universität wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

"The Fight against Drug Trafficking in East Asia: A Comparison of Government Policies Designed to Combat Drug Trafficking in China, Japan and the Philippines"

verfasst von / submitted by

Alejandra Cervantes Nieto

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2018 / Vienna, 2018

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / degree programme code as it appears on the student record sheet:	A 066 864
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt / degree programme as it appears on the student record sheet:	Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Ostasiens
Betreut von / Supervisor:	Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Rüdiger Frank

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

ACCORD: ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous
ADEC: Asia-Pacific Operation Drug Enforcement Conference
AFP: Armed Forces of the Philippines
APAIC: Asia and Pacific ATS Information Centre of the UNODC
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATS: Amphetamine-Type Stimulants
BC: Bureau of Customs of China
BCP: People's Army of Burma Communist Party
BDIWG: Bilateral Drug Intelligence Working Group
BINLEA: US Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
BOC: Bureau of Customs of the Philippines
CCDPW: Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide
CDC: Centre for Disease Control
CIR: Compulsory Isolation Rehabilitation
CND: Commission on Narcotic Drugs
DDB: Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines
DEA: Drug Enforcement Agency of the United States
DOH: Department of Health of the Philippines
DPF: Federal Police of Brazil
ELN: National Liberation Army
FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAC: General Administration of Customs of the PRC
GMS: Great Mekong Sub-Region
HCV: Hepatitis C
HONLEA: Heads of Narcotic Law Enforcement Agencies
HRW: Human Rights Watch
IADITG: Inter-Agency Drug Interdiction Task Group in the Philippines
ICAD: Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs of the Philippines
ICC: International Criminal Court
ICPO-INTERPOL: International Crime Police Organization
IDU: Injection Drug Use
INCB: International Narcotics Control Board
JCGC: Joint Coast Guard Committee
JICA: Japan International Cooperation Agency
LUG: Local Government Units in the Philippines
MDMA: 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (Ecstasy)

MHWL: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan
MLAA: Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement
MMT: Methadone Maintenance Treatment
MOJ: Ministry of Justice of Japan
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
MPS: Ministry of Public Security of the PRC
NCB: Narcotics Control Bureau of the PRC
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
NIB: National Bureau of Investigations of the Philippines
NNCC: National Narcotics Control Commission of the PRC
NPA: National Police Agency of Japan
NPC: National People's Congress of the PRC
NPS: New Psychoactive Substances
OAS: Organization of American States
ONDCP: White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
OST: Opioid Substitution Therapy
PCG: Philippine Coast Guard
PCTC: Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime
PDEA: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
PNP: Philippine National Police
PRC: People's Republic of China
PWID: Possession with Intent to Distribute
RTL: Re-education Through Labour
SOMTC: Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime
SUD: Substance Use Disorder
TCO: Transnational Criminal Organization
TDI: Department of Trade & Industry of the Philippines
TESDA: Technical Education & Skills Development Authority of the Philippines
TO: Terrorist Organization
TRC: Treatment and Rehabilitation Centre in the Philippines
UN: United Nations
UNCAC: UN Convention Against Corruption
UNGASS: UN General Assembly Special Session on Drugs
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNODC CP: UNODC Crime Programme
UNTOC: UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
WHO: World Health Organization

List of Figures and Tables

List of Annexes

Chapter 1: Theory

1.1. Introduction

In February 2017, Ismael Enrique Arciniegas died by execution in Guangzhou, China after spending seven years imprisoned for bringing 4 kilograms of cocaine into the Asian country. Once a journalist, Mr. Arciniegas became one of the 145 Colombians convicted for drug-related crimes, and the first Latin-American to suffer the capital punishment for drug trafficking in China (Cosoy 2017). His case is not an exception, as every year over 1,000 people die worldwide by execution because of drug related offences. China is part of a group of 33 countries that have approved the use of death penalty for drug trade or possession (Rope and Sheahan 2015). Nonetheless, stricter law enforcement and harsher penalties have not managed to curb the illicit drug market significantly. By 2014 revenue from drug sales had reached a historical high, accounting for more than one quarter of total revenues from transnational organized crime (UNODC 2017e, 22).

