

MASTERARBEIT

Titel der Masterarbeit

“Regional and International Community in Conflicts Resolution: the Case of Somalia”

verfasst von

Abdishakur MOHAMMAD ABDULAH

angestrebter akademischer Grad

(Master of Arts (MA))

Wien, 2015

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt: A 066 824
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt: Masterstudium Politikwissenschaft
Betreuerin / Betreuer: Univ.-Doz. Dr. Johann Wimmer

Acknowledgement

First and foremost I would like to express my deep gratitude to my supervisor, Univ.-Doz. Dr. Johann Wimmer for his support and useful suggestions, which motivated and encouraged me every time I attend his session. I am also indebted to my uncle Ahmed-Wali Mo'alim, without his encouragement, this study would not have been completed. My deepest gratitude also goes to my wife, Hamdi Hassan who has been very patient with me during the long days and nights of my writing. I would like also to thank my friend, Abdikani, with whom I have had the pleasure of sharing views and exchanged ideas.

Dedicated to the Somali People

Table of Contents	Pages
Acknowledgments.....	II
Dedication.....	III
Map of Somalia.....	VII
Abbreviations.....	VIII
Chapter One:	
Introduction and Theoretical Perspective on Conflict	
Introduction.....	1
1.1. Historical Background of Somalia	
1.1.1 Early History and Colonial Division.....	1
1.1.2. Somalia Post-Independence.....	4
1.1.3 Military Rule and Civil war.....	6
1.1.4 State Collapse after Siad Barre Regime.....	9
1.2. Statement of the Problem.....	11
1.3. Methodology and Significance of the Study.....	12
1.4. Organization of the Study.....	13
1.5 Theoretical Perspective of Conflict Resolution	
1.5.1. Conceptualizing the Term ‘Social Conflict’.....	13
1.5.2. Social Conflict Analysis.....	14
1.5.3. Origins of Social conflict.....	15
1.5.4. Stages of Social Conflict.....	16
1.5.5. Third Party ‘Conflict Resolution’.....	17
Chapter Two	
Traditional Clan Structure and Institutions of Somali Society	
2.1 Clan Structure.....	20
2.1.1 Clan family.....	20
2.2 Traditional Institutions: Pastoral Democracy.....	24
2.2.1 The Heer (Customary Law).....	24
2.2.1 Juridical Political Authority: the Shir (assembly).....	25
2.3 The Dominance of kinship Relations.....	27
2.3.1 Kinship as Socio-Political and Economic Dominance.....	28

Chapter Three

Conflict in Somalia: Roots and Consequences

3.1. Origins of the Conflict.....	31
3.1.1. Colonial Legacy.....	31
3.1.2. Rapid Union and South-North Disparity.....	32
3.1.3. Military Coup in 1969 and Socialist Policies.....	33
3.1.4. Cold War Legacy and Ogaden war.....	34
3.1.5. Formation of Opposition Groups and Lack of Coherence.....	36
3.2. Consequence of State Collapse.....	37
3.2.1. Internal Consequence.....	37
3.2.1.1. The Breakdown of Economy and Humanitarian Tragedy.....	37
3.2.1.2. Separatist and Subnational Governance.....	39
3.2.1.3 Religious Extremists.....	39
3.2.2. Regional and International Consequences.....	42

Chapter Four

Intervention of International Community in Somalia during 1990s

4.1. How United Nations Get Involved In Somalia.....	45
4.1.1. Decision Making by Security Council to Intervene.....	46
4.1.2. The Establishment of UNOSOM.....	47
4.1.3. Efforts of the UNOSOM.....	49
4.2. ‘Operation Restore Hope’.....	53
4.2.1. The Deployment of UNITAF: Implication.....	55
4.2.2. The Issue of Disarmament.....	57
4.3. Participation of International community in the Conflict of War.....	59
4.3.1. June Incidence and US Withdrawal	60
4.4. Combination of Humanitarian and Military Intervention.....	61
4.4.1. Nature and Scale of the Conflict.....	65

Chapter Five

Reconciliation Process: The Role of Regional and International Community

5.1. Attempted Peace Process: The Role of IGAD.....	66
5.1.1. Background of IGAD.....	66
5.1.2. Djibouti Peace Conference of 1991.....	67

5.1.3. Sodere Peace Conference.....	69
5.1.4. Arta Peace Process of 2000.....	71
5.1.5 Eldoret Peace Process.....	73
5.1.5.1 The Establishment of TFG.....	74
5.1.5.2 The Invasion of Ethiopia and Emergence of Al-Shabab Extremists.....	86
5.1.6. Djibouti Peace Agreement and the Establishment of TFG II.....	87
5.2.1. IGAD’s Contribution to Peace and Security.....	79
5.2.3 Incapability of TFG.....	81
5.3 The Role of UN in Somali Peacebuilding.....	82
5.3.1. UNPOS.....	83
5.3.2 UNSOM.....	84

Chapter Six

Prospects of Peace and Current Developments in Somalia

6.1 The End of Transitional Period.....	86
6.1.1 The Roadmap Process.....	87
6.2 The Establishment of Federal State.....	88
6.2.1 AMISOM and Security.....	90
6.2.2 The Defeat of Al-Shabab and AMISOM Military Advance.....	91
6.3 Political Development of SFG: Opportunities and Challenges.....	94
6.3.1 Policy strategy.....	94
6.3.2. Opportunities.....	97
6.3.2.1 Creation of Regional Administration.....	97
6.3.2.2 Security Situation.....	98
6.4 Challenges.....	99
6.4.1 Federalism.....	100
6.4.2 Security and Building National Army.....	103

Conclusion.....105

Bibliography.....107

Abstract.....111

Curriculum VI tea.....112

Map of Somali Republic



Source: https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_pol02.jpg

Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSC	AU Peace Security Council
ARS	Alliance of Re-liberation for Somalia
ASWJ	Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
EU	European Union
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
IDPs	Internationally Displaced Peoples
HLTF	High Level Task Force HLTF
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority for Drought Desertification
IGASO	Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia
IJA	Interim Juba Administration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of African Union
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
PSBG	Peace and State building Goals
PDRY	Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
ROE	Rule of Engagement
SCIC	Somali Council of Islamic Courts
SCSC	Supreme Court of Sharia Council
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SDU	Somali Democratic Union
SFG	Somali Federal Government
SNA	Somali National Army
SNC	Somali National Congress
SNM	Somali National Movement
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRC	Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SRSO	Special Representative of the Secretary-General

SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SYL	Somali Youth League
TFA	Transitional Federal Assembly
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TFIs	Transitional Federal institutions
TFP	Transitional Federal Parliament
UNO	United Nation Organization
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nation Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office in Somalia
UNSC	United Nation Security Council
US	United States of America
USC	United Somali Congress
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WSLM	West Somali Liberation Movement

Chapter One

Introduction and Theoretical Perspective on conflict resolution

1. Introduction

Democratic Republic of Somalia collapsed in January 1991 and the country has been without a functioning state and a central government lost the power of legitimacy to control its territory. More than two decades, Somalia is experiencing both political and humanitarian tragedy. The military regime ruled by Mohammad Siad Bare was overthrown in 1991, and as a result regional fiefdoms under clan administration and powerful warlords emerged throughout the country, capital being the most affected by endless wars. Somaliland and Puntland in the north and east parts of the country have succeeded some sort of stability, while the southern part has been largely affected by violence as various clans, warlords and Islamist groups have repeatedly competed for power and resources. Somali civil war became endless and one of the most complicating regional conflict in Africa. It became a major concern for the regional states and as well as international communities. From 1991 and 2004, Somalia was without central political authority. It was first in 2004 when Somalia's Transitional Federal Parliaments was inaugurated in Kenya and elected Abdulahi Yusuf as the President of Somalia. In this section of instruction historical overview of Somalia and theoretical perspective on conflict will be precisely highlighted.

1.1 Historical Background of Somalia

1.1.1 Early Histories and Colonial Division

Somali people used to live in the Horn of Africa for a long time of period as a nomadic pastoralism being their main livelihood source. In the middle of the 19th century, the Somali people experienced massive migration into territories inhabited by other ethnic groups (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 114). It was Ahmed Gurey (1506-1543) who successfully conquered large parts of Abyssinia (Ethiopia and Eritria), when the Somali clans united to have a common cause for the first time:

“But the subsequent evaporation of the newly expanded state and its highland conquests- which reached within 50 miles of present day Addis Ababa- foreshadowed the implausibility of strong state enduring within the realities of Somali national identity. There is evidence that the early-city states scattered along the Eastern Somali shores emerged with distinct Swahili Arab influences” (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 10)

Imperialism and Division

The first contact between Somali people and Europeans was trade relationship through which colonialism was introduced into the Somali territories. In the beginning of the tenth century, the coastal cities of Somalia had been a passageway between the pastoral Somali hinterland and regional commercial centres in south-eastern Africa, Egypt, and coastal parts of Arabia, Persia and even far away China (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 10). Arab and Persian traders facilitated and created network relationship in connecting Somalia to the rest of the world and as a result Islamic religion and Arab culture was introduced in the Horn of Africa.

Based on this trade relationship, new system of political institution was introduced and became inevitable. Coastal cities like Zeila, Berbera, Barawe and Marka became strategic as commerce developed and urban administration was established. The main aim was to introduce urban bureaucratic structure, law and order to cope up with this newly cultural and commercial development in the region (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 10-11). ‘Middle Eastern traders on the Somali coast wrote the prologue to the gradual incorporation of Somali life into the evolving regional and global system’.

However, a destructive attack of European colonialism on the African continent affected the Horn of African region in general, and the history of Somali society changed definitely into another direction. In 1869, immediately after the Suez Canal was opened, Horn of Africa continued to be strategically significant for the world powers because of the Red Sea becoming the shortest route connecting Europe with the Middle East and Far East Asia. Thus, the colonial powers rushed to expand their already established spheres of influence in the sub-region. In 1884, Berlin Conference during the ‘course of the Scramble for Africa’, Britain, France, Italy as well as Ethiopia under Menelik, competed among themselves for territorial acquisition in the sub-region

(Laitin and Samatar 1987: 22). Accordingly, the Somali people and their inhabited territories were divided into five separate divisions under imperial powers.

For its strategic significance, British occupied the port of Aden in Yemen in 1889 as a strategically vital port for contact with the subcontinent. Port Aden's commercial need, particularly for commodities such as meat supplies soon brought the adjacent northern Somali coast with its abundance of sheep, goats, camels, and cattle to London's attention (Lyon and Samatar 1996: 12). By 1886, the British colonialist and representatives of some major kin groups from the Northern Somalia reached an official agreement, which later turned into a protectorate.

The French arrived in the region at about the same as British came. The French, willing to have Ethiopian natural resources as well as interesting to have port in order to connect trade network between Madagascar and Indochina, invaded the coastal areas of Somalia. Between 1883 and 1997, French conceded northeast Somali cost and declared French Somaliland, presently known as Djibouti. In 1890s, Italy arrived in the Somali territory and in 1893, officially created its colony in the southern part of Somalia (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 48). The Italians came late to the division of Africa because of their own domestic unification. In the late 19th century, Ethiopia under Emperor Menilik expanded and invaded the eastern territory inhabited by Somali people. Great Britain facilitated Emperor Minilik to invade and consolidate his authority and administration over Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia. Furthermore, the British imperialist conquered north-eastern Kenya, where Somali pastoralists used to live and declared it as part of British colonial empire.

Accordingly, the Somali people were divided into five separate areas. Early Somali nationalists founded and organized armed opposition groups against this colonial partition and permanently fought to bring the five Somali territories into a single state, 'Greater Somalia' (Mohamoud 2006: 65). Somalia was the only country, which once fought for its independence against four imperial colonialists to unite its people.

1.1.2 Somalia Post-Independence

On 26th June 1960, the British north-western Somaliland became independent. Four days later, on the 1st July 1960, the Italian Somaliland gained its independence, and at the same date, the two territories united together and established the Republic of Somalia. Since there were other three territories still remaining under colony, the main political priority of the government in the post-independence period was the unification of all Somali territories including Ogaden, north-eastern Kenya and Djibouti. As a result, the idea of achieving 'Greater Somalia' into a single state influenced both internal and external policies of the country (Menkhaus 2007: 80). It can be argued that in addition to the perceived ancestral and religious commonness, Greater Somalia was a common idea that united all Somali politicians to be their agenda.

The notion of 'Greater Somalia' had a big impact on the Somali state politics. It had significantly affected the foreign policy of the newly formed government. The new Republic refused to recognize colonial borders that had divisive impacts on them, while the chapter of the OAU indicated that colonial borders must be intact and internally recognized borders. As far as Somalia is concerned, 'the adaptation of status quo principle affected for Somalis in losing all legal and diplomatic grounds for their claim for unification' (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 129). As a result, Somali politicians felt that they forced to attempt any possible means to achieve unification. Thus, foreign policy of the new republic based on greater Somalia resulted in diplomatic isolation, specifically within Sub-Saharan continent.

The period between 1960 and 1969, from the time of independence to the rise of military rule, a civilian government governed the country. The new republic was supposed to promote not only a less developed economy but also fragmented social political structures. One of the first challenges faced by the government was the legal and administrative system of the united Somali territories. Customary law and Italian administrative system were common and practiced in the southern part of the country practiced, whereas in the North, the British common law together with *Sharia* were common (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 73). This was later solved after a long debate by introducing a unified legal system, acceptable to both territories.

A new constitution was also immediately ratified after the independence in June 1961, in which Somalia would be 'a liberal democratic State'. But the absence of effective and transparent institutions, which supposed to implement the constitution, paved a way for all possible typed of political manipulation and corruption. A traditional inter-clan contest and completion dominated party politics and pluralistic liberal democracy. 'The combination of all these mall-governance, paralyzed the will and power of the government to address other urgent social and economic problems'. In addition to this, the new government failed to win diplomatic support for the issue of unification (Mahamoud 2006: 103). This was the period of the peak of Greater Somalia and this led the government's loss of popular legitimacy that is crucial for any political entity to ensure its existence.

The nature of unification of the two territories, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960, caused points of differences. Power sharing between the north and south became a challenge for the government to work effectively. The north politicians accused the south taking the main political positions of the state including the presidency, the prime ministership, more than two thirds of the senior cabinet posts, and the two top posts in the military forces and the police (Omar 1996: 2). Northern politicians expected that leadership would be rotated between the north and south as agreed, while others thought that the north would be marginalized from the rest of the country, partially Hargeisa, the capital of north, being far from the capital Mogadishu.

In addition to north-south inequality, the post independency political system was exposed to the interest of few corrupted ruling elites. The state was also seen the only strategic place to ensure private wealthy, resulting in the creation of a multitude of political parties (political parties being one way to join the contest of the regime membership). Thus, in 1964, the first post-independence national election, eighteen parties participated amid sharp accusations of corruptions and fraud (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 13). Out of these only three, the Somali Youth League (SYL), the Somali National Congress (SNC), and the Somali Democratic Union (SDU) had any national standing. Inter-clan based political parties on the eve of the elections became a typical characteristic of the Somali experiment with liberal democracy. The 1969 election demonstrated that this kind of political competition that was 'symptomatic of deeper maladies.' In this election, 60 political parties participated and more than one thousand

candidates competed to vie for 122 seats. In order to win the election, the ruling party, SYL, raided the national treasury to buy votes.

There were all possible types of political ‘maneuver’ and ‘intrigue’. However, at national and local level, little was publicly debated. On contrary, each candidate identified his campaign with sub-clan interests, in order to make sure the probability of winning. This kind of spoiled political party system encouraged the rise of tribalism. As a result, the SYL won the election of 1969 with seventy-three seats, while the Somali National Congress (SNC) had eleven and the rest went to other parties. Based on this manipulated result, four defeated political parties attempted to challenge the result. However, the Supreme Court ruled on technical grounds that it lacked any legal authority to adjudicate (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 13). The first nine years of independent government did not create a state responsive and responsible to the challenges facing the Somali society.

1.1.3. Military Rules and the Civil War

On October 15, 1969, a military coup took place in Somalia, after a police officer shot the president Abdirashid Ali Sharmake in the town of Laas Anood, in the north. Six days later, General Mohammed Siad Barre, a military leader took the power with a bloodless coup. The assassination of the president was in fact not backed by the military, though they were planning to take power from the civilian government. This armed force was organized, as a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), which was warmly welcomed by the population as they were considered as ‘heroes who had left the barracks to save the nation’. The SRC immediately achieved significant progress both social and economic development that the civilian parliament failed to implement. The SRC selected an official orthography for the Somali language, programs of adult literacy, settlement of populations and anti-corruption campaign (Menkhaus 2007: 79; Lyons and Samatar 1995: 14). However, in 1970, the military regime adopted ‘scientific socialism’ as regime’s guiding ideology and the government introduced policies to prohibit clan or ‘tribal identities’. The military regime abolished the National Assembly and the constitution. It was declared that the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) with President Siad Barre being a chairman would lead the country.

But in the mid-1970s, the political atmosphere began to change. It had become clear that the SRC was not willing to restore democracy, as it promised. It would keep to itself more on concentrated power and privileges. The SRC created a special secret police to punish all opposition groups and individuals. In 1971, the SRC executed Mohamed Ainshe and Salad Gabeire, two senior coup maker Generals, as the first victims of the military rule and a warning indication to any opposition group. Thus, as Lyons and Ahmed Samatar (1995) indicated:

“Siad Barre permitted state sanctioned veneration of the ‘Revolution’ to be twisted into a cult of personality and sycophantic flattery hitherto unseen in the history of the country”
(Lyons and Samatar 1995: 15).

Since, it was the peak of pan-Somali nationalism, and the regime’s power consolidation with the help of Soviet, the military should take significant issues towards the unification of Somali territories in a single state. The regime provided military support to the West Somali Liberation Movement (WSLM) (a military front that established to free Ogaden from Ethiopia and fought against the central government of Ethiopia led by Mengistu Haila Mariam). Moreover, in 1977, the Somali national army crossed the border into Ethiopia to support the WSLM (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 173). In this moment, Siad Barre believed that it is the right and appropriate time to liberate Ogaden because of Ethiopia’s post-revolutionary weakness and Somali’s well-equipped military.

At the beginning, the Somalis quickly made deep advances and large parts of the southeastern region of Ethiopia, inhabited by Somalis, came under the control of WSLM, supported by Somali forces. Strategic towns of Harar and Dire-Dawa were isolated from the rest of Ethiopia. But, the success was short lived and military power balance shifted into the side of Ethiopia after the USSR directly involved in the conflict by assisting Ethiopian regime. The Ethiopian military force, strongly supported by Soviet military technology and tens of thousands of Cuban troops participated in the war and as a result, the Somali troops were pushed back across to the border (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 15). The Ogaden war in 1977 was one of the main mistakes made by military regime. It was political and military defeat for the regime and meant the beginning of the state collapse in Somalia. Opposition groups were formed against the

regimes and the dream of 'Greater Somalia' as a legitimating ideology for Siad Barre's regime failed:

“The Ogaden debacle also led to a search for clan scapegoats, and clan cleavages burst into open. The regime's issue of clan rivalries and patronage, on the one hand, and repression, on the other, to maintain authority became increasingly clear in the 1980s. As Barre's power eroded, his reliance on arbitrary force grew until by the 1980s, he relied upon little but manipulations of clan identities to remain in power” (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 15).

The civil war

The First domestic armed opposition to the Barre regime emerged in April 1978, immediately following the Ogaden war. A group of disaffected officers from the Majerteen sub-clan attempted unsuccessful coup. Although some of the conspirators, were captured and either jailed or executed, others escaped to Ethiopia, where they launched the Somali Salvation Front (later, Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The SSDF, backed by Ethiopia, Libya, Yemen and Peoples democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), received military support and started guerrilla war in the central region of the country. However, SSDF made little success and its troops and leaders remained in exile. The SSDF divided into two groups and disappeared in the mid-1980s, but was succeeded by a number of other clan-based rebel movements. The Somali National Movement (SNM) was also formed in North that represented the Isaaq clan and waged significant attack against the government in the north. The Hawiye clan, inhabiting the capital Mogadishu and its surrounding area created their own political opposition party, namely the United Somali Congress (USC). Ogaden clan, inhabiting in the South of the country, also organized Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (Bryden and Brickhill 2010: 243). All these opposition parties were established spontaneously against the regime and represented respective tribe interests and thus, lacked an appropriate political program.

Not only domestic issues contributed to the civil war and state collapse, changes in the international political development, which was conducive to the consolidation of Siad Barre's power, has also facilitated his downfall. The US government suspended all military and economic assistance to the regime in 1989 with allegations of increased human rights violations and a lack of political and economic reforms (Mohamaud 2006: 135). As a result of the combination of these two internal and external factors, the

insurgents advanced across most of the regions in the country and the government ceased to exist and lost power of legitimacy and begun to collapse. The military bases and vast armouries of the Somali government fell into rebel and civilian hands. Tens of thousands deserted with their weapons, many joining new clan militias. The dismantling of the state's monopoly on the use of force was complete.

1.1.4 State Collapse after Siad Barre Regime

Although, these clan-based opposition groups were determined to dispose Siad Barre regime, they lacked broad nationalistic idea and represent their specific clan, if not the leaders' individual, interests. They had neither political program nor the will to cooperate with each other to form a transitional government. In January 1991, following Siad Barre's overthrow, the complete state of Somalia collapsed into chaos and anarchy (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 21). Tribal fighting, looting, lawlessness, anarchy and consequent famine were most profound in Southern Somalia, particularly in riverine area and the capital Mogadishu, where no one faction said to be victorious and dominant.

In central and north-eastern Somalia, the former SSDF leader and (first TFG President, Abdulahi Yusuf), succeeded to win the support of local people and stabilised relative peace and stability that reduced looting and also prevented widespread famine as happened in the south. In north-western Somalia, the SNM took power and control. The north-western region, being former British colony declared itself 'the independent Somaliland Republic'. The SNM claims to represent the interest of the majority of the population in the former British Somaliland (Bryden and Brickhill 2010: 250). The Somaliland continued to insist on independence despite lack of international recognition.

After state collapsed and country divided, armed opposition groups launched fighting against each other to attain the upper hand. The main power struggle between two strong warlords, namely General Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, became symbolic of the general situation in south Somalia. In the days following Siad Barre's flight from Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi Mohammed, the leader of the USC faction associated with Manifesto group, proclaimed himself interim president and began

appointing a cabinet. His rival in the USC, General Mohamed Farah Aideed, who claimed to represent the interest of his sub-clan Habar Gedir, from the Hawiye clan and other factional leaders refused to accept Ali Mahdi's leadership. A destructive war broke out in Mogadishu as Lyons and Samatar (1996) indicated:

“A confused mixture of competition between factions of the USC, a personal leadership struggle between Aideed and Ali Mahdi, a fight between two sub-clans, the Habar Gedir and Abgal, and a desperate struggle to win public office and financial benefits such positions promised.” (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 22)

While the two groups were leading an intensive fight among themselves, the forces of the ousted government, the Marehan, and some from the larger clan family, the Darod, fled south across the Juba River, where they regrouped in the traditional Darod territory from Kismayo upriver to Bardera and on to the Ethiopian border, repeatedly tried to reoccupy Mogadishu, the capital (Issa-Salwe 1994: 74). As the result of attacks and counter-attacks among the different factions, the whole country and in particular the southern part was driven into a state of chaos. The country remained without central political authority until 2004 when an interim government was formed in Mbgati (Kenya) and exported to Baidoa (southern part of Somalia).

As the consequence of the conflicts, economic activity was paralyzed. Agricultural production was decimated to nearly nil. The outbreak of Famine in 1991 and 2011, which put the lives of almost million populations at risk, was largely due to the persisted fighting. The destruction of the country, killings of innocent people and intimidation became common in the country (Sufi 2003: 282). To escape from these tragedies, hundreds of people fled the country and became refugees in the neighbouring countries; tens of thousands were displaced inside the country and lost the livelihoods. The most dramatic violence and the source of the images that later came to international attention occurred in the area between Kismayu, Mogadishu, and Beled wayn. Armed teenage gangs known *Mooryaan* emerged began to terrorize the countryside and urban areas (Lyons and Samatar 1995. 22).

