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„The International Security Field after 9/11.
A Sociological Approach to International Relations "

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to answer the question of how the international security field changed after 9/11 from an international political sociology perspective. To do so, I first apply the Strategic Actions Field (SAF) theory (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011) on the international security field. Secondly I use the method of content analysis based on the Declaration of War on Terror as a reference to test the discursive changes of nine states before and after 9/11. In addition, and in order to test the mechanisms of change of the subfield of the fight against international terrorism, I carry out this analysis for the case of NATO.

The results of this research show that the shock of 9/11 affected the field on state level in a generalized way, therefore confirming that field theory – and in particular the SAF theory – are a useful theoretical framework to understand the developments in international security. Moreover, the results show that the 9/11 shock affected the discourse of NATO member states in a stronger way than it did to other states. Furthermore, the results indicate no correlation between being P5 member state and having stronger discursive coincidences with the Declaration of War on Terror. Also, the results suggest that the dominance of states in the subfield dedicated to the fight against international terrorism influenced the impact that the exogenous shock of 9/11 had on other state- and non-state actors. Lastly, this primary position appears to have influenced the expansion of the new imperative order within the international terrorism field as well as in the wide international security field.

Das Ziel dieser Thesis ist es die Auswirkungen der Anschläge des 11. Septembers auf dem internationalen Sicherheitsfeld aus soziologischer Sicht zu analysieren. Dazu wende ich zuerst die so genannte „Strategic Action Field (SAF)" Theorie (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011) auf den Bereich der internationalen Sicherheit an. Danach führe ich eine Inhaltsanalyse der Deklaration des Kriegs gegen den Terror durch, um diskursive Veränderungen in den Aussagen von neun Staaten bevor und nach dem 11. September zu analysieren. Zusätzlich beobachte ich die Reaktionen von Neben- oder Unterbereiche der internationalen Sicherheit auf den Kampf gegen internationalen Terror am Beispiel der NATO.

Die Resultate dieser Analysen zeigen, dass der 11. September das internationale Sicherheitsfeld aus staatlicher Ebene stark beeinflusst hat und dies mittels der SAF-Theorie sehr gut nachweisbar ist. Außerdem zeigt die Analyse, dass obwohl vor allem NATO-Mitglieder stärker betroffen waren als andere Staaten, der Diskurs der Allianz keine Starke Korrelationen mit der Deklaration des Kriegs gegen den Terror aufzeigen. Des Weiteren, wird die privilegierte Position von Staaten innerhalb des Sicherheitsfelds durch ihren Einfluss auf andere staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure reflektiert.

1. Introduction

The terms "war on terror" or "war against terrorism" are used to describe the international al campaign on fighting terrorism led by the Bush administration after the attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11). The measures taken after the US president declared a global war on terror included "military operations, new security legislation (and) efforts to block the financing of terrorism", among others (GPF). [1] The reactions to these attacks in the field of international security theory were, however, limited. Cronin (2006), for example, notes: "the tendency has been to fall back on established bureaucratic mind-sets and prevailing theoretical paradigms that have little relevance for the changes in international security that became obvious after the terrorist attacks" (Cronin, 2006). This theoretical uncertainty for understanding the changes in international security and the nature of International Relations (IR) as a discipline has opened the debate about the role and content of IR theory and the most appropriate theoretical framework to study these fields (Lawson, 2006; Wiener & Schrire, 2009). In order to enlighten this debate, researchers have taken notice of Sociology's contributions to "highlight the importance of socially constructed norms and social structures in the study and practice of world politics", which has ultimately led to a "sociological turn in IR" (Lawson, 2006).

Following this line of thought and based on the disciplines of International Relations and Historical Institutionalism, I approach the question of the consequences that 9/11 had on international security from an international political sociology perspective with the following research question: **How did the international security field change after 9/11?**

For answering it I first formulate an application of the Strategic Action Fields Theory[2] of Fligstein and McAdam (2011) on international security. I then use this application to compare the discursive changes of relevant actors of the international security field before and after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which I see as triggering mechanism of change in the international security field. In particular, I analyze the discourses of four of the permanent members[3] of the Security Council of the United Nations as well as the discourse of five non-permanent members[4] with different political, geographical and cultural backgrounds in order to find out how their discourses and therefore the core principles of the international security field changed after 9/11. In addition and due to the multi-layered nature of this field, I also take documents of the North Atlantic

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[1] See Record (2003) for an interesting discussion on the incomplete characterization of the "war on terrorism" as a war.

[2] Hereafter SAF theory.

[3] United States of America, China, United Kingdom and Russia.

[4] Australia, Spain, Ireland, Georgia and Finland.

Treaty Organization (NATO) into my sample in order to determine how the 9/11 shock affected different subfields. My base for this comparison is the language of George Bush's Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress of the US on September 20th after the attacks[5].

By assuming that the events of September 11 were a shock that triggered a spillover effect within the international security field, I implicitly assume that "international security" can be regarded as a field from a sociological point of view. Thus, justifying this assumption and defining the range of this field represent two central objectives of the thesis in order to answer the research question. For this purpose, the definition of field that I use is the one made by Kornprobst and Senn (2016), who take into consideration the traditional concept of field (Bourdieu, 1969) and define the social field as a "semi-autonomous social space" (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016). Another reason for using this definition of social field is because it takes into consideration the factors that could produce changes in security communities by seeing the social fields as a "space in which actors contest, decontest and reproduce background ideas through their foreground communication" (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016). Furthermore, this definition is that it helps to understand the "layers" of fields with the notions of "nomos" and "topoi": While the first stands for an ordering imperative in form of a deep background and serves as the foundation of order (principles) in a social field, the second one is "constituted by (…) rhetorical commonplaces round which communities of actors coalesce", which are "more frequently contested than the nomos" (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016). Therefore, in my research I am presupposing not only that the international security field exists but also that this field is characterized by its semi-autonomy and its adaptability to new principles that can lead to the creation of new patters within the field.

Having in mind these assumptions as well as the need to test them, the thesis is divided into a theoretical and an analytical part. The theoretical part starts with an introductory literature review chapter. In this chapter I define the general characteristics of field theory by looking into the impact and applications that this theory has had in sociology, putting a special emphasis on the SAF theory (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). Sections 2.4 and 2.5 are dedicated to macro-methodological considerations to show why content analysis is the most suitable method for approaching my research. In the third chapter I present my theoretical application of the SAF theory on International Security Field. After explaining the causes, mechanisms and consequences of this application, I present my research design within an empirical framework in which I draw the characteristics of the research design of the case study. In chapter 5 I present the content analysis

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[5] Henceforth "Address to the Congress" or "Declaration of War on Terror"

results first by subdividing the sample into groups. Finally, I use the conclusion chapter to summarize these results from a more general perspective and demonstrate how the changes in the international security field after 9/11 can be explained within the framework of field theory.

2. Literature review

2.1 Introduction to Field Theory

"The tension between individual level and social level understandings" (Martin, 2003) can be seen as one of the main debates in sociological theory. This tension is reflected in the association of field theory with the resolution of theoretical dualism that creates the notion of "imaginary opponents" (Martin, 2003) of the terms. Having this in mind, Martin (2003) argues that field theory can overcome this tension as it "has the potential to yield general but non-trivial insights into questions rightly deemed theoretical, and to organize research in a productive fashion" and also "allows for a rigorous reflexivity which is necessary in all cases in which sociology attempts large scale political and institutional analyses" (Martin, 2003). To make his argument, Martin (2003) starts pointing out that field theory finds it origins in the physical sciences and names motion induced by gravity, electricity, or magnetism as examples. Further, he uses the characteristics of classical electro- magnetism to number the characteristics of field theory from a physical science perspective and applies them on social sciences. What is particularly interesting in his explanation is how these characteristics are comparable to the habit of using linking variables to determine causality in social sciences (Martin, 2003).

In this sense, he explains that, the same way "massless bodies remain unaffected by a gravitational field (...), there is no field known to physics that affects all particles; similarly, the mere existence of some class of persons who are not susceptible to a social field effect does not disprove the claims regarding the existence of the field" (Martin, 2003). Thus, seeing the field as a force makes it possible to explain how an element (or a variable in social sciences) might indirectly "cause" an effect on another variable (through the field) without "affecting" the other variable (Martin, 2003). This logic results useful to understand the nature of fields, whose existence can only be proved by their effects (Rummel, 1975). Lastly, Martin (2003) argues that the field "serves as some sort of representation for those overarching social regularities that may also be visualized (...) as quasi-organisms, systems, or structures" (Martin, 2003).

2.2 Bourdieu's Field Theory

Bourdieu sees the field as a "social typology within a social space" (Bourdieu, 1985) in

his application of field theory in a sociological context. However, this typology may also be sub-divided into other domains or dimensions (Bourdieu, 1985; Martin, 2003), giving the field a certain degree of autonomy (Bourdieu, 1969). Pouliot (2008) very accurately identifies three main dimensions that – following Bourdieu – help understand the structure of a field, namely: "relations of power, objects of struggle, and taken-for granted rules" (Pouliot, 2008; Bourdieu, 1980). The first dimension implies that, due to historically constructed economic, social and symbolic capitals, power is unequally distributed, determining the (dominating or dominated) positions of actors in a field (Pouliot, 2008).

The second dimension "objects of struggle" refers to the relative autonomy of fields. With their autonomy, fields develop their own "Eigengesetzlichkeit" that can be described as a "specific legality" (Hilgers & Mangez, 2014). Pouliot (2008) links this autonomy to the fact that fields are "characterized by certain struggles that have been socially and historically constituted" Pouliot, 2008). This normative orientation serves as a reference point and determines the position and (to some extent) the behavior of the actors within the field. Nevertheless, while external events are still important for the actors in the field, "they do need to be translated to the internal logic of the field" (Swartz, 1997).

This brings us to the third dimension. Taken-for-granted rules, which covers "all that is accepted as obvious, in particular the classifying schemes which determine what deserves attention and what does not" (Bourdieu, 1980). Hence, the predictable but at the same time dynamic structure of the field allows actors to operate coherently in the social space (Bourdieu, 1985). Thus, the behavior and dispositions of an individual actor is affected not only by the field, but also by the expectations about the dispositions and behavior of other actors (Martin, 2003; Pouliot, 2008). Here, the relevance of "habitus" - a core concept of Bourdieu's sociology - is particularly noteworthy as it determines coordination in the field. Though its linkage to a field position, the habitus[6] acts as a "cultural unconscious matrix of dispositions that serves to affectively organize perceptions" (Bourdieu 1969; Martin, 2003). This "practical sense" that results from the interplay of field and habitus, or in Pouliot's words "the intersection of embodied dispositions and structured positions" is reason why agents have skills to identify certain practices with their common sense (Pouliot, 2008) and "what allows one to behave appropriately without posing or executing a 'should'" (Bourdieu, 1997). This identification is only feasible if actors "have embodied specific dispositions (habitus) in the past and face a social context (field) that triggers them" (Pouliot, 2008). This way, the notion of practical sense helps explain first, what makes

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[6] This is also reinforced by institutions that constitute collective thought for example in form of language or art (Bourdieu, 1977).

people behave accordingly in certain situations and secondly, why, while embodied at the subjective level, the habitus is comprised by intersubjective dispositions, explaining why in Bourdieu's eyes social action "is neither structural nor agentic, but relational" (Pouliot, 2008).

