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1 Introduction

With the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in 2009 that also made the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union legally binding, the European Union has transformed to also function as a "community of values" (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013). The Union became an institution and its ideas and visions can arguably be interpreted as a script of an "ideal society". Two of these self ascribed and promoted ideas are the values of *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality between men and women*. Based upon scientific definitions and previous research on tolerance (Hadler 2012; Quillian 1995; Weldon 2006; Andersen and Fetner 2008) and equality (Pfau-Effinger 2005), they were each comprised of three dimensions. Tolerance and non-discrimination is comprised of tolerance towards different races, ethnic minorities and immigrants, tolerance towards different religious groups, and tolerance towards homosexuality. Equality is comprised of gender roles towards work, gender roles towards combining work-life and children, and gender roles towards children by itself. This leaves those values ranging from intolerant vs. tolerant views for *tolerance and non-discrimination* and traditional vs. modern views about gender roles for *equality*.

Especially in light of the recent migrant crisis, the importance of these two values has been stressed time and time again. Examining values gives insight into patterns of desirable states, objects, and goals which affect behaviour and actions of individuals (Schwartz 1992, Fehr & Gächter 2002) so it is important to know how these values come to be. The aim is however not to test as to what extent member states uphold these values, but rather whether the ideas and visions of the EU can be interpreted as a societal script with normative power and even more importantly, how possible differences in value positions across countries as well as between individuals can be explained.

This is especially important in light of the scientific debate over which culture theory - or theoretical mix - can guide researchers to analyse value differences best. During the last decades, value researchers have thought about and analysed what constitutes culture and what influences value change. Furthermore, they looked into what characteristics are able to explain cultural differences and normative standards in any given society. The two most prevalent theories are modernisation theory and institutionalism. Modernisation theories assume that higher standards of living, higher levels of education and overall higher levels of prosperity and development contribute to individuals holding increasingly materialist or post-materialist values that oppose traditionalist and intolerant ideals while at the same time favouring self-fulfilment

and egalitarian values (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart & Baker 2000; Inglehart et. al. 2002). Institutionalism assumes that ideas over desirable societies are embedded in the institutional framework that shapes value orientations of individuals, while at the same time being subject to value change itself when values that members of society hold cause a shift in the institutional setting (Brinton & Nee 1998; March & Olsen 1989). Since these two theories do not contradict themselves, combining them enables researchers to find where causalities of factors that explain value orientations and differences in value orientations lie.

This theoretical mix presents the need to distinguish different dimensions of effects. These are effects that affect the individual (micro-level) and effects that affect countries (macro-level). Affluence for example can both be measured by the personal income of individuals as well as aggregated wealth of a country. Both modernisation theories as well as institutionalism work with these levels. Whereas modernisation theories argue that the wealthier individuals and societies as a whole are, the more tolerant and in favour of equality between men and women are, institutionalist theories focus on the interplay between individual values on institutionally embedded norms that both influence each other. By deploying both levels one can analyse causal effects between those levels.

Increasingly, the bulk of current value research has taken a comparative approach. Research focuses more often on analysing value change over time in a longitudinal context (Inglehart & Norris 2009), or analysing more than one country or society at the same time in a cross-national context (Arts et al. 2003). According to Arts (2011), value researchers have to increasingly focus on multi level models, since macro-level variables can explain general motivations "about large processes like modernisation and big structures such as institutions", while the real causation happens at the micro-level (Arts 2011: 29). And "to make things even more complicated, interactions between the different levels are also relevant" (Arts 2011: 29).

Comparative research is undertaken by using data sets that have made use of standardised questionnaires and which were conducted in a number of countries at the same time. One of these data sets has been established by the European Values Study (EVS), that conducts value surveys in European countries ever since 1981 and repeats them every nine years.

The underlying research question of this thesis is how value differences *between* and *within* member states of the European Union can be explained and what the role the EU itself plays in shaping value orientations of its citizens.

This thesis contributes to the comparative literature on values and culture, traditionalism and gender roles, as well as tolerance and discriminatory attitudes by providing an analysis that covers every member state of the European Union at the time the EVS-fieldwork was completed (2008-2009, N = 27), by taking both micro- and macro-level characteristics into account by applying a multi level model.

Micro level variables are variables that apply to individuals (e.g. age, level of education, etc.), whereas macro level variables apply to countries (e.g. the duration of EU membership, the GDP per capita, etc.). Both levels are important and focusing only on one of them while leaving out the other could lead to missing or misinterpreting findings because often one level has an influence on the other, since both levels are not (necessarily) independent from another.

The main finding is that the role of the European Union itself for promoting *tolerance* and *equality* cannot be negated and that there are significant differences in value orientations between countries. Patterns between the "old-15" and the "new-12" countries emerge, revealing that citizens of older member states are on average more tolerant and less traditional in their views about gender roles. Differences of value orientations between countries were found to be highly significant, but even bigger differences emerged within countries. The duration of EU membership stayed highly significant when controlling for a number of other factors both on the micro- and macro-level. This suggests that institutionally embedded norms and values do impact value orientations of individuals. The process of European integration can therefore help to promote these values among citizens of member states of the European Union, especially in countries that on average have not held these values in as high regard as other countries.

Other findings are that modernisation theories were able to better explain value orientations than institutionalist theories. The main deliberations of modernisation theories hold up on the micro-level, meaning that the more affluent individuals are, the more tolerant and in favour of equality they are. The macro-level revealed often contradictory findings, meaning that the more affluent societies or countries are does not necessarily lead to more tolerant and less traditional views when accounting for other effects at the same time. Age, political views, personal beliefs, and religious denomination were found to be significant contextual effect that too impact value orientations. Though macro-level effects did not explain value orientations as well as micro-level effects, they were still able to further contribute to understanding value differences. Their inclusion is therefore justified and hereby encouraged.

The next sections outline the underlying research question and the theoretical framework that guided the analysis. The aim of this thesis and the hypotheses are then stated, followed by an overview over the data and method before continuing on to presenting the results, which are discussed in the last section and summarised and reviewed in the conclusion.

2 Research question

Over the years the process of European integration has not only expanded in terms of the number of its member states, it has also expanded in the way it functions. While the European Community was established to mainly serve as an economic partnership it has transformed into the political, societal and cultural arena. Given this transformation it does not suffice to look at the European Union and European integration merely in the context of economic convergence, since the European Union and its member states also consider themselves to be a community of values (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013; Gerhards 2006: 23).

This process of integration has been shaped by an expansion of its member states. The (arguably) biggest change has been the so called "Eastern enlargement" in 2004, when Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czechia, Hungary and Cyprus and in the year 2007 Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union. The year 2013 has marked the entry of Croatia into the European Union.¹

With the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, the EU has also emphasised the active promotion of values and principles. These values are expressed in Article 1a which states: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail" (Lisbon treaty 2009: 11).

Article 6 states that "the Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties." and that "the Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" (Lisbon treaty 2009: 13).

This adherence to certain principles and values expressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000) became legally binding with the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty.

When examining the role of the European Union as a value entrepreneur, one has to analyse what the effects of institutionalised and promoted ideas

¹Croatia is not included in the analysis since it joined the Union after fieldwork was completed.

of the Union are. This is done by looking at value differences between and within countries and their explanatory factors. The underlying question this thesis tries to answer is how value differences between member states of the European Union and differences within member states can be explained and if the Union itself helps shape the value orientations of its citizens.

Value differences are deeply rooted in nations' histories and different political and socio-economic frameworks and experiences. Citizens of countries that are members of the European Union have had different experiences in their lives and also have different ideas about how societies should be organised. The institutional order has an influence on the opinions of citizens, over what they deem to be permissible and desirable and normative value systems of those citizens in turn shape the institutional order (Merkel 2010).

Different opinions over what is desirable and what is undesirable do not only prevail between member states but also within societies. Previous research has shown that values vary more between individuals than national borders (Kaasa et al. 2013; 2014; Haller 2002). It is therefore necessary to also look into the level of dissension within countries as opposed to just countries. The level of conflict of opinions gives valuable insights into the overall cultural identity of countries and differences within countries and then ultimately the European Union.

Derived from the above mentioned values that the European Union promotes, two items were chosen in order to answer the research question: *Tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality between men and women*.

These two values were chosen for various reasons. First, because they are two of the core values the European Union actively promotes, second to further elaborate on existing research in value research especially regarding (social) tolerance and equality (Hadler 2012; Quillian 1995; Weldon 2006; Andersen and Fetner 2008) and lastly because of their increasing relevance in the public discourse in recent years, especially since the migrant crisis that started during the summer 2015. Debates about common European values on the one hand and value systems of migrants on the other hand have been increasingly held and became mainstream. While some people focused on upholding European values such as solidarity, human rights and non-discrimination, others emphasised the need for teaching migrants about the value systems of the host countries in order to integrate them better into the society especially with respect to gender equality.² So ultimately, public debate focused a lot on the promotion of values of tolerance and equality

²Der Standard (2016). Wertekurse für Flüchtlinge - Wir Österreicher sind wie Zwiebeln. <http://derstandard.at/2000032222052/Wertekurse-fuer-Fluechtlinge-Wir-Oesterreicher-sind-wie-Zwiebeln>

which is what gives the question on what factors these values depend on a higher sense of topicality.

These values were measured by using the surveys of the European Values Study (EVS) from the latest wave which took place in 2008. Characteristics that are able to explain differences between these values were derived from modernisation theories and institutionalism theories. These theories also help in order to find answers regarding the scientific debate over whether micro- or macro-level variables better explain differences in value patterns (Arts 2011). Whereas micro-level variables pertain to individuals and individual factors, macro-level variables pertain to countries and state-level factors. Both are important and there are factors on both levels that shape value orientations, however focusing only on one or the other might lead to drawing false or incomplete conclusions. Taking both level effects into account therefore guarantees limited loss of information, while the mutual interaction between these two levels is, where the real interesting effects are located.

[Accessed 28 December 2016].

3 Theories

In order to address the research question, the theoretical framework has to be explained in full detail. What are values? How can values be defined and measured and in what way can they be explained by other factors? What are the underlying ideas and theories concerning value differences across countries? What interdependencies are at play and how do they translate to the values of citizens within societies and between nations?

These questions are addressed in this chapter by first giving an overview over what values are and how they are defined and treated in this thesis and ultimately, what theories are used that work as a guideline in order to come to a conclusion.

3.1 Values

3.1.1 Definition of values

The key terms used in this thesis are *values* and *culture*. Values are something that are both held by individuals as well as by collectivities. Both psychologists and sociologists agree that values are likely seen as deeply rooted motivations or orientations acquired in early stages of life which guide and/or explain attitudes, norms, and opinions which in turn control human action (Spates 1983).

Schwartz (1992) more concretely defines values as "desirable states, objects, goals, or behaviors, transcending specific situations and applied as normative standards to judge and to choose among alternative modes of behavior".

According to Schwartz (1999), values are trans-situational criteria or goals of the desirable, ordered by importance as guiding principles in life. Moreover, values (being "cultural ideals") are always positive, whereas attitudes can be positive or negative (Mohler et al. 2006: 7ff.). For example one can have negative or positive feelings towards certain political policies, but values are always something that is seen as a positive idea one wants to hold onto, like being respectful towards others, or being self-reliant.

According to Clyde Kluckhohn "a value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of actions" (1951: 395). He then goes on and states that values are a "conception of the desirable" and that "a value is not just a preference, but is a preference which is felt and/or considered to be justified" (1951: 396). Kluckhohn thereby

extends the value definition by claiming that values are not only something positive but also something that feels right, something that is worth striving for, therefore being an idea that guides one's life.

Helmut Thome refined this by stating that ideas of the desirable are neither identical with aspired objects, nor with the needs of their subjects, since values are justified wishes (2003).

Values are also orientations that are generalized by time, meaning that they do not change overnight. Various studies have shown that values are subject to socialisation and remain relatively stable (Inglehart 1971).

Hofstede points out that values have both *intensity* and *direction*. He states that "if we 'hold' a value, this means that the issue involved has some relevance for us (intensity) and that we identify some outcomes as 'good' and others as 'bad' (direction)" (2001: 6).

He also identified the need for distinction between values as the *desired* and the *desirable* which is "what people desire versus what they think they ought to desire. Whereas the two are of course not independent, they should not be equated; equating them is a 'positive fallacy', a confusion between reality and social desirability" (Hofstede 2001: 6). However, he points out that when studying values "asking for the desirable is perfectly respectable; it is part and parcel of the phenomenon studied. [...] Social desirability in our measurements is not undesirable; we should only realize that we deal with values of two different kinds" (2001: 6).

He further distinguishes between desires and deeds. Desires correspond with values, deeds with behaviour, however values as the desired are closer to deeds than values as the desirable. Values as the desired have a normative character which is statistically measurable and functions as an indicator for culture.

3.1.2 The relevance of values

There are different areas that explain why culture in a sense of value orientations is relevant, the first being social (inter)action. M. Rainer Lepsius defines this as such: "Social interaction [...] is carried out in structured interaction contexts in reference to value orientations" (2003: 33). Interactions can be explained by preferences and the restrictions of interactions. When examining values, one examines generalised, evaluated preferences of citizens that will have an impact on their actions (Fehr & Gächter 2002). As Mohler et al. point out "[...] individuals, groups or societies may differ in their hierarchical patterns of values (some values are more important than other values), which is the prime field of interest of comparative value research"

(2006: 8).

Another area that explains the importance of values of individuals is the stability of institutions (Gerhards 2006: 35). Political institutions are only stable if there is congruence between the institutions and the value of citizen, whereupon congruence means that citizens support the basic values of the political system, the political regime and the actions of politicians (Inglehart 1988). The importance of political culture has been addressed especially in the transformation theories when analysing former socialistic countries of the Soviet Union (Merkel 1995, 1999, 2010; Fuchs & Roller 1998). The socialisation of citizens of the former Soviet Union is critical when trying to answer the question whether they support political institutions and economic institutions.

3.2 Culture

3.2.1 Definition of culture

The term culture is a concept that is a controversial and highly debated one, especially in the social sciences and its definition varies across researches. Kroeber and Parsons (1958) defined culture as "transmitted and created content and patterns of values, ideas, and other symbolic-meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behavior and the artifacts produced through behavior" (1958: 583).

Clyde Kluckhohn's definition is that "Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional [...] ideas and especially their attached values" (1951: 86).

In his book "Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across countries", Geert Hofstede treated culture "as the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another" (2001: 9).

He builds upon Kluckhohn's definition, stating that "culture in this sense includes values; systems of values are a core element of culture. [...] Culture is to human collectivity what personality is to an individual" (Hofstede 2001: 10).

He then concludes that the term culture is usually reserved for societies. Societies in turn are social systems "characterized by the highest level of self-sufficiency in relation to its environments" (Parsons 1977: 6). A society

usually consists of different cultural groups and categories that are interdependent with other categories, but these groups (e.g. Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Muslims and non-religious people) usually share cultural traits with another, making them members of society that are recognizable by others not belonging to this society (Hofstede 2001: 10).

Jürgen Gerhards also built upon Kluckhohn's definition, defining culture as a "system of values which is shared between (political) actors and which is used to interpret the 'world'" (2006: 19).

In order to understand culture and its subgroups, one needs to look at values, their differences and their explanations connected to it.

3.2.2 Carriers of values

Gerhards defined two different carriers of culture: The first carrier are collective actors and institutions. Parties and governments have ideas over how the economy and family life should be organised and what the role of government ought to be. Institutions are not only bureaucratic organisations, they are also carriers of ideas and culture if they have visions of desirables which they can try to implement with their policies. The culture of institutions can manifest themselves in party platforms, legislative texts or public statements (Gerhards 2006: 23). The European Union is such an institution and its ideas and visions can be interpreted as an institutionalised script of an "ideal society". Two values of the EU promotes and that are of interest in this thesis are *tolerance* and *non-discrimination*.

The second carrier of culture are the citizens or subgroups of citizens of a society. Connected with the distinction of different areas of objects of a society, citizens can have different ideas over which duties the government ought to have, how the economy and family life should be organised, etc. (Gerhards 2006: 24).

This thesis uses the same cultural definition for this purpose as Almond and Verba did: "When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population. [...] The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of pattern of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation" (1963: 13). This means, that any nation has a general pattern according to their value orientations. These patterns in turn also allow for comparisons between nations as well as between citizens of these nations, and therefore how variance between these patterns can be explained.

3.3 Prevalent culture theories

The two biggest and most often used theories in value research are modernisation theory that has been discarded, revived and adapted time and time again, the theory of institutionalism and neo-institutionalism.

The following sub chapters give a detailed insight into these theories.

3.3.1 Modernisation theory

The underlying assumption of modernisation theory is that technical innovations and economic growth pave the way for value change in two areas: First, the more societies modernise, or advance technologically and economically, the more an individualisation process occurs; collectivist ideas pave the way for an individualistic ethos. Second, the more societies modernise and advance, value patterns of citizens shift from an absolute "ethics of principles" to a pragmatic "ethics of responsibilities" (Arts 2011: 10).

Industrialisation, the development of bureaucratic structures and urbanisation create a standard environment with standard, institutional pressures for particular groups in a way that should produce standard patterns of beliefs and values (Arts and Halman 2011: 80).

One of the biggest proponents of modernisation theory is Ronald Inglehart. He demonstrated that the trend that modernising countries show similarity in value patterns could not be denied, but on the other hand differences still remained. These remaining differences could be explained by what Inglehart (1997) defined as "path dependence". Current value systems are not only a product of the presence and modernisation but also of country-specific value systems of the past. History seemed to matter.

Other scholars have modified modernisation theory in order to explain why much their initially presumed value change did not materialise, by defining an effect called "partial modernisation" or "cultural lag theory" which means that not all societal domains modernise at the same speed or with the same impact. William Ogburn stated that while material culture (e.g. economy) usually evolves and changes quite quickly, non-material culture (e.g. values) tends to only change slowly over time (Ogburn 1958). Inglehart recognised this "lag" as well and adapted his theory by stating that value change exists due to a change in birth cohorts, or intergenerational population replacement and called it "the silent revolution" (Inglehart 1971). So it seems that value change mostly manifest itself between generations, since latent value structures are relatively stable over time.

However, Inglehart further assumed that also short-term developments such

as wars and revolutions shape people's values, connecting it to the scarcity hypothesis which states that the direst needs at the moment are of the highest value. In later years, Inglehart talked about the end of modernisation and distinguished it from what he calls postmodernisation. Prevailing values will further evolve, but rather than survival and achievement motivation which are materialistic values, the postmodern age will bring well-being and self-expression which are postmaterialistic values. These postmaterialistic values focus on the desire for tolerance, equality, self-fulfilment and participation (Inglehart 1997). Regarding equality, Inglehart sees it as arguably the most central component of this postmaterialist value change. (2002: 336).

Given this focus on tolerance and equality, the postmaterialistic theoretical approach is the one most fitting to the research question of this thesis which focuses on those two aforementioned values. It is however necessary to distinguish between the micro- and macro-level when discussing this theory.

On the micro level, economic development and security aides the development of postmaterialistic values of individuals. The more economically secure people have been throughout their socialisation, the more likely they will develop postmaterialistic values which manifest themselves in valuing diversity, self-expression, and the condemnation of strict absolute rules and norms regarding sexuality. The more economically insecure people are, the more prone they are to xenophobia and authoritarian values (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart & Baker 2000; Inglehart & Welzel 2005). These values are also dependent on age and urbanisation (Inglehart 1971, 1997). Education is also a core driver of tolerant views, a higher level of education increases contacts with global ideas which in turn makes it more likely that traditional views do not prevail as much, while a lower level of education will increase competition and prejudices towards people with whom individuals compete (Ramirez 2006; Ramírez, Suárez & Meyer 2007; Quillian 1995, 1996). Therefore, it is expected that a higher level of education fosters tolerant values. Questioning one's beliefs also expands to the area of attitudes towards gender relations. Thus, higher levels of education are assumed to decrease traditional views (Gerhards 2006: 117f.).