Northern part of Somalia also did escape totally the fall-out from the defeat of Siad Barre's regime. Once the central government collapsed, provincial authorities immediately gave up. The SNM militias in the north defined itself as the new and rightful power in northern Somalia. Soon, the SNM's armed winning began to intimidate non-Isaaq areas and pressure them into accepting SNM political authority. Some battles took place in several areas. In the end, the SNM achieved at least acquiescence from most residents of northern Somalia. In May 1991, with its dominance established and the South in complete disarray, the SNM's leadership declared the independence of the north (the old British Somaliland) as the new Somaliland Republic (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 23), but not yet internationally recognized.

To conclude this chapter of historical background, since its independence in 1960 the gentle and easily governable people of Somalia have hardly enjoyed a comfortable existence, due to inefficient and corrupted leaders. The post-independence period saw corruption, malpractices, nepotism and killings, creating an opportunity for the military takeover in 1969. Before, earlier wounds could be healed; the people of Somalia found themselves in a situation worse than the previous ones. Even the collapse of dictatorial regime of Moammed Siad Barre did not put an end to the suffering of the people. During the post-independence period there was hardly and protest, demonstration or strike against the oppressive policies of the government and treated its people cruelty. By 1969, the Somali parliamentary democracy experienced mal governance, corruption and gave little relevance to the daily challenges facing the population. After the defeat of Siad Barre regime, the state totally collapsed into chaos and tribal conflicts spread throughout the country (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 23). As a consequence, all institutions and provincial authorities gave up and economic activity was paralyzed. Famine and drought broke out which killed thousands of people.

1.2 Statement of the Problem and Hypothesis

Since 1992, when the conflict and civil war reached at the worst stage, several efforts of the third party conflict management have been under taken with the aim of averting the worst consequences. These peace efforts were mainly regional and international level. Most of the peace process succeeded on bringing the majority of the conflicting parties together and even produced several agreements signed by the majority of the conflicting

parties who participated in the peace conferences. However, fourteen peace conferences and conflict resolution process under coordination of regional (IGAD) and international community have failed since the collapse of Somali state in 1991. The failure of efforts and the continuing state of Somalia without any central political authority signifies political uncertainty in modern context of international state-system.

Thus, it is this failure by regional and international community's peace attempt, which makes conflict resolution in Somalia scholarly interesting and deeply analyse it. This study focuses on understanding the success and failures of the major peace reconciliation process and the playing role of regional and international organizations contributing to conflict resolution in Somalia. Thus, this research will deeply involve analysing research areas such as factors behind IGAD's involvement in Somali conflict resolution and the interests of IGAD member states in Somalia. The study will also examine whether IGAD as an east African regional organization has political will and economical capacity to engage such a complicated Somali conflict.

1.3 Methodologies and Significance of the Study

Methodologically, the study will deeply look at the complex causes of the Somali endless conflict, peace process, regional, and international roles. Analytical and descriptive approaches will be the main methods in the study, where peace negotiation process, reconciliation conferences and regional and international community resolutions will be employed. The major principle source of data will be documents and academic literature that include books, articles and different reports.

The impact of Somali political and humanitarian crises was not only limited to Somalia, but also affected regional and international communities and even became prolonged. To grasp various aspects about the Somali conflict and how the conflict became complicated, it seemed vital for me to consider and evaluate the issue more detail than the public media covers. Thus, this study is significant, as it gives, some kind of possibility to acquire considerable information about the issue, both to those who interest the subject and the author himself. Moreover, since the study discusses the roots and causes of the conflict, it contributes to the negotiations and efforts of statebuilding

in Somalia. In the second part of this chapter, I will overview theoretical perspective on conflict.

1.4. Organization

Thus research is organized in to six chapters. The first chapter of the study is about introduction that highlights the theoretical perspective of conflict resolution and historical background of Somalia from the period of impendence to the state collapse in1991. The second and third chapters deal about the traditional social structures, roots and causes of the Somali crises respectively. The fourth and fifth chapters will assess international community's intervention in Somalia and the major attempted peace process since 1991. In the last chapter, I will analyse the prospects of peace and current developments in Somalia, and finally I will conclude it.

1.5. Theoretical Perspectives on Conflict Resolution

1.5.1 Conceptualizing the Term 'Social Conflict'

The term conflict can be commonly understood as a struggle or contest between people with opposing interests, ideas, beliefs, values, or targets. It is easy to understand the meaning when someone says, for example, 'I have a conflict with someone'. Conflict usually emerges in circumstances where people are intermixed and interdependent. If societies or groups are independent from each other, the probability to have opposing ideas and values is little (Makhubella 2010: 17).

Opposing values and goals indeed imply the possible rise of 'disharmony' or 'disagreement' about particular subject of interest that highlights the main theme of social interaction among the social actors. The term conflict however, is usually linked with values and judgments, despite the various ways of grasping it in the respective socio-cultural context. In this study, this indicates the lack of introducing a common and agreed definition of explaining the core idea of the term 'conflict'. However, In particular:

“The term ‘social conflict’ is something endangering to as ‘natural’ perceived ‘harmony’, ‘order’, or ‘commonness’, act of striking together; clash, competition or collusion. It is a sort of social interaction that differs from a ‘natural’ or ‘normal’ perceived interaction among the social agents. It is a social phenomenon, in which two or parts or social agents are involved who have mutual interference of incompatible approaches to and /or perceptions over an ‘issue’ of their interaction (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 19).

Idealists argue that the term social conflict and conflicting beliefs is reciprocal problem between interdependent groups that requires to be dealt with a comprehensive and collaborative endeavor. This leads identifying and respecting the legitimacy of each other’s value and the need to look for appropriate solution convincing the demands of actors engaged in the conflict issue. But, the Somali conflict evolved into a situation of troublesome, which is not linked in the origin. Therefore, Somali conflict requires to be differently handled and be given more awareness by the mediators (Makhubella 2010: 17).

1.5.2 Social Conflict Analysis

Level of analysis

After conceptualizing the term social conflict, it is also significant to distinguish the objects of conflict analyses based on the given particular social level on which the analysis emphasizes. Level of analysis in other word means the social level at which the conflict takes place. Thus, to differentiate, conflict at individual level means the conflict that emerges within and individual specifically when his motives are rejected and incapable of taking decisions. While conflict at collective level could take place at international level among different parts such as class, ethnic, racial or other interest groups. More over Gebremeskel Tekie (2009) described four areas of conflict study and four levels of analysis respectively:

“Social conflict involving structures of dominance and inequality between class or interest groups within a society; Industrial conflict between organized labor and management groups within an established adversarial system; organizational conflict involving small groups (units, departments, etc.). Within a cooperative system; and international conflict between nations within the loosely defined global system” (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 21).

- at individual level: intra-personal conflict;
- at societal level: interpersonal conflict;
- at societal level: inter-group conflict;
- at international level: inter-societal conflict, and interstate conflict

Such categorizations and differentiations of conflict are sufficient input to indicate and understand that conflict takes every level of social life. But, it is vital to point out those categorizations between social levels remain only in the theoretical aspect of the social study, rather than in the real world. This is because of complicated social reality classified by ‘overlapping and cross-cutting among individual, group, State and international systems’. Accordingly, a ‘social group’, can be interchangeably used as state, ‘ethnic group’, a ‘clan’ or ‘tribe’ in the Somali social cluster subject. Societal and inter-societal level of conflicts should be focused in this study as applicable to Somalia conflict perspective (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 21).

1.5.3 Conceptualizing Origins of Social conflict

It is important to explain and understand the theoretical aspect of causes and origins of social conflict. But the definitions of such theoretical perspective dealing with the origins of social conflict differ based on the historical and social context. Some scholars explain the origin of the social conflict from the ‘subjective’ point of explanation by arguing ‘conflict and fighting is innate in all social animals including human being’. The classification of human conflict depends on ‘instinctual theories of aggregation, competition for self-preservation and self-assertion’. Other scholars focus that conflict originates from ‘poor communication, misperception, miscalculation, socialization, and other unconscious processes. These scholars deny the ‘instinctual theory’ and the ‘incompatibility of interests’ among conflicting groups as origin of the social conflict (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 23).

From point view of ‘objective’ theoretical explanation, realist scholars contend that social conflict appears due to each social group which ‘often pursue individual or national interests that are incompatible with the interests of one or more social groups interacting within a social arena’. This view is widely accepted particularly in

international relations. Such incompatible values and interests focus on security, power and prestige of the concerned parts (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 23).

However, explaining the origin and cause of Somali conflict, one can argue that the Somalia conflict was intractable and somehow beyond power struggle. Omar (1996) pointed out:

“The world wondered why this had happened to Somali, the most homogenous race in the continent of Africa, who speak only one language, unlike other parts of Africa where people speak different languages, who believe in one religion, Islam, unlike many parts of Africa, where people believe in different religions. The answer is simple power struggle. Power knows no father, no mother, no brother and no sister. It knows no friend or neighbor. Those who fight for power always claim to be doing so for the people. At the same time they do not care how much misery and death they cause to their same people” (Omar 1996: 20).

Indeed, the cause and origin of Somali conflict cannot be defined power struggle alone as Omar mentioned in the above quotation. It is multiple and originated from a hatred, manipulation, dominance and widespread violence (Makhubella, 2010: 28). In other words, the cause of Somali conflict traces back to perpetuated old hostility between tribes and clans.

1.5.4 Stages of Social Conflict

According to Marxist school of thought, social conflict is conceptualized as dialectic or reasoning and hierarchical stages by which a given society is transformed from one phase to another phase of social change. Marx viewed class conflict process as evolving in stages, where each stage emerging from the previous one and eventually cause to complete revolution. Marx argued that the last phase of social conflict forms peaceful and secure society, as no more class interest exists (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 30). However, according to ‘Contingence Model of Third Party Intervention’ introduced by Fisher and Keashly Four stages of social conflict are differentiated as follows:

“Stage 1) polarization, the dominant mode of communication is discussion and debate 2) polarization state change to a reliance on interpretation (often misinterpretation). If the conflict is not de-escalated, stage 3), segregation, can be reached where the communication is limited merely on issue of threats, that can lead to stage of 4), destruction, in which the conflicting parties have no direct communication with each other except through violence means” (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 32).

As indicated above, social conflict takes place because of conflicting values and ideas of social groups, each one pursuing to legitimize particular interest over the other. Contest and competition over power between social groups changes from one stage to another through time and course in line with the change of mode of communication between opposing groups, but the roots and causes of the conflict exist as static (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 32; Makhubella 2010: 17).

1.5.5 Third Party ‘Conflict Resolution’

Concept of ‘Conflict Resolution’ and ‘Conflict Management’

In the theoretical and practical perspective of social conflict, misunderstanding between the notions of conflict resolution and conflict management became visible. The notion conflict ‘resolution’ also conflict ‘reconciliation’ has been one of most used mediation terminologies to deal with conflict. It emphasizes the need to easily grasp the origin of the conflict, development and ending. While the concept ‘conflict management’ indicates that conflict arises and develops in a specific anticipatable design or patterns that can be grasped and managed. In this study, both concepts can be interchangeably used as they, are perceived in finding solutions for social conflict (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 33).

Based on this definition, conflict resolution or management consists of a diversified methods, process, strategies, approaches engaged in reducing the risks of conflict and also facilitating peaceful ending of conflict. Accordingly, ‘third party’ conflict resolution or conflict management implies an external group or body that is not in ‘principal constituent to a conflict. The term third party conflict resolution can be described as Gebremeskel Teki quoted from George (1992):

“...As a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties own efforts, where the conflicting parties or their representatives seek assistance, or accept an offer of help, from an individual, group, state or organization to change, affect or influence their perception or behavior without restoring to physical force”... (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 35).

Accordingly, third party conflict resolution can be conceptualized as a process, a social actor, or lack of influencing the action of opposing groups. There are strategies, mechanisms and means, which the third part conflict resolution or conflict management uses to assist the conflicting parties to reach an agreement (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 35).

Social Actor as Third Party Conflict Resolution

Conflict among social groups can be generally resolved and mediated by several social actors such as respected individuals, social group, state, International Governmental Organizations (IOs) and Non-Governmental International Organizations (NGOS). Based on the nature and complexity of the concerned social conflict, the activity of the third party social actor conflict resolution can be divided into ‘two tracks’ (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 36).

‘Track one’. Here in this track of third party conflict resolution, states, International Governmental organizations are main actors dealing with social conflict settlements. States and International Governmental Organizations appoint popular politicians like ambassadors as their representatives to organize, coordinate and mediate conflict resolution efforts. These social actors recognize the endeavor of the representatives and the outcome of the conflict resolution process (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 36).

There are different cognitions and grounds that motivate a state or International Governmental Organization to take the role and responsibility of third party conflict resolution. Domestic securities and economic interests are the major prominent reasons that motivate a state to initiate and take third party conflict resolution. The basic international norms, principles, establishment and diplomatic acceptance push regional and international Governmental organizations to lead third party conflict resolution, since, promoting peace and order is their main agenda and responsibility. This implies

their existence and popularity depends on engaging conflict resolution process. In the case of Somali, conflict both state actors and IOs involved in Somali conflict resolution based on their respective interests (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 36).

‘Track two’. In this process of third party conflict resolution, low level of social conflict is identified. Thus, individuals, NGOs and other non-state institutions initiate and take the role of third party conflict resolution. This is typical in traditional Somali conflict resolution where elders take the role by inviting conflicting parties to find solution (Gebremeskel Tekie 2009: 39). This indicates a bottom-up approach where the roots and origins of the conflict issues are debated and solved. In the second part of this chapter historical background of Somalia will be discussed.

Chapter Two

Traditional Clan Structure and Institutions of Somali Society

2.1 Clan Structure

2.1.1 Clan Family

Traditional clan-based structure is the most constituent social element among the pastoralist Somalis. According to Lewis (1994), clan segmentary lineage system can be distinguished into categories of clan family, clan, sub-clan, primary lineage and ‘diya¹-paying group’.

"Clan families are segmented agnatically by reference to apical ancestors in their genealogies by uterine ties or complementary filiation, so clans are similarly divided into a series of component patrilineages. The clan family is generally the upper limit of clanship. The genealogical length of a clan family is not fixed and can account up to 20 or more generations to a common ancestor" (Lewis 1994: 20).


The main traditional division of Somali clan families is traced back to definite genealogy of two men, Somali (Samaale), and Sab. The Dir, Darood, Isaaq and Hawiye clan families are descendants of Somali and mostly practice pastoral-nomadic economic way of life whilst the descendants of Sab are Rahanweyn and Digil, which exercise an agro nomadic life style. The majority of Somali population constitute these six groups. Apart from these six main clan families, there are also other minority groups in the country such as the Bantu origin who live in the Juba and Shebelle regions. There are also Reer Hamar, the Amarani (reer Barawe) who live mainly in Mogadisho, Marka and Barawe. These groups differ in their descent and most of them trace back to Arabs, Asians and other Middle East origin. There are other minority and despised groups within the pastoralist clans (Issa-Salwe 1994: 2). These are Gabooye ('Tumaal, Midgaan and Yibir'), and they are well known for their artisan talent and due to of this, they are despised by the pastoralists and isolated in terms of marriage interaction.

¹ The name diya-paying, which became standard administrative usage under the British, derives from the Arabic diya (Somali mag), meaning blood wealth (Lewis 1994: 20).

The most noticeable features of Somali segmentary lineage association traces patrilineal way of system and through genealogy (abtirsiinyo, 'reckoning of ancestors') where each individual has exact place in the society. According to Lewis (1994):

"Patrilineal descent (tol) indeed is all pervasive: most corporate activities are contingent upon it; in the veneration local lineage saints Islam is interpreted to some extent according to it; and politics stem from it. Everyone is born into a patrilineal, and thereby into a system of highly segmented patrilineal descent groups" (Lewis 1994: 19).

Map of Somali inhabited territories



Source: Lyons and Samatar (1995): *Somalia State Collapse Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction*.

Clans and sub clans: clans are the main divisions of Somali societies and act as a corporate political unit, where an individual both socio-political and economic aspect belong to the clan. Clans are similarly divided into a series of component patrilineages. Clan members derive their identity from their common agnatic descent rather than a sense of territorial belonging (Lewis 1994: 20). The term clan in other words is, the upper limit of the political action, has sense of territorial properties, and is often led by clan-head, but remains without centralized administration.

'Primary lineage': primary lineage is the most clearly identified subsidiary group within the clan. According to Lewis (1994):

"This unit represents the limits of exogamy; amongst its segments marriage is forbidden, although not considered incestuous, and most marriages are between people of different primary. Lineages within the segmentation of his primary lineage a person most frequently acts as a member of a diya-paying group" (Lewis 1994: 19).

Diya-paying group': the diya-paying group is the most salient social institution for each individual among the Somali clans. It consists a coalition of a few small lineages tracing descent to a common ancestor from between four and eight generations. Thus, all men are counted and defined by their belonging to a 'diya-paying group', and their social and political relations are defined by contracts called *xeer*²-the Somali customary law. Members of *diya*-paying groups are strongly connected under diya-paying system and, as a result have common responsibility towards any other group. The unity of the diya-paying group is assured under contribution of membership collective payment of blood-compensation. This means that if one individual of diya group is injured or killed by another clan, collective vengeance is made against the wronged clan or reparation will be made as a form of compensation paid by the wronged Clan that will be given and shared amongst all its male members (Lewis 1994: 21). Oppositely, if a person of a 'diya-paying group' commits homicide or injury outside his group, all other members are collectively responsible for his action and jointly concerned in affecting reparation.

2.2 Traditional Institutions: Pastoral Democracy

2.2.1 The Heer Customary law)

Social and 'Political relations of Somali society are clearly identified by contracts called *xeer*² (Heer). Ahmed Samatar (1995), Indicated:

"The heer as a customary law consists of common wisdom and constitute an unwritten but loosely accepted pan-Somali code of conduct'. Heer implies the values of interdependency and inclusiveness and thus formed the basis for social order. Heer did not eliminate strife but provided accepted and workable ways of dealing with disputes and conflicts. The combined meaning of these elements constituted the milieu in which the private and public were defined" (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 10).

According to the heer, it is collective obligation for each clan under the diya-paying umbrella groups to support each other in socio-political and jural responsibilities, specifically in paying compensation for acts committed by members of one of their group against the other. This collective obligation is, regardless of territorial distance, rather kinship belonging is what matter that connects clan individuals together. Based on this, clan leaders must observe the implementation of the contract; the *xeer* (Lewis 1994: 20). The introduction of Islam by Muslim Arabs in the eighth century consolidated the *heer* system.

"By infusing new moral language into the culture and requiring all believers to see one another as members of the larger fraternity, committed to doing and earning good in this world to secure salvation in the next life, the faith offered Somalis an additional way to expand and strengthen old models of behavior. The symbiosis of heer and Islam stipulated uprightness and piety, deepened meaning, and helped sharpen accepted procedures for participations in everyday living. The traditional pastoral Somali economy therefore was community-oriented in its production and kin-relations and, later; Islam principle defined the main frame of reference for political and cultural life" (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 10).

^{2 2} Xeer (heer) is the Somali old tradition of customary law that is entered within and between 'diya-paying groups'. It was the embodiment of common wisdom and constitutes unwritten but loosely accepted pan-Somali code of conduct (Lewis 1994: 20; Lyons and Ahmed Samatar 1995: 10)

Moreover, *heer* principles and values are the most significant methods for conflict resolution among Somali societies. The *heer* regulation settles tensions that arise between groups and lineages for the access to shortage of resources such as water and pasture during dry seasons. Furthermore, *heer* principles are used to apply for the situations of homicide, injury, robbery etc. The *heer* is unwritten law and the men who specialize in the procedures of *heer* laws are known as 'wisemen'. For instance, since the Somali language was oral, it was the successive aged elders of the pastoral nomads who were the repositories of the *heer* laws (Mohamoud 2006: 54). And it was in this way that every generation transmitted *heer* constitution to the next generation.

2.2.2 Juridical Political Authority: the *Shir* (assembly)

The Somali traditional political system became widely accepted and was disseminated through the society as a general as common in most kinship systems. The *Shir* is the assembly of tribal elders of which reflected in pastoral democracy where socio-political issues are debated and decisions are made rather than center for political control. During the *Shir*, clan leaders deal politico and juridical issues on a face-to-face basis (Mohamoud 2006: 54). This traditional political authority generally applies to all the people regardless of the territorial distance and close contact. However, it functions only when the kinship networks relationship between the tribal elders and others exist. Wisemen tribal elders were the only responsible organ for all socio-political and juridical issues concerning the given tribe and its formal relations with other tribes. However, the most democratic feature is that, these elders have no right to claim as rulers over their tribal individuals. They debate and chair based on the will of the majority (Issa-Salwe 1994: 5). In a pastoral democracy 'even the office of the clan-head is generally little more than a nominal title corresponding to the degree of social and territorial exclusiveness'.

This clan-based system of Somali Juridical-political authority structure is the dominant pastoral independence. It consists of various levels of tribal elders. The highest level of elders is often referred to as Boqor, Ugaas, Suldaan, Islaan, Garaad, Malaaq, Imaam, Isim, and Beeldaaje etc. These clan elders play the most important judicial responsibility and symbolically represent the clan members but they lack actual political power. They chair over the assembly (the *Shir*) and have little executive power and do not make

decisions. The Somali-pastoral nomads have no hierarchical system like their brothers, the agro-nomads (Issa-Salwe 1994: 5). When the clan head dies, an assembly (*shir*) is held to elect another leader.

Somali clan-based traditional authority of 'egalitarianism' is the most basic local democratic participation where a member of the clan has the right to a say and give his idea in a communal issues. For instance, a particular issue is discussed in the institutionalized *shir* that is conceptualized as fundamental matter of government. The *shir* has no formal, written constitution, no regular place or time of meeting and there are no official positions on it (Mohamoud 2006: 54).

During the *shir*, after a deep discussion and analysis of the issue concerned, a common decision is made in the *shir* by consensus. Thus, this is what is known as 'pastoral democracy', a democracy where everybody has the right to participate. All adult males are considered as elders and their views are respected. Every male in the Clan is empowered by contractual treaty to direct the policies of the lineage (Issa-Salwe 1994: 5). Thus, the alien externally imposed colonial concept of democracy was incapable of understanding old traditional democratic concepts and institutions evolved by indigenous people such the pastoral Somalis.

The European colonial authorities, particularly British and Italy introduced the modern system of administration into Somali communities in order to run the routine administrative activities. They appointed chief for each tribe. However the introduction of European system of administration particularly, the British administration of the 'Local Authorities Ordinance' in Somalia was rejected by tribal chiefs since the system challenged their own tribal authority. The newly introduced system became known as Aqil system among society and created conflict in sub-clans as lineages as they begun to compete the office of the appointed clan-head. The Aqil (holder of the office) received permanent salary and some concessions by the administrative authority. They helped the District Commissioners in running the territory. The main aim of the newly introduced European colonial administrative system into Somali pastoralist society was to create power contest, abolish the unity of the tribes and the authority of clan leader (Issa-Salwe 1994: 6). This system of undermining the 'traditional source of leadership' was to incapacitate the future

leadership of the modern Somali state that later led the collapse of total State institutions at the end of 1990s.

2.3 The Dominance of Kinship Relations

Kinship Concept

The concept of kinship in the Somali pastoral society consists of two elements: *blood ties* and *xeer* (*heer*). Blood-ties are product of genealogical link by a patrilineal system traced back to common ancestor. As we mentioned above, Somalis consist of several major clan families (the Dir, Darood, Isaaq, Hawiye, Digil etc) and each clan family is divided into clans and sub-clans, where sub-clans also further break down into various lineage segments, all the way down to *reer* (household) through blood-payment:

"Lineage had collective obligations to honor certain debts and make restitution for wrongs. The clan structure was further reinforced by communal access to the range and family ownership of the herd, the principal economic asset. This cephalous society therefore was highly egalitarian and democratic as well susceptible to frequent internecine feuds" (Lyons and Ahmed Samater 1995: 8).

In the past history where living style of Somali society was mainly based on subsistence economy, as it was common in most African pastoralist, old societal formations were characterized by the intermeshing of economic production, political life, and culture Thus:

"Production which was small in scale and coterminous with consumption was done with reer³ (household). As a result, an individual Somali's location in any of the three strictures automatically included him or her in the others. A distinctive Somali social organization thereby emerged from the close inter-linkages among the economic, cultural, and political spheres of life. This structure suited pastoral, subsistence production and allowed the Somali to survive and live with dignity in the harsh conditions of northeast Africa (Lyons and Ahmed Samater 1995: 8).

