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„Equality“ in American English and Russian. A
Sociolinguistic Corpus-based Study“

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1. Introduction

1.1. The topic, the word selection

This thesis explores the specificity how the nominal categories [EQUALITY] and [FREEDOM] in American English and Russian are conceptualised. The idea for this research first emerged in 2012, when the world's media were debating the questionable parliamentary and presidential elections in the Russian Federation and the degree to which the Russian post-Communist community had adapted and 'understood' the democratic occidental values. Subsequent dramatic events in the Ukraine and the diplomatic escalation between the former Cold War opponents just heated the passions further. The thesis thus touches upon a sphere which is currently very present in the public discourse. Its main interest lies therefore on the coherences and discrepancies between the speakers' understanding of [FREEDOM] and [EQUALITY] across the two languages..

I selected these two categories because I perceive the concepts of *equality* and *freedom* (or *liberty*) as salient and culturally stereotypical examples of the broader, more complex and more abstract categorical domain [DEMOCRACY]. From the 'liberté, égalité, fraternité' of the French Revolution up to the majority of the normative documents and programmes published by the UNO, EU, UNESCO etc., the concepts of *freedom/liberty* and *equality* are among the most likely realisations of the immediate constituents of the domain [DEMOCRACY]. Therefore, the peculiarities of their conceptualisation in American English and Russian might allow us to make indirect assumptions about the processes relevant for the conceptualisation on the macro-level of the whole speech community.

1.2. Research applicability and goals

The main research question is whether there are empirically provable and quantifiable differences in the conceptualisation of the cognate terms within the mentioned categories. The research was conducted against the theoretical background of Cognitive Linguistics, using the methodology of Corpus Linguistics. Although the cognitive approach matches the qualitative design quite well, I would nevertheless like to expand its applicability by using a quantitative procedure, which is easier to survey, replicate, and to confirm or disconfirm. Thus, a data collected by a quantitative procedure and analysed from the

Cognitivist standpoint can unite the flexibility of the theoretical approach with the empirical falsifiability. I will provide a detailed justification of the selected paradigmatic setting, format and design in the section dealing with the research methodology.

Apart from this the findings of the research can be used to improve intercultural mediation. It can be an element of discussion in a Language Teaching class or directly ‘in the field’ at work with the students, or a better interpreter’s awareness of the possible discrepancies between the categorical conceptualisations; the theoretical conclusions of the research may, therefore, become a background or a practical unit in the intercultural communication.

1.3. Research questions

The study aims at proving or refuting a set of working hypotheses. Generally, I expect that:

- The rise in type frequencies of the concepts within the categories [FREEDOM] and [EQUALITY] will correlate with the major socio-political events of their speakers’ communities (such as the Abolition of Slavery in the USA in the 1860s, the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, or the Communist Revolution in Russia of the 1910-1920s etc.). Furthermore, the affirmative and negative forms (that is, forms stating and negating a statement) rise and fall in a negative correlation with each other. The more frequently *equality* is topicalised, the less frequently does the concept *inequality* become used.
- English will have a more ‘universal’ character of the concepts. I attempt to study the structures and frequencies of possible utterances which include the phrase ‘all people are equal’ in the category [EQUALITY]. An initial assumption is this: a ‘bare’ phrase (i.e. unmodified by any further constituents) has a very common, universal character, whereas such instances as ‘all people are equal before law/God/nature’, ‘all people are equal now/here/there’ or ‘not all people are equal’ ultimately limit the applicability of the statement to a particular situation, place, or referential power. Therefore, a survey of the proportions between the modified and the unmodified utterances can help judging upon the degree of the value’s acceptance within a speech community. Moreover, within the modified types American English is expected to reveal more of those types referring to a legal or at least secular power as a supreme referent of the equality. I expect to find fewer utterances of this kind in Russian as a linguistic reflection of the shorter and less

unequivocal democratic tradition of the community. In both languages I expect to find a downward trend of references to God with relatively high figures in the 19th century followed by a constant decay from the 20th century onwards. In Russian this trend might be especially dramatic after 1917 due to the Communist revolution.

- For the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY], there will be no clear contextual distinction between the synonymous concepts *freedom* and *liberty* in English. Neither will there be a substantial difference in their frequencies of use: *liberty* is not coming out of use. It will, however, have a shorter list of types with the same lemma.
- In Russian, the corpus will show a bigger contextual differentiation for the same category between the two possible terms *svoboda* and *volya* (the latter, as it will be shown later, is a second possible term for expressing the categorical notion ‘freedom’).
- Furthermore, *freedom* will attract positive constructions (structured as ‘freedom to + infinitive verb’) rather than negative ones (‘freedom from’) in English. *Liberty* will behave similarly. In Russian *svoboda* will attract negative utterances, *volya* rather positive ones.

1.4. The structure of the thesis

The thesis contains 11 structural blocks, including the Introduction, the Conclusion, Bibliography and Appendices. Chapters 2 and 3 are dedicated to the theoretical background of the paper: to the emergence, development and standardisation of the contrastive scholarly linguistic knowledge and to the theories of scientific categorisation, respectively. Chapter 4 provides detailed information on the methodology, format and procedure of the research and justifies these. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the categories [EQUALITY] and [RAVENSTVO] and study these according to the research procedure. Similarly, chapters 7 and 8 deal with the categorical concepts: [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] and [SVOBODA/VOLYA]. The Conclusion follows in chapter 9. In its main body the thesis contains 16 figures and 7 tables that serve the optimal illustration of the provided argument. Supplementary data can be found in the Appendices.

1.5. Note on the typographic conventions

Names of categories and categorical domains are given in square brackets and printed in capitals, such as: [FREEDOM].

Linguistic expressions are printed in italics: *liberty*.

Single quotes are used for the particular words within a given language used as manifestations of the linguistic expressions and for the search types: 'liberty'.

Double quotes are used for immediate translations of the words taken from a foreign (in our case mainly Russian) language. For example: The Russian word 'volya' is traditionally translated as "freedom", but only partially overlaps with the English concept *freedom*.

A question mark preceding an expression in an example means this example is problematic from the semantic point of view.

2. The study of language(-s): an overview of the epistemic growth

2.1. Language as an object of early authoritative expertise

It is a truth universally acknowledged that language is a social phenomenon of a highly complex structure. Even more complex is the process of cross-cultural communication. Performed by speakers of two or more different language communities, such communicative attempts are not always successful. It is true that the speech participants use one language as a common means of communication and the grammatical competences of these speakers regarding the lingua franca may vary greatly. However, there still remains a certain specificity of cognitive conceptualisations peculiar for each speaker's own language, which influences their worldviews and can lead to misunderstandings. Both the language as an abstract whole and the interrelation of particular languages has been a subject of major scholarly interest ever since the emergence of the great Classic civilisations.

The Judaic-Christian religious tradition addresses the plurality and mutual incomprehensibility of the world's languages in the biblical myth of the Tower of Babel. Apart from the obvious didactic purpose the story also points at the interesting fact. As early as at the times when the Old Testament was written there existed much of awareness concerning the plurality of languages and their mutual incomprehensibility. At that time and stage of social development such plurality was perceived as a punishment of God, that is, strictly negative (cf. Hüllen 2005: 21).

Aside from religious practices and beliefs, cross-linguistic communication has been one of the earliest interests of scholars all around the globe. The Ancient Greeks, for example, were so much aware of the fact that some words change their meanings in the course of time that since approximately the fifth century BCE they provided the manuscript copies of earlier authors with commentaries on obsolete or unusual words. Approximately two centuries later, scholars working in the Alexandrian library started to compile separate glossaries comprised of these materials (Hanks 2013: 507). The first language dictionaries were created by the Chinese courtly scholars of the 3rd-2nd cc. BCE. (ibid.: 505).

The awareness of the importance of language was omnipresent in Europe of the Early Modern Time. Several present-day theories in the Social Sciences seek to explain the rise of Europe, which started – or at least became notable – from the 16th century onwards. As Europe managed an economic and cultural breakthrough from its rather marginal position

(compared to the great civilisations of China, India and the Arab world), as the Europeans expanded their trade and power networks, the ability to communicate with the foreigners gained importance for the subsequent European story of success.

At the same time there were no standardised vernaculars, that is, there was no ‘proper’ English, French, Dutch, or Italian spoken in the Early Modern period. Parallel to geographic discoveries, the process of state centralisation within Europe led to the first attempts to regularise and unify what previously was a mere set of geographically neighbouring dialects, vaguely perceived as some loosely connected and unclear unities.

Benedict Anderson provided an argument on the close tie between language and the rise of nationalism from the Enlightenment onwards (cf. Anderson 2006: 47-52). For Anderson a common standardised written vernacular was, an essential milestone contributing to the construction of the imagined entities, which later developed into nation states.

The epoch preceding this vernacular-focused nation-building period used, according to Anderson (ibid.: 12-22), other instruments for creating a sense of a communal homogeneity, in particular the loyalty towards a ruling dynasty or religion with its sacred languages: Latin for Christian Europe and Arab for the Muslim Civilisation. In contrast to the vernaculars these had a well-established system of grammar, stylistics and conventions of Rhetoric. Latin, Arab or Chinese spoken in the Confucian Middle Kingdom created shared identities that stretched across the borders of pre-Modern states and their usually multi-ethnic and multilingual societies. The rise of nation states often led to the abandonment of the supranational sacred languages for the sake of the vernaculars. English, German, French, Dutch, or Russian became useful tools of creating new kinds of communities. However, these had hardly ever been connected by a mutually understandable lingua franca, be it Latin, Chinese, or any other language.

The process of unification and homogenisation of modern languages into complex, abstract – yet coherent – systems took place in the Early Modern time. In the case of English, William Caxton’s reflections on the difficulties of choosing some rules to adhere to when printing books, i.e. difficulties of actually creating a standard by performing it, are well known (cf. for example the corresponding reference in Nevalainen’s manual on Early Modern English: Nevalainen 2006: 30-32).

The same epoch saw the rise of an awareness and anxiety regarding language change and sought to answer this challenge by ‘fixing’ the languages in their current states via

prescriptivist rules of use. The prescriptivist paradigm presumed a division into correct and incorrect modes of language use, the former ones being a characteristic feature of higher social strata and an obligatory condition for any social upward mobility. Language achieved the character of a sociocultural marker, serving a purpose of immediate recognition of a person's membership in a particular social group. A commonly known example of the awareness concerning the importance of a 'proper' language use for social progress is, of course, George Bernard Shaw's *Pygmalion*.

All in all it appears that the language, although not being a subject of its 'own' discipline, has been the focus of scholarly and social attention ever since the very beginnings of our civilisation. Language contact, its change and the role language plays in creating human identities were thus subjects of scholarly interest long before the advent of Linguistics in its strict scientific sense.

2.2. From Bacon to de Saussure: elaboration of language-related science

Another way of looking at language was to put it into the context of the universal philosophical paradigm which would explain everything in the world. Such a scholarly urge arose with the growth of secular sciences in the Early Modern time and flourished during the Enlightenment. The scientists of this time sought ways of establishing a perfect society. Language offers itself both as a medium of transferring the necessary wisdom and as a coil which can be effectively shaped in order to influence (i.e. improve) human minds and manners.

In those days scholars saw the language as a means of communication, perfect at its birth as any other God-created thing should be. Yet this perfect tool was regularly misused by the imperfect skills of its vulgar users. Among the major historical supporters of this position was Francis Bacon with his famous Four Idols, each of which being responsible for a particular aspect of what altogether results in misunderstanding between people and peoples. The following excerpt illustrates the philosopher's position:

There are also idols formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other, which I call Idols of the Market-place (...) for it is by discourse that men associate; and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do the definitions or explanations wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead

men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies. (Bacon 1965 [1620]: 17)

The claim of the great philosopher and empiricist of the 17th century is clear: there exists a highly abstract, complex, wisely and neatly structured and ultimately unequivocal system called language. The everyday use of this supreme system, however, is obscured by the Idols (which are, briefly summed up, the speaker's personal, educational and ideological presuppositions plus the quoted mode of a regular interaction with one's environment). Bacon's remedy, quite in the style of his epoch, was simple: one should avoid appeasing the Idols, eliminate the obstructions of meaning caused by these, train the method of induction and speak unequivocally.

One more remarkable thing about language is that, having being used by people for centuries, its semantics and the cognitive logic behind the semantics had remained relatively seems to have remained untouched until recently. The philosophers of the earlier epochs used it, but never looked any further than beyond the surface. The grammarians published books on how the language should be used. Only few of them mentioned in a lamenting tone that the actual performance differed dramatically from the prescribed one. No one asked why a certain form was more preferable than another one, or where the two forms had come from. The *Académie française* in the 17th or the Russian *Akademiya Nauk* in the 18th century explored the style and genre variations, yet without ever going into detail why it happened so. Intercultural communication necessarily fell prey to the holistic and universalistic aspirations of the continent that was growing more and more integrated. The hegemonic science sought holistic convergence, rather than polyphonic variety. In this regard linguistics shares the fate of another discipline, psychology. Here as well, despite an ever-present interest in the human soul, a genuine exploration of it has been limited by behaviour rules and conventions, prescriptions and holistic universal 'truths' for centuries. Rephrasing one of psychology's 'founding fathers' Hermann Ebbinghaus, it can be said that linguistics as a science, too, had a long past, but a short history (quoted in Gerrig & Zimbardo 2008: 8). It was not before the European Enlightenment that the idea of studying language as an object of a controlled and standardised scholarly project emerges and becomes accepted.

The scholarly world of the 18th and early 19th century was dominated by Philosophy, History and Ethnography. Linguistics was slowly developing out of the general scope of social sciences and still had a strong focus on socio-historical aspects. One of the major

concerns of the epoch was a possibility of the reconstruction of the Proto-Indo-European language which might have been shared by all the peoples worldwide once.

The rise of natural sciences and their methodology during the European Enlightenment positively influenced Humanities. Language, too, was increasingly treated as a research object, studied by more and more standardised, genuinely scholarly procedures.

Of crucial importance was the hypothesis offered in the early 19th century by Wilhelm von Humboldt, who pointed out the interconnection and mutual dependence between a given language and the extralinguistic reality of the speech community (Humboldt 1967 [1836]: 5).

This claim stood in obvious contradiction with the general tendency, established in the European scientific discourse ever since the early beginnings of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment appealed to human reason and claimed that this reason and its products, e.g. virtues and values, were shared by the whole humanity in equal mass (consider the fact that Kant, although notoriously known for his classification of human races, still presumed their common ancestry and alike importance and value: Kant quoted in Irrlitz 2002: 91). Language, being both a product of human activity and a mean of transmitting human values, by definition could not be culture-specific. The importance of Humboldt's contribution was, thus, the re-introduction of cultural relativity into science in a methodological format that could be accepted and further explored by the academic community.

Further consolidation of the linguistic discipline in the late 19th century gave birth to a new approach, the influence of which outlived its initial historical context and has been shaping linguistics ever since. Structuralism was partially a logical extension of the shared scholarly yearning for the genuinely scientific methodology; the attribute 'scientific' has ever since then been commonly identified with 'empirically testable' (cf. Popper's article on Falsificationism in Seiffert & Radnitzky 1989: 82-85).

Partially, without doubt, Structuralism was an alternative way of exploring language. This way was chosen by the scholars who hadn't been satisfied with descriptive, often vague and unchallengeable speculations of language from Philosophy, Anthropology, or Philology (the latter as opposed to the newly-born empirical linguistics, as differentiated by Schleicher (quoted in Deumert & Keith 2013: 655-656). Structuralism sought to provide a strictly scientific basis for the language expertise and, therefore, had to narrow down the

scope of its interest to what appeared explorable by the empiric methods of the epoch. The best explored area of Structuralism was phonology, although we may not ignore their contribution to grammar or semiology. The focus once again lay rather on abstract language constructions than on actual speech performance (famous de Saussurean *langue* versus *parole*) and again sought the common, not the different. Semantics, let alone contrastive semantics with socio-pragmatic concerns, was considered far too vague for a proper study. Thus the epoch's obsession with the Empiricism and the wish of the early linguists to be accepted as real scientists doing genuinely scientific research marginalised everything that might be perceived as imaginative and unscientific and pushed contrastive sociolinguistics aside.

An interesting insight in this empiricist obsession can be gained from reading Leonard Bloomfield. Quite in accordance with the spirit of the epoch and his own scholarly environment Bloomfield dedicated much attention to the Behaviouristic aspects of language acquisition and performance. At the same time he seemed to realise that purely physiological means are not sufficient for the comprehension of the far too complex nature of language. Bloomfield invited to observe the language performance 'in the mass'; yet was seemingly haunted by the cliché that linguistics may not go into 'danger' of

[...] mentalistic views in psychology, which may tempt the observer to appeal to purely spiritual standards instead of reporting the facts (Bloomfield 1935 [1933]: 38).

All in all, Structuralism has contributed greatly to the establishment and recognition of Linguistics, as well as to its different subareas, which it explored with the best empirical ardour. What was left behind - the actual language performance, the vocabulary, syntax, etc. which could hardly fit into the sign-symbol debate – became the fruitful soil for further investigations of other major linguistic approaches of the 20th century.

2.3. Schools and approaches in linguistics in the 20th century

Humboldt postulated that a language is to a large extent predetermined by the natural environment and social conditions of a speech community (Humboldt, Schubert 1910: 135). At the same time, language counter-affects and partially shapes the social reality of its speech community. The idea of cultural specificity and mutual influence between a language and a culture had a huge impact on the scholarly thought in Linguistics.

The famous Sapir-Whorf theory and the approach of language relativism in general grew out of this Humboldtian assumption. Edward Sapir made a number of statements in support of the cultural relativity of a language. The fact that the language spoken by the people in the immediate environment becomes the language into which a growing child is socialised, allowed Sapir to describe speech, an actual performance of language, as a non-instinctive, acquired, "cultural" function (Sapir 1921: 2). However, Sapir rejected the mutual influence between language and culture. Language for Sapir was a mere medium invented in process of history (as a 'drift of culture'). If the culture changed, it did so without any help or influence of language. Vice versa, language change was considered as simply a change of form, but not of the whole culture (ibid.: 221).

Benjamin Lee Whorf continued Sapir's idea of cultural relativism. For him the reciprocal causal relation was undisputable. It is not only that the language is shaped by the 'drift of culture', it is that it, the language, in its turn 'shapes back'. The following passage from Whorf's essay *Science and Linguistics* has become famous and caused much critique on the author's position:

It was found that the background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade. Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular program, and differs, from slightly to greatly, between different grammars. We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organised by our minds - and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. (Whorf 1978 [1940]: 212-213).