These key indicators for the modernisation of societies and individuals not only play a role in social tolerance towards people of different race and ethnicity but also in social tolerance towards homosexuals (Anderson & Fetner 2008).

However, values are also influenced by personal experiences in life. Kalmijn found that "[m]arriage and children tend to make people more conservative, in part because marriage often turns out to be a more traditional arrangement than people expect when they are young. It is plausible therefore, that people

adjust their attitudes in a conservative direction when they marry and have children" (2003: 316). Thus, the number of children and the marital status are also theorised to impact attitudes towards tolerance and traditionalism. Following Jürgen Gerhards' (2006: 41ff.) findings, religious tolerance and religious values in regard to different religious groups also have an impact on people's value orientations. It is expected that a higher degree of integration into church lowers tolerance especially towards homosexuals and the overall degree of tolerance.

Therefore it is necessary to look into how much individuals are integrated into their churches, how this degree of integration differs between religious denominations and what reciprocal effect this has on other factors.

On the macro-level similar directions regarding economic stability and education are also maintained on the macro level. Affluent societies will hold stronger postmaterialistic values than poorer societies and the more well-off societies are, the more they will reject political, religious and economic authorities rather than conform to them. Also, individuals who have to compete and rival for (limited) resources with other people tend to antagonise different (ethnic) groups more than individuals with more resources and less competition (Blumer 1958; Olzak 1994; Quillian 1995, 1996). The bigger the other groups are and the more economically unstable the situation is, the higher the perceived threat (Persell, Green & Gurevich 2001). These effects are theorised to be explained by net migration and economic characteristics (GDP, HDI, GINI-coefficient). Uslaner and Brown found that the more inequality exists in societies, the less tolerant people at the lower end of economic stability are (Uslaner 2002; Uslaner & Brown 2005). This is in line with Przeworski's theory of income distribution playing a vital role in determining value orientations (Przeworski 1991).

Differences between religious denominations are also expected, where individuals of religious groups that emphasise authoritarian values show a weaker sense of tolerance than religious groups that do not emphasise authoritarian values as much and people, who are not religious.

As Arts points out with regard to Need and Evans (2001), critics of modernisation theory claim that after "the fall of atheist communism, the institutional presence of religion was strengthened and this led to a recent resurgence of religiosity among the young" (2011: 18). But Need and Evans found no evidence of a resurgence of religiosity among younger groups (2001). However, during his revision of modernisation theory with its so called "path dependence", Ronald Inglehart has also stressed the importance of religious traditions which are sustained by their respective institutions and then transmitted onto the public (Inglehart 1997). This falls in line with Gundelbach's

findings (1994) who analysed that religious denominations best explain family values.

Religious factors however are not only limited to projecting values onto individuals, their value orientations are embedded and institutionalised in societies. The importance of religion for individuals and societies is expected to explain attitudes towards tolerance and traditional gender roles. Differences between religious denominations regarding their overall adherence to traditional norms and expectations are assumed to have an impact on gender equality as well (Gerhards 2006: 119). As previous research has shown, countries that consist mainly of Protestants hold less traditional views than countries that consist mainly of Catholics (Norris and Inglehart 2002).

Religion is one of the key factors where modernisation theories and institutionalist theories are intertwined. As stated in the previous paragraph, values of individuals and societies are not only institutionally embedded but those norms also shape value of individuals and societies in turn. So while institutionalism focuses mainly on macro-level effects, it cannot exist without the mutual influence of the macro-level on the micro-level and vice versa. These effects are not limited to religion, but also economic and technological advancements and others, as is seen in the next subsection. This next section outlines what institutionalist theories are about, before tying modernisation and institutionalist theories together and the interplay between the micro- and macro-level.

3.3.2 Institutionalism

Theories of institutionalism assume that cultural norms are embedded in an institutionalised framework that influence attitudes and values of citizens on the one hand, while on the other hand also being subject to value change themselves. The need for explaining value patterns from an institutionalist point of view paved the way for an adaptation and development called "new institutionalism" or "neo-institutionalism" which focuses on the way institutions interact and affect society and its value patterns (Brinton and Nee 1998; March and Olsen 1989). Neo-institutionalist scholars assume that institutions transmit their norms to the public and influence the beliefs and values of the population. With this influence, they can affect people's perceptions of self-interest and change their thinking about opportunism by impacting their sense of behavioural rational course of action from a moral point of view. While institutions do wield this influence over people, people do not follow the embedded norms of institutions blindly.

One of these areas that transmits its values onto the public is - as mentioned before - religion. Ever since Samuel P. Huntington's controversial theory expressed in his book titled "The Clash of Civilisations" (1996) which highlighted the impact and importance of culture, extensive research has been carried out trying to explain and analyse cultural differences. A number of researchers have tested Huntington's assumptions about the connection between culture and religion (Inglehart & Baker 2000, Inglehart, Norris & Welzel 2002, Norris & Inglehart 2002) finding evidence, that culture and religion do indeed play a role in politics and value orientations.

Religious, political, social and economic traditions are founded and sustained by their respective institutions and are transmitted by educational institutions and mass-media (Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart 2008). This means that even when the original and domain-specific institutions have already changed, traditions will still have an impact since other institutions have taken over. Inglehart concludes that there can be no one-to-one relationship between economic and technological development and the prevalence of secular-rational values. He mentions that social security systems confound the relationship between economic and technical development and the prevalence of (post)materialistic values, linking the people's sense of security to welfare institutions as well as the economic and technological advancement of a society.

Before Inglehart, Peter Gundelach (1994) argued that when countries have different institutional characteristics, that these characteristics are going to have a different impact on the values of their citizens, however when they have the same characteristics, they will have a similar impact. He tested his hypothesis by looking at different family types, welfare state regimes, and levels of cultural fragmentation in Europe. He found that the religious denomination which dominates a country best explains family values. What was striking, was the fact that these institutional variables explained much more variance than modernisation variables. So it seems that some value orientations are better explained by the institutional framework which seems to impact what the population deems to be desirable quite a lot.

In terms of gender roles in the family realm, Pfau-Effinger (2011) has laid out a framework that assumes that "family models" and dominating values regarding gender relations and family life pertain in every modern society. These family models are also tied to an institutionalised system and are therefore often times relatively stable in influencing actions of individuals. However, these family models can also often be contradictory and sometimes the institutionalised system does not reflect overall attitudes towards gender relations. This is where the previously mentioned "path dependence" comes

into play. Domestic and cultural factors that are embedded in society help shape attitudes and values that citizens hold. Institutionalised gender roles influence attitudes and values (Pfau-Effinger 2004, 2005) just as well as modernisation and religious compositions do.

Institutionalised gender roles can manifest themselves in terms of women's participation in the labour force - and in the policy arena - whether countries have a generous social security net like maternity leave and many others. The overall employment rate of women in any given country helps to explain the degree to which individuals change their attitudes about women's employment and gender roles in general. It is assumed that higher employment rates of women result in more modern attitudes towards women in the workplace and overall attitudes towards gender roles (Kalmijn 2003).

"Social capital", a term coined by Hilary Putnam, can also indicate institutionalised (dis-)trust. What Putnam means by "social capital" is that it is the long-range commitment of the civil society, which has to be learned and historically accumulated, since democratic values and the behaviour of societies cannot be implemented straight from the drawing board (1993). Informal norms and mutual trust, civil engagement and civil self-organisation coin the social communication of a society, this in turn civilises such a society not only by means of state rulings but stabilises also the political institutions of democracies. The more trust there is in a society, the more likely social cooperation will follow. Social cooperation in turn leads to more trust. Societal institutions strengthen political institutions and vice versa (Merkel 2010: 83).

Considering these circumstances, historic and political peculiarities have to be taken into account in order to be able to explain value differences - especially between Western and Eastern European countries. This is done by looking at the length of democratic rule in any given country, as well as the duration of EU membership (Gerhards 2006), since the EU itself is also a key driver in influencing gender roles. By establishing scripts and principles, in some cases even laws that super-cede national legislation, the European Union can be seen as a "value entrepreneur" that advocates gender equality and non-discrimination (Gerhards 2009: 516f.). Therefore, it is assumed that the longer countries have been members of the European Union (and the longer individuals have been living in a democratic country), the more attitudes towards tolerance and non-discrimination and gender equality of citizens of these countries correspond to the notions of the Union.

Following this approach, democratic systems tend to show more tolerance towards different groups, while high levels of autocracy do not foster tolerant views (Weil 1985). Since "cultural lags" can appear according to Ogburn and

Inglehart (Ogburn 1958; Inglehart 1971), meaning that value orientations do not change overnight and are relatively resistant towards abrupt changes, the duration of democracy and the time of exposure towards democratic systems is assumed to correlate with tolerant values as well. Given the context of the European Union promoting the values of tolerance, non-discrimination and the protection of minorities, and regarding the argument of "cultural lag", the length of membership in the European Union should also have a visible effect on tolerance values.

Furthermore, in context of cultural and political heritage, whether individuals live in countries that have a communist legacy are theorised to explain variance about tolerance and gender roles (Hadler 2012), since the economic order of socialist countries differed highly from capitalist countries. Work ethics are also assumed to have been affected. Former communist countries enjoy less economic development and have an overall higher sense of traditionalism (Gerhards 2006: 166f.).

To summarise, values are held by both individuals (micro-level) as well as societies and countries (macro-level) as a whole, and value change also affects individuals as well as societies. The more affluent and educated individuals and societies are, the less traditional/authoritarian and more in favour of tolerance and equality they are. Value orientations are relatively persistent over time and are shaped by both the embeddedness of values in a society and its institutions while these institutions also shape value orientations of individuals and societies. Modernisation, as well as short- and long-term developments and historical peculiarities can be seen as the key drivers in value change. While modernisation theories are about the modernisation effects that change value orientations of individuals (micro) and societies/countries (macro), institutionalist theories are about the interactive effects of the micro- and macro-level and how one level affects the other and make no assertions about a modernising society by itself. Finding out the relationship between the interdependent effects on the micro- and macro-level is one of the cornerstone this thesis tries to answer.

4 Theoretical Framework

Having presented the most prevalent theories used in value and culture research the underlying theory used in this thesis is detailed in this chapter.

4.1 The relevance of tolerance and non-discrimination and equality

Tolerance and equality are two key values that the European Union and its member states promote specifically not only since the ratification of the Lisbon treaty in 2009, but also already in the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000. These values are expressed in Article 1a: "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail" (Lisbon treaty 2009: 11).

Also, these two values have been subject to scientific research interests for years. Value researchers have analysed the level of social tolerance (Hadler 2012; Quillian 1995; Weldon 2006; Andersen and Fetner 2008) and gender roles and equality (Gerhards 2003, 2006, 2007; Kalmijn 2003) across countries and time. Building upon their findings and applying new theoretical deliberations onto a multi-level model should provide further scientific insights into how differences in value orientations concerning tolerance and equality can be explained.

Lastly, debates over values and value systems have entered the mainstream and in recent years, public discourse has increasingly revolved around these two values (and others). Ever since the financial crisis that started in 2008 and its impact on the European Union by growing sentiments of anti-solidarity with countries that have been hit harder such as Greece and an impending collapse of the Euro-zone, the values of the European Union have been under attack. To this day the European Union faces many crises, and its current culmination could be seen as the result of the referendum of the British public to secede from the European Union in June 2016.

While these events affected the foundation of the European Union and European solidarity but not the values of tolerance and non-discrimination and equality

per se, other events such as growing anti-immigrant sentiments (with some arguing the Brexit vote was also partially motivated by ³) directly threaten these values.

Anti-immigrant movements such as PEGIDA which has started as a German national phenomenon but has since spread across national borders led to chancellor Merkel quoting the former German president Christian Wulff that "Islam belongs to Germany" ⁴ in January 2015, before the wake of the refugee crisis later that year that would question European values and solidarity even more.

The refugee crisis can be seen as the turning point in which *common values* entered public discourse. Proponents of taking in refugees appealed to European values such as solidarity, the dignity of human life, as well as tolerance and non-discrimination and equality, while others stressed the importance of teaching asylum seekers from different cultures about these values. ⁵ The Austrian minister of Foreign Affairs and Integration, Sebastian Kurz, for example mandated that refugees have to attend at least 8 hours of "value courses" where they are taught the basics of how the Austrian society works and what values its society upholds. ⁶ So in light of this ever increasing importance in which values are debated in the public sphere, *tolerance and non-discrimination* as well as *equality* stand out as one of the two most important ones. Understanding what factors can explain agreement or disagreement over the adherence to these values is therefore critical.

³The Washington Post (2016). The uncomfortable question: Was the Brexit vote based on racism?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/25/the-uncomfortable-question-was-the-brexit-vote-based-on-racism/?utm_term=.1ad4c64dc511.

[Accessed 13 February 2017].

⁴Der Spiegel (2015). Kanzlerin Merkel "Der Islam gehört zu Deutschland".

<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-islam-gehört-zu-deutschland-a-1012578.html>

[Accessed 13 February 2017].

⁵The Economist (2016). Migrant men and European women.

<http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21688397-absorb-newcomers-peacefully-europe-must-insist-they-respect-values-such-tolerance-and>.

[Accessed 12 October 2016].

⁶Österreichischer Integrationsfonds (2017). Wertevermittlung als Basis der Integration.

<http://www.integrationsfonds.at/themen/kurse/werte-und-orientierungskurse/>

[Accessed 13 February 2017].

4.2 Definitions of Tolerance and Equality

The following two subsections outline the definitions of *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* that the later outlined theoretical framework will subsequently follow.

4.2.1 Definitions of tolerance and non-discrimination

The first definition of *tolerance* in the dictionary is "a fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward those whose opinions, beliefs, practices, racial or ethnic origins, etc., differ from one's own; freedom from bigotry" ⁷.

The European Union states in Article 2 of the Lisbon treaty "[The Union] shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child" (Lisbon treaty 2009).

Article 5b of the Lisbon treaty notes that one of EU's goals is that: "In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation" (Lisbon treaty 2009).

Those definitions and self-ascribed goals have the following dimensions in common: gender, racial or ethnic origins, beliefs, and practices. In order to measure tolerance and non-discrimination, questions from the survey that corresponded to this definition had to be chosen. Ultimately, three dimensions of tolerance could be measured with the data provided: tolerance towards (racial) minorities and immigrants, tolerance towards religious beliefs and tolerance towards sexual orientations.

4.2.2 Definitions of equality

Given that this thesis analyses equality in a gender dimension, the theoretical definition focuses on equality regarding women and men. Attitudes and values towards equality are measured in the context of traditionalism and modernity.

The first definition of *equality* in the dictionary is "the state or quality of being equal; correspondence in quantity, degree, value, rank, or ability" ⁸.

⁷<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/tolerance>

⁸<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/equality>

The Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Union 2000) stipulates that "[a]ny discrimination based on any grounds such as sex [...] shall be prohibited" (Chapter III, Art. 21) and that "[e]quality between men and women must be ensured in all areas" (Chapter III, Art. 23).

The European Union seeks to promote equality between women and men as stated in the Lisbon treaty (Lisbon treaty 2009). However, the European Union focuses on gender equality primarily in economic terms (Ostner 1992; Watson 2000). It seeks to prevent unequal opportunities and treatment of men and women in the workplace and promotes equal pay for equal work (treaty of Rome 1957: Article 119; treaty of Amsterdam 1999: Article 119). This principle of equality has further been stipulated in decrees, guidelines of the Union, as well as verdicts of the European Court of Justice (Bergmann 1999: 45ff.; Wobbe 2001; Gerhards 2006: 106).

Gender equality in the eyes of the European Union focuses primarily on "equality in the economic realm, the participation of women in political decision-making, and equality in education" (Gerhards 2009: 519).

So equality between the sexes in economic terms is one of the dimensions of gender equality. However, gender equality consists of more than this dimension, it also covers equality in everyday life and social life and especially equality in family life (Pfau-Effinger 2004a; 2004b). The latter is especially important when trying to include more than one dimension of gender equality, since gender roles in the economic realm are not necessarily independent from gender roles in the family realm (Gerhards 2009). Therefore, both dimensions and the interplay between them have to be included in the theoretical framework as well as in the model.

4.3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses

Modernisation theory as well as institutionalism enable researchers to understand different value systems and value change over time. Both socio-economic effects as well institutionally embedded ideas and norms affect values and beliefs of individuals. The connection between these factors is subject to reciprocal effects and value change will also impact institutionalised ideas.

The European Union is such an institution and it promotes *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* between men and women. By doing so, it transmits its values onto the member states and their citizens. However, these member states and citizens of these member states also created this

societal script. Member states that have been part of the Union for a longer period of time should therefore conform more with these values and principles, since longer exposure to EU membership should have a significant impact on individuals' value orientations. Also, the longer the democratic rule and the more stable democratic institutions in any given country are, the more people's attitudes and beliefs should conform with these ideas. Another macro-level institutionalist variable that takes the historical heritage into account is whether or not countries have a communist heritage (see Gerhards 2006). The longer people have been exposed to democratic ideas, the more they should hold values that promote democracy (Gerhards 2006). Citizens of countries that have a communist legacy have not been faced with the same degree of democratic influence for the same amount of time. Similarly, values that have been shaping people's values during the communist era are theorised to still have an impact on those people, since value orientations do not change overnight (Inglehart 1971).

Furthermore, institutionalist considerations imply that national and historic peculiarities matter. Societal norms and ideas that are embedded in the institutional framework of societies shape value orientations of individuals - while also being subject to change by these individuals. The overall institutional framework of any given society therefore impacts value orientations that allow for generalising collective and common cultural constructs and value orientations. Therefore, it is expected that citizens who have been exposed to democratic institutions for longer periods of time hold more tolerant attitudes and value equality between men and women more.

These deliberations lead to the first hypothesis:

H1: The longer individuals have been exposed to democratic institutions and have been members of the European Union, the more they value tolerance and equality.

By combining modernisation theory and institutionalism it is necessary to focus on more than one dimension. What holds up on the macro-level does not necessarily have to apply to the micro-level. Accounting for those two levels means to take hierarchical effects into account. As outlined before, variance of value orientations are expected to be higher within countries than between countries (Kaasa et al. 2013, 2014). This is because differences between individuals of any given society are likely to be higher since levels of education, income, and other explanatory factors vary to a larger extent within societies than between them. Also, while the macro-level can explain general tend-

encies and motivations, the micro-level is where the real causation happens (Arts 2011: 29). Still, taking interactions between these levels into account is relevant and expected to reveal results that give better insights into explaining value orientations than only either modernisation or institutionalist theories were able to give on their own.

Based on the findings of these scholars the next hypothesis is:

H2: Variance in value orientations is higher within countries than between countries.

Modernisation theory has given valuable insight into value research even if it has its flaws. Especially Ronald Inglehart's adaptations and enhancements to modernisation theory in recent years makes it wise to include certain aspects of it into the theoretical framework. His proposed rise in postmaterialistic values is therefore taken into account. However, rather than working with country dummies from the get-go, macro-level variables and micro-level variables are to be tested on individuals.

On the micro-level, variables that are in line with modernisation theory include the level of education, the level of income, the degree of urbanisation, the employment status, religious denominations, religiosity, and most importantly age as Ronald Inglehart has noted that age cohorts play an important role in value studies (Inglehart 1997). Education, the income level, employment (and the degree of urbanisation) are all variables that measure modernisation (and competitiveness respectively), whereas religiosity and religious denominations test the degree of traditional values that can even be institutionalised in some cases.

In line with the implications of modernisation theory it is expected that more affluent countries develop more tolerant attitudes and hold equality between men and women in higher regard. However, this connection is not only implied on the state-level but also on the individual-level. Given that there are economically more competitive and less competitive people in any society, the same relationship is expected. Accounting for people's level of competitiveness is expected to explain variances about their value orientations which leads to the following hypothesis:

H3: The more economically secure and/or competitive individuals are, the more they value tolerance and the less they hold traditional values.

As mentioned in the last paragraphs, affluent societies are also expected to

hold less traditional and more postmaterialistic values. These country effects should therefore also influence value orientations of individuals. On the macro-level the GDP per capita has been a consistent factor in explaining variances and confirming the underlying principle of modernisation theory (Cutright 1963, Dahl 1971, Vanhanen 1984, Lipset et al. 1993, Welzel 1996, Przeworski 2000). The Human Development Index (HDI) has also been a variable that has brought fruitful results (Gerhards 2006). Taking up Przeworski's recommendation, income distribution is also being analysed by using the Gini-Index that measures income inequality.

Considering that modernisation and the overall degree of wealth and competitiveness can be also be derived from macro-level factors, the second hypothesis regarding affluence is the following:

H4: Individuals who are living in countries that are more economically secure and/or competitive, value tolerance more and hold less traditional values.

Institutionalism has also given valuable insights into value research. Most of the findings specialised in welfare state arrangements and social policy schemes (Bäckman 2009; Lohmann 2009; Brady 2003), but research about gender equality is also making use of institutionalism, for example focusing on gender related state policies (maternity leave and protective legislation) that aid women's integration to the job market (Chang 2004) and gender related statistics that show the degree of equality. One of these measurements is the Gender Gap Index (GGI) introduced by the World Economic Forum which quantifies economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, political empowerment, and health and survival and creates an index consisting of these four dimensions and then ranking countries accordingly (Gender Gap Report 2008). Also, the employment rate of women gives an insight into countries' values regarding women in the workplace.

According to Wil Arts, institutions "may determine not only people's perceptions of self-interest but also mitigate their inclinations toward opportunism because transmitted norms become sometimes internalized" (Arts 2011: 23). Therefore, institutions may "not only determine what people find to be a rational course of action, i.e. what is in their self-interest, but also what behavioural alternatives are acceptable to them or should be rejected from a moral point of view" (Arts 2011: 23f.). Hence, institutional embeddedness in a society can shape norms and values of the population. This can be seen by policies that are in place with respect to social security nets, labour market

policies, pension systems, the organisation of unions, the degree of state intervention and others. Comparative analysis that investigates the influence of different institutional orders on individual behaviour however are scarce (Gerhards 2006: 45). Better quantifiable indicators of different institutional policies that are in place and that show how much value institutions attach to their policies and make comparisons easier, are macro-level variables that measure embedded societal behaviour. This can be social expenditures per inhabitant, research and development spending, the percentage of the population that lives in poverty, public expenditure on education, and early leavers from education and training.

But rather than focus on these characteristics, statistics about net migration, unemployment rates, and employment rates of women are taken into account, since these variables measure socio-economic characteristics of countries that either exist because of attitudes and values of their citizens, and/or in turn shape attitudes and values of their citizens. No matter which direction this influence has, an existing influence is presumed based on findings by other scholars (Kalmijn 2003). Uslaner and Brown found that the more inequality exists in societies, the less tolerant people at the lower end of economic stability are (Uslaner 2002; Uslaner & Brown 2005). Therefore, net migration and unemployment statistics should explain some degree of (in)tolerance especially among underprivileged groups.

Following Gundelach's findings (1994) that institutionalism can sometimes explain differences in value orientations better than modernisation theory and building upon Inglehart's early work (1971) that focused on macro-level effects, the following results are expected:

H5: Macro-level effects can explain additional variance in value differences on top of micro-level effects.

It is assumed that aspects derived from modernisation theory and institutionalism are often interdependent, meaning that values of individuals are not only dependent on their own experiences and socio-economic positions, but also have been shaped by the society they live in. By accounting for a sufficient number of meaningful factors and controlling for their reciprocal effects one can go on to draw valuable insights and conclusion as to how value orientations can be explained.

Altogether a multi-level theory approach enables researchers to work simultaneously on different levels and dimensions without having to restrict themselves to either the micro- or the macro level, nor do they have to dismiss

relevant hypotheses that are based on either the modernisation theory or institutionalism. Since this thesis does not seek out to explain cultural changes over time but rather follows a cross-national, cross-societal approach taking what has worked in the past from both theories and testing whether they hold up in this setting seems to be the best choice.

4.4 The micro- and macro-level

Given the theoretical mix between institutionalism and modernisation theories and the multi-level, cross-national approach of this thesis, there are independent or explanatory variables are classified into individual characteristics (micro-level) and national characteristics (macro-level).

Haller (2002) pointed out that when a model includes the macro and micro level, four effects can be distinguished from one another. Macro-to-micro effects are when a macro-actor (e.g. the government) makes decisions that directly affect institutions (laws) and indirectly influence value patterns. Other macro-to-micro effects occur when actions of macro-actors (political parties) influence the attitudes of many individuals. Micro-to-micro effects occur when values of individuals evolve which in turn changes their routines and vice versa. Lastly, micro-to-macro effects take place when institutions are transformed because of many individuals adapting their values and behaviour.

Given the information and findings of previous research, a multi-level approach for this thesis is chosen, taking valuable aspects from modernisation theory and institutionalism into account, following a three-dimensional framework at: 1) the individual level, 2) social groups (e.g. religious denominations) and 3) countries.

A number of value researchers have heeded Haller's advice and worked with multi level frameworks. In later years, Inglehart combined modernisation theory with cultural perspectives (Inglehart 2007). Kalmijn (2003) took a similar approach when analysing how European societies differ in terms of their attitudes towards gender roles. A modernisation theory approach would suggest that economic and technological advancements influence behavioural and value change according to the new conditions. Kalmijn found that changes in women's employment lead to changing gender-role attitudes, since people not only adjust their attitudes according to what they themselves experience, but also according to what other people in society are doing (Kalmijn 2003).

Hadler (2012) found that when examining social tolerance in 32 different countries (and over time), the "more affluent and better educated individuals" were, the less "xenophobic and homophobic" they were (Hadler 2012:

227). While he focused mainly on macro-level effects, he states that "it is clear that individual-level factors must not be ignored" (Hadler 2012: 228). He however also found that the societal and cultural and religious background of countries matters and sometimes even remained after accounting for economic and political factors (Hadler 2012: 228).

5 Data and Method

This chapter gives an overview over the data that are used and how the data are structured and subsequently treated in order to test the hypotheses. The exact wording of the dependent and independent variables is presented and detailed explanations about clusterings of the data are given. Also, the statistical approach and the way the data are treated is outlined.

5.1 Measuring values

Jürgen Gerhards stated that a comparison between different elements is only possible if the reference point of the comparison is kept constant, meaning that the examined values are measured by using the same methods. Standardised questionnaires that are conducted at the same time across various countries do comply with this requisite (2006: 17).

Today most social scientists agree that a person's values are inherent characteristics which can only be measured as latent constructs, i.e. they cannot be observed directly. However, they can be measured indirectly, i.e. in the way in which people evaluate states, activities or outcomes (Mohler et al. 2006: 8). Measuring values is ultimately done by conducting surveys and questionnaires. In the social sciences there is however little content validity of measurements of values, since researchers make their own selections of items and put different emphasis on certain *values* that correspond with their classification of values and research interests (Hofste 2001: 7).

Outlining how the values examined are classified is therefore critical. A detailed description about how these values are made up of is therefore given in the following sub-chapters.

5.2 Operationalising Tolerance and Equality

This sections gives an overview over how the definitions of *tolerance* and *equality* can be translated into a model that measures *tolerance* and *equality*.

Operationalisation of variables is one of the most important things to do when working with data that has no coherent underlying theoretical framework itself. Definitions have to be made and then measured. Defining *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* is not as easy as it might seem. Different scholars may have different definitions and ways of measuring items and these definitions have to be justified by theoretical considerations. In order to do

that, these definitions have to first be defined themselves. Having outlined the overall research question, one can go on to specify definitions that are the foundation of an analysis. This is done by defining notions and by defining their meaning and differentiating them from other definitions without them contradicting themselves. Only then can one look at the dimensions of these definitions and how it is possible that they are captured. Then one can go on to classify dimensions and cluster them based on certain attributes. It is also necessary that variables included in the model are both reliable and valid, meaning that repeated measurements will lead to the same results and that these measurements actually measure what they ought to measure. There is for example no reason to assume that the height of a person will determine or even influence her attitude on tolerance or equality. However, people for example stating that they do not want people of another race as their neighbours will enable researchers to partly determine their attitudes towards non-discrimination.

Finding questions that correspond well to one's research question in these surveys is often a difficult task, especially considering issues of practical nature such as non-responses or country-specific deviations from the questionnaires. One must find the variables that contain most similar definitions used in the theoretical framework which sometimes works for the best and sometimes compromises have to be made.

5.2.1 Operationalisation of Tolerance and non-discrimination

Finding evidence of openly voiced discrimination and intolerance is sometimes tricky to measure for social scientists since social desirability can lead to respondents not wanting to openly admit opinions that might seem bigoted in nature towards the interviewer, especially if the interviewer also belongs (or is suspected to belong) to a certain group that the respondent feels negatively towards (King and Bruner 2000).

Still, one established way in surveys is to ask about not wanting certain groups as neighbours. This little trick can be seen as making use of what is called "nimby", or "not in my back yard" concerning attitudes about new developments where people are directly affected.⁹ People may be tolerant and non-discriminatory in general, but this might also be them just paying lip service. However, when asked about something that would directly affect them, people might choose to answer more honestly, hence asking about neighbours. The downside to asking about neighbours is a methodological

⁹<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/nimby?a=british>

one: Answers to this are mostly binary, thus not being able to measure the degree of intolerance or maybe even context about why respondents feel the way they do.

This problem is addressed by also including items asking about more than just undesired neighbours and which offer better insights especially from a methodological point of view because of their non-binary scales. On the ethnic and migrant tolerance dimension, items that asked people about seeing immigrants as a threat to society and whether they thought that there were already too many immigrants were included to control for the binary neighbour questions. On the sexual orientation dimension, items that measured whether respondents found homosexual behaviour to be justifiable were included to control for the binary neighbour question.

Ultimately, tolerance and non-discrimination consists of two spheres: intolerant values of exclusion on the one hand and tolerant values of inclusion on the other hand. Whereas intolerance manifests itself in the rejection of different ethnic groups, religious groups and homosexuality, tolerance manifests itself not by promoting or aiding said groups, but already by merely accepting them without taking issue.

5.2.2 Operationalisation of Equality

Measuring people's attitudes towards gender roles is not as tricky as asking them about racial topics. Arguably nobody would answer that they would not want to have women or men as neighbours. Also, gender roles are not supposed to measure discrimination per se, but rather measure traditional gender roles vs. modern gender roles and how they are embedded and institutionalised.

Therefore, asking about opinions towards family life and work regarding gender roles is not as controversial. Questions included in the earlier described three-dimensional equality model therefore aim at the attitudes towards ascribing responsibilities to men and women in family life and child care, and at the workplace and household income. What these questions measure is how much responsibility respondents assigned either gender to the family and work realm, where these responsibilities lay and how strongly they felt about it.

This is done by selecting questions that aim at children (and wanting/needing children) and parental roles, compatibility between work and family life, and understandings of gender roles in employment and work. The overall measure of equality then consists of two spheres: traditional and modern

views. Whereas traditional views see a clear-cut distinction between what roles men and what roles women ought to adhere to in the family and work life, especially with regards to (the need for) children, modern views do not put focus on gender roles regarding these areas and can regard these issues in a more practical rather than principled sense.

5.3 Data

The data that are used are taken from the European Values Study (EVS). The EVS (formerly EVSSG, the 'European Value Systems Study Group') is an international and multidisciplinary group of academics that was established in the late 1970s and wanted to seek out how Europeans feel and think about the value systems of their countries, whether Europeans share common values and if these values are changing. They also wondered about the role of Christianity in value systems, and European identity by conducting large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal surveys covering topics like perception of life, family, work, politics and society, religion and morale, national identity, the environment and life experiences. The first survey was conducted in 1981 where representative samples of European Member States were interviewed. The EVS seeks to conduct these surveys every nine years and consequently the surveys were repeated in 1990, 1999 and the latest survey in 2008. This latest survey is by far the biggest data set, covering a total of 47 different countries (Arts 2011: 7).

Though the EVS lacked a clearly formulated and underlying theory - which turns out to be an even bigger disadvantage considering that a big portion of the questionnaires have to stay the same over the years in order to make longitudinal analyses and comparisons possible - this approach turned out to have one big advantage: It is not susceptible to "fashionable theories getting in social science's bad books" (Arts 2011: 8).

For this thesis, the latest dataset from the years 2008-2009 has been used. Every country contains at least 1000 respondents to this survey and often times many more than that. Representative samples (with weights according to socio-demographic characteristics) and standardised questionnaires that have been translated into the respective languages of each country are the biggest strong points about the EVS. It features a wide array of questions regarding almost every aspect of values and beliefs of people.

While the amount of questions is vast and those questions almost do not differ between countries it is still necessary to point out when and where they differ. The following sub chapter lists the exact wording of every question relevant to this thesis, what options for answering respondents had and whether there

were slight differences in the questionnaires across countries.

5.4 Dependent Variables of Tolerance and Non-Discrimination and Equality

This sub chapter lists how the overall dependent variables of *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* are comprised and also lists the exact wording and answer scales of their respective questions. Both *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* variables are comprised of three dimensions each. In each of these three dimensions and in the summary of these three dimensions respectively that constitute the two dependent variables, those scores were subsequently summed up and divided by the number of items only when none of the answers were missing. In case one answer was missing, the value was calculated by using linear transformations of the other components that were available. This backward estimation process is obtained by regressing the three component averages on the two components that are available and is repeated three times, one for each possibility of one item "missing" in order to avoid information loss. The still remaining missing values were left as missing values. The finished scale ranges from 0 to 1, including decimal places between 0 and 1. So even though the possible values range from 0 to 1 they are not dummy variables.

This regression imputation step has been undertaken in order to deal with less non-response items and is one of the standard procedures when dealing with missing data entries and has been described in detail by Wenzel (Wenzel 2013: 52ff.)

5.4.1 Dependent variables of Tolerance and Non-Discrimination

The dependent variable of *tolerance and non-discrimination* is comprised of three items: tolerance towards (racial) minorities and immigrants, tolerance towards other religious groups, and tolerance towards homosexuality. Those items in turn are comprised of several questions.

Tolerance towards (racial) minorities and immigrants:

Tolerance towards racial minorities and immigrants is measured by combining three items: Tolerance towards immigrants/foreign workers, tolerance towards people of another race, and tolerance towards Romani people. All of these groups are measured by looking at the answers to the question, whether people would want them as neighbours. The exact wordings was: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you

would not like to have as neighbours - Immigrants/foreign workers, People of a different race, Gypsies [sic!]" . Respondents could then either mention this group or not. When they mentioned them, respondents received a "0" score, when they did not mention them, respondents received a "1" score.

After this step, individuals' values were controlled for with questions regarding their attitudes towards immigrants becoming a threat society and whether they felt that too many immigrants lived in their country. The exact wording of the first question were: "Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale? - 1 in the future the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society, (2-9 empty), 10 in the future the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to society". Respondents could then place themselves anywhere on this 10-point scale.

The exact wording of the second question was: "Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding immigrants living in your country: - Today in [COUNTRY], there are too many immigrants". Respondents could then either answer with "1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 disagree, 5 disagree strongly".

The scores they received based on their answers to these question was divided by the number of parameter values on the answer scales and then multiplied with their earlier scores on tolerance towards (racial) minorities and immigrants. This was done in order to control for the binary answer scales before and to end up with a more nuanced measurement of attitudes towards immigrants.

Tolerance towards other religious groups:

Tolerance towards other religious groups is measured by combining four items: Tolerance towards Jews, Muslims, and Christians, and attitudes towards "only one true religion". All of these groups are measured by looking at the answers to the question, whether people would want them as neighbours. The exact wordings was: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours - Jews/Muslims/Christians". Respondents could then either mention these groups or not. For each of the three categories a standalone question was asked, however the following countries did not include the question about Christians in their respective questionnaires: Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, and Slovenia.

In order to measure religious tolerance, people were already labelled as religiously intolerant when they mentioned at least one of these three groups if - and only if - they did not belong to these groups themselves. It can hardly be considered discrimination or intolerance when somebody who has stated that he or she is Christian in another section of the questionnaire and mentioned Christians as not wanting to have them as neighbours. This could ultimately have been the reason for some of the aforementioned countries to not include the "Christian" item in their survey since they are predominantly Christian countries. Respondents' reasoning for not wanting members of their own religious groups as neighbours is neither reproducible (it would be merely speculation) nor are they of interest in this thesis. This distinction however is necessary when trying to measure religious tolerance towards other religious groups.

Another distinction that is introduced in this thesis which apparently has not been made in the existing literature, is differentiating between people who have never been a member of any religious group and people who are currently not a member of any religious group *but once have been belonging to a religious group*. While the former are people who have neither belonged to a religious group and still do not belong to one (both by the decision of their parents and their own decision to not join a religious group), the latter are so called *apostates* who made the conscious decision at some point during their lives to not wanting to belong to their religious or group or any other religious group any longer. This is a valuable distinction that should bring up interesting results especially in the context of increasing secularisation in Europe over the last decades. Overall, 3419 respondents (8.55% of all participants in these surveys, including people who did not answer the question about their religious denomination) of European Union member countries in this survey were apostates.

A further distinction between people who once have had a religious denomination but who are currently belonging to a different religious group, the so called *converts* has been dropped again since the number of people who were religious converts is too small (< 3%) in order to justify this distinction.

Respondents who mentioned none of the three possible groups (Jews, Muslims, Christians) received a "1" score. People that mentioned at least one of the three were given a "0". In the case of Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, and Slovenia, which are countries that did not include a question about Christians in their questionnaires, respondents received a "0" when they mentioned either Jews and/or Muslims and a "1" when they mentioned neither of them.

The last item that measured religious tolerance is the attitude towards "only one true religion". The exact wordings was: "These are statements one sometimes hears. Please choose the statement that best describes your view?". Respondents could then either answer with "there is only one true religion", "there is only one true religion, but other religions do contain some basic truths as well", "there is not one true religion, but all great world religions contain some basic truths", and "none of the great religions have any truths to offer". Respondents who responded with the two more definite answers were given a "0", while those who responded with one of the two options in the middle were given a "0.5" instead of "1" because this question does not carry as much weight on its own as the neighbour questions before that did and also because there is no option on this 4-point-scale that would definitely point to a most tolerant answer.

Given the fact that people who are neither Jewish, Muslim, or Christian (e.g. Buddhists or other religious or non-religious people) could potentially discriminate more against other religious groups than the aforementioned groups since the survey did not include a question about not wanting non-religious people (or other religious groups) and thus them not being able to be discriminated against due to the survey design, and the fact that some countries did not include questions about all three religious groups, religious tolerance results might be more or less in favour of these groups. However, one must work with the data that is available and find workarounds. The workaround chosen for this model was to weigh responses of other religious groups and non-religious groups and citizens of countries which did not include all three neighbour items in the following way:

When other religious groups and non-religious groups received a "0" score on the neighbour questions because they discriminated against at least one of the religious groups, this zero was turned into one third if they answered the question about religion and truth with one of the middle answers. This affected 1256 out of 3103 respondents who were other religious groups or non-religious groups and previously had a score of 0 on the neighbour questions.

When citizens of countries which did not include a question about Christian neighbours received a "1" score on the neighbour question because they did not discriminate against any of the religious groups, this "1" was subtracted by one third if they answered the question about religion and truth with one of the two extreme answers. This affected 1299 out of 5303 respondents who were citizens of these countries and previously had a score of "1".

Robustness checks revealed this step to be necessary in order not to skew results to much in favour of countries that did not include a "Christian" question in predominantly Christian countries.

Tolerance towards homosexuality:

Tolerance towards homosexuality is measured by combining three items: Tolerance towards homosexual neighbours, attitudes towards homosexuals being able to adopt children, and justification of homosexuality in general.

The first item is looking at the answers to the question, whether people would want to have homosexuals as neighbours. The exact wordings was: "On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours - Homosexuals". Respondents could then either mention this group or not. When they mentioned them, respondents received a "0" score, when they did not mention them, respondents received a "1" score.

The second item is looking at the answers to the question, whether people would want homosexuals to be able to adopt children. The exact wordings was: "How would you feel about the following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them? - Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children". Respondents were given the option to answer on a 5-point-scale and to either "agree strongly", "agree", "neither agree nor disagree", "disagree", or "disagree strongly". When respondents answered with "agree strongly", they received a score of "1", when they answered with "disagree strongly", they received a score of "0". The three remaining options in the middle received an integer score according to their position that was multiplied by "1/4" (e.g. "agree" received a score of "3/4", "neither agree or nor disagree" received a score of "2/4", etc.).

The third item is looking at the answers to the question, whether people justified homosexuality. The exact wordings was: "Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. - Homosexuality". Respondents were given the option to answer on a 10-point-scale, ranging from "1 never" to "10 always". When respondents answered with "always", they received a score of "1", when they answered with "never", they received a score of "0". The eight remaining options in the middle received an integer score according to their position that was multiplied by "1/9" (e.g. "almost al-

ways" (second after always) received a score of "8/9"). The only country that did not include this question in their survey was Italy since this item was translated incomparably, asking about "homosexual behaviour" instead of "homosexuality".

It is not possible to measure tolerance towards people who have a different sexual orientation than oneself as was done with religious denominations since no questions about the respondents' sexual orientations were asked. However, as with the question about immigrants (immigrants can also not want other immigrants as neighbours) it does not matter in this context whether respondents were homosexuals themselves or not.

Overall, scores near "1" indicate more tolerant attitudes, while scores near "0" indicate less tolerant attitudes towards homosexuality.

5.4.2 Dependent Variables of Equality

The dependent variable of *equality* is comprised of three items: attitudes about gender and children, attitudes about gender and work and children, and attitudes about gender and work. Those items in turn are comprised of several questions.

Attitudes about gender and children:

Attitudes about gender and children is measured by combining four items: believing that women need children in order to be fulfilled, believing that men need children in order to be fulfilled, believing that being a housewife is as fulfilling as a paid job, and believing that women really want a home and children.

Believing that women need children in order to be fulfilled is measured by looking at the answers to the question, whether people agree to that statement or not. The exact wording was: "Do you think that a woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled or is this not necessary?". Respondents could then either answer with "need children" or "not necessary". When they answered with "need children", they received a "0" score, when they answered that it was "not necessary", respondents received a "1" score.

Attitudes about men needing children in order to be fulfilled is measured by looking at the answers to a very similar question, however the possible answers differed. The exact wording was: "How would you feel about the

following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them? - A man has to have children in order to be fulfilled". Respondents could then either answer with "1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 4 disagree, 5 disagree strongly". When respondents answered with "agree strongly", they received a "0" score, when they answered with "disagree strongly", they received a "1" score. The three remaining options in the middle received an integer score according to their position that was multiplied by "1/4" (e.g. "agree" received a score of "1/4", "neither disagree nor agree" received a score of "2/4", etc.).

Believing that being a housewife is as fulfilling as a paid job is measured by looking at the answers to the question whether respondents agreed to this statement or not. The exact wording was: "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. - Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay".

Believing that women really want a home and children is measured by looking at the answers to the question whether respondents agreed to this statement or not. The exact wording was: "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. - A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children".

Respondents could then answer with "1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 disagree, 4 disagree strongly". When they answered with "1 agree strongly", they received a score of "0", when they answered with "4 disagree strongly", they received a score of "1". The two remaining options in the middle received an integer score according to their position that was multiplied by "1/3" (e.g. "agree" received a score of "1/3", "disagree" received a score of "2/3").

Attitudes about gender and children and work:

Attitudes about gender and children and work is measured by combining three items: believing that pre-school children are likely to suffer if their mother works, believing that a working mother can establish just as warm of a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work, and believing that fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers.

Believing that pre-school children are likely to suffer if their mother works is measured by looking at the answers to the question: "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. - A pre-school

child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works".

Attitudes towards working mothers were measured by looking at the answers to that statement: "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. - A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work". Believing that fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers is measured by looking at the answers to that statement: "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. - In general, fathers are as well suited to look after their children as mothers". Respondents could then answer with "1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 disagree, 4 disagree strongly". When they answered with "1 agree strongly", they received a score of "0", when they answered with "4 disagree strongly", they received a score of "1". The two remaining options in the middle received an integer score according to their position that was multiplied by "1/3" (e.g. "agree" received a score of "1/3", "disagree" received a score of "2/3").

Attitudes towards gender and work:

Attitudes about gender and work is measured by combining three items: believing that jobs are the best way for women to be independent, believing that both husband and wife should contribute to the household income, and attitudes towards the statement that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.

Believing that jobs are the best way for women to be independent is measured by looking at the answers to the statement: "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. - Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person".

Attitudes towards both husband and wife contributing to the household income are measured by looking at the answer to the statement: "People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. - Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income".

Respondents could then answer with "1 agree strongly, 2 agree, 3 disagree, 4 disagree strongly". When they answered with "1 agree strongly", they received a score of "1", when they answered with "4 disagree strongly", they received a score of "0". The two remaining options in the middle received an integer score according to their position that was multiplied by "1/3" (e.g.

"agree" received a score of "2/3", "disagree" received a score of "1/3").

It is noteworthy that the answers of respondents from the Netherlands have not been taken into account for this question. As Matthijs Kalmijn (2003) pointed out while working with data from the 1999 surveys, the average score for disagreeing with this notion in the Netherlands was way higher than expected (and way higher than in other countries). Kalmijn suspected that the wording in the Dutch questionnaire "may unintentionally have suggested that spouses should contribute *equally* to the household income" (Kalmijn 2003: 317). Looking up the exact wording in Dutch from the codebook, it said "Zowel man als vrouw moeten ieder een deel van het huishoudelijk inkomen inbrengen". This translates to "Both husband and wife *need to/must each* contribute a part of the household income". So the combination of the words "moeten (must)" and "ieder(each)" were the cause for confusion. Though "moeten" can sometimes also mean "should", in combination with "ieder" it is clear that the question deviated from the intent of the original question. So Kalmijn's suspicion proved to be also be correct in this survey from 2008, therefore his lead was followed by dropping cases from the Netherlands for this particular question. Those missing values are taken care of by linear transformations in the end, estimating responses of participants from the Netherlands for this question by their other responses that were given by them, following a simple regression imputation step typical for missing values.

Believing that when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women is measured by looking at the answers to the statement: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? - When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women". Respondents could answer with "1 agree, 2 disagree, 3 neither (spontaneous)". When they answered with "agree", respondents received a score of "0", when they answered with "disagree", they received a score of "1", and when they answered with neither, they received a score of "0.5".

Overall, scores near "0" indicate more traditional attitudes, while scores near "1" indicate more modern attitudes towards equality.

5.5 Independent variables of Tolerance and Non-Discrimination and Equality

This sub chapter gives an overview over the wording of questions and scales of the answers regarding the independent variables used to explain variances

in *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* values. The following subsection lists all the independent variables before going into detail about how they are measured and where the data has been obtained from.

5.5.1 Independent Variables

Given the multi level approach, independent variables are classified into individual characteristics (micro level) and national characteristics (macro level). The next section gives an overview over which independent variables on the aforementioned levels are chosen for analysis.

Individual-level independent variables:

The independent variables derived from the theoretical framework are: age in years, gender (dummy variable), the level of education, household income (monthly), the size of the home-town (urbanisation), a measure of adherence to authority called obedience where respondents were asked whether obedience should be taught to children, a measure of overall sense of tolerance where respondents were asked whether tolerance should be taught to children, political attitudes on the left-and-right-scale, social trust, employment status, marital status, occupational status, a nominal variable that consists of religious denominations and the overall importance of religion in life.

For the *equality* value two additional variables have been included to measure attitudes towards gender roles: Whether respondents were in a relationship (including non-legally binding ones like marriage or registered partnerships are) and the number of children respondents had. The relationship status seeks to control for respondents' marital status. The expected link between married people being more traditional in their values regarding gender roles, is tested by also accounting for people in a stable relationship that at the time of the surveys were not married, or not married any longer (widowers and divorced people), or never have been married. The number of children (or having no children) is suspected to influence gender roles (Kalmijn 2003), since respondents who actually had children had personal experience with balancing work and family life. The expected relationship is that people with more children tend to be more traditional towards their attitudes about gender roles.

National-level independent variables:

The independent variables derived from the theoretical framework are: The Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita), the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gender Gap Index (GGI), the GINI coefficient, the national unemployment rate in percent, net migration in immigrants per 1000 people, the duration of EU membership in years, the length of democracy in years and communist legacy (dummy variable).

For the *equality* value one additional national-level independent variable has been added: The employment rate of women. It is expected that the higher the employment rate of women in any given country is, the more open people of these countries are towards women in the workplace and the more modern their attitudes towards gender roles in general are (Kalmijn 2003).

5.5.2 Micro-level Variables

Age:

With regard to age, respondents could state their age in years.

Gender:

Gender is a classic dummy variable differing between "male" and "female". Those were the two options presented to participants of the surveys. "Male" is coded as "0", whereas "female" is coded as "1".

Education:

The highest educational level that respondents had achieved was measured country-wise and then summarised into different categories. The categorisation used in this thesis is derived by the ISCED97 code to which national educational categories have been recoded. The exact wording was: "What is the highest level you have completed in your education?" to which respondents answers were recoded into "0 : pre-primary education or none education, 1 : primary education or first stage of basic education, 2 : lower secondary or second stage of basic education, 3 : (upper) secondary education, 4 : post-secondary non-tertiary education, 5 : first stage of tertiary education, and 6 : second stage of tertiary education". Using this harmonised variable is necessary in order to obtain comparable results.

Income:

Various measures of income have been asked of the respondents. The one used in the thesis is a harmonised variable that has been recoded from country specific currencies in Euros and measures the monthly household income on a 12-point-scale.

Urbanisation:

Urbanisation is not a question that participants of the surveys had to answer themselves. Rather than rely on estimations on the number of inhabitants by the respondents, the interviewers looked up the population sizes themselves, leaving researchers with an 8-point-scaled variable where the highest value consists of town sizes with 500000 inhabitants or more.

Obedience:

Obedience is a question that aims at the adherence to authoritarian values in general. The exact wording was: "Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five!" where one of the 12 items presented was "obedience". Possible answers only included "mentioned" or "not mentioned" (and not answering). Mentioning it takes the value "1", while not mentioning it takes the value "0".

Teaching Tolerance to Children:

This is the second variable after "obedience" where respondents were presented with a number of items that they would want children to be taught. It was included because it specifically contains the word tolerance and should therefore be a good indicator when measuring overall tolerance. The exact wording was: "Here is a list of qualities which children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five!" where one of the 12 items presented was "tolerance and respect for other people". Possible answer only included "mentioned" or "not mentioned" (and not answering). Mentioning it takes the value "1", while not mentioning it takes the value "0".

Political View:

Political view is a variable that is introduced in order to measure whether

the value orientations examined depended on and/or correspond to the left-right dichotomous measure of political orientation, as Hadler identified that "individuals who do classify themselves on the political left-right scale are more tolerant than those who do not classify themselves" (2012: 228) when analysing its relationship between social tolerance.

The implementation of this variable in the EVS dataset however, leaves much to be desired. The exact wording was: "In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and the 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?". Respondents then had the option to place themselves on a 1-10 scale. Opting for an even-numbered 1-10-scale instead of an odd-numbered 0-10-scale resulted in most respondents placing themselves on the "5". Most respondents opting for the middle whenever this question is asked in surveys is nothing new, however when presented with an even-numbered scale people are forced to choose either the left or right next to the middle, skewing results a bit. Also people might be prone to believe that a "5" is the middle at first glance. Unfortunately this happened in these surveys as well, with almost a third (31.10%) of respondents placing themselves on the "5" and only 12.78% placing themselves on the "6". Albeit its flaws, this variable is taken into the model since histograms and the mean value shows a distribution that suggests no significant deviations from conventional findings regarding political view scales in the political sciences. The higher the value, the more "right-wing" respondents were.

Social Trust:

Following Putnam's classification of social capital (Putnam 1993) which translates into social trust, this variable is taken into the model in order to measure whether people who consider 'trust' a valuable trait has an effect on their overall attitudes towards tolerance. The exact wording of the question was: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" leaving respondents with the option of either answering "most people can be trusted (1)" or "can't be too careful (2)" (or refusing to answer). So higher values mean *less* trust. The assumption is that people who claimed that "most people can be trusted" tended to be more tolerant than individuals who answered "can't be too careful".

Employment:

Employment is a classic dummy variable. Participants were asked: "Are you yourself employed or not?" leaving them with the option of answering either

"yes (1)" or "no (2)". So a higher value implies no employment. The data were cleared of potential plausible inconsistencies regarding other questions about their status of employment.

Marital Status:

Marital status has been taken into the model in order to test whether the marital status has any effect towards attitudes towards homosexuality and consequently overall tolerance. Respondents were asked: "What is your current legal marital status?", and they were able to respond by stating either "1 married, 2 registered partnership, 3 widowed, 4 divorced, 5 separated, 6 never married and never registered partnership", making it a categorical variable. The default answer in the model is "1 married". In Austria, Italy, Poland, and Portugal were not able to select "2 registered partnership".

Occupation:

The occupational status is included in order to measure whether class schemes correspond to the hypothesis that individuals employed in lower classified occupation face more competition and are therefore more prone to have more intolerant attitudes. Respondents were asked what occupation they currently hold and were then classified into different sections on an 11-point categorical scale consisting of "1 I: higher controllers, 2 II: lower controllers, 3 IIIa: routine non-manual, 4 IIIb: lower sales-service, 5 IVa: self-employed with employees, 6 IVb: self-employed with no employees, 7 V: manual supervisors, 8 VI: skilled worker 9 VIIa: unskilled worker, 10 VIIb: farm labor, 11 IVc: self-employed farmer".

Religious Denomination:

This item asked the *current* religious denomination of respondents. As presented earlier on, religious denomination has been recoded in order to include and distinguish between individuals who never have been religious from *apostates*. Other recoding tasks included placing "Buddhists" (0.05%) and "Hindus" (0.06%) amongst "other religious denominations" because of their overall low appearances in the dataset. Jewish people were almost as underrepresented (0.12%) as the aforementioned religious groups but given the fact that one variable in this data set and in this thesis specifically measures wanting Jewish people as neighbours or not, Jews have not been recoded to "other religious denominations".

The exact wording of the question about respondents *current* religious de-

nomination after asking them about whether they even belong to any religious denomination or not was: "Do you belong to a religious denomination? - Which one?". Country specific answers have been recoded in advance by the EVS team making it comparable across countries. With regard to the aforementioned recoding for this thesis, the classifications consisted of: "roman catholic", "protestant", "free church/non-conformist/evangelical", "jewish", "muslim", "orthodox", "no religion", "apostate", and "other". It is noteworthy that "orthodox" means Christian orthodox only, not Jewish orthodox.

Recoding of apostates has been done with an auxiliary variable that followed right after the question about respondents *current* religious denomination, namely whether respondents did belong to a religious denomination and - if so - which one. The exact wording was: "Were you ever a member of (another) religious denomination? - Which one?". Again, responses were harmonised in order to make nation-wide comparisons possible. Individuals were classified as apostates when they answered the question about whether they did belong to a religious denomination with "yes" but answered the previous question about whether they currently belong to a religious denomination with "no". The overall majority had a Roman Catholic (59.21%) and Protestant background (32.04%) which is not surprising given the fact that these are the most prevalent religious denominations in Europe. However, given the fact that Roman Catholics (36.71%) and Protestants (14.51%) only just made up more than half (51.22%) of respondents' current religious denominations, but account for 91.26% (all percentages not including missing values because of the coding of these variables) of all former religious denominations of apostates in these surveys, a trend amongst Europeans to turn their backs towards Christianity cannot be denied. Therefore, the need for scholars to differentiate between non-religious people and apostates is hereby stressed once again.

Importance of Religion:

Having the option of choosing between a number of religious variables included in the data set, ranging from the frequency of prayers and attending religious services, to the importance of children learning about religious faith, and many others, the decision ultimately fell on the one question that asked specifically about the level of importance of religion in respondents' lives which was phrased in the following way: "Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life. - Religion". Respondents were then able to choose from the following answers on a 4-point-ordinal-scale: "1 very important, 2 quite important, 3 not important, 4 not at all important".

Note that higher values mean that religion was *less* important for individuals which might seem counter-intuitive.

Two micro level variables that are uniquely included in the *tolerance* model are:

Relationship:

Whether people have been in a relationship at the time of the surveys and whether this had an influence on their attitudes towards equality and gender issues is tested by using the variable that specifically asked people whether they were in a relationship: "Do you have a steady relationship?". Respondents could then answer with "yes" or "no". Note that only people were asked that have not previously stated that they were married or in a registered partnership. However, this latter question was used as an auxiliary variable, by treating married people and people who were in a registered partnership as being in a relationship, as well as non-married and people who were not in a registered partnership but claimed to be in a steady relationship as being in a relationship with the value "1". The other value - no relationship - received the value "0", making this variable a dummy variable.

Number of children:

The number of children that respondents had at the time the surveys were conducted, is taken into the model in order to determine whether this had an effect on their attitudes towards equality. Respondents were asked how many children (if any) they had. In the very few cases that respondents stated more than 10 (one respondent even stating 16), those cases have been summarised to the value "10 or more" in order to not skew results with low frequencies.

5.5.3 Macro-level Variables

GDP:

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is generally used to determine economic performances of countries. To make sensible comparisons across countries possible, the GDP *per capita* is a good measure in order to control for costs of living, inflation rates and even the size of the population. The data have been taken from the World Bank database for the year 2008 in which most of the surveys in all countries were conducted. Higher values means better

economic performance.

HDI:

The Human Development Index (HDI) features statistics about life expectancy, per capita income and education. Countries with lower HDI scores tend to have lower life expectancies, lower overall levels of education and lower GDP per capita. Data have been also been taken from the World Bank database for the year 2008. Higher values means more development.

GGI:

The GGI is the Gender Gap Index established by the World Economic Forum. It takes four different dimension into account in order to measure gender equality: Health, Economy, Education, and Politics. The data have been taken from the World Economic Forum for the year 2008.

GINI:

The GINI-coefficient measures the level of income distribution and is a good indicator for economic inequality. The data have been taken from the World Bank database for the year 2008. The GINI-coefficient can take any value between 0 and 1, where the closer this value is to 0, the more equal the distribution of wealth is, the closer this value is to 1, the less equal the distribution of wealth is.

National Unemployment Rate:

The national unemployment rate serves as an equivalent to the micro-level variable *employment status*. It measures - as the name already suggests - the level of unemployment in each country. The data have been taken from EUROSTAT.

Duration of EU Membership:

This variable that takes the length of countries' membership of the European Union into account.

Length of Democracy:

This value measures how long countries have been exposed to prevailing

democratic rule. Since all of the European Union member countries are democratic regimes this variable does not need to be treated as a categorical variable too. However, there are noteworthy variances between countries that correspond well to the next variable. Data has been taken from Boix-Miller-Rosato's (BMR) dichotomous coding of democracy and the John F. Kennedy's School of Government at Harvard University.

Communist Legacy:

Lastly, whether countries have a communist legacy is taken into account. This is treated as a dummy variable ("0" if no communist legacy, "1" if they have a communist legacy). Coding was followed by Hadler's own compositions (Hadler 2012). This variable presents a valuable extension to the previous two variables in the following way: Not all countries who have joined the European Union later on have a communist legacy and a communist legacy seems to indicate higher levels of intolerance when they have not had a successful transition as for example Slovenia did (Todosijevec and Enyedi 2008; Hadler 2012: 218) and can also override effects of the GDP per capita (Hadler 2012: 222).

It is noteworthy however that a highly industrialised country such as Germany had to be treated as a country with a communist legacy because of its unification with the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Data provided by the EVS are available to treat Germany in terms of former West Germany and East Germany.¹⁰

One macro-level variable that is uniquely included in the *equality* model is:

Employment rate of women:

The relationship between countries' employment rates of women is taken into account. Following the institutionalist theory, prevailing attitudes can be influenced or even changed when people oversee other people deviating from cultural norms more often. Data have been taken from EUROSTAT for the year 2008. Higher values indicate a higher percentage of the female population being employed.

¹⁰No significant difference between treating Germany as a single country and treating it as West Germany and East Germany could be found in the model, so the model that did not distinguish between East and West was kept.

5.6 Method

5.6.1 Multi level models

Due to the development and improvement of statistical models and computer power, it is possible for to conduct more complex statistical research. Multi level models are models, that vary at more than one level. Individual value orientations are of interest here, but these individuals are also grouped by their countries.

Multi level value and culture theories incorporate macro-level and micro-level characteristics of societies in their models. Macro-level variables usually work by deriving the mean value scores of countries for the dependent variable (e.g. mean approval of democracy) and generalised scores for independent variables (e.g. GDP per capita). Micro-level variables usually work by looking at individual value scores for the dependent variable as well as individual scores for the independent variables (e.g. person A approves of democracy so and so and has a monthly income of so and so while person B approves of democracy so and so and has a monthly income of so and so).

Ronald Inglehart and others have for some time only worked with macro-level variables. The advantage is that much more percentage of variance between societies and/or countries can be explained in some models. However, working with generalisations can be misleading if the boundaries by which groups are distinguished from one another are not based on sound theoretical considerations. National borders in Europe *alone* are a most arbitrary division as Harding et al. found (1986) since "they only bear a crude relationship to more fundamental socio-cultural differences". Neglecting regional variations and differences between social groups within countries and societies can lead to coming to the wrong conclusions (Kaasa et al. 2014) - which is one of the reasons why the level of urbanisation (= number of inhabitants where respondents lived) is taken into the model.

The biggest problem when working with macro-level variables and mean value scores is that variations within societies and countries fall through the cracks which ultimately leads to a loss of information. This becomes especially apparent when different countries have a similar mean score but differ vastly in regard to other characteristics (variance and standard deviation respectively) on the dependent variables and maybe even differ considerably in their independent variable scores. It is therefore necessary in order to avoid false conclusions and information loss to include socio-demographic variables and intra-national regions (the level of urbanisation, meaning the size of towns where respondents live) into a model so as to explain possible deviations

from the mean scores.

With independent macro-level variables problems arise when composition effects are taken as context effects - a problem that is especially prevalent when only small sample sizes are available that do not necessarily reflect a representative sample of the overall population. This can happen when some countries have a large percentage of rather old people compared to countries that have a rather large percentage of young people and those two groups are following rather different value patterns. Thus is necessary to control for the composition of the population by including micro-level variables.

Another danger is the correlation between macro-level variables when researchers do not ask themselves *why* relationships on a national level are as they are. The direction of causations have to be established theoretically. For example, there can be strong correlations between the GDP per capita and the duration of EU membership of a country. Without theoretical considerations, it could therefore be assumed that longer EU membership leads to higher GDP per capita. Looking at the countries that have joined the European Union earlier than other countries, it becomes apparent that these countries have already had a higher GDP than countries that joined later. One can still assume that EU membership leads to higher prosperity and therefore a higher GDP per capita, merely looking at a strong correlations does not however imply causation. In context with each other (and other variables) the association between duration of EU membership and GDP per capita can become more clear.

Ultimately, multi level models are able to explain much more variance in the models itself, but what makes them stand out even more is their ability to explain contextual effects especially concerning the interplay between institutionalised values that shape values of individuals and values of individuals that in turn shape values of institutions and impact cultural norms and orders. This can be measured by the so called intra-class correlation. Depending on what parameters have been set to work on a different level than other variables (in this thesis the two levels are macro and micro), intra-class correlation shows how much variance can be explained by the different levels while taking reciprocal effects of the full model into account.

5.6.2 Model selection

The data are treated in the following way: The two dependent variables *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* are tested by using linear (multivariate) regression models in the first two models, whereas the last model is the multi-level model. There are three different models that are analysed:

Model 1 is comprised of every micro level variable and therefore shows how significant each regressor is while controlling for all other micro level variables at the same time, and how much variance of the dependent variables these independent variables can explain together.

Model 2 is comprised of every macro level variable and therefore shows how significant each regressor is while controlling for all other macro level variables at the same time, and how much variance of the dependent variables these independent variables can explain together.

Model 3 is the full and most important model and ultimately the only model that is a multi level model. It combines every micro and macro variable, and controls for all of them at the same time. Interactions and interdependencies between all variables are accounted for. This model shows how significant every item in respect to all other items is, and how much of the variance of the two dependent variables can be explained on its own as well as together.

This approach has been chosen in order to allow for more insight into how reciprocal effects between the micro and macro level affect the analysis. Differences between model 1 and model 2 from model 3 demonstrate the power and effectiveness of multi-level models in case coefficients differ between these models.

The two sets of independent variables are kept largely the same for both dependent variables for the following reasons: Derived from the theoretical framework that is based on modernisation theory and institutionalism, the key characteristics and items that have been identified to be able to explain variances in people's values fit both *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* very well. Keeping the set of independent variables as constant as possible therefore enables researchers to make comparisons over these items. Believing for example that the GDP per capita is able to explain lots of variance in value orientations, one should include the GDP per capita in every set of values that one likes to analyse. When taking an interest in interdependencies and reciprocal effects, one should also try to include as many of the same items as possible in order not to skew results. Only by keeping the set of independent variables as constant as possible in both models, comparisons between models and these characteristics are possible and comprehensible. The relatively large number of independent variables has been chosen in order to explain as much variance but even importantly to control for as many effects as possible, however, only if their inclusion has been theoretically justified.

All models have been tested on whether they fulfilled the required prerequisites.

ites for linear regression. This included but was not limited to residuals being normally distributed, no multicollinearity, and no heteroscedasticity. Though slight signs of heteroscedasticity have been found at the tails of residuals and fitted values - which is due to the nature of the answer scales of the questionnaires that often existed of dummy variables - the model assumptions for linear regression have not been violated.

Outliers that have been identified by making use of the Cook's Distance and DFITS - which combine information on residuals and leverage points and therefore are able to identify influential observations such as outliers - have been excluded from each model, only very slightly decreasing sample sizes. The prerequisites for linear regression have been further met after this step.

The differences in sample sizes between the micro and macro level result from missing answers in the questionnaires. Only respondents who have answered each and every question in the surveys without skipping or refusing to answer, were therefore included in the models in order not to skew results. Macro level variables were not derived from the surveys, which is why the sample size is larger than in the other models. This is because the only individuals not included in model 2 are individuals who have not answered more than one question of the three items that constituted the measure of *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality*, the dependent variables, whereas model 1 and 3 also excluded respondents who did not answer every question from the independent variables.¹¹

To give an overview over the distribution of the two dependent variables, the following histograms are presented. As one can see, they both follow a normal distribution - *equality* more so than *tolerance* (which is probably due to the vast number of dummy variable this dependent variable was comprised of). This makes working with the variables more convenient but ultimately for the model assumptions for linear (multivariate) regression to be fulfilled, the data of the dependent variables are not required to be normally distributed - only the residuals in their regression models have to be.

¹¹The earlier described method for backwards estimation of missing answers is limited in its use, meaning that in each of the three dimensions that ultimately comprised the two dependent variables respectively, no more than one answer of which the three dimensions consisted of could be missing for calculating an unbiased estimator.

Figure 1: **Histogram of Tolerance (in percent)**





Figure 2: **Histogram of Equality (in percent)**



6 Results

This chapter presents output of the statistical analysis for each of the dependent variables. Descriptive statistics according to the specified characteristics are presented in the form of graphs, while the regression models are discussed by the use of tables because of their multi-dimensionality. The three dimensions that constitute both *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* respectively are presented in the form of maps according to each country's mean position.


The direction and overall degree of influence are laid out in a way that makes it possible to recognize patterns that will later then be addressed in full detail while discussing the the statistical model. The GDP per capita, HDI, GINI coefficient and other macro level variables have been divided into quartiles, since every country received a different score which would have been counter-intuitive when interpreting as well as presenting those findings in the form of conventional maps or graphs in this model.

6.1 Tolerance and non-discrimination

6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for Tolerance


The first variable of interest chosen was how countries of the European Union differ in their attitudes towards tolerance in general. In the next figure, countries are listed in ascending order. Higher values mean more tolerance. It can be seen that Cyprus had the lowest degree of tolerance while Sweden had the highest degree tolerance.

Figure 3: General Tolerance, by country




Looking at the different religious denominations it becomes clear that Christian Orthodox respondents were the least tolerant, while apostates were the most tolerant. Distinguishing between non-religious people and apostates has proven to be a good choice since non-religious people were the third most intolerant group.

Figure 4: **General Tolerance, by religious denomination**




The importance of religion for individuals shows that the more important religion was for respondents, the less tolerant they were. The most tolerant group was people who said it was not important for them, being slightly more tolerant than those for whom religion was not at all important.

Figure 5: **General Tolerance, by importance of religion**




No surprises emerged when looking at the political view of respondents. People on the "left" were generally more tolerant than people on the "right". People on the extreme "left" however were less tolerant than other people on the "left".

Figure 6: **General Tolerance, by political view**




Age did play a role, albeit a small one. Still, a general direction can be seen. The younger respondents were, the more tolerant they were.

Figure 7: **General Tolerance, by age**




The level of education also explains differences. The better educated people were, the more tolerance they showed.

Figure 8: **General Tolerance, by education**




The level of income shows that people with higher wages tended to be more tolerant than people who earned less. The two highest wage groups however, showed a bit less tolerance.

Figure 9: **General Tolerance, by income**




Next is looking at the employment status of individuals. Respondents who at the time of the interviews were employed, showed more tolerance than unemployed people.

Figure 10: **General Tolerance, by employment**




The type of occupation also had a part to play. The higher skilled the occupation was, the more tolerance people showed. Higher Controllers were the most tolerant while farmers were the least tolerant.

Figure 11: **General Tolerance, by occupation**




Next, it is revealed that people that trusted other people more held more tolerant attitudes than individuals that were sceptical of other people.

Figure 12: **General Tolerance, by social trust**




Looking at urbanisation, no clear differences between people who lived in cities as opposed to smaller villages regarding their attitudes towards tolerance could be found.

Figure 13: **General Tolerance, by urbanisation**




People who mentioned that obedience was something that should be taught to children were less tolerant than people who did not mention this trait.

Figure 14: **General Tolerance, by teaching children obedience**




Respondents who mentioned that tolerance and respect were things that should be taught to children showed more tolerance than people who did not mention this trait.

Figure 15: **General Tolerance, by teaching children tolerance & respect**




Looking at the marital status, widowers were the least tolerant while people in a registered partnership were the most tolerant.

Figure 16: **General Tolerance, by marital status**




No clear pattern however emerged when looking at gender. Women were slightly more tolerant than men, though the differences were very small.

Figure 17: **General Tolerance, by gender**




The duration of democracy also had no clear direction on attitudes towards tolerance.

Figure 18: **General Tolerance, by duration of democracy**




The duration of EU membership in years also had no clear direction on attitudes towards tolerance.

Figure 19: **General Tolerance, by duration of EU membership**




The GDP however explains quite a lot. The higher the GDP per capita was, the more tolerant citizens of these countries were.

Figure 20: **General Tolerance, by GDP per capita**




The HDI shows very similar patterns. More developed countries showed more tolerance than less developed countries.

Figure 21: **General Tolerance, by HDI**




The Gender Gap Index (GGI) also follows this pattern. Countries which provided more equality among genders were more tolerant than countries that provided less equality among genders.

Figure 22: **General Tolerance, by GGI**




The GINI coefficient however shows no clear patterns, though countries in which wealth was more equality distributed (closer to 0) were slightly more tolerant on average.

Figure 23: **General Tolerance, by GINI coefficient**




Net migration also shows no clear pattern on its own. It was however introduced to control for contextual effects, so this finding is not surprising.

Figure 24: **General Tolerance, by net migration**




The unemployment rate shows interesting results. No differences between the first quartiles could be found, though the quartile with the most unemployment showed *more* tolerant attitudes than the other three groups.

Figure 25: **General Tolerance, by unemployment rates**



Whether people lived in EU member countries that have a communist legacy had an impact on their level of overall tolerance. Citizens of countries that have no communist legacy were more tolerant.


Figure 26: **General Tolerance, by communist legacy**



With the exception of gender, the duration of EU-membership, the duration of democracy, net migration, and the GINI coefficient, all independent variables showed the expected significant patterns. The unemployment rate was the only variable that showed significant patterns in the opposite direction from what was expected.

The following maps give an overview over how each country scored on the three dimensions that *tolerance and non-discrimination* consisted of: tolerance towards (racial) minorities and immigrants, tolerance towards other religious groups, and tolerance towards homosexuality.

Figure 27: **Religious Tolerance & Racial Tolerance, by country**




Looking at this first graph, one can see that members of the EU-old 15 countries are located mostly at the top, meaning high religious tolerance, whereas newer member states are less religiously tolerant. However, all countries can be considered to be more religiously tolerant than not since the cut-off point on this graph is at the value 5 (with the scale ranging from 0-10). Racial tolerance is not as pronounced in all countries, and countries that are more sceptical towards ethnic minorities and immigrants are located on the left side of the map.

Generally, older and newer member states can be classified quite well on these two dimensions with the most significant outlier being Hungary because of its high religious tolerance.

Micro-level correlation between these two items was 0.2877, macro-level correlation as seen in this map was 0.4678.


Figure 28: **Racial Tolerance & Tolerance towards Homosexuality, by country**



This map reveals that distinguishing between older and newer member states could almost be done with a clear cut line going from the lower left to the top right with the only exceptions being Czechia and Portugal. Newer member states are clearly less tolerant of homosexuality but not that much different regarding their racial tolerance.

Micro-level correlation between these two items was 0.2424, macro-level correlation as seen in this map was 0.2395.

Figure 29: Tolerance towards Homosexuality & Religious Tolerance



Again, newer member states are located mostly on the top right, meaning overall higher tolerance of both homosexuality and other religions, with Austria being the least religious tolerant country of the EU-old 15.

Micro-level correlation between these two items was 0.3004, macro-level correlation as seen in this map was 0.6349.

Differences between the correlation values arise since the macro-level works with mean values for every country without accounting for standard deviations. This loss of information can sometimes lead to quite large differences in correlations.

The next table gives an overview over the mean scores regarding all three dimensions that comprise the *tolerance and non-discrimination* value. As one can see, the EU-old 15 countries were on average always more tolerant than the EU-new 12 member states.

Table 1: **Overview over EU-old 15 and EU-new 12 mean statistics for Tolerance**

Mean value [0-1]	EU-old 15	EU-new 12
Racial Tolerance	0.273	0.246
Religious Tolerance	0.760	0.679
Homosexuality Tolerance	0.603	0.360
Mean Tolerance	0.545	0.429

These findings were meant to provide an overview at first glance. They are discussed and put into context in the next section.

6.1.2 Multi Level Model regarding Tolerance

This section addresses the theoretical hypotheses outlined earlier in this thesis. With the use of multivariate linear regression, variables included in the models are tested for their significance and how much they are able to explain differences in attitudes towards tolerance and non-discrimination.

Three models have been created: Model 1, where only micro-level variables have been tested simultaneously, Model 2, where only macro-level variables have been tested simultaneously, and finally - and most importantly - Model 3, which constitutes the multi level model, where all independent variables have been included and tested while simultaneously accounting for all other factors and reciprocity as well as intra-class correlation.

Continuing with the three models, let's jump to the interpretation of findings. An overview over the coefficients and their level of significance is provided in the following table. Note that for categorical variables such as marital status and religious denomination, "married" and "no religion" have been the reference points. A detailed overview over the measures of each variable is provided in the 'Data and Method' section. Also note that the values of tolerance and non-discrimination that had their limits between "0" and "1" before, have been multiplied by ten, transforming the scale to include values from "0" to "10". This was done in order to provide more precise coefficients that include less zeros since the coefficients in the tables only consist of three decimal places.

Table 1: Regression table for Tolerance

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	-0.013 ^{***} (0.001)		-0.016 ^{***} (0.001)
Gender (female)	0.311 ^{***} (0.027)		0.260 ^{***} (0.026)
Education	0.129 ^{***} (0.012)		0.168 ^{***} (0.012)
Income	0.114 ^{***} (0.114)		-0.005 (0.008)
Urbanisation	0.053 ^{***} (0.053)		0.042 ^{***} (0.006)
Obedience	-0.357 ^{***} (0.030)		-0.455 ^{***} (0.030)
Political View	-0.150 ^{***} (0.006)		-0.145 ^{***} (0.006)
Social Trust	-0.825 ^{***} (0.029)		-0.740 ^{***} (0.028)
Unemployment	0.141 ^{***} (0.032)		0.063 (0.031)
Marital Status			
reg. partnership	0.252 ^{***} (0.060)		0.145 (0.058)
widowed	0.025 (0.050)		-0.041 (0.049)
divorced	0.140 ^{***} (0.044)		0.021 (0.044)
separated	0.461 ^{***} (0.065)		0.040 (0.069)
never married	0.306 ^{***} (0.038)		0.171 ^{***} (0.037)
Occupation	-0.054 ^{***} (0.005)		-0.050 ^{***} (0.005)
Tolerant Children	0.492 ^{***} (0.031)		0.390 ^{***} (0.031)
Religious Denom.			
Roman Catholic	0.220 ^{***} (0.041)		0.323 ^{***} (0.040)
Protestant	0.604 ^{***} (0.047)		0.512 ^{***} (0.050)
F.C./n.C./evangelical	0.786 ^{***} (0.090)		-0.319 ^{**} (0.098)
Jewish	0.447 ^{***} (0.092)		0.648 ^{***} (0.082)
Muslim	0.792 ^{***} (0.080)		0.572 ^{***} (0.087)
Orthodox	-0.202 ^{***} (0.051)		0.287 ^{***} (0.55)
Apostate	0.572 ^{***} (0.047)		0.410 ^{***} (0.047)
Other	0.480 ^{***} (0.071)		0.642 ^{***} (0.076)
Import. of Religion	0.055 ^{***} (0.015)		0.040 [*] (0.015)
GGI		9.584 ^{***} (0.406)	1.595 (0.633)
HDI		-3.562 ^{***} (0.613)	-0.451 (0.903)
GDP		0.019 ^{***} (0.001)	0.017 ^{***} (0.002)
GINI		-0.064 ^{***} (0.005)	-0.064 ^{***} (0.008)
Duration EU		0.014 ^{***} (0.001)	0.011 ^{***} (0.001)
Communist legacy		-0.031 (0.048)	0.169 (0.074)
Net migration		1.04e-7 ^{***} (2.48e-8)	8.44e-9 (3.65e-8)
Unemployment Rate		0.156 ^{***} (0.007)	0.173 ^{***} (0.011)
Duration Democracy		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
constant	5.188 ^{***} (0.128)	1.637 ^{**} (0.532)	5.266 ^{***} (0.794)
N	17998	34123	17641
R ² (adjusted)	0.3157	0.1642	0.3683

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Model 1:

Model 1 tested only micro level variables while controlling for all other variables included in the model.

At first glance interpreting findings of multiple regression coefficients can be confusing. In short, the coefficients represent explanations of attitudes towards tolerance and non-discrimination while also taking all other effects into account. So the values of each coefficient show how much - and in which - direction the variables are affected by the dependent variable while all other factors are held constant. To give an example: With every year of age that respondents had, they are predicted to shift 0.013 points towards intolerance on the tolerance and non-discrimination variable (as indicated by the minus before the coefficient) while accounting for all other factors, like education, income, etc. For interpreting these coefficients it is important to know how both the dependent variable and the independent variables are scaled.

The first interesting finding is that while accounting for all other micro level effects, employment shifted its direction, meaning that unemployed people held more tolerant views than people who were employed. Also divorcees and separated people were more tolerant than married people. The type of occupation was no longer as important, but gender was. Also Roman Catholics were more tolerant than non-religious people while Orthodoxes remained less tolerant than them. Additionally the importance of religion was not as important as before. What remained very significant was people's views on what ought to be taught to children: obedience decreased tolerance and tolerance and respect increased tolerance, as before. Not much changed regarding the significance level of the coefficients, only widowers and divorcees changed.

