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To my family, my friends and my fiancé,
thank you for the patience, the cynicism and all your support.

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1. Introduction

Cities are affected by the economic system they are embedded in. Consequently, the central planning systems of the socialist period in Eastern Europe and Asia altered the urban environment to perform certain functions, thus leaving a socialist legacy behind. So far, only a few studies of post-socialist transformation in the built environment of urban landscapes exist. Post-socialist research has mostly concentrated on the socio-economic repercussions of transition. A small number of studies, mostly edited volumes, analyse changes in the urban morphology in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The most recent include Stanilov (2007), Kliems and Dmitrieva (2010), Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic (2006), Czepczynski (2008) and Boren and Gentile (2007).

Contemporary researchers have come to the conclusion that there has been too little post-socialist research concerning cities outside the CEE region (Wiest 2012, 844). Several have compared socialist city elements across continental borders and different cultural contexts, see for example Boren and Gentile (2007), Forbes and Thrift (1987), Myers (1994), Kliems and Dmitrieva (2010) or Wasserstrom (2007). Yet, none have compared former socialist cities and their post-socialist development in East and Southeast Asian countries. Most comparative works on post-socialist urban Asia only cover the Chinese urban transition, especially the re-development of Shanghai. Wu and Yeh's (2003; 2007) as well as Gaubatz's (1999) contributions on China are especially prominent.

This thesis aims to address this lack of research and tries to uncover whether the socialist city, as it is understood in Central and Eastern European urban development literature, also existed in other East and Southeast Asian countries and if so, what is happening to its legacy. Furthermore, it strives to reveal whether the current transformations in East Asian cities are in any way comparable to the transformations in Southeast Asian cities. Therefore the research question is:

> *Is the transformation of socialist legacy in the urban environments in Beijing and Hanoi similar, and why?*

Why is the question even relevant? Socialism has ended almost everywhere in the world and was often unsuccessful in its social, economic and political goals. Eventually, research on the urban structures left by socialism will become unnecessary, as new urban layers dominate former socialist cities and obscure the socialist legacy. However, currently the urban form and function of post-socialist cities are still digesting these legacies.

To lay the foundation for research on the post-socialist city, my analysis first has to clear up the question if the socialist city is a globally valid concept and whether it is possible to distinguish common spatial elements that bear the mark of the socialist city. The socialist city theory is mostly derived from research on cities in the Soviet Union (SU)–it will therefore be interesting to find out if it also exists in China and Vietnam. Furthermore, the research is meant to contribute to the resolution of the wider question if the concept of a global post-socialist city exists.

In this context it has to be noted that transcontinental urban analysis is generally difficult to execute. However, the global influence of socialist ideology produced similar economic, social and political backgrounds in which cities developed. This shared history of political and economic central planning has markedly influenced urban areas and brought forth recognisable socialist urban patterns. Thus in

order to answer the research question about post-socialist transformation successfully, a first premise is that the research objects contain elements of the socialist city. My first hypothesis hence is:

> *H 1: Socialist legacy can be found in the urban morphology of Beijing and Hanoi.*

If this first hypothesis is correct, I am going to compare the post-reform development of the socialist urban legacies. My claim is that the urban socialist legacy in Beijing and Hanoi is transforming similarly, due to a related socialist history and a comparable reform path. Furthermore, I assume that socialist urban legacy across the world transforms in similar fashion, because the market economy has demands on the urban environment that require the former elements of the socialist city to change their function in a specific way.

Therefore, my second and final third hypotheses are:

> *H 2: The transformations of socialist legacy in the urban environments in Beijing and Hanoi are similar.*
>
> *H 3: There are two main reasons why transformation of socialist legacies in the urban environments is similar: A) the related socialist history and a comparable reform path, and B) the universal demands of the market economy on the urban environment.*

This thesis is divided into three main parts: (I) the theoretical background, (II) the analysis, (III) the results.

Part I opens with Chapter 2 on definitions of the terms 'socialism' and 'transition' that are relevant for the understanding of the rest of the paper. Chapter 3 then deals with the social production of space and the relationship between cities, development and economic systems. The centre piece of the theoretical part is Chapter 4, where the concept of the socialist city is introduced and discussed. The theoretical part ends with a short explanation of what the post-socialist city is (Chapter 5).

Part II is the analytical section of this research paper. In Chapter 6, the method and categories of comparison between Beijing's and Hanoi's transformation are discussed and justified. Chapters 7 and 8 then deal with the in-depth examination of the five socialist urban elements in Beijing and Hanoi respectively.

Finally, Part III consists of the comparative analysis in Chapter 9. After presenting the socialist elements of Beijing and Hanoi, I will focus on how they have been transforming in the post-reform period. In the final Chapter 10, the most important conclusions with regard to the above mentioned claims and the research question are drawn.

PART I: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

2. Definitions

Socialism. Since this research paper is about the post-socialist city and socialist legacy, the use of the term 'socialism' needs to be clarified. It describes a set of theories aiming to create a more equal and fair social order than was the case under capitalism (Gabler Wirtschaftslexikon, n.d.).

The countries that are referred to as socialist in this paper were governed by totalitarian communist parties. Their economy was centrally planned and controlled, goods were publicly owned and private activity, whether it was political, economic or cultural, was censored (Herrschel 2007, 19). Herschel (2007, 25) argues that "it is the organisation of the economy that fundamentally shapes the concept of 'socialism'". Thus once their economy is not centrally planned and publicly owned anymore, they become post-socialist.

The terms socialism and communism are frequently used as synonyms[1]. The arbitrary terminology results from the labels that parties attributed themselves and from the labels that authors writing about them used (Herrschel 2007, 19). Communism is often understood as the radical and revolutionary execution of socialist doctrine. Yet theoretically, as advocated by Marx, communism precludes the dissolution of government in order to establish an egalitarian communist society (Herrschel 2007, 25). Since no leading communist party abolished itself, this stage was never achieved by any country. For this reason Kornai prefers the term socialist. He simply argues that in Marxism-Leninism 'communism' refers to the utopian state of society in which everybody will be equal and all possessions are equally shared (Kornai 1992, 10). Moreover, the communist parties of socialist states themselves had referred to their own political and economic regime as 'socialist' (ibid.). Throughout this thesis the term 'socialism' is used.

Economic transition. "Transition is the replacement of one economic system by another" (Gregory and Stuart 1999, 413). It refers to the changes that have occurred in former socialist countries after political and economic reforms. It is mostly applied in one direction describing the transition from a socialist economic system with a totalitarian communist party to some form of market economy.

Some countries used the 'big bang' approach, which meant that reformers abolished the communist party and central planning mechanisms. They then replaced them with market mechanisms and the fitting legislation as fast as possible (Gregory and Stuart 1999, 417). Other countries, such as China and Vietnam have taken a more cautious and gradual approach (Herrschel 2007, 5).

Economic transition affects urban development. In the context of cities that transform from socialist to post-socialist, i.e. some form of market economy, some researchers (see Wu 2003) write about 'transitional' rather than post-socialist cities. Sometimes the equivalent term 'cities in transition' is used in this paper. The meaning of all of these expressions stays the same.

[1] For a detailed description of the socialist/ communist labeling-debate see Herrschel 2007 and Kornai 1992.

3. Cities and development

Cities are important because at present a little more than half of the global population resides in urban areas. Overall, rapid urban growth is going to continue in the future and it is estimated that the proportion of urban population will climb to 67 percent until 2050 (UN DESA 2012, 2). The highest concentration of big cities is found in large economies with a numerous population, such as the USA, China, Japan, Russia, India, Mexico or Brazil (Satterthwaite 2002, 245). Less developed countries still have a high percentage of rural population, but urban centres are rapidly growing as well. From the large proportion of people living in cities around the globe, it already becomes clear why studying the city is fascinating for researchers from various disciplines, such as economics, anthropology, sociology, geography, urban planning or architecture, to name just a few.

In the following subchapters, I will touch upon a few ideas in urban research that are relevant to my argument. In particular, I will elaborate on the way cities are produced and how economic regimes, more specifically capitalism and socialism, have an impact on the urban environment.

3.1 The production and reproduction of urban space

The Western origin of the production of urban space is based on the accumulation and concentration of resources and subsequent economic and social progress:

> Urban communities can be supported only when the foundation of life is such as to yield a surplus of food over and above the consuming needs of the food producers, and also when the means are available to concentrate this surplus at particular spots (Turner, 1949, quoted in Sit 1995, 1).

The city is inevitably linked to the rise of civilization, because the agglomeration of human capital led to safety in numbers and an increasingly complex way of life. It is a place of economic activity, social interaction and collective creativity. Density in human resources brings innovation and learning capacity. Scott (2008, 6) describes cities as “spatially agglomerated activity systems”. Cities enable human achievement and concentrate wealth, economic and political power, arts, literature and science (Sit 1995, 5). Edward Glaeser (2011, title), a famous urban economist, even thinks that cities are "our greatest invention" - we being mankind.

It is essential to understand that “[…] all cities are composed in the aggregate of varying times and places and people” (Gelazis, Czaplicka and Ruble 2009, 3). Cities are always changing because their inhabitants fluctuate, traffic flows, new buildings are erected, and so on. As a consequence, no city is static, but shaped by economic, political, social and cultural factors (Scott 2008, 149). However, any city also shapes the socio-economic dynamics that operate within its area of influence. This means that cities are both producing socio-economic institutions and are in turn being produced by set institutions (Szelenyi 1981, 174). In other words: “Urban spaces are collectively produced and socially constructed by human actions, and people in turn relate to their surroundings and are affected by them in complex ways” (Nedovic-Budic, Tsenkova and Marcuse 2006, 9). Subsequently, space should not be viewed as a container for human life, but rather as a product of everyday social processes that are executed and transformed by many different individuals (Broudehoux 2004, 8). From this point of view, space can never be uniform or static.

Since cities are a product of their time, they are historic monuments depicting how its inhabitants envision the future, and how they choose to conserve the past. “Building and redesigning, conserving, and renovating are political acts *making* history in these cities” (Gelazis, Czaplicka and Ruble 2009, 3). Gelazis, Czaplicka and Ruble also refer to Anselm Strauss, who once asked a very simple question: “What time is this place?” The answer to that question can be found in the built environment that always reflects the economic, political and cultural history of a city. Henri Lefebvre wrote in his seminal work, *The Production of Space*, that changes in the political and economic regime are only successful in transforming society if they manage to transform space:

> A revolution that does not produce a new space has not realized its full potential; indeed it has failed in that it has not changed life itself, but has merely changed ideological superstructures, institutions or political apparatuses. A social transformation, to be truly revolutionary in character, must manifest a creative capacity in its effects on daily life, on language and on space. (Lefebvre 1991, 54)

Since, the city landscape is factually shaped by economic, social and political actors who place physical structure within the city; these actors imbue it with representational power:

> Landscape in a similar way to language, can operate as a representational system. Signs, names, buildings, places, and spaces can be read and interpreted as geosymbols. [...] Landscape is one of the most visible and “communicative” media, through which thoughts, ideas, and feelings as well as powers and social constructions are represented within a culture. (Czepczynski 2010, 17)

Therefore planners and policy makers may use space and landscape to communicate their official messages and, for example, unite the population behind an idea. Broudehoux writes about the situation in China: "Throughout history, city leaders have manipulated cultural forms and symbols to engineer consensus among city residents, foster local pride, and promote a shared sense of identity in order to secure social stability and unity and boost confidence in the ruling party" (Broudehoux 2004, 27). She further argues that policy-makers use urban planning to manipulate the physical environment to strengthen the population's belief in the political ideology of the party (Broudehoux 2004, 27).

The political, social and economic circumstances, which planners and policy makers are embedded in, define and restrict urban planning procedures:

> The characteristics of a nation’s urban planning system generally reflect the overall socio-economic and political environment within which it operates. Or put in another way, the political economy of the society defines the necessity of urban planning and delineates the measures to which urban planning can possibly resort to. (Yeh and Wu 1999, 169)

An interesting development in comparative urban studies, which relates to the production of urban space, is the convergence discourse. There is a lot of evidence that certain city elements develop in similar fashion all over the world. Stanilov (2007, 12) even criticises that cities all over the world are merging into a homogenous mass of inner city attractions, gated suburban communities and shopping malls. Central Business Districts (CBDs) around the world look strangely similar; they mostly consist of modern high-rise office blocks. Transnational companies use global branding strategies and transplant successful concepts from one city into another. Thus, because CBDs look so much alike, the built environment evokes a familiarity among the employees and clients of multinational companies (Rowe 2005, 16). There is also the more practical correlation between form and function. Buildings with the same functions usually have the same form. For example office blocks need to be space- and cost-efficient and should be located in easily accessible areas in the city. Global technological

advancement, internationally standardised building practices and the fact that builders do not solely have to rely on traditional, local materials anymore, inevitably leads to a certain sameness in the built environment of cities around the world (Rowe 2005, 17). Most people who have recently travelled to a few cities on different continents can attest to this convergence trend of architectural form. While there is a lot of evidence that cities around the world develop similarly, local context still matters in the overall development of an urban area and no two cities are the same.

A researcher who supports the convergence argument is Enyedi. He argues that all cities undergo similar steps of development, which reminds of Rostow's model for economic development. According to Enyedi, modern urbanisation is universal. The first phase consists of rapid urbanisation through migration and industrialisation. This phase currently occurs in economically less developed countries. The second phase is best compared to the post-World War II development in Western Europe, when cities expanded into the surrounding environment, thus creating suburbs. Moreover, at this stage industrial manufacturing is gradually replaced by the service sector. The third phase is embodied by cities in developed countries whose industries have shifted to high-tech development. There, cities begin to lose population again and rural areas reabsorb the outflow of city dwellers (Enyedi 1984, quoted in Stanilov 2007, 12). The post-socialist city can be placed between phase one and phase two. Enyedi's hypothesis is simplistic and neglects to take different local socio-economic contexts into consideration. Moreover, it has been criticised at length for not addressing two major issues that plague post-socialist cities: (1) the possible building of urban slums where the socialist housing estates are located, and (2) the derelict industrial sites (Stanilov 2007, 13).

In summary, cities are activity systems that are shaped by and shape the politically, economically and socially motivated behaviour of actors. Some urban forms tend to look similar across geographically distant places due to their functions in an increasingly interconnected global world. Therefore, global urban trends can be deduced. Nonetheless, cities are embedded in their local context, which adds local distinctions to global trends.

The following sections will briefly outline the significance of urbanisation in capitalism and socialism.

3.2 Cities and capitalism

> The relationship between capitalism and urbanization has been manifest since the first stirrings of modern industrialization in eighteen-century Britain, […]. The city is not only a response to the pressures of capitalism (via the formation of distinctive clusters of capital and labor on the landscape) but also a basic condition of the continued social reproduction of the capitalist economic system […]. (Scott 2008, 1)

Industrialisation and urbanisation are closely interrelated. The Fordist production system let cities in the USA and in Western Europe swell up in the first half of the nineteenth century (Scott 2008, 2). Large-scale mass production clustered in urban areas, thus attracting even more employment-seekers. The resulting industrial agglomerations were at the heart and centre of fast-paced urbanisation (Scott 2008, 9).

Not only does industrialisation boost urbanisation, but urbanisation is also essential to industrial progress. First, industrial development requires a large number of workers. Second, in order to sell industrial goods, a concentrated market needs to be in place. Third, bundling industry in one location creates positive economies of scale (Mingione 1987, 30). A high level of urbanisation provides these

three factors. The successful city knits many individual units of economic interaction together and creates positive linkages and synergetic networks of productive capital (Scott 2008, 6).

The urban fabric in the city under capitalism is shaped by countless factors such as the public agenda, private investors, real estate markets, residents' attitudes, environmental concerns, economic competitiveness, conservation of heritage, ownership disputes and so on. The decentralised decision-making process makes planning often incoherent and difficult.

Worth mentioning in the context of capitalism and cities is the currently very popular global city discourse, based on John Friedmann's and Saskia Sassen's analysis of how cities behave in a globalised economy (see Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1991). Essentially, cities all around the world are centres of accumulation that compete with each other in order to attract international global capital. Due to the chiefly service-based nature of the current global economy, large transnational companies are more flexible to change to more attractive places quickly. As a consequence, the development of cities that are embedded in the global capitalist system therefore reacts to international economic forces.

3.3 Cities and socialism

When analysing the role of cities under socialism, it is helpful to consider what Karl Marx theorised about the city:

> Die klassische alte Geschichte ist Stadtgeschichte, aber von Städten, gegründet auf Grundeigentum und Agrikultur; die asiatische Geschichte ist eine Art indifferenter Einheit von Stadt und Land; (die eigentlich großen Städte sind bloß als fürstliche Lager hier zu betrachten, als Superfötation[23] [*sic*!]über die eigentlich ökonomische Konstruktion); das Mittelalter (germanische Zeit) geht vom Land als Sitz der Geschichte aus, deren Fortentwicklung dann im Gegensatz von Stadt und Land vor sich geht; die moderne [Geschichte] ist Verstädtischung des Landes, nicht wie bei den Antiken Verländlichung der Stadt." (Marx 1858, 390-1)

Marx and Engels propagated the view that the social differences between city and rural areas needed to be levelled. Still, they favoured the city as a catalyst for development over the countryside. For this reason, most Marxist governments were biased towards developing urban areas through industrialisation and achieving the desired equality by attracting people to the cities (Enyedi 1996, 113).

Dean Forbes and Nigel Thrift suggest a practical approach to identifying a socialist development programme. It should have the following characteristics (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 3):

- A high state ownership of means of production in industry as well as agriculture;
- a central planning economy;
- effective one-party rule;
- and egalitarian goals written down in state documents.

For urban policy, these goals mostly translated into creating an egalitarian urban society and preventing a city hierarchy (meaning that all cities and rural areas should be equally important in the overall development of the country). Hence, territorial development was more vital than the growth of one specific city region (Myers 1994, 452). Nevertheless, the central state prioritised certain cities over others. The urban hierarchy in the socialist state was thus imposed from the top − supposedly in

the best economic interest of the whole nation. The major industrial centres were the most important followed by specialised middle-sized cities. Small towns often received little attention and financial help (Enyedi 1996, 114). Therefore, cities under socialism, much like in a market economy, were important nodes of economic development. Forbes and Thrift explain the significance of the city under socialism as follows: “Cities are required because they assist the formation of economies of agglomeration and permit the creation of economies of scale, which are essential to the development of the forces (or means) of production” (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 11). This leads to the assumption that the emphasis in the socialist city clearly was on production.

Under socialism the urban fabric had to bend to a different set of priorities, because "[...] the socialist city existed in a context of shortage; under such circumstances, the players in the urban game operated under different rules and conventions than they would in a market economy" (Boren and Gentile 2007, 98). Andrusz stated the following elements that were important for the spatial development in a centralised socialist state:

- industrialization and urbanization were to be based on state ownership of the means of production and the centrally planned determination of the use and allocation of resources;
- priority was given to investment and heavy industry;
- economic planning took precedence over physical (spatial) planning;
- investment-production plans and locational choices were to be based not on market or profit criteria but on planners’ preferences which took into consideration local, regional and national needs;
- land was to be nationalized; however, the systems of agriculture have varied between countries, with each state evolving its own combination of private collective and state farming;
- the governments maintained monopoly control over foreign trade;
- the state provided cheap , highly subsidized public welfare goods and services, including food;
- light industry, consumer good production and the service sector were neglected (Andrusz 1996, 37).

The earlier mentioned elements stem from or are themselves factors in the socialist system that differentiated space according to national priorities. Boren and Gentile add that defence considerations, the existence of black markets and the ideological leadership of the Communist Party also are important factors in socialist urban development (Boren and Gentile 2007, 97). The modernisation strategies and the role of urbanisation varied across socialist countries, but urbanisation was a key strategy for development in all of them.

3.4 Conclusion: Main differences in the production of space under capitalism and socialism

To sum up, no matter what economic regime a city is embedded in, the connection between modernisation, industrialisation and urbanisation is undeniable. However, there are main differences in the production of space between the city under capitalism and under socialism.

First, the range of actors differs. In a centrally planned socialist system, the state decides and allocates, whereas in a capitalist one many public and private actors need to be considered in the planning process. These include policy-makers, the public, environmental and non-governmental institutions, investors and planners.

Second, it is easy to assume that cities under socialism were governed more cohesively than capitalist ones. However, this is not universally true, because cities under socialism were limited in their development by the shortage economy.

Third, another important difference is of ideological nature. Socialist cities were meant to be places of production, whereas capitalism thrives on urban consumption.

Fourth, social equality was more important under socialism than capitalism. All people in urban and rural areas were meant to be equally well-off.

These different mechanisms for the production of space have led to disparate spatial outcomes in the respective cities. Due to local context, no city has developed like any other and the outcomes are countless. Still, there are common trends. The following chapter will outline socialist city planning principles and their impact on urban morphology.

4. The socialist city: real and ideal

In order to explore the hypothesis of this thesis, it is necessary to find out what the distinct elements of socialist cities are and whether such elements can be found in Beijing and Hanoi. The following chapter will elaborate on the idea and reality of urban areas under a socialist doctrine. The questions that will be dealt with in this chapter are whether a socialist city does exist, if it differs from the capitalist city and what its main characteristics are?

4.1 The debate: Is there a distinct socialist city?

French and Hamilton claim that "the socialist city is the most neglected subject in the field of urban studies" (French and Hamilton 1979, 2). The first question that arises is, "What is the socialist city?". Even before that we have to ask if the socialist city even exists and whether it is different from the capitalist city?

The socialist city as a concept for urban analysis is based on the general agreement that there are elements in cities that used to be under the influence of a socialist central planning system, which differ from those in classical capitalist cities. Despite this baseline agreement and anecdotic evidence, it is yet widely debated whether the socialist city should be considered as a distinct, separate concept from the capitalist city. Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic lay out the extreme positions of the debate as follows:

> Two of the most sharply opposed streams of the debate over socialist versus capitalist cities are the ecological and the historical schools (Bodnár 2001; Hirt 2006; Szelenyi 1996). The ecological school argues that urban form is the outcome of universal processes of urbanization and industrialization that cross the capitalist-socialist boundary, and that socialist cities represent a mildly distorted urban model (Enyedi 1996). Advocates of the historical approach believe that in minimizing private ownership of land, housing, and the means of production, socialism produced a truly unique urban model (Szelenyi 1996). (Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 2006)

In other words, the ecological approach believes in one inevitable line of urbanisation, which starts with economic development and industrialisation. The socio-economic organisation of a place is an intervening variable that slightly distorts the general path (Szelenyi 1996, 289). Enyedi, whose theories have been touched upon in the chapter on cities and development, essentially argues that there is only one path of urbanisation and that all cities develop along this path. The socialist city is a mere detour that speeds up certain aspects while omitting others in the urbanisation process (see Enyedi 1996). Hence the spatial results in the socialist city and the capitalist city are very much alike, albeit driven by different mechanisms. For example, offices are centrally located in both types of cities simply because locating workplaces in an easily reachable area is the most efficient way to guarantee their function (Enyedi 1996, 104). Yet, even Enyedi acknowledges that the socialist city has special features such as the role of rapid industrialisation or the high amount of rural population in the city (Enyedi 1996, 115-118). Yet, he does not elaborate on the fact that these special features eventually are the root cause of a different urban environment.

The historical school, in contrast to the ecological school, which is represented by neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian scholars, emphasizes the importance of local historic heritage and institutions (Szelenyi 1996, 290). Szelenyi describes the way he sees the socialist city as follows: "[...] these cities are here

called socialist not because they necessarily looked the way socialist planners or ideologues wanted them to look, but because they were cities of industrial societies that had abolished private ownership as the means of production." (Szelenyi 1996, 287) The most important influences on the distinct socialist urban structure are the public ownership structure as well as the central allocation of means. Szelenyi is a strong advocate for the argument that there is a socialist legacy in cities with a former socialist system.

A second problem in the debate on the existence of the socialist city is that comparing cities across different countries is difficult because of the socio-economic, historical and cultural differences:

> As one might expect, there are significant differences in the geography of towns, not only between 'socialism' and 'capitalism', but also between the various socialist countries themselves - for good historical, social, economic and even political reasons (French and Hamilton 1979, 4).

For example, the starting point of urbanisation varied in different cities. Russia was sparsely urbanised in 1917 with 18 percent of the people living in urban areas, whereas in the German Democratic Republic in 1945 the urbanisation rate boasted 67.6 percent (French and Hamilton 1979, 4). Still, the majority of countries had a low level of urbanisation at the time when they became socialist (French and Hamilton 1979, 2).

In spite of the different levels of urbanisation, different local historical, geographical context and historical paths when CEE countries were subjected to socialist policies, cities developed common urban structures and patterns. This happened mostly through the ideological application of socialist principles. Of course local culture and societal practices have produced obvious spatial differences, especially in areas of historic significance such as old city centres (French and Hamilton 1979, 14). Polish cities, for example, have a lot of cafés and former Yugoslav cities have many barber shops, which is due to historic influences of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, common physical urban types have emerged across the socialist landscape. Socialist cities share especially great uniformities of spatial distribution, even though to the keen observer they are superficially very diverse (French and Hamilton 1979, 15).

Another feature that separates the socialist and the capitalist city, is that population growth was slower in socialist cities than in capitalist ones. This was due to migration controls and the wish to keep cities compact and middle-sized. In some cities industrial workplaces grew faster than the population, which led to temporary shortages of workers and what Szelenyi calls under-urbanisation (Szelenyi 1996, 294). Both Asia and Europe experience slower urban growth rates. In Vietnam the decline of urban population was more prominent, because the communist party tried to break the urban bourgeoisie apart by sending them away or eliminating them. China focussed on building up rural industry, therefore fewer migrants moved from the country to the big cities (Szelenyi 1996, 297).

It also makes sense to consider the socialist city as its own distinctive framework, since ideas from Soviet planners spread throughout the Soviet Bloc and beyond to other socialist countries in the world. Some because overseas scholars studied in the SU; others because ideas were exported by Soviet planners employed abroad.

> The sharing of the foregoing concepts and actual planning strategies by planners in the various socialist countries, and the similar problems of translating theory into practice, have brought about a certain degree of uniformity in cities throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. (French and Hamilton 1979, 14)

The exchange in styles across socialist countries was so intensive in certain aspects, that one city resembled another. "Indeed, if one were transported into any residential area built since the Second World War in socialist countries, it would be easier at first glance to tell when it was constructed than to determine in which country it was" (French and Hamilton 1979, 15). Chinese urban patterns have been deeply influenced by the Soviet socialist city for example (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007, 233). Another particularly remote example is the socialist experiment for urban development in Zanzibar City between 1964 and 1977 (Myers 1994, 451). The first master plan for Zanzibar City was written by a planner from the German Democratic Republic and the second one from a team from the People's Republic of China (Myers 1994, 452). The foreign planners used their imported knowledge and designed the projects according to popular Soviet practices. Since a lot of scholars were educated in Moscow, the socialist urban concept spread all over Eastern Europe and to China and Vietnam.

Another important reason why the socialist city has to be considered as distinctly separate from the capitalist city, is its relatively long period of isolation from the international market. "Due to its limited contact with the outside world, the socialist landscape to some extend resisted the flow of globalization until the early nineteen-nineties" (Czepczynski 2010, 25). Since there was little exposure to global architecture and planning styles, the socialist city has retained its authenticity until the 1990s. Even though there was regular exchange among countries of the communist bloc, there was little economic or politic interaction with the rest of the world. The lack of relations was either self-imposed or in some cases resulted from international sanctions. Most of the international exchange that took place was supervised and authorised by the central government (Mingione 1996, 37).

The socialist city never was a “fundamental alternative” to the capitalist city (Andrusz 1996, 71). Andrusz suggests that the difference between the socialist and capitalist city simply stems from certain features in the spatial structure that were more prominent in socialist principles. While a capitalist city can be more easily differentiated through different social classes living in different areas, the socialist city is divisible in terms of land use patterns. Such features include neighbourhood units, distinct land-use planning with functional zones and the importance of public transport, which will be discussed in more detail in the following subchapters.

To sum up, there are more arguments that support the idea that there is a distinct socialist city. When contrasted with the capitalist city it is most easily identified in land use patterns and the spatial distribution of certain functions that were required of the city in order to convey socialist ideology. However, no city is static, but rather dynamic and its society constantly changing itself and the environment. Therefore, no socialist city is like another. Bertaud and Renaud state that "it is appropriate to speak of a ’socialist city’ whenever urban development is expected to proceed without land markets and land use decisions are made administratively" (Bertaud and Renaud 1997 138). This description forms the baseline of the investigation into what further features the socialist city may have. The socialist city, as an analytical model today, is not a rigid concept.

4.2 The real and ideal socialist city

The core problem with the socialist city as an analytical concept is that it has not been coherently applied. It is much rather a framework of ideologically and economically motivated planning decisions. Despite central planning, socialist urban features were often unintended outcomes of the political and economic structure under socialism (Szelenyi 1996, 287). They were not all meticulously planned and controlled by a central planning agency. “Everywhere the broad aims of planners have been the same – to create an optimum living environment where enhanced productivity, social justice, and maximum satisfaction of the inhabitants would be attained.” (French and Hamilton 1979, 5) Although the aims have been similar in the planning of all socialist cities, the degree of urbanisation, the availability of resources and the political will of the party have influenced what has been truly achieved. Objectives and reality are chaffing in the socialist city.

Therefore, in order to truly understand what the socialist city is, researchers have to make a distinction between what was imagined and what actually happened. The authors of literature on the socialist city widely agree on this point:

> When speaking of the socialist city we refer to two categories, not exactly identical but overlapping in some aspects: the first is the ideal city, whose characteristics were defined in ideological and political literature; and the second is the city of real socialism. (Coudroy de Lille and Guest 2010, 36)

Already in the 1960s and 1970s, the gap between the ideal socialist city and the reality was apparent to researchers. In an analysis from 1977, Bater clearly criticised how far apart the normative goals of socialist city planning and the actual state of what has been realised are (Bater 1977, 203). Even Fisher in 1962 realised that socialist city norms were not on track (Fisher 1962).

The duality between norm and reality makes the concept 'socialist city' somewhat difficult to examine. Place specificity and path-dependent development have produced very different cities, therefore defining an exact outline merely based on empirical research in former socialist cities is complex. However, if the socialist city is approached as a normative concept, which it was for urban planners in Soviet Russia, it becomes fairly straightforward. Mingione warns that when analysing socialist countries and their respective cities, using an idealistic approach is only of limited use, since most countries did not live up to their ideals. In order to understand the true socialist identity of any country, its socialist reality needs to be examined (Mingione 1996, 36). Nevertheless, the ideals have defined the reality and are thus worth examining more closely. This socialist urban reality varies across countries, but common spatial types have still emerged.

In fact, with very few exceptions, the ideal socialist city has not been comprehensively realised. Rather only a few urban elements have been markedly shaped by socialist urban procedure. A lot of policies were simply too expensive to implement. For example, especially in the 1950s and 1960s there was not enough housing in most CEE countries to guarantee everyone a comfortable and adequate living space (Frolic 1970, 681). The only examples where a fairly comprehensive set of socialist planning norms was realised were the "new socialist cities", which were built on previously empty land (Fisher 1962, 255). In designing new towns the socialist planners actually had the chance to create drawing board cities and thus to physically implement a new socialist world order. Usually grand designs were envisioned in theory. In reality, many of these newly constructed towns lack a proper centre and are

full of empty spaces because the envisioned projects were never built (Czepczynski 2008, 81). A big problem with new towns was that they were built to serve one purpose, usually to house labour of a certain factory or to function as regional administrative centre (Fisher 1962, 255). So instead of creating a new socialist society in these towns, planners just set up factory towns (Czepczynski 2008, 81). Nowa Huta is the biggest and best known new town of socialist urban development. It was newly built in close proximity to Krakow with the aim of erecting a large steel mill. In Nowa Huta wide streets lined with modernist blocks of prefabricated houses radiate from a central square (see Czepczynski 2008, 80).

Another socialist new town was Stalin City (Dunaújváros since 1961) in Hungary, which is located about 60 km south of Budapest on the banks of the Danube. Socialist planners first erected an iron works factory and then housing facilities. However, they ignored the fact that the loess ground was rather unsuitable for construction and they underestimated the population growth (see Kerékgyártó 2010). Consequently, there was insufficient poor-quality housing and too few service facilities for the swelling population.

4.3 The role of planning in the socialist city

It is essential to understand that the planning in the socialist and capitalist city took place in a completely different institutional framework.

> In a market driven society, the necessity for urban planning stems from the existence of externalities and the need to provide public goods. In a planned economy, urban planning is perceived as a tool to realize the socialist ideology of planned development and to 'translate' the goal of economic planning into urban space. (Yeh and Wu 1999, 169)

Planning under socialism happened without private property. All investments were state controlled and decision-making was a centralised process and hierarchically executed (Häussermann 1996, 215).

Capitalist urban development by contrast has happened in another setting, where the interests of private owners and developers play the key role. Decision-making and urban planning has therefore been more complex. It has been led by "market competition, private property, real estate profitability, local decision-making, and physical planning on a city-by-city basis" (Enyedi 1996, 101). Hence, in theory, central planning provided superior circumstances for urban planning than in a market economy. Since socialist urban planning was normative and tried to create an urban environment as well as a society that cohere with socialist ideals, the socialist city should supposedly have turned out more coherent than the capitalist city (Bater 1977, 178). Yeh and Wu explain,

> It is claimed by socialist ideology that the superiority of socialism over capitalism is that through public ownership, urban development could be better organized and the public interest can be maximally guaranteed. Yet, urban development in the case of pre-economic reform China is far from organized development, although the government did have overwhelming control over the urban space. State ownership can not [*sic!*] eliminate the fragmentation between government departments and their vast subordinate state work units. (Yeh and Wu 1999, 231)

Planning however was not straightforward at all, because targets and priorities tended to change (Boren and Gentile 2007, 99). Moreover, despite central planning, the approach to urban planning was very compartmentalised. One reason for this was that different departments and ministries were

responsible for developing different zones in the city (Bater 1977, 198). In other words: "[...] the essence of a centrally planned system is that there is a plan - or rather countless plans [...]" (Boren and Gentile 2007, 98). Planning was mostly carried out as sector planning where each ministry was responsible for a different kind of industry or service sector. Planning in the socialist city therefore was a patchwork process rather than a centrally controlled mechanism (Enyedi 1996, 111).

The socioeconomic aims of town planning in the socialist city include an economic and a social purpose in the wider context of socioeconomic development of the whole country (Ciborowski 1970, 170). “Under "socialism" nationwide city planning, an integral part of regional planning, is concerned with the location and distribution of economic productive forces: Industry, power, and transportation” (Fisher 1962, 252). It is not an objective to create a city that is economically powerful in itself, but the urban agglomeration is part of creating greater wealth and progress throughout the country. Urban planning was a tool not only to improve city life, but also to strengthen the national economy. Both objectives were easy to unify since the centralised state administration controlled them.

From a practical point of view, Bater argues that there are two imperatives for successful planning of the socialist city. Urban growth should be planned and the planning should be executed in a normative style (Bater 1977, 177). However, normative planning can be very difficult if there is not enough information, money and power in the hands of the planners:

> For a normative approach to town planning to be successful, it is imperative that there be reasonably accurate knowledge as to what the economic and demographic parameters of a city and its immediate hinterland are likely to be within a specific time period, that there be the power to influence events so as to have developments conform reasonably well with plans and that there be the requisite financial resources to realize planned objectives. (Bater 1977, 181)

Therein lay the difficulties of the success of the ideal socialist city. Planners were not able to either gather enough information, or did not have enough means or power to satisfactorily implement the normative plans. For instance, urban growth was not stemmed by restriction policies, because workers flocked to the city for employment opportunities and the number of people was unpredictable.

To sum up, the structural characteristics of socialism have produced recognisable and predictable spatial patterns in cities under socialism. Yet, there is no blueprint socialist city, since every city is the result of many layers of history. Hence the socialist city is a framework of predictable spatial patterns, distinguishable architectural types and typified land use dedications. In its regional variations, however it wears many guises.

4.4 The role of ideology in socialist planning

The political ideology of the ruling elite strongly influenced urban development, especially in a central planning system. “The landscape we now see is the result of present and past ideologies superimposed on urban tissue, and additionally modified by cultures, economies and societies” (Czepczynski 2008, 59). Landscape therefore could be used as a medium to convey messages of power and ideology to its users, who are, in the case of a city, the inhabitants. Czepczynski argues: “Making socialist landscape significant and controlling that significance was one of the important tasks of the new communist regimes” (2008, 69). He further explains that ideology was implemented at different levels of the city, namely the typological that represents function, the spatial and the syntactic. One of the most

important functions of the communist city was to house power. Representing culture was also an important function in the socialist city. Culture manifested itself in the form of cultural centres or museums. A fitting example of this is the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw (Czepczynski 2008, 72).

Fisher stresses two general ideological objectives that socialist city planning hoped to achieve:

> (1) to correct the ills inherited from the era of capitalism; (2) to develop a new pattern for the city which will indicate clearly the inherent unity of the people, the classlessness of the society. The spatial manifestation of the new socialist relations among men is, at the same time, to conform to the stated ideals of each country's national revolution. (Fisher 1962, 252)

Point one refers to prioritising the needs of the central state over the needs of the individual city, whereas point two stresses the importance of realising the ideological goal of an egalitarian socialist society. The last sentence is also interesting, because it shows that even in the 1960s it was clear that socialism was not the same in every country. Consequently, urban planning was understood as an instrument of the communist revolution in each country.

"Socialist theory of urban transformation is an expression of the idealistic aspirations of politically oriented socialist planning" (Fischer 1962, 251). Several ideological underpinnings were premises for the actual planning process and shaped the fabric of the socialist city. The urban fabric was changed "due to the socially (and spatially) revolutionizing ambitions of the system itself" (Boren and Gentile 2007, 97). The key themes are:

- *Central planning and public ownership.* Since central planning existed under socialism, everything was inadvertently planned by central authorities. Urban planning was accordingly inherent to the system and also centrally organised. Moreover, since there was no private property, all land was public and available for development. In terms of institutions, urban planning under socialism was an urban planner's paradise.
- *Modernisation through Industrialisation.* The aim of socialist planners and ideologues was to transform the city from a place of consumption to a place of production (Lo 1980, 132). Cities were part of the overall modernisation process, which was to be achieved through the built up of heavy industry. Industrialisation with the emphasis on heavy industry was the driving force for developing the socialist city (Fisher 1962, 251). Since the extensive industrialisation programme of socialist regimes was very costly planners economised on 'non-productive' investments such as social services (Szelenyi 1996, 296). This meant that planners were bound to give industrial projects, which were important for national modernisation, precedence over others. Sjöberg referred to the spatial outcome of this practice as "landscapes of priority" (Sjöberg 1999, 2224).
- *Equality and collectivism*. Under Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in theory, all citizens were equal, thus the city should reflect social equality. The socialist urban environment should encourage a sense of collective identity.

The role of ideology changed over the course of the socialist decades in SU. Boren and Gentile identify two main paradigms of planning in the SU (Boren and Gentile 2007, 101). The first paradigm spans the ideology-driven Stalin era (1929−1953). The Stalinist era was politically rigid and

emphasised unyielding planning concepts, which were heavily influenced by ideological aims (Fisher 1962, 265). Fisher describes the role of the planner in the Stalinist era as follows: “It is the planner's desire to express tangibly in the brick and mortar of his cities the philosophical aspirations of Marxism-Leninism” (Fisher 1962, 252). Stalinist urban planning had two distinct development aims. On the one hand it prioritised the industrialisation of the city, while on the other hand it put a focus on prestige projects that glorified socialism and gave cities a sort of grandeur. This resulted in a land-use pattern in which the heavy and defence industry enjoyed prime access to urban infrastructure (Boren and Gentile 2007, 98). The second paradigm gained foothold after Stalin's death. The party leadership became more pragmatic and the planning paradigm shifted to cheap mass-housing developments.

4.5 The role of architecture in the socialist city

Socialist ideology was most vividly expressed by architecture. Socialist land use patterns may be very distinct, but they do not appear to the casual visitor, unless he or she sits down and studies a map. This chapter therefore describes the various trends in socialist architecture in the SU. In the case study section, we will see that the Soviet architectural style was exported both to China and Vietnam.

Edmund Goldzamt, a polish architect, wrote: “ Die Große Sozialistische Oktoberrevolution befreite die Architektur aus ihrer Abhängigkeit vom <<Geldsack>> und stellte Sie in den Dienst des Volkes” (Goldzamt 1967, 206). Under a central planning economy, public officials finally had the means to construct grand and splendid buildings. Besides that, architecture, as stipulated by Lenin, was seen as an art form that was meant to educate the proletariat.

> Bezeichnend ist das Bestreben der revolutionären Macht, mit der Kultur- und Kunstpropaganda den Massen des Volkes entgegenzukommen, diese Propaganda mit einem gesellschaftlich fortschrittlichen Inhalt zu erfüllen und für sozialistische Erziehung zu nutzen. (Goldzamt 1967, 207)

Landscaping and architecture were tools of empowerment for the communist leaders, because the message was transmitted on a grand and visible scale. According to Czepczynski the socialist city is defined by the ideological implications behind each building that was constructed. There were no arbitrary building projects, but rather all fit into the ideological canon of the concerned communist parties (Czepczynski 2008, 107). Usually it was fairly easy to understand the meaning of a building or other spatial arrangements (Czepczynski 2008, 63). Many buildings essentially became propaganda tools, which by no means degraded their functionality. A good example with an easy message is the Berlin wall.

The role of architects, as well as planners, was to satisfy the party’s wishes for educational propaganda. Therefore, in some cases socialist planners and architects tried to deliberately break with existing urban forms. Yet, in other cases, baroque and renaissance like elements were used on buildings in order to link socialism to already existing architectural heritage (Czepczynski 2008, 79). Sometimes local culture and architectural tradition were expressed on the outside of the heavy and symbolic buildings. Even historic decorative designs were borrowed from national heritage. Scenes from the Medieval Cloth Hall in Krakow for example were used to decorate the Palace of Science and Culture (French and Hamilton 1979, 15). The Lenin Museum in Tashkent, which is a culturally distinct place from other cities in CEE, was also built in grand white socialist style, but the traditional technique of filigree design was used to adapt the building to local context (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Lenin Museum Tashkent (The Great Mirror 2013)

Socialist building practices in Soviet countries can be divided into three phases: (1) Stalinist classicism, (2) modernist international style, and (3) late Soviet individualistic style (Czepczynski 2008, 88). The first phase is marked with ideological consolidation and monumental propaganda buildings. Stalin especially influenced this early phase. The buildings that represented the new political order had to be grander than all the buildings before. Early skyscrapers in Moscow such as the Ukraina Hotel are examples for Stalinesque classicism (French and Hamilton 1979, 15). A lot of the buildings were white and symmetrical and drew on historical stylisation. The architects borrowed neo-classical decor and built large, imposing buildings with several storeys and layers, usually covered with ideological statues, mural paintings and carvings. This design of the Stalinist era is also known as the Soviet "wedding cake" design of socialist realism (Fisher 1962, 257). Other good examples are the Lomonosov Moscow State University, the Largo in Sofia, the Hotel International in Prague and the Ceausescu Palace (nowadays Palace of the Parliament) in Bucharest (see Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 (left to right) Lomosonov State University, Moscow (Wikipedia 2012); Ceausescu Palace, Bucharest (The Telegraph 2010); Hotel International, Prague (Open buildings n.d.)

Most of the Soviet architecture in the 1940s and 1950s was influenced by historical styles dictated from Moscow. Characteristic housing types from the classical era were blocks of flats built along the lines of neo-classicism. "Blocks of flats of the same period appear virtually indistinguishable, whether at the Kaluga Gates in Moscow, on the Miners' Prospekt in Prokop'yevsk, in Mokotów in Warsaw, along Karl-Marx-Allee in Berlin, or in central Nowa Huta, Eisenhüttenstadt, [...]" (French and Hamilton 1979, 15).

The most megalomaniac example for a Stalin-era neo-classical building project is the never completed Palace of the Soviets project. The Palace of the Soviets was meant to house government agencies,

entertainment facilities and so on. It was to be the highest building in the world, topped with a huge statue of V.I. Lenin. Its design was important to convey the power of the communist regime in the Soviet Union and therefore an architecture competition was held. Out of 160 entries, the Russian architect Boris Iofan's neo-classical design was chosen (see Figure 4.3). For its construction near the Kremlin, the Church of Christ the Saviour, which was the largest church in Russia, was torn down. In 1939 its foundations were laid. However, due to the invasion of Russia by German forces, construction came to a halt and the building materials, especially the steel beams, were used in the defence of Moscow (Hoisington 2003, 65). The project was abandoned after the war and the remaining foundation structure was flooded in 1958 and became the world largest outdoor swimming pool. After the end of the SU, the originally destroyed Church of Christ the Saviour was rebuilt in its original form in 1995 (see Hoisington 2003).



Figure 4.3 Palace of the Soviets, Design by Boris Iofan (SkyscraperPage Forum 2008)

After Stalin's death, socialist building practices followed the modernist international style, which is the second phase of Soviet building style. Monumental construction was abandoned in favour of modernist and more practical housing developments (Häussermann 1996, 217). Architects became more pragmatic and less dramatic in their development choices. The modernist, functional international style was influenced by the Swiss architect Le Corbusier as well as the founder of the Bauhaus school Walter Gropius. Modernist architecture was widely used in non-socialist and socialist countries, but its origins lie in Western countries. Ornaments were mostly banned and functionality triumphed over form. Grand blocks of prefabricated flat estates became the new paradigm, especially when erecting new towns (Czepczynski 2008, 95). New standardised building techniques further allowed for more efficiency and uniformity. The dominant shape of buildings was 'the block' with clear, straight lines. Le Corbusier had popularised the view that block and line shapes represent equality and balance the chaotic individualism of capitalist cities. This concept of equality in housing and other buildings greatly appealed to the communist party (Czepczynski 2008, 97). The blocks of

flats were plain, but large, and thus had to be located outside the existing urban core in peripheral areas where there was enough undeveloped space.

Figure 4.4 Pre-fabricated housing estates. (left) Plattenbausiedlung Mahrzahn Berlin (Bundesarchiv 1987); (right) Panelák of Petržalka, Bratislava (Wikipedia 2005)

Public transport was planned to connect them with the city centre, albeit it was not always sufficiently implemented. The standardised prefabricated housing blocks were of much better quality than the crowded and derelict remnants of inner city housing. Thus in the beginning the block flats were more desirable to live in. Between the 1950s and 1970s buildings remained functional with little symbolic value or identification possibilities. The prefabricated housing had various colloquial names throughout Eastern Europe. In German they are called *Plattenbau* and in Czech and Slovak they were known as *panelák* (see Figure 4.4). The block flat constructions were appealing to communist leaders because on the one hand they were cheap to build and on the other hand they were rather uniform. These characteristics were expected to create a collective identity among the citizens (Czepczynski 2008, 99). However, due to their lack of recreational and socialising space, the residents could not really identify with their home or bond with their neighbours. There was little sense of place and connection to other parts of the city.

Figure 4.5 Late Soviet individualism. (left) Ministry of Highways and Transportation, 1979, Tbilisi, Georgia (Rota n.d.); (right) Residential Building on Minskaya Street, 1980s, Bobrujsk, Belarus (Belorussian State Archive of Scientific-Technical Documentation n.d.)

The third phase of Soviet architecture is the late Soviet individualistic style. It is characterised by the loss of faith in ideological representation of the urban fabric in the 1980s. Efforts to create a new society by altering urban form, had thus far been unsatisfactory. Therefore urban planning and architecture became more individualistic across countries (see Figure 4.5). Some leaders even returned

to Stalinist forms. One excellent example of such a case is Ceausescu's Palace of the People in Bucharest. During the late period tourism also increased which led to the building of spa towns and hotels in huge numbers (Czepczynski 2008, 102f).

4.6 Planning norms in the socialist city

In contrast to the capitalist city, the socialist city had a set of Marxist-inspired and formulated norms that it wanted to achieve. In socialist countries the "[...] solutions to urban problems are sought within a philosophical framework of Marxist doctrine and mostly within a practical, decision-taking structure of a command economy" (French and Hamilton 1979, 1). The following section will highlight how the ideological underpinnings of socialism translated into universal planning norms as defined by Soviet urban planners. The main recurring norms in socialist planning that were necessary to achieve these ideological objectives among others were: (1) equality of citizens, (2) standardisation, (3) controlling urban growth, (4) land use segregation, (5) integration of work and residential areas, (6) administrative and cultural city centre.

Equality of citizens

Modernisation of the economy and an equal society were among the most important mantras of socialist planners. The basic idea of socialism was that everybody should be equal. The city had to reflect the equality and unity of all citizens, since the socialist society was supposedly classless. Therefore the basic aim of the socialist city was to create and perpetuate equality because there should be uniform living conditions for all (Ciborowksi 1956, 24).

> No part of the city should ideally attract or repel certain classes—wealthy people living in exclusive residences, the poor in low-rent burned-out industrial areas. All parts of the city of socialist man will be composed, in theory, of all people—a truly classless potpourri. (Fisher 1962, 252)

After the various communist parties had taken over in the CEE states after the 2nd World War, capitalist homeowners were removed from their homes. These newly vacant buildings were fitted with apartments and filled with residents formerly belonging to different social classes. However, throughout most cities people that shared an occupation would still live in the same area (Fisher 1962, 259). Equality of all citizens also included that consumers have equal access to goods and services (Bater 1977, 192). This was problematic, because new housing was constructed in the first periphery of the city and usually service development occurred long after people settled into the housing estates. Furthermore, service quality greatly varied across the city, with some districts privileged due to their location or the occupation of its inhabitants (Smith 1996, 77).

While equality was a leitmotiv in planning the socialist city, it was poorly executed in regard to social affairs. The ideologically desired mix of classes and the hence classless society was never accomplished in reality. This was particularly obvious since the communist party elite had settled down in the prime residential areas (Fisher 1962, 259). Social equality was to a limited extend present in new industrial towns where almost all inhabitants were employed as workers in a huge public factory (French and Hamilton 1979, 16). Nonetheless, all cities managed to acquire a fair degree of spatial uniformity by setting up standardised housing blocks and giving the city a homogeneous architecture in some districts. Also some professions were more valued than others, so that workers in heavy industry usually had more living space and better apartments. People from the upper level such

as bureaucrats, party officials, military officers or academics even occupied special buildings with access to better service facilities (Smith 1996, 80). Socio-spatial segregation was thus no longer based on income and economic power, but rather on occupation. Altogether researchers, however, agree that there was less social segregation in the socialist city when compared to the capitalist city. Socialist society nonetheless was far from the sought-after collective lifestyle (Smith 1996, 96). Ethnic and class distinctions were produced and reproduced despite all egalitarian principles (Szelenyi 1996, 303). To put it briefly, urban social equality under socialism was an important ideological goal, but in reality it was not widely applied.

Standardisation

Since people were moving to the cities to find work in the new industrial plants, most socialist cities faced a housing shortage. This was eventually ameliorated by the introduction of standardised, prefabricated housing blocks, which were cheap and easy to build (Fisher 1962, 263). The quality of housing varied. The initial Stalinesque housing was of good quality, because the buildings were meant to look grand and durable. Also financial problems were not an issue yet. Prefabricated estates that were constructed towards the end of the 1950s to alleviate the housing crisis were often cheap and substandard buildings. Cost-efficiency remained the main mantra in construction for socialist governments during the 1960s. Later high-rises from the 1970s greatly improved in quality (Smith 1996, 78).

The standardised prefabricated housing units were meant to create a more uniform living environment where everyone would be the same. In order to achieve the desired housing equality, flat size in newly built apartments was regulated to 50 m² -71 m² (Fisher 1962, 253). However, instead of creating a collective community spirit, most residents hardly knew their neighbours (Frolic 1970, 682). Social uniformity across the whole city proofed to be difficult, because the large, new housing areas usually accommodated people from the same occupational group, for instance workers from a nearby plant. Therefore in reality the egalitarian social mix and the desired collective identity did not arise. Even if a neighbourhood unit was more mixed, the individual houses were still mostly inhabited by people with similar background (Smith 1996, 82).

Controlling urban growth

Another important objective of socialist planners was controlling town growth. The ideal socialist city was supposed to have between 50.000 and 100.000 inhabitants. Everything exceeding this size was to be built as satellite towns (French and Hamilton 1979, 11). This size was considered to foster community spirit and it was manageable in terms of easy delivery of goods and services, because providing social services and infrastructure for big cities was very costly. Moreover, cities should be turned from consumer to producer cities and become economically self-sufficient (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 10). In order to stymie urban growth, mobility restrictions on rural-to-urban migration were imposed and strictly controlled through the use of internal passports (Boren and Gentile 2007, 101). For some time, immigration to some cities was completely shut down in order to cope with the swelling population. In 1970, 15 Soviet cities had closed populations. Among them were Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad (Frolic 1970, 684). Despite these measures, growth in the big urban centres could not be controlled. As a result of rapid industrialisation, migration increased drastically and hence

planners were even less able to restrain urban growth according to formulated goals. Keeping cities small was hopelessly utopian. Eventually planners conceded to reality and the concept of the 'right' city size was largely abandoned.

Land use planning and segregation

Land use functions in socialist cities were similar to those in capitalist cities. However, land use segregation was much more distinctive in socialist cities, because of centralised decision-making and the public ownership of land (Häussermann 1996, 218). A large area of land could be dedicated to one purpose, such as industry, housing or recreation, in order to make the city more efficient. This meant that there were large residential districts, agglomerations of administrative buildings as well as industrial zones. In the SU defence considerations and the location of defence related industry was important in shaping the urban fabric as well (Boren and Gentile 2007, 100). In urban Russia during the Cold War, military areas occupied large territories and restricted urban growth in its surroundings, which does not apply to all socialist cities. In general, however, military strategy did influence the location of boulevards, subway stations and even the distance between buildings. Wide avenues were easier to block and defend than small winding streets. The socialist planners were inspired by the grandeur created by the architect Haussmann in Paris who restructured the French capital under Napoleon III. An example for such a boulevard created under socialist influence is the Karl Marx Allee (formerly Stalinallee) in former East Berlin. See Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6 Karl Marx Allee, Berlin (Wikipedia 2004)

The main reason for the distinct land use patterns in the socialist city was the central allocation of land and the absence of a land market. Like all goods in a central planning economy, land was a scarce resource allocated through the central authorities and rationed accordingly. All investment decisions were made by the bureaucracy without land markets (Bertaud and Renaud 1997, 137). This meant enterprises or other entities did not have to pay rent for land, but simply wait until a free plot was allocated to them. Land had to be divided between productive urban elements, such as industry and enterprises, and non-productive ones, such as residential and service facilities. Naturally, industrial projects usually got prioritised or as Boren and Gentile put it: "[...] industry had first choice, while the town planner was near the bottom of the food chain [...]" (2007, 99). This means that industry got a

fair share of valuable inner city land. Since there was no market competition, state firms did not really need to be profitable and successful. For that reason, there were no better or worse locations for industry within the city (Ciborowski 1956, 22). Consequently, industry was scattered all over the urban area, which is a distinctive difference to the capitalist city, where industrial areas are usually located close to good infrastructure and mainly on cheap land plots. Furthermore, land was often allocated to an enterprise very liberally and then frozen for future use. This resulted in ineffective allocation and waste of land. Subsequently, unused patches of land emerged and undermined comprehensive planning efforts (Boren and Gentile 2007, 99). In general, a lot of intended developments were not realised (Bater 1977, 199). Socialist cities were riddled with unfinished building projects, sometimes because of plan changes, budget constraints, or even because materials vanished and were sold on the black market by the construction crew (Boren and Gentile 2007, 100).

Another flaw in socialist land use planning was that the state postponed investment in projects that were in non-priority sectors as long as possible. 'Unproductive' structures, such as housing or health care facilities, were deferred until the social costs were no longer tolerable. This investment pattern resulted in a non-systematic pattern of land use allocation. Urban land development in the socialist city was in some respect crisis management, rather than planning for the future (Tang 1994, 407).

The urban fabric of the socialist city is less dense than that of the capitalist one. Again the reason for this was the absence of a land market. All land was publicly owned and therefore planners did not need to economise with space. As a consequence, space was rather luxuriously used in many central locations of socialist cities (Szelenyi 1996, 301). One such example is Alexanderplatz in Berlin. Open space was politically important, because propaganda ceremonies and parades needed to be conducted in spacious squares. This allowed for a large amount of spectators. Czepczynski refers to them as “anti-agoras”, because they were not used for democratic purposes but rather for rallies to support the communist party’s regime (2008, 72). The urban fabric of the socialist city is also less dense, because the incentive to recycle abandoned land was low. Since there was no land market, land had no value. It was thus more costly to tear down existing structures on abandoned land, than to build on a fresh plot. "Land prices exert a powerful influence to recycle land in the inner rings when the type and intensity of the existing use is too different from the land's optimum economic use" (Bertaud and Renaud 1997, 139). Moreover, derelict areas were left to themselves, since no one had to pay land rent. If planners wanted to build something new, they would simply allocate a new stretch of land on the undeveloped outskirts. Derelict areas in the inner city were rarely redeveloped, even despite their prime location. The central land allocation process thus encouraged distinct patterns of inner city rust-belts.

Interesting in this context is that although the central areas in the socialist city were less built up than the centre in the capitalist one, they were often more densely populated. This is because people had to share and sublet flats as a consequence of acute housing shortages in the 1950s and 1960s. The city outskirts, however, were compactly built up with large housing estates and generally showed a more dense urban fabric (Boren and Gentile 2007, 99). In comparison, the capitalist city becomes less dense the farther one moves away from the city centre, because private single family residences form a formidable mattress of urban sprawl. There is no fuzzy suburban fringe in the socialist city since the state retained control over land (Bater 1977, 198).

In conclusion, the central allocation of publicly owned land, absence of land markets and the prioritisation industry and defence have imprinted recognisable land use patterns upon the socialist city. Due to prestige buildings and deliberate open spaces as well as to derelict or vacant industrial land, the socialist city is more open in the city centre. Towards its periphery it becomes more built up, due to the housing projects.

Integration of workplace and residential area

The socialist city was meant to be organised into decentralised neighbourhood units called micro-district or *mikrorayon*. These units were to be built close to industrial areas and provide services to its residents, thus effectively economising on the distance that needs to be overcome to access everyday services (Frolic 1970, 681). This idea was inspired by several Soviet and international scholars. One of the early conceptions of what a socialist city could look like was the linear city by Miliutin in the 1920s (Bater 1977, 196). He stressed the advantage of the proximity of workplace and private residence. Short work journeys would benefit the workers leisure time and relief public transport. Between work and home there was to be a green belt as a buffer zone. Miliutin's linear city scheme was not very popular, but its core idea of placing industry and residential areas in near proximity and separating them with a green belt nevertheless remained popular (French and Hamiltion 1979, 9). At the beginning of the 1960s, Strumilin envisioned socialist urban living as communal living, where each commune is its own *mikrorayon*. The micro-district concept was also used and developed by modernist international planners and architects in non-socialist countries. An example is the famous Swiss architect Le Corbusier's plan for Chandigarh in India.

The *mikrorayon* is a self-contained spatial planning unit that includes residential buildings, communal recreation and eating space, basic services such as kindergartens, schools, medical facilities and staple shops. Each micro-district is ideally located in close proximity to an industrial plant, where the inhabitants will work. The *mikrorayon* never took the all-encompassing shape outlined above in Soviet cities, but it became a basic planning instrument for housing development. However, instead of the integrated micro-district, only huge residential zones were developed, which lacked the adequate neighbourhood services. Industry was frequently not spatially connected with these large scale neighbourhoods (French and Hamilton 1979, 11).

Despite the articulated goal of keeping distances to a minimum, work travel constantly increased as socialist cities grew. Public transportation was well developed in the central areas of large urban agglomerations, but became infrequent in the suburbs. However, maintaining public transport for large cities at affordable price levels was very costly for the state (French and Hamilton 1979, 17). Public transport was not able to serve the fast-growing housing estates. Thus the *mikrorayony* were not properly connected to the workplaces of their inhabitants.

Administrative and cultural city centre

“The distinctive character of the socialist conception of the city’s centre is that it functions not as an area of retail concentration but as the political-cultural-administrative centre” (Fisher 1962, 253). Fisher argues that this is in stark opposition with the capitalist city centre that often functions as the central business district. This norm was quite comprehensively achieved in socialist urban planning. The few commercial entities around the centre of the socialist city were usually designed for

international guests and tourists. Although there might have been one department store, a restaurant or a coffee shop, other forms of leisure or consumer outlets were the exception in the city centre.

The city centre most certainly was the stage for the principal socialist monuments and buildings (Fisher 1962, 253). Often it was a sterile and unwelcoming place that projected the power of the state. Inhabitants of the socialist city were expected to go to the centre for rarely needed specific administrative services or national celebrations. In capital cities, the central administrative and political buildings were monumental buildings that were to attract nationwide, as well as international, attention. Since the socialist city centre conformed to its planning norms, more details are given in Chapter 4.8.

4.7 The real socialist city

As mentioned before there was a gap between the ideal socialist city and its reality. When a city was transformed according to socialist ideals it took on a different purpose. Since capitalist production was abolished, several buildings lost their function when socialism was introduced. In a socialist city residents do not have or ideally do not need access to various consumer services, such as a stock exchange, fancy department stores or luxurious hotels. Therefore the state planning authorities repurposed these buildings with former capitalist usage for more practical uses such as offices, storage or housing (Czepczynski 2008, 83). Leisure facilities in contrast were often closed. The state kept only some hotels and spas open to house foreign visitors.

Warsaw is a good example of how difficult it really was to apply the above mentioned norms and principles. Since the Polish capital had been almost completely destroyed in the Second World War, socialist planners had the chance to remodel the city according to new socialist principles. Adolf Ciborowski, one of the head planners of the reconstruction, writes that 81% of the city had been hit by bombs and made unusable. The historic centre was completely obliterated (Ciborowski 1956, 13). The population of Warsaw had shrunk from 1.3 million in 1939 to 162,000 in a mere six years (Smith 1996, 85). 1945-Warsaw was to be largely rebuilt according to socialist principles and made habitable again. The polish planners were instructed to prioritise building up industrial areas and the necessary transportation lines. Heavy industry and long distance travel access points were especially important. The inner city was designated as the core administrative area and the periphery was to serve as living quarters (Ciborowski 1956, 18). The plan to build grand public buildings in the inner city, however, was foiled by the public desire to restore the historic core. The historic centre of Warsaw was an important national symbol, because it represented the struggle of the polish nation (Fisher 1962, 257). Hence it was reconstructed in its original form, albeit the buildings

Figure 4.7 Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw. View from Warsaw Financial Center (Wikipedia 2008)

were mostly repurposed as housing. Apart from the centre, a lot of monuments and churches that did not fit into the new socialist ideological canon were displaced or dismantled (Ciborowski 1956, 46).

The city centre's new desired cultural and public service functions were placed outside the historic core, around what is now Defilad Square (formerly called Stalin Square). The centrepiece of the culture and service redevelopment was the Palace of Science and Culture (Ciborowski 1956, 25). It (Figure 4.7) is a multi-functional building, filled with cinemas, theatres, a youth centre, sports facilities such as gym halls and swimming pools. It also houses the largest congress hall in Warsaw and is the seat of the Polish Academy of Science and the Museum of Technology.

The real socialist city faced similar problems as the ones exemplified in the reconstruction of Warsaw. Just like in many socialist cities, the socio-economic restructuring of Warsaw was utopian. The socialist inspired urban regeneration program was too expensive and the planners lacked the experience. A few years into the rebuilding process state finances dried up. Rebuilding was reorganised in collectives, members of which had to spend their private savings to buy construction progress (Smith 1996, 85). The planners working on Warsaw lacked the experience to effectively push through their desired program. What is more, the city did not have enough money for costly iconic buildings and a completely new urban pattern (Ciborowski 1956, 20). City growth could not be contained the way it was planned. The overall territory of the city expanded rapidly due to the building of new residential areas and the significant expansion of urban industrial activities. Public transport development could not keep up with the rapid city growth and the urban fringe became partly isolated (Smith 1996, 85). The reconstruction of Warsaw started out with socialist goals in mind, but as many others failed to superimpose the utopian socialist urban planning norms.

Despite the fact that there rarely is a blueprint socialist city, it can be summarized that a good amount of the socialist ideals of city planning have at least been partially implemented in existing cities as well as new towns. They make up what I will later refer to as 'socialist legacy'. I will now take a look at some of the most common architecture and planning elements that were realised in most socialist towns and cities of CEE.

4.8 Common physical elements in the real socialist city

Some of the socialist city norms have in fact been realised in many places with varying degrees and directly translate into the architectural heritage or socialist legacy in these towns. The best area to examine socialist legacy in the urban environment is the inner city, because of the complete absence of a land market under socialism. For my analysis of post-socialist Beijing and Hanoi to work, it has to be established whether they were socialist cities. In order to make a qualified statement, whether a city has socialist legacy or not, five urban structural elements that have distinct forms and functions in the socialist city will be examined. In other words these five elements have been quite comprehensively realised through urban areas under socialism. The elements are (1) the city centre, (2) industrial areas, (3) the micro-district, (4) residential buildings, (5) architectural heritage. Their form, function and location in socialist urbanism will be described in more detail in the following section. This categorisation will later build the basis for the analysis of Beijing and Hanoi.

City centre

The inner city was a very sterile place that was only used for administrative and cultural functions. There is no conventional CBD in the socialist city (Boren and Gentile 2007, 99). Commercial and service functions were executed by the state firms and the state bureaucracy.

In addition to reflecting the central functions of the city, the function of the centre was to embody what Czepczynski calls the "socialist myth". He compares the socialist system with its celebrations and rituals to a cult (2008, 65). The city centre was a special place of worship erected to transport the dogmatic messages of the communist party to the population. "The monumentalism of the space and the rituals conducted in them were designed to create feelings of security, permanence and pride among the people and their rulers" (Andrusz 1996, 65). Important architectural manifestations of the socialist cult for example are the Lenin Mausoleum on the Red Square in Moscow and the copy of the Liebknecht balcony in Berlin. "Socialist ritual" and ideological celebrations such as marches, manifestations, speeches or parades were carried out in the large city centre squares. Central squares in socialist cities usually were grand open spaces with the purpose of accommodating oversized celebrations. Squares and boulevards were the principle staging ground for socialist “mass spectacles” (Czepczynski 2008, 65). The communist authorities often built central administrative and cultural functions near the central square. The most famous one is the Red Square in Moscow.

The city centre was usually functional and adhered to socialist aesthetics (Bater 1977, 198). Its structure usually followed a clear order. It was mostly artistically designed to assert dominance over the rest of the urban region. Often a skyscraper monumentalised the socialist victory (Häussermann 1996, 216). Government buildings, museums, revolutionary statues and mausoleums lined the principle squares and boulevards. In most places in the SU the historic city centre was kept or rebuilt as in Warsaw.

Industrial sites

Socialist cities have an especially high share of inner city industrial land. Moscow’s industrial sites, for instance, covered 31 percent of the built up area in 1992. When contrasted with 6 percent in Seoul and 5 percent in both Paris and Hongkong, this was rather high (Bertaud and Renaud 1997, 144). Such inefficient industrial land use patterns are a consequence of the prioritisation of the construction of heavy industry. Enterprises were built as closely to the city centre as possible because they needed administrative infrastructure. Public transport provision usually lagged behind construction and workers could not easily reach remote industrial locations. Socialist industrial sites were also larger than their counterparts in capitalist cities. Due to the shortage economy, plant managers had to store a lot of input materials in case they ran out at a particular time. Storage space therefore took up a large part of any industrial site. This resulted in a low ratio of jobs to land (Bertaud and Renaud 1997, 144). Furthermore, the technological input was fairly low and therefore a lot of space and workers were needed. For the most part, industrial sites were spread out evenly across the socialist city, because land was free and centrally allocated by the state. In capitalist cities, in contrast, industry settled on cheap land close to transport facilities (French and Hamilton 1979, 16). Still, key industries belonging to important ministries tended to get prime sites under socialism.

As already explained, there was little incentive for land recycling. Consequently the large industrial sites in good, central locations often turned into brownfields, when they went out of use (Boren and Gentile 2007, 97). Brownfields are abandoned factory sites that are left undeveloped and useless. Essentially, new factories never replaced old ones, but instead were set up on new land.

The micro-district or neighbourhood unit

The *mikrorayon* or micro-district was a residential unit, which on average encompassed about 8,000 to 12,000 inhabitants. It comprised of several smaller housing units with each between 1000 and 1500 residents. The idea was that these districts provided essential services to their residents, such as educational, health, shopping and entertainment facilities. These service amenities were located in the neighbourhood centre, which was in a central position in the *mikrorayon* (Fisher 1962, 263). Moreover there were pedestrian areas connecting all the service facilities.

The basic idea of the micro-district was that it is located close to industrial workplaces in order to minimise journey-to-work distances:

> […] the development of the mikrorayon is premised on at least a sizeable proportion of the potential workforce being employed nearby […] this has not generally worked out in practice and with the increasing redevelopment of the central cities, which includes the dispersal of nonconforming industries […]. (Bater 1977, 196)

As Bater remarks it was not always possible to plan micro-districts and industrial sites together. The distance a worker travelled to work constantly increased, as cities grew and industrial sites spread out.



THE NEIGHBORHOOD UNIT: *A typical Polish interpretation currently under construction in Warsaw. Projected population is 7,000. Note the separation of automobile from pedestrian traffic and the use of major transportation routes to delimit the complex. The major shopping area is to be located at the left central portion of the photograph.*

Figure 4.8. Micro-district in Warsaw, Poland. Population 7,000 (Fisher 1962, 254)

Four to five micro-districts comprised a residential district, which provided more specialised services. The micro-district essentially was the lowest level of service provision in the administrative hierarchy. Neighbourhood unit planning was widely applied in Moscow and Warsaw (Smith 1996, 75). Figure 4.8 shows the layout of an average-sized micro-district in Warsaw. The self-contained neighbourhood

unit was an easy building block for planners. Fisher called the neighbourhood unit: “The basic tool of socialist urban planners in their attempt to create “urban uniformity””(Fisher 1962, 253). Socialist planners in the early 1960s had largely abandoned other forms of spatially dividing the city in favour of the *mikrorayon*. This means that the city became fairly homogenous, because neighbourhoods were not specialised in any kind of service or industrial production anymore. Instead each micro-district theoretically provided all types of basic services. In reality, many micro-districts were only an assembly of apartment blocks, as service provision lagged behind housing construction.

The micro-district concept was pervasive throughout the SU. Bater estimated in 1977 that about half the urban population in Soviet cities lived in some form of *mikrorayon*. Albeit the level of service provision in most of them was inadequate for the number of residents (Bater 1977, 193). Sit agreed that when socialism came to an end, roughly half the population of the SU was still living in a micro-district housing complex (Sit 1995, 203). The micro-district, although universally acknowledged as a planning instrument, did not take the exact same shape in all socialist countries. In some, like former Yugoslavia and China, it had extensive administrative functions and was to some extend a self-managing unit that micromanaged local affairs (Fisher 1962, 255). The unit was managed by a 'Neighbourhood Unit Council', a form of organisation that still exists in Chinese and Vietnamese urban administration.

The neighbourhood unit was designed so that "each unit would be a microcosm of Soviet society" (Frolic 1970, 682). It was intended to achieve the desired social cohesion and sense of place, and a feeling of community among the residents. People, however, did not choose to arrange their lives around their place of residence. Few residents knew their neighbours (Frolic 1970, 682).

Residential buildings

Soviet housing policy was influenced by the socialist principles of state-ownership, planned residential areas, spatial equality for collective services and short journey to work distances (Sit 1995, 201). Hence, housing had to be cheap, easily accessible and close to industrial areas.

The early socialist cities faced a massive housing shortage which resulted from already overcrowded inner city housing, as well as the tide of immigrants from rural areas that were coming to work in urban industrial plants. In order to solve the shortage created by the build-up of industry, the state invested heavily in affordable public housing schemes. Since construction needed to be as cheap as possible, the standardisation and industrial production of prefabricated units helped alleviate the crisis considerably (Bater 1977, 193). The cheap price, however, created a drop in quality. Soviet-manufactured materials were often of shoddy quality due to a lack of control and the imperative to meet production targets. Hence, buildings were often constructed with sub-standard material and deteriorated quickly (Boren and Gentile 2007, 98).

New mass-housing developments are the most obvious common form of socialist cities. Prefabricated housing in the 1960s was mostly five-storey walk-up buildings and only in the 1970s housing blocks became high-rises (French and Hamilton 1979, 15). Fifteen storey houses were already considered a high-rise building. Indeed, most public housing blocks ranged between 5 and 15 storeys. Most prefabricated apartment blocks were clustered in the above mentioned micro-districts. Szelenyi calls these grand-scale housing developments “the most socialist phenomenon” of a socialist city (Szelenyi

1996, 288). A lot of them are still in existence and are visual reminders of the cities' socialist past. The homogenous mesh of the prefabricated estates rendered the peripheral suburbs of socialist towns almost indistinguishable from one another (Myers 1994, 455).

Architectural heritage

> Cultural heritage (or just heritage, since every heritage is cultural), is the legacy of physical and mental artefacts and intangible attributes of a group or a society that are inherited from past generations, maintained in the present and bestowed for the benefit of future generations. (Czepczynski 2008, 54)

The communist leadership in various countries treated historic heritage differently, sometimes preservation was necessary to protect socialist ideals, sometimes demolition was required to break with the capitalist past. Socialist building activity included eliminating buildings that were considered to belong to a wrong historical canon. Symbols of capitalism or religion, such as temples and shrines as well as bourgeois housing needed to be either altered or eliminated from the new socialist cultural landscape (Czepczynski 2008, 81). In order to break with the capitalist past, some architectural heritage's function was transformed. For example churches were turned into storage facilities. In Hungary the communist party removed several monuments and statues that reminded of the former monarchy and replaced them with socialist ones. In order not to incite the population these reconfigurations and demolitions were justified as necessities for economic development. However, not all cultural heritage was deemed inappropriate. As long as it served the ideological goals of the communist party, it was acceptable. The reconstruction of inner city Warsaw, for example, was essential to safeguard the national sovereignty of Poland. However, the CP changed the narrative slightly. Post-war rebuilding of historical city centres in Poland, including Warsaw Old Town, omitted the previously existent German architectural elements on purpose, especially in Gdansk and Wroclaw (Czepczynski 2008, 82). It can therefore be concluded that heritage was important as long as it served the communist leaders' interests. In other cases old buildings were demolished to make room for new projects. After the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, the communists and urban planners felt that they could remove historic buildings and exchange them for new socialist prestige buildings. A prime example is the demolition of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow ordered by Stalin, so as to make room for the Palace of the Soviets project.

While the party often repurposed monuments, historic housing was often neglected and not restored. Most inner city housing was nationalised, but some of it was in bad shape due to war damages or simply crippled from age. Since maintaining the old buildings was often more costly than tearing them down and building new ones, a lot were demolished and replaced with modernist prefabricated housing estates (Bater 1977, 193). The rest was left to the tenants in poor state. Since rents had to be kept low, most old inner city buildings fell into disrepair, despite being state-owned (Szelenyi 1996, 304). The old city was also often neglected for ideological reasons, because it was meant to be a reminder of a capitalist past (Häussermann 1996, 219).

To sum up, depending on the previous purpose and function of the architectural heritage, it was either dedicated to new purposes or demolished. In some cases, when a monument served a nationalistic purpose, it was conserved under the communists. In essence, socialist urban planning had a very unsentimental and practical approach to the conservation of heritage.

The five elements described in this section will be used as analytical categories for the comparison of Beijing and Hanoi. The following chapter explains the debate about the post-socialist city.

5. The post-socialist city: legacies

5.1 The debate: Is there a distinct post-socialist city?

Post-socialist city research is a recent area of study for two reasons: One, the end of socialism in CEE was only two decades ago. Two, physical changes in urban structure occur more slowly than economic and political reforms, as socialist-built urban legacy needs some time to transform.

> The demise of Soviet-type central planning and the urge to reform felt in many ailing socialist economy have stimulated considerable interest in the process of urbanisation in former and existing socialist societies. [...] this is an outcome of the improved understanding of, and access to, previously closed or semi-closed societies. (Sjöberg 1999, 2217)

Research mostly exists in the form of comprehensive case study efforts in CEE cities (see Stanilov 2007, Andrusz, Harloe and Szelenyi 1996, Kliems and Dmitrieva 2010, Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 2006). Andrusz and colleagues (1996) und Stanilov (2007) are two prominent edited works. Both assembled case studies from different European countries looking into change in urban governance, the built urban environment and urban sociology. Most of the literature examines either: (1) urban governance and management, (2) social changes, or (3) changes in urban morphology and land use. A lot of researchers have tried to find universal patterns of post-socialist change. In spite of regional variations among cities, some shared land-use change patterns have evolved from the specific socialist history. Despite the "regional guise", the patterns are distinguishable (Boren and Gentile 2007, 96).

Like in the case of the socialist city, there is also a debate whether specifically researching and defining the concept of a post-socialist city is viable. Comparative urban research is tricky because of the impact of local context on spatial outcomes. Yet, researchers agree that common patterns in land use and urban morphology emerge in post-socialist cities:

> Twenty years after the political ruptures of 1989/91, there seems to be a certain amount of common ground in the transformation process of urban, post-socialist space—despite all the cultural, political and social differences between the cities in question and despite their divergent conditions and traditions. This common ground is created if nothing else by the necessary response to the rupture in the image of the city and the clash between the socialist legacy and post-socialist appropriation, transformation and upheaval. (Dmitrieva and Kliems 2010, 12)

The extent to which these commonalities are constructive is however disputed. Wasserstrom underlines the usefulness of post-socialist urban research with regard to drawing conclusion for future urban development:

> The "legacy of the past" can provide more than "just ruins" for a city. Passing through socialism can give a special harshness as well as a special sense of relief to a capitalist present of rising inequalities and increasing excitement, but it can also give tools to those looking to create a more humane urban future. (Wasserstrom 2007, 234)

Wu (2003, 1337) agrees that “transitional cities can provide a valuable experiment site for generating theories and illuminating the path towards a better understanding of changing human settlements.” Nevertheless, he is against strictly defining a rigid theory of the post-socialist city because for him the post-socialist city is simply a variation of the path that capitalist cities in general are taking. Wiest warns against the assumption that the development of post-socialist cities is going to converge with capitalist cities. This would preclude that there is a norm towards which all cities are moving (Wiest

2012, 834). However, theories arguing in favour of convergence run the risk of ignoring underlying, local internal and external factors. This means that while an urban development in *city A* may have the same result as in *city B*, the reason behind the outcome could be very different. When analysing the post-socialist city, it is viable to keep in mind that urban development in both capitalist and formerly socialist cities is shaped by global trends as well as historical and geographical background.

Change and development in an urban area can have many reasons, and the change from a central command economy to a market system is not the sole catalyst of change in a post-socialist city. Recently most industrial cities in economically more developed countries have undergone a set of changes that is called the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist city. The Fordist city was a place of production, whereas the post-Fordist city thrives on the knowledge economy and the tertiary sector. Since industrial production has shifted to low income countries, cities in economically more developed countries have started to attract businesses in the service industry. The post-Fordist global order means that cities are increasingly becoming places of consumption. "With the proliferation of thematic shopping complexes, festival marketplaces, convention centres, theme parks, and downtown consumer paradises, urbanity itself was redefined as a consumption experience" (Broudehoux 2004, 4).



Figure 5 The double transition in post-socialist cities (Wu 2003, 1332)

Post-socialist cities are no exception to this transition. In fact, as Wu points out in Figure 5.1, they are undergoing a double transition: the shift from Fordist to post-Fordist as well as the transition to post-socialist cities. Both influence urban development (Boren and Gentile 2007, 95). Therefore it is difficult to clearly attribute changes in the urban fabric just to one transition force. Nevertheless, since post-socialist cities undergo the post-Fordist transformation as well, the comparability among cities is still feasible. It is important to keep this double transition in mind. This research paper explicitly looks at how the regime transitions have affected socialist urban legacy in land use and morphology. A lot of the discovered spatial outcomes may also be found in post-Fordist cities that have never been influenced by socialism.

It has also been argued that post-socialist cities are interesting research objects because they magnify how globalisation dynamics affect an urban environment (Wiest 2012, 835). This is because socialist cities were more isolated from international economic exchanges than capitalist cities. Post-socialist cities in contrast are subjected to globalisation as much as capitalist cities. Globalisation and international pressures at present imprint cities with new international functions (Boren and Gentile

2007, 96). For CEE cities this is less relevant. Most were connected with other CEE cities at the European level before their communist era and at some level also during it. In East Asian post-socialist cities this is however more interesting. Cities in China and Vietnam have been fairly isolated during and before their socialist periods. Moreover, they are still undergoing rapid urbanisation. Hence, they experience developments, which took several decades in Western capitalist cities, in just one or two decades. Friedmann expresses his admiration of urbanisation in Asia and especially in China and Vietnam as "an epic drama unprecedented in both scale and transformative power" (Friedmann 2011, 426). This makes the post-socialist urban research in China and Vietnam very compelling.

The debate over the feasibility of post-socialist city studies has another major angle. Wiest asks the question of how much longer the label "post-socialist city" can still add to the comparison of cities in CEE (Wiest 2012, 830). Socialist urban elements cannot shape modern urban outcomes for many more decades, since at some point the former socialist elements will have been twisted into new forms and imbued with new functions. Thus their origin is not eternally relevant to their practical application. Since the urban environment is changing slowly and socialist legacy remains in many urban environments, post socialist city research is still relevant.

To sum up, due to the complexities and the many dimensions of change in any given city, there is no single reason or phenomenon to explain all changes satisfactorily. However, the post-socialist city may be grasped more easily, if the socialist legacy that is present in land use patterns and in the urban morphology is adopted as the departure point for further inquiry. Therefore a post-socialist city is defined by socialist legacy in its urban fabric.

5.2 Spatial change in post-socialist cities: an introduction to CEE countries

Since a lot of research on post-socialist cities in CEE countries has already been conducted, this chapter gives a short overview of the forces at work in post-socialist cities and their outcomes. The purpose of this introduction is to present the general direction of urban change in cities after socialism.

As already mentioned, the socialist period of urbanisation has left a distinctive mark on its cities. Post-socialist transition does not mean the eradication of socialist heritage, but rather adding on new layers and new functions to the already existing urban morphology (Boren and Gentile 2007, 97). In a way post-socialist cities are a combination of socialist and post-socialist urban elements (Wiest 2012, 834). The economic and political changes are transforming society and the urban environment. In other words, the socialist layers are confronted with a new reality of globalised market requirements. In order to be successful in accumulating wealth and content citizens, post-socialist cities and their administrations need to adapt. Post-socialist cities experience many transformations at the same time, including gentrification, the commoditisation of urban space, demographic change and post-industrial economic transition (Czaplicka, Gelazis and Ruble 2009, 1).

On the economic side, reforms such as privatisation, real estate development, foreign investment and so forth changed not only the urban form and function, but all life in the city (Gaubatz 1999, 1496). The introduction of political and economic choice has led to more colourful city environments than offered by the grey housing blocks stereotypically associated with the socialist era in Eastern Europe

(Czaplicka, Gelazis and Ruble 2009, 9). Reforms in CEE countries have also created room for new problems, such as social stratification:

> The end of strict one-party control has meant the re-emergence of suppressed ethnic and social identities, be they cultural, religious, or class-based. Often, these identities are conflicting and contradictive. Seeking to straddle old and new realities. […] These economic differences translate into new cultural and social divisions, both spatially- most visibly within the cities- and socially, such as between the generations. (Herrschel 2007, 15)

Social stratification is also visible in unattractively ageing urban areas (Stanilov 2007, 11). Other derelict areas are former socialist industrial zones. Large industrial zones used to make up about a third of the urban fabric in socialist towns. Cities in transition therefore have a lot of abandoned industrial zones, which are like dead and unusable tissue in the urban fabric (Stanilov 2007, 10). Ever more extensive brownfields are created by the ongoing process of de-industrialisation in CEE cities. Recently, under market pressure, these valuable inner city plots are being rediscovered and regenerated more efficiently. Many are turned into spaces for the cultural and creative industries.

Urban planning has also changed. Comprehensive planning was abandoned due to both a deep mistrust among the population concerning anything that was centrally planned or coordinated as well as a lack of funds to execute any plans (Stanilov 2007, 10). This has mostly left the reshaping of cities to private investors and developers.

Indeed, one of the most defining characteristics of post-socialist city transition is privatisation (Stanilov, 2007, 7). Many assets such as housing, services, transportation and public space have been transferred from public to private players. Therefore the individual choices have multiplied in terms of shopping and leisure opportunities, types of housing or work place environments. More individual choice supplied by private investors was tailed by a trade-off: the state no longer provides all welfare benefits, services or eternal employment. These changes in society are slowly manifesting itself in the post-socialist space. More individuality was often paid by a loss of community facilities (Stanilov 2007, 11). A lot of newly built suburbs lack public services and open recreational spaces, like playgrounds or sports tracks.

In the cities of CEE, many governments were deliberately breaking with the past and effectively dismantled urban socialist heritage (Czaplicka, Gelazis and Ruble 2009, 9). Many city authorities are restoring the often derelict historic inner city architectural heritage. Thus in most urban areas the inner city is being slowly gentrified and renovated (Boren and Gentile 2007, 97). Local heritage helps create a unique local identity, which in turn supports the international image of a city and gives it an edge over other cities (Broudehoux 2004, 5). The desire to conserve cultural heritage arises from different factors including the economic potential attached to it, the psychological value in creating a sense of place and local specificity and the educational value that push people to preserve heritage (ADB 2008, 10-11). Increasingly, however, the socialist legacy is being acknowledged as a part of the historic legacy of the formerly socialist countries. There are spaces of "communist nostalgia" emerging in many CEE cities, and communist heritage tourism is evolving (Boren and Gentile 2007, 102). In general, post-socialist cities have become increasingly entrepreneurial in promoting their cultural and economic assets in order to attract international investment, tourists and attention.

These are just a few impacts that economic and political reforms have had on the urban environment of former socialist cities in CEE. There are many varieties of these spatial changes across different cities. Part II of this thesis will describe the method how the socialist legacies in Beijing and Hanoi will be analysed.

PART II: ANALYSIS

6. Method

6.1 Comparative case study approach

The previously described debates over the concepts of the socialist and post-socialist city have already touched upon the complexities of drawing international comparisons between cities. Comparing different cities is difficult, mainly because of historic context. However, it can be very useful to draw conclusions from the analysis of one city and formulate implications for other cities in similar context (Gough 2012, 865).

Decades ago French and Hamilton (1979, 3) pointed out that CEE and Asian socialist countries are difficult to compare when it comes to urbanisation. Asian countries had a much lower starting point in their level of urbanisation when they entered their periods of socialism. Moreover, they claimed that the culture is very distinct, whereas the culture across CEE countries has common origins. Additionally, strong ideological campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution in China and wars, like the Vietnam War further distorted urban development. It is clear that there are many differences in East Asian and CEE cities, because as already established, local context matters in respect to how a city is envisioned and produced. Nevertheless, due to Soviet aid there definitely has been international academic and hands-on exchange and the ideas of how to build a city according to socialist principles have spread. Hence, elements of the socialist city can also be found in East and Southeast Asian cities.

Comparative post-socialist city research has been successfully executed in CEE countries. Therefore comparing two culturally not too distant countries in East and Southeast Asia seemed feasible. In particular, I wanted to analyse whether there are common post-socialist urban patterns in cities in East and Southeast Asia. There are several countries in the Far East that have socialist legacy in their cities, such as China, Vietnam, Mongolia, Laos and Cambodia. Laos and Cambodia have experienced short and tumultuous periods of socialism, in which there was little room for comprehensive urban socialist development. Mongolia was socialist for a longer period and under direct influence from Moscow, but its post-socialist reforms neither resemble the ones of China nor Vietnam. Moreover, Ulaanbaatar is a small city and there is little research available on its urban development.

I have eventually decided to analyse China and Vietnam, because they share cultural roots and their approach to economic reforms has been similar. Both countries have tried to alter their political system as little as possible, while still introducing market reforms. The communist parties in each country are holding on to power by decentralising decision-making and encouraging economic growth. Furthermore, in imperial times Vietnam adopted concepts of urban growth from its northern neighbour. Several scholars have already compared urban development in China and Vietnam, due to the shared past and similar approach on reform.

6.2 Comparing China and Vietnam

Some comparisons between urbanisation in China and Vietnam already exist. For example, Mc Gee (2009) used his expertise of Chinese urbanisation to analyse how cities are developing in Vietnam. He

argued that "allowing for the cultural and historical differences between the two societies, the similarities in how urbanisation processes in the two countries have occurred far exceed the differences" (McGee 2009, 241). He further emphasises that both countries have been substantially influenced by socialist legacy.[2]

Turley and Womack (1998) are comparing Guangzhou and Ho Chi Minh City on a more policy oriented level. They claim that China and Vietnam are very similar, but still different in specific aspects of reforms and development and are therefore ideal for comparison:

> No country is more similar to China than Vietnam in terms of traditional society, revolutionary experience and post-revolutionary government. Yet it is equally obvious that China is not only much larger in population and territory; it is considerably more advanced economically today, and its state structure has had more time to develop organizational complexity and managerial capability. China also started the move towards a more open, competitive market economy earlier and from a stronger base, and it has experienced the most rapid economic growth in the world during the past fifteen years. All these differences together create a contextual disparity in which similar policies in the two countries can have different effects [...]. (Turley and Womack 1998, 95)

Furthermore, historically Vietnamese cities have been influenced by Chinese urban planning and architecture. The Vietnamese and Chinese cultures are similar, because there was always a strong Chinese influence in Vietnam, which was a tribute state to the Chinese emperor for a long time.

The shared past and similar approach on reform has lead several scholars to compare urban development in China and Vietnam. John Friedmann, for instance, compares peri-urban dynamics in China and Vietnam. He points out other similarities between the two countries: "Both states are dominated by communist parties, both have large coastal cities surrounded by densely populated agricultural areas, and both are undergoing rapid industrialization" (Friedmann 2011, 426). Moreover, the short time span and pace of urbanisation in China and Vietnam are fascinating. In 1949 only 10 percent of the population of the PRC lived in cities (Leaf 2011, 529). While by 2011 this number had jumped to 45 percent and is expected to grow to 60 percent in the next two decades. Vietnam's urbanisation rate in comparison is lower at 30 percent, but is estimated to increase 3 percent annually (CIA World Factbook n.d.). McGee argues that although Vietnam's process of urbanisation has not been as fast as China's, the government nevertheless has recognised the importance of urban development for international integration and economic progress (McGee 2009, 238).

In short, by comparing urban China and Vietnam I am following a path that was already deemed viable of investigation.

Comparing Beijing and Hanoi

Beijing and Hanoi are good subjects for comparison with regard to Asian post-socialist cities for several reasons. First, both Beijing and Hanoi were little developed cities when the communists took power. The two cities received help from the SU in form of engineers, planners and other advisors that greatly influenced the local urban planning practices.

[2] For a detailed overview of the driving factors of contemporary urbanisation in China and Vietnam see McGee 2009.

Second, I have also picked Beijing and Hanoi, because both cities are capital cities of their respective countries. They have a similar history in serving as their nation's capital. Since they are both capital cities their architecture was representing an entire nation and therefore is more pronounced than in less important cities.

Third, neither city is the main economic driving force of the country, but both are important regional economic hubs.

Fourth, Beijing under socialism is interesting to analyse, because it had been hardly influenced by Western ideas of commercialisation and architectural style before 1949 (Sit 1995, 82; Broudehoux 2004, 16). Modern Chinese port cities that traded with European powers or were occupied by them received more foreign influence. For example global capitalist ideas had already transformed Shanghai, Guangzhou and Nanjing (Sit 1995, 83). Shanghai got the British-inspired Bund and the French Quarter. Since Beijing experienced relatively little international influence before the 1949, Soviet ideas of the socialist city transformed the city tremendously. This fact combined with its status as symbolic capital city makes Beijing an ideal place to analyse socialist city planning elements.

Fifth, Hanoi is the best socialist city to analyse in Vietnam, because the period of socialism lasted longer in Northern Vietnam than it did in the South. When the South reunited with the north, the political ideology had barely time to penetrate the political institutions much less the built environment in the southern cities before the *doi moi* reforms were introduced[3]. In addition, unified Vietnam had to concentrate on curing wartime ills left in the economy. Hanoi therefore is a preferable example over Ho Chi Minh City.

Sixth, the research for this thesis is based on secondary literature and a lot of visual material in the form of photographs and maps. Beijing has been more widely covered by urban researchers, than any other Chinese city, except maybe Shanghai. Materials about Hanoi were more sparse, but sufficiently available.

Local Point of Departure- pre-communist Beijing and Hanoi

The following section is a brief overview of the urban development in Beijing and Hanoi up to the communist revolutions. This will establish a baseline of different local pre-conditions for the development of the socialist city.

Beijing Overview

Like any city, Beijing is the product of many layers of history, which still influence the later functions and layout of the city. Some of the principles that are specific to traditional Chinese urban planning influenced how the Chinese city was imagined under socialism and how it still is today.

Beijing is located in a strategic position on the edge of the North China Plain. It has been an important political centre since the Warring States period from 453-221 B.C, because it has access to agricultural resources and population living in the Eastern lowlands (Gaubautz 1995, 79). Moreover it was always

[3] *Doi moi* means renovation and is the name of the Vietnamese reforms of 1986. It will be explained in more detail in Chapter 8.4.

an important military base in the defence against the northern barbarians who frequently invaded the Chinese empire. Beijing like other Chinese cities was planned and built according to ancient Chinese city planning principles, which were based on the Confucian and Dao comprehension of the universe. The Chinese city represented a model of the ordered cosmos (Lo 1980, 143). It was an expression of Chinese culture, in which the emperor was the mediator between heaven and earth. Chinese cities were laid out in a rectangular form in which the main palace which was slightly north of the centre was facing south. The north-south axis was particularly important in Chinese cosmology. Traditionally the Chinese city was the seat of the bureaucratic administration. The rural-urban divide was much less pronounced than in Western culture (Sit 1995, 6). The urban centres were marked by grandeur that represented the cosmic power of the emperor. Especially the capital radiated the spectacular (Broudehoux 2004, 36). The palace was the seat of the administration and symbolised the emperor's heavenly mandate. In contrast to European cities, the Chinese city was less important as a place of commerce than as a seat of administration. The importance of a city was determined by the rank of the bureaucratic official residing there (Sit 1995, 28). In this spirit, Beijing had never been a commercial centre. On the contrary, its infrastructure mostly served administrative and ceremonious purposes. Yet, imperial Beijing was highly specialised and functional zones for trade, craftsmanship and industry existed (Sit 1995, 24).

Pre-1949 Beijing essentially consisted of palaces, temples, gardens and residential areas. The city was divided into neighbourhoods, which were made up of courtyard houses (Lo 1980, 131). The courtyard houses were made for a single family and surrounded by a wall. The importance of walls in imperial China is striking. They divided the countryside from the city and family from public areas (Gaubatz 1999, 1497). The *hutong*, which are narrow alleyways, separated the walls of the courtyard compounds and snaked through the residential wards. Some *hutong* still exist today. The Imperial Palace and the Qianmen-Dazhalan market date back to Ming times, whereas the commercial and shopping area east of the palace and the university district in the North West were established under Qing rule. Quite a few of the uses and historical buildings survive until today (Gaubatz 1995, 80).

Beijing's role as the political and administrative centre was reaffirmed in 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made it the capital city again (Sit 1995, 85). As the national capital of China, Beijing received more attention in its urban reconstruction than less important cities (Lo 1980, 133). According to Chinese thought, the capital city had to lead the country in all aspects of urban life.

Hanoi Overview

Contemporary Hanoi is the product of its time as an imperial capital, as a flourishing trading city, as the colonial capital of French Indochina, as a city under distress in several decades of war, as a socialist development project, as an incubator of economic reforms and more recently as a battleground of globalisation.

Geographically, Hanoi is situated in the Red River (*Song Hong*) delta. It has many waterways and lakes, hence some areas are prone to flooding. The most important lakes are Ho Tay (West Lake), Ho Guom or Hoan Kiem Lake. Horen argues that Hoan Kiem lake is the "spiritual centre" of Hanoi (van Horen 2005, 165). According to legend a fisherman caught a sword in the lake, which he later used to defeat invading Chinese troupes. He became king and returned the holy sword to the lake, where it

transformed into a jade dragon. Hoan Kiem Lake hence is the "Lake of the returned sword". Many festivities and ceremonies are held on the spaces around the lake.

The city of Hanoi is the oldest commercial centre of Vietnam. It was founded about 500 AD as a Chinese military camp. Due to Chinese occupation, Vietnamese culture has been influenced by Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. This is still evident in the numerous temples, pagodas and shrines all over Hanoi and other cities and especially around the lake areas (Horen 2005, 164). Furthermore education, architecture and urban planning in Vietnam are based on Chinese practices (Waibel 2001, 68).

200 years after its founding day, it was named the capital of the Chinese protectorate Annam. Then the Ly dynasty made it the capital city of the *Dai Viet* (Great Viet) state around 1010 AD, a position it has retained until today, albeit with short breaks. In 1802 the capital was moved to Hue by the Nyguyen dynasty. Subsequently, Hanoi's political role ceased and the structures of the imperial city were scaled back. In 1873, Hanoi was captured by the French and 14 years later, was made capital of the Indochina Union (Kurfürst 2012, 37). During World War II the Japanese occupied Hanoi. On September 2nd 1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam on Ba Dinh Square. However, the war of independence from the French continued until the division of North and South Vietnam in 1954.

Whereas Beijing was designed as a classical cosmological Chinese city, the changing powers that have ruled in Hanoi have always imposed their own vision and symbols on the urban environment. Kurfürst writes: “[...] power over the urban landscape of Thang Long-Ha Noi always lies with the state, first the monarchy, then the colonial regime, and finally the party-state” (Kurfürst 2012, 36). Central Hanoi is hence made up of three distinct historical parts that clearly show how different eras and cultural influences have shaped the city on the Red River: (1) the Ancient Quarter, (2) the French Quarter and (3) Ba Dinh area.

The Ancient Quarter is an area around Hoan Kiem Lake that has been continuously developed for a thousand years. It is the historic core of the city and was the commercial and residential area that developed outside the palace walls (Surborg 2006, 243). The streets are narrow and winding and used to be occupied by different artisan guilds. Originally each street belonged to a different guild of traders, merchants or craftsmen, similar to European cities in the Middle Age (Waibel 2001, 62). The street names have not been changed and still reflect the guilds and their activities. Each guild even had its own place of worship. Some temples and pagodas truly date back to the eleventh and twelfth centuries, whereas most residential buildings where constructed after 1870 and already show some European decorative elements (Logan 1995, 329). A lot of houses are younger than that, because the Ancient Quarter was badly damaged in revolts against the French occupation. Moreover, the French administration added to the existing infrastructure of the Ancient Quarter. In some places the traditional tube houses were rebuilt, roads widened and sidewalks added. The French also drained the whole area, thus the Ancient Quarter lost its characteristic waterways (Waibel 2001, 87). Merely, the street pattern was kept similar.

Contrary to Beijing, which had been isolated from Western urban ideas, Hanoi experienced the influence of the French colonial rule, under which it was an important administrative centre. Hanoi was a "consumer city" and trade centre under French occupation (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 377).

Industry was limited to a few manufacturing plants, mostly for food and textile production. The French-built houses and boulevards to the south of the Ancient Quarter are referred to as French Quarter. Its main characteristics are wide tree-lined boulevards and spacious, neoclassical villas with gardens (see Figure 6.1). The neat grid-shaped street pattern and many buildings still evoke the colonial influence. Examples of French architecture are the Grand Opera house, which was modelled after the opera house in Paris, or the Presidential Palace, which used to be the Palace of the Governor-General of French Indochina (both in Figure 6.1). French engineers and architects also improved Hanoi's infrastructure by cleaning up the swamps and forming Hanoi's lakes to their present shape (Logan 1995, 330).

Figure 6.1 French colonial architecture in Hanoi (Horen 2005, 167; Hanoi Today Blog)[4]

The third historic area that makes up central Hanoi is the citadel or Ba Dinh area. The ancient citadel was built in 1014 AD according to geomantic principles, similar to Chinese palaces and cities (Logan 1995, 331). It was the seat of the Vietnamese rulers. When the capital moved to Hue, the Hanoi citadel only had military value and the emperor Gia Long replaced the earthen walls with Vauban stone. The French tore down the remains of the imperial citadel, in order to rebuild the area in a European fashion with the Governor General's Palace and other administrative buildings. The former location of the citadel is still visible in today's street pattern.

[4] (top left). Colonial villa in the French Quarter, Hanoi Today Blog, posted by Simon Kutcher, 21 June 2010.

(top right) Metropole, Hanoi Today Blog, posted by Simon Kutcher, 9 March 2012

(bottom left) Horen 2005, 167

(bottom right) Colonial building in the diplomatic quarter, Hanoi Today Blog , posted by Simon Kutcher, 26 August 2012

As can be seen from this analysis Beijing and Hanoi were fairly different when they fell under socialist influence.

6.3 Geographical area of analysis

Due to the sheer size of the urban agglomerations of Beijing and Hanoi, the geographical research area has been restricted to the modern inner city or urban core. The inner city usually refers to the city centre and a first, dense peripheral ring development. If we take the case of Vienna as an example, the inner city area would be everything located inside the Gürtel.

The inner city is a good area of reference for two reasons: (1) it restricts the area of analysis to a manageable territory, and (2) the socialist city was meant to be compact, therefore most development was planned around the centre. Thus less socialist legacy can be found in the outer urban districts.

The inner cities of Beijing and Hanoi are shown in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2 The inner city areas of Beijing (left) and Hanoi (right) (Google Maps 2013, own modifications)

Beijing municipality contains 19.6 million inhabitants, is divided into 16 urban districts and two counties. It spans 16, 410 km² which is about half the Island of Taiwan. Beijing's urban structure is shaped by circular ring roads from the second to the sixth which connects the outlying towns. Currently, the fourth ring road is the boundary between urban and peri-urban areas (Yang et al. 2011, 1). The area within the second ring road is the Old City (marked white in Figure 6.2), as the second ring road roughly follows the now demolished city wall. For the purpose of this paper, I assumed Sit's definition that delineates the modern inner city as the area of 158 km² within the third ring road (the area in black including Old City area in white in Figure 6.2), which is 7.5 km from the city centre (Sit 1995, 132; Ding 2013, 486). Quite some construction happened within this area from 1949 to 1978, beyond it was mostly agricultural land. Tiananmen is considered the actual city centre. Ding argues that most urban infrastructure is centred around Tiananmen area, it is politically, culturally and commercially important (Ding 2013, 487).

Hanoi is the second largest urban agglomeration after Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam. After an enormous extension to the west in 2008, which incorporated parts of other provinces, Hanoi municipality spans an area of 3328.9 km² and has 6.7 million inhabitants (GSOV 2012). The urban core area incorporates about 2.6 million people (VNO n.d.). Modern Hanoi can be divided into seven

urban and five sub-urban districts. Ba Dinh, Dong Da, Hai Ba Trung and Hoan Kiem are the urban core (Horen 2005, 165). They make up what is referred to as inner city in this paper. Cau Giauy, Than Xuan and Thay Ho are the peripheral urban districts, beyond that are the sub-urban areas.

6.4 Categories of analysis

In the chapter on the socialist city, I have worked out five structural elements that have been realised in socialist cities. These five elements are the research categories. Their key features are summarised in Figure 6.3.

Table 6.3 Summary of research categories and their general features in socialist cities

City centre	• one centre • political, administrative and cultural functions • a large open space and wide streets for ceremonial purposes • only little state-approved commercial activity
Industrial sites	• sites often located on inner city land • industrial zones • spread out over the whole city • abandoned sites were not recycled, but left as brownfields
Micro-district	• planning unit • self-reliant residential community provided basic services to residents • close to workplace • undifferentiated by functions
Residential buildings	• standardised, prefabricated buildings • modernist block design • built in the periphery of historic city cores • cheap quality materials • 5-15 storeys
Architectural heritage	• mostly abandoned, demolished • only embraced when it fit with political ideology • no funds for maintenance • dedicated to new functions

The aim of my analysis is first to find out whether these elements were present in Beijing and Hanoi under socialism and in what form. Then in the next step I am going to analyse their status after the reforms in both countries. Finally, in Part III I am going to compare the post-socialist spatial outcomes in the two cities.

7. Case A: Beijing, PRC

This chapter will first outline the socialist transformation of Beijing between 1949 and 1978. The time span is sometimes also referred to as Maoist era. The transformation of the five inner city elements that have been described in previous chapters is the core part of the analysis of socialist Beijing. The second section of this chapter deals with changes in Chinese urban planning since 1978. The five inner city elements are then examined in their post-reform state.

7.1 Socialist transformation of Beijing 1949−1978

Chinese cities were thoroughly underdeveloped in 1949. Years of unrest had crippled the national economy, the population was poor and urban infrastructure could not remotely meet the needs of the urban population. Therefore the CCP wanted to modernise its cities as fast as possible.

When the communists took power in 1949, the Chinese government viewed most cities as "consumer cities". Much like their Soviet colleagues, the CCP made it its mission to transform urban China into "producer cities", meaning that they devoted most of their attention to industrial development. This came at the expense of non-productive elements such as infrastructure and housing (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 14). The classification of cities into consumer and producer cities underlined the importance of the national industrialisation project (Lo 1980, 132). The CCP distinguished between cities with no previous industry, cities with a modern industrial layout, and such cities with a moderate industrial base. Beijing and Xian belonged to the first category with almost no industrial activities whatsoever. Shanghai was an example for the second and Hangzhou an example for the third category. Cities like Beijing, which belonged to the first category, received the biggest make-over during the Mao era in China. Chinese socialist urban planners changed land use patterns dramatically, altered the physical form and function of buildings, modified infrastructure, widened roads and destroyed historic structures such as the city walls (Lo 1980, 133). Beijing maintained its grid-like street pattern and the old city gates determined the main transport routes. Most of the urban morphology, however, was transformed according to socialist city guidelines. Obvious, visible elements such as street and square names were changed and new monuments that represented and supported the communist reign were set up across the city (Sit 1995, 85).

7.1.1 Specificities of Chinese socialism that impacted urban development

As already established, socialism varied across countries. Therefore depending on local needs, governments implemented different development agendas. Some of the special features of a nation's socialist doctrine impacted the urban policy making. China pursued rural-urban equality a lot more than states in the SU (Sit 1995, 86). This was in part due to the fact that in the 1930s and 1940s China was mostly rural and that the communist revolution was based on peasants rather than on the bourgeoisie. This basic difference in the Chinese and Russian communist revolution had an indirect influence on urban policy-making in socialist China.

In fact, 1949-China was a developing country that strongly depended on agriculture; subsequently food production became an essential component of urban development under socialism. Hence, the Maoist development strategy was largely based on rural industrial development and agricultural collectivisation (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 10). The CCP invested in rural industry projects in order to

minimise the distinctions between rural and urban areas. Urban industry partly supported the agricultural activities of the countryside nearby by producing agricultural machinery or by manufacturing fertiliser (Lo 1980, 146). Furthermore, a large portion of agricultural land in Chinese cities produced vegetables and mixed crops (Lo 1980, 152). The city was, ideologically speaking, not the single most important production unit. The countryside was equally important, especially with regard to agricultural production. In sum, however, socialist planning affected towns in China in a similar way than Soviet ones. Heavy industry and more extensive manufacturing were also concentrated in urban areas. Thus Chinese cities still carried the modernisation process.

In general, urban planning in socialist China followed economic planning, which was disrupted by several economic and political crises. Xie and Costa described the role of urban planning in China as follows, "[…] it is an instrument for implementing the nation's economic development programme" (Xie and Costa 1993, 104). Pre-1978 urban development in Beijing can be roughly divided into three phases (Sit 1995, 92):

1) 1949−1957: Soviet advisors helped shape a new vision modelled after Moscow. Housing the new administration and starting to build up heavy industry was most important.
2) 1958−1965: A period of explosive industrialisation followed. The Soviet experts were still vital in drawing up the 1958 general plan that influenced Beijing's development in this phase. The city was planned for up to six million residents. In the meantime economic hardship wrecked the countryside.
3) 1966−1976: During the Cultural Revolution urban planning was anarchic.

The urban planning phases in Beijing roughly followed general economic planning, which was laid out in the Five-Year Plans. The first Five-Year Plan (1953-57) stipulated that the labour force in old cities be employed in newly built industrial facilities. The existing physical structures should be used as housing and public service amenities (Lo 1980, 133). Essentially, just like in CEE countries, buildings were converted to fit socialist ideals.

The second Five-Year Plan (1958-62) marked the beginning of the Great Leap Forward, which was a radical Maoist modernisation campaign designed to boost economic output. Economic development became the foremost priority. The Great Leap Forward aimed to eliminate social contradictions between rural and urban areas, between industry and agriculture, as well as between manual and mental labour. In short, the state wanted to create a wealthier and more equal China. During the Great Leap Forward, the government introduced people’s communes in Beijing to make it more socially equal and self-sufficient (Sit 1995, 97). The government abolished the specialisation of districts and Beijing's neighbourhoods were expected to be self-sufficient in food supply as well as in services. The expectation to be self-reliant in food production was a radical Chinese characteristic, not found in Soviet urban theory. Beijing's green space was turned into gardens, and the peripheral urban zone outside the newly built factories and residential buildings was used for farming (Sit 1995, 98). In the meanwhile, the rest of the country was stricken with economic and political chaos during the Great Leap Forward. Food output decreased and millions of Chinese people starved to death.

General economic planning was disbanded until the third Five-Year Plan of 1966. In 1966, however, the Cultural Revolution brought more political turmoil. The Cultural Revolution was a notorious anti-

urban campaign during which Mao tried to create an egalitarian society by sending the young urban population to the countryside to turn them into humble farmers. At the same time, the revolutionary authorities practically abandoned urban planning and development. At the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1968, the Urban Planning and Administration Bureau in Beijing was even abolished, but reinstated four years later. As a consequence of the radical Maoist policy making, the revolutionaries sent economists and planners to the countryside and replaced them by revolutionary municipal officials who had no expertise in planning, economics or politics (Xie and Costa 1993, 104). There was no formal planning process during the Cultural Revolution, instead lay people applied anarchic substandard building methods and developers simply filled in gaps in the existing urban fabric (Sit 1995, 101).

The political and economic consequences of Maoist policy-making impacted Chinese urban development to a great extent. Mao's tumultuous revolutionary policies also created interesting specificities in Chinese urban development. Chinese planners and architects did not have to bow to Stalinist ideas, but Maoism enabled them to construct more revolutionary spaces than in the SU (Bray 2005, 124). The most striking consequence was that urbanisation in China occurred even slower than in other socialist countries, because it was disrupted by the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. This is evident from the estimated rate of urbanisation in the 1960s and 1970s. Until 1960, people moved to the cities to find work and the percentage of China's urban population increased to 19.7 percent. During the Cultural Revolution, city inhabitants were relocated to the countryside, resulting in a decline in urban population to 17.3 percent (Friedmann 2005, 11). Moreover the CCP tried to limit rural to urban migration through the *hukou* or household registration system. Every citizen was assigned a *hukou*, which determined his or her place of work, residence and social services. Therefore peasants could not choose to migrate to any city without specific permission from the state, because they would not be able to work there. Essentially, the Chinese government did not allow moving around China to find a better place to live. Since workers were needed in the coastal cities, the Household Responsibility System was gradually relaxed in the last decades and migration was more or less quietly accepted by the authorities. Surplus rural labour hence migrated to the cities (Yang et al. 2011, 3).

7.1.2 Soviet influence

Beijing in 1949 was wrecked by years of turmoil starting with the warlord period, the Japanese occupation and the following civil war. When it was declared capital city of China again in 1949, it was clear that it needed to be renovated and rebuild. However, according to Sit there were only about 15 resident architects in the city. In order to fill this enormous skill gap, Soviet advisors, architects, planners and engineers came to China from all over the SU. As a consequence, Chinese urban planning principles were largely adopted from Soviet practice (Sit 1995, 88). The early Soviet cities served as models for the reconstruction of urban China. In some ways Beijing is a more socialist city than many Russian ones, because the principles were applied more strictly and erased previous practices more efficiently. Especially the linear city concept, the idea of concentric growth, limiting city size, land use zoning and the micro-district took root in Chinese planning (Sit 1995, 93).

Soviet influence ended in 1959, when political relations between China and the SU turned sour. Moscow suddenly pulled around 1200 advisors out of China. However, their ideas still influenced Chinese planning until the 1980s and early 1990s (Sit 1995, 97).

7.1.3 Urban planning in the Mao era

Urban planning in China, like in other socialist countries, was clearly driven by the strategy for industrial progress (Lo 1980, 143). Tang argues that due to a less centralised planning system compared to the SU, China's planning investments tended to be more chaotic and overlapping (Tang 1994, 398). Also a lot of projects were implemented outside the plan. Like in most socialist cities the form and function of Beijing's physical environment were highly generalised, which meant that there was little specialisation of districts. Still, certain areas performed specific general functions, such as the government district or industrial areas. Yet, the city was in fact much less specialised than it had been before 1949 (Gaubatz 1995, 81). Other factors that influenced the urban planning process in Maoist China were the allocation and distribution of land, shared responsibilities between ministries, the administrative landscape and Maoist ideology.

The Chinese socialist planners, influenced by Soviet and Maoist ideas, deliberately broke with ancient Chinese planning traditions. The Mao era urban planners were especially dissatisfied with the Confucian idea that nature dominated over man and man needed to conform, which forms the basis for the traditional cosmic Chinese city layout (Lo 1980, 144). They preferred the idea that man could conquer nature, which was rooted in the Legalist School. As a consequence of this philosophical rift, planners started to consider realistic geographic factors such as natural resources and availability of water. Hence, cities did not conform to symmetric symbolisations of the universe anymore (Lo 1980, 144). Another ideological feature was the special regard for the capital city Beijing. Sit remarks that it was important to the CCP that Beijing, as the capital city, was the leading city in all aspects of urban life: industry, education, infrastructure, monuments and culture. Beijing obtained strong support from the central government (Yang et al. 2011, 3).

The CCP coordinated its efforts in modernising China through the Five-Year Plans. A lot of internal reorganisation was needed to achieve what Friedman describes as follows: "Cities would be transformed into engines of production, rather than remain as sites of decadent consumption" (Friedmann 2005, 11). Industries were organised into work units called *danwei*. The *danwei* housed workers and factories and served as administrative entities as well as basic units in spatial construction in Maoist society. The *danwei* were "a collection of self-contained and spatially defined communities" and gave the Chinese city a special character (Bray 2005, 124).

It is essential to understand how land is acquired and developed when discussing urban planning. Urban planning in socialist China, like in other socialist economies, was influenced by the shortage economy. Unsurprisingly, the communist ideology dictated public ownership. Land was a short-in-stock good and thus needed to be equally allocated. State-owned land could only be used by the party that had been granted usage rights, and after the land was not needed anymore it had to be returned to the state. The user enjoyed no rights of alienation, such as renting to third parties (Tang 1994, 402). However, not all users needed the land that they owned usage rights to and thus resold the usage rights. For these reasons a black market developed, providing an alternative channel of land

acquisition (Tang 1994, 404). China, like most centrally planned economies, suffered a land inflexibility problem during the socialist era, because some developers started hoarding land that they did not use immediately.

Another problem with urban planning and land development in China was that it included many stakeholders such as the central planning authority, the material allocation authority, the investment quota allocation authority, the land administration organisation, the construction unit, the municipal engineering department, private enterprises and the peasants (Tang 1994, 395). A high degree of confusion stemmed from the problem of shared responsibility between different institutions. Of course not all stakeholders were equal −ministries largely pursued their own agendas and the municipality had little say in the overall plan (Sit 1995, 90). The responsibility for the water supply, for example, was divided between the Ministry of Water Resources and Electrical Power that was responsible for water conservancy. Yet, responsibility for purification fell to the public utility department of the respective city and the municipal engineering department maintained the pipes. All those institutions had separate year plans, which made coordination difficult (Tang 1994, 399).

The state was not interested in comprehensive city development. The economy was compartmentalised into various ministries and institutions which controlled plan and investment targets. The city itself was irrelevant, because it was the sum-total of individual state plans that were aimed at raising the economy.

> The state is interested in the city as a place to facilitate the discipline of enterprises. The city as an entity, the reproducibility of which requires separate attention and scientific analysis, never appears on the agenda of the state. As a corollary, the state prefers a system of land control mechanisms that allows it to discipline the enterprises – to administratively allocate and reallocate the right of use to meet all the requirements of various designated investment plans. Whether the city can accommodate all the stipulated land requirements and can continue functioning properly is never a consideration in the system. (Tang 1994, 405)

Despite this laissez-faire attitude in planning, Chinese cities used to have an Urban Planning and Administration Bureau. This institution, however, did not possess the power to coordinate land development projects. Until the passing of the Land Requisition Law 1982 and the 1988 State Land Administration Law, there was no single entity in charge of land administration affairs. In contrast to industrial planning, Chinese land planning was not normative, meaning it did not have to meet targets. Therefore the agencies that controlled land allocation had no decision guidelines and reference points. Additionally, land was practically free of charge. Only if it was clear that the previous owner depended on the land parcel for living and needed to find an alternate source of income, then a compensation fee had to be paid (Tang 1994, 406).

To sum up, despite central planning, the overall land allocation and the use of land were leaning towards being anarchic (Tang 1994, 409). The next section will show how socialist city elements have been realised in Beijing in a more or less comprehensive way.

7.2 Analysis of inner city elements in the socialist era

The following sections will show if and how the form and function of the five inner city elements that have been chosen were affected by socialist urban planning in Beijing. The areas of examination are the city centre, industrial sites, the micro-district, residential buildings and heritage conservation.

7.2.1 City centre

Figure 7.1 Map outlining Tiananmen Square, the Forbidden City and Wangfujing Street (eBeijing, n.d.)

Imperial Beijing, as the capital city of China, was traditionally associated with administrative and political functions, which were always more important than its commercial ones (Gaubatz 1999, 1499). In imperial times the seat of the Emperor, which was the Forbidden City or Imperial Palace, used to be the spatial embodiment of this administrative and political power. It was surrounded by the Imperial or Old City, which was encircled by a wall. Under socialism, the centre remained a monumental representation of power, but the canon was changed. In order to break with, but also to make use of the symbolism of the imperial past, the CCP built its own symbolic space of power. It constructed Tiananmen Square immediately south of the Forbidden City (see Figure 7.1). The Tiananmen Gate, which is the southern entrance of the Forbidden City, had already become a symbol of the communist takeover since Mao had proclaimed the PRC from its balcony on October 1st 1949. By using the historic gate, the CCP established itself as new ruling dynasty (Braester 2010, 156). Hence, it created both a break and continuance with the imperial past.

Beijing's city centre under Mao had a distinct Soviet touch. Tiananmen Square was extended according to a plan of Soviet advisors, who argued that building within the Old Town instead of on a new site would save resources and money[5]. Essentially, Tiananmen Square was enlarged and built to resemble the Red Square in Moscow (Gaubatz 1995, 81). The CCP erected the Great Hall of the People, the Museum of the Chinese Revolution and the Museum of Chinese History on both sides of the square. The buildings around the square were part of the spectacle of communist triumph and most

[5] The debate surrounding the redevelopment of Tiananmen is discussed in more detail in the section on architectural heritage.

were completed for the 10-year anniversary of the PRC in 1959 (Broudehoux 2004, 229).The wide monumental streets and boulevards that still cross the city centre are another distinctly socialist feature (Gaubatz 1995, 80). The CCP extended most of their widths to suit their parade needs. Changan Street, which separates Tiananmen Square from the Forbidden City, was dubbed the nation's most important street and was used for lots of parades.

Tiananmen Square was a monumental space that existed outside the rest of the urban fabric. Officially its layout was only changed once after 1959, when the Mao Mausoleum was erected on its south side in 1977. The restoration of some elements of Tiananmen Gate in 1970 was even kept secret for 35 years, so as not to disturb the continuance of power (Braester 2010, 152). The Tiananmen Square arrangement fits the purpose of a socialist city centre since it houses cultural, political and administrative buildings and monuments (Lo 1980, 134). The main government buildings were located near Tiananmen Square between the Forbidden City and the 2nd ring road. Especially the west of the Old City was repurposed as government buildings and housing for high political figures (Gaubatz 1995, 81). The party headquarters and other administrative buildings were located around the Zhongnanhai Lake area west of the Forbidden City. Tiananmen Square and its surroundings functioned as state and administration centre. Its form radiated power and socialist spectacle.

The rest of Beijing's central area held some hotels and state-approved commercial entities. Some very large hotels and embassies for foreign dignitaries, originally intended for Soviet advisors, were located in the East of the Imperial Palace (Gaubatz 1995, 91). The only commercial areas in central Beijing were Dongdan-Wangfujing and Xidan, which extended east and west from Tiananmen Square. Their primary function was to attract domestic tourists and be a sign of splendour and wealth under communism (Yang et al. 2011, 3). Especially Wangfujing shopping street had been one of the most modern streets and the cosmopolitan shopping area in Beijing before 1949. The popular Dongan market, which was the main amusement centre in Beijing in the 1920s and 1930s, was located there. In 1949 Wangfujing Street underwent a dramatic change. With the CCP in power foreign goods were no longer sold and gradually stores went out of business. Slowly state approved stores, which only sold staple goods, replaced them. Wangfujing remained an exemplary commercial area, albeit a socialist one. The first Chinese shopping mall opened there in 1955 and became a major tourist attraction. In 1956 the Dongan market too was nationalised. Wangfujing area was ideologically whitewashed and even renamed into People's Street or in Chinese *renminlu* (Broudehoux 2004, 105). Yet, it is important to note that it remained in essence a commercial centre. The CCP did not break with the traditional use of the area.

7.2.2 Industrial sites

Beijing was a city with little industry in 1949. Only four percent of the total 1.4 million inhabitants were employed in industrial activities—a very low ratio for that time (Sit 1995, 91). As mentioned earlier, according to CCP thinking, the capital city needed to be the frontrunner in all aspects of urban life, which included industrial output. Therefore, in order to turn Beijing into a producer city, a lot of industry needed to be built. The first Five-Year Plan concentrated on starting an industrial base in Beijing, in which especially heavy industry was nurtured. In accordance with the plan, some large and some super-large SOEs such as the Shougang Group for Iron and Steel and the Yanshan Petrochemical Company, which both employed over 100,000 people, were erected (Yang et al. 2011,

3). During the Great Leap Forward little attention was paid to the pollution aspect of factories. Thus harmful factories were built right beside residential neighbourhoods without the green space to separate them. By 1960 Beijing had already been turned into a major industrial base (Sit 1995, 98).Industrial development stymied during the Cultural Revolution. While during the initial Five-Year Plans ten industrial districts were built in Beijing, only one new petrochemical complex was added to Beijing's landscape between 1966 and 1976 (Sit 1995, 166).

The allocation of industrial land determined the rest of the urban layout to great extent because industry needed a lot of land and residential areas were generally built nearby (Yang et al. 2011, 3). Influenced by the linear city concept, industry and housing was built side-by-side and separated with green space (Sit 1995, 93). The work-units were the project basis for industrial development, hence they were an integral part of running and acquiring industrial sites (Bray 2005, 143).

> [...] the industrial location trend in the 1949-1976 period in China's cities was to disperse industry widely throughout the city in order to foster the work-unit ideal by achieving integration of housing and factories and urban and district level-self-sufficiency. (Gaubatz 1999, 1503)

However, because differentiated land use functions existed in Chinese cities, industrial complexes were not built at random (Yan et al. 2002, 42). This meant that planners designated tentative zones for industry, commerce and housing. Most of the industry in the 1950s was located in the then suburban areas beyond the second ring road. Today this area is part of the urban core. A lot of industry was grouped in the east and south of the Old City. This was done to minimise air pollution from the predominantly north and north-west winds (Lo 1980, 134). The Old City housed pollution neutral industries such as clothing, food or arts and crafts manufacturing. The radical period of the Cultural Revolution at the end of the 1960s brought forth a fair amount of industry in the historical areas, because everybody needed to engage in some form of productive activity (Sit 1995, 168).

7.2.3 The micro-district or neighbourhood unit

In socialist Beijing the spatial micro-district concept was implemented on the basis of the work-unit:"[...] spatial development was based on the concept of productive territorial complexes, to create manufacturing zones with work units (Danwei) attached to it" (Yang et al. 2011, 3).

A *danwei* functioned as an administrative unit that provided employment, housing, welfare and health benefits as well as administrative services (Wang and Chai 2009, 30). Work and a place to live were thus always connected. Spatially the *danwei* was modelled after the micro-district. Each *danwei* unit enclosed about 30-60 hectares and 10,000-20,000 people (Sit 1995, 204). Yet, some resembled small independent cities with up to 140,000 people (Bray 2005, 146). The *danwei* compound was widely implemented in Beijing with the 1958 plan. The physical *danwei* unit combined enterprises, production facilities, dining halls, infirmaries and other basic services with housing. It was surrounded by a wall (Gaubatz 1995, 80). This is a Chinese specificity and has historic roots because walls in ancient China were used to enclose the space of the traditional Confucian family. All courtyard houses, palaces and similar structures were encircled by a wall, which delineated their realm (Bray 2005, 145).



Figure 7.2 Aerial view of a *danwei* in Beijing specialised in motorised tractor repairs (Bray 2005, 149)

Figure 7.2 shows an example of a typical walled *danwei* compound in Beijing. This *danwei* unit was a motorised tractor repair station in Beijing. The open area consists of the repair workshop, tool sheds and other working space. The workers' dormitories are on the far right and front right side. The residential parts and working spaces are separated by a narrow strip of green recreational space. The black line encircling the complex is the *danwei* wall (Bray 2005, 149).

Moreover, the *danwei* complex was closed to traffic (Sit 1995, 204). There was little expectation that residents needed to travel beyond their neighbourhood very often, as ideally their workplace and service needs would be met there (Gaubatz 1995, 80). The road network laid in socialist Beijing was based on this assumption and was not meant for heavy traffic (Gaubatz 1999, 1497). Several *danwei* compounds formed a higher hierarchical unit which was called 'residential district' and the unit above that was called the 'district'. The residential district and the district had shopping centres, theatres, cinemas and general hospitals (Sit 1995, 108).

In short, socialist Beijing was theoretically divided into self-sufficient neighbourhood districts that each contributed to the overall productivity of the city. This is comparable to individually functioning cells that support a whole body. Metaphorically speaking, the city grew by adding new cells (Gaubatz 1999, 1497). All work-unit compounds were undifferentiated by service functions, however the production facilities varied. Each *danwei* neighbourhood had to fulfil a different industrial task, so that essentially all production units were complementing each other (Lo 1980, 150). Even though the micro-district was supposed to foster community spirit, there was little sense of community or sense of place in the rows of monotonous apartments. Residents merely used the shops and services for convenience.

In socialist Beijing, the micro-district was quite pervasive as a planning unit. It was applied mostly in new developments. Still, the *danwei* concept also existed in older parts of the city. Some used old courtyard houses to accommodate their workers. These older neighbourhoods were also governed by street committees and housed a few small production facilities (Gaubatz 1995, 80). An example for an early residential district in Beijing is Fengsheng neighbourhood which covered 1.5 km² and comprised of two main streets and 132 lanes. It encompassed 14,136 households and almost 53,000 people in

1973. The neighbourhood was governed by the street residents committee who also oversaw seven factories, a household-service shop with eight branches, four kindergartens and a hospital (Lo 1980, 149). Each district was supplied by a commercial service bureau and the *danwei* (Gaubatz 1995, 90). Another example of an early micro-district development is Sanlitun. It spanned 18 hectares, had a population of around 7,000 and an average building height of 4.7 floors (Sit 1995, 206).

The Chinese *danwei* complex is a step further towards realising an equal socialist society than the Soviet *mikrorayon* concept, because it also has more administrative functions. Moreover, the *danwei* concept was very pervasive in Beijing and thus covered more people. It provided work and housing and was also supposed to be self-sufficient. The wall that divided the Chinese *danwei* complex from the rest of the city was a key difference in form to the Soviet micro-district.

7.2.4 Residential buildings

In 1949, Beijing was a large city in a developing country. It lacked electricity, clean water and sanitary facilities. Most houses were one-storey, single family Chinese-style courtyard houses (Sit 1995, 91). A lot of areas were slum-like. Many migrants from the countryside had erected self-built single storey make-shift homes and sub-standard housing was an acute problem in 1949 (Gaubatz 1980, 85). Beijing under Mao suffered from a chronic undersupply of good quality housing.

However, under socialism "[h]ousing was viewed as a right and a kind of welfare […]" (Zhu 2009, 254). Therefore the state was responsible for accommodating most of the workers. Initially in the 1950s a lot of housing remained privately owned and only rent controls were imposed by the state. In 1958, all housing became publicly owned (Sit 1995, 203). Urban residents paid low rents that did not cover state expenses for housing maintenance during the socialist era. Subsequently the existing public housing fell into a poor state. Rapid population growth exacerbated the dire accommodation supply. In a misguided attempt to curb urban growth, apartment construction was deliberately slowed down in the early 1960s (Gaubatz 1995, 86). Another reason for the dismal housing situation was the prioritisation of industry, because it caused a shortage of capital for housing construction. During the first Five-Year Plan the ratio between floor space for productive activities and residential uses was 1:1.12, whereas from 1958–1976 it was at an average of 1:0.9 with the Great Leap Forward marking the lowest point at 1:0.64 (Sit 1995, 205). From 1949 to the early 1970s, about 20 million square metres of new housing were built in Beijing, which was twice as much as in Shanghai in the same period (Lo 1980, 147). Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, when people returned from the countryside after the Cultural Revolution, Beijing authorities were confronted with an even more serious housing shortage.

Pre-1960s buildings were mostly three storeys or less. Exceptions were historical palaces and pagodas. New constructions in the early 1950s were made of wood and brick and mostly had one or two floors, because there was a lack of building materials and skilled labour to put up more permanent structures. The situation changed after 1953 when many houses became standardised concrete apartment buildings and their height was raised (Sit 1995, 208). From then on most new residential units built under Mao looked remarkably similar. Government-built d*anwei* housing compounds were physically uniform and "geometrically repetitive" (Gaubatz 1980, 87). Most Mao-era buildings were cheap, rectangular concrete blocks that were modelled after modernist residential buildings in the SU

(Gaubatz 1999, 1509). The average storey height in the 1960s was three to five. However in areas with adjacent open space buildings were allowed to reach up to ten storeys. Yet, their height mostly averaged around seven or eight floors (Sit 1995, 94).

Most new buildings were erected in a dense ring around the old city core. The western part was developed first, so as to house the many government workers that were employed in the administrative buildings nearby (Sit 1995, 208). Ideally the residential buildings were not only close to the factories, but also close to the communes on the city outskirts that cultivated the agricultural land and produced food (Lo 1980, 147). Workers' dormitories were erected in the vicinity of factories —initially also around the historic city centre (Lo 1980, 136). This created a rather dense belt of housing and factories in the first periphery of the Old City. The dormitories were usually called workers' new villages or production villages and were part of the *danwei* complexes.

7.2.5 Architectural heritage

The conservation of historical heritage was not a priority of the CCP. Indeed, heritage was mostly neglected and abandoned due to a lack of funds for restoration and redevelopment. However, when it suited propaganda needs, cultural heritage was appropriated into the ideological canon.

Especially interesting is the case of Tiananmen Square, which is used to be a forbidden space. As already discussed, Tiananmen Square was the new symbolic location of the power of the CCP and also the core political and administrative centre of Beijing. In 1950 there was a harsh debate between Soviet planners and the few Chinese architects living in Beijing, which were led by Mr. Liang and Mr. Chen (Sit 1995, 244). The Chinese architects argued for complete preservation of the old Imperial City within its walls, which ran along what is now the second ring road. They wanted to protect Beijing as a good example of a traditional Chinese city for future generations. According to Mr. Chen and Mr. Liang's plan, the new administrative headquarters were to be established outside the western wall of the Old City on empty land. The Soviet planners, in contrast, argued that it would be more cost-efficient and faster to repurpose some buildings in the Old City as offices for the new administration. In their opinion the old parts of the city needed to be modernised. Actually the Soviet planners literally considered "extreme respect for old architecture" a "major danger" to the modern urban development of Beijing in their formulation of the 1954 general plan (Sit 1995, 94). They suggested building the new offices and monumental buildings right outside the Imperial Palace, to the south and southwest of Tiananmen Gate. Mao decided to embrace the Soviet concept, which was modelled after the Red Square in Moscow. In extending the Tiananmen Square, the CCP disregarded the traditional Chinese city planning principles and clearly superimposed a Soviet concept−foremost because there were no huge principle squares or wide roads in the traditional Chinese city. Tiananmen was redeveloped from 1954–1960 and embodied the new power of the CCP and diverted attention from the Imperial Palace (Sit 1995, 247). Changan Road and the new square were henceforth used for rallies and parades. The buildings lining the square were designed in mixed Soviet and Chinese style, but very strongly reminded of monumental Stalinist architecture in the SU. The pinnacle of socialist architecture in Beijing is the Hall of the People (Figure 7.3). The Mao Mausoleum, added at the south end of the square, was another break with tradition because previously Chinese emperors needed to be buried underground.

Figure 7.3 (left) Tiananmen Square with the Memorial of the People's Heroes and the Mao Mausoleum; (right) Great Hall of the People (Beijingholiday 2012a)

Still, not all traditional Chinese customs were abandoned in the redevelopment. The traditional north-south axis in Chinese city planning was kept intact with the design of the square. The Memorial of the People's Heroes marks the cosmic axis (see Figure 7.4). The memorial however was deliberately designed to be higher than the throne hall of the palace complex (Sit 1995, 247). Chaoyang Gate and the Jinlou archery tower were also preserved, whereas the rest of the historic buildings surrounding the square were demolished for new developments.



Figure 7.4 Sketch of the Tiananmen Square redevelopment in the 1950s (Sit 1995, 248)

With the exception of the huge Mao portrait hung from Tiananmen, the Imperial Palace remained more or less intact. Chinese preservationists were also successful in keeping the height profile in the Old City low. In the 1980s, a regulation on building height within the historic central area of the city was introduced to preserve its character (Sit 1995, 250). Therefore today Beijing has a bowl-shaped high rise profile, with the highest skyscrapers clustering around the second ring road.

The socialist urban planners paid little attention to the conservation of non-monumental architecture such as traditional housing or the city wall. Practicality was prioritised over heritage and often the function of structures was changed. Old courtyard houses, which were customarily meant for one family, were subdivided and used as housing for workers. One such house could suddenly contain 40 families. The distribution and upkeep was handled by the *danwei* administration. The houses were not only subdivided but also a lot of courtyards were filled in, so that even more people could fit into one

compound. This practice destroyed many of the historical houses (Gaubatz 1980, 86). Sometimes even structures that formerly bore no residential use like temples and pagodas were converted into multi-family homes (Gaubatz 1999, 1515). The ancient city wall encircling the Old City was torn down in order to make room for wider streets and to create a more coherent city landscape (Lo 1980, 134).

Sometimes heritage was useful to the CCP's agenda. If that was the case, it was revived and used to lobby for the communist cause. Thus not all historical functions of the city were relegated. For example Dongtan and Xitan, historic commercial areas, remained important commercial zones throughout the socialist period (Lo 1980, 150). An example for propagandistic use of heritage is the revival of the Yuanmingyuan site to the north of Beijing. Yuanmingyuan was the Old Summer Palace built under the Qing dynasty and was referred to as the Garden of Gardens. The vast garden-palace complex was looted and burned down in 1860 by invading European soldiers. In 1951 the CCP invoked this tragic historic event in order to raise anti-imperialist sentiment to support the Korean War. There was, however, no money for restoration and the site was left to itself. During the Cultural Revolution it was occupied by communes that tore down the ruins and felled the ancient trees for building materials (Broudehoux 2004, 64). Only after the economic reforms started Yuanmingyuan was declared a national heritage park and turned into a major tourist attraction.

7.3 Post-1979 transformation of socialist city elements

7.3.1 Reform and Opening in Beijing

The Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee 1978 marked a turning point for Chinese politics and paved the way for economic reforms and the transition to a market economy (Naughton 2007, 79). The last radical Maoists had been brushed aside and reformers under Deng Xiaoping rose to power. Reform and Opening (*gaige kaifang*) included gradual economic reforms and the slow transformation to a, in Chinese terms, socialist market economy, as well as the opening up of China to foreign investment. The Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989 and the ensuing crack-down stifled global integration and economic development for a few years, but the wind of reforms picked up again in the early 1990s.

Researchers speak of a two-part transition from a socialist to a market economy in China. First, the CCP introduced economic reforms gradually and loosened state control over resources. The gradual approach is in stark contrast to transition in some CEE countries that opted for a "big bang" transition, in which their policy-makers tried to abolish the whole socialist system in one big blow. China's reform was slow-paced, which produced a hybrid system of socialist central planning and market reforms until 1996—a period, which is sometimes referred to as market socialism (Bramall 2009, 550). Since then China has transformed into a market economy:

> [T]he rhetoric of socialism remains and the brand of capitalism which China has established is better described as state capitalism than anything else; state intervention remains continues to pervade every corner of Chinese society. In reality, however, the language of socialism is being using to cloak the creation of a capitalist system as vicious and malevolent as anything that has been seen across the globe. (Bramall 2009, 553)

Naughton agrees that "the market is now the predominant economic institution in China" (Naughton 2007, 5). He further claims that China therefore does not face the hurdles of economic transition

anymore, but instead the problems of a developing country. Despite being predominantly a market economy, the state continues to meddle in some economic policies, which strongly resembles the notion of the "developmental state" that originated in reference to Japan (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007, 11). The state prioritises certain branches of the economy in order to strengthen overall economic development.

The market economy is now the central element of the CCP regime. China is neither socialist in its economic policies—as the market is the dominant force, nor in its social policies. This has had direct consequences for Chinese society. In urban areas the state used to provide housing, health care and pension through the *danwei* system, a practice that was dubbed the 'iron-rice-bowl'. As the state was shrinking after Reform and Opening, the state-owned-enterprises had to carry the major burden of that service provision which made them inefficient (Zhu 2009, 253). Consequently, a lot of enterprises decreased their social service spending and the iron-rice-bowl came to an end. This scaling back of social services and welfare provision, as well as in further consequence evicting people from their homes is against the socialist principle of the egalitarian society. "People now talk of the three new mountains which now rest on the shoulders of the Chinese people. Housing, hospital fees and school tuition are no longer covered by the government" (Broudehoux 2004, 141). Accordingly, the CCP has increasingly defined itself over nationalist rather than socialist values. Socialist rhetoric of equality is still in place, but modern CCP policy-making is predominantly guided by market principles. Moreover, consumerism is an important tool for distancing the population from politics and keeping them content and occupied (Broudehoux 2004, 10).

Due to the many facets of the reforms and their multiple social outcomes, Chinese cities have undergone a lot of changes simultaneously. The re-emergence of commerce had the most instant impact on city life in Beijing. Little street traders emerged; stalls were built in work-unit walls and empty spaces. However, they had to move on as soon as construction started and the space was more permanently redeveloped (Gaubatz 1995, 90). Beijing was awoken from its monotonous socialist existence at the end of the 1970s. Broudehoux describes the visual changes as follows:

> The austere landscape of the socialist era with its quiet vernacular neighbourhoods, starkly utilitarian apartment blocks, and horizontal skyline punctuated by fuming smokestacks was turned into a bustling metropolis, teeming with sleek corporate towers, sparkling shopping malls, and notorious traffic jams. On street corners, busy entrepreneurs clutching cell phones have replaced unhurried model workers gripping the once ubiquitous 'little red book'. (Broudehoux 2004, 2)

The transition to a market-based economy has brought new wealth to Chinese citizens, which in turn has created new discernible patterns in the arrangement of urban space. One of them is suburbanisation (Yan et al. 2002, 41). Although in general the population is still rising in Chinese cities, there is a definite trend towards less people living in the metropolitan centres. In 1992 the population density in central Beijing was 28,360 persons/ km², whereas in 2009 it had sunk to 22,800 persons/ km². At the same time, however, in most other parts of the city the population density has increased (Yang et al. 2011, 5). People have been moving to the suburbs because the environmental quality is better. The city centres became over-crowded and infrastructure and housing quality is poor. Some residents have been relocated because of new non-residential developments in the centres (Gaubatz 1980, 87). Since 1999 residents have also been offered financial compensation instead of just being allocated a new apartment (Broudehoux 2004, 130).

Beijing's suburbanisation was enabled through the increased use of cars. People who could afford a car did not have to live near public transport hubs anymore (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007, 296). The use of private cars has created an enormous traffic problem in Beijing (Gaubatz 1995, 92). The subway and the ring road system, where most motor-vehicle transport runs, have given some relief. The second ring road was opened in 1987 and follows the old city wall. The fifth ring road, constructed in 2003, connected the key suburban areas and the sixth ring road, built in 2010, linked the main towns in the outer municipality (Yang et al. 2011, 5). Still, traffic in Beijing has remained terrible.

The re-commercialisation of Beijing's economy has created the need to build new spaces for business. Subsequently, there were massive redevelopments in the inner city. Albeit socialist Beijing was far from being an egalitarian city, social segregation is becoming an apparent problem. According to an interview that Broudehoux made with a resident, Beijing is becoming segregated again like in a pre-communist saying: "'*Dongfu, Xigui, Nanluan, Beiqiong*' (the East is for the rich, the West for the nobles, the South is for the depraved and the North is for the poor)" (Broudehoux 2004, 133). The redevelopments in the inner city are pushing the poorer people into the suburban areas where they are farther away from their social networks and workplaces. Inner city redevelopment mostly profits people with money. Especially foreign investors have a lot of power in urban development decisions—certainly more than the Chinese public. Despite socialist rhetoric it is clear that "[...] the Chinese state has ultimately privileged capital over the people" (Broudehoux 2004, 143).

In addition to the internal dynamics of reform, external, global factors have been impacting the Chinese economy. In the 1980s and especially 1990s globalisation hit China like a tidal wave.

> After decades of international isolation, economic hardship, and ideological struggle, Chinese society was suddenly thrown into the maelstrom of world capitalism and exposed to new technologies, novel forms of consumption, fresh flows of ideas, and unique hopes and possibilities. (Broudehoux 2004, 8)

Besides its move towards a market economy, there has also been a transition within the Chinese economy from a secondary to a tertiary economy. "Since the 1980s, in an attempt to meet the opportunities offered by market reform and globalisation, China's global cities have been undergoing a profound transformation from industrial to post-industrial cities" (Zhao 2010, 87). This means that knowledge-based and creative industries have become more important. The service industry is booming, which is especially noticeable in China's urban centres (Yan et al. 2002, 37). Beijing is competing with other large international cities in the global city hierarchy.

7.3.2 Planning in post-1979 Beijing

The institutional restructuring brought on by market reforms such as de-collectivisation of land, privatisation and the establishment of a property market and land use rights, have changed the dynamics of urban development in China. Planning has become a more interactive process with many stakeholders and investors, which is in contrast to the linear hierarchical structure of pre-1979 urban planning (Yang et al. 2011, 3). Nonetheless, the legacy of state socialism still provides the local authorities with a convenient system to interfere in market transactions (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2007, 16). Yet, urban planning has become more decentralised. Municipal authorities and local governments have more power over urban development than they used to and therefore development is not comprehensive but disorganised. Currently economic motivation is still high on urban planning

agendas, whereas cultural and environmental aspects are often neglected (Yan et al. 2002, 46-47). The added complexities have created new challenges to contemporary urban planning in China. The three main problems with urban planning according to Yan and colleagues are: (a) the heavy influence of multiple decision-makers, instead of planning agencies; (b) planners pay little attention to socio-economic needs, but rather focus on physical planning; (c) the public has very little say in the planning process, so that public demands and the realities of planning do not match (Yan et al. 2002, 54). For example d*anwei* and other administration units will resist inner city redevelopment if their built environment is threatened (Tang 1994, 410).

Indeed, when looking at new planning mechanisms, it is important to review the structure of land ownership in China. All land still belongs to the state and private users can only buy land use rights for up to 99 years. The land use rights however may be sold, rented or leased to third parties. Otherwise land transactions now conform to market bidding. Since the mid-1990s real estate business has been booming in Beijing (Yang et al. 2011, 3).

Beijing city planners had to reinvent themselves and their approach to development after the reforms, because market-oriented development posed new challenges to the urban environment. Post-reform urban planning is not based on Soviet principles anymore and instead has found inspiration in Western planning traditions and strategies (Gaubatz 1995, 95; Ding 2013, 486). Planners have become more pragmatic and adopted a polycentric planning approach for Beijing's vast urban area (Yang et al. 2011, 15). Dedicated development zone planning has also become a popular planning tool in Chinese cities (Gaubatz 1999, 1505). Subsequently Beijing has been divided into spatial and functional zones, for instance an area devoted to function as CBD and special zones dedicated to industrial clusters.

As already established, Chinese urban planning has reoriented itself according to market needs. In the 1982 general plan, Beijing was newly defined as a cultural and political centre, yet not as an economic powerhouse anymore. The notion of retaining a high level of industrialisation in and around the city was abandoned for the first time, because the environment had suffered too much. Social order, cleanliness, education, technology, culture and economic prosperity dominated the new agenda (Sit 1995, 102). This revised attitude is a big break with the previous doctrine that Beijing needed to occupy first rank in all aspects of urban life including industry. City authorities and the central government yielded to practical evidence and acknowledged that Beijing and its environment were unsuitable for excessive industrial development. The 1982 general plan also indicated a shift away from prioritising heavy industry. The 1991−2010 master plan aimed at turning Beijing into an international city with an emphasis on globalisation and preservation (Braester 2010, 286). The 2008 Olympic Games were an important marker in this period. Beijing reinvented itself, in order to present the world with a spectacle and to showcase the city internationally (Braester 2010, 281). The current master plan 2004−2020 stresses sustainability and efficient infrastructure (Beijing Municipal Institute of City Planning and Design, n.d.).

7.4 Analysis of inner city elements in the reform era

The following section will take a closer look at what has happened to the form and function of the five city elements, which were analysed for their features under socialism in the previous section.

7.4.1 City centre

Before Reform and Opening, Beijing had one administrative centre, which was also the political and cultural centre: Tiananmen Square and its surroundings. Besides that, the neighbourhood units provided everyday services. After Reform and Opening the situation changed dramatically. Nowadays there are several financial and commercial hubs around the inner city. Beijing has become a polycentric city (Gaubatz 1999, 1498).

Nevertheless the central area, around Tiananmen and the Forbidden City, is still the civic and cultural centre of China. National and municipal government buildings and historically significant buildings occupy almost 90 percent of the area within the second ring road (Yang et al. 2011, 7). Despite it being located in the very centre of the city, Tiananmen Square has not become the economic or commercial heart of Beijing. It remains, however, the symbolic centre of power and exists fairly detached from the bustling redevelopment in other parts of the city. It is still a monumental space that represents the eternal power of the CCP (Braester 2010, 152). Thus it cannot easily be altered. Since 2004, Tiananmen is even an urban district in its own right. Braester reports that its police station was dubbed "[...] "the No.1 Precinct Station under Heaven" (*Tianxiadiyipaichusuo*)" (Braester 2010, 153). Nonetheless, not even Tiananmen Square has remained entirely untouched by the commercialisation of Beijing; it too is now lined with shops like McDonalds, KFC and advertising billboards. For the 50th anniversary of the PRC in 1999, which was a big televised celebration, both Tiananmen Square and Changan road were tidied up. Hence all billboards were removed; trees and flowers planted; lights, statues and benches placed, buildings and pavements were renewed in order to project an orderly socialist image to domestic and international viewership (Broudehoux 2004, 164). While Tiananmen on the one hand represents power, it is on the other hand also a space of protest and resistance to the CCP regime (Braester 2010, 167). The best example for this is the 1989 Tiananmen protest. Besides being a politically contested space, the square is nowadays also used as an apolitical public space, where children fly kites and people practice sports (Braester 2010, 175). Finally, Tiananmen has turned into a significant tourist landmark in its own right.

Tiananmen's form is fairly static and there has been little change in the general political and administrative function of the city centre. What certainly has changed in the city centre is the now unwavering presence of commercial entities and symbols of consumption. Many different kinds of commercial areas are required in Beijing's market economy such as retail and office space. Especially between the second and third ring road, numerous new buildings for business activities have been established (Ding 2013, 487). Commercial activity is also reflected by billboards overshadowing Tiananmen and Changan Street. Little booths and market stalls selling food and trinkets have returned commercial life to previously solemn government districts.

Figure 7.5 Modern-day Wangfujing pedestrian shopping area (Beijingholiday 2012b)

Wangfujing, Qianmen and Xidan, which are three pre-1949 commercial areas, located just outside of the traditional city gates, have been revitalised and sell all kinds of consumer goods (Gaubatz 1995, 90). Particularly Wangfujing commercial area, which is west of the Forbidden City, changed dramatically after Reform and Opening. It retrieved some of its pre-communist commercial glory and became a tourist area full of hotels and little shops. In the 1992 master plan of Beijing it was partially redeveloped as a CBD (Broudehoux 2004, 106-109). However the renovation of Wangfujing into a CBD destroyed the informal commercial structures that were in place since the late 1970s.

> Renovation gave the street the sanitized air of postmodern shopping and entertainment districts now found around the world, whose sedate environment is engineered to create the best conditions for people to focus their energy on consumption. (Broudehoux 2004, 110)

In the last two decades, downtown Beijing has been turned into a sterile CBD and mall environment by foreign capital. Street carts and temporary stalls or even the chaotic, outdated courtyard housing have given way to clean and tidy offices, huge commercial centres, luxury apartments and hotel blocks (Broudehoux 2004, 134).

7.4.2 Industrial sites

In order to meet market needs, Beijing has been de-industrialised, which has created spaces that are now often filled by knowledge-intensive and cultural industries (Zhao 2010, 73). Manufacturing is still strong in Beijing, but has shifted to ICT and high-tech manufacturing as well as to the pharmaceutical and automobile industries (Yang et al. 2011, 11). Aside from that, Beijing's days as a base for heavy industry are over. Instead of iron and steel works, knowledge-based services in finance, research and development, business, education and technological innovation are fuelling Beijing’s economy. Since the mid-1990s the booming service industry has needed a lot of new office buildings and space to expand. This newly arisen need is being satisfied by CBD developments. For example, the main banks and some financial services are located along the west of the second ring road on the Financial Street and the CBD in Chaoyang district, next to the eastern section of the third ring road, which spans 399 hectares (Yang et al. 2011, 10).

In order to boost recent industrial development, the government established designated specialised economic development zones to create positive synergies in agglomerating similar businesses (see Figure 7.6).

> The zones are expanding and are now often called economic clusters. Not only have they become important in the economic development of Beijing, but they also influence the spatial dynamics (Yan et al. 2002, 43). The success of the economic clusters is a combination of government incentives such as taxation, infrastructure and land as well as other financial advantages that attract firms to produce there (Yang et al. 2011, 7). Development zones are also a sign of heavy state influence in planning. Yang and colleagues present an interesting argument that the concept of economic zones resembles the idea of the Soviet socialist productive industrial complex (Yang et al. 2011, 7). Although it is true that the Soviet city was planned with specialised zones for industrial development, the important difference is that modern Chinese economic clusters are neither explicitly planned for heavy industry, nor with adjacent housing for the workers. Now the issue is to provide enough public transport and roads for the employees to reach the economic clusters (Yang et al. 2011, 15). In Beijing, new industrial areas are developed in the south and southeast, particularly along the Beijing-Tianjin railway. Moreover the western suburbs are home to new industrial areas too. Early examples are the Shangdi Information Industry Base, Haidian Special Zone and the Fengtai Industrial Park (Gaubatz 1999, 1506). One example in the inner city is Zhongguancun Electric Street, established in 1988 in Haidian district, which provides economic incentives for electronics retailers (Gaubatz 1995, 83). It has been expanded and is now renamed Zhonguancun Science Park (Yang et al. 2011, 7).

Post-reform urban planning has clearly departed from the idea that industry needs to be dispersed throughout the city. In effect, the location of industry in the inner city has had harmful effects on the environment. To counteract these problems, large-scale and toxic industries have been moved to the outskirts of the city. Electronics and motor vehicles have become the preferred industries because of their lower pollution levels (Sit 1995, 105). Another reason why industrial plants move to the periphery is the high value of inner city land plots (Sit 1995, 168). The share of industrial sites in inner city areas is in fact constantly decreasing. Industry is moving to the suburbs where the land rent is cheaper and more land is available to expand. “In 1980 the ratio of industrial landuse in the inner-city districts to that in the outer districts was 1:20.4, by 1989 it was 1:41.7” (Gaubatz 1995, 85). From

these numbers it is clearly deducible that industry was declining in inner city districts and new industry settled on the city borders. This was both achieved by relocation, but to a higher degree by the opening of new development sites (Gaubatz 1999, 1503). Moreover, when industry moves to shared locations in the suburbs, agglomeration synergies with other factories are generated (Yan et al. 2002, 41). Despite deindustrialisation, some of the old industrial sites in the urban core area have been retained and gentrified. An example is the 798 Art District or Dashanzi Art District. The large 1950s military industry area was turned into a trendy space with galleries, studios, restaurants, cafés and other cultural industries that collectively form a major visitor magnet (Currier 2012, 184). The industrial complex used to be one of the most modern socialist production facilities created under the first Five-Year-Plan. It was designed by East German architects in the modernist Bauhaus-style (Figure 7.7), and is thus now a historic landmark by itself (Currier 2012, 187). 798 Art District is also vital in the scheme of selling Beijing as an art-concerned global city (Currier 2012, 185).

Figure 7.7 Gallery in the old factory buildings of 798 Art District (Phaidon 2012)

7.4.3 The micro-district or neighbourhood unit

The rather homogenous micro-district concept of the socialist era was broken up in the last decades. The planning focus is now on creating a city where different areas specialise in specific activities. Neighbourhoods or whole city areas are now specialised as CBDs, recreational or commercial zones. Nonetheless, the micro-district has persisted as a planning tool, albeit in a different form (Sit 1995, 103). Residential developments are still often developed as residential clusters, now called small districts (*xiaoqu*) (Bray 2005, 176). An important difference is that their scale has gone up quite significantly. The big residential clusters can house 200,000 to 300,000 residents. Most of the large ones are constructed between the fourth and fifth ring roads, where space for large area developments still exists (Yang et al. 2011, 5). The difference to the pre-1978 *danwei* complexes is that commercial and service facilities are no longer community-oriented and concentrated in the centre of the district. Instead they are located at the entrances and exits thus creating an open service system that can also be used by non-residents. The existing *danwei* in the inner city have often transformed their enclosing walls into shopping areas by leasing space to private entrepreneurs (Bray 2005, 170). Residential and

commercial uses are now mixed together to create adequate supply for the residents. Furthermore, industrial complexes are no longer integrated into these residential areas. Work and residence areas have become separated, thus creating more commuters (Wang and Chai 2009, 38). Commuting distances are often far because of the suburban character of these complexes. The socialist assumption that residents rarely need to travel beyond their own neighbourhood has proven to be the bane of post-socialist Chinese cities because streets were not designed for the rambling amounts of private traffic.

The *danwei* were still important as an administrative unit into the 1990s and in some cases still are today. Some have also remained major employers. Often businesses buy up apartments and then rent them to their employees, thus employment and a place to live remained tied together (Gaubatz 1995, 88). However, the physical structures, meaning the enclosed compounds of the *danwei* have largely vanished from Beijing's cityscape (Bray 2005, 176). Most walled work unit compounds have been demolished and replaced by modern high-rise apartment buildings.

Quite often new housing communities are gated and protected by fences and security checks (Gaubatz 1999, 1503; Bray 2005, 177). This stems from the fact that neighbourhoods are now mostly economically differentiated (Gaubatz 1995, 93). Hence there is a perceived need to protect wealthier areas, which was not the case in a more or less equal city under socialism.

7.4.4 Residential buildings

As already mentioned, after Reform and Opening, Beijing faced a severe housing shortage at the end of the 1970s. Main reasons for this were young people returning from their Cultural Revolution countryside banishments, increased rural-urban migration and children who had formerly lived with their parents had grown up, got married and needed their own homes (Gaubatz 1995, 86). Therefore a lot of new buildings had to be constructed. In the six years from 1977 to 1983, the newly constructed housing amounted to 46 percent of the stock built in the previous 27 years from 1949 to 1976 (Sit 1995, 104). Between 1979 and 1981, 70 percent of all construction was dedicated to residential use (Sit 1995, 205). Often new residential areas were constructed in the form of large estates with houses in different shapes and price ranges. The problem of too little housing was also tackled by setting up a real estate market and selling public assets. In order to achieve this, the government set up a scheme called housing monetarisation. *"Housing monetarization* refers to the provision of direct cash subsidies and allowances to urban residents by the government or work units in the place of in-kind housing distribution" (Zhu 2009, 256). There was also a secondary housing market for private flats and the number of private home owners increases steadily (Zhu 2009, 279).

Figure 7.8 Old and new housing developments and the rising skyline in Beijing (Worldcrunch 2011)

The most striking difference to the form of residential buildings in the Mao era is that they are growing skywards (see Figure 7.8). High-rise structures (nine storeys or more) are replacing the old concrete five-storey apartment buildings, to make room for more living space. In the socialist era Beijing was the leading city in erecting skyscrapers, which seems odd when compared to present-day Shanghai. The first high rise with an elevator was already built in 1960 and about ten more were added until the early 1970s. In 1985, in contrast, one new high-rise was approved every 1.3 days (Sit 1995, 216). Hence a new homogeneity of high-rise housing has been brought about by the development of new skyscraper neighbourhoods and the destruction of old ones (Yan et al. 2002, 44). Still, the high-rise development took time. New residential buildings in the mid-1980s were often low-rise community-centred projects that tried to blend Western and Chinese architecture. The architecture was practical and box-like, but more varied than it had been in the monotonous work-unit compounds. Also, the apartments were equipped with running water, toilets and a kitchen, which had not been the norm before 1979 (Gaubatz 1995, 87). Recently, a lot of new developments in Beijing are mid- and high-rise projects with high population densities. In the suburbs, however, Western- or sometimes Chinese-style luxury villas have become popular (Gaubatz 1999, 1503). An example for an early inner city apartment complex is Fangzhuang in the southeast corner within the third ring road. The Fangzhuang site used to be agricultural land, which spanned 148 hectares and was occupied by about 1000 farmers. It was redeveloped into a housing new town for 76,000 residents and covered with mixed housing styles ranging from two to 30 floors in height (Gaubatz 1999, 1503).

Most structures today are high-rises and the buildings themselves are placed closer together, so as to achieve greater density in the urban fabric (Sit 1995, 214). In terms of distribution, the newly built housing is much more spread out through the city and not just concentrated in the undeveloped periphery. Apartment buildings are not necessarily developed in a complex with others but also on their own, to fill gaps in the inner city. Despite that, overall project sizes for housing developments have increased.

The trends in residential areas in modern day Beijing are densification of housing in the peripheral inner city, depopulation of the city centre to make room for office buildings, suburbanisation and the

development of price-differentiated housing. The form of the houses is architecturally varied and growing skywards.

7.4.5 Architectural heritage

Beijing's urban image and the collective identity of its citizens centre on the idea that Beijing is a traditional city. Especially tourists are lured to Beijing through the commodification of historic sites (Broudehoux 2004, 42). The importance of conservation and preservation of the environment and historical heritage in Beijing was written down in 1982 (Sit 1995, 102). The most important outcome of this early policy was a rigid building height restriction to preserve the low-rise skyline in the centre. Therefore Beijing has an unusual bowl-shaped height structure and a lower profile than other Chinese cities. Building height is restricted to 9 metres in an area of 6.8 km² that contains the Forbidden City and the Zhongnanhai central government buildings (Ding 2013, 486). However, it is economically unfeasible to restrict building height, because the lower holding capacities of buildings decrease the land value. Thus the city becomes less compact and more sprawled. Nevertheless, Beijing authorities have implemented these restrictions, because the conservation of the character of the Forbidden City and the traditional centre of Beijing is a national imperative.

However, not all monuments and heritage areas are equally lucky. The preservation debate concerning less principle monuments only became more heated in the 1990s, when private developers started to commercialise cultural sites. One reason for this discussion is that heritage is primarily viewed as a source of potential economic value by both the state and private developers (Braester 2010, 117). Heritage is invaluable when promoting international events in Beijing. For example the Olympic Games, speeded up the commercialisation of heritage significantly. The urban restructuring for the 2008-spectacle went hand in hand with cultural engineering (Braester 2010, 283). Gaubatz mentions that conflicting paradigms and priorities plague the conservation of historic architecture in urban China. On the one hand there is the will to preserve, protect and restore structures. On the other hand there is the financial pressure to redevelop areas in the inner city into more profitable neighbourhoods with high quality buildings (Gaubatz 1999, 1516). Yet, in reality historical architecture is mostly preserved when it serves the financial interests of the municipality. For example, the redevelopment of Wangfujing Street into a CBD required the destruction of several historic landmarks, such as elaborate mansions of the Manchu aristocracy, the Dong An Market and the Jixiang Theatre (Broudehoux 2004, 123). Nonetheless according to Gaubatz, Beijing municipality has been more sensitive to historic background of existing landscape when redeveloping than other cities (Gaubatz 1999, 1516). In spite of this, more often than not, the fate of Beijing's historic land marks is in the hands of private developers, because the municipality cannot afford to preserve them. Sometimes culturally significant sites are integrated into the new developments (Braester 2010, 134). In general, the restoration of individual landmarks has been prioritised over the preservation of entire historic areas (Braester 2010, 112). One reason for this is that it is more cost-effective. Yet, the main reason among others is to make the city more compact by replacing low-rise historic structures with high-rises in order to densify the urban grid.

Among the least lucky heritage areas are the *hutong* alleys and courtyard houses. Inner city land, especially around the Imperial Palace, has become so valuable that historic preservation was set aside. Some areas of old courtyard housing were designated for preservation, especially north of the Imperial

City (Gaubatz 1995, 86). In 1989, an official survey estimated that 805 still intact courtyard houses were to be preserved. Conserving these justified the destruction of other historic houses (Braester 2010, 112). Due to the extensive damage and the costly restoration of old courtyard housing, a lot of them were destroyed and replaced by new apartment buildings. The courtyard houses, which are still in one piece, often undergo far-reaching renovations. Rents rise and the original tenants cannot afford them anymore. The *hutong* and courtyard houses are a powerful instrument in city marketing, because people associate them with traditional Beijing. Braester underlines that as long as the courtyard house does not resist marketisation and modernisation, it will remain a symbol of Beijing (Braester 2010, 115). In this spirit some areas have already been gentrified and turned into walk-in museums where the 'real imperial Beijing' can be explored (see Figure 7.9). An example is Shi Cha Hai *hutong*, which is one of the 25 *hutong* that are protected under the Conservation Plan for the Historic and Cultural City of Beijing 2002. Shi Cha Hai is now a popular area for leisure shopping and dining in historic atmosphere. Gentrification brought a level of homogeneity with other areas to cater for the needs of international and domestic tourists, thus it has lost its original character. "[...] almost each junction of alleyways bears an informative notice board in English and Mandarin, the walls are plastered (a heritage of cleaning the area for the Olympic Games), the shop fronts display fashionable clothing and restaurants offer a variety of cuisines" (Gu and Ryan 2012, 27).

Figure 7.9 (left) Redeveloped commercial street in Dashila and (right) undeveloped neighbouring *hutong* (Yang et al. 2011, 11)

8. Case B: Hanoi, Vietnam

8.1 Socialist transformation of Hanoi 1954−1985

Vietnam was war-torn and divided when the communists defeated the French in 1954. The capital city Hanoi bore the typical bipolar character of a colonial city. On the one hand it had a quarter for the native population, which was the Ancient Quarter. On the other hand it had areas built up by the colonial power, which were the French Quarter and Ba Dinh area (Waibel 2001, 105). Hanoi's modern suburban areas were still very rural and the urban core was limited to these three historic areas.

The initial Five-Year Plan for the development of North Vietnam included the building up of socialist infrastructure (Horen 2005, 163). Consequently, Hanoi was going to be changed according to socialist ideals as well and was supposed to be transformed into a producer city. Street traders were replaced by state outlets that were supplied by cooperative farms outside the city. The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) changed the colonial street names into Vietnamese ones. For example, the bustling Rue Paul Bert was renamed Trang Tien Street and transformed into a gloomier version as private shops and cafés vanished (Thomas 2002, 1613). In the 1950s, Hanoi had gradually started to transform into a characteristic socialist city. Its socialist modernisation path was, however, disrupted by war.

8.1.1 Vietnamese specificities of socialism that impacted urban development

Vietnamese socialism was heavily impacted by three decades of war from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s. For this reason the socialist urban development of Hanoi is characterised by wartime austerity, bombing campaigns and ensuing loss of population (Marr 2002, 326). The first decade of war that is significant for Vietnamese socialism is the First Indochina or French War (1945–1954). Although this war was fought before the separation of North and South Vietnam and the official period of socialism in Hanoi, it is vital to understanding urban development in Hanoi, because of the legacy it left in the urban morphology. During the years 1946–1947, almost 30 percent of Hanoi's buildings were destroyed or partially damaged (Logan 1995, 337). The First Indochina War ended in 1954 and the country’s economy and infrastructure was in a bad state. Unfortunate for the development of Vietnam and Hanoi, the Second Indochina or American War started in 1955 shortly after the end of the First Indochina War. Vietnam was thus consumed by two more decades of war that lasted until 1975. Hanoi was frequently bombed during the American War.

The war effort created many peculiarities in urban policy-making in Hanoi. In the mid-1950s, especially after the end of the First Indochina War a lot of development efforts were focussed on rebuilding the war-tattered economy. In this context the VCP had an advantage, because Hanoi had already had a useful legacy of colonial infrastructure that could be revived. Moreover, when the French were defeated in 1954, all French citizens were expelled from Vietnam and their property was seized by state authorities. This brought the largest part of French-style villas in the colonial quarter under state administration (Waibel 2002, 129).

The VCP also had to be pragmatic and consider wartime hardships of the population when it collectivised land and housing. Often the acute needs of the population took precedence over socialist ideals. Between 1958 and 1960 most private property was turned into state property. Throughout the 1960s almost all private land was transferred to collective ownership and allocated to cooperative

factories and agricultural production units (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 375). The formation of cooperatives and collectivisation of land largely followed the Chinese model of socialism (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 105). In reality, however, some houses, land and small enterprises remained in private ownership. The reason for this was that due to war operations the state could not provide enough goods and services that the residents in Hanoi needed to survive. Hence, private entrepreneurship and property were tolerated on a small scale to service the population's needs (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379). The government turned a similarly blind eye, when turning private into public housing. In the Ancient and the French Colonial Quarter owners of houses were not expropriated if they exercised non-capitalist professions such as teachers, independent craftsmen or state employees. Yet, if they were in a more capitalist trade like shop owners, traders or pharmacists, at least parts of their houses were seized by the state. Then one capitalist family had to share its house with other families. Nevertheless, all people retained a part of the land use rights of their former house in their private possession (Waibel 2002, 121-122). The Vietnamese communists had to be fairly practical and lenient when expropriating private land- and homeowners, in order to keep the population motivated for the war effort of the Second Indochina War.

As in many socialist countries, the VCP limited migration in order to restrict urban growth (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 380). The war was one reason for this was. Urbanisation and industrialisation rates were deliberately kept low during the American War, in order to avoid creating big agglomerations of industry and people that would be easy targets for bombs. As a result of US bombings, the North Vietnamese government decentralised its economy and moved large masses of inhabitants out of Hanoi, which actually lost population from 1965 to the end of the bomb raids in 1973. Between a third and a quarter of the population were evacuated and resettled in new industrial and residential areas about 40-60 km outside the city centre (Waibel 2002, 108). It is estimated that as many as 720,000 people were evacuated from Hanoi in the early 1970s (Horen 2005, 163). However, as soon as the American War had ended, migrants from rural areas flooded the city in search of work and prosperity. Subsequently the population of Hanoi increased by 400 percent and severe overcrowding and housing shortages were the consequences (Logan 1995, 332).

Regardless of the shocking number of evacuations and bombings, the Second Indochina War did not gravely damage Hanoi (Logan 1995, 331).

> Despite serious damages to the city infrastructure and economy, the bombing of 1965–1972 could not stop the economic development of Hanoi. The value of fixed assets of the material production sector in the 1966–1972 period increased six times over the 1961–1965 period (HSO, 1984; 1989). (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 378)

The coastal port of Haiphong for example suffered a much grimmer fate. The most significant hit in central Hanoi was the railway station (Waibel 2002, 109). Only a few other major infrastructure points such as a radio station, the Bach Mai Hospital in the suburbs and the historic Long Bien Bridge were destroyed. Moreover, around 17,000 houses did not survive the bomb raids (Horen 2005, 163).

Another peculiarity of Vietnamese socialism was that the northern and southern parts of Vietnam were on different levels of development. The American War ended with the fall of Saigon in 1975. After reunification there were major differences between the North and the South. The South's industry was much more developed, but its economy had depended largely on American aid, which had been

withdrawn. Thus the VCP prioritised the development of the South for a while. This included redeveloping the urban areas in southern Vietnam according to socialist ideals, in order to introduce socialist values to all Vietnamese people (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 122). Putting a socialist face on the former South was a labour-intensive task and many police and state employees were deployed from the North. As a consequence state control in Hanoi was more relaxed after reunification than during the war. Thus, private enterprise and the black market gained traction in Hanoi in the mid-1970s.

Overall, Vietnam endured economic misery from 1976 to 1986. Especially between 1976 and 1980, the government focussed so much on developing heavy industry that it completely neglected the agricultural sector, which led to severe food shortages (Waibel 2002, 124). Subsequently, due to the economic hardship of the country, most people needed to engage in private commercial activities to survive. It was estimated that right before the introduction of *doi moi* in the mid-1980s, roughly half of all commercial activities were conducted outside state channels (Waibel 2002, 126).

8.1.2 Soviet influence in Hanoi

Vietnam established strong linkages to the SU in the 1950s, which included economic aid and trade agreements, but also technology and knowledge transfers. The exchange waned during the American War. Despite having promised economic aid to Vietnam in the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, the US did not deliver any help to the re-unified state. In 1978 the US government even imposed a trade and investment embargo upon Vietnam, which made economic recovery miserably difficult (Logan 2000, 192). Moreover, Vietnam fell out with China over Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, which in response provoked a Chinese attack on Vietnam (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 111). For these reasons, Vietnam was inevitably pushed into the Soviet realm for development aid and international relations (Logan 1995, 332). In 1975 Vietnam and the SU signed the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation, which re-established economic ties. Most Vietnamese scholars were educated in the SU –between 1955 and 1990 the number of students amounted to around 22,700 people (Horen 2005, 163).

In addition to the Vietnamese planners and architects educated in the SU, Soviet planners and architects shaped the urban form of Hanoi themselves. In 1965 the preliminary master plan for urban Hanoi was drawn up with the aid of Soviet experts (Waibel 2002, 119). Buildings such as the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Cultural Palace close to the railway station, the State Assembly Building, the People's Committee Building, the Polytechnical Institute, the Hanoi railway station as well as the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum and the Ho Chi Minh Museum were designed by Soviet architects and bear clear resemblance to monumental Soviet architecture (Horen 2005, 163).

Figure 8.1 (left) Ho Chi Minh Museum (Geo Reisecommunity n.d.); (right) Hanoi Railway Station (TNH n.d. B)

In 1965, the government adopted a master plan for Hanoi that had been worked out three years earlier by the Soviet architect Antyonov and a few Vietnamese planners (Logan 2000, 210). The plan meant to extend the city to the south, west and east, build new bridges across the Red River, and establish a new city centre between Hoan Kiem and the West Lake. However, its execution was disrupted by the bombings of Hanoi in 1965 and 1966 and the plan was largely abandoned soon after (Waibel 2002, 119). In 1973 a new master plan for Hanoi was developed abroad by the Leningrad Scientific Research Centre for Urban Planning and Construction. The Leningrad Institute had previously designed successful plans for Siberia and Kazakhstan (Logan 2000, 211). This plan is also referred to as 'Leningrad Plan' (Surborg 2006, 244). It adhered closely to socialist principles of a vast and spread-out city with open green space, public transport, specialised industrial areas and equal access to amenities. However, the city administration did not fully execute it because it failed to address the real problems of Hanoi that were lack of housing, lack of industrial facilities and infrastructure. Some details were realised, such as the airport that was built 65 km to the north of the city centre, which was unnecessarily far away for the spread of the urban area in the 1980s (Waibel 2002, 120). Furthermore, a lot of the Soviet-style housing estates and blocks, as well as large industrial zones were built in Hanoi's suburbs (Horen 2005, 165).

Unfortunately both Soviet plans ignored the local specificities of Vietnamese culture and the needs of Hanoi’s residents and underestimated the available funds of the VCP (Horen 2005, 170). Hanoi simply was too poor to be turned into a thriving socialist metropolis. Soviet aid finally ended in 1991 with the dissolution of COMECON (Waibel 2002, 120).

8.1.3 Planning in socialist Hanoi

As already mentioned, urban planning was influenced by Soviet principles and disrupted by war. Like in most socialist cities planning in Hanoi also focussed on large-scale redevelopments. Most building projects were executed according to master plans that followed the overall economic agenda of the state to boost industrialisation. From 1954 to 1986 Hanoi's area tripled in size, although in a fairly uncoordinated fashion with little comprehensive planning (Waibel 2002, 120).

According to the first master plan for Hanoi in 1962, a new centre around the West Lake with large radiating boulevards inspired by Haussmann's Paris was to be developed. Hanoi was meant to look like a fan, encircled by three ring roads that bore the brunt of the traffic. Yet, due to the American War

the original form of the plan was never realised (Surborg 2006, 244). It was, however, the inspiration for future urban development in Hanoi. Its notion that the city centre should be kept between Hoan Kiem and the West Lake remained popular (Logan 2000, 210). The new centre was also supposed to incorporate Ba Dinh Square. The Leningrad master plan in 1973 was an entirely Soviet concept and hardly implemented. In short, it was too expensive and moreover it failed to address major problems in Hanoi, such as the tropical climate, flooding, overcrowding and the lack of financial means (Logan 2000, 212).

Planning in socialist Vietnam encompassed five stages which were similar to Soviet practices: "economic–technical feasibility study, general plan, development plan for a first stage, detailed plan, and execution plan" (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 377). They further explain:

> Given the cost and the time for the preparation of general plans, there was practically no detailed plan in urban areas. Urban planning often focused on new residential areas, neglecting the old city core and leading to dilapidation of old settlements. As private development was not recognized in the investment planning, neither land nor detailed plans were foreseen for privately built activities. During that period, city planners played an active role in the selection of factory sites, the functional division of urban land use, and the design of residential areas. In reality, urban planning often resulted in abstract plans without implementation (MOC, 1995, p. 13). (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 377)

Moreover, the issue of land was important for urban planning. In theory, after the Vietnamese reunification, all land belonged to the state. Land allocation was managed through a central administrative body and "[u]rban land practically served as a free good" (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 375).

Urban planning in Hanoi during the war was sporadic. Large-scale industrial and residential developments were usually set far apart from each other in order not to create large areas that were possible bomb targets. Only after the end of the war urban planning became more comprehensive and sought to create a more socialist urban environment.

8.2 Analysis of inner city elements in the socialist era

The following sections will show how the five parts of the inner city that were selected as research objects of this thesis were affected by socialist urban planning in Hanoi.

8.2.1 City centre

Hanoi's city centre is not as easily determinable as Beijing's, because diverse political regimes have built different centres. The Ancient Quarter was the commercial and trading centre of Hanoi. The French colonial administration built itself a new centre in the French Quarter around the Opera house. The VCP decided to set up their political centre of power in the area of the old citadel in Ba Dinh (see Figure 8.2).



Figure 8.2 Map of three central areas in Hanoi: Ba Dinh, the Ancient Quarter and the French Quarter (Google Maps 2013, own modifications)

The monumental city centre and historical seat of power was the area of Ba Dinh square to the east of the Ancient Quarter. The name Ba Dinh was selected by the mayor of Hanoi in 1945 to commemorate the defence against the French in 1886 and 1887. Prior to the socialist period Ba Dinh-area "was an uncultivated plot right in the middle of the French administrative district" (Kurfürst 2012, 76). Originally, the space was occupied by the imperial Thang Long citadel which was the seat of the Vietnam's rulers until the French colonial troupes tore it down (Horen 2005, 166). The French built the Palace of the Governor General, the Finance Institution, the Registry Office and several ministries close to Ba Dinh Square, but did not actually develop the square. A plan to extend it, developed by Hébrard, a well-known French architect, was never realised (Kurfürst 2012, 76).

The symbolic power of Ba Dinh Square stems from its historic significance for the VCP. It was in this spot that Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam from the French on September 2nd 1945 (Waibel 2001, 102). Indeed Ba Dinh Square was selected as the site of the declaration, because the square in front of the opera was deemed too small to hold the expected masses. Moreover, it was in the heart of the French colonial administration quarter, and thus served as an act of "counter symbolism" to the old colonial regime (Kurfürst 2012, 77). Ba Dinh Square is thus irreversibly linked with the national independence in Vietnam. Nine years later in 1954, the state of North Vietnam was also inaugurated on Ba Dinh Square with Ho Chi Minh as its leader (Thomas 2002, 1617).

After 1954 the square was redesigned according to socialist principles (Logan 2009, 88). Interestingly, the socialist government took over the east-west axis of the French colonial administration. This represents a contrast to the classical geomantic north-south axis design, a practice derived from China that was common in traditional Vietnamese urban planning (Kurfürst 2012, 81). The VCP and Soviet

planners redeveloped and veiled the square in socialist ideals. For example, a statue of Lenin was set up on one side of Ba Dinh Square. They also built Soviet-style architecture around it which included the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum, the Ho Chi Minh Museum, the offices of the VCP, the National Assembly and State Council Buildings as well as the State Assembly building. "There is an overwhelming sense of remoteness and formality in the structures [...]", according to Thomas' description of the square (Thomas 2002, 1617). The square itself with the wide boulevards that surround it, was made to function as a space for large parades (Logan 1995, 331). At least 100,000 people could fit onto the square (Kurfürst 2012, 81).

Figure 8.3 Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum on Ba Dinh Square (van Horen 2005, 163)

The Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum (see Figure 8.3), which was and still is the dominant structure of the square, was constructed between 1973 and 1975 and only completed after the end of the Second Indochina War. Yet, Ho Chi Minh had already died in 1969. However, because of the ongoing war, his proper entombment was postponed. The mausoleum was built after plans by the Soviet architect Grigorievich Isakovich who used the Lenin Mausoleum in Moscow as inspiration (Kurfürst 2012, 39). However, traditional Vietnamese style-elements were also incorporated. The three-tier steps and three-layer roof resembled the architectural make-up of ancient Vietnamese residences and communal houses. Furthermore, the mausoleum was designed around the metaphor of a lotus flower, which was an ancient "symbol for beauty and purity" (Kurfürst 2012, 83).

The VCP acknowledged the Ancient Quarter as the traditional and historic city centre (Surborg 2006, 244). However, due to the nature of socialism, the Ancient Quarter lost its commercial influence and became primarily residential (Surborg 2006, 243). The traders were reorganised into collectives and then incorporated into state-owned stores for retail and food. Commercial activity was restricted to about 300 state and collective stores (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 380). Shops in better locations were turned into state outlets, whereas shops in less accessible locations were simply converted into living space (Waibel 2002, 121). Very few new buildings were erected in the old city centre during socialist times, with the exception of a small amount of structures for administrative purposes.

8.2.2 Industrial sites

Industrial development was financed through the state and foreign aid by the SU. The share of the industrial sector relative to the total economic output rose from 52 percent to 78 percent between 1960 and 1978 (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 378).

Starting in the 1960s, zones for heavy industry were built on the periphery of the old city. These zones revitalised North Vietnam's industry and raised industrial output. Most zones were located along the main axial roads and their crossing with the ring road (see Figure 8.4). In general, industrial location was selected with regard to good access to transport routes, vacant land without tenants that needed to be resettled, and wind direction in order to avoid excessive pollution in the old city (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379).

Figure 8.4 Spatial distribution of industrial sites in Hanoi before *doi moi* (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379)

According to Soviet principles, each industrial zone was specialised in a certain industry. This is in contrast to Chinese industrial areas which tried to be self-sufficient and had workers live on site (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379). Hanoi's industrial zones were also a lot smaller than in Beijing, because large agglomerations of industry were easy bombing targets. The biggest zones reached about 80 hectares. The industrial sites were dispersed all over the urban areas and the surrounding country-side. Many were even located about 40 to 60 km outside the city centre, in order to be less easily detectable during bomb raids (Waibel 2002, 108).

Eventually, in the 1970s and 1980s, after the end of the war, the VCP could finally devote all of its resources to developing the socialist economy. Investment in heavy industry was favoured. Post-war,

pre-reform industrial development in Hanoi was carried out in nine large zones in the periphery of the old city quarters. Each comprised of about 150 factories (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379).

8.2.3 Micro-district or neighbourhood unit

Similar to Beijing, the micro-district concept was also applied in Hanoi. Neighbourhood units were developed and located in close proximity to the factories (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379). Thus the neighbourhood districts were also located in the periphery of the old city. The micro-district was, however, not very pervasive in Hanoi. The concept was very actively applied in the 'Leningrad Plan', which was never comprehensively realised (Surborg 2006, 244). Altogether only 15 micro-districts were realised in Hanoi. Yet, numerous smaller ensembles of residential apartment complexes were built in Soviet style as well (Waibel 2002, 118). The housing units of the micro-districts were grouped around amenities such as small shops, recreational areas and educational facilities (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 379). Most of Hanoi's micro-districts were located near industrial sites in order to keep the travel time to the workplace to a minimum. Other residential areas, however, were often located far outside the city centre, which meant that residents had to travel long distances by bus. Not all areas were connected by public transport (Waibel 2002, 118).

The areas where the Soviet housing dominated were south and east of Ba Dinh area. The neighbourhoods were grouped together and connected with thin streets and alleys that were often too narrow for cars. The overall character of the areas was shaped by large and wide main streets or boulevards (Surborg 2006, 247). An early example for a micro-district in Hanoi is *Kim Lien*, about 4 km south of the Ancient Quarter (see Figure 8.5). Other examples are *Nguyen Cong Tr* about 1.5 km south of the centre and built in 1963*, Giang Vo* in the west*, Trung Tu* to the north of *Kim Lien* and the district *Than Xuan* that was built between 1983 and 1990. *Than Xuan* was made up of prefabricated blocks and was meant for 17.600 residents (see Waibel 2002, 115-119).

The implementations of the Soviet-textbook micro-districts in Hanoi lead to several problems. One was that the apartments were planned for nuclear families, rather than the extended family networks that were predominant in Vietnamese society in the 1970s and 1980s (Horen 2005, 168). The result was fierce overcrowding in the housing units. Other problems were caused by the building material and the way of construction. The prefabricated, concrete blocks were not designed for the hot and wet tropical climate, which caused early decay. Moreover, there was no money to restore and maintain the buildings on the side of the government, because of the low rent prices. Residents themselves were forbidden to make alterations or maintenance work (Waibel 2002, 118).

Figure 8.5 Maps of Kim Lien micro-district. (left) Kim Lien Soviet plan of 1957, (right) reality of Kim Lien construction (Marr 2002, 295f)

The plan on the left in Figure 8.5 is the original design made by Soviet planners for the Kim Lien micro-district. The rows of houses are in orderly fashion. The white-striped areas represent green space, the grey buildings are public buildings and black buildings are mostly 4 storey apartment buildings. The numbered buildings are public facilities: (1) Primary school, (2) kindergarten, (3) restaurants and canteens, (4) hospital, (5) supermarket, (6) community and club house, (7) home for elderly. The plan on the right in Figure 8.5 depicts the actual materialisation of Kim Lien. The striking black areas correspond to unplanned densification through illegal squatter buildings and other make-shift structures. The white-striped areas are also 4 storey apartment blocks. The crossed-white boxes on the right side are industrial buildings. The numbered buildings have different purposes than in the original plan as well: (1) market, (2) clinic, (3), post office, (4) bank, (5) hotel, (6) school, (7) administrative services, (8) community and club house (Marr 2002, 295-296). The district that was actually built is much denser and the service facilities are not exclusively grouped in the central area of the micro-district. Moreover, there were industrial buildings integrated in the Kim Lien micro-district. After its completion in 1976, Kim Lien suffered from severe over-crowding (Waibel 2002, 116).

8.2.4 Residential buildings

Initially after the communist take-over of Hanoi, traditional one- or two-storey houses were erected. Only at the end of the 1950s the Soviet-style four- to five-storey walk-up buildings were adopted as preferred type of state housing. Prefabricated housing blocks only started to be used in Hanoi in the 1970s, when the bombings had ceased and it was feasible to built high rise apartments again (Waibel 2002, 116).

Housing construction was generally financed through the state, but the government usually prioritised construction for military purposes over residential building (Waibel 2002, 111). Some people received subsidies for housing, in other cases enterprises or ministries provided housing for their employees. However, this was not commonplace like in Beijing. The provided housing was in accordance with socialist principles located as close as possible to the workplace (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376).

Despite some large-scale state housing projects, housing demand greatly exceeded supply in Hanoi's socialist period. Since there was not enough newly-built accommodation, the population density in the old areas rose drastically. Between 1954 and 1990 the average living space per capita dropped from 6.7 m² to 4 m² (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376). Hence, a lot of building went on illegally or privately. This practice was not encouraged, but tolerated out of necessity. In the French Quarter the wide spaces between villas and houses were filled in with make-shift buildings. Furthermore, the houses in the Ancient Quarter were often extended by a floor or subdivided into smaller units (Marr 2002, 310).

Figure 8.6 Soviet housing block in Hanoi (Horen 2005, 168)

After the American War the housing situation in Hanoi was dire. “Production of housing was dominated by technical and economic considerations [...]” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376). With the help of the SU, the VCP built new prefabricated apartment blocks in the periphery of the urban core as public housing. In the old areas of Hanoi in contrast, hardly any new apartment buildings were erected during the socialist period (Forbes and Thrift 1987, 126). The form of the new, cheap buildings was the block-like modernist style (see Figure 8.6). Most buildings were four- to five-storey walk-up buildings (Horen 2005, 168). Thus monotonous areas that looked like other urban residential areas in the SU or China emerged. The new constructions did alleviate the problem of too little housing slightly, but soon became overcrowded themselves as new migrants arrived from the countryside. Moreover, due to the poor quality of materials and building practices, most blocks soon became decrepit and unattractive (Logan 1995, 332). The housing blocks and their materials were not ideal for Hanoi’s climate, which led to more deterioration. Since rents were subsidised and thus below market value, the state had no revenue to sufficiently maintain them (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376).

8.2.5 Architectural heritage

The old city areas, the Ancient and French Quarter as well as Ba Dinh area, were disturbed very little by the socialist agenda of the VCP. The focus of urban development lay on advancing new residential and industrial areas in the periphery, rather than within the crowded old city. Hardly any land or structures in the old areas were changed, because the cost for the reallocation of the residents would have been too high for the state to pay (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 380). Moreover, land was available and practically free on the edges of the city. Nevertheless, the inner city architectural heritage suffered some consequences of the socialist regime.

Like any new regime that comes to power, the VCP branded Hanoi with its own monuments and statues, to mould it into a socialist producer city. It tore down the colonial town hall east of Hoan Kiem Lake and built the People's Committee Building in its place (Logan 1995, 340). Another example is the Lenin Statue in a park on Dien Bien Phu Street. The statue replaced a monument that commemorated fallen soldiers of the French army (Kurfürst 2012, 39). The VCP also redefined the meaning and function of many colonial buildings. The *Residence Supérieure* was changed to a government's guesthouse, and the Bank of Indochina was turned in the Vietnam National Bank (Kurfürst 2012, 41).

Housing in the Ancient Quarter was and still is called tube housing, because the facade is only about two to four metres wide. Yet, the houses stretch to depths of 20 to 60 metres (Horen 2005, 165). Most houses are divided with one to three courtyards that bring light and ventilation into the house (Waibel 2001, 65). Originally, they were designed for one extended family made up of different generations. However, in the aftermath of the First Indochina War, when people returned and migrated to Hanoi, four to five families lived in one house. In extreme up to nine families shared one such house. Hence, some of the inner courtyards were filled in, in order to provide more space (Waibel 2002, 127). As a consequence, the living conditions were bad and in some streets the living space per person had dropped to 1.5 m² (Waibel 2002, 127). Subsequently, the houses deteriorated quickly due to over-occupation.

Villas in the French Quarter suffered a similar fate. The state altered their function from single family residences to mass housing facilities that could hold around 120 people. The VCP had no money to maintain the buildings, thus their physical shape declined considerably (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 381). The nicer villas were given to upper party-cadres who usually occupied one house per family. Some former residential buildings were used as administrative buildings. Only the function of those structures, which had been also used for socially beneficial purposes such as the military or education under French rule, was not changed (Waibel 2002, 130).

The government had no means to maintain neither the tube houses in the Ancient Quarter nor the French villas. For this reason the old houses were not altered at all and remained in their original, albeit more dilapidated, state. "The survival of Hanoi's built heritage is one of the very few benefits to come out of this disastrous half century of economic depression, wars, crushing poverty, lack of foreign investment, and rigid, centralized government" (Logan 1995, 332). Since there was no foreign or domestic investment the government could not afford to replace still useful buildings with more modern and functional block high-rises. Nonetheless, a lot of heritage buildings changed their functions. For example temples and community houses were turned into kindergartens or cooperative workshops (Waibel 2002, 122).

8.3 Post-1986 transformation of socialist city elements

8.3.1 *Doi moi* in Hanoi

At the end of the 1970s people were living below subsistence level and it was obvious that socialist modernisation did not bring the expected wealth and equality. Farmers thus started to set up private enterprises and produce less for the collectivised system (Kurfürst 2012, 45). These were at first

tolerated experiments with market mechanisms. By the mid-1980s the poverty level in Vietnam was high, inflation rampant and economic conditions were worsening every year. Additionally the old revolutionary generation went into retirement and a reform-oriented leadership took charge of the VCP (Horen 2005, 164). Hence, the party acknowledged the failure of the socialist system by implementing the *doi moi* reform programme. *Doi moi*, which means renovation, was introduced at the Sixth Party Congress in Hanoi in 1986. It started with gradual economic reforms, but no real political change occurred. Private-sector development, opening the country to foreign investment and creating a strong export base were the main aims. The state allocation system was shrunk and thus a lot of state-owned enterprises were closed and workers were laid off. However, some state-owned enterprises remained in business and are now often still state-owned or public-private partnerships. Land was de-collectivised and redistributed according to market-oriented mechanisms. Price subsidies and controls were suddenly lifted in 1989. Essentially, market mechanisms largely replaced the socialist central planning system. Kurfürst claims that the reforms were a sort of "state initiated capitalism" and commenced the path to Vietnam's transition to a market economy (Kurfürst 2012, 45). On the political front, like in China, the party retained its monopoly. However, the party has been trying to create a sort of political plurality by incorporating the interests of many different population groups within its own factions (Kurfürst 2012, 43).

Another consequence of *doi moi* was that political ties with the SU were cut and attention was directed towards other countries. The US-trade-embargo from 1979 was finally lifted in 1994 and allowed Vietnam's return to the international political sphere. Especially the integration with its Southeast Asian neighbour states was an important step for Vietnam's economic development. Vietnam joined the ASEAN in 1995, which accelerated the opening up of its economy. Vietnam has also established special business zones where favourable tax and trade conditions apply in order to attract foreign investment (Painter 2006, 68).

Modern day Hanoi is booming. It is one of the most dynamic cities in Asia and its economic growth rate is predicted to stay around 7 percent until 2025 (Waibel 2011, 48). Currently, industrial production and manufacturing of export goods are still the main pillars of Vietnam's economic development; however the service sector is gaining traction and is increasingly important in supporting other primary and mainly secondary industries (Surborg 2006, 249). In order to boost the economy, Hanoi is orienting itself towards becoming a major export and service centre in Southeast Asia (Horen 2005, 170).

The reforms also had important social consequences that have substantially influenced the urban environment of Hanoi (Kurfürst 2012, 47). First, the state lost its role as employer and provider of services and goods. Thus commercial entities flooded the streets to offer goods and services to the residents. Market reforms brought private entrepreneurs, small shops, street vendors and trishaw drivers into Hanoi's streets (Horen 2005, 164; Waibel 2001). However, the characteristic mobile street vendors are now again increasingly banned by the authorities (Turner and Schoenberger 2012, 1030). Second, due to more economic opportunities, not everybody was socially equal anymore. Instead, a very wealthy middle class emerged and thus social stratification became an apparent problem in Hanoi. Moreover, a shift in national values occurred. Under socialism and especially during wartime, individual needs had been sidelined, as everybody needed to contribute to the collective effort of

winning the war. After the introduction of *doi moi* and privatisation, individuality returned to Hanoi (Kurfürst 2012, 47). In addition to living this increased individuality, planers and architects have tried to tidy up and polish the Hanoi cityscape. Luxury buildings, five star hotels and gated residential complexes have been reflecting the increased prosperity in the city. Currently, there are also plans to redevelop Hanoi's waterfront on the Red River into a glamorous international attraction (Logan 2009, 92). Hanoi, like many large cities is trying to appear modern, clean, efficient and attractive to live in.

The VCP has retained power in Vietnam, but had to adapt to the new market environment. The fact that Hanoi, at least in some places, is also symbolically changing supports this thesis. Until 1992, for example, a large portrait of Ho Chi Minh hung on the building of the State Bank in central Hanoi. It has been removed with the intention to acknowledge that capitalist values were the way to future economic development of Vietnam (Logan 2009, 88).

8.3.2 Urban planning in post-*doi moi* Hanoi

Around the introduction of *doi moi* the government realised that socialist central planning had become an unfeasible tool to develop Vietnam's and Hanoi's economy. Slowly the practice of top-down master planning has been given up and replaced with a more strategic planning approach. Furthermore, in hand with market reforms, the power of the central government has been diffused and local authorities as well as private actors have become increasingly important in decision-making processes (Horen 2005, 170). Initially, during the first years after *doi moi,* urban development was dominated by individual actors who sought to ameliorate their own living conditions. "With global integration and private sector development, a multitude of spatial producers entered the stage and each of them leaves their very own imprints on the city's landscape" (Kurfürst 2012, 62). Private entrepreneurs, the public, the government, and international investors all wanted to shape spaces in Hanoi according to their own interests. As a consequence, in spite of formulated master plans, planning was uncoordinated and authorities were overwhelmed (Waibel 2011, 50).

An important factor in urban planning is the land ownership structure. The Vietnamese land is officially owned by the people and administered by the state, which in practice means that the state acts as land owner. The ministries of Construction and Natural Resources thereby control the expansion and usage of urban land (Labbé 2011, 440). However, since 1992 land use rights can be bought, sold, mortgaged or leased to private entities (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376). Land use rights are granted for either 20, 50 or 70 years depending on the use. After the lease time is up the user can apply for an extension (Law on Land, X-2908).

Apart from the temporal restriction of the lease, Vietnamese land-use rights in fact are applied as if the land were privately owned. An interesting angle in Vietnam's land market is that the state still allocates the land or actually the land-use rights according to fixed prices. The owners of the land-use rights, however, can sell these according to market prices. "State allocation of the land to users is known as the primary land market, whilst the transfer of land among users forms the secondary land market" (Han and Vu 2008, 1105). This two-tier land pricing system has led to exorbitant speculation and skyrocketing land prices in Hanoi. Absurdly, land rents in the city centre of Hanoi are among the highest world-wide, due to extreme land scarcity. Rents in central locations are comparable with prices

in Paris or London (ADB 2008, 34). Therefore developers choose to move their projects to the new western suburbs.

Planners have to cope with fast growth in post-reform Hanoi. Due to the increased employment opportunities, a lot of people migrate to the cities from the countryside. “The urbanisation process has reflected the economic policy, resulting in rapid increases in urban population and urban built-up areas” (Han and Vu 2008, 1098). Cities are growing so fast in Vietnam that legislative and regulatory frameworks cannot keep up. Instead they tackle environmental problems only after they occur instead of preventing them (Forrest 2009, 293).

Due to over-crowding in the urban core, Hanoi municipality annexed its neighbouring provinces in the West in 2008, which tripled the size of the urban area. Reasons behind this were cheap land prices in the urban fringe, scarcity of undeveloped land in the core urban area and better planning possibilities for the peripheral land. The authorities in Hanoi can now control and locate development projects more easily (Waibel 2011, 48). This means that a lot of former villages and rural communities are being swallowed by the city. Often the local residents have little choice but to adapt or relocate. Since land is state owned, every now and then issues concerning evictions of residents emerge. The state and developers often form coalitions against the residents. In contrast to China, where local authorities and residents frequently put up violent and highly publicised fights, Vietnamese evictions are generally less tumultuous (Han and Vu 2008, 1099). Moreover, since the early 1990s with modifications in 2003, there are laws for compensation in which the residents get about 70 to 80 percent of the market value of their land (Han and Vu 2008, 1107). Breaking up and redeveloping Hanoi’s many urban villages into mixed use high-rise areas leads to increased social conflict with the population (see Labbé 2011).

In order to mitigate Hanoi's environmental and overcrowding problems, the current master plan “Hanoi Capital Construction Master Plan to 2030 and vision to 2050” thus concentrates on sustainable development, relieving the crowded transport arteries and turning Hanoi into a “green city” (Dang 2010). It focuses on relieving the crowded inner city by establishing development zones for residence and industry in the urban periphery (Waibel 2011, 51). Hanoi is aiming to become Southeast Asia’s first sustainable city.

8.4 Analysis of inner city elements in the reform era

The following section will take a closer look at what has happened to the form and function of the city elements that have already been analysed in socialist Hanoi in the previous chapter.

8.4.1 City centre

“Hanoi’s central area is fast becoming a dynamic scene of business activity, reducing its previous planned residential and administrative profile” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). The central areas have certainly become more compact and densely built up since *doi moi*. In order to avoid human resettlement costs, foreign developers have filled in open spaces, converted former industrial lots or public buildings for new high-rise developments (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). Residential use is going down as rents become too expensive. Commercial floor space takes its place.

Doi moi policies have revived the Ancient Quarter and restored its original commercial function (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). It now attracts tourists and leisure seekers with small businesses, cheap hotels and artisan shops. The economic reforms have allowed citizens more autonomy and many have used it to set up informal buildings structures or house extensions in the central areas of the city, mostly for entrepreneurial purposes (Surborg 2006, 243). Altogether there is more individual choice than before. An obvious change in the Ancient Quarter is that many residents have become entrepreneurs and have converted their homes into small hotels with four or five storeys (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). Usually this has been done by illegally extending the houses. The downsides of the economic reforms in the Ancient Quarter are increased social stratification and the appearance of slums, due to over-crowding and poor housing maintenance. Population density in the Ancient Quarter had risen to an unbearable 1.5m² per inhabitant in the mid-1980s, leaving municipal authorities concerned (Horen 2005, 163). Since then however, many residents have moved into the less crowded suburbs. A recent development in Hanoi that affects the commercial bustle of the old areas is the cleaning up of the city's sidewalks. Street traders and little pavement shops are increasingly being banned by the municipal authorities, in order to transmit a modern and clean image of Hanoi to the world (Kurfürst 2012, 108).

Ba Dinh Square is still the "politically symbolic center of the city" (Thomas 2002, 1617). Logan claims the fact that the Lenin statue is still standing in present-day Hanoi is a monument to the VCP's unfaltering resistance to political change (Logan 2000, 198). The Vietnamese flag on the flagpole in the square is still hoisted every day at 6 am and lowered at 9 pm (Kurfürst 2012, 81). Moreover, Ba Dinh Square has remained a space of worship for Ho Chi Minh (Kurfürst 2012, 89). Besides that, it is still used to stage state spectacles. In this function it was the centre of attention at the 1000 year celebration of Hanoi's history in 2010. Moreover, with its mix of socialist and French-colonial architecture, it has become an attraction for visitors.

Now, however, Ba Dinh Square is also used as an apolitical public space. According to Kurfürst, there is an apparent shift in the use of the square after *doi moi*, because the citizens of Hanoi increasingly appropriate the space for their own needs (Kurfürst 2012, 84). Ba Dinh Square is divided into a concrete-covered part and an area of 168 grass squares that are each separated by 1.4 metres wide lanes. It is forbidden to step on the grass and there are guards to ensure this rule is not broken (Kurfürst 2012, 81). Since it is a flat, rather large open space, joggers, skaters, *taichi* practitioners and so forth make use of it for their pleasure, whereas in socialist times people simply came to celebrate the state (Thomas 2002, 1612). However, the leisurely use of the space is restricted during opening times of the mausoleum and the everyday activities of visitors are disrupted by the raising and lowering of the flag in the morning and evening.

Ba Dinh area is still the most important administrative and political space in the city and many embassies and ministries are located there. Due to its lasting symbolic status as the seat of power of the VCP, Ba Dinh Square is a monument in itself and is fairly safe from redevelopment (Horen 2005, 167). There was one exception in 2008, however, when the State Assembly or Ba Dinh Hall was torn down, in order to build a larger more modern building.

Other parts of Hanoi besides Ba Dinh have experienced a commercial and entertainment facelift since *doi moi*. Hoan Kiem Lake area has been transformed into a fashionable recreational zone with many

international restaurants (Surborg 2006, 245). The French Quarter too has been commercially revived and has turned into the most expensive area in the city (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). The French Quarter has attracted foreign investment and thus become the acting CBD of Hanoi. Particularly, the area around the Opera House is the core of the CDB-isation (Surborg 2006, 249). Many international companies have set up their offices and headquarters in the spacious French-style villas and constructed new glitzy offices and international hotel chains in the rest of the French Quarter.

Other areas of Hanoi have also adopted important CBD functions. Since there is little space in the central historic areas of the city, different urban centres are being built outside the historic urban core in convenient proximity to major transport arteries. Municipal authorities are planning to develop a new CBD area around the West Lake. Another example is a new political and administration centre with CBD properties around Keangnam Hanoi Landmark Tower. Existing structures there include the Hanoi Museum, the National Archive and the National Congress Centre. Luxury hotels, office buildings, sport and leisure facilities as well as large residential areas are situated there too. Moreover, the important Thang Long highway passes through, providing easy access. In the future, this new CBD area will slowly move towards the middle of Hanoi, due to the annexation of land in the West of Hanoi (Waibel 2011, 52).

Hanoi is no longer centred on one area and future developments at least indicate that there will be more centres. Nonetheless, Ba Dinh Square still is the point of political power, spectacle and symbolism for the communist party.

8.4.2 Industrial sites

The general trend is that new industrial sites are now increasingly being located on the rural outskirts of Hanoi, where land is still cheap (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 381). Moreover, there is sufficient space to expand operations and pollution is not as big a problem as in the city centre.

However, old factories are not always moving out of the inner city areas. This is due to state intervention as the state still fixes the land prices at fairly low rates. Whereas once the government has leased the land to a user, the usage rights can then be resold at market prices. This creates a distorted real estate market. Factories have no incentive to move out of the city, because the land rent they pay to the state is still cheap and well below market value. This means that the state essentially subsidises a lot of factories. In 2002, 40 percent of all industries were still located on the edges of the inner city (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 382). Some factories subdivide their land and lease it in order to earn some money. “Many state companies have made use of their land assets by restoring and reconstructing their headquarters for commercial, tourist, or other economic activities” (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). Others, in contrast, continue to use it for industrial production.

The government has realised that leaving too many industrial areas in the inner city is a problem. A lot of factories were causing unnecessary pollution in the inner city. Thus Hanoi city authorities have started to relocate approximately 1,000 older factories and similar facilities from high-value inner city locations to the suburbs, in order to free up more land for commercial activities, public works, parks or schools (ADB 2008, 35). Waibel states that a few industrial plots have also been redeveloped for cultural and creative purposes (Waibel 2011, 55). Industrial areas in the suburbs are often organised as

industrial development zones (see Le and Vu 2008). While some have already been built, Hanoi municipal authorities are planning more zones to located new and old industry (Vietnam News 2012)

In sum, industrial areas are slowly moving out of the inner city, but due to the ongoing cheap land leases provided by the government, factories have little incentive to vacate their current centrally located sites. Thus large industrial areas still unnecessarily occupy large plots of inner city land in Hanoi.

8.4.3 Micro-district or neighbourhood unit

The monotonous form of industrial-residential linkages was abandoned after *doi moi* (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 381). Hence apartments were no longer required to be close to residents' workplaces. The micro-district, which had never been widely used in Hanoi, has been abandoned as a planning unit. Still, often new residential projects by private developers are built as large compounds and complexes. However, these large-scale residential developments, where houses fit together in terms of architectural style, have moved to the outskirts. A decade ago many were developed in the zone of about two to five kilometres from the centre (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). Nevertheless, since then construction projects have moved further out into the suburbs, especially to the West where rural land was more affordable.

A current trend is the introduction of gated residential communities, which have replaced the socialist neighbourhoods. Especially, the middle and upper classes are moving into gated communities in the periphery (Forrest 2009, 296). When entering the city of Hanoi from the airport, any driver passes a pompous arc that looked like a relic from the French occupation, which is however the entrance to a newly constructed gated community called Ciputra (see Figure 8.7).

Figure 8.7 The main gate to the Ciputra gated community with triumphant frolicking stallions (TNH Hanoi n.d. A)

Many remnants of the micro-districts and similar socialist housing developments are still left in Hanoi's urban morphology. The Soviet-style architecture has created a distinct impression particularly

in the southern and south eastern part of inner city Hanoi. There modern Hanoi is still characterised by low-rise block apartments and some colonial structures. What has changed in the micro-districts and socialist neighbourhoods is that the grey utilitarian buildings are now dotted with restaurants and little stores in their ground floors. Apart from little details such as antennas and air-conditioners, the buildings have remained the same and some of them "could well be found in East Berlin or Warsaw" (Surborg 2006, 246).

8.4.4 Residential buildings

At the beginning of *doi moi* residential living space in Hanoi was scarce. Despite the scarcity, the state greatly scaled down public housing provision. Therefore people had to build and pay for their own accommodation. Between 1990 and 2000, 50 to 70 percent of the overall floor area dedicated to housing was self-built (Zhu 2012, 83). The state encouraged people to construct their own housing by commercialising the building materials industry and allowing rents to increase dramatically (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 376). Moreover, in 1991 the Ordinance on Housing was passed, which allowed people to own their houses (McGee 2009, 240). Most large-scale housing projects are no longer subsidised or constructed by the state, but through private or semi-private developers.

Hanoi municipality spent very little funds on social housing in the 1990s (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 383). However, recently the municipal authorities have realised that housing provision is still a main problem in Hanoi and that private developers cannot meet the huge demand alone. Moreover, the houses constructed by private developers are usually aimed at the middle class or even wealthier clients. Less affluent Hanoi residents cannot afford the steep rents. Hence since the turn of the millennium, in general more attention has been paid to public housing construction (McGee 2009, 240). The authorities have devised another way to solve the problem by seizing some of the already existing housing stock. As there are too many residential building projects in Hanoi, 20 percent of most projects have to be dedicated as social housing (VietnamNet Bridge 2012b).

Gaining access to land in Hanoi is difficult without the right connections to the government. Since land prices are so high in Hanoi, real estate speculation has created some empty and unfinished housing projects for which buyers are desperately wanted (Waibel 2010, 12). Only in the last years several large construction projects have emerged that are funded from abroad (see Waibel 2011, 54). An example is the Ciputra West-Lake International City, which was developed by one of the largest Indonesian land developers, Ciputra Group. However, until 2005 it was the only joint venture that was largely financed through a foreign investor (Waibel 2011, 53).

The form of buildings has moved away from standardised designs to more individualism. In a survey conducted in 1992, out of 170 newly constructed houses only 20 had actual building permits and hardly anyone adhered to the existing building standards and height restrictions (Zhu 2012, 84). Hanoi's urban governance is rudimentary when it comes to implemented housing standards. As a consequence, neighbourhoods take all shapes and sizes with little consideration to the overall efficiency of the city. Quang and Kammeier characterised the housing developments as: "Spontaneous diversity and irregularity [...]" (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 383). Nonetheless some architectural designs are more popular than others. Many new houses are modelled after the elegant tube houses

and French-style architectural elements are a common decorative theme (Waibel 2010, 11). French-style houses are especially popular in the high-end, luxury housing sector (Han and Vu 2008, 1109).

Hanoi's urban fabric is becoming denser in all areas of the city. Villages that were predominantly agricultural wards are redeveloped into high-rise packed housing areas, especially in the northern periphery (Horen 2005, 168). Single-storey housing in the inner city is also replaced by higher density buildings. In the suburbs, however, houses still range between two and five storeys (Horen 2005, 171). The inner city is becoming increasingly dense with new expensive housing. High-end luxury apartments in the inner city are especially valuable, because they can be leased to foreigners.

8.4.5 Architectural heritage

Already since the 1990 master plan, protection of the city's historic areas was important to the municipality of Hanoi (Horen 2005, 170). In 1995, Hanoi authorities decided to protect and renovate the Ancient and French Quarter (Parenteau et al. 1995, 166). Currently, the conservation decisions are reported to the Hanoi People's Committee, which is the highest authority in Hanoi. Hence, conservation of the old areas is a priority policy. However, the conservation process is difficult, because not all residents and private investors report to the conservation department (ADB 2008, 43).

Figure 3.8 Ba Dinh Hall, the former National Assembly building, was demolished in 2008 (Wikipedia 2007)

A good example of the importance of national heritage in Hanoi is Ba Dinh Hall or the State Assembly building (see Figure 8.8). The Soviet-style building was used for the National Assembly, but was demolished in 2008, to make room for a larger structure. Due to archaeological findings on the construction site, remains of the ancient Thang Long Palace, the project was delayed. The uncovered ruins are going to be embedded into a redesign of Ba Dinh Square (Logan 2009, 91).

Most renovation and conservation is going on in connection with tourism and commercial development. With cooperation from private developers some areas in the old quarter have already undergone gentrification and space has been restored for commercial and tourist activities (ADB 2008, 37). Especially areas close to Hoan Kiem Lake are becoming fashionable areas for shopping and dining among Hanoi residents and visitors (Horen 2005, 165). Logan notes that the Ancient Quarter is not an important heritage item because of the architecture, but rather because of the lifestyle (see Figure 8.9). Most of the original architecture was destroyed in 1870 or later in the 1940s, and the

better part of what remains was built after the 1930s. Instead, the Ancient Quarter is a bustling "cultural landscape" that needs to be preserved in order to maintain the charm of the area (Logan 1995, 338).

Figure 8.9 Ancient Quarter in modern Hanoi (Horen 2005, 167)

Already in 1995 the Ancient Quarter has attracted foreign and domestic visitors, because of its brisk multi-purpose character. Local residents live, work and manufacture traditional goods there. Other researchers agree that the "community structure in the central districts is seen as conductive to tourism" (Parenteau et al. 1995, 163). Still, the character of the Ancient Quarter has already changed, due to the informal construction and extensions made by residents and shop owners (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). The biggest threat to historic houses in old Hanoi are, in effect, eager and affluent residents who convert the buildings according to their own needs and profit interests (Logan 1995, 335). Additionally, some of the tube houses are falling into disrepair, because of the ownership structure. Due to state-ownership the tenants are discouraged to finance the repair works that are necessary (Horen 2005, 165).

Recently, more attention is being paid to boosting tourism in areas besides the Ancient Quarter. Craft villages around Hanoi are frequently turned into tourist attractions (VietnamNet Bridge 2012a). The master plan for Hanoi 2020 emphasises the potential of the French Quarter in attracting international tourism and business. The French-style villas dating from the 19th century are very popular with embassies and international firms and are being restored by the national and international new users (Parenteau et al. 1995, 168). Hanoi municipal authorities have limited funds to restore the houses in the old areas; therefore a lot is financed through leasing buildings to foreign investors who covet centrally located spaces for business activities. As a consequence, the function of individual buildings is often changed from residential to retail or office space. Nearly 90 percent of the renovated buildings in the Ancient and French Quarter have been dedicated to commercial, service or administrative functions (Parenteau et al. 1995, 172).

Both the Ancient and the French Quarter are excellent areas for commercial activities, because of their central location within the city (ADB 2008, 33). Land prices in central locations are skyrocketing and therefore developers are vying for land to redevelop, which is a threat to conserving local heritage. Some historic buildings have already been destroyed in order to make room for more modern houses. Often developers try to integrate existing cultural heritage into new, high density residential and office buildings in the city centre. Thus some heritage structures have been damaged (Horen 2005, 171). Nonetheless, conservation efforts are not in vain. Many former residential structures are undergoing "commercial gentrification" (Quang and Kammeier 2002, 384). Quang and Kammeier further argue that an important advantage of "commercial gentrification" is that the architectural character of the area remains intact. In order to preserve the natural views and to ensure that buildings fit in with their neighbouring structures, there is a five-storey construction limit in the old parts of Hanoi, especially around Hoan Kiem Lake (Logan 1995, 335). In 1996, the Golden Hanoi Hotel project on the shores of the lake was cancelled due to public protest, because the hotel was planned for 11 storeys. The population was very concerned for the aesthetics of the scenery around Hoan Kiem Lake (Thomas 2002, 1619). There are other examples where economic and conservation interests were balanced. The restoration of the French-colonial Metropole Hotel, for instance, was a conservation success (Logan 1995, 339).

PART III: RESULTS

9. Comparison

9.1 Socialist Beijing vs. socialist Hanoi

After having described socialist and post-socialist Beijing and Hanoi in detail, the purpose of this chapter is to compare the two and to clarify where potential differences appear.

The previous chapters have proven that there are elements of the socialist city in both Beijing and Hanoi. Quang and Kammeier (2002, 379) drew the same conclusion: “As a result of the centrally planned economy during the more than thirty years till 1985, the urban spatial structure of Hanoi developed features similar to those of Soviet or Chinese cities”.

The main reason for the existence of socialist legacy in the urban form and function is that China and Vietnam have both experienced socialist revolutions in the 1940s. The communist parties that came to power aimed at transforming the city into a place where society was equal and everybody had a place to live and work. Due to previous lack of experience this was achieved with the help of Soviet experts of urban planning and architecture, who exported ideas from Moscow all over the world. Both the Chinese and Vietnamese communist governments accepted the help form the SU and utilised the imported knowledge to create a Chinese and Vietnamese socialist urban society. Especially, the monumental architecture attests to Soviet influence. While it is important to keep in mind that Soviet advisors greatly influenced the planning traditions in China and Vietnam, Hanoi and Beijing are still very diverse. External circumstances as well as local culture and traditions created different environments that constrained the socialist urban development and thus naturally lead to two different cities.

Beijing's development suffered from waves of radical Maoist policy-making, which often favoured the countryside and even led to de-urbanisation. Furthermore, at intervals the political and economic catastrophes killed large parts of the population and slowed down the economy, therefore urban centres such as Beijing could not flourish.

Hanoi's development in contrast, was plagued by wartime austerity as well as long-lasting bombing attacks. The VCP was often forced to be pragmatic in its socialist development agenda to ensure the well-being of the population during the war. For example, it accepted the existence of some small private businesses and private homeownership in order to provide goods for the population that the state could not supply. At the end of the war, the costly national reunification took away resources from further redeveloping Hanoi's urban area according to socialist principles. Funding from the SU was instead poured into industrial development of the South. Moreover, due to international economic sanctions Vietnam did not manage to sufficiently recover from the war until after *doi moi*.

The five analysed inner city elements (as explained in Chapter 6.4) in this thesis can be found in both cities, albeit in varying degrees. By and large they were all present in Beijing and Hanoi, but the aforementioned factors produced some specificities in their application. Figure 9.1 below highlights the main disparities of those elements in socialist Beijing and socialist Hanoi in bold script.

Table 9.1 Summary of main differences and similarities in socialist Beijing and Hanoi (differences highlighted in bold script)

Beijing	Hanoi
City centre	
• one centre around Tiananmen • unites political, administrative and cultural functions • Tiananmen Square is a large open space for ceremonial purposes • Tiananmen is the space of power for the CCP • only limited state-controlled commercial function around Wangfujing	• **no one clear centre** • Ba Dinh has political and cultural functions, the Ancient and French Quarter administrative and cultural centre functions • Ba Dinh Square is a large open space for ceremonial purposes • Ba Dinh Square is the space of power for the VCP • state outlets in the Ancient Quarter, but **a few private traders were tolerated**
Industrial sites	
• built on free land in the near periphery initially east and south of the Old City • **no specialised industrial zones** except a few for heavy industry • from the Great Leap Forward on sites were spread **out all over the city and bound to *danwei*** • old sites were not recycled but left alone	• **built far outside the city close to transport routes** during the war, later 9 large new zones were built in the periphery of the centre • **highly specialised**, but small industrial zones • **production sites were widely dispersed, in order to avoid agglomerations** • industry was always settled on new land, old sites were abandoned
Micro-district	
• very pervasive as urban planning unit • **self-reliant administrative unit** • average size of 20,000 residents and more • **walled compounds** • **industrial production sites, residences and service facilities were combined in the *danwei* complex** • all *danwei* provided similar basic services and were not specialised	• planning unit, but **only 15 micro-districts** were built • little administrative properties • average size around 15,000 to 20,000 people • open complexes with narrow streets, where **illegal construction filled in open spaces** • workplaces were mostly close by, but not integrated • **poor service provision**
Residential buildings	
• public housing arranged in the *danwei* • standardised, prefabricated buildings introduced in the late 1950s • Soviet-style concrete blocks • built in a ring around the Old City • cheap quality materials • average height around 7 or 8 floors	• **too little public housing−instead illegal self-built constructions** • **prefabricated buildings only in the 1970s** • Soviet concrete block-design • to the south and southwest of the old areas • cheap materials not made for hot, humid weather • 5 storeys, but height increased with prefabrication techniques
Architectural heritage	
• break with historic principles on Tiananmen Sq. • mostly left alone, little maintenance • restored when it fitted ideological purposes • the function of historic buildings was mainly altered to housing • no state funds for restoration	• new Soviet design on Ba Dinh Square • mostly left alone, but given new functions • only embraced when it fit with political ideology • heritage repurposed as housing • no funds for alterations

City centre

Due to historic context Hanoi had three central areas, whereas the centre in Beijing was marked by the Forbidden City. The communist parties each chose their own new centre: Tiananmen Square and Ba Dinh Square. Both city centres were redeveloped according to socialist ideals in order to reflect the power of the communist parties. From the buildings we can deduce that the CCP had more financial means for the redevelopment, while at in the meantime the VCP was busy with warfare. War caused another difference in central Hanoi and Beijing. In contrast to Beijing, Hanoi used to have a small number of private entrepreneurs, even under socialism because of wartime supply problems. The Hanoi authorities had to tolerate some measure of private commerce, in order to guarantee the supply of goods to the population.

Industrial zones

Industrial zones were more specialised in Hanoi than in Beijing, where industrial production was divided among the self-sufficient *danwei*. However, Hanoi's industrial production facilities during the war were rather small and spread out over the city, in order to hide them from bomb attacks. Large industrial zones in Hanoi were only set up after the end of the American War.

Micro-districts

The micro-district concept has substantially influenced the urban planning in Chinese and Vietnamese cities, which both show signs of what McGee calls "'cellular' landscapes" (McGee 2009, 235). The micro-district was more pervasive in Beijing than Hanoi. The Chinese micro-district had a unique spatial feature in that it was surrounded by a wall. In Hanoi only 15 complexes were built, because large agglomerations of housing were mostly avoided during the war. Furthermore, the apartment blocks in the micro-districts were inadequate for the hot and humid climate as well as the size of Vietnamese families. Often the open spaces in the micro-districts were filled in with self-built housing in order to provide more living space. Moreover, Beijing's micro-districts were self-sufficient neighbourhoods, where industry and residence were combined, whereas Hanoi's neighbourhood units were merely close to industrial sites and by no means self-sufficient. Some of them did not even include basic service facilities. In sum, the application of Hanoi's micro-districts resembles that of the SU more closely than that of China.

Residential buildings

The form of the residential structures that were put up in both cities during the socialist eras were mostly homogenous block-shape concrete buildings. The main difference in residential development in Beijing and Hanoi is that there was less public housing available in Hanoi, because the state could not afford a lot of construction during the war. Therefore, people built their own informal settlements. The state had to tolerate them because it could not provide an alternative, as mass-produced prefabricated housing only reached Hanoi at the end of the American War with the help of SU engineers.

Architectural heritage

Conservation was not high on the agenda of either the CCP or the VCP. Both eliminated symbols of the past when necessary and appropriated former imperial or colonial heritage to their own needs. The

function of many former buildings was changed to suit socialist needs. Owing to financial constraints the historic parts of the city were mostly left alone. Due to housing shortages, Hanoi's tube houses and Beijing's courtyard houses became severely overcrowded. Consequently, they were damaged and their courtyards filled in.

9.2 Post-socialist Beijing vs. post-socialist Hanoi

To be able to answer the research question we also have to compare post-socialist Beijing with post-socialist Hanoi. Despite the slight differences in the socialist urban legacies of Beijing and Hanoi, their post-socialist development is fairly alike—similarities clearly outweigh the differences.

The market reforms in both countries have had similar effects on the urban landscape. Especially the revival of private enterprise and commerce has revived the cities and demanded new forms and functions of buildings and public space. Beijing and Hanoi's formerly quiet and grey socialist space is undergoing commercialisation and gentrification. Both cities now have specialised CBDs, industrial development zones, shopping and entertainment complexes, social stratification and gated communities as well as heritage tourist activities. Indeed, Beijing has more commercialised areas such as CBDs and mall districts than Hanoi because it is larger and reforms have been in place longer.

The end of centralised planning has produced another common feature in post-socialist Beijing and Hanoi. Now, instead of one central authority, a multitude of spatial producers has emerged that influences the urban environment. Foreign investors, large real estate companies, and municipalities all have some power over the development of space. Even the public, which is rarely consulted, has the means to partly shape spatial outcomes by public protest.

Moreover, both cities are heavily influenced by external, global market pressures. Hence, urban planners in Beijing and Hanoi aim to create modern cities that are increasingly marked as global consumer spaces and can compete with other global cities. Both cities have started banning street traders because they give streets an untidy and backward look. Beijing and Hanoi are thus increasingly acting like other large urban centres around the world. For instance becoming a knowledge-based city with a strong creative industry is getting more important. Also, in the spirit of many cities around the world, China and Vietnam are keen on labelling their cities sustainable and environmentally friendly (McGee 2009, 242).

These reasons are just a selection of the forces that induce changes in the spatial environment of Beijing and Hanoi. The main differences in the post-socialist urban development of Beijing and Hanoi are resulting from a different approach to economic reforms, in particular land reform. In China land can be leased for up to 99 years, whereas in Vietnam this period is only up to 70 years. Moreover, the land market in Hanoi is distorted due to the aforementioned two-tier pricing system, in which developers pay fixed prices to the state, but then resell the land use rights at market prices. Some state-affiliated enterprises or institutions do not even pay rent or only very little of it to the government. This has consequences for the location new residential developments as well as the recycling of old industrial sites.

Table 9.2 Summary of main differences and similarities in post-reform Beijing and Hanoi (differences highlighted in bold)

Beijing	Hanoi
City centre	
• Tiananmen Square and its surroundings is still the political, administrative and cultural centre • new commercial functions in the central areas • Tiananmen is still a space of political power used for spectacle • Tiananmen is increasingly used for leisure and tourist activities • several commercial and administrative centres in form of new CDBs	• Ba Dinh retains political and cultural functions, the Ancient Quarter has cultural and commercial functions and the French Quarter commercial and administrative functions • commercial activity all over the centre • Ba Dinh Square remains a space of power • leisure and tourism activities on Ba Dinh • polycentric development with several commercial centres
Industrial sites	
• moved to the urban fringe • specialised industrial development zones and industrial parks • located close to major transport routes • old sites on valuable inner city land are recycled and redeveloped into office and residential space or used by the creative industry	• new industry built outside the city on still cheap and undeveloped land • industrial development zones in the suburbs • **old industry is only slowly moving out of the inner city as land rents are still subsidised** • few industrial sites have been redeveloped for cultural or commercial uses
Micro-district	
• not a planning tool anymore • not an administrative unit anymore • most walled *danwei* compounds have vanished • similar layout is applied to large residential developments i.e. gated communities • industrial and residential areas are separated • neighbourhoods are economically differentiated and specialised	• not used any more • some buildings of the micro-district development still exist • large scale housing developments in the suburbs often developed as community complexes • gated communities resemble the Soviet micro-district • industrial and residential areas are separated
Residential buildings	
• also private ownership and development • more diverse shapes and individual designs: skyscrapers, luxury villas and apartment blocks • densification through high-rises in the inner city, large-scale developments in the suburban areas • better amenities and higher quality building materials • mostly high-rise developments	• **little public housing built: instead expensive private housing remains empty** • more individual designs, French- and tube house style are popular • **self-construction is common** • **lax construction laws, private building extension usually illegal** • high-rises in the inner city, 2-5 storeys (suburbs)
Architectural heritage	
• cultural heritage important for nationalist and economic reasons • commercialisation of heritage sites • **preservation of the principle monuments** • height restrictions in the old city • **old courtyard houses are often demolished** for new high-rise developments • municipality has little money thus often private and foreign funds are used for restoration	• heritage preservation is a priority policy • conservation in connection with tourism and commercial development • building height restrictions in the old city • commercial gentrification of old houses • functions of houses are changed from housing to commercial space • little public funds, but foreign and local enterprises restore colonial villas as commercial space

In Figure 9.2 the main differences between post-socialist Hanoi and post-socialist Beijing are again highlighted in bold script. As can be easily seen, there are not as many differences as in the socialist development.

City centre

The functions of the city centres in Beijing and Hanoi after the market reforms have stayed the same. Tiananmen and Ba Dinh Square have remained symbols of political power and continue to embody the power of the communist party because the political situation has not really changed since the reforms in either country. Yet, at the same time the sacrality of Tiananmen and Ba Dinh Square has been encroached upon by the local population who increasingly use the large open squares for apolitical leisure purposes. Moreover, the two squares and their attractions such as the Mao and Ho Chi Minh Mausoleums have become important points of interest for visitors and tourists.

Other central areas besides Tiananmen and Ba Dinh Square have transformed into bustling commercial spaces. In Beijing the Wangfujing area was one of the first neighbourhoods to regain its commercial flair and transform into a sort of CBD, whereas in Hanoi the area around the French Quarter attracted the initial office space seekers. In both cities, however, it soon became obvious that the previous central areas could not perform all new business functions required. Thus several commercial, financial and leisure centres have grown around modern Beijing, which is now a poly-centric city. Hanoi is smaller and therefore more compact than Beijing. Nonetheless, Hanoi municipal authorities too are constructing alternative centres.

Industrial sites

While both cities still have a lot of industry, they are also experiencing de-industrialisation. Heavy industry has been replaced by lighter manufacturing and now also increasingly by the service industry. In Beijing a lot of industry is moving to the suburbs because of cheaper land rents and more space to expand. Urban planners have adopted zoning measures, which means that related industries are clustered into industrial development zones. Most former industrial plots in the central areas have been redeveloped as residential and commercial areas, while others have remained intact and been converted to serve the culture and service industry.

So far, industrial plots in Hanoi, in comparison, have mostly stayed in the vicinity of the centre. Due to state-subsidised land prices, industry can occupy valuable inner city land for free or for very cheap land rents and has no financial incentive to relocate. As a result, industry will usually only move out of the city if it needs space to expand. Still, there are a few unused industrial plots in Hanoi too. Yet, the government has not efficiently made use of these old industrial areas to form creative spaces for Hanoi's fairly lively art scene. This is a phenomenon that is already occurring in Beijing with the Art District 798 project or in Shanghai with the M50 area (Waibel 2011, 55).

Micro-district

By and large, the micro-district in its original function has vanished from the cityscapes of Beijing and Hanoi. It has been replaced with high-rise apartments and office space. Modern neighbourhoods do not provide all services, but are more specialised. Only the numerous gated community developments, which are mostly located in the suburbs, remind of the old communal lifestyle.

In Hanoi the few micro-districts built under socialism now simply are run-down concrete block-houses, unless they have been demolished. In Beijing, where the micro-district/ *danwei* concept had a more profound impact on urban spatial development under socialism, most of the complexes and their walls were torn down to make room for more compact housing developments. The few remaining compounds have rented space to private entrepreneurs and are accessible to the public. Modern Beijing does not retain the cell-like character it had during socialist times.

Residential buildings

Two features apply to the post-socialist form of residential buildings in Beijing and Hanoi: they have become taller and more diverse in design. Apart from these resemblances, the Vietnamese land laws have produced different land use patterns in this category as well. As can be seen when comparing Figure 9.1 to Figure 9.2, the lack of public housing has persisted in modern day Hanoi. Individual family-home construction, which has historic tradition, is still the logic alternative because apartments built by large private real-estate developers are usually geared for the upper middle class. Developers prefer high-end apartments because they need to compensate for the high price that they had to pay for the land-use right in Hanoi. Families plan and build their own homes on the edges of the inner city and the suburbs where land is still available and cheap. Recently, the authorities started addressing the problem of too little affordable housing in Hanoi, by forcing private developers to include cheaper apartment buildings in their projects. Private home development is thus much more common in Hanoi than in Beijing.

Architectural heritage

Beijing and Hanoi are both rich in architectural heritage and in the 1990s their city authorities have acknowledged the importance of maintaining this heritage. For example, Hanoi and Beijing municipalities have both introduced building height restrictions to preserve the character of their historic city areas. Neither city has sufficient funds to maintain all heritage areas on public money and therefore local and foreign private developers are often responsible for restoration.

Nevertheless, minor differences exist in their approach to conservation. Beijing is trying to maintain its numerous principle monuments, but it was very liberal when destroying minor structures, in particular courtyard houses, in order to free up land for higher and more modern buildings. Only in the last decade, has Beijing encouraged conservation of these areas, albeit through private developers and commercialisation of heritage sites. Hanoi city, in contrast, has a more comprehensive approach to heritage conservation and actively tries to preserve the character of its Ancient and French Quarters. On the one hand Hanoi has less principle monuments and on the other hand it has less money to demolish and redevelop old areas. In sum, however, Hanoi authorities in general seem more careful when it comes to conserving heritage.

To sum up, the market reforms had fairly similar effects on the socialist legacies of urban Hanoi and Beijing, especially on the form and distribution of buildings. There are however differences in the land use, resulting from the specificities of the Vietnamese land market.

10. Conclusion

This thesis has shown that Beijing and Hanoi have socialist urban legacies in their urban morphology. It has also proven that in their post-socialist era these legacies have been transforming in a comparable way. Reasons for this similar development are the analogous histories and reform paths of both countries, and the general production of space in a market economy. Subsequently, I would like to explain these conclusions in more detail.

First of all, it can be confirmed that Beijing and Hanoi both developed the qualities of a socialist city, despite different external and local circumstances. Therefore, my first hypothesis articulated in the Introduction is true: *Elements of the socialist city can be found in Beijing and Hanoi.*

A main reason why these similarities occurred is because Soviet urban planners brought their expertise to the redevelopment of both cities. Their knowledge had a lasting impact on urban planning in both countries, so that even when relations between the SU and China or Vietnam were interrupted the concepts remained. Ideas on urban planning spread through the international network of the SU and thus the socialist city as a framework applies to both, CEE and the former SU. This line of thought is not new, however, and has already been subject to research (see for example Myers 1994). Following this research, I assume that for countries at a low level of development with little previous experience in conceptual urban planning, the socialist city expertise made a more lasting impression on future planning approaches. Hanoi, for example, had already been in touch with traditional Chinese planning concepts as well as European ones under the French colonial administration before SU planners entered the process. Beijing, in contrast, had only been shaped by ancient cosmological Chinese urban planning ideas beforehand. After the communist revolution, the CCP wanted and needed the cityscape to change and therefore the then available Soviet expertise made a lasting impression. Going forward, it would be interesting to analyse which other countries outside the SU have been as deeply influenced by Soviet urban planning as China.

A further purpose of this thesis was to establish whether it is feasible to think about an East- and Southeast Asian manifestation of the post-socialist city. In this paper, I conclude that it makes sense to speak about post-socialist cities in East and Southeast Asia. Yet, the amount of socialist legacy that cities have in their urban fabric depends on the economic and political circumstances that were in place while a country was socialist. If the socialist government was occupied with war, famine, natural catastrophes, international economic sanctions or similar situations, comprehensive urban development was low on the national agenda. Interestingly, Hanoi has a fair amount of socialist legacy despite the wartime interruptions to its development.

Thus far, Beijing and Hanoi have proven that the post-socialist transformation of their socialist city elements is reasonably similar. Therefore the research question can be positively answered: *Yes, the transformation of socialist legacy in the urban environments in Beijing and Hanoi is similar.* Thus, also my second hypothesis could be confirmed.

Finally, the question why the transformations are similar remains. Possible reasons articulated in the third hypothesis were: *A) the related socialist history and a comparable reform path, and B) the demands of the market economy on the urban environment.*

As far as claim A) is concerned, we have already seen that Beijing and Hanoi were influenced by socialist ideology and imported ideas from the SU. China and Vietnam's reform paths are comparable, as other researchers have concluded and I have merely touched upon in passing in Chapter 6.2. The political state of affairs in China and Vietnam is similar in the way that the communist parties are still in power. This is also reflected in the public space in Beijing and Hanoi. Tiananmen and Ba Dinh Square are still spaces of power—the flag is raised every morning and parades take place regularly. Nevertheless, both spaces have become more accessible to the population than they used to be under socialism. Thus the reforms have produced similar outcomes for the two squares, i.e. more leisure visitors but political spectacle remains. However, while the general spirit of the Chinese and Vietnamese post-reform era may be alike, not all the details of economic reforms match. Vietnam's peculiar land law and the resulting distorted land market have created different spatial patterns in Hanoi's socialist legacy than in Beijing's.

As far as my research has touched upon the matter, claim B) is also true. Due to revived commercial and specialised service activity, post-socialist cities in a market economy need office space, leisure centres, retail space, hotels and similar facilities. Moreover, the globalised market economy has had a significant impact on urban Beijing and Hanoi. In order to attract foreign and domestic capital, both put considerable effort into becoming an internationally competitive city. So far, Beijing, which is larger and the capital city of the bigger country of the two, has been more successful in this endeavour. Therefore, while this thesis cannot, in all honesty, affirm that the urban needs of a market environment are the reason for similar transformations of socialist urban legacy around the world, it can definitely do so for Beijing and Hanoi.

An interesting future path of research in this respect would be to compare the transformations in East and Southeast Asia with the CEE experience. Unfortunately, the limited scope of this thesis does not allow for such further analysis. However, the post-socialist elements used in this paper could be used as the basis of a methodology to compare inner city redevelopment of former socialist cities across different geographical contexts. Indeed, if I ever write a PhD-thesis I would like to analyse this topic more extensively.

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12. Appendix

12.1 Abstract

This thesis concerns itself with the transformation of socialist into post-socialist space. It is based on the theoretical background that urban space is affected and produced by the political and socio-economic circumstances that it is embedded in. Consequently, the socialist central planning systems altered the urban environment to perform certain functions, thus leaving a socialist legacy behind. What is more, cities in former socialist urban countries have been exposed to market reforms for several decades. As a consequence, the form and function of the socialist urban legacy has been gradually transforming in order to meet the spatial demands of a market economy.

This post-socialist transformation has been widely researched in Central and Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union, but has been largely neglected in the Asian context. This research paper addresses this gap. Concretely, it tackles the question whether such a legacy in East and Southeast Asian cities exists at all and whether its transformations are alike or not.

The paper examines two cities that have experienced periods of socialist governance: Beijing, People's Republic of China and Hanoi, Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The method of research is a comparison using already existing literature as well as maps and photo sources. The analysis is done by examining how the form and function of five physical elements has changed in the reform period. These elements are the city centre, industrial sites, micro-districts, residential buildings and architectural heritage. These selected five inner city elements have been profoundly influenced by ideas and concepts of socialist cities and represent socialist urban legacy. The research then compares how the urban morphology and land use patterns of those elements have changed in the post-socialist period.

A result of the analysis is that the socialist city, as it is understood in Central and Eastern European urban development literature, also existed in Beijing and Hanoi. Furthermore, despite the different local context, this socialist legacy left in their urban fabrics is transforming in a fairly similar way in the post-reform period in Beijing and Hanoi, as far as the five examined elements are concerned. This is because of a shared history of socialist urban governance as well as a similar approach on reform in China and Vietnam. The differences in the post-socialist development mainly result from different land laws in the two countries.

Since Beijing's and Hanoi's post-socialist urban environment are comparable, other cities may be analysed in future using the same methodical framework. Eventually, the analysis in this thesis contributes to the wider question of whether the concept of a global post-socialist city exists or not.

12.2 German summary

Diese Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Transformation von sozialistischen in post-sozialistische Stadträume. Die Analyse basiert auf dem theoretischen Hintergrund, dass Stadtraum von politischen und sozioökonomischen Gegebenheiten beeinflusst und ‚produziert' wird. Ehemalige sozialistische, zentrale Planwirtschaften haben daher sozialistisches Erbe in der physischen Struktur von Städten hinterlassen. Solche Stadträume sind seit mehreren Jahrzehnten Marktmechanismen ausgesetzt. In der Folge passen sich Form und Funktion des sozialistischen Erbes den neuen räumlichen Anforderungen einer Marktwirtschaft langsam an. Postsozialistische Transformationen in den Städten Zentral- und Osteuropas, sowie in anderen Ländern der früheren Sowjetunion wurden bereits ausreichend erforscht, im asiatischen Kontext jedoch weitgehend vernachlässigt. Diese Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich daher mit der Frage, ob sozialistisches Erbe in den Stadträumen Ost- und Südostasiens existiert und ob seine postsozialistische Transformation von Stadt zu Stadt vergleichbar ist.

Die Analyse befasst sich mit den Fallbeispielen Beijing in der Volksrepublik China und Hanoi in der Sozialistischen Republik Vietnam, die beide sozialistischen Regierungsperioden ausgesetzt waren. Als Forschungsmethode wurde ein Vergleich der beiden Städte anhand bereits existierender Sekundärliteratur sowie Karten und Bildmaterial angewandt. In der Analyse wurde überprüft, wie sich die Form und Funktion von fünf Bauelementen in der Reformperiode verändert haben. Diese fünf Kategorien wurden ausgewählt, weil sie besonders von den Ideen und Konzepten der sozialistischen Stadtplanung geprägt waren. Konkret vergleicht die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit, wie sich Stadtstruktur und Landnutzungsmuster dieser Elemente in der postsozialistischen Periode verändert haben.

Ein Hauptergebnis der Forschung ist, dass das Konzept der sozialistischen Stadt, so wie es in Zentral- und Osteuropa verstanden wird, auch in Beijing und Hanoi existierte. Dieses sozialistische Erbe verwandelt sich in beiden Städten in ähnlicher Weise, insoweit das anhand der fünf analysierten Elemente feststellbar ist. Diese Ähnlichkeit ergibt sich einerseits auf Grund einer analogen Vorgeschichte mit sozialistischen Stadtplanungsprinzipien und andererseits auf Grund vergleichbarer wirtschaftlicher und politischer Reformansätze in China und Vietnam.

Aus der Tatsache, dass Beijing und Hanoi in diesem Zusammenhang gut miteinander vergleichbar sind, lässt sich schließen, dass man auch andere Städte anhand des hier verwendeten methodischen Rahmenwerks vergleichen könnte. Die Forschung in dieser Masterarbeit trägt somit zur übergeordneten Frage bei, ob das Konzept der ‚sozialistischen Stadt' globale Gültigkeit besitzt.

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