All in all, by taking away the traditional focus on norms and interests, looking instead into their reason and nature, Bordieu's field theory can clearly be considered as an innovation in terms of analyzing IR (Leander, 2011). Nevertheless and while his findings had an important impact in sociology, Bourdieu's field theory has also been criticized. Hilgers and Mangez (2014) argue that Bourdieu's field theory should be seen as a regional theory as it is built up from local history. This means that its usefulness is limited to societies "where a relatively strong state guarantees the existence of a unified market in cultural and economic capital and has the power to preserve certain domains" (Hilgers and Mangez, 2014).

On the other hand, Leander (2011) postulates that „the promise of Bourdieuian thinking" cannot be fulfilled due to the "rigidities and fixities entailed by the structuralism oft he approach" (see also Kornprobst, 2010; Seabrooke and Tsingou, 2009). In particular, she identifies different "debates" from which she draws some of the key objections that arise with Bourdieu's field theory from a pragmatic point of view. Consequently, she comments on the minimalism of "thinking in terms of fields" in IR and finds that this perspective is affected by a lack of fluidity and complexity, not taking instability of world politics into consideration (Leander, 2011). Also, looking at the understanding of actors and agency and IR, she looks at the habitus and concludes that, from a pragmatic perspective, it falls short to estimate the capacities of agents, as their behavior may be influenced by feelings, talents and their personalities (Leander, 2011).

Concerning Hilgers and Mangez's opinion on the restricted nature of field theory to regional levels and its inconsistency with its applicability in the international system, I argue that this contradiction may be overcome by claiming that globalization trends have expanded the concept of regionalism to the international level. This assumption would therefore allow the application of Bourdieu's field concept to contemporary societies that, while organized in states with own sovereignty and powers, are part of a global market.

It is however Leander's pragmatic opinion and her improvement suggestions what I will use as a transition to the next sub-chapter. In order to solve the problematic of rigidness in Bourdieu's field theory, she calls for recognizing and highlight the dynamism of fields. In the case of the habitus and its limited power to explain agent's conduct, Leander (2011) bets for recognizing the centrality of ethnographic aspects for the concept (Leander, 2011).

In conclusion, the presented problems show how the main features that appear to solve

the difficulties of Bourdieu's sociology could be to present it "so that we highlight the extent to which answers to the problems raised already are inherent in our approach" (Leander, 2011). Secondly, further developments of this theory should be encouraged, so that the structural minimalism can be overcome. Unsurprisingly and as it should become clear in the frame of this thesis, I argue that the Strategic Action Fields Theory solves at least some of the problems mentioned above as it represents a contemporary and more open way to look at field theory.

2.3 Strategic Action Fields Theory

Fligstein and McAdam (2011) disagree with the common view of a typological separation of social movements from organizations and advocate for congruence to study both phenomena as one. This unification of institutional actors in modern society is, as they argue, possible because of "collective strategic action" as a common underplaying phenomenon for them. Accordingly, they present a "general theory of social change and stability" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011) under the assumption that social life is dominated by "meso-level social orders" or "strategic action fields". The explanation of Fligstein and McAdam's (2011) theory starts with an introduction of the key components of the theory, which are then used to "generate propositions about the dynamics of field emergence, stability and change" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). The key components of the Strategic Action Fields theory (or SAF theory) are the following:

1. Strategic action fields
2. Incumbents, challengers, and governance units
3. Social skill,
4. The broader field environment
5. Exogenous shocks, field ruptures, and the onset of contention
6. Episodes of contention
7. (Institutional) settlement

(Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

The first element is about the nature of *Strategic action fields*, which represent the "fundamental units of collective action in society" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). Similarly to general field theory in physical sciences, these fields are characterized by the interactions of individual and collective actors, who share common understandings about the field, its rules and the other actors in it. Another feature that these fields share with the latter theory is the subdivision of fields, that in this case takes place through collective actors. In line with Bourdieu's "Eigengesetzlichkeit", Fligstein and McAdam (2011) also argue that consensus among actors is built in a field, creating a shared understanding of the rules of the field. This then allows actors to understand their positions, interpret and react to other's actions. For this reason, they further argue that

actors can improve their positions and change the nature of the field. This happens because "cri-
ses (can) undermine existing relationships and meanings, (so that) the order becomes reestab-
lished with a new set of relationships and groups" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). Therefore, the
authors see the field as a continuum challenged by such crises that can trigger the establishment
of new orders (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

The second element of SAF theory looks into the composition of fields. Here, the authors
(based on Gamson, 1975) distinguish between *incumbents, challengers and governance units*.
Here, incumbents have a privileged position in the field as their "disproportionate influence
within a field tends(s) to be heavily reflected on the organization of the SAF" (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2011). Contrarily, challengers do not enjoy privileges nor influence over the operation
of the field. While they usually accept the prevailing order, challengers can imagine alternative
visions of the field in which they occupy other positions. Nevertheless, these incumbents and
challengers do not exist separately but also even form coalitions (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).
Also, SAFs can have not only external state structures with jurisdiction over specific aspects of
the fields but also internal *governance units* whose function is to administer and control the
compliance with field rules (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

Social skill, the third element of SAF theory, may be defined as "how individuals or col-
lective actors possess a highly developed cognitive capacity for reading people and environ-
ments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people in the service of these action 'frames'"
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Fligstein, 2001; Jasper, 2008; Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford,
1988). The inherent consensus involved carried by this concept reminds again of Bourdieu's
field theory, in which the habitus, just like the social skill, creates a framework that determines
identities (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). However, Fligstein and McAdam (2011) emphasize the
fact that "social skill is the idea that people want to produce collective action by engaging oth-
ers" and that "this set of skills is distributed (...) across the population" (Fligstein & McAdam,
2011), making people act strategically, determining the status quo with their power (Fligstein &
McAdam, 2011).

Next, the authors proceed to introduce three distinctions in order to characterize the
broader field environment (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). These distinctions are distance (1), hi-
erarchy (2) and nature (3). First, while the actions in proximate fields have regular effects on
SAFs, distant fields do no exert any influence on them. Secondly, if fields show a vertical hierar-
chy, there will be a relation of subordination between the fields and one will exert relatively
more authority. On the other hand, in horizontal hierarchies, the fields will "mutually depend

upon each other" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

Finally fields may be classified as state or non-state fields. In this context, state actors have "the formal authority to intervene in, set rules for, and generally pronounce on the legitimacy and viability of most non-state fields" granting them "considerable and generally unrivaled potential to impact the stability of most SAFs" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). This is relevant when regarding that the relations between fields and especially the conflicts between them, can change their nature (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). Furthermore*, as a consequence of the interdependence of fields, changes in form of *exogenous shocks* or *field ruptures* in a field can destabilize other (proximate) fields[7]. As the privileged position of incumbents and the support of allies usually stabilize the field, crises rarely emerge and the destabilizing change "unfolds through a process that speaks to the capacity for social construction and strategic agency" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). Further, the *onset of contention* is defined as a "highly contingent outcome of an ongoing process of interaction involving at least one incumbent and one challenger" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). This process is shaped by three mechanisms: (1) "the collective construction/attribution of threat to, or opportunity for, the realization of group interests", (2) "organizational appropriation" and (3) "innovative action" against the violation of field rules (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

Moreover, the next elements of SAF theory are *episodes of contention*. These periods are characterized by "emergent, sustained contentious interaction between... (field) actors utilizing new and innovative forms of action vis-à-vis one another" (McAdam, 2007), depending the duration of these episodes on the perceived and shared sense of uncertainty of the organizational aspects of the field (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

Finally, *(institutional) settlement* is the generalization of (new) rules and cultural norms of a field after a crisis (Davis et al., 2005, Schneiberg & Soule, 2005). In such cases, stability may not only come from state actors but also from proximate fields, as they may offer alternative ideas and practices, creating "spillover" (Meyer & Whittier, 1994) effects in other fields.

2.4. Content Analysis: An introduction

In the first part of this section I define and explain the main characteristics of content analysis, as well as the reasons for using it in my research. Afterwards, I offer an overview of the

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[7] As it will become evident in case study 1, exogenous shocks are especially relevant in the case study of the fight against international terrorism as they have the power not only to "destabilize specific fields, but the entire national/state structure in which the fields are embedded" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Dobbin, 1994), which can ultimately lead to regime crises and the structuring of a new political order (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

methodological precedents of how it has been applied in IR and more interestingly, in the context of the international security field.[8] This should serve as a mean to deepen in additional literature and as an additional argument for using content analysis in my research. Based on this information I then present my research design.

"Content analysis seeks to analyze data within a specific context in view of the meanings someone – a group or a culture – attributes to them" (Krippendorff, 1989). This method enables to study the consequences that communicative circumstances have for "their senders, their receivers, and the institutions in which their exchange is embedded" (Krippendorff, 1989). While content analysis is often equated or even mixed up with the method of discourse analysis due to their similarities, the main difference between both is that, while the first one is the analysis of what has already been stated in a written form, discourse analysis is characterized by taking into consideration the mimic and gestures of the act of communication (Starks & Trinidad, 2007). In this sense, Neumann (2008) advocates for studying the implications of the phenomena one is interested in by accessing discourses from different perspectives (Neumann, 2008). Here, content analysis allows creating different perspectives since it allows to "(revealing) cultural trends, patterns, and differences no longer obvious to the untrained individual" (Krippendorff, 1989). Applied to the research topic of this thesis, this means that while the statements of the most obvious actors in (international) politics such as professional politicians, institutions and governments have been widely studied; the recipients of political communication have often been overlooked (Van Dijk, 1997). Hence, a different perspective in Neumann's sense would mean to study the discourse of *the people* more closely, giving it a more prominent role in political discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 1997).[9]

The types of documents that are used as samples in content analysis can range from public verbal discourses to visual representations, nevertheless other documents - such as disarmament negotiations - and in fact "anything that occurs in sufficient numbers and has reasonably stable meanings for a specific group of people may be subjected to content analysis" (Krippendorff, 1989).

According to Krippendorff (1989) content analysis comprises involves six steps (design, unitizing, sampling, coding, drawing inferences and validation). While the first descriptive phases are relatively intuitive, in content analysis drawing inferences represents the most important step, as „it applies the stable knowledge about how the variable accounts of coded date ate relat-

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[8] Based on Kornprobst and Senn (2016).

[9] In section 5.3 I provide definition of *the people* that illustrates the importance of this perspective in the selection of the documents for the sample of the case studies.

ed tot he phenomena" (Krippendorff, 1989). This means that it is essential to establish "how the frequency of references indicates the attention a source pays to what it refers to, which distinct literary style uniquely identifies a particular author, and the way preferences for certain verbal attributions manifest (…) attitudes (Krippendorff, 1989).

Finally, validation also poses a challenge in content analysis, as the very aim of content analysis is to "infer what cannot be observed directly and for which validating evidence is not readily available" (Krippendorff, 1989).

Apart from the well-known inconveniences in reliability and relevance that human and computer coding pose, the method of content analysis has further limitations. The first one is that the analysis of communications is opposed to the value of statistically significant findings (Krippendorff, 1989). Also, the replicability of the analysis is questioned, since political communication be and have very ambiguous interpretations, especially if content analysis is done using a computer.

2.5. Field Theory and Content Analysis in International Security

Some of the most well-know examples of the use of content analysis for understanding political developments are the speeches of the soviet Politburo that helped find out its structure on Joseph Stalin's birthday and the speeches of Joseph Goebbels, from which military intelligence information was decrypted (Krippendorff, 1989).