Including only these micro level variables in the model explained 31.57% of the variance of attitudes towards *tolerance and non-discrimination*. This is quite a high value considering dealing with such a large survey dataset of individuals from different countries.

Model 2:

Model 2 tested only macro level variables while controlling for all other variables included in the model.

It is important to note that none of these variables have been included in the original dataset but have been taken from different sources such as the world bank or Eurostat to name a few (see the Data and Method chapter for details). Each individual of any given country has been assigned the value according to their country's value of each item. This means that all 34123 individuals included in this model shared only a few of the same data points on the independent variables. Naturally, variance between these items was quite high. However, macro level variables pose no problems regarding linear regression and have been useful in the past to explain variances in value orientations. Interpreting their coefficients follows the same principles as with other variables.

The first interesting finding is that while accounting for all other macro level effects, the HDI changed its algebraic sign while being highly significant. This means that in context of the other macro-level factors, higher development of countries led to less tolerant attitudes of individuals. This does not come as a total surprise, since the Human Development Index is also comprised of the GDP per capita, so on some level these variables measure the same thing. This could already been seen while checking all the regressors for multicollinearity, where the HDI had the closest value of all items that would indicate multicollinearity (which it did not in the end however).

Whether countries have a communist legacy and the duration of democratic rule were the only insignificant factors in control of all the other macro-level factors.

The unemployment rate on the other hand caused quite a surprise because it points in the opposite direction to what was expected and is highly significant. The more unemployment there was in the analysed countries, the more tolerant citizens were which is contrary to what was expected.

Model 3:

Model 3 tested both micro and macro level variables while controlling for all other variables included in the model.

This was by far the most interesting model and ultimately the only one that followed the multi level theoretical framework outlined earlier in this thesis. It tested variables while accounting for all other variables at the same time, were they micro or macro level variables.

The first interesting finding is the change of significance level for some of the coefficients. On the micro-level, the level of income and the employment

status, and on the macro-level, net migration were no longer significant in context of the other variables. The GGI and HDI retained their level of insignificance from model 2.

Also, the employment status (even though it lost its significance) retained its unexpected direction from Model 1, where unemployed people were more tolerant than employed people. Considering that the level of income and the employment status of individuals was not significant and only the level of education and occupational status (while pointing in the expected direction), hypothesis 3 can neither be considered to be correct nor rejected for *tolerance and non-discrimination* in a multi-level model.

Widowers, divorcees, and separated people also lost their significance in respect to married people, meaning that there was no significant difference between these groups regarding their attitudes towards tolerance and non-discrimination. Quite curiously, members of the Free Church/non conformists/evangelicals were now the only religious group which was more intolerant than non-religious people. Orthodoxes were now significantly more tolerant than non-religious people, as were Jews and Muslims. Other significant differences while accounting for all other factors, members of other religions (e.g. Buddhists), Protestants, apostates and Roman Catholics were now highly significantly more tolerant than non-religious people. Interestingly enough, the importance of religion for individuals was only slightly significant. This means that no matter how important religion was for respondents, their official religious denominations were more telling regarding their attitudes towards tolerance non-discrimination.

Age remained a constant factor in all models for explaining value differences towards tolerance and non-discrimination. Women were still more tolerant on average than men and higher levels of education fostered tolerant views. The more populated the areas were where respondents lived, the more tolerant they were. Believing that obedience or tolerance and respect are something that ought to be taught to children was still as significant as in model 1. The more authoritarian people were, they more their attitudes leaned towards intolerance, while openness corresponded to more tolerant attitudes. Maybe even more significantly regarding its coefficient was social trust. The more people trusted other people, the more tolerant they were.

Interestingly enough, both the GGI and HDI were still insignificant while accounting for all other items. The HDI not being relevant while controlling for other macro level variables - especially the GDP per capita since the in-

dex is also comprised of the GDP per capita - comes as no surprise, however when looking at the GGI's very big coefficient in model 2, it not being relevant any more and even changing its algebraic sign is quite surprising. This indicates that the overall measure of gender equality in any given country did not explain tolerance when accounting for the other factors included in this model.

The GDP and GINI coefficient retained their direction and significance. The wealthier and the more equally this wealth was distributed among members of any country's society, the more tolerant its inhabitants were. However, given the fact that the higher unemployment in countries was, the more tolerant its citizens were, taints these results a bit. So it cannot be said that hypothesis 4 is correct, although it is also not rejected at this point.

The items that did not fall in line with the expected results were net migration, and the duration that countries have been under democratic rule. Especially net migration comes as somewhat of a surprise, since its theoretical contextual effect regarding competition for lower skilled labourers, the unemployed, and people with lower incomes led to the assumption that a higher net migration would foster less tolerant attitudes - especially towards immigrants. That the outcome is not as expected could have two reasons: the assumption was simply wrong, or net migration does not measure what it was supposed to measure, since net migration does not allow for distinguishing between higher and lower skilled labourers who either leave or enter countries. Furthermore, the causes for migration are manifold and the measures of net migration does not allow for controlling for these causes.

Regarding the communist legacy and the duration of democratic rule of countries, these results are indeed surprising - since theoretical deliberations led to the the assumption of different results - and merit further investigation in future research. So even though the duration of EU-membership proved to be highly significant and points into the expected direction (for every year more that countries are members of the EU, they are predicted to become more tolerant by a factor of 0.011 on a 0-10 point scale), combined with the results of the duration of democratic rule and communist legacy, it cannot be said that hypothesis 1 is fully correct. However, it can also not be rejected at this point.

Intra-class correlation is 16.33%, meaning that in this mixed model, 16.33% percent of total residual variance could be explained by macro-level effects. This is quite a high value for macro-level effects to explain variance, so this means that Hypothesis 5 is correct for *tolerance and non-discrimination*.

Excluding items that showed no significant explanation of tolerance and non-discrimination attitudes from the model led to no mentionable increase or decrease of the level of explained variance. Therefore, this model and its results are kept as they are. As the R-squared indicates, this model was able to explain 36.83% of variance in attitudes towards tolerance and non-discrimination, a higher value than the micro or macro level on their own were able to explain.

Regarding the question whether variance between or within countries was higher, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the following results:

Table 3: **One-way Analysis of Variance for Tolerance**

Level	SS	MS	F	Prob > F	Est. St. Dev.
Between country	14989.54	599.58	198.36	0.0000	0.947
Within country	53244.49	3.02			1.739

R-squared = 21.97%
N = 17641
ICC = 23.66%

It can be seen that Hypothesis 2 is supported when looking at the estimated standard deviation which is way higher within countries than between countries. That means that *tolerance and non-discrimination* values differ more between individuals of the same country than the mean *tolerance and non-discrimination* values between countries. Also, the F-statistic suggests that tolerance values differ significantly between countries.

These findings have the following implications: First, it means that value differences in any given country between its members are greater than average value orientations between countries. This could be ascribed to different experiences made in the life of citizens and different socio-economic standings that help shape value orientations, or as Mohler et. al. phrased it "individuals, groups or societies may differ in their hierarchical patterns of values (some values are more important than other values), which is the prime field of interest of comparative value research" (2006: 8).

Secondly, while societies differ more between their own members than between other societies, the second finding of this ANOVA led to the realisation that societies still differ significantly from another. So while it is possible for members of different countries to differ more from their fellow country men and


find more similarities between them and certain citizens of other countries, these cross-national differences are still significantly different on average regarding the value *tolerance and non-discrimination*. This can be attributed to different levels of wealth and income inequality, and differences in institutionally embedded values since the duration of EU membership was highly significant in the models. The longer countries are members of the European Union the more they value tolerance which in turn means that a longer membership would also decrease the gap between tolerant values between its member states.

6.2 Equality

6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Equality


The first variable of interest chosen was how countries of the European Union differ in their attitudes about equality in general. In the next figure, countries are listed in ascending order. Lower values mean more traditional attitudes towards equality. It can be seen that Cyprus had the most traditional views on gender equality while Sweden had the most modern views on gender equality.

Figure 30: Attitudes towards Equality, by country




Looking at the different religious denominations it becomes clear that Muslim respondents were the most traditional religious group, while apostates were the least traditional group. Distinguishing between non-religious people and apostates has again proven to be a good choice.

Figure 31: **Attitudes towards Equality, by religious denomination**




The importance of religion for individuals shows that the more important religion was for respondents, the less traditional they were. The most tolerant group was people who said religion was not at all important for them.

Figure 32: **Attitudes towards Equality, by importance of religion**




No surprises emerged when looking at the political view of respondents. People on the "left" were generally more tolerant than people on the "right". People on the extreme "left" were a bit less modern in their views about gender roles than other people on the "left". Overall, the differences are not as clear as in the tolerance section.

Figure 33: **Attitudes towards Equality, by political view**




Age has only played a role, albeit a small one. Still, a general direction can be seen. The younger respondents were, the less traditional their views were.

Figure 34: **Attitudes towards Equality, by age**




The level of education also explains differences. The better educated people were, the less traditional attitudes they showed.

Figure 35: **Attitudes towards Equality, by education**




The level of income shows that people with higher wages tended to be less traditional than people who earned less. There is however a slight trend among the two highest wage groups to show a bit higher levels traditional views.

Figure 36: Attitudes towards Equality, by income




Next is looking at the employment status of individuals. Respondents who at the time of the interviews were employed showed less traditional views than unemployed people.

Figure 37: Attitudes towards Equality, by employment




The type of occupation also has a part to play. The higher skilled the occupation was, the less traditional people's views were. Higher Controllers held the most modern attitudes, while farmers held the most traditional attitudes.

Figure 38: **Attitudes towards Equality, by occupation**




Next, it is revealed that people that trusted other people more held less traditional attitudes than individuals that were sceptical of other people.

Figure 39: **Attitudes towards Equality, by social trust**




Looking at urbanisation, no clear differences between people who lived in city as opposed to smaller villages regarding their attitudes towards gender equality could be found.

Figure 40: **Attitudes towards Equality, by urbanisation**




People who mentioned that obedience is something that should be taught to children were more traditional overall than people who did not mention this trait.

Figure 41: **Attitudes towards Equality, by teaching children obedience**




Respondents who mentioned that tolerance and respect are things that should be taught to children showed less traditional views than people who did not mention this trait.

Figure 42: **Attitudes towards Equality, by teaching children tolerance & respect**




Looking at the marital status, widowers held the most traditional views while people in a registered partnership held the most modern views.

Figure 43: **Attitudes towards Equality, by marital status**




No clear pattern however emerged when looking at gender. Women were slightly more modern than men, though the differences were very small.

Figure 44: **Attitudes towards Equality, by gender**




The duration of democracy has also had no clear direction on attitudes towards equality. Individuals of countries that lived in countries that have been under democratic rule the longest were the most traditional. However, individuals of countries that lived in countries that have been under democratic the longest were the second most traditional group.

Figure 45: **Attitudes towards Equality, by duration of democracy**




The duration of EU membership in years also had no clear direction on attitudes towards equality.

Figure 46: **Attitudes towards Equality, by duration of EU membership**




The GDP however explains quite a lot. The higher the GDP per capita was, the less traditional citizens of these countries were.

Figure 47: **Attitudes towards Equality, by GDP per capita**




The HDI shows very similar patterns. More developed countries held equality in higher regard than less developed countries.

Figure 48: Attitudes towards Equality, by HDI




The Gender Gap Index (GGI) also follows this pattern. Countries which provide more equality among genders were more modern than countries that provided less equality among genders.

Figure 49: Attitudes towards Equality, by GGI




The GINI coefficient shows that countries in which wealth is more equality distributed (closer to 0) had more modern opinions on gender roles on average.

Figure 50: **Attitudes towards Equality, by GINI coefficient**




Net migration also shows no clear pattern on its own other than citizens of countries that had a higher level of net migration were less traditional.

Figure 51: **Attitudes towards Equality, by net migration**




The unemployment rate shows interesting results. While differences between the first three quartiles are small, the quartile with the most unemployment showed *less* traditional attitudes than the other three groups.

Figure 52: **Attitudes towards Equality, by unemployment rates**




Looking at the relationship status, no differences between these two groups could be found.

Figure 53: **Attitudes towards Equality, by relationship status**




The number of children reveals a pattern that shows that the more children respondents had, the more traditional their views were.

Figure 54: **Attitudes towards Equality, by the number of children**




The employment rate of women shows that the higher percentages of women were employed, the less people held traditional views about gender roles.

Figure 55: **Attitudes towards Equality, by the employment rate of women**



Whether people lived in EU member countries that have a communist legacy had an impact on their level of overall tolerance. Citizens of countries that have no communist legacy were more tolerant.


Figure 56: **Attitudes towards Equality, by communist legacy**



With the exception of gender, the relationship status, the duration of EU-membership, the duration of democracy, net migration, and the GINI coefficient, all independent variables showed the expected significant patterns from the hypotheses. The unemployment rate was again the only variable that showed significant patterns in the opposite expected direction.

The following maps give an overview over how each country scored on the three dimensions that *equality* consisted of: attitudes towards gender roles and children, attitudes towards gender roles and combining work and children, and attitudes towards gender roles and work.

Figure 57: Attitudes towards gender roles and children & Attitudes towards gender roles and children and work, by country




Generally, older member states of the EU were less traditional in their views towards gender roles and combining children and work, as well as gender roles concerning solely children than newer member states. However, there are significant differences between certain member states such as Italy (traditional) and Denmark for example.

Newer member states however are all located on the bottom half of this map, meaning that they hold quite traditional views about gender roles and children.

Micro-level correlation between these two items was 0.2693, macro-level correlation as seen in this map was 0.5222.


Figure 58: Attitudes towards gender roles and children and work & Attitudes towards gender roles and work, by country



This next map shows that countries such as Sweden, Denmark and France are significantly more modern in their views concerning gender roles with respect to work and children than most other countries. Interestingly enough, attitudes about combining children and work, and gender roles about work seem to almost follow a linear relationship. Whether countries belong to the EU-old 15 or EU-new 12 however, does not seem to be a good classifier for this relationship.

Micro-level correlation between these two items was 0.2888, macro-level correlation as seen in this map was 0.6633.

Figure 59: Attitudes towards gender roles and work & Attitudes towards gender roles and children, by country




Interestingly enough, gender roles concerning solely work and solely children does not seem to be associated with each other. Citizens of European member states seem to distinguish quite well between those two dimensions, leaving country averages scattered all around the map with no clear relationship. However, newer EU member states hold less traditional views about gender roles with regards to children, whereas attitudes about working men and women differ no matter whether countries belong to the EU-old 15 or EU-new 12.

Micro-level correlation between these two items was 0.1523, macro-level correlation as seen in this map was 0.1486.

Lastly, this next map shows where countries are located regarding their mean tolerance and mean equality values.

Figure 60: Mean tolerance values & mean equality values, by country



As once can see, there is almost a completely linear relationship between mean values of tolerance and equality for EU member states with Sweden being the most tolerant and least traditional country, and Cyprus being the least tolerant and most traditional country. Almost all older member states are located at the top right section, while almost all newer member states are located at the bottom left section. This EU-old 15 and EU-new 12 seems to be a very good classifier for identifying the values of tolerance and equality. Micro-level correlation between these two items was 0.3581, macro-level correlation as seen in this was an astonishing 0.9113.

The next table gives an overview over the mean scores regarding all three dimensions that comprise the *equality* value. As one can see, the EU-old 15 countries were on average always less traditional than the EU-new 12 member states.

Table 4: **Overview over EU-old 15 and EU-new 12 mean statistics for Equality**

Mean value [0-1]	EU-old 15	EU-new 12
Gender and work	0.746	0.720
Gender and children	0.534	0.378
Gender and combining work & children	0.660	0.597
Mean Equality	0.645	0.566

These findings were meant to provide an overview at first glance. They are discussed and put into context in the next section.

6.2.2 Multi Level Model regarding Equality

This section addresses the theoretical hypotheses outlined earlier in this thesis. With the use of multivariate linear regression, variables included in the models are tested for their significance and how much they are able to explain differences in attitudes towards equality.

Continuing with the three models, let's jump to the interpretation of findings. An overview over the coefficients and their level of significance is provided in the following table. Note that for categorical variables such as marital status and religious denomination, "married" and "no religion" have been the reference points. A detailed overview over the measures of each variable is provided in the 'Data and Method' section. Also note that the values of equality that had their limits between "0" and "1" before, have been multiplied by ten, transforming the scale to include values from "0" to "10". This was done in order to provide more precise coefficients that include less zeros since the coefficient in the tables only consist of three decimal places.

Table 2: Regression table for Equality

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Age	-0.003 ^{***} (0.001)		-0.005 ^{***} (0.001)
Gender (female)	0.502 ^{***} (0.018)		0.480 ^{***} (0.018)
Education	0.063 ^{***} (0.008)		0.087 ^{***} (0.008)
Income	0.124 ^{***} (0.004)		0.035 ^{***} (0.006)
Urbanisation	0.021 ^{***} (0.004)		0.009 (0.004)
Obedience	-0.105 ^{***} (0.020)		-0.155 ^{***} (0.020)
Political View	-0.048 ^{***} (0.004)		-0.045 ^{***} (0.004)
Social Trust	-0.205 ^{***} (0.020)		-0.112 ^{***} (0.020)
Unemployment	-0.104 ^{***} (0.022)		-0.163 ^{***} (0.021)
Marital Status			
reg. partnership	0.266 ^{***} (0.043)		0.033 (0.043)
widowed	0.013 (0.049)		-0.024 (0.047)
divorced	0.291 ^{***} (0.043)		0.175 ^{***} (0.043)
separated	0.324 ^{***} (0.061)		0.089 (0.064)
never married	0.277 ^{***} (0.041)		0.110 [*] (0.040)
Occupation	-0.020 ^{***} (0.003)		-0.024 ^{***} (0.003)
Tolerant Children	0.278 ^{***} (0.021)		0.190 ^{***} (0.020)
Religious Denom.			
Roman Catholic	-0.034 (0.282)		0.016 (0.028)
Protestant	0.190 ^{***} (0.032)		-0.030 (0.034)
F.C./n.C./evangelical	0.590 ^{***} (0.063)		0.151 (0.068)
Jewish	-0.154 [*] (0.056)		-0.204 ^{***} (0.042)
Muslim	-0.191 ^{**} (0.055)		-0.317 ^{***} (0.061)
Orthodox	-0.340 ^{***} (0.035)		-0.086 (0.019)
Apostate	0.386 ^{***} (0.033)		0.180 ^{***} (0.032)
Other	0.003 (0.056)		-0.020 (0.060)
Import. of Religion	0.144 ^{***} (0.011)		0.136 ^{***} (0.010)
Relationship status	0.046 (0.037)		0.028 (0.036)
Nr. of children	-0.043 ^{***} (0.008)		-0.065 ^{***} (0.008)
GGI		6.372 ^{***} (0.318)	3.360 ^{***} (0.010)
HDI		0.971 (0.390)	0.492 (0.564)
GDP		0.009 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)
GINI		-0.045 ^{***} (0.003)	-0.039 ^{***} (0.006)
Duration EU		0.007 ^{***} (0.001)	0.004 ^{***} (0.001)
Communist legacy		0.110 ^{***} (0.031)	-0.075 (0.054)
Net migration		3.71e-8 (1.63e-8)	-2.96e-9 (2.71e-8)
Unemployment Rate		0.074 ^{***} (0.005)	0.076 ^{***} (0.007)
Duration Democracy		0.003 ^{***} (0.000)	0.004 ^{***} (0.001)
Women Employment		0.007 ^{***} (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
constant	5.012 ^{***} (0.097)	0.601 (0.334)	3.535 ^{***} (0.554)
N	15831	33709	15511
R ² (adjusted)	0.3222	0.2262	0.3833

^{***} $p < 0.01$, ^{**} $p < 0.05$, ^{*} $p < 0.1$

Model 1:

Model 1 tested only micro level variables while controlling for all other variables included in the model.