³ Reer is a political norms and cultural values linked up with economic structures by way of the ideology of kinship thereby creating an interlinked web of social economic and political institutions (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 9).

2.3.1 Kinship as Socio-Political and Economic Dominance

The kinship system dominated the whole socio-political and economic aspects of Somali pastoral society. It managed and regulated not only the production of livestock economy, but also administered all issues related to political, social and cultural areas (Mohamoud 2006: 54). Among the Somali society, Kinship consisted of blood ties and heer (customary law), groups that are closely related are supposed to enter into a common agreement for:

"Mutual aid and cooperation in order to survive in the harsh environment. Thus, the blood descent element of the kinship system was significant because it served at the bases of Bond and solidarity that guaranteed the physical and economic security of the smallest units of the lineage segments" (Mohamoud 2006: 54).

The kinship ideology served also to regulate the wider social relations of the clans and the clan families at the highest political apex. Due to kinship connection:

"Lineage segmented groups enter into heer social contract for different needs such as not making use of each other's pasture zones and bore wells without prior permission. Also peaceful neighboring clans enter into heer treaty for a peaceful coexistence" (Mohamoud 2006: 54-55).

The secular kinship practice mixed with Sharia Islamic law became the most dominant in communal Somalia. For instance to settle conflicts among clans, Sharia rules and heer principles were used together and this mixed system brought effective way of conflict mediation and resolution. Islamic religion was introduced in to Somalia around tenth century when Muslim Arab proselytizers first arrived at the coastal towns of the country. Immediately after Islamic religion was easily spread throughout the country, Sharia experts known (Wadaado) working with the wisemem⁴ emerged and launched to implement the Sharia together with the heer law. Therefore both heer and sharia scholars worked together as a judiciary team in order to prevent, manage and resolve the political tensions within community at large. This is how they conducted the reconciliation process as conflict arose:


⁴ "In Somalia, "wisemen are those who embody the great wisdom and excellent erudition of the traditional mechanisms of conflict settlements whose advice in heer matters is highly regarded" (Mohamoud 2006:55).

“First, the men versed in the secular heer rules sit in shir (assembly) and deliberate the grievances and the issues to the conflict. After they reach the decision and pronounce the final verdict, the men of the sharia step in to complete the matter. The men of the sharia solemnize the verdict by reading verses in the holly Quran and praying that such conflict shall not occur again in the community. The mediating role of men of Islamic sharia was to provide deeper spiritual bindings, which the parties involved, are expected to abide by” (Mohamoud 2006: 55).

Basically the *heer* and Islam tied together gave the stateless Somalis, a rightful political center of gravity capable of controlling changeable, ‘managing inter-subjectivity, and offering order and continuity’. Thus, in pre-colonial communal Somalia, this is how effective social stability and political order were maintained. More significantly, the blending of the values and the laws of the Islam with that of the native kinship ideology is what gradually matured to a ‘moral commonwealth or Umma, the superstructure of the old Somali orders in communal Somalia’. It can be here indicated on how the moral common wealth governed the social relations of pre-colonial Somali by drawing the following scheme (Mohamoud 2006: 56). The charter illustrates the make-up of the constitution of the old Somali order.

To analyze the dominance of the kinship system in pre-colonial Somalia demonstrates that communal or traditional Somali society does not lack public order but formalized political institutions, simply because ‘the kin-ordered mode inhibits the institutionalization of political power, resting especially upon the management of consensus among clusters of participants’. However, it was in the absence of this authoritarian structure that the public order was not coercive but essentially moral. As elsewhere, communal Somalia was not without conflicts due to the constraints in the material environment on the land. The frequent droughts, the scarcity of rains and the competition for scarce postural resource such as water and grass were bones of contention and the source of occasional clashes, particularly, during the periods of drought and dry seasons such tensions were more acute. Fortunately, the moral public order was effective mechanism of social control for the simple reason that the pastoral production was a communal activity (Mohamoud 2006: 56). Put simply, it was a communal activity embedded in social relations of productions in which the economic production, political life and culture were all intermeshed.

Figure 3 Basic elements of Somali Traditional Moral Order



Source: Adapted from Mohamoud Abdulahi A. (2006): State Collapse and Post -Conflict Development in Africa

Chapter Three

3. Conflict in Somalia: Roots and Consequences

3.1 Origins of the Conflict

More recent discourses and analysis of the Somali political crisis are based on views and simplistic generalizations of the uniqueness of the Somali society as culturally homogeneous entity. This view ignores Somali political reality as it engages in a dimensional exploration of 'conflict based on clanship'. Scholars who believe this view argue that all Somali people belong to one ethnic group, speak the same language, follow the same religion and share the same culture and tradition. However, a deep analysis on this assertion shows that it is inaccurate, since Somali society has always been divided into nomadic pastoralists in the north, center and agro-pastoralists in the south, and which have distinctively different cultural, linguistic, and social structure.' The significance of livestock production in relation to subsistence agriculture is regionally different; where rural communities in the south depend on agriculture while households in the north and center rely more on livestock (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 114). Indeed people living in the inter-riverine regions speak a different language, known as *Mai*, 'a combination and colloquial local dialects Swahili and Somali.'

Indicating exclusively on clans and lineage structures, several scholars concluded clanship to the most prevailing factor in the examination of endless Somali political crisis. Conceptualizing clan and lineage structure in the contemporary Somalia politics, while, necessary, is not sufficient to start their social and political organization (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 114). Grasping state collapse in Somalia needs examining beyond tribalism and ongoing factional intrigue, which is a symptom of state collapse rather than its cause.

3.1.1 Colonial Legacy

As common in the continent, most conflict in Africa could be attributed back to European colonialism. In this regard, colonialism had crucial impact on Somalia. The colonial powers partitioned Somalia into five parts. Britain took two parts (British

Somaliland and northern territory of Kenya), Italy, one Part known as Italian Somaliland, France colonized the northern coast, and the rest was occupied by Ethiopia. The subsequent attempt to integrate these different Somali inhabited parts led the state, which emerged in 1960, to enter into conflicts with neighboring states and eventually to disintegration. The issue of compatibility of the Somali 'pastoral democracy' and civil society structure with the postcolonial (centralized) state has recently indicated in some examinations of the state Somali collapse. It has been argued that institutional structures that incorporated concepts entirely alien to the existing Somali institutions were imposed under colonial rule. As a result:

“Discrepancy emerged between the highly decentralized pastoral structures and the highly central nature of the postcolonial state. It is not simply the coincidence that the strongest opposition to the centralized state has come from the north, where a pastoral mode of production is predominant. This incompatibility was intensified by the transfer of power and authority from pastoral groups to centralize and urban-based political structures. As a result, pastoralism was treated less as a distinct way of life and more as an economic resource to be tapped” (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 114).

Colonialism also posed a serious challenge to national integration in the post-independence period because of the distinct colonial experience of the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, which formed the independent republic of Somalia.

3.1.2 Rapid Union and South-North Disparity

One of the root origin of the Somali conflict can be attributed to the hasty union of the two Somali territories to form the 'United Somali State in 1960, as they have been administratively different colonial system. Immediately after independency and the republic was formed, politicians in the north became disillusioned with the way the union was proceeding and indeed voted 'No' in the unification referendum. In the interest of preserving a 'Union', the northerners initially accepted conditions demanded by southern leaders. Mogadishu became the capital and the base of the newly created Somali parliament. Southern Somalis also held all major posts in the new government, and a majority of seats in the parliament (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 115). In spite of the increasing discontent, southern officials adopted measures aimed at enforcing rapid integration, serving to further alienate their northern counterparts.

In addition to this, the main task of the newly formed republic was to break the colonial legacy and influence under which the British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland had developed during the colonial time. The major challenge was to introduce common administrative system and the linguistic barriers worsened the issue, as there was no official Somali script to run the routine administrative activities. This was due to that Italian language was the main means of administrative and legal communication in the south, while English was mainly dominant in the north. Even though a unified legal system was introduced, some sensitive issues such as that of tariff levels caused considerable challenge. To standardize the system, the rates of the northern region had to be raised to the levels of the southern region. This brought the increase of the price of essential commodities in the north. The exodus of the British expatriates also affected the northern economy causing economic decline in the region. Immediately, popular anger took place in the northern region (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 115; Issa-Salwe 1994: 49). As a result, they expressed their grievance in the referendum on the constitution of 1961 where they voted 'No' in the unification referendum, following this event in December 1961 a secessionist military coup led by twelve northern officers failed:

"The government's development programmes also failed to tackle the serious problems of underdevelopment and socioeconomic stratification in the north, problems inherited from the colonial administration. Despite the integration of the two administrative systems, latent corruption has been attributed to the residual Italian influence (the Italian factor) in the public sector" (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 114).

3.1.3 Military Coup in 1969 and Socialist Politics

On 15 October 1969, President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was shot dead by one of his police guards. Following this event, on 21 October, the army occupied key points throughout the capital, where influential members of the government, other leading politicians and personalities were arrested. The National Constitution was suspended, the Supreme Court abolished, the National Assembly closed, political parties declared illegal, and rule by Supreme Revolutionary Council established (Lewis 1980: 207). The suspended constitution of 1960 was the last hope of the Somalis as it

guaranteed the integrity of the Somali territories, democracy, freedom of speech and multiparty system.

In the following year of 1970, the military regime decreed adaptation of Scientific Socialism', an ideology that was (as Siad Bare claimed) 'fully compatible with Islam and the reality of nomadic society'. Under the slogan of 'socialism, Socialism unites, tribalism divides', clan and kinship ties were officially banned and the new government promised to root out any reference, verbal or written, to clanship. In an effort to limit the tradition of blood money payments between groups, the regime introduced the death sentence for those convicted of homicide (Lewis 1980: 208; Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 115). Although, the military regime introduced significant political and legal changes, its repressive security apparatus and formidable propaganda machine, which were formed soon after the revolution, were too painful to tolerate. Accordingly:

“A wave of nationalization (garamayn) of all medium-size business, including banks, schools, insurance firms, imports and whole sale trade started in the early 1970s. Many new state-owned agencies, maintaining absolute monopolies, were created as a foundation for a socialist economy. Private traders were prohibited by law from importing, storing, purchasing or distributing food items. It became increasingly clear that nomads and agro-pastoralists, including wealthy nomads and farmers who owned large herds, were to be treated as lumpenproletariat rather than capitalists. But in spite of erecting cooperatives for rural communities, the government found the nomads largely uncooperative” (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 116).

Competition for limited economic resources is also a major cause for the Somali conflict. As we mentioned that most Somalis are nomadic pastoralist, perpetual conflicts and clashes over scarce resources such as shortage of water, livestock, and grazing areas have always had been the origin of clan disputes and contest in the rural areas even before and after the independence periods. In the urban areas, particularly after the independence, increasing contest over key positions of state power involved securing the main economic resources. This state power competition added already existing public financial mismanagement, corruption, and failure to meet the people's expectations and provide them basic services by successive regimes led to increasing poverty and further discontent. Thus, this public mismanagement mainly

brought clan conflicts and eventually clearly contributed state collapse in 1991 (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 114-117). In 1980 the government abandoned economic policies of scientific socialism' as it was incompatible with the Somali pastoralist way of life. The government had no coherent economic strategy and its macroeconomic policy was described as 'erratic, inconsistent, and often moved from one set of objectives to another, thereby creating market confusion.

3.1.4 Cold War Legacy and Ogaden War

The cold war politics between the Western powers and East led by USSR has to some extent played a crucial role in the cause of Somali conflict. Soon after, the colonized countries received their independence, a new mode of neo-colonial competition emerged where the super powers launched competing to influence countries indirectly rather than imposing direct administration as was the case in the colonial era (Mulugeta 2009: 10). The Horn of Africa was particularly affected by this cold war politics since the Horn became strategic place.

The new Somali republic became a battlefield of superpower rivalry for its strategic position. This means that the conflict between Somalia and its neighboring countries in the region, such as Ethiopia were meddled in constantly by the superpowers to serve their strategic interest (Mulugeta 2009: 10; Mohamoud 2006: 106). Somalia's strategic position on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, had attracted the attention of both superpowers, the US and USSR, especially during the cold war to gain and maintain access to Middle Eastern oil in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The Soviet Union strongly supported Somalia's military and gave considerable financial aid. In 1977 after the friendship agreement was reached between the USSR and Ethiopia, Somali regime was disappointed and in turn, shifted its alliance by seeking support of the West, particularly the US. Thus, the successive military support from superpowers continuously contributed the regime to be in power and the country to be a full of arsenal. (Mulugeta 2009: 10). As a result, increasing internal opposition led the collapse of the state in 1990.

The 1977-1978 Ogaden war was one of the main causes of the conflict and state collapse in Somalia. The major objective of the war was to liberate Ogaden region from Ethiopia as the first step of long reunification dream of creating Greater Somalia by uniting the Ogaden in to the newly Somali Republic. In July 1977, the Somali government decided to contribute its army to the liberation of Western Somaliland and helped since the beginning of seventies. The liberation of Ogaden and its integration into the republic was supposed to consolidate Somali nationalism and bring all Somalis in one nation-state. Nonetheless:

"The war turned unpleasant for Somalia in the early 1978, when it was defeated by Ethiopia, with the support of Soviet Union, direct participation of Cuban troops and Yemenis. The defeat generated the dissatisfaction and despondency within the army. Somalia's defeat weakened military regime politically and intensified internal opposition. The defeat troubled General Siad Bare and as a result a group of dissatisfied army officers attempted a coup d'état in 1978 and rebel movements were established and launched attacks against the regime, which further exacerbated the conflict" (Mulugeta 2009:10).

The Ogaden war was disaster for the Somalis as the regime lost the war because of the Soviet and Cuban military assistance. The war caused a flood of mainly ethnic Somali refugees from Ogaden region to north and central regions of Somalia. By 1979, there were officially 1.3 million refugees in the country. More than half were settled in the north, where one in four of the population was refugees. The large number of refugees from Ethiopia to Somalia particularly, in the north increased the competition over limited economic resources. It created permanent clashes between local inhabitants in the north regions and the forced refugees. The policy of recruiting huge number of refugees into the national army intensified the clashes (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 118). This implies that defeated Ogaden war totally eroded the credibility of the army and police and the asserted guardians of Pan-Somali nationalism'.

3.1.5. Formation of Opposition Groups and Lack of Coherence

Immediately after the defeat of Ogaden in 1978, senior military officers from the northwest of the country attempted coup. Although, the government militarily reacted and crushed the rebellion, few senior officers including Abdulahi Yusuf (first TFG President who escaped after the coup in 1978), went abroad and succeeded to establish

the first Somali opposition movement, called Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). SSDF militias launched guerrilla warfare across the border between Somalia and Ethiopia, but the military rule brutally destroyed this opposition movements (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 118). As a consequence, each major clan formed its own opposition movement. The Somali National Movement (SNM) was the next established opposition party in 1981, by a group of businessmen, religious leaders, and intellectuals specifically from the Isaaq clan (Ahmed and Herbold Green 1999: 118-9). Following the formation of opposition movements based on clan, conflict was intensified and the government increased its brutality against all oppositions.

In 1987, the United Somali Congress (USC) by Hawiye clan in the South and central regions was also established in Rome, Italy. The USC soon spitted into two rival factions based on two major Hawiye sub-clans. General Aided emerged as the main Hawiye military leader. General Gabyo, a former minister of defence and the highest-ranking Ogadeni clan in government established Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) in 1989 (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 21). However, these various rebel movements lacked coordination and had no any political objective to form a united government. Each group represented its narrow clan interest and they failed to agree on terms for the establishment of a viable post-Barre government and this led to the total breakdown of law and order, which also brought endless conflict among clans.

3.2 Consequences of State Collapse

3.2.1 Internal Consequences

3.2.1.1 The Breakdown of Economy and Humanitarian Strategy

More than 20 years Somali had no functioning central government. Somali people have been suffering from lawlessness because of absence of state authorities. Somalis are victim of their own clan-based political functions, warlords, extremists and frequent foreign invasions. The endless perpetuated conflict affected the whole country in all aspects both socio-political and economic sector. It caused the destruction of all state and non-state institutions. Destruction of farms and agricultural land resulted in lack of food and famine in the entire region. Infrastructure was completely destroyed by militias and fighting groups. Economies of plunder developed featuring

violent banditry by armed gunmen and warfare waged principally over opportunities to loot. Unregulated market and black economy such as export of banana and charcoal allowed a few groups and individuals to be financially powerful from the collapse of state economy. Due to the absence of central government, the rate of unemployment reached at the highest stage (Menkhaus 2007: 81; Mulugeta 2009: 11). Forty-seven per cent of economically active population became unemployed. The majority of the population depended on remittance from their families in abroad.

Because of the total collapse of the economy system caused by the state collapse, catastrophic humanitarian crises took place in the country. The last humanitarian tragedy was in 2010 conflict and famine complicated the humanitarian assistance. According to last report indicated that:

“Out of the total estimated of nine million people, 3.2 million are in dire need of humanitarian assistance; Over 1.2 million have been displaced; hundreds of thousands have lost their lives as a result of civil war. Factors such as endless violence, long drought, the rise of food price, piracy and killings of humanitarian workers worsened the humanitarian tragedy” (Mulugeta 2009: 11).

However, there are some reports indicated that humanitarian crises was not so extreme. The point is that few humanitarian organizations exaggerate conditions in Somalia while they are part of the problem by serving their interest. Some experts believe that humanitarian organizations themselves have become warlords, who want to see the perpetuation of the conflict because of the financial resources allocated on covering the operational costs of the humanitarian organizations (Mulugeta 2009: 11). The main point is that most humanitarian organizations are outside of the country because of security reason and, as a result, they could not conduct effective evaluation and monitoring systems.

3.2.1.2 Separatist and Subnational Governances

The prolonged civil war in Somalia had different political implications for future unity of the Somali state. Separatists and powerful autonomous regions emerged. The most visible and manifestations of subnational governance in Somalia are formally, self-declared administrations. Due to of long lasting conflict, considerable

regional and transitional authorities established their own local administration since 1991. The British Somaliland in the north declared its independence in 1991. Somaliland succeeded to achieve relative peace and political stability. It showed some kind of democratic participation and multiparty political system, though not yet internationally recognized. Abdulahi Yusuf also formed Puntland autonomous regional administration, in the northeast of the country in 1998. (Mulugeta 2009: 12). Puntland regional administration also secured its given territories and made some kind of political and economic development. The Galmudug regional state and the Ahlu-Suna wal-jama⁵ administration in the central parts of Somalia succeeded a type of good governance, which helped to restore a relative peace in their respective areas.

Moreover, several other regions such as the Rahanwayn of Bay and Bakool, the Darood Clans of Juba regions and Gedo, the several clans in Hiiraan and middle Shabele regions showed a kind of interest to establish subnational governments. In reality, these regional and trans-regional politics are based on clan homeland 'reflecting a Somali impulse to pursue a Balkan solution' or more appropriate to Somali context', 'clanustans''. (Menkhaus 2007: 83).

3.2.1.2 Religious Extremists

Al-Etihad

Al-Etihad is the oldest Somali religious organization. The origin and operation of Al-Etihad movement before the state collapse are mostly uncertain. However, its first establishment in Somalia became known in 1950 (ICG 2005:3). Siad Bare regime outlawed all religious groups as the country adopted 'scientific Socialism'. As a result, Al-Etihad officially launched its religious and political activity in Somalia in 1991 after the state failure and civil war broken out. In Puntland and Gedo regions, Al-Etihad had militarily attempted two times to overrun clan and world lord politics to establish Sharia administration entities. But lost the war because of Ethiopia's military support to the warlords. Accordingly, Al-Etihad changed their objective in religious dissemination as Mulugeta (2009) described:

"The group had been using mosques, schools, and refugee camps to disseminate its

⁵ Ahlu-Suna wal-Jama is a paramilitary organization created in 1991 to protect Sufis Muslims in Somalia. They consist of moderate Sunni Muslims and engaged fierce fighting against Al-Shabab.

ideology and recruit supporters. It has also been providing social services to the society in Southern Somalia, which made them popular among the Somalis. Arab states have been the greatest supporters of Al-Etiihad in terms of finance, ideology, military training, and equipment. But Al-Etiihad never emerged as a major military or political force in Somalia, but steadily disseminated their ideology in all Somali communities (Mulugeta, 2009: 12). The clan-based groups and factions led by warlords in Mogadishu are secular and have been at odds with Al-Etiihad, even though some of these groups maintained tactical alliance from time to time with Al-Etiihad” (Mulugeta 2009: 12).

The Union of Islamic Courts

The Union of Islamic Court (UIC) was the most successful religious organization in Somalia. Taking it as a form of local response to the existing lawlessness, several courts based on clans emerged to form a union of Islamic courts. Several Islamic courts in Mogadishu united and established a union of Islamic courts in 2004 as a political organization und under the framework of Supreme Council of Sharia Court (SCSC). Their main objective was to replace the warlords, clan-based political functions and piracy and therefore establish Islamic State in the whole country. The UIC consisted of diverse groups of the society including business community, religious leaders, and some intellectuals. It seemed many people to support the UIC as the only hope to get peace and security (Dagne 2011: 18; Mulugeta 2009: 13). They used to collect huge finance in the exchange for protection from gangs and warlords. As a result, the UIC became immediately successful and popular in all Somali regions.

In 2006, the UIC disarmed militiamen; removed roadblocks operated by gunmen and policed the streets of Mogadishu making the city safe for the first time since the late 1980s. Their victory brought significant progress and hope for the Somalis in two decades (Menkhaus 2007: 89). By the end of 2006, the UIC were strong enough to drive out the warlords who controlled cities and ports in the southern and central parts of Somalia; these include Jawhar, Bay, Bakol, Beledwayne, Hobyo port and they opened the Mogadishu port and as well as Afisyone International Airport (Mulugeta 2009: 13).

Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, a moderate scholar, was chosen as a chairman of the UIC, while Hassan Dahir Aweys, former Al-Etiihad leader, who participated in Puntland and Gedo Al-Etiihad fighting, was also elected as vice chairman. Hassan Dahir Aweys and few other leaders of UIC had hidden agenda and had some

connections with Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations (ICG 2005: 4; Mulugeta 2009: 13). They aimed to take the rest of the country through military invasion in order to implement their extreme ideology. Nevertheless, the UIC seemed a threat both regional and internationally, and the forces of transitional federal government of Somalia supported by Ethiopian military and USA financial and military support destroyed the power of the UICs.

Al-Shabab

Al-Shabab is the latest formed radical religious organization that controlled much territory in South and central regions in Somalia. It is linked to Al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations. Al-Shabab, being the extremist group of UIC continued to wage war against the TFG and its allies including AMISOM and Ethiopian troops. During Ethiopian intervention in 2006 to destroy UIC. Al-Shabab won the support of many people as being patriotic nationalism since they decided to overrun the foreign troops from the country (Mulugeta 2009: 14).

The idea of establishing Al-Shabab traces back to some influential Al-Etihad scholars such as Sheikh Ali Warsame, brother in-law of Sheikh Hassan Aweys and a number of other top leaders, who decided to form their own radical movement in 2003. Some of these leaders including the former leader of Al-Shabab, Abu-Subeer, were trained and fought in Afghanistan. In the town of Laasa aanood, in northern Somalia, they established an organization called Harakat Al-Shabaab Al- mujahedeen, now Al-Shabab. As other religious groups, their main objective was to create Islamic State under their own extreme ideology. Al-Shabab is still powerful and engages guerrilla Fight against the AMISOM and TFG. According to (Mulugeta 2009):

“Many young Somalis joined the Al-Shabab to fight against the transnational government of Somalia and Ethiopian forces. Some of these volunteers did not know or had only limited knowledge of the intent and objectives of Al-Shabab. It was in the mid-2007, the true leaders of Al-Shabab emerged and the ties with Al-Qaeda became clear. In February 2007, the US Secretary of state Condoleezza rice designed Al-Shabab as a foreign terrorist organization and as specially designated global terrorist (Mulugeta 2009:14). Between 2007 and 2010, the Al-Shabab effectively controlled larger parts of territories in the central and southern parts of Somalia including 90 per cent of Mogadishu” (Mulugeta 2009: 14).