Another more contemporary example is offered by Kornprobst and Senn's (2016) research to test their rhetorical field theory. An interesting feature of this theory is the notion of different layers of backgrounds that help explain the likelihood with which principles may be affected by change: The deep background (nomos) comprises the "core principles" of a field, which serve as the foundation of order (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016), while the less profound background (topoi) is comprised of "rhetorical commonplace around which communities of actors coalesce in the fields" (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016), while and has a higher vulnerability in terms of likelihood to be contested.

Thus, Kornprobst and Senn (2016) identify four causes that may generate nomic change (destabilization, adaptation, disorientation, and shift) with which they analyze nomic change in the nuclear weapons field. According to the authors, this subfield of the "larger security field" enjoyed a stable nomos marked by the imperative of the destructiveness of such weaponry throughout decades (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016), leading to the development of an epistemic ordering principle based on the scientific knowledge about nuclear weapons and the two ontological principles based on the role of the state as the object to be protected and the principal agent in

the field respectively (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016). The authors further support this argument reviewing and allocating international developments – such as Treaties and Conventions – to the changes of the above-mentioned principles of the nuclear weapons field. For example they state: "the 1996 Canberra Report highlights the 'intolerable threat to all humanity' posed by nuclear weapon and calls for their abolition (replacing) the deterrence logic with an humanitarian logic" (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016). Based on this, the authors postulate that at that point state security divested its importance to human security as the "ultimative benchmark for making judgments in the (nuclear weapons) field" (Canberra Commission, 1996; Kornprobst & Senn, 2016).

This example illustrates the methodological value of taking into consideration actual language used in legal documents that play a part in the development of the nuclear weapons and hence, the international security field. Consequently, I see these arguments and the use of discourse developments as an empiric milestone to assess the changes that the international security field has undergone since 9/11.

3. Application of the Strategic Action Fields Theory on International Security

This chapter is divided into two parts: The first part is dedicated to the theoretical framework that I use for the application of the SAF theory on international security. The second part of the chapter constitutes the empirical framework. I use this framework to describe the micro-methodological considerations – population, sample and coding – of the research model that I use in my application.

3.1 Theoretical framework

This section shows how the SAF theory can be applied on the International Security Field from a theoretical point of view. This creates a theoretical framework, which allows drawing conclusions from the analyzed case study. After a general introduction of its main ideas, I examine the causes that led to the changes within the international security field after 9/11. Next, I focus on the mechanisms of change that led to these alterations in section 3.1.2. These mechanisms should be seen as the central element of the application of the theory. Finally, I present the consequences that 9/11 produced on the international security field.

Starting from the point that international security may be considered as a subfield within the field of IR discipline (Kornprobst & Senn, 2016), and applying this to Fligstein and McAdam's SAF theory (2011), I consider the attacks of 9/11 as an *exogenous shock* to the inter-

national security field that changed the imperative order in this field. Specifically, these kinds of disturbing events "(do not only tend) to destabilize specific fields, but the entire national/state structure in which the fields are embedded" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Dobbin 1994).

While the origin of these kinds of crisis can be another state's threat or declaration of war, macro-economic crises can act as destabilizing factors with other fields (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). Thus, with an increasing number of fields affected by the crisis, the unstable the state will be. Nevertheless, such deep crises may also serve as "opportunities for collective action to transform the entire system" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011). Moreover, Fligstein and McAdam (2011) argue that "by destroying any semblance of a political status quo, regime crises encourage innovative strategic action by all groups sufficiently organized to contest the structuring of a new political order" Fligstein & McAdam, 2011).

Having this in mind, my working theory is that the attacks of 9/11 pushed the international security field into a crisis. This affecting not only the US and other countries that engaged in the war on terror, but also the non- state (nested) fields related to war and security. Thus, I argue that while 9/11 destabilized the international security field – which had been a more or less stable since the end of the Cold War –, the attacks also offered an opportunity to reinvent the international system by facilitating the development of a new consensus in the international system. This new consensus was only possible thanks to a new common understanding of the states in favor of preventing new similar shocks through enhanced international cooperation. Thus, I argue that after leading to a crisis in the international terrorism field, the measures taken to avoid new shocks changed not only this field but also related ones.

3.1.1 Causes

While Fligstein and McAdam's (2011) SAF theory focuses on evolutionary changes, I identify the shock of 9/11 as the cause for changes in the international security field in my application of the SAF theory. This does however not limit the range of more evolutionary transformations within fields, as I argue that the international security field – in which other subfields are embodied – can be affected by the same exogenous shock both in a sudden and in a more progressive way at the same time. Moreover, I believe that the capacity of the field to confront and accept shocks can affect the structure of it, as the different subfields can be more or less affected by determined exogenous shocks, depending on the actors that occupy it. Thus, I claim that the

impact of 9/11 first affected the subfield of (the fight against) international terrorism[10] – which is dominated by states[11][12] – and only then affected the wider international security field as well as other related subfields[13]. These features of the international security field are essential to understand how the very nature of the field allowed 9/11 to trigger changes within its status quo.

3.1.2 Mechanisms of change

Looking at the mechanisms of change within the international security field, I formulate the following assumptions: First, I presume that due to the fact that the attacks of 9/11 were against a state and because states dominate the subfield of international terrorism, states were the first (and most) actors to get affected by the 9/11 shock. Additionally, I consider the possibility that the role of the US as a global power may have speeded up the impact of the insurgents' message in the international security field by mobilizing states with the Declaration of War on Terror.[14] In this line of thought, the emphasis that the subfield of international terrorism introduced into the international security field changed the imperative order (and discourse) of the field. In addition this new idea was spread though the Declaration of War on Terror, which at the same time was as a reaction to the insurgents' provocation. Therefore, the shock of 9/11 created a new shared understanding within the states of the international security field and influenced the field though the power exerted not only by the insurgents, but also by the US.

For these reasons, I suggest that this spin-off effect of the post-9/11 discourse on international terrorism stretched from the US to all the states in the international terrorism field, regardless of their relationship to the US. Based on the assumption that both the international security field is dominated by states, I believe that the diffusion of the new imperative followed a hierarchical order in which non-state actors occupy lower positions than states and international organizations within the subfield of international terrorism.[15] As figure 1 shows, this means that the impact that the 9/11 shock had on the actors of the international terrorism field faded with growing distance between states and other actors. While this impact still affected international organizations and alliances like NATO, due to the influence that states exert on them, I argue that the

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[10] Henceforth "subfield of international terrorism".
[11] This assumption relies on the fact that traditionally, the phenomenon of terrorism has been analyzed and fought from a state- centered perspective.
[12] See the state vs. Non-state fields classification in section 2.3.
[13] One of these further subfields could be for example the arms control field.
[14] Within Fligstein and McAdam's (2011) SAF theory, this could be equated to the social skill component.
[15] See figure 1.

intensity with which they were affected was lower. In the same way, I believe that non-state actors had an indirect exposure to 9/11.[16]

Figure 1: Overview mechanisms of change within the International Terrorism Field

Source: Own compilation

3.1.3 Consequences

Following the arguments that I present in the previous section, the consequences from the impact of the 9/11 shock are not restricted to the directly and indirectly affected state- and non-state actors.

On the one hand, the fact that the Declaration of War on Terror originated from a state does, as noted, not mean that only states share and promote its message. It does however mean that these actors are more likely to influence the outcome of the new field order and therefore the consequences that the exogenous shock has on it. Therefore, states – as promoters of the new principles of the field – can especially impact the role of the organizations they are part from within the field. In this particular case, I see NATO as an "instrumentalized" arena that offers its members[17] a window of opportunity for carrying out their objectives through the alliance.[18]

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[16] Throughout this thesis I do not test the intensity of this impact. However, as figure 1 shows, I believe that the shock could reach them though the state actors after the new field order settled and that in return these actors influenced in the international terrorism field.

[17] Especially the US.

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On the other hand, I believe that the consequences related to 9/11 reached beyond the international terrorism field, as the broader field environment allowed the shock to transmit itself to other areas[19] embedded in the international security field.[20]

In conclusion, I defend that the shock that (the shock of) 9/11 had not only change the imperative order in the international terrorism field but also created a new set of rules that eventually affected the wide international security field as a whole in a hierarchical way within the state-actor group and in a more horizontal way considering the relation of state and non-state actors.

3.2 Empirical framework

In this section I explain in detail the CA- model I follow in order to analyze whether changes affected the international security field after 9/11 by looking into discursive communication.

The sample I use is comprised on the one hand, of official governmental communications (strategies), and on the other hand, of other independent organizations, like non-governmental and international organizations and media publications. These three sample-categories follow the logic of Van Dijk (1997), as not only the communicators (governments) but also *the people* is represented in form of groups of civil society[21] and individuals, taking therefore the recipients of governmental communication into account.

Furthermore, I have chosen human coding, as the documents of the sample can be semantically and contextually complex and a computer based CA could overlook contents. It has to be taken into consideration, that while - based on George W. Bush's Address to the Congress - I have defined concrete (obvious) wordings to look for in the documents of the sample, the list was widened during the research when words directly related to the events appeared. These wordings and codes are fitted to each case study[22].

In this design drawing inference will not only be the most important but also the most critical part of the research. While the frequency of key words represents my first priority, I also

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[18] This is tested in the case study (see section 5.2).
[19] Such as the arms control field.
[20] However, I do not regard this influence in my research.
[21] Civil society is constituted by organizations with varying degrees of formality and typically includes associational forms such as trades unions, social movements, virtual networks, campaigns, coalitions, faith groups, direct action groups, peace groups and human rights organizations, operating variously at local, national and global levels (Howell, 2011).
[22] See tables 3 and 4.

take into consideration the style and how these words are positioned in a document, as, for example, dedicating an entire section of a document to an issue may be an indicator for giving this issue a more prominent importance. Nevertheless, I use the levels of priority only as a control variable. Another challenge that has to be taken into consideration is that validation of the results is very difficult, as it would mean asking authors of the documents about their intentions with the wording, which is a criticism point on the model together with the already mentioned difficulties related to reliability and relevance criteria.

3.2.1 Hypothesis and crisis- definition

For examining the role that the fight against international terrorism had in the changes to the international security field after 9/11, I work under the assumption that the exogenous shock of 9/11 did not only affect state fields (such as the field of the US) but also non- state fields. This, I argue, built in the end a new international security field with reinforced international cooperation. Leaving the consequences of reinforced consequences aside, as they shall be examined in the second case study, my first hypothesis is that *the crisis of 9/11 which triggered the war on terror, led to changes in the international security field*

Here, measuring and defining the dependent variable "crisis" is of essential importance. Based on Fligstein and McAdam characteristics of the SAF theory (2011), I define "crisis" as a "destabilizing event with consequences beyond state and interstate structure with the ability to destabilize a regime" (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Dobbin, 1994). In the context of this case study, the first indicators that the attacks of 9/11 triggered such a crisis can be found in the immediate reactions after the attacks, characterized by a worldwide and "unprecedented expression of shock, horror, solidarity and sympathy for the victims and their families" (History channel). 9/11 not only achieved to generate solidarity among people but also among a great number of governments that condemned the attacks, even if they did not belong to the US' traditional friends list.[23] NATO also reacted to the attacks by invoking Article 5[24] of the Washington Treaty for the first time in the history of the organization (NATO), which would ultimately lead to the deployment of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (BBC). Looking at empirical work, the NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) has evidence that after the attacks, the number of countries with anti-terrorist laws increased noticeably (Human Rights Watch).

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[23] Some examples are the Iranian and the Cuban governments (CNN).
[24] See NATO.

3.2.2 Population and Sample

Between 2003 and 2009 thirty-seven allied nations supplied troops to the coalition led by the US in Iraq and an approximate number of sixty states supported it with direct or indirect means (Carney, 2012). Furthermore organizations like the UN and NATO carried out missions in this area under the command of different states.

Therefore, the population of this case study comprises all the actors that directly or indirectly participated or supported the efforts against international terrorism in the region of Iraq. Consequently and in order to have a representative number of relevant actors in my analysis, I classify the actors that I draw for classified using the following categorization: Type of actor (1), NATO membership (2) and support to the US-led coalition (3). Furthermore I subdivide the states of the sample into "P5 States" and "non- P5 States" to reflect the dominance these states have in the UN Security Council[25]. For the selection of the states of the sample I also take into consideration their geographic location and their ties to the US in terms of common language and broad cultural and political ties .[26][27] Regarding the timeframe of the assistance of these actors, I focus on immediate support[28], which I consider support within the first eight years[29] after George Bush's Address to the Congress. On the other hand, these evidences are compared to documents from three years before the attacks. The timeframe for these documents is more constrained than the timeframe from after the attacks in order to avoid taking into consideration discourses from the post-Cold War period.[30]

Having this selection in mind, in the next section, which is divided into "P5- and non-P5 States", I briefly explain the main characteristics listed above for each country together with relevant national facts, and important developments related to the US and the war on terror. In addition, I present my expectations regarding the chosen sample-states discourse. As I only use the US- documents for comparative purposes, I explain the expectations I have with respect to the influence of this discourse on other actors.

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[25] This division is a central part of the analysis, as the membership the permanent states in the Security Council represents, together with the differences in discourse between NATO and non-NATO member states, a core question to test my hypothesis.

[26] See table 1.

[27] Looking at the table it stands out how, while the European continent and in general western cultures are overrepresented, states from other parts of the world like Africa and South America do not appear in the sample. This lack of representation has two main reasons: On the one hand there was a lack of data in states such as Egypt; on the other hand the available White Papers for other states like Ethiopia, Iran and Argentina did not fit in the fixed framework. Furthermore, some documents were only available in their original languages, impeding the discourse analysis in English.

[28] I choose this focus due to the importance of the "trigger effect" that I argue that 9/11 had on the international security field.

[29] Being that the end of the year 2009.

[30] This is the reason why France is the only P5 country which cannot be taken into consideration in the sample: While there is an available White Paper on Defence and National Security for the year 2008, the previous paper was published in 1994.

Table 1: Overview of relevant actors, Case Study

	Actor	NATO Membership (yes/no)	Support to US-led Coalition (yes/no)*	Geographical location	English as official language	Socio-political ties (yes/no)
P5 States	**United States of America (US)**	Yes	Yes	North America	Yes	-
	China (CN)	No	No	East Asia	No	No
	United Kingdom (UK)	Yes	Yes	Western Europe	Yes	Yes
	Russia (RU)	No	No	Eastern Europe/ Northern Asia	No	(Yes)
Non-P5 States	**Australia (AU)**	Yes	Yes	Oceania	Yes	Yes
	Spain (ES)	Yes	Yes	Southwestern Europe	No	Yes
	Ireland (IE)**	No	No	Western Europe	Yes	(Yes)
	Georgia (GE)	No	Yes	Caucasus	No	No
	Finland (FI)**	No	No	Northern Europe	No	No
	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	-	-	-	Yes	Yes

Source: Own compilation

* based on (Carney, 2012).

** neutral countries

3.2.2.a P5 States

As it was the leader of the war on terror and founder of the „coalition of the willing"
(Carney, 2012), I expect the post-9/11 discourse of the **United States** to be strongly based on the
declaration of war on terror. Therefore, I expect a wide use of the (exact) wordings of the Declaration of War on Terror in the *National Security Strategy* of 2002. I also expect the frequency of
this use to be higher than in any other documents from after the attacks.

Based on the consequences of the Application oft he Strategic Actions Fields Theory on
International Security[31], I further expect actors which are in the P5 and NATO or to have very
similar wordings to the ones oft he Declaration of War on Terror with a high frequency of use.

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[31] See section 3.1.3.

On the other hand, I also expect these wordings to appear very often in the neutral countries[32], which are whether members of the P5 and NATO, nor supported the US-led coalition in Iraq.

Since its shift to a more open market-based economy in the late 1970's, the **People's Republic of China**[33] has become the second largest economy in the world (World Bank Group, 2017). In spite of having one of the greatest growth rates in the world, its developing country situation makes it a very interesting case for the sample. Regarding its involvement in the war on terror, in spite of being one of the P5 member states and "offering China's cooperation in the worldwide counter-terrorism struggle" (Scobell, 2005) after 9/11, the country did not support the US-led coalition. Thus, and even if China supported the global war on terrorism, it did not participate in the military operations related to it (Scobell, 2005).

Having in mind the contradictions that shape the country's economic and foreign policy, I expect *China's National Defence in 2002* document to reflect (and support) the idea of the war on terror from a moderate point of view without going into details.

The **United Kingdom**[34] is not only one of the most characterizing countries of Europe and western culture but also inherently connected to the US through a "special relationship" that goes far beyond the (obvious) historical and linguistic ties of the two countries. This relationship "applies particularly to the governmental realms of foreign, defense, security, and intelligence policy, but it also captures a broader sense that both public and private relations between the United States and Britain are particularly deep and close" (Bromund, 2016).

The UK was not only one of the states with the longest period of involvement times from March 2003 until July 2009, it also contributed more troops than any other coalition partner. After the end of the combat operations, the kingdom's contributions focused primarily on supporting the Iraqi Security Forces (Carney, 2012).

With regards to the sample documents of the UK, it should be noted that while the 2003 Defence White Paper was the first strategy document after the publication of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of 1998, the UK published another document as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks under the name 2002 SDR New Chapter. While I only analyze the documents of 1998 and 2003, the fact that the UK did not wait until the publication of the 2003 Defence White Paper and instead added a new chapter tot he 1998 SDR shows the significance of the events of 9/11 for the national defence strategy. All together, noting the special relationship between the UK and the US as well as the involvement of the kingdom in the war against terror, my expectations

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[32] Ireland and Finland.
[33] Henceforth "China" or PRC".
[34] Henceforth "UK".

are to find many similarities as well as a high frequency in the use of wordings between the discourses of both nations after 9/11.

In 2001, Vladimir Putin was in his second year of presidency in **the Russian Federation** [35]. During this time, Putin broke with the of Russia's "subjugation to the West" (CIDOB), that had been the norm in the 1990's, and advocated for a more multipolar order focused on strengthening ties with the former soviet countries and on a confrontational foreign policy towards the US (CIDOB). Actually, Russia and France (unlike China) agreed to block the UN Security Council Resolution that would have given an UN mandate for the invasion. Moreover, not only did Russia not support the US-led coalition, but also kept its relations with Iran and Syria, which had been pointed at by the US for supporting terrorism (CIDOB).

Following this line of policy, the revolutions in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) and the willingness of NATO to let both countries join the Alliance, deepened the complicated relations between the countries (CIDOB). Having in mind the traditional cultural differences caused by the Soviet past and the animosities of the US and Russia regarding the invasion of Iraq, I only expect vague references to the post-9/11 security situation in the discourse of Russia after the attacks.

3.2.2.b Non- P5 States

Australia was one of the supporters of the US-led coalition in the initial invasion of Iraq in March 2003, when it started providing combat and security forces (Carney, 2012). In 2006 the Australian Al Muthanna Task Group became the Overwatch Battle Group-West and supported Iraqi Security Forces (Carney, 2012). Thus, together with the UK Australia is one of the states from the sample that supported the US-led coalition for the longest period of time (from March to May 2003 and from June 2005 to July 2009) (Carney, 2012). This is a significant detail to take into consideration: While on the one hand Australia may be seen as a natural ally of the US because of its NATO membership and cultural and socio-political ties that both countries share, this ties, unlike the ones of the UK are partially offset by the fact that Australia is not a P5 member. Also, taking into consideration a southern hemisphere state in the sample surely enriches the geographical diversity of the sample as well as the (global) relevance of the research. In sum, due to Australia's participation in the invasion of Iraq, it's membership in NATO and for the multiple common features that it has in common with the US, I expect to find several parallels between the Australian discourse and the of Address to the Congress.

At the beginning of the deployments between March 2003 and April 2004, the troops of

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[35] Henceforth "Russia".

the **Kingdom of Spain**[36] focused on humanitarian missions (Carney, 2012). Later, a combat force of 1,300 troops was sent later in the conflict (Carney, 2012). However, Spanish support only lasted several months due to the change of the national government of the country and to the lack of support that of Spanish society towards the invasion (Carney, 2012). This was founded by the Madrid bombings of 2004, which are considered "the worst Islamist attack in European history" (The Guardian) and marked the society's attitude towards the election of a new government in favor of the withdrawal of Spanish forces in Iraq (Carney, 2012). This reason makes the Spanish case particularly interesting as – unlike in the US – a crisis triggered by terrorist attacks in its national territory caused skepticism towards the war on terror rather than support to it. Furthermore, Spain's geographical location and membership in NATO makes it a good choice for representing countries of the European Union in the sample[37]. The early support of Spain to the US-led coalition on the one hand and its not strong cultural ties with the US on the other, make me expect clear but less strong evidence in terms of frequency of key and related words in comparison to the Australian documents.

The **Republic of Ireland**[38] is also in the European continent but, contrary to Australia and Spain, is not a member of NATO due to its neutrality. Also, Ireland did not support the US-led invasion of Iraq in spite of sharing the western culture of Australia, Spain and the US. As Ireland is not a member state of NATO and did not support the US-led coalition in Iraq, I do not expect to find significant differences in the discourse in the Irish documents of 2000 and 2007. However, I expect to find general mentions to the events to the war on terror in general and to the new challenges that the events of 9/11 represent.

The **Democratic Republic of Georgia**[39] as a developing country is not only interesting because of its geographical location in the Caucasus between Europe and Asia but also because of the cultural differences between Georgia and the other state- actors of the sample. For example, in terms of religion, Georgia is the only country in the sample with a Christian Orthodox majority (NationMaster). These features allow adding a point of view between tradition and

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[36] Henceforth "Spain".
[37] Another good choice for the sample would have been Germany or Sweden, as both countries did not support the US-led invasion of Iraq, because Germany is a member of NATO while Sweden is not. Nevertheless, the defence strategy papers for both were not available or too wide ranged in the timeframe between 1998 and 2007, making them inappropriate for the sample.
[38] Henceforth "Ireland".
[39] Henceforth "Georgia".

western values to the sample[40]. Regarding its implication in the war on terror, Georgia stands out because in spite of not being a member of NATO, it supported the US-led coalition between 2003 and 2008 (Carney, 2012). In Iraq, the focus of the Georgian mission was put on "key infrastructure security, checkpoints, base protection, patrols, and security in the International Zone" (Carney, 2012). Due to the support of Georgia to the US-led coalition in Iraq in spite of not being a member state of NATO, I expect a relatively high frequency of key and related words in the National Military Strategy of 2007.

Located in the Northern of Europe, the **Republic of Finland**[41] is one of the five neutral countries of the European Union and a member of the Partnership for Peace since 1994 (NATO, 2017). While Finland did not support the US-led coalition in Iraq (Carney, 2012), it did collaborate with the Allied forces within the framework of NATO. Even if Finland does not have very obvious cultural ties with the US, I expect a considerate amount of influence of the US in its discourse after 9/11.

3.2.2.c North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO is an intergovernmental military alliance established with the Treaty of Washington[42] (1949). The Alliance is based on the principle of collective defence, which is set in Article 5 of the Treaty and states that "an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies" (NATO). Despite having its headquarters in Belgium, the traditional leading state of the organization has been the US. The role of the US goes beyond the one of the other founding members, as it is the first financial contributor of the Alliance. In fact, the US was the first member state invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty after the attacks of 9/11.

Having in mind the role and influence that the US has in the Alliance; I expect a high amount of parallelisms – and therefore a high incidence of key and related words – in the vocabulary of the Address to the Congress and NATO's *Comprehensive Political Guidance* of 2006.

Furthermore, the content analysis of the Alliance's documents should serve to test whether or to which extent its discourse was affected the one of the US in the aftermath of 9/11. Secondly, the commonalities and differences in quantity and frequency of use of words could give hints about the hierarchy of actors in the international security field. Here, I expect the content

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[40] Some other interesting points from non- European countries would have been the ones of Mexico or Japan, as both countries are the leading ones in their regions and would have added more cultural and geographical diversity to the sample. However, no data was available.
[41] Henceforth "Finland".
[42] Also called "North Atlantic Treaty".

analysis to shed light on whether the influence of the US on NATO is direct or collateral through its members. Identifying causalities here will be however difficult.

As table 2 shows, the sample comprises different documents[43] from the above presented actors with relevance in the international security field and their reports/strategies before and after the attacks of 9/11. At this point I would like to highlight that, while these actors' positions towards the invasion of Iraq differ from each other, in my research I do not take into consideration the positions of the governments and organizations which documents I analyze. Instead, I look into how the war on terror has marked their discourses, as I associate this variable with changes in the international security field.

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[43] In order to be able to compare the language of these documents, I only analyze documents written or translated to English from their original languages by the relevant actors.

Table 2: Overview of documents, Case Study

	Actor	Document 1 (year)	Document 2 (year)
P5 States	**United States of America (US)**	A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (2000)	The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002)
	China (CN)	China's National Defense in 2000	China's National Defense in 2002
	United Kingdom (UK)	The Strategic Defence Review. (1998)	Delivering Security in a Changing World. Defence White Paper (2003)
	Russia (RU)	National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)	The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2008)
Non- P5 States	**Australia (AU)**	Defence 2000. Our future Defence Force	Australia's National Security. A Defence Update 2003
	Spain (ES)	Defence White Paper 2000	Strategic Defence Review (2003)
	Ireland (IE)	White Paper on Defence (2000)	The White Paper on Defence. Review of Implementation (2007)
	Georgia (GE)	Georgia and the World: A Vision and Strategy for the Future (2000)	Georgia National Military Strategy (2007)
	Finland (FI)	Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001. Report by the Government to Parliament	Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009. Government Report
	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	The Alliance's Strategic Concept (1999)	Comprehensive Political Guidance (2006)

Source: Own compilation.

3.2.3 Coding

In order o analyze the changes in discourse in the sample's documents, I take the vocabulary of George W. Bush's Address to the Joint Session oft he 107th Congress on September 20th in the US capitol, as this occasion represents the first time the president described in detail what the concept of war on terrorism means and the consequences that it would have. Within the coded words I distinguish between keywords[44] and related words[45] taken from this speech. The first kind of words have direct terrorist related connotations to the war on terror and the second one

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[44] See table 3.
[45] See table 4.

are words that could have such a connotation depending on the context they appear in.[46] While the first group has a more obvious importance for the case study, the second one are equally significant because of the less obvious message they may contribute to. Also, terms that were not used before the attacks of 9/11, such as "war on terror", and "September 11" are included as control variables that should give a general impression of how the 9/11 crisis has marked the actors general discourse.

Table 3: Key word(s), Case Study 1		Table 4: Related word(s), Case Study 1	
Category	Key word(s)	Category	Key word(s)
Directly relevant	Enemy/ies	**Related word(s)**	Justice
	Terrorist		
	Terror/ism		Islam
	Al Qaeda		Destruction
	Islamic extremism		Threat
	Islamic		Allah
	Extremism		Religion
	Radical		Weapon
	Osama bin Laden		Defend
	Taliban regime		Values
	War on Terror		Fear
	Counter-terrorist/ism*		
	Sadam Hussein*		
	September 11/ September 2001*		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

5. Case Study: Fight against International Terrorism

Among the variety of challenges that exist in international security, I focus on the fight against international terrorism for two reasons. Frist, because this issue has certainly marked discussions within the public opinion, having great repercussion on policy and media discourses since the end of the Cold War and after 9/11. Secondly, the global dimension of this (perceived) threat should serve to put an emphasis on the interdependency of fields within the international security field.

In this section I present the summary of the results for my Case Study. These results are based on a comparison of the CA results of the documents for each relevant actor of the sam-

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[46] The importance of the context here highlights the necessity of human analysis for the meanings of the coded words in the documents.

ple.[47] This comparison is done using the difference between the frequency of appearance of each key and related word in the documents analyzed for every relevant actor.

5.1 Analysis of Results: P5 States

United States

In A *National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (2000), the wording „terrorist/s" appeared 30 times, indicating that the US had a special focus on this issue in comparison with the other P5 states, being the state with the highest frequency of this key word from the sample in the document of the pre-9/11 era. Moreover, there is a whole chapter dedicated to "combating terrorism", stating that the strategy of the US "requires us (the US) to both prevent and, if necessary, respond to terrorism". Nevertheless and while this could suggest that the US had a more "settled" focus on the fight against terrorism, even before 9/11 influenced its defence strategy, throughout the document the focus is also put on responding to attacks with WMDs.

While the key word „Islamic" only appears once in the context of collaboration with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the word „radical" appears interestingly in a paragraph dedicated to the Talibans:

> "Afghanistan remains a serious threat to U.S. worldwide interests because of the Taliban's continued sheltering of international terrorists and its increasing export of illicit drugs. Afghanistan remains the primary safehaven for terrorists threatening the United States, including Usama bin Ladin"

(Clinton, 2000).

Mentioning not only Afghanistan but also the word Taliban (seven times) and its leader is also a very unique issue throughout the documents oft he sample published prior to 9/11. Thus, this shows that there was a certain preoccupation in connection with this area before the invasion was carried out. In the same line, the statements related to the key word „Islam" was defended against possible links to generalization of terrorism to terrorism but with a focus on south Asia: "…United States policy in the region (south Asia) is directed at the actions of governments and terrorist groups, not peoples or faiths" (Clinton, 2000). On the other hand, while it is stated that „Ethnic conflict represents a great challenge to our values and our security", this statement is not directly connected with terrorism.[48]

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[47] See tables 15 to 33 in Annex.
[48] See page 46 in Clinton (2000).

This emphasis on the fight against terrorism prevails in the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America.* In this document a particularly patriotic part of the declaration of war on terror is cited in the chapter dedicated to the transformation of the countries national security: "Terrorists attacked a symbol of American prosperity. They did not touch its source. America is successful because of the hard work, creativity, and enterprise of our people" (Bush, 2001). Another proof for the distinctive discourse of the US involves the related word "justice": …This vulnerability will persist long after we bring to justice those responsible for the September 11 attacks"[49] (Bush, 2001). Moreover, while in other documents of the sample the word "terror" hardly appears, in this case it is used with the same connotation than the word "terrorism"[50], making the key word appear a total of 19 times. Another special feature of the American discourse is that the wording "counter-terrorism" is not only implied in synonyms like "defeat terrorism"[51] but also in figures taken from Bush's Address like "war/battle against terror/terrorism"[52][53]. Another interesting aspect of the document is that while "the link between terrorist and extremist groups" (Bush, 2001) is recognized for the case of Colombia, it is not used in relation to Islamic groups.

Further, the related word religion appears in the same anti-generalistic context as in the document of the year 2000 but directly related to the fight of the US in the "war against global terrorism" after the attacks.[54] In the same line, the words "values" and "fear" are used in the same context that appeals to the American ideals.[55] Actually, the context in which especially the word "religion" appears but also the use of other "emotional" wording seems to be a very characteristic feature of the American discourse that is not extended documents of the sample.

In sum, the document of 2002 definitely shares discourse features with the Address to the Congress. However, the analysis results for the US are certainly unexpected, as there are not many significant changes in the frequency of use of words between the analyzed documents[56]. In fact, while the key word "terrorist/s" was used relatively more frequently in the post-9/11 document, the use of the word "Terror/terrorism" decreased dramatically. This could be a result of the differences in length of the documents: While the document of the year 2000 is very extensive in its 84 pages, the National Security Strategy of 2002 only occupies 35 pages.

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[49] See page 34 in Bush (2002).
[50] For example, the wording "combating global terror" is used on page 3 (see Bush, 2002).
[51] The following synonyms of "counter" were counted into the "counter-terrorism" cateogory: "defeat, against".
[52] See for example page 12 in Bush (2002).
[53] These figues are included in the category „War on Terror".
[54] See page 11 in Bush (2002).
[55] See page 13 in Bush (2002).
[56] See table 5.

Table 5: Summary of content analysis results, US (2000 vs. 2002)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	-1	Justice	=(1)
Terrorist/s	+7	Islam	-1
Terror/ism	-15	Destruction	=(0)
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	+1	Threat	-9
Islamic/ist extremism	=(0)	Allah	=(0)
Islamic/ism	-1	Religion	=(1)
Extremism	=(0)	Weapon	=(0)
Radical/ism	+1	Defend	+1
(Osama) bin Laden	=(0)	Values	=(1)
Taliban/ Taliban regime	-6	Fear	+1
War on Terror	7		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	-8		
Sadam Hussein*	=(0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	(+7)		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).

* Added ex post

Republic of China

China's National Defense in 2000 has an emphasis on territorial integrity and the Taiwan issue[57]. In general, this document stands out not only for its short length – 7 pages – but also for its lack of similarities with the declaration of war on terror. The matches in the discourse are not only seldom but also significantly low in occurrence, with only three coinciding key words[58][59] and none related words. Another general feature of the document is the importance that is given to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in it, which is the only context in which the words "destruction" and "weapon" appear.[60]

The content analysis results of the 2002 document contrast with the ones from 2000 in quantity and frequency, as the increase in the use of the key words "terrorist/s", "terror/ism", as well as "counter-terrorist/ism"[61] is particularly high. Looking at the related words, the word "religion", which is generally not used many times throughout the sample document is, in this case used in a very direct and emphatic way: "Terrorism should not be confused with a specific nation

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[57] See pages 1 to 4 in Ministry of National Defence (2000).

[58] „Enemy/ies", "terrorist/s" "extremism" are each mentioned once in the document.

[59] The Word "extremism" appears in form of "extremist forces"(see page 2).

[60] As the use of these words is not related to the issue of terrorism, they are not included in the category "related words" of table 17.

[61] This includes the use of the following synonyms of "counter": "fight", "combat", "anti".

or religion" (Ministry of National Defence, 2002)[62]. Thus, taking into consideration that China did not support the US-led coalition in Iraq, the country's discourse is very marked by the terrorist threat and the new security situation after 9/11. This is supported by the fact that the post-9/11 document includes two mentions of the attacks[63]. These facts sustain the expectations with respect to China, whose defence strategies moderately reflects having been affected by the events of September 2001.

Table 6: Summary of content analysis results, China (2000 vs. 2002)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	+5	Justice	=(0)
Terrorist/s	+14	Islam	+1
Terror/ism	+11	Destruction	=(0)
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	=(0)	Threat	+4
Islamic/ist extremism	=(0)	Allah	=(0)
Islamic/ism	+1	Religion	+1
Extremism	+2	Weapon	=(0)
Radical/ism	=(0)	Defend	=(0)
(Osama) bin Laden	=(0)	Values	=(0)
Taliban/	=(0)	Fear	=(0)
Taliban regime	=(0)		
War on Terror	=(0)		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	+22		
Sadam Hussein*	=(0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	(+2)		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post.

United Kingdom

In spite of only mentioning the word "terrorist" once in the context of Northern Ireland[64][65] *The Strategic Defence Review* (1998) shares with the US the interest in the region of Iraq prior to 9/11: Saddam Hussein is put in the spotlight four times like in the following abstract, that seems to predict the conflicts that would arise only three years later:

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[62] See page 34 in Ministry of National Defence (2002).
[63] See pages 1 and 34 in Ministry of National Defence (2002).
[64] See page 152 in Ministry of Defence (1998).
[65] On page 13 the terrorism of Northern Ireland is even identified as a threat (see Ministry of Defence, 1998).

"There are already significant sources of instability in these regions - including the continuing threat represented by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The size of the military forces available and the presence and potential spread of ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons and even nuclear weapons add to the risks. These dangers seem unlikely to diminish and may grow. Many of our Allies and Partners have similar important interests and friendships in these areas. We would therefore expect to work with them in responding to any future crises"

(Ministry of Defence, 1998).

Moreover, the Review does not directly mention the Taliban regime but states: "As Iraq has amply demonstrated, such (very dangerous) regimes threaten not only their neighbors but vital economic interests and even international stability" (Ministry of Defence, 1998)[66], confirming the focus on Iraq. Nevertheless, in the document of 2003 the discourse related to terrorism shifts even more clearly from Northern Ireland to Iraq: Already in the foreword, the threat of international terrorism is seen as a growing one together with the threat posed by WMDs. Furthermore, in comparison to the document of 1998, there is a generalized increase in the frequency of the use of terms from the declaration of war on terrorism. Furthermore, words – such as "Islamic extremist", "Taliban regime" and the related words "destruction" and "defend" – that were not part of the 1998 defence strategy, became part of the post-9/11 discourse of the UK[67], however not with a high frequency in their use.

Nevertheless, the related word that stands out the most is "threat", which was only used two times in the 1998 *SDR* and thirteen times in the 2003 strategy. Apart from these mentions of "threat"[68], there are several references to "new threats", which I have not counted into the content analysis but could as well point to international terrorism[69]. The section "Future Need for Forces" within the "Future Needs for Defence" chapter shows the role and the interplay of these words in a very accurate summary of the UK's priorities: "Defending the UK, protecting our interests overseas, dealing with the proliferation of WMD and addressing the threat from international terrorism require a clear focus on projecting force, further afield and even more quickly than has previously been the case" (Ministry of Defence, 2003).

In conclusion, not only did the UK's strategy in 2003 share some of the most significant words related to the war on terror of the Address to the Congress, but also the increase in frequency of these words with respect to the pre-9/11 defence strategy was very significant. Hence,

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[66] See page 17 in Ministry of Defence (1998).
[67] See table 20.
[68] See for example page 4 in Ministry of Defence (2003).
[69] The fact that the paper is called "Delivering Security in a Changing World" could also be a reference to the role of international terrorism in (international) security.

and having in mind the shared priorities – and the special relationship – of the US and UK even before 9/11, the expectations of very similar discourses is confirmed.

Table 7: Summary of content analysis results, United Kingdom (1998 vs. 2003)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	-3	Justice	=(0)
Terrorist/s	+10	Islam	=(0)
Terror/ism	+13	Destruction	+1
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	+4	Threat	+11
Islamic/ist extremism	+1	Allah	=(0)
Islamic/ism	=(0)	Religion	=(0)
Extremism	=(0)	Weapon	=(0)
Radical/ism	=(0)	Defend	+2
(Osama) bin Laden	=(0)	Values	=(0)
Taliban/ Taliban regime	+1	Fear	=(0)
War on Terror	=(0)		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	+5		
Sadam Hussein*	=(0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	+3		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

Russian Federation

The documents analyzed for the case Russia stand out for not having a lot of words in common with the declaration of war on terror. However, it is interesting to see how each of the wordings that the *National Security Concept* of the year 2000 shares with it, are also present in the *Foreign Policy Concept* of 2008. Moreover, the frequency with which these words[70] appear increases moderately in all cases except in for the key word „terror/ism".

In the document prior to 9/11 the Russian discourse often uses wordings such as „terrorist activities", „terrorist actions" or „terrorist organizations" rather than pointing at individual terror-ists[71][72]. The use of the word „extremism" could also be related to terrorism, as it appears with the word „religious" preceding it both times in the document. Like in other cases, the key word "couter-terrorist/ism" appeared in different forms such as "fighting" "combat" and "prevent international terrorism" a total of four times. Here it is interesting to see how the discourse after

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[70] See tables 21 and 22 in Putin (2008).
[71] See for example page 9 and page 16 in Putin (2000).
[72] These wordings are still counted within the category "terrorist/s".

9/11 evolves beyond of these wordings and includes the word "anti-terrorism"[73], which could be seen as a stonger formula than the ones oft he year 2000.[74]

While in the majority of state documents the word "threat" appears with relation to terrorism, the Russian document of the year 2000 has – together with the one of the UK – the third highest frequency of this related word after the US.

In table 22 one can appreciate that the key word "Islamic/ism" appears four times, but it is important to note that these mentions are related to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Islamic Republic of Iran and with reference to the Islamic world, rather than to terrorism. In the same way and just like in the first Russian document, the word extremism only appears in a religious context. Interestingly however, "extremism" appears just after the word "terrorism" in the paragraph dedicated to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[75] The foreign strategy document of 2008 also has a very interesting paragraph in which the word "threat" emphasizes the priority of international terrorism over more "traditional" problems:

> "New challenges and threats (first of all, international terrorism, narcotraffic, organized crime, spread of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, regional conflicts, demographic problems, global poverty, including energy poverty, as well as illegal migration and climate change) are global problems that require adequate response of the entire international community and solidarity efforts to overcome them"

(Putin, 2008).[76]

Moreover, in this document the „crisis in Afghanistan" is seen a „threat to the security of the southern CIS boundaries" (Putin, 2008)[77][78], which could be an allusion to the war on terror. Also, the related word "religion" appears in the context of terrorism in a similar non-discriminative discourse than in other countries' documents. Seeing these kinds of resemblances between the Russian post-9/11 discourse, the Address to the Congress and the ones from other states, it seems that, even if the frequency and quantity of words used does not stand out, the idea of war on terror slightly influenced the Russian discourse. However, the post-9/11 document of Russia is the only P5-state document that does not mention the events of September 2001.[79] This

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[73] See page 13 in Putin (2008).
[74] The "anti-" formula is also used in the wording "anti-Semitism", which is also a feature of the post- 9/11 security document.
[75] See page 19 in Putin (2008).
[76] See page 4 in Putin (2008).
[77] See page 25 in Putin (2008).
[78] The threat that Afghanistan poses is also noted in page 19: The priorities here include elimination of terrorist and drug trafficking threats emanating from the territory of Afghanistan and prevention of risks of destabilization of the situations in Central Asia and Transcaucasia" (Putin, 2008).
[79] Within the non-P5 states, the only exception not mentioning 9/11 after these events is Georgia.

could be interpreted as a gesture of indifference or lack of solidarity due to the differences of the US and Russia in the past, which would coincide to the expectations I had with regards to the Russian discourse.

Table 8: Summary of content analysis results, Russia (2000 vs. 2008)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	=(0)	Justice	=(0)
Terrorist/s	+1	Islam	=(0)
Terror/ism	-6	Destruction	=(0)
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	=(0)	Threat	+4
Islamic/ist extremism	=(0)	Allah	=(0)
Islamic/ism	(+4)	Religion	+1
Extremism	=(2)	Weapon	=(0)
Radical/ism	=(0)	Defend	=(0)
(Osama) bin Laden	=(0)	Values	=(0)
Taliban/ Taliban regime	=(0)	Fear	=(0)
War on Terror	=(0)		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	+4		
Sadam Hussein*	=(0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	(0)		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

5.2 Analysis of Results: Non- P5 States

Australia

Australia's security documents present an enormous difference of frequency of use of key-and related words in the documents of 2000 and 2003. This stands out especially in the case the key words "terrorist/s", "terror/ism" and "Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida".

Moreover, the strategy of the aftermath of the attacks mentions "Saddam Hussein"[80], being the only mention to the former leader in the documents. It also stands out that, even if the war on terror was not mentioned in the post-9/11 document, the attacks of 9/11 are cited up to eight times throughout the document, starting in the preface, which stands for giving a high priority level to those events. A further general feature of this document is that "terrorism" is not

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[80] This key word was not on the preliminary list of words of the content analysis

only used more often than any other key word, but also that it has its own section[81] – Global Terrorism – in the *Defence Update* of 2003. Also in this section, the word "threat" is directly associated to terrorism. Another concept that is unique in the sample is "Islamic governments"[82], which is used two times in the defence strategy document of 2003. This concept and the related word "religion" are used in the same conciliatory context, with the objective of making clear that the country does not point at all Islamic countries but only to the not "moderate" ones. This, contrasts with the use of the words "islamist terrorism"[83] in the "global terrorism" section of the 2003 paper.[84]

In conclusion, the majority of listed words of the Address to the Congress correlated with Australian discourse. This, together with the fact that there are only few wordings with a diminishing frequency of use between the documents of 2000 and 2003, corroborates the expectations regarding Australia's discourse, which also matches with the support that the country offered to the US.

Table 9: Summary of content analysis results, Australia (2000 vs. 2003)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	= (1)	**Justice**	+1
Terrorist/s	+ 10	**Islam**	= (0)
Terror/ism	+20	**Destruction**	= (0)
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	+9	**Threat**	+7
Islamic/ist extremism	+1	**Allah**	= (0)
Islamic/ism	+4	**Religion**	+1
Extremism	= (0)	**Weapon**	= (0)
Radical/ism	+1	**Defend**	-3
(Osama) bin Laden	+1	**Values**	+2
Taliban/ Taliban regime	+1	**Fear**	= (0)
War on Terror	(= (0))		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	-3		
Sadam Hussein*	+1		
September 11/ September 2001*	(+8)		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

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[81] See page 11 in Department of Defence (2000).
[82] See pages 11 and 12 in Department of Defence (2003).
[83] In the CA this wording was countes into the "islamist extremism" key word- category.
[84] See page 12 in Department of Defence (2000).

Spain

For the Spanish 2000 White Paper, I only take into consideration the main strategy paper, as the Annexes are an explanatory addition and deal with treaties, conventions and military equipment. As expected, in the case of Spain not a lot of words from list based on the Address to the Congress appear in the strategy papers of the country. Still, the all the key and related words that do appear in the Spanish documents ("enemy/ies", "terrorist/s", "terror/ism", "threat", "values") have a moderate higher frequency of use in the declaration of 2003 in comparison to the document of the year 2000[85].

