



universität  
wien

# MASTERARBEIT

Titel der Masterarbeit

„EUROPEANIZATION OF SERBIAN POST-YUGOSLAV  
CINEMA: BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EU“

Verfasser

Petar Mitric

angestrebter akademischer Grad

Master (MA)

Wien, 2014

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt:

A 067 805

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt:

Individuelles Masterstudium:  
Global Studies – a European Perspective

Betreuerin / Betreuer:

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Katharine Sarikakis



universität  
wien

# MASTERARBEIT / MASTER THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the master thesis

## EUROPEANIZATION OF SERBIAN POST-YUGOSLAV CINEMA: BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EU

Verfasser / Author

Petar Mitric

angestrebter akademischer Grad / academic degree aspired

Master (MA)

Wien, 2014

Studienkennzahl :

A 067 805

Studienrichtung:

Individuelles Masterstudium:  
Global Studies – a European Perspective

Betreuer/Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Katharine Sarikakis

## Table of Contents

<b>EUROPEANIZATION OF SERBIAN POST-YUGOSLAV CINEMA: BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE EU</b> .....	<b>2</b>
ABSTRACT .....	2
ABSTRACT .....	3
INTRODUCTION .....	4
LITERATURE REVIEW .....	6
<i>Europeanization and Policy Transfer</i> .....	12
Europeanization .....	12
Policy Transfer .....	14
<i>Europes out of Europe</i> .....	15
<i>Cultural Identity Change Trajectory: the Case of Post-Yugoslav Serbia</i> .....	20
Cinema of Self-Balkanization .....	22
Cinema of Normalization .....	23
Marxist Approach .....	24
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK .....	26
<i>Research objectives and question</i> .....	27
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS .....	28
<i>Interviews</i> .....	28
Rationale for choosing Interviews as a research method .....	29
Limitation of the expert interview method .....	30
Topic Guides .....	31
Thematic coding of interviews .....	31
<i>Case study setting</i> .....	32
<i>Textual Analysis</i> .....	33
<i>Policy Framework</i> .....	34
<b>RESEARCH RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS ...</b> 37 <b>ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.</b>	
CHAPTER 1: LEGACY OF THE YUGOSLAV FILM POLICY .....	37
CHAPTER 2: “CINEMA OF THE OTHER”– POST-YUGOSLAV SERBIAN FILM IN THE 1990s .....	40
<i>Integration into Europe through Self-Balkanization</i> .....	45
<i>Conclusion</i> .....	52
CHAPTER 3: “CINEMA OF NORMALISATION”– POST-YUGOSLAV SERBIAN FILM AFTER 2000 .....	53
<i>The Idea of Eurimages</i> .....	55
The Main objective of Eurimages .....	55
Eurimages Policies .....	56
Eurimages and European Identity .....	58
The main Challenges of Eurimages .....	59
<i>The role of Eurimages in Europeanization of Serbian Cinema</i> .....	62
First Two Years in Eurimages .....	65
Cinema of Catharsis .....	69
Virtual Yugoslavia .....	72
<i>Economic Crisis and a Way Out</i> .....	75
The Idea of a Regional Post-Yugoslav Film Fund .....	79
CONCLUSION .....	81
REFERENCES .....	86
APPENDIX 1 – SCREEN SHOTS AND PHOTOS .....	95
APPENDIX 2 – STATISTICS .....	98
APPENDIX 3 – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS .....	99
AUTHOR’S BIOGRAPHY .....	102

# Europeanization of Serbian Post-Yugoslav Cinema: Between Yugoslavia and the EU

## Die Europäisierung des serbischen postjugoslawischen Kinos: Zwischen Jugoslawien und der EU

Petar Mitric

---

### ABSTRACT

With the hope of contributing to the analysis of the cultural integration of Eastern Europe to the EU, this master thesis investigates the Europeanization of the Serbian film industry after the collapse of Yugoslavia.

The analysis of so-called EUization and new identity building in the Eastern European cinemas after the fall of Communism unveils an unabated cultural division between Eastern and Western Europe despite the fact that economically and legally speaking once-socialist block has been entirely integrated into the Western liberal capitalism. A serious investigation into the *negative feedback* to non-selective internalization of the Western European cultural policies has mostly remained an absence within the mainstream academia and media. This master thesis suggests that the Europeanization of the post-socialist film industries, and cultural sector in general, implies the *opportunity cost* that originates from both insufficient social-economic development of the East European post-socialist states and the rigid policy transfer recommended or dictated by the EU administration. To prove so, I chose to elaborate on the post-Yugoslav Serbian cinema as a case study. In the syntagm post-Yugoslav Serbian cinema I particularly accentuated “Yugoslav” since it reiterates the neglected fact that Serbia used to be a federal unit in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that prior to 1991 had had a clearly defined cultural policy that was in many aspects reminiscent of what is now promoted as a desirable European model.

This master thesis invites the concepts of Europeanization, policy transfer and cultural identity. In addition to the theoretical concepts, it is much based on fieldwork, that is, studying the Eurimages-supported co-productions with participation of Serbia - academically still unexplored terrain. All of the 30 supported and 19 non-supported Serbia-involved projects that applied for Eurimages co-production support before 2013 were examined, along with other relevant Eurimages documents, stored in the Eurimages Secretariat in Strasbourg. This study thus provides the first systematic analysis of to-date primary sources about Serbian (and to some extent the entire post-Yugoslav), cinema in relation to the European fund Eurimages, and defines the current position of Serbian cinema within the current European film industry in general. The study also includes expert interviews with 13 professionals from the European and Serbian film industry that are recognized as being well positioned to report on how the transition of the Serbian film industry is evolving.

This thesis suggests that much of the opportunity cost and negative feedback to the Europeanization of the post-Yugoslav Serbian film industry lies in the fact that the post-Yugoslav states fail to transfer the EU policies only to the extent that would not disempower the regional collaboration (as it is case with the Nordic region), and do not rely whatsoever on once potent regional infrastructure. Instead, they adopt the EU policies in a manner that rather disrupts a regional collaboration, alienate the regional national productions from the local and international audiences and keep the post-Yugoslav space fragmented and culturally colonized by the economically superior core EU countries.

In conclusion, this thesis calls for an increased policy-related attention to defragmentation of the post-Yugoslav film industry. Understanding cinema to be a potent

cultural and identity-safeguarding product, a plea is made for aiding a sustainable, regional subsidy structure for an autonomous post-Yugoslav cinema that would perceive Europeanization as a tool instead as the eschatological goal.

## **ABSTRACT**

In der Hoffnung, zur Analyse der kulturellen Integration von Osteuropa in die EU beizutragen, untersucht diese Masterarbeit die Europäisierung der serbischen Filmindustrie nach dem Zusammenbruch Jugoslawiens.

Die Analyse der sogenannten EU-isierung und Entwicklung einer neuen Identität im osteuropäischen Kino nach dem Fall des Kommunismus zeigt eine ungebrochene kulturelle Teilung zwischen Ost- und Westeuropa, obwohl in wirtschaftlicher und rechtlicher Hinsicht der ehemalige sozialistische Block vollständig im liberalen Kapitalismus des Westens aufgegangen ist. Eine seriöse Untersuchung des negativen Feedbacks auf die nichtselektive Internationalisierung westeuropäischer Kulturpolitik hat im breiten akademischen und medialen Diskurs nicht stattgefunden. Diese Masterarbeit verfolgt die These, die Europäisierung der postsozialistischen Filmindustrie - und des Kultursektors im Allgemeinen - führe zu Opportunitätskosten, die durch die unzureichende sozioökonomische Entwicklung der postsozialistischen Staaten Osteuropas und die starre Übernahme von der EU empfohlener oder diktiert Richtlinien entstehen.

Diese versuche ich am Beispiel des postjugoslawischen serbischen Kinos zu belegen. Im Begriff 'postjugoslawisches serbisches Kino' habe ich dabei besonders 'jugoslawisch' hervorgehoben, um den oft vernachlässigten Umstand zu betonen, dass Serbien ein Föderationssubjekt in der Sozialistischen Föderativen Republik Jugoslawien war, die bis 1991 eine klar definierte Kulturpolitik verfolgte, die in vieler Hinsicht an das erinnert, was heute als wünschenswertes europäisches Modell gilt.

Diese Masterarbeit stellt die Konzepte der Europäisierung, des Policy Transfers und der kulturellen Identität vor. Zusätzlich zu diesen theoretischen Konzepten fußt sie vor allem auf Feldforschung, d. h. der Untersuchung Eurimages-geförderter Koproduktionen mit serbischer Beteiligung – akademisch bisher unerforscht. Alle Projekte mit serbischer Beteiligung, die bis 2013 um Eurimages-Koproduktionsförderung angesucht haben – 30 haben sie erhalten, 19 nicht – sowie andere relevante Eurimages-Dokumente habe ich während meines zweimonatigen Aufenthalts beim Eurimages-Sekretariat in Straßburg untersucht. Damit stellt diese Studie die bis heute erste systematische Analyse von Primärquellen über serbisches, und bis zu einem gewissen Grad postjugoslawisches, Kino im Verhältnis zum europäischen Filmförderungsfonds Eurimages dar und bestimmt die aktuelle Position des serbischen Kinos innerhalb der europäischen Filmindustrie im Allgemeinen. Diese Studie enthält darüber hinaus Experteninterviews mit 13 Fachleuten aus der serbischen und europäischen Filmindustrie, die geeignet sind, Einblicke über die Transformation der serbischen Filmindustrie zu vermitteln.

Diese Arbeit kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Opportunitätskosten und negatives Feedback zur Europäisierung der postjugoslawischen serbischen Filmindustrie zu einem großen Teil in dem Umstand begründet sind, dass die postjugoslawischen Staaten – statt eine einst potente regionale Infrastruktur zu nützen und die EU-Richtlinien nur in einem Umfang anzuwenden, der die regionale Zusammenarbeit nicht verunmöglicht (wie es die nordischen Staaten tun) – diese Richtlinien in einer Weise umsetzen, die regionale Zusammenarbeit schwächt, die regionalen nationalen Produktionen dem lokalen und internationalen Publikum entfremden und die den postjugoslawischen Raum fragmentiert und kulturell von den wirtschaftlich überlegenen EU-Kernstaaten kolonialisiert hält.

Zusammenfassend empfiehlt diese Arbeit, der Defragmentierung der postjugoslawischen Filmindustrie kulturpolitisch verstärkt Beachtung zu schenken. Da Film ein potentes kulturelles und identitätsstiftendes Produkt ist, fordert diese Arbeit eine nachhaltige, regionale Förderstruktur für ein autonomes postjugoslawisches Kino, das Europäisierung als Mittel und nicht als Selbstzweck versteht.

## INTRODUCTION

At the present moment, in the early 2014, the overall Serbia's path-dependant EU integration process seems rather stable. The country has started the EU accession negotiations. The Stabilization and Association Agreement has been ratified by all current EU member states. The Brussels Agreement initialed by the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia for the purpose of normalizing the relations between Serbia and its breakaway province reaffirmed the EU's political will to unanimously back the Serbian EU integration.

At the same time, the current situation in the Serbian cultural sector, as seen by cultural workers, seems apocalyptic. The government allocated only 0.62% of its budget to culture in 2013. A number of music festivals, non-commercial cultural journals and local theatres are dying out as a consequence, for they cannot survive without public support. What is in particular relevant for this thesis is the fact that the Ministry of Culture decided to allocate no funding for the national cinematography in 2013 despite its legal obligation to do so, as stipulated under the new Law on Cinematography.

However, according to the European Commission's "assessment at start" regarding Serbia's compatibility with the *acquis*, the country's full alignment with the Chapter on Culture & Education is expected to be completed "without major difficulties" in the near future. In its Progress Reports on Serbia, the EC evaluates the audiovisual and cultural alignment with *acquis* as "moderately advanced" (Serbia Progress Report: 2013 - 2009) and recommends only a faster harmonization.<sup>1</sup>

Hence, although it can be enthusiastically concluded that the culture sector will not hinder Serbia's further EU integration, considering that the country has been to a certain extent Europeanized through a number of transferred cultural policies, the current circumstances in Serbian culture, cinematography in particular, imply that all policy-related actions have been mostly their own goal – existing but not effective. It is the "negative feedback" (Pollak, 2008) to the cultural policy transfer from the EU to Serbia that I am going to focus on in this thesis. This negative feedback will be defined as an *opportunity cost* borne during the country's EU integration and transition to liberal economy in the past two decades

---

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.seio.gov.rs/documents/eu-documents.231.html> (Retrieved February 25, 2014)

This master thesis will investigate into the chronology of the post-Yugoslav Serbian film sector in the context of the major “external” and “internal factors” that have been shaping it (Švob-Đokić 2004:3). The external factors are examined through Serbia’s membership in the Council of Europe’s film fund Eurimages and availability of the European partners and public funds to Serbian film professionals. The internal factors, on the other hand, are identified as cultural policies and strategies that the Serbian governments have (or have not) adopted in order to Europeanize the Serbian film industry on its EU integration path.

In pursuing its objectives, this study utilizes the concepts of Europeanization, policy transfer and cultural identity. In addition to the theoretical concepts, it is much based on fieldwork, that is, studying the Eurimages-supported co-productions with participation of Serbia - academically still unexplored terrain. All of the 30 supported and 19 non-supported Serbia-involved projects that applied for Eurimages co-production support before 2013 were examined, along with other relevant Eurimages documents, during my two-month visit to the Eurimages Secretariat in Strasbourg. This study thus provides the first systematic analysis of to-date primary sources about Serbian, and to some extent entire post-Yugoslav, cinema in relation to the European fund Eurimages, and defines the current position of Serbian cinema within the current European film industry in general.

This thesis is divided into five sections. In this first section, the study is introduced. The second section presents a review of theories and concepts applied. It examines the process of Europeanization, policy transfer and identity-negotiation process in order to provide a conceptual framework within which the transformation of the post-Yugoslav Serbian cinema is scrutinized. A multiple perspective, combining political, economic and cultural aspect is presented due to the fact that cinematography can be analyzed through the films’ content and legal-economic framework that regulates film production. The third section presents the methodology applied to the study by discussing the epistemological choice, methods for collecting and analyzing primary sources, expert interviews and case study setting. In the fourth section the established conceptual framework is applied to mapping the Serbian post-Yugoslav cinema, as a case study, within the European film industry. The collected empirical data are analyzed and the main findings are presented. This section is divided into three chapters, the first being an analysis of the cultural policy in the Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-1991) and its legacy, and the second and third being a presentation of the two major chronological phases of the Serbian post-Yugoslav cinema. The final section concludes the overall research by defining the opportunity cost of the Europeanization of the post-Yugoslav film industry and how much the Yugoslav legacy in the field of film policies can be utilized today to reduce the negative feedback to the overall Europeanization of the post-Yugoslav Serbian cinema.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The European cultural policy was significantly re-shaped after the fall of the Berlin Wall. While on one hand, the idea of protecting culture and cultural diversity in the new unifying Europe became a goal of the European policy makers, on the other hand, cultural products and services gained its dichotomous economic-cultural dimension in line with the dominant trends of economic globalization. The most presentable case in this regard is the European film industry insofar as it has played a prominent role in promoting what was defined as “common European values”, and demonstrating how economic and cultural aspects collide or synergize within the concept of creative industries.

The notion of a “pan European cinema” emerged as early as 1960s (Rivi 2007, Betz 2001). However, the idea of institutionalizing European cinema through policy actions was reinforced only in the late 1980s on the basis of the “European tradition of co-productions and opening up national markets to non-domestic European films with an organized and institutional approach” (Yilmazok 2011, 60, De Vinck, 2009).

The first official attempt of establishing a pan-European cinema and television support fund had come from the French president François Mitterand and was rejected by the European Community in 1984 (Yilmazok 2011, 60). Cinema, especially in the UK, had already been regarded rather as an economic activity, not a matter of cultural and autonomous expression. In addition, “individual countries expressed anxiety that they may loose control of the national support mechanisms to Brussels. After this attempt failed, France researched the possibility of setting up such a fund within the framework of the Council of Europe” (Yilmazok 2011, 61). As a result, the European film co-production fund Eurimages was created in 1988.



The upside of establishing Eurimages within the framework of the Council of Europe is the fact that also non-EU countries could be admitted which has had the paramount importance for the integration of Eastern European countries, and later on the post-Yugoslav states, into the European film industry landscape. However, the economic downside of this solution was the fact that the budget of Eurimages, operating within the Council of Europe, is made only out of the modest contributions of its member states, which reduces the Eurimages support to a quality label and a symbolic financial contribution. The political issue is the very fact that the European Union itself failed to establish a cultural film co-production fund. Such a fund would have certainly been much richer within the framework of the European Commission and probably more inclusive of diverse and autonomous content, styles, and voices from different parts of Europe. Therefore, policy actions regarding film at the EU level have been marked by “inconsistency between grand ambitions on the one hand and the lack of political power on the other” (Kaufmann & Raunig 2003). What stayed in charge of the European Commission however are what Kaufmann calls “harmless areas”, promotion and distribution of European audiovisual works produced by the national European states, and it has been realized through the MEDIA program of the European Union<sup>2</sup>.

The post-Berlin Wall Europe introduced a set of actions meant to protect the European cultural goods and services. After the 1993 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations within the World Trade Organization (WTO), governmental regulatory and cash support for national film industries was claimed as a ‘cultural exception’ (Sojcher 2002, 3, Wayne 2001, Finney 1996, Kaufmann & Raunig 2003). As a result, the audiovisual sector avoided the uniformity, which strongly determined the process of European economic integration to a single-market space.

The situation has been additionally complicated after the introduction of Article 128 into the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, that is, introduction of the Protocol on the system of Public Broadcasters to the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, which recognizes protection of the European cultural values and includes culture and media into the policy field (Sarikakis 2007(1), 15-16.). The Article 128 envisaged the “principle of subsidiarity and cultural

---

<sup>2</sup> The MEDIA Programme helps the European Union film and audiovisual industries with financial support in the development, distribution and promotion of their work ([http://ec.europa.eu/culture/creative-europe/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/culture/creative-europe/index_en.htm)) Retrieved December 25, 2013.

cooperation and exchange within the EU and between the EU and non-EU countries”, in particular the other members of the Council of Europe (Kaufmann & Raunig 2003, Rivi 2007),

In December 2000, the Council of Europe adopted its Declaration on Cultural Diversity. Article 2 stipulated that: “Cultural and audiovisual policies, which promote and respect cultural diversity, are a necessary complement to trade policies” (Mc Donnell, 2009). In November 2001, UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity was passed. The declaration solidified the stance of the EU within the WTO/GATT negotiations that audiovisual services, as a cultural good, should stay exempted from trade rules (Pauwels, De Vinck & Rompuy 2007, 24). This “cultural exception still enables Europe to maintain its support for public broadcasting and for the system of subsidies, which helps national cinema industries in Europe to survive” (Mc Donnell 2009).

At the same time, there are strong lobby groups within the European Commission that opt for reducing of these state subsidies in favor of the idea of inclusion of cultural and audiovisual services into free market and trade agreements. The European Commission passed the Cinema Communication in 2001 (extended in 2004, 2006, 2009 and most recently in December 2013), whereby it defines how and to what extent national cinemas can stay protected through public subsidy structures (Pauwels, De Vinck & Rompuy 2007, 24).<sup>3</sup>

The most recent public debate related to the commerce-culture dichotomy of film happened on the occasion of the mandate that the European Commission got from the European Council to negotiate a comprehensive trade and investment agreement with the United States, the "Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership". In March 2013 the Commission had adopted a draft mandate, authorizing the opening of negotiations that would include cultural and audiovisual services (IRIS 2013-5/25)<sup>4</sup>. After, among other things, lobbying of almost 70 European public film funds during this years' Cannes film Festival, the Council agreed that “audiovisual services would not be covered by this mandate, as the EU legislation in this area is still in development” (Screendaily: June 2013)<sup>5</sup>.

Apart from policy-makers, the said binary nature of film has been the source of

---

<sup>3</sup> The content of the Cinema Communicating 2013 is available at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:332:0001:0011:EN:PDF> (Retrieved November 17, 2013)

<sup>4</sup> <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2013/7/article4.en.html> (Retrieved November 22, 2013)

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.screendaily.com/news/cinema-communication-deadline-extended/5057017.article> (Retrieved November 22, 2013)

disputes and concerns among film scholars and filmmakers (Wayne 2002, Puttnam 1997, Sojcher 2002). As early as 1969, Thomas Guback juxtaposed the films with the communicating role that “convey human message understandable to people everywhere” with the commodified films that “often deflect attention from reality and count on developing audience response with synthetic images” (Guback 1969). The British director Ken Loach holds that today film is more a commodity than a communication tool and considers the European Union as a corporation rather than a public service (Palic Film Festival Newspaper: July 2008, 1). In the same fashion the discursive transition of the term *film culture* into *film industry* is also criticized by evoking the Marxian terminology of Gramsci, Adorno and Horkheimer. Marxian film theoreticians foresee *film culture* as the cinema free from any commercial pressures and based on autonomous auteurs with their distinctive views and philosophies. On the other hand, the notion of *film industry* implies rather “star-systems, economic performance and overuse of technologies and entertainment” (Dragojevic 2011, 100-102; Landy 2005, 74; Leslie 2005, 36; Finney 1996). Jonathan Rosenbaum is one of the few US film scholars who follow this anti-imperialist argumentation. He rejects the prevailing assumption that “film quality is in decline and that there is no sign of renaissance of the *cinema d’auteur*”. He claims that such “assumption is only a self-serving invention of Hollywood publicists” (in Sojcher 2002, 309).

On the other hand, there are voices that in a less alarming tone talk about the Hollywood dominance over the local film industries. Albert Moran emphasizes that there is the

*“invariable rule that in nation states outside USA, it is the case that the term ‘film industry’ is one that refers to bipartite or dual system. Such a system is marked by a distribution/exhibition sector that is under the control of private commercial entrepreneurial interests, and which whether locally owned or else operating under joint venture arrangements is tied very much to the Hollywood majors for much of the programmes that they screen. The second sector of national film industries is concerned with film productions within the national territory and is characterized by the active support of government and other elements of the state”* (Moran: 1997, 9)

Moran discards the cultural imperialist discourse as anachronistic, as a “rerun of the mass culture/high culture debate”, arguing that those who use such an argumentation only showcase their “personal aesthetic taste that prefers the art cinema to popular or mass culture” (in particular Hollywood films) (Moran 1997, 11).

There is also the argumentation challenging the European insistence on the protection of cultural diversity in Europe. Its proponents claim that if the “protectionist policy, based on quotas for the production or distribution of domestic films, results simply in the substitution of predominant American films by domestic films, to the detriment of ‘other films’, the objective of increasing cultural diversity will not be achieved” (Moreau&Peltier 2004, 141-142). The cultural economist Michael Rushton argues that the educational-role-argument in propagating the government aid was valid when it unambiguously referred only to the so-called high art (theatre, opera, symphonic orchestra, etc.). She argues that nowadays, in the era of multiculturalism, when the cultural preferences are very diverse and numerous, “sponsoring all of them with the tax-payers’ money would only increase the transaction costs and social welfare losses, and still fail to satisfy various communities”. Therefore, she proposes that government should use public funding to support only “one collective public art’s good”, whereas “the private sector (including the non-profit and voluntary sector) should become a more attractive financing alternative for minority cultures” (Rushton 2003).

David Puttnam in his book *Undeclared War* suggests a solution that combines the above two opposing views on the “subsidy-driven film-financing”. Puttnam is the British producer who worked in Europe but was engaged by Warner Brothers American Studio as well. He maintains that the European cinema should amalgamate “the narrative drive, energy and accessibility of the American cinema with the subtlety and sophistication of the traditional European cinema”. In production terms, according to him, European film industry should attempt to “formulate a way of working that offers a practical means of providing financial prudence and artistic ambition” (Puttnam 1997, 334-335).

Bearing in mind the current production landscape in Europe, on both national or the EU level, it seems that European film industry is taking up Puttnam’s middle-ground, compromising approach (Finney 1996). It stays in line with the British interpretation of the “creative industry” concept that treats the culture sector as something that can be a considerable facilitator of the economic growth of a country as well as art (Pratt 2008, 12-14, Mikic 2013, Jovicic & Mikic 2006).

Therefore, commercialization of the European culture has been encouraged to certain degree through policy measures in search for new sustainability formulae.<sup>6</sup> Such a status of the European audiovisual industry symbolically reflects two conflicting philosophies (Wayne, 2002: 10). On one hand, there is still a “determination to sustain the tradition of social democracy through willingness to intervene in cultural market outcomes to protect the European audiovisual industry” (as still expressed in the latest Commission’s Cinema Communication: 2013). On the other hand, the second tradition is the “neo-liberal philosophy whose keystone is freeing the profit and capital from as many social commitments as possible” (Wayne, 2002 :10; Morawetz, Hardy, Haslam & Randle, 2007).

Entering a new era, marked by “the liberalization of services and privatization of functions of the public sector, media oligopoly and new technology-driven and uncontrollable distribution platforms for cultural products”, the EU cultural and media policies, in general, entered the process that necessitates their re-examination. The result of the prevalence of “the market focused” private interests over public interests converted the role of “citizen public” into “consumer-public”, which keeps imposing the changes to the governance within the EU’s audiovisual framework (Sarikakis 2007 (1): 72) that starts targeting the European citizens as consumers rather than active citizens.

