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The analysis of Turkish parliament parties' positions toward
EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement “**

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Abbreviations

AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi: Justice and Development Party)

ANAP (Anavatan Partisi: Motherland Party)

BDP (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi: Peace and Democracy Party)

CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries)

CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: Republican People's Party)

DEP (Demokrasi Partisi: Democracy Party)

DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi: Democratic People's Party)

DP (Demokrat Parti, Democratic Party)

DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti: Democratic Left Party)

DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi: Democratic Society Party)

DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi: True Path Party)

EU (European Union)

EEC (European Economic Community)

FP (Fazilet Partisi: Virtue Party)

GP (Genç Parti: Young Party)

HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi: People's Democratic Party)

IPA (Instrument Pre/accession Assistance)

Ibid. (Ibidem, meaning "in the same place")

ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)

MP (Member of Parliament)

MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi: National Movement Party)

PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Worker's Party)

PM (Prime Minister)

R.A (Readmission Agreement)

SP (Saadet Partisi)

TBMM (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi: The Grand National Assembly of Turkey)

TCNs (Third Country Nationals)

OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe)

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Introduction

The Readmission Agreement that Turkey signed with the European Union on the 16th of December 2013 essentially addresses the readmission of illegally residing persons in EU member states to Turkey (TBMM, 2014c). The beginning of the negotiations for the Readmission agreement between Turkey and the EU dates to the 4th of March 2003 – a period even before Turkey became a candidate state and began talks about full membership with the EU. The negotiation process of the agreement has been though an everlasting case since Turkey's membership bargaining throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century which has been decisive on the halts and continuations of the whole negotiation duration of the agreement. To explore this whole decade, it is also important to analyze the process in detail. The time course from 2003 to 2005 makes up respectively the first phase, when the issue of readmission began to predominate the Turkey-EU agenda. The second phase continued with the meetings in 2005 and 2006, yet it came to a halt between 2006 and 2009. In the third phase, the talks resumed and finally Turkey signed the Readmission Agreement with the EU in Ankara on the 16th of December 2013 (Ibid.). On the same day, a visa liberalization dialogue between Turkey and the EU has also been launched. But this dialogue did not directly grant the visa exemption for Turkish citizens and conditioned visa lifting to a roadmap which entails Turkey to implement and adopt 72 requirements (European Commission 2016).

Considering the entire process from a broader perspective, the destiny of the Readmission Agreement is not only about the readmission of persons residing without authorization, but it has also constituted a new age of the Turkey-EU relations in the shadow of migration processes and refuge crisis, which encompass Turkey and Europe together. Concentrating on the issue from this point of view divides the EU-Turkey relations in three main phases, which also involves the implications about the particular interest of this research. The first phase starts with the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which foresaw Turkey's gradual economic integration and resulted in the Customs Union in 1996. The second phase is labelled with Turkey's becoming a candidate state for member of the EU and the following full membership talks in 2005 (Aka & Özkural, 2015: 255), while the third phase reflects rather the process of Readmission Agreement that forms Turkey's current relationship with the EU, notwithstanding this does not directly point out to the criterion of Turkey's EU membership.

As such, the process of the Readmission Agreement also constructs a new platform for analyzing the Turkish parliament parties' positions toward the longstanding EU-Turkey relations and EU integration. Therefore, this study attempts to answer firstly how the Turkish parliament parties are positioned toward the Readmission Agreement, signed between Turkey and the European Union and secondly, whether the process of signing the Readmission Agreement prompts a change within the positions of the Turkish parliament parties toward the European Union and European Integration.

Research Question and Methodology

Bearing in mind the implications mentioned in the introduction, a research question has been developed as such;

Research Question: *How do the Turkish parliament parties position toward the re-admission agreement signed between Turkey and EU?*

Sub-Question: *Does the process of signing readmission agreement prompt a change within the positions of Turkish parliament parties toward EU and European Integration?*

To have answers to these questions, The External Incentive Model of Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2005) and the approaches of Euroscepticism from Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) have been applied as the theoretical access. In this respect, the question of how party based Euroscepticism may be measured, leads to a decision as to whether the official party positions or the positions of party voters, the activists or the parliamentarians is more appropriate. Taggart and Szczerbiak highlighted rather the importance of measuring the official party positions and suggested that a party's public statements, the parliamentary voting on key European issues or on treaties and the published party programs and manifestos might form the key sources of party based Euroscepticism. Yet they also mentioned that elements constituting a Eurosceptical position might vary from country to country and how the measurement takes places, might be context dependent. (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2008: 5). In this relation, the party based Euroscepticism within Turkish parties has already found examinations by some studies. For instance, Bardakci researched the positions of Turkish parties toward EU by analyzing the party and election manifestos (Bardakci, 2010). Moreover, Kiratli carried out a discourse analysis of the election manifestos of the centre-left,

the Republican People's Party (CHP), and the Nationalistic right, the Nationalist Movement Party, from 1965 to 2011. (Kiratli, 2015).

Differing from these already existing studies, this study has measured the positions of Turkish parliament parties through examining the commission and the parliamentary protocols in the light of readmission agreement. More specifically, the expressions and arguments of party deputies within the commission and parliamentary sessions were used as the primary data. Thus, it was evaluated what sort of position the parties took in relation to readmission agreement and indirectly to European integration or how the opposition articulated or reflected itself in this relation. The data has provided sufficient information to understand where exactly the lack of confidence within the parties is rooted. Following documents have been examined and analyzed to reach empiric results;

- The Commission Protocols (2014): Commission Protocol of European Union Integration, Commission Protocol of Internal Affairs, Commission Protocol of Foreign Affairs
- The Protocols of Parliament sessions, (2014): The Grand National Assembly of Turkey Parliament 106.Session Protocol, The Grand National Assembly of Turkey Parliament 108.Session Protocol
- The Commission Protocol (2016): Commission Protocol of Foreign Affairs
- The Protocols of Parliament sessions, (2016): The Grand National Assembly of Turkey Parliament 84. Session Protocol

The Protocols have been analyzed by the qualitative content analysis according to Philipp Mayring (2000; 2002). The order of data evaluation follows such a direction; Firstly, it is the process of coding where it is determined which passages in the text is to assess. (Code Units, Context Units). In this way, the terms, items or passage are marked under a code or under the certain codes. Secondly, it is the phase of paraphrasing, in which the code units are rewritten in grammatically short forms regarding to the content. In the following, it is the phase of generalizing, in which the obtained paraphrases are formulated more generally in a previously determined abstraction level. Here, the same content and unimportant paraphrases are crossed off. And then, it is the process of the reduction where the paraphrases correlating with each other are summarized in the new assertions in a form of a complex category system. The last

step in the process is the examination and interpretation of the results of the analysis that orientates itself rather to the direction of research question (Lacher, 2010: 4-5).

Based on the procedures of the content analysis according to Philipp Mayring, the analysis has started firstly by the determining the documents that are relevant for the analysis. As above illustrated, the commission and parliament protocols have been chosen as the primary data. Next step was the process of the coding in which the relevant passages in the protocols have been settled and coded. For the coding process, atlas-ti program has been used. Turkish political parties have been determined as the categories. As such, each party constitutes a category. Yet, since sometimes all the deputies from all the parties or sometimes just from two party took part in the sessions and started to speak and assert in relation to the topic of readmission agreement, the coding was not carried out separately for each party but rather dependent on the party that participated in the discussion. The coding scheme of atlas-ti program has facilitated this complex process despite difficulties confronted through the confusion of party assertions, since they made similar references in a lot of cases. In the next step, the code units were extracted in a word file from which all the codes with quotations were classified and transferred in the categories of parties in form of a table of summary screen. During this process, some of the codes were incorporated with the similar codes and improved according to the content of the context. Within the same process, the same content-related parts, particularly in the commission protocols, have been also analyzed, but not in detail, since considerable number of quite similar arguments were made within these protocols. In the next step the paraphrasing took place, in which the code units have been rewritten in the grammatically short forms regarding to the content as much as possible. This is the part where the translations from Turkish to English also took place, since the documents are in Turkish. The next step is the phase of generalizing, in which paraphrases from the previous phase were formulated in the more generalized formats that regarded previously determined abstraction level of explanations. During this process, the exact same content and unimportant paraphrases were crossed off. Yet most of the generalized assertions have been often left untouched without crossing off because they were regarded as important for the part of reduction, namely the next part in which the paraphrases correlating with each other were summarized in the new assertions. During the reduction part, some of the codes, which were considered to be irrelevant in relation to the context, have been completely taken out of the analysis. In the last step, all the results of the analysis have been broadly examined and interpreted. While this interpretation process, the recurring and similar contents have been

descriptive summarized and according to the purpose of the research interest and question explicated.

Turkey-EU relations: From Ankara Agreement to Readmission Process

In this part of the study, the focus will be laid upon the Turkey's long-lasting relations with EU. The purpose of the section helps to understand what sort of developments Turkey historically experienced with EU. First, it will be shown how Turkey at the very beginning started the negotiations on Turkey's integration into EU and then how Turkey became a candidate country for EU membership after a very long time. And finally, Turkey's recent relation with EU in the context of readmission agreement will be enlightened to find out what is the meaning of the readmission agreement with EU-Turkey relations.

1963 Ankara Agreement

After the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, Turkey's relation with Europe enters the new phase. Historically, Turkey had very close relations with Europe, it came to apply for an associate membership in July 1959. The EEC suggested that the establishment of an association was an interim measure, pointing the full accession. This development led to the negotiations and Turkey finally signed the Ankara Association Agreement on 12 September 1963, marking Turkey's first official relation with EEC and first preliminary step for the full membership. The Ankara Agreement rather laid the focus upon the economic relations because the EEC was created first as an economic union. Therefore, Association Agreement basically foresaw Turkey's progressive establishment of custom union in order to obtain the objectives of the agreement. This resulted in signing the additional protocol on 23 November 1970, coming into force on 1 January 1973. From now on, the relations did not work well due to the military inventions in Turkey and Turkey's interference in Cyprus (Aksu 2012: 6-7). After the establishment of civil government under Özal in 1983, Turkey's relation with EU normalized, the new government's struggle to introduce reform programs and a mass campaign within and outside the country to initialize Turkey's application for the full membership, boosted the hopes for Turkey's gradual integration. Ali Bozer, then Turkey's minister in charge for the relations with EEC, handed the membership request to Leo Tindemans, then Belgian's foreign minister and the president of the EEC's Council of Ministers, on April 14, 1987. Tindemans insisted that EEC had to

study every application under the Treaty of Rome despite the objections from Greek government (Ibid. 9). The army's ongoing influence in Turkish politics, Turkey's poor record on the human rights and the discordance on the issue of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece, led to EEC's negative decision on Turkey's membership request. Yet the Commission initiated a new package, called Matutes, on 7 June 1990 to modernize Turkey's economy and improve Turkey and now EU relations. Consequently, the Custom Union, which was foreseen in the Ankara agreement, was signed on 6 March 1995 (Nugent, 2005: 2; Ibid. 10-12).

1999 Helsinki Summit and 2005 Opening of Full Membership Negotiations

The Custom Union did not bring about the desired outcome for Turkey. The Europe Council's December 1997 meeting in Luxembourg stated that Turkey was not eligible for the second enlargement waves. Turkey's waiting longer and longer without any prediction on the probable future review and a date to start the negotiations, prompted angry reactions from Turkey. In the aftermath, the council initialized a new attempt, declaring that Turkey was eligible in principle for accession, yet it had to fulfill the Copenhagen criterion as the other applicants. Through the same process, Turkey obtained the status of a candidate country at the December 1999 in Helsinki. Meanwhile, Turkey worked on the new reforms in constitutional changes and domestic political and administrative practices in line with the Copenhagen criterion. However, The Commission in 2003 linked Turkey's membership prospect with the issue of Cyprus, explaining that Turkey should be determined to find a solution for the decades lasting Cyprus problem. While this issue preserved its hotness and the new discussion on the proposal of Germany and France that Turkey should obtain a privileged partnership status instead of a full member, the commission recommended that Turkey nearly implemented the Copenhagen Criterion. Finally, in December 2004, the summit agreed on the recommendation and confirmed a date for the negotiations to be opened, namely in October 2005, yet with some conditions (Nugent, 2005:2-5). The negotiating framework namely defined the accession negotiations as 'open-ended' and conditioned with some provisions as to what ends the talks between EU and Turkey (Schimmelfennig, 2009: 414). These conditions were not welcomed by Turkey and the demand of EU that Turkey should sign the update customs agreement, requiring the official recognition of Republic of Cyprus, was rejected (Nugent, 2007: 482). Therefore, the first real prospect for EU full membership, that brought along democratic reforms and labelled the 'golden age' of Europeanisation in Turkey, vanished by its start of the accession negotiations in October 2005. Turkey's reluctance to

accept the new protocols of custom agreement, that foresees Turkey to recognize republic of Cyprus, led to EU decisions in December 2006, suspending the opening of the negotiations until Turkey fulfills the demand of EU on Cyprus issue (Aydin-Düzgit & Kaliber 2016: 1-2).

Readmission Negotiations

The suspension of the negotiations, because of the disagreement in Cyprus issue, intersects with the process of negotiations in Readmission agreement (Bürgin, 2012: 889). However, the beginning of the readmission process for the first time got into motion with the EU Council's invitation in March 2003. Yet firstly, Turkey did not accept the conditions of the readmission draft. Following, the EU has set a political pressure on Turkey, declaring that a failure in the readmission process would negatively influence Turkey's accession talks. Turkey ultimately began to negotiate for a likely readmission agreement in March 2004. As the membership process did not go well in December 2006, the readmission process was also suspended (Aka & Nergiz, 2015: 258). After three years of halt in readmission negotiations, Turkey and EU finally agreed on a readmission agreement text on 14 January 2011 and initialed the agreement on 21 June 2012 (Ibid., 265). Turkey finally signed the readmission agreement on 16 December 2013. On the same day, a visa liberalization dialogue has been also launched with Turkey. But this dialogue did not directly grant the visa exemption for Turkish citizens and conditioned visa lifting to a roadmap which entails Turkey to implement and adopt 72 requirements (European Commission 2016). In terms of content, readmission agreement basically obliges Turkey to readmit the irregular immigrants to Turkey, that entered Europe passing through Turkey (Bürgin, 2016:110). Barring from the Visa liberalization dialogue, the developments in refugee crisis in 2016 have brought together Turkey and EU officials. On 18th of March 2016, the EU Heads of State and Turkey agreed on the new provisions, which foresaw the visa liberalization roadmap to accelerate lifting up the visa requirements for Turkish citizens till latest end of June 2016. Yet, as before, it has been conditioned for Turkey to fulfill the entire criterions that are stated on the roadmap. Besides, it has been stated that EU will speed up the financial aid of 3 billion under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and prepare the additional 3 million till the end of 2018 when the initial resource is spent. Moreover, the accession process will be re-opened with Chapter 33 on financial and budgetary provisions and it will be simultaneously continued with the preparatory work on the opening of the other chapters (European Commission, 2016).

The Election Results in Turkey (2002-2015)

In this part of the study, it will be firstly illustrated what sort of election system in Turkey prevails and how this impacts on political party's distribution in the parliament. Secondly, the election results from 2002 to 2015 will be displayed in order to have a good eye on the party's position and power within the Parliament. This section will also render to see which political parties increase or decrease their electorates throughout the decade. The goal is to understand whether or which parties could be regarded as the parties that have more possibilities to take over office or to become a coalition party.


Since the transition to the multi-party system in 1946 a bunch of different election systems have been applied in Turkey. Between 1946 and 1960, the majority election system has been put into practice that resulted in a massive domination of single governing party. That subsequently brought about the debates underlying the injustices of a majoritarian system and the importance of a proportional election system (Haydaroglu & Cevik 2016: 54-5). The discussions brought along a change in the electoral system and Turkey switched it to the proportional election system in 1961. Since then the republic has implemented *d'Hondt* system in all the general parliamentary elections and in by-elections barring from the 1965 general parliament election and the 1966 parliament by-election (Sami, 2006: 91). Despite the diverse applications of even the *d'Hondt* system throughout 60s, 70s, 80s, Turkey eventually adopted the *d'Hondt* election system with country threshold of 10 per cent in 1995 (Ünlükapan: 2003: 56). The law 4121 adopted on 23.07.1995 has stated in this regard that “*The election laws is regulated as consistent with the principles of fair representation and stability in management.*” (Sami, 2006: 102). Yet, it was clear that introducing 10 per cent of country threshold has favored the principle of stability in management. This was indeed the goal of the military administration following the coup in 1980, which considered the coalitions as the primary reason of political instability and aimed at ending the political structure with separated multi-parties (Haydaroglu & Cevik 2016: 57). This tradition of increasing political stability with such a high threshold in the election system has been applicable since then till nowadays. The effects of such an election system are remarkable. Therefore, this section intends to look at the effects of such a threshold on the party system. The argument of this section follows the doctrine of the Maurice Duverger, who namely expressed that “*The factors which condition a country's political life are... fundamentally interdependent. A study of the effects of just one of them, considered in isolation, necessarily*

implies a great deal of artificiality... In other words, one cannot say a certain electoral system determines that political life will take this or that form, but simply that it tends to have this or that effect, that is to say that it reinforces elements pushing in one direction and weakens those pushing in the opposite direction.” (Duverger: 1950:11 in Hale 1980).

Duverger’s argument basically points out to the fact that election system is not absolute deterministic for the sake of parliamentary democracy despite its major effects on the parliamentary allocations (Hale: 1980: 410). Put it differently, the argument of the Duverger namely recognizes the importance of an election system on party constellations in parliament, but refers also implicitly to the other factors relevant for shaping the party politics. In line with his argument, the examination of election results from 2002 to 2015 is made in the following sections.

Parliament Election: 3 November 2002

The parliament election, held on 3th of November 2002, took place in the pursuit of an atmosphere in which the economic crisis occupied the agenda of the entire country. The turmoil, prompted by the economic downturn found expression in the campaign and mirrored the encompassing disaffection of the voters for all parliamentary parties (OSCE, 2002: 3). In addition, the inefficient and corruption-ridden governments of the last decade and its effects of political instability and economic deterioration have exhausted all segments of the society (Cagaptay, 2002: 42-3). After such an unsettled era, Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) has managed to gain a landslide victory, receiving 34.4 percent of the vote and owing to the 10 per cent threshold of election system, winning 363 seats of 550. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican’s People’s Party) was the only other party that exceeded the country threshold and was able to capture representation in the parliament. CHP namely received 19.3 percent of the vote and won 178 seats. Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP, Democratic Left Party), Anavatan Partisi (ANAP, Motherland Party) and Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP, National Movement Party) – the parties that formed the coalition government since the 1999 parliamentary elections experienced a heavy defeat und remained under the threshold. Moreover, Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP, True Path Party) stroke also the threshold snag, winning 9.5 of the vote and consequently took no seats in the parliament. Furthermore, the pro-Kurdish Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP, Democratic People’s Party) fell short to hurdle the 10 per cent threshold, receiving 6.2 of the vote (Sayari 2007: 198-9).



Source: the Guardian

Graphic 1. Turkish election 2002

The fact that AKP and CHP have been the only two parties that could capture seats in the parliament, implies a major effect of the election system, the high threshold of 10 per cent. As can be seen in above, AKP attained almost two-third of the parliament's seat which is sufficient to form a majority government and almost sufficient to make the constitutional changes, which require 367 MPs, despite receiving well-nigh one-third of the vote. Likewise, CHP acquired nearly a one-third of the seats of parliament despite winning only one-fifth of the vote. These numbers illustrate rather an obvious effect of the electoral system than the outcome of a strong majoritarian impulse among Turkish voters (Ibid: 206). If there was no threshold in the election of 2002, AKP and CHP would have garnered respectively 261 and 114 seats. Similarly, DYP, MHP, GP¹, DEHAP and ANAP would have taken respectively 42, 34, 28 and 51 seats. The seats that these parties could have acquired in case of no threshold have forfeited to AKP and CHP. The election system evidently altered the proportionality of party representation in the parliament, favoring AKP in a high degree and CHP to a lesser degree while disadvantaging their competitors in a very high degree (Ibid: 201).

¹ Genc Parti (GP, Youth Party) was a party formed by a business tycoon whose politic arguments were based on the populist critics of International Monetary Fund (IMF), globalization and West (Sayari, 2007:199).

Parliament Election: 22 July of 2007

The parliamentary election on 22 July 2007 was an early election that was prompted by the crisis of electing a new president for Turkey. The first voting round boycotted by the Republican's People's Party CHP led subsequently to a decision of constitutional court declaring that the first round of voting is not valid due to the lack of two-third majority of the parliament. Following, AKP proposed to make a constitutional change in a package that demands the direct election of the president by a popular vote. The ongoing disagreements and discussions finally gave rise to the declaration of an early election on 22 July 2007 (OSCE, 2007: 2-3). In this election, AKP has increased its vote by 12.4 per cent and received 46.5 per cent of the vote in total, thus won 341 seats in the parliament. The electoral coalition of CHP and DSP garnered only 20.8 per cent of the vote and captured 112 seats in the parliament. Twenty per cent of the vote that CHP and DSP together received, remained under the expectations of the electors. The Nationalist Movement Party managed to pass 10 per cent threshold and received 14.3 per cent of the vote. MHP thus won 71 seats in the parliament and caught output since the party failed to win seats in the parliament in 2002 elections. Current HDP, then DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, Democratic Society Party) ran as independents in the 2007 parliamentary election and they managed to win representation in the parliament. The twenty-six of its candidates became the first parliamentarians from a Kurdish ethnic party after more than a decade of attempt (Sekercioglu & Arikan, 2008: 213-14; Haberturk, 2007).


Election results from 2007 seems to have lesser effect on the party allocation in the parliament. Since DTP as independents and MHP have managed to win representation in the parliament, the effect of 10 per cent threshold shrank in comparison to the 2002 Elections. If there was 4 per cent threshold instead of 10 in 2007 elections, AKP would have won 338, CHP 110, MHP 68 and DTP 25 seats. Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti, DP) that received 5.4 per cent could have won 9 seats if the threshold was brought down to 4 per cent. As can be seen, 10 per cent threshold has practically hindered DP from winning the seats in the parliament, though the loss of parliamentarians from each party in case of 4 per cent threshold does not imply huge differences in comparison with the differences of the 2002 elections (Göksel & Cinar, 2011:4).

Parliament Election: 12 June of 2011

Although all the political parties have addressed more specific issues during the election campaign of 2011, the main topic has concentrated on the debate over the constitutional reform. The constitutional amendments of 2010 played also a leading role in the further discussions of a new constitution aiming to democratize Turkey (Aslan-Akman, 2012: 87-8). In the aftermath of such an atmosphere, Turkish people went to cast their votes. The results have reinforced AKP's hegemony once again. AKP, that has won the parliamentary elections three times one after the other and thus increased its vote steadily, has been the first party since the introduction of the multi-party system in 1950 (Tezcür, 2012: 117-18). Justice and Development Party, AKP namely, received 49,83 per cent of the vote winning 327 seats in the parliament. Republican's People's Party, CHP, gathered 25.98 per cent of the vote and gained 135 seats. National Movement Party, MHP, took 13.01 per cent of the vote, capturing 53 seats. And HDP, then BDP (Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi, the peace and Democracy Party), managed to take seats with the independent candidates, receiving in total 6,57 per cent of the vote and capturing 35 seats in the parliament (Haberturk, 2011). The election results of 2011 have exhibited the appearance of a dominance party system in Turkey, in which AKP continued to preserve its absolute majority in the parliament, and other three parties: CHP, MHP and HDP, then BDP, constituted the other competitive parties in the Turkish party system (Aslan-Akman, 2012: 79). AK parties' sequentially sweeping electoral victory in the third term has been the evidence of a dominance party system - winning the three consecutive elections. This implies on one hand how powerful AKP is, that pass other parties' vote share in the election competition and on the other hand, how the weak opposition helps to facilitate the emergence of a dominant party, since the opposition, divided and dispersed, is not capable of arising as an alternative competitor (Carkoglu, 2011: 44).

The effect of the 2011 Election System on the party allocation in the parliament has been noticeably reduced since the four parties emerged to be the competitors in the Turkish party system. As can be seen in the graphic below, no party has gained bonus seats in the 2011 Elections. Other parties aside from AKP, CHP, MHP and HDP, then BDP, failed to take a considerable vote for winning a seat in the parliament. Yet, if there was no threshold or 1, 2, or 3 per cent of threshold, SP (Saadet Partisi, Felicity Party) would have won 6 seats in the parliament. Although Saadet Partisi was not assertive in the 2011 elections, a change in the

threshold might have enhanced the fair representation of Turkish parliament (Göksel & Cinar, 2011:3-4).




Source: the Guardian

Graphic 2. Turkish election 2011

Parliament Election: 7 June of 2015

The election in 2015 has been shaped by three central points: the concerns on AKP’s tendency toward authoritarianism, AKP’s economic performance and the competition for the Kurdish vote. Besides, the constitutional change for introducing a presidential system has been another issue during the campaign of the election. Although this did not find an explicit expression in AKP’s promises, it became apparent in the background that the issue was an essential part of the election in June 2015. In addition, all the opposition parties: CHP, HDP and MHP, have asserted that the presidential system would facilitate the authoritarian inclination for the ruling party and determinately opposed it (Kemahlioglu, 2015: 450-51). The results were astonishing for any person in Turkey: AKP has lost its majority in the parliament for the first time, receiving 40.87 per cent and thus won 258 seats. Other surprising result was HDP’s success to pass the 10 per cent threshold, garnering 13.12 per cent of the vote and capturing 80 seats in the parliament. MHP has also increased its vote, receiving 16.29 per cent of the vote, winning 80 seats. CHP has not achieved success for its vote, stagnating its traditional per cent range, receiving 24.95 per cent and taking 132 seats (Haberturk, 2015a).



Source: the Guardian

Graphic 3. Turkish election 2015

The results of June 2015 Election have created a new picture for the Turkish Parliament, changing the balance of the party constellation in parliament. As shown in the graphic above, the fair representation in the parliament has been further enhanced by HDP's exceeding the election hurdle. No parties have gained extra seats in the parliament, reducing the impairing effect of the 10 per cent threshold of Turkish election system.

Parliament Election: 1 November of 2015


Turkey went to the snap parliamentary elections in November 2015 in an ambiance, in which the increasing political violence and terrorism, which were awakened by the renewal of the Kurdish conflict in the southeast, and the two-major suicide bombing, carried out Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), dominated the agenda (Sayari, 2016). Since the incumbent AKP lost its dominance in the June 2015 Election, there appeared an opportunity to form a minority government between CHP, HDP and MHP in order to replace AKP in power. Yet, the disunity between these parties brought along no success and resulted in a failure. Besides, President Erdogan's determined stance toward the declaring the snap elections, for which he hoped and considered AKP to gain its majority in the parliament, eliminated other five options from the six government coalition possibilities (Ibid, 2016: 265, 267-269). The result of 1 November 2015 elections was surprising once again. AKP gained back its power, receiving 49.50 per cent of the vote. Thus, AKP captured 317 seats in the parliament, obtaining the power to form a majority government. CHP preserved its traditional vote range with a minor increase in comparison with the June election, garnering 25.32 per cent of the

vote and winning 134 seats. HDP and MHP appeared to lose their electorates, yet they managed to surpass 10 per cent threshold. HDP gained 10.76 per cent of the vote, winning 59 seats. MHP scored 11.90 per cent of the vote, taking 40 seats in the parliament (Haberturk 2015b). The effect of the threshold of Turkish election system has been also reduced almost to zero since all the four parties managed to gain seats in the parliament.

Table 1. The percentage of the vote and number of MPs since 2002

Parties	2002		2007		2011		2015 (June)		2015 (Nov.)	
	Vote (%)	MPs	Vote (%)	MPs	Vote (%)	MPs	Vote (%)	MPs	Vote (%)	MPs
AKP	34	365	46	341	49	327	40	258	49	317
CHP	19	177	20	112	25	135	24	132	25	134
MHP	8	0	14	71	13	53	16	80	11	40
HDP ¹	6	0	5	26 ²	6	35	13	80	10	59

Source Haberturk (<http://www.haberturk.com/secim>)



Source: The author, based on the election results (<http://www.haberturk.com/secim>)

Graphic 4. Election results in Turkey since 2015, by party (%)

In sum, as the Table 1 and the graphic above display, the opposition parties CHP, MHP and HDP have not managed to obtain sufficient vote to form a government or a coalition government. It is apparent that AKP has steadily increased its vote since 2002 till to June

2015 Elections and remained to be the dominant party in Turkey. For the first time since June 2015 Elections it was possible that the opposition parties could have formed a minority government. Yet this did not take place due to the disagreement between the opposition parties, which also facilitated President Erdogan's wish to announce the snap elections in the pursuit of winning the majority in the parliament. In relation to the effect of the 10 per cent threshold of Turkish election System, AKP has benefited quite a lot from it in 2002 Elections. The fact that no parties except AKP and CHP surpassed the election hurdle in 2002, has also relatively favored CHP in the parliament. This effect of the threshold has been reduced in 2007 elections since MHP managed to win seats in the parliament. Elections in 2011 have further minimized the damaging effect of the threshold. By June 2015 and November snap elections, this effect has almost disappeared because all the four parties were able to gain seats in the parliament. Returning to the argument of Duverger, it is to recognize that Turkey's very high country threshold in the election system has mostly served to the dominance of AKP throughout the decade, affecting well enough the party constellations in the parliament. However, it is also to acknowledge that AKP has steadily enhanced its popularity and its electoral wins throughout the elections, and remained in the post. On the contrary, opposition parties CHP, MHP and HDP were neither able to capture an electoral dominance, such as AKP has, nor unique enough to form a coalition to topple the AKP from power when the chance came.

Political Party Stances toward European Union

In this section of the study, the political party stances of the Turkish parliament parties toward the European Union will be illustrated. Particularly, it will be examined how the parties view the EU as a whole and as such, where precisely they stand within the pro-contra EU range. The focus will also be laid on the parties' cleavages, which will enlighten their left-right spectrum. Thus, the positioning of the investigated parliament parties will reflect their ideological lines. This section will also help to answer the sub-research question of the study. It will be namely attempted to show how the relevant in the context of the study parties generally picture the European Union and the European Integration and it will become apparent whether there is a change to detect within the positions of the parties through the process of readmission agreement.

AKP-Islamist Conservative Party

Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP mainly descends from the pro-Islamist political party FP (Fazilet Partisi, Virtue Party) as the successor of a late conservative Islamist faction of the Turkish political system. In its establishment though, the AK Party has expressed separation of its party program and ideological stances from the traditionalist pro-Islamist parties, highlighting the EU membership as a natural consequence of modernization. By embracing the EU and the EU membership, associated with democratization, improvement of individual rights and freedoms, and foreign investments, the party has described itself as a modern liberal conservative party despite its Islamist pedigree (Dikici Bilgin, 2017: 199-200). The pro-Islamist parties, on the other hand, have been categorically the most sceptic and rejectionist parties toward EU and EU membership. They picture the EU as a Christian Club and consider it a threat to the national sovereignty and unity (Ibid., 204).

AKP has yet maintained its democratic conservative position from 2002 onwards. Its pro-EU stand, commitment to further democratic reforms, and cooperative foreign policy approach allowed the party to pull the constituency from the right-wing during the 2007 elections, by shifting its position toward becoming a centre party in Turkish politics (Carkoglu, 2007). The ideological positions within the first decade of the 21st century in Turkish politics have been indeed changing for each party, especially for AKP. The increasing support among the voters in the elections of 2007 and 2011 also exhibited such trend by revealing that the positive evaluations of performance and the ability to manage the economy well, rather than the ideological position of AKP government, played more significant role (Kalaycioglu, 2013: 494). The pro-European position of AKP though started to disappear from the official agenda toward 2010 due to the severe trust problem and the enhancing reluctance of the EU to recognize Turkey as a full member in the aftermath of the Cyprus issue. Besides, certain incidents, such as the decision of European Court of Human Rights that the headscarf ban in the Turkish universities conforms with the principle of secularism in Turkey, have confused the head minds of AKP and the conservative religious community on the ideal of EU membership (Yaka, 2016: 154). Since most of the AKP constituency relies on this faction of the society, this and similar incidents were of enough importance for AKP officials to shift to a rather skeptical position toward the EU. Therefore, from 2010 onwards AKP began to sound more critical toward the EU, limiting the relations to mutual benefits and interdependence that the full membership would bring about (Dikici Bilgin, 2017: 200-1).

Despite its changing positions though, in its very nature AKP has been the representative of the conservative religious project of Turkey. Islamic conservative identity is constituted through the historical narrative of being the enduring element of the nation, based on the national and religious values (Alaranta, 2014: 122). The party's early years introduced plenty of reforms that increased civil liberties, reduced the political role of the military, liberalized society and economy and got one's hand to solve the most controversial problems, such as the Kurdish question. Yet the recent attitude of the party has shown deteriorations in its liberal position, by attempting to initiate a social engineering project that aims to turn Turkey into a religiously defined conservative country (Ibid., 116).

CHP-Centre Left Party

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP, the founding party of the Turkish Republic is labelled as the center-left party in Turkey. The party's discourse has been rather a left one during the late 1960s and during the 1970s. A shift toward centrist attitude can be observed since the 1990s (Dikici Bilgin, 2017: 196). The parties from the center-left in Turkey have been categorically pro-EU. It is clear that the skeptical positions from this faction increases when they are opposition parties. When coming into power, they focused on the expected economic gains, attempting to take a pragmatic position. Yet CHP has historically been the biggest proponents of EU membership as the Atatürk's, founder of Turkish republic, modernization project (Ibid., 204).

Even though the sociological origins locate CHP as pro-EU party, from the 2000s onward, the critical positions toward the EU found a significant place. This change within the party position has been interpreted as to increasing Euroscepticism from CHP's side. Yet on the contrary, CHP's opposition toward the EU since the 2000s arises from the contextual factor of the party's opposition role against the ruling AKP. In other words, when opposition in the parliament, CHP approached skeptically AKP's pro-EU attitude, arguing firstly, that AKP employed the EU membership as a goal in order to establish its social conservative agenda and secondly referring to AKP's failure to advocate Turkey's national interest through the EU membership process (Celep, 2011: 424-25). Likewise, from the 2000s onward, CHP criticized the EU and other member states policies and treatments toward Turkey for their unwillingness

and dissidence to recognize Turkey as a European country (Dikici Bilgin, 2017: 204). Moreover, in its very establishment by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, CHP represented the national secularist identity, produced by the historical narrative of the Atatürk's revolution and his principles. That inferred a secular state which is free from the dogmatic, backward and repressive religious traditionalism. Traditionally, CHP has been the representative of Atatürk's party and the Kemalist ideological stream (Alaranta, 2014: 122). Such an ideology toward the EU meant being both pro-Western and anti-imperialist. The anti-imperialist position supposed the party's response to the western powers that Turkey fought against in the Turkish war of Independence and a reaction to foreign powers sanctions and stances following the defeat of Ottoman Empire in the First World War (Celep, 2011: 423-24).

HDP-Pro Kurdish Left Party

Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP is the current version of the traditional pro-Kurdish political movement. Hitherto, a plenty of Kurdish parties has been closed down by the Constitutional court in Turkey. DEP, HADEP, DTP, BDP (respectively, People's Labor Party, People's Democracy Party, Democratic Society Party, Peace and Democracy Party) are all the previous versions of today's HDP (People's Democratic Party). The pro-Kurdish element has come along as a separate movement from the factional movements within the leftist parties as the political processes relatively normalized in the 1990s (Dikici Bilgin, 2017: 194). As a left pro-Kurdish party, which means being the representative of oppressed groups of people, this party's family discourse has been historically based on the domestic issue of ethnic-cultural rights. Though the pro-Kurdish parties have been constantly closed due to their so-called separatist activities, the main ideology remained the same (Ibid., 196). The BDP, a previous version of the current HDP, was the first party of its family that gave place to foreign policy in its manifesto, where they pledged not to make any secret treaties with other countries and to leave the issues of foreign policy to the domain and authority of the central government (Ibid., 201). The current HDP emerged as the first leftist party among its family parties that has introduced itself as a Turkey's party, promised to be the representative of all the oppressed people rather than deal only with the Kurdish issues. Pledges on women's politics, communal autonomy and decentralizing, the rights of ethnical and religious minorities, improvements regarding the minimal wage, increasing of the pensions, effective fight against the unemployment, and reducing of the working hours to thirty-five have become the determinant positions of the party (Küçükyaşar, 2015). From such

a perspective, it can be argued that HDP categorically strives to become a Turkish version of a green party in Europe. Carrying the Kurdish elements within and introducing a new leftist ideology, the party can be classified as pro-EU party.

MHP-Nationalist Far Right Party

Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP as a nationalist far right party emerged in the context of the long-standing ethnic conflict in Turkey; a party that perceives any challenges from the left with an extremist sensitivity and regards the religious norms quite respectfully (Dikici Bilgin, 2017: 194). The MHP has been categorically not an EU-rejectionist party, on the contrary, it has considered the full membership as a republican target. Yet the party's harsh and radical critics of the EU occupied its agenda since the mid-1990s particularly due to the Cyprus and Armenian issues. Basically, MHP's opposition is not directed against the EU membership itself but rather against the EU's unequal treatment toward Turkey (Ibid., 204). The party, for instance, rejects conclusively any other option than an actual membership, expressing its opposition to the offer of privilege membership on Turkey (Ibid., 200). Yet the party is extremely sensitive about the continuity of nation state, declaring those who oppose the idea of a national Turkish state as the enemy. Therefore, MHP's enemies have been changing: while communism was the enemy during the 1970s, from the 1990s onward, it has become the separatist PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistane, Kurdistan Worker's Party) (Baskan, 2005: 60-1). Thus, though the party perceives the EU membership as an ideal of the republic's principle, it highlights also that being a EU member is not necessary an element of the Turkish identity, thus separating its position clearly from the Kemalist discourse (Dikici Bilgin, 2017: 200). Put it differently, while, for instance, it could be argued that the party has been the only one within the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition from 1999 to 2002, opposing Turkey's effort to fulfill the legal criteria for EU membership (Canefe & Bora, 2003: 127), this opposition has been rather moderate, focusing the critics on the EU's double-standard treatment and its policy demands in relation to the Cyprus issue (Dikici Bilgin, 2017: 200).

In summary, even though AKP has classified itself as a modern liberal conservative party in its establishment and continued to follow this direction for a long time, the recent position and ideology seems to show it rather as an Islamist conservative party in Turkey. CHP, as the party that founded the republic, has been a constant advocator of the EU and the

Westernization. Though the party still principally stands for the EU membership, the recent critics toward the EU is based, firstly, on its role as an opposition party in the parliament and, secondly, on the EU and other member state's treatment toward Turkey. HDP, as basically the pro-Kurdish party, avoided taking an explicit position toward the foreign policy for a long time, concentrating on the issues of ethnic and cultural rights. Later the party in its current situation has embraced explicitly a discourse, by collecting a lot of leftist elements under the roof of HDP and thus becoming a pro-Kurdish leftist party. MHP, by being a far right nationalist party, has categorically not rejected the EU membership but has shown extreme sensitivity in regard of the issues of the Turkish identity and nation. Any initiative touching upon these sensitive areas resolved in an extremist oppositional reaction within the party.

Theory Part: Understanding Party Positions regarding to Readmission Agreement

The theory part mainly attempts to interpret the positioning of Turkish parliament parties in respect to Readmission Agreement by drawing two theory line, namely the External Incentive Model and the definition and conceptualization of Euroscepticism. The External Incentive Model aims to clarify the primary positioning of the ruling Justice and Development Party, Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AK party in a shortened form. The concept of Euroscepticism, on the other hand, serves predominantly to address the positioning of opposition parties. This theory line will yet throw light on the secondary positioning of AK Party as well.

External Incentive Model

This study seeks to explore what positions the Turkish parliament parties take within the debates of commission meetings and parliamentary sessions in the background of the Readmission Agreement. First goal is to understand the position of the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP)). AK party is currently the ruling party in Turkey, therefore shedding light on the party's interest in negotiating and afterwards in signing the Readmission Agreement with the EU takes precedence for the study. Bearing in mind the theoretical framework, the External Incentive Model, of Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2005), who are basically concerned with the analysis of external governance of Europe within the relations between EU and the former accession countries of

Central and Eastern Europe, implies a great deal in this relation to detect ruling AK party's position (Schimmelfennig & Wagner, 2004: 658).

When examining, the governance approach in European studies aims largely to describe and examine significant forms of policy making within EU. Yet, the process of eastern enlargement of the CEECs, illustrates the relevance of EU's external relations. The main difference between the internal and external dimension of governance arises from the distinction of where and how it is applied. In the former the rules are created and implemented in the national political systems within the EU. However, the external dimension demonstrates an exclusive transfer of given EU rules and their adaptation by non-member states. The focus of this study is laid upon the latter dimension, namely the external dimension of governance, to understand the prior facet of the ruling AK Party. The most important aspect of the EU external governance deals with the governance mode through which the EU transfers given rules. In other words, the key concern in the whole process is clarifying how the rule transfer or adaptation happens or which form it takes (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 661-2). Analyzing the arguments and statements of AK parties' deputies in the commission and parliament parties, thus, offers substantial implications about the way in which rule transfer operates or is being adapted – in this case, how the signing of the readmission agreement and its rule transfer or adaptation occurs or impacts its position and at last, which form it takes. However, the present study does not restrict itself to exclusive factors of EU's external governance. Because, although the external governance suggests the process through which EU expands its rules beyond the EU's borders and thus, contributes to the extension of the scope of the European integration, it lays the focus on its effects and forms too, which go beyond its incentive of membership for candidate states. Furthermore, EU governance approach concentrates more on the sectoral fragmented specific issues and points to possible relations of power and interdependence with countries across regions, international organizations and third-country nationals in form of bilateral co-operation agreements, co-operation frameworks, and democracy promotion in divergent public areas (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009).

Indeed, studying Europeanisation brings together a range of literature of EU approaches; such as the enlargement, transition, EU governance, Europeanisation and international institutions and unavoidably puts forward the different forms and effects of the Europeanisation process,

giving possibility to see the deficiencies of each research area (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 3-7). What is desired to say is, that the purpose of the argument is not to limit the scope of the study merely to the external governance approach or to expose comparative analytical perspectives of Europeanisation studies, but rather to prove the importance of conceiving various approaches of EU's external dimension, which constitutes the most crucial point of studying the Europeanisation of CEECs and thus, in this case study, helps to understand the positioning of the ruling AK Party towards the Readmission Agreement.

The Europeanisation principally indicates a process in which a government adopts EU rule or norm. Rule adoption as the dependent variable refers to the institutionalization of EU rules into the domestic politics. Yet, the impact of EU on the domestic politics does not necessarily confine itself to the legal transposition of rules; it also involves the implementation and enforcement of rules, which brings along a distinction between different forms of adoption; the formal, the behavioral and the communicative or discursive conception. These basically highlight the different conceptions of norms from the literature of international institutions. The formal conception or adoption refers to the process in which the states transpose EU rules into national law or establish formal institutions and procedures as required by the EU rules (Ibid., 7-8). This form of adoption might be costly for the government, nevertheless, it has a place in creating formal EU-conformed rules for external interests which might eventually have less or no effect on the actual domestic politics and outcomes (Ibid., 17). The behavioral conception or adoption points out to the behavior that primarily seeks to address the rule-conforming. In this form of adoption, the compliance with the EU rules is the costliest. The impetus behind the behavioral adaptation arises from the need or the conviction that a domestic policy fails or certain domestic policy area is to be redressed (Ibid., 17, 25). Finally, the discursive conception or adoption points out to the discourse or the rhetorical action that the domestic actors take to demonstrate the incorporation of a rule as a positive reference. This sort of act and discourse may either be in the form of sincere persuasion of a norm or it may simply show a strategic action of the domestic actor to "talk the EU talk" (Ibid., 8, 17; Jacoby, 2002).

Such a positioning refers to the functional dualism approach in organizations in which developing formal structures helps to overcome high costs of harmonization process through

creating dual nature. This configuration, in turn, “*buffers*” the “*actual activities of organization*” through exterior “*ceremonial*” structure. Similarly, domestic actors buffer the actual costs of incorporation of EU rule through underlying the importance of the implementing EU-conform changes (Jacoby, 2002: 130-1). In other words, as such, the actors strategically follow such a behavior to justify their self-interested claims or cement the significance of their preferences and actions through underlining the consonant of the EU rule with the domestic needs. The purpose of such rhetorical act is mainly to reduce or avoid the costs of socialization of the EU norms and rules since actors’ focus and interest is fixed upon the consequences of conforming the EU norm, rather than its appropriateness to the domestic needs or to the actors’ changing views, interests and identities (Schimmelfennig, 2005: 830-1). It is yet important to note that the different forms of adoption, which function as the explanatory variables for the specific behavior of the actors, do not exclude each other mutually and are difficult to distinguish from each other. Because, as March and Olsen argued, although the rules guide the behavior to a certain extent and make one action more dominant than the other ones, they usually do not determine a precise political behavior or policy outcomes. Rules, laws, identities and institutions function as inducing factors rather than dictate a changeless action. It can be sometimes seen that the actors tend to *accommodate shifting circumstances by changing behavior without changing core rules and structures* (March & Olsen, 2004: 10).

As can be seen, different forms of rule adoption can be put into practice by the domestic actors during the process of the Europeanisation. The fact that the actors may follow different forms of rule adoption, results firstly from the different mechanisms of Europeanisation and the conditions under which governments adopt EU rules and secondly from the different logics that socialization dynamic of rule adoption possibly follows (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 8-9). The *first* distinction leads to the further question of whether the process of Europeanisation is driven by an external force, whose trigger is EU, or if the domestic change is spearheaded by domestic actors (Tocci, 2005). If the EU induces the process of rule adoption, then that is regarded as an EU-driven rule adoption, however, if the domestic actors in nonmember states independently initiate the rule adoption, this is termed as domestically driven adoption. The *second* distinction emerges from the different logics of action which governments follow during the process of socialization (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 8-9). The distinction between the different logics finds expression within

the contrast between the rationalism and constructivism in IR theory and between the rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism in comparative studies. They both attribute to the distinction between the analysis of “*logic of consequences*” and the “*logic of appropriateness*”. The former holds that domestic actors are instrumentally rational and act strategically to carry out their interests and preferences. In the latter case, the actors are influenced by the internalized identities, values and norms. Accordingly, they choose the most appropriate one to their internalized variables (Sedelmeier, 2011: 11).

If these two distinctions are paired, the three models of socialization process appear, which relates to the question whether the conditionality and incentives, or persuasion, or a combination of both is determinant for the domestic change (Checkel, 2005: 803; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 9). The first model to explore in this respect is therefore the External Incentives Model that occupies the underlying dynamics of European Union’s conditionality. The model mainly asserts the logic of consequences and implies a socialization process whereby the external rewards or sanctions of EU get involved to the cost-benefit calculations of the rule-adopting state. In contrast to the External Incentive Model, two other alternative models are framed; the Social Learning Model and the Lesson-Drawing Model. According to the Social Learning Model, the legitimacy of the rule adoption arises rather from the identification of the state with EU and its persuasion of EU rule, than merely material incentives of EU. According to the Lesson-Drawing Model, on the other hand, the candidate state adopts the EU rule because the rule adoption is induced by the domestic needs and policy challenges. In this model, EU does not offer an external incentive for the role adoption, and has no major role in rule transfer into domestic law; the adoption comes solely from the domestic persuasion that entails the incorporation of EU norm into national law (Ibid., 9-10). Both socialization models however follow the logic of appropriateness, indicate a shift away from the logic of consequences and as such emphasize distinct form of socialization dynamics (Checkel, 2005: 804-5).

The External Incentive Model trails the ties of the rationalist bargaining model. As to it, the focus is laid on the actors and it follows the logic of consequences. The EU lays down the rule adoption as a condition and the candidate countries must implement to get the rewards from the EU. There are usually two types of rewards for the candidate countries: Assistance and Institutional ties. Assistance takes the form of technical and financial assistance that the EU

offers for the transition to the market economies or the preparation of EU accession. Institutional ties ordinarily can be trade and cooperation agreements via association agreements or full membership. EU conditionality functions basically as a reactive reinforcement system for the reward. It is basically very simple process; European Union establishes a rule for the process of integration of a nonmember state, commonly for the candidate states. Adopting the rule is the condition for winning the reward. If the state complies with the rule adoption, it will be simply rewarded and if not, the reward will be off the table. It is of a great importance to underline that if the state fails to comply with EU rule, EU does not step in after this point and does not offer extra rewards for the compliance or it does not apply to coercive methods to make the state fulfill the EU norm. The governments that cannot implement the condition are simply excluded from the reward of assistance, association or membership (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 10-11). However, EU interferes in the first place somehow in the domestic equilibrium which is the status quo of domestic bargaining power. EU's conditionality fluctuates this domestic equilibrium by its offer of reward for the compliance of the EU rule. The benefits of EU reward evoke an interest for the government to comply with EU's demand (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 664). The most crucial point yet is, that a government must consider that the reward EU offers in return for the compliance exceeds in value than the cost of domestic rule adoption. Putting it differently, the candidate countries adopt EU rules, because the importance that is put upon the benefits of EU membership or EU rewards is greater than the costs incurred by the domestic adaptation process. Yet this model refers also to the cost-benefit balance that points out to four sets of factors, which also matter for the way the incentive model works: *the determinacy of conditions, the size and speed of rewards, the credibility of threats and promises, and Veto players and adaption costs* (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 11-12).

Determinacy of Conditions

The External Incentive Model puts forth that the EU rules must be determinant and introduced as the condition for rewards. Otherwise, the adoption of EU's rule will fail. Setting the EU rule as a condition and the determinacy of the rule are two key factors for the compliance. Determinacy holds key for its two traits. Firstly, it is the informational character of determinacy, that is, it gives the government the information it needs to get the reward. The government comes to know what the task is to address for the reward or what EU wants the government to implement in to the domestic politics. Secondly, the determinacy deepens the

credibility of the conditionality. It makes clear to both sides that neither the EU's rule can be manipulated by the target government nor can the reward be withheld by the EU (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 664).

Size and Speed of Rewards

The Size and Speed of Rewards is the second important factor for the strategy of reinforcement by reward. What size does the reward take is an important question in this regard. It is however obvious that the promise of membership could be more desirable for a candidate state than any promise of an association or assistance. At the same time, it is a question of a time, namely how long it takes for EU to give the reward. The closer is the day of paying the reward, the easier or more likely the rule adoption takes place. Besides, if the ultimate reward of membership seems to be distant because of problems regarding to speed of reward, EU may also intervene by intermediary reward to accelerate the rule adoption (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 13).

Credibility of Conditionality

The Credibility of Conditionality refers both to the ability of EU to threaten withholding the reward in case of noncompliance and to the EU's promise to give the reward in case of rule adoption. There are other factors or more accurate, conditions that may stir the scale of the credibility. Firstly, if the costs of the reward that EU gives becomes challenging, meaning EU is no longer able to afford the reward it offers, this could result in loss of EU's credibility on both its promises and its threats. Secondly, credibility decreases if the EU is perceived as an inconsistent organization that is not in the position to pay its rewards, or that is subordinated to the conditionality of other political, strategic and economic considerations. Thirdly, the cross-conditionality decreases the credibility of EU's conditionality. If other sources exist different than EU that offer target states comparable rewards with lower costs, EU's credibility of condition is likely to decrease. Fourthly, asymmetries in information, especially in the favor of target states are a significant factor that decreases the credibility of EU's conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 665-66).

Veto player and Adoption Costs

The External Incentive Model suggests also that the rule adoption brings along various forms of costs. If rule adoption did not require any cost, it would have not engaged in a process of conditionality. The cost is however also dependent upon the number of veto players. Because, bigger number of veto players means bigger number of adoption costs. Therefore, this condition assumes that less veto players enhance the impact of EU's conditionality on the target government, which indirectly effects the government's cost-benefit assessment. Veto players could incur additional costs for adopting foregoing rule, that can result from opportunity costs or welfare and power losses. Therefore, it is better to have smaller number of Veto players and thus small cost of adoption for EU's conditionality to work (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 16-17).

Shortly, EU's conditionality works best if the rules and conditions are determinant and set for rewards, the size is certain, desirable and swiftly allocated, EU can threat the reward and can give its rewards and smaller number of veto players is at play while the adoption costs are small. These conditions help in certain extend to form the government's rule adoption; in this case, the government would rather follow the form of discursive adoption in comparison to formal or behavioral adoption (Ibid., 17).

As mentioned above, two other alternative explanation models are suggested for the conditionality of the rule adoption for candidate countries. Firstly is the Social Learning. This model is the most well-known alternative rationalist bargaining model in contrast to the External Incentive. It follows the logic of appropriateness according to which the states are expected to comply with an EU rule due to the perception that it is appropriate for the domestic collective values and norms. EU's offer of reward has no importance in this form of rule adoption. The state adopts an EU rule if it perceives the EU rule as compatible with the collective identity, values and norms. In this model, persuasion plays also an important role; therefore, it is expected to be initially a sincere discursive rule adoption and then to be a rather formal and behavioral adoption (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004: 667-68). Secondly is the Lesson-Drawing. This model bears trace of both the rationalist and a more sociological mode. The most important point here is that domestic dissatisfaction with current policies predominates the agenda of policymakers which leads subsequently to a search of learning

from abroad. In this relation, EU does not engage in offering a reward for the rule adoption. EU's conditionality comes into play as it limits the boundary of the search, indicates an exemplary model and provides legitimate arguments for pushing domestic changes in line with EU (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 20; Tocci, 2005: 81; Bürgin, 2016). Put it differently, it might be seen that domestic actors are not satisfied with a certain domestic policy area and are in search of redressing it, and if their interest in EU's rule in this respect falls into the extent of its conditionality, the actors in question might narrow the scope of their search rather than extending it because it might be costlier otherwise. In this regard, EU's conditionality functions as it leads domestic actors to stop extending their search and express additional justification for the pathway they follow which intersect with EU's demands and renders EU an 'external ally' (Tocci, 2005: 81; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 21). Although it might also appear to be as such that EU rewards outweigh adjustment costs for a rule adoption for the domestic actors, it must be taken into consideration that the motivation behind the compliance with the EU is a voluntary action and it takes root from the perception of domestic utility, not from the EU's offer of reward within the conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 21). In this model, the government clearly follows the form of behavioral adoption because the primary concern of the domestic actors is to redress the domestic policy failures. EU's reward mechanism is not in operation, and its rule is seen rather to be fitting in to the failed policy area during the search (Ibid., 25).

External Incentive Model has been used by the Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier to analyze the enlargement or, more accurately, the Europeanization process of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), where the governments constituted the examined actors. In other words, their study was based on the analysis as to how the Europeanization process of candidate CEECs countries accrued. It did not focus on party-based positions of political parties of CEECs candidate countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). It must be yet noted that although the External Incentive Theory essentially takes the government as the main actors, explaining the direct effect of EU, one shall mention the importance of EU's political conditionality as an indirect impact on the political parties in the candidate countries. Whereas the AKP is currently the ruling party and forms the government, EU's conditionality influence takes places both directly on the government-level and indirectly on the party level. Although the results of the empirical analysis may bring out similar information (but not all),

regarding the effects of the conditionality on both levels, the study intends to focus on the positioning of the party influenced by the conditionality of EU (Sedelmeier, 2011: 20).

A study regarding to the External Incentive Model has also been performed by Alexander Bürgin (2013), who used the cost-benefit calculations as main explanatory model of Turkey's willingness to sign the Readmission agreement with EU. He basically argued that the Turkish government's insistence on the Readmission agreement was in fact based on the reward of visa exemptions for the Turkish citizens offered by the European Commission. Although his work implies a guideline for this study and provides important insights about the Turkey's relations with EU in the light of the Readmission Agreement, it fails to shed light on where AK party as a parliament party intrinsically stands in this complex process. In more depth, the road this study follows comes across with the study of Alexander Bürgin (that namely reached its empirical findings through interviews made with the government officials both from the Ministry of Internal and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) with a methodological and a focus-point difference. Since this study essentially aimed to analyze documents of Parliamentary sessions and Commission protocols, it is also logical and congruent to apply the External Incentive Model in order to gain sights about the Turkey-EU relations and particularly the position of Justice and Development party towards European integration. For, as mentioned, the AK party is the ruling party and plays the most important role in convincing to sign the deal within the parliamentary sessions and the commission debates. Therefore, in plain words, this study attempts to analyze the AK party's position as a parliamentary party within the External Incentive Model.

The basic argument is formulated here as such that the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)) aims to increase its political support through an external acquisition which might also bring along legitimacy for its party position and the readmission agreement with EU thus serves as a means or an opportunity structure for this purpose. In other words, the political gain that is aimed to come from the visa liberalization for the Turkish citizens (external acquisition) is considered to generate internal support (legitimacy) for the party while the social and economic costs of readmitting irregular immigrants appear to be less important than visa exemption in comparison with one to another. Therefore, I suggest that external incentive model and the rational cost-balance calculations (Bürgin, 2013: 884) explain AK party's engagement in Readmission agreement and thus its primary pro-

European integration positioning since EU's conditionality or its condition of signing the readmission agreement and adopting other 72 requirements bring along numerous EU rules into Turkish domestic politics, exhibiting a degree of integration. As the reinforcement in the External Incentive Model suggests, actors do not voluntarily attempt to confront a problem in a certain policy area, or the motive that leads actors to be interested in adopting a rule does not arise from the persuasion that the compliance fits in with the internalized identities, norms and values. Actor views the norms and rules of international organization rather as the external institutions that on one hand generate the resource of norm-conforming behavior and on the other hand as such that function as a constraint imposing costs on norm-violating behavior. The behavior in such socialization or in this case Europeanization process is the result of the extrinsic motivation that reflects the self-defined political preferences. These political preferences are on one hand material, as the security and welfare benefits, and on the other hand power-oriented, as the desire of gaining political power and preserving it (Schimmelfennig, 2005: 830). In this case, the ruling AK party views the EU's reward as an external institutional fact that works as a resource of support for norm conforming behavior. Complying with the conditions of Readmission Agreement, along with 72 requirements attached to roadmap for lifting the visa for Turkish citizens, namely the norm-conforming behavior form the resource of visa liberalization offer of EU and its promises on improving the relations, more specifically, the opening of the chapters in the accession process. Simultaneously, not complying with the Readmission Agreement constitutes itself as a constraint that imposes costs of not having a visa liberalization and non-improvement in Turkey-EU relations on a norm-violating behavior.²

Taking all arguments of External Incentive Model into consideration, the hypothesis regarding to the positioning of ruling Justice and Development Party is formulated as following;

Hypothesis 1:

The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP)) considers the re-admission agreement with EU as a means or an opportunity structure to find legitimacy, seeking to gain political support within the internal politics through external acquisitions.

² EU does not constrain to impose costs in case of non-compliance. What is attempted to explain here is that EU interferes only in the domestic equilibrium which is namely the status quo of domestic bargaining power. EU takes a role in this respect as it fluctuates the domestic equilibrium with a reward for the compliance.

Euroscepticism: Approaches of Euroscepticism

In this part of the theory section, the definition and conceptualization of Euroscepticism will be explicated to understand mainly the positioning of the opposition parties. In addition, the concept will clarify the secondary positioning of the ruling AK party. Four hypotheses are generated in relation to the concept of Euroscepticism including the secondary positioning of the ruling party. In accordance with the propositions of the concept, it will be attempted to show the positioning of the Turkish parliament parties in the light of the readmission agreement.

The political debates about the Euroscepticism have initially emerged from the Britain's anti-integrationist position towards the Continental European project of political and economic integration throughout the post-war period. Since then, a diverge forms of Euroscepticism have been analyzed by the scholars, which also gained momentum as the European Union's policy competence started to extend. Especially since the fourth Enlargement process of the Union, the literature on the political importance of Euroscepticism also started to deal with the party politics of European Integration (Harmsen & Spiering, 2004: 13-14).

The literature has mainly concentrated itself on the question of the definition of Euroscepticism in order to provide a better understanding and a precise delimitation of the phenomena, since the term, at first sight, might mean something similar to the British case – being anti-integrationist, or opposition to and doubts towards the European Integration. Therefore, it is very important to choose a concept or theoretical access, which would be able to illuminate the positions of the Turkish parliament parties towards EU integration in the light of the Readmission Agreement. Bearing in mind these thoughts, the study applies to the definition and the conceptualization of Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2004). Since their analysis focused on the party-based Euroscepticism in the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe, analyzing Euroscepticism within the parliament parties in Turkey as a candidate state might also offer better insights on the current party-based Euroscepticism and also the degree of European integration within the Turkish domestic politics. Focusing on the conceptualization of Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004), is suggested a definition, which matters

the most for the analysis and divides the party-based Euroscepticism in two forms: Hard Euroscepticism and Soft Euroscepticism.

***Hard Euroscepticism** is where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.*

***Soft Euroscepticism** is where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that 'national interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002: 7).*

Apart from the distinction between the Hard and Soft Euroscepticism, authors mention also about the National Interest Euroscepticism which gives rise to the rhetoric defending or standing up for the national interest in the context of EU debates. Similarly, while parties may develop rhetoric toward the deepening European integration on the one hand, they feel the need to employ 'national-interest Eurosceptic' rhetoric to consolidate their domestic support base on the other hand (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004: 4). Considering all the thoughts, the second hypothesis regarding to secondary positioning of ruling AK Party is generated;

Hypothesis 2:

The process of Readmission Agreement becomes a platform for Justice and Development Party, both to take a position of pro-European Integration and to articulate itself within the national interest Eurosceptic rhetoric.

Along with the distinction between Hard and Soft, authors are testing six propositions of Euroscepticism in order to extend the understanding of Euroscepticism in general sense. Since the data that will be collected is not appropriate to answer all the six of them, the study will focus on the analysis of three propositions of Euroscepticism. The consideration behind the delimitation emerges from the need to gain more reliable results. In addition, the authors' three propositions pertain to the analysis of Euroscepticism with a data collection which goes

beyond the empirical findings of this study. The *first* proposition deals with the distribution of Euroscepticism within the party systems. More specifically, it examines a party's position in left-right spectrum on the expression of Euroscepticism. It is argued that Euroscepticism is able to bring together some unusual coalitions of ideological forces. In other words, parties from the opposite end of the spectrum might pair up despite the ideological differences. Looking at the positions the Turkish parliament parties take in the debates of Readmission Agreement allows examining whether, in the context of the Turkish parliament parties, the left-right division provides an analytical use (Ibid., 5). Therefore, taking the Turkish parliament parties position into account, the third hypothesis of the study is proposed;

Hypothesis 3

Turkish parliament opposition parties' position on the left-right spectrum is unrelated to its European stance.

The *second* proposition concerns a party's position in its party system. A party with less possibility to come to power or to become a coalition partner is likely to take the Eurosceptic position freely than a party that is the government or potential party of government. The latter may avoid taking any sort of Euroscepticism considering that the high costs regarding to such positions in a case of becoming the negotiation partner may have negative effect on the party's core. In addition, since the issues of European Integration are regarded as the second-order issues, the parties' stance may deviate from its core appeal, which is more likely to refer to the positioning regarding to domestic national issues (Ibid., 5-6). By considering the Turkish parliament's position in this respect, the fourth hypothesis is generated;

Hypothesis 4

The positions of Republican's People's Party (CHP), People's Democratic Party (HDP) and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in the party systems are related to the expression of Euroscepticism.

Finally, the *third* proposition correlates with the differentiation between the Hard and the Soft Euroscepticism (Ibid., 2004: 7). Taking the distinction above into the consideration about the

Hard and Soft Euroscepticism that the authors suggested, the following proposition can be made:

Hypothesis 5

The Hard Euroscepticism is likely to be less evident than the Soft Euroscepticism in the Turkish parliament parties in the context of Readmission Agreement.

Other propositions of the authors, as mentioned, go beyond the scope of the empirical analysis of this study. For example, one of the other propositions of the authors refers to the public Euroscepticism. The basic argument is that the level of party-based Euroscepticism is not dependent on the levels of popular Euroscepticism. Since the European Integration is considered as a second order issue by parties, they choose to become Eurosceptic towards the European Integration independent from the level of public Euroscepticism because parties taking such positions recognize that they would not endanger their core identity or electoral appeal while European integration is a worth of second order issue. As a result, such a proposition entails an empirical analysis of the public Euroscepticism, which goes out of the range of this study's empirical findings (Ibid., 6).

Empirical Analysis:

In this part of the study, the Turkish parliament parties' positions toward the Readmission agreement and indirectly the European integration will be analyzed. The results, obtained from the empirical findings, will be overall descriptively interpreted in order to provide a crucial picture of the positioning of the parties. Subsequently, the theoretical considerations regarding to the party positions will be linked with the empirical findings and an attempt will be made to examine whether the results correspond to the parties' attitudes. Thus, it will be possible to test the hypotheses and understand the positioning of the Turkish parliament parties toward the Readmission agreement.

Data

The Commission and Parliament protocols as the primary data has been used for the part of empirical analysis. These documents essentially constitute the main data of the whole argument of the study. Yet, it is important to note what sort of documents these are. As

mentioned, the Commission and Parliament protocols (2014 and 2016) that are concerned with the process of Readmission Agreement were investigated. In detail though, respectively, the protocol of the European Union Integration Commission that is based on the session on the 29th of January 2014 consisting of sixteen pages; the protocol of Internal Affairs Commission that is based on the session on the 30th of January 2014 consisting of twenty-two pages; the protocol of Foreign Affairs Commission that is based on the session on the 5th of February 2014 consisting of eighteen pages; 106.session protocol of Parliament meeting that is based on the session on the 19th of June 2014 consisting of twenty-nine pages; 108. Session protocol of Parliament meeting that is based on the session of the 25th of June 2014 consisting of fifty-seven pages; the protocol of Foreign Affairs commission that is based on the session on the 20th April 2016 consisting of eight pages; and the 84. Session protocol of Parliament meeting that is based on the session on 3rd of May 2016 consisting of seventy-eight pages, are the major data of this research study. It is however important to mention, particularly that though other issues are debated in some of these sessions in the Parliament, the main topic of the sessions pertained to the process of Readmission Agreement. In addition, all the documents of the analysis are retrievable on the official website of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.³ Moreover, these documents are published in Tutanak Dergisi (Protocol Journal) by the TBMM Directorate for Protocol Services, that prepares a literal record in line with the expressions of the speakers in the Commissions and Parliament sessions. Therefore, all the documents that are analyzed for the empirical part are regarded as eligible for the sake of the study. In regard to the analytical process, it is necessary to note that the Commission protocol of Internal Affairs (2014), Commission Protocol of Foreign Affairs (2014) and the

³ More specifically, the protocol of European Union Integration Commission is available at:

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari.goruntule?pTutanakId=465

The protocol of Internal Affairs Commission is available at:

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari.goruntule?pTutanakId=80

The protocol of Foreign Affairs Commission is available at:

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari.goruntule?pTutanakId=79

106.session protocol of Parliament is available at:

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?PAGE1=1&PAGE2=1&p4=22179&p5=H

108. session protocol of Parliament is available at:

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?PAGE1=1&PAGE2=1&p4=22185&p5=H

The protocol of Foreign Affairs commission is available at:

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/komisyon_tutanaklari.goruntule?pTutanakId=1602

84. session protocol of Parliament is available at:

https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?PAGE1=1&PAGE2=1&p4=22629&p5=H

Commission protocol of Foreign Affairs (2016) have not been included into the scope of the last phase of the evaluation process, showed in the methodology part, since the data from these documents very clearly repeated themselves. Therefore, such a method has been chosen namely in order to avoid the more explicitly replicating arguments and mentions. Yet, the number of mentions that are illustrated below in the codebook refers to the repeating numbers of argument that carried out through the coding process.

Codebook and the number of mentions in the analyzed documents.

AKP (Justice and Development Party):

Human Right Concern	8
Lack of Clarity in Readmission Agreement	7
Lack of Clarity in Financial Aid	3
National Interest	10
Political Connectivity (Negative)	7
Positive Cost of Readmission Agreement	15
Readmission Agreement-Financial Aid (Positive)	3
Readmission Agreement -EU Membership (Positive)	2
Readmission Agreement-EU Integration	9
Readmission Agreement-Unilateral Cancellation (Sceptic)	7
Readmission Agreement-Visa Liberalization (Positive)	24
Readmission Agreement-Border Security	10
Readmission Agreement-Fight against Illegal Immigration	7

CHP (Republican's People's Party):

Critic on EU's intention in Readmission Agreement	20
Human Right Concern	50
Lack of Clarity in Readmission Agreement	2
Lack of Clarity in Financial Aid	5
National Interest	118
Readmission Agreement as a block to Turkey's Membership	13
Pro-European Integration	8
Political Connectivity (Negative)	14
Political game of European Union	64
Readmission Agreement-Visa Liberalization (Negative)	17

Readmission Agreement-EU Integration (Negative)	2
Readmission Agreement- EU Sceptic	2
Unfair Treatment	28
Uncertainty in Visa Liberalization	40
Uncertainty in Financial Aid	4

HDP (People's Democratic Party):

Human Right Concern	57
National Interest	34
Political game of EU	16
Unfair Treatment	2
Readmission Agreement as a block to Turkey's Membership	4
Readmission Agreement-Financial Aid (Negative)	2
Readmission Agreement- Mutual Benefit (Negative)	1
Readmission Agreement-Uncertainty in Visa Liberalization	10
Readmission Agreement-Visa Liberalization (Negative)	3
Readmission Agreement-EU's External Border Control Mechanism (Negative)	1
Readmission Agreement-Neo-Colonist Agreement	1

MHP (Nationalist Movement Party):

Human Right Concern	6
Political Game of EU	25
National Interest	32
Uncertainty in Financial Aid	5
Uncertainty in Visa Liberalization	8
Unfair Treatment	7
Readmission Agreement-EU Sceptic	6
Readmission Agreement-Financial Aid (Negative)	2
Readmission Agreement-Visa Liberalization (Negative)	9

The positioning of Justice and Development Party (AKP)

This subsection will illustrate the arguments and claims made by the Justice and Development party's deputies both in the commission and in parliament sessions. Most of all, it will be attempted to reveal what sort of arguments are made and how the party views the Readmission Agreement, or in other words, what the Readmission Agreement amounts to the Justice and Development party.

The Justice and Development party, or shortened AKP, articulated a number of points that reflect the party's priorities and interests in the frame of such a complex process. The assertions on why Turkey shall sign the Readmission Agreement voice distinct aspects. AKP considers it as a positive instance that the Readmission Agreement will enter into force three years after Turkey signs it. Thus, Turkey will not be bothered with it immediately (TBMM, 2014a). Likewise, it is very crucial for the party that the R.A and the visa exemption are carried out as parallel processes. R.A should not be evaluated alone because it is closely connected with the visa exemption; it should be seen rather as a very important turning point in the Turkey-EU relations. For, it will bring along the visa exemption in return, as it was the case in the Balkan countries. Therefore, as regards to AKP, Turkey wants to sign the Readmission Agreement in order to have the visa exemption from EU. In other words, complying with R.A is very significant for the reason that it will remove a major obstacle for the Turkish citizens and enable them to travel freely in Europe. Hence, because the road map on visa exemption has been approved by the European Union, Turkey considered it to be appropriate to sign the agreement: namely the visa exemption was initiated before the R.A negotiations (TBMM, 2014a; 2014b). Another positive side of the R.A refers to the financial aspect of the agreement. According to AKP, European Union will offer financial aid to Turkey to build the accomadation and readmission centres, which is how AKP aims to overcome the refugee problem thorough R.A: step by step, sharing the burden with EU. Similarly, it is counted as positive that the cost of readmitting illegal persons will be covered by the sending countries (Ibid.). In relation to the critics from opposition parties, AKP describes as method, that EU will have to prove with concrete documents that the illegal immigrants entered EU through Turkey in any case when EU member states decide to readmit them to Turkey (TBMM, 2014b).

Apart from the positive effects of the Readmission Agreement, AKP argues that European Union membership is Turkey's most strategic objective. Turkey has been struggling for a long time to become a member of the European Union and R.A is a part of this struggle. For, the same effort has been made for R.A as it was made for the abolition of the death penalty, the Law on Associations and the Law on Civic Foundations. Likewise, it is asserted that signing R.A means also improvements in the EU-Turkey relations. AKP accuses the opposition parties, that refuse to accept the agreement, of being against the EU and the EU reforms. Accordingly, the point is alleged that AKP sets the EU membership as a target, that Turkey needs to work on it. R.A in this respect implies continuation of Turkey's close relation with EU and as such it helps to achieve Turkey's goal of European integration. Once more, through R.A it appears that the strength and persistence of Turkey's willingness to be member of European Union and EU's approach toward Turkey, makes Turkey hopeful for the future EU-Turkey relations (TBMM, 2014a).

The fact that AKP insists on signing the Readmission Agreement points out also to two different argumentations. Firstly, AKP argues that Turkey needs to provide border automation, integrated border management and customs automation with or without EU relations. Therefore, R.A gets involved in the process and plays an important role for Turkey to take new steps and helps to reduce the work in this relation, namely adequate control and surveillance at the border. It is expressed that improvement in this area will also help to reduce the readmission-related problems. The party regards the agreement as a way to safeguard the border security through EU funds and IPA assistance, and as a result, can increase Turkey's ability and capability that are relevant to stronger border management and visa policy. Secondly, AKP suggests that signing R.A is in direct relation to the fight against illegal immigration and the migrant issue, or that it simply infers the fight against illegal immigration and migrant issues. Hence, R.A can be considered as something to deter the illegal immigration because it not only obligates Turkey to fight against the illegal immigration to Europe, which in return entails a close relationship with the EU, but it also encourages the country to take measures against the illegal immigration. Therefore, R.A, in the sense of close cooperation with EU, means fighting and deterring the illegal immigration traffic that also impacts the region of Turkey (TBMM, 2014a; 2014b).

As AKP lines up the reasons or interests in regard to the agreement, it is also observable that the agreement's drawbacks are expressed by the party. Although a plenty of matters in favor of signing the readmission agreement are mentioned by AKP deputies, there are yet also statements that demand for changes within the articles of R.A or that interpret the concept of the agreement differently referring to the various aspects. One of these aspects is related to Turkey's possibility to abolish the Readmission Agreement unilaterally. It is argued that Turkey has the right of unilateral termination of R.A and it is something relaxing that Turkey has an option to abolish the agreement, if it does not get visa exemption within a reasonable period of time (Ibid.). Such arguments rather point out to the party's state of distress, that is why namely the AK party shall draw itself back from the readmission process with EU. Another point of view applies to the human rights' concerns of the party. It is noted that the R.A does not guarantee the human rights for the regular and irregular immigrants who are usually ill-treated in EU member states. An article that secures the human rights of those people is something necessary in this regard. Similarly, R.A contrasts with the provision of the European Convention on Human rights, since the former does not secure all kinds of human rights of persons who are to be readmitted. The EU must also take responsibility to provide such a guarantee by adding it to the agreement. Likewise, it is stated within R.A, that Turkey will not send to their home country people, who might face persecution, a life threat or inhuman treatment. That is crucial for Turkey to maintain the deal in a way that protects human lives. As seen, there have been arguments that ask for changes which guarantee human rights within the scope of the agreement, yet such a remark also has been made regarding to the human rights' aspect of the agreement, and namely: Turkey follows a humanitarian purpose in R.A, according to which it will send those readmitted to Turkey to their home countries under humanitarian conditions within three years (TBMM, 2014d). It is clearly seen that, although, on the one hand, a claim has been raised, that R.A fails to provide human rights in certain aspects, namely it violates the provision of the European Convention on Human rights, on the other hand, it has been specifically articulated, that sending back the readmitted persons to their home countries will take place under humanitarian conditions. The reason to mention about such a detail comes from the need to exhibit the way the party views the issue of human rights. In this respect, it becomes possible to observe what sort of positioning the AK party takes.

Beyond the humanitarian aspect of the agreement, AKP explains several issues in such a way, as to pose problems from within. For example, according to AKP, R.A suggests several deficiencies in many aspects. Lining these up, firstly comes the depriving of clarity about Turkish citizens' visa-free entry into the European Union states. An article that clearly states that Turkish citizens will be granted visa-free movement in the EU member states is missing. Secondly, R.A is lacking in the matter whether only those countries, that will readmit immigrants to Turkey, will lift the visa requirement, or all the European member states. Thirdly, it is not guaranteed in R.A that Turkish citizens are excluded from the expulsion before the judicial process is complete. Fourthly, R.A is deficient in a way that it does not assure if Turkey will be decisive in accepting the irregular immigrants who pass through Turkey to EU. Fifthly, R.A does not cover Turkey's reservation on the geographical limitation. Similarly, it is also signified that there is no clarity on the EU's aid to Turkey within R.A: it does not contain, for example, how many per cent of the costs of the readmission agreement will be funded to Turkey or whether the Instrument Pre/accession Assistance (IPA) supports will be activated to meet the costs in this regard. No certain number has been stated regarding the financial aid except political promises from a partner that haven't fulfilled many commitments toward Turkey until now. Therefore, as the argument goes on, AKP shall not consider EU as a trustable partner and will not make commitments on an agreement that does not contain any details and lacks clarity. Besides, the party refers particularly to the national interest of Turkey that is put into danger through the Readmission Agreement. Some of the arguments overlap with the ones that are articulated within the context of the deficiencies of the Readmission Agreement. Same arguments are also mentioned regarding the national interest context. Concerning this matter, AKP criticizes again that R.A includes the Turkish citizens into the scope of the Readmission Agreement and does not assure their exclusion from expulsion. In addition, R.A enables the readmission of not only all Third/Country nationals (TCNs) and stateless persons who enter Europe through Turkey, but also those who filed a legal process by objecting to the requesting state's court. Thus, it gets very easy for EU to declare that such people come from Turkey and readmit them back there. In the view of AKP, Turkey's national interests are ignored within the scope of R.A in a lot of ways. For instance, the agreement does not give protection to Turkey's reservation in relation to the geographical limitation. This is a right that Turkey possesses in this regard, but EU constantly imposes on Turkey to lift this reservation. In the same way, a provision stated in the transit procedure of the agreement, gives to Turkey only five days to assess whether the person relevant to the readmission has gone to Europe through Turkey. In

this respect, the agreement grants Turkey insufficient time to identify the persons who passed through Turkey to Europe. Moreover, R.A presents only a joint declaration in the field of visa policy, which rather refers to the importance of cooperation. It presents only a political connectivity regarding to the visa liberalization and no legal connectivity exists in this respect. It is suggested, that it might not be plausible to engage in R.A with EU that offers only commitments, which is a deprive of the legal connectivity. The same thing is valid in relation to the financial aid: EU does not provide a legal connectivity in this area as well, these are nothing but political commitments. In addition, the fact that the European Union member states have not implemented even the decisions of the Court of Justice, which Turkey has gained legally up to now, does not makes a good impression and does not encourage Turkey to engage in R.A without any legal connectivity (TBMM, 2014d).

In sum, AKP articulates many positive effects of the Readmission Agreement: the visa exemption that R.A brings alone; the assumption that the agreement enters into force after three years so that it will not burden Turkey; the fact that the EU will offer financial aid to Turkey which will reduce the burden on the country; that it will not be that simple for the EU to readmit any person they wish and the EU will have to prove with concrete documents that the persons who are subjects to readmission went to Europe through Turkey. Besides, it is obvious that AKP takes a pro-European position, based on the arguments that the EU is Turkey's strategic objective and the Readmission Agreement is a part of the struggle that Turkey has been going through for becoming a member state of the EU. It is clearly stated that AKP considers the process of the Readmission Agreement as a new phase of improving the relations between the EU and Turkey. Aside from the positive effects of the agreement and the value that AKP has put upon the membership and the improvement of the Turkey-EU relations, many other assertions voice the reasons why Turkey should sign the Readmission agreement: Turkey needs to safeguard its borders regardless of the EU's demands, Turkey must provide adequate control and surveillance at the border and the agreement will help Turkey to achieve this goal; signing the Readmission Agreement means also a direct fight against the illegal immigration, for the agreement will deter the illegal immigrants from entering Europe and consequently will lead other countries to take measures against the illegal immigration trafficking.

While statements in favor of signing the Readmission Agreement are expressed, there are also other arguments which signify AKP's skepticism toward signing the agreement and in general toward the European Union: Turkey has the right to abolish the agreement unilaterally if the visa exemption for Turkish citizens is not provided by the EU; in relation to the human rights' aspect, the agreement is not compatible with the provision of the European Convention on Human Rights; in respect to the lack of clarity within the agreement, AKP shall not consider EU as a trustable partner and engage in an agreement that does not contain any details. Similarly, regarding to the national interests, a plenty of opposite opinions toward the agreement are introduced: the Turkish citizens are included into the scope of readmission agreement and might face deportation; the European Union obtains a broad of authority in readmitting the persons to Turkey; the geographical reservation of Turkey is ignored, which allows Turkey to accept refugees only from European states; in relation to the visa policy, it is argued that what EU promises is a cooperation, not a direct visa liberalization; there is no legal connectivity for EU to provide a visa exemption, it only consists of a joint declaration; EU is not obligated through the agreement to provide the financial aid, it is only political commitments that deprives of legal connectivity.

While analyzing the arguments that are in favor of the agreement, it becomes apparent that the External Incentive Model of this studies' primary theoretical access fits in to explain the positioning of the Justice and Development party within the process of the Readmission Agreement. As the External Incentive Model suggests, the rational bargaining model predominates the process of rule adoption. European Union's conditionality and incentives get involved into the process of the compliance with a particular EU rule. The model basically follows the logic of consequences and points out to a socialization process, whereby the external rewards or sanctions of the EU get involved in the cost-benefit calculations of the rule-adopting state. EU's conditionality functions basically as a reactive reinforcement system for the reward: the EU establishes a rule for the process of integration of a non-member state, and if the state complies with the rule adoption, it obtains the award. The most crucial point yet is, that a government must consider if the reward the EU offers in return for the compliance, exceeds in value the cost of the domestic rule adoption. The award for the candidate countries is principally a membership (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 10-12). Yet for the case of Turkey in the context of Readmission Agreement, the visa exemption has been offered as a reward. This incentive namely has been brought forward in the meeting

that resulted in signing the Readmission Agreement and the visa liberalization dialogue on the 6th of December 2013 (European Commission, 2013), which did not ensure a visa exemption directly, but conditioned it to a roadmap that required Turkey to implement and adopt 72 benchmarks (European Commission, 2016). Other than that, the developments in the refugee crisis in 2016 have brought together Turkey and EU officials. On the 18th of March 2016, the EU Heads of State and Turkey agreed on the new provisions which have foreseen the visa liberalization roadmap to accelerate in order to lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens until latest by the end of June 2016. Yet, as before, it has been conditioned for Turkey to fulfill the entire criteria, stated on the roadmap. Besides, it has been established that EU will speed up the financial aid of 3 billion Euro under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and prepare the additional 3 million until the end of 2018 when the initial resource is spent. Moreover, the accession process will be re-opened with Chapter 33 on financial and budgetary provisions and it will be simultaneously continued with the preparatory work on the opening of the other chapters (Ibid.). As seen, aside from the visa exemption, in the statement on the 18th of March 2016 financial aid and re-opening of the accession process have been offered to Turkey. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that the visa exemption has been predominantly put into words in respect of signing the Readmission Agreement, while the arguments regarding the financial aid from the EU has taken place within the parliament and commission sessions.

Empirical findings clearly exhibit that the party's insist on the Readmission Agreement is indeed related to the EU's offer of visa exemption in return for signing the Readmission Agreement. This has been often raised as an argument in favor of the agreement. The positioning of AKP thus is suitable with the first hypothesis regarding to the party's primary attitude, namely: The Justice and Development Party aims to increase its political support through an external acquisition which might also bring along legitimacy for its party position, hence the Readmission Agreement with EU serves as an opportunity structure for this purpose. Putting it differently, clearly within the context of the agreement the political gain for the Turkish citizens, aimed to come from the visa liberalization (external acquisition), is considered to generate the internal support (legitimacy) for the party, while the social and economic costs of readmitting irregular immigrants appear to be smaller than the visa exemption's cost in comparison with one another. It is important to note, that while the above-mentioned arguments, which point out to the party's reservations toward the agreement and

demand for changes or non-participation in the process, are also brought forward by the AKP deputies, yet eventually, these arguments seem to be less important than the visa exemption that the EU offers in return to the signing and complying with the provisions of the agreement. Similarly, it is very important to mention that all of the party's reservations and skeptic positions toward the EU come from the arguments expressed within the commission debates, and all other arguments in favor of signing the agreement are articulated within the parliament sessions.

As mentioned in the theory part of this work, External Incentive Model also refers the rule adoption to the cost-benefit balance, which points out to four sets of factors that are important for the model to function. In sum, the EU's incentive model namely works best if the rules and conditions are determined and set for rewards; the of this rewards size is certain, desirable and swiftly allocated; the EU can threat the reward and is capable of giving it; and a smaller number of veto players is at play, while the adoption costs are small (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 10-11, 17). When analyzing the process of the Readmission Agreement, it is observable that EU's rules and conditions, in form of the Readmission Agreement and the provisions within it, are determinant. It offers a reward in the form of visa liberalization for the Turkish citizens, which seems to be very desirable for the governing AK party. It has been scheduled for the reward to be given within three years, according to the first meeting in 2013, and has been accelerated in the meeting in 2016 within a certain given time, namely until latest the end of June 2016. Yet, the reward of visa liberalization depends on the adoption by the Turkish parliament of the 72 requirements, which gives EU the possibility to threat the reward in case of non-compliance. And since the AK party is the only governing party and constitutes the majority in the parliament to pass the law regarding to the Readmission Agreement, it can be said that there are no veto players present and the costs in this respect are smaller.

It is also important to mention, that this kind of process implies the form of discursive adoption. The discursive conception or adoption points out namely to the discourse or the rhetorical action that the domestic actors take to demonstrate the incorporation of a rule as a positive reference. This sort of act may either be in the form of sincere persuasion of a norm, or it may simply show a strategic action of the domestic actor to "talk the EU talk" (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005: 8, 17; Jacoby, 2002). In addition, as suggested in the

functional dualism approach in the organizations, the adoption refers to the discursive action, in which the developing of formal structures helps to overcome the high costs of the harmonization process by creating dual nature. This configuration, in turn, *“buffers” the “actual activities of the organization” through exterior “ceremonial” structure*. Similarly, the domestic actors buffer the actual costs of incorporation of the EU rule by underlying the importance of implementing the EU-conform changes (Jacoby, 2002: 130-1). When analyzing the empirical results, the arguments such as the positive effects of the Readmission Agreement are expressed: Turkey will not be burdened, because the agreement enters into force after three years; it is not that easy for the EU to readmit any person it wishes; AKP struggles for EU membership and R.A functions as part of this struggle; Turkey needs to safeguard its borders regardless of EU’s demands; Turkey must provide adequate control and surveillance at the border and the Readmission Agreement means also direct fighting against illegal immigration; the agreement will deter the illegal immigrants from entering Europe. These assertions point out to the strategic action of domestic actors to “talk the EU talk”. These arguments could also be considered as the AK Party buffers the actual costs of incorporation of the EU rule through underlying the importance of implementing EU-conform changes. For, when also looking at the requirements, set in the road map, one can clearly see, that it is highly important for EU that Turkey fully implements the Readmission Agreement – especially in relation to the border management and visa policy, so as to be able to prevent irregular immigration effectively (European Commission, 2013).

Apart from the primary positioning of the ruling AK Party, the empirical findings obviously indicate, that on the one hand, AKP attempts to articulate the importance of the Readmission Agreement in relation to improving the Turkey-EU relations, which corresponds with AKP’s pro-European positioning, on the other hand, the expression of national interests, the skeptic attitude toward EU’s commitments or the lack of clarity and legal connectivity for EU in the agreement in respect to the visa liberalization or the financial aid, which as a whole ignore Turkey’s self-interests, dominates the agenda of the commission debates. These observations namely suit with the second hypothesis of the study: the Readmission Agreement becomes a platform for the Justice and Development Party, both to take a position in favor of the European Integration, and to articulate itself within the National Interest Eurosceptic rhetoric. For, as the approach of Euroscepticism suggests, National Interest Euroscepticism gives rise to a type of rhetoric, that defends the national interest in the context of particular EU debates.

Similarly, while parties may develop rhetoric in favor of the deepening European Integration, on the one hand, they feel the need to also employ ‘National-Interest Eurosceptic’ rhetoric in order to consolidate their domestic support base, on the other hand (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 4).

The positioning of Republican’s People’s Party (CHP)

In this subsection, the arguments of Republican’s People’s Party will be illustrated to understand why the party refuses to accept the conditions of readmission agreement. The empirical analysis will enlighten also party’s general stance toward the European Union and European Integration.

The Republican’s People’s Party, or the shortened form, CHP made mention of many subjects within the readmission agreement’s parliamentary sessions. The party deputies have touched upon a lot of themes which on one hand refers to the main reasons of refusal of the agreement and on the other hand reflects the party’s presidencies in general. Firstly, the party argues that the readmission agreement ignores the human rights of the persons’ subject to readmission from many points of view. For example, the readmission agreement allows migrant workers and their family members to be deported without any question although they own some guarantees through International Convention on Protection of Human Rights of All Migrant Workers and Family Members. As such, some of the provisions of the agreement are contradictory to United Nations Basic Human Rights Convention and therefore needs to be changed (TBMM, 2014a; 2014b) Likewise, CHP argues that it is not acceptable that refugees’ freedom will be taken away who risk their lives, just to get visa exemption for Turkish citizens. Therefore, R.A has to be discussed with respect to the humanitarian aspect (TBMM, 2014b).

Secondly, CHP asserts that an uncertainty relating to the financial aid prevails in readmission agreement. There is no guarantee that the cost of R.A will be met by EU or there is no financial portrait of what sort of cost R.A will bring along for Turkey. There is only a verbal commitment in this regard but no concrete commitment (TBMM, 2014a). Relating to the uncertainty in the agreement, CHP also argues that there is no certainty on a date or a definite consolidation or a binding that Turkey gets the visa exemption if it signs the R.A and

meet all the conditions (TBMM, 2016a). In addition, The readmission agreement is related to a road map for the visa exemption which is not even subject to the approval of Turkish assembly. And there is also no binding in the Roadmap for EU to provide the visa exemption. It is rather full of instruction that EU impose to Turkey. What EU promises in visa liberalisation is something soft, it is not binding that Turkey will get it after so-called three years. This can be seen also in the fact that the visa exemption and the readmission agreement do not come into force at the same time. EU will consider to give a visa liberalisation if Turkey implement it correctly. EU will namely vote on removing the visa obligation for Turkey and this is a qualified voting. Therefore, It will actually consider whether to implement the visa facilitation or not and then vote if necessary (TBMM, 2014b).

Thirdly, As to CHP, serious national interests are in question through R.A. For Instance, R.A makes it possible Turkish citizens to be deported by including them into the scope of agreement. That is to say, Turkish citizens who are in an irregular position, including those born in EU countries, and those Turkish citizens who live in Europe and are legally resident but can not maintain their regular status for various reasons will be readmitted to Turkey. They will not be able to bring even a suit in the court and will have to follow it from Turkey if they face deportation. Through the agreement, Turkey can not protect its own people's interest which on the contrary allows them to be deported. Apart from the Turkish citizens, R.A allows also those TCNs to be readmitted to Turkey who once obtained their legal status in EU but can not provide it any longer. Besides, EU will also be able to readmit the persons to Turkey without obligation to prove if it determines that the person went to Europe illegally through Turkey. Another argument in respect to violation of Turkey's national interest is that R.A does not include provisions that would reflect the drawbacks that the Geneva Convention places on Turkey due to its geographical position. Because, as CHP argues, it is uncertain whether those readmitted to Turkey will be sent to the source countries due to the situations in those countries that might threaten human lives, or due to the fact that Turkey does not have readmission agreements with their own countries for most of them. As a result, Turkey will have a high number of irregular migrants for a long time and their costs and burdens will have to be met by Turkey. Thus, the agreement will put Turkish Republic in a danger in social, economic and security fields and consequently the country will become an illegal immigrant repository. Hence, the agreement is such a process that both endangers Turkey's interest and backspace its accession process with EU and also impairs Turkey's reputation on international platforms. As to party, in reality, EU sets a trap for Turkey and AKP government sets a trap

for its own citizens through “ Visa-free Europe” . CHP signifies namely that R.A does not include a visa exemption for Turkish citizens, it is a deception from the government that has not been able to provide the visa liberalisation Turkey is entitle to. CHP argues in this respect that the roadmap documents for visa exemptions are misleading. For, there is no legal link between readmission agreement and visa issues. Visa exemptions through roadmap is essentially conditioned on the positive evaluation of EU member states, which does not imply a legal binding but rather a political binding (TBMM, 2014a; 2014b).

Fourthly, the CHP considers the agreement as a political game of EU. The argument is that EU wants to use Turkey through an offer of Turkey entering in EU or as a subcontractor for the problem it can not solve because in reality it wants to send the illegal immigrants to Turkey. It could be seen in the precipitation that EU quickly ratify the agreement and publish it in the official newspaper. What is at stake for EU is its urgent interests. Yet in reality, EU sets a trap to Turkey (TBMM, 2014a). As such, while there is no authority or provision in favor of the Republic of Turkey, EU obtains a broad authority through the agreement. The link between the readmission agreement and the visa is actually a link established and imposed by the European Union. For, Although EU organize visa registrations for all countries it has started the membership negotiations and recognize the visa exemption, turkey is treated exceptionally. Besides, CHP asserts that EU must have already given visa exemption for Turkey due to the negotiations which have been in effect since 1963. Yet this does not happen. Therefore, R.A is considered as sort of a dominion treatment of EU which views Turkey rather as a third world country than a candidate member state or a neighbor country (TBMM, 2014b).

Fiftly, CHP sees the agreement also as an unfair treatment toward Turkey. For example, it is argued in this context as well that although Turkey has the right to visa exemption in accordance with the 1963 Ankara Agreement, it is denied to benefit from it and moreover linked to new conditions and opened process. Similarly, although EU organizes visa registrations for all countries it has started the membership negotiations and recognize the visa exemption, only exception in this regard as well remains Turkey. The countries such as Peru, Guatemala, Argentina, Montenegro, Croatia and Moldova obtains the visa exemption. However, Turkey remains to be the only country with visa obligation among the candidate countries that are negotiating with EU. Therefore, EU shall not be regarded as a reliable

partner because, although it pledges so many times for so many things, at the end it does not keep its word especially in relation to EU-Turkey relations. According to CHP readmission agreement is something that can only reflect an association between a colonial and a dominant country (TBMM, 2014a; 2014b).

Notwithstanding the republican's people's party express many critics toward European Union in relation to the signing readmission agreement, it could be interpreted through many arguments that the party does not stand against the european integration and european union in a general sense. For example, CHP considers in relation to readmission agreement and visa liberalization that the government attempts to create opportunity structure from the refugee crisis by linking the EU-Turkey relations to the pre-condition of visa exemption for Turkish citizens. In this regard, CHP namely criticizes that the government reduces the EU relations to the visa exemption process and that a perception is attempted to be created by the government as if Turkey will immediately obtain free movement in the Schengen Region (TBMM, 2016a). Yet According to CHP, the progress into European Integration can not be obtained through signing R.A and having visa exemption in return. Progress can be possible through conforming to the European Unions and United Nations norms or through commitments in Copenhagen Criteria or Budapest Convention(TBMM, 2014b). CHP basically considers that EU has a successful integration process that is based on transparent democratic institutional structure and high level representative determination process and decision making mechanisms. (TBMM, 2016a). However, signing readmission agreement as a distraction blocks Turkey's EU membership. For, it is not certain through R.A whether Turkey will be assured in term of EU membership and that it will be a full member in the same conditions as the other states. Therefore, R.A in reality leads Turkey to recognize the privileged partnership status and thus hinders Turkey's oppurtunity to become a full member state of EU (TBMM, 2014a). CHP namely supports fully the EU Integration law process by exhibiting responsible attitude. As Turkey's main opposition party, it supports an unconditional membership of Turkey by also criticizing all the deficiencies in the harmonization laws in a constructive way. Its support in this process shows the intention to achieve success in the sense of visa liberalization as well. In addition, the party believes that Turkey must avoid high-level statements that are harmful for Turkey's membership process because they break all that what Turkey performs during this harmonization process in the eye of EU Public Opinion. In this regard, CHP supports and expects a common will both from the government and EU to open

chapters in EU-Turkey integration process, particularly in regard to the judicial and fundamental rights in the 23th chapter and the 24th chapter of Justice, Freedom and Security. (TBMM, 2016a).

In summary, CHP gives voice to various perspectives as related to the agreement and passes criticism on most of them. Yet the party does not essentially oppose to the European integration or to the European Union and manifest it through the views articulated in the context of the readmission agreement. When examining briefly why the party rejects the process of the readmission agreement, first of all, it should be stated that the CHP considers the agreement to violate the human rights of the migrants and refugees. More importantly, the party beholds the connection as unacceptable between the visa liberalization and readmission that Turkey will get visa exemption for its citizens and in return, the refugees who risk their lives to reach Europe will be readmitted to Turkey. Secondly CHP argues that an uncertainty predominates in terms of the financial aid and the visa liberalization. The argument is namely that the financial aid within the context of readmission is based on the verbal commitments of EU, which is deprived of necessary legal binding. There is no financial portrait on how much cost the agreement might bring about for Turkey and concerning the visa exemption, lifting the visa for Turkish citizens depends on the qualified voting of European member states, which does not directly guarantee the visa liberalization. Thirdly, CHP criticizes many provisions of the agreement arguing that it violates turkey's national interests. Such assertions are made with reference to the disregard of national interests: Turkish citizens are included into the scope of agreement; Turkey will be burdened through the agreement and it will become an illegal immigrant repository; Turkey's geographical reservations are ignored, which will further impact negatively turkey's capability to accommodate the readmitting persons; EU gains an extensive authority in readmitting persons to turkey and country's position is rather weakened in this relation; There is no legal binding between the agreement and visa liberalization to which turkey is already entitled. Fourthly, CHP esteems the process of readmission agreement with the visa exemption as a political game of European Union. Similarly, EU's treatment toward Turkey in the readmission context is asserted to be unfair and unacceptable. Whilst Turkey has a right to visa exemption according to the Ankara Agreement in 1963 or EU authorizes the visa liberalizations for the candidate countries, Turkey is treated differently and unfairly although it is a candidate state since 2005. To cap it all, EU binds the visa exemption to new conditions and to an opened process through the agreement which takes the form of a political game. For, in reality, EU intends to get rid of

the problem it faces through readmitting immigrants to Turkey and burden Turkey with it. Therefore, CHP regards the European Union as an unreliable partner. Despite many critics toward the agreement, the party takes a position of a pro-European integration and criticizes that Turkey-EU relations are reduced to solely to the process of readmission agreement. It is stated that the integration into EU norms does not take place through the readmission agreements, but it rather points out to the progress of conforming EU and United Nations norms, or Copenhagen Criteria or Budapest Convention. As to CHP, signing readmission agreement rather precludes Turkey's chance to become a member state in EU because it indirectly leads Turkey to accept the status of privileged partnership. Yet Republican's People's Party stands supportive to European Integration and deems European Union as an example of successful integration that is resided in the transparent democratic institutional structure and the high level of representative determination process and decision making mechanisms.

The Positioning of People's Democratic Party (HDP)

People's Democratic Party or HDP in shortened form, mentions about many points that criticize the process and provisions of the readmission agreement. Yet party's predominant critic is based on the dimension of the human rights. There are a number of arguments which constitutes problematic in a lot of ways and claims the agreement to be incompatible with the concept of human rights.. Firstly, HDP argues that Turkey is lacking a basic human rights protection mechanism concerning the treatment of TCNs. Secondly, It is not an ethic and a qualified foreign policy that Turkey trades the visa exemption in favor of its people in return for readmission agreement that sends the refugees to their home countries who risk their lives for the hope of a humanitarian protection. As such, the handling of humanitarian problem as a service or commodity is incompatible with human rights and human dignity (TBMM, 2014a). In this regard again, as regards HDP, PM's praise about making a good trade through R.A is not acceptable because there cannot be a bargain over human life, it is neither moral and nor a right behavior (TBMM, 2016a). Thirdly, R.A is a lack of transparency, monitoring and accountability, it has a potential to set up chain border mechanism that might lead target countries to commit their responsibilities to other countries. As per the party's assertion, the people at stake are not only irregular immigrants, but also asylum seekers and refugees (TBMM, 2014a). Minorities, Refugees, Turks, Kurds, going out of their own countries, all of them will be under this threat and danger of being deported every day without any guarantees

(TBMM, 2014b). Therefore, R.A basically goes beyond the European states precautions to control irregular immigration because refugees who must flee their country for reasons such as war, conflict, persecution, human rights violations get affected adversely. Besides, the agreement basically allows refugees to be excluded from making applications in Europe through bilateral readmission protocols or illegal withdrawal methods. Basically, the process through R.A allows refugee problem to be reduced to the points of national security and expense which contribute to the construction of a perception that supports the xenophobic abstraction of irregular migrants from human rights and consequently fosters discrimination in every field. This process also makes it possible to reduce the immigrants to numbers, national security threats to migration and political parties to political gains through the human lives. HDP namely suggest that EU's shift from a human rights perspective to a security-based approach impacts EU's neighbor countries and paves the way for daily repeating tragedies on the borders (TBMM, 2014a). Fourthly, the party debates that while Turkey can not solve its own problems, signing R.A with the motto "we love the refugees and we embrace them" and still keeping three million people in places akin to prison in return for 3-5 billion is a trick and unacceptable. Turkey besides does not include the responsibilities of the countries which substantially caused the refugee crisis, on the contrary, it follows a policy that holds refugees somehow in jail and calls for money from the responsible countries in return as if Turkey is brought to a position to do a human trafficking. In addition, it is argued that EU spent 25 billion only for 600-700 thousand syrians within a year, but Turkey will get or spend 6 billion for 3 million people, this is how the government tries to make money through the syrians by putting them into camps that could be called as "prison". Fifth argument relating to the human rights concern is that EU harmonization laws in relation to R.A fullfills the need to consider Turkey a safe third country however, To be a safe third country, there should be no torture or no race, language and religious discrimination in a country or no asylum seekers should face serious risks and democratic standards must be fulfilled. Yet human rights organizations, such as the United Nations Refugee Agency, Amnesty International expressed that R.A is not in line with the refugee law and that Turkey is not fulfilling the criterion of being a third safe country. Apart from that, HDP does not only accuse the turkish government of violating human rights in the agreement, European Union is also to be indicted for. Because, as the argument continues, Turkey can not solve the refugee problem alone, EU bears part of the blame that are worth criticizing as well. For, EU becomes silent on the illegality made in the R.A and therefore tries to cover up this matter for their ugly interest. What both EU and Turkey is doing is to close their eyes to human rights, which is also supported by the right

governments in Europe that follow closed border policy by violating European refugee law. Sixthly, Another issue that will indirectly lead to human rights violations is about the possible occurrence of the cheap workforce. HDP argues that such a development will make both Turkey's proletarians poor and refugees victims and it will consequently give rise to massive economic strike and poverty, which might result in racism and discrimination against refugees, willingly or unwillingly. While there is such a problem in Turkey that even Turkish people can not profit from the wealth of the economy, how could the incoming refugees profit from it. And although one of the excuses of EU signing R.A was the work permit for Syrians, yet today less than 0.1 percent of the Syrian people in Turkey have permission to work. The party asserts that it stands neither against visa liberalisation nor refugee recognition, it stands yet against such a readmission agreement that could ruin the lives of the refugees and could burden on this countries' folk because, as to party position, accepting refugees into country does not mean a good policy as long a country can not provide healthy conditions for them. HDP stands for welcoming refugees and that they must have certain rights, like rights to life, to housing and other affairs in Turkey. However, the party stands for the lives of refugees not only in Turkey but also in all over the world yet as much as the infrastructure of a country can afford. Therefore, In sum, Turkey's signing readmission agreement in return for visa exemption and EU's distraction with R.A to get rid of the immigrants shows that human rights are sacrificed for the political struggle both in domestic policy and also in the external political bargaining. HDP argues that the agreement must be evaluated again in the Turkish Grand National Assembly within the context of human rights, within the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Geneva Convention and other instruments of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights by taking into account the social, economic and political instability of the Turkey's region (TBMM, 2016a).

HDP's critic on readmission agreement refers also to other contexts aside from the human right concern. The party comments on the aspect of the national interest as being violated through readmission agreement. According to party's argument, R.A ignores Turkey's national interest and leaves Turkish citizens living in Europe with a threat of deportation. R.A brings only burden on Turkey and put this on the top of the country when considering that Turkey is a transition country and used by many immigrants (Ibid.). Not only the readmission is problematic but also the position of the returning refugees will be confronted as a separate problem (Ibid.). Turkey will be punished for the refugee dimension of the war in return for 3-

5 cents yet it will put on Turkey different costs apart from the money while EU's refugee problem will be solved solely through financial aid (TBMM, 2016a). R.A with Turkey is basically an indication that EU actually wants to inflict the problem into Turkey. That is to say, it wants to drive all of those people from all over the world who go to Europe, into Turkey. It clearly escapes from a burden sharing (TBMM, 2014b). R.A namely shifts EU's problem toward Turkish people as a burden. Through a visa liberalization, a hundred of issues will be imposed on the shoulder of not only Turkish people but also Turkish North Kurdistan people. Likewise, the refugees without any social security will be also burdened on Turkey and the cost will certainly increase. The problems such as intense prostitution, drugs, theft, the deepening of criminal matters, violence and alike will be similarly on the agenda. Yet the policy in R.A will not come to an end, this issue will not come to an end even when the problem in Syria is resolved. In the future it will deepen and turn into a problem that will bring millions of people into Turkey. Since there is war everywhere in the world, and millions of people are displaced from their homes and come out of their countries with economic poverty, this will be standing before Turkey as a problem that might bring major problems, including these people's business area, education, health, housing and cultural and all the similar issues, including the matters regarding to the demographic structure. Bringing more three million people into the existing problems in Turkey, will not be wise and the EU will increase this to ten millions in ten years, they will never give up on this. For these reasons, HDP stands for refugees and their rights but this could be possible by embracing as much as it falls to Turkey's share, as much as the infrastructure of this country can afford (TBMM, 2016a).

HDP besides argues that the readmission agreement constitutes a block to Turkey's EU membership. The assertion is that Since EU and Turkey comes to the sense that Turkey cannot enter EU under these conditions, R.A offers a new arena for EU-Turkey relations, in which EU on one hand blocks the full membership status of Turkey through linking relations only to R.A process and on the other hand attempts to solve its refugee problem. Yet, the agreement basically aims to solve EU's refugee problem in an undemocratic way, that postpones the fundamental issues increasing Turkey's democratic standards and thus strengthen governments' hand. In addition, R.A covers up the failure of government in the full membership process through an offer of visa exemption for Turkish citizens (Ibid.). HDP criticizes the government and the relation between the R.A and Visa Liberalisation and argue that Visa Liberalisation through R.A reduces the EU-Turkey relations only to R.A and pushes

back Turkey's full membership status. What is at stake is to hide the collapsing EU full membership process and the governments' unsuccessful full membership process through a visa exemption. And the result is burdening Turkey with a hundreds of issues in return for Visa liberalisation (Ibid.).

People's Democratic Party also state that EU carries out a capitalist European bargaining in R.A. and tricks Turkey with it as a political game. There are a bunch of points that are mentioned in this regard. Firstly, as the argument goes on, it is clear that EU aims to gain a greater benefit by R.A, which is more than 3-5 Billion Euros or Visa Liberalisation offer for Turkey. Secondly, EU pushes its current refugee problem out of Europe by pushing it out of European Borders. Thirdly, EU overlooks its own lawlessness and wants to get rid of a great burden by imposing it on Turkey, Thus EU signing R.A with Turkey aims to distract the real issues of refugees such as the problem of work permit for Syrian Refugees in Turkey. Fourthly, EU carries out an ugly bargain by R.A because they do not want to take anyone to their own country, refusing people that are victimized by the wars. Fifthly, in the issue of Syrian refugees, EU plays out with Turkey again. EU namely wants to pick up those it likes or those educated and especially selected ones. Sixthly, EU uses the visa exemption as a carrot toward Turkey and seems to play a sufficiently injurious and disgusting game with Turkey in which it takes measures to cancel visa exemption unilaterally. EU has always done such things even in the time of Ottoman Empire. Thus, there is no trust neither from Turkey to EU, nor from EU to Turkey (Ibid.).

Another argument that criticizes the process of readmission agreement is the uncertainty on so called offer of visa liberalisation. HDP argues in this relation that there is no certainty on which EU will provide visa exemption in Europe although the European press has published news about EU's conditional approval on visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens. For, Visa Liberalisation will not be allowed immediately, because it will depend on a positive vote and rating from European countries. That is to say, visa liberalisation have to pass on the approval of both Member States and European Parliament despite the recommendation of the European Commission. Besides, as the policy paper claims, Germany and France have already begun to take their own measures against the visa liberalization agreement with Turkey. EU namely tries to develop a mechanism that will ensure that Turkey always meets the criterion of the European Union and that otherwise the visa agreement is canceled. Similarly, EU plans to

suspend the deal and refuse the visa liberalisation if the number of people from Turkey who go to Europe visa free and continues to stay without residence permit or the number of refugee applications in Europe arise and Turkey do not readmit enough number of refugees (Ibid.).

Last but not least, HDP argues that the readmission agreements is an unfair and neocolonialist agreement (TBMM, 2014b) The argument is that Turkey must already have obtained the visa exemption due to the negotiations since 1950s. Yet Turkey in return faces a rough treatment particularly (Ibid.). HDP criticizes the relationship between the signing the R.A and having the visa exemption in return. According to HDP there must be the rule of reciprocity in visa exemption. Linking it to readmission agreement is not acceptable (Ibid.). The party considers it also unfair that Turkey is constantly treated unfairly. For instance, it is a fact according to the party that Turkish diplomats and even the Turkish deputies who have a diplomatic passports are treated roughly in the gates of European states (Ibid.).

In summary, People's Democratic Party mentions about many aspects pointing out to a plenty of critics regarding readmission agreement but the first and most mentioned context deals with the dimension of human right. HDP refers to six important arguments that accuses the readmission agreement of being problematic in terms of human rights context despite multiple sub-debates are also mentioned. Firstly, there exist no basic human rights protection mechanism in Turkey that could provide protection for those subject to readmission. Secondly, Trading readmission agreement with the visa exemption for Turkish citizens is neither acceptable nor ethic. Thirdly, readmission agreement as a concept enables the responsibility of a refugee problem to be shifted to an external country, in this case, EU transfers its responsibility to Turkey, Thus, EU reduces the refugee problem to the dimension of national security or to the assumption that all the people coming to Europe are illegal immigrants ignoring the reality of asylum seekers and refugees or also reducing the immigrants to numbers, which results in political parties' struggling to gain power through the human lives. Fourthly, Readmission agreement allows asylum seekers and refugees to be kept in camps akin to prison. According to HDP, through the readmission agreement, Turkey undertakes the role of doing human trafficking for Europe and other countries responsible for the refugee crisis and putting people in camps in return for money. Fifthly, Readmission agreement serves the purpose to render Turkey a safe third country, yet as to party, Turkey does not provide the criterion to be the one safe third country. Sixthly, readmitting all the

people from Europe to Turkey might inevitably pave the way for the emergence of a cheap workforce which might possibly endanger economic position of proletarians of Turkey and consequently lead to discriminative behaviors and measures towards refugees. Apart from the agreements' violations on human rights, HDP also argued that readmission agreement stands against national interests of Turkey. For example, Turkish citizens living in Europe will have to face deportation through the agreement. Also, Readmitting refugees to Turkey will be the trigger of many social, economic major problems which will not be solved only through financial aid. European Union pushes its burden on Turkey and Turkey's folks. Beside the point of national interest, HDP considers readmission agreement as a block to Turkey's membership. The agreement pursues two major purposes of EU in this respect, First, EU solves its refugee problem through readmission agreement, and second, EU linking readmission agreement to visa exemption aims to block Turkey's membership status. Through such an approach of EU toward Turkey and many others within the process of agreement that basically serves to deceive Turkey, HDP assumes readmission agreement to be a political game of EU. Finally, the party asserts that visa exemption that is offered in return for readmission agreement is not even something certain. The visa exemption must pass on the approval of both Member States and European Parliament despite the recommendation of the European Commission. Besides, Member states might take national measures to preclude the visa liberalization for Turkish citizens. Moreover, binding the agreement to visa exemption can be regarded as something unfair because Turkey must basically have a visa exemption due to the negotiations since 1950s.

The Positioning of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)

Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP in shortened form, discusses on three basic arguments in terms of the Readmission Agreement. In comparison with the other parties, MHP does not participate in a lot of arguments. The subject on which the party makes its points mostly refers rather to the national interests. However other two arguments constitute importance in terms of the reflection of the party's stance toward the Readmission Agreement.

MHP basically argues that through R.A, EU desires to send all the illegal immigrants to Turkey without facing any problem, while in return it gives a visa exemption for a limited period of three months. The agreement is a must for Turkey, yet what EU makes concession

on is a three month free travel. According to MHP, the agreement is problematic from many aspects. Firstly, Through R.A, EU solves its problem through Turkey without any financial expense and Turkey accepts to become a repository for immigrants. Secondly, although the agreement will bring along financial burden on Turkey, it is not even certain how many people will be readmitted. Thirdly, R.A renders not only Turkish citizens to be sent back to Turkey but also all third-country nationals and stateless persons and thus also those Turkish citizens, who do not meet the requirements to enter, stay and reside in that country. Fourthly, EU obtains a broad authority through the agreement. For example, a person who had illegally entered into one of the member states of the European Union fifteen years ago will be also readmitted to Turkey if a member state realizes and determines that the person stays illegally. Likewise, EU member states will be able to send the persons within five years after it is determined that the person is living inside the country (TBMM, 2014a; 2014b). Fifthly, as the argument goes on, Turkey will not be able to send the people back to their countries under circumstances that might risk people's lives. Therefore, the R.A will not only impose a financial burden, but also very serious social problems for Turkey. According to MHP, there is already one million Syrians living in Turkey and more will come through R.A. These people might become the source of a variety of problems especially in respect to securing the public order. Sixthly, Turkey is not in a position to accommodate all the people coming to Turkey, neither economically viable nor physically available. Similarly, R.A will indirectly change the demographic structure of Turkey since there is one million Syrians already living in Turkey and more will be readmitted. According to MHP, Turkey is a country in which the elements that make up the Turkish nation live, therefore, Through R.A Turkey's demographic structure will be also in danger (TBMM, 2014b).

Apart from the national interest, MHP argues that there is no certainty in the Readmission Agreement regarding the financial assistance and visa exemption. According to MHP, the EU does not keep its word in concern to many promises it makes, therefore there is no certainty in financial aid as, for example, there was no financial aid for Cyprus at the time of the Annan plan, even though such was promised to Turkey (TBMM, 2014a). MHP argues that there is no certainty concerning the visa exemption as well. For that matter, EU will only consider to provide a visa exemption if Turkey signs the R.A and the visa exemption for Turkey will actually depend on a qualified voting after the Council's recommendation, and if one of the

EU member states blocks the voting for removing the visa obligation for Turkey, there will be no visa exemption (Ibid.).

Besides the assertion of uncertainty, MHP considers as a political game of the EU the fact that refugees from the EU will be readmitted to Turkey in return for visa exemption. It is also considered as a strategic politics of the EU that a link between the financial aid and the visa exemption is established. Through R.A, EU actually wants to get rid of the people that it considers as a burden on the economy by readmitting them to Turkey (Ibid.). MHP basically regards EU as a non-trustable partner. By the fact that EU never keeps its word toward Turkey, it can not be predicted if EU will lift the visa obligation for Turkey or let Turkey enter the EU. For there is no binding for the EU to grant visa liberalisation, such consists only in a verbal commitment. Besides, it is not expected from EU member states like France and Greece to accept Turkey's membership in EU in case they go for a referendum on whether to accept Turkey or not (Ibid.).

In Summary, MHP's critics on the Readmission Agreement reside in three basic argument. Firstly, the agreement threatens Turkey's national interests. What MHP problematize in this respect is that the R.A brings along burden on Turkey – for instance, the argument, that through readmitting illegal immigrants Turkey will become a repository for immigrants, or that the agreement puts Turkish citizens at risk of deportation, or the fact that the EU will possess an extensive authority to determine the subject to readmission, or that Turkey's demographic structure will be in danger through immigrants who do not belong to Turkish identity. Secondly, MHP does not see any concrete provisions within the process of Readmission Agreement that can assure Turkey financial assistance or visa exemption. According to MHP, EU does constantly the same thing, promising to provide financial assistance, which, at the end, does not take place. In regard to the visa exemption, the party argues that the decision on the visa exemption depends on a qualified voting in pursuit of European Council's recommendation, which is namely lack of certainty. The third argument refers to the point that MHP views the process of the Readmission Agreement as a strategic politics of EU's side to use Turkey, for the EU only strives to get rid of the immigrants through the agreement. Therefore, European Union is regarded as a non-trustable partner by the party. According to the party, the EU never keeps its promise toward Turkey and there is

no binding for EU to provide the visa exemption, for what is promised consists only in a verbal commitment.

The analysis of hypotheses regarding to party positions of opposition parties:

Empirical findings unequivocally show that the Turkish parliament opposition parties, namely the Republican People's Party (CHP), the People's Democratic Party (HDP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) take similar positions regarding the process of Readmission Agreement by expressing almost the same arguments and critics. Despite the differences in the frequency or the weight of the assertions, which also reflect the parties' positions on the left-right spectrum, most of the arguments express similar content.

CHP for instance makes reference to the human rights' concerns, the uncertainty of the financial aid and the visa liberalization, the conflict of the agreement with the national interests and refers to the Readmission Agreement as a political game of the European Union, that is unfair and serves as a block to Turkey's EU membership. Among these statements, the national interest argument gains the center stage, which is yet not to say, that the other issues are regarded as less-important.

HDP also refers to the human rights' concern, the national interest issues, assess the Readmission Agreement as a block to Turkey's membership and as a political game of the EU, highlights the uncertainty in the aspect of visa exemption and sees the process of readmission agreement as an unfair treatment. Yet the human rights' concern is the most mentioned issue and a predominant context, that the party's argument devotes itself to. The national interest argument goes after the human rights' concern, namely as the second most referred perspective. HDP's other references and critics are also signified in an important extent.

MHP devoted itself mainly to the aspects of national interest, the uncertainty of the financial assistance and the visa exemption, and also assess the Readmission Agreement as a political game of the EU. Among the three arguments, the national interest comes to the fore very clearly. Yet, other assertions take their place during the debates.

As pointed out above, the positioning of the opposition parties toward the Readmission Agreement significantly resemble each other and, as such, their critical view brings them together, despite that they belong in different parts of the spectrum of the party systems. In other words, even though, for instance, CHP is defined as center-left party, HDP as pro-Kurdish left party and MHP as nationalist far right party, representing different ideologies in Turkey comes together in the articulations of arguments and critics toward the process of Readmission Agreement. As mentioned in the theory part, Taggart and Szczerbiak argue that Euroscepticism brings together some unusual coalitions of ideological forces and that even parties from opposite ends of the spectrum might pair up, despite the ideological differences (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 5). For these reasons, the positions of the opposition parties toward the Readmission Agreement seems to suit in with the third hypothesis: the Turkish parliament opposition parties' position on the left-right spectrum is unrelated to their European stance.

Likewise, the fourth hypothesis also seems to be confirmed through the positioning of the Turkish opposition parties: namely, that the positions of the Republican People's Party (CHP), People's Democratic Party (HDP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the party systems are related to the expression of Euroscepticism. That is to say, these are the parties that have the less possibility to be the ruling party or to become a coalition partner. Therefore, it is easier for them to freely take a Eurosceptic position than it would be for a party that is in the government or is potentially governing party (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004: 5-6). As it was pointed out in the second section concerning the election results, CHP, HDP and MHP are the parties that did not gain the possibility to become a governing party or to take part in a coalition, which is also a result of the election system in Turkey. In addition, Taggart and Szczerbiak argue that if the issues of European Integration are regarded as second-order issues, the parties' stances may deviate from their core appeal, which is more likely to refer to domestic national issues (Ibid.). As the empirical findings illustrate, all the opposition parties, CHP, HDP and MHP make references to the domestic national interest while criticizing the agreement and taking a Eurosceptic position, which in return implies a deviation from the parties' core appeal. Yet, this could be seen more clearly in the positions of CHP and HDP in comparison to MHP.

The fifth hypothesis, according to the empirical findings, corresponds with the positions of all the parties in the parliament, including the ruling Justice and Development Party. As shown in the theory part, Hard Euroscepticism is defined rather as a principle opposition toward EU and European Integration, which means that a party's policies illustrate an opposition to the whole project of European Integration. Therefore, the party urges the country's withdrawal from EU membership. On the other hand, the Soft Euroscepticism is defined as an expression of qualified opposition that considers EU's trajectory in conflict with the party's sense of national interest (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002: 7). Considering the theory's suggestions, the fifth hypothesis of the study asserted that the Hard Euroscepticism is likely to be less evident than the Soft Euroscepticism in the Turkish parliament parties in the context of the Readmission Agreement. When analyzing all the arguments that the parties made in the context of R.A, it becomes apparent that the Eurosceptic positions of the parliament parties and the ruling AK party's National Interest Eurosceptic rhetoric do not imply a principle opposition to the European Union or European Integration, for the parties do not claim the withdrawal of membership goal or, in the case of Turkey, withdrawal of candidate country status for EU membership. On the contrary, AKP for instance highlights the importance of the Turkey-EU relations, arguing that Readmission Agreement helps to improve Turkey's integration in the European Union and that it represents part of the struggle for membership. Also, CHP asserts that the party regards EU membership as a party goal and stands for the European Integration. Nevertheless, it criticizes that Turkey's relation with EU is being reduced only to the process of Readmission Agreement, even though there are more important subjects for the improvement of Turkey's integration into EU that could be handled. The party basically views the agreement as a block to Turkey's EU membership, which in no sense manifests a principle opposition to EU Integration. HDP also consider the Readmission Agreement as a block to Turkey's membership. The party argues that the linkage between the visa exemption offer of the EU and the signing of the Readmission Agreement serves namely to this purpose of blocking Turkey's membership. In the case of MHP, there is no argument concerning the Readmission Agreement as a hurdle to Turkey's membership, or the party does set as a goal EU membership or European integration. Conversely, MHP takes the clearest Eurosceptic position toward the EU. Nevertheless, the assertions point out to a qualified opposition, namely that the EU's trajectory through the Readmission Agreement violates the national interest of Turkey. In conclusion, the analysis of the Turkish parliament parties positioning toward EU-Turkey the Readmission Agreement makes it clear, that re-

scepticism toward European Union predominates the agenda of Turkish parliament parties' positions in the context of the agreement.

Conclusion

This study analyzed the Turkish parliament parties' positions toward the Readmission Agreement, signed between the EU and Turkey. It becomes clear that Turkey had and has an ever-lasting relation with the EU. The argument of the study suggests that the first phase of that relationship dates to the 1963 Ankara Agreement, which aimed Turkey's gradual economic integration and resulted in the Customs Union in 1995. Turkey's becoming a candidate country of the EU and the full membership talks in 2005 labelled the second phase. Since then, it appears that the negotiations on the accession process are being replaced by the negotiations on the Readmission Agreement. Therefore, I suggest that a new age of relations between Turkey and the EU begins as the third phase, which implies rather the process within which the Readmission negotiations play a key role, though this does not exclusively refer to the criterion of Turkey's EU membership. From this point of view, the process of the Readmission Agreement also presents the current EU-Turkey relations. Hence, the study attempted to find answers on how the Turkish parliament parties positioned toward the Readmission Agreement and whether the process of signing the Readmission Agreement prompted a change within the positions of the Turkish parliament parties toward EU and European Integration.

The results suggested that European Union's conditionality and incentives became the main source of compliance of the Justice and Development (AK) Party in signing the Readmission Agreement. That is to say, the party's insist on the Readmission Agreement is indeed related to the EU's offer of visa exemption in return for signing it. This has been often raised as an argument in favor of the agreement. The most crucial point yet is, that a government must consider if the reward the EU offers in return for the compliance, exceeds in value the cost of the domestic rule adoption. The findings confirm this claim and show that The Justice and Development Party aims to increase its political support through an external acquisition which might also bring along legitimacy for its party position, hence the Readmission Agreement with EU serves as an opportunity structure for this purpose. In other words, the political gain for the Turkish citizens, that is to come from the visa exemption (external acquisition), is

considered to generate the internal support (legitimacy) for the party, while the social and economic costs of readmitting irregular immigrants appear to be smaller in comparison with the visa exemption's cost. The content analysis of the parliament debates for AKP's positioning found out, in summary, that arguments about the positive effects of the Readmission Agreement are expressed by the AKP deputies: Turkey will not be burdened, because the agreement enters into force after three years; it is not that easy for the EU to readmit any person it wishes; AKP struggles for EU membership and the Readmission Agreement functions as part of this struggle; Turkey needs to safeguard its borders regardless of EU's demands; Turkey must provide adequate control and surveillance at the border and the Readmission Agreement means also a direct fight against the illegal immigration; the agreement will deter the illegal immigrants from entering Europe. As shown in the theory part, these assertions point out to the strategic action of domestic actors to "talk the EU talk". These arguments could also be considered as the AK Party buffers the actual costs of incorporation of the EU rule through underlying the importance of implementing EU-conform changes.

While such a pro-EU positioning of AKP often found its expression, its sceptic statements toward EU also denoted another face of the party's positioning. That is, while AKP attempts to articulate the importance of the Readmission Agreement in respect of improving the Turkey-EU relations, the expression of national interests, the skeptic attitude toward EU's commitments or the lack of clarity and legal connectivity for EU in the agreement in respect to the visa liberalization or the financial aid, which ignore Turkey's self-interests, dominates the agenda of the commission debates. This does not also imply any disagreement on the argument that the Readmission Agreement becomes a platform for the Justice and Development Party, both to take a position in favor of the European Integration, and to articulate itself within the National Interest Eurosceptic rhetoric.

The empirical results also illustrated that all the opposition parties expressed skepticism toward signing the Readmission Agreement and refused to cooperate with AKP in this matter. Their arguments resemble each other and, as such, their critical views make them meet in a common point, despite the fact that they belong in distinct parts of the spectrum of the party systems. In other words, even though, for instance, CHP is defined as center-left party, HDP as pro-Kurdish left party and MHP as nationalist far right party, representing different

ideologies in Turkey, they come together in the articulations of arguments and critics toward the process of the Readmission Agreement. Thus, the other argument of the study for the opposition parties' gains validation: the Turkish parliament opposition parties' position on the left-right spectrum remains unrelated to their European stance. Similarly, the literature analysis in the second section discovered that the positions of the Republican People's Party (CHP), People's Democratic Party (HDP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) in the party systems are related to the expression of Euroscepticism. Putting it simply, CHP, HDP and MHP are the parties that did not gain the possibility to become a governing party or to take part in a coalition, as illustrated in the second section, which is respectfully a result of the election system in Turkey.

Finally, the results confirmed the general assumption of the study that the Hard Euroscepticism is likely to be less evident than the Soft Euroscepticism for all the Turkish parliament parties in the context of the Readmission Agreement. Empirical findings put forward namely that the Eurosceptic positions of the parliament parties and the ruling AK party's National Interest Eurosceptic rhetoric do not imply a principle opposition to the European Union or European Integration, because the parties do not claim the withdrawal of the membership goal or, in the case of Turkey, withdrawal of candidate country status for EU membership. Only in the case of MHP, there is no direct reference or argument concerning the Readmission Agreement as a hurdle to Turkey's membership, or the party does set EU membership or European integration as a goal. Conversely, MHP takes the clearest Eurosceptic position toward the EU. Nevertheless, the assertions point out to a qualified opposition, namely that the EU's trajectory through the Readmission Agreement violates the national interest of Turkey.

In relation to the sub-research question, whether a change within the party positions are observable through the process of the Readmission Agreement, the results from the third section exhibit that AKP classified itself as a modern liberal conservative party and has been taking steps in this direction for a long time. In addition, it can be said that AKP has been struggling for its pro-EU stance since it came in power in 2002. Yet, since the standstill of Turkey's accession process in 2005, the party began to be rather sceptic toward the EU, nevertheless did not give up completely on Turkey's EU prospect. The findings also reveal that this position is still preserved. Regarding to CHP, the party has been a constant advocator

of the EU and the Westernization. Though the party still principally stands for the EU membership, the recent critics toward the EU is based, firstly, on the party's role as an opposition in the parliament and, secondly, on the EU and other member state's treatment toward Turkey. Therefore, the party's stance within the context of the Readmission Agreement did not expose a comprehensive change. HDP rather avoided taking an explicit stance toward the EU in its previous forms, focusing on the issues of ethnic and cultural rights. Yet the party in its current stand has explicitly embraced a discourse, by collecting a lot of leftist elements under the roof of HDP and thus becoming a pro-Kurdish leftist party. From this perspective, it could be argued that the party can be considered as pro-EU party. Yet, it becomes clear that the party did not change its position on one aspect: HDP's previous versions have consistently strived for the matters of ethnic and cultural rights and thus human rights. What HDP basically opposed within the Readmission Agreement was the fact that the agreement's provisions violated basic human rights. MHP has categorically not rejected the EU membership but has illustrated an extreme sensitivity regarding the issues of the Turkish identity and nation. Any initiative touching upon these sensitive areas resolved in an extremist oppositional reaction within the party. It emerges from the empiric results, that what MHP essentially stood against, was that the Readmission Agreement included Turkish citizens into its scope. Hence, it can be asserted that MHP keeps its stance toward EU.

In conclusion, the analysis of the Turkish parliament parties' positioning toward the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement makes it clear, that re-skepticism toward the European Union predominates the agenda of the Turkish parliament parties' positions in the context of the Readmission Agreement.

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Abstract (English)

The present thesis is concerned with the analysis of the Turkish parliament parties' positions toward the Readmission Agreement that is signed between the European Union and Turkey on the 16th of December 2013. The goal is to understand what sort of positions the parties took within the debates both in the Commission and in Parliament of Turkish Grand Assembly. The study aims to present what arguments have been put forward by the deputies of each party that possess seats in the Parliament and how these assertions generate their party stances toward the European Union and European Integration. As such, the research seeks to answer where the parties stand within the range of pro and contra-EU and European Integration. Even though the Agreement substantially refers to the readmission of Third Country Nationals residing unauthorized within European member states, the Commission and Parliament debates form a key area to apprehend the parties' standings toward the European Union. The paper also intends to understand whether a change within the party positions toward the EU could be detected through the process of the Readmission Agreement. To answer these questions, the protocols of the Commission and the Parliament debates have been analyzed through the qualitative content analysis according to Philipp Mayring. The investigation period of data collection includes the commission and parliament protocols from 2014 and 2016, in which the discussions regarding to the Readmission Agreement constituted the main agenda. As the results suggested, what appears to be explanatory for all the parties including the ruling Justice and Development (AK) Party is that the skepticism toward the European Union sustains its presence. However, that is not to say that the Turkish parliament parties principally reject the prospect of European Integration and European Union membership. The findings also show that the ruling AKP's insistence on signing the Readmission Agreement emerges both from EU's commitment to lift the visa requirements for Turkish citizens and AKP's strategy to increase its legitimacy within the domestic politics.

Abstract (Deutsch)

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Analyse der Positionen der türkischen Parlamentsparteien gegenüber dem Rückübernahmeabkommen, das am 16. Dezember 2013 zwischen der Europäischen Union und der Türkei unterzeichnet worden ist. Ziel ist es zu verstehen, welche Positionen die Parteien in den Debatten, sowohl in der Kommission als auch im Parlament der türkischen Großversammlung eingegangen sind. Die Studie zielt darauf ab, zu präsentieren, welche Argumente von den Abgeordneten jeder Partei vorgelegt wurden, die Sitze im Parlament besitzen und wie diese Behauptungen ihre Parteienpositionen gegenüber der Europäischen Union und der europäischen Integration hervorbringen. Als solche sucht die Forschung zu beantworten, wo die Parteien im Rahmen von Pro und Contra EU und EU-Integration stehen. Obwohl die Vereinbarung die Rückübernahme von Drittstaatsangehörigen, die in den europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten nicht zugelassen sind, im Wesentlichen verweist, sind die Debatten der Kommission und des Parlaments ein Schlüsselfaktor, um den Standpunkt der Parteien gegenüber der Europäischen Union zu erfassen. Das Papier beabsichtigt auch zu verstehen, ob eine Änderung innerhalb der Parteienpositionen in Richtung EU durch den Prozess des Rückübernahmeabkommens erkannt werden könnte. Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, wurden die Protokolle der Debatte der Kommission und des Parlaments durch die qualitative Inhaltsanalyse nach Philipp Mayring analysiert. Als Untersuchungszeitraum wurden die Kommission und Parlamentsprotokolle von 2014 und 2016 gewählt, in denen die Diskussionen über die Rückübernahmevereinbarung die wichtigste Agenda darstellten. Wie die Ergebnisse vorschlugen, scheint für alle Parteien, einschließlich der herrschenden Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung Partei (AKP), zu erklären, dass die Skepsis gegenüber der Europäischen Union ihre Präsenz erhält. Das heißt aber nicht, dass die türkischen Parlamentsparteien die Aussicht auf die europäische Integration und die Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union weitgehend ablehnen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen auch, dass das Bestehen der AKP auf die Unterzeichnung des Rückübernahmeabkommens sich sowohl aus der Verpflichtung der EU, die Visumpflicht für türkische Staatsbürger aufzuheben, ergibt, als auch aus der Strategie der AKP, ihre Legitimität innerhalb der Innenpolitik zu erhöhen.

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