Whorf's position has been heavily criticised and is considered quite radical even by the general supporters of the language relativism. Thus, Anna Wierzbicka, author of *Understanding Cultures through Their Key Words* and a co-creator of the Natural Semantic Metalanguage as an alleged remedy against conceptual imperfection of definitions (we will discuss this point in more detail later), referring to Whorf's ideas, writes:

Undoubtedly, there is a good deal of exaggeration in this passage [...] Yet no one with genuine cross-cultural experience could deny that it also contains a great deal of truth. (Wierzbicka 1997: 6).

The position of language relativism originated from the ever-growing scholarly awareness of the language change and differences across societies. It was, however, not the only major disciplinary approach established in the 20th century.

Generative Grammar, which has become the dominating paradigm of the linguistic thought throughout the whole 20th century, shared some of the fundamental attitudes of the Structuralism. Just like the Structuralists, the Generativists favour the common and the neatly structured, and to a large extent neglect the 'imperfect' use of language in the everyday life. The main focus of Generative Linguistics is on the highly abstract innate mechanism in the mind of every human responsible for language acquisition and use.

Generative Linguistics recognises the existence of internal variation within a given language: the existence of dialects, sociolects, or contextual 'neglect' of a strict norm, e.g. in informal oral speech. This variation, however, has been commonly perceived as a deviation from the language competence of an ideal speaker-listener. Thus, the real performance was once again abandoned for the sake of working with the assumingly existent implicit language competence. Following the same logic as Structuralism has done before, Generative Linguistics concentrates on a set of particular language domains that appear to be best explorable from the perspective of the ideological basis of the whole approach. As a result, Generative Grammarians produce a highly complex and strict model of Syntax, indeed applicable to many languages.

The focus on what is universal, or common for all languages had a further positive influence upon the whole discipline: it forced the scholars to turn their attention to the languages of the world other than the Indo-European ones. The systematic expertise of Australian, American and African languages enriched the scope of the linguistic knowledge. The egalitarian air of Generativism helped the discipline to successfully overcome the prejudices of the Imperial Age and the colonialist discourse in science.

Apart from a clear preference towards an abstract idealised model and the corresponding neglect of the actual performance, there was one more essential side effect of Generativism. Semantics as a field of language was largely left aside, for it appeared incompatible with the strict unification-driven Generativist view of a good language practice. These and some more shortcomings prepared the ground for alternative, contesting modes of work in the discipline. Generativism was challenged by Cognitive Linguistics, which has emerged and established itself from the 1980s onwards.

Antonio Barcelona and Javier Valenzuela define the fundamental difference between these two major theories of the present-day linguistics as non-modularism and non-objectivism of the Cognitive Approach (Barcelona & Valenzuela 2011: 19-21). The non-modularism ascribes the language quite a modest role of an ordinary human facility, one among many further cognitive facilities of a human mind.

This assumption is a counterpart of the Generativist belief in a superordinate and unique role of language, as well as in the existence of an extra system, innate to all human-beings and responsible for the language as a sum of various activities (acquisition, recognition, performance, etc.).

Certainly, these two approaches may at times overlap in their opinions. Cognitive Linguistics, as a matter of fact, largely shares the idea that in the course of evolution humankind has developed a particular affinity towards language acquisition as such. That is, human learn a language, be it a L1 or any further one, because the human mind is evolutionarily trained to acquire such a competence. It is also a plausible thesis to assume a certain degree of uniformity of the internal structures of languages across the globe. There are, indeed, some abstract phenomena that appear to be universal. Langacker, for example, differentiated between the *absolute universals* (shared by all languages insofar as we know) and *universal tendencies* (highly common and unexplainable by reasons of borrowing, common origin or any other possible reasons) (Langacker 1973: 246-247).

Non-objectivism relates the presumed special status of language even further by claiming that no objective, extra-human meaning exists beyond the borders of human cognition (Barcelona & Valenzuela 2011:, 20). The meaning, therefore, is a relative and subjective product of cognitive activity, not a universal constant.

The current research is widely based on the principles of Cognitive Linguistics, although it is also undoubtedly influenced by earlier works on the nature of language relativism. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to find a certain respectful and symbiotic way of treating other approaches including Generativism. However, the very field of work – socio-semantic assumptions reached indirectly by means of grammatical structures – can be best studied within the Cognitive paradigm.

It also has to be pointed out to the importance of a careful delineation of the researcher's own position in relation to the emotionally loaded matter of language relativism versus universalism.

It is crucially important for any scholar conducting a contrastive study to understand and clarify that the differences in conceptualisations uncovered in the process of work are not of a biological, but of a sociocultural and historical nature. It appears that scholars denying any transcultural differences avoid making such distinctions due to the common anxiety that their actions might be regarded as discriminatory and the scholars themselves as racists. However, recognising variation in this case bears no trace of evaluation or judgement of the role, importance, level development or sophistication of any of the languages studied. Consequently, denying any kind of variation for the sake of conformity to the dogma of political correctness impoverishes the scope of scientific expertise, plays down the awareness of variation and, consequently, impedes the progress of intercultural communication.

3. Conceptualisation and categorisation of meaning

3.1. Categorisation as a cognitive facility

Human civilisation is based on – and can, therefore, be traced down to – the fundamental mechanisms of gaining and processing information. We classify the experience gained from the interaction with the environment, order it and give it a certain name, be it a concrete object, animate or inanimate, such as a boy, or a chair, or be it an abstract construct, e.g. love or friendliness. These are two basic yet very complex processes we perform: by defining and ordering similar elements within the system and by giving these a name we are able to categorise and conceptualise the elements of our environment.

When asked to describe something we usually provide a number of distinctive features that would help a hypothetical Martian interested in the object to recognise this object in the scope of other partially similar objects. When a child learns its first language, in order to understand what e.g. a dog is, the child also describes the essential features of the concept [dog]: it has four legs and a tail, it barks, it sometimes wags the tail, etc. To put it plainly, to categorise is to provide a system of various heterogeneous features, the presence, absence, or combination of which allows us to identify something.

Roberta Corrigan gave an interesting overview of psychological experiments conducted in the early days of cognitive revolution in the 1980. Her main interest lay in exploring the infants' categorisation facility, which turned out to be present already within the first year of life (Corrigan 1989: 3).

Lack of the ability to categorise dramatically reduces the cognitive performance of a person and, subsequently, his/her sanity and life standard. From a rather 'light' disability to recognise other humans' emotions and intentions, therefore, to communicate proficiently – as in case of Asperger syndrome – to far graver problems, a huge bulk of psychic disorders manifests itself as limited, distorted or absent ability for categorisation. Another example of a dysfunctional categorisation facility is a dissociative identity disorder, far better known to publics as a split-personality syndrome. A person having a split personality disorder, roughly explained, fails to single out their own identity in its multi-faceted complexity and develops sub-persons, the change between which is can be triggered out by the change in the environmental conditions.

Conceptualisation might be understood as the process on the one hand, and on the other hand as the cognitive ability to perform this process. Finally, it is also the product of the

above. Conceptualisation is thus closely tied with the creation of meaning of one's each particular experience of reality. The immediate link of conceptualisation to the mental system of a human is one of the milestones of the cognitive paradigm in linguistics, and can be further formulated in the way Langacker puts it:

Because conceptualization resides in cognitive processing, our ultimate objective must be to categorize the types of cognitive events whose occurrence constitutes a given mental experience. (Langacker, 1990: 2).

A necessary product of cognition and a building block of every conceptualisation is a representation, which, as laconically defined by Eysenck and Keane,

... stands for some things in the absence of that thing; typically, that thing is an aspect of the external world or an object of imagination (i.e., our own internal world) (Eysenck & Keane 2002: 247).

Eysenck and Keane treat knowledge acquisition, processing and reproduction from the perspective of Cognitive Psychology. The dichotomy of possible representations embraces for the authors both external and internal ones, the former group being linguistic, the latter a propositional symbolic representation (ibid.). These two elements might be ontologically regarded as parallel to each other to a certain extent. Both of them are non-analogical (i.e. having no resemblance with what they stand for, as opposed to pictorial means). However, linguistic representation obeys a system of rules prescribed by the language system, whereas the propositional one is described as follows:

... [P]ropositional representations are language-like representations that capture the ideational content of the mind, irrespective of the original modality in which the information is encountered. (...) Propositional representations are considered to be explicit, discrete, abstract entities that represent the ideation content of the mind. They represent conceptual objects and relations in a form that is not specific to any language (whether it be it [sic] Russian, Serbo-Croat, or Urdu) or to any modality (whether it be vision, audition, olfaction, or touch). Thus, they constitute a universal, amodal, mentalese. By *mentalese*, we mean that propositions are a fundamental language or code that is used to represent all mental information. (ibid., pp. 246-247)

Cognitive science has developed a far-spread classification of such representations. Palmer, e.g., speaks about templates, pre-prepared mental schemas, *pictures*, as he calls them, that serve as a basement of at least some of the representations (Palmer 1978: 280-281).

Representations play an important role in the process of categorisation, of which there are several established systems. Let us now briefly refer to the historical milestones of the development of the episteme in time.

3.2. Aristotelian view of categorisation

Aristotle formulated his ideas on categorisation in a time when the terms ‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ could be used interchangeably. Aristotle’s argument from the beginning of the fifth book of his *Metaphysics* was quoted, mentioned and used as a food for further thought an infinite amount of times (Aristotle 2005: 69-73).

Aristotle has expanded and developed Plato’s essentialism, i.e. the idea of each object having its *essence*, which, together with *substratum* (loosely, material of which the object is created), comprises the substance of this object (ibid.). This substance might be roughly described as a constellation of features that comprise the nature of a given object. Several objects may have similar ultimate substratum, so as in Aristotle's example, wine, water, oil and juices are ultimately the same in their “either the nearest to, or the farthest from, the final state”, (ibid.: 71).

The fact that they are yet different should be, therefore, explained by the combination of their essential parameters: the senses. The *sense*, so Aristotle, is an immanent attribute of an object, without which an object loses its distinctiveness from the others. There is, further, a set of supplementary parameters, *descriptions*, each of which adds up to the characteristics of the object but is no *conditio sine qua non*.

We might say that such a system of categorisation allows us to imagine each given object as a net of attributes, some of which – the immanent ones – belong to the first order and are closer to the centre of the net or a field of meaning, whereas the additional attributes are ranged second and stand further away from an imagined core. From this point of view it is easy to see that the Aristotelian ideas on the categorisation at least partially overlap with the currently established Cognitivist notions of prototypes for more or less characteristic participants of a given category. Why this overlap can only be partial and what the crucial differences between these approaches are will be discussed further below.

Taylor offers a legitimate critique of Aristotelian categorisation principles (Taylor 2009 [2003]: 35-40). It is, for example, problematic to say that both water and oil (ultimately having the same *substratum*) are equally good examples of fluids: the author of these lines would intuitively claim water to be a better example than oil. Or let us turn to the classical example provided by Eleanor Rosch’s research: different objects as good or bad examples of furniture (cf. her results quoted in Taylor 2009 [2003]: 60). However, Aristotelian theory claims all the objects to have the same status within the categories they belong to.

Another problematic aspect is that the categories as offered by Essentialism are binary. At the level of any individual object or analysed category this means that an attribute is either present or not, with no in-betweens. But in such a case we would not be able to classify a penguin or an emu as a bird, for the ability to fly is a very salient attribute of the notion *bird*. Emus, penguins and alike ‘bad’ examples were clearly not known to Aristotle and the whole scientific paradigm of the Hellenistic Antiquity. The proven existence of numerous ‘bad’ examples within probably every category comprises a weak point of Aristotle’s position nowadays.

It is also inconvenient that Essentialism claims the categories to have very distinct clear-cut borders. This desire for a neat differentiation between the categories appears to be a common and probably quite natural by-product of any scholarly discipline. Abstraction and idealisation belong to the *essence* of science, if we were to use Aristotelian stanza once more. No discipline is free of an urge to provide as neat and precise a picture of its subject matter as possible (consider the rise of Structuralism or of the Generativist approach as two examples of this phenomenon within linguistics). The abstraction and neatness of a model are also often associated with the correctness of any conducted experiment or observation. Aristotle’s viewpoint, moreover, is strongly influenced by logic and Logical science is known to be very sceptical about any fuzziness even nowadays (consider the Popperian position in Seiffert & Randitzky 1989: 82-85).

So, it is no wonder that Aristotle, the great mind of the Classical era opted for a system which appeared the neatest, the strictest, i.e. the best to him. It is also not surprising that nowadays in the era of polyphony in science and everyday life there are quite a number of arguments against this inflexible and strict model, which no longer seems to fulfil scholarly expectations. In the next section alternative, contemporary, models of categorisation will be introduced.

3.3. Further acknowledged paradigms of categorisation: John Stuart Mill

Despite the overwhelming authority of Classic views in general and the Aristotelian ones in particular, the scholarly expertise stepped further and had to adapt, transform, or sometimes refute its earlier postulates. Although John Stuart Mill was definitely not the first since Aristotle to publish on the matter of categorisation, his ideas are an outstanding

example of how the weak points of Essentialism were recognised and philosophically treated long before the Cognitive revolution of the 20th century.

Mill did not completely break with Essentialism, the fact easily deducible from the use of the same working terminology. However, when talking about *essences* and *descriptions*, Mill already made a step away from the strict functional and hierarchical delineation between them. Whereas for Aristotle it had been logically impossible to categorise by means of *descriptions*, i.e. secondary or non-exclusive attributes, Mill recognised that the everyday use actually did so with little problem to the coherence of communication (Mill 1965 [1868]: 108). Mill's example was not an unwitty reply to Aristotle's definition of man by the essential features: a man is a rational animal (such a definition, however, might very well include Hoyuhnms, and it is merely a lack of systematisation there are no such creatures (ibid.).

The proper definition, so Mill, should be performed *per genus et differentias* (ibid: 109), e.g. by the enlisting of all the attributes, all differentiating factors of a given entity and its hierarchical surrounding, i.e. similar entities of the same genus and the superior, which we might call a superordinate generic term. Yet the author was well aware of the definitions, which he called imperfect. Of these Mill counted two types. The first case was the not full enlistment of the qualities; the second - the definitions by accidents, the secondary descriptions. In each case, however, Mill found arguments why such an imperfect categorisation might be valid still.

If one tried to enlist all the important parameters of an object or entity there would appear the problem that some of the entities simply have no superordinate elements in the hierarchy. If we attempt to define via the Essentialist accidents, we just have to be sure

that the definition (or description) thus formed, should be convertible with the name which it professes to define; that is, should be exactly co-extensive with it, being predictable of everything of which it is predictable, and of nothing of which it is not predictable; though the attributes specified may have no connexion with those which mankind had in view when they formed or recognised the class, and gave it a name. (ibid.: 110)

Generally, John Stuart Mill proposed a set of highly valuable ideas unthinkable for the Aristotelian Essentialism. First of all, one did not need to know all the attributes of a single element in order to be able to categorise it. It was enough now that the means one would use for doing so coincided with the common understanding of this entity – not with what the term might have been planned to mean at the moment of its creation (compare this to

Bacon's idea of the distortion of the initially wise and unequivocal use of words in the common use mentioned above). This claim distanced the scholarly thought from the abstract matters of classical logic and philosophy. It propagated the importance of actual use, of the real performance as opposed to the presumably right one.

Another important issue is that if an entity can be equally well defined both by essences and accidents, there is no constructive difference to be made between these two any longer. It might be simply easier and faster to recognise an object by its very distinctive and peculiar features (what we might call salient attributes), but the lack of essential components would not automatically make the whole definition impossible.

In this sense, John Stuart Mill had anticipated some of the later important differential criteria of the Cognitive categorisation, which emerged a whole century after the publication of his ideas.

3.4. The Cognitivist approach to categorisation

Although the contribution of the Aristotelian episteme of categorisation cannot be underestimated, there has been a range of issues ever since that were not or could not be answered by it. The Cognitive Science in general and Cognitive Linguistics in particular offered one more possible way of treating the issue of categorisation.

The first and most essential matter arising is the fuzziness of the category borders, which often makes it impossible to ascribe one entity under discussion to one particular generic field. Some decades before the Cognitive Revolution Ludwig Wittgenstein had argued on the impossibility to provide a clear-cut definition of the German word "Spiel" ('game') (Wittgenstein 1978 quoted in Taylor 2009 [2003]: 42-43). Later Brent Berlin and Paul Kay, when working on the subject of colour terms across the languages, pointed out at the cultural relativity and once again at the fuzziness of the categorical boundaries in colour terms (Berlin & Kay 1991 [1969]: 2). Here, the faculty of colour recognition might be regarded as a biological one, i.e. universally valid and invariable; yet the empirical researches uncovered remarkable discrepancies across the languages in drawing the borders between the colour categories and the varying presence or absence of whole colour terms and, respectively, categories.

The seminal study conducted by Eleanor Rosch on the undergraduate college students of Psychology proved a paradoxical thing. Despite the fact that the Essentialist postulate about

the equal membership within a category sounds quite plausible, some notions, in fact, were considered better suitable to represent a given category than the others. As it turned out, some furniture items or some bird species were regarded as better examples of the respective class of entities (cf. Rosch 1975).

Rosch's data inspired and triggered a new theory of categorisation and a whole set of experiments and studies within it. The Prototype theory has both supporters and opponents. Even the very term 'prototype' is not free of critique: consider Wierzbicka's argument on the far too indiscriminative, 'all-inclusive' use of this word (Wierzbicka 1990: 348 ff., esp. 365-366) or Schmid's summary of the delineation problem between the terms prototype and stereotype (Schmid 1993: 33-35).

It is not only that categorisation allows humans to identify distinctive features of objects in order to identify these. The borders of the mental categories are considered broad enough to create cognitive coherence. In a given context a speaker performing a speech act can 'oversee' the distinctive and foreground the common features, therefore, making a category in question contextually broader and more inclusive. The logical question arises why we should include more members instead of less, for such a situation necessarily causes ambiguity and fuzziness of meaning. This question is answered differently, depending on the paradigm to which the author of the answer belongs. The answer of Cognitive science can be summarised based on Dirk Geeraerts' early work: the lack of overlapping in categorisation (everything is described in the full form and unique) would simply lead to the overload of our brains (Geeraerts 1989: 72-74).

What distinguishes the Prototype theory from the previously accepted or alternatively offered paradigms is, first of all, its empirical fundament. As opposed to a stereotype (although since the publication of Schmid's arguments on the difference, this term seems to have been limited to the field of non-empirical sciences and studies mainly in the area of Cultural studies), a prototype can be to a large extent revealed by falsifiable means and, therefore, is not entirely in the power of the scholar's intro- or circumspection.

As a next step, the Prototype theory makes the necessity of a category to have essential and accidental features relative. Thus it is no longer obligatory for a category to have both obligatory and sufficient features. Further, the accidental features gained in status, compared to the essential ones. Some of the attributes were now regarded as more important and salient for the language community, even if the classic Essentialism would regard them

as secondary (see Taylor's discussion of Labov's *cups* and the implications of these *cups* for the whole theory in Taylor 2009: 43-44).