As a paramount example of this tension within the field of governance and regulation of cultural and media policies, Sarikakis analyses the Television Without Frontiers Directive, the major EU piece of media legislation. The challenges like technological issues framed along the lines of individual consumption, “incapability” of the state to stand up to the technology when it poses a disruptive element, and “superiority of the competition of individual interests in the market as the regulator for media”, are put to the fore (ibid, Sarikakis 2004).

---

<sup>6</sup> First example can be an Increasing number of commercial co-productions between the UK and US that would still be counted as European films and generate a significant profit at the same time (Baltruschak 2009). Second example can be the new plan of some of the leading filmmakers in Scandinavia to make movies that will combine the American and European style and thus simultaneously secure higher admissions and preserve the artistic quality. <http://www.screendaily.com/news/scandinavian-directors-forge-creative-alliance/5051182.article> (Retrieved January 22, 2013)

## **Europeanization and Policy Transfer**

In addition to this major cultural policy challenge that the EU has been struggling with in the past two and a half decades, the second biggest challenge Europe has been facing since the fall of the Berlin Wall is its reunification through the integration of Eastern Europe into the EU. Before going deeper into an analysis of this process, it is necessary to define two intertwining concepts: *Europeanization* and *policy transfer*.

### ***Europeanization***

In theoretical conceptualizing of Europeanization, space seems to be a prominent factor. If Europeanization is confined to the EU member states, then we can talk about neo-functional or inter-governmentalist approach in defining Europeanization and political, social and economic forces in uniting Europe (Borneman & Fowler 1997; Howell 2002; Cini & Perez-Solorzano Borraran 2004). Sometimes Europeanization is even replaced by the term 'EUization' (Radaelli 2003, 27) in this context, and is marked by a pronounced economic character. Europeanization as such deals only with the countries that are already recognized as Western democracies. On the other hand, Europeanization can be extended to the territories of the member countries of the Council of Europe (Vink 2003, 65, Schimmelfennig 2007). In that case, we most often talk about the "political and cultural Europeanization" or "general and informal Europeanization" (ibid). Such Europeanization is extended to the countries that aspire long-term to become Western democracies and it facilitates their European path. If Europeanization refers to the process of the EU enlargement (like the ones in 2004 and 2007), then as a meta-theory it is closely linked to the grand theory of EU integration. Namely, "European integration comprises the environment on which Europeanization impacts or from which it emanates" (Howell 2002). There is also the approach to the European integration that is concerned with ethical issues such as "citizenship, human rights, democracy, the role of identity and culture" (Sarikakis 2004, 32).

Due to myriad definitions of Europeanization, any theoretical definition becomes too broad and vague. Olsen thus separates different phenomena called Europeanization, that is *what is changing*, and assumes that the "exact nature of the processes of change and their end results should be determined by empirical studies rather than by definition" (Olsen 2002,

922). One of the five changes that Olsen indicates is the “normatively driven change of extending the borders of ‘Europe’ implemented through the rule-following. If an applicant country follows the rules and meets the set criteria of membership, it is admitted. If not, then the door is closed” (Olsen 2002, 927).

The Europeanization in the field of audiovisual policy implies the alignment of cultural policies in Eastern European countries with the Community *acquis*, the Television without Frontiers Directive, and legislative alignment by adopting new media laws (De Smaele 2007, 113). According to De Smaele, this process on one hand provides the East European audiovisual industries with opportunities like “increased investment and funding, more cooperation partners, better export possibilities”, but on the other hand, it also bears a threat of Europeanization as a “process of cultural diffusion or cultural dominance” (De Smaele 2007, Iordanova 2002).

While Europeanization could be understood as reforms a country needs to implement in order to join the European Union, as discussed above, It could also be defined as the answer to the challenges of globalization by building institutions in line with those in the European Union, or reasserting cultural diversity and identity. “For many it simply meant, and still means: being more alike Western Europe” (Bjelic 2003).

The process of Europeanization exerts influence on the establishment of cultural policy as well as its relationship with the film sector. Dragicevic-Sesic provides three possible practices and approaches of cultural policy in the sphere of film industry: *defensive*, *proactive* and *integrative* approach. Defensive approach implies film industry as part of general economic policy. The support to film industry is economically and politically motivated whereas the cultural aspect is marginalized. Proactive approach is market-oriented and implies that the film industry should be developed through nourishing and developing creative production and improvement of conditions for its market valorization. Integrative approach situates film industry in the wider business framework, establishing the stronger bond between the cinematic and non-cinematic exploitation of film stories, ideas and characters. Film industry is integrative insofar as it stands for the main contributor to the local and regional economy, encouraging myriad additional branches of creative industry (Mikic 2012, 4; Dragicevic-Sesic & Dragojevic 2006, 169-170).

### ***Policy Transfer***

The process of Europeanization of once communist countries goes hand in hand with *policy transfer*. Policy transfer is widely understood as “a process through which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in development of similar features in another” (Dolowitz, 2000, 3 in Benson and Jordan 2011, 366). Dolowitz and Marsh originally listed a number of things that could in theory be transferred, namely “policy goals, structure and content, policy instruments or administrative techniques, institutions, ideology, ideas, attitudes and concepts” (Benson and Jordan 2011, 370).

In evaluating policy transfer, this master thesis evokes the typology as defined by Dolowitz and Marsh. The most relevant type of transfer for this study is *emulation* or copying. It is the “strongest form of transfer, entailing ‘borrowing’ a policy model more or less intact from another jurisdiction” (Bulmer and Padgett 2005, 106; Dolowitz & Marsh 1996, 344, Pratt 2006). It “appears to result from ‘hard’ coercive transfer under conditions of Europeanization”. (Bulmer et al., 2007 in Benson and Jordan: 371)

According to Bulmer and Padgett, the type and the result of policy transfer are determined by and dependent on different form of EU governance. Therefore, based on the EU governance, they identify *hierarchical*, *negotiated* and *voluntary policy transfer*. The hierarchical governance is relevant for this thesis because it implies the form of policy transfer where “the EU institutions exercise supranational authority leading to coercive forms of transfer” (2005). This is the type of governance based on which the (cultural) policy transfer is taking place in Eastern Europe.

*“Under this form of governance, policy transfer occurs vertically through the application of rules, or institutional arrangements, by authoritative supranational actors to lower level of governance. Hierarchical governance employs variety of coercive mechanisms, the source of which lies in the treaties, European legislation, supranational European law more widely construed, and the powers delegated to supranational institutions.....Coercive transfer occurs via the exercise of transnational or supranational authority; a state is obliged to adopt policy as a condition of membership in an international organization, or as a condition of financial assistance from the letter (Bulmer and Padgett 2005, 107-108, 105).*

The EU candidate countries must adopt *the acquis communautaire* - the entire corpus of community law. This process is emulative and non-negotiable because socio-economic indicators show that enlargement countries are still well below the EU average and need a thorough transformation in order to catch up. “This slow level of socio-economic



development therefore calls for substantial investments and financial assistance to bring these countries closer to EU standards” (Cassidy 2012; Stubbs 2005, 78-81). Those investments are conditioned by the rigid alignment with the *acquis* and annulations of almost entire previous legislation insofar as it is marked as either outdated or simply incompatible with the EU standards. The process is implemented through so-called *positive* and *negative* harmonization processes. It means that an enlargement country either adopts such national regulations through which the obligations originating from the EU law shall be transferred, or eliminates and refrains from adopting the regulations that are considered in conflict with the EU law<sup>7</sup>.

Marsh and Dolowitz also define a set of constraints of the policy transfer process. Some of them, like “path-dependency arising from the past decisions, institutional and structural impediments”, and a “lack of ideological compatibility between transferring countries”, are relevant for this master thesis (in Benson and Jordan 2011, 372).

## **Europes out of Europe**

The integration of Eastern Europe into the EU through Europeanization and policy transfer has been highly visible within film industry and audiovisual sector in general. The process was symbolically initiated through the establishment of the European Film Award in 1988 with the idea of promotion of Europe’s film culture. This was accompanied by the public appeal of the most renowned European film auteurs<sup>8</sup> of the time from both sides of the iron curtain. They warned of “the danger of emerging cultural homogeneity, pollution of intellectual and spiritual values, and suppressing national identities and our desire for natural beauty of ‘otherness’”<sup>9</sup>. At the first Award ceremony held in Berlin, in 1988, it was the Polish director Krzysztof Kieslowski who won the best European film award for his film that was produced in still socialist Poland.

However, the vision of the united Europe soon proved to be “di-vision” or from the Balkan perspective “tri-vision” (Ellmeir & Rasky 2006, 13). All the above-described changes

---

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.seio.gov.rs/%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8.528.html> (Retrieved January 22, 2013)

<sup>8</sup> The list includes Theo Angelopoulos, Ingmar Bergman, Dusan Makavejev, Istvan Szabo, Wim Wenders, Federico Fellini, to mention a few.

<sup>9</sup> The quotation is taken from the full letter available at: <http://www.europeanfilmacademy.org/Appeal-from-European-Film-Directors.187.0.html> (Retrieved September 25, 2013)

within the cultural sector in the West were, in fact, results of years long intensive public debates and slow and gradual processes. In Eastern Europe, it was implemented much faster after 1989 since, overwhelmed by the demise of Communism, the East European elites tended to take “liberal economic fundamentals much more seriously in the cultural practice than it was ever the case in Western countries” (Ellmer & Rasky 2006). In the first post-communist years, the film industry was guided by the strategy based on “economism”, as Octavio Getino identifies it, which sees “film industry and its product only in economic terms” (in Moran 1997, 135). The entire distribution and exhibition was commercially driven and production ceased to be supported by the state. The common market that existed within the Eastern Bloc during socialism became highly fragmented and disconnected.

In order to follow the EU integration path, the East European countries have been prompted to implement what Alison Harcour calls the European model in audiovisual sector, which means “the promotion of public service broadcasting, European content in Programming, protectionism and re-regulation” (in de Smaele 2007, 114). On the other hand, most of these countries aspired to the membership in the World Trade Organization, which means opening up the market to the U.S. distributors and Hollywood production. Ewa Mazierska identifies the two following factors that affected the discourse on new Polish cinema (and those factors can be applied to majority of other East European states) – a) the idea that “pre-communist Poland was poor and backward due to the state socialism grip”, and b) “the main remedies for this after the fall of Communism was promoting competition and privatization” (Mazierska 2007). Another important process in the post-1989 Eastern Europe was building up or reviving the national identity. Ellmeir and Rasky sum up this complex transition as a three-way road whereon new democratic cultural policy administrators in Eastern Europe have had to cope with the questions of “new identity building, financial problems, opening up a market which is not yet in existence, confrontation with a massive influx of Western mass cultural good, all at once and in a short period of time” (2006, 15).

It took almost two decades before all countries in Eastern and Central Europe, that so far have joined the EU, aligned their audiovisual policies with the ones of the Western Europe. That process included, among the other, passing the European Media Law, Law on Radio and Television, Television without Frontier Directive, and negotiations about the

Chapter 20 of *acquis* on cultural and audiovisual policy (De Smaele 2007). As a result, in terms of official and proclaimed audiovisual policies those countries do not differ any more from those of what is defined as Western Europe. “They all signed up for the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity in 2005, whereby cultural works have got dual nature – cultural and economic – and individual countries should have the right,” in line with the principle of subsidiary, “to develop independent policies to sustain their cultural industries” (Portuges & Hames 2013). Both ‘East’ and ‘West’ of the European Union now can formally commit themselves jointly to safeguarding the European cultural diversity and fostering the circulation of the European films and other audiovisual goods. They do it by meeting as equal partners on numerous conferences, workshops and training programmes held at the EU level and usually co-supported by the MEDIA programme of the European Union.

However, in reality divisions between the East and West remain.

*“Thanks to the overall post-1989 transformations in the East, individual action and human capital has been developed but, unlike the West, the public domain and every aspect of collective action is much weaker and less consolidated in Eastern Europe. Due to the fact that the state is still considered as a sole political decision-maker instead as a public partner, and that economic domain is based only on promotion of private ownership and neglecting stakeholding, the social capital in the East is much weaker than in the West”* (Hausner 2010: 125).

It rather evokes what Pierre Bourdieu defines as negative social capital based on reproducing inequality.

Hausner further develops two types of social development. The first one is designated as *molecular* and is linked to the “lack of institutional adjustment and change”. According to this type, it is “much easier to establish than autonomously adjust and develop institutions” and “political parties in many East European countries in practice are colonizing and destroying the institutions” that are established through policy transfer during the EU integration (Hausner 2010).

The other, so-called *modular mode* positivistically implies that development cannot be “sustainable, broader and multi-scalar without culture as a domain of collective horizontal communication, discourse, cooperation and innovation” (Hausner 2010). The solutions to the crisis of the cultural sector that Hausner recommends invite for “more social, political and administrative accountability, and less passive adjustment based on active seeking of external control”. He also identifies the entire array of incentives that are necessary for establishing culture as an important social and economic factor: “legislation, funding,

discourse, empowerment, self-organization, market, competent politicians, officials, experts and creators” (Hausner 2010).

Thus, Hausner discerns the internal factors that hinder the implementation of desirable social-economic cultural policies in Eastern Europe modeled after the ones existing in the West. However, he fails to analyze in details the method through which that policy transfer is being implemented, and that there may also be some external (non-Eastern European) factors that hinder a more productive development of cultural policies in the East. Sarikakis identifies two weaknesses of the EU-centric type of policy production one of which I wish to mention here in the context of the post-Socialist Eastern Europe. It is based on the

*“claim that socio-geographical particularity of Western Europe is partly a determinant of European integration and policy-making. The example of Western Europe becomes overtly Eurocentric in that it places too much attention on the co-operation of Western European states, neglecting the fact that similar co-operation patterns have taken place in other regions of the world (Sarikakis 2004, 49-50).*

Furthermore, the EU’s emphasis on “the market-ability of culture reinforces the very material and symbolic conditions detrimental to social cohesion especially one based in part on construction of the European identity(ies)” (Sarikakis 2007 (1), 86).

Hedwig de Smaele describes, citing a former Bulgarian Deputy Minister and chief negotiator for the EU, that “exclusive focus that the accessing countries have on alignment with the *acquis* contribute to the rigidity of the integration process and lead to *basically non-negotiable negotiations* with the EU” (De Smaele 2007, 117). As a consequence, all applicant states could neither influence the content of the transferred legislation nor rely on some positive practices from the Socialist period that might have functioned well.

Furthermore, the difficulties of the process are most often explained through the downsides of the old communist system. The process itself is usually discursively marked as “transition from communism to post-communism” (Mazierska, 2007, Copic 2004) to make communism present as a constant threat even in the new times. The process is most often described as “transition”, a radical movement of the entire society to what is eschatologically perceived as the one and only place, and not as “transformation” (as Hausner at one point suggests), which would imply that the society stays where it is, gradually and selectively transforming into a more sustainable and progressive model of society. On the other hand, in interpreting the difficulties the transitional countries have been facing, various reports stay

impervious to failures of the new system of liberal capitalism. The European legislation, for instance, is transferred replacing the old one before it was made sure that there were financial and institutional capacities for its full implementation. Therefore, instead of an intended natural unification of Europe that was announced in 1989, there was the process that De Smaele calls *Europeanization of Europe* that in certain regards of cultural policies can be described as forced and perilous just as the Americanization is (2007, 129).

In 2009, on the occasion of the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the fall of Communism, the conference named Culture and Development 20 years after the Fall of Communism was held in Krakow under the auspices of the Council of Europe and Culture Watch Europe. It resulted in publication of the same-named book that includes contribution from the most renowned cultural policy experts in the region. In his extensive article about the current state of cultural policies in the entire post-communist space, Peter Inkei (in collaboration with six other prominent cultural policy experts from the region<sup>10</sup>) indirectly identified six different Europes within the region, on the basis of how much each part of the region had harmonized its cultural policies with the Western concept. The first group includes the countries that reached the full membership in the EU after they had successfully completed the transition of their “cultural system and policy” (Inkei 2010, 44-48). The other countries were grouped and rated in accordance to the extent to which their cultural policies are complimentary to the Western ones, disregarding the fact that their cultural policy models can be their own choice or not necessarily discarded.

Such approach to defining cultural policies in Eastern Europe based on the fact that they have to be unquestionably transferred from Western Europe leads to the conclusion that Elmeier and Rasky drew in their publication on Europeanization of Eastern European cultural policies. According to them, “it is not only the hegemonic discourses from the West that poses the impediment to balancing out the unequal ability to speak from different positions within Europe”. The second crucial factor is actually the fact that the “intellectual elites from Eastern regions often regard their cultural uniqueness as sheer backwardness which has to be overcome at any price” (2006, 16).

---

<sup>10</sup> Milena Dragicevic-Sesic, Mikhail Gnedovsky, Baiba Tjarve, Vesna Copic, Cornelia Dumcke and Zsuzsa Hunyadi

## **Cultural Identity Change Trajectory: the Case of Post-Yugoslav Serbia**

A number of studies describing the post-1989 transformation of East European film industries have already been written, using either a single country as a case study (Haltof 2002, Mazierska 2007, Kristensen 2012), or using a set of Eastern European countries (Mazierska, Kristensen & Naripea 2013, Portuges & Hames 2013, Iordanova 2003). These studies identify a set of challenges that a national cinema goes through in order to handle the three major challenges of the post-Berlin Wall era: *Globalization, Europeanization, identity-building*. The globalization challenge, as mentioned above, has been the unifying European problem, since all European film industries have been threatened by the domination of Hollywood. The challenge of Europeanization, as we could see was more inherent to Eastern Europe or at least those East European countries that aspire to the EU membership.

However, the third challenge - how do these processes influence the identity change? - is more difficult to investigate. The ways in which identities were modified or built in Eastern Europe after 1989 are fluid and divergent. The identities are “broken down and reshuffled due to the reaffirmed national values and strong tendencies to enter global cultural trade and exchange” (Svob-Djokic 2004). This master thesis will be restricted to the case of the identity change trajectory of post-Yugoslav Serbia.

The term “post-Yugoslav”, as defined by Jurica Pavicic (2011), will be essential for this thesis from the following reasons: Firstly, post-Yugoslav evokes not the period after 1989, but after 1992 when most of the ex-Yugoslav socialist republics gained independence, reducing Yugoslavia to Serbia and Montenegro. This time difference of three years is important because while the re-emergence of nation states throughout many ex-Soviet satellite countries was celebrated as liberation from Communism and the onset of unification with the West, the emergence of the post-Yugoslav nation states brought about only the most aggressive forms of nationalisms that made the country plunge into the devastating civil war.

Secondly, talking about Serbia as a post-Yugoslav country, we can avoid the usual trap of ignoring the fact that Serbia’s identity strongly implies the heritage of living almost half a century in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia characterized by its authentic form of progressive Socialism. The rich cultural legacy Serbia inherits from Yugoslavia – the Cold war era’s poster boy of development - paradoxically seems to be a burden rather than

advantage in the process of the Europeanization of the cultural policy and film industry after 2000. Vesna Copic identifies the following four reasons why former Yugoslavia, albeit a socialist one-party state, had one foot in Western Europe as early as 1950s: a) “Yugoslav open frontiers”, b) “the introduction of market rules into the planned economy”, c) “the replacement of state property with common property and the recognition of private property”, and d) “an attempt to use self-management as a means for compensation for the one-party system” (Copic 2004, 43). In her article, Copic in a critical manner relates to the way the public sector in general had been governed in Yugoslavia, emphasizing the complex limitations in its implementation in reality. However, she still does not propose the total disintegration of the entire infrastructure but rather introduction of some significant changes that would be modeled on the successful EU practices: “more involvement of civil sector, giving more autonomy to cultural institutions already recognized as legal entities, destigmatization of bureaucracy” (Copic 2004, 43). During the EU integration, the political elites in Serbia and other post-Yugoslav countries failed to take advantage of once existing infrastructure in facilitating the transformation and collaboration in the cultural policy field, but introduced the EU laws and practices behaving as a deeply fragmented space.

The transformation of the cultural identity of the post-Yugoslav Serbia deserves attention because it is even more dynamic and complex than it was the case with other European countries. Namely, after the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia collapsed and the Yugoslav civil war commenced, Serbia experienced all-way UN Security Council embargo and isolation, and finally the NATO bombing in 1999, attaining the global reputation of one of the top villainous countries. In 2000, however, after the notorious regime of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic was removed, the country initiated its transition to liberal economy and EU integration, with an ambition to catch up with other ex-socialist states that had begun the identical process 10 years before. Therefore, its government’s determination to “wage war against the rest of the world” and ignore the global trends in politics, economy and culture during the 1990s when the rest of Eastern Europe was celebrating them, makes the Serbia’s case a unique showcase of the major global economic, political and social/cultural processes.

The cultural identity expressed in the Serbian cinema has been constantly negotiated and changing in the narratives of Serbian films just as the “narratives have been determined

by the ever-changing production conditions” (Baltruschat 2002). Three types of cultural identity argument, as defined by Kauffmann, will be referred to in this master thesis when treating the identity transformation through Europeanisation: 1) “the nationalist/local argument”, 2) “the neoliberal argument (economic context of branding)” and 3) “the visibility argument (culture as perfect field for raising the visibility of the European Union)” (Kaufmann & Raunig 2003).

### ***Cinema of Self-Balkanization***

The Europeanization and harmonization with the European Law officially begun in Serbia in 2001 when the country had the distinct image of the ‘Other’ in the West. The dominant image of Serbs as ‘bad guys’ was maintained in global media throughout the 1990s while the disintegration of Yugoslavia was in progress. In the post-1989 period, when a new post-Cold War “symbolic geography and mapping was established”, Serbia was marked as a point of the clash of civilizations, as Samuel Huntington defined it in the early 1990s (1993). In line with Huntington’s theory, Serbia could be marked as a meeting point of different religions, which inevitably triggered the conflict after the end of the Cold War.

Vesna Goldsworthy wrote that

*“...the defamiliarizing of accounts of Balkan conflicts in the Western media – describing ethnic wars as unthinkable elsewhere in Europe while supplying gory details of singularly Balkan butchery to an eager audience – contribute to the perception of the peninsula’s ambiguous, not-yet or never-quite Europeanness “ (Goldsworthy 2003, 4).*

The journalists, historians, political scientists and politicians equated Yugoslavia, and the entire Balkans, with a “place of ancient hatred” where violence and bloodsheds happen in cycles as earthquakes. Such an interpretation originated from the Western popular fiction and film where the Balkans often “provided a threatening space – the mysterious and unheimlike (*unheimlich*) Eastern location for the unfolding of Western adventure” (Dakovic 2003, Goldsworthy 2003).

In the 1990s, the Balkanization debate was also enriched and problematized by some new strategies inspired by the discourses within postcolonial studies. The Balkan was examined through Maria Todorova’s concept of ‘*Balkanism*’ (1994), John Allcoc’s examination



of '*multiple marginality*' in '*Constructing the Balkans*' (Allcoc & Young 1991) and Milica Bakic-Hayden concept of '*nesting orientalism*' (1995).

At the same time, Serbia was the only ex-Yugoslav country that had to some extent vital cinematography during the 1990s, and some of its films won several significant awards at the renowned international film festivals, and entered the global distribution channels. The most notable Serbian authors of the time were Goran Paskaljevic, Emir Kusturica and Srdjan Dragojevic. Film scholars Dina Iordanova (2001) and Pavle Levi (2007) in their seminal works on the post-Yugoslav cinema argue that these authors in fact won the international recognition by reproducing the dominant Balkanization image, providing to the Western audience a thrilling journey to the wild, crazy and savage Balkans where the wars were not taboos and where a Western viewer can find a lot of entertainment and excitement. That is why the most successful Balkan films made in the turbulent 1990s were designated as the "cinema of self-Balkanization" (Jameson 2005, 235; Longinovic 2005, 45; Samardzija 2007, 57; Krstic 2009 in Pavicic 2010, 2011). Iordanova and Levi also investigate to what extent these self-balkanization films can be regarded as subtle and covert pro-Serbian propaganda, considering that Slobodan Milosevic's government was partly or entirely sponsoring them. The main shortcomings of the works of Iordanova and Levi, as suggested in Jurica Pavicic's book *Post-Yugoslav Film: Style and Ideology* (2011), comes from the fact that they "rarely delve into the production of the post-Yugoslav countries beyond a narrow cluster of the festival hits made between mid and late 1990s that had international distribution, and stirred political controversy" (Pavicic, 2011: 75).

### ***Cinema of Normalization***

In order to comprehend the Serbian social-political context in the post-Milosevic, that is, post-2000 transition towards liberal capitalism, it is essential to define the discourse of *normalization* as the dominant societal discourse. It can be explained by the sociological concept of normalization. As Foucault used the term, normalization involved the construction of an idealized norm of conduct. New ideas come to be seen as 'normal' and become taken for granted as 'natural' in everyday life (Foucault 1990; Adams 2004). The Serbian governments and political and economic elites in the past thirteen years have been

encouraging general social processes by which new ways of thinking, working and organizing became routinely incorporated in every-day life.

The ruling elites propagated the normalization discourse as part of Serbia's Europeanization aspirations, and in order to prevent a re-birth of nationalisms (Dakovic, 2006; Pavicic, 2010). Such a discourse was supposed to create a reality in which all people, regardless of their living standard, would believe that the economic course the government is pursuing is 'long and tough but the only possible one'. Jurica Pavicic described *normalization* as a "blurry, seductive term" that refers to the process of political and economic reforms that all post-Yugoslav countries have entered (Pavicic, 2010; 2011). He maintains that in the post-Yugoslav countries this process of normalization had "an obvious, undisputed and almost eschatological goal, that of joining the European Union. One side effect of this eschatological goal is supposed to be an evolution into a fully functional democracy and liberal market economy with their set of values and practices" (Pavicic 2010).

The overall societal changes after the year 2000 influenced inevitably the film culture in Serbia, because the internationally visible films could send the images of the new Serbia to the world. The self-Balkanization rhetoric, so typical of the Serbian cinema of 1990s, abated.

*"In the period in which all post-Yugoslav societies tried to prove and demonstrate 'normality' and reach the status of 'normal' (i.e. European membership, or at least candidacy for membership), instead of being 'different', the rhetorical strategy typical of the 'cinema of self-Balkanization' had suddenly become unpopular" (Pavicic, 2010).*

Instead, the new trend became what the Stewart Hall calls *reversing stereotypes* (1997) that is presenting the Yugoslav peoples as the same as Western European – with the same problems and goals, therefore affirming the unification and integration into the EU.

### **Marxist Approach**

Neo- or post-Marxian approach also addresses the topics like internationalization of the causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration in a way that would remove the label of "cultural otherness" from this territory. In the same fashion the Indian Marxist, Eilaz Ahmad, accused Edward Said's Orientalism concept, of being obsessed with Western knowledge (in Goldsworthy 2003, 9), the Marxist media and film specialist Mike Wayne challenged the scholars and filmmakers who applied postcolonial theories and theories of otherness to the Yugoslav war of the 1990s (Wayne 2002).

The Marxist approach is the least utilized in interpreting the post-Yugoslav cinema. It emphasizes (unlike the discourse present in the works of the most known experts on the Balkan cinema like Jordanova, Levi, or Daniel Goulding (2002), who reduce the Yugoslav problem solely to the isolated case of the rise of Slobodan Milosevic), the social-economic and political integration of the post-Yugoslav space into liberal capitalism and new global order, while the region is being kept as the cultural other at the same time (Wayne 2002). It presents the Yugoslav crisis rather as a “crisis of the entire Judeo-Christian civilization”, not as an isolated case (Bogoeva-Sedlar, 2002). The Marxist discourse challenges the dominant discourses of Samuel Huntington’s “cultural clashes” and “cultural wars” that “define cultural identity as something absolutely fixed that divide people and even encourage them to kill each other” (Kaufmann & Raunig 2003).

Wayne critiques the ‘cultural turn’, its impact on the main-stream analysis of the Balkan cinema, and the way cultural theory utilizes the concept of the “Otherness” in analyzing Eastern European cinemas in general.

“The tendency to dissolve the material world into the cultural is powerfully operative across the majority of social and cultural theory today, with the effect that theory fails to identify, indeed it actively represses, the deep ontological delineaments of power in our times: namely the socio-economic relations of life within capitalism” (Wayne 2002, 126).

Wayne utilizes this premise when he talks about the films from, and about, post-Yugoslavia made in the 1990s. He departs from the idea that the collapse of Yugoslav economy is the “absence, the silence around which the Western discourse of centuries-old ethnic (that is cultural) enmities can be built and blamed” (Wayne 2002, 127).

The Marxist approach is a response to the normalization discourse that, as shown above, neglects the Yugoslav legacy in the process of societal transformation, and presents the post-Yugoslav societies and film industries as new-born and dependant solely on the EU integration path. Marxian approach evokes the notion of “negative feedback” (Pollak, 2008) to policy transfer that I am going to focus on in this paper. This negative feedback will be defined as an *opportunity cost* borne during Serbia’s EU integration and transition to liberal economy in the past two decades.

## CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Influenced by the multifaceted globalization on one hand and its own agenda to preserve the European cultural diversity on the other hand, the European cinema, as a mosaic of diverse national cinemas, found itself in the midst of the dichotomous tensions between the notions of national and European as well as economic and cultural. The continuum of possible epistemological approaches to analyzing these tensions ranges from radical structuralist to functionalist, and institutionalist to Marxist.

The concept of top-down Europeanization and transfer that I will apply to the Serbian post-Yugoslav cinema can be approached from two oppositional perspectives. Burrell and Morgan's (1979) paradigmatic differences of the view of the nature of society will be recalled here. The first view is based on functionalist approach and positivist perspective. Its proponents "emphasize the importance of maintaining order in society and inducing social change through problem solving within the boundaries of existing authoritative and control structures". They are more likely to "espouse cultural homogenization and comprehensive universalism" (Nemetz & Christenen, 1996).

In this context the EU can be regarded as an end-state. In order to improve the culture sector, the supporters of this view do not traverse the borders of the existing film industry policies and institutions and suggest that the problems of the European cinema, primarily the circulation of European films, be resolved within the existing institutions (Pauwels, De Vink & Van Rompay, 2007; De Vinck 2009; Naarajarvi, 2011, Neuman & Appelgren 2007).

The opposite view on the continuum is defined as radical structuralism. Radical structuralists assert that humans cannot assume a "common value system built around consensus, but that a plurality of interests exists. Plurality is seen not as a purposeful exercise in democracy, but rather as a collection of central points of conflict" (Worseley 1985). Further, they view conflict resolution as an "opiate and a tool of domination whose purpose is to prevent revolution and the shift of power to the oppressed" (Nemetz & Christenen, 1996). In this context, the EU can be perceived as both victim and disseminator of global capitalism. Considering the European film industry in this context, it is necessary to mention the neo-Marxist or post-Marxist scholars that offer a critique of the external influence of liberal

capitalism on the European film industry (Wayne 2001; Landy 2005; Phillips 2005; Miller 2005; Bogoeva-Sedlar, 2002; 2009) and suggest more radical changes for its reorganization (Kaufmann & Raunig, 2003).

Although aware of the thoroughness and immense relevancy of the analyses provided by the proponents of the former view, whose outcomes I often consult in this study when writing about policy documents and regulatory institutions in Serbia and the EU, this study will identify the latter, Marxist approach, as more appropriate to investigate problems in the European film industry, and propose solutions that may go beyond cosmetic changes within the cultural sector. Furthermore, unlike institutionalist approach, that mostly reduces the analysis of the European cultural policy to the EU and its institutions, Marxian approach emphasizes political dimension of the cultural field of broader Europe, enabling the “permeability of its boundaries and transgression of different fields” (Kaufmann & Raunig, 2003).

## **Research objectives and question**

The European cultural policy makers are torn between the pressure to commercialize the film industry and the dictum to foster a broader European unity in diversity within the European cinema. The EU candidate countries are, however, torn between the Europeanization by means of a rigid policy transfer on one hand, and the ever-present challenge of identity-building on the other hand. The objective of this thesis is:

- 1. To contribute to the debate on unification of Europe through European cinema by analyzing current film policies in the Europeanized post-Yugoslav Serbia.***
- 2. To engage critically and constructively with the on-going discussions on the role of European film fund Eurimages both within policy field and film industry.***
- 3. To scrutinize the impact of Europeanization on the cultural identity change in a transitional society like Serbia.***
- 4. To investigate the impact that the current cultural policy in post-Yugoslav Serbia, being a EU candidate country, exerts on film production conditions.***

Consequently, I formulated the following research question and sub-questions:

- 1. What is the opportunity cost of Europeanization of Serbian cinema?***

- a) **How is cultural policy transfer achieved in Serbia?**
- b) **How do the institutional changes happen within the film sector?**
- c) **Was the rich cultural heritage from the times of socialist Yugoslavia a benefit or impediment to the process of Europeanization?**
- d) **What are the changes in production and style of the Serbian films made after the country joined EURIMAGES?**
- e) **How does the national cinema showcase the new 'europeanized' identity?**

## **RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS**

The two methods I will use in order to answer the research question and sub-questions are Interviews and case study. The case study method will be complemented by the text analysis of the selected group of films, archival documents, quantitative analysis of available data and references to different discourses on Serbian cinema.

### **Interviews**

The interviews as a classical methodological tool will be used for the analysis of the Europeanization of Serbian cinematography and culture in general. The interviewees are professionals from the various walks of film and creative industry. Their number was determined by their availability. The interview conversations are based on in advance formulated questions. The interview questions are conceptualized in a way that the answers can be combined with the results acquired by means of the analysis of Eurimages reports, quantitative analysis of figures regarding production and distribution of Serbian films, public debates on Serbian cultural policy and textual analysis of a number of Serbian films.

Having considered the research question of this thesis and the way in which the interview results will be integrated into the analysis, I chose to conduct in-depth *expert interviews*. By definition, "a person is attributed as expert by virtue of his/her role as informant" (Bogner, Litig & Menz 2009, 4). A person is "considered an expert if he or she possesses an institutionalized authority to construct reality". (Hitzler, Honer & Maeder 1994 in Bogner, Litig & Menz 2009). The persons I interviewed can be classified into two types of experts. The first type comprises employees of the Council of Europe's film fund Eurimages

who are either well-informed about the situation in the European cinema or directly involved in making regulatory policies, the heads of the two most prominent film institutions in Serbia that spent significant part of their careers in former Yugoslavia and two Serbian experts on cultural policies. The second type of interviewees is people from the “opposite” side - producers and directors whose insights put a different light on the tendencies in the Serbian/European film industry.

***The reasons for choosing Interviews as a research method***

Bogner, Littig and Menz identify four general motivating factors for making expert interviews: (a) “professionalism of people familiar with being in the public eye”, (b) “silent awareness of the scientific/political relevance of their field of activity or professional achievements”, (c) “professional curiosity about the topic and field of research” and (d) “interest in sharing one’s thoughts and ideas with external experts” (Bogner, Litig & Menz 2009).

There are three additional pragmatic reasons why I decided to conduct expert interviews in this particular study. First, they can shorten time-consuming data-gathering process, particularly if the experts are seen as ‘crystallization points’ for practical insider knowledge and are approached as representatives for a wider circle of players (Bogner, Litig & Menz 2009). Second, the fact that as a film cultures researcher and a film producer I share common professional background with my interlocutors provides me with additional knowledge and skills necessary for conducting these interviews. Third, a number of the interviewees are even familiar with my to-date work in the field, which decreases their mistrust and fears from being misinterpreted or manipulated.

The persons I interviewed hold positions that can be placed throughout the entire film industry. The spectrum of their engagement in European cinema ranges from entirely autonomous approach to the dependence on an institutionalized power center. By means of their intellectual, creative capacities and skills they intend to provide either criticism or defense of the activities of economic, political and cultural elites that regulate the European/Serbian film today.

**Limitations of the expert interview method**

The method of expert interviews presents two limitations: the “quality of the experts” (Dorussen, Dortmut & Blavoukos 2005, quoted in Cannon 2011, 16) and the “biases of the researcher” (Berger 1998, quoted in Cannon 2011, 16). In order to reduce these limitations as much as possible, in addition to the interviews, I consulted alternative sources, wherever possible and adequate. These resources include Eurimages reports, applications and minutes from the Board of Managements meetings. Furthermore, I was regularly keeping track of the relevant articles and debates on Serbian cinematography and cultural policy in the mainstream Serbian media (website of the Radio-Television B92, *Politika* daily newspaper, film journal *Filmograf*, and internet portal “SEECult.org”) as well as the online archives of the mainstream European journals like *Variety*, *Screen International*, and the internet portal Cineuropa). Significant source are also informal conversations and email correspondence with a number of colleagues from the film industry who wished to stay anonymous. Their contribution is important insofar as it helped me shape the meta-narrative of this study, and choose the epistemological approach.

The biggest limitation, however, is the fact that a number of potential interviewees that I contacted were not eventually interviewed. Most of them are the employees of the Serbian governing institutions (Ministry of Culture, Parliamentary Committee for Culture and Media, and National Council for Cultural Strategy). They either never responded to my e-mails or showed disinterest in contributing to this study.

The list of interviewees is as follows:

<b>Name</b>	<b>Profession</b>	<b>Interview date</b>	<b>Method</b>
Roberto Olla	Executive Director of Eurimages	27/05/2013	Interview
Alessia Sonaglioni	Project Manager at Eurimages	31/05/2013	Interview
Iris Cadoux	Project Manager at Eurimages	29/05/2013	Interview
Miroľjub Vuckovic	Former CEO of Film Center Serbia	14/06/2013	Interview
Radoslav Zelenovic	CEO of the Serbian Film Archives	15/06/2013	Interview
Jelena Mitrovic	Serbian Producer	16/06/2013	Interview
Biljana Prvanovic	Serbian Producer	01/10/2013	Skype
Snezana Penev	Serbian Producer	15/10/2013	Interview
Hristina Mikic	Cultural Policy Expert (CoE)	28/08/2013	Skype
Srdjan Dragojevic	Serbian Director	01/10/2013	Skype
Iris Zappe-Heller	Austrian representative at Eurimages	10/09/2013	Interview



Irena Strzalkowska	Polish representative at Eurimages	14/10/2013	E-mail
Vladimir Tomcic	Serbian representative at Eurimages	16/08/2013	E-mail

### ***Thematisation of the interviews***

The interviews were thematically analyzed centering on the information related to the initial and emerging themes. The main phases of the interviews' analysis were: defining topics, thematizing, and positioning the findings within the theoretical concepts. Occasionally, "additional information was solicited from the interviewees by email for clarification and feedback" (Aronson, 1994 in Cannon 2011).

The interview themes differed depending on different groups of the interviewees. The interviews with the employees at Eurimages were divided into the following thematic sections: *the role of Eurimages in safeguarding European diversity, challenges Eurimages faces regarding the commercialization of cinema, Impact of Eurimages on the Balkan production landscape, strategies regarding the further enlargement of the fund*. The Interviews with persons in charge of Serbian public cultural institutions include topics like *the change of cultural identity, importance of Yugoslav cultural legacy, national cultural strategy, the context of the Serbian industry during the 1990s*. The third groups of interviews were Belgrade-based international producers. The main topics with them were *their personal experience with European film co-production as well as the experience with the new institutional structures in Serbia created as a result of the policy transfer*.

### **Case study setting**

I set a qualitative single case study made of all Serbia-involved co-productions that have ever applied to the European co-production film fund Eurimages. The selected corpus of films makes the most representative sample of the film industry in the current Serbian film sector insofar as it delineates the production conditions in Serbia, the collaboration between Serbia and other European countries in the field of film industry, and the impact of a pan-European film fund and cultural policy in shaping the European and local cinemas and identities. Almost all internationally visible films and filmmakers from Serbia involve Eurimages in some way. And last but not least, getting a Eurimages support necessitates co-productions whereby the collaboration among the post-Yugoslav countries was intensified. Therefore, the case study

method will tackle more or less all research sub-questions, but its primary focus will rest on tracing the impact of Eurimages on the local film industries, and changes in cultural policy and identity due to the EU integration and Europeanization. The case study complemented the interviews part of which were also the topics and production process of the case study films.

This case study relies on the primary sources about Serbian, and to some extent overall post-Yugoslav, cinema in relation to Eurimages and Serbia's position within the European film industry. I have examined 30 supported and 19 non-supported Serbia-involved projects that applied for Eurimages co-production support until 2013, and a number of films from other European countries that deal with post-Yugoslavia. In addition, I have examined relevant Eurimages documents during my two-month study visit to the Eurimages Secretariat in Strasbourg. Those documents include the application folders with the documents the respective applicants are required to submit, annual activity reports of Eurimages, minutes from the Eurimages policy and Board of Management meetings.

This study is the first comprehensive analysis of all Serbian co-productions supported by Eurimages. The relevant primary sources stored in the archives of the Eurimages Secretariat I consulted during my two-month stay in the Eurimages offices in Strasbourg have not been extensively consulted thus far. Therefore, this case study will be exploratory and of revelatory nature and will provide some useful insights.

Below is the list of the Eurimages-involved Serbian co-production that will serve as the basis for the set case study.

	<b>Supported by Eurimages</b>	<b>Rejected by Eurimages</b>
<b>Serbia as majority co-producer</b>	Love Fair (2005) <sup>11</sup> Fantom (2005) The Trap (2005) Ordinary People (2006) Mamaros (2006) Love And Other Crimes (2006) St George Kills the Dragon (2007) The Tour (2008) Besa (2008) White, White World (2009) Circles (2010) Parade (2011) When the Day Breaks (2011) Monument to Michael Jackson (2012)	Porcupine (2005) - the first delegate project ever Vilenjakova prica (2007) Moja porodica (2007) Promise Me This (2006) Kraj igre (2007) Zena sa slomljenim nosom (2007) Crna Zorica (2008) Kakos u me ukrali Nemci (2009) Tesla Ruler of the World (2010) Scent of the Rain in the Balkans (2010) Bajaco Bluz (2010) - withdrawn Dr Ray and the Devils (2011) - withdrawn Zmaj Jovini Pangalozi (2011) - withdrawn Others (2012)
<b>Serbia as minority</b>	Underground (1993) Cabaret Balkan (1997)	Marlowe (2005) Monza (2006)

<sup>11</sup> The year in brackets marks the year when Eurimages supported the film not the year of release

<b>co-producer</b>	Falling into Paradise (2001) Fly by Rossinant (2005) Karaula (2005) Tesko je biti fin (2006) Tvrda koza ali dobra po srcu (2006) If The Seed Does Not Die (2006) The Woman without Body (2007) Neka ostane medju nama (2008) Some Other Stories (2008) Circus Kolumbija (2009) Stanje soka (2010) Night Boats (2011) Others (2011) The Priests Children (2011) Enklava (2012)	Mirush (2006) The Sky Above Us (2012) My Name is Elif (2012) A Tear in Your Eyes (2012)
--------------------	---	--

### Textual Analysis

The analysis of the above-introduced Serbian-involved co-productions consists of two levels. One level will be interpretive and based on interviews and analysis of various documents whereas the second level will include the classical elements of film analysis. The classical instruments of film analysis include instruments of description (Omon & Mari 2007, 45-79). The description instruments refer to what can be seen and heard while watching a film. This analytical approach implies a detailed description of scenes that make a film whereby a special emphasis is on "selection of the elements that seem to be charged with information" (Omon & Mari 2007, 64). Therefore, the main objective of describing a film image is an accurate recognition and identification of shown elements, as well as putting of visual schemes into a certain social-political context to which the very film belongs (Omon&Mari, 2007:64). In addition to description, the movie photograms will also be treated from the semiotics perspective. The analysis here starts from Barthes' statement that every image is polysemic (Barthes, 1979: 467). Connotative meanings of scenes will be taken into account as well as the codes that can be used in identifying various layers of meaning of a movie.

### Policy Framework

As defined by Dolowitz, "the process of policy transfer includes the transfer of variety of things - knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas - from one political system into another" (Dolowitz 2000, 3 in Benson and Jordan 2011, 366). This master thesis demonstrates on a micro level - on the example of Serbia - how the political,

economic and cultural transformation in the age of globalization (triggered by the momentous events like the fall of the Berlin wall, GATT negotiations within the World Trade Organizations, etc.) in combination with the notion of preserving the national identity impacts film cultures and cultural policies in small European countries that do not play as global actors whatsoever.

The main instruments that define cultural policy at the European level include:

1. UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity from 2005 whereby cultural works have got dual nature – cultural and economic – and individual countries the right to develop independent policies to sustain their cultural industries.
2. Inclusion of article 151 into Maastricht Treat whereby the culture became incorporated into the European Community's policies (1993).
3. "Cultural exception" clause to the WTO/GATT arrangements (1993) that legitimized state intervention into protecting European cultural services and goods
4. Television without Frontiers Directive (1989/1997/2006) that encourages both free flow of national television programmes within the EU and the protection of European audiovisual industry against the US programmes.
5. Chapter 20 of the Community *acquis* (AVMS Directive) related to the common European audiovisual policies. Alignment with AVMS Directive opens the door to membership in the MEDIA Programme of the European Union.
6. European Convention on Cinematographic Co-productions (1994) whereby film co-production among the European states is encouraged. Its signing is also the major pre-requisite to membership in the European co-production film fund Eurimages.

In order to become a full EU member, a candidate country is either obliged or recommended to sign or adopt the said instruments. The progress of the integration process (audiovisual and media sector included) is mentioned in the annual Progress Reports compiled by the European Commission.

On the other hand, only a small portion of financial assistance to candidate countries realized through Accession Partnership (the main instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) is allocated to culture (Cassidy 2012). Regarding the Serbian cultural sector, there is no direct EU budget lines. However, the policy transfer performed in other fields necessarily shaped


the cultural and audiovisual sector in Serbia. The transitional dictums such as privatizations of state or social companies and passing the laws on media, free trade and public procurement, had substantial consequences for the film sector.

The Serbian political elites officially support the idea that the Serbian cultural policy should be complementary with the ones in the EU. Thus far, Serbia joined the Council's of Europe film fund EURIMAGES (2005) and the EU programme Culture (2007), the old Law on Film from 1992 was superseded by the new Law on Cinematography in 2011 and Law on Culture (2009), the Parliament established the National Council for developing the national cultural strategy (2010) in line with the EU standards. The Serbian Film Center was established in 2005 as an institution that should autonomously operate the fund the government allocates for cinematography. The Film Center is modeled after its EU counterparts.

The idea to inaugurate a creative industry in Serbia, based on the British socio-economic model, emerged among the cultural policy makers and experts after the democratic changes in 2000. The recommended strategy for development of creative industries were a) small countries like Serbia should have their own creative industries (based on economic and cultural policies) in order to avoid identity problems and dominance of imported cultural goods. Hence, all cultures in transition should become providers of cultural goods and services by encouraging local creativity, b) regional connecting and integration should imply a cultural policy that will recognize the common interest of small countries in a bigger market and define common strategies that will secure their survival in the global market. Hence, the government should take measures and instruments for development of domestic market (quotas), establishment of a wider regional market and support for export of cultural goods and services, c) privatization of radio and TV stations, theatrical networks and film studios should be completed, d) the role of culture as a soft power and an instrument that would improve the bad image Serbia had for years in the global media is important. Launching the new positive image of Serbia would attract investment and business activities (Mikic & Stojanovic 2006).

Although the Serbian governments seem to act autistic to the potential that the development of a creative industry in Serbia would bring, it cannot be denied that no

endeavors for transferring the legislation and institutional models in order to pursue the above-mentioned goals have been made. Figure 1 shows the negative feedback to such endeavors when it comes to the film industry at least.



## RESEARCH RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS

### CHAPTER 1: LEGACY OF THE YUGOSLAV FILM POLICY



Figure 2. Six post-Yugoslav states. Screen shot from *Cinema Komunisto* (2010) by Mila Turajlic

Cinematography in Yugoslavia was continuously developing since the end of the Second World War until 1992. After 1951, soon after the clash between Tito and Stalin and Yugoslavia's decision to stay neutral towards both ideological blocs, the cinematography was decentralized. The post-war style of the Soviet-type social-realism was dismissed, production companies were expected to be more market-oriented and the state only partly supported film production costs. As a result, a number of production companies increased, the competition became tougher and the filmmakers depended on the success of their films.

*"By 1962, the Yugoslav film became part of the European cinematographic landscape. The first film schools were established, Yugoslav movies won the first awards at the International film festivals and the first two co-productions were made - one with Norway and one with Austria" (DZ)<sup>12</sup>.*

In 1974, the *policy of self-management* was inaugurated with the purpose of further decentralization of culture in Yugoslavia. "Self-managing communities were introduced and free labour exchanges facilitated closer links among cultural institutions and local economies through, for example, theatre communities, private galleries, etc." (Mikic, Dragicevic-Sestic,

<sup>12</sup> All interviewees' quotation will be sourced in the text by the interviewees' initials. A list of interviewees can be found in the "RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS" section.

Brkic 2013). "Cultural policy was delegated to the cultural communities and the provision of cultural services to independent cultural producers" (Copic, 2004).

*The 1960s and 1970s were a time when cultural professionalism and creativity were emphasized as a reflection of the country's multiethnic character. In addition, Western influences, mainly reflected in modernization, and the global openness of the country (the policy of non-alignment) brought various cultural influences. Ideological control over culture loosened, followed by political liberalization (Primorac, Svob-Dokic, Obuljen 2012).*

When it comes to film industry, such a cultural policy turned different Yugoslav towns into centers of various production forms. For example, Zagreb and Novi Sad had an important animation schools, whereas Belgrade-based "Dunav Film" produced documentaries. On the other hand, film studios like "Avala film" in Belgrade and "Jadran film" in Zagreb were made to host big international productions.

The Yugoslav Film Archive (Jugoslovenska Kinoteka) was established in 1949.

*"Former Yugoslavia imported more than 300 films annually and a copy of each imported or produced film had to be provided to the Film Archive according to the law. As a result, the Yugoslav Film Archive<sup>13</sup> today has around 100,000 film copies and is regarded as one of the most complete film collections in the world. The average Film Archive in Europe has 20,000 copies." (DZ).*

Import quotas stipulated that proportionately to the films imported from the West a number of films from Non-Aligned Movement member states, and the Eastern Bloc, and other communist countries had to be imported. "That created a diverse collection of films that today represents 134 national cinemas" (DZ).

The Association of Film Workers, inspired by the model of the then British Film Institute, in 1963 established the Institute for Film whose purpose was providing additional training for graduate filmmakers, publishing and translating literature from the field of film studies and related fields, promoting film literacy, and publishing analyses and statistical data regarding the Yugoslav film production.

*"The Ministries of Culture would launch the open calls, provide financing for production of old kinds of films and create cultural policies. From 1950s on, there were independent free-lance film workers. Unlike in Eastern European countries where film workers could only be employed in state film studios and all copyrights belonged to the state, film workers in Yugoslavia could self-organize into Independent film production companies (slobodne radne filmske zajednice) formed ad hoc for realization of one or several projects. Such production companies in advance entered into pre-sale agreements with exhibitors throughout the entire Yugoslavia who thus took part in production of the film. There were also independent distributors who would follow the news about the upcoming world hits and autonomously pre-order them for the Yugoslav cinemas." (MV).*

---

<sup>13</sup> Retained the name Yugoslav although it now officially belongs to the Republic of Serbia



By 1960 Yugoslavia had around 1300 new cinema theatres, 630 of which were in Serbia (MV, Subotic, Opacic & Damjanovic 2013). The agreements regulating the fees and rights of the director were also independently made and executed unlike Eastern Europe where it was the state who owned the works of every filmmaker. Collaboration among 6 Yugoslav republics functioned on the basis of classic co-production deals that could be seen in Europe today. A co-production arrangement between, for instance, Slovenian, Serbian, Croatian and Macedonian production companies implied that each co-producer should negotiate with the exhibitors in their own republic to pre-buy the coming films. The fees were paid off to the crew upon the completion of the film. The producers were forced to ask for money everywhere because the Ministries of Culture only partly sponsored films.

*“Slovenia was the only republic where the Ministry could finance the entire film. In Croatia it could be up to 70% of film’s budget and in Serbia up to 20%. The rest of the budget had to be provided in other Republics and from other sources” (MV).*

These co-production deals, good interactivity between different sectors of the film industry, as well as combining sources of financing and respecting diversity and freedom of expression in the multicultural Yugoslav society resembled most of the provisions of the European Convention on Cinematographic Co-production that will be created in 1994.

*“There was also the idea that without marketing and promotion of films, their production is in vain. The separate company called “Jugoslavija Film” was established for the purpose of marketing and promotion of the Yugoslav film abroad and for the export and import of films. It was also in charge of authorization of the ever-growing number of international co-production agreements” (MV)*

The policy of decentralization and institutional self-management of Yugoslav economy, along with a defined cultural policy, fostered the actions Yugoslavia undertook to make its cinematography internationally visible. Namely, the open frontiers of the country, exposure to different world cinematic styles, and market competition inspired the Yugoslav filmmakers to experiment with different aesthetical expressions, genres, and ideologies, in order to reach more audience and respond to all social and political processes. Accordingly, the wide spectrum of movies was produced.

*“From so-called “red wave” epics about the Yugoslav partisans (often ordered by the President Josip Broz Tito himself) whose purpose was to glorify the Yugoslav Communist Party and “brotherhood and unity” of all Yugoslav nations to the so-called “black wave” movies that were deeply subversive and critical of the Yugoslav socialism. Yugoslavia produced up to 30 feature films a year in the 1949-1991 period” (DZ).*

## CHAPTER 2: “CINEMA OF THE OTHER”– POST-YUGOSLAV SERBIAN FILM IN THE 1990s

*“We face a plain act of Serbian expansionism and aggression. This is no more civil war than Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia had civil wars in the 1930. This, as then in my view, is a Fascist doggerly on a march”*

Senator Joseph Biden addressing the UN in 1994

The described trend in Yugoslav film policy was abating already in the 1980s and was finally dismantled by the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991. The new independent post-Yugoslav states had much smaller territories and populations. The network of myriad self-managed local cultural communities was not sustainable anymore because new strictly national markets were too small to make the cultural product commercially viable. Therefore, successor states decreased the number of cultural institutions during the 1990s, reduced the number of cultural activities in the remaining ones and centralized them.<sup>14</sup> The new nationalistic power elites expected culture to be patriotic. Alternative stylistic and ideological forms were possible when they found their way to the market or if they were supported by an emerging NGO sector. In the following section of this chapter I will demonstrate how the film policy changed in the post-Yugoslav Serbia of the 1990s

The introductory quotation of then Senator Biden illustrates the image Serbia attained during the early 1990s in the major global media. In the international politics post-Yugoslav Serbia was demonized by evoking the two paramount traumas the Western world was decontaminating from in the second half of the twentieth century – colonization and Fascism. By presenting the Yugoslav war of the 1990s as an attempt of Serbia to colonize the rest of former Yugoslavia through the fascist-like aggression reminded the citizens in the West that the problems they had overcome still existed elsewhere. Serbian filmmakers seeking for the international recognition and financing were compelled to build their careers in such an atmosphere. They had to navigate through the pariah identity created by the Western media and the identity based on the strong nationalistic elements that the Serbian power elites fostered.

*“In the 1990s, Serbia lacked a clear cultural policy. Culture as a process in the modernization of society, as it was the case in Yugoslavia, was marginalized in favor of the concept of culture as a ‘keeper’ and promoter of national identity. Self-government was*

---

<sup>14</sup> In Bosnia and Herzegovina this process was entirely disrupted by the devastating civil war (1992-1995)

*abandoned as a system, and cultural institutions were returned to state / municipal authority that was appointing directors and controlling their activities” (Mikic, Dragicevic-Sestic, Brkic 2013).*

The financing of culture was reformed by closing down self-managing communities and introduction of municipal, regional, provincial and republic cultural funds (Mikic, 2012: 13).

The new Law on Cinematography passed in 1992 governed the film sector.

*“It defined the Institute for Film as an institution of national importance and the State entirely took over the role of its founder whereas the real founder from 1963, the Association of Film Workers, became a historical category. The Institute for film also took over the role of promotion and marketing of the films, particularly after “Jugoslavia Film” was privatized and lost its function soon afterwards. Ministry of Culture allocated all budgets, appointed directors and set up the management boards” (MV).*

The remaining traces of Yugoslav cultural policies in Serbia were based on the initiatives of certain individuals that stood out from the new system and on the fact that Serbian government, that kept presenting itself as left wing, was still ready to invest more money into culture than it was the case elsewhere in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. According to Radoslav Zelenovic, who was appointed as the director of the Yugoslav Film Archive in 1992, “culture received 3.5% of the budget annually” (DZ)<sup>15</sup>. The state therefore could invest more money into cultural campaigns<sup>16</sup> than it is the case today when “culture traditionally gets less than 1% from the state budget” (JM).

The government also took over financing of the Yugoslav Film Archive in line with the Law on Cultural Activities of General Interest from 1992, but the institution kept its autonomy. In 1995, the Yugoslav Film Archive established the international award called Golden Seal awarded to many notable authors of the time like Liv Ullmann, Theo Angelopoulos and Nikita Mikhalkov who visited Belgrade to receive it. In the same year, the European Federation of Film Archives was created and the Yugoslav Film Archive was invited to join it despite the UN-imposed cultural embargo that banned any cultural collaboration with Serbia of the time. According to Dragoslav Zelenovic,

---

<sup>15</sup> In 2013 the budget for culture was 0.64% and it was decided that cinematography would not be supported at all

<sup>16</sup> In 1994, for example, the Ministry of Culture implemented the campaign called “Lakse je sa kulturom” (Culture makes it easier) whereby it allegedly intended to fight the kitsch that began to prevail in the Serbian society of the 1990s. As a result, magazines, journals and music production that were regarded as high culture were tax-exempted (B92, 2013)

[http://www.b92.net/kultura/vesti.php?nav\\_category=1087&yyyy=2013&mm=08&dd=10&nav\\_id=741211](http://www.b92.net/kultura/vesti.php?nav_category=1087&yyyy=2013&mm=08&dd=10&nav_id=741211)  
(Retrieved August 15, 2013)

*“these activities were, although financed by the state, autonomous from the political structures in power and run by enthusiastic individuals. The international filmmakers would visit the Film Archives and leave the country without any contact with political officials” (DZ).*

When the NATO forces during its military intervention in Serbia in 1999 ransacked one of the Film Archive's depots with 90,000 boxes with film negatives and 300 million meters of the film reel, the French government, that later on financed the construction of the new depot, warned, together with the international film stars who had visited Yugoslavia, about the value of the world legacy kept there. Bernardo Bertolucci and Theo Angelopoulos<sup>17</sup> were among the first European intellectuals that in the spring 1999 publicly accused NATO of damaging one of the 5 most important film archives in the world, and at the same time questioned the entire military action and the discourse of its justification developed by the global media (DZ, paraphrased).

Although the privatization and transition to liberal economy was in fact initiated in 1990s in a peculiar way, a plenty of social companies from the period of Yugoslav self-management were not privatized in this period and were still ready to support film production, continuing the practice from the Yugoslav times. It is evident from the closing credits of the films shot in the 1990s. The state network of screens and cinema theatres inherited from Yugoslavia was still relatively functional and state owned, although faced with financial difficulties (the number of cinemas in Serbia in 1990-2000 dropped from 370 to 151) (Damjanovic, 2013).

The role of television as a co-financier of films was controversial. The Public Broadcaster “Radio-Televizija Srbije” (RTS) indeed was used as the biggest propagandistic weapon of the ruling elites. Although it was still officially financed from the subscription fees as a public service broadcaster, there are no official data about the percentage rate of charge. In reality it was mainly financed from the state budget whereby the regime in power could control it more easily. The autonomy of the TV centers in the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo & Metohija was removed and they became part of one centralized state broadcaster, which helped the government to instrumentalize the power of Television in the entire territory of Serbia. However, the Serbian TV still used the old Yugoslav practice (copied from BBC) of taking the advantage of financing the ad-hoc production groups to

---

<sup>17</sup> The content of open letters sent on April 6, 1999 can be found in library of Jugoslovenska kinoteka in Belgrade

create its programme. Among the film projects the state television supported there were also subversive anti-Milosevic films. According to Mirosljub Vuckovic, the state TV co-financed them because they were meant only for the limited circle of cinema-goers. "Although they were advertised on TV, they were never broadcast on TV where a multi million audience could see them" (MV).

The oppositional cultural groups used the inherited practice form Yugoslav self-managing communities in order to finance and produce alternative cultural content. According to the 2013 official report on Serbia's cultural policy profile to the Council of Europe, almost 50% of the opposition to Slobodan Milosevic's regime was manifested through culture (NGOs, independent publishers, etc.). "The cultural activities of the sort were spread throughout the entire country and cultural organizations also managed to gain financing from the international community" (Mikic, Dragicevic-Sesic & Brkic 2013). The resourcefulness of the local film workers also came from the fact that they had never entirely relied on the state (even during Yugoslavia, the Serbian Ministries of Culture covered maximum 20% of the production costs) and thus were more prepared to go for alternative sources of financing.

Serbian filmmakers of the period can be classified into several groups. Some filmmakers refused to collaborate with the political regime whatsoever and simply refrained from shooting. Some of them entirely switched to independent micro-budget films. A typical example was Zelimir Zilnik, already accomplished director at the time, who managed to come out with two non-budget titles - **Marble Ass** (1994) about a real-life transvestite hooker, Merlin, who "services" Serbian men, many of them soldiers of fortune and war profiteers and **Tito for the Second Time among the Serbs** (1995) that was shown at the biggest film festival in Serbia of the time FEST. Such films were highly critical of the Milosevic regime and their authors felt comfortable to criticize because they did not depend on the public funding.

A number of filmmakers decided to compromise in order to ensure proper financing for their films. They applied for the public funding (Ministry of Culture, State Television, etc.), searched for international financing and tried to attract private sponsorship. The paradigmatic case of such a film is **Premeditated Murder** (1995) by Gorcin Stojanovic. The film received financing from the Serbian Ministry of Culture, Serbian Radio Television and state-owned studio "Avala Film". It included Hungarian and Bulgarian co-producers and participation of the

Bulgarian national broadcaster. The main sponsors were one state bank and two socially owned companies. Thus, the film in the first place shows diversity of financing sources that ranged from the government subsidies to sponsorship from still unprivatized companies willing to invest in art cinema. The film story itself is the adaptation of the same named novel by Slobodan Selenic, liberal intellectual who was in strong opposition to Milosevic's regime. Much of **Premeditated Murder** is clearly anti-Milosevic (the anti-Milosevic student protests of 1992 are re-created, for instance). "Instead of plunging into simplifications, the film precisely captures the uneasy feeling of the times" (Horton 1996). Therefore, the film content demonstrates that financiers and political elites were still ready to support projects that would not only serve the most immediate propagandistic needs.

*"A number of award-winning movies about the Yugoslav war of the 1990s were already made in this period without any historical distance. The series of three films about the town of Vukovar, a border town between Croatia and Serbia that was sieged and heavily destroyed by the Yugoslav National Army in the late 1991 was shot. The series comprises of **Vukovar Poste Restante** (1994), **Say Why You Have Left Me** (1993) and **Deserter** (1992)" (RD).*

Although without any direct references to Serbia's direct involvement in the war itself, these films were strong anti-war movies that evoked the immense suffering of all Yugoslav nations and the hardships of every-day life in a way that could not be seen in mainstream Serbian state media at the time.

*The regime of Slobodan Milosevic apparently had no national film censor as expected. It was proved by the embarrassment that followed the popular success of director Srdjan Dragojevic's **The Wounds** (1998). It is the story of two under-age Belgrade criminals, set in the early 90s as the former Yugoslavia disintegrated and morals went awry. It is brutally critical of the Serbian government at the time and of President Milosevic. When it attracted 30,000 people in its first week in Belgrade, the government banned further advertising, despite state support towards the 1 million US dollar budget (Sight & Sound, 1998).*

At the initiative of enthusiastic individuals, some progressive policy moves were conceptualized. During the International Belgrade Film Festival FEST in 1996 there was an initiative to create a Balkan Film Board.

*The Yugoslav Institute for Film invited on this occasion filmmakers from Rumania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece, Slovenia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to discuss the possibilities for mediation in co-production matters and the offer of technical services, together with a better distribution network with "market potential" and cooperation among film festivals with Balkan themes (Horton 1996).*

It was the year after Theo Angelopoulos made his **Ulysses' Gaze** in collaboration with Serbia, and Emir Kusturica won Palme d'Ore at Cannes with **Underground**. Although this Board never came into fruition, it was the forerunner of the regional fund South-East

European Cinema Network established in 2000 at the initiative of the Greek Film Center, and the initiative of a regional film funds that even today, 20 years after the Yugoslav war and transition towards the EU, the post-Yugoslav politicians are not ready to implement.

### **Integration into Europe through Self-Balkanization**

A group of Serbian filmmakers managed to achieve international visibility by entering the circuit of the A film festivals, winning main awards or acquiring a citizenship of a West European country. That was a general phenomenon inherent to the entire East Europe in this period. After 1989, the public film financing collapsed and all distribution networks that had worked within the region during Socialism were dismantled. As a result, filmmakers made migrations to Western countries to get access to national funding in those countries, as well as to the pan-European funds MEDIA program of the European Union and Eurimages. Therefore, in the 1990s Eastern European filmmakers moved to the West only for the economic reasons, often reshaping their authentic East European styles in order to adapt to the Western visual styles and narratives. As for the Western countries, it was only France that offered several schemes within its national film fund CNC (Fonds ECO, Fonds Sud Cinema and Cinema du Monde) to which East- and non-Europeans could apply for funding. Apart from France, no other country established an official financing scheme. In the UK and Germany, it was matter of the good will of heads of public film funds whether they were going to support a project from Eastern Europe (Iordanova 2002).

However, while the Eastern European filmmakers were trying to renounce their Communist legacy and emphasize their belonging to Western Europe, it was the opposite case with the post-Yugoslav filmmakers. They took advantage of their newly gained image of an exotic far-away country, despite its geographical closeness to Western Europe, and the image of the “cultural other” in order to penetrate the Western market and cultural elites. At least five Yugoslav films of the time became huge arthouse hits and gained significant critical acclaim and academic coverage. The most popular was Kusturica’s **Underground** that won Golden Palm in 1995. The other four films that made a significant success are **Pretty Village**, **Pretty Flame** and **Wounds** by Srdjan Dragojevic, **Powder Keg** by Goran Paskaljevic and **White Cat**, **Black Cat** by Emir Kusturica. In the following paragraphs I will focus more on

**Underground** and **Powder Keg** because they opened collaboration between Serbia and the European film fund Eurimages and thus, in a symbolical way, commenced the cultural Europeanization of Serbia and the identity shift towards cinema of self-balkanization.



Figure 3: Closing scene of Kusturica's **Underground** (1995). A splinter of land with "crazy Balkan people" disconnects from the mainland and drifts away on its own.

The said films provided an "external look" in the West through which the Westerners could comfortably watch exotic Balkan people ("the Others") living in their semi-mythical space, and mystic reality. The exoticism is blatantly presented already in the opening scenes. **Underground** starts with the exotic gypsy music and two wild drunk Balkan men, macho womanizers ready to enter another cycle of inevitable Balkan war and pillage that comes and goes uncontrollably like a natural disaster. The famous introductory scene of Paskaljevic's **Powder Keg** starts with a club entertainer, dressed up as a drag queen, addressing the film audience with an exoticizing teaser (Figure 4).



Figure 4: "Why do you laugh? Because I'm different? Because I am a freak? Well, then welcome!"



These films either introduce the profitable prejudice of the Balkans as a land where people party, drink and shoot (as in case of Kusturica) or aggressively and sadistically kill each other (in case of Paskaljevic).

*“The black picture of Paskaljevic’s Belgrade and wildly exaggerated one-dimensional characters are produced in an attempt to shock the audience about the state of affairs in wide parts of the former Yugoslavia. However, behind an attempt to shock and give a mythical interpretation of the Yugoslav tragedy, there is no serious mention of its broader social and political context. The tragedy is presented as self-inflicted and written in the code of Serbian people who are either evil perpetrators or passive victims. Paskaljevic’s depressive and claustrophobic portray of Yugoslav tragedy certainly entertained adventure-hungry Western audience and unfortunately served to justify, in the eyes of some global media, the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia as a country of “alcoholic rapists and mass-murderers” (WSWS 2000)<sup>18</sup>.*

The question is what made the post-Yugoslav Serbian filmmakers of the 1990s internalize the Balkanisation discourse that classified Yugoslavia as a “specific subcategory of Eastern Europe - tribal, backward, primitive, barbarian” on which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the 'European' and 'the West' has been constructed (Iordanova, 1999). The most probable answer is securing financing and international acclaim. Due to the UN-imposed all-way embargo, Serbian films and directors could hardly travel to the Western festivals. Therefore, the best way, as in the case of Eastern European directors, was to secure the citizenship or residence in the West and make the films that will satisfy the Western onlookers.

While developing his idea for **Underground**, Emir Kusturica attracted the owners of two large production companies in then Europe – French CIBY 2000 and Hamburg-based Pandora. They put in place the largest portion of financing as equity investment. A tiny portion of public money the film acquired came from the regional fund in Hamburg. When the German delegate producer submitted **Underground** to Eurimages in September 1993 the co-production structure was Germany- 30%, France - 40%, Hungary – 10% and Czech Republic (Barandov Studio) – 20%. The budget was 17 million US dollars, which was more than 5 times as much as an average European budget of the time.

However, if we take a look at the Eurimages’ selection criteria of the time, the project was ineligible by several criteria. The minority Hungarian co-producer apparently could not provide the mandatory minimum of 10% of financing. The language of the film was not the

---

<sup>18</sup> <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/04/balk-a18.html> (Retrieved June 5, 2013)

language of co-producing countries while the creative team, cast and the majority of technical crew were coming from Serbia as a non-Eurimages (non-European?) country.

The most controversial part however was involvement of the financing from Serbia. Due to the UN embargo, the collaboration with the regime of Slobodan Milosevic was banned. In accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 757, all economic, cultural, technical and scientific exchanges with Yugoslavia were suspended. Thus, it was impossible to co-produce with Yugoslavia<sup>19</sup>. Nevertheless, the Board of Management of Eurimages that makes decision on which projects will be supported agreed to allow derogation to the 10% minimum participation rule to this project due to the exceptionally high global budget of the film. In addition, the Board regarded the project very favorably due to its “political relevance and well-written story” and even decided to negotiate on “more favorable reimbursement conditions of the Eurimages support” (Report 1993). They allowed a waiver to the Clause 3.3.1<sup>20</sup> of the Eurimages regulations (linguistic requirement) on the basis of the fact that “it has been obviously impossible to arrange a co-production with Yugoslavia due to the political situation” (Report, 1993).

In reality, Yugoslavia (Serbia) participated in the film financially as well. In the cost of production statement as of October 31, 1995 performed by the certified accountants Malde&co, it was shown that the Yugoslav production company Komuna participated in production with 1.445.000,00 USD and in post-production (editing) with 360,000.00 USD (Application, Underground). Since a co-owner of the Belgrade-based Komuna production company was Milorad Vucelic, the General Director of the state TV and a high-ranking member of Slobodan Milosevic’s party, it was probably him who arranged additional support on part of the Serbian state TV to the film (which is not visible in Eurimages application but only in the ending credits of the film) for the scenes shot in Belgrade (which was not indicated as a shooting location in the Eurimages application). It remained unclear how much of Serbian financing Kusturica actually secured. According to the Eurimages cost of production statement, it was around 10% of the 17 million USD budget. This financing was taken under the wing of the French co-production and the co-production agreement, accordingly,

---

<sup>19</sup> At the time Yugoslavia was composed of Serbia and Montenegro

<sup>20</sup> The Clause 3.3.1. reads as follows: “The principal language used in the film shall preferably be one of the Member States [Eurimages states] involved in the co-production”.

changed. Czech co-producer (studio Barandov) withdrew, although the majority of the film was shot in the Prague studio and the French financing increased from 40% to 60%, so the new co-production structure was France 60%, Germany 30% and Hungary 10%. The assumption can be made that the rise in French financing could be the unidentifiable illegal financing from the Serbian government that filled in the missing Czech participation. The sales and distribution rights in the territory of post-Yugoslavia were granted to Emir Kusturica himself, since probably no local distribution company was allowed to step in. The film's premiere was at the Cannes film festival in 1995. On that occasion, it was the Council of Europe, not an individual country, which presented **Underground**. Surprisingly or not, the film received the main award Palme d'Or and became the first Eurimages film that won the main award at a major film festival.

There are three factors why Eurimages would engage in supporting such a controversial project as **Underground**: 1) benevolence of the European film fund that wished to position itself above the dominant international politics by challenging the UN cultural embargo against Yugoslavia, 2) estimation that a film which confirms the image of crazy and wild Yugoslav people, already developed in the Western media, will make a huge box-office in Europe (especially France where exotic stories were particularly profitable) or 3) strong lobbying on part of the German and/or French representatives in the Eurimages' Board of Management since this promising project was mainly German-French co-production. The most probable answer would be: the mixture of all three factors, which the following paragraphs will show.

The popularity of exotic films from the Balkans with atypical narratives was huge in the mid-1990s. In Cannes, **Underground's** main rival was Theo Angelopoulos film **Ulysses' Gaze** that also partly dealt with and was shot in post-Yugoslavia. Goran Paskaljevic also won "Prix du Public" with his film **Someone Else's America**. Although the main topic of Paskaljevic's film is struggle of the Yugoslav immigrants in the US, the film, apart from the cast and screenwriter, had no Serbian element whatsoever. The film was presented as French/German/UK/Greek co-production, was shot in Greece, Bulgaria, Mexico and New York while Goran Paskaljevic was attached as a Greek resident. Both **Ulysses' Gaze** and **Someone Else's America** were Eurimages films.

Another interesting example is the case of Bosnian film **Perfect Circle** (1996) by Ademir Kenovic. The Eurimages application was submitted in November 1994 and the project was presented as French-Hungarian-Dutch co-production. The total of 25% of financing that came from Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia was put under the wing of the French co-producer. This was the first film from the war-devastated Bosnia. French delegate producer made the application while Sarajevo was still sieged by the Army of Bosnian Serbs. The film is a first-hand account of the horrors of living in besieged Sarajevo. According to the Eurimages application, the Hungarian and Dutch co-producers came along out of a sheer solidarity with the victims of the war and political necessity of realization of such a projects. Most of the members of the Board of Management agreed that the project should be supported due to “the political and human context” (Report 1994). However, the German representative to Eurimages Rolf Bahr expressed strong reservations as to the eligibility of the film during the Eurimages meeting on December 1, 1994 and arranged that the Directorate of Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe check it. Bahr expressed doubts that the project was neither a real tri-partite nor even a bilateral co-production since the French participation of more than 50% was purely financial. He considered this film as purely Bosnian (non-Eurimages) film with French financial and minimal Hungarian technical participation. The Legal Affair Directorate however approved the decision of the Management Board and **Perfect Circle** eventually received the Eurimages support, being the first film made in post-Yugoslav Bosnia. Nevertheless, the question remained why the German representative would so much insist on legal correctness of this “politically necessary film” when he had agreed about support to Kusturica’s **Underground** a year before. A possible answer is the fact that in Kusturica’s film a big German production company was involved whereas in Kenovic’s film it was not the case. Thus the German representative probably lobbied in any way possible to transfer the money to Germany-involved projects. This obvious example opens up the debate on how much lobbying of the most potent European states can influence the pan-European funds and its supposedly non-economic and supranational goals.

**Powder Keg** (1998), the above-mentioned film by Goran Paskaljevic, was supported by Eurimages after the UN embargo against Yugoslavia was eased and Milosevic’s Yugoslavia could participate as a co-producer. The action of the film takes place in Belgrade,

during the night spent waiting for the Dayton peace to be signed, to end war in Bosnia and lift the embargo against Serbia. The film introduces a series of tragedies and excessive violence in the streets of Belgrade. In his director's note of intent, submitted as part of Eurimages application, Goran Paskaljevic focuses his motivation to make this film on the fact that several films that had already been made about the bloody conflict in Yugoslavia were

*"made by non-Yugoslav directors who use the formula of a "foreigner", journalist or otherwise, who arrives in the country and gives us his outside view of the conflict. With the exception of Ademir Kenovic's **Perfect Circle**, the films made by the post-Yugoslav directors either simplify matters or only denounce the evil in the other communities, or else turn out to be really quite ambiguous"* (Application, Powder Keg)

By this statement, Paskaljevic announced that his film would be neither an external outsider's view like Angelopoulos' **Ulysses' Gaze** nor a politically controversial piece like it was the case with Kusturica's **Underground** and likes that were often labeled as covert Milosevic propaganda. His film was supposed to be unambiguously anti-Milosevic and call for the fall of his "totalitarian regime that provoked the war". He emphasized that as a Yugoslav of Serbian origin he had long felt the need to talk of "evil that lies within his own people", by recounting the "fate of ordinary people contaminated by the virus". Paskaljevic apparently intended to go a step further than other directors dealing with the Yugoslav crisis and present the situation in Yugoslavia as grim and claustrophobic, without exoticizing it. He wished to introduce the Yugoslav problem "as a conflict that due to its geopolitical nature has gone beyond its local borders and become European" (Application, Powder Keg). However, he eventually ended up in the same self-Balkanization canon, portraying the numerous characters in his film as people who cannot control their own lives and have been dragged into a crazy Balkan spiral. His tragic and freakish characters stay exotic and "the Others" through their in-born mystical (self-) destructiveness that requires no knowledge about the broader social and political context in order to be comprehended.

Another interesting point is that albeit the film is blatantly anti-Milosevic, most of the 15% of financing calculated under the Yugoslav co-producer, came from the Serbian Government. The Serbian State broadcaster, ART TV (a private Serbian television with the cultural content) and Ministry of Culture were the main financiers in Serbia together with the Ministry of Culture of FYR Macedonia (the other co-producing countries were Greece, Turkey

and France). The film was also the Yugoslav entry for the Oscar in 1998, was advertised on the state TV and run in the cinemas throughout Serbia.

## Conclusion

In this Chapter I outlined the dynamism of filmmaking in Serbia of the 1990s. Despite the utmost isolation from the rest of the world and the Yugoslav war, Serbian filmmakers had a clear agenda of building connection with Western Europe and targeting the international instead of exclusively local audience. In addition to the above described endeavors of Serbian filmmakers to be part of the European cinematic canon, in 1992, in the midst of the UN embargo, the Festival of European cinema "Palic" was started in the vicinity of the town Subotica in Northern Serbia thanks to the enthusiasm of a group of individuals. According to Radoslav Zelenovic, during 1990s "Serbia participated in production of around 70 feature films that won 50 international awards in total" (RZ). Another interesting point is that, contrary to all expectations, the smallest percentage of the produced films was blatantly propagandistic. Film theoretician Nevena Dakovic in her article "Europe Lost and Found: Serbian Cinema and EU Integration" mentions only a couple of titles like **Knife** (1998) by Miroslav Lekic and **Byzantine Blue** (1993) by Dragan Marinkovic as openly nationalistic and instrumentalising projects (2006). The conclusion is that the majority of filmmakers in the 1990s actually suggested the inevitability of Serbia's Europeanization. On the other hand, the Serbian cinema of the 1990s, no matter how financially dependent on the authoritarian regime in power, contested the nationalistic/local argument in identity building.

### **CHAPTER 3: “CINEMA OF NORMALISATION”– POST-YUGOSLAV SERBIAN FILM AFTER 2000**

*“We share a long and great history with these countries. They have a proud cultural heritage and have made major contributions to our own cultural development - including in art film sport - but also business science and technology”*

*(UK Minister for Culture 2001)*

*“The code has been changed. Welcome to the age of positive changes”*

*(Head of the Film Center Serbia, 2005)*

After the elections in September 2000, when the then notorious president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic was defeated by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia and extradited to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague, Serbia formed its first democratic government that invited economic experts of Serbian origin from all over the world to contribute to Europeanization of the country. What ensued was the fraught transition towards neoliberal market economy and the onset of EU Integration. Privatizations of all state companies (iron mills, car industry, telecommunications sector and petrol industry, among them) were fostered. State banks were liquidated. Universities went through a thorough reform in order to adapt to the Bologna Declaration. Tax system was revised.

The upsides of this process in the first couple of post-2000 years were that Serbia was re-admitted to the UN, the embargo was entirely lifted after almost a decade, Parisian Club wrote off the old Serbia's debt, donations from Western countries ensued, war criminals started being prosecuted and harmonization with European Union's *acquis communitarie* (EU legislation) was initiated together with the reform of judicial system. Serbia also was allowed to take loans from World Bank and IMF. All these actions were accompanied by an immense enthusiasm of Serbian citizens for an economic recovery after almost a decade of living in war-like ambience and total isolation from all global economic and cultural trends of the time.

Finally, EU-Western Balkan Summit was organized in 2003 in Thessaloniki when a firm commitment was made to the countries of the region that 'the future of the Balkans is within the European Union'. Around the same time, the city of Thessaloniki also hosted the conference titled the Future of Cinema and the Audiovisual Sector Within the Framework of European Union Enlargement. On this occasion, the European Audiovisual Observatory

published a report on distribution of films from eight Central and Eastern European countries (that were about to join the European Union in a less than a year<sup>21</sup>) on the EU market. The report showed a paradox that despite successful EU integration of the eight post-Socialist states in the period 1996-2003, only 49 films from this region were distributed in the old 15 EU countries which represents 0.9% of the new films distributed in the EU in this period and only 0.05% of the market share in terms of admissions (European Audiovisual Observatory 2003). The saddest paradox was that the more these East European countries aligned its audio-visual policies with the *acquis*, the less visible on the Western market their audiovisual products were.

The overall societal changes after the year 2000 immediately influenced film culture in Serbia as well. The 'cinema of self-Balkanization', as discussed in the previous Chapter, was dismissed. The only Serbian film that was supported by Eurimages in the period between the democratic changes and 2005 when Serbia became officially a Eurimages member was **Falling into Paradise** (2004) by Milos Radovic (German/Dutch/French/Serbian co-production). Content-wise, this film opened up the normalization wave in Serbian cinema by normalizing the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. The film is a love story with many comical relieves between a Serbian girl and young American NATO pilot who ends up on the roof of the girl's house in Belgrade after his airplane crashes. She saves his life and helps him escape Serbia eventually, while he assists her family in an attempt to assassinate Serbia's president Slobodan Milosevic. The film however fails to provide any broader social and political context. Bombed Belgrade reminisces rather a fictionalized scenography in which a love story should evolve more entertainingly. The only bad guy in the film is Slobodan Milosevic who will be toppled now a NATO pilot helps out the normalized Serbs.

Speaking about new film policy, as early as 2001 Emir Kusturica himself met the new Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in order to discuss how to establish the film subsidy structure that will be harmonized with the prevalent European system and enable easier access to the European film funds. Round the same time, the first negotiations about the privatization of the "Avala" film studio took place with the idea to help it attract and service big co-productions as in the heydays of Yugoslav film industry. The first action in this regard was

---

<sup>21</sup> Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania



an attempt to merge “Avala” film studio with the Luxemburg’s company “Stadlux investment” (“Avala Film” - resenje ili propadanje, 2011). At the same time, the diversity of genre and number of films increased due to the liberalization of the market. Namely, local filmmakers opened up towards European countries, co-productions became more common and the Eurimages and some other European funds became accessible to young Serbian filmmakers as well, not only the established ones as it was the case in the 1990s. As a result, Serbia became able to produce 10 to 20 films a year in a short period of time.

## **The Idea of Eurimages**

In this Chapter I mainly deal with the Serbian films supported by Eurimages fund in the first 8 years of Serbia’s membership (2005-2013). The selected films, put in the cultural policy context, will be treated as the paradigmatic case study of Europeanization of Serbian cinema. Before I delve into the analysis of the films, I will present first the general findings and conclusions derived from my two-month stay at the Eurimages Secretariat in Strasbourg (March-June, 2013) and the interviews conducted with the members of the Secretariat.

### ***The Main objective of Eurimages***

The Resolution 88 (15) of the Council of Europe, describing the original aims of Eurimages, says that the main objective of the fund is to

*“... foster the co-production and distribution of creative cinematographic and audiovisual works in order to take advantage of the new communications techniques and to meet the cultural and economic challenges arising from their development”.*

Eurimages has had the same objective since its establishment in 1988 and it is complementary with the majority of national selective film funds.

*“The main objective is to promote the idea and logic of European co-production that does not connect only producers from the same region but from across Europe” (AS).*

In reality it simply boils down to helping producers make those films that the industry and market alone would not be able to finance because they are too controversial, or they are niche films, or they describe a point of view that is not the mainstream.

*“Eurimages is there to help producers take risks. We also finance films that have international added value, as compared to the national ones. We are doing it by trying to fit into the reality of film industry and communicating with televisions and film funds” (RO).*

The increasing number of producers applies to Eurimages every year. The main reason is that the money it offers to producers needs to be reimbursed only on the net receipts, which makes Eurimages support practically a grant.

*“If producers go to a bank for the same amount of money, they pay high interest rates and if they go to a television or increase the number of co-producers, they risk to lose rights of the film. Eurimages support frees them from high interest rates and allow them keep the rights” (IC)*

### ***Eurimages Policies***

Eurimages has no official influence whatsoever in shaping European film policies. Its economic impact is practically non-existent. The annual budget of the fund is around 22 million Euros, which makes the fund marginal in comparison to the budgets of MEDIA programme of the European Union and the public funds in rich European countries. Eurimages provides only top-financing, which means that its support is not essential for the project but rather supplementary (it is less than 15% of a film’s global budget and comes only as the last financing).

*“We are not a policy maker. We can discuss the trends and problems in the national film sectors, but we cannot influence the governments. We cannot even say to governments what kind of member states’ representatives we need for the Board of Management” (RO).*

*“During the plenary meetings, members of the Management Board and Secretariat discuss the problems in individual countries and the problems on the supranational level (cultural exception close, gender equality issues, etc.), but only in order to understand what is happening, not to intervene” (AS).*

The internal policies are broadly discussed during annual policy meetings. Currently the most debated issue is how to ensure more transparency and responsibility in decision-making. In the past, the decisions would be made on plenary sessions when the Board of Management (consisting of one representative from each Eurimages member state appointed by their respective Governments) would engage only in general discussions about the submitted project before making final decisions.

*“We introduced small co-production working groups (CPWG) in 2005. It replaced the plenary sessions during which there was never time to go into in-depth analyses of scripts before the final decisions are made. The decisions used to be made on the basis of the financial set-up and geopolitics. Everything depended on the rhetorical and lobbying skills of the country representatives. CPWG is a smaller group (8-10 Board of Management members) whose members are now obliged to read scripts and have a comprehensive discussion about projects before they present them to the Board of Management” (RO).*

In addition, in 2011 the policy of engaging external script-readers was introduced whereby two script-writing experts evaluate each eligible script. The Eurimages Secretariat,

based in the Eurimages offices within the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, provides those script evaluations together with thorough analyses of the financial and production set-up of eligible projects to the Board of Management so that its members can make decisions focusing primarily on scripts and its artistic potential.

*“Therefore, due to the recent changes, during the Board of Management meetings the focus moved from the production element and financing to the artistic and creative content, which has provoked some criticism against us” (RO).*

The major rules for producers are based on the fact that Eurimages is a top-financing fund, which means that a project must have at least 50% of financing confirmed in each co-producing country before producers apply. The financing set up of a project should include either a public fund, or Minima Guarantee by distributors and sales agents, or Television investment. In addition, projects must demonstrate the circulation potential outside the co-producing countries.

Eurimages has no editorial policy. A general and unofficial definition of a Eurimages film can be “a quality oriented film, whatever you want to define as quality, with certain degree of originality, and the film that producers have hard time to finance entirely on the market” (RO). Quality in Eurimages is most often confirmed by already existing support from the national or regional public funds in Europe.

*“Public financing is essential because most of the Board of Management members are also sitting in the national selection committees, so they prefer projects that they and their Board colleagues have already supported” (AS).*

Finally, the Board of Management is not very happy to see commercial projects that can be easily financed on the market or films that are pure financial co-productions without any artistic and technical collaboration between co-producing states.

### ***Eurimages and European Identity***

Eurimages was created in 1988 when the idea of building the common European emerged.

*“Since Europe was not created as a political entity, and its unification went through economic integration, there was a need to create more intellectual glue and that was supposed to happen through the audiovisual sector. Thus, the first interventions to the European audiovisual sector were made on the economic ground because there was a legal basis only for that, and behind that was this idea to create common European identity” (RO)*

However, the EU never succeeded in setting-up the fund that would support (co-) production of European films. The EU's only audiovisual programme MEDIA has been focused mostly on distribution, promotion and development of European films, that is,

companies that primarily contribute to European economy.

*“The topic of European identity was immediately dropped already in the 1980s. Today it is never mentioned in any EU official document (published by the European Commission). You can find it only in the European Parliament, mentioned by politicians” (RO).*

That explains why Eurimages, the only fund that supports the content-related segment of the film value chain – production, and not for economic but cultural and political reasons, exists outside the EU, within the Council of Europe. The idea of promoting the European identity through Eurimages apparently existed in the moment of the funds’ inception, but it was never achieved, so today it focuses on supporting diverse European films and how to boost their circulation across Europe.

*“The Europeanness of projects is not measured by the ‘European content’ of scripts but by the level of collaboration between the European partners (artistic, technical and financial cooperation)” (IC).*

According to Roberto Olla, Eurimages has no agenda in terms of its ideology and identity whatsoever, because the members of the Management Board sitting around the table and deciding are changing systematically.

*“Eurimages is simply the forum of different sensitivities about cinema. People sit and discuss, and the outcomes will depend solely on the sensibility of people that are discussing the projects that particular day. No general conclusion on what kind of identity Eurimages wishes to promote is possible. European identity agenda would annihilate the current diversity agenda. The diversity does not call for unity but accepting what already exists. The EU measures are taken to support that idea” (RO).*

On the other hand, Eurimages films do share recognizable visual style, ideology and philosophy. The Eurimages touch can be discerned in the narrative of most of its films, particularly the ones from smaller European countries. However, the question is whether those commonalities can reminisce of a unifying European cinema.

*“Eurimages films rather target the group of people with shared social and cultural background (educated people, liberal, left-wing intellectuals) across European countries. The Board of Management supports films that satisfy the taste and communicate with that particular class. Producers, on the other hand, play along with that when they are packaging their projects for Eurimages. To foster a common European identity, we need a fund that will make artists across Europe collaborate already in the development phase. Only in that case we can start sharing the same stories and create pan-European cinema. At the moment we are sharing in Europe only commercial movies and blockbusters. The smaller films remain within national or regional boundaries. An increase of public funding and a wider transnational collaboration at all stages can improve the situation (AS).*

### ***The main Challenges of Eurimages***

The art-commerce dichotomy of the European cinema necessarily puts challenges in front of Eurimages as well due to its intention is to synchronize with the reality of the European and global film industry.

*“At Eurimages we need more commercial films. They will increase the visibility of the fund and ensure higher reimbursements that we can then invest in arthouse films. With arthouse films we are visible only on festivals while the recupment rate is close to zero. We supported **Asterix** for example and it was released in many countries and reimbursed well”.* (IC)

The Board of management makes difference between financial co-productions and commercial films. Financial co-productions are usually well-received by the Board of Management if the artistic value is evident despite the lack of artistic and technical collaboration between co-producing countries. The Board is open to financial co-productions because the film industries of some big European countries are based on the long tradition of bilateral financial co-productions governed by the inter-state bilateral co-production treaties. Almost all co-productions between Italy and France are very often financial and there is no need for artistic and technical collaboration since such films traverse the Italian-French border easily.

*“In Spain, for example, there is a strong tradition of genre film, but that does not mean that all Spanish films are commercial. We will support genre films as well but only if they are anyhow original. When you read the script you can see if there is an auteur approach to the genre, and if the director wants to break the rules of the genre and bring something innovative. Without such interventions on part of the filmmakers, the Board of Management would never support such projects”* (RO).

Another challenge Eurimages is facing is the globalization of co-productions. This trend has made Eurimages consider opening up to non-European countries.

*“Eurimages has been approached thus far by Canada and Israel that wish to join. We formed the working group on third countries and there is an internal discussion at the moment. It is on the agenda although the current policy framework does not allow non-European members”* (AS).

In 2012, Eurimages was invited to Dubai by the Dubai International Film Festival to hold one of the four Board of Management annual meetings there during the festival.

*“They wanted to learn about the content we are dealing with because they were considering the option to establish a similar fund in the Middle-Eastern region. We organized there a workshop with the producers from Arabic countries. However, It was fascinating to see how their film industry is Europeanized and how the DIFI’s market was swarming with the European producers”.* (IC).

However, the internal discussion within Eurimages prior to the Dubai meeting was marked by protest of certain members of the Board of Management who complained that the

United Arab Emirates are far beyond Europe's cultural space and that the country exercises gross discrimination against women. Some country representatives eventually refused to attend the Dubai meeting.<sup>22</sup>

Improving transparency of the decision-making process is another challenge. Member states still have a very strong impact and their representatives in the Board of Management are not willing to give up their power whatsoever. They are torn between representing Eurimages values and the pressure from their governments to lobby for projects that involve their country. As a result, Eurimages introduced the rule in 2012 that the co-producing countries' representatives are not anymore allowed to vote for the projects they are presenting, in order to avoid conflict of interest.

*"Also, the identity of some representatives does not fit 100% with what we are doing. Some of them are too administrative; some of them are political people, etc. I think that we should have independent experts from cinema sector both on the creative side and industry side, doing the expertise, and the Board of Management only giving the direction to the fund. Board members could act as a share-holding committee and have a say in the management of the fund in so far as their governments are paying contributions"* (RO).

In November 2013, the Consulting Group Olsberg•SPI published their evaluation of the Eurimages fund. In order to keep the Eurimages more up to date with the trends of European film industry, they recommended that on the basis of the commonality between the programs of Eurimages and Creative Europe (MEDIA Programme), a representative of Creative Europe be invited to Board of Management's meetings. Furthermore, the Board was recommended to undertake regular external evaluation, which "would reflect the breadth of change currently being seen in the European film sector, and the value in allowing the Fund to reflect on its achievements" (Evaluation 2013)<sup>23</sup>. In their evaluation of the Revision of European Convention on International Co-production, performed a year before, Olsberg•SPI also recommended that extra points are allocated to projects that have a successful European producer attached (Evaluation 2012). Linking the Eurimages fund to the EU's audiovisual fund MEDIA and inviting external experts from the European film industry to take over some duties from the Eurimages Board of Management creates the impression that Eurimages may shift its internal policy towards the idea of supporting economically strong

---

<sup>22</sup> The author of this master thesis was present at the Plenary session in Copenhagen in June 2012 when the debate took place.

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/eurimages/Source/EurimagesEvaluationFinalREVISEDReport\\_%2013012014\\_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/eurimages/Source/EurimagesEvaluationFinalREVISEDReport_%2013012014_en.pdf) (Retrieved, January 25, 2014)

European producers at the expense of the idea of cultural diversity and democracy as the main objectives of its founder the Council of Europe.

The Eurimages' challenge that is most tightly linked to the topic of this Master thesis is the economic crisis that led into decrease and restructuring of subsidy structures across Europe. Not only did it hit the filmmakers in the crisis-stricken countries but it increased division between rich and poor European countries and impaired the principle of solidarity between them, which started being reflected in Eurimages as well.

*"We cannot influence the governments' policies but we have impact in a sense that if there is no public support provided by national governments, there will be no project at Eurimages as a consequence. Producers will be blocked because they won't be able to get the funding necessary to approach Eurimages" (RO).*

Therefore, less projects at Eurimages in long-run can influence a national government in two ways. It will either withdraw from the fund because it does not pay off to make financial contribution any more or, to the contrary, become aware of how important the public money for international visibility of local films is. Be as it may, without participation of smaller and poorer countries, Eurimages can, in the long run, turn into a fund for projects from those European countries that can still provide necessary public support prior to applying to Eurimages.

This challenge poses a question whether the Eurimages fund will make sense in the future if its member states loose public support while the fund itself is not allowed to make any interventions in that regard. At Eurimages' request, in 2012 the evaluation on revision of the European Convention on Cinematographic Co-Production was performed for the purpose of adapting this paramount instrument for European co-production to the changing reality in the European film industry. One of the recommendations set in the study is that minimum participation of minority co-producers should be decreased from 10% to 5% of financing so that more participation of poorer countries can be encouraged (Evaluation 2012). The results of this initiative will be known by the end of 2015.

### **The role of Eurimages in Europeanization of Serbian Cinema**

Serbia officially joined Eurimages on January 1, 2005. The preparatory process caused the first Europeanizing policy changes in the Serbian film sector. Serbia signed the Transfrontier

Television Directive and ratified the European Convention on Cinematographic Co-production. Preparations for the new Law on Cinematography were initiated in order to replace the outdated Law from 1991 and bring Serbian cinematography closer to the new reality of European film industry. Institute for Film proposed in 2001 that the Associations of producers, directors, actors, distributors and exhibitors delegate two representatives each to a task force that will draft the new law. The Ministry of Culture, Yugoslav Film Archives and independent lawyers provided the support as well.

*“We asked all parties involved in the film industry from the experienced to emerging directors and producers to share with us all their knowledge. Also, we asked partner institution from across Europe to provide us with their Film Acts. We consulted Finnish, Dutch, Croatian, Romanian, German, Austrian, etc. legislation and guidelines. There was also the idea to redesign the technical base we had in the “Avala” film studio.” (MV).*

In 2004 the initiative to establish the Film Center Serbia was created. The Ministry of Culture decided to close down the Institute for Film founded in 1963. Film Center Serbia (FCS) was modeled after the national film institutes throughout the EU as an autonomous public funding body in charge of cinematography. The first appointed director of the Film Center in 2005 announced that the main objective of the Center would be revitalization of Serbian cinematography and creating environment for co-productions with leading production companies from Europe and the US. Accordingly, in 2005, the Ministry of Finance allocated 3.5 million Euros for Cinematography, which was significantly higher amount in comparison to previous years. Film Center launched the first open calls for film production and script development. The city of Belgrade also set up its Fund for Cinematography within the city Secretariat of Culture that will later become member of the Cine Regio, the network of European regional film funds tightly linked to the European Commission. At the Cannes film festival in 2005, the FCS for the first time presented Serbian cinema under the slogan “Rediscover Serbia”. At the same time, the spotlight of Eurimages at the Cannes 2005 was on new post-Yugoslav member states (Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and FYROM). In the early 2006, the most prominent film festival in Serbia FEST that traditionally was an audience festival introduced “B2B Belgrade Industry Meetings”. B2B (Business-to-Belgrade) become a gathering place for directors, producers, financiers, exhibitors, distributors, representatives of ministries of culture and film centers from non-EU European countries<sup>24</sup>,

---

<sup>24</sup> A special festival competition section “Europe out of Europe” was introduced the same year.



together with representatives of film funds and production companies from Western Europe. This industry event stimulated the Europeanization of local film production for the purpose of easier access of the local filmmakers to the sources of financing in Western Europe.

In parallel with this process of opening up towards the EU film industry, the remaining technological base that was created before the collapse of Yugoslavia was dilapidating (Figure 5, 6 and 7). All plans for privatization or redesigning of the “Avala” film studio fell through and its technological base and laboratory was devastated. The number of cinema theatres was dropping down the climax of which was reached in 2007 after the privatization of the company “Beograd film” that caused closure of 17 Belgrade cinemas once belonging to this state company.

*“The film archives of the Autonomous province of Vojvodina lost the financing and its valuable old film reels ended up in the rubbish bin after which we managed to transport some of them to the Yugoslav film archives’ depots in Belgrade” (RZ).*

On the other hand, the Law on Cinematography was still pending (it will be passed only in December 2011), which enabled a number of individuals to monopolize the entire film sector and fragmentize rather than unify the film workers. At the same time, after the removal of the Institute of film, once thriving publishing, training and film literacy activities were significantly reduced. The ambitiously designed co-production market B2B stopped in 2009 because the state lacked the financial sources to support it further.