Al-Shabab established a well-coordinated network with all foreign terrorist organizations. They receive financial and military assistance from foreign nations and terrorist organizations. Considerable number of foreign fighters from Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Qatar, Nigeria and Pakistan and EU, who have been religiously misled, joined Al-Shabab (Roitsch 2014: 5). However, because of the change of the mandate of AMISOM to attack the Al-Shabab, and the recent political progress made by the TFG, Al-Shabab lost larger territories in south and central parts of Somalia including, Mogadishu, Afgooye, Bay, Beled-weyne, Bali-Doogle and other key ports of Kismaayo and Merka.

Since the federal government of Somalia was established in 2012, Al-Shabab lost large part of territories and even public popularity. This is due to its strict interpretation of Sharia laws and terrorizing innocent people in urban areas through deadly explosives. Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jamaa strongly opposes Al-Shabab both militarily and ideologically as it claims to represent the right and traditional Islamic practice. Nevertheless, Al-Shabab is still threat to Somalia and neighboring states.

3.6 Regional and International Consequences

Refugees

The Somali civil war had also huge impact on both regional and international arena. The state collapse caused displacement of large number of refugees in the neighboring countries. The country became also a safe place for international terrorist individuals. Piracy sabotaged international trade and became one of the salient concerns for the international community in Somalia. Because of lack of central government and endless conflict Somali people suffered twice the worst humanitarian tragedies in the world in 1991 and 2012. Based on UNHCR 2009 report, Somalia is the third largest origin of refugees in the world next to Afghanistan and Iraq. Somali people immigrated to all over the world in order to escape the conflict. The neighboring countries including Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti are the most affected ones (Mulugeta 2009: 15). For instance Kenya hosts the largest Somali refugees, where Dhadhaab refugee camp became the second largest populated city in Kenya.

Large-scale refugees have socio-political, economic and even environmental impact on developing countries, which host refugees. In the early stage of refugee settlement in a host country, conflict and competitions rises between the refugees and local population. This conflict is based on already scarce natural resources, including access to clean water, foodstuff and shelter. Refugees increase the need for basic schooling, medical facilities and utilization of public transport infrastructure. However, the impact of refugees on hosting country can be either positive or negative or both. (Dagne 2011: 9; Mulugeta 2009: 15)

Somali refugees have positively contributed to hosting countries. They heavily invested in countries particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. Somali communities established well-organized business activities, such as money transfer system, import and export sector, and creating job possibilities for many people in Ethiopia and Kenya. However, the Somali refugee was also a threat to the security sector of hosting countries. For instance, members of Al-Shabab militias among refugees conducted serious terrorist acts in Kenya and Uganda. Recently, Al-Shabab has been accused of recruiting significant number of young Somali teenagers from refugee camps in Kenya. The Western countries, where a large number of Somali migrants live, have also indicated their concern that Al-Shabab may influence these Somali migrants to be radicalized. It has been reported that some Somali young men from USA and UK went to Somalia and joined Al-Shabab (Mulugeta 2009: 15).

Terrorism

The longtime absence of central government and lack of state institutions made the country vulnerable to all extremists, criminals and terrorist organizations. Since 1991, Somalia had no a functioning government that controls its territory. The country became a concern for both regional and international community in terms of terrorism. It is believed that Somalia was mastermind place and transit for all terrorist individuals including Al-Qaida agents particularly who organized a series attacks and bombings in eastern Africa including US embassies in Nairobi and Tanzania. Al-Shabab took the responsibility of the latest West Gate Mall attack in Nairobi in 2014, where more than 70 civilians were killed. The West specifically US closely follows the movements of Al-Shabab and other terrorist organizations in Somalia (ICG 2014; Mulugeta 2009: 15).

Piracy

Piracy off the Somali coast has been a concern of international community. Since 2005, acts of piracy off Somali coast were threat to international shipping. In 2009 almost 217 acts of piracy took place off Somali coast, out of which forty-seven ships were hijacked and 867 crewmembers were taken as hostage. This made Somali coast one of the most insecure passageways for ships. The increase of piracy acts off Somalia coast sabotaged the international trade and threatened the lives of many crewmembers. Economically, it negatively affected shipping companies due to high increase in insurance for ships, commodity cargos and crewmembers (Menkhaus 2009: 9; Mulugeta 2009: 15).). The impact that piracy act could cause can be large as Mulugeta (2009) indicated:

“Though the actual use of force by the Somali pirates is modest, the human cost of piracy incidents is still a concern for the international community. For example, out of 889 crewmembers taken hostage in 2008, 815 were taken in Somalia. Four people lost their lives, fourteen are still missing, and two crews were injured as a result of Somali pirate attacks. Piracy incidents could also increase the possibility of environmental degradation. Pirates have been indiscriminately firing rocket propelled Grenades in order to capture potential targets. Such violent acts against chemical and oil tankers could result in major oil spill-over and cause environmental damage in the horn of Africa” (Mulugeta 2009: 16).

According to the threat posed by pirates, Western and other concerned countries deployed considerable naval forces along the length of Somali coast, which longer than 3000 km. The major aim is to protect the international trading ships passing Somali water from pirates. However, this operation did not eliminate the piracy acts and costs much. For instance, the annual expense, which EU allocates for this operation of guarding and protecting shipping trades, is more than \$80million. Somali pirates can be eliminated only when peace is resorted and it is only effective Somali government that can assure the security of its coast (Tardy, 2014:14; Mulugeta 2009: 17).

Chapter Four

Intervention of International Community in Somali

4.1 How UN Get Involved in Somalia

The humanitarian tragedy brought by the state collapse reached its highest level in 1992 after the political system collapsed into anarchy. Even a semblance of government ended with Siad Barre's overthrow in January 1991. In the end of 1990s and in the early 1990s, the Somali political system was deteriorating and several scholars, observes and some international actors who deeply documented the emerging political situations in the country indicated warning signs of political and humanitarian tragedy, but the international community was not interested to prevent it effectively (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 25). It was the regional actors who initiated to hold peace conference in Djibouti in the mid-1991, to forge or create a new ruling ally but ended with no success.

The situation deteriorated in Somalia and the conflict within the country seemed to spread and threaten the whole east African region. It was a January 1992 when a team of United Nations officials went to Somalia in order to foster political reconciliation and secure access by international aid agencies. During that visit no agreement for a cease-fire could be reached but there was unanimous support for a United Nations role in bringing about national reconciliation. It was against that background that the Security Council placed Somalia on its agenda on 23 January 1992. After the results of the visit were reported to the Security Council, the Council unanimously adopted RES/733 on 23 January 1992 (Philip 2005:525-526). However, the United Nations and the rest of International Community responded slowly to the opportunity to broaden the cease-fire into an effective process to promote political reconciliation and institutional. In this Chapter I would like to describe and analyze the events, which took place during the period of (1991-1993) the intervention of international community in Somalia.

The intervention of international community generally supposed to solve both humanitarian and political crises in the country. The Somali people hoped that the UN will take the responsibility for the public attain as the 'domestic political elite became a bunch of individuals with irreconcilable differences, totally immersed in

politics of private pursuit' (Philip 2005:525-527). Even though the intervention of international community solved the humanitarian tragedy, it failed to achieve its political and military objectives. Thus, I do indicate that the intervention of international community in Somalia failed ultimately because it was poorly conceived, poorly planned and poorly executed.

4.1.1 Decision Making by the Security Council to Intervene

Because of the humanitarian tragedies in the country, aid organizations have already reported Somalia's tragedy, and at the same time the media began to introduce and cover the story of 'Africa's latest Famine'. However, necessary support from the international community was low and late, not only that the humanitarian situation was unusual: 'a country without government whose people desperately lacked food and medical supplies, which could only be delivered to the neediest by running gun outlet of hostile, predator militias abundantly equipped with modern weapons' (Lewis 1994: 267).

Due to this tragedy and publicity of the situation and constant pressure from activist groups on international community, the Secretary-General authorized the deployment of 50 observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, and Mohammad. Sahnoun, a seasoned Algerian diplomat, was appointed as the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Somalia. Sahnoun's first task was to prepare a secure and proper food distribution to the needy people. In August 1992, Sahnoun reported that 1.5 million people were at risk but he lacked the means to provide the necessary armed protection for food convoys (Lewis 1994: 267). This is due to the heavy armed factions throughout the country.

In addition to this, the Somali government requested for the Security Council to consider the situation in Somalia. The secretary General, concerning rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human loss, decided to take some initiative first in the humanitarian field. Being concerned that the continuation of crisis constitute a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council, recalling under the primary responsibility of the Council under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, urged all parties to the conflict to cease hostilities, promote reconciliation and facilitate the delivery of

humanitarian assistance. Specifically, the devastating civil war with all its consequence was classified by the Security Council as a threat to international peace and security under Article 39 of the UN Charter and thereby opened the way for collective action. (Philipp 2005: 526). The Council also issued on a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.

However, the United Nation's first significant steps to encourage political reconciliation took place more than a year after Siad Barre's downfall. Thus, in February 1992, the Secretary-General together with representatives from the league of Arab States, the OAU and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as well as representatives from both rival factions had talks at the UN headquarters in New York with the aim to establish a cease-fire and help the process of political settlement by a conference on National reconciliation and unity (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 30). At the meeting, the immediate cessation of hostilities was agreed upon as well as a visit to Mogadishu by a delegation comprised of representatives of the UN, OAU, League of Arab States and OIC. After several consultations, Aideed and Mahdi signed an agreement on the implementation of cease-fire on March 3 1992 that included:

“The acceptance of United Nations Security Component for convoys of humanitarian assistance, as well as the deployment of 25 military observers. The two sides agreed also that a Technical Team would visit Somalia, which was later authorized through S/RES/746 to develop a high priority plan to establish mechanism to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. The team, which was sent, also included Representatives of the three regional organizations. The Team still was facing rival factions but managed to have the following agreements signed: Unarmed military observers would be deployed in order to monitor cease-fire, and a highly armed force to provide security for relief personnel, equipment and supplies at Mogadishu port and Airport and to escort convoys of relief supplies” (Philipp 2005: 528).

4.1.2 The Establishment of UNOSOM:

According to the reports made by the NGOs on the deteriorating human sufferings caused by the famine and conflict, the humanitarian organizations put sustained pressure on international community and proposed the direct involvement of the international community in the shortest way of dealing the tragedy and supporting the needy

people. Thus, partially the idea of international 'Humanitarian Intervention' was debated in several times before the international community determined to put it into action (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 58). The first Humanitarian intervention in Somalia was established in the mid-1991 under the name of United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I).

Six weeks later, on April 24 1992, the UN Security Council determined to authorize and establish a UN operation mission in Somalia (UNOSOM, later named UNOSOM I). The establishment of UNOSOM meant to oversee the cease-fire and to implement a ninety-day plan of action for emergency for humanitarian assistance. Accordingly to the Resolution 751(April, 1992), 50 unarmed observers⁶ were deployed to Mogadishu and the council also approved to send 500 security force to protect humanitarian delivers. Again at US assistance, the Security Council postponed plans to send peacekeeping forces (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 31). To implement the UN mission, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria as a Special Representative for Somalia and General Imtiaz Shaheen of Pakistan as chief military observer have been appointed by the Secretary-General.

The response of the International Community was not only late but also little. The Resolution 733, on January 23, 1992, adopted by the Security Council requested the international community to provide more humanitarian aid to the starving people, called the imposition of a total arms embargo on Somalia and urged the warring parties to agree to cease-fire and to reconcile their differences through peaceful means. However, one point should be examined: how and what the reaction of the world community, in particular the United Nations effort. Thus, to examine this effort, Mohamud (2006) indicated that:

"Concrete action does not automatically follow the UN Resolutions as the Members States and International agencies, which are requested for assistance always need more time to respond because of the cumbersome bureaucratic clearances and logistical problems among other things. As a result, when the UN Security Council finally authorized the implementation of ninety-day plan of action for emergency humanitarian assistance in Somalia as late as

⁶ The observers were provided by Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan Morocco, Pakistan and Zimbabwe.

October, the food aid that was flown in, was too little and for many hapless civilians it came too late" (Mohamoud, 2006: 137).

4.1.3 Efforts of UNOSOM

To have political reconciliation, the Secretary-General launched a peace agreement and invited the representatives of the main warlords to come to New York in February 1992, and agree what observers call a 'vague cease-fire'. The Secretary-General also sent James Jonah as a Special envoy to Somalia, to mediate among warring factions. On March 3 1992, another cease-fire agreement was signed by warring factional leaders, Aideed and Ali Mahdi, which led to a brief period of termination of hostility in Mogadishu. On April 1992, the appointment of Ambassador Mohammad Sahnoun as a special representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia by Secretary-general was a forward move and Sahnoun was welcomed both in locally and internationally because of his long time regional experience. Sahnoun strategically initiated to address political crises by starting to hold several peace agreements at local levels. His approach was to build a peace settlement from a 'bottom-up'. This bottom-up approach viewed by Sahnoun was practical means to deal the Somali conflict since the whole state and institutions collapsed. Mohamed Sahnoun having deep knowledge of the Somali people, their existing local social structures and networks of the clan system, he emphasized to start a grassroots political solution in order to identify the source of the conflict and put the solution as it is the only way of building the nation again (Mohamoud 2006: 137).

Because of his past experience in the region and having a long time vision Sahnoun adopted 'an all-inclusive broad based strategy'. Sahnoun's 'bottom-up' approach implied a decentralized and wide political participation mechanism, where all types of Somali societies including elders, military leaders, religious leaders, traders and businessmen, journalists, intellectuals for peace and women's associations take part. However, Sahnoun's bottom-up approach of conflict resolution and he himself as the Special Representative were not allowed to have the opportunity to be operational as he was forced to resign in October 1992' (Mohamoud 2006: 138).

As a result of the resignation of Sahnoun as Special Representative in Somalia, the

bottom-up political initiation process was also replaced by 'top-down' approach. The replacement of Sahnoun and the introduction of top-down approach, which legitimized the warlords and their civil massacre, implied that the international community was not ready to settle the perpetuated conflict in the country (Mohamoud 2006: 38). Nevertheless, the UN action was criticized for failing to exploit this opportunity. As Lyons and Samatar (1995) described: after the cessation of the hostilities UN. Senior diplomats foundered in the field, the Security Council dithered, and UN relief squandered valuable time' (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 31).

Instead of the first step as to initiate grassroots and broader political peace strategy to foster sustained political reconciliation to fill the underlying vacuum authority, international community put more emphasis on cease-fire as a means to facilitate humanitarian operations. Giving more emphasis on cease-fire, while necessary as a precondition for humanitarian operations, also had the negative effect of promoting militia leaders as the primary political actors. Accordingly:

"A creative diplomatic initiative supported by joint UN-Somali operations to set up and enforce zones of peace and channels for food relief along with other confidences-building measures may have created a framework for broader political reconciliation to begin in March 1992. By missing this opportunity and allowing tensions to fester and conflicts to flare, the crisis in Somalia became a catastrophe, divisions widened, and the costs of reconciliation rose. Somali leaders may have been able to accept a negotiated settlement in March 1992 that they could not accept in March 1993 because the intervening violence raised the stakes, weakened civilian leaders, and strengthened the most ruthless factions" (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 31).

The International community's slow response implied lost opportunities for mediation and preventive diplomacy at starting period of conflict and peace process. Early peace negotiations based on bottom-up approach may have minimized the extent of the tragedy, promote reconciliation and at the same time avoid or reduce the cost of UN military deployment in Somalia. Lack of effective and efficient operations led international community to fail in Somalia (Mohamoud 2006: 38).

The Somali civil war and conflict was given a priority as the international community was also dealing with other peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia and in Cambodia.

The most influential Western diplomats in UN indicted that internal conflict situation presents special difficulties, and this explained in a large part of the view of those at the UN headquarters. Thus, UN response to Somalia was confined only humanitarian provision. This view was also significant influenced by the US and Russian reluctance to become involved (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 31; Murphy 2002: 33).

Nevertheless, UNOSOM's early mediation efforts achieved less progress but to some extent, succeeded to put a temporary cease-fire agreement between two major warlords, General Mohammed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi. It was during this cease-fire when UN technical team arrived in Mogadishu. It can be criticized that UN negotiating with warlords like Aided, was a weak approach of encouraging and legitimizing warlords. However, some observers defended UN, by arguing that the negotiation was based on pragmatic consideration due to that the UN had probably a little option in the circumstance (Murphy 2002: 34). But the UN's pragmatic approach ignored that these warlords were responsible for the conflict and violated human rights.

The significance given to these leaders and dealing with them may be a barrier to confronting recalcitrant leaders effectively. Moreover the UN policy towards Somalia was inconsistent throughout the period as it gave little emphasis to inspire confidence among traditional Somali leaders and elders. Aideed understanding that he has no future in the country clearly rejected any deployment of UN personnel and a ceasefire (Murphy 2002: 35). He predicted that deployment is as a system of freezing his '*status quo*' and preventing him from defeating Ali Mahdi, which he thought he was in a position and a right time to begin.

To achieve broad consent of all parties was the means to deploy traditional peacekeeping premises. The application of conventional thinking and methods were not possible to employ in such a failed state. There was no good coordination from the factions and outright oppositions from others, which led to long delays in the deployment of these units and absence of consensus. As Murphy (2002) pointed:

"The linking of action to the agreement of the warlords at a time when Somalis were starving damaged the credibility of the Organization in the eyes of Somali people. It was an abdication by the Security Council of its responsibility, and a lost opportunity for early

intervention. Agreement and consensus is preferably, but given the humanitarian crisis a deadline should have been set for intervention to impose a ceasefire and secure humanitarian aid" (Murphy 2002: 35).

Nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General continued to be critical in the situation of Somalia. The earlier peace efforts made by Special Representative of Secretary-General indicated some sort of peace building. Negotiations between traditional elders and political leaders were initiated by UN and showed some kind of hope. Sahnoun's 'bottom-up' approach was supposed as the best option to be employed in order to bring back the political balance in favor of more traditional leadership that had been consistently urged an UNOSOM by the result of structural rigidity and bureaucracy. However, the scale and complexity of the Somali conflict and the encouragement of warlords as legitimate leaders made difficult the UNOSOM to operate successfully (Mohamoud 2006: 136). In fact the UNOSOM confused whether they would deal with the warlords, and if so in what manner? There were no political structures, and the physical structure was almost not-existent.

The UN plan to deploy traditional peacekeeping operation in Somalia and the mandate given them by SC to use all means of protecting humanitarian aid was in principle agreed. The bottom-up approach and decentralized concept of all concerned groups including regional and Somali political factions had priority to recommend. If this approach were followed, peace would have been achieved in Somalia. But the reality indicated that UNOSOM I was not given a chance to succeed. Murphy (2002) clearly argued:

"Several serious problems were created by wrong and unjustified moves of the UN management, both at headquarters and by some agencies' representative in the field. These hampered Sahnoun's effort, which led to strains in relations, but his primary aim in the eyes of the UN hierarchy was to make his views known publicly. After 'arduous negotiations', and with the help of local elders, Sahnoun obtained the consent of Aideed and Mahdi, and other faction leaders to deployment of 500 armed UN 'security personnel' to protect aid coming through Mogadishu port. This was not the victory. It seemed as Aideed and others probably realized that aid could be hijacked as soon as it left the port anyway. However, before even these touched down in Somalia, the Security Council agreed the size of the force to 3,500 at the request of the secretary-General" (Murphy 2002: 36).

Moreover, there was lack of coordination between the UN Security Council and the Special representative in Somalia. In other words, the decision to send more troops to Somalia by UN SC was neither consulted nor informed the Special Representative of the Secretary-general, Sahnoun. This undermined his authority even though it seemed a positive step to improve the worsening security situation in the country. In addition to this, frontline countries that had been part of the problem and even solution were also not consulted by UNSC regarding deploying more troops. However, in mid-1992, the situation worsened and the ongoing political conflict and violence erupted over the limited international food aid (Mohamoud 2006: 139). The food supply was short and inadequate that increased the insecurity and produced even more violence and this brought international military intervention.

4.2 'Operation Restore Hope'

The 'Restore Hope Operation' of 1992 was an international humanitarian intervention destined to save the famine tragedy that had claimed the lives of thousands of Somalis, caused by the conflict in Somalia. Because of the total collapse of state institutions and widespread humanitarian crisis, the need for some military form of intervention to improve the security situation became crucial. Aid workers and the general population were being harassed and terrorized, and there were reports of drought in the agricultural rich lands to the south. As a result, on December 3 1992, the Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 794. The Council was determined by the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, which was further exacerbated by the problems concerning the distribution of humanitarian assistance constituting a continuing threat in international peace and security (Philip 2005: 532). The Council also imposed an armed embargo as (Lyons and Samatar (1995) found in the Resolution:

“Threat to international peace based on predominantly international conditions. The United Nations started that it was gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and aware of its consequences on the stability and peace in the region” (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 30).

As a result of the increasing humanitarian tragedy, it became urgent to reach the

suffering people and provide for humanitarian assistance. The ongoing conflict prevented from the aid organizations to reach the needy people. This meant there must a peace and stability at least during the humanitarian operation. The UN welcomed the offer by Member States concerning the establishment of an Operation to create such a secure environment (Philipp 2005: 533). Based on Chapter VII of UN, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General and Member States together to implement the offer and 'to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief Operation in Somalia'.

It was President George W. Bush who responded to this resolution. Immediately after Bush decided to send troops and lead an international intervention, the US government considered the worsening situation in Somalia and needed to launch a careful and diplomatic political mechanism capable of facilitating the major troop deployment authorized by UN Resolution 794. Accordingly, the Security Council considered the Secretary-General's proposal and adopted resolution 794 (1992) on which basis the 'Operations Restore Hope' under US leadership was launched (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 39).

Thus, President Bush appointed Robert Oakley a former Ambassador to Somalia and well respected career diplomat, as his special envoy. Oakley, a well-experienced diplomat immediately succeeded to put cease-fire between the two major warlords in Mogadishu, Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The two warlords agreed to stop fighting during the landing of US forces in Mogadishu. The US deployment meant victory for Ali Mahdi as he claimed an 'interim President' and already called for international intervention in Somalia, but it was a disaster for Aideed since US intervention would reduce his might, but realized the intervention is inescapable and rejecting it, will be a mistake (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 168).

Thus, Oakley and his team soon assembled US Liaison Office (USLO) and involved peace talks with militia leaders even before troops arrived. The American-led multinational force arrived in Mogadishu on November 9 1992, accompanied by the international media reporting live the event of the landing of troops on Somali coast without any resistance, they gained control over the seaport and airport in the capital:

"The United Nation's Intervention in December 1992, naturally focused on the massive task of deploying thousands of troops, securing airports and other transportation facilities, moving tons of material in support of the troops and distributing vast quantities of relief food to remote villages and other famine locations. This extraordinary logistical feat prevented massive starvation and clearly represented a major accomplishment of the international intervention. To make this impressive operation possible, Oakley conducted a string of ad hoc meetings and reached a modus vivendi with various militia leaders (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 39).

4.2.1 The Deployment of UNITAF: Implication

The International community decided to change the form of intervention to give it more military character and United Task Force (UNITAF) led by US was deployed and empowered to grant the safe dispersion of the relief foods to the starving people in Somalia, US armed forces organized in UNITAF were immediately deployed in Mogadishu and heavily started humanitarian task under 'Restore Hope Operation' (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 169).

The main point to be raised here is the most key words in this operation were 'all necessary means.' This indicated that the United Task Force was authorized to use force to establish secure conditions for humanitarian relief. However, the resolution did not clearly specified how a secure condition for humanitarian relief be established in such conflict areas. In other words, it has made no specific reference to disarmament and demobilization. Under the name 'Operation Restore Hope, the Council requested on member states to send more troops and to make significant contribution as soon as possible (Philipp 2005: 534). The deployment of the 3,500 personnel of UNOSOM I already authorized by resolution 775 should pursue the operation based on the assessment of the crises situation on the ground.

As indicated above, even though the United Nations had first launched the idea of creating UNITAF, the UN neither organized nor commanded the troops that were allocated to secure humanitarian mission. Since the US contributed the largest military contingent and even financial assistance, it took the leadership of the task of UNITAF force. The first elements of UNITAF force arrived in Mogadishu in early

December 1992. In March 1993 37,000 UNITAF forces were deployed in southern Somalia. Out of this 24,000 were American troops (Philip 2005: 535).