According to Rosch, prototypes can be identified as:

the clearest cases of category membership defined operationally by people's judgments of goodness of membership in the category (Rosch 1978: 36).

Cruse then pointed at the fact that two directions of work were possible within the Prototype theory. If the member-centred approach to the prototypicality was foregrounded, each category should have a certain member uniting all these most salient qualities. A feature-centred approach in its turn does not presuppose the presence of such a member (Cruse 1990: 391). This feature-oriented mode of work seems to correspond to Rosch's conscious separation of the term 'prototype' from any feature limitations which would contradict the (Wittgensteinean) idea of fuzzy category boundaries (Rosch 1978: 36).

Finding the prototypical elements of meaning of the abstract, nominal categories (as opposed to natural ones, see Rosch 1978), such as [EQUALITY], [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] and their respective Russian equivalents is the aim of this research. The abstract nature of the entities in the categories under survey, will not allow finding a concrete 'item of freedom' or the best example of the category within a discussed language. However, it might be possible to provide a list of salient features which constitute a category and compare the composition of the categories across the two selected languages. In order to be able to do so, one needs a suitable method.

4. Research methodology

4.1. Justification of the format

The research is based on empirical data collected from two electronic national corpora: Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) and Russian National Corpus (RNC). Corpus linguistics is a dynamically developing branch of the linguistic discipline and appears to be an optimal solution for the given research questions.

There are two major concerns usually posed by the opponents of corpus linguistics. The first one is that although the corpus data indeed allow us to see what was once uttered and written down (or, in case of the audio-corpora, recorded), they do not include possible, but nevertheless unuttered constructions. The second major concern is that every corpus, no matter how big it is, is still but a selection of texts. The fact that the texts comprising the body of a corpus are preselected relates the reliability of any corpus-based and –driven researches.

These two objections are legitimate, of course. With regard to the first argument it has to be stated that there is no ideal speaker/listener with a perfect language competence and awareness of all possible combinations of language units. With corpora only registering what has once uttered, we unavoidably miss the units of language that remained not performed, but possible. With regard to the second concern it can be said that no existing research design conveys a 100% certainty of its findings.

A corpus research has an advantage in this respect. Although no one would dare to claim that corpus-inferred data are ultimately faultless in their composition, many present-day corpora (especially those positioning themselves as national corpora) are usually big and balanced enough. The imperfect competences, genre-, class- and epoch-specific aberrations, spelling mistakes and misprints are altogether too small and singular to distort the whole picture of a language use. However, the amount of data collected within larger corpora should be large enough, so that the mentioned aberrations do not distort the general picture too much.

Another advantage of corpora is the general accessibility of empirical data. A research in the COHA, conducted by a scholar in Peru – as long as the scholar was disciplined enough to explicate his/her methodology and research procedures – can be reproduced in China, France or South Africa. Both national corpora selected for this research are in the free

access online, thus a research conducted on them can be replicated and falsified by any scholar interested in the subject.

The ultimate goal of this study is to find out in how far the speakers of American English and Russian conceptualise *freedom* and *equality* in similar or different ways. Just like neurolinguists draw conclusions concerning language processing in the human mind by looking at PET- or fMRI-pictures of a brain, and just like medical doctors diagnose the condition of their patients from a certain set of reactions, a linguist can use the data of the corpora for gaining insight into the functioning of socially settled conceptualisation patterns.

Interviewing or doing questionnaires would be another possible research design for this study. However, without a proper professional organisation any questionnaire-oriented research presents a distorted picture. With or without information priming, the population is usually able to recognise the hidden logic between the questions and is inclined to answer in a way that it perceives as expected, socially acceptable, polite, etc. (cf. the discussion of self-serving bias and self-fulfilling prophecies in Gerrig & Zimbardo 2007: 640-643).

Working with larger corpora such as COHA or RNC provides a sufficiently large scope of raw data that is stored in an accessible and systematic form. The retrieved data are genre-balanced¹ and cover two centuries of use, so that it becomes possible to trace down the diachronic change in conceptualisation. Finally, the large-sized corpora, each of which embraces the written evidence of the language performance of the whole language community, optimally suit the general, whole-community-oriented character of our main research question.

4.2. Research procedure

The procedure of the present study has been organised and is to be presented in thematic circles. Each of the next four chapters is dedicated to one of the two selected concepts in one of the two selected languages. For each concept I treat the results from both languages parallel to each other in order to make the comparison immediately understandable.

¹ Both COHA and RNC are declared as genre-balanced and provide corresponding data on their information pages. Lacking the data refuting this assumption, the two corpora will be thus treated as genre-balanced.

For each concept I first enlisted the set of possible word types as given by a language dictionary of reference: the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) in case of English and the *Ozhegov & Shvedova* dictionary for Russian. Both dictionaries are widely known within their language communities. With the definition of a concept formulated and the types articulating this concept selected, these were tested in the corpora. A very basic search for the types allowed us to find out if they had been present in the representative scope of language sources in corpora throughout the whole studied period of time. This allowed eliminating the types that were listed in the dictionaries but actually were never or no longer used in the language corpus.

Here I supported the assumption according to which the more often a word is used, the more important is the concept it signifies for the language community. Personally, I would like to specify this assumption. With no doubt there are concepts with rather limited frequency of use in a given society in a given period of time, which are, nonetheless, of a great importance for the community. The terms from the domain [God] were prohibited for the vain, i.e. worldly use in the Christian tradition. However, if some research should reveal a rather restricted number of them, it would be a wrong solution to induce a lack of importance of the Christianity for the European vernacular communities of the times before the raise of secularism. It is clear that the unperformed utterances can be very for their language communities. The problem is that it is hard to impose an empirical test on them. Furthermore, the fact that some rare words matter much for a community does not mean that the other words (that might be unrestricted by sociolinguistic convention) rather rise in frequencies when the ideas they conceptualise gain importance and become socially focalised. In the context of this research I regarded the frequency fluctuations as meaningful and explainable, for the selected terms belonged to the common scope of language and were in no way tabooed.

I called the concepts under investigation – *equality*, *freedom* and *liberty*, and their Russian counterparts *ravenstvo* and *svoboda* (plus *volya*, a Russian second term for ‘freedom’) – the nominal representatives of the conceptual categories or domains. These are multidimensional abstract ideas and the basic language units denoting a State or Phenomenon within the category. Their State-related function partially overlaps with the ‘classical’ understanding of a noun.

Apart from the State- or Phenomenon-related terms there are also concepts that can be best described as referring to a Property. Yet one more type is united by the reference to

performing the action that imposes the categorical meaning (be it *freedom* or *equality*) over someone or something. I have given the last subcategory the label Result. Further below in 5.2 this division into subcategories is justified further and illustrated by the examples from the category [EQUALITY].

In order to visualise the structure of the categories I have provided a possible conceptual scheme for each of the four categories. The schemes embrace the possible abstract subcategories of meaning within the category (these may partially overlap with the Part-Of-Speech division, but are not be limited by it). The main aim has been to provide a visual impression of how a category elements may be related to each other. The core of each conceptual schema is comprised by a core stem (given in capitalised letters) that is being used for building up the studied members of the category. A set of possible generalised meanings (underlined) springs from the core. From these the Subcategories can be formulated (written in bold). Each of the subcategories contains several possible word representations of it (visualised as unmarked words in the schemes). In cases where both affirmative and negative forms of the words were possible, this information was provided by + or – in the brackets behind a relevant word.

The conceptual schemes provided here must be regarded as one, but not the only possible way of visualising the structure of the categories. They seek to combine the relations between meaning and form, but are by no means exhaustive.

The quantitative representation of these subcategories and its fluctuations across the time between 1810 and 2009 created the empirical fundament for the conclusions to be drawn. In order to make the changes in trends more visible I provided the arithmetic mean of some values (when relevant for the argumentation), e.g. the average of the particular Part-of-Speech subcluster (i.e. related to the state, property, or result in a given category in a given language) across the whole timespan between 1810 and 2009. I have compared the meaningful pairs of variables for Pearson correlation coefficients. This allowed to achieve a better level of coherence and falsifiability when interpreting the interrelations between the data subclusters.

After this purely quantitative counting the work on the research questions has been done. For the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] I checked if one or the other of the two State-related terms would tend to what I call negative or affirmative meanings.

In this sense it is important to distinguish these from the other binary: ‘affirmative’/‘negative’. I apply this pair to the forms such as ‘freedom’/‘unfreedom’ (i.e. it is an opposition of a grammatical character). By saying ‘positive’/‘negative’ I introduce another binary opposition of semantic character, which has been explained in section 1.3.

As the last point of each given concept-cycle I treated the category-related research questions listed in the Introduction. I have chosen the category [EQUALITY] for testing its perceived conceptual universality or limitedness. In case of [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] I will check (see above 1.3.) their negative/positive conceptual meanings. The possibility remains opened to extend the research by testing [EQUALITY] for the negative/positive forms and performing the corresponding supplement procedure on the second categorical set. I have consciously decided to leave this step out in this research, due to the format limitations. My interest lay rather on seeing if the method works.

4.3. Homogenisation, normalisation and some notes on counting

The last essential methodological point is related to the homogenisation of the samples extracted from the corpora. There are certain differences in the design and size between the COHA and the RNC. In order to achieve a better degree of research validity the corpus samples had to be homogenised to the largest possible extent.

The first thing to start with, the two corpora cover different time spans. The COHA contains with the data from written sources between 1810 and 2009 and consists of 406.232.024 words. The Russian National Corpus starts with the data from the 18th century and does not stop with the year 2009, but extends into the next decade, too. Thus the RNC covers an extremely long time span, from which only the data from the period between 1810 and 2009 have been used for this research.

Some of the research questions demanded the smaller pools of data (such as a decade normalised frequency). In this case the data from the RNC are harder to retrieve. The page with the official information on this matter provides sample sizes for the 50-year chunks and, if searched further, each separate year’s chunks². The normalised frequencies per

² Unfortunately, this is not explicated in the official information on the corpus composition. However, each webpage with the results of any search query provides the data on sample sizes per year.

decade can be counted from these data. They also allow to calculate the overall size of the corpus part for the relevant time period (between 1810 and 2009).

Due to the fact that the sum of any 50 sequential years does not match the official data on the size of these chunks, it was necessary to recount the data manually. It is probable that the official corpus statistics are actualised less often than the corpus data. All in all, the size of the research-related corpus within the RNC-corpus comprised 219.265.658.02.

Unlike the COHA, the Russian corpus gives the sample sizes with decimals. According to the information provided by the corpus technical support, such ‘halfwords’ come into being when the source text has a ‘double’ date of origin. For example, a document or a book had been written in 1846, but first published in 1857. In such a case the RNC ‘splits’ the instance between the corresponding decades (with a half going to each one). I have taken the sample sizes in the form they are given by the RNC-administration, for no alternative material was available. In the later counting in cases when a singular token belonged to two dates I have ascribed it to the date of its publication, i.e. to the later one.

The figures achieved from the calculations throughout the research are normalised with relation to the timespan sample they refer to. This means that the overall frequency is always related to the size of the whole corpus and the frequency per decade to the size of the corresponding decade sample. As for the irregularly large samples (1810-1917, 1917-1991 and 1991-2009) the frequencies were normalised from the raw figures for the relevant years.

5. [EQUALITY]

5.1. Dictionary and corpus types

The category [EQUALITY] in English is realised by a number of terms, the central one being *equality*. The online edition of the Oxford English Dictionary defines *equality* broadly as ‘the quality or condition of being equal’ and differentiates between 6 possible meanings, two of which are out of use; one more refers to the common name for the U.S. state Wyoming.

Earlier meanings of this word refer to the quality of non-abstract things and describe the visible uniformity of size, shape, or proportion. Examples of such a meaning date back as far as to the 14th century, whereas the official date of borrowing *equality* from French, i.e. of the word’s enter into the English language, is set in the 15th c. (OED, search term ‘equality’, last access on 6.7.15). Equality in the meaning of an abstract quality applied to further abstract complex qualities such as human rights, opportunities, dignity, rank, etc. - appears from the 16th century onwards.

The OED thesaurus offers the following synonyms and variants for the word *equality*: *parage*, *egalness*, *equalness*, *egality*, *classlessness*, *levelling*, *levelism*, *Levelry*, *liberation*, *equality of opportunities*, *equalitarianism*, *egalitarianism* and *integration*. Some of these, clearly enough, are simply synonyms by context. Consider for example the concept *classlessness* as a synonym of ‘equality of dignity and rank’ (ibid.). One word of the thesaurus – *parage* – used to have a meaning synonymous to that of ‘equality of dignity’; this meaning is stated as extinct (ibid.).

The question concerning the degree of synonymy of the terms *equality* and *integration* is rather philosophic, and exceeds the framework of this research. The main focus lies rather on the concept *equality* and all its cognates. *Levelry*, *liberation* and similar types are considered to be contextual synonyms and thus are excluded from this study.

The information from the Oxford English Dictionary enlists all the types that have been used to express the abstract meaning *equality* since the Old English period. In order to find out which of those were in active use in the timespan between 1810 and 2009 I have searched for any possible cognates of *equality* in the COHA. Very basic general queries *equal** and *egal** provided all types having any random number of symbols after the word stems. In order to include the possible negative forms, which escaped such a search, each of the two basic queries was subsequently completed and tried with the negative suffixes

un-/in-. The search results of with negative forms were then included into the general counting.

The stem *egal* provided us with 478 tokens within 22 types. Further investigation of the types, however, revealed that many of the findings either referred to ‘Egalite’ as a proper noun – for example, ‘Palais Egalite’ or ‘Philippe Egalite’ – or they occurred in French phrases and clauses within English source texts, i.e. when the characters, speech participants, or the author used French. With all the falsely tagged, misspelt and unsuitable variants excluded, there were 390 tokens within 8 types: ‘egalitarian’ (295 occurrences), ‘egalitarianism’ (81), ‘egal’ (5), ‘egalitarians’ (7), ‘egally’ (2) and ‘egalomaniac’ (1), plus the negative forms (of which only one type - ‘inegalitarian’ - exists).

As it could be expected, the stem *equal* turned out to be far more productive, both in the variety of the possible types and in the frequency of their occurrence in the corpus. The amount of tokens to work with could be then limited to 68002. An extra search for the phrase ‘equality state’ allowed us to expel 2 more tokens, in this case a fixed idiomatic expression – the nickname of the state Wyoming. The prefixed negative forms added up around 5000 further tokens (3148 for the lemmas ‘unequal’ and 2154 for ‘inequal’). All in all, by means of excluding the misspelt or semantically irrelevant variants, and by integrating the negative forms the (raw) total number could be settled on 73.692 tokens spread over 44 types.

An interesting tendency immediately attracted attention at this stage: the frequencies of use of the word types from the category [EQUALITY] distributed per decade between 1810 and 2009 revealed a steady decrease. Consider the Figure 1:




Figure 1: Occurrence frequency of the general abstract type/category [EQUALITY] in the COHA (frequencies normalised per decade, 1810-2009)

One might expect that the notion of *equality* would be far more spread in our present-day egalitarian and free-market-oriented capitalist society, than in the 19th century. Consider the fact that these were the days of legally established slavery in the USA. However, the frequency of the type ‘equality’ and its cognates actually dropped from 384.35 tokens per mil in the first observed decade to 92.70 in the years between 2000 and 2009. This rough draft does not give any clearer picture of the situation, but creates the first general impression. A more thorough examination is necessary for revealing the more elaborate picture of the concept’s functioning.

5.2. Conceptual scheme and semantics of the category [EQUALITY]

The complex nature of conceptualisation and categorisation has been already discussed above in the chapter 3. Now, at this stage it is time to consider the conceptualisation of ‘equality’.

Given the dictionary definitions, one could define [EQUALITY] as a category conceptualising the relation of roughly comparable status of two or more subjects perceived in relation to a certain (usually ethnically and emotionally loaded) criterion frame. The referential frame can relate *equality* to the political and legal domains (‘all people are equal before the law’). It can be also organised with regard of perceived divine power or Deity being the medium that creates and judges upon the degree of the established *equality* (‘equal before the God’). The following Figure (Fig. 2) roughly visualises the essentials of the category:




Figure 2: Schematic representation of the semantic-grammatical constitution of the category [EQUALITY]

In order to overcome the unavoidable fuzziness of the grammatical categories Noun, Adjective, or Verb, I organised the types within the category according to the meaning they convey. The three main groups of meaning largely, but not completely overlap with the notions of parts of speech.

State contains nominal elements, such as *equality*, *equalness* and their negative and plural forms, but does not contain such types as *equalizer*, *equalization*, or any instances of an adjective or a verb used in the role of a noun. The group State, therefore, is dealing with the types that denote the abstract mental category in its quality as a phenomenon or state. The following two sentences provide an example of such ‘phenomenal’ or ‘state’ *equalities*:

- (1) a) An exact equality of suffrage between the members, has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. (Hamilton, Madison, Jay. *The Federalist*, on the new Constitution, written in 1788, by Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Jay: with an appendix. Philadelphia: Benjamin Warner. 1817. In *COHA*)
- b) The convention marked the beginning of the generations-long struggle for women's equality in this country. (Lynne. *Freedom's daughters: the unsung heroines of the civil rights movement from 1830 to 1970*. New York: Scribner. 2001. In *COHA*)

The group Property correlates with the adjectival forms, such as *equal* or *egalitarian*. It also includes the corresponding nominalisations of the types above, as well as such types as *egalitarianism* and alike. The reason for that is that these words, despite their formal

place in a certain morphological cluster (here Noun) appear to be immediately related to the Property. The Property is closely tied to the other word classes, too, yet these connections are not as simultaneous as the words' bond to the feature *equal*. The third group is labelled as Result; it embraces a number of verbal types and those the main meaning of which can be roughly formulated as acquisition of property *equal* or achievement of state *equality*. In (2) the sentence a) illustrates the subcategory Property; b) provides an example of a Result-related use.

- (2) a) All Americans are guaranteed "the equal protection of the law" (Harris. Profiles in injustice :why racial profiling cannot work. New York: New Press. 2002. In *COHA*)
b) Often, an organized advocate equals political power, and political power gets the resources. (Smith. The U.S. must answer the challenge of spacepower. In USA Today Magazine: May 2000: . Vol. 128, Iss. 2660; pg. 10, 4 pgs. In *COHA*)

Clearly enough, the introduced distribution does not eliminate the problem of fuzziness completely. Thus the subcategory Property reveals the fuzzy borders, for it embraces a property 'pure' – 'equal' – as well as a property from the legal perspective – 'egalitarian' – and the applications of these to subjects – 'an equal' (i.e. a person to whom the property was ascribed), 'egalitarianism' (legal and political philosophy supporting the conveyance of the property 'equal' and support of it), and the verb 'to equal' (an action communicating the property of being equal to the subjects previously untouched by it). Within the subcategory Result one might differentiate between actions that are telic and deprived of duration (e.g. 'find equality') and those containing duration and an 'open outcome' (e.g. 'seek equality').

