



universität  
wien

# MASTER THESIS

Titel der Master Thesis / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Global governance and environmental policy“

verfasst von / submitted by

Michael Authried

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of European Studies (M.E.S.)

Wien, 2016 / Vienna, 2016

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /  
Postgraduate programme code as it appears on  
the student record sheet:

A 992 959

Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt /  
Postgraduate programme as it appears on  
the student record sheet:

Europäische Studien / European Studies

Betreut von / Supervisor:

Doz. Dr. Wolfgang Mueller

# CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	1
1. INTRODUCTION .....	2
2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE .....	3
2.1. Definitions .....	5
2.2. Historical Origins .....	8
2.3. Theoretical Roots .....	11
2.4. Actors.....	13
3. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE.....	14
3.1. The International Force Awakens – Efforts Of The International Community .....	15
3.2. Regional Efforts .....	28
3.3. States In International Regimes .....	31
3.4. Think Global, Act Local – Local Actors.....	34
3.5. The Rise Of Ngos.....	36
3.6. Private Sector .....	39
4. CASE STUDY: AGENDA 21.....	45
4.1. Agenda 21 And Global Governance .....	45
4.2. Building Process And Implementation .....	47
4.3. Success Or Failure?.....	48
5. CASE STUDY: GLOBAL MARSHALL PLAN.....	51
5.1. The Eco-Social Market Economy .....	52
5.2. Five Pillars Of The Global Marshall Plan.....	55
6. MAJOR CHALLENGES.....	58
6.1. Structures Of International Organizations .....	58
6.2. Democratic Deficit .....	61
6.3. Hegemonic And Unilateral Tendencies .....	63
6.4. Capturing The South .....	64
6.5. Proliferation And Coherence .....	65
6.6. Analogy Traps.....	66
CONCLUSION.....	68
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	70

## ABSTRACT

Auf der Suche nach Wegen, globale Herausforderungen zu bewältigen, und in der Frage nach der Regierbarkeit einer globalisierten Welt, bietet sich global governance als eine Antwort an. In dieser Arbeit wird das Konzept näher diskutiert und dabei auf dessen historische sowie theoretische Wurzeln eingegangen. Im Fokus stehen dabei die Entwicklungen nach 1945. Durch die Einbeziehung verschiedener Akteure auf verschiedenen Ebenen widerspricht global governance den Grundgedanken der realistischen Schule in den internationalen Beziehungen und orientiert sich am Liberalismus. Gleichzeitig ist global governance durch die Vielfalt der Akteure und unklaren Strukturen ein sehr komplexes und schwer überschaubares Konstrukt. Um das Konzept anhand eines Anwendungsbeispiels greifbar zu machen, wird in dieser Arbeit das Politikfeld globale Umweltpolitik herangezogen und werden die Anstrengungen verschiedener Organisationen und Akteure auf, über und unter der nationalstaatlichen Ebene beschrieben. In einem weiteren Schritt konkretisieren die Fallstudien der Agenda 21 und des Global Marshall Plans die Strukturen und Ambitionen des Konzepts. Durch die Einbeziehung verschiedener Probleme und Herausforderungen wird das Verbesserungspotential von global governance thematisiert. Insbesondere veraltete Strukturen internationaler Organisationen, demokratische Defizite und die Beteiligung von Entwicklungsländern erweisen sich als zentrale Stolpersteine.

Global governance is a contingency measure for worldwide problems in a globalized world. This thesis discusses the concept of global governance including its progress and historical as well as theoretical roots, thereby concentrating on the developments since 1945. Global governance contradicts the Realist perception by combining a variety of actors on different levels in a seemingly vast and complex, rather Liberalist approach. To facilitate the understanding of the approach, this paper illustrates global environmental governance including the efforts of different organizations and actors at above and below the national level. In the attempt to clarify the structures and ambitions of the concept, the case studies of the Agenda 21 and the Global Marshall Plan are included providing a more tangible perspective on the field. By addressing several challenges, the thesis acknowledges the potential for improvement. Outdated structures of international organizations, democratic deficits and the involvement of developing countries prove to be major obstacles to the approach.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Globalization has triggered positive as well as negative consequences for mankind and confronts world society with great international challenges in various areas. The global dimension of issues like climate change, worldwide diseases and epidemics, or nuclear security impairs the prospects of successful national approaches. Coping with problems that transcend national borders demands a code of conduct leading to worldwide cooperation of different systems. Recognizing this necessity, the approach of global governance has emerged in the last decades, a concept striving for answers to unsolved global issues.

This thesis examines how global cooperation in favor of combating international threats can be achieved through global governance and investigates the question of how far actors on different levels are involved in the process to achieve such cooperation. The fact that this issue leads to different methods depending on the underlying theoretical perspective is considered. However, the thesis is based on applicable theoretical assumptions supporting the concept of global governance. Because of the global dimension and the severe impact of global environmental degradation, efforts towards climate protection are analyzed more closely, examining existing structures of global environmental politics and law. This analysis aims to demonstrate the vast and complex structure of global environmental governance as well as the variety of efforts taken by different organizations. Considering conventional approaches that focus on the state level cannot solve global environmental problems, the relevance of global governance in general and global environmental governance in particular is obvious.

The concept of global governance follows a new perspective of international relations. This is highly relevant for Europe and the European Union for several reasons. European countries and their pursuit of welfare are far from being uninvolved in evoking environmental problems, but the EU in particular has ambitious goals and programs that favor environmental protection. The experiences the Union has gathered as a supranational organization can be valuable contributions to the evolution of global governance and within the concept the EU is an essential regional actor.

The purpose of the thesis is to emphasize the increasing need for global solutions. Especially environmental issues need to be addressed worldwide. In light of the complexity and intangible structure of the global governance approach, this paper aims to contribute to its comprehensibility. By considering major challenges and criticisms, potential for the improvement of the approach is illuminated, which possibly contributes to its efficiency in future. Due to its relevance and spread, global governance is addressed in numerous scientific papers, publications and books. The contributions by Messner and Nuscheler are central to the global governance discourse. The German political scientists inter alia address its political genesis, its theoretical roots, global governance research and challenges for the concept in the report *Das Konzept Global Governance: Stand und Perspektiven*. Achim Brunnengräber, another political scientist focusing on international relations, has intensively dealt with global governance in the context of environmental and climate policies. Together with Heike Walk, an expert in the field of environmental policy research, he published the book *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, which highlights the application of Global Governance to address the challenges of multi-level perspectives in environmental policy. When examining the efforts of international organizations, their reports, resolutions, conventions, and other published documents are important. In the environmental field,

especially the outcomes of environmental conferences of the United Nations are pertinent. The mentioned sources, among others, are consulted in this thesis to examine the formulated research questions within the scope of a literature analysis.

To capture the notion and basic assumptions of global governance, a globalization discourse including its consequences is followed by different definitions of global governance (chapter two). In addition, the chapter includes an overview of its historical roots to characterize the major milestones in its development, which are closely linked to underlying theoretical assumptions. Also, an overview of actors involved is given. Chapter three analyzes the concept by means of global environmental governance. The developments in this field as well as the cooperation and efforts of different actors are accompanied by an illustration of different interacting levels. The case studies of the Agenda 21 (chapter four) and the Global Marshall Plan (chapter five) intend to clarify the approach and its implementation in practice. The Agenda 21 is an action plan adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 1992, constituting a good example of the involvement of local authorities and non-governmental actors, while the Global Marshall Plan is an attempt by civil actors to concretize the complex structure of global governance, promoting the implementation of an eco-social market economy as a milestone towards sustainable development. Finally, a selection of major challenges the concept faces is listed, indicating areas with need for future action.

## 2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

A Kenyan saying suggests that “one finger alone cannot even kill a louse”. As simple as that phrase seems, it very well captures the tenet of global governance in a nutshell. In light of increasing global interdependence in different areas like economy, politics, culture, environment and global problems associated therewith, it seems rather improbable that a single actor by itself is capable of “killing the louse”.

Changes in these areas are evident and closely related to the phenomenon of globalization. In our globalized world, political, economic, cultural and social events have become increasingly interconnected, and societies are affected increasingly and more extensively by their consequences.<sup>1</sup> This interconnectedness and the resulting possible positive effects come at a high price. It can be argued that the possibility of exporting goods to developed country markets may have generated higher income for developing countries. However, the over-use of resources and increased trade have evoked negative consequences, especially for the environment. Even though the relationship between environmental degradation and globalization is multifaceted and in some cases contradictory, globalization has in fact encouraged the relocation of industries, population movement towards cities and increasing levels of consumption, thus raising the levels of emissions of effluents and waste gases. Similarly, ever-freer trade contributes to environmental pollution by increasing levels of shipping.<sup>2</sup>

The remarkable increase of publications dealing with the topic as well as strong media attention since the 1990s have seemingly made globalization a relatively new phenomenon.<sup>3</sup> Baylis et al. mention 9/11

---

<sup>1</sup> John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), p. 8.

<sup>2</sup> John Vogler, ‘Environmental Issues’, in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), p. 352.

<sup>3</sup> Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson, *Globalization - a Short History* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005), p. 1ff.

including the subsequent war in Afghanistan and the controversial attack on Iraq 2003 followed by insurgency and civil war as examples of how globalized today's world is. These events involved international coalitions and transnational violent networks that linked actions in apparently unconnected regions of the world.<sup>4</sup> In fact, historians argue that the origins of globalization can be traced back over hundreds of years. Worldwide connections can already be found prior to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, for example in the form of empires such as the British. According to Osterhammel and Petersson, the essential factors when considering empires as worldwide actors were consolidation, religion, long-distance trade and mass migration of populations.<sup>5</sup> Moving on in history, the industrial revolution and the French revolution of 1789 were essential events in the context of the development of globalization. Their implications did not only shape the second half of the 18<sup>th</sup> century but they have also decisively contributed to establishing an interconnected world. On the one hand, the French revolution introduced a new age of political order in Europe and consequently throughout the world. On the other hand, the industrial revolution, although it did not immediately change intercontinental economic relations, it inter alia induced great progress in transportation, a crucial factor for globalization. In particular, the use of steam energy to mechanize movement enabled transportation of mass commodities over long distances.<sup>6</sup> As a result of technological and political factors, numerous economic relationships were established worldwide. A trade volume 25 times larger in 1913 compared to 1800 illustrates the growing economic interdependence.<sup>7</sup>

The increasing worldwide Interconnectivity accelerated by new inventions can be further described in the beginning 20<sup>th</sup> century. For example, the first motorized flight was performed in 1903. When the South Pole was reached in 1911, the whole world was eventually explored and charted.<sup>8</sup> This indicated an important feature of globalization: The world had become smaller, thanks to the simplicity and pace with which people, goods and information cross large distances, and increasingly interrelated. The thesis that globalization is not a new phenomenon can be illustrated by US economist Richard Ely when he already pointed to the imminent end of the phase of nationally organized economies in 1903, which would be followed by a global economy. The process of globalization in the form of worldwide merging of markets, companies, knowledge, cultures, and global trade of goods and capital was apparent at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Multinational establishments already existed. The Siemens family at that time owned 30 production sites around the world and controlled electricity, tram and lighting companies from Argentina to Russia. Furthermore, new communication and transport arteries turned uncivilized regions into lucrative centers of growth.<sup>9</sup>

Despite all the arguments in favor of a long tradition of globalization, not every aspect of globalization can be traced back so long in history. On the one hand, it can be argued that not only the media presence and academic awareness have increased in the last decades and thus lifted the term to a significant modern catchword but also that globalization has become increasingly evident within all the mentioned spheres. Changes or crises, respectively, in one world region often evoke impacts on the whole planet.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Baylis, Smith and Owens, p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> See Osterhammel and Petersson, p. 31ff.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 57ff.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 77f.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 83.

<sup>9</sup> Harald Schumann and Christiane Grefe, *Der Globale Countdown: Gerechtigkeit Oder Selbstzerstörung - Die Zukunft Der Globalisierung* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2008), p. 9ff.

<sup>10</sup> Anthony McGrew, 'Globalization and Global Politics', in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), p. 16.

On the other hand, the perception of globalization and its consequences to a large extent depend on the underlying theoretical perspective. Smith et al. mention four main theories, each of which focuses on different aspects of world politics. **Realists** acknowledge that increased interconnectedness between economies and societies potentially make them more dependent on one another. Nonetheless, the same effect does not apply to the states system. States' struggle for sovereignty and political power is not terminated by globalization. The threat of the use of force and the balance of power remain important cornerstones of the international political system. Differently, **Liberals** interpret globalization as "the end product of a long-running transformation of world politics"<sup>11</sup>. From a liberalist perspective, globalization clearly contradicts the Realist perception of international relations since states cannot prolong their position as sole central actors. Instead, numerous actors, including non-state actors, have gained importance. Driven by changes in technology and communication, new patterns of world political relations have emerged, characterized by increased interconnectedness between societies. The **Marxist** theory does not accept the novelty of globalization and rather describes it as the latest stage in the development of international capitalism. Thus, globalization is a Western led phenomenon. Instead of assimilating the world's population, it contributes to the divergence between the core, the semi-periphery, and the periphery. However, there is no remarkable effect on world politics. Finally, the **Constructivist** theory, sometimes described as being an inter-paradigm debate between the other three theories, asserts that "globalization tends to be presented as an external force acting on states, which leaders often argue is a reality that they cannot challenge"<sup>12</sup>. Constructivist theorists interpret this depiction as a political act, since it allows leaders to circumvent responsibility by referring to "the way the world is" instead of actively encountering and frame globalization. Advocates of the theory are convinced that globalization can be shaped in a multitude of ways offering opportunities to create cross-national social movements supported by technological improvements.<sup>13</sup>

Following a rather Liberalist argumentation, the former Commission on Global Governance recognized another change in globalization, that in a further step is essential for the global governance concept. At the time when the United Nations were established, states had been very dominant; governments were trusted and entrusted to ensure the protection and well-being of their citizens. It seemed that states were without competition on the global political stage.<sup>14</sup> This is not true for the world in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In times of globalization, problems assume global proportions and thus pose a fundamental requirement for global governance.

## 2.1. Definitions

The complexity of global governance is reflected by the varying existing definitions of the term. The abovementioned core idea that single-handed solution approaches to global problems are not promising is incorporated in the definition of the *dtv-Atlas Politik*. The idea of international cooperation of a multitude of actors at various levels is seen as the leitmotiv to compensate for decreasing problem-solving competences of nation states. Concurrently, attempts of inter- and transnational cooperation, coordination and collective decision-making are integrated in the approach to contribute to the (re-)strengthening of capacities and problem-solving abilities of the international system.<sup>15</sup> Similarly,

---

<sup>11</sup> Baylis, Smith and Owens, p. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Andreas Vierecke, Bernd Mayerhofer and Franz Kohout, *Dtv-Atlas Politik*, 4th ed. (München: dtv Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2015), p. 243.

Thomas Weiss, director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, describes global governance as “collective efforts to identify, understand or address worldwide problems that go beyond the capacity of individual States to solve”. He includes different mechanisms, relationships and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations in his definition, “through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, rights and obligations are established, and differences are mediated”.<sup>16</sup>

The Commission on Global Governance noted that governance on the global level in the past was viewed as intergovernmental relationships, while in modern days actors other than states need to be involved. Governance is described as “the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs”. The term relates to “formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest”. The Commission emphasizes the process character of the concept, through which controversial or different interests can be balanced and cooperative acting might be initiated. By definition, its depiction as a process is underlined by the fact that there is neither a single model nor form of global governance, nor a single structure or set of structures. In reality, the concept is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances. “Effective global decision-making thus needs to build upon and influence decisions taken locally, nationally, and regionally, and to draw on the skills and resources of a diversity of people and institutions at many levels.”<sup>17</sup>

Due to the inclusion of several levels, global governance is considered as a form of multi-level governance.<sup>18</sup> Within the social sciences, the latter is increasingly seen as an analytical tool and starting point for theory development, as well as illustrating necessary approaches to the social reality. Nation states are not only enmeshed in an ever stronger net of domestic and transnational negotiating relationships but they must also include non-governmental and commercial policies in global governmental activities, besides state policy. By definition, not only global governance but also superiorly multi-level governance indicates a new way of governing characterized by a multi-level character, internationalization of statehood, and plurality of actors.<sup>19</sup>

With respect to the distinction of the two terms, some authors notice that the multi-level designation is commonly used in discussions about the European political system, while global governance dominates debates about international governing. However, the demarcation is not always perfectly clear and the argumentation overlaps.<sup>20</sup> On the European level, the idea of multi-level governance has experienced significant conceptual development beyond administrative issues along with the progressive integration within the European Union. The approach considers that national political processes do not happen independently of European processes of policy making but power and competences are spread between the planes. It has become almost impossible to clearly separate tasks. Decisions are increasingly

---

<sup>16</sup> *Definition of Basic Concepts and Terminologies in Governance and Public Administration* (New York: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 5 January 2006), p. 4.

<sup>17</sup> Commission on Global Governance, p. 2ff.

<sup>18</sup> Michael Zürn, ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’, in *Handbook on Multi-Level Governance*, ed. by Henrik Enderlein, Sonja Wälti, and Michael Zürn (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2010), p. 80ff.

<sup>19</sup> Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk, ‘Der Mehrwert Der Mehrebenenbetrachtung’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007), p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> Heike Walk, ‘Demokratische Herausforderungen Für Multi-Level-Governance’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007), p. 33.



negotiated, taken and coordinated between the European and national levels. As a result, the increased need for coordination between the various levels has led to a gain in importance of new actors and actor constellations. Multi-level governance acknowledges this development by facilitating the analysis of the distribution of power and competences as well as of the interdependences between local, regional, national and European organizations.<sup>21</sup> It can thus serve as a pattern, concept and theoretical approach to describe political processes, which cross national borders and policy fields of collaboration of state and non-state actors using traditional as well as developing novel instruments. Besides the analysis of the European political system, multi-level governance is generally of value for the consideration of transnational relations, linking the everyday world with global policy and the analysis of North-South relations.<sup>22</sup>

One reason that multi-level governance is often correlated with the European multi-level system or the European Union is that the latter is a particular system located somewhere between an international organization and a federal country. Thus, the EU is a combination of different elements that are typical of the multi-level system.<sup>23</sup> In contrast to international decision-making procedures, in which consensus-oriented decisions of participating governments are dominant, a formalized preparatory process takes place.<sup>24</sup> Essential characteristics of the EU as an intermediate system are the specific institutional anchoring of national and European actors. While the European Commission possesses the right of initiative, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice are peculiar compared to other international institutions in the sense that they are not bound to national institutions but rather have a European orientation. In contrast, institutions like the Council of Ministers are non-national European decision-making arenas in which national interests are negotiated. Generally, the multi-level system illustrates the fact that different and (according to the logic of nation states) territorially defined decision-making levels exist in conjunction with one another.<sup>25</sup>

The definitions and characteristics of global governance (or multi-level governance on a superordinate level) mentioned so far indicate that the approach promotes governing above and below the national level. Thus, global governance conceptually needs to be clearly differentiated from global government as the interpretation of the latter rather suggests a worldwide bureaucratic authority. This distinction is inter alia included in the definition of the former Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics:

*“LSE Global Governance understands global governance not as government but as a minimum framework of principles, rules and laws necessary to tackle global problems, which are upheld by a diverse set of institutions, including both international organisations and national governments.”*<sup>26</sup>

The difference between governance and government is analyzed in *“Governance without government”* by Rosenau and Czempiel. According to Rosenau, both expressions refer to purposive behavior, goal-driven actions and systems of rule. While government is based on formal authority and police powers

---

<sup>21</sup> Brunnengräber and Walk, ‘Der Mehrwert Der Mehrebenenbetrachtung’, p. 17f.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 19f.

<sup>23</sup> Daniel Bongardt, ‘Multi-Level-Governance Und Europäische Umweltpolitik’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007), p. 51.

<sup>24</sup> Brunnengräber and Walk, ‘Der Mehrwert Der Mehrebenenbetrachtung’, p. 18.

<sup>25</sup> Bongardt, p. 51f.

<sup>26</sup> Website London School of Economics, ‘Centre for the Study of Global Governance’.

to insure the implementation of policies, governance premises on shared goals that are not necessarily enforceable.<sup>27</sup>

The German political scientists Messner and Nuscheler have been dealing with the concept of global governance intensively and inter alia have addressed the divergence in interpretations and recommendations for problem-solving. In spite of all the differences, they recognize a common objective: the development of institutional instruments and paths towards a cooperative combat of worldwide problems as well as towards political organization of globalization. In other words, the goal and purpose of global governance is to develop an institutional and regulation system and new mechanisms of international cooperation that allow for continuous problem-solving of global challenges and cross-border phenomena.<sup>28</sup>

## 2.2. Historical origins

The origins of global governance can – similar to the those of globalization – be traced back far in history. This thesis, however, focuses on the crucial developments in international relations beginning with the 20<sup>th</sup> century. These include the experiences from the two world wars, from which an increased interest in international cooperation emerged. This resulted in the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 with the idea of world peace and the United Nations in 1945 along with its system of collective security. In terms of the core idea to statutorily regulate international relations and propagate interactions between member states, particularly in the years after World War II, numerous organizations und programs were established, some of them in the UN framework, within which states pursue common objectives. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 1946, the World Health Organization (WHO) 1948, the International Labor Organization (ILO) 1917 - since 1946 under the UN umbrella - and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 as a precursor of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are examples of special organizations within the United Nations founded in the post-war years.<sup>29</sup> On the European level, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 1948 was founded to help implementing the Marshall Plan. The organization was later reformed into the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1961. Intensifying efforts for economic cooperation resulted in the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC represents the starting point of the European integration with the signing of the Paris treaty in 1951. On the global level, however, the East-West conflict dominated international relations from the 1950s and damped the perspectives of international cooperation for the following centuries.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, many global problems reemerged, having been previously overshadowed by the ideological conflict. Additionally, a new scope of action for the United Nations arose, followed by a noticeable increase in international cooperation in the 1990s and 2000s.<sup>30</sup> In June 1992, for example, an earth summit of the United Nations was held for the first time in 20 years, followed by further world conferences. New communication and information technologies fostered the increasing international interdependence. Nevertheless, the increasing international cooperation in

---

<sup>27</sup> James Rosenau, 'Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics', in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), p. 4.

<sup>28</sup> Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler, *Das Konzept Global Governance - Stand Und Perspektiven*, INEF Report (Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden der Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2003), p. 3.

<sup>29</sup> Website 'Global Governance Seit 1945', *Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung*.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

those years was accompanied by a debate about the governability of the world under the conditions of globalization. Symbolically for this discussion, in 1994, the political scientist Yehezkel Dror raised the question to the Club of Rome, a global think tank founded in 1968: “Is the earth still governable?” His answer was that it was not governable with the traditional methods and instruments originating from the heritage of the Westphalian state system<sup>31</sup>, which had sealed the central role of nation states in international relations in the following centuries.

Political complexity, frequent violent conflicts in the geopolitical periphery, growing social inequalities and ecological crises substantiated the demand for a new world order that was supposed to propose solutions which the conventional diplomatic ad hoc crisis management had not been capable of yielding.<sup>32</sup> The absolute sovereignty of nation states began to totter not only due to the European integration process but also due to new actors on the international stage, increasing restriction of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs (e.g. humanitarian interventions, international criminal courts) and not least because of new global challenges beyond national borders (like ecological problems, terrorism).<sup>33</sup> Aside from the frequently claimed strengthening of the UN system, it was not clear how globalization could be organized across national borders. In this question, global governance offered a normative guideline.<sup>34</sup>

However, the vision of multilateral cooperation culture did not only emerge with the end of the Soviet Union. According to the British historian and political scientist Paul Kennedy, the idea of a universal association of humankind goes back hundreds or even thousands of years, ranging from Chinese philosophers to Catholic theologians in the middle ages proposing some form of universal governance and Immanuel Kant’s perpetual peace in 1795.<sup>35</sup> Interestingly, Kant’s idea is included in the UN Charter of 1945.<sup>36</sup> During the East-West conflict, the North-South Commission can be highlighted as an example of the various attempts and forms of international cooperation. Chaired by the former German chancellor and head of government Willy Brandt, the Commission attempted to breathe fresh life into *Weltinnenpolitik*. The term had already existed in the 1970s but its core idea of diffusing the North-South conflict through a global peace and development policy soon fell victim to the cold war. The ambitious efforts also shattered as a result of the resistance of economically powerful countries to open themselves to the new world economic order.<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless, Willy Brandt made a clear statement in his introduction of the Brandt report 1980, in which he pleads for the internationalization of solutions to threats and challenges of globalization:

*„Ob es uns passt oder nicht: Wir sehen uns mehr und mehr Problemen gegenüber, welche die Menschheit insgesamt angehen, so dass folglich auch die Lösungen hierfür in steigendem Maße internationalisiert werden müssen. Die Globalisierung von Gefahren und Herausforderungen [...] erfordert eine Art ‚Weltinnenpolitik‘, die über den Horizont von Kirchtürmen, aber auch über nationale Grenzen hinausreicht.“*

*Willy Brandt, 1980<sup>38</sup>*

---

<sup>31</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 3.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Website ‘Global Governance Seit 1945’.

<sup>34</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 3.

<sup>35</sup> Paul Kennedy, *The Parliament of Man*, First Vintage Books ed. (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2007), p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 4.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Willy Brandt, “Das Überleben Sichern” - Die Einleitung Zum Nord-Süd-Bericht’, 2013, p. 46.

Another prominent pioneer for the global governance concept is the report presented by the UN World Commission on Environment and Development, or the “Brundtland Commission” named after the Norwegian politician Gro Harlem Brundtland, who chaired this commission in 1987. The report addressed the deteriorating global environmental crisis and not only introduced the principle of sustainable development but also underlined the necessity of worldwide and cooperative solutions. The ideas were applied at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro 1992 and were concretized in the subsequent Agenda 21 and international conventions (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC, the Convention on Biological Diversity CBD, and Convention to Combat Desertification UNCCD).<sup>39</sup>

The 1990s were of great importance for the developing process of global governance. The world conferences and world commissions in this decade referred to “global commons” as a basis for global actions. According to the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the term refers to “resource domains or areas that lie outside of the political reach of any one nation state”.<sup>40</sup> Following this definition, international law acknowledges four concrete global commons: the high seas, the atmosphere, Antarctica and outer space. In the past, reaching resources found within these areas was a rather challenging task. At the same time, they had not been considered as scarce. Later on, progress in science and technologies facilitated access to resources in global commons, evoking increased activities in these resource domains and thus raising the demand for control and regulation.<sup>41</sup> In a more abstract way, global commons can also be interpreted as joint vital interests of mankind.<sup>42</sup> In that sense, new constellations of actors formed, indicating that states could no longer act in diplomatic exclusiveness regardless of the consequences, as had happened at the Congress of Vienna in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. As Messner and Nuscheler stress, states no longer possess the monopoly for shaping international relations.<sup>43</sup> The congress of Vienna, however, can also be cited as an example of taking on European and, in fact, global challenges, considering discussions about a European army and the abolition of slave trade.<sup>44</sup>

In the formation process of global governance, three further reports must not be neglected. Firstly, the 1991 submitted report by the Club of Rome on *The First Global Revolution* demanded a simultaneous approach, comprising tackling of all problems at all levels. With a mixture of problem analysis and suggested solutions, the report even then anticipated several approaches to argumentation on global governance. Secondly, the members of different world commissions gathered by Brandt in 1991 elaborated the Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance, which raised points the Commission on Global Governance was to pursue. Both reports supported the reform and strengthening of the UN system. Finally, the publication of the comprehensive report *Our Global Neighbourhood* by the Commission on Global Governance in 1995 can be characterized as a milestone since it describes in detail the concept of global governance as well as its fundamental importance for the world population.<sup>45</sup> Equating global governance with the compression of international cooperation in international organizations and regimes was and is a key element of the approach, even though from a

---

<sup>39</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 4.