However, people like Mr. Arciniegas are just the weakest link in an otherwise intricate drug trafficking network, composed by producers, exporters, wholesalers, regional traffickers, drug refiners and dealers who operating mostly in a decentralized manner (Babor et al. 2010, 65–66). The level of complexity continues to rise when one takes into account the dynamism of the drug market itself. There is always a new substance, a new way to consume narcotics. New ways to smuggle it, with addicts in every country and social class. According to the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, UNODC (2018b) around 5.6% of world's population consumed drugs on 2016, with over 30 million people suffering from disorders associated with drug use.

This master thesis is concerned precisely with the problem of drug trafficking and the policies designed to combat it. Drug trafficking is the riskiest and most crucial phase of the drug market, deviating legal prescription drugs to the illegal market, and making thousands of kilograms of illegal narcotics available for consumption (M. S. Jenner 2011, 902). It fosters other illegal activities and grows stronger in the presence of weak institutions and poor exercise of the rule of law. It does not recognize borders and demands the coordination of both domestic and international efforts. Within this context, East Asia faces a great challenge as a drug trafficking hub with increasing inflows of cocaine and methamphetamines, and a surge in the production of opioid painkillers in clandestine laboratories (UNODC 2018b, 9–11).

1.2. Research Question

Analysing the entire region of East Asia is an unrealistic task given the nature of the topic of this thesis, the amount of countries composing the region and the limitations in data accessibility for this thesis. Thus, it is necessary to narrow-down the focus of the research to include a few countries affected by drug trafficking on different levels. For this purpose, the research will focus on the People's Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines and Japan.

In 2016, China was one of the three countries with the largest amount of convictions for PWID (Possession with Intent to Distribute) in the world, as well as the country with the most vendors distributing illegal drugs through the dark net in East Asia (UNODC 2018c, 15, 37). In addition, the country is a major producer and trader of methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs (Clarke 2008; UNODC 2017b, vii–viii), as well as a consumer of opiates in spite of the high penal punishments for PWIDs or for the use of illegal substances (Dupont 1999, 445–46). Although significantly less than Afghanistan or Pakistan, China continued to rank in the first places amongst countries with the largest amounts of opiates (Opium, Morphine and Heroin) confiscated by 2016 (UNODC 2018b, 15).

The Philippines is both a country for transit and destination of drugs in East Asia. Along with China, the country has seen an increase in people treated for methamphetamines addiction, as well as in seizure of cannabis plants (UNODC 2017d, 16, 2018d, 39). However, perhaps a more relevant reason to include the country in the scope of this research is its current approach to combating drug trafficking. A rise in what has been catalogued as extra-judicial killings of drug traffickers and users since president Rodrigo Duterte's rule (Johnson and Fernquest 2018). With around 1,8 million drug users, roughly 1,8% of its population (Gavilan 2016), the Philippines government has imposed harsher sanctions and stepped up its law enforcement operations, surpassing records of arrests and deaths product of its "war against drugs" (Simangan 2018).

Lastly, Japan offers the possibility of assessing the problem of drug trafficking in a country where a hierarchical criminal organization like the Yakuza controls most of the stages of illegal drug trade, including the recruiting of mules to transport drugs into the country (UNODC 2018f, 30). Furthermore, Japan offers the possibility to assess the drug policy used to reduce consumption in a developed country affected by the influx of synthetic drugs, in particular methamphetamine coming mostly from China (UNODC 2017e). Japan, the Philippines and China experience the problem of drug trafficking differently; hence, they have set up seemingly different strategies and objectives within the context of the war on drugs.

Bearing the previous context in mind, there are sufficient arguments to select these countries for analysis, and apply the following research question:

> "What strategies do China, Japan and the Philippines have in common and in which ones do they differ when it comes to combating illegal drug trafficking?"