All in all, the possible forms and their meanings can be united in a slightly modified form of the scheme above (See Figure 3). The selected core of the scheme is not to be read as a particular type, but rather as a stem of the word, which I regard as the smallest structural unit of meaning. The stem is modified into particular type-forms. Further I provide the conceptual schemes for each concept under discussion in as follows:




Figure 3: Conceptual scheme of the types within the category [EQUALITY]

This scheme embraces the cognate types of the [EQUALITY] within the three semantic-grammatical subcategories State/Phenomenon, Property and Result. It provides a visual representation of the interrelation between the cognitive content and its particular representations in language. By illustrating the categories in this particular way I also try to exemplify the complexity of their structure. There is no one to one correlation within cognitive categories. In some cases several words can express a very close mental unit. That is why it is important to bear in mind that the directions of the arrows on the scheme are not unidirectional hierarchical channels and are represented in one but not the only possible way.

5.3. Frequential analysis of the category

After the main semantic clusters of the category [EQUALITY] in English have been defined, the changes in frequency can be examined in a closer detail. The Table 1 visualises the quantitative fluctuations of the selected categories within four equally long time periods:

	State	Property	Result
1810-1859	33.40	174.51	13.57
1860-1909	29.49	112.38	10.66

1910-1959	18.92	78.53	10.00
1960-2009	15.78	62.93	7.25
TOTAL	22.38	94.45	9.73

Table 1: Development of the frequencies of the English [EQUALITY] between 1810 and 2009

The downward trend observed in the Figure 1 is confirmed by the results of a series of complex searches that underlie the table given above. The column Total shows that the speakers of American English used to activate the conceptual scheme [EQUALITY] twice as frequently in the years 1810-1859 compared to the timespan between 1910 and 1959. The last time block (1960-2009) reveals the continuation of this decline.

As already mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, such evidence was quite surprising if one considers the historical backgrounds of the American English language community. Surely enough the great frequency in the first fifty years' block can be plausibly explained by the fact these figures refer to the very early stage of the American Republic. Back at that time its democratic values and ideals were still strongly in focus of the public discourse. It is also true that the years preceding the American Civil War were marked by the Abolitionist debates, and the category [EQUALITY] was once again in the centre of the public attention. From this point of view it is quite understandable that the word 'equality' is used quite often during these first hundred years. This line of argumentation might even explain the decay of frequency until the end of the 19th century: perhaps after the legal equality of all American citizens had been at least formally established, the speech community considered it unnecessary to topicalise the issue with the same ardour as before.

Yet it appeared surprising that the falling trend continued in the years 1910-1959 and further from 1960 onwards. The same recession could be found in all three subcategories. Following the logic 'the more actual the topic, the higher the frequencies' one might have rather expected a certain rise at the decades of serious political and social changes. However, neither the two World Wars, nor the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, nor the active export of democracy during and after the Cold War had any influence over the sinking popularity of the category [EQUALITY] in American English.

The group Property had the widest spread of all, and one might even think, the terms within this group were simply too common, so that they are used on the daily basis with no clear

reference to anything ‘democratic’ or abstract. If this had been the case, Property would have shown no declining trend. However, even the Property showed a steady fall. There appeared to be a slowdown of this fall in the last 50-years block: the figure for 1960-2009 differed from that for the previous 50 years by far less than a third. A closer, decade-specified view of the subcategory Property revealed that a certain rise had taken place in the 1960s. From this minor peak, however, the trend line went on falling ever after (see Figure 4 below):




Figure 4: Diachronic change in the frequencies of the State, Property and Result between 1810-2009, normalised per mil per dec.

In Figure 4 the colour blue represents the subcategory State, orange – the subcategory Property while green stands for the types united under semantic category Result.

Pearson correlation coefficients showed that changes in the frequency of the categories State and Property had a strong positive correlation (0.87). This means that each time speakers started conceptualising the category [EQUALITY] as a State (speaking about *equality* or *inequality*) more frequently, they also used the Property-related forms (*equal* and similar) more often. At the same time, there appeared to be rather weak negative correlation between State and Result (-0.2) and Property and Result (-0.16). Therefore, speakers of American English tended to talk less about the active *equalizing* and at the same time they spoke slightly more about the abstract and thus passive aspects of the category, e.g. *equalness*, *equality* or someone being *equal*. Yet there was no strong bond between these values. This allowed me to presume that the statistical interdependence of the types within the pairs State/Result and Property/Result existed, but was rather weak. For the pair State/Property this interdependence of occurrence seems to exist to a larger and more stable extent.

5.4. Negative and affirmative type forms of [EQUALITY]

In the previous four sections the selected aspects of [EQUALITY] were treated without any specific differentiation between the affirmative and negative forms.




Figure 5: Frequency fluctuations of affirmative and negative forms of the meaning categories State, Property and Result for the category [EQUALITY], 1810-2009, norm. per dec.

Figure 5 complements the already discussed data by differentiating between affirmative (double line trends on the graph) and negative (dash line) meanings. The colour representation remains the same as above (blue – State, orange – Property and green – Result).

The graph shows a dramatic difference between the use of affirmative and negative forms within a single meaning category: compare the 91.96 tokens per million of affirmative Property types in 1900 and only 6.52 negative tokens (per mil) in the same year. The average values for each of the three pairs showed a similarly large gap: [EQUALITY] as a State had the average mean of 18.94 tokens per mil for the affirmative forms against 6.02. for the negative forms.

[EQUALITY] as Property showed the difference of more than 6 times (AM of the affirmative tokens – 103.16, AM negative – 15.74 per mil). The Result of [EQUALITY] had affirmative forms (AM – 2.68) only. The speakers of American English, therefore, apart from speaking less and less of equality as such, clearly have preferred affirmative forms: ‘equality’ instead of ‘inequality’, or ‘equal’ instead of ‘unequal’.

One of the hypotheses listed in 1.3 presumed that if the speakers used more affirmative forms in a given time period, at the same time they would use fewer negative forms (a

negative correlation between the values). However, so far the correlation coefficients between affirmative and negative forms within the category [EQUALITY] seem to suggest that this is not the case. Leaving out the subcategory Result (as mentioned above, it contained no negative forms at all), both Property and State showed a rather strong positive correlation (Pearson coefficient 0.93 and 0.87, respectively). This means that at the times when the speakers conceptualised such types as ‘equality’, ‘egalitarian’, ‘an equal’ etc. with growing frequency, the frequency of the negative forms ‘inequality’, ‘unequal’ and alike rose, too.

5.5. All people are equal - Phrase

In this last section of the chapter dedicated to the category [EQUALITY] I would like to provide an overview of the use of a particular structure in American English. There is a common phrase, formulated in various ways, yet having one general meaning: all people are equal³. This utterance is interesting from two different perspectives. On the one hand, its immediate environment might provide additional information on the semantic conceptualisation of the category [EQUALITY]: are all people equal before the law? Or before the God? The selected phrase could show the semantic composition of the category [EQUALITY] for the speakers of American English. At the same time it can be assumed that the syntactic pattern of the utterance in its environment could give an indication of whether the speakers perceive the category [EQUALITY] as something absolute and non-negotiable or rather as something that is commonly accepted, but can still be ignored under certain circumstances. In case of the former, one could expect the corpus collocations with ‘all people are equal’ to take no adjunct and to be followed by no further clause or sentence starting with the coordinating conjunction *but*. If the equality should be considered negotiable rather than absolute, I would expect to find abundant modifications, pointing at conditions and criteria that specify when, why and to what extent all people are equal.

In order to answer this question, I have searched the corpus for the words ‘all’ and ‘equal’ and coded the results.

³ As the matter of fact, the most numerous group of instances in the COHA used ‘men’ instead of ‘people’. However, due to the fact that I have searched for the phrase pattern with any possible synonym of the word ‘people’, the corpus provided ‘men’, ‘individuals’ and other similar results within a single search string.

From 327 possible search results 131 referred to the word ‘people’ or its synonyms, such as ‘men’, ‘humans’, ‘persons’ and alike. According to their meaning, the types could be distributed among the following groups:

- Utterances referring to the superior instance (God, law, government, or alike);
- Utterances referring to a certain time or period (e.g. ‘at the time of birth’);
- Utterances referring to the place, real (a certain country) or metaphorical (e.g. ‘in nature’);
- Utterances containing condition under which equality could take place or a limitation of it (‘all people are equal, but...’);
- Cases with no clause modification at all (‘absolute’ equality with no further elaboration)’
- Cases where equality was regarded negatively;
- Other cases.

The two largest groups are No modification (57 instances, which corresponds to the normalised frequency of 0.26, or 43% of all found instances) and modification via reference to a Superordinate power (41 utterances, normalised frequency of 0.09, or 31%). The table in the Appendix 11.2 sums up the numerical aspect of both English and Russian phrases. The Figure 6 provides a pie-chart visualisation of these relations. The frequencies per million here are replaced by percentages in order to allow a proper insight into the ‘power relations’ within the phrase.




Figure 6: Modification references of the utterance *all (people) are equal*.

What is interesting about the non-modified, ‘absolute’ instances of ‘all (people) are equal’ is that their number appears to have diminished by 4%, if the periods 1810-1909 and 1910-2009 are compared. The number of Superordinate types actually increased by 6%. An immediate and speculative conclusion here might be that speakers in the 20th century came to perceive equality of all people less self-explanatory than it had been the case before. At the same time their perception of the equality might have changed insofar that they associated it with a certain kind of superior authority more than they had done in the 19th century.

The group Superordinate power provided an interesting insight into the perception of the category [EQUALITY] and generally cultural worldview of the speech community. The speakers of American English differentiated between references to God (16 of 41 raw tokens, i.e. 39%), those referring to law (17, or 41%), to those referring a worldly power (*emperor* and *King* are the 2 instances, all in all 5%). Five further instances in this group referred to what could roughly be summarised as biological and environmental determinants: *nature* (twice), *hunger*, *cold and fatigue* (12%). Two further instances: *system* and *the Question* belonged to the unclassifiable group of Other.

Therefore, if the speakers of American English performed the utterance *all people are equal* and referred to any superordinate at the same time, it was slightly more often that their referent was worldly rather than religious. Within the sample this worldly power was predominantly represented by the abstract entity *law*. There were also two personified examples from the genre of Fiction that take *King and emperor* as a superordinate; these examples being expectably marginal due to the fact alone that the USA have been a republic since the late 18th century.

References to God doubled in absolute numbers in the 20th century: in the time span between 1910 and 2009 there were 11 instances of the Deity being the origin and criterion of the equality of all people, as opposed to the previous hundred-year period with only 5 examples. Almost a half of these 11 instances (5) of the 20th century came from the period between 1976 and 2009.

However, this rise in numbers vanishes if the figures are normalised. It is not only that the speakers of American English used to topicalise all people's equality before God more often, it is also that the sample has grown immensely. From this perspective, the normalised frequencies of the references to God even dropped slightly from 0.09 to 0.07 in the 20th century.

However, it is interesting, that the drop was not any sharper in the 20th century, the age of high technologies and secularism. God did not disappear for the speakers of American English, and the decline of the trend was quite small. The re-appearance of God-related utterances from the 1970s might be connected with what Social Scientists call the Comeback of religions (consider, e.g. the argument of Huntington in his *Clash of Civilizations*).

The groups Condition/Concession and Place had comparable numbers of 13 and 12 instances, respectively (normalised frequencies 0.06 and 0.05). The former group included those instances where the statement 'all people are equal' was modified by the elements that limited its truthfulness e.g. by tying it to certain conditions, or to an explicitly ironic context. Consider the following two examples for the conditions of all people being equal:

- (3) a) But, here, all are equal who know how to conduct themselves with propriety. (Cooper, J.F. 1845. *The Pioneers*. In *COHA*)
- b) [...] for not only are all men civilized, but potentially all are equal, in Mr. Goldenweiser's view. (Krutch, J. W. 1922. *Two Major Novelists* in *The Nation*: 12/6/1922, Vol. 115 Issue 2996, p. 624-628, 3p. In *COHA*)

4 of the 13 instances within this group were related to the famous saying from Orwell's animal farm: 'all animals are equal, but some are more equal'. Three of these four use 'animals' as the Agent of the utterance. However, in such a case the implicit reference to people is clear. Thus these examples were included in the sample. The fourth instance substituted 'animals' with 'citizens', which once again points at the fact that the phrase had achieved such a degree of conventionalisation that its idiomaticity survived the change of an Agent. All four Orwellian items came from the 20th century, of course. All in all there were 6 and 7 raw condition-related instances in the 19th and 20th cc., respectively. Normalised to the sample size it comprised 0.11 and 0.04 uses per million, respectively. Therefore, there was a definite decrease of Condition-related instances in the last 100 years. Parallel to this decrease a very particular instance, created by George Orwell, established itself as a salient example of Condition (a third of all uses in the 20th century).

In the case of the group Place it is interesting to note that the references to a metaphorical space (e.g. 'all men are equal in grave', or 'in death') were as frequent as those to a place in a relatively direct sense (e.g. 'in that country'). I have ascribed such items as *here*, *there* to the direct space because they activate contextually known reference to an existent (real or fictional) place.

At this point I would like to close the [EQUALITY]-related part of the thesis and turn to the conceptualisation of the corresponding category in the Russian language.

6. [RAVENSTVO]

6.1. Normative and conceptual definition

The Russian equivalent for English ‘equality’ is ‘равенство’ (*ravenstvo*). Similarly as in English, the Russian concept can be applied to a particular kind of mathematical expressions. Further, there is a supplementary set of concepts, morphologically related to and grouped around ‘egalitarian’ – ‘эгалитарный’ (*egalitarniy*). These terms, similarly as the corresponding ones in English, come from French and still bear traces of its original orthography. The foreignness of ‘egalitarniy’ and its cognates is even more marked. It is not only the stem that points to the loan character of a word, it is also the graphic choice of letters used. The actually used Standard of the Russian Orthography and Punctuation mentions 10 genuinely Russian words, mostly demonstrative pronouns and interjections, starting with the letter ‘э’. Apart from that use of this letter in the initial position is typical for the Cyrillic transliteration of the borrowings.

The Ozhegov & Shvedova Dictionary of Russian defines *ravenstvo* as

1. Full similarity, resemblance (in size, quality, value) [...]
2. People’s condition in the society that guarantees them the same standing with relation to law, the same political and civil rights and equality of these rights.
3. In mathematics: relation between two values that points at the fact that these values are the same. (Ozhegov & Shvedova Dictionary Online, translated by the author, last access on 19.07.15).

The Russian language as such is quite creative in word-building. Apart from the major and most obvious types: nominal (*не-)*равенство (*(ne-)ravenstvo*), attributives *равный* (*ravniy* – “equal”) and *эгалитарный* (*egalitarniy*) and verbal *равнять* (*ravnyatj*)/*уравнивать* (*uravnivatj*) there are at least two concepts that have no one-to-one correspondence in English. One of these is the non-countable concept *уровниловка* (*uravnilovka*) – a widely spread semi-colloquial term that denotes an indiscriminative, blind and authority-driven, negatively connoted kind of equality. The other concept is *ровня* (*rovnya*). This one is mostly used in the negatively connoted utterances with comparisons. In such cases the Theme of comparison (a person or an object compared) is regarded as failing to be of an equal value or status with someone or something. Consider the example:

- (4) Хотя и говорили все, что не ровня я тебе, чтоб не ждала.
 Although everybody said, that I am no equal to you (not your rovnya), so that you should not wait for me (Okudzhava, Bulat. 1962. Новенький как с иголки (Noven'kiy kak s igolochki). In *RNC*)

The speaker of (4) addresses a female Recipient of his speech. This Recipient had been told by someone that the Speaker was not her *rovnya*, thus of a lower social status, so that the Recipient should not (bother to) wait for him.

The notion *rovnya* has the same stem (with the o/a-vowel alternation, which is quite widespread in Russian) as the [RAVENSTVO]-concepts. On the other hand it is related to the adjectival type *rovniy* – “even”, “straight”. Further cognates include such words as *ravnina* (“plain”), a compound *ravnodushie* (“indifference”, verbatim “equality of a soul”) and so forth. The high productiveness of prefixation as a word-formation mechanism adds up such words as *sravnivatj* (“compare”), *uravnivatj*, (“make equal”, most commonly in legal sense), *vyravnivatj* (“turn smth straight (again)”), *podravnyat* (“to equal”, “to make even”, e.g. hair), *sravnyatjsa/poravnyatjsa* (“to equal oneself”) and many more. The latter two are peculiarly complex, for their explanation demands either a whole context, or a visualisation.




Figure 7: The Russian concept 'poravnyatjsa'

Poravnyatjsa, for example, has two possible scenarios. In the first case B is moving in the direction of A and is the focal point; A (Reference point) is not moving or moving towards B. Its movement or immobility remains unfocalised; *poravnyatjsa* describes the moment when B is either at the same point in space or close enough to A in order to perform an action on it (e.g. communicate). In the second scenario, B is once again the Agent and the focal point, but A is moving away (i.e. in the same direction as B); *poravnyatjsa* describes the moment when B catches up and can either outstrip A or adjust the pace to the speed of A, so that A and B move together.

This example illustrates the abundance of meanings created by the stem combination *rovn/ravn*. Altogether these meanings create a far broader domain, loosely tied by a very abstract meaning of two or more things, substances, or entities being comparable or alike. The category [RAVENSTVO] is a part of this broader domain, and its conceptual scheme

is more or less bound and shaped by the meanings from the other sections of the domain. Quite similar situation takes place in German, where the stem ‘gleich’ also produces quite a number of cognates that nowadays appear like distant relatives: *Gleichheit* (“equality”, “equalness”), *Ausgleich* (“compensation”), or *Vergleich* (“comparison”)⁴.




Figure 8: Conceptual scheme of the domain 'rovn'/'ravn' with [RAVENSTVO] in it

In the scheme above (Fig. 8) the concepts referring to equality – [RAVENSTVO] as a State and to [RAVENSTVO] as a Property can have affirmative and negative (‘inequality’) forms. The forms marked with asterisk have a negative connotation, both having a substandard, colloquial status.