The major objective of UNITAF force was to create a stable environment by assuring the secure delivery of humanitarian aid throughout the country and eventually transfer the responsibility to UNOSOM after law and order is restored in the country. However, as the Secretary-General clearly made in his letter to the President Bush, that only under two conditions could make the transition of peacekeeping to be continued: first the UNITAF should effectively disarm the warlords and all militias possessing weapons; second The UNITAF Task Operation should take place in all cities and regions of the country, not only in Mogadishu (Philipp 2005: 535). The Secretary-General meant the transition of authority from UNITAF to UNOSOM and its withdrawal from the country could be possible only when these two conditions are assured. This indicated there was a clear division between UNITAF and UNOSOM.

The International Community's military intervention in Somalia could not escape to be criticized. As we have explained above the international intervention in Somali was not based on traditional peacekeeping requirements. Sending peacekeeping mission would have required two preconditions: 'Peace to keep and an invitation from a host government'. During the intervention of UNITAF, Somali had no legitimate government and no peace to keep. But as Mohamoud (2006) argued 'once a country utterly loses its ability to govern itself, it also loses its claim to sovereignty and should become a ward of the United Nations'. However, some Somali observers opposed this justification. They argued that the intervention happened unilaterally and Somali scholars and people were not prior consulted and ignored, as a result the mission was ineffectively managed (Mohamoud 2006: 140). Although, UNITAF operation saved thousands of people, some observers including Mohamoud (2006: 140) indicated:

"The US-led international force intervened in Somalia with an agenda far broader than is attested. The new US agenda as spelled out by Bruce W. Nelson in Time magazine is that this US spearheaded military force 'will be conducting an experiment in World order; armed peacekeeping, rather than peacekeeping; which Madeline Albright explained 'assertive militarism' Therefore, Somalia was a test case and success would have encouraged future UN military intervention in hot-spot areas elsewhere. Nevertheless, with its short-term humanitarian focus, the UNITAF intervention was a success. But a discrepancy arose

between its mandate and its long-term agenda. Both issues became a dispute between UNITAF and UNOSOM I” (Mohamoud 2006: 140).

4.2.2 The Issue of Disarmament

Since all state institutions collapsed, the international intervention was assumed the best convenient opportunity for which disarmament could be carried out, as it is one of the significant preconditions for future peace reconciliation and state building. As the civil war broken out in 1991 and the national military dismantled, the whole state arms including heavy weapons, and ammunitions, which were accumulated and received during the cold war, as the only legacy from East-West proxy wars' came in the hands of clan militias and warlords. Accordingly, the major operation that the Somali people were waiting was immediate disarmament carried out by UNITAF Force throughout the country. Unfortunately, UNITAF had no intention to disarm the warlords and militias. The main problem was the lack of coordination between the UN and UNITAF Force. In one hand, the UN and Secretary-General clearly indicated disarmament should be the integral part of the humanitarian operation; on the other hand the UNITAF commanders informed Somali warlords that disarmament was not their job (Mohamoud 2006: 142).

Logistical as well as operational problem between UNITAF and UNOSOM I emerged as a clear division and this implied that:

“The combination of a peacekeeping force and an enforcement force, both operating at the same time during an ongoing conflict, did not prove a valuable concept. In particular the disarmament issue proved to be handled in an inappropriate manner and became the subject of major dispute between the Secretary-General and the Americans” (Philip 2005: 535).

Regarding the interpretation and implementation of the issue of disarmament in reference to the resolution, it became the core controversial element between the UN Secretary-general and US government. The main dispute arose from the differing interpretations of what constituted ‘a secure environment’, as indicated in the UN Resolution 794 (Philipp 2005: 536). It was not clear whether a ‘secure environment’ meant protecting the delivery of food supplies or disarming all Somali militias and stabilizing the whole country under UN operation.

However, to some extent, the Secretary-General obviously interpreted the Security Council resolution provision in a detail manner. He argued that the paragraph which indicates that ‘action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’ have to be understood as creating stable environment for humanitarian operation, where disarmament issue is part of the operation. As far as disarmament was concerned, the Secretary-General viewed as stated below:

"Any forceful action by the international community must have the objective of ensuring that at least the heavy weapons of organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed" (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 169).

Nevertheless, Washington insisted disarmament task was not part of the mission and even directly informed Somali warlords and clan militias that they can keep their weapons if they moved them outside Mogadishu. This decision taken by the US government was the main failure of the operation and even motivated General Aideed to attack the UNITAF and UNOSOM troops. It is also believed that ‘disarmament would have been possible and would have send an early and absolutely clear message that the United States and the United Nations were serious about restoring order in the country and were moving in the same direction’ (Philip 2005: 536).

The US government and the Secretary-General also differed on the field of the UNITAF deployment in the country. According to the letter of the Secretary-General written to President Bush that mentioned above Boutros Ghali indicated that UNITAF forces should be deployed in all regions of the country in order to secure the whole country and distribute humanitarian aid. He argued that:

"The purpose of the new Operation should be to create a secure environment throughout Somalia and that this should be apparent from the outset. It is true that the quantity of the suffering is greatest in the areas where it is planned to deploy, the unified command's Force in the first phase. But qualitatively the situation is just as bad as elsewhere, especially in the North" (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 171).

However, the US government obviously rejected the Secretary-General's letter of troop deployment throughout the country. Based on report to the Council regarding to

the Resolution 794(1992), the United States expressed that it had no agenda to send troops to the north and central parts of Somalia (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 171). As a result the deployment of multinational force was confined to areas such as Mogadishu, Baidoa, Huddur, Beledweyne, Kismayo, and Bardere that are all in the southern part of Somalia.

In fact, the level of humanitarian and political crisis in the Northwest and Northeast of the country was not the same as in the South. The northwest, which declared its independence in 1991, after the Siad Barre regime was collapsed, enjoyed a considerable peace. The northeastern part (Puntland) administered by the SSDF showed some kind of secure environment compared to south (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 171). Thus, it was not important to send troops to northwest and northeast of the country.

4.3 Participation of International Community in the Conflict of War

On May 1993, the UNOSOM II took the responsibility and authority from the UNITAF force. The power and authority transfer from UNITAF to UNOSOM II happened according to the Security Council Resolution 814 under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which was adopted on 26 March 1993 (Mohamoud 2006 144). Based on the Resolution, the total number of UNOSOM II was assumed to consist of 28,000 troops and 3,000 civilians from 33 countries (Philip 2005: 536). The UNOSOM II was also given the mandate to bring peace and carry out disarmament of all armed groups.

In fact the responsibility that UNOSOM II was supposed to perform was the same one the UNITAF force failed to achieve during the operation. Since disarmament issue was clearly included in the new mandate of UNOSOM II tension began between warlords and UNOSOM II. As a result General Aideed decided to confront the UNOSOM II troops and launched to release hostile propaganda against UNOSOM II. This tension led the events on 5 June 1993 (Ahmed Samatar and Lyons 1995: 58; Mohamoud 2006 143).

4.3.1. The June Incidence and US Withdrawal

The peace negotiation on March 1993, between the warring Somali factions mediated by UN did not last long. The main dispute emerged on the process of the implementation of the agreements reached in Addis Ababa. Giving more power to warlords as legitimate leaders by international community, warlords begun to act more powerful by organizing more militias and sending propaganda against UNOSOM troops and other rivals (Mohamoud 2006: 143; (Ahmed Samatar and Lyons 1995: 58). As a result clashes between militia leaders broke out once again in the southern part of Somalia, Particularly in the port of Kismayo and Mogadishu. The first military clash between UNOSOM II and Somali militias started on June 5, 1993 when well-armed militiamen ambushed Pakistani UN troops conducting a previously announced UN inspection in a compound of Aideed's radio station. At the same time others were also attacked and killed at food delivery center, indicating the attack was well prepared and well-coordinated. This was a tragedy and shock on both Somali people and UN officials. As a result the UNITAF forces launched brutal military to react the attack. The situation worsened alter the US Liaison Office had issued a warning in mid-May that special gunmen, linked to Aideed, had planned to kill Americans (Ahmed Samatar and Lyons 1995: 57).

The Security Council strongly condemned the 'unprovoked armed attack' and adopted Resolution 837 that allowed 'all necessary measures against all those responsible' the next day. The Council's resolution expressed that the militias that attacked UN troops were special members of USC faction and sent by General Aideed. As revenge and to capture Aideed, UNITAF Chief, General Howe ordered US and UN commanders in Mogadishu to kill or capture Aideed and even put a public price on Aideed's head, and US ambassador to the United Nations Madeline K. Albright 'branded Aideed a 'thug" (Ahmed Samatar and Lyons 1995: 58). As a result, US government ordered the Special US commanded Quick reaction Force to launch consistent attack and heavy bombardment on sections of Mogadishu and isolated large portion the population in the city. Thus, the focus of inconsistent US-UN political strategy after the Pakistani attack turned to be a campaign to capture Aideed rather than initiating and encouraging peace reconciliation. This clashes between US forces and Aideed Militias paralyzed the efforts of UNOSOM.

Since it was US that had the largest military and financial contribution in UNITAF operation, US government provided most forces allocated to capture Aideed. In July 1993, US helicopters conducted a ruthless operation where they completely bombarded and demolished high buildings, believing one of the Aideed's headquarters, and killing many innocent people. As a result of the clash, US casualties also began to increase, and public anger emerged in Washington and grew against Clinton administration over fears of more US casualties. Although, Democratic senator Robert C Byrd called for US forces in Somalia, to 'pack and go home' in July, US troops had no immediate plan to withdraw. US General Howe decided to capture Aided and stay there by requesting for more US elite special Operation Delta Forces.

At the same time, US Secretary of defense, Les Aspin rejected the withdrawal of US troops and in a speech on August 27, he insisted on the government's policy which is to stay the course,' and further stated: 'we went there to save people, and we succeeded, we are staying there now to help those same people rebuild their nation'. By September 1993, US government destined to emphasize on diplomatic means rather than engaging direct Fight with Aideed's militias and recognized the risk and cost of hunting Aideed might be ineffective (Samatar and Lyons 1995: 59).

Nevertheless, the situation once changed after the US commander in Mogadishu received secret information that top Aideed lieutenants would be meeting at Olympic Hotel and on October 3, US Special Army Rangers attacked them in order to capture or kill them. Unfortunately, the US forces were surrounded and overwhelmed. 18 Special Army Rangers dead, 84 wounded, and 1 helicopter pilot captured. It was the worst causality on US troops since the Operation was launched (Mohamoud 2006:145). One Malaysian peacekeeper was also killed and seven were wounded. 312 Somalis were killed and 814 were wounded. As a result of the US casualties, horrifying pictures appeared on US television networks:

"The corpse of American solders being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, a blooded and terrified helicopter pilot being held hostage. These pictures generated a powerful visceral reaction among Americans. The public had been given no explanation for why troops were in Somalia other than to feed the hungry, and so the reaction was strong. After

having been promised cost-free international order, the public resented the price being paid. As the New York Times put it, 'Americans were told that their soldiers were being sent to work in soup kitchen and they were understandably shocked to find them in house-to-house combat' (Samatar and Lyons 1995: 59).

4.4 Combination of Humanitarian and Military Intervention

The deterioration of humanitarian crises and the absence of central government, which was supposed to assure the security of humanitarian relief workers, led the combination of humanitarian and military intervention. The Secretary-General of UN stated the importance of strong international security personnel and military force to provide the humanitarian aid and pave for reconciliation efforts. Based on Secretary-General's recommendation on November 1992, 3000 additional security personnel as part of UNOSOM mission were deployed in Mogadishu. The Secretary-General also stated that UNOSOM could not able to make significant progress so far in the worsening humanitarian situation. In order to make change and support the suffering people, he recommended the importance of reviewing the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 156).

4.4.1 The Nature and Scale of the Problem

After the state collapsed in 1991, devastating conflict spread throughout the country. Inter-clan fighting resulted in genocide and caused one of the worst humanitarian tragedies. Such large-scale conflict in the 21st century became beyond the imagination of Western public image. Reports of horrifying pictures of mass starvation and diversion of aid by warlord militias released by Western media put public pressure on international actors to take immediate action. The humanitarian intervention in Somalia, in 1992, was therefore the immediate need to have more effective action of dealing the humanitarian tragedy in Somalia. But the support from UN and regional organizations was slow and little. According to Murphy (2002), the Secretary-General was frustrated and identified several options regarding the situation:

"The first was to continue with peacekeeping, i.e. a consensual and non-forceful mission. This option did not seem viable, given the nature and scale of the problems. A second option was to withdraw, but this has to be unacceptable public admission of failure that might also have

been interpreted as setting a bad precedent for ongoing operations in Balkans. A further option was more assertive and forceful in the capital, in the hope that this would have an influence in the country as a whole. Alternatively, a UN enforcement mission could be launched under its own command and control (Murphy 2002: 37).

Based on the efforts made by Secretary-General, the UN-Security Council considered the humanitarian situation, coupled with complicated conflicts by indicating the scale and nature of the crises need more effective action. Thus, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 794 (1992) combining humanitarian and military intervention. It determined that the widespread conflict and its long-term impact and the diversion of humanitarian aid by armed factions could risk regional and international security. Thus, the council approved UNITAF mission being a multinational force under the leadership of US. The mandate of UITAF was to use 'all necessary means to establish as soon as possible' a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations. This implies that Security Council Resolution admitted that the Somali crises were different and the mandate given to the UNOSOM and UNITAF was beyond the traditional peacekeeping premises and principles. There was a common understanding on what make up or form a 'threat to peace' allowing direct military intervention under Article 42 (Lyons and Samatar 1995: 31; (Murphy 2002: 38).

Article 42 of the UN Charter indicated the use of force by UNITAFF, which was a new model from the normal peacekeeping approach. The Secretary-General also recommended that the mandate of international forces by stating that the UN intervention and deployment of UNOSOM and UNITAF troops should take place throughout the country. He also indicated, the urgent need to set out time for disarmament to be carried out under the UN Command and control. The recommendation meant after disarmament, the UNITAF would transfer the power and authority to UNOSOM peacekeeping forces (Murphy 2002: 38).

Despite UN command, the UN-Security Council decided on to approve a 'unified Command and control system'. Which implies the possible acceptance made by the US to take the leadership role. This was based on the assumption, that Washington would not agree UN command in any situation. The fact was that, though UN authorized

the mandate of UNITAF, it was the US, which organized and commanded the troops. This was one of the most significant differences between UNITAF and UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II Missions (Murphy 2002: 39).

To summarize, the UN intervention in Somalia was based on urgent need of international community to respond the Somali crises and conflicts caused by state failure after the regime totally collapsed. The Security Council authorized the operation where the mandate and authorities of mission were stated in Resolution 794 (92). The most salient disputed issue of the international intervention was ‘to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible’. The main difference between the UN-secretary-General and US was on what it constituted the phrase ‘to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief Operation’. (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 172). This controversial point led partially lack of coordination between the UN and US and subsequently the failure of the UN mission in Somalia.

Based on the UN-Security Resolution, the mandate of UN troops to establish a secure corridor for humanitarian relief operation was to employ ‘all necessary means’. Some observers argued that this meant to use lethal power and enforce peace and security in Somalia. It can be also said, such approach of peace enforcement would be risk and ineffective where powerful warlords exist like in Somalia. Furthermore, the resolution had not clearly stated how a secure environment was to be made. The Council gave power and authority to the international forces to use force if necessary. The main weakness of the international community was based on the interpretation of the phrase ‘use all necessary means’ and what it constitutes Ghebremeskel Tekie (1999: 172). This created the major dispute between the US and the Secretary-General of United Nation. According to the approach of Secretary-General, the issue of disarmament should be a means and one of the first steps to establish a secure environment both for the short-term humanitarian provision and facilitation of long-term political reconciliation. But the US clearly rejected to engage disarmament tasks as Ghebremeskel Tekie (1999): indicated:

“Bush repeatedly stated in public that the UNITAF mission would be in Somalia ‘only as long as necessary to establish a secure environment’ for humanitarian efforts. But The UN

Secretary-General had a different view. In his speech in the Security Council, Boutros Ghali addressed the Somalia people, shortly before the first troops landed, that the UN was acting 'in the cause of Security, humanitarian relief and political reconciliation' (Ghebremeskel Tekie 1999: 172).

The dispute over the responsibility and long-term vision of intervening force between the US government and UN seemed a proof that the UN operation in Somalia from the initial point was inescapable to fail. The UN operation in Somalia in 1990s obviously lacked a clear-cut agenda and coordination to engage the complicated humanitarian and political crises in the country. The UN policy makers had not basically clarified the powers and authority of the mission Ghebremeskel Tekie (1999: 172-73).

Chapter five

Reconciliation Process: the Role of Regional and International Community

5.1 Attempted Peace process: the Role of IGAD

5.1.1 Background of IGAD

The View of regionalism in Africa has a resonance concept and was aimed to build effective and integrated regional organization handling continental crises without external interventions. However, the continent in general lacks structural conditions that facilitate the success of regionalism. For instance:

“Regionalism in Europe was built on the foundation of strong nation states, each comprising a government capable of protecting its borders, exercising control of its territory, enjoying a monopoly of the legitimate use of force and capable of providing security and community to all its citizens. State weakness has tended to reinforce the attachment of Africa's political leaders to juridical sovereignty and the fierce protection of statehood rather than encouraging effective forms of regionalism” (Healy 2009: 2).

The Horn of Africa is one of the insecure regions in the continent and the lack of sub-regional organization to deal its multiple problems made it vulnerable to violence. It was in 1996, when IGADD was established with the objective of addressing environmental crises that led to food scarcity and frequent famine mainly caused by repeating inter- and intrastate conflicts. The concept of establishing such an organization originated from UN organizations believing that IGADD would address the region's food insecurity and famine. The Organization consists of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Eritrea. Djibouti city became the headquarters of the organization. Since Horn of Africa is one the volatile conflict areas, members of IGADD had no good political relations. Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and Sudan governments continuously sought to destabilize one another and each one backed rebel groups of the other (IGAD 2001). They had no real potential for establishing effective institutions.

Even if the main objective of the IGADD was narrow and limited to environmental issues, the organization held several meetings between member states to solve other issues of mutual concern including peace and security. The organization succeeded to pave peace agreement between Somali and Ethiopia in 1988. As a result its founding members

decided to expand the organizations objectives beyond environmental issues and include conflict resolution programs ((IGAD 2010; Mulugeta 2009: 23). On November 26, 1996 the organization was transformed and renamed as Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Thus IGAD mainly focused on peace reconciliation as the best mechanism to achieve long lasting progress. The involvement of IGADD in the Somali and Sudan peace negotiations motivated member states to expand the organizational objectives and change its name. IGAD members agreed:

“To take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability; to establish effective mechanisms of consultation and cooperation for the peaceful settlement of differences and disputes; to agree to deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organizations. Within this aim, three priority areas were identified: conflict prevention, management and humanitarian affairs; infrastructural development and food security; and the environment protection” (Mulugeta 2009: 23).

The long-term vision of IGAD is to create a secure, prosperous and stable region and become an effective regional organization through political and economic integration in the Horn of Africa. Principally, the organization has aims the promotion of good governance, protection of human rights through institutionalization of democracy and transparency. However, the basic principles of OAU, particularly that of ‘non-interference’, did not guide regional relationships in the Horn. The IGAD member states had been extensively involved in each other's internal affairs (IGAD 2011; Mulugeta 2009: 23). Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea leaders had all won military victories against the prevailing order and were proud to have overturned abusive regimes. Structurally, the organization consists of heads of State and Government, Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors and the Secretariat of the organization.

5.1.2 Djibouti Peace Conference of 1991

As one of the most priority areas of IGAD was addressing the long-standing inter-and intra-conflicts of Eastern Africa region. Somali conflict alone affected almost all IGAD members in the region. With this respect, IGAD has been engaged in multiple activities to solve the Somali crises (Kasaija 2008: 262). During 1991 to 2002, IGAD decided to

give a peace process mandate to member states to engage and solve the Somali crises. Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya are the concerning members of IGAD in the Somali conflict engagement (Mulugeta 2009: 24). This indicates in principle that members of IGAD were in one way or another on common terms to reach a common agreement to deal the Somali peace initiative taken by one of them.

Attempts of convening peace and bringing stability back to the Somali country and even pushing Somali factional leaders to reach an agreement has been complicated by proxy wars of the regional actors. Ethiopia, Egypt and Libya have consistently involved in the Somalia internal affairs directly and indirectly. Almost thirteen peace and reconciliation attempts were organized by IGAD member states, UN and EU but all failed to form effective peace process. The reason is, in one hand, that some peace efforts emphasized on convening the warlords others focused on the reconciliation of all other parts of the Somali people, excluding warlords (Gebrehiwot Berhe 2014: 121). On the other hand, regional actors lacked coordinated objective to reach the roots of the conflict because of each country's interest.

The first peace initiative conference took place in Djibouti on 5 July 1991, when the former president of Djibouti, Hassan Guled Abtidon invited warring parties to his office. Djibouti's effort was supported by IGAD and its member states. The Djibouti conference was attended by the SSDF, SNM, USC, SDM, and IGAD. They agreed to hold a National Reconciliation Conference and as a result, Djibouti government convened the second conference on 15 and 21 July 1991. Accordingly, political factions agreed: to a cease-fire; establishment of Provisional Government involving the Opposition groups that would be formed and mandated to enforce the unity of the country and the people; adherence to the 1960 constitution for a period of up to two years; establishment of a legislature of 123 members based on the eight regional administrative areas of the civilian government before 1969; and enactment of regional autonomy (Issa-Salwe 1996: 117). However, the agreement did not hold and failed to address the real issue and the root causes of the conflict, and instead endorsed Ali Mahdi Mohammad, who himself participated the conflict, as interim president for two years. According to Issa-Salwe (1996):

"The Djibouti conference fell short of overall national expectations as the country was fragmented into clan held or clan controlled regions. It was unrealistic that some of the prominent clan groups were denied participation in the reconciliation process. This was infringing the customary Somali way of settling conflicts. Upholding of the principle of the fair representation and the participation of all clans were supposed to be very basis of the conference. The Djibouti resolutions had more negatives than positives and ignited new inter-clan hostilities. The USC militia leader and one of the most powerful leader, General Aideed, rejected the newly declared provisional government, and this resulted in a wide spread violence. The SNM, which declared the independence of Somaliland, also boycotted the meeting" (Issa-Salwe 1996: 119).

5.1.3 Sodere Peace Conference

The conflict in Somalia was different and originated mainly from comprehensive collapse of state institutions. Members of IGAD, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya are concerned about the Somali affairs since they share long borders with Somalia and possess considerable Somali ethnic population in their countries. The state collapse and the formation of extremist organizations in Somalia created tension and gave the conflict a regional dimension with implications. It also excited the interest of US and other Western nations concerned about the threat of international terrorism (Healy 2011: 111).

The rise of fundamentalist associations like, Al-Etihed in the early 1990 with the objective of forming extreme religious administration in Somalia based on Sharia law created domestic fear on neighboring countries. Accordingly, neighboring countries particularly Ethiopia and Kenya oriented their own foreign policy to take the lead in the Somali conflict resolution among IGAD members. In 1997 Ethiopian forces intervened in Somalia and destroyed Al-Ettihed camps in Gedo region of Somalia (Healy 2011: 112). IGAD, OAU and UN made no comment regarding this military intervention in one's internal affairs

The Ethiopian government made some efforts to deal with some Somali crises. In 1993, the UN-sponsored peace conference was convened in Addis Ababa where only warlords participated in the conference. Even though the conference indirectly legitimized the status of warlords in Somalia, it failed due to power struggle among

representatives of warlords. In the mid-1990s, Ethiopia asked for IGADD to take the responsibility for conflict resolution among Somali political factions (Mulugeta 2009: 26).

As a result, in January 1997, Melez Zenawi organized a peace conference for the Somali political factions in the Ethiopian town of Sodere. The participants of the Sodere peace process established new Salvation Council as part of a preparatory course of action leading to the establishment of a Provisional Central Government of Somalia, headed by Abdulahi Yusuf, a long-standing ally of Ethiopia. However, some powerful warlords like General Aided (leader of USC) who controlled most of Mogadishu boycotted the Sodere Conference. This opened a door for competing initiative launched by Egypt and the Arab league, which jointly hosted a separate set of Somali reconciliation talks with Aided and others in 1998. The Cairo conference clearly divided the participants of Sodere peace process, and created confusion among Somalis ensuring the failure of both (Healy 2011:112).

In response to the Egypt's action, IGAD members expressed their serious concern on the proliferation of initiatives with regard to Somalia. The IGAD summit of March 1998 in Djibouti, called for an end to the 'proliferation of Peace initiatives', which led the failure of Sodere Somali peace process (Healy 2011:113). Moreover, the summit requested all concerned states and international organizations send all financial contribution of the Somali conflict resolution through the IGAD organization.

During summit in 1998, IGAD accepted new proposal drafted by Ethiopia based on its own national interest in Somalia. The proposal in principle identified the importance of bottom up approach of the peace process in Somalia, but in practical based on autonomous regional administration as building blocks for reconciliation. Ethiopia claims that it the main stakeholder in Somali affairs (Mulugeata 2009: 27).

Ethiopia having the longest border with Somalia, intervened Somali internal affairs and obviously backed Somalia warlords and clan militias that control territory along the long lawless border between the two countries in order to form a buffer zone against possible threat from radical Islamist groups in Somalia. The major Ethiopian national interest in Somalia is to see weak decentralized federal state system. However, Ethiopia's

traditional rival, Egypt rejects this approach and sees it as secessionist' approach serving for the Ethiopian interest to weaken Somalia. Egypt prefers a strong central Somali state to counterbalance the Ethiopian hegemony in the Horn. Nevertheless, IGAD prepared a strategic paper namely 'new approaches to Somalia reconciliation process' which led Ethiopia and IGAD and therefore convened a number of meetings including the first and second international Consultative Meetings on Somalia in late 1998 (Gebrehiwot 2014: 122). During these meetings, Somali standing committee and a fact-finding commission were formed.

5.1.4 Arta Peace Process of 2000

In May 2000 Djibouti's new President Ismail Omer Guled proposed a new initiative, focusing Civil Society Organizations as a grass root. He hosted the Somali National Peace Conference in town of Arta, in Djibouti. The conference undertook within the framework of IGAD, but externally financed by several countries such as Egypt, Libya, and Gulf States. Guled's approach was different and all-inclusive by inviting all traditional and civilian Somali leaders rather than the warlords who hijacked all previous peace process. IGAD accepted and endorsed the Arta peace process initiative in 1998 and even obviously publicized that 'there is no alternative for peace in Somalia to pushing forward with the building block and bottom-up approach in which the role of the warlords contained and that of civil society is enhanced' (Healy 2009: 9; Mulugeta 2009: 27). The Arta peace process gave hope for many Somalis since warlords did not participate.

Thus, the Arta peace conference was all nearly inclusive and widely participated by almost all concerned Somali groups. More than 400 delegates attended the peace process. Representatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSO), and some Somali Clan leaders were invited to the conference. In August 2000, the conference gave rise to the establishment of Transitional National Government (TNG) where, Dr. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan was elected. Some Islamist groups and business associations in Mogadishu financially supported and backed the TNG. The TNG had strong links with Djibouti and was recognized by IGAD, OAU and the UN (Heally 2009: 9).

However, several powerful factional leaders, as well as Somaliland and Puntland authorities boycotted the Arta peace process. Some Somali warlords accused the TNG having strong ties with Islamists, and therefore sought support for Ethiopia. Ethiopia as part of the Somali problem and having long-term ties with several warlords, opposed the TFG by accusing it has link with extremists. This was a good opportunity for warlords and they had established a new council, the SRRC, under the chairman of Abdullahi Yusuf and worked with Ethiopian support to undermine the TNG (Healy 2011:112). Although all member states of IGAD officially expressed their full support for the TFG, Ethiopia turned to be the main Opponent by accusing TNG having link with Islamists. Djibouti and Eritrea being allies with TNG were disappointed while Kenya and Uganda became neutral.

Nevertheless, the TNG was not without critics. During the peace process, it was agreed that the Baidoa City in southern part of the country, would be a temporary capital for the TNG while Mogadishu was insecure and dominated by rival warlords. But the President and his surrounding members declined and landed in Mogadishu. In general it can be said that:

“The TNG also did not succeed to win sufficient support internally. It lacked legitimacy from the major clans and was regarded as representative of the Hawiye clan/Habar Gidir sub calns, which led to fierce clan rivalry especially with Darood clan represented by SRRC and backed by Ethiopia. Subsequently, the TNG failed to establish its authority beyond the capital, Mogadishu and its three-year life span terminated without operating as a national government. The Arta peace process was not, therefore, successful in stemming the continued fighting. Violent clan wars continued to plague Somalia” (Mulugeta 2009: 27).

Thus, in general it can be argued that IGAD had no real commitment to solve the Somali conflict and lacked the necessary institutional capacity to handle the complicated Somali crises. Some members of IGAD were part of the problem and the IGAD organization had to endorse only the initiatives presented either Ethiopia or Djibouti. The Organization’s absence of political unity undermined the Arta peace process and its outcome (Healy 2011: 112). In particular, the role and activity of IGAD, were undermined by the internal division and competition between Ethiopia and Djibouti, which permanently vested their interest in the peace process rather than seeking solution among disputants.

5.1.5 Eldoret Peace process

The TNG that was established in Arta, Djibouti in 2000 lacked internal support and remained in small area of Mogadishu. Regional organizations and international communities also declined to assist the TNG and its political agenda. The international community ignored Somali and mainly emphasized on the war on terrorism and Afghanistan. At the end of 2000 Somalia was ignored and marginalized from the international affairs. Since 1993 after the UN failed in Somalia, it was not ready to be back in the country and take reconciliation leadership responsibility (Menkhaus 2007: 361; Mulugeta 2009: 28).

As a result of regional rivalry particularly between Djibouti and Ethiopia on Somalia issue, IGAD Summit held in Khartoum in January 2002, made a strategic breakthrough by changing its approach of endorsing one member state initiative on Somali peace process and thus convened a new peace process under the responsibility of IGAD organization. Khartoum summit declared a resolution mandating three frontline states (Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti) to coordinate the efforts for national reconciliation in Somalia. IGAD leaders assigned the responsibility of under taking the peace process to what they called the IGAD Technical Committee, which composed of three Front line states (Mulugeta 2009: 28). The summit declared a new reconciliation process on Somalia would take place under the coordination of Kenyan President Moi within two months. The Summit called for the TNG and all other parties to join IGAD in supporting and establishing peace process in Somalia. (Gebrehiwot Berhe 2014: 121).

In February 2002, Committee of Foreign Ministers of IGAD met in Nairobi to push forward Khartoum mandate of Somali peace process. They established a technical committee consisting of Frontline States and IGAD Secretariat under Kenyan leadership to coordinate and facilitate the peace process. The committee decided criteria for participation, number of participants, monitoring and fund raising tasks (Gebrehiwot Berhe 2014: 123). Nevertheless:

“This is the 14th national peace and reconciliation process that was convened under a close follow-up of the IGAD Council of Ministers. The Process brought the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia with an international recognition. IGAD was

somehow effective enough to initiate the process in a way that all tribal and factional leaders were represented and a close follow-up of the Council of Ministers and International partners included, but the result of the process was far less than effective by bringing another government that failed to get a full support of the Somali people” (Gebrehiwt Berhe 2014: 122).

In general, member state initiatives endorsed by IGAD to solve the Somali crises remained fruitless due to disagreement between Somali political factions, insurgents and regional and international interventions in the country's internal affairs. However, future hope can be perceived from now after the new coordination between IGAD, AU and International community succeeded the deployment of a peace enforcement force under AMISOM in Somalia. AMISOM supports the federal government of Somalia in terms of security and building state institutions (Gebrehiwt Berhe 2014: 122).

5.1.5.1 The Establishment of Transitional federal Government

The Eldoret Peace Conference was most productive one and consisted of three stages. In the first stage, delegates invited from all parts of Somali society would accept the outcome of the conference. The second stage would involve in the core issues of the conference and consisted of several committee including federal and constitution committee, disarmament and economic recovery committees. The final stage would carefully handle sensitive agenda of power sharing in order to establish all inclusive and accepted federal government. The Eldoreth peace conference indicated future peace and stability in the Horn of Africa (ICG 2005; Mulugeta: 28).

On October 27, 2002, The Eldoret peace agreement was declared and signed. Even though, Somaliland authorities remained out of this Eldoret peace conference, the forum was almost inclusive from all Somali clans. It provided for a ‘Cessation of Hostilities and for the Speculation of Structure and Principles of Somali National Reconciliation Process’. Delegates agreed a number of crucial issues including new federal charter, decentralization and federalism (Mulugeta 2006:28)

Although, the Eldoreth Peace Process took a long time and faced several difficulty issues particularly when it came to the agenda on representation on the Reconciliation

Committee that was later solved based on formula for a clan representation known as 4.5 formula, it achieved tangible results. The Formula envisaged 400 seats divided equally between the four major clan groups, and minority groups collectively receiving half as many seats as major clan. This means eighty-four seats for each major clan, forty-two seats for minority clans and twenty-two additional seats to be allocated at the discretion of the technical committee (Menkhaus 2007: 360; Mulugeta: 2009: 28). Because of some claims made by Somalis, the Technical Committee was expanded by including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Sudan and also renamed as the Facilitation Committee on the peace process chaired by Kenya.

On January 29 2004, after series of debates and bargaining during the conference, the Somali participants generally agreed the name of the government and charter, the size of the parliament, and the duration of the transitional period. The delegates selected 275-member transitional parliament, based on the '4.5 formula', in which each of the four major clans would have sixty-one delegates and minority groups collectively thirty-one, which immediately approved the Charter of the TFG for five years. The Charter of TFG created:

"Institutions assigned responsibilities, roles and obligations. Major political agreements reached by the different factions for political dissension in Charter include: election of the president by parliament; traditional leader to elect parliamentarians in consultation with political leaders; parliament to be composed of states and regional administrations; and the interim period to be five years "(Mulugeta 2009:30).

Eventually, the newly selected TFG parliament soon after it approved the transitional federal Charter for five-year term, agreed a constitution and holding election. On October 10 2004, Abdulahi Yusuf was elected as president of the TFG. The President also appointed Ali Mohamed Gedi as his Prime Minister. Even though Somaliland Authority and group of Islamist entities did not attend the Eldoreth peace process, meaningful results had been achieved including establishment of TFG and Transitional Charter (Healy 2011: 114).

The role of IGAD members played in ending the negotiation and establishing state in Somalia, despite their internal divisions was significant. After twenty years of

failure, IGAD relatively succeeded establishing a government, though consisted of warlords. From view point of IGAD, the organization succeeded what the UN had failed to take action on (Mulugeta 2009: 30). This effort gave IGAD legitimacy for the organization's regional conflict resolution and even international popularity.

There were some attempts made by regional and international organizations to bring together the TFG and UIC to reach agreement. President Omer-Al-Bashir of Sudan held a conference in Khartoum where two peace negotiations took place. However, all efforts failed and both parties accused each other of violating the terms of agreement (Menkhaus 2007: 362). TFG considered the UIC aiming to attack Baidoa and other regions in order to disseminate their rule, while the UIC accused the TFG invited Ethiopian troops into the country.

The TFG had no national army, police, and security forces and as a result could not move direct into Mogadishu, which was under direct control of the Union of Islamic Courts. The TFG landed first in Jowhar City before it later moved to Baidoa in the south of the country, the fifth largest city in Somalia. The UIC emerged in June 2006 as the most popular Islamist in Somalia. Within six months, they secured the whole Mogadishu and overrun all warlords, pirates and gangs. The UIC opposed the TFG by calling it illegitimate, which does not represent the interest of Somalia as it consists of warlords backed by traditional enemies of Somalia. (Menkhaus 2007: 362). Accordingly, the TFG could not move to Mogadishu and also considered the UIC as a terrorist organization.

5.1.5.2 The Invasion of Ethiopia and Emergence of Al-Shabab Extremists

The verbal words between the TFG and UIC continued and led direct military clash. The troops of UIC surrounded the TFG's headquarter in Baidoa and risked its existence. The UIC also declared war against Ethiopia, while Ethiopian government backed by USA, waiting such verbal war as a domestic interest justification, decided to invade Somalia to eliminate UIC. On 24 December 2006, Ethiopia troops supported by TF forces attacked the UIC from different directions. The leading figures of UIC left the country to avoid more bloodshed and destruction. Ethiopia's decision to intervene Somalia was based on UIC 'alleged link to terrorists, irredentist rhetoric, and dependence on Eritrea' (Dagne 2009: 98). In December 2006, the TFG moved to Mogadishu with the support of

Ethiopian Troops. However, Humanitarian and security conditions deteriorated in the South and central parts of Somalia due to conflict intensification.

The Union of Islamic Courts had been significantly defeated. They lost strategic Kismaayo port as one of the key areas to defeat Al-Shabab militias. Some of its forces and leaders including its moderate chairman Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, disappeared to Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen and Eritrea, but much of its fighters remained in the hinterland of the country and melted into the society. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed reportedly met with US ambassador in Kenya. US officials have also approached other leaders of UIC as a new attempt to create dialogue between the UIC and TFG (Dagne 2009: 98).

Even though some governments and regional organizations including, AU, EU and Arab League have criticized Ethiopia, it had got most financial support from US due to global war on terrorism. Among IGAD member states, it was only Eritrea that opposed the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia. Ethiopia defended itself and its military actions by accusing UIC as international threat to its domestic security. US government also considered UIC an Al-Qaida affiliated organization. However, UIC definitely rejected these accusations. In 2007, top leaders of UIC outside of the country established a political organization called Alliance for the Re- liberation of Somalia (ARS) and engaged series of dialogue with TFG (Dagne 2009: 98; Healy 2011: 123).

However, Ethiopian and TFG force faced heavy fighting and guerrilla warfare from Al-Shabab (extremist group of UIC) militias, which first time used suicide bombings in the Somalia's history. The intensification of the conflict resulted one of the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the world. The Al-Shabab military tactic of hit and run forced Ethiopia to withdraw its forces from the country after two years of heavy fighting. Al-Shabab controlled much of the south and central territories of Somalia (Apuuli 2010: 48).

5.1.6 Djibouti Peace Agreement and the Establishment of TFG II

The weakness of TFG, the increasing influence of Al-Shabab among Somali people due to foreign military intervention, the increasing guerrilla warfare, and the worsening humanitarian situation led the international community to consider new peace dialogue

between the insurgents and TFG. The objective of this negotiation was to bring together the moderate elements of the ARS, and TFG, by establishing a joint federal government and marginalize the radicals, namely Al-Shabab. Accordingly, on May 2008, Djibouti peace conference was started in Djibouti under the auspices of UNPO in Somalia (Mulugeta 2009: 31). Unfortunately, the opposition groups (ARS) divided into two parts: ARS-Djibouti, which were ready to negotiate and ARS-Asmara, which conditioned the withdrawal of foreign forces prior to talk peace (Kasaija 2010: 269).

The Djibouti peace process was held under the administration of the United Nation Organization and coordinated by UNPOS. Officials, from United States, Europe, the African Union, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference and regional governments took part as observers during the talks in Djibouti. The Somali peace conference participants agreed on a wide range of issues, including secession of hostilities and commitment to find a durable peace agreement. They also agreed the deployment of UN peacekeeping force and withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. They also promised to ease humanitarian access to civilians in need and to establish a joint security committee to ensure the implementation of security arrangements and create an interim joint security force (Mulugeta 2009: 33). The parties established the High Level Committee, chaired by UN to deal with political, justice, and governance issues.

The resignation of former TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, after he met pressure from regional and international leaders, contributed to the agreement between the TFG and ARS-Djibouti. IGAD expressed its commitment and established a Facilitators Office for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation to observe all peace activities to be effectively implemented. The ARS-Djibouti and the TFG agreed to form a new unity government by expanding the number of Somali parliamentarians to 550 and elected the former leader of UIC, Sheikh Sharif and Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as the new President and Prime Minister of the TFG, respectively (Apuuli 2011: 47). The two sides also agreed to establish a 10 000 joint security force that should be trained by international community to replace the Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian forces fully withdraw as agreed by the Djibouti peace process. Despite the establishment of the new government, the security situation remains worsening.

5.2 IGAD's Contribution to Peace and Security: Implications

The establishment of inclusive Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in Kenyan town of Eldoret in 2005 created a positive implication that IGAD was providing unusually task and achieving its conflict resolution role. The outcome of Eldoret peace reconciliation process organized by IGAD implied ‘a remarkable accomplishment, especially considering that it addressed long and complex conflict that had defied previous attempts at settlement’. However to analyze it deeply, circumstance in which the agreements were reached indicates to a more meaningful judgment about IGAD's institutional role. Healy (2011) indicated that:

“In origin, the IGAD peace initiative in Somalia was political initiative, conceived and largely executed by one or more member states. The Leading regional mediators were also interested parties. While the appointment of respected figures to lead mediation efforts has been the norm of African conflict resolution, in this case they did not, as might have been expected, rely on the IGAD secretariat, which lacked the capacity and authority to manage the peace process that were carried out in its name”. (Healy 2011: 114).

In fact, the internal divisions among member states and weak financial power, IGAD lacks the required organizational and logistical capability to undertake such complicated Somali peace process. As a result, Kenya government took the organizational and logistical capability of the peace process and appointed Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat as the chief negotiator for the Somali peace process. Moreover, Kenya was the only neutral country among IGAD members regarding to Somali and Sudan conflicts. The success of IGAD's peace efforts both in Somalia and Sudan depended on Kenyan neutrality and its good will. (Healy 2011: 114). Accordingly:

“Notwithstanding its institutional weakness, the IGAD secretariat successfully institutionalized donor support through the IPF. The willingness of external donors to finance the peace process as both a blessing and a burden: their involvement generated frictions over ownership and the Implementation of spurious deadlines to finance. Despite the successful mediations in Sudan and Somalia, IGAD is still far from providing an institutional basis for regional security in the Horn of Africa. There remains a high propensity of regional actors to resort to the use of force. Reports to the UN Security Council's Sanctions Committee on the Somali arms embargo record military assistance from

Ethiopia to its allies among the Somali factions throughout 2003-4. When the Somali national peace conference was in progress. Later, Eritrea's assistance to Islamist opponents of the TFG was scaled up, reaching a peak in late 2006 just before Ethiopia's Intervention” (Healy 2011: 114-5).

Specifically, since the IGAD members had a hostile relations in the history, the circumstance of militarized 'peace process' is part of a regional political attitude in which states permanently introduce and exercise their military power outside by intervening one's internal affairs. This militarized situation in the region complicated the possibility of building regional structures for peace and security. Thus, to have strong and effective regional organization, member states have to give up a degree of sovereignty, 'either by agreeing to be bound by regional rules and decisions or by giving an institutional secretariat some independent authority'. (Healy 2011: 116). But members of IGAD do not intend to give up any degree of sovereignty to the organizations executive. Such lack of member commitment to have primary regional organization, creates tension among member states and IGAD will continue to be weak and ineffective.

IGAD's peace contribution to Somali reconciliation process was little and limited. The TFG that was established in Kenya under the auspices of IGAD could not move to Mogadishu and had no domestic popular acceptance from the Somali people in the country. As a result, members of GAD faced a challenging issue and involved to debate about how to support the TFG that they created in Eldoreth to be a functioning government in Somalia. IGAD decided to move 'beyond conflict resolution and found itself in a one-sided intervention at the forefront' of peacekeeping mission in Somalia (Healy 2011: 117). However, on January 31 2005, heads of states and governments of IGAD meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, determined to deploy IGAD peacekeeping mission, namely IGASOM to provide security support to the TFG and guarantee the sustenance of the IGAD peace process and assist with the establishment of peace and security including training of the Somali police and the army' (Healy 2011: 117; Muliti 2014: 5).

Nevertheless, IGASOM peacekeeping mission failed and IGAD made little contribution to the Somali peace process. The main factor for the IGASOM failure was members of IGAD interested in the issue of the arms embargo on Somalia, which the UN

Security Council did not consider it necessary at the time to amend the embargo to allow for such a protection force ((Mulugeta 2009: 31; Multi 2014: 5). It was first in 2007, two years later, when the UNSC considered amending arms embargo on Somalia by approving AMISOM troops to be deployed, in Mogadishu.

It was on 19 January 2007, when the AU Peace Security Council (APSC) considered the worsening situation in Somalia and established AMISOM in place of IGASOM. The UNSC also approved the AMISOM peacekeeping deployment in Somalia where the first 1,700 AMISOM force from Uganda arrived in Mogadishu with the US financial support (Healy 2011: 118).

5.2.2 TFG Incapability

The TFG, though, consisted of mainly warlords tried to some developments in the first two years. It attempted to establish a national army consisting of all Somali regions and clans. It created several training centers for security and national army in the country. It has also established some political institutions including Supreme Court. Furthermore to achieve long-term peace and statebuliding, the TFG convened a National Reconciliation Conference held in Mogadishu. But weak institutions, little resource and lack of foreign support undermined transitional federal institutions to achieve more efforts and progress. The TFG could not expand its territory and depended on AMISOM support, and weak national army loyal to clans and warlord. Creation of effective and efficient national security forces could be almost impossible for a country of more than two decades of conflict and state collapse (Mulugetha, 2009: 34). Moreover, President Abdulahi Yusuf lacked internal support from Hawiye clan in Mogadishu, not only that he is from Daarood clan (main Hawiye rival clan), but also being a long time warlord ally of Ethiopia and his request of more international troops. His appointment of inexperienced prime minster, Mohammed Ali Gedi a veterinary professor of Ethiopian ally, though from Hawiye clan, made no change.

The TFG was also ineffective because of Power struggle between the President and Prime minster based on constitutional issues particularly, on the term of the office of the Prime Minister and its implications. Having limited experience, the Prime minster failed to appease Hawiye clan and create reconciliation process among all

warring factions. The political dispute between the Prime minister and President was solved with the resignation of the Prime Minister. (Dagne 2009: 99; Mulugeta 2009: 34). However, fresh political disagreement emerged between the President Abdulahi Yusuf and new prime minister.

Increasing internal power struggle within the TFG, hindered its political, institutional and administrative capacity of all transitional institutions. It can be argued that, Somali leadership is responsible for all failure to form effective institutions of governance and create all-inclusive federal government. As a result Djibouti peace process was convened as another means to make dialogue between the insurgents and the TFG by forming a large coalition government.

5.3 The Role of United Nation in the Somali Peace Building

The Role of the UN involvement in Somalia after state collapse in 1991 has various interpretations. The marginalization of Somalia by UN and international community created a sense of hopeless among Somalis that UN is only a project pursued by small states and international organizations whom interest depends on Somalia's conflict. In 1992, the UNO attempted to tackle Somali crises both humanitarian and conflict issues by dispatching two peacekeeping forces, under the names of UNOSOM I and II. More than 37,000 troops from 33 different countries were deployed in Somalia with sophisticated weapons (Mulugeta 2009: 47). However, after eighteen US marines were killed, the UN peacekeepers left Somalia without restoring peace and stability.

The withdrawal of such huge military from different countries under the name of UN without settling conflict created negative perception among Somali people towards UN. The failure UNOSOM Operation in Somalia in 1990 also affected the UNO decision makers not to go back to Somalia and establish UN peacekeeping mission or take the peace reconciliation leadership. Thus, Somalia was marginalized from UN affairs and turned on the world corner. Although, there were some peace conferences sponsored by UN, most UN activities were limited on humanitarian assistance.

5.3.1 The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS)

The United Nations direct intervention in Somali affairs failed to establish peace and stability to Somalia and UN peacekeepers completely left in 1995, leaving Somalis alone. However, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was formed on April 15, 1995, in order to coordinate and facilitate Somali reconciliation efforts among all concerned groups such as politicians, civil societies and neighboring countries. United Nations Department of Political Affairs (DPA), controls, evaluates and the activities performed by UNPOS. The Head of UNPOS is the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia, who closely monitors the situation in and relating to Somalia and assists the Secretary-General in providing periodic briefings and written reports to the Security Council every four months. UNPOS also organizes, coordinates and raises fund for humanitarian aid organizations operating in Somalia. It also encourages regional governments to engage reconciliation efforts to create dialogue among warring Somali factions (Mulugeta 2009:48; UNPOS 2013: 1). It supported several peace process including Arta Peace Conference, Eldoterh peace initiative and Djibouti agreement.

Since June 2013, Mr. Nicolas Kay has been the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, who succeeded Augustine Mahiga. Its current operational office is in Mogadishu. The main strategy of the United Nations in Somalia is based on three areas. The first one is about political mission with the objective of supporting newly established Somali government in building state institutions and creating stable and inclusive government through discourses and negotiations (UN 2009: 4). The UNPOS also supports the federal government by increasing the capacity of regional entities, drafting permanent federal constitution and protecting human rights in Somalia.

The second strategy of UNPOS in Somalia is enhancing security areas in the whole country. It finances the federal institutions in a way they can establish effective, legitimate and credible security forces. The third and final UN strategy is effective and efficient continuation of UN humanitarian services. UNPOS also supports the SFG create an effective mechanism to get financial support from the international community (UN 2009: 4).

In 2007 the Somali crises reached a critical situation. The conflict was intensified and humanitarian catastrophe broke out. The Ethiopian troops and Al-Shabab militias engaged a devastating war and committed human rights violation. Some states and international organizations proposed UN-peacekeeping mission in Somalia (UN 2009 15). However, the UN Secretary-General opposed by recommending that UN-peacekeeping mission in Somalia would be a high-risk option.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

On 2 May 2013, the UN Security Council passed a unanimous Resolution in 2012 founding the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNASOM). The new mission will replace the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, which will complete its mandate on 3, June 2013. UNSOM's headquarter would be in Mogadishu. The UNASOM would establish offices throughout the country depended on the need and request made by the Federal Government and as security conditions permit. UNSOM's mandate is:

"Provision of policy advice to the federal Government and the African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on peacebuilding and statebuilding in the areas of governance, security sector reform and rule of law (including the disengagement of combatants), development of a federal system (including preparations for elections in 2016), and coordination of international donor support. UNSOM will also help build the federal government's capacity to promote respect for human rights and women's empowerment, promote child protection, prevent conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice institutions" (UNOPOS 2011).

The main financial and military assistance of AMISOM is assured with good cooperation between AU and UN. One of the roles of UNSOM includes working in a coordinated manner with AMISOM by strengthen the strategic partnership between the UN and the African Union/AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Both organizations have a role to play in supporting Somalia's peacebuilding (Mulugeta 2009: 49; UNPOS, 2013). As the deployment of UN force became controversial, the UN chose to follow the option of strengthening AMISOM while building Somalia's security institutions. According the Report of the Security-General.

The United Nations mainly assists the AMISOM troops in various areas including establishment of well-disciplined and trained troops, increasing the size of the

AMISOM, and Enhancing the capacity of AMISOM in the effective and efficient mechanism of providing security until its mandate is over and the national security force replaces. The UN also supports AMISOM in terms of financial, logistical and technical capability to implement its tasks (UN 2009:15).

Chapter Six

Prospects of Peace and Current Developments in Somalia

6.1 End of Transitional Period

The main task of TFG is the reconstruction of institutions in the war torn Somalia and leading the country to restoration of democratic order. It was expected that the Transitional Federal Parliament would soon engage crucial tasks including the adoption of new constitution to be submitted to popular referendum. The TFG leaders were also supposed to promote the good governance, and give priority the restoration of peace and security in the country. However, as we mentioned above, continues internal power struggle between TFG leaders and high corruption led the failure of all planed agendas, even though its mandate was renewed several times. The TFG also lost regional and international credibility. According to UN-Embargo Monitoring group on Somalia and Eritrea, TFG troops diverted significant number of weapons into illegal market and corrupted humanitarian aid (HAB 2014: 12).

The retreat of Al-Shabab from Mogadishu and the military advance made by the Somali national army supported by AMISOM made security conditions in Mogadishu and its surrounds improved, The Djibouti peace process in 2008 outlined the requirements of the TFG such as a new constitution, the disarmament of militia groups, resettlement of refugees and IDPs for Somalia. As the result, based on Kampala Accord signed in Uganda, time was set off for the end of transitional period and the establishment of permanent federal government. August 20, 2012 was scheduled for the expiry date of TFG and at the same date the formation of the parliament and the election of the head of the state was to be held (HAB 2014: 12; Loubser and Solomon 2014: 10). A roadmap was declared in September 2011 to ensure that mandated tasks were accomplished by 20 August 2012 deadlines.

However, ending transitional period and forming permanent federal state on the planned date was set back and the whole process was postponed to September 10, 2012. The whole collapse of all necessary state institutions and persistent conflict and instability in the country indicated the incredibility of direct political election (Loubser

and Solomon 2014: 10). Thus, traditional clan elders took the responsibility of selecting the representative of the people in the parliament (HAB 2014: 8).

6.1.1 The Garowe Roadmap

The Garowe roadmap was a process of how the transitional period should end. It passed a several phases of consultations between four principle actors: the transitional federal government headed by Sheik Sharif Ahmed; the autonomous region of Puntland in northeast; the administration of Galmudug in Southern Mudug region and Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama (ASWJ). Two constitutional conferences took place in Garowe, Puntland at which the four main TFG actors agreed to assure and implement the transitional steps before the TFG's mandate expired. The Garowe roadmap process involved in a complicated selection process as Bryden (2013) indicated:

"The roadmap process, particularly the authenticity and integrity of the clan elders and delegates who convened in Mogadishu to form the Constituent Assembly and elect a new parliament was fiercely contested. Allegations of vote buying were rife, and an attempt to disqualify the former warlords from standing for office was over turned under pressure from the outgoing president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, who had replaced Abdulahi Yusuf in 2009. As the parliament prepared to select a new head of state, many independent observers despaired of any change, believing that the entire process so flawed that Sheikh Sharif was all but assured of another term of office. The subsequent reversal of electoral fortunes was so dramatic and unexpected that it surprised even the closest observers of the process, including- given the astonished look on his face carried live on television-president elect Hassan sheikh Mohamoud" (Bryden 2013: 6).

The Garowe roadmap process implied the convenient opportunity of transitional milestone through achievable required security, federal constitution and countrywide reconciliation and good governance. To implement above responsibilities, this political process was the only option the TFG had, as good governance does not equate with the corruption. The support of international community towards the establishment of a federal Somalia implied the unity of Somali state including Somaliland and Puntland. The international community put pressure on TFG leaders and all other concerned groups to adhere the Garowe roadmap process. There was a joint statement made by the UN Special representative of the Secretary-General

for Somalia, the IGAD and AU Representatives for Somalia on May 1, 2012 ‘warning that any opposition to the roadmap would be treated as spoilers and would be sanctioned’ (Bryden 2013:5; Loubser and Solomon 2014:10).

However, the road map lost its way apparently only after that Hassan Sheikh had been elected as president. Its principle founders such as Puntland, Galmudug and Ahlu-Sunna-Wal Jama had somehow been left behind. The new federal government was no longer the sum of any meaningful parts, thus came into being without the authority, territorial control, and political backing that these de facto authorities could have conferred upon it, and found itself instead confined to those limited urban areas in Southern Somalia protected by AMISOM (Bryden 2013: 6).

Even though, the ending transitional process was in a haste move, a new federal parliament was selected by Constituent Assembly and a new Provisional Constitution was also approved which clearly identified that Somalia would be a federation. However, the hastened political process indicated that the passed constitution was not deeply debated, prior to its approval and therefore the constitution is provisional and needs a more inclusive national discourse before 2016 planned national election (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 14).

6.2 The Establishment of Federal State

On September 10 2012, Somalia once again after more than two decades of dark experience entered into world arena and marked a new beginning with the formation of a new Federal Charter and government that immediately received international recognition. Long time chronic instability and statelessness and twelve years of weak and corrupted transitional governments, the SFG has been widely welcomed as Somalia’s first 'post-transition'. Many Somali people and considerable observers indicated new beginning and hope for Somalia. It is tempting to imagine that Somalia is finally on the path to recovery (Bryden 2013: 2).

The inauguration of new permanent federal government took place in Mogadishu based on Garowe Roadmap political process. Indirect selection, where traditional clan elders selected 825 delegates to a Constituent Assembly, which intern selected a 275-

member parliament that later subsequently selected the president was the only possible option to take, due to the expiring mandate of the TFG and general security situation of the country (Bryden 2013: 5; Farah 2013: 4).

The transitional governments headed by Sheik Sharif Sheikh Ahmed ended on September 2012 and the presidential election by parliament held on the same date gave rise the establishment of Somali Federal Government under the leadership of President Hassan Sheik Mohamud, who immediately appointed Abdi Farah Shirdon as the new Prime minster. The election of 2012 and the establishment of permanent federal state in fact created, a hope and bright future phenomena for Somali people in the country and among Somali-diaspora for more than two decades of hopeless. Furthermore, the end of Somalia's prolonged transitional process and formation of new federal government has been globally welcomed. For instance, on January 17, 2013, the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and EU representative declared for the first time in twenty-two years that:

"Somalia now possessed new representative government with a new President, a new parliament, a new prime minster, a new constitution. She stated that US would recognize the Somali government. EU High representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton declared also: Somalia is no longer a failed state. Numerous foreign governments and international organizations have since followed suit, restoring formal diplomatic relations and opening embassies in Mogadishu" (Bryden 2013: 3).

The popular hope was also raised that both the President Hassan Mahmoud and the Prime Minister did not participate in the prolonged conflict and worked in civil society and private business activities. President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud was not only a civil society activist and businessman, but also researcher and head of a technical institute in Mogadishu. The Prime Minster also established eighteen member cabinet, consisting of qualified professionals and technocrats rather than former warlords from past, failed transitional governments (HAB, 2014: 5; Bryden 2013: 3).

The first step of the new SFG after twenty-two years of chaos and crises was to launch the formation of national institutions, restoration of national security, promotion of good governance and prepare all necessary steps for the 2016 countrywide elation. It was believed that the new SFG would learn from the past mistakes and obstacles

paralyzed previous transitional governments, and therefore avoid any internal power struggle among its leaders by giving priority saving people and serving national interest. In a short-term:

“The government has to create the framework for a real functioning state. Among the main priorities, there is the reform of the judiciary and security sectors in order to reinforce the rule of law. Well-trained police and security forces are essential to assure public confidence and security. Demilitarization of the society, reintegration of former fighters and arms control are important conditions for stability and long-term social reconciliation. The restoration of law and order require the existence of efficient organs, to counter all forms of illegal practices (corruption, intimidation, political violence) in order to build public trust in the nascent institutions”(HAB 2014: 9).

6.2.1 AMISOM and Security

Background

The Ethiopian military intervention backed by US with the objective of eliminating UIC and Al-Shabab, caused tremendous damage and loss of many lives and even prevented humanitarian relief operation. The TFG of Somalia that had been established in Nairobi lacked any means of power to protect its existence. Since 1994 when UNOSOM left the country without restoring peace security, peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives in Somalia was difficult and Somali was still in search of peace and the situation was worsening. According to the Resolution 1725 of the UNSC, member States of African Union and IGAD should establish a protection and training mission in Somalia, namely IGASOM. The proposed IGASOM peacekeeping mission failed even if, UN Security Council approved it on December 2006 (Murithi 2010: 80). Due to the failure of IGASOM peacekeeping deployment in Somalia, AU Peace and Security Council established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was a peacekeeping operation that meant to be a six-month deployment. It was in January 2007, based on the report of the Chairman of AU Commission on the situation in Somalia and the evaluation and recommendation of the AU Military Staff Committee, which led African Union’s Peace and Security Council to approve the deployment AMISOM forces in Somalia. The mandate of AMISOM consisted of:

"To provide support for the TFGs in their efforts to stabilize the situation in Somalia and further dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; to create conditions conducive to long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia" (Murith, 2010: 80).

The main challenge of AMISOM in 2007 was to move and deploy forces quickly to Somali, particularly to Mogadishu in an effective and efficient means by creating a secure atmosphere area for the TFG. The first troop deployment of AMISOM was started with 1700 Ugandan forces with minimal training and preparation. Although the number of AMISOM was little compared to Al-Shabab, which are undisciplined militias, AMISOM had a well-trained and sophisticated weapons. However, the TFG and AMISOM failed to create secure environment and reduce the risk of Al-Shabab from 2007 to 2011. In one hand, this failure can be attributed to shortage of forces and the limited mandate of AMISOM. On the other hand, the TFG leaders were engulfed by internal division and corruption (AU 2007; UN, 2007; Roitsch 2014: 5).

6.2.2 The Defeat of Al-Shabab and AMISOM Military Advance

The occupation of Ethiopian troops based on its domestic security in the Somalia, took place during 2006 and 2009. The occupation worsened already deteriorating situation and even destroyed the destruction of the remaining infrastructure in the country. It also contributed the popularity of Al-Shabab militias and even overshadowed the AMISOM troops. However, after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in 2009, situation changed and AMISOM troops pushed back the Al-Shabab and took more territory securing 60% of Mogadishu during 2010 and 2011(Loubser and Solomon 2014: 8). During the Ethiopian Intervention, TFG and AMISOM controlled only small areas including the Airport, the State House, Villa Somalia and K-4 junction.

The TFG forces and AMISOM achieved this military success, despite a fierce and bloodshed attack from Al-Shabab insurgents, whose main objective was the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country. The threat of Al-Shabab to international security, after they have conducted a suicide bombing in Uganda during July 2010, which killed more than 70 people, was alarmed and led the extension of AMISOM

mandate by UN Security Council. The Security Council approved the increase of AMISOM troops up to 22,000 forces and the immediate deployment of 4000 troops under the mandate of attacking the bases of Al-Shabab and bringing under the TFG control (Loubser and Solomon 2014: 8). Heavy fighting between the Al-Shabab and AMISOM troops caused increase of civilian casualties in the country.

On 6 August 2011, the war against Al-Shabab and the situation in Mogadishu dramatically changed after Al-Shabab insurgents officially declared they withdrew from Mogadishu. The withdrawal of Al-Shabab was mainly caused due to increasing military power of the TFG and the new mandate given to AMISOM to attack Al-Shabab bases. This was also the time when the human tragedy escalated and famine broke out. International community also launched a new system of closely inspecting financial and economic sources of Al-Shabab by prohibiting the export of charcoal industry whose exports to Middle-east countries supported Al-Shabab financially (Loubser and Solomon, 2014: 8). According to Loubser and Solomon (2014):

“Al-Shabab's weakness bore no relation to TFG's strength; rather, it was due to political infighting, unpopular policies and military pressures from AMOSOM and other regional forces. Regional governance systems in Somalia formed from community initiatives produced stability in certain areas, which once again, could not be attributed to TFG. Ironically Al-Shabab was popular internationally, with foreign fighters joining the Islamist insurgency from the U.S.A, UK, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Gulf region” (Loubser and Solomon 2014: 8).

Al-Shabaab insurgents conducted several attacks on Kenya-Somali border and as a retaliation, Kenyan troops launched Operation Linda Chi entering south Somalia, in order to minimize the threat of Al-Shabab and create buffer zone between the two countries. Based on this Kenyan national interest, Nairobi showed its interest in joining AMSOM, and on 6 July 2012, 2664 Kenyan troops officially became part of AMISOM. Thus, the total number of AMISOM was 17, 000 forces. Kenya's decision to join AMISOM and involve in the war on Al-Shabab, created insecurity in Kenya after Al-Shabab conducted series attacks including Church attacks in Garisa, West Gate mall attacks in Nairobi shopping center and Mombasa tourist areas, which left hundreds dead (Loubser and Solomon 2014: 9).

Before 2011, the mandate of AMISOM was based on traditional peacekeeping operation, though no peace was to keep. Its power and authority was confined to only in 'support dialogue and reconciliation, protect infrastructure, monitor the security situation and facilitate humanitarian operations'. Moreover, Rules of Engagement (ROE) limited AMISOM to employ lethal force. As a traditional peacekeeping operation, they were not allowed to engage in war with the Al-Shabab except in a self-defense (Roitsch 2014: 6).

In the mid of 2012, after Kenya forces joined AMISOM, AMISOM military capability was at the highest point and they prepared to engage fierce fighting with Al-Shabab by attacking their bases all over the country. Uganda and Burundi also added additional battalions. Based on the extension of AMISOM troops, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1744 extending the mandate of AMISOM by allowing AMISOM forces to take 'all necessary measures appropriate to carry out their mandate'. This new mandate meant that authority to destroy the Al-Shabab bases and eliminate their threat (Roitsch 2014: 7).

AMISOM and TFG forces had secured the whole Mogadishu and surround areas and districts including Afgoye and Balad. Since Al-Shabab's power was weakened, they also lost the popularity among the people. At the end of 2012, Al-Shabab lost also major cities including Kismayo, Brawe, Jowher, Baidoa, Hudur and baladwayne. The weakness of Al-Shabab and the military advance achieved by TFG and AMISOM which secured the capital Mogadishu first in two decades, allowed the TFG to end the protracted transitional period by conducting indirect election. The end of transitional government and the election of 2012, gave rise a new permanent federal government and international recognition (Roitsch 2014: 8).

The new military success made by TFG and AMISOM forces and the change of political process in the country was great. Al-Shabab insurgents lost both morally and militarily. They could not make any war propaganda towards the Somali federal Government as people were hoping that the new recognized government would restore peace and security and create all institution. The AMISOM and Somali national forces also neutralized insurgents' street credibility, not only in Mogadishu but also in the central and southern regions of the country. Furthermore, Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama (ASWJ) launched new wave of attack on Al-Shabab insurgents in the central and south

cities (Roitsch 2014: 8-9). This military success motivated other AU countries including Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia to promise to send troops to Somalia as part of AMISOM, where Ethiopia alone sent 5000 troops to the mission. Nevertheless:

“Operationally Al-Shabab has promised to reengage AMISOM and SFG using guerrilla tactics. Clearly this is an acknowledgment that it had no longer has the capability of seizing and holding key terrain in Mogadishu and other big cities, as guerrilla warfare typically favors numerically inferior numbers and is only designed to dominate terrain for short periods of time it” (Roitsch 2014: 9).

6.3 Political Development of SFG: Opportunities and Challenges

6.3.1 Policy strategy

After more than two decades, Somalia has witnessed the inauguration of non-transitional government. The establishment of non-transitional federal government in fact raised the hope of the Somali people first in two decades. However, opportunities and challenges that the new government leaders face, determine the progress and future of the Somali people. As a result, the new government immediately announced its policy strategies and options including six-pillar policy strategy introduced by the president Hassan Mahmoud that was perhaps best articulated as he himself publicly addressed:

“My administration's goal over the next four years is to put in place the necessary mechanism to: 1) create stability in the country; 2) speed up economic recovery; 3) build peace and remove the main drivers of conflicts; 4) vastly improve the government's capacity to respond to the needs of its people by improving service delivery; 5) increase our international partnerships and create closer ties with our neighbors and friends of Somalia; 6) last but not least achieve unity at home” (Bryden 2014: 7).

Nevertheless, despite the promise made by the president, the Somali federal government depended on financial assistance from the donor countries. Thus the international community and the SFG together established new strategies, namely, the New Deal Process and Somali Compact through which Somali state should be built.

Somali Compact

The Somali Compact is a development assistance process between the SFG and international donors together with the New Deal for engagement in chronic conflict affected and fragile states. It is a development cooperation and inclusive process to identify the main objectives and strategies of Somalia for the years between 2014 and 2016. The concept is initiated by Somali federal Government, based on New Deal Principles, which ties with five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 15). To support and implement this Compact, SFG and donor countries formed a High Level Task Force (HLTF) in March 2013 (SFG: 2013: 5).

According to the Compact, the five-peacebuilding and statebuilding goals are identified as major strategies including Inclusive Politics, Security, Justice, Economic Foundation, and Revenues and Services. As stated in the compact, Inclusive Politics implies: inclusive political discourse between the SFG and the regional entities in order to identify and clearly relations between federal government and regions; complete the provisional constitution and hold countrywide national election. The security emphasizes on: enhancing security institutions and organs in order to restore peace and security; integrating the security forces into federal institutions; a ‘program for disengaged compacts’; and maritime security strategy (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 15). The main priorities and needs stated in the compact are based on the result of consultative process between SFG with citizens, civil societies at national level with leading donor countries and international partners. In detail as indicated in Compact:

“The Specific priorities of the Compact are drawn from the six pillars Program of SFG, and further defined through consultative process. It represents Puntland's commitment to contribute to peaceful, just and productive life for the whole of Somalia. It incorporates a special arrangement for Somaliland, which represents Somaliland's Peace and State Building Goals. Building priorities and is the result of several consultations. The priorities of the Somali compact are framed by the five PSG of the New Deal and represent agreement on what is required to move toward peace and recovery. It aims to foster the resilience of Somali people and institutions, restoring the Somali Peoples' trust in the state and its ability to protect and serve their basic needs for inclusive politics, security, justice, an economic foundation and revenue and services, in full respect of human right” (SFG Compact 2014: 3).

However, the process of Somali Compact was not implemented as it was assumed because of new internal division and dispute between the government leaders. The President and the prime Minister disagreed on constitutional terms based on who has the legal power to appoint the cabinet members, which later brought the removal of the Prime Minister, Abdi Shirdon after he lost a vote of confidence in the parliament. The resignation of the head of the Somali Central Bank, Yusr Abrar, who claimed she was forced to engage improper transactions, also contributed the Compact to be hindered. (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 15). Internal power struggle among Somali leaders and persistent corruption paralyzed the previous transitional governments and the same manner continues in current post-transitional government headed by Hassan Mahmoud.

The New Deal of 2016

The Garowe roadmap political process gave rise the first non-transitional government in Somalia since 1991 with the objective of ending prolonged transitional periods of the twelve years. This post-transitional government is indeed not the product of all-inclusive process and enjoys no authority in the country except in Mogadishu. It lacks general acceptance from the population as the country is still divided on regional administrations based on clan politics. The SFG is also founded on a Provisional constitution, which implies that before 2016, basic responsibilities of state formation process must be done. Such process of state formation include: the establishment of federal regions, reviewing and completing the constitution and holding constitutional referendum; formation of electoral system, and holding elections by 2016, before its term ends. According to Bryden (2014), if the SFG fails to perform these above responsibilities, on the planned time, political and constitutional crises will emerge which might lead either to the 'unilateral extension of the current SFG' s mandate or an improved progression to the next 'post transitional' government' (Bryden 2014: 16). Such this political process would also reduce the credibility of federal government and other actors in the region. In indeed it is disappointing that the leaders of SFG had done so far little to address and accomplish state formation responsibilities and tasks within the first three years, and presently no stable political atmosphere to do these tasks in the remaining time. According to Bryden (2014) based on the provisional constitution:

"At least 12 articles must be amended and 22 laws enacted during the federal parliament's first term. Other transitional imperatives, including the foundation of federal governance and the development of an electoral system, are to be entrusted to independent commissions that should have been established within sixty days of the cabinet. Up to now, these remained on the drawing board, and neither the SFG nor the parliament has shown any real sense of urgency in meeting these crucial constitutional obligations. Instead they impaled themselves on an issue that has threatened to derail the transitional process altogether and plunge Somalia back to civil conflict and power struggle between president and prime minister" (Bryden 2014: 17).

6.3.2 Opportunities

6.3.2.1 Creation of Regional Administration

The Provisional Constitution drafted in 2012 for the post-transitional government clearly indicates that Somalia principally becomes a federal state where two and more regions can form a regional state under federal government. Puntland is the only recognized and existing federal entity in the country. Formation of federalism will be a difficult task for the SFG as the system is unfamiliar and alien to Somali community. Based on the provisional constitution, the federal parliament should debate about federal member state formation and their demarcation zones. The constitution also states that during the process of federal formation, the federal government must directly administer the new-formed member of federal state for a maximum period of two years. This means in one hand, the formation of federalism is not confined to the region only rather is influenced both by the federal parliament and federal government. On the other hand present existing federal member states for instance Puntland must be consulted in the formation of federalism. Such a complicated relations and competing authorities might cause delay and crises on federalism (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 15). Currently, there are several regional initiatives regarding on regional state formation in south-central Somalia. These include Jubaland, South-West State and Central State.