<sup>40</sup> Website ‘IEG of the Global Commons’, *United Nations Environment Programme*.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 4.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Guido Thiemeyer, *Europäische Integration - Motive - Prozesse - Strukturen* (Köln: UTB GmbH, 2010), p. 30f.

<sup>45</sup> See Commission on Global Governance, p. 2ff.

present day perspective it does not capture the profound essence of the increasingly complex term developed by political science.<sup>46</sup>

Today, global governance has become an ambiguous catchword. In some places the term is interpreted as an attack on state sovereignty, and as a result the approach frequently encounters resistance in nationalist movements. Generally, skepticism towards international institutions is more common in the USA than in Europe.<sup>47</sup> In Russia, officials and academics working in the field of foreign policy tend to show limited enthusiasm for global governance.<sup>48</sup> China's attitudes towards the approach are multifaceted. On the one hand, China's nationalists and realists are strongly influential in parts of the academic world and represent a skeptical opinion on multinational approaches. On the other hand, there are Chinese scholars arguing for strong global institutions.<sup>49</sup>

The approach is also confronted with the reproach of not being more than a shimmering catchword. Furthermore, there is skepticism as to whether the concept can meet the great expectations of its political and scientific advocates. This, however, does not diminish its upswing in the 1990s in the course of the globalization debate, when the approach offered a conceptual and analytical instrument for the examination of globalization processes, developed a political strategic reform approach for the management of globalization, and included new actors in international policy.<sup>50</sup>

### 2.3. Theoretical roots

The involvement of a number of actors within the structure of global governance raises the question of its theoretical roots in international relations. The earlier conducted classification of the different interpretations of globalization indicated the theoretical path global governance is following. Connections to the basic thoughts of realism can hardly be established due to the fact that the theory does not share ideas like global commons. Realists identify power and (national) interests as exclusive action-oriented categories. The underlying assumption is that the world of states is an anarchic one, in which nation states are the only relevant actors since they take binding decisions on their own, make international law and only involve international organizations to better enforce their own interests on the international level and to enhance national welfare. In contrast, the model of complex interdependence shares two central assumptions with global governance. Firstly, not only states are acting in world politics; together with private and societal actors they are entangled in a system of transnational interactions due to political, military, economic and cultural ties. Secondly, the national monopoly is no longer the only effective means to maintain security and welfare. Instead, the international institutional system can effectively be used for the settlement of international conflicts of interests and for defending own interests.<sup>51</sup>

The empirical observation that powerful states also contribute to the establishment of international organizations and regimes as well as the interdependence-theoretical support of the institutionalization of international cooperation gave rise to the regime theory, which peaked in the 1980s. Regime theorists reacted to the increased need for regulation in policy fields without world state regulation authority and the increased need for coordination between a variety of actors with differing interests. According to

---

<sup>46</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 5.

<sup>47</sup> Gerd Winter, *Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change: Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law* (Cambridge Univ Press, 2006), p. 276.

<sup>48</sup> Charles Grant, *Russia, China and Global Governance* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2012), p. 19.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57ff.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6f.

the theory, international regimes are regulatory systems based on contractual agreements, which are supposed to arrange the presumed anarchy of states in subsections and thus crucial elements in the horizontal self-regulation of the states and of the global governance architecture. One merit of the theory is the regulation of specific problems and conflict areas and the reduction of complexity, encouraging accurate actions. Simultaneously, the multitude of regimes is the reason for its limited effectiveness. The quantity of policies commonly overextends developing countries with improvable institutional structures. By including international regimes as elements of international cooperation, global governance builds upon the deficits of the regime theory (variety of policies, uncoordinated sub-schemes), attempting to establish a comprehensive architecture.<sup>52</sup>

Messner and Nuscheler designate *Governance without government* by Rosenau and Czempiel published in 1992 as a decisive step in the change from the regime theory towards global governance. Besides the already mentioned distinction between governance and government, which has become the trademark of the new paradigm, this work focuses on the analysis of structural change in world politics and the formation of a multipolar world. This included the shift of authorities from nation states towards supranational actors on the macro-level and the valorization of competences of private and civil actors on the micro-level.<sup>53</sup> The geopolitical structural changes include the proliferation of international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the emergence of transnational networks (“cross-border coalitions”) and of problem specific regulations (“issue regimes”) following agreements between state and non-state actors.<sup>54</sup> This development is attested by the increasing number of conventional intergovernmental organizations, which rose from 37 in 1909 to 123 in 1951 and 337 in 1986, and of NGOs, which accounted for 176, 832 and 4649 respectively in the same years. Likewise, there has been a remarkable increase in the quantity of congresses and conferences held within the frame of these organizations: Between 1838 and 1860 two to three, in the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century about 100 per year, and in the 1970s more than 3000.<sup>55</sup>

The analysis of global tendencies of development clearly shows that governance structures need to include interactions between state and non-state actors. Associated with these, the state-centered policy model that was still anchored in the regime theory needed to be overcome. Governance does not only include intergovernmental organized forms of regulation in specific problem areas but it also includes crosscutting policy dimensions of the world order.<sup>56</sup> Thus, Rosenau and Czempiel dedicated influencing political processes in a multi-level system to the identification of new actors, but refrained from giving strategic recommendations for action and stressing visions how a new world order could or should be organized.<sup>57</sup>

In contrast to globalization, the global governance discourse is pursued twofold in an empiric-analytical and a normative-prescriptive notion. The concepts cannot always be assigned to one of the two terms but they mostly occur in mixed forms. An empiric-analytical notion facilitates problem analyses close

---

<sup>52</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 9f.

<sup>53</sup> James Rosenau, ‘Citizenship in a Changing Global Order’, in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), p. 272ff.

<sup>54</sup> Mark W. Zacher, ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance’, in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), p. 65ff.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>56</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 11f.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

to reality but it faces the risk of not surpassing the description of new structures and processes. From a normative perspective, global governance offers political guidance and a new strategic reform approach to remodel statehood in the process of globalization.<sup>58</sup> While the empiric-analytical conception focuses on control mechanisms and institutional matters, such as regulations of international institutions, the normative-prescriptive variant advocates the emergence of a common global ethos legitimating global governance.<sup>59</sup>

#### 2.4. Actors

Even though Global Governance advocates agree that **nation states** are no longer the sole actors in the world arena, they acknowledge states' remaining key role for problem-solving on the global scale. In short, global governance does not mean the end of nation states. Zacher, for example, anticipated in 1992, that non-state actors will indeed become more important, but will not replace states as the core of world politics in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>60</sup> This statement can be justified by the mere fact that international organizations are composed of representatives of the respective member states, who determine its policy. The involvement of **international organizations** as well as their increasing occurrence has already been mentioned. Especially the United Nations play a central role in the global governance architecture due to its universality and due to the circumstance of being the only forum where governments of the world meet as equal partners and regularly attempt to resolve world's most demanding issues. It serves as a principal mechanism to facilitate governments' cooperation and international communication. Nevertheless, the UN alone cannot govern the world.<sup>61</sup> Depending on the perspective, **regional international organizations** can be cited as a category, in which the European Union constitutes an unprecedented form of supranational organization. Even though the EU does not act globally in the narrow sense as it abolishes frontiers only within the Union but not externally, it can be considered as a contribution to the development of global governance, apart from being a central actor in the concept. Firstly, the European Community is actually based on European interests, but the values the EU invokes as well as the principles on which the EU treaties are factually built on are universal (and not specifically European). The Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights, for example, is based on universal human rights. Secondly, the EU is the first observable example of nation states merging to become more than a confederation of states. In a sense, the EU demonstrates that governance on a global level ultimately means the overcoming of national sovereignty and challenges and resistances in this context need to be mastered/overcome.<sup>62</sup> Often economically concentrated, regional organizations are also formed in other regions of the world, for example ASEAN in Asia, Mercosur in Latin America or the African Union.

In addition, increasing international trade and the possibilities of modular production lead to an increase in quantity and importance of **multinational enterprises**. These are responsible for a significant part of world trade and thus relevant actors for the shaping of globalization. Considering the **global civil society** as an actor within global governance, it is observable that not only states but also non-state actors increasingly interconnect across borders. Especially NGOs progressively act on an international

---

<sup>58</sup> Sieglinde Gstöhl, *Global Governance und die G8: Gipfelimpulse für Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik* (LIT Verlag Münster, 2003), p. 10.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 10f.

<sup>60</sup> Zacher, p. 64.

<sup>61</sup> Commission on Global Governance, p. 6.

<sup>62</sup> Anton Pelinka, 'Die Finalität Der Europäischen Union: Generalprobe Für Global Governance', in *Friedensmacht Europa: Dynamische Kraft Für Global Governance?*, ed. by Herwig Büchele and Anton Pelinka (Innsbruck: Innsbruck Univ. press, 2011), VI, p. 35f.



level and they strongly network to reach common goals. The World Social Forum, for example is considered as a counter-event to the summits of the WTO, the World Economic Forum, and the summits of the representatives of government of the G8 / G20 states.<sup>63</sup> Other literature additionally includes **epistemic communities** developing technical and scientific solutions for international problems and major advances in **international jurisdiction** as essential elements in global governance.<sup>64</sup>

### 3. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE

The world has changed. There is no doubt about the negative consequences of economic and population growth on the environment. The impact on natural and human systems on all continents is evident.<sup>65</sup> The greenhouse effect is artificially enhanced by anthropogenic carbon emissions, which cause an accelerated global warming at worrying rates.<sup>66</sup> The concentration of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere has reached a level that needs urgent attention. Compared to pre-industrial levels, it has risen from 280 parts per million to over 380 today. As a consequence, the average temperature on earth is now roughly 1°Celsius higher than in 1800 with some regions experiencing even higher increases.<sup>67</sup>

Although the global average temperature increase does not appear disastrous, it shows that the world has indeed become warmer. Worst-case scenarios see an increase in CO<sub>2</sub> concentration in the atmosphere to more than 500 parts per million, exceeding today's average by 50% already by 2035 and a temperature rise of 3°C over pre-industrial times. By the year 2100, the global warming will amount to over 6°C warmer than the pre-industrial average if no radical measures are adapted straightaway. The Stern Commission's business-as-usual scenario and the International Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) A1FI scenario confirm the numbers.<sup>68</sup> The extent of the man-made changes as well as its irreversibility becomes apparent considering that – according to the IPCC – a further global warming of 0.9°C by the end of this century cannot be prevented even if all worldwide emissions could be completely stopped overnight.<sup>69</sup>

The consequences of climate change are devastating for our planet. Changes of rainfall patterns, glacial melting, sea level rise, new contagious diseases, accumulation of bad harvests, droughts and hurricanes are not worst-case future scenarios but can be observed already. Within only one year (2007), the following natural disasters occurred: Hurricane Kyrill crippled half of Europe; four and a half million people in 80 Chinese districts and their livestock suffered from the rationing of drinking water during the summer, making the cultivation of rice impossible; England experienced midsummer temperatures in April, followed by the worst flooding in 70 years in the North of the country and severe drought in the South; Iran and Saudi-Arabia faced the first ever recorded tropical cyclone off their coast; torrential monsoon rains and floods haunted 30 million people in South-East Asia, while the water needed to be rationed for weeks in Ankara; severe flooding strained Africa in September; in October also three quarters of the Mexican state Tabasco and the Dominican Republic were submerged in water; a cyclone claimed the lives of thousands in Bangladesh in November; and Australia suffered from the sixth, in

---

<sup>63</sup> Website 'Akteure', *Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung*.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri and Leo Meyer, *Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2014), p. 6.

<sup>66</sup> Hans-Werner Sinn, *The Green Paradox: A Supply-Side Approach to Global Warming* (MIT Press, 2012), p. 1.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 19.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>69</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 209.



some parts even twelfth, dry year in succession, and farmers could only harvest half as much as in the past. Even if not all of these incidents can unequivocally be attributed to climate change, their higher frequency and enormous intensity is indisputable. Experts thus state that the heating of the atmosphere is not going to cause an inconceivable major disaster in the distant future (no sudden apocalypse), but the process of destroying the Earth has already started. It has been demonstrated that environmental impacts first hit individual regions, then ever greater parts of the world and finally affect all ecosystems and residents of the planet.<sup>70</sup>

The extent of the greenhouse effect depends on complex correlations, among others the conduct of politics, economy and consumers. For this reason, the experts of the IPCC can only identify bandwidths in their forecasts. Accordingly, the 0.9°C warming by the end of this century is the most favorable case while the worst-case scenario would be 6.4°C. This worst-case scenario cannot be ruled out due to the further increase of global energy consumption predicted by the International Energy Agency (IEA). This, of course, implies dramatic consequences for the climate, unless a rapid switch to green energy happens. According to the IEA, central problem areas in this regard are China and India that are emerging markets, where energy consumption is likely to increase due to the rising welfare as well as the air traffic emissions. The latter presently accounts for a relatively small proportion of greenhouse gases but showed increases of nearly 90% between 1990 and 2003 and could double again by 2020. Similarly, freight water traffic has increased sevenfold since the 1990s.<sup>71</sup>

Even the countries protecting themselves with carbon filters and catalysts and shifting parts of their polluting production to other countries with more relaxed legislation and correspondingly lower costs are not immune to pollutants. In the mountains of California and Oregon, scientists have repeatedly measured high concentrations of harmful substances and particles in the air attributed to Chinese coal-fired power plants, reaching the American West coast via sea.<sup>72</sup> This example shows that environmental issues do not respect national borders and thus underlines their international dimension. As a global commons problem, climate change challenges the international system since it is not a “normal” environmental problem. In short, global environmental problems require cooperation beyond national borders and thus legitimate the demand for global environmental governance.

### 3.1. The international force awakens – Efforts of the international community

In light of all the impacts just mentioned, it is not surprising that the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of the **United Nations** listed environmental degradation as one of the ten official global threats in 2004.<sup>73</sup> The serious environmental consequences are also addressed in the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), which defines environmental degradation as “the reduction of the capacity of the environment to meet social and ecological objectives and needs”.<sup>74</sup>

These two examples show that environmental issues are taken seriously. This has not always been the case. Ecological problems were long branded as being incidental and negligible for national interests

---

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, p. 209f.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 212f.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, p. 217.

<sup>73</sup> United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility : Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* (United Nations Publications, 2004), p. 24ff.

<sup>74</sup> Website ‘Terminology’, *The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction*.

and international politics by most governments.<sup>75</sup> Circumstances such as the economic downturn in the 1970s and the threats of the Cold War displaced environmental issues from the international agenda. First international agreements could be concluded after World War II, for instance the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (1946) or the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (1958), but experts would not designate these agreements as great power politics. While these matters were the domain of United Nations specialized agencies, they only played a tangential role in the UN General Assembly. The famous text *Politics among Nations* by the US American political scientist and jurist Hans J. Morgenthau 1955 exemplifies this disregard, depicting natural environment as a fixed contextual factor or a constituent of national power.<sup>76</sup>

It was not until 1972 that the first major international conference on environmental protection proceeded in Stockholm. The UN Conference on the Human Environment gathered representatives from 112 countries to determine principles for the environment and development and emphasize the urgency of environmental questions.<sup>77</sup> At that time, long lasting droughts attributed to human action attracting attention in different parts of the world. At the behest of the Stockholm conference, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was established in the same year as well as environmental departments by many governments. Nevertheless, some experts claim the real starting point of international environmental policy with the first world climate conference of the United Nations (WCC1) in Geneva in 1979. At this conference, the increasing levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were indicated and the participants concluded that this issue deserves special attention of the international community since it potentially evoked long-term changes of the global climate.<sup>78</sup>

Climate policy goals were not concretized until 1988. At the Toronto climate conference targets were put in concrete forms, for example a reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> by one half by 2050 was recommended. However, the provisions of the conference were of a recommendatory nature and did not oblige participating countries to take appropriate measures. The government officials only promised such measures on a voluntary basis.<sup>79</sup> Finally, the United Nations established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Toronto. The panel consists of leading climate change scientists, who observe and carefully examine climate change and its impacts to date and contribute to climate discourses with the involvement of government representatives by carefully and cautiously drafted reports.<sup>80</sup>

The situation has changed as environmental movements in industrialized countries have strongly gained in importance. Environmental hazards, such as climate change, potentially affecting the well-being of the entire human race, have forced their way into public awareness. The efforts of the IPCC have a large share in this development. Surveys confirm that environmental awareness has reached high levels in industrialized countries and environmental problems are increasingly perceived as threats by policy

---

<sup>75</sup> Pamela S. Chasek, David L. Downie and Janet Welsh Brown, *Handbuch Globale Umweltpolitik* (Berlin: Parthas Verlag GmbH, 2006), p. 11.

<sup>76</sup> Vogler, p. 353.

<sup>77</sup> Maren Becker, Stefanie John and Stefan A. Schirm, *Globalisierung und Global Governance* (Paderborn: UTB GmbH, 2007), p. 164.

<sup>78</sup> Website Aachener Stiftung Kathy Beys, 'Weltklimakonferenzen in Genf, 1979-2013', *Lexikon Der Nachhaltigkeit*, 2015.

<sup>79</sup> Becker, John, Schirm, p. 164f.

<sup>80</sup> Vogler, p. 361.

makers. However, global phenomena like climate change are associated with uncertainty among people, in particular the share of human influence on them.<sup>81</sup>

Today, environmental concerns also play a more decisive role in North-South relations, international conflicts and domestic social and political stability.<sup>82</sup> In the context of the desiccation in African regions, which “to a certain extent man-made global warming” is blamed for, Ban Ki Moon explained that the first victims of climate change are especially those people who are least responsible for it.<sup>83</sup> The UN Secretary General considers climate change along with the consolidation of global crises as a reason for the ongoing conflict in Darfur. According to that, the crucial causes were the desiccation and impoverishment of the soil and the encroachment of the desert due to water shortage as well as the run on scarce oil.<sup>84</sup> In short, climate change is the catalyzer merging and intensifying all other problems since it potentially triggers war in other regions of the world as well – eventually allowing escalations in even greater dimensions. This was reason enough for the British government to introduce the topic climate change in the UN Security Council for the first time in 2007. Warning of devastating consequences for the collective security, the British referred to the consequences of environmental problems as more threatening than those of single conflicts.<sup>85</sup>

The fact that the most powerful body of the United Nations has even dealt with environmental issues and discussed it in the context of global security, indicates the “late, but lasting awakening” of the world population.<sup>86</sup> This, however, is not the only reason why 2007 is considered to be a landmark. In the same year, the IPCC alone analyzed and included 29,000 data series of 75 large individual studies in its fourth assessment report concluding that the warming of the climate system is unequivocal. Before, it had only cautiously warned of consequences of the greenhouse effect. Corresponding to the data situation or models respectively, the then expected consequences were associated with uncertainty. By 2007, the warming of the climate system was evident due to observations of increases in worldwide average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice as well as rising global sea level. Diminishing doubts can be illustrated by the use of language in the reports. In 2007, temperature increase “is *very likely* due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations”<sup>87</sup>, while in previous reports human activity was *likely* to be responsible for temperature increases.<sup>88</sup> The appealingly small, but decisive difference is to be found in the treatment of uncertainty. The IPCC defines likelihood ranges corresponding to the terms, whereas *likely* means a certainty of more than 66% and *very likely* refers to a probability of occurrence of more than 90%.<sup>89</sup> In that sense, the degree of certainty increased remarkably between the third assessment report in 2001 and the fourth one. Furthermore, all earlier prognoses were considerably adjusted upwards. That was hardly surprising in light of the facts, since 11 of the 12 years before 2007 had been the warmest since temperature

---

<sup>81</sup> Melanie Weber, ‘Wahrnehmung Globaler Umweltprobleme’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007), p. 189.

<sup>82</sup> Chasek, Downie, Brown, p. 11.

<sup>83</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 204.

<sup>84</sup> See L. Gray, M. Kevane, *Darfur: Rainfall and Conflict*, 2008.

<sup>85</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 207f.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 208.

<sup>87</sup> Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri and Andy Reisinger, *Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2007), p. 13.

<sup>88</sup> Vogler, p. 361.

<sup>89</sup> Core Writing Team, Pachauri and Reisinger, p. 27.

measurements have been recorded. The reason for these developments was clearly attributable to the human being, which incessantly uses more land, massively consumes fossil fuels and thus continuously increases emissions.<sup>90</sup> Besides the IPCC report, UNEP addressed water shortage, desertification, species decline and loss of agricultural terrain in its annual report and concluded that mankind lived beyond its means. Gro Harlem Brundtland had already noticed long ago that the world was not confronted with environmental, development and energy crises, but that all these crises had merged to a single one called climate change.<sup>91</sup>

For this reason, governments and international organizations commonly request environmentally conscious acting of citizens. That presupposes that they are equipped with sufficient information and orientation capabilities to recognize the relevance of environmental problems (in a small scope). The awareness of environmental aspects might pose difficulties whenever their scope is global. This especially applies to cases of delayed effects, global warming entails, for example. At this point, the multi-level system becomes relevant. Multi-level governance helps to capture and conceptualize political processes in which national borders and policy fields of collaboration of state and non-state actors are crossed and thus facilitates the development of instruments.<sup>92</sup> In literature, the interdependence of actions from the global to the local level is described as “glocal context”.<sup>93</sup> The multi-level analysis is also connected to the already mentioned changed perception and addressing of global environmental problems. While the fields of political science or in particular international relations used to screen cross-border issues and global problems from the perspectives of emergence and explanation of international cooperation to handle these issues and of the effects of international agreements on national politics, the focus has shifted and widened meanwhile. Questions of linking global issues with local dimensions and of interaction of institutions on different levels have increasingly taken center stage. In any case, it is recognized that environmental issues cannot be considered as an isolated policy area, they having wide-ranging social impacts.<sup>94</sup>

The development of global environmental governance stressed the fundamental character of international regimes. The term has already been defined as a regulatory system based on contractual agreements in the context of the regime theory. When examined in more detail, this definition refers to a system of principles (key assumptions about facts, causal links or morals), norms, rules, procedures and institutions, which actors set or accept to coordinate and regulate actions in specific areas of international relations.<sup>95</sup> Regimes exist in various fields of international affairs besides the environment, such as trade, human rights or military security.<sup>96</sup> Irrespective of the specific area, regimes are always formed in multilateral negotiations. Such negotiations are conducted if various states consider the status quo as unacceptable and / or if states fear high costs in case of continuing present trends. Although reaching agreements on problem-solving is of interest to individual states, winning as much as possible or dispensing as little as possible is crucial as well. Nevertheless, the expected value of the outcome must be positive for each participating state and thus the result as a whole too. Otherwise, states would lack the incentive to negotiate or to subsequently accept the outcome. Consequently, every state

---

<sup>90</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 208f.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p. 218.

<sup>92</sup> Brunnengräber and Walk, ‘Der Mehrwert Der Mehrebenenbetrachtung’, p. 19f.

<sup>93</sup> Weber, p. 189f.

<sup>94</sup> Christoph Görg, ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt* (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007), p. 76f.

<sup>95</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 30f.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, p. 31.

participating in multilateral negotiations needs to profit from the results (or at least benefit in comparison to the situation without an agreement); otherwise, it does not comply.<sup>97</sup>

International regimes usually have the form of binding agreements or legal instruments. The most popular legal instrument is the convention. It can either contain all negotiated binding obligations or precede the legal instrument, which then elaborates norms and regulations. Since by definition, the negotiating partners of international regimes are states, regulations in general refer to state actions. However, private actors like multinational corporations, banks, companies or industries are usually involved in activities subject to regulations. If conventions are negotiated in the course of pending further provisions, they are called framework conventions. Further provisions are determined in one or more protocols including specific obligations for involved actors.<sup>98</sup>

Indeed, political solution strategies for climate change (representing global environmental issues) are mainly negotiated on the international level. A good example for such international efforts is the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or “earth summit” 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. Then, the conference was the largest international conference there had been, attended by 110 heads of states / government, nearly 10.000 delegates from 150 countries and thousands of official representatives of NGOs. Based on the principle of sustainable development, the Rio declaration claimed new forms of political cooperation on the international level, which were not only to include national governments but which were also to distinguish societal representatives. The aims were formulated in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which also imposed on the contracting parties the objective to reduce greenhouse gases for the benefit of future generations. But like the previous international agreements, the UNFCCC lacked enforceability under international law and was vaguely formulated. It created a framework for future negotiations, but did not provide concrete measures for the participants. The main reason for the non-binding character of the framework convention was the divergent positioning of participating countries that finally did not allow for agreements on substantial issues. Thus, a kind of minimum consensus was the maximum outcome. Especially the USA stood as an opponent to a legally binding contract and only went along with agreements on a voluntary basis.<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, due to its concentration on environmental and development policy, the conference conceptually was a major step forward in comparison to the Stockholm conference 20 years earlier.<sup>100</sup> With the help of the UNFCCC, global environmental issues became institutionalized for the first time.<sup>101</sup> Such institutionalizations require a global problem definition and regulation, which in turn is delivered to citizens through national, regional and municipal institutions with the aim of promoting environmental awareness and performance. This procedure seemingly supports the emergence of a globally valid and accepted model.<sup>102</sup> Besides the UNFCCC, the Agenda 21, another non-binding action program to reach sustainable societies, belongs to the important outcomes of Rio. It will be further discussed as a case study in chapter four.

With the UNFCCC entering into force, annual conferences of the parties (COP) of all 189 signatories were established for the monitoring of its implementation. One of the most prominent follow-up

---

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 34.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, p. 34f.

<sup>99</sup> Becker, John, Schirm, p. 165.

<sup>100</sup> Chasek, Downie, Brown, p. 53.

<sup>101</sup> Achim Brunnengräber, ‘Multi-Level Climate Governance’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007), p. 211.

<sup>102</sup> Weber, p. 191.

conferences was the Tokyo conference 1997 since the Kyoto protocol had been agreed on. The protocol is an international regulation with the main objective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO<sub>2</sub>, in industrialized countries. The OECD countries agreed to reduce emissions below the level of 1990 by 2012.<sup>103</sup> Despite the good intentions expressed, the agreement has been singled out as the object of much criticism because the implementation of a flexible mechanism offered opportunities to circumvent greenhouse gas reductions for states. Three mechanisms were agreed on to provide flexible ways to achieve committed reduction targets instead of actually reducing CO<sub>2</sub>. The first mechanism allows trading in emissions, that is rights to pollute can be bought and sold on the market. The basic idea is that in the long term the number of permits available decreases, the price of carbon rises, and alternative power sources become more competitive. The second mechanism employs joint implementation, enabling industrialized countries to receive credits in terms of their own reduction targets by financially contributing to projects in other industrialized countries. It was assumed that money flows into projects where the largest reduction in worldwide emissions could be achieved. The third mechanism is similar to joint implementation, and provides for clean development. It applies to relations between industrialized and developing countries.<sup>104</sup>

At the same time, political-economic efforts in favor of climate protection are contradicted by developments in real emissions. A comprehensive UNFCCC study, which published official data on greenhouse gases of 40 industrialized and 121 developing countries between 1990 and 2003, did not raise new hope of a trend reversal. On the contrary, the study forecasts emission increases. According to the German Institute of Economic Research, an increase of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of around eight percent in Western industrialized nations was registered between 1990 and 2002. This complies neither with stabilization nor with approximation to the agreed targets of the Kyoto protocol.<sup>105</sup> In this regard, it should be mentioned that the protocol had not come into force in the years 2002 or 2003. It had been agreed that it should not enter into force until at least 55 contracting parties which accounted for not less than 55% of worldwide CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of Annex I countries (industrialized countries) in 1990, ratified the agreement. After long periods of uncertainty, the protocol finally came into force only in 2005.<sup>106</sup>

Another problem area accompanying the agreement of 1997 was again the differing interests of the participating countries. On the one hand, many developed countries were not ready to waive economic growth. This resulted in varying CO<sub>2</sub> reduction targets. The average target of eight percent in comparison to 1990 for the EU was, according to the principle of burden sharing specified by different percentages for individual member states<sup>107</sup>, just like the US target of seven percent, above the worldwide average of around five percent. Compared to the claims of climate scientists and NGOs, suggesting reductions between 45 and 80%<sup>108</sup>, the numbers appear devastatingly small. The fact that some countries could not even reach these unambitious targets and instead reverted to flexible mechanisms or completely resigned from the program, further dwarfed previous efforts. The USA and Australia, for example, refused to ratify the protocol. Instead, both countries formed the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) together with Japan, China, India and South

---

<sup>103</sup> Becker, John, Schirm, p. 166.

<sup>104</sup> Vogler, p. 362.

<sup>105</sup> Weber, p. 200ff.

<sup>106</sup> Becker, John and Schirm, p. 167.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, p. 166.

<sup>108</sup> Weber, p. 201.

Korea with the objective to engage in voluntary climate actions and thereby cooperate with the private sector beyond the Kyoto protocol. The political and environmental significance of these six states is evident: they account for almost half of the worldwide energy consumption and are responsible for around 50% of global greenhouse gas emissions.<sup>109</sup> In this respect, the block's absence in the Kyoto protocol clearly constitutes a major setback.

On the other hand, several developing countries did not want to commit themselves to the reduction of emissions since they had hardly contributed to climate change. China, India and Brazil, for instance, were not willing to slow down their growing economies by binding regulations on emission targets. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) claimed industrialized countries should redeem their historical debts in the form of climate protection efforts. This, however, did not influence the negotiations beyond a moral appeal. However, the attempt of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to weaken the outcomes of international climate policy was more successful. Russia's signing, which was finally decisive for the inception of the protocol 2005, could only be reached through the EU's promise to support Russia's WTO accession.<sup>110</sup>

From a neo-realistic perspective, the difficulties in the negotiation process indicate that international climate policy can be considered as a domain of international relations in which states attempt to enforce their respective interests when resolving the global problem climate change. With this in mind, national interests dominate international negotiations or individual climate strategies. The multi-level governance perspective focuses on the interaction of international forms of regulation and national government policy. According to this perspective, changes of national and supranational preferences can occur. In contrast to the USA, the EU opposed emission trade as a climate protection instrument for a long time, but finally introduced it. On the basis of common national interests, coalitions and oppositions are formed between groups of countries (within as well as beyond the Kyoto protocol), expressing themselves internationally and contributing to the reformulation of national politics. For this reason, national and international decision-making level as well as domestic and foreign policy cannot be clearly distinguished in global environmental governance.<sup>111</sup>

In literature, the clear distinction of domestic and foreign policy is one of the three characteristics of the traditional understanding of state power, which is challenged by the new processes. The other two areas are that states possess a territorially fixed allocated sovereignty and the conception of the state as a timeless "container" of social and economic processes (assuming that they coincide in the national scope).<sup>112</sup> The discussions about these points address the necessity to no longer take the spatial existence of statehood for granted. In the light of globalization societies, economies and cultures are neither per se settled on the national level nor territorially clearly demarcated.<sup>113</sup>

It can thus be argued that the rise of the governance concept entailed historical changes, especially conversions of the relations between state and politics and other social subfields. The conversions are reflected by increasing blurring of borders of established fields of competences in territorial, functional, and sectoral points of view. Interaction of various decision-making procedures and administration processes on the national, international or municipal level with each other as well as with private or

---

<sup>109</sup> Brunnengräber, p. 211f.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, p. 212f.

<sup>112</sup> Görg, p. 81.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

non-state regulatory areas has developed. This means that environmental policy is also made in economic or research policy, for example.<sup>114</sup>

Despite all its deficiencies, the Kyoto protocol is still commonly considered as a symbol of climate protection. This indicates that not primarily the efficiency of the instrument is valued but rather its symbolism. It being the only set of agreements committing more than 140 nations worldwide to international legally binding obligations and a major step forward in comparison to previous agreements, it can be considered a success by the international community.<sup>115</sup> On the other hand, Brunnengräber places the reason for governments', international organizations', NGOs' and research institutions' adherence to further development of the protocol in spite of slow-moving negotiations and insufficient implementation in a more pessimistic light. Without doubting the value of having laid the foundation for a challenging international set of rules, the fact that the world community has not yet yielded a better international instrument against the greenhouse effect is to blame for the complete adherence to the agreement. He considered the Kyoto protocol as being based on a fragile foundation, which even in the case of a successful implementation would have been an uncertain set of rules because it potentially led to substantial social instabilities such as increasing energy expenses, job losses or national competitive disadvantages.<sup>116</sup>

The annual meetings of the 156 parties to the Kyoto protocol (CMP) are a platform for discussing the Kyoto protocol. They have complemented the UN conferences of the parties since 2005. Due to the expiration of the protocol in 2012, the eighth conference of the contracting parties (CMP 8) in Doha was of great importance. At this meeting, a follow-up contract, "Kyoto II" was concluded, which is currently in force from 2013 to 2020. Because of many withdrawals, the Doha amendment was signed by only 65 states<sup>117</sup>, which in total are responsible for about 15 percent of the worldwide CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.<sup>118</sup> The EU, having reached their climate targets of reducing greenhouse gases by 20% by 2020 early, was a driving force behind the continuation of the Kyoto protocol.<sup>119</sup>

The ambitious targets of the latest UN climate conference (COP 21 and CMP 11) in Paris 2015 attracted great media attention. The contracting parties reached a climate agreement which included the limitation of global warming to below 2°C, preferably 1.5°C as well as proposals to participating countries to reach this target, such as suggestions to pursue domestic mitigation measures or the commitment for industrialized countries to support developing countries.<sup>120</sup> The "historical" Paris agreement for the first time brings all nations to a common denominator with respect to past, present and future responsibilities in climate issues.<sup>121</sup> In April 2016 it was signed by as many as 175 states and just like the Kyoto protocol, it will come into force as soon as 55 nations accounting for at least 55%

---

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, p. 80f.

<sup>115</sup> Weber, p. 200ff.

<sup>116</sup> Brunnengräber, p. 207f.

<sup>117</sup> Website 'Chapter XXVII Environment', *United Nations Treaty Collection*, 2016.

<sup>118</sup> Website Aachener Stiftung Kathy Beys, 'UN Klimakonferenz Doha, 2012', *Lexikon Der Nachhaltigkeit*, 2015.

<sup>119</sup> 'EU Greenhouse Gases in 2011: More Countries on Track to Meet Kyoto Targets, Emissions Fall 2.5 %', *European Environment Agency*, 2012.

<sup>120</sup> See Art. 2 and 4, *Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015* (Paris: UNFCCC, 29 January 2016), p. 22f.

<sup>121</sup> Website UNFCCC, 'Historic Paris Agreement on Climate Change', *UN Climate Change Newsroom*, 2015.



of worldwide emissions have ratified it.<sup>122</sup> In contrast to the Doha amendment three years earlier, big players like the USA or Canada are on board.

Irrespective of all successes or failures of UN efforts in the field of environmental policy, the strongly increasing number of conferences, agreements, establishment of organizations etc. show that global environmental problems have triggered great need for action on the international level and that the international community has finally realized this necessity. The fact that ‘only’ UN efforts have been dealt with so far but are not yet exhausted further underlines this statement.

Climate change talks of the United Nations, for example, are organized more than once a year in addition to the conferences of the parties. The talks are subdivided in Ad Hoc Working Groups on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), serving to discuss future commitments for industrialized countries under the Kyoto protocol (since 2006)<sup>123</sup> and Ad Hoc Working Groups on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), established to guide a comprehensive process facilitating the complete and effective implementation of the convention (since 2008).<sup>124</sup> The so called Cancún agreements 2010 can be seen as an example of significant achievements resulting from the work of the latter. The agreements include the United Nations’ decisions to establish a Green Climate Fund to support projects, programs, policies and further activities by parties in developing countries, and a technology mechanism consisting of a technology executive committee and a climate technology center.<sup>125</sup>

Another example for international cooperation and the growing attention environmental issues attract is the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 2000. Within the framework of the Millennium Summit, the participating world leaders committed their nations to a new global partnership to reduce extreme poverty and agreed on a schedule for the following 15 years. The declaration thus contained eight time-bound targets, also known as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). One key area of these goals was to ensure environmental sustainability.<sup>126</sup> The goal was divided into four sub-targets. Firstly, the principle of sustainable development was to be integrated into country policies and the loss of environmental resources was to be reversed. Secondly, the biodiversity loss was to be reduced with the aim to achieve significant results by 2010. Thirdly, the share of the world population without sustainable access to drinkable water and basic sanitation was to be halved by 2015 and fourthly, a noteworthy improvement in the lives of more than 100 million slum dwellers was to be reached by 2020.<sup>127</sup> Drawing a summary after the expiration of the goals, the United Nations indeed could demonstrate some success within the goal of environmental sustainability. Regarding the access to piped drinking water, for example, about 2.6 million people gained access to improved drinking water between 1990 and 2015. The target of halving the population without access was achieved ahead of schedule. Similarly, 2.1 billion people across the world have gained access to improved sanitation. Although these numbers seem like a reason to rejoice, they need to be treated with caution, considering

---

<sup>122</sup> See Art. 21, *Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015*, p. 34.

<sup>123</sup> Website ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex (AWG-KP)’, *United Nations Framework on Climate Change*.

<sup>124</sup> Website ‘Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA)’, *United Nations Framework on Climate Change*.

<sup>125</sup> *Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010* (Cancun: UNFCCC, 10 December 2010), p. 17ff.

<sup>126</sup> Website ‘Millennium Development Goals’, *UNDP*.

<sup>127</sup> Website ‘Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability’, *United Nations Millennium Development Goals*.

that 663 million people are still living without access to improved drinking water<sup>128</sup> and 2.4 billion are still facing unimproved sanitation facilities.<sup>129</sup> As of the beginning of 2007, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) continued the work previously carried out by the Millennium Project secretariat team.

After expiring in 2015, the MDGs were superseded by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are included in the 2030 Agenda.<sup>130</sup> The concept was engineered at the earth summit 2012 (Rio+20), the third follow-up conference of Rio 1992. The current 17 sustainability goals build on the MDGs but they have a broader range. Coping with environmental problems can already be seen in a number of goals, for example in the goal of clean water and sanitation or in the one of affordable and clean energy. At this point of time almost self-evidently, taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts constitutes a separate goal.<sup>131</sup> The concrete targets within the goal of climate action inter alia address the resilience and capacity to climate-related threats and natural disasters, climate change mitigation, early warning, improvement in education and awareness associated therewith and promotion of a mechanism supporting climate-change related planning in developing countries.<sup>132</sup>

In the creation of global answers to global challenges, both the **G7** and **G8** have also become a central forum. The establishment of the G7 is closely related to the developments of globalization since it was founded in answer to turbulences of the global economic crisis in the 1970s. Then, heads of Western industrialized states recognized their interdependence and vulnerability, illustrated by the decline of the hegemonic position of the USA, which fell victim to events like the Vietnam War, the upswing of Japan and Europe, the oil crisis and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.<sup>133</sup> Presently, the forum consists of the highest political decision-makers from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the USA and the EU. Russia belonged to the forum between 1998 and 2014, turning it into the Group of 8, but the Western members and Japan suspended the cooperation after the annexation of Crimea.<sup>134</sup>

Apparently, the G7 is particularly demanding in terms of the protection of global public goods, which includes climate change. Environmental topics are regularly on the agenda of G7 summits. In Brussels in 2014 as well as in Germany in 2015, the necessity of having concrete measures to combat climate change was emphasized. The decision at the COP 15 to enter into the commitment to raise 100 billion USD annually in order to satisfy the needs for climate change and to adapt developing countries in the context of sensible and transparent climate protection measures<sup>135</sup> was supported at the Brussels summit.<sup>136</sup> With regard to the later climate summit in Paris, the G7 appealed for the preparation of

---

<sup>128</sup> Achilleas Galatsidas and Finbarr Sheehy, 'What Have the Millennium Development Goals Achieved?', *The Guardian*, 6 July 2015, section Global development.

<sup>129</sup> Website 'Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability'.

<sup>130</sup> Website 'Sustainable Development Goals', *UNDP*.

<sup>131</sup> Website 'SDG 13: Climate Action', *UNDP*.

<sup>132</sup> Website 'Goal 13: Take Urgent Action to Combat Climate Change and Its Impacts', *United Nations Sustainable Development Goals*.

<sup>133</sup> Gstöhl, p. 9.

<sup>134</sup> Julian Borger Nicholas Watt, 'G7 Countries Snub Putin and Refuse to Attend Planned G8 Summit in Russia', *The Guardian*, 24 March 2014, section World news.

<sup>135</sup> *Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009* (Copenhagen: UNFCCC, 30 March 2010), p. 7.

<sup>136</sup> *Erklärung Des G7-Gipfels von Brüssel* (Brussels, 5 June 2014), p. 4.

ambitious contributions and legally binding agreements at its meeting in Germany.<sup>137</sup> At the meeting in Japan in 2016, the result of the climate conference in the form of the Paris agreement and in particular the fact that nearly all participating UNFCCC-states signed it was welcomed. In the same breath, states were encouraged to undertake further efforts to reach the 1.5°C target.<sup>138</sup>

Discussing the connection of global governance and the G7 summits, the distinction of governance and government arises again because of the common accusation that the forum attempts to be a world government. However, it is definitely not a world government but has a certain level of influence on essential questions of world economics and politics. According to Gstöhl, the summits are not the focal point of global governance but have become one of the junctions in its architecture. The G8 has established a network of new relations starting in the 1990s. This consultation process includes other states, international organizations and civil society (inter alia NGOs and companies), showing key characteristics of the global governance concept.<sup>139</sup>

The **OECD** is also an important actor on the stage of international environmental policy as the following statement of the OECD Secretary General shows:

*“In the interest of the next generation, we simply cannot afford to put climate change on the back burner... unlike the financial crisis, we do not have a ‘climate bailout option’ up our sleeves.”*<sup>140</sup>

*Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary General*

The organization particularly advocates sustainable production and consumption within its member states. Its tasks include the provision of background information and funding programs with regard to trade- and environment related issues and transport.<sup>141</sup> The OECD supports action on climate change thereby referring to and basing its actions on the Paris agreement. The organization acknowledges four key outcomes of the contract, which are all connected with challenges. Firstly, the outcome of a plurality of countries agreeing to limit the increase in temperature below 2°C is counteracted by current emissions reduction targets, which are probably too unambitious to reach the outcome. Major investments in low emission, climate resilient infrastructure are needed in the near future. Secondly, successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs) should positively transform countries’ progress and mirror their highest possible ambition. However, the next couple of years will show if countries indeed intensify their mitigation actions and sufficiently finance them. Thirdly, climate governance “has evolved into a hybrid system made up of an overarching transparency, accounting and stocktaking process [...]”, according to the OECD report *The OECD Supporting Action on Climate Change* of 2016. In fact, individual emissions reduction contributions differ largely, main aspects of transparency and review mechanism are pending, and challenges concerning methodology, such as measuring and monitoring climate finance continue. Finally, the Paris agreement provides varying actions for its implementation between industrialized and developing countries, but it demands close collaboration to effectively combat climate change. The OECD identifies the need for improving the way governments administer financial liabilities due to climate change.<sup>142</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup> *Leader’s Declaration G7 Summit 7-8 June 2015* (Schloss Elmau, 8 June 2015), p. 12f.

<sup>138</sup> *G7 Ise-Shima Leader’s Declaration, 26-27 May 2016* (Ise-Shima, 27 May 2016), p. 26f.

<sup>139</sup> Gstöhl, p. 21.

<sup>140</sup> *Financing Climate Change Action* (OECD, November 2014), p. 2.

<sup>141</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 102f.

<sup>142</sup> *The OECD Supporting Action on Climate Change* (OECD, June 2016), p. 1.

In light of these challenges, the OECD provides assistance for countries in five key areas. Under the first category, “supporting international progress”, the OECD supports countries in understanding and implementing the transparency-related provisions in the Paris agreement, generating appropriate and effective approaches to transparency and stocktaking of climate related policy actions, enhancing the capability to monitor, evaluate and improve their actions, and developing instruments for mitigation and adaptation. The second area, “aligning policies for effective mitigation”, aims to strengthen countries’ implementation efforts by observing the scale of the mitigation challenge with the help of indicators, furnishing the impact of climate policy on greenhouse gas emissions with numbers, establishing a policy toolkit allowing states to analyze the effectiveness of their policies and regulatory approaches, and facilitating the interaction between varying areas. The third category, “adapting to the climate challenge” underlines the political and economic importance of adaptation. In this sense, the OECD intends to strengthen countries’ inclusion of climate risks into core development planning in order to ensure that the infrastructure is strong enough to stand extreme events and changing climate patterns. The fourth concern is “greening the financial system”, including green bonds and green investment banks with the main aim to encourage private and public investment in low-carbon, climate resilient infrastructure. Finally, the aim of “reinforcing public-private collaboration” indicates the engagement of different stakeholders.<sup>143</sup> In this context, the OECD collaborates with interest groups in new forms of international cooperation to combat global issues that need to be managed beyond national borders and launched its green growth strategy in 2011, which addresses the framework for green growth, the absolute importance of green growth strategies as well as international cooperation, and the monitoring of progress in this respect.<sup>144</sup> In the context of the reinforcement of public-private collaboration, the OECD has also published “Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises”, a comprehensive set of recommendations on responsible business conduct. This document is discussed along with the involvement of private actors in section 3.6.

The OECD has also developed policies to finance climate change action. In the document *Financing Climate Change Action*, published in 2014, it identifies associated key challenges and gives instructions on how to manage these challenges. Some of the policies are similar to the conclusions of the 2016 report mentioned earlier. With regard to raising climate finance flows and steering investments to enhance green growth, especially large-scale private investment and finance flows to developing countries are emphasized. The second area addresses the challenge of strengthening domestic policy frameworks to support low-carbon and climate-resilient infrastructure investment. The approach to a green investment policy includes different key elements, such as aligning policies across and within levels of governments, financial reforms to support long-term investment, research and development for green technology, or information policies, corporate reporting, and consumer awareness programs. In this context, the OECD has published the non-prescriptive *Policy Guidance for Investment in Clean Energy Infrastructure* to support governments in their efforts. The third key challenge is to ensure adequate financing for adaptation, again providing a key role for the private sector and identifying special needs in developing countries. Lastly, the area of tracking climate finance flows to build trust through transparency and accountability is demanding since flows have various sources and channels. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) builds on a robust system for measuring and

---

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 2ff.

<sup>144</sup> OECD, *Towards Green Growth*, OECD Green Growth Studies (OECD Publishing, 2011).

monitoring financial support for climate change gathering official development assistance. It screens each bilateral aid activity and categorizes it as either targeting mitigation and / or adaptation.<sup>145</sup>

The OECD Environmental Performance Reviews (EPR) makes up an essential instrument for monitoring OECD objectives. In these reviews, the progress of countries in monitoring environmental policy commitments is assessed. The idea started in the 1990s when governments of OECD countries signed several environmental treaties and declarations and raised the need for mechanisms ensuring that environmental promises were kept. The reviews include elements such as key environmental trends (efficiency of using energy and natural resources, carbon intensity reduction of the economy), policy-making environment (environmental governance system, coordination mechanisms) or green growth (efforts to include environment in economic policies, support of the greening of economies). It enables countries to compare their efforts with those of other countries. Regarding the impact of the ERPs, the OECD attributes the following successes to the program: The introduction of a CO<sub>2</sub> tax on fuels in Denmark 1992, the establishment of a ministry of the environment in Chile 2010, the preparation of a national plan for the reduction of air pollution by the Ministry of Finance in Israel 2013, and the approval of a fiscal reform including a tax on the carbon content of fossil fuels by the Congress of Mexico in the same year.<sup>146</sup>

The efforts made by the OECD in environmental protection are broadly based and definitively constitute a positive example of environmental attitude. This, however, is not true for another group of international organizations, namely **multilateral financial institutions**. In particular, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are considered exceedingly powerful in the group of international organizations. By connecting the provision of large financial resources with conditions of particular development strategies and economic policies, they are able to influence the development and environmental policies of developing countries. Donor countries determine the policy of such financial institutions depending on the size of their contributions. The intentions of the donor countries have not always followed environmentally friendly considerations, the institutions' influence on developing countries has rather been considered as not contributing to sustainable development in countries which take out loans. The World Bank has tended to grant large loans to large-scale, capital-intensive, and centralized projects, evaluated on the basis of their quantifiable repayment rates, while long-term, non-quantifiable social and ecological benefits were disregarded. In the 1970s and 80s, the World Bank supported several projects accelerating deforestation, including settlement programs in the rainforests of Brazil and Indonesia, large-scale farming projects in Central and South America, and tobacco farms in Africa. The enhancing environmental movement in the 1980s inaugurated a rethinking process creating greater sensibility regarding the ecological implications of the credit approval. The public requested the World Bank's to participate in the solution of global environmental problems instead of fostering them. Even the US congress criticized some credits that were granted. The World Bank reacted by not renewing several projects in Brazil and Indonesia and introducing an environmental department employing environmental experts. From then on, explicitly ecologically oriented programs were financed.<sup>147</sup>

The positive development towards environmental friendliness accelerated in the 1990s when the World Bank took concrete measures to participate in the arena of global environmental negotiations. It became

---

<sup>145</sup> *Financing Climate Change Action*, p. 4ff.

<sup>146</sup> Website 'About Environmental Performance Reviews', *OECD*.

<sup>147</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 91f.

the executing agency of the multilateral fund for the implementation of the Montreal Protocol and the emerging global environmental facility, a multilateral fund for financing additional costs arising from projects with global ecological benefits. Furthermore, the World Bank became involved in investments for the conservation of forests and biodiversity.<sup>148</sup> In 1997, the organization announced it would calculate the potential impacts on climate change of all its energy projects with immediate effect and in case of concern on the part of clients (in developing countries), it would support the finance of climate-friendly options.<sup>149</sup>

It seemed like the World Bank would drift over to the “light side” of the environmental force. However, when giving credence to the 2002 report on the Sustainable Energy and Economy Network (SEEN), the ambitious phrases of the World Bank turn out to be empty. According to the report, the World Bank only rarely includes carbon emissions in their project reports, they being the most important indicator for the implications of its projects on climate change. Furthermore, the World Bank approved more than 24 billion USD for 229 different projects on fossil fuels between 1999 and 2002, which produced 46.7 billion tons of carbon dioxide.<sup>150</sup>

In the enumeration of international organizations essential for global governance, **international standardization organizations** must not be excluded. Standardization helps to remove obstacles from the lack of understanding of legal and market requirements. The bilateral or multilateral exchange of information and institutional experience can lead to an indirect bench-marking process, whereby regulatory authorities exchange experiences and amend their practices as a result.<sup>151</sup> In particular, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as part of the World Standards Cooperation (WSC) plays an important role in harmonizing legal, political and economic standards.

### 3.2. Regional efforts

Beside all the efforts by international organizations, regional and other multilateral organizations have become increasingly important in global environmental governance. Some of them are specialized organizations working for their interests, such as regional fisheries management organizations engaging in environmental policy out of necessity, while others have broad political and economic targets including essential environmental questions. Among the regional organizations, the **European Union** is the only organization that makes binding decisions for its member states.<sup>152</sup> Similar to the United Nations, the EU’s dedication to environmental issues started in 1972, when the heads of state or government at that time adopted a declaration of environmental and consumer protection policy at the Paris summit, in which they emphasized the importance of a Community environmental policy. As a result, the first of four consecutive action programs was adopted, preferring prevention rather than cure. Furthermore, the first environment ministries were founded.<sup>153</sup>

The European Environment Agency defines the 1970s as the decade of the environmental movement not only due to the first European steps towards a common environmental policy and the abovementioned developments of the United Nations but also due to numerous efforts in other parts of

---

<sup>148</sup> Ibid, p. 92ff.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid, p. 95.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> *Commission Staff Working Paper - Implementing Policy for External Trade in the Fields of Standards and Conformity Assessment: A Tool Box of Instruments* (Brussels: European Commission, 28 September 2001), p. 10f.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 100f.

<sup>153</sup> Website ‘1970s’, *European Environment Agency*.

the world.<sup>154</sup> In 1970, the independent US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was founded followed by several legal acts adopted by Congress in favor of the environment, such as the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Pesticide Control Act of 1972, the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972, and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976.<sup>155</sup> In 1971, the well-known international environmental organization Greenpeace was founded and in 1974 scientists suggested for the first time that chlorofluorocarbons might be harmful for the ozone layer.<sup>156</sup>

Since the Paris summit in 1972, the EU has adopted more than 200 legal acts to prevent environmental degradation. Furthermore, environmental policy was anchored in primary law with the Single European Act 1987. The subsequent treaties strengthened environmental competences of the EU even more. The principle of sustainable development was embedded in the Treaty of Maastricht 1993 and declared as one of the top priorities of the Union in Amsterdam in 1999.<sup>157</sup> Meanwhile, the seventh environmental action program is in force until 2020, including the request that Europeans will not only live in prosperity by 2050 but will also respect the ecological limits of the planet.<sup>158</sup>

In the context of taking environmental measures to the European level and its analysis from a multi-level perspective, the co-decision procedure including the right of initiative of the Commission and the decision-making power of Parliament is an essential element. The procedure sets the institutional framework for the collaboration of national and European actors – the influence of Commission and Parliament complements and restricts the negotiating strength of the Council of Ministers, where decision-making follows the logic of international negotiations. In that sense, national governments represent interests defined on a national level, but the positions of the Parliament and the Commission need to be considered. Accordingly, the culture of consensus orientation is useful for the negotiations. Instead of insisting on individual principles, actors often propose compromises.<sup>159</sup>

The second crucial procedure in the field of European environmental policy is the comitology. Under this procedure, some decisions are delegated to the Commission to relieve the committees of “high politics”. Nevertheless, committees of the Council are engaged to maintain a certain level of control. In these committees, national representatives and staff of the Commission jointly take decisions. National interests are thus respected, and at the same time participants are usually highly interested in finding solutions.<sup>160</sup> Overall, the decision-making procedures of the EU show that European environmental policy involves a variety of actors. The number of actors increasingly raises the question if interest groups are taken into account. Their activities range from informing actors to attempting blockades of decisions.<sup>161</sup>

In practical terms, environmental policy has been Europeanized in the last decades. The fact that developments of positive coordination could be reached in spite of vulnerability to blockades might possibly be due to the special constellation of environmental actors. In particular, the Commission as a European actor is not party-politically biased and considers environmental policy as a field in which

---

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> Diori L. Kreske, *Environmental Impact Statements: A Practical Guide for Agencies, Citizens, and Consultants* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996), p. 51f.

<sup>156</sup> Website ‘1970s’.

<sup>157</sup> Werner Weidenfeld, *Europa von A bis Z: Taschenbuch der europäischen Integration*, 13 ed. (Baden: Nomos, 2014), p. 426ff.

<sup>158</sup> European Commission, ‘Von Jetzt Bis 2020: Das Neue Umweltaktionsprogramm Der EU’, 29 April 2014.

<sup>159</sup> Bongardt, p. 52f.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, p. 53.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid, p. 54f.

firstly joint actions are especially appropriate due to the cross-border character of problems, secondly a regulatory competence through the internal market can be justified due to the close relation to market rules, and thirdly the EU yields positive coordination which citizens in general consider reasonable.<sup>162</sup> Members of the Commission and Parliament meet national environment ministers in the Council of Ministers. The latter can consider the European level as a forum, in which the influence of other sectoral ministers is rather limited. This allows the enforcement of environmental policy over interests of other policy fields. Hence, environmental policy is a field fitting very well with the goals of the EU on the one hand, and is decided in arenas providing favorable constellation of actors facilitated by common interests in positive coordination, on the other hand.<sup>163</sup>

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has supported the favorable conditions of environmental policy by a jurisdiction widening the principles of the common market to environmental aspects. The mode of political interdependence is thus coined by supranational decisions of the ECJ. In addition, there are adjustment and coordination mechanisms in terms of diffusion resulting in different strategic options for European environmental policy. If national environmental actors fear a race to the bottom in the context of mutual adaption, centralization can be aspired. Besides starting a European legislation process, cases can occasionally be taken to the ECJ and thus hierarchical decisions on the EU level can be reached. However, if agreements in terms of the co-decision procedure are unlikely, members can refer to the open method of coordination.<sup>164</sup>

In the realm of regulation, essential impulses are given on the EU-level and implemented on the national level. However, the examples of the ecology tax or the Renewable Energy Act show that environmental innovations on the national level potentially have international effects. Introduced by the German government, these innovations were also enforced in other member states by national decisions following the logic of mutual adaption. The spread of CO<sub>2</sub> or energy taxes in Europe shows that centralized activities were only of limited success due to oppositions of individual countries. This is not true for every environmental measure. Emission limits, for example, are predominantly regulated on the EU level. The main reason for this is that they are connected with the Common Market. Uncoordinated regulations on the national level would frequently cause competitive disadvantages for national businesses. Thus, centralized solutions appear advantageous in this area.<sup>165</sup>

European environmental policy is essential in the context of globalization since locational competition does not primarily occur between EU countries but in particular between EU and third countries. The degree of environmental protection is comparatively higher in the EU. Therefore, the question is to what extent European environmental policy reduces states' adjustment pressure in the locational competition through centralized regulation. The absence of European regulation would make a race to the bottom in many areas not only possible but very likely.<sup>166</sup>

Indubitably, the EU is a very essential and unprecedented form of a regional organization, but it is by far not the only one. The **Organization of American States** (OAS), for example, is the oldest regional organization in the world, having roots in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. From October 1889 to April 1890, the first international conference of American states was held, establishing the Inter-American system. The

---

<sup>162</sup> Ibid, p. 66.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid, p. 66f.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid, p. 68.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid, p. 69.



OAS itself was founded in 1948 with the signing of the Charter of the OAS, entering into force in 1951. Today, it comprises 35 independent states of the Americas and is considered as the main political, juridical, and social governmental forum in this hemisphere.<sup>167</sup> The environmental efforts by the OAS date back to the summit of the Americas on sustainable development in Bolivia in 1996. In the declaration, the heads of state and government refer to the Rio Declaration 1992 and the Agenda 21 and formulate the aim to concretely strengthen sustainable development. In that sense, they stressed the task of developing a strategy to support public participation in decision-making processes for sustainable development<sup>168</sup>, which resulted in a plan of action including several initiatives on health and education, sustainable agriculture and forests, sustainable cities and communities, water resources and coastal areas, and energy and minerals.<sup>169</sup> So far, the OAS has established special ministerial conferences, meetings, expert groups and supra-institutional working groups to support environmental and sustainable goals.<sup>170</sup>

The **African Union** (AU) was launched in 2002 replacing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and currently consists of 54 member states.<sup>171</sup> One of its main targets is the promotion of sustainable development, enshrined in the Agenda 2063, the strategic framework for the socio-economic transformation of the continent over the next decades. Among other previous and current initiatives for growth and sustainable development, it includes the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which was established in 2001. The primary objects of NEPAD are to stop the marginalization of the continent in the globalization process, combat poverty, and guide African countries on their way to sustainable growth and development. The priority of environmental protection is accepted by the program, which has received international acknowledgement and solidarity assurances of the United Nations, the G8, and the EU, among others.<sup>172</sup>

The list of regional organizations dealing with environmental issues can be extended with the **Central American Commission on Environment and Development** (CCAD). The CCAD was founded in 1989 to improve the regional cooperation in environmental and development issues. Since then, it has adopted various regional agreements concerning the preservation of biological diversity, climate change, management and preservation of forest ecosystems, and other areas.<sup>173</sup> Finally, the **Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation** (APEC) is noteworthy, which was also founded in 1989 as a response to the growing interdependence of Asia's and Pacific economies. The organization includes three main environmental areas in their general work, namely the pollution of air, atmosphere and water, the exploitation of resources, and the consequences of demographic changes such as rural depopulation, food security and urbanization.<sup>174</sup>

### 3.3. States in international regimes

Although it has been argued that the importance and influence of states has decreased compared to earlier times or other theoretical approaches other than global governance, states cannot be omitted in

---

<sup>167</sup> 'Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development', OAS, 2009.

<sup>168</sup> *Declaration of Santa Cruz de La Sierra* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia: Organization of American States, 8 December 1996).

<sup>169</sup> *Plan of Action for the Sustainable Development of the Americas* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia: Organization of American States, 8 December 1996).

<sup>170</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 103.

<sup>171</sup> Website 'History of the OAU and AU', *African Union*.

<sup>172</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 104.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid*, p. 106.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid*, p. 104f.

the concept and still play an important role in governing environmental issues. One of their most important activities in this regard is the negotiation of regimes. In this process, the roles of states can be summarized in four categories. Firstly, states can assume a leadership role in environmental questions if they are driven by a strong need for efficient international action. Leading states push the negotiating process by presenting their own concept of environmental actions as a basis for agreement and strive for the support of other state actors. Secondly, supportive states take a favorable position towards the proposal of the leading state. Thirdly, decisive states (in votes) impose conditions following their own national interest for their consent. Such a condition could be a longer deadline for the termination of production and usage of a certain resource, for example. However, decisive states do not impose conditions potentially weakening the regime. Finally, blocking states either openly fight proposed environmental regimes or try to weaken them.<sup>175</sup>

Decisive or blocking roles are often used tactically. The threat of a veto is sometimes used to strengthen the own negotiating position as shown in the example of India and China: At the second meeting of the contracting parties of the Montreal protocol in London 1990, the two states refused to accede to the agreement of withdrawing chlorofluorocarbons by 2010. They only agreed when the industrialized countries promised financial and technical assistance to developing countries.<sup>176</sup>

A leading role is not necessarily occupied by a single state. Sweden and Norway, for example, simultaneously have advocated a long-term cross-border agreement on air pollution. However, Germany in the context of climate change 1990 and Canada in a fishery issue 1992 showed that frequently only one state is paramount in pushing a certain measure.<sup>177</sup> There are several ways for leading states to convince other state actors in global environmental issues. A leading state can finance, commission or call attention to research the problem and indicates its urgency. In the case of acid rain, Swedish research proved serious damages resulting from it. States can also attempt to inform the public, as Canada did distributing brochures about the acidification of Canadian forests and waters to US tourists aimed at collaboration with US organizations. Furthermore, diplomatic influence can be used to persuade international organizations to prioritize certain issues. In that sense, the USA and Canada succeeded in convincing the OECD to include the ozone problem and chlorofluorocarbons in their policies. Similarly, the worldwide network of NGOs can be used to strengthen other countries' position in international conferences. Diplomatic means can also be used to take measures against states threatening them with veto as the USA did to Japan with reference to African ivory. Finally, leading states can also commit themselves to provide financial or technical means to obtain developing countries' support.<sup>178</sup>

Depending on the negotiated topic, states have different positions. A strong dedication to one environmental issue does not necessarily mean the endorsement of environmental actions in other areas. Even within the course of negotiations, the role of countries can change. The decision which position a country pursues depends on domestic political factors and on relative costs and benefits of the proposal. In addition, the anticipation of international political consequences (worldwide prestige) occasionally influences the decision.<sup>179</sup>

---

<sup>175</sup> Ibid, p. 63f.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid, p. 64.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid, p. 65f.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid, p. 66.

Domestic political factors largely depend on economic interests and ideological tendencies. In other words, powerful domestic economic and bureaucratic actors as well as the attitude of voters towards environmental issues influence a government's decision to reject, support or push a proposal. Economic interests proved to be particularly relevant in the uptake of veto roles. The Norwegian fishing industry claimed that its fishing quota suffered from the international whale protection and successfully influenced the Norwegian government to protect whaling in the international community.<sup>180</sup> However, a strong domestic environmental movement does not guarantee a leading role of the corresponding state actor. The environmental movement in the USA, for example, ranks among the largest and best organized ones in the world, but has not been able to demonstrate great successes in domestic policy with regard to the Kyoto protocol or the ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity or the Conventions of Basel, Rotterdam or Stockholm. US participation in such agreements is rather opposed by other powerful interests and lobby groups. On the other hand, the absence of an effective domestic environmental movement increases the probability of states blocking international regimes or taking a decisive role. In comparison to American or European ones, Japanese NGOs are underrepresented. Furthermore, under the Japanese political system it is hardly possible for interest groups to influence politics without political connections at the top level. For this reason, the Japanese government has faced little political pressure to support regimes on African elephants, whaling or drift-net fishing.<sup>181</sup>

Relative costs and potential risks as well as benefits of environmental regimes also influence the definition of domestic interests. Increased vulnerability through consequences of environmental damages can induce individual countries to promote global measures or even assume a leading role in the negotiations. 32 small island states were directly concerned by the rise of the sea level in consequence of global warming and therefore formed the Alliance of Small Island States 1990 to engage more effectively in climate negotiations. Costs for the implementation of an agreed regime vary greatly. The influence of these differences on states' roles is illustrated by the negotiations of the Montreal Protocol 1987. The UNEP chairman recognized that the difficulties in the negotiations were not about the question if the environment was threatened or not, but rather about who outclassed whom. The USA was ahead of EU states and Japan because they had already prohibited sprays containing substances that were ozone depleting and had developed substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons. For this reason, the USA supported the claim of the Nordic states and Canada for a prohibition of chlorofluorocarbons sprays. Western Europe and Japan rejected the prohibition since technological alternatives had not been available. The Soviet Union was also against the idea to withdraw chlorofluorocarbons from circulation due to the lack of development possibilities of alternatives. China and India, producing chlorofluorocarbons in small amounts but facing a production increase at that time feared that the conversion to ozone-friendly chemicals would imply high costs. The anticipated costs of implementation were also a crucial point in the negotiations that later on led to the Kyoto protocol. Some countries could reach greenhouse gas emissions more cost-effectively than others. EU countries, partially importing fossil fuels, had learned to reduce energy consumption without jeopardizing economic growth. Hence, they faced relatively low costs of implementation and pushed the negotiations for the protocol.<sup>182</sup>

Another factor influencing the role of states is potential gains or losses in international relations, in a broader sense. A state can hope for international prestige by assuming a leading role, or choose not to

---

<sup>180</sup> Ibid, p. 66f.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid, p. 70.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid, p. 71ff.

insist on a veto in order to prevent international isolation or damages in relations to other countries, for which environmental issues are of greater importance. In the past, worries about a state's reputation in the international community were limited to the area of international security. In the early 1990s, states started to utilize leading roles in global environmental protection as a mechanism to improve the international status. During the climate summit of 1992, the USA was the only nation declining the Convention on Biodiversity, thus damaging their reputation. Although Germany and Japan shared the US concerns, they did not put their veto to use fearing image losses. Canada at least partly ratified the Kyoto protocol in 2002 to protect their progressive environmental image.<sup>183</sup>

### 3.4. Think global, act local – Local actors

As mentioned earlier, international organizations increasingly stress the involvement of **local actors** in environmental actions. Indeed, environmental engagement of cities, federal states and municipalities seems to rise. One approach to underline the importance of local measures is the fact that cities constitute a large proportion of greenhouse gases, especially because of traffic being the largest source of carbon dioxide emissions. It is expected that effective municipal policy has the potential to reduce traffic's share in carbon emissions. This perhaps has been the leitmotiv for 132 mayors of larger US cities in May 2005, who were disappointed by the refusal of the Bush administration to ratify the Kyoto protocol and launched an initiative to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by seven per cent from 1990 levels in less than ten years. The participating cities were liberal strongholds such as Los Angeles as well as traditionally conservative cities in Texas. The reduction of greenhouse gases has taken place in several US cities. In Seattle, all cruise ships coming into port must turn off their engines while loading stocks and use the electricity provided by the city, in Utah the city administration of Salt Lake City is the largest purchaser of wind energy, and in New York the urban fleet is enlarged by hydrogen driven vehicles.<sup>184</sup>

Greenhouse gas emission reduction measures feature more prominently on the level of US federal states. There has been a remarkable increase of states introducing the renewable portfolio standard, basing its electricity on renewable sources to a certain degree. California has announced its goal to obtain 20% of its energy from renewable sources by 2017 and has established limits for greenhouse gases in the automotive industry. In 2003, nine US states launched the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a market-based program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions with the help of a cap and trade program. It mainly concerns CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of power plants in the region. Participating industrial companies are allocated emission contingents of one ton of CO<sub>2</sub>, whereby polluters can either reduce their emissions or buy additional allocations from other companies. New Jersey has committed itself to reduce greenhouse gases to three and a half percent below the value of 1990 by 2020. The regional cap and trade program supports all participating states to reach such targets as well.<sup>185</sup>

On the European level, the Climate Alliance is a prominent example for the integration of the local level in global environmental politics. The alliance is a network currently of more than 1,700 cities, municipalities and districts as well as NGOs and other organizations from 20 European countries, which have committed themselves to protect the world climate.<sup>186</sup> The program follows international agreements and this is underlined by the targets defined as follows: members of the alliance aim to

---

<sup>183</sup> Ibid, p. 73f.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid, p. 75.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid, p. 75f.

<sup>186</sup> Website 'Our Members', *Climate Alliance*.

reduce greenhouse gas emissions continuously, preferably by ten percent every five years. The associated milestone is to halve the per capita emissions by 2030. In the long-term, a sustainable level of two and a half tons CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent emissions per capita and year is to be achieved. Energy saving, energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy sources are the cornerstones to reach that target. However, the Climate Alliance emphasizes that municipalities alone cannot reach this goal. On the contrary, concerted efforts by all decision-making levels (EU, national states, regional councils) are needed.<sup>187</sup> Cooperation with the regional level is underlined by the execution of an EU funded project contributing to the realization of the MDGs.<sup>188</sup>

The Climate Alliance supports local authorities in their climate protection efforts by a set of tools and methods. The Climate Compass method is described as a roadmap for the development of local action plans. Its main focus is to identify possible climate measures and implement them short-dated. The Compass also lays the foundation for a long-term commitment to climate change policies. This includes a variety of policy options for local climate protection in various fields, such as transport, agriculture or forestry. The method follows a five step approach, starting with the initiation – including activities relating to the information of relevant departments, clarifying needs and expectations, and raising awareness of local climate change policies – followed by an analysis of the setting and institutionalization (building organizational structures). Finally, the climate action plan is to define targets and select priority measures, which in the final stage are monitored with the help of indicators.<sup>189</sup> Another method is energy and CO<sub>2</sub> monitoring, including the Internet based tool ECORegion, which allows for the calculation of municipal energy and CO<sub>2</sub> inventories and monitoring their achievements.<sup>190</sup> Finally, the tool of Climate Cities Benchmark addresses mutual learning of local authorities and encourages stable conclusions with reference to the state and the effects of local climate protection efforts. It is based on four elements, namely city fact sheets with a brief overview of city characteristics and local circumstances, activity profiles to display local efforts, CO<sub>2</sub> emission display linked to the ECORegion tool, and a set of 17 indicators revealing the achievements.<sup>191</sup>

The Climate Alliance is involved in political campaigns against malpractices and engages in the field of public relations in different manifestations advocating renewable energy in the Amazonas region. In this context, projects of indigenous people are financially supported by the Climate Alliance.<sup>192</sup> This engagement for the Amazonas region seems surprising at first sight but was the basis for the “manifest of European cities”, when local representatives, environmental groups and scientists discussed the opportunities for local contributions to preserve the tropical living space in 1989, triggered by pictures of the burning Brazilian rainforest.<sup>193</sup> Although the above mentioned instruments indicate that the focus has slightly shifted, the Climate Alliance still pursues the target of linking environmental and North-South issues as well as local and global responsibilities by cooperation between indigenous peoples and European communities.<sup>194</sup>

---

<sup>187</sup> Website ‘Our Objectives’, *Climate Alliance*.

<sup>188</sup> Heiko Garrelts, ‘Organization Profile - Climate Alliance’, in *Routledge Handbook of the Climate Change Movement*, ed. by Matthias Dietz and Heiko Garrelts (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 249.

<sup>189</sup> Website ‘Climate Plan Development - Climate Compass’, *Climate Alliance*.

<sup>190</sup> Website ‘Energy and CO<sub>2</sub> Monitoring’, *Climate Alliance*.

<sup>191</sup> Website ‘Climate Cities Benchmark’, *Climate Alliance*.

<sup>192</sup> Garrelts, p. 249.

<sup>193</sup> Jörg Mayer-Ries, *Globalisierung lokaler Politik: Das „Klima-Bündnis“ europäischer Städte mit den indigenen Völkern Amazoniens* (Springer Verlag, 2013), p. 1ff.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

From a multi-level analytical perspective, it can be seen that political solution strategies for global environmental issues such as the Kyoto protocol are primarily negotiated on the international level. Especially the organizations and conferences of the United Nations are essential for this purpose and thus for the global (environmental) governance architecture. The regional level inter alia helps to observe and measure climate changes and relate them to worldwide changes. In this framework, the EU can be described as a secondary negotiating level since it succeeded in adopting several action programs and policies and was a key pillar in the negotiations for the Kyoto protocol. Besides its contribution to international agreements, the EU is of special interest for the multi-level analysis due to its special actor constellation. The European experiences about the advantages and challenges of supra-nationality are a valuable contribution to the development of global governance. On the national level, the climate protection commitments stipulated in international agreements are implemented by administrative and regulatory apparatuses. Finally, on the local level the claim of creating awareness and local actions is formulated. According to the documents of the Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC, this lowest level is the implementation level and thus essential in terms of global governance.<sup>195</sup>

### 3.5. The rise of NGOs

So far, environmental efforts of state actors on, above and below the national level in various formations have been discussed. But as mentioned in Chapter two, state actors do not have the monopoly on governance at the international and global level. In fact, global governance is also provided by **non-state actors**. Especially NGOs are considered essential links between local, national and international action areas. NGOs' influence on global environmental policy is based on three factors: Firstly, many NGOs have specialized in environmental protection. The longstanding experience in the field results in expert knowledge as well as fresh thinking. Secondly, they admittedly engage in targets crossing national or sectoral interests, and thirdly, NGOs represent domestically influential groups. Through mobilization of their supporters, NGOs can even exert influence on domestic policy.<sup>196</sup> Thus, NGOs play a central role in governments' assessments, how their political programs correspond to the predominant values of society, and in particular with regard to elections.<sup>197</sup> The existence of strong environmental movements can be a decisive factor for the definition of national interests represented in international regimes. In this way, the rise of environmental movements in Western Europe at least partly explains why Germany and France took a leading role in environmental issues in 1989. At this time the Western German Greens had gained over eight percent of votes at the election for the European Parliament and had already previously been a strong force in the German Parliament before.<sup>198</sup>

The structure of international NGOs varies from loose coalitions of national partners - the Friends of the Earth, for example, are a global network of presently 75 national member groups<sup>199</sup> - to organizations with rather centralized structures, such as Greenpeace as one of the world's largest NGOs with offices in 45 countries and more than three million members.<sup>200</sup> Even larger, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is another prominent, independent environmental NGO, having offices in more than 80

---

<sup>195</sup> Weber, p. 190f.

<sup>196</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 106f.

<sup>197</sup> Becker, John and Schirm, p. 170.

<sup>198</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 66f.

<sup>199</sup> Website 'About Us', *Friends of the Earth*.

<sup>200</sup> Website 'Greenpeace Stellt Sich Vor', *Greenpeace*.

countries around the world and employing around 6,200 full time staff. Since the organization was founded in 1961, it has invested over 11 billion USD in more than 13,000 projects.<sup>201</sup>

One of the NGOs' main functions in terms of political processes is the influence of the development, strengthening and implementation of international regimes. Such influence can be exercised using different methods: By raising new questions or redefining existing ones, NGOs can influence the global environmental agenda; NGOs can urge governments to take a more committed position towards a certain problem by organizing consumer boycotts and information campaigns; before a conference, text proposals for a convention can be formulated and distributed in the hope of formal support and its submission to national delegations; NGOs sometimes directly participate at international negotiations along with advocacy groups; they can simply draft reports; openly support the implementation of a regime, especially in developing countries; and monitor conventions and report developments to stakeholders. Sometimes the exercise of pressure is a useful way to influence international regimes or achieve changes in the policy of an essential actor. In the 1970s, for example, the Clean Air Coalition, a group of US environmental organizations, successfully committed to a national prohibition of sprays and the regulation of chlorofluorocarbons. By the endorsement of a complete ban of the substances before the negotiations for the Montreal Protocol started, they contributed to the US seizing a leading role.<sup>202</sup>

In particular, the great influence on the agenda setting of international regimes shows that NGOs are not only needed on the international stage as independent control bodies and sources of information, but they also make an important contribution to the democratization of international politics. Together with scientists and municipalities, NGOs visualized the serious environmental problems at the Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere 1988 and called for a solution of the international system. With regard to the regulation of policies on climate, NGOs ultimately have little influence. Today, the role of NGOs in problem-solving is commonly described as "watchdogs of globalization" along the political possibilities, which in turn are coined by interests of other actors and the balance of powers in international politics. However, the professionalization and internationalization of NGOs in the last decades has been a crucial strategic resource to be taken seriously after all.<sup>203</sup>

The internationalization of NGOs is underlined by the increasing connectedness and transnational collaboration of NGOs. One of the most important organizations in this context is the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), which is a unique union of both government and civil society organizations. It considers itself as the "world's largest and most diverse environmental framework" with about 1,300 member organizations and around 16,000 experts. Due to the association of various stakeholders and the provision of the latest scientific and objective recommendations, the IUCN provides a neutral forum in which NGOs, governments, scientists, companies, municipalities, indigenous peoples and other organizations can collaborate with the aim to develop solutions to global environmental challenges.<sup>204</sup> Another international network uniting members of different nations under one roof is the Climate Action Network (CAN) with over 1,100 NGOs in more than 120 countries. Its main goal is to limit human-induced climate change to

---

<sup>201</sup> Website 'WWF in Brief'.

<sup>202</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 116ff.

<sup>203</sup> Brunnengräber, p. 213f.

<sup>204</sup> Website 'About IUCN', *International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources*, 2014.

ecologically sustainable levels. The merger of NGOs, or stakeholders respectively, is intended to help facilitate coordination of individual efforts.<sup>205</sup>

The networks of NGOs mentioned above have already had extensive means of participation at the UNCED 1992, which were not only accepted but were advocated at the conference. This can be recognized in the Agenda 21, decided then, which emphasizes the importance of the involvement of NGOs in a separate chapter. On the European level, the European Environmental Bureau (EEB) was founded in 1974. With over 150 environmental organizations in more than 30 countries it represents the largest European federation of NGOs. Its field of activity ranges from the local to the national, European and international level. In this context, the office in Brussels coordinates EU-oriented activities with the members at the national stage, following the main targets of advocating and supporting EU policy on environmental protection and sustainable development by integrating environmental protection targets in horizontal and sectoral EU policy measures. On the global level, the EEB acts in coalitions with representatives of other organizations. The EEB's work addresses a variety of environmental issues and includes experts, scientists and politicians and aims to develop and protect environmental policies.<sup>206</sup>

In contrast to environmental NGOs in the global North, engagement for the environment in developing countries is mostly based on the experience of a "one-sided, unequal and environmentally damaging development process".<sup>207</sup> Central questions rather address human rights, ethnicity or distributive justice instead of ozone depletion or global warming. NGOs in the global South often organize activities against projects of multilateral banks or policies that possibly displace villagers or threaten rainforests like the World Bank resettlement projects in the rainforests of Brazil and Indonesia, farming projects in Central and South America and tobacco projects in Africa. Because of their critical attitude towards governments, NGO members who are committed to the environment are sometimes persecuted, politically suppressed or imprisoned.<sup>208</sup>

Many campaigns for the environment are still fought on the village level. However, some NGOs and coalitions in developing countries pursue a broader range of environmental protection and development issues. The Third World Network, for example, is an independent international network of organizations and individuals addressing issues of development, the third world, and North-South issues. Furthermore, the network also provides information services on climate change. NGOs in developing countries are also increasingly connecting themselves at the national level, as can be seen in the Indonesian Forum for Environment (WALHI). The Forum composes over 400 environmental NGOs and over 100 individuals nationwide and is a partner of the Friends of the Earth network.<sup>209</sup> Moreover, international coalitions of NGOs for certain topics are to be found. The Antarctic and Southern Oceans Coalition (ASOC) have around 30 member NGOs ensuring the survival of the global common Antarctic.<sup>210</sup>

Although the collaboration between North and South NGOs is not always easy, their cooperation is occasionally highly effective. In 1986, an alliance of US NGOs and indigenous activists called

---

<sup>205</sup> Website 'About CAN', *Climate Action Network International*.

<sup>206</sup> Website 'About EEB', *European Environmental Bureau*.

<sup>207</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 109.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid, p. 109f.

<sup>209</sup> Website 'Indonesia - Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia', *Friends of the Earth International*.

<sup>210</sup> Website 'About ASOC', *Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition*.



worldwide attention to Brazil's policy and managed to stop the "Polonoroeste project" of the World Bank, which had planned road and colonization projects in the Amazon region.<sup>211</sup> Similarly, North and South NGOs agreed on the necessity of restructuring the global environmental facility, an international partnership of 183 countries, international institutions, civil society organizations, and private sector.<sup>212</sup> The NGOs jointly criticized its administration by the World Bank during its pilot stage between 1991 and 1993 and claimed the establishment of an independent environmental facility secretariat as well as for a transparent and democratic process of project approval.<sup>213</sup>

The problematic relationship between the NGOs of developing and developed countries was reflected during negotiations on climate change in 1991. Southern NGOs complained they had not been consulted by their Northern counterparts when the latter claimed sharp reductions of carbon dioxide emissions. According to NGOs in developing countries, the reductions demanded would especially burden countries in the global South.<sup>214</sup>

An area still described as problematic by NGOs is the interaction of trade and environment. When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established after World War II, it defined the aim of removing customs and other trade barriers between contracting parties, but it did not provide any kind of observer status or other involvements of NGOs. Environmental activists fighting for greater transparency, participation and responsibility in the subsequent World Trade Organization (WTO) consider the latter as a secret organization without any sense of responsibility. They claim that the participation of NGOs would contribute to a more transparent and responsible world trade system. The unrealized hope that governments would negotiate more openly with development and environmental organizations finally ended in violent street protests during the ministerial talks in Seattle in 1999. Subsequently, the WTO did not comply with the NGOs' demand for participation, but organized its next meeting in Doha, Qatar, which hampered the company of NGOs and protesters because of strict visa regulations, restrictive security measures and high travel expenses.<sup>215</sup>

Within a smaller framework, environmental think tanks, mostly financed by individuals or by contracts, attempt to influence global environmental policies with the help of their technical know-how and research programs. One of the well-known think tanks is the World Resources Institute (WRI) that publishes reports on the global environment and studies about specific issues. The experts and staff collaborate closely with governments to put sustainable thoughts into practice.<sup>216</sup> The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), a policy and action research organization, declared its mission "to build a fairer, more sustainable world, using evidence, action, and influence in partnership with others".<sup>217</sup> The institute pointed out the connection between poverty and destruction of the environment in developing countries rather early.<sup>218</sup>

### 3.6. Private sector

The role of **private actors** in the global governance architecture can be discussed from two points of view. On the one hand, companies, especially multinational ones, are an essential aspect of

---

<sup>211</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 114.

<sup>212</sup> Website 'What Is the GEF', *Global Environment Facility*.

<sup>213</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 120.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid*, p. 114.

<sup>215</sup> *Ibid*, p. 121f.

<sup>216</sup> Website 'What We Do', *World Resources Institute*.

<sup>217</sup> Website 'About IIED', *International Institute for Environment and Development*.

<sup>218</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 109.

environmental policies since their core activities use resources and pollute the environment. Since climate protection measures usually affect negative environmental concomitants, they directly concern economic interests of the private sector. Logically, private companies generally have a negative attitude towards measures associated with high costs and reduced profits for them.<sup>219</sup> Having been reserved in the agenda setting and the politicization of the conflict area for a long time, the private sector realized the significance and threats of possible climate policy decisions for economic activities. At least since the preparatory works for the Kyoto protocol, the private sector shifted its role from a passive to an active actor.<sup>220</sup> Large corporations are potentially in the advantageous position to dampen the direct concern by influencing global environmental policy. They have direct access to decision-makers in most governments and international organizations and avail themselves of their technical know-how in certain issues to their favor. Organized in national and international industry associations, which represent political interests and are in decisive financial and technical funds to develop solution strategies, the private sector often attempts to weaken environmental regimes behind the scenes, such as those concerning the protection of the ozone or climate change.

However, interests of individual economic actors are anything but uniform. Sometimes international environmental agreements are supported if they provide looser regulation compared to the existing domestic legislation, for example. Corporations facing high environmental standards in their own country tend to advocate agreements that impose comparable stricter regulations on the competition in other countries.<sup>221</sup> A corporation's support or rejection does not only depend on existing regulation in the respective state, but can also be distinguished between branches. Conservative industries dependent on fossil fuels, such as the energy sector for oil, coal and gas or issuer of the steel, paper or cement industry are among the vehement opponents of climate agreements. Shortly before the conclusion of the negotiations for the Kyoto protocol, US industries successfully weakened the government's negotiating flexibility, for example. Several powerful industrial lobby groups formed the Global Climate Information Project (GCIP), which sowed doubt as to the enforceability of the emission control included in the protocol by advertising campaigns. The campaign claimed that emission controls would raise taxes on gasoline, fuel oil and consumer goods and would negatively affect the competitiveness of American industries. The coalition of industry and workers influenced the American senate to such an extent that it clearly voted for the resolution demanding that the president would not sign a protocol which provided greenhouse gas reductions without conditions for developing countries or damaged the American economy in any other way.<sup>222</sup> Generally, industry lobbies similar to NGOs try to influence negotiations on environmental regimes by providing information and analyses to delegations, which come closest to their objectives. The coal sector, for instance, is said to have advised delegations from the USA, Russia and Saudi Arabia on how to impede the negotiations on climate change.<sup>223</sup>

Financial service providers like consulting companies, emissions traders or banks as well as corporations acting in the field of renewable energy hope for stricter regulations and new markets for their products. This group benefits from environmental measures. Interestingly, the argumentation towards climate agreements of the two groups greatly differs but come to a similar conclusion. The former group conducting business with fossil fuels stresses the high economic costs and growth

---

<sup>219</sup> Ibid, p. 122.

<sup>220</sup> Brunnengräber, p. 215.

<sup>221</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 122f.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, p. 127.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid, p. 128.

preventing effects of implementing climate measures, while the latter refers to already high costs related to economic damages of the climate change and indicates that the late adaptation to climate change is hardly financeable.<sup>224</sup>

By influencing regimes, private actors have an impact on global environmental policy, which shapes governance structures and is not to be underestimated. On the other hand, multinational corporations directly exercise functions of governance themselves. Although their economic activities cause environmental problems, multinational corporations at the same time can use their economic and political power to contribute to the solution of these problems and thus govern environmental issues by self-regulation. The magic phrase in this context is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR usually refers to voluntary self-commitments and actions performed by companies. Starting in the 1990s, corporations have increasingly relied on codes of conduct and standards which inter alia concern sustainable development and with which their economic activities are to comply.<sup>225</sup> The increasing number and prestige of NGOs and the intensive public discussion about entrepreneurial conduct towards the environment (“naming and shaming”) are motives to follow CSR as well as image improvement or preventive measures for possible upcoming legislation. Considerations that avoid environmental pollution can be profitable, encouraging several CEOs to publicly support sustainable development and environmental protection regimes.<sup>226</sup>

The increasingly high expectations of multinational corporations are also connected to government structures in the global South, where many of such corporations are active. Since the state is often incapable or not willing to implement laws and regulations in favor of employees or the environment, pressure on corporations is exerted by civil society. It is argued that private actors could adhere to higher environmental and labor standards even without state regulation.<sup>227</sup> International organizations do their part by proposing guidelines, which private actors follow because of public pressure. The other way round, international organizations also count on private actors to support their policies and programs.

As early as 1991, the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a group of 48 top managers representing multinational corporations, was established at the request of the UNCED secretary general. This group supports the SDGs and claims that prices of goods should reflect the ecological costs of their production, usage, recycling and disposal. Together with the World Industry Council for the Environment (WICE), an initiative of the international chamber of commerce, the WBCSD formed a coalition of presently over 170 international corporations. They jointly engage in sustainable development.<sup>228</sup>

The largest cross-industry initiative for the promotion of responsible corporate action is the UN Global Compact (UNGC). The agreement between the United Nations and private corporations was founded by the former UN secretary General Kofi Annan in 1999. It came into force in 2000 aiming to create a sustainable and inclusive global economy. To reach that ambitious target, 8,700 participating companies from 165 countries<sup>229</sup> are supported to align their strategies with ten principles, which

---

<sup>224</sup> Brunnengräber, p. 215.

<sup>225</sup> Melanie Coni-Zimmer and Annegret Flohr, ‘Transnationale Unternehmen: Problemverursacher Und Lösungspartner?’, *Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung*, 2013.

<sup>226</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 131f.

<sup>227</sup> Tanja A. Börzel, *Governance With/out Government*, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series No.23, 2010.

<sup>228</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 131f.

<sup>229</sup> Website ‘United Nations Global Compact’.

include categories such as human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption<sup>230</sup>, and take further strategic actions in light of broader societal goals, such as the SDGs. The category of environment is covered by three principles. Principle seven introduces the “precautionary approach” to businesses. This approach was already enshrined in the Rio Declaration of 1992 (Principle 15) and clearly states that lack of full scientific certainty is not an excuse for delaying actions for environmental protection. In other words, companies must not wait for conclusive proof to take preventive measures whenever serious environmental damage is to be expected. In practical terms, precaution includes the systematic use of risk assessment, management and communication.<sup>231</sup> Principle eight refers to chapter 30 of Agenda 21, suggesting enterprises undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility and thus be “good actors” in the community. It can be described as the next logical step for companies after accepting principle seven, since the inclusion of environmental issues into the management level is provided.<sup>232</sup> Finally, principle nine concerns the development and spread of environmentally sound technologies, again referring to Agenda 21. Complying with this principle, companies need to ensure cleaner production processes, pollution prevention, recycling of their waste and products, and other forms of actions to burden the environment less.<sup>233</sup>

An example of a corporation following environmental principles of the UNGC is the Swedish textile giant H&M. The clothing company uses chemicals such as chemical dyes, commonly used in the textile industry. Following principle seven of the UNGC, H&M has launched a chemical restriction policy to limit the use of such chemicals in their products. According to the H&M environment and CSR manager, the company followed the strictest regulations of all the countries H&M was retailing in and followed the precautionary principle. Meanwhile, the list of chemicals that must not be used or should be used only nominally in the production process includes over 170 items and is regularly revised. Although H&M’s contribution to environmental protection is just a simple list of chemicals, it has far reaching consequences beyond the corporation’s facilities. Its whole supply chain has to follow these rules, or at least all the producing companies involved in it. At the start of the collaboration with H&M, suppliers need to sign the chemical restriction commitment and additionally have to endure regular testing procedures, giving samples to approved laboratories which screen the input materials. Since around 70,000 sample analyses are necessary annually, H&M bears the expenses of these at nearly 1.75 million USD. As a positive result, the H&M policy has widened the precautionary principle to many other companies taking into account that supplying H&M also requires suppliers of the suppliers comply with the chemical restrictions.<sup>234</sup>

It can be seen as a major achievement that the UNGC got private actors to accept principles directly derived from international law, in fact without interposing national authorities. However, this indicates the acknowledgement that the international community cannot overcome global (environmental) challenges without the participation of enterprises. This is one reason why the UNGC is well accepted as an integral part of global governance<sup>235</sup> and once more underlines the importance of the private sector within its structure.

---

<sup>230</sup> Website ‘The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact’, *United Nations Global Compact*.

<sup>231</sup> Gregory C. Unruh, ‘The United Nations Global Compact Environmental Principles: Achievements, Trends and Challenges’, in *The United Nations Global Compact: Achievements, Trends and Challenges*, ed. by Andreas Rasche and Georg Kell (Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 67f.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69f.

<sup>233</sup> Website ‘Principle 9: Environment’, *United Nations Global Compact*.

<sup>234</sup> Unruh, p. 75f.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 59f.

The OECD became active in the field of CSR much earlier and drafted the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, a code of conduct for responsible worldwide corporate actions, in 1976.<sup>236</sup> After the discontinuation of the negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MAI) in 1998, which governments had introduced at the annual meeting of the OECD Council at ministerial level in 1995, the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were revised and extended in 2000.<sup>237</sup> The special feature of the revision was the support and involvement of the business community, labor representatives and NGOs.<sup>238</sup> The 2011 update of the guidelines constitutes the fifth and latest revision and consists of ten chapters besides the general principles and concepts. One of the categories addresses the environment and includes eight specific recommendations for action. The overarching goal recommends corporations to operate in a way that contributes to sustainable development and thereby respects the need to protect the environment.<sup>239</sup> The eight concrete sub-items are supposed to address the general aim and guide corporations in their actions towards it. One of them suggests the establishment or maintenance of a system of environmental management adapted to the company. Such a system *inter alia* consists of the collection and evaluation of appropriate and relevant information about possible environmental and other impacts of its activities, and the setting and monitoring of measurable targets.<sup>240</sup>

To further underpin the guidelines, the OECD has established an institutional framework consisting of National Contact Points and the OECD Investment Committee. National Contact Points must be established in all participating countries, which comprise 34 OECD member states and 12 additional states, which have committed themselves to promote and implement the guidelines for responsible conduct under international law.<sup>241</sup> The main function of national contact points is to assist the effectiveness of the guidelines. This includes the execution of promotional activities, handling enquires, and contribution to problem-solving in cases, where the guidelines were not observed.<sup>242</sup> From an analytical perspective, the institutionalization of the national level follows the purpose of multi-level governance, since the OECD not only acts at the international level but also involves national actors. Additionally, the supranational level is involved in form of the EU, which supports the guidelines as an observer.<sup>243</sup>

The Austrian National Contact Point, for example, is the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy, which defines its core tasks as raising the awareness of the OECD guidelines, engaging in their implementation and increased application, and maintaining the exchange of experience and collaboration with other National Contact Points. This means it is a reliable contact for enterprises, civil society, and other interested actors. To fulfill these tasks, the Austrian National Contact Point regularly organizes information events and workshops and drafts reports of national progress and activities to the OECD.<sup>244</sup>

---

<sup>236</sup> Website ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, *OECD*.

<sup>237</sup> Website ‘Multilateral Agreement on Investment’, *OECD*.

<sup>238</sup> *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Statement Made on the Adoption of the Review 2000* (OECD, 27 June 2000), p. 4.

<sup>239</sup> ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (OECD Publishing, 2011), p. 42.

<sup>240</sup> ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, p. 42.

<sup>241</sup> Website ‘OECD-Leitsätze Für Multinationale Unternehmen Und Der Österreichische Nationale Kontaktpunkt’, *Bundesministerium Für Wissenschaft, Forschung Und Wirtschaft*.

<sup>242</sup> Website ‘National Contact Points’, *OECD*.

<sup>243</sup> ‘National Contact Points’.

<sup>244</sup> ‘OECD-Leitsätze Für Multinationale Unternehmen Und Der Österreichische Nationale Kontaktpunkt’.

The OECD Investment Committee manages the OECD liberalization instruments concerning international investment and services. Its goals include the promotion of liberalization towards international capital movements, international direct investment and multinational enterprises as well as the facilitation of international cooperation in this context. To reach these objectives, the Committee performs a variety of tasks, such as the provision of a forum in which current issues can be discussed among policy-makers and administrators from OECD and non-OECD countries, also consulting representatives of business, NGOs and labor in conferences or roundtables; monitoring the observance of rules with regard to the OECD Codes of Liberalization and other OECD documents about international investment and multinational enterprises; developing new regulations where necessary; and the preparation of analysis of trends in investment flows.<sup>245</sup>

Building upon the UNGC principles, the OECD guidelines and the *UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights*, the *ISO 26000 Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility* (giving recommendations for corporate responsible behavior) and the *Tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy* of the ILO, the European Commission developed a renewed EU strategy for CSR in 2011. The new definition of CSR according to the European Commission is “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”.<sup>246</sup> In order to fully meet CSR, corporations should integrate a set of concerns including environmental ones into their business operations and economic strategies in cooperation with their stakeholders. The agenda for action 2011 does not only contain recommendations for corporations, EU states, and further stakeholder groups, but also commitments from the European Commission itself. It comprises in total eight targets, in which particular characteristics (limited resources) of small and medium enterprises are taken into account.<sup>247</sup> In order to emphasize the importance of national and sub-national CSR policies, the Commission acknowledges that public policy measures are best performed at national and local level. Local authorities are instructed to make appropriate and prudent use of EU structural funds to strengthen the growth of CSR. The Commission’s commitment in this field is to establish a peer review mechanism for national CSR policies together with member states.<sup>248</sup>

The inexhaustive list of private sector agreement in favor of sustainability clearly reveals that companies can no longer act regardless of the environment but rather bear great responsibility across borders. This development is largely influenced by the increased possibilities of NGOs to exert pressure on multinational corporations. The presence of UN initiatives, OECD guidelines or EU strategies also shows that the private sector cannot be regarded independently but is highly interconnected to other actors in the global governance structure.

---

<sup>245</sup> Website ‘OECD Investment Committee’, *OECD*.

<sup>246</sup> *A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility* (Brussels: European Commission, 25 October 2011), p. 6.

<sup>247</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8ff.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid*, p. 12.

## 4. CASE STUDY: AGENDA 21

Agenda 21 is an action program for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, adopted at the UNCED 1992. The participants at the conference made clear that sustainable development could only be reached through a global program. The Agenda includes a variety of areas in which mankind impacts the environment and provides detailed mandates to counteract the environmental degradation and the degradation of the situation of mankind in general as well as to promote sustainability. The Agenda is taken as an example for global governance in this chapter, since it is a global agreement committing different actors on several levels. The preamble of the UN document explicitly provides that the successful implementation of the political commitment to collaborate in the fields of environment and development is primarily the responsibility of governments. Therefore, national strategies, plans, measures and processes are necessary. The efforts taken at national level are to be supported and complemented by international cooperation, whereby the system of the United Nations has to play a central role. Furthermore, other international, regional and sub-regional organizations are invited to contribute to these efforts. Also, non-state organizations and private actors are to be involved.<sup>249</sup>

### 4.1. Agenda 21 and global governance

The strengthening of the role of various actors is covered by a total of ten chapters. Thereby, the decisive character of the engagement and involvement of all societal groups for the effective implementation of objectives, policies and mechanisms, which were agreed on jointly by governments in all the different program areas in the Agenda 21 is once more illustrated. Especially the opportunity for individuals, groups and organizations to participate in environmental decision-making and gain access to relevant information is highlighted. In particular measures affecting the respective communities need to be pillared by the public.<sup>250</sup>

Another chapter emphasizes the vital role of NGOs in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy. Because of their importance, formal and informal organizations should be treated as partners when implementing Agenda 21. A major challenge for the world community in transforming unsustainable development patterns into environmentally friendly and sustainable development is to establish a sense of common purpose throughout societies. In this context, the global network established by NGOs is especially valuable, along with their expertise and experience in the field. Society, governments and international bodies are responsible for developing patterns so that NGOs can realize their conceded partnership effectively and thus strengthen the role of NGOs within the framework of the Agenda. Governments should take corresponding measures, such as facilitating communication between local NGOs and local authorities or involving NGOs in national mechanisms making use of NGOs' capacities.<sup>251</sup>

Agenda 21 also dedicates a whole chapter to local authorities. Their participation and contributions are crucial since many issues addressed by the Agenda have their roots on the local level. Probably the most important objective for local authorities is the implementation of the Agenda in the respective communities. This includes a dialogue with the local residents, reaching consensus on a "local Agenda 21". With the help of the international community, cooperation between local municipalities is to be

---

<sup>249</sup> *United Nations Conference on Environment & Development Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992 - Agenda 21* (Rio de Janeiro: United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 1992), chap. 1.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid*, chap. 23.

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid*, chap. 27.

improved. The United Nations expects that local authorities profit from the contributions of the community, companies and industrial organizations in this process to identify the best strategies.<sup>252</sup>

Overall, the Agenda includes 40 chapters structured into four sections: social and economic dimensions, conservation and management of resources for development, strengthening the role of major groups, including the previously discussed chapters on NGOs and local authorities, and means of implementation. The chapters in turn are structured into concrete program areas, consisting of the basis for action, objectives, activities and means of implementation. Besides the involvement of various actors, chapter one stresses the urgency of a global partnership and measures, which is explicitly stated in Article 1.1., with clear words:

*“Humanity stands at a defining moment in history. We are confronted with a perpetuation of disparities between and within nations, a worsening of poverty, hunger, ill health and illiteracy, and the continuing deterioration of the ecosystems on which we depend for our well-being. However, integration of environment and development concerns and greater attention to them will lead to the fulfilment of basic needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future. No nation can achieve this on its own; but together we can - in a global partnership for sustainable development.”*<sup>253</sup>

*Agenda 21, Art. 1.1*

Objectives concerning the environment are mentioned explicitly or indirectly in most chapters. Chapter nine, protection of the atmosphere, touches upon an environmental area directly. It advises governments and other bodies to consider the options and measures described in the chapter in their efforts to protect the atmosphere and implicate them, where appropriate. The four program areas in this field are: addressing the uncertainties and improving the scientific base for decision-making; promoting sustainable development in different areas like energy or transportation; preventing stratospheric ozone depletion; and transboundary atmospheric pollution. Within each of these program areas, the basis for action precisely describes the prevailing situation. In the field of trans-boundary atmospheric pollution, for instance, the document discusses its negative consequences on human health and detrimental environmental consequences like forest loss and the acidification of water bodies. Also, difficulties with reliable emissions data and atmospheric pollution monitoring networks outside Europe and North America are addressed, which hampers the determination of cross-border air pollution. In light of these challenges, six specific objectives are formulated, including the development and usage of pollution control and measurement technologies as well as generating alternative technologies in favor of the environment. To reach the objectives, different activities are recommended, which governments are bound to implement at the compatible level in collaboration with the respective UN bodies, NGOs, the private sector and financial institutions. In the present program area, one of the activities is the establishment or strengthening of early warning systems and response mechanisms for trans-boundary air pollution with regard to industrial accidents and natural disasters. Finally, the means of implementation for the protection of the atmosphere include international and regional cooperation, capacity building, human resource development and financial and cost evaluation.<sup>254</sup>

---

<sup>252</sup> Ibid, chap. 28.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid, chap. 1.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid, chap. 9.



## 4.2. Building process and implementation

As mentioned, the United Nations intend an implementation of the Agenda 21 into a local Agenda 21 by local authorities. To illustrate the local Agenda building process and its implementation, the Japanese prefecture Kanagawa is taken as an example. Kanagawa has a population of about 8 million inhabitants and is a highly populated and highly developed region of Japan with major industrial centers in Yokohama and Kawasaki. In 1992, the prefecture constituted the local Agenda 21 planning framework, called Agenda 21 Kanagawa. Within the regional administration structure, the environment department was responsible for the organization, planning and preparation of meetings as well as finally drafting the Agenda 21 Kanagawa.<sup>255</sup>

At first, the prefecture established an expert's advisory panel consisting of ten eminent members representing the scientific and academic community to observe the process and comment the final document. In the end, the panel assembled five times during the Agenda building process. In addition, several meetings of key organizations in the region were part of the progression. The key organizations can be classified into three sectoral committees consisting of representatives of citizens' and non-governmental organizations, the private sector and local municipalities, respectively. The citizens' committee covered 43 key groups and NGOs, the private sector was represented by six economic and trade associations (for instance the local chamber of commerce) and the local municipalities delegated representatives of all 37 city, town, and village authorities within the region. The three bodies contributed different concrete proposals to shape the local Agenda 21 building process and exchanged views and information on progress at round table meetings throughout the process.<sup>256</sup>

Also, an Interdepartmental Liaison and Coordination Committee including the heads of department within the prefectural government was introduced to enable harmonized responses to the input and suggestions resulting from the Agenda building process. On a lower level, a working group with the section chiefs from each department summarized the inputs from each of the three sectoral committees, reported on this progress internally to the Liaison and Coordination Committee and provided feedback externally. Furthermore, the secretariat introduced different possibilities for citizens and organizations not directly involved in the Agenda building process to participate. These included neighborhood consultative meetings or direct mail campaigns allowing feedback. In general, the secretariat prioritized building awareness of and promoting involvement in the local Agenda 21. In the end, thousands of responses were the outcome of these efforts.<sup>257</sup>

Subsequently, the Agenda 21 Kanagawa was institutionalized by action proposals targeting citizens, enterprises and local government in four goal areas: environmental lifestyles, sustainable cities, environmentally symbiotic socio-economic system and international environmental cooperation. Within the area of environmental lifestyles, one example for recommended actions for citizens is avoiding disposable paper products and enterprises. Likewise, governments are encouraged to use air conditioners and heaters efficiently and introduce cleaner vehicles. The goal of sustainable cities can be reached by: citizens protecting and planting greenery, governments surfacing roads with water-permeable pavement, and enterprises surrounding factories and offices with greenery. Similarly, measures for the different actors are recommended in the remaining two goal areas. One key feature of

---

<sup>255</sup> International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, International Development Research Centre and UNEP, *The Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide: An Introduction to Sustainable Development Planning* (Toronto, 1996), p. 115.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 116.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*

Agenda 21 Kanagawa is that actions are not only vaguely formulated but are concretely framed using a quantitative approach. In this regard, measurable goals for the targets were set, for example to reduce the electricity consumption by ten percent. The quantification was crucial for the public support and action.

In January 1993, the Kanagawa conference for the promotion of global environmental protection was held. The abovementioned actors in the Agenda building process attended the conference, in which Agenda 21 Kanagawa was formally adopted as new action guidelines for global environmental protection. The conference participants were featured as the permanent Agenda 21 Kanagawa oversight body with the task to monitor the progress of implementation.<sup>258</sup>

Consequently, the public and private sector became active in various ways to achieve the Agenda 21's objectives. Citizens' groups organized activities like tree planting, recycling of cans, bottles, milk cartons, and clothes, and organizing environmental festivals, among others. Local enterprises became active by conducting environmental training seminars, developing a framework for environmental auditing, and financially supporting public events and projects. The prefecture itself launched 52 projects in favor of the Agenda 21 Kanagawa, spending nearly 150 million USD. Moreover, a "household edition" of the Agenda 21 Kanagawa was issued, a comprehensive study of environmental activities of local enterprises was commissioned, a manual for corporate environmental action was distributed among small and medium enterprises, and citizens' and NGOs' activities were supported financially or in other ways.<sup>259</sup>

Also large-scale projects were promoted and executed. One of these was the construction of model "eco-housing" developments with the main aims to conserve energy and make use of rainwater and recycled resources. Soon afterwards, more than 100 units were completed and utilized. Another project addressed the burden on waste-water treatment and storm-water system as well as the replenishment of groundwater. The outcome of the project was 30 km of roadways being surfaced with water-permeable pavements in a relatively short time span. A third result of large scale projects was a prefecture-wide system for the recovery and destruction of ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons, in which municipalities collect chlorofluorocarbon containing waste, such as refrigerators, and recover the substances with suitable equipment. Prefecture organs then organized the delivery of the chlorofluorocarbons to demolition facilities of the national government. Besides, the prefecture established a subsidy system rewarding the purchase of non-chlorofluorocarbons apparatus. Further projects were realized in the fields of conservation of tropical forests and international cooperation. Overall, Agenda 21 Kanagawa has raised the awareness of the urgency to protect the environment and has contributed to the general Agenda 21 demand of a sense of common purpose in the light of environment.<sup>260</sup>

### 4.3. Success or failure?

Not only because of such local measures is Agenda 21 well accepted as a monumental effort of the international community. In general terms, the agreements on principles and a long-term action plan on sustainable global development are widely appreciated.<sup>261</sup> Clearly, the Agenda formulates ambitious

---

<sup>258</sup> Ibid, p. 117f.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid, p. 118.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid, p. 118f.

<sup>261</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, p. 53.

targets and provides a large set of measures. Meanwhile, more than 20 years of Agenda 21 have passed so it is possible and appropriate not to only praise the ambitions but also evaluate their achievements.

Critics of Agenda 21 claim that the efforts of the United Nations have indeed triggered academic debates about environmental issues, strengthened their public perception, and effected minor adaptations in the system of national statistics and tax laws, but they have not led to fundamental changes in how national economies are organized and evaluated.<sup>262</sup> This argument is supported by points of criticism, according to which no euphoric mood or mobilization of masses is recognizable several years after the adoption of the Agenda. A qualitative examination of three German local Agenda 21 processes found that major challenges are lack of awareness of the Agenda 21, which complicates its communication to the public and the need for political legitimation or the lack of political support. In the same breath, the continuous process character of the (local) Agenda 21 is stressed, which implies incorporating the lessons learned and experience gained into the next cycle.<sup>263</sup>

20 years after the UNCED 1992, the International Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future reviewed the implementation of the Agenda 21 and the Rio principles. Internal and external experts assessed the progress and gaps of the programs of action included in the 39 chapters of the Agenda 21 (excluding chapter one - the introduction). The underlying methodology was a scoreboard traffic light rating system, whereby red means no progress or regression, yellow represents limited progress or an achievement far from target, and green stands for good progress or an achievement on target. Additionally, a blue mark tags excellent progress or a fully achieved target.<sup>264</sup>

The Stakeholder Forum concluded that success of Agenda 21 was very unstable and according to the expert ratings, progress was limited overall. The majority of the chapters were rated yellow, showing that many areas had not reached the ambitious objectives, and three chapters were even given the worst assessment, indicating no progress at all. From an environmental point of view unfortunately, the abovementioned chapter nine on protection of the atmosphere is among the “red” chapters. The decisive reason for the very negative depiction was the continuing rising level of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions accompanied by the repeated failure of efforts to achieve international agreements on curbing emissions.<sup>265</sup> The earlier mentioned limited success of the Kyoto protocol underlines this development.

Only five chapters were considered to deserve a green or blue rating, indicating convincing results with good progress or better. Interestingly for global governance, chapters 27 and 28, namely those concerning the involvement of NGOs and local authorities were among the few rays of hope in the assessment report. The positive assessment of the participation of NGOs was explained by a strong increase of status and importance of NGOs since the adaptation of the Agenda. The experts claim that NGOs today have various important roles such as being moral stakeholders, watchdogs or mediators and have become increasingly professionalized. Therefore, international organizations in general as well as UN agencies more specifically are now dependent on NGOs’ work, demonstrating a mutually beneficial partnership. On the national level, NGOs have assumed many governments’ responsibilities in the area of sustainable development. Ultimately, governments can no longer easily ignore NGOs but

---

<sup>262</sup> Ibid, p. 56.

<sup>263</sup> Eick von Ruschkowski, ‘Lokale Agenda 21 in Deutschland – Eine Bilanz’, ed. by Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, *Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte*, 2002.

<sup>264</sup> *Review of Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles* (Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future, 2012), p. 4.

<sup>265</sup> Ibid, p. 25.

rather have to face the need to involve them in decision-making. Only the circumstance that the process of increasing involvement is organic and ever evolving impeded a blue rating and so the worldwide achievements in the area were evaluated green.<sup>266</sup>

The integration of local authorities by the local Agenda 21 is described as one of the most successful programs to connect global targets with local actions. All around the globe local authorities participated in the process and started programs and activities in the sense of the local Agenda 21. Today, many global organizations consist of local authorities, underlining the interest of the local level to engage for global issues. In addition, experts who assess argue for the necessity of multi-level governance in order to expand and prolong its success.<sup>267</sup> Regarding both chapters, Agenda 21 has raised a different notion of involvement in decision-making. The importance of non-state actors has infiltrated every stage of government, international law and international governance. The structural particularity of the Agenda 21 is that it was the first UN document to arrange positions and responsibilities for involved actors.<sup>268</sup>

According to the Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Development, another success of Agenda 21 is that it has pushed subsequent international agreements and documents into a positive direction. In contrast to conferences in the 1960s and 70s, in which technology-oriented contents such as rapid industrialization were at focus, the concept of sustainable development has increasingly taken center stage in developments since the 1990s.<sup>269</sup>

Nevertheless, major remaining challenges dampen the success of the Agenda. One of the identified challenges addresses the segmentation in sectoral issues. It is accepted that building bridges between sectors can still be improved since related topics are often treated in separate forums without linking connected issues or establishing policy coherence. UN agencies have not yet managed to effectively solve this issue. Moreover, some key sectors are not included in the all-embracing approach of the Agenda and this has been criticized. For instance, energy and mining are key sectors not having an individual chapter. Similarly, the categorization of the Agenda into 40 sector chapters is criticized for reflecting a rather static view of the world. This has prevented the adherence of the interconnectedness of different goals and the examination of the economic system itself. Also, essential motives of sectoral and inter-country outcomes have been disregarded, including the impacts of trade and globalization or the recognition of future generations' needs on today's policy making.<sup>270</sup>

The assessment 20 years after Rio furthermore shows that some fields of Agenda 21 have not been crowned with success. On the contrary, some are even considered failures. One of these areas regards consumption and production patterns, which still remain unsustainable on the global scale. Statistics show that the consumption of natural resources is distributed very unequally, with a per capita consumption of roughly 90 kg per day in North America, 45 kg in Europe and ten kg in Africa.<sup>271</sup> In spite of a variety of initiatives and growing awareness, worldwide progress remains very limited, illustrated by the red assessment of chapter four (changing consumption patterns). Consumption has constantly increased since 1992, fostered not only by traditional high levels in industrialized countries but also by intense increases in the consumer population in emerging countries like Brazil, India or

---

<sup>266</sup> Ibid, p. 33.

<sup>267</sup> Ibid, p. 33.

<sup>268</sup> Ibid, p. 5f.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid, p. 7f.

<sup>271</sup> Friends of the Earth Europe, Global 2000 and Sustainable Europe Research Institute, *Overconsumption? Our Use of the World's Natural Resources*, 2009, p. 20f.

China. Overall, the patterns of consumption do not seem to become more sustainable, but rather move towards an even more unsustainable direction.<sup>272</sup>

Altogether, the review of Agenda 21 shows that it definitely succeeded in contributing to a positive development in some areas but it still has large potential for improvement, since many ambitions could not be satisfied or failed. Agenda 21 clearly underperformed in relation to its scope and expectations, but nevertheless found worldwide resonance and has great potential. Without impairing the developments achieved so far, it is clear that there is still much to be done.

## 5. CASE STUDY: GLOBAL MARSHALL PLAN

The Global Marshall Plan is another striking example of institutionalizing global governance. It aims to transform long-standing theoretical considerations with regard to improving global processes into a concrete plan. The initiative originated in May 2003, when representatives of 16 civil society organizations, including environmental associations, development agencies, industry associations, the Eco-social Forum Europe, and the Club of Rome, gathered in the framework of the initiative for world peace, sustainability and justice.<sup>273</sup> The participants recognized that several documents were adopted at UN conferences and agreements on how to counter the increasingly threatening global difficulties in the development of mankind had existed, but the practical efforts taken remained limited. The Global Marshall Plan was launched intending to create a world in balance. This requires adequate shaping of globalization, which can be reached by implementing a worldwide eco-social market economy, according to the pioneers of the initiative. Accordingly, associated with it is a system capable of creating value and worldwide solidarity. It thereby addresses global framework conditions, sustainable development, defeating poverty, environmental protection justice, and subsequently a new economic miracle.<sup>274</sup>

The initiative did not simply appear but was a response to the earlier mentioned negative consequences of globalization. It is coined by the idea of a world ethos shaped by the Swiss theologian Hans Küng<sup>275</sup> and supported by Kofi Annan, resulting in the UN resolution on the Global Agenda for a Dialogue among Civilizations of the United Nations<sup>276</sup> in the “United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations” 2001<sup>277</sup>. The inclusion of ideas originating from other innovative texts like *Manifesto of the earth* by former Soviet statesman Mikhail Gorbachev or the influential *Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit* written by Al Gore before he became US vice-president and already anticipating the term Global Marshall Plan in 1992<sup>278</sup>, as well as the Earth Charter Initiative launched in the 1990s, in which again Gorbachev among others was involved, show that the Marshall Plan merges various thoughts and unlike Agenda 21 was not a UN initiative. A direct forerunner is clearly

---

<sup>272</sup> *Review of Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles*, p. 7.

<sup>273</sup> Franz Josef Radermacher, *Global Marshall Plan - Ein Planetary Contract*, ed. by Ökosoziales Forum Europa and Global Marshall Plan Foundation (Vienna, 2004), p. 46.

<sup>274</sup> Website ‘Was ist der Global Marshall Plan?’, 2010.

<sup>275</sup> Radermacher, p. 47.

<sup>276</sup> *Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly* (United Nations General Assembly, 21 November 2001).

<sup>277</sup> *United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. Report of the Secretary-General* (United Nations General Assembly, 2 November 2001).

<sup>278</sup> James A. Yunker, *Global Marshall Plan: Theory and Evidence* (Lexington Books, 2014), p. 76.

the ambitious initiative for an ecological Marshall Plan, which collected around 750,000 signatures for the submitted plans in 1997.<sup>279</sup>

The manifestation of the Global Marshall Plan can be mainly found in *Global Marshall Plan – Ein planetary contract* by Franz Josef Radermacher and on the Website [www.globalmarshallplan.org](http://www.globalmarshallplan.org). Due to the network character of the initiative, a document comparable to the UN Agenda 21 does not yet exist. In 2008, representatives of local and regional supporting groups gathered in Germany to discuss the establishment of a national initiative in terms of governance structures of the initiative. As a result of the meeting, an “Erfurt declaration” was accepted capturing the intention to found an umbrella association housing regional, local and national groups. However, the representatives finally refrained from establishing a national organization in order to not infringe the Global Marshall Plan’s own understanding of its open format.

Numerous organizations, local groups and other associations supporting the initiative, encourage the involvement of individuals. Besides that, the Global Marshall Plan addresses a wide range of actors to engage, including religious communities and the media to spread the idea of the initiative and raise awareness; advocacy groups and NGOs to join forces in the fight for a just, sustainable globalization; science to further develop the project in different academic disciplines; economic actors to make the Global Marshall Plan their own matter; national governments to officially support the initiative and shape the dialog with other actors; the EU as a bearer of hope; the United Nations and its specialized agencies playing an important role for the implementation of the plan; and the G7 with the request not to prioritize short-term measures but to tackle the roots of global problems like poverty.

### 5.1. The eco-social market economy

The overarching goal to establish an eco-social market economy addresses governance structures as described in the global governance approach. It builds upon value-creation abilities of markets, innovation and growth under adequate framework conditions, which do not only regard economic but also social, cultural and ecological aspects of mankind. The Global Marshall Plan follows a changed economic conception of man, which empirical economic examinations marked as closer to reality than the abstract classical construction of the homo oeconomicus assuming that everyone benefits if everyone thinks of himself. The latter serves as a basis for market fundamentalism and turbo-capitalism by following interpretations of Adam Smith. Advocates of the Global Marshall Plan favor the consideration of human as homo oeconomicus cooperativus, according to which individuals act “systematically unsystematic”.<sup>280</sup>

Besides the different conception of man, the initiative involves the idea that prices should tell the truth, meaning that external costs should be internalized adequately into market activities. International mobility, for example, is very inexpensive nowadays as measured by accompanying direct and indirect damages. Overall, the underlying principle is that individuals are not there for the economy but the economy is there for individuals and that a strong, efficient state as well as strong and efficient global governance structures in a globalized economy are necessary to have welfare, growth and advancement in effect for the whole world society. This concretely presents difficulties in linking the WTO with other global regimes in the fields of security, economy, environment, and social issues, in order to create a consistent global regulatory framework. The absence of such a framework is one of the

---

<sup>279</sup> Radermacher, p. 47f.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid, p. 48f.

weaknesses of today's world and is one of the reasons why the world community despite a variety of declarations and resolutions has not won the fight against starvation yet.<sup>281</sup>

A similar conclusion regarding social aspects of globalization was drawn by the ILO report of the World Commission of the ILO in 2004. It indicated several grievances in the global economy, such as engrained and consistent imbalances in its functioning, the representation of developing countries, or increasing income gaps between rich and poor countries. It also criticized the inadequate implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals and claimed that they require much more financial resources than provided at that time. But like most critical international reports, the suggestions were rather formulated with caution. The Global Marshall Plan seizes such issues and attempts to convert plans and hopes into solutions and implementation successes. It assumes that modern complex problem areas can only be solved by a greater overall design covering a variety of issue areas, not by small framed, individual actions.<sup>282</sup>

Conceptually, the Global Marshall Plan shares a perspective attempting to replace the market fundamentalist Washington Consensus of the 1990s and reprioritize the importance of basic conditions of the economy. In this context, it *inter alia* criticizes the present world financial system, including the way the International Monetary Fund (IMF) grants loans to developing countries. Loans are linked to conditions that dismantle the state, indirectly affecting local education and health systems and thus hurting the poor population. The essential character of education and health as key factors for sustainability has raised the question of how development can be accomplished under these conditions. The Global Marshall Plan follows the concern that the granting loans in future favors sustainability rather than burdening it. The eco-social market economy suggests co-funding connected to the establishment of worldwide standards compliant with sustainability concerns.<sup>283</sup> The principle of co-funding for the harmonization of standards could already be found in the US Marshall Plan after World War II, officially called European Recovery Program, which followed a similar logic. Furthermore, another link to the old Marshall Plan can be drawn. After World War II, the USA recognized that Europe's stabilization was indispensable for global security. A similar necessity exists today on a global scale. Even though the preconditions are different, the spirit of the Marshall Plan as a basis for a planetary contract is urgently needed. Then, it delighted Europe with an enormous economic upswing and gave hope to people. These circumstances need to be revived today, with regard to sustainability. Logically, not the same procedure in every detail is demanded today, since the situation is hardly comparable but the underlying idea can be taken as an example.<sup>284</sup> Western countries' engagement in development would clearly indicate solidarity and is capable of producing major effects. Global Marshall Plan advocates are sure that those efforts linked with the establishment of a regulatory framework equal for the North and the South would be the basis for a global economic miracle. Inevitably associated with this is a dematerialized gross world income and corresponding change in lifestyles. At the same time, an increase of resource efficiency is necessary which is largely dependent on technical progress.<sup>285</sup>

The eco-social approach can be seen, possibly even more clearly, in the example of the enlargement processes of the EU. The alignment of standards is coupled with market opening and co-funding and

---

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 49f.

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50ff.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58ff.

<sup>284</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111f.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112f.



ultimately results in open borders and more open societies. Mentioning Europe as an orientation guide for worldwide solution does not imply perfect circumstances in Europe. The same applies to the Marshall Plan referring to the US program for Europe. US Aid programs are commonly examined critically throughout the world, also the resource consumption on both continents does not constitute a good example. Also, the colonial past in Europe cannot be denied and is often seen unfavorably. Therefore, many countries would reject the idea of implementing a model inspired by Europe and the term Marshall Plan is problematic for many people turning a deaf ear to positive effects of the Marshall Plan in the post-war period, in light of the tense geopolitical situation. The term Global Marshall Plan thus is primarily common in Europe and the USA, while on other continents terms like eco-social market economy, planetary contract, world solidarity plan or balanced way are rather more trouble-free.<sup>286</sup>

In any case, the Global Marshall Plan is definitely not a super-elevation of Europe, the West or the industrialized world. In the contrary, experiences of other world regions need to be included in the approach to the same extent as the West can contribute. While appreciating European experiences, the Global Marshall Plan approach is based on the following principles: firstly, the willingness to participate in international agreements and thereby promoting the principle of consensus (as shown in the Kyoto protocol or the International Criminal Court); secondly showing strong commitment to environmental protection, at least to such an extent that no disadvantages in the world economy are implied; thirdly substantial investments in high social equity within the European countries; fourthly substantial investments in the promotion of cultural diversity and tolerance within Europe; and finally the willingness to undertake market openings for EU enlargement processes and raise co-funding as well as the intention to further open markets internationally, along with the concern to co-finance development in the context of common standards.<sup>287</sup>

Again, the strong orientation towards Europe is not a neo-colonial Eurocentrism but because successful principles of the European economic philosophy are taken as a basis for a worldwide strategy. The formulated basic position is not specifically European but was elaborated in the framework of a global society dialogue initiated by the EU with the collaboration of representatives from all world regions and was the outcome of a broad background of international deliberations. The corresponding thoughts were fertilized by the discussions about the world ethos including all the larger religions of the world.<sup>288</sup>

The principle of co-funding development under the condition of aligning standards has become the central position of developing countries at most international conferences. In recent years, developing countries' core demand for a special funding pot called "digital solidarity fund" has underlined this statement. The digital solidarity fund was supposed to overcome the digital divide of North and South, but it has been blocked by richer countries. The picture was almost the same at an OAS meeting in 2004: While the USA planned to negotiate on free trade, liberalization and the fight against terrorism, most Central and South American states focused on combating poverty. The idea of a fund for the poor was refused by the USA with the simple argument that there had already been sufficient programs of that kind. The EU is probably a model in the field of co-funding at least, since it negotiates corresponding duties for recipient countries in the enlargement processes on eye level.<sup>289</sup>

---

<sup>286</sup> Ibid, p. 60ff.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid, p. 62f.

<sup>288</sup> Ibid, p. 64.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid, p. 64f.



The worldwide eco-social market economy is understood as a natural framework for the achievement of an open society. This also applies to the transformation into a worldwide information- and knowledge based society of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which entails great chances but also great risks. The latter especially address rebound effects of technological progress as a result of non-adequate economic framework conditions. The necessary eco-social framework needs to respect eco-efficiency and eco-effectivity, whereby the latter means taking the “right” actions and the former addresses effecting relationships. However, the Global Marshall Plan claims that the eco-social approach seems to be the far superior in comparison to an increasingly deregulated global economy pursuant to the dominant market fundamentalism, which is characterized by too much bottom-up both on a national and international scale. This in turn creates worse global conditions than an eco-social economy would.<sup>290</sup>

This aspect was also discussed in the context of better shaping globalization by the initiators of the Global Marshall Plan movement. They argued that the world could be more balanced, peaceful and in particular prosperous than it was or still is. Therefore, different distribution patterns, investments into the development of overall human capital, equipping all humans with sufficient infrastructure and securing the access to necessary resources are needed. And all these changes are only possible under adequate civic regulatory framework. According to advocates of the initiative, the failure of the development round of the WTO in Cancún 2003, the obvious difficulties of the USA in Iraq or fraud on national and international financial markets and the exploitation of global ecological resources are indicators that humankind is in a position that urgently requires a new approach. Besides all the mentioned features, such an approach needs understanding of internal dynamics of processes and long time periods necessary for a worldwide transformation process.<sup>291</sup> A worldwide eco-social market economy ultimately means that the same ecological, social and democratic standards are introduced to all major global institutions (UN; WTO, IMF, World Bank). This would increase the chances for functioning global governance.<sup>292</sup>

## 5.2. Five pillars of the Global Marshall Plan

The conceptual considerations finally led to five pillars of the Global Marshall Plan to reach a world in equilibrium. Firstly, the plan promotes the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. Before its expiration in 2015, it referred to the Millennium Development Goals. In areas where progress could be achieved, continuity of actions is necessary if MDG targets have failed, and new efforts need to be undertaken. The goal of achieving the MDGs was seen as an intermediate step to an eco-social market economy as well as kind of a benchmark for the project itself. Secondly, the 0.7% target is finally to be reached. The target is an agreement of the world’s governments to commit 0.7% of the industrialized countries’ gross national income to official development assistance. This commitment was already reached in a General Assembly Resolution of the United Nations in 1970 and since then it has been declared in several international agreements.<sup>293</sup> However, many developed countries have still not managed to comply with the target. In 2014, 0.7% of the developed countries’ gross national income accounted for roughly 326 billion USD, in fact the amount of only 135 billion USD was committed to developing countries. This amount is equivalent to 0.29% of the combined gross national income of

---

<sup>290</sup> Ibid, p. 67.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid, p. 67f.

<sup>292</sup> Josef Riegler, “Global Governance” ist Machbar: Global Marshall Plan Für Eine Weltweite Ökosoziale Marktwirtschaft Als Modell, in *Friedensmacht Europa: Dynamische Kraft Für Global Governance?*, ed. by Herwig Büchele and Anton Pelinka (Innsbruck: Innsbruck Univ. press, 2011), vi, p. 248.

<sup>293</sup> Website ‘The 0.7% Target: An in-Depth Look’, *UN Millennium Project | Press Archive*.

industrialized countries. Reversely, richer countries spent roughly 191 billion USD or 0.41% of their gross national income less than they had committed.<sup>294</sup> According to the Global Marshall Plan initiative, this amount would fully cover the necessary additional annual means for development. The third pillar is a fair taxation of global value added as a financing base. This includes the taxation of global transactions and of consumption of global commons. The funds earned from these are to be used for financing development cooperation and the SDGs without burdening state budgets. Fourthly the mentioned fundamental worldwide eco-social market economy is to be promoted. In this context it means further strengthening of global governance including a viable regulatory framework for a sustainable world economy and digital transformation. Finally, a fair global development partnership and efficient use of funds in development cooperation is the fifth pillar.<sup>295</sup>

The central idea of connecting co-funding with certain standards has been mentioned. More precisely, this means that countries claiming financial contributions from a Global Marshall Plan have to accept and implement ILO standards, those of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and global environmental agreements coordinated by the UNEP. Although this imposition of standards might seem restrictive at first sight, the system of co-funding can be seen as an offer from the North to the South laying the foundations for developing countries to finally implement standards they have usually signed long ago, without facing economic disadvantages. Consequently, the initiative attempts to link those three elements (plus other worldwide standards where appropriate) and the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank to a coherent system of global governance. This system needs to include adequate ultimate legal competences, which can institutionally be provided by connecting different existing international legal institutions, especially including the WTO. Developing countries' and NGOs' demand for the implementation of core social standards of the ILO, worldwide environmental contracts, and economic, social and cultural human rights in the WTO could finally be achieved and enforced by sanction mechanisms of the WTO, IMF and World Bank globally.<sup>296</sup>

Accepting the ILO standards concretely means accepting eight fundamental conventions, including Convention 87 (1948) on the freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, Convention 29 (1930) on forced labor and Convention 105 (1957) on abolition of forced labor.<sup>297</sup> Concerning environmental standards it has to be mentioned that there have been debates on the existence of a binding force of global environmental agreements with the WTO. The Global Marshall Plan intends to allay all doubts about it by explicitly incorporating the compliance with standards in WTO policies.<sup>298</sup>

Being part of the above mentioned standards, local governments have to engage more actively than they have done to date. This is an indispensable requirement for countries to be eligible as recipients of funds. However, reasonable transition periods for institutional adjustment measures and capacity building are to be negotiated, creating a position similar to the candidate status in a EU enlargement process.<sup>299</sup> Environmental protection under coordinated worldwide conditions is also indispensable for the approach. It shifts further technical progress, a key factor for coping with developmental issues, towards dematerialization. In this context, the organization of conditions supporting materials cycle in

---

<sup>294</sup> Website 'Official Development Assistance', *United Nations Integrated Implementation Network*.

<sup>295</sup> Website 'Was ist der Global Marshall Plan?'

<sup>296</sup> Radermacher, p. 74f.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid*, p. 76f.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid*, p. 82.

<sup>299</sup> *Ibid*, p. 85f.

the area of industrial production is important as well as addressing ideas like eco-efficiency and eco-effectivity. Production processes integrating products as a part of a biological or technical cycle are worth striving for and the regulatory framework that is needed at the same time prevents the earlier mentioned boomerang effects of technical progress. Asymmetrical growth conditions entailing a growth of up to ten percent growth for many years in the South while limiting growth to around two percent in the North make a worldwide social balance possible in the long term. This, however, is only possible with the application of appropriate co-funding, which also aims at the establishment of adequate domestic conditions, thereby addressing distribution issues within the country.<sup>300</sup>

Besides the coherent governance system that is an essential role of the WTO, worldwide market opening and new financial resources, a new and better use of funds is a central concern of the Marshall Plan. Enabling development is not an easy task, and goodwill and money alone is not enough. Although the concepts of development aid have largely improved over the last decades, new means for international development are to be made available and used following a new logic. The perspective of the new development economics drops unrealistic key assumptions of the neoclassical model of competition and introduces market power, spillover effects, imperfect information, institutional framework conditions and issues of enforceability of recommendations in the political process. The traditional perspective is not replaced by a single model but rather by various theoretical approaches including new economics of growth and foreign trade theory, new economic geography, new political economy and new institutional economics. These theories proved to be especially useful in the field of development research, not least because traditional assumptions of perfect competition and optimally functioning political transmission mechanisms proved to be far from reality.<sup>301</sup>

On the implementation side, solution designs are intended to integrate bottom-up approaches as well as thoughts on generating property in poor countries or the overcoming of poverty by enabling proactive initiatives of persons concerned like Nobel Prize winner in economic sciences Amartya Sen suggested. Other innovative thoughts continue the idea of private initiatives and suggest competitions for the financial means provided by co-funding. Therefore, a neutral jury needs to be institutionally anchored at the IMF, which awards the financial means independently.<sup>302</sup> In any case, considerations and the use of new financial resources need to be embedded in the Rio follow-up process. Agenda 21 thereby serves as a framework for action and further development.<sup>303</sup>

Today, the network of different actors engaging in the initiative comprises more than 5,000 prominent supporters from different areas of society, including the German Chancellor Angela Merkel or the American singer and UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador Harold George “Harry” Bellanfanti, and over 200 organizations, enterprises and student groups interacting on the national and international level. Additionally, national and regional structures have developed in different countries. The coordination office facilitates the networking between all actors.<sup>304</sup> On the one hand, the Global Marshall Plan refers to existing global governance structures and characteristics. These include the objectives of the United Nations MDGs and SDGs; regimes and organizations in the fields of trade, finance and environment, among others; processes and experiences in the inclusion of various actors such as NGOs; funding instruments including considerations such as the Tobin Tax on financial transactions; and legal

---

<sup>300</sup> Ibid, p. 87f.

<sup>301</sup> Ibid, p. 88f.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid, p. 93.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid, p. 89f.

<sup>304</sup> Website ‘Struktur’, *Global Marshall Plan*, 2010.

enforceability of various regimes with the help of possible sanctions. On the other hand, the initiative attempts to enhance global governance. The Marshall Plan architects agree that the foundation for a reasonable global governance system has already been laid in the form of different regimes, financing instruments, common goals and the possibility of sanctions. However, they identify one major deficiency: The entanglement among the different regimes. The Global Marshall Plan thus suggests the mentioned integration of core ILO standards and essential environmental agreements into the set of rules of the WTO and makes them mandatory for actions and projects in the area of financing for IMF and World Bank. Therefore, consensus in the international community is necessary, especially in the context of WTO committees. At this stage, the principle of co-funding of development by the global North is an essential component.<sup>305</sup>

## 6. MAJOR CHALLENGES

Global governance has achieved improvements in different areas. The quantifiable successes of humankind on their way to a cooperative world society among others include the reduction of poverty and progress in education, disease prevention, hygiene, and water treatment. According to calculations of World Bank economists, between 1999 and 2004 about 135 million people escaped absolute poverty. Since then, the number has probably doubled again. Education is reaching a growing share of the world population. In 1975, one out of four people between 15 and 25 was illiterate, while now one out of ten is.<sup>306</sup> In spite of all these developments and efforts, global governance still faces a set of challenges. This chapter – without claiming to be exhaustive – provides an overview of the major challenges and points of criticism associated with the concept.

### 6.1. Structures of international organizations

Globalization has entrapped states into deep mutual dependence and at the same time triggered global crises and hazards. The solution of global issues requires global instances of cooperation and coordination. This is one of the key characteristics of the global governance approach which has been described so far. However, critics claim that today urgently needed global organizations and structures prove to be desperately obsolete and ineffective. The UN Security Council and other UN sub-organizations as well as WTO, IMF, the World Bank and the world coordination of the G8 countries are all confronted with inadequate structures. The distribution of power in executive committees is one-sided, being tailored to yesterday's welfare states and superpowers. The "losers" of globalization from developing countries do not get sufficient hearing, "winners" like the new economic powers Brazil or India cannot exert influence which would correspond to their economic and political importance on global activities.<sup>307</sup> Paul Kennedy acknowledges the constant evolution of the earth and its power structures and considers it possible that China becomes the largest economic power by the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the United Nations. Also, the Indian economy will probably overtake some European economies.<sup>308</sup> Nevertheless, the UN Charter provides vetoes for the five super powers of the past in the Security Council, while India, accounting for a sixth of the world's population and contributing five times more peacekeeping forces than China, is only occasionally represented as an electoral member. The long obsolete privilege allows the veto powers to block or delay necessary UN actions in their

---

<sup>305</sup> Radermacher, p. 119ff.

<sup>306</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 408f.

<sup>307</sup> Ibid, p. 374.

<sup>308</sup> Kennedy, p. 245.

interests again and again.<sup>309</sup> Kennedy warns that the United Nations will increasingly become anachronistic if they further adhere to constitutional structures of 1945 and fail to react to the fast changing economic and subsequent power shifts.<sup>310</sup>

Kennedy concludes that the UN structures are antiquated. It can also be argued that they were flawed from the beginning. Another difficulty arising therefrom is that the issues in 1945 were different to today's. Then, nobody had the awareness for problems such as global warming or failed states. Today, they represent threats to mankind globally. The international challenge is to cope with (environmental) global challenges and at the same time industrialize developing countries in Asia, for example, to improve living conditions. Similarly, the issue of failed states needs to be solved by the international community. Events in Bosnia, Western Africa, Somalia and Afghanistan have demonstrated the difficulties of that task and have challenged the United Nations adherence to a constitution of 1945. Transnational changes question even more the nation-oriented Charter since they completely go beyond the assumptions and expectations of the politicians, who gathered with good intentions in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>311</sup>

Since the United Nations has been presented as an essential part of the global governance structure, criticism of the organization is relevant for the approach. Such points of criticism also include mismanagement and viscous bureaucracy. It is argued that important posts are still assigned in "back room deals" following national prestige-oriented considerations. Consequently, UN management staff frequently lacks professionalism.<sup>312</sup> Probably even more serious is the lack of funds. The UN secretariat has a budget of only 2.1 billion USD (2008), which is less than the US military costs for two days.<sup>313</sup> The insufficient funding of the head office is paired with wastage of means in other parts of the UN system, in which unclear division of labor evokes overlaps. For example, food security in developing countries is cultivated by three different UN organizations: the FAO, the World Food Program (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Otherwise, the area of environmental and climate policy is still in quest of a strong organization. The UNEP is largely dependent on voluntary contributions of individual governments and can hardly provide anything beyond public relations and research work. System failures are even apparent in the core task of the United Nations, peace keeping. Every military action of the blue helmets is preceded by negotiations for months or even years.<sup>314</sup>

Similarly, the G7/G8 summits can be depicted as an attempt of the old industrialized countries to pompously put their own political coordination in form of an informal committee in the limelight. The group of the former most powerful economic nations had its first "meeting among friends" without Canada and Russia in 1975 on the initiative of the French president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the German federal chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The motivation behind the meeting was concern about the oil crisis and the dollar exchange rate. Starting rather as an intellectual exchange between the six largest Western powers, it has become one of the most visible political authorities with around 2,500 employees, translators and consultants. Today, G7 summits deal with a variety of topics besides economic issues, accompanied by criticisms about reaching agreements within a club of wealthy nations. It is a fact that the represented economies account for almost two thirds of the global economic

---

<sup>309</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 377.

<sup>310</sup> Kennedy, p. 245ff.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid, p. 245ff.

<sup>312</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 375.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid, p. 375f.

output, but the question if the G8 can really make a difference remains. Formally, the G8 does not have any legal competence and initiatives on fighting poverty and climate change hardly go beyond announcements. Unlike the UN Security Council, however, the G7/G8 at least attempted to acknowledge the rise of emerging countries by establishing the “outreach 5”. For the first time in 2005, the heads of states of India, China, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico were invited to participate in the consultations for one morning, thereby establishing the G8+5, as a result of Russia’s suspension of G7+5. Resulting thereof, the G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue was introduced in 2006. Nevertheless, the attempt to involve the leaders of emerging countries rather created the impression of condescension, as illustrated by Manmohan Singh, the Prime Minister of India, describing the meeting as a waste of time.<sup>315</sup>

In light of the grievances within the United Nations system and the G7, it is not surprising that public debates about reforms of the bodies have come alive. Especially the structure of the United Nations is a welcome target of reform proposals. As Paul Kennedy indicates, the proposals can be summarized in three categories. Firstly, what Kennedy describes as a reform according to the motto “clean out the stable”, basically means turning the whole system upside down. This includes cutting back authorities with overlapping competences, reducing highly paid bureaucrats and reducing costs in general. In fact, this scenario was partly put into practice and is associated with downsizing the United Nations, certainly not expanding powers. This reform proposal is particularly popular among those who are basically skeptical about international governance structures and identify threats for national solo efforts in them. The second possible scenario claims profound changes of the UN Charter are necessary. The Security Council is to be expanded by five additional permanent members acknowledging the rise of emerging economies and the veto option is to be restricted to acute cases of war. The Economic and Social Council is to be replaced by a capable economic committee with executive powers and a corresponding social committee. Since these proposals contain significant shifts of power and privileges, it is fiercely debated. The third proposal represents a rather moderate position. It demands that the United Nations are not to be reduced, but the effectiveness and possibilities need to be increased to improve the UN’s reputation among governments and the public. It hopes to increase effectiveness and to change the Charter in the long term. This position gathers advocates who are for a change of the Charter, but emphasize balance and rationality of proposals, so that no government needs to feel threatened. Kennedy himself is among those.<sup>316</sup>

The need for fundamental reforms of the international organizations and committees is underlined by the Russian president Vladimir Putin’s description of the system as archaic, undemocratic and cumbersome. Paradoxically, the establishment of permanent members which can effectively exercise a veto in the UN Security Council can be traced back to claims of the former Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.<sup>317</sup> Since then, Russia in fact has done more than any other country to block the UN from becoming more efficient. The US economist and director of the Earth institute Jeffrey Sachs predicts that the G7 in the present form will become increasingly insignificant in future and the former French president Nicolas Sarkozy even announced a renaissance of global cooperation in January 2008, as half of mankind can no longer be ignored. Instead of the G8+5, a G13 with real participation of the outreach is desirable. Shortly after that, the British prime minister at that time, Gordon Brown, demanded a radical reform of all global institutions at a state visit in India, so that they finally offer an appropriate

---

<sup>315</sup> Ibid, p. 387f.

<sup>316</sup> Kennedy, p. 247ff.

<sup>317</sup> Serhij Plochij, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Viking, 2010), p. 117ff.

framework for a new world order and a new world society. Also, the British Ambassador Matthew Rycroft of the UK Mission to the UN, emphasizes the positive developments of the United Nations in the past but stresses Britain's position to support modernization of the organization.<sup>318</sup> So far, all these statements seem to be empty phrases. The G8 leaders repeatedly omitted opportunities for basic reforms. Besides the USA, European states have proved to be a large blocking power. The political leaders like to advertise the multilateral orientation of their foreign policy, at the same time adhering to the obsolete supremacy of Europe in different committees. This was also one reason for the failure of the reform of the Security Council in 2005. Germany advocated the inclusion of India, Brazil, Japan and two African states as permanent members but simultaneously raised the claim to rise to the same status itself. That in turn provoked criticism since Western Europe had already been overrepresented by France and the United Kingdom. A single European seat was not seriously discussed and so the reform proposal lacked the necessary persuasiveness from the beginning.<sup>319</sup> Overall, the veto in cases of own interests within the UN framework seems to be a major problem for its efficiency.

## 6.2. Democratic deficit

Another major challenge for global governance is the issue of a democratic deficit. The debate on this, which has long been accompanying EU decision-making, raises the question of effects of multi-level governance with respect to democratic legitimacy and responsibility. According to Messner and Nuscheler, the shift of transfer to the international level increases problems of legitimacy and democracy since decision-making authority is withdrawn from elected parliaments.<sup>320</sup> Considering that democracy has by no means always been self-evident and was hard-won within some national borders, this circumstance becomes problematic. The influence of globalization on democracy is controversial. Some theorists claim that globalization contributed to the democratization of the world, since the principle of market economy was accompanied by the distribution of democracy. In contrast, critical voices claiming that globalization systematically jeopardizes democracy increasingly become more and louder.<sup>321</sup> From the analysis of globalization processes, globalization theorists derive the conclusion that it bursts the sovereignty of nation states as a characteristic of the international system in two ways: The external sovereignty and freedom of action in relation to other states through increasing interdependence and the internal sovereignty as states' capacity to make domestic political decisions independently from the actions of other state, intergovernmental (such as the WTO) or private (multinational corporations) actors. If a state is increasingly subject to externally taken decisions, its right to democratic self-determination is weakened, and this in turn causes issues of legitimacy for global governance. Existing approaches of governance beyond the nation state by means of international institutions or sets of rules largely already escape democratic participation and parliamentary claims to control.<sup>322</sup> In fact, decisions are increasingly made above the national level with citizens having few possibilities to influence them. Several examples such as the UN secretariat, management of IMF and the World Bank or the G7 summits show that democratic control of the actors virtually does not take place. It can be argued that NGOs have partly assumed that responsibility within a global governance structure, but formally global governance happens in a democracy-free zone.<sup>323</sup>

---

<sup>318</sup> Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Matthew Rycroft, 'Together, We've Spent 70 Years Striving for Peace, 70 Years Helping the Poorest and Most Vulnerable', *Gov.uk*, 2015.

<sup>319</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 383ff.

<sup>320</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 33.

<sup>321</sup> *Ibid*, p. 33f.

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid*, p. 35f.

<sup>323</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 392ff.

The issue of a democratic deficit is closely associated with a normative conflict of objective. On the one hand, modern forms of governance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century cannot be organized and legitimized in the same way as in the tradition of nation states of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. On the other hand, the requirements of democratic legitimated governance so far have been met less and struggle to do so compared to democratic nation states. Global governance theorists back international law and the formation of a global rule of law as prerequisites for the functioning of a multilateral cooperation culture. However, they stand accused of underestimating or even ignoring questions of power and democracy in their focus on the problem-solving ability of multilateralism.<sup>324</sup>

It is a fact that issues of democracy exacerbate more international institutions exert control functions the less they underlie democratic control and the concerned actors and their respective decisions that have the possibility to participate. The negotiations of international policies by representatives of governments and their ratification without parliamentary influence on the content do not foster transparency as a condition for democratic control. On the global scale, the power imbalances of international organizations mentioned earlier do not contribute to legitimacy either. The more capable of acting internationally organizations are, the more serious the problem of democracy and legitimacy gets, thus exposing the problems of the global governance construct, which advocates the spread of multilateralism without claiming its democratization or at least greater transparency and control by democratic legitimated institutions.<sup>325</sup>

Another issue associated with democratic deficit is that global governance processes are frequently dominated by a few actors who can exert influence depending on their resource situation. Solutions strengthening weaker actors and encountering power struggles address the introduction of formal agreements.<sup>326</sup> However, democratic issues remain on the international level since democratic institutions do not exist yet and control options for citizens are not ensured. Overall, there is no institutional framework regulating the decision of including or excluding of actor groups.<sup>327</sup>

It was mentioned earlier that NGOs potentially fulfill an important democratic function and thus possibly fill the gap of democratic control. Indeed, NGOs can contribute to make international negotiations, usually carried out behind closed doors, more transparent and public.<sup>328</sup> Beyond that, the possibilities for non-state actors to participate in global politics are rather limited in most policy fields of the various levels. Empirical studies have shown that on the global level balanced participation cannot be assumed since only a few NGOs are capable of acting globally. This in turn means that the spectrum of represented interests is selective rather than fully exhausted. Additionally, civil actors face limits of participation since they only have the possibility to channel their expertise into the negotiation process or publicly voice their opinion, but struggle with enforcing their interests.<sup>329</sup> Furthermore, their action radius is influenced by political chess moves. Politicians tactically and consciously transfer or emit responsibilities to higher levels in case of anticipated negative reactions in the domestic population. National governments commonly revert to such means if unpopular decisions are taken and strong rejection in the home country is expected. The existence of this possibility is relevant for the

---

<sup>324</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 36.

<sup>325</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37f.

<sup>326</sup> Walk, p. 36f.

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>328</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 39.

<sup>329</sup> Walk, p. 44.



acting of non-state actors since the transfer of responsibilities to transnational levels impedes the mobilization of domestic protests for oppositional groups.<sup>330</sup>

Several politicians and activists have racked their brains how to encounter the democratic deficit. Some are convinced that the world institutions acting as a concert of governments can be democratized. In 2003, the Committee for a Democratic UNO was founded, advocating the democratization of the United Nations and global governance through a parliamentary representation of world citizens. Consisting of parliamentarians, representatives of civil society, scientists, public figures and engaged citizens from all over the world, the committee elaborates political recommendations and provides expertise.<sup>331</sup> It co-initiated the campaign for a UN parliament in 2007, which is presently supported by 1460 parliamentarians from 120 countries worldwide. The campaign suggests that a UN Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) is not to replace the General Assembly but rather to constitute an additional organ. It also claims that occupation of UN bodies and of other international organizations with officials appointed by governments is not adequate considering the growing importance and responsibility of international organizations and its decisions and thus introduces the UNPA elected directly by the people.<sup>332</sup> According to the former UN general secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali, a UN parliament would increase the transparency of the United Nations and would make it more effective and democratic. Initially, the UNPA as an independent control body could at least curb the mentioned backroom deals for the allocation of posts and budget resources and possibly increase the public awareness about operations of sub-organizations. Once more, the EU parliament and its increasing recognition in the last decades can be considered as a role model.<sup>333</sup> The campaign proposes an extension of UNPA competences in future, constituting a democratic reflection of the diversity of the worldwide public opinion.

### 6.3. Hegemonic and unilateral tendencies

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, global governance is still a fragile project and especially its liaison with multilateralism is not compatible with hegemonic and unilateral orientations. Such tendencies were observable during the Clinton administration and strengthened by the Bush administration in the USA. The unilateral policy of hegemony and the tendentious dismantling of the UN system undermined the concept of cooperative security. Republican congressmen, notably senator Jesse Helms, and conservative think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute, initiated campaigns against global governance led by its interpretation as an attack on American sovereignty.<sup>334</sup> The resistance against the involvement in multilateral agreements can be illustrated by the refusal to ratify the statute of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto protocol. The events of 9/11 did not foster the popularity of multilateralism but rather encouraged the renationalization of foreign and security policy and provided good arguments for political realism basing on military power. American hegemonic unilateralism, however, has constraining impacts on global governance since effective multilateralism cannot be built against the political, military and economic superpower, particularly as its signal effects also reach other superpowers. China and Russia also opposed the establishment of the International Criminal Court, which is supposed to be a milestone on the stony way towards a global rule of law.

---

<sup>330</sup> Ibid, p. 46.

<sup>331</sup> Website 'Über Uns', *Komitee Für Eine Demokratische UNO*.

<sup>332</sup> Website Kampagne für ein Parlament bei der UNO, 'Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly', *Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly*.

<sup>333</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 392ff.

<sup>334</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 41.

Those countries as well as many parts of the former colonized third world suspect everything “global”, whether it is a global environmental organization, a world ethos coined by Hans Küng, or global governance, as a backdoor of Western imperialism.<sup>335</sup>

This clearly shows that it is not only powerful states which struggle with waiving relative power and locational advantages in favor of global commons and subordinating regional or global instructions and regulatory frameworks. Also weaker nations see their fragile sovereignty as a form of self-protection against a world order dominated by the North. Industrialized as well as developing countries are concerned with the question why existing national power and control positions for the benefit of a global collective with an uncertain political, economic and cultural orientation should be abandoned. Global governance advocates clearly have to accept that thinking within national borders is tenacious. Nevertheless, even in the USA weighty voices urging a return to multilateralism exist. The political scientist Samuel Philips Huntington indicated using a pun that hegemonic unilateralism could turn the *only* superpower into the *lonely* superpower. He claimed that hegemonic views of the world have no future in a polycentric world and that the concept of hegemony does not only hinder cooperation but is also expensive due to the pressure of armament. In the end, however great a military power might be, it cannot fully protect its population without international cooperation, and least of all solve global problems single-handedly.<sup>336</sup>

The recent past has clearly shown that unilateral tendencies are not US specific. The rise of right wing populist parties<sup>337</sup> and historic events like the Brexit are staggering the European Union. The long periods of euphoria about European integration seem to draw to a close; instead nationalization tendencies are evident in many European countries. Apart from the EU being an important regional actor in the global governance architecture, worldwide cooperation is seemingly hard to legitimate in times of nations not even willing to participate in regional cooperation, thus providing an unstable basis for global governance.

#### 6.4. Capturing the South

Global governance research and discourse are presently taking place in the OECD world. Globalization discussions in developing countries are limited to integration of national economies into the global economy and issues of foreign trade. Messner and Nuscheler describe this circumstance as an issue, since firstly global problems such as climate change are not to be solved without cooperation between OECD and developing countries and secondly even problem-solutions designed by industrialized countries and aligned to inclusion and cooperation often insufficiently include specific interests of developing countries in the context of the global governance architecture. In particular, socio-economic and institutional adjustment problems of developing countries are commonly underestimated or simply neglected. Also, the fact that European experiences differ significantly from South experiences with international cooperation is often ignored. While the European experience is predominantly positive because of the EU, developing countries occasionally associate international cooperation with structural adjustment policy of the IMF or the World Bank. Foreign control by the Washington organizations and the little or no influence by poor countries on international regimes, organizations and decision-making processes are in people’s minds. It is not surprising that these circumstances have led to skepticism

---

<sup>335</sup> Ibid.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid, p. 41f.

<sup>337</sup> Jon Henley, Helena Bengtsson and Caelainn Barr, ‘Across Europe, Distrust of Mainstream Political Parties Is on the Rise’, *The Guardian*, 25 May 2016, section World news.

towards global governance. The little importance attributed to contributions from developing countries to the global governance discussion is neither satisfactory for developing countries nor for the OECD world. Developing countries miss the opportunity to co-shape global regulations of the future and become permanent rule takers. The developing countries' strategies of passive adjustment to processes of further development of global governance leads to a lack of development of autonomous global governance capacities in the respective countries. This in turn results in they not being strong partners for industrialized countries in shaping globalization. Finally, the global governance architecture is likely to lack legitimacy and efficiency if a proportion of actors does not act as subjects but is only involved as a concerned object.<sup>338</sup>

### 6.5. Proliferation and coherence

With the proliferation of international agreements, the amount of standards has increased drastically. Only with regard to clarity and manageability, global governance architects need to question the amount of existing standards of a variety of organizations. This particularly addresses the increasing coupling of loans to standards mentioned earlier. Critics furthermore query if standards rather stabilize structures in industrialized countries instead of benefiting developing countries. Considered individually, standards may absolutely make sense, but as a whole they potentially overextend the institutional capacities of developing countries. Apart from that, it is argued that the process of harmonizing national development strategies threatens the institutional diversity. Global standards do not take national peculiarities into account.

A subsequent point of criticism that has also been briefly touched upon in the context of the Global Marshall Plan is the lack of coherence within the global governance structure. It consists of a variety of transnational regulatory structures, which overlap in different areas but do not assemble to a coherent overall structure. Partially, different agreements and standards have developed independently from each other. This can be shown in the example of the WTO anchoring the patent protection of medicines for combating AIDS, which potentially is in conflict with the human right to health, since the patent protection leads to unaffordable prices of medicines for the population in poor countries.<sup>339</sup>

Messner identifies the complexity and lack of clarity of patterns in the global governance architecture as one of the key areas that global governance research has to focus on. He claims that research has already contributed to make structural changes in international politics tangible. The debate around global governance at first focused on the increasing importance of the United Nations, and was then enlarged by the dimension of established international organizations and contributions of the regime research. Up to this point, the discussion remained within the framework of international relations. The thematic of reorganizing nation states under the conditions of globalization, the proliferation of new actors in world politics, the examination of new governance patterns beyond transnational cooperation and organizations, the relation between regional governance and global governance, and the interaction of local, national and global politics in the multi-level system, however, went beyond the scope of theories of international relations. The global governance research demarcated the framework of conditions for politics in times of globalization with diversity of actors and multi-level politics as central characteristics. But now, new challenges emerge. It has become necessary to complete, concretize, and differentiate the created picture of main features of the global governance structure. So far, analyses only contained individual organizations and networks, but not the interactions between different

---

<sup>338</sup> Messner and Nuscheler, p. 42ff.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid, p. 45f.

governance patterns. An overall picture taken from a macro perspective is necessary, to make the overall structure with all its cross-connections tangible.<sup>340</sup>

## 6.6. Analogy traps

According to Messner, the transition from national to global problem constellations and governance structures involves the danger of analogy traps. Analogy traps mean that the constitutive elements of national democracies cannot simply be transferred to the global level without adequately considering qualitative differences between national societies and the emerging world society. This includes the issue that cross-border political processes are often unreflectingly interpreted with instruments and categories actually developed for the analysis of national politics. This is relevant for research of the EU, for example. Although the EU might be seen as a role model for global governance in some areas, the methods and findings derived from research on Europe cannot be applied one to one to global governance search processes.<sup>341</sup>

The question what new challenges arise at the transition from national to global constellations leads to different answers in different areas like trade, finance or climate change. Nevertheless, Ostrom et al. have identified some general characteristics that shape the shift from the local-national to the global level.<sup>342</sup> The category “scaling-up problems” addresses the issue of an increasing number of participating actors, which leads to organizational difficulties. In particular, diverging interests impede the agreement on common rules and their enforcement. The “cultural diversity challenge” means that cultural diversity is desirable but has resulted in different solutions in different regions for similar problems. Furthermore, diversity can evoke problems in communicating shared interests, as the North-South issue clearly shows. “Complications of interlinked common-pool resources“ stress the difficulties of interactions between global phenomena. The authors acknowledge that solutions for local problems are sometimes hard to find, but interactions between fields like climate change and the loss of biodiversity reach an enormous level of complexity. Global issues and global systems are connected to each other and can evoke hardly predictable global risks. System risks do also exist in local and national spheres, but there they are territorially limited and more easily controllable than global risks occurring worldwide at places far apart from each other. “Accelerating rates of change” address the issue that phenomena like capital mobility, economic or technological change as well as climate change create worldwide conversions with effects that often become significant in retrospect. The “requirement of unanimous agreement as a collective-choice rule” emphasizes that global governance and collective actions are mostly voluntary negotiating systems, and issues like free-rider behavior, powerful states and economic global players ensuring their privileges, and asymmetry between involved actors in light of mobilization of economic, personal and institutional resources, coin the approach. Dismantling such structures globally is a far greater challenge than nationally. Finally, the issue of “we have only one globe” speaks for itself.<sup>343</sup>

---

<sup>340</sup> Dirk Messner, ‘Herausforderungen Für Die Zukünftige Global Governance-Forschung: Dimensionen Einer Zweiten Phase Eines Jungen Diskurses’, in *Globale Öffentliche Güter Unter Privatisierungsdruck*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2003), p. 292ff.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid.