At first glance interpreting findings of multiple regression coefficients can be confusing. In short, the coefficients represent explanations of attitudes towards tolerance and non-discrimination while also taking all other effects into account. So the values of each coefficient show how much - and in which - direction the variables are affected by the dependent variable while all other factors are held constant. To give an example: With every year of age that respondents had, they are predicted to shift 0.003 points towards more traditional views on the equality variable while accounting for all other factors, like education, income, etc. For interpreting these coefficients it is important to know how both the dependent variable and the independent variables are scaled.

The first interesting finding is that while accounting for all other micro level effects, no coefficient changed its algebraic sign other than intra-variable coefficients in the marital status and religious denomination. These characteristics are divorcees, separated people, and widowers (non-significant) on the marital status side, and people of "other" religious denominations on the religious denomination side.

Moreover, only slight variations in significance levels can be seen. Widowers and people of "other" religious denominations lost their level of significance completely, Muslims lost a bit of significance, and Jews had their level of significance raised by a bit.

The gender coefficient is quite interesting. When accounting for every independent variable in this model, women are estimated to shift half a point on a 10-point scale towards more modern attitudes about gender roles. No other dummy variable in this model had this much of an impact when also accounting for standard errors.

What remained an issue was that the relationship status explained almost nothing about attitudes towards gender roles even when accounting for all other factors. Excluding this variable from the model however, did not raise the explained variance in gender roles.

Including only these micro level variables in the model explained 32.22% of the variance of attitudes towards *equality*. This is quite a high value consid-

ering dealing with such a large survey data set of individuals from different countries.

Model 2:

Model 2 tested only macro level variables while controlling for all other variables included in the model.

It is important to note that none of these variables have been included in the original dataset but have been taken from different sources such as the world bank or Eurostat to name a few. Each individual of any given country has been assigned the value according to their country's value of each item. This means that all 33709 individuals included in this model shared only a few of the same data points on the independent variables. Naturally, variance between these items was quite high. However, macro level variables pose no problems regarding linear regression and have been useful in the past to explain variances in value orientations. Interpreting their coefficients follows the same principles as other variables.

The first interesting finding is that while accounting for all other macro level effects, the HDI is not significant when accounting for other macro level variables, though it did not change its algebraic sign as it did with tolerance and non-discrimination - where it was also highly significant in model 2. Again, this does not come as a surprise, since the Human Development Index is also comprised of the GDP per capita, so on some level these variables measure the same thing. This could already been seen while checking all the regressors for multicollinearity, where the HDI had the closest value of all items that would indicate multicollinearity (which it did not in the end however).

The GGI was highly significant which falls in line with the hypotheses, as do the GDP per capita, and the duration that countries have been members of the European Union.

Net migration lost its significance. However, whether countries had a communist legacy changed its algebraic sign *and* was highly significant. It seems that while controlling for all other macro level effects, living in a country that had a communist legacy increased modern attitudes about *equality*. Also the unemployment rate that caused quite a surprise earlier on with *tolerance and non-discrimination* was still highly significant and pointing in the opposite direction to what was expected.

Higher employment rates of women, longer durations of both EU membership and continuous democratic rule were all highly significant and decreased

traditional views about equality. This falls in line with what was expected.

Model 3:

Model 3 tested both micro and macro level variables while controlling for all other variables included in the model.

On the micro-level, the first interesting finding is the change of significance level for the level of urbanisation and some items in the categorical variables marital status and religious denomination. The degree of urbanisation did not explain attitudes towards gender equality while accounting for all other items at the same time. Also whether respondents were widowers, separated, never married (though slightly significant), in a relationship whatsoever, or in a registered partnership did not make a significant difference from views of married people on gender roles. Only divorcees were significantly less traditional in their attitudes about gender roles than married people.

Age, gender, the level of education and income, the political view, the employment and occupational status, the importance of religion, the number of children respondents had, their level of trust, the number of children respondents had, as well as attitudes towards teaching tolerance and respect, and obedience to children retained both their direction and level of significance from Model 1 .

Regarding religion, Jews and Muslims were significantly more traditional in their views about equality, whereas no significant differences between non-religious folk and Roman Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox people, and people belonging to other religious groups could be found while accounting for all other factors. Apostates were the only group that was significantly less traditional in their attitudes than non-religious people.

Given the fact that the level of education, income, and occupation were highly significant and pointing towards the expected direction (higher levels/more skilled meaning less traditional attitudes towards equality), and that unemployed fostered traditional views it can be said that hypothesis 3 can be considered to be correct for *equality*.

On the macro-level - conflicting with previous findings in the *tolerance and non-discrimination* section - the GGI retained its level of significance in the full model regarding *equality*, though the HDI did not. Also, the employment rate of women now faces in the opposite direction, meaning that the higher the employment rate of women was in any given country, the more traditional views of respondents regarding gender equality were. However, this factor

lost its level of significance completely. In addition to that, higher overall unemployment rates actually fostered less traditional views about gender equality.

The duration that citizens of EU member states have been members of the EU had a positive effect towards their modern attitudes about gender roles and has been found to be highly significant. Combined with the fact that the duration of democratic rule proved to be highly significant (though a communist legacy did not), it can be said that Hypothesis 1 is supported.

The items that did not fall in line with the hypotheses were the level of urbanisation, and the relationship status on the micro-level and on the macro-level the GDP per capita, the HDI, whether countries had a communist legacy, net migration, and the employment rate of women (all non-significant), and lastly the unemployment rate which faced in the opposite direction to what was expected.

This means that hypothesis 4 has to be largely rejected, since factors that measure affluence of countries were not found to be of significance or pointed in the wrong direction. While the HDI could be explained by its similar measurement to the GDP per capita, the employment rates of women and overall unemployment rates come as a surprise. It seems that when controlling for all other factors, those two items actually lead to more traditional attitudes towards gender roles. Further research has to be undertaken to better understand these effects. Factors such as the GGI and the GINI that measure how equal (both economically and from a gender perspective) a society is, were however very good indicators for explaining the value of *equality*.

The unexpected (non-)effect of net migration has already been discussed in the Model 3 section regarding *tolerance and non-discrimination* and much of the same explanation is given here.

Intra-class correlation on the macro-level was 16.29%, meaning that in this mixed model, 16.29% percent of total residual variance could be explained by macro-level effects. This is very close to the 16.33% of intra-class correlation in the *tolerance non-discrimination* model and therefore the same conclusions can be drawn here: Since this value is quite high, hypothesis 5 is correct for *equality* as well.

Excluding items that showed no significant explanation of equality attitudes from the model led to no mentionable increase or decrease of the level of explained variance. Therefore, this model and its results are kept as they are. As the R-squared indicates, this model was able to explain 38.33% of variance in attitudes towards equality, a higher value than the micro or macro level

were able to explain on their own. The conclusion is therefore that multi level models allow for better understandings when analysing value orientations of both individuals and countries.

Regarding the question whether variance between or within countries was higher, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with the following results:

Table 6: **One-way Analysis of Variance for Equality**

Level	SS	MS	F	Prob > F	Est. St. Dev.
Between country	6079.80	243.19	198.80	0.0000	0.64
Within country	18942.59	1.22			1.11

R-squared = 24.30%
N = 15511
ICC = 25.34%

It can be seen that Hypothesis 2 was correct when looking at the estimated standard deviation which is way higher within countries than between countries. That means that *equality* values differ more between individuals of the same country than the mean *equality* values between countries. As with *tolerance*, the F-statistic suggests here as well that *equality* differs significantly between countries.

The estimated standard deviation of both between-country and within-country statistics is lower than for *tolerance and non-discrimination*, meaning that respondents to these surveys agreed more about *equality* on both the inner-country level and between countries. But as with *tolerance and non-discrimination* the same implications hold up here, namely that value differences are bigger between citizens of the same country, than between country averages. However, there are still significant differences between countries. So for both *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* values it can be said that even though differences between countries are significant, there is even less consensus about them within each country.

7 Conclusion

This chapter summarises findings and provides an overview over the findings that answer the underlying research question.

Given the European Union's transition during the last years to also become a self-proclaimed "community of values" (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2013; Gerhards 2006: 23), two key principles that the Union has ascribed to itself and is actively promoting have been analysed in a cross-national and cross-societal setting. Those two values were *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality between men and women*. While the former measured tolerant vs. intolerant attitudes of citizens, the latter measured traditional vs. modern attitudes of citizens.

The role of the European Union as a value entrepreneur has been examined by looking at value differences of citizens of EU-member states both between countries and within countries. Given that in any society values often vary more between individuals than between member states, individuals were even more of interest as countries.

In order to find characteristics that would best explain these differences, the independent variables included for both of the examined values were derived from modernisation theory and institutionalism. While modernisation theory argues that the more affluent and educated societies become and the more materialist needs are met, the more tolerant and less traditional in their views individuals become, institutionalism (or neo-institutionalism) focuses on how the institutional order and its values affect value orientations of individuals, while value orientations of individuals also help shape the institutional order. Since those two theories do not contradict each other, this thesis has made use of both of them in order to get a broader picture and account for different effects. For example, it is theorised that the more affluent a country is, the more its members hold less traditional values, as well as the more economically secure individuals are, the more they also hold less traditional values *and* therefore shape the common perspective on values in the country, thereby influencing the institutionalised setting.

However, the institutional order is not only affected by the value orientations of its citizens, but also by their historical and political heritage as well other "value entrepreneurs" such as religious groups and their influence.

This theoretical mix has brought forth a number of items both on the individual (micro) and country/aggregate (macro) level that ultimately made up a multi-level theoretical framework that aimed to include the biggest advantages of both theories.

In order to explain cultural differences within the European Union, surveys that have been conducted by the European Values Study (EVS) in all European countries during the years 2008-2009 have been used.

The two values *tolerance and non-discrimination* as well as *equality* have been thoroughly defined before continuing on with picking questions from the surveys that best adhered to these definitions, resulting in both values consisting of three dimensions. The value *tolerance and non-discrimination* was comprised of tolerance towards (racial) minorities and immigrants, tolerance towards other religious groups, and tolerance towards homosexuality. The value *equality* consisted of attitudes towards gender roles and children, attitudes towards gender roles and combining children and the work life, and attitudes towards gender roles and the work life.

Simple statistics where the independent variables were used separately on their own revealed almost no deviations from the expected direction of these items (see graphs and figures in the respective descriptive statistics chapters). Models 1 & 2 that focused only on the micro- or macro-level respectively brought forth interesting results on the corresponding levels, however, full multi level models revealed that the interdependencies and reciprocal effects sometimes led to unexpected results.

Differences regarding *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* values between member states and individuals of EU member states do exist when not controlling for contextual effects as could easily be seen by mapping the countries' mean values. Even though in some cases the pattern was not so clear, newer members of the European Union were found to tend to hold less tolerant and more traditional views. This seems to be an indicator that "cultural lag" (Ogburn 1958) and "path dependence" (Inglehart 1997) theories of modernisation theories hold up to a certain extent.

The factor of the duration of EU-membership was found to be highly significant, hypothesis 1 - the longer individuals have been exposed to democratic institutions and members of the European Union, the more they value tolerance and equality - had to be found largely correct, even though the duration of democratic rule and communist legacy both showed mixed results. For *tolerance and non-discrimination*, it could be seen that a country's communist legacy and the duration of continuous democratic rule had no influence on value orientations. For *equality*, the communist legacy was still not significant in the multi-level model, while the duration of continuous democratic rule aligned with the expected direction and was found to highly significant. Even though value differences of the EU-old 15 and EU-new 12 member states emerged as outlined in the previous chapter, one could argue that this rela-

tionship could also very well be superficial, since older member states enjoyed more affluence and stability of democratic institutions than newer members did at the time of joining the Union. This strong correlation between affluence and duration of EU membership was accounted for by including both types of variables in the model, so it can be seen how important each of the factors are when being controlled for by the others. The duration of EU membership as well as the GDP per capita (though not for *equality* in the multi-level model) and the GINI Index were highly significant for both *tolerance and non-discrimination* as well as *equality* even when being controlled for by the others which means that they do not cancel each other out and measured what they were supposed to measure.

Since these findings lead to the rejection of hypothesis 4, as well as the fact that variables that measure affluence were controlled for at the same time as the duration of democratic rule and EU membership, hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected, because the impact of the European Union which sees itself as a "community of values" on shaping these values is still highly significant. Hypothesis 1 can therefore be seen as correct but has to be taken with a grain of salt regarding the duration of continuous democratic rule and especially a country's communist legacy.

The question whether values differ more between countries than within countries was addressed by conducting one-way ANOVA tests and the results are in line with previous research (Kaasa et al. 2013; 2014; Haller 2002), namely that values differ vastly more between citizens of the same country than between countries. So hypothesis 2 - variance in value orientations is higher within countries than between countries - is strongly supported. However, ANOVA tests revealed a very significant difference between countries as well, so it cannot be said that there are no differences in value orientations between countries.

Micro-level variables derived from modernisation theory were found to explain value orientations of individuals quite well. Younger people, women, higher educated people and people who lived in larger cities were more tolerant and less traditional. The more "right-wing", and the lower skilled the occupation of people was, the less tolerant and more traditional they were. While the level of income and the employment status of individuals were no longer found to be significant for *tolerance and non-discrimination* in the multi level model, they were very significant for *equality* and retained their expected direction.

Overall, hypothesis 3 - when individuals themselves are more economically secure and/or competitive, the more they value tolerance and the less they

hold traditional values - is supported, though the multi-level model for *tolerance and non-discrimination* brought forth mixed results.

Macro-level variables of modernisation theory like the level of a country's development (HDI) and its Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP) showed mixed results. The level of development was no longer relevant for both *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality* which could be due to the fact that it is also comprised of the GDP per capita which was also being controlling for at the same time. This is supported by the fact that the higher the GDP per capita was, the more tolerant respondents were, although no significant effect could be seen for how traditional or modern respondents were.

Institutionalist variables were overall less suited to explain variance in value orientations. Higher net migration had no impact on neither *tolerance and non-discrimination* nor *equality*. However, it could very well be that net migration is a variable that does not measure what it should have measured, namely competition, since it does not account for differentiating between skills of various migrants.

The overall unemployment rate and the employment rate of women had the opposite effect to what was expected. Higher unemployment rates led to both more tolerant and less traditional values, while the employment rate of women was not significant at all in the multi-level model for *equality*.

While the Gender Gap Index (GGI) did nothing to explain tolerant attitudes, it was a highly significant and very powerful predictor for attitudes towards equality. The GINI-coefficient too was very significant and pointed into the expected direction in all models for both *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality*, meaning that the more income inequality in any given country was, the less tolerant and more traditional its citizens were.

All in all, there are too many contradictory findings in order to support hypothesis 4 - when individuals live in countries that are more economically secure and/or competitive, the more they value tolerance and the less they hold traditional values. Further research is necessary to investigate the interplay between modernisation, institutional embeddedness and macro-to-micro effects.

Also, hypothesis 5, that macro-level effects help explain variance about value differences on top of micro-level effects can be supported considering the quite high levels of intra-class correlation in both models. Intra-class correlation in both multi level models was quite large overall (16.33% for tolerance, 16.29% for equality), meaning that on the one hand macro-level effects explained less residual variance than micro-level effects, but on the other hand still explained quite a lot variance. These findings are a strong argument for

not excluding macro-level variables from statistical analysis for value orientations, but rather work with multi-level models.

Lastly, contextual effects like finding it important to teach children tolerance and/or obedience were very powerful predictors for tolerance and equality and kept their expected direction of impact. This also holds true for the level of social trust. The more trusting people were, the more tolerant and less traditional they were.

Religion also proved to matter. Members of the Free Church / non-conformists / Evangelicals were the least tolerant while Jewish people were the most tolerant. Muslims and Jewish people were the most traditional religious groups with respect to gender equality while apostates (which were treated in this thesis as people who once had a religious denomination but opted to leave their religious groups *and* did not join another religious group afterwards) were the most modern religious group. Differentiating between non-religious people and apostates proved to be a good decision since these groups varied significantly from one another. While the importance of religion for individuals lost its significance for tolerance, the less important religion was for respondents, the less traditional their views were with regards to gender equality.

Regarding family life of individuals, the number of children respondents had brought increased traditional views about gender roles with it. People who were never married were significantly more tolerant than married people, while divorced people had the least traditional attitudes towards equality.

Overall the multi level models could explain much of value differences between individuals and countries of the European Union (> 36%). Both modernisation theory and institutionalism have been helpful in their underlying hypotheses. The socio-economic status of individuals explained quite a lot and the theoretical deliberations of modernisation and post-materialist theories (Inglehart 1997) were largely confirmed. Institutionalism has also been able to help explain value differences, even though its findings between the two models were sometimes contradictory and the opposite from what was expected. Often times it was not clear why these contradictions existed, but better understanding the complicated nature of institutional embeddedness and civil society and the mutual transmission of values should be a goal for future research.

In this thesis, modernisation theories were able to explain value differences better than (neo-)institutionalism, however these findings also suggest further adaptations to these theories to be necessary in order to fully understand

value orientations and value differences - especially in highly developed countries such as member states of the European Union.

The following table provides an overview over how the hypotheses have held up for both *tolerance and non-discrimination* and *equality*.

Table 7: **Overview over Hypotheses**

Hypotheses	Tolerance	Equality
H1: The longer individuals have been exposed to democratic institutions and have been members of the European Union, the more they value tolerance and equality.	~	✓
H2: Variance in value orientations is higher within countries than between countries.	✓	✓
H3: The more economically secure and/or competitive individuals are, the more they value tolerance and the less they hold traditional values.	~	✓
H4: Individuals who are living in countries that are more economically secure and/or competitive, value tolerance more and hold less traditional values.	~	X
H5: Macro-level effects can explain additional variance in value differences on top of micro-level effects.	✓	✓

Discussion

This thesis sought to answer multiple research question. The first, and biggest one, is how value differences between and within member states of the European Union can be explained. In order to answer this question, modernisation and institutionalist theories have been used in order to come up with an elaborate theoretical framework which allowed for a well defined set of independent variables in order to test the hypotheses.

It could be seen that individual characteristics (micro-level) explained vari-

ance for the values of tolerance and equality better than country characteristics (macro-level). However, macro-level variables were able to contribute to the overall explained variance quite well, therefore justifying the use of multi-level models. Haller's (2002) and Arts' (2011) call for researchers to work with multi-level models when examining value orientations of individuals is hereby strongly supported.

Especially in light of the interaction between the micro- and macro-level where reciprocal effects have to be taken into account, valuable insight has been gained that would not have been provided if only one or the other dimension had been used. Since both dimensions influenced the other, looking at which effects still remained statistically significant while controlling for others provided the answers as to which factors actually influence value orientations and which do not. It can be seen that the socio-economic status of individuals matters, as well as age and belief systems that manifest themselves in religion and personal attitudes (e.g. teaching children trust and tolerance).

More affluent individuals cared more about tolerance and equality between men and women, thereby supporting modernisation and post-materialist theories - at least on the micro-level. The family and relationship status of individuals however did not explain much about their value orientations which was more surprising for equality since a lot of its questions asked about gender roles in the family- often specifically aimed at children.

On the macro-level, too many contradictory findings towards affluence of countries as a predictor for value orientations regarding tolerance and equality in multi-level settings suggest that personal affluence has a bigger impact on value orientations, than the average affluence of countries where individuals live. This is further supported by the fact that value differences are higher within countries than between countries.

For value researchers this means that the importance of affluent characteristics of countries should not be overestimated and using them when analysing solely macro-level and aggregated effects is hereby discouraged. Including macro-level measures of wealth and affluence in multi-level models is however encouraged in order to control for component effects and taking the interplay between micro- and macro-levels into account. More precise measures of affluence seem to be variables that measure inequalities within countries rather than average wealth, since one of the most consistent factors for both promoting tolerance and equality on the macro-level has been the GINI coefficient which measures income inequality. The less income equality there was on a state level, the more tolerant and modern in their views about gender equality respondents were even when taking all other effects into account.