The scheme also includes a compounds. Although it was previously stated that compounds are generally regarded as the types including the same basic meaning plus an extra meaning element added, I would like to include these two into the Russian part. The term *ravnopraviye* explicitly refers to the equality of rights. Russian, therefore, allows two alternative ways of speaking about the [RAVENSTVO] in a society: either by naming it *ravenstvo prav* (“equality of rights”) or *ravnopraviye* (the same meaning in a single word). The RNC provides 805 tokens of this type in an affirmative form alone. It points at a

⁴ German, however, has a further Germanic stem for the ‘plain’ and ‘straight’ meanings: ‘eben’, which corresponds with the English ‘even’. ‘Even’, in its turn, is rather a marginal term for expressing the category [EQUALITY].

relatively common character of this compound. It is to expect that speakers of Russian use the terms interchangeably; therefore, both have to be included. *Ravnoznachnostj* is the second compound I would like to include: its frequency is lower, but semantic character is the same: *ravnoznachnost* stands for “equality in importance”.

The corpus search and further analysis, therefore, covered all the standard types belonging to the category [RAVENSTVO]: *ravenstvo*, *neravenstvo*, *ravnopraviye*, *neravnopraviye*, *ravnoznachnostj*, *neravnoznachnostj*, *ravniy*, *neravniy*, *ravnjatj*, *uravnivatj* and *egalitarniy*. I discuss the two colloquial types as a separate group. Similarly as in case of American English the types were distributed according to the correlation between their function and meaning. *Ravenstvo*, *neravenstvo*, *ravnopraviye*, *neravnopraviye*, *ravnoznachnostj* and *neravnoznachnostj* belonged to the subcategory State/Phenomenon; *ravniy*, *neravniy*, *egalitarniy*, *neegalitarniy* and a nominal form *egalitarnost* – to the Property. The group Result contained the terms *ravnjatj* and *uravnivatj* (both can be translated as “equalise”, “make equal”).

6.2. Frequential distribution and development of the types

As previously for the American English category [EQUALITY] the relevant types were counted within the three functional categories: State/Phenomenon, Property and Result.

	State	Property	Result
1810-1859	12.30	298.66	11.36
1860-1909	19.65	244.92	11.88
1910-1959	16.78	243.68	8.71
1960-2009	17.56	307.24	9.26
TOTAL	17.45	279.64	9.74

Table 2: Distribution of frequencies of [RAVENSTVO] across the three functional categories and 200 years

There was a series of remarkable differences between the frequency distribution and change in Russian and the corresponding data for [EQUALITY] (see Table 1 in 5.3). The proportional relation between the subcategories in English had been, with a certain degree

of fluctuation, 2x10x1 (State x Property x Result). In Russian, this proportion looked like 1.5 x 28 x 1.

The frequencies of State and Result to a certain extent corresponded to the ones for English, and if there had been no reverse of the declining trend in the last decades of the 20th century (see below), this similarity would have been even bigger. At the same time the subcategory Property here, in Russian, was much more dominant than in American English. Property appeared to be the most prominent, the prototypical part of the [RAVENSTVO]. The question arising at the sight of such figures is whether all these extremely popular uses are still sufficiently bound to the category of [RAVENSTVO]. Or is it possible that so many uses are simply closer linked to the meanings that are not related to social conditions and ideas (see the conceptual scheme in Figure 8)? If so, one should also claim that such types as *ravniy* and even *ravnopravniy* drift in the direction of losing its genuine meaning of likeness and comparability of two or more elements and into a slightly grammaticalised form of a cliché. Yet another possible explanation might be that the Russian language as such has a tendency to use much more adjectives than it is the case with American English. However, the results of the second pair of categories did not support this assumption. As it will be shown later on, the other Russian category [SVOBODA/VOLYA] is more balanced across the subcategories. Thus it can be claimed that [RAVENSTVO] indeed has a very prominent Property-related part.

Before the subcategory Property is further explicated, one more important thing has to be highlighted with regard of overall frequency developments across the three subcategories. In Russian there was no clear downward trend among the frequencies. [RAVENSTVO] as a State grew by almost 50% in the 19th century. It started to decay from the 1910s onwards. However, this decay was more moderate than it happened with [EQUALITY] in American English. The figure from the 1910-1959 (after the decrease) remained slightly higher than the one from the period between 1810 and 1859. In case of American English the uses halved in the same time period.

Further, the Russian State-terms have been growing in numbers ever since the 1960s. Thus in case of Russian the [RAVENSTVO] types actually did not fall in their frequencies, but rather fluctuated between the growth and decay.

The subcategories Property and Result both revealed a decaying trend with a reversal tendency in the last 50 years of observation, too. Property for example halved in the time

between 1860 and 1909. Its decay slowed down in the first half of the 20th century until it started to grow in the 1960s and has been growing ever since. The subcategory Result showed a gradual decline by approximately a quarter of uses within the time between 1810 and 1959, until this steady decay was deflected by a slight growth over the last 50 years of observation.

What might be the reasons for such fluctuations? If we accept the assumption that the quantifiable presence of a type in a given discourse correlates with the extralinguistic events the speaker community experiences, then there should be a clear connection with the changes in the Russian society that influenced the frequencies.

Both *equality* and *ravenstvo* belong to the group of terms that are commonly used in times of any serious political and social transformations. As opposed to the USA, Russia changed its political system twice within the observed time period. Add to that the civil movement for the abolition of Serfdom around the middle of the 19th century, which could be compared in its ideology to the Abolitionist movement of the United States of the same period. A diachronic line chart can provide the more precise information related the decade fluctuations of the frequencies here. Due to the fact the subcategory Property had an overwhelming presence, I had to split the graph into two parts, so that the developments of State and Property could be seen at all (for a correct scaling note the x-axis figures of the both parts):




Figure 9: Frequencies of occurrence of the subcategories State, Result (both l.) and Property (r.) in the RNC, 1810-2009

The colour markings for the subcategories are the same as in the previous chapter: blue for State, orange for Property and green for the Result.

As it can now be seen from the graph, the most numerous subcategory (Property) started with remarkably large figures for the first decade. These figures have actually never been reached or neared again ever since. There are two intertwined possible explanations for such a phenomenon. On the one hand, such a dramatic frequency might be explained by a composition of the corpus sample for the 1810s: despite the declared balanced character of the corpus it is still possible that the first decade of the 19th century simply lacked enough differentiated texts. On the other hand, it must be admitted that this decade was a period of dramatic military and socio-political events. Russia of the 1810s saw the Napoleonic invasion, which brought both the patriotic sentiments of triumph after the victory over the French and the bourgeois ideas of French Revolution. The reformatory ideas ignited Russian intellectuals and were partially supported, but never truly fulfilled by the autocratic emperor. The discrepancy finally led to the Decembrist rebellion after the monarch's death in 1825. The subsequent three decades were shaped by political reaction and conservatism. From this perspective it might be an understandable thing that the trend line started quite high and fell steadily until the 1860s.

The popularity of the Property-related types rose in the 1860s, the decade when the serfdom was abolished in the Russian Empire. Despite the necessity of further reforms, however, this milestone did not trigger off further democratic change. Instead of this Russia saw the rise of politically motivated terrorism, which might have scared the people away from the democratic cause and seriously damaged the public acceptance of any liberal and reformatory concepts in the public debate.

After the 1860s the use of the terms from the subcategory Property became stable, until it started growing again with the new wave of public demands for political reforms – and with the Russian Revolution – in the 1910s. The subsequent decade saw the peak of discourse about 'being equal', until the Property sank in its frequencies in the 1930s and 1940s. It might be a coincidence, but this fall might really correlate with the rise of Stalinism (Stalin's rule was incontestable and sole since 1929) and the Second World War (COHA also showed the fall of the same subcategory in the 1940s). The second peak of the

20th century might be connected with a decade of Khrushchev's political liberalisation (Khrushchev's 'Thaw' in the late 1950s and early 1960s). Interestingly, the second change of the political order within a single century (the disintegration of the USSR in 1991) appears to have left the subcategory Property unaffected.

The situation is different with the [RAVENSTVO] as a State. Similarly to the Property, this subcategory showed expectable upward trend in the 1860-1870s, the 1900s (first (liberal) Russian revolution 1905) and a decaying presence of [RAVENSTVO] in the discourse of the 1930s and 1940s. However, the 1910s, where the further rise might be expected due to the Bolsheviks' revolution and their propaganda, proved to have a lower frequency of [RAVENSTVO]-related terms than the preceding decade. The 'Thaw', mentioned above, does not correlate with any changes in the State-subcategory, but, interestingly, coincides with an upward trend in Result. The rise of both to a peak in the 1980s should be explained by the start of Perestroika, which later resulted in the collapse of the USSR. This collapse was followed not only by the liberalisation of the regime (on the affirmative side) but also by the severe economic crisis and galloping stratification of the society in the penultimate decade of observations. The new rise in this period, thus, might be brought in connection with the fact that people now on one hand suffered an extreme economic impoverishment, on the other hand, for the first time they could speak about it and further social anxieties openly.

The Pearson coefficient for State and Result proved the correlation between these categories to be barely higher than null (0.06). Unlike in American English State and Property correlated negatively. This correlation was also quite weak (Pearson coefficient equals -0.15). Such a value points to the unrelated, coincidental nature of overlaps rather than on any systematic logic behind them. At the same time, Property and Result unexpectedly showed a value of 0.88 (a strong positive correlation). The speakers of Russian appear to have conceptualised people, things, or entities *being* equal more often at the times when they speak about *making* someone equal more often, too.

6.3. Affirmative and negative type forms of [RAVENSTVO]

As previously done with the English category [EQUALITY], in this chapter the [RAVENSTVO] is analysed from the point of view of its affirmative and negative forms.

The same colour code is used in the Figure 10 as in the previous schemes on the topic. What becomes clear from the graph is that similarly to American English, the overall number of negative types in every subcategory was lower than that of the affirmative types. Just like in English the subcategory Result had no negative types. This doesn't mean, of course, that American English or Russian lack the concept for depriving someone of equality. Yet, 'undoing' equality might be conceptualised not by means of a negative action-related construction, but in some other way. This might be for example via introducing a necessary extra action, which should be applied to the object having the property 'equal' or, in broader sense, to the abstract state, a mind- and condition set within a society, which is called 'equality'. In such case the negative forms should be investigated by some other means than those of this research.




Figure 10: Distribution of affirmative and negative forms within the subcategories State, Result (l.) and Property (r.)

The negative types of the subcategory Property varied within the span of 23.14 at its highest peak in the 1820s and 3.84 at its deepest point in the 1930s. This means that on the scale used in the left part of the graph the line representing negative Property-related types would lie somewhere between the two blue trends of State (the average mean of the Property negative being 9.05, that of the State affirmative 10.42 and of the State negative – 5.55).

Affirmative types of the same subcategory were quantitatively prevailing, so it was no wonder that the chart line in this case largely overlapped with the one from the Figure 9. Its qualitative overlap with the negative line, exemplified by the correlation coefficient of

0.58, was moderately marked and pointed at an average positive correlation. Thus affirmative and negative forms coexist and at times appear to rise or fall in popularity together. However, they do not exclude or predetermine each other. This coexistence might be interpreted as a general public interest towards the category as such, but with no causal connection between the negative and the affirmative forms.

There is an interesting thing to be mentioned when speaking about the State [RAVENSTVO]. The English sample for this subcategory had more than three times as many affirmative tokens as negative (17.08 versus 5.30 tokens per mil uses). In case of the RNC the negative State-terms were far more frequent. The overall account within the subcategory was: 11.34 affirmative versus 6.12 negative uses per mil. The search type ‘ravenstvo’ was even more balanced with its negative counterpart (frequencies 7.62 and 5.81, respectively).

The higher percentage of the negative types might have a number of reasons. On the one hand, the conservative autocratic regime in the 19th (the monarchy) and quite similar one in the 20th centuries might have caused a wave of protest *against inequality* and fight *for equality*, which found its way into the public discourse. One more possible explanation is that no regime, no matter how oppressive it is, ever officially declares its reactionary character. The last Soviet Constitution of the year 1976, which was also used as a source text for the RNC, had been full of references to the equality of Soviet citizens and all people and peoples of the Globe. The public discourse of the Soviet era never refrained from using the terms that are commonly perceived as democratic. Equality, freedom and political participation were overtaken from the French Revolution and became the essential part of the public discourse of the USSR.

The sample of this subcategory, as explained above, was composed of the concepts *ravenstvo/neravenstvo* (“equality”/“inequality”), *ravnopraviye/neravnopraviye* (“equalrightness” and its negation) and *ravnoznachnostj/neravnoznachnostj* (“equalimportance” with the negation). The latter pair proved to be quite rare and played a rather marginal role within the subcategory. *Ravnopraviye* on the other hand had a respectable total of 794 instances in the RNC (corresponds with 3.64 tokens per million) in the affirmative form. The sample contained only 62 instances of the negative form *neravnopraviye*, i.e. approximately 13 times fewer than the affirmative forms. The discrepancy in overall numbers, therefore, came from the fact that the term *ravnopraviye* had a strong tendency to the affirmative form and was quite rare in the negative one.

This is why it was interesting to look at the diachronic distribution of the types within the subcategory State also from a slightly modified perspective. The Figure 11 illustrates the development of the three quantitatively significant types within it: *ravenstvo*, *neravenstvo* and *ravnopraviye*.




Figure 11: Diachronic distribution of the 3 significant types for describing [RAVENSTVO] as a State. Figures normalised per mil per dec.

The elaboration of the types in the Figure 13 provides an insight into one more aspect of the category. First, it becomes clear that the concept *ravnopraviye* did not enter the corpus of the Russian language before the 1860s, the decade of the triumph of the civil movement for the abolition of serfdom, the decade of the never finished democratic reforms ‘from above’. It behaved in a partially similar way as its ‘parent’ *ravenstvo*: it showed the rising tendency between the 1860 and the 1870s and a sharp curve up at the decade of the first Russian revolution (1905) and liberal reforms of the 1900s. Interestingly, the frequency of *ravenstvo* in the subsequent decade, the decade of the October Revolution 1917, rather decreased. A possible reason for this might be that political aspirations of the speaker community in the revolutionary Russia progressed from the general wish for equality to a more elaborated wish for equality of civil rights a decade later. *Ravnopraviye* did indeed grow further in the 1910s, so that the overall frequency in this decade overran that of *ravenstvo*. A situation when a more specific term prevailed over the more general one never repeated again within the observed timespan.

It is also interesting that once again there was a sharp reversal of the declining trend of frequencies in the last decade of the sample (2000-2009). This part of the sample provided

data that could hardly be explained in any other way but by the dramatic social and ideological change that had been taking place. Whereas *ravenstvo* and *ravnopraviye* had been growing since the 1970s (a decade of little political change, but high social stability), the presence of *neravenstvo* remained relatively stable. The 1980s were the time of the long awaited political reform in the framework of Perestroika. The end of political censure allowed authors and their descendants to publish texts full of critique of the social conditions and the ruling party. This fact could very well explain the sharp rise in the frequency of *neravenstvo*, paired with further slight rise of *ravenstvo*.

Ravnopraviye at the same time decreased. How is this possible that the society that after more than one and half centuries of political censure finally got the right to perform their rights, failed to speak about the equality of these rights within its members? Was it the first, back then state-sanctioned, contact with the world of Capitalism, was it the economic stratification that affected the popularity of the concept *ravnopraviye*? A peculiar detail is the fact that the dramatic rise in frequencies in broader context of the whole observed timespan is comparable with the levels of the 1860s or the 1890s, a decade before the start of the cascade of revolutions. The rise of actuality and presence in discourse is even more dramatic with regard to its previous, relatively uninterrupted decrease since the 1920s. The Russian society of the 1980s was obviously as interested in matters of equality and inequality – and possibly other basic democratic values – as it has never been since the establishment of the Soviet rule.

The 1990s saw the end of the USSR, the end of its ideologies, the end of the economic stability accompanied by a galloping inflation, bankruptcies, rise of corruption, and criminality. It comes as no wonder that the speakers of Russian seem to have lost their interest in debating the democracy. The political programme had been reached, and the liberal values and liberties proclaimed. The people were no longer haunted by the official clichés of the Soviet *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, neither had they the necessity to activate the conceptual category again and again in course of fighting for its realisation. At the same time they had more important things to do rather than talking about equality – survive the crisis. It is remarkable that the last decade - often called the ‘respectable’ or ‘calm’ 2000s – in the Russian discourse once again saw the rise of the frequencies of all three quantitatively dominant types within the State-related part of the category [RAVENSTVO]. This reversal of the declining trend is a continuous peculiarity of this

category in Russian. Later on we will see if the same phenomenon can be traced down in the category [SVOBODA/VOLYA] as well.

6.5. Vse lyudi ravny – All people are equal in the RNC

The Russian equivalent of the English utterance ‘all people are equal’ is ‘все люди равны’ (‘vse lyudi ravni’). The overall normalised frequency of this phrase within the corpus of the Russian language was more than three times higher than the corresponding value in the American corpus: 2.12 as opposed to 0.60. Slightly more than a half of these types (1.12) revealed no modification, which comprised 53%. This figure in its turn was roughly 10% higher than in the case of the COHA data. Thus the initial expectation that the language of the ‘more democratic’ community would reveal more unmodified, ‘absolute’ types than the one of the ‘undemocratic’ Russians has to be abandoned here.

As in the case of American English, the popularity of the utterance decreased, if the samples of 1810-1909 and 1910-2009 are compared (consider the Table in the Appendix 11.2). However, it is interesting that this downward trend appeared to be slower in Russian. So, the total normalised occurrence of the phrase ‘all people are equal’ in the COHA diminished from 1.32 in 1810-1909 to 0.37 in the following century. The Russian figures, correspondingly, were 2.75 to 1.92 (all normalised within each century with relation to the size of the corresponding century-sample). Similarly, the instances of ‘all people are equal’ with no modification were four times more frequent in the sample of 1810-1909 with relation to the next century in the COHA. The decrease in the RNC was, correspondingly, from 1.49 to 1.00 – a third of uses, i.e. much less than in the American English language.