1.3. Relevance

As showed above, drug trafficking has become an ever-growing concern, in particular given its status as a transnational crime, with both hierarchical and decentralized crime networks becoming a threat to national and international security (Jenner 2013; Williams 2008; Emmers 2003). Drug trafficking and the policy implemented to combat it have a strong impact on social and economic development. They demand a substantial amount of state resources and pose an economic burden on the criminal justice system and the public health, among others. This problematic does not exclude East Asia, as supported by reports from the UNODC and academic sources that see the region heavily affected by transnational crime, with drug and human trafficking as some of its most relevant forms (Dupont 1999; Emmers 2003; Clarke 2008; Chouvy 2012).

Given the relevance of the topic for this region, a comparison of national drug policies opens the possibility to design competitive strategies both nationally and regionally, and improve the results in reducing drug trade in East Asia. Additionally, breaking down the drug policy into its different components provides an opportunity to understand the rationale behind them and see the areas where countries could work together to make the fight on drugs more effective. (Houborg, Bjerge, and Frank 2018). Moreover, doing this policy comparison within these countries and defining if there is a regional approach could provide a solid base to pursue a comparison with other regions affected by drug trafficking (like Central Asia or South America), in the search for better policy-making practices.

1.4. Structure of the Research

Given the complexity of the topic of drug trafficking, as well as the implication of both national policies and the existing international legal framework, this thesis' chapter 1, Theory, splits into three sections: literature review summarizing the background of the problem, state of the art and analytical framework. The first one reviews the most recent trends of the illicit drug market, including the existing categorization of drugs and the main problematic related to drug traffic in East Asia. It will also include an overview of the existing international legal framework set by the United Nations and its evolution to adapt to the surge of synthetic psychoactive substances.

The second section corresponding to the state of the art reviews the existing literature on policies for drug trafficking, with a strong emphasis on the different ways such analysis has developed in academia. Finally, the segment of the analytical framework defines the criteria and sources required to pursue a drug policy comparison among the three countries selected as case studies.

Chapter 2, Empirical Approach, reviews the criteria defined in the AF and applies it to each of the three countries selected for this research. The chapter splits into two main segments: international dimension and national dimension. Each dimension will sub-divide into the criteria, and for each criterion, the paper assesses the evidence on each government in order to establish the differences and similarities in their responses. Afterwards, chapter 3, Discussion of Findings, reviews the outcomes from the previous chapter constructing a full review in the form of country cases. Thus, this chapter splits into three segments, one for each country studied. This aims to facilitate the analysis as a region, while keeping in mind each national policy. The last part of this chapter focuses on the conclusion, aiming to answer the research question and provide an insight into opportunities for further research in the topic of drug trafficking.

This master thesis has some limitations concerning the scope of the research. Given the complexity of the topic, the thesis will not discuss in depth policies for prevention or treatment of drug addiction. It will mention them as part of the harms reduction approach, but only with the objective of reducing demand for drugs as part of a government effort to tackle drug trafficking. This means the thesis will not discuss topics such as the effectiveness of treatments for drug addiction or preventive educational measures for the youth.

In addition, this thesis will make use of official sources and secondary literature to categorize each national policy bearing in mind the selected criteria. It is important to highlight that the use of official sources could affect the result of the analysis, as it does not take into account that there is often a difference between policy rhetoric and written law, and the way local authorities interpret and implement law. To avoid this, the thesis will include relevant data from reports from international organizations reviewing human rights violations and compliance with the international legal framework set to combat drug trafficking. However, it is still possible that the available information does not provide an accurate picture of the national drug policy of each country, given the existing challenge in finding reliable and standardized data on the implementation of drug policies (Houborg, Bjerge, and Frank 2018).

This thesis' focus is the comparison of the drug policy among China, the Philippines and Japan. This means that the analysis of each case takes into account the drug policy on a national level, regardless of the fact that some regions or cities within each country have a more active role in drug trafficking than others. In addition, although methamphetamines and opioids (both natural and synthetic) make up for the largest share of drugs trafficked in the East Asia (UNODC 2018b), the drug policy analysis will be reviewed as a whole. However, statistics used in each case study could be limited to selected regions and cities within a country, as well as a specific group of drugs. This occurs as each country follows a different methodology for data collection related to the illicit drug market, but the reader will be able to identify the cases where data is incomplete or it shows only the information from selected cