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To my aunt Annemarie Murphy

and the other Hirzberger sisters, Brigitte and Trude.

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Abbreviations

AC Army Commander

ADF Arab Deterrence Force

AFL Army of Free Lebanon

CAO Communist Action Organisation

CND Committee for National Dialogue

DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

FLA Free Lebanon Army

FNPPF Front of National and Progressive Parties and Forces

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

HISC Higher Islamic Shi'ite Council

IDF Israeli Defence Forces

LAF Lebanese Armed Forces

LCP Lebanese Communist Party

LNM Lebanese National Movement

LNRF Lebanese National Resistance Front

MNF Multinational Force

MENA Middle East and North Africa

NLP National Liberation Party

SAAP Socialist Arab Action Party

SSNP Syrian Social Nationalist Party

PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation

PSP Progressive Socialist Party

SLA South Lebanese Army

UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

Chapter 1

Introduction

Geographically, Lebanon has always been a buffer state between Europe and Asia. Historically the country was located between the European empires and the Ottoman Empire. Today it is in the vicinity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore, the country is - to a certain extent - affected by the Syrian civil war. As a result, it can be seen that the Lebanese ethno-political structure is often influenced by conflicts surrounding the Lebanese territory. As a matter of fact, political groups inside Lebanon act as proxies for bigger actors like for the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran, the USA or France to name but a few. The basis upon which these ethnic groups inside Lebanon are mobilised can be traced back to various elements of the countries geographical, economical as well as socio-political history. These very historical developments constitute the uniqueness of Lebanon and the country's history shows the constant involvement of foreign powers in Lebanese internal affairs.

1.1 Introducing fragments

In the introduction to his early analysis of the first couple of years of the Lebanese civil war, David Schiller, a German political scientist and journalist, wrote that

> a great deal of the attempts to explain [the civil war] depleted themselves in schemes inappropriate for the Near East region like ‚left or right-wing', ‚imperialistic-progressive', ‚reactionary-revolutionary' and ‚communistic-democratic'. Some mentioned the antagonism between Christians' and Muslims' and illustrated an erroneous image of a religious conflict by doing so. Other justifications of the events [of the civil war] accused Zionist and imperialist forces of racketeering.[1] (Schiller 1979: 10; remarks LW)

Today, more than 30 years after Schiller wrote these introducing lines, these dichotomising dynamics can be found in a considerable amount of publications on non-western conflicting societies (just as on western societies). In order to go beneath the surface of vacuous and debilitating analysis, only an interdisciplinary approach that conceptualises social formations, not only along confessional lines (but introduces categories like class, identity, ethno-nationality, aso.) can grasp social and/ or societal transformations, and subsequently explain the roots of upheaval. Analyses - also regarding modern conflicts - has to take historical backgrounds into account, multi-perspectively highlight the transformation of

[1] Original quote: „[...] viele der bisher geleisteten Erklärungsversuche erschöpften sich in für den Nahen Osten so unpassenden Schemata wie ‚links-rechts', ‚imperialistisch-progressiv', ‚reaktionär-revolutionär' und ‚kommunistisch-demokratisch'. Andere sprachen von einem christlich-islamischen Gegensatz und vermittelten das falsche Bild eines Religionskrieges. Wieder andere Rechtfertigungen der Ereignisse beschuldigten zionistische und imperialistische Kräfte dunkler Machenschaften." (Schiller 1979: 10).

political economy and the social fabric in order to avoid the construction of monocausal simplifications of highly complex social processes.

To understand conflicts between various social/ societal actors within states is one of today's central issues, not at least to better frame the upheavals following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on 4^{th} January 2011 in Tunis. For this work, it is important not to get entangled with an understanding of nationalism disguised in ethnic categories that is being trapped in historical lines of tradition in order to be able to critically assess social as well as political conflicts (cp. Werz 2000: 6).

In the beginning of the 1990s, after the Lebanese society was widely fragmented in the aftermath of the civil war, a distinct national identity was out of reach while the consensus that brought peace to the whole country „was predicated on a created or constructed myth – Lebanese nationalism" (Hovsepian 2008: 36). After the civil war, the confessional element of Lebanon's political structure became, in fact, much more problematic then it was before the war started in the mid-1970s. At the beginning of the 1990s, political-confessionalism inhabited a greater social sphere, subsequently holding a stronger position in society as it did before the war. Ethno-political communities became a source of collective solidarity (cp. Kippenberg 2008: 98). Emerging ethno-political communities in Lebanon are integrally linked with external actors, may the reason be religious belief, common ethnic identity, security or economic interests or whatsoever. The political groups of Lebanon's political structure after gaining independence have been embedded in regional and global spheres of influence, which are not only polarising the Lebanese society, but constantly reproducing a fragmented landscape of consolidated social formations. These formations have been influenced by external actors, especially since a process of modernisation and globalisation, injected by Western capitalism in the mid-19^{th} century. In light of the upheavals, protests, economical ruptures of recent years and the present situation in the Arab world with its peculiar social fabric, socio-economic setting and polit-economical history, Lebanon can not be detached from ongoing transformations. The bottom line being that Lebanese social formations, however determined, are not (and have never really been) isolated from the outside. It is most likely that for the future of Lebanon, this will also not be the case.

> The Lebanese people have rarely succeeded in confronting foreign intervention with national unity. Sadly, national unity is as elusive a goal as it has ever been. (Abukhalil 2008: 267)

An essential externally determined fracture concerning the present situation is the Sunni-Shia divide, which has been aggravating since 2005. Furthermore, the involvement of external actors in Lebanese politics constantly presents an important factor in internal affairs (cp. Abukhalil 2008; El Husseini 2012: 202*f.*).

Like Ashutosh Varschney (2002) suggests for the case of India, the point of departure for a deeper understanding of the roots of social fault lines (e.g. ethno-national animosities) lies in the very moment when peaceful coexistence between different ethnic groups turns into a series of agitations between them. Given the amount of literature that has been published on the subject of the Lebanese political system, its confessional parties and the outstanding influence of external actors, it is absolutely necessary to look into aspects of the Lebanese history that are largely under-represented in the scientific literature.

On this account, the role of capitalism and the transformation of socio-economic settings in the aftermath of the construction of the Lebanese nation succeeding the adoption of a capitalistically influenced conception of nationalism need to be stressed. Furthermore, the role of Lebanon's civil society concerning the question of national identity has to be assessed in order to highlight an alternative to the image of Lebanon as a country inhabited by various ethno-political groups that predominantly exist within their rigid microcosms that bounce against each other every now and then, much like billiard balls. Subsequently, the notion of interaction between these groups forecloses any analysis below the level of these microcosms.

1.2 Structure and content of the thesis

The complexities of the topic discussed in this thesis will - to a certain extent - also be reflected by the structure of the thesis. The two integral parts of the thesis are a methodological-theoretical part on the one side, and a thematic-analytical part on the other.

Starting with the methodological-theoretical part in chapters 2 and 3, the methodology applied throughout the thesis and the theoretical approaches that will be used are depicted. The methodology applied is based on literature work and concerned with the Lebanese socio-economic history with the purpose to get a better understanding of the influences of capitalism on a traditional ethno-confessional equilibrium and the development of the Lebanese nation-state. Throughout the thesis interviews conducted in Beirut in 2011 will also be incorporated. The interview excerpts will support the argumentation of the thesis in an illustrating manner throughout the whole thesis. The theoretical complex emphasises theoretical approaches of nationalism, national identity, ethno-nationalism (and its links with social classes) as well as civil society. These concepts will then be further used in the thematic-analytical part of the thesis.

In chapter 4, the country's history, with a special focus on the socio-economic dimension, will be depicted. The processes and structures that shaped the social landscape of Lebanon over the centuries (starting from the Ottoman era to the First World War) are going to

be stressed in order to get a better understanding of the traditional social structures. The Lebanese socio-economic and socio-political history will be emphasised from section 4.2 to 4.5. Moreover, the specific nature of the Lebanese political structure (especially the political model of consociationalism) and the „cantonisation" of ethno-confessional identity (that means the shift in locality of an traditional ethno-confessional equilibrium) are stressed throughout this chapter.

Chapter 5 then goes into detail about the lines of ethno-confessional differentiation and the subsequent establishment of fragmented ethno-nationalisms. Throughout the chapter the „modernisation" of traditional social fabrics will be depicted in order to demystify the role of confessionalism in shaping the Lebanese political structure. Therefore I will focus on the transformation of certain political, social and economical structures of the Ottoman system. Contextually, one section will focus on the determinants for political confessionalism in post-civil war Lebanon (e.g. the Ta'if Accord) and incorporate a critique on the political model of consociationalism. Another aspect of this chapter will be attributed to the Lebanese (national) identity and to (historical) Arab/ Lebanese nationalism in order to better understand the foundation of „modern" Lebanese national identities. Additionally, major attention will be given to the country's ethno-national nexus which is produced through transformations of traditions and the merging of social and political confessionalism. The end of this chapter will be an assessment of the relationship between civil society and ethno-nationalism.

Since the thematic-analytical part of this thesis covers the Lebanese history until the beginning of the 1990s, chapter 6 will address some important developments of recent years. This chapter will contextualise some findings of chapters 4 and 5 with developments of more recent years. The aim of this chapter is to understand that Lebanon today is facing „similar" challenges as in the earlier years of independence. In this regard, the Ta'if Accord can be seen as the latest one of many agreements that manifested ethno-political structures over the past decades.

Chapter 2

Conceptual clarifications

2.1 General research focus

This thesis proposes to contribute to the discussion about the Lebanese political system and its social formations. Specifically, I will outline the changing relationship between socio-economic foundations, meaning the augmentation of a traditionally social structure based on confessional identity with a modern class consciousness, and the transformation from a traditional social hierarchy based on a confessional equilibrium towards institutionalised ethno-national politics throughout Lebanon's modern history. In doing so, I am going to emphasise historical aspects that are fundamental to this process on one hand, while conceptualising ethnicity as a social relationship located between ideological formations of nationalism, group identity and economic realities that are emerging from the „logic of capitalism".

Turkmen-Dervisoglu (2012) draws a picture of Lebanon's possibilities and obstacles in terms of what Lebanese nationalism means in a country where politics are highly confessionalised. In Lebanon, developments towards a distinct national identity are strongly linked to a fortification of ethnic identities and accompanied by an increased politicisation of ethnicity. Hypothetically it can be argued that the Lebanese confessional system prevents the development of a distinct Lebanese nationalism in a process of mutual exclusion (cp. Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2012). In the words of Hamzeh (2004: 143), „[t]he ineffectiveness of Lebanon's confessional system is attributed to a paradox inherent in the system itself." Stemming from a historical dimension of Lebanon's political system (which will be extensively outlined in chapter 4), „[s]ectarian loyalties have constantly undermined the democratic aspect of the system, and accordingly the nation-state building model was transformed into sectarian regional loyalty" (Hamzeh 2004: 144). Here, Hezbullah's political rhetoric can serve as an example by showing the exclusive dimension of the party's understanding of the Lebanese nation:

> The national unity that Hizbullah preaches is one where internal dialogue and discussion are suppressed in favour of the party's own views about the necessity and the aims of the resistance in Palestine (...) Hizbullah's national unity includes only those who agree with its views about Palestine, and its notion of unity excludes a significant part of the Lebanese population. (Hoigilit 2007: 132*f.* cited in Wärn 2010: 131)

Particularly true for the Lebanese context is that „[r]eligious nationalism [or ethno-nationalism] challenges the sociological imagination. It requires that we think anew. It forces us to rethink the duality of social and cultural, [...] to recognize the heterology of institutions as the basis of politics and collective agency" (Friedland 2001: 149; remarks LW). By building on Roger Friedland's argument, as well as by accepting the unique context in which

ethnicity became politicised throughout Lebanese history, one is able to understand the „blending [of] nationalism and religion into a theoretical theory of action" (Ehrlich 2007: 24) that subsequently reflects into individual life environments. At this point it is important to understand that the Lebanese socio-political structures, as they developed out of the long period of Ottoman rule, as well as their recalibration during the integration (and transformation) of the local market into the modern world market after the granting of independence and during the civil war, have and are continuing to fragment the Lebanese society along ethnic lines. Ethnicity, then, can be understood as a complex setting, incorporating aspects of identity, religion and ancestral tradition while the concept itself institutionalises social relationships. Hence, ethnicity becomes a frame of reference for every individual who is actively engaging in social life. Contextually, ethnic groups touch upon the question of legitimate sovereign power, represented by the Lebanese state. In order to accept the state (the sovereign) as a nation resembling individual identities, which are highly politicised under the banner of ethnicity, an inclusive definition of the Lebanese nation would subsequently be necessary to develop a distinct Lebanese nationalism. Particularly since the mid 1980s, ethnic groups have successfully replaced the Lebanese state in exclusively defining what national identity in a Lebanese context means to them (and their respective communities). As a result of this process various perceptions of national identity, tailored to their respective ethnic foundations, can to be found in Lebanon. In respect to the juridical aspects involved, Turkmen-Dervisoglu (2012) understands that

> one's sect is almost equivalent to one's nation. Every sect has the right to regulate its own rituals (wedding, divorce, baptism) according to respective religious beliefs, and this 'autonomy' makes the formation of a broad national identity much harder. The stratified structure of the current education system also helps perpetuate sectarian autonomy as a primary tool in shaping people's identities and feeding prejudices towards other sects.

Right after the signing of the Ta'if Accord in 1990, the various ethno-national militias justification to act as the ultimate holders of power (while relying on it within their constituencies), was transformed into a consociational political model. This transformation was accompanied by a shift in acceptance for, and justification of the exclusiveness of power generated by the ethnic groups (militias which later on turned into parties). Since the debate about national identity and/ or unity has an outstanding tradition in Lebanon, it became politicised by the various ethnic groups when their social standing empowered by traditional hierarchies somewhat collapsed under the banner of consociationalism. They then started mobilising their constituencies along political topics in a democracy context, instead of e.g. broaching the issue of security as a central theme, as it was done during the „cantonisation" of Lebanese territory in the late stages of the civil war.

In order to be able to comprehend the socio-political transformations that were imposed on the Lebanese society, and thus on their traditional ethno-confessional equilibrium that has

existed over the centuries in this particular region, and how it changed the perception of politics itself, is open to ample analyses. The constructivist theoretician Benedict Anderson re-adjusts the understanding of these transformation processes at this point. For Anderson the „socio-political grammar" that was imposed on former European colonies (e.g.) while they were peripherally integrated (or at least semi-integrated) into Western terminological categorisation of social processes generated a shift of traditionally grown social structures due to - not exclusively, but also - a rupture of the semantic meanings of traditional social categorisation (cp. Anderson 2000: 42-57). When the European powers entered Lebanon, they took along not only colonial armies and administrators but also conceptions and ideas which until then were alien to local inner-society interactions but imposed in a hegemonial manner, however. The technical aspects of this process (that stretched over centuries, beginning in the mid-19^{th} century) involved the introduction of a census or elections (e.g.), thus building the basis of the establishment of the Lebanese nation itself.

Key to this analysis is the understanding that the national conceptualisation the Lebanese state itself is producing and keeps reproducing ethno-national identities. In line with Hamzeh's (2004: 143) argument that „[t]he ineffectiveness of Lebanon's confessional system is attributed to a paradox inherent in the system itself", the substantial questions of interest have to be aimed at the system itself, the processes that influenced it, and its appendant socio-political transformations.

2.2 Research hypothesis

Throughout my thesis, I focus on answering research question upon the basis of the following hypothesis:

- The intervention of European powers, the subsequent imposition of capitalism, and the integration of the local Lebanese market into the world market destroyed the foundations of the confessional equilibrium between the Lebanese ethnic groups.
- By adopting a nationalist conception when gaining independence, the foundation to constantly reproduce ethno-national aspirations was being paved.
- Ethno-national social formations in Lebanon first came to prominence during and after the civil war (especially after the second half of the 1980s). The roots of agitation between the ethnic groups stem from this period of the civil war when the ethno-national militias entrenched themselves in territorially confined cantons. During this time, the way to articulate ethnic interests has programmatically moved from a political to an economical mode (thereby transforming the modes of production).

2.3 Core research questions

The following research questions should be answered throughout my thesis:

1. Did the construction of Lebanon as a *nation, based on a capitalist conception,* contribute to a transformation of socio-political structures and processes?

   a) If so, how is Lebanese national identity conceived by the Lebanese?

   b) If so, can ethno-nationalism be understood as an nationalist-capitalist peculiarity?

   c) If so, which processes and frameworks shape(d) Lebanese national identity along ethnic lines?

2. What role does the civil society play as a trans-confessional/ -ethnic element in Lebanon? In other words: Can the Lebanese civil society serve as a carrier of inclusive identity aspects?

2.4 Methodological approaches

Key to this analysis is an evaluation of Lebanon's socio-economic history in order to clarify the influence of capitalist developments on the country's society from the mid 19^{th} century onwards. The nation itself will therefore be understood as one possible conception of the state [2] that is deeply involved in a capitalist process.[3] Thus, the very conception of the state as an capitalist economical unit is understood to have a significant socio-economic and political leverage on social formations, and influences the transformation of new ones. Hence, on the one side, I will therefore focus on the country's socio-economic history, based on a solid theoretical base (e.g. national identity, ethno-nationalism, civil society, aso.). On the other side, I will use excerpts of interviews conducted on a research trip in Lebanon in February 2011.

[2] This is done in order to distinguish nationalism from various theoretical approaches outlined in Hroch (2005: 13-47).

[3] Ayubi (1995: 41) notes that „Capitalism [...] is the first mode of production that is global in scope: it now envelops practically the entire world - with its exchange systems (relations of production), if not its mode of production. [...] Thus whereas various modes of production may be articulated with each other in countries of the periphery, and as certain sectors within these are in turn articulated with capitalism in ‚core' countries, the world system is now, on the whole, one big market subject to the capitalist relations of production and laws of exchange."

2.4.1 Critical review of socio-economic history

When working with fragmented societies (e.g. countries that are structured by deeply rooted political confessionalism), one encounters a mixture of terms and descriptions that do randomly overlap while at the same time create ample cleavages. The cloud that contains all these terms and approaches that partly cover social processes not only hinders objective light to be shed on the scene(s), but is also rooted in theoretical traditions of Westerns social sciences that are often prone to generate explanations - or analysis, respectively -, which are to a certain extent judgemental and most of the time highly fragmented.

Accordingly, ethnicity - or the debate about ethnicity in social sciences - has been approached quite differently during the last decades. The theoretical traditions applied are still insufficient when enquiring about ethnic aspects of social conflicts (which do not necessarily have to be violent in the first place), often leading to theoretical puzzles. One basic challenge to fill the voids of insufficient enquiry about ethnicity is to enrich it with aspects of social processes that allow an in-depth view. Conceptual frames like the notion of civil society, cultural and economical aspects help to grind the fringe of traditional theoretical approaches like that of essentialism, instrumentalism, constructivism and postmodernism. Ashutosh Varshney (2002) for example, by researching on ethnic conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India, broached the importance of the concept of civil society in his work Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. Fawwaz Traboulsi (2007) in A History of modern Lebanon and David Schiller (1979) in Der Bürgerkrieg im Libanon: Entstehung, Verlauf, Hintergründe on the other side, highlightened socio-economic aspects in their historical analysis of Lebanon. By combining different theoretical traditions with socio-economical and socio-political aspects, ethnicity is framed by a variety of relevant social aspects, rather than squeezed into rigid theoretical formations.

2.4.2 Use of interviews

In February 2011 nine students including myself went on a research trip to Lebanon. The objective of this research trip was to deepen our understanding of the complexities of socio-political processes and structures in Lebanon. Partly, the interviews conducted on the 2011 research trip are going to be incorporated in this thesis.

The interviews are used in a way to better understand the Lebanese society and the interwoven identity-issues. Furthermore, the excerpts are ought to give a broader insight into complex social processes in Lebanon. The interview excerpts are mainly used in chapters

4, 5 and 6, where they are used in a systematical manner, but can be also found elsewhere on a more minor or individual basis.

The interview excerpts used express significant insights and are chosen deliberately in order to depict central arguments this thesis proposes to put forward. In general, the interview excerpts are ought to have an illustrating character and are therefore used in a subordinate manner throughout this work.

Since the political situation in Lebanon is very dynamic and, hence, unpredictable, I choose to anonymise the interviewees and only give information about their occupation, gender, nationality and - since it is relevant in regard to their statements - their confession. I also choose not to attach the interview transcripts in the addendum in order to maintain a high degree of anonymity for the interviewees.

General questions of the interviews

It has to be taken into account that the interviewees had different occupational and ethno-confessional backgrounds. Hence, the interviews where conducted in a semi-structured manner, leaving space for interposed questions along the way in order to better cope with the complexity of the Lebanese society.
The basic conception of the interviews reflected on the dominant role of ethno-national parties in Lebanon and question whether this domination helps in establishing a distinct national identity.

The following questions were used as a general guideline when conducting the interviews in 2011:

1. Is there something like a „social contract“ or a „national contract“[4] existing in Lebanon? How could this/ these contract/ s look like?
2. How do the Lebanese define development and how is this definition considered by their political representations?
3. What notion of development is created through elected parties (e.g. Future Movement, Hezbullah, aso.) and does it facilitate the establishment of a distinct Lebanese identity?
4. How do the Lebanese see the role of the state within the country's confessional political structure?

[4]Hovsepian (2008: 40) uses the terms „social contract“ and „national contract“ in his evaluation of the state-society relations and reproduction of the Lebanese confessional system. It has to be taken into account that the use of these terms in Lebanon does not necessarily reflect a Western understanding of the concepts behind the terms.

5. What role do NGOs play in Lebanon and how is the work of several NGOs accepted by the Lebanese?

Interviewees

A Occupation: Author & journalist
Gender: Female
Nationality: Lebanese
Confession: Shi'ite

B Occupation: Former member of UNIFIL
Gender: Male
Nationality: Turkish
Confession: Unknown

C Occupation: Taxi driver
Gender: Male
Nationality: Lebanese
Confession: Armenian Christian

D Occupation: Member of Parliament for Hezbullah
Gender: Male
Nationality: Lebanese
Confession: Shi'ite

E Occupation: TV-Anchor for Al-Manar TV (Hezbullah)
Gender: Female
Nationality: Lebanese
Confession: Shi'ite

Chapter 3

Theoretical approaches

An overview on theoretical approaches to ethnicity by Ashutosh Varshney marks the epistemological range of existing theoretical traditions on one hand, and the discursive credibility of these theoretical approaches, on the other hand.

Varshney argues that in an essentialist view, „ethnic conflicts today can be traced back to older animosities between groups [...] [while it] focuses on the intrinsic power of ethnic differences“ (Varshney 2002: 27). Keywords like „tribalism“, „old animosities“ or „ties of blood“ dominate the everyday notion of ethnicity. They can be traced back to the basic argument that historical animosities, based on inherent differences in race, religion or culture, are a source of contemporary conflicts and that human beings can be easily made to care for their ancestry (cp. Varshney 2002: 28). The confining elements of this approach are the limited possibilities of instrumental analysis. Because

> essentialism tends not to make a distinction between ethnic (or national) identity on one hand and ethnic (or national) conflict on the other [...] [it] makes it hard to explain why, if animosities are so historically deep and so rooted in cultural differences, tensions and violence between groups tend to ebb and flow at different times. (Varshney 2002: 28*f.*)

In other words, an essentialist view describes quite well how ethnic identities are - or can be - historically constructed, but leaves a question mark regarding the question how these historical identities can explain contemporary conflicts between these groups.

Like essentialism, instrumentalism does also „explain why ethnic conflicts occur at all, [but] not why they occur when they do and where“ (Varshney 2002: 27). In an instrumentalist view, ethnicity can serve as a focal point and therefore be useful as a mobilisation strategy. In this perspective, mobilisation on ethnic grounds does not only serve internal purposes, but also helps to distinguish the own group from others. Leaders ultimately draw power from ethnic identities as they „may deploy its potential for mobilization to extract goods and services from the modern sector“ by exploiting the intrinsic instrumental, political or economic values of ethnic differences (cp. Varshney 2002: 27-30). Nevertheless, by appropriating instrumentalism in order to explain ethnic conflicts, problematic voids occur due to the challenge of locating the tipping point of the involvement of the masses in ethnic conflicts (in intergroup as well as intragroup conflicts).

In a postmodernist comprehension, constructivism advanced to our understanding by implicating that „[m]odernity changed the meaning of identities by bringing the masses into a larger, extralocal framework of consciousness. It made identities and communities wider and more institutionalized“ (Varshney 2002: 31). The postmodernist arguments (that build the basis for constructivism) claim that the formation of knowledge is directly linked to

power and that objective and/ or scientific knowledge is usually hardly more than a narrative constructed by the knowledge elite. These narratives then create effects that span into culture, politics, and society in general (cp. Varshney 2002: 32). These constructions were emphasised especially in colonising countries and regions in the Global South which subsequently led to manifestations of newly established group boundaries as Varshney (2002: 32) illustrates:

> Fuzzy identities, even when real, were not registered as such and were instead split into lucid, modernist categories. Furthermore, if public policy, based on such census groupings, allocated patronage, public offices, or state grants, then the very act of census categorization would begin to create larger identities. This, postmodernists argue, is what happened in the developing world during the colonial period.

„Unpostmodern" constructivists have a slightly different approach than postmodernists as they argue that it is not as essential to construct master narratives (about ethnic identity e.g.) for the knowledge elite as it is to transform existing narratives in a way that are closer to reality. The knowledge elite is continuously challenged to modify narratives since the masses (with the possibility to access modern communication structures) create alternative identities and group boundaries on their own (cp. Varshney 2002: 32). Benedict Anderson, representing an unpostmodern constructivist view, „argues that by involving the masses and posing challenges to the existing dynastic and ecclesiastical elite, nationalism sought to undermine the old order" (Varshney 2002: 31*f.*). For Anderson, the mere interest of the elite is not the sole reason for the rise of nationalism. Instead he emphasised the impact of modern technology (e.g. the printing press) and a modern economic system (capitalist modes of production and accumulation) as framing conditions on the masses, enabling „imaginations about large, popular, and secular communities [...] that overtook the premodern, extralocal, religious communities of clergymen and aristocratic dynasties" (Varshney 2002: 32). Possible problems and challenges by adhering to the theoretical tradition of constructivism can be of terminological nature, namely that [t]he explanation provided for the formation of ethnic identity is [...] also extended to ethnic violence [or that it does not] deal with variances across time and space" (Varshney 2002: 35; remarks LW).

As in a constructivist tradition, institutionalism „tend[s] not to make a distinction between conflict and violence" (Varshney 2002: 38). The key proposition of institutionalism is that there are existing connections between the political institutions or structures and the propensity of ethnic conflicts to occur. Especially in societies with ethnically plural populations, particular political institutions are required. When imposing political institutions to ethnically plural societies, the cleavages and power structures in the respective countries/ societies have to be taken into account. Institutions specify procedures and rules, suggest the mode of political contestation and subsequently predispose their outcomes, often excluding large parts of the population from the political process (cp. Varshney

2002: 35*f.*). Lijphart (who coined the term consociationalism) and Horowitz, two influential institutionalists, specified features that are necessary for the elite to accept political compromise in order to enable a consensual political system in ethnically plural societies: a grand coalition of ethnic leaders in government, a mutual veto given to each group, group proportionality in decision-making positions and segmental autonomy with respect to matter such as education, language and personal laws. Additionally, electoral incentives to compromise on ethnic matters have to be offered to grand coalitions in order to work well (cp. Varshney 2002: 37*f.*). Here again, the main critique on institutionalist positions is that they are not suited to deal with regional variations because of its focus on the national-level (cp. Varshney 2002: 38).

In the Lebanese context, the triangle capitalism, nationalism, and ethnic identity can be seen from different perspectives, with their roots being akin to a certain degree. Albeit risking an analytical leap, it is necessary to move from ethnic identities to constructions of nationalism, while taking in aspects of capitalist developments and entangling it with historical fundamentals. In a retrospective view, Lebanon's pre-capitalist structures that were established as early as in the beginning of the 19^{th} century (cp. Traboulsi 2007: viii), began to flourish after the country gained independence. Thus, the social fabric of Lebanon got vividly transformed into a society affected by capitalist modes of production and accumulation. Confessional bonds increasingly became exposed to indistinct class dynamics. Hence, the civil war that broke out in the 1970s cannot only be seen as an ethno-confessional conflict based on a contested notion of ethnicity alone. Socio-economic reasoning alone would lead to insufficient conclusions as well.

Since this work is based upon the usage of categories and concepts, it is essential to clarify some important terminological contexts in which they will be used. The categories and concepts used here are especially vulnerable to ample usage if not specified, and thus often squeezed into potentially random terms. An a priori definition is crucial for precise research.

As often as possible I use generally accepted English terms and formulations (e.g. for actors, parties, states or events, aso.) throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, the reader is going to encounter a range of abbreviations or expressions and terms that do not have a sufficient translation (e.g. *za'im* or *iqta'*) and therefore need further explanation on a regular basis. Therefore, the reader will find a list of abbreviations in the front section as well as a glossary in the back section of this thesis.

3.1 Nationalism and national identity

Nationalism roots in a modern conception of statehood and its appendant cultural implications which are deeply connected with historical backgrounds and contextualised identity. Furthermore, nationalism is framed by the formation of civic life and the emergence of capitalist-industrialist society. The emergence of nationalism in the 19^{th}century was imagined as a natural and homogenising process, alienating the centrality of the state with the classes it produced. Thus, nationalism served as cement between new socio-economic and political formations and was central for determining the identity of the bourgeoisie. In the logic of modernity, national identities ideologically and territorially constituted themselves by delineating from others. The „we" was equal to progress (positive image) while the „other" meant regress (negative image). To constitute an identity (not necessarily a national identity) one group had to define cunning borderlines against the other group in order to be able to emerge as a qualitative majority, who can then transfer is definatory power onto societal realities (cp. Käpernick 2000: 36; Melber 1992: 24*f.*; Volkan/Itzkowtz 1994 cited in Väyrynen 1999: 129*f.*).

> Migrations, colonial migrations and conquests [...] established various ‚islands of settlers'. This becomes relevant when states define themselves as incarnations of a ‚nation' and attempt to unify this ‚nation' in one unitary territory on the one hand and to establish a homogeneous nation-state on the other. This ultimately results in contested territorial claims (irredenta) and to a greater or lesser extent in politically forced assimilation.[5] (Kößler 1992: 22)

Another aspect is that the process of constructing national identities not only meant a mere unification of various territories with cultural similarities or the same language, but also a demarcation of the territory for potential military and economical development. Kößler (1992: 21) argues that the military expeditions of the French provoked regional counter-movements against them all over Europe that build their „national awakenings" on economically and military suitable territory. In 18^{th} and 19^{th}century Germany for example, a national culture and national symbols had to be established in the first place. As Kößler (1992: 20) notes, various associations collected money to build monuments, historians had to produce scientific research in order to deliver a national tradition and poets wrote poems on the nation.