In the corresponding section of the American English-related part of this comparative analysis I introduced the division of the modifying elements into the following groups: the constructions specifying the Superordinate referent of all people’s equality, those dealing with the Time, Place (direct or metaphorical), those related to Concession or Condition under which the equality becomes possible; the modifying structures providing Negative meaning (‘not all people are equal’ or ‘people are not equal’ and alike). Finally, the rest of the instances is united in the group Other. The results retrieved from the Russian corpus are visualised in the Figure 12 below:




Figure 12: Modification references of the utterance *vse lyudi ravny*

Table 11.2 in the Appendix presents the quantitative data on the use of the utterance over time (between two equally large 100-year chunks) and across the groups mentioned. A brief survey of the table and of the pie chart reveals remarkable similarity of the tendencies in American English and Russian. For example, in addition to the declining trend, both languages showed a very slight rise in Negative modifying elements. In case of American English such structures first emerged in the period between 1910 and 2009. In case of Russian the references to all people *not* being equal occurred in the 19th century's chunk as well and rose slightly in the second period. The Russian results in general revealed a number of very peculiar references to equality. Consider the following examples:

- (5) а) С какую радостью я, переехавши море, увидел в турецком Эпире, куда я назначен был консулом, иную жизнь, — не эту всеобщую истинно проклятую жизнь пара, конституции, равенства, цилиндра и пиджака. (К. Н. Леонтьев. Национальная политика как орудие всемирной революции (1888))

– How strong was my joy when after my appointment as a consul, I have discovered a different life in Epirus: not this omnipresent damned life of steam, constitutionalism, equality, cylinder, and jacket. (K.N. Leontyev, Natsionalnaya politika kak orudie vsemirnoy revolyutsii, ("National politics as a weapon of the world's revolution"). 1888. In *RNC*)

- б) Даже сейчас, ровно через 86 лет, оно поражает чистотой любви к России, не загрязненной ни «свободой, равенством и братством», ни «союзными

обязательствами», ни чем-нибудь иным. (Александр Алексеев. Корнилов и корниловцы (2003) // «Спецназ России», 2003.08.15)

– Even today, 86 years later, it strikes with its pure love of Russia, not stained by ‘freedom, equality, and brotherhood’, nor ‘responsibilities within a political alliance’, nor anything else. (A. Alexeyev. Kornilov i Kornilovtsi, ("Kornilov and Kornilovians") (2003) In ‘Spetsnaz of Russia’ (“Russian special forces”), 2003.08.15. In *RNC*)

с) А вот и другой совет: забудь о равенстве и дай будущему мужу увидеть в тебе «маленькую задумчивую девочку, которую он торжественно поведет за ручку в волшебный мир больших денег». - Лариса Рудова. Гламур и постсоветский человек // «Неприкосновенный запас», 2009

– And here is one more piece of advice from me: forget about the equality and let your future husband discover in you a “small thoughtful girl, whom he will solemnly lead into the magical world of big money” [quotation marks as in the original – AS] (L. Rudova. Glamur i postsovetskiy chelovek, ("Glamour and a postsoviet person"). In ‘Neprikosnovenniy zapas’ (“Emergency ration”), 2009. In *RNC*)

The first two utterances are separated from each other by more than a century and two violent changes of the political regime. As already stated above, these political changes caused a dramatic re-installment of the whole society, its culture and language. Russian taught as a foreign language beyond the former borders of the USSR and spoken by the early emigrés, varies from the language spoken in the ‘core’ of Russia in its vocabulary, grammar, orthography and, possibly, in its value system. Yet, a conservative diplomat of the Tsarist era was obviously as anxious and distrustful in his concern for equality, which he put into the same row with genuinely Occidental capitalist phenomena, as was his colleague from the year 2003. For the Speaker in the second example, the trio of the French Revolution is a stain, a danger to the pure love towards Russia, incompatible with this love.

The third example might appear surprising to a Western liberal observer. However, it represents a vision of gender equality, which is comparatively popular among the female speakers of Russian. Here equality is conceptualised as an unnecessary attribute, which, when its female holder sticks to it, can stand in the way of the holder’s way into the world of big money, i.e. financial success. Instead of pursuing gender equality, an obviously implausible solution for the author of the utterance, one should rather apply the alternative strategy: to allow a man to treat a woman as a little girl and lead her to prosperity (otherwise unreachable, one might presume).

These three examples are no exceptions in the *RNC* and point to an interesting fact. Despite the high quantitative presence of the concepts from the category [EQUALITY] in Russian,

the category contained diametrically opposite value judgements within it. On the one hand there were the numerically dominant uses of [EQUALITY]-terms in the sense known from the COHA. In such cases the authors of the utterances evaluated and elevated the importance of universal equality, the relevance of the category for the human race and often lamented on the lack of [EQUALITY] in Russia. On the other hand, there was a number of instances where [EQUALITY] was regarded as an element genuinely alien to the imaginary construct of the Russian identity. Brought from the Occident, [EQUALITY] together with other values of the French revolution, a bourgeois society and Capitalism, endangered the national identity and had to be abandoned for the sake of Russia's glory. The number of explicitly Negative [EQUALITY]-related modifications was not extremely high, though: 0.02 uses per mil in the 20th century.

The group Condition/Concession, compared to the corresponding utterance in American English, developed in an opposite way. Whereas in the American case the instances of this group halve in the 20th century, in Russian the utterances limiting [EQUALITY] to certain conditions rose from 0.02 in the first period to 0.10 (i.e. five times!) in the years between 1910 and 2009.

Given the political changes we can see the reason why the utterances elaborating the superordinate referent of God sank in its popularity in the 20th century. Apart from the political events, this trend was also observed in the COHA, and might point at some general logic in the Western-minded societies towards more and more atheistic secularism. Unlike in the COHA, the references to physical circumstances (e.g. hunger) as a superordinate rose from 0,02 to 0,07 uses per million in the second observed time-period. The references to the worldly power (e.g. government, or a particular ruler) has decreased between 1910 and 2009.

With regard to the political changes in Russia it might be a plausible idea to distribute the figures provided in the table above among 3 instead of 2 periods. The corresponding table in the Appendices covers three time blocks: 1810 to 1917 (from the agreed start of observation to the Bolshevik revolution), from 1918 to 1991 (the years of the Communist rule) and from 1992 onwards (contemporary epoch).

This redistribution leads to a completely different picture. For example, within the utterances referring to a superordinate power, those speaking of God saw a dramatic decline from 0.39 to 0.11 in the Soviet years and a slight rise afterwards. Keeping in mind the fact

that the pursuit of the religious beliefs and customs was considered anachronistic and shameful, and was often ex- or implicitly punished in the USSR, one might explain the rise of frequencies by both the fall of censorship and the revival of interest towards spiritual matters. Thus Russians have not become more secular, but rather the opposite, as they nowadays are free to explore this previously closed dimension of life. At the same time, the decades of state-pursued rational secularism led to the rise in the frequency of uses of the biological powers as superordinate referents. Whereas there had been only 0.02 uses per mil before the revolution of 1917, this figure tripled in the Soviet era (to 0.06) and continued to rise further afterwards (0.08 in the last period).

The references to the law or worldly powers saw a dramatic fall of uses in the Soviet era. In the first case, Law as superordinate referent made a curve from 0.26 (before 1917) to 0.07 (1918-1991) and, finally, rose to a new peak of 0.38 after 1991. The three corresponding figures for the worldly powers were 0.03/0.01/0.03. The Soviet period presented itself as the culmination of state-driven development of the society, freed from the burden of religious rites and petty bourgeois customs. Despite the fact that the RNC includes the full texts of the Soviet constitutions, which should theoretically boost the frequencies of the utterances within the groups Law and Worldly powers, no such explosion actually occurred. An assumption could be made here that, although the equality of all people before the law or government used to be eagerly proclaimed in public, the discrepancy between the proclaimed and the real states of affairs kept the corresponding utterances from being too popular among a broader circle of speakers.

The negative uses, as we can see from the Table 11.2 (Appendices), only appeared after the revolution 1917. Parallel to this, the use of 'vse lyudi ravny' in context of condition or concession has been growing ever since: if before 1917 it had had the frequency of 0.02 tokens per mil., there were 0.05 for the Soviet era and three times more, 0.17, after the disintegration of the USSR. That is, although taught the idea of the common equality of all people, the speakers of Russian seem to have resisted this idea of all-unifying equality. Of course the 0.17 tokens per million are not only the utterances as in the examples above, in many cases they embrace the sharp social critique against the emerging stratification of the society. It might be claimed that the utterance 'vse lyudi ravny' does not belong to the category of semi-grammaticalised truths, accepted by all, learnt to the level of automaticity and no longer processed as a meaningful unit.

6.6. 'Uravnilovka' and 'rovnya' – Russian terms for negative equality

As mentioned in the section 6.1 above, the Russian language knows two extra terms that are used to refer to [RAVENSTVO] in a negative context. The first one is *uravnilovka* (“equalisation”). This negatively connoted concept refers to the process of making everyone equal and alike regardless of any differences, the implication being that some distinction would be positive.

The term *uravnilovka*, as the RNC shows, emerged Russian in the 1920s, i.e. shortly after the establishment of the Soviet rule. Social, legal and political equality being one of the cornerstones of the Bolshevik agenda, these terms caused not only euphoric excitement, but also a quick public dissatisfaction. One of the many reasons for that might be, for example, the violent practical policies of the new regime against the earlier aristocracy and intellectual elites. The property was considered superfluous and luxurious, and was violently expropriated, destroyed, or its owners were forced to share it by means of the collective use. It is no wonder, therefore, that the type ‘uravnilovka’ entered the language with 0.19 tokens per mil in the 1920s and boosted up to 0.80 in the 1930s, where the equalizing policies continued and resulted in the great famine all across the USSR. The rapid fall out of the discourse in the 1940s (to 0.23 uses per million) corresponded with the peculiarity that was observed in the frequential analyses of [EQUALITY] and [RAVENSTVO] above. In the 1940s *equality* and *ravenstvo* decreased, too. This fact could be connected with the 2nd World War and people being roughly speaking, busy with something more important than disputing on democratic concepts. The term *uravnilovka* came back into fashion in the 1970s (0.89) and reached the peak of its popularity in the 1980s, the years of Perestroika and declared Glasnost (“freedom of speech”) – 2.03 uses per million. In the 1990s it decreased again just to start rising once more in 2000s. Once again there is a picture of this reversed declining trend in the late period of observation.

Rovnya appears to have been present in the Russian language at least since the middle of the 18th century (the farthest diachronic extent of the RNC). Therefore, it is no coinage of any particular state regime. Its frequency is higher than the one of ‘uravnilovka’ (average mean 1.94 against 0.32, respectively), which also points at a longer and better rooted position in the language.

The concept *rovnya* has a mostly negative connotation. Consider the following example:

- (6) Дурак ты, вот что! — засмеявшись, сказала она. — Ты полагаешь, что ты ровня московской царевне? Как же! Пригож ты, правда, да зато глуп же порядком, а глупых мужчин я не люблю. (Е. П. Карнович, 1879, На высоте и на доле: Царевна Софья Алексеевна)

A fool, that is who you are! – she said, laughing. – You consider yourself to be an equal (*rovnya*) of a Moscow Princess? No way! You are handsome, indeed, but quite dumb, and I don't like stupid men. (E.Karnovich, 1879. Na vysote i na dole, ("One the height and in the dale: Princess Sophia Alexeyevna". In *RNC*)

The English translation misses to capture the intertextuality, accessible to advanced and native-speakers of Russian. The negative scepticism of the phrase lives from the negative connotation of the concept *rovnya*, which makes it clear right away, that the speaker (here: the princess), positions herself far above her unlucky suitor.

Seeing oneself as someone's *rovnya* in Russian does not necessarily mean that this assumption is shared and accepted by other party. It is rather a claim, than an actual status. Treating someone as *rovnya* includes an element of a negative judgement: the Agent performs something, which is either superfluous, or senseless, or even insulting:

- (7) Штаны ж ему гладил юркий рыжий солдат, с которым разговаривал он как с ровней, показывая остальным, будто не унижает его, а уваживает. (Олег Павлов. 1996. Дело Матюшина)

And his pants were ironed by a quick red-haired soldier, to whom he spoke as to a rovnya. By this he believed to show the others that he was not humiliating him [the soldier - AS], but was showing him respect instead. (Oleg Pavlov. 1996. Delo Matyushina, ("Matyushin's Case"). In *RNC*).

Rovnya revealed a moderate positive correlation with affirmative State-related [RAVENSTVO] types (Pearson 0.64). The major trait of its frequential fluctuations is that *rovnya* was the only term from the Russian [RAVENSTVO] category which did not decrease, but actually rose in use in the 1940s: from 0.80 tokens per million a decade before to 2.34 just in order to fall once again to 0.72 in the 1950s. The situation is even more remarkable, for no source text within this decade has any political, historical, social orientation. These were merely fiction texts that included *rovnya* here. The types were almost equally distributed between the first and the second half of the decade (9 raw tokens from 1940-1944 and 11 from 1945-1949). It is, therefore, unclear why and how this unexpected rise, which appears to have had nothing in common with the course of the Second World War, took place. *Rovnya* did not have the reverse of the decaying trend in the last decade of observation (2000s), either: instead, it was on its rise in the 1990s and slightly decreased afterwards.

7. [FREEDOM/LIBERTY]

7.1. Normative and conceptual definition

There are two terms that are used for the conceptualisation of the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] in English: *freedom* and *liberty*. The former is clearly of Germanic origin, the latter came to English as a Norman borrowing in the 14th century (see corresponding article in the OED).

An interesting set of hypotheses concerning the conceptualisation of this category in English, Russian and further languages was provided by Wierzbicka. According to her the two concepts – *liberty* and *freedom* – initially were only partly synonymous. *Freedom*, according to Wierzbicka (1997: 129-132), contained not only ‘positive’, but also ‘negative’ meaning: i.e. a *free* person on one hand was free *to* perform what he/she wanted, on the other hand free *from* doing something one didn’t want to do. Due to the fact that the labels ‘affirmative’/‘negative’ have already been used earlier in this thesis (for the differentiation between the grammatical forms stating and negating the concept), I will further on refer to this semantic differentiation in terms of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ meanings.

Further, *liberty* was regarded as a type that had seen a steady decay in English ever since the late 18th century (Wierzbicka, 1997: 132-136). According to Wierzbicka this concept underwent a sharp narrowing of meaning and became an item that was now tied to civil liberties and generally to the legal normative domain. In addition to its frequencies are considered as relatively low (ibid.) *Freedom*, in contrast, became the dominant term within the category. With reference to Berlin Wierzbicka briefly mentions the fact that these two notions, unfortunately, were often used in an indiscriminating manner, interchangeably; which contradicted their original meanings (ibid.).

Such an assumption implicitly stated that the speakers of English used the terms *freedom* and *liberty* in a wrong way and disregarded the inherent differences between these. The prescriptivist character of this assumption is very problematic and questionable. Basically it is clear that that no speaker has perfect language competence. Therefore, potentially, everyone lacks *some* knowledge of the language he or she speaks. Yet the interchangeable use of *freedom* and *liberty* is a pattern that has been used repeatedly by more than one user and over a period of 200 years. Thus it would be logical to claim that a certain shift of conceptualisation might have occurred indeed, rather than that the speakers have been

doing it wrong throughout two centuries. Pledging for what is considered as ‘originally right’ brings a scholar into a dead-end of normative restrictedness.

The Oxford English Dictionary indeed provides definitions for *freedom* and *liberty* that are widely overlapping. Both terms are considered as referring to the state of being free from a restriction of any kind (a physical one, a legal one, such as slavery, as well as a spiritual one, such as sin) (OED, last access on 19.07.15). Both include the normative aspect with the only slight difference. *Liberty* is claimed to refer to a set of civil liberties; *freedom* – to its particular examples (e.g. freedom of speech). A very slight hint pointing at the legal specialisation of the concept *liberty* could be found in the cognate types within the category that referred to the Property or Result.

Liberal might be a very close synonym of *free*, indeed, but at the same time it might be a reference to a political mind-set of ‘liberalism’ which was initially associated with the bourgeois ideal of being free from any legal and class restrictions. ‘Libertarian’, both as an adjective and as a nominalisation of it, refers to the same, yet with the French word ‘libertaire’ taken as a ground. ‘Libertine’ at the same time, although also of a French origin, does not include any political connotation, but rather constitutes a less negatively coloured counterpart for such terms as lewd, or frivolous.

Summing up, the presumed ‘legal’ specialisation of the concept *liberty* can be – if at all – traced down in the Property-related terms, although even here its meaning is not limited to political/legal *liberty*, but is rather supplemented by it. The fact, that a word that initially was a borrowing, has an almost identical applicability as the genuinely Germanic type points at the fact that *liberty* and its cognates has been harmoniously adopted into the corpus of the English language.

The central, most abstract and inclusive meaning of the terms united in the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] can be formulated as something or somebody being entitled to perform certain actions and independent from the constraints of either physical, or legal, or moral nature. Once again if a schematic view of the interrelation between the content and possible forms of expression should be provided, it might be represented as follows:




Figure 13: Conceptual scheme of the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY]

The constitution of the three cognitive grammatical subcategories – State, Property and Result – remained the same as in the previous part of the thesis. The subcategory State, therefore, included the terms: ‘freedom(-s)’, ‘liberty (-ies)’, and the only negative state-form in COHA, ‘unfreedom’. Property-related terms were more numerous and included such types genuinely adjectival ‘free’, ‘freer’, ‘freest’, ‘unfree’, ‘liberal’ etc., as well as words from the other P-o-S that are tied to the Property: ‘liberalism’ (pursuing liberal politics), ‘freemen’ (‘freeman’ had to be excluded, for the majority of results was comprised by proper names, unlike the plural, referring to subjects having a property) etc. Acquisition, in its turn, became the types around the concepts ‘liberalise’ (including ‘liberaliser’) and ‘liberate’ (incl. ‘liberator’, ‘liberationism’ and alike).

7.2. Frequential distribution of [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] in the corpus

In order to be able to get an impression of the diachronic quantitative changes within the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY], consider the table below. Its design and referential points within the corresponding conceptual category are the same as in case of [EQUALITY] and [RAVENSTVO].

	State	Property	Result
1810-1859	294.65	332.02	30.83
1860-1909	173.19	247.81	31.88
1910-1959	141.72	230.02	41.78
1960-2009	113.99	218.19	51.31
TOTAL	160.96	244.22	40.97

Table 3: Frequential distribution of the types of the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] in American English across the timespan between 1810 and 2009 in the COHA

What strikes one's eye at the first sight is the remarkably high numbers of uses per million. Within all three grammatical subcategories the figures for [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] dramatically exceed those of [EQUALITY]. The least difference can be found in the Property subcategory with twice as much [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] tokens, compared to those of [EQUALITY].

The subcategory State here included a rather limited set of types (6 COHA-types). In contrast, the subcategory Property showed an abundance of types from all major Parts-of-Speech (all in all, 21). Yet it is remarkable that the overall numbers of these two subcategories turned out to be not that different at all. In the case of [EQUALITY] these were 9 State and 26 Property types, the former group had 5-6 times fewer tokens for the State than for the Property.

Here, in case of [FREEDOM], the ratio was 1 to 1.5. There are two possible ways to interpret this finding. It is either that the speakers of American English perceive the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] as 'more nominal', with the terms denoting the State being central constituents. This logic would presume that it is implicitly considered more habitual to speak about *freedom* rather than someone being *free*, and speaking about *freedom* is much more habitual than speaking about *equality*. The other way of seeing this situation is the opposite: [EQUALITY] then is perceived as an attributive, Property-tied category. Therefore, concepts relating to State or Phenomenon of *equality* are far less frequent than those relating to *being equal* and than those relating to *freedom*.

