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**„Reporting Invisible Violence: Media Restrictions in West Papua and the Impact
on Human Rights“**

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‘Reporting conflict, such as in the case of West Papua, should be seen as an ethical necessity. Journalists and editors shape the world the media represents, even if now social media opens the way for other actors to participate more fully. Visibility—whether in the traditional or social media—is the very basis on which entry into the media public sphere is made.’

— **Dr Beate Josephi**, *International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) Committee Chair*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AHRD	ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights
AJI	<i>Aliansi Jurnalis Independen</i> / Alliance of Independent Journalists
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
FLNKS	<i>Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste</i> / Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front
GPK	<i>Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan</i> / Security Disturbance Movement
GPL	<i>Gerombolan Pengacau Liar</i> / Wild Terrorist Gang
HRJ	Human Rights Journalism
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAMCR	International Association for Media and Communication Research
ICCPR	International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
KNPB	<i>Komite Nasional Papua Barat</i> / West Papua National Committee
Komnas HAM	<i>Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia</i> / National Commission for Human Rights
KPK	<i>Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi</i> / Corruption Eradication Commission
MIFEE	Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate
MSG	Melanesian Spearhead Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OPM	<i>Organisasi Papua Merdeka</i> / Free West Papua Movement
OTSUS	<i>Otonomi Khusus</i> / Special Autonomy
PDP	Papuan Presidium Council
PV	Papuan Voices
RNZI	Radio New Zealand International
RSF	<i>Reporters Sans Frontières</i> / Reporters Without Borders
SARA	<i>Suku, Agama, Ras, Antargolongan</i> / Ethnicity, Religion, Race, Social groups
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> / Indonesian National Army
TPN	<i>Tentara Pembebasan Nasional</i> / National Liberation Army
ULMWP	United Liberation Movement for West Papua
UN	United Nations
UNDRIP	United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
WPMA	West Papua Media Alerts

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Located in the South Pacific region just north of Australia, the provinces of Papua and West Papua¹ make up the western half of the island of New Guinea and were once part of the Dutch colony known as the Dutch East Indies. Today, they are considered the easternmost provinces of Indonesia, after a controversial transfer of power that took place following the New York Agreement in 1962 and the Act of Free Choice in 1969. Papuans have been struggling for their independence ever since – at first violently through armed guerrilla resistance groups, but increasingly through diplomatic means and the use of local media.

According to the Free West Papua Movement, also known as the OPM, roughly 500,000 Papuans have been killed at the hands of the Indonesian Government since the early 1960s.² Extrajudicial killings are less frequent today, but arbitrary arrests and torture are still widely practiced against Papuans for expressing their cultural identity – for instance, through traditional song, dance or the symbolic Morning Star flag – which the Indonesian Government has branded as an act of separatism. In 2016 alone, more than 8000 Papuans were arrested for participating in peaceful demonstrations, approximately half of which occurred between April and June, indicating a 300 percent increase in political arrests since 2015.³ Most of these violations are committed by the military or police, which pose the greatest challenge for the government in resolving cases of human rights abuses. Nevertheless, the Indonesian Government has called for

¹ This region was previously named West New Guinea under Dutch colonial rule and Irian Jaya or West Irian under Indonesian sovereignty. In 2008, the Indonesian Government split the region into two provinces, called Papua and West Papua respectively, angering local activists who prefer to call the entire western half of the island of New Guinea ‘West Papua’. Henceforth, this thesis uses the term ‘West Papua’ in solidarity with local preferences. See Appendix I for a comprehensive map of the region.

² *Free West Papua Campaign*, [website], <https://www.freewestpapua.org/info/human-rights/>, (accessed 10 January 2017).

³ Free West Papua Campaign, ‘Human Rights in West Papua: 2016 in Review’, *Free West Papua Campaign*, 19 January 2017, <https://www.freewestpapua.org/2017/01/19/human-rights-2016-review/>, (accessed 28 January 2017).

the wider distribution of the military in West Papua,⁴ even though in 2014, the ratio of security personnel to population was already 1:99 compared to the national average of 1:296.⁵ Poor education and health services, as well as abject poverty, are also significant issues in West Papua, despite the massive transfer of funds to the region under Special Autonomy (OTSUS). This is attributed to the misconduct of local government, which suffers from high levels of bureaucracy and widespread corruption, as well as the negligence of national government, for its lack of monitoring and implementation of development programmes.

During his campaign for presidency, Joko Widodo (popularly known as Jokowi) vowed to take a new approach to West Papua and has made several promises since, such as pursuing dialogue with Papuans,⁶ promoting increased and participative development,⁷ and opening access to foreign journalists.⁸ However, while he has achieved a number of improvements, such as releasing Papuan political prisoners in 2015⁹ and awarding official forest permits to local villages in March 2017,¹⁰ many of Jokowi's promises remain unfulfilled. The main criticism is that like previous leaders before him, Jokowi places too much emphasis on economic development and not enough on investigating cases of human rights abuses. In a bold move that renewed international interest in West Papua, six Pacific Island nations raised their concerns about human rights abuses in the region to the United Nations (UN) in September 2016. They also called for West Papua to be placed on the UN decolonisation list, as they viewed Indonesia's presence in the

⁴ N. Lumanauw and E. Prasetyo, 'TNI should be Indonesia-centric, not Java-centric: Jokowi', *Jakarta Globe*, 12 January 2017, <http://jakartaglobe.id/news/tni-indonesia-centric-not-java-centric-jokowi/>, (accessed 16 January 2017).

⁵ M. Supriatma, 'West Papua Report: December 2014', *East Timor Action Network (ETAN)*, 2014, <https://www.etan.org/issues/wpapua/2014/1412wpap.htm>, (accessed 30 June 2017).

⁶ A. Harsono, 'Papuans have heard Jokowi's promises, but is the president listening?', *Jakarta Globe*, 12 January 2015, <http://www.jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/opinion/papuans-heard-jokowis-promises-president-listening/>, (accessed 24 May 2017).

⁷ A. Budiman, 'Jokowi wants Papuans to be involved in development', *Tempo*, 9 November 2016, <http://en.tempco.co/read/news/2016/11/09/307818991/jokowi-wants-papuans-to-be-involved-in-development>, (accessed 10 November 2016).

⁸ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Something to Hide? Indonesia's Restrictions on Media Freedom and Rights Monitoring in Papua*, USA, HRW, 2015, pg. 21.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ H. Jong, 'West Papuan villages awarded forest permits', *The Jakarta Post*, 10 March 2017, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/03/10/west-papuan-villages-awarded-forest-permits.html>, (accessed 10 March 2017).

region as a form of colonial occupation. In its Right of Reply, Indonesia persistently denied its involvement in any human rights violations and reminded the Pacific Island nations of the principles of sovereignty and non-interference.¹¹ Jokowi's administration has been rebuilding its image ever since, with a notable increase in positive developmental news being reported in the national media immediately after the UN meeting. However, according to the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, which published the Papua Road Map on conflict resolution, one thing remains clear: 'The ebb and flow of sympathy and international support for the Indonesian Government depends to a great extent on how OTSUS is being implemented, particularly with regard to the enforcement of human rights.'¹²

1.2 Significance of the Media

Making sense of the conflict in West Papua is a complex matter as access to and information coming from the region remains relatively scarce. Animosity between Indonesian nationalists and Papuan separatists has also resulted in the distortion of truth, making it difficult to distinguish between reliable information and 'fake news'. Without independent investigative research by media and human rights workers, alleged human rights abuses are therefore difficult to verify, which can have serious consequences, such as when Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said that there was not enough evidence of human rights abuses in West Papua to entail greater Australian involvement.¹³ Similarly, the absence of media and human rights researchers makes it difficult to verify claims of improvements in the welfare and treatment of Papuan indigenous people. In 2016, the Indonesian Government reiterated Jokowi's commitment to human rights in the region and claimed that 'mass media have rarely

¹¹ J. Blades, 'Indonesia accuses Pacific countries of interference', *Radio New Zealand International*, 27 September 2016, <http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/314234/indonesia-accuses-pacific-countries-of-interference>, (accessed 26 September 2016).

¹² M. Widjojo et al, *Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future*, Jakarta, Indonesian Institute for Sciences (LIPI), 2008, p. 8.

¹³ 'PNG opposition leader calls for "honest" take on Papua', *Radio New Zealand International*, 12 December 2016, <http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/320202/png-opposition-leader-calls-for-honest-take-on-papua>, (accessed 11 January 2017).

reported progress made by the government.’¹⁴ This thesis argues that a free media could provide current and reliable information in both cases that would enrich people’s understanding of the situation in West Papua.

Unfortunately, restrictions against the media have been in place for over five decades and continue to exist in the fear that giving voice to separatist sentiments might lead to international criticism of Indonesia’s ‘sovereignty’.¹⁵ Although significant improvements have been made since the period of *reformasi* (‘reform’), which saw the resignation of the Indonesian dictator Suharto and a new era of democratisation, the media in West Papua is still subject to government- and military-imposed constraints. According to Ross Tapsell, who identifies the situation in West Papua as a system of ‘subnational authoritarianism’, ‘Papua remains an exception to many of the impressive processes of democratization which have occurred nationwide.’¹⁶ Unlike other Indonesian provinces, for instance, foreign journalists seeking access to West Papua must first complete a demanding visa application process that requires approval from 12 different state agencies, including the military. They are also routinely monitored by intelligence during their stay.¹⁷ Meanwhile, local journalists experience much harsher conditions, such as intimidation, death threats, discrimination, censorship and other challenges to their work – dangers that also exist for local witness sources, making it difficult for journalists to interview freely.¹⁸

According to Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Indonesia currently ranks 124 out of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index. On the topic of West Papua, which it refers to as an ‘information black hole’, RSF highlights Indonesia’s discriminatory visa law, bribery and corruption among poorly paid journalists, and the risk of arrest for

¹⁴ ‘Jokowi continues Papua rights issue resolution’, *Tempo*, 3 October 2016, <https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2016/10/03/055809149/Jokowi-Continues-Papua-Rights-Issue-Resolution>, (accessed 5 October 2016).

¹⁵ R. Tapsell, ‘The media and subnational authoritarianism’, *South East Asia Research*, vol. 23, no. 3, 2015, p. 333.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 319.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 320.

¹⁸ K. Abplanalp, ‘Media Restrictions on Papua: Understanding the Impacts’, Master Thesis, Auckland University of Technology, 2015, p. 57-62.

journalists and fixers as particularly problematic.¹⁹ In May 2015, under pressure from organisations calling Indonesia to open access to West Papua, President Jokowi declared that the ban on foreign journalists had officially been lifted. Unfortunately, Jokowi neglected to pass a presidential decree on the issue and his statement was negated less than 24 hours later by the Chief of the Army, the Chief of Intelligence, and the Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs.²⁰ The reason given was that there were too many dangers and security risks for foreign journalists working in the region – even though, according to Tapsell, not one foreign journalist has been injured by Papuan separatists in over 50 years of the West Papua conflict.²¹

Today, little is known about West Papua both inside and outside of Indonesia, especially when it comes to local experiences of institutionalised discrimination. Foreign and national media often rely on old narratives of physical violence, which are unhelpful to contemporary Papuans and ignore ‘the sophistication of the non-violent movement,’²² while local journalists – although slightly better at reporting on cultural and structural violence – still work under the paradigm of mainstream ‘hot’ news, and could also focus more effort towards covering these stories. These issues should not be blamed on the journalists themselves, however, but rather on the structural limitations placed on their profession. In this thesis, I argue that the lack of media freedom in West Papua results in the under- and misrepresentation of the conflict, which perpetuates the current system of human rights abuses and impunity enjoyed by the military and government. Most importantly, it draws a veil on the cultural and structural violence committed in the region, which are just as severe as cases of physical violence, yet receive little to no media attention in the international sphere.

In the next section, I outline the legal framework for media in Indonesia and the country’s state obligations under international, regional and national law. The right to a free media is protected under the freedoms of opinion and expression, and considered

¹⁹ *Reporters Without Borders*, [website], 2016, <https://rsf.org/en/indonesia>, (accessed 6 April 2017).

²⁰ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 332.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 320.

²² Abplanalp, p. 53.

essential to a functioning democratic society and the protection and fulfilment of all human rights.

1.3 The Legal Framework for Media in Indonesia

1.3.1 International Framework

The freedoms of opinion and expression are encoded in article 19 of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which were adopted or ratified by Indonesia in 1948 and 2006 respectively. Article 19 ICCPR stipulates that everyone has ‘the right to hold opinions without interference’ and the ‘freedom to seek, receive and impart information ... either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media.’²³ According to General Comment No. 34, the freedoms of opinion and expression depend on an independent and diverse press, and thus, it is a duty of the State to ensure the editorial freedom of media organisations and that citizens have access to journalistic work.²⁴ Moreover, it is prohibited to penalise a media outlet for criticising government institutions, or the existing political and social system, as public figures are ‘legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.’²⁵

Restrictions are permitted under article 19, paragraph 3 (and article 20 on the prohibition of war propaganda), given they are provided by the law, deemed necessary and adhere to the proportionality and least intrusive measure tests. Paragraph 3 states that the freedoms of opinion and expression may only be restricted for the ‘respect of the rights and reputations of others’ and for the ‘protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.’²⁶ According to General Comment No. 34, laws on treason or threats against national security must be clearly defined to prevent

²³ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 19.

²⁴ UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression’ (12 September 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34, para. 10-16.

²⁵ *Ibid*, para. 38.

²⁶ ICCPR art. 19 para. 3.

‘unnecessary or disproportionate interference,’ and should not interfere with the work of journalists, researchers and human rights defenders.²⁷ Furthermore, restrictions may not lead to arbitrary arrest, torture, intimidation, the threat to life or other attacks, and if so, must be investigated, prosecuted and remedied in a timely manner, as to do otherwise would be incompatible with the purpose of the Covenant. The Human Rights Committee also agreed that article 19 may not be derogated from in a state of public emergency, even though it is not formally included in article 4 of the ICCPR.²⁸ The Committee states:

It is normally incompatible with paragraph 3 to restrict the freedom of journalists ... to travel outside the State party, to restrict the entry into the State party of foreign journalists ... or to restrict freedom of movement of journalists and human rights investigators within the State party (including to conflict-affected locations ... and locations where there are allegations of human rights abuses).²⁹

Finally, restrictions are additionally permitted under the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, which were endorsed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression Abid Hussain. Under principle 6, ‘expression may be punished as a threat to national security’ but only if the expression is ‘intended [and likely] to incite imminent violence’.³⁰ Principle 2 further defines a legitimate national security interest as one that ‘protect[s] a country's existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force ... such as incitement to violent overthrow of the government.’³¹ It does not cover intentions to protect the government from criticism and ‘exposure of wrongdoing’, and

²⁷ UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 34’, para. 46.

²⁸ Ibid, para. 5.

²⁹ Ibid, para. 45.

³⁰ Article 19, *The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information*, London, Article 19, 1996, p. 9.

³¹ Ibid, pg. 8.

must not be discriminately imposed based on race, colour, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, or other status.³²

1.3.2 Regional Framework

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a sub-regional organisation consisting of the Member States of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. In 2009, it established the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) to promote the protection of human rights in Southeast Asia, and in 2012, adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD).³³ The freedoms of opinion and expression are encoded in article 23 of the AHRD, which stipulates that everyone has the ‘freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information, whether orally, in writing or through any other medium of that person’s choice.’³⁴ These freedoms may be restricted under article 8 for reasons of national security, public order, public health, safety and morals, and ‘the general welfare of the peoples in a democratic society.’³⁵ Unfortunately, the AHRD is a non-legally binding instrument, which, combined with the lack of a protection mandate and the ASEAN’s fundamental principles of non-interference and decision by consensus, makes it a considerably weak document. ASEAN has often been criticised for its lack of transparency and effectiveness in regards to human rights monitoring. Nevertheless, it is included in this thesis to outline regional commitments to media freedom, as reiterated in the AICHR thematic meeting on media and human rights in May 2016.³⁶

³² Article 19, *The Johannesburg Principles*, p. 8-9.

³³ *ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)*, [website], 2012, <http://aichr.org/about/>, (accessed 27 May 2017).

³⁴ Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), *ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD)*, Jakarta, ASEAN, 2013, p. 7.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 5.

³⁶ ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), ‘Press Release: AICHR Regional Forum on Media and Human Rights in ASEAN’, *AICHR*, 23 May 2016, <http://aichr.org/press-release/press-release-aichr-regional-forum-on-media-and-human-rights-in-asean-16-17-may-2016-kuala-lumpur-malaysia/>, (accessed 27 May 2017).

1.3.3 National Framework

In Indonesia, the freedoms of opinion and expression are included in article 28 of the Constitution, but more importantly, the right to a free media is protected under the 1999 Press Law, which explicitly states that ‘freedom of the press is guaranteed as a basic right of citizens.’³⁷ As stipulated in Article 4, paragraphs 2 and 3, the press ‘shall not be imposed with censorship, muzzling or broadcast prohibition’ and ‘has every right to seek, obtain and disseminate ideas and information’.³⁸ Although permissible restrictions are not included in the document, journalists are expected to comply with the Journalistic Code of Ethics established by the Indonesian Press Council.³⁹ The organisation Article 19 has commended the Press Law for a number of positive features, such as the protection of journalists and confidentiality of sources, the right of citizens to establish media organisations and its basis for the progressive interpretation of the law. However, Article 19 has also raised concerns regarding the Press Law’s content restrictions, right of reply, general obligations and rules governing the foreign press.⁴⁰

Fortunately, Indonesia is one of five ASEAN countries to have a national human rights institution, which is an independent non-judicial body responsible for ensuring that international human rights obligations are implemented at the domestic level. Indonesia’s National Commission on Human Rights (known locally as Komnas HAM) has a mandate covering human rights monitoring, mediation, study and research, and the dissemination of human rights issues to the public. Komnas HAM currently holds six representative offices in the provinces of Aceh, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua, West Kalimantan and West Sumatra, and in February 2017, agreed to open a seventh

³⁷ Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 40 of 1999 on the Press, art. 4 para. 1.

³⁸ Ibid, art. 4 para. 2-3.

³⁹ Ibid, art. 7 para. 2.

⁴⁰ Article 19, ‘Note on the Indonesian Press Law’, *Article 19*, 2004, <https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/analysis/indonesia-press-law-feb-2004.pdf>, (accessed 29 May 2017).

office in the province of West Papua, in order to fulfil the needs of people whom ‘faced difficulty voicing their rights to the government.’⁴¹

Despite Komnas HAM’s A-status accreditation by the OHCHR, however, it has been criticised by various organisations and Papuan activists. In May 2017, human rights groups called for the reform of Komnas HAM after it was reported to have shown ‘little progress’ in the investigation of human rights abuses. Komnas HAM was also accused of ‘improper handling’ of Papuan investigations, such as the investigation into police and military abuses in Wamena in 2001, where ‘documents relating to victims and witnesses had vanished.’⁴² Finally, local activist Sebby Sambom called for the resignation of Komnas HAM’s chairman in 2012, after he appeared to legitimise military operations taking place in West Papua.⁴³ Although Indonesia is commended for being one of five ASEAN countries to host a national human rights institution, these criticisms should be taken into consideration, as well.

1.4 Organisation of the Study

With the conclusion of the introductory chapter, I now move on to the ‘Methodology’, where I outline the research questions and theoretical framework that guided the investigation of this thesis. An examination of Johan Galtung’s ‘triangle of violence’ provides some insight into the loopholes of mainstream journalism, and ways in which a rights-based approach to journalism may alleviate violence and conflict. This chapter also outlines the research methods used and existing limitations in the study.

⁴¹ F. Riana, ‘Komnas HAM establishes representative offices in West Papua’, *Tempo*, 9 February 2017, <https://en.tempo.co/read/news/2017/02/09/055844721/Komnas-HAM-Establishes-Representative-Offices-in-West-Papua> (accessed 29 May 2017).

⁴² S. Batu, ‘Rights groups call for Komnas HAM reform’, *The Jakarta Post*, 14 May 2017, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/14/rights-groups-call-for-komnas-ham-reform.html> (accessed 29 May 2017).

⁴³ ‘Papuan human rights activist calls on Komnas HAM chairman to resign’, *West Papua Media*, 6 December 2012, <https://westpapuamedia.info/2012/12/06/papuan-human-rights-activist-calls-on-komnas-ham-chairman-to-resign/>, (accessed 29 May 2017).

In Chapter 3, I provide some background on ‘The West Papua Conflict’ and the historical grievances that continue to influence local aspirations for self-determination. The Free West Papua Movement is also briefly described, covering its transition from a violent armed resistance to a peaceful and political umbrella organisation. Lastly, I examine the role of the media in reporting conflict and human rights abuses, as well as recent developments in media restrictions.

Chapter 4 on ‘Challenges for the Media’ explores the constraints that local, national, regional and international journalists face when reporting in or on West Papua. This chapter reveals the complexities of the journalistic profession and debunks several unfounded but deep-rooted myths, such as the belief that all national journalists are pro-government and all local journalists are pro-independence. It also explores restrictions unrelated to the military or government, such as conglomeration, politics and the lack of independent funding.

In Chapter 5, I examine ‘West Papua in the Media’, using literature review to determine how the region was portrayed in the past, and a media analysis to determine how it is reported on today. The comparison will reveal how, or if, the media has improved, and how the lack of press freedom impacts coverage of West Papua both locally and abroad.

Chapter 6 focuses on media restrictions and their ‘Impact on Human Rights’, particularly economic, social and cultural rights, such as the right to health and education. Although media restrictions themselves do not result in human rights abuses, the lack of press freedom enables the impunity enjoyed by state officials, and thus, the underreporting of these issues contributes to further violence and conflict in the region.

Finally, in Chapter 7 on ‘Recommendations’, I suggest solutions for improving the quality of local, national, regional and international media, and encourage the practice of networked journalism. I then finish my thesis with a conclusion in Chapter 8.

2 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Research Question

Academics and human rights activists have conducted numerous studies on Indonesia and the lack of freedom of opinion and expression in West Papua. Few of them, however, analyse the nexus between media and human rights, focusing on either one or the other as separate topics. Articles on media restrictions, for example, highlight violations against the freedom of opinion and expression, but rarely mention its effect on the realisation of Indonesia's other human rights obligations. Meanwhile, articles on human rights present many of the violations Indonesia has committed in West Papua since the early 1960s, but seldom consider the role of the media within this context. This thesis is one of few studies that explores how the lack of media freedom affects journalists' ability to execute balanced honest reporting – especially of cultural and structural violence – which in turn, results in the negligence of human rights fulfilment. To achieve this, I first examine the sub-question *'What is the role of the media in the promotion and fulfilment of human rights?'* in the next section on human rights journalism theory. I then continue to the main research question:

'How does the lack of media freedom affect the coverage of West Papua, and how does this impact Indonesia's fulfilment of other human rights in the region?'

2.2 Human Rights Journalism Theory

The theory of human rights journalism (HRJ) provides the interconnection between media and human rights that this thesis seeks to establish and thus, forms the backbone of the methodology. Drawing on the fundamental principles of human rights and non-discrimination, HRJ is generally defined as a journalism 'based on the respect for human dignity irrespective of colour, nationality, race, gender, geographical location

and so on.⁴⁴ Specifically, it redefines the role of the media in conflict situations and the responsibility of journalists when reporting on human suffering. Where human rights news was once viewed as the work of civil society organisations that present their knowledge to the press in the hopes of gaining media attention, HRJ makes it the job of journalists to consider human rights in all aspects of their reporting.⁴⁵ Considered additional duty-bearers, they are responsible for informing rights-holders of, and how to claim, their rights, as well monitoring duty-bearers by reporting honestly on human rights abuses. Like traditional journalism, HRJ views the media as the ‘fourth estate’ and takes pride in acting as the people’s watchdog. However, unlike traditional journalism, ‘[HRJ] carries with it an obligation of activism. It is not enough that a reporter merely identify a rights abuse, she/he is obligated to include in her/his coverage ways in which the abuse can be eliminated.’⁴⁶ HRJ is therefore solution-oriented and guided by the principle of empowerment – not only of victims to gain agency and claim their rights, but also of governments and institutions to strengthen their capacities towards human rights fulfilment.

In addition to these added responsibilities, HRJ is based on honest diagnostic reporting, which means to analyse and explain the reasons behind conflict, rather than sensationalising events. This is in contrast to evocative reporting where the aim it is to capture audience sympathy – often by presenting stereotypical images of violence and suffering – and which tends to result in ‘compassion fatigue’⁴⁷. Shaw writes: ‘It is quite common for suffering to be commodified by the media, to the extent that the audience become passive spectators of distant death and pain without any moral commitment to change things for the better.’⁴⁸ This issue is resolved, however, through the diagnostic reporting of HRJ, as audiences are more likely to take interest and mobilise when the reasons of conflict are explained to them. In order to do this, journalists are trained to

⁴⁴ I. Shaw, *Human Rights Journalism: Advances in Reporting Distant Humanitarian Interventions*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 1.

⁴⁵ T. Rose, ‘A Human Rights-Based Approach to Journalism: Ghana’, *The Journal of International Communication*, vol. 19, no. 1, 2013, p. 88.

⁴⁶ Rose, p. 89.

⁴⁷ Shaw, p. 38.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 7.

report on invisible forms of cultural and structural violence – perhaps the most significant characteristic of human rights journalism.

2.2.1 The Triangle of Violence

The concept of invisible violence derives from Johan Galtung’s ‘triangle of violence’ (Figure 1). According to this model, there are three elements to any conflict:

- (1) **Direct violence** as a result of visible **behaviour** (e.g. murder, arrest, torture);
- (2) **Cultural violence** that stems from **attitudes** that justify or glorify violent practices (e.g. hate speeches, myths, religious justifications for war); and
- (3) **Structural violence**, or institutionalised inequalities, that define the **context** of a conflict (e.g. colonialism, apartheid, patriarchy).⁴⁹

As seen in Figure 1, direct violence sits at the top of Galtung’s triangle and represents the tip of the iceberg of conflict situations. As visible behaviour, it is easier to witness and quantify – for instance, in death tolls or the number of injuries – and is therefore considered a hard fact. Direct violence is often associated with violations against civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty and security, freedom of thought, religion and expression, and freedom from slavery and torture, to name a few. Indirect cultural and structural violence, on the other hand, are found at the bottom of Galtung’s triangle and represent the root causes of a conflict. They are associated with violations against economic, social and cultural rights, since neglecting the right to work, housing and food can lead to violence such as absolute poverty, homelessness and famine. Due to the internalisation of attitudes and institutionalisation of inequalities, cultural and structural violence are harder to witness and quantify, and thus, taken for granted. It is important to note, however, that they are still considered ‘social facts’ – that is, types of

⁴⁹ Shaw, p. 12.

behaviour or thinking that exist beyond the individual and are capable of exercising social control.⁵⁰




Figure 1. Galtung's 'triangle of violence'. Adapted from I.S. Shaw, *Human Rights Journalism: Advances in Reporting Distant Humanitarian Interventions*, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 12.

Unfortunately, due to the visibility of direct violence and invisibility of cultural and structural violence, more attention is given to the former in the media and other institutions. This practice is informed by the traditional 'negative peace' theory, which claims that the presence of peace means the absence of (visible) violence, thus implying that direct violence demands more attention than its invisible counterparts.⁵¹ The premise of Galtung's triangle, however, is that in order to eliminate war, genocide, torture or murder, the cultural and structural reasons for such practices must be addressed and eliminated first. Shaw writes:

Human rights journalism calls for a more robust pro-active (preventive) rather than dramatic reactive (prescriptive) role of the media in humanitarian intervention. It is particularly concerned with getting the

⁵⁰ E. Durkheim, 'What Is a Social Fact?', in S. Lukes (ed.), *The Rules of Sociological Method: And Selected Texts on Sociology and its Methods*, New York, Free Press, 2013, p. 20-28.

⁵¹ Shaw, p. 16.

much neglected second-generation rights (that is, positive economic, social and cultural rights) in order to prepare the ground for the achievement of first-generation rights (that is, negative political and civil rights).⁵²

Such is the concept of ‘positive peace’, which is based on the active fulfilment of human rights, as opposed to the passive non-interference from committing human rights violations.⁵³ The relationship between violence, peace, human rights and journalism is therefore summarised in the following table (Table 1).

Table 1. Relationship between violence, peace, human rights and journalism.

	Visible	Invisible
Violence	Direct	Cultural and structural
Peace	Negative (i.e. absence of visible violence)	Positive (i.e. proactive tackling against invisible violence)
Human Rights	Violations against civil and political rights	Violations against economic, social and cultural rights
Journalism	Human wrongs journalism/ evocative reporting	Human rights journalism/ diagnostic reporting

2.2.2 Theoretical Criticisms

Despite the significance of human rights journalism theory, there are valid criticisms against the effectiveness of using HRJ in practice. One of the claims of HRJ, for example, is that news consumers are more likely to empathise with suffering and call

⁵² Shaw, p. 41.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 16.

for humanitarian intervention if the structural reasons for conflict are explained rather than sensationalised.⁵⁴ However, this argument falls victim to the ‘politics of truth’, which assumes that wider access to marginalised information will immediately affect social and political change, and result in mobilisation.⁵⁵ According to Uzelman, action depends not only on truth, but also on political will, habit, mind-set and various other factors, all of which contribute to the ‘will to ignorance’.⁵⁶ Without readership demand to provide the funds necessary for in-depth investigative reporting, newspapers therefore increasingly rely on government advertising or become subject to the concentration of media ownership, both of which affect journalistic independence by encouraging self-censorship. In Indonesia, half the print media is controlled by just nine business groups, many of which are directly aligned with political parties and may therefore express political biases.⁵⁷ While supporters may argue that ‘HRJ is honesty-oriented’ and therefore ‘free from any economic or political manipulation’,⁵⁸ the reality of professional journalism may not be so simple. According to a study on HRJ in Ghana, journalists expressed the difficulty of sustaining a rights-based approach to journalism in the face of increasing economic, political and religious pressures. One editor commented: ‘Human rights just don’t sell. What does sell is sensationalized news, crime news, news about celebrities: the staples of private new media everywhere.’⁵⁹

2.2.3 Standards of Assessment

Another criticism against human rights journalism theory is that it lacks concrete and culturally appropriate standards to effectively assess journalistic practices. A 2008 training manual by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), provides some guidance in this area by highlighting seven human rights

⁵⁴ Shaw, p. 23.

⁵⁵ S. Uzelman, ‘Dangerous practices: ‘Determinism of technique’ in alternative media and their literature’, *International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics*, vol. 7, no. 2, 2011, p. 21.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 25.

⁵⁷ R. Tapsell, ‘Politics and the Press in Indonesia’, *Media Asia*, vol. 39, no. 2, 2012, p. 109.

⁵⁸ Shaw, p. 67.

⁵⁹ Rose, p. 95-96.

issues that ‘have a particular relevance to Asia.’⁶⁰ They include gender, children, disabled persons, HIV/AIDS, education, health and the environment, and should be considered during all stages of reporting, including the interview and production processes. Additionally, reporting should actively fight against power imbalances, include marginalised voices and increase the capacity of disadvantaged groups.⁶¹ The performance of journalists can be measured against five standards of assessment, also known as the five principles of human rights journalism, which include:

- (1) **Accountability** – The identification of rights-holders and duty-bearers in order to inform them of their roles, whether that is to claim rights based on entitlements, or respect, protect and fulfil rights according to state obligations;
- (2) **Participation** – ‘Active, free and meaningful’⁶² participation by the most disadvantaged groups, as well acknowledging how economic inequality and structural violence may hinder the participative process;
- (3) **Non-discrimination** – The fair and equal representation of vulnerable groups based on race, gender, disability, class, et cetera and ensuring that journalistic practices do not exacerbate power imbalances;
- (4) **Empowerment** – Giving a voice to marginalised groups and strengthening their capacity to claim rights through the relevant human rights mechanisms. Not to be confused with participation, this could mean a call to action or reporting on the duties and promises of governments and international organisations; and
- (5) **Linkages to human rights standards** – The reference to human rights conventions and ratified treaties in order to inform rights-holders and duty-bearers of the relevant human rights. Moreover, including human rights in the curriculum of professional journalistic training.

⁶⁰ UNESCO, *The Human Rights-Based Approach to Journalism: Training Manual, Vietnam*, Bangkok, United Nations, 2008, p. 18.

⁶¹ Shaw, p. 234

⁶² UNESCO, *The Human Rights-Based Approach to Journalism*, p. 25.

2.3 Research Methods

2.3.1 Primary Sources: Interviews

In order to gain better insight into the in-field experiences of working in West Papua, I conducted seven semi-structured interviews with local and foreign journalists, as well as media and human rights experts. I decided to use semi-structured interviews with the understanding that the West Papua conflict is extremely complex, and deserves a free conversational flow for interviewees to adequately express their opinions. During my in-country interviews in Jogjakarta, I also noticed the uneasiness with which Papuan journalists first replied to my questions, and felt that semi-structured interviews were an appropriate way to build rapport and gain their confidence. Unfortunately, I was unable to conduct formal interviews in West Papua due to time constraints and my lack of affiliation with a news organisation, which is required to apply for a journalist visa. I managed to visit Manokwari for a week in December 2016, where I spoke with locals about their general experiences in the region. However, I decided not to interview anyone during this time, as experts have advised against performing these activities under a tourist visa, which may cause harm to locals, journalists and the trust in journalist networks.

The advantage of using interviews is that it enabled me to better understand the nuances of the West Papua conflict, which I would not have been able to do had I used questionnaires or quantitative research methods. The knowledge I gained from interviewees particularly helped me with the first part of my research question on how the lack of media freedom affects the coverage of West Papua. One limitation, however, was the language barrier between English and Bahasa Indonesia, which severely restricted whom or how many people I was able to interview, as well as the extent I was able to engage with the Papuan journalists I managed to secure. Finally, it was relatively difficult to confirm appointments with Papuan interviewees, from whom I detected a level of uneasiness. One journalist who had initially agreed to being interviewed via email stopped replying after several weeks.

2.3.2 Secondary Sources: Media Analysis

Based on the theory of human rights journalism, I assumed that the lack of media freedom in West Papua would result in one-dimensional and evocative reporting. To test this hypothesis, I assessed the quality of HRJ in local, national, regional and international media by conducting a media analysis between September 2016 and March 2017. This time frame was chosen due to the increasing attention that West Papua received as a result of human rights abuses being raised at the UN in September, and the resulting scrutiny that Indonesia was placed under, leading up to the World Press Freedom Day conference hosted in Jakarta in March. The selection of newspapers was determined by my subscription to the *reg.westpapua* newsletter, which is an English-language news list ‘covering issues related to politics, human rights, economy, environment, self-determination and activism for West Papua’.⁶³ It is updated by Tapol and the East Timor Action Network, two human rights organisations monitoring conflict in West Papua and Timor-Leste. I believe the newsletter was the most legitimate and balanced one available, considering the inclusion of local, national, regional and international newspapers, and a broad range of topics expressing mostly neutral perspectives. However, there was one significant limitation, in that the *reg.westpapua* newsletter selects local and national newspapers based on their English publication. Thus, when Bahasa news is featured, it is poorly translated to English by Google Translate, which may lead to certain concepts being lost in translation.

For the media analysis, I conducted a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods to study both the extent and thematic content of media coverage of West Papua. Qualitative analysis was used to determine the presence of the themes of visible and invisible violence, as well as compliance with the five principles of human rights journalism. Meanwhile, quantitative analysis was necessary to calculate the extent of media coverage according to the above-mentioned definitions. Some guiding questions included:

⁶³ *Riseup.net*, [website], <https://lists.riseup.net/www/info/reg.westpapua>, (accessed 13 September 2016). Register for the *reg.westpapua* email newsletter using this webpage.

- *What was the extent of local, national, regional and international coverage of West Papua between September 2016 and March 2017?*
- *What was the extent of the coverage of visible and invisible violence?*
- *Which media practiced the best form of human rights journalism?*
- *Did the media cover structural issues particularly relevant to Asia, such as those related to gender, children, disabled persons, HIV/AIDS, education, health and the environment?*

The categorisation matrix summarises the categories and sub-categories that were used during the course of the media analysis (Table 2).

Table 2. Categorisation matrix.

Category	Sub-category
Location	Local, national, regional, international
Themes	Visible violence, invisible violence
Principles of HRJ	Accountability, participation, non-discrimination, empowerment, linkages to human rights standards

Under the category of location, ‘local’ refers West Papua, ‘national’ to Indonesia, ‘regional’ to the Pacific Islands area (excluding New Zealand) and ‘international’ to anywhere beyond (including New Zealand and Australia). Under themes, visible and invisible violence are defined according to Shaw’s description, which separates civil and political violence, such as arbitrary arrests, genocide, killings and the mistreatment of prisoners, from economic, social and cultural violence, such as poverty, famine,

marginalisation and human trafficking.⁶⁴ Finally, compliance with the principles of HRJ was measured according to the UNESCO definitions, which were outlined in Chapter 2.2.3 on ‘Standards of Assessment’. These principles were slightly modified to suit the needs of the media analysis and are described in following table (Table 3).

Table 3. Definition of the principles of HRJ as used in the media analysis.

Principle	Definition
Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifies rights-holders and duty-bearers • Articles about police brutality are taken as a given (i.e. police are accountable)
Participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Includes quotes from local or Papuan sources
Non-discrimination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Covers issues experienced by vulnerable groups • Offers balanced stories (i.e. includes both Papuan and non-Papuan sources, or supported by extensive data)
Empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides information for critical thinking • Empowers Papuans’ ability to claim their rights • Recommends solutions to the government
Linkages to human rights standards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refers to national or international human rights standards

It should be noted that I did not include articles that only vaguely mentioned human rights abuses, unless the types of abuses were explained in further detail. Neither did I include articles about regional politics, or positive developmental news related to Papuans’ economic, social and cultural rights, as the purpose of HRJ is to cover

⁶⁴ Shaw, p. 2.

invisible violence. Finally, duplicates of articles that were published on multiple news sites were also excluded from the analysis.

2.3.3 Other Limitations

I would like to conclude this chapter by pointing out some other limitations I experienced during the investigation of this thesis. Since West Papua is restricted to journalists, academics and non-governmental organisations (NGO), there is not a lot of data on the topic available. Indonesian institutions, such as the Central Bureau of Statistics, have conducted some research in the region, but as it is difficult to find translations of these reports, this thesis primarily depended on second-hand articles by English-language news organisations, such as Kompas and The Jakarta Post. It is also important to note that Indonesia does not disaggregate data based on ethnicity, so that it is difficult to assess how issues, such as healthcare, education and unemployment, affect indigenous Papuans in comparison to non-Papuan Indonesians. The impact of these issues is only assumed based their prevalence in urban or rural areas, and the geographical segregation of the population, where non-Papuans are now a majority in the richer urban cities and Papuans form a majority in the remote rural highlands. Lastly, my subscription to the [reg.westpapua](#) newsletter was based on what I assumed was balanced reporting by all types of media, including the more independent national news organisations in Indonesia. However, several of the people I interviewed mentioned that they do not trust the national media and that it is prone to biases when it comes to reporting on West Papua. As a foreigner and non-expert on the situation, I was unable to confirm whether their assumptions were true, but it would be interesting to conduct further research on government-owned media to see whether biases increase within these institutions, or remain relatively equal.

3 THE WEST PAPUA CONFLICT

Before delving into the challenges of the media in West Papua, it is important to have some background on the West Papua conflict. In Chapter 3, I explore the historical grievances surrounding the 1962 New York Agreement and 1969 Act of Free Choice that continue to influence local aspirations for self-determination. I also briefly describe the OPM and its transition from an armed resistance group to a political and human rights-based organisation, before examining the role of the media and highlighting recent media developments over the past two years.

3.1 Historical Grievances

3.1.1 Conflicting Narratives on Independence

On 17 August 1945, after three and a half centuries of Dutch colonial rule, Indonesia finally gained its independence from the Netherlands. All territories under the former Dutch East Indies were given back to Indonesia with the exception of West New Guinea, based on the argument that the people were historically, culturally, religiously and ethnically different.⁶⁵ Instead, the Dutch helped to establish an educated Papuan elite, and in 1960, began a 10-year plan for self-determination, starting with the establishment of the New Guinea Council, which soon acted as a de facto parliament.⁶⁶ On 1 December 1961, Papuans sang their national anthem and raised the Morning Star flag for the very first time, an act that they consider a declaration of national sovereignty.⁶⁷ Yet in accordance with the principle of *uti possidetis juris*, Indonesia continued to claim territorial integrity based on the borders of the former Dutch East Indies,⁶⁸ and to this day, reject Papuan independence, as they believe West Papua was liberated with the rest of Indonesia in 1945. They also argue that Indonesian unity was

⁶⁵ P. Matbob and E. Papoutsaki, 'West Papuan 'independence' and the Papua New Guinea press', *Pacific Journalism Review*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2006, p. 88.

⁶⁶ D. Webster, 'Self-Determination Abandoned: The Road to the New York Agreement on West New Guinea (Papua), 1960-62', *Indonesia*, vol. 95, 2013, p. 10-11.

⁶⁷ Widjojo, p. 419.

⁶⁸ M. Leadbeater, 'Conflict in West Papua: The contrast between historic and contemporary media coverage in New Zealand', *Pacific Journalism Review*, vol. 21, no. 1, 2015, p. 232.

never based on cultural, religious and ethnic uniformity,⁶⁹ since according to the third pillar of the state ideology of Pancasila:

Pancasila nationalism demands that Indonesians avoid superiority feelings on ethnical grounds, for reasons of ancestry and color of the skin ... The Indonesian coat of arms enshrines the symbol of “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika” which means “unity in diversity”. Social differences in daily life should never affect national unity and integrity.⁷⁰

In a letter to John F. Kennedy in 1961, the Indonesian President Sukarno warned that if the Netherlands continued to prepare Papuans for independence, ‘there is no alternative left to us but the use of force.’⁷¹ The threat of war placed heavy pressure on the United States, a key figure in the negotiations leading up to the 1962 New York Agreement, which detailed plans on the administration of the territory of West New Guinea. Kennedy was particularly concerned how war in Southeast Asia would leave a ‘clear field for communist intervention’ in Indonesia, and create a domino effect in Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia.⁷² Thus, Cold War politics side-lined the question of self-determination in West Papua – or what Robert Komer, an advisor to President Kennedy, dismissively referred to as ‘a few thousand miles of cannibal land.’⁷³

3.1.2 Too Primitive for Self-Determination

The sentiment that Papuans were too primitive for meaningful self-determination was surprisingly widespread. According to Van der Kroef, however, government services had already undergone a process of ‘Papuanisation’ under Dutch rule, so that by 1961,

⁶⁹ ‘Questions over Indonesian claim to have over 11 million Melanesians’, *Radio New Zealand International*, 13 April 2011, <http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/196572/questions-over-indonesian-claim-to-have-over-11-million-melanesians>, (accessed 3 April 2017).

⁷⁰ *The Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia*, [website], <http://www.indonesia.ro/republic.htm>, (accessed 3 April 2017).

⁷¹ Webster, p. 13.

⁷² *Ibid*, p. 19.

⁷³ T. Banivanua-Mar, “‘A Thousand Miles of Cannibal Lands’: Imagining Away Genocide in the Re-Colonization of West Papua”, *Journal of Genocide Research*, vol. 10, no. 4, 2008, p. 583.

4,950 out of 8,800 government positions were filled by Papuans at low, middle and executive levels.⁷⁴ In a telegram to President Kennedy, the New Guinea Council expressed its disappointment in being portrayed as backward and asked the international community for technical aid, rather than prematurely disregarding the feasibility of independence.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, in 1968, British intelligence informed its Foreign Office that the US, Dutch, Japanese and Australian governments would not 'risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia [over] a relatively small number of very primitive people.'⁷⁶ West New Guinea was therefore placed under the temporary administration of Indonesia and a referendum on independence would be held in five years time. Although a UN commissioner was supposed to be present during this period to supervise the organisation of the vote, these duties were restricted in the final agreement and planning of the referendum was eventually placed in the hands of Indonesia.⁷⁷ Before the referendum even took place, however, the Indonesian Government had already 'explicitly denied' Papuan's right to self-determination and said it would only hold the vote in order to honour its bilateral treaty with the Netherlands.⁷⁸ Since the UN did not officially endorse the New York Agreement, Indonesia did not see the referendum as an obligation under international law,⁷⁹ a behaviour that very few countries seemed concerned by. US Ambassador Marshall Green even commented: 'Free elections among groups such as this would be more of a farce than any rigged mechanism Indonesia could devise.'⁸⁰

3.1.3 The Act of 'No' Choice

Soon after the UN withdrew its last peacekeeping troops from West New Guinea, Indonesia established a 'political quarantine' whereby public gatherings were officially banned, local media was placed under government control, and the freedom of

⁷⁴ J. Van der Kroef, 'West New Guinea: The Uncertain Future', *Asian Survey*, vol. 8, no. 8, 1968, p. 694.

⁷⁵ Webster, p. 17.

⁷⁶ Banivanua-Mar, p. 594.

⁷⁷ Webster, p. 20.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

movement became heavily restricted.⁸¹ During this period, the Indonesian military were reportedly involved in the murder of 30,000 Papuans, causing US Ambassador Frank Galbraith to believe that '[military operations] had stimulated fears ... of intended genocide.'⁸² When the Act of Free Choice (sometimes referred to as the Act of 'No' Choice) finally took place in 1969, Indonesian authorities selected over 1000 tribal leaders as representatives for the vote, or less than 0.2 percent of the population at the time.⁸³ The leaders unanimously voted under 'demonstrable coercion'⁸⁴ for Indonesian sovereignty, despite Galbraith's evaluation that 'possibly 85-90 [percent of the population] are in sympathy with the Free Papua cause.'⁸⁵ Nevertheless, during a UN General Assembly meeting to approve the Act, 84 members voted in favour and zero against, while 30 members abstained.⁸⁶ A significant number of Papuans view the Act of 'No' Choice as robbing them of their independence, and consider the lack of dialogue from Indonesia today as ignoring a decades-long injustice.

3.2 The Free West Papua Movement

The Free West Papua Movement was first established in 1965 but split into several factions following inter-party disagreements on how to achieve self-determination. The more violent or extreme forms of resistance was primarily organised by the National Liberation Army (TPN), or the armed section of the independence movement, while other groups supported peaceful dialogue, a second referendum, special autonomy or international intervention and recognition.⁸⁷ These groups include the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP), the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, and the National Committee for West Papua (KNPB), to name a few. Unfortunately, the media commonly uses the term 'OPM' to refer to all Papuan activists – a practice that ignores

⁸¹ Van der Kroef, p. 695.

⁸² J. Robinson, 'The UN's chequered record in West Papua', *Al Jazeera*, 21 March 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/03/201232172539145809.html>, (accessed 1 April 2017).

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Banivanua-Mar, p. 584.

⁸⁵ B. Simpson, 'Indonesia's 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by "Free Choice"', *The National Security Archive*, [website], 2004, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB128/>, (accessed 1 April 2017).

⁸⁶ Webster, p. 21

⁸⁷ C. Webb-Gannon, 'Merdeka in West Papua: Peace, Justice and Political Independence', *Anthropologica*, vol. 56, no. 2, 2014, p. 367.

the nuances of the current human rights movement. Their confusion is understandable, however, considering local sentiments, such as those of the refugees in the border camp of Papua New Guinea, who claimed: ‘We are all OPM!’⁸⁸ Kirksey and Roemajauw explain this phenomenon by describing the OPM as a ‘cultural world view’ that unites the 250 cultural groups of West Papua, rather than a specific political organisation.⁸⁹ Unfortunately, the term ‘OPM’ continues to invite suspicion from Indonesian authorities, as it is associated with the violent opposition of armed separatist groups, who were particularly active in the 1970s and 80s.

3.2.1 The Militarisation of the State and TPN

During the 1970s and 1980s, the West Papua conflict was characterised by explicit violence and the ‘most intense period of militarization’ by both the Indonesian military and TPN/OPM.⁹⁰ Most TPN attacks were targeted against government outposts or the Freeport McMoRan copper and gold mine, causing Freeport to employ military forces as its private security personnel.⁹¹ The TPN were also responsible for a number of kidnappings, such as the abduction of ten biodiversity researchers working with the World Wildlife Fund in 1996. After a highly publicised rescue operation by the Indonesian military, eight hostages were released and two were unfortunately killed.⁹² This event sparked the discourse on national security, thus justifying the military’s presence in West Papua and undermining the legitimacy of the independence movement. However, although the TPN’s use of violence is unjustifiable, it is important to note that it ‘replicated the militarization of the state’ during that time,⁹³ and that the

⁸⁸ S. Kirsch, ‘Ethnographic Representation and the Politics of Violence in West Papua’, *Critique of Anthropology*, vol. 30, no. 1, 2010, p. 13.

⁸⁹ S. Kirksey and J. Roemajauw, ‘The Wild Terrorist Gang: The Semantics of Violence and Self-determination in West Papua’, *Oxford Development Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2, 2002, p. 191.

⁹⁰ Banivanua-Mar, p. 590. Henceforth, I use the term ‘TPN’ to refer to the organisation responsible for violent opposition, in order to avoid stigmatisation of the larger Free West Papua Movement.

⁹¹ Widjojo, p. 413.

⁹² Ibid, p. 413-414.

⁹³ Kirsch, p. 13.

TPN's low-level armed insurgency was frequently met with disproportionate force by the Indonesian military.⁹⁴

Throughout the 1970s, for example, Indonesia expanded its operations into the Papuan highlands, where the military increasingly used secret intelligence and conducted 'small-scale massacres, intimidation, torture and disappearances'.⁹⁵ In 1977, under *Operasi Tumpas* ('Operation Annihilation'), the Indonesian military suppressed the Amungme people's resistance near the Freeport mine by dropping cluster bombs on villages, slash-and-burning residential gardens, and shooting thousands of innocent civilians.⁹⁶ A few years later, in 1981, the military authorised several massacres under *Operasi Sapu Bersih* ('Operation Clean Sweep'), using napalm and other chemical weapons. The cleared land was later used as a transmigration site for non-Papuan Indonesians.⁹⁷ Most significantly, however, the well-known and celebrated anthropologist Arnold Ap was detained and murdered by Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) in 1984 for his alleged involvement with the OPM. His death was a shock to many, as Ap was an academic and not a guerrilla fighter. Military violence was discussed in national newspapers for the very first time, and the Indonesian Government introduced a Criminal Code stating that all human rights should be respected.⁹⁸ This unfortunate but significant event was one of several episodes that paved the way for the human rights movement in West Papua.

3.2.2 Papuan Spring: A Shift Towards Human Rights?

With the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the onset of *reformasi*, a political space opened up for Papuan activists seeking peaceful dialogue with Indonesia. This period is commonly referred to as the 'Papuan Spring', where the OPM's agenda shifted from armed

⁹⁴ Widjojo, p. 422.

⁹⁵ Banivanua-Mar, p. 590.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 591.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

resistance towards a more diplomatic means of human rights campaigning.⁹⁹ In 1999, a group of elected representatives called Team 100 were invited to a national dialogue with President Habibie to discuss local grievances and economic development.¹⁰⁰ A year later, the PDP was elected and consisted of a 31-member executive and 500-member panel of local representatives, with the charismatic Theys Eluay filling the position of PDP Chair.¹⁰¹ Progress was also being made through Act 26/2000 on Human Rights, obliging the Government to establish four permanent human rights courts in Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya and Makassar.¹⁰²

Despite these improvements, however, political violence increased six-fold in 2000 compared to 1999,¹⁰³ perhaps due to the fact that ‘Indonesian authorities [were] more wary of peaceful activists than armed separatist groups because the former has stronger foreign influence.’¹⁰⁴ A leaked letter outlining the military’s strategy to re-establish control over West Papua included eliminating the Papuan leadership, increasing military operations, and establishing pro-Indonesian militias.¹⁰⁵ Then, in 2001, PDP Chair Theys Eluay was strangled to death at a military function, which he attended as the military’s guest of honour.¹⁰⁶ Although the perpetrators were eventually punished, the lack of remorse was evident in Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu’s press statement, in which he said: ‘Okay, we are a state based on the rule of law, so they have been punished. But for me, they are heroes because the person they killed was a rebel leader.’¹⁰⁷ By 2001, many of the military reforms achieved under President Habibie and

⁹⁹ Kirsch, p. 14.

¹⁰⁰ Widjojo, p. 423.

¹⁰¹ J. Macleod, ‘Citizen media and civil resistance in West Papua’, *Pacific Journalism Review*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2016, p. 43.

¹⁰² Widjojo, p. 423.

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, p. 419.

¹⁰⁴ Article 19, ‘Indonesia: Submission to UN Universal Periodic Review’, *Article 19*, 2011, <https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2865/en/indonesia:-submission-to-un-universal-periodic-review>, (accessed 8 October 2016).

¹⁰⁵ Macleod, p. 44.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 45.

¹⁰⁷ Australia West Papua Association (AWPA) Sydney, ‘Australia must not respond to Jakarta’s request’, *AWPA Sydney*, 31 October 2016, <http://awpasydneynews.blogspot.co.at/2016/10/media-release-australia-must-not.html>, (accessed 4 November 2016).

Wahid were repealed by the military-backed Megawati administration,¹⁰⁸ signifying the end of the Papuan Spring.

3.3 Special Autonomy

In the attempt to appease Papuan grievances without compromising its national sovereignty, Indonesia introduced Special Autonomy in 2001, also known as OTSUS. Under this programme, Irian Jaya was officially renamed Papua, and millions of dollars from oil, gas and mining were redirected to the local government in what Sidney Jones described as the ‘prosperity approach.’¹⁰⁹ However, health and income levels reportedly deteriorated under Special Autonomy, and human rights abuses, such as torture, increased.¹¹⁰ The problem was a lack of transparency and accountability in the distribution of money, so that corruption among national and local governments became increasingly widespread. Funds therefore only benefited a small group of elite Papuans, while most indigenous people unfortunately ‘lost out.’¹¹¹ Ironically, local media also experienced tighter restrictions, even though Jakarta allocated a lot of money into local media management. One journalist commented:

During the time of *reformasi* we could write more about the topic of independence. We would interview people from OPM. Now they are afraid to speak publicly. Special Autonomy has meant these things are not supposed to be discussed anymore.¹¹²

Just four years after Special Autonomy was introduced, 10,000 Papuans marched with a coffin marked ‘OTSUS’ through Jayapura and symbolically ‘returned’ Autonomy to Jakarta.¹¹³ In 2013, the Papuan Governor Lucas Enembe tried to make improvements through a revised OTSUS Plus, which would restrict transmigration, place a tax on the

¹⁰⁸ Widjojo, p. 416.

¹⁰⁹ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 321

¹¹⁰ Macleod, p. 45

¹¹¹ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 321

¹¹² Ibid, p. 325.

¹¹³ Macleod, p. 46.

use of indigenous lands, improve health and education, and increase representation of indigenous Papuans in local government.¹¹⁴ However, the proposal also asked Jakarta for a 150 percent increase in Special Autonomy funds, which critics suspected was ‘motivated by personal gain.’¹¹⁵ Like its precursor, activists opposed OTSUS Plus for its ‘closed process of drafting,’ and because its changes were seen as inadequate amendments to an already failed law.¹¹⁶

3.4 The Role of the Media

Throughout the West Papua conflict, both the Indonesian military and Papuan independence movement understood the importance of the role of the media. On 6 July 1998, for example, thousands of Papuans gathered at the Biak City water tower to raise the Morning Star flag in the hopes of capturing the UN’s attention. Protest leader Filep Karma said: ‘[Before when Papuans raised] the flag in the jungle it was ineffective ... No one sees it. But if you [raise the flag] in the town a lot of people can see it including the media and automatically the story gets disseminated globally.’¹¹⁷ Unfortunately, the protest was violently squashed by the Indonesian military and many months passed before the Biak Massacre was covered in national or foreign media. As local and alternative media flourished in the 2000s, however, the press began paying more attention to the conflict, which finally pressured Komnas HAM into meaningful action. According to Widjojo:

Thanks to the efforts of the NGOs, church-based institutions and other civil society groups, these human rights violations were disclosed and published ... Based on detailed accounts of specific cases, the pressure forced Komnas HAM to establish a Commission of Inquiry for Human

¹¹⁴ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), ‘OTSUS Plus: The Debate Over Enhanced Special Autonomy for Papua’, *IPAC*, 2013, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2013/11/IPAC_Otsus_Plus_The_Debate_over_Enhanced_Special_Autonomy.pdf, (accessed 25 July 2017).

¹¹⁵ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 322.

¹¹⁶ IPAC, ‘OTSUS Plus’, p. 10.

¹¹⁷ Macleod, p. 38.

Rights. Their findings were also distributed through the Internet, giving leverage to international human rights activists in their efforts to put pressure on the Indonesian government.¹¹⁸

Finally, the presence of the media may even serve as a conflict prevention mechanism, as opposed to merely reporting on abuses after they happen. According to Nick Chesterfield, the founder of West Papua Media Alerts (WPMA), this is exactly what happened when WPMA covered the OTSUS demonstrations in 2005.

Less than ten minutes before the deadline for dispersal of the two day rally of over 45,000 people, Indonesian security forces were forced to back down after a BBC report aired, organised by the WPMA, which brought international attention to the explosively dangerous situation ... [and] enabled the protestors to peaceably leave the scene of the protest.¹¹⁹

3.4.1 Recent Developments

Today, instead of targeting expressions of *merdeka* ('freedom'), the coverage of illegal activities, human rights abuses and SARA (i.e. issues related to ethnicity, religion, race and social groups) have become the new taboo.¹²⁰ During a meeting in Jakarta in January 2017, for instance, the Indonesian Government announced that it had blocked 800,000 websites since December 2016. According to staff at the Communications and Information Ministry, 90 percent of these websites contained pornographic or gambling material, while 'some were simply spreading hoaxes.'¹²¹ This statement came just a month after the Legal Aid Institute for the Press condemned the government for its

¹¹⁸ Widjojo, p. 423.

¹¹⁹ N. Chesterfield, 'Free the people? Free the Media! Broadcasting Papua's songs of freedom', in P. King et al (ed.), *Comprehending West Papua*, Sydney, University of Sydney, 2011, p. 33.

¹²⁰ Interview with Aprila Wayar, Vienna, 11 November 2016.

¹²¹ 'Indonesia blocks 800,000 websites', 7 January 2017, *The Jakarta Post*, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/07/indonesia-blocks-800000-websites.html>, (accessed 15 January 2017).

shutdown of the news site, suarapapua.com, for containing ‘negative’ SARA content.¹²² Suara Papua regularly covers human rights abuses, such as the recent illegal detention of peaceful demonstrators – including an infant and children aged 4 to 17 years – who participated in the Trikora protests in December 2016.¹²³ Although the website was online again the next day, it remained inaccessible on the Telkomsel Internet provider, which accounts for 65 percent of Indonesia’s mobile phone services market.¹²⁴

In July 2016, the Pacific Freedom Forum called on Indonesia to improve its media environment before the World Press Freedom Day conference would be hosted in Jakarta the following year. As a result, eight journalists travelled to West Papua as part of Indonesia’s Media Freedom Committee and reported eight key findings, including the discrimination of government officials and security personnel towards Papuan indigenous people, the underreporting of environmental damage due to restrictions against the press, and the prevalence of sexual harassment towards female journalists.¹²⁵ Despite this information, West Papua was not even mentioned during the Press Freedom conference, since according to the Press Council chairman:

[The issue of press freedom in Papua] is a domestic affair while this event is an international forum where we focus more on discussing issues that are relevant both locally and internationally ... We cannot solve the matter [at the WPFDD event], only Jokowi’s administration can. Other countries can’t meddle in this affair, because of non-interference principles.¹²⁶

¹²² Interview with Mikael Kudiai, Jogjakarta, 1 February 2017.

¹²³ A. Belau, ‘Linus Hiluka: Saya lihat ada bayi berusia satu tahun ikut ditahan di Polres Jayawijaya’, *Suara Papua*, 21 December 2016, <http://suarapapua.com/2016/12/21/linus-hiluka-lihat-ada-bayi-berusia-satu-tahun-ikut-ditahan-polres-jayawijaya/>, (accessed 7 January 2017).

¹²⁴ A. Barahamin, ‘Blocking Papua from the truth’, *New Mandala*, 28 March 2017, <http://www.newmandala.org/blocking-papua-truth/>, (accessed 24 May).

¹²⁵ T. Nissl, ‘Press freedom investigation in Papua highlights challenges for local journalists’, *Engage Media*, 15 February 2017, <https://www.engagemedia.org/blog/press-freedom-investigation-papua-challenges-for-local-journalists>, (accessed 1 June 2016).

¹²⁶ M. Sapiie, ‘No talk of Papua at Press Freedom Day’, *The Jakarta Post*, 3 May 2017, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/05/03/no-talk-of-papua-at-press-freedom-day.html>, (accessed 24 May 2017).

Ironically, on the day of the conference, police had reportedly beaten up a local journalist in West Papua for covering a peaceful KNPB demonstration. He was released four hours later, but left with a swollen back and cut lips.¹²⁷ Between May 2016 and April 2017, the Alliance for Independent Journalists (AJI) in Indonesia recorded 72 cases of violence against journalists, including 38 cases of physical assault.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ V. Mambor, 'Journalists in Indonesia's Papua region complain about violence, threats', *Benar News*, 1 May 2017, <http://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/Papua-press-05012017191343.html>, (accessed 23 May 2017).

¹²⁸ International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), 'Papua remains restricted under Widodo; 72 cases of violence against journalists', *IFEX*, 19 May 2017, <https://www.ifex.org/indonesia/2017/05/19/papua-remains-restricted/>, (accessed 24 May 2017).

4 CHALLENGES FOR THE MEDIA

The media has always played a significant role in the West Papua conflict by disseminating information to the public and placing pressure on duty-bearers to respect human rights. But as seen in Chapter 3.4.1, the media continues to be restricted in West Papua. While the challenges for foreign journalists have been studied in other reports, international audiences are less informed about the hurdles that local and national media face. Thus, it is easy to take for granted the unfounded but deep-rooted myth that all local journalists are pro-independence and all national journalists are pro-government. Discussions on the role of regional media have also been largely missing, despite the importance of regional support for the Papuan human rights movement. In Chapter 4, I explore the restrictions against international, regional, national and local media, and how they interfere with citizens' freedom of opinion and expression.

4.1 International Media

According to former Tabloid Jubi journalist Aprila Wayar, international media is crucial in spreading news about, and support for, human rights in West Papua, as its absence preserves old narratives and myths being distributed by Indonesian nationalists.

Indonesia hasn't allowed international journalists to cover Papua, so of course, the international community doesn't know anything about it. And I cannot blame them or be mad about the situation, because Indonesia made Papua like that. They do it deliberately so that Papua is still portrayed like a primitive people, like Papuan people were 50,000 years ago. But Papuan people have changed!¹²⁹

Foreign journalists are therefore essential to changing the image of West Papua and educating readers about the realities of the conflict. More importantly, as Human Rights

¹²⁹ A. Wayar interview, 2016.

Watch (HRW) researcher Andreas Harsono noted, foreign journalists can set the standards for human rights reporting on economic, social and cultural violence.

If there is a free media, including international media covering Papua, it helps the government to get more information ... It will help the government to deal with, for instance, health problems [or] poverty [or] racism against Papuans.¹³⁰

In order to achieve this, foreign journalists must have greater access to and within West Papua, but instead, face a number of challenges, such as a convoluted visa application process, the risk of arrest and deportation, and the difficulty of ensuring the safety of sources. These restrictions violate paragraph 45 of General Comment No. 34, which states that journalists have the freedom to travel outside, into and within a State party, including to conflict-affected locations.

4.1.1 Access to West Papua

Over the 50 years that access to West Papua has been restricted to foreigners, a number of journalists have managed to get in, whether through the official channel of the Clearing House or by ignoring the requirement of journalist visas. Either way, gaining access remains a difficult task with inconsistent results. In 2013, for instance, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression Frank La Rue was invited by the government to visit Indonesia, but did not receive permission to visit West Papua. Although La Rue's request was not explicitly denied, 'they never said anything [regarding a solid date.] It was plausible deniability.'¹³¹ Many journalists shared similar experiences in the HRW report, *Something to Hide: Indonesia's Restrictions on Media Freedom and Rights Monitoring in Papua*. Because of the lack of an official ban on journalists – as well as academic researchers, humanitarian workers and aid organisations – Indonesia is able to deny the existence of any government-imposed

¹³⁰ Interview with Andreas Harsono, Vienna, 22 May 2017.

¹³¹ HRW, *Something to Hide*, p. 1.

constraints. As recently as 2015, the police claim to have ‘never’ restricted foreign journalists and described their actions as ‘monitoring’ instead.¹³² The current regulations on gaining access to West Papua are so strict and cumbersome, however, that they serve, according to Radio New Zealand International (RNZI) journalist Johnny Blades, as an ‘effective ban’.¹³³

Currently, all journalist visa applications are reviewed by a Clearing House managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and must be unanimously approved by 18 working units from 12 different ministries, including the National Police, the State Intelligence Agency and military intelligence.¹³⁴ As part of their application, journalists must supply a list of people they intend to interview (including dates, times and content) and have interviewees confirm the appointment by sending a confirmation on their letterheads. Finally, they must submit the application and wait for a reply, a process that can take anywhere between one month and five years,¹³⁵ thus ‘eliminating the possibility of reporting ‘news’.’¹³⁶ Many applications, according to HRW, are simply ignored,¹³⁷ while the ones that passed may have been due to their promise of including Indonesia’s position in their reporting. Blades recalled:

The Indonesian Embassy criticised us for not getting the Indonesian voice on Papuan issues and I thought, maybe they’ve got a point ... I said, ‘we want to hear the Indonesian voice ... to hear about the development that you’re talking about that’s under way’, [and] I think that worked in terms of getting the visa.¹³⁸

¹³² R. Hidayat, ‘Polisi klaim ‘tidak pernah’ halangi jurnalis asing di Papua’, *BBC*, 12 November 2015, http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2015/11/151112_indonesia_polisi_aparat_pecat, (accessed 24 May 2017).

¹³³ Interview with Johnny Blades, Vienna, 12 November 2016.

¹³⁴ HRW, *Something to Hide*, p. 14.

¹³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 16.

¹³⁶ *Abplanalp*, p. 26.

¹³⁷ HRW, *Something to Hide*, p. 19.

¹³⁸ J. Blades interview, 2016.

Even after obtaining a visa, however, journalists must cover the travel expenses of an Indonesian intelligence officer, who is required to accompany the journalist everywhere they go.¹³⁹ Access within West Papua is also still restricted, such as in the remote highland areas and Freeport mine, where violence and conflict are particularly rife.

Admittedly, not all of these restrictions seem to apply all the time. Where some journalists found the application process extremely lengthy and difficult, others were accepted within weeks and without having to submit documents or letters from interviewees. Former Fairfax Media correspondent Michael Bachelard was not assigned an official minder for either of his trips in 2013 and 2014. He remarked: ‘I applied twice, I got in twice and I don’t think I went easy with my story on them so I don’t know ... There’s no real way of judging what’s going on or why you have been accepted or not accepted.’¹⁴⁰ This inconsistency seems to have promoted a climate of uncertainty, so that journalists are no longer confident how far they can push the boundaries. According to Tapsell:

Some of the foreign media still ... think they can’t get a visa and actually, there are a lot of them that haven’t even bothered to try ... I have constantly said to journalists, why don’t you apply? ... Apply and then we have evidence that you can’t get in, because at the moment, the response from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry is [that] you can go. But as we would say, you can go to any other part of Indonesia and report on whatever you like. Why do you need this special permit to Papua?¹⁴¹

4.1.2 Deportation and Detainment

Due to the convoluted visa application process, a number of journalists have chosen to bypass the official channel and travel to West Papua on a tourist visa. Freelance

¹³⁹ Davies, p. 71.

¹⁴⁰ Abplanalp, p. 28.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Ross Tapsell, Vienna, 20 March 2017.

journalist Rohan Radheya reported undercover from West Papua four times between 2013 and 2015.¹⁴² While this strategy may have been successful in the past, however, journalists are no longer recommended to take their chances. If caught, they are usually deported from Indonesia and prohibited from returning for several months to show the seriousness of their offence. The most recent case, in March 2017, saw two French journalists deported for filming a documentary without the necessary documents, even though they were working on a project about culture and nature that was sponsored by the national airlines, Garuda Indonesia.¹⁴³ But the stakes for journalists are getting higher. Three years earlier, a second group of French journalists, Thomas Dandois and Valentine Bourrat, were also caught reporting from the highlands without a permit. They were detained and accused of subversion, and faced up to five years in prison for contributing to the ‘effort to destabilize Papua.’¹⁴⁴ Eventually, they served a two-and-a-half month prison before returning home to France. The Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club described the events as ‘a sad reminder of the Suharto regime, and a stain on Indonesia’s transition to democracy and claims by its government that it supports a free press and human rights.’¹⁴⁵

4.1.3 Safety of Sources

Finally, due to the strict requirements to obtain a journalist visa, foreign journalists not only incur risks for themselves, but also for their sources. The requirement to list all interviewees ensures that all sources are government-approved, while the ones that are not are easier to identify and locate. Five months after Jokowi announced the lift of the media ban over West Papua, Radio France correspondent Marie Dhumieres was granted a police permit to Jayapura to interview members of the KNPB. Although she faced no problems herself, a week after she returned to Jakarta, the police detained the Papuan activists whom she had interviewed. In a tweet to President Jokowi, she exclaimed: ‘So

¹⁴² HRW, *Something to Hide*, p. 34.

¹⁴³ ‘Indonesia deports French journalists from Papua province’, *Borneo Bulletin*, 20 March 2017, <http://borneobulletin.com.bn/indonesia-deports-french-journalists-papua-province/>, (accessed 24 May 2017).

¹⁴⁴ HRW, *Something to Hide*, p. 33.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Mr @jokowi, foreign journalists are free to work anywhere in Papua but the people we interview get arrested after we leave?’¹⁴⁶

This issue proves that media access alone is not enough to claim press freedom, and that the narrow focus on foreign journalists ignores the dangers that Papuans face on a daily basis. When French journalists Dandois and Bourrat were detained in West Papua, international media covered their story extensively. However, few news outlets mentioned that Areki Wanimbo, the head of the Papuan indigenous council whom the journalists had interviewed, was placed under custody and charged with conspiracy to commit treason. He was released eight months later on lack of evidence.¹⁴⁷ Additionally, as late as 2015:

Several of the people [the journalists] were working with up in the highlands are still in custody ... There are still three people facing charges, there are five people who were tortured, there are nine people who are on the wanted persons list. One person was murdered.¹⁴⁸

4.2 Regional Media

Besides the establishment of local media, regional media coverage is perhaps the most crucial in garnering support for the Papuan human rights movement. It is thanks to the actions of a few Pacific Island nations in September 2016 that West Papua gained the media attention that it did, not only by local and national journalists, but also by international news organisations. These same nations have been pushing for West Papua’s membership in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), an influential regional organisation comprising of the Member States of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) of French New Caledonia. According to RNZI journalist Johnny Blades:

¹⁴⁶ HRW, *Something to Hide*, pg. 26.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, pg. 33.

¹⁴⁸ Abplanalp, pg. 58.

The West Papuans know that their chances of integration into the region rest with the prospects for unity among Melanesian countries. A united Melanesia is a powerful bloc, and Indonesia knows this ... If the MSG members can be united on this, then there is a chance they can achieve more than just West Papuan membership in the group.¹⁴⁹

Unfortunately, the support for West Papua is largely influenced by regional politics, which in turn, affects regional media coverage of the conflict. As Indonesia builds closer relationships with Melanesian states, the question of Papuan justice remains uncertain.