It seems that in the intentions to Europeanize the film sector as fast as possible, the Serbian film professionals focused rather on cosmetic changes with short-term effects while any serious film policy strategy and taking advantage of the authentic Yugoslav legacy remained an absence.

*“I feel free to say that setting-up of a unifying Film Center Serbia was made with good intentions but the result seems to have been very impracticable. Metaphorically speaking, the Film Center Serbia was built from the 17<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> floor whereas the fundamentals and elementary starting points failed to be defined” (MV).*



Figure 5: TV studios of the Radio-Television Serbia in Novi Sad and Belgrade destroyed by NATO in 1999



Figure 6: Creative reactions to the closures of 17 Belgrade cinema theatres - "No screening today, come yesterday" and "In memoriam of the *Balkan* cinema theatre and all other victims of the privatization of Beograd Film"



Figure 7: "Avala" film studio's corridor lit by hand lantern after the government cut off the electric power (screen shot from **Cinema Komunisto** (2010) by Mila Turajlic

### ***First Two Years in Eurimages***

Despite the newly emerged situation, the first years in Eurimages were surprisingly successful. During its first year of membership - 2005, Serbia was involved in 8 projects with different co-production set-ups. Three out of four Serbian directors attached to the project with Serbian majority co-producer were first-time and second-time filmmakers little or not known in the West. Serbian co-production partners were mainly from Germany and Bulgaria, but also France, Austria and Hungary. Serbia was also announced as a minority co-producer in the ambitious commercial project **Marlow** by Roland Joffe (Italian/UK/Serbian co-production). Also, the first post-war collaboration among all six Yugoslav countries happened

in 2005 after all new countries joined Eurimages. It was **Border Post** (HR/SI/BA) by Croatian director Rajko Grlic. As a natural co-production, the film involved public financing and cast&crew from Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia, was shot in Macedonia and post-produced in Slovenia. The film story symbolically relates to the last days of Yugoslavia and its national army that was still composed of soldiers from all Yugoslav republics. The film was successfully released in all six post-Yugoslav countries.

The three supported Serbian majority co-productions fit into to the normalization discourse in three different ways. **Guca!** (DE/RS/BG/AT) by Dusan Milic is a story about a forbidden love between a black Roma boy and the white girl from a conservative xenophobic Serbian family, and is taking place during the biggest trumpet festival in the world in the village of Guca. Throughout the film, the Balkans is most of the time described in a stereotypical way as yet undiscovered and stereotypical part of Europe inherent to Emir Kusturica's popular self-Balkanisation films from the 1990s. Serbia is presented alternately as "heart of darkness" and "Arcadia". The Eurimages' Board of Management praised the project because it was indeed supported by Kustrurica and introduced authentic Balkan Gypsy jazz. However, behind this recognizable self-balkanization scenography there is a new message. The film avoids any of those typical tragic and ambiguous endings that only confirmed the unavoidability of permanent state of conflict in the Balkan area. To the contrary, by the end of **Guca!**, the forbidden love between a black boy and white girl is accepted, Serbian nationalists compromise and a natural order is finally established. The harmony is presented through recognizing diversity, respecting human rights and conflict resolution - all those values that Serbia was required to transfer while following its EU integration path.



**Figure 8.** Love between a Gypsy boy and white girl celebrated under the Serbian flag in **Guca!**.

The second supported film was **Phantom** (RS/FR/BG) by the young first-time director Jovan Todorovic. This film demonstrates normality through showing the “absurdity of the communist regime” in Yugoslavia, just as it could be seen in myriad East European films across after 1989. It uses the authentic archive film materials, photographs from 1979, and interviews to “portray the surreal ambience that people [in Socialist Yugoslavia] immersed their lives into” (Application, Phantom). The main hero of the film emerges in such a setting only to stand up to the “degenerate” socio-political circumstances nourished by a socialist regime that is now finally over.

The third Serbia-led film supported in the first year of Serbia’s membership in Eurimages **The Trap** (RS/DE/HU) by Srdan Golubovic has probably been the most internationally visible Serbian film since 2000. Golubovic most radically breaks all self-Balkanisations conventions and “revisits the essential principles of European classic narrative style, applying a type of active problem-solving hero who is capable of transformation in a new transitional society” (Pavicic 2010). The main protagonist Mladen is a Dardennean character who finds out that his nine year old son is seriously ill and that only the expensive operation in Germany that he cannot afford can save him. Mladen is soon faced with the dilemma whether to kill a man for the amount of money necessary for his son’s operation or let his son die. He reminds of protagonists in mainstream European art films pressurized by similar dilemmas typical of life in liberal capitalism. Such films intensively stitch-up the spectators into the micro-world of the main film hero with whose plight they strongly identify but together with him fail to discern and alienate from the essential social and economic disorders of liberal capitalism. Therefore, **The Trap** is a film that contains the most appealing combination for the European film financiers on all levels. It has an entertaining narrative drive and energy of the American cinema and the visual subtlety and sophistication of the traditional European cinema (Putnam 1997),

**The Trap** was premiered at the Berlinale film festival and short-listed among nine nominees for Oscar for the best foreign film. One US studio bought the rights to do its re-make. At the same time, in Serbia it was accepted with standing ovations from both politicians and cultural elites of the time that saw in this film the birth of a new Serbian cinema that will become integral part of the European arthouse canon.



Figure 9: **The Trap**. The image of Belgrade suburbs that does not defer from any working class suburban landscape in the films from the European arthouse canon.

The year 2006 was even more successful in terms of Eurimages results. Serbia was involved in nine projects, six of which were supported. It is interesting to note that three first-time filmmakers were supported while Kusturica's project **Promise Me This** that will compete in Cannes 2007 was rejected. In comparison to the majority of other European countries, Serbia scored surprisingly well. On the other hand, almost none of the supported films will achieve a significant festival success or high box-office result in the years to come. Therefore, it creates a doubt that Serbian projects could be positively discriminated at the time.

*"Eurimages simply reflects trends in cinema. Yugoslav projects have been successful because there was a horrible war over there. It has triggered so many stories that touch everybody's soul and heart and create empathy. On the other hand, there is a general interest from Europe in that part of the world. Think of the Sarajevo Film Festival. It was created and developed into one of the most important industry-oriented festivals in the world thanks to the interest from the rest of Europe. Sarajevo now overshadowed the Thessaloniki Film Festival that has longer tradition of the biggest Balkan Festival"* (RO).

In May 2006, Belgrade hosted one of five annual Eurimages meetings. It was the anniversary 100<sup>th</sup> Eurimages meeting and the final plenary session was symbolically held on May 9<sup>th</sup> – the Europe day. Then Ministry of Culture of Serbia opened the meeting greeting his special guests - his counterparts from other post-Yugoslav countries. Referring to Serbia's accession to Eurimages a year earlier, he said the move had enabled Serbia to get involved in European affairs at an early stage of its EU integration, and was particularly welcome as it would be another 10 years before they could join the European Union. He emphasized that thanks to new Europeanized public funding structure, 26 films had been financed in 2005 in Serbia. The Minister hoped that Serbia would make a substantial contribution to the European film industry in the period up to 2010 and welcomed the setting up of the Serbian Film Centre,

which was expected spur the development of the film industry in the future. He announced new rules on co-production that were being drawn up to facilitate partnerships (Report 2006).

In 2006, Serbia also was involved in two high budget films of 8 million euro each. The first one was the abovementioned Kusturica's **Promise Me This** (RS/FR). The second project was **Monza-Scelta Speciale** (IT/RS/CY) by the Italian director Luigi Perelli where Serbian co-producer "Commora System" announced 40% of purely financial contribution. Although this film apparently has never been made and the Eurimages Board of Management rejected it as the purely commercial film, it demonstrates the intentions on part of Serbian film sector to catch up with rising budgets in Europe and become a relevant film industry not only an auteur cinematography.

In the same year, four prominent production companies YODY, ZILLION, MASLACAK and DELIRIUM merged in order to found a company "Saint George kills the Dragon" and secure the sources to make the same named film by accomplished director Srdjan Dragojevic that budget-wise and technology-wise will be complementary with the West European film industry. The goals of this merger epitomize the two dominant cultural discourses in Serbia of the time. The first goal was to make the most expensive Serbian film ever and demonstrate that Serbia is able to catch up with European and global film industry. The second goal was to

*"film the most important cultural and national project in the past decades. The four joined companies had made films that accounted for more than 90% of the total number of domestic films viewers and more than 80% of all the awards at film festivals. The intention of the four major producers was to set up a company that will make a significant contribution to restoring Serbian cinematography's leading position it held during past decades in South-Eastern Europe"* (Application, St. George).

**Saint George Kills a Dragon** (RS/BA/BG) is a period film dealing with the First World War – a topic that, according to Dragojevic "was completely blocked for depicting in literature and film during the half-century of Communist rule in Yugoslavia" (Application, St. George). It was supposed to be a "vivisection of the character and mentality of the Serbian nation" (Application, St. George). To secure 4.5 million euro budget (66% percent of which was secured in Serbia and 24% in the Republic of Srpska – Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Coeurimages database, 2013), Dragojevic applied two identity discourses. At home, in front of the Serbian government at the time led by the right-wing Democratic Party of Serbia, the film was presented as a grand national epic that would remind about the

neglected pre-Yugoslav glorious past of Serbia and “the only war victory in the past one hundred years when country lost almost half of its population” (Application, St. George). The film received 1.7 million euros from the Serbian Ministry of Culture and additional 200.000 Euros from the state TV which is an unprecedented support a single film in Serbia has ever been granted. The project was supported by additional 750.000 euros by the Ministry of Culture of Republic of Srpska (Serbian entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Coeurimages Database, 2013). The other film-selling discourse, that was more suitable for Eurimages, emphasized that the story was banned by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in the late 1990s and that the intention of the film is to stress how after 100 years of “living in the darkness”, Serbia should wake up and be ready to “learn the lesson and redirect the energy of the nation towards creation and invention” (Application, St. George).

The film eventually was a market failure. It did not perform as expected either in Serbia or internationally. It stirred a lot of controversies and debates in Serbia, from the accusation that it falsified history to claims that instead to reflect the standards of the West European film industry, it only conveyed reality of the impotent Serbian cinematography (Politika 2009)<sup>25</sup>.

### ***Cinema of Catharsis***

Another wave of Serbian films supported by Eurimages appeared in the period when Serbian filmmakers started questioning country’s role in the Yugoslav wars of the 90s. It correlated with the installment of the new government in 2008 led by the pro-European Democratic Party whose main slogan was “Europe Has No Alternative”. The normalization discourse of this period implied the readiness of Serbian state to face Serbia’s responsibilities for the wars throughout ex-Yugoslavia, to de-tabooize the topics that were an absence in the previous decades and therefore demonstrate that Serbia is a European democracy ready to face its burdensome past, go through catharsis and continue its EU integration path. The major indictees for war criminals were extradited to the Hague Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. The resolution on war crimes committed by the Serbian state during the Yugoslav war was passed in the Serbian Parliament in 2011. All these actions on part of the Serbian governments were

---

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Kultumi-dodatak/SHta-se-desilo-sa-Azdahom.lt.html> (Retrieved, June 25, 2013)

done under a huge pressure from the EU that threatened to suspend Serbia's EU integration otherwise.

The Eurimages supported Serbian films from this period rather create an impression of political activism than art. Their topics are too local and very often not recognized globally, which is demonstrated by poor results in the major film festivals and low circulation potential. They were packaged and conceptualized to conform to curation principles of the European financiers (both Eurimages and rich countries like Germany or France whose financial support has been substantial for the post-Yugoslav producers, but apparently conditioned by political relevancy and engagement of the projects).

*“Financing arrangements and donations that are entirely autonomous from market turn into an instrument of political and ideological indoctrination and propagating the mainstream topics like human rights, national minorities, LGBT rights, political revolt, etc. If we take a look at the films realized in the past period, they are low-quality and uncreative productions about the local war stories and controversial issues of the local political and ideological past.” (HM)*

Film **Besa** (RS/SI/HU/FR) by Srdjan Karanovic supported by Eurimages in 2008 is set in the multi-ethnic Kingdom of Serbia at the outbreak of the First World War. The film itself presents the ultimate reversal of stereotypical images of nations that after the war inaugurated the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The story is about a taciturn Albanian peasant Azim who saves the Slovenian teacher Eva from a raging crowd of Serbian peasants who identify her with their mortal enemy, Austro-Hungarian Empire. The character of Azim for the first time evokes the idea that defies the predominant pariah discourse of the Serbian modern historiography when it comes to the conflict between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. The film rather reiterates what the critical historian Dubravka Stojanovic defines as “history of the present”, implying connection that exists between past and problematic present (2010). According to **Besa**, conflict and mistrust of Albanians towards the Serbian state stem from a simple fact that Serbian authorities have never given Albanians the chance to integrate into the Serbian society whatsoever but kept treating them as pariahs instead. The average Serbian people of the pre-World War time are de-victimized in this film and depicted as a xenophobic and uneducated mass from which only random individuals stand out. Eva however is portrayed as well-educated, liberal and emancipated woman, a civilizer from Western Europe, who through her friendly treatment of Azim and his family point out to all burdensome setbacks of Serbian pre-modern mentality. Film spectators are left with the



impression of how impactful that backward mentality is even in the present day Serbia, considering the fact that Kosovo is still the main manipulation instrument in hands of the Serbian elites in power.



Figure 10: **Besa** by Srdjan Karanovic. Slovenian women and Serbian Albanian hiding in a village school

The film **Ordinary People** (FR/RS/CH) by Vladimir Perisic was the first film that openly spoke about the atrocities committed by Serbs during the Yugoslav war of the 1990s, presenting them not as individual savagery, but as state-organized crime. The director decided to make this film after he went through the Court files from the Yugoslav War Crime Tribunal in The Hague and read about mass murders of Bosnian Muslims in the town of Srebrenica.

*“The Serbian state and propaganda of the 1990s organized collective ignorance about the horror of the crimes committed by the Serbian army. Because the state carried out executions, it wrapped them in mystery and silence and erased all evidence.”* (Application, Ordinary People).

The film emphasizes that war criminals were not only sporadic monster-like figures but in many cases ordinary men who chose to submit to the State and obey orders to commit barbaric acts. The film re-creates one mass execution represented through blocks of time filmed in real time, with the intention to show a “gradual disappearance of humanity in a man, and how the whole event is duly organized” (Application, Ordinary People). **Ordinary People** won the main prize “Heart of Sarajevo” at the Sarajevo Film Festival in 2009. It was a

symbolic political action to award a Serbian film with cathartic intentions in the city that was three and a half years under the siege of the Serbian army during the war in Bosnia.

The other two political films that dealt with responsibility of the Serbian State for the war crimes in Bosnia are **Circles** (RS/HR/SI/GE/FR) by Srdan Golubovic (supported in 2010) and **The Tour** (RS/BA) by Goran Markovic (supported in 2008). The Serbian films of catharsis supported by Eurimages were part of the broader corpus of films with the same political thesis on origins and consequences of the war in Yugoslavia. Some of them were made by the Bosnian directors like Jasmila Zbanic (Golden Bear prize for **Grbavica** in 2006) and Aida Begic. However, a number of the films belonging to this canon come from Western Europe. German film **Storm** by Hans-Christian Schmidt speaks about the mass rapes perpetrated by the Serbian soldiers in Bosnia but from the perspective of a prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Some Eurimages films by West European directors used the atrocities committed in Bosnia as a scenography and background for the issues that exist in their own countries like forced deportations of refugees from Europe in **War Child** by German director Christian Wagner and global women's rights in **As If I Am Not There** by the Irish director Juanita Wilson.

### ***Virtual Yugoslavia***

The last group of Serbia-led Eurimages films I will analyze in this thesis I creatively designate as "Virtual Yugoslavia project" since apart from Eurimages top-financing they are completely financed in the territory of post-Yugoslavia.

*"In the case of former Yugoslavia, it may be that Eurimages inadvertently encourages local filmmakers to collaborate thus recognizing an easier path to reconciliation. Yugoslav co-production were most often supported during the Board of Management sessions (VT)"*

According to the Eurimages statistics made for the period 2007-2011, post-Yugoslav countries received a significant Eurimages support, particularly Serbia whose projects would traditionally receive much more money than the Serbian government would contribute to the Eurimages fund on the period 2005-2011.

*"Regarding the fact that we are a small cinematography, I think that Serbian film gets much more money from Eurimages than some officially much stronger national cinemas in Europe" (BP).*

If we imagined a former Yugoslavia as a virtual state again, its projects would cover around 3.6% of the entire co-production budget of the fund in the said period, second only to the core four European film industries (Activity report, 2011).

What differs the purely Yugoslav co-productions from other Serbia-involved Eurimages films is that they prevent both self-villanization and self-victimization discourse that often exists in films about Yugoslavia with financing from Western Europe. The obvious reason for that was the fact that the local film funds are the sole financiers of the films so they tend to support films without sharp good/bad guy division, in order to keep everybody satisfied. Accordingly, these films had to avoid all simplifications and the "Othering" in order to find the audience in all co-producing countries. Instead of searching for a sole perpetrator responsible for the troubled Yugoslav past, they apparently attempt at dealing with the present issues and common future.

**Woman Without Body** (RS/HR) by Croatian director Vinko Bresan was the first Croatian-Serbian official co-production since the breakup of Yugoslavia. Both countries were brought together by the topic and locations of the film.

*"The incentive that spurred us most was the film's courage and provocativeness, having as a result a healing effect. This film offers satisfaction to those who were disgusted by the war, hatred and evil and fought against them in the territory of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s"* (Application, Women Without Body).

This film introduces the love story between Martin, Croatian war veteran, and Serbian women Desa, whose husband was killed by Martin during the Croatian war.

*"Their forbidden love is the opposite version of Romeo and Juliet since the lovers are not young and inexperienced persons who fell in love, but old and worn-out heroes burdened with all types of guilt"* (Application, Woman Without Body).

Throughout the film they are jumping different obstacles and break myriad rules in order to save each other and eventually continue their lives re-united, liberated from the burdensome past.

**Parade** by Srdjan Dragojevic is the Serbian/Croatian/Slovenian/Macedonian co-production that has been the only example of boxoffice success throughout the entire Yugoslavia (more than 600,000.00 sold tickets) and was successfully distributed to many European countries after it won Panorama Audience Award at Berlinale in 2012. "In Serbia it had 330,000 viewers which is two times more than all Serbian films together in 2011 and 2012" (SD). "The film had 55000 viewers in Germany and 75000 in France". (BP).

**Parade** is a road movie about a Serbian gangster and war veteran Limun who in his attempt to secure the gay parade in Belgrade travels throughout ex-Yugoslavia to reunite with all his gangster counterparts in other ex-Yugoslav countries against whom he was fighting during the Yugoslav war. He brings them all to his house in Belgrade and there they together create the strategy to make the gay parade happen. This film presents excessive homophobia as a disturbing problem of the Serbian society. However, in order to fight against it, Limun does not ask for help from Western Europe, but, paradoxically enough, from his once war enemies with whom he eventually synergizes and makes every conflict completely absurd and unnatural.



Figure 11: The war enemies (a Serb, Croat, Bosnian and Albanian) remember with nostalgia the time they spent together in Yugoslavia – once their common country.

The film with which I will finish this case study of Serbia-involved Eurimages projects is the co-production of as many as 5 out of 6 Yugoslav states (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia) **Some Other Stories**. The idea was to make the ex-Yu anthology film directed by five young post-Yugoslav female directors that would deal with the problems of the post-Yugoslav youth against the background of the consequences of the war.

*“Post-Yugoslavia is a part of Europe’s body somewhat under-grown, and thus needs to be shaken up and some of its small vital bones need to be strengthened so that, all together, we become able to move better.... Films are like x-rays, they can at least help diagnose where something is broken”.* (Application, **Some Other Stories**).

Although the above-mentioned films of normalization have bravely attempted to inspire catharsis and reconciliation in post-Yugoslavia, they hardly did so. Only the few of them attained a significant international visibility or spurred the interest and engagement of

the local audiences. Evoking the Marxist film scholar Mike Wayne, the reason for that may rest on the fact that these, mainly political, films in fact only reproduced the Western media representation of the Yugoslav crisis and replaced a serious scrutiny of socio-economic factors with purely cultural factors when dealing with Yugoslavia. The immediacy of the war that dominated media coverages in the 1990s is present even in the discussed post-war Eurimages films at the expense of a serious investigation into the causes. The directors of the films about the Yugoslav crisis find it

“immeasurably easier to represent and concretize the war in terms of the political leader, the burning village, men with the gun, victims and so on than represent the field of transnational flows and pressures that make up the global capital today” (Wayne 2001: 104).

All the accounts of Yugoslav tragedy erased the collapse of the economy after the region became integrated into Western and global capitalism and the fact that it was also the economic crisis of the late 1980s that laid the basis for the rise of nationalisms in Yugoslavia. In spite of all intentions, post-Yugoslavia has mostly remained represented as a cultural other while serious accounts of its economic assimilation into the Western economy are still an absence.

## **The Economic Crisis and a Way Out**

The economic crisis found Serbia in the midst of its EU integration in 2008. Harmonization of the local laws with the European *acquis* continued while the budgets necessary for implementing the new legislation were cut down. The new Europeanized Law on Cinematography was finally passed in December 2011 but in the crisis-stricken Serbia it did not contribute to the film industry whatsoever. The Article 7 of the Law stipulates that each foreign producer filming in the territory of Serbia will receive 20% of the invested money back from the budget of the Republic of Serbia although this clause has not become effective yet.

*“That is a bad idea anyway. There are examples in Europe – Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria – where the dominance of foreign crews and films devastated national cinematographies. The only fair solution would be if 10% of their spent would be given back to them and another 5% or 10% percent to the Film Center Serbia as the only source of financing of Serbian cinema”* (BP, SD).

In line with the European standards, Article 4 of the Law envisages that a minority Serbian co-producer must participate in a project with minimum 10% of financing which is hardly achievable now when the Film Center Serbia allocates up to 50 000 EUR to a minority

co-producers which is never 10% of an average European budget. At the same time, this public money is a single source of income for minority Serbian co-producers for they are not able to find any additional financing (public broadcasters are almost bankrupt, commercial TVs are not interested in supporting “difficult films” and all state-owned companies that used to provide sponsorships in the past have been privatized).

*“Making films eligible for Eurimages implies finding partners who can comply with the requirement that a minority co-producer must secure at least 10% of the global budget. It is getting harder and harder to meet that requirement now when budgets for minority co-productions are cut down everywhere” (BP)*

Article 14 of the Law enumerates 17 different activities that the Film Center Serbia is going to perform (from supporting all phases of the film value chain, through publishing and film literacy activities, organizing film festival and promotion of the Serbian film abroad, to fighting piracy). However, the Ministry of Culture and Ministry of Finance decided in early 2013 to allocate 0 EUR to the Film Center Serbia, whereby the FCS remained completely paralyzed. Another source for financing of the FCS, 1.5% of the public TV subscription fees also abated in the late 2013 when government decided to undertake a populist measure of abrogating the public TV subscription fee and finance the public Broadcaster entirely from the budget. Basically, the only two practicable sources of financing stipulated by the Law remained are broadcasting agency and public telecom operators. As a result, Serbian films, set up as co-productions, often get less financing “at home” than in the countries of minority co-production whereby they stop being Serbian films.

Due to the lack of financial sources, between 2011 and 2013, the SFC did not launch a single open call. It inevitably reduced the number of co-productions and application to Eurimages (Figure 12) whereby the contribution of the Serbian government to the fund, amounting to round EUR 120,000 per year, becomes yet another unjustified cost. In addition, it has compelled Serbian producers to turn to low-budget guerilla film-making that alienates them from the reality and trends in the West European film industry based on growing budgets and co-productions.

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
<b>Number of Serbia-involved applications to Eurimages</b>	8	9	6	5	3	5	7	6	1

Figure 12: Number of applications to Eurimages since Serbia joined the Fund in 2005

It has been announced that the Serbian Parliament would soon harmonize with the Chapter 20 of the community acquis – so called AVMS directive after which Serbia will be able to join Creative Europe (MEDIA program). Serbian producers set up a Producers' Association that would put an additional pressure on the government in this regard. However, there are doubts about how much Serbia's contribution to this EU programme, amounting to 300,000 EUR, would actually help out the Serbian audiovisual sector. Creative Europe and MEDIA programme are designed for the countries with strong national support system whose projects MEDIA finances with up to 50% in order to create a European added value of the projects. Thus, Creative Europe basically supports economy through supporting creative industries in rich European countries.

*“Participation in Creative Europe would be of rather symbolical than practical character. Serbian cultural organizations do not have sufficient financial, administrative programming capacities to gain any significant sources from this fund. Creative Europe and other EU funds are designed primarily for the creative industries of developed Western countries not for the countries where audiovisual industry is only developing and where the majority of applicants can not even qualify to apply” (HM).*

In addition, a number of recent pro-European Laws have also impaired the new Law on Cinematography. The Law on Public Procurement passed in the late 2012 envisaged that the cultural workers had to be hired through public tenders, which is in case of all cultural institutions absurd. The Law on fees for the use of public goods and services completely annulled the Article 19 and 20 of the Law on Cinematography that envisages the financial contributions from the State TV, Broadcasting Agency and Telecoms to the Film Center Serbia (Blic 2013)<sup>26</sup>.