Another interesting thing was that the assumption of Wierzbicka (1997, 133-136) – that *liberty* was a term with a very narrow meaning and generally almost extinct – could not be supported by the corpus data. Already a very brief overview of the figures across types showed that from all in all 65269 raw instances of State-related concepts of the category *freedom* and its forms comprised 35235, *liberty* and its forms – 30048. That is, the two forms had a very slight difference in their frequencies of occurrence.

The cognates of *free* were predominant in the semantic subcategories Property (normalised overall frequencies of *free*-cognates was 234.53, as opposed to 9.25 of *liber*-types) and Result (30.12 and 10.78, correspondingly). 46% of all State-related tokens were the *liber*-types (overall normalised frequencies of 86.74 for the *free*-types and 73.97 for the *liber*-types). Almost a half of the tokens should be considered as quite a good result for a concept that presumably was almost extinct.

All in all it can be stated that the speakers of American English seemed to prefer using the *free*-types for describing features and characteristics, but hardly made any difference within the nominal types.

The diachronic distribution of frequencies within the three subcategories of meaning looks as follows:




Figure 14 Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.: The diachronic distribution of the types of the English category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY], elaborated by stems

The fluctuations of frequency between the American English categories [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] and [EQUALITY] happened in different periods of time and thus did not coincide on the temporal axis. Speaking about *freedom* in American English

preceded the 1860s (where [EQUALITY] had its peaks) and was followed by a steady fall out of actuality. The 1930 and 1940s saw a renew rise of popularity of talking about *freedom* or *liberty*, but not about *equality*. Whereas the category [EQUALITY] saw a slight improvement of the trend between the 1990s and 2000s, [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] declined. Of course, there might exist a connection between the two independent categories. For example, it seems logical that the popularity of [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] dropped after the end of the Cold War: one might claim that for a while there was no need to propagate freedom. With the *freedom/liberty* being out of fashion, *equality* might have become a more prominent topic for discussion. However, this interrelation then would have to have been of a very subtle nature, so that it could not be uncovered and investigated by the Corpus linguistics and in particular by the chosen methodology.

7.3. Semantic environment of [FREEDOM/LIBERTY]

It has become clear so far that the concepts liberty and freedom differentiate in their frequency rather insignificantly. However, what if they are semantically different, if they cannot be used interchangeably, but are rather reserved each for a set of specific semantic domains? In order to be able to answer the question, I surveyed the nominal types occurring in the postposition of the phrases ‘freedom of’ and ‘liberty of’. Such a search allowed seeing what types were attracted to the corresponding concepts – and if these types were qualitatively similar or different. The following table provides the list of the 20 most common types and their raw frequencies in COHA:

Freedom of N			Liberty of N		
N	Total (raw)	Norm. freq.	N	Total (raw)	Norm. freq.
Speech	753	1.85	Conscience	196	0.48
Press	458	1.13	Press	179	0.44
Action	408	1.00	Action	114	0.28
Choice	257	0.63	Speech	96	0.24
Thought	240	0.59	Thought	76	0.19
Expression	210	0.52	People	66	0.16
Movement	184	0.45	Subject	48	0.12
Trade	154	0.38	Contract	40	0.10

Seas	124	0.31	Citizen	39	0.10
Will	122	0.30	Country	39	0.10
Religion	121	0.30	Choice	38	0.09
Freedom	120	0.30	Individual	38	0.09
Information	120	0.30	Man	37	0.09
Conscience	117	0.29	Opinion	33	0.08
Opinion	98	0.24	Worship	19	0.05
Worship	81	0.20	Citizens	18	0.04
Act	80	0.20	Men	18	0.04
City	63	0.16	Freedom	14	0.03
Discussion	63	0.16	Mind	14	0.03
People	61	0.15	Others	14	0.03

Table 4: Nominal referents of *freedom* and *liberty*

Apparently, the only serious difference between the two word-lists lies in the frequencies of the types' occurrences. Most of the types repeated in both lists, slightly varying in their frequency ranks. Those that were unique within these top 20 types, such as *will* in the list of nominal referents of *freedom* find their correspondences beyond the top 20 in the further lists of the types of the second list. So, *will* in the utterance *liberty of will* took the position 46 among the most spread collocates.

Almost identical sets of nominal collocates point at the fact that the speakers of American English don't seem to have differentiated between the meaning variations of *liberty* and *freedom*. Therefore, the normative definition, according to which *liberty* was the term reserved for the legal domain – and *freedom* for the rest – might be regarded as refuted. It did not reflect the actual performance of the speakers. In speech *liberty and freedom* appear to have been used interchangeably throughout the whole 200-years timespan. It is true, indeed, that the utterance *freedom of N* was quantitatively more widespread, but this fact alone shouldn't lead to any conclusions about the extinction of *liberty* in American English. On the other hand, the fact that *freedom* and *liberty* have been used interchangeably in this one instance (no matter how salient the phrase might appear), could not be regarded as a claim that these types have developed to a full doublets. However, the differences between the types are obviously too subtle to be noticed in a broad overall picture of the language corpus and for the quantitative method. In order to reveal these one should apply a very

different, rather qualitative methodology with a strong attention to each speaker's personal language choices. This might be an interesting topic for a further research.

7.4. Negative and positive meaning of [FREEDOM/LIBERTY]

At this point of the research I would like to test the last of the research questions: the tendency of the categorical concepts *freedom* and *liberty* to perform either negative or positive meanings within the category. The term 'negative', as briefly mentioned above, refers to such utterances where *freedom* or *liberty* denote a state of not having or not being bound to a certain limitation. So, for example, being 'free *from* fear' means not having fear; 'freedom *of* speech' means the state of not being bound to a limitation of speech. A positive meaning can be found in the utterances when *freedom* or *liberty* denote the legal or physical or moral ability to perform some action or achieve some state. A salient example of such a use is 'freedom *to* do something'. Note that the terms 'negative'/'positive' used for this part of the research don't coincide with the meaning I encode into the binary opposition 'negative'/'affirmative'.

The assumption expressed in 1.3 was that *freedom* would attract positive constructions (structured as 'freedom to INF') rather than negative ones ('freedom of'); and that *Liberty* would behave similarly. In order to test these assumptions I have selected two representative groups for negative and affirmative uses. For the former I searched for all phrases having a structure of: Lemma freedom/liberty + preposition 'from'.

For the affirmative uses I have taken the structure: Lemma freedom/liberty + to + Verb in Infinitive. It was necessary to define the infinitival verb explicitly because otherwise the results would have included instances with NPs such as: 'freedom to the people'.

In order to test the significance and co-relation for the pair of concepts in two particular clauses I have done the 2x2 contingency test. This statistical method allows finding out in how far the two covariant values under similar conditions depend on each other or are if their seeming co-variation is a matter of a mere chance (null hypothesis case)⁵. The left-most part of the following table presents the actual figures, the right-most part one – those that would be there in case if the null hypothesis would be true.

⁵ User-friendly open-access software for 2x2 contingency and further statistic tests, which might be interesting for the linguistic expertise is available at a webpage of the Vassar College, NY, USA. See Bibliography for the link.

		Freedom	Liberty		Freedom	Liberty
Token + from	Actual values	1729	86	Null hypothesis values	990.24	824.76
Token + to + Inf.		1712	2780		2450.76	2041.24

Table 5: 2x2 Contingency table for Freedom of/to and Liberty of/to

The hypothesis regarding the negative orientation of *freedom* stood the test. The 2x2 contingency table shows that, there were twice as many ‘negative’ types of *freedom* (990.24 would correspond the null hypothesis, i.e. no connection, the actual amount was 1729). At the same time, the frequency of the phrase *freedom to N* was significantly below the level expected for the null hypothesis. Thus the results of the Contingency test show that *freedom* indeed attracts the types with which it has a negative meaning. There are also less positive types, than it could be expected.

However, the behaviour of *liberty* proved to be even more surprising. There were only 86 occurrences of negative *liberty* in the COHA and 2780 positive ones. The relation for the validity of the null hypothesis should have been 824.76 to 2041.24. Therefore, it could be stated that *liberty* had a strong tendency towards positive uses – the uses entitling someone with privileges of any kind – and a strong aversion of the negative meanings. The latter tendency was so strong (ten times less than might have been expected), that it might appear reasonable to speak rather about the *rejection* of the negative meanings by *liberty* than about the less remarkable attraction of these negative types by *freedom*.

8. [SVOBODA/VOLYA]

8.1. Conceptual scheme of the category

Similarly to English, Russian has more than one term for defining the concept *freedom*. There are two major variants. The Russian *svoboda* is defined by three main meaning components in Ozhegov & Shvedova dictionary:

- Ability to act according to one's will
- Absence of repressions and limitations, and
- State of not being imprisoned or held somewhere against one's will (Ozhegov & Shvedova Online, last access on 19.07.15).

There is a second term in Russian used to denote freedom: *volya*. This term is reserved for two only partially overlapping concepts: the concept of *will* (in the sense of Latin *voluntas*) and *freedom*. In addition to that there is also the set of types united around the stem *liber*: 'liberalnost' ("liberality"), 'liberalizm', 'liberalniy' (adjective 'liberal') and alike. These terms are closely tied to the notion of political, in particular Occidental understanding of *liberty*. Thus, speaking about someone having a property of being free, a Russian native speaker will never use the adjective 'liberalniy': this one rather means "having a property of treating people and the surrounding reality according to the values of a secular Occidental society". Russian, therefore, discriminates the meanings of the types with the stem *liber* and ascribes them – with a different degree of obligatoriness – to a very specific semantic domain. The major conceptual scheme of the category [SVOBODA/VOLYA] can be visualised as follows in the Figure 15. I consciously excluded the notions with the stem *liber* because the meaning of such words in Russian is largely narrowed down the general categorical meaning to one and only domain, namely that of the political thought. These forms, however, will be included into the quantitative analysis, for the same was the case in American English in the previous section.




Figure 15 Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert.: **The conceptual scheme of the category [SVOBODA/VOLYA] in Russian**

The graph exemplifies a peculiar interrelation between the Russian homonyms *volya* (“freedom”) and *volya* (“will”). The intertwining between these leads to an interesting semantic distribution among the word forms.

Whereas *volniy*, an adjective from *volya*, refers to the Property of someone being free, *nevolniy*, the same word form but with a negation prefix must be translated as “involuntary”. The distinction here is quite fuzzy. On the philosophical level if something happens against one’s will, it surely enough affects the subject’s freedom. Yet, the English *unfree* clearly lacks this semantic element of a will expression. *Unfree* merely means “deprived of freedom”. *Nevolniy* means, additionally to the above, someone being forced to perform an action against one’s will. The concept *bezvolniy* (*bez-* being a prefix that codes the absence of something) has no tie to the [SVOBODA] at all, for it denotes a property of human character: “lacking the power of will”.

Therefore, the Russian understanding of the category [SVOBODA/VOLYA] must be affected by this homonymy and partial overlap of meanings between *volya* (“freedom”) and *volya* (“will”). This assumption is confirmed by the largely interchangeable use of the concepts *bespredel* and *proizvol*. Both notions refer to a state of despotic and unjust arbitrariness, coming from a person or an institution of any level, entitled with authority

and power in a given context. The word *proizvol* has a longer history (traceable beyond the borders of the selected time-period in the RNC) and is a cognate of the concepts referring to *will* (compare to the German *Willkür* and *Wille*). The term *bespredel* is a relatively new word (first occurrences in the RNC date back to the 1970s) and is a coinage of the prefix *bez-* mentioned above and the term *predel* – “limit” in topographic, temporal, or clearly metaphorical contexts. The original adjective *bespredelnyy* most typically refers to vast open spaces, free of any border and limitation. Its application in the new domain, namely that of power abuse, underlines the tie between the volition as a power mechanism and spacious unlimitedness, i.e. freedom. This mutual influence is not present in English.

8.2. Frequential development of [SVOBODA/VOLYA]

The frequential developments within the category [SVOBODA/VOLYA] across the two centuries of observation are, as in any previously treated case, visualised in the table below:

	State	Property	Result
1810-1859	289.06	143.75	70.82
1860-1909	63.32	47.26	14.46
1910-1959	33.20	22.98	10.66
1960-2009	13.56	11.27	4.82
TOTAL	43.43	28.43	11.85

Figure 6: Frequential distribution of types of the category [SVOBODA/VOLYA] in Russian across the timespan between 1810 and 2009 in the RNC

A remarkable difference in power relations between the semantic subcategories could be uncovered here. Whereas in American English the types related to [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] as a Property were numerically predominant, and the same was true in case of the categories [EQUALITY] and [RAVENSTVO], Russian Property of [SVOBODA/VOLYA] appeared remarkably infrequent. This might be interpreted as the preference of the speakers of Russian to talk about the State/Phenomena of *svoboda* and *volya*, but rarely about someone actually being free, i.e. having the Property. A bold assumption might be that a speaking community deprived of the genuine *freedom* for a long time – first due to the institute of

serfdom, later because of the undemocratic regimes, avoided attributing *freedom* to anyone but rather philosophised about the abstract value that it did not possess. This assumption, however, in order to be verified or falsified, needs a completely different research setting and probably does not belong into the domain of Linguistics, but rather into the sphere of Cultural Studies, Sociology, or Psychology.

Such a surprising ‘underdevelopment’ of the Property-related subcategory is also interesting from a different perspective. It has been mentioned in the chapter 7 that a whole set of types, united under the name of *liber*-types (i.e. those having the loan stem ‘liber’) had a peculiar narrow meaning and was presumed to be tied to the political and legal institutes. In Russia these institutes were introduced by or adopted from the European state bodies and philosophies. The *liber*-types were included into the subcategory Property: regardless of a grammatical Part-of-Speech of any given type (e.g. *liberalism*, or, *a liberal*), they are closer tied to the Property (‘liberalism’ being a pursuit of politics that are described as having the property ‘liberal’ etc.). The only *liber*-types that did not join the Property-group are verbal such as ‘liberalizovatj’ (“to liberalise”). Result is a better classification cluster for this type. All in all the subcategory Property was abundant on types, but obviously poor on particular uses of these types.

The Western values encoded into the *liber*-types were treated differently depending on the epoch and particular fashion in the ideology of the time. Sometimes they were regarded as positive adoptions from Europe or at other times as strange and destructive intrusions of the dominant West, that, as perceived by some Russians, sought to subordinate Russia and deprive it of its peculiar identity. Therefore, I have provided an extra graph for the *liber*-types as well. Consider the Figure 16:




Figure 16: The frequential diachronic development of [SVOBODA/VOLYA] across the subcategories State, Property and Result. The *liber*-types from the subcategory Property

Starting with the *liber*-types, their development is characterised by three major rises. Unlike the overall panorama of the semantic subcategories, *liberal*-types hadn't started on the highest point and then decreased later. It is rather that the rise started in the 1830s and continued well into the 1880s. This period embraced the abolition of serfdom, mentioned in the analysis in the Chapter 6. In the broader sense, one might claim, at least a part of this rise of speaking about the 'liberal things' coincided with the reign of the emperor Alexander II (1855-1881), who came down in history with his reforms, both the executed ones and those that remained projects. Another explanation for the rise of the *liber*-stemmed types might be the crystallisation of the whole philosophical and political movement of the Westernisers (Russian: '*zapadniki*') in the 1830s. The Westernisers were a part of the Russian intelligentsia of the 19th century that sought a wider introduction of the Occidental European values and principles to the various spheres of public life of the Russian Empire. It should be no wonder that the concepts such as *liberal*, *liberalism* and alike rapidly gained popularity: even if it was about countering the pro-European reformation and modernisation of Russia, the opponents had to put into words what they fought against.

Following the same logic the fall out the *liber*-types out of popularity after the 1880s might be explained by the start of the reign of conservatively oriented Alexander III and then his son and Russia's last emperor Nicholas II.

The next, much smaller peak of use coincided with the first decade of the Soviet rule in the 1920s. After that the *liber*-concepts decreased and remain rather non-numerous up to the drastic rise in the last decade of observation.

The subcategory [SVOBODA/VOLYA] as a Property, to which the particular case of *liber*-types belongs, had a far more balanced trend pattern. It started as the other two subcategories with rather high figures in the 1810s, from which it dropped gradually in the two following decades. After that the trend line remained relatively stable throughout the whole period of observation, with only slight fluctuations around the 1860s and in the 1950s. The latter decade, interestingly, revealed a decline of all three sub-categorical trends. In the 1950s the speakers of Russian talked about [SVOBODA/VOLYA] as a State, Property and Result of these significantly less than in the preceding and in the subsequent decades.

A similar fall from grace was revealed in case of the State and Result-related [RAVENSTVO]-terms. However, in that case the speakers of Russian at the same time increasingly spoke about equality as a Property. In contrast to that Property in [SVOBODA/VOLYA] followed the general trend and decreased, too. Such a decision of the speakers appears quite enigmatic if one keeps in mind the historical context of the epoch of the Thaw. The Thaw went down in history as a period of bringing the concealed problems to the open discussion, of revealing the cult of Stalin, and of the political and legal rehabilitation of the hundreds of thousands of imprisoned and executed citizens. It is surprising that such an enormous political change has not been accompanied by the quantitative increase in using the concepts from the category [SVOBODA/VOLYA]. Instead of that the increase started in the next decade. Yet it is surprising that talking about [SVOBODA/VOLYA] went on increasing in numbers in the subsequent political epoch of Stagnation, too. Even more surprising is the fact that the frequency fell once again in the 1980s, where one could expect a new rise due to the reformatory ideas of Perestroika.

8.3. Negative and positive meanings of [SVOBODA/VOLYA]

As the last step of this research I would like to provide the empirical data concerning the Genitive and infinitival phrases attracted to the categorical concepts *svoboda* and *volya* (negative and positive freedom). The procedure of data selection and testing has been discussed in the 7.4. The only difference here arose from the fact that Russian, having generally a far more synthetic character than English, does not take a preposition for the

Genitive (relational) phrase after the concept of interest. That is: the ‘negative’ phrase had a structure of: Lemma ‘svoboda’/’volya’ + any type in the Genitive case. The positive form was coded as: Lemma ‘svoboda’/’volya’ + and Infinitive.