In doing so, the modern state was turned into a nation and incorporated in a capitalist-industrialist environment. Since the state became the main economical actor as well as

[5] Original quote: „Wanderungen, Kolonisiationsbewegungen und Eroberungen hatten [...] zu vielfältigen ‚Siedlungsinseln' geführt. Dies alles wird in dem Augenblick relevant, wo Staaten sich als die Inkarnation einer ‚Nation' definieren und nun beanspruchen, erstens die gesamte ‚Nation' in einem einheitlichen Territoium zu vereinen und zweitens einen homogenen Nationalstaat zu schaffen. Es kommt zu konkurrierenden territorialen Ansprüchen (Irredenta) und zu mehr oder weniger gewaltsamer Assimilationspolitik." (Kößler 1992: 22)

the ultimate frame of reference in economical questions, one of the main tasks was the development of the state's productive forces. Thus, the centrality of society (as perceived in the sense of modernity) only came to prominence through the penetration of socio-economic settings by capitalism. By entangling the economic progress of the state with the national awakening that accompanied the initial phase of industrialism, cleavages were constructed between class, ethnic and national identities. According to Tarja Väyrynen (1999: 137) „[g]lobal capitalism produces, with growing internalisation of production and finance, global divisions of labour. Global divisions of labour has its local counterpart, namely, segmenting of labour force along ‚race' and ‚ethnic' lines." In the early 19^{th} century in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, „the ‚national' or ‚ethnic' classification often correlated with the social situation"[6] (Kößler 1992: 22). In his article about nation-building in Pakistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Wieland (2000: 32) notes that the different interests of landowners and peasants in Bosnia and Herzegovina created ample social and economical conflicts, but as soon as a „national identity" was laid over it, it suddenly began to matter that most of the landowners were Muslims and the peasants were Serbs and Croats at large. In his analysis he furthermore stresses that „even in India socio-economic cleavages were easily turned into ethno-national conflicts, particularly when they overlapped"[7] (Wieland 2000: 32).

When the process of territorial demarcation of the supposed nation-states was to a greater or lesser extent settled, capitalism (by then applied by the polit-economical elites of nation-states) could flourish. Through formations of capital, the elites then aspired towards a hegemonic position in society (cp. Kößler 1992: 23). Essential for the elites strife to power is the permanent contestation of the state and the instrumentalisation of „‚imagined communities' which seek to create states of their own or carve out pieces of existing states" (Väyrynen 1999: 136). In Arjun Appadurai's (1990 cited in Väyrynen 1999: 136) words, „‚nation-state' is a battle of imagination with ‚state and nation seeking to cannibalise each other'".

Racism is not an alien phenomenon to nationalist constructions since „demarcations tend to become natural and absolute. Differences are turned into a biological-genetic determinant or into ostenisble culturally immutable dispositions"[8] (Melber 1992: 25). Or as Attalides (1979: 33) puts it:

[6] Original quote: „In Ost- und Südosteuropa [...] fiel [...] die ‚nationale' oder ‚ethnische' Zuordnung häufig mit der sozialen Lage zusammen." (Kößler 1992: 22)

[7] Original quote: „Auch in Indien ließen sich sozio-ökonimsche Spaltungslinien immer leichter in ethnonationale Konflikte ummünzen, besonders dort, wo sie sich überlappten." (Wieland 2000: 32)

[8] Original quote: „Grenzziehungen naturalisieren und verabsolutisieren. Differenzen werden zu biologisch-genetischen Determinanten oder angeblich kulturell unveränderlichen Dispositionen stilisiert." (Melber 1992: 25)

> The emphasis on racial purity is an intellectually weak but emotionally strong argument in favour of inculcating national consciousness. It makes the national claim just, since it is in any event biologically given.

The notion that a nation descends from one homogeneous cultural community is very similar to the way national culture is conceived in a racist point of view, where culture is supposedly passed on from one generation to the next, creating a tradition of culture. Nationalism nevertheless, gets caught up by its own proposed ideals, namely the envisaged state of a homogeneous national community that can never be obtained. Homogenisation along cultural and religious lines is - to a great extent - squeezed into constructions of the „nation". Minorities in turn become an abstract factor within the state which acts as a nation that is only recognisable through their constructed political and legal label. Furthermore, minorities (often perceived as objectionable groups) are transformed to a „state within a state" (cp. Käpernick 2000: 36; Melber 1992: 25; Wieland 2000: 33).

From the perspective of the nation-state, „an ethnic group claiming a right to produce difference and make distinctions which transcend the official state ideology is an ‚enemy within'" (Väyrynen 1999: 136*f.*). The result of these processes, however, is that a „*neo-racism* grounded not in biology but in anthropology and an ideological commitment to the virtues of difference" (Volkan 1998: 22; original emphasis) replaces „traditional" racism.

3.2 Conceptualising ethno-nationalism

> *The issue of violent ethnic identification is, thus, fundamentally a question of modern political subjectivity. The roots of violent ethnic identification lie in the ontological insecurity of the subject.* [9]

Generally speaking, common of approaches to ethnicity are a mix between various traditions of the social sciences and/ or concepts about identity and their origins (as argued throughout section 3). Constructivist arguments for example emphasise the advances in communication technologies, making ethnic groups increasingly aware of oneself and others. Although identity becomes a core category when analysing ethnicity, it is unsatisfying to subsidise all types of ethnic conflicts under the term „identity conflict" as it is the case in human needs theories or other socio-psychological oriented theories (Väyrynen 1999: 129). Other approaches to ethnicity also broach the issue of identity. Michel Hechter (1975 cited in Väyrynen 1999: 127) argues that „ethnic identification arises from ‚internal colonisation' in which some parts of the country exploit others [where] [e]thnic mobilization is an unavoidable consequence". For Väyrynen (1999: 126) the central notion of ethnicity in social sciences evolves from a set of three different aspects: (i) the shift from inter-state

[9] Väyrynen 199: 135.

relations to intra-state relations after World War 2, (ii) the neglection of the idea that minorities are assimilated into the majority once the state's modernisation project reaches a mature state and (iii) the acceptance of the existence of multiple identities. Older enquiries on ethnicity produce static and flat frameworks about ethnic identities. In Alfred Schultz's (1964 cited in Väyrynen 1999: 132*f.*) words, ethnicity is perceived as a way to typify the world in order to build foundations for self-interpretation.

In his article about ethno-nationalism, Carsten Wieland (2000) shows how homogenisation processes of ethno-confessional groups (in Pakistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina) appropriate their religious core identity by enriching it with additives such as history, territory and language. His analysis makes it possible to identify the stages of homogenisation that ultimately lead to political mobilisation along ethnic lines. For Wieland (2000: 31), ethnic homogenisation processes can be viewed as sequences, originating from a confessional identity, leading to an ethnic identity and finally reaching the state of an ethno-nation (which is a highly discussed term on its own). Similar to Wieland, Paul Brass (1991 cited in Väyrynen 1999: 127; remarks LW) argues that „ethnic communities are created and transformed by particular elites [thereby acknowledging that] ethnic identification has different stages which range from the formation of ethnic community to the politicizing of the community, to the ethnonationalistic stage".

In the first stage of this process confessional groups identify themselves as ancestral communities who - not necessarily, but often - look back at a „golden age". Central to this stage is the search for principal dimensions of demarcation such as language and history. Since language as a dimension of demarcation is often problematic due to the territorial overlapping of language areas of different confessional groups (as it is the case in Lebanon and the Middle East in general), the recourse to the dimension of history constitutes a crucial element during this stage. In the recourse to the ancestral history of the ethno-confessional group, viable historical facts often do not necessarily root in religious history but in the history of the ancestral community. Thus, the historical facts that are needed to draw demarcation lines to other groups are not solely religiously determined and can often be traced back to the foundations of the respective ancestral community (e.g. Arab history, African history and so on). Even though confessional ties are inflicted by historical deductions, these primordial bonds do not explain confessional awareness or the emergence of ethnic identities. In order to understand the foundations of ethnic identities, critical social science also has to take into account the interests that constitute their instrumentalisation (cp. Perthes 1994: 132*f.*; Wieland 2000).

Throughout the second stage, the members of the former confessional community are being transformed into bearers of an ideology. Religion then becomes more than a mere set of beliefs and faith since its former „believers" are acquired by a commencing articulation of political ideology. Then the members of a confessional group are bearers as well as

the resource of a later political ideology. During this stage every individual that is within the demarcation lines(that were drawn in the first stage) experiences a surge of objective classification that later evolves into a system of clientilism propagated by the leaders of the respective group as well as by the group itself. The leaders and the elites first begin to emphasise cultural claims (through the surge of objective classification) which are followed by political claims. When the transformation from the emphasis on cultural claims to political claims has been completed, religion as a category of identity is turned into a source of political mobilisation.

The third stage therefore converts religion itself along polit-economical lines and its members to political capital. During this stage socio-economical conflicts are typically identified as ethnic conflicts of which the symbols of the very religion are also an integral part. The practical dimension of objective classification becomes visible when e.g. ethnically composed groups (acting as criminal gangs) begin to loot towns and/ or villages who are inhabited by members of another ethnic group. Then, the assertion that different ethnic groups cannot live next to, or with each other, is only possible in the retrospective view.

In the fourth stage, which is rooted in the consecutive logic of accumulating political capital, politics then are solely used to articulate ethnic interests. Wieland (2000: 33; remarks LW) concludes his analysis by asserting that „[e]thnical conflicts do not exist [and] [t]hat the fronts are not smooth at all. [Furthermore he notes that] [t]he content of these conflicts does not have anything to do with ancestry, belief, language or habits per se. Their features merely serve as hubs that enable a group to faster mobilise its political constituencies.“[10] (cp. Wieland 2000). Väyrynen, by developing Appadurai's concepts of nation-states, explains how it is possible to imagine the link between ethnicity and nationalist politics: „Groups with ideas about nationhood seek to capture or co-opt states power, and states simultaneously seek to capture and monopolize ideas about nationhood. Here is, thus, a platform for separatism and micro-identities to become political projects within nation-states“ (Väyrynen 1999: 136).

Since we learnt about the central role of the state in the formulation of national identities and its interplay with economic conditions from Kößler (1992) in section 3.1, the central role of the (ethno-political) elites becomes more comprehensible. The very logic of the elite's territorial claims squeezes the interplay of economic and political settings into a dialectic relationship of power consolidation and identity construction. For Wieland (2000: 33) ethno-national leaders are therefore encouraged to found states on their own, even when the accompanying homogenisation processes can never consolidate political peace since

[10] Original quote: „Ethnische Konflikte gibt es nicht. Die Fronten sind bei weitem nicht so glatt. Und die Inhalte der Konflikte haben nichts mit Abstammung, Glauben, Sprache oder Gewohnheiten per se zu tun. Diese Merkmale dienen nur als Andockstellen für eine beschleunigte politische Mobilisierung.“ (Wieland 2000: 33)

homogenisation only transforms internal conflicts instead of solving them: „An ‚ethnically' homogeneous nation state is an illusion. The effects of ethno-nationalisms - understood as a dynamic framework for action - are not to be underestimated. As soon as the ideal of the homeland has been achieved, the state collapses like a house of cards"[11] (Wieland 2000: 33).

To think the duality of the territorial state and its assumed coexistence with the nation is vital to understand ethno-national processes. According to Tarja Väyrynen ethno-nationalism is a confused social practice where

> the state has aimed at providing a shared domain of meaning for social groups located within its sovereign control and territory. The state, as a social and political practice and as a system of inclusion and exclusion par excellence, has tried to solve the problem of conflicting identity claims by producing precise distinctions between citizens and aliens, by domesticating particular identities and by creating a coherent sovereign identity. (Väyrynen 1999: 136)

In chapter 5 it will be explained why religious-nationalist separatism and/ or the ethnic foundations of politics - under the title of consociationalism - ultimately reproduces structures of ethno-national clientilism. Ted Gurr's (1994 cited in Väryryen 1999: 129) argument that „states going through a major transitional period are prone to ethnopolitical conflicts" fits in the picture of the struggles of Lebanese consociationalism as described by Perthes (1994) in section 5.3.

In order to frame the voids of the debate about nationalism in Lebanon as well as the identity claims of various ethnic groups, it is important to accommodate to the manifold aspects and implications of the political concept of nationalism. Friedland (2001: 137*f.*) suggests an understanding of nationalism that takes into account religious and cultural backgrounds as well as the emancipatory value that can be observed in various ethno-national movements.

> Nationalism is a state-centred form of collective subject formation, a form of state representation, one grounding the identity and legitimacy of the state in a population of individuals who inhabit a territory bounded by that state. The cultural commonalities of that population do not, in themselves, constitute the basis for the formation of a nation. Nationality is a contingent and contested claim, not a social fact.[12] Nationalism, the political processes organized through the state in the name of the nation, creates the nation, not the reverse.[13] Nationalism is a program for the co-constitution of the state and the territorially bounded population in whose name it speaks. Nationalism is not ideology. It is a discursive practice by which the territorial identity of a state and the cultural identity of the people whose collective representation it claims are constituted as a singular institutional fact. The state is central in the process in

[11] Original quote: „Ein ‚ethnisch' homogener Nationalstaat ist ohnehin eine Illusion. Ethno-Nationalismus mag als dynamisches Handlungskonzept große Wirkung entfalten. Kurz nach der Erreichung eines homeland als Idealziel fällt er jedoch wie ein Kartenhaus in sich zusammen." (Wieland 2000: 33)
[12] Cp. Brubaker 2000 & Smith 1991 cited in Friedland 2001: 138.
[13] Cp. Calhoun 1998 cited in Friedland 2001: 138.

> that it is the direct relation between the state and individual through the organization of markets, armies, schools, and families that composes this national identity.[14] [...] Nationalism offers a form of representation - the joining of state, territoriality, and culture. It has nothing to say about the content of representation, the identity of that collective subject, or its values. (Friedland 2001: 137*f.*)

In describing the hybridisation of nationalism and religion, Ehrlich (2007) portrays a peculiar political development. Hybridisation in his view is a result of a movements desire to act. Political movements do so by „blending nationalism and religion into a theoretical theory of action" and thereby we are „observing [...] a process of politicisation of religion or, as some would prefer, religionisation of politics" (Ehrlich 2007: 24). When drawing a wider frame around the process of „hybridization", understood as a social and political development, it is essential to identify the agents of this process. It is essential in order to explain social changes within an interdependent community such as the Lebanese. Friedland (2001) does emphasise the role of civil society at this point. He locates the „energizing power" of civil society in the contradictions generated by the state and its modes of capitalistic production, in the same way he portrays religious nationalism as a contradiction between the capitalist state and religion. The modern capitalist nation-state becomes the bearer of its civil society and the frame of reference for religious activities. Here, thus, the state is subsequently turned into a platform where interaction of both, civil society and religion, becomes possible (cp. Friedland 2001: 148*f.*). From this perspective religious nationalists in a way have to center their activity on the nation-state (cp. Friedland 2001: 138).

3.3 Class and (ethnic) group consciousness

In order to allow a differentiated view on Lebanon's society, I would like to outline the rather broad understanding of the conceptualisation of the ethno-national group one the one side, and the confessional group on the other side, which are being stressed throughout this thesis. I understand this two conceptualisations as a self-constitutive nexus in itself. Since this nexus depicts the high inconsistency and incongruence of conventional social and political categorisations, this thesis refers to Ayubi's concept of collectivity in order to frame the understanding of group identity in the Middle East (and at this point Lebanon in particularly). For him the group consciousness finds itself in a

> situation that invokes a political vocabulary which appears to reify a ‚collectivity' (the ‚community' - variously defined - and/or the state) and a whole range of activities that seem to locate much of the political function with clientelistic networks (thus the importance, among others of ‚patronage') and/or within nominally formal organisations (thus the importance, among others, of ‚bureaucratic politics'). We seem

[14] Cp. Rokkan 1975 cited in Friedland 2001: 138.

> therefore to be having *groups* (some of them ‚primordially' solidaristic and some more socio-economic in nature), and we have the state. Then we have a whole variety of ‚arrangements' (some more abrupt and cruel than others) for sorting out the relationship between the groups and the state. Some of these arrangements are collaborative and inclusionary, [...] while some are more conflictual and exclusionary [...].
> I attribute such manifestations less to an imagined cultural continuity (e.g. an ‚organic' conception of society in Islam) and more to the articulated, and often transitory, nature of the modes of production in developing countries [...]. (Ayubi 1995: 33*f.*; original emphasis)

While Ayubi distinguishes between capitalist societies and societies in transformative developing countries, he emphasises the duality of the individual: one the one hand the individual is a member of a political party (at this point I need to stress that this group can be of ethno-political nature, but doesn't necessarily have to be) while the individual is also a member of an emerging class structure (cp. Ayubi 1995: 34*f.*). Furthermore, „[t]he relative importance of the various groups varies from one society to another depending on a society's level of socio-economic differentiation and its social and cultural history" (Ayubi 1995: 34). This is the reason why a broad outline of a country's socio-economic history is important in order to understand contemporary socio-political structures. The entanglement of historical social dimensions and emerging political structures at the moment of gaining national independence led to a moment of inclusionary practices, that were helped

> in the short run, by the ability of the ‚relatively autonomous' state to expand national industry, public employment and social service. The relative autonomy of the state, as well as its ability to disburse largesse, were both made possible through the acquisition by the state of significant financial resources by way of nationalising private enterprises (foreign and local) or through the receipt of considerable external payments (oil revenues, foreign aid, etc.). (Ayubi 1995: 35)

One result of the socio-economic transformations that were accompanying the nationalisation project, increased the states

> reliance on ‚un-earned' income, invoking the description of many Arab countries as rentier (or semi-rentier) states, has rendered the state vulnerable to several (mainly external) forces over which it had little control. This, combined with the growing financial burdens of welfarist policies has led to the escalation of a ‚fiscal crisis of the state', that left the state panting both for cash and for legitimacy. Such developments (supported by important globalisation pressures) started, in turn, to usher the exhausted state in the direction of economic *privatisation* and a certain degree of political *pluralisation* [...]. (Ayubi 1995: 35; original emphasis)

In section 5.1.1 the ethno-confessional-/ class-complex will be stressed further (at this later point the historical dimension of Lebanon can already be taken into account).

It is important to note that throughout this thesis I will use the term ethno-confessional (rather than the often used term „sectarian" that blurrs sharp categorical boundaries) for

the religious communities whose historical development depicts a sociological evolution. The term „ethno-confessional“ conveys a notion of identity that describes religious communities not as a collectivity sharing a common religious affiliation alone, but as communities whose identity is furthermore determined by historically transformed (cultural, social, economical, aso.) traditions (cp. Schiller 1979: 17). In this regard, the term „confessional“ will be used

> [...] to denote sectarian identities. [...] I use the terms confessional and confessionalised as opposed to religious, since a religious identity expresses a person's beliefs and practices, whereas a confessionalised identity is first and foremost a political one. Here, religious heritage, symbols and habitus are used to legitimize differences that find their institutional expression in the Lebanese political system of confessionalism. (Peleikis 2001: 403, footnote 14)

For a political analysis of Lebanon's political structures, it is important to understand that the religious dimension has an important influence on society. This influence is made effective through the political system that has traditionally been based upon a confessional equilibrium. Hence, in this thesis the focus is rather on the fact that the system has an important confessional dimension, than on a terminological discussion.

3.4 Civil society

Since this thesis is seeking to provide not only an analysis of how the formation process of ethnic identities intertwined with the flourishing concept of nationalism, we have to take into account the exclusive elements of ethno-nationalism and political confessionalism. In order to identify and evaluate common denominators to bridge politicised and confessionalised differences inherited by ethno-nationalism, this thesis is going to identify what the Lebanese civil society is and what role it plays for society as a whole. In terms of national identity this thesis will furthermore depict if (and if yes, how) civil society reacts to ethno-national exclusivity and initiates an unmaking of ethno-national boundaries by creating (or helping to create) a distinct Lebanese national identity.

The debate about the concept of civil society has a long tradition and constantly underwent a transformation influenced by dominat political influences. Departing from Aristoteles' *koinonia politika*, Alexis de Toqueville then saw civil society as something that limits the state. For Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel the *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* was the state's power source and for Antonio Gramsci *società civile* was the space (in addition with the dominant class) where the state exercised its hegemony (cp. Braune 2005: 14; Chandhoke 2007: 609). Generally, it is commonly distinguished between civil society (i) in a *democratic context* (where on one hand we find a liberal-conservative position that sees civil society as an integral part of the state and on the other a critical-leftist position

which identifies civil society in opposition to the state), (ii) undergoing a *transformation process* and (iii) in an *Arab context* (with secular and Islamic positions) (cp. Braune 2005: 14-24). The prevalent understanding of civil society is that of a neutral element as a part in society. In Alexander's view (1996 cited in Friedland 2001: 147) civil society is „a sphere separated from both the economy and the state, as well as from religion, family, science, and primordial communities. Civil society is roughly equivalent to the public sphere, a zone where individual rights are protected, political participation organized, and societal membership defined." Throughout this thesis, Alexander's understanding will not be sufficient because of the separation of society and economy. The pertinent literature additionally conceptualizes civil society in relation to the state. It is often contextualized as a precondition for democracy, yet this approach can be seen as a western approach to the concept of civil society. Democracy and civil society themselves often evolve from a Western tradition of the social sciences and, thus, have to accept critical stances toward eurocentrism and import of western ideology formations (cp. Braune 2005: 24; Chandhoke 2007: 610-613).

The importance of the concept of civil society in this work derives from the voids generated by traditional inquiry on ethnic matters. In line with Varshney's (2002: 39) argument, that „[c]ivic engagement between communities tends to be local or regional, whereas the existing traditions of inquiry are national or global", inquiries on organisational forms of civil society as well as the form of embedment in, and links to, the general society become utterly important. In order to delineate civil society from religion and family, to confine it only to contemporary forms of association, and neglect the relevance of primordial communities (as in Alexander's view), one needs to exclude most forms of social organisation from an in depth inquiry. Many definitions of civil society also suggest, „that the civic space be organized in *associations* that attend to the cultural, social, economic, and political needs of the citizens and that the associations be modern and voluntaristic, not *ascriptive*" (Varshney 2002: 40, original emphasis). Practically, these arguments restrict informal group activities even more, ultimately indicating that „informal and ascriptive activities are considered [...] to be traditional, whereas civil society is modern" (Varshney 2002: 40). The „free zone"[15], where people in Eastern Europe before 1989 associated, can be seen as a refutation to the limitations inflicted by entangling civil society with modernity. In Eastern Europe (to depict one prominent example) the historical state-civil society relationship was uncoupled (cp. Chandhoke 2007: 610), but did not restrict itself to informal or ascriptive forms of civil activity.

> The point, of course, is not that formal associations do not matter. [A]ssociations are undoubtedly a much more robust form of sustained and effective civic interaction

[15] „The Eastern Europeans called this free zone, peopled by social associations, self-help and self-management organisations, and characterised by mutual solidarity, ‚*civil society*'" (Chandhoke 2007: 610, original emphasis).

> between individuals. Associations do not exist everywhere, however [...]. An absence of associations stops neither villages nor the subaltern from participating in a public or political discourse. (Varshey 2002: 45)

Varshney's argument, can clearly be identified within an Eastern European context, where „[t]he ‚civil' in ‚civil society' no longer signified non-political; it meant that people inhabitating the sphere outside the state had the right to debate about the nature of the state and the politics that it pursued" (Chandhoke 2007: 610).

As the review of relevant literature makes clear, civil society as a concept can encompass a wide variety of notions. Comparing the prevalent arguments of the debate about civil society implies not to resort to definitions of civil society that are aligned to the debate about modernity. For a neutral understanding of civil society „it is vital to disentangle normative expectations from the analysis of actually existing civil societies, and to see what civil society actually does or does not do for different people who inhabit the sphere" (Chandhoke 2007: 613). Religion - as well as family ties - base a form of civil society activity since „the purposes of activity rather than the forms of organization should be critical to civic life" (Varshney 2002: 46). Subsequently, „[i]nformal group activities as well as ascriptive associations should be considered part of civil society as long as they connect individuals, build trust, encourage reciprocity, and facilitate exchange of views on matters of public concern - economic, political, cultural and social" (Varshney 2002: 46).

Arab positions on civil society vastly differ in their approaches and, thus, also in their arguments. However, they have to be taken into account when inquiring upon ethnic dynamics in the construction of national identities. To choose a deliberate approach and to disentangle normative expectations from reality at this point becomes a vital task as seen in section 5.5, where a description of the Lebanese civil society will be given.

Chapter 4

Contextualised history

The Lebanese history is a long and winding road that has been strongly affected by various occupations, by colonialism, the intervention of European powers, by wars, civil wars, capitalist integration and regional political and social dynamics. Furthermore, the territory that constitutes contemporary Lebanon has experienced a multiplicity of cultural influences from the Phoenicians (9^{th}century BC - 7^{th}century BC), from Hellenistic Greece (from 4^{th}century BC), and the Romans (from AD 1^{st}century). The first strong Arabian or respectively Muslim influences derived from the Caliphate of the Umayyads followed by the Abbasid Caliphate, the Fatimid Islamic Caliphate (7^{th}century - 11^{th}century), and the colonisation by the Great Seljuq Empire (from 11^{th}century BC).

Although the cultural influences that shaped the social landscape of Lebanon over the centuries were manifold, the colonisation by the Ottoman Turks (1516 - 1919) had the strongest impact. These impacts can still be found in the social fabric and political structure of the country. When the Ottoman Empire broke up into nation-states under the auspices of France and Great Britain after the First World War, the State of Greater Lebanon was created as an political autonomous state as part of the French Mandate of Syria in 1920. In doing so, the predecessor of modern Lebanon was quarried out of the Syrian territory of which it has been part for centuries. The traditionally strong ties with Syria always had a strong impact on Lebanon. Thus, the political autonomy can be seen as a decisive turning point in Lebanese history. Syrian influences continuously shaped political conditions in Lebanon ever since, e.g. during the civil war (chapter 4.4) and its aftermath (chapter 5).

When independence was granted in 1943, the social fabric suggested an confessional equilibrium as basis for the distribution of political power, relying on the population census that took place in 1932. By referring to this census (the only one in Lebanon ever since) as a fundamental pillar of the Lebanese nation, Lebanon, after existing with the status of political autonomy of various kinds for centuries, has silently adopted an European understanding of modern statehood. The following decades saw Lebanon's economy adopt to a capitalist model of capital accumulation, the emergence of a new business elite, the disintegration of the mode of production away from import-substitution towards export-orientation, and the subsequent formation of social classes.

In order to understand the breakup of confessional balance between the Lebanese ethno-national groups, one has to take into account important aspects of Lebanese history and modern history. One important aspect in this regard is the Lebanese history prior to 1860, as contextually analysed by Peleikis (2001). Other aspects include the traditional social structures and hierarchies of Ottoman Lebanon - as contextually analysed by Fawaz (1994)

or by Kneissl (2002) -, Lebanon as a sphere of cultural influences, the social clashes of the 1960s and early 1970s in the run-up to the civil war, the civil war and its peculiar mode of accumulation and at last the peaceful consolidation of political power after the civil war, then under the banner of consociationalism.

4.1 Ottoman Lebanon

The Ottoman Empire with its formative role had the strongest impact on Lebanese political and socio-economic structures. The territory of Ottoman Lebanon was about half the size of modern Lebanon but covered the Mount Lebanon Range as shown in figure 4.1. Mount Lebanon was extensively used as a settlement area for Maronite Christians and Druze Muslims and in some parts also Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims. The empowerment of Maronite and Druze communities is especially interesting when contextualising the Ottoman colonisation with economical development.

Historically, Ottoman rule in Lebanon went through different stages over the centuries. The Emirate of Mount Lebanon (from the 1520s to the 1840s) was replaced by the *qa'im maqamiya* (1843 - 1861). When the first *Mutasarrıf* (Dawud Pasha) was appointed, it was the *qa'im maqamiya* that was to be replaced by the *Mutasarrifiya* (1861 - 1919). One central reason for the downfall of the Emirate was the Egyptian occupation of Syria (1831 - 1840), which initially linked ethno-confessional aspects to political involvement. Moreover did the Egyptian occupation trigger armed confessional confrontation for the first time in Lebanese history.

4.1.1 The Emirate of Mount Lebanon (1523 - 1842)

„The Emirate of Mount Lebanon under Ottoman rule was run according to the *iqta'* system, or *iltizam*, which allocated tax-farming rights in mountainous or desert areas to ethnic or tribal chiefs under the control of the Ottoman walis" (Traboulsi 2007: 3). The political autonomy of ethnic groups heavily drew from a feudal system where sheikhs and emirs administratively controlled confessional communities, levied taxes from peasants and subsequently paid their shares to the Ottoman sultan. The most important feudal families of that time were the Al Khazen and the Hobeich families which were both Maronite Christians and the Druze Jumblatt family. Others were the Arsalan or the Dahda family as well as the Shihab or the Abi-I-Lam family. Those families were called the *muqtada' ji* families, since they were holders of the *iqta'* (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 3, 48). The influential role of the *muqtada' ji* families can be traced back to the early beginnings of the Emirate but can also be found in later periods. Hence, the role of the *muqtada' ji* families in the

structuring process of Lebanese economy cannot be neglected. Also, their strong ties with external powers were integral in the turbulences of the 20^{th}century.

According to the *milet* system, the Ottoman rule furthermore distinguished between a higher community made up of Muslims, that was commissioned to protect a lower community of Christians and Jews. While the „Christians and Jews tended to specialise in commerce, finance and handicrafts", the „Druze community dominated mainly the tribal-warrior function" (Traboulsi 2007: 4). Hence, the combination of the *iqta'* and *milet* system resulted in a division of labour that would ultimately transform political conflicts, or land ownership disputes, into confessional conflicts (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 4*f.*). The *milet* system itself was an administrative system that accounted for the existence of manifold confessional groups next to each other, whereas the term *milet* could be translated as „nation" in an European horizon of meaning (cp. Schiller 1979: 33).

Periodical peasant revolts were characteristic for that time in Lebanese history. Furthermore, Fakhr al-Din II., the emir of Mount Lebanon from 1590 to 1633, made the first attempts to introduce Lebanese silk production to the Italian market. In doing so, he had to stimulate labour migration of Christians into Druze inhabited sericulture regions, wherefore he expelled Shi'ites from Druze villages.

4.1.2 The Egyptian occupation of Syria (1831 - 1840)

From 1831 to 1840 the Emirate of Mount Lebanon fell under Egyptian rule. Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, the wali of Egypt, sent his son Ibrahim Pasha to take over Syria after disputes over land ownership with Istanbul. For this undertaking, Ibrahim sought help from the Sunni emir of Mount Lebanon, Bashir Shihab II. Consequently, Syria fell under Egyptian rule. As Muhammad 'Ali Pasha enjoyed French support, the Porte, planning a counter-offensive, sought the help of the Britain's.

At the time of the Egyptian occupation, Ibrahim's Syrian policy beared a high degree of resemblance with Muhammad 'Ali's Egyptian policy. Ibrahim „strengthened the administration, tried to fight corruption, set up representative councils in towns and cities, treated Christians and Muslims equally and encouraged industry and international trade" (Traboulsi 2007: 12). In doing so Ibrahim Pasha „undermined the powers of local lords (sing. *muqtada' ji*), enforcing regular taxation, and compelled recognition of the rights of non-Moslems to hold office in local government" (Hitti 1970: 746). These developments ignited the first confessionally biased confrontations (e.g. the Christian involvement in the 1838 Druze revolt in Hawran) that would inevitably lead to a range of future conflicts. After the eruption of various revolts, Ibrahim urged Bashir to disarm the Christians, but the Christians refused and rebelled together with the Druze against the Egyptian rulers.

Interestingly, the church did not support the uprising but considered to involve France on a military basis to defeat the rebellion, backing Bashir and Ibrahim. In doing so, „the Christians, the great beneficiaries of the emirate, had nevertheless contributed to its downfall" (Traboulsi 2007: 13). In 1840 Ottoman troops (with the support of Austrian and British troops) ended the Egyptian occupation and exiled Bashir to Malta. In the immediate aftermath of the Egyptian occupation, multiple conflicts over land property broke out. When the Druze sheikhs returned from exile their property rights were protected by the British and the Ottoman authorities. (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 12-14).

Nevertheless, the Egyptian occupation „was epoch making in the cultural history of that land" (Hitti 1970: 746), since it ended the era of decentralised authorities and laid the foundations for centralised dependence. As Hitti (1970: 749) remarks, the expansion trends of European powers clashed in the Middle East as nowhere else, resulting in opening an entry point for imperial economic interests. The end of the Egyptian occupation did open Syria's territory (which included today's Lebanese territory) to political penetration by Western powers and imperial trade networks. Britain for example did impose free trade on the Ottoman Empire in the 1840s, what, in the long run, led to patterns of uneven socio-economic development between Maronites and Druzes. Traboulsi (2007: 16) depicts the social mapping of that period in Lebanese history by asserting that „while the Maronite *muqtada' ji*s were tax collectors and quasi feudal lords over their own co-religionists, the Druze sheikhs were primarily tax farmers and feudal lords over their Christian subjects" due to their elevated status under British patronage (cp. Makdisi 2008: 22). The socio-economic aspects of this structuring process inevitably culminated in the downfall of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon. The complex setting and the asymmetry of ethno-confessional fragmentation along socio-economic lines resulted in an increase in political mobilization on an ethno-confessional basis. Moreover, the continued influence by foreign powers resulted in an increasing politicisation of economic interests, using the various ethno-confessional groups as vessels that would drive the region to the adoption of „peripheral capitalism" (Traboulsi 2007: 24) in the *qa'im maqamiya*.

4.1.3 Qa'im maqamiya (1842-1860)

After a proposal by the Austrian Chancellor Metternich, Mount Lebanon was divided into two administrative regions. The northern district was ascribed to the Christians and the southern district was put under Druze authority. The Christians, however, „interpreted [the] Ottoman reform to mean a ‚restauration' of an imagined Maronite Christian emirate in Mount Lebanon" (Makdisi 2008: 23). The Druze increasingly became afraid to loose power to the Christians in certain regions, since they often constituted a majority due to the administrative split. Subsequently, this division triggered new violent revolts on

an ethno-confessional basis and the years between the late 1840s to the late 1850s were full of agitation. In 1845 for example, the Ottoman empire had to intervene in force to end armed Druze-Christian clashes. What followed were a series of armed revolts of which the Druze armed revolt against the Ottoman forces in 1852 constituted a minor turning point concerning ethno-confessional relations in Lebanon: „When the Ottoman troops were defeated in the first round of fighting [...], they enlisted Christians for support, increasingly poisoning sectarian relations" (Traboulsi 2007: 27).

In 1858 the commoners revolt of Kisrawan made numerous socio-economic factors visible, depicting aspects of recent economical transformations. Kisrawan, with commercial production heavily dependent on the European market, was heavily indebted. The sheikhs as well as the commoners were not able to pay their taxes and rents any longer since the silk crisis in Lyon reduced the export from the *qa'im maqamiya* by half in 1858. The revolt sought to establish equality between the commoners and the sheikhs. After a few months of confrontation, Kisrawan came under rebel authority for about two years. Interestingly, the revolt directly challenged clerical authority, meaning that the revolt did not fall under clerical control, while the church did not intervene directly in the uprising (cp. De Nerval 1980 cited in Traboulsi 2007: 33). Shortly after the Kisrawan revolt, the „events of 1860", as they were called, took place. In the course of these events both, Christians and Druze, practised ethnic cleansing. Significantly, the ethnic cleansing and the expelling of confessional communities from towns and regions had its economic limits. Traboulsi (2007: 33) remarks that conflicting clans soon called upon the other communities to come back to their towns, because they were needed as labour force. Salibi (1998: 16) estimates that about 11.000 Maronites were massacred by the Druzes in 1860.

The transformation of ethno-confessional economical foundations from the *muqtada' ji* system into pre-capitalist structures also happened under the *qa'im maqamiya*. Although the clan-like structures remained strong (also on an ethno-confessional basis), the role of the *muqtada' ji*s slowly declined. Even though the *muqtada' ji*s „tried by all means to preserve their declining economical and political power" (Traboulsi 2007: 27), capitalist processes started to shape the Lebanese landscape. This

> process (from the nineteenth century on) [...] incorporated the Arab World - mainly through ‚colonialism' - into the world capitalist system. Capitalism neither evolved mechanically from the modes of production that preceded it in the Arab World, nor did it completely dissolve these modes. As in many other societies, it sometimes coexisted with such modes and sometimes even buttressed and prolonged certain of their aspects. (Forster-Carter 1978: 51*ff.* cited in Ayubi 1995: 41)

In 1857 for example, „at least four major merchant towns had finally shaken off *muqtada' ji* control and ran their own affairs through elected councils in which merchants, silk producers and middlemen predominated" (Traboulsi 2007: 27). Subsequently, these

transformations „opened the door to non-elite political participation [...]. Communal relations inadvertently democratized politics as non-elites forced themselves to the forefront of sectarian mobilizations which, in turn, often violated traditional hierarchies“ (Makdisi 2008: 23). Makdisi (2008: 23) sees these transformations also in light of Western powers struggling to turn confessional communities into political ones.

4.1.4 Mutasarrifiya Jabal Lubnân (1861 - 1919)

The outcome of the „events of 1860“ led to the *Reglement Organique* that established Mount Lebanon as a privileged administrative region of the Ottoman Empire, the *Mutasarrifiya*. The *Mutasarrıf*, a Christian Ottoman administrator, submitted Mount Lebanon to Ottoman authority with political guarantees by European powers (especially by the French) while the Druze lost its former heavier political weight (cp. Salibi 1998: 16; Schiller 1979: 21; Traboulsi 2007: 41).

The economy of Mount Lebanon at that time heavily drew on the production of silk for the European market. The Ottoman colonial model encouraged linking economic prosperity to external powers predominantly from the 19^{th} century onwards by „the development of a world division of labour“ (Traboulsi 2007: 41). One aspect of this model was that it allowed the creation or the deepening of trade/ patronage networks with external actors. At this point, the dependence of the Lebanese (and Syrian) sericulture industry on the French market, and especially to the french silk-capital Lyon, has to be mentioned:

> The Lyons Chamber of Commerce went even further, referring to Syria as a ‚colony of Lyons'. Soon this dependence on the external market transformed Mount Lebanon into an exporting enclave, dominated by Beirut. Half of Mount Lebanon's population were engaged in the silk economy, which generated around a third of its total revenue (the other sources being tobacco and olive oil). In 1867, there were 67 silk-reeling factories, the seven biggest and most modern being French owned. In 1885, their number had reached 105, with only five French factories, as foreign investment (mainly Lyons-based) moved from the productive sector to the control of sericulture through the market. (Traboulsi 2007: 46)

Another aspect of this economic model was the manifestation of ethno-confessional division within Lebanon's social fabric on the one hand, but more importantly the fragmentation into clan-like „pre capitalist formations [...] [who were] recycled to play new roles in a peripheral capitalist economy“ (Traboulsi 2007: viii) on the other hand. Furthermore, the community-based economic model that was established over the years empowered the confessionally linked extended families („Clans“) and their communities on a financial and military basis. Foundations that were laid for later administrative structures can be traced back to this period of Lebanese history: „[T]hrough the administrative aristocracy, a political continuity was maintained in Lebanon's government, linking the period of the Mutesarrifate with the earlier periods of the Emirate and Kaymankamate and preparing

Figure 4.1: The Mutasarrifiya



Source: Traboulsi 2007: 42.

the way for later developments“ (Salibi 1965: 4 cited in Schiller 1979: 21). The administrative council was based on the political weight of the confessional group's share of the respective region represented. Subsequently, the model of confessional representation based on an early perception of European liberal nationalism resulted in a slow but steady rise of a new class of (administrative) state employees. This emerging „administrative class“ of civil servants would later constitute the backbone of Lebanese independence. More importantly, the administrative reforms reduced the potential of confessional conflicts of former decades to a minimum by trying to adjust political representation stemming from the special status of the *Mutasarrifiya* under the *Reglement Organique* (cp. Schiller 1979: 21*f.*).

What began in the *qa'im maqamiya* as an economical decline of the *muqtada'ji*s continued in the *Mutasarrifiya's* consolidation of new political and administrative structures. This

reformist processes, which has its foundations in the Ottoman *tanzimat*[16], „where then pushed [...] by the European colonialists in order to expand the imperial market and weaken the native leadership, while cultivating the loyalty of newer social élites“ (Ayubi 1995: 23).

Culturally, the late 1850s and the 1860s enriched the whole Levant. Especially Beirut and the mountain region experienced an Arabic cultural awakening. The *Nahda*, as the cultural renaissance or awakening was/ is called, was initiated by migrants who came from Mount Lebanon to Beirut, heavily financed by philanthropic Christian association from Europe and/ or the U.S. Those migrants were embedded in Beirut's educational infrastructure, protected by the civic freedom of the *Mutasarrifiya* and subsequently transformed into intellectuals that challenged the *muqtada' jis* and the Maronite Church. The transitional period of the *Nahda* also assimilated European concepts of modernity and civilisation into popular thinking. Thus, the educational question became more and more important as the notion of progress was entangled with a national revival of the Arabs and the possibilities of modernity and civilisation, perfectly merging and transforming nationalist ideology with identity. On the educational side, numerous schools all over Mount Lebanon and a few universities in Beirut were established, mostly funded by either French and American Protestant missionaries (beginnings of the American University) or Jesuits (beginnings of Université Saint Joseph). From the 1860s onwards Arab journalism was on the rise with the first newspapers being published all over Syria (e.g. *Al-Fatat* & *Lisan al-Hal*). Additionally scientific journals in Syria like *Al-Mashriq* or *Al-Muqtafaf* were increasingly published. Alongside with newspapers in Egypt and Istanbul these papers laid the foundations for the Arabic press (cp. Salibi 1998: 17; Schiller 1979: 22; Traboulsi 2007: 60-67).

4.2 First World War to independence

After being part of the Ottoman Empire for more than 400 years, Lebanon was ascribed to France under Mandate from the League of Nations in 1919. On 1^{st} September 1920 the French established *Grand Liban* (State of Greater Lebanon) as a part of the French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon (figure 4.2) alongside the British Mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia (Iraq). The French High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, Gouraud,

[16] Secularist tendencies in the Ottoman empire generated a crisis of cultural frames of reference hitherto valid. Especially the slow dissolution of the *milet* system contributed to this development: „[T]he Tanzimat regime showed the Turkish people its lack of a genuine social substratum. [...] Ottoman sovereignty was no longer based upon Islam. It no longer meant rule over a number of subordinate theocracies called millets. It was not even a sovereignty sustained by a Turkish ‚nation', as that did not exist either in the modern sense of nationality, or in the sense of religious community" (Berkes 1998: 201).

appointed Major Traboud as governor of Greater Lebanon. In 1922, the governor established an Administrative Council (that would later become a partly elected Representative Council) and assigned it to draft a Lebanese constitution. The drafting process was very slow due to various internal Lebanese political contradictions and disputes over confessional distribution of political power. In the beginning, the Administrative Council was largely rejected by the Muslim population and began to attract Muslim participation only slowly. The Syrian Revolt (1925 - 1927) drove France to grant Lebanon (and Syria) a constitution in 1926 that renamed Greater Lebanon the Lebanese Republic. After the constitution was adopted the Representative Council became the Chamber of Deputies and a Senate representing the confessional communities and the regions was set up. The constitution, however, had an ambivalent character, laying the foundation for later political confrontations along confessional lines (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 88-90).

> The constitution was a hybrid one: on a republican body, emphasising individual rights and liberties and political and judicial equality were grafted articles concerning communal rights and representation [...]. Article 95 provided for the (temporary) fair distribution of government and administrative posts (but not for parliamentary seats) among the various sects. According to article 9, the state relinquished to the religious communities its legislative rights and rulings on personal status (marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, inheritance, etc.) in the name of freedom of religious belief. Article 10 summoned the state to defend private religious education on condition it did not conflict with public education. (Traboulsi 2007: 90)

Although a lot of developments modified the Lebanese political landscape, the French stayed an influential player in Lebanon after the adoption of the constitution. French influence manifested in the Lebanese foreign affairs, public security, administration, and the military. Also, French advisers where scattered all over the government and held an eminent position when it came to political decisions. Additionally, the president, who had to be a Christian, was granted a strong position within the government.

Generally speaking, the strong French inclination to privilege Christian Maronites led to a politically unbalanced situation. As Traboulsi (2007: 94) notes, „Christian rights, instead of being protected by foreign troops, were to be inscribed in the constitution, which guaranteed Maronite political supremacy“.

Since the power distribution was very unbalanced - between confessions as well as a matter of the distribution of posts - the overlapping governing processes created countless misunderstandings, thus, a labile internal situation. This fragility led to an abrogation of the constitution in 1932 with the result that a large share of the political power was transferred to the president. France then started negotiating the termination of the League of Nations Mandate for Syria and Lebanon. The involved parties eventually reached an agreement in 1936 that endured during the pre-World War 2 time until 1939 when France dissolved the agreement as a consequence of its involvement in World War 2. In the midst of the

Figure 4.2: Map of the French Mandate of Syria in 1923



Source: unimaps.com/syria-leb1923/mainmap.gif.

European turmoil of World War 2, General Charles de Gaulle launched the „Free French Forces campaign“ as a counterpart to the forces of the Vichy regime in France, that also controlled mandated territories and colonies. As part of the Free French Forces, General Catroux was appointed High Commissioner of the Levant in 1941 where he subsequently recognized the sovereignty of Syria and Lebanon. Lebanon then started emancipating its political sphere, and in 1943, the parliament rejected the political authority of the French colonial administration. This act provoked French military involvement in Lebanon, leading to the arrest of the president, ministers, and members of parliament. Finally pressure from the Allied Forces of World War 2 forced France to finally grant the Lebanese State independence on 8^{th} November 1943, when the Lebanese government abolished the French League of Nations Mandate. However, it was not until 1946 that the last French troops withdrew from Lebanese territory and the Lebanese State obtained its full independence from colonial occupation. Nevertheless, the year 1943 is recognized as the birth year of the Republic of Lebanon (cp. Fürtig 2009: 63-65).

Independent Lebanon drew its pattern of political power distribution between the various religious groups in the parliament from the only population census that took place in 1932.

This census has been forming the foundation for the distribution of power between the various confessional groups in the parliament for over 60 years, wherefore it is called the unwritten „National Pact“ (arabic: *Mithaq Al-Watani*). The National Pact, „a gentlemen's agreement between the country's Maronite Christian President Bishara al-Khouri and his Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Riyadh al-Solh“ (Harb 2006), requires the president be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister be a Sunni Muslim, the speaker of parliament be a Shi'ite Muslim, and the deputy prime minister as well as the deputy speaker of parliament be a Greek Orthodox. The representation of confessional communities through distribution of political posts in the parliament was set to a ratio of 6:5 in favour for Maronite Christians, vis-à-vis Muslims. The first and only modifications of the National Pact were a result of the Ta'if agreement negotiations that ended the Lebanese civil war in 1990 (cp. Harb 2006).

From a critical perspective, it needs to be taken into account that the National Pact was more of an expression of interests from the Lebanese bourgeoisie than a socially integrating element. Nevertheless, the National Pact was carried by most political groups (cp. Rondot 1966: 130*f.* cited in Schiller 1979: 26). Another aspect touching on the issue of the National Pact and its conclusion in 1943, is the role of France. Since the French provisory government sought to keep up the fragmentation of the Lebanese society in order to ensure continuity of its mandate in the early 1940s, the trans-confessional and trans-national consensus under the National Pact united the Lebanese against this policy and enabled Lebanese independence in the first place (cp. Schiller 1979: 26).

4.2.1 Important socio-political repercussions

Owen (1976 in Traboulsi 2007: 88) noted that „by splitting of Greater Lebanon from its natural hinterland, the French not only confirmed the financial and commercial hegemony of Beirut over the Mountain, but also strengthened a pattern of economic activity, in which agriculture and industry became subordinated to banking and trade“. The geopolitical frame of the French colonial interests became clearly visible through the drawing of borders of Greater Lebanon. By cutting off Lebanon from the Syrian hinterland, the borders that were drawn had significant economic impacts. Lebanon's economic perspectives were thus predefined in a way that an outward looking role was forced upon it by French colonial policies. Slowly international communication structures arose out of an emerging merchant and financial bourgeoisie while the agricultural sector was significantly petered. The „new“ Lebanon soon heralded a revived Phonician cultural identity that was subsequently enriched by the notion of Lebanon as the „Switzerland of the East“. Lebanon „soon became a multifunctional model: Lebanon, banker of the region, federation of sectarian cantons and a country that exploits its natural beauty in tourism and estivation“

(Traboulsi 2007: 92). Furthermore, the collapse of the sericultural sector in the 1930s led to a wave of extensive migration of the Lebanese peasantry.

> Here are the ghost villages, inhabited by unemployment, laziness and desolation. [...] Here is the lost wealth, alimented by the newspapers... and the gentlemen dressed in European attire. National pride, dressed in artificial silk, eats its bread drenched in the sweat of Africa. (al-Rihani 1965 in Traboulsi 2007: 92)

The economical processes shaping part of the Lebanese identity were to a large extent influenced by France, however, they also had a confessional aspect: „While the original confessional formula was good for civic peace and gradual democratic development, it created other problems. [...] While the Muslims in general wanted close relations with their Arab, mostly Muslim, neighbours, the Christians wanted to maintain close relations with the West despite their Arab identity" (Harb 2006). Nationalist aspirations from different ethno-confessional communities nonetheless led to various inter-ethno-confessional and multi-ethno-confessional cooperations. Basically, inter-ethno-confessional and multi-ethno-confessional awakening came to Lebanon after the Lebanese realized the influence of economic factors on their daily lives. Generally these cooperations did not have a deep cross-confessional character, except from the desire to be granted independence. Differences between the confessions manifested in the perceptions of a Lebanese identity, „‚Lebanonism' was synonymous with Christianity and ‚unionism' synonymous with Islamism" (Traboulsi 2007: 99). Christian „Lebanonism" was a peculiar kind of protectionism nourished by France while Muslim „unionism" was a „patriotism that would surpass the attachment/detachment dilemma in favour of a wider version of Lebanon's Arab national roots" (Traboulsi 2007: 100). In other words, this period of Lebanese history was twisted between ideas of independence, nationalism and reformism (cp. Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2012).

The debates about nationalism, either of Muslim or of Christian kind, had an sustainable effect on Lebanese politics, since it profoundly focused on internal debates (within the Lebanese borders drawn by the French Mandate from the League of Nations) for the first time in the country's history. Thus, the national pact is not necessarily a sign of Lebanese political emancipation but a mere dropping of the old linkage of internal political activity by external framing: „[T]he alliance between Bishara al-Khuri and Riad al-Sulh was sealed and elaborated in the famous National Pact, in which the former traded French protection for Christian political primacy guaranteed by the constitution and the latter dropped the idea of Muslim annexation to Syria in return for Muslim partnership in running affairs in the country" (Traboulsi 2007: 105*f.*). Nevertheless, the crux of the territorially enlarged Lebanon was that „the addition. . . almost doubled the area of the country and increased its population by about one-half, over 200.000, predominantly Muslims. . . What the country gained in area it lost in cohesion. It lost its internal equilibrium" (Hitti 1956: 490*f.* cited in Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2012). Furthermore, the shifting internal equilibrium can also be attributed to

> [t]he foreignness of the apparatus of power and administration has prevented the state from permeating the society. Thus the ‚legal rule' was never combined with a ‚moral conscious', nor has the emotional bond with the community or with the nation been identified with a political association (the state). The state machine was reformed, and a technocracy of sorts was allowed to function, bringing economic improvements to most people, but the state remained ‚alien' in relation to society, and the nationalist movement and the Arab intellectuals remained attached to Utopia, and a long way away from accepting the reality of the state or dealing objectively with it. (Ayubi 1995: 23)

In light of the incongruence that was produced by the foreignness of the state and a considerable attachment to Western conceptualisation of society, the

> autonomous group [confessional group in a traditional understanding] appeared to be a threat that should be suppressed before colonialists could exploit it for their own purposes, and the autonomous individual seemed to resemble an enemy that should be suppressed. Like the territorial state, the new one remained remained concentrated and authoritarian, but its domain has expended tremendously at the expense of the freedom of the group and the individual. (Ayubi 1995: 23; remarks LW)

4.3 From independence to the outbreak of civil war

4.3.1 Taking off: Lebanon from 1943 to 1952

French colonial interests prevailed in Syria and Lebanon after the formal act of gaining independence in 1943. After the end of World War 2, however, France was about to revive its involvement in Lebanon by sending Senegalese troops to Lebanon and Syria which were, in turn, ordered back to their bases by British troops. It was only in 1946, when all foreign troops finally left Lebanese territory. Even if such neo-colonial practices did not succeed in the long term, other ways of securing influence in Lebanon were quite successful. This primarily concerned economical aspects: The growing integration into the economical periphery of the oil-producing Arab countries triggered intensified neo-colonial efforts by Britain and France. France for its part established a network of local representatives, enabling French companies to secure their interests through economical patronage networks. By doing so, French banks soon dominated the Lebanese banking system (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 112*f.*, 118*f.*).

A huge impact on the restructuring of political power was attributed to the way the national pact and the 1943 constitution were being read. That is exactly what Traboulsi (2007: 111) means by the negative impacts „of a country ‚taking off' with two founding texts" that still constitute the modern Lebanese political landscape. The newly established Lebanese Republic was an equilibrium of ethno-confessional pluralism dominated by the

Maronites. The head of state Bishara al-Khuri, a Maronite, was involved in most political decisions, which made him „the main pole of attraction for the country's dominant economic interests" (Traboulsi 2007: 115). As a result of the presidents political and economical primacy, a consortium compromising the presidents family and related families was able to create a revenue that made up 40 per cent of Lebanon's national revenue in 1948. The main economic sources of these families were drawn from the silk economy, war profits (expenditures of foreign troops until 1946) and emigrant money (coming from Africa, the Americas and oil-producing Arab countries). Adjacent to the consortium of economical elites, the industrial class was not able to administer a sufficient local market for their goods. Respectively, „[t]he Lebanon of the 1940s was a pioneer in rejecting ‚import substitution' in favour of ‚export-oriented' industry" (Traboulsi 2007: 120) that occurred alongside the gradual detachment of the Lebanese economy from the Syrian one.

Besides the role of the president, the parliament's role was more or less exclusively the establishment of ethno-confessional peace between the various factions within the country. These various factions, however, did align themselves in a fierce opposition to the ruling presidential establishment of the Constitutionalist Party.

4.3.2 Authoritarianism: Lebanon from 1952 to 1958

The financial institutions that were formed in the presidential period of Bishara al-Khuri led to a relative economic prosperity all through the 1950s, due to the increasing amounts of capital that flew into the Lebanese banks in order to be handled by them. Nevertheless, the generated revenues were poorly allocated and largely concentrated in the area of Mount Lebanon (of which the majority of the residents were Maronite Christians, Greek Orthodox and Druzes). The weak government that the new president - Sham'un - formed when he took over the presidential post, allowed him to center the gravity of political power in his hands, yet exceeding presidential authoritarianism of Bishara al-Khuri by large. Because „economic ‚openings' and privatisations can indeed be articulated with political authoritarianism" (Ayubi 1995: 29*f.*), the impacts of the economical prosperity in combination with the monopoly of power led to a dramatic increase in corrupt political practices.

> The Middle East has historically possessed modes of production that were mainly tributary in nature. Such a predominance of ‚control-based' modes of production has often constrained the process of accumulation but it has certainly increased the importance of the political factor. In modern times, the tributary modes of production have been articulated with the encroaching capitalist mode of production. (Ayubi 1995: 24*f.*)

The results of these developments and other political factors aggravated social disparities and sustainably consolidated ethno-confessional divisions like never before: The Maronites were largely favoured by Sham'un's policy but became increasingly divided, ultimately

leading to the development of a Christian third force that called for neutrality in Arab conflicts (addressing the controversial political debate about the Baghdad Pact[17] on the one side and the Arab Defence Pact[18] on the other side). Naturally, the Muslims' were alienated by the pro-Maronite and corrupt policy of Sham'un and ultimately expressed their reservations by calling for strikes and demonstrations.

> The civil war of 1958 was [...] a struggle of power between political factions rather than a sectarian war - for example many Maronites could be found siding against the Maronite church. (Fawaz 1994: 220)

While Sham'un was backed by the US administration in the first months of fighting that erupted in Lebanon between partisans of the opposition and the army, the United States did not actively intend to intervene in Lebanon. When the security situation was not controllable any more, British troops landed in the region, and the US administration decided to deploy the Sixth Fleet to Lebanon. Sham'un was then replaced by Army Commander Fu'ad Shihab, who was elected in July 1958, in order to be sworn in as president of the Lebanese Republic in September 1958. The opposition-biased government that was formed in the aftermath was met by three weeks of counter-revolution initiated by the Christian Phalange Party[19]. After dissolving the government and forming a balanced government between rebels and loyalists, tensions began to ease and the US Sixth fleet left by the end of October 1958 (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 128-137).

4.3.3 The road to civil war: Lebanon between 1958 and 1975

Shihab's agenda focused on a comprehensive social reform in order to establish equality between the Lebanese: „His version of Lebanese nationalism was unifying and egalitarian, for, said he, ‚in being a Lebanese there is no discrimination nor privilege'" (Traboulsi 2007: 139). Nevertheless, officers from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) tried to overthrow the government after being in office for four years. The aborted *coup d'etat* led to strict control mechanisms of the army intelligence, known as the *Deuxième bureau*. The *Deuxième bureau* took over the formal control of trade unions and the power brokers and controlled the carrying of arms. Except the aborted *coup d'etat*, Lebanon under Shihab experienced a period were social conflicts were largely contained (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 138-140). Shihab and his government „wanted to correct the failures of the sectarian system by injecting it with large doses of economic and social justice" (Traboulsi 2007: 140) to

[17] The Baghdad Pact, also known as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), was an anti-communist instrument of containment of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The Pact was declared in 1955 between Iraq, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey and dissolved in 1979.

[18] The Arab Defence Pact was signed as a response to the Baghdad pact by Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

[19] The name Phalange originates from European fascist organisations with which Pierre Jumayil, the founder of the Phalange - or Kata'ib, became acquainted at the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936 (cp. Kraft 2011: 8*f.*).

establish a social equilibrium. The challenge Lebanon was facing at this point illustrates the dichotomy between classes and the independent state itself. Ayubi remarks that

> [i]f class forces are generally weak, a situation typical of most pre-capitalist or newly capitalist societies, then the state may enjoy a high degree of independence from capitalists most of the time. If the classes are economically and/or politically weak, that would allow for an independent state [...]. Or else hegemony could be organised by the intellectuals, in a contingent way, via specific *supra-class discourses.* (Ayubi 1995: 27; original emphasis)

In this regard, the forces who were attracted by the Shihabist reforms where largely interested in building (and continuing to build) an independent state. In government, the Phalange Party and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) formed the basis of Shihabs political and social ambitions. The civil forces during his presidency involved

> a bourgeois faction that was either fighting against the monopoly powers ot the ‚consortium' or seeking political recognition and a place in the system; middle classes that acceded to social mobility through Arab capital invested in Lebanon; large sectors of the petite bourgeoisie, including some intellectuals and many civil servants; and generally, the Muslim public. (Traboulsi 2007: 143)

At the brink of a potential crisis after the presidential elections in 1964, the threat to fall back into a situation like in 1958 became imminent. When Shihab was re-elected by a sweeping majority, the Christian opposition threatened to rebel on the streets just as the Muslims did in 1958. As a result, Shihab did not renew his presidential term and Charles Hilu was chosen as a compromise candidate. The following presidency of Hilu opened for re-emerging ethno-confessional disparities in Lebanon as he „soon fell victim to the polarisation between the Shibabists [...] and their opponents [...] as well as the polarisation between the two populist parties that constituted the basis of the preceding regime, [...] Phalange and [...] PSP" (Traboulsi 2007: 144). Hilu followed a strict *laissez-faire* doctrine and confined the states role to the development of the service sector and infrastructure.

In the run-up to the 1967 Six-Day War between Israel and its Arab neighbours Jordan and the UAR[20], various social movements (especially worker movements) that emerged in Lebanon called for numerous strikes and protests. The demands of the protesters targeted the labour conditions and called for wage increase and a rise in the minimum wage. In general, Lebanon experienced a crisis in agricultural business during the 1960s that considerably attributed to the labourers' situation. Although the demands were met by a generous wage increase of 8 per cent for workers (and 20 per cent for the deputies), „[t]he working class found itself in a vicious circle: what they won in terms of social services was lost in terms of job security" (Traboulsi 2007: 146); arbitrary dismissals of workers

[20]The United Arab Republic (UAR) was an union between Syria and Egypt that existed between 22^{nd} February 1958 and 2^{nd} September 1971. During its existence, Gamal Abdel Nasser served as its president.

happened on a daily basis. The social struggles of the workers and peasants in the 1960s raised the question of national unity and asked for a definition of the state that comprises all social classes. Inflamed by debates about social disparities (like living conditions in shantytowns) the question about the presence of foreigners in Lebanon became pressing. The argument was that rich foreigners bought land property and that Lebanon was „sold out" to strangers. As Sharara (1980: 740*f.* cited in Traboulsi 2007: 148) remarks, the foreigners in Lebanon were accused of „snatching the peace of bread from the mouth of the Lebanese".

By calling for national resistance against the „foreign conspiracy" towards the Lebanese, internal problems like inequalities between rich and poor were exteriorised. This standpoint towards internal dynamics, the soaring involvement of the oil-producing countries and the Western financial centres were the framing conditions of the Intra Bank crash in 1966. The crash of Intra Bank, the biggest Lebanese bank, ignited a series of bankruptcies of smaller Lebanese banks and sparked a popular debate about class differences. Interestingly, these debates focused on social class rather than ethno-confessional distinctions. After the banking crisis, the debris from the Shihab presidency, like security services that firmly controlled Lebanese life, on the one hand, and parties that divided the social base (with the Phalange party representing parts of the society and ant the PSP, nationalist and leftist parties representing the other parts) on the other hand, threatened the socio-economic base that largely bridged the class disparities during the early 1960s.

In the course of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war (also known as the Six-Day War) Palestinian *fida'iyin* entered Lebanese territory and drew the southern border regions into the conflict. The establishment of *fida'iyin* bases in the south soon led to internal political discord, deteriorating relations with Syria, and Israeli military actions in south Lebanon. After massive demonstrations and clashes between the demonstrators and the army, the government finally resigned, bowing to the internal pressure against the official governmental position regarding the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. The crisis only resolved after the formation of a government of national unity that was tasked with the implementation of the Cairo Accords[21] (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 148-155).

Another result of the banking crisis was the subjection of the Lebanese economy to foreign capital, meaning that at the end of the 1960s small domestic depositors had largely disappeared and the 40 per cent of the bank deposits were owned by foreign banks (only five years later this percentage increased to 80 per cent). The reason behind this development was the large influx of petrodollars from the oil-producing Arab countries that were to be

[21] The Cairo Accord, signed on 8^{th} November 1969 by Yasir Arafat, „recognised the armed *fida'iyin's* right to be present on and move around Lebanese territory [...] and provided a form of extra-territoriality for the Palestinian camps, long under the heavy hand of the Lebanese security services, and recognised a Higher Palestinian Commission [...] as a *de facto* Palestinian embassy in Lebanon" (Traboulsi 2007: 154; original emphasis).

invested either in Europe or the the USA. Since the rapid industrial growth that accompanied these developments was for the most part export oriented, the massive capital stock that circulated in Lebanese banks barely contributed to domestic productive sectors. The increase of industrial workers (from 65.000 in the mid 1960s to about 120.000 in the mid 1970s) at the same time petered the diversity of the industrial sector, meaning that the specialisation of the Lebanese industry was in fact a drastic reduction of the capabilities to produce a variety of goods for the domestic market itself. Major effects of the Lebanese export oriented economic model were (i) a balance of trade deficit generated by vast imports of raw materials and other goods for the domestic market, while the export rate increased disproportionally slow, (ii) the extensive payment of royalties and licences to foreign owned companies, (iii) the extinguishing of large parts of the domestic market due to extensive imports for the domestic market, as well as the dependency of the productive sector on foreign markets, and (iv) the disappearing of the agricultural sector due to capitalist logic invading the production process, and (v) the steady replacement of domestic production by an export driven agricultural sector (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 156-159).

The demographic consequences that Lebanon experienced in the early 1970s, were a result from the economical settings that were established throughout the 1960s. On the one hand, the crisis of the agricultural sector forced many Lebanese into urban areas in order to find work. This contributed to an increased influx of non-Lebanese workers in this sector, and to a doubling of living costs in the capital Beirut between the mid 1960s and the mid 1970s. On the other hand, emigration to Europe and the Americas carried out „a permanent reconstruction of the country's social stratification" (Traboulsi 2007: 159) while returnees with an elevated social status altered the traditional bourgeoisie and got involved in commerce, property, and finance. Soon Beirut turned into a center of commerce with about 50.000 empty luxury apartments and skyscrapers hosting banks and foreign companies, surrounded by a poverty belt consisting of poor and working class suburbs next to the Palestinian refugee camps (Burj al- Barajineh, Mar Iliyas, Tall al-Za'tar, Sabra and Shatila) that were established as emergency relief in 1950, in response to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In the poverty belt lived some 40 per cent of Beirut's total population of about one million, of which about 250.000 were Shi'ite Muslims that experienced the highest rates of urbanisation due to the collapse of the economy in the Beq'aa valley and the concentration of *fida'iyin* bases in Southern Lebanon, causing constant clashes in that area. As Traboulsi (2007: 162) remarks, „these suburbs [were] breeding grounds for the populist parties of the Left and Right [...] [while] the proximity of the Palestinian camps provided one with hope for change, the other with the needed scapegoats".

Lebanon's social structure at the end of the 1960s was „one of small-scale privileges and distinctions produced by patronage and the sectarian system, along with large scale class

Figure 4.3: Confessional residence areas before the civil war



Source: Hanf 1990: 257.

privileges and divisions“ (Traboulsi 2007: 160), contributing to a desire for change among all segments of the society. Regarding this situation, Ayubis comments that

> [t]he class nature of such a society manifests in a dispersed, fluid class map with classes excessively dependent on the state (or on the outside world) and with many intermediate strata [...] in existence. Several of these contend with each other for social and economic prominence but without any of them being structurally capable of assuming class hegemony within the society. (Ayubi 1995: 25)

The existence of highly utilized patron-client networks and a middle class making up about two thirds of the Lebanese population ultimately blocked social mobility and increased ethno-confessional and class pressure on the job market and educational institutions. The Christians (as the socio-economically most advantaged ethno-confessional community) were exemplary for the confessional distinctions within the society: In the early 1970s, the Christians still controlled most of the businesses in Lebanon. The ration between Christians and Muslims in the banking sector was 71/ 29 per cent, 75,5/ 24,5

per cent in commercial firms and 67,5/ 32,4 per cent in industrial firms (cp. Labaki 1988: 166*f.* cited in Traboulsi 2007: 162).

At this time social movements of workers, peasants, and students organised strikes and demonstrations at a daily rate, sometimes also resorting to armed violence. Again, like in the centuries before, job security was a pressing topic at the demonstrations, thus, drawing the support of the Left on their side. By entangling political aspects of the Left with demands of the Lebanese protesters, their class-consciousness steadily developed. Indeed, socio-economic class-factions started developing a political consciousness that enabled them to articulate their frustration via channels like political parties or unions. The biggest workers protest took place in November 1972, at the Ghandour factory in Beirut, led by Kamal Jumblat of the PSP. Effectively, the unsuccessful workers strikes and protests led to even more frustration and popular protests on the street, without any gains. Also, the Lebanese students formed unions that called for protests against the Lebanese „merchant society". In the early 1970s, student demonstrations took place at a daily rate in Beirut, often leading to clashes between the police/ army and demonstrators or in other cases between various militias, like the Christian Phalange, and demonstrators. The deep socio-economic disparities among the poor and middle classes favoured the elites in a way that the traditional big family clans returned to power. They literally manifested their power positions in the Lebanese society in terms of economical and political influence (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 164-170). A significant aspect of the value of political representation was attributed to traditional family and clan loyalties, irrespective of their class/ confessional political attitude, meaning that the „effects of socio-economic integration were being erased and family, clan and confessional allegiances reproduced" (Traboulsi 2007: 171).[22] Another aspect of the Lebanese political system was to be seen in 1972 from which Suleiman Franjiyeh rose to presidency, namely the factual impossibility for new societal forces to rise to power.

The control of the traditional economical elites over the political establishment became obvious in the first years of Franjiyeh's presidency and led to the resigning of a number of ministers, since no confessional fraction was willing to give up any of their prerogatives. Franjiyeh's political programme focused on reforming the country from above as a counter measure to the numerous popular protests and aspiring social movements. Anyhow, the promised reform largely failed and

> [a]s revolution was not made from above, it was to be made, in the most vicious and destructive manner, ‚from below'. In a country where the rights and obligations of people are nearly always defined by the individual's belonging by birth to a sectarian political community, social frustrations and blocked social demands gradually slipped

[22] This Lebanese phenomenon still represents a pressing issue when it comes to regional elections as it was last seen in May 2010. Up to this day the reformation of the (communal) election system poses a profound challenge. Further reading: *Mühlberger (2010).*

> toward sectarian and regional division, aggravated by the political conflict between reform and security, the latter centred on the Palestinian armed presence. (Traboulsi 2007: 174)

Generally, the debate about security was a mix between articulating frustration about the internal repression that the army enforced upon the society, and the role of the army, especially in regard to the armed *fida'iyin* presence in the south. The public opinion was, that „[t]he army was there to defend the system, not the homeland" (Traboulsi 2007: 174), as it could be observed in the uninterrupted series of strikes, demonstrations and protests on the eve of civil war. Frictions of the middle class and especially their frustrations that enriched the security debate, constituted the major drivers for a diversion of social movements articulating political demands into armed conflict. Especially the younger generation became increasingly frustrated because of the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War. At this point, the social attention slowly shifted from national to social issues:

> Every morning, a gun falls on the mountain
>
> and we are but silent witnesses.
>
> But a day will come
>
> when we will direct our ploughshares
>
> To their obese
>
> and debauched hearts.[23]

Before the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 (also known as the Yom Kippur War), ethno-confessional tensions in Lebanon became increasingly intense. The government announced that higher governmental posts were not longer to be reserved for people from a respective ethno-confessional community but open for every community. This change was thought to bring notables of the old elites into the government. The political debate at this point was strongly entwined with security issues as the formation of pro-Palestinian groups[24] emerged as a fierce opposition to groups who got more and more involved in armed clashes[25] with the PLO. Clashes between the PLO and the the army (either side backed by Lebanese militias of various ethno-confessional community) dynamically transformed to clashes between the supporting groups themselves. In 1974 and 1975, fighting between militias of the Phalange and the PSP, between the PLO and their Lebanese allies and the army as well as violent confrontations at workers and student protests became a daily routine. On 13^{th} April 1975 fights erupted between the PLO, their respective allies, and the Phalange

[23] Poem by 'Abbas Baydun cited in Traboulsi 2007: 181.

[24] Support for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Lebanon was especially provided by the PSP, Nasserite movements and other parties from the Left. In 1973 Kamal Junblat accused Christian parties/ militias of liquidating the PLO in Lebanon.

[25] In May 1973 the government and the PLO signed the Melkard accord that imposed a cease-fire between the PLO and the Lebanese government. Nevertheless, fighting between the PLO and the army, backed by the Phalange, continued. In addition to the Phalange the National Liberation Party (NLP) opposed the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

in Beirut, marking the beginning of the Lebanese civil war that was to be last until the signing of the al-Ta'if-Agreement in 1990 (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 180-183).

4.4 The Lebanese civil war

The large influx of Palestinian refugees (especially into South Lebanon) in the late 1960s and 1970s had an influence on internal Lebanese political dynamics. Although this influx can be viewed as one factor in destabilizing the country, the subsequent civil war that followed was not a direct result from it. Instead it only ignited already stressed social tensions. The focus on the Palestinian influx as the main trigger of the civil war only externalizes internal contradictions of the Lebanese society that led to the civil war in the first place.

The Lebanese civil war which took place between 1975 and 1990 involved many different actors. This period saw the relationships between these manifold ethno-confessional groups go through various stages, resulting in shifting sets of coalitions and alliances throughout the years of the civil war. The civil war ended with the Ta'if-Agreement that was intended to stabilize the country's confessional political structure. A major change from the prevailing structure was the change of the distribution of political power between Muslims and Christians in parliament from 6/5 for Christians to 5/5 .

The following overview of the Lebanese civil war is ought to highlight the ethno-confessional aspects and their socio-economical as well as their socio-political foundations. Instead of a linear portrayal of the civil war and their appendant events, the diverging political interests and the subsequent mobilisation on an ethno-confessional basis will be in focus as the developments of this period of Lebanese history constitute a major factor for contemporary politics in Lebanon.

Albeit the focus in the following sections will not be on static historical events of the civil war, it should be stressed that political rhetoric and mobilisation in this period of Lebanese history was - on the one hand - rooted in fights for interests and territorial ambitions and - on the other hand - stimulated heavy fighting in the first place.

4.4.1 Overview of developments in the Lebanese civil war 1975-1985

Throughout the first phase of the Lebanese civil war a „game of exclusions" was played by each political camp against the others. By trying to win sovereignty in the security debate and in the debate over political reform of the Lebanese system, every camp attempted to reach power within the political system. Beginning in 1975, a Two-Year War between

Christians and Palestinians that would involve the Lebanese Front[26] (with its main actor the Christian Phalange) on one side and the PLO as well as the Lebanese National Movement (LMN[27]), an unification movement of Leftist parties that existed from 1975 to 1982, on the other side. In this early phase of what came to be known as the Lebanese civil war, the LNM emphasised attempts to abolish confessional quotas for administrative posts. Thus, it can be seen that the early ambitious articulation of political reform was based on the political confessionalism that was prevailing in Lebanon. Most of this attempts generally involved little dialogue but extensive populist rhetoric and finally ended in a stalemate between the Lebanese Front and the LNM (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 187-190).

> The envisaged abolishment of political confessionalism was a prevailing claim of the Leftist parties to be anathema to the Maronite notables. The Maronite or Christian privileges that were inherent in the confessional system were seen as guarantees to protect them against political group favouritism of Muslims and pressures of assimilation.[28] (Perthes 1994: 21)

Critical positions on the proportional representation of confessional groups in administration and politics that perceive confessionalism as a leftover of European imperialism, frame the demands to abolish confessional quotas as a conclusive stage of a decolonisation process (cp. Schölch 1977: 9 cited in Schiller 1979: 26).

The severe fighting that followed after the early phase of the war was adjourned for the first time in late 1975 when a cease-fire was declared between the belligerent forces in order to form the Committee for National Dialogue (CND). The CND was tasked with building a basis „to return to ‚coexistence among the countries spiritual families (sects)'" (Traboulsi 2007: 190) and, for the first time in Lebanese history, touched upon questions of public life. The ongoing civil war (seen as a confrontation between the social demands of various groups in society) was only „sectarian in form, [...] [but] social in contents and demands" (Traboulsi 2007: 191). The CND, concluding its meetings and enquiries, suggested to abolish confessional quotas since

> [s]ectarian pluralism, the independence of sects and the political and administrative representation according to (presumed) numerical percentages of each sect among the

[26] The Lebanese Front was a coalition of right-wing parties (mainly Christian) and was formed in 1976. It included the Phalange (or Kata'ib) of Pierre Jumayil, the Lebanese Forces of Sham'un and the NLP of Franjiyeh. In the early phase ot the civil war the Lebanese Forces constituted an umbrella organisation for various Christian militias (Tanzim, Guardians of the Cedars, Tigers, Tyous Team of Commandos, etc.) and became a separate actor from the 1980s onwards.

[27] The LNM emerged out of the Front of National and Progressive Parties and Forces (FNPPF) in 1969 which ran for elections for the first time in 1972. The LNM allied the PSP, LCP, CAO SSNP, the Syrian-led Ba'ath party branch as well as the Iraqi-led Ba'ath party branch alongside Palestinian Fractions (DFLP and PLFP).

[28] Original quote: „Die geplante Abschaffung des politischen Konfessionalismus gehörte zu den alten Forderungen der politischen Linken und war Anathema insbesondere für die maronitische Elite. Die maronitischen und christlichen ‚Privilegien' die das konfessionalistische System in seiner konkreten Gestalt beinhaltete, waren in der christlichen Diktion Schutzgarantien gegen muslimische Majorisierung und Assimilierungsdruck." (Perthes 1994: 21)

> population [...] were contrary to the fundamental democratic principle of legal and political equality among citizens (Traboulsi 2007: 191)

Nevertheless, the CND's decisions were sabotaged by Franjiyeh, Sham'un and Jumayil, the most notable leaders of the Lebanese Front, and were never incorporated in the political system.

After the failure of reform efforts, the security situation escalated. Followed by operations of the LNM against the Phalange, which is also known as the „battle of the hotels", the Phalange committed a massacre against Muslim civilians in East Beirut. The interventions of the Lebanese Army in the war led to an increased involvement of the PLO and various Palestinian militias. In the course of the the fights commencing in summer 1975, parties of the Lebanese Front accused the Palestinians to be responsible for the deteriorating situation, since they „intervened in internal Lebanese affairs". Generally the Muslim population was perceived as being responsible for weakening the state by the Christian Phalange, establishing a wider debate about confessionalism in the country that was ploughed through with political confessionalism for hundreds of years. This debate led to defections of Muslim units within the army, constituting the birth of a second army[29] financed by Libya and supported by Fatah (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 191-194).

The bombardment of the palace of ex-president Franjiyeh on 25^{th} March 1976, signalled the final breakdown of the state. Subsequently the Christians enforced discussions about a foreign military intervention while the camps within the Christian ranks were divided over whether Syria or the USA (under UN auspices) should deploy their forces to Lebanon. It should be noted that the Christian camps favoured an Israeli intervention in the first place but as their request was turned down, negotiations commenced with Syria and the USA. As no intervention by any foreign military force was to take place, Israel supported the Phalange with military supplies and training while Syria served as their political protector. In June 1976, the Syrians' finally sent about 15.000 soldiers to Lebanon in order to protect the Maronite villages (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 194-198). Later this Syrian military force was mandated as an Arab Deterrence Force (ADF) by the Arab League and got some minor detachments from other Arab countries in order to provide them with „pan-Arab cover and legitimacy" (Traboulsi 2007: 199).

As an opposition to the Israel-Christian alliance, the LNM and the PLO formed a counter-alliance to defend their common interests, culminating in military operations against Israel

[29] This second army became known as the Army of Free Lebanon (AFL). Major Saad Haddad split from one Battalion that was stationed in Southern Lebanon, known as the Free Lebanon Army (FLA). After the 1978 Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon, a part of the FLA joined ranks with the regular Lebanese army again and the remaining units under command of Haddad became known as the South Lebanese Army (SLA), a major ally of Israel that controlled large parts of the South under supervision of Israeli officers.

in Southern Lebanon. Within this alliance the PLO profited from internal Lebanese contradictions and a weak state while the LNM used the PLO as a military weight to impose political reform. Thus, the Two-Year War can be seen as a „balancing game" between the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and the political advantages of the Christians. One problematic issue for the LNM was the loss of intra-Lebanese support due to the sustaining articulation of ethno-confessional divisions in Lebanon (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 198-200). The LNM for its part envisaged political reforms that should constitute the foundations for socio-economic reforms. This approach was based on earlier debates within the Lebanese Marxist Left:

> From the results of the 1972 elections and the politicisation of the social movements of the prewar years it had drawn the conclusion that it had no chance to achieve any of its socio-economic reforms without prior political reforms The principal tactics of the LNM were to impose a new superstructure on the Lebanese oligarchy - ‚bourgeois', modern and non-sectarian instead of ‚feudal', sectarian and ‚underdeveloped'. (Traboulsi 2007: 203)

This phase of the civil war, the Two-Year War, ended with the assassination of Kamal Jumblat[30] in March 1977 as he ventured to change the Lebanese system opposing the Syrian intervention.

Elias Sarkis, who served as president between September 1976 and September 1982, initiated a programme that should revive the economy by reconstructing the countries banking sector and accompanying privatisation policies. His programme got largely undermined by competing political fractions, even within the Christian camp, most notably by Bashir Jumayil, the son of Pierre Jumayil, who envisaged to run as a presidential elect in the next elections. Bashir Jumayil's efforts to build a power base led him to establish alliances with other right-wing and Christian parties within the Lebanese Front. Furthermore, he tried to articulate power through the tertiary economical sector. Bashir Jumayil's Phalange was by far the strongest force within the Lebanese Front and controlled large parts of the Lebanese territory in the late 1970s (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 200-205).

The social context in which the Lebanese Forces manoeuvred through the late 1970s clearly showed the rise of new social forces and their subsequent empowerment against traditional Christian leadership. Traboulsi (2007: 208*f.*) highlighted the social forces that strove for change within the Christian camps: „the youth, fighters, members of the professional middle class, members of subaltern families or villages [...] [and] the salaried". Hence, it was no surprise that Bashir Jumayil's Phalange attacked Franjiyeh's residence in order to threaten the Christian establishment, which Franjiyeh represented in one way or the other. On another side the Phalange fought against the Syrian occupation of Beirut and drove the Syrian forces out of East Beirut in a 100 day battle. In doing so, Bashir Jumayil quite

[30] Kamal Jumblat was the Druze leader of the LNM and one major figure in the early phase of the civil war. He was succeeded by his son Walid Jumblat after his assassination.

successfully coined the term of the Lebanese resistance anew: to a resistance against the traditional ethno-confessional elite leadership on the one hand, and against the presence of foreign troops on Lebanese territory, on the other. Entangled with his ambitious perception of national resistance, he „also wanted to eliminate any competitor in his relationship with the Jewish state“ (Traboulsi 2007: 209).

Figure 4.4: Areas under Christian control in 1978



Source: Hanf 1990: 306.

Important events of the late 1970s were the deployment of an UN peacekeeping force to South Lebanon and Israel's „Operation Litani“. From 14^{th} to 21^{st} March 1978 the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) launched „Operation Litani“ in order to create a frontier zone in South Lebanon, intending to drive out the Palestinian militias and the PLO. After the military campaign, the SLA (with officers from the IDF) was tasked with handling the security in the occupied region.

At the same time, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was deployed to South Lebanon, but the UN troops „did not solve much of the thorny southern question, except that these troops served as a safety net to reinforce Israel's control over the border strip“, as Traboulsi (2007: 206) remarked. One interviewee describes the basis upon which the newly established peacekeeping force had to work. After mentioning the long

diplomatic and bureaucratic talks in the run-up to the deployement of UNIFIL, he says that

> [o]nce the UN came here, everybody forgot why you were here. [...] Twelve countries send soldiers here, they had no idea why they were here. They didn't understand anything. We had twelve Palestinian groups in charge of south Lebanon. We had 20 Lebanese groups working with them. Then they were fighting with the Israelis and Israeli militias working for the Israelis. Beirut was another Jungle, everybody was fighting each other. So into that force, into that mess, you put a UN force.[31]

Elsewhere he touches upon the political side of the implementation of the UN mandate in Lebanon in the late 1970s:

> When UNIFIL came in '78, the south was Palestine. There was absolutely zero Lebanese authority. UNIFIL was everything. We provided the only medical service to the people in the south. Today they have hospitals, one knows this. [...] I mean in 1978 they wrote us a mandate. And they said to us you have to restore the authority of the country in all parts of the government, in all parts. Which authority? We had civil war's going in all places of Lebanon and somebody is telling me authority. What authority? [...] Hamra Street [one important Street in Beirut, know for its ethno-confessional diversity and for shopping] was controlled by six different groups. So how am I gonna be? The state did not control Beirut, Hamra Street, and they are telling me, the Security Council, you take the state authority to the south and there is another war going there. And, this is the political side of it. Mandates written on paper [...].[32]

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Christian-dominated Lebanse Front changed its ethno-confessional political strategy and did not defend the constitution of the Lebanese state any longer. Slowly the Lebanese Front's strategical bias was turned against the Muslim population in order to establish Christian control over the richest regions and end Muslim participation in the government. Here, altering political strategical settings can be seen as signs of a shift of the confrontational basis. While socio-economic struggles and social disparities between ethno-confessional fractions constituted the starting point of the armed clashes in the mid 1970s, the war was fought alongside inter- as well as intra-ethno-confessional lines at the beginning of the 1980s. Significantly, not only the strategical setting of the Christian camp was modified due to the dynamics of the war or changing alliances between militias and ethno-confessional groups. Changes could also be seen within Muslim ranks themselves: In the beginning of the civil war, the LNM drew heavily from Palestinian military strength, using it as a tool to impose political reforms. At the beginning of the 1980s the Palestinians used the weak Lebanese state and the non-existing government to serve their strategies since the Lebanese authorities were no major obstacle. On the other side, „many Lebanese saw the Palestinian mini-state [...] [as] a buffer against the extension of Phalange domination over the whole Lebanese entity" (Traboulsi 2007: 213). Subsequently, the internal Muslim debate about confessionalism turned into a debate oscillating between patriotism and non-patriotism for the respective

[31] Interview with interviewee b in Beirut, Lebanon on 12^{th} February 2011.
[32] Interview with interviewee b in Beirut, Lebanon on 12^{th} February 2011; remarks LW.

ethno-confessional community, all perfectly in line with Arab mainstream debate at this time (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 207-214).

At the height of the debate about confessionalism and the accompanying battles and clashes, the IDF invaded Southern Lebanon for the second time in 4 years. On 6^{th} August 1982 the IDF launched „Operation Peace for Galilee" that would later take Israeli troops to Beirut. Interestingly, the deployment of Israeli troops to Lebanon did not spark a discussion about the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation but an political debate whether the PLO should withdraw from Lebanon or not. This debate finally led to the heavily discussed withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon with the last *fida'iyin* leaving Lebanese territory on 23^{rd} August 1982.

Bashir Jumayil, backed by Israel and by a majority of the Christians, was to be elected as president, but killed on 14^{th} August 1982. In the draft of his inaugural address, Jumayil picked „nationality" as a central theme, imposing a new definition of Lebanese identity on the country's population. By doing so he introduced a central topic to the ethno-confessional debate, namely the debate about identity.

> Bashir saw himself as the winner of a war rather than a parliamentary election. [...] [T]he fundamentalist Christian nationalist president [...] saw himself as the reincarnation of the state: ‚it is the first time that the Nation takes charge of the state', he affirmed. Having presented his election as the result of unanimity around his person, he felt that all of Lebanon's ‚civilisation groups' (read: religious communities) should feel themselves associated to government by the mere fact of his election! [...] ‚Lebanon is not a Christian country', Bashir announced, ‚but a country of Lebanese Christians and Muslims.' Nevertheless, Lebanon was purged of any Arab identity, defined by its ‚oriental belonging' and ‚Arab links'. [...] Bashir's ‚new Lebanon' was to be built by the victorious fighting Christians and the old marginalised notables of political Islam. (Traboulsi 2007: 216*f.*)

Ultimately, Bashir Jumayil envisaged to transform ethno-confessional privileges into socio-cultural privileges in-cooperated in a federation project (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 217*f.*).

Shortly after Bashir Jumayil's assassination the IDF entered West Beirut in order „to prevent a bloodbath" but the weekend following his assassination, a massacre in the Palestinian twin refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila was committed by the Phalange militia and troops of the SLA. To a large extent the IDF was held responsible for this massacre since they took over the security of the Palestinian camps after international troops (deployed in Lebanon as Multinational Force - MNF - with US, Italian, British and French contingents) hurriedly left the capital. Between 15^{th} and 18^{th} August 1982 an estiminated

Figure 4.5: Military zones between 1976 and 1982



Source: Hanf 1990: 328.

number of 2.000[33] civilians were killed in the camps of Sabra and Shatila. Only two days after the massacre, the US and France recalled their troops to Lebanon.

After the death of Bashir Jumayil, his brother, Amin Jumayil, was elected as president. At the very moment when Amin Jumayil took over his post as president, Lebanon had in fact two presidents: His father Pierre Jumayil and himself, one commanding the Lebanese Army, the other commanding the Lebanese Forces (of which the Phalange was their biggest militia). As the Christians (acting as the main Israeli allies) started to negotiate a peace accord with Israel and the LMN basically dissolved into its constituting parties, these

[33]Estimated numbers of victims range from 300 up to 3.500. Robert Fisk estimated that 2.000 civilians were killed in the massacre of Sabra and Shatila Further Reading: *Fisk, Robert (2011): Sabra und Schatila: Ein Augenzeugenbericht Libanon 1982. Wien: Promedia.*

parties formed a new opposition block, the Lebanese National Resistance Front[34] (LNRF). The LNRF increasingly fought against the Israeli occupation of the southern frontier zone and West Beirut, forcing the IDF to retreat from West Beirut on 21^{st} September 1982. In Southern Lebanon the Israeli occupation furthermore triggered the emerging of civil resistance movements that partly pillared on Amal. Under the banner of Islamic resistance, Hezbullah, a new Shi'ite party in the Southern Lebanon and in the Beq'aa emerged and increasingly strengthened its constituencies among the Shi'ite population. The Shi'ite resistance movements, with Amal on the one and Hezbullah on the other side, largely grew due to the dissolving of contingents of the regular Lebanese army that was deployed to Southern Lebanon. The defected soldiers from the Lebanese army joined ranks with Amal and Hezbullah rebel units to fight the Israeli occupation and their subsidiaries, the SLA under Major Haddad (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 220-224).

The period between 1983 and early 1985 was marked by a series of heavy battles in the Shuf mountains between Walid Jumblat's militia and Christian militias[35], once more accompanied by attempts to reform the political system. The goal was to bring back Muslim political participation as well as to balance ethno-confessional political practice. The emerging political articulation and involvement of armed rebel groups from Southern Lebanon in the country led to a withdrawal of the contingents of the MNF, notably after the suicide attacks on the French and US barracks by Hezbullah, killing 58 French parachuters and 241 US soldiers. These developments led to a shift in the balance of power, leading to a withdrawal of the IDF from large parts of territories occupied by them. After the withdrawal of its main ally, Amin Jumayil sought to establish a government of national unity that was ought to involve a participation by traditional Muslim *za'im's* and militia leaders. At the end, Jumayils initiative did not establish the envisaged balance among the ethno-confessional factions since it did not achieve to create a sustainable political structure (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 224*f.*).

At the end of 1985, on 28^{th} of December, Jumblat, Birri (the leader of the Amal militia) and Hubaya (who has taken over leadership of the Lebanese Forces together with Samir Ja'ja) signed a Tripartite Accord with Syria. The following break and the deep division of the Christian camp was in line with the redefinition of Lebanon as an „Arab country as regards its belonging and identity" (Traboulsi 2007: 226). Amin Jumayil was left with the sole leadership of the Phalange while the other part of the Christian camp was favouring the diplomatic commitment to counter a renewed Syrian counter-offensive. It was not later than March 1986 when Amin Jumayil, together with Samir Ja'ja, overthrew Hubaya

[34]The LNRF consisted of the SSNP, the OCA, the LCP and the Socialist Arab Action Party (SAAP) as well as other ex-LNM parties, and Palestinian fractions that were still present in Lebanon after the withdrawal of the *fida'iyin*.

[35]In the „war of the mountains" Druze militias killed about 1.500 Christian civilians and destroyed 62 villages between September and December 1983.

because they did not comply with most of the terms of the Tripartite Accord. „Although [t]he Tripartite Accord [...] met its end, [it was] to be resurrected after some years as the basis for the Ta'if accords (Traboulsi 2007: 227). The Christian reaction to the Accord courted Syria's resentment that ultimately led to the return of Syrian troops to Beirut (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 225-227).

4.4.2 Economic entanglement: The war and ethno-national militias between 1985 an 1990

The civil war for its part left the economy of the country devastated after 1984. The economical crisis involved a „dollarisation" of the country's economy alongside the devaluation of the official Lebanese currency, the Lebanese Lira. The public debt rose to a height of 35 billion Lebanese Lira in 1985 due to the governments military spending and the squandering practices of the militias (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 227*f.*). The subsequent marginalisation of the Lebanese state and the expansionism of the Phalange was accompanied by a dissolution of the state's territory into ethno-national cantons and the emergence of newly formed militias. Interviewee B gave an insight into the confessional dimension of these developments:

> And then at the end of '83, the first reaction I guess the Israelis started, the resistance against the Israelis, there was still no Hezbullah. It was started by the LCP, very interesting, is eh, it was a very interesting group. Eh, multi-sectarian, Christian, Druze, everybody mixed together, mostly university students. But they were small and fighting the Israelis but not very effective, you know, cause there are only once every ten days or, eh, they very doing good operations, but it was not hurting the Israelis. Then near Tyre, the first reaction started from the Amal organization militia. They started to hurt the Israelis. And then another group started near Nabatieh, which we didn't really understand who this guys were and they were very, very good. Very good operations against the Israelis. Then it turned out to be that this was a Islamic group, but not Hezbullah yet. They were called the Islamic Students Union. it was organized and managed by young Shaykh called, Shaykh Ragheb Harb who was killed by the Israelis one year later because he was too expensive for them. He organized a small groups of students in the villages, five, six boys in each village, but all of them relatives. They knew each other, so you could not put a spy in there, they all know each other, relatives. That was the first Islamic resistance. Hizbullah itself came to south Lebanon for the first time, eh, in the middle of 1984 and as soon as they came to south Lebanon, because they are Shia but they are not from south, they are from Beq'aa [the Beq'aa valley lies between the Lebanon mountain range and the Antilebanon mountain range in the east of the county, bordering Syria], they are mostly young man from Beq'aa.[36]

The similarity between the „cantonisation" of the Lebanese territory and the Ottoman *iqta'* system was inflicted by the militias who steadily emphasised the economic control within their territories as the war came closer to its end (cp. Picard 1999: 70).

[36]Interview with interviewee b in Beirut, Lebanon on 12^{th} February 2011; remarks LW.

> This was a time of proliferation in mini-states whose justifications were the defence of their regions against the expansionism of the Phalangist mini-state and the fall of the ‚central' state under Phalangist domination. Seventeen sects, a dozen cantons, some twenty ports and dozens of armed organisations - this was the Lebanese scene after 1983. [...] The war, partially the result of sectarian conflicts, was to become the crucible in which those sects were reproduced. (Traboulsi 2007: 216*f.*)

The dissolving of Lebanon's territory into ethno-national cantons also derived from the increased confessionalism of the Muslim community after the breakup of the LNM's political alliances which could not be fully replaced by the newly established LNRF. Aspects of this developments were the marginalisation of the Sunni Muslim community by other Muslim fractions (Murabitun, the only Sunni militia was wiped out by Amal and PSP after 1983), and the rise of political ambitions and articulation of interests within the Muslim camps.

In regard to the processes shaping this period of the Lebanese civil war, Ayubi's remarks on the theoretical level should be taken into account. He notes

> that in the short- to medium-run a higher level of socio-economic inclusion may distract from/compensate for political participation. in the longer run, however, the more comprehensive the socio-economic inclusion, the more certain that claims/ demands for political participation will emerge. (Ayubi 1995: 33)

On these grounds, the ethno-national inclusion/ exclusion processes can be understood as socio-economic differentiation of society, leading to the establishment of peculiar social formations, a process that is widely understood as „cantonisation" of the Lebanese territory.

On the Shi'ite side various fractions attempted to win over the Lebanese Shi'ites after their „voice" Imam Musa as-Sadr „disappeared" in Libya at the event of a formal visit in August 1978. Since Shi'ite religious foundations were heavily influenced by the Iranian religious establishment, connections became more and more visible when political Shi'ism was becoming increasingly relevant in Lebanese politics. One faction of the Shi'ite community, that of Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din (Vice President of the Higher Islamic Shi'ite Council - HISC), „supported a political solution that would reveal the numerical weight of the Shi'a" (Traboulsi 2007: 229). The second current among the Lebanese Shi'ites was adjunctive to the guidance of Sayyed Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Although he acted as the spiritual guide of Hezbullah, he did not adhere to the structures of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For this reason he did never, until today, join ranks with Hezbullah. Hezbullah, as a third current, propagated an Islamic Republic for Lebanon, mainly attracting the young and deprived population of Southern Lebanon, the Beq'aa, and Beirut's southern suburbs. The fragmentation of the Shi'ite community after 1985 became also visible through the continuing animosities between Amal and Hezbullah. Nabih Berri's Amal as the established Shi'ite force in Lebanon with its parvenu bourgeoisie constituencies,

> held an intermediary position between the two poles of the [Shi'ite] community, the ‚legalist' and the ‚radical', [both in discourse and in practice]. [...] Berri was intent on eliminating this historical image [of the Shia as permanent victims of Muslim history] in favour of a positive image of a community claiming its share of political power. (Traboulsi 2007: 230; remarks LW)

Hezbullah's radicalism - for its part - continued to act as a resistance movement against the Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon. Generally speaking, the Shi'ites defined themselves by anti-feudal connotations and fought for representation in the Lebanese political system (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 228-230).

The Druze community fiercely fought against the Maronite expansionism while redefining their identity upon historical foundations when Walid Jumblat's role was associated with „the rank of mythical ancestor of the Druze community and rehabilitated by an act of historical revenge [against the Christian repression of the Druze community under Bashir Shihab II.]" (Traboulsi 2007: 230; remarks LW). In doing so, the Druze community reproduced the model of the former feudal *muqtada' ji*s and reduced the Christians to peasants:

> Sectarian distinction cannot function without its class component. For the historical reversal to be completed, the historical identification had to be pushed to its ultimate logic. A popular poem by the Druze poet Tali' Hamdan, celebrating his community's victory in the War of the Mountain, identified the Druze community with its feudal status and reduced its adversaries to their former status as commoners and peasants. The Christians found themselves attacked by Hamdan's poem as peasants, sharecroppers and servants whom ‚we brought to our (Druze) region' but revealed their ungrateful nature as ‚venomous serpents' who turned against their benefactors. (Traboulsi 2007: 231)

In the second half of the 1980s, the civil war shifted to intra-ethno-confessional tensions, thus, generating new forms of violence and resistance. When the ethno-national militias entrenched themselves in their own confessionally dominated territories, their legitimacy began to erode. The „lack" of predominantly external enemies internalised violence in order to put firm control onto their own territories. At this point of the civil war, the existing militias began to be recognised as mafias, ostensibly by their own ethno-confessional constituencies. Increasingly, the militia leaders sought to solely represent their own communities, leading to intensified fights within the ethno-national cantons and camps in general. The fight for the monopoly of representation eventually led to the nourishing of the debate about identity. „[T]hey imposed their discourse of ‚protection' on their own ‚people': the ‚other' wants to kill you, but we are here to save your lives" (Traboulsi 2007: 233). Transformations of power and violence also took place in other spheres. Economically, the *laissez-faire* approach of the state in the late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s turned into an economy dominated by „mafias" that generated political and military power through the extraction of economic surplus. In doing so, the tax-farming

mechanisms of ancient-feudal Lebanon transformed the militia leaders into capitalist warlords, levying surplus out of all activities of their respective territories[37] (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 231-234).

When the state's economy gradually collapsed, the militias were able to use their power and control mechanisms to substitute unavailable governmental funding by accumulating economical surplus or, if possible, extract as much available resources from the state. Through the existence of numerous ports on the Lebanese coast (all of them controlled by militias), the export and import trade was basically under militia control. The ethnonational cantons were mainly build around those illegal ports, whereat the largest ports in Tripoli and Tyre held the largest share of imports from Europe. In controlling the trade, arms and drug trafficking naturally was also in militia hands. This largely attributed to the accumulation of the generated surplus[38]. The involvement of Syrian officers and government officials in the militia-economy manifested a system of profitable import/ re-export practices of petrol, timber, tyres, steel, medical supplies or other subsidised goods with countries like Jordan, Syria, Cyprus, or Turkey. From an economical perspective, these accumulation processes could also be seen as a modern derivative of a liberal understanding of economy where warlords and militiamen were transformed into ultra-liberal businessmen. Deriving from the clientilism of Lebanon in the 1940s and 1990s, the traditional economic liberalism of Lebanon's *laissez-faire* economy was altered into an ultra-liberal war economy. After the economic debacle of the mid-1980s, the militias increasingly invested their profits in the real estate sector in Europe and Lebanon, or deposited it in branches of Western banks that were present in Lebanon. At the height of the civil war in the late 1980s, this economic surplus was laundered into privately owned companies and business enterprises (cp. Picard 1999: 50, 57, 59, 67, 81; Traboulsi 2007: 234-238).

The economical strategies of the different militias varied to a high degree in terms of their resources, their economical settings, structures, and in the way they enforced their control mechanisms. Other striking differences were the militia/ state and the militia/ business enterprises relationships and their accumulation processes. The PSP for example, mostly imported petrol and other goods, enforcing contraband trade of ammunition and weapons with Syria and the PLO while receiving substantial financial support from Libya. The Lebanese Forces on the other side did not rely on foreign support (inasmuch as military supplies were not concerned), but generated most of their profits through the relocation of business dealings to Europe and Cyprus. The Shi'ite militias largely drew from their transnational networks of emigrants (especially emigrants in West Africa who

[37] E.g.: Head tax, individual protection money and protection money by big companies, income taxes, tax on land ownership, entry and leaving permits at militia checkpoints, building permits, residence permits for foreigners (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 235*f.*).

[38] Also, toxic waste from Europe was imported and buried in the countryside and the coast. The toxic waste import reached a peak especially after 1987 through massive imports from Italy (cp. Picard 1999: 65).

sought to invest in their hometowns in South Lebanon) and Shi'ite business enterprises in Iraq and Syria. In the Shi'ite community a fierce competition between the contesting camps (of Amal, Hezbullah, the HISC, and Sayyed Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah) over grants of the Shi'ite diaspora prevailed (cp. Picard 1999: 73-80). One interviewee pictured that it sometimes was rather the sympathy towards the confessional community than the sympathy for a militia in particular that led the Lebanese population to grant large sums of aid to the militias:

> I've seen a man, I know who he is, he is a very big merchant from West Africa. he came to meet Hezbullah in a coffee-shop while I was sitting. He opens the briefcase, I've never seen so much Dollars in my life. 400.000 Dollars cash. I work in the UN 30 years, I didn't see that money. [...] The Hezbullah guys said: „This is 400.000." And he says: „I want you to spend that money for the Shia." He just left it and he didn't take a receipt. 400.000 Dollars. I couldn't believe it. So I asked the guy „How do you trust them?" He said: „I know", he says "they know that i hate them." [...] „But" he says, „I know that this money, every Dollar, will go to the poor Shia." And he says „I don't want one Dollar for the resistance, no way". And they said he trust them. Most of their money for resistance comes from donations like this.[39]

None of the militias, neither the major ones (Amal, Hezbullah, Lebanese Forces and PSP) who professionalised after the economic debacle of the early 1980s, nor the minor ones, were able to initiate a holistic developmental project. The persistence of ultra-liberal accumulation processes led to internal migration and emigration of an impoverished majority of the population (those employed in the tertiary sector of economy and public servants) in search of work, and the consolidation of the small elite of traditional notables/ warlords. Attempts to overcome the widening gap between those two poles in society generally did not meet their envisaged claims. Hezbullah's Center for Research and Documentation for example attempted to initiate projects in urban development (mostly in Beirut's southern suburbs, where a majority of Shi'ites lived) but resulted in speculations in real estate and business deals (cp. Picard 1999: 53, 68*f.*).

In the late civil war an important shift in the perception of the militias was taking place in the Lebanese society. When the militias went through a process that increased their professionalism as armed groups, the status of their fighters changed:

> Henceforward, the militiamen were not the ‚guys from the neighbourhood' any longer but soldiers in uniforms, trained by foreign armies (USSR, Israel, aso.) or in military bases. Usually their pay was they only income of families who suffered from unemployment and a paralysed economy.[40] (Picard 1999: 56)

As Kizilhan (2004: 364) points out, the opportunity to join a militia is especially appealing to younger persons. The social and economical reasons to do so, however, are less

[39] Interview with INTERVIEWEE B in Beirut, Lebanon on 12^{th} February 2011.

[40] Original quote: „Von da an waren die Milizionäre nicht mehr die ‚Jungs aus dem Viertel', sondern Soldaten in Uniform, die in Kasernen ausgebildet worden waren, manchmal sogar im Ausland (UdSSR, Israel, etc.). Ihr Sold war häufig das einzige Einkommen der Familien, die unter Arbeitslosigkeit und Lähmung der Wirtschaft zu leiden hatten." (Picard 1999: 56)

important than the ideological reasons and prestige. Furthermore, social solidarity - even when regionally and temporally varying - with militia fighters can serve as a dynamising element. The influential effect of the social support with militia fighters was observed in a number of conflicts (for instance in the Iran-Iraq war between 1980 and 1988).

4.5 The end of the war and the Ta'if Accord

When Amin Jumayil's presidential term ended in September 1988, two governments were formed due to the fact that the opposing fractions could not agree on a presidential successor. The incumbent cabinet under prime minister Salim al-Huss refused to step down while Army Commander (AC) General 'Awn attempted to form his own government. Then, both governments then claimed to legitimately represent the Lebanese, resulting in two competing governments with no president in office. 'Awn could rally the majority of the Christians behind him as well as a minority of the Muslim population by attempting to revive the statehood, control the militias, and fight the Syrian occupation. The devastating impacts of General 'Awn's strategy marked the bloodiest phase of the civil war with prolonged fighting between 'Awn's troops, the Lebanese Forces, and the Syrian Army (cp. Perthes 1994: 14*f.*).

In order to stop the bloodshed, the remaining 62 members of the parliament met in the city of Ta'if in south-east Saudi-Arabia to confer about a peace treaty. After three weeks of intense talks between the Lebanese, the Moroccan, Saudi-Arabian, and Algerian foreign ministers accepted a „Document of National Accord" which in November 1989 would officially become known as the Ta'if Accord. On 24^{th} November 1989 Iliyas Hrawi was elected as president (just before René Mu'awwad had been elected as President but was shot a few days later) and a new government formed. The new government immediately stopped the flows of money to 'Awn's troops who by then were still on the government's payroll. The increasing isolation of General 'Awn (nationally and internationally) finally forced him into exile in France after he was expelled and refused to come back for five years by the Lebanese authorities (cp. Perthes 1994: 16-18).

When the Lebanese civil war came to an end, around one third of the population had left the country, about 80.000 people had been killed and 100.000 injured during the 15 years of fighting. Another 670.000 Christians and 158.000 Muslims were internally displaced during the war, creating a new demographic equilibrium in Lebanon at the beginning of the 1990s (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 238*f.*).

In September 1990 president Hrawi signed the constitutional amendment on basis of the Ta'if Accord. In practical terms the changes in the constitution had social implications for

Figure 4.6: Military zones in 1990



Source: Hanf 1990: 753.

the Lebanese. The Ta'if Accord implied a sizeable modification of political power (changing of the power balance from 6/ 5 for the Christians to a parity between the Christians and the Muslims), an extension of the states authority on the whole Lebanese territory, disarmament of the militias, strengthening the status of internal refugees and security institutions (cp. Perthes 1994: 20*f.*). For the Muslims in Lebanon the new constitution implied abandoning any historical claims to reunite with Syria while the Lebanese Christians abandoned Western protectionism (cp. Perthes 1994: 19). Traboulsi (2007: 244*f.*) argues that „the Ta'if regime reproduced the sectarian system" and „merely created another system of discord". Interestingly, the content of the Ta'if Accord did not vary much from earlier agreements such as the Tripartite Agreement from 1985 between Syria, the PSP, the Lebanese Forces and Amal. In 1989 the only differences that finally led to the peace treaty were the will to end the war, and the stance of the parties involved (national as well as international). Zartman's theoretical approach (in Perthes 1994: 141) identifies the preconditions for the Ta'if Accord as a „mature moment in conflict management": (i) an impasse that is equally fatal to the involved parties, (ii) an existing formula to solve

the crisis and (iii) signs that the involved parties would agree to this formula. In terms of the content, the Ta'if Accord - as a basis for political reform - was already often exploited but never put in practise. Ta'if therefore was an avowal to consociationalism and to the coexistence of the various sects. After Ta'if, old revived concerns that ethno-confessional privileges could be manifested in the Lebanese political system (e.g. the law of civil status or in the field of education) circulated in the public opinion (cp. Perthes 1994: 22*f.*). Especially the Christians experienced alienating effects vis-á-vis the state after Ta'if, meaning that the relationship between the Christians and the state was similar to the way the Muslims handled their relationship with the State of Greater Lebanon in the 1920s: Lebanon was not controlled by them and was not their state since the historical relationship with France was replaced with an Arab identity (cp. Perthes 1994: 24).

> Its [the new constitutions] preamble proposed a new compromise on the country's identity, defining Lebanon as ‚Arab in its belonging' and ‚the final homeland for the Lebanese'. The finality of Lebanon, meaning that it would never enter any union with any other state, namely Syria, had been a major demand by Christians since the formulation of the National Pact of 1943. On the other hand, Lebanon's Arab identity was upgraded from the ‚Arab character' in the National Pact to ‚Arab belonging'. (Traboulsi 2007: 244)

Problematic in this perspective was not the construction of the renewed Arab identity of the Lebanese but the formula on which this constitution was based upon. The formula of the Ta'if Accord emanated from the „successful" conflict resolution of the 1958 civil war, stating that neither victorious nor defeated groups emerged from the war. In 1989 this proposition was not more than a mere illusion. The civil war, however, did actually produce disadvantages for certain groups (e.g. the Maronites or the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon) (cp. Perthes 1994: 142).

Chapter 5

Lines of fragmentation and differentiation

> *As identity is defined against someone else, it implies not identifying with the other. It leads to disaster. That is exactly why in-group history is written only for the group (‚identity history') - black history for blacks, queer history for homosexuals, feminist history for women only, or any kind of in-group ethnic or nationalist history - cannot be satisfactory as history, even when it is more than a politically slanted version of an ideological sub-section of the wider identity group. No identity group, however large, is alone in the world; the world cannot be changed to suit it alone, nor can the past.* [41]

This chapter is ought to superimpose, depict and ponder the entanglement of theoretical approaches from chapter 3 with historical backgrounds as well as findings from chapter 4. When studying Michael Attalides (1979: 22-36) work on nationalism in Cyprus in which he emphases the role of anti-colonialism, ethnic identities, and imperial powers, different questions emerge in regard to the ethno-nationalist elements of the Cypriot Enosis movement. Once adjusted to a Lebanese context, most of these emerging questions can also be potentially helpful to give insight to processes shaping the country's politicisation of identity: Does social dissatisfaction create an ethnically informed nationalism in a society pre-fragmented by confessionalism and blurred by a class consciousness uprooted from socio-economic reality? Did occupation, imperialism, foreign intervention or an externally stimulated prolongation of hostilities between ethno-confessional militias during the civil war nourish ethnic entrenchment[42], and, hence, a territorially informed ethno-nationalism? Is it possible to separate demands for inclusive social reform from the formulation of a distinct Lebanese nationalism?

This questions in mind, this chapter is ought to highlight aspects of central historical importance while portraying the evolvement of a traditionally secular but ethno-confessionally determined society into one with a high propensity of ethno-national mobilisation. The link between these stages of Lebanese social history, namely a capitalistically determined conception of the state, is going to be emphasised.

[41] Hobsbawm 2002: 416*f.*

[42] This hypothesis is based on the argument by Fawaz (1994: 226), that the civil war „surpassed in destructiveness anything that preceded it, due in part to the availability and sophistication of modern weapons and to the greater number of hostile local, regional and international parties involved. In both 1860 and 1975 and after, the internal equilibrium triggered conflict, but regional and international considerations determined its magnitude, if not its duration."

5.1 Demystifying Lebanese confessionalism

In the opening lines of his short portrayal of Lebanese sectarianism, Ussama Makdisi notes that some established arguments usually depict sectarianism as anti-thetical to modernity and quite common in less developed countries. Clearly, arguments of this kind not only „leave little room for historical nuance", hence, ignoring the historical context, they also provide a simplification of complex problems that define our world (cp. Makdisi 2008: 20*f.*).

This chapter is ought to show historical implications in order to understand rather modern phenomenons. In doing so, this chapter challenges some historically established, over-determined aspects, and tries to detangle the developmental dimension of those aspects with imagined social hierarchies.

5.1.1 Modernisation of traditional social fabrics

In Leila Tarazi Fawaz's work on 19^{th} century Lebanon, she illustrates the nature of the ties and networks of the country's social and political structure by comparing the 1860 civil war with the civil war that took place between 1975 and 1990. This comparison shows how conflicting loyalties have been developing ethno-confessional tensions (cp. Fawaz 1994: 218). First of all, it has to be made clear that during the 400 years of Ottoman rule, religion (and hence confessionalism) never served as the main resource of identity, rather

> social boundaries were primarily status-based and drawn between powerful elite families (*a'yan*) including the clergy and notables, on the one hand, and the common villagers (*ahali*), on the other hand, who were traders, farmers and craftsmen. (Peleikis 2001: 403)

Throughout the Ottoman era, status based social boundaries created hierarchical relationships which were defined by the inherited family status. Thus, secular rank constituted an important element of identity (cp. Peleikis 2001: 403). The transformation of the social order took place

> in the mid-19^{th} century, which is characterized as a period of transition in the Ottoman Empire, of growing European political, missionary and ideological influence, and of internal struggle for social and political power leading to violent upheaval and the civil war of 1860. (Peleikis 2001: 403)

Fawaz (1994: 219-222) found that the Lebanese equilibrium rested on three major foundations that enabled a peaceful coexistence of the Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims, Maronites, Druze', Greek-Catholics, and Orthodox communities (to name but the major ones) in historical Lebanon: (i) a relative balance among communities with intercommunal cooperation and coexistence defining their role and relationships with one another, (ii) the role

and place of the leading families in maintaining this balance, and (iii) the existence of an institution that was standing above all communities and families as a third force (e.g strong position of the president, that was only dropped with the constitutional changes after the Ta'if Accord).

In the mid-19th century a processual production of ethno-confessional identities was introduced while serving as an important marker of modern political identity. A rupture with the past was initiated by a dynamical relationship between imperial (Ottoman), colonial (European) an local (Lebanese) actors. It was during this period that the application of a coherent typology of separate communities, imagined confessional communities were being produced and group boundaries reshaped (cp. Peleikis 2001: 403*f.*). Between the mid-19th century and the gaining of independence in the early 1940s

> the emergence of a ‚culture of sectarianism' as a modern political articulation has strongly influenced the shifting of group identities and the reconstruction of boundaries within the multiconfessional village [...]. Family and local identities became redefined in the context of the developing system of confessionalism but also by a further unbounding of their social spaces due to the disintegration of agriculture, by rural-urban migration, and above all by civil war. (Peleikis 2001: 406)

In doing so, the equilibrium between the ethno-confessional communities was disrupted, subsequently giving way to the articulation of ethno-national identities. Especially the comparative advantages given to the Christian community right after independence paved the way to sustainably imbalancing the Lebanese socio-economic structures. The rapid economic ascendancy of the Christians, accompanied by modernisation along capitalistic lines, left large segments of the society impoverished, destitute and radicalised. These groups (Sunni, Shia, Palestinians) continuously migrated into the poverty belt surrounding Beirut whilst opening up to manipulation by foreign actors, owing to their destitute socio-economic situation. In other words, the historical equilibrium between the confessional communities was disrupted due to demographic changes, migrations, socio-economic transformations based on capitalist modernisation, and the diminishing credibility of traditional families (cp. Fawaz 1994: 222*f.*).

As already mentioned throughout sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.4, it was during the period of the *qa'im maqamiya* when the *muqtada' ji*s economically declined. Later in the *Mutasarrifiya,* their role continued to decline politically. While the *muqtada' jis* role slowly declined during this period, however, it was after independence when new class formations increasingly aspired to power and broadened the base for Lebanon's elite:

> Lebanon's republican form of government had encouraged the mutual recognition of established élites. The integration of society's upper echelons was encouraged during Lebanon's economic boom in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Originally, most of the economically privileged class were Christians. With time, however, Sunnis and members of other communities joined the Christians in their prosperity. Observers

> stress the disunity in Lebanon's confessional political system and imbalanced economical growth, but as long as élites from all communities benefited from the system, the status quo was not threatened. (Fawaz 1994: 221)

The expansion of the elite class (combined with the entanglement of the world market and nourished by the economic boom), and the loss of social mobility within the impoverished ethno-confessional groups further undermined the role of the traditional families. This erosion of power threatened the traditional balance between the ethno-confessional communities. The traditional balance was created through shared local identity which was „produced through everyday practice of neighbourhood relataions, mutual assistance in agriculture, and attendance of religious rituals of the confessional ‚Other'" (Peleikis 2001: 407). When the country's traditional merchant structures were changed as a result of modernisation and globalisation, however, the influences on the landscape of trans-confessional, family, and clientelistic social alliances were tremendous (cp. Peleikis 2001: 407).

One person interviewed mentioned the influence of growing up with people from other ethnic groups on the individual identity. This interviewee also relates to the Christian-Muslim divide before, during, and after the civil war, and the more recent (post 2005) Sunni-Shia divide:

> Our area was, we were lucky because we were in an old building where from all, very diverse. If you wanna talk about the sectarian bases we had like in our building Druze, Moslems, Shia - I am Shia - we had Sunni and I was in a Christian school. So we were lucky, in this sense. But when I went to university I met - I'd like to tell you this - I met students, who were, who came from Christian parts of Lebanon and they had never seen like the other, you know the other Muslims. It was their first time in university. So that's how I found that I've been really lucky to be living in an, yeah... diverse. And that influenced me. Until now I cannot understand why things happen [...] . It's not Christian-Muslim anymore it's... They want it to be Sunni-Shia and it's not working I guess.[43]

Thus, the peculiarity of class structures in Lebanon was (and still is) determined by an inter-confessional dimension (merchants, city dwellers, villagers) on the one side, while the confessional groups themselves are „internally stratified into graded classes" (Khuri 1969: 29*f.* cited in Schiller 1979: 46). The introduction of the state's modernisation programme, emigration, and the influence of the country's new education system as well as socio-economic transformations introduced various social dynamics in Lebanon. These dynamics admittedly translated into the establishment of new and the diversification of (existing) social classes. Upward mobility, however, largely relied on familism and ethno-confessionalism. Therefore, a socialist class consciousness never managed to gain a foothold in Lebanon (cp. Schiller 1979: 46). To a large extent, this also explains why social policy is one central (if not the main) dimension of ethno-confessional politics.

[43]Interview with interviewee a in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.

As noted by Fawaz, the relative balance among communities as well as intercommunal co-operation and coexistence „dependent on the leading families of the various communities knowing one another and adhering to accepted and recognized rules“ (Fawaz 1994: 221). Modernisation and globalisation transformed patron-client networks that were based on the role of traditional families. In combination with the formation of the Lebanese Republic as a nation-state (in order to meet the requirements of modernity), parliamentary elections were introduced that ultimately disturbed the traditional balance and emphasised intra-communal rivalries (cp. Fawaz 1994: 221). The confessional equilibrium between the communities in a society rested upon agriculture and traditional trade, the disruptions produced by a globalised economy individualised rivalries, thus, providing a confessional/ ethnic basis for identity and transforming transconfessional social spaces and class formations. Fawaz' remark on these socio-political transformations makes clear how problematic the conception of independent Lebanon state itself was during as well as after this period.

> The political system devised in the 1930s made room for the traditionally dominant communities and their leaders, but it was not flexible enough to accomodate new demographic, economic, and social forces that that subsequently surfaced. (Fawaz 1994: 224)

The necessity of a revaluation of identity in a process of political transformation stems from a socio-political evolution similar to what can be found in Wielands (2000) sequences (as described in section 3.2). The rupture between a confessional and an ethnic identity began in the run-up to independence, when confessional identities became politicised.

The restructuring of the Lebanese society in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, combined with altered economical realities, was naturally accompanied by socio-economic change. Rural-urban migrations and emigration changed traditional local interaction as people found jobs in the civil administration and the emerging banking sector, while the traditional agriculture sector and crafts increasingly diminished. This process can be identified as the separation of capital and work as one central characteristic of capitalist modes of production. When the sectoral transformation of the economy altered the social fabric, trans-confessional contact became less relevant in everyday life. Furthermore, local hierarchies began to be questioned and subsequently eroded. Hence, the necessity of trans-confessional interdependency diminished as „the seeds for social deterritorialisation were sown“ (Peleikis 2001: 411). Rural-urban migrations revaluated ethno-confessional identities in the cities and their suburbs, which in turn became an important element of political organisation (cp. Peleikis 2001: 410-412).

> [...] Shiite migrants from the south, who had never celebrated 'Ashura publicly in their villages of origin, now did so in the city. Gradually, the ritual became an instrument for migrants to display their new solidarity and political organisation on the basis of confessional affiliation. Similarly, the Kataeb party offered new political spaces on the

> basis of confessional identity for the Maronite migrants in the city. (Khuri 1972 cited in Peleikis 2001: 411)

5.1.2 Derivatives of the Ottoman *milet* system

As described in section 4.1.1, the *milet* system under Ottoman rule was an important landmark for future developments. Even if it „may not have been the elaborate construction historians once supposed“ (Fawaz 1994: 220), the system had a significant influence on the way social relations were, and still are determined, long after the Ottoman authority over Lebanon. Interestingly, most of the scholarly analysis about the Lebanese confessional system identifies the *milet* system as a central element that shaped the Lebanese administrative structures. Kneissl (2002: 11) or Schiller (1979: 33*f.*) - to name but a few - emphasise the importance of the system before and after the civil war. Their assessment (and the assessment of many others) is certainly not essentially wrong, although it should not be overestimated. Nevertheless, the point here is not to question the importance of the system in yesterdays and todays Lebanon, it rather is the horizon of the meaning of the term *milet* itself. It is important to address the synonymity to the European term „nation“ at this point. Of course, it would be utterly vacuous to argue that the *milet* system is the reason for modern ethno-nationalism since the nation is obviously implied and modern ethnic identity can by used synonymous to confessional structures. Neither line of argumentation would withstand any serious assessment, but the uncritical transformation of the socio-political realities of the *milet* system into a post-civil war understanding of ethno-nationalism can not be underestimated. In other words, it is rather the question what the meanings of the socio-economic realities of the *milet* system imply in order to understand what the Lebanese nation is and its realities are. Since this question concerns an identity issue, it cannot be separated from whatever the a respective community identifies as a „nation“. By emphasising ethnicity (ethno-confessionalism) as a retreat during the civil war, ethnicity became the nation, ethno-nationalism became the point of reference. This process is not detached from historical meanings of administrative and political autonomy at all, but instead of inhabiting this meaning, it was transformed. Contrary to Schiller and many others, it is not the demographic development that lead to systemic imbalance, it is the transformation of the system as a whole (of which the *milet* system is one subsystem) by capitalist logic, by the ideal of the liberal European nation of the 19^{th} century (cp. Hobsbawm 2005: 25-58), and by the instrumentalisation of identity politics that lead to a polit-economical pragmatism regarding the use of ethnicity. Accordingly, ethno-nationalism is an artificial phenomenon shaped by the Lebanese nationalisation itself and augmented with the historical foundations of pre-1918 Lebanon. As long as the nation is the frame of reference for ethnicity, ethnicity itself is going to group around nationalism and its sub-currents. From this perspective, the civil war can be understood as

one stage in a process of regrouping ethnicity around the Lebanese nation and this process has not yet come to its end.

5.2 Lebanese (national) identity

> *And we ask ourselves when will ‚Hizbullah' take off its confessional cloths and decide to join the national project by integrating its brave fighters with the heroes of the Lebanese Army so that the fearful Lebanese sects can come out of their shelters.* [44]

Out of the many aspects of the Lebanese identity a few approaches help to understand on which basis these constructions of identity are built upon. Zein (2012: 43) remarked that identity should never be seen as a static concept but rather understood as a social process. For Zein identity is made up of dialectical relationships: individual/ society, particularity/ collectivity and affiliation/ exclusion. While it is important to understand that in this concept subjectivity is produced through society and vice-versa, hence, generating a homogenising effect (but we will come back to that later).

This observation shows how the collective and the individual can be torn between a multipolar frame of reference consisting of religion or confessionalism (as a dominating confessional and cultural identity), nationalism (as an expression of anti-colonial struggle), and the family (as a patriarchal structured family) of which each single dimension is intrinsically totalitarian. Nationalism (perceived as a temporally variable and a referencing dimension) is highly determined by political interests and the *Zeitgeist*. The nation itself - perceived as a result of a nationalist programme - not only complied with popular anti-colonial claims, but also gave (and continues to give) an answer in times of profound identity crisis and social transformation (cp. Zein 2012: 44*f.*). On the topic of the patriarchal structured family and confessionalism, Barakat (1977: 33 cited in Schiller 1979: 45) notes that „kinship, religious, and communal loyalties persist strongly in Lebanon (...) confessionalism and familism constitute pervasive, diffuse, and enduring loyalties [...] undermining nationalism."

5.2.1 Arab nationalism and Lebanese nationalism

Arabism, as formulated by Muslims and Druze Arabs, and Arab nationalism help to understand the environment in which identity is formulated in Lebanon. In the first place,

[44] Al-Nahar Newspaper 08^{th} October 2007 cited in Barak 2009: 194.

Arab nationalism[45] had a strong emphasis on anti-colonialism that paved the way for the creation of various independent nation-states. Nevertheless, also „[t]he question of religion is central to the rethinking of Lebanese history [because] one of the main weaknesses of Arab nationalism as an idea was the fact that it originally confused and continues to confuse the history of the Arabs with the history of Islam" (Salibi 1998: 223). Furthermore, the restricting conditions of this development of Lebanese nationalism needs to be viewed through a historical-traditional lens as Yamak (1969: 37*f.* cited in Schiller 1979: 43) suggested even before the civil war introduced new momenta:

> The objective realities which shaped the structure of Lebanese society conditioned, if not determined, the confessional orientation of a national movement. As long as the agencies of integration and socialisation remained the traditional institutions of sect and family, it was not possible for the national movement to rise above the limits of sectarian existence.

The first theoretical differentiation at this point is that Lebanese identity does not imply to be Muslim at all. Christian Arabs are not alien to the Islamic world. The shared experiences by various religious communities of more than 1.400 years entangled their social and cultural history. The confusion of Arab nationalism that implies the entanglement of Islam with the concept of the nation, reduces the state's claim to power down to an rationalised ideal disconnected from society (cp. Bin Talal 2003: 93; Salibi 1998: 231, Zein 2012: 47). In order to get a clear picture what accounts for the Arab world in general (and for Lebanon especially), it is important to stress that Arab history was never an one-way street occupied by Islam.

> Even during the relatively brief period when the Arabs actually stood at the head of the Islamic empire, Arab history was not restricted to the history of the caliphate as the sovereign institution in Islam, but equally involved a whole complex of regional, sectarian and tribal rebellions against the established Islamic order. Once the Arab ascendancy in Islam ceased to exist, the history of the Arabs became to all effects, so many different regional experiences, each to be understood for what it was, much as was the case before Islam. (Salibi 1998: 227*f.*)

At this point it is important to understand that Lebanon is one of those „different regional experiences" and that neither the influence of Western imperialism nor the global expansion of capitalism *created* the basis of social disparities that where existing in Lebanon. But at the same time it is utterly relevant in which way Lebanon was incorporated in the modernising project by external powers.

It is necessary to understand how the already existing social factors where instrumentalised and transformed by external formations in order to be adopted by the various Lebanese communities. Salibi argues that

[45] Because of Arab nationalism, Western influence can be seen as the conceptual basis: „As for Arab nationalism, it is a struggle to reunite all Arabs in a single independent state stretching from Morocco to Iraq and from Syria to Sudan and by this transforming the Arab *Kulturnation* to an Arab *Staatsnation* as explained by the Herder-inspired al-Husri." (Valbjørn 2009: 143, original emphasis)

> [a]mong the Lebanese people, the Christians were the first to begin adapting to the ways of the modern world, and the Shiites among the Muslims were last. In all cases, however, the process of adoption and development created social and economic tensions between the different Lebanese communities, and also within each community, which invariably resulted in political conflict and outbreaks of violence. (Salibi 1998: 232)

The pioneering role of the Christians in the *Nahda,* and hence, their involvement in the formulation of nationalism in Lebanon, that was ideologically biased towards 19^{th} century liberal European nationalism, is not to be underestimated. Their adoption of Western thought led to the institutionalisation of modern journalism and the establishment of education systems (as described in section 4.1.4). What was of great importance in Lebanon is the Christian (Maronites and to a lesser extent the Uniting Churches) role in implementing the particular political culture in the years leading up to independence from France as well as afterwards (cp. Bin Talal 2003: 90*ff.*; Schiller 1979: 22). Schiller makes clear that the Lebanese nationalism as formulated by the Christian community, incorporated elements of an European „*völkisch*"-national ideology of German origin (drawing especially from Herder, Fichte[46] and Arndt). The rejection of the *Umma*-based conception of Lebanese identity (which favours an Islamic notion as the basis for collectivity) was framed through a Western-oriented, Mediterranean discourse, sometimes emphasising the Phoenician origins of the Lebanese identity (cp. Schiller 1979: 43).

Figure 5.1: Arab nationalism



Source: Valbjørn 2009: 144.

Not only the Christians (especially the Maronites) had a strong influence in „formulating" or „constructing" a Lebanese identity, also the Druze community played a major role in this process. Their historical role and status (as described throughout chapter 4) enabled them to actively participate in structuring Lebanese politics, thus, in articulating what is „Lebanese" in the first place. From this perspective, religion (Christian/ Maronite and Muslim/ Druze) was not solely a set of beliefs but constituted a constant frame of reference for its historical experience. As a result, the specific religious institutions (the Maronite patriarchy and the Druze council of initiates) illustrated a coherent type of history, one „of specific religious communities which were highly organized at more than one level,

[46] J. G. Fichtes speeches to the German nation aimed at the liberation from foreign rule by establishing an externally determined philosophy of mobilisation (cp. Käpernick 2000: 249).

and which had a distinct advantage over their neighbours in regional compactness and group solidarity“ (Salibi 1998: 228). In the run up to independence, Christians and Druzes alike turned their communities into bearers of - and a resource for - political ideology. In Wieland's (2000: 32) understanding, religion as a category of identity was turned into a source of political mobilisation. The Druze' as well as the Christians were the only groups that actually could derive their strength from religious organisation. The demonstrable continuity in doing so wielded their definatory power to identify what Lebanon „is“ (cp. Salibi 1998: 228-231). Subsequently, religion cannot be seen as the single source of identity in Lebanon. Even as it served as a source for identity constructions (especially before independence), its part in political mobilisation is also of great importance.

The voids, generated by the two competing fractions who fought over the definatory power in Lebanon, resulted in outbreaks of violence. The special status of the religious communities that was granted by the Ottomans also served as a historical justification to inhabit the political sphere, both by Maronites as well as by the Druze'. During the time of colonial intervention in Lebanon, the custom that the special status granted by the Ottomans implied was sustained in order to preserve the conflict potential between the Christian and Druze community. By sustaining this potential, Western powers opened a corridor to intervene in Ottoman affairs. Through concessions and offers of perpetuation of local autonomy external powers took advantage of local quarrels between the ethno-confessional communities. This „investment“ enabled them to be on the scene when the Ottoman empire collapsed (cp. Salibi 1998: 230). Although the question here is not how Western powers intervened in Lebanon, it is important to understand that the prolongation of the special status of Maronite and Druze territories is to a large extent responsible for an institutionalised civic conflict, however. The first attempts to fill the voids of the dichotomised power struggle between Maronites and Druze' were their respective formulations of distinct Lebanese nationalisms in order to build a common foundation for a Lebanese identity. Again, two confronting positions collided, that of (Muslim) Arab nationalism, and that of (Christian) Lebanese nationalism.

The Muslim Arab nationalism succeeded to propagate that the imagined historical Arab unity was possible under the auspices of Islam but especially in Lebanon, it made it hard to accommodate this imagined reality to the present circumstances. The „Arab nation“ somehow became mythically elevated, thus overemphasising its historical aspects. Non-Muslims found it hard to accept that the political and cultural history of Islam was in fact Arab history. While Arab theories of identity were poorly formulated (and the Christians either underemphasized or ignored them) (cp. Salibi 1998: 218-222; Zein 2012: 45*f.*) the Christians

> did not claim for themselves a historical nationality separate and distinct from the common Arab nationality, other Arab countries which came into being after the first

> world war [sic!], at about the same time as Lebanon, did not have much difficulty accepting themselves and recognizing one another as legitimate Arab states. Because the Christian Lebanese hesitated or declined to do the same, and at the same time claimed for the different communities which happened to form the population of Lebanon a special historical nationality separate and distinct from the common Arabism, they kept the legitimacy of the Lebanese state in question not only for other Arabs, but also for large and important sectors of the Lebanese population. (Salibi 1998: 222)

Arabism then had to be taken for what it was: „a primordial bond which unites the Arabs at some levels without overriding all the differences between them" (Salibi 1998: 223).

5.2.2 Modern Lebanese national identities

Today, Lebanese identity became to be widely accepted as an „extravagant claim", a „distinct sense of territorial identity". Contemporary national Lebanese identity is largely unravelled from its historical foundations (cp. Salibi 1998: 220, 222) But even if the Lebanese share a peculiar, poorly formulated national identity, Christians and Muslims alike, came to accept their own unique national identity, or as A. J. Abraham (2008: 176 cited in Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2012; remark Turkmen-Dervisoglu) puts it: „Lebanon's communal organization had produced an identity problem in the tiny republic. (...) Thus, they [the sub-communities] act as independent mini-nations within a larger national entity called Lebanon making it very difficult for a citizen to be ‚just Lebanese'."

> I think there is a country called Lebanon which is very important to all the Lebanese people. Despite of the fact, that they have different perhaps affiliations, but this country is very important. [...] Lebanon remains for the Lebanese. This is the national identity of Lebanon.[47]

The common elements of the modern Lebanese national identity are rooted in a territorial understanding of the Lebanese state, on one hand and in the mutual experiences of the civil war on the other hand. One important element that is absorbed by the Lebanese national identity (not necessarily only in the allegedly distinct modern version), is the fact that it is strongly determined by an external dimension (either by foreign powers or the impact of the Lebanese diaspora in domestic affairs). Volker Perthes notes that after the seven day long conflict with Israel in March 1993 many Lebanese talked about the creation of the Lebanese nation for the first time in history. Interestingly, this sense of nationality founded in solidarity with the 300.000 to 400.000 displaced persons after the Israeli bombardment (cp. Perthes 1994: 143-145). The dimension of solidarity is not alien to Lebanese identity constructions. Hezbullah's perception of the Lebanese nation, for example, has a specifically pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli momentum, that has been contesting national unity ever since the early 1980s but prominently since signing the Ta'if

[47] Interview with interviewee e in Beirut, Lebanon on 9^{th} February 2011.

Accord. This ideological bias has a rootedly dialectic element as Wärn (2010: 138; remarks LW) remarks.

> [B]y providing the resistance [against Israel and the influence of Western countries and Israel in Lebanon, as well as Palestinian resistance against Israel] with national legitimacy it also altered the national identity of Lebanon. [...] To Hizbollah, the Lebanese identity remained an open field of contest, ready for change. As Nasrallah claimed, 'the man who (offers) his blood (for the) homeland (...) is the most patriotic'.

The implications arising thereout are that on one hand Hezbullah offers a way of blending its religious foundations in a Lebanese political context (cp. Ehrlich 2007), but on the other hand stems the development of a common national identity, which ironically is stated to be envisaged by the party. Another example that highlights how highly contested the debate about national identity is, are the LAF which are considered and widely respected as a state institution claiming to be based on a Lebanese national identity. This is only true as far as the LAF are a considered as a stable institution of the Lebanese state compared to others, whereat there is no national unity to be observed. Units are widely separated by religious backgrounds and Lebanon for its part has not developed any such thing like a distinct national identity that could serve as the basis for national unity. At the same time, observers often refer to the victory of the LAF in the armed clashes between the LAF and Fatah al-Islam in 2007 as a „national victory" that is linked to a „national ideology" (cp. Barak 2009: 194). In 2006, half a year after the war with Israel, AC Suleiman called upon graduating officers from the Military Academy that „may your family be the army, your sect be nationalism, and your village be all of Lebanon" (Al-Jaysh cited in Barak 2009: 202). The discourse about state institutions and their perceived national foundation, are reflected in the debate about the LAF. While one side promotes the national basis of the army, the other side does not see the army as an efficient state institution, neither in its very own function as a defence institution, nor as an institution; that could unify the Lebanese:

> Hezbollah, when he make fight with Israel, Lebanese Army he don't involved and Israel he don't bomb here. He bombed the place of them, bridges, sporting. At that time, if Lebanese Army he involved, at that time all the Lebanon would destroyed. It would be very big war with them. Just not only Lebanon, it would involve many countries. This is it.[48]

Touching upon the security topic, one interviewee, a political representative of Hezbullah, links the domestic socio-economic situation in Lebanon with the country's geopolitical dimension. In doing so, the interviewee makes Hezbullah's position vis-à-vis the LAF in regard to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) clear. [49]

[48] Interview with INTERVIEWEE C in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.

[49] Among other things, the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701 (2006) calls for „full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559

> It will be impossible to say that Lebanon can defend itself in a classical way. Army to army. This is not logic and not concrete, for many reasons. For, regarding Lebanese geopolitics, Lebanese economic and regarding the fragile Lebanese social construction. And don't forget that the whole Western Europe and United States supporting the Israelis [...]. If you want to say that the Lebanese army must defence against the Israelis' army it is a joke.[...] And then we have to ... understand the other Lebanese parties about one understanding for the Lebanese, national Lebanese defence strategy. Our resistance will never be facing to the Lebanese Army. They have to be together, side by side. And I think some day in the future we will achieve this equivalence, this acquisition.[50]

In this context, however, it is utterly important to consider how a long established highly politicised civil society (and a peculiar understanding of democracy), which is outlined in section 5.5, can contribute to the establishment of a „distinct" Lebanese national identity (cp. Braune 2007: 74; Perthes 146).

5.3 Political confessionalism in Lebanon

> *[I]n Lebanon I stopped talking about sectarian problems. It's all about interests. And it comes to interests, my God, the Christian and the Muslim, they get along so beautifully, when it comes to making the money. Right? But the people get nothing from this. It doesn't get out to the people.* [51]

Kischli's argument that confessionalism itself is merely an ideology of domination, first utilised by the ruling feudal elite, the *muqtada' ji*s (as described in section 4.1), needs to be acknowledged in order to frame the emergence of Lebanese political confessionalism within a historical dimension. For Kischli, the intertwining of administrative reforms and proportional confessional representation in the *Mutasarrifiya* led to an institutionalisation of confessionalism and a preservation of the longstanding tradition of feudalism of the *muqtada' ji*s. Emerging from this period the modern Lebanese state is therefore a matrimony between feudalism and confessionalism (cp. Kischli 1970: 90-99 cited in Schiller 1979: 21*f.*). The argumentation behind this position may be fragmentary and not withstanding criticism, but it nevertheless shows the incorporation of historical elements in the younger Lebanese history.

As Rosiny (2011: 1) points out, even though the interim arrangement of proportional confessional representation the Ta'if Accord produced, became a permanent condition, it nevertheless shielded Lebanon from giving power to autocratic regimes or rulers. At the

(2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state". URL: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement (last accessed on: 20^{th} February 2013).

[50] Interview with INTERVIEWEE A in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.

[51] Interview with INTERVIEWEE B in Beirut, Lebanon on 12^{th} February 2011.

same time, one interviewee suggested that the Ta'if Accord never enabled a discussion of what happened during the civil war, remarking that „you could feel that we were just turning around in our place"[52]:

> [W]e should have talked about what happened in the war. Just don't close this thing and go, you know, memory is something that we have to discuss, we have to talk about what happened. Reconciliation has to happen by discussing why, why the war happened. Why violence happened, why this hate? And that never happened in Lebanon, you know. The war ended after the Taif Accord and you had to rebuild and you had to pretend that you are very happy and forget.[53]

Makdisi's argument on the other side, points out that even though the political system based on confessionalism may be „equitable in the sense that all major players in Lebanon have bought into it, but not equal in the sense that the political shares of the respective sects are not equally distributed", saying that „secularists are totally excluded from the political process" (Makdisi 2008: 20). One doesn't need to look at Lebanon in order to identify similar tendencies as described above. At the 2012 International Crisis Group Vienna Forum on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region, Joost Hiltermann[54] (regarding the MENA regions upheavals of the last two years) remarked that the term secular has a „dirty" connotation for it is equated with atheism. The preferred term of secular activists therefore is „liberal".

Throughout this chapter an overview of the Lebanese political system and structure should be given. Contextually, their basis for the production of ethno-nationalism should be stressed.

5.3.1 Political determinants in Lebanon after the civil war

Even though Turkmen-Dervisoglu (2012) locates the true seat of political power until 2005 in Anjar, Lebanon, near the Syrian border, where the Syrian Army Military Intelligence had set up its headquarters, and Makdisi (2008: 23) defines the Ta'if Accord as „simply the latest in a series of sectarian arrangements", the accord is of central importance for post-civil war Lebanon.

The Accord ought to determine the future of the Lebanese political system, since it put the reform of political confessionalism on the parliamentary agenda. Volker Perthes, in his analysis of the Lebanese political system after the Ta'if Accord, argues that two different views on political confessionalism prevail in Lebanon, making it hard to apply any changes to the existing system. One common opinion is that the Lebanese society is essentially

[52] Interview with interviewee a in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.
[53] Interview with interviewee a in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.
[54] Joost Hiltermann is the International Crisis Group MENA Deputy Program Director for Iraq & the Gulf region.

confessional and the existence of confessional loyalties has to be accepted as a structural element. One other opinion about political confessionalism is entangled with the role of the elites (the old notables and the parvenu elites that emerged out of the civil war). The argument here is that the clientelistic system is not only used by the elites but also determines which elites use it in the first place. In any case, it can be said that the political system is to a large extent determined not only by its political structure but also by the way it is utilised. On the practical side this observation generates an intrinsically Lebanese paradox, namely that the ones who pushed for political reform before and in the civil war benefited from confessionalism after the war (Nabih Birri e.g.) (cp. Perthes 1994: 130-132).

After all, the Ta'if Accord may have destroyed old allegiances, but replaced it with new ones. It may have dismantled the Maronite hegemony, but it empowered others (cp. Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2012). The linking of the Ta'if Accord (as the climax of various fragmentary debates and largely unsuccessful attempts to broach the issue of Lebanese national identity during the civil war) with Lebanese identity can be seen as a highly problematic issue in this regard. The country's identity was hollowed out as a political necessity in order to re-pacify ethnic groups and ethno-nationalist parties. All this happened not on the basis of a solidly held, socially inclusive debate. With the superficial introduction of phrases like „Arab in its belonging" or „final homeland for the Lebanese" (cp. Traboulsi 2007: 244) the historical chance to question the frame of reference of the „nation of Lebanon" remained untouched. On these grounds the disguised superficiality of the Ta'if Accord had to set its practical implications for reform contrary to keep up the status quo in terms of confessional politics. First, the confessionalised political system has invigorated the role of the „spiritual" leaders of the respective ethno-confessional communities within their community as well as in the political system. Second, the traditional Lebanese notables (Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims) are threatened by a shift of the center of power towards the opening of political posts to the general public. This also involves a shift in the traditional power structures within the communities. Third, secularising the political system added fuel to the anxieties of the Maronites to finally loose their political privileges which they perceive as protective barriers against the establishment of an Islamic state and the pressure of assimilation this would involve (cp. Perthes 1994: 133-135).

As described in section 4.4.1 the Muslim alliance and external Muslim groups attempted to abolish confessional quotas for administrative posts often by propaganda campaigns against the Christians. After the war the Christians translated these calls for reform into a deeply rooted anxiety to loose their hegemonic position in society that would be replaced by an „inversed confessional hegemony" (Perthes 1994: 136) (through and Islamic state e.g.). The Christian anxieties also rooted in the absence of strong Christian political parties

(Kata'ib and Lebanese Forces) in the post-war government, resulting in a feeling of non-representation. Additionally, the post-war period in Lebanon also revived other inter-ethnic conflict dimensions such as the Sunni-Shia animosities. The Shi'ite as well as the Sunni Muslims suffered from a decline in political relevance during the civil war. By entangling this decline with the social disparities in Beirut in the last years of the civil war and in the years following the war, it is to be observed how social conflicts tended to be politicised along ethnic lines. The first Hariri government (formed in October 1992), by focusing on a reconstruction agenda, was seen as an advance of Sunni interests in favour of Shi'ite interests: The reconstruction of Beirut (by then perceived as a Sunni agenda) involved the displacement of illegal Shi'ite inhabitants who settled there from the 1970s onwards (cp. Perthes 1994: 135-139).

5.3.2 Critique on Lebanese consociationalism

The Lebanese political system is an example for what Lijphart (in section 3) termed consociationalism, even if Rosiny (2011: 3) argues that Lebanese consociationalism was being implemented in a manipulative manner and, hence, is a fault in itself. Generally, consociationalistic systems are unflexible to socio-demographic and social change. Furthermore, political systems of this kind carry a high intrinsic propensity that political and social conflicts tend to be confessionalised (cp. Perthes 1994: 132) and thus, as it is the case in Lebanon, transformed into ethno-political conflicts.

In order to understand what effects political confessionalism produces for the Lebanese nation as a whole one needs to examine the hierarchies of interests transported with it:

> [I]n the culture of sectarianism the articulation of a broad, national, and secular citizenship will always be sacrificed on the altar of narrower communal interests. [...] [W]hat makes sectarianism so tenacious today is that it is an intrinsic component of the modern nation: it is a manifestation, but at the same time a subversion, of a discourse of equality. As a political culture it promises national accord, but works against the very idea of a transcendent national identity. (Makdisi 2008: 27)

Gurr's argument that „states going through a major transitional period are prone to ethnopolitical conflicts" (Gurr 1994 in Väryryen 1999: 129) fits to a Lebanese context. The structures of ethno-national clientilism that are reproduced under the title of consociationalism as a proportional representation election system tied the Lebanese society to their communities and therefore also to the appendant elites. The mentality of political confessionalism can be seen as a consolidation of segregating constructions of ethnic identities. Political confessionalism in Lebanon promoted and hardened patronage networks (or clientelistic networks), obviated the establishment of national parties as well as interconfessional associations, and left the ethno-chauvinist elements in politics untouched. From the time of Lebanese independence onwards, mobilisation was driven by particulate

interests that manifested ethno-political structures. Since the renewal of ethnic ties is one constant in Lebanese history, transformed socio-economic foundations (urbanisation or capitalist working conditions e.g.) do not influence the status of ethnicity and confessional politics itself (cp. Perthes 1994: 132*f.*; Rosiny 2011: 1).

In respect to the secularisation project after the Ta'if Accord, the president as well as the Maronite patriarch argued that confessionalism has to let go of the „souls" before it can be discarded from the „texts" (cp. Perthes 1994: 130). In this regard President Michel Sleiman admonished that the Lebanese constitution has been degraded to a mechanism to distribute benefices in April 2011 (cp. Rosiny 2011: 2).

Generally, the basis of political confessionalism, its state-wide entanglement with socio-economic classes, and the resulting interdependency of these dimensions of the state, structurally implicates a constant strive for hegemony by ethno-political groups. Ayubi remarks, that by

> [o]wing to the lack of class hegemony, politics in such a society is not characterised by an orderly process of aggregating demands but by acts of capturing the state and acts of resisting the state. Once in power the ruling caste has usually no intention of giving it up. (Ayubi 1995: 25)

Also the concept of hegemony has a cultural dimension that can be emphasised in order to frame the interoperability of political confessionalism. According to Kippenberg's description of „cultural enclaves" one could interpret the acting of ethno-political groups as being aligned with the concept of these so called enclaves. Within these „cultural enclaves", Kippenberg points to religious authorities being able to enforce hegemony over their territory in order to obtain cultural sovereignty over all members living there[55] (cp. Kippenberg 2008: 42*f.*). This perception of a groups activity in Lebanon could help bridge to Antonio Gramsci's[56] theoretical background by using „cultural hegemony" as a central category. When linking this thoughts with Lebanon's post-civil war situation, it can be deducted that „the state as a whole is weak because it lacks rationality and because it lacks the moral, ideological and educational supports" (Ayubi 1995: 23) and is therefore vulnerable to permanent ethno-national contestation.

Nevertheless, the conceptual framework of hegemony, however, is not only applicable to cultural dimensions, but also to, and this also accounts for Lebanon, the political dimen-

[55] Original quote: „[D]urch Hegemonie über das Territorium die kulturelle Hoheit über das Leben aller Mitglieder zu erlangen" (Kippenberg 2008: 43).

[56] Antonio Gramsci was born in Sardinia in 1891 and started University studies in 1911 in Torino. He was editor of socialist newspapers, and one of the founding members of the Italian Communist Party. From November 1926 to 1935 he was imprisoned due to his political activity. During this period he wrote the „Prison Notebooks", a range of political essays that view the fascist Italy from a Marxist-philosophical standpoint. In 1937 he died in Rome from the aftermath of his imprisonment. The theories of Gramscianism as well as Neogramscianism are deducible from his Prison Notebook writings (cp. Neubert 2001: 7-16).

sion. The contesting groups, when trying to capture „the state would require to preserving the status quo [while] the ruling caste would strive to co-opt other groups, in a ‚consocational' manner if possible" (Ayubi 1995: 25). Consocationalism then can be seen as a peculiar mode of achieving hegemony by arranging the own groups interests with other interest group's within the states political structures.

5.4 Ethno-nationalism in Lebanon

When talking about ethno-nationalism it is important to understand that this particular manifestation of nationalism is a highly politicised product with (a) blurry historical dimension(s). It is the product of articulation of particulate interests (confessionally and economically), a discontinued democratic development embedded in a nationalisation project, and violently disrupted local identities that were once generated within balanced socio-economic microcosms. Confessionalism may be the basis of a highly politicised ethnic identity but it had to be politicised in the first place. It was not like that from the start. The emergence of ethno-nationalism can neither be answered by the dissolution of a common identity through protracted violence during the civil war, by the rise of confessional identities nor by the Christian-Druze or the Sunni-Shia divide. By drawing from Zein in this regard, the „how" becomes as interesting as the „why": „Both systems, the nation as well as religion have been instrumentalised in many ways. Particulate interests have been subjected to the respective political, economical or social situation"[57] (Zein 2012: 45).

As outlined throughout chapter 4 as well as by Rosiny (2011: 2*f.*) or Peleikis (2001: 403), the colonial project of European powers in the mid 19^{th} century not only started to transform social conflicts into ethnic grievances in order to exploit them but injected them in the first place by economical means. Furthermore, the European powers started introducing their conceptualisation of statehood as a nation which was until then largely alien to the Lebanese society and to the way social processes were traditionally handled by the ethno-confessional elites. Also Ayubi touches upon these fault lines when linking notions of European bureaucracy with the Arab state:

> The Arabs moved fairly rapidly in adopting the structural features of the state and the bureaucracy (in the European style) but they were rather slow in internalising the concept of the state itself, or the ‚ethics' of public service and the attitudes of collective action.[58] Nor were they particularly impressed by the concept of ‚freedom' (which Western thinkers closely relate to the development of the modern state), when they learned of it in the European literature. (Ayubi 1995: 22)

[57] Original quote: „Beide Systeme, Nation und Religion, wurden in vielfältiger Weise instrumentalisiert und nach politischer, wirtschaftlicher und gesellschaftlicher Situation für die eigenen Interessen dienstbar gemacht." (Zein 2012: 45).

[58] Cp. Bonné 1973: 17-19; Umlil 1985; Al-Jamal 1984: 365-368 cited in Ayubi 1995: 22.

On the topic of the creation of the Lebanese nation Benedict Anderson's arguments are of central importance and should be taken into account. Anderson (2000: 62*f.*) argues that the way political identification shaped the self-perception of ethnic groups during the late 19^{th} and all through the 20^{th} century is primarily based upon the introduction of the concept of the nation itself[59]. I personally argue that this introduction is one direct derivative of the usability of the state as an economic unit, a nation-state that legitimises its power via instruments like census and citizenship, thus, being able to represent itself as the legitimate economical actor. Andersons argument that by applying these peculiar notion of modernity to colonies (formerly so called third world countries), the acceptance of national identity is based upon the very existence of ethnic identities, which had to be created in the first place in order to categorise the state's own national citizens, and the replacement of traditional identification (family, neighbourhood, home region) with ethnic identification. „Ethnic politics is being practised upon the basis of an *earlier* national recognition and is legitimated in the basis of proportionality of the present census"[60] (Anderson 2000: 62; original emphasis), meaning that the fault lines that are produced by the nationalisation of local ethnically balanced microcosms reinforce the identity crises that are experienced by ethnic groups. Therefore, ethnic identities „cannot be taken as a deep-rooted social reality but as having been actively produced, and reproduced in an ongoing process" (Peleikis 2001: 400). This process is linked to the establishment of the Lebanese nation on the one side, their peculiar economical autonomy (with its climax in the late 1980s), and - not to forget - the Lebanese post-civil war political system of consociationalism. After all, the ambivalent relationship between tradition and modernity defines the Lebanese society. On one side it keeps values and traditions firmly established while, on the other, constantly striving for modernity. The concomitant socio-cultural and -economical change can be seen as expressions for this transformations (e.g. a transition from an economy dominated by handicraft, agriculture and trade into one dominated by light industry, bureaucracy and a large service sector) (cp. Zein 2012: 47*f.*).

5.4.1 Merging social and political confessionalism

One central aspect of the country's political confessionalism is the constitutional autonomy of confessional groups in the social, political and legal system which can be identified as one element of ethno-national steadfastness. As Vergopoulos remarks: „[T]he political sphere

[59] As Anderson, Schillers remarks in 1979 also address the implementation of the Western conceptualisation of the nation in the complex socio-confessional setting in Lebanon. This complexity, the „stratified social mosaic" (Barakat 1977: 25 cited in Schiller 1979: 45) enabled the various social fractions and/ or ethno-confessional communities to occupy the space for interpretation of what nationalism means to them (cp. Schiller 1979: 43-45).

[60] Original quote: „Ethnische Politiken finden auf der Grundlage der *früheren* nationalen Anerkennung statt und werden auf der Grundlage der Proportionalität im Rahmen des gegenwärtigen Zensus legitimiert." (Anderson 2000: 62, original emphasis).

can be linked to the social sphere not in the sense of a representation but rather in a sense of a compensation: political forms do not reflect what is social, *they complete it*" (Vergopoulos 1990: 142, 154 cited in Ayubi 1995: 29, original emphasis).

Rosiny (2011: 2) points out that once the National Pact between Bishara al-Khouri Riyadh al-Solh (section 4.2) became legally anchored through the Ta'if Accord, political confessionalism secured the confessional groups rights to a legal framework. Confessionalism thus enabled a consolidation of ethnicity by a legal framework of segregating identity constructions: „The political system tries to accommodate the diverse interests in an unifying manner, but conversely reinforces differences by unifying separate communal entities while denying a national civic identity" (Moufarrege 2009).

> The Lebanese political system as set up by the French in 1926, even after the so-called Taif reform of 1989, reinforces the sectarian affilations of the citizens. A citizen is only dealt with by the state according to his or her sectarian affiliation, through their sectarian representatives. (Abukhalil 2008: 361)

Ta'if's constitutional autonomy of confessional groups strongly contrasts the equality on an individual level (that is supposed to be guaranteed by Ta'if and its constitutional character as well). This contrast is produced by the very nature of the political system itself and stipulated by the Ta'if Accord that is first and foremost a compromise between the confessional communities. By compromising the individual, the Lebanese state reinforces the prioritised positioning of ethno-confessionalism/ -nationalism that categorically constantly renew the production of difference through its constitution. While Lebanese political confessionalism (*at-Ta'ifiya as-siyasiya*) can be translated as consociationalism, the country's social confessionalism (*at-Ta'ifiya al-ijtima'iya*) is framed by the autonomy of the confessional communities over the personal status law, the education system as well as the social system. This is granting massive influence of the confessional communities in the daily lives (sports, media, education, security, aso.) of its members (cp. Rosiny 2011: 3, 5). One interviewee mentioned that the entanglement of social and political confessionalism can even be found as a determinant on the job market:

> It was an official building here, even the guy cleaned the floor, one is Christian the other is Muslim. There are no points of cleaning the same floor. One is Christian one is Muslim. This is so much so, even in the banks here. When they need somebody to work in the bank. Today look, how many Christians they have in the bank and how many Muslims they have in the bank? Of course. And you think they will hire you because of your MBA? No. MBA yes. But if there are five Christians and only one Muslim they will get a Muslim. That's the way it works here.[61]

Confessional communities are upgraded to influential units that create normative ethnic identity. Another interviewee made clear how ethno-confessional identity shapes his indi-

[61] Interview with interviewee b in Beirut, Lebanon on 12^{th} February 2011.

vidual actions, in a political perspective and vis-à-vis other groups, nevertheless portraying an image of religion that is supposed not to touch the public sphere:

> We separate between the ideological and religious issues and the political issues and legislations in the parliament. I am a believer, I believe in God, I am Shi'ite I have my own ideology, perspective in this life, but this is my own issue. When I want to think about the Lebanese people in general I think in political perspective ... and I respect the Lebanese specialities in general. I have to respect the other religions, the other sects and they have to respect me. My religion, it is something private and I use it in society in general because I inspire my values from my religion. And this support me and push me to be more respectful for the other people. But in the same time I have to respect the specialities of the other sects.[62]

Another aspect of Lebanese consociationalism enforcing ethno-national structures is the structure of the country's election system, that is segmented along confessional lines. Due to these structures, multi-confessional parties are not possible, virtually forcing political leaders to put particular interests above national or socially inclusive interests. Furthermore, political mobilisation heavily relies on intra-confessional solidarity and inter-confessional stereotypes. In doing so, the political debate is constantly reduced to an expression of particular interests of the respective ethno-confessional communities that on one side have to relate and reproduce to the state and its constitution but nevertheless hollow out the state, and create an peculiar notion of the nation on the other side (cp. Rosiny 2011: 3*f.*). What Ehrlich portrays as hybridisations by „blending nationalism and religion into a theoretical theory of action" while „observing [...] a process of politicisation of religion or, as some would prefer, religionisation of politics" (Ehrlich 2007: 24), individual identity is attributed to confessional or communal identity. In doing so, the confessional group converts the individual into a member of an ethno-nationalist group. Here, „[i]identification goes beyond individual identity and 'situates' the 'communal individual' within the larger society" while the question of „[t]he self is formed jointly with societal allegiances only in terms of the 'what' but independently in terms of the 'who'". (Moufarrege 2009). Since a groups (collective) identity cannot generate on its own terms,

> [t]he equality of individuals of the we-collective materialises through homogeneity within this collective and exclusion of non-members. Such an understanding of homogeneity suppresses the individual in favour of the collective. [63] (Zein 2012: 44)

In the construction process of the individual identity, the identity of the individual not only conflates with the social (community) and the class identity (cp. Moufarrege 2009), but also with the national identity, which is ultimately turned into an unattainable goal that becomes an exclusive ideal framed by ethnic interests. At exactly this point ethnicity

[62] Interview with INTERVIEWEE D in Beirut, Lebanon on 9^{th} February 2011.

[63] Original quote: „Die Gleichheit der Individuen eines Wir-Kollektivs realisiert sich durch die Homogenität innerhalb des jeweiligen Kollektivs und einen gleichzeitigen Ausschluss der Nichtzugehörigen. In einer solchen Homogenität wird das Individuelle (das Eigene) durch das Eindringen des Allgemeinen verdrängt." (Zein 2012: 44)

merges with nationalism. Even though many Lebanese can imagine to choose their identity within a distinct national identity, hybrid identities simply cannot exist since the people are forced to position themselves within the boundaries of one ethnic identity (cp. Rosiny 2011: 4*f.*). As a result, membership in a confessional community almost becomes a requirement for citizenship while „rights and duties are constructed through the patriarchal and tribal lens embedded in kinship relations rather than through the principles of inclusive and equal democratic citizenship“ (Moufarrege 2009).

5.4.2 The production of ethno-nationalism

From the end of the civil war onwards, a peculiar form of political development has taken place in Lebanon. On one hand ethno-nationalism became vital for political articulation in a democratic context in order to mobilise the respective ethnic constituencies while on the other hand, the consensual secularisation project on the basis of the Ta'if Accord sought to eradicate ethno-political structures. Hamzeh (2004: 143*f.*) describes the restrictive dimension of the Lebanese political system after the constitutional amendment implementing the Ta'if Accord.

> The ineffectiveness of Lebanon's confessional system is attributed to a paradox inherent in the system itself. [...] [T]he Lebanese confessional system has failed to create national cohesion among the various communities. Sectarian loyalties have constantly undermined the democratic aspect of the system, and accordingly the nation-state building model was transformed into sectarian regional loyalty.

When drawing conclusions from transformations of the political system during the last decades in Lebanon, it becomes obvious that the roots of national identity themselve become a paradox. While religion is an important source for nationalist dynamics in Lebanon, it is also its most confining element. „Religion, then, is not just a doctrine, a set of myths, a culture; it is an institutional space according to whose logic religious nationalists wish to remake the world“ (Friedland 2001: 141).

The origins of the various perceptions of modern Lebanese nationalism can be traced back to the civil war, hence, to a period when the state was more or less absent. In this environment „[r]eligious nationalism, like the modern state itself, originates as a symbolic disordering out of the interested plays of agents who are particularly positioned. The position of religious agents is important in explaining the rise of religious nationalism“ (Friedland 2001: 144). At exactly this point, ethnic identities become relevant for the individual: just as the groups need to outweigh the individual's needs, these „individuals begin to perceive the group as seeking to satisfy the same vital needs they themselves want to satisfy“ (cp. Volkan 1998: 25, 27). It is also crucial to take the „political environment [into account, that provided] [...] little opportunity for men and women of real stature to develop as political leaders“ (Norton 2007: 123; remarks LW). In this post-war environment

„religious figures prepared to criticise widespread corruption and a generally compromised political system [...] [that] also advance[d] a convincing model for a religiously rooted society“ (Norton 2007: 123). By doing so they filled a vacuum of political authority.

As outlined in section 4.4.2, it was in the mid 1980s when it was relatively easy for ethno-national militias to erect structures that paralleled, or even substituted the state due to its absence. Throughout this period, the political and military leaders in power naturally had no interest in welding any common identity and rather emphasised their „cantonisation“ projects. Wentker (2008: 150) and Sakmani (2008), by describing the case of Hezbullah in the 1980s and the party's extensive welfare programme, frame a statement made by one interviewee. When asked what will happen to the party's social institutions in case a strong state would take them over, the interviewee, who is a Hezbullah politician himself, answered:

> [W]e have a lot of institutions, specials on many levels, everything. We have health centers and many hospitals. We have [...] a radio and newspaper also and we have schools, a chain schools and we have many institutions run to help the poor people and other to help the wanted [...] people. Yes, and we have many cultures centers. And then this is the reason why they accused us, we are a state within a state. But this in Lebanon is not strange because the other parties and the other sects have the same. This is one of the, you can say, the ... Lebanese specialities or Lebanese characters, but we are doing that because the state is not offering people this service. But in case, that in the future, if we suppose that we'll be a real state and strong state [...], who offer these functions for the people, we will give up. We will get rid of it.[64]

This „Lebanese character“ or „speciality“ can be traced back to the the mid 1980s. Back then it could be observed that „the origins and bases of many power relationships in modern, complex societies[...] derived from economic relationships pertaining to property rights or control over the means of production“ (Ayubi 1995: 30). In this sense, the absence of the state was crucial for the emergence of territorial ethno-nationalism, deriving its political legitimacy along economic lines, therefore advancing its peculiar modes of production and accumulation (that allowed ethnic groups to form their own social institutions, e.g.) (cp. Ayubi 1995: 31*f.*).

> The warlords on either side fiercely hold on to the communal cantons they have come to head as virtually independent despots, and none among them show much intention of yielding any of their acquired powers for the general good. Yet, these same warlords, to maintain some public credibility, feel compelled to declare themselves in principle, every so often, for the continued existence and fundamental territorial integrity of the country, even as they persist in acting to the contrary. In their public statements, all of them claim their ultimate aim is to secure the reconstruction of a viable Lebanon. (Salibi 1998: 222)

A derivative of this period is the dilemma that superficial democratic structures are manned by exactly the warlords Salibi mentions (or their sons). In this sense, non-

[64] Interview with interviewee d in Beirut, Lebanon on 9^{th} February 2011.

democrats make up the Lebanese democracy and as a result, most of the parties are not democratically structured and politicians endeavour to consolidate their basis not only on the legal basis of the highly disputed constitution, but also through external orbits, the control of resources, and the domination of capital formations in order to increase leverage in internal affairs. Their power base is often erected in the private sector and the occupation of the media sector. One interviewee defined this development as a central problem in post-civil war Lebanon:

> Well, they do nothing to unite.
> Yes, they divide, of course. Of course. They also divided the politics. [...] So they do nothing unfortunately. And what hurts us, the post generation war and even our parents [...] And it's the same people and who had formed the country let's say who form the parties and like who work for us. The warlords, responsible for battles [...] And they're still now the heads of you know the... the state.
> They are still the people in power and they are still the people I talk about and I read about everyday. When I was seven or eight and I don't know, like who were responsible for many bad things that happened. Yeah, and these are the head of the parties.[65]

Contextually it is easier to understand why inter-ethnic conflicts are continued to be dissolved on a military or financial basis. Nevertheless, the civil war can be seen as a period of radical change regarding the basis upon which the leading politicians operated. While old leaders (traditional notables) appealed to confessional and trans-confessional ties, new leaders (who were often leaders of militias during the civil war) appeal to ideologies. (cp. Fawaz 1994: 224; Perthes 1994: 146; Rosiny 2011: 5*f.*).

> These new leaders understandably have no more commitment to the balance that existed among the communities before the war than do the masses they attract; they have little reason to protect a political system too inflexible to make room for them, and they are not interested in making alliances with traditional politicians. This aggravates an already serious breakdown of communications among politicians. (Fawaz 1994: 225)

The production of these ideologies is strongly aligned with the establishment of ethnic ideology and its entanglement with nationalism. The chain reactions of confrontations during the civil war which led to an eradication of confessional ties between the communities were accompanied by a territorialisation of confessional identities. The demographic structure of the urban and rural areas changed drastically during the 15 years of civil war, leading to an ethno-confessional homogenisation of vast areas of Lebanon's territory, known as the division into ethno-national cantons in the 1980s (see section 4.4.2). Hence, territorial separation led to a development of local identities of which confessionalism is one central element. The basis for the formulation and the latter evolvement of ethnic identity was the territorial homogenisation of confessionalism, its entrenchment, and the violence between the communities in the civil war. At this point it is important to understand, that the hostilities between the confessions first appeared during the process of cantonisation because

[65] Interview with interviewee a in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.

difference began to be ideologically produced. One fundamental basis of Lebanese ethno-nationalism lies in the difference that was produced (cp. Fawaz 1994: 226; Peleikis 2001: 414*f.*) With reference to refugees from the south Lebanese village of Joun, Peleikis (2001: 415) describes the process of alienation between the ethno-confessional groups during the civil war, leading to a consolidation of identity, giving way to the complex construction of ethnicity.

> [M]any Joun refugees were increasingly prepared to call on confessionalised identities to restructure their images of the confessional ‚Other'. The invocation and making of confessionalized memories in this process helped to construct differences and to legitimize confessional identities. [...] [T]he confessional ‚Other' was constructed as an anonymous enemy, while refugees struggled with their fate as victims of displacement and expulsion. Here, the confessional ‚Other' could be made to adopt the role of perpetrator, responsible for their plight.

In Lebanon, the construction of ethnicity and its entanglement with a nationalistic-economical dimension of territoriality constituted a fundamental ingredient of what Eric Hobsbawm (2002: 368) goes as far as to call a „world epidemic". Ethno-nationalism (as well as linguistic and confessional nationalism) draws its power from a fortification of confessional identities by creating a narrative about the homeland. While the socio-economical realignment during the years of forced displacement were „unmaking [...] memories of multi-confessional local practices, while simultaneously mobilizing confessional identities that promised integration into the new localities, [...] they were [also] remaking their memories" (Peleikis 2001: 417). As Varshney (2002: 29) remarks, leaders tend to, or have to, emphasise ancestry in order to build community feelings. Even though this may be just one example of the many dimensions along which ethnicity is constructed, one central aspect is highlighted here: the entanglement of blurred memories with a vision of political empowerment. The result is an accumulation of „identity capital" by harvesting community history, decontextualising memory, and clamping on reconstructible symbols of historical identities.

Amongst other things ethno-nationalism instrumentalises nostalgia „as a form of politicised cultural memory [by] blending a longing for the past and [...] [evocating it] in [a] present social reality" (Peleikis 2001: 418; remarks LW). An important role in this present social reality is attributed to the family which Zein (2012: 44) perceives as one dimension (out of three) that is being utilised as a frame of reference for identity. Here, the family is the space where identity models based on collectives are being merged with the individual identity. In this sense, the traditionally structured families, as well as a largely disappointing modernisation process can serve as one potential basis of a collective identity (cp. Zein 2012: 48*f.*).

In order to produce and constantly reproduce ethnic identity which is also always a fight for superiority over other groups, usually a neighbour (cp. Volkan 1998: 21), leaders struggle to control the past. During the civil war for example, the confessional communities began

to formulate their identities on an exclusive confessional basis and frame it in a political context. When the confessional communities entrenched themselves in ethno-national cantons in the mid-1980s, the civil war reached a point where leaders began to fight over intra-confessional politicised memory (that's why an increase in intra-community violence could be observed at this time) on the one hand, and over inter-confessional definatory power of national identity. The exclusiveness this process produced is also absorbed by the very concept of ethnic identity and the reason why individuals had to integrate into an ethno-confessional identity in order to be accepted as a member of society itself. As the social fabric of post-independence Lebanon changed, it was subsequently aligned around capitalist dimensions, transforming the power base of political leaders. At this point, neither secular rank, nor confessional hierarchies alone were able to mobilise communities any longer. The fight over the power base additionally became a fight over economical resources. In other words, capitalism restructured ethnic power bases of political leaders and led to a confusion of ethnic identity and class consciousness among its members. As a result, the task of the newly established political parties (with their ethno-national basis) after the civil war and the Ta'if Accord, was to bridge the gap between nostalgic politicised memory and socio-economic realities as produced by capitalist regimes of regulation of production and accumulation of capital in order to frame their power bases.

Since this peculiar developments and the realities that have been produced influenced generations born during and after the civil war, ethnic identities constantly manifest the confessional adherence, hence, generating an exclusive nationalism. The realities arising thereout may involve municipal elections or the involvement in civil society associations and organisations on an ethnic basis. But not only ethnicity is defined along these lines, also national identity is subsequently defined in this way as we have learned before. Makdisi grasps the phenomenon of ethno-nationalism by entangling it with confessionalism, describing it as a

> historically contingent moment when religious difference becomes accepted and imagined as the bedrock of modern politics of equal representation. Rather than stress individual equality, or a national citizenship that can and should aspire to transcend religious affiliation, the diversity of religious identity becomes the basis of national citizenship. The foundation of coexistence in modern Lebanon, therefore, depends on a notion that religious communities must be represented as political communities. (Makdisi 2008: 24)

One can observe that nationalism, like ethnicity, is also formed around a socially exclusive dimension, making it possible to clearly identify different kinds of nationalism belonging to particular groups.

> In its policies, there is no doubt that Hizballah is a nationalist party. Its view of nationalism differs from that of many Lebanese, especially from the nationalism based on the Phoenician origins myth espoused by Lebanon's Christian right, and from the

> neoliberal US-backed nationalism of Hariri's party. Hizballah offers instead a nationalism that views Lebanon as an Arab state that cannot distance itself from Arab causes like that of Palestine. (Deeb 2008: 65)

5.5 Civil society in Lebanon

Lebanon's civil society formations are a mix of domestic, regional and international actors who deliver services to the people that the state itself cannot or is unwilling to deliver (as it is the case with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, e.g.). The ethno-confessional fragmentation of the Lebanese society also reflects into the sphere of the civil society.

> The landscape of Lebanese civil society, specifically in rural areas, is very similar to that of Koura. Koura is characterized by a wide political vacuum, at both the representational and institutional level, resulting from successive unfair electoral laws and the absence of local and national political and societal organizations. Most, if not the only active groups are religious based organizations, both Christian and Muslim, affiliated with the church or mosque of the village. These groups basically fill state created vacuums by providing critical social services as well as a sense of community, hence the strength of the allegiances. In general, civil society is conflated with communal society. (Moufarrege 2009)

This considerations have to be taken into account in order to identify the sources of mobilisation for ethno-confessional groups. What is of special interest here is to „what extent do, or can, different community groups produce different national values?" (Moufarrege 2009).

Figure 5.2 shows how the different Arab countries can be qualitatively categorized by their state/ civil society relationship. Even though the matrix reflects the situation in the 1990s, Lebanon's positioning in cell C is not substantially wrong for the contemporary situation. Concerning the developments of state institutions, like the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) for example, Lebanon could be moved closer towards cell B today.

Post-civil war features become visible in Lebanon when it comes to terms of civil society structures. While the civil war „weakened the state [...], other regional developments have unwittingly empowered new and old constituencies" (Ibrahim 1998: 377), groups that emerged out of, or respectively during the civil war, carried the momentum they created into Lebanon after Ta'if. Some retained their societal status, even though ideologically biased, up to this day. Shi'ite, Sunni, Druze and Christian (especially Maronite) factions have to be mentioned in this context. After the Ta'if Accord, the civil society gained importance in restructuring the country but had to compete with actors that emerged out of the civil war. Furthermore, in the transformation process that civil society underwent, some old foundations based on socio-economic disparities were incorporated in the post-war context of ethno-confessional loyalties and particularism.

Figure 5.2: State and civil society in the Arab world in the 1990s

Civil Society	State		
	Strong	Moderate	Weak
Strong	Morocco Jordan (A)	Yemen (B)	Lebanon Palestine (C)
Moderate	Oman (D)	Tunisia Egypt Kuwait Qatar UAE (E)	Algeria (F)
Weak	Syria Libya (G)	Saudi Arabia Bahrain Mauritania (H)	Iraq Somalia Sudan (I)

Source: Ibrahim 1998: 379.

What is interesting, is the continuity of a strong civil society in Lebanon. In the 1990s reconstruction work and a changing political environment were challenging the country. The country, however, emerged from a „state of shock“ into a peaceful consolidation. Nonetheless, the civil society seemed to be of continuous strength over the years and kept its strong position. It could be explained by what has been described above: the tethering of civil society to confessional factions, and also its traditional or historical foundations within the Lebanese society. Yet, this observation is potentially superficial if not put in a context of a western understanding of civil society that conceptualises social formations vis-à-vis the state, as it was observed in the run up to the civil war.

5.5.1 Civil society in pre-civil war Lebanon

In order to understand what role the Lebanese civil society is playing in creating (or can help to create) a distinct Lebanese national identity, one needs not only to understand along which lines the exclusiveness of ethno-nationalism was established, but also on which basis civil society can react to socially and politically contested formations. In order to do so, Lebanon's development from a partially autonomous territory in the Ottoman empire into a nation-state in the 1940s needs to be taken into account in regard to the country's social organisation.

> In Lebanon [...] - as in other new states formed after the decline of colonialism - one cannot speak of a constituted nation, conscious of itself, existing prior to the establishment of the state. Indeed, these new states often suffered from significant social disintegration and the existence of ‚particularistic' allegiances which were stronger than national ties and which prevented their formation. As a result, the State did not come into contact with a civil society, but with a multifaceted, pluralistic and

> composite communal society. This is why the concept of a communal society has been used to describe the range of what can be called ‚civil' activities in the lives of its citizens [...]. (Kiwan 1993: 71)

The first time elements of a civil society could be identified in Lebanon, was when the political landscape was consolidated after gaining independence. As Traboulsi (2007: 164-170) and Kiwan (1993: 71*f.*) illustrated, in the run up to the civil war in the late 1960s and early 1970s, social movements initiated by students, unions, and workers did not mobilise the society by drawing from confessional or ethnic loyalties but through student, workers and opposition movements, as well as through a dynamic press. Ines Braune (2005: 73) notes that parties from the political opposition, the students movement, the worker and labour unions acted nationwide and unified. In conclusion, it can be stated that popular protest and conflict was largely determined by class identities in order to draw attention to pressing socio-economic issues. These socio-economic problems were picked up by the ideologically biased parties and translated into the necessity to reform the political system.

At this point, however, the absence of a class consciousness with the potential to bridge ethno-confessional divisions needs to be stressed. Even though the economic development in Lebanon led to a growing number of industrial workers as well as trade and labour unions, only 15% out of 57.000 industrial workers were members of one out of the 169 unions in 1975. Furthermore, the 2.099 industrial enterprises employed less than 10 persons in 1964, making up the absence of a „industrial proletariat". The lack of the „industrial proletariat" that would evolve from „concentrating on [...] efforts on the procurement of better wages and/ or better working conditions" explains the lack of a „revolutionary zeal" (cp. Lechleitner 1972: 86*f.*, Smock 1975: 101 and Suleiman 1972: 11*f.* cited in Schiller 1979: 45*f.*).

The 1960s and 70s were a period in Lebanese history when society's self-perception was aligned along socio-economic classes to a certain degree. It was a time „when underprivileged groups began to question the local and national order of things dominated by the elites" (Peleikis 2001: 428) and demanded a voice in national politics. In this context, Bryce (1989 citied in Kizilhan 2004: 358) points out that in the Lebanese context, these underprivileged groups had no other choice than to fight for their rights while wealthier families had more options at hand to escape the effects of the political system. The driving force behind the social demands of that time was the young generation who grew up in independent Lebanon and adhered to the democratic principles of the Lebanese nation, however vacuous and fragile their foundations may have been. „[T]hese young people had visions of questioning the power of the new local elites and overcoming the dominant ‚culture of sectarianism'" (Peleikis 2001: 428). It was exactly this young generation who had the power to overcome the confessional structures of politics, inherited by former genera-

tions. Yet, during the civil war, especially as the war became increasingly determined by confessional agitation that led to the establishment of ethnic identities, the spirit of this generation with their understanding of a class society was transformed.

5.5.2 Civil society and ethno-nationalism

During the civil war confessional loyalties and particularism slowly became the primal source of social mobilisation. Before the military dimension dominated the civil war, the civil society, by relying on their existing structures, played at least a minor role in shaping a distinct and unifying identity for the Lebanese. With the increasing militarisation of the conflicts, however, the civil society had to step back and give way to traditional/ ethno-confessional loyalties on the one hand, and violent clashes between the respective militias on the other. The „fate of the sect“ became the stigma of the second half of the civil war, enabling the militias to ideologically exploit their „cantonisation“ of the Lebanese territory. In this period, the space for collective identity became a narrow gap and was equal to be non-existent. The civil society nevertheless performed a walk on the edge when mobilising 250.000 people in Beirut in order to demonstrate against the war in 1987. The protesters were a mixture of students, university professors, occupational unions, women and human rights associations who organised round tables, conferences and participated in sit-ins and strikes. Their strengthened collective stance was borne in the adoption to the tide of events of the ongoing civil war (cp. Braune 2005: 73*f.*; Kiwan 1993: 73). By indefatigably confronting the militias and the political parties with the government (and vice-versa), they increasingly gained ground in the confrontations „and clearly indicated the existence of a developing civil society because they took place at an equal distance from the complacent state and the dominant military forces which sought the disintegration of Lebanese society“ (Kiwan 1993: 73).

As it can be seen, civil society in contemporary Lebanon is continuously strong since the 1960s on the one hand, but largely based on particulate interests and considerably fragmented from the 1970s onwards it was on the other hand. Today, „the traditional/ sectarian loyalties are obstructing the development of civil society to the same extent as they are an integral part of it“[66] (Braune 2005: 75).

> [S]ocial allegiances preclude a certain cluster in the crowd of the multiple actors of civil society. ‘Objectivity’ and ‘reality’ cease to be ‘inter-subjective’ (ultimately derived from distinctiveness), but become ‘intra-subjective’ based on the construction of the self, the perception of otherness and group ties. (Moufarrege 2009)

[66] Original quote: „Die Verankerung traditioneller Strukturen und konfessionsgebundener Orientierungen hemmt die Entwicklung [der Zivilgesellschaft] in dem Maße, wie sie Teil der Zivilgesellschaft sind.“ (Braune 2005: 75; remarks LW).

The link between nationalism, ethnicity, identity, and civil society was made visible in the civil war between the mid 1980s and the end of hostilities in 1989/ 90. The resulting reinforcement of the ethnic cantonisation project can be seen as the climax of social disintegration and brought back

> pluralistic communal ties at a time when conditions necessary for developing civil society at a national level were not present. This situation induced people to look to reinforce their sense of security and protect themselves from military threat. The result was a tendency by individuals to identify with one particular group against another group or groups, were little room was left for a concept of a national collectivity. The feeling of belonging to a national collectivity formed of diverse groups was thus thrust aside by a tendency to identify with smaller groups which, nevertheless, were perceived as representing the collectivity. (Kiwan 1993: 72)

In spite of these developments political programs at this time largely called for decentralisation and cantonisation. Although these programs heavily influenced young generations of Lebanese who did enroll in ethno-national associations and organisations, it also led to a revival of trade unions and liberal-democratic liberal parties on the basis of a distinct national identity (cp. Kiwan 1993: 72*f.*).

> The war years witnessed a tug-of-war between the forces calling for a return to particularistic communal ties, and those opposed to them who aspired to the consolidation of national civil society. [...] [In the postwar period] Lebanese society [...] [continued] to be pulled between those who would like to see particularistic allegiances predominate, and those who want a national allegiance to prevail. [...] [C]iticens find themselves at an equal distance between communal society and the emerging civil society. (Kiwan 1993: 74; remarks LW)

Although civil society formations are often tethered to ethno-confessional loyalties, group activity cannot be primarily restricted to ethno-confessional interests. Although religious formations are one source of mobilisation, ethnic traditions and elite interests, the alignment of groups and associations along topics (e.g. environment, economy, culture, etc.) is also important in Lebanon. One example of a community group that is and has been producing different national values is the Lebanese Social Movement:

> The Lebanese Social Movement is an NGO established to address local concerns and empower citizens through lobbying, networking, raising awareness and initiating new community projects. It aims to channel demands and civic action through institutions based on principles of grass root democracy and equality. (Moufarrege 2009)

Nevertheless, the role of NGOs in Lebanon is also perceived critically. Although basically seen as a positive element of the civil society, for interviewee A, the work of NGOs itself became a business model, touching on the topic of inter-confessional marriage.

> There are of course many who might be appreciating it. But it has to be for a good cause, you know. But I guess that things in NGOs happen not really honest way sometimes. [. . .] Because it's a corrupt society again, so I think that, like marriage between marriage and corruption, [...] it's not in every case, you know I am just saying what [...] sometimes becomes the business of an NGO. Sometimes the money will go.

> [...] [W]hen I hear NGO it's always something very positive, but I hear this from my colleagues [or] from my husband's colleagues [...].[67]

One central topic of Lebanese civil society on the local level was centred on creating a new transconfessional image of locality. This topic which became prominent in the aftermath of the civil war throughout the 1990s can be seen as a manifestation of the ethnic image that was created during the civil war, even if it superficially aimed at dissolving it. Peleikis (2001: 427) argues that „it seems that local politicians are trying to unite the members of the municipality by means of a discourse on a distant, harmless but impressive past, in order to avoid conflict among the councillors". What we can see here is a blinding out of the memories experienced during the civil war by emphasising the past. By creating reviving narratives about the glorious foundations of the respective ancestral community, an existing high propensity within the Lebanese society to build identity upon confessional/ ethnic identities is exploited in the name of establishing an equilibrium between this very ethnic groups.

> By adopting the national politics of civil war denial, they ignore people's traumatic memories and contribute to the danger that confessionalised identities could once again be mobilized to express severe discontent within the political system. [...] [T]he new elites of the post-war period seem to be consolidating the boundaries between elites and non-elites, and thereby reproducing the politics of the past - the creation of a strong patron-client system, elite-dominated localities, and a confessionalist Lebanese state. (Peleikis 2001: 429)

5.5.3 The paradox of national history

Kiwan (1993: 74) emphasises the need of „a national civic education program directed at the younger generations" in order to overcome the ethnic divisions of the Lebanese society. Although this demand was cast in a legislative mold in the Ta'if Accord, no noteworthy progress concerning the establishment of a national history has been made since. By describing a conflict between the ministry of education and the Center for Education which is responsible for the creation of new history textbooks, Hannah Wettig (2005: 38-42) exemplifies problematic areas concerning a common national Lebanese history. Most of her findings show how difficult it is to establish one distinct national history with the potential of vanquishing controversial perspectives. After more than 15 years of the creation process of school books on national history (that only exists since the 1940s), it was decided to let historical documents speak for themselves, much like Salibi (1998: 217) suggested:

> To gain the degree of solidarity that is needed to maintain viability, their best chance lies in getting to know and understand the full truth of their past, and to accommodate to its realities. Factual history, in cases of this kind, has often to be forcibly extracted from the privacy of the historian's study, and thrown undressed and dishevelled into

[67] Interview with interviewee a in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.

> the open, for all to see it as it is and learn to accept and live with it as best as they can.

In fact, every ethno-national group still holds the monopoly of power over history within their community that is not shared with the rest of society. Basically all historical periods of Lebanese history are in dispute (cp. Wettig 2005: 38). Also Schiller (1979: 38) identified this element as one of the major obstacles preventing the overcoming of the inter-confessional antagonism. He added that the authority of the confessional communities in this regard dates back to the 18^{th} century.

At the core of this problem lies the impossibility to squeeze non-national history into the framework of a national history that requires the alignment of non-national categories in order to make sense for a nationalist conception. Hence, history is constantly being transformed to fit the political system. The fault lines that this utilization of history creates can be observed in the civil society landscape. The systemic obstacles to discuss national identity within the society are reproduced by the structures and realities of nationalist state conception that led to the strengthening of ethnic identities in the first place.

Chapter 6

Recent repercussions

As I explained along which lines the Ta'if Accord destroyed old allegiances and hegemonies, but at the same time enabled the construction of new ones in section 5.3, the repositioning and reconfiguring of internal political allegiances, as well as the constant reviving of the strive for hegemony within the system is the actual process that keeps reproducing the socio-political imbalance. Ethno-nationalism for its part is only a pawn in the systematic suppression of an profoundly held internal debate about the country's conception of statehood. The country's identity (regardless of the political, economical or social setting) was hollowed out in order to pacify confessional groups and ethno-nationalist parties. In this regard, interviewee A mentioned the (infirm) union of the Lebanese society before 2005:

> Now this society is still divided. Now this is something that you cannot hide. That's the difference between before 2005 and now. After 14^{th} March when we were, all Lebanese I guess were, most of them agreed on that they wanted Syria out. This was the point of their agreement. But then after 14^{th} March this beautiful image of the Lebanese union was all destroyed.[68]

Elsewhere, the interviewee added that „[a]fter 2005 [...] it went down and then things were going down and are still going down.“[69]

After the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the country's political balance is sustained by a two-bloc alliance system that is new to Lebanese politics. In this system parties and groups keep changing sides and positions. One bloc is called the March 8^{th}-Alliance while the other is called March 14^{th}-Alliance. However, this indifferent situation is not new to the Lebanese scene and will probably not consolidate anytime soon, especially not with the spillover effect from the Syrian conflict, because most groups and parties are most likely to not let go of their interests despite the massive political transformations (e.g. the Ta'if Accord, the Hariri-assassination in 2005, the 2008 Doha Accord[70], aso.):

> This idea of groups refusing to cede any power and not letting go of their positions is one of the most difficult problems in Lebanese politics. Apart from causing inter-sect conflicts, this attitude results in intra-sect conflicts and power struggles as well. (Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2012).

While the major fissure of the 19^{th} and 20^{th} century was formed along Maronite and Druze lines (cp. Abukhalil 2008: 360), a new form of political confessionalism has been introduced to the Lebanese political scene: an alliance-bloc building that diffuses the politics of the left and the right with the dialectics of confessional and/ or ethnic distinctions:

[68] Interview with INTERVIEWEE A in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.
[69] Interview with INTERVIEWEE A in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.
[70] Further reading: *Dingel (2008)*.

> It is not easy to borrow the terms of civil war. We can't talk about left vs. right. The Aoun movement, for example, judging by its economic program, is to the right of all factions and political parties in Lebanon. Furthermore, the so-called Socialist Progressive Party and the Democratic Left Movement are aligned with the Hariri dynasty's right-wing movement. And Hizballah can't be said to be leftist when the party has disregarded the cause of socioeconomic justice in Lebanon. And the Muslim-Christian label of the Lebanese conflict does not apply either, because both sides of the political divide in Lebanon have a share of the Christian community and its political representatives. (Abukhalil 2008: 363)

Regarding the political balance after the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory in April 2005 (after being present for nearly 20 years) the Sunni-Shia divide foregrounded. Today even the Christian camp is divided into „Shi'ite Christians" and „Sunni Christians". Abukhalil (2008: 365) remarks that Lebanon after the Syrian withdrawal (with its narrow confessional calculations) resembles the old Lebanon. Since the two main parties at play, Hariri's Future Movement and Hezbullah are based on an unique trans-regional, financially potent foreign backing, three interrelated sets of issues need to be considered when defining the most recent instrumental ethno-confessional developments in Lebanese politics: (i) the unlimited use of cash, (ii) reliance on foreign powers and finally (iii) resort to confessional agitation (cp. Abukhalil 2008: 361). Here, the last point is of central importance for Abukhalil's hypothesis. He argues that when in a position of (political) weakness, „narrow sectarian agitation and mobilization" is the best comeback option. While most leaders in Lebanon traditionally tend to portray conflicts along ethnic lines, Rafik Hariri made great use of it. His son Sa'ad Hariri who inherited an ethno-confessional camp (rather than a national leadership) from his father in 2005, however, relied on inter-confessional agitation and mobilisation more than his father (cp. Abukhalil 2008: 360*f.*). In other words, what we can observe from 2005 onwards (with the impacts of the 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel taken into account), is a coming back of inter-confessional agitation, an emphasis on ethno-national politcs, and to a minor extent also intra-confessional fragmentation as expressed by Hassan Nasrallah (2006: 9):

> There is a real impasse in Lebanon today, especially after the war. There is sharp national division and not sectarian division. What exists now is not a dispute between Shi'is and Sunnis, or between Muslims and Christians, or among Druze, Sunnis, Shi'is, and Christians. There is a national political division. There are major strategic and political options, on which Shi'i, Sunni, Druze, and Christian political forces agree and others, on which Shi'i, Sunni, Druze, and Christian political forces disagree. When some Shi'is said things different from Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, they thought that we would grieve. We were happy when others came forth in supporting the other stand, which proved that the dispute here is not sectarian, but political.

By softening the terrain of civil society (cp. Neubert 2001: 69), ethno-nationalism appeals to a wider part of society. In a speech given by Hassan Nasrallah after the 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel, it can be observed how ethno-nationalism is produced by confessional and socio-political rhetoric:

> Our victory is not the victory of a party or a community; rather it is a victory for true Lebanon, the true Lebanese people, and every free person in the world. Do not contain it in party, sectarian, communal, or regional clans. The Lebanese resistance provided strong proof to all Arab and Islamic armies. [...] What is distinct about the resistance movements in Lebanon and Palestine is that they choose the dignity of their people, holy places, and freedom and offer their leaders, sons, and dear ones as sacrifices to join the throne of God Almighty. We announce from this place, with the blood of our martyrs, that any talk in Lebanon about partition [federalism and cantons] is an Israeli talk. [...] We the Lebanese, our fate, decision, and wish to God should be to live together in one state. [...] What will protect Lebanese unity is a strong, capable, and just state. [...] What will tackle social and livelihood crises for the Lebanese and the residents in Lebanon is a strong, capable, just, clean and proud state. This is what we all aspire to. A strong and capable state means a state that can proudly regain every inch of its occupied territory and protect every drop of water [...]; that can stop the enemy from encroaching on its sovereignty daily; and that can assure its people that it is truly protecting them with arms, power, reason, unity, organization, planning, and national will. [...] We want a strong, capable, just, clear, and independent state that rejects any foreign trusteeship or hegemony; a noble and proud state that does not succumb to any humiliating terms; and a clean state where there is no room for theft or waste. This is the state that we need. The Resistance will not end while Israel is still occupying our land, violating our honor, undermining our security, and plundering our waters and resources. Never! I swear to God. (Nasrallah cited in Robinson 2007: 264*f.*)

A public poll from January 2010 showed that 58% of the Lebanese population would like to see political confessionalism being abolished. While 75% of all Muslims are in favour of abolishing the proportional representation of confessional groups, only 35% of the Christian population support it (cp. Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2012). In this regard, Turkmen-Dervisoglu (2012) poses the question of how confessionalism can still survive despite the large number of Lebanese who would like to see political confessionalism being abolished, and most scholars who perceive it as one (if not the main) obstacle to „the formation of a distinct Lebanese nationalism." His suggestion that the Ta'if Accord with its potential to provide „an appropriate agenda for constitutional alteration, paving the way for national unity" may prove wrong when looking at the historical elements which have been constantly altered to fit into a transformed socio-economic setting. This was also the case regarding the conception of confessionalism in a nationalist environment that ultimately led to the rise of ethno-nationalism(s) as a totalitarian form of emancipation. The intrinsic totality of ethno-nationalism deeply roots in the perception of identity, because the livelihood of the individual is profoundly attached and instrumentalised by the identity of one's group (cp. Werz 2000: 7).

This totality also reflects onto the individual sphere: One interviewee mentioned the peculiarities needed for a distinct national identity in order to overcome the notion of national identity based upon ethnicity. For this interviewee the elements needed are secularism, being possible to criticise, and civic rights based on citizenship. The interviewee added that

it is „identity, that's what we lack"[71]. This indication shows that the elements that make up a state in a Western understanding, one that was imposed on Lebanon in the mid-20^{th} century, are missing in Lebanon. But it is not the absence of these elements alone. It is also the social and political relapse into ethnic dimensions on a daily basis.

> You can find very cool chic people, who just follow Nasrallah[72] and they feel that their identities in a way is not only confessional. So, it's not only about politics. It's very much more complicated. [I]t's also protecting yourself because you're always. . . you are living in the shadows of what happened, you know. Especially if you live in a certain area. [...] I give you an example: I heard people criticise Berri, you know Berri, the Speaker of the Parliament[73] [...]. And then when you ask them: Ok, are you voting? - „Yes of course I vote." You just said horrible things about them. „I know what I have to do. I feel I have to vote."[74]

Another interesting development in Lebanon is the continuation of foreign actors involving in Lebanese domestic affairs. This continuation sustains the stance of the ethno-political groups in Lebanon. By constantly offering support, the „reliance on foreign powers" (Abukhalil 2008: 361) is turned into a dependency-regime used and utilised by these groups at the same time. One interviewee compared the situation before the civil war began with the situation in the late 2000s, emphasising the external dimension of Lebanese politics. In doing so, the interviewee depicts the leverage of foreign actors on the political situation in Lebanon:

> In the '70s you had the Palestinian issue that divided the Lebanese and divided the Christians and Muslims. Christians didn't want to help the Palestinian cause, and of course Muslims wanted. And this was a big gap. [...]
> No, no, no one wants to talk about the Palestinians anymore. So now it's, you have America, you have the United States and you have Iran and [...] it's always the outside, it's always the outside. Because we are very weak, [...,] the proxy war happens on our field. So that's the main, that's the big difference. It's Iran and the United States and in the South of course Saudi. Iran and Saudi again, [...] it's not the Palestinian cause anymore.[75]

Regarding external actors in Lebanon, another interviewee highlightened a different important aspect, trying to explain why there is a reluctance to work with the Lebanese government. In doing so, the interviewee suggested that foreign actors do not want to work with the government because it is either corrupt or too bureaucratic:

> I remember there was a mine clearing in 2000. [The] United Arab Emirates donated 35 million Dollars to clearing the mines in the South. „So we [UNIFIL] can do with the Lebanese government, the national de-mining office, we have a UN office also. So let's get some companies that are clearing the mines." Lebanese said, „no, no, no we have to make a project", so we are waiting. So three months later they come with a project. 20 cars, 50 computers, ten secretaries, this building, this. And out of 35 millions 25

[71] Interview with INTERVIEWEE A in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.
[72] Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General of Hezbullah.
[73] Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament and Head of the Amal movement.
[74] Interview with INTERVIEWEE A in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.
[75] Interview with INTERVIEWEE A in Beirut, Lebanon on 13^{th} February 2011.

> million were going to be spend for this. So the Emirates guys said „Stop! We do it ourselves.“ Since they are Arab countries, they pushed the Lebanese completely out, they do it themselves. Look at the Iranians. The roads you travel in South Lebanon today, 700 km are financed by the Iranians after the 2006 war. 700 km. The Iranians came, they didn't ask any about this. They are the best roads in the South.[76]

At the same time, the question of the electoral law (as already mentioned in section 4.3.3) is a recurring challenge Lebanon is facing. As of 2009, the Lebanese elections where based on the electoral law of 1960. This law refers to small electoral districts with boundaries of constituencies that are congruent with ethno-confessional boundaries. The existing draft from 2009 is based on enlarged boundaries of constituencies, that would soften the rigid ethno-confessional boundaries (cp. Harrer 2013).

> Until now, there has been no electoral law that unites the Lebanese, regardless of who is doing the proposing and how many supporters it has. Such laws do not receive backing because they present what is best for the Lebanese, but because they satisfy the interests of certain political groups. None of the proposals puts the interests and the future of the Lebanese at the forefront. The country is forced to watch as its politicians bicker among themselves about who will come out triumphant this time. (Daily Star 2013)

The spill-over from the Syrian conflict further exacerbates the ethno-confessional tensions. However, the intra-ethno-confessional dynamics vary between the communities at the grass-roots level (cp. Hajj 2012).

[76] Interview with interviewee b in Beirut, Lebanon on 12^{th} February 2011; remarks LW.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

Based on a nexus of hypotheses that are discussing the intervention of European powers and the integration of the local Lebanese market into the world market, aspects of central historical importance were highlighted throughout this thesis. While the evolvement of a traditionally secular but ethno-confessionally determined society into one with a high propensity of ethno-national mobilisation was portrayed, a capitalistically determined conception of the state challenged some historically established, over-determined aspects. This very conception detangled the developmental dimension of the processual aspects with imagined social hierarchies in order to leave room for historical nuance as Makdisi (2008: 20*f.*) claimed.

The preceding chapters (especially chapter 5) described how central the debate about identity in Lebanon is and to what degree it reflects not only on the individual and certain social formations but also on the society as a whole. In Lebanon, the retreat of the identity debate into ethnicity and, hence, into ethno-nationalism constantly poses a threat to a pluralism of identities of whatever kind. A new alignment of political and economical power may be possible by a change of bilateral relations of external actors (e.g. between Iran and Saudi-Arabia) probably even through an unexpected turnout in the inner-Syrian conflict.

Disintegration of („balanced“) inter-local social fabrics

By drawing from the comparison of the 1860 civil war with the civil war that took place between 1975 and 1990, it can be observed that prior to independence religion did not serve as a primary source of identity. This is were the importance of the transformation of the *muqtada'ji* families derives from (e.g. through highlighting their role in the balancing of a local social equilibrium) (cp. Fawaz 1994: 218-222). In the mid-19^{th} century a dynamical relationship between imperial, colonial and local actors produced imagined confessional communities and reshaped group boundaries. This was supported by processes of rural-urban migration and socio-economic transformations due to a disintegration of the agricultural sector (cp. Peleikis 2001: 403-406). While this processes reshaped group boundaries, they also gave rise to new class factions that were increasingly entangled with the world market. At the same time the introduction of the state's modernisation programme, emigration, and the influence of the country's new education system contributed to the facilitation of a peculiar upward mobility, based on familism and ethno-confessionalism (cp. Schiller 1979: 46). The links between social policy and ethno-confessional politics are determined by these very socio-political and -economical processes.

Hence, modernisation (alongside the formation of the Lebanese Republic as a nation-state) and globalisation (alongside the disintegration of traditional modes of production and accumulation) transformed patron-client networks, disturbed the traditional balance and emphasised intra-communal rivalries, leading to a revaluation of identity in a process of political transformation, politicisation of collective identities, and social deterritorialisation.

Accordingly, the construction of Lebanon as a nation, based on a capitalist conception did contribute to a transformation of socio-political structures and processes along lines illustrated in the following.

Fragmented identities and porously constructed common nationality

Historically, the Ottoman *milet* system had a significant influence on the way social relations were, and still are determined, while the synonymity to the European term „nation" frames the horizon of the meaning of the term *milet* itself, depicting an uncritical transformation of the *milets* socio-political realities into a post-civil war understanding of ethnonationalism. Hence, it is rather the question what the meanings of the socio-economic realities of the *milet* system imply in order to understand what the Lebanese nation is and its realities are. The constantly present and ongoing ethno-national agitation in Lebanon is also attributed to the fight over definatory power by the ethno-national political parties and groups about what the Lebanese nation is, or should be, regardless of what it was in the past. The historically special status of the religious communities not only served as a historical justification to inhabit the political sphere, but also paved a way to ample interference in - and manipulation of- these elevated juridical statuses. Today, the statuses of the religious communities can still be identified in the country's socio-political landscape (e.g. personal status law).

Based on the conception that identity never should be seen as a static concept but rather understood as a social process, Zein (2012: 43) perceives collective identity as a set of dialectical relationships (individual/ society, particularity/ collectivity and affiliation/ exclusion), creating a multipolar frame of reference consisting of religion or confessionalism, nationalism, and the family. In an ideological environment that is historically shaped by Arab nationalists' notions of anti-coloniality and Lebanese nationalist currents that formulated what a Lebanese identity was supposed to be throughout the first half of the 20^{th} century, a socio-economically determined exploitation of ethnicity and confessionality (as perceived within the ethno-national nexus) can be observed. Ethno-confessionalism for its part did not (and does not) solely serve as a set of beliefs but constituted a constant frame of reference for historical experiences of various ethno-national groups, creating a source of political mobilisation.

The origins of the various contemporary perceptions of modern Lebanese nationalism can be traced back to the civil war, when the state was more or less absent. By emphasising ethnicity (ethno-confessionalism) as an area of retreat during the civil war, ethnicity became the nation, ethno-nationalism became an important referencing point. It is not only the demographic development that lead to the unbalancing of the system, it is the transformation of the system as a whole by capitalist logic and by the instrumentalisation of identity politics that lead to a polit-economical pragmatism regarding the use of ethnicity. Accordingly, ethno-nationalism can be seen as an artificial phenomenon shaped by the Lebanese nationalisation while being augmented with the historical foundations of pre-1918 Lebanon.

As long as the nation is the frame of reference for ethnicity, ethnicity itself is going to group around nationalism and its sub-currents. From this perspective, the civil war can be understood as one stage in a process of regrouping ethnicity around the Lebanese nation and this process has not yet come to its end. Today, however, the „extravagant claim" (Salibi 1998: 220) of a contemporary Lebanese national identity can be attributed to the ethno-national stratification not only on a statewide level but also on a communal level „making it very difficult for a citizen to be ‚just Lebanese'" (A. J. Abraham 2008: 176 cited in Turkmen-Dervisoglu 2012). Hence, Lebanese national identity is downgraded to a „distinct sense of territorial identity" (Salibi 1998: 222).

Political determinants for ethno-nationalism

The Ta'if Accord was originally thought of as an interim arrangement of proportional confessional representation ending the civil war but became a permanent condition. This can be traced back not only to the political system itself, but rather to the way the political structure facilitates the system to be utilised. Accordingly the country's identity is constantly being hollowed out as a political necessity in order to tranquillize ethno-nationalist parties. However, it is important to note that this is not happening on the basis of a solidly held, socially inclusive debate, hence, the disguised superficiality of the Ta'if Accord keeps the status quo in terms of confessionalised politics alive. One example at this point is the way social disparities (e.g. in the southern suburbs of Beirut) are constantly politicised on an ethno-national basis, as seen by the increasing level of agitation between Sunni and Shi'ite groups in Lebanon from the second half of the 2000s onwards. Since consociationalist systems are generally inflexible to socio-demographic and social change, the way it is utilised in Lebanon furthermore aggravates socio-economic tensions. The basis of consociationalism, its state-wide entanglement with socio-economic classes, and the resulting interdependency of these dimensions of the state structurally implicates a constant strive for hegemony by ethno-political groups trying to fill a vacuum of political

authority. During the civil war in the mid 1980s it was relatively easy for ethno-national militias to erect structures that paralleled or even substituted the state. Throughout this period, the political and military leaders in power naturally had no interest in welding any common identity and rather emphasised their „cantonisation" projects on basis of an exclusive ethno-national identity. Hence, the absence of the state was crucial for the emergence of territorially determined ethno-nationalism, deriving its political legitimacy by peculiar modes of production and accumulation within these cantons. The political behaviour patterns of politicians and/ or leaders of ethno-national parties today have been profoundly shaped by the cantonisation project of the civil war. Accordingly, the basis for the formulation of ethno-national identity was being provided through the territorial homogenisation of ethno-confessional elements, its entrenchment, and the violence between the communities in the civil war that began to be ideologically determined while the ancestral past was increasingly politicised.

The fight over the power base additionally became a fight over economical resources. In other words, capitalism restructured ethnic power bases of political leaders and led to a confusion of ethnic identity and class consciousness among its members. As a result, the task of the ethno-national political parties after the civil war was to bridge the gap between nostalgic politicised memory and socio-economic realities as produced by capitalist regimes of regulation of production and accumulation in order to frame their power bases.

The ethno-national nexus in Lebanon is a highly politicised product of blurred historical determination, articulation of particulate interests, discontinued democratic development embedded in a nationalisation project, and violently disrupted local identities. The Ta'if Accord for its part makes it possible to entangle social with political confessionalism, thus, enabling a consolidation of ethnicity by a legal framework of segregating identity constructions (that contrasts the equality on an individual level by transforming confessional individuals into members of an ethno-national group). The ongoing debate about the reformation of the election system is one example that circulates around the core of this problematic political systematisation.

Ethnicity, like nationalism, is also formed around a socially exclusive dimension, making it possibly to clearly identify different kinds of nationalism belonging to particular groups.

The role of civil society

The central question concerning the role of the Lebanese civil society in the production of a distinct national identity is brought forward by Moufarrege (2009): „what extent do, or can, different community groups produce different national values?"

„The“ Lebanese civil society is continuously strong since the 1960s but has undergone manifold transformations. Community organizations derive their strength from a solid base of factions ideological linked to the ethno-national nexus. This was not always the case, but the disintegration of relatively strong students and union movements (to name but a few) in pre-civil war Lebanon that were largely determined by class identities in order to draw attention to pressing socio-economic issues shows how these movements were being exploited by political interests of certain parties in the run up to (as well as during and after the civil war). The driving force behind the articulation of social demands was the young generation who grew up in independent Lebanon and adhered to the democratic principles of the Lebanese nation, challenging confessional(ised) political structures.

While the space for collective identity became a narrow gap and was equal to be non-existent during the civil war, the civil society nevertheless performed a walk on the edge and was able to mobilize people for protests and demonstrations. From the beginning of the civil war onward, however, the civil society became increasingly fragmented by particulate - often ethno-confessional - interests. The link between nationalism, ethnicity, identity, and civil society was made visible in the civil war between the mid 1980s and the end of hostilities in 1989/ 90. The resulting reinforcement of the ethno-confessional cantonisation project can be seen as the climax of social disintegration that also reflected into the civil society. Although civil society formations are often tethered to ethno-confessional loyalties, however, group activity can not be primarily restricted to ethno-confessional interests. Nevertheless, the role that the civil society plays as a trans-confessional/ -ethnic element in Lebanon is highly controversial and can not be seen as serving as a carrier of „nationally inclusive“ identity aspects.

Glossary

fida'iyin Armed Palestinian militia which was involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their bases were mainly based in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Syria.

iltizam A form of tax farming that was in place until it was abolished under the tanzimat.

iqta' Partition of territory in military and tax districts under Ottoman rule.

milet The term refers to confessionally separated legal courts, allowing confession-based self rule under the terms of a personal status law. The term itself has been connoted quite differently in the various political systems it was applied (from confessional communities to minority groups to „nation").

Mutasarrif The Mutasarrif was the head of the Mutasarrifiya.

muqtada'ji The muqtada'jis were the holders of the iqta' and, thus, important feudal families.

nahda The Arab cultural renaissance or awakening in the 19^{th} and early 20^{th} century in the Near East or Levant (parts of Jordan, Lebanon, northern Palestine and Syria) and Egypt.

tanzimat New organisations and arrangements introduced by the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876 which attempted to integrate non-Muslims more thoroughly into society by granting them civil liberties and equality.

Umma Literally means „nation" or „community" but is a synonym for the collective community of Islamic peoples.

za'im A political leader.

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Addendum

The Ta'if Accord[77]

This agreement, which ended the civil war in Lebanon, was negotiated in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 and approved by the Lebanese parliament on 4 November 1989.

1. General Principles and Reforms

I. General Principles

A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens.

B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding member of the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, without exception. C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or preference. D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovreign and they shall exercise their sovreignty through the constitutional institutions. E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and private ownership. F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of the state's unity and of the system's stability. G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, economic, and social reform.

H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon].

I. No authority violating the common co-existance charter shall be legitimate

II. Political Reforms

A. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority which exercises full control over government policy and activities.

1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the duration of the chamber's term.

[77] Source: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taif.htm (last accessed on 23. May 2012).

2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy speaker, the chamber my vote only once to withdraw confidence from its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately to fill the vacant post.
3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued unless it is included in the agenda of a public session and read in such a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution passes without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the cabinet.
4. The electoral district shall be the governorate.
5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of secterian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the following bases:

    a) Equally between Christians and Muslims.
    b) Proportionately between the denominations of each sect.
    c) Proportionately between the districts.

6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the districts created on the basis of this document and the districts whose seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this document, their seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be formed.
7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not secterian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues.

B. President of Republic: The president of republic is the head of the state and a symbol of the country's unity. He shall contribute to enhancing the constitution and to preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting.
2. Head the Supreme Defense Council.
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days of the date of depostion of the resolution with the presidential office. Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should the grace period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the decree of the resolution shall be valid and must be published.

4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the Chamber of Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may also request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the constitution. In case the laws are not issued or returned before the end of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be published.
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies.
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber of Deputies speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, the outcome of which the president shall officially familiarize the speaker on.
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently.
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the cabinet.
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet ministers and decrees relieving them from their duties.
10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and award state medals by decree.
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and signing of international treaties which shall become valid only upon approval by the cabinet. The cabinet shall familiariaze the Chamber of Deputies with such treaties when the country's interest and state safety make such familiarization possible. As for treaties involving conditions concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without Chamber of Deputies' approval.
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies.
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of Deputies to hold special sessions by decree.
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any urgent issue beyond the agenda.
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special session whenever he deems it necessary.
16. Grant special pardon by decree.
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless he violates the constitution or commits high treason.

C. Prime Minister: The prime minister is the head of the government. He represents it and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the following powers:

1. Head the cabinet.

2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with the president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 30 days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it is considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of affairs.
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies.
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and decrees accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired.
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws and requesting the reexamination of laws.
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president of the republic in advance with the issues included in the agenda and with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual session minutes.
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions, coordinate between the ministers, and issue general instructions to ensure the smooth progress of work.
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the presence of the minister concerned.
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman.

D. Cabinet:

The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

The following are among the powers exercised by it:

1. Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills and decrees, and takes the necessary decisions for its implementation.
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise the activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the civilian, military, and security departments and institutions.
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces.
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in accordance with the law.
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of the president of the republic if the chamber refuses to meet throughout an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the government. This right may not be exercised again for the same reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance.

6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet sessions. The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. The legal quorum for a cabinet meeting is 2/3 the cabinet members. The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible, then by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the cabinet members. The following shall be considered major issues: The state of emergency and it abolition, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers.

E. Minister: The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible with the government's general policiy and with the principle of collective responsibility. A minister shall not be relieved from his position unless by cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies withraws its confidence from him individually.

F. Cabinet Resignation, Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers:

1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases:

    a) If its chairman resigns.

    b) If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the decree forming it.

    c) If its chairman dies.

    d) At the beginning of a president's term.

    e) At the beginning of the Chamber of Deputies' term.

    f) When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence from it on an initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis of a vote of confidence.

2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the republic and the prime minister, with cabinet approval.

3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of Deputies shall, by law, be considered to be convened in a special session until a new cabinet is formed. A vote-of-confidence session shall follow.

G. Abolition of Political Secterianism: Abolishing political secterianism is a fundamental national objective. To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies electedon the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual,

and social notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. The following shall be done in the interim period:

1. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims without allocating any particular job to any sect.
2. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity card.

III. Other Reforms

A. Administrative Decentralism:

1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong central authority.
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall be expanded and all state administartions shall be represented in the administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving common coexistance and unity of the soil, people, and institutions.
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level of the smaller administrative units [district and smaller units] through the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every district, to ensure local participation.
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the resources of the municipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources.

B. Courts:

[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common coexistance and the basic rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand:

1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is to try presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of trial before this council shall be promulgated.
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections.
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the constitutionality of the laws:

    a) The president of the republic.

    b) The Chamber of Deputies speaker.

    c) The prime minister.

    d) A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies.

[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to:

1. Personal status affairs.
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites.
3. Freedom of religious education.

[3] To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the the Higher Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body.

D. Parliamentary Election Law: Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee common coexistance between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and efficient political representation of all the people's factions and generations. This shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of unity of the people, the land, and the institutions.

E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development: A socioeconomic council shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in drafting the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals.

F. Education:

1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the elementary stage at least.
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general laws and regulations.

3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools and textbooks shall be strengthened.
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, strengthened, and developed in a manner that meets the country's development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the university, especially to its technical colleges.
5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national education.
6. Information: All the information media shall be reorganized under the canopy of the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war.

2. Spreading the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories

Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be as follows:

A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 months, beginning with the approval of the national accord charter. The president of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the political reforms shall be approved constitutionally.

B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through:

1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in the governorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic training courses.
2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea.

C. Strengthening the armed forces:

1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own.

2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in preserving security under conditions determined by the cabinet.
3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.
4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks.
5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military objectives exclusively.

D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he was evicted shall be established. Legistlation to guarantee this right and to insure the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through its own forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments – the Syrian Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government – shall decide to redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded by the two governments to determine the strength and duration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces' relationship with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement.

3. Liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation

Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-recognized Lebanese borders requires the following:

A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council resolutions calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation.

B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949.

C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdawl and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability to the border area.

4. Lebanese-Syrian Relations

Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternal relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. This is the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed to develop these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria's security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's security under any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine its security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty.

Abstract

This thesis proposes to contribute to the discussion about the Lebanese political system and its social formations. Specifically, the changing relationship of traditional socio-economic foundations (and the transformation of a traditional social hierarchy based on a confessional equilibrium) and institutionalised ethno-national politics throughout Lebanon's modern history are analysed.

Based on a methodological-theoretical introduction and historical socio-economic analyses, the Lebanese (national) identity, the political system of consociationalism, and the emergence of ethno-confessional identities is described and followed by an in-depth analyses and assessment of the relationship between civil society and ethno-nationalism. The point of departure of this thesis is a nexus of hypotheses that are discussing the intervention of European powers and the integration of the local Lebanese market into the world market that both destroyed the foundations of the confessional equilibrium between the Lebanese ethnic groups. Furthermore the hypothetical nexus stresses the role of the adoption of a nationalist conception when gaining independence as one reason to constantly reproduce ethno-national aspirations of various social groups in Lebanon. The post-civil war roots of agitation between the ethnic groups stem from a period of the civil war when the ethno-national militias entrenched themselves in territorially confined cantons, thereby transforming the modes of production and accumulation.

In detail, this thesis emphasises historical aspects that are fundamental to a process of capitalist societal differentiation by conceptualising ethnicity as a social relationship located between ideological formations of nationalism, group identity or economic realities that are emerging from the capitalist modes of production and accumulation. As socio-political as well as ethno-confessional transformations played (and still play) a major role in post-independence Lebanon it is key to this analysis to understand, that the national conceptualisation the Lebanese state itself is producing and keeps reproducing ethno-national identities.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Arbeit soll zur Diskussion über das politische System des Libanon und seine gesellschaftlichen Formationen beitragen. Insbesondere wird die sich verändernde Beziehung der sozio-ökonomischen Basis einer traditionellen (auf konfessionellem Gleichgewicht basierenden) hin zu einer von ethno-nationaler Rhetorik dominierten Gesellschaft in der modernen libanesischen Geschichte aufgezeigt.

Nach einer methodologisch-theoretischen Einleitung und einer historischen sozio- ökonomischen Analyse wird die libanesische (nationale) Identität, das politische System der Konkordanzdemokratie sowie das Entstehen ethno-konfessioneller Identitäten beschrieben. Darauf aufbauend wird die Beziehung zwischen der libanesischen Zivilgesellschaft und Ethno-Nationalismus analysiert und beurteilt.
Ausgangspunkt dieser Arbeit ist ein Nexus an Hypothesen, die die Intervention europäischer Mächte, die Integration des lokalen libanesischen Markts in den Weltmarkt und die Rolle dieser beiden Prozesse am Zerfall des ethno-konfessionellem Gleichgewichtsinn der libanesischen Gesellschaft thematisieren. Weiters hebt der Nexus an Hypothesen die Bedeutung der nationalistischen Konzeption des libanesischen Staates im Hinblick auf die ständige Reproduktion ethno-nationaler Ansprüche hervor. Die Wurzeln der ethno-nationalen Agitiation im Post-Bürgerkriegs-Libanon leiten sich in dieser Konzeption von einer Phase des Bürgerkriegs ab, in welcher sich ethno-nationalistische Milizen in abgeriegelten Kantonen verschanzten und damit die Produktions- und Akkumulationsweise transformierten.

Im Detail hebt diese Arbeit historische Aspekte hervor, die für den Prozess einer kapitalistischen gesellschaftlichen Ausdifferenzierung maßgeblich sind und erst durch die Konzeptualisierung von Ethnizität als soziale Beziehung, die zwischen ideologischen Formationen wie Nationalismus, Gruppenidentität oder ökonomischen Realitäten (einer kapitalistischen Produktions- und Akkumulationsweise) verortet liegt, möglich werden. Nachdem sozio-politische und ethno-konfessionelle Transformationen im unabhängigen Libanon eine maßgebliche Rolle spielten (und spielen), ist es grundlegend zu verstehen, dass ein Grund dafür die nationalistische Konzeption des libanesischen Staates selbst ist, die ethno-nationale Identitäten produziert und reproduziert.

Curriculum vitae

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