The Law on Culture that was passed in 2009 envisaged that a comprehensive strategy on Cultural development should be passed no later than September 1, 2010, but it is still pending.

*“The problem is that in the last 20 years nobody conceptualized a comprehensive cultural policy or strategy. Therefore the policy transfer from the European Union is useless, because it is performed without any strategy and is not practical” (JM).*

Therefore, the opportunity cost of an unconditional transfer of the EU policies without consolidating and harmonizing them with the existing legacy and infrastructure turned the post-Yugoslav Serbian film sector into a shaky construction that misses the fundamental elements: a) technical and technological base, b) organized production and distribution (at

---

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.fcs.rs/generic.php?page=vest&id=1626> (Retrieved May 2, 2013)

home and abroad), c) network of exhibitors and d) legally defined system of financing of cinematography that would fit the reality. What remained is only a debased superstructure composed of film festivals, random publishing, film archives, institutes and associations that have no social influence and relevancy. "Avala Film" studio with its central film laboratory has definitely been destroyed, waiting to be privatized. The other four film laboratories built in the time of Yugoslavia (TV Belgrade, "CFL", "Zastava Film", "Filmske Novosti") are also non-existent. The first one was destroyed during the NATO bombing, the other three have been devastated by the total neglect and disinterest of all post-2000 Ministries of Culture. As a result, Serbian producers are now compelled to do the laboratory processing of their films in Budapest, Vienna or London (Filmske radosti, 2013)<sup>27</sup>. At the same time, the number of cinema theatres in Serbia reduced from 373 in 1992 to 87 in 2013 (Subasic, Opacic & Damnjanovic, 2013).

*"Serbian distributors are dictated by the Hollywood majors. Cinema network is a disaster. You have to beg distributors and exhibitors to put a Serbian film in their programme. All arthouse cinemas are closed and there is no place to see anything but commercial cinema now. Those shopping mall cinema theatres keep your movie until they make profit and after that it is impossible to see your film anywhere else" (JM)*

The saddest thing is that the major cause for this degradation does not lie so much in the devastating civil war of the 1990s and nationalisms as in the impotence of transitional post-Yugoslav Serbian governments to take the transition to liberal capitalism more strategically and less for granted.

### ***The Idea of a Regional Post-Yugoslav Film Fund***

Although this thesis focuses on Europeanization of the Serbian film sector, considering the regional perspective is inevitable. There is a general impression that all six post-Yugoslav countries share the same destiny and that once autonomous and potent Yugoslav film industry has been transformed into a cluster of mostly underdeveloped, irrelevant, and disconnected post-Yugoslav national cinematographies. The only exception may be Croatia to some extent because since 2010 it has been successfully implementing an elaborately designed film policy based on best practices from the EU countries and Yugoslavia.

---

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.filmske-radosti.com/novo/%C4%8Clanci/Kritika-%E2%80%9E%C4%8Distog-filma%E2%80%9D-u-savremenoj-srpskoj-profesionalnoj-kinematografiji-VI-deo> (Retrieved February 25, 2014)



Nevertheless, although the technological and policy infrastructure of the Yugoslav film industry has been materially dissolved, the fact that all post-Yugoslav countries essentially share the same cultural identity and same or similar mother tongues leaves room and hope for setting up some future regional collaboration in terms of policy-making, talent exchange and financing, that will make the cinematography of post-Yugoslavia more relevant and appreciated on the European scale.

*“It is much easier to co-produce with the ex-Yu countries because we are all sharing the same cultural background, which is not the case when we work with Germans and French. In postproduction, during the editing, we understand each other much better. We agree on the sensibility of the film much more easily. That is why we need a regional fund. It would provide an additional source of financing to co-productions between the Yugoslav countries and give us better starting point in negotiations with French or German partners.” (JM)*

Despite the fact that there is no collaboration among the post-Yugoslav countries at the policy level when it comes to cinematography, statistics show that the overall annual amount awarded to minority co-productions in all the post-Yugoslav countries amounts well above 500,000 EUR (Ravlic, 2013). It implies a lot of potential, but at the same signals the need for a consistent long-term regional policy framework that would at least prevent drastic fluctuation in annual number of collaborative projects.

In 2013, there were two concrete initiatives for setting-up a regional film fund for post-Yugoslav countries. The first one emerged during the LIFFE film festival in Serbia where 15 directors from different post-Yugoslav countries met to discuss the possibilities for creation of a common fund for financing and promotion of Yugoslav film, together with a unified network of exhibitors, which would be financed by the national governments. Another, much more relevant strategic meeting was organized during the Sarajevo Film Festival that gathered the representatives of all national Film funding bodies in the Yugoslav region. The host of the forum, director of the Sarajevo Film Festival Mirsad Purivatra, in his introductory text mentioned that there is

*“history we can build on, which is very important. Recent positive example of the new Croatian system stems from the fact that it has been created on the legacy of the Yugoslav film laws from 1956 and 1978, which all these [post-Yugoslav] countries have experience with” (Purivatra, 2013).*

The analysis of the Sarajevo forum and all other similar initiatives that in the past decade have emerged from the civil society, film festivals and independent producers (but never from governments thus far) opens up two possibility for regional collaboration. Jozko

Rutar, director of the Slovenian Film Center, proposed the establishment of an informal body for development of the first steps for more synchronized policies in financing “production and human sources development”. That body would discuss “urgent and strategic matters of cinema development in the region and improve cooperation between post-Yugoslav film industries focusing on co-productions, distribution, cultural education and audience building”. Such a body, in the long term, could have a say in lobbying for or against crucial political decisions taken by the Brussels administration (Rutar 2013).

The second, long term and more revolutionary, strategy would be to recycle all good policy experiences from the times of Yugoslavia, take advantage of the infrastructural remnants and consider the good practice of another European regional fund Nordisk Film and TV Fund that helped Nordic countries shape their film industries more autonomously and predictably, and, at the same time, transform them into significant European players. Once-existing Yugoslav practices that still can be restored for the purpose of sustaining such a Yugoslav regional film fund are the common Yugoslav labor market for the audiovisual professionals, a network of Yugoslav Public Service Broadcasters, organized exchange of talents, circulation and distribution through a unified network of exhibitors, active part of the main Broadcasters in financing alongside the public support system, long-time and dynamic co-operation between producers and production companies. The crucial factor would be a political consensus to support an authentic Yugoslav film culture and political awareness of the necessity of public intervention in the film sector of all post-Yugoslav countries. In that case the national public support would be combined with regional support and the other partners like Eurimages, MEDIA and the funds from the major EU countries could be more of a potential partner and less as an unavoidable financier. At the same time, the Yugoslav cinema would be more vibrant and potent content-wise.

*Collaboration within the region comes in the first place, and only then come the European funds and Eurimages. Serbian producers propagate that idea and with our project we have demonstrated in reality how important it is. However, every idea about setting up a regional ex-Yu fund always ends up only as an idea. In every post-Yugoslav country there are in fact very strong lobbyists within local establishments who want to limit that collaboration as much as possible in order to keep their privileged position in the local markets that they do not deserve whatsoever. (SD, BP).*

Indeed, corrupt elites across post-Yugoslavia seem to be the major generator of the lack of political will for any significant collaborative project that would regulate the policy field

of the film sector in the region. The biggest paradox is that the same elites continuously assert themselves as heralds and implementers of the overall Europeanization of the post-Yugoslav region, and are recognized as such by the EU administration.

## CONCLUSION

The three challenges that the Eastern European cinema has faced since the fall of the Berlin Wall are Hollywoodization, Europeanization and identity-negotiation (Mazierska 2007; Ellmeier & Rasky 2006). The Hollywoodization issue has been the factor that in fact facilitated the unification of Europe. Namely, the cultural protectionist measures initiated by the French government in the late 1980s (cultural exception clause, pan-national cultural film fund Eurimages and film subsidy structures) and maintained throughout the past 25 years have been inclusive of both East and West when it comes to safeguarding the European cultural diversity and freedom of expression. At the same time, the analysis of so-called EUization (Radaelli 2003) and new identity building in the Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism unveils an unabated cultural division between Eastern and Western Europe despite the fact that economically and legally speaking once-socialist block has been entirely integrated into the Western liberal capitalism (Wayne 2001).

The transfer of cultural policies from the core EU countries to the new EU members and EU candidates, carried out through a non-negotiable *emulative* process (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996; Bulmer and Padgett 2005), has barely involved local specificities of the receiving countries and communities (De Sojcher 2007). The process resembles rather an automatic transition than a gradual and selective transformation of societies that had already had cultural policy structures and significant cultural legacies originating from the socialist era.

After 1989, the East European region started off the processes of Europeanization and EUization of its culture with a clean slate, as no cultural policy actions had existed in the previous 45 years. Myriad impediments to the policy transfer that have occurred in Eastern Europe after 1989 have been described solely as remnants of the backward pre-1989 Communist regimes that had eternally handicapped the East European countries in adopting the desirable *modular type* (Hausner 2010) of development of cultural policies. At the same time, a serious investigation into the *negative feedback* (Polak 2008) to non-selective

internalization of the Western European policies has mostly remained an absence within the mainstream academia and media. "Becoming like Western Europe" has been an eschatological final goal of the cultural and power elites throughout Eastern Europe that should be achieved at any cost (Pavicic 2010).

This master thesis suggests that the Europeanization of the post-socialist film industries and cultural sector in general implies the *opportunity cost* that originates from both insufficient social-economic development of the East European post-socialist states and the rigid policy transfer recommended or dictated by the EU administration. To prove so, I chose to elaborate on the post-Yugoslav Serbian cinema as a case study. In the syntagm post-Yugoslav Serbian cinema I particularly accentuated "Yugoslav" since it reiterates the fact that Serbia used to be a federal unit in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that prior to 1991 had a clearly defined cultural policy that was in many aspects reminiscent of what is now promoted as a desirable European model. Thanks to its authentic economic model of self-management and socially owned enterprises, coupled with the policy of decentralization and rapid modernization, a vibrant and potent film industry was created in a record period of time in the post-WWII Yugoslavia. The eight Yugoslav federal units functioned pretty much according to the principle that many pan-European and regional film policy instruments recommend today as the European ideal. Namely, the co-production deals, multiple sources of financing, small independent production companies, exchange of talents, well-structured network of public broadcasters and taking advantage of the economic potential of film were only some of the characteristics of the Yugoslav film industry that are impossible to imagine today in the post-Yugoslav space. Therefore, much of the opportunity cost and negative feedback to the Europeanization of the post-Yugoslav Serbian film industry lies in the fact that the post-Yugoslav states instead to revive once potent regional infrastructure and adopt the EU policies to the extent they do not disempower the regional collaboration (as it is the case with the Nordic region), they adopt the EU policies in a manner that rather disrupts regional collaboration, alienate the regional national productions from the local and international audiences and keep the post-Yugoslav space fragmented and culturally colonized by the economically superior core EU countries.

The emulative and hierarchical policy transfer from the EU to post-Yugoslav Serbia with the intention to make Serbia more like Western Europe impacted significantly the identity-negotiation process as well as the circumstances under which the new film production develops. After 1992, any significant film financing was made dependent on the rich European states (primarily France and Germany). In order to secure financing for their films and a place in the cultural elite of Western Europe, Serbian filmmakers had to attract money from these countries, since the post-Yugoslav states could not afford it any more after the collapse of Yugoslavia. The case of films of Emir Kusturica and Goran Paskaljevic demonstrates how French and German financing fostered a new identity that will satisfy and reconfirm the expectations of the biased onlookers in the West. If the global media of the 1990s applied the discourse of Balkanization in order to present Serbia and Yugoslavia as “the Other”, the internationally acclaimed Serbian filmmakers built the new Serbian identity on the discourse of self-Balkanizations in order to secure their position in the European film industry (Jameson 2005, 235; Longinovic 2005, 45; Samardzija 2007, 57; Krstic 2009, Jordanova 2001). Although Serbia of the 1990s was far from any institutional and legislative alignment with the EU due to the civil war and the UN-imposed embargo, the said films mark the first phase of Europeanization of the Serbian post-Yugoslav cinema. In this period, Europeanization implied confirmation of the image of Yugoslavia imposed by the mainstream Western media and academia that reduced the Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s to a cultural debate and the rise of Slobodan Milosevic (then President of Serbia), ignoring any discussion on the socio-economic context of the Yugoslav crisis that would necessarily involve certain responsibility on part of the West. Paradoxically enough, self-balkanization films also received financial and promotional support from the Serbian government and the state broadcaster of the time despite the fact that they were labeled as strongly anti-European.

The institutional Europeanization of Serbian film industry commenced in 2001 after Slobodan Milosevic was removed and the new pro-Western government was installed. The all-embracing transition towards free market economy included privatization of socially owned enterprises and government-owned assets. As a result, the public film production companies, film studios and the network of exhibitors were either privatized or put under restructuring that in most of the cases led to their closures. Consequently, the local film workers remained

without shooting studios, laboratories and other facilities that traditionally serviced production and post-production of films. Socially owned companies that traditionally sponsored domestic cinema became completely disconnected from the local film industry upon their privatization, leaving the filmmakers without a significant financing source. Distribution sector became absolutely dominated by the subsidiaries of the American studios that offered only the Hollywood production in the remaining cinema theatres. In 2007, eventually 17 arthouse cinema theatres in Belgrade were closed down due to their privatization. To sum up, apart from the Yugoslav Film Archive that, thanks to foreign donations, received a new central building and depots where the old film reels and copies could stay preserved, almost the entire autonomous infrastructure inherited from Yugoslavia was dismantled by 2008 and the new Serbian film industry remained debased. The process was carried out in line with the new Europeanized Law on Privatization that allowed 70% of a company to be sold to foreign investors - with just 15% reserved for workers (The Guardian 2004)<sup>28</sup>.

In parallel with the fraught transition to liberal capitalism, the Serbian cultural sector underwent its Europeanization through the transfer of the EU cultural policies designed rather to service highly-developed and economically potent West European audiovisual industries than to help out small and devastated film cultures. In order to catch up with Western Europe, Serbian governments, however, passed the new Europeanized Laws on Cinematography and Culture, signed the Convention on European Cinematographic Co-productions and joined the European film fund Eurimages. The Serbian Parliament is about to adopt the AVMS directive from the European community acquis so that Serbia can soon join the MEDIA program of the EU. The old Institute for Film was closed down, so that the new institution - Film Center Serbia - could be founded to resemble the national film institutes across the EU.

Despite the fact that many financing resources and facilities disappeared in the first years of the post-2000 transition, the Serbian governments were willing to allocate a significant funding from the state budget to the film sector in order to keep the new Europeanized structure operative. Until 2010, the government would allocate up to 4 million euros annually for the support of national cinematography, which was a significantly higher amount in comparison to previous years. Thanks to the generous public funding, ever-

---

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/21/kosovo.comment> (Retrieved February 1, 2014)

increasing number of film projects emerged every year. With domestic financing in place Serbian producers could more easily team up with co-producers in other European countries and apply for Eurimages support. Indeed, in the first 7 years of membership in Eurimages, 49 Serbia-involved applications were submitted, 30 out of which were successful, which was almost an unprecedented score. More than fifty percent of the annual production was co-productions with different European states (Germany dominated) in this period. In addition, the competition for Eurimages support stimulated producers from Serbia and other post-Yugoslav states to team up (just as they used to do before 1991) among themselves to create faster co-production set-ups eligible for Eurimages. The number of such regional co-productions was at a steady growth until the economic crisis, which demonstrates that the post-Yugoslav space, no matter how fragmented and devastated by the war of the 1990s, still has a large potential to revive the infrastructure of once common Yugoslav film industry and, in addition to Eurimages as a pan-European film fund, create a regional film and TV fund that would empower the post-Yugoslav film industry and make it more relevant and innovative (as Nordisk Film and TV Fund did in the Nordic region). Only through regulated collaboration, the post-Yugoslav film industry could become empowered enough to create again an autonomous content and authentic narrative styles instead of sheer reconfirming the identity as created in the countries of main financiers (as I demonstrated with the case studies of Eurimages films that involve Serbia). Despite the numerous initiatives in this direction on part of the film industry professionals from the post-Yugoslav states, thus far there has been no will on part of the national politicians to meet this need. The paradox is that the local politicians are in fact actively involved and collaborative in terms of the EU integration of the entire region. Also, they are recognized as desirable partners by the EU administration in Brussels. Nevertheless, every regional collaboration that is not directly conditioned by the path-dependent EU integration process, at least within the film sector, still remains blocked.

The opportunity cost of the Europeanization of the Serbian post-Yugoslav cinema became most evident with the first consequences of the most recent economic crisis. Challenged by the crisis, the Serbian government was forced to rationalize its public spending drastically. It was encouraged to do so by the EU, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Among the first rationalization victims was cultural sector, cinematography in particular,

that in 2013 received as much as 0 euro from the state budget. Suddenly, the entire policy structure that had been transferred from the EU became dysfunctional since the government was not in position to sustain it anymore. At the same time, all alternative sources originating from the Yugoslav legacy have been either neglected or eliminated through privatizations, having been labeled as a disruptive element to the transition to free market economy.

In the very end of this master thesis I wish to recall again the picturesque metaphor of Miroljub Vuckovic, a former Director of both Yugoslav Institute for Film and Film Center Serbia, whom I interviewed during my thesis-related research. Namely, despite good intentions, the new film policy framework in the transitional Serbia resembles a building that has been built from the 17<sup>th</sup> to the 21<sup>st</sup> floor and will necessarily collapse once it becomes obvious that the lower floors are missing.

## REFERENCES

Adams, M. L. (2004), "The Trouble with Normal Postwar Youth in Making of Heterosexuality", In Michelle Webber and Kate Bezanson, (Eds.) *Rethinking Society in the 21st Century: Critical Readings in Sociology*, Canadian Scholars' Press Inc.

Andrew Horton, The Belgrade International Film Festival, *Cineaste*, Volume XXII, Issue No. 2, 1996.

Andrew Horton, The Wounded, *Sight and Sound*, Vol. 8, No. 9, 1998.

Bakic-Hayden, M. (1995), "Nesting *Orientalisms*: The case of Former Yugoslavia," *Slavic Review* 54, No. 4, pp. 917-931.

Baltruschat, D. (2002), "Globalization and International TV and Film Co-productions: In Search of New Narratives", *Media and Transition 2: Globalization and Convergence*, May 10-12, 2002, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Barthes, R. (1968), *Elements of Semiology*, New York: Hill and Wang.

Benson, D. & Jordan, A. (2011), "What Have we Learned from Policy Transfer Research? Dolowitz and Marsh Revizited", *Political Studies Review*, Vol 9, pp. 366-378.

Berger, A. (1998), *Media Research Techniques*, London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Betz, M. (2001), "The name above the (sub)title: internationalism, coproduction, and polyglot European art cinema", *Camera Obscura*, 46, 16(1), pp. 1-44.

Bjelic I. Dusan (2003), "The Balkans' Imaginary and the Paradox of European Borders", *Eurozine*.

Bogoeva-Sedlar, Lj. (2002), "Art Against War or War Against Art? Versions of Macbeth, Part I: NATO's Use of Shakespeare in the 1999 Attack on Yugoslavia", Nis: Facta Universitatis, Series: Linguistics and Literature Vol.2, No.7, pp. 87-106.

Bogoeva-Sedlar, Lj. (2009), "The 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Age of Consent, or Concern? The Rise of Democratic Imperialism and "Fall" of William Shakespeare", *NASLEDJE - Journal of*



Language, Literature, Art and Culture, Vol. 6, No. 12, pp. 31-52.

Bogner A., Littig, B. and Menz, W. (Eds.) (2009), *Interviewing Experts*, New York: Palgrave Mcmillian.

Borneman, J. & Fowler, N. (1997), "Europeanization", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, Vol. 26 (1997), pp. 487-514

Bourdieu, P. (1984), *Distinction. A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* (R. Nice, Trans.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bulmer, S. & Padgett, S. (2005), "Policy Transfer in the European Union: an Institutional Perspective", *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 35, No.1, pp. 103-126.

Burrell, G., & Morgan, G. (1979), *Sociological Paradigms and Organizational Analysis*, London: Heinemann.

Cannon, B. (2011), "The united states of unscreened cinema: The political economy of the self-distribution of cinema in the U.S.", LSE, Department of Media and Communications, MEDIA@LSE Electronic MSc Dissertation Series.

Cassidy, N. (2012), *Guide to European Funding for the Non-profit Sector, 2012-2013*, Bruxelles: ECAS.

Copic, V. (2004), "Transition in Culture in Terms of Reconceptualizing the role of the State, the Profession and Civil Society" in Svob-Djokic, N., ed. *Cultural Transition in South-Eastern Europe*, Zagreb: Institute for International Relations, pp. 43-59.

Cini, M. & Perez-Solorzano Borragan, N. (eds.) (2004), *European Union Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Council of Europe: Evaluation and proposed revisions of the European Convention on Cinematographic Co-production (2012)

Dakovic N. (2006), "Europe Lost and Found: Serbian Cinema and EU Integration", *New Cinemas* 4: 2, pp. 93-103.

Dakovic, N. (2001), "Srce tame i slike granice: celuloidna Jugoslavija/Balkan" (Heart of darkness: representation of the Balkans in recent media), *Zbornik radova Fakulteta dramskih umetnosti*, No. 6-7, pp. 261- 270.

De Smaele Hedwig (2007) "More Europe: More Unity, More Diversity? The Enlargement of the European Audiovisual Space", *European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics*, 24, 1, 23-43(21), pp. 113-134.

De Vinck, S. (2009), "Europudding or Europaradise? A performance evaluation of the Eurimages co-production film fund, twenty years after its inception", *Communications*, Vol.34(3), pp.257-285, doi: 10.1515/COMM.2009.017

Dolowitz, D. & Marsh D. (1996), "Who Learns What from Whom: a Review of the Policy Transfer Literature", *Political Studies*, XLIV, pp. 343-357.

Dorussen, H., Hartmut, L., & Blavoukos, S. (2005), "Assessing the Reliability and Validity of Expert Interviews" *European Union Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 315-337.

Dragojevic, Z. (2011), "Domaci kinematografski slucaj", *Novi Filmograf: Casopis za bolju kinematografiju, za vaskrs srpskog filma, medjubroj*, pp. 19-23, Belgrade: Udruzenje filmskih radnika Srbije.

Ellmeier, A. and Rasky, B. (2006), *Differing Diversities: Eastern European Perspectives*.

*Transversal Study on the Theme of Cultural Policy and Cultural Diversity*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing.

European Audiovisual Observatory, "Distribution on the European Union Market: films from Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, Latin America and Asia", on the occasion of the Thessaloniki Conference, May 25-27, 1993.

"Evaluation and proposed Revisions of the European Convention on Cinematographic Co-productions", Council of Europe, 2012

Finney, A. (1996), *A New Doze of Reality: The State of European Cinema*, London: Cassell.

Foucault, M. (1990). *The History of Sexuality, Volume I: An Introduction*, Robert Hurley, trans. New York: Vintage.

Goldsworthy, V. (2003), "Invention and in(ter)vention: The rhetoric of Balkanization", Eurozine.

Goulding, D. (2002), *Liberated Cinema: Revised and Expanded Edition: The Yugoslav Experience, 1945-2011*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Guback, Thomas, H. (1969), *The international movie industry: Western Europe and America since 1945*, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.

Hall, S. (1997), *Representation – Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices (Culture, Media and Identities Series)*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Haltof, M. (2002), *Polish National Cinema*, Oxford/New York: Berghahn Books.

Hausner, J. (2010), "Culture and Transformation" in Palmer, R. & Purchla, J., ed. *Culture and Development 20 Years after the Fall of Communism in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp. 26-35.

Howell, K. (2002), "Developing Conceptualization of Europeanisation and European Integration: Mixing Methodologies" ESRC Seminar 1 / UACES Study Group 2, Elmfield Press: Sheffield.

Huntington, S.P. (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3, pp. 23-49.

Inkei, P. (2010), "Introduction: Nature and Function of the Background Paper" in Palmer, R. & Purchla, J., ed. *Culture and Development 20 Years after the Fall of Communism in Europe*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp. 36-141.

Iordanova, D. (2013), *Cinema of the Other Europe*, London: Wallflower Press.

Iordanova, D. (2001), *Cinema of Flames: Balkan Film, Culture and Media*, London: British Film Institute.

Iordanova, D. (2002), "Feature filmmaking within the new Europe: moving funds and images across the East-West divide", *Media Culture Society* 24: 517, pp. 517-536, doi: 10.1177/016344370202400404

Iordanova, D. (1999), "Kusturica's 'Underground': historical allegory or propaganda?", *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television*, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 69-86.

Jameson, F. (2004): "Thoughts on Balkan Cinema", In A Egoyan and I. Balfour (Eds.), *Subtitles: On the Foreignness of the Film*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp.232-56.

John B. Allcock and Antonia Young, eds. (1991), *Black Lambs and Grey Falcons. Women Travellers in the Balkans*, Bradford: Bradford University Press, pp. 170-191.

- Jovicic S. & Mikic, H. (2006), *Creative Industries: Basic Facts and Policy Recommendations for Serbia*, Belgrade: British Council Serbia and Montenegro.
- Kaufmann, T., & Raunig, G. (2003), "Anticipating European Cultural Policies = Europäische Kulturpolitiken vorausdenken, Wien/Linz: European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies (eiPCP).
- Kristensen, L. (2012), *Postcommunist film - Russia, Eastern Europe and World Culture: Moving Images of Postcommunism*, London: Routledge.
- Krstic, I. (2009), *Wunden der symbolischen Ordnung – Subject zwischen Trauma und Phantasma in serbischen Filmen der 199er Jahre*, Wien: Verlag Turia+Kant.
- Landy, M. (2005), "Gramsci, Sembene and the Politics of Culture" in Wayne, M. ed., *Understanding Film: Marxist Perspective*, London/Ann Arbor, Mi: Pluto Press, pp. 58-87.
- Leslie, E. (2005), "Adorno, Benjamin, Brecht and Film" in Mike Wayne, ed., *Understanding Film: Marxist Perspective*, London/Ann Arbor, Mi: Pluto Press, pp. 34-58.
- Levi, P. (2007), *Disintegration in Frames: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Yugoslav and Post-Yugoslav Cinema*, Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
- Lodge, J. and Sarikakis, K. (2013), 'Citizens in "an ever-closer union"? The long path to a public sphere in the EU', *International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics* 9: 2, pp. 165–181, doi: 10.1386/macp.9.2.165\_1
- Longinovic, T. (2005), "Playing the Western Eye: Balkan Masculinity and Post-Yugoslav War Cinema" In Aniko Imre (Ed.) *Eastern European Cinema*, New York and London: Routledge, pp. 35-47.
- Mazierska, E. (2007), *Polish Postcommunist Cinema: From Pavement Level*, London Peter Lang.
- Mazierska, E., Kristensen, L. & Naripea, E. (2013. (eds.), *Postcolonial Approaches to Eastern European Cinema*, London/New York: I.B. Tauris.
- McDonnell, J. (2009), *Cultural Diversity-European Perspective*, London: Catholic Communication Center.
- Mikic, H. (2013), "Kulturne industrije i raznolikost kulturnih izraza u Srbiji" (Cultural Industries and Diversity of Cultural Expression in Serbia), Edition EKSPERTIZE No. 1/2013, Belgrade: Grupa za kreativnu ekonomiju.
- Mikic, H. (2012), *Strateska analiza filmske industrije u Srbiji: medjunarodni, izazovi, dileme i perspective* (Strategic analysis of the film industry in Serbia: international challenges, dilemmas and perspectives), Belgrade: Grupa za kreativnu ekonomiju.
- Miller, T. (2005), "Hollywood, Cultural Policy Citadel" in Wayne, M. ed., *Understanding Film: Marxist Perspective*, London/Ann Arbor, Mi: Pluto Press, pp. 182-194.
- Moran, A. (1996), *Film policy: international, national and regional perspectives*, London: Routledge.
- Morawetz, N. Hardy, J. Haslam, C. and Randle, K. (2007), "Finance, Policy and Industrial Dynamics—The Rise of Co-productions in the Film Industry", *Industry and Innovation* 14:4, pp. 421-443.
- Moreau, F. & Peltier, S. (2004): "Cultural Diversity in the Movie Industry: A Cross-National Study", London: Routledge, *Journal of Media Economics*, 17:2, pp. 123-143.

Naarajarvi, P. (2011), *International Co-Production and Collaborative Agreements, the Case of Finnish Film Industry*, Helsinki: Aalto Print.

Nemetz, P.L. & Christenen, S. L. (1996), "The Challenge of Cultural Diversity: Harnessing a Diversity of Views to Understand Multiculturalism", *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol 21, No.2, pp. 434-462.

Neumann, P & Appelgren, C. (2007), *The Fine Art of Co-Producing*, Copenhagen: Neumann Publishing.

Olsen, J. P. (2002), "Many Faces of Europeanisation", *JCMS*, Volume 40. Number 5. pp. 921-52.

Omon, J. and Mari, M. (2007). *Analiza Film (Film Analysis)*, Belgrade: Clio.

Palic Film Festival, FESTIVAL NEWSPAPERS/FREE COPY, No 1 / 20.07.2008

Pauwels C. De Vinck S. and Van Rompuy B. (2007), "Can State Aid in the Film Sector Stand The Proof of EU and WTO Liberalisation Efforts?", *European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics*, 24, 1, 23-43(21), pp. 23-43.

Pavicic, J. (2010), "Cinema of Normalization: Changes of Stylistic Model in Post-Yugoslav Cinema after the 1990s", *Studies in Eastern European Cinema*, Volume 1, No. 1, pp. 75-97.

Pavicic, J. (2011), *Postjugoslovenski film: stil i ideologija (Post-Yugoslav film: style and ideology)*, Zagreb: Hrvatski filmski savez.

Philips, D. (2005), "The Althusserian Moment Revisited (again)" in Wayne, M. ed., *Understanding Film: Marxist Perspective*, London/Ann Arbor, Mi: Pluto Press, pp. 87-105.

Polak A. M. (2008), "The New institutionalism and European Integration", in Wiener, A. & Thomas D (eds), *European Integration Theories (2nd ed)*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Portuges, C. & Hames, P. (2013) (eds.) *Cinemas in Transition in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989*, Temple University Press.

Pratt, A.C. (2006), "Policy Transfer and the Field of the Cultural and Creative Industries: What Can Be Learned from Europe?", An initial version of this chapter presented at 'Creative Cities, Creative Economies Conference, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences'. October 16, 2006. Thanks to the participants for comments and discussion.

Puttnam, D. (1997), "The Undeclared War: The Struggle for Control of the World's Film Industry", London : Harper Collins.

Radaelli, C.M. (2003), 'The Europeanization of Public Policy', in K. Featherstone and C. M. Radaelli (eds), *The Politics of Europeanization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ravlic, S. (2013), "Reciprocity in Co-productions Between the Countries of Ex-Yugoslavia", State of the Region, Sarajevo Film Festival.

Rivi, L. (2007), *European Cinema after 1989 – Cultural Identity and Transnational Production*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Purivatra, M. (2013), "Welcome to the Forum", State of the Region, Sarajevo Film Festival.

Rushton, M. (2003), "Cultural Diversity and Public Funding of the Arts: A View from Cultural Economics", *The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society*, London: Routledge, 33:2, 85-97.

Rutar, J. (2013), "Is It Time for South Eastern Europe Film Agencies Directors Network – Seefad", State of the Region, Sarajevo Film Festival.

Samardzija, Z. (2007), "Bal-can-can", Cineaste, 3:32, New York.

Sarikakis, K. (2007), "Introduction". European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 24, 1, 1-22 (21), pp. 1-22.

Sarikakis K. (2004), *Powers in Media Policy: the Challenge of the European Parliament*, Oxford/Bern/Brussels/Frankfurt am Main/New York/Wien: Peter Lang Academic Publishers.

Sarikakis, K. (2007), "Introduction". European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 24, 1, 1-22 (21), pp. 1-22.

Sarikakis, K. (2007(1)), "Mediating Social Collision: Media and Cultural Policy in the European Union and Canada". European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 24, 1, 1-22 (21), pp. 65-87.

Schimmelfennig, F. (2007), "Europeanization beyond Europe", Living Rev. Euro. Gov., Vol. 2, (2007), No. 1, pp. 3-22.

Sesic-Dragicevic, M. & Dragojevic, S. (2006), "Zamisljene ili prave podele? Kulturne politike i njihove granice", Zbornik radova fakulteta dramskih umetnosti, Beograd: Fakultet dramskih umetnosti, pp. 165-183.

Sojcher F. (2002), "The Economics of Cinema: History, Strategic Choices and Cultural Policy". Contemporary European History, 11, pp. 305-316 doi: 10.1017/S0960777302002084.

Subotic, B., Opacic, B., Damjanovic, J. (2013), *Bioskopi u Srbiji* (Cinemas in Serbia), Belgrade: Zavod za proucavanje kulturnog razvitka.

Stojanovic, D. (2010), *Ulje na Vodi: Essays from Serbia's Present*, Belgrade: Pescanik.

Stubbs, P. (2005), "Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and the Politics of Scale in South East Europe", South-East European Politics, Vol. VI, No. 2, pp.66-87.

Svob-Djokic, N. (2004), "Cultural Contexts in Transition Process" in Svob-Djokic, N., ed. *Cultural Transition in South-Eastern Europe*, Zagreb: Institute for International Relations, pp. 7-19.

Todorova, M. (1997), *Imagining the Balkans*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Vink, M. P. (2003) 'What is Europeanisation? and other questions on a new research agenda', European Political Science 3(1): 63-74.

Wayne, M. (2002), *The Politics of Contemporary European Cinema: Histories, Borders, Diasporas*, Bristol: Intellect Books.

Worseley, P. (1985), "Introducing Sociology". New York: Penguin Books.

Yilmazok, L. (2012), *Eurimages and Turkish Cinema: History, Identity, Culture*, Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, ASCA.

## ONLINE SOURCES

Annual Progress Report of the European Commission for Serbia (2005-2013), Retrieved February 25, 2014 from <http://www.seio.gov.rs/documents/eu-documents.231.html>

Aronson, J. (1994), "A Pragmatic View of Thematic Analysis", *The Qualitative Report*, 2(1). Retrieved August 1, 2013, from <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/BackIssues/QR2-1/aronson.html>

B92: Retrieved August 15, 2013 from [http://www.b92.net/kultura/vesti.php?nav\\_category=1087&yyyy=2013&mm=08&dd=10&nav\\_id=741211](http://www.b92.net/kultura/vesti.php?nav_category=1087&yyyy=2013&mm=08&dd=10&nav_id=741211)

Cinema Communication 2013: Retrieved November 17, 2013, from <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:332:0001:0011:EN:PDF>

Creative Europe Programme: Retrieved December 25, 2013 from [http://ec.europa.eu/culture/creative-europe/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/culture/creative-europe/index_en.htm)

"Evaluation of the Eurimages Fund", Council of Europe, 2013, Retrieved, January 25, 2014 from [http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/eurimages/Source/EurimagesEvaluationFinalREVISEDReport\\_%201](http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/eurimages/Source/EurimagesEvaluationFinalREVISEDReport_%201)

Government of the Republic of Serbia European Integration Office: Retrieved January 22, 2013 from <http://www.seio.gov.rs/%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8.528.html>

IRIS 2013-7:1/4 (Council of the EU approves USA/EU Free-Trade Talks Excluding Audiovisual Services): Retrieved November 22, 2011 from <http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2013/7/article4.en.html>

Mikic, H., Dragicevic-Sesic, M., Brkic, A. (2013), "Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, 14<sup>th</sup> edition 2013", Retrieved April 22, 2013 from <http://www.culturalpolicies.net>

Mile Klindo, Cabaret Balkan by Goran Paskaljevic, Deeply Pesimistic Film, WSWWS, April 18, 2000, Retrieved June 5, 2013, from <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2000/04/balk-a18.html>

Milorad Djokic, Sta se desilo sa azdahom?, *Politika*, December 31, 2009, Retrieved, June 25, 2013 from <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Kulturni-dodatak/SHta-se-desilo-sa-Azdahom.lt.html>

Miroslav Bata Petrovic, Kritika Cistog Filma u savremenoj srpskoj profesionalnoj kinematografiji, *Filmske Radosti*, December 30, 2013, Retrieved February 25, 2014 from <http://www.filmske-radosti.com/novo/%C4%8Cianci/Kritika-%E2%80%9E%C4%8Distog-filma%E2%80%9D-u-savremenoj-srpskoj-profesionalnoj-kinematografiji-VI-deo>

Neil Clark, The Spoils of Another Year, *The Guardian*, September 21, 2004, Retrieved February 1, 2014, from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/sep/21/kosovo.comment>

Neven Dzodan, Filmadžije ostaju bez posla i bez para (Filmmakers remain broke and jobless), *Blic*, March 13, 2013, Retrieved May 2, 2013, from <http://www.fcs.rs/generic.php?page=vest&id=1626>

Primorac, J., Svob-Dokic, N., Obuljen, G. (2012), "Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, 14<sup>th</sup> edition 2013", Retrieved April 22, 2013 from <http://www.culturalpolicies.net>

Screen Daily: Cinema Communication deadline extended: Retrieved November 22, 2013 from <http://www.screendaily.com/news/cinema-communication-deadline-extended/5057017.article>

Screen Daily: Scandinavian Producers Forge Creative Alliance: Retrieved January 22, 2013 from <http://www.screendaily.com/news/scandinavian-directors-forge-creative-alliance/5051182.article>

1988 Appeal from the European Film Directors: Retrieved September 25, 2013 from <http://www.europeanfilmacademy.org/Appeal-from-European-Film-Directors.187.0.html>

## **PRIMARY SOURCES FROM THE EURIMAGES ARCHIVES**

Activity Report of Eurimages for the year 2011

Application file: Underground

Application file: Powder Keg

Application file: Perfect Circle

Application file: Phantom

Application file: Saint George Kills the Dragon

Application file: Ordinary People

Application file: Women Without Body

Application file: Some Other Stories

Coeurimages database

Eurimages Guidelines from 1992

Eurimages Guidelines from 1994

Eurimages Guidelines from 2012

Report from the Board of Management Meeting from October 1993

Report from the Board of Management Meeting from May 2006

Report from the Board of Management Meeting from December 2014

## **FILM TITLES OUTSIDE THE EURIMAGES CASE STUDY LIST**

**Cinema Komunisto** (2010) by Mila Turajlic

**Premeditated Murder** (1995) by Gorcin Stojanovic

**The Wounds** (1998) by Srdjan Dragojevic

**Pretty Village, Pretty Flame** (1996) by Srdjan Dragojevic

**Black Cat, White Cat** (1998) by Emir Kusturica

**Someone Else's America** (1994) by Goran Paskaljevic

**Ulysses' Gaze** (1995) by Theo Angelopoulos

**Marble Ass** (1995) by Zelimir Zilnik

**“Avala Film” – resenje ili propadanje** (2011) by Srdjan Knezevic

**Grbavica** (2006) by Jasmila Zbanic

**Storm** (2009) by Hans Christian Schmidt

**As if I Am Not There** (2010) by Juanita Wilson

**War Child** (2010) by Christian Wagner

**Tito for the Second Time among the Serbs** (1995) by Zelimir Zilnik

**Vukovar Poste Restante** (1994) by Boro Draskovic

**Say Why You Have Left Me** (1993) by Oleg Novkovic

**Deserter** (1992) by Zivojin Pavlovic

**Knife** (1998) by Miroslav Lekic

**Byzantine Blue** (1993) by Dragan Marinkovic

## **APPENDIX 1 – SCREEN SHOTS AND PHOTOS**





Figure 2. Six post-Yugoslav states. Screen shot from **Cinema Komunisto** (2010) by Mila Turajlic



Figure 3: Closing scene of Kusturica's **Underground** (1995). A splinter of land with "crazy Balkan people" disconnects from the mainland and drifts away on its own.



Figure 4: “Why do you laugh? Because I’m different? Because I am a freak? Well, then welcome



Figure 5: TV studios of the Radio-Television Serbia in Novi Sad and Belgrade destroyed by NATO in 1999




Figure 6: Creative reactions to the closures of 17 Belgrade cinema theatres - “No screening today, come yesterday” and “In memoriam of the *Balkan* cinema theatre and all other victims of the privatization of Beograd Film”



Figure 7: “Avala” film studio’s corridor lit by hand lantern after the government cut off the electric power (screen shot from **Cinema Komunisto** (2010) by Mila Turajlic



Figure 8. Love between a Gypsy boy and white girl celebrated under the Serbian flag in **Gugal**.



Figure 9: **The Trap**. The image of Belgrade suburbs that does not defer from any working class suburban landscape in the films from the European arthouse canon.



Figure 10: **Besa** by Srdjan Karanovic. Slovenian women and Serbian Albanian hiding in a village school



Figure 11: The war enemies (a Serb, Croat, Bosnian and Albanian) remember with nostalgia the time they spent together in Yugoslavia – once their common country.

## APPENDIX 2 – STATISTICS

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
<b>Number of Serbia-involved applications to Eurimages</b>	8	9	6	5	3	5	7	6	1

Figure 12: Number of applications to Eurimages since Serbia joined the Fund in 2005

## **APPENDIX 3 – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

### **Questions to the Eurimages' Staff**

1. What are the main objectives of Eurimages in the context of the European and global film industry? (provide some examples where Eurimages succeeded in fulfilling these objectives according to your personal experience, and where it failed)
2. How do you see the future of Eurimages in the current context when it seems that the public support tends to decrease and circulation of European films is getting ever smaller?
3. Project managers use specific and precisely defined regulations for doing the project analysis. There are also some general objectives the members of the Board of Management must abide by in making their decisions. However, are there any "sub-criteria" behind these official ones that you can identify?
4. Would a film with an extremely commercial potential be attractive to Eurimages, regardless of the rules?
5. How did the rules and regulations evolved throughout the time? What circumstances stimulated the changes and tightening of the rules?
6. Why less public support was asked for in the past? Does it mean that less attention used to be given to financing and more to the artistic quality of a film? (In the case of Kusturica's "Underground", for example, project-analysis indicates almost no public money)
7. What is the Eurimages approach towards reconciliation of all different identities into a single European identity? Can you compare it with the similar identity-related process in the EU?
8. Do you feel that there might be a danger of creating homogeneity among the Eurimages-supported films, because all the supported stories tend to conform to the same style and the same criteria?
9. What are the revisions that Eurimages is planning to make in the future? What are the revisions that you personally would make within Eurimages?
10. What is going on with the enlargement policy to other countries?
11. How often do project managers read scripts and synopses?
12. Do you think that Board of Management sometimes focuses distinctly on a certain region or a certain country due to political, economic, etc. reasons?
13. How much the national representatives lobby for the projects from their home countries? Are they under pressure from their governments to do that?

### **Questions concerning the Balkans:**

14. Is Eurimages softer with the Balkan project as they come from a poor region that is still integrating into the EU?
15. According to your experience, how honest are co-productions from the Balkans? Does it happen that the final co-production structure is different from the one you supported?
16. How does Eurimages influence the circulation of the movies from the Balkans in the

Western Europe? Does it provide any assistance?

17. What kind of derogations to the rules, and on what occasions, does the Board approve (in general, and particularly in the case of the Balkan states)? Would the Board, for example, support commercial foreign production in a poor region primarily because it will create jobs there?
18. Increasing number of the Balkan countries is drastically cutting the public film funds. As a consequence, the number of applications to Eurimages from the region is dropping. If such a trend continues, do you think that Eurimages can play any role in improving the situation?

### **Questions to the Serbian policy makers**

1. Does (and to what extent) the policy transfer happen in Serbia in relation to the EU?
2. To what extent has the Serbian cultural sector been aligned with the European community *acquis*?
3. What should the cultural strategy of Serbia include, according to you? When will it be finalized?
4. How do you explain the autism on part of the Serbian government towards development of the national cultural strategy?
5. Does Serbia have a proper infrastructure for development of creative industries?
6. How could the other Ministries (not only the Ministry of Culture) contribute to the development of creative industries in Serbia?
7. How did the privatization influence the TV sector after 2000?
8. What should the Serbian state do with the facilities and legacy of the "Avala Film" studio?
9. Is the cultural policy and infrastructure that existed during the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia an impediment to or facilitator of the Europeanization of the current Serbian cultural policies?
10. Will Serbia, if it joins the World Trade Organization, fight for obtaining the "cultural exception" clause?
11. Do you think that cultural sectors in the EU candidate countries require a stricter monitoring from the EU administration of how the pro-European strategies and policies are being implemented?
12. Should the European cultural fund have at their disposal higher financial means so that they can afford to support smaller, autonomous cultural projects?
13. Will Serbia become part of Creative Europe and how can the Serbian cultural sector benefit from this membership?

### Questions to the Serbian producers

1. How much the Eurimages support means to you, regarding the global budget of your films?
2. Had you failed to get the Eurimages support for your projects would you have managed to make them?
3. Is the financial support from Eurimages a good recommendation for your films in a sense that it attracts other sources of financing?
4. If you decide not to apply to Eurimages with a project, what are the reasons for that?
5. Does the intention to apply to Eurimages influence the project content in any phase (particularly in the course of script-development)?
6. Do you think that the presence of Serbian project at Eurimages is satisfactory?
7. Do Serbian Eurimages representatives properly evaluate the Serbian projects and lobby for them in an adequate way?
8. Do the Serbian producers apply to Eurimages with the projects "that are expected from Serbia"? Do you think that there are topics that could never pass at Eurimages?
9. Serbia had a very successful period at Eurimages between 2007 and 2011. Why then in the most recent Eurimages calls there are almost no projects from Serbia and former Yugoslavia in general?
10. How can Serbian cultural sector profit from the membership in Creative
11. Can the role of broadcasters as co-producers be better regulated in Serbia?
12. Do you think that a small market share of domestic and European films stems from the insufficient number of cinema theatres or an average Serbian cinema-goer simply do not find them interesting?
13. Are you satisfied with the level of co-production activity in Serbia in the past 20 years?
14. Should there be more co-productions within the former Yugoslavia? Is there an idea about establishing a regional film and TV fund?
15. How can Serbia attract more foreign producers?
16. Can Europeanization of national cinemas lead into some unnatural "transnational cultural diffusion", that is, diffusion of cultural norms, identities and ideas into a politically correct model (as "Europpuding" used to be in the past)?
17. How much are your films visible in the West European market? How the situation can be improved?
18. Do you consider the co-productions you have been involved in as Serbian or European films?
19. Is the new Law on Cinematography good enough and does it correspond to the needs and conditions of the Serbian cinematography? What is the reason for its bad implementation?

## Author's Biography

### PERSONAL DETAILS:

- **Name:** Petar Mitrić; **Date of birth:** 27 January 1983; **Place of birth:** Tuzla, Yugoslavia; **Place of Residence:** Vienna; **Contact:** [petarmitric@yahoo.com](mailto:petarmitric@yahoo.com)

### EDUCATION & QUALIFICATIONS:

- 2011-2014 – MA in Global Studies – joint degree by the Roskilde University (Denmark) and University of Vienna (Austria)
- 2006-2007 - MA in History at the Central European University in Budapest
- 2001-2006 - BA from the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philology (Serbia)
- 2004-2005 - The School of Film Directing at the Student Center DK "Studentski grad", Belgrade (Serbia)
- 2004-2005 Belgrade Open School, Department of Advanced Undergraduate Studies, Belgrade (Serbia)

### WORK EXPERIENCE

**Organisation:** Film production company "Nina Kusturica Projects", Vienna

**Job title:** Audience designer, Producer

**Dates employed:** **From:** January 2014 **To:** Present

**Organization:** Austrian Film Institute (MEDIA Desk Austria)

**Job title:** Trainee/Project Assistant

**Dates employed:** **From:** October 2012 **To:** March 2013  
June 2013 November 2013

**Organization:** Council of Europe's film fund EURIMAGES, Strasbourg

**Job title:** Researcher

**Dates employed:** **From:** March 2013 **To:** June 2013

**Organization:** Danish Film Institute (International Office), Copenhagen

**Job title:** Assistant to the DFI's International Producer

**Dates employed:** **From:** January 2012 **To:** September 2012

**Organisation:** Translation Agency "Perolo", Belgrade (Serbia)

**Job title:** Project Manager

**Dates employed:** **From:** July 2007 **To:** August 2011

**Organisation:** *THINK TANK – Balkan Magazine* (regional cultural magazine) -publisher: "Sluzbeni Glasnik"– Belgrade, under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Serbia

**Job title:** Journalist

**Dates employed:** **From:** July 2007 **To:** 2010



**RECENT WORKSHOPS AND CONFERENCES**

- April 8-12, 2014 – participant at the CineVision – workshop for distribution of short and middle-length films organized by NISI MASA, Brive (France)
- March 18-19, 2014 – speaker at the Industry meeting related to the digital distribution during the “Diagonale” film festival in Graz (Austria)
- September 17-20, 2013 – Reporter at the 3<sup>rd</sup> MEDICI workshop on film financing strategies in Europe “Film-Funding Journey”, Brussels (Belgium);
- August 17-24, 2013 – participant at the Sarajevo Film Festival’s Talent Campus;
- June 23-July 6, 2013 – participant and a scholarship holder at the summer school “Documentary Film in Digital Century” organized by the Central European University in Budapest;
- March 12-17, 2013 - participants at the “Go Short Student Film Campus” in Nijmegen, The Netherlands;
- January 25-27, 2013 – Film journalism workshop GENERAZINE in Strasbourg, France.
- November 2012 – Reporter at the 2<sup>nd</sup> MEDICI workshop on film-financing strategies in Europe “Film–Funding Journey”, Retz (Austria);
- December 2011 – Speaker and curator of the showcase of modern Serbian cinema at the Festival of New Latin American Cinema in Havana;

**PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS:**

- “Transition in Poland as seen by the Polish Cinematography” in: *Collection of Essays* (2006), Belgrade: Belgrade Open School, pp. 82-103.