<sup>342</sup> Elinor Ostrom and others, ‘Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges’, *Science*, 284.5412 (1999), 278–282 (p. 281f.).

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

All the above mentioned challenges show that global governance clearly has not reached its peak. But, time is passing. Particularly environmental matters do not give time to wait for perfect reforms of the institutions or perfect democratic participation by the establishment of a UN parliament. This might have been the thought of a series of like-minded states founding the international renewable energy agency (IRENA) on the initiative of Germany, which aims to forward green technologies in particular in poor countries. The number of participating countries is rising.<sup>344</sup> On other positions of the „patchwork rug“ global governance, the Californian governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the German minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier planned to link the emission trade system of some US West coast states and the EU, representing an unusual form of cooperation on very different federal levels.<sup>345</sup> Increasingly influential, big cities support each other more frequently in particular in the area of environmental protection, not least because they are responsible for a large proportion of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.<sup>346</sup> Worldwide, global governance is in an experimental phase. Everywhere, governments are working to improve their global cooperation abilities. Meetings of foreign ministers often yield astonishing parallels from Washington to Peking, and their communication alone has an intrinsic value.<sup>347</sup>

Nevertheless, successful communication also includes governments assuming their responsibilities in their respective countries by demanding their citizens' compliance with international agreements. In combating corruption this principle has been applied for a long time. Managers of multinational corporations are increasingly charged by the courts of their home country, when they are involved in corruption scandals in different countries. In this way, an international OECD convention is implemented. Similarly, states need to follow their extraterritorial duties also in other areas more determinedly. Maybe then a global “we-identity” can develop.<sup>348</sup>

---

<sup>344</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 392ff.

<sup>345</sup> ‘Schwarzenegger Kommt Zu EU-Klimakonferenz’, *DiePresse.com*, 2007.

<sup>346</sup> Schumann and Grefe, p. 392ff.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid, p. 396f.

## CONCLUSION

The increased intensity of diversified challenges affecting the well-being of humankind, resulting in high levels of interconnectedness and vulnerability, are not secondary matters but concern the whole world society. In times of globalization, hoping for ultimate solutions of sovereign states is no longer appropriate, since issues crossing national borders and affecting several regions at the same time rather dash this hope. In fact, a broad approach to thinking outside the national box is needed. This school of thought has gained popularity since the 1980s and yielded the desire for global governance. With its extensive assumptions of including not only various levels of politics beyond and above the national level but also different actors apart from states, the approach seems to be more future-proof than narrow Realist designs of world politics.

Environmental problems are seemingly a classic example for the incapacity of single-handed national solutions since issues like the climate change do not hold passports but rather involve the whole world. After being hardly existing far into the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, global environmental policy experienced a significant upswing with the emerge of global governance. Particularly the United Nations realized the need for international cooperation to combat global problems and has organized a series of conferences, forums, and programs with participation from all over the world. The UNCED is a striking example of efforts in the environmental field and the resulting Agenda 21 acknowledges the need for cooperation between various actors on different fields by including non-state actors, states, and local authorities in their objectives. Although the Agenda, like other UN milestones such as the Kyoto protocol or the UNFCCC, is not free of criticism – as the assessment of the International Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future 20 years after Rio identified serious shortcoming in some areas – these documents paved the way towards sustainable development. Advocating a global governance perspective, the review of Agenda 21 also yielded positive findings, since the inclusion of local authorities and NGOs were among the successes. The well-known Kyoto protocol of 1997 deserves the designation of a milestone in global environmental policy since it succeeded in binding numerous states under international law; it tempers, however, its high ambitions with the introduction of flexible mechanisms. Also, the climate conference in Paris 2015 ended in a commendable result in the form of an international legally binding agreement with ambitious targets, which need to be pursued in future.

Despite their groundbreaking efforts, international organizations are not exclusively represented by the United Nations. The OECD, for example, proved to actively contribute to environmental efforts, inter alia publishing documents on how to finance climate protection measures. Although a major point of criticism of the overall global governance concept addresses the lack of coherence of international agreements and standards and their independent development, the common references to the Paris agreement or MDGs and SDGs in documents of several organizations including the OECD, indicate the attempt to improve collaboration in this regard. Furthermore, the listing of international organizations essential for the environmental field is not complete without mentioning multilateral financial institutions. In the past, particularly the World Bank was conspicuous for its environmentally unfriendly policies, which included the financing of projects jeopardizing the environment and the conditions for loans negatively affecting developing countries.

The inclusion of the local level is not only pronounced by the claim to introduce a local Agenda 21, which seemingly achieved successes in various regions by local projects and activities of state as well

as non-state actors and was positively accepted in different regions of the world. Various US initiatives and the Climate Alliance on the European level verify that local authorities are indeed willing to voluntarily engage in environmental protection and, to achieve this purpose, collaborate and build regional networks. Also, following the motto “think global, act local”, the United Nations repeatedly emphasize the importance of the local level in environmental measures not only because many issues have their roots in local surroundings but also because it attributes high effectiveness to local measures.

Global governance also means that the private sector cannot be ignored but in light of the delicate climate situation on this planet its participation to ensure sustainable development is urgently needed. In this respect it is observable that corporations increasingly advocate environmental measures and merge to reach environmental goals although such measures often restrict the economic interests of the private sector. The reasons for the environmental engagement vary but are certainly connected to the increasing power and reputation of NGOs, which have managed to establish themselves in international and national politics in the last decades. Their increasing professionalization and international networking in the search for global solutions in environmental issues have been cornerstones on their way to they becoming an essential pillar in the global governance architecture.

The concept of global governance is highly complex and it is hard to provide an overview of the structures and interconnections of all the different actors and levels, especially since the existence of a clear structure comparable to corporate organization charts is more than questionable. However, the Global Marshall Plan can be seen as a form of concretizing the approach since it formulates clear targets like an eco-social market economy and suggests the allocation of specific roles, including legal competences for the WTO in a regulatory framework, for example.

Nevertheless, major challenges for global governance remain. Inadequate structures of essential international organizations call for reforms, which inter alia take the changes in world politics since 1945 into account and allow emerging countries to participate. The lack of democratic participation in international organizations has raised the demand for parliamentary constructions. Furthermore, nationalist and unilateralist tendencies in different regions question the possibility of worldwide cooperation while negative experiences raise skepticism towards the approach especially in the global South. These obstacles certainly do not terminate the way global governance pioneers have taken but indicate that the approach needs to meet the various challenges. Since environmental problems, as many others, are irreversible and will always exist, global governance needs to unite all the actors in its pursuit of a governable world – or, as Kenyans would say, since there will always be lice, we need all our fingers to kill them.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- '1970s', *European Environment Agency* <<http://www.eea.europa.eu/environmental-time-line/1970s>> [accessed 23 June 2016]
- Aachener Stiftung Kathy Beys, 'Weltklimakonferenzen in Genf, 1979-2013', *Lexikon Der Nachhaltigkeit*, 2015 <[https://www.nachhaltigkeit.info/artikel/weltklimakonferenz\\_genf\\_1979\\_689.htm](https://www.nachhaltigkeit.info/artikel/weltklimakonferenz_genf_1979_689.htm)> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- Aachener Stiftung Kathy Beys, 2005-2016, 'UN Klimakonferenz Doha, 2012', *Lexikon Der Nachhaltigkeit*, 2015 <[https://www.nachhaltigkeit.info/artikel/un\\_klimakonferenz\\_doha\\_2012\\_1737.htm](https://www.nachhaltigkeit.info/artikel/un_klimakonferenz_doha_2012_1737.htm)> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- A Renewed EU Strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility* (Brussels: European Commission, 25 October 2011)
- 'About ASOC', *Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition* <<http://www.asoc.org/about>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- 'About CAN', *Climate Action Network International* <<http://www.climateactionnetwork.org/about/about-can>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- 'About EEB', *European Environmental Bureau* <<http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/about-eeb/>> [accessed 30 May 2016]
- 'About Environmental Performance Reviews', *OECD* <<http://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/about-env-country-reviews.htm>> [accessed 27 June 2016]
- 'About IIED', *International Institute for Environment and Development* <<http://www.iied.org/about>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- 'About IUCN', *International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources*, 2014 <<http://www.iucn.org/secretariat/about>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- 'About Us', *Friends of the Earth* <<http://www.foe.org/about-us>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- 'Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)', *United Nations Framework on Climate Change* <<http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6409.php>>
- 'Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA)', *United Nations Framework on Climate Change* <<http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6431.php>>
- 'Akteure', *Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung* <<http://www.bpb.de/veranstaltungen/netzwerke/teamglobal/67459/akteure>> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008)
- Becker, Maren, Stefanie John, and Stefan A. Schirm, *Globalisierung und Global Governance* (Paderborn: UTB GmbH, 2007)
- Bongardt, Daniel, 'Multi-Level-Governance Und Europäische Umweltpolitik', in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007)



- Börzel, Tanja A., *Governance With/out Government*, SFB-Governance Working Paper Series No.23, 2010  
<[http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen/working\\_papers/wp23/SFB-Governance-Working-Paper-23.pdf](http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/publikationen/working_papers/wp23/SFB-Governance-Working-Paper-23.pdf)>
- Brandt, Willy, “Das Überleben Sichern” - Die Einleitung Zum Nord-Süd-Bericht’, 2013  
<[http://www.willy-brandt.de/fileadmin/stiftung/Downloads/Schriftenreihe/Heft\\_25\\_Nord-Sued-Bericht.pdf](http://www.willy-brandt.de/fileadmin/stiftung/Downloads/Schriftenreihe/Heft_25_Nord-Sued-Bericht.pdf)>
- Brunnengräber, Achim, ‘Multi-Level Climate Governance’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007)
- Brunnengräber, Achim, and Heike Walk, ‘Der Mehrwert Der Mehrebenenbetrachtung’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007)
- ‘Chapter XXVII Environment’, *United Nations Treaty Collection*, 2016  
<[https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg\\_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&lang=en](https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&lang=en)>
- Chasek, Pamela S., David L. Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown, *Handbuch Globale Umweltpolitik* (Berlin: Parthas Verlag GmbH, 2006)
- ‘Climate Cities Benchmark’, *Climate Alliance* <<http://www.klimabuendnis.org/benchmark1.0.html>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- ‘Climate Plan Development - Climate Compass’, *Climate Alliance*  
<<http://www.klimabuendnis.org/544.0.html>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood: Report of the Commission on Global Governance* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995)
- Commission Staff Working Paper - Implementing Policy for External Trade in the Fields of Standards and Conformity Assessment: A Tool Box of Instruments* (Brussels: European Commission, 28 September 2001)
- Coni-Zimmer, Melanie, and Annegret Flohr, ‘Transnationale Unternehmen: Problemverursacher Und Lösungspartner?’, *Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung*, 2013  
<<http://www.bpb.de/apuz/175496/transnationale-unternehmen-problemverursacher-und-loesungspartner?p=all>> [accessed 30 May 2016]
- Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri, and Leo Meyer, *Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2014)
- Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri, and Andy Reisinger, *Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Geneva, Switzerland: IPCC, 2007)
- Declaration of Santa Cruz de La Sierra* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia: Organization of American States, 8 December 1996)
- ‘Energy and CO2 Monitoring’, *Climate Alliance* <<http://www.klimabuendnis.org/co2-monitoring0.0.html>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- Erklärung Des G7-Gipfels von Brüssel* (Brüssel, 5 June 2014)  
<[www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press.../06/.../erklärung-des-g7-gipfels-von-brüssel/](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/press/press.../06/.../erklärung-des-g7-gipfels-von-brüssel/)>

- ‘EU Greenhouse Gases in 2011: More Countries on Track to Meet Kyoto Targets, Emissions Fall 2.5 %’, *European Environment Agency*, 2012 <<http://www.eea.europa.eu/media/newsreleases/eu-greenhouse-gases-in-2011.5>> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- Europäische Kommission, ‘Von Jetzt Bis 2020: Das Neue Umweltaktionsprogramm Der EU’, 29 April 2014 <[http://ec.europa.eu/environment/news/efe/articles/2014/04/article\\_20140429\\_02\\_de.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/news/efe/articles/2014/04/article_20140429_02_de.htm)>
- Financing Climate Change Action* (OECD, November 2014)
- Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and Matthew Rycroft, ‘Together, We’ve Spent 70 Years Striving for Peace, 70 Years Helping the Poorest and Most Vulnerable’, *Gov.uk*, 2015 <<https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/together-weve-spent-70-years-striving-for-peace-70-years-helping-the-poorest-and-most-vulnerable>> [accessed 6 August 2016]
- Friends of the Earth Europe, Global 2000, and Sustainable Europe Research Institute, *Overconsumption? Our Use of the World’s Natural Resources*, 2009
- G7 Ise-Shima Leader’s Declaration, 26-27 May 2016* (Ise-Shima, 27 May 2016) <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000160266.pdf>>
- Galatsidas, Achilleas, and Finbarr Sheehy, ‘What Have the Millennium Development Goals Achieved?’, *The Guardian*, 6 July 2015, section Global development <<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/datablog/2015/jul/06/what-millennium-development-goals-achieved-mdgs>> [accessed 23 June 2016]
- Garrelts, Heiko, ‘Organization Profile - Climate Alliance’, in *Routledge Handbook of the Climate Change Movement*, ed. by Matthias Dietz and Heiko Garrelts (Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2014)
- ‘Global Governance Seit 1945’, *Bundeszentrale Für Politische Bildung* <<http://www.bpb.de/veranstaltungen/netzwerke/teamglobal/67458/gg-seit-1945>> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- ‘Goal 7: Ensure Environmental Sustainability’, *United Nations Millennium Development Goals* <<http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml>> [accessed 23 June 2016]
- ‘Goal 13: Take Urgent Action to Combat Climate Change and Its Impacts’, *United Nations Sustainable Development Goals* <<http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/climate-change-2/>> [accessed 23 June 2016]
- Görg, Christoph, ‘Multi-Level Environmental Governance’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt* (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007)
- Grant, Charles, *Russia, China and Global Governance* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2012)
- Gray, Leslie, and Michael Kevane, *Darfur: Rainfall and Conflict* (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 20 May 2008) <<http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/3/3/034006/pdf>> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- ‘Greenpeace Stellt Sich Vor’, *Greenpeace* <<https://www.greenpeace.de/ueber-uns/greenpeace-stellt-sich-vor>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- Gstöhl, Sieglinde, *Global Governance und die G8: Gipfelimpulse für Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik* (LIT Verlag Münster, 2003)
- Henley, Jon, Helena Bengtsson, and Caelainn Barr, ‘Across Europe, Distrust of Mainstream Political Parties Is on the Rise’, *The Guardian*, 25 May 2016, section World news

- <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/25/across-europe-distrust-of-mainstream-political-parties-is-on-the-rise>> [accessed 6 July 2016]
- ‘History of the OAU and AU’, *African Union* <<http://www.au.int/en/history/oau-and-au>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- ‘IEG of the Global Commons’, *United Nations Environment Programme* <<http://www.unep.org/delc/GlobalCommons/tabid/54404/>>
- ‘Indonesia - Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia’, *Friends of the Earth International* <<http://www.foei.org/member-groups/asia-pacific/indonesia>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, International Development Research Centre, and UNEP, *The Local Agenda 21 Planning Guide: An Introduction to Sustainable Development Planning* (Toronto, 1996)
- Kennedy, Paul, *The Parliament of Man*, First Vintage Books ed. (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2007)
- Kreske, Diori L., *Environmental Impact Statements: A Practical Guide for Agencies, Citizens, and Consultants* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996)
- Leader’s Declaration G7 Summit 7-8 June 2015* (Schloss Elmau, 8 June 2015)  
<[https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/7320LEADERS%20STATEMENT\\_FINAL\\_CLEAN.pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/7320LEADERS%20STATEMENT_FINAL_CLEAN.pdf)>
- London School of Economics, ‘Centre for the Study of Global Governance’  
<<http://www.lse.ac.uk/globalGovernance/research/research%20themes.aspx>>
- Mayer-Ries, Jörg, *Globalisierung lokaler Politik: Das „Klima-Bündnis“ europäischer Städte mit den indigenen Völkern Amazoniens* (Springer Verlag, 2013)
- McGrew, Anthony, ‘Globalization and Global Politics’, in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008)
- Messner, Dirk, ‘Herausforderungen Für Die Zukünftige Global Governance-Forschung: Dimensionen Einer Zweiten Phase Eines Jungen Diskurses’, in *Globale Öffentliche Güter Unter Privatisierungsdruck*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2003)
- Messner, Dirk, and Franz Nuscheler, *Das Konzept Global Governance - Stand Und Perspektiven*, INEF Report (Duisburg: Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden der Universität Duisburg-Essen, 2003)
- ‘Millennium Development Goals’, *UNDP*  
<[http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg\\_goals.html](http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/mdg_goals.html)> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- ‘Multilateral Agreement on Investment’, *OECD*  
<<http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/multilateralagreementoninvestment.htm>> [accessed 29 June 2016]
- ‘National Contact Points’, *OECD* <<http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/>> [accessed 29 June 2016]
- OECD, *Towards Green Growth*, OECD Green Growth Studies (OECD Publishing, 2011)
- ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’, *OECD*  
<<http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprises.htm>> [accessed 29 June 2016]

- OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Publishing, 2011)  
<<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf>>
- OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Statement Made on the Adoption of the Review 2000* (OECD, 27 June 2000)
- ‘OECD Investment Committee’, *OECD* <<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/oecdinvestmentcommittee.htm>> [accessed 29 June 2016]
- ‘OECD-Leitsätze Für Multinationale Unternehmen Und Der Österreichische Nationale Kontaktpunkt’, *Bundesministerium Für Wissenschaft, Forschung Und Wirtschaft*  
<<http://www.bmwf.w.gv.at/Aussenwirtschaft/investitionspolitik/Seiten/OECD-Leits%C3%A4tze-f%C3%BCr-multinationale-Unternehmen-und-der-%C3%B6sterreichische-Nationale-Kontaktpunkt.aspx>> [accessed 29 June 2016]
- ‘Official Development Assistance’, *United Nations Integrated Implementation Network*  
<<http://iif.un.org/content/official-development-assistance>> [accessed 4 July 2016]
- ‘Organization of American States: Democracy for Peace, Security, and Development’, *OAS*, 2009  
<[http://www.oas.org/en/about/who\\_we\\_are.asp](http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp)> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- Osterhammel, Jürgen, and Niels P. Petersson, *Globalization - a Short History* (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005)
- Ostrom, Elinor, Joanna Burger, Christopher B. Field, Richard B. Norgaard, and David Policansky, ‘Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges’, *Science*, 284 (1999), 278–282
- ‘Our Members’, *Climate Alliance* <[http://www.klimabuendnis.org/our\\_members0.0.html](http://www.klimabuendnis.org/our_members0.0.html)> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- ‘Our Objectives’, *Climate Alliance* <<http://climatealliance.org/our-objectives0.0.html>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- Pelinka, Anton, ‘Die Finalität Der Europäischen Union: Generalprobe Für Global Governance’, in *Friedensmacht Europa: Dynamische Kraft Für Global Governance?*, ed. by Herwig Büchele and Anton Pelinka (Innsbruck: Innsbruck Univ. press, 2011), VI
- Plan of Action for the Sustainable Development of the Americas* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia: Organization of American States, 8 December 1996)
- Plochij, Serhij, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (New York: Viking, 2010)
- ‘Principle 9: Environment’, *United Nations Global Compact* <<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles/principle-9>> [accessed 30 June 2016]
- Radermacher, Franz Josef, *Global Marshall Plan - Ein Planetary Contract*, ed. by Ökosoziales Forum Europa and Global Marshall Plan Foundation (Vienna, 2004)
- Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009* (Copenhagen: UNFCCC, 30 March 2010)  
<<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf>>
- Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010* (Cancun: UNFCCC, 10 December 2010)  
<<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2>>

- Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015* (Paris: UNFCCC, 29 January 2016)  
<<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf>>
- Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly* (United Nations General Assembly, 21 November 2001)
- Review of Implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio Principles* (Stakeholder Forum for a Sustainable Future, 2012)  
<[https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/641Synthesis\\_report\\_Web.pdf](https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/641Synthesis_report_Web.pdf)>
- Riegler, Josef, “‘Global Governance’ ist Machbar: Global Marshall Plan Für Eine Weltweite Ökosoziale Marktwirtschaft Als Modell”, in *Friedensmacht Europa: Dynamische Kraft Für Global Governance?*, ed. by Herwig Büchele and Anton Pelinka (Innsbruck: Innsbruck Univ. press, 2011), vi
- Rosenau, James, ‘Citizenship in a Changing Global Order’, in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992)
- Rosenau, James, ‘Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics’, in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992)
- von Ruschkowski, Eick, ‘Lokale Agenda 21 in Deutschland – Eine Bilanz’, ed. by Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, *Aus Politik Und Zeitgeschichte*, 2002
- Schumann, Harald, and Christiane Grefe, *Der Globale Countdown: Gerechtigkeit Oder Selbstzerstörung - Die Zukunft Der Globalisierung* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2008)
- ‘Schwarzenegger Kommt Zu EU-Klimakonferenz’, *DiePresse.com*, 2007  
<<http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/326866/Schwarzenegger-kommt-zu-EUKlimakonferenz>> [accessed 6 July 2016]
- ‘SDG 13: Climate Action’, *UNDP* <<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-13.html>> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- Sinn, Hans-Werner, *The Green Paradox: A Supply-Side Approach to Global Warming* (MIT Press, 2012)
- ‘Struktur’, *Global Marshall Plan*, 2010 <<http://www.globalmarshallplan.org/struktur>> [accessed 4 July 2016]
- ‘Sustainable Development Goals’, *UNDP*  
<<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoverview.html>> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- ‘Terminology’, *The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction*  
<<https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology>> [accessed 20 June 2016]
- ‘The 0.7% Target: An in-Depth Look’, *UN Millennium Project | Press Archive*  
<<http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htm>> [accessed 4 July 2016]
- The OECD Supporting Action on Climate Change* (OECD, June 2016)  
<<http://www.oecd.org/environment/cc/The-OECD-supporting-action-on-climate-change.pdf>>
- ‘The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact’, *United Nations Global Compact*  
<<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles>>
- Thiemeyer, Guido, *Europäische Integration - Motive - Prozesse - Strukturen* (Köln: UTB GmbH, 2010)

- ‘Über Uns’, *Komitee Für Eine Demokratische UNO* <<http://www.kdun.org/de/ueber-uns/>> [accessed 5 July 2016]
- UNFCCC, ‘Historic Paris Agreement on Climate Change’, *UN Climate Change Newsroom*, 2015 <<http://newsroom.unfccc.int/unfccc-newsroom/finale-cop21/>> [accessed 29 May 2016]
- United Nations Conference on Environment & Development Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 3 to 14 June 1992 - Agenda 21* (Rio de Janeiro: United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 1992)
- ‘United Nations Global Compact’ <<https://www.unglobalcompact.org/>>
- United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change* (United Nations Publications, 2004)
- United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. Report of the Secretary-General* (United Nations General Assembly, 2 November 2001)
- UNO, Kampagne für ein Parlament bei der, ‘Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly’, *Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly* <<http://de.unpacampaign.org/>> [accessed 5 July 2016]
- Unruh, Gregory C., ‘The United Nations Global Compact Environmental Principles: Achievements, Trends and Challenges’, in *The United Nations Global Compact: Achievements, Trends and Challenges*, ed. by Andreas Rasche and Georg Kell (Cambridge University Press, 2010)
- Vierecke, Andreas, Bernd Mayerhofer, and Franz Kohout, *Dtv-Atlas Politik*, 4th ed. (München: dtv Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2015)
- Vogler, John, ‘Environmental Issues’, in *The Globalization of World Politics*, ed. by John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008)
- Walk, Heike, ‘Demokratische Herausforderungen Für Multi-Level-Governance’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007)
- ‘Was ist der Global Marshall Plan?’, 2010 <<http://www.globalmarshallplan.org/was-ist-der-global-marshall-plan>> [accessed 4 July 2016]
- Watt, Julian Borger Nicholas, ‘G7 Countries Snub Putin and Refuse to Attend Planned G8 Summit in Russia’, *The Guardian*, 24 March 2014, section World news <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/24/g7-countries-snub-putin-refuse-attend-g8-summit-russia>> [accessed 24 June 2016]
- Weber, Melanie, ‘Wahrnehmung Globaler Umweltprobleme’, in *Multi-Level-Governance: Klima-, Umwelt- Und Sozialpolitik in Einer Interdependenten Welt*, ed. by Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (Baden: Nomos-Verlag-Ges., 2007)
- Weidenfeld, Werner, *Europa von A bis Z: Taschenbuch der europäischen Integration*, 13 ed. (Baden: Nomos, 2014)
- ‘What Is the GEF’, *Global Environment Facility* <<https://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- ‘What We Do’, *World Resources Institute* <<http://www.wri.org/our-work>> [accessed 28 June 2016]
- Winter, Gerd, *Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change: Perspectives from Science, Sociology and the Law* (Cambridge Univ Press, 2006)

‘WWF in Brief’ <[http://wwf.panda.org/wwf\\_quick\\_facts.cfm](http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_quick_facts.cfm)> [accessed 28 June 2016]

Yunker, James A., *Global Marshall Plan: Theory and Evidence* (Lexington Books, 2014)

Zacher, Mark W., ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance’, in *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992)

Zürn, Michael, ‘Global Governance as Multi-Level Governance’, in *Handbook on Multi-Level Governance*, ed. by Henrik Enderlein, Sonja Wälti, and Michael Zürn (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2010)