Przeworski's (1991, 2000) recommendation for including income inequality has therefore been proven to be correct.

Another consistent macro-level factor for explaining variance between value orientations was the duration of EU membership, which leads to the second research question this thesis tried to answer:

Does the European Union help shape value orientations of its citizens?

- Theoretically, the European Union also functions as a "community of values" that transmits and promotes its values to its citizens and member states. However, it was not clear if the Union truly has an impact - and if so - how big this impact was. Given the theoretical framework with a number of variables being controlled for at the same time, creating logical fallacies when looking at the duration of EU membership as a measure of influence the Union has on promoting some of its self-proclaimed values were limited. Since more affluent countries have joined the Union at an earlier time, merely looking at the duration of EU membership on its own could have led to actually measure affluence. Only by controlling for measures of affluence like the GDP per capita, the Human Development Index, the GINI coefficient, the unemployment rate and a communist legacy (because a lot of newer member states have a communist legacy) at the same time, could the real effect of the EU and its enduring impact on value orientations be seen.

The results are clear: Even when controlling for all other effects, be they on the individual level (personal affluence, family status, religion, age) or the country level (state affluence, net migration, institutionally embedded (in-)equality) the duration of EU membership was in all cases a very significant factor in explaining value orientations of its citizens. The longer countries have been members of the European Union, the more citizens of its member states held the Union's self-proclaimed values in the form of tolerance and non-discrimination as well as equality in high regard. This means that the role of the EU as a value entrepreneur cannot be negated.

Even more importantly, if the Union wants to keep promoting these values and see a rise in perpetuation of these values, keeping current member states in the Union and extending European integration towards to possible new member states in the future could help maintaining and further promoting these values.

As theories of institutionalism argue, both individuals and institutions have an impact on shaping value orientations. These findings therefore suggest that the European Union is such an institution, thereby impacting value

orientations of its members. Though significant differences of average value orientations between countries could be seen, the fact that these chosen values differ more within countries than between them is also a chance of the European Union to work towards a stronger common consensus of these values.

Given the fact that quite a lot of countries only just joined the Union recently when the surveys were conducted (2008 and 2009), newer research could provide further insights with regard to the role of the EU as a value entrepreneur as well as citizens of newer countries also shaping the values of the Union as a whole.

Based on the results of this thesis, an even stronger commitment to these values especially in newer member states should be seen. Researchers should however maybe look to also find other ways to better incorporate the degree of institutionalised European integration and adherence to principles and values of the European Union of individuals and member states other than the duration of EU membership. Controlling for other effects that could measure the same things however, is always vital in order to find where the real causation lies.

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List of Tables

The following tables present findings discussed in the descriptive statistics sections for both tolerance and non-discrimination and equality and correspond to the figures presented in these sub chapters.

General findings for tolerance and non-discrimination

Table 8: **Tolerance, country**

country	mean
Austria	0.478026
Belgium	0.5635151
Bulgaria	0.4846993
Cyprus	0.3100737
Czech Republic	0.4592997
Denmark	0.6253655
Estonia	0.4092449
Finland	0.5889202
France	0.5696163
Germany	0.5111842
Greece	0.4050583
Hungary	0.488686
Ireland	0.5062291
Italy	0.4625587
Latvia	0.4327401
Lithuania	0.3554512
Luxembourg	0.5971242
Malta	0.396936
Netherlands	0.6000461
Poland	0.4492411
Portugal	0.4866549
Romania	0.4546538
Slovak Republic	0.4706935
Slovenia	0.4326367
Spain	0.5710917
Sweden	0.6621896
Great Britain	0.5435185
Total	0.4937715

Table 9: **Tolerance, religious denomination**

religious denomination	mean
roman catholic	0.4763354
protestant	0.5676234
free church/non-conformist	0.5722733
jewish	0.5304537
muslim	0.5296139
orthodox	0.422761
no religion	0.4840607
apostate	0.5782251
other	0.5224986
Total	0.4938207

Table 10: **Tolerance, religious importance**

religious importance	mean
very important	0.4333908
quite important	0.4904223
not important	0.525935
not at all important	0.5160626
Total	0.4937528

Table 11: **Tolerance, political view**

political view	mean
left	0.4907143
2	0.5606845
3	0.5679432
4	0.5604857
5	0.5010882
6	0.4938942
7	0.5033385
8	0.4754679
9	0.4391151
right	0.3859427
Total	0.5049434

Table 12: **Tolerance, Age**

age	mean
15-29 years	0.5291263
30-49 years	0.5196164
50 and more year	0.4616353
Total	0.4936276

Table 13: **Tolerance, Education**

education	mean
0 : Pre-primary education or none	0.3933755
1 : Primary education	0.4161531
2 : Lower secondary education	0.4608197
3 : (Upper) secondary education	0.4902977
4 : Post-secondary education	0.517274
5 : First stage of tertiary education	0.5712654
6 : Second stage of tertiary education	0.6358073
Total	0.4935423

Table 14: **Tolerance, Income**

income	mean
< 150	0.4486591
150-299	0.4277128
300-499	0.4351555
500-999	0.4517445
1000-1499	0.4755811
1500-1999	0.505207
2000-2499	0.5282753
2500-2999	0.5516868
3000-4999	0.5910618
5000-7499	0.6086984
7500-9999	0.6094032
> 10000	0.6082691
Total	0.4960332

Table 15: **Tolerance, Employment**

employment	mean
yes	0.5192508
no	0.4646104
Total	0.4934279

Table 16: **Tolerance, Tolerance, Occupation**

occupation	mean
I :Higher Controllers	0.5504615
II :Lower Controllers	0.5487716
IIIa:Routine Nonmanual	0.5298676
IIIb:Lower Sales-Service	0.5048236
IVa:Selfempl with employees	0.4725329
IVb:Selfempl no employees	0.4551649
V :Manual Supervisors	0.475336
VI :Skilled Worker	0.439804
VIIa:Unskilled Worker	0.4469414
VIIb:Farm Labor	0.4156658
IVc:Selfempl Farmer	0.3866363
Total	0.493801

Table 17: **Tolerance, social trust**

social trust	mean
most people can be trusted	0.570231
cannot be too careful	0.4554734
Total	0.4932111

Table 18: **Tolerance, Urbanisation**

urbanisation	mean
under 2000	0.4414244
2-5000	0.4725298
5-10000	0.5040802
10-20000	0.50209
20-50000	0.5205623
50-100000	0.5186115
100-500000	0.5029307
500000 and more	0.5309866
Total	0.4942328

Table 19: **Tolerance, important for children to learn obedience**

obedience	mean
not mentioned	0.5136928
mentioned	0.448697
Total	0.495361

Table 20: **Tolerance, important for children to learn tolerance**

children tolerance	mean
not mentioned	0.4366098
mentioned	0.5181887
Total	0.4955086

Table 21: **Tolerance, marital status**

marital status	mean
married	0.4856516
registered partnership	0.5389571
widowed	0.423578
divorced	0.4993145
separated	0.5319097
never married or reg. partnership	0.5313383
Total	0.4931224

Table 22: **Tolerance, Gender**

gender	mean
male	0.4806663
female	0.5041221
Total	0.4937519

Table 23: **Tolerance, Duration of democratic rule**

democracy length	mean
1st quartile	0.4649241
2nd quartile	0.5298959
3rd quartile	0.5224088
4th quartile	0.453386
Total	0.4937715

Table 24: **Tolerance, Duration of EU-Membership**

EU age	mean
1	0.4698157
4	0.4248809
13	0.5680569
22	0.5280956
27	0.4050583
35	0.5646295
56	0.5498438
Total	0.4937715

Table 25: **Tolerance, GDP**

GDP	mean
1st quartile	0.4441348
2nd quartile	0.4380136
3rd quartile	0.5237873
4th quartile	0.5664039
Total	0.4937715

Table 26: **Tolerance, HDI**

HDI	mean
1st quartile	0.4373694
2nd quartile	0.4362117
3rd quartile	0.4987286
4th quartile	0.5783475
Total	0.4937715

Table 27: **Tolerance, GGI**

GGI	mean
1st quartile	0.4580344
2nd quartile	0.4566547
3rd quartile	0.5096917
4th quartile	0.5570076
Total	0.4975728

Table 28: **Tolerance, GINI**

GINI	mean
1st quartile	0.5079909
2nd quartile	0.5350014
3rd quartile	0.4503826
4th quartile	0.4852039
Total	0.4975728

Table 29: **Tolerance, net migration**

net migration	mean
1st quartile	0.4862137
2nd quartile	0.4789183
3rd quartile	0.5186439
4th quartile	0.4919203
Total	0.4937715

Table 30: **Tolerance, Unemployment rate**

unemployment rate	mean
1st quartile	0.4524642
2nd quartile	0.4743964
3rd quartile	0.4723369
4th quartile	0.5650361
Total	0.4937715

Table 31: **Tolerance, communist legacy**

communist legacy	mean
no communist legacy	0.5222879
communist legacy	0.4603094
Total	0.4937715

General findings for equality

Table 32: Equality, country

country	mean
Austria	0.6161651
Belgium	0.6818177
Bulgaria	0.5830892
Cyprus	0.5255532
Czech Republic	0.5590929
Denmark	0.6916831
Estonia	0.5551661
Finland	0.7021478
France	0.6651265
Germany	0.6401218
Greece	0.5339149
Hungary	0.5752975
Ireland	0.6267197
Italy	0.5674286
Latvia	0.5637802
Lithuania	0.544061
Luxembourg	0.6639487
Malta	0.5386064
Netherlands	0.6802858
Poland	0.568525
Portugal	0.577592
Romania	0.5395001
Slovak Republic	0.5944108
Slovenia	0.6403348
Spain	0.6490982
Sweden	0.7459267
Great Britain	0.6364898
Total	0.6089569

Table 33: **Equality, religious denomination**

religious denomination	mean
roman catholic	0.5913298
protestant	0.6578173
free church/non-conformist	0.6579376
jewish	0.5808338
muslim	0.5475521
orthodox	0.5449288
no religion	0.6273054
apostate	0.6880558
other	0.5895023
Total	0.6089812

Table 34: **Equality, , religious importance**

religious importance	mean
very important	0.553564
quite important	0.591614
not important	0.6306442
not at all important	0.6582406
Total	0.6091479

Table 35: **Equality, political views**

political view	mean
left	0.6143709
2	0.6367728
3	0.6495797
4	0.6396854
5	0.6158803
6	0.6060764
7	0.6177806
8	0.6021739
9	0.580113
right	0.5585457
Total	0.6161447

Table 36: **Equality, Age**

age	mean
15-29 years	0.6359124
30-49 years	0.6300614
50 and more year	0.583797
Total	0.609003

Table 37: **Equality, Education**

education	mean
0 : Pre-primary education or none	0.5181965
1 : Primary education	0.5443671
2 : Lower secondary education	0.588813
3 : (Upper) secondary education	0.6118349
4 : Post-secondary education	0.6285711
5 : First stage of tertiary education	0.6591561
6 : Second stage of tertiary education	0.6958483
Total	0.6089977

Table 38: **Equality, Income**

income	mean
< 150	0.5488449
150-299	0.5519262
300-499	0.5597947
500-999	0.5745478
1000-1499	0.5992814
1500-1999	0.6208854
2000-2499	0.6395885
2500-2999	0.6563554
3000-4999	0.6829362
5000-7499	0.6936918
7500-9999	0.6858234
> 10000	0.6818379
Total	0.6096045

Table 39: **Equality, Employment**

employment	mean
yes	0.6339712
no	0.5805564
Total	0.6088093

Table 40: **Equality, Occupation**

occupation	mean
I :Higher Controllers	0.6456455
II :Lower Controllers	0.6505215
IIIa:Routine Nonmanual	0.6405889
IIIb:Lower Sales-Service	0.6234969
IVa:Selfempl with employees	0.5890569
IVb:Selfempl no employees	0.5806765
V :Manual Supervisors	0.5990864
VI :Skilled Worker	0.5758722
VIIa:Unskilled Worker	0.5776374
VIIb:Farm Labor	0.5435359
IVc:Selfempl Farmer	0.5266428
Total	0.6110733

Table 41: **Equality, social trust**

social trust	mean
most people can be trusted	0.6438663
cannot be too careful	0.5923794
Total	0.6093145

Table 42: **Equality, Urbanisation**

urbanisation	mean
under 2000	0.5780991
2-5000	0.5983607
5-10000	0.6140737
10-20000	0.6149932
20-50000	0.6219745
50-100000	0.6292683
100-500000	0.6161525
500000 and more	0.6269515
Total	0.6095575

Table 43: **Equality, important for children to learn obedience**

obedience	mean
not mentioned	0.6194864
mentioned	0.5844554
Total	0.6095933

Table 44: **Equality, important for children to learn tolerance**

children tolerance	mean
not mentioned	0.5736581
mentioned	0.6231634
Total	0.6095339

Table 45: **Equality, marital status**

marital status	mean
married	0.5975064
registered partnership	0.6530454
widowed	0.5515594
divorced	0.6319701
separated	0.6326545
never married or reg. partnership	0.6447033
Total	0.6085349

Table 46: **Equality, Gender**

gender	mean
male	0.5926312
female	0.621667
Total	0.608938

Table 47: **Equality, duration of democratic rule**

democracy duration	mean
1st quartile	0.567946
2nd quartile	0.6270255
3rd quartile	0.6229282
4th quartile	0.5981698
Total	0.6089569

Table 48: **Equality, duration of EU membership**

EU age	mean
1	0.5614066
4	0.5671299
13	0.6816368
22	0.6127427
27	0.5339149
35	0.6549279
56	0.6498256
Total	0.6089569

Table 49: **Equality, GDP**

GDP	mean
1st quartile	0.5625596
2nd quartile	0.570044
3rd quartile	0.6355583
4th quartile	0.6645154
Total	0.6089569

Table 50: **Equality, HDI**

HDI	mean
1st quartile	0.5602992
2nd quartile	0.5730662
3rd quartile	0.61419
4th quartile	0.6701343
Total	0.6089569

Table 51: **Equality, GGI**

GGI	mean
1st quartile	0.568274
2nd quartile	0.5842334
3rd quartile	0.6258536
4th quartile	0.6607229
Total	0.6117135

Table 52: **Equality, GINI**

GINI	mean
1st quartile	0.6256113
2nd quartile	0.6409407
3rd quartile	0.582464
4th quartile	0.5935587
Total	0.6117135

Table 53: **Equality, net migration**

net migration	mean
1st quartile	0.5943572
2nd quartile	0.5889118
3rd quartile	0.6329392
4th quartile	0.6181336
Total	0.6089569

Table 54: **Equality, unemployment rate**

unemployment rate	mean
1st quartile	0.580193
2nd quartile	0.592026
3rd quartile	0.5986154
4th quartile	0.6573633
Total	0.6089569

Table 55: **Equality, relationship status**

relationship status	mean
no relationship	0.6056304
in relationship	0.6060935
Total	0.6059486

Table 56: **Equality, number of children**

nr of children	mean
0	0.6409677
1	0.6114701
2	0.5999569
3	0.5872498
4	0.5711645
5	0.5561163
6	0.5497035
7	0.519366
8	0.5146753
9	0.5543553
10 or more	0.5057375
Total	0.6089044

Table 57: **Equality, employment rate of women**

employment rate women	mean
36.9-	0.5539465
55-	0.6061975
60-	0.6091198
65.2-	0.6588083
Total	0.6089569

Table 58: **Equality, communist legacy**

communist legacy	mean
no communist legacy	0.6274955
communist legacy	0.5872265
Total	0.6089569

Abstracts

7.1 English

This thesis looks at how value differences between citizens of member states of the European Union can be explained and what role the Union plays in shaping these values. The process of European integration has paved the way for the European Union to not only be an economic and political union, but also a "community of values" which actively promotes certain values that its members have devised and subsequently adhere to. Two of these values - *tolerance and non-discrimination* as well as *equality between men and women* - are analysed in this thesis due to scientific debates on how these values can be explained and also since in recent times these values have entered the public discourse. Knowing what factors impact value orientations is therefore critical.

In order to explain these values, two theories have been drawn upon: Modernisation theories, that argue that the more affluent individuals and societies become, the more they will develop postmaterialistic ideals which emphasise tolerant attitudes and valuing equality; and institutionalist theories which see and interplay between institutionally embedded values that both impact societies and individuals as well as being impacted by those actors. Both theories distinguish between individuals (micro-level) and societies/countries (macro-level).

Derived from these theories five hypotheses are set up which stipulate that the longer stable democratic institutions in countries prevail, more affluent individuals, and more affluent countries lead to more emphasis on tolerance and equality. The other two hypotheses are that variance over these values is higher within countries than between countries and that macro-level variables help to explain this variance.

Results from quantitative multi-level analyses are mixed. Evidence is found that support the first two hypotheses. Furthermore, while more affluent individuals do value tolerance and equality more, the more affluence there is on the country-level does not necessarily explain value orientations when controlling for other factors. However, macro-level factors were able to explain additional variance and should therefore not be neglected. The most interesting finding is that the impact of European integration on positively shaping these values cannot be denied which can have severe ramifications in promoting these values among members - and possible future members.

7.2 German

Diese Masterarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie Werteunterschiede zwischen Bürgern und Bürgerinnen von Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union erklärt werden können und welche Rolle die Union bei der Gestaltung dieser Werte hat. Der Prozess der europäischen Integration hat den Weg dafür bereitet, dass die Europäische Union nicht nur eine ökonomische und politische Union, sondern eine "Gemeinschaft der Werte" ist, welche aktiv bestimmte Werte fördert, die ihre Mitglieder entworfen haben und nachfolgend einhalten. Zwei dieser Werte - *Toleranz und Nicht-Diskriminierung* sowie *Gleichheit zwischen Mann und Frau* werden in dieser Masterarbeit aufgrund wissenschaftlicher Debatten darüber, wie diese Werte erklärt werden können und auch, da in jüngster Zeit diese Werte den öffentlich Diskurs erreicht haben, analysiert. Zu wissen, welche Faktoren Werteorientierungen beeinflussen ist daher entscheidend.

Um diese Werte zu erklären, wurden zwei Theorien herangezogen: Modernisierungstheorien, welche argumentieren, dass je wohlhabender Individuen und Gesellschaften werden, desto mehr werden diese postmaterielle Ideale entwickeln, die tolerante Einstellungen und Gleichheit betonen; und institutionelle Theorien, die eine Wechselwirkung zwischen institutionalisiert eingebetteten Werten, die sowohl Gesellschaften und Individuen beeinflussen, wie sie auch von diesen Akteuren beeinflusst werden. Beide Theorien unterscheiden zwischen Individuen (Microlevel) und Gesellschaften/Staaten (Macrolevel).

Ausgehend von diesen Theorien wurden fünf Hypothesen aufgestellt, welche aussagen, dass je länger stabile demokratische Institutionen in Staaten vorherrschen, je wohlhabender Individuen, und je wohlhabender Staaten sind, dies zu einer größeren Betonung auf Toleranz und Gleichheit führt. Die anderen beiden Hypothesen sind, dass die Varianz bezüglich dieser Werte innerhalb von Staaten höher ist, als zwischen Staaten, und dass Macrolevel-Variablen helfen, um diese Varianz zu erklären.

Die Ergebnisse der quantitativen Multi-Level-Analysen sind gemischt. Die ersten beiden Hypothesen erfahren Zuspruch. Des Weiteren findet sich, dass während wohlhabendere Individuen Toleranz und Gleichheit mehr schätzen, diese Assoziation auf der Macro-Ebene nicht unbedingt Werteorientierung erklärt wenn für andere Faktoren kontrolliert wird. Dennoch, Macro-Level-Faktoren konnten zusätzliche Varianz erklären und sollten daher nicht vernachlässigt werden. Die interessanteste Erkenntnis ist, dass der Einfluss der

europäischen Integration, diese Werte positiv zu fördern nicht negiert werden kann, was deutliche Auswirkung darauf haben könnte, diese Werte unter den EU-Mitgliedstaaten - und möglichen zukünftigen Mitgliedsstaaten - zu fördern.