Puntland

Puntland is a regional administration established in 1998 and it is the major significant millstone for the formation of Somali federal state. Puntland mainly supports the idea of federalism. The relationship between Somali Federal Government and Puntland leaders was relatively calm and cooperative, though sometimes Puntland warned suspending federal relations based on constitutional terms, Power and resource

sharing issues. The new President of Puntland, Abdiwali Mohamed Ali Gas (a former TFG Prime Minister, was elected in January 2014) improved Puntland's relationship with the central government (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 19).

Somaliland

Somaliland had declared its independence in 1991 and established its own administration, which is not yet recognized by international community. Somali federal government considers Somaliland as part of the future Somali federal state and started negotiations with Somaliland leaders regarding with the unification of the country, while Somaliland came in the negotiation table with its longstanding political agenda based on separation. Nevertheless, there is some hope that the two will agree on something regarding on the future of Somalia (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 19).

6.3.3 The Security Situation

The current security situation in the country, compared to the past transitional periods, is an opportunity of the SFG to accomplish the remaining federal process and hold election by 2016. In the beginning of 2014, after 5000 Ethiopian troops joined AMISOM mission, The Somali national Army and AMISOM made a considerable success in the security situation. They defeated Al-Shabab in different regions and took control of large urban cities and territories including much of Bakol, Gedo, Hiran and Galgadud regions (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 20).

The Somali Security Force

Building Somali National Army is the greatest means that Somali Federal Government can restore peace and security and enhances its capacity. Currently there are 20,000 Somali national forces including militias aligned to government officials. There is an opportunity that European Union offered to the Somali government to train and advice Somali forces through European Training Mission (EUTM). The United States and Turkey also promised to support the SFG in constructing its national army. There had been also Thousands of Somali forces sent to Uganda and trained in Uganda's Military Academy (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 22). A committee consisting of Somali National Army officers, the EUTM and Turkey coordinate the training service provision facilitated by UNOSOM.

Despite such efforts to rebuild and increase the capability of Somali National Army, there are complicated issues delaying or even confronting the formation of a well-unified national army. In 1991, after the national army dismantled, security personnel were divided based on Clan politics and each group aligned to its clan and became loyal to the given regional leaders rather than federal government. Several factors paralyze the establishment of unified army. First, since, there is no still effective federal government that can take the responsibility of the security situation, each region prefers to have its own army rather than commanded by a weak Federal National Army. The other factor is that, there is accusation that most of army trained By USA, Turkey, EUTM belong the capital and surrounding districts and therefore the National Army represents on Mogadishu and its surroundings (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 22).

Finally, there is lack of commitment from regional and international community to effectively build a strong and efficient army. Somali National Army has no required equipment. They depend on AMISOM and always supported by AMISOM troops in military operation since they lack effective weapons to stand and fight alone. To equip national army is only possible after exemption to the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by the Security Council in 1992. In 2012, the SFG requested the total removal of arms embargo in order to build its national security force, but partial exemption was allowed which was even suspended later (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 20).

6.4 Challenges

The Somali Federal Government formed in 2012, has a huge responsibility and tasks to complete the remaining state institutions and completing federal formations. As we have mentioned above, it had announced its policy strategies and opportunities that could lead success if effectively implemented. However, there are several challenges to be stated that the SFG faces. These challenges include, establishment of federal member states, reviewing of provisional constitution, holding fair and free election, restoring security and building security forces. To implement all these tasks, inclusive political process should be engaged where SFG and regional administrations cooperate to review the constitution and prepare election by 2016 (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 25).

6.4.1 Federal System

After the state collapsed in 1991, the country was divided into different regions based on clan administrations, some of whom being powerful and prefer to have more powers and authorities. There had been several debates and discourses about the convenient political system of government, which the country will adopt, but no common agreement was reached on the issue. However, the present provisional constitution adopted by the SFG states that Somali would be a federal state. Article 1 of SFG states that:

"Somalia is a federal, sovereign, and democratic republic founded on inclusive representation of the people and a multiparty system and social justice" (FRS. 2012: 1).

In fact, the current political situation in the country, federalism is the only option that Somalia can take. But the question is what kind of federalism should be the best in order to avoid future insecurity and political instability, or the question is whether federalism is the appropriate system for Somali culture. This is the salient feature and even members of the parliament are divided on federalism as the convenient system for the country. Somalis are homogenous society, which has only two similar languages, and almost all Somalis share one culture and religion, and therefore adopting federal system might encourage conflict and clanism, which is the source of crises. It is believed that the concept of federalism in the country is externally imposed on Somali politicians by members of IGAD mainly Kenya and Ethiopia which want to see weak and divided Somali federal government that will not raise great Somalia' or not support Somali ethnic populations in their respective countries (Bryden 2014: 20; Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 25). International community and donor countries probably view that federalism as a realistic but not necessarily the best alternative to unitary system.

Some Somali scholars believe that decentralization is preferable and might win the consensus among Somali people and politicians. Decentralization in terms political, administrative and financial powers, delegated to local governments creates sense of belongings and reduces power mismanagement by the central government. In other words, this developed political system may probably be convenient to Somalia rather than federalism or unitary which both could create crises in the country. Based on the past experience, unitary form of political system and state is linked with an authoritarian

regime, while Somali federal state may be weak, ineffective and increase tribalism, clanism and separatists. According to Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 28), possible solution could be:

"A unitary state with strong local governance in a devolved political system. Devolution, or democratic decentralization, rests on three essential components: substantial and clearly defined powers must be provided to elected bodies at sub-national units; substantial resources-human and especially financial-must be provided; and strong accountability mechanisms must be existed to ensure accountability of elected officials to voters and accountability of bureaucrats to elected officials" (Bryden 2014: 20).

Nevertheless, the possible current solution to go forward, enhance debates and discourses, and restore peace and security in the country is federalism, since this federal system initiative is backed by powerful regional administrations (Puntland), neighboring states and international community that sponsored and established these recent political process in Somalia. This means rejecting federalism may cause new disagreements and conflicts. Two important things should be mentioned. The current political process is an ad hoc initiative without consensus between federal government and coming members of federal state. There is also a fear that a there is a hidden agreement between some Somali elites, linked with neighboring and federal government leaders, which might result 'elite capture' and domination (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 29).

Adopting Constitution

Adopting permanent and legitimate state constitution is one the first constituent statebuilding process and restoring law and order. The current constitution is provisional, and as a result should be debated, revived and finally approved. The initial process of drafting this provisional constitution was not based on inclusive process, and many Somalis believe that it is even externally imposed without the will and interest of the Somali people (Bryden 2014: 21).

Nevertheless, more emphasis and awareness should be given on many real and institutional areas, which can be given space through legislation pending the final form of federal constitution. For instance, clarification of power and authority division between the federal government and members of the federal state should be identified.

Some more issues have significance in the current political process and require to be settled later, such Sharia law, status of Mogadishu and the question of Somaliland (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 29).

Elections

The formation of Electoral System Act, creation of multiparty system including independent electoral commission and electoral management bodies need to be set up. The SFG faces shortage of time, as it has one more year to complete all remaining issues including holding a general election according to the New Deal 2016. Moreover, competing political parties require considerable time and media availability in order to campaign and sell their political agenda throughout the country before the election. Thus:

“The timing of elections has been hotly debated in Africa, and alongside the lesson learned that democratization through elections has proved successful; it is also critical to remember that the timing of elections is highly contextual. Somalia, virtually stateless and conflict-ridden for so long, requires specific attention paid to context” (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014:29).

Based on the paralyzed political process and limited developments so far achieved by SFG, there is a view that no election will be held in 2016 or indirect election will take place as in 2012. In fact it is unrealistic to hold election by 2016 since none of the responsibilities associated with the election and all other state building issues remain to be done and the time is too short to accomplish these strategies. Some observers viewed that there is a possibility to hold different forms of election in different regions of the country, while others argue holding different elections in deferent parts of the country may crucially undermine the legitimacy of the entire democratic process (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 29).

This implies that, holding 2016-planned national election, in this situation may result risks and undemocratic process. Premature elections could deteriorate the chronic political crises in Somalia, rather bringing peace and democracy. However, delay of the planned election and the extensions of the term of the present federal government may also create, suspicion, which could result in new conflict and clash among already warring

political factions and federal government (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014: 29). It is significant that the election takes in the appropriate time based on fair and free election.

6.4.2 Security and Building national army

The offensive and stabilization Challenge

Establishing effective security force and building strong national army is one of the challenges SFG faces. Formation of national security institutions in order to restore peace and order should be priority for the government. Currently, there are no effective security personnel and it is AMISOM force, getting support from weak and unorganized national army that provides security only for government officials and compounds (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014:29). The point is the mandate and the time of AMOSOM is limited. Thus there is offensive and stabilization challenge.

The combination of 'hard' and 'soft' forms of military intervention are, most strategies used by international intervention to restore peace and securities in countries where chronic instability and state failure took place. Stabilization implies the combination of military enforcement, reconciliation and provision of humanitarian assistance. The AMISOM and Somali National Army offensive strategy against insurgents, therefore, indicates military part of stabilization program in the territories they take from Al-shabab insurgents. As AMISOM aims offensive and counterterrorism strategy, the SFG face capability challenge of establishing security and order in many territories where AMISOM took over or Al-shahaab withdrew. The SFG already failed to create temporary administrations. This implies weakness of government's statebuliding capability (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014:29).

The SFG must emphasize building effective national army. It should enhance the capacity and efficiency of all security institutions. This is necessary, specifically after AMISOM transfers power and authority to Somalia national and security forces. Even though SFG aims to build strong national army, it is far from reality to have unified national army in a very short period of time. The present national army is similar to warlord militias and is mostly loyal to some government officials, rather than federal government. Moreover they lack a unified command and control structure. There is also

accusation that the current national armies are recruited from Mogadishu and its surrounding districts and only these forces have access to the most training opportunities provided by EUTM. Thus, this increases the division, suspicion and mistrust between the federal government and regional administrations (Skeppström and Nordlund 2014:29). Equal sharing of resources and power among clans is a means of forming strong national army.

Conclusion

Somalia became one of the failed states in twenty-first century where the whole state collapsed in 1991, after a devastating civil war broke out throughout the country. The prolonged conflict became the result of socio-political process, which Somalia had been experiencing for more than twenty years. This outcome had been affected by domestic, regional and international particularities. Both regional and international communities had made many attempts to solve the Somali conflict. There had been almost fifteen peace process mediated and sponsored by UN, AU, EU IGAD and Arab league which all delivered little success and almost failed. Such failure of international community 's involvement in Somalia's conflict, pointed out the inappropriate use of top-down approach, which undermined the specific Somali traditional and social methods of crises mediation.

Regional organizations, particularly IGAD had involved in Somali conflict resolution process since 1991. IGAD being weak regional organization has no financial and organizational capacity to deal such complicated Somali conflict. Members of IGAD particularly Ethiopia and Djibouti deeply interested to engage in conflict resolution process and IGAD was to endorse their proposals and approaches. The first peace process took place in Djibouti in 1991 where President Hassan Guled Abtidon invited all Somali political factions. But the process failed after the delegates nominated Ali Mahdi Mohammed as interim president, who himself was a warlord and as part of the problem.

IGAD as a horn African regional organization claimed that it is IGAD's responsibility to stand and solve the Somali conflict as it affects the region as a whole. The most noticeable peace process made by IGAD were the Eldoreth peace conference in 2004 held in Kenya, which gave birth the Transitional Federal Government; and the Djibouti peace agreement in 2008, which also led the peace agreement between the transitional federal government and the moderate insurgents of UIC. However, though IGAD attempted to engage in Somali conflict, their role was limited and members of IGAD were in fact part of the conflict rather than a solution. The rivalry and competition among members of particularly Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti added fuel into the fire.

Their opposing approaches prevented IGAD to take a neutral position. Indeed, IGAD lacks institutional, financial and organization capacity to solve the Somali conflict.

In the period between 1991 and 2012, the country had been undergoing a lack of functioning central government. However, on September 10, 2012, Somalia made historic change and appeared once again in international affairs, after a new federal government was established in Mogadishu, for the first time in the country for more than two decades. Both regional and international communities immediately recognized the SFG. The establishment of SFG is the first post-transitional government, after the outcome of a long time peace process and twelve years of corrupted and incapable transitional authorities. The formation of provisional constitution, federal parliaments and indirect presidential election in 2012, indicated signs of future and hope for many Somalis. The new leaders of Somali federal Government also promised they will effectively deal with this chronic insecurity and open new chapter for Somali people. However, in fact, since the establishment of SFG in 2012, little progress has been made in terms of security and statebuilding activities.

In 2007, AU determined to engage in Somali conflict and as a result, AMISOM peacekeeping troops were deployed in Somalia. Even though AMISOM forces succeeded to defeat Al-Shabab in the capital city and other several large urban cities and territories, the security situation and provision of basic necessities are still lacking.

Despite the weakness of Al-Shabab and the establishment non-transitional federal government, the country is still in secure and the hope of Somali is fading. This is due to, the internal dispute and division among leaders of Somali federal government and external influence mainly from neighboring countries. Thus, the SFG faces both domestic and external challenges to deal the statebuliding and security. There are separatists and powerful regional administration that have strong ties with neighboring countries. Moreover, to see stable and secure Somalia, the SFG has to promote inclusive political process and hold peace negotiation conferences among clans and tribes. Formation of federal regions, finalization of provisional constitution and holding election by 2016 should be accomplished.

Bibliography

- Issa-Salwe, Abdislam M. 1994. *The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy*. London: Haan Associates Press.
- Lewis, I. M. 1980. *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*. Oxford: James Curry.
- Lewis, I. M. 1994. *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, Inc.
- Laitin, David D. and Samatar, Said S. 1987. *Somalia Nation in Search of State*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Lyons, Terrence and Samatar, Ahmed I. 1996. *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention and Strategies for Political Reconstruction: Brookings Occasional Paper*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Mohamoud, Abdulahi A. 2006. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia (1960-2001)*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press.
- Omar, Mohamed Osman. 1996. *Somalia: A Nation Driven to Despair*. New Delhi: Somali Publication.
- Mirreh, Hassen A. 1994. *On Providing for the Future*. In Ahmed I. Samatar (ed). *The Somali Challenge from Catastrophe to Renewal* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Tiwald, Andreas. 2013. *The security Situation in Somalia*. In Alexander Schahbasi & Thomas Schrot (Eds). *Somalia, Securities, Minorities and Migration*. Vienna: Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior.

Articles and Others

- Ahmed, Ismail I. and Green, Reginald Herbold. 1999. "The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level effects, External Interventions and Reconstruction." *Third World Quarterly* 20 (1): 113-127
- Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip. 2011. "Somalia after the United Nations-led Djibouti peace Process". *Journal of African Security Review*, 20(3): 45-53. Retrieved August 2014. <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20>.
- Baker, Peter Deane. 2010. "The AU Standby Force and the Challenge of Somalia". *African Security Review* 16 (2): 120-123. Retrieved Sept.2014 <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20>
- Bryden, Mat and Brickhil, Jeremy. 2010. "Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabilization From a Collapsed State." *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development* 10(2):

- 239-262. Retrieved May 19, 2012 (<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/kcsd20>).
- Cornwell, Richard. 2010. "Somalia: Distorting reality", African Security Review Institute for Security Studies, 15(2): 75-78-
- Dagne, Ted. 2011. "Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a lasting Peace." Retrieved November 10, 2012
<http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=Dagne>).
- Dagne, Ted. 2009. "Somalia: Prospects for a lasting Peace." Journal of Mediterranean Quarterly. 20(2): 95- 112. Retrieved August 15, 2014.
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mediterranean_quarterly/v020/20.2,dagne.html.
- Dagne, Ted 2009. "Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a lasting Peace" Congressional Research Service. Retrieved June 20, 2014.
<http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33911.pdf>
- Elmi, Afyare Abdi and Barise, Abdulahi. 2010. "The Somali Conflict: Root Causes, Obstacles and Peace-building Strategies". Journal African Security review, 15(1): 32-54. Retrieved October 2014. <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20>.
- Ghebremeskel Tekie, Adane. 1999. "Conflicts and Conflict Management in the Horn of Africa: The case of Somalia" (Dissertation), University of Vienna, Vienna.
- Horn of African Bulletin, 2010 "Chaotic Somalia. Options for Last Peace". April 2010, 22 (4): 1-12.
- Horn of African Bulletin (HAB), 2012. "Somalia post Transitional Government Opportunities and Challenges ahead for the new Government". September October 2012, 24(5): 1-20.
- HOB, 2014. IGAD and Somalia. Now and then". May-June, 2014, 26(3): 1-8.
- HOB, 2012. "Security and Foreign policy, Somali post-transitional: a Brief of Assessment". November-December 2012 24 (6): 1-24.
- Federal Government of Somalia 2014. "The Somali Compact". Retrieved November 2014 <http://www.pbsdialogue.org/The%20Somali%20Compact.pdf>.
- Gebrehiwot Berhe, Mulugeta. 2014. "Regional Peace and Security Co-operation Under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development: Development Challenge. „Journal of Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review. 30 (1): 105-131. Retrieved August 15, 2014. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/eastern_Africa_Social_science_research_review/v00/301_berhepdf.
- Healy, Sally. 2009. *Peacekeeping in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD Contribution to the Regional Security*. Crises State Paper No.2.
- Healy, Sally. 2011. "Seeking peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: the Contribution of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development".

International Affairs. 87(1): 105-120.

- International Crises Group .2005. "Somalia's Islamists". Africa Report No.100.
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/--/media/Files/Africa/horn-of-Africa/Somalia/Somalias%20Islamists>.
- International Crises Group .2007. "Somalia. To move Beyond the Failed State". Africa Report No. 47. -Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). 2001. "IGAD Institutional Assessment", 2001: 43.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development. (IGAD). 2007. "Declaration a 26th Session of IGAD Council of Ministers", April 13, 2007, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). 2010. "IGAD Visions http://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&fitemid=124&limitsta2.
- Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD). 2010. IGAD. http://www.igad.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&fitemid=14&limitstar4.
- Lofland, Valerie J.2002. "*Somalia: US. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope.*" 1-12.RetrievedOctober2014.
<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/somalial.pdf>.
- Loubser, Helg-Mari and Solomon, Hussein. 2014. "Responding to State Failure in Somalia." *Journal of African Review*. 6(1): 1-17.
- Makhubella, LM 2010. "Conflict Resolution in Somalia: Learning from Failed Mediation Process. Dissertation, University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
- Menkhaus, Ken. 2007. "The Crises in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts." *African Affairs*, 106(2):357-390.
- Menkhaus, Ken. 2009."Somalia". *The RUSI Journal*, 154(6): 6-12. Retrieved October, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi20>.
- Menkhaus, Ken. 2007. "Governance without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State. Building and Politics of Coping." *Journal of Project Muse*. Retrieved September 15, 2012 ([http://muse.hu.edu/loin?auth=0&e=summar&url=journals/international security /v031/31. 3 menkhaus .html](http://muse.hu.edu/loin?auth=0&e=summar&url=journals/international%20security/v031/31.3%20menkhaus.html)).
- Mulugeta, Kidist 2009. Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving Conflict". Retrieved September 20, 2012(<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopi/en/07937-book.pdf>).
- Murithi, Tim. 2010. "African Union's evolving role in peace operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia". *Journal of African Security Review*, 17(1): 69-82

- Murphy, Ray 2002. The Political and Diplomatic Background to the Establishment of UNIFIL in Lebanon and UNITAF and UNOSOM Missions in Somalia. 1-3.
- Mwangi, Oskar. Gakuo. 2010. "The Union of Islamic Courts and Security Governance In Somalia." African Security Review, 19 (1): 88-94.
- Peter, Baker-Deane. 2010. "AU Standby Force and Challenge in Somalia". Journal of African Security Review, 16 (2): 120-123. Retrieved September 2014. <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20>.
- Petretto, Kristin & Ehrhart, Hans Georg. 2013. "Stabilizing Somalia: Can the EU's Comprehensive Approach work?" European Security. Institute for Peace research and security policy, 23(2): 179-297.
- Philipp, Christine E. 2005. Somalia: A very Special Case. Retrieved January 12, 2014. http://www.mpil.de/files/pdf2/mpunybp_9_517_554.pdf.
- Roitsch, Paul. 2014. "The Next Step in Somalia: exploiting victory, post-Mogadishu". African Security Review, 23(1): 3-16. Retrieved October 2014. <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasr20>.
- Skeppström, Emma and Nordlund Per 2014. "Security, State stabilisation and Formation in Somalia: Challenges for implementing the Somali Compact" Report No. June-2014, 3899. Retrieved November 2014. www.foi.se/Documents/Skeppström%20and%20Nordlund.
- Tardy, Thierry 2014. "The Contact group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: genesis, Rationale and objectives". (Ed). In Fighting Piracy off the coast of Somalia: Lessons learned from the Contact Group. ISSUE Report No 20, 2014. Retrieved in December 15, 2014. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Report_20_Piracy_off_the_coast_of_Somalia.pdf
- Terlinden, Ulf. 2004. "IGAD: Paper Tiger facing Gigantic Task", Berlin. <http://www.ulfterlinden.de/docs/Terlinden2004-IGAD-engl.alf>.
- United Nations Organization (UN). 2009. "Report of the Secretarial General an Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1863(2009), April 16, 2009.
- African mission in Somalia (AMISOM)-<http://amisom-au.org/>.
- United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) <http://unpos.unmissions.org/>.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2011 "Iraq, Afghanis and Somalis Top List of Asylum Seekers, Returnees, Internally displaced and Stateless persons". Retrieved 17, 2012 ([ww.un.org/News/Press/.../2011/sc9566.doc.ht](http://www.un.org/News/Press/.../2011/sc9566.doc.ht)).

Abstract

In January 1991 Somali Democratic Republic collapsed after a widespread civil war broke out throughout the country. Since 1991, Somalia lacked a central and functioning government and as a consequence, humanitarian tragedies, prolonged conflict and rise of religious fundamentalists threatened not only Somalia, but also regional and international communities. Thus, this study focuses on the attempts made by both regional and international community to solve the Somali political crises. It emphasizes the knowledge about the cause, history and nature of Somali crises as well as regional and international peace efforts destined to bring back peace and security to the country. Although, the Somali crises is complex, and fifteen-year peace process had failed to find peaceful resolution, the study concludes and points out such failure of international community's involvement in Somalia can be attributed to the use of top-down approach of conflict resolution, which legitimized warlords and undermined the specific Somali traditional and social methods of crises mediation. Furthermore, members of IGAD regional organization particularly frontline countries, introduced and secured their national interest in the peace process by bargaining the result of the reconciliation efforts based on their national interest.

Abstrakt

Nach einem Bürgerkrieg der sich im ganzen Land verbreitete, brach die Demokratische Republik Somalia im Januar 1991 zusammen. Seit 1991 herrscht keine zentral funktionierende Regierung. Der Bürgerkrieg führte neben humanitären Nöten auch zu Konflikten zwischen religiösen Gruppen und zum Aufstieg von religiösen Fundamentalisten, die nicht nur in Somalia sondern regional auch international für Gefahr sorgten. Zum einen ist das Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit/Studie sich auf die Versuche der regionalen und internationalen Gemeinschaft um den Konflikt zu lösen, damit wieder Frieden und Sicherheit im ganzen Land herrscht, einzugehen. Zum anderen wird versucht zu zeigen, dass der Top-Down Ansatz zur Konfliktlösung in Somalia nicht funktionieren wird, denn die Krise in Somalia ist sehr komplex. In den 15 Friedensprozessen wurde keine friedliche Lösung gefunden. Weiteres wird versucht zu erläutern, dass es den IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) Mitgliedern in erster Linie um die eigenen nationalen Interessen geht anstatt für eine friedliche Lösung in der Region.

Curriculum Vitae

Personal Data

Name: MOHAMMAD ABDULAHI Abdishakur
Place of Birth: Mogadishu, Somalia
Nationality: Somalia

Education

1983-1987: Elementary School, at Abudwak Elementary School, Abudwak, Somalia.
1987-1990: Intermediate School at Abudwak Intermediate School, Abudwak, Somalia.
19904-1997: Secondary School, at Harar Senior Secondary School, Harar, Ethiopia.
1997-1998: Diploma Certificate in History, at Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
1998-2002: Bachelor Arts (BA)-Degree in Political Science and International Relations (Major); Management and Public Administration (Minor), at Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
2000-2001: Computer Science at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia.
2009-2010: Preparatory and German Language Course at University Of Vienna, Austria.