The results of the search are provided in the Table 7 which has the same structural composition and logic as the corresponding one from the section 7.4. (see Table 5):

	Actual values	Svoboda	Volya	Null hypothesis values	Svoboda	Volya
Token + Gen		15459	15297		15171.17	15584.83
Token + Inf.	1815	2448	2102.83	2160.17		

Table 7: 2x2 Contingency table for negative and affirmative *svoboda* and *volya*

The hypothetical assumption (see 1.3) was that *Svoboda* would attract more negative utterances, and *volya* – rather positive ones. In the former case it was true, indeed: the null hypothesis value for the utterances with *svoboda* and a relational phrase was slightly lower than the actual one (i.e. there was a slight tendency to attract the semantically negative uses). There were also fewer utterances with *svoboda* and infinitive (e.g., ‘freedom to make something’). In the case of *volya* the intuitive assumption proved to be true, too: there was slight a tendency towards positive uses and against the negative ones. Thus the hypothesis from 1.3 could be proven for the Russian category as well. Compared to American English, however, the positive/negative dichotomy was much weaker. The Russian types, therefore, appear to be very flexible and less specific in their applicability.

9. Conclusion: a contrastive résumé

9.1. Category [EQUALITY]

The comparative analysis of the categories [EQUALITY] and [RAVENSTVO] provided a series of results that make it possible for us now to make a résumé.

The frequency of the types within the American English category [EQUALITY] decreased gradually within all three specified subcategories on the timespan between 1810 and 2009. The frequency curves for each of the defined three subcategories looked relatively stable with few rather smooth fluctuations. The frequencies of such types as *equality* and *equalness*, which I called State-related and considered the cornerstones of the category's semantic content were less numerous than the Property-related types and only slightly exceeded those of Result. This allowed me to presume that the prototypical concepts of the category were not the nominal ones, that would define the axiological value, but rather those that characterised a feature.

The subcategories State and Property both contained relatively small sets of negative types. The constituents of these sets were composed morphologically via prefixation. In both State and Property affirmative and negative types stood in a strong positive correlation with each other (Pearson 0.87 and 0.93, respectively). The subcategory Result had no negative types.

The attempt to support or falsify my assumption concerning the correlation between the proportion of the unmodified utterances 'all people are equal' and the 'absoluteness' of [EQUALITY] in a language community, gave the following results. 43% of the instances of this phrase in the COHA were unmodified, the figure for the timespan 1810-1909 being 45%, for 1910-2009 - 4% less. At the same time, the proportion of the reference to the Superordinate referents of [EQUALITY] increased in the second time period (from 28% to 34%, the medium for the two hundred years being 31%). The time period between 1910 and 2009 revealed the emergence of negatively connoted instances of the utterance *all people are equal*.

Compared to American English, Russian has two more cognate types that stand for the negatively evaluated [EQUALITY]. *Uravnilovka* first emerged in the early days of the Bolshevik rule. The *rovnya* had a regime-independent distribution among all the studied 200 years. Apart from being a negative type *rovnya* was interesting due to its borderline position between two semantic fields that were conceptualised by means of the same word stem *rovn/ravn*. The first semantic field was the one of [EQUALITY]. The second field

embraced the terms conceptualising the flatness, the flatland and alike. There was a partial overlap of these two domains, so that the ascription of a notion to the former or the latter group was unavoidably fuzzy and symbolic. This partial conceptual overlap of the cognates was unknown to the English language, where the meaning of ‘flatness’ is brought to word by etymologically unrelated terms. In addition to that the Russian language also had a separate compound for ‘equality of rights’: *ravnopraviye*.

Unlike in the American English there was no clear decreasing tendency of any of the subcategories of the Russian [RAVENSTVO]. If the semi-century blocks were compared, the figures for the State rather rose, those for Property and Result rose, fell and then rose again. The Russian subcategories of [RAVENSTVO] also revealed a reversal of the falling trend line in the last decade of observation. A possible explanation for the two phenomena above might be the violent change of the political and ideological regime in the country, in which the most part of the language community lived, twice within the observed 200 years. If this explanation should be right, one might expect similar tendencies when comparing the categories [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] and [SVOBODA/VOLYA].

Affirmative and negative types within the RNC revealed a smaller gap in numbers in the subcategory State. Thus if we take proportions as a basis, the speakers of Russian conceptualised the notion of *neravenstvo* more often than the speakers of American English. Unlike in American English, there appeared to be no significant correlation between the affirmative and the negative types’ frequencies in the subcategories State and Property in Russian (Pearson coefficients 0.29 and 0.58 respectively).

Finally, the utterance ‘vse lyudi ravny’ (“all people are equal”) in Russian actually revealed a higher percentage of non-modified (‘absolute’) instances: 53% (although the figure, similarly as in American English, slightly decreased in 1910-2009). Thus, the assumption that the nation with a ‘more liberal regime’ would have a more universal perception of equality and express it by a higher percentage of non-modified phrases, proved to be invalid.

In a further 30% of cases the utterance was modified by a reference to a superordinate power. In American English this was 31%, which made the two nations quite comparable in this concern. However, if American English saw the rise by 6% between 1810-1909 and 1910-2009 (28% to 34%), the Russian occurrences actually decreased by almost the same percentage (34% to 29%) in the respective period. This may lead one to the assumption that

the American society developed its trust in law as a supreme performer of equality, whereas the Russian community lost some of this trust. Similarly as in English, the number of the references to God as a superordinate decreased, too.

Then the data was redistributed not among the equally long 100-year-chunks, but among three time-periods between the major changes of the political regimes (i.e. from 1810 to 1917, from 1918 to 1991 and from 1992 to 2009). The references to God fluctuated between 0.39 at the age of monarchy, 0.11 in the secular and anti-clerical epoch of the Soviet rule, and 0.16 ever since the disintegration of the USSR. Similarly, the references to law as a superordinate changed as 0.26 – 0.07 – 0.38 tokens per million, correspondingly. Those with reference to the biological powers: 0.02 – 0.006 – 0.08. These figures mean, for example, that the equality before God in Russian was more present in the public discourse before the October Revolution 1917 and gained some of its actuality back after the end of Communism. At the same time, biological forces being the superordinate referents rose during the Soviet age, strictly secular and ration-driven and kept rising afterwards.

The most remarkable was the development of the references to law. The utterances like ‘all people are equal before the law/constitution’ or alike were, despite all the government propaganda, very non-numerous in the Communist time. Their explosion of frequency after 1991 might be explained on one hand by the advent of the more liberal and democratic regime. On the other hand, the abolition of the state censorship allowed media and broader audiences problematising the ‘equality before the law’ more freely. For American English, spoken by the language community within a political continuity in the years of observation, such changes are irrelevant.

9.2. Category [FREEDOM]

The categories [FREEDOM/LIBERTY] and [SVOBODA/VOLYA] were included in the research in order to test the extralinguistic assumptions inferred from the previous categorical pair. On the other hand, this pair of categories made it possible to test how further empirical quantitative tools and methods can work on other research questions within a Cognitive project.

The first and the most important difference between the [EQUALITY]/[RAVENSTVO] and [FREEDOM/LIBERTY]/[SVOBODA/VOLYA] was the presence of the second variants for expressing the prototypical categorical meaning in the latter case. Of course,

one might find some further partial synonyms of a different degree of overlap for the former two categories, too. Yet the most general and most immediate concepts for the categorical meaning would be ‘equality’ and ‘ravenstvo’; in the latter case – both offered concepts.

I have claimed that the divergence of meanings between the *freedom* and *liberty* is far less obvious than stated by some scholars. Quantitatively there was very little difference, indeed. The semantic environment revealed the same sets of nominal notions. This doesn’t mean, of course, that *liberty* is no rather-legal-than-anything-else and *freedom* is no more-general term. It merely means that the quantitative data, acquired from a large sample of the actually performed speakers’ decisions did not support this assumption. The only kind of difference revealed by the research concerned the positive and negative meanings of the types *freedom* and *liberty*. Here, indeed, there was a certain discrepancy: whereas *freedom* turned out to have an expected negative character, *liberty* surprisingly showed a very strong affinity for affirmative constructions. The same situation, although to a smaller extent could be traced in Russian on two its State-related concepts.

However, the most remarkable difference lay in the very terms used for the conceptualisation of the categories. The American pair *freedom/liberty* is very different from the Russian pair *svoboda/volya*. The Russian notions include the homonym of *will*, and, accordingly, a whole set of semantic types standing somewhere between *freedom* and *will*. One could argue that the Russian conceptualisation of the domain [SVOBODA/VOLYA] per definitionem contains more volition, more power and more action.

9.3. Methodology

At the final point of this thesis I would like to provide a concluding word on the applicability, advantages and disadvantages of a quantitative methodology in a cognitive linguistic research.

Language as such is both a testable product of human activity and a socially complex and thus necessarily fuzzy tool, a medium for further activity. This complexity of its nature explains a certain reservation, which is still shared by a remarkable number of linguists in what regards empirically testable quantitative methods. Their main argument elevates the language into a position of something genuinely unexplorable, or at least points (reasonably, indeed) to the fact that what is actually performed is not always everything

that is possible or that happens in human minds. True indeed that neither a human soul or mind, nor the means they use are neat statistical variables. Any research will contain fuzziness or it can be refuted as far too reductionist.

It is clear that quantitative procedures can only be helpful to a certain extent. Quantification has a limited use for the interpretation of causes of frequency changes. However, I do believe that the fluctuations as such are best to be tracked down by the quantitative means. The statistical significance of these fluctuations – if they occur just accidentally or if there is some internal logic in it, or if the data possibly co-fluctuate with some other data, too – is also fully in the domain of statistical procedure. At this level, I believe, the Cognitive assumptions can and must be productively combined and tested by the quantitative means.

One of such assumptions was for example the decision to divide the categories not across the Part-of-Speech lines, but rather with relation to their functional and semantic aspects. This approach – being not untypical of the Cognitive paradigm – sometimes appears too theoretical and too vague. A question can be raised by the critics again and again, if the Cognitive approach as such has any serious (that is, usually: empirically testable) basis.

An answer provided by the data of this research would be the following. If there had been no logic in a division as performed here, the corpus data would have presented an endless mess of various data with no logic at all. As the matter of fact, both corpora provided coherent results that correspond with the extralinguistic reality more than occasionally. Even more, in some cases the application of the quantitative procedures has revealed the unexpected co-fluctuations which I personally never expected to find (consider the positive correlation between the affirmative and negative types of State- or Property-related types within the discussed categories). The intuitive assumption might have been rather the opposite: if a certain community starts speaking about e.g. equality more, the antonymic form might be expected to fall out of actuality. The by-product of the empirical method here proved the opposite. Such unexpected findings can serve as a basis for further researches.

But, of course, every quantification has its limits, too. The purely statistical interpretation has little sense if there is no social and historical context, to which the findings can be related. The formulation of the research questions is qualitative, and the data interpretation necessarily stands on the qualitative grounds. Furthermore, in case of frequency fluctuations the historical context explains much, but not everything. Why do some types

change at the decades of relevant political changes, and some lag behind and start changing a decade or two later? In such a case the format of this research finds no answer.

A corpus-specific methodological limitation lies in the differences of corpus design if more than one corpus is used. In some cases these discrepancies can be effectively minimised: I have limited the amount of data in the RNC and thus adjusted it to the size and time frame of the COHA. The sample size differences can be eliminated by the normalisation procedure and re-calculations. Yet if, for example, one wanted to look at all semantic types used in pre- or postposition with, e.g. 'equality', the situation would grow problematic. The COHA provides a list of all possible types and (in form of a table) their frequencies, per decade and total. The RNC, however, gives a whole list of all instances with each possible token of a type. This means that in order to compose a list of possible modifying types, let alone count them in any way, a researcher has to look through all singular tokens offered by the portal. This may be possible in case of very narrow search queries, but a search for modifiers of such a commonly used type as *equality* (some thousands of results) would explode the limitations of any research. As long as the design differences play a role, some research questions have to be necessarily narrowed down, transformed or abandoned at all.

In any case, the combination of the quantitative methodology and Cognitivist assumptions is a promising way of treating certain linguistic hypotheses and questions in a 'genuinely scientific', (that is empirically testable) way and can provide an abundant set of data and a number of interesting unexpected findings.

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11. Appendices

11.1. Sample sizes

COHA			RNC			
Per decade		Per 50 years	Per decade		Per 50 years	
1810	1.181.205.00	54.403.008.00	1810	311.871.23	12.766.917.44	
1820	6.927.173.00		1820	1.123.438.86		
1830	13.774.588.00		1830	2.805.751.26		
1840	16.048.393.00		1840	3.223.311.66		
1850	16.471.649.00		1850	5.302.544.43		
1860	17.054.872.00	98.631.538.00	1860	6.952.894.73	41.008.792.75	
1870	18.562.265.00		1870	8.204.570.56		
1880	20.315.965.00		1880	7.364.002.05		
1890	20.600.843.00		1890	8.602.977.95		
1900	22.097.593.00		1900	9.884.347.46		
1910	22.700.638.00	121.849.785.00	1910	9.454.658.19	58.633.741.77	
1920	25.653.746.00		1920	15.753.661.20		
1930	24.602.615.00		1930	12.433.833.24		
1940	24.347.955.00		1940	8.557.755.90		
1950	24.544.831.00		1950	12.433.833.24		
1960	23.977.232.00	130.617.326.00	1960	11.123.931.54	112.206.138.94	
1970	23.815.191.00		1970	11.245.023.66		
1980	25.315.978.00		1980	9.848.537.62		
1990	27.941.535.00		1990	23.080.763.76		
2000	29.567.390.00		2000	56.907.882.36		
Total	406.232.024.00		Total	219.265.658.00		

11.2. 'All people are equal' - Modification pattern and references within it the phrase in American English and Russian – Even period distribution

	ENGLISH			RUSSIAN		
	1810-1909	1910-2009	TOTAL	1810-1909	1910-2009	TOTAL


No modification	0.60	0.15	0.26	1.49	1.00	1.12
Reference to a superordinate	0.37	0.13	0.09	0.93	0.54	0.65
• God	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.45	0.13	0.21
• Law	0.19	0.04	0.08	0.28	0.22	0.23
• Biological powers	0.09	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.05
• Worldly powers	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.02
• Other	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.13	0.11
Time	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Place	0.17	0.02	0.05	0.26	0.16	0.18
• Direct	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.13	0.06	0.08
• Metaphorical	0.09	0.01	0.03	0.13	0.06	0.08
Condition/ concession	0.11	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.10	0.08
Negative	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02
Other	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.06	0.07	0.06
Total	1.32	0.37	0.60	2.75	1.92	2.12

**11.3. ‘Vse lyudi ravny’- Modification pattern and references within it the phrase -
Distribution according to the changes of political regimes**

RUSSIAN				
	1810-1917	1918-1991	1992-2009	TOTAL
No modification	1.58	1.04	0.84	1.12
Reference to a superordinate	0.85	0.37	0.74	0.63
• God	0.39	0.11	0.16	0.21
• Law	0.26	0.07	0.38	0.23
• Biological powers	0.02	0.06	0.08	0.05
• Worldly powers	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02

• Other	0.08	0.06	0.19	0.11
Time	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Place	0.23	0.14	0.19	0.18
• Direct	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.08
• Metaphorical	0.11	0.01	0.12	0.08
Condition/ concession	0.02	0.05	0.17	0.08
Negative	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.02
Other	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.06
Total	2.72	1.70	2.03	2.10

11.4. Numerical difference between the *liber-* and *free-* stems in the subcategories within the category [FREEDOM/LIBERTY]



11.5. Abstract

According to the principle of linguistic relativity the language and the environment of a given speech community are interrelated and influence each other reciprocally. This thesis investigates the ways how the categories [EQUALITY] and [FREEDOM] are conceptualised in American English and Russian. The main aim of the research is to explore the semantic idiosyncrasies of the language communities in comparison with each other and within each community's socio-political context.

As a result of the corpus research and further analysis of the data it has been found that there is a general tendency of the categorical types in American English to decline in frequency over the last 200 years, whereas in Russian the declining trend is broken and reversed several times. The changes in frequencies find a partial explanation in the historical timeline of the communities.

Furthermore, the corpus data refuted the assumption that the concept *liberty* has a marginal character and is falling out of use. The statistic testing revealed that *freedom* attracts negative and *liberty* positive semantic meanings. The similar differentiation could be traced for the Russian terms *svoboda* and *volya*. There also appears to be a general discrepancy in the conceptualisations of the abstract categorical meanings. American English [EQUALITY] does not contain any overlaps with the category [FLATLAND], the category [FREEDOM] does not overlap with [VOLITION]. Russian proved to have such overlaps. At the same time, the research data disconfirm the assumption that Russian has a less universal character of the selected categories (and thus perceives [FREEDOM] or [EQUALITY] as less universal).

11.6. Zusammenfassung

Folgende Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich damit, auf welche Weisen die Kategorien [EQUALITY] und [FREEDOM], beziehungsweise deren Äquivalente [RAVENSTVO] und [SVOBODA] im Amerikanischen Englisch und in der russischen Sprache konzeptualisiert werden. Der Hauptfokus liegt somit auf dem Erforschen der semantischen Idiosynkrasien der zwei Sprachgemeinschaften verglichen mit einander und innerhalb der eigenen sozialpolitischen Kontexte.

Die durchgeführte Forschung und Datenauswertungen offenbarten eine sinkende Frequenz der kategorischen Begriffe im Amerikanischen Englisch, während das Russische keine solche Tendenz, aber eher eine starke Fluktuation der Daten aufwies. Die Veränderungen der Wort- und Typfrequenzen können im Rahmen der Arbeit teilweise durch historische Ereignisse erklärt werden, die die Sprachgemeinschaften in der Zeit zwischen 1810 und 2009 prägten.

Die Datenanalyse konnte außerdem die Idee widerlegen, dass das Konzept *liberty* nur mehr einen marginalen Charakter besitzt, auf eine spezifische semantische Domäne eingeschränkt ist und langsam aus dem Sprachgebrauch gerät. Die statistischen Daten zeigten außerdem, dass das Konzept *freedom* eine Affinität für – und das Konzept *liberty* eine Abweisung von der negativen semantischen Bedeutung zeigt. Eine ähnliche Differenzierung der Synonyme konnte auch anhand des russischen Paares *svoboda* und *volya* festgestellt werden.

Es besteht eine generelle Diskrepanz in der Weise, auf die die Kategorienpaare in ihren Sprachen konzeptualisiert werden. So beinhaltet die englische Kategorie [EQUALITY] keine semantische Überdeckung mit der Kategorie [FLATLAND] („Ebene“), die englische Kategorie [FREEDOM] – mit der Kategorie [VOLITION]. Für die russischen Äquivalente der Kategorien war dies der Fall.

Zugleich widerlegten die Forschungsdaten aber die Behauptung, dass das Russische einen weniger universellen semantischen Charakter der Kategorien hat.

11.7. Lebenslauf

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Interessen und Schwerpunkte der Forschung im Bereich Sprachwissenschaft:

- Cognitive Linguistics (Kognitive Sprachwissenschaft)
- Sociolinguistics (Soziolinguistik)
- Discourse Studies and Discourse Analysis (Diskursanalyse)