedom of expression still prevalent in Turkey, which stands in stark contrast to European standards and has repeatedly been used as example for Turkey’s incompatibility with EU rules (see Claire Berlinski’s commentary on Radio Free Europe on July 3, 2009). The OSCE report argues “that there could be a breach of Article 10 of European Convention of Human Rights if blocking measures or filtering tools are used at state level to silence politically motivated speech on the Internet, or the criteria for blocking or filtering is secret, or the decisions of the administrative bodies are not publicly made available for legal challenge” (OSCE report 2010, p. 3).

Article 301 of the Turkish Constitution that prohibits “denigrating the Turkish nation” is certainly not the only provision that is used to curb the freedom of the press. The Articles 216 (incitement to hatred) and 220 (propaganda made through media, about the goals of an organization, which has been established in order to commit crimes) (see Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, p.23) that have been introduced in 1996 in the wake of new amendments to the Law on the Fight against Terrorism equally increase the pressure on media outlets. The adapted anti-terrorism law torpedoes Turkey’s efforts to combat torture by providing detainees access to medical examinations and legal counsel (see Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, p.19). Similar to other countries, Turkey has introduced clauses that remove the detainees’ automatic right to access a lawyer for a period of up to 24 hours (see Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009, p.21).

5.5.3 The Military’s privileged position

The privileged position of the military within Turkey’s political system and the direct influence it is thus able to exert has been subject to repeated criticism by the European Union. The ruling AKP has been determined to curb the power of the military in recent years, which is naturally met with resistance by the military. This power struggle has clearly become evident in the dispute surrounding the election of Abdullah Gül as President of the Republic of Turkey by the AKP-dominated Grand National Assembly in 2007. As self-perceived safeguard of the secular Kemalist republic, the Turkish General Staff posted a statement on its website declaring that “some circles who have

been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the republic of Turkey, especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently”, warning that the “fundamentalist understanding [of the government] was eroding the very foundation of the Turkish Republic and the ideas that it was founded upon” (Capezza 2009, p.20). At this point, the military seemed determined to once again intervene in the political domain just as it had on several occasions in the past. This time, however, the statement which was later branded as an “internet coup” and which was to be a warning to the AKP to draw back in the power struggle with the secular elites proved to be without consequence as public opinion was against yet another coup by the military. The AKP responded swiftly and called for new elections in which it was able to secure a clear victory with 47% of the votes (see Report of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2010, p. 8-9; Capezza 2009, p.20). In the end, Abdullah Gül became Turkey’s new President, thus “further consolidating the AKP’s power and effectively eliminating any future presidential vetoes over concerns about the constitutionalism of AKP legislation” (Capezza 2009, p.20) and the military’s privileged position and authority within Turkey’s political system had been permanently weakened.

Recently, the shift in the institutional balance in favor of the AKP has fueled the prosecution of suspects charged with planning a plot against the AKP-led government, which became known as the “Ergenekon conspiracy”. The suspects “purportedly planned to carry out a string of high-profile murders, sow chaos and provoke a military coup in Turkey” (“Turkey and the army: Conspiracy theories”, in *The Economist*, January 29, 2009). The main initiators of the alleged coup plan were retired military officers, but prosecutors have identified a diffuse and widespread “network of plotters” within the so-called “deep-state”. As the group of suspects has increasingly been extended to government critics, “inconvenient” journalists and political rivals “the AKP faces growing criticism that it is using the case as an excuse to intimidate or silence anyone who opposes its agenda” (Capezza 2009, p. 21).

Despite the fact that the underlying motivation for the AKP’s efforts in curbing the influence of the military is questionable and may actually be rooted in the antagonism between the military and the AKP and the desire to fortify its power base rather than in an actual commitment to democratic reform, the government has undoubtedly succeeded in somewhat restricting the formerly all encompassing powers of the military

apparatus. The recent reform, that ensures the jurisdiction of civilian courts over military personnel in peace time is a first step towards civilian control over the military and has been widely disputed by the establishment opposed to the AKP. However, governmental oversight over the military's budget is still marginal and Article 35 of the internal service law that gives the Turkish Security Forces the duty of protecting and watching over the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey as defined by the constitution is still in effect. From this article the military derives its authority to orchestrate a coup in the event that it perceives the secular order of the country to be threatened. Only a reform of the Constitution could ultimately fulfill the demands of the EU, but the secular establishment has repeatedly warned the AKP to refrain from doing so and until 2010 the AKP did by and large not want to risk this power struggle (see Sariibrahimoglu 2009).

5.5.4 Turkish Constitutional Reform

Repeatedly, the European Union has encouraged a revision of the Turkish Constitution which dates back to 1982 and was drawn up by the military regime that ruled the country after the military coup in 1980. "The Constitution's emphasis on the state's as opposed to the individual's rights put it at variance with EU norms" (Chislett 2010, p.2). The EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle stated that "a revised Constitution is needed in Turkey to allow for a number of key reforms – which aim at enhancing the democratic standards, human rights and the rule of law, and thus improving the daily life of Turkish citizens. Therefore the Commission welcomes the willingness of the government to proceed in this direction" (Statement by Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement, 03/29/2010). Moves towards constitutional reform in Turkey have to be seen in the context of "Turkish society and politics which have become polarized between growing religious conservatism and advocates of secularism" (Evin et al. 2010, p.25). The electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in the 2002 general elections marked a new era in Turkish politics and the changing tides in the Turkish political system entailed "severe resistance from the bureaucratic elite that were so invested in the old system." (Ete on The Middle East Channel of Foreign Policy, September 09, 2010).

In the last decade, Turkey's political landscape has been marked by a power struggle between new, more conservative and religious elites from Anatolia which form the

power base of the AKP and the old, secular “Kemalist” elites that have traditionally dominated Turkey’s political affairs and who had continuously viewed the state and political power as their personal legacy. The polarization of Turkish society and Turkey’s political landscape and the battle for power and influence between various interest groups has been complemented by competing ideas of Turkish identity. Turkish identity as promoted by its secular political and military elites for the past decades suggested Turkish nationalism and an identity based on a dominant Turkish culture, a rather narrowly defined cultural homogeneity and a modern state that is closely tied to the civilized Western world. On the other hand, the AKP has introduced a competing concept of “Turkishness”, which emphasizes a more inclusive understanding of identity, anchored in Turkey’s Muslim tradition and based more explicitly upon Turkey’s Ottoman heritage (see Breitegger 2009; for a detailed account see Yavuz 2009).

While the AKP claimed that by introducing constitutional reform measures, it merely sought to eliminate the imbalances and injustices of the illiberal 1982 Constitution, the opposition under the lead of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) asserted that the core objective of the package was to shift the institutional balance in favor of the AKP led government by curbing the power and independence of the judiciary, one of the “safeguards” of the values and institutions of the Kemalist republic. “This fear [of the opposition] reflects a major and structural short-coming of Turkish democracy: the lack of a strong and reliable system of checks and balances on political power” (Sinan Ulgen in Financial Times, September 09, 2010). The judiciary’s position as protector of the Kemalist republic had gained even more importance in the past few years, as the military’s role in public affairs had been weakened by revelations in the Ergenekon case, European pressure on non-interference in the daily political life and changed societal expectations.

Besides the controversial issue regarding the composition of the Constitutional Court and the right to select members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors, the body in charge of Court appointments, there have also been several other provisions with repercussions on the balance of power within the Turkish political system. For instance, the powers of military courts are further limited, prohibiting them from trying civilians in times of peace. Moreover, Article 11 of the Constitution that had prevented the prosecution of the leaders of the 1980 military coup, which entailed considerable

bloodshed, was repealed. Also, the jurisdiction of civilian courts has been extended and now covers trying military officers charged with plotting coups. Military officers discharged by the Supreme Military Council now have the right to appeal which can be attributed to the AKP's perception that Islamists were the focus of previous army purges. Another measure, which drew considerable criticism, is the clause that elected deputies are now allowed to serve in parliament until the end of their term, even if their party is disbanded by a court. This provision is tailored to limit the secularist's ability to repel and disband Islamist as well as moderate Muslim parties and can be attributed to the AKP's attempt to prevent any future ban on the party imposed by the judicial system (Chislett 2010; Report of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2010).

Other changes have been largely excluded from public debate and have been of little political salience. They will help to align the Turkish Constitution with EU norms, such as protective measures for children, positive discrimination of women, extended rights for trade unions or the chance for governmental employees to engage in processes of collective bargaining. These amendments have been generally welcomed, as these provisions are long overdue (Report of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2010, p.2). Also, the right for all citizens to appeal to an ombudsman has been largely undisputed, as it has always been pushed for by the EU (Chislett 2010).

In the end, the constitutional reform package was approved by a clear majority of 58%, with 42% rejecting it. The voter turnout of 78% indicates how politically salient this reform had become (Chislett 2010, p.1). However, public debate in the run-up to the vote did not center on the actual content of the reform proposal or on benefits and shortcomings of the proposal, but was merely directed towards the underlying motives of the AKP for pursuing the constitutional reform and the fundamental reasons for the opposition's rejection of the package. The EU Commission largely views the revision of the Constitution favorably and has repeatedly welcomed the constitutional reforms as an important step towards an EU accession: "The Commission welcomes the approval, by the Turkish people, of the Constitutional reforms in the referendum which took place on 12 September. It demonstrates the continued commitment of Turkish citizens to reforms in view of enhancing their rights and freedoms. As we consistently said in the past months, these reforms are a step in the right direction as they address a number of long-standing priorities in Turkey's efforts towards fully complying with the accession

criteria” (Statement by Stefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement, September 13, 2010). By speaking out in favor of the reform package prior to the vote, the EU Commission also lent its support and thus credibility to the proposal, which has certainly contributed to the clear outcome of the referendum.

However, some experts have voiced strong criticism of the amendments adopted, based on the argument that they would solely bring about a shift in power rather than actually improving the status quo. Chislett (2010, p. 3) points out that “the reform package will introduce procedural changes to the appointments of supreme justices, allowing more to be appointed by the President and the legislative branch at the expense of appointments from state institutions controlled by the executive branch, which raises legitimate concerns”. Indeed, “strains of authoritarianism are still entrenched in many regulations and the structure of leading institutions. Ironically, the AKP government’s strength and authority emanates from the institutions that the Kemalist elites built to safeguard their own supremacy” (Evin et al. 2010, p.26). It can be argued that the constitutional reform has primarily served as a means to fortify the AKP’s grip on the state and that a big opportunity was missed by the AKP’s unilateral approach to this reform, which came at the expense of thorough consultation and broad public support through compromise. Only a completely new constitution could in fact pave the way for a state in which liberal and democratic values such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press and other markers of modern liberal democracies are adequately protected. This is in line with Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle who stated that “a civilian constitution is the most important starting point for Turkey to strengthen its democratic system in line with EU standards” (Statement made by Stefan Füle, EU commissioner for enlargement at the 7th Bogazici Conference on Turkey-European Union Relations in Istanbul, via europeanunionplatform.org).

5.5.5 Women’s rights and honor killings

The Progress Report on Turkey by the European Commission in 2008 noted that “domestic violence, honor killings, and early and forced marriages are still a serious problem” (European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p.20) and that “women in Turkey, particularly Kurdish women, were lagging far behind their male counterparts in areas such as education, access to meaningful employment, political representation and access to justice” (Background Paper, EUTCC Conference 2009,

p.31; see European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report). Gender equality has not yet taken root in all parts of Turkish society and the transformation of legal reforms into actual real-life changes within society has been stalling. Cases of honor killings in Germany have repeatedly raised questions regarding the incompatibility of Turkish culture and Islam with Western, liberal values. Honor killings within Turkey have also reinforced the widespread view of the backwardness of Turkish society, dominated by archaic concepts of patriarchy and family honor. A lack of gender equality and poor treatment of women has been particularly prevalent in the Kurdish region in the South-East of Turkey, which puts emphasis on the fact that several human rights issues in Turkey are interconnected. Granting the Kurdish minority more cultural freedoms could actually reinforce existing traditions and lead to a persistence of honor killings. On the other hand, cultural autonomy for Kurds may also open up the close-knit communities and Kurdish culture to outside influences and modernization that they have so far sought to avoid at any cost in order to preserve their contested identity. Turkey has experienced a rapid process of urbanization, having shifted in less than half a century from a country where 75 percent of the population lived in rural areas to one in which 65 % now live in cities. This has been labeled as the “ruralization of towns and cities” (“Turkey- Geography and Demographics”), as “people put their traditions in their luggage, along with their pillows and sheets”, which has led to a transfer of tribal traditions, strictly conservative Islamic values and archaic family structures into Turkey’s urban areas. It is against the backdrop of the amenities of modern, urban life that strict family traditions come under attack and a generation gap becomes visible, as male family members that are still mentally stuck in their rural traditions feel threatened by the new lifestyle of their daughters. (Molly Moore in Washington Post, August 8, 2001) This is not to say that honor killings predominantly occur in urban settings but it could explain why they continue to happen in places such as Berlin or Istanbul. They mainly constitute a problem in the Kurdish dominated areas around Diyarbakir, Batman and Bismil which are poor, rural and deeply influenced by conservative Islam. Recently, families have started to press the daughters to take their own lives instead. Often, the feudal character of Kurdish society is blamed for incidents of honor killings and forced suicides (see Bilefsky in NY Times, July 16, 2006; see Nielsen in Human Rights- The World Affairs Blog Network, March 28, 2009).

5.5.6 The Kurdish minority

The Kurdish minority issue perhaps serves as the most prominent example to underline the poor human rights record of Turkey. Assimilationist pressures have greatly reduced open ambitions to achieve cultural recognition on the part of ethnic minorities, with the exception of the large Kurdish minority based in the South-East of the country (Flam 2003, p. 6). Despite the fact that Turkish identity has become slightly more inclusive and that the current administrations seeks a rapprochement with the Kurdish minority, cultural recognition for the Kurdish minority has only been granted marginally even though it is estimated that the Kurdish minority makes up about 20 percent of the overall population. Granted, a local radio channel, Muş FM, has received authorization to broadcast in Kurdish and the state-run Turkish Radio and Television's (TRT) new Kurdish-language channel, TRT-6, went on the air on January 1, 2009 (European Commission, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, p.25). In general, however, minorities and particularly the Kurds experience pressures towards uniformity in a nation with a remarkably normative foundation and understanding of identity. In 2002, the military lifted the decades-long state of emergency over the South Eastern provinces during which countless atrocities were perpetrated under the umbrella of counter-terrorism (Steinvorth on Spiegel Online, May 27, 2009). Despite the fact that the situation has somewhat improved under the rule of the AKP, disproportionate use of force by the military and the police against the Kurdish minority is still subject to criticism on the part of the EU. The Democratic Society party (DTP), the formerly fourth-largest political party in Turkey, was often regarded as the mouthpiece of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK) by the Turkish government and military. It was shut down on December 11, 2009 by the Turkish Constitutional Court on charges of being a “focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation”. DTP leaders Ahmet Turk and Aysel Tugluk were stripped of parliamentary immunity and banned from politics for five years along with 35 other party members (BBC News, December 11, 2009). Subsequently, the party has resurfaced in 2010 under the name Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which continues to represent the Kurdish agenda in the Turkish parliament. The Turkish government has repeatedly emphasized the proximity of Kurdish political parties to the PKK which is internationally labeled as terrorist organization and has continuously engaged in bloody assaults on civilian targets throughout Turkey. It has to be taken into account that the Turkish Constitution

does not allow for the formation of political parties based on ethnicity, which gives the authorities a pretense to crack down on these organizations. Often, political officials in the Kurdish region are assumed to have close ties to the PKK. In July 2009, this already resulted in the arrest of more than 200 high-level officials of the DTP. Moreover, in July 2009, a Turkish court jail-sentenced the mayor of Diyarbakir, Osman Baydemir, and the mayor of Batman, Nejdet Atalay, for labeling the PKK as guerillas when they criticized a military incursion, thus “spreading PKK propaganda” and “inciting separatism”. This episode sheds light on Turkey's strict laws on freedom of speech and the rigid handling of minority issues (Tran on guardian.co.uk, April 27, 2009). It also highlights Turkey’s insecurity when it comes to territorial integrity, which is one of the recurring themes in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. However, a distinction needs to be made between the struggle for independence and the quest for more cultural autonomy on the part of the Kurdish minority.

5.5.7 The Armenian genocide

The Armenian genocide issue remains unresolved, which influences the perception of Turkey’s poor human rights record by European constituencies. It is often argued that Turkey needs to come to terms with its past in order to overcome the anxiety in connection with the alleged genocide, which impedes progress in other domains of the human rights regime. Jacques Derrida has identified “awareness and regretful acceptance of the totalitarian, genocidal and colonialist crimes of the past” (speech at Le Monde diplomatique’s 50th anniversary celebrations in May 2004) as building block of his version of European identity. Viewed from this perspective, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that by accepting its past with its dark chapters, Turkey may actually move mentally closer to the European community and relate to the burdens, experiences and responsibilities that come with such a mindset. Equally, a motion by the major parties in the German parliament stresses that Turkey’s policy of denial is “contradictory to the idea of reconciliation that is the foundation of the community of values existing in the European Union” (ESI Report 2009, p. 19; German Bundestag, 15th electoral term, Motion tabled by the parliamentary groups of the SPD, CDU/CSU, ALLIANCE, 90/THE GREENS and the FDP, “Remembering and commemorating the expulsions and massacres of the Armenians in 1915 – Germany must make a contribution to reconciliation between Turks and Armenians”, 15 June 2005).

The brief assessment of the situation in this chapter is predominantly based on a report of the European Stability Initiative (an Istanbul-based think-tank) from 2009 (“Noah’s Dove Returns. Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide”- ESI Report 2009), as in my opinion it provides a comprehensive, detailed and contemporary account of the political developments that have increased chances for a lasting thaw in relations between Armenia and Turkey. It is not within the scope of this paper to answer the question, whether or not the events of 1915 actually constitute genocide, even though there seems to be increasing consensus among international scholars that the events of 1915 can be labeled as genocide (De Waal 2010, p.2). A minimal degree of context has to be provided in order to understand the root causes of the conflict. Subsequently, however, the focus will move to issues and concerns that will have to be accounted for if a permanent settlement between Armenia and Turkey is to be achieved.

The conflict with Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora on the one hand and Turkey on the other dates back to World War I and the displacement of the Armenian community and massacre of Armenian subjects in the Ottoman Empire in 1915. The deportations of Armenians were orchestrated by the government of the Young Turks and fueled by its ideology of Turkish ethno-nationalism. The ESI Report cites Murat Bardakci, who published documents of Mehmed Talat (who in turn is widely believed to be the main architect of the Armenian deportations and massacres) entitled “The Remaining Documents of Talat Pasha”. These documents indicate that the number of Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire fell from 1,256,000 before 1915 to 284,157 just two years later. 972,000 Ottoman Armenians disappeared from official population records between 1915 and 1916. A report of the German Embassy in Istanbul from October 4, 1916 even estimated that approximately 1.5 million Armenians were killed in 1915.

According to Article II of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide, “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

The ESI report cites Berkday, who argues that “an Armenian rebellion had resulted in the deaths of thousands of Turkish and Kurdish Muslims, but ‘the activities of the Armenian rebels had more the character of localized violence.’ According to him, the Ottoman response, however, was of a different order as the government created “special death squads” and volunteer forces of convicted criminals to conduct the massacres” (ESI Report 2009, p. 3).

Turkey claims that the Armenians were supporting the invading Russian Army and that the deportations of the Armenian population were a natural answer to the disloyalty and the rebellion. According to the official Turkish position, Armenian casualties were mainly the product of disease and starvation during these deportations. Turkey denies any intention to exterminate the Armenian community and refers to the events as tragic byproducts of a war and inter-ethnic violence that resembled civil war and which cost countless lives among all ethnic communities in Anatolia. It denies that there was a genocidal policy and claims that the numbers of Armenian victims has been artificially inflated, while it emphasizes the high number of casualties among the Ottoman Muslims through deportations and killings during WWI (see ESI Report 2009, p.4; see also de Waal 2010, p.2).

Turkey, as a successor state of the Ottoman Empire, is undoubtedly concerned that a normalization of relations with Armenia, an apology for the events during WWI or even an open admission to genocide would have severe legal repercussions, ranging from demands for reparations, full restitution by Armenians or even territorial claims by Armenia itself (see ESI p. 13, see also McCarthy 2005). However, the International Centre on Transitional Justice in New York stated on the question of legal responsibility for the genocide that “the Genocide Convention contains no provision mandating its retroactive application. To the contrary, the text of the Convention strongly suggests that it was intended to impose prospective obligations only on the States party to it. Therefore, no legal, financial or territorial claim arising out of the Events [of 1915] could successfully be made against any individual or state under the Convention” (see ICTJ Report 2002, p. 4.). Moreover, the ESI report also cites a leading international scholar of genocide and international law William Schabas who noted that “nobody but

Turkey can invoke international law before the International Court of Justice in order to claim the right to compensation for the genocide of the Armenians, something it is hardly likely to do.” (ESI Report 2009, p.22; Schabas 2000, p. 443).

Turkey and Armenia currently do not maintain diplomatic relations with one another. Yet, it should be considered that Turkey initially recognized the newly independent Republic of Armenia after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 (De Waal 2010, p.2) and only cut diplomatic ties and closed the border between the two countries (which has remained closed ever since) in 1993 out of solidarity with Azerbaijan which at that time was at war with Armenia over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh (Shields et al. in *The Wallstreet Journal*, A6, October 12, 2009). De Waal (2010, p.2) emphasizes, however, that “the mayors of Kars and Gyumri have lobbied jointly for a re-opening of the border. Armenian tourists visit Turkey regularly, and thousands of Armenians live and work illegally there. There are weekly Armavia (Armenian Airlines) flights between Yerevan and Istanbul.” This indicates that some progress has already been made towards normalizing relations on a low-key level. Moreover, on September 19, 2010, the first mass was held at the Armenian Church of the Holy Cross on the Akdamar Island in the Lake Van, in the South-East of Turkey, which had been left to decay in recent decades, had only been restored in 2007 and is a museum now (Pelek, on *Bianet.com*, September 20, 2010).

Azerbaijan, a close ally of Turkey with common linguistic and ethnic background has no interest in detaching the Turkish-Armenian settlement from a solution for the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh (see ESI Report 2009, p. 13). This further exacerbates an already delicate and complex situation as it ties two issues together politically that are actually not intrinsically linked with each other from an analytical view point. Apart from having a considerable lobby within Turkey and enjoying popular support of the Turkish public, Azerbaijan can also exert some leverage over Turkey with regard to its natural resources and its privileged geographic position along several energy corridors which are of strategic interest to Turkey (see also chapter “Energy Relations”). Thus, Turkey will be keen on avoiding any disruptions in the traditionally close relationship with its “little brother”. At the same time, it should be kept in mind that in the aftermath of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it was not only the Turkish-Armenian border that was

closed but also the border between the Azeri enclave of Nachichevan and Armenia. This further increased Armenian dependency on Russia, thus reviving the leverage of one of the major players within the region and amplifying Russia's influence over Armenia's foreign policy and its position in the frozen conflict with Turkey (see Evin et al. 2010, p.16).

Often, this Armenian issue is also linked with the overarching motive of Turkish foreign policy and recurring theme in internal policies throughout most of the 20th century-Turkey's territorial integrity. In some ways, it also touches upon one of the fundamental founding myths of the modern Turkish nation in which Turkey managed to secure its borders despite all efforts from foreign powers to divide up the country and the betrayal of other ethnicities within the Ottoman Empire. Admitting to genocide would shake up Turkey's self-image of having solely been the victim of hostile foreign powers and internal betrayal (see ESI Report 2009, pp. 6-9; p.11).

The "diplomatic warfare" surrounding the official recognition of the Armenian genocide by the parliaments of several countries or considerations thereof, serves as a constant source of insecurity within Turkish foreign policy and also has repercussions for Turkey's relations with EU member states. Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, Cyprus, Italy, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Greece and France have issued resolutions on the massacres of the Armenians in 1915, and most of them specifically referred to the events as genocide (see De Waal 2010 p.4). Especially relations with France were seriously strained after the explicit recognition of genocide by the French parliament. Since 2006, the denial of the Armenian genocide is a punishable offence in France (Röhrlich 2009, p. 27). In fact, Paris is one of the strongholds of the Armenian Diaspora and therefore the French government is subject to intense lobbying on the part of Armenians (ESI Report 2009, p.18), which may have adverse effects on Turkey's EU ambitions if the conflict with Armenia cannot be resolved.

The visit of Turkish President Abdullah Gül to Yerevan to watch a football World Cup qualifying game between Turkey and Armenia in 2008 was the start to a thaw in relations between the two countries. At the same time, this was the first visit ever by a Turkish president to Armenia (ESI Report 2009, p. 1). In 2009, the two countries were already on their way to overcome the tragic events of their common past and to move

towards a normalization of their relations when Turkey and Armenia signed a peace accord on October 10, 2009 which was to restore diplomatic ties and open their shared border (Euroactiv, October 12, 2009). However, the agreement has never been ratified by either parliament of the respective parties and in April 2010, Armenia suspended ratification of the accord. (Reuters, April 29, 2010).

The road towards an agreement with Armenia not only shows Turkey's willingness to normalize relations with its neighbor, but also its ambition to overcome existing hurdles to EU accession and actively engage in resolving dwelling conflicts at its borders. A continued effort to bring about a thaw in relations between Armenia and Turkey would remove one of the major obstacles along the road towards EU accession, as the prolonged conflict between these two countries has repeatedly been used as a marker in the geopolitical argument against Turkey's accession. The argument emphasizes that the EU will be confronted with instable external frontiers and unresolved conflicts not only in the immediate neighborhood but also between Turkey and other third-party countries.

5.6 “Turkey's Accession Puts the Success of Previous Enlargement Rounds at Risk”

The EU's ability to incorporate future member states has been repeatedly questioned and with regard to Turkey's bid for membership, the EU has emphasized that “the Union's capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.” (The Council of the European Union, European Council Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1993). Viewed from an organizational perspective, the EU has indeed experienced rapid growth and has as a consequence undergone massive transformation processes with regard to its internal decision-making structure. The EU has also been subject to increased regional economic disparities. It is often argued that the previous enlargement rounds with mainly Central and Eastern European Countries have overstretched the resources of the EU and its ability to absorb new member states.

A consolidation of the EU is thus needed and is clearly articulated in the EU's new accession strategy, which focuses on the "3 Cs" (see also German Federal Foreign Office, "conditions of the enlargement process"):

- "Consolidation" of the EU's own commitments,
- "Conditionality" (i.e. the requirement that accession candidates meet obligations),
- "Communication" with citizens in order to win their support for enlargement

A considerable share of the attraction which emanates from the EU stems from its ability to offer prospective candidates an air of stability and especially economic development. This "soft power" will be undermined if new members are not brought to EU standards in terms of GDP and standard of living (Jovanovic 2005, p. 10). A growing income disparity within the EU will also threaten the coherence of the Union. It is evident that the progress made by Romania and Bulgaria is at best rudimentary. Moreover, the financial crisis has once more made it clear that the economic development in Central and Eastern European countries still stands on shaky ground. Thus, the argument is often made that unless previous enlargement rounds have been succeeded by considerable economic growth and consolidation in the new member states, it should be refrained from further enlargement (see Balytska 2006, p.16). This should be seen in light of the fact that transfer payments to Turkey might reduce the amount of transfer that the new member states will receive in years to come.

Turkey, perhaps more than any other country, has engaged in a comprehensive Europeanization project. A rejection of Turkey would thus imply that the convergence to a European value and belief system becomes less attractive to other states and could ultimately limit the EU's soft power in the future. On the other hand, opponents of Turkey's EU accession promote the argument that the accession process of several Eastern and South-Eastern European countries, such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria has come too early and that by prematurely admitting them into the EU, the benefits of using the full leverage of the membership prospect could not be adequately harvested.

5.7 “Turkey's accession will impede any further in-depth integration within the EU”

Turkey's accession bid forces political elites to consider several questions regarding the future set-up of the European Union, ranging from the speed and (functional as well as geographical) scope of integration to preferred methods of coordination among member states. The cleavage between the “intergovernmentalist” vs. the “federalist” view of the EU has traditionally divided member states of the EU. In various countries concerns remain that an enlargement of the EU to include Turkey may torpedo its further in-depth political integration (see Hughes 2004, p.2). It is argued that geographical expansion of the Union will be at the expense of further in-depth functional and structural integration (see Grabbe & Hughes 1998, p.5). This view is particularly widespread in countries that have traditionally favored a federalist EU and closer integration in a wider range of policy areas, such as Germany, France and to some extent Italy, which negatively impacts on their sentiment towards Turkey's EU accession. In countries, such as the UK or Nordic countries, which are generally in favor of a more intergovernmentalist EU, further enlargement is perceived more positively (Barysch, August 24, 2007, p. 3). It should be noted that the line between these two camps is undoubtedly fluid and varies according to each individual policy field. Also, this perspective does not yet take into account which of the camps Turkey would ultimately support once admitted into the European Union. It is not *per se* certain that Turkey's accession will have a crippling effect on further functional integration. Undoubtedly, the point can be made that functional integration can only be prolonged if the already complicated framework of EU institutions and multi-level governance remains manageable. However, this could also give an incentive to additional adaptations regarding the EU's decision-making structure – a process that has already started with the Lisbon Treaty. Often, concerns have been voiced that Turkey as a member state will not play a constructive role and will act solely on the basis of self-interest. While this position would not be far from the current European reality, this is an assumption that until now cannot be substantiated by facts but is rather grounded on uncertainty and past experiences in the aftermath of former enlargement rounds which are projected on Turkey. It seems certain that Turkey will simply join existing coalitions within the EU, which could strengthen certain coalitions at the expense of others (Moravcsik & Vachudova 2003, p.19). In case Turkey favors functional integration it could even add the leverage of another large country to the “federalist coalition”. Interestingly, the coalition within the EU which


advocates cohesive integration far beyond the common market is promoting deeper functional integration in several policy domains to which Turkey could make important contributions upon accession. Turkey would enhance the Union's geo-strategic position, add military strength, provide sources of leverage and offer a network of complementary resources within the realm of foreign policy.

An accession of Turkey would also result in a relative decline in power of the current large member states according to Alessandri (2010, p.17). Yet, as the results of a study by Baldwin & Widgrén (2005) will show, the picture is slightly more differentiated than it may at first appear. Turkish accession would also mean a strengthening of the periphery of the EU against the predominance of the center, not only geographically, but also when economic power is considered. The assumption that the EU institutions would be gridlocked after the accession of Turkey and current structures would not support an EU 28 or EU 29 does not necessarily hold if one considers the adaptability of institutional processes. A study by Helen Wallace that looked in detail into the effects of the enlargement round in 2004 on the decision-making processes in various EU institutions came to the overarching conclusion that the “EU’s institutional processes and practice have stood up rather robustly to the impact of enlargement to EU25 in May 2004” (Wallace 2007, p. 22). Baldwin & Widgrén (2005) assessed the impact of an EU enlargement including Turkey and Croatia on the EU’s capacity to act and its effect on the voting power of current member states. They found that Turkey’s accession has “only a negligible effect on the EU’s power to act”, whereas it will have a considerable impact on the distribution of power (p.137). At the time the authors conducted their study it was still unclear whether the new rules for qualified majority voting (termed QMV hereafter) would apply. Despite the fact that the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty has failed, these reforms became incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty and will replace the QMV rules set out in the Treaty of Nice. The standard system of voting is based on the principle of the double majority. Decisions in the Council of Ministers will need the support of 55% of Member States (currently 15 out of 27 EU countries) representing a minimum of 65% of the EU's population. Therefore, only results of this study which were made under the assumption that the voting regime of the Constitutional Treaty will apply will be included, as Turkey will certainly not join under the Nice rules. It is important to mention that the changed rules on QMV that will be applied as a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty will have considerably more impact on

the EU's capacity to act and the distribution of power within the EU than any effects on the EU's decision-making efficiency or any shift in power as a consequence of Turkey's accession. The probability that a new initiative will be passed in the European Council will only decrease slightly with an accession of Turkey and Croatia.

The shift from Nice QMV rules to QMV rules laid out in the Lisbon Treaty largely favors the largest member states and the smallest member states, especially at the expense of medium-sized member states such as the Netherlands or Austria. Turkey would be the second most powerful member state in the EU (after Germany) and dispose of considerably more voting power than France, Italy or the UK. In general, large countries can be said to have a positive effect on the efficiency measure. However, the accession of Turkey will impact on the distribution of power in the EU. Here the two measurements of voting-power employed by Baldwin & Widgrén (2005) yield contradicting results and do not allow a clear statement of who will relatively benefit compared to other member states. What seems certain, however, is that Turkey's accession will have a positive impact on the relative power of the larger member states, perhaps with the exception of Germany. From a distributional power perspective with an emphasis on national interest, one would thus expect, all other things being equal, that support for Turkish membership would predominantly come from Italy, Spain, Poland, UK and France and resistance especially from the smaller and medium-sized member states.

Fig. 18 Passage probabilities in the EU Council 1957-2004 and after the entry of Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Turkey



notes: The figure shows the passage probability which measures the likelihood of that randomly selected issue would pass in the Council of Ministers. source: Baldwin & Widgrén 2005

5.7.1 Alternatives to Full Membership

It is certainly true that Turkey's membership bid has revived discussions about the future set-up of the European Union. Policy-makers that are wary or outright opposed to Turkey's full membership still acknowledge the need to come up with an alternative to full membership and struggle with a lack of options under the existing, rather static framework. The word "privileged partnership" that is roaming the corridors of power in many European capitals is, despite not being well received by Turkish political circles, perhaps more of an indication of the uncertainty regarding the future of the EU itself than an expression tailored to Turkey's accession process. It is evident that the European Union will be subject to large external and internal pressures as well as disparities, all of which will strain the boundaries of the existing institutional framework. More internal flexibility may derive from a new flexible approach towards membership that could include modular integration ("Europe à la carte") or the concept of concentric circles ("Europe of several speeds") with several opt-in clauses for outsiders or safeguard clauses, long transition periods for new member states and opt-out clauses for insiders. However, this would limit the EU's ability to influence candidate states in the run-up to their actual accession and would undermine the value of membership by reducing its exclusiveness and thus its appeal. Most importantly, though, it could torpedo European cohesion, would render coordination virtually impossible and add enormous complexity – thereby evoking management issues (see Lippert 2008). Also, it would diminish the effectiveness of the "full membership card". On the other hand, the question should be raised if and to what extent the concept of borders has become obsolete to define a Union that sets out to represent a new form of governance mechanism beyond the nation state. More importantly, as "full membership" for accession candidates is resented by an increasing number of European citizens, it might prove to be a barrier that cannot be easily overcome and could constitute a crossroads at which expectations are disappointed and resentment is created. The concept of full membership for applicant states thus has the potential to (if it has not already) become an anathema for political elites and the mass public in member states and applicant states alike. Repeatedly, the argument has been voiced that this concept induces a "black-white" division and does not sufficiently take gradual progress and varying levels of development and convergence in different areas towards European ideals and institutions into account. By removing the obstacle of full membership the

rigidity of the existing enlargement framework could be eased and diminish the risk of derailing the accession process for candidate states and avoid the ensuing antagonism of the rejected state or any other adverse effects to the EU. It would also take the complexity of accession sufficiently into account and provide flexibility to adapt procedures to a dynamic environment. So far, the question whether a country has proved worthy to join the European Union has been relegated to a simple “yes or no question”. In the future, this could be substituted by a more differentiated approach that includes peculiarities and varying degrees of progress in different policy areas. The question remains, however, whether such an approach does not only serve as an excuse to free Europe from the obligation to make a final, definite and overall decision on accession and ultimately on the scope and functional depth of integration. Additionally, it needs to be considered that the negotiation framework with Turkey has been based on the incentive of full membership for such a long time that a departure from this concept at this point of the accession process would certainly lead to considerable disappointment within Turkey and may even call the EU’s reliability in international affairs into question.

5.7.2 European Neighbourhood Policy

In this context, it seems worth analyzing the European Neighbourhood Policy (named ENP hereafter). Its aim is specifically to “avoid dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation” (European Commission, Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2004) 373). In the Lisbon Treaty, it is emphasized that the “development of a special relationship with neighboring countries aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation” (Article 8 TEU) is one of the goals of the EU. In its essence the ENP ultimately seeks to blur the force of clear cut external borders and adheres to the principles of open coordination. It may indeed be a forerunner and first indicator of the effectiveness of the concept of concentric circles and herald another era in the project EU. The “welfare divide” between the enlarged EU and its new neighbours is clearly evident and is also accompanied by a governance gap, with authoritarian regimes or democracies with weak institutions within the EU’s proximity

(Dannreuther 2009, p.194). In explaining the newly found strategic interest in promoting transformational processes in the countries in the vicinity of the EU, the EU commission stated that “existing differences in living standards across the Union’s borders with its neighbors may be accentuated as a result of faster growth in the new Member States than in their external neighbors; common challenges in fields such as the environment, public health, and the prevention of and fight against organized crime will have to be addressed; efficient and secure border management will be essential both to protect our shared borders and to facilitate legitimate trade and passage” (European Commission, “Paving the way for a new neighbourhood instrument”, COM (2003) 393 final). This also highlights the need to control migration flows either directly coming from neighboring countries, or consisting of migrants who use these countries as staging area for getting into the EU. The EU is seeking to ensure stability within its wider perimeter and establish a “ring of friends” beyond its external border. Its strategic aim is to foster the development of these countries in order to prevent these states from becoming the breeding ground of organized crime and terrorist activities and a source of instability. According to the “European Security Strategy”, “even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed” (The Council of the European Union 2003, p.6)

The EU has often been praised for its “soft power” in bringing about policy changes and transformational processes in other countries. What is often forgotten, however, is that the transformative capacities of the EU have been predominantly contingent on extending the offer of EU membership to countries on the periphery of the EU in order to promote domestic economic and political reforms in these countries. In the absence of this membership perspective, the EU has mostly been lacking the ability to draw countries in its proximity closer to European values (Dannreuther 2009, p.188). As a consequence of increasing enlargement fatigue among European constituencies and the repeatedly questioned absorptive capacity of the EU, Europe is seeking ways to export the “European model” to non-members without offering full EU membership. The ENP is employing similar procedural measures and operational tools as the ones devised in the pre-accession process of applicant states, such as action plans, annual reviews and other benchmarks. Yet, the ENP lacks the conditionality of gaining EU membership upon the successful implementation of political and economic reforms and the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, which clearly diminishes the leverage of the EU

compared to the pre-accession strategies that the EU is deploying towards candidate states (see Tulmets 2010, p.318). One of the aims of the ENP is to offer the participating countries “a stake in the internal market” and the scope of cooperation could be summarized as “all but institutions”. However, it has been repeatedly criticized that the incentives of the ENP as indicated in the action plans have been largely kept ambiguous and that the EU has not been “serious about setting clear benchmarks (and standing by them consistently) and offering concrete incentives (even when they perceive these to be costly to themselves) [which will have to change] if the ENP is to meet its core objectives” (Smith 2005, p. 772).

The ENP provides an umbrella under which several neighborhood initiatives (TACIS and MEDA) and their respective financial instruments (INTERREG, PHARE, CARDS) are subsumed. Since the ENP builds upon existing agreements between the EU and the partner in question (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, or Association Agreements in the framework of the EuroMediterranean Partnership), the ENP is not yet ‘activated’ for Algeria, Belarus, Libya or Syria since no such Agreements are in force up to date. The European Neighbourhood Policy applies to the EU's immediate neighbours by land or sea but has recently also been extended to include countries within the wider perimeter of Europe. – Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The central element of the European Neighbourhood Policy is the bilateral ENP Action Plan agreed between the EU and each partner. Previously existing PCAs and Euro-Med agreements form the foundation of this “new quality of bilateral relations” (Smith 2005, p.763). This differentiated approach “reflects a recognition of the great diversity of countries included in the ENP and that a ‘one size fits all’ policy is counterproductive and frustrates the ambitions of those genuinely seeking to engage substantively with the EU” (Dannreuther 2009, p.191). These bilateral agreements form the foundation of a more thorough cooperation. For the next budgetary period (2007-2013), approximately €12 billion in EU funding is available.

One of the main criticisms of the ENP is that it is taking a bilateral approach towards transformation rather than taking a more holistic perspective that focuses on the facilitation of regional cooperation and cross-border activities (Smith 2005, p. 764).

However, in recent years the EU has responded to this challenge and supplemented its efforts with a growing focus on fostering cross-border and regional initiatives. One of the operational programs devised under the ENP is “The Black Sea Basin Joint Operational Programme” (hereafter Black Sea JOP). Ten countries are participating in the Black Sea JOP, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkey, Ukraine, Romania, and Greece. The program has established a set of priorities such as „supporting cross border partnerships for economic and social development based on common resources“, „“sharing resources and competencies for environmental protection and conservation and „supporting cultural and educational networks for the establishment of a common cultural environment“ (Black Sea Cross Boarder Cooperation- “Priorities & Measures”). However, the impact of this (around €18 million between 2007 and 2013) and similar programs is negligible compared to intra-EU transfer payments both financially and structurally.

Upon Turkey’s accession the newly enlarged EU would border Iran and Iraq, which has often been named one of the main strategic, geopolitical concerns in European capitals (see Aliboni 2005). At this point it would have to be assessed whether to include these countries into the wider ENP framework. However, since there are no automatism involved in the ENP, the EU would be at liberty to decide on how to proceed. If Turkey’s bid for EU membership was to be rejected, Turkey would “recede to neighborhood status”. In this case, Turkey could, similar to Russia, reject the status as a partner within the framework of the ENP and insist on a privileged position or reduce its engagement with Europe altogether.

One of the reasons why the nearer and wider neighborhood is of particular strategic interest to the EU is the need to access the oil and gas resources of Russia, the Caspian region, the Middle East and North Africa and to stabilize the countries along the main import routes. Undoubtedly, the EU could be regarded as a hegemonial power in its relations with most of its neighbors was it not for its energy needs that make it dependent on its periphery and thus susceptible to external pressure (see Dannreuther 2009, p.196-197). The EU Commission projects that by 2030, total energy consumption will be 15% higher than it was in 2000. “What is at stake”- the background document on the “Green Paper - A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” (European Commission Report 2006) specifically

highlights that the growth rates of energy consumption become smaller over time with consumption virtually stabilizing post-2020. This reflects stagnating populations in EU member states and consequently lower economic growth. The report also states that the increase of energy consumption by 2030 is much lower than the growth of GDP (15% versus 79%). According to estimates by the International Energy Agency, the EU's oil import dependence is projected to grow from currently 52% to 85% in 2030, and for gas from 36% to about 63% as a consequence of increased European demand and a decline in European domestic oil and gas production in the North Sea. Projections of the EU Commission draw an even bleaker picture: import dependency for oil could reach 94% in 2030 and gas import dependency is expected to rise substantially from somewhat over 50% at present to 84% in 2030 (it should be noted here, however, that also Norwegian oil and gas deliveries qualify as imports, although these imports seem to be strategically well secured). While this predicament becomes evident in Europe's relations with Russia, and the EU's careful approach towards its Eastern neighbours that lie within the Russian sphere of influence, this also has repercussions for the membership perspective of Turkey.

5.8 Energy Relations

Turkey wants to establish itself as main transit country and hub for energy resources from the Caucasian and Central Asian area to Europe that in turn is seeking alternative transit routes for Russian gas other than the Ukraine and Belarus and at the same time a diversification of its energy supplies away from Russia. The strategic dimension of energy relations in the context of EU relations with Turkey becomes evident when it is considered that Turkey is adjacent to countries or regions that possess 71.8% of the world's proven natural gas reserves and 72.7% of the world's proven oil reserves (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2003; Roberts 2004, p.98). "In geographical terms, Turkey is clearly increasingly well placed to serve as a central transit supplier for the anticipated major increases in European demand", according to Roberts (Roberts 2004, p.112), who highlights (see tables & below) the supplies of natural gas, which could reach the EU via Turkey.

Fig. 19 Supply potential for natural gas to the EU

a. Supply potential as of 2010				
Country	Volume	Transit country	Potential by 2015	Existing system
Iran	10 bcm	Turkey	20-30bcm	3-10 bcm
Turkmenistan	13 bcm	Iran/Turkey	30 bcm	13 bcm
Turkmenistan	34-80 bcm	Russia	80 bcm	50 bcm
Turkmenistan	10-36 bcm	Russia/Ukraine	36 bcm	36 bcm
Azerbaijan	7 bcm	Turkey	20 bcm	6-20 bcm*
Iraq	10 bcm	Turkey	10 bcm	None
Egypt	4 bcm	Jordan/Syria	10-12 bcm	Link to Jordan**

* SCP system under construction, due to open 2006.

** Egypt-Jordan gas line has reached Syrian border.

b. Additional supply potential post-2015			
Country	Volume	Transit country	Existing system
Qatar	20-30 bcm	Kuwait/Iraq/Turkey	None
Egypt	10-12 bcm	Jordan/Syria	Link to Syria*
Saudi Arabia	10-20 bcm	Jordan/Syria/Turkey	None
Kazakhstan	10-20 bcm	Azerbaijan/	None
Turkmenistan	20-30 bcm	Azerbaijan/Turkey	None
Turkmenistan	30-36 bcm	Iran/Turkey	Limited connections**
Uzbekistan	5-10 bcm	Turkmenistan/Azer/Turkey	None

* This would be additional to the 10-12 bcm potential delivery before 2015.

** Turkmenistan's Caspian shore gas fields are already linked into the Iranian network via the 12 bcm/y capacity line from Korpedzhe to Kurt-Kui, but there are no significant connections to Iran from Turkmenistan's main central and southeastern gas fields.

(source: Roberts 2004, p.112)

The Nabucco project under the leadership of Austrian-based OMV also comprises Turkish companies and increasingly becomes a bargaining chip for Turkey in its EU accession talks. (see Ozcan, 2009; Barysch, December 12, 2007). Nabucco and the Turkey-Greece(-Italy) Inter-connector would allow circumventing Russian territory and would offer the EU advantages compared to the current situation in which it completely lacks bargaining options and is solely dependent on Russian natural resources and very few supply lines (see Roberts 2004, p.112). At the same time, it has to be kept in mind that Turkey itself is also overly reliant on Russian natural gas supplies and that Russia has not always turned out to be a reliable energy partner for Turkey either. The country thus also seeks to diversify its own energy supply. Russia in turn is regarding Turkey as

a viable alternative transit country to Europe and also as important customer with considerable growth in its demand, but is also wary of Turkey's privileged position to act as an intermediary between other potential suppliers and European markets. In order to position itself as energy hub and secure its own supply Turkey has thus a strong interest in maintaining good relations with the EU on this issue. However, it does not want to entirely detach cooperation in the energy sector from the general accession talks and a rejection of Turkey's EU ambitions could have negative consequences for the EU energy diversification strategy (see Barysch December 12, 2007).

5.9 “The EU cannot afford the accession of Turkey”

In connection with Turkey's bid for EU accession, the argument is often made that the European Union in its current structure will not be able to afford the accession of Turkey with its large population but low GDP. Before accession costs can be accurately assessed it has to be mentioned “that future developments and reforms within the EU framework, which will have a considerable impact on any financial transfers to Turkey are difficult to predict” (Dervis et al. 2004, p.77).

So far, the largest country in the EU, Germany, is also the one with the largest national economy. Thus, there exist hardly any concerns regarding the legitimacy of its political weight within the Union. However, when other large states within the Union are examined, this argument has been only partly valid for quite some time now, as with the accession of Spain and more recently of Poland, populous countries with a lower GDP than the EU average (particularly at the time of accession) have enjoyed a degree of voting power that did not at all correlate with their national economies' weight within the Union. In 2008, Turkey's population equated to roughly 70 million citizens. If current population trends continue Turkey will surpass Germany as largest EU member state population-wise in 2025, with 87 million people, accounting for 15.5% of the EU28 population (source: Eurostat). This is less than Germany's 18.1% share of the EU25 population prior to the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. Will the economic impact of Turkey's membership thus be considerable? In order to answer this question it has to be considered that Turkey's economy is just 1.9% of EU25 GDP, with a GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) that is only at 27% of the EU average. Assuming average annual growth of 5%, it would be 2.9% of GDP in 2015 (Hughes 2004, p.3; 8).

The data used by Hughes is used also to illustrate the development until 2008 when the effects of the financial and economic crisis already had an effect on national GDPs, and the GDP growth rates of Turkey and the EU economies. The unemployment rate of the EU27, for example, which has increased tremendously throughout the crisis reached 8.9% in June 2009. Spain was particularly hit hard, with unemployment rate reaching 18.1% in June 2009 and also other EU countries such as Slovakia (11.2%), Ireland (12.2%), and the Baltic states (Estonia 13.3%, Lithuania 13.8%, Latvia 17.2%) have experienced particularly high levels of unemployment (source: Eurostat). In comparison, Turkey's unemployment rate has risen to 13.2%, but it has started from a higher initial level of unemployment prior to the crisis. In 2008, Turkey's GDP amounted to €501 billion, in contrast to €12.5 trillion of the EU27 (source: Eurostat). The Turkish GDP per capita was €7,050. If purchasing power standards are applied to ensure adequate comparability of the data this would equal 45.7% of the EU27 average. It should be noted that the Turkish economy grew at the remarkable rate of 11.7% in the first quarter of 2010 (GDP at constant prices, source: Turkstat) and has thus by far outperformed the European economies which are slow to recover from the recession year 2009 during which the Turkish economy contracted by 4.5%. In several European economies, such as Germany (-4.9%), Italy (-5.0%), Latvia (-18.0%), Slovenia (-7.8%), Finland (-8.0%), Sweden (-5.1%) and others, the GDP decline in 2009 was even more considerable (source: Eurostat). Admittedly, part of Turkey's spectacular growth rate in Q1 2010 rate can also be attributed to Q1 2009 which serves as the point of reference and in which the Turkish GDP shrunk by 14.5% (source: Turkstat). However, also projections of Eurostat for the whole year 2010 show, that with 4.7% the Turkish economy is predicted to grow at a much faster pace than all the European economies (forecast for EU27: 1%), some of which will still even exhibit a negative GDP growth. This data clearly demonstrates the dynamic economic recovery that Turkey has made in the aftermath of the economic crisis and actually indicates that the Turkish economy has gained in strength relative to Europe as a consequence of the crisis. It also tends to uphold previous assumptions of higher long-term growth rates of Turkey relative to European economies, although it may be too early to assess the long-term impact of the recession on growth rates.

Turkey would certainly become a major net recipient under existing EU transfer payment schemes due to its ability to draw from structural cohesion funds and funds

allocated to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). At the same time its low GDP would entail low payments into the EU budget, as payments of individual member states is capped at 4 % of GDP. It has to be considered that the actual effects of accession on trade levels are difficult to predict because comparable data from the CEE region does not seem applicable. This can be attributed to the fact that the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey also includes the harmonization of technical legislation, anti-trust regulations and the protection of intellectual property (Lejour et al., 2004, p. 23) and thus might already have anticipated some of the positive GDP effects that accession of the CEE countries has entailed. Moreover, consequences of a rejection of Turkey's bid on trade flows cannot be accurately estimated due to a lack of precedent (Lejour et al., 2004, p. 29). Finally, most models that have dealt with quantifying financial transfers to Turkey struggle with the fact that institutional developments and reforms of existing policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural and Cohesion Policy and their respective impact on net transfers are difficult to predict.

It should be taken into account that the effects of the current economic crisis may not have been adequately accounted for in most studies measuring the financial impact of Turkish accession on the EU budget. The economic potency of the EU has suffered considerably and the ultimate effects on national GDPs and Europe's ability to bear accession costs have yet to be determined. Turkey has undoubtedly been severely affected by the economic slump, as have been several EU member states, but as we have seen earlier seems to be recovering more quickly. The equation of accession costs will ultimately depend on the economic recovery in the EU and in Turkey and future economic growth rates. What is certain is that the economic crisis has led to even more wariness among European populations towards further enlargement and favorable public opinion seems to be contingent on a positive overall economic climate and a quick recovery of Europe's national economies.

5.9.1 Structural Policy

Turkey will be a major recipient under the structural and cohesion policy. These funds are reserved for regions with a GDP per capita at purchasing power parity below 75% of the EU average. Under the current policy rules, the upper limit of transfers to a country

is 4 percent of GDP. Dervis et al. (2004) estimated under their GDP assumptions of around €200 billion in recent years that Turkish accession would have entailed financial transfers in the framework of the structural and cohesion policy of around €8 billion annually, if Turkey had already a member of the EU in 2004. However, it needs to be taken into account that Turkey's GDP by now is considerably higher. This does not necessarily have a negative impact on their future projections, as they build on Turkish GDP numbers as a percentage of EU GDP figures. Their assessment of membership costs in a future scenario is also based on the assumption that the cap on structural transfers on 4 percent of GDP will prevail, that the Turkish economy will grow at a faster pace than EU economies over the next decade and that Turkish GDP will reach about 4% of EU-28 GDP (at present it amounts to only around 2%) by 2015. This implies that the financial transfers to Turkey within the structural and cohesion policy would equal 0.16% of EU-28 GDP. Additionally, Turkey's contribution to the EU budget would be around 1 percent of its own GDP or 0.04% of EU GDP if above-mentioned assumptions are applied. When looking at the Eurostat figures for 2009, Turkey with its GDP of €440 billion would constitute 3.7% of the EU-28 GDP of €11,788 trillion (Turkish GDP added to EU-27 GDP of €11,785 trillion at market prices, source: Eurostat). Thus, according to this slightly modified model, payments could amount to 0,148% of EU GDP and Turkey's contribution would equal 0.037% of EU GDP, which would amount to net transfers of 0.11% of EU-28 GDP or €12.9 billion. This is also in line with other projections regarding annual financial transfers to Turkey in case of EU membership.


According to Grethe (2004, p.18), financial transfers to Turkey would amount to €15.3 billion in 2014 with net transfers of €12.6 billion, provided that past GDP trends continue. It However, transfer payments to CEE countries have until now not reached the 4 percent barrier and are well below this threshold. This has to be seen in the context of an overall EU-budget of around €120 billion. Thus, net transfer payments to Turkey under the cohesion policy could take up roughly 10 percent of the total budget, which constitutes a significant share (see Hughes 2004, p. 21). Especially in times of economic recession this will lead to considerable opposition, particularly on the part of the net-contributors to the EU budget. In this context, it should be taken into consideration that “the experience with the current enlargement process suggests that over time the discussion will shift from how much it costs to who will bear the burden” (Dervis et al.

2004, p.77), which would place distributional conflicts at the heart of the discussion about the financial implications of Turkey's accession.

It should be noted that Turkey already is a recipient of EU funds under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA). These transfer payments are certainly not of the same magnitude as the funds that Turkey would receive upon accession and Turkey also is not entitled to the continuous allocation of these funds, but they are listed here to get a perspective of the magnitude of financial transfers and the constraints that an accession of Turkey would put on the EU budget.

Fig. 20 *Financial resources allocated to Turkey under IPA per component for the period 2007-2012 (in million Euro)*

Component	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
■ Transition Assistance and Institution Building	256,7	256,1	233,2	211,3	230,6	250,9
■ Cross-border Co-operation	2,0	2,8	9,3	9,5	9,7	9,9
■ Regional Development	167,5	173,8	182,7	238,1	291,4	350,8
■ Human Resources Development	50,2	52,9	55,6	63,4	77,6	89,9
■ Rural Development	20,7	53,0	85,5	131,3	172,5	197,8
TOTAL	497,2	538,7	566,4	653,7	781,9	899,5



(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/financial-assistance/index_en.htm)

5.9.2 Common Agricultural Policy of the EU

Budgetary concerns exist regarding the transfer payments to Turkey under the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU in the case of accession. Direct payments to producers

and rural development measures (e.g. payments under environmental programs and investment subsidies) would constitute the main cost drivers (Grethe, 2004, p. 6). When the costs for implementing the CAP in Turkey are assessed it has to be kept in mind that the CAP at the point of accession will most likely not be equivalent to current CAP practices, as it certainly will be modified and somewhat adapted in anticipation of Turkey's accession. Also, the Turkish agricultural sector will not resemble the current state, as technological advancements, urbanization, and economic development are progressing. Assuming a €55 billion budget for the CAP in 2014, Turkey would receive € 3.6 billion or 5.6 percent of the CAP budget in 2014 and 8.3 percent in 2024. This would translate into a net transfer under the CAP to Turkey of about €1.6 billion in 2014 in total and could rise to €2.6 billion in 2024 due to full phasing in of direct payments and rural development policies. France in comparison, received €1.5 billion and Spain €2.9 billion in net transfers under CAP in 2002. Romania and Bulgaria currently receive €1.7 billion annually. Thus, these numbers concerning Turkey should not be overstated in the light of other net transfers that take place within the CAP (Grethe, 2004, p. 16, 17).

Oskam et al. (2005, p. 147) projected the total financial impact of Turkey's EU accession under existing policies. Assuming an accession of Turkey in 2015 (which does not seem to be a viable assumption any longer) they concluded that "the net transfers to Turkey would range between €11-18 billion (2004 values), consisting of market and price support, and direct income payments to Turkish farmers, which would amount to €3.6 billion respectively (at the 2004 value of the euro), rural development expenditure of €1.6 billion and funds of the structural and cohesion policy between €9.5 and €16.6 billion (2004 values), while they project a budget contribution by Turkey of €5.4 billion".

5.9.3 Negative externalities in the event of a rejection of Turkey's bid

Negative externalities of a rejection of Turkey's bid for EU membership should also be taken into account when benefits and disadvantages of Turkey's prospective membership are assessed. It seems impossible to adequately quantify the economic consequences in case Turkey's EU ambitions were to be disappointed and any developments will to a large extent depend on the circumstances under which this

would happen. Breuss (2002) tried to quantify the effects of non-enlargement for CEE countries prior to their accession. He identified the following components that contribute to the economic effects of accession (see also Breuss 2001):

- Trade effects: elimination of tariffs and handling costs
- “Common Market” effects: increase in efficiency and competitive price pressures
- FDI and work-related migratory flows
- Accession costs and transfer payments

He projected that the negative economic effects (or more precisely neglected economic potential) of non-accession would in the long-run accumulate to 0.2-0.7 % of real GDP for the EU-15 and up to 10% for the CEE countries. These figures would constitute opportunity costs (“lost benefits”) in case of non-accession. However, through the customs union, Turkey is economically already more closely affiliated with the EU than the CEE countries prior to accession and some of the effects that he projected for the CEE countries would not occur in the case of Turkey. He also pointed out that the exact magnitude would to a large extent depend on the actual causes for non-accession. Also, these figures only concern immediate economic effects and do not take into account adverse political developments or the costs incurred as a result of instability of a large neighboring country such as Turkey.

Projections with regard to the question how such a rejection will affect Turkish politics, economy and its society are difficult to make, given the fluidity of public opinion, expectations and international relations. However, a rejection of Turkey's application will certainly alienate the country from Europe (see Hannay 2009), and may lead to a backlash that would undermine recent reforms. A rejection could result in a change in leadership within Turkey and could give rise to more nationalist and extremist elements of Turkish society, which has the potential to disrupt economic and political stability in the country (see Hughes 2004, p. 12). Foremost, it could lead to an inward-looking orientation of Turkish politics or a clear shift in priorities away from Europe. Not only the rise of Islamic oriented parties with more extremist positions should be of concern but also a more nationalistic outlook on the part of the “westernized elites” is to be expected. It is unlikely that a rejection of Turkey's bid will destabilize the political system in general, which could induce substantial migratory flows (see Erzan et al. 2005, 2006), lead to violent outbursts among Turkish minority groups in Europe and

cause instability along the EU's external border. However, a situation like that is not inconceivable. Thus, the potential downside of non-accession has to be carefully reviewed. The Customs Union between Turkey and the EU and the importance of trade ties to the EU would most likely prevent a major disruption of economic relations but would perhaps cause Turkey to radically shift its priorities to diversifying its economic ties, which will hurt Europe's economic interests in the long run. A failure to detach the energy component from accession talks could result in harmful consequences for Europe's energy diversification ambitions. Even if Turkey refrained from deliberately complicating energy relations with Europe, its ability to act on behalf of Europe or as "Europe's quasi-proxy" in energy negotiations in the Middle East or Central Asia may be seriously undermined. According to Alessandri, these considerations have already led "some European leaders to conclude that the 'costs' of saying 'no' to Turkey are ultimately much higher than so-called absorption costs" among them the Italian president Giorgio Napolitano (Alessandri 2010, p.17, see Napolitano 2009).

6. Limitations

This research endeavor has several short-comings and limitations, some of which I want to briefly highlight at this point. The precise level of knowledge of the Austrian public regarding the effects of Turkey's EU accession for the EU and Austria has to my knowledge not yet been sufficiently explored and should thus be subject to extensive quantitative research. While originally included in the research design for this paper the mere magnitude of this project would exceed the scope of this thesis and the resources of the author and should perhaps be tackled in the context of a comprehensive research project or even be incorporated in the Eurobarometer surveys in order to ensure a sufficient sample size and representativeness. This seems vital in order to explore whether the Austrian public is informed on this issue and will indicate in which areas (constructive) political actors can provide the public with more in-depth information to correct existing misperceptions.

One major weakness of this paper is that it does not adequately address distributional issues within the EU, but also within the national political arenas. It is important to understand that distributional conflicts within the EU are often at the center of political contestation at the European level, that not all countries will be equally affected by

Turkish membership and that also within a member state, not all segments of society and all actors will equally benefit or experience the negative side effects of Turkey's accession. In this paper, public opinion within Austria is viewed from a rather holistic perspective and a differentiation between different segments of society may shed some light on how European issues affect each of them and how European interests may best be communicated to them. The study by Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci (2009) on public opinion in Cyprus could perhaps serve as a source of inspiration on how to structure such a research project.

Moreover, it has to be considered that the growing interdependence between the member states and the painful realization thereof as a consequence of the financial and economic crisis and the "forced solidarity" with other member states may actually not lead to an increased incorporation of European interests into the national political framework. Rather, this will cause national actors to put a brake on functional integration and enlargement altogether, whether or not this is actually beneficial in the long run. This step may be an initial reflex and turn out to be impracticable in light of the "regionalization and globalization of issues" that have to be tackled at an adequate spatial level, but it is a course of events which has to be reckoned with.

7. Conclusion

This conclusion will come up with a fairly comprehensive account of the main findings of this thesis. It is deliberately kept rather long, in order to account for the complexity of the issue at hand. Also, I wanted to provide readers with little time with a substantial summary and an overview of the main points of the paper without excluding necessary data altogether.

Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), revised in the Treaty of Lisbon, forms the legal basis of enlargement and states that "*any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2*", which cover freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, "*may apply to become a member of the Union*". Certainly, Turkey still has deficits in the domain of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These will have to be addressed if an EU membership is to become reality, especially since this dimension figures prominently in public opinion throughout the EU and is

also touching the very core of European values and principles, among them “the individual”, human dignity and equality of men and women, peace and freedom, democracy and the rule of law, as well as tolerance and solidarity. The progress of Turkey in this domain is being closely tracked by the European Commission in its yearly progress reports of enlargement candidates and full reflection of these values in Turkish laws and policies will certainly be a precondition for membership. A newly drafted civilian constitution, which tackles some of the current issues in the set-up of the Turkish political system and crafts a sustainable societal contract between the competing fractions and different segments of Turkish society could undoubtedly move Turkey closer towards Europe and underline its democratic credentials.

An explicit aim of the European Union is to preserve differences in national identities of member states while emphasizing similarities, which is expressed in the term “unity in diversity”. It is not unreasonable to speak of “European cultural pluralism”(Yukleyen 2008, p. 123) and the analogy between the EU and an orchestra in which several distinct instruments form an ensemble (see Johnson 1991, 9-10) is certainly apposite. Interestingly, the percussion section in the modern orchestra is actually owed to Ottoman influence (Quataert 2000, p.8) and in light of the plurality of European identity it does not seem inconceivable that Turkey will play its part in the “concert of Europe”. In this context, it is relevant, whether Turkey can or should be seen as a European country. It will be the question of European identity, which will undoubtedly be decisive for Turkey’s membership perspective. A look at the historical relations between Turkey and Europe reveals that the Turks have often been perceived as “the other” against which European identity was affirmed. On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire also became a European power that was incorporated into the framework of European powers in the 18th century and mutual cultural influence and interactions have been manifold. Most Europeans affiliate themselves culturally with Christianity and even if they do not actively practice their religion or attend church regularly, religion continues to play an important role in people’s lives. However, Europeans seem to be strikingly tolerant in their religious views and findings in this paper do not support the assumption that public opinion will be decisively shaped by considerations of “religious exclusivity within the EU”. The notion of Turkey as “the other” is still widely accepted in Austria. Austrians view the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states as too significant for Turkey to join the EU. Also, the geographical and historical

European credentials are challenged by a majority of Austrians. Among other factors, such as this feeling of unfamiliarity contributes to the fact that only 16% of the Austrians support Turkish accession, ranking last among the member states in support of Turkish membership (Eurobarometer 69, 2008). The survey of the Austrian Society for European Politics in 2010 showed that public support for Turkey's EU ambitions has stabilized at relatively low levels of 17%. However, it should also be kept in mind that findings of public-opinion surveys have to be viewed carefully, as a study conducted by the Austrian Society of European Politics in 2005 drew a more differentiated picture. It concluded that 8% of the Austrian respondents already regarded Turkey as ready to join the EU, 28% saw this perspective within 10 years, 22% thought Turkey would be in a position to join the EU within the next 20 years and only 32% dismissed Turkey's accession perspective altogether, which would somewhat alter the picture and simply reflect a more cautious view on the time frame of accession negotiations.

Breuilly (1996) argues that "the myths of common descent, which often surround claims of ethnic homogeneity, are often selected, modified or even fabricated by nationalist elites who use them to forge a sense of loyalty to the national community they claim to represent" (pp. 150-152). In the case of Austria, it has to be mentioned that its identity has undergone fundamental transformation within the last century, away from an identity firmly rooted in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and elements of a pan-German identity towards a small state and exclusively Austrian identity (see Spohn 2003). Thus, the exclusivity of Austrian identity and the exceptionality of Austria may have been deliberately overstated in order to forge and fortify a common identity by national political elites.

If current population trends continue Turkey will surpass Germany as largest EU member state population-wise in 2025, with 87 million people, accounting for 15.5% of the EU28 population, which is less than Germany's 18.1% share of the EU25 population, prior to the accession of Romania and Bulgaria. However, the mere size in addition with the low level of economic development raises questions whether the EU will be able to finance Turkey's accession and whether it will be able to absorb the country in a way that will not impede the functioning of EU institutions. Despite the fact that the costs of Turkey's EU accession in terms of transfer payments and

budgetary effects would be considerable (particularly under the current structural cohesion policy) they certainly seem manageable as they are similar in size to the previous enlargement round of CEE countries. Oskam et al. (2005, p. 147) projected the total financial impact of Turkey's EU accession under existing policies. Assuming an accession of Turkey in 2015 (which does not seem to be a viable assumption any longer) concluded that "the overall net transfers to Turkey would range between €11-18 billion (2004 values)". A slightly modified model of Dervis et al. (2004) arrives at net transfers under the structural and cohesion policy of €12.9 billion. Other sources estimate that the net transfer under the CAP to Turkey could total about €1.6 billion in 2014 and rise to €2.6 billion in 2024 due to full phasing in of direct payments and rural development policies. France in comparison, received €1.5 billion and Spain €2.9 billion in net transfers under CAP in 2002. Romania and Bulgaria currently receive 1.7 billion annually.

It is not *per se* certain that Turkey's accession will have a crippling effect on further functional integration in the EU. Baldwin & Widgrén (2005) assessed the impact of an EU accession of Turkey and Croatia on the EU's capacity to act and its effect on the voting power of current member states. They found that Turkey's accession has "only a negligible effect on the EU's power to act". However, it will have a considerable impact on the distribution of power between the member states (p.137). Similarly, a study by Helen Wallace that looked into the effects of the enlargement round in 2004 on the decision-making process in various EU institutions in detail, came to the overarching conclusion that the "EU's institutional processes and practice have stood up rather robustly to the impact of enlargement to EU25 in May 2004" (Wallace 2007, p. 22). Therefore, the resistance of certain member states against further enlargement can in many cases be traced back to the selfish motive of retaining power and influence.

Many politicians, other decision-makers and scholars emphasize the need for the EU to honor the principle of "pacta sunt servanda" especially in the domain of enlargement and that if explicit rules are laid out, they have to be generally applied or the EU runs the risk of being regarded as unreliable, inconsistent and driven by double-standards in its policies, which may have severe repercussions with regard to its credibility and influence in international affairs (see Balytska 2006, p.7). In this context, the propagated alternative to full membership- a privileged partnership- does not prove to be a viable

option. The EU has often been praised for its “soft power” to bring about policy changes and transformational processes in other countries but its transformative capacities have been contingent on extending the offer of EU-membership to countries on the periphery of the EU. In the absence of this membership perspective, the EU has mostly been lacking the ability to draw countries in its proximity closer to European values. This is also true for the EU’s relationship with Turkey. A rejection of Turkish membership bid cannot likely be substituted by a more integrated cooperation, as Turkey will most probably not accept “integration without participation”.

A negative outcome of the accession process of Turkey would also likely put an end to the aspirations for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus between the two ethnic communities. Although there is a desire for the successful conclusion of negotiations and dissatisfaction with the status quo, both communities are at the moment highly pessimistic and do not think that a settlement can be negotiated in the near future. Lordos et al. (2009) found the position of Turkey to be highly relevant and Turkey’s influence to be evident, as 28 percent of the Turkish Cypriot swing voters assigned importance to Turkey’s position on any negotiated settlement in the future. Furthermore, they note “that the Greek Cypriot swing vote is highly sensitive to the perceptions of Turkey’s post-settlement intentions, that is, ‘whether Turkey will have convinced me that it intends to honor the agreement’ (45%). Thus, taken together, these two findings highlight the critical role that Turkey will play in securing a Cyprus settlement.”

What happens if Turkey’s bid for EU membership is rejected? Breuss (2002) tried to estimate the (by now hypothetical) negative economic effects (or more precisely neglected economic potential) in case of a failure of the accession negotiations between the EU and the CEE countries. In the event of non-accession he projected missed economic potential of 0.2- 0.7 % of real GDP for the EU-15 and up to 10% for the CEE countries. These numbers only seem partly applicable to the case of Turkey as the Customs Union has already anticipated some of these economic gains. The immediate and measurable economic effects seem negligible; however, the long negotiations have already led to a build-up of expectations, which if disappointed, could have devastating effects for both, the EU and Turkey in volatile financial markets. The impact would be particularly severe for Turkey as foreign direct investment is contingent on a stable

environment, which could be seriously undermined in the event of a rejection of the accession bid. Also, the positive demographic impact on the EU's population and the precise effect of the dynamic and growing Turkish market on the European economy (-ies) in case of accession can hardly be predicted. The mere fact that Turkey's association and accession process has already been an on-going process for decades would make a rejection all the more consequential and could lead to severely strained relations between Turkey and the EU, could cause an estrangement between the two parties and in the worst case evoke tremendous instability at the EU's external border, which could induce significant migratory flows but also entail other adverse effects for the EU. Moreover, as Turkey does not entirely want to detach cooperation in the energy sector from the general accession talks, a rejection of Turkey could have adverse consequences for the EU energy diversification strategy to which Turkey, with its privileged geo-strategic position could make considerable contributions. The issue of energy security and supply diversification has not yet arrived in Austrian public discourse on Turkey's membership perspective and it remains doubtful, whether it will ever decisively influence public opinion. However, national political elites will soon be confronted with the necessity to take the strong European interest in this matter increasingly into account.

Interestingly, the Austrian debate on Turkish accession has been closely linked with the more general debates on globalization, Austrian EU membership and immigration. The debate on Turkish EU accession has certainly become the lightning rod for fears and concerns in these domains and the rejection of Turkish EU ambitions is also an expression of a wide-spread resistance to change within large segments of the Austrian population. Despite the fact that all of these issues are in some aspects interrelated, it has to be kept in mind they cannot per-se be analytically tied to the discourse on Turkey's prospective EU membership. The political elites in Austria have pursued opinion-polls driven politics and gave way to short-term political considerations that prevented a rational debate on the merits and short-comings of a full membership of Turkey. However, political leaders should seek to evoke a clear distinction between these issues in the minds of the Austrian public, be it for the sake of long-term national or community interests.

This becomes evident in the domain of immigration. A study conducted by Erzan et al.

(2005, 2006) concludes that less Turks are likely to immigrate if Turkey becomes an EU member state than if Turkey is left out of the EU. The scenario that is based on the assumption that past trends of Turkish immigration will continue and that Turkish membership will occur and will be accompanied by unhindered freedom of movement with accession in 2015 forecasts that 2.1 million Turks will have migrated by the year 2030. In the opposite scenario which assumes no membership hence no free movement of labor and also a slow down in the Turkish economy the numbers would be 2.7 million (Erzan et al. 2005, 2006; Avcı & Kirişçi 2008, p. 158). These numbers - if corroborated by other studies - will undoubtedly be of relevance for the Austrian discourse on Turkish accession and given the negative public attitude towards more immigration and opinion-driven politics by the political elites could shift the tide towards a more favorable view on Turkish accession. More detailed studies, specifically exploring net migration to Austria could subsequently create additional relevance for Austrian constituencies, as these findings can be expected to be even more pronounced in the case of Austria due to the fact that immigration in the event of non-accession will to a large extent happen on the grounds of family reunification and will be contingent upon an already considerable Turkish immigrant population within the country. Network effects may thus become even more pronounced. In this context, it should be noted that disapproval ratings of Turkey's membership bid are among the highest in countries that will as a consequence of network effects be disproportionately affected by immigration, which may perhaps be an argument to tackle the issue of immigration on a European level and share the burden of large waves of immigration more evenly. It is certain that the Turkish migrants will not proportionately disperse over EU territory which is why some member states naturally will be more affected by these migration flows than others.

Remarkably, Austria is, apart from Greece, the only country in the EU-15 in which a majority supported unanimous decision making in the EU in the 2000 Eurobarometer survey. While only 31% favor majority voting procedures, 52% support unanimous decision-making processes. This cannot simply be explained by a general tendency towards unanimous voting structures by smaller states, as this pattern was not found in other small member states. This ties in with another interesting aspect of Austrian public debate on Turkey's accession bid that actually relates to the wider institutional perception of European and national political institutions. While the Austrian levels of

trust in European institutions are in line with the European average, Austrians have a relatively high trust in their national political institutions (51% Austrian parliament, 54% Austrian government; Eurobarometer 73, 2010). This highlights the role that these institutions play in the formation of public opinion.

In conclusion, it can be said that Turkey will have to specifically address fears in Europe that an accession of Turkey will dilute or even threaten European identity if it wants to ameliorate its image in European societies and increase support for its membership bid. However, perceived identity cannot be easily altered and encompasses a wide array of assumptions, thoughts and beliefs that have been entrenched in the mindset of many people and have persisted for decades, if not centuries. Despite the fluidity of identity, the notion of a primordial existence of a European identity based on Christian civilization still seems widely accepted. This is a political reality that European politicians will not disregard, especially in light of the fact that European issues are becoming increasingly politicized in national arenas. However, one cannot help but notice that the component of cultural or religious homogeneity does not always figure prominently in various surveys and are not reflected in the core values of the European Union. A comprehensive discourse about the true nature of European identity is thus needed, in order to clarify the actual foundation of the European Union. It is not possible to determine its future borders without a thorough understanding of the underlying values that shape Europe. While it seems necessary to highlight positive effects of Turkey's accession, it is even more important to illuminate negative public perceptions and reassess them with full analytical vigor. In my opinion, it seems vital to largely detach the discourse on immigration from the debate on Turkish accession, contrary to the initial impulse to constantly consider that “the image of Turkey in the minds of many Europeans has been formed by their encounter with Turkish immigrants. This encounter by and large has been a negative one and exacerbates European fears that Turks will actually invade their societies if Turkey was to become a member of the European Union” (Avcı & Kirişci 2008, p. 167). This would embed the discourse on Turkey's accession into the wider discourse on immigrant integration. As we have seen, a non-accession of Turkey would likely even increase migratory flows compared to a situation of Turkish accession and freedom of movement (which could in addition be subject to transition periods) and would certainly not affect the number of Turkish immigrants already living in the member states or for that matter have any positive

effect on their level of integration into European societies.

Moreover, an effective nation brand management of Turkey seems vital in communicating the secular nature of the Turkish state as well as the historic interdependence and interaction between Turkey and European countries. This should be seen under the premise that rather undirected and unspecified prejudices that emphasize basic cultural and religious differences are perhaps the single most important underlying factor that influences negative attitudes towards Turkey's accession. All in all, the analysis of the arguments against Turkish accession shows that the issues at hand are certainly more complex than they may appear at first sight and the findings certainly do not justify a vigorous opposition of Turkey's accession to the extent that we see it in Austria.

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9. Appendix

Zusammenfassung

Diese Arbeit setzt sich mit einem möglichen EU Beitritt der Türkei und der Diskussion darüber auseinander. Auf der einen Seite werden Argumente gegen einen Beitritt auf ihre Gültigkeit und Aussagekraft geprüft. Sie sollen vor allem im Hinblick auf EU Interessen beleuchtet werden, da eine rationale Betrachtung der Gemeinschaftsinteressen langfristig für ein prosperierendes Europa und durch die enge Verknüpfung zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten, auch für die positive Entwicklung jedes einzelnen Mitgliedsstaates essentiell ist. Auf der anderen Seite ist auch die österreichische Debatte, mit all ihren Facetten, Hintergründen und Besonderheiten von Interesse, da die Mitgliedsstaaten über die ultimative Entscheidungsgewalt über eine etwaige Erweiterung der Union verfügen und in nationalen Debatten Gemeinschaftsinteressen kurzfristig ausgeklammert sein können. In der österreichischen Debatte kommt es zu einer Verquickung des Diskurses über einen Türkeibeitritt zur EU mit verschiedenen anderen Diskursen wie zum Beispiel jenen über Immigration, Integration, Europa und Folgen der Globalisierung. Diese Diskurse müssten von einer analytischen Sichtweise her betrachtet, teilweise voneinander abgekoppelt zu werden, um Kausalitäten adäquat bewerten zu können.

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Education

2004-2011	University of Vienna Political Science/International Relations <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Thesis: "Accession of Turkey to the European Union? EU Community Interests vs. National Political Reality- The Case of Austria."• Degree Examination Certificate (end of 1st of 2 parts of studies with honours (03/26/2007)• Scholarship for Joint-Study Semester at Georgetown University• Expected date of graduation: 03/2011	Vienna, AT
2004-2009	Vienna University of Economics and Business International Business Administration, (Austrian equivalent to Master's degree) specializing in International Marketing & Management and International Business <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Thesis: "The Concept of Subsidiary Autonomy in MNCs with Special Emphasis on the Size-Autonomy Relation" (grade: A)• Honours program: Center of Excellence (02/2007-04/2009)• Scholarship for academic achievement (2007/08)• Date of graduation: 04/17/2009• GPA: 3.27 (max. 4)	Vienna, AT
01-05/2009	Georgetown University <ul style="list-style-type: none">• GPA: 3.753 (max. 4)	Washington DC, U.S.
08-12/2008	Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam <ul style="list-style-type: none">• GPA: 8.455 (max. 10)	Amsterdam, Netherlands
07-08/2006	International Summer University, Vietnam	Hanoi, Vietnam
07/2001-07/2002	Foreign Exchange Year with AFS at the Camp Hill High School	Pennsylvania, U.S.
1995-2003	Junior High School & High School, Gymnasium "Wasagasse" Date of Graduation: 06/14/2003 with honours	Vienna, AT

Professional Experience

12/2009-	Unilever Austria Unilever Future Leaders Programme <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Graduate management trainee program• 2 year program• 1st year: Local Marketing (Brand Building) Knorr in Austria• 2nd year: - 6 months: Customer Marketing for SCC & Dressings - 6 months: job to be confirmed – Hamburg, DE	Vienna, AT & Hamburg, DE
06-08/2009	German Marshall Fund of the United States Internship at the GMF office in Washington D.C., Mediterranean Program <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Research assistant to Ian Lesser on Turkey-related issues• In-house Reports on "Turkey-Iran", "Turkey-China & the Uighur Predicament" and "Turkey's EU Accession"	Washington DC, U.S.

02-05/2008	Vienna University of Economics and Business Project assistant at the Department of International Marketing and Management	Vienna, AT
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contacting executives (cold calling) on the level of subsidiary management, convince them to participate in the study on subsidiary autonomy and offer support with regard to the content of the questionnaire • Managing and organizing the target population data gathered via databases and dividing it into work packages • Planning of coordination meetings with other team members 	
07-08/2007	Austrian Chamber of Commerce Internship at the commercial office of the Austrian Embassy in Santiago de Chile	Santiago de Chile
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gathering data on specific industries for industry reports and an overall country report on Chile • Contacting Chilean, Ecuadorian & Peruvian companies working on specific infrastructure projects to explore business opportunities for Austrian enterprises and investors. • Establishing contact between Austrian and Chilean companies 	
07-08/2005	Österreichische Lotterien GmbH (Austrian Lotteries Ltd) Internship in the purchasing department	Vienna, AT
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • technical procurement • merchandise procurement 	
07-08/ 2004	Linde-Verlag GmbH (publishing house specializing in law and business related publication)	Vienna, AT

Extracurricular Activities

11/2009	Article "Turkish-Iranian Relations-A Reality Check" in: Turkish Policy Quarterly - Fall Edition 2009
05/2008	38. St. Gallen Symposium: International student participant, selected via an essay contest, based on my contribution: "Creative destruction of values- the breeding ground for newly developing forms of identity."
2009-	Students 4 Excellence
2003-2004	Mandatory Military Service

Language skills

german	mother tongue	
english	fluent	TOEFL score: 118 out of 120 (Internet-Based Test)
spanish	conversant	
french	intermediate knowledge	
dutch	basic knowledge	dutch certificate - A2 level

EDP knowledge

user skills	MS Office Suite (Word, Excel, Powerpoint, Access)
statistics	SPSS, AC Nielsen Nitro
database	Database Training (LexisNexis- Interaction) AC Nielsen Basic Database Analysis Training AC Nielsen Advanced Database Analysis Training

Other trainings

2010	Unilever Marketing Academy
2010-2011	Unilever Future Leaders Programme
2010	Mindshare Media Day