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## Second Round of NATO Enlargement Why did Lithuania join NATO?

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## Acronyms

|            |   |
|------------|---|
| CBSS       | Council of Baltic Sea States  |
| CEE        | Central and Eastern Europe  |
| BALTBAT    | Baltic Battalion  |
| BALTDEFCOL | Baltic Defence College  |
| BALTNET    | Baltic Air-Surveillance   |
| BALTRON    | Baltic Naval Squadron   |
| EU         | European Union  |
| GATT       | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  |
| LITPOLBAT  | Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion   |
| MCM        | Mine Counter Measures   |
| MOU        | Memorandum of Understanding (between 3 Baltic States, the 4 Nordic States and the UK for the BALTBAT project) |
| NACC       | North Atlantic Co-operation Council   |
| NATO       | North Atlantic Treaty Organization  |
| OECD       | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  |
| OSCE       | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  |
| PfP        | Partnership for Peace (NATO Program)  |
| RASCC      | Regional Airspace Surveillance Coordination Centre  |
| SFOR       | Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina   |
| TACIS      | Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States  |
| UN         | United Nations  |
| US         | The United States of America  |
| 9/11       | Terror attacks on September 11 <sup>th</sup> 2001 in the United States  |

# **1 Introduction**

## **1.1 Introductory Comments**

I had the chance to spend one year as an Erasmus student in Lithuania in 2006/2007, where I studied at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the University of Vilnius and I had the opportunity to witness how Lithuania is becoming more and more a part of Europe again.

In this year I also realized how essential it is for Lithuania to be part of Europe; that the European countries see Lithuania no longer as a former state of the Soviet Union, but as a member state of the European Union and NATO.

Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO in 2004, both memberships were important milestones for the country, but for different reasons. The joining of the European Union was merely for economic reasons and to be realized as an integrative part of the “European family”. In my thesis paper I want to dwell on analyzing the reasons for Lithuania’s NATO membership. For one reason because I discovered that this is a very interesting topic, although a very emotional one for Lithuanians and for the other that there is a lot of literature on NATO’s second round of enlargement including Lithuania in 2004, but very few on why Lithuania felt the need to join this global security alliance.

Therefore this concentrates on the question why Lithuania chose to join NATO and if there were other security scenarios possible for the country which were not chosen and for what reasons. Which factors played a role? On the other hand why was NATO interested in the membership of the Baltic States, three former Soviet Union countries, although it clearly imperiled its relations with the Russian Federation? And of course the resultant question why was especially Russia against the joining of Lithuania?



## 1.2 Guiding Questions and Hypotheses

To assess the reasons for Lithuanians NATO membership on both sides, from the point of view from Lithuania as well as from NATO, the following questions will guide the analysis of this matter:

- Why did Lithuania want to join NATO?
- Is there another possibility for an emerging small state than to join an international security organisation?
- Why didn't Lithuania want to be neutral?
- Why was Baltic Co-operation not an option that was taken into further consideration concerning military security?
- Was NATO the best choice for Lithuania?
- Why did NATO want Lithuania as a member state?
- Why was Russia against Lithuania's joining of NATO?
- What is Lithuania's public view of its military?

Through these questions five hypotheses are to be tested.

1. If Lithuania still believes that Russia is a threat to their nation then Russia is one of the main reasons Lithuania joined NATO. Lithuania saw Russia as a threat throughout history and was often proven right and therefore they wanted joined a defence alliance.
2. If the Lithuanian identity and history played also an important role in their decision to join NATO then Lithuania wanted to set a clear signal for the Western countries that they want to belong to them and are not anymore a satellite of the Russian Federation.
3. If the military power of their threats is as big as the one of the Russian Federation then the Lithuanian armed forces would neither have the quantity nor the quality – no matter if they stand alone nor co-operate with the other Baltic States – to protect their nation.

4. If Lithuania could not find another alliance or institution that would guarantee their hard security concerns then their only choice was NATO.
5. If Lithuania has NATO membership Lithuania then they believe to assure that the Western countries and especially the United States would be their allies in times of emergencies.
6. If the parties of Lithuania would not have agreed completely upon NATO membership then the public would have considered alternatives like neutrality more.

### 1.3 Theory and Definitions

In this part I want to develop or adopt some definitions or theories in order to explain what opportunities small states, and in particular Lithuania, have for ensuring their security.

Firstly I will point out some descriptions that are essential for understanding the topic. What is a small state and what did this mean in history and nowadays? And what does this mean especially for Lithuania? All in all the whole paper concentrates on security and what did Lithuania do to ensure it for its nation, so I wanted to define the term security. Not only what does security mean for Lithuania, but also how much security means defence for this country. Did the challenge for a country to be secure change since 9/11 and does this affect Lithuania? Lithuania chose NATO-membership, the membership of a security alliance; therefore I will define what is an alliance and what it differs from other forms of bonds.

Secondly I will look on theoretical concepts. What “solutions” does political theory have for small states and their security policy and are they practical for Lithuania? Does a theory explain why this small country joined NATO? By the virtue of security policy I chose Realism and Liberalism. On the one hand because the two theoretical schools differ from each other very much and have varying options how to solve a security dilemma, but on the other they both explain in way why Lithuania is now a member of NATO. But as Erich Reiter put it very accurately in one of his articles,

- The question whether small states should join alliances or not is both sustainable and unsustainable in theory.
- The question whether a specific small state should be a member of an alliance, cannot be answered, however, by theory, but can only be answered on the basis of concrete circumstances, in particular, its objective comprehensible interests in the specific situation and the foreseeable development of the security policy environment.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Erich Reiter, Introductory Comments on the Objective of the Small States and Alliances Workshop, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p. 14

## 1.3.1 Some Definitions

### 1.3.1.1 Small states

The heydays of small state theory were in the '70s of the last century and it has been criticised and questioned a lot since then. It had two trends: First the powerful states and the realist school of thought researched the small state “phenomenon” and after that, quasi as a respond, the small states analyzed themselves.<sup>2</sup>

You could argue that small state theory is no longer relevant as a political theory but it is very usable for Lithuania. On the one hand Lithuania sees itself as a small state and on the other the common perception is that of the Baltic states and not as Lithuania as such. Furthermore the recognition of small states is still crucial when it comes security matters<sup>3</sup> and international organizations or even the EU.

#### Definition

To define what a small state is and what states are small states, the literature does not quite agree and in most articles the definition is left out with the reference that this is a complicated topic.

That is why I decided to choose different types of definition in which it will be coherent that there is no doubt that Lithuania, the state of my thesis, is a small state.

#### 1. Quantitative Definition

Small states are states with a population under 15 million people.<sup>4</sup>

For a quantitative definition it has proven to be suited to use the population of a country. In this way countries with a comparatively large territory but with a small population, for example Canada or the Scandinavian countries, can also be seen as small states.

Lithuania has a population of 3.349.872<sup>5</sup>, so using this definition it is clearly a small state.

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Felix Koßdorff, Die Republik Irland – Ein Europäischer Kleinstaat und seine Aussenpolitischen Strategien als Mitglied der EU, Dissertation, University of Vienna, 2000, Vienna, p. 20-25

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Felix Koßdorff, Die Republik Irland – Ein Europäischer Kleinstaat und seine Aussenpolitischen Strategien als Mitglied der EU, Dissertation, University of Vienna, 2000, Vienna, 41-46

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Helmut Kramer, The concepts of Small States, Paper presented at the Workshop „Small States and Alliances“, Austrian Institute for International Affairs OIIP and Institute for Military Studies, 1999, Vienna

## 2. Definition by Power

In international politics states are often referred to as powers, bearing realist theory in mind that international politics is always a struggle for life. You could emanate from this that small states and minor powers point to the same conclusion.

“[M]inor powers can be defined as states whose diplomatic and material resources are so limited that their leaders focus mostly on the protection of their territorial integrity rather than the pursuit of more far-reaching global objectives.”<sup>6</sup>

Lithuania proofed in their choice of joining NATO that they are mostly concerned with assuring their security and according to this they are a minor power.

## 3. Comparative Definition

“Small states are defined by what they are not.”<sup>7</sup> Neumann and Gstöhl wrote that every state that is not a great power and is not insisting to be a middle power is a small state. According to this definition states compare themselves to others and if they are a small state in their self-perception, they are one.

## History

In history small states were mostly seen as weak states, because they had not the ability to build up armed forces with enough military power. Thus they were vulnerable to the expansionary policy of their larger neighbour states and hence small states often became the victims of larger powers interests. One of the crucial examples for Lithuania was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when the foreign ministers of Russia and the German Reich decided how to split the region between Germany and Russia. In this secret document the larger powers under Hitler and Stalin regarded Poland and the three Baltic States just as interstations to their dominance in Europe.

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<sup>5</sup> Lithuanian Population 2009 in: <http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/pages/view/?id=371> 26th October 2009

<sup>6</sup> Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns, in: Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p. 16

<sup>7</sup> Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? In: Christine Ingebritsen (Ed.), Small States in International Relations, University of Washington und University of Iceland Presses, 2006, Seattle/Reykjavik p. 6

But on the other hand small states had some positive recognition too; they were seen as “politisch übersichtlich und für demokratische Strukturen besonders geeignet”<sup>8</sup>, but unfortunately this fact didn’t matter that much when they were constantly threatened by militarily more potent states.

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century there were two major historic incidents that shaped Europe and its state world as it is today. Those two had the most influence on Europe’s “Mutation [...] zum Kleinstaaten Kontinent”<sup>9</sup>.

### 1. The First World War

After the break up of the “Habsburger Reich” the emerging of numerous small states was evident. What was before one state became Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia.<sup>10</sup> Before, most of the world powers were European empires but after the 1<sup>st</sup> World War the time of big empires was over and the time of the nation state arose and as said earlier some of them were newly built. “Gab es im Jahre 1914 lediglich acht Kleinstaaten”<sup>11</sup> thus in 1919 the number of small states had nearly doubled.

### 2. The Fall of the Iron Curtain

After the cold war was over and Soviet Union broke up another large number of states emerged, of course not all of them were small states with the population under 15 Mio. But nevertheless the following incidents, after this major historic event, like the peaceful splitting up of Czechoslovakia, or the martial dissolution of former Yugoslavia let the number of small states in Europe increase to 38 in 2004.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Laurent Goetschel, Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik von Kleinstaaten: Indiz für die Entwicklung der internationalen Beziehungen?, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, p. 223

<sup>9</sup> Romain Kirt, Der Kleinstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, p.155

<sup>10</sup> Karl Vocelka, Österreichische Geschichte, 2007, C.H. Beck, Munich, p.96

<sup>11</sup> Romain Kirt, Der Kleinstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, p.156

<sup>12</sup> cf. Romain Kirt, Der Kleinstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, in: E. Busek (Ed.), Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, p.156 and Heinz Gärtner, Small States and Alliances Part I, OIIP Arbeitspapier 30, 2000, Vienna

As the Belgian Prime Minister Theo Lefèvre put it already in 1960: “All countries in Europe are getting small. There are those which know it already and those which don’t know it yet.”<sup>13</sup>

### 1.3.1.2 Security

Even in the classic English Dictionaries like the Oxford English dictionary and the Thesaurus the understanding of security is quite different. In the Thesaurus<sup>14</sup> defence and protection are listed first, when in The Compact Oxford English Dictionary<sup>15</sup> defence and protection is not even mentioned. What is also interesting is that The Compact Oxford English Dictionary sees terrorism and espionage as criminal activities and not as military threats.

In political science Heinz Gärtner found several different definitions of security:<sup>16</sup>

1. Security is the absence of a threat.
2. Security is the absence of a threat or the power to defend oneself against a threat.
3. Security is “the ability states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity”<sup>17</sup>.
4. Security is the inner freedom to make decision even under the pressure of an external aggressor.

Especially the 4<sup>th</sup> definition is crucially important for Lithuania so they can withstand the pressure of the Russian Federation.

Security policy was and sometimes still is the major topic in the foreign policy of small states. Of course in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century it was far more important for a small state to be

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<sup>13</sup> Cited after Romain Kirt, *Der Kleinstaat im Zeitalter der Globalisierung*, in: E. Busek (Ed.), *Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen*, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, p.157

<sup>14</sup> Roget’s II: *The New Thesaurus*, Third Edition, 1995

<sup>15</sup> *Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English*, 2009

<sup>16</sup> Heinz Gärtner, *Internationale Sicherheit, Definitionen von A-Z*, Wiener Schriften zur Internationalen Politik – Band 9 OIIP, 2005, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p. 125

<sup>17</sup> Buzan cited after Heinz Gärtner, *Internationale Sicherheit, Definitionen von A-Z*, Wiener Schriften zur Internationalen Politik – Band 9 OIIP, 2005, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p.125

able to secure their country against all threats because the military superiority of the large empires in Europe was evident.

The level of threat has changed dramatically in the last one hundred years; symmetric conflicts are no longer state-of-the-art instead new forms of asymmetric conflicts appear.<sup>18</sup> Since 9/11 especially, terrorism is a new threat, but terrorism is a threat for all states, the size doesn't matter, "[g]egenüber dem Terrorismus sind alle Staaten klein"<sup>19</sup>. I would even say that the chance of an international terrorist attack is higher for great powers because the attracted attention is much higher if you attack the United States than for example Lithuania. But not only size matters, military power is no safeguard either and not even the largest intelligent agency of the world, the CIA, could foresee the terrorist attacks in September 2001.

### 1.3.1.3 Alliances

According to Krause and Singer, the major disadvantage of the existing literature on alliances is that there is "no overall consistent theoretical framework on alliances"<sup>20</sup>. As Singer and Ward note, a key impediment to theory building in alliance research is the absence of clarity about what constitutes an alliance. One way to come to a definition is to point out how alliances are distinct from alternative forms of international co-operation as alignments and coalitions. That is why I will briefly differentiate among alignments, coalitions and alliances involving sovereign states.<sup>21</sup>

- "An alignment is usually understood as any general commitment to co-operation or collaboration."<sup>22</sup> This is a rather vague co-operation with a broad task field, including military, economy, politics and culture.
- "A coalition is a group of states avowing a common purpose, but which may leave the specific obligations it entails open and indeed subject for negotiations when the contingency to which the common purpose applies arises."<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> cf. Irene Etzersdorfer, *Krieg*, 2007, Böhlau Verlag, Wien-Köln-Weimar, p. 115-136

<sup>19</sup> Laurent Goetschel, *Die Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik von Kleinstaaten: Indiz für die Entwicklung der internationalen Beziehungen?*, in: E. Busek (Ed.), *Der Kleinstaat als Akteur in den internationalen Beziehungen*, 2004, Verlag der Liechtensteinischen Akademischen Gesellschaft, Vaduz, p. 226

<sup>20</sup> Volker Krause and J. David Singer, *Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns*, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) *Small States and Alliances*, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.16

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Volker Krause and J. David Singer, *Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns*, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) *Small States and Alliances*, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg

<sup>22</sup> Volker Krause and J. David Singer, *Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns*, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) *Small States and Alliances*, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.157



- “An alliance is based on a written, mostly voluntary, formal agreement, treaty or convention among states pledging to coordinate their behaviour and policies in the contingency of military conflict. The more aggressive an external enemy, or the more serious a military threat, the more cohesive a formal alliance is.”<sup>24</sup> Alliances are furthermore primarily concerned with military and security issues. “The predominant goal of alliances is to guarantee each signatory’s integrity and security on the bases of collective military defence.”<sup>25</sup>

You could further distinct between three basic types of formal military alliances: <sup>26</sup>

- the defence pact, for example NATO
- the non-aggressions/neutrality treaty, for example Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 and
- the entente, for example British-French Entente Cordiale of 1904

## 1.3.2 Theoretical Background

### 1.3.2.1 Security Concepts for small states

#### 1.3.2.1.1 The Realist Model

In Realist Theory everything centers on power. A state has to have power either economically or militarily, because otherwise it has no chance to survive in the world of Realists. Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the main representatives of realist thought, said that the world is in “einem Zustand der Anarchie”<sup>27</sup> and international politics is “wie alle Politik ein Kampf um die Macht. Wo immer die letzten Ziele der internationalen Politik liegen mögen, das

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<sup>23</sup> Henry Kissinger, cited after William Safire, ON LANGUAGE; The Way We Live Now, The New York Times, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2002 in: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/27/magazine/the-way-we-live-now-1-27-02-on-language-needing-to.html?scp=8&sq=on%20language%20january%202002&st=cse> 26<sup>th</sup> October 2009

<sup>24</sup> Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.157

<sup>25</sup> Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.157

<sup>26</sup> Cf. Volker Krause and J. David Singer, Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns, in: E. Reiter (Ed.) Small States and Alliances, 2001, Physica, Heidelberg, p.158

<sup>27</sup> Christiane Lemke, Internationale Beziehungen, 2008, Oldenburg, München/Wien, p. 15

unmittelbare Ziel ist stets die Macht.”<sup>28</sup> From this it follows that the highest interest of a state must be to ensure and maximise its own power, so it is able to guarantee the security of the state. The followers of the Realistic school of thought have a very pessimistic idea of man; everybody is eager for their own interests and doesn't think of any others. Which means that, in this scenario continuing peace is nearly impossible.

So what does this all mean for a small state? As Andreas Kley points it out in his article “Der Kleinstaat in suprastaatlichen Einigungen” the „politische Realismus ist einigermaßen Kleinstaaten unfreundlich“, because it sees small states under an everlasting threat of greater powers and their selfish interests. In Lithuania's point of view history proves this assumption is not that wrong. Lithuania was always in danger of being overrun by another state; the Poles, the Germans and the Russians did it a couple of times in the past centuries, although Russia still insists that the last occupation in 1940 was not existent.

Is there actually a way for small states to be secure of their larger enemies? There are two possibilities for small states in Realistic theory; either they ally with a great power or they join an alliance of great powers. But for now I want to concentrate on the second option, the alliance in order to explain Lithuania's choice for NATO membership.

### **Alliances in the Realist Model**

For the Realist school of thought alliances are based on one of their main concepts, the concept of “balance of power”. For Hans J. Morgenthau alliances are the “most important manifestation of the balance of power”<sup>29</sup>. Stephen Walt developed Morgenthau's balance concept further; for him alliances are the result of a “balance of threat”<sup>30</sup>. Kenneth Waltz on the other hand is more interested in the motivation of states to join an alliance. He states that members of alliances have only negative common interests: the fear of other states. In a nutshell you could say that in the Realist Model, the connection between alliances and a potential threat are inseparable. This explains that this model resulted from bipolarity and the Cold War.

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<sup>28</sup> Christiane Lemke, *Internationale Beziehungen*, 2008, Oldenburg, München/Wien, p. 15

<sup>29</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among nations*, 1985, 6th Edition, New York, p.205-206

<sup>30</sup> Stephen Walt cited after Heinz Gärtner, *Small States and Alliances Part I*, OIIP Arbeitspapier 30, 2000, Vienna, p.8

But can you still rely on this model after the cold war is over and the Soviet Union as a sufficient threat for NATO is gone? Kenneth Waltz concluded on this matter: “NATO’s days are not numbered but its years are.”<sup>31</sup> Nearly 20 years after the end of the Cold War NATO shows no sign of dissolution. The thing that is different now is that the threats have changed. The threat is no longer one single country, but an international terrorist organisation for example.

If you see this topic through the eyes of Lithuania, the threat has not changed that radically. The possibility of a terrorist attack in Lithuania is not very high, but an attack from the Russian Federation is still feared and Lithuania saw this proven in summer 2008, when Russia fought against Georgia. Lithuania feels this instant threat and sees its ensured security only in NATO.

### **1.3.2.1.2 The Liberalist Model**

In contrast to the realistic model which concentrates mainly on power and national sovereignty, the liberalist model is more concerned with individual protagonists and their interdependence. It is their interaction that is the field of study. Especially for small states interaction in communities or institutions is very important, because it defines their role and importance in international relations.<sup>32</sup> I concentrated now mainly on Pluralistic Security Communities and Institutionalism to point out what is relevant in the liberalist model for Lithuania and its decision-making. On the one hand it points out the options for a small state in the means of security policy and on the other what led to Lithuania’s conclusion that joining NATO would be the best of these options.

#### **Pluralistic Security Communities**

Karl Deutsch and his colleagues work on the concept of “security community” from the late 1950ies has proven very influential and had been further developed in recent years. According to Deutsch:

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<sup>31</sup> Kenneth Waltz, The Emerging Structure of International Politics, in: International Security, 18, no.2 1993, p.75-76

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Christiane Lemke, Internationale Beziehungen, 2008, Oldenburg, München/Wien, p. 21-23

“A security community is a group of people that has become “integrated.” By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure [...] dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief [...] that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change [that is, the] assurance that members will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.”<sup>33</sup>

There are three major conditions concerning security communities:

1. compatible values for the member states
2. states must be relevant to each other and mutually responsive (criteria can be assessed by the level of communication, consultation and transaction)
3. shared identity<sup>34</sup>

These conditions should provide enough assurance for states not to fight each other according to Gärtner. Institutional structure should be added, but need not have formal inter-governmental machinery and political differences among the member states.

“Rightly understood, the self-interest of the West-centric states and peoples advises them to cope with conflict beyond their immediate borders if for no other reason than their long-term security, material welfare, and open, democratic ways of life depend on the progressive development of a global security community.”<sup>35</sup>

Is this really an option for Lithuania? Lithuania was reintegrated into the European community step by step and they do have the compatible values, but I think that Lithuania doesn't want just to have confidence that especially the Russian Federation has the same beliefs. So this whole concept can't be functional, if one of the suspected enemies turns out not to be part of the community. It doesn't help Lithuania if they commit to the pluralistic security community and Russia won't. Their potential enemy will be very unlikely part of the European Union, so in a way Lithuania is already in a pluralistic security community, but it won't erase all their possible threats. After the Cold War Lithuania felt the need to assure their security by all possible means, therefore to rely on only a security community would have been not the “safest” option, especially since the European Union haven't decided yet on a joint conclusive security policy.

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<sup>33</sup> Karl Deutsch (et al.), *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, 1957, Princeton, p.5

<sup>34</sup> Heinz Gärtner, *Small States and Alliances Part I*, OIIP Arbeitspapier 30, 2000, Vienna, p.11

<sup>35</sup> Heinz Gärtner, *Small States and Alliances Part I*, OIIP Arbeitspapier 30, 2000, Vienna, p.11

## **Institutionalism**

The international system especially in the Western countries at the end of the Cold War was highly institutionalized: state behaviour was to a considerable high extent governed by rules, which meant that states had agreed on following certain rules of international institutions for example the Charter of the United Nations or the North Atlantic treaty.

Institutions fulfil specific functions:

- facilitate communication
- provide information
- develop common principles, norms and rules
- constrain aggressive behaviour
- provide a bases for joint actions, conflict prevention, management and resolution<sup>36</sup>

According to the liberalist school international institutions promote co-operation among members and they also pull the strings in international relations.

The common values and beliefs of a community are now transformed into rules of an institution and make the members depend on each other and their abiding by the rules. There are a lot of similarities between pluralistic security communities and international institutions but institutionalism developed the concept further by the means that they defined the shared values and interests into a mutual agreement, which can be a charter, treaty, pact, or similar and is signed by the members of the institution.

In the eyes of Lithuania this model of the liberalist school is much more trustworthy than the pluralistic security community – model, because the members of the institutions are bound to their joint agreement. Of course it depends on the form of institution how much they are bound to the rules, for example the difference between the United Nations and NATO. Concerning security issues NATO was thought to be the institution with the “strongest” rules. The most important passage in the North Atlantic Treaty by this means is article 5, which states that the “Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> Heinz Gärtner, Small States and Alliances Part I, OIIP Arbeitspapier 30, 2000, Vienna, p.10

<sup>37</sup> North Atlantic Treaty, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm> (03/26/09)

## **1.4 Methodological Approach**

The method of qualitative analysis of primary and secondary documents was central in my research process for the thesis.

Primary sources include NATO documents and documents from various Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian ministries. Press releases from several institution or ministries were also taken into the survey. Since the primary sources concerning the topic are few, the research was based merely on secondary sources. Studies on the issue of NATO enlargement, in particular the second round of NATO enlargement, as well as commentaries on the security issues of the Baltic States were taken as secondary sources.

Since the particular topic of the thesis has rarely been the topic of academic research as such and primary and secondary sources were not always conclusive, I took interviews or had e-mail correspondence with several experts. These experts were chosen from different backgrounds, namely an official representative, a journalist and a writer and interpreter, so it was possible to examine the topic from different angles. Unfortunately it was only possible to interact with the experts in German and that is why their expertise was mainly used as references.

## **1.5 Outline of the Analyses**

The first chapter of the thesis portrays NATO as an institution in general and presents a timeline to Lithuania's NATO membership, where as the second chapter concentrates on Lithuania and its identity. The preceding chapter is about Lithuania's view of their security and their military. The alternatives to NATO are also shown and why they did not succeed. That Russia was an important factor is the next topic of analyses and why NATO wanted the Baltics as member states. According to these issues the question on why did Lithuania join NATO will be assessed. According to these issues the question on why did Lithuania want to join NATO will be assessed.

## 2 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

### 2.1. General

NATO was founded on the 4<sup>th</sup> of April in 1949 in Washington D.C. by the twelve founder members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States of America), when they signed the North Atlantic Treaty.

This Treaty consists of 14 articles and its introduction says that:

*The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.*

*They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.*

*They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.*<sup>38</sup>

A very important passage in article 5 states that the “Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”<sup>39</sup>.

### 2.2 Structure

NATO is a global security alliance which has now 28 member states (the founding members as mentioned above plus Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey) and its headquarters are in Brussels. The delegations of each permanent member form the North Atlantic Council (NAC), but there are also meetings with the NAC and the heads of Government or State and the Foreign and Defence Ministers. NATO summits form another

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<sup>38</sup> North Atlantic Treaty, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm> (03/26/09)

<sup>39</sup> North Atlantic Treaty, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm> (03/26/09)

venue for major decisions, such as enlargement. Since 2004 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (the Netherlands) is Secretary General and since 2008 Giampaolo Di Paola (Italy) is Chairman of the Military Committee, which is the highest military authority in the alliance.<sup>40</sup>

## 2.3 History

At first NATO was more a political association than a military alliance, which changed quickly with the Korean War and the resulting beginning of the Cold War. The famous statement of the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, that the organization's goal was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”<sup>41</sup> underlines the direction NATO was heading. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 NATO’s attention turned to the Balkans and the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, former Warsaw Pact countries or even former Soviet Union countries. Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 and the increasing loss of traditional wars with one country vs. the other, NATO tries to refocus its goals and prepare for new challenges.

You can find the appropriate timeline to NATO-membership in the appendix.

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<sup>40</sup> Source: NATO, [www.nato.int](http://www.nato.int) (03/26/09)

<sup>41</sup> David Reynolds, *The origins of the Cold War in Europe, International perspectives*, 1994, Yale University Press, New Haven, p.13



### 3 Lithuanian Identity and Values

After 150 years of foreign domination by Russia and Poland and with little intermission for another 40 years as part of a Soviet State, “it was necessary to face the daunting task of rediscovering and redeveloping the roots of [Lithuania’s] national identity”<sup>42</sup>. Lithuania is a small country and its independence was endangered throughout history, so it was and still is very crucial for Lithuania to find its identity.

Lithuania has always had difficulties to be seen as an independent state for itself, and it had to always to distinguish itself from others.

“For the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it has become important to stress their difference both from Russia and from other parts of the previous Soviet Union, and – perhaps increasingly - from each other.”<sup>43</sup>

Not only is Lithuania a small country with a difficult history, its major problem is that it is mostly seen as part of the Baltic States by Western countries, including EU countries. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are steadily seen as a conglomerate of countries that belong together. They have the terrifying time of the Soviet era in common. But there the resemblance ends.

“It’s time that we recognize that we are dealing with three very different countries in the Baltic area, with completely different affinities. There is no Baltic identity with a common culture, language group, religious tradition. For almost four years now, Lithuania has been correctly pointing out that it is a Central European country. Its Catholicism, architecture, history all link it to Poland and the other Vishegrad [sic!] countries.”<sup>44</sup>

It was very hard for Lithuania to find its place in Europe and to stress that it is a Central European Country, not just a former Soviet Union country, and that it doesn’t have the same interest as the other Baltic countries, such as Estonia, who wanted to be part of the Scandinavian countries.

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<sup>42</sup> George F. McLean, Introduction, in: Aida Savicka (Ed.), *Lithuanian Identity and Values*, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., p.1

<sup>43</sup> Mikko Lagerspetz, *How Many Nordic Countries?* in: *Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 38/1, 2003, Sage Publications, p. 53

<sup>44</sup> Toomas H. Ilves cited in: Mikko Lagerspetz, *How Many Nordic Countries?* in: *Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 38/1, 2003, Sage Publications, p. 53

I think that this search for an identity and the convincing of other states of the very same is a very important aspect in understanding Lithuania, its security and foreign policy and also why it joined the North Atlantic Alliance.

### **3.1 Construction of Identity**

Since you can see a relation between Lithuania's identity and values and its decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, this chapter should explain what identity means and how and by whom identity can be constructed.

The content of identities is made of "relatively stable organization of feelings, values, imaginations, experiences and future projects related to oneself"<sup>45</sup> states Malewska-Peyre. By identity this author means personal identity how an individual sees itself in society. For this paper, however it is more important how individuals see their country and where they would place their country in the world and other contexts. Therefore, the distinction between personal identity and national identity, as A.D. Smith<sup>46</sup> calls it, is crucial and the focus in this thesis should lay on the second one, the national identity.

Essential features of national identity according to A.D. Smith are:

1. A historic territory or homeland
2. Common myths and historical memories
3. A common, mass public culture
4. Common legal rights and duties for all members
5. A common economy with territorial mobility for members<sup>47</sup>

As you can already see at the first point, "a historic territory and homeland", it is not that easy to tell for Lithuania. The country was split several times and most of its time it was under foreign rule. That is also why the two times when Lithuania was a state of its own, during the

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<sup>45</sup> Hanna Malewska-Peyre, Identity and Cultural Conflict, Research Problems, Psychological Studies, Vol.20 No.1, 1981, Poland, p. 27

<sup>46</sup> Cf. Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, University of Nevada Press, 1991

<sup>47</sup> Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, University of Nevada Press, 1991, p.14

Grand Duchy and interwar period, are often glorified. Lithuania was always under great influence from other nations and had to eke out their capital Vilnius from Poland several times, the last time after the Second World War

The second feature, “common myths and historical memories”, is very distinctive in Lithuania. The Grand Duchy, the late Christianisation, Lithuania as a nation in the 1920s, the Lithuanian partisans known as the Forest Brothers who were against the Soviets, are all very important historic events for Lithuania which are also mystified. Balcytiene even states that the public discourse in the early nineties “was based on the myths created in the glory of previously independent Lithuania and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of much earlier centuries”<sup>48</sup>. She named this early phase of the independent Lithuania the “mythological stage” of political culture, which “can be described as a lack of rational thinking [...] as showing increased trust in authorities and accepting illusionary myths rather than reality”<sup>49</sup>.

Concerning the third point, “a common, mass public culture”, Smith does not fully describe what he means by that. If he is referring to common values and the influence of mass media and political parties on the country, then yes, Lithuania has “a common mass public culture”. Especially in the early stages of Lithuanian democratisation, there was pressure to have common national and moral values, which was even encouraged by the media and politics.<sup>50</sup> After the break-up of the Soviet Union, a return to religiosity and religious moral values took place in Lithuania.<sup>51</sup>

Points four and five, “common legal rights and duties for all members” and “a common economy with territorial mobility for members”, are all true for Lithuania. Lithuania is also part of the Schengen states and Lithuanians have to obey not only Lithuanian law, but also European law.

Manuel Castells also finds three distinctions of identity.

1. *Legitimizing identity*<sup>52</sup>: used by the dominant institutions to legitimize their power and authority

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<sup>48</sup> Aukse Balcytiene, Changing Role of Media in Post-Communist Lithuania, Working Papers in International Journalism, No.2, 2002, Projekt Verlag, Bochum, p. 14

<sup>49</sup> Balcytiene Aukse, Changing Role of Media in Post-Communist Lithuania, Working Papers in International Journalism, No.2, 2002, Projekt Verlag, Bochum, p. 15

<sup>50</sup> Cf. idem, p. 14-17

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Stanislovas Juknevičius, Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians in the Europeans Context, in: Savicka Aida (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., p. 101-104

<sup>52</sup> Cf. Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, The information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. II, 1998, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, p. 8

2. *Resistance identity*<sup>53</sup>: used by the opponents of the dominant institutions to justify their principles which differ from legitimizing identity
3. *Project identity*<sup>54</sup>: social actors redefine their identity by the transformation of social structures. Castells gives feminism as an example, which was first a branch of resistance against patriarchy and became institutionalised in society.

Lithuania has a multi-party system with 37 registered parties<sup>55</sup> in 2008. Like most post-communist countries, it has a high fluctuation of governing parties and Lithuanians lean more towards individual-related parties than to party platform oriented ones.<sup>56</sup>

Therefore it is not easy to say what the *Legitimizing identity* or the *Resistance identity* is in Lithuania. The people are still divided in ex-communists and anti-communists<sup>57</sup>, so you could say that the *Legitimizing identity* or the *Resistance identity* is to be against or in favour of communism. However, since the former communist party managed its transformation into a left-wing social party<sup>58</sup>, the distinction is not as evident anymore. The clear tendency that can be seen in Lithuania, like in most post-communist democracies is the turning towards nationalism and populism in most of the parties.

You could say that *Legitimizing identity* as well as *Resistance identity* is strongly related to individuals and less to principles a party or institution represents, which you can also see in the levels of trust in 2004 of the parliament (16%), of political parties (10%) and of the president (66%)<sup>59</sup>.

As *Project identity* you could see the transformation from a Lithuania within the Soviet Union to an independent Lithuanian nation. The long fight for status is now reality and the world recognized it as such.

But the question now is: what is Lithuanian? Previously we discussed how A.D. Smith defined national identity and how it can be applied to Lithuania. Now I want to discuss the

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<sup>53</sup> Cf. idem, p.8

<sup>54</sup> Cf. idem, p.8

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.lrytas.lt/-12117988511210019906-p1-Lietuvos-diena-Partij%C5%B3-derliaus-metais-u%C5%BEder%C4%97jo-ir-profs%C4%85jung%C5%B3-partija.htm> 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2010

<sup>56</sup> Cf. Benjamin Ewert, Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur, Interdisziplinäre Europa Studien, Gornig et al. (Ed.), Band 4, 2007, Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main, p. 70-72

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Verena Fritz, State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, 2007, Central University Press, Budapest, p.253

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Verena Fritz, State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia, 2007, Central University Press, Budapest, p.244/245

<sup>59</sup> Cf. Benjamin Ewert, Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur, Interdisziplinäre Europa Studien, Gornig et al. (Ed.), Band 4, 2007, Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main, p.145

aspects that are essential in my eyes for Lithuania's identity. In my opinion, Smith ignored some crucial aspects, like the common language or its relation to the nations that influenced it and still do.

### 3.2 Political Culture

The construction of a civic society, in the sense of Almond/Verba<sup>60</sup>, is not yet finished in Lithuania, like in most other former Soviet Union member states. Lithuanians have a deep rooted skepticism towards lobbying groups or any associations that originated from Soviet rule.<sup>61</sup> They don't trust these institutions. On the other hand, Lithuanians' trust in specific institutions is rather high, such as the military, the church and the president.<sup>62</sup>

In 2004, only 69% of Lithuanians thought that democracy is the best form of governance.<sup>63</sup> However, these numbers are a result of the disenchantment with politics, which is a noticeable phenomenon in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe. This specific disenchantment is also reflected in the decline of voter turnout in the elections since 2000.<sup>64</sup> In the '90s, it was more or less a sense of duty to participate in elections, but later the strict reforms and political reality caught up with Lithuanians. Seimas, the Lithuanian parliament, was praised prematurely, and lost its trust after diverse corruption scandals, such as the impeachment of Rolandas Paksas leading to disillusionment.<sup>65</sup> As a result, Lithuanians have a tendency to technocracy.

Only 2-4% of Lithuanians are members of a party, which is not only a result of the distrust from Soviet times, but it also exacerbates the political participation of Lithuanians.<sup>66</sup> The trust

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<sup>60</sup> Almond, Gabriel/Verba, Sidney, *The Civic Culture*, 1963, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, p. 14 et seq.

<sup>61</sup> Benjamin Ewert, *Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur*, p. 68 and Cf. Joachim Tauber, *Das politische System Litauens in: Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas*, W. Ismayr (Ed.), 2004, 2nd Edition, UTB, Wiesbaden, p. 180

<sup>62</sup> Benjamin Ewert, *Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur*, p. 145

<sup>63</sup> *idem*, p. 70

<sup>64</sup> Cf. Joachim Tauber, *Das politische System Litauens in: Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas*, W. Ismayr (Ed.), 2004, 2nd Edition, UTB, Wiesbaden, p. 176

<sup>65</sup> Cf. *idem*, p. 180

<sup>66</sup> Cf. *idem*, p. 180

in parties or the parliament is alarmingly low. 14% of Lithuanians have trust in the Seimas and only 7% trust in the political parties<sup>67</sup>, which is also a result of disillusionment .

Therefore, it is not a surprise that a subjective political culture, which judges the political system by its results but without any idea about the decision making and without seeing itself as part of the political process, is predominant (68%) in Lithuania.<sup>68</sup>

### 3.3 Language

Lithuanian is a Baltic language, closely related to Latvian, although they are not mutually intelligible. The Lithuanian language has its roots in the Indo-European language and “[i]t is [even] the most archaic Indo-European language still spoken.”<sup>69</sup>

Lithuanian is the official Language since 1918 and one of the key elements of Lithuanian identity. It is also one of the things that separate Lithuania and Latvia from the third Baltic country, Estonia. Estonian is a Uralic language which is closely related to Finnish, which also explains its close ties to Finland.

The language is also one of the keys to Lithuanian identity, thinks Cornelius Hell.<sup>70</sup> Lithuanian language and Lithuanian literature have a long history of suppression. They both survived the polonization, the russification and the Latin domination of the Catholic Church. Only during the interwar period had literature in Lithuanian language its heyday. Between 1940 and shortly before its independence, a free literary scene was only possible in exile<sup>71</sup> and those books had to be smuggled into the country. Although in our region not commonly known, lyric has had a long tradition in Lithuania and was even prohibited in Soviet times, because it was often used to criticize the establishment. Prose, on the other hand, hadn't become an outrider until the last 25 years.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Cf. idem, p. 181

<sup>68</sup> Cf. idem, p. 180

<sup>69</sup> Lithuanian Language in: Encyclopaedia Britannica in: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/343881/Lithuanian-language> 12th September 2009

<sup>70</sup> Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Vienna

<sup>71</sup> Cf. Cornelius Hell, Litauen: Große Literatur aus einem kleinen Land in: Die Rampe, Litauen lesen, Hefte für Literatur 2/09, Trauner Verlag, 2009, Linz, p.9-11

<sup>72</sup> Cf. Cornelius Hell, Litauen: Große Literatur aus einem kleinen Land in: Die Rampe, Litauen lesen, Hefte für Literatur 2/09, Trauner Verlag, 2009, Linz, p.9-11

The Lithuanian language and literature had and will always play a strong role in the Lithuanian culture, because it was an expression of resistance for centuries and one of the most precious forms of identification not only in Lithuania, but also in exile. The Lithuanians are proud of their ancient language and their unique literature.

### 3.4 History

Lithuanians have a very ambivalent relation to their history. They are very proud of their history when it comes to the things Lithuania has achieved, but on the other hand they tend to “forget” historical facts when they cast a negative light on Lithuania, or at least they think it would.<sup>73</sup> For example, they are very fond of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the 13<sup>th</sup> century and they refer to it very often to show that Lithuania was already independent then and even bigger than today. On the other hand, they often suppress the fact that Vilnius was a Polish city for a long time, even during the interwar period and the second independence of Lithuania.

Nevertheless, they are Lithuanians and hence very proud of their history, especially when it comes to singularities, like the fact that they were very hard to Christianize. But you also have to bear in mind that their fears are also closely related to their history. History proved them right in that they are a small and defenceless country that needs strong allies.

Even with recent history such the interwar period or the Soviet Regime, Lithuanians tend to see their history in extremes. Especially the interwar period tends to be glorified;<sup>74</sup> yes, it was the second awakening of Lithuania as a nation, but it was a corporate state with Antanas Smetona as a de facto dictator.<sup>75</sup>

There is a strong tendency to ignore the historic events in-between the Grand Duchy and the first rising of a Lithuanian state; the centuries when Lithuania was occupied and influenced by Poland, Prussia/Germany and Russia. Perhaps this protection mechanism is crucial for a state that still has trouble to find its roots.

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<sup>73</sup> Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Vienna

<sup>74</sup> Cf. Ralph Tuchtenhagen, *Zwischen Klasse und Rasse, Der europäische Nordosten beim Ertasten der Staatlichkeit 1918-1940*, in: *Ostsee700-2000*, Komlosy (Ed.), 2008, Promedia, Vienna, p. 218

<sup>75</sup> Cf. idem, p. 224

### 3.5 Religion

Catholicism came to Lithuania with the Teutonic Order, that wanted to convert the Lithuanians to Christianity and failed at first.<sup>76</sup> The Lithuanians are very proud of their heathenism and call themselves the last pagans of Europe.<sup>77</sup> This is one of the things that distinguishes Lithuania from other countries and some pagan rituals even survived until today.

However, Catholic religion became very important to Lithuanians. It served as a barrier against the Russians and their Orthodoxy on one side, but on the other Catholicism was also a form of resistance against the regime, both the Czarist and the Soviet.

The Catholic Church was always a backup for Lithuanians and they didn't forget that a lot of priests helped them during Nazi and Soviet times.<sup>78</sup> The Church not only survived the Soviet regime, but also had a tremendous reputation in Lithuania; it was the only constant they had and that's why it meant that much.

That is why the church had a remarkable inflow after gaining independence and religious beliefs still have strong influence in Lithuania. For example, in 2001 41% of the Lithuanian population thought that it "would be better for our country if more people with religious beliefs held public service positions"<sup>79</sup>, which was the highest rate from all questioned states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland). Another interesting survey also from 2001 points out that 24% of the questioned Lithuanians think that "[p]oliticians who do not believe in God [sic!] are unfit for public office", which was also by far the highest rate of the same questioned states.

The importance of being an active Catholic has diminished, but the Church still represents "good old Lithuania" and its traditions.

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<sup>76</sup> Cf. Stanislovas Juknevičius, *Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians in the Europeans Context*, in: Savicka Aida (Ed.), *Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C.*, p. 101-104

<sup>77</sup> Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Vienna

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Vienna

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Stanislovas Juknevičius, *Religiosity and the Moral Values of Lithuanians in the Europeans Context*, in: Savicka Aida (Ed.), *Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C.*, p. 108



### 3.6 Poland

The Poles and the Lithuanians have a long history together. There was a Polish-Lithuanian State (also known as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) between 1569 – 1795<sup>80</sup> and even before the Grand Duch of Lithuania was married to a Polish princess. Vilnius was long a Polish city and even during the interwar period it was Polish territory while Kaunas had to be the capital of Lithuania. The Poles and the Lithuanians do not have a conflict-free history. For example, they both tend to ignore each other's presence in their commonwealth, but nevertheless they managed to put their disputes behind and developed strong bilateral relations. They even built up a strategic partnership with the LITPOLBAT as its figurehead. (For further information see chapter Lithuanian-Polish Co-operation)

Related to their common history is also their common religion, Catholicism, which Cornelius Hell not only sees as a tie, but also as a borderline to other religions of the region, especially to the Russian orthodoxy.<sup>81</sup>

In Lithuania, the Polish minority is the biggest with 6,74%<sup>82</sup> of the population and it is mostly located in the Vilnius region, where you have a significant polish community.

(For further information see chapter Comparison to Poland.)

### 3.7 Russian Federation

The Russian minority is, comparable to the other Baltic countries, small with 6,31%<sup>83</sup> of the Lithuanian population. Nevertheless, Lithuanians still have very strong feelings towards the Russian Federation.

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<sup>80</sup> Cf. History of Lithuania in: Encyclopaedia Britannica in: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/343803/Lithuania> 19th September 2009

<sup>81</sup> Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Vienna

<sup>82</sup> Statistics Lithuania, Population by Ethnicity, 2005 in: <http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/pages/view/?id=1731> 11<sup>th</sup> September 2009

For all the Baltic countries, Russia is still the enemy. They cannot forget the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the 50 years of forced Soviet regime. On the other hand, they are, like nearly every country in Europe, dependent on Russia's energy resources. Russia knows how to stress this fact and it also has some difficulties to seeing Lithuania as an equal opponent. You get the feeling that Russia likes to treat Lithuania as its little, unimportant brother and Lithuania is very used to react as such.

(For further information see chapter The Role of the Russian Federation.)

### 3.8 USA

The US plays an important role for Lithuania in many aspects.

First, since the first waves of emigration in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the US is traditionally the country where most Lithuanians migrate. Most Lithuanians settled down in the city of Chicago, which has a big Lithuanian community and even had a Lithuanian opera house.<sup>84</sup>

Second, Lithuania sees the US as its most important ally and through NATO membership the US is even bound to help the country, if attacked.

After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, many of migrated Lithuanians came back from the US and many of them engaged in politics, Foreign Service or international relations in Lithuania. The most obvious example is Valdas Adamkus. His family fled in 1944 from Kaunas, Lithuania to Munich, Germany and later in 1949 emigrated to the US. The family also settled down in Chicago, where Adamkus studied civil engineering and later joined the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where he was even awarded for his achievements by President Reagan. But after Lithuania regained its independence he returned to Lithuania and ran for the presidency in 1998, winning for the first time. Adamkus served for two presidencies from 1998 to 2003 and from 2004 to 2009.

Adamkus played an essential role for Lithuania in its relationship to the US during his presidency. You could even say that Adamkus was good for Lithuania's self-esteem. He had a

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<sup>83</sup> Statistics Lithuania, Population by Ethnicity, 2005 in: <http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/pages/view/?id=1731> 11<sup>th</sup> September 2009

<sup>84</sup> Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Vienna

gentlemanly appearance and was not a “nobody” from a small former Soviet Union country, but instead a man who had a steep career in the US and was taken seriously on internal stage.

You get the feeling that nearly every family had some relatives in the US and therefore this country had a special meaning for Lithuanians. It is the land where everything is possible, but even so many emigrated Lithuanians returned from the US and moved back to Lithuania in the nineties.

### 3.9 Migration

Migration plays a strong role for such a small country, especially when the emigration is higher than the immigration. In 2006, the percentage of immigrants was 7,7 and the percentage of emigrants was 27,8; hence there was a difference of 20,1%, whereas in 2005 the difference was even 41,3%.<sup>85</sup> For a country with a little over 3 million inhabitants, losing that many people every year is enormous. Although the numbers are not as high anymore, emigration is still an important topic.

Lithuania had and still has traditionally a high rate of emigrants, but the type of emigration changed over the decades. In the 18th century, migration occurred due to bad conditions of living and famines. In the 1930s and 1940s, it was more of an escape than emigration; on the one hand, a lot of Jewish Lithuanians fled because of the Nazis, but on the other hand, a few years later the people fled because of the Soviets. The next wave of migration was after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, because the Lithuanians were free to go where they wanted for the first time in fifty years. Today, the migration changed into a “working migration”<sup>86</sup>, where 70% of the migrants go to an EU-country, especially Ireland and Great Britain (50%), because they were the first ones to open their labour markets.<sup>87</sup> The difference between this type of migration and the others is that the migrants hope to return when they have earned enough money for themselves and their families. This also affects the families, especially the

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<sup>85</sup> Cf. Migration in Lithuania in: <http://www.stat.gov.lt/lt/news/view/?id=6719> 22<sup>nd</sup> September 2009

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Interview Cornelius Hell, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2009, Vienna

<sup>87</sup> Cf. Ekaterina Ryabykh, Migration als Soziale Innovation, Untersuchung im Rahmen des wissenschaftlichen Forschungsprojekts (RGNF) "Migration als soziokulturelle Realität" in: TRANS. Internet-Zeitschrift für Kulturwissenschaften. No. 16/2005 in: [http://www.inst.at/trans/16Nr/13\\_1/ryabykh16.htm](http://www.inst.at/trans/16Nr/13_1/ryabykh16.htm) 22<sup>nd</sup> September 2009

children, because most of the time the migrants leave their families back home in Lithuania. A lot of parents are working in another country, while the children grow up at the grandparents' home.

You get the feeling that migration is a mixed blessing for Lithuania. They profit from emigrants who send their money back home or support their families, but the "Brain-Drain" is becoming a problem. Especially young educated workers leave the country, because the chances for a career and better salaries are higher elsewhere.

Furthermore the sheer number of migrants during the last 150 years is an enormous challenge for such a small country.

### **3.10 Self-perception**

It is always difficult for a small country to have a positive self-perception, but in the case of Lithuania it is especially hard.

Lithuania is used to decades of suppression and can only look back to two times as an independent state (Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the interwar period). Considering this, the problems of Lithuania's identity are easily understood.

Bearing this in mind, it is not at all surprising that Lithuanians identify themselves firstly with their settlement and secondly with Lithuania; Europe and the world are only in fourth and fifth position, even in 2004.<sup>88</sup>

Antanas Andrijauskas even called one of his articles "Searching for Lithuanian Identity Between East and West"<sup>89</sup> which reflects the insecurity of Lithuania and where it sees itself.

In my perception, Lithuania sees itself as a beautiful country with a unique language and culture, with warm and brave people who can play basketball very well. Yes, these are all clichés, but the feeling occurs that even that is hard for Lithuanians to describe. Lithuania tries

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<sup>88</sup> A.V. Matulionis, Self-Identification: Sociological Research Data, in: Savicka Aida (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., p. 85

<sup>89</sup> Antanas Andrijauskas, Searching for Lithuanian Identity Between East and West, in: A.V. Matulionis, Self-Identification: Sociological Research Data, in: Savicka Aida (Ed.), Lithuanian Identity and Values, Lithuanian Philosophical Studies V, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, V.31, 2007, The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, D.C., p. 53-79

very hard to point out its uniqueness and find its way in Europe, but it does not succeed every time.

It is shocking how many people still don't even know which one of the Baltic States Lithuania is. Lithuanians are used to being seen as one of the three Baltic States, but it is not beneficial to their positive self-perception. That is also the reason why they are very keen on pointing out their differences to their neighbouring countries.

Lithuania tries to point out its achievements and singularities rather than its failures, which is also understandable and it will take time before it can look at its identity critically, because it has to establish a positive self-perception first.

## 4 Security of Lithuania

In this chapter I want to explain what security means for Lithuania. For this purpose I looked at the current structure and also the history of the armed forces in Lithuania and what does this military means for the Lithuanian public. What are the relations between society and military and have they changed since the break-up of the Soviet Union? Why are the armed forces so crucial for an emerging state and especially for the small state Lithuania? What are the security threats for this country and what role does the Russian Federation and NATO play in this context?

### 4.1 Armed Forces of Lithuania

The number of servicemen and cadets serving in the National Defence System in 2006 was 18.250. In September 2008 the general conscription was rescinded and now Lithuanian military is a professional army with the strength of 15.525 men in 2009.

The main focuses of Lithuanian defence policy are determined by the military missions, which are:

1. “Protection of Lithuania’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”<sup>90</sup>
2. “Contributing to regional and global stability”<sup>91</sup>
3. “Contributing to the peace and welfare in the country”<sup>92</sup>

#### 4.1.1 Structure of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces and chair of the State Defence Council is the President of the Republic of Lithuania. The State Defence Council is concerned with discussion and coordination of the significant issues of national defence. The Parliament

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<sup>90</sup> Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, [www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188824](http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188824) (03/25/09)

<sup>91</sup> Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, [www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188824](http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188824) (03/25/09)

<sup>92</sup> Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, [www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188824](http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188824) (03/25/09)

implements the parliamentary control of the national defence system and it has to approve major military decisions. The Government has to “protect the inviolability of the territory of the Republic of Lithuania and ensure State security and public order”<sup>93</sup>. It also appoints the Minister of National Defence, who is supported by a Vice-Minister, a State Secretary and three Undersecretaries. The Ministry of National Defence (MoND) is responsible for the development and implementation of the defence policy of the Republic and it is also responsible for its Military resources.

The Defence Staff is subordinated to the Commander of Armed Forces and he exercises the command authority over the Armed Forces. Furthermore he advises the President and the Minister of National Defence and he is responsible for the requirements planning of the Military.

The Armed Forces consists of three main groups, such as:

- Land Forces
- Air Forces and
- Naval Forces.

In addition to these three main forces there are:

- the National Defence Volunteer Forces,
- the Special Forces,
- the Logistic and Training Command and
- the Military Police.<sup>94</sup>

#### **4.1.2 National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF)**

The NDVF is the reserve of Lithuania and could be compared to the National Guards in the United States of America. Its tasks are widespread: one part of the NDVF is trained for “participating in international crisis response operations”<sup>95</sup>. But the NDVF is also responsible for the provision of “protection of national strategic objects”<sup>96</sup>, assisting “civil authorities and

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<sup>93</sup> Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Chapter 7, Article 94

<sup>94</sup> Source: Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, [www.kam.lt](http://www.kam.lt) (03/25/09)

NATO, [www.nato.int/invitees2004/lithuania/defence.htm](http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/lithuania/defence.htm) (03/25/09)

<sup>95</sup> Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, <http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/38174/> (03/26/09)

<sup>96</sup> Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, <http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/38174/> (03/26/09)

the police”<sup>97</sup> in exceptional circumstances and the “Host Nation Support for NATO and partner forces”<sup>98</sup>.

### 4.1.3 History

Lithuania has a “deeply rooted, many layered national military tradition”<sup>99</sup>, at least Lithuania sees it like that as Andrius Krivas describes it in one of his articles. Fact is that Lithuania had its first armed forces during the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the medieval times, when they had to fight against intruders like the Teutonic order, the Golden Horde or the Russians. After the Union with Poland, Lithuania had no national army until after the 1<sup>st</sup> World War; in the period between 1918 and 1940, when Lithuania was independent for the first time since the Middle Ages. During their Independence Lithuanian armed forces played a strong role against the Red Army and the Polish and German troops. But at the time of incorporation into the Soviet Union the army was not deployed as defence which was merely caused by the indecisiveness of politicians on how to react to the situation. During the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War the Local Force (LF) was established; a compromise between the Lithuanian army and the German troops, which meant that it was still a Lithuanian Force but under the command of the Wehrmacht. But the LF fell apart when it was ordered to fight outside of Lithuanian territory.

After the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War the Lithuanian military fought as a guerilla like resistance against the Soviet occupation. These partisan battles lasted until 1956. In the time when Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union the national influence of the army was barely existent. Lithuania established its new national armed forces only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since then the Lithuanian Armed Forces have undergone multiple changes to pass the requirements of NATO membership in 2004.

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<sup>97</sup> Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, <http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/38174/> (03/26/09)

<sup>98</sup> Ministry of National Defence Republic of Lithuania, <http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/38174/> (03/26/09)

<sup>99</sup> Andrius Krivas, Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania, in: A. Forster, et al., Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 115



## 4.2 Military and Society in Lithuania

The Military has throughout history played an important role for the country as I've shown in the preceding chapter. "The image of the Lithuanian warrior is both mythologised and idealised in today's public perceptions."<sup>100</sup> This perception developed for a reason. It was essential for Lithuania after the break-up of the Soviet regime that they established their own armed forces, not only in terms of security, but also in terms of identity. This country struggled ever since for their independence and role in Europe. It was very difficult to differentiate itself to the neighboring countries and one of the reasons was that Lithuania had no army.

So one of the first agendas after regaining independence, was the establishment of the Lithuanian armed forces.

First it had merely a symbolic role since the Russian army stayed in the country until 1993. The Military was a symbol of national unity and a visible attribute of sovereignty. You could almost say it had nation building functions. Andrius Krivas sees even an "embodiment of Lithuanian national traditions"<sup>101</sup> in its military. One is for certain the Lithuanian military played an important role in the country's way to the West; Since 1994 Lithuania's armed forces participated in peace supporting operations (PSOs) for example under NATO command.

The Lithuanian armed forces managed to gain the trust of the public. In 1996 46% and already in 2004 63% of the population trusted its military, only the president (66%) and the church (65%) earned more trust<sup>102</sup>, which is exceptional high compared to other states<sup>103</sup>.

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<sup>100</sup> Andrius Krivas, *Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania*, in: A. Forster, et al., *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe*, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 117

<sup>101</sup> Andrius Krivas, *Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania*, in: A. Forster, et al., *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe*, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p.113

<sup>102</sup> Benjamin Ewert, *Potentiale der direkten Demokratie in Litauen, Slowenien und Ungarn unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der politischen Kultur*, *Interdisziplinäre Europa Studien*, Gornig et al. (Ed.), Band 4, 2007, Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main, p.71/145

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Verena Fritz, *State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia*, 2007, Central University Press, Budapest, p.257

### **4.2.1 During Soviet Times**

When Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union, it had practically no national army, not even a notional branch of the Soviet Army. The Soviet military doctrine was the only source of expertise also for the military in Lithuania.

That was why the military had no positive public perception during that time. It was seen as yet another imposition of the Soviet regime and not as a national institution. Military issues were associated with this widely despised regime. And first Lithuania didn't even want or feel the need for its own military branch, because of anti-militarism and pacifism.

Therefore the Lithuanian military had a very bad public perception at first, but over the years Lithuania realized how important a national army is.

The Lithuanian military had to assure the population of their concern for the nation, by the means of independence and sovereignty.

### **4.2.2 Legitimacy after the Soviet Regime**

Because the military was so crucial for the country the population was willing to spend a significant amount on the military budget. But the military also had to gain its legitimacy. First, it has to be recognised by the public, and the Western countries and institutions, especially NATO, for its efforts and progress in defence reform and development of the armed forces. After that the trust of the population in the military grew.

Second, the military had to have, unlike in Soviet times, a democratic and civilian control. The public had the right to co-decide what happened with and in the military.

Third, Lithuania's armed forces gained their capabilities and professionalism through international aid, military advice and military training.

Fourth, Domestic Military Assistance became more and more important. The military now was also capable of helping in states of emergency, for example natural disasters like flooding.

Fifth, there was a public debate about defence spending and the relevance of universal military conscription, which was the first time this happened in the history of the country.

Finally, the Ministry of Defence had a public information campaign about the military and its development and established a public relations department. In this way the population not only was informed about scandals, but also about achievements and changes.<sup>104</sup>

### **4.2.3 The Role of the Military before NATO Membership**

Initially the Military had two main reasons assuring independence and defence against threats, especially by the Russian Federation, but it also had to acquaint to other task fields such as:

- The role of a nation builder and builder of national identity and the establishment of a multi-ethnic military in a multi-ethnic country.
- Lithuania's wider security culture, which includes international peacekeeping missions.
- The domestic military assistance role in medical emergencies, police operations and states of emergency.

Lithuania's military had to manage its way to a western-style military force with all its requirements and adapt to its new challenges; most notably after 9/11, when the "classic" threat was disused.

Especially important in the trends in relation of military and society was the opportunity of the integration of western security institutions, first and foremost NATO, if the development of Lithuanian armed forces was to be successful. Although the new challenges of the military, like domestic military assistance and soft security issues gave positive conception in public, the most crucial achievement was the interoperability of NATO and the so accomplished accession to NATO. NATO membership is a widely approved goal of the country and it "also adds significantly to society's willingness to pay for the development and the strengthening of the country's national defence capabilities"<sup>105</sup>. But the acceptance to pay also for large peace

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<sup>104</sup> C. f. Andrius Krivas, *Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania*, in: A. Forster, et al., *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe*, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 112-115

<sup>105</sup> Andrius Krivas, *Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania*, in: A. Forster, et al., *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe*, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p.113

keeping units, which are included in NATO membership, could not really prevail. It was far more important for Lithuanians to assure their own security with the help of NATO, than wider security issues including peacekeeping all over the world.

One severe test was the establishment of laws concerning the military, like Law on Fundamentals of National Security (1996), the Law on the Organization of the National Defence System and Military Service (1998) and the National Military Defence Strategy. In all these documents the democratic civilian control of the army is the key point. These control arrangements focus on two issues.

First, the Military leadership is subordinated to the democratic civilian authorities.

Second, the political activities of the armed forces and its personnel are limited strictly. These restrictions go as far as public criticism of decisions of the political authorities even concerning military is not allowed. Bearing in mind the Soviet past of the country and its military these laws do make sense, although they are not that strictly enforced anymore. This led for instance to the debate in 2002 over a Commander of the Armed Forces who took part in a conference organized by the US Lithuanian community while he was on leave. He had criticized practices of social and economic management in Lithuania. He was called for account before the President and the Speaker of the Parliament, while the right wing opposition argued that he had only expressed his view as a citizen.<sup>106</sup>

These laws reflect the deeply rooted distrust since the Soviet era against military and state personnel in general, but these issues are getting better the more the armed forces appear in public and are included into NATO.

Another heatedly discussed issue concerning military was the general conscription, which was rescinded in 2008. Andrius Krivas saw it as “one of the most important factors in military-society relations in Lithuania”<sup>107</sup>. It was the link between the armed forces and the population; it was not an elitist group of society, but every male over 18 knew the military because he served. Now the armed forces are getting more and more specialized and better trained, nevertheless the question arises if it’s beneficial for the relations between society and military.

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<sup>106</sup> Cf. Andrius Krivas, *Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania*, in: A. Forster, et al., *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe*, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke

<sup>107</sup> Andrius Krivas, *Armed Forces and Society in Lithuania*, in: A. Forster, et al., *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe*, 2003, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p.123

All in all you can say that the view of the armed forces in Lithuania has changed dramatically in the last 20 years. From a totally distrusted part of the Soviet apparatus to one of the most trusted institutions of the country.<sup>108</sup> It was now hope of a new emerged state as a nation-builder, gate to international institutions and finally to specialized forces with international character in NATO, assuring in this way the security of the country.

But not only were the relations between society and military shaken up, the armed forces literally reinvented themselves. They had to start from scratch with all its advantages and disadvantages and a lot of support from Western countries. In addition to that it had to change from a purely on defence construed forces to forces that concentrate on international peacekeeping and domestic military assistance. It had to transform itself from a military based on hard security to one based on soft security issues. This is precisely what could strain the society-military relations, because the first thing what Lithuanians want is to feel safe, especially when it comes to the Russian Federation.

Ironically Lithuania wanted to join the “old” North Atlantic Alliances, not the new one, which sees Russia not as the main enemy anymore, but is more concerned about asymmetrical conflicts and terrorism. Perhaps the Lithuanians will realize that they have paid a high price to be in NATO and yet their security is not guaranteed.

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<sup>108</sup> Cf. Verena Fritz, *State-Building: A Comparative Study of Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, and Russia*, 2007, Central University Press, Budapest, p.257

### 4.3 Security Threats

When you talk about security threats and Lithuania, one thing is obvious; the Russian Federation is seen as the main problem.

“Though there are few people who would say Russia presents a military threat to the Baltics today, it is nevertheless the only possible source of threat to the Baltic security. The enormous power asymmetry between the three small Baltic countries and Russia predetermines the need for the Baltic integration into Transatlantic and European institutions.”<sup>109</sup> I definitely agree with Atis Lejins in the point that Russia is seen as the one and only threat in Lithuania.

Especially the war in Georgia in summer 2008 alienated all the three Baltic countries and old fears came up again. Die Presse, an Austrian newspaper, had then as a headline “Die Urangst der Litauer vor den Russen”<sup>110</sup>, which in a way is true. If you look at the history of small Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours you can understand that fear.

Russia made it very clear that Lithuania and the Baltic States are still in the sphere of interest for them.<sup>111</sup> Crisis in the relations between Russia are immanent, which is if nothing else due to the inability of Russia to treat its weaker neighbours as equals. Everything Russia did or does towards Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania sounds like sabre-rattling to these countries.

Especially audacious was the offer of security guarantees to the Baltic States by the Russian Federation in October 1997, which reminded them of the one during 2<sup>nd</sup> World War, where the Red Army freed the Baltics from the German enemy just to absorb these states itself. Of course this offer was rejected and seen as pure derision.

But still in 2004 Janusz Bugajski describes in his book “Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism” that Russia wants to reassert its influence of the security policies of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Atis Lejins, The “Twin Enlargements” and Baltic Security: Prospects of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century in: Paul Luif (Ed.), Security in Central and Eastern Europe, Problems, Perceptions, Policies, The Laxenburg Papers No.12, 2001, Braumüller, Vienna, p. 201

<sup>110</sup> Hannes Gamillscheg, Die Urangst der Litauer vor den Russen in: Die Presse, 30<sup>th</sup> September 2008 in: <http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/418860> 2nd October 2008

<sup>111</sup> Cf. William Safire, ON LANGUAGE; The Near Abroad, The New York Times, 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1994 in: <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html> 1st August 2009

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Richard Krickus, Iron Troikas: The New Threat From Russia in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 15/16, 2005, p.98

Richard Krickus sees the treat from Russia changed and describes the “Iron Troikas”<sup>113</sup> a new way of the Kremlin to achieve influence over other states. The “Iron Troikas” consists of:

1. The Siloviki, the “men of power”, are mostly former members of the military or the secret service, like Vladimir Putin. Under Putins presidency the number of these in important positions grew rapidly. They now pull the strings not only in state affairs, but also in the economy, preferably in the energy sector.
2. The economic warlords are the “new” oligarchs that have close ties to the Kremlin and the Siloviki. Putin tried very successfully to re-nationalise Russia’s important branches of trade, primarily exploiting natural resources. This has the advantage that Russia can put a lot of states under pressure, which depend on energy from the Federation.
3. Political and business groups that are under Russian influence in the former Soviet Union and Socialist states.<sup>114</sup>

The best example for this in Lithuania would be “Paksagate”. In 2004 the president of Lithuania, Rolandas Paksas was impeached, because Yuri Borisov, a Russian citizen and President of an aviation company, Avia Baltika, who had financed Paksas' political campaign was given Lithuanian citizenship by Paksas decree. Furthermore Paksas was accused of warning Borisov of secret investigations concerning corruption.

The Russian threat has changed, it is no longer a military threat, but if you define security after Gärtner as “the inner freedom to make decision even under the pressure of an external aggressor”<sup>115</sup> the Russian Federation is clearly still a security threat for Lithuania.

Lithuania has seen itself always as powerless against this major power and that is the way it was certain that it had to find a security solution were the defence against the Russian Federation was guaranteed. But if NATO was really the best solution remains uncertain. For example the recurrent threat of Russia to station Iskender Missiles, nuclear capable missiles, wouldn't be so severe if the Baltics were not members of NATO. With NATO membership Lithuania not only assured its security, it also became part of the Western security strategies, which sometimes provoke Russia more than the Baltics would like.

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<sup>113</sup> Richard Krickus, Iron Troikas: The New Threat From Russia in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 15/16, 2005, p.98

<sup>114</sup> Cf. Richard Krickus, Iron Troikas: The New Threat From Russia in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 15/16, 2005,

<sup>115</sup> Heinz Gärtner, Internationale Sicherheit, Definitionen von A-Z, Wiener Schriften zur Internationalen Politik – Band 9 OIIP, 2005, Nomos, Baden-Baden, p. 125

Another threat that could occur because Lithuania thought being an ally of the United States would be the best option against the Russian harassment is its support of the US in its war against terror. Not only is Lithuania part of NATO operation in Afghanistan, it also had sent a small troop to Iraq.

Furthermore Lithuania is now in headlines because it supposedly provided the CIA with a building outside Vilnius for interrogation purposes and as a secret prison for terror suspects.<sup>116</sup> On the one hand Lithuania helped the CIA and the US government to commit crimes against Human Rights and on the other it made itself a target for terrorist attacks.

Lithuania should be more concerned about measuring on the one hand pleasing his most important ally, in his eyes, or on the other becoming a butt for an unknown threat. Luckily for Lithuania it is small and not that important as a state, but it is considered to be part of “new” Europe and was a supporter of US foreign policy under President Bush therefore an enemy of Al Qaida. Lithuania is so focused on having the US as a partner; it doesn’t realize that this can be dangerous too.

After the break-down of the Soviet regime every Western state was eager that the Baltic region and the former Socialist countries are granted to be stable. Central and Eastern Europe was the hotspot, the feared tinderbox in Europe, but these states have proven to be stable and democratic countries, which are almost all now integrated into Western institutions. The concerns of Western states and NATO have shifted. Now the Caucasus is considered to be the trouble spot in Eurasia and perhaps Romania and Bulgaria are becoming much more important NATO members and allies of the US than the Baltic countries or Poland.<sup>117</sup>

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have the feeling that they were and are forgotten by their most important ally and that’s why they addressed altogether an open letter in a Polish newspaper to the Obama administration in the hope to get attention for their concerns.

“Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however, we see that Central and Eastern European countries are no longer at the heart of American foreign policy. [...]Despite the efforts and significant contribution of the new members, NATO today seems weaker than when we joined. In many of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant - and we feel it.

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<sup>116</sup> Cf. Teresa Schaur-Wünsch, CIA-Geheimgefängnis auch in Litauen? In: Die Presse, 22nd August 2009, Vienna, p.6

<sup>117</sup> Cf. Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 292



Although we are full members, people question whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defence in some future crises.”<sup>118</sup>

After some years of easing the tension between the Russian Federation and the Central and Eastern European countries, Russia is back with its reputation as a serious threat. If nothing else because the Western security institution they all joined is not what it was during cold war and it's not certain anymore if the US will join in defending CEE states if necessary. European dependence on Russian energy is not easing the conflict in any way.

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<sup>118</sup> Cf. An open letter to the Obama Administration from Central and Eastern Europe with the signatures of Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, Alexander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, Janos Martonyi, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Rotfeld, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Alexandr Vondra, Lech Walesa in: Gazeta Wyborcza, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2009 in: [http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,6825987,An\\_Open\\_Letter\\_to\\_the\\_Obama\\_Administration\\_from\\_Central.html](http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,6825987,An_Open_Letter_to_the_Obama_Administration_from_Central.html) 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2009

## **5 Alternatives**

### **5.1 Regional Co-operation**

#### **5.1.1 Nordic Co-operation**

After about fifty years being part of the Soviet Union, Lithuania and the other two Baltic States were not quite sure where to belong. Since the prestige and the allegiance of the Scandinavian states are very high in Lithuania<sup>119</sup>, why not become a part of the Nordic community? The Nordic countries are recognized for their diplomatic behaviour and their welfare state, which you could compare in a way to the social benefits of the Soviet times; all very desirable goals for emerging states.

But could the Nordic Co-operation assure the so much wanted security for these nations? And is the Nordic Co-operation willing to affiliate the Baltic States? Could this co-operation help Lithuania on its way to the West?

##### **5.1.1.1 What is the Nordic Co-operation (Norden)?**

In the interwar period Scandinavia considered forming one Scandinavian State<sup>120</sup>, but this concept failed and instead a formal and informal co-operation network, especially between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, was formed.

This co-operation manifested in the foundation of the Nordic Council in 1952, the Helsinki Treaty in 1962 and the Nordic Council of Ministers in 1971. The Nordic countries also coordinate their policies in various international organisations (UN, OECD, GATT).

The Areas of co-operation vary, which is also a sign of the different paths of international relations these countries struck. Denmark, Iceland and Norway joined NATO, Sweden and

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<sup>119</sup> Study of 150 Lithuanians and their heterostereotypes of other Nations. Scandinavians (in this Study Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) were ascribed the most positive attributes of all investigated nations. In: Sonata Neumüller, *Das Selbstbildnis der Litauer und die Abgrenzung gegenüber Nachbarn*, 2006, Vienna, p. 50

<sup>120</sup> Cf. Tom Schumacher, *The Emergence of the New Nordic Co-operation*, DUPI Working Paper 2000/6, Danish Institute of International Affairs, Denmark

Finland (since the dissociation of the soviet sphere of influence) stayed neutral. In addition to that Denmark, Sweden and Finland are part of the EU, Iceland is now considering to join and Norway still refuses.

**Table 1: Areas of Co-operation of the Nordic Co-operation**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <p><b>Culture, Leisure and Media</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creative Industries</li> <li>• Language</li> <li>• Information Technology</li> <li>• Music, Literature</li> <li>• Etc.</li> </ul> | <p><b>Economy, Business and Working Life</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries</li> <li>• Regional Policy</li> <li>• Economics, National Budget, Taxation</li> <li>• Energy</li> <li>• Etc.</li> </ul> |
| <p><b>Education and Research</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Higher Education</li> <li>• Schools</li> <li>• Language</li> <li>• Research</li> <li>• Etc.</li> </ul>                                | <p><b>Environment and Nature</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries</li> <li>• Environment (Nature, Culture)</li> <li>• Sustainable Development</li> <li>• The Arctic</li> <li>• Etc.</li> </ul>        |
| <p><b>Legislation and Justice</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom of Movement</li> <li>• Justice Co-operation</li> <li>• Moving Commuting</li> <li>• Etc.</li> </ul>                           | <p><b>Welfare and Gender Equality</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Health, The Nordic Welfare Model</li> <li>• Social Integration</li> <li>• Disabilities</li> <li>• Etc.</li> </ul>   |

Source: Norden, Official Co-operation in the Nordic Region, in: <http://www.norden.org/en/areas-of-co-operation>, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2009

Tom Schumacher sees four motives, why the Nordic Co-operation still functions:

First, the common historical and cultural traditions of these countries paired with their closely related languages (although I would argue the language point, since Finnish is clearly not related to the other Scandinavian languages). He sees an “overall feeling of belonging together”<sup>121</sup>, which results in a certain pressure for Nordic politicians to co-operate.

Second, the achieved advantages like the division of labour, which bear great chances for these small states with limited chances to complete each other.

Third, the Nordic countries were eager to balance their relations with their neighbouring major powers, like Germany and France. They could increase their power by co-operating.

<sup>121</sup> Tom Schumacher, The Emergence of the New Nordic Co-operation, DUPI Working Paper 2000/6, Danish Institute of International Affairs, Denmark, p. 4

Fourth, the Nordic nations represented and still represent the “Third Way”, which Olof Palme, former Prime Minister of Sweden, described as Democratic Socialism. Especially during the Cold War period this was an important motive, because this was an alternative to the bipolarity of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But the Nordic Welfare Model is still an essential, if not the most essential, factor in Nordic policy.<sup>122</sup>

### 5.1.1.2 Are the Baltic States Nordic States?

In the interwar period there was even the idea of Estonian politicians to form a “Balto-Scandian” federal state, which would include the three Baltic States and the Scandinavian states. After the break-up of the iron curtain this concept was seized again especially by Estonians, but in another contexts; the Baltic countries wanted to become a part of the Nordic community and the Nordic Co-operation.

“Scandinavism implied staking out a boundary line towards Russia on the one side and Germany on the other.”<sup>123</sup> Just the idea that being Nordic would mean to have a boundary line towards the Russian Federation, and be essential for all three states.

Since Finland is part of Norden and sometimes also considered to be Baltic<sup>124</sup>, why not all the Baltic States too? “Much if not most is determined by what others believe”<sup>125</sup> about states as the former Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves stated in one of his speeches. He refers to the successful self-redefinition of Finland from a Baltic country before the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War to a Nordic country in the 1950ies.

But what defines the Nordic countries? Lars-Folke Langrén, Professor at the University of Helsinki, determined eight key elements of Nordic Identity and Mikko Lagerspetz, Professor at the University of Tallin, compared these elements with the cultural, social, political and economic landscapes of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to see if these countries would fit in the Nordic Community.

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<sup>122</sup> Cf. Tom Schumacher, The Emergence of the New Nordic Co-operation, DUPI Working Paper 2000/6, Danish Institute of International Affairs, Denmark

<sup>123</sup> Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 38/1, 2003, Sage Publications, p. 51

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Anatol Lieven, The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence, 1994, Second Edition, Yale University Press, New Haven (et al.)

<sup>125</sup> Toomas H. Ilves cited in: Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 38/1, 2003, Sage Publications, p. 54

**Table 2: Bases of Nordic Identity after Landgrén**

|  | <b>Estonia</b> | <b>Latvia</b> | <b>Lithuania</b> |
|--|----------------|---------------|------------------|
| 1. Geographical Location   | +              | +             | (+)              |
| 2. Historical ties   | +              | +             | -                |
| 3. Linguistic affinity   | (+)            | -             | -                |
| 4. Lutheran faith  | +              | (+)           | -                |
| 5. Social Development<br>(the Nordic Model)  | -              | -             | -                |
| 6. Nordic co-operative organs  | (+)            | (+)           | (+)              |
| 7. Legal & administrative<br>tradition (municipal self-<br>determination, the rule of law) | (+)            | (+)           | ?                |
| 8. Gender equality   | -              | -             | -                |

*Source:* Lars-Folke Landgrén cited in: Mikko Lagerspetz, How Many Nordic Countries? in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 38/1, 2003, Sage Publications

*Note:* The “+” indicates the presence of an element of Nordic Identity. The “(+)” indicates the relative presence. The “-” indicates the absence and the “?” shows that the relation is uncertain.

As you can see on Table 2 Lagerspetz couldn't find common elements in all three states in the points of Social Development and Gender Equality. The Nordic Model is one of the most important characteristics of the Scandinavian States and neither one of the Baltic countries fulfilled it's criterias. Estonia has some linguistic affinities at least with Finland, but the other two lack to have similarities concerning any Scandinavian language. Protestantism is rampant in Estonia, already less in Latvia and Lithuania is a catholic country with 80% Catholics.<sup>126</sup>

Estonia has the most common ground with the Nordic countries comparing to Latvia and especially Lithuania. The Baltic countries fail to be part of the Nordic community at the compliance of its requirements. Lithuania has not much in common with the Nordic countries and even if it would make efforts to adapt, it would unlikely succeed. Mainly the Nordic Social Model, the key element, is none of the three countries willing to adopt fully because their economic policies are closer to the neo-liberal model than the Nordic.

<sup>126</sup> Cf. Lithuanian Catholic Network, The Percentage of Lithuanian Catholics 1990-2001 in: <http://www.lcn.lt/en/bl/istorija/5/>

### **5.1.1.3 Nordic Co-operation as a Goal**

It is important for all the three Baltic States to stress their difference from their past, thus the Russian Federation and the other former Soviet Union states and the Nordic Co-operation represented an alternative.

But viewed realistically, Lithuania has no common ground with the Scandinavian countries, neither cultural (Protestantism vs. Catholicism, no language affinity, or historical ties) nor social (gender equality). Not to speak of the economic model.

Member states of the Nordic Co-operation have no interest in an overthrow of their long-lasting and well established institution. On the one hand the Co-operation would have had to change dramatically to adapt to their new members and on the other it is not even sure if they could have provided what the Baltic States were expecting.

As you can see in Table 1 the areas of Nordic Co-operation do not include any security issues. You could use the co-operation to distance oneself from the Soviet past and the Russian Federation symbolically, but not in the area of security against possible threats, which exclude soft security threats. The Nordic countries all go their different ways when it comes to “hard” security policy. As I mentioned before, Denmark, Iceland and Norway are member states of NATO, while Sweden and Finland are neutral. Norden excludes security issues deliberately in order to function as a co-operation in its own way.

Nevertheless the Nordic countries realised how important their impact and influence is for the Baltic States on their way to the West. It is not only in their interest that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are stable democracies and independent states, but it is one of their characteristics to act as a mouthpiece for other countries interests.

According to this the Nordic Co-operation not only helped them to join NATO and EU, but also established a larger Co-operation – the Council of Baltic Sea States. There they enabled Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a regional forum for their interests and needs.

The Nordic Co-operation found a way to keep the Baltic States out, but even so integrated them to the West and Europe. It “is not to argue that the Nordic countries [...] did not play a significant role in supporting the transition of former socialist or Soviet countries. Particularly

concerning the Baltic States [...] [they] indeed contributed significantly to the process of political – economic – social change”.<sup>127</sup>

### 5.1.2 Baltic Sea Region

“The Baltic Sea Region has throughout history been characterized more by cultural and political diversity than by any form of unity.”<sup>128</sup> Nevertheless Helmut Hubel ascertained a „development of a certain „regional“-awareness around the Baltic Sea“<sup>129</sup> after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990ies. The emerging of a region which never used to function as one is difficult, especially if some parts regard the others as villains or does not see them as equal partners. The big problem in this region is that they have no common ground to build on. Some of the states have historical ties, but have no cultural or social affinities.

For the Baltic Sea Region it could be useful to draw on the definitions concerning regions of David Lake. He states that regions, especially in terms of security relations, are being shaped by specific “externalities”.<sup>130</sup> For the Baltic Sea Region these “externalities” were the pressure of the EU and Norden to put the Baltic States, Poland and Russia into a regional context, were they have to work together to stabilize their relations. These “externalities” are not developed from inside the region, they are set mostly from outside.

Is it nevertheless possible to develop a regional co-operation in a region that is newly constructed? Could this regional co-operation function as a security co-operation? Would it have been another alternative for Lithuania and the other two Baltic States to decrease their security concerns if Russia, their most feared neighbor, is part of the co-operation?

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<sup>127</sup> Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 285

<sup>128</sup> Lars F. Stöcker, The History of the Baltic Sea Region in the Cold War Era, in: Sooman, Donecker (Eds.), The “Baltic Frontier” Revisited, 2009, Vienna, p.153

<sup>129</sup> Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 283

<sup>130</sup> David A. Lake cited in: Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications

### 5.1.2.1 Council of Baltic Sea States

The CBSS sees itself as an “overall political forum for regional inter-governmental co-operation”<sup>131</sup> with the eleven states of the Baltic Sea Region (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden) and the European Commission as members. The CBSS was established by the Foreign Ministers of the member states in 1992.

**Table 3: Areas of Co-operation of the CBSS**

|   |  |
|---|--|
| <b>Environment</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Baltic 21, etc.</li></ul>  | <b>Economic Development</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Baltic Sea Labour Network Project, etc.</li></ul>  |
| <b>Energy</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Meeting of Energy Ministers, etc.</li></ul>                                   | <b>Education &amp; Culture</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Ars Baltica, Euro Faculty Pskov, etc.</li></ul> |
| <b>Civil Security &amp; the Human Dimension</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Border Control Co-operation, etc.</li></ul> |  |

Source: Council of the Baltic Sea States in: <http://www.cbss.org/main>

As you can see in Table 3, CBSS is not a security co-operation; it deals mostly with soft security, social and cultural issues. As Helmut Hubel puts it, CBSS acknowledged “that other institutions in post-Cold war Europe are far more relevant in terms of *high politics*, i.e. economic and military integration.”<sup>132</sup> CBSS had never the intention to inherit functions of EU or NATO.

Besides the member states of CBSS have deliberately restricted the competences of the council, perhaps also bearing in mind the conflict situations it would create especially between the Russian Federation and the Baltic States or Poland. The CBSS should be a forum of discussion were Russia should be a part of, in that way Russia was not left outside and little damage could be done.

<sup>131</sup> Council of Baltic Sea States in: <http://www.cbss.org/main>

<sup>132</sup> Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 284



Unlike Browning and Joenniemi<sup>133</sup>, I wouldn't say that security is the essence of the Baltic Sea Region and its co-operation. CBSS is clearly concentrated on soft security issues and social topics which in my opinion is the key point why this could have never been an alternative to NATO membership.

On the one hand the creation of CBSS was a positive initiative, but on the other it was just a drop in a bucket, because it was a compromise solution. The Nordic countries didn't and couldn't admit the three Baltic States into their co-operation, though the Western countries believed that establishing regionalism, where the former Social and Soviet states are part of, is essential for restoring democracy and assuring peace in Europe. They wanted to set a symbolic act, which you can also see at the membership of the European Commission in the council.

It would be illusive to think that the CBSS, the way it was established, could serve as an alternative to NATO. No one should be left out, that's why the council has eleven member states and the European Commission, and this is the reason why CBSS has little influence. The members don't have common aims and for example the Russian Federation doesn't see itself as part of the Baltic Sea Region. It is too diverse to be a section of a region and therefore has little interest in it; especially when it likes to see certain members still in their sphere of influence.

An institution like the CBSS could never assure Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania its independence and security.

### **5.1.3 Baltic Co-operation**

„Unfortunately most if not all people outside Estonia [Latvia and Lithuania] talk about “The Baltics”. This is an interesting concept, since what the three Baltic States have in common derives almost entirely from shared unhappy experiences imposed upon them from outside: occupations, deportations, annexation, sovietization, collectivization, russification. What these countries do *not* share is a common identity.”<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Cf. Christopher S. Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, *Regionality beyond Security? The Baltic Sea Region after Enlargement* in: *Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 233-234

<sup>134</sup> Toomas H. Ilves cited in: Mikko Lagerspetz, *How Many Nordic Countries?* in: *Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 38/1, 2003, Sage Publications, p. 53

Thoomas H. Ilves, the former Foreign Minister of Estonia, points out what a lot of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians think and the “West” fails to realize. In the aftermath of the break-up of the Soviet Union the Baltic States were seen as a geopolitical union and not as three different emerging states. Nevertheless Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania managed to establish, with the help and pressure of the “Western” countries, a regional co-operation especially concerning security issues. A regional co-operation that is very remarkable, because it is unique in Europe and serves often as a good example for other states.

### **5.1.3.1 Reasons for a Baltic Co-operation in Terms of Security**

Since all three States had not inherited armed forces from the Soviet period, they had on the one hand to build up new armed forces and on the other to professionalise the little they already had. Thus the Baltic States had to develop their defence structures from scratch. Hence, they had very similar tasks to manage in a very short period of time.

All three states were parts of the Soviet Union before and had therefore Russian troops stationed until 1993/4. These troops and the constant violations of their airspace by the Russian Federation, posed a threat for the emerging states and their reclaimed independence. In addition to that, Russia still saw and sees the Baltic States as their “near abroad”, which is “the claim by Russia of political interest and influence in states adjacent to it that were once part of the Soviet Union”<sup>135</sup> and still leaves a bitter aftertaste in these countries. That’s why the Baltics felt the urge to establish armed forces as quick as possible.

Another reason was that the three states were eager in their efforts to anchor their security within the EU and especially NATO. Therefore they were keen on reaching the standards for admission and especially to build up armed forces that are NATO interoperable.

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<sup>135</sup> William Safire, ON LANGUAGE; The Near Abroad, The New York Times, 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1994 in: <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html> 1st August 2009

### 5.1.3.2 BALTBAT

BALTBAT was established in 1994 as the showcase of co-operation of the Baltic States, as former Soviet states, NATO and Western not-NATO states and it was embedded in the NATO PfP program. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed a tri-national agreement on building a joint peacekeeping unit and the Baltic States, four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding. Denmark agreed on taking the patronage of BALTBAT and later other Western states (including the United States and Germany) also joined the MOU.

As I said before the three countries had to develop their armed forces from scratch and BALTBAT was a good opportunity to enlist assistance in terms of resources, training and money. For the supporting countries on the other hand it was much easier to justify their intense engagement to BALTBAT, a PfP project, rather than giving it to a former Soviet Republic to build up their new armed forces and in that way “produce” a new threat in the region.<sup>136</sup>

BALTBAT was in no way without controversy. The three states were more or less forced into this co-operation and their national armies saw BALTBAT as a rival, who costs an immense amount of money, which they could use for themselves. But instead it was put into an “elite” troop, with soldiers that earn remarkable high bonuses and with skills that were irrelevant to the needs of national defence of the respective countries.<sup>137</sup>

The organisation of BALTBAT was co-ordinated on the one hand by the BALTBAT Steering Group, which was responsible for political decisions and the co-ordination of support and on the other hand the BALTBAT Military Working Group, which was responsible for the military aspects related to the realisation of the project.<sup>138</sup>

BALTBAT was first deployed in 1998 as part of the Danish Battalion (DANBAT) in the SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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<sup>136</sup> Cf. Robertas Sapronas, BALTBAT and development of Baltic Defence Forces, in: Baltic Defence Review 2/1999, Baltic Defence College, Tartu

<sup>137</sup> Cf. Vitalijus Vaiksnoras, The Role of Baltic Defence Co-operation for the Security of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, NATO Individual Fellowship Report, 2000-2002, Vilnius, in: <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/Vaisknoro.pdf> 31st July 2009

<sup>138</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p15

Just in 2002 Vitalijus Vaiskornas wrote in a NATO Fellowship Report about the future of BALTBAT, its opportunities as a joined peacekeeping unit and becoming part of NATO North Eastern Army Corps.<sup>139</sup> Nevertheless in September 2003 BALTBAT was disbanded, oddly because it “successfully completed its goals”<sup>140</sup>.

**Table 4: Achievements of BALTBAT**

- The creation of the Peace Keeping Operations Centres
- The creation of a national quick reaction force Scouts Battalion
- The ability to send peacekeeping forces to various crisis locations (a good current example is the forces participating in the international operation in Afghanistan)
- Acquiring trilateral and international co-operation experience
- Drew up common English procedures for the development of co-operation
- Skilled and experienced units and officers

*Source:* Estonian Embassy in Tokyo, Estonia and NATO, Baltic Co-operation Projects, in: [http://www.estemb.or.jp/lang\\_4/rub\\_1906/rubviide\\_157](http://www.estemb.or.jp/lang_4/rub_1906/rubviide_157) 3rd August 2009

After the Baltic States realized that the EU, NATO and the Western countries are taken with the tri-national BALTBAT project, they initialised other joint forces and hoped to attain the same assistance as for BALTBAT. The plan came together.

### **5.1.3.3 BALTNET**

BALTNET is the Baltic Air Surveillance Network, in which development started in 1994 and was launched in 2000. Norway took the chairmanship of the project and the Baltic States also gained other supporting nations, like the US.

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<sup>139</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p.32

<sup>140</sup> Cf. Estonian Embassy in Tokyo, Estonia and NATO, Baltic Co-operation Projects, in: [http://www.estemb.or.jp/lang\\_4/rub\\_1906/rubviide\\_157](http://www.estemb.or.jp/lang_4/rub_1906/rubviide_157) 3rd August 2009

A Regional Airspace Surveillance Co-ordination Centre (RASCC) was built in Kaunas, Lithuania. This enables Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to view, identify and monitor air traffic across the entire Baltic region, a fact that rose hackles with the Russian Federation.<sup>141</sup>

BALTRON is now integrated into NATO operations.

#### **5.1.3.4 BALTRON**

BALTRON is the Baltic Naval Squadron and was established in 1997 under the patronage of Germany.

Its main mission was the establishment of a tri-national squadron of MCM vessels. A unit for search and rescue operations and a training center were added.

BALTRON is now also integrated into NATO units and has its headquarters in Estonia.

#### **5.1.3.5 Baltic Defence College - BALTDEFCOL**

BALTDEFCOL is the Baltic Defence College in Tartu, Estonia with the mission to educate full-fledged military personnel for the Baltic States.

#### **Table 5: Education at BALTDEFCOL**

The mandate of BALTDEFCOL is to educate:

- Staff Officers - Army Intermediate Command and Staff Course (AICSC)
- General Staff Officers - Joint Command and General Staff Course (JCGSC)
- Leaders of Transformation - Higher Command Studies Course (HCSC)
- Senior Civil Servants - Civil Servants Course (CSC)
- Short-term tailored courses according to the request from the Baltic States

*Source:* Baltic Defence College in: <http://www.bdcoll.ee/> 8<sup>th</sup> August 2009

<sup>141</sup> Cf. James Geary, Yes, We Have No Army, Time Magazine, Nov 2002, in: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901021125-391500,00.html> 4<sup>th</sup> August 2009

In the last years more and more military personnel from other states than the Baltics graduate from the Baltic Defence College, which is now a well recognised college for military education.

Maybe the Baltic Co-operation could have been the alternative to NATO membership, but the co-operation was coerced by the Western states and not a grown co-operation like the Nordic. Not even the biggest project BALTBAT, which was thought as a joint peacekeeping mission for NATO operations, lasted. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not willing to adapt their security issues on each other. They see each other as totally different countries with totally different goals; Estonia sees itself more as a Nordic country with close ties to Finland, Lithuania on the other hand sees itself as a Central European country with close ties to Poland and Latvia is somewhere in the middle. They don't want to give up their newly achieved independence to fit into a close security co-operation and be part of a region they don't want to belong.

#### **5.1.4 Lithuanian-Polish Co-operation**

„Since neutrality or co-operation with the Nordic or with the Baltic countries cannot lead to security guarantees, the optimal geopolitical code version could be the orientation towards Poland and the strengthening of the strategic links with the country”<sup>142</sup> state Tomas Janekiunas and Kristina Baubinaite.

Is Poland really the best strategic partner in the region? What role plays the US in this partnership? Could it have been an alternative to NATO?

Poland and Lithuania have undoubtedly some common ground. You could see two cultural ties; on the one hand both countries share some history together, i.e. the Polish-Lithuanian Union from the 14<sup>th</sup> to the 16<sup>th</sup> century. On the other hand Lithuania and Poland both have significant national minorities in the respective country. Poles are the biggest minority in Lithuania with around 7% of the population.

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<sup>142</sup> Tomas Janekiunas and Kristina Baubinaite, In Search for the Optimal Regional Alliance: Strategic Partnership between Lithuania and Poland in: Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, 2006, Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, p.79

Polish influence on Lithuania is far more evident than the other way round, but Lithuania is a good strategic partner for Poland in the means of supporting it in international structures. Poland and Lithuania both represent the new Central Europe with similar aims. With this partnership Lithuania hopes to gain influence on an international level, also on the ground that Poland has become a not to underestimated ally of the US in Europe (War on Terror – Afghanistan and Iraq, US - Missile Defence Shield).

Poland became a NATO member in NATO extension round before Lithuania in 1999. In this way they could provide support and essential information about NATO accession and its procedures. Lithuania also achieved easier access to NATO operation force “Northeast” and the establishment of BALTSEA (Baltic Security Assistance Management Group) through the help of Poland.<sup>143</sup>

Poland was throughout history Lithuania’s gate to the West and when Lithuania saw its opportunity to be part of the West again, it relied on the support of Poland again. Lithuania sees Poland as its role model, both in economic and military aspects especially since it is an ally of the United States. Lithuania thought that with a military partnership with Poland it collateralizes its hard security issues in two ways; First, Poland is one of the largest confederate states in the Central and Eastern European Region and second, Lithuania gains more importance, especially regarding US military and NATO support.

“The presumptions of strategic partnership between Poland and Lithuania on the global level [...] are mostly connected with the identical geo-strategic aim of two countries – to gain hard and soft security.”<sup>144</sup> The two countries have a similar threat – Russia. They both want to escape Russia’s sphere of influence and Lithuania is less vulnerable with Polish backup. Above all it is very useful if Lithuania and Poland pull together concerning Kaliningrad - Oblast and so build up a stronger opposition against the Russian Federation.

As Andrius Krivas put it in an article, expressed a bit oddly but still correct: “Military co-operation with Poland, a large friendly neighboring country, is a form of bilateral relations in

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<sup>143</sup> Cf. Andrius Krivas, Lithuanian-Polish Military Co-operation in: Lithuanian foreign Policy Review, No. 2 Vol. 7 2001, in: <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2001-7/Krivas.pdf>

<sup>144</sup> Tomas Janekiunas and Kristina Baubinaite, In Search for the Optimal Regional Alliance: Strategic Partnership between Lithuania and Poland in: Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, 2006, Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, p.82

the sphere of such a vital importance.”<sup>145</sup> The main military co-operation of these two countries is the LITPOLBAT, the Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion.

#### **5.1.4.1 LITPOLBAT**

The foundation of military co-operation between Lithuania and Poland lies in the agreement signed on June 15, 1993 in Vilnius between the Ministries of National Defence of the respective countries concerning the establishment of mutual military co-operation.

The Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion is designed for maintenance and restoration of international peace and security as well as participation in peace-keeping missions, humanitarian and rescue actions undertaken by the UN, EU and NATO. Nearly 800 soldiers serve in the battalion (435 Polish and 351 Lithuanian) and the key staff positions are taken up by rotation. The joint LITPOLBAT headquarters are located in Orzysz, Poland.<sup>146</sup>

It was also designed as a support and training project for Lithuania’s joining of NATO in a way alike BALTBAT. Poland demonstrated how to achieve NATO operability and Lithuania benefited from Polish NATO experiences.

The Lithuanian-Polish military co-operation helped and helps Lithuania in many ways, but it was never thought as an alternative for NATO membership, more a gateway to it. Lithuania realizes how important the Polish support is in strategic aspects, however it would not rely only on that. Besides it was very clear that Poland’s goal was also from the beginning to join NATO in that way it could only be of real help if Lithuania also is a member of the North Atlantic alliance.

LITPOLBAT was established with the joining of NATO in the back of both countries heads and Lithuania clearly profited from it. It was similar to the idea of the BALTBAT project, only with the difference that it was not forced upon Lithuania by the Western countries. This co-operation was far more logic and “natural” in the eyes of Lithuania.

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<sup>145</sup>Andrius Krivas, Lithuanian-Polish Military Co-operation in: Lithuanian foreign Policy Review, No. 2 Vol. 7 2001, in: <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2001-7/Krivas.pdf>

<sup>146</sup> Cf. Lithuanian-Polish Peace Force Battalion, Ministry of National Defence of Poland in: <http://www.mon.gov.pl/strona.php?lang=2&idstrona=128> 7<sup>th</sup> August 2009



## 5.2 Neutrality

Since I live in a small country that is more or less voluntarily neutral since the end of World War 2<sup>nd</sup>, I thought of neutrality as an option for Lithuania too, but reading literature it seemed that I was the only one.

Neutrality if at all was only mentioned in one or two sentences, describing that it never was an aspired goal for the country. A fact that the three Baltic States share.

Even the “Law on the Basics of National Security of Lithuania [which was established 1996] stipulates that the national defence system of Lithuania is developed as a part of the common European security and transatlantic defence systems”<sup>147</sup>

When it works for small European countries like Austria or Switzerland and even for another country with the Russian threat at its borders like Finland, why was it never thought of for Lithuania? Could neutrality have been the answer?

### 5.2.1 Why not?

There are several reasons why neutrality was never thought of as an option for Lithuania after the break up of the Soviet Union.

The most obvious one is certainly the fear of a Russian aggression. Lithuania and also the other Baltic States were overrun throughout history by different major powers. According to that to sit on the fence didn't help them either the last time during World War 2<sup>nd</sup> when they were bargained in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

There was another problem after independence, as I mentioned in the chapter about the armed forces of Lithuania and also the Baltic co-operation, Lithuania had no military at all at this time. Building up armed forces that could ensure independence and security for Lithuania, if

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<sup>147</sup> Agreement between the parliamentary parties of Lithuania on the defence policy in: <http://www.nato.int/pfp/lt/current/2001-05-23.html> 28th August 2009

it is neutral, would have been a long-term assignment and the country wanted the quickest possible version.

You could argue that Lithuania's armed forces had to start from scratch anyway; why not build up military that would suit neutrality instead of NATO?

Most of all because the establishment of armed forces was only possible with the help and support of several Western countries, who were willing to spend money and effort, because Lithuania was part of NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program. They definitely wouldn't have been willing to do that, if Lithuania's "security future" would have been uncertain. They would have feared a change of mind of Lithuania concerning neutrality and through that endanger the stability of the region.

Furthermore history taught Lithuania that neutrality is not a safe option. "Dass Litauen eine solche Verankerung [a NATO membership] anstrebte, hat auch mit der schlechten historischen Erfahrung zu tun, die man in der Zwischenkriegszeit mit der Neutralität gemacht hat. Sie bot keinen Schutz, sondern machte Litauen im Gegenteil anfälliger dafür, zum Spielball anderer Mächte zu werden."<sup>148</sup>

Lithuania not only wanted to ensure their security, but also to show the Russian Federation what side they are now on and what powerful allies they have. The small country feared that being neutral Russia could see as a concession and an invitation to see it once more as its "Near Abroad". They wanted to send a signal that they are now not only an independent country but also independent from Russia's sphere of influence with the help of NATO.

"Lithuania's primary security and foreign policy objective is full integration in the North Atlantic Alliance. Vilnius explicitly rejected all other security options as unrealistic and destabilizing, including membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), states neutrality, and non-alignment. All these options generated ambiguity and could have potentially undermined the country's pro-Western aspirations."<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> E-mail correspondence with Reinhard Veser, October 2009

<sup>149</sup> Raimundas Lopata, et al., Lithuania's Security and Foreign Policy Strategy in: Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 1/2002, p. 203

## 5.3 OSCE

Another alternative could have been the tight ensnarement with the OSCE; since Lithuania is a member since 1991 right after their independence and all the states of the region are members as well.

“Several political actors (including the late Soviet Union’s and thereafter Russia’s leaderships) had hoped that in post-Cold War Europe the CSCS, since 1995 the OSCE, would develop into *the* key institution for safeguarding peace and co-operation in the continent.”<sup>150</sup>

### 5.3.1 What is the OSCE?

With 56 States drawn from Europe, Central Asia and America, the OSCE is the world's “largest regional security organisation”<sup>151</sup>, which was founded in 1975 when 35 countries signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The OSCE headquarter is based in Vienna, Austria. It has now grown to 56 member states<sup>152</sup>.

The OSCE divides its members into the regions of South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe (including the three Baltic States), South Caucasus, Central Asia and Western Europe and America for their missions, field operations and activities.

Its activities in the various regions are separated into three so-called “security dimensions”, which are the politico-military dimension, the economic and environmental dimension and the human dimension.

**Table 6: Dimensions of the OSCE**

| • <b>Politico-Military Dimension</b>  | • <b>Economic &amp; Environmental Dimension</b> | • <b>Human Dimension</b>                         |
|---|---|--|
| Arms Control<br>Border Management<br>Combating Terrorism<br>Conflict Prevention | Economic Activities<br>Environmental Activities | Anti-trafficking<br>Democratization<br>Education |

<sup>150</sup> Helmut Hubel, The Baltic Sea Subregion after Dual Enlargement in: Co-operation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, Vol.39 No.3, 2004, Sage Publications, p. 288

<sup>151</sup> OSCE in: <http://www.osce.org/> 27<sup>th</sup> August 2009

<sup>152</sup> Cf. OSCE members in: <http://www.osce.org/about/13131.html> 27th August 2009

Military Reform  
Policing

Elections  
Gender Equality  
Human Rights  
Media Freedom  
Minority Rights  
Rule of Law  
Tolerance and Non-  
discrimination

*Source:* Activities of the OSCE in: <http://www.osce.org/activities/> 27<sup>th</sup> August 2009

As you can see on Table 6 the security understanding of the OSCE has a wide range which stretches across the politico-military dimension to the economic and environmental dimension and the human dimension. The politico-military dimension concentrates more or less on hard security issues, but the others are centred on soft security issues like media freedom, minority rights or environment.

Bearing these dimensions in mind the OSCE would fulfil in fact the premises of a global security organisation.

### 5.3.2 Why not?

As I quoted above, the OSCE sees itself as the “largest regional security organisation”<sup>153</sup> and has not the aim to be a global security organisation. I don’t quite understand why the OSCE calls itself a regional security organisation when it has 56 member states stretched across 3 continents, but it seems that this is one of the key elements of it. This alliance is geared to operate in its five regions and concentrates on specific activities in specific regions. In this way it can respond better to the particular needs of each region on the one hand, but on the other it anticipates to act as a global security player.

The biggest drawback of the OSCE concerning Lithuania is certainly that it is no defence pact.

“The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice. [...] For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement

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<sup>153</sup> OSCE in: <http://www.osce.org/> 27<sup>th</sup> August 2009

or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement agreed to in advance to the disputes to which they are parties.”<sup>154</sup>

The OSCE is construed to solve issues with diplomatic means and not with military intervention in any way.

“[S]everal “new democracies” in Europe’s former East (especially Poland and the Baltic States) were not willing to forego US “hard” military guarantees for OSCE’s “soft mechanism” to maintain stability.”

The OSCE does a good job on preventing conflicts and in this way ensuring the stability in its distinct regions, but it will never be a security organisation like NATO, not even the “new” NATO, because it is no defence pact and it has not the support of the United States in means of military. It had the chance of becoming a global security alliance but without the backing of the US it was doomed to fail.

To put it a nutshell the OSCE could not ensure security as Lithuania has aimed for, because it was developed as a regional security organisation with a different understanding of security than Lithuania.

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<sup>154</sup> Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, p. 5 in: [http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044\\_en.pdf](http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf) 28th August 2009

## 6 Comparison to Poland

Comparing Lithuania to Poland is almost natural, even more natural than setting in relation to the other two Baltic countries, Latvia and Estonia. The demarcation of the countries in this region was and is still more or less arbitrary.<sup>155</sup> Lithuania and Poland formed a commonwealth in the 16<sup>th</sup> century and since at least that time the Polish influence in Lithuania has been obvious.

However, they not only shared a commonwealth, but they also share the same history of foreign rule. The Prussians/Germans, the Habsburgs and the Czars/Russia/Soviets dominated the region in different stages and far too often Lithuania and Poland were a pawn in the hands of the powerful.

It cannot be denied that the Polish ties and influences especially concerning the Vilnius and Kaunas region have been very strong due to this region being always densely populated by Poles. It was also repeatedly part of Polish territory. Above all, Vilnius has been the apple of discord between the two countries for quite some time, the last time being in 1938, when Poland occupied the city and its surroundings causing a diplomatic discord.<sup>156</sup>

Poland and Lithuania were nations in transformation after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. They chose similar ways to force the communist party to react and to gain back their freedom through peaceful means (*Solidarność* and *Sajūdis*). In addition, both countries stroke related new paths to European democracies with the same foreign policy goals, such as memberships to the EU and NATO. They both became members of the EU and NATO for the same reasons and trusted NATO safeguarding their security.

Sometimes the feeling is evoked that Poland sees Lithuania as its “little brother”, as one of the countries in the region it has to look after and needs to provide a guiding hand.<sup>157</sup> On the

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<sup>155</sup> Cf. Gregor Ryssel, *Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen*, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 21

<sup>156</sup> Cf. *Idem*, p.30 et seq.

<sup>157</sup> Cf. Mieczysław Jackiewicz, *Litauen und Polen aus polnischer Sicht in: : Litauen Nachbar im Osten*, J. Hackmann (Ed.) *Travemünder Protokolle Band 1*, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 108 et seq.

other hand, Lithuania sees Poland as its most important ally in the region, who offers the most in return, like good relations to the US.<sup>158</sup>

The intention of this chapter is to compare the political systems of Poland and Lithuania, because it would go beyond the scope of this paper, but to point out the similarities and connections between both countries in some areas. Therefore it focuses on their history, their transformation and their foreign policy over the last few years. Hence, on the one hand, it is a diachronic comparison and on the other hand it is a policy comparison with the emphasis on foreign and security policy of both countries.

## 6.1 History

Poland and Lithuania has had close contact even before they formed a commonwealth in the 16<sup>th</sup> century during Christianization of the region, which was “promoted” by the Teutonic Order.<sup>159</sup> In 1569, Lithuania signed the Union of Lublin in which Poland and Lithuania created a single state: the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This union was strongly in favour of Poland, which had the chance to push Lithuania into this treaty because it feared the fast advancing Russians. The Union of Lublin made clear who had the political predominance in this commonwealth, namely Poland. Afterwards the Polish influence in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania grew stronger and stronger as Poland initiated its language as a vehicle of culture and religion.<sup>160</sup>

In 1791, Lithuania suffered the loss of its autonomous state and became a part of the Polish state. Shortly afterwards, in 1795, during the third partition of Poland, the whole nation declined and the Russian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, and Habsburg Austria divided up the lands of the former commonwealth among themselves. From then on, the forced Russification process began in large parts of the two countries.<sup>161</sup> By then the Lithuanians

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<sup>158</sup> Tomas Janekianas and Kristina Baubinaite, In Search for the Optimal Regional Alliance: Strategic Partnership between Lithuania and Poland in: Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2005, 2006, Lithuanian Military Academy, Vilnius, p.75-91

<sup>159</sup> Cf. Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 25

<sup>160</sup> Cf. Idem, p. 26

<sup>161</sup> Cf. Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 85/86

were seen as different speaking Poles, thus the Polish influence couldn't be denied any longer. In the following years a process of alienation occurred between the two nations.<sup>162</sup>

After World War I, the relations grew particularly tense since Lithuania proclaimed independence and the Vilnius region became the problem case between the two countries. This region was always densely populated by Poles and was also part of Poland from time to time. On the other hand, it was Lithuania's largest city, with a significant economic importance to the new state. Furthermore, Germany engaged itself in this conflict and was eager to limit Polish influence in the region.<sup>163</sup>

Nevertheless, in October 1920 Polish armed forces occupied Vilnius and the eastern part of Lithuania, which caused the state of war for several years between the two countries.<sup>164</sup> Interestingly, in most historic outlines of Lithuania, Lithuanian scientists are coy about the fact that during the interwar period Vilnius was not part of the independent Lithuania the entire time.

In 1939/1940, both Lithuania and Poland became once again a pawn in the hands of the powerful when Hitler and Stalin agreed on the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, better known as the Molotow - Ribbentrop Pact, which included the division of Northern and Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. Since then Poland and Lithuania were under the changing rule of Germany and the Soviet Union.

Another topic between Lithuania and Poland that is willingly kept under wraps is the "Armia Krajowa", and if this topic is discussed, the Poles and Lithuanians do not have the same position.<sup>165</sup> "Armia Krajowa" was a Polish partisan movement that fought for the independence of the eastern part of Lithuania from the Germans, the Soviets and more or less the Lithuanians.

For both countries the Soviet Communist dominance began after 1945. Lithuania became part of the Soviet Union and although Poland remained a nation on its own, it still was under Soviet rule.

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<sup>162</sup> Cf. Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht, p. 86

<sup>163</sup> Cf. Marianne Bienhold, Die Entstehung des Litauischen Staates in den Jahren 1918-1919 im Spiegel Deutscher Akten, 1976, Brockmeyer, Bochum, p. 115 et seq.

<sup>164</sup> Cf. Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht, p. 86

<sup>165</sup> Cf. the articles of Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht, p. 87 and Mieczysław Jackiewicz, Litauen und Polen aus polnischer Sicht, p.104 both in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln



To put it in a nutshell, Poland and Lithuania shared a common history for centuries, which was often dictated by foreign rule. Thus, they share the same inveterate fear of being overrun or pretermitted by a big power.

## 6.2 Transformation

The transformation process into consolidated democracies of Poland and Lithuania share some similarities, but first I want to shed some light on the two movements which initiated the transformation in the first place: Solidarność and Sąjūdis

Though the two movements arose from totally different backgrounds, their characteristics are related. Solidarność was a labour union, which promoted the betterment and rights of workers and was not directed at the government at first. Sąjūdis, on the other hand, arose from a movement that supported Glasnost in Lithuania and which was political from the beginning, but foremost not against the Communist Party. Due to their different backgrounds, they chose different instruments of protest, strikes and demonstrations. Nevertheless, they both had similar claims like eventual independence and achieved the enforcement of free elections through peaceful means. New parties derived from Solidarność and Sąjūdis<sup>166</sup>, which lost influence over time, but were essential in the process of transformation.

Both movements shaped the Polish and Lithuanian states and gave them state systems with a similar character.<sup>167</sup>

Table 7: Characteristics of Solidarność and Sąjūdis

| Solidarność  | Sąjūdis  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The founding-activity emanated from the people</li> <li>• The movement was not political at first</li> <li>• The instrument of protest was going on strike</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The movement emanated from the people</li> <li>• The movement was political from the beginning</li> <li>• The instrument of protest was demonstrations</li> </ul> |

<sup>166</sup> Cf. Joachim Tauber, Das politische System Litauens in: Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas, W. Ismayr (Ed.), 2004, 2nd Edition, UTB, Wiesbaden, p. 171

<sup>167</sup> Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 55

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The movement questioned the leading role of the (communist) party</li> <li>• The movement enforced free elections</li> <li>• New parties derived from Solidarność</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The movement questioned the leading role of the (communist) party</li> <li>• The movement enforced free elections</li> <li>• New parties derived from Sąjūdis</li> </ul> |
|---|---|

*Source:* Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 40 and 48/49

The revivification of the Polish-Lithuanian relations began in the '80s on behalf of the Catholic church and the Pope.<sup>168</sup> The Catholic Church always had a great influence in both countries since the Christianization in the 15<sup>th</sup> century and played an important role in the transformation process.<sup>169</sup> The church enjoys a high reputation in both states (for Lithuania see Chapter 3.4.) and both states have a very high rate of Catholics (Lithuania 79% in 2001<sup>170</sup>, Poland 89% in 2002<sup>171</sup>). The Church influenced the values under which the transformation took place.

Poland and Lithuania both had to find their place in global relations and from the beginning it was clear to both of them that they wanted to belong to Europe and not be related to the Russian Federation or to the CIS.<sup>172</sup> The Russian Federation as such is a highly emotional topic for both countries as they relate everything Russian to the Soviet Union. Gregor Ryssel even speaks of "hatred"<sup>173</sup> towards the Russian Federation because of the forced ward of the Soviet Government. Furthermore the Russian troops that were stationed in both countries until 1993 tightened their relationship to the Russian Federation even more.

<sup>168</sup> Cf. Mieczysław Jackiewicz, Litauen und Polen aus polnischer Sicht, p. 106

<sup>169</sup> Cf. Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 39

<sup>170</sup> Lithuanian Catholic Network, The Percentage of Lithuanian Catholics 1990-2001 in: <http://www.lcn.lt/en/bl/istorija/5/> 27<sup>th</sup> July 2009

<sup>171</sup> CIA – The World Factbook, Poland in: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html> 18th of June 2010

<sup>172</sup> Laure Paquette, NATO and Eastern Europe after 2000, Strategic Interactions with Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, 2001, Nova Science Publ., Huntington, NY, p. 37/38

<sup>172</sup> Cf. Rokas Bernotas, Der Aktuelle Stand der litauischen Außenpolitik in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 81/82

<sup>173</sup> Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 71

Both countries see themselves as a bridge between the East and the West and like the idea of the leadership in the region.<sup>174</sup>

### 6.3 Foreign Policy

At first glance it doesn't seem self-evident that Poland, a country with over thirty-eight million inhabitants, and Lithuania, with not even four million people, have very similar foreign policies. However, looking deeper into the matter this becomes obvious.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, Poland and Lithuania had the same fears and the same enemy. It was crucial for both countries to restore their independence and their international recognition.<sup>175</sup> This was more difficult for Lithuania, because it was part of the Soviet Union and not a nation of its own. Nevertheless, they both feared that Russia would dictate its terms, or even more frighteningly, that Russia would use military force to restore the old system after gaining back its strength, particularly since both countries had Russian troops stationed in Poland<sup>176</sup> and Lithuania<sup>177</sup> until their phased withdrawal was completed in the summer of 1993. Furthermore, a total breakdown of the Russian Federation was another suspected scenario, which would have toppled the transformation to consolidated democracies in the whole region.<sup>178</sup>

Foreign policy as such was a blank page to both states since it was dictated by the Soviet Union for decades. Poland had at least some diplomatic relations to and embassies in other countries, whereas Lithuania had not even those. Nevertheless, Lithuania had the most diplomatic ties compared to the other Baltic states.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Cf. Aleksander Smolar, Introduction in: Poland's Foreign Policy: Continuation or Brake with the Past?, 2004, Discussion, Stefan Bartory Foundation, Warsaw, p. 8

Cf. President Artūras Paulauskas, Lithuania's New Foreign Policy in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 13/14, 2004, p. 11 et seq.

<sup>175</sup> Cf. Rokas Bernotas, Der Aktuelle Stand der litauischen Außenpolitik in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 80

<sup>176</sup> Cf. Jacek Cichocki / Wojciech Konończuk, Polen und seine östlichen Nachbarn Das Verhältnis seit 1989 in: [http://www.bpb.de/themen/LG5Z1Y,0,0,Polen\\_und\\_seine\\_%F6stlichen\\_Nachbarn.html](http://www.bpb.de/themen/LG5Z1Y,0,0,Polen_und_seine_%F6stlichen_Nachbarn.html) 15th June 2010

<sup>177</sup> Cf. Romuald Misiunas, National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic states in: The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, F. Starr, The international Politics of Eurasia I, 1994, Sharpe, Armonite, NY, p.108/109

<sup>178</sup> Cf. Romuald Misiunas, National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic states, p.103

<sup>179</sup> Cf. Romuald Misiunas, National Identity and Foreign Policy in the Baltic states, p.103

As you can see in table 8, Poland and Lithuania agreed on almost the same foreign policy strategy in the '90s. In both countries the political parties agreed on the aspiration of a membership to the EU and NATO.<sup>180</sup> Like most states in transformation, assuring their security was one of their major concerns and both trusted NATO the most to safeguard their nation.<sup>181</sup> EU membership, on the other hand, was important for a different reason. Economic reasons were a determining factor, combined with the desired alignment with Western Europe. Poland and Lithuania wanted to state clearly their commitment to Europe and to distinguish themselves from the Russian Federation as much as possible. Furthermore, the friendly relations between the Bonn/Berlin - Moskow axis were feared because they brought back some negative memories of the Molotow-Ribbentrop pact<sup>182</sup> and being part of the European community provided additional security.

Table 8: Foreign policy goals of Poland and Lithuania in the '90s:

| <b>Poland</b> <sup>183</sup>   | <b>Lithuania</b> <sup>184</sup>   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• consolidation of state security and national independence</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• national sovereignty and national security</li> </ul>      |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• economic and social development of the country</li> </ul>             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• economic growth and social development</li> </ul>          |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• development of a suitable position for Poland in the world</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• prevention of smuggling and illegal immigration</li> </ul> |

Needless to say, after the accession of the EU and NATO the foreign policy of both states changed, but nevertheless the similarities remained. Naturally now they concentrate now naturally more on European policy and global relations: especially their relations to the US are crucial for Poland and Lithuania likewise. Also remarkable is their emphasis on relations to other countries in their region, in which they both want to act as a mediator. Interestingly,

<sup>180</sup> Cf. Aukse Balcytiene, Changing Role of Media in Post-Communist Lithuania, Working Papers in International Journalism, No.2, 2002, Projekt Verlag, Bochum, p.16 and

Cf. Poland's road to NATO in: The Warsaw Voice, November 2008, <http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/19144/article> 15th June 2010

<sup>181</sup> Cf. Zenonas Namavičius, Die litauisch-polnischen Beziehungen aus litauischer Sicht in: in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 89

<sup>182</sup> Cf. Gregor Ryssel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 68

<sup>183</sup> Laure Paquette, NATO and Eastern Europe after 2000, Strategic Interactions with Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, 2001, Nova Science Publ., Huntington, NY, p. 38

<sup>184</sup> Rokas Bernotas, Der Aktuelle Stand der litauischen Außenpolitik in: Litauen Nachbar im Osten, J. Hackmann (Ed.) Travemünder Protokolle Band 1, 1996, Mare Balticum, Köln, p. 80 et seq.

Poland as well as Lithuania stated aspirations of leadership in the region, which is obviously more realistic from Poland's point of view than from Lithuania's.<sup>185</sup>

Table 9: Foreign policy goals of Poland and Lithuania after 2004:

| <b>Poland</b> <sup>186</sup>   | <b>Lithuania</b> <sup>187</sup>   |
|--|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• relations with the countries in its region</li> </ul>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• relations with countries in the region, bridge the East and the West</li> </ul>          |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• European policy</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• European policy</li> </ul>   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• transatlantic or global relations (esp. NATO and the US)</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthening Euro-Atlantic Alliance, EU-Russia relations and EU-US relations</li> </ul> |

Another characteristic that both foreign policies share is that they are strongly connected to the history of both states and are therefore often highly emotional. And as Aleksander Smolar states, the “combination of emotions and foreign policy is hazardous”. Especially any item concerning the Russian Federation Poland and Lithuania tend not to be objective, but instead they hear an assault on their countries.<sup>188</sup>

The fact that the fear for their security and the fear to be overrun is still alive, even after 2004 and their memberships in the EU and NATO, is shown by the following citations.

“For the first time in several hundred years no external threat hangs over Poland. Poland's security, to many previous generations of poles an unattainable dream calls for constant vigilance.”<sup>189</sup> “We [Lithuanians] should defend our national interests and [...] avoid a situation where we are made an item of trade or other states pursue their interests at our expense”<sup>190</sup>

<sup>185</sup> Cf. Aleksander Smolar, Introduction in: Poland's Foreign Policy: Continuation or Brake with the Past?, 2004, Discussion, Stefan Bartory Foundation, Warsaw, p. 8

<sup>186</sup> Aleksander Smolar, Introduction in: Poland's Foreign Policy: Continuation or Brake with the Past?, 2004, Discussion, Stefan Bartory Foundation, Warsaw, p. 14

<sup>187</sup> President Artūras Paulauskas, Lithuania's New Foreign Policy in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 13/14, 2004, p. 11 et seq.

<sup>188</sup> Cf. Gregor Rysel, Innenpolitische Demokratisierungsprozesse und grenzüberschreitende Vernetzung der Bevölkerung als Motor einer zukünftigen Stabilisierung und Intensivierung der polnisch-litauischen Beziehungen, 1997, Univ. Diss., Bonn, p. 70/71

<sup>189</sup> Laure Paquette, NATO and Eastern Europe after 2000, Strategic Interactions with Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, 2001, Nova Science Publ., Huntington, NY, p. 42

<sup>190</sup> President Artūras Paulauskas, Lithuania's New Foreign Policy in: Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, Vol. 13/14, 2004, p. 11

## 7 Russia as an Important Factor

“It is said that Russia is the biggest obstacle to NATO expansion to the Baltic states. The Baltic states certainly think so [...]”<sup>191</sup>. According to that it is necessary to look at the Russian NATO relations and the Russian Baltic relations concerning NATO enlargement. It shall be explained why Lithuania’s NATO membership did cause the Russian Federation headaches and why did Russia decide nonetheless not to block the expansion. For this reason the chapter largely bases on NATO-Russian relations because “Russia’s attitude towards NATO enlargement [...] is only part of Russia’s attitude towards, and Russia’s perception of NATO as such.”<sup>192</sup>

### 7.1 Historic Aversion

Moscow’s extremely negative reaction towards the first and especially the second wave of NATO enlargement is closely connected with the image the Soviet Union established of NATO during the Cold War.

Even Gorbachev’s Perestroika, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following so called “honeymoon with the West”<sup>193</sup> at the beginning of Yeltsin era didn’t change the original image Russia had of this transatlantic security organization essentially. It is a quite paradox phenomenon, because former enemies, such as United States or Germany, were no longer regarded as hostile countries. NATO was still viewed as a potentially anti-Russian coalition and it was more or less seen as a collective enemy. The fact that NATO is a powerful alliance with, back then, 16 highly developed Western states, with mechanisms that linked the United

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<sup>191</sup> Daniel Austin, *NATO Expansion and the Baltic States*, Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 1999, Surrey, p. 1

<sup>192</sup> Vladimir Baranovsky, *NATO Enlargement: Russia’s Attitudes*, speech for IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, July 2001, Brussels

<sup>193</sup> Alexei K. Pushkov, *A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options*, NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C., p.123

States to their allies in Europe, made it more ominous and threatening than any single Western state, even the before mentioned United States or Germany.<sup>194</sup>

Of course strong Russia's attitude was merely inherited from history. The creation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 was portrayed as a security response to NATO, which was established seven years earlier. And even until the early 1990s the Soviet political literature described NATO as "a military bloc of capitalist countries under American leadership, directed against USSR and other peaceful countries"<sup>195</sup>. The Hungarian reformers 1956 and the initiators of Pragues Spring 1968-69 were accused of having intended to leave the Warsaw Pact and join NATO instead and destroy the social commonwealth.

More than three generations of Russians and especially political people – including diplomats, journalists, military officers, government and party officials – were brought up to strongly believe in this paradigm. Although fewer and fewer Soviet citizens believed that NATO would launch a military attack against Soviet Union or any of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact, the negative attitude changed woefully little.

One of the reasons why the image of NATO was barely possible to destroy was the Leninist concept of two camps inside the world's bourgeoisie<sup>196</sup>: one militarist, aggressive camp and one pacifist camp. This idea was brought to new life under the Khrushchev era and they divided the West into the "realistic and moderate forces" and the "aggressive and militaristic circles". Naturally and automatically NATO fell into the second category and NATO was by definition the stronghold of the most militaristic circles in the West.

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<sup>194</sup> Cf. Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C.

<sup>195</sup> Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C., p. 124

<sup>196</sup> Cf. Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C.

## 7.2 NATO – Russian Relations after the Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991-1993)

During the first two years of Yeltsin's rule, the more or less liberal political establishment of Russia did not consider NATO as a serious problem. The general approach towards the West and adjustment of Russia's foreign policy especially concerning the Western countries was seen as much more significant and necessary.<sup>197</sup>

It was hard enough to change the purely communistic foreign policy, which was full of anti-Western heritage, radically into a more moderate form and get rid of the remnants of the communist system. It was a remarkable change to a distinct pro western policy promoted especially by Yeltsin, Kozyrev and the members of "Democratic Russia". They also sought a way to start integration into international economic and financial institutions with regard to the national debt.<sup>198</sup>

Russia even joined North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) and started to increase and intensify their ties with NATO.

But relating to NATO it is essential to say that Russia believed very much that NATO would change after the end of Cold War, because it has lost its main threat.<sup>199</sup> That its main focus would be on disarmament and it would concentrate on the remaining threats outside of Europe (e.g. the Middle East). Russia didn't think that NATO would still maintain their priorities in Europe.

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev labeled this era as a "romantic period"<sup>200</sup> in Russian foreign policy and set high hopes on Western assistance.

But this so called "honeymoon" with the West was soon over, to be precise at the end of 1992, when the West made it clear that it had no mind to see Russia as a close ally, after such a short time after emerging from 70 years of communism.

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<sup>197</sup> Cf. Margot Light, Foreign Policy Thinking in: N. Malcolm (Ed.), Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, 1996, Oxford, p.33

<sup>198</sup> Cf. Wolfgang Wilhelmi, Die Politik der Rußländischen Föderation gegenüber dem „Nahen Ausland“, Nomos Verlags Gesellschaft, 2002, Baden-Baden, p.47/48

<sup>199</sup> Cf. Vladimir Baranovsky, NATO Enlargement: Russia's Attitudes, speech for IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, July 2001, Brussels

<sup>200</sup> Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C., p. 126



So as the West was not willing to grant Russia a place in their own arms markets the opposite happened, Washington insisted that Moscow would drop some of its intended deals, for example China.

When the situation between the Western countries and Russia grew tense, the support for Kozyrev's foreign policy nearly disappeared and the conservatives and communists in the Supreme Soviet criticized him sharply.<sup>201</sup>

Debates began, especially in the US, concerning NATO's future and by the summer of 1993 the governments of Central and Eastern Europe started to prepare the ground for joining NATO. This idea was widely accepted and supported meanwhile in the West as they saw a need to enlarge towards Eastern Europe to ensure stability in Europe. On the contrary Russia was kept out of their considerations.

On August 26<sup>th</sup> 1993 President Yeltsin said his famous statement in Warsaw that Eastern European countries are free to join any alliance they consider necessary and changed the pretext of NATO enlargement from theoretical to practical. Moscow tried immediately and desperately to relativize Yeltsin's saying.<sup>202</sup>

### **7.3 Russia's Fears and Threats in General towards the Enlargement**

- Isolation and Exclusion:

Russia felt betrayed by the West and NATO, because they were treated differently from other Eastern European countries.<sup>203</sup> NATO even considered Ukraine, not only a former socialist state, but also a former USSR state, to become a member of the alliance, but Russia was not part of the European or Western community still.

Russia was deeply concerned and it feared that the Western countries were trying to profit from its weakness because it was no longer a world power. The conservatives criticized that

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<sup>201</sup> Cf. Wolfgang Wilhelmi, Die Politik der Rußländischen Föderation gegenüber dem „Nahen Ausland“, Nomos Verlags Gesellschaft, 2002, Baden-Baden, p.48-51

<sup>202</sup> Cf. Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C., p. 124

<sup>203</sup> Cf. Vladimir Baranovsky, NATO Enlargement: Russia's Attitudes, speech for IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, July 2001, Brussels

Russia was leaning too much towards the West and they get the paycheck as NATO would still remain a militaristic, aggressive alliance.<sup>204</sup>

The liberal pro-Western democrats were not so much concerned about NATO as a threat to Russia but they felt eliminated by the “civilized world”. They were more or less hurt by the fact that Russia tried to move decisively to the West and in return the West turned away from it. The western countries decided to not embrace Russia, but to strengthen NATO.

The enlargement would change the geopolitical configuration of Europe in an unfavorable way for Russia.

- Moving NATO Troops Closer to Russia:

Not only would a part of the former Soviet Union come under Western influence, but the threat that NATO would gain new allies right beside Russian borders was strong.<sup>205</sup> NATO would be able to post their troops at strategic points near Russia. If NATO wished they could overrun Russia easily, as they would have military bases along the whole western border of the Russian Federation. Russia just managed to gain a more or less trustworthy relationship with its former enemies, but how would that be possible if Russia would be surrounded by NATO?

- Loosing Influence:

Russia had a very hard time (and still has) to realize that it is not a world power anymore and that the world is no longer bipolar even if they still preferred it to be. Extremely hurting was to see that they also lost influence in their former Soviet Union member states and that the power of the Western alliance will be unavoidable. The Russian Federation wanted to have at least ensured the possibility of co-decision in Europe, but would this be possible if a couple of former socialist and USSR countries would have seats and even veto-rights in NATO? Russia would have liked that the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) act as a “counterbalance” in the East under the patronage of Russia. Russia still felt it would be the “big brother”.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Cf. Graeme P. Herd, *Russia-Baltic Relations, 1991-1999: Characteristics & Evolution*, Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 1999, Surrey, p.3

<sup>205</sup> Cf. Vladimir Baranovsky, *NATO Enlargement: Russia's Attitudes*, speech for IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, July 2001, Brussels

<sup>206</sup> Cf. Vladimir Baranovsky, *NATO Enlargement: Russia's Attitudes*, speech for IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, July 2001, Brussels

Every one of that issues bothered the Russian Federation, but “when they are all considered together, this creates a critical mass of negative attitudes making Russia feel particular depressed. Such political and even psychological frustrations represent the source of Russia’s vigorous (although not always coherent) opposition [to NATO]”<sup>207</sup>.

Regarding Russia’s fears it also thought of a couple of “counter measure” reactions to NATO expansion towards the East.<sup>208</sup>

- Building a CIS military based counter-alliance
- Re-deploying armed forces in the western areas of Russia
- Targeting East Central Europe with nuclear weapons
- Developing strategic partnership with anti-Western regimes

Luckily none of them was realized as such, because the pressure of the international community would have been too heavy and Russia would have destroyed his foreign relations with every Western country. The results would have also been disastrous in economic trade for Russia.

Political Scientists found at least five factors which prevent the Russian Federation from setting out on this path. These were true especially in the 90s:<sup>209</sup>

- Its economic weakness
- Its dependence on Western financial sources and investments
- The necessity to integrate in to the world economy by becoming part of international economic and financial institutions
- The desire to be part of global decision making (G-7)
- The weakness of its military and the absence of belligerent attitudes in society

Of course all these mentioned factors changed a lot during the 90s and for example energy issues became one of the factors which are clearly favorable for Russia. Through this they can put a lot of pressure on European countries as needed.

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<sup>207</sup> Vladimir Baranovsky, NATO Enlargement: Russia’s Attitudes, speech for IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, July 2001, Brussels

<sup>208</sup> Kazimierz Malak, Russia towards Enlarging NATO in: Security Political Dialogue 1999 Vol.2, 2001, Vienna

<sup>209</sup> Cf. Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C., p.135

## 7.4 Further Development in Russian – NATO Relations

Right after the shock of the announcement of the willing to expand NATO to the East of Europe, leaving out Russia, the talks and debates about joining the Partnership for Peace (PFP) were very tense.

But nevertheless NATO and the Russian Federation officially signed the PFP declaration in January 1994. Foreign Minister Kozyrev made nearly every effort during the negotiations with NATO to make clear that Russia wanted at least a postponing of the enlargement. So it is very obvious how pleased Kozyrev was when NATO decided to adopt a slow approach to the expansion.<sup>210</sup> The Russian federation also joined the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC).

The earlier tension grew visible again during the war in former Yugoslavia and with NATO intervention. The Russian public opinion opposed the planned NATO attacks to stop the Serbs as Russian diplomats tried hard to reach a more diplomatic and “peaceful” solution with the Serbs.

NATO on the contrary was flying air strikes against the Serbs without even informing Moscow and Yeltsin was hurt, not so much as the defender of the Serbs, but more as the leader of a great power who had not been notified of a major international action on which Moscow had uttered serious doubts and concerns. But after the initial frustration Russia even supported the air strikes, although the feeling of uneasiness concerning the Expansion of NATO grew stronger.

When the first war in Chechnya was shocking the international community the tension grew intense once again.

At the end of 1996, NATO – Russian dialogue entered a new stage, measured both by the intensity of mutual contacts and new proposals on mutual relations. On May 27<sup>th</sup> 1997 in

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<sup>210</sup> Cf. Alexei K. Pushkov, A View from Russia in: J. Simon (Ed.), NATO Enlargement, Opinions and Options, NDU Press, 1995, Washington D.C., p. 129

Paris the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation” was signed.<sup>211</sup>

Although at the end of 1997, when the new NATO candidate countries signed the agreement for their admission to NATO, negative feelings towards the enlargement still remained very obvious.

“Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov [...] reiterated his country's opposition to NATO expansion but said, it would not "keep harping on" it. Speaking on arrival in Brussels, where Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic earlier signed protocols clearing the way for their admission to NATO, Primakov said, "We continue to take a negative view of the expansion of NATO and we do not want to see this. At the same time, we are not going to keep harping on about these issues. So we are going to have a serious discussion. As for the interests of those countries which are joining NATO or are signing up, we'll just have to wait and see, as they say." His remarks were broadcasted by Russian NTV television.”<sup>212</sup>

## 7.5 Why not the Baltic States?

- Former Soviet Union member states:

The Baltic States were not “independent” socialist countries, like Czech Republic, Poland or Hungary, on the contrary they were part of the former Soviet Union – they belonged to the core countries of Russia. So it was even more hurting when the Russian federation had to realize that they would lose one of the “little brothers” – their “near abroad”.

Russia wanted to see the Baltic States as a part of the CIS family, but they refused. Instead they “deserted” to the Western enemies and NATO. Russia would sustain the loss of its influence on the Baltics and therefore it felt even more excluded.<sup>213</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> NATO's relations with Russia in: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50090.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm) 20th August 2009

<sup>212</sup> See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/40233.stm> on December 16th 1997

<sup>213</sup> Cf. Wolfgang Wilhelmi, Die Politik der Rußländischen Föderation gegenüber dem „Nahen Ausland“, Nomos Verlags Gesellschaft, 2002, Baden-Baden, p.51-62

- “Buffer zone” against NATO:

This was more a problem concerning military security, because Russia saw the Baltic States as a buffer zone against NATO, but now NATO would be able to post military bases right in front of the western borders of the Russian Federation.

- Russian Minorities:<sup>214</sup>

The tremendous Russian speaking minorities bared a lot of problems even before. Russia used them before as a counter argument on why they are not willing to withdraw all their troops in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Especially in Estonia and Latvia the Russian minorities were up to 30% of the population and Russia insisted that they have an obligation to protect them. The public opinion of the Russian speaking minorities was divided. A lot of them were not in favor of the enlargement and would have preferred stronger ties with Russia instead of the new alliance with the West, but the supporters of the Expansion were not that small either. They saw themselves not as Russian but felt like citizens of Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia.

- Border issues:

The border issues concerning Lithuania are very much linked to Kaliningrad Oblast, but Estonia and Latvia had some problems of their own.<sup>215</sup>

There are tensions between Latvia and Russia over border issues. The two countries have yet to sign a treaty formally delineating the border because they haven't agreed on every term. Actually the Estonians and Russian had already agreed on the borders, but as you can see in the following Russia is not really reliable on that. In 2005 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced during a visit to Helsinki that the Russian Federation had decided to revoke its signature from the border agreements it signed with the Estonian government in Moscow. The move came just one week after the Estonian Riigikogu ratified the border document which slightly amends the border that has been used since Estonia regained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

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<sup>214</sup> cf. Andris Spruds, *Minority Issues in the Baltic States in the Context of the NATO Enlargement*, NATO Individual Research Fellowship, Final Report, Riga Stradina University, Riga

<sup>215</sup> Cf. Graeme P. Herd, *Russia-Baltic Relations, 1991-1999: Characteristics & Evolution*, Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 1999, Surrey, p.4

- Kaliningrad:

“The problem with this half-forgotten enclave of Russia is that for historical reasons it is diplomatically highly sensitive. The break-up of the Soviet Union left Kaliningrad, home to 950,000 Russians, as an isolated outpost with its road and rail connections to Russia passing through Lithuanian territory.”<sup>216</sup> Kaliningrad is still of great strategic importance to Moscow. It houses the Russian Baltic Fleet at the port of Baltiysk and is the country's only European ice-free port.

Nevertheless Russia and Lithuania managed to agree on the borders of Kaliningrad with the help of the European Union in 2003. They also agreed on Visa issues and the transit of civilians and military personnel.<sup>217</sup>

## **7.7 The Enlargement still Happened**

It was significant that before NATO and EU took their decisions in 2002, they were eager to manage to develop further their “partnership relations” with the Russian Federation.

NATO and Russia had their co-operation in the Project for Peace on the one hand and on the other even more important they signed a formal partnership agreement during the Rome Summit of May 2002 – an agreement, which would involve Russia in all of NATO’s decision making, except the core of collective defence, which are enshrined in Article V. This was the Establishment of NATO Russian Council.<sup>218</sup> This NATO Russia Council was a milestone in the relations between NATO and the Russian Federation. The US and Russia were willing to form a corporate alliance after the attacks of 9/11 in their joint war on terrorism.

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<sup>216</sup> Daniel Austin, NATO Expansion and the Baltic States, Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 1999, Surrey, p. 10

<sup>217</sup> Transit from/to Kaliningrad Region in: <http://www.euro.lt/en/lithuanias-membership-in-the-eu/transit-from-to-kaliningrad-region/> 18<sup>th</sup> December 2010

<sup>218</sup> NATO’s relations with Russia in: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_50090.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm) 20th August 2009

### **Realist School of thought:**

If you bear in mind the realistic model<sup>219</sup> Russia agreed not because of the power of institutions like NATO as such, it was more likely that it just couldn't suppress the realisation of the US as a "hyper power". We have also to consider that the US made it clear a couple times that they would support the expansion either way. America took the tough position the enlargement would take place in spite of Moscow's veto so the Russian Federation tried to realize as many advantages as they could, but not kick over the traces with its demand to consent to the expansion.

### **Liberal School of thought:**

Following the Liberal Model<sup>220</sup> you could argue that Russian decision makers are increasingly following the "logic of interdependence", especially in terms of economic and political means in the increasingly globalised world of today. They depend on the European and Western markets for trade and they would have risked heavy losses in their field of exportations.

Both schools have its plausible explanations and they do not exclude each other. On the contrary the truth is lying somewhere in the middle. Russia depends as much nowadays on the United States as on the European Union and NATO.

But the relations between Russia and NATO were still on rocky ground and from time to time Russia has outbursts to push through their demands. We can see it on the example of an BBC article about the resolution of the Duma concerning NATO enlargement.

"The Duma's tough resolution was supported by 305 deputies, with only 41 voting against and also two abstentions. The document said NATO's move eastwards contradicted a pledge to enhance the alliance's co-operation with Russia in counterterrorism, peacekeeping and other areas contained in an agreement signed in 2002. It also warned that Russia may revise a promise to limit troop numbers in its Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, and the north-western Pskov region near Estonia, if NATO tried to change the military-political balance in the whole region.

"Common responses to modern global challenges don't require a build-up of weapons on the

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<sup>219</sup> Cf. Christiane Lemke, *Internationale Beziehungen*, 2008, Oldenburg, München/Wien, p. 15

<sup>220</sup> Cf. Christiane Lemke, *Internationale Beziehungen*, 2008, Oldenburg, München/Wien, p. 21-23



territories of Russia's neighbours," the resolution said. The Duma said it would also recommend the government to strengthen Russia's nuclear deterrent and consider the deployment of additional troops on the country's western borders. Earlier the same week, the US ambassador to NATO, Nick Burns, said there was no sense of a crisis in relations with Russia over the expansion. Mr Burns also said NATO had no intention of deploying substantial forces in any new member country. <sup>221</sup>

Another possible answer is that Russia doesn't see NATO and the membership of the Baltic States as threat anymore, because the whole institution of NATO has changed. The Baltic States no longer join the hard security alliance anymore.

NATO isn't the "old" NATO anymore; at the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR, the war on terrorism and the wide expansion to the East of Europe, NATO had to change its perspectives and find new challenges. They are no longer that much focused on collective defence, but are now more and more interested in "out of area" problems (e.g. Dafur).

The Russian leadership was not so frightening anymore especially in a military point of view and leading to a much more "relaxed" attitude at the end of the discussions of the second wave of enlargement.

## **7.7 Conclusion**

The attitude towards the eastward expansion of NATO was and is still very much connected with Moscow's attitude in general towards NATO.

It was not easy for Russia to overcome historic aversion concerning NATO and the Western countries and it was even harder to expect that the bipolar world setting with Russia as one of the super powers has come to an end. Russia lost its influence in a region, which was especially painful, because it was a former Soviet Union state and Russia's "near abroad".

Russia had to expect that it depends on the one hand on the United States and on the other on institutions like NATO and the EU. Russia is able to put pressure on the Western countries when it comes to the energy issue, but it still has to be part of the globalised world.

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<sup>221</sup> See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3587717.stm> on April 1st 2004

When the Russian leaders saw that the expansion was unavoidable, they tried to gain as much favor as possible; in NATO and the NATO Russian Council with some concessions even of the United States. Of course NATO as an organization as such has changed and it is not the hard security alliance it was fifteen years ago and less a threat to Russian security.

In order to have good relations both with NATO and the Baltic States the desecuritisation of Russian foreign politics would be essential, but it is arguable if this will really happen, since having imperialistic goals is popular under Russian leaders more than ever. In addition to that you get the feeling that especially this imperialistic politics and the thinking of a “Near Abroad” once again made Putin and Medwedew so popular in the Russian Federation.

## **8 Why did NATO want Lithuania as a Member State?**

The main focus of my analyses is why Lithuania wanted to join NATO, but in this chapter I want to discuss shortly on why NATO wanted Lithuania as a member state. I think it is essential to shed light on the perspective from NATO and also from NATO's super power, the United States.

What were the advantages of the Treaty Organisation and why it was seen as a high risk at first and why did NATO take it either way.

### **8.1 Stability**

In the early 90ies the discussion about an enlargement of NATO concerning former Socialist states and even former Soviet Union states was heated and feared. As Magenheimer wrote scholars were sceptical where these states and the Russian Federation were heading, they even feared a renaissance of Marxism and Leninism.<sup>222</sup>

Furthermore the war in former Yugoslavia had just broken out and similar scenarios were feared to take place in the other Eastern states. There were also battles in the Caucasus Region between Russia and Georgia and it was not clear if some of the Russian constituent republics would want to leave the Russian Federation.<sup>223</sup>

The integration of the Eastern European states is a track record, but it should not be forgotten that the future seemed unpredictable for these countries in the early 90ies.

Not only was the West uncertain how these states would develop, but also Lithuania was not sure where it should head. Russia offered all the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, a membership in the CIS, as well as it offering security guarantees to the Baltic

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<sup>222</sup> Cf. Heinz Magenheimer, *Politik, Strategie und die Osterweiterung der NATO*, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 1997, Wien

<sup>223</sup> Cf. E-mail correspondence with Reinhard Vesper, October 2009

States even in 1997.<sup>224</sup> In 1997 it was clear that Lithuania would resolutely reject the offers, as a few years early it would have caused public debates.

For NATO and the Western countries in general it was soon evidently that promising NATO membership would stabilize these countries on one hand and on the other pave their way to the West and not back to Russia.

„That move [,the acceptance of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia,] would, in one stroke, increase stability from the Baltics to the Balkans.“<sup>225</sup>

Veser stated also that „die Bereitschaft von EU und - anfangs mit Einschränkungen - Nato, diese Länder aufzunehmen, waren meines Erachtens ein Faktor, wenn nicht sogar der entscheidende Grund dafür, dass die Entwicklung dort stabil und demokratisch verlaufen ist.“<sup>226</sup>

But not only assured NATO membership the stability of the region by integrating the former Soviet states into the West, but also NATO now had control as far as the Russian border. As Schwarzingger put it very strikingly, “die Kontrolle und Abdeckung des baltischen Luftraumes der NATO macht absolut Sinn. Weil das natürlich die russische Luftbewegung enorm einschränkt. So würden sie über die ganze Ostsee hin und her fliegen und die Küsten Schwedens und Dänemarks davor abschippeln, und so drehen sie schon über baltischen Boden um. Das ist schon ein großer Unterschied.”<sup>227</sup>

## 8.2 Coalition Partner

The other most evident advantage for NATO and especially for the United States is that they have now one more ally country in „New-Europe”.

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<sup>224</sup> Atis Lejins, The “Twin Enlargements” and Baltic Security: Prospects of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century in: Paul Luif (Ed.), Security in Central and Eastern Europe, Problems, Perceptions, Policies, The Laxenburg Papers No.12, 2001, Braumüller, Vienna, p. 202

<sup>225</sup> Strobe Talbott, From Prague to Baghdad – NATO at Risk in: Foreign Affairs, Vol.81 No.6, Nov/Dec 2002, New York, p. 46-57

<sup>226</sup> E-mail correspondence with Reinhard Veser, October 2009

<sup>227</sup> Cf. Interview with Dr. Michael Schwarzingger, 2nd October 2009, Vienna

They have now one more state that is easily convinced in joining the US in their opinion and intentions. “Old” Europe is not always delighted of the fidelity the CEE states show to the US, from the point of view of Lithuania and the other CEE states it is rather obvious. They see their most important ally in the US, so they will support them in every possible way.

Another important factor is that NATO now has a far larger contingent of soldiers they can send on missions. “[S]ie [steuern] da Man-Power bei und politischen Support. Und dann macht auch die Mitgliedschaft von so heterogenen Partnerländern absolut einen Sinn.“

In retrospect NATO gained a lot with the acceptance of several Eastern European countries, which was not evident at first but paid off for NATO in nearly every way.

## 9 Conclusion

### 9.1 Hypotheses

The outcomes of the study allowed testing the following five hypotheses:

1. If Lithuania still believes that Russia is a threat to their nation then Russia is one of the main reasons Lithuania joined NATO. Lithuania saw Russia as a threat throughout history and was often proven right and therefore they wanted joined a defence alliance.

The first hypotheses can be verified. The Russian Federation is still believed to be the biggest threat in the eyes of Lithuanians. Lithuania has the feeling that Russia changed their way on influencing their “Near Abroad”, but the intention stayed the same.

Russia still has a very aggressive foreign policy where they only see a few states as equal powers and Lithuania is clearly not one of them. Unfortunately Lithuania remained dependent on Russia in certain sectors, like energy resources, and in this way Russia is able to put pressure on Lithuania.

Furthermore the risk of Russia threatening Lithuania was reduced drastically with its membership in NATO and the EU.

2. If the Lithuanian identity and history played also an important role in their decision to join NATO then Lithuania wanted to set a clear signal for the Western countries that they want to belong to them and are not anymore a satellite of the Russian Federation.

This hypotheses can also be verified.

Lithuania tends to relate everything to their history which you can easily see when you read some articles. A lot of Lithuanian scholars like to point at their history in every aspect of political science. In addition to that Lithuanian identity is closely related to their history of

suppression. They are proud that they are now a part of Europe and the West which was sealed with their NATO and EU membership.

Another important aspect in choosing the West instead of Russia were the large number of Lithuanians that lived in exile in the United States. They played a crucial role in Lithuania especially after the break-down of the Soviet Union. You can see this for example in the presidency of Valdas Adamkus, who came back from the US after Lithuanians independence.

3. If the military power of their threats is as big as the one of the Russian Federation then the Lithuanian armed forces would neither have the quantity nor the quality – no matter if they stand alone nor co-operate with the other Baltic States – to protect their nation.

This hypothesis can be partly verified. Lithuania is a small state with fewer than 4 m people, so it would be impossible to build up armed forces that would withstand military attacks of a major power, like Russia, their main threat. Furthermore Lithuania's military had to be built from scratch, so the expenses were enormous in any way. Lithuania simply would not be able to afford the quality of military equipment to defend their country.

The only way I could see that would have worked was the development of joined armed forces of the three Baltic States, although Schwarzingger and Veser think that these armed forces still would be too small. Together Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have approximately 7 m people, you could compare to Switzerland. Besides, one united military would have been more affordable than three of its own. I would not have been the most conflict-free possibility, bearing in mind the different interest of these states, but in my opinion the only real alternative to NATO.

4. If Lithuania could not find another alliance or institution that would guarantee their hard security concerns then their only choice was NATO.

This hypotheses proofs to be right. In my analyses I looked at several alliances and institution and none could assure Lithuania's military security in the way NATO can/could.

Although some institutions or alliances were planned to provide help also in hard security topics, they all developed into purely soft security alliances. A lot of co-operations were founded after the Cold War but they all failed in becoming security alliances. Either the member states did not want this development because Russia was part of the co-operation or because it was not. In the 90ies the Western states were very uncertain what the outcome of the break down of the Soviet Union would be and they didn't want to provoke Russia in any way.

5. If Lithuania has NATO membership Lithuania then they believe to assure that the Western countries and especially the United States would be their allies in times of emergencies.

You can clearly say that the willingness of the Western states to help Lithuania increased with Lithuania's integration to the West. But on the other hand it is not certain if, especially the US really would help Lithuania under every circumstance. The priorities of the US have clearly shifted and it is not assured if the United States would intervene in times of crises.

6. If the parties of Lithuania would not have agreed completely upon NATO membership then the public would have considered alternatives like neutrality more.

This hypotheses can only be partly verified. Fact is that in a survey taken in 1998 on behalf of the NATO Office of Information and Press and The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania 26% think that NATO would be the best choice to guarantee the country's security and stability and 23% said it would be neutrality.<sup>228</sup> In the following years the approval of NATO membership grew, but why? All the parties in Lithuania agreed on joining NATO and favoured this decision, with the support of the media.

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<sup>228</sup> <http://www.fas.org/man/nato/national/980300-opinion.htm> 2nd March 2010



## 9.2 Theoretical Implications

A mix of Realist thoughts and Liberalist thoughts are required to fully explain Lithuania's choice of joining NATO. In a way you could say they were both right.

Lithuania as a small state reacted according to the Realists to Morgenthau's „Balance of Power“. They realised that they are not able to secure their state from possible threats on their own so they decided to join an alliance. But not only did they join an alliance they also gained an important ally within. So Lithuania acted on all the realistic implications, they joined a powerful alliance and allied with a major power.

In the eyes of Lithuania the world hasn't changed that much since the Cold War ended. They still see the Russian federation as their main and only security threat. According to that the “Balance of Power” between the US and Russia is an essential factor for them. NATO changed in the last two decades but in 2004 Lithuania hoped to join NATO as an alliance seen in Realist theory.

Liberalist theory suggest for small states to join alliances with states that have similar goals. In the late 90s Lithuania did not see the European Union as an institution that has the same goals as they have when it comes to Russia and ensuring their security against it. Therefore they saw their only solution in a military alliance and not an economic alliance.

In NATO they saw their interest represented and Lithuania also has the chance to build alliances in NATO, for example “New Europe”. In addition to that Lithuania now has close ties to Poland which is also very helpful in NATO. The US on the other hand has now new allies when it comes to their interests.

### 9.3 Outlook

Lithuania's integration to the West is terminated in so many ways, but I think it will be still a long way until Lithuania's fear of Russia, as its main threat, is effaced.

It would be very important for Lithuania to concentrate on becoming less and less dependent on Russia. I do not understand why Lithuania does not try harder to get self-sufficient regarding energy. Yes, of course, they have to get oil and gas from somewhere, but the issue of Lithuania's power plant, Ignalina, is getting absurd. It was stipulated with the EU that it has to close it with the end of 2009, but Lithuania has no planned alternative for Ignalina so far. This way its dependence on Russia will increase and Russia will have more opportunity to put pressure on Lithuania and continue not treating Lithuania as an equal partner.

The paradox that Lithuania's main energy provider is simultaneously their most feared partner does not help to solve its security issues.

Under the government of Kubilius an essential turn in Lithuania's relations with Russia took place. With Obama's famous "Reset", the government decided to loosen up their rigid view concerning its foreign policy with Russia and it will be interesting to see where this will lead.

It is questionable if NATO is still "the" NATO Lithuania wanted to join, because NATO is developing itself more and more into an organisation with less hard security issues as its main sphere of activity. Nevertheless Lithuania is well integrated into NATO operations abroad and tries to gain allies through that.

It is crucial for Lithuania how the EU will develop itself in terms of foreign and security policy. In my opinion Lithuania would be far more relieved if a joined EU security policy would be established.

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## 10.2 Interviews

### 10.2.1 Interview on 15th of September 2009 with Cornelius Hell<sup>229</sup>:

Hofmann: Zu Beginn gleich folgende Frage: Wie sehen die Litauer sich selbst bzw. wie ist das Selbstbild der Litauer? Fallen dir dazu ein paar Stichworte ein?

Hell: Mir fallen, wenn ich an die Litauer denke zwei Stichwörter ein. Das eine ist ihre Sprache, dass sie ganz stark durch die Sprache bestimmt sind. Litauer ist, wer litauisch spricht. Mitunter natürlich auch durch die Kultur und alles, was damit zusammen hängt, denn die lange Unterdrückung der Sprache hängt einfach noch nach. Und das zweite ist, dass sie stolz sind, dass sie etwas Eigenes haben. Auch wenn sie jetzt nicht mit dem alten Heidentum sympathisieren. Aber diese lange Geschichte des Heidentums, oder diese ganz unikale Geschichte mit den Bücherträgern. Solche Dinge, die stellen sie schon gerne heraus. Dass sie klein sind, aber nicht wie jeder andere, oder wie jede andere Nation.

Hofmann: Da Du das gerade mit dem Heidentum angesprochen hast. Als ich dort war habe ich mitbekommen, dass sie doch stolz darauf sind, die letzten Heiden in Europa gewesen zu sein, aber auch andererseits, dass die katholische Religion unheimlich wichtig für sie ist. Ist das auch heute noch so, oder war das vorwiegend während der Zeit der Sowjetunion?

Hell: Also, das ist, glaube ich, auch heute noch so. Natürlich verändert und nicht mehr so stark. Aber zum einen ist die katholische Kirche sicher unbeschädigt und mit einem großen moralischen Kredit aus der Sowjetunion herausgegangen, durch diese Chronik der katholischen Kirche, die längste ständig erscheinende Untergrundzeitschrift der Sowjetunion. Zum anderen durch das Verhalten vieler Priester. Natürlich ist dann auch für manche heutige Intellektuelle, die Kirche ein bisschen zu dumm, ein bisschen zu simpel. Natürlich nicht nur Landpfarrer, sondern viele Priester sind sehr schlecht ausgebildet, weil sie auch keine Möglichkeit dazu hatten. Das ist schon ein Problem.

Auf der anderen Seite gibt es hervorragende Intellektuelle unter den Priestern.

Heute am deutlichsten (Lauskris heißt er glaub ich), der am Sonntag immer die Messe in der

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Bernhardiner Kirche hält. Und wenn man sich die ganze Homepage, [www.bernhardiner.lt](http://www.bernhardiner.lt) anschaut, was es da für Dokumente gibt, welche Leute sie weit über das Christentum hinaus zusammen bringen, die dort wichtige Texte deponieren, dann ist das schon ein wichtiger Katalysator, der liberal und nicht fanatisch katholisch ist, aber eine Rolle in der Gesellschaft spielt.

Hofmann: Hat die Religion, nachdem die Religion auch etwas ist, was sie mit den Polen verbindet, auch in ihren Beziehungen zu Polen irgendwelche Auswirkungen?

Hell: Na sicher ist das bei allem, was schwierig war, schon ein Bindeglied. Und wenn man sich verbunden fühlt, ist natürlich der Katholizismus ein Absetzen zur Orthodoxie. Das auf jeden Fall.

Hofmann: Und das Radikale, dass die katholische Kirche in Polen hat, schwappt das auch ein bisschen über nach Litauen, oder hat das eigentlich überhaupt keine Bedeutung?

Hell: Nein, das habe ich eigentlich in Litauen so nie gespürt. Es hatte vielleicht in der Sowjetunion etwas, das vergleichbar war; aber das spielt heute auch keine Rolle mehr, dass die Priester wahnsinnig angesehen waren und auch relativ reich waren, weil sie so viele Spenden bekommen haben. Aber das ist wohl eher eine sowjetische Geschichte, die heute vorbei ist.

Aber eine andere Sache. Ich glaube, dass Religion und Identität im Diskurs eine Rolle spielen. Da könnte ich dir noch eine litauische Publikation sagen, über die habe ich referiert bei der Übersetzerkonferenz. Ich glaube, es gibt einen Mainstream, der es so sieht, dass der Katholizismus den Eingang Litauens nach Europa und den Anschluss an Europa, das Mitspielen in Europa bedeutet hat und Litauen es überhaupt ermöglicht, in der Geschichte, eine mittelalterliche Großmacht zu werden. Und damit ist es bis heute diese Schleuse nach Westeuropa und zur gesamten europäischen Kultur, die durch den Katholizismus aufgegangen ist. Es gibt aber eine Minderheit, da gehört sicher der Jonas Basanavičius dazu, welcher ganz wichtig für die Stargeschichte [?] war. Dazu tendiert aber auch, der vor einigen Jahren verstorbene Mythologe und baltische Religionsforscher Gintaras Beresnevičius, die sagen dass es eine Gewaltgeschichte ist und damit die Fremdherrschaft beginnt. Und das ureigene litauische und das, was Litauen anders macht und das, was Litauen Europa zu bieten hat liegt eigentlich im Heidentum. Das ist das unikale.

Hofmann: Und dass die Religion bis zu einem gewissen Grad etwas Aufgezwungenes war?

Hell: Ja. Mit Christentum beginnt die Kolonisationsgeschichte.

Hofmann: Also wird alles eher kritisch betrachtet.

Hell: Beide Seiten haben natürlich gewisse Gefahren. Der Mainstream blendet aus, dass das Christentum wirklich eine Gewaltgeschichte ist, vor allem mit der Missionierung.

Und die anderen übersehen, dass man mit der Meinung, dass das Heidentum das war, was Litauen ausgemacht hat, sehr schnell in eine Hypostase eines a-historischen Litauertums hinein kommt.

Hofmann: Ich hatte bei den jungen Litauern das Gefühl, dass Religion für sie etwas Traditionelles ist und das, was das alte Litauen auszeichnet. Also dass sie das als etwas Positives in der Geschichte Litauens sehen. Und nicht als aufgezwungen.

Hell: Kann ich mir auch vorstellen.

Hofmann: Wenn wir schon bei der Geschichte sind. Ich finde die Litauer haben ein etwas zwiespältiges Verhältnis zu Geschichte und sie rollen Geschichte zu jedem Thema immer wieder auf. Wie siehst Du das? Sind sie mit Ihrer Geschichte versöhnt? Trägt das zu ihrer Identität positiv bei? Oder picken sie sich nur bestimmte Dinge heraus und vergessen den Rest?

Hell: Sie trägt natürlich positiv bei. Und sie definieren sich viel stärker als wir über die Geschichte. Und das Mittelalter von der Ostsee bis zum Schwarzen Meer spielt immer eine Rolle. Sie blenden aber aus der Geschichte des Großfürstentums auf jeden Fall aus, dass es für sie in gewisser Weise auch eine Misserfolgsgeschichte war, weil einfach diese große Polonisierung des Adels stattfand. Dadurch, dass die Residenz nach Krakau übersiedelt ist, ist Vilnius zu einer viel unbedeutenderen Stadt herabgesunken. Und diese Polonisierung war ja kein Druck, sondern, weil es das Attraktivere, das Größere, das Stärkere war, hat sich der Adel quasi von sich selber polonisiert und das Litauisch ist zu so einer Art Bauernsprache herabgesunken. Das ist ja auch das Ergebnis des litauischen Großfürstentums. Davon spricht

man aber nicht so deutlich und nicht so gerne und natürlich überbetont man das litauische Element im Großfürstentum. Das ist aber kein Wunder. Das machen die Polen auch. Ich habe am Wawel in Krakau nicht das Gefühl gehabt, dass bei den Jagiellonen viel Litauisch war. Oder gar, dass sie eine litauische Dynastie waren.

Hofmann: Also blenden sie das jeweils Andere aus.

Hell: Aber was sie schon sehr richtig sehen: Es gibt den Terminus, die Litauer hätten den Osten gegen den Westen und den Westen gegen den Osten verteidigt. Also gegen die Tataren und gegen Russland, gegen Moskau haben sie den Westen verteidigt und den Osten gegen den deutschen Norden verteidigt. Und das ist eine große Frage. Sehen sie sich einfach als Teil Westeuropas, oder sehen sie sich in einer Zwischenposition zwischen Ost und West. Das, so glaube ich, ist auch zwischen den Intellektuellen nicht ganz geklärt.

Hofmann: Dieses Ost und West habe ich in schon sehr vielen Artikeln gelesen. Das sie sich wirklich als Bindeglied sehen; auch in der heutigen Zeit. Und dass sie finden, dass sie, auch was die NATO und die EU betrifft, anderen Ländern, wie Weißrussland und Ukraine auf ihrem Weg gen Westen helfen können.

Hell: Tun sie auch mit der weißrussischen Opposition und der weißrussischen Universität. Ich glaube, das ist schon eine realistische Hoffnung, dass sie in der EU ein bisschen als Experten gesehen werden. Von Weißrussland versteht sicher niemand so viel wie sie und von der Ukraine verstehen sie auch eine Menge.

Hofmann: Ich hatte aber eigentlich eher den Eindruck, das Weißrussland, obwohl es ein Nachbar ist, eher stiefmütterlich behandelt wird und das eigentlich keiner der Litauer schon einmal in Weißrussland war. Oder sich zwar vielleicht auskennt, aber keine wirkliche Nahbeziehung zu Weißrussland hat. Ganz im Gegensatz zu beispielsweise Polen.

Hell: Logisch, wenn man nicht über die Schengengrenze muss, sondern ein Visum braucht, wenn man dort beäugt wird vom Geheimdienst. Es gibt in dem Buch von Martin Pollack herausgegeben "Nachrichten aus Sarmatien" [Anm. C. Hofmann „Sarmatische Landschaften – Nachrichten aus Litauen, Beloruss, der Ukraine, Polen und Deutschland“] einen interessanten Reisebericht von Marius Ivaškevičius, der länger in Weißrussland auf den Spuren seiner

Familie und der Landschaft war. Also das gibt es manches Mal schon, ist aber eher selten.

Hofmann: Was ich auch relativ oft gehört habe ist, dass es schon irgendwelche Verwandte gibt, die entweder aus Weißrussland kommen, oder in Weißrussland sind, aber es trotzdem eigentlich keine Verbindungen mehr gibt.

Apropos Verwandte in anderen Ländern. Wie siehst Du das mit Exillitauern vor allem in den USA bzw. auch welche die nach Irland gingen und dort arbeiten. Inwiefern haben diese einen Einfluss? Inwiefern beeinflussen sie nicht bloß die Identität, sondern auch wie Litauer andere Länder, die USA und auch Irland sehen?

Hell: Also, es kommt natürlich durch Migration immer sehr viel Weltkenntnis in das Land. Das war in der Sowjetunion natürlich mit Amerika. Von einfacher Mode bis verschiedenen Orientierungen, sind durch Immigranten ins Land gekommen. Nicht zuletzt natürlich eine große Zahl von Lyrikern, die hat heimlich Emigrations-Lyriker von Hand abgeschrieben, weil das die waren, die die modernen Verfahrensweisen im Gedicht – die Avantgarde Techniken praktiziert haben in der Litauischen Sprache. Und daran hat man sich selber gebildet. Das war in der Kunst ein großer Einfluss und war immer auch etwas Prestigeträchtiges. Z.B. hat es in Chicago ein Litauisches Opernhaus gegeben, also war die Kultur, die litauische Kultur, in manchen Teilen Amerikas sehr stark war.

Die heutige Emigration – die Arbeitsemigration – die einer der höchsten der EU ist, ist natürlich ganz etwas anderes. Die bringt kaum litauische Kultur in den Arbeitländern hervor, weil sie ja eigentlich immer als temporäre konzipiert ist, auch wenn die Leute dann länger bleiben als gedacht, aber ursprünglich geplant ist, dass man nicht emigriert, sondern einige Jahre arbeitet und dann wieder nach Hause geht.

Hofmann: Hat glaubst du Adamkus, was die USA betrifft, auch eine große Rolle gespielt?

Hell: Also das glaube ich schon. Zum einen zeigt er an, dass natürlich die amerikanische Emigration einmal angesehen ist. Und nicht nur er, sondern es hat sie ja auch in der ersten Generation von Botschaftern gegeben. Die erste Botschafterin in Wien, die dann zur NATO gegangen ist war Kite Dermotis [?], eine litauische Amerikanerin. Ich vergleiche es gerne damit, man sieht natürlich, dass es möglich ist, dass ein hochgeachteter Präsident mit einem stark amerikanischen Akzent spricht. Man stelle sich einen ungarischen oder polnischen Präsidenten vor, mit einem amerikanischen Akzent. Ich glaube, das wäre nicht möglich. Das

zeigt schon, dass es ein positives Bild ist.

Hofmann: Und hat Adamkus das Verhältnis zwischen Litauen und den USA verbessert?

Hell: Ja absolut. Der war ja ein hoher Beamter, hat viele Leute gekannt. Er konnte auftreten, konnte auch Bush gegenüber treten, er konnte mit einem akzentfreien und einem Jahrzehnte lang geübten Englisch wie zu Hause auftreten. Das hat natürlich etwas ausgemacht.

Hofmann: Was somit auch das Selbstbewusstsein der Litauer gestärkt hat, dadurch, dass sie so einen Präsidenten hatten - einen auf quasi gleichem Niveau mit Bush...

Hell: Genau so ist es.

Hofmann: Du hast gesagt, es ist eine angesehene Migration. Das heißt aber auch, dass die Arbeitsmigration nicht unbedingt angesehen ist? Oder ist das einfach neutral, weil es kein wirkliches Exil ist?

Hell: Sie wird irgendwie ein bisschen verschämt behandelt. Oder es wird nicht so viel darüber gesprochen. Man bekommt nicht so leicht so viele Zahlen. Die Leute treten natürlich in Litauen nicht auf, weil sie ja nicht da sind. Aber auch in London oder wo sie arbeiten, nicht. Sie wollen lieber unter sich bleiben und arbeiten und Geld nach Hause schicken. Sie machen sich natürlich bemerkbar, im Bruttosozialprodukt mit dem Geld, was sie nach Hause schicken, sie machen sich negativ in der Arbeitslosenstatistik bemerkbar. Sie bewerkstelligen da einiges im Image von Litauen, aber es kommt, so glaube ich, nicht wirklich zu Wort. Und die Auswirkungen sind natürlich auf der einen Seite, wie gesagt, Weltwissen, Kenntnisse. Und auf der anderen Seite Disaster; es gibt ja sogar Familien wo zwei Kinder mit den Großeltern leben und die Eltern im Ausland arbeiten. Das ist auch sehr schwierig.

Hofmann: Sehen die Litauer das auch als "Brain Drain"? Also, dass die Litauer sich in ihrem eigenen Land ausbilden lassen und dann als gute und ausgebildete Arbeiter woanders hingehen?

Hell: Ich weiß nicht, ob das so thematisiert wird.

Hofmann: Weil es in Österreich eigentlich immer mal wieder ein Thema ist, dass man sagt, dass in der Wissenschaft gerade die Leute bei uns zwar wirklich gut ausgebildet werden, aber dann eigentlich keine Möglichkeit sehen sich weiter zu entwickeln und dann deshalb gerade in die USA oder nach Großbritannien gehen.

Wird das in Litauen nicht in der Form thematisiert? Bzw. noch nicht?

Hell: Da geht es vor allem um Verdienste und dass man in vielen Bereichen eben noch viel zu wenig verdient.

Hofmann: Wo sieht sich Litauen selbst kulturell bzw. geographisch positioniert. Sehen sie sich als Teil von Europa und hat da auch der Beitritt zur EU dazu etwas beigetragen? Oder sehen sie sich immer noch am Rand positioniert?

Hell: Nein. Also sie sehen sich sicher als Teil von Europa. Und es war immer schon so, auch in den Anfängen, wo z.B. in der Unabhängigkeitsbewegung der Slogan damals "Zurück nach Europa" war. Auch da war das schon unter dem Vorzeichen "Wir sind eigentlich Mitteleuropa". Also wir sind nicht Nordeuropa, dass ja auch protestantisch ist. Also ein unglaublich schwammiger Begriff mit offenen Enden. Aber doch brauchbar. Nicht Nordeuropa, nicht protestantisch, asiatisch, skandinavisch. Und natürlich heißt es, dass sie nicht Osten, Russland oder orthodox sind. Und ich glaube mit Berechtigung. Denn wenn man nicht zweifelt, dass Polen zu Mitteleuropa gehört, dann gehört auch Litauen zu Mitteleuropa. Und dann geht um Litauen schon eine scharfe Grenze, die dann vor allem eine starke Grenze gegen Estland ist und eine scharfe Grenze zu Weißrussland.

Hofmann: Weil Du jetzt Estland ansprichst: Das Konglomerat der baltischen Staaten, das vor allem aus den Köpfen von EU-Politikern entstanden ist. Man hat jetzt nicht das Gefühl, dass die Litauer sich als baltischen Staat sehen. Auch einfach deshalb, weil sie finden, dass Estland überhaupt nicht ihre Ambitionen hat, sich geographisch doch völlig anders positioniert. Wie siehst du ihr Verhältnis zu Estland bzw. zu Lettland, das irgendwie in der Mitte zu stecken scheint?

Hell: Es ist in verschiedenen Bereichen verschieden. In der Musik beispielsweise und auch im Tanz, da sind die Beziehungen eigentlich am stärksten. Doch auch im Theater und in den darstellenden Künsten. Es gibt auch ein "Baltic Art" Tanzfestival. Da ist der Austausch am

stärksten. Auch zum Beispiel bei den Poesie Festivals ist Estland oder Lettland eigentlich immer dabei. Da gibt es schon solche freundschaftliche Beziehungen.

Hofmann: Aber das ist interessant, gerade bei Poesie, wo die Estländer ja eine völlig andere Sprache haben. Da werden offensichtlich Barrieren überwunden?

Hell: Da gibt es gegenseitig gute Übersetzer und es wird auch natürlich prozentuell ins Estische oder Lettische mehr übersetzt, als in die großen Sprachen. Nur hilft es den Schriftstellern nicht sehr viel, weil sie ja nur über die großen Sprachen bekannt werden können.

Hofmann: Und ist das Verhältnis zwischen Litauen und Lettland ein anderes, als zwischen Litauen und Estland? Man könnte ja glauben, da sie Nachbarn sind und durch die größere Verwandtschaft in der Sprache zu Lettland mehr Verbindungen haben.

Hell: Im ganz allgemeinen Gefühl ist Litauen ihnen sicher näher. Gerade in den Grenzregionen gibt es auch viel mehr Kontakte. Und bei Estland muss man wirklich weiter fahren.

Hofmann: Und das ganz schwierige Thema, was die Nachbarländer betrifft, natürlich Russland. Hast Du das Gefühl, dass sich die Beziehungen verbessern? Bzw. dass sie nach 20 Jahren ihre Geschichte mit etwas mehr Abstand sehen? Oder ist es immer noch der absolute Angstgegner? Sie sind ja jetzt seit 2004 in der NATO und seit 2004 in der EU.

Hell: Die Angst ist sicher durch die NATO und auch durch die EU gedämpft. Wird aber schnell bei Kaukasus Konflikten, in Georgien und so, wo Litauen genau die Strategien sieht, die sie kennen und befürchten, schnell wieder einmal geschürt. Der absolute Gegner bleibt Russland auf jeden Fall. Jetzt nicht nur militärisch, sondern es ist auch Thema wo es um gemeinsame Erinnerung geht. Ich denke daran, dass, im Gegensatz zur Lettischen Präsidentin 2005 und 60 Jahre Ende des 2. Weltkrieges, Präsident Adamkus nicht nach Moskau gefahren ist um mit Putin das Ende des 2. Weltkrieges zu feiern.

Hofmann: An der Lettischen Präsidentin ist da ja auch sehr viel Kritik geübt worden.

Hell: Ja. Und deshalb verstehe ich die Position von Adamkus völlig. Es wäre ja auch absurd, dass er, der unter Lebensgefahr von den Sowjetischen Truppen geflohen ist, dann mit Putin, der heute noch sagt, es sei schade, dass die Sowjetunion zerbrochen ist, zusammen das Ende des 2. Weltkrieges feiert.

Es ist ja auch so, dass wir in der EU keine gemeinsame Erinnerungskultur haben. Die wichtigen Daten für uns sind nicht auch die wichtigen Daten für Litauen oder die baltischen Länder. Dass das Ende des 2. Weltkrieges ganz anders eingeschätzt wird und wie die Litauer sagen, gar kein Ende war. Da sind die Identitäten schon noch sehr stark verschieden. Und da ist natürlich auch mit Russland, solange man nicht darüber reden kann, solange Russland kein Schuldeingeständnis, keine Entschuldigung oder Ähnliches abgibt nicht zu sprechen. Und dann ist natürlich auch bei dem, wie ich glaube, vom so genannten Westen her ein zu schonender Umgang mit Russland, wo die Litauer in der EU immer die ersten sind, die mahnen und die gefordert haben, dass man nicht nur die Nazi Symbole, sondern auch die kommunistischen Symbole unter Strafe stellt.

Hofmann: Ja, nachdem die Russen für uns ja auch zu den Alliierten, also zu den Guten gehört haben ist es glaube ich schon schwer für das westliche Europa sie als den Feind anzusehen, wie es Litauen tut.

Sagt Dir der Begriff „Near Abroad“, also „Nahes Ausland“ etwas?

Hell: Klar.

Hofmann: Es ist ja immer noch ein absolutes rotes Tuch, wenn man das in Litauen erwähnt. Sieht Russland Litauen wirklich immer noch als "Nahes Ausland"? Und spielt das noch eine Rolle?

Hell: Also jetzt nachdem ja klar ist, die baltischen Länder wie Litauen gehören zu der EU und vor allem zur NATO, glaube ich nicht, dass der Geheimdienst am Werk ist um sie auszuhebeln um dann einmarschieren zu können. Das stellt sich aber auch in Litauen niemand so vor. Viel gefährlicher ist die Unterwanderung in der Wirtschaft, in der Energieversorgung. Da bin ich mir nicht so sicher, ob sie Litauen da aufgegeben haben, oder ob sie nicht Positionen halten, wo sie einsickern wollen, bestimmte Geschäftsbereiche kontrollieren wollen. Also das glaube ich schon.



Hofmann: Im Grunde haben sich die Methoden geändert. Aber dass Russland findet, dass Litauen immer noch zu ihrer Einfluss Sphäre dazugehören sollte, hat sich damit nicht wirklich geändert?

Hell: In Russland, das sieht man ja auch mit der Ukraine, hat die wirkliche Trennung zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft nie stattgefunden. Und das wirkt sich da auch aus.

Hofmann: Noch eine kurze abschließende Frage.

Hell: Ich wundere mich ja eigentlich, dass es so gut geht. Also das Transitproblem, das Kaliningradproblem überhaupt zivilisiert lösen konnte.

Hofmann: Aber auch durch den Internationalen Druck.

Hell: Ja absolut.

Hofmann: Sonst hätte Russland sich ja nicht darauf geeinigt. Soweit ich weiß ist es ja so, dass die Grenzen zwischen Lettland, Russland und Estland und Russland eigentlich nie wirklich fixiert worden sind. Weil Russland sich immer noch geweigert hat diese Verträge zu unterschreiben und die NATO und auch die EU gemeint haben, es ist trotzdem kein Hindernisgrund, dass es trotzdem zur Stabilität beiträgt, wenn sie der EU beitreten. Und das, so glaube ich, nur durch internationalen Druck funktionierte.

Hell: Du, das ist möglich, da weiß ich echt nicht Bescheid.

Wo Litauen im Vorteil ist und was Russland eigentlich nicht kann und das in Estland und Lettland schon tut, ist die Möglichkeit die Russische Minderheit zu instrumentalisieren. Dadurch, dass sie in Litauen in der Regel integriert sind und auch Staatsbürger sind gibt es diese Geschichten nicht.

Hofmann: Die Russische Minderheit ist glaube ich 6,4%. Sie sind zwar die zweit größte Minderheit, aber das war es dann auch schon.

Findest Du, dass Litauen mit seiner Identitätsfindung und mit seinem Selbstbild ein Problem haben?

Hell: Vielleicht wie bei vielen kleinen. Das ist ja auch in Österreich nicht ganz unbekannt, dass es so unvermittelt zwischen Überschätzung und Unterschätzung hin und her geht. Also wir sind die Besten und wir haben das was niemand hat und dann sind wir die letzten Zwerge von hinten. Das geht schon manchmal unvermittelt ineinander. Aber es sind nicht einmal 20 Jahre, dass der Staat existiert. Ich bewundere eher, wie viel in dieser Zeit gelungen ist. Auch was das Identitätsbild angeht. Ich glaube schon, dass man mit dem EU-Beitritt sich als zwar kleines, aber als normales Mitglied, das seine Rechte hat, das nicht betteln muss, das nicht hoffen muss irgendwo eingelassen zu werden, dass das natürlich die Sache verändert hat.

Hofmann: Und ist es für Litauens Identität ein Problem, dass Litauen doch oft als Baltischer Staat wahrgenommen wird?

Hell: Das mit dem Baltischen Staat ist schon ein Problem, weil sie nicht als einer von Dreien wahrgenommen werden wollen, oder im Kollektiv wahrgenommen werden wollen. Wenn man ihnen so gegenüber tritt spüren sie, dass derjenige eben keine Ahnung hat, oder sie nicht wirklich wahrnimmt, oder nicht viel über ihre Geschichte weiß.

Hofmann: Vielen Dank für das Gespräch!

## 10.2.2 Interview on the 2nd of October 2009 with Dr. Schwarzinger<sup>230</sup>:

Hofmann: War ein Beitritt der Baltischen Staaten zur NATO die logische Konsequenz nach der Unabhängigkeit der drei Staaten?

Schwarzinger: Ja, also nach dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion war ja, aber das haben sie sicher auch in der Literatur gelesen, die Überlegung auf der Seite der NATO, dass ein Beitritt der baltischen Staaten eigentlich ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit ist, weil man dann im Anlassfall diesen Teil der NATO nicht verteidigen könnte.

Hofmann: Außerdem gab es ja auch Angst bezüglich Russlands - was Russland dazu sagt und wie sie darauf reagieren würden, oder?

Schwarzinger: Naja, das war sicher auch ein Gesichtspunkt im Wesentlichen. Also es wurde eigentlich lange Zeit ausgeschlossen. Es galt als nicht machbar für die NATO.

Hofmann: Ich habe eigentlich vor allem in der Literatur, vor allem der litauische Literatur, gelesen, dass es schon die Befürchtung gab, dass sich Russland völlig dagegen stellen würde und dass Russland die NATO Mächte davon überzeugen könnte, dass die baltischen Staaten nicht aufgenommen werden. Ist das doch etwas subjektiv gefärbt aus litauischer Sicht, oder entsprach das der Wahrheit?

Schwarzinger: Vor allem von deutschen Autoren wurde immer wieder vorgebracht, dass der Gewinn, den man mit der Aufnahme der baltischen Länder erzielen würde, konterkariert werde durch den Verlust an guten Beziehungen zur Russischen Föderation.

Und das deshalb ein Kosten-Nutzen-Denken geben sollte und da scheidet eigentlich der NATO Beitritt der baltischen Staaten aus.

Hofmann: Allerdings habe ich beobachtet, was jetzt natürlich nichts mit der NATO zu tun hat, dass vor allem auch die Europäische Union und auch die skandinavischen Länder Bestrebungen gehabt haben trotzdem Foren zu schaffen, in denen die baltischen Staaten drinnen sind, wie z.B. CBSS. Wo sie aber auch gefunden haben, dass Russland dabei sein

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<sup>230</sup> Dr. Michael Schwarzinger is the former Austrian ambassador in Lithuania (2001-2006)

soll. Aber ich hatte den Eindruck, dass nicht wirklich darüber nachgedacht worden ist, was sie eigentlich gemacht werden soll. Gerade bei CBSS hatte ich diesen - dass es völlig eingeschlafen ist, dass es dort im Grunde keinen Fortschritt mehr gibt.

Schwarzinger: Aber das war ja schon die Länderarchitektur der nordischen Länder vor dem Fall der Mauer, vor der Wende. Es gab immer schon die Tradition, dass die nordischen Länder untereinander stark zusammenarbeiten. Der Nordische Ministerrat usw. Im Grunde genommen war das dann eine Streckung Richtung der baltischen Länder; die Einbeziehung der baltischen Länder in die nordischen Strukturen. Das war ja im Grunde von Seitens der Finnen und Schweden eine logische Maßnahme, dass man versucht Gespräche zu pflegen und vor allem bilateral. Dass die Finnen die Esten betreuen, die Schweden betreuen die Letten und die Dänen betreuen die Litauer.

Hofmann: Ich habe auch erstaunlich viele Artikel gefunden, in denen es darum ging, ob die baltischen Staaten eigentlich zu den Nordischen, also zu den Skandinavischen, Staaten gehören, oder nicht. Weil ja vor allem Estland die Bestrebungen hatte auch in das Nordic Council aufgenommen zu werden. Was Litauen betrifft gab es da weniger Intentionen, aber angedacht wurde es für Litauen auch, ist dann aber völlig im Sand verlaufen.

Schwarzinger: Das hat aber keinen Effekt, so weit ich weiß. So weit ich weiß, ist der Nordische Ministerrat noch in der alten Zusammensetzung.

Hofmann: Nichtsdestotrotz gibt es dazu einiges an Literatur - dass sich die Esten mehr den Finnen zugehörig fühlen und Finnland, sowohl wie den skandinavischen Ländern anschließen wollten. Und dass Litauen mehr zu CEE tendiert hat.

Schwarzinger: Ja, also die engste bilaterale Verknüpfung ist zwischen Finnland und Estland gelungen. Das liegt aber auch daran, dass sprachliche und kulturelle nahe Verhältnisse da sind. Worum sich die Litauer in der ersten Zeit ihrer staatlichen Unabhängigkeit stark bemüht haben, war die Verbesserung der Beziehungen zu Polen. Aber das ist wieder eine andere Geschichte.

Da wurde sehr viel investiert. Die Litauer haben eine große Botschaft in Warschau. Es gibt auch viele Begegnungen mit Politikern um das litauisch-polnische Verhältnis wieder gerade zu biegen.

Hofmann: Ich habe auch einen Artikel gelesen in dem Polen als Litauens stärkster Verbündeter genannt wird. Und interessanter Weise steht in dem Artikel, dass Polen in den USA der wichtigste Verbündete ist, darüber musste ich fast lächeln. Aber die Stimmung dürfte wirklich so sein - sie haben das Gefühl, sie müssen sich gut mit Polen verstehen, damit die USA sich mehr um Litauen kümmert.

Schwarzinger: Ja, also aus amerikanischer Sicht ist es ganz klar. Polen ist das wichtigste Land in Mittel-Osteuropa. Und da muss man hin, da muss man sein. Deswegen ist auch George Bush so früh wie es eben ging nach Polen gefahren. Plus Ungarn, glaub ich auch. Der berühmte Besuch von George Bush Senior in Polen und in Ungarn.

Was dann auch viel Ausgelöst hat. Diese Unterstützungsaktion der G24 usw. Was dann später das Fahrerprojekt [?] in der EU wurde - das wurde alles durch diesen doch sehr raschen Besuch von George Bush damals ausgelöst.

Hofmann: Dr. Vesper von der FAZ, dem ich auch Fragen geschickt habe, hat etwas sehr interessantes gesagt, und zwar dass seit dem die Regierung Kubilius an der Macht ist, sich die Außenpolitik gegen Russland etwas verändert hat und nicht mehr so starr ist. Sie hatten das Gefühl sich jetzt neu positionieren zu müssen seitdem Obama Präsident ist.

Empfinden sie das auch so?

Schwarzinger: Naja, natürlich ist das eine wichtigen Ansage, wenn Präsident Obama diesen "Reset" macht. Da muss Litauen natürlich schon darauf reagieren. Das ist ganz klar. Ich meine, man geht ja weg von dieser „lehrkonservativen“ Politik der USA hin zu eine vorsichtigeren, wobei sich die Außenpolitik von Obama erst entwickeln wird müssen. Aber natürlich muss auch ein Staat wie Litauen auf diese neuen Begebenheiten reagieren.

Hofmann: Nun eine allgemeine Frage: Glauben sie, war der Beitritt in die NATO für Litauen die beste Möglichkeit, die beste Wahl?

Schwarzinger: Es entspricht auf jeden Fall dem, was die Leute wollten. Also der Rückhalt in der Bevölkerung war enorm. Und man hat schon gedacht, dass es sozusagen ein "Window of Opportunity" ist, dass man dieses Angebot hat, diese Möglichkeit der NATO beizutreten. Und wenn man das jetzt nicht nützt, wer weiß wie sich die Welt entwickelt - auf einmal ist das

unmöglich. Die Leute haben das schon als eine ungeheure Chance empfunden, dass sie tatsächlich die Möglichkeit haben und auch dazu eingeladen wurden der NATO beizutreten - als Vollmitglied.

Hofmann: Das war ja auch sehr bald. Man hatte ja eigentlich schon 93/94 das Ziel in die NATO zu kommen, oder?

Schwarzinger: Die Litauer haben es nicht als wahnsinnig rasch empfunden. Ich meine, es waren ja doch einige Jahre. Wann ist Litauen gegründet worden, als Staat? 90/91? Das sind ja doch 12/13 Jahre und die waren ja doch auch zäh. Weil man ja auch nicht wusste, wie die strategische Position Litauens wirklich ausschauen würde. Nach der Gründung des Staates war ja nicht klar, wie sich das ganze dann weiterentwickeln würde. Z.B. wenn sich der Westen nicht wirklich für Litauen interessiert hätte. Und die Erfahrung war ja auch nach dem März 90, wo Landsbergis die Unabhängigkeit erklärt hat, war ja zunächst die Message des Westens „Stört die Kreise des Gorbatschow nicht“. Es gab ja die berühmten Besuche in Berlin, in Washington und in London usw., wo immer wieder gesagt worden ist, dass diese Unabhängigkeitserklärung uns gerade quer kommt zu unseren Bemühungen, denn wir wollen ja, dass Gorbatschow mit seiner Perestroika weitermacht. Und dass er an der Macht bleibt und dass er eine Chance hat. 9:37

Die Angst war, dass Gorbatschow auf die Unabhängigkeitserklärungen an den Rändern reagieren muss, sodass daran der ganze Perestroika Prozess zusammenbricht. Und aus dieser Erfahrung war ja nicht abzuleiten, für die Litauer, dass der Westen sie mit offenen Armen aufnehmen würde. Und die Litauische Unabhängigkeit als eine Selbstverständlichkeit sehen würde, als ein Positivum.

Und dann war ja auch nicht klar, wie groß und stark Russland sein würde. Die litauische Wirtschaft war ja völlig verflochten mit der russischen Wirtschaft. Der Strom kommt zwar von Ignalina, aber das ist ja im Grunde genommen ein russisches Kraftwerk. Man ist auch sonst leitungsmäßig verbunden mit dem russischen Energienetz, das ganze Gas kommt von Russland etc. Wie sollte man hier eine wirtschaftliche Unabhängigkeit darstellen? Es war auch nicht klar woher das Einkommen des Landes kommen sollte. Es war also schon eine sehr mutige Sache. Man muss sagen, dass es schon sehr kurzfristig gedacht war; weil man sich keine Gedanken gemacht hat wie dieses Land in Unabhängigkeit tatsächlich überleben soll.

Das ist ja auch das, was viele Leute beim Kosovo sagen. Man hat sich keine Gedanken darüber gemacht, wo denn eigentlich wirklich der Vorteil davon ist, wenn der Kosovo abgespalten ist. Das sind Entwicklungsstränge, die zur Unabhängigkeit führen, die manchmal sehr kompliziert sind. Aber wie gesagt, es war nicht klar, ob Litauen nicht nur unter Duldung von Moskaus sein würde. Und wie weit man wirklich wegrudern kann vom russischen Bruder. Das war in den 90er Jahren nicht ganz klar.

War die jetzige Entwicklung zu sehen? Nein. Zunehmend gab es Signale aus dem Westen, dass sowohl eine NATO Mitgliedschaft, wie auch eine EU Mitgliedschaft tatsächlich möglich wird. Das hat sich so Mitte der 90er Jahre dann abgezeichnet. Das war dann schon eine ungeheure Erleichterung für die baltischen Länder, als registriert wurde, dass nach der anfänglichen Enttäuschung, sich der Westen dann doch für sie erwärmt hat.

Hofmann: Was mich dann doch gewundert hat ist, dass Szenarien wie Neutralität überhaupt nicht diskutiert worden sind. Und was mich auch wundert ist, dass diese baltische Kooperation, die angedacht worden ist mit BALTBAT und die dann erweitert worden ist mit BALTRON usw. nicht weitergeführt wurde. Warum hätte man nicht auch das ausbauen können und sagen können, dass es ein Militärbündnis zwischen den drei baltischen Staaten gibt?

Schwarzinger: Naja, mir ist nicht ganz ersichtlich, wo der Mehrwert herkommen soll, wenn 3 arme Länder zusammen arbeiten.

Hofmann: Hilfe hätten sie ja schon bekommen, weil BALTBAT ja auch vor allem durch westliche Hilfe aufgebaut worden ist. Aber dann trotzdem aufgelöst 2003 worden ist. Was mir nicht ganz logisch erscheint.

Schwarzinger: Ich glaube BALTBAT war nicht sehr preisgünstig - diese Kooperationsformen haben ja auch immer Extrakosten.

Hofmann: Man hätte doch auch sagen können, dass man eher eine Großarmee der drei Länder hat, als eine Armee für jedes Land extra aufzubauen. Aber offensichtlich wurde das nicht weiter gedacht - was mich gewundert hat.

Ebenfalls Neutralität. Da wir ja in einem neutralen Land leben, schien mir das nicht so utopisch, dass man als Staat Litauen sagen könnte - auch in Hinblick auf die Geschichte - wir

sind genug überrannt worden und wollen uns jetzt einfach aus allem raus halten und neutral sein.

Schwarzinger: Ja eben. Neutralität hätte ja auch eine langfristige Absage an die NATO und an die Amerikaner bedeutet. Und das wäre für viele Litauer doch als eine ziemlich große Ungeschicklichkeit erschienen. Man darf auch nicht vergessen, dass Litauen auch von vielen, aus Amerika zurückgekehrten Exil-Litauern beraten worden ist und auch immer noch beraten wird. Und für die war ziemlich klar, dass Litauen doch eine enge Einbeziehung mit den USA sucht.

Es gibt auch sehr viele Litauer, die in den USA leben. Sie sind sehr gut organisiert. Und auch der zwischenzeitliche Staatspräsident Adamkus war Amerika-Litauer.

Und für die wäre es vollkommen unverständlich gewesen, wenn man eine Politik der Äquidistanz zwischen Russland und Amerika gesucht hätte.

Hofmann: Also sie finden, dass die Exil-Litauer, die in den USA leben, einen großen Einfluss haben?

Schwarzinger: Ja, das würde ich schon sagen. Dass sie auf das Denken, auf die politische Beratung schon einen großen Einfluss genommen haben.

Hofmann: Interessant. Ich hatte nämlich mit Cornelius [Hell] darüber gesprochen. Gut, er hat das Ganze eher aus kultureller Perspektive gesehen und hat gemeint, dass vor allem Adamkus wichtig war. Aber jetzt der Einfluss nicht mehr so groß ist, wie kurz nach der Unabhängigkeit.

Schwarzinger: Kutamaičik und Kaites [?], das ist in Amerika ausgebildeter Offizier; dann die Wirtschaftsentwicklungsagentur Grodis [?], es gibt sehr viele Amerika-Litauer, die auch dort in Funktionen tätig waren. Und auch viele, die informelle Berater waren.

Hofmann: Und glauben sie, dass wenn sie neutral geworden wären, sie den Eindruck gehabt hätten aus der Einflussphäre Russlands nicht raus zu kommen?

Schwarzinger: Genau. Das Signal wäre gewesen: Wir verzichten auf einen Weg der uns in die NATO hineinführt. Bevor wir auch irgendeine Chance haben sagen wir ab, da gehen wir nicht hin. Ich glaube schon, das wäre in Litauen als eine Einschränkung der Möglichkeiten



empfunden worden. Und nicht unbedingt eine Verbesserung der Wirtschaft. Das ist ja ein unglaublich schlechtes Signal an Russland, wenn man das tut.

Hofmann: Und meinen Sie dass das „Near Abroad“ jetzt auch noch eine Rolle spielt?

Schwarzinger: Für Russland ist es auf jeden Fall ein Konzept. Für Russland macht es auf jeden Fall einen Sinn eine Einflussosphäre zu definieren und auf die dann einzuwirken.

Hofmann: Und gehört da Litauen noch dazu?

Schwarzinger: Würde ich schon sagen, ja.

Hofmann: Aus beiden vorhergehenden Interviews mit Cornelius Hell und auch mit Dr. Vesper ging hervor, dass sich wohl eher die Mittel geändert haben, mit denen Russland vorgeht und Litauen noch zu verstehen gibt, dass es noch in ihrem Einflussbereich ist. Und auch, dass diese nicht mehr so politisch sind, sondern sich eher auf Wirtschaftliches beschränken. Dass Russland beispielsweise die Gaspipeline abstellt, weil sie angeblich kaputt ist.

Schwarzinger: Ja, das ist das, was viele an der russischen Politik kritisieren. Dass es immer eine Machtbasierte ist, dass die wirtschaftlichen Mittel nicht als „assentive“, sondern eben als Druckmittel eingesetzt werden. Dass man versucht die Souveränität der umliegenden Staaten zu unterminieren und diese nicht ernst zu nehmen.

Hofmann: Bei Litauen wahrscheinlich noch schwerer, weil es zur Sowjetunion dazugehört hat, oder?

Schwarzinger: Auch da hätte Russland andere Möglichkeiten gehabt. Mit einer „Charm-Offensive“ zum Beispiel. Oder mit dem Angebot einer Zollunion, oder man sagt, wir machen eine gestaltete Unabhängigkeit - man sagt, wir regeln das irgendwie oder wir erlauben euch das und haben auch Sonderverträge, zum Beispiel.

Und genau das ist ja für Litauer immernoch ein großes Problem - Verträge mit Russland zu machen. Verträge mit Russland sieht man immer als einen Nachteil für Litauen, weil wenn sich Litauen nicht hundertprozentig an den Vertrag hält, hat Russland alle Druckmittel,

während, wenn sich die Russen ein bisschen über den Vertrag hinwegsetzen, ist es für Litauen fast unmöglich irgendeine Art von Druck zu machen. Also immer informelle Arrangements. Ein Beispiel ist der Transit von Mittelmeergütern zwischen Russland, Weißrussland und Kaliningrad. Wo die Russen immer ein Gütertransportankommen haben wollten, was die Litauer eben nicht gewährt haben.

Hofmann: Weil sie Kaliningrad gerade ansprechen. Ich habe es interessant gefunden, dass in der Literatur der 90er Jahre viele Politologen davon ausgehen, dass Russland Kaliningrad als Schnittstelle zum Westen benutzen könnte. Das hat überhaupt nicht stattgefunden...

Schwarzinger: Nein. Die Theorie war, dass die russische Linie bisher immer eine war, den Mittelweg zu gehen. Das Land soll nicht ganz schlecht sein, aber es soll auch nicht wirklich wirtschaftlich aufblühen. Weil eine wirtschaftliche Blüte in Kaliningrad würde bedeuten, dass sie sofort von den Russen die Unabhängigkeit fordern. Und daher fahren immer so einen Mittelweg.

Hofmann: Eine völlig andere Frage noch: Wie sehen sie den Nutzen, den die NATO davon hat, dass die baltischen Staaten und auch Litauen der NATO beigetreten sind?

Schwarzinger: Wenn man die NATO als Verteidigungsbündnis anschaut, wäre ja eine baltische Mitgliedschaft und auch die Mitgliedschaft von Bulgarien und Albanien usw. eigentlich eine Erstreckung, die mehr Kosten als Nutzen hat. Wenn man die NATO aber als „Toolbox“ ansieht, also als Vereinigung von Staaten, die immer potentielle Kollisionspartner sind. Dann wird es auch sehr interessant arme und geographisch schwierige Länder mit einzubeziehen. Also wenn man jetzt an das Engagement in Irak oder in Afghanistan denkt, macht es politisch erst einmal einen ungeheuren Sinn, eine große Zahl von Staaten zu haben, die die Politik in internationaler Form unterstützt. Die einmal in der UNO usw. darauf drängen, dass das was die Amerikaner machen das Richtige ist - die ein paar Resolutionen unterstützen, die auch in allen möglichen Foren und Gesprächsthemen die amerikanische Position voll unterstützen. Also eine möglichst große Koalition zu haben. Und das zweite ist, dass man doch mehr Ressourcen hat, die klassifiziert sind; weil es jetzt ist z.B. in Afghanistan möglich, dass man die Missionen in Afghanistan auf viele Staaten abwälzt. Da machen die Polen mit, die Litauer haben eine ganze Provinz, Goa, wo sie doch mit erheblichen eigenen Mitteln diese Leute in einem sehr schwierigen Gelände positioniert haben und dort einen

guten Job machen. Also steuern sie da Man-Power bei und politischen Support. Und dann macht auch die Mitgliedschaft von so heterogenen Partnerländern absolut einen Sinn.

Hofmann: Ich hatte auch den Eindruck, dass man das Gefühl hatte, wenn die NATO die baltischen Staaten aufnimmt, dass dann die Stabilität in der Region größer wird.

Schwarzinger: Gut, da ist ja immer wieder mal das Gegenargument, wenn man die Russen zwickt, warum soll es der Stabilität nützen? Das gleiche ist ja mit der Satellitenanlage in Polen und Tschechien. Der Nutzen, den man evtl. hat, weil man ein Raketenabfangsystem hat, wird wieder abgeschwächt, weil man wieder ein Dauerproblem mit den Russen hat.

Hofmann: Und haben sie das Gefühl, dass eine Umstrukturierung der NATO seit dem 11. September für die Litauer negativ sein könnte? Das weg von einem reinen Verteidigungsbündnis, also nicht nur Hard Security, sondern auch Soft Security im Fokus haben, dass das den Litauern schaden könnte?

Schwarzinger: Ja. Aber ich glaube, die werden nicht wirklich gefragt. Ich glaube sie müssen die NATO so akzeptieren, wie sie sich eben entwickelt und wenn das heißt, dass sie im Charakter völlig umgemodelt wird, oder wenn sie auch einmal ganz andere Mitgliederstrukturen bekommen sollte - dass z.B. die Asiaten mit einbezogen werden sollen. Ich glaube nicht, dass die Litauer dann eine große Mitsprache hätten. Und sie würden dann auch nicht nach dem Sinn suchen, weil die Litauer aus der NATO viel profitiert haben. Es hat ja ein enormes Plus an Sicherheit gegeben. Sicherheit macht es auch Investoren dort leichter zu investieren, weil das politische Risiko ziemlich gering ist. Und es hat tatsächlich dazu geführt, dass Litauen mit den Russen Teilprobleme lösen konnte. Und dann haben die Litauer einen enormen Rückhalt und eine riesengroße Unterstützung in der Auseinandersetzung mit Weißrussland. Weißrussland ist ja auch für Litauen ein riesengroßes, bilaterales Problem und im Umgang mit den Weißrussen finden sie in der NATO die Unterstützung Amerikas. Weil auch die Amerikaner Weißrussland zunehmend als ganz großes Problem sehen. Und das ist eine riesige diplomatische Unterstützung, die die Litauer da haben. Auch in finanzieller Hinsicht. Es ist für Litauen sehr leicht für Amerika Vorschläge zu machen, wie die Amerikaner gegenüber Weißrussland vorgehen sollen. Da haben sie einen enormen Einfluss. Und das ist schon toll für so ein "Mini-Land" Litauen mit einer gewissen Teilgeschichte so einen Riesen wie Amerika beeinflussen zu können. Das ist ungeheuer, wenn man das kann.

Und aus diesem Grund nehme ich schon an, dass die Litauer auch weiterhin ein willfähriger Partner der Amerikaner in der Nato sind und auch nicht irgendwelche Reformen in der NATO blockieren werden. Also ein sehr angenehmer Partner für Amerika.

Und so gesehen haben die Amerikaner wieder mehr Vorteile gezogen. Unter dem Strich lohnt sich das für uns, dass die Litauer dabei sind.

Hofmann: Sind für die NATO eigentlich die baltischen Staaten mit Weißrussland und Ukraine als Brennpunkt nicht mehr so interessant, wie Rumänien, Bulgarien, die ja näher am Kaukasus liegen?

Schwarzinger: Das kann durchaus sein. Aber das ist ja auch wieder ein Vorteil nicht „non-stop“ zu sein, sondern auch als eine relativ stabile Region wahrgenommen zu werden. Wenn man Weißrussland noch als großen Konflikt sieht, vor allem weil sich dort nichts weiter bewegt.

Hofmann: Die Litauer sind ja sehr stolz auf ihre Funktion als Bindeglied zwischen Ost und West...

Schwarzinger: Das darf man nicht überschätzen. Im Grunde sind sie kein Bindeglied. Weil die Amerikaner Litauen sicher nicht brauchen um mit den Russen auszukommen. Also das wird gewaltig überschätzt. Aber zum Beispiel die Kontrolle und Abdeckung des baltischen Luftraumes der NATO macht absolut Sinn. Weil das natürlich die russische Luftbewegung enorm einschränkt. So würden sie über die ganze Ostsee hin und her fliegen und die Küsten Schwedens und Dänemarks davor abschippern, und so drehen sie schon über baltischen Boden um. Das ist schon ein großer Unterschied.

Hofmann: Da sie baltische See und Ostsee angesprochen haben. Was ich auch sehr interessant gefunden habe ist, dass diese Region, die Baltic Sea Region, aus dem Boden gestampft worden ist, vor allem von EU-Politikern und sich die Region nicht wirklich als Region sieht Und Litauen sich da auch nicht wirklich zugehörig fühlt.

Schwarzinger: Och. Ja das hat immer eine Vorgeschichte. Das war eben 1999 das Konzept des damaligen finnischen EU Vorsitzes diese Nordic Dimension einzuführen. Der Sinn der

Nordic Dimension ist, dass man ein Masterkonzept hat und die einzelnen Bemühungen die es da gibt, bilateraler Art, wirtschaftlicher Art, im Verkehr, alles Mögliche, dass man das irgendwie koordiniert. Vor allem die Hilfslieferungen TACIS damals für Russland. Dass man das Einbinden kann in einer gewissen Konditionalität, dass man Verpflichtungen verbindet. Dass man sagt, ok, wir bauen hier Schulen und Krankenhäuser. Mit Verpflichtung der Russen im Rahmen z.B. der nordischen Organisation beim Umweltschutz. Und das macht viel mehr Sinn, als z.B. die Schulen und Krankenhäuser einfach so zu bauen. Also dass man ein Konzept hat, dass man diesen Guten Willen und die Zahlungen und Leistungen auch wieder dann verwenden kann und wieder Forderungen stellen kann. Das ist das Beste mit dem Umgang mit den Russen überhaupt. Wenn man was gibt, dann fordere auch was dafür. Und sonst wäre TACIS weitgehend ein "Gebe-Program" mit sehr wenigen Rückflüssen, was wir fordern können. Und da hat sich die nordische Dimension unter dem Strich schon gelohnt, auch wenn die Erfolge nicht so wahnsinnig sichtbar sind. Und was jetzt gemacht wird ist diese makroregionale Strategie. Warum nicht? Man kann auch das Selbe machen, was die nordische Dimension war, noch strenger vernetzt unter einander. Dass es ein flüssigeres Konzept wird. Und es gibt nicht wirklich so viele Formen wo wir die Russen in einer Kooperation einbinden. Man muss die Russen ja auch sich in eine Kooperation einbinden lassen. Die Nordische Dimension hat an sich über die Jahre ganz gut funktioniert und doch einige Erfolge gebracht, an Wohlwollen, an Deeskalation, dass weniger „Incidents“ sind, wo z.B. die Fischerboote versenkt werden und so weiter. Ein mehr friedliches Umgehen mit einander hat es schon gebracht. Das lässt sich nur schwer messen. Weil man ja die nicht versenkten Fischerboote nicht zählen kann. Aber unterm Strich hat es sicher zur Beruhigung und Deeskalation beigetragen. Und wenn man das System jetzt weiter strickt, warum auch nicht? Wir nützen das ja jetzt auch in der Mittelmeer-Strategie der EU mit dieser Mittelmeer Union, für die Nordafrika Länder. Destabilisiert sich jedoch zunehmend. Wenn dort z.B. mehr an Ausbildung stattfindet, mehr Dialog usw. plus Entwicklungshilfe, dann ist das gar kein so schlechtes Konzept. Und dann bauen wir das ja weiter aus für den Donauraum. Das ist zwar keine Krisenregion, aber immerhin haben wir da Länder wie Serbien zum Beispiel, die wir einbauen können, die wir so zusagen vom Baum herunter holen können, dass wir ein Normalverhalten kriegen und dann gibt es von dort weiterhin die Zentral-Asien-Region. Und das ist wieder verbunden mit der Nachbarschaftspolitik der Union. Das ist zwar alles Tonnen an Papier, wo Strategien geschrieben werden, aber wenn es sie nicht gäbe, wäre es ein weniger kohärentes Vorgehen. Man fördert hier, man fördert da und verbindet es dann irgendwie nicht.

Und vor Allem, wenn keine Strategie da ist, ist auch kein Commitment der Partner da.

Hofmann: Wir reden hier jetzt auch von den baltischen Staaten und eigentlich an sich auch in Österreich und in Europa von den baltischen Staaten und werden auch als die baltischen Staaten wahrgenommen. Ich hatte in Litauen den Eindruck, dass sie selber damit möglichst wenig zu tun haben wollen, als Konglomerat gesehen zu werden. Was meinen Sie dazu?

Schwarzinger: Ja, weil es Bereiche gibt, wo die Litauer nicht hineingezogen werden wollen. Das sind zum Beispiel die Auseinandersetzungen mit der russischen Minderheit, die in Litauen so ca. bei 6-7% ausmacht, also sehr klein. Im Vergleich was die Letten und die Esten haben. Da möchte man sich nicht hineinmischen. Und dann auf Seiten der Esten, die eine viel vehementere wirtschaftliche Entwicklung haben, die sich eben nicht zu sehr anbinden wollen an die ärmeren Nachbarn. Und dann haben wir kulturell das Interesse mit den Polen zusammen zuarbeiten, auf Seiten der Litauer. Das teilen wiederum die Letten und die Esten nicht. Die haben andere Interessen und sehen nicht diese enge Notwendigkeit mit den Polen sich politisch abzustimmen. Und da ist es besser, wenn jeder seine gewissen Freiräume hat. Es gibt auch wieder Dinge in die sich die anderen wieder nicht hineinmengen wollen. Beispielsweise der Kaliningrad-Transit. Den haben wieder die Litauer leider am Hals. Oder die Militärtransporte. Das ist ein Spezialfall dort wieder. Auf der anderen Seite, wenn es um Verkehrsplanung geht, da müssen sie wieder zusammen arbeiten.

Hofmann: Ich habe auch den Eindruck, dass sich die Esten Richtung Norden orientieren, die Litauer Richtung Ost- und Mitteleuropa und die Letten sind ja irgendwo in der Mitte.

Schwarzinger: Das sind auch Standard-Wettbewerbe. Die Häfen konkurrieren gegen einander, die Tourismusbetriebe konkurrenzieren gegen einander, da ist wenig Synergie möglich. Das ist ganz klar. Die alle wollen in den Euro und so weiter.

Also da muss dann schon jeder sein Heil selber suchen. Aber hin und wieder macht es durchaus Sinn wieder gemeinsam aufzutreten. Aber man weiß da wieder um die Grenzen.

Hofmann: Außerdem haben ja Estland und Lettland immer noch keine fixe Grenze.

Schwarzinger: Es hat schon einen Vertrag gegeben und es ist ja an sich ausgemacht, wo das ist. Nur ist das in der DUMA nicht ratifiziert. Und die Demarkation hat noch nicht stattgefunden. Aber auf dem Papier weiß man schon, wo die Grenze ist.

Es gab ja den Vorwurf, dass die Esten noch Territorialforderungen hätten, das wurde dann in der Duma wieder „hochgekocht“. Aber das ist etwas, was meiner Meinung nach nicht wirklich ein großes Problem darstellt.

Hofmann: Sehr interessant. Vielen Dank, dass sie sich die Zeit genommen haben und danke für das Gespräch.

### **10.2.3. E-mail correspondence with Dr. Reinhard Vesper<sup>231</sup> October 2009:**

#### **1. Hat sich Litauens Außenpolitik seit dem NATO Beitritt gewandelt (auch bezüglich Russland)?**

In den Grundzügen nicht, in vielen Nuancen schon. Die grundsätzliche außenpolitische Orientierung Litauens ist seit Anfang der neunziger Jahre konstant geblieben, und spätestens seit 1993/94 gab es auch einen alle wesentlichen Parteien einschließenden Konsens über die Westorientierung und das 2004 erreichte Ziel, Vollmitglied in der EU und Nato zu werden.

Bis die Entscheidung über die Aufnahme in diese beiden Organisationen gefallen war, wurde in der litauischen Außenpolitik diesem Ziel alles andere untergeordnet, d.h. Litauen hat - wie die anderen Beitrittskandidaten - eine Profilierung in strittigen Fragen vermieden, vor allem in solchen Fragen, die unter den EU- und Nato-Mitgliedern selbst umstritten waren. Da man die Zustimmung aller Mitglieder für die Aufnahme benötigte, wollte man keines verärgern.

Litauen hat - wie eine Reihe anderer osteuropäischer Demokratien - in einer innerwestlichen Streitfrage zum ersten Mal Anfang 2003 in der Debatte über den Irak-Krieg offen Position bezogen, d.h. nachdem auf dem EU-Gipfel in Kopenhagen und dem Nato-Gipfel in Prag die jeweiligen Erweiterungsentscheidungen gefallen waren. Damals stellte es sich (wie in der Erklärung der sogenannten Vilnius-Gruppe im Februar 2003 (Datum bitte prüfen)) auf die Seite der Vereinigten Staaten. Litauen war - in der Diktion des damaligen amerikanischen Verteidigungsministers Rumsfeld - "New Europe". Ein Grund dafür war die Annahme (auf der bis vor kurzem auch die polnische Außenpolitik wesentlich gründete), dass angesichts der Neigung einiger großer EU-Staaten wie Deutschland, Frankreich und Italien zu einer großen Nähe zu Russland die eigene Sicherheit nur dann gewährleistet ist, wenn man auch enge Beziehungen zu Washington pflegt.

Von Washington aus wurde diese Haltung, vor allem von Vizepräsident Cheney, aktiv unterstützt. Sie wurde aber auch gefördert durch das Verhalten der Westeuropäer, so durch das Dreieck Berlin-Paris-Moskau, das Schröder, Chirac und Putin gegen den Irak-Krieg

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<sup>231</sup> Dr. Reinhard Vesper is editor at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung since 2000, specialized on Eastern European politics.



bildeten. Weitere Entwicklungen, wie z.B. die Art und Weise, wie von der Regierung Schröder die Ostsee-Pipeline über die Köpfe der Osteuropäer hinweg vorangetrieben wurde, haben diese Haltung noch gestärkt.

Auch Richtung Osten hat Litauen nach Nato- und EU-Beitritt eine aktivere Politik zu betreiben begonnen. Das betrifft vor allem die Bestrebungen, die Ukraine, Moldau und Georgien näher an die EU heranzuführen, was besonders augenscheinlich wurde durch die litauische Vermittlerrolle während der Orangen Revolution in der Ukraine Ende 2004 und zuletzt während des russisch-georgischen Kriegs. Diese Ostpolitik koordiniert Litauen relativ eng mit Polen - man kann fast von einer litauisch-polnischen Achse in der EU sprechen. Beide Länder arbeiten auch in EU und Nato eng zusammen, wenn es darum geht, eine Russland-Politik zu formulieren.

Die Haltung gegenüber Russland hat sich seit dem Beitritt zu beiden Organisationen eher verhärtet. Ein Grund dafür dürfte sein, dass Litauen außenpolitisch insgesamt seither ein deutlicheres Profil zeigt - und das aufgrund der Sicherheit, die es jetzt hat, auch gegenüber Russland wagen kann.

Der Hauptgrund aber liegt in der russischen Politik, als da wären:

- das Bestreben Moskaus, die ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken als seine Einflussosphäre zu arrondieren (und es gibt den durchaus begründeten Verdacht, dass es das mit Präsident Paksas auch in Litauen versucht hat)
- die Politik der ständigen wirtschaftspolitischen Nadelstiche gegenüber den osteuropäischen EU- und Nato-Mitgliedern (der Fall Mazeikiu Nafta mit der "lecken" Druschba-Pipeline, der russisch-polnische Fleischstreit)
- die russische Geschichtspolitik, in der die sowjetische Okkupation des Baltikums als freiwilliger Anschluss dargestellt wird
- was zu solchen akuten Krisen führen kann wie dem Streit über das sowjetische Kriegerdenkmal in Tallinn.

Vor diesem Hintergrund habe ich den Eindruck, dass sich der "antirussische" Konsens in der litauischen politischen Elite in den Jahren seit dem Machtantritt Putins in Moskau deutlich verfestigt hat.

In der litauischen Russland-Politik ist allerdings seit Herbst vergangenen Jahres (d.h. interessanterweise seit dem Amtsantritt der Regierung Kubilius) eine Wende zu mehr

Pragmatismus zu beobachten, für die es offenbar zwei Gründe gibt. Zum einen hat man in Vilnius erkannt, dass eine derart harte Haltung wie Litauen sie mit seinem langen Veto gegen die Aufnahme von EU-Russland-Verhandlungen über ein Partnerschaftsabkommen bis Frühjahr 2008 gezeigt hat, nicht auszahlt, weil man sich dadurch in der EU (bzw. Nato) isoliert und so letztlich sowohl innerhalb der Gemeinschaft als auch gegenüber Russland in eine schwächere Position gerät. Zum anderen sind in Washington die Inspiratoren der harten Haltung abgetreten. Obamas "Reset" in den Beziehungen zu Russland zwingt die Osteuropäer, sich neu zu positionieren.

Bei diesen Veränderungen aber gilt, dass sich an den grundsätzlichen Annahmen und der grundsätzlichen Ausrichtung der litauischen Außenpolitik, über die ein breiter Konsens in der politischen Elite besteht, nichts geändert hat: Man sieht in Russland eine potentielle Gefahr für die eigene Sicherheit, gegen die man sich nur durch eine feste Integration in allen westlichen Organisationen schützen kann.

## **2. War der Beitritt zur NATO die beste Wahl für Litauen? Bzw. warum kam Neutralität oder ein Ausbau der Baltischen Kooperation (BALTBAT, BALTRON, etc.) nicht in Frage?**

Die Antwort auf den ersten Teil der Frage lautet uneingeschränkt: ja. Der Antwort auf ihren zweiten Teil wird sich aus der folgenden Begründung ergeben.

Noch eine Vorbemerkung: Bei der Beantwortung derartiger Fragen sind Nato und EU immer zusammen zu sehen - das Streben nach Mitgliedschaft in diesen beiden Organisationen diene dem gleichen Ziel, der festen Verankerung Litauens im Westen, zum Schutz vor Russland, bei dem bis heute unklar ist, ob es die Souveränität der ehemaligen Sowjetrepubliken wirklich akzeptiert.

Dass Litauen eine solche Verankerung anstrebte, hat auch mit der schlechten historischen Erfahrung zu tun, die man in der Zwischenkriegszeit mit der Neutralität gemacht hat. Sie bot keinen Schutz, sondern machte Litauen im Gegenteil anfälliger dafür, zum Spielball anderer Mächte zu werden. In einem Bündnis wie der Nato, in dem alle Mitglieder über wesentliche Entscheidungen mitbestimmen, ist Litauen dagegen Teil einer Macht, deren Prinzipien

(Demokratie, Rechtsstaat, Marktwirtschaft) es teilt. Ein Vorteil dabei ist, dass bei Interessenkonflikten mit größeren Staaten im eigenen Bündnis für diese die Bündnisregeln gelten. Litauen hat durch die Vollmitgliedschaft in Nato und EU also auch gegenüber befreundeten Staaten eine stärkere Position.

Die Entscheidung für die Westbindung fiel Anfang der neunziger Jahre in einer Lage, in der die politische Landkarte Europas in einem Maße in Bewegung war, wie seit dem 2. Weltkrieg nicht mehr. Es war nicht klar, in welche Richtung sich die gerade von der kommunistischen Diktatur befreiten Staaten entwickeln würden - angesichts der Erfolgsgeschichten in Ostmitteleuropa gerät das heute leicht in Vergessenheit. Das galt für Litauen ebenso wie für alle seine Nachbarn, d.h. auch Polen und Russland, gegenüber denen beiden man aufgrund historischer Erfahrungen ein Sicherheitsbedürfnis hatte.

Auch in Bezug auf Polen herrschte damals in Vilnius große Unsicherheit - man wusste ja nicht, wie stark auf Dauer jene Kräfte werden würden, die dem verlorenen Wilno lautstark nachtrauerten. Dass man Partner für einen Schutz gegen Polen finden würde, war aber ausgeschlossen, schließlich war es das Land, das damals die größte Aufmerksamkeit und die größte Unterstützung aus dem Westen genoss. Also musste es darum gehen, unter das gleiche Dach wie Polen zu schlüpfen, d.h. in ein Bündnis einzutreten, in dem klare Regeln gelten, z.B. was die Unverletzlichkeit von Grenzen angeht.

Das klingt aus heutiger Sicht sehr hypothetisch und hatte damals in der litauischen Debatte mitunter hysterische Züge, aber man muss bedenken, dass in jener Zeit Jugoslawien gerade in einem blutigen Bürgerkrieg zerfiel, dass es in Moldau einen Sezessionskrieg der slawischen Minderheit am Ostufer des Dnjestr gab, dass im Kaukasus die Krieg um Abchasien, Südossetien und Nagornyj Karabach tobten. Es war nicht ausgeschlossen, dass es auch anderswo zu gewaltsamen Eskalationen kommen könnte - auf der Ebene von Straßengewalt gab es sie z.B. in Bulgarien mit der türkischen Minderheit, in Rumänien mit der ungarischen Minderheit. In Litauen spielte eine große Rolle, dass die Führer der polnischen Minderheit im Umland von Vilnius sich in den Jahren von 1989 bis 1991 von Moskau hatten instrumentalisieren lassen und nach dem Ende der Sowjetunion versuchten, nun Warschau für ihre Forderungen nach Autonomie zu gewinnen.

Vor allem aber war alles andere als klar, welchen Weg Russland nehmen würde. Es gab die -

vor allem im Westen laut geäußerte - Hoffnung, es könne sich zu einer Demokratie entwickeln, aber auch die Furcht, aus dem Zerfall könne eine nationalistisch-revanchistische Kraft hervorgehen; selbst in Russland wurden in politischen Debatte damals oft Parallelen zwischen der Weimarer Republik und Russland gezogen. Eine andere, durchaus reale Möglichkeit schien eine weitere Desintegration Russlands - zentrifugale Tendenzen gab es nicht nur in Tschetschenien, sondern auch in Tatarstan, Baschkortostan und einigen anderen Teilgebieten mit nichtrussischer Titularethnie sowie sogar einigen ethnisch russischen Provinzen. Wie real die Gefahr eines Staatszerfalls in Russland war, zeigte sich auch in der gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzung zwischen Präsident Jelzin und dem Obersten Sowjet im Oktober 1993.

Bei einer negativen Entwicklung Russlands (und zwar egal bei welchem Szenario), wäre Litauen, das sich im Staatsaufbau befand und daher in seinem Inneren selbst noch schwach und instabil war, nicht in der Lage gewesen, sich allein gegen die Folgen zu schützen: Weder hätte es sich gegen eine Aggression (auch nur eines Teils Russlands oder sich selbständig machender Teile der russischen Streitkräfte) verteidigen können, noch wäre es in der Lage gewesen, die von einem zerfallenden Russland ausgehenden Wellen der Instabilität aufzufangen.

Dieses Gesamtbild muss man sich vor Augen halten, wenn man die damals getroffene grundsätzliche Entscheidung für eine Westintegration nachvollziehen will.

Die frühe Festlegung aller ostmitteleuropäischen Staaten auf eine Westintegration und die Bereitschaft von EU und - anfangs mit Einschränkungen - Nato, diese Länder aufzunehmen, waren meines Erachtens ein Faktor, wenn nicht sogar der entscheidende Grund dafür, dass die Entwicklung dort stabil und demokratisch verlaufen ist. Vereinfacht gesagt, waren die beiden Organisationen informelle Garantiemächte für die Einhaltung von Regeln, sowohl in der Innen- wie in der Außenpolitik. Beide Organisationen machten die Erfüllung demokratischer Standards im Inneren zur Voraussetzung für die Aufnahme. Das hatte zwei Folgen: Zum einen gab es für die jeweiligen Regierungen einen starken Anreiz, sich auch wirklich an Regeln zu halten - ein grober Verstoß hätte zwar möglicherweise kurzfristig taktische Vorteile im innenpolitischen Machtkampf gebracht, wäre aber insgesamt schädlich für die eigene Position gewesen. Umgekehrt musste derjenige, der gerade nicht an der Macht war, nicht fürchten, für immer ausgeschlossen zu bleiben, d.h. es war kein Risiko, z.B. eine

Wahlniederlage zuzugeben und die Macht in andere Hände zu geben. Entsprechende Anreize funktionierten auch für das Verhalten in Beziehungen zu den Nachbarstaaten.

All das führte dazu, dass es in den politischen Eliten einen festen Konsens in allen wesentlichen Grundsatzfragen gab, was in Umbruchzeiten, in denen oft das politische Faustrecht regiert, alles andere als selbstverständlich ist. Damit war auch die Gefahr einer Manipulation innenpolitischer Ereignisse durch Moskau (die Regierung oder auch nur mächtige Interessengruppen in bestimmten Ministerien, Sicherheitskräften oder Wirtschaft) gering, wie sie in Weißrussland, der Ukraine und Moldau sowie im Kaukasus zu beobachten waren.

Konkret auf Litauen bezogen heißt das (natürlich grob vereinfacht): Es gab nach 1991 im rechten Flügel von Sajudis starke Kräfte, die sich das unabhängige Litauen als nationalistisch-autoritären Staat (ähnlich wie Kroatien unter Tudjman) vorstellten, während auf der anderen Seite aus der KP kommende Geschäftsleute und Interessengruppen an politischen Zuständen interessiert waren, wie sie sich in Russland entwickelten, d.h. einer engen Verquickung von wirtschaftlicher und politischer Macht. Auf beiden Seiten gab es "Geschäftsleute" aus der Untergrundwirtschaft der Sowjetzeit, die auf verschiedenen Wegen nach einer wenigstens teilweisen Legalisierung ihrer Geschäfte strebten und dazu ebenfalls politischen Einfluss suchten. Aber auch für alle diese Gruppen, die eine ernste Gefahr für eine demokratische Entwicklung waren (und z.T. noch sind), waren aus unterschiedlichen (wirtschaftlichen, ideologischen) Gründen die Mitgliedschaft in EU und Nato interessant. Man kann also sagen, dass sich Litauen mit seinem Streben nach Westbindung gewissermaßen vor sich selbst geschützt hat.

Baltische Kooperation war also keine Alternative - zumal Estland und Lettland wegen des hohen Anteils russischsprachiger Bevölkerung in einer noch weitaus größeren Gefahr der inneren Destabilisierung als Litauen waren und also keine verlässlichen Partner werden konnten; davon abgesehen wären auch die drei baltischen Staaten gemeinsam zu klein gewesen, sich etwaigen Wiedereinverleibungsversuchen aus Osten wirksam zu widersetzen. Sie ist aber im Rahmen der Nato sinnvoll - so wie es ja auch deutsch-französische oder deutsch-polnische Einheiten gibt.

## **11 Appendix**

### **11.1 Timeline to Lithuanian-NATO-Membership**

The chronology of key events to Lithuanian NATO membership:

**On 20 December 1991**, Lithuania together with Latvia and Estonia joined the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC).

**On 13-16 March 1992**, the first visit by a NATO secretary General, Manfred Wörner, to the Baltic States took place at the invitation of the Governments of these three states.

**On 5 October 1993**, political parties of the Republic of Lithuania addressed the President regarding the integration of the Republic of Lithuania into NATO.

**On 4 January 1994**, President of the Republic of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner requesting Lithuanian membership in NATO.

**On 27 January 1994**, Lithuania joined the Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme.

**On 19 December 1996**, Law on the Basics of National Security was adopted, which defined integration into European and transatlantic structures as the priority goal of the Lithuanian foreign policy and the measure for safeguarding national security.

**On 1 August 1997**, the Lithuanian Mission to NATO was established.

**On 9 October 1997**, the former Minister of National Defence Linas Linkevičius was appointed as Ambassador of Lithuania to NATO.

**On 23-25 April 1999**, at the NATO Summit in Washington NATO leaders launched the Membership Action Plan, designed to assist countries, like Lithuania, aspiring to join the alliance in preparation for NATO membership.

**On 18-19 May 2000**, a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the nine NATO aspirant countries

was held in Vilnius, during which the Vilnius Statement was made a joint declaration of NATO Enlargement. As a result of this meeting, the Vilnius Ten group was established after the joining of Croatia.

**On 17 November 2000**, Ambassador Giedrius Èekuolis was appointed chief coordinator of Lithuanian integration to NATO.

**On 25 January 2001**, by decree of the President, Gintė Damusis was appointed as Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuania to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU).

**On 27-31 May 2001**, NATO Parliamentary Assembly held its spring session in Vilnius.

**On 21 November 2002**, in Prague, seven NATO candidate countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia were invited to start accession negotiations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

**On 26 March 2003**, Protocols of accession were signed, paving the way for the invited candidate countries to join the Alliance.

**On 10 March 2004**, the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania ratified the Washington Treaty.

**On 29 March 2004**, Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas and his Bulgarian, Estonian, Latvian, Romanian, Slovakian and Slovenian counterparts presented to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell the ratification instruments of the Washington Treaty. On this day Lithuania became a full-fledged member of NATO.

**On 2 April 2004**, the Lithuanian flag was raised at NATO headquarters in Brussels. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania Antanas Valionis and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia attended the official ceremony.<sup>232</sup>

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Source: Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, [www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188864](http://www.kam.lt/index.php/en/188864) (03/25/09);  
NATO, [www.nato.int/invitees2004/lithuania/chronology.htm](http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/lithuania/chronology.htm) (03/25/09)

## **11.2 Abstract**

### **Abstract English:**

Lithuania joined in 2004, together with the two other Baltic countries Estonia and Latvia, not only EU but also NATO. The paper deals with the reasons why Lithuania joined the military alliance respectively what other possibilities Lithuania had to satisfy their needs in terms of security especially towards Russia. First it is to be analyzed which options a small state has according to the liberal or the realist school of thought concerning its security. Subsequently the specific conditions of Lithuania like its history, identity and its military are taken under consideration. A crucial factor in the context of Lithuania joining NATO is Russia. It was not only seen as the main threat by Lithuania, it was also the biggest opponent of NATO accession of the Baltic states.

### **Abstract Deutsch:**

Litauen trat 2004, gemeinsam mit den anderen beiden Baltischen Staaten Estland und Lettland, nicht nur der EU sondern auch der NATO bei. Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich nun mit den Gründen warum Litauen der NATO beigetreten ist bzw. welche anderen Möglichkeiten es für Litauen gegeben hätte, sein Sicherheitsbedürfnis vor allem gegenüber Russland zu stillen. Zunächst wird beleuchtet welche Optionen ein Kleinstaat im Falle Litauens dem Liberalismus und dem Realismus folgend hat. Danach wird auf die besonderen Gegebenheiten Litauens, wie seine Geschichte, Identität und sein Militär eingegangen. Ein wichtiger Faktor ist Russland im Zusammenhang mit Litauens NATO-Beitritt, da die Russische Föderation nicht nur als größte Bedrohung in Litauen wahrgenommen wurde, sondern auch der größte Gegner des Beitritts der Baltischen Staaten zur NATO war.



## 11.3 Curriculum Vitae

### Catherina Hofmann

\*19.8.1983, Wien

#### Studium

|                                  |   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 2006 – 2007                      | Erasmus-Aufenthalt in Litauen an der Vilnius University       |
| 2002 Wintersemester<br>bis heute | Politikwissenschaft an der Universität Wien                   |
| 2002                             | 1 Semester Medizin an der Universität Wien                    |
| 2001                             | Politikwissenschaften und Publizistik an der Universität Wien |

#### Schule

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| 2001        | Matura am Bundesgymnasium Tulln                           |
| 1997        | Wechsel in das Bundesgymnasium Tulln                      |
| 1993 – 1996 | Höhere Internatsschule des Bundes Boeharvegasse 1030 Wien |
| 1989-1993   | Volksschule Strohgasse Wien                               |

#### Praktika und weitere Tätigkeiten

|                                |   |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 2008 September<br>bis Dezember | Praktikum bei IDM (Institut für Donauraum und Mitteleuropa)<br>Aufgabenfeld: mehre Publikationen, Unterstützung bei der<br>Organisation von Veranstaltungen, Mitwirkung an der Studie<br>„Der Donauraum“, Englische Übersetzungen |
| 2007 April                     | 2 Vorträge zum Thema „Die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten der EU und<br>Arbeitsmigration“ im Auftrag der TU Wien im Rahmen des<br>Projektes „Optimierte Marktbearbeitung STRABAG 2020“ mit<br>der STRABAG SE                               |

#### Publikationen

- „Europäische Zukunft für die Ukraine?“, in IDM Info Europa 4/2008
- „Partei Perspektiven“ in Kooperation mit C. Hell, in „Litauen“ IDM Sonderheft als Beilage der Wiener Zeitung
- „Alte Uni, neue Bildung“, in „Litauen“ IDM Sonderheft als Beilage der Wiener Zeitung
- „Seen, Sand und alte Städte“, in „Litauen“ IDM Sonderheft als Beilage der Wiener Zeitung