Regarding the control key-words "war on terror" and "September 11", they do both appear in the Spanish post-9/11 discourse. It does however stand out how "September 11" is mentioned more often than in the Australian document, as Australia is within the non-P5 state group the country with the most important connections and support to the US. Further, while the Spanish document of 2003 does not have a special section dedicated to terrorism, it does have references to the events in the Preface of the Minister of Defence and throughout the document. Another interesting fact of the 2003 document is that in a reference to NATO, it states "The September 11 terrorist attacks clearly marked a new phase in the evolution of defence" (Ministerio de Defensa, 2003)[86], which definitely signalizes with emphasis that the attacks marked the defence policies of Spain (and NATO).

In spite of only having a moderate number of word-coincidences with the Address to the Congress, this general message that 9/11 was a changing point for Spanish defense policies makes me conclude that, the expectation of fining a clear influence of the American discourse on the Spanish one, can be corroborated.

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[85] See table 10.
[86] See page 48 in Ministerio de Defensa (2003).

Table 10: Summary of content analysis results, Spain (2000 vs. 2003)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	+5	Justice	= (0)
Terrorist/s	+3	Islam	= (0)
Terror/ism	+7	Destruction	= (0)
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	= (0)	Threat	+4
Islamic/ist extremism	= (0)	Allah	= (0)
Islamic/ism	= (0)	Religion	= (0)
Extremism	= (0)	Weapon	= (0)
Radical/ism	= (0)	Defend	= (0)
(Osama) bin Laden	= (0)	Values	(+1)
Taliban/ Taliban regime	= (0)	Fear	= (0)
War on Terror	(+1)		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	= (0)		
Sadam Hussein*	= (0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	(+9)		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

Ireland

The amount of words of the Irish security documents matching those of the Address to the Congress is relatively low, having some similarities to the Spanish case. Nevertheless, the frequency of the key-words "terrorist/s" and "terror/ism" is clearly lower than in the Spanish documents. Another tendency that coincides with the NATO members, is the explicit mention of "September 11", which has a high frequency in comparison to the ones of the other key and related words[87].

It also has to be taken into consideration that, while the words "terrorist/s" and "terror/ism" can be related to national events, the (low in frequency) mention of "Islamic/ist extremism" together with the mentions of the attacks of 9/11, could stand for at least some importance of these events in the Irish security agenda.

On the other hand, it especially stands out how Ireland is the only non-P5 state whose documents do not mention the key word "enemy/ies" whether before, nor after the attacks. However, Ireland's *Review on Implementation* of 2007 does follow the tendency of the other state-actors, as the related word "threat" in the context of terrorism appears more often than in the

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[87] See table 11.

document of the year 2000. This tendency is reinforced by the facts that in the section "Environmental Changes 2000 to 2006" of the 2007 *Review of Implementation* there is an explicit section dedicated to international terrorism.Therefore, Ireland meets the expectations with respect to the differences between the analyzed documents. However, the Irish discourse slightly seems to follow the trend of being influenced by the Address to the Congress at least in a general way.

Table 11: Summary of content analysis results, Ireland (2000 vs. 2007)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	= (0)	Justice	= (0)
Terrorist/s	+1	Islam	= (0)
Terror/ism	+5	Destruction	= (0)
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	= (0)	Threat	+3
Islamic/ist extremism	+1	Allah	= (0)
Islamic/ism	= (0)	Religion	= (0)
Extremism	= (0)	Weapon	+1
Radical/ism	= (0)	Defend	= (0)
(Osama) bin Laden	= (0)	Values	= (0)
Taliban/ Taliban regime	= (0)	Fear	-1
War on Terror	(= (0))		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	= (0)		
Sadam Hussein*	= (0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	(+3)		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

Georgia

Looking at the totality of analyzed documents in the sample, the ones belonging to Georgia's security strategy have a comparatively low amount of key and related words in common with the Address to the Congress. While the *Georgia National Military Strategy* of 2007 mentions NATO very often in relation to the necessity to defending the country "with its own resources"[88] (Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000), it does not make allusions the events of 9/11. This makes Georgia, together with Russia, one of the two exceptions of the sample in terms of not dedicate words to the attacks in their post-9/11 document regarded in the sample. While the allusions to NATO can be explained with the interest that the country has to join the alliance for national reasons, it is quite surprising that it does not directly mention the attacks, having in

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[88] See page 16 in Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000).

mind that they marked the discourse of the other NATO member states of the sample. These features of the Georgian discourse correspond to the fact that the related word "threat" is only used once in the context of terrorism but quite often in the sense of territorial integrity.

Having in mind that Georgia supported the US-led coalition in Iraq, these findings do not match the expectations, as the country did not seem to dedicate special attention to Islamic radicalization or terrorism in its security strategy after the attacks.

Table 12: Summary of content analysis results, Georgia (2000 vs. 2007)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	+3	**Justice**	= (0)
Terrorist/s	= (3)	**Islam**	= (0)
Terror/ism	= (2)	**Destruction**	= (0)
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	= (0)	**Threat**	+1
Islamic/ist extremism	= (0)	**Allah**	= (0)
Islamic/ism	= (0)	**Religion**	= (0)
Extremism	= (0)	**Weapon**	= (0)
Radical/ism	= (0)	**Defend**	= (0)
(Osama) bin Laden	= (0)	**Values**	= (0)
Taliban/ Taliban regime	= (0)	**Fear**	= (0)
War on Terror	(= (0))		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	+3		
Sadam Hussein*	= (0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	(= (0))		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

Finland

In the document's section dedicated to the Russian Federation, The *Finnish Security and Defence Policy* of 2001 states that „It can be argued that Russia's security problems lie mainly in the south. Islamic fundamentalism is a challenge not only in the Caucasus but also in Central Asia" (Ministry of Defence of Finland, 2001), being the only mention of the wording "Islamic/s". While the related word "threat" is used in the context of terrorism, it appears mostly in relation to the WMDs.[89]

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[89] See for example page 15 in Ministry of Defence of Finland (2001).

Looking at the Finnish document of 2009[90], it stands out that there is a section dedicated to terrorism[91][92] within the first chapter and between the parts dedicated to WMDs and arms control and the one dedicated to Human rights, democracy and the rule of law. In addition, there is a section within chapter 4, which title is „Finland's security"[93], that confirms the prominent role that terrorism has – a priori – in the Finnish discourse after 9/11.

Turning to use of key –and related words, there is a significant increase in the quantity of words in common with the Address tot he Congress, as well as a large growth in their frequency. An example would be the following fragment in which the interplay of the words „terror" and „war" reminds to the American discourse: „Conflicts have become increasingly asymmetrical in nature, involving progressively more non-state groupings. Violence and terror against the civilian population is widely used as an instrument of war" (Ministry of Defence of Finland, 2001).[94]

However, the most outstanding increases can be found in the categories "terrorist/s" (+21), "terror/ism" (+32) and "counter-terrorist/ism" (+21), which contrast with the -1 value in the category "enemy/ies". Another interesting characteristic of the 2009 document is its resemblance to the discourse of the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* of 2002 in terms of style and used expressions. Some examples are the direct allusions to the war on terrorism in the section dedicated to the American country.[95] Also, one of the times in which the document refers to 9/11, it states that "after 9/11 Russia defined the Chechen War as a war against terror" (Ministry of Defence of Finland, 2001). This observation leads to think that Finland (and Russia) see 9/11 as a legitimate point of time to draw "before and after"- lines. Consequently, these results lead to think that the US discourse did not only have a considerate amount of influence on the post-9/11 Finnish discourse like I expected but a surprisingly major impact on it. Similarly to the multiple mentions of NATO in the Georgian discourse, the Finnish commitment with the US discourse could be a way of publicly proclaiming – to Russia – that Finland has links to the US.

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[90] In the content analysis of this document, I did not take into consideration whether the general information of page 5, nor the appendixes (page 127 onwards).

[91] See page 21 in Ministry of Defence of Finland (2009).

[92] In addition, this chapter has strong language and points directly at different kinds of terrorism, such as extremist or suicide terrorism.

[93] See page 91 in Ministry of Defence of Finland (2009).

[94] See page 16 in Ministry of Defence of Finland (2001).

[95] See page 41 in Ministry of Defence of Finland (2009).

Table 13: Summary of content analysis results, FI (2000 vs. 2009)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	-1	**Justice**	+1
Terrorist/s	+21	**Islam**	=(0)
Terror/ism	+32	**Destruction**	=(0)
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	=(0)	**Threat**	+3
Islamic/ist extremism	+1	**Allah**	=(0)
Islamic/ism	-1	**Religion**	=(0)
Extremism	+3	**Weapon**	=(0)
Radical/ism	+5	**Defend**	=(0)
(Osama) bin Laden	=(0)	**Values**	=(0)
Taliban/	=(0)	**Fear**	=(0)
Taliban regime			
War on Terror	(+2)		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	+21		
Sadam Hussein*	=(0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	(+3)		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

5.2 Analysis of Results: NATO

Surprisingly, there is a very low incidence of words of the Address to the Congress in the two analyzed NATO documents. However, while there are only two key-word coincidences between the declaration of war on terror and the *Alliance's Strategic Concept* (1999), the mentions increase to seven in the Alliance's document of 2006. Yet, the increase in the frequency of the use of these words is very subtle, being (+3) the highest increment between both documents.[96] Taking a closer look into the 2006 *Guidance,* the new additions of related words – "destruction", "threat", "weapon" and "defend" are not particularly outstanding wordings of the US *National Security Strategy* of 2002, contradicting my expectations. This is supported by the relatively lack of influences of emphasizing language in the NATO post-9/11 discourse and the lack of similarities with the Address to the Congress discourse. However, the fact that these related words are used in the post 9/11 documents and that at the same time the key-words "terrorist/s" and "terror/ism" show a slight rise in frequency of use, could mean that the NATO discourse was only collaterally affected by the one of the US. This is supported by the fact that 9/11 is only men-

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[96] See table 14.

tioned once[97] in the document, therefore recognizing the importance of the events without over-emphasizing them.

In conclusion, on the one hand, the expectations regarding a high amount of parallelisms between the *Address to the Congress* and the *Comprehensive Political Guidance* are not met. On the other hand, the discreet increases of wordings related to terrorism in the post-NATO discourse, could corroborate the theory that the Alliance was only slightly affected by the US discourse. Consequently, I believe that these results could serve as an evidence to show how the Alliance occupies a secondary position with respect to states within the international terrorism field. This would explain why in spite of the general significant influence of the US discourse on the members of the Alliance, the discourse of NATO itself was not substantially affected by it.

Table 14: Summary of content analysis results, NATO (1999 vs. 2006)

Key word(s)	Difference in times used	Related words	Difference in times used
Enemy/ies	= (0)	**Justice**	= (0)
Terrorist/s	+1	**Islam**	= (0)
Terror/ism	+3	**Destruction**	+3
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	= (0)	**Threat**	+2
Islamic/ist extremism	= (0)	**Allah**	= (0)
Islamic/ism	= (0)	**Religion**	= (0)
Extremism	= (0)	**Weapon**	+2
Radical/ism	= (0)	**Defend**	+1
(Osama) bin Laden	= (0)	**Values**	= (0)
Taliban/ Taliban regime	= (0)	**Fear**	= (0)
War on Terror	= (0)		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	= (0)		
Sadam Hussein*	= (0)		
September 11/ September 2001*	+1		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush (2001).
* Added ex post

5.3 Summary of Results

P5 and Non-P5 States

Out the four analyzed P5 States, the content analysis results of the documents of China and the UK are the ones that match the most with the stated expectations. While the similarities

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[97] See page 12 in NATO (2006).

between the UK' and the US' discourses are more intuitive due to cultural and historic consid-
erations, the Chinese results are quite interesting also because contrary to the UK, China did not
support the US-led coalition in Iraq. Yet, the Chinese case is not the only state within the P5
group sharing the general message of the US in spite of not supporting the US coalition. In this
sense, the Russian documents also reflect a certain degree of similarities to the US discourse in
spite of being the only P5 State not mentioning the attacks of 9/11 explicitly throughout the ana-
lyzed documents.

While these results are relatively similar and expected, the results of the content analysis
of the US documents are surely not. In this case, the fact that the post 9/11 document reflects
clear but not frequent – and comparatively even less - references in comparison to the Address to
the Congress speech is disconcerting.

Interestingly, there are more differences within the P5 group that between the P5 and the
non-P5 States. Within the non-P5 states, the clearest influences of the Address to the Congress
can be found in the Australian, Spanish, Georgian and Finnish discourses. Except for Finland, all
of these countries supported the US-led coalition. Thus, I think that the decision national deci-
sion to support the US in its war against terror definitely marked the discourse of the participat-
ing states. As it was mentioned in the analysis of the Finnish results, the coincidences of the
country's discourse with the declaration of war on terror could be designed to send a sign to Rus-
sia. However, the Finnish and the Irish cases could be seen together as a proof that regardless of
their membership status in the Security Council, Bush's message transcended to states with very
diverse cultures and political priorities.

Having in mind that the content analysis results show that a vast majority of states share
at least some features with the Address to the Congress and the post-9/11 US discourse in inter-
national security, results of the US should not undermine the fact that belonging to the P5 does
not seem to be an influencing factor for sharing the post-9/11 discourse of the US.

NATO and non- NATO States

Within the nine countries of the sample, four – the US, the UK, Australia and Spain – are
members of the Alliance. Contrary to the results of the P5 and non-P5 States, the analysis of the
discourses of the NATO countries seem to have stronger linkages to the Address to the Congress
than the states that do not belong to the Alliance.[98]

From a general perspective, this could suggest that the membership of NATO could be a
factor for sharing discourse features with the declaration of war on terror. Nevertheless, the re-

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[98] Here the results of the US again do not completely coincide with the main tendency of the group.

sults of the NATO documents refute this assumption due to the lack of common key- and related word that they share with the Address to the Congress. This, added to the fact that the post-9/11 NATO does not share major similarities with the post-9/11 document, suggests that the shock of 9/11 could have influenced the discourses of the member states in a more significant way than it did to the Alliance.

As it was advanced in the section dedicated to the results of the Alliance, this could corroborate that the international security field is divided into subfields and that within this field, states enjoy a relatively hegemonic position over other actors. This argument would thus explain why the main message of the war against terror reached NATO in a less strong way than it reached its member states as well as other states.

6. Conclusion

For answering the research question of this thesis[99], I first looked into field theory from different perspectives, to later apply the international political sociology perspective of the SAF theory (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011) on the international security field. Using the elements and the main assumptions of this theory, I was able to identify the causes, mechanisms and consequences that 9/11 had as an exogenous shock on the subfield dedicated to international terrorism within the wider international security field.

I then applied this theoretical framework using the method of content analysis. Based on the assumption that "the frequency of references indicates the attention a source pays to what it refers to" (Krippendorff, 1989), I compared the discursive changes of nine states and NATO before and after the attacks with the Declaration of War on Terrorism. While I did the discursive analysis of these state-actors under the assumption that the international terrorism field is dominated by states, I interpreted the results of the content analysis of the documents of NATO as a control variable to understand the hierarchical order within the international terrorism field. Here, my main priorities were testing the primary position of states within the international terrorism subfield and if so, in which way this influenced actors in secondary and tertiary positions.

Following this theoretical framework, I draw three general features of the functioning of the international security field from the content analysis results: First, showing the dynamics of the subfield of international terrorism, I could confirm that it is embedded in the international security field. Secondly, the results showed how the spillover effect affected different actors depending on their position within the international terrorism field, thus upholding the hierarchical

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[99] Namely "How did the international security field change after 9/11?".

element of the SAF theory. Thirdly, the influence of the attacks 9/11 as an exogenous shock corroborated that the SAF theory can be applied to understand the functioning of both fields.

Taking a closer look into the consequences that the 9/11 shock had on the actors of the international terrorism field, the content analysis results of the sample states showed no correlation between being a P5 member and sharing the post-9/11 discourse of the US. While NATO states generally present more discursive coincidences with George Bush's Address to the Congress, the NATO documents did not especially stand out for sharing features with it.

All together, the results of this thesis could shed light not only on how the international security field changed after 9/11 but also on the mechanisms of this field and the subfield dedicated to the fight against international terrorism. Nevertheless, there are some issues that could be further explored in prospective research. It would be first interesting to test in which way the international security field reacts to less critical exogenous shocks like economic crises. In this context, testing whether the diffusion of new imperative orders coming from supranational entities also follow a hierarchical structure would help understand the flexibility of the mechanisms of change of fields. Furthermore, as I mentioned in the section dedicated to mechanisms of change within the application of the SAF theory to the international security field, I did not include non-state actors such as NGOs and civil society in my research. Therefore, future research could also focus on how the post-9/11 discourse influenced these actors and how they reacted to it in terms of inputs in the international terrorism field.

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8. Annex

Table 15: Number of Key Words in "A National Security Strategy for a Global Age" (US, 2000)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	6	Justice	1
Terrorist/s	30	Islam	1
Terror/ism	34	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	16
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	1	Religion	1
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	1	Defend	2
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	1
Taliban/ Taliban regime	7	Fear	0
War on Terror	(0)		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	26		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 16: Number of Key Words in "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (US, 2002)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	7	Justice	1
Terrorist/s	37	Islam	0
Terror/ism	19	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	1	Threat	7
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	1
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	2	Defend	3
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	1
Taliban/ Taliban regime	1	Fear	1
War on Terror**	7		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	18		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	7		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 17: Number of Key Words in "China's National Defense in 2000"

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	1	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	1	Islam	0
Terror/ism	0	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	0
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	1	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	0		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 18: Number of Key Words in "China's National Defence in 2002"

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	6	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	15	Islam	1
Terror/ism	11	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	4
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	1	Religion	1
Extremism	3	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	22		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	2		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 19: Number of Key Words in "Strategic Defence Review" (UK, 1998)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	4	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	1	Islam	0
Terror/ism	5	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	2
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	(23)	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	6		
Sadam Hussein*	4		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive.*
* Added ex post

Table 20: Number of Key Words in "Delivering Security in a Changing world" (UK, 2003)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	1	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	11	Islam	0
Terror/ism	18	Destruction	1
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	4	Threat	13
Islamic/ist extremism	1	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	2
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	1	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	11		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	3		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive.*
* Added ex post

Table 21: Number of Key Words in
"National Security Concept of the Russian Federation" (2000)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	0	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	3	Islam	0
Terror/ism	10	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	2
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	(2)	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	4		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 22: Number of Key Words in
"The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation" (2008)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	0	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	4	Islam	0
Terror/ism	4	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	6
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	(4)	Religion	1
Extremism	2	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	8		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	0		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 23: Number of Key Words in "Defence 2000. Our Future Defence Force" (AU)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	1	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	1	Islam	0
Terror/ism	3	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	3
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	3
(Osama) bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	-		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	4		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Table 24: Number of Key Words in "Australia's National Security. A Defence Update 2003"

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	1	Justice	1
Terrorist/s	11	Islam	0
Terror/ism	23	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	9	Threat	10
Islamic/ist extremism	1	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	4	Religion	1
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	1	Defend	0
(Osama) bin Laden	1	Values	2
Taliban/ Taliban regime	1	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	1		
Sadam Hussein*	1		
September 11/ September 2001*	8		

Table 25: Number of Key Words in "Defence White Paper 2000" (ES)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	2	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	0	Islam	0
Terror/ism	2	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	0
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
(Osama) bin Laden	0	Values	(1)
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	-		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	0		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 26: Number of Key Words in "Strategic Defence Review" (ES, 2003)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	7	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	3	Islam	0
Terror/ism	9	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	4
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
(Osama) bin Laden	0	Values	2
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	1		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	0		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	9		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 27: Number of Key Words in "White Paper on Defence" (IE, 2000)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	0	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	2	Islam	0
Terror/ism	1	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	0
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	1
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	0		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 28: Number of Key Words in "The White Paper on Defence. Review of Implementation" (IE, 2007)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	0	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	3	Islam	0
Terror/ism	6	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	3
Islamic/ist extremism	1	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	1
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	0		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	3		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 29: Number of Key Words in "Georgia and the World:
A Vision and Strategy for the Future" (2000)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	0	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	3	Islam	0
Terror/ism	2	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	1
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	0		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 30: Number of Key Words in "Georgia National Military Strategy" (2007)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	3	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	3	Islam	0
Terror/ism	2	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	0
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	3		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	0		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 31: Number of Key Words in "Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001"

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	1	**Justice**	0
Terrorist/s	6	**Islam**	0
Terror/ism	6	**Destruction**	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	**Threat**	3
Islamic/ist extremism	0	**Allah**	0
Islamic/ism	1	**Religion**	0
Extremism	0	**Weapon**	0
Radical/ism	0	**Defend**	0
Osama bin Laden	0	**Values**	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	**Fear**	0
War on Terror	(0)		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	10		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 32: Number of Key Words in "Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2009"

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	0	**Justice**	1
Terrorist/s	27	**Islam**	0
Terror/ism	38	**Destruction**	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	**Threat**	6
Islamic/ist extremism	1	**Allah**	0
Islamic/ism	0	**Religion**	0
Extremism	3	**Weapon**	0
Radical/ism	5	**Defend**	0
Osama bin Laden	0	**Values**	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	**Fear**	0
War on Terror	2		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	31		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	3		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 33: Number of Key Words in "The Alliance's Strategic Concept" (NATO, 1999)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	0	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	1	Islam	0
Terror/ism	1	Destruction	0
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	0
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	0
Radical/ism	0	Defend	0
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	0		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	-		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

Table 34: Number of Key Words in "Comprehensive Political Guidance" (NATO, 2006)

Key Word(s)	Times used	Related Word(s)	Times used
Enemy/ies	0	Justice	0
Terrorist/s	2	Islam	0
Terror/ism	4	Destruction	3
Al Qaeda/ Al Qaida	0	Threat	2
Islamic/ist extremism	0	Allah	0
Islamic/ism	0	Religion	0
Extremism	0	Weapon	2
Radical/ism	0	Defend	1
Osama bin Laden	0	Values	0
Taliban/ Taliban regime	0	Fear	0
War on Terror	0		
Counter-terrorist/ism*	0		
Sadam Hussein*	0		
September 11/ September 2001*	1		

Source: Own compilation based on Bush, G. W. (2001). Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress. *The White House George W. Bush Archive*.
* Added ex post

On my honor as a student of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, I submit this work in good faith and pledge that I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it.

Raquel Barrios Gayo