4.2.1 Politics

Throughout the West Papua conflict, regional media coverage has been especially poor, with the exception of Vanuatu, which has a history of supporting indigenous peoples against colonialism.¹⁵⁰ Vanuatu gained its independence from British-French rule in 1980 and has since supported West Papua and the FLNKS against French and Indonesian occupation. The Solomon Islands are also critical of Indonesia's presence in West Papua and was one of the six nations to address the UN in 2016. In the past, however, it has mostly expressed its support by pursuing 'engagement' with Indonesia.¹⁵¹ Unfortunately, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands' support of Papuan membership in the MSG has been traditionally blocked by Papua New Guinea and Fiji, which support Indonesia's argument that West Papua is a domestic issue.¹⁵² Their alliance with Indonesia may also be due to increasing political and economic relations. Between 1999 and 2016, Indonesia has launched over 105 development programmes in Papua New Guinea, in areas such as food production, management, multimedia,

¹⁴⁹ J. Blades, 'Melanesia's test: The political quandary of West Papua', *Pacific Journalism Review*, vol. 20, no. 2, 2014, p. 38.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 25.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 29.

¹⁵² *Ibid*, p. 28.

tourism, peat forest development and coastal restoration.¹⁵³ These activities are part of ‘Indonesia’s US\$20 million commitment for capacity building for Pacific countries from 2014-2019.’¹⁵⁴ Similarly, Fiji has enjoyed over 40 years of bilateral relations with Indonesia and recently strengthened its ties in development,¹⁵⁵ military training, intelligence sharing and counter-terrorism.¹⁵⁶ According to Blades, ‘Jakarta’s strong desire to build links with each independent Melanesian state has been described by observers as being mainly about countering support for West Papuan self-determination.’¹⁵⁷ While Indonesia was granted observer status of the MSG in 2011, the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) was only granted the same in 2015 and is still waiting for full membership.

As a result of regional politics, the presence of regional media in West Papua is not a priority issue, such that regional media increasingly depends on international news agencies for their stories. This means that the same statistics and data are recycled and that in-depth news on a variety of topics is not covered, but rather compromised for the easy stories of demonstrations and Freeport protests. In 2013, when Abplanalp visited the Bali Media Forum with more than 70 journalists from the Asia Pacific, most journalists agreed that West Papua had been forgotten by the media.¹⁵⁸

4.3 National Media

Unlike foreign and regional journalists, national media workers have greater access to West Papua, but are deeply mistrusted by locals for their alleged biased reporting.

¹⁵³ ‘Indonesia, PNG to strengthen cooperation for welfare of region’, *Antara News*, 22 September 2016, <http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/106858/indonesia-png-to-strengthen-cooperation-for-welfare-of-region>, (accessed 17 March 2017).

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ ‘Indonesia, Fiji discuss development cooperation in Pacific region’, *Antara News*, 21 September 2016, <http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/106825/indonesia-fiji-discuss-development-cooperation-in-pacific-region>, (accessed 17 March 2017).

¹⁵⁶ ‘Fiji looks to grow defence links with Indonesia’, *Radio New Zealand International*, 7 November 2016, <http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/317516/fiji-looks-to-grow-defence-links-with-indonesia>, (accessed 17 March 2017).

¹⁵⁷ Blades, 2014, p. 30.

¹⁵⁸ Abplanalp, p. 54.

While these accusations may be true in some cases, however, I would like to focus on the challenges that restrict the more moderate and critical media outlets. According to Tapsell, the biggest problem with national media today is not that it is pro-government, but thanks to media conglomeration, that it is highly concentrated in Java.

The point [I] would make about the Indonesian media is that it's very Jakarta-centric ... Mainstream news doesn't really cover Papua very much and I think there's a number of reasons for that. Some of it is just simply cost and people aren't particularly interested ... Frankly, they don't really care. But it's not just Papua, of course. They don't really care about issues in Kalimantan, in East Nusa Tenggara. It's all very Jakarta-centric or Java-centric.¹⁵⁹

Fortunately, several independent media outlets, such as Kompas, Tempo and The Jakarta Post, are increasingly featuring news about West Papua. They even include critical news written by academics or members of civil society organisations. However, this does not mean that coverage of West Papua is entirely open and free, as clarified by Harian Jogja journalist Aquino Adri.

If you write some issues about Papua, the editor will censor [certain] words. The editor only chooses the words which [are] according to their policy. We are not free to write about Papua because it is a sensitive issue.¹⁶⁰

In Chapter 4.3, I focus on the topic of media conglomeration and self-censorship among Indonesian journalists. Although these issues affect all media workers, I cover them under this section to dispel some of the myths held against national reporters, and reveal another side of media challenges – unrelated to government or military – that few people are aware of. These restrictions violate paragraphs 10 to 16 of General Comment

¹⁵⁹ R. Tapsell interview, 2017.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Aquino Adri, Jogjakarta, 1 February 2017.

No. 34, which state that it is the duty of the government to ensure the editorial freedom of media organisations.

4.3.1 Media Conglomeration

The Indonesian media is increasingly subject to platform convergence, or the accumulation of multiple platforms, such as radio, print and television, by a single media company. The Visi Media Asia group, for example, owns two public television channels, one commercial television station, one online news site, two daily newspapers and investments in a popular social networking app.¹⁶¹ This trend is driven by the ‘digitalisation of media content,’ where everything can now be found on the Internet, thanks to the increased use of mobile technologies by young audiences.¹⁶² However, the effect it has on media freedom is still contested. On the one hand, convergence means that more social and alternative media is included in mainstream journalism, and that citizens can participate in online debate. On the other hand, due to the influx of contributions, media companies must now screen and edit news articles, as well as readers’ comments, not necessarily to restrict participation, but to avoid defamation charges. Under Indonesia’s Criminal Code, media companies are responsible for publishing defamatory material, even if they did not produce it.¹⁶³ Tapsell attributes these benefits and dangers to the difference between ‘technological convergence’ (i.e. the digitalisation of the media) and ‘commercial convergence’ (i.e. media conglomeration).¹⁶⁴ While the former provides opportunities for democratisation, the latter results in less diverse opinions and limited public debate. Unfortunately, Indonesia is experiencing the latter, or what the chief editor of Tempo referred to as the

¹⁶¹ Tapsell, 2015a, p. 32-33.

¹⁶² Tapsell, R., ‘Platform convergence in Indonesia: Challenges and opportunities for media freedom’, *Convergence*, vol. 21, no. 2, 2014, p. 183.

¹⁶³ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Turning Critics into Criminals: The Human Rights Consequences of Criminal Defamation Law Indonesia*, USA, HRW, 2010, p. 37.

¹⁶⁴ Tapsell, 2014, p. 183.

‘cartelization of media ownership,’¹⁶⁵ with just nine business groups controlling half of the print media in 2012.¹⁶⁶

Of course, media conglomeration affects countries all over the world. What makes Indonesia unique is that most news outlets are directly owned by, or affiliated with, members of political parties.¹⁶⁷ Surya Paloh, for instance, owner of Metro TV and Media Indonesia, ran for chairman of the Golkar party in 2008 against Aburizal Bakrie, owner of Visi Media Asia. When he lost, Paloh created his own National Democrats party and recruited fellow media mogul Hary Tanoesoedibjo, owner of Media Nusantara Citra, in 2011. Other media owners had even closer ties with the government and served as government ministers for a number of years. Chairul Tanjung, owner of Trans TV and Detik.com, became spokesperson for the Democratic Party in 2014, and was later appointed as the Coordinating Minister for Economics. Former Jawa Pos CEO Dahlan Iskan, who owns 140 newspapers throughout Indonesia, also became the Minister for State Owned Enterprises between 2011 and 2014.¹⁶⁸

4.3.2 Self-Censorship

As a result of media conglomeration, pressure on national media now comes from media owners who try to protect their economic and political interests.¹⁶⁹ In a 2009 survey of 82 journalists at six major newspapers, 76 percent of participants said that they experienced owners’ interference and 71 percent believed that content would be changed at an owner’s request.¹⁷⁰ Unfortunately, like foreign journalists’ access to West Papua, censorship is inconsistent and difficult to predict, such that media restrictions today are similar to those under the Suharto regime. According to Tapsell:

¹⁶⁵ Tapsell, R., ‘Old Tricks in a New Era: Self-Censorship in Indonesian Journalism’, *Asian Studies Review*, vol. 36, 2012, p. 228.

¹⁶⁶ Tapsell, 2012b, p. 109.

¹⁶⁷ R. Tapsell, ‘Indonesia’s Media Oligarchy and the “Jokowi Phenomenon”’, *Indonesia*, no. 99, 2015, p. 32.

¹⁶⁸ Tapsell, 2015a, p. 33.

¹⁶⁹ Tapsell, 2012a, p. 228.

¹⁷⁰ Tapsell 2012b, p. 110.

The effectiveness of the controls [under Suharto] was based on the ability of the ruling elite to create a climate of uncertainty in the press such that it produced self-disciplined journalists as subjects who would tread carefully on any topic considered even slightly controversial.¹⁷¹

Self-censorship is now an internalised journalistic practice and considered a ‘style’ rather than the omission of facts.¹⁷² In fact, journalists are told that self-censorship is a ‘responsible’ function to ‘build and develop the nation,’¹⁷³ and that failure to do so can result in punishment, such as receiving less work, being assigned to a different department, or being demoted or fired.¹⁷⁴ In an interview with Tapsell, Jawa Pos journalist Ahmad Rahman commented:

We do write more sensitively and it is difficult to explain. We give a pinch instead of a slap. You have no idea how powerful these people are. They can bring down Police Ministers, Governors ... It would not be difficult for them to arrange for me to get fired.¹⁷⁵

Interestingly, however, it is not just the government that may act violently towards critical news coverage. In a study by Gazali, researchers found that mob violence was deterring journalists from reporting critical news about Indonesian public figures. When one media outlet uncovered a political scandal in Jogjakarta, its media office was attacked by a group of hooligans, claiming that the news report was false and that it defamed a person they deeply respected. Gazali recorded nine other cases of mob attacks against a media office during his research, suggesting that mob violence may be the ‘trade-off for the freedom of expression.’¹⁷⁶ With this in mind, editors are careful about ‘sensitive issues’, such as those pertaining to SARA, or ethnic, racial, religious

¹⁷¹ Tapsell 2012a, p. 231.

¹⁷² Ibid, p. 237.

¹⁷³ Ibid, p 228.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 240.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 238.

¹⁷⁶ E. Gazali, ‘The Suharto Regime and its Fall Through the Eyes of the Local Media’, *Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies*, vol. 64, no. 2, 2002, p. 136.

and group tensions. Kompas founder Jacob Utama commented: '[The press] cannot be blunt, we must be considerate, especially about religion and race. These are sensitive issues in this country. I always think of the impact.'¹⁷⁷ Thus, national media coverage of West Papua may be limited, not necessarily because it is pro-government, but because it, too, faces numerous media challenges.

4.4 Local Media

Due to the restrictions against foreign, national and regional journalists, Papuans have been establishing a local print media since 2003, dedicated to balanced reporting and the equal representation of marginalised voices. In an interview with Tapsell, one editor highlighted the importance of employing Papuan journalists because of the unique contributions they are able to make based on their indigenous background.

I think the Papuan journalists are more brave than the non-Papuans ... They are more direct and will ask the people the right questions – which includes if they want independence or not. The non-Papuans are afraid to ask. They write more safely and self-censor more.¹⁷⁸

As a result, however, local journalists experience much harsher conditions, such as intimidation, death threats, discrimination and other challenges to their work, which are rarely investigated and held accountable for. These practices violate paragraph 46 of General Comment No. 34, which states that restrictions may not lead to arbitrary arrest, torture, intimidation, the threat to life or any other attacks on a person, and if so, must be investigated, prosecuted and remedied in a timely manner. I explore these topics in Chapter 4.4, as well the lack of independent and sufficient funding, which restrict the quality of local journalism.

¹⁷⁷ Tapsell, 2012a, p. 229.

¹⁷⁸ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 330.

4.4.1 Police Intimidation

The phrase, *merdeka* ('freedom'), was once the main target of media censorship, as it was considered the 'catch-cry' of the Papuan independence movement.¹⁷⁹ Today, 'if you talk about Papua *merdeka* they will not care. It's not really 'hot' anymore ... But if you talk about illegal logging, they kill you at that moment.'¹⁸⁰ Former Tabloid Jubi journalist Aprila Wayar recalls how her colleague, Ardiansyah Matra'is, was killed in 2010 for investigating illegal logging on the border of West Papua and Papua New Guinea. Shortly before his murder, Matra'is received a text message warning 'cowardly journalists [to] never play with fire if you don't want to be burned ... We have data on all of you and be prepared for death.'¹⁸¹ His naked body was found a week later, handcuffed to a tree and bearing signs of torture, yet the investigation into his death concluded that Matra'is had most likely committed suicide.¹⁸² Other taboo topics in the media, besides illegal logging, include corruption, land grabbing, human rights abuses and negative reporting about the police and military. According to several reports, the police and military in West Papua are involved in a number of criminal activities, including the illegal trade of fuel, timber, drugs and prostitutes.¹⁸³ 'That's how the general eats. That's their plate for food,' Wayar warns. 'Don't touch their plate or they will kill you.'¹⁸⁴

Matra'is is just one of many examples of police intimidation in West Papua, but unfortunately, most of these cases go unreported so that the lack of accountability by the military and police is one of the most striking issues in the region. In 2015, an international delegation of media freedom representatives visited Indonesia at the invitation of the AJI. On West Papua, it concluded:

¹⁷⁹ Webb-Gannon, p. 354.

¹⁸⁰ A. Wayar interview, 2016.

¹⁸¹ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 330.

¹⁸² HRW, *Something to Hide*, p. 39.

¹⁸³ M. Bachelard, 'Papuan face ignorance, corruption and racism from Jakarta', *The Interpreter*, 26 June 2015, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/papuan-face-ignorance-corruption-and-racism-jakarta>, (accessed 23 May 2017).

¹⁸⁴ A. Wayar interview, 2016.

Indonesia's existing climate of impunity continues to impact negatively on journalist safety and working conditions. Attackers are empowered by the knowledge that there are currently no formal accountability processes on investigations into attacks, intimidation and murder of journalists and media workers.¹⁸⁵

Even the journalists who avoid pro-independence sentiments or reporting on illegal activities are intimidated for their coverage of SARA issues. Suara Perempuan, for instance, is a news outlet dedicated to gender equality and covering the challenges experienced by women living in West Papua. However, reports that are specifically about indigenous women are rejected by authorities because it would highlight ethnic differences between Papuan and non-Papuan Indonesians.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, while journalists may write about violence against women in general, they may not write about military violence, or they are 'given the stigma of being pro-OPM.'¹⁸⁷ This can be frustrating for local media outlets that do not have a political agenda and are merely offering a platform for marginalised voices. The local weekly Tabloid Noken was one example, before it was forcefully shutdown in 2014 after receiving multiple threats from the State Intelligence Agency.¹⁸⁸

Finally, Kopassus documents that were leaked in 2011 identified 12 Indonesian journalists on the payroll of the military intelligence. They reportedly received Rp1 to 2 million per month for their activities, which included unlawful spying and intelligence gathering within local media organisations.¹⁸⁹ As a result of these activities, local journalists no longer trust sharing information with other media workers, and are even suspicious of the national journalists' union. HRW Researcher Andreas Harsono

¹⁸⁵ J. Blades, 'Watching this space, West Papua', *Pacific Journalism Review*, vol. 22, no. 1, 2016, p. 22.

¹⁸⁶ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 330.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 331.

¹⁸⁸ HRW, *Something to Hide*, p. 37.

¹⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch (HRW), 'Indonesia: Military documents reveal unlawful spying in Papua', *HRW*, 14 August 2011, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/14/indonesia-military-documents-reveal-unlawful-spying-papua>, (accessed 24 May 2017).

warned: ‘This national organisation is not trusted when talking about Papua.’¹⁹⁰ In 2012, when the prominent Papuan journalist Oktavianus Pogau was beaten by police during a peaceful rally in Manokwari, the AJI reportedly refused to help him on grounds that he crossed the line between journalism and activism.¹⁹¹ According to Harsono, ‘Indonesian journalist associations fail to understand the problem in Papua.’¹⁹²

4.4.2 Discrimination

The lack of understanding of the Papuan experience may be due to the fact that many ‘local’ media organisations do not even employ Papuan journalists. In 2005, it was estimated that only ten percent of journalists in West Papua and 25 percent of members of the AJI Jayapura branch were of indigenous origin.¹⁹³ The truth is that Papuan journalists face much more discrimination than their Indonesian counterparts, such as harassment from the police and military, combined with a lack of due process. According to the former editor of *Suara Papua*:

Every time a Papuan journalist is in trouble [with security forces], the reaction among Indonesian police or [non-Papuan] journalists is always to question [the journalist’s] capacity. The viewpoint is more or less similar to that of the police officers who beat me [at the KNPB demonstration]. They were curious to see an ethnic Papuan taking photos of the protest. They beat me and asked questions later.¹⁹⁴

Furthermore, ethnic Papuans do not receive the same level of cooperation as their Indonesian colleagues when it comes to securing government sources. The result is that

¹⁹⁰ A. Harsono interview, 2017.

¹⁹¹ D. Robie, ‘Journalism as it plays out on the ‘real’ human rights frontlines’, *The Daily Blog*, 20 February 2017, <https://thedailyblog.co.nz/2017/02/20/journalism-as-it-plays-out-on-the-real-human-rights-frontlines/>, (accessed 24 May 2017).

¹⁹² A. Harsono interview, 2017.

¹⁹³ D. Hill, ‘On the border: Local media in the land of Papua’, in K. Sen and D. Hill (ed.), *Politics and the Media in Twenty-First Century Indonesia: Decade of Democracy*, London, Routledge, 2011, p. 40.

¹⁹⁴ HRW, *Something to Hide*, p. 41.

Papuan journalists only have access to one side of a story and are criticised for omitting Indonesia's side of events. However, as Wayar noted:

The point here is that local journalists like me, we don't really have access to the police or TNI in Indonesia ... They always speak to Indonesian journalists ... How can I, as a local journalist, make news balanced if I have no chance to confirm a situation with a police leader? How can I make news with enough credibility?¹⁹⁵

Thus, the pro-independence stereotypes held against local journalists are for the most part unfounded, as well. Most Papuan journalists are dedicated to balanced and fair reporting, but are limited in doing so, by the restrictions placed on their profession.

4.4.3 Lack of Funding

Finally, under OTSUS Special Autonomy, large funds have been dedicated to local media management, but most of this money gets lost due to corruption among government officials. Newspapers must therefore depend on government advertising if they want to stay afloat. The Jayapura-based Cendrawasih Pos, for example, generally earns 60 percent of its revenue from government advertising, of which 20 percent comes from the Papua Province Governor's office, 20 percent from local district heads and mayors, and 20 percent from government and political parties. This figure is expected to increase to 70 percent during an election year, with only 30 percent coming from newspaper sales.¹⁹⁶ If government advertising were to be pulled, not only would this mean the loss their funding, but other investors would pull out, as well, in fear of supporting a newspaper that the government does not. Such was the case for Suara Perempuan in 2013, after which it struggled to keep up financially.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ A. Wayar interview, 2016.

¹⁹⁶ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 322

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

Furthermore, the salaries of local journalists fall below the living wage of Rp1 million per month, such that in 2005, ‘more than 50 percent of journalists [were] unable to cover their basic needs ... and [were] forced to take on other jobs to support themselves.’¹⁹⁸. Where a journalist in Jakarta earns a base salary of Rp6 million per month,¹⁹⁹ their colleagues in West Papua may earn anywhere between Rp300,000 and Rp800,000 instead. Thus, one activity that journalists resort to is bribery, or ‘envelope journalism’, which in some cases, can double their insufficient salaries.²⁰⁰ It is common for the government, for example, to buy a story on the front page of a newspaper, spending anywhere between Rp1 to 6 million per article.²⁰¹ Additionally, journalists tend to schedule their activities around official government events, which cover the costs of their meals, transport and accommodation. One newspaper editor recalled:

Sometimes if there is a press conference from the government, three journalists from our news organisation will turn up. I presume this is to receive the envelopes [of money]. I get mad if they do that. I ask: did it need three of you? In every newsroom the rule is you are not allowed but I know the practice is very different.²⁰²

For the reasons stated above, recruitment of local journalists is becoming increasingly difficult. During the recruitment process for Radar Timika, the managing editor recalled that out of 30 new potential journalists that appeared on the first day, twelve had returned on the second day and zero on the third.²⁰³ According to Tabloid Jubi editor Victor Mambor: ‘If you want to be a real journalist in Papua and committed to ethics, it’s very hard, from the reporting to the salary.’²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁸ Hill, p. 42.

¹⁹⁹ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 323.

²⁰⁰ Tapsell, 2012a, p. 230.

²⁰¹ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 322.

²⁰² Ibid, p. 323.

²⁰³ P. Auliani, ‘Tak gampang menambah wartawan baru di Timika’, *WAN-IFRA Media Freedom Committee Indonesia*, 2 February 2017, <https://mfcindonesiablog.wordpress.com/2017/02/02/tak-gampang-menambah-wartawan-baru-di-timika/>, (accessed 11 February 2017).

²⁰⁴ C. Davidson, ‘A voice from Papua, Indonesia’, *Dawn*, 2 December 2016, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1299982>, (accessed 13 March 2017).

5 WEST PAPUA IN THE MEDIA

Based on the theory of human rights journalism, I assumed that the lack of media freedom in West Papua would result in one-dimensional and evocative reporting. Without foreign journalists' access, national and regional media's independence and local journalists' safety from harassment, citizens cannot expect to receive consistent and reliable information. In Chapter 5, I explore West Papua in the media – both in the past, by analysing literature review, and in the present, by conducting a media analysis.

5.1 Historical Media Coverage

Studying the past is important in order to understand how Papuans have been portrayed throughout history and its impact on the legitimacy of the independence movement. Based on the work of several academics, three main practices have identified, which contribute to the repression of Papuan activism: the promotion of the themes of primitiveness and cannibalism, the essentialism of violence onto Papuan indigenous people, and the negligence of the media as it reports misinformation.

5.1.1 Primitiveness and Cannibalism

As mentioned in Chapter 3.1.2, multiple actors involved in the 1962 New York Agreement considered Papuans too primitive for meaningful and effective self-determination. This stereotype, according to Banivanua-Mar, is based on Papuans' 'presumed cannibalism', which was sensationalised after the disappearance of Michael Rockefeller in 1961 in the Asmat region of West Papua.²⁰⁵ Since then, and in conjunction with the tourism industry, mainstream media have capitalised on stories of isolated jungle cannibals. Articles in the 1990s and 2000s bore titles such as 'Untouched Civilizations', 'The People That Time Forgot' and 'Sleeping With Cannibals', to name

²⁰⁵ Banivanua-Mar, p. 584.

a few.²⁰⁶ Although the vast majority of Papuans no longer practiced cannibalism by this time, companies were still selling ‘cannibal tourism’ as late as the mid-2000s.²⁰⁷ One travel journalist described using night vision cameras to capture first encounters with ‘native tribes who have never seen outsiders’, even though there was evidence that the encounter was staged for tourist purposes.²⁰⁸

The tourism industry and mainstream media also reinforced the notion of “‘discovery” as fatal impact’,²⁰⁹ or in other words, that Papuan interaction with modernisation would mean the end of its culture and people. Unlike contemporary urban societies, it is not believed that Papuans can adapt or adjust to globalisation and modernity. They are perceived as static rather than dynamic identities, which reinforces the stereotype that Papuans are ‘insufficiently modern’ and ‘in need of external supervision.’²¹⁰ Although most actors today acknowledge the existence of human rights abuses in West Papua, such as arbitrary arrests, torture and violations against the freedom of expression and assembly, it is still questioned whether an independent West Papua would succeed or become a failing state.²¹¹ Thus, the media frames of primitiveness and cannibalism reinforce ‘the notion that the Papuans’ political rights/will are in principle unreachable and/or unrealistic.’²¹²

5.1.2 The Essentialism of Violence

Closely related to the frames of primitiveness and cannibalism is the essentialism of violence by the media onto Papuan indigenous people. In a 1963 article accompanying the ethnographic film *Dead Birds*, an anthropologist described the native Dani society

²⁰⁶ R. Stasch, ‘Textual Iconicity and the Primitivist Cosmos: Chronotypes of Desire in Travel Writing about Korowai of West Papua’, *Linguistic Anthropology*, vol. 21, no. 1, 2011, p. 2.

²⁰⁷ Banivanua-Mar, p. 594.

²⁰⁸ Kirsch, p. 8-9.

²⁰⁹ Banivanua-Mar, p. 589.

²¹⁰ Kirsch, p. 7.

²¹¹ D. Scott, ‘Would An Independent West Papua Be a Failing State?’, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, vol. 9, no. 37, 2011, p. 1-53.

²¹² T. Petersson, ‘Foreign and travel journalism on West Papua: The case of the Swedish press’, *Pacific Journalism Review*, vol. 19, no.1, 2013, p. 194.

as being ‘ultimately based [on] ritual war’, such that ‘if war were suddenly stopped the society would collapse.’²¹³ When the Dutch intervened a few years later, however, scholars learned that the Dani ‘were often relieved by the end of warfare, which they had been unable to achieve on their own because they lacked the political structures necessary for negotiating a permanent truce between warring parties.’²¹⁴ Rather than externalising violence onto political structures, the media internalised the violence onto Papuan identities.

The essentialism of violence is not the fault of the media alone, however, as both the government and pro-independence groups have utilised violence to further their opposing causes. Security officials, for example, thrived on images of violence as it delegitimised the independence movement and justified Indonesia’s presence in West Papua. In the 1980s and 1990s, the media referred to the OPM by various acronyms imposed by the Ministry of Information, such as GPL (*Gerombolan Pengacau Liar*) or the ‘wild terrorist gang’ and GPK (*Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan*) or the ‘security disturbance movement’.²¹⁵ This practice was problematic because as mentioned in Chapter 3.2, it failed to distinguish between the militant TPN and other non-violent OPM supporters. Obligatory use of the acronyms ceased in 1999,²¹⁶ but since GPK, GPL and OPM were used interchangeably in the past, the legitimacy of the OPM is still questioned to this day. On the other hand, pro-independence groups also tended to ‘exaggerate and magnify violent events’, which they attributed to the Indonesian government regardless of whether it was politically motivated or ‘purely criminal.’²¹⁷ Like the Indonesian military, separatist groups ‘need[ed] violence’ to justify their discourses and actions – in this case, the belief that state violence necessitates Papuan independence from Indonesia.²¹⁸ According to Widjojo, due to the essentialism of violence by both the military and pro-independence activists:

²¹³ Kirsch, p. 6.

²¹⁴ Ibid, p. 7.

²¹⁵ Kirksey and Roemajauw, p. 193.

²¹⁶ Ibid, p. 194.

²¹⁷ Widjojo, p. 426-427.

²¹⁸ Ibid, p. 427.

Both sides are trapped in their own discourses: the government that refuses to believe that humane and just policies can overcome secessionist aspirations, and the independence supporters who demonize everything that comes out of Jakarta.²¹⁹

5.1.3 Reporting Misinformation

Finally, national media has hindered support for the Papuan human rights movement by reporting misinformation in the past. Although this practice may have improved since the fall of Suharto in 1998, its history of neglect has resulted in a climate of mistrust in Indonesian reporters that lasts to this day. In 1984, for instance, at least 10,000 Papuan refugees fled to the border of Papua New Guinea after a series of violent attacks by the Indonesian military to clear land for transmigration sites. In an article by the national newspaper Kompas, however, the refugees were referred to as ‘uneducated villagers who were frightened by a sonic boom made by a fighter plane.’²²⁰ Furthermore, ‘in order to avoid offending Indonesia,’ the Papua New Guinea government instructed its local press to refer to these people as ‘non-traditional’ or ‘illegal border crossers’, even though ‘the status of the West Papuans fulfilled the criteria of refugees.’²²¹ According to Kirksey and Roemajauw, Kompas’ article was one of four front-page articles about West Papua published that day, which was unusual as West Papua rarely made headline news during this period.²²² They believe its purpose was to distract the public from the death of anthropologist Arnold Ap, who was detained and murdered by Kopassus that same week. Newspapers took weeks to cover the event, and when it did, national media claimed that Ap had died of a heart attack, even though local sources said he was strangled to death.²²³ To this day, Papuans have expressed mistrust in national media outlets, with the state-owned Antara News, TVRI and RRI being the least trusted.²²⁴

²¹⁹ Widjojo, p. 428.

²²⁰ Kirksey and Roemajauw, p. 196.

²²¹ Matbob and Papoutsaki, p. 97.

²²² Kirksey and Roemajauw, p. 196.

²²³ Ibid, p. 199.

²²⁴ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 329.

5.2 Contemporary Media Analysis

I now move on to the media analysis to assess the compliance of contemporary media with the principles of HRJ, and whether media coverage of West Papua has improved since the 1990s and 2000s. In total, I analysed 412 articles between September 2016, when several Pacific Island nations raised their concerns about human rights abuses in West Papua to the UN, and March 2017, when Indonesia hosted the World Press Freedom Day conference in Jakarta – two events that generated significant media attention for the Papuan human rights movement. Out of the 412 articles analysed, 70 (16.99 percent) were publications from local media outlets, 163 (39.56 percent) from national media outlets, 55 (13.35 percent) from regional media outlets and 124 (30.10 percent) from international media outlets (Table 4). These results were surprising, as I expected international and national media to cover Papua less. Upon closer inspection, however, 61 out of the 124 international media articles (49.19 percent) were from Radio New Zealand International, an organisation that works extensively with the local newspaper *Tabloid Jubi*. The remaining 50.81 percent were also predominantly from Australia, indicating a more regional than truly international range of coverage. Finally, national media accounted for the most coverage of West Papua, but in the next section we will see that it does not cover HRJ issues nearly as much as local media does.

Table 4. Number of articles that covered West Papua in local, national, regional and international media.

	Articles on West Papua	*Percentage of Total
Local	70	16.99
National	163	39.56
Regional	55	13.35
International	124	30.10
Total	412	-

**Percentages rounded to the nearest hundredth.*

5.2.1 Visible and Invisible Violence

After the initial data collection, I further analysed the articles for their coverage of visible and invisible violence (referred to as ‘HRJ issues’ in Table 5). Out of the 412 articles, only 141 (34.22 percent) dealt with these particular topics – 47 published by local media outlets, 43 by national media outlets, 10 by regional media outlets and 41 by international media outlets. These results were also surprising due to the approximately equal number of articles by local, national and international media.

Table 5. Number of articles that covered HRJ issues in local, national, regional and international media.

	Articles on HRJ issues	*Percentage of articles on West Papua
Local	47	67.14
National	43	26.38
Regional	10	18.18
International	41	33.06
Total	141	34.22

**Percentages rounded to the nearest hundredth.*

However, it must be noted that out of the 163 national media articles covering West Papua between September 2016 and March 2017, only 43 (26.38 percent) covered visible or invisible violence. Likewise, only 41 out of 124 international media articles (33.06 percent) covered these topics, while 47 out of 70 local media articles (67.14 percent) did the same. Thus, the data suggests that local media is extremely important in informing readers about visible and invisible violence in West Papua. It also indicates a lack of attention by regional media organisations, with only 10 out of 55 articles (18.18 percent) covering HRJ issues. This is problematic considering that West Papua’s

international significance and opportunity for justice largely depends on regional (Melanesian) support.²²⁵

While both visible and invisible violence should be covered during conflict situations, the reporting of the latter is especially vital in order to understand the root causes of the conflict. Unfortunately, out of the 141 articles covering visible and invisible violence, 84 articles covered the former, 38 covered the latter and only 19 made references to both. These results affirm the hypothesis of HRJ theory, that visible violence receives more media attention, due to the increased ability to witness civil and political rights abuses. Interestingly, a significant number of articles covering invisible violence were related to President Jokowi's call for development, where Jokowi himself addressed the economic inequalities between Papuan and non-Papuan Indonesians. However, this does not necessarily mean that inequalities were reported on in a participative, non-discriminatory way that is in alignment with human rights journalism. Calculating the number of articles covering invisible violence is therefore not enough to assess the quality of reporting, but rather, the content must be analysed, as well, to determine whether these articles also comply with the five principles of HRJ.

5.2.2 Principles of Human Rights Journalism

In the next step of the media analysis, I assessed the content or quality of the articles according to the five principles of HRJ: accountability, participation, non-discrimination, empowerment and linkages to human rights standards. Out of the 141 articles covering HRJ issues, 116 (82.27 percent) complied with the principle of accountability, 62 (43.97 percent) with participation, 59 (41.84 percent) with non-discrimination, 48 (34.04 percent) with empowerment and 17 (12.06 percent) with linkages to human rights standards (Table 6).

²²⁵ Blades, 2014, p. 38.

Table 6. Number of articles that complied with the five principles of HRJ.

	Account-ability	Particip-ation	Non-discrimin-ation	Empower-ment	Linkages to human rights standards
Local	40	29	26	18	6
National	29	16	20	12	3
Regional	10	5	3	3	3
International	37	12	10	15	5
Total	116	62	59	48	17
*Percentage of total articles on HRJ issues	82.27	43.97	41.84	34.04	12.06

**Percentages rounded to the nearest hundredth.*

These results were according to my expectations, as I believed the concepts of empowerment and linkages to human rights standards would be the most foreign to traditional journalists. Accountability, participation and non-discrimination, on the other hand, should be easier to implement due to these principles already being based in traditional journalistic standards. Under accountability, the most complied-with principle, articles merely had to identify duty-bearers, which in most cases was either the government or multinational corporations. Next came participation, which was measured by the inclusion of local or Papuan sources, but it was noted that the majority of these articles were from local media outlets. Thus, national, regional and international media should put more effort into seeking diverse voices, especially from those who are directly affected by violence in West Papua. Non-discrimination was measured according to two standards: the representation of vulnerable groups or the balanced nature of reporting (i.e. including multiple and diverse sources or being based on comprehensive data). Although 59 articles complied with this principle, few of them

covered disadvantaged groups or the UNESCO-recommended themes of gender, children, disabled persons, HIV/AIDS, education, health and the environment (Table 7).

Table 7. Number of articles that covered the recommended themes in the 2008 UNESCO training manual.

	Local	National	Regional	International
Gender	3	0	0	0
Children	0	0	0	0
Disabled Persons	0	0	0	0
HIV/AIDS	0	1	0	0
Education	5	4	0	1
Health	1	1	0	1
Environment	1	3	0	5
Total	10	9	0	7

Additionally, more articles need to actively pursue the principle of empowerment by informing readers what can be, or is being done, about a conflict situation. Several articles included recommendations to the government, which is a step forward in solution-oriented reporting, but relying on government action should not be the only message given to readers. Many Papuans have expressed their frustration over the lack of mechanisms to claim their rights,²²⁶ making it the duty of journalists to inform them of alternative methods. Finally, linkages to human rights standards were the least complied-with principle, with only 17 out of 141 articles making specific references to international or national human rights law. More outlets should consider including this information, as it bases responsibilities in concrete legislation and reminds duty-bearers of their legal obligations.

²²⁶ Riana, *Tempo*.

5.3 Comparison of the Past and Present

In comparison to the media in the past, the media today has improved significantly in terms of its portrayal of West Papua and its people. Few articles pushed the stereotypical image of the jungle warrior or essentialised violence onto the innate character of Papuan indigenous people. While references to these motifs were sometimes made (especially in the images, which show Papuans wearing traditional headdresses and penis sheaths), it was not the focus of the article, as it used to be in the past. This may be due to the increased awareness of such representation, which WPMA founder Nick Chesterfield, who organises fixers for foreign journalists in West Papua, has consistently reprimanded.

[Journalists] are focusing on this exotic other of guerrillas in the mist, men in penis gourds who represent the only true resistance in the West's demise. What they are refusing to look at is the sophistication of the non-violent movement and the developments of the not so cool, not so glamorous shots that evolve with the slow reality of the movement being built. We are absolutely sick of the constant depiction of armed groups as being the be-all-and-end-all of the struggle, so we just don't help journalists who are trying to recreate the myth over and over again.²²⁷

In the articles of media analysis, the acronyms GPL and GPK were also no longer used and more distinctions were made between OPM supporters. However, there are still cases where the OPM is delegitimised through its association with the TPN, such as in a 2013 Jakarta Globe article titled, 'OPM claims responsibility for fatal shooting of TNI soldier in Papua'.²²⁸ It is only in the fifth line of the article that it explains that responsibility was in fact claimed by the commander of the TPN. Although the TPN is a faction of the OPM, I believe it is necessary to use the appropriate name in the headline

²²⁷ Abplanalp, p. 53.

²²⁸ B. Ambarita, 'OPM claims responsibility for fatal shooting of TNI soldier in Papua', *Jakarta Globe*, 26 June 2013, <http://jakartaglobe.id/news/opm-claims-responsibility-for-fatal-shooting-of-tni-soldier-in-papua/>, (accessed 25 July 2015).

to avoid stigmatisation and confusion. Additionally, in May 2016, the national outlet *Zona Lima* referred to members of the KNPB and ULMWP as ‘criminals’ and ‘fugitives’, and to the KNPB’s call for a referendum as ‘misguided propaganda’.²²⁹ Racism against Papuans is also still apparent, with one news article quoting an East Javanese teacher as saying: ‘Many Papuan people are too lazy to work ... The locals often get drunk and do not care about education. This is the reason they lose the competition to outsiders and move back to the highlands.’²³⁰ While the rest of this article presented a critical outlook on the education sector in West Papua, the inclusion of this particular quote might signify the continued stereotypes held against local indigenous people.

Finally, while most articles in the media analysis had a neutral perspective, the distortion of information was still evident in several cases, most notably in the national media. In March 2017, for instance, *Antara News* reported that the Papuan activist Mikael Merani was shot dead by police after allegedly resisting arrest.²³¹ This statement was based on only one official source from the police, a practice that has been criticised by local journalist Aprila Wayar because it only covers one side of events.²³² That same day, local media outlet *Tabloid Jubi* also covered the shooting but reported a slightly different story. They were able to interview police, who confirmed that Merani was on the wanted list, but also interviewed the family, who claimed that Merani was shot unarmed. They also said that Merani was placed on the wanted list after allegedly killing a policeman, even though these charges were never proved.²³³ Lastly, I include an example from 2013 when a foreign activist directly called out the national media for

²²⁹ E. Pratama, ‘Stand up against the misguided propaganda of KNPB’, *Zona Lima*, 30 May 2016, <http://www.zonalima.com/artikel/8900/Stand-Up-Against-the-Misguided-Propaganda-of-KNPB/>, (accessed 24 May 2017).

²³⁰ D. Halim and D. Mononimbar, ‘Papua still faces massive education backlog’, *Jakarta Globe*, 12 October 2016, <http://jakartaglobe.id/news/papua-still-faces-massive-education-backlog/>, (accessed 12 October 2016).

²³¹ ‘Armed gang leader shot dead in Yapen, Papua’, *Antara News*, 27 March 2017, <http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/110166/armed-gang-leader-shot-dead-in-yapen-papua>, (accessed 7 April 2017).

²³² A. Wayar interview, 2016.

²³³ ‘Keluarga: Mikael Merani tidak bersenjata saat ditembak’, *Tabloid Jubi*, 27 March 2017, <http://tabloidjubi.com/artikel-4906-keluarga--mikael-merani-tidak-bersenjata-saat-ditembak.html>, (accessed 7 April 2017).

misquoting him in its report. In a Jakarta Post article on the Canadian activist Jeremy Bally, who visited Papuan political prisoners in 2013, Bally is quoted as saying: ‘They are healthy and have no problems. I’m sure that officers in the prison have treated them well ... Papua’s condition is in fact different to what I’ve heard.’ Shocked by the article, Bally responded in an editorial: ‘Whether through political motivation or journalistic incompetence, this article stands as an explicit example of Indonesian propaganda in national media.’²³⁴

²³⁴ Tapsell, 2015b, p. 331.

6 IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS

As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, restrictions against the media in West Papua hinder the quality of media coverage of the region, especially when measured against the five principles of human rights journalism. While the media does occasionally cover invisible (economic, social and cultural) violence, it does not cover the topic as much as visible (civil and political) violence, which is poor HRJ practice, as conflict can only be understood when both types of violence are thoroughly reported on. In an interview with former Fairfax Media correspondent Michael Bachelard, a KNPB activist remarked:

The main picture that gets out internationally is that people get killed and that is why we should have freedom. But that is not the true reason in our hearts. It's much bigger than just killing people. We want our own country because we're different.²³⁵

Although this is a clear reference to the ethnic differences between Papuans and Indonesians, it is not just a matter of identity politics. For several years now, the Indonesian Government has worked towards bridging the gap between West Papua and the rest of nation, but Papuans continue to disproportionately suffer from illiteracy, poverty, HIV/AIDS, land grabbing and discrimination. Of course, removing media restrictions alone will not result in the end of these human rights abuses. However, the lack of media freedom and coverage of structural violence contributes to the ignorance of these issues, and as a result, the impunity enjoyed by state officials. In its concluding observations in 2014, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights highlighted the lack of comprehensive knowledge of the human rights situation in West Papua.²³⁶ Thus, by restricting the freedom of the media, the Indonesian Government essentially evades its economic, social and cultural rights obligations, as well. In

²³⁵ M. Bachelard, 'For Papua's independence activists, the struggle is about more than human rights', *The Interpreter*, 25 June 2015, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/papuas-independence-activists-struggle-about-more-human-rights>, (accessed 23 May 2017).

²³⁶ UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 'Concluding observations on the initial report of Indonesia', (19 June 2014), UN Doc E/C.12/IDN/CO/1, para. 12.

Chapter 6, I focus on the topics of development, education, health, environment and discrimination, and how the media has influenced Indonesia's accountability in these five areas.

6.1 Development

Under Jokowi's economic and cultural approach, Indonesia aims to address social injustices in West Papua through equal and participative development. Funding to West Papua is currently 30 times higher than it was at the beginning of Special Autonomy, which attests to Indonesia's activities in the region.²³⁷ Developments in the last ten months include the construction of a new airport in Yahukimo,²³⁸ greater access to electricity²³⁹ and Internet services,²⁴⁰ and the introduction of a one-price fuel policy to combat price escalation.²⁴¹ President Jokowi particularly emphasises infrastructural connectivity, which would lower transportation costs and commodity prices, as well as increase the provision of public services to remote Papuan villages. But while the plans for development are often promising, their implementation is not always as successful. In January 2017, Indonesia announced its plan to finish the 4,300-kilometre-long Trans Papua road within the next two years.²⁴² Yet two months later, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) reported possible collusion in the Jayapura road construction project, which was 40 percent overvalued. Approximately 10 to 15 percent

²³⁷ Franciscans International, *Human Rights in West Papua 2015: The fourth report of the International Coalition for Papua (ICP) covering events from April 2013 until December 2014*, Geneva, ICP, 2015, p. 63.

²³⁸ E. Karena, 'Jokowi to inaugurate two border airports', *Jakarta Globe*, 16 October 2016, [http://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-inaugurate-two-border-airports/](http://jakartaglobe.id/news/jokowi-inaugurate-two-border-airports/http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/jokowi-inaugurate-two-border-airports/), (accessed 25 October 2016).

²³⁹ A. Amindoni, 'Jokowi to inaugurate electricity projects in Papua and West Papua', *The Jakarta Post*, 17 October 2015, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/10/17/jokowi-to-inaugurate-electricity-projects-in-papua-and-west-papua.html>, (accessed 25 October 2016).

²⁴⁰ 'Govt speeds up development in Papua', *Antara News*, 6 March 2017, <http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/109771/govt-speeds-up-development-in-papua>, (accessed 10 March 2017).

²⁴¹ A. Amindoni, 'One-fuel price policy will create social justice in Papua: Jokowi', *The Jakarta Post*, 18 October 2016, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/10/18/one-fuel-price-policy-will-create-social-justice-in-papua-jokowi.html>, (accessed 27 October 2016).

²⁴² 'Govt targets to finish Trans Papua by 2018-2019', *Netral News*, 27 January 2017, <http://www.en.netralnews.com/news/business/read/760/govt.targets.to.finish.trans.papua.by.2018.2019>, (accessed 31 January 2017).

of the mark-up was distributed to local officials.²⁴³ Similar cases can be found throughout West Papua, so that it is common to find new roads and highway repair jobs left unfinished due to money going missing. Moreover, according to critics, development is currently concentrated in the four main regions of Jayapura, Merauke, Nabire and Biak (which have non-Papuan majorities due to transmigration), even though it is most needed in Papuan-majority rural areas.²⁴⁴ Jokowi himself admitted that up to 46 percent of ministries choose regions where projects would be easiest to implement.²⁴⁵

Unfortunately, corruption not only exists in infrastructural development projects, but in all sectors of the local government, which are discussed in the following subchapters. Jokowi has therefore called for better integration among sectors and regions, as ‘the allotted budget [to West Papua] is unequal to the improvement of people’s welfare we want to reach.’²⁴⁶ In 2010, West Papua’s per capita GDP was measured at US\$3,510 compared to Indonesia’s US\$2,452, but poverty levels in 2012 were still three times higher at 30.66 percent. Rural poverty was higher still at 39.39 percent.²⁴⁷ These numbers decreased slightly in September 2016 to 28.4 percent and 37.07 percent respectively, but were still three times higher than the national averages.²⁴⁸ Based on this data, it is clear that Indonesia’s economic contributions to development in West Papua do not necessarily alleviate poverty and inequality. If these conditions are to be improved, accountability for money management must be the first priority, which can be achieved through greater and better media coverage. According to former KPK

²⁴³ ‘KPK raises possibility of ‘collusion’ in Papua road project’, *The Jakarta Post*, 4 March 2017, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/03/04/kpk-raises-possiblity-of-collusion-in-papua-road-project.html>, (accessed 7 April 2017).

²⁴⁴ Budiman, *Tempo*.

²⁴⁵ ‘President calls for integrated development planning in Papua’, *Antara News*, 9 November 2016, <http://www.antaraneews.com/en/news/107692/president-calls-for-integrated-development-planning-in-papua>, (accessed 9 November 2016).

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ J. Elmslie, ‘Economic and social indicators in West Papua’, *Pacific Institute of Public Policy*, [website], 2013, <http://pacificpolicy.org/2013/06/economic-and-social-indicators-in-west-papua/>, (accessed 3 July 2017).

²⁴⁸ ‘Poverty rate 28.54%, slightly lower in Papua’, *Tempo*, 5 January 2017, <https://en.tempco.co/read/news/2017/01/05/056832782/Poverty-Rate-2854-Slightly-Lower-in-Papua>, (accessed 10 January 2017).

commissioner Erry Hardjepemakas, public and media support are the KPK's 'greatest assets' in fighting corruption.²⁴⁹

6.2 Education

Like Jokowi's development projects, the education sector in West Papua has experienced a number of improvements, but mostly in the urban and non-Papuan majority areas, such as the city of Jayapura. *Tabloid Jubi* reported these achievements in 2016, such as the inclusion of local languages in elementary, junior and high school curriculums,²⁵⁰ and the instalment of classrooms computers to enable e-learning.²⁵¹ In the rest of West Papua, however, and especially in rural villages, the quality of education is severely lacking, which Franciscans International has deemed a 'crisis' with impacts that are 'hugely underestimated.'²⁵² Although new schools are regularly being built thanks to the availability of Special Autonomy funds, educational services are virtually non-existent, such that many new schools remain empty and unused. In a 2014 study conducted in 40 villages, researchers found that many schools had been closed down for several years, and that staff members were regularly absent, even though they continued to receive wages and bonuses for 'working' in remote areas.²⁵³ Literacy rates in more than half of the villages were measured below 25 percent, and in one third of villages, below 10 percent. Despite these low figures, many students still 'graduated' from high school, but only because teachers would help them cheat during the exam period in order 'to save face.'²⁵⁴

Another reason for cheating on the exams is the status that comes with a high school certificate. This certificate enables students to apply for the civil service test, which is

²⁴⁹ M. Goldfien, 'Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission', *Leadership Academy for Development (LAD)*, 2004, http://cddrl.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/indonesia_kpk_paginated.pdf, (accessed 21 July 2017), p. 11.

²⁵⁰ 'Local languages included in local curriculum', *Tabloid Jubi*, 26 September 2016, <http://tabloidjubi.com/eng/local-languages-included-local-curriculum/>, (accessed 27 September 2016).

²⁵¹ 'Jayapura launches digital school program', *Tabloid Jubi*, 30 September 2016, <http://tabloidjubi.com/eng/jayapura-launches-digital-school-program/>, (accessed 4 October 2016).

²⁵² Franciscans International, *Human Rights in West Papua 2015*, p. 61.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

necessary if they want acquire well-paid government jobs, such as that of a teacher or doctor. The incentive for cheating is therefore very high, and with easy access to schools where this behaviour is permitted, many parents do not understand why their children should go to merit-based schools instead. One teacher in Eragayam said that they lose five to six students every year because parents pull them out to attend other institutions.²⁵⁵ As a result, even the students training to become teachers often do not have their basic education. Pieter van der Wilt, a Dutch missionary who works at a teacher training college in Wamena, estimated that new students score 30 to 35 on average on a skills test out of 100.²⁵⁶ The effect this may on Papuans' future capabilities is profound. With such low literacy rates, Papuans will find it much harder to compete in the market against non-Papuan Indonesians, which is already a major problem that is fuelling ethnic tensions. Additionally, they are more likely to be exploited by companies or other actors, and may not know how to claim their rights through the appropriate mechanisms.

Of course, the media cannot directly monitor teachers' attendance, as this is the job of the government, school principals and local communities. However, teacher absenteeism in West Papua is often related to the lack of quality infrastructure, such as the provision of toilets, clean water and electricity.²⁵⁷ Mobile phone coverage is also necessary for online banking, so that teachers do not have to travel to the city to collect their paychecks. It is in these areas that the media may play its role, by informing readers of the structural causes of teacher absenteeism, and holding the government accountable for the development of these areas.

²⁵⁵ Bachelard, *The Interpreter*, 2015d.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), 'We Like Being Taught: A Study on Teacher Absenteeism in Papua and West Papua', *UNICEF*, 2012, https://www.unicef.org/indonesia/Teacher_Absenteeism_Study_Papua_ENGLISH.pdf, (accessed 20 July 2017).

6.3 Health

Another significant issue in West Papua is the quality and access to health services. Although free healthcare is available under Special Autonomy, facilities in rural areas are often in a ‘dilapidated state’,²⁵⁸ so that the majority of Papuans prefer to travel to the city even for basic illnesses. As patients still bear the cost of transportation, however, they can spend as much as US\$50 for an eight-hour bus ride – approximately a full month’s wage of a part-time construction or plantation worker.²⁵⁹ In 2008, the ratio of doctors to population in urban areas was approximately 1:2000,²⁶⁰ but because of the preference for city health centres, there is now overcrowding and a lack of medical staff. Meanwhile, the ratio of doctors to population in rural areas can reach as low as 1:23,000,²⁶¹ which is significantly lower than the recommended minimum of 23 health workers per 10,000 residents.²⁶² Medical staff are also regularly absent from rural hospitals, even though they, too, still collect their paychecks. One reason for their absenteeism is that not many doctors are interested in working in the poor conditions of remote villages. According to the head doctor in Bokondini, seven doctors were sent to his village in June 2014, but five refused to stay. Three months later, another four doctors were assigned to refill their positions, but all four of them eventually returned to Jakarta.²⁶³

As a result of the poor health services in West Papua, Indonesia’s HIV epidemic is currently one of the worst in the world. Between 2005 and 2013, AIDS-related deaths increased by 427 percent and only 8 percent of HIV-affected persons had access to therapy treatment.²⁶⁴ In the regency of Jawawijaya, the number of HIV/AIDS cases

²⁵⁸ Franciscans International, *Human Rights in West Papua 2015*, p. 54.

²⁵⁹ ‘Free healthcare overwhelming Indonesia’s Papua’, *IRIN*, 3 December 2013, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/99247/free-healthcare-overwhelming-indonesias-papua>, (accessed 20 July 2017).

²⁶⁰ Rees et al, p. 642.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*

²⁶² ‘Free healthcare overwhelming Indonesia’s Papua’, *IRIN*.

²⁶³ M. Bachelard, ‘In Papua’s health centres, a glimpse of dysfunction and corruption’, *The Interpreter*, 23 June 2015, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/papuas-health-centres-glimpse-dysfunction-and-corruption>, (accessed 23 May 2017).

²⁶⁴ Franciscans International, *Human Rights in West Papua 2015*, p. 55.

increased from 1351 to over 5000 in less than three years, the majority of which were young indigenous Papuans from the highland districts of Yahukimo, Tolikara, Puncak Jaya and Lani Jaya.²⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the mortality rate for children under the age of five is currently three times higher than other parts of Indonesia, since skilled attendance during pregnancy can fall below 10 percent in rural areas.²⁶⁶ Although local women are sometimes trained in midwifery to combat this issue, they often leave their villages after completing their training to work in larger cities.²⁶⁷ Last but not least, mental health services are virtually non-existent throughout West Papua, even though alcohol and substance abuse are particularly rife among young Papuan men.²⁶⁸ A 2013 study found that over 80 percent of Papuans who fled to Australia reported having post-traumatic stress disorder. Although there is no local data on the prevalence of mental illness, it is thought to be ‘considerable’ due to the rate of violence in the region.²⁶⁹

During the course of the media analysis, I recorded a total of three – out of 412 – articles that critically covered the topic of health and HIV/AIDS. Considering the health epidemic that is currently taking place, this finding was absolutely shocking. On the one hand, it is the media’s responsibility to actively report on stories of structural violence; on the other, ‘the government should [also] recognize that ... allowing media to freely report in Papua can play a crucial role in supporting official efforts to fill gaps in the public health delivery systems.’²⁷⁰ Fortunately, Indonesia has made some progress by granting rare access to the UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Health in April 2017. In his preliminary observations, Dainius Pūras raised his concerns about ‘ethnic Papuans, who still face stigma and discrimination, including in healthcare settings’, and concluded:

²⁶⁵ Franciscans International, *Human Rights in West Papua 2015*, p. 55.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ A. Harsono, ‘Indonesia permits rare Papua access to UN health rights expert’, *Human Rights Watch (HRW)*, 7 April 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/07/indonesia-permits-rare-papua-access-un-health-rights-expert>, (accessed 21 May 2017).

There are real opportunities and genuine commitment to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to health in Indonesia but public authorities need to step up efforts to address structural and systematic issues, both in law and practice, to make sure that they are not tempted by the “lower hanging fruit” and none is left behind.²⁷¹

6.4 Environment

The US-owned Freeport McMoRan mine is one of the largest copper and gold mines in the world and has been operating in West Papua since 1967, two years before the Act of Free Choice took place. Today, it is Indonesia’s largest taxpayer and supports a number of programmes for local communities, but its history of environmental degradation is a long and exploitative one. According to Earthworks and Mining Watch Canada’s 2012 estimates, Freeport dumps more than 200,000 tonnes of mine waste (or tailings) into the Ajkwa delta daily, and will produce over three billion tonnes of tailings before it closes. These tailings have killed most of the fish, oysters and shrimps that form the basic diet of the local Kamoro and Amungme tribes, and have buried over 166 square kilometres of customary forest and wetlands.²⁷² Other parts of West Papua are also increasingly vulnerable to land grabbing, which are used by logging companies, or more recently, for agricultural plantations. As land becomes scarce in Kalimantan and Sumatra, the Indonesian Government has turned to West Papua as a solution for Indonesia’s food and energy crisis. The Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE), for instance, is the largest plantation in the region and funded by the Indonesian Government in the hopes that they will ‘meet 30 percent of the national demand for rice.’²⁷³ By 2014,

²⁷¹ D. Pūras, ‘Country Visit to Indonesia, 22 March to 3 April 2017: Preliminary observations’, *Office of the Higher Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR)*, 3 April 2017, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21472&LangID=E>, (accessed 25 July 2017).

²⁷² Earthworks and MiningWatch Canada, ‘Troubled Waters: How Mine Waste Dumping is Poisoning Our Oceans, Rivers and Lakes’, *Earthworks*, 2012, https://www.earthworkSACTION.org/files/publications/Troubled-Waters_FINAL.pdf, (accessed 25 July 2017), p. 16.

²⁷³ A. Barahamin, ‘Commentary: Jokowi is ‘killing’ Papua with rice’, *Jakarta Globe*, <http://jakartaglobe.id/opinion/commentary-jokowi-killing-papua-rice/>, (accessed 2 February 2017).

however, only 5.38 percent of MIFEE's total land area was used for rice cultivation, while the rest was used for timber, wood processing, palm oil plantations and sugarcane farms. A UK-based NGO reported 'severe food insecurity, malnutrition and the deaths of at least five children following deforestation and pollution near Zanegi village,' while the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food said that MIFEE could affect the food security of over 50,000 people.²⁷⁴

In addition to the social and economic issues that land exploitation introduces, companies are also responsible for increasing political violence, since they employ military and police as their private security personnel. Freeport disclosed that it had paid the Indonesian military US\$4.7 million in 2001 and US\$5.6 million in 2002. Although Freeport claims that the money merely covered the cost of infrastructure, food, travel and community assistance programmes, Global Witness found that several payments had been made to individual officers as opposed to the government or other institution.²⁷⁵ As a result, local Papuans working in plantations feel too intimidated to claim their rights, such as in PT Nabire Baru, where employees were too afraid to protest against the late payment of their wages. There have also been cases of military and police threatening communities into giving up their land, such as one woman from Keerom, who claimed: 'If we do not submit (land) forests, they say we're protecting the OPM in the woods.'²⁷⁶ Involvement with the OPM is considered a treasonous offence and is punishable up to 20 years in prison.

Despite these weighty issues, I only recorded nine articles that critically assessed the environment in West Papua between September 2016 and March 2017. I believe that the media can do more, especially in debunking myths that benefit exploitative companies, such as in Merauke, where 'the central and local governments have given

²⁷⁴ Barahamin, *Jakarta Globe*.

²⁷⁵ Global Witness, 'Paying for Protection: The Freeport mine and the Indonesian security forces', *Global Witness*, 2005, <https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/16424/paying%20for%20protection.pdf>, (accessed 25 July 2017), p. 4.

²⁷⁶ Franciscans International, *Human Rights in West Papua 2015*, p. 68.

the impression that the land allocated to MIFEE is uninhabited.²⁷⁷ A recent example of the power of the media was seen in September 2016, when Mighty Earth and Mongabay News released a report on forest clearing by the Korean company Korindo. By January 2017, Korindo said that it would stop clearing forests, as well as conduct a sustainability assessment of their land concessions in West Papua.²⁷⁸

6.5 Discrimination

The previous chapters on development, education, health and environment are examples of institutionalised discrimination, which is a legacy of the policy of transmigration and which only recently ended in 2015. As part of the process of ‘Indonesianisation’, the purpose of transmigration was to facilitate contact between Papuan and non-Papuan Indonesians in order to promote assimilation and strengthen national unity.²⁷⁹ However, in conjunction with enforced family planning, its aggressive implementation is often considered a form of population control – or even ‘cold killing’²⁸⁰ – as it has reduced Papuans to a minority in their own land. In 1971, Papuans constituted a significant majority at 96.09 percent of the total population, but only accounted for 47.89 percent of the population in 2010. Franciscans International predicted a further decrease to 28.99 percent in 2020, with non-Papuans claiming the majority at 71.01 percent.²⁸¹ This could have potentially harmful consequences in the future, as Papuans account for fewer votes in upcoming general elections.

Additionally, transmigration has resulted in extreme inequalities between ethnic groups, as high-skilled Javanese workers outcompete Papuans in most urban markets. According to the Netherlands Trade Union Confederation, West Papua has the highest youth unemployment rate, having reached as high as 60 percent in rural areas in the

²⁷⁷ P. Barber and R. Moiwend, ‘Internet Advocacy and the MIFEE Project in West Papua’, in P. King et al (ed.), *Comprehending West Papua*, Sydney, University of Sydney, 2011, p. 42.

²⁷⁸ G. Belmaker, ‘Korean company bans forest clearing for Indonesian palm oil concessions’, *Mongabay*, 12 January 2017, <https://news.mongabay.com/2017/01/korean-company-bans-forest-clearing-for-indonesian-palm-oil-concessions/>, (accessed 27 January 2017).

²⁷⁹ D. Gietzelt, ‘The Indonesianization of West Papua’, *Oceania*, vol. 59, no. 3, 1989, p. 201.

²⁸⁰ Banivanua-Mar, p. 585.

²⁸¹ Franciscans International, *Human Rights in West Papua 2015*, p. 71.

past.²⁸² A 2013 report also found that only 17 percent of Papua's total labour force were employed in full-time work, 38 percent were working in unpaid domestic help, and 45 percent were self-employed or working part-time. The average salary for part-time work in road construction or plantation farms is about Rp700,000 (approximately US\$53), which is almost a third of the US\$166 minimum wage in the province of Papua.²⁸³ Although Javanese workers are advantaged in their knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia, rice cultivation and other culturally relevant skills, the growing inequality is often blamed on Papuans, who are referred to as *bodoh* ('stupid'), *malas* ('lazy'), *mabuk* ('drunk') and *primitip* ('primitive').²⁸⁴

As of 2016, the Indonesian Government recognises 1128 ethnic groups, some of which are referred to as *masyarakat adat* or 'customary people', although the terms 'ethnic group', 'traditional communities' and 'indigenous peoples' are also used interchangeably in official reports.²⁸⁵ While Indonesia is party to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP), however, it does not recognise Papuans as 'indigenous' as defined in the UN document. During Dutch colonial rule, it considered all Indonesians as indigenous, and therefore, does not view Papuans as deserving special treatment based on this status. In response to a report by the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Peoples, Indonesia wrote: '[A]s a matter of principle, Indonesia's ... ethnic groups were all regarded as equally indigenous; any reference in the Forum's report was therefore irrelevant.'²⁸⁶ Finally, although Indonesia supported the adoption of UNDRIP in 2007, it explicitly stated:

²⁸² W. Van der Maten, 'Papua has the highest youth unemployment in Asia', *Netherlands Trade Union Confederation*, https://www.fnv.nl/site/over-de-fnv/internationaal/mondiaal-fnv/contentpaginas/english/Papua_highest_youth_unemployment_Asia, (accessed 20 July 2017).

²⁸³ 'Papuan returnees live with broken promises in Indonesia', *IRIN*, 5 December 2013, <http://www.irinnews.org/report/99270/papuan-returnees-live-broken-promises-indonesia>, (accessed 20 July 2017).

²⁸⁴ J. Macleod, *Merdeka and the Morning Star: Civil Resistance in West Papua*, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 2015, p. 67

²⁸⁵ International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), *The Indigenous World 2016*, Copenhagen, IWGIA, 2016, p. 262.

²⁸⁶ J. Bertrand, 'Being Indigenous in Indonesia and the Philippines: Contradictions and Pitfalls', *Immigration, Minorities and Multiculturalism in Democracies Conference*, 2007, <http://www.queensu.ca/csd/sites/webpublish.queensu.ca.csdwww/files/files/publications/wps/4-BBertrandpaper.pdf>, (accessed 25 July 2017), p. 16.

The principle of self-determination set out in the draft declaration should not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that might dismember or impair totally or in part the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign, independent States.²⁸⁷

Once again, I believe that the role of the media is important in combatting discrimination by overcoming false stereotypes. Gietzelt notes that during Suharto's rule, control of the media was a 'mechanism for the dissemination of the Indonesian world-view, in that [it] attempt[ed] to instill an acceptance of and desire for the dominant value-system.'²⁸⁸ The media can therefore be used to combat negative stereotypes as well, but as seen in Chapter 4, it must still improve its compliance with the principles of participation and non-discrimination in order to achieve this.

²⁸⁷ Bertrand, 'Being Indigenous in Indonesia and the Philippines', p. 18.

²⁸⁸ Gietzelt, p. 203.

7 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

7.1 Access to Foreign Journalists

International media plays a significant role in conflict reporting, and if done correctly, even in conflict resolution. For starters, the presence of foreign journalists increases the competition among local, national and foreign media, thereby encouraging better and faster coverage of events. Foreign journalists can also help set the standards on good media practice, particularly in human rights journalism, and support the government's efforts towards fact-finding and uncovering local corruption. Thus, it is of utmost importance that Indonesia continues to open up foreign journalists' access to West Papua, not only to the region, but most importantly, within it. To reiterate the Human Rights Committee:

It is normally incompatible with paragraph 3 [of the ICCPR] to restrict the freedom of journalists ... to travel outside the State party, to restrict the entry into the State party of foreign journalists ... or to restrict freedom of movement of journalists and human rights investigators within the State party (including to conflict-affected locations ... and locations where there are allegations of human rights abuses).²⁸⁹

Journalists should also be able to interview 'separatist' sources if they please, since according to paragraph 38 of General Comment No. 34, public institutions or figures are 'legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.'²⁹⁰ Moreover, the confidentiality of sources should be protected in accordance with article 4, paragraph 4 on the Right to Refuse in Indonesia's Press Law.²⁹¹ General recommendations on opening access to foreign journalists therefore include:

²⁸⁹ UN Human Rights Committee, 'General Comment No. 34', para. 45.

²⁹⁰ Ibid, para. 38.

²⁹¹ Law No. 40 of 1999 on the Press, art. 4 para. 4.

- Issuing an official presidential decree opening access to foreign journalists and ensuring that all government ministries, as well as security forces (including the military intelligence), comply with the order;
- Guaranteeing the safety of sources by protecting their confidentiality under article 4, paragraph 4 of the 1999 Press Law;
- Establishing a formal mechanism through which foreign journalists can report complaints on illegal surveillance, harassment and police intimidation; and
- Providing international media with training on human rights journalism.

7.2 Editorial Independence and Media Interest

National and regional media face similar challenges pertaining to the editorial freedom of its news organisations and a lack of general interest in local Papuan issues. Tapsell recalls: ‘I’ve tried to speak to these news organisations in Jakarta and say, ‘why don’t you do more on Papua?’ They just say, ‘but we do! We just had five stories last month on Papua.’ And I reply, ‘yeah, five stories out of how many?’²⁹² During the media analysis, I found that only a small percent of national media articles were dedicated to West Papua and even fewer still to visible and invisible violence. The figures for regional media were poorer still, even though the success of the Papuan human rights movement largely depends on regional support. National and regional journalists should therefore focus on HRJ reporting and send correspondents to West Papua, which would allow journalists to investigate issues in more depth and produce less superficial articles. As of now, Tapsell claims that many ‘organisations are not in Papua talking to Papuans. They are commentating from the outside, but what Papua needs is more coverage of what is actually going on there, rather than armchair commentary.’²⁹³ General recommendations on improving national and regional media therefore include:

²⁹² R. Tapsell interview, 2017.

²⁹³ Ibid.

- Ensuring the diversity and editorial independence of national and regional media by introducing stronger or clearer legislation on media ownership;
- Establishing a formal mechanism through which national journalists can report complaints on workplace harassment or wrongful termination; and
- Sending correspondents to West Papua to actively pursue local stories, as well as providing national and regional media with training on human rights journalism.

7.3 Local Media Training

Based on the findings of the media analysis, local media performed the best human rights journalism, with 67.14 percent of articles covering visible and invisible violence. However, journalists can still benefit from professional training courses to solidify their credibility and broaden their readership. Local media, for instance, is mostly consumed by Papuans and Indonesians who are already interested in the West Papua issue, but is rarely read by an international audience due to the language barrier. Some local news outlets, such as Tabloid Jubi, are beginning to publish English versions of their news sites, but others have not yet done so and rely on poor Google translations instead. Former Tabloid Jubi journalist Aprila Wayar recognised the importance of learning, when she said:

It's a big problem. Like me, I have seven years experience as a local journalist, but I have almost nothing. When I was in the Netherlands, I had to learn many things about journalism around the world. I want to try and change and become an international journalist. If I become an international journalist, I can help my people.²⁹⁴

Additionally, new journalists should be trained in human rights journalism, such as the UNESCO training session that was originally held in Vietnam. This would increase

²⁹⁴ A. Wayar interview, 2017.

their awareness of key topics – such the coverage of gender, children, disabled persons, HIV/AIDS, education, health and the environment – that are currently missing, even in the local media. HRW Researcher Andreas Harsono, however, poses a reasonable question: ‘Who will do the training? ... If you ask international journalists, will they get the permit to go there?’²⁹⁵ Thankfully, according to WPMA founder Nick Chesterfield, some programmes are already taking place, which provide training in ‘safe information gathering, careful abuse documentation, scrupulous investigative journalism methodology, information quality assurance, assured protection of sources, and more.’²⁹⁶ Like most local media organisations, however, WPMA also faces funding challenge, such that in 2016, it suspended its regular publication for the first time in ten years. On their news site, the organisation writes:

We feel without a current sustainable funding base and savings in the bank, we are unable to ethically provide the correct amount of support currently needed for our brave clandestine stringers and journalists to expose themselves in the field at this point. We are working hard to create the mechanisms so that they are armed always with real time digital security and support when they do venture into the field, and are able to report safely.²⁹⁷

General recommendations on improving local media therefore include:

- Ordering security forces to stop using intimidation against journalists, whether through the use of force, threats or unlawful spying;
- Establishing an appropriate mechanism through which journalists can report their complaints regarding police intimidation and harassment; and

²⁹⁵ A. Harsono interview, 2017.

²⁹⁶ Chesterfield, p. 35.

²⁹⁷ *West Papua Media Alerts (WPMA)*, ‘Why West Papua Media is having a break from publishing and our exciting new projects – we need your help’, *WPMA*, [website], 2016, <https://westpamuamedia.info/2016/09/22/westpamuamedia-twitter-feed-sticky-post/>, (accessed 25 July 2017).

- Financially investing in local media initiatives and training programmes, as well as providing professional training in safety, English and human rights journalism.

7.4 Networked Journalism

Collaboration between local, national, regional and international media is extremely important for the holistic improvement of the coverage of West Papua. This means increasingly participating in networked journalism, which ‘includes citizen [media], interactivity, open sourcing, wikis, blogging, and social networking, not as add-ons, but as an essential part of news production and distribution itself.’²⁹⁸ American journalist Jeff Jarvis explains:

Try this on as a new rule for newspapers: Cover what you do best. Link to the rest. That’s not how newspapers work now. They try to cover everything because they used to have to be all things to all people in their markets ... But in the age of the link, this is clearly inefficient and unnecessary. You can link to the stories that someone else did and to the rest of the world. And if you do that, it allows you to reallocate your dwindling resources to what matters.²⁹⁹

Thus, national media in West Papua can provide its connection with government sources; local media can offer its in-depth understanding of everyday Papuan issues; and international and regional media can disseminate this information globally to new audiences. Blades also notes that connections with international outlets may provide safety for local journalists working in the region.

²⁹⁸ A. Kröll, ‘The Role of Journalism in the Digital Age’, *Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism*, 2015, <http://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/publication/role-journalism-digital-age>, (accessed 25 July 2017), p. 9.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 17.

Foreign media outlets should actively engage with these journalists on the ground in Papua and use them as a correspondent, regularly or occasionally. Because even though they might still be compromised or are facing certain pressures, the support can provide a little bit of fortification. If there's some international component in their work it might make their work safer or less compromised.³⁰⁰

General recommendations on networked journalism therefore include:

- Collaboration between local, national, regional and international media during news production and distribution processes;
- Participating in journalist exchange programmes and cross-cultural training workshops; and
- Employing local journalists as correspondents to provide a level of credibility and security.

7.4.1 Alternative Media

Finally, networked journalism should not only be limited to collaboration between mainstream media, but should also work with alternative media, such as community radio and television or online citizen journalism. According to Barahamin:

Alternative media raises awareness about on-going human rights violations, land grabs against indigenous people, massive environmental destruction, education and health problems, and poverty – issues that are rarely mentioned by the mainstream Indonesian press.³⁰¹

This criticism also pertains to local print media, which still tends to quote 'official' sources, such as the police and organisations like the KNPB. Meanwhile, alternative

³⁰⁰ J. Blades interview, 2017.

³⁰¹ Barahamin, *New Mandala*.

media, such as the video production project, Papuan Voices (PV), cover the everyday activities and views of local people, thereby sharing greater insight into their daily experiences. PV was created in 2011 to offer Papuans a platform to share their stories, which include diverse issues, such as the use of harmful substances in the highlands; the lack of healthcare in the villages of Jokjoker and Kosefa; the loss of traditional culture in the education system; the lack of education and opportunities for women in West Papua; the competition between Papuan and non-Papuan vendor sellers; and the impact of land exploitation on indigenous peoples.³⁰² These are examples of the economic, social and cultural violence that Papuans experience on a daily basis, but that are not covered in the media – including local media – because they require in-depth analysis rather than quick, basic reporting. According to Teddy Wakum, a filmmaker for the Jogjakarta student branch of Papuan Voices, the use of video is important ‘because that way, people from the outside can view a situation directly ... If you just write it on a paper, you can lie, but if you use video, the people will believe us because we can record directly about the situation in the field.’³⁰³ In 2016, Wakum’s video about the violent dispersal of a Papuan student protest in Jogjakarta was featured in mainstream news outlets, such as Tempo and the BCC.³⁰⁴ Its YouTube page has additionally collected over 37,000 views as of July 2017.³⁰⁵

However, alternative media still faces a number of challenges in West Papua, such as sustainable management and the lack of digital know-how. According to the PV content and training coordinator Yerry Borang, teaching Papuans can sometimes be difficult, as knowledge of the Internet – which is a relatively new luxury in West Papua – is still very minimal.

The Internet scale, the digital scale, it’s not there yet. So we have to develop from the very beginning. Many people started five years ago and they didn’t

³⁰² *Papuan Voices*, [website], <http://pauanvoices.net/story-map>, (accessed 12 November 2016).

³⁰³ Interview with Teddy Wakum, Jogjakarta, 1 February 2017.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁵ *Polisi dan ormas mengepung dan mengancam Orang Papua di Jogja*, [online video], 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bwAll7b_2I0, (accessed 25 July 2017).

have emails, so we introduced them to email ... In Papua, there is a cultural jump. They started from nothing and then suddenly have 3G.³⁰⁶

Many Papuan activists are also desensitised to security risks because of their daily encounters with violence in the region. Borang commented:

The main problem is the mentality, because many of them believe, ‘ah, if something happens, I’m prepared to die.’ But we try to encourage them to learn, because it’s not only for you but for other people surrounding you – your family. Your property, you don’t care; but what happens with your outer circle?³⁰⁷

Finally, grassroots organisations such as Papuan Voices also lack administrative stability, such that they depend on external help and funding from parent organisations, such as Engage Media, which is based in Jogjakarta. Borang notes: ‘It’s a management thing. They’re not used to working in a hierarchy – having someone to take care of their financial problems and so forth. [Engage Media] works with them on creative projects and find[s] them funding.’³⁰⁸ This is just one of many limitations that could potentially restrict the growth and stability of alternative media projects.

³⁰⁶ Interview with Yerry Borang, Jogjakarta, 16 January 2017.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

8 CONCLUSION

The role of the media in conflict resolution is not always easily apparent. According to traditional media theory, professional standards require journalists to work under the principle of neutrality and refrain from taking moral sides in their reporting. However, with the rise of alternative and citizen media, which have blurred the lines between journalism and activism, researchers such as myself are beginning to question: *'What is the role of the media in the promotion and fulfilment of human rights?'* Today it seems that more and more research is being conducted on peace journalism, conflict sensitive reporting and other forms of media practice that promote the concept of 'reporting as I see it' as opposed to 'reporting as it is'. According to Ibrahim Shaw, the author of *Human Rights Journalism: Advances in Reporting Distant Humanitarian Interventions*, 'the first approach focuses on the journalist as a moral witness of human rights violations who has a sense of attachment to the suffering of victims.'³⁰⁹ Rather than only reporting on the visible facts of an event, human rights journalism explores the invisible factors that drive those events, as well. By doing so:

The practice of human rights journalism based on media activism can provide tremendous support to critical social movements in exposing and challenging, through non-violent channels ... the structures of economic injustice that perpetuate global economic inequality and extreme poverty.³¹⁰

For this reason, I used the theory of HRJ as the foundation of my research to investigate the main research question: *'How does the lack of media freedom affect the coverage of West Papua, and how does this impact Indonesia's fulfilment of other human rights in the region?'*

In Chapters 4 and 5, I found that despite the democratisation of the media after Suharto, local, national, regional and international media still faced numerous challenges in their

³⁰⁹ Shaw, p. 55.

³¹⁰ Ibid, p. 180.

reporting of the West Papua conflict. International journalists' access, for example, is still restricted, even though the Indonesian Government claims to have lifted the ban on foreign journalists in 2015. Although a number of journalists have successfully passed Indonesia's demanding visa application process, this system does not exist for any other Indonesian province, which begs to question why West Papua is treated differently. Moreover, access within West Papua is also still restricted, as journalists are denied entry to conflict-ridden areas, are monitored by intelligence during their stay, and cannot ensure the safety of their sources once they leave. Regional journalists face similar problems, but more importantly, the interest in West Papua is generally lacking due to the political relations between Indonesia and Melanesian states. For this reason, regional media no longer send correspondents to West Papua and rely on international news agencies for their stories instead.

Despite the belief that all national journalists are pro-government, they, too, face limitations in their ability to report freely. Due to commercial convergence and partisan media ownership, self-censorship is now considered a style of reporting rather than the omission of facts. Journalists that criticise the elite and challenge their political or economic interests may therefore face serious consequences, such as being demoted, transferred to a new department, or even fired. They are also vulnerable to mob attacks by aggravated citizens, so that even independent news outlets are wary of the way they report conflict. Finally, local journalists face the most challenges due the lack of accountability in West Papua, and the blatant discrimination against Papuan indigenous people. AJI has reported numerous cases of intimidation, death threats, beatings and other forms of violence against Papuan journalists, who are usually targeted because of their presumed pro-independence agenda. Moreover, Papuan journalists are generally underpaid, making less than half of the living wage, and depend on government advertising to keep their news organisations afloat.

As a result of these media restrictions, coverage of West Papua is often superficial, especially when measured against the five principles of human rights journalism. In a media analysis between September 2016 and March 2017, I found that only a fraction of

articles on West Papua covered visible and invisible violence, and fewer still covered the issues of gender, children, disabled persons, HIV/AIDS, education, health and the environment. Although some of the HRJ principles were fulfilled, most notably those of accountability and participation, the others were severely lacking in media articles. Local media, however, showed the best performance out of the four, which was not surprising considering journalists' first-hand experience of the West Papua conflict. These journalists were more likely to cover invisible forms of violence, such as the lack of healthcare and education, which offered a better understanding of Papuans' grievances and their continued aspirations for self-determination.

In Chapter 6, I assessed the impact of media restrictions on Indonesia's fulfilment of other human rights in West Papua. I argued that economic, social and cultural violence in the region is more easily ignored, thereby preserving the culture of impunity enjoyed by the military, police and local government officials. The lack of development, education and health services, for instance, is largely due to corruption among local politicians, who siphon money from the well-intended Special Autonomy funds in order to fill their own pockets. As a result, conditions are extremely poor compared to the rest of Indonesia. Unfortunately, few people inside and outside of Indonesia know about these conditions, as there are not enough researchers to collect the data and journalists to disseminate the information.

In conclusion, if media restrictions result in the ignorance of structural and cultural violence – and this perpetuates the abuses against not only economic, social and cultural, but also civil and political rights – than it is reasonable to assume that a free media would cover these types of violence, and therefore minimise or prevent human rights abuses. Indonesia should therefore strongly consider lifting all media restrictions in West Papua, not only because the right to a free media is guaranteed under its 1999 Press Law, but also because a free media could help the country reach a resolution regarding the West Papua conflict.

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APPENDIX I: MAP OF WEST PAPUA



*Figure 2. Map of the provinces of Papua and West Papua. Reprinted from Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Something to Hide? Indonesia's Restrictions on Media Freedom and Rights Monitoring in Papua*, USA, HRW, 2015, pg. ii.*

APPENDIX II: TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEWS

*Disclaimer: Interviews have been slightly edited and condensed for clarity.

Interview with Aprila Wayar, Vienna, 11 November 2016

TN: In the past, Indonesian mainstream media have reportedly used negative framing, selective advertising, and even outright propaganda to undermine the Papuan struggle. Is that still happening now or has the situation improved at all?

AW: Of course it's still happening until today. Just a few days ago, my friend, the chief editor of Suara Papua, said that the government blocked their website. If you are in Indonesia and you use the Telkomsel provider, you cannot get access to that website again. I tried to ask him why they did that. The government said they censored it because the website is full of racist comments. But I think it's not about race, it's about the Papuan struggle.

TN: What about your personal experience? Have you ever been intimidated or harassed for your work as a journalist in West Papua?

AW: Yes, you can Google it. I experienced verbal violence in 2013. You can Google it if you type my name, 'Aprila Wayar demonstration', or 'Wartawan Papua gets intimidation'. But only in Bahasa, you can get it. I experienced it two times, and the second time physically, because the police tried to chop my neck from the back.

TN: Why do you think it's important to have local journalists writing about these issues?

AW: Because of the balancing issue. Indonesian journalists who live in Papua and cover Papuan issues, they're not really covering the truth. They are not honest about what's going on there, because every day, Papuan people are killed by Indonesian soldiers. But they never make a report about that. Of course, me, as a Papuan journalist, can cover something about my people. If people like me are not in Papua, in ten or twenty years, there will be no more Papuan people living on Papuan land.

TN: What about in comparison to international journalists? Is there something local journalists can do that international journalists cannot?

AW: Yeah, of course, why not. But the issue here is that not many Papuan journalists can speak English. It's a big problem. Like me, I have seven years experience as a local journalist, but I have almost nothing. When I was in the Netherlands, I had to learn many things about journalism around the world. I want to try and change and become an international journalist. If I become an international journalist, I can help my people. But for today, I know for sure that Indonesia will care if Papuan people try to become a journalist, a writer, or something, because they keep Papua like that. They keep Papua far away from the world. When I was in the Netherlands, the people asked me, 'where do you come from?' I said I come from Papua. 'Where is West Papua?' I said it's in Indonesia. 'Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, it was colonised by the Dutch in the past.' How about West Papua now? They don't know anything about West Papua today. Many people didn't even know that West Papua still exists. That makes me so sad. For more than 25 years, Indonesia hasn't allowed international journalists to cover Papua, so of course, the international community doesn't know anything about it. And I cannot blame them or be mad about this situation, because Indonesia made Papua like that. They do it deliberately so that Papua is still portrayed like a primitive people, like Papuan people were 50,000 years ago. But Papuan people have changed!

TN: How do we change international perception about Papuan primitiveness? How do we get news out there to show the international community that this image isn't true?

AW: For me, what the international community can do is help Papuan people get international training, or maybe English courses. It really helps Papua people if they can get the experience. This is a really difficult situation, what you're asking, because all the money from NGOs abroad is cut by Indonesian authorities in Jakarta. Before, five or ten years back, there were many organisations that could send money directly to Papuan indigenous people, but over the last five to ten years, Indonesia has cut it. So maybe the international community can invite them to come out from

West Papua, to join training [sessions] or English courses or something, and then they come back. And maybe introduce them to the international community; help them get employment for one, two, three years.

TN: One concern that people have is the credibility of local journalists. How do you respond to that criticism?

AW: Of course, Indonesian journalists will say that. I'll give you an example: there is a demonstration, or maybe somebody gets shot. I don't know about other journalists, but when people call me when someone is shot by the TNI or Indonesian police, I come first. I'm not the police. First I take pictures, I interview victims if the families allow me, and after that, I will confirm with the police. But the point here is that local journalists like me, we don't really have access to the police or TNI in Indonesia. I have no access to them. They always speak to Indonesian journalists. They [Indonesian journalists] think they have more right to confirm with the TNI or the leader of headquarters. How can I, as a local journalist, make news balanced if I have no chance to confirm a situation with a police leader? How can I make news with enough credibility? Sometimes it makes me more stressed about the Papua journalism situation. If they cover news about a TNI or police celebration, they get money. Of course they take sides with whoever gives them money, and they make good news. But if you cover poor Papuan people and how they get AIDS, for example, you have no money. You cover NGOs' problems but NGOs don't give you money.

TN: How do people in remote areas of Papua get their news, if they don't have computers and Internet?

AW: Many people, but only intellectual people, use the Internet in the city. But the Internet connection is not really good in Jayapura. Sometimes I think it is the work of the intelligence. All the cities are broken in terms of connectivity, but suddenly, only in one hotel, in Grand Abe Hotel, you can use the Internet for twenty-four hours. The Internet is so good. I'm so surprised, because for me it's not normal. They try to tap everything, every communication in civil society. If you talk about Papua *merdeka* or Papua freedom it's not really worrisome for me, because Papua *merdeka* for the TNI and police is just a reason to send more soldiers and police to cover all the places for mining, for companies. But if you talk about illegal logging, they kill you at that moment. My friend is a journalist. He died in 2010. He's from Maluku, he worked with me at [Tabloid] Jubi at the time, and then after that he moved to Manokwari Tisi. He covered illegal logging on the border of Papua New Guinea and West Papua, and they killed him. If you talk about Papua *merdeka* they will not care, it's not really 'hot' anymore. But if you talk about illegal logging – that's how of the General eats. All the Indonesian generals eat from illegal logging. They gain from the companies. They already cut Papua into parts, and all of Papuan land no longer belongs to the Papua people. It belongs to all the generals in Jakarta. That's their plate for food. Don't touch their plate or they will kill you. My friend is so brave, for me he is so brave. Even in Jayapura, he asked me, 'Aprila, can you come with me to the border?' I said, 'no, no, no, are you crazy? I don't want to go with you.' And he always liked to go there. And every journalist asked, 'why did they kill him? He didn't talk about Papua *merdeka*.' I said, 'Papua *merdeka* is not the issue.' You have to make a good analysis about the Papuan situation today. Sometimes I think I'm scared about what I do, too, in Papua.

Interview with Johnny Blades, Vienna, 12 November 2016

TN: When did you first become interested in West Papua and Melanesia as a journalist?

JB: In 2000, I got this job in the Pacific Islands division of New Zealand's state broadcaster. I'm still there. And I just couldn't believe – Melanesia – I knew so little about it, and I realised that most of us in New Zealand here don't know much about the Melanesian countries, of which Papua New Guinea or the whole of New Guinea is the biggest land mass and most of the people. In New Zealand we're quite in tune with the Polynesian islands, like Samoa, Tonga, and we've got Polynesian heritage – Maori. But Melanesia to me was fascinating because it was big and wild and steeped in quite interesting history. But the more I looked into it, the more I saw disturbing things and human rights issues, which glaringly seemed in bad need of attention, and there wasn't much attention – very little in New Zealand or actually anywhere. So that's why I got interested. It led me to West Papua in terms of questions, such as 'what is this place; why have we never heard of it?' I think it's fascinating that there's this line down the middle of that island, which introduces all kinds of political issues and it's just so arbitrary. The world's second biggest island; it's got a line straight down the middle. Troublesome. I just found it fascinating and I guess I quickly hooked up with some people who were well networked. There were a lot of these old Dutch guys up there or half-Dutch-Papuans who are priests, because as you know, the church groups are quite active. They've been good at trying to relay information to the outside world from

Papua about what's been going on. Then there was this period in 2000 after Suharto fell, when there was a bit of an opening in some ways. So there was Habibie and Gus Dur. There was that change of period they called the Papuan Spring, and for a while they changed the name from Irian Jaya back to Papua. If you see video footage from that time, it's quite emotional. There was this thing called the Papuan Congress where they came together, many thousands, and it looked like progress was happening because they had talks directly with the Indonesian president; they had some concessions, they were organising in terms of their own political structure, and it seemed really good. Around that time, as well, foreigners were able to get in, before everything closed up again under Megawati.

TN: I read in one of your articles that you travelled to and reported from West Papua, as well?

JB: I travelled there last year but I didn't report from there. I actually thought it would be best to wait. It almost seemed a little bit farcical. The problem was that I'd been denied a visa before and I felt that I would never get one, but I thought after Jokowi's announcement last year that they were lifting the ban on foreign journalists. Although there effectively was not one. It was an effective ban but not an official one because it was so hard to get in. It was ridiculously hard because of all these letters you needed to get and recommendations. Anyway, so I thought I would apply again, I went in and it was clear from the people at the embassy in New Zealand that it probably wasn't going to happen. I wouldn't get a visa if I'd said I was going to go up to the jungle and talk to the OPM. What I also wanted to do – because the official at the Indonesian Embassy criticised us for not getting the Indonesian voice on Papuan issues and I thought, maybe they've got a point. But we tried a lot. It's just that the Indonesian government is always so defensive and they don't want to talk to us or take us along. You can never do it in a timely fashion, which is no good for media. So it was really difficult but I tried. I said, 'we want to hear the Indonesian voice or the non-Papuan Indonesian voice, to hear about the development that you're talking about that's under way. Show us.' I thought that was the way to do it and I think that worked in terms of getting the visa. So we got some interviews with people from the Indonesian government, and I include in that the Papuan governor, who is a Papuan. And I don't think he's just a stooge for Jakarta. He's not pro-independence outwardly but he's also not afraid to be really critical of things like the Freeport mine, about transmigration. So that was good. Another one was the Special Envoy, Judith Dipodiputro, who's the head of the Jokowi administration's development efforts in Papua. By interviewing her in Papua, you got a feel for what they want to do. But of course, there are always other elements. I don't know a lot about Indonesian politics but there are all these divergent elements. There might be some elements trying to do a better job in Papua and maybe Jokowi is a part of that, but there are always these other actors that are still doing it as they always did and obfuscate the process. That's the feeling that I got.

TN: How is it with transmigrations? Do Papuans and non-Papuan Indonesian in West Papua clash?

JB: Transmigration was something a lot of West Papuans talked about when I was there. I got the feeling that in the earlier years you'd have this image of the jungle warrior, the OPM guerrilla fighters, and I feel that's unhelpful and inaccurate. Mind you, I didn't go to the remote areas and therefore I was seeing urban people, but they seemed quite organised in their civil resistance. They don't want to fight. That was a big feeling that I got, that they're not scared of expressing themselves – hence why we had these massive demonstrations this year. And they've got a right to demonstrate even though there's a sticky area where they're not really supposed to show sentiment for separating from Indonesia. That's when arrests and so forth can be made. They were just sick of staying silent on being marginalised as a demographic. They weren't clashing as such with the Javanese or Sumatran people. There's a lot of assimilation, but they were resentful of the state-organised process of transmigration. Even though it's not officially a state policy anymore, there are still these boats coming in with lots of people every week. It's bad. It's really bad. This is the way they're getting swamped. But it didn't feel like a Melanesian city – Jayapura. I wondered coming in whether it'd be a good mix. Indonesian culture is really interesting but it seems like the Javanese culture is the dominant thing there.

TN: You talked about West Papuans being portrayed as the jungle warrior. Does that image still exist in international media?

JB: Probably. It's hard to tell because international media has only in recent years got on to it, but there probably is this image of the guerrilla dressed in non-Western clothes fighting up in the jungle – not necessarily helpful. Maybe that's changing with the likes of Benny Wenda and other figures. You get some of these charismatic leaders lobbying around the world, getting around where they can. He gets visa problems in some countries. But they're charismatic and articulate and there's a warmth about them that people really relate to.

TN: Is there a reason why international media is less interested in the region?

JB: New Zealand media is terrible. We're so insular. It seems that most of the foreign news that outlets here like is the stuff out of America and Europe, which I understand because there are European people here. But I would hope to look at our own region, as well, a place like Papua New Guinea or West Papua and Indonesia. They're closer than the USA. We need to know about our own neighbourhood. But the reason, I'm not sure. I think it's the double standard. Some people think white lives are more important than brown lives. Years ago we had this joke in the office. We used to wonder, if there was an accident, how many lives lost would it take before they picked up the story, and we worked out this quotient, say one New Zealand life or one American life equals say ten Papuan lives. Also, I don't think international media understand much about the issue. People frequently confuse it. There's this confusion between West Papua and Papua New Guinea, and it's understandable because it's the same island. There's just this line down the middle but it's the same island and they don't realise that half of it is in Indonesian territory. Then they look closer and they still get confused because there are indigenous people there that don't look Indonesian, or what they consider to be Indonesian, because of course they may not realise that Indonesia isn't just Javanese, it's a series of different peoples. Also, access to it, obviously. People haven't been able to get there so you don't have images beaming out – until now. Things have changed because of the Internet. Jakarta can't keep a lid on it anymore. And therefore they're also scrambling to control it now. There are still ways they can control it, the messages coming out, but not entirely. If you follow people on Twitter involved in the West Papuan awareness sector or the solidarity movement, there might be others in control and after a while you might work out that it might be an Indonesian government personnel, someone from intelligence, that try to subvert it under the cover of being a Papuan. There's probably a lot of misinformation out there, as well.

TN: What are the pros and cons of relying on local journalism to cover West Papuan issues?

JB: I don't know a lot about it because it's hard to say any one thing for all of them. They have a lot of pressures from authorities; that's fair to say, I think. To be independent is very difficult. Bribery is quite rife, I understand, so they'll be taking backhanders from authorities to be able to get a story. I mean, that's not so unusual. It happens in other parts of the world. But it comprises journalists' independence to forge too close a relationship with a certain official or military or police and so forth. There's also no denying that if they report on touchy subjects that some of them are going to get killed, physically intimidated, and that's huge. I've heard quite a few stories about that. You've probably heard of Victor Mambor. He was my guide – I've known him from before – and he runs one of the only independent newspapers, *Tabloid Jubi*. His staff get a lot of heat from the police and military. But he just soldiers on. His father spent most of his life in prison as a political prisoner and I think that drives him on. He's not afraid. But he's also not out there causing disinformation. He's not anti-government. He's very pragmatic, he knows the rules; although I think in his heart he would still like West Papua to be free. He realises that these people have rights; they shouldn't be treated like animals; they shouldn't be marginalised. So he's not going to stop writing about that. It's also not easy for them to get access to people unless they compromise their values. This is people in agencies like Antara or Tempo, too. I don't know if Jakarta Post has someone posted on the ground there. That's obviously one of the better newspapers nationally, but that's another element that I should mention. When those big two newspapers, the *Globe* or the *Post*, report on Papua, they seem to get things wrong sometimes. It's changed a bit lately but for years it always seemed as though separatists would be blamed for anything, any violence, and it was so obviously false. When you started to verify things – and I should add that sometimes it's just too hard, you can't verify things – you can't run a story. It was always the OPM who'd caused this, or it was tribal fighting. But when I looked more, it didn't seem to be the case. It's just easier. It's always been easier for the Indonesian state to discredit Papuan separatism for any problems there or for tribal fighting. It's more complicated than that and that's the problem. There's a shortage of nuanced reporting from the local people, because of pressures in the case of local Papuan journalists or because of misunderstanding from the national media about the issues. Because the Papuan issues don't really rate on the big national scale, as far as I can see. It's a very small portion.

TN: How can people from the outside support local journalists in improving local journalism?

JB: That's a good question. To be honest, I'm not sure. Maybe you could donate money. I don't know if that makes a difference. It's probably important for us as journalists to show our support through whatever networks we have. And maybe support exchanges. That's a good thing. Get in touch. Foreign media outlets should actively engage with these journalists on the ground in Papua and use them as a correspondent, regularly or occasionally. Because even though

they might still be compromised or are facing certain pressures, the support can provide a little bit of fortification. If there's some international component in their work, it might make their work safer or less compromised.

Interview with Yerry Borang, Jogjakarta, 16 January 2017

TN: When and how did you get involved with Papuan Voices?

YB: It was around 2011 when we started a video production project in Papua. That's also the time when we met several of the members of Papuan Voices 2. Basically, for that project, we trained many young Papuans who already worked with churches to help young people in kampongs by providing basic skills like writing, health services and things like that. And we trained them to use video to strengthen and expand their skills to give them a tool to spread their problems – problems that they face in kampongs and so on. Since the beginning, we already discussed it internally in Engage Media. We want to be a security consultant. With my colleague from the Philippines, we've been training overseas as part of this broad network of security digital trainers in Asia. We then developed the security digital training into the curriculum of the video production workshop.

TN: What are some examples of security threats that Papuan Voices filmmakers face?

YB: As you know, in Papua – especially if we're talking about media activists, which most of the Papuan Voices members are – there is a lot of censorship, including physical censorship. You cannot travel between this and that area; you cannot cover this issue; you cannot cover demonstrations. Security apparatus will grab your camera and try to break it. There are many security checkpoints around the villages, so if you want to cover a story about a shooting, it becomes very dangerous for young people to carry cameras and go to the villages. Also, on the digital side, we've heard that they've been watched. Their phones receive anonymous text messages threatening them, even if they've already changed their SIM card and even their hand phones. Many of them are working in several different NGOs and advocacy groups. We also taught them about security in their offices, how to store files and so on. If something happens, what should you do, where do you keep this file, what kind of software do you use?

TN: Do the security threats affect the members' willingness to join the organisation?

YB: No, many of the PV members already have an activist background. Many of them have already been arrested. They are very committed to the cause. It's not a problem for them at all.

TN: You were talking about some of the security methods you were teaching them. Can you give some examples?

YB: We created a buddy system for filming in the field. You cannot cover something if you are alone. You should be with somebody else – three or four people. We act out a role-play – what if someone takes your cell phone or camera? What should you do if something happens? You should leave all your data before you go to the field. You should give your contact details to somebody else. After you come back, how to bypass security checkpoints? If they manage to seize your camera and see inside, what should you do? What is the preparation to make files to look less dangerous? They should have two cameras – one inside their bag, one outside. Or they should have software to manipulate the file icon to look like something else, or like a corrupted file. We also encourage them to use secure applications to communicate, such as emails using PGP.

TN: How was the teaching process? Were there any hurdles?

YB: The main problem is the mentality, because many of them believe, 'ah, if something happens, I'm prepared to die. I'm ready to give myself for the cause.' But we try to encourage them to learn, because it's not only for you but for other people surrounding you – your family. Your property, you don't care; but what happens with your outer circle? Also, to be honest, the education background is very minimal. The Internet scale, the digital scale, it's not there yet. So we have to develop from the very beginning. Many people started five years ago and they didn't have emails, so we introduced them to email. They already have Facebook, though. I don't know how they managed to register with

Facebook but they don't use email. In Papua, there is a cultural jump. They started from nothing and then suddenly have 3G.

TN: Is Internet access available or does the government block access in Papua?

YB: It's only an assumption but somehow the Internet for government buildings is very fast compared to general-purpose use. So it's interesting.

TN: So do Papuan Voices upload the videos themselves or do they depend on Engage Media to upload them onto the Internet?

YB: Both. They send material. Sometimes they do it by themselves. They mostly have YouTube accounts now or blogs. They also send video or collaborate with video makers and TV stations from Europe and Australia directly.

TN: Are they independent now as an organisation?

YB: Not yet. It's a management thing. They're not used to working in a hierarchy – having someone to take care of their financial problems and so forth. We work with them on creative projects and find them funding. Our aim is mostly to secure them money so they will be able to maintain production.

Interview with Aquino Adri, Jogjakarta, 1 February 2017

TN: Which newspaper have you been working with and what sort of news did you cover?

AA: I'm a former journalist for Harian Jogja. I've stopped working there for the past seven months. I use to cover social issues about the community, about the culture and daily events in Jogjakarta. Sometimes my newspaper covered national issues, as well.

TN: Has your newspaper covered West Papuan issues?

AA: Yes. Most newspapers in Indonesia talk about Papua, but maybe they're given a topic, because Papua is a very sensitive issue. My newspaper, for example, is not really open or balanced about Papuan issues. I don't know why – maybe because in Jogjakarta, they have a regulation about Papuan students. Papuan students are not free to express themselves or to speak about Papua openly in Jogjakarta, so newspapers also follow these rules. In 2016, there was an issue in Jogjakarta and Timoho. Papuan students were driven out of their boarding houses because some racist organisation wanted to fight them. The Sultan said students must be quiet, must be calm. If you write some issues about Papua, the editor will censor certain words; the editor only chooses the words, which are according to their policy. We are not free to write about Papua because it is a sensitive issue.

TN: What about events unrelated to Papua? Are the regulations as strict or do you have more freedom?

AA: Except for Papua and the Sultan, we are free to write about anything.

TN: Do you think that this could change in the future?

AA: No.

Interview with Teddy Wakum, Jogjakarta, 1 February 2017

TN: Could you please introduce yourself and what kind of work you're involved in?

TW: My name is Teddy Wakum. I come from Papua, specifically from Jayapura city. In Jogja, I facilitate and participate in the alliance for Papuan students. I am also a video activist that covers Papuan issues. For example, last year, I made a video and sent it to ULMWP.

TN: Do you mostly cover demonstrations or do you also cover economic and cultural issues?

TW: Yes, mostly. Another video I made is about racism in Jogjakarta. I made this video because many Papuan students are facing racism in Jogja. For example, for students from Papua, it's hard to find a boarding house. Even if it's empty, the local people, they don't want to give it to the Papuans. This video was shared on Engage Media. Another issue is about the women in Papua and about the heavy use of alcohol.

TN: Where do you think the racism and stereotypes against Papuans come from?

TW: People think the Papuan people are like monkeys, like stupid people. There is a story behind this since Papua joined the rest of Indonesia. The military in Papua, they have this mindset that Papuans are really hard to educate and closed off to other people, and when they come back to Indonesia, they tell their families. Then, in the situation where there is media, it becomes worse and worse.

TN: I want to ask about the video you made that went viral. Can you explain what that video was about?

TW: I shot the video from inside the Papuan boarding house. I couldn't go outside because I was afraid that the police would take my equipment. In front there was the militia and at the back there was the police. The militia is formed by the military or police. It is more aggressive because the police play by the rules, but the militia don't. They don't have rules. I shared the video on my Papuan Pride Facebook page, but I couldn't get all the footage because I was being chased by the militia and police.

TN: Was that event covered in the news?

TW: Yes, it was covered on BBC and Tempo. It was covered a lot, at the time. You can easily type in Google and find it. It happened in June of last year.

TN: Why is video advocacy important?

TW: Because that way, people from the outside can view a situation directly, because people want to see what really happens. If you just write it on a paper, you can lie, but if you use video, the people will believe us because we can record directly about the situation in the field.

Interview with Mikael Kudiai, Jogjakarta, 1 February 2017

TN: Could you please introduce yourself and which newspaper you are currently working with?

MK: My name is Mikael Kudiai. I am from Paniai. I worked at Suara Papua but after the head director passed away, I stopped working for eleven months. I wanted to focus on studying, and for the first five months, I also joined Indoprogress. Indoprogress is a progressive citizen journalism organisation.

TN: Suara Papua was recently censored. Do you know the reason why?

MK: The Ministry of Communication and Information wanted to shut down Suara Papua because they thought Suara Papua published something negative and racial. They blocked it suddenly, without permission, and also put it back without any notification. Arnold, the chief editor, is now writing a petition to the Ministry to give a statement or explanation on why they did it.

TN: You mentioned that you come from Paniai. When the 2014 shootings happened, did the national media cover the event?

MK: Suara Papua covered it but it was not the first media to cover it. That was Majalah Selangkah, another Papuan news site. Indonesian media also covered the event, but with their own perception. In the mainstream media, they blame Papuans. They use propaganda. There is something missing in their report or it's not complete. It's very different from what happens in real life.

TN: What challenges do local journalists face?

MK: They receive terror and intimidation through their mobile phones. Sometimes they are attacked or their offices are ruined. They get hit by the police.

TN: Have you ever been intimidated by the police?

MK: Not yet. I mostly worked on the laptop. I don't go outside so I'm quite safe.

Interview with Ross Tapsell, Vienna, 20 March 2017

TN: From your research and interview with journalists, do you find that mainstream media's portrayal of West Papua is mainly positive or negative?

RT: The point I would make about the Indonesian media is that it's very Jakarta-centric. You've got all of the big conglomerates in the capital city that are generally reporting Jakarta news, national news, and feeding that out to the archipelago. Mainstream news doesn't really cover Papua very much, and I think there are a number of reasons for that. Some of it is just simply cost and people aren't particularly interested. It's easier just to ignore the situation going on there. Some of the news stations do have stringers or correspondents in Jayapura, so they get some news about the politics of the capital or what the governor is doing, but you don't really get in depth reportage. Frankly, they don't really care. But it's not just Papua, of course. They don't really care about issues in Kalimantan, in East Nusa Tenggara. It's all very Jakarta-centric or Java-centric, but particularly Jakarta-centric.

TN: Why is it so Jakarta-centric?

RT: It's partly because of the ratings, the way that ratings work. AC Nielsen, which is the god of television ratings, they only measure the top ten cities – you're talking about Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Medan and Palembang. There's nothing in eastern Indonesia, so if you want to rate well, you have to get Java-centric news. And it's also cheaper. It's cheaper to have people and news reporting from the one spot.

TN: What about the print media? What's their agenda?

RT: Print media is a little better in the sense that they do actually get stories, but it's a difficult situation to be able to write freely and to move about the capital. Also, so much print media is moving towards online clicks – DETIK.com, Kompas.com, TribuneNews.com. All of those outlets are also about covering national politics and national events, so you'll get stories about Freeport, for example, because that's of interest to the nation and resource nationalism. But there's not a lot of on-the-ground reporting in Papua itself, which is why they're relying on outlets like Tabloid Jubi to do that job.

TN: What do outlets such as Cendrawasih Pos classify as?

RT: What they are, are the Jawa Pos group, for example. There are two major print conglomerates – Jawa Pos and Kompas Group – and they then have subsidiaries in each region. I think the Jawa Pos Group has about 140 newspapers all around the archipelago. Cendrawasih Pos is one of those newspapers, so they're a subsidiary of a larger conglomerate, but they also have local ownership. They do provide something, as a lot of people have said before. I think David Hill said that they do provide a reasonable amount of coverage, they do actually practice journalism, and it was certainly a lot worse before Jawa Pos expanded its coverage all around the archipelago. So they're not all bad. But as I pointed out in my article, it's very problematic in the way that they receive their advertising and sources –

advertising and funding, and the fact that so much of it is government sources now from Indonesia. There's not really a strong critical press there.

TN: Do you find that the media over- or under-exaggerates the dangers and human rights violations in Papua?

RT: I think what's happening there now is that the Melanesian Spearhead Group has been very vocal about the Free West Papua Movement. I'm thinking of Vanuatu and a number of other countries that have spoken out to say that West Papua should be free from Indonesia. And that does affect global narratives about Papua, when you've got other countries in the Pacific saying that Papuans need to be free. In response, what the Indonesian government has tried to say is, 'Papua is fine.' They're putting money into Twitter and other online news sites, which are blatantly pro Indonesian, pro-development, and everything is good news. They're so ridiculously positive. There's not really quality journalism. It's just saying, 'look at all the wonderful things that Indonesia has been doing.' And I presume there's money there that's been funded. You can simply call it propaganda from the Indonesian government. Even in Jakarta, politicians are very hesitant to say anything critical about what might be happening in Papua, because it might give a voice to other countries, such as Vanuatu. Alternatively, I think there are a number of organisations that still might not understand the complexities of Papua. That's certainly the case in Australia. A large reason why it's hard to get high quality, independent coverage outside of Tabloid Jubi, Suara Perempuan and a few other outlets, is because a lot of those organisations are not in Papua talking to Papuans. They are commentating from the outside, but what Papua needs is more coverage of what is actually going on there, rather than armchair commentary.

TN: Jokowi is reportedly trying to make reforms in West Papua, but why is it so hard to change policy?

RT: I know people on the Clearing Houses who've spoken to me off the record. By the way, the Clearing House is the Jakarta-based meeting where they decide who gets a visa, who gets to go to Papua and who gets rejected. And I've talked to people on these Clearing House committees, and the general view is that it is the military every time saying, 'no, we don't want this person to go; no, this person is biased; no, this person will write something critical.' I think Richard Chauvel has said this – Papua is the last bastion of New Order military rule. I remember once, an Indonesian human rights friend of mine was threatened by someone in the military who said to him, 'yeah, you're safe here in Jakarta but come to Wamena in Papua and then we'll see what happens to you.' In other words, I can't do anything here but in Papua I can do what I like. And I think that's a huge problem. You've also got others in the government who are former military figures who grew up thinking – and in part, there's some justification to this – that Papua is a region where there is a very violent independence movement that needs to be shut down. They believe that that's still going on and that there's no way that we should be too liberal in letting in Human Rights Watch and independent people and journalists. The second point I'd make is that, unfortunately, some of the foreign media, too, still live in that prism where they think they can't get a visa, and actually, there are a lot of them that haven't even bothered to try. This is something that Andreas Harsono, from Human Rights Watch, and I have constantly said to journalists. Why don't you apply? Don't just say, oh you can't go to Papua and it'll be too hard. Apply and then we have evidence that you can't get in, because at the moment, the response from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry is you can go. But as we would say, you can go to any other part of Indonesia and report on whatever you like. Why do you need this special permit to Papua? Journalists should be able to go there without permission from Jakarta. But it is interesting. I've talked to many Indonesian government officials who've come through Australia and so on. Whenever I bring this up, it's amazing the responses you get. I've been in meetings and they talk about Papua being like Chechnya in Europe – like a warzone. So not every government official, particularly those in the military, has a strong understanding of what's going on there.

TN: How much influence does the national government have on the local Papuan government? Why would the local government want to censor or suppress media freedom?

RT: That's a tough one. I haven't been there in a couple of years – I was there during the SBY years – so I couldn't say. It's a complex place there and it was good to go there because I got to see that. I've got Papuan friends and some of them are very much pro-independence but there's still plenty who are not. I think that was the most important that I gathered from that research – how complicated that place is and how often the government with the elites in Papua are arguing among themselves. You don't go there and get the feeling that everybody wants independence from Indonesia. Plus, you've got the transmigration issue of people from Java and Sumatra who have moved to Papua, so there's now conflict between those who are rich and making money out of it. The reason why they might muzzle the press is because they're quite wealthy, they're doing very well out of this current arrangement – the Papuan elites. Some might

say they've let down their fellow Papuans in some of the policies and the way the money has not flown to poorer people. That, of course, happens in every region of Indonesia, not just Papua, and indeed in every country around the world. There's places where elites hold on to money and stay into power, because they're doing very well out of it. Papua's another place like that but it is a very complex place, and even outside Manokwari, it was a very different feeling than Jayapura. So my takeaway from it was that a lot of Papuans – the way they spoke to me about the region when I was there – were not necessarily pro-independence. What we want, though, we want the military out. That's been a call from many Papuans for a long time, that they want the Indonesian military out of there. But the response from the national government is simply to provide more police. They say they're getting the military out, but they just replace them with national police, who can be just as corrupt and just as brutal.

TN: Can you explain how Jayapura and Manokwari differ in terms of issues?

RT: Jayapura gets a lot of foreign visitors so I felt I was watched more in Jayapura than I was in other places, because the intelligence knows that anybody – foreign journalists, human rights activists, academics – they are probably going to come through Jayapura. Jayapura is far wealthier. They've got a nice mall with Wi-Fi, Krispy Kreme, et cetera – all the Western type of stuff. Jayapura also has a lot of transmigrants in the shops, so you get a lot of Chinese Indonesians or Javanese Indonesians who are working there quite well. They also have a university and it's a large, reasonably developed place. Other parts, like Manokwari, are a bit more rustic and like provincial towns. But they're governed right by different governors and that's probably the most interesting thing politically, is that the West Papua governor at the time, when I was there anyway, was far more out there in trying to come up with his own rules while the Papuan governor Lukas Enembe was generally considered as not doing a wonderful job.

TN: How can people from outside support local journalists in what they do?

RT: My two points there is that the national media needs to do better quality journalism. I've tried to speak to these news organisations in Jakarta and say, 'why don't you do more on Papua?' They just say, 'but we do! We just had five stories last month on Papua.' And I reply, 'yeah, five stories out of how many?' So my point is that the national media needs to do a better job of reporting Papua. Also, someone like Victor Mambor would say they need funding to keep Tabloid Jubi going and to do that they need international help. They need money from organisations like the Soros Foundation and Media Development Loan. That's how outlets like Malaysiakini started in Malaysia, where there wasn't independent critical news. That's what needs to happen in Papua, as well.

Interview with Andreas Harsono, 22 May 2017

TN: Which newspapers did you work for in the past?

AH: Before I joined Human Rights Watch, I worked at a monthly magazine called Pantau. It is an Indonesian magazine on media and journalism. Basically, I was a media critic then. I was working there for eight years, and in those eight years, I began to learn more, write more, regarding media freedom, criminal defamation cases, the criteria for anonymous sources, and the Johannesburg Principles. The Johannesburg Principles is a UN declaration that basically says the government can restrict journalists into certain areas. So it is possible, but only for a limited time using a transparent mechanism. Before that, I worked for an NGO in Jakarta called the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information, another media-related organisation. But I was more on the management side then.

TN: How has the media in Indonesia changed over the years? Are there any new challenges?

AH: After the fall of Suharto, media freedom increased tremendously because there was no licensing anymore. During Suharto, if you wanted to set up a newspaper, you had to get a license and a recommendation letter from the military confirming that you were free from 'communism'. All together, there were fourteen licenses to apply for before you could establish a newspaper. That's why when Suharto was in power Indonesia only had 258 newspapers. After the fall of Suharto, it became much better. The way that I can talk and write now, it shows that there are improvements. In the past, I had no by-lines. I had to be careful. I might be – I was – suddenly attacked by a mysterious man. That thing does not happen today. The new challenge is the rise of extreme Islamism in Indonesia, because they are spreading their ideology. Many journalists cannot differentiate between their profession and the interpretation of their faith. We have

faith; we have nationalism; we have gender identities; we have social identities. As a journalist, we should use those backgrounds to enrich our understanding of what we are writing. But these journalists in Indonesia, they let the interpretation of their faith dictate their reporting. That is really problematic for me. Another problem is the conglomeration of the media. We are seeing more and more media concentration in Indonesia lately. Right now we only have thirteen media companies, and I'm afraid that in the next ten, twenty years, this number is going to be less and less. It means that we will have less and less media diversity.

TN: In what way does the rise of extreme Islamism affect coverage in West Papua?

AH: Papuans are predominantly Christian. They eat pork and pork is haram for Muslims. There is also stigma against people with dark skin and curly hair. This bias affects their independence when reporting on Papua.

TN: Why do you think the government is so concerned about silencing news coming from West Papua?

AH: I think they are paranoid about foreigners covering Papua. The paranoia is translated into what the military term as ABDA – A for America, B for British, D for Dutch and the second A for Australia. They recently also added the character, F, for France, so now it is ABDFAF. That's why there are more and more French journalists being arrested, deported and detained in Papua.

TN: How do you think a free media can actually help the government?

AH: If there is a free media, including international media covering Papua, it helps the government to get more information, to get quality information. Because with so much bias, so much dependence among Indonesian journalists, if there are foreign journalists, at least we can expect some of them to do quality journalism on Papua. And even if that isn't the case, it will help the government. It will help the government to deal with, for instance, health problems in Papua. Health is a big issue. You can Google the UN Special Rapporteur on Health Rights deploring the Indonesian government's failure to provide healthcare. Malaria, HIV, TBC, tuberculosis – all these diseases are spreading in Papua. Secondly, poverty, that is also a big problem. And the third is racism against Papuans. Indonesian journalists fail in providing quality journalism on these issues.

TN: When we talk about media freedom in West Papua, we often talk about foreign journalists' access to the region. But what about local journalists? How does the lack of media freedom affect their work?

AH: They are often harassed. There are a lot of reports regarding ethnic Papuan journalists being harassed, being labelled as separatists, being discriminated, and not given access to official sources. Victor Mambor said that there is a lack of confidence among Papuan journalists when doing reporting. Why? Because they have been repressed for so many decades. They themselves are scared. Some Papuan journalists are very courageous and brilliant, though. One of them that I can mention is Oktavianus Pogau. He was brilliant but he passed away last year.

TN: Is there a national or local media organisation responsible for helping these journalists?

AH: Journalists are members of the Jakarta-based national organisation, but this organisation is not trusted when talking about Papua. That's my own journalists union, the Alliance of Independent Journalists. Unfortunately, they fail to understand the problem in Papua.

TN: Do you think that the media in West Papua would improve with increased professional training?

AH: The question is, who will do the training? If you ask Indonesian journalists to do the training, there's no way. If you ask international journalists, will they get the permit to go there?

ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)

Due to restrictions against the media in West Papua, little is known about the region today, especially when it comes to local experiences of institutionalised discrimination. Foreign and national media often rely on old narratives of physical violence, while local media is only a slight improvement, even though the theory of human rights journalism maintains that in order to eliminate civil and political rights abuses, the cultural and structural reasons for such practices must be addressed and eliminated first. Unfortunately, the coverage of these issues is very minimal, as revealed in a media analysis between September 2016 and March 2017. This thesis argues that the lack of media freedom in West Papua results in the underrepresentation of the conflict, which perpetuates the current system of human rights abuses and impunity enjoyed by the military and government. Most importantly, it draws a veil on the cultural and structural violence committed in the region, which are just as severe as cases of physical violence, yet receive little to no media attention in the international sphere.

Keywords: West Papua, media restrictions, human rights journalism, media analysis, cultural and structural violence

ABSTRACT (DEUTSCH)

Über die Situation der Medien in Westpapua ist aufgrund der Einschränkung der Medienfreiheit wenig bekannt, vor allem wenn es um die lokalen Erfahrungen mit institutionalisierter Diskriminierung geht. Ausländische und nationale Medien thematisieren vor allem traditionelle Narrative körperlicher Gewalt, während in den lokalen Medien dahingehend graduelle Unterschiede zu beobachten sind, nämlich, dass im Sinn der Theorie des Menschenrechtsjournalismus zuerst die kulturellen und strukturellen Rahmenbedingungen geschaffen werden müssen, um Rechtsmissbräuche auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen zu beseitigen. Die durchgeführte Medienanalyse im Zeitraum von September 2016 bis März 2017 zeigt, dass in der Berichterstattung wenig auf diese Fragen eingegangen wurde. Die vorliegende Arbeit dokumentiert wie durch fehlende Medienfreiheit der Konflikt unterrepräsentiert in der Öffentlichkeit verhandelt wird, was zu einer Perpetuierung der Menschenrechtsverletzungen führt und wo weder das Militär noch die Regierung Repressalien befürchten müssen. Am wichtigsten dabei ist, dass ein „Schleier“ über die kulturelle und strukturelle Gewalt, die in dieser Region verübt wird, gelegt wird, die genauso schwerwiegend ist wie physische Gewalt, die aber international so gut wie keine Medienaufmerksamkeit findet.

Stichworte: Westpapua, Medienbeschränkungen, Menschenrechtsjournalismus, Medienanalyse, kulturelle und strukturelle Gewalt