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# DIPLOMARBEIT

Titel der Diplomarbeit

**“Consequences of ‘Development’ & Globalization in  
Cape Verde:  
On Aspects of Exclusion and ‘Identity  
Construction’“**

Verfasserin

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angestrebter akademischer Grad

**Magistra (Mag.)**

Wien, September 2011

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt:

A 057 390

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt:

Internationale Entwicklung

Betreuer:

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# Preface

In 2007, I first travelled to Cape Verde to volunteer at a local children- and youth center. I went there rather naïvely, not knowing much about the country's history or current situation. After a couple of days I heard the first comments about "African" and "European". When I explained to people that it was my first time in Africa, for example, some told me not to say that out loud since many Cape Verdeans did not like to hear that. These comments and my overall experience there made me curious to learn more about the history of and the identity construction on the archipelago.

After my return to Vienna I took several classes dealing with *Creole Studies* and thereby deepened my knowledge of and interest for Cape Verde in particular. Moreover, I have continued my work for the Cape Verdean children- and youth center up to today and have therefore constantly been involved and confronted with the country's contemporary issues and difficulties.

I would hereby like to thank everyone who has supported me thus far and will continue to support me. A big thank-you to Bea Gomes, Walter Schicho, and the entire "Traraa"-research group for their continuous feedback, input, and time. To my Cape Verdean friends and colleagues: *Obrigadu pa tudu, pa nhós ajuda y gazadju!!* And – last but not least – to my family and friends, who never stop to encourage, impress, and inspire me.



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# Introduction

In the contemporary world of rapid globalization, change, and social, cultural, political, and economic upheaval, people increasingly feel the need to reconceptualize their identity as it represents a sense of security and solidarity in a world filled with transition and instability.

This thesis addresses the recent process of "development" and globalization in Cape Verde since the early 1990s and its consequences on "cultural" or "national" identity construction – a construction that has always evolved around the society's closeness to "Africanity" and "Europeanness", respectively. The growing Internet access plays a vital role in this context, especially with regard to the younger generation, which is the main research focus. Subsequently, the correlation between identity construction, the conception of "development" or "developed" and "undeveloped", respectively, and processes of social exclusion will be emphasized. The thesis at hand aims at singling out and analyzing the aspect of identity construction and how people "adapt" their identity to the processes of "development" and globalization in Cape Verde.

The relevant contexts and backgrounds are strongly entangled, which leads to constant overlaps and reciprocative effects. This means that changes described are often both consequence and cause of further processes of change. The research questions and research method – which can be seen as the centerpiece of the thesis and thus of the empirical research – are thus not mentioned at the beginning of the thesis but rather shortly before the actual analysis and evaluation of the results from the conducted interviews. It makes more sense to raise these questions and to present the method at that point because only the examination of the preceding topics makes the understanding of the questions and their context possible. In addition, the pertinence of certain themes and areas addressed in the research questions will become more apparent.

## Structure

The outline of this thesis will open with a brief general introduction to the Cape Verdean history. The subsequent chapter deals with the issues of "development" and globalization. It takes into account the economic "development" in Cape Verde since the early 1990s, the time of the first multi-party elections when the country began to open up politically and

economically. One of the results of this "development" is a process of (social, political, economic) exclusion and inclusion. There is no doubt that certain demographic groups are benefitting from the current "development" (and are thus "included") but the majority of the Cape Verdean population remains poor and "excluded", which is why the aspect of exclusion will be addressed more thoroughly.

In the following two chapters, the research topic – which includes theoretical foundations and concepts as well as the research questions – and the research method will be illustrated, which in turn serves to prepare the empirical part of this thesis. Thereafter, theories and concepts regarding identity construction will be presented in order to facilitate the later analysis of changes in Cape Verdean identity construction. Finally, the results of the interviews and the attempt to answer the previously raised research questions will be presented and the overall findings of the thesis summarized.



# 1. Historical Abstract: Cape Verde

After (political) independence from Portugal in 1975, the African Party for Independence of Cape Verde (*Partido Africano da Independência do Cabo Verde*, PAICV) came to power and subsequently governed Cap Verde as the sole legal political party from 1980 until 1990. In 1990, the constitution was modified to admit opposition parties and thus a multi-party system was established (cf. Baker 2006: 494; Carter et al. 2009a: 30, 70). The previously uninhabited archipelago<sup>1</sup>, located roughly 500 kilometers west of the Senegalese coast, had been settled by a small group of Portuguese, Spanish and Genoese people in the 1460s, a few years after it had first been sighted by Portuguese merchant explorers. Thereupon, it had become one of the most important transit points in the Atlantic slave trade between approximately 1500 and 1660. Thusly, the islands had developed on the basis of slavery and plantation economy. When the focus of the slave trade shifted further south (to the successful sugar plantations in São Tomé), Cape Verde became marginalized politically and economically and remained largely isolated. In the early nineteenth century, however, the islands were reaccepted into the world economy due to the onset of the steamship, whereby the island of São Vicente functioned as an essential stop for – primarily British – ships refueling en route to the Americas. The Cape Verdean population, culture, and language evolved from the forced contact between African enslaved peoples and European, mostly Portuguese, colonizers. In many cases, terms such as “mixed”, “mixing” or “mulatto”<sup>2</sup> were – and still are – used to describe the origin of Cape Verdeans, their language (generally referred to as *Kriolu* or *Kabuverdianu*, the official language still being Portuguese), and their culture (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 14; Lobban 1995; Baker 2006: 504ff.; Rodrigues 2008: 350; Bogdan 2000; Meyns 1990; Carter et al. 2009a: 22ff.; Williams 1999: 111).

The PAICV was formed when the previous party fighting for independence, namely the PAIGC (*Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*), ruptured due to internal conflicts in 1980. Subsequently, Cape Verde was a single party-state with a socialist / Marxist-leaning government for the first fifteen years after independence (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 14; Lobban 1995; Bogdan 2000: 87; Bourdet 2002: 13). Under its first rule, the PAICV

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<sup>1</sup> Fikes (2007) refers to this popular narrative of Cape Verdean history as a “*product of colonial ethnology*” (Fikes 2007: 161). She cites an alternate version: According to unedited accounts, the island of Santiago was already inhabited by people from the Senegambia region around 1460 (Fikes 2007: 162).

<sup>2</sup> “*Mixed-blood*” (Bogdan 2000: 86), „*Vermischung*“ („*Mestiçagem*“) (Meyns 1990: 17) – i.e. “intermixture”, or “*Mestiço race*” (Baker 2006: 504), for example. My criticism of these terms will be elaborated and made clear in chapter 5 (on “identity”).

focused on infrastructure, education, and health (cf. Baker 2006: 494; Lobban 1995). Being socialist / Marxist in theory, PAICV's actions were in fact much more social democratic than its ideology might have indicated (cf. Baker 2006: 494; Bogdan 2000: 87). The democratic transition from a one-party state to a multi-party system in 1990 was the result of negotiations between the PAICV and the already founded opposition group, the MpD (*Movimento para a Democracia* / Movement for Democracy). Consequently, the MpD won the first democratic (parliamentary and presidential) elections in 1991, the National Assembly elections in 1995, and the presidential elections of 1996. In 2001, however, the tables were turned again with the win of the PAICV, which also won the 2006 (cf. Baker 2006: 495; Lobban 1995; Carter et al. 2009a: 30, 70; Bogdan 2000: 87; Bourdet 2002: 25) and 2011 elections. The fact that power has been transferred without major problems in Cape Verde is often considered one of the country's main signs of democracy and modernity – primarily by external institutions and observers (cf. Baker 2006: 495).

The governance of the MpD was characterized by a more liberal approach and a greater emphasis on private investments and a market economy (cf. Lobban 1995: 120; Bourdet 2002: 13). In general, the PAICV identifies itself as a pro-African political party, whereas the MpD can be described as a center-right party, which is more oriented towards Western or European politics – i.e. favoring free trade and a liberal economic policy, among other things. Furthermore, the PAICV is said to receive its overall support from the poor, while the MpD is more popular with the urban middle class (cf. Baker 2006: 498; Bogdan 2000: 87). In the past five to ten years, however, the ideological differences between both parties have blurred significantly (cf. Baker 2006: 499). This becomes evident when looking at the government programs of the PAICV and the MpD since the multi-party system has been established: Both have pursued a policy of privatization, economic liberalization, foreign investments, and closer trade with both Europe and Africa (cf. Baker 2006: 500).

The history of Cape Verde is predominated by its unique history of migration. It was the periodic droughts and serious famines in particular that have made the country a nation<sup>3</sup> of emigrants. The relation between the diaspora<sup>4</sup> and its “homeland” were crucial for the country

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<sup>3</sup> By virtue of Hall's deconstruction of “nation” as an imagined community, as a system of cultural representations, it is made clear that “nations” are nothing else than discursive drafts that establish specific meanings of “nation” with which we can identify ourselves or are identified by others.

<sup>4</sup> Brubaker (2005) argues against the notion of “membership” of diasporas. He believes that many scholars have generally overstated the importance of diasporas. Depending on the exact definition of “diaspora”, it may be necessary to accept that this large (imagined) group of people may actually have little in common with each other. According to him, three core elements remain understood to be fundamental to a diaspora. “*The first is*

after independence as well as for the transition from one-party to multi-party nation (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 13; Meyns 1990: 19; Bourdet 2002: 7). Today, the Cape Verdean diaspora still plays an essential part in the country's economy and electoral process (cf. Baker 2006: 496). Due to its degree of representation many Cape Verdeans feel that the diaspora – in particular the one living in the United States – turned around the result in favor of the PAICV in both the 2001 and 2006 elections (cf. Baker 2006: 497; Carling et al. 2008: 24).

It is widely acknowledged that the diaspora population outnumbered the roughly 500.000<sup>5</sup> residents on the islands, but there is hardly any reliable data on the exact number of Cape Verdeans living abroad. Furthermore, the question of who should or can be considered “Cape Verdean” remains unanswered (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 19, 20; Bogdan 2000: 87). According to Carter et al. (2009a) and Carling (2002), the number of Cape Verdeans living abroad is difficult to determine for three reasons. First, there is an ever-growing number of third or fourth generation Cape Verdeans living abroad, making it difficult to “categorize”<sup>6</sup> them. Second, there are large numbers of undocumented emigrants living overseas. And third, “*approximations of populations by community leaders in immigrant neighborhoods outside of Cape Verde may be overstated*” (Carter et al. 2009a: 86).

Approximately a century and a half of widespread emigration has resulted in Cape Verdean diasporas on all four continents (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 19; Bogdan 2000: 87). Cape Verdean migration flows have differed in various aspects, such as destinations, conditions, or period of time. One of the first migrations from the islands<sup>7</sup> occurred in the 1860s and was related to the US-American whaling industry (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 20; Rodrigues 2008: 354; Meyns 1990: 20). As the end of slavery in Cape Verde was declared, the Portuguese colonial power encouraged the migration of Cape Verdeans – primarily men – to other Portuguese colonies in Africa as indentured laborers. As a result, the majority of them were forced to migrate to São Tomé e Príncipe and work on coffee and cacao plantations there (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 21; Rodrigues 2008: 354; Meyns 1990: 22, 23; Carter et al. 2009a: 24). Many of them never made it back to their home country.

These are merely two examples of the enormous variety of migration experiences from Cape Verde, aside from the migration of low-skilled workers to Portugal, seafarers to the Netherlands, or female domestic workers to Italy (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 22). It is estimated

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*dispersion in space; the second, orientation to a 'homeland'; and the third, boundary-maintenance*” (Brubaker 2005: 5).

<sup>5</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Apresentação de Dados Preliminares do IV<sup>o</sup> RGPH 2010. September 2010. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise/destaques/files/CD/Start.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>6</sup> In the sense that identification and social allegiance tend to cease over time (cf. Bourdet 2002: 10).

<sup>7</sup> The islands of Fogo and Brava, in particular.

that about 60 percent of the members of the diaspora are living in the United States, about 25 percent in Western Europe, and the remainder in coastal Africa (predominantly in Angola and Senegal) (cf. Bourdet 2002: 7). Today, according to recent statistics, the number of emigrants leaving Cape Verde in search for a more prosperous life (and thus the “export of labor”) is decreasing. As a result, the indispensable stream of remittances from Cape Verdeans living abroad is likely to decline in the future (cf. Bourdet 2000: 121; Bogdan 2000: 87, 88; Carter et al. 2009a: 86).

## 2. “Development” & Globalization in Cape Verde

### 2.1. General Introduction

When speaking of “development“, many connotations of this word come to mind. One can talk about “land development“, “human development“, “community development“, or “international development“. International (or global) development generally refers to the development of greater quality of life for all human beings. The well-being of all people – by means of “development” – seems to be a rather simple goal. But what does “well-being” contain and how can it be measured?

It becomes clear that it is not so easy to define “development“. There is no coherent and indisputable definition. The concept of “catch up” is at the root of one of the most universally accepted definitions of “development“. According to this notion (which emerged in the early 1950s), “development” and the “stages of development“, respectively, take place linearly and should entail an upward step-by-step climb (cf. Novy 2005: 40). Thereof, the contradistinction of “developed” and “developing” or “underdeveloped” countries emerged<sup>8</sup>. As Grassi (2009) explains,

*“the term and indeed idea of development (inherently bound up with the idea of backwardness) finds its origins far back in the historical processes that resulted in the crisis of the feudal structure of the economy and society and the emergence of capitalism. Within the conceptual origins of both development and backwardness, there are mutually interconnected facets, including: the discovery of the ‘primitive’ world and a Euro-centric vision, the modern ideal and the affirmation of the ideology of capitalism as the natural state of affairs – in accordance with nature and reason”* (Grassi 2009: 45f.).

In compliance with this concept, poor countries are supposed to adopt “our”<sup>9</sup> technology and “our” model and understanding of democracy in order to become “like us” in the future (cf. Fischer et al. 2004: 16). The notion of the existence of a final destination in history and of an aspiring purpose was undoubtedly shaped by European / North-American discourse. This approach of assessing the Other from the standpoint and lifestyle of the Self is often referred to as “ethnocentrism“. The Self is considered to be the standard which all others have to orient themselves by (cf. Novy 2005: 41).

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<sup>8</sup> Since I criticize this concept, I will use quotation marks for these highly disputed terms.

<sup>9</sup> Meaning “Northern“ / “Western“

The general belief in imitation and “catch up” could only imply one thing, namely economic growth. This broad agreement among the rich country’s elites was embraced by the poor country’s elites as well as the conviction that economic growth – and hence “development” – could solely be reached by means of industrialization. Differences of opinion existed merely with regard to the way the process of industrialization should be set in motion (“unbalanced” or “balanced” growth). In general, however, the formula for “development” was simple: Development = economic growth = nationally initiated or supported industrialization (cf. Fischer et al. 2004: 17).

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the equation of “development” and “economic growth” was widely criticized and there were a number of attempts to define “development” in an alternative way. As a result, it is difficult to avoid questions in terms of environment, gender, participation, or sustainability when speaking of “development” today (cf. Novy 2005: 44). Important international institutions such as the World Bank, however, still comply with economic indicators (per capita GNP, for example) to determine which countries are considered “developed” and which ones are not. The indicator used by the *United Nations Development Program* (UNDP) is the *Human Development Index* (HDI). Many organizations prefer to work with the HDI since it includes aspects other than economics, such as life expectancy or education. This helps to evaluate the “economic development” and the “social development” separately, which has the advantage of countering the illusion that economic growth automatically results in a better standard of living (cf. Fischer et al. 2004: 26, 31).

While I disagree with the common equation of “development” and “economic” growth – and advocate an extended comprehension of “development” that involves economic growth combined with equality and fairness, freedom, independence, and participation – I will employ this (simplified) definition of “development” within my thesis since it continues to characterize the official political and economic discourse.

## **2.2. Economic Development since the 1990s**

At the beginning of the 1990s, Cape Verde started a process of market-oriented economic reforms (referred to as *Mudança*<sup>10</sup>) – the main objective being a higher and lasting growth rate in order to increase the real incomes and living standards of the population. To be precise,

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<sup>10</sup> Equivalent to the English “transition” or “change”

the reforms began on a small scale at the end of the 1980s while Cape Verde was still a one-party state. They were continued afterwards in an enhanced and accelerated form by the MpD, which had won the first multi-party elections in 1991. After a worsening of the fiscal situation in the mid-1990s and a subsequent government reshuffle in 1997/98, the process of reforms was revived again and the influence of the state within areas of economic activity decreased. These measures were concomitant with an increased involvement of the multilateral donor community, namely above all the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU (cf. Bourdet 2000: 121; Bogdan 2000: 87, 90; Bourdet 2002: 13ff.).

The political changes, in particular since 1997/98, included notably the strengthening of the fiscal policy stance, which had both indirect and direct effects on the country's economic and social situation. Due to its serious structural developmental limits and natural restraints, such as its unfavorable location coupled with high transportation costs, lack of mineral resources, and small domestic markets, Cape Verde is constantly facing difficulties with regard to a long-term, self-sufficient economic growth. It is crucial for the government, however, to focus on these challenges for two main reasons. First, bilateral aid has been cut during the past few years and is most likely going to diminish even more in the future. This is primarily because of the comparatively high per capita income in Cape Verde today, which has resulted in the country's upgrade from "Less (or Least) Developed Country" (LCD) to "Medium Developed Country" (MDC) by ECOSOC<sup>11</sup> or "Middle-Developing Nation" by the World Bank in 2008, and has thus led to a decrease in foreign development assistance. Second, the preciously high and economically important stream of (private) remittances from the Cape Verdean diaspora is also likely to subside from now on as a result of the notable reduction in emigration numbers during the past two to three decades. As the country is highly dependent on emigrant remittances and foreign aid due to its economic sensitivity, it is momentarily facing a number of complex and serious political and socio-economic decisions (cf. Bourdet 2000: 121, 122; Fikes 2010: 56; Bourdet 2002: 15ff.; Africa Research Bulletin 2007; Ford 2004: 56; Rodrigues 2008; Baker 2006: 506; Carter et al. 2009a: 87ff.; Brito 2006: 29; Meyns 1990: 41ff.).

The first wave of reforms happened during the first half of the 1990s and had a mixed outcome. From 1991 until 1996, the growth of GDP reached an average of about 4 percent. This amount may seem significant but was in fact the consequence of a considerable increase

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<sup>11</sup> ECOSOC is the *United Nations Economic and Social Council*

in international assistance and a substantial fiscal policy (cf. Bourdet 2000: 123). In 1993, the Cape Verdean government passed a number of laws in order to open the nation's economy to foreign investors (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 70). According to article 90(4-5) of the Constitution, “*the state shall support foreign investments and the integration of Cape Verde into the world economic system*” (Bogdan 2000: 90). Especially between 1993 and 1997<sup>12</sup>, public investments increased rapidly but the fiscal deficit made up 16 percent of GDP during the same period. As a result, public debt grew and – in addition to the indefensible fiscal deficit and a high rate of unemployment – represented the dominant macroeconomic drawback in the mid-1990s (cf. Bourdet 2000: 123).

Owing to the mixed socio-economic results of the reforms during the first half of the 1990s, a reorientation of economic policy occurred in 1997-1998. This reorientation included a cabinet reshuffle in 1998 and the increased importance of multilateral organizations, above all the IMF. Contrary to the first wave of reforms at the beginning of the 1990s which had been developed and effectuated locally and with restricted input from outside, the second wave relied on the involvement of institutions such as the IMF in the implementation of economic policy. This involvement took shape with an IMF adjustment operation, which was put into effect in 1998<sup>13</sup>. In addition, other multinational organizations such as the World Bank and the EU increased their commitment to Cape Verdean economic policy. On the other hand, Cape Verde has experienced a withdrawal of some bilateral donors over the past few years, except for Portugal and Luxembourg. In accord with the new reform policy and the collaboration with multinational organizations such as the IMF in the second half of the 1990s, the Cape Verdean government implemented structural reforms – especially the accelerated privatization of state-owned enterprises and banks (cf. Bourdet 2000: 124; Rodrigues 2008: 360; Bourdet 2002: 14ff.).

The privatization program, which was (or is, respectively) carried out in close cooperation with the World Bank, was and continues to be considered essential regarding both the reduction of domestic public debt and an increase in assistance on the part of the donor community. The second wave of privatization was enforced in 1998 and included no less than 27 companies in the industry and service sectors over the next few years, such as two commercial banks (BCA, *Banco Comercial do Atlantico* and CECV, *Caixa Económica de Cabo Verde*) in 1999, and the electricity and water company (ELECTRA, *Empresa de*

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<sup>12</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Contas Nacionais. <http://www.ine.cv/dadosestatisticos.aspx>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>13</sup> cf. IMF (International Monetary Fund): IMF Approves Stand-By Credit for Cape Verde. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/pr9803.htm>. [Access: 17.05.2001]



*Electricidade e Agua*) and the telecom company (*Cabo Verde Telecom*) in the same year. Several large, medium, and small companies remain to be privatized within the following years, predominantly in the transport, shipyard, and food sectors (cf. Bourdet 2000: 125; Africa Research Bulletin 2007). During the rule of the MpD, the PAICV uttered strong criticism in terms of the privatization program, especially concerning the extensive role Portuguese business interests played in the implemented privatization of large-scale enterprises. A main argument of the critics, who also came from the MpD itself, related to the loss of national economic sovereignty resulting from large-scale privatizations in favor of foreign (mostly Portuguese) companies. This critique can also be seen with the example of the exchange rate agreement<sup>14</sup> between Portugal and Cape Verde in 1998 in mind. This agreement de facto implicated the country's loss of its sovereignty with respect to monetary and exchange rate policy (cf. Bourdet 2000: 124-127; Brito 2006: 28; Bourdet 2002: 15).

After the increase in public debt in the first half of the 1990s, resuming control over fiscal policy was the main macroeconomic priority after the mid-1990s. During this phase of reorientation, the new cooperation with multilateral organizations resulted in the aforementioned agreement on a "Structural Adjustment Program" (SAP) between the Cape Verdean government and the IMF in 1998<sup>15</sup>. In order to strengthen the country's fiscal policy it was seen as necessary to reduce the burden of domestic debt and lower public expenditures (cf. Bourdet 2000: 129; Bourdet 2002: 15ff.). Clearly, most of the burden of the aforementioned adjustments fell on capital expenditures, whose share of GDP dropped about 15 percent during the second half of the 1990s. This strong decline was simultaneous with a comparative cut-back in external assistance. With regard to the distribution of capital expenditures across economic sectors it is obvious that the Cape Verdean economy is dominated by the tertiary sector. This sector is principally concerned with transport and communications, education, energy and water, and the social sector (which includes health, social promotion, and poverty reduction). Public investments in the tertiary sector have increased over time, despite the fact that total capital expenditures have generally decreased. The Cape Verdean economy is characterized by a unique structure, which has been shaped by various aspects such as the low amount of natural resources, the unfavorable ecological and climatic conditions, the aftereffects of Portuguese colonialism, the importance of the state in

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<sup>14</sup> The nominal exchange rate agreement in 1998 tied the CVE to the Portuguese Escudo (and indirectly to the Euro) and in 2002 directly to the Euro (cf. Bourdet 2002: 15). The agreement included, among other things, the obligation for the Cape Verdean government to respect the "Maastricht criteria" (with requirements regarding the level of government deficits, interest rates, or inflation rate) and a restriction in terms of the government's use of the country's money creation (cf. Bourdet 2002: 27; Bourdet 2000: 133).

<sup>15</sup> cf. IMF (International Monetary Fund): IMF Approves Stand-By Credit for Cape Verde. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1998/pr9803.htm>. [Access: 17.05.2001]

the country's economy after 1975, or the relatively high amount of external assistance – in the form of official aid as well as remittances<sup>16</sup> from the diaspora (cf. Bourdet 2000: 131, 132; Bourdet 2002: 2f., 33).

The reorientation in Cape Verde's economic policy and the implemented reforms were conducive to the improvement of the country's fiscal situation. Between 1991 and 1998, the fiscal stance improved while the inflation rate fluctuated but still remained relatively low. Due to the exchange rate agreement with Portugal in mid-1998 Cape Verde's monetary policy has been subject to certain restrictions, which nevertheless had positive effects on the country's inflation (cf. Bourdet 2000: 134; Bourdet 2002: 12).

As Bourdet (2000) remarks,

*“a main objective of the reorientation of reform policy in 1997-1998 was an acceleration of the rate of economic growth. Higher growth was considered the best remedy for the dismal employment situation and the widespread poverty”* (Bourdet 2000: 135).

This greater focus on growth issues was seen as the essential instrument for the country's sustainable development. As mentioned before, in Cape Verde – compared to other Sub-Saharan countries – the tertiary sector plays a dominant role in the country's economy. Financial liberalization, the increase in private economic activities and in the number of private enterprises, and the promotion of tourism, among other things, contributed to the rapid growth in Cape Verde after the mid-1990s (cf. Bourdet 2000: 137, 140; Bourdet 2002: 14).

Foreign policy plays an important role for a small state such as Cape Verde – especially for economic reasons<sup>17</sup>. Since its struggle for independence, Cape Verde has been pursuing a policy of *non-alignment*<sup>18</sup>. Given the country's lack of resources, it is reliant on good foreign relations with diverse cooperation partners (for economic reasons alone). Its scope of action regarding foreign-policy decisions is thus severely constrained. Cape Verde is involved in the *Community of Portuguese Language Countries* (CPLP, *Comunidade dos Países de Língua*

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<sup>16</sup> In 2002, these remittances constituted approximately 23.2 percent of the GDP. There are, however, some doubts about the reliability of these numbers since remittances are part of a hidden economy and thus hard to measure accurately (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 87f.). The official statistics regarding the level of remittances most likely underestimate the actual stream because they do not include the considerable amounts that are carried back to Cape Verde during holidays, for instance (cf. Bourdet 2002: 9).

<sup>17</sup> Hence, the country's reform policy primarily consisted (and consists) of measures aimed at integrating the Cape Verdean economy into the world economy (cf. Bourdet 2002: 14).

<sup>18</sup> Countries pursuing a policy of non-alignment consider themselves not aligned with (or against) a major power bloc and do not belong to a military block.

*Portuguesa*)<sup>19</sup>, an intergovernmental organization which was founded in 1996. The cooperation with the other member countries (Portugal, Brazil, Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé e Príncipe) has a special position with regard to cultural aspects. In 1998 – as mentioned before –, Cape Verde signed an agreement with Portugal, which included economic, educational, and social security aspects. In recent years, the country has aspired to a closer connection with Europe (with the fixation of the *Cape Verdean Escudo* to the Euro<sup>20</sup>, for example) (cf. Meyns 1990: 76 ff.; Brito 2006: 27, 28; Bourdet 2002: 15). For example, there are serious ambitions on the part of the Cape Verdean government to become a member of the European Union (cf. Baker 2006: 509).

Cape Verde's membership<sup>21</sup> in the regional economic community ECOWAS<sup>22</sup> (*Economic Community of West African States*) is a sign that an economic cooperation with other African states (or other “developing countries”, for that matter) is considered important as well (cf. Brito 2006: 176). This membership, however, is not likely to bring many economic benefits since Cape Verde is located in a rather marginal site regarding the regional market, and its trade with the other member states is hardly noteworthy. Besides, an economic community such as ECOWAS (meaning one based on trade liberalization) tends to favor the member states, which are already more “developed” economically<sup>23</sup>. Hence, Cape Verde's membership is politically important in order to become better integrated into the West African group of states (cf. Meyns 1990: 91).

By and large, however, Cape Verde has focused on multilateral rather than regional liberalization. To some extent, this policy choice can be attributed to the country's structure of foreign trade, which is set very much in favor of industrial – in particular European – countries (cf. Bourdet 2002: 15).

History has played an essential role in shaping Cape Verde's open attitude towards trade. Due to its historical relations with continental Africa, Europe, and the United States, the government also considers the country's position “*as somewhere between Africa, Europe and America, and is determined to keep good trade relations and cultural ties with all three*” (Baker 2006: 506).

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<sup>19</sup> The PALOP (*Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa*), which was also founded in 1996, forms part of the CPLP. The PALOP consists of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé e Príncipe and – since 2007, when it adopted Portuguese as its official language – Equatorial Guinea.

<sup>20</sup> In January 2002 (cf. Bourdet 2002: 15).

<sup>21</sup> Since 1976

<sup>22</sup> *Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental* (CEDEAO) in Portuguese

<sup>23</sup> That is to say, states that already have a more stable and higher economic growth.

In general, there is no doubt that Cape Verde entered the twenty-first century as an expanding economy. It was still, however, considered to be among the poorer nations of the so called “Global South”<sup>24</sup>. Important economical sectors of the islands are agriculture, together with forestry and fishing<sup>25</sup>. More than 10 percent of the active workforce is employed in these areas<sup>26</sup>. Even so, businesses are not booming. The major challenges regarding agriculture are the unfavorable climatic conditions – the country is regularly stricken with drought – and the small area appropriate for cultivation (only about 12 percent). As a result, more than 80 percent of the food consumed in Cape Verde has to be imported (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 67; Meyns 1990: 41; Baker 2006: 506).

The fishing sector is not promising either. Even though Cape Verde is located in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean and thus perfectly situated in terms of available quantities, fishing remains low due to lack of modern equipment. The industry has in fact declined over the past few years due to the lack of investments made in boats and other necessary equipments. All in all, agricultural production and fishing rarely constitute more than 15 percent<sup>27</sup> of the GDP (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 67; Rodrigues 2008: 350). Furthermore, there have been reports on overfishing on the part of the EU in West Africa (ergo in Cape Verde as well). According to reports by Greenpeace in 2011, for example, these developments originate in agreements of the EU with West African states, who have handed fishing rights to Europe for payments in the amount of several millions of Euros<sup>28</sup>.

Another important employer and source of GDP is the manufacturing industry. Yet the country is faced with lack of resources, high prices, and disadvantageous location and infrastructure in this area. These issues, on the other hand, do not exactly encourage foreign investments in Cape Verde (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 68; Baker 2006: 506).

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<sup>24</sup> The expressions “North“ and “South“ or “Northern” (or “Western”) and “Southern” countries, respectively, do not correspond with geographic criteria but are rather used here to discern the countries with greater (“North” or “West”) and lesser (“South”) economic and industrial power, and performance under the terms of indicators such as the *Human Development Index* (HDI), respectively.

<sup>25</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Gabinete do Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação – RGPH 2010. Actividade económica. March 30th 2011. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise/destaques/files/CD/Start.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>26</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Gabinete do Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação – RGPH 2010. Actividade económica. March 30th 2011. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise/destaques/files/CD/Start.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>27</sup> cf. FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations): Special Report. FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Cape Verde. December 3<sup>rd</sup> 2002. <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y8164e/y8164e00.htm>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>28</sup> cf. Greenpeace Magazin: Greenpeace stellt sich gegen EU-Überfischung in Afrika. April 27th 2011. [http://www.greenpeacemagazin.de/index.php?id=55&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=108199&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=23&cHash=1d57f3ee26](http://www.greenpeacemagazin.de/index.php?id=55&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=108199&tx_ttnews[backPid]=23&cHash=1d57f3ee26). [Access: 05.05.2011]. See also: taz.de: Überfischung der Meere. EU fischt Afrikanern das Essen weg. June 20th 2008. <http://www.taz.de/1/politik/europa/artikel/1/eu-fischt-afrikanern-das-essen-weg/>. [Access: 06.05.2011]. Spiegel Online: Fischfang vor Afrikas Küste. Europa kauft die Meere leer. August 28th 2010. <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,712541,00.html>. [Access: 05.05.2011]

In the wake of the difficulties with the abovementioned sectors of employment it has been suggested to focus the country's economic attention on another industry: tourism. The service industry is rapidly gaining relevance in Cape Verde's economy and most of the economically engaged population is presently working in a service job. Tourism is considered to be the industry with the greatest potential of creating jobs and stimulating the national economy (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 68). As reported in 2006, the government is still trying to allure foreign investors – primarily in the tourism sector – in order to help boost the economy. Moreover, it is still seeking closer economic ties with the United States and Europe (i.e. the EU) (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 70).

When the PAICV regained power in 2001, it more or less continued the politics of liberalization, economic reforms (i.e. privatization, for example the national food distribution company – *Empresa Pública de Abastecimento* / EMPA – in 2002), enticement of foreign investors, and concentration on the tourism industry – in spite of its initial left wing ideological base. Furthermore, the new government focused its attention in the 2001-2006 program on the integration of the diaspora<sup>29</sup> in the development of the country. And the government's program for 2006-2011 continued to advocate liberalization and private foreign investment, above all in the tourist sector (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 23, 24; Rodrigues 2008: 360, 361).

In the process of reorientation, one of the most important components within the nation's new (economic) engine – namely the tourism industry – has resulted in the annexation of innumerable hectares of land for the construction of hotel complexes and other facilities needed to accommodate the increasing number of tourists. While the population of the country is estimated to be about 500.000<sup>30</sup>, “in 2007 alone over 300.000 Europeans vacationed in *Cape Verde*” (Fikes 2010: 56).

Cape Verde's political discourse on economic growth and prosperity culminated when the country became a beneficiary of the *Millennium Challenge Account* (MCA)<sup>31</sup> in 2005 (cf.

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<sup>29</sup> It is crucial to keep up the relations to the emigrant community. They constitute an economic potential that should not be disregarded. “*The economic importance of the diaspora, however, raises the question of to what degree they should influence the politics of the islands*” (Baker 2006: 509).

<sup>30</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Apresentação de Dados Preliminares do IVº RGPH 2010. September 2010. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise/destaques/files/CD/Start.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>31</sup> In 2002, George W. Bush announced that the new MCA would increase US development assistance. The first five countries to benefit from this were Cape Verde, Honduras, Madagascar, Nicaragua, and Georgia. Mawdsley (2007) argues that “*the newly invigorated security-development paradigm (...) [was] used to legitimate more spending on ‘development’ programmes [sic] which are primarily intended to serve the interests of US consumers, manufacturers and investors. Despite the rhetoric, poverty reduction is at best a secondary objective*” (Mawdsley 2007: 487). The *Millennium Challenge Account* is administered by the MCC (*Millennium*

Rodrigues 2008: 359). Remarkably enough, the new investments and development projects also coincided with the reclassification of Cape Verde's status in 2008 (cf. Fikes 2010: 56; Ford 2004: 56; Africa Research Bulletin 2007). This "upgrade", however, represents a mixed blessing for the country itself for various reasons. First, it is generally recognized that under WTO and World Bank rules, "Least Developed Countries" (LDCs)<sup>32</sup> are granted more protectionism than MDCs. In addition, they are also able to accept donor support in areas that would be proscribed for MDCs. Second, as the Cape Verdean ambassador to the UN already stated in 2004, "*this decision will lead to Cape Verde losing some advantages, including favourable [sic!] conditions in terms of loans and benefits of technical assistance (...)*" (Fonseca, cited in Ford 2004: 56). Thus, Cape Verde risks the loss of aid receipts, preferential treatment, and easy-term loans due to the ending of its classification as LDC (cf. Ford 2004: 57; Africa Research Bulletin 2007).

The change of Cape Verde's status within the multinational organizations has coincided with the country's general economic growth. Annual GDP growth averaged 7 percent a year during the 1990s (cf. Ford 2004: 56). In 2006, the growth rate<sup>33</sup> was set with 10.8 percent<sup>34</sup> (cf. Africa Research Bulletin 2007) and in 2007 with 7.8 percent<sup>35</sup>. For the first time, foreign investment exceeded development aid and revenues from tourism surmounted another essential contributor to the country's economy, namely remittances sent by the diaspora. There is more money currently circulating in Cape Verde than has ever been documented before. The rise in wealth is primarily connected to private foreign enterprises and investments from the EU and, more recently, China<sup>36</sup>. Nonetheless, the country still lacks the means to come up for the enormous investments needed, for example in the fields of energy and other basic infrastructure. It has become clear as well that privatization is not the proper solution for development, as most enterprises are now in Portuguese hands and Portugal has failed to act as a satisfying investor (cf. Africa Research Bulletin 2007; Fikes 2010: 56).

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*Challenge Corporation*). For further information please see *Millennium Challenge Corporation: MCC*. United States of America. <http://www.mcc.gov/>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>32</sup> For many years, the high dependence on foreign assistance and emigrants' remittances was the main argument for keeping Cape Verde in the group of the LDCs, in spite of the relatively high average income per capita (cf. Bourdet 2002: 2).

<sup>33</sup> Economic growth in Cape Verde accelerated considerably over the past decades, from 3.5 percent between 1986 and 1991 to 6.3 percent between 1992 and 2000 (cf. Bourdet 2002: 16).

<sup>34</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Estimativa do PIB em 2005 e 2006. [http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cpublicacao%5Cfiles%5Ccoment%C3%A1rios\\_estimativas%20do%20PIBpb.pdf](http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cpublicacao%5Cfiles%5Ccoment%C3%A1rios_estimativas%20do%20PIBpb.pdf). [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>35</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Estimativas do PIB na óptica da Oferta. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cdestaques%5Cfiles%5CPIB%202007.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>36</sup> For more information, see: Alden, Chris; Davies, Martyn: A Profile of the Operations of Chinese Multinationals in Africa. In: South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2006, pp. 83-96. Or: Haugen, Heidi Ostbo; Carling, Jorgen: On the edge of the Chinese diaspora: The surge of baihuo business in an African city. In: Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, July 2005, pp. 639-662.

In terms of the Internet as a mechanism of “development” and globalization, Cape Verde acts as an example for many other LDCs. *“Immediately after independence (...), Cape Verde’s new government declared the telecommunication sector crucial to the country’s development and its promotion was made a top priority”* (International Telecommunication Union 2002: 6). The first experimental network was launched in 1996 by *Cabo Verde Telecom* (CVT) and the service commercialized in 1997. Yet, the country’s entry into cyberspace was comparatively late (it was the 29<sup>th</sup> African country to get connected to the Internet), which may be attributable to the dispersed geographic situation (cf. International Telecommunication Union 2002: 18).

Cape Verde’s recent development is appreciated by the international donor community as a success story. It is seen as one of the “top-reformers” of all African states. In spite of the economic success, it is the next few years that will be a key period for the further development of the country. Its vision of a high economic status and per capita income is based on an export-oriented and private sector-dominated growth – driven by the tourist sector, in particular (cf. Brito 2006: 29).

### **2.3. Consequence I: Exclusion**

Despite the country’s obvious economic boom, it is still a major debtor nation. In 2002, it owed \$ 360 million (roughly €409 million) in external debt and pays about \$ 14 million (€16 million) a year in debt service<sup>37</sup>. The global debt crisis is affecting Cape Verde in the same manner as it has most other poor nations. The increase in debt all over the world is partly due to additional loans but it is overwhelmingly caused by the growth in the amount of interest owed (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 4).

*“The [Cape Verdean] government believes that in part it has been a victim, ironically, of its own prudent economic management. Attention has been paid to maintaining external debt service (...) at the cost of development programmes [sic!]”* (Baker 2006: 508).

The discrepancy in control and power between so called “debtor countries” and wealthy nations / the international financial institutions manifests itself in the absurd fact that more

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<sup>37</sup> cf. CountryWatch: Cape Verde. Country Review. 2007. <http://www.countrywatch.com/>. [Access: 01.06.2011]

money is being transferred from poorer nations to wealthier nations than vice versa. That is to say, as Carter et al. (2009a) put it, that

*“for all but the three of the past 23 years, countries in the Global South have paid out more money in the form of interest, repayments, penalties, and fines on old debt than they have received in the form of new loans. Although almost all poor countries have repaid more than they borrowed, their debts continue to mount”* (Carter et al. 2009a: 4).

It can also be stated that – in general – economic relationships among nations tend to benefit the wealthier countries. In Cape Verde, for instance, some of the land used to grow cash crops for export could be harvested for the country’s own population. Because of debt and foreign dependence, however, most of Cape Verdean produce is periodically sold immediately or made nonperishable for export (such as canned tuna), instead of consumed by the inhabitants. Thus, the alimentary needs of the inhabitants of the archipelago are ignored and, as a result, hunger is still an issue in Cape Verde (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 4, 32).

In spite of the country’s reclassification to “Middle-Developing Nation”, it remains very poor, with about 37 percent<sup>38</sup> (and up to 44 percent among young Cape Verdeans<sup>39</sup>) of its population living below the poverty level. Furthermore, the inequality of income distribution is increasing. Additionally, Cape Verde continues to be heavily dependent on loans and foreign aid – estimated at about 10 percent of GDP – in order to maintain its economy (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 2; Africa Research Bulletin 2007; Rodrigues 2008: 344; Baker 2006: 507).

Cape Verde, just as every other country in the twenty-first century, has been shaped by the forces of globalization<sup>40</sup>. Hardly any phenomenon has caused as much debate and controversy as “globalization” has, particularly with regard to the effects it has for different nation states

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<sup>38</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Cabo Verde. Diagnóstico da Pobreza. November 29th 2004. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cpublicacao%5Cfiles%5CDIAGNOSTICO%20DA%20POBREZA%20-%20BM.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]; Baker 2006: 507.

<sup>39</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Cabo Verde. Diagnóstico da Pobreza. November 29th 2004. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cpublicacao%5Cfiles%5CDIAGNOSTICO%20DA%20POBREZA%20-%20BM.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]; Baker 2006: 507.

<sup>40</sup> It is difficult to define what “globalization” is exactly, as there are various and sometimes opposing definitions. In general, however, it is assumed that “globalization” means an increased interconnectedness of different parts of the world, mounting economic interdependencies, and the loss of global diversity as contrasted with a rising uniformity. Yet, some theorists consider it crucial to note that “globalization” has to be distinguished from the French term *mondialisation* (which can be translated as “universalization”), “Americanization” or “McDonaldization”, and “glocalization”. They point out that “globalization” itself is not really a new phenomenon (as is often claimed) but merely new in its intensity and pace. Furthermore, they emphasize that the effects and the reach of globalization are extremely unequal all over the world. For more information, see Mufwene, Salikoko S. (2008): *Language Evolution. Contact, Competition and Change*. London, New York: continuum, pp. 205-272 or Steger, Manfred B. (2009): *Globalization. A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



and their populations. Multinational organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO have argued in favor of globalization, commenting that it will benefit everyone and will eventually amend universal problems. According to critics, however, globalization has created more problems than solved. Most of them claim that the profits of globalization are solely directed at those who are already at the top of the socioeconomic ladder in wealthy nations while the residents of the poorer nations experience nothing but misery, poverty, and destruction of their culture and environment. They also argue that globalization, controlled by international institutions such as the IMF with its *Structural Adjustment Programs* (SAPs) and *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* (PRSPs), worsens the life of the poor and especially for women. They support the notion that these programs represent a form of neo-colonialism in the “Global South” (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 5f.).

Enormous amounts of foreign money always sound promising to countries such as Cape Verde that are struggling to develop their extremely vulnerable economy. But there is always a reverse to loans and assistance – international aid and support from the international financial institutions does not come without rigorous conditions regarding economic reforms. Cape Verde has received numerous loans over the years, including \$ 11.5 million (roughly € 10.6 million) from the World Bank in 2003, an additional \$ 3 million (€ 2.2 million) in 2007, and \$ 110 million (€ 85.1 million) – distributed over five years – from the *Millennium Challenge Corporation* (MCC) in 2005<sup>41</sup>. In 2008, Cape Verde joined the WTO (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 7).

The aforementioned institutions assert that their goal is to help so-called “developing countries” in their struggles to reform their economies in order to become equal partners in the global economy. The IMF has called for economic reforms, such as opening markets and trade or focusing on export, for these goals to be achieved. In order to obtain loans from the international donor community, the nations in question have to comply with the proposed recommendations and conditions (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 7).

One of the means of the IMF to impose conditions upon debtor nations is the *Structural Adjustment Programs* (SAPs), that were previously mentioned. These SAPs urged nations to reduce public spending in social service sectors and to privatize as many enterprises as possible. Contrary to the IMF’s claim that SAPs are assisting “developing countries” they have in fact proven disastrous for poorer nations and the majority of their residents (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 8). In 2005, the Foreign Ministry of Cape Verde published an official statement

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<sup>41</sup> cf. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC): Cape Verde. <http://www.mcc.gov/pages/countries/overview/cape-verde>. [Access: 18.05.2011]

concerning its opinion on the country's external debt and the constraints it had on the economy:

*“The impact of the [government's development] strategy, particularly on living conditions of the poorer population, would be far greater if the country did not have to spend a considerable amount of resources on external debt service. Alternatively, these resources could be put to much better use in priority sectors, such as Education, Health and Basic Infrastructure...the Government calls on the international community to relieve Cape Verde of the heavy debt burden by means of its cancellation...More than a reward for good behaviour [sic!], what is called for here is that a country not be penalised [sic!] for its good performance in the area of development”* (Official statement 2005, supplied by the Foreign Ministry of Cape Verde, cited in Baker 2006: 508; Carter et al. 2009a: 9).

After the term SAP was replaced by PRSP in the late 1990s, new features were included to increase control on the part of local governments but the overall content remained almost the same. The IMF still urges the governments of poorer countries to privatize and enforce trade liberalization, but to do it more quickly than before. In general, there is no denying that globalization has interconnected the world in ways that have great potentials and advantages – perhaps even to contribute to “ending poverty” and “creating universal equality”<sup>42</sup>. So far, however, globalization has created and caused, respectively, more problems than it has solved or at least ameliorated (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 9f.).

Notwithstanding that Cape Verde's economy has been developing quite positively in terms of economic growth (an average of 6.1 percent every year from 1996 to 2001), there are a number of facts which diminish the optimistic data. The country's debt has risen too, for example, and more than one quarter of the population (18.3 percent in 2006<sup>43</sup>) continues to be unemployed (among young Cape Verdeans it is calculated at about 40 percent<sup>44</sup>) and about 26 percent of the population is underemployed. Additionally, the poverty rate is rising according to official statistics – about 37 percent<sup>45</sup> were measured in 2003, with 20 percent<sup>46</sup> of the

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<sup>42</sup> I use quotation marks here because on the one hand, there is a certain irony regarding these goals, and on the other hand, because they are in fact illusionary.

<sup>43</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): O IIEFP e o INE divulgam os dados do Inquérito ao Emprego 2006. Desemprego em Queda. [http://www.ine.cv/pesquisa\\_portal.aspx?id=desemprego](http://www.ine.cv/pesquisa_portal.aspx?id=desemprego). [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>44</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Recenseamento Geral da População e da Habitação. Censo 2000. Características Económicas da População. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cpublicacao%5Cfiles%5CCaracteristicas%20Economicas%20da%20Popula%C3%A7o.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>45</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Cabo Verde. Diagnóstico da Pobreza. November 29th 2004. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cpublicacao%5Cfiles%5CDIAGNOSTICO%20DA%20POBREZA%20-%20BM.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]; Baker 2006: 507.

population being identified as extremely poor – and Cape Verde is currently ranked 118 out of 169 countries<sup>47</sup> (with comparable data) in the *Human Poverty Index* (HDI)<sup>48</sup> by the UN (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 68; Africa Research Bulletin 2007).

Apart from Cape Verde's debts to international financial institutions and the donor community in general, it is among the world's largest beneficiaries per capita of foreign development assistance as well. Moreover, Cape Verde's most important industries and enterprises are owned by "Northern" nations. Large amounts of money have been invested by foreign governments and corporations, most notably from Portugal in the manufacturing industry and more recently from Italy in the booming tourism industry. Overall, about 50 percent of the country's banks, hotels, or airlines – which used to be owned by the government – have been privatized and sold to foreign investors. In consequence of the policies of privatization, these investors now have a lot of power in industries such as the water or energy industry (that is to say in industries which provide for the basic needs) (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 68, 69; Bourdet 2000: 125). As Bourdet already pointed out in 2000, "*the dominant foreign participation (mostly Portuguese) in the share-holding of newly privatised [sic!] enterprises may also result in monopoly profits being transferred abroad rather than being invested and consumed in Cape Verde*" (Bourdet 2000: 126).

Measures of privatization are a top priority of neoliberalism and institutions such as the IMF, which have dedicated their work to its implementation all over the world, continually push this economic trend. The Cape Verdean government is constantly pressured by the IMF to privatize remaining public enterprises, such as the national airline company (TACV, *Transportes Aéros de Cabo Verde*) or the major oil supply company (ENACOL, *Empresa Nacional de Combustíveis, S.A.*) (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 68, 69; Bourdet 2000: 125).

The groups suffering the most from this era of rapid privatization are the country's business class of the private sector and the poor households. Even though the IMF affirms that privatization is helping poorer nations to make their businesses productive and competitive within the global market, these "reforms" almost always result in higher prices for the consumer and lower wages for employees (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 69f.). The current period of economic challenges and changes, and the overwhelming global forces, are causing an

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<sup>46</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Cabo Verde. Diagnóstico da Pobreza. November 29th 2004. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cpublicacao%5Cfiles%5CDIAGNOSTICO%20DA%20POBREZA%20-%20BM.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]; Baker 2006: 507.

<sup>47</sup> cf. UNDP (United Nations Development Program): International Human Development Indicators. Cape Verde. <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/CPV.html>. [Access: 24.05.2011]

<sup>48</sup> In addition to income per capita (measured in PPP), the HDI takes into account aspects such as health, living standards, and education (cf. UNDP (United Nations Development Program): Human Development Reports. The Human Development Index (HDI). <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/>. [Access: 24.05.2011]).

enormous imbalance in countries like Cape Verde. People are being sucked into a global economic system where major, life-altering decisions are made in the “North” and profits are not transferred back to the “South”. These challenges and changes are continuously noticeable: Globalization is no longer an abstract theory but rather realistic, everyday experiences (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 70).

The government’s major hope for economic growth is the tourism industry, whose rapid expansion poses serious risks and challenges for the islands – most of them still have inadequate infrastructure, an extremely fragile and small-scale environment, and restricted resources and authorities. Cape Verde has to import almost everything (from food, cement, bricks, tiles, or even sand) and the country’s demand has exceeded its local supply a long time ago. Health and transportation industries, which are indispensable to a successful tourism industry, are still very small and lack financial investment. Thus, the country “*does not yet have the minimum conditions to sustain the high-end market it aspires to*” (Africa Research Bulletin 2007).

Unemployment has been a main problem in Cape Verde throughout its history. The employment situation of the country is characterized by low employment rates<sup>49</sup>, high and continuous levels of unemployment, and existence of a huge informal sector<sup>50</sup> with unstable employment opportunities and an absence of formal employment contracts. This unpleasant situation can be traced back to a variety of factors. First, the country’s agricultural sector is – compared to most other “developing countries” – relatively small and characterized by low productivity. The country’s inhospitable climate, with returning and enduring droughts, is one of the main explanations for the unproductiveness of the agricultural sector. Second, Cape Verde is equipped with a fairly small industrial sector. This is primarily due to the disadvantageous location<sup>51</sup>, a rather limited domestic market<sup>52</sup>, and an insufficient supply of human capital. A third factor is Cape Verde’s large service sector, which to a certain degree arose from high levels of foreign assistance and emigrant remittances. Consequently, the country has a unique economic structure: It “*looks like that of a developed country*”<sup>53</sup>, but with a significantly lower average productivity and income per capita“ (Bourdet 2000: 141).

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<sup>49</sup> The number of employed people in relation to the total population.

<sup>50</sup> La Porta and Shleifer (among others) argue that informal companies are small and extremely unproductive compared to even the smallest formal enterprise. For example, unregistered companies regularly pay lower wages than those that are registered. In Cape Verde, “wages in unregistered firms (...) are 10 percent lower than income per capita” (La Porta 2008: 323).

<sup>51</sup> In terms of high transport costs to export markets.

<sup>52</sup> About 500.000 inhabitants (the exact number of the 2010 Census is 491.575).

<sup>53</sup> See chapter 2.1. (on “development“)

National unemployment rates are estimated to be approximately 20 percent<sup>54</sup>. Concerning Cape Verde's labor force it can be noted that participation rates vary significantly between the islands (being highest on those focused on agriculture, such as Fogo or Brava, and lowest on those focused on tourism, such as Sal<sup>55</sup>) and in terms of gender. Labor force participation rates amounted to 67 percent for men and 51 percent for women in 2010<sup>56</sup>. This difference may in part be due to diverse school leaving ages or the high participation of women in market activities (cf. Bourdet 2000: 141; Rodrigues 2008: 360; Bogdan 2000: 87). *"It is thus of concern that development is unequally distributed geographically and demographically"* (Baker 2006: 507).

In terms of overall numbers, however, women exceed men by about 12.000 (in 2006)<sup>57</sup>. It is often said that women form the core of Cape Verdean society. Due to the various global forces, in particular globalization, Cape Verdean women continually face problems such as poverty, managing single households, lack of educational possibilities, or violence. Gender also plays a crucial role in terms of economy, or economic development, as women (both in the "North" and the "South") are more often than not seen as "lower" in status, power, and access to resources compared to men (cf. Carter et al. 2009a).

In Cape Verde, women have put up with both economic and personal challenges due to the current economic system of job shortages and low salaries. Beyond the direct effects of these challenges on women, there are a number of indirect effects – first and foremost emigration, primarily of men. More recently, women have joined men in search of jobs and better opportunities outside of Cape Verde (for instance, female domestic workers in Italy, or international petty traders<sup>58</sup> who travel back and forth between Cape Verde and other nations). The gender balance regarding emigration has shifted so much recently that Cape

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<sup>54</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): O IEFP e o INE divulgam os dados do Inquérito ao Emprego 2006. Desemprego em Queda. [http://www.ine.cv/pesquisa\\_portal.aspx?id=desemprego](http://www.ine.cv/pesquisa_portal.aspx?id=desemprego). [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>55</sup> cf. IEFP (Instituto do Emprego e Formacao Profissional): Observatório de Migrações e Emprego. 2002. <http://www.iefp.cv/>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>56</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Gabinete do Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação – RGPH 2010. Actividade económica. March 30th 2011. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise/destaques/files/CD/Start.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>57</sup>cf. CIA World Fact Book: Cape Verde. June 13<sup>th</sup> 2006. <http://www.umsl.edu/services/govdocs/wofact2006/geos/cv.html#People>. [Access: 12.05.2011]

<sup>58</sup> International or transnational petty traders make a living by buying consumer goods in West African countries, Portugal or other European countries, Brazil or the United States, and sell them back in Cape Verde – either on local markets or in their own small shops. For more information, see: Marques, M. Margarida; Santos, Rui; Araújo, Fernanda: Ariadne's thread: Cape Verdean women in transnational webs. In: Global Networks, Vol. 1, No. 3, 2001, pp. 283-306.

Verdean female emigrants now outnumber male emigrants in some places (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 87).

The urge to emigrate and work abroad has been prevalent in Cape Verde throughout history. As Carter et al. point out, those who have openly expressed the desire to emigrate are generally younger and have lower levels of education. They usually mention lack of employment opportunities, too low remuneration, and having relatives abroad as the main reasons for their wish to leave. In general, they believe that after their emigration they will have higher employment opportunities and earn more for themselves and their families (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 12; Bourdet 2002: 7).

Women in Cape Verde experience economic difficulties (such as high unemployment and low wages), domestic violence and the challenges of being single mothers (mostly due to the emigration of boyfriends or husbands), among many other things (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 12, 85). Women are omnipresent on the streets of Cape Verde. These women, however, who are working and socializing outside on sidewalks and local markets, are overwhelmingly working-class. Wealthy women are by and large invisible – they have maids to handle their daily chores (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 17).

As mentioned above, women are increasingly emigrating in search of “better opportunities” as well but the majority of Cape Verdean women today stay and thus continue to struggle in Cape Verde. A significant percentage of these women are heavily dependent on emigrant’s remittances to manage a number of economic aspects of their daily lives. Some of them, however, do not benefit from remittances sent by husbands or boyfriends abroad if the men do not return or do not send remittances home. Women who are left behind by men also often face social pressures. That is to say that at times migration is used – or at least perceived – as a courteous form of desertion (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 85f., 88).

Generally speaking, Cape Verdean women (and many women throughout the world, for that matter) are confronted with a dual struggle: To survive on the one hand and to assert themselves as independent individuals with needs and demands apart from socially expected responsibilities towards others. It is certainly possible for these two aims to exist collectively. In many cases, however, women experience severe conflicts between the necessity to survive in economically and socially delicate contexts and their desire experience other aspects of life (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 91).

Cape Verdean women face similar problems to most people living in Southern economies in the global system. Their difficult situation is further reinforced by the absence of men in many

households, which leaves women to care for themselves and their children<sup>59</sup> in economically tough times (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 98). As a matter of fact, the situation of the majority women in Cape Verde reflects realities in respect of family life and gender relations in the “Global South”. On the one hand, privatizations and government cutbacks bring about a loss of jobs. As a result, many people (in this case mostly men) emigrate and those who are left behind (in this case mostly women) have to run households and act as primary “bread-winners”. In the case of Cape Verde, many women “*are left with raising children, continuing household duties, and finding some type of income in order to survive*” (Carter et al. 2009a: 99). On the other hand, when women try to enter the economy they soon come to realize that jobs are rare and wages are low. If they manage to find work, they usually make an insufficient income through selling prepared food or produce, petty trading, prostitution, or finding jobs in the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing jobs that do exist, however, are problematic because as the demand for the fabrication of export products increases, the amount of factories with miserable working conditions increases as well. All things considered, women endure the various effects of the economic measures of globalization. As Carter et al. (2009a) sum it up,

*“from a social structural point of view which focuses on the global and national economic situation, the most salient factor in the women’s lives is the difficult economic context that creates job shortages and low wages, which subsequently cause massive out-migration especially of men. This leaves women faced with serious economic problems coupled with difficult personal relationships with men because of the uneven gender ratio”* (Carter et al. 2009a: 99).

There is no doubt that the changing world economy has affected the lives and careers of both women and men. Globalization has transformed the ways people act in everyday situations, their roles, and their relationships with others. Despite the fact that the global tendency to incorporate women into the paid labor market can be seen as an advantage for women, some globalization critics argue that this entry may simply modify their subordination and not resolve it. In those cases when women do find paid jobs in globalized economies, their work is more often than not poorly paid (piece wage, for example) while men more often find work that is paid on a daily basis. Furthermore, the reproductive unpaid (and frequently not even considered “work”) labor of women in the home and in the fields perpetuates the increasing

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<sup>59</sup> And those who do not have children will most likely care (or help to care) for the child / children of a sibling, cousin, son or daughter who lives abroad.

productivity of men. With the current job shortage (about 55 percent<sup>60</sup> of Cape Verdean women are not in the paid labor force), inadequate support and actions from the government, and insufficient help relating to household activities, women in Cape Verde have few alternative prospects<sup>61</sup> (cf. Carter et al. 2009a: 113f.).

As Fikes (2010) indicates, the recent foreign investments, and economic and financial developments constitute severe changes in terms of Cape Verde's past history of income creation. From the sixteenth until the mid-twentieth century, the former colonizer Portugal profited from the reoccurring long-term droughts and subsequent famines. The colonial administration forced thousands of Cape Verdeans to work on plantations in other Portuguese colonies in Africa (notably São Tomé e Príncipe) and paid them miserly wages. They were promised that they would receive the remaining sum in cash upon returning to Cape Verde – if they survived and managed to pay their journey back home. By the early twentieth century, these state-coordinated remittances made up a significant share of the income distributed in the colony. Returnees to Cape Verde and those who were left behind provided for themselves by recycling cash remittances in local markets (by buying food and other goods). This increase in cash flow was observed by officials, who thus supported local markets with – mainly Portuguese<sup>62</sup> – products. The fact that everybody sold and bought commodities led to a steady flow of cash and remittances were therefore recycled locally. Consequently, by the early twentieth century, poor Cape Verdeans were both vendor (*Rabidantes*<sup>63</sup>, for instance) and consumer on local food and goods markets (cf. Fikes 2010: 56f.).

Towards the end of the 1990s, after the multi-party system had been introduced in 1991, the consequences of deregulation heavily affected Cape Verdean vendors habituated to an economy based on cash currency. In the context of economic reorientation and growing foreign investment, the Chinese government dispatched poor working-class Chinese migrants to Cape Verde and accredited them with discount retail shops. At the same time, private European enterprises (above all Portuguese and Italian) started to invest in the tourism and manufacturing industries. As a result, the buying power in the remittance was immediately

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<sup>60</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Gabinete do Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação – RGPH 2010. Actividade económica. March 30th 2011. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise/destaques/files/CD/Start.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>61</sup> There are a couple of NGOs working in Cape Verde in this field. Their main focus is the fight against sexual abuse and violence. This topic, however, would go beyond the scope of this thesis. See Carter et al. (2009a) for further information.

<sup>62</sup> i.e. imported from Portugal or by Portuguese merchants from other Portuguese African colonies (cf. Fikes 2010: 57).

<sup>63</sup> *Rabidantes* are the Cape Verdean market women. It is very common for three or more generations of women (that is to say, grandmother, mother, and daughter) to work as market women.



reduced due to the declining capacity of the *Cape Verdean Escudo* (CVE) to circulate steadily among the majority of Cape Verdeans, namely the poor. Indeed, local markets were severely weakened by the new presence of financially stable foreign entrepreneurs, who were not reallocating or recycling profits within the domestic economy. Today, in spite of the increased amount of money circulating, fewer Cape Verdeans come into direct contact with or have direct access to it (cf. Fikes 2010: 57f.).

The current crisis is not necessarily about increased “foreign” investments: In theory, both remittances and foreign assistance represent private foreign investments. Hence, most economic resources in Cape Verde are and have always been “foreign”. The crisis is, in fact, much more about the reorientation and new economic politics, and the real income distribution and flow that results in a shift regarding the dependency of the poor from relatives living abroad to barely existent public assistance or foreign donors. In addition, the crisis is reinforced by enhanced immigration restrictions (primarily in the United States and the European Union). These recent limitations impede the movement of money along historic migratory routes (between New England in the United States and Cape Verde, for instance). In combination with the consequences of deregulation, current restrictions and a decrease in money transfers bring about a feeling of confusion and anxiety regarding new and old foreign currency sources among many poor Cape Verdeans (cf. Fikes 2010: 58f.; Bogdan 2000: 88; Baker 2006: 507; Carter et al. 2009a: 86).

*“If emigration opportunities lessen due to restricted entry into Europe and the USA, if liberalisation [sic!] policies continue to fail to promote employment, and if the government remains reluctant to engage in serious wealth redistribution through taxes and benefits, then the numbers in poverty will be hard to reduce”* (Baker 2006: 507).

Fikes’ (2010) group of analysis is Cape Verdean market women, the *Rabidantes*. As a result of the government’s privatization programs, many of them registered great income losses at the beginning of the 2000s. In accordance with Carter et al. (2009a: 70), they are one of the groups<sup>64</sup> who feel the changes and challenges of globalization and “economic development” and experience them on a daily basis. Ironically, market women are now for the first time included politically as a part of the electorate but are excluded economically (i.e. not recognized as a labor group on a legal scale). Their personal experiences and reports cast light on events obscured by new private foreign income being invested in Cape Verde. Historically, emigrant remittances and the prospect of migration have been treated as concrete resources or

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<sup>64</sup> Even among the discriminated group of women, they are particularly excluded.

possibilities existing in an external world. Deregulation and privatization, in contrast, are usually conceived as incomprehensible forces that act locally. The complicated relationship between these two processes on a personal level leads Cape Verdeans – in this case market women – to second-guess themselves and their actions (cf. Fikes 2010: 59).

A consistent disappearance of female vendors from local markets has been registered in Cape Verde since the early twenty-first century. Many of them conclude that they can no longer afford to pay for transportation, that the money they spend transporting themselves and their products to the markets exceeds their day-to-day earnings. Accordingly, many women have stopped selling altogether and instead hope to manage with the little food they have and, in addition, apply for some kind of public assistance (cf. Fikes 2010: 60).

Previously, remittance receipts moved quickly as many Cape Verdeans acted as both vendors and consumers on the streets and in the markets. Today, remittances and foreign aid are gradually decreasing while private foreign investments increase rapidly due to economic reforms. Consequently, the financial capital boosting new European and Chinese businesses trickles down slowly and if it does, it more often than not reaches nonlocal sources. Eventually, sales on local markets become “backward” as the cycle of remittances is terminated or replaced with (“new”) foreign entrepreneurship (cf. Fikes 2010: 65).

Still, the historically imagined concept of a diasporic connection seems to be so strong that the financial networks that once accounted for it have now been separated from their common status. Instead, various other aspects such as music or art now unite the diasporic imaginary on a global scale. The notion of monetary transfers, however, continues to designate general accounts of income creation to this day: this can be seen to some extent in the form of huge, ubiquitous Western Union billboards. This predominant notion conceals the fact that the financial networks that were so essential in the construction of the Cape Verdean diaspora are slowly vanishing (cf. Fikes 2010: 65).

With respect to Cape Verde, the dividing line between “economics” (in this case: “economic development”) and “community” is crucial. Today, there are new paths and subjects through which national revenues circulate and are acquired. As a result of the challenges and changes mentioned above, a complete reorganization of social relationships has to take place. Cape Verde’s society is now characterized by an inward financial orientation (contrary to a former outward orientation); that is to say that everyone has to increasingly use from and share the same internal reservoir of external sources in contrast to an independently accumulated<sup>65</sup> stream of financial means from abroad (cf. Fikes 2010: 65f.).

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<sup>65</sup> This stream of financial means from abroad is independently accumulated by migrants.

It is often taken for granted – even by the politicians who are critical of apparent imbalances in Cape Verde –, that new developments and economic reforms will lead to wealth and prosperity. On the one hand, money is being distributed but, on the other hand, local income has to flow through particular bodies in order to provide for the generally impoverished masses. For the most part, it is Cape Verdean individuals, namely the politicians, or local corruption that are blamed for current disparities – unlike the unidirectional structures that come along with the process of capital reforms and new estate enterprises (cf. Fikes 2010: 65-67).

Another main group facing exclusion is the new urban underclass<sup>66</sup>, which has formed on the outskirts of the major cities in Cape Verde. Rodrigues (2008) emphasizes the fact that present food shortages – similar to past famines, which were not only concealed by the Portuguese colonial administration, but also smothered and reinforced (cf. Brooks 2006) – do not fit into the current image of a “developed” Cape Verde: A postcolonial nation characterized by “*prosperity, liberal capitalism, and political democratic stability*” (Rodrigues 2008: 345). Thus ever more frequently emerging food problems are yet again suppressed. Today’s general climate of optimism and enthusiasm concerning the country’s “development” – in other words, its economic growth – does not leave any room for open discussions about famine and food issues. There is no place for it in a postcolonial context; it is rather attributed to colonial times, when political neglect and exploitation marked Cape Verde’s history – problems that no longer affect the condition at present (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 346, 370).

In addition to the fact that public discussions about social and economic inequalities and food disadvantages are not compatible with the depicted image of prosperity and modernity, the present financial investments have a different focus as well. As Cape Verde is increasingly represented as a paradise-like tourist destination, issues such as poverty or food inequalities are likely to be of less relevance as other investments (such as luxurious hotel complexes, for example) become political and economic priorities. The momentary political discourse of economic optimism to attract tourists and foreign investors, coupled with the general lack of attention regarding new forms of urban poverty, makes for the presentation of Cape Verde as an “African success story”<sup>67</sup>. To reveal the existence of food issues and increasing inequality in presently expanding urban areas would “weaken” the current efforts towards “modernization” and “development” (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 347, 370).

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<sup>66</sup> Urbanization and hence urban slums are a universal phenomenon of globalization.

<sup>67</sup> On paper, at least.

Food shortages, contrary to famines, continue through day-to-day experiences and become – to a great extent – normalized (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 346). By and large, African state policies

*“have systematically privileged urban areas in detriment of food producing populations, thus accelerating migration to towns, the growth of slums, and dependency on urban markets for access to food”* (Rodrigues 2008: 348).

Nevertheless, Cape Verde has always been prone to drought and consequently to food shortages and enduring famines. The country’s lack and irregularity of rain, respectively, and insularity have been critical in constructing a Cape Verdean ethos, which had been – as of shortly – distinguished by a history of emigration and a strong rural-oriented society (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 349; Meyns 1990: 19; Baker 2006: 506). Today, Cape Verde still relies on food importation for almost all its food needs. Since the 1990s, foreign (food) aid has been the most important resource of food security. Currently, Cape Verde continues to rely on food aid as the main instrument to guarantee food security (Rodrigues 2008: 350, 370; Carter et al. 2009a: 67).

At present, urbanization is a global phenomenon. In Cape Verde, moving to the cities in search of better opportunities or a new livelihood has been common practice for a long time and continues into the twenty-first century (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 355). Relocating to urban areas – in particular the port cities of Praia (on the island of Santiago) and Mindelo (on the island of São Vicente) – provided a certain degree of alleviation or at the very least hope that support would reach the harbor towns first. According to the most recent government census (in the year 2000), an estimated 62 percent<sup>68</sup> of the total population in Cape Verde is already urban. At present, the service sector – which is concentrated in towns – constitutes about 70.2 percent<sup>69</sup> of the country’s GDP. Job opportunities appear to be more promising in urban areas too (the construction sector is growing, for example, due especially to emigrant investments in the building of vacation / retirement houses<sup>70</sup> and emerging tourist facilities). By and large, poor households spend about 53 percent of their expenses on food, 29 percent on housing, and

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<sup>68</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Apresentação de Dados Preliminares do IV° RGPH 2010. September 2010. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise/destaques/files/CD/Start.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

<sup>69</sup> cf. Banco de Cabo Verde: Quadros Estatísticos. <http://www.bcv.cv/vPT/Estatisticas/Quadros%20Estatisticos/Paginas/QuadrosEstatisticos.aspx>. [Access: 12.05.2011]

<sup>70</sup> This kind of investment on the part of emigrants can be labeled as “tempered altruism” or “enlightened self-interest” (cf. Stark, cited in Bourdet 2002: 10).

the remainder on transportation and other needs<sup>71</sup>. Nationally, 38 percent<sup>72</sup> of all poor households are already located in urban centers (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 356, 359, 360f.).

In accordance with past agricultural issues and droughts, present food relief programs continue to focus on the rural poor and thus frequently disregard new forms of urban poverty and exclusion. In the context of globalization and high rates of unemployment, urbanization is augmenting and challenging existent patterns of (food) relief. Until recently, food relief was also “provided” by the diaspora in the form of direct remittances (these remittances are still transmitted, of course, but in a declining intensity). Those who manage to leave continue to be seen as having comparative advantages compared with those who stay, and consequently are obligated to care and help (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 357f.).

The urban slums located on the outskirts of cities such as Mindelo and Praia and the living conditions encountered there call into question the popular notion that poverty in Cape Verde is essentially a rural problem, and that food scarcities are due to agricultural failures. In spite of that, the present discourse regarding the country’s economic growth and general boom conceals the emerging forms of urban poverty by continually emphasizing that rural areas are the main location of food vulnerability, and by presenting the current urbanization phenomena as an inevitable prerequisite of development and modernization. The predominant notion is that potential forms of urban poverty are transitory “sacrifices” that the country is tolerating in order to win praise regarding its “good governance” and “developmental achievements” afterwards (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 358f.).

Contrary to rural poverty, food procurement in urban slums is essentially connected to individual petty cash economies (which are not enough to yield diversified meals). In rural regions, a fertile agricultural production leads to a variety of different meals, but in the urban context this variety greatly depends on actual cash to generate food – irrespective of agriculturally successful or fruitless years. Somewhat ironically, relocating to urban areas has been a widespread coping mechanism to avoid food scarcity in years of low agricultural production. This reliance on cash together with small remains of rural “survival” techniques has made the slums<sup>73</sup> unambiguously urban and partially rural at the same time, yet without the complete infrastructural advantages of urban centers. Furthermore, lacking subsistence

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<sup>71</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Perfil da Pobreza: Quem São e Onde Estão os Pobres em Cabo Verde. 2004. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cartigos%5Cfiles%5CPerfil%20de%20Pobreza.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2001]

<sup>72</sup> cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo Verde): Perfil da Pobreza: Quem São e Onde Estão os Pobres em Cabo Verde. 2004. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise%5Cartigos%5Cfiles%5CPerfil%20de%20Pobreza.pdf>. [Access: 17.05.2001]

<sup>73</sup> This is not to say that these areas or the phenomenon in general is homogeneous / homogeneously poor. They are, in fact, quite heterogeneous socio-economically.

agriculture as a “provision-mechanism”, and by virtue of waning acts of reciprocity or *Djunta Mon*<sup>74</sup>, urban poverty becomes nearly hopeless and forlorn. In order to guarantee a certain “deposit” of cash to buy food, emigrant’s gifts are commonly exchanged for money. Thus, actual cash is presently generated through other (often mass) products, such as imported apparel, shoes, CDs, DVDs, and other technological and “modern” accessories brought to Cape Verde by emigrants, street vendors, or – more recently – Chinese entrepreneurs. Accordingly, emigrant’s remittances and presents frequently find their way into the informal market of retail trade in order to procure cash to buy food. To poor families, they are thus decisive to mitigate debt and guarantee small streams of cash (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 360ff., 366, 370; Fikes 2010: 64).

In postcolonial times, supermarkets in both urban and rural areas are replete with imported groceries. However, as the Cape Verdean population becomes rapidly urban and thus contingent on the market prices of food items, the tendency has been to replace traditional food with cheaper and faster meals, with rice<sup>75</sup> in particular. Therefore, the urban poor consume by and large less protein than the rural poor (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 363f.). Overall, as Rodrigues (2008) puts it,

*“present diary changes also reflect the transition from a former colonial era where subsistence agriculture predominated to a postcolonial era where food production is increasingly economically marginal and culturally devalued”* (Rodrigues 2008: 365).

All in all, migration and remittances continue to be – in the fashion of past times – of utmost importance to the future viability of poor households in particular and – more and more – to the possession of highly desired “Western” goods. With certainty, technological devices such as televisions can be found in many poor (urban and rural) neighborhoods – not just in Cape Verde<sup>76</sup>. This ironic aspect of “modernity” indicates that

*“in poor households economic priorities are not immune to the growing desires and needs brought about by global markets, media advertisement, returned migrants, and the proliferation of ‘Chinese made’ Western brand name clothing”* (Rodrigues 2008: 368, original emphasis).

The (previously) large amounts of money sent from overseas confirm that remittances

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<sup>74</sup> *Djunta Mon* can be translated as “working together” (Fikes 2010: 64) or “common hand”. “People know that the collective obligation to assist or work with others (...) specifically in the city, is decreasingly expected” (Fikes 2010: 64). Waning acts of *Djunta Mon*, however, are not only an urban phenomenon.

<sup>75</sup> Because of globally low prices, rice has become the most important staple in much of the “developing world”

<sup>76</sup> This circumstance is not atypical but reflects the co-existence of poverty in households where demands (and expectations) are the same as found in the so called “developed world”. To ignore this context of higher expectations (and demands) under urban structural poverty is to postulate a false boundary between “us” and “them” (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 369).

*“play a decisive role in the Cape Verdean economy, substantially affect saving, real incomes, income and wealth distribution, the scope and depth of poverty, rural-urban migration, and current and longer-term growth”* (Bourdet 2002: 8).

In general, food security or insecurity is increasingly interconnected with the various mechanisms regarding earnings rather than with the mere presence or absence of food per se. Represented as an economically growing and politically “developing” nation, and an inspiring example for all of Africa, the vulnerability of Cape Verde’s food supplies – primarily in the urban areas – are promptly “forgotten” (cf. Rodrigues 2008: 370, 371).

Generally speaking, it can be said that absolute poverty has declined in Cape Verde in recent years, which means that there are economic results to all the reforms and the reorientation. Absolute poverty, however, is still high and inequality is in fact increasing. Overall, the occurrence of poverty is related to urbanization, gender, and employment, among others. Poverty predominates in rural areas, in emerging suburban slums, among female-headed households, and amongst the unemployed. Contrary to earlier times, there is the risk that a permanent (!) underclass is generating itself today (cf. Baker 2006: 507).

With regard to “development” it is possible to distinguish between what I identify as “collective development” – that is the macroeconomic “development” of a country, for example – and “individual” or “personal development”. Concerning “collective development”, it seems only natural to regard “economic growth” as the key mechanism. In reality, however, this kind of “development” is often merely on paper and always includes the danger of ignoring the prime “development target”: The individual. “Personal” or “individual development” is often (deliberately or subconsciously?) lost in the big picture of globalization and foreign aid schemes. It is thus important to reconceptualize this employed concept of (“collective”) “development” and to move beyond models of “development” based on the nation-state. According to Bakewell (2008), these models “*may fail to match the interests of their ‘target groups’*” (Bakewell 2008: 1353).

As Fikes (2010) points out, there is a clear distinction between the general idea of some phenomena and the personal sentiments relating to this. In general, deregulation and privatization are praised as guarantors of development, freedom, or personal enrichment. Yet the individual perceptions and emotions object these ideal conceptions (cf. Fikes 2010: 63ff.). There is extensive evidence – from both radical critics and mainstream researchers – that neoliberal globalization and “*crude neoliberal development approaches can result in greater*

*poverty, inequality, instability and even conflict, eroding human and political security*” (Mawdsley 2007: 502). It is crucial not to equate “economic growth” or “economic development” with the overall “development” of a country and its population. A mere increase in GDP per capita does not automatically imply a general increase in the living standard of the majority of people. If there is an uneven – or in the worst case zero – income distribution then a small minority will actually benefit and experience a raised standard of living while most citizens (Cape Verdeans, in this case) will remain poor and underprivileged and thus excluded from the economic benefits of reforms and political reorientation. Furthermore, if the majority of the profit-making enterprises and industries is privatized and belongs to foreign investors, it is unlikely that these profits will trickle-down to the general local population. Instead, they will more likely be transferred back to the foreign investors and their national economies. In addition, as Bourdet (2002) remarks,

*“productivity gains cannot be maintained and amplified without investments in machines and equipment as well as in education and training. An implication of this is that growth is not sustainable if only (or mostly) based on capital accumulation”* (Bourdet 2002: 21).

To sum up, it is quite clear that the economic “boom” in Cape Verde is not as ideal as many people, governments, institutions or organizations are persistently trying to portray. It is rather accompanied by various types of exclusion and numerous downsides. But hardly anybody – especially the global (i.e. “Northern”) players – wants to talk openly about this.



## **3. Research Topic**

### **3.1. Theoretical Foundations and Concepts**

This thesis is concerned with the relation between the recent “development” and globalization, and subsequent changes modifications regarding the “national” or “cultural” identity construction in Cape Verde. In this regard, theories and concepts such as Identity Studies, Transnationalism, Gender Studies, Critical “Race” Studies, History, Migration Studies, Globalization Studies, Economy, etc. come into play. All of them operate as the theoretical support and the analytical approaches for the completion of this thesis. They are unavoidable if one wants to analyze any aspect of identity construction in Cape Verde. On the one hand, it is impossible to elaborate on all of the aforementioned theories and concepts within the scope of this thesis. On the other hand, any broad elaboration on every particular theory would be beside the point. The approach of this theory is meant to be transdisciplinary, which is why a subdivision of the individual disciplines would be counterproductive. Consequently, the discipline known as “Transdisciplinary Development Studies” will be employed as the relevant hypernym for the theoretical approach of this thesis.

For the purpose of intelligibility, however, the most significant concept – namely “identity” – will be dwelled on in detail in chapter 5. Any other theories or conceptions that are cited in the text will briefly be explained in the footnotes.

### **3.2. Research Questions**

So far, the chapters of this thesis have dealt with historical and theoretical treatises on Cape Verde and “development”. These aspects are crucial to a better understanding of the actual research topic – changes in Cape Verdean identity construction. Henceforth, the essential research questions are presented in order to specify my research perspective.

The following research questions were indicative within the process of theoretical coding, and the subsequent analysis and interpretation of the gathered data, and are to be answered throughout this thesis:

- What kind of effects do “development” and globalization have on identity construction in Cape Verde?
- What and who, respectively, is considered “developed” and how does this affect the recent changes in Cape Verdean identity construction?
- Who partakes in the process of change and “development” and who does not?
- How do other consequences of “development” – such as exclusion – correlate with changes in identity construction?
- Which identity is seen as “capable of development”?
- What are the characteristics that are perceived as more favorable to the improvement of one’s own opportunities (i.e. the personal participation in “development”)?

The changes in Cape Verdean identity construction in the context of “development” and globalization are at the forefront of my research interest. The other research questions are to facilitate the analysis of processes of change and link the identity-focus with the individual perceptions regarding “development”. The following graphics is to illustrate the research theme and the coherences:

*Consequences of the (relatively recent) “development” in Cape Verde:*

→ *Processes of inclusion and exclusion*



→ *Changes in identity construction*

The Internet – as both a new medium of communication and a sign of “development” and globalization – will be employed as an exemplar and conjunctive or cross-cutting aspect, respectively, throughout the thesis. As Melo (2005) emphasizes, the Internet plays a crucial role in “*how people organize into different communities of interest and how the relationship between the members of those communities are articulated, mostly in terms of identity, representation, constructions of the self (...)*” (Melo 2005: 2). The Internet plays a decisive role in all three areas – “development”, exclusion, and (change in) identity. Firstly, the Internet is a “development” criteria or instrument and it is also often talk of “technological development”. Secondly, the question of who has internet access is connected with the

question of exclusion and participation in “development”. Finally, the Internet can function as an identity-establishing and “horizon-expanding” medium.



## 4. Method

At the beginning of my month-long research stay in Cape Verde I decided to focus my interviews on a group of people but to not formulate my research questions in detail in order not to limit the scope of my own interest and research from the outset. I knew my main areas of interest and I had a number of research questions in mind but I wanted to leave a margin and narrow down my research focus after the actual research stay. A method that ensured this relatively open research process is the *Grounded Theory*. I decided to reference to Glaser and Strauss (2010), who define this method as a way to discover a theory based on data, within which social research is systematically gained and analyzed (cf. Glaser et al. 2010: 19).

### 4.1. Grounded Theory

Glaser et al. (2010) assume that – in contemporary sociology – the verification of theories is overemphasized while the preceding step of determining which concepts and hypotheses are actually relevant for the scope of analysis is undervalued. Since the verification takes precedence, the desire to generate theory is often set aside – if not abandoned entirely – in particular researches (cf. Glaser et al. 2010: 20).

From the outset, *Grounded Theory* gives priority to the data encountered in the field. Thus, previously formulated theoretical assumptions are not introduced to the inquiry. Instead, the theory is only developed and formulated as a result of the data collected in the field. That is not to say that the researcher should commence her/his studies without any foreknowledge but rather that she/he should not consider it as conclusive and finished. In fact, it should be possible to discard the existing foreknowledge by means of new and contradictory information. Theoretical concepts that are developed within the research are discovered in the course of the data analysis and must prove themselves according to the data. As a result, the road to the data is repeatedly pursued anew and the process of analysis is both *triadic* and *circular*, meaning that a constant contemplation of the entire research and its subareas is necessary (cf. Glaser et al. 2010: 21ff., Flick et al. 2009: 33f.).

### **4.1.1. Theoretical Sampling**

According to Glaser et al. (2010), *Theoretical Sampling* is the process of data collection which is aimed at the generation of a theory. As part of this process, the researcher is supposed to simultaneously gather, code, and analyze her/his data and determine which data should be gathered next and where it can be found. Additionally, this process of data collection is controlled and validated by the emerging theory. Therefore, it is not about specifying the sample structure beforehand but rather about gradually defining it in the research process. In other words, the decision regarding the sampling and the structure of the empiric material is made in the process of data collection and data evaluation. Thus, the representativeness or the statistical balance of the data is not as important as the selection of the data which is most likely to introduce new aspects to the developing theories (cf. Glaser et al. 2010: 61; Flick et al. 2009: 36).

As the data collection seems to be never-ending within *Theoretical Sampling*, the question arises in terms of when to stop with the collection of new material. In this context, Glaser et al. (2010) make reference to the *Theoretical Saturation*, which describes the point when the sampling (depending on the category) can be terminated. Accordingly, this saturation means that no more additional data can be found whereby the researcher can develop further features of the category. Once the examples start to repeat themselves the researcher has to assume that a category is saturated. The *Theoretical Saturation* can be reached by means of a simultaneous collection and analysis of the data (cf. Glaser et al. 2010: 76f.).

### **4.1.2. Theoretical Coding**

Furthermore, Glaser et al. (2010) delineate the process of coding. *Coding* can be described as encipherment or translation of data and includes the presentation of concepts as well as their closer explanation and discussion. It is predefined that there are three types of coding, namely *open*, *axial*, and *selective* coding. In this regard, “code” is a technical term of the interpretation process and the goal of the first analyses are codes that refer directly to the data. Moreover, code *memos* should be prepared in order to facilitate the analysis of the arising theory. The writing of theoretical memos is conducive to a dissociation of the data and plays a part in contributing to progressing beyond a merely descriptive research paper (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 475-477).

Within the scope of *Selective Coding*, the researcher primarily acts as author based on the already acquired categories, notes, memos and so forth. The aim is to outline a core category around which other theories that could arise can be arranged and hence integrated (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 482f.).

## **4.2. Data collection**

According to the contents of *Grounded Theory* the process of choosing the data set is rather flexible. Basically, the data is every kind of text – from scripted interviews and field notes to study protocols and (Internet) articles (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 476).

The gathered data and material for this thesis consist of (a) interviews, (b) participant observation, and (c) online content analysis.

### **4.2.1. Access to the Field**

I started my research stay without any pre-formulated research questions in mind. The only certain thing was that I wanted to gain knowledge regarding the contemporary changes in terms of “identity construction” in Cape Verde. Subsequently, I spent the first two weeks talking to a number of people, doing research on-site, figuring out what could be done realistically, and trying to contact potential interviewees. I had thought about a potential group of interviewees beforehand but while talking to various people I realized that if I wanted to focus on current changes (especially in the context of the recent “development” from the onset of the 1990s and globalization) I had to talk to people approximately my age. This insight was further reinforced by the realization that in the context of Cape Verde (as a country or “culture” embedded in a transnational network) the aspect of communication has been crucial for questions concerning identity throughout history. Hence, the recent advances in the communication technology – and herein the influence of the Internet in particular – had to be incorporated into my thought process. The increasing importance of social networking, such as Facebook, hi5, or blogs, is evident all over the world – most notably among the younger generation.

Consequently, I decided to focus my interviews on people aged approximately 18 to 25 years old. Since the emigration rate among Cape Verdeans between 18 and 25 years old is

extremely high<sup>77</sup>, many of those who stay in Cape Verde attend university or some other kind of higher education there. Also, it is critical that students themselves are – due to their education and knowledge – actively involved in the process of Internet development (websites, news, or blogs, for instance). The Internet in Cape Verde is most prevalent in urban centers and students and the so called middle class constitute the majority of users (cf. Melo 2005: 3). On top of this, there is a high probability that today’s students are the next ruling classes and their attitudes and perceptions will thus be relevant in any future development of Cape Verde. I am well aware that students are part of a more privileged segment of the population and thus not representative for the entire age group. But I opted for them because, as Carter et al. (2009b) already outlined,

*“of their level of knowledge about their communities and their leadership role in Cape Verde as a highly educated stratum. They comprise an important segment of Cape Verdean citizens because they are among a relatively small proportion of people who continued their education past secondary school”* (Carter et al. 2009b: 222).

Furthermore, I am aware that students constitute “insiders” in Cape Verdean society. In other words, they overwhelmingly participate in the process of “development” and globalization and are generally not excluded from their benefits. It is important to note, however, that not everybody who is able to study in Cape Verde is automatically part of the upper- or middle-class because many of them struggle enormously and fully depend on scholarships in order to attend a university.

In addition to the interviews with students, I conducted four interviews with professors. All of them devote themselves to questions of the history, “culture”, and national identity of Cape Verde.

#### **4.2.2. Interviews**

All of the interviews were recorded and the interviewees were informed about my intentions. Some of them were contacted by an intermediary while others were approached directly. They

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<sup>77</sup> In 2010, the group of emigrants aged 17 to 24 accounted for about 47 percent of the absolute emigration number. The total number of emigrants in 2010 was 18.522 while the number for the 17- to 24-year-olds was 8.705, followed by the group of 0- to 16-year olds with a rate of 3.630 (cf. INE (Instituto Nacional de Estatística): Gabinete do Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitacao – RGPH 2010. March 30th 2011. <http://www.ine.cv/actualise/destaques/files/CD/Start.pdf>. [Access: 14.06.2011]).



were given the opportunity of choosing the meeting point and venue, respectively, and were ensured confidentiality and anonymity. Thence, the letter C (which stands for both Cape Verdean and communication partner) and a number were given to each individual interview (see annexed list of interviews). All interviews were conducted in Portuguese – with the exception of the first one (C1), where the interviewee (an English major) preferred to speak in English. The Portuguese interviews were translated into English for citations by the author of this thesis.

<b>Person</b>	<b>Age, Sex</b>	<b>Profession</b>	<b>Origin</b>	<b>Length</b>	<b>Language</b>	<b>Code</b>
1	26, male	Student	Santiago (from Tarrafal, studies in Praia)	01:02:38	English	C1
2	21, female	Student	Santiago (from Tarrafal, studies in Praia)	00:22:58	Portuguese	C2
3	21, male	Student	Santiago (one parent from Tarrafal and one from Angola, studies in Mindelo and Praia)	00:32:34	Portuguese	C3
4	25, male	University graduate	Santiago (from Tarrafal, studied in Praia)	01:05:05	Portuguese	C4
5	23, female	Student	Santiago (Praia)	00:34:02	Portuguese	C5
6	22, female	Student	Santiago (Praia)	00:46:24	Portuguese	C6
7	19, female	Student	Santiago (from Pedra Badejo, studies in Praia)	00:51:24	Portuguese	C7
8	Unknown, male	Professor, writer, journalist	Santiago (Praia)	01:17:27	Portuguese	C8
9	Unkown, female	Professor	São Vicente (Mindelo)	00:14:53	Portuguese	C9

10	28, male	Student	São Vicente (Mindelo)	00:33:43	Portuguese	C10
11	Unknown, female	Professor	São Vicente (Mindelo)	00:40:26	Portuguese	C11
12	21, female	Student	Boa Vista (studies in São Vicente)	00:30:36	Portuguese	C12
13	Unknown, male	Professor	Santiago (from Santa Catarina, teaches in Praia)	00:46:04	Portuguese	C13
14	23, male	Student	Santiago (from Tarrafal, studies in Assomada)	00:43:11	Portuguese	C14

#### 4.2.2.1. Expert Interviews

Qualitative interviews are widely used in social research. They play an important role in ethnographic research projects based on participatory observation. Herein, they serve the determination of expert knowledge about the particular research area, among other things. By implication, expert interviews are meant to grasp the point of view of a person as an expert in a certain social field. In the context of the ascertainment it is not about expertise or professional knowledge but rather about factual and interpretative knowledge as related to the respective social practice (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 349f.). Correspondingly, I considered both the students and the professors as experts in the field.

The interview guide prepared before the first interview was partly standardized and kept quite general and broad, thereby allowing for a flexible conducting of the interviews. The aim was to leave the interviewees room to talk freely and to not lead them into a certain direction. The interview guide was thus merely a reference point if the interview came to a standstill, for example. Due to the diversified character of the interview guide new aspects arose time and again and incessantly – in the sense of *Grounded Theory* – affected the research process. The tape recordings were not transcribed immediately afterwards but notes were made in the “research diary” as to how the atmosphere was during the interview or if anything striking had happened.

#### **4.2.2.2. Narrative Interview**

For the interviews with the students, I decided on employing *narrative interviews*. These interviews are frequently used in the context of biographically oriented questions. The term “narrative interview” is conceived broadly to some extent and occasionally appropriated as an abbreviation for partly standardized biographical interviews. In the original sense of the term, however, this is not included – the primary element of the narrative interview is rather the freely educed narrative structure on the part of the interviewee by means of a starting question, the so called “narration generating question” (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 355).

The researcher is not supposed to interview at first but rather take the part of an attentive listener during the main narration and contribute to the maintenance of the narration by means of supportive gestures as well as non-directive brief comments. It is the inquiry section that gives the researcher the chance to shape the interview more actively. Here, thus far unanswered questions, which arose during the narration, are taken up. These questions should be formulated as openly as possible and encourage the interviewee further narrations. The inquiries related to the narration already have the function of cautiously testing assumptions that became apparent in the course of the narration (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 356).

In order to obtain information in terms of *changes* within identity construction, questions concerning the interviewees’ past, present, and future were asked.

#### **4.2.3. Participant observation**

Participant observation as a method of data collection is employed particularly in ethnographical fieldwork. If a researcher plans on empirically analyzing the people’s actions, their everyday practices, and their environment, he/she has basically two options – one of them being the conduct of conversations about these actions, the other being the personal and active participation in the everyday practices, interactions, and activities of certain groups of people. This second option is generally referred to as *Participant Observation* or *Ethnography* (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 384f.). Given that the *active* participation in practices and activities of my research area was not always possible for practical reasons most of my observations can be described as *passive* participant observations. Depending on the apprehension of the

method “participation” can range from mere physical presence to the total interaction with the group.

Due to the fact that I had been to Cape Verde before in 2007 and hence already knew people there, my reception and acceptance was generally positive and my “access” facilitated.

It is important to note that participant observation entails a certain dilemma, namely the difficulty of pursuing one’s scientific standards and tasks from distance while simultaneously behaving in a manner that is socially and culturally acceptable in particular situations. The role of the observer includes both impartiality and personal involvement. Furthermore, the process of documenting one’s observations needs to be looked at critically. It is crucial to consider how one should protocol (summarize from memory subsequently or make notes in the given situation, for example), among other things (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 386f.).

I wrote down all kinds of observations and thoughts in a “diary” during my research stay in Cape Verde. This was supposed to serve as the basis for the documentation of the method and experiences in the field as well as for a subsequent contemplation and was therefore – in the sense of the *memos* brought up by Glaser and Strauss – part of the theory construction. I decided to summarize from memory after the actual observations in order not to affect or manipulate the given situation with the obtrusive recording on the spot.

It should be mentioned that observation protocols are (compared to audiovisual recording techniques) the result of a representation *ex post facto* that is both reconstructed and already interpretive. Therefore, observation protocols cannot be considered as faithful reproductions or problem-free summaries of the experiences but must instead be seen as texts by the author (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 396).

#### **4.2.4. Additional research**

Internet blogs and social networking websites (such as Facebook or hi5) are to constitute another type of data and provide additional information. The *Online Content Analysis* distinguishes itself from the “classic” content analysis by means of its objects of research, which are found online and predominantly on the Internet. According to Welker et al. (2010), the object of online content analysis is the communication (meaning the structures and contents) of and within online media. This includes contents and links of weblogs,

communication in forums, emails, or the exchange in social networks, among others (cf. Welker et al. 2010: 10).

It must be noted, however, that I focused my evaluation and interpretation for this thesis on the *Grounded Theory* mentioned above, namely the interviews, and participant observation. The additional online content analysis is only supposed to provide extra information and support the process of analysis. Nonetheless, the Internet (in my case, the review of weblogs and social networking) is both interesting and crucial to the research questions because of its role with regard to identity construction and personal representation of identity on a global scale – especially among younger generations. Within the meaning of *Grounded Theory* I consider the Internet (i.e. weblogs and social networking) as another kind of text within my data set.

I am well aware of the problems and risks of using the Internet as a data source. Among others, the tendency of the online content to change is an essential feature relating to the online analysis. Contents that are found at a certain point of time are thus often merely transient snapshots. Yet, if the focus of the study is on the mediated messages then one can arguably speak of the content analysis of mass communication as a mere extension of the classic approach with a view to a new “channel”. In this case, the Internet just represents one of several sources, whose messages are analyzed (cf. Welker et al. 2010: 11, 39).

### **4.3. Evaluation & Interpretation**

After transcribing the recorded interviews, I adopted the type of coding suggested by Glaser and Strauss (2010) in their *Grounded Theory*. The entire corpus (i.e. transcribed interviews, observation protocols, and online texts) was subjected to an *open coding* method, which followed the aforementioned research questions. Within open coding, the data is itemized analytically and concepts developed gradually. These concepts can eventually be deployed as components of a model (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 477).

The category present from the beginning was the “Cape Verdean identity”. In the course of my research stay, I realized that the changes pertaining to this identity were going to be the core theme of my research and analysis. Correspondingly, the main step of the coding method was to work through the corpus and pay attention to references in terms of changes, “development”, attributions, and classifications. The thus relevant sequences for analysis

were labeled with superordinate category names. In the course of this process, the goal was to elaborate on the formulated research questions.

### **4.3.1. Coding**

In the sense of *Grounded Theory*, the researcher develops *concepts* during the process of *coding*. These concepts are conceptualized hypotheses and the researcher tries to relate them in order to generate a theory with the aid of a continuous coding of data. While coding, the researcher utilizes her/his background knowledge concerning the context of the evaluated text passage and her/his general knowledge about the area in question (cf. Flick et al. 2009: 36, 478).

At first, the information was disassembled into units of meaning. This course of action can also be referred to as *segmenting*. Thereby, all the references relevant to the already mentioned research questions were gathered. Respective text passages of the interviews were assigned to a category. Codenames were allotted to the particular coding entities and code notes as well as memos drafted to each passage. In order to facilitate the transparency, verifiability, and the process of interpretation the central evaluation, categories were complemented with a general survey in the form of a chart.

## 5. Identity Construction

Theories and concepts regarding the term “identity” have altered strongly over time in consequence of a persistent critique of the term itself. Today, “identity” has become a key word in most social sciences. Everywhere, one hears, reads, and discusses questions about identity in diverse forms – personal identity, social identity, national identity, cultural or ethnic identity, sexual identity and so forth. At the first glance, the use of the term seems rather confusing and it appears to be almost impossible to pick one’s way through the vast number of potential meanings and applications. As Sarup (1994) resumes,

*“there are talks and discussions on the meanings of home and place, displacement, migrations and diasporas. Distinctions are made between immigrants, economic migrants, refugees and exiles. There is also a great deal of interest in the self, subjectivity, and in recent developments in the theory of the subject. (...) There is talk about different positionalities. Identity can be displaced; it can be hybrid or multiple. It can be constituted through community: family, region, the nation state”* (Sarup 1994: 93).

Subsequently, he deals with the importance of “home” in the construction of identity. This sense of “home” is reflected in different expressions of everyday life (such as “homemade”, “homecoming”, “homesick”, or “home is where the heart is”). Thus, it can be said that “home” is usually connoted with a positive feeling, with pleasant memories about a place of warmth and protection amongst loved ones. Clearly, this notion of “home” is not the same universally. The concept is, however, is always – in one way or another – closely related to the notion of “identity”. By now, it has become (predominantly) common knowledge that “identity” is a social construction and a result of a process of interaction between people, institutions, and practices (cf. Sarup 1994: 94f., 102).

With regard to the definition of the concept, it is still unclear what constitutes the main reference point for “identity”. Is it “nation”, “race”, “ethnicity”, “class”, or “gender”? Benedict Anderson coined the concept “imagined community”,<sup>78</sup> concerning “nation”, which describes that “nation” is a socially constructed community, imagined by (or imposed on) the people who discern themselves as part of that group. Accordingly, this concept can be applied to other categories such as “race” or “class”.

No matter how exactly one defines “identity”, one has to take into consideration that it has multiple (perceived) signifiers (“race”, sexuality, class, etc.) and that it is a multivalent

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<sup>78</sup> For further information, see Anderson, Benedict (1983): *Imagined communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. London [a.o.]: Verso.

concept that is fluid and malleable. Most importantly, however, “identity” is conceptualized at a particular historical moment and permanently re-forged over time (cf. Williams 1999: 106).

Auernheimer (1989) focuses on the topic of “cultural identity” or “ethnicity”, which is understood by many as a social construct, as a societal ascription and classification of minorities. Others, however, conceive it as a – more or less random – self-attribution in the process of self-definition (cf. Auernheimer 1989: 248f.). Auernheimer’s assumption is that *“political and economic revolutions, processes of social change as well as migration movements entail cultural transformations and regenerations”*<sup>79</sup> (Auernheimer 1989: 254; translation H. S.). Ethnic groups require a certain kind of “we”-consciousness and a “myth of origin” in order to become actors in social processes and realities, and constructions of identities. For Auernheimer, it is important to state that alongside factors such as language, other symbolic “determinants” or “identity markers”<sup>80</sup> – such as religion, music, and others – can be chosen for “cultural identity” / “ethnicity”. Furthermore, it is revealing that “cultural identities” or “ethnicities” become politically relevant in those contexts where minorities or majorities are particularly affected by oppression, exploitation, or socio-economic discrimination (cf. Auernheimer 1989: 255, 258).

To clarify the issues regarding “identity construction”, I want to particularly focus on the theories of Stuart Hall. Hall (1994) discusses the question of “ethnicity” in the context of new society configurations that have entrenched a certain kind of hybridity<sup>81</sup> as social reality by means of migration, colonialism, and globalization<sup>82</sup>. These socio-cultural movements have created positions that have the power to scatter and challenge essentialist and consolidated concepts of identity. Against these backgrounds, it is no longer possible to speak of a stable of solid subject. Identities are no longer a fixed point of thought and existence (cf. Hall 1994; Singer 1997: 153).

Hall believes that “old identities” (such as class or religion), which have acted as a stabilization for a long time, are in decline and give way to new ones. This “crisis of identity”

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<sup>79</sup> The original quote in German is *“politische und ökonomische Revolutionen, Prozesse des sozialen Wandels ebenso wie Migrationsbewegungen haben kulturelle Um- und Neubildungen zur Folge”* (Auernheimer 1989: 254).

<sup>80</sup> In Cape Verde, language and music / dance are perhaps the most crucial “identity”-establishing elements. The history of migration (or the “migration experience”) and the desire to migrate, respectively, also constitute some kind of “identity marker” for the Cape Verdean population, as it contributes to the notion of a global *Kabuverdianidade*.

<sup>81</sup> The concept of “hybridity” will be addressed in chapter 5.1.1.

<sup>82</sup> Globalization, however, is not a new phenomenon. It is merely the intensity and pace that has changed over the past decades.



needs to be understood in the context of an extensive process of change (i.e. late modern age, globalization). The changes regarding time and space are of relevance here – Hall comprehends globalization as a fragmented space-time constellation. Thus, the political scenery of the modern world is increasingly fragmented by competing and scattering identities. It is necessary to note, however, that in his analysis Hall never regards “identity” as complete, absolute, or secluded (cf. Hall 1994: 67ff., 180ff., 209ff.). He describes “identities” as

*“the names that we give to different circumstances by which we are positioned and by which we position ourselves on the basis of narratives about the past. (...) [they are the] unstable identification points or interfaces that are formed within the discourse on history and culture. No essence, but a positioning”*<sup>83</sup> (Hall 1994: 30; translation H. S.; my emphasis).

Some theorists hold the view that the general impact of globalization undermines national forms of “cultural identities”. Supposedly, the strong identification with national cultures<sup>84</sup> is losing ground, which in turn leads to the phenomena of “cultural homogenization”. On the other hand, however, there nonetheless exists a certain fascination with difference<sup>85</sup>, a commercialization of “ethnicity” and “otherness”, and a new interest with the local. Also, globalization and its effects are unevenly distributed and people are affected by the aforementioned homogenization in different ways and degrees. In short, globalization is an unequal process and “cultural identities” are put into universal perspective due to the consequences of the space-time densification (which results from globalization). “Identity changes” increase more in the center of the global system than in its periphery. Societies of the periphery, however, have always been open to Western cultural influences and are so now more than ever (cf. Hall 1994: 208ff.).

This begs the question as to how the fragmented subject is anchored in its cultural and national identity. Here – by virtue of Hall’s deconstruction of “nation” as an imagined community, as a system of cultural representations –, it is made clear that “nations” are

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<sup>83</sup> The original quote (which was translated from English by Ulrich Mehlem) in German is “*die Namen, die wir unterschiedlichen Verhältnissen geben, durch die wir positioniert sind, und durch die wir uns selbst anhand von Erzählungen über die Vergangenheit positionieren. (...) [sie sind die] instabilen Identifikationspunkte oder Nahtstellen, die innerhalb der Diskurse über Geschichte und Kultur gebildet werden. Kein Wesen, sondern eine Positionierung*“ (Hall 1994: 30).

<sup>84</sup> The term “culture” has to be used with caution. Recently, it has been employed more and more frequently – particularly as a political catchword. The danger of the concept of “culture” is not only that it is an ambiguous and indefinable term and a social construct, but also that it is applied to isolate certain groups of people and treated as having natural, distinct, and insurmountable boundaries. “Culture” is not “carried” by either individuals or groups, but rather produced, used, or reconstructed by various agents.

<sup>85</sup> Similar to “identity” or “representation”, “difference” is a term that is extremely hard to grasp and thus also a “contested term”.

nothing else than discursive drafts that establish specific meanings of “nation” with which we can identify ourselves or are identified by others. Despite the diversity of its members (in terms of class, gender, or “race”, for example), the discourse of “national culture” tries to unite them according to one “cultural identity”. Hence, a national culture is always a structure of power as well (cf. Hall 1994: 201ff.). The profound divisions and differences that shape national cultures are annihilated or made less visible by means of cultural power dynamics:

*“One way to standardize them [i.e. identities] consists in presenting them as an expression of an underlying culture of ‘a people’. Ethnicity is the term we bestow on cultural characteristics, such as language, religion, customs, traditions, and sentiments for a ‘place’, which are shared by a people. Yet, this belief becomes a myth in the modern world. Western Europe does not have a nation that consists solely of a people, one culture, or ethnicity. All modern nations are culturally hybrid”<sup>86</sup> (Hall 1994: 207; translation H. S.; original emphasis).*

Every time “identities” are irritated, the oscillation between “tradition” and “translation”<sup>87</sup> becomes obvious on a global level. Everywhere, “cultural identities” arise that are not fixed but rather float in the passage between different positions. These positions simultaneously draw on various cultural traditions and are the result of complex junctions and cultural connections, which become more and more common in a globalized world. It may thus be tempting to believe that in the era of globalization, “identity” could only either return to its “roots” or vanish due to assimilation and homogenization. According to Hall, however, there is also always the possibility of “translation”. The “hybrid cultures” that have emerged in this regard are unambiguously new types of “identities” (cf. Hall 1994: 217f.).

Below, I will approach the topic of “identity” in separated subchapters. My focus will be on the subtheme of “race”, as a category according to which people act, and “black identity” / racialized “identity” constructions, respectively. Here, the notions of “creoleness” or “hybridity” are crucial to a better understanding of the Cape Verdean context. Subsequently, I will briefly address the categories of “gender” and “class” to illustrate some essential theories

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<sup>86</sup> The original quote (which was translated from English by Ulrich Mehlum) in German is “*eine Art, sie [d.h. Identitäten] zu vereinheitlichen, besteht darin, sie als Ausdruck einer ihr zugrunde liegenden Kultur ‘eines Volkes’ darzustellen. Ethnizität ist der Begriff, den wir kulturellen Eigenschaften, wie Sprache, Religion, Gebräuchen, Traditionen und Gefühlen für einen ‘Ort’, geben, die von einem Volk geteilt werden. Aber dieser Glaube wird in der modernen Welt ein Mythos. West-Europa hat keine Nation, die nur aus einem Volk, einer Kultur oder Ethnizität besteht. Alle modernen Nationen sind kulturell hybrid” (Hall 1994: 207, original emphasis).*

<sup>87</sup> Homi Bhabha came up with the concept of “cultural translation”. According to Bhabha, “translation” does not mean a literary translation but is rather the process and condition of human migrancy. For further information, see: Bhabha, Homi (1997): *The location of culture*. London [a.o.]: Routledge.

regarding “identity”. Finally, I want to point out a number of criticisms concerning the term and concept “identity” and outline my personal approach in this regard.

## 5.1. “Race“ & “black identity“

Stuart Hall concerns himself with the analysis of the category “black”. According to him, it is crucial to acknowledge the extraordinary diversity of social experiences and cultural identities that together constitute this category. Likewise, it is of utmost importance to acknowledge that “black” is essentially a politically and culturally constructed category and hence does not have any natural or biological guarantees<sup>88</sup> (cf. Hall 1994: 18; Singer 1997: 153). Relating to the question of “ethnicity”, Hall declares that

*“if the black subject and the black experience are not stabilized by nature or other intrinsic guarantees then they have to be historically, culturally, and politically constructed – the term denoting for this is ‘ethnicity’: This term recognizes the significance of history, language, and culture for the construction of subjectivity and identity as well as the fact that every discourse is placed, positioned, and situational and that every knowledge is related to a context”<sup>89</sup> (Hall 1994: 21f.; translation H. S.).*

An essential aspect of “identity construction”, “hybridity”, “ethnicity”, or “nation” is the aspect of “race”<sup>90</sup> and racism<sup>91</sup>. According to Hall, racism works only on the basis of apparently irreconcilable borders – the difference between belonging and otherness is

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<sup>88</sup> In this regard, it is important to note that “white” and “whiteness” are also politically and culturally constructed categories and not natural or biological ones. The focus of this thesis, however, is on theories concerning “race” in the context of “black identity” which is why theories regarding “white” and “whiteness” – which interrelate, of course – are not explained in more detail here. For more information on the construction and depiction of “white” and “black”, see: hooks, bell (1992): *Black looks. Race and representation*. Boston: South End Press; or Dyer, Richard (1997): *White*. London [a.o.]: Routledge.

<sup>89</sup> The original quote (which was translated from English by Ulrich Mehlem) in German is “*wenn das schwarze Subjekt und die schwarze Erfahrung nicht durch die Natur oder andere wesenhafte Garantien stabilisiert werden, dann müssen sie historisch, kulturell und politisch konstruiert sein – der Begriff, der dies bezeichnet, ist der der ‘Ethnizität’: Dieser Begriff erkennt den Stellenwert von Geschichte, Sprache und Kultur für die Konstruktion von Subjektivität und Identität an, sowie die Tatsache, daß [sic!] jeder Diskurs plziert [sic!], positioniert und situativ ist und jedes Wissen in einem Kontext steht*“ (Hall 1994: 21f.).

<sup>90</sup> I will use quotation marks for “race“ throughout this thesis, not only because it is a social construct but also because I consider it very problematic. As Kolko et al. (2000) state, the social constructionist view of “race” argues that there is no genetic or biological basis for classifying the global population into a number of distinct racial groups. It is important to emphasize, however, that “*the socially constructed nature of race doesn’t meant that our understanding of race and racial categories isn’t somehow real or that it doesn’t have real effects: quite the contrary, those categories do exist and they have tangible (...) effects on the ways that people are able to live their lives*” (Kolko et al. 2000: 2, original emphasis). Hence, it can be concluded that the systems of racialized categorization existent derive from culture and not from nature.

<sup>91</sup> I understand racism as a naturalized, hierarchized imputation or classification upon a constructed collective. Action patterns, power relations and the process of dehumanization play key roles in this understanding.

permanently marked, fixed, and neutralized. Hall refers to Fanon, who considers that the discourse of self-ethnicizing exists on the inside and on the outside simultaneously. On that account, it is not merely about “black” or “white” skin but also about “black skin and white mask” – hence, an internalization of the Self as Another. One objectifies oneself, that is to say through the gaze of the Other or – according to Fanon’s imagery – “glancing through a white mask”. A “black” person perceives himself / herself through the gaze of the “White”. Similar to gender constructions, racism constructs the “black subject” in two manners (noble savage and violent avenger). Within this doubling, aspects like fear and desire become apparent. Fanon (and Hall) articulates the two sidedness of the discourse, the need for the Other for the own Self, the inscription of “identity” in the gaze of the Other (cf. Hall 1994: 73ff., 207ff.). According to Hall, the attempt to harmonize national identities based on “race” poses a great problem – especially since “race” is not a biological or genetic but rather a discursive category. In recent years, the biological notion of “race” made way for a cultural definition of “race” that to some extent continues to permit the thinking in (ethnic-cultural) “racial” categories. In this regard, Paul Gilroy coined the term “cultural racism” (cf. Hall 1994: 207).

Following Hall, I consider it important to elaborate on the theme of “race”, and “black identity” above all. This aspect of identity construction is particularly pertinent to my later remarks on “identity” in the Cape Verdean context, since I will be focusing on aspects of “national” or “cultural identity” (“ethnicity”) and racialized identity constructions<sup>92</sup>.

“Race”, “black”, or “white” are very problematic terms, which is why I want to briefly bring in some explanatory notes concerning this matter (that is to say, the fact that the three aforementioned terms are historical and social constructs, which have been extremely volatile and elusive, and are used to “label” groups of people who are extremely heterogeneous and more often than not have very little or nothing in common).

As Blakely (1999) points out, the claim that “Blacks” or people of African descent constitute a distinctive “racial” group was first brought forward by Europeans and not by Africans themselves (cf. Blakely 1999: 87). The use of the term “black” to designate dark-skinned people – mostly with negative connotations – dates back to the early medieval period. In this regard, Blakely highlights a number of examples, such as (primarily Dutch or German) songs, tales, jokes, stories, or jingles. Moreover, he refers to (again, mainly Dutch) entries in

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<sup>92</sup> cf. pages 87ff. and comments concerning the categories “Badiu”, “Sanpadjudu”, or “Mandjaku” in Cape Verde.

dictionaries and encyclopedias regarding terms like “Moor”<sup>93</sup>, “Neger”, or “Blanke”. By the nineteenth century, the terms “creole” and “colored” first appeared in Dutch dictionaries. *“The expression ‘colored’ designated both nonwhites in general and those of mixed white and nonwhite parentage”* (Blakely 1999: 90). Both of the terms varied in meaning in different European colonies. In spite of the scope of the conceptual “color spectrum” (i.e. the wide range of related designations), it was the color and the concept of “blackness” which has been the actual center of attention. In the public, being “black” was something fixed and unchangeable and often given negative connotations – the only possible way for a person with “black” skin color to “change his / her skin” (figuratively, that is) was through Christianity. More recently, “blackness” as a skin color has been “exploited” in commerce (tobacco, coffee, or rice, for example) or in the music industry (cf. Blakely 1999: 91ff.).

Science played an important role in the definition and construction of a “black racial identity”. The first scientists in Western tradition – namely philosophers – *“took the lead in advancing theories on race and were accorded great respect”* (Blakely 1999: 94). The racial views of Immanuel Kant, for example, were generally accepted (with some exceptions, of course) by other thinkers throughout Europe. His initial portrayal of “Blacks” included statements such as *“the African Negro by nature has no feelings which rise above the trifling (...)”* (Kant 1764, cited in Blakely 1999: 94).

It is peculiar that over the centuries, the more “racial identity” and “blackness” was met with detail and scientific attention, the more incorrect information circulated. For example, a nineteenth-century dictionary definition stated that

*“[the Ethiopian race] have a more or less black, greasy and velvety-soft skin. (...) their head is small (...); they cannot sneeze (...). (...) Negroes can never reach the level of civilization which other, more highly organized peoples, (...) have reached (...). In general Negroes are unfeeling (...). Thus they are vengeful and appear only, or at least best suited for manual labor”* (P. G. Witsen Geysbeek 1845, cited in Blakely 1999: 97, original emphasis).

Starting in the eighteenth century, physicians, anatomists, anthropologists and other scientists began a more systematic inquiry about the differences between people. The history of craniology and craniometry up to the present day, for example, reveals just how enduring and dominant the concept of racial hierarchy has been. One of the most widespread ideas from the

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<sup>93</sup> For more information regarding the construction of the term “Moor” see Johnston-Arthur, Araba Evelyn (2004): *Über die Konstruktion des moren und der moerin im Kontext “epistemischer Gewalt” und den traumatischen Charakter neokolonialer Erfahrungen in der modernen afrikanischen Diaspora in Österreich*. Wien: Univ. Dipl. Arb.

nineteenth century on – despite overwhelming disproving evidence – was that intelligence is proportional to brain size (cf. Blakely 1999: 97-99).

Williams (1999) writes that “[black] identity in politics and society has been imposed from without and shaped from within the community” (Marable, cited in Williams 1999: 105). The U.S. Census with its narrow categories of “black”, “white”, “Asian”, or “Hispanic”, for instance, is a perfect example of how (racialized) “identity” is imposed from the “outside”. In turn, the recurring debate regarding the name(s) dark-skinned people should collectively use for identification can be characteristic of the debate about “identity” from “within”<sup>94</sup> (cf. Williams 1999: 105f.).

With regard to the notion of an “African” or “black identity”, the main problem is the question of how to move beyond the powerful idea that people of African descent are connected primarily by their “blackness” (in other words, by a “racial” essence). The first step in this regard would be to recognize that there is no one idea of “African” or “blackness”. It is impossible and completely absurd to try to account for the complex and distinct histories of people of African descent with any one definition such as “black” or “African identity”<sup>95</sup>. Furthermore, it is necessary to acknowledge that the historical experiences of those who are included in the category “African” or “black” have resulted in a continual internal division by class, gender, or political consciousness. Thus, it is relevant to include “difference” into the interpretative framework of “black” or “African” (and “African diaspora”). By implication, the deceptive “racial” categorization of “black historical reality” has to be abandoned. Especially in terms of (“African”) diaspora, the varied experiences should no longer be treated simply with the binary “racial” categories of “black” and “white” (cf. Williams 1999: 109). As Hall points out, *“the diaspora experience as I intend it [here] is defined not by essence or purity, but by the recognition of necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of ‘identity’ which lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity”* (Hall 1990, cited in Williams 1999: 110).

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<sup>94</sup> I put “outside” and “within” in quotation marks because of my personal discomfort with these terms since both of them are very imprecise and imply a certain notion of “us” and “them”.

<sup>95</sup> Just as it would be impossible or absurd to do the same with any other “imagined community” (referring once more to Anderson (1983)).

### 5.1.1. Creoleness / Hybridity

With reference to the above-cited quote by Hall, concepts such as “hybridity” and “creoleness” are crucial concerning the concept of “identity” in general and “identity construction” in Cape Verde in particular.

The term “hybridity” is generally used in the context of analyses regarding migration and diaspora. The notions concerning “hybrid” are mixed; the term is slippery, contested, and usually applied to assert change. In view of diaspora, the most common accounts affirm that “hybridity” is a process of cultural “mixing” where immigrants adopt certain aspects of the host culture and rework, reform, and reconfigure this in creation of a new “hybrid culture” or “hybrid identity”. As Hutnyk (2005) outlines, “*in addition to the general positions (...); hybridity is an evocative term for the formation of identity; it is used to describe innovations of language (creole, patois, pidgin (...)); it is code for creativity and for translation*”<sup>96</sup> (Hutnyk 2005: 81).

One of the crucial questions is to what degree the assertion of “hybridity” depends on the notion of an earlier “pure” that precedes “mixture” (cf. Hutnyk 2005: 81). Even as a process of translation or transformation, the notion of a “hybrid identity” draws on a position of non-hybridity. Many theorists (Paul Gilroy and Stuart Hall, among others) have struggled with how to deal with this inherent issue. Gilroy, for instance, has distanced himself from an allegiance to “hybridity”:

*“Who the fuck wants purity? (...) the idea of hybridity, of intermixture, presupposes two anterior purities (...). I think there isn’t any purity; there isn’t any anterior purity (...) that’s why I try not to use the word hybrid (...). Cultural production is not like mixing cocktails”* (Gilroy 1994, cited in Hutnyk 2005: 82).

Gilroy further deplors the “*lack of a means of adequately describing, let alone theorizing, intermixture, fusion and syncretism without suggesting the existence of anterior ‘uncontaminated’ purities*” (Gilroy 2000, cited in Hutnyk 2005: 82). It takes merely a small, incautious step to move from notions of horticulture and biology to discussions of human “races” as diverse species that, upon mixing, produce “hybrids”<sup>97</sup>. Hence, there are efforts to

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<sup>96</sup> Here, the notion of “translation” comes into effect again. At an abstract level this “translation” depends on the assumption that translation across difference occurs. Frequently, translation is undertaken by those who can enforce their opinion. Hence, the translation becomes an appropriation of (cultural) ownership. Consequently, the discussions regarding “hybridity” can open up vital issues of power and control, such as who is (not) able to translate and why (not) (cf. Hutnyk 2005: 87).

<sup>97</sup> And associated with this are anxieties in terms of “racial mixture”, “racial impurity” and “intermarriage” that have prevailed throughout history. The motley terminology of “mulatto”, “mestizo”, “mixed blood”, “half-caste”, “bi-racial”, or “mixed-race” all illustrate essentialism and bipolar thinking. These are specific terms for

differentiate the use of the term from its questionable – and perhaps dangerous – biological precedents, and to give up the illusion that cultural or ethnic purity ever existed (much less provided any foundation for civil society) (cf. Hutnyk 2005: 82f.).

A major field in which the idea of “hybridity” plays an important role is in linguistics. The concept of (linguistic) creolization evolved from the study of the contacts and interactions like that between African and European peoples in the Caribbean, for example. There, the existent languages provided for the formation of the concept of “hybrid languages”, which were said – to put it simply – to consist of one language’s vocabulary enforced upon the grammar of another. Linguistic research with regard to “hybrid” or “creole languages”, however, has often neglected or ignored the specific socio-political contexts and the historical circumstances (such as violence, forced isolation, and oppression) (cf. Hutnyk 2005: 85).

The term “creolization” has been borrowed from linguistics, where one of its several definitions is “*the creation of a new language out of contact between at least two different languages*” (Siegel 2005: 141). “Creolization” in the sociocultural context “*usually refers to the creation of new aspects of culture as a result of contact between different cultures*” (Siegel 2005: 141). Today, there is commonly accepted that sociocultural creolization implies the evolution of a unique society. Furthermore, the notion of “mixture” (as mentioned above) of various cultural elements is another essential factor of the concept of sociocultural creolization. More recently, the concept has also been broadened to more global contexts to describe the general processes of transnational cultural “mixture” and “hybridization” (cf. Siegel 2005: 142f.).

Linguistic and sociocultural creolization have considerable parallels, such as the importance of contact, the colonial context, or the development of a new and unique variety. Ulf Hannerz uses a center-periphery model of cultural characteristics as well as a continuum based on it. This model includes the cultural “center” with social power, prestige, and (“Western” or “modern”) characteristics on the one hand, and the “periphery” with little social power or prestige and “traditional” cultural characteristics on the other hand (cf. Siegel 2005: 145; Knörr 2008: 8). As Knörr explains,

*“Hannerz’ model of cultural creolization reflects the in creole linguistics widespread position that the creolization of language is a process largely determined by European standard languages. Correspondingly, allegedly ‘modern’ characteristics are considered part of the*

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people who cannot easily fit into the “self-evident” racialized binary opposition. Despite the fact that people with one “black” and one “white” parent have historically been categorized as “black”, they are at the same time identified as excluded from the categories of both “black” and “white” people. The entire problem with “mixed parentage” is connected with the fiction of racial difference in blood and genetics.



*European contribution and the center culture, while purportedly 'traditional' characteristics are understood as the native contribution and the periphery culture (...)* (Knörr 2008: 8).

Creolization (and its correlates “Creoleness” and “Creole”) is defined in diverse ways but is generally – but mistakenly – equated with terms such as “hybridization”, “syncretization”, and other terms hinting at processes of “mixture” (cf. Knörr 2008: 1). On a related note, some theorists emphasize the importance of linguistic creolization while others focus on sociocultural creolization. It can be characterized as a “*process of forging new human and cultural identities*” (Arion 1998, cited in Siegel 2005: 147) or as a “*way of forging a 'native' identity in a situation where there is no natal society*” (Rath 2000, cited in Siegel 2005: 147). One can also speak of a new claim of “belonging” based on movement, difference and transformation rather than on stagnation and stability. Post-colonial theorists prefer to treat “creoles” (i.e. languages and culture) as distinct creations instead of adaptations. They highlight the creation of new and unique languages, cultures, and “identities” and oppose the concept of bland European versions (cf. Siegel 2005: 148, 158).

“Race” often comes into play to distinguish “creoleness” from other “identities”. As Knörr specifies, “*(...) being white is (however mistakenly) not usually associated with ethnic and 'purity' and dark skin with 'mixture' (...)*” (Knörr 2008: 6).

Within the process of creolization, heterogeneous cultures or “heritages” are the base for constructing a new “common culture”. Additionally, a new “common identity” is created in order to replace the various agglomerate “identities”. According to Knörr (2008), the process of creolization differs from other processes of “mixing” due to the “ethnicization” and “indigenization” that go along with it. Hence, there is more creolization than the mere “mixing” of people and cultures. While old boundaries are dissolved, the recontextualization of culture and “identity” results in the creation of new boundaries (cf. Knörr 2008: 4f., 11).

## **5.2. Gender & Class**

Another vital social structure category is gender. Degele (2008a) illustrates that the naturalization of gender and of gender relations are historic phenomena. In the 18th century, physiologically diagnosed differences between men and women were declared as natural, the gender hierarchy as anatomic circumstance, and motherhood as a bio-ethic imperative. This resulted in the idea of gender characteristics. Accordingly, the qualities and behavior attributed to one specific gender are deduced from a combination of biology and natural

destiny and internalized in (wo-)man as an essential feature at the same time. Women<sup>98</sup> were excluded, domesticated, “housewife-ized”. A shift of gender relations toward a fundamental difference occurred. The development of opposed “gender characteristics” with the construction of antagonisms, however, is also a modern phenomenon through and through. This is evident in areas such as the division of labor – with the separation of gainful employment and domestic work, “male” work is upgraded while “female” work is seen as meritless. Household chores are not qualified as work, they appear as (invisible) reproductive activities without a distinct societal value (cf. Degele 2008a: 60, 63).

Apart from gender, the category of “class”<sup>99</sup> plays a key role within “identity construction”. Currently, there are two distinct schools within class analysis. The first is assuming an increasingly precise and contained position with respect to the meaning of “class”, while the second favors a broadened and transformed class theory (cf. Bottero 2004: 985). Some theorists argue that “class” as a social category is losing its relevance and that – in general – less and less people identify themselves as being part of a certain “class”. As Bottero (2004) points out, however,

*“people do not have to explicitly recognize class issues, or identify with discrete class groupings, for class processes to operate. All that is required is for specific cultural practices to be bound up with the reproduction of hierarchy. The emphasis is not on the development (or not) of class consciousness, but rather on the classed nature of particular social and cultural practices”*  
(Bottero 2004: 989).

It is hence crucial to note that while collective “class identities” may indeed be weaker today than they used to be, people do continue to define their own individual “identities” in ways which unavoidably include relational comparisons with members of different “social classes”,

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<sup>98</sup> The category “woman“ has been (justly) criticized for many reasons. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, for example, criticizes the assumption that “woman“ constitutes a homogeneous group with the same interests and desires – regardless of differences concerning class, ethnicity, or “race“. This assumption, however, is predominantly conveyed in Western feminist discourse, in whose depiction “[t]he Image of an average third world woman (...) ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family oriented, victimized, etc.” (Mohanty 1984: 337) emerges. This construct – established by Western feminist discourse – views “women“ as a powerless, homogeneous group and simultaneously as victims of socio-economic systems (cf. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade: Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses. In: Boundary, Vol. 2, Nr. 12 (3), 1984, S. 333-358). Gudrun-Axeli Knapps proposes to apprehend “woman“ as an “imagined community“ (cf. Degele 2008b: 68). Within this thesis, “women“ is not supposed to be understood as a homogeneous group. I am well aware that “women” differ according to various aspects, such as class, age, or education. For the purpose of a more coherent illustration, however, I choose to use this term. This applies to the entire content of this thesis.

<sup>99</sup> Two of the leading class theories were by Karl Marx on the one hand, and by Pierre Bourdieu on the other hand. It would, however, exceed the scope of this thesis to go into these two theories in detail.

merely representing a reorientation of “class identity” on a more individual level (cf. Bottero 2004: 989f.).

Both of these categories (gender and class), however, do not play an essential role in the construction of a so called *Kabuverdianidade*<sup>100</sup>. Gender differences and inequalities are indeed crucial to understanding Cape Verdean society but they play a less important role in the construction of a “national / cultural identity”. The differences and inequalities regarding class are – now more than ever – becoming increasingly relevant for the structure of Cape Verdean society. As mentioned in chapter 2.3., a new (urban) underclass is emerging and is likely to become a permanent fixture in the country’s social structure. Accordingly, “class identity” is connected with processes of (economic, among others) exclusion and access (or the lack thereof, respectively) to certain means of communication – such as the Internet – decisive to the (re-)modification of “(national / cultural) identity”. By implication, the structural category of “class” (as well as the category of gender) does come into the picture when analyzing shifts concerning “identity construction”. I, however, consider “race” and “racialized identity”, respectively, to play a more important part in the construction of the aforementioned *Kabuverdianidade*.

### 5.3. Criticism

Like many other terms, such as “transnationalism” or “diaspora”, the notion of “identity” can be criticized for various reasons, including the fact that it is so ambiguous that it is almost impossible to define or actually make use of the term analytically, respectively. “Identity” can mean so many things that – ultimately – it may mean both nothing at all and everything at once.

This is precisely the argument of Brubaker et al. (2000). They claim that “identity” (as an analytical category) is prone to “*mean too much (when understood in a strong sense<sup>101</sup>), too little (when understood in a weak sense<sup>102</sup>), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity). (...) If identity is everywhere, it is nowhere*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 1). Apart from theoretical

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<sup>100</sup> Which can be translated as “Capeverdeanness” or “Cape Verdeanity”.

<sup>101</sup> By “strong (or hard) sense“ they understand positions that emphasize fundamental or basic sameness over time or across persons (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 10).

<sup>102</sup> By “weak (or soft) sense” they understand positions that oppose notions of fundamental or basic sameness. These weak conceptions have been favored in theoretical discussions of “identity” in recent years (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 10f.)

realms that are evidently concerned with “identity”, such as work on gender, “race”, nationalism, immigration, or culture, even those fields that are not traditionally engaged in these topics have addressed questions of “identity” by now. Brubaker et al. believe, however, that the work “identity” is supposed to do might be done better by other, less ambiguous terms.

In spite of their critique of the use of “identity” in contemporary social sciences, they point out a number of key uses of the highly ambiguous term. First, “identity” can be understood as “*a ground of basis of social or political action (...)*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 6). This is quite likely the most general use of the term and implies the way in which action “*may be governed by particularistic self-understandings (...)*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 6, original emphasis). Second, it can be understood as “*a specifically collective phenomenon, ‘identity’ denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among members of a group of a category*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 7, original emphasis). Third, “identity” can be comprehended as “*a core aspect of (...) ‘selfhood’ or as a fundamental condition of social being*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 7). Accordingly, it is used to refer to something putatively foundational or consistent and regarded as something to be preserved and savored. Fourth, “identity” can be seen as “*a product of social or political action, ‘identity’ is invoked to highlight the (...) development of the kind of collective self-understanding (...) that can make a collective action possible*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 7). And finally, it can be understood as the “*evanescent product of multiple and competing discourses*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 8). In this case, it is called upon to emphasize the unstable and fragmented nature of the Self. In short, “identity” is required to do a lot of work. The various usages, however, are not only heterogeneous but rather point in extremely different directions. Some usages stress a basic sameness while others dismiss any idea of consistent sameness (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 8).

Brubaker et al. disagree with the assumption that “identity” is something all people or all groups have, ought to have, or are searching for; that “identity” is always a given and something all individuals and groups “forge” or “(re-)construct” (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 10, 27f.). They believe that “*‘identity’ is neither necessary nor helpful as a category of analysis, even where it is widely used as a category of practice*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 25, original emphasis). The all-encompassing concept of “identity” obscures the countless different meanings, causes, locations, contexts, needs, or – especially – the individual experience, among many others. Its general use bears the danger of flattening those distinct histories into a static, undifferentiated and singular hypernym (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 30).

Brubaker et al. do not agree with the majority of scholars who claim that the term “identity” is problematic yet indispensable. They offer a number of alternative analytical idioms to realize some aspects of the work “identity” has to do but without the associated confusion, contradictions, and ambiguity. Their propositions are “identification” and “categorization”, “self-understanding” and “social location”, and “commonality” / “connectedness” / “groupness” (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 14-19). Regarding the former, they distinguish between a relational and a categorical mode of identification. The categorical mode of identification (i.e. the identification “*by a membership in a class of persons sharing some categorical attribute*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 15), such as “race”, language, or nationality) has gained greater importance in “modern” settings. “Identification” can further be differentiated according to self-identification and external identification<sup>103</sup> (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 15). Regarding “self-understanding” Brubaker et al. exemplify the need to redesignate the way in which (individual and collective) action can be influenced by particular understandings of the Self and one’s social location. In that regard, they coin the term “situated subjectivity” – that is to say, “*one’s sense of who one is, of one’s social location, and of how (...) one is prepared to act*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 17). It is crucial to note, however, that the term “self-understanding” does not entail “*a distinctively modern or Western understanding of the ‘self’ as a homogeneous, bounded, unitary entity*” (Brubaker et al. 2000: 17). Contrary to “identity”, “self-identification” does not have any semantic connection to sameness or difference. Finally, “commonality” / “connectedness” / “groupness” implicate a certain sense of “belonging” to a distinctive, confined group, which includes both a feeling of solidarity and oneness with other members and of difference or antipathy to “outsiders”. These terms also include attributes of networks and of “communal spirit”<sup>104</sup> (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 19f.).

I do not agree with the term “identity” and its implications. Nevertheless, I decided to make use of it in this thesis due to the shortage of adequate alternatives. Having employed quotation marks in the theoretical deliberations, I will hereafter use the term without quotation marks for the sake of improving legibility – while being simultaneously aware of the dangers, risks and problems surrounding “identity” and its ambiguous meanings.

Based on Stuart Hall, I understand “identity” as a positioning (or a “sense of belonging”), not as a natural essence. For myself personally and in order to conduct my research, it is

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<sup>103</sup> I argue that self- and external identification cannot be separated. In accordance with Stuart Hall, I believe that the way we define ourselves can never be detached from the way others define us.

<sup>104</sup> Max Weber referred to it as “Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl” (cf. Brubaker et al. 2000: 20), which can be translated as “communal spirit”, “(feeling of) solidarity”, or “shared identity”.

important to recapitulate that every individual holds various complex, multi-layered “identities”, not merely one single “identity”. These “identities” (or personae or social structure categories) coexist *pari passu* – there is no hierarchy, no “identity” that is more relevant or important than another. According to the context, these “identities” gain in importance. Thus, social structure categories and “identities” are contextual – in certain situations, for example, “race“ as a social structure category (and as one of many “identities“, respectively) is temporarily perceived or defined as dominant or more important, both externally and internally.

“Cultural identity“ (as made clear previously) is subject to several, perpetually changing factors. It is imagined or refers to a never (or no longer) existing “nativeness“ or “originality“. I consider the construction of “identities” as the foundation and precondition of exchange, communication and knowledge transfer (and thus of the construction and balance of power). The “Self” – meaning one’s own “identities” – underlies tangible and concrete actions. As mentioned before, it is generally recognized that “identity” per se is a social construct. People, however, act upon this construct – which gives it a real relevance.

McClintock (1995) proposes to factor in all three categories (“race“, gender, and class) equivalently in any kind of analysis. This claim has been articulated since the 1970s by – particularly “non-white“ – feminists, who have strongly criticized the Eurocentric view of “white“ feminists and their privileging of the category „gender“ (cf. McClintock 1995: 7). “*No social category exists in privileged isolation; each comes into being in social relation to other categories, if in uneven and contradictory ways*“ (McClintock 1995: 9). As mentioned before, however, I argue that the categories of class and gender are less relevant for the construction of the *Kabuverdianidade* than the category of “race”, which is why my focus will be on the latter.

# Results

## 6. Consequence II: Changes in Identity Construction

In Cape Verde, discussions regarding the population's "national" or "cultural" identity are omnipresent – be it in day-to-day discourse or in official political debates in relation to the officialization of *Kriolu*. These discussions and all of their partial aspects (attitudes towards language, music and other cultural expressions as well as perceptions of "African" and "European") have their origin in the times of Portuguese colonialism and in the racialized classification introduced and deployed, respectively, by the Portuguese in Cape Verde. Today, the official "dilemma" of "defining" the Cape Verdean identity or self-image is primarily connected to issues concerning "development", "progress", and attaining external power bases: What and who are Cape Verdeans or *Kriolus*? Are they South Europeans, West Africans, neither, or both? Clearly, these questions cannot be answered or even analyzed explicitly and generally because the answers depend on who is being questioned, when and why the questions are taking place, and who the interviewer is in the first place. Thus, the following analysis and interpretations constitute a "snapshot" and simply intent to illustrate tendencies.

At the time of colonialism, Cape Verdeans were useful to the Portuguese in terms of maintaining the Empire – they were often employed as minor officials in the administration of the different Portuguese colonies. It is often stated that the Portuguese considered Cape Verde and Cape Verdeans as intermediaries in both the biological and cultural sense. They were viewed as both "cultural middlemen" between Europeans and Africans and valued as physiologically better suited to tolerate the natural conditions of different African regions. Being lighter-skinned, mostly Portuguese-speaking and partly of Portuguese ancestry, Cape Verdeans profited from the first school for higher education in any Portuguese colony<sup>105</sup>. In general, Creole populations were assumed to be closer to Portuguese beliefs as related to culture, values, and identity. It was presumed that the "Creole offspring" were closer to the

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<sup>105</sup> The actual investments in the field of education, however, were very small and only a minor part of the population had access to education (cf. Gomes 2001: 39).

Portuguese than to the African because of their paternal “Portuguese blood”<sup>106</sup> (cf. Rodrigues 2003: 94f.; Meintel 1984; Bogdan 2000: 86).

Thus, Cape Verdeans held some kind of special status within the populations colonized by the Portuguese. Hence, with regard to the Portuguese colonial ideology it is crucial to understand that Cape Verdeans had a different status than other Africans living under Portuguese colonial rule. Unlike other Africans, Cape Verdeans were never viewed as *indigenas*, but rather as *assimilados* under Portuguese colonial law<sup>107</sup>. Consequently, Cape Verdeans were granted the status of “honorary Portuguese” citizens. By the nineteenth century, Cape Verde increasingly served the dual role of colony as well as source for colonial intermediaries (cf. Williams 1999: 111f.). “(...) *Cape Verdeans were viewed by the Portuguese as a ‘unique’ group whose culture was deemed superior to that of Africans living on the continent (...)*” (Williams 1999: 111). They were on the one hand seen as more “civilized” and assimilated to Portuguese culture than other colonized populations and therefore not as “African”, on the other hand, however, Cape Verde was itself an exploited colony and its colonialist experience was a long way from “*the ‘racial democracy’ that the Portuguese argued was a cornerstone of their colonial philosophy*” (Williams 1999: 112). Nevertheless, Cape Verde was – compared to other Luso-African colonies – better off and Cape Verdeans had little reason to identify with other African countries whose economies or education systems were in many cases significantly worse. Accordingly, it can be stated that Cape Verdeans (primarily those in top positions in the colonial administration) were caught in a colonial structure where they were both subordinated and privileged, slaves and enslavers, and thus both victims and victimizers (cf. Lobban 1995: 58).

The fact that Cape Verdeans were active in the Portuguese colonial administration resulted in a certain suspicion, distrust, and at times even contempt towards them on the part of local societies in other Luso-African colonies. But the relationship of Cape Verdeans with Africans from the mainland was (and still is, as will be discussed below) quite ambivalent. A certain feeling of superiority was/is definitely existent (cf. Meyns 1990: 25).

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<sup>106</sup> It is generally declared that sexual relationships between “white” Portuguese men / slavemasters and “black”, African slave women resulted in the creation of the Cape Verdean society (cf. Lobban 1995: 54; Carling et al. 2008: 14).

<sup>107</sup> The *assimilados* (“assimilated”) were formally recognized in 1930. This status was ascribed to those residents of Portuguese colonies whose education, literacy, financial position, or other accomplishments granted them more rights as Portuguese citizens. The *indigena* (“native”) classification, on the other hand, was employed on the grand majority of Africans, turning them into wards of the Portuguese state, who were deprived of basic civil rights, referred to the low-wage jobs and poor-quality schools, among other things (cf. Lobban 1995: 60). One of the most essential criteria in order to be considered an *assimilado* was to speak the Portuguese language “correctly” (cf. Gomes 2001: 37). For more information with regard to the Portuguese racialized and racist system of classification, see Lobban 1995: 53-62 or Rodrigues 2003: 96.



The recent experiences of “development” and globalization in Cape Verde have unquestionably altered the country’s “national” or “cultural” identity. With regard to “development” and globalization, the Internet is a crucial tool of implementation and has without doubt played a key role concerning the aforementioned alterations – especially among the younger generation. The question of access (in other words, inclusion or exclusion) to “development” can be linked to Internet access (as a “development” criterion), which in turn correlates with the degree of change regarding identity construction. Those who do not have any access will experience little change, those who have little access will experience a few changes and those who have broad access will experience a lot of changes, creating what could become a vicious circle. Unequal access to the Internet could increase existing inequalities in Cape Verdean society.

Following Mazrui (2008), I understand the Internet as “*one of the recent engines of globalization, of the process of rapid acceleration in the circulation of people, goods, information and images on a world scale*” (Mazrui 2008: 193).

In Cape Verde, general Internet access has increased immensely since the late 1990s. Internet access at home is still rather limited due to the extremely high costs (about 9.250 Cape Verdean Escudos (CVE), which equals €84, for the installation and then about 3.700 CVE (€ 34) per month) and cybercafés are very popular but also quite expensive (about 200 CVE per hour, which equals € 1,80)<sup>108</sup>. The rapid emergence of universities, however, has brought about a rise in internet usage since most universities have computer courses and computer rooms with free Internet. Moreover, nearly all reasonably big cities or towns now have WLAN on their main squares and airports. Despite the fact that the WLAN is pretty slow and that most young Cape Verdeans do not own a laptop, the squares are filled with people in the evening, who gather in groups of four or five around one laptop and listen to music, upload photos to hi5 or chat on Facebook.

*“(...) the Cape Verdean nation is now faced with the reality of the European Common Market and the tightening of borders around the ‘First World’. At the same time, the country gains more access to outside information through its improved telecommunications system, not only facilitating contact with the diasporic communities, but also the importation of foreign discourses and imagery. (...) The pull towards globalisation [sic!] coexists in a tense relation with both the ‘colonial’ and the ‘national’ modes, further complicating the issue of Cape Verdean identity” (Rego 2008: 156).*

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<sup>108</sup> Given the relatively low general income in Cape Verde compared to Europe, these prices are not affordable to the majority of the population.

References to changes in identity construction – on the basis of the already mentioned research questions – appeared in different ways in the interviews. By means of the open guideline, emphases and priorities in terms of central aspects and themes were largely set by the interviewees themselves. It is important to note that the changes are not shared and experienced equally. Perceptions regarding identity – as mentioned before – are not a consistent determinant but rather a variable that shifts according to the situation and the participator. Yet, most interviewees referred to the same (or similar) phenomena from their their personal experiences and knowledge, or observations from their surroundings.

Within the process of content analysis, it is necessary to pay attention to assertions people make about themselves and about others. This constant comparison of statements allowed me to identify between self-assessment and the view of others. Only the permanent and repeated coding and contrasting of the interviews made the elaboration of more general features and tendencies possible, facilitating the finding of indications and information regarding the research questions.

It is significant, however, to point out that these interpretations cannot be read as absolutely objective as every researcher approaches the evaluation and analysis of the interviews from his/her own perceptions, opinions, and expectations. Hence, the position, expectations, and perceptions of the researcher are always part of the academic work process.

For the purpose of intelligibility, this chapter is divided into several subchapters. The aim of this is to begin with the more general aspects of Cape Verdean identity construction before eventually dealing with the specific effects of “development” and globalization.

## 6.1. Mestiçagem & Creoleness

In order to analyze identity construction in the Cape Verdean context, it is vital to understand that two of the most central analytical categories are those of *mestiçagem*<sup>109</sup> and Creoleness. In this regard, it is best to comprehend the Cape Verdean social formation by examining the process that – for some – led to a *mestiço*<sup>110</sup> culture, and – for others – to the emergence of a Creole society. As Furtado (2009) elucidates, the notion of *mestiçagem* generally appears to

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<sup>109</sup> The Portuguese *mestiçagem* can be translated as “miscegenation”, “hybridization” or “mixture”.

<sup>110</sup> According to the racialized taxonomy in Cape Verde under Portuguese colonial rule, there were *brancos* (“Whites”), *mestiços* (also known as *mulattos*), and *pretos* (“Blacks”), referring to those of “apparent” African origin (cf. Lobban 1995: 54).

fluctuate between a phenotypic dimension and a sociological categorization (cf. Furtado 2009: 10).

Today, the concept of *Crioulidade* or *Kabuverdianidade* is believed to be politically neutral and is often used to emphasize “Cape Verde’s unique form of Africanity in connection to its historic transatlantic experiences of contact and cultural hybridity” (Fikes 2007: 168).

At present, *Kabuverdianidade* is still characterized by a sense of *mestiço* identity. As one interviewed professor elaborated,

*“it is a hybrid identity...in this case mixed and as a result of this Creole. (...) in the matrix of the identity formation there is a matrix which is plural. So that...plural in all senses. The most basic analysis opposes an intermixture of a European and an African identity. (...) the study of the Cape Verdean identity has – in my perspective – transformed itself into something semi-schizophrenic...so that...It is a schizophrenia in the study of identity”* (Interview C13, my emphasis)<sup>111</sup>.

The choice of the terms “schizophrenic” and “schizophrenia”, respectively, is supposed to illustrate the ambivalent and volatile identity construction – while most Cape Verdeans will assert that their identity (in other words, *Kabuverdianidade*) is unique in its Creoleness, the question whether it is closer to a “European” or an “African” identity is unaltered.

*“Kriolu is an identity. (...) It is different from the Creole in Guinea. It is different from the Creole in Senegal. There is a part in Senegal where they speak a Creole. But it is...it is more than a language. It is...I think it is a unique identity, (...) – a unique identity. (...) It is more than a language. Not only to speak but...the people continue to identify”* (Interview C3, my emphasis).

*“(...) Creole of Guinea has words that they pronounce that Cape Verde has more Portuguesed<sup>112</sup>. Kriolu of Cape Verde has a little bit of Portuguese mixed in it, in Guinea I think they have a lot more Bantu than Portuguese itself. That is why it remains a unique Kriolu”* (Interview C3, my emphasis).

*“Kriolu is like...we say it is our language. (...) Kriolu is...it is what identifies us as Cape Verdeans. I think. (...) I am a Kriola. (...) Kriolu...comes from the mixture of...of the African languages and...but it is just that...there are places in Africa where they speak a Creole but the Creole there is very different. It is not like our Kriolu”* (Interview C5, my emphasis).

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<sup>111</sup> In the original, C13 said “*é uma identidade híbrida...neste caso mestiça e por isso kriola (...)*”.

<sup>112</sup> In the original, C3 uses the word “*aportuguesada*” which literally means “made Portuguese”.

“*Kriolu is an African language that...that those slaves that were here, that they used with each other. But it was mixed...came, the Portuguese came with their Portuguese, it was a bit mixed. Because we speak...also in our Kriolu, many words too, many words we speak are also Portuguese. That’s the way it is. A little bit of Portuguese, a little bit of...mixture, Pidgin. (...) it is a mixture, thus...*” (Interview C7, my emphasis).

Hence, the idea of “hybridity” or “mixture” and of an identity that is always “in between” still dominates the everyday discourse and public dialogue<sup>113</sup>. At the same time, the young generation in Cape Verde continues to be “proud” of the perceived uniqueness and singularity of *Kabuverdianidade*. The usage of this term refers to the authenticity of the own culture and way of life. As explained and analyzed in more detail in chapter 6.2., the “national” or “cultural” identity of Cape Verde has always been and still is strongly characterized by a differently perceived closeness to Europe or Africa, and by racialized perceptions regarding what is “European” and “African”. This is reflected and appears in all aspects of “national” or “cultural” identity construction (*mestiçagem* and Creoleness, identity markers, island differences, officialization of Kriolu, modification of the country’s flag, etc.).

### 6.1.1. Identity Markers

While speaking of their culture and what constitutes or typifies it, all interviewees referred to (a) their language (*Kriolu* or *Kabuverdianu*), (b) their music and dance, and (c) their history of emigration<sup>114</sup>.

#### 6.1.1.1. Language

Today, language is still considered one of the most important – if not *the* most important – “cultural” identity markers in Cape Verde. While Portuguese is still the official language and used in schools and churches (among others), *Kriolu* is the primary language of the entire population. The political efforts to officialize *Kriolu* reflect some of the ambivalent attitudes

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<sup>113</sup> In parts, this goes so far that investigations are made to determine the “composition” of the Cape Verdean population (cf. ASemana: População cabo-verdiana: “57% dos genes são de origem Africana e 43 %, de origem europeia”. May 27<sup>th</sup> 2010. [http://asemana.sapo.cv/spip.php?article53126&ak=1#ancre\\_comm](http://asemana.sapo.cv/spip.php?article53126&ak=1#ancre_comm). [Access: 22.07.2011]).

<sup>114</sup> All of them mentioned (a) and (b) and the majority talked about (c) as well. Some also mentioned food (Cape Verde’s national dish is the *Katchupa* or *Kaxupa*, a stew of corn, beans, and fish or meat).

with reference to “national” or “cultural” identity and the discussions concerning the country’s “Africanity” or “Europeanness”. Out of the 10 student interviewees, seven mentioned their support of an officialization of *Kriolu*. One of these seven remarked that both Portuguese and *Kriolu* should be the official languages in Cape Verde.

*“But nowadays we’re working to make our Kriolu the language that we study in the school. Because in the primary school until high school they don’t teach Kriolu – it’s bad. It’s just Portuguese...And political, in the parliament they speak only...And in church you speak only Portuguese. (...) Yeah, I think it [note: the officialization of Kriolu] would be better. Because we can work with our hands and our feet – because if we are depending on the Portuguese language...So if we want to write a book in Kriolu it’s not to be successful, you know. It’s going to be difficult, I have to go to print it outside, to come...So it’s going to be hard” (Interview C1).*

*“Yeah, the official language...First of all, people will be interested in meet our place. Because many, many tourists come but they don’t have who can teach them, who can show them, (...). So we have no organization. So Kriolu to be an official language is a big, big work. Because when Kriolu turn official and the people don’t speak it in the world, it’s going to be a trouble. Because people must speak, must know the place in order to...our place to increase more. (...) So the people will come more from the islands, the people will hear about our language, Kriolu, Kriolu (...)” (Interview C1).*

*“Because...To me, it should be an official language. It is – like I said – the Cape Verdean identity. (...) ...over time, people will lose Kriolu. (...) In Kriolu there is...there is a high probability that it will disappear. Because there are a lot of Cape Verdeans out there. And while being outside they speak Portuguese, like in my case – me and my brother were born here but we only speak Portuguese, we don’t speak in Kriolu [with each other]. This...over time, over time people can forget. They can even lose...the Creole identity” (Interview C3).*

*“I think it [note: the officialization of Kriolu] would be good. Since every country has a language, I think it... (...) ...I just think that it will take a lot of work to have all the books in Kriolu” (Interview C5).*

This shows that the official recognition of *Kriolu* is predominantly considered crucial to the country’s self-esteem and maintenance of an imagined collective identity. Three of the students declared that they were against the officialization of *Kriolu* mainly because of the difficulties in terms of its implementation and enforceability (each island has its own variety), and not so much because of prestige. One of them quoted the aspect of globalization as his reason to disapprove.

*“I don’t think so [note: that Kriolu should be the official language]. Because Kriolu, well...it’s easy to speak but the writing is difficult. No, I don’t think that it will bring a lot of results. The writing is totally difficult to write. Speak, people speak, but write – in order to yield results in schools, I think it will lead nowhere. Because the writing in Kriolu is very difficult” (Interview C6).*

*“I think that...frankly, I don’t agree with it [note: the officialization of Kriolu] very much. (...) I...my big...my big ambition is to see globalization. For me, it would be better to have only one language. (...) In the entire world. (...) I have a lot of faith in globalization” (Interview C10).*

Here, it is already made clear that the phenomenon of globalization does have an influence on how younger people (meaning people who have access to the mechanisms of globalization) view their identity – their language, in this case – and change their attitudes accordingly.

As mentioned before, Cape Verdeans characterize their language as being unique on the one hand, and the result of a “mixture” on the other hand. *Kriolu* (and not Portuguese) is seen as the own language and belongs to “being Cape Verdean”. Nevertheless, *Kriolu* and Portuguese are still assigned to diverse realms of life (*Kriolu* is assigned to the “private realm” and “informal contexts” – meaning the home, the family, or on the street – while Portuguese is assigned to the “public realm” and “formal contexts” – meaning school, work, or other public institutions) and hence valued differently. As one student explains, *“I prefer to speak Kriolu because I learned it at home. So I practice more Kriolu, I speak Kriolu well. So I know it better. Now, Portuguese is for thinking (...) we speak Portuguese only in school”* (Interview C2). Not being able to speak *Kriolu* would mean that one is not “truly Cape Verdean” while not being able to speak Portuguese would mean that one is rather “chanceless” and excluded from any local opportunities for advancement as well as any international processes.

The dichotomy between the country’s identity orientation towards Africa or Europe and the significance of the concept of *mestiçagem* becomes apparent in debates on language too. As one professor illustrated, questions with respect to language involve much more than language analysis per se – they include taking into account the entire concept of what *Kriolu* means.

*“For the question...not Kriolu language individually but Kriolu...the concept of Kriolu, (...). It is this concept of being mixed, which is the mixture between European and African alike, also various African races...that have origin in this culture, let’s just say Kriolu, we call it the Creole culture, hybrid culture. And which has a very own identity, an own Cape Verdean identity...that manifests itself by means of the language, which is unique, which is our Kriolu (...)” (Interview C8).*

Considering that the aspect of language – as well as all other “cultural” identity markers – cannot be analyzed irrespectively of historical processes, it is essential to note that the notion of “civilization” was an important element of the Portuguese expansion overseas, whereby the “Portuguese language and culture” was to represent this “civilization”. The societies that emerged from this colonization were and still are characterized by the antagonisms “civilized vs. uncivilized”, which in turn shape the meanings of “African” and “European” (in this context, “European” can generally be equated with “Lusophone”).

Attributions and categorizations, which originated in colonial times, are still present in Cape Verde today – albeit with modified or shifted meanings. As Gomes (2001) expounds, the Creole societies that emerged in the 15th century, experienced the reflection and reproduction of these asymmetries relating to the situation between the dominated and the dominant. From the beginning, the languages that developed in these contexts were seen as “simplified” versions of Portuguese and – to date – misappropriated as corresponding to the “Romance (linguistic) community” (cf. Gomes 2001: 35). Therefore, the analysis of the question of the Cape Verde’s cultural belonging or affinity is extremely relevant to the “national” identity. The question “am I Portuguese or African?” coins the construction of identities and has political relevance. It is understood as a political statement to ascribe to *Kriolu* a certain degree of “Africinity” or “Latinity”. Thus, I was surprised that half of the 10 students asserted that *Kriolu* was an African language, while the other five explained that it was a mix between African and European languages (mainly Portuguese). None of them referred to *Kriolu* as a European, Romance, or Latin language.

*“Yes, Kriolu is total African language. They say that Cape Verde belongs to Africa. Some people say no...because if you go to the map, you see Cape Verde outside, in the middle of the ocean, Atlantic Ocean. But why...we are from Africa” (Interview C1).*

*“It is a mixture between the languages of the colonizers, maybe English, French, just as there are some words in Kriolu that are similar to those in English, in French, in Portuguese...And other African languages, Wolof, Bantu (...). It is a mixture” (Interview C4).*

It is thus not the case that *Kriolu* becomes less important in relation to Portuguese. The command and proficiency of *Kriolu* continues to be viewed as an essential element of “being Cape Verdean”. It is extremely relevant in order to “belong” to the (imagined) Cape Verdean community. Similar to colonial times, however, – when the only reference point of “civilization” was the “Portuguese language and culture”, and the world was categorized into

a “civilized” and an “uncivilized” part (cf. Gomes 2001: 33) – processes of social inclusion and exclusion still take place in Cape Verde today.

In contemporary Cape Verde, social interactions are very revealing in terms of how social status is coded by referring to social mechanisms that have been existent since the colonial period. Code switching between *Kriolu* and Portuguese in order to distance oneself from others is a main indicator of a higher status. Additionally, as Rodrigues (2003) highlights, the local distinctions between “deep *Kriolu*” and “softer *Kriolu*” suggest that even within the Cape Verdean language there are internal distinctions that signify a social differentiation. “*These internal forms of demarcating status, based on gradations of similarities and differences from the Portuguese language, are still used to demarcate the higher status of a local elite*” (Rodrigues 2003: 99).

Nonetheless, *Kriolu* is a significant linguistic feature not only for those living on the islands but also for the “global Cape Verdean identity” that was constructed when the first Cape Verdeans were forced to emigrate. It is widely acknowledged that one has to speak *Kriolu* in order to be able to understand the “Cape Verdean culture”. In the context of transnationalism and diasporic networking and exchange – which has been facilitated tremendously by means of the Internet as a result of globalization –, *Kriolu* continues to predominate as a means of communication. Six of the 10 students declared that they used *Kriolu* as the main language in blogs, chats, and other social networks (facebook and hi5, in particular) while two stated that they did not really use the Internet to communicate with other Cape Verdeans. One student stated, for example, that “*if I speak with my family, who is Cape Verdean, or with my friends, who are Cape Verdeans, we use Kriolu*” (Interview C4). The remaining two said that they preferred to use Portuguese because it was faster to write<sup>115</sup> (Interview C12) or because they grew up somewhere else (Angola) and only had Cape Verdean friends who also speak Portuguese (Interview C3).

*“Portuguese. Normally...sometimes...now and then I write Kriolu, when I’m communicating with one of my friends, I sometimes write in Kriolu. But usually I...I write more in Portuguese because it’s faster and Kriolu is a little bit complicated to write. And it takes a long time, for example, at times I write more Portuguese”* (Interview C12).

*“Portuguese. (...) But with my friends...I speak Kriolu more with my family, with my mother, my father and my siblings I only speak Portuguese. He is in Angola, we only speak Portuguese. I don’t know why but it’s a habit. But we also speak Kriolu. They know how to speak Kriolu like I do. But we find it easier to communicate in Portuguese”* (Interview C3).

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<sup>115</sup> In Cape Verde, there is no standardized orthography of *Kriolu* yet.



Consequently, it can be concluded that *Kriolu* is not becoming less important in a global Cape Verdean context; it is still the only language of communication for the majority of the “global Cape Verdean community” as most Cape Verdeans living abroad – apart from those who reside in Portugal, for example – do not speak Portuguese and English is by and large not yet spoken by Cape Verdeans from the archipelago. At the same time, Portuguese is seen as crucial for any contact with the “outside world” and thus for “development”.

### 6.1.1.2. Music and Dance

Cape Verdean music (and dance) is the other vital key marker of Cape Verdean “cultural” or “national” identity. Here, too, the notion of *mestiçagem* exists as the various musical styles are both influenced by musical traditions from different parts of the world and something unique and distinct.

The Cape Verdean archipelago is home to a very broad musical tradition and a variety of genres, respectively, especially considering its size. The history of emigration is ever-present in the country’s various musical expressions. The musical style *Morna*, for instance, generally deals with themes such as *Sodadi*<sup>116</sup>, emigration, suffering, separation, or memories of the “homeland”. *Morna* was initially linked to the islands of Brava, Boavista, and São Vicente but is now performed and listened to on all of the islands and the diaspora. *Koladera*<sup>117</sup> is another musical genre that is similar to *Morna* in its instrumentation (namely stringed instruments) and origin (supposedly São Vicente) but is more critical and humorous in terms of content.

Two other important styles of music in Cape Verde are *Batuku* and *Funana*. In its original form, *Batuku* is a combination of drumming, dancing, and singing and initially developed on the island of Santiago. It is primarily practiced by women, who use scraps of cloth wrapped in plastic bags as drums, and sing about ordinary events, experiences, as well as poverty, gender issues, politics and culture in an amusing but critical way. *Funana*, on the other hand, is an accordion-based music with a rather upbeat rhythm, accompanied by a couple dance. It is said that *Funana*, too, originated on Santiago. Its lyrics are generally about the quotidian life and its many happy and difficult moments.

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<sup>116</sup> It is generally believed among Portuguese speakers that the Portuguese term “saudade” (and thus any equivalent term in Portuguese-based languages) cannot be translated correctly into any other language. It can be taken to mean the feeling of longing for somewhere, someone, or something.

<sup>117</sup> Or *Coladeira* / *Coladera*

Among the younger generation, Cape Verde's musical genres still play a key role in the construction of a shared identity. Seven of the students listed "music and dance" as typical aspects of Cape Verdean culture and identity. One of them asserted that "*Kriolu of Cape Verde is known internationally by means of the Cape Verdean music*" (Interview C3) while another commented that "*Music. Dance. Food. Gastronomy. Our famous Katchupa. (...) Funana, dance. And to differentiate our country from others, that's it. Dance, music, dishes*" (Interview C7).

Yet, music and dance are not solely mentioned to characterize a shared identity but also to distinguish (or construct differences) between the islands in terms of their "cultural" identity.

*"In cultural terms [they] differ a bit in music. In music and in dance. On the island of Sal, they prefer (...) Mazurka but here in Santiago we adore Funana, we adore Batuku. (...) [on Sal] they don't know Batuku, they don't know what Batuku is. Batuku is a typical Cape Verdean dance, it is typical, it is general. Batuku and Funana, from Cape Verde"* (Interview C4).

*"In cultural terms...there are typical dishes on each island. (...) And the festivities they have. (...) Music...On Santiago there is Funana, which everybody adores. (...) On the other islands more Mornas"* (Interview C5).

It was noteworthy that the interviewees commonly referred to the musical genre associated with "their island" as the genre universal to a broader Cape Verdean identity. As one professor from São Vicente explained,

*"Music is the other very strong element of our cultural identity. Hence, Morna, Koladera, Batuku. For example, Batuku is more native to Santiago. But Morna is to all of Cape Verde. Every Cape Verdean identifies himself/herself with Morna. Because Morna...I from São Vicente like Morna, Santiago likes Morna, Santo Antão, it is music from Cape Verde. But if you talk about Batuku, for example, Batuku is from Santiago, which is a dance and music that...a style of music (...) that emerged on Santiago during the time of slavery. So, we from this side here, São Vicente, we were populated no longer by slaves, we don't identify very much with Batuku. But it is an element of our culture, but more from Santiago"* (Interview C9).

With reference to music, the data reveals that young Cape Verdeans – for the most part – consider the islands' musical styles as something they identify with and actively listen to. When asked what music they personally liked best, many of them listed other genres – Hip Hop, Funk, Rock, Heavy Metal, or Reggae – as their favorites. Here, the influences of "development" and globalization (namely, the diffusion of the Internet among the population and its popular use to download and share music) are already explicit. The fact that many young Cape Verdeans indeed still identify with *Batuku*, *Funana*, or *Morna* but at the same

time increasingly identify with other (not “traditionally” Cape Verdean) styles of music is seen as both positive and negative by members of the older generation. In the interviews, one professor spoke about his worry regarding this trend, while another deemed it a natural occurrence.

*“Because very often, and we know this with the phenomenon, for example, Rap or R’n’B, Hip Hop, which are now imposed by means of this publicity, (...). It is a big, it’s a great hazard because now it’ll be a spectacle and, well, it’s not the spectacle of Cape Verdean music and Cape Verdean dance but rather of Hip Hop or, well, of...this type of thing where you do this [note: makes “Hip Hop moves”], it’s already a signal with the clothes and whatnot, it’s already imposed, and this is not just in Cape Verde but all over the world. (...) They’re already singing foreign music (...). They sing in Kriolu, but it is foreign music. Zouk<sup>118</sup> (...) it’s African, there are a lot of countries that have Zouk of similar type (...). (...) but Zouk is not Cape Verdean, we have our music. Any many people already think that Zouk is Cape Verdean. Because they sing it in Kriolu. Also, Reggae is not Cape Verdean. They have their own identity, they have their own country. (...) it cannot be Cape Verdean music” (Interview C8).*

*“This identity doesn’t change. It simply adapts itself to the evolution of times. Because identity is a product of the feeling of ownership. (...) And adolescents perceive themselves as Cape Verdeans. Only that they cannot be the Cape Verdeans of the past century when they are in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, can they? (...) And today with the constant change...where globalization, the “mondialisation” is stronger each time...well, this experience tends to be of a different kind” (Interview C11).*

To sum up, it can be noted that globalization and the growth – and augmenting use – of the Internet has unquestionably affected the way young Cape Verdeans perceive themselves and what they identify with – similar to what is happening globally in differing degrees and intensities.

### **6.1.1.3. Migration**

Furthermore, the perception of a Cape Verdean “cultural” or “national” identity is intertwined with the country’s lack of natural resources and droughts, and thus its history of emigration. *“Since migration is an intrinsic part of Cape Verdean identity, these migrant[s] (...) have come to play the role of cultural heroes”* (Carling et al. 2008: 21). Not only do Cape Verdeans

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<sup>118</sup> For more information regarding *Zouk*, see Hoffman JoAnne: Diasporic Networks, Political Change, and the Growth of Cabo-Zouk Music. In: Batalha, Luís; Carling, Jorgen [ed.] (2008): Transnational Archipelago. Perspectives on Cape Verdean Migration and Diaspora. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 205-220.

somewhat identify with the country's main migration destinations<sup>119</sup> but (and this is perhaps even more important) emigration is seen as the primary goal in life by a large majority, which leads to its inclusion in everyday actions, decisions, and representations. During an introduction game at a local children- and youth center, where everybody had to say their name, likes, and dislikes, an overwhelming majority of the elementary school children stated that they would like to emigrate but did not have the conditions to do so<sup>120</sup>.

*“In Cape Verde, the past is imbued with leave-takings and departures. The history of constant out-migration deeply affects the way people look upon themselves and their nation. Each successive generation grows up seeing mobility as an intrinsic part of life, and leaving family and homeland for another country is portrayed as an inevitable component of Cape Verdean life. (...) The idea that migration is a destiny that unites the Cape Verdean people is widespread. (...) the culture of migration in Cape Verde is integrated into processes of identification. (...) Mobility is, simply put, an intrinsic part of both identity constructions and everyday practices”* (Akesson 2008: 279, 281f.).

According to more or less recent statistics, the percentage of people who wish to emigrate is still relatively high at about 56 percent<sup>121</sup>. Surprisingly, however, all of the interviewed students (except for C3, who wished to return to Angola because he felt that he had more opportunities there) declared that they did not wish to emigrate – they could imagine traveling or perhaps even studying abroad, but they wanted to return and live in Cape Verde.

*“I’ll go to get my Master in...outside. (...) Come back for work. When I get my Master I will finish and move to my country. In order to increase. To work. Because people go to study, they will forget their country. So your country will fall down, will never increase. Every time they say our country is going down. But if everybody come to work for this place, this place will be well known from every corner of the world”* (Interview C1).

*“I...well...I would like to travel but leave Cape Verde, no. I’d like to...go and come back but never leave Cape Verde”* (Interview C5).

*“Europe, I don’t know why all Cape Verdeans have the ambition to go to Europe. I don’t know why. But all Cape Verdeans have the ambition to go to Europe. I have it, but only to travel. Now, to work or...stay there, no. (...) Cape Verde. Yes, to travel, get to know it, that could be it but to stay there, no. (...) Yes, my future [is] in Cape Verde. (...) Life here is easier. (...) Here, life is easier than in Europe”* (Interview C7).

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<sup>119</sup> This includes music and sports, in particular.

<sup>120</sup> “*Quero emigrar mas não tenho condição*”.

<sup>121</sup> cf. IEFPP (Instituto do Emprego e Formação Profissional): Observatório de Migrações e Emprego. 2002. <http://www.iefp.cv/>. [Access: 17.05.2011]

*“I...every project in my life is to stay in Cape Verde. I’d like to...travel, grow, mature, but reside in Santo Antão. Because – because it’s a calmer place there. And the contact with nature is more. (...) Countries that I would like to visit: Japan, China – (...) the monasteries, learn the philosophy, experience all this richness (...). Another place that I’d like to...be in the country, (...) like Germany in order to feel innovation itself (...). (...) Live in Cape Verde, yes” (Interview C10).*

It is important to interpret these statements with caution. It is (statistically) rather unlikely that all of the interviewees will actually stay in Cape Verde and continue their lives there. This is not to imply that the students did not tell the truth. Instead, I want to suggest that due to the recent “development” and the international praise of Cape Verde as “Africa’s success story”, many Cape Verdeans feel enthusiastic and optimistic regarding the country’s future. The expedient “emigration” is rejected in most cases but actual emigration has not come to an end and will not do so any time soon, as unemployment rates and poverty are still very high.

Nonetheless, it is indisputable that the increased interaction through and access to the Internet has led to a change in the view of (e)migration. The migration tradition is being challenged by the growing awareness that foreign – especially European – countries are not a “paradise” where everything grows on trees and where all dreams come true. This new attitude is often expressed by young people when they talk about their future. As Akesson (2008) ascertains, *“it has become common to call migration ‘an illusion’ (...)”* (Akesson 2008: 271). The newly prevalent idea is that the traditional image of foreign countries is both naïve, illusory, and influenced by returning migrants, who want to reinforce their own status. Many students referred to their negative perception of life abroad and mentioned aspects such as racism or unemployment as part of the daily routine overseas.

*“They go to Portugal...nowadays. From studying. But I don’t think it’s good, you know. (...) When you go, some will go to bad life, women go to prostitution, men drink, go to work as a slave...you know. Day by night, so it come hard” (Interview C1).*

*“Cape Verdeans think...that it’s easier. (...) No. I don’t think that living in Portugal is easier than living in Cape Verde. Me! I live calmly... (...) For example, I have a friend in Portugal who...he wants to return home but he doesn’t manage to. He doesn’t manage to because life or living in Portugal is very expensive. Very expensive so he doesn’t even manage to buy a return ticket. (...) They work...more than 12 hours (...). Every day, the work during the day, during the night, until dawn, they work...This is no life, I believe” (Interview C4).*

*“Here, life is easier than in Europe. (...) it must be more difficult there, I don’t know. It must also be more lucrative, right? Because...many Cape Verdeans emigrate to Europe and come*

*back with better living conditions, they build their houses, come with their cars, well. It must be more lucrative but it must also be more suffering. Because here in Cape Verde, life is...well...I'm not going to say that there are no people who go hungry here. People go hungry in every country. But in Cape Verde, people give. Give, give food. (...) Here, you feel...well...I can't say...well, here people have amity, everything is passed on. Cape Verde – the island of Santiago, I don't know the other islands – everything is passed on, you go to your neighbor's house: Lend me...do you do this in Europe?" (Interview C7).*

*"For example, people from Portugal (...), here in Cape Verde we treat them in a better way (...). But if we Cape Verdeans go to Europe, we are treated in the worst way, so...because of our skin color" (Interview C14).*

*"They [note: Whites] are treated very well in our country. And we...I don't think that we are treated very well in their countries. We're discriminated. And usually...sometimes we're even discriminated in our own country because of them. Because of the Whites" (Interview C12).*

These statements are representative of the change in the representation and perception of foreign countries. Many of the interviewees elaborated that they had all of this information from regular contact with relatives and friends living in the diaspora, as well as from the increased availability of world news. Thus, the importance of cheap, fast, and reliable telecommunications is made clear in this context. Today, the intensified global interconnectedness – as a result of globalization – makes it easier for those still living in Cape Verde to gain a differentiated and more nuanced understanding of how emigrants live abroad. Consequently, there is an increasing acknowledgement of the fact that migrants also encounter a number of difficulties and obstacles.

Cape Verde is now part of the globalized world and this logically results in a new “openness” of the country. *“Areas formerly isolated from the rest of the archipelago are now in direct contact with the world outside (...)”* (Meintel 2002: 40). The island region is being expanded and Cape Verdeans increasingly identify with places they've never visited – they remain on the islands physically but not mentally. They are not in Lisbon, Boston or Rotterdam but they are somehow tied and anchored to these places. *“A sort of technologically enabled transnationality is evoked here (...) [which] will allow him to metaphorically go wherever he likes”* (Nakamura 2000: 17). It is a salient point, for example, that many young Cape Verdeans – some of whom have never even left their natal island – have foreign sports teams as their profile picture on hi5 or facebook (these primarily include the *Boston Celtics*, *Benfica Lisbon*, or *Sporting Lisbon*).

Presently, more and more non-Cape Verdean people and commodities enter the country. There are more tourists and imported goods, such as food or clothes, than ever before. As a

result, it can be registered that the Internet – and the media in general – play an important role in this progress. People read about and see pictures of violence, crime, poor living conditions, floods, and earthquakes on the screen and instinctively compare them to life in Cape Verde. When people in Cape Verde speak about what the advantages of their country they usually mention their hospitality, their weather and beaches, and their lack of involvement in wars.

*“Because Cape Verde nowadays is increasing, politically. Because considering in the whole the Africa we are well than anybody, more peaceful. (...) Yes, because we don’t have fight – it’s all. Because we are peaceful” (Interview C1).*

*“[In Cape Verde], I like...the ambience, this...familiarity (...). For example, abroad...well...they say that the people are more...well, more towards work, these kinds of things. (...) The food. Peace too, there is no war here. There are no catastrophes. There are not these...well, these...horrible accidents (...). These assassinations, they don’t exist here. It’s already a bit easier like this. Even if we’re poor here but these things don’t exist” (Interview C6).*

In addition, the vast expansion of the school system in Cape Verde since independence was extremely relevant to the modification of people’s understandings of the “outside world” and the conditions of those who emigrate. Even among those who have never left their native island, the idea of magic foreign countries, where everything is possible, is disappearing. In the wake of their increased understanding, life abroad appears less glamorous and paradise-like today. It seems as if people are eventually becoming at least partially disenchanted with the “glorious West”. Nowadays, people see opportunities and possibilities in their country where they used to only see them abroad.

## **6.2. “European” vs. “African”**

As mentioned before, the consciousness of a racialized dualism within the Cape Verdean community has resulted in the maintenance of a certain degree of socioeconomic stratification – even in the postcolonial context. Throughout history, some segments of the Cape Verdean society have been able to cope well with their own position in the light of “negative” colonial images of Africa or “Africanity” and European racism. Consequently, some Cape Verdeans do not – to some degree – accept the social and political role African populations played in the emergence of the Cape Verdean society (cf. Lobban 1995: 57f.). In spite of this,

*“after independence, class – which is treated as mutable and potentially controllable by the state and supporting donor agencies alike – is that which is recognized as being at stake; race is effectively blocked from debate” (Fikes 2007: 169).*

In academic literature, too, it is not generally acknowledged that racialized perceptions and tensions exist in Cape Verde:

*“Cape Verde is one of the few countries in Africa to have a homogenous society, free of ethnic competition (...). (...) and absence of discrimination based on colour [sic], race or religion (...). (...) and that the benefits of a nation homogeneous in race may be lost to a nation divided by class” (Baker 2006: 504ff.).*

One of the most striking examples for the variable attitudes regarding the official “national” or “cultural” identity is perhaps the Cape Verdean flag and its modification over time. During and after independence, the country’s “African identity” was of great political relevance. The flag adopted in 1975 exhibited “typically African” colors (red, yellow, and green)<sup>122</sup> and the political and economic alliance with the African continent was emphasized. The first multiparty elections in 1991 were a sign of a political transition, which included – among other things – a reorientation of Cape Verde’s “national” identity. One of the most obvious symbolic changes of the MpD government was the new flag, which was designed in blue, with red and white stripes and a circle of ten yellow stars (representing the islands)<sup>123</sup>. The undeniable resemblance between the new layout and the flag of the European Union and of the United States of America matched the reorientation of Cape Verde’s foreign policy and “development strategies” (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 14f.; Bogdan 2000: 86).

The historically constructed (and racialized) distinction between an “African” and a “European” or “Lusophone” Cape Verde dates from the colonial period. The islands were settled at different points of time and are thus said to have had different influences and histories. According to most sources, Santiago (where about half of the population lives today) was the first island of settlement and consequently the first island to which slaves from the African mainland were transported. The remaining islands were then first and foremost populated by an already “mixed” population from Santiago and by newly arriving European settlers and traders. In São Vicente – the island that is said to be the most different from Santiago –, the great natural harbor in Mindelo became one of the most important coaling stations to international (particularly British) sea liners (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 16).

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<sup>122</sup> See Figure 1 in the Annex, p. 121.

<sup>123</sup> See Figure 2 in the Annex, p. 121.



The differences between the islands are by and large treated as natural and fixed. Up until recently, interactions between the particular islands were rather limited but this has definitely changed since the 1990s. Nonetheless, distinctions are still made with reference to the islands' cultural peculiarities (language variety, music, or dance) as well as their "phenotypic characteristics". While it is generally proclaimed that Cape Verdeans, and therefore *Kabuverdianidade* too, are a product of *mestiçagem* – as mentioned before – the various perceptions of "Africanity" and "Europeanness" or "Lusitanity" are inherent in notions of *Kabuverdianidade* and emerge above all when people speak of the distinct features of the islands and their inhabitants.

The Cape Verdean archipelago is divided into *Barlavento* (Winward Islands, namely Santo Antão, São Vicente, Santa Luzia, São Nicolau, Sal, and Boa Vista), or the Northern islands, and *Sotavento* (Leeward Islands, namely Maio, Santiago, Fogo, and Brava)<sup>124</sup>, or the Southern islands. The *Kriolu* variety of the Northern islands, for instance, is said to be more "Portuguesed" while the variety of the Southern islands is said to be more "African". In terms of cultural traditions, music, or dance, too, the Southern islands are regarded as having retained more of their "African heritage" while the Northern islands experienced a greater degree of European influence.

The evaluation of the interviews revealed that all interviewees attested to differences between the islands – particularly between Santiago, which is usually said to be the most "African island", and São Vicente, the most "European" island – but the majority believed that these differences were in fact decreasing with the increased interaction and exchange between the islands.

*"Kriolu is a bit different [note: on the islands] because they have some words that they use but we don't use them, don't even know them. It's a bit different... (...) well...every island has a culture that they practice more. We here, in Santiago, we practice more Batuku, Funana, on the other island more Tabanca<sup>125</sup> ...well. (...) The clothes, perhaps it's the same. The way we dress here, they dress there as well – it's the same"* (Interview C2).

*"There are differences...be it in physical characteristics, be it in...the way of speaking. Kriolu of São Vicente is not the same as Kriolu from Praia. (...) There are various differences, also in customs, lifestyle habits, there are differences. (...) São Vicente is an island that previously*

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<sup>124</sup> See Figure 3 in the Annex, p. 122.

<sup>125</sup> According to Lobban (1995), "the musical form known as *tabanca* is derived from the *Crioulo* word meaning 'village'. (...) In Cape Verde, the term *tabanca* refers to aspects of the musical and folk life of the rural *badius*. Cape Verdeans also use the term to refer to a processional dance performed at certain festivals (...). During this dance, the participants walk in loose formation throughout the town, singing, clapping, and dancing to the accompaniment of drums, conches, and whistles" (Lobban 1995: 77).

*attracted many tourists and...from this history of São Vicente – it's an island that always had ships there. (...) from Holland, Germany, Brazil...and these seafarers that came, they began to have relationships with Cape Verdean women. (...) people with different characteristics. Cape Verdeans with blue eyes, Cape Verdeans with your skin, they speak Kriolu but they have ancestors from Germany, from Holland, other places” (Interview C3).*

*“Now we are in times of a globalized world. The clothing labels are the same. The ways of dressing are the same, the influences (...). In Sal, you can find African-Americans, people who dress...Rockstar...you can find various types of...also here in Santiago, the same is happening. Only that before we were more remote, previously. (...) now in the globalized world there are people from the island of Santiago on Sal, there are people from Santiago on Fogo, from Fogo here. (...) In cultural terms, it differs a bit in music. In music and in dance. (...) Profile on the other islands, people have a lighter skin color. (...) Here in Santiago we are a bit more tanned. And on the other islands they have this color [note: points at me]. They have this hair [note: points at me]. So, they compare the hair color, the coloring, the eyes, way of speaking, (...). All of this. They compare and characterize. São Vicente, the Sãovicentians, are more European and we here are more African” (Interview C4).*

*“We all understand it. Everybody has their own accent but we understand. (...) In culture too. Here in Santiago we have a typical dance, for example Batuku. In São Vicente, there is Koladeira. (...) Dance...in general, it's all part of Cape Verde but between the islands, well, dances are different” (Interview C6).*

Young Cape Verdeans feel that the cultural differences in terms of music, dance, or clothes are decreasing in the context of “development” and globalization. In terms of clothes, it can be noted that the style of dress varies throughout Cape Verde and especially by age. While elderly women dress more conservatively, young girls and women wear short skirts, and stylish, fitted shirts. Young men generally wear trendy, sporty clothes, sometimes sent from abroad. While it is thus true that the cultural differences as expressed in clothes, for example, are becoming less important, it is also evident that the racialized differences relating to skin color and its connection to certain stereotypical characteristics continue to play a key role in Cape Verdean identity construction – although it is rarely pronounced explicitly. Also, the linguistic and cultural varieties are still perceived as more or less “African” and “European”, respectively. These imagined distinctions are based on the divergent, contact-dependent developments of the individual islands and are associated with ascriptions and classifications.

*“Santiago is more African because – (...) because there they really have the major African influence. (...) in terms of customs, for example, in terms of...not only by means of the skin color but also in terms of customs. There is, for example, Batuku. It's only danced in Santiago. It's exclusive to Santiago. (...) The garments, the dressing, the use of the Pano. Also purely African,*

*it's not European. (...) That's why these elements, they have much more Africanization there than here. Why is it that São Vicente is considered more European – São Vicente is more European primarily because São Vicente is from the 19<sup>th</sup> century, almost. (...) Thus, as a result, a community formed and a population much more...with a much lighter complexion...and the complexion, the skin is lighter. So they say that essentially...thereafter, it's essentially European because – because the entire history of São Vicente revolved around the harbor. (...) we don't have these things because – because we're from a recent evolution. Like I said, Portugal dealt with the bringing of people with light skin, they wanted to create a light city on São Vicente, a city with light skin. Those in Santiago, on the other hand, experienced a lot of slavery” (Interview C11).*

Aspects such as dance, music, or clothes are wedded to “Africanity” or “Europeanness”. According to these associations, dances with a lot of hip movements, drumming, wearing a cloth around one’s waist, carrying a basket on one’s head, or carrying a child on one’s back are considered as “African”, which is implicitly equated with “traditionalism”, “originality”, and “primitiveness”. According to Fikes (1998), “*under Portuguese colonization the Catholic church banned batuku arguing it was ‘sexually suggestive’*” (Fikes 1998: 12), while Portuguese authorities considered it “too African” and “too primitive” (cf. Lobban 1995: 75).

The data shows that four of the 10 students declared that their cultural identity was closer to a “European” than to an “African” identity, while three stated that they felt more “African” and the remaining three felt “in between”. In terms of physical appearance, however, four of them believed that Cape Verdeans were more “European” while three considered them to look more “African” and the remaining three said that they were “a mixture”.

*“They say that our culture looks like the European culture. So when you go to Africa, you know, it's really...When you go to Africa and come out to Cape Verde, you see that Cape Verde is different from the culture that is in the Africa. From Guinea people, from Muslim people, from Namibia people, Angola people. But you...our style of dressing, our style of speaking, our style of eating seems more like than European people. We cannot deny it because it happens. The Portuguese influence has power here, that's why...that's why we have this influence of European people. But I'm still African because of my color” (Interview C1).*

*“We are closer to Europe. Mmm...in terms of clothing – our clothing is not similar to the one in Africa at all. In terms of clothing we are similar to Europe. (...) With regard to physical appearance we are similar...there is a part that is similar to Africa, there is a part that is similar to Europe” (Interview C2).*

*“In cultural terms...even our thought, closer to Europe than to Africa. The main part of...of our daily routine is European. You know that there are Africans that come from their...in other words, from their origin...it’s different from...here, too, we say that we’re not Africans. We’re on the coast of Africa, Cape Verde, many people might not understand. It’s closer to Europe up to...clothes, dressing, up to music. We prefer to listen more to Europe than to our own Africa”* (Interview C7).

*“I identify myself as a mestizo. As we say, this mixing, that we come from the African and from the Portuguese. (...) I think I’m not only African and not only European either. I am both sides (...). I don’t consider myself only European, I’m not white. I don’t have...not completely black either. I think that...I’d say an African person, but to say I’m only African, that I’m purely African, no. But if you asked me I’d say African. But I have both”* (Interview C6).

This demonstrates that – albeit identifying with both Africa and Europe – many young Cape Verdeans indeed no longer view “Africanity” as something to reject but nonetheless prefer to be recognized as “different” from the rest of Africa. Within the assumption of a “mixed” identity there are nevertheless always contradictions and juxtapositions regarding the closeness to Africa or Europe. To take pride in one’s “Africanity” or one’s “African roots” is usually accompanied by romanticizations and references to a connectedness in terms of struggle, colonialism, or oppression. Furthermore, this “solidarity” of the younger generation is also related to a greater knowledge of movements such as Pan-Africanism and of the difficulties immigrants face in “the North”, and an increasing identification with diaspora communities and African-American music or fashion. All of this is related to the growing global interaction and the general trends of globalization. Overall, however, it is still more or less frowned upon to refer to Cape Verdeans as “Africans”. And among young Cape Verdean students too, one might encounter people who deny any resemblance to “Africans” whatsoever. During a night out with a group of students in Mindelo, for example, one of the students – who was rather dark-skinned himself – remarked that he did not like “Africans” because they were “backwards”.

### **6.2.1. Badiu & Sanpadjudu<sup>126</sup>**

The attitudes with regard to who and what, respectively, is more “African” and “European” find their strongest expression in the differentiation between *Badiu* and *Sanpadjudu* (which

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<sup>126</sup> The styles of writing this term range from *Sanpadjudu*, *Sampadjudu*, or *Sampadjudo* in literature and in Cape Verde itself.

are both self-ascriptions and ascriptions by / to others). These designations have their origins in Portuguese colonial rule and its racist system of classification. It is widely acknowledged that freed slaves or runaways, who had escaped into the interior mountainous regions of Santiago, were labeled as “vadios” (the Portuguese word for “vagabonds” or “bummers”), which later turned into *Badius*. Popular narratives of Badiu identity are connected with fantastic stories of resistance and vulgarity. As Fikes (2007) outlines,

*“(…) stories of trickery, aggression, and violence commonly characterized ‘Badiu’ revolts. (…)* Moreover, the politicized participation and leadership of women in rebellions further served the purpose of representing Santiaguense as savages (...). (...) Gendered representations of Santiaguense identity as ‘Negro’ and aggressive were essential to discursively discerning ‘mestiço’ from ‘Negro’ identity. (...) Thus, as ‘mestiço’ identity was imaginatively constitutive of ideas of mutability, Badiu identity controlled Santiago by ‘blackening’ it” (Fikes 2007: 171).

Today, the term is theoretically applied to all inhabitants of Santiago. In fact, however, “real” Badiu are identified as being from the interior. *Badius* are still said to have retained a certain degree of “African” cultural distinctiveness in their customs, practices, and language variety. *Sanpadjudu* refers primarily to those who reside on the *Barlavento* islands but may also include residents of Fogo and Brava. It is unknown exactly what the term derives from; some believe that it comes from “são para ajudar” (“they are for helping”) or that it is connected to their work with “palha” (straw). While the term *Badiu* is associated with various aspects this does not apply to the term *Sanpadjudu*, which is simply attached to a lighter skin color and a certain cultural proximity to Europe. This notion of proximity to Europe and the greater degree of “Europeanness” is linked to the naturalness with which these concepts are equated with “civilization” and “Western” moral values.

It is possible to speak of conflicts or rivalry in Cape Verde in the context of the distinction between *Badiu* and *Sanpadjudu*, although most Cape Verdeans label it as “Bairrismo”<sup>127</sup>. They deny that this has anything to do with skin color or racialized perceptions, while only a minority actually speaks of racism.

*“Bairrismo, not racism. (...) Bairrismo is like...you are from Austria, you have a region, you are from the South of Austria. It’s just an example. And those who come from the North...there is always a rivalry. (...) but it’s not a strong racism. It’s more irrelevant. But one always has to defend that, for example, we have many...here in São Vicente and Praia is a lot of rivalry. Soccer, music, these things”* (Interview C10).

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<sup>127</sup> “Bairrismo” can be translated as “localism” or “local patriotism”.

*“Sanpadjudu is everyone who is not Badiu. It’s the foreign land. Sanpadjudu is the strange, it’s the foreigner. In fact, I go to Santiago, I am Sanpadjudu. (...) You are foreign. You are Sanpadjudu. (...) It’s a term of negation. It’s a term, let’s say, of... (...) there is a type of xenophobia, let’s say. It’s a type of xenophobia because when is this expression used – this expression is used very often with a sense of observing...and hence a pejorative sense. So, it has a bit of xenophobia – you are not from here. (...) And Badiu is also used, it means that – you are a descendant from slaves” (Interview C11).*

It is undeniable, however, that one notices differences when travelling, for instance, both to Santiago and São Vicente. On São Vicente, the lighter complexions, the more “Portuguese” *Kriolu*, the smaller and cleaner streets, the art galleries and studios, the Irish Pubs, and the alamedas indicate the more “European” aspect of the Northern islands. In contrast, the darker complexions, the less “Portuguese” *Kriolu*, the more chaotic and noisy traffic, the squalid streets, the stray dogs, or women wearing baskets on their heads allegedly denote the “Africanity” that lingered on the Southern islands, primarily on Santiago. Women on both islands try to straighten their hair but on Santiago, one sees a lot more women with a headdress to conceal their frizzy hair. Many Cape Verdeans say that people from São Vicente look down on people from Santiago, that they are supercilious and think that they are better because they are “whiter” and that they are more intelligent because they had more intimate contact with Europeans. People from Santiago (*Badius*), on the other hand, often emphasize that “their culture” and “their *Kriolu*” are more authentically Cape Verdean as they are “more original and older”. These firmly established stereotypes are rooted in the very origins of the names *Badiu* and *Sanpadjudu* – although most interviewees assured that “we are all Cape Verdeans”. As one student explains,

*“Yeah, sometimes we have a problem with each other. We say...they say ‘Badiu – pé rachado’. If you...foot... ‘rachado’, if you been cut. But it not has a sense. Just to play with them...with us. We say ‘Sanpadjudu – barriga batata’. Barriga – belly. Batata – potato. Barriga batata. It’s like a joke, you know. (...) the slavery was different there. The world was different, they had a...they made a change. Is long time ago, we didn’t wear shoes. (...) So, we say it for joke. I don’t...we don’t have a reason. (...) As a joke. Sometimes it provokes fight”<sup>128</sup> (Interview C1).*

Most Cape Verdeans assure that the two designations used to have a negative meaning but that they are generally used to tease each other or to distinguish between the language varieties nowadays. Still, they continue to be a symbol of the racialized attributions,

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<sup>128</sup> The English translation of “Badiu – pé rachado, Sanpadjudu – barriga batata” is “Badiu with cracked feet, Sanpadjudu with potato bellies”.

indicating that *Badius* are primitive and backward while *Sanpadjudus* are spoilt and greedy. While many young *Badius* often use this term with pride for those on the islands and in the diaspora, it continues to be used as a derogatory designation by some and often finds a use with reference to criminality or “civilization”. It was striking that the overwhelming majority of people on São Vicente with whom I had informal conversations (most of them were between 30 and 50 years old) professed that they had no interest in ever travelling to Santiago. Surprisingly, they generally tended to equate Santiago with Praia and hence associated it with dirt, crime, and chaos.

As Santiago is said to be the most “African” island of the archipelago and São Vicente the most “European” one (and the “cultural center”), it is possible to deduce from comments on *Badiu* and *Sanpadjudu* language or culture, respectively, what is perceived as “African” or “European”.

*“What I’m trying to say is that...on the island of Santiago, we say Badiu. It’s a Creole language. Within Kriolu we can divide into Sanpadjudu and Badiu. In the Sotavento we can find Sanpadjudu, it’s the more Portuguesed language, more sophisticated, (...) it’s the smoother language, gentler. (...) Badiu is rougher, more aggressive (...). Badiu...it’s the way of speaking, the way of dressing, the way of socializing with people. (...) Badiu, for example, they think that Badiu is more aggressive, more aggressive by nature. (...) So much that a Badiu here and a Sanpadjudu there don’t mix a lot. Sanpadjudu is more scared that the Badiu is aggressive (...). Sanpadjudu is gentler, mellower, more amicable (...)” (Interview C4).*

*“Badiu was because...the Badiu was more terrible, was more terrible and had, well...didn’t, well, take all the suggestions from the Portuguese, not even...in other words. And now, Sanpadjudu...liked to carry ‘palhas’<sup>129</sup>. They gave them...them the name Palhudus (...). The very characteristics of the people show a difference between the island of Santiago and the island of Boa Vista, or for example São Vicente. (...) Sanpadjudu, when they use the expression Badiu, it was a bit of contempt. Yes, in relation to...and also vice versa. For example, I live together with a person here, we don’t know that she’s not from the island of Santiago. And we say it like this, in Kriolu – look, that Sanpadjudu there” (Interview C7).*

I thus argue that the perceptions in terms of “African” and “European” are still racialized. This racialization manifests itself in the associations of “African” with “backwardness”, “savagery”, or “aggressiveness” and “European” with “modernity” or “civilization”. The different spheres ascribed to Portuguese (the language of business, politics, education, and government) and *Kriolu* (the language of daily life, jokes, songs, proverbs, feelings, and emotions) are already characteristic of this racialization. As one professor confirmed,

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<sup>129</sup> Straw

*“One of the forms of expression of this perception of difference can be found, for example, in some activities, for example sportive, that oppose the two groups. Such as in soccer games. The soccer teams...for example, of Praia and of São Vicente, when they meet, it’s all a climate of tension. And the use of expressions, as well as aggressiveness that is extremely strong and that very often borders on a certain racism. (...) Very often they are racialized. Although people don’t say so but there is a racial component in this phenomenon. Such as...and you can find it, for example in other forms. Well, when violence happens, hence...in some... (...) so later you connote a) it was a Badiu, right...meanwhile, there is almost a direct emotion. When there’s violence, it’s clear – it’s a Badiu” (Interview C13).*

In this regard, it must be recapitulated that this perception of difference is generally modifying itself among young Cape Verdeans. Due to the increased interaction, integration, and exchange between the islands and with the “outside world”, the conflict potential tends to decline. The aforementioned increase in inter-island migration brings *Badius* and *Sanpadjudus* – the younger generation in particular – into closer contact with each other, which may reduce certain tensions. This tendency not only results from another generation per se but also has to do with the current phase of globalization and openness. Yet, racialized perceptions continue to exist and manifest themselves in the changes in identity construction within the younger generation.

### **6.2.2. Mandjaku**<sup>130</sup>

Another important aspect that plays a vital role in relation to identity construction and racialized perceptions of “African” and “European” is the increasing immigration of continental Africans to Cape Verde. This immigration is becoming a contested issue as more and more workers enter the country and “*according to popular opinion, work for lower rates than Cape Verdeans*” (Baker 2006: 503). According to statistics, the number of African immigrants increased especially after Cape Verde’s accession to the ECOWAS, which includes a protocol on the free movements of people (cf. Carling et al. 2008: 15). African immigrants constitute the largest group of current immigrants, namely 71.7 percent. Of these, about 60 percent are from West Africa (most of them from Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Nigeria) and 8.4 percent from PALOP countries (cf. Instituto Nacional de Estatística Cabo

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<sup>130</sup> “Mandjaku“ is the predominant Cape Verdean spelling but one can also find uses of “Mandjako“ or “Manjaco“.



Verde (INE) 2010). Few of them – those with a high level of education – find jobs in the Cape Verdean formal labor market while the majority works in the informal sector, selling sunglasses, cellphones, and “African arts and crafts” on the sides of the road or at the markets of *Sucupira* in the center of Praia.

The presence of African immigrants is looked upon rather ambivalently. The data shows that the majority of the interviewees considered the growing immigration as a positive process. At the same time, they admitted that the numbers were growing too fast and that there were difficulties, tensions and discrimination.

*“Too much. Too much. People are coming here. From Africa. Every day. (...) To live. They come, they have their own plan. Maybe they came, from Africa people, to get a Cape Verdean citizens in order to get visa – is more easy for them to go outside. (...) More and more are coming. They will struggle their life in the beach. They will build the big boats. They will sleep...10, 12, without eating for a week. (...) they are here because they don’t have a chance. But I think if they had chance they would leave here. I think so. I don’t think they want to do the life they are doing here. Selling things on shoulders. The money is not enough to eat. Sometimes some of them live in the worst condition. (...) Sometimes. For example, they say that the Nigerian people and the others, they will bring drugs from here. (...) So when they bring drugs the young people will use drugs. (...) There are many problems. (...) So sometimes bring troubles, sometimes brings benefits. The both sides. (...) Benefits...a new culture. They will come with a new perspective” (Interview C1).*

*“There are many. (...) Now, many more than before. (...) I don’t know...here, we have more conditions, they come to work here in order to send to their countries. (...) We hardly associate with them” (Interview C2).*

*“I think that Cape Verdeans don’t feel very well when they see the people come here and look for...the life – they come...come to work. They think that they will occupy their place. (...) Those from Guinea, Senegal, those from Africa who come to work here are marginalized and are treated differently – they are treated like people of lower standard. Proper Cape Verdeans do this. It’s already showing a lot...and I associate this very much with racism. It may be that it’s not actually racism, it may be that it’s prejudice” (Interview C3).*

The racialization and construction of the “Other” is clearly discernable in the discussions of African immigration and in the appraisal of African immigrants. All African immigrants are labeled as *Mandjakus*<sup>131</sup> or sometimes – more recently – as *Amigos*<sup>132</sup> by Cape Verdeans.

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<sup>131</sup> *Mandjaku* (or *Mandjako* or *Manjaco*) is an ethnicity and language from Guinea-Bissau. “According to the slave registers from 1526 to 1550 (...), the majority of slaves [in Cape Verde] were from the peoples of Senegambia (...), and Guinea-Bissau (...). These registers list such coastal Senegambians as the Bagas, Baiotes,

Thus, they are constructed and viewed as a homogeneous group. *Mandjakus* are conceived and imagined as one (racialized) category of people (cf. Rocha 2009: 112f.). It is widely recognized – and at times respected – that “*they do not like being called that way*” (all interviewees uttered this). Consequently, many Cape Verdeans have now switched to calling them *Amigos*, which is seen as nicer, friendlier, and less pejorative. It was not acknowledged by anyone (except for C13) that this “new” designation is ultimately a mere semantic shift. Calling them *Amigo* still displays

*“a denotation of difference and the making of a point of separation. This...well...the exercise of reinforcement of an identitarian specificity so that...again, the negation of the Other. Of an Other that is referenced to in any way. So this is what...a side of history – you negate this and you overrate another...in the case, there is the entire excursion of the reassurance of the European matrix”* (Interview C13).

By implication, the ever-increasing immigration of Africans from the mainland and the imposed label *Mandjaku* for all of them is conducive to the increase in racialized perceptions and in the role skin color and other physical characteristics play in contemporary Cape Verde. The racialized perceptions are evident and manifest themselves in interviews, casual conversations, and everyday situations. At one time, for instance, I was sitting on the main square in a village of Santiago with a group of people when a (perhaps drunk) man walked by and started to flirt with a woman. She politely told him that she was not interested but he insisted, complained and assured that “*I’m not a Mandjaku, I’m Cape Verdean*”<sup>133</sup>. And another time, a local friend on Santiago wanted to order *Grogu*<sup>134</sup> on a square but the waitress told him to come inside and get it in the bar. He immediately opined that she would not bring his drink to him because he was so “*preto*”<sup>135</sup>. I went inside to get my own drink and the waitress handed me the *Grogu*, telling me to give it to the “*preto*”.

While all interviewees (as already mentioned) agreed that they opposed the discrimination and mistreatment of African immigrants, they nonetheless voiced and reproduced stereotypical, racialized perceptions and characterizations of “the Africans”.

*“We misjudge the culture of our African friends and we misjudge the lifestyle, we misjudge the way of eating, we misjudge every type of handling that our friends use. So, what happens? (...)  
We socialize with them and we don’t like the way they eat, we don’t like the way they dress, we*

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*Balantas, Banhuns, Beafadas, Bololas, Brames, Cassangas, Cobianas, Diolas, Felupes, Manjacos, Nalus, Papels, Qissis, Susus, and Tandas (...)* (Lobban 1995: 69, my emphasis)

<sup>132</sup> Friends

<sup>133</sup> “*N ka e Manjdaku, ami e kabuverdianu*”.

<sup>134</sup> *Grogu* or *Grogue* is a Cape Verdean alcoholic beverage made from sugarcane.

<sup>135</sup> Black

*don't like...well (...). So that very often they are called names that are not pleasant. (...) Mandjaku (...) is a vicious ethnicity, it's a despised ethnicity, it is an ethnicity less – disproportionately – less favored. (...) We call them Mandjaku. Very often they're not Mandjaku. Very often they're not from this malicious ethnicity, very often they're good people, they're working people, they're friendly people” (Interview C4)<sup>136</sup>.*

*“For example, I think that the Africans from the Coast...the Africans from inside of Africa, well, in Ivory Coast, Mali, they're not like us in terms of culture. (...) we are closer to...because, well...in the way of dressing, so... (...) these Africans that live inside of...they have a different manner. For example, they eat with their hands – we eat with the spoon, similar to the Portuguese. We wear these clothes, they wear them too. But the Africans who...inside of Africa (...) sometimes...in these tribes, they don't dress. They stay almost naked” (Interview C6).*

*“They cause some problems, yes, with...in terms of...I can give an example from Boa Vista, which is normally...the inhabitants...they don't usually like to rent their houses...to the Africans because they're a bit...well...they don't clean their houses, for example, and they destroy the houses and don't...well (...) And thus they turn them into...how do you say...barracks. (...) It's good [note: the relationship] as long as they come in peace and don't...don't harm anyone” (Interview C12).*

This racialization and (re)construction of a homogeneous Other, which find expression in the label *Mandjaku* (and *Amigo*, respectively) or *Negro*<sup>137</sup>, are another indication of the aforementioned “social or identitarian schizophrenia”. It seems that the intercultural dynamics that result from the presence of continental Africans lead to the emergence of behaviors that rest upon the racialized differentiation and refer a certain social / identitarian schizophrenia. The newly constructed “African identity” (*Mandjakus*) is prescribed by Cape Verdeans with reference to the immigrants and – for the most part – not assumed by the latter. This imposed identity may result from a (to this day) supposed superiority of Cape Verdeans based on their “mixed character”. In this case, the dimension of “race” emerges as an essential category and permits the recognition of difference and the inculcation of stigmas and attributes. Ethnic and racial categories are superimposed and made synonymous with the purpose of homogenizing the Other in order to reinforce the Self. The ethnic category *Mandjaku* is transformed into an

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<sup>136</sup> In the original, C4 said “*desconhecemos a cultura de nossos amigos africanos e desconhecemos a maneira de viver, desconhecemos a maneira de comer, desconhecemos toda forma de manejar que os nossos amigos utilizam. Então, o que acontece? (...) relacionamos com eles e não gostamos da maneira que eles comem, não gostamos a maneira que eles vestem, não gostamos...então (...). Então, tanto que muitas vezes eles são chamados pelos nomes que não são agradavel. (...) Mandjaku (...) é uma étnia mau, é uma étnia desprezado, é uma étnia menos – desproporcionalmente – menos favorizado. (...) Chamamos de Mandjaku. Muitas vezes não são Mandjaku. Muitas vezes não são daquela étnia maligna, muitas vezes são pessoas ótimas, são pessoas trabalhadores, são pessoas amigavel”.*

<sup>137</sup> Black (compared with “preto“, “negro“ is commonly perceived as the more derogatory and pejorative term).

identitarian “racial marker”, which turns all continental “black Africans” into an ethnically uniform group in spite of their diversity and negates any “Africanity” of the Cape Verdean society.

As previously noted, the growing presence of immigrants from the African mainland – and their overall subsumption as *Mandjakus* – gives rise to a greater importance of skin color and other physical characteristics, which are, by implication, attached to racialized perceptions and stereotypical images. Cape Verdeans with a lighter skin color or other “European” characteristics (such as lighter hair or blue eyes), for example, are referred to as “*brancos*”<sup>138</sup> (it is generally not a new phenomenon, however, that more “European looking” Cape Verdeans are given a different name). And – as one professor pointed out – the designation *Mandjaku* is starting to be applied to people who are not necessarily African immigrants but who look a certain way.

*“In fact, it’s funny for them – there’s a thing that I...an African from the continent said that, so...he was talking to a Badiu, those who are called Mandjaku say: Yes, I’m Mandjaku but on São Vicente we’re both Mandjakus. To show that on São Vicente it is not used as a form to: He is an African from the continent, but it’s a shocking way of referring to people” (Interview C11, my emphasis).*

Immigration of continental Africans is likely to surge even more over the next few years. Correspondingly, it is highly probable that the relationship between the arriving immigrants and the Cape Verdean population will continue to be rather ambivalent. There is a great risk that the already severe discrimination will worsen further if no counter-measures are adopted. With an ever-augmenting number of African immigrants present in Cape Verde, however, the debates regarding the country’s “cultural” or “national” identity and the internal relations will have to be rethought.

### **6.2.3. “Development” = ?**

The recent process of “development” and the era of globalization have not passed by the Cape Verdean society without leaving some marks. The pertinent consequences in terms of identity construction are most visible with young Cape Verdeans, who – for the most part – have more access to “development” and globalization and their instruments, respectively, in comparison

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<sup>138</sup> Whites

to older generations. The assessment of what “development” is and of who can be seen as “developed” play a vital role in this context.

The data reveals that all interviewed students without exception and most interviewed professors associated the concept of “development” and “developed” with Europe or “Europeanness”. Regardless of whether or not this is connected to identity markers such as music, language, or clothing, the younger generation’s self-expression and representation outwards is shaped by this assessment. Europe or “Europeanness” is linked with ideas of “modernity”, “organization”, “progress” (the establishment of universities or airports, for instance) or “governmental stability” which are all seen as requirements for “development”. And since Cape Verde is considered to be one of the few African countries where these things are actually happening, it is usually assessed as one of the most – if not *the* most – “developed” countries in Africa.

*“(…) as a more free people and a well organized and a well government in Africa continent. (...) It’s better. It’s well government than every country in Africa. Some country are richer than us, for example South Africa, Angola...But in South Africa, the corruption there, incredible”* (Interview C1).

*“It’s development because...before, Cape Verde didn’t have...I think university, well. International airport...we didn’t have many and now on almost every island there’s an international airport. Schools too, there are many schools now, high schools, they didn’t exist before. I think it’s the development. (...) It means...I think that, well...Europe is a developed country. So, if you go there, you have more opportunities for example... (...) better living conditions, people live better than here. Totally. They live better. In financial terms”* (Interview C6).

*“After Cape Verdean independence there was a big development. So, since then it has become more and more developed, more alliances, airplane, ship. After independence. And it has improved more and more”* (Interview C9).

Related to the notions of “development” and “developed” and their correlation with “Europeanness” and “Africinity”, it is also possible to use the (imagined) differences between *Badius* and *Sanpajjudus* as a point of reference or as an example, respectively (see citations and remarks in chapter 6.2.1.). Furthermore, in the context of changes in migration attitudes (cf. chapter 6.2.2.) it was significant that all students (with the exception of C3, who wanted to return to Angola) asserted that they did not plan to migrate but instead wanted to live in Cape Verde. Many of them, however, stated that they would like to get their master’s degree abroad or travel in order to experience and learn new things. All of them mentioned Europe

(or Asia, in the case of C10) as the destination of their studies or travels – none of them referred to Africa as a place that they would like to visit in the future.

The appreciations of “culture” and “civilization” are still relevant in Cape Verde today and play a role in the evaluation of what “development” is and of who is capable of participating in this process. In this regard, the racialized perceptions concerning what is “African” (namely inferior, backwards, or primitive) and “European” (namely civilized, modern, and progressive) clearly influence the abovementioned evaluation of “development” mentioned above (cf. Moniz 2009: 29ff.). The majority (including contemporary Cape Verdean writers such as David Hopffer Almada) sees the necessity of a close relationship with Europe and the EU and deems it a prerequisite, enabling “development” and “progress” in Cape Verde (cf. Almada 2006: 42). But Almada, for example, also emphasizes the risks, dangers, and dubiousness of “development” and globalization for the “national, identitarian values” in Cape Verde. He points to the correlation of “development” with “growth”, “progress”, “dependency”, and “underdevelopment” and criticizes the fact that “development” is predominantly – by the government and international institutions in particular – measured in terms of economic growth and profitability (cf. Almada 2006: 115, 152f.). It is obvious, however, that the official position of the government values the alignment with Europe and the orientation of the “cultural” or “national” identity towards a “Europeanness”, considering it to be essential to the country’s advancement. Cape Verde’s boom approximates the “European way”, as is evident from the layout of the flag or in the country’s ambition to become a member of the European Union.

Cape Verdean adolescents are increasingly involved in transnational practices, networking, and global exchange. The Internet as an instrument of “development” and globalization has facilitated their access to the “outside” and has – among other things – contributed to the modification in identity construction and self-representation<sup>139</sup>. All of the students interviewed declared that they used the Internet fairly regularly or almost every day to do research for their courses or to read the news online. Eight of them stated that they also used the Internet to stay in touch with friends and to communicate with those living abroad while two said that they did not use the Internet as a means of communication (i.e. chats, blogs,

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<sup>139</sup> It is important to point out that this is phenomenon is not unique to Cape Verdean but is occurring – in various dimensions, rates, and intensities – in most parts of the world. Many theorists argue that online environments facilitate the fragmentation of identity. *“To have a virtual presence means deliberately constructing an identity for yourself, whether it is choosing an e-mail name, putting together a webpage, designing a graphical avatar, or creating a nickname for a chat room or virtual world. Within such a constructivist environment, the construction of identity becomes even more important”* (Kolko et al. 2000: 6).

Facebook, or hi5). As mentioned before, the main language of communication on the Internet is *Kriolu*<sup>140</sup>. When browsing through Internet sites, one can find an enormous quantity of news-sites, blogs and profiles in social networks (facebook, hi5) by – primarily younger – Cape Verdeans. People discuss everyday topics as well as political and social issues, exchange gossip, or simply post lyrics and pictures. As one interviewee put it,

*“I chat with those that are outside and facebook, hi5. I also read the news on sapo.cv, they have a free journal and everything. Sometimes I search for some things. (...) Out there, I talk with friends, family...we chat, ask how things go. News, what’s going on here, what’s going on there. These kinds of things”* (Interview C2).

Another explained that

*“I think that the Internet today is the center. It’s the whole globalization. (...) More than communication. A medium to...to be. It’s another virtual life. Internet today is a means of being. (...) It’s something very useful”* (Interview C3).

“Western” ideals of beauty are of concern to – primarily younger – Cape Verdeans, both female and male. Here, the dissemination of Internet access and other media (television or advertising) comes into effect. Adolescents largely have access to globalized (and racialized) images of “beauty” and “success” – even the “lower class” or people who do not own a computer or a television can access these images indirectly through friends or public display. Subsequently, young Cape Verdeans are strongly influenced by the media and by popular culture from other countries (particularly African-American fashion or music and sports)<sup>141</sup>. Fashion and clothes plays a vital role for self-expression and self-representation, above all. As Crane (2000) writes,

*“clothing, as one of the most visible forms of consumption, performs a major role in the social construction of identity. Clothing choices provide an excellent field for studying how people interpret a specific form of culture for their own purposes, one that includes strong norms about appropriate appearances at a particular point in time (...)”* (Crane 2000: 1).

Clothing – and fashion (including consumer goods) in general – is used to either blend in or to stand out, and is a means of distinguishing groups according to age, gender, class, or “race”.

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<sup>140</sup> In a world where most international communication is conducted in English, this is an interesting phenomenon. Through their choice of language people continuously (re)make who they are and assert (certain aspects) of their identity.

<sup>141</sup> Many also cited Brazil (i.e. music and *telenovelas*, meaning Brazilian soap operas) as an important source for identification.

Many feminists assert that media images of women are always directed at men. They regard hegemonic femininity as incorporating masculine standards for female appearance that accentuate physical attributes and sexuality. Public images (advertisements or fashion photography) that display this hegemonic femininity present women in sexualized and demeaning poses (cf. Crane 2000: 205). This is observable when examining profile pictures on social networks, for example, where most Cape Verdean girls or young women pose playfully, dressed in short skirts and tight shirts. Boys or young men, on the other hand, present themselves in “cool postures” or “Gangster pose”<sup>142</sup>, wearing athletic clothes and sunglasses.

Fashion is no longer restricted to certain spaces. The emergence of powerful electronic media with broad public appeal changed the significance of fashionable clothing and accessories (and consumer goods in general) as a means of identification. The access to “Western” clothing is made available to nearly all social classes due to the penetration of the Cape Verdean clothing industry by Chinese vendors, who sell a variety of (low-quality) products (clothes, shoes, bags, make-up) for extremely low prices.

Since “Europeanness” and a “European / Western” identity, respectively, is seen as more suitable for participation in “development”, it is deemed important to “look European” both in terms of skin color, other physical characteristics or appearance and in terms of clothes or other consumer goods. One cannot contradict that “racial” aspects such as skin color are still related to professional success and social advancement. When walking through the streets on Santiago or São Vicente, for instance, it is possible to notice that the majority of public billboards advertize with very light-skinned models. Moreover, it is perceptible that most employees encountered at universities or government buildings and other public buildings are also quite fair-skinned. This is representative – as Furtado (2009) comments – of “*the relative importance of Whites and Blacks in the social and economic structure of the islands, [and] the social roles reserved for each of these actors*”<sup>143</sup> (Furtado 2009: 7; translation H. S.).

As previously shown, young Cape Verdeans have by and large better chances to partake in the process of “development” and globalization. Due to their greater access to corresponding instruments (such as the Internet), their changes in identity construction are more extensive compared to other segments of the population. Based on this access it is easier for them to

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<sup>142</sup> This generally includes a serious facial expression and some kind of hand position (such as a peace sign or another gesture typical of Hip Hop or Rap music).

<sup>143</sup> The original quote in Portuguese is “*o peso relativo de brancos e negros na estrutura social e económica das ilhas, os papéis sociais reservados a cada um desses actores*” (Furtado 2009: 7).



“adapt” their identity according to what they believe benefits them the most in terms of improving their personal opportunities. This becomes even more decisive when analyzing a group that is unable (and often accused of being unwilling) to draw level with “progress” and Cape Verde’s new MDC status. In this regard, it is useful to go back to the example of the *Rabidantes*, the Cape Verdean market women. On the basis of economic growth, privatization, deregulation, and foreign investment, they have started to second-guess themselves, their work, and their actions. This means that they are experiencing a crisis of identity because their year-long method of income-generation is altered and thus their basis of existence lost. The fact that many *Rabidantes* now need to seek some kind of public assistance because of their inability to afford transportation in order to sell at local markets “reinforces the idea of the poor as a community beyond the state’s modernizing agenda and hence justifies the presence of the new foreign entrepreneur” (Fikes 2010: 60). In other words, those who are not able (or perhaps not supposed) to “fit” into the picture of “development” and “modernity” (in terms of “Europeanness”) with regard to their characteristics and attributes are disregarded and excluded, respectively, from the participation in the general process of growth and advancement. In the case of the *Rabidantes*, their activities (selling on local markets) and appearance (headdresses, *panos* around their hips, and baskets on their heads) are usually considered “backwards” and “African”, which is indicative of the aforementioned racialized perceptions and of the respective association of “development” with Europe and “developed” with “European”.

### **6.3. A “new” Kabuverdianidade?**

By means of the interviews, the memos, and the additional research it became clear that young Cape Verdeans at large “adjust” their concept of “cultural” or “national” identity – in other words, of *Kabuverdianidade* – to the present times of “development” and globalization. The racialized, societal hierarchization, however, has partly continued today and is not dissociable from the historical, colonial context. The categorized classification of the islands and their populations into more or less “African” and “European” are still associated with skin color (and other physical characteristics) and racist accounts of character attributes, which originated in colonial times.

Yet, the rivalries and perceived differences between the islands are decreasing in the wake of the country’s new “openness” and globalization. There is more exchange (e.g. inter-island

migration, trade, online communication) within the archipelago than ever before. It can be argued, however, that – appropriate to the overall global trend – racialized perceptions of “Africanity” and “Europeanness” continue to be very relevant. It is a general phenomenon that people look for a scapegoat in times of crisis. As Cape Verde is currently experiencing a time of optimism and is praised by all international institutions for their “successful (neoliberal) development”. This general, optimistic, and euphoric climate influences the way many Cape Verdeans feel about their opportunities and about their future. But if there are minor conflicts or crises, people generally revert to claiming the *Badiu* or *Mandjaku*. “*You know, the crises are what provoke these discriminations*” (Interview C8), one professor explained. In times of crises, especially when they are internal, the racialized differences between “African” and “European” become more relevant again.

Migration plays a smaller role in the identity construction of the younger generation in Cape Verde today. While most children continue to see migration as “the only way out” and migration numbers are still very high, many adolescents – primarily those with access to the means of “development” and globalization and therefore those who constitute part of the “in-group” – no longer believe that the act of emigration will automatically lead to a better life. This might be due to the fact that they are more enthusiastic about their chances in Cape Verde but also more aware of the challenges and difficulties abroad, as well as of the increasing barriers in destination countries.

It can be said that Cape Verdean adolescents nowadays have constructed a more “global” identity for themselves, where regional differences seem to matter less, but racialized perceptions still play an essential role<sup>144</sup>. The younger generation can perhaps be seen as some kind of “cosmopolitans” with a close political (and cultural) orientation towards Europe and “Europeanness” and a close emotional (and cultural) affinity with Africa and “Africanity”, respectively. The new and rather “cosmopolitan” or “global” identity nonetheless picks out certain (positive) aspects that are seen as most “capable of development”, and is thus mostly shaped by “Western” identity.

*“It’s a new phenomenon. But it’s...sometime ago it happened. Some time ago...now is more. If you go to...you see they dress like European, like they saw in TV. They don’t dress their real style. Because it’s good...I mean when you, you took some part of the other culture – you put it in your culture...it’s strong. Because when you go to the someone cultures you will be more flexible. So now you open minded, you’ll accept your culture”* (Interview C1).

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<sup>144</sup> It can be argued that racialized identities have gained in importance globally, not just in Cape Verde. For more information, see Clarke, Kamari Maxine; Thomas, Deborah A. [ed.] (2006): *Globalization and Race: Transformations in the cultural production of blackness*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

In Cape Verde, the new generation can be recognized as having a “globalized” and hybrid identity in terms of cultural aspects. While “cultural” identity is becoming more and more “globalized” all over the world, I argue that racialized (phenotypic) concepts of identity and character continue to play a crucial role and are closely linked to constructions of “national” or “cultural” identity.

It is important to note that the aforementioned affinity with Africa (in the sense of a shared experience of colonialism, exploitation, or slavery) and certain similarities (such as the skin color) are not slandered by young Cape Verdeans. Even so, there is a general assumption that Cape Verde is “more developed” than the rest of Africa and that this “development” was made possible by the country’s orientation towards and cooperation with the “North” / “West” (i.e. Europe and the United States). During the period of Portuguese colonialism, Cape Verde already possessed a “privileged”, racialized “special status” compared to other Luso-African colonies and it retains a “special status” within Africa today. It is important to note, however, that this “special status” regarding “development” is only on the collective level, while the individual level is still characterized by exclusion and poverty.

Accordingly, it can be inferred that the majority of the students interviewed identified as “African” but as “different” and “more European”, respectively, than other Africans. “Development”, “progress”, or “modernity” are then unequivocally perceived as “European”. Europe and what it stands for, however, are appraised more “realistically” (due to the growing use of the Internet, among other things) – not everything “European” is automatically seen as positive. The increasing exchange and knowledge acquisition by means of the Internet allows for a more “reflective copying” of ideas and concepts.

Overall, the Internet plays a vital role in the change in identity construction among the younger generation – not only in Cape Verde. As Thomas et al. (2006) remark, “*the proliferation of new technologies, as well as greater access to older technologies, has also resulted in an intensified circulation of popular culture forms worldwide*” (Thomas et al. 2006: 25). This phenomenon has resulted in new openings, new ways of collaboration and communication, and new opportunities for “*the elaboration of different ideas about the relationships between progress and the development of racial, national, class, gender, or generational identities*” (Thomas et al. 2006: 25). The popularity and absorption of cultural expressions such as hip hop or of African-American fashion trends among young Cape Verdeans are a manifestation of this new identity.

*“From new generation. So we will modify everything – the culture we change, we copy from Europe, from America. So the culture modifies sometimes. It happens in every corner of the world, I think so” (Interview C1).*

*“They’re always important for the reinforcement of this identity. Because – because the communication, the knowledge empowers us more each time to interpret our own identity. And the comprehension of many identitarian elements that we didn’t understand before. The Internet, the communication doesn’t ruin these things. On the contrary. It helps us, it makes us to reflect and define the identitarian parameters. And these identitarian parameters are Cape Verdean parameters. Only that they’re changed in accordance with the current era. One cannot always experience an identity set in stone. We have to live in accordance with the moment each one experiences. And this communication that we all have now, it’s enriching” (Interview C11).*

*“Today...yes...today more every time. I think today more and more. In the sense that it allows that – and this primarily for the young generations – to have new references. So, references not only in terms of a relation with the diaspora but in a relation with the world. Thus, forcibly a new outlook of the new generation” (Interview C13).*

Currently, newly (re)constructed identities all over the world are not only commodified but are realized by means of consumption. In this regard, the concept of generation plays a key role in the modification and revision of consumerism and consumption. To direct one’s attention to generation *“provides a way to mark the significantly changed relationships to political structures and economic mobility that characterize contemporary youth experiences”* (Thomas et al. 2006: 27).

## 7. Conclusion

As indicated thus far, the (fairly recent) process of “development” and globalization in Cape Verde have affected the process of “cultural” or “national” identity (re)construction. Aspects of social exclusion and inclusion, too, have been influenced by these phenomena. Those who have access to and can partake in implementing change and “development” are most notably also those who are able to “adapt” or “modify” their identity according to what is considered “capable of development”. Those segments of the population that do not fit into the current picture of a “dynamic”, “modern”, “progressive”, and “developed” country – which the Cape Verdean government and most international institutions so strongly try to portray – are ignored or excluded from the opportunities and benefits of the highly praised “advancement” (in other words, the recent investments and economic growth).

The macroeconomic boom in Cape Verde on the collective level (“collective development”) has not been appropriately accompanied by an overall improvement on the individual level (“individual” or “personal development”). In reality, however, “development” (in the sense of “collective development”) is often merely on paper and always includes the danger of ignoring the prime “development target”: the individual. Subsequently, “personal” or “individual development” is often lost in the big picture of globalization and foreign aid schemes. Yet, the question of who is excluded is extremely relevant to the study of “development”. There is no doubt that certain demographic groups have indeed benefitted from the latest upswing but for the most part the income gap and social inequality has increased. Overall, the country is richer than before but relatively speaking, there are also more poor people. It is important to note, however, that what is good for “collective development” might not always automatically be good for the individual (and vice versa). The accelerated formation of a class system in Cape Verde with a more and more apparent elite and a constantly growing group of excluded “outsiders” is conspicuous. This is not to suggest that Cape Verde was not a class society before the reforms of the 1990s but that it was more coalescing then.

It is salient to note that social (and financial) exclusion occurs along similar lines as “cultural” or “national” identity construction. Since “development”, “modernity”, and “progress” are associated with Europe and “Europeanness” and not with Africa and “Africanity”, those who are perceived to have a more “African” identity are in turn regarded as “incapable” – or perhaps even “harmful” – to the country’s aspiration for “advancement”. In this regard, the *Rabidantes* are perhaps one of the most evident examples. They are perceived as typical

*Badiu* women, who not only “look African” (headdress, *panos*, or children tied on their backs) but who have also preserved their “African heritage” (in terms of *Batuku* or their language variety). I argue that thinking in terms of (linear) progress and globalization operates regardless of the consequences. People have to “assimilate” their identity (among other things) in order to at least have the possibility to participate. Those who cannot / do not want to / are not permitted to “adjust” remain excluded and barely profit from economic changes. The “identity model” for “development“, “progress“, and “modernity“ orientates itself by the so called “Western“ or “European“ values (such as “civilized”, “decent”, “neat”, or “reputable”) and hence stays Eurocentric.

I argue that “cultural” or “national” identity construction in Cape Verde is characterized by (and has been since and due to Portuguese colonialism) racialized perceptions of “African” and “European”. While inter-island differences are declining nowadays on the basis of the increased contact between the islands, the fairly recent immigration of Africans from the mainland has contributed (among other things) to a returning, growing importance of racialized characteristics and conceptions. Furthermore, as Thomas et al. (2006) formulate rightly,

*“because globalization today is facilitated by the transmissions and reproduction of deeply embedded social prejudices rooted in a past characterized by territorial concepts of belonging that both generated and were generated by racial inequalities, the contemporary distribution of wealth has exacerbated historically entrenched racial hierarchies”* (Thomas et al. 2006: 1).

Currently, around the globe, “race”, racialized notions, and biological attributes or metaphors are revitalized in order to designate feelings of “belonging”. *“Metaphors of blood in particular are being used to create political identity in the midst of globalization”* (Glick Schiller 2005: 289). Identity in general continues to play a key role in today’s age of globalization. All over the world, people constantly try to reconstruct and modify their identity depending on what and who is deemed “trendy”, “in”, and “promising”.

*“In a world of global flows of wealth, power, and images, the search for identity, collective or individual, ascribed or constructed, becomes the fundamental source of social meaning. This is not a new trend (...). Yet identity is becoming the main, and sometimes the only, source of meaning in a historical period characterized by widespread destructuring of organizations, delegitimation of institutions, fading away of major social movements, and ephemeral cultural expressions. People increasingly organize their meaning not around what they do but on the basis of what they are”* (Castells 1996, cited in Warschauer 2000: 152).

In Cape Verde, identity construction is strongly shaped by the notion of *mestiçagem* or “mixture”. The younger Cape Verdean generation – even many of those who are less privileged – is more susceptible to the current period of “development” and globalization and has experienced a modification of their opportunities to “adapt” their identity in accordance with the general expectations concerning the necessary attributes to partake in this “development”. Here, the dissemination and increased ease of Internet access has been an essential criterion. Adolescents continue to strongly identify with so called “typical” Cape Verdean identity markers (such as language, music, dance, or migration) but increasingly add other, new, and primarily “Western” / “European” markers to their identity construction. In order to represent themselves (both online and offline) as more “modern” or “progressive”, they speak in a more “Portuguesed” *Kriolu* and Portuguese, respectively, in certain situations or incorporate Portuguese or English words into their everyday speech, they dress according to “Western” fashion trends and try to avoid looking “African”<sup>145</sup> in everyday, public life (wearing *panos* and carrying things on one’s head are associated with *Batuku* but not with daily routines), they straighten their hair when possible, or post pictures of themselves in “hip” poses and in “sophisticated” surroundings<sup>146</sup>.

To sum up, I argue that the classifications of “African” and “European” – and thus of identities – today are also associated with more or less chances and opportunities, respectively. The notions of “African” and “European” are still racialized and considered relevant and irrelevant, respectively, to a person’s personal advancement.

The perceptions and perceived closeness of one’s identity to “African” or “European” may vary depending on who is asked (age, gender, class) but it is rather conclusive that “African” and “European” are seen as stereotypical antagonisms. In this regard, contemporary as well as historical power constellations, both in the global context and on the islands themselves, are of importance. The aforementioned terms, labels and their associations clearly reflect the global power relations between the “North” and the “South”, between the depicted image of Africa as a homogeneous unity, and the worldwide dominance of Eurocentric viewpoints and practices.

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<sup>145</sup> This includes “African” patterns or styles, for instance.

<sup>146</sup> By this, I mean surroundings that will not be associated with “African” or “poor” such as a rundown house or a cropland. Instead, many adolescents post pictures of themselves in front of trees, beautiful flowers, living rooms with televisions, computers, on the beach, or in discos.





## 8. Acronyms

BCA	Banco Comercial do Atlantico
CECV	Caixa Económica de Cabo Verde
CEDEAO	Comunidade Económica dos Estados da África Ocidental
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa
CVE	Cape Verdean Escudo
CVT	Cabo Verde Telecom
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ELECTRA	Empresa de Electricidade e Agua
EMPA	Empresa Pública de Abastecimento
ENACOL	Empresa Nacional de Combustíveis, S.A.
HDI	Human Development Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Less (or Least) Developed Country
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MDC	Medium Developed Country
MpD	Movimento para Democracia
PAICV	Partido Africano de Independência de Cabo Verde
PALOP	Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
TACV	Transportes Aéreos de Cabo Verde
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WTO	World Trade Organization



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# Annex

**Figure 1**



URL : [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/09/Flag\\_of\\_Cape\\_Verde\\_1975.svg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/09/Flag_of_Cape_Verde_1975.svg)

**Figure 2**



URL : [http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/38/Flag\\_of\\_Cape\\_Verde.svg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/38/Flag_of_Cape_Verde.svg)

Figure 3



URL : [http://www.capeverdeislands.uk.com/images/cape\\_verde\\_sm\\_2006.gif](http://www.capeverdeislands.uk.com/images/cape_verde_sm_2006.gif)

## Abstract English

The Cape Verde islands have been undergoing enormous transformation since the early 1990s. After independence in 1975, the conservative center-right MpD won the first multi-party elections in 1991 and subsequently initiated a process of market-oriented economic reforms, primarily in the form of massive privatizations, to promote globalization as a solution to the country's economic difficulties. These neoliberal reforms were more or less continued by the former independence-party PAICV, which regained power in 2001.

The Cape Verdean economy heavily depends on the remittances sent by the great number of emigrants living in the diaspora and on foreign development assistance. In recent years, however, the country experienced an unprecedented economic growth. This upswing is first and foremost based on the booming tourism industry and on private foreign investments, primarily from Portugal and Italy. At the same time, however, remittances and development assistance have started to decline. In 2008, Cape Verde was “upgraded” to the status of an MDC (*Middle Development Country*) and is since praised as the “African success story”.

Yet, this recent “development” is based on a simplified definition of “development” used in the common political and economic discourse, which measures “development” only in terms of economic growth. In spite of the economic upturn, the unemployment rate remains relatively high, the income gap is increasing, and new urban slums are forming rapidly. Cape Verdean market women (*Rabidantes*), an important economic, social, and generational group, are losing their basis of existence due to recent private foreign investments. These instances are generally ignored or concealed by the Cape Verdean government as they do not fit into the picture of a “modern”, “developed” country.

In Cape Verde, “cultural” or “national” identity construction has been firmly established in discussions regarding the closeness to Africa or Europe. The racialized perceptions of “African” and “European”, respectively, and the racialized, societal hierarchization have partly continued up until the present and are not separable from the historical context of Portuguese colonialism and its racist system of classification. In the contemporary context of “development” and globalization, these notions of “African” and “European” are further associated with “undeveloped” and “developed”. In this regard, many Cape Verdean adolescents are experiencing a modification of their opportunities (i.e. the dissemination of the Internet) to “adapt” their identity in accordance with the general expectations concerning the necessary attributes to partake in this “development”. It is therefore argued that the classifications of “African” and “European” – and thus of identities – today are associated

with more or less chances and opportunities, respectively. Consequently, these notions are still racialized and considered relevant and irrelevant, respectively, to a person's personal advancement.

# Abstract Deutsch

Die kapverdischen Inseln erleben seit den frühen 1990er Jahren einen enormen Wandel. Nach der Unabhängigkeit im Jahre 1975 gewann 1991 die konservative, mitte-rechts Partei MpD die ersten Mehrparteienwahlen und initiierte in der Folge einen Prozess marktorientierter Wirtschaftsreformen – vor allem in Form von massiven Privatisierungen – um Globalisierung als Lösung für die wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten des Landes voranzutreiben. Diese neoliberalen Reformen wurden von der ehemaligen Unabhängigkeitspartei PAICV, die im Jahr 2001 die Macht wiedererlangte, mehr oder weniger fortgesetzt.

Die kapverdianische Wirtschaft ist stark abhängig von den *Remittances*, die von der großen Anzahl der in der Diaspora lebenden Emigranten geschickt werden, und von ausländischer Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. In den letzten Jahren erlebte das Land jedoch ein noch nie dagewesenes Wirtschaftswachstum. Dieser Aufschwung basiert vor allem auf der boomenden Tourismusindustrie und auf privaten Auslandsinvestitionen, insbesondere aus Portugal und Italien. Gleichzeitig haben die *Remittances* und die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit allerdings angefangen zu sinken. Im Jahr 2008 wurden die Kapverden zum Status eines MDC (*Middle Development Country*) “hochgestuft” und wird seither als “Afrikanische Erfolgsgeschichte” gepriesen.

Diese rezente “Entwicklung” hat jedoch eine simplifizierte Definition von “Entwicklung” zur Grundlage, die im politischen und ökonomischen Diskurs weit verbreitet ist und “Entwicklung” nur im Sinne von Wirtschaftswachstum misst. Trotz des Wirtschaftsaufschwungs ist die Arbeitslosigkeit weiterhin relativ hoch, die Einkommensschere wächst, und es bilden sich zusehends neue urbane Armenviertel. Kapverdianische Marktfrauen (*Rabidantes*) – eine wichtige ökonomische, soziale, und generationsübergreifende Gruppe – verlieren aufgrund der jüngsten ausländischen Privatinvestitionen ihre Existenzgrundlage. Diese Vorgänge werden im Großen und Ganzen von der kapverdianischen Regierung ignoriert oder verschwiegen, da sie nicht in das Bild eines “modernen”, “entwickelten” Landes passen.

“Kulturelle” oder “nationale” Identitätskonstruktion ist auf den Kapverden stark verankert in Diskussionen bezüglich der Nähe zu Afrika oder Europa. Die rassialisierten Wahrnehmungen von “Afrikanisch” bzw. “Europäisch” und die rassialisierte, gesellschaftliche Hierarchisierung bestehen teilweise bis heute fort und sind untrennbar vom historischen Kontext des Portugiesischen Kolonialismus und dessen rassistischen Klassifikationssystems. Im gegenwärtigen Kontext von “Entwicklung” und Globalisierung werden diese Vorstellungen

von “Afrikanisch” und “Europäisch” weiters mit “unterentwickelt” und “entwickelt” assoziiert. In diesem Zusammenhang erleben viele kapverdianische Jugendliche eine Veränderung ihrer Möglichkeiten (beipielsweise die Verbreitung des Internets) ihre Identität entsprechend den allgemeinen Erwartungen bezüglich der für die Teilnahme an dieser “Entwicklung” notwendigen Eigenschaften “anzupassen”. Es wird somit argumentiert, dass die Klassifikationen von “Afrikanisch” und “Europäisch” – und folglich von Identitäten – heutzutage mit mehr oder weniger Chancen bzw. Möglichkeiten assoziiert werden. Dementsprechend sind diese Vorstellungen weiterhin rassialisiert und werden als relevant bzw. irrelevant für den persönlichen Aufstieg eines Menschen angesehen.

# Curriculum Vitae

## Hanna Stepanik

### Personal Data

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Date of Birth :	14.08.1986
Birthplace :	Vienna
Nationality :	Austria

### Education

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1996-2000	Junior High School in Vienna
2000-2004	Senior High School in Vienna
2004	Graduation from High School with distinction
2004-2005	Study of Law at the University of Vienna
Since March 2005	Study of "Development Studies" at the University of Vienna (Focus Areas : Creole Studies, Racism Studies, Intercultural Philosophy)
January – June 2009	Study Abroad at the University of Chicago, U.S.A. (Focus Areas : African American-Studies, Racism Studies)
September 2010	Research in Cape Verde

### Other Qualifications

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Since 2005	Employment at a Viennese law firm
February 2007	Voluntary work in Tarrafal, Cape Verde
Since March 2007	Voluntary work for Delta Cultura Austria
Since March 2011	Member of the research group "Transnational Spaces Africa" and of the reading circle "Racism & Development Assistance"
Language skills	German (native), English (fluent), Portuguese (good), Spanish (good), Italian (basic knowledge), French (basic knowledge), Cape Verdean Creole (basic knowledge)