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“University Student Austrian-Turks and Their perceptions of Homeland vs. Hostland: Is Roots Migration possible?”

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

Throughout the history, 'a fundamental characteristic of people is their movement from place to place' (UN, 2002, S. 1)<sup>1</sup>. International migration process has been carried world population from one destination to other destination. According to UN Migration Report, international migration, with its intricate web of demographic, social, economic and political determinants and consequences, is a topic that has moved to the forefront of national and international agenda. In the last few years, immigration has become a major issue of concern in an increasing number of countries (UN, 2002, S. 1). In executive summary of ILO: A right based approach states that with globalization, international migration is going to increase, not decrease, in the twenty-first century. Each year, millions of women and men leave their homes and cross national borders. Many seek higher wages and better opportunities, but many others are forced to migrate because of famine, natural disasters, violent conflict, persecution or simply a lack of decent work in their home country. At the same time, in major destination countries increased demand for skilled workers, reluctance of local workers to accept certain low-skilled jobs, population decline and population ageing act as strong drivers (ILO, 2010). All of cross-border population actions display specific stories and the bonds of homeland and hostland. Studies on international labor migration have expressed that return ratios of could be more than 50 percent, and in some examples as high as 80 percent. Impressed by the absolute size of the phenomenon, not to mention its social/economic/cultural impacts, academics frequently notes the lack of knowledge and debate on the topic and calls for more research.

As Christina Boswell cities that all European states are now net immigration countries. For more established host countries such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Benelux countries, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark, this has been the case since at least the 1960s. Despite a decline in migration after recruitment stops in 1973-4, immigration flows have been continuous, for the most part taking the form of family reunion, refugee flows and labor migration. Most have experienced particularly high levels of immigration since the 1990s (Boswell, 2005).

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<sup>1</sup> International Migration Report 2002


Germany had recruited 'guest workers' and the country became a country of labor immigration firstly. After Germany rapidly, other continental western European countries began to import migrant workers. In the study of Euro-Turks, Kaya and Kentel argue that migration into post-war Germany started as labor recruitment to mitigate shortages in specific industries. Between 1955 and 1968, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) concluded intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean countries: first Italy (1955), then Spain and Greece (1960), Turkey (1961 and 1964), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968). The German federal labor office (*Bundesanstalt für Arbeit* or BFA) set up recruitment offices in the countries concerned (Kaya&Kentel 2005:7). Turkish labor migration has pursued same structure in Germany and in Austria. According to Michael Jandl and Albert Kraler, Austria began to forge bilateral agreements with southern and southeastern European states in the 1960s. These pacts were designed to recruit temporary workers. Agreements with Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966) were quickly followed by the establishment of recruitment offices in these countries and over time led to the settlement of significant numbers of these workers and their families in Austria. In 1969, the number of foreign workers from Turkey and Yugoslavia stood at 76,500. By 1973, numbers had almost tripled to 227,000 - 178,000 of who came from Yugoslavia and 27,000 from Turkey (Jandl & Kraler, 2003). As economists say that labor import of migrant workers is such a milestone for Western European's great economic boom after World War II.

Foreign workers were employed as labor in auto, construction, mining and textile industry. Most of workers emigrated from the rural regions of their country of origins and high unemployment ratios and poverty pushed them to work in Europe. On the other hand, higher wage levels led them to support their families which lived in homeland. Migrant workers subsisted in very limited part of their salaries because they had to send many homelands or saved money for future investment.

During early 1970s, European countries ended to employ migrant workers because Arab Oil Boycott and the serious economic recession. Afterwards, the situation of migrant workers had also changed; they gain possession of permanent worker permits with work permits then their families moved to receiving countries under the terms of family unification.

Today, descendants of migrant workers comprise of a part of European population; additionally migrants have higher birth ratio. Especially, the Turkish migrants have an important population ratio in Europe.

**Table 1: Main citizenships of non-EU foreigners residing in the EU-27, 2010**



Source: Eurostat<sup>2</sup>

In Turkish migration case, migration to Europe has been proceeding during the following decades by way of family reunification. Initially, first generation migrant workers brought their families to Europe thus a young Turkish generation has grown up in Europe. When young Turkish migrants became adults, they began to find spouses from Turkey. In this way, immigration policies vanquished simply and new generation had change to be existed in Europe. As Toktas states that young generations -even fourth generation- of immigrants represent a unique profile of immigration which has contributed to the cosmopolitan multiculturalism (Toktas, 2012). Close to four million Turks live in European countries and Turkish population is one of the biggest migrant groups in Europe.

Throughout the migration process to Europe, Turkish migrants have had difficulties about integration into mainstream societies in their hostlands. In their study, Crul and Schneider explain that most first-generation Turkish “guest workers” were recruited from the lowest

<sup>2</sup> Vasileva, Katya (2011), ‘Population and Social Condition’, Statistic in Focus 32/2011, Eurostat

socioeconomic strata and had very little education. In the rural areas, where most of them grew up, educational opportunities were generally limited to primary school. In general, first-generation men had only finished primary school, and most women had just a few years of schooling. Because small-scale subsistence farming was the primary activity in these rural communities, education was not particularly important (Crul&Schneider, 2009). They lived in bad life circumstances with language barriers and limited contacts to mainstream society. Turkish migrant population became visible with the Turkish second generation who is involved into mainstream society much more than their parents. That is why the first generation is not seemed as a migration population which has integration problems. Actually, the first generation did not pay attention to discrimination because they had no long term dreams about living abroad. They had powerful bonds of homeland and the idea of returning back so they were not willing to get their hostlands citizenship.

In the case second/third generations, despite they have higher language skills, education and job qualifications than their parents have; they struggle against integration and discrimination problems which they always face in their daily lives because there are still significant distinction between Turkish migrants and mainstream society. In her essay, Ayca Kilicli insists that the trend among the second/third generation to become more involved in inter-ethnic activities is significantly higher than among the first generation. This is a very positive sign, particularly with regards to integration. In general the fact that the second/third generation tend to be more willing to integrate and accept the host population's culture, not only indicates an acceptance of the lifestyle of the majority, through adaptation of this lifestyle, but are important factors contributing to the integration process (Kilicli, 2003).

It is obvious that Turkish population in Europe have several difficulties but newly coming generations are getting more integrated into hostland's culture and being great asset for both hostland and homeland.

During last centuries, Austria has used to incorporate international migration by force of Habsburg Empire and its geopolitical conditions because the empire had dominated a large area where regularly caused international migration. After World War II, Austria came across a new type of international migration. Such as other European countries, Austria began to accept foreign labor during 1960s. Because of spreadly growing economy, the country needed an extra labor force from southern and southeastern European countries.

At the beginning, bachelor (single man) workers without families moved to Austria for a limited time period plan; they would have gone back to their homeland after put by some money. In the view of Rotation Principle, they were sort of short-term worker who had to return to the sending countries. Contrary to Rotation Principle, migrant workers became permanent settlers and they brought their families through family reunification so that migrant workers and their families began to establish their migrant communities.

In Austria, migrant workers needed residence visa and work permit to stay in the country constantly and their documents were extended. Additionally, migrant workers could be able to request Austrian citizenship after incessantly working and living period in the country. As Cinar states that roughly 710,000 foreign nationals make up 8,9 per cent of Austria's population (8,032,926). National of former Yugoslavia (322,261) and Turkey (127,226) are the two biggest groups, together accounting for 63 per cent of the total foreign population. It should be noted that these figures include foreign nationals born in Austria. The number of persons born abroad, who lives in Austria, is much higher than the number of foreign nationals (Cinar, 2010:1).

Migrant workers were mostly employed as unqualified or semi-qualified workers; they accepted low-paid job which were unwanted by Austrian. Migrant workers were often not able to speak German and they resided in industrial regions of Austria mainly.

As Solsten explains that the Employment of Foreigners Law passed in 1991 limited the number of foreign workers who could be employed in Austria to 10 percent of the domestic labor force. The Resident Alien Law of 1993 reduced the number of foreign workers, that is, workers from outside the EU and the European Free Trade Association still further--to 9 percent of the total work force of about 3.5 million. As a result of these laws, approximately 300,000 foreigners can work in Austria. Because many of these workers have dependents, Austrian officials assume foreigners could come to constitute approximately 10 percent of the total population (Solsten, 1994).

In Today's Austria, migrants from the former Yugoslavia have the widest proportion in the population then Turks migrants follow up. Germans, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanians are other minorities of the country.



Austria and Turkey have been sharing a long history since ages. Throughout the history, Austrian-Turkish relationship was controlled by wars and both countries felt hostility towards each other. After World War II, Turkey and Austria signed the bilateral agreement in 1964 then the first wave of Turkish migrants was employed immediately. As Herzog-Punzenber explains that in 1971, the Austrian workforce included 5,600 Turkish citizens. In the “classical” period of migrant workers migration, from 1960 to 1973, only 11,700 male and 3,400 female workers came from Turkey to Austria. The numbers actually grew after the Wiedereinreisestopp of 1974. Since the mid-1970s, it has been crucial for Turkish workers to know that if they left the country, it would be difficult to re-enter. So they stayed and asked their families to come to Austria. (Herzog-Punzenberger, 2003:1124). Under the terms of the rotation principle, they were accepted as non-permanent workers. With family reunification, Turkish migrants started to bring their families to Austria during 1970s and Turkish migration population has been increasing.

According to Johan Wets, the proportion of Turkish residents in Austria grew from 7.7 percent of all foreigners in 1971 to 22.2 percent in 2001 or 160,000 Turkish citizens. An economic boom in the late 1980s created renewed labor shortages in some sectors, following which employers looked to the traditional sources of labor from South-Eastern Europe to fill these slots. The number of Yugoslavs residing in Austria rose due to the crisis and the war in Yugoslavia. In 1990, Austria’s policymakers also regularized the employment status of 29,100 foreigners hitherto illegally employed. The number of non-nationals in Austria doubled from 344,000 in 1988 to 690,000 in 1993. The share of foreign workers of all employed people rose from 5.4 percent to 9.1 percent (Wets, 2006: 88).

As Potkanski states that today, Turkish community has one of the largest populations in Austria, Turkish population follow after German and Serbian population. According to birth rates, the birth date of Turkish population (2,41) is above average birth rate (1,17) of Austria (Potkanski, 2010, S. 3).

Turkish labor force have been encouraged to work in Austria and they had the low-paid job without social prestige thus Turkish migrants formed the basis of a new labor-lower class. As studies point out that Turkish migration population has lower integration rates. In Austria, they always have integration problems because of lower social origin, deficient educational

level, lack of German language and cultural differentness. Turkish migrants also tend to isolate their selves from mainstream society. Turkish migrants have deficient educational level and inadequate German language skills so that this situation affects job opportunities. The first generations have suffered from being less educated and nowadays next generations have better educational – but still deficient- level education.

Young Turkish generations of migrants also suffer from integration problems because they are not both proficient in the their homeland of origin and in Austria. The second/third generation Turkish migrants face integration, educational and employment problems regularly. Turkish youngsters in Austria possess deficient educational level and higher drop-out rates. There are huge discrepancy between Turkish students and other students groups in Austria. Some of Turkish youngsters attends to special schools, because Turkish youngsters do not have competence educational level. As Herzog-Punzenberger states that the picture of Turkish students probably results from a combination of factors, such as poor knowledge of German, unfavorable learning conditions, lack of parental support, learning difficulties, and a system that is not prepared to deal with heterogeneity in that it tends to sort out those with whom teachers are not prepared and/or willing to deal (Herzog-Punzenberger, 2003:1132). Additionally, the Austrian education system has also some structural problems in the concept of integration and education; particularly homogeneity problems in multilingual/multicultural classes, deficiency of extra-support for children before and after school.

Due to deficient educational situation, in general, the second/third generation is not able to get high level jobs; they are mostly employed as a blue collars or rarely midstage white collars. Additionally, there are a group of the second-generation Turkish entrepreneurs who have expanding business activities. In Austria, the second/third generation tends to be isolated because of integration problems. Beside the main picture of the Turkish second/third generation does not seem promising, there are a group of Turkish migrants who tends to have a better carrier or reach higher positions. For them, it is important to speak perfect German and get high level university degree.

The situation of second generation migrants is similar throughout Europe; as Bridge states that they are at risk to encounter cultural, linguistic and social difficulties, sometimes they have to face prejudices and their self-esteem may suffer (Bridge, 2010). By force of integration problems, some of Turkish young generation may tend to lose future inspiration to

live in Austria. As new studies explain that especially, a highly educated part of the second/third generation may consider returning to homeland. Perhaps, their return aims are bigger than their parents. On the one hand, integration problems, social and political prejudgments of Turkish identity and economic crisis in Europe become push factors for them. In contradistinction for their parents, these highly educated Turkish-Austrians have greater job opportunities as highly qualified candidates and young Turkish entrepreneurs also see new occasions in Turkey. These are great pull factors to live in Turkey. Additionally, the Turkish government and economic elites regard the return migration of second/third generation emphatically because their re-emigration possibilities will be a great acquisition for Turkey.

Return migration is a part of migration process which contains voluntarily return of migrants to their homelands. Turkish-Austrians who were born and grew up in Austria consider moving to Turkey permanently or for a long time period. In this study, I would like to use the term of 'roots migration', instead of return migration. Roots-migrants attribute a new meaning to culture, identity and homeland. Susanne Wessendorf determines the concept of roots migration to describe the migration to a place where members of the second generation originate from, but they have never lived. She also underlines that migration to the parents' country of origin has been largely understudied in research on the second generation (Wessendorf, 2007: 1084). In migration literature, return migration generally explains that the first generation's return aims to their homeland and roots migration try to focus on the second/third generation's homeland perception and their possibility to live in their country of origin.

## 1.1. Conceptualization of Research Question and Methodology

In this study, I would like to work on highly-educated Turkish-Austrians and their profiles, homeland and hostland perceptions. Throughout their profiles and perceptions, I try to understand their re-emigrate possibility to Turkey. In regard of roots migration concept, I chose second/third generation of university student Turkish immigrants<sup>3</sup>, who have potential to return back to Turkey, as my target group.

I examine this target group as a significant part in the roots migration process because the rates of roots migration from receiving countries to Turkey have increased. I focus on the purpose to return among second/third generation Turkish immigrants who study in Vienna/Austria. I try to realize that the reasons behind their mentation to return back to Turkey and get the picture of their hopes and concerns about roots migration.

When I was building my study borders, I use basically the term of roots migration because it provides better theoretical structure than return migration. Of course, I do not ignore the patterns of return migration; it was a cooperative term for my study. Susan Wessendorf (2007a), (2007b) specifies that it is a protraction of the international migration process. As Martin Klinthall states that second/third generation should be considered as particular group who can change the direction of international migration, in the terms of economic and social metamorphosis in both hostland and homeland countries, (Klinthall, 2006).

Before I focused on Turkish-Austrians, I have been inspired by *Euro-Turks: A Bridge or a Breach between Turkey and the European Union? A Comparative Study of French-Turks and German-Turks* research which was examined by Ayhan Kaya and Ferhat Kentel (Kaya & Kentel, 2005). This research became my starting point to conceptualize my master thesis. The Euro-Turks is a comprehensive study which involves various aspects about Turkish immigrants who live in Europe. It was impossible for me to execute a study as mighty as Euro-Turks; thence I limited my focus area and focus group.

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<sup>3</sup>In this study, the term of Turkish does not cover an ethnic group; it covers a supra identity. The term is used for every ethnicity which is originally from Turkey. When any specification is needed to underline, their particular ethnic or religious background emphasizes the importance of careful attention.

Firstly, I had constrained my focus area and limited my study with return migration. Because return migration is one of the most important parts of worldwide labor migration and half of labor migrants tend to return to their country of origin.

During my literature research, I have noticed that there is an interesting social fact which is called 'integration paradox'. In their essay; Tolsma, Lubbers and Gijsberts state that higher educated minorities supposedly perceive more discrimination, supposedly express more, not less ethnic hostility and supposedly identify more, not less to their origin country (Tolsma, Lubbers & Gijsberts, 2012). That is why I also retargeted the second/third generation population in regard of integration paradox possibility. According to these limitations; university student, second/third generation of Turkish migrants who live in Vienna became my target group in the end. Beside first generation, they are more integrated to Austria so it is more interesting to analyze their perceptions and their situation is more attractive to examine. There is also another significant point, which is stated by Heath, Rethon and Kilpi, Turkish ancestry appears to be particularly disadvantaged in education, access to the labor market, and occupational attainment (Heath, Rethon & Kilpi, 2008:229); I found out this point quite interesting to analyze why Turkish youngsters struggle with schooling.

After all this processes, in this this study, I would like to investigate roots migration possibilities for Turkish-Austrians. The main focus is on the question of whether developments in Turkey can pull highly-educated Turkish-Austrians to re-emigrate to their country of origin. The following research question can be formulated:

- University Austrian-Turks and Their Perceptions of Homeland vs. Hostland: Is Roots Migration Possible?
- Being part of Austrian society: What is the description of highly-educated Turkish-Austrians in Austria?
- How do highly-educated Turkish-Austrians perceive Turkey as their country of origin?
- How do highly-educated Turkish-Austrians, who are university students, perceive Austria as their hostland?

About methodology, I preferred to use qualitative interviews. I interviewed with 15 second/third generation Turkish students who study in Vienna. During interviewing, I applied in-depth interviewing method. Interviews took average 45-60 min. In the beginning, I began to interview with open-ended questions. After some time, I did not need to ask any question because interviewees expressed their selves naturally and shared their opinions widely. All interviews were recorded then they were transcribed. When I finished collecting the data set, I began to analyze them. In this stage, I applied *Content Analysis* method to identify and qualify the data set.

In following sections, theoretical background will be subjected firstly and migration theories, migration history and migration types will be determined. Then exploratory study will follow with its five sub-sections; in-depth interviews, qualitative content, description of sample, being migrant and being second/third generation, perception of Turkey and perception of Austria. Conclusion will be the last section in which the results will be shown.

## **2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

In this chapter, I undertake to display theoretical background of migration theories, migration history and several migration types. Because there are theoretical migration designs which have been conjectured to define migration processes. In this study, I focus on mainly international migration and its reasons. International migration also creates new kinds of minorities by courtesy of transnational mobility. These new minorities establish inchoate migrant societies and their descendants begin to grow up in abroad. Rising generations has also a power to produce their own culture as a second/third generations.

During this chapter, I come up for a theoretical review in four steps. In first step, theory of migration is examined deeply in the regard of international migration history and processes. Then 'Euro-Turks' is explained with its historical concept. Thirdly, the history of labor recruitment in Austria follows up and the second generation is the last step of this chapter.

### **2.1. THEORY OF MIGRATION**

Migration can be shortly defined as the movement of people from place to place; man has continuously changed his place. UN International Migration Report explains that the right to move was recognized globally over a half century ago with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration states in Article 13 that "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" and "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." (UN, 2002:1)

Migration is a phenomenon which involves all the historical periods. Man moves because of several reasons such as natural disasters, poverty, climatic changes, and regional conflicts. From ancient empires to modern world, migration has always been a reality of human being, but large-scale migration has been occurred in the modern period. By the modern period, migration has become long-distance and worldwide. Migration began to occur more intensively at the beginning of Industrial Revolution, millions of people moved for new

working patterns. Along with Industrial Age, migration has been an interest of study in several disciplines. As Zolberg states that German geographer E. G. Ravenstein conceptualized migration as relocation of human beings across space, within or between countries, and strove to achieve an elegant formal model that would account for such movements (Zolberg, 1989). Ravenstein improved a series of migration 'laws of migration' which was published in the Journal of the Statistical Society in England in 1885. Ravenstein's 'laws' formed the basic theory of modern migration theory which achieved to define migration patterns. A series of seven 'laws of migration' are set as follows (Ravenstein, 1985):

- Most migrants only proceed a short distance, and toward centers of absorption.
- As migrants move toward absorption centers, they leave "gaps" that are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, creating migration flows that reach to "the most remote corner of the kingdom."
- The process of dispersion is inversed to that of absorption.
- Each main current of migration produces a compensating counter-current.
- Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centers of commerce or industry.
- The natives of towns are less migratory than those of the rural parts of the country.
- Most international migrants are young males, while more internal migrants are female.

Migration is described mostly as a permanent or semi-permanent replacement of residence. Migration arises at several levels: rural/urban intra-regional, interregional, intercontinental and intra-continental. According to Everett S. Lee, no matter how short or how long, how easy or how difficult, every act of migration involves an origin, a destination, and an intervening set of obstacles, we include the distance of the move as one that is always present (Lee, 1966).

Migration is a greater area of interest for many social sciences. As Robin Cohen states that theory construction proceeds by antinomies (or, in more sophisticated version, through asymmetrical dyads, with one pole more strongly affirmed than the other). These dyads might be set out as follows (Cohen, 1996):



- Individual vs. Contextual Reasons to Migrate
- Rate vs. Incidence
- Internal vs. International Migration
- Temporary vs. Permanent Migration
- Settler vs. Labor Migration
- Planned vs. Flight Migration
- Economic Migrations vs. Political Refugees
- Illegal vs. Legal Migration
- Push vs. Pull Factors

Although migration has gone on since the dawn of human history, only the modern history of migration has risen up as a main force throughout the entire world. Migration has affect societies in modern time and it can be examined in four historical periods. In his essay, Douglas Massey explains that the modern history of international migration can be divided into four periods. During the *mercantile period*, from about 1500 to 1800, world immigration was dominated by flows out of Europe and stemmed from processes of colonization and economic growth under mercantile capitalism. Over the course of 300 years, Europeans came to inhabit large portions of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Oceania (Massey: 2003:1). The second period is the industrial period which was ruled by Industrial Development in Europe from 19<sup>th</sup> century till the World War I. Over 45 million Europeans emigrated from Europe. After this period, the third, the limited migration period came which involved first four decades of 20<sup>th</sup> century. There are several very significant historical events in the third period which are World War I, Great Depression and World War II. The United States was the major destination for emigrants all over the world. As Massey states that the fourth period of *post-industrial migration* emerged during the middle 1960s and constituted a sharp break with the past. Rather than being dominated by outflows from Europe to a handful of settler societies, immigration became truly global in scope, as the number and variety of both sending and receiving countries increased as the global supply of immigrants shifted from Europe to

developing countries of the Third World. Whereas migration during the industrial era brought people from densely settled, rapidly industrializing nations into sparsely settled, rapidly industrializing countries, migration in the post-industrial era brought people from densely-settled countries in the earliest stages of industrialization to densely-settled post-industrial societies. (Massey, 2003:3).

### **2.1.1. INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION**

International migration has three major patterns; social, economic and political transformations. According to Wallerstein's the Modern World Systems Theory, the international division of labor consist of three parts; core countries (capitalist markets), semi-periphery countries (pre-market) and periphery countries (non-market) (Wallerstein, 1976). Global economy gives rise to people who continuously look for better social and economic opportunities that is why the widespread displacement of people has enormously increased during the last century. It is fact that international migrants are not only originally from undeveloped and isolated regions where are disconnected from world markets; merely from regions or states which cannot stand the pace of international trade, technological, production and information networks. According to neo-classical economics, people leave their traditional live hoods to find new and better ones. In other words, global migration is not just a result of international market development, but a part of the development of markets themselves. In other words, Global economy is not only significant to capitalist economies which affect also countries which have pre-markets and non-market economies and both of these economies. Because of poor economy, socio-economic conditions are also damaged in these countries; that is why the widespread displacement of people comes up. In general, rural areas have lower wages rate than urban areas; therefore labor migration occurs from rural to urban, especially in developing regions. According to the neo-classical theory, people migrate to developed countries to have higher wages which provides for existence of international labor markets.

As Zolberg states the dynamics that have propelled international population movements to the forefront of humanistic and political concerns during past decades is likely to be amplified in the next. Given the persistence of huge disparities of conditions among rich and poor countries, the pool of potential international migrants will continue to grow (Zolberg, 1989).

International migration can be occurred in different ways but whole movements have mutual roots and all different forms of international migration (labor, long/short-term emigration, refugees) are quite interrelated. During the several historical periods; colonization, decolonization, modernization people have moved to foreign regions to have better condition. The basic pull factors are problems of cultural, demographic, economic, environmental, political and social patterns. International migration is a complex phenomenon which is closely related several socio-economic conjunctures. According to Portes and Böröcz; immigration, like other international processes, does not so much take place between compartmentalized national units as within an overarching system, itself a product of past historical development. Nation-states play an important, but not exclusive role within this system which also includes the activities of a multiplicity of private actors from large corporations to working class households (Portes & Böröcz, 1989: 626).

### **2.1.2. INTERNATIONAL LABOR FORCE**

International labor force was every firstly occurred in Western Europe immediately afterwards World War II. Macro economy tendency affected employment of foreign workers powerfully. According ILO: Migration for Employment Convention, a person who migrates from one country to another with a view to being employed otherwise than on his own account and includes any person regularly admitted as a migrant for employment (ILO, 1949). As Portes and Böröcz explain that the most widely held approach to the origins of international migration is a push-pull theory which sees labor flows as an outcome of poverty and backwardness in the sending areas. Representatives of this perspective provide lists of 'push factors' –economic, social and political hardships in the poorest parts of the world; and 'pull factors' –comparative advantages in the more advanced nation states- as casual variables determining the size and directionally of migrant follows (Portes & Böröcz, 1989: 607).

According to OECD Annual Report, the recruitment of foreign labor force has created new challenges and opportunities for both sending and receiving countries. Perhaps what is most distinctive about immigrant employment is clustering or concentration in particular jobs, industries and economic sectors. The sectorial nature of immigrant employment concentration varies from country to country due to historical factors and variables, such as entrepreneurial and foreign strategies (OECD, 1994: 37). From 19<sup>th</sup> to middle of 20<sup>th</sup> century, migrant recruitment trends of the post-colonial regions of Americas were high-priced in terms of capital input. On the other hand, spontaneous and self-started labor migration is a newer situation. Labor migration occurs in pre-market and non-market states consumption models which are out of phase with the global capitalist economy. Throughout post-World War II, Western Europe has two basic style of labor migration; migrant workers and labor from former colonies.

### **2.1.3. HISTORY OF GUESTWORKERS SINCE 1945**

After World War II, the economy of Western Europe began to improve that is way they needed to import labor, particularly for unqualified jobs during the time period between 1945 and the early 1970s. Generally, Western European countries imported migrants impulsively and afterwards their rights were regularized. On the other hand, some countries – the Netherlands, UK and France- preferred to receive guest-workers from former colonies who already got citizenship rights.

As Veysel Özcan argues that in the 19th century, Germany was a country of emigration. This changed somewhat at the turn of the century, when larger numbers of Polish workers were imported to work in the mining sector. The next wave of foreign workers was counted in the millions, as able-bodied men from Nazi Germany's occupied territories were forced to work in the German heavy manufacturing sector during World War II (Özcan, 2004). After World War II, Germany began recover to the traces of war, as soon as possible. Then Germany started recovering process with domestic labor. In time, Germany could not be able to meet the increasing demand of labor; additionally Eastern European workers had not enough

numbers to correspond the increasing demand. In the middle of 1950s, Germany sought to Southern European countries for new labor force. Their first choice was Southern Europe because they believed that migrants of this region could be assimilated easily. As Kaya and Kentel state that between 1955 and 1968, Germany concluded intergovernmental contracts with eight Mediterranean countries: Italian migrants came first (1955); Greek and Spanish (1960), Turkish (1961), Moroccan (1963), Portuguese (1964), Tunisian (1965) and Yugoslavian (1968) came (Kaya&Kentel, 2005). After Germany, other continental European country began to import migrant workers. As most economists say that labor importation of migrant workers is a milestone for Western European's great economic boom after World War II.

Germany specified the guest-workers situation clearly, they would abide by the plan; so they would stay while there were suitable works for them, and afterwards guest-workers would go back to their homelands when the economy got better. In first periods, the plan worked and migrant workers returned to their homelands according to plan in 1967.

In late 1973, The Arab Oil Boycott organized in the wake of the Yom Kippur War sent the European economy into a deep recession, and in November of that year Germany suspended migrant worker recruitment. According to Constant and Massey, unlike immigrants to the United States, migrant workers were viewed as short-term entrants and were expected to comply with what German bureaucrats called 'the rotationprinzip' (rotation principle), under which they would enter and work during economic booms but return and stay home during periods of recession. (Constant&Massey, 2002: 6). In the beginning of 1970s, numbers of guest-workers were rising but there was also an economic stagnation so both German governments SPD-FDP decided to stop guest-workers migration in 1973. As Constant and Massey state that authorities expected the migrant population to dwindle slowly as visas expired and the guests rotated out. They were surprised to discover however, that neither employers nor quest workers behaved according to plan. Employers wished to avoid the costs of recruitment and retraining, and thus sought to extend the visas of foreign workers they already had. The migrants, meanwhile, did not want to give up their good jobs and steady incomes, so they stayed put. Rather than leaving, they sought to sponsor the entry of their wives and children. After dipping slightly in 1974, the foreign population of Germany rose and its composition shifted increasingly from workers to dependents. Since 1974 most

immigrants to Germany have come through family reunification (Constant&Massey 2002: 6). As Castles points out the reasons of why did many guest-workers become permanent settlers:

- Migrants' objectives were linked to the life cycle: young single workers originally intended to stay for a few years, but as they grew older and established families, their plans changed.
- The recession was much worse in Turkey and North Africa than in Europe, so there were economic incentives to stay.
- Migrant workers had been partially integrated into welfare systems: entitlements to unemployment benefits, education, and social services made it worth staying despite worsening employment prospects.
- In liberal democratic societies, governments could not simply expel legally resident foreigners: the courts protected their rights to secure residence status and to live with their families.
- A coalition of pro-immigrant forces, embracing trade unions, churches, and civil rights organizations, influenced policies through their links with social-democratic and liberal parties (Castles, 2006: 743).

Additionally guest-workers also received support of religious organizations, civil society members, some academics and a number of legal judgments that guaranteed their right to stay. After Germany, other European countries stopped guest-worker's migration too.

### **2.1.3.1. Family Reunification**

According to rotation principle, the first foreign workers were young bachelors between 20 and 39 ages without family. They worked for industry basically with jobs which required few qualifications and their work period was designed one to two years and then they had to go back to their home countries to make room for future guest-workers. As Castles cities that the idea was to ensure “rotation” by recruiting workers for a limited period, restricting their rights, and minimizing family reunion. Migrants were expected to accept relatively poor wages and conditions, make little demand on social infrastructure, and not get involved in labor struggles (Castles, 1986). On the other hand, the most significant sending origin was converted from Italy to Turkey by the early 1970s. Turkey was 23 percent of all foreign workers than Yugoslavia, Italy, Greece and Spain came after.

After migrant workers have found a way to live in receiving country permanently, they requested for family reunification to indigenous courts. According to Hansen, as a result, in admitting young men in the 1950s and 1960s European states committed themselves to admitting wives, children and sometimes grandparents later. At the same time, in the short to medium term, migrants almost always have a higher birth rate than the indigenous population. The result, for every nation in Europe, was the emergence of multicultural, multilingual societies (Hansen 2003). Family reunification accelerated and the reality of settlement and migrants came out and became visible, because of this situation a new type of migration was existed which is called family-chain migration. Family-chain migration starts with a young bachelor who immigrates into a receiver country as a guest-worker. He works in the industrial sector for a while and he decides to stay permanently then firstly he sponsors their wives -who are economically dependent on their husbands- and children; and maybe later closes relatives –especially parents and siblings- for permanent settlement.

There are two theories to explain types of migrants, who is inclined to sponsor migration of their wives and children, which are target-earners or income-maximizes. In his essay, Amparo Gonzalez-Ferrer argues if migrants, as the Neo-Classical Economics of Migration assumes, are income-maximizing individuals who move in response to the higher wages in the receiving nation, and will stay abroad as long as there is no reduction in the bi-national wage difference, they are expected to be more willing to endure relatively long separations until the proper arrangements can be made for family reunification. On the contrary, if migrants are

target-earners who return home as soon as they manage to remit or save the amount of money they need, as the New Economics of Labor Migration argued, to have a spouse and children at origin would encourage migrants to work longer hours abroad. However, bringing the spouse and children of working age to the immigration country might help to meet faster the savings' target of the household (if they work) and, thus, would shorten their stay abroad (Gonzalez Ferrer, 2007).

Throughout the family reunification process, family-chain migration is indicted for integrations problems and ghettoization. According to Böse, Haberfellner and Koldas, as the mostly male immigrants decided to stay longer, the immigration of their family members started in the beginning of the 1970's. This phase of immigration profoundly changed the structure of the foreign population. Austria became in fact an immigration country, relative to the size of its population, even one of the foremost immigration countries in Europe. However, this status has never become part of Austria's official self-understanding. Even in phases of significant immigration, the political discourse held on to notions of "Zuwanderung", thus emphasising the transitory state of immigration, as opposed to "Einwanderung", which implies settlement. Integration was considered as the unifying policy objective related to immigrants, which served to distract from the fact of immigration. Following from this outlook, the need for an active immigration policy was not perceived in Austria until the mid-1990 (Böse&Haberfellner&Koldas 2001:3).

### **2.1.3.2. The Politics and Policies of immigration**

In the beginning of migrant workers process, the workers were generally employed as unqualified workers and earned lowest-paid job which any of ethnic Europeans wanted. On the other hand, they were not still seen as permanent settlers. When the settlement of guest-workers was perceived as a permanent situation, immigration became politicized; especially in France and Germany. As Castles and Miller explain that relatively few people foresaw that the decision to recruit foreign labor in the wake of the Second World War would one day affect the political landscape of Western Europe. But immigration did lead to a significantly altered political environment (Castles & Miller 2003: 255). Immigration process is important both of two countries; sending and receiving countries and but their political power can be



active or passive. In other words, migrants can be political actors for their socio-economical rights or be apolitical individuals. Additionally, they also could be the object of politics.

By early 1970s, immigrants became significant for political area. They began to be participated in politics and search for opportunity for representation. Political visibility of immigrant societies started with advisory councils. These advisory councils instructed to accept immigrants in local government in various countries then immigrants were entitled to vote in local and regional elections. As Castles and Miller state that proposals to grant local voting rights to legally-resident aliens became important domestic political and constitutional issues, particularly in France and Germany (Castles & Miller, 2003:58). Actually, political affirmation of migration reality took time. Many receiver countries lead to have a citizenship very hard for immigrants. Especially Germany insisted on believing that one day, migrant workers would go back their home countries that is why Germany declared off ethnic citizenship hardly then guest-workers could take German citizenship after a long time.

According to Castles, Western European societies did not integrate immigrants as equals, but as economically disadvantaged and racially discriminated minorities. As a result, immigrants tended to settle in specific neighborhoods, marked by inferior housing and infrastructure. Ethnic enterprises and religious, cultural, and social associations developed in these areas. Thus the inherent contradictions of the migrant worker system led to today's ethnically diverse but socially divided European societies (Castles, 2006: 744).

As mentioned above, minorities reside in specific neighborhoods where they can preserve their mother languages. Guest-workers share same conditions with all the other minorities; they live in a disadvantaged urban areas and excluded from mainstream society. Additionally, host-societies prefers a hands-off attitude to immigrants that is why non-European minorities becomes the most marginalized groups in the entire receiver countries. There are several reasons for marginalization of minorities; cultural distance, lower socio-economic conditions and being recently arrived.

As Böse, Haberfellner and Koldas (Böse&Haberfellner&Koldas 2001:9) state that in contrast to post-colonial countries such as England or the Netherlands, there is no comparable tradition of 'race-talk' and anti-racism policies. Racism or xenophobia, as resentments against

immigrant minorities are generally referred to in Austria, has emerged in different waves in Austria. In the mid-1990s, for the first time in several decades racist violence existed. Although the extent of violent racism seemed to be smaller than in other European countries, xenophobia has always had a crucial impact on the daily lives of immigrants in Austria.

Immigration reality has been shown as a political trump for extreme right-wing parties for European politic area. Anti-immigrant propagandas are used by right-wing parties mainly. There are several examples about anti-immigrants politics all over the Europe. For integration of ethnic minitorities and immigrants, racist campaigns, vexation and violance are significant. Racist-actions force miniorites to overcome isolation and defensive strategies and less integration into mainstream societies.

Migration is a tough human movement which differeniates social, political and economical patterns. International migration is able to affect both of reciever and sending countries. Every country of immigration has their own style to cope with migration process. Austria fits into the differential exclusionary model, as Castles cities that the model is based on the desire to prevent permanent settlement, has proved very hard to maintain because it leads to social tension and because it contradicts the democratic principle of including all members of civil society in the nation-state (Castles, 1995). As Jeannette Money, state policy also tends to segregate immigrants residentially through social housing policies and to discriminate in the provision of social services. Finally, these states make acquisition of citizenship difficult both for the initial immigrants and for their children. Austria, Switzerland, and Germany, before its citizenship reforms, are often given as examples of differential exclusionary states (Money, 2010).

To sum up, the process of guest-worker's migration is a complex historical phenomenon which includes several economical social and political patterns. Guest-workers have been an important part of European economic boom besides entire migration problems.

#### **2.1.4. TRANSNATIONALISM and COUNTER-MIGRATION MOVEMENTS**

Migration is one of the most significant social phenomena of modern history. Especially, during the last two centuries, international migration has accrued all over the world. There are several reasons for migration; such as economic, environmental, political and social reasons. On the grounds of these reasons, members of one nation have left their ancestral and traditional homelands and settled in another place where is away from their homeland; they established a new life conditions in there then probably fellow migrants jointed them.

Transnational migration communities are oriented by factors of migration, time period and conjecture. On the other hand it is also important how they were treated in receiver country and how the mainstream society in receiver country perceives transnational migration communities' original culture and homeland. Additionally, diasporic minorities can be affected by economic, cultural, environmental, political and social conditions in receiver country. By time, they may constitute a new culture or identity which is based on being diasporic in a host country. And next generations might be fond of the county and culture their families left or they might have a glacial perception for their descendant culture.

Furthermore, the conditions of transnational migration can be bidirectional, unidirectional or reversible. Global world provides several opportunities to be mobilized for diasporic communities, between host and home countries. On the other hand, a transnational migration community costs of misplacing population, labor force, brain power and economic activity for the sending country. In this case, the homeland often expect that diasporic community will move back to homeland then the homeland can take cultural, economic, political and social advantages of diasporic community so that homelands generally try to be in contact with diasporic communities.

*Transnational Turkish Community in Europe:* The modern transnational Turkish labor community in Europe can be defined as Euro-Turk population and their descendants who immigrated and settle in another country where is outside of Turkish Republic. The modern Turkish labor community was existed as foreign workers according to economic boom conditions after Post-war. Turkey signed bilateral agreements with Austria, Belgium, France,

Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, Sweden. The significance of the Turkish Labor community can be inspected in economic, social and political patterns.

At the economic case of Turkish labor community has great potential which can be exploited by both Turkey and receiver countries. According to Centre for Studies on Turkey, the EU has 1.372 million Turkish workers making 0.69% of the EU labor force and adding EUR 80.7 billion to EU GDP. This is a remarkable contribution almost equal to twice of the annual GNP of Luxembourg and just over half the GDP of Greece. Levels of self-employment and entrepreneurship are rising amongst the Turkish labor community symbolizing the transformation from migrant worker to employer. The research explains that the number of Turkish entrepreneurs is the highest in Germany with 56.000, followed by Holland with 13,500. The overall number of Turkish entrepreneurs in the EU has risen from 56,500 in 1996 to 101,000 in 2006. The importance of Turkish entrepreneurs is also significant in terms of investment. According to the same research, between 1996 and 2006, investment by Turks in their host economies rose from EUR 5.6 billion to EUR 10.9 billion (Centre for Studies on Turkey, 2007).

For politics, Turkish labor community also has an unique position; the diasporic community can affect both political conjuncture in Turkey and the receiver country because of their special political positions and their citizenship which they have.

Transnational communities have very complex social structures which makes them hard to classify. Not all of them, but many diasporic communities have 'homeland myth' which can provide 'a different' life. The keynote of an ultimate return to homeland is changeable between transnational communities, socio-politic conjuncture, across time. As King and Christou state that homeland orientation and a universal desire to return are thus questionable as necessary criteria for the definition of transnational communities, especially for long established transnational communities dating back centuries. For newer transnational communities, those which are the result of labor migrations or refugee flows over the past half-century or so, the more specific phenomenon of second-generation 'return' does seem to be gaining in significance (King & Christou, 2008:5). According to IOM, return migration is an umbrella term, which subsumes voluntary as well as forced return (IOM, 2004). According

to the European Migration Network (EMN), there are three forms of return measures are to be distinguished: voluntary return, assisted voluntary and forced return:

- Voluntary and independent return of immigrants (for example of former “guest workers”, who want to spend their retirement in their original home countries).
- Assisted voluntary return of persons without means: usually rejected asylum seekers, refugees and persons with irregular residence status.
- Forced return (deportation) as part of coercive measures of the Aliens’ Police (EMN, 2006).

And again according to the same survey, in Austria, the general conception prevails that voluntary return should be preferred to forced return as it is not only more cost-efficient but also more effective, and furthermore allows avoiding the stigmatization of the returnees. Nevertheless, the principle of voluntary return has not yet been explicitly codified in a legally binding manner and therefore there is not a generally valid definition for this form of return (EMN, 2006:15).

Additionally, the return migration literature focuses on nearly just on the first generation. As King and Christous state that from earlier literature on labor migrants ‘return, it is almost as if they had no families. What we find instead are fleetinf references to the problems of the children of these returnees who are plunged into a school system with which they are unfamiliar, which is unprepared for them, and in which their educational progress may be seriously held back (King & Christou, 2008: 11).

Literatur says us that the second-generation, return migration is mainly used as a voluntry-return migration of second-generation. Because of this situation, all return behavioral of second generation will be considered as a roots-migration in this study. As Susan Wessendorf states that the concept of ‘root migration’ to describe the migration to a place where members of the second generation originate from, but where they have never lived (Wessendorf, 2007: 1084).

#### **2.1.4.1. Roots Migration**

As mentioned above, Susanne Wessendorf determines the concept of roots migration to describe the migration to a place where members of the second generation originate from, but they have never lived (Wessendorf, 2007a: 1084). She also underlines that migration to the parents' country of origin has been largely understudied in research on the second generation. Only recently have there been some studies focusing on the children of transatlantic migrants such as Greeks from North America or Caribbeans from Britain who 'return' to their parents' homeland (Wessendorf, 2007a: 1084). It is also important to respecify that in the migration literature, the concept of return migration also examines the second generation and their perception of their return possibility to their parents' homeland. In addition, the second-generation has mainly been studied on the receiving country in the literature. Likewise, studies on return migration generally consider that the first generation's return possibility and their re-integration into their homeland. On the other hand, it is significant to realize that all the transnational experiences and realities; such as return migration and the first generation because they help to understand the second generations's homeland perception and their wish to live in there.

Furthermore, first-generation return migration are generally considered in the social conditions between homeland and hostland which compirese transnational relations. Studies on return migration differentiate immigrants for whom return is unit of initial migration politics and those who intent for permanent settlement in the receiver country and choose or are forced to return because of the political, economic and social conditions. It has been stated that, in many cases, the basic reason for return are non-economic; it is deeply-related to strong family relations.

The return dream has been always existed and it is also a significant part of labor immigrant' characteristic. Thus, the nostalgia of the homeland is an important phenomenon for labor immigrants. Transnational practices are important and complicated realities of immigrants. As Glick Schiller explains transnational relations in two ways; 'ways of being and 'ways of belonging' (Glick Schiller, 2004). According to Wessendorf ,while transnational 'ways of being' refers to the actual practices and social relations individuals engage in, 'ways of

belonging' refers to emotional connections to persons or localities that are elsewhere, and practices that signal a conscious connection to, or identification with, a particular group. Thus, individuals can engage in transnational ways of being in their social relations and everyday practices. However, only those who highlight the transnational elements of who they are express transnational ways of belonging (Wessendorf, 2007a: 1090).

Transnational practices have significant place in the childhood of second-generation. Additionally, it is also a determining factor for ways of being and ways of belonging. In general, social ties with family, relatives and cognate friends is still important for the second-generation; this situation is deeply related to transnational ways of being. Nonetheless, there are also a number of individuals who are continue to related to transnational ways of belonging and who feel particularly tough about the 'home country' are the roots migrants. As Wessendorf argue that although they do not 'return' to their parents' homeland (they have never lived there), they move to a place which has always been part of their identity and their everyday lives, and their migration is strongly motivated by nostalgia (Wessendorf, 2007a: 1091).

In her essay in 2006, Susan Wessendorf argues that second-generation roots migration could be interpreted as a reaction to such intensely trans-local childhood and juvenescence. The term 'roots' not only reflects the roots migrants' own interpretation of where they come from, but also their aspiration to settle in just one place and to cease to lead lives characterized by mobility. This somewhat contradicts the contestation of the 'rootedness' of identity in social sciences and confirms that 'modern individuals continue to "centre themselves" in a notion of home which is itself centered on the specific spatial and temporal coordinates of the homeland' (Wessendorf, 2007a:1091).

The roots-migration of second-generation is a new and compounded field to research which involves trans-local and transnational practices. Also a small group of second-generation migrants think about returning to the homeland is interesting to analyze what expectations roots-migrants hold.

## 2.2. EURO-TURKS: Turkish Guest-Workers in Europe

Western European countries needed industrial labor force after the World War II. Under the terms of a Labor Export Agreements Turkish labor migration to European countries pioneered in early 1960s. Consequently modern Turkish transnational labor community was existed. The labor recruitment agreements were an executable solution for Turkey and receiver-European countries. Turkey expected an inducement for economic improvement and industrial modernization from return of migrant workers. European countries, on the other hand, required to temporary labor force with lower cost during great economic development without the anxiety of raising wages.

According to Kaya and Kentel, in the early stages of the migration, Turkish migrants were mainly men between the ages of 20 and 39, relatively skilled and educated in comparison to the average working population in Turkey, and from the economically more-developed regions of the country. The proportion of rural migrants at this stage was just 17.2%. In the second half of the 1960s, recruitment primarily consisted of rural workers since the textile and electronics sectors demanded cheap female labor in the middle of 1960s (Kaya&Kentel, 2005:7). Throughout this period, the number of Turkish female migrants begun to grow, approximately a quarter of the Turkish workers were women.

Labor migrants planned to work in Europe for several years before returning Turkey. In middle of 1960s, almost a million Turkish has started migrated to Western Europe for working as guest-worker; most of them to Germany. In their study, Sonmez and McDonald explain that at the beginning the number of migrants was comparatively small and basically young men without families; a third of migrants was skilled workers. The Turkish Employment Services (Türkiye İş Kurumu- İŞKUR) mediated between workers and employer. During the period between 1963 and 1966, almost 180,000 Turkish migrants went to Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany. Turkish Labor migration carried on increasing after 1968 and nearly 520.000 workers migrated to Western Europe, mainly to Germany (Sonmez&McDonald, 2008). According to Abadan-Unat, subsequent agreements encouraged establishment of assistance organizations to help migrants deal with various problems, such as housing or legal problems, while abroad. In the course of time, migrants themselves developed their own self-help organizations (Abadan-Unat 1976).



The recruitment of Turkish labor was accepted through a rotation principle. According to agreements, Turkish guest-workers were allowed to work in Europe for temporary period; such as one or two years afterwards they were required to turn back to Turkey, then the other migrants would be the next. In their study, Constant and Massey state that authorities expected the migrant population to dwindle slowly as visas expired and the guests rotated out. They were surprised to discover however, that neither employers nor foreign workers behaved according to plan. Employers wished to avoid the costs of recruitment and retraining, and thus sought to extend the visas of foreign workers they already had. The migrants, meanwhile, did not want to give up their good jobs and steady incomes, so they stayed put. Rather than leaving, they sought to sponsor the entry of their wives and children. After dipping slightly in 1974, the foreign population of Germany rose and its composition shifted increasingly from workers to dependents. Since 1974 most immigrants to Germany have come through family reunification (Constant&Massey, 2002: 6). In any case, by time temporary agreements converted to permanent agreements; embracing family reunification, inescapably illegal labor migration and politically supported migration (by Turkish governments). As Icduygu cities that by the early 2000s, there were more than 3 millions of Turkish citizens in Europe with Germany being the major host, followed by France and the Netherlands. The number of Turkish workers was the highest once again in Germany with around 732,000, followed by France and Austria. Expatriate Turks amounted more than 3.5 million which is almost 5% of the nation's total population (Icduygu, 2004).

In their study Euro-Turks, Kaya and Kentel explain the Euro-Turks. According to them, despite the significant transformation and upward mobility they have undergone, Euro-Turks have been continually misrepresented both in Germany and Turkey. The labels attached to them include derogatory terms such as 'in between', 'foreigner', 'German-like' (*Almanci*), 'degenerated', 'conservative', 'radical', 'nationalist' or 'lost generations'. All these problem-oriented representations have acquired wide popularity in both countries. It seems that the popularity of these labels springs from a traditional notion of culture that is widely used in both countries – a point to which we shall return shortly. Turkish workers have generally been addressed in the official German discourse as '*Gastarbeiter*' (guest-worker), '*Ausländer*' (foreigner) or '*Mitbürger*' (co-citizen) – terms that underline their 'otherness' and displacement. They are officially defined in Turkey as either '*gurbetçi*' or '*Almanya'daki vatandaşlarımız*' (our citizens in Germany). German-Turks are stereotypically defined by their compatriots in Turkey as either '*Almanyalı*' or '*Almanci*'. Both terms carry rather

negative connotations in Turkey. Their spoken Turkish and the way they dress also contribute to the construction of an *Almancı* image in Turkey. “Here we are called *yabancı* (foreigner) and there in Turkey they call us *Almancı*” is a refrain one hears frequently, especially among the German-Turkish youth (Kaya & Kentel, 2005).

As Biffl cities that migrants from Turkey represent a fairly small proportion of all migrants to the EU. In 2008 some 2.3 million foreign born from Turkey were counted, i.e. 6% of all foreign born in the EU15 and 0.6% of the total EU15 population<sup>2</sup>. They live in the main in Germany (1.5 million), Austria (158,000), France (230,000), and the Netherlands (200,000). If one adds the number of second generation migrants from Turkey to the foreign born, i.e. those already born in Europe, the total rises to close to 4 million (Biffl, 2011:1). Nowadays, the fourth generation is growing up with their integration problems but the cultural metamorphosis of Turkish youngsters begins with second generation. Second generation is not fully-integrated citizen but they are not like their parents. Besides they might have weaker roots with homeland than first generation has, the second generation can speak German fluently and they still have good Turkish language level.

### **2.3. HISTORY OF LABOR RECRUITMENT IN AUSTRIA**

Austria has a significant amount of foreign nationality population, as Eurostat<sup>4</sup> states that 15.2 per cent of Austrian population is foreign born inhabitants and 8 per cent of Austrian population has foreign nationality.

Indeed, Austria has not considered itself as an immigrant country; Austria has been a country of immigration traditionally. Over the last two centuries, Austria has participated in various forms of international migration, including immigration, emigration, and transit migration. As Jandl and Kraler state that during the 19th and early 20th centuries, when the territory of today's Republic of Austria made up only about one-tenth of the Habsburg Empire, migration was driven by that period's new forces of social change: industrialization, proletarianization and urbanization. (Jandl & Kraler, 2003). In Austria, immigration has been being related to

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<sup>4</sup> Vasileva, Katya (2011), 'Population and Social Condition', Statistic in Focus 32/2011, Eurostat

economic dynamic and social changes. Austria is an extremely developed corporatist welfare state. As like as Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg; Austria is member of the continental social regime type which includes a high-developed social security system. Namely, this system provides efficient welfare service and social rights above the European standards; such as a good income protection for entire family, workers are protected against dismissal and high pension benefits. The continental social regime is a high priced system and migration flows makes the system exhausted but the system also needs foreign labor force to carry itself to the future.

By the end of the Second World War, Austria became a part of European economic boom. Austria became an inviting destination for labor migration. In 1960s, Austria led to labor recruitment, as Germany and Switzerland have already put into practice. Bilateral agreements designed to recruit short-term migrant workers in 1961; with southern and southeastern European states (Turkey 1964, Yugoslavia 1966). After agreements, a significant amount of migrant workers and their families immigrated to Austria. Migration started to flow with 1.800 numbers of workers in 1961 then amounted to almost 227,000 migrants in 1973.

Migrants were gladly consented as workers who were accepting lowest- paying jobs. Firstly, only young bachelors moved to Austria who were originally from northern Yugoslavia, mainly Slovenes and Croats. Afterwards, migration continued to flood from countryside regions in the Southeastern Yugoslavia; such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia. Thus far this stage, the existence of labor migrants was ignored by public and politicians because migrants were only single males who were not visible in schools and mainstream society. Subsequently, Turkey became a sending country which exported a great amount of labor to Austria and after young males owned permanent work permits, family reunification invoked. Then migration converted to a new social phenomenon which took the attention of the public.

In Austria Country report presents that Austria also followed the Rotation Principle to set up a migration policy. Because of the Oil Crisis in 1973, Austria stopped to external recruitment. This policy change supported preferred employment for Austrian workers (*Inländerprimat*); limited migrant labor only to those sectors deemed necessary for the Austrian economy (*Generalvorbehalt*); and excluded non-Austrians from specific social welfare benefits. These measures were all ratified under the 1975 Alien Employment Law

(*Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz*), which regulated migrant labor permits and the right to work. This law remains one of the primary control mechanisms of foreign employment. While active labor recruitment was stopped, other forms of migration - family reunification, spontaneous labor migration and, by the late 1980s, clandestine migration and asylum - became more important (Austria Country Report, July 2007).

As Maresova states that a result of a restrictive immigration policy, the period from the second half of the 1970s to the middle of the 1980s marked an ever-decreasing number of foreign workers in Austria. In the second half of the 1980s and particularly after the collapse of the communist regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR, the number of foreigners in the Austrian labor market started to rise (Maresova, 1999).

In their essay, König and Stadler argue that in the 1990s, the Austrian government initiated a series of legislative reforms. These covered all areas related to migration, including entry, residence, employment, and asylum. These reforms must be regarded as representing a substantial shift in the Austrian migration regime, moving from a system of flexible reaction towards the demands of the labor market to a strictly regulated and limited system of immigration (König & Stadler: 2004). On the other hand, a quota for the recruitment of migrant workers was applied which was determined as maximum amount migrant workers in the total labor force (8% of the total labor force). Moreover, the Residence Act (*Aufenthaltsgesetz*) was amended which implemented quotas for a number of categories of migrants in 1992. Additionally, first residence permits had to be appealed for from homeland afterwards immigration status was reassessed by Austrian government. According to König and Stadler, a statement of the Aliens Act (*Ausländergesetz*) was distinguished in 1998, between migrant rights to impermanent settlement. The reinforcement of residence (*Aufenthaltsverfestigung*) was developed into living conditions for permanent migrants. In addition, integration courses (language, historical and political instruction of Austria) became mandatory for whole newly arrived migrants from non-EU states (König & Stadler: 2004:6).

**Table 2: Demographic and geographical characteristics of immigration to Austria**

<b>Phase</b>	<b>Duration</b>	<b>Quantitative dimension</b>	<b>Demographic characteristics</b>	<b>Geographical origin</b>
Initial phase	1960 up to 1973	emerging immigration, gets more important than emigration, but is still related to cyclic phenomena, high fluctuation of balances	young males migrating as single persons; demand-driven immigration into employment	Ex-Yugoslavia; regions of origin shifted from the North to Serbia and Montenegro
Intermediate phase	1973–1993	high fluctuation of balances; shift from male labor migration to family unification and more balanced migration; dominance of the traditional guest worker countries	shift from a male dominated migration to family migration	Turkey became an important region of origin due to family reunification
New stability	1994 until today	immigration is a constant phenomenon; with the accession to the EU the EU-internal migration becomes more important	migration of young employees; dominance of 15–35 age groups; male and female migration	spread of regions of origin; relative loss of importance of the traditional guest worker countries

Source: IDEA Working Paper No. 1, December 2008<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP1\\_Austria.pdf](http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP1_Austria.pdf)

On 1 January 2006, the “Alien Law Package 2005” came into force, partly building on the basic structures from previous legislation. The Alien Law Package defines the legal status of aliens in three central acts: the Alien Police Act (FPG)<sup>6</sup>, the Settlement and Residence Act (NAG)<sup>7</sup> and the Asylum Act (AsylG)<sup>8</sup>. The employment of foreigners is regulated by the Aliens Employment Act of 1975 (AuslBG)<sup>9</sup>.

‘On 21 July 2005 Austria’s controversial asylum act has passed the Regional Council. Because of many restrictions the opposition announced legal actions at the Constitutional Court before the act will come into force on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2006. Human rights organizations criticize lacks in legal protection, the introduction of forcible feeding of asylum seekers and wide range authorizations for the police forces. The act has been adopted by the National Council, i.e. the Austrian parliament, on 7 July 2005. On 21 July 2005 the Regional Council approved it without raising an objection. The Austrian interior ministry told that it has drawn major importance on the conformity with human rights. This is of a particular interest since the Constitutional Court declared invalid three key provisions of the 2003 asylum act on 15 October 2004. According to the highest judges, the former act was contrary to human and constitutional rights in so far as it contained a preclusion of new arguments in a legal remedy, extended possibilities of expulsion detention and the negation of protection against expulsion while an appeal is pending’ (Naujoks, 2005).

As Cinar stated in ‘Country Report: Austria’ that nationality legislation was amended once again in 2009 as part of a comprehensive reform of the Asylum Law, Aliens Police Law and the Law on Settlement and Residence. The new regulations entered into force on January 1, 2010 (Cinar 2010:9).

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<sup>6</sup> Alien Police Act 2005, BGBl I 2005/100 in the version BGBl I 2006/31 (FPG).

<sup>7</sup> Settlement and Residence Act 2005, BGBl I (Federal Law Gazette) 2005/100 in the version BGBl II 2006/31 (NAG).

<sup>8</sup> Asylum Act 2005, BGBl I 2005/100 (AsylG).

<sup>9</sup> Aliens Employment Act 1975, BGBl 1975/218 in the version of BGBl I 2006/99 (AuslBG).

**Table 3: General legal trends and specific measures**

Phase	General legal trends	Specific measures
1960 up to 1973	No specific immigration policies at hand; labor market policy is dominating	1962 Raab-Olah-Agreement with the dominance of the rotation principle 1964 Recruitment Agreement with Turkey 1965 Recruitment Agreement with Yugoslavia 1968 First Austrian Asylum Act
1973–1993	Oscillating between liberalization and tightening of political measures	1975 Aliens Employment Act introduced a system of stepwise access to different types of permits 1991 Asylum Act, introducing the principles of ‘safe third countries’ and ‘safe country of origin’ 1993 Residence Law marks the beginning of a controlled immigration system following the American example
1994 until today	Differentiated legislation with a multitude of ‘channels of immigration’ to control migration more efficiently	1997 Revision of the 1991 Asylum Act, abolished the heavily criticized ‘safe country of origin’ principle and provided for the inclusion of the Schengen Agreement and the harmonization of the Austrian asylum law with the 1990 EU Dublin Convention 1997 Aliens Act, merged the 1992 Aliens Act and the 1993 Residence Act into a single law. The main aim of the reform was to promote the integration for aliens already living in Austria, in the place of new immigration. This concept was called ‘Integration before immigration’, and the law became known as the ‘Integration Package’ 1998 Naturalization Act retained the core elements of the previous regulations: principle of <i>ius sanguinis</i> and a regular waiting period of 10 years for naturalization. It shifted the burden of proof to the individual immigrant, who now has to prove that he/she is sufficiently integrated into Austrian society, is economically self-sufficient and has a sufficient command of German language 2005 Aliens Law Package, a comprehensive legislative reform on order to implement EU directives and strengthened measures against irregular immigration and fraudulent marriage and adoptions. The reform contains among others the Settlement and Residence Act, the Aliens Police Act and the revised Aliens Employment Act


Source: IDEA Working Paper No. 1, December 2008<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> [http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP1\\_Austria.pdf](http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP1_Austria.pdf)

Migration in Austria is deployed to cities, mainly towards Vienna, Tyrol and Vorarlberg. Almost half of Austria's total migrant population lives in Vienna. In general terms, big cities provide better living conditions to live and stay.

As Fassmann and Reeger shows that immigrants from the EU-15 are concentrated in the West of Austria, which proves the distance argument, and in the Vienna region. Most of them originate from Germany and either work or have a second home close to the Bavarian border. According to the distance factor, migrants from Eastern Europe display a diametrically opposed distribution. They are found in the Vienna region and along the border with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, with Western Austria playing an insignificant role (Fassmann & Reeger, 2008):

**Figure 1: Share of foreign citizens in the total population in the political district, 2001**



Source: IDEA Working Paper No. 1, December 2008<sup>11</sup>

As in recent years, naturalization has had a very significant role in Austria. In the 1980s, the number of naturalizations averaged 7 700 people a year. The naturalization figures rose sharply from the mid-1990s as a result of the marked increase in the number of non-Austrian nationals. In 1997 for instance, just under 16 000 foreign nationals living in Austria were

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP1\\_Austria.pdf](http://www.idea6fp.uw.edu.pl/pliki/WP1_Austria.pdf)



naturalized; in 1999, around 25 000; and in 2003, a total of almost 45 000. The number of naturalizations has been declining since 2004 to 6 135 in 2010. This has been the lowest figure since the beginning of the nineteen seventies. As a proportion of the foreign population (naturalization rate), the number of naturalizations has doubled in recent years. In the 1980s and 1990s, there were 2.4 naturalizations for every 100 foreign nationals on a statistical average; since 2001 the rates have been over 4%, amounted to 6% in 2003 but dropped again afterwards. In 2010, the naturalization rate amounted to 0.7%, which has been the lowest level ever reached since 1961. In 2010, the number of naturalizations declined by more than one-fifth over the previous year and by as much as more than four-fifths over 2003. Austrian citizenship was granted to a total of 6 190 people (including 55 persons who were resident abroad) in 2010 (2009: 7 990; -22.5%). Close to two-fifths of those naturalized (2 342 or 37.8%) were born in Austria.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> [http://www.statistik.at/web\\_en/statistics/population/naturalisation/index.html](http://www.statistik.at/web_en/statistics/population/naturalisation/index.html)

**Table 4: Naturalized persons since 2000 by selected characterizes**

Characteristics	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
<b>Naturalisation (total)<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>31.731</b>	<b>36.011</b>	<b>44.694</b>	<b>41.645</b>	<b>34.876</b>	<b>25.746</b>	<b>14.010</b>	<b>10.258</b>	<b>7.978</b>	<b>6.135</b>	<b>6.690</b>
Naturalisationrate <sup>2</sup>	4,4	4,9	6,0	5,5	4,4	3,2	1,7	1,2	0,9	0,7	0,7
<b>Citizenship</b>											
Former Yugoslavia <sup>3</sup> )	10.737	13.990	21.574	18.917	16.974	12.631	9.346	6.003	4.181	3.152	2.811
Turkey	10.046	12.623	13.665	13.004	9.545	7.542	2.076	1.664	1.242	937	1.178
Countries of the European Union <sup>4</sup> )	157	131	147	1.537	1.075	711	1.051	854	856	598	709
Other European countries	5.152	4.200	4.236	2.274	1.958	1.765	284	288	291	270	461
Non-European OECD-countries	120	107	110	167	151	86	97	144	103	36	46
Other countries	5.519	4.960	4.962	5.746	5.173	3.011	1.156	1.305	1.305	1.142	1.485
<b>Country of birth</b>											
Austria	9.647	11.121	13.680	12.278	10.024	7.710	4.988	3.821	3.053	2.328	2.374
Outside Austria	22.084	24.890	31.014	29.367	24.852	18.036	9.022	6.437	4.925	3.807	4.316
<b>Age groups</b>											
0 to 18 years	12.323	14.404	18.112	17.090	13.941	9.808	5.720	4.377	3.398	2.463	2.530
18 to 59 years	19.239	21.424	26.231	24.138	20.406	15.549	8.002	5.657	4.442	3.583	4.056
60 years and over	169	183	351	417	529	389	288	224	138	89	104
<b>Sex</b>											
Men	16.035	18.290	22.337	20.913	17.560	12.577	6.410	4.803	3.756	2.872	3.116
Women	15.696	17.721	22.357	20.732	17.316	13.169	7.600	5.455	4.222	3.263	3.574
<b>Länder</b>											
Burgenland	851	714	839	660	652	501	244	170	157	138	144
Carinthia	438	691	997	1.581	1.534	1.292	631	427	319	471	317
Lower Austria	3.137	3.191	5.148	5.123	4.915	3.961	1.721	1.550	1.202	799	1.144
Upper Austria	5.449	6.857	7.314	6.046	5.152	4.128	2.025	1.458	1.313	995	1.045
Salzburg	1.661	2.376	2.681	2.758	2.086	1.481	897	586	518	516	480
Styria	2.410	1.828	3.823	3.388	3.815	2.220	1.091	805	557	430	399
Tyrol	1.793	2.689	2.984	3.431	2.540	2.027	1.162	800	632	574	617
Vorarlberg	2.598	2.993	2.823	2.304	1.942	1.482	1.039	680	425	467	473
Vienna	13.394	14.672	18.085	16.354	12.240	8.654	5.200	3.782	2.855	1.745	2.071
Outside Austria <sup>5</sup> )	349	371	418	529	541	513	31	10	12	55	64

Source: STATISTICS AUSTRIA, Naturalization statistics. Revised result for 2010. - Compiled on 21.6.2011.

Note: 1) Naturalizations of Austrian residents. 2) Per 100 non-Austrian (annual average). 3) Since 2004 without Slovenia. 4) Until 2003: EU-14; since 2004: EU-24, since 2007: EU-26. 5) Naturalizations of non-residents.

As Leif Lybecker Eskesen claims that Austria faces significant population aging of its population over the next 50 years. The ratio of elderly to people of working age will be more than double over this period. As the average age of the population increases, spending on pensions, health care, and long-term care will rise. At the same time, the shrinkage the

number of labor force participants will lower tax and social security contribution revenues. This will put pressure on the public finances from both the expenditure and revenue side, undermining the finances of the traditional Austrian welfare state. Moreover, Christoph Reinprecht underlines that compared to the census of 1991, the share of older migrants (6.3%) has risen more sharply than for the Austrian population (21.1%). In the view of declining immigration rates, the migrant population will become older. Forecasts indicate that the age patterns of the migrant population will equal those of the Austrian population by 2021 (Reinprecht, 2003).

### **2.3.1. TURKS IN AUSTRIA**

Austria and Turkey share a long history for ages. Throughout the history, Austrian-Turkish relationship was controlled by wars and both countries felt hostility towards each other. The big part of the Hungarian territory was conquered by Ottoman Empire after the Mohacs Battle in 1526. This battle-defeat changed the political conditions and Islamic region came closer to central-European borders. The two sieges of Vienna (1529 and 1683) are well known in Austria. Besides Turks had no victory, these sieges affected Austrian politics deeply. After sieges, Austria became the defender of Europe and the Danube became the Austrian-Turkish military boundary. After the Turkish-Russian War in between 1878-1877, the Treaty of Berlin was promulgated and the Austrian-Turkish military zone ended.

Since the victory against the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 18th century the memories of the Austrian-Turkish wars have been kept alive in many places and regions.

Place names and monuments show us the collective remembrance of this era (Matzka, 2009).

After World War II, Turkish migration to Austria started with bilateral agreements in 1964. According to agreements, Turkish workers came to Austria, mainly settled in Vienna and Vorarlberg. As Herzog-Punzenberger states that in 1971, the Austrian workforce included 5,600 Turkish citizens. In the “classical” period of guest worker migration, from 1960 to 1973, only 1 1,700 male and 3,400 female workers came from Turkey to Austria. The

numbers actually grew after the Wiedereinreisestopp<sup>13</sup> of 1974. Since the mid-1970s, it has been crucial for Turkish workers to know that if they left the country, it would be difficult to re-enter. So they stayed and asked their families to come to Austria. (Herzog-Punzenberger, 2003:1124).

Turkish labor migration process can be examined in four levels. In the beginnings, the first generation of Turkish immigrants, who were semiskilled or unskilled workers, had mainly farmer and provincial backgrounds. Exclusively, a small part of migrants were self-employed or employed as a white collar in Turkey. Additionally, the first generation of Turkish immigrants was lower-educated and qualified than Turkish immigrants in Germany. In the second level, Turkish migrants were progressively concentrated in fixed industries and occupations, especially textiles, leather goods, food processing so that Turkish workers turned into progressively complementary to Austrian workers. In the third level, the request of the particular skills of the migrants declined because of economic restructuring, the increment of employment of Austrian women and youth and the baby boom generation. In accordance to this situation, lots of Turkish workers lost their jobs, generally without gain rights to unemployment benefits. Therefore, Turkish labor became stabile but family reunification caused population increase. The fourth level continued during the middle to late 1980s, Turkish migration had been developed and Turkish entrepreneurs began to establish their ethnic business and associations. In this way, Turkish migrants put milestones for trade linkages with their homeland.

The socio-cultural situation of the Turkish migrants in Austria is in the significant discussion which is about their integration problems in Austria because Turkish population correspond a big amount of the immigrants. As Biffl indicates that in the respective European countries the share of foreign born from Turkey differs markedly. Austria has the largest proportion of foreign born form Turkey -with 1.9% of the total population- who live in Austria. If the second generation is considered, the amount will reach to over than 3% of the total population of Austria (Biffl, 2011:1).

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<sup>13</sup> As Herzog-Punzenberger states that a Wiedereinreisestopp (in English: stop re-enter) was organized, making it significantly more difficult for guestworkers to come back to Austria after leaving the country (Herzog-Punzenberger 2003:1122).

In the regard of socio-economic realities, Bernhard Perchinig states that the available comparative and case studies about the socioeconomic position of Turkish people paint a picture of a group at the end of the socioeconomic scale in most receiving countries. According to an analysis of the European Labor Force Survey, employment is particularly low and unemployment particularly high among Turkish immigrants and only one third of the female immigrants from Turkey in working age are employed. Turkish immigrants are over proportionally active in skilled and unskilled manual professions, 23% of the Turkish immigrants work in skilled manual and 35% in unskilled manual positions. He also underlines that there are nearly no comparative studies, available on the situation of Turkish immigrants in the labor market. According to a study of the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union, which i.e. asked about discrimination in the labor market and included Turkish immigrants as a specified sample in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, about 40% of the respondents in the Netherlands and 36% in Belgium reported discrimination in the labor market, compared to 20% in Germany and 17% in Austria. It has to be added that general reporting levels were different from country to country and so the figures can only serve as rough indicators (Perchinig, 2008).

On the other hand, according to Cinar, in 1998, the coalition government reached agreement on amending the conditions for facilitated naturalization. The official aim of reform of 1998 was to 'harmonize' the administration of citizenship legislation across the country and to restrict the possibility of facilitated naturalization. The reform made this mode of acquisition dependent on at least six years of residence and proof of the applicant's 'sustainable integration' (Cinar 2010:8). The individual immigrant who wants to get Austrian citizenship must to prove that he/she has already integrated into mainstream Austrian society. Also he/she must document that he/she is economically independent and must have enough competence for German language.

After the new Naturalization decree in 1998, Turkish migrants applied to get Austrian citizenship and the number of naturalization of Turkish migrants has been spreading. According to the Essen-based Center for Studies on Turkey, 53 percent of Turkish living in Austria are naturalized (Wets, 2006: 89). Additionally, as Johan Wets states that the position of the Turkish population in West European countries is important in the discussion of problems associated with the integration of immigrants since it represents a large share of the

(non-EU) foreigners living in these countries, including in Austria and Belgium. In both countries, Turks are often presented as the least integrated group of immigrants (Wets, 2006: 86).

In education case, as studies say those Turkish students have problems in both Turkish and German languages. All of these educational failures show that the students, who have Turkish migration backgrounds, need special education. Schooling is obligatory in Austria between 6 and 15 ages, careless of their socio-cultural and ethnic background. According to OECD Thematic Review on Migrant Education, there are ten basic schooling problems which the children of Turkish immigrants struggle with:

- Low percentage of attendance to preschool education,
- Experiencing cultural controversies and communication challenges due to lack of good command of mother tongue,
- Lack of academic orientation and failure in learning the language of instruction adequately as a result of attending at schools where the majority of students are migrants,
- Developing communicational and behavioral disorders due to incompetency of language and the outgrowth in the number of students who attend to schools for special needs,
- Rise in dropout rates as a consequence of failure in the countries applying early selection in education,
- Unemployed youngsters who have completed their vocational education but have not undergone apprenticeship / on the job training,
- Damages on self-image and self-esteem because of unpleasant expressions about homeland in curriculums and in text books,
- Negative influence of teachers who are not open to cultural dialogue and who do not have so much expectations from migrant students,
- Parents' low interest in schools,
- Deficiencies experienced in host countries in counseling, orientation and guidance services due to lack of institutional measures taken for migrant children (OECD, 2009a).

According to OECD (OECD, 2009b), achieving real improvements in the education outcomes for immigrant students, more efforts are needed to ensure successful implementation of policies. There is segregation for immigrant background students because the educational backgrounds of Turkish migrants and living conditions are not sufficient for mainstream Austrian society because of this the school performance of Turkish student in Austria are deficient. Compared to their native Austrian peers, immigrant students on average have weaker education outcomes at all levels of education. At the end of primary education, the average student with neither parent born in Austria already performs well below his or her peers in reading, mathematics and science. Nearing the end of compulsory education, at age 15, there are very significant performance disadvantages for immigrant students on average. These gaps are especially pronounced for second generation immigrants (OECD, 2009:9).

Clearly, insufficient education level affects job opportunities; the first generation Turkish migrants are mostly unskilled and semi-skilled worker that is why they generally have blue-collar jobs so they have lower salaries than other social groups. Towards this situation, Turkish migrants are employed particular sector which need unskilled labor; such as catering, cleaning and construction. The first generation has suffered from being less educated. Compared to this situation, following generations have better educational level but their educational level might be still mediocre for Austrian standards. As OECD Austrian Review cities that immigrant students are significantly over-represent among less socio-economically advantaged groups. The differences in socio-economic background account for a large part of the performance gap between native and immigrant students. This indicates that immigrant students would benefit from broader equity policies targeting less socio-economically advantaged students. However, even after accounting for socio-economic background, significant performance gaps remain between native and immigrant students. This highlights the need for targeted support measures for immigrant students to complement other equity measures (OECD, 2009b:9).

In his essay, *A Short History of the Turkish Immigrants to Central and Western Europe*, Bernhard Perchinig argues that Europe and Turkey share a long and complex history of emigration and immigration. Despite this long lasting relationship, there is only very little really comparable knowledge on the living conditions of Turkish immigrants and their impact on the so called 'receiving societies' available. At first glance, there is the general picture of a group of immigrants who are still kept mainly lower echelons of the receiving society and are

often confronted with discrimination, but there are also signs of upward mobility and success. But Europe will not only have to improve the comparability of data, Europe will also have to increase its efforts to remove the barriers preventing immigrants from developing their full potential to make its long history of immigration into a success story for both parties involved (Perchinig, 2008:18).

To sum up, Turkish migrants have large population in Austria and as studies shows they have been already isolated and marginalized. There are various integration problems into several patterns. Although second/third generation have already grown up, they have still basic integration problems; such as language, low-paid jobs, poorer households.

## **2.4. THE SECOND/THIRD GENERATION**

In European context, the second generation refers to the children of immigrant families whose families came from former colonies or were employed as a guest-worker. The majority - but not entire amount of them- was originally from rural regions and less educated.

The integration process of second generation is a key point and there are several aspects about the integration process. As Thomson and Crul specify that into what section of society are young people integrating. The potential for 'formal acculturation' of the second generation into the mainstream is weaker than 'informal acculturation' which means their outside school and work experiences are more significant. Additionally, upward mobility through a good education and hard work may not be highly prized by some members of the second generation. This situation can bring conflict within households if parental expectations of their children are not fulfilled or are opposed, and especially when immigrant parents are unable, due to poor language skills and limited knowledge of the new culture, to control how their children are integrating -a process which has been described as 'dissonant acculturation'(Thomson & Crul, 2007:1029).



*Turkish Second Generation in Austria:* The literature says that the educational typology of the Turkish second-generation displays that they always have lower-educational level and higher drop-out rates, despite there are some individual success stories. In Austria, the educational status of Turkish generation is not different from other European countries. According to OECD Country Background Report for Austria, as regards participation in the different educational stages, 11% of all children in child-care institutions do not hold Austrian nationality, 22% speak a first language other than German. Students with a non-Austrian nationality are most over-represented at special schools, and here particularly children of Turkish nationality. Students whose German-language skills are insufficient upon admission to school to be able to follow instruction are graded as non-regular students for a period of one to two years. Their performance is not assessed and their schools are entitled to additional funding, i.e. extra teaching hours. (Wroblewski&Herzog-Punzenberger, 2009:14). As Maurice Crul cites that the greatest distinctions can be seen in the percentages of young people of Turkish origin in vocational tracks — considered the "lowest" secondary-school type in all countries. In France, about one-quarter of the Turkish second generation follows a vocational track while comparable figures stand at one-third for Belgium and the Netherlands. In Germany and Austria, the figure is between two-thirds and three-quarters. National contexts therefore vary widely in the types of opportunities available to the Turkish second generation. One might now be tempted to conclude that France and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands and Belgium provide the best institutional contexts for migrants, that is not the whole story. However, drop-out rates are very high in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands and considerably lower in Germany and Austria. Thus it is difficult to single out one country in which the Turkish second generation is doing better. But it is possible to identify what works well and what blocks mobility in a particular country (Crul, 2007).

The concept of downward assimilation can be considered to understand educational problem of Turkish second. According to Thomson and Crul, children of some ethnic groups, like second-generation Turks, who are considered to do less well than other children of ethnic groups, are still upwardly mobile compared to their parents. The problematic behavior of boys in at-risk groups is often a feature of the in-between generation, and is less an issue in the second generation. As time passes, and younger generations are born, these behavioral difficulties seem to lessen (Thomson & Crul, 2007 :1033).

Actually, this educational position of Turkish second-generation is expected because of low educational background of parents, traditional gender relations, absences of role models. Additionally, the Austrian education system has also some structural problems in the concept of integration and education; particularly homogeneity problems in multilingual/ multicultural classes, deficiency of extra-support for children before and after school. As Wroblewski and Herzog-Punzenberger cite that ninety-three per cent of young Austrians attend a school after having finished compulsory education, but only 60% young Turks. In Vienna young immigrants of the second generation are more often integrated into the educational system than their peers of first generation. Young people with a Turkish background have, more often than the average only a certification of compulsory education. Young immigrants from Turkey are more integrated in the labor market, around 56%. Immigrants are more affected by unemployment than their native peers. Around 13% of young immigrants with a Turkish background are unemployed, but only 3% of their native peers (Wroblewski&Herzog-Punzenberger, 2009:54).

In addition, the second-generation Turkish entrepreneurs have expanding business activities. According to Austrian Institute for SME<sup>14</sup>, the self-employment quota of persons with migration background varies between about 5% for the 2nd generation to about 10% for foreigners who have attained Austrian citizenship in the meantime. About 40% of all Austrian self-employed persons with a foreign citizenship are citizens of a Western European country, mainly coming from Germany, 40% stem from Eastern European countries (including Turkey) and 20% from a variety of other countries. With regard to the individual nationalities German, Ex-Yugoslavian and Turkish entrepreneurs are the most important groups of self-employed persons with a migration background. Self-employed with a Turkish citizenship work more often in the field of hotels and restaurants and are less active in financial intermediation as well as in other community, social and personal service activities. Contrary to Turkish self-employed who show the lowest shares of women -about 20% (SME, 2007).

To summarize, the general view over Turkish second-generation cannot catch average patterns of Austria in the terms of education. Thus their educational and labor market positions are also below average in mainstream Austrian economy and society.

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#### **2.4.1. ROOTS MIGRATION in the TURKISH SECOND/THIRD GENERATION CONCEPT**

The return behaviors of second-generation have created attention. Roots-migrants attribute a new meaning to culture, identity and homeland. Unfortunately, studies on roots-migrants are very limited. In addition, return migration of first generation is also not thoroughly examined, under the both political and social concept. There are only a few studies which concern Turkish re-emigration to Turkey.

In the report of Return Migration and Employment, Regioplan presents that Turkey does not have a specific immigration policy. However, the Turkish government states that all activities services undertaken by them available to all Turkish citizens, including return migrants (Regioplan, 2005). According to Tiryakioglu, at the beginning of early eighties, restrictive immigration policies were pursued by countries which had received Turkish immigrant workers, together with financial incentives for returning workers. However, around the same time, some of the receiving countries offered Turkish immigrants the possibility of full integration, letting them the same rights given to nationals of that particular country. This resulted in the acquisition of a new citizenship. In order to integrate into society and to attain appropriate working and living conditions, Turkish immigrants often pursued to acquire the citizenship of the country in which they lived. These developments, in which Turkish immigrant workers sought to acquire dual citizenship, led to a shift in Turkey's own citizenship policy in the early 1980s. For example; in 1981 the Turkish Nationality Act was amended to remove obstacles to dual citizenship for Turkish citizens. Given the sizeable number of Turkish immigrant workers in Western European countries intending to live with their dependents in those countries, it became necessary to introduce dual citizenship into Turkish law. Therefore, the Turkish population living abroad acted as a catalyst for the formation of citizenship policies for the period of 1980 to 2000 (Tiryakioglu, 2006). Returnees, who do not hold Turkish citizenship, also have many legal rights as ex- Turkish citizens; except voting rights, military service duty, working for public office.

Besides second-generation has significant education problems, they have better education level than their parents. Moreover, a small minority of second-generation migrants, whose family came from Turkey, have individual success to get higher educational degree. It is obvious that second-generation migrants had less life experience in Turkey because they had

spent limited time in there. In this situation, returning to Turkey depends on marriage, education and job/entrepreneurial opportunity. Additionally, the family decision of permanent return is significant for second-generation. The family decision of return might orient member of second/third generations to re-emigrate to Turkey. On the contrary, member of second/third generations might decide to return while their families continue to stay in Europe. In their essay, Tılıç-Rittersberger, Celik, and Özen argue that basically, return migration has been discussed in relation to consequences and impacts for the sending as well as the receiving countries, (re) integration constituted the main theme of investigation and analysis. Taking into consideration a number of studies dealing with this issue, it seems possible to provide a set of different answers. It can be stated that return decisions are influenced by economic, social, cultural, political as well as psychological factors (Tılıç-Rittersberger, Celik, & Özen, 2011).

According to Gudrun Biffl, While Turkey continues to be a country of outmigration it is also becoming a country of immigration. In the year 2000 (latest data available for foreign born by country of origin) some 1.3 million or 1.9% of the 67 million inhabitants were foreign born. In the year 2000 the share of Germans in the foreign born population of Turkey amounted to 21.4% (273,500) and of Austrians to 1.1% (14,300). The numbers and the share of Germans and Austrians in the Turkish population are growing, mostly highly skilled second generation migrants who return to their parents' home country to take advantage of employment opportunities as Turkey is rapidly restructuring and in need of skilled workers to support the export led growth strategy (Biffl, 2011:2)

To sum up, the image of 'returning home' might be not definitely perceived as living in there forever for second generation who was raised in Austria. They will want to ensure for a possible future return to Austria. Especially, potential returnees, who return with individual decision, will live in Turkey more temporarily. In other words, Austria certainly might not be the only country they would like to live; they spend some time in Turkey to work, study then will turn back to Austria whenever they want.

### 3. EXPLORATORY STUDY

The exploratory part of this study has been comprised in several steps. In the beginning, a large literature research was controlled; including the related previous studies on Euro-Turks, international migration, labor migration, return and roots migration. Additionally, literature on Turkish-Austrians was also examined.

In the second step, a focus group discussion was reduced to practice. As Fatemeh Rabiee states that the main aim is to understand, and explain, the meanings, beliefs and cultures that influence the feelings, attitudes and behaviors of individuals (Rabiee, 2004). To catch the gist of my target group, I have practiced a focus group discussion. The focus group discussion had three people who carry out focus group's characteristics. While the group were discussing, significant points were determined carefully. According to the group's essential points, I have created outlines of the exploratory study at the first step. The outlines were identified in four stages; description of sample, being migrant and being second/third generation, perception of Turkey and perception of Austria.

Afterwards, in regard to the focus group discussions' results, in-depth interviews were prepared. The open-ended questions were built up in the light of four main stages; description of sample, being migrant and being second/third generation, perception of Turkey and perception of Austria. 15 in-depth interviews were supplied and recorded in Vienna. The interviews contained open-ended questions which took average 45-60 minutes. However interview language was Turkish, some interviewees expressed their selves in German in some points. Interviews were transcribed then translated from Turkish to English.

Whereby interviews with my focus group, I have aimed to recreate my theory of mind of advice. I used recapping qualitative content analysis conducting to four main stages.

## 3.1. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

In-depth interviews are an effective data collection way for qualitative research methodology. In-depth interviews help to analyze diversity of purposes, containing needs evolution, problem definition and settling strategy. In-depth interviews are proper path to use open-ended questions in this way strength information can be collected from comparatively less interviewees.

As Guion, Diehl and McDonald state that in-depth, qualitative interviews are excellent tools to use in planning and evaluating Extension programs because they use an open-ended, discovery-oriented method, which allows the interviewer to deeply explore the respondent's feelings and perspectives on a subject. This results in rich background information that can shape further questions relevant to the topic. The key characteristics of in-depth interviews are the following:

- **Open-ended Questions.** Questions need to be worded so that respondents expound on the topic, not just answer “yes” or “no.” Many open-ended questions begin with “why” or “how,” which gives respondents freedom to answer the questions using their own words.
- **Semi-structured Format.** Although it is important to pre-plan the key questions, the interview should also be conversational, with questions flowing from previous responses when possible. For example, if an interviewee remarks that “The elections are approaching,” an appropriate response would be, “How do you feel about the candidates involved?”
- **Seek Understanding and Interpretation.** It is important to use active listening skills to reflect upon what the speaker is saying. The interviewer should try to interpret what is being said and should seek clarity and understanding throughout the interview.
- **Recording Responses.** The responses are typically audio-recorded and complemented with written notes (i.e., field notes) by the interviewer. Written

notes include observations of both verbal and non-verbal behaviors as they occur, and immediate personal reflections about the interview (Guion, Diehl, & McDonald, 2001).

In-depth interviews provide individual assessments of specific qualitative material. In-depth interviews assist to develop exact and particular answers as good as detailed and different information about independent practices, ideas and reasons. These interviews contain not just list of questions, but consistently recording answers to get intensive consequence and explanations.

## **3.2. QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS**

Qualitative Content Analysis elicits to summarize all kind of content by collecting several points of the content and assist to get a more empirical evaluation. Content analysis provides an adjustable, pragmatic way for improving and expanding information. Content analysis can be made up of documents, video shots, and the reports of observations, interview transcriptions and discussions which provide to collect comments. Collecting different comments is also quite important to apply content analysis.

As Phillip Mayring (Mayring, 2000) states that with the qualitative content analysis we wanted to describe procedures of systematic text analysis, which try to preserve the strengths of content analysis in communication science (theory reference, step models, model of communication, category leaded, criteria of validity and reliability) to develop qualitative procedures (inductive category development, summarizing, context analysis, deductive category application) which are methodological controlled. Those procedures allow a connection to quantitative steps of analysis if it seems meaningful for the analyst.

The procedures of qualitative content analysis seem less appropriate,

- If the research question is highly open-ended, explorative, variable and working with categories would be a restriction, or
- If a more holistic, not step-by-step ongoing of analysis is planned.

On the other hand qualitative content analysis can be combined with other qualitative procedures. The research question and the characteristics of the material should have the priority in the decision about adapted methods. So it would be in my opinion better to discuss questions about methods in respect to specific content areas and then to compare different methodological approaches (quantitative approaches as well) (Mayring, 2000).

### **3.3. DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLE**

In this chapter, interviewees are examined under three different categories which language, education, identity description. Every category focuses on an issue which is related to examine description of sample. In Austria, approximately 247,500 people live who has Turkish descent (Potkanski, September 2010, S. 7)<sup>15</sup>. During this research, 15 interviews were made with interviewees who have Turkish descent.

All interviewees live and study in Vienna. Interviewees study at the University of Vienna, WU (Vienna University of Economics and Business) and TU Wien (Vienna University of Technology). Unfortunately, the gender dispersion of interviews has not an equal proportion; there are 9 women and 6 men interviewees.

The age dispersion of interviews is determined under three age categories. First category comprises the age distribution between 20 and 25 and there are 8 interviews in this category. In second category, which has the age distribution between 26 and 30, compasses 6 interviews. For the last category, there is only 1 interview which represents the age distribution over 30 years old.

Interviewees were born in both Austria and Turkey. The interviewees, who were in Turkey, migrated to Austria at relatively early ages. Some of them attended school in Turkey before

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<sup>15</sup> ÖIF-Dossier N° 13



their migration process. On the one hand, these interviewees specify that they have better Turkish skills than other second/third generation friends because they had chance to learn Turkish in Turkey, On the other hand, they do not think that they have any lack of German language.

International literature says that chain migration includes complex migration processes which migrants embolden and support family members, relatives and friends to immigrate to receiver country. As interviewees reported their family backgrounds have also shaped by chain migration processes. Interviewees have several relatives in Austria or/and in other European countries. Interviewees stressed that relatives are one of the most important pull factors for their family tradition of immigration.

In the regard of the province or the region, the families of interviewees originated from different geographic areas in Turkey that is why it is hard to specify a particular province or a region with a high emigration rates to Austria. Interviewees' origins display a small Turkish map with several ethnic and religious characteristics.

In generation respective, interviewees are member of both second and third generation. 5 of them are second, 10 of are third generation. This situation easily says that Austria already have third generation which will promote fourth generation soon.

All interviewees reported that their parents and grandparents migrated to Austria to work in different time period. Besides economical deficiency, some interviewees also express that domestic politics of Turkey is another push factor to immigrate; especially for families who have Kurdish descent.

About marital status, only three of interviewees are married, others are still single or engaged. Married interviewees have Turkish spouses and one interviewee has a child. Additionally, interviewees reported that they do not object to intermarriages between Austrian and Turks in theory, but some of them consider their parent's negative reactions.

Of course, intermarriage is so normal in today's world but I cannot do that because my family is extremely against intermarriage. I know, it is inane and insularity perspective but they would not change their mind

and I do not want to offend against my family. Nothing is more important than my family, even falling love (Rana, 26).

I am not against intermarriage but I also do not support. And now, you are thinking why I am so narrow-minded about this, right? Well, I believe that a person should protect his/her native culture and hand on next generations; intermarriage would not allow this (Rabia, 24).

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About residency, some interviewees still live with their families and others have their own living place or live in a dormitory. When asked for owning car, small group interviewees told they have their own car.

Despite all interviewees are student, some of interviewees have been already employed who have part-time or full-time jobs.

### **3.3.1. LANGUAGE**

After first generation migrant workers decided to stay in their host countries, a young generation of Turkish immigrants began to grow up in abroad. The second generation and third generation still live in their host countries and lack of German language is a significant problem for Turkish immigrant population.

According to Alba, in USA, third-generation mostly shifts to speak only English, also known as English monolingualism. The first, or immigrant, generation typically arrived in the US as young adults and spoke mainly their mother tongue, learning just enough English to get by. Their children, the second generation, were raised in homes where parents and older adults spoke to them in the mother tongue. However, they preferred to speak English, not only on the streets and in schools, but even when responding to parents (Alba 2005). For Austria, this situation cannot accrue at the moment because all Turkish generations persist to speak their native language; especially at home. Despite first generation, second and third generation can speak German fluently, in some respects; they have some deficiency about German language.

Interviewees reported several ideas about German language deficiency of second and third generation. Speaking Turkish at home and in basic environment is one of popular answers. They also stressed that school classes have not ethnically homogeneous structure so children continue to speak Turkish at school too. There are no effective Turkish classes in schools because they cannot learn their native language clearly; they also are not able to learn perfect German.

*Turkish youngsters do not want to speak German clearly, they just want to show that they are the 'others' and like to have a different sociolect (Deniz, 22).*

*They cannot speak either a good Turkish neither a good German; it is just like our identities, we are not totally Austrian, we are not totally Turkish, we are stuck in an identity-limbo (Muazzez, 23).*

*I think Turkish children in Austria should not to watch Turkish TV channels for a long time because they are addicted to watch Turkish TV series desperately. Unfortunately, they cannot contradistinguish realities in Turkey and their reality in Austria (Sinan, 29).*

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When asked interviewees about their first language (the language they can speak best), some of interviewees informed that German is their first language. The other part of them said that Turkish their first language (a language which a person speaks the best) and for two interviewees, both Turkish and German are their first language.

In their perspectives, none of them have any problem with German language in speaking/understanding and reading/writing levels; they are proficient in every level of German. In the case of Turkish, they gave different answers. They do not have significant problems to speak or understand Turkish. In writing/reading level, they are not so confident with their Turkish knowledge. They said that they did not attend any Turkish classes so they

have deficiencies about grammar and literature. They have been improving their Turkish in writing/reading level individually.

*I always have dreams in Turkish; I speak Turkish automatically when I am happy, upset and angry. Maybe I have some problems about Turkish grammar but not necessary, whole my reactions are at first in Turkish (Ozan, 28).*

*Honestly, my Turkish had not been that good before I met my Turkish friends who came to Austria to study. Thanks to them, my Turkish much more better now (Rana, 26).*

*In intellectual level, I prefer to use German because I have difficulties to read or write comprehensive texts in Turkish. Unfortunately, I did not chance to attend Turkish classes. Whatever I cannot understand people who grew up in Austria and still have German language problems. Such a pity, they wasted their school time, learnt everything in minimum (Umur, 27).*

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Interviewees, who have Kurdish descent, reported they have limited Kurdish knowledge and they do not feel confident to speak Kurdish language. Only one of them informed that she has intermediate Kurdish language level.

Additionally, all interviewees speak English as foreign language. Some of them can speak other European languages (French, Italian and Latin) too.

*I am ethnically Kurdish but I cannot speak Kurdish because my family did not teach me; we speak Turkish at home. Isn't it ironic? I can speak several languages; German, Turkish, English and French; except Kurdish (Gokhan, 22).*

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### 3.3.2. EDUCATION

In Europe, Turkish second/third generation of migrants still have a wide problem of presence for schooling. The performance of these children generally lags behind children of non-immigrants in all school-success indicators; they drop out at higher rates, repeat grades more frequently, and are concentrated in the least-challenging educational tracks. As Crul cites that the educational gap between the second/third generation and children of native-born parents is a great concern for policymakers and politicians in local and national governments (Crul, 2007:17).

The Turkish young migrants struggle with difficulties in school. Literature says that Turkish youngsters have significant educational problems because their educational level always signs the lowest ratio of the country. As Heath, Rethon and Kilpi states that minorities whose parents came from less developed non-European origins tend to have substantially lower educational attainment or qualifications than do their respective majority groups. The most disadvantaged groups in this respect are young people of Turkish ancestry in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (Heath, Rethon, & Kilpi, 2008:216). According to the same study, the Turkish second generation in Austria is associated with lower Turkish rates of entering higher education (Heath, Rethon, & Kilpi, 2008:228). In this regards, Turkish second/third generation migrants have weak opportunities and higher education chances to by analogy with children of non-migrants parents. Despite evidence shows, there is a significant amount of individual success to continue higher education. Unfortunately, most of Turkish families do not come from a cultural orientation which emphasizes higher education. Towards this research, it can be easily understood how migrant's parents have important role during their children's schooling period.

In this research, all interviewees are involved to higher academic educations and they have had steady success during their schooling period; because of this situation, there were always big expectations to go on to university and beyond.

When asked their current field of studies, interviewees gave different answers. As a second/third generation migrants, interviewees tend to study academic programmes which have public prestige. The participants who were interviewed study law, business administration, economics, pedagogy, architecture, engineering and information systems.

Interviewees chose their academic programs with their own will but they were influenced by their parents widely. In this case, parents have an important role on their children's choice. Some interviewees decided the academic field that they study, under the influence of their parents. They expressed that they have not been able to make a good decision for their academic future because they had not gotten enough information about academia that is why they think that there is no harm for their parent's influences.

When all expressions are summed up, nearly all interviewees state that they had limited information about universities, academic programs and their abilities before choosing their fields. They did not get any help to supply their deficiency. They also stressed that there were no one who could be role model for them.

*I am the first person who attends university in my family; I mean the Austrian part of my family otherwise my cousins in Turkey have already held higher education degrees. I do not know why Turks in Austria are much more conservative than Turks in Turkey, same for my family. I really fought with my parents to continue my education, literally I fought. They are pleasant now that their daughter will get university degree but it was really hard to convince them. In Turkey, families support their children so much to go to any university but in Austria, Turks find higher education unnecessary because they are sure that their children will be employed anyhow. Maybe, parents in Turkey think that holding university diploma helps to get a good job and go up into higher social class in Turkey but in Austria, you will always be a Turkish, and even you have PhD degree (Seniha, 31).*

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On one hand, interviewees agree that there is a big educational gap between Turkish migrant back-grounded children and other children in Austria. When I asked the reason of this educational lack, they mainly gave same answers. Their answer can be collected in three main

groups. Firstly, Turkish families generally have an inadequate educational history; they came to the Austria with lower human capital level because of their rural background.

Secondly, there are several parent-based educational problems about Austrian educational system. Turkish children attend school at age 6 thus they start to learn German. But they cannot be able to have enough German knowledge to be successful in formal education system. In addition, Turkish parents cannot help their children for their school assignments because they do not have fluent German to understand and read and they rarely follow parent's meeting so Turkish parents and teachers cannot work together.

*Some parents cannot realize that kids must go to kindergarten to gain skills for primary school. Parents still think kindergartens are some kind of play lots, no idea about preschool education. And yes, there is also a German deficiency. Turkish children should improve their German before primary school then they can study properly (Muazzez, 23).*

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Thirdly, Turkish children generally attend a class which is composed of other Turkish children basically; that is why Turkish children cannot improve their German skills in expected level and communicate other students in school. Because of lack of German language, Turkish children push to attend mainly German classes then they do not have a chance to get other classes.

*Turkish students always have to attend German classes first, but education means not only German. If a student gets mostly German classes, how can he/she find the time for other lessons? (Narin, 29)*

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### 3.3.3. IDENTITY DESCRIPTION

Second and third generations are considered with both cultures of homeland and hostland. Culture can be defined by the norms and standards of a group that will delineate the appropriateness of behavior. As Lalonde and Giguère say that bicultural individuals, therefore, have psychological access to two sets of cultural norms that may be tied to geography, ethnicity and/or religion (Lalonde & Giguère, 2008). Biculturalism of second/third generation in Austria causes several social conflicts because of gap between two different cultures. Despite they grew up in bicultural society, they often tend to stand for their native culture. During interviews, only one interviewee accepted Austrian identity with underlining his bicultural situation. Others reported that they do not define their selves as Austrians. They say that they only have 'citizenship tie' with Austria, they are not Austrians. Some of interviewees underlined that they are Turkish and/or Kurdish; the other part defined their selves as a world citizen or human being and the rest part expressed that they are Austrian citizens with Turkish/Kurdish descent. As wrote above, only one interviewee accepted Austrian culture as an identity.

*I do not agree with others. I am not % 100 Turkish, I cannot be. I grew up in Austria and I speak German as a native speaker. I cannot reject influence of Austrian culture, nobody can. On the other hand, of course I am Turkish. It is the reality; I am both Austrian and Turkish. (Umur, 27)*

*Despite I like to live in Austria, I cannot see myself as an Austrian. I am Turkish who lives in Austria; there is no other explanation for me (Ozan, 28).*

*I am really sick of this identity questions and labeling people because of their ethnicities. Everybody talks about globalization and also stress importance of ethnicities and local cultures, such a dilemma. I am world citizen, an easy way to express my feelings (Seniha, 31)*

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As Kaya and Kentel state that Islam is, by and large, considered and represented as a threat to the European way of life in the West. It is frequently believed that Islamic fundamentalism is the source of the xenophobic, racist and violent attitudes present. If so, then in order to tackle such constraints, discourse on culture, identity, religion, ethnicity, traditions and the past becomes essential for minorities in general and migrant groups in particular. This is actually a form of politics generated by outsider groups (Kaya & Kentel, 2005: 60). As Will Herberg suggested that second-generation immigrants would be less religious than their parents, and that by the third generation individuals would return to their religion as a way of distinguishing themselves from others. In this perspective, interviewees have second generation characteristics (Herberg, 1955).

Despite interviewees are not as religious as their parents, they still care about their religious beliefs and nobody rejects importance of religion. According to Karakas, Turkey is the only Muslim country in which Islam is not the state religion, while laicism is enshrined in the constitution (Karakas, 2007), religion is still a great pattern for Turkish culture. Islam is one of the most significant essential parts of Turkish identity. Kemalist elites have created a discriminative and an undemocratic style of laicism and it could not really fixed into Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Nowadays, AKP (the Justice and Development Party) is a conservative-democratic political organization which has Islamic background. The party has been ruled since 2002 that is why Islam became more invisible in the daily life of Turkish culture. Additionally, there are also several sects and diversities of Islam in Turkey. Basically, people believe in two main sects; Sunni and Alevi in Turkey. Interviewees reported that they defined their selves as a Sunni/Muslim or Alevi/Muslim. Except one interviewee, all interviewees defined their selves as a faithful person. Particularly, interviewees yearn for religious holidays and its special traditions in Turkey and complain that they do not have chance to celebrate these days.

*I do not believe in God, I am not faithful but I can say I am Alevi because my religion is also a part of my culture, a part of me (Rana, 26).*

*You also knew...Last month, there was our Kurban Bayrami (Muslim Feast of Sacrifices), so what? Nothing... It was like a regular day because*

*everybody must work or go to school. But in Turkey, in our hometown...  
My cousins celebrated and had lots of fun; I could only phone them  
(Muazzez, 23).*

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About politics, interviewees do not show any special reaction. They have politic views but do not have strong political consistency. Interviewees defined their selves as social-democrat, democrat, leftist and liberal. A small group of interviewees are not sure about their political views. When I asked how they get their political orientation, they mostly reported that they share almost same political view with their families. Additionally, their political orientation is based on Turkish political tradition because they are interested in Turkish politics more than Austrian politics and they specify Turkish political terms better. Particularly, interviewees with Kurdish descent have deeper concern politics in Turkey because of their family's political conflicts against Turkish Republic. About Austrian politics, interviewees basically distinguish between racist parties and others.

According to European Union relations, interviewees are disappointed in EU in economic affairs as Austrian citizens. They think enlargement of European Union has been decreasing economic stability since 2000s and they do not want to suffer from economic bottleneck because of other countries.

*It is unfair to pay more taxes or bills because of other EU countries.  
Austria is a small country but one of the important stakeholder of EU so  
Austria save EU with our money. For prosperity of others, we should make  
a sacrifice (Sinan, 29).*

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Interviewees support Turkey's participation in the European Union; however they do not think that Turkey does not need EU in economic patterns, contrary to this, EU needs Turkey to weather current financial crisis. In socio-politics patterns, they are sure that membership would provide more democracy and political respect for ethical values and develop the execution of human rights.

*In past, I could not imagine that there is a chance to Turkey's participation in EU. I guess EU is more moderate about Turkey now because of Turkey's economic boom. Turkey has an economic power now which can change some conditions and EU needs Turkey as a growing market in its region. Addition to this, Turkey extremely needs EU to improve its political and social conditions. Turkey must carry out several reforms urgently to refine these conditions (Ercan, 26).*

*Turkey's participation in EU will bring more democracy for Kurdish people and other minorities. I would like to return to Turkey if Turkey will join EU because EU participation will provide political controlling so Turkish governance will become more equal for Kurds (Harun, 23).*

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### **3.4. BEING MIGRANT and BEING SECOND/THIRD GENERATION**

In this part, interviewees explained they no longer perceive their country of origin as a final destination for permanent return. Instead of this, they want to derive benefits both from Austria and Turkey. Their identities are more transnational, active, urbanite and flexible now. They do not want to be described as foreigners in Austria and they request the approval of their biculturalism. Interviewees think that they are much more integrated into Austria than their grandparents and/or parents. Despite this expression, some of interviewees reported that they feel more affiliated with Turkey; other group interviewees reported that they are equally close both to Austria and Turkey and a small of group interviewees feel more affiliated with Austria.

*Definitely, I am more affiliated with Turkey because I feel Turkish. It does not mean that I do not like to live in Austria but I belong to Turkey (Narin, 29).*

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*It is hard to answer...I grew up in Austria and I speak German better than Turkish. It seems my whole life is in Austria. In other side, I have a Turkish identity which I cannot ignore. Well, both of them are my countries (Seniha, 31).*

*Turkey is my country of origin but my life in here, the answer is Austria (Rana, 26).*

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As interviewees reported, integration is the greatest dilemma for Turkish migrant community in Austria. Interviewees stated several problems that they face in Austria as a Turkish migrant. They think that Austrian mainstream society does not know their culture in a good way and there is a huge prejudice for their community. They also complain that there are limitations for their culture, particularly about Islam. Some interviewees implied Turkish community tends to ignore mainstream society and live in their neighborhoods because they can be blamed for anything easily. Additionally, some Turks do not want to communicate with main stream society because they abstain to lose their Turkishness or Islamic faith.

*Okay, lots of Turks do bad things; drugs, violence etc... But not all of us! Of course, we are not pleased either because of their attitudes. In Austria, many Turks have their own business and good careers, why do not want to see this reality? (Rabia, 24)*

*Somebody bombed Twin Towers in USA; sorry for that but it is not my guilt. I do not want to be judged by others because I am Muslim. What they expect, am I supposed to do change my belief because of some Arabic terrorists? (Narin, 29)*

*I cannot understand some Turkish guys. They have non-Turkish girlfriends, but they want to marry Turkish girl because their future children must be % 100 Turkish, ridiculous (Ozan, 28).*

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About discrimination, they have different opinions. Some of them have never faced any discrimination personally but they know other Turkish people had bad experiences about discrimination. Some interviewees faced discrimination in school, at work place. During schooling period, they had some difficulties with their teachers. They stressed that lack of German language is still significant problem for Turkish community. Despite Turkish migrants can speak German, most of them still have difficulties to use German language clearly.

*I had some bad experiences with a teacher at school. She was intolerant for Turkish student. I have been a successful student, still I am. Once I had a bad exam result, just an exam and that teacher insisted to imply that I am not enough good to attend university and suggested to get a job in short, instead of studding. I did not consider her recommendations so I am at university now (Eda, 22).*

*I have not faced a real discrimination personally. Yes, I have been experienced in some improper behaviors or statement but they were general. You know, old people look at you in a bad way because you have foreign appearances or somebody say something like, foreigners should return. It is childish to expect everybody's approval or love; there are always opponent ideas for other groups (Rana, 26).*

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Interviewees can be quite objective when they are talking about negative impacts of Turkish people on the mainstream Austrian society. They also underline that they are not satisfied with unacceptable attitudes. They have several example and stories of negative attitudes of some of Turkish people. According to interviewees, Turkish community tends to isolate their selves from other Austrians. Because of this isolation, they are up against various integration problems. Interviewees reported that integration problem is most negative impacts of Turks.

*We, Turks have still been dreaming about same thing: making lots of money as much as we can and having properties, apartments in Turkey; this is the same plan since 1960s -70s so we do not care anything in Austria. Actually, nobody needs to be integrated. Why do they make an effort? They can reach everything through Turkish network; it is easier, isn't it? (Sinan, 29)*

*In the past, only lack of German language was seen as integration problem, because first generation was a foreign population who just communicated with Austrians in train stations, work places as workers and cleaners so this invisible 'guest' population needed only German to be integrated. Nobody could recognize that the problem is bigger than language. Today, second/third generation can speak German but integration problem is still so lively. I think the real integration problem has started with second generation; Turkish population became visible with second generation. Turkish are permanent citizens and in everywhere now; at school, in parks, in cafes etc. with their non-integrated Turkishness (Narin, 29).*

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Beside integration problems, some of Turkish people insist on not adapting to local values. Interviewees complained about this problem. Especially, Turkish youngsters have some behavioral and anger problems to accept moral values of Austrian society.

*It is simple; they are showing their social inequality with angers. They know that they will always be seen as children of guest workers. They hate this social class, want to go up into a higher social class but they cannot; they do not have enough qualifications so they show their anger to reject social values (Gokhan, 22).*

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*Some Turks act like crazy. They freak out about keeping their religious belief or traditions. They avoid any personal contact with non-Muslims, expect obligatory contacts. All strangers are potential enemy for their religion or Turkishness in their perspectives so they consciously put gaps between their community and others. I guess increasing Islamophobia after 9/11 attacks help them to be isolated (Deniz, 22).*

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Additionally, an interviewee mentioned that some Turks avoid working fairly and abuse social security system consistently. And another interviewee thinks that Turks have no negative impacts to Austrian society.

*In some case, I agree with Austrians...You know, nobody can say we (Turks) are ideal citizen for Austria. Some families have many children unpleasantly to get money (family assistance or maternity leave payments) from Austrian state, some women have literally 'full-time mom' job. (Pelin, 21)*

*I do not think Turks have exact negative impacts for Austrian culture. There are always some people in a community who tends to commit an illegal act or behave badly. Turkish community has that kind of people like Austrians or other immigrant groups, not a big deal (Ercan, 26).*

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Besides negative impacts of Turkish community, Turks have also positive impacts. Interestingly, interviewees reported many negative impacts but they give only two main answers for positive effects. Firstly, Turkish labor force is the most important impact of Turkish migrant community. They stressed that Austria owe a great deal to Turkish migrants for economic boom.

*Yes, our parents and grandparents came to Austria to work, make money and get better life but they worked hard, they had worse jobs which are unwanted from Austrians and they stayed bad living areas. Nobody appreciates their endeavors to just get better life (Ozan, 28).*

*Austrians should accept this; they are rich today because our grandparents worked for them very hard, they are not the only holder of today's welfare and richness (Harun, 23).*

*Why does not anybody appreciate Turkish people who do good things? For example, Turkish entrepreneurs make successful investments. Or Turkish football players are good at their jobs. This situation is not supportive for Turkish community at all (Sinan, 29).*

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Secondly, interviewees reported that Turkish migrant population adds a value of cultural diversity and richness into Austrian culture. They explained several examples and their examples can be determined as acculturation.

*Today, everybody eats döner and kebab, does grocery shopping from Turkish markets. In Germany, the amount of regular markets and Turkish markets is nearly same; not only we (Turks) like Turkish goods, everybody likes. It is also a good thing for European culture (Ercan, 26).*

*At least, Austria has met another religious belief via Turks. Austria had not contained a Muslim population historically; there are some mosques in Austria now (Rabia, 24).*

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Second/third generation grew up in striking transnational environment. As Wessendorf states that despite similar cultural and socio-economic backgrounds, second-generation migrants have developed a variety of ways in which they relate to their parents' homeland, to hostland, and to the social arenas in which they live. For some members of the second generation being of migrant origin does not play an important role in their everyday lives (Wessendorf 2007b). According to interviewees, being children of migrant workers/migrants is an important for them because their identities were also shaped by this reality.

*When I was child, I wanted to be like others; it was so inconvenient to have migration background or to be different. By time, I understand that it is my richness then I made it up my differences (Rana, 26).*

*Before we were naturalized, our Turkish passports were listed as 'isci cocugu' (children of workers). Of course, our parents' social statuses were important for us both in Austria and Turkey (Seniha, 31).*

*I belong to a country which is idealized by my parents and I know that Turkey is not better than Austria but I feel I would have a better life in there. (Narin, 29).*

*In Austria, I have everything and I am proud of my migration background. If my family did not immigrate to Austria, I would not be able to have a standard of life in this level (Seda, 22).*

*It is a sort of tricky situation. Immigrant background can be hard to hold because of discrimination or homesickness but there are also advantages. Simply, I grew up as a bilingual person or I can compare my culture and another culture (Deniz, 22).*

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Interviewees are satisfied with their current economic and social conditions in general. They reported that they are luckier than their grandparents or/and their parents. A group of

interviewees think that their socio-economic conditions are better than their grandparents or/and their parents. Another group of interviewees expressed that they have much better socio-economic conditions compared to their previous generations.

*It is so meaningless to compare our generation's conditions with previous generation's conditions. Obviously, every condition is better for us now. I guess they have felt as aliens in a foreign country for a really long time (Harun, 23).*

*They were poor from rural Anatolia without enough education. They have suffered so much in a foreign country. Okay, our generation still has several problems but our conditions cannot be compared to their conditions (Rana, 26).*

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When interviewees compare their current conditions with their previous conditions, some of interviewees think that their current life standards are better and they have much better socio-economic conditions and a small group of interviewees think their socio-economic conditions are same.

*It was harder when I was a child. Our family had to save money strictly. Nowadays, all conditions are better (Seda, 23).*

*For me, all conditions are same. I was a child whose family has migrant background; now, I am a person who has migration a background (Deniz, 22).*

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The migration perspective of interviewees is more different their ancestors. All interviewees stated that there is no more chance for unqualified/newly-coming Turkish migrants, because of increasing unemployment rates, intolerance to native cultures, low salaries, difficult working places and homesickness. Interviewees said that unqualified people should stay in Turkey because Austria does not provide better life for unqualified people; additionally there are also same opportunities in Turkey. They are not sure about qualified Turkish people's immigration to Austria. Interviewees think that qualified Turkish people can still find good opportunities for particular professions in Austria. Interviewees with Kurds roots recommend to immigrating to Austria persistently because Turkey has democracy problems and Kurdish population still is under threat.

*Turkey is still not a comfortable country for artists and scientists because funds are not enough and facilities are limited. Circumstances in Turkey do not let them to improve their selves so these kinds of successful people can immigrant to Austria, but there is no chance for others (Narin, 29).*

*Kurdish question is still alive in Turkey and Kurdish politics and intellectuals are under pressure so Austria will be a good destination to immigrate (Seda, 23).*

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Susan Wessendorf proposes the term of 'roots-migration' as relocation of second generation. For her, 'roots-migration' has nostalgic characteristic because second generation feel a similar nostalgia for the country of origin as their parents, and despite harsh economic and structural conditions in native land, they see life its villages as attractive alternative to their lives in host-land (Wessendorf 2007b:3).

When asked about returning back to Turkey, they gave two different perception of roots-migration. First perception is existed by idealized images of the Turkey and possible difficulties of integration after the migration, related to politic and socio-economic difficulties.

*In Austria, we will always be strangers, non-Austrians and Muslims. I like to live Austria but something is missing in here. If a person has a chance to live in his/her native country, he/she should live in there because he/she belongs to his/her roots (Muazzez, 23).*

*In Turkey, I find everything better; its nature, social relations, and foods...everything...I know that life is not that easy in there but more meaningful and lively, for sure (Eda, 22).*

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The second perception is shaped by more realistic images of Turkey and relatively satisfying integration in Turkey.

*Turkey is developing rapidly; nobody can reject this reality. There are enormous business opportunities in there if man has good relations with European culture. Indeed, life is much more attractive in Turkey for a person who has money (Sinan, 29).*

*Okay, Turkey is such a nice country with several natural beauty, sun, sea etc. Turkey can fascinate anybody during holidays but living in there is a totally different issue. Life is beautiful in there, but not better. In some point, Turkey is exhausting to live. For example, health system cannot be compared with Austria, it should be improved (Pelin, 21).*

*I feel good when I am in Turkey; seeing relatives and friends and being in holiday. Yet I begin to be angry after a while; people may be so rude in there or small, bothersome problems can be existed (Seda, 23).*

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When asked for returning back to Turkey in the future; some of interviews gave positive answers without any prerequisite. Interviewees, who gave positive answers, consider returning back in any case; no matter which social, economic and political conditions Turkey has.

*I would like to return back to Turkey in any conditions. I believe that I will be happier in there. My grandparents came to Austria because there were not enough job opportunities in our hometown in that time. It was hard to find job in Turkey as an unqualified so they moved to abroad. Everything is different for me; I am educated and have a specific profession so I have chance. I would like to live in a big city in Turkey like Istanbul or Izmir (Rabia, 24).*

*After graduation, I would like to move to Turkey when I find a good job. My sister returned two years ago and she is happy in there. For sure, conditions would be better or worse, in any situation, I have chance to keep living in Austria (Ozan, 28).*

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Furthermore, another group of interviewees reported they would consider returning back to Turkey if Turkey has stabilized economic and political conditions because they particularly do not trust political atmosphere in regard of democratic and Kurdish problems.

*I would like to return back to Turkey if nobody discriminates my people because of their Kurdish identity otherwise I would stay Austria, at least I feel safe in here as a Kurdish. (Seda 23)*

*I do not know, I cannot answer this question right now because I am still student and my future is not clear enough. For returning back to Turkey, I will have to find a good job firstly and I have no prediction for my future husband's opinion about Turkey (laughs). But I would like to live in Istanbul, such a gorgeous city (Eda, 22)*

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### 3.5. PERCEPTION of TURKEY

The second and third generation Turkish migrant population, who studies at one of Austrian universities, is focus group for this study. Interviewees of this study have a different situation from other Turkish migrants in Austria, Austrians and Turks in Turkey. In other words, they are not the shape of stereotypical Turkish migrants which are constituted by Austrian and Turkish societies. They are Euro-Turks who have wider world view than first generation and less educated second/third generation. In order to growing up in transnational social environment, they are bicultural and distinguish from Austrians. They also cannot be same as Turks in Turkey because they have migration background in a receiving country.

Turkey is not perceived as a last destination of return by interviewees but it is still the nostalgic country of ancestors. Interviewees reported that all of them have already integrated into main stream Austrian society but they still feel more affiliated with Turkey in general. They also stressed that they should be reconsidered by Austria and Turkey and their differences should be understood better.

As interviewees said that they often visit Turkey. Interviewees visit Turkey every year generally; some interviewees visit Turkey more than once a year and a small of group interviewees visit Turkey rarely. Interviewees have different reasons to visit Turkey. Mainly, they go to Turkey to visit their relatives and homelands. Beside them, interviewees visit Turkey for holiday, seaside and sun. Only an interviewees visit Turkey to manage his future business contacts.

*I visit Turkey as much as I can. When I was a younger, Turkey was just for holidays and relatives. Nowadays, I go to Turkey for more professional interests; for an internship, job interviews (Sinan, 29).*

*Turkey means holiday for me, no more meanings. Whole my family lives in Austria, I do not have any personal contacts in there so do not prefer to go there so often. There are also other destinations to visit (Gokhan, 22).*

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Interviewees specified that they are acquainted with the facts in Turkey, if they interested in or not. Interviewees have a general knowledge about any circumstances in Turkey, at least. Interviewees have different ideas and politic views. I asked how much they are interested in politics in Turkey. Some of interviewees reported that they are interested in as much as they can; another group of interviews interested in very much so and a small group of interviews are not really interested in.

*I do not want to be so into Turkish politics because it makes me sick. There is always bad news about Turkey, although I am informed in some way (Rana, 26).*

*I am interested in Turkish politics very much so because I would like to understand all circumstances in there (Sinan, 29).*

*It is not possible to be away from Turkish politics because everybody talks about politics around me, particularly Turkish politics. We watch Turkish news every night at home and I also read news from internet. (Rabia, 24)*

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Interviewees are affiliated to different parties. There are some interviewees who support the government party which is called AKP (Justice and Development Party) and also another group of interviewees support opposition party CHP (Republican's Party) and interviewees with Kurdish roots are affiliated to BDP (Peace Democracy Party). It is important to underline that some of interviewees strictly reported that they do not trust any party in Turkey so they do not support any political party. All interviewees agree about that there are huge domestic politic problems in Turkey.

*Nobody expect me to trust Turkish politicians, they are all liars. Turkey has great potential to improve itself in every field, but it has bad politicians who are not reliable. I cannot understand how all politicians could tend to corruption, immorality... (Ercan, 26).*

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*I would like to vote for AKP if I had Turkish citizenship. I follow their policies close and find their decisions quite affirmative. Their political road map provides economic stability which I appreciate most (Sinan, 29).*

*CHP is our family tradition. Frankly, I cannot see a better alternative to be affiliated (Ozan, 28).*

*I am Kurdish so BDP would be my decision, if I had a chance to vote in Turkey. Well, I believe that BDP is the only democratic party in Turkish politics (Deniz, 22).*

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Interviewees think that there are some influential institutions in Turkish politics. Interviewees reported USA/EU is the most influential institutions then the Turkish government, media and religious elites are following after.

For interviewees, there are some important problems in Turkey. In total, nine different answers are collected. The most popular problems the Kurdish question which is stated by then lack of education, ignorance, unemployment and economic-social instability follow up. Last four problems are democracy and human rights, administrative problems, health care and social security, woman's rights.

*Turkey has lots problems because it is a big country but Kurdish problem must be priority. There has been a war since 30 years and thousands of people died for their freedom. I am not sure after this war, Turks and Kurds can live together peacefully but first, Kurds must get their rights against cruel Turkish state (Seda, 23).*

*For me, Turkish health care and social security system is a nightmare. You know the situation in there... Everything is deficient; doctors, nurses, equipments etc. and health officers are so rude to everybody. I know*



*there are really good doctors in Turkey but hospitals are very caotic (Rana, 26).*

*I do not know what about your other interviewees mentioned but woman's rights. Yes, I know that women are equal to men legally in Turkey and there is no discrimination against women by laws. But the situation is different in social reality. I am really sick of news about murders of women or violence against women. NGOs, which advocate women rights, are powerful and active but not enough to prevent crime against women (Narin, 29).*

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Some interviewees reported that they do not trust any institution in Turkey. The institutions, which interviewees trust most in Turkey, are the Turkish government, BDP (political party), educational institutions, army, religious institutions, and social security institutions.

*There is no institution to trust, all of them are involved in corruption or oriented by a political wings. No institution is enough good in there, unfortunately (Umur, 27).*

*I really trust in the Turkish army, despite the anti-propaganda which is directed by AKP (the governing party). Turkish army is the only patriot institution in Turkey (Ozan, 28).*

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Contrary to trustworthy institutions answers; some of interviews do not trust in the Turkish government, courts, political parties, educational institutions, media and municipalities, which are seemed as untrustworthy institutions.

*I do not find current government reliable because of their Islamic roots. Secularism is so important for Turkey which makes Turkey democratic. Okay, Turkish democracy is not perfect, but at least a democracy (Seniha, 31).*

*Courts...You know that lots of journalists, intellectuals, university students and Kurdish politicians are in jail without any proper reasons. Courts are controlled by the government to keep opposition camps up by intra vires (Seda, 23).*

*Well, media is weird in my view; they always provoke the public opinion. They must be objective (Deniz, 22).*

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Interviewees have three different views about Turkey's current situation. Some interviewees find Turkey's current situation better than previous years; another group of interviewees think Turkey is much better than previous years. These two groups stated that there is a great socio-economic development in Turkey and they can realize it easily during their Turkey visitations. In opposition to these two groups, a small group of interviewees finds Turkey's recent situation worse than previous years in the regard of political climate.

*It is obvious that there are huge positive differences in Turkey. When I was a child, I always realized that Turkey was poor country. Today, I do not see that certain poorness. Everything is better in there and I am proud of this. Some European countries do not want to see a reality; Turkey is more developed than many other European countries. The problem is Turkey is a big country so the prosperity cannot be shared by all regions equally (Eda, 22).*

*I cannot ignore the recent development of Turkey about infrastructure and construction, urbanism etc. But political atmosphere is still repressive for Kurdish minority. The government continues to kill Kurdish civilians*

*and guerillas. BDP (Kurdish political party) is threatened, even Kurdish parliamentarians. Without political liberties, Turkey cannot be enough good for me. Kurdish problem must be solved peacefully (Harun, 23).*

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Despite Turkey's deep-rooted problems, some interviewees report that they are quite optimistic about Turkey's future. They stated that the country has enormous domestic dynamics which provide supportive power for Turkey and they really believe that Turkey will be a stronger country in near future.

*I agree with some political observer who claims Turkey will be the super power of its region. We have economic power, a young population and great army force. I am quite optimistic about Turkey, everthing will be better in near future (Narin, 29)*

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### **3.6. PERCEPTION of AUSTRIA**

The interviewees of this study are member of Austrian society. They are fluent in German and have social and economics networks with Austrian people. Despite most of them are affiliated more to Turkey, they consider Austria as their home that is why they do not want to be seen as a strangers or guest population.

It is a common opinion that Turkish migrants in Austria are not keen on Austrian politics, they often focus on Turkish politics. Despite this opinion, interviewees of this research reported that they are interested in Austrian politics as much as they can or they are very much interested in and a small group of interviewees reported that they are not interested in Austrian politics.

*Sure, I live in this country. As a citizen, I want to have a command of politic circumstances and I must know personal rights to protect myself (Gokhan, 22).*

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In addition to Austrian politics interest, interviewees tend to vote regularly. Except only one interviewee, all interviewees vote for every election. I asked which political party in Austria they are more affiliated to SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria), ÖVP (Austrian People's Party) and GRÜNE (The Greens – The Green Alternative). According to interviewees, they really do not support the politics which they indicated. They vote for these parties because there are not any better alternative to support.

*I do not trust any political party in Austria but I vote because I do not let FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) to become stronger in Austria. I vote just for preventing FPÖ (Deniz, 22).*

*In Austria, Turkish people mainly (both left and right wings) support SPÖ and GRÜNE because of their political approaches to migrants and they hate FPÖ. No problem for leftists, it is funny for right wings people, such a dilemma...They support MHP (Nationalist Action Party) or AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey and they became leftists in Austria because of SPÖ or GRÜNE, ridiculous! (Pelin, 21).*

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Towards politics, when asked about the most important problems in Austria, interviewees gave eight different answers. Unsurprisingly, integration is the most popular problem in their perceptions and it is mentioned largely by interviewees. After integration problems, administrative problems of Austria and unemployment (which is an increasing problem because of financial crisis in European Union) are underlined widely. Then discrimination, lack of education, social complexity, narrow perspective, xenophobia follow up as important problems.

*For me, the most important problem of Austria is xenophobia. I guess I should be more specific; Austria has only Turkophobia. In Austria, Turkophobia is a rising problem (Harun, 23).*

*They want to see only bad side of Turks population, their perspective is really narrow and they cannot recognize this problem, sadly...(Sinan, 29).*

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Interviewees are satisfied with administration of Austrian state. They trust all institutions in Austria; except FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria). Interviewees trust health care and social security institutions most. Then Austrian courts, labor unions most, municipalities and ethnical associations are seemed most trustworthy institutions.

*Austria is not like Turkey. Because of strong public consciousness, corruption rates are so low. Addition to great administration system of the country, people's social rights are protected highly (Umur, 27).*

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Despite interviewees really trust Austrian institutions, a group of interviewees distrust institutions which are related to Turkey or Turkish community. Another group of interviewees trust Turkish official institutions, ethnical associations and religious institutions most.

*I trust the Turkish embassy most. Despite I am not a Turkish citizen, I am sure that they will take an interest when I have a problem (Muazzez, 23).*

*There is no Turkish institutions in Austria to trust. They are so superficial and not able to work systematically (Seniha, 31).*

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Except one interviewee, all of interviewees have Austrian citizenship. They expressed that naturalization is quite important to live Austria comfortably but they would like to hold dual citizenship.

*I am pleasant to be Austrian citizen but it is so pity that I am not able to hold dual citizenship. Hope to a new legal arrangement which let to get dual citizenship (Rabia, 24).*

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Interviewees do not tend to be member of non-government organizations (NGOs) or civil society organizations (CSOs), only a small group interviewees are member of any organizations. This group of interviewees are member of Turkish/Kurdish ethnic associations, religious associations or Turkish charity organizations. In this case, it shows that interviewees are not interested in NGOs or CSOs such as Turks in Turkey. Throughout their answers, their memberships are mainly member of organizations which are related to their ethnic or religious background; not related to Austrian mainstream society.

Additionally, about friendship with non-Turkish people, some interviewees reported that they have close Austrian friends whom with they always meet and they also visit their Austrian friends as families. Only a small group of interviewees have not personal/special friendship contacts with Austrians. As this situation shows interviewees's social networks are not only surrounded by Turkish people; they also have other social networks which are not based on ethnicity.

*Honestly, I do not have close Austrian friends. There are always some people to hang out or go out but we are not that close to each others. I feel more comfortable with my Turkish friends, we can share anything more deeply (Rana, 26).*

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Some interviewees have deep concerns about Austria's current situation compared to previous years, they think that Austria's current situation worse than previous years. Additionally another group of interviewees do not see any differences between current and previous situation. Only a small group of interviewees reported that current Austrian situation are better than previous situation.

*For me, Austria is doing bad day by day because of economic problems. I am not sure it is a current problem or not. Unemployment rates and taxes are so high. There is also Xenophobia which borders me personally (Muazzez, 23).*

*Austria has a good geopolitical conditions and I do not think so that Austria's stability can change easily, this country has a strong administrative system (Sinan, 29).*

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According to economic conditions, there is a big deal of pessimism among a group of interviewees about the future of Austria. Another group of interviewees are optimistic about Austria's future.

*The last enlargement of European Union damaged Austria. As a relatively rich country, Austria has overmuch responsibility. European financial crisis is another obstacle for the country (Pelin, 21).*

*Austrian is a rich European country which can survive from economic recessions. Current problems will not steer future conditions so much (Sinan, 29).*

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## 4. CONCLUSIONS

This study has discovered several findings which are related to university student Turkish-Austrians if they considered a return to their country of origin. I analyzed the in-depth interviews of 15 Turkish immigrants in Austria. These highly educated young Turkish-Austrians have created a new identity in regard of being migrant and second/third generation, in a line which provides a reform of being Austrian and Turkish. As a member of the second or third generation, they constitute several types of social relationships. A part of their social relationships is constituted by life in Austria which mostly covers all relationships with formal and public authorities in Austria. Additionally, the practicability in Austria in terms of socio-economic upward mobility allows for keeping their fondness to Austria where they grew up. The other part of their social relationships is constituted by Turkish culture which they receive from their ancestors. University students Turkish-Austrians have steady, powerful relationships with Turkish culture and Turkish ethnic peer groups.

In today's global world, when many people have in common with the cultural situations of being uprooted, Turkish-Austrians live in a transnational place where cannot be perceived as isolated, rigid or unchangeable. Contrary to common thought, I sense that their unique situation supplies interrelationships between two cultures. It is obvious that they have several problems about being migrant, integration or their identities because they live in a space which could be described a cultural 'in-between'. Literally, Turkish and Austrian cultures (or civilizations) are quite different from each other so they always face with various incoherencies and obstacles when they try to combine these two cultures in their lives. Despite these incoherencies and obstacles, they have created some hybrid cultural areas; as a mixture of Austrian and Turkish culture.

Highly educated young Turkish-Austrians have structured their cultural, political and social perception under the influence of their ethnicities but this situation does not let them to hold separate their selves from Austrian culture or being Austrian. Willingly or otherwise, a part of their identities have become Austrian. Beside their strong Turkish mentality, they also possess an Austrian mentality. Their Austrian mentality comes out especially in some professional



areas; academic studies, business carrier. In general, they have strict self-discipline, work ethic and community consciousness which cannot be described as a part of Turkish mentality. For example, during interviews, they awfully talked about corruption in Turkey because they are forced to understand how a crime can be so common, semi-legal and visible in a society. Another awful situation for them to feel Turkish state's strong public authority by police or army power because strings of shooting and illegal-treatments by police or army forces often cause human rights violations in Turkey which are not acceptable in any European country.

As I observed; some interviewees, who stand aloof from living in Turkey, has weaker personal relationships with non-Turkish people and tends to follow native traditions. For example, interviewees, who express that they do not have any, close Austrian friends, also reported that they would hardly consider returning back to Turkey. This situation represents a kind of 'integration paradox'<sup>16</sup>. They underline their cultural distinction from Austrian culture conversely and they want to continue live in the country without any real return idea. They also have the more aggressive and pessimistic opinions, statements and comments about both countries.

Interviewees with Kurdish roots show sensitivity to human rights and democracy patterns. They are quite interested in these areas because their grandparents or/and parents have been experienced in unfortunate politic and social discriminations in Turkey. Interviewees with Kurdish roots stress generally that the urgent problems of Turkey are mostly about Kurdish question. Besides the deficiency of Kurdish rights, they do not any prior consideration to live in Turkey. Additionally, interviewees with Kurdish roots cannot speak their native language fluently but their Turkish skills are as good as other interviewees with Turkish roots.

Despite interviewees express that they have problems about Turkish language, most of them have proficiency level Turkish for me. In language case, I do not have any problems to making interviews in Turkish. It is important point to prove how Turkish migrants have strong relations with Turkey. In general, second/third generation of migrants tend to lose their native language skills but Turkish-Austrians still continue to speak Turkish widely.

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<sup>16</sup> Tolsma, Lubbers and Gijsberts state (Tolsma, Lubbers & Gijsberts, 2012) that higher educated minorities supposedly perceive more discrimination, supposedly express more, not less ethnic hostility and supposedly identify more, not less to their origin country.

As mentioned above, interviews have a unique cultural 'in-between'. In some cases, they display their Austrian part; in others, they can behave differently. They approach to NGOs or CSOs with their ethnical background. When I had asked them if they have any NGO or CSO membership, they have perceived any organization related to Turkey or Turkish community firstly then they answered back. They have a low level civil association consciousness which is based on Turkishness or Kurdishness and to advocate their rights in Austria as migrants.

The idea of return has always been considered during the all migration process so that the new generation of Turkish population have been used to this idea since they were born. Nevertheless, the first generation was not be able to achieve this aim because of several obligations; saving enough money, schooling of their children and inconvenient conditions in Turkey.

There is a possibility that interviewees who are highly educated Turkish migrants consider returning to Turkey without real critical judgment because several push and pull factors provoke them hardly to re-emigrate. In the migration literature, push factors are known as the sum of total reasons to leave a country. In this case, integration problems, discrimination and social prejudices are the most important push factor for Turks to leave Austria. There are also economic reasons which cover entire Europe over the last few years. Europe's Financial Crisis affects all Euro-Zone as well which causes high rates of inflation and unemployment, economic instability. On the contrary, pull factors inspires migrants to choose a particular country or their parent's homeland. Pull factors involves better political conditions, economic boom, social network and cultural-ethnic identity. There is a significant question if Turkey has enough provocative pull factors for this group of Turkish migrants, or if the conditions in Austria produces enough push factors. The socio-economic and politic situations in Austria for Turkish labor migrants constitute some of the powerful push and pull factors for highly educated Turkish-Austrian thinking about re-emigrating to Turkey.

The second/third generation strives to overcome the prejudices because of their social classes. It is significant to understand that the influence of the socio-political environment in Austria on the desire to expel. Increasing Xenophobia and Islamophobia have negatively influence the opinion of Austrians towards ethnic groups, particularly Islamic populations. Political surveys show that right-wingers are on the rise in Europe, as well in Austria. According to these

political circumstances, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) expands its political efficiency in Austria. The party would like to carry out some ordaining reforms with 'zero immigration' slogans. These reforms are against migrants and immigration process which involve entire spheres affiliated to immigration, residence and employment. The political atmosphere in Austria is able to give rise to move back to Turkey. The impacts of this kind of political conditions and other integration problems have helped to improve the consideration to leave Austria. The attitude of Austrian media also might be a push factor because the media tends to express Turkish immigrants with negative images.

Surveys prove that acceptance into the labor market is a quite significant conductive consideration towards positive attitude of immigrants in Austrian society. In Austrian job market area, it is a quite exhausting to find a job for a youth, who has migration background. They feel that they are always restraint to effort three times more than other employees for proving their selves. Acceptance into the labor market point outs whether of immigrants groups which are getting a bridgehead on and climbing up the steps regarding of paid recruitment. Lots of highly educated migrants struggle for finding a job. This situation can be explained by several reasons. Turkish migrants stay out of the proper business networks, so they become less noticeable as applicants for open positions. Additionally, employers occasionally have prejudice for the achievement of immigrants.

At the beginning of migration process, there were many heavy manual labor jobs particularly in the several parts of industry. By contrast with past, service industry has been becoming more important which needs communicative skills, personal contacts and social networks so all these deficient circumstances could be disadvantages for Turkish migrants. Additionally, there is another factor which might be a reason for deficient social network. As Heath, Rotheron and Kilpi state that lack of knowledge about opportunities in the labor market might be another possible mechanism explaining minority disadvantage. One relevant study is that of Kalter (2006)<sup>17</sup> who, using longitudinal techniques to illuminate causal processes, shows that the Turkish ethnic penalty in the labor market can be explained largely by the ethnic composition of friendship networks and German language proficiency (Heath, Rotheron&Kilpi 2008:223). Highly educated Turkish-Austrians have a particular example of identification that affects their idea to leave Austria. It is important to know if they perceive themselves firstly

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<sup>17</sup> Kalter F. 2006. Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft: Zugleich eine Replik auf den Beitrag von Holger Seibert und Heike Solga. *Z. Soziol.* 354:144–60

with the Austria as their homeland or if they perceive their selves as Turkish migrants in Austria who have a powerful adherence for Turkey and its culture.

Many migrants can be able to make up proper conditions in a different culture, in that they can digest customs of the new culture; at the same time they continue to keep their original customs up. Certainly, it is very important point for receiving society that migrants can be integrated into mainstream society. The advantage of retaining one's native culture is a significant subject about the integration of migrants into receiving country. There are two different poles about this subject. Defenders believe in that the mixture of immigrant culture could be rational outcomes of variety and improvement. Objectors claim that retaining the original culture of the population of migrants damage the integrity of Austrian society and block preservation of an Austrian identity. It is very significant to examine the social relations of Turkish migrants to Turkey, compared to Austria. Social isolation from mainstream Austrian society can be quite common for Turkish migrants in Austria. As Gonul Tol states immigrant organizations provide the necessary environment for strengthening the ethnic bonds and creating a "parallel society" independent of the mainstream society and its institutions (Tol, 2004); thus they tend to get primarily Turkish social network. They are so keen on keeping intimate contacts with their relatives and friends in Turkey via modern technological methods and Turkish migrants go to Turkey as much as they can. It is obvious that close bonds with native country encourage Turkish migrants to move back to Turkey.

Nowadays, Turkey becomes a great center of attraction for Turkish-Austrians, apart from being native country. Turkey achieves stable developments in economic, social and politics patterns. Moreover, according to the OECD, Turkey is expected to be the fastest growing economy of the OECD members during 2011-2017, with an annual average growth rate of 6.7 percent<sup>18</sup>. Additionally, the Economist Magazine says Turkey's current-account deficit exceeded 10 per cent of gross domestic product, more than twice as much as any of the emerging markets regularly<sup>19</sup>. These economic successes make Turkey more attractive for native Turkish migrants in Europe. About social and political areas, Turkey tries to improve its social and political structures due to European Union's regulation. Turkey would like to enter the EU excessively so it is very important to reach European standards for the country.

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<sup>18</sup> <http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-us/turkey/factsandfigures/pages/economy.aspx>

<sup>19</sup> <http://thechronicleherald.ca/business/81939-turkey-enjoying-decade-long-economic-boom>

In global politics, Turkey becomes more significant from day to day. Turkey is one of the most important members of NATO and G20. In its region, Turkey also plays other important roles for prosperity of the region.

At the same time, there are also several success stories of second/third generation who returned to Turkey. Especially, in artistic fields, some Euro-Turks became phenomenon in Turkey with their different styles and perspectives. This group of Euro-Turks will be role-model for other young generations. So far, success stories in economic and academic areas are not so popular but it began to come out slowly.

*I have watched one of Murat Pilevneli's interviews on TV, he is an artists. He said that he decided to move back to Turkey when he was 15 because there was no chance to be something different in Europe as a Turkish, at least for him. I totally agree; it is not impossible but hard to be different in Europe as a Turkish. The society categorized us as children of guest workers which means we should be in worker class naturally. You know there are lots of problems in Europe about integration, xenophobia etc. But in Turkey, we have at least a chance... We are well educated ones, can speak several European languages and have European perspectives so it might work in Turkey. It is sort of brain gain and everybody will win, including we, Turkey and Austria. I support personally this brain gain or contra-migration whatever it is called (Narin, 29).*

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Roots migration has complex structure which is founded on economic, politic and social concerns. There are several push and pull factors to encourage or discourage which might not stay static in time. Highly educated young Turkish-Austrians take account of several points in order to decide to re-emigrate or stay; including social, familial, politic and economic factors. Highly educated young Turkish-Austrians will become Turkish roots migrants and re-emigrate to Turkey with the expectation of occupational possibilities which they cannot achieve in Austria. Additionally, possible Turkish roots migrants in Austria look for another

life which is established upon the myths of the country of origin. These myths were designed by Turkish labour population in Austria and in the terms of their nostalgia of Turkey. For these myths, Turkey is an unhurried, friendly and warmth region where everything is run more easily than in Austria. By contrast with Turkey, everything is more formal and serious in Austria. Per contra, roots migration might be eradicating and appalling for Turkish returnees from Austria because of the metamorphosis of the Turkey myths to the reality of Turkey. Turkish roots migrants might face some difficulties to re-integrate into mainstream Turkish society and be disappointed about the idealised Turkey pictures.

The roots migration possibility of high educated Turkish-Austrians is still an uncommon example for transnational migration processes. Even though, roots migrants represent a small group, it is quite exciting to study on them because they decide to live country of origins. Highly educated young Turkish-Austrians have produced a unique apparition in their hostland which is related to their homeland strictly. With roots migration, they might be separated from their hostland socio-economically. It is hard to predict how possible roots migrants will practice their new transnational conditions after growing up as migrants in abroad.

To sum up, the aim of this study is to display potential roots migration possibilities through highly educated Turkish-Austrian's description and their perception of homeland and hostland. From past to the present, the labor migration realities shifts from a blue-collar migration of unqualified labor towards a highly skilled white-collars. The roots-migration of highly educated professionals is going to be critical and significant for development and prosperity of countries in this century. Europe was very attractive for as unqualified or semi-qualified workers from rural Anatolia because of various economic benefits, but today, according to new economic, social and politic circumstances; a new kind of social mobility grows which can be defined as a brain gain for Turkey or a brain circulation. Interviewees who are highly educated young Turkish-Austrians tend to re-emigrate to Turkey but they still have drawbacks about the stability of conditions in Turkey.

In my opinion, roots migration processes will be successful only if highly educated young Turkish-Austrians do not change their considerations because of the social, economic and political conditions in Turkey. In last decade, Turkey have been executed a great economic

stability and also relative politic and social developments. But Turkey has such frail geopolitical position which can be easily head over heels.

When Turkey's critical situation is considered in the regard of politics and economics, the roots migration possibility of high educated Turkish-Austrians seems weaker. Although they have a great bond to their homeland Turkey, the priority of high educated Turkish-Austrians is to protect their life standards so their re-emigration decisions will be always depend on basically economics, then politics and social conditions which can be never stabile in Turkey.

In my view, high educated Turkish-Austrians will create a transnational mobility between Turkey and Austria but this mobility will not turn into a certain re-emigration to Turkey. Instead of roots migration, the mobility of high educated Turkish-Austrians will cause back-and-forth-migration.

Additionally, the Turkish policy makers, economic leaders and academic interest groups should understand that highly skilled second/third generations will support economic growth but they will also change their considerations about roots migration with a few unpleasant experiences.

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## NOTES

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13. As Herzog-Punzenberger states that a Wiedereinreisestopp (in English: stop re-enter) was organized, making it significantly more difficult for guestworkers to come back to Austria after leaving the country (Herzog-Punzenberger 2003:1122).
14. KMU FORSCHUNG AUSTRIA, Irene Mandl & Andrea Dorr
15. ÖIF-Dossier N° 13
16. Tolsma, Lubbers and Gijssberts state (Tolsma, Lubbers & Gijssberts, 2012) that higher educated minorities supposedly perceive more discrimination, supposedly express more, not less ethnic hostility and supposedly identify more, not less to their origin country.
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Table 5: Median age of the population by group of citizenship and country of birth, EU-27 and EFTA, 2010

### The Figure:

Figure 1: Share of foreign citizens in the total population in the political district, 2001

## QUESTIONNAIRE

1.	<b>Gender?</b>	
	Female	
	Male	
	Other	
2.	<b>Age?</b>	
3.	<b>What is your field of study?</b>	
4.	<b>Why did you choose this field?</b>	
5.	<b>Do you work for living? Part-time or Full-time?</b>	
6.	<b>What is your place of birth?</b>	
	Born in Turkey	
	Born in Austria	
	Born in Somewhere else	
7.	<b>At what age did you leave Turkey?</b>	
8.	<b>Are you second or third generation?</b>	
	The second generation	
	The third generation	
9.	<b>Why did your parents/grandparents come to Austria?</b>	
10.	<b>Marital status?</b>	
	Married/Cohabiting	
	Single	
	Widow, divorced	

11.	<b>Is your spouse Turkish, or?</b>	
	Turkish	
	Austrian	
	Other	
12.	<b>Do you have children? If so, how many?</b>	
	No	
	Yes, and.....	
13.	<b>Where/How do you live?</b>	
	In a house/flat with my family	
	In a house/flat without my family	
	In a dormitory	
	Other	
14.	<b>Do you have a car?</b>	
	Yes	
	No	
15.	<b>How do you describe your Turkish language skills in reading/writing or speaking/understanding level?</b>	
16.	<b>How do you describe your German language skills in reading/writing or speaking/understanding level?</b>	
17.	<b>Do you have any another language skills?</b>	
18.	<b>How do you describe your language skills in reading/writing or speaking/understanding level in this/these language?</b>	
19.	<b>How do you compare your socio-economic conditions compare with your parents?</b>	

20.	<b>How do you compare current your socio-economic conditions compare with previous years?</b>	
21.	<b>Could you explain if you feel more affiliated with Austria or with Turkey?</b>	
22.	<b>How often do you visit Turkey?</b>	
	More than once a year	
	Once a year	
	Once in every two to three years	
	Rarely	
	Nearly not at all	
23.	<b>What are your reasons for not to going to Turkey?</b>	
	For political reasons	
	I do not have time	
	For economic reasons	
	I do not have any ties with Turkey	
	Because of military constraints	
	Family	
	Other	
24.	<b>What is the purpose of your visits to Turkey?</b>	
	Holiday, seaside, sun	
	Visiting relatives, homeland	
	Professional	
	No answer/Others	
25.	<b>To what extent are you interested in politics in Turkey?</b>	
	Not at all	
	Not really	
	So-so	
	As much as I can	
	Very much so	
26.	<b>Is there any institution in Turkey do you trust most?</b>	
27.	<b>Is there any institution in Turkey do you trust least?</b>	

28.	<b>Are you more affiliated with any political party in Turkey?</b>	
	AKP (Justice and Development Party)	
	CHP (Republican People's Party)	
	MHP (Nationalist Action Party)	
	BDP (Peace Democracy Party)	
	ÖDP (Party for Freedom and Support)	
	SP (Felicity Party)	
	BBP (Great Unity Party)	
	None	
29.	<b>In your view, is there any (the most) important problem in Turkey?</b>	
30.	<b>How do you describe your political interests about Turkey?</b>	
31.	<b>How do you describe your political interests about Austria?</b>	
32.	<b>Is there any institution in Austria do you trust most?</b>	
33.	<b>Is there any institution in Austria do you trust least?</b>	
34.	<b>With which political party in Austria is you more affiliated?</b>	
	SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria)	
	ÖVP (Austrian People's Party)	
	FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria)	
	FPK (The Freedomites in Carinthia)	
	BZÖ (Alliance for the Future of Austria)	
	GRÜNE (The Greens – The Green Alternative)	
	FRITZ (Citizens' Forum Austria)	
	HPM (Hans-Peter Martin's List)	
	None	
35.	<b>In your view, is there any (the most) important problem in Austria?</b>	
36.	<b>Do you think that there are some positive impacts do the Turks have on the host society? Could you explain it?</b>	

37.	<b>Do you think that there are some negative impacts do the Turks have on the host society? Could you explain it?</b>	
38.	<b>Is there institution is (the most) influential in Turkish politics?</b>	
39.	<b>How do you compare Turkey's current situation with recent years?</b>	
40.	<b>Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Turkey's future?</b>	
41.	<b>Is there significant problem that you face in the host-country as a Turkish person?</b>	
42.	<b>Do you trust any Turkish institution most?</b>	
43.	<b>Do you have Austrian citizenship?</b>	
44.	<b>What do you think about NGOs, CSOs? Is there any organization here in which you are a member or you are involved?</b>	
45.	<b>What kind of NGOs, CSOs are you involved in or are you a member of?</b>	
46.	<b>How do you compare Austria's current situation with recent years?</b>	

47.	<b>Are you optimistic or pessimistic about Austria's future?</b>	
	<b>Would you recommend immigrating to Austria to those from Turkey? Why or why not?</b>	
49.	<b>How do you define your identity?</b>	
50.	<b>Would you consider returning back to Turkey if Turkey solves its major problems?</b>	
51.	<b>How do you describe yourself with regard to the political identifications?</b>	
52.	<b>What is your religious belief? And how do you describe yourself in regard of your belief?</b>	
53.	<b>Do you believe that you are discriminated or pressured by the Turks living in Austria?</b>	
54.	<b>What is your personal relationship with the Austrian people?</b>	
55.	<b>Would you consider returning back to Turkey in the future?</b>	



## **ABSTRACT in ENGLISH**

The Turkish second/third generation grew up in transnational environment. The generation has suffered from several integration problems. The general educational status of Turkish generation is not hopeful. Turkish youngsters has several schooling problems which affects their their future employment and social prestige. Additionally, the Turkish second/third generation still bears a strong Turkishness which opens a road to isolate them from mainstream Austrian society. Despite they live in Austria, they have strong social relations with Turkey and Turkish culture. Among Turkish migrants in Austria, these relations lead to them considering moving to Turkey. Turkey becomes a magnet for highly educated, second/third generation Turkish-Austrians especially who can have several opportunities in there. Highly educated young Turkish-Austrians have developed their unique cultural areas in regarding to Turkishness and Austrian experiences. Including as result of economic, politic and social factors; some of them begin to consider 'roots migration' to re-emigrate to Turkey.

In this study, university student Turkish-Austrians are examined in four major steps; description of sample, being migrant and being second/third generation, perception of Turkey and perception of Austria. Based on a deep literature research and in-depth interviews, this study tries to display if they really consider re-emigrating to Turkey in near future.

## ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die zweite/dritte Generation von TürkInnen ist in einer transnationalen Umgebung aufgewachsen. Diese Generation hat verschiedene Integrationsprobleme. Obwohl sie in Österreich lebt, ist die soziale Bindung an die Türkei und die türkische Kultur sehr stark. Unter den türkischen MigrantInnen in Österreich hat diese soziale Bindung dazu geführt, dass sie es in Erwägung ziehen, in die Türkei zu übersiedeln. Die Türkei ist zu einem Magneten für gut ausgebildete österreichische TürkInnen der zweiten/dritten Generation geworden, für die sich dort besonders viele Möglichkeiten bieten. Gut ausgebildete österreichische TürkInnen haben sich eigene kulturelle Räume geschaffen, die ihr Türkischsein und ihre österreichischen Erfahrungen betreffen. Als Folge von ökonomischen, politischen und sozialen Faktoren beginnen viele 'Wurzel-Migration', eine Rückwanderung in die Türkei, in Betracht zu ziehen.

In dieser Studie werden gut ausgebildete österreichische TürkInnen in drei Schritten untersucht: Beschreibung von dem Sample, ihre Wahrnehmung der Türkei und ihre Wahrnehmung von Österreich. Ausgehend von einer intensiven Literaturrecherche sowie In-depth-Interviews versucht diese Studie aufzuzeigen, ob österreichische TürkInnen eine Rückwanderung in der nahen Zukunft wirklich in Betracht ziehen.

# RESUME

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## Education

- 2009-2012: MA Sociology –University of Vienna  
Specialization: -Social Structure and Integration  
- Studies of Science
- 2007-2008 (drop out) MA Middle Eastern Studies - Marmara University, Istanbul  
Specialization: Middle Eastern Sociology and Anthropology
- 2003-2007: BA Sociology and Anthropology – Istanbul University  
Specialization: -in Sociology, General Sociology  
-in Anthropology, Social Anthropology

## Experiences

- 2011-2012: United Nations Vienna Office on Drugs and Crime  
-Working for an international organization  
-Learning on the work undertaken by NGOs and the international community in general on drugs, crime prevention, criminal justice, human trafficking and anti-corruption.  
-Project management
- 2006-2007: Anthropology Department of Istanbul University  
-Worked on a Research Team  
-Experimented for a survey  
-Worked with minorities and marginal groups
- 2006 Forum Diplomatie (Newspaper): Summer

- Assistant for Arts news
- Translated international news
- Making and transcribing interviews

2005

Star TV

- Archive
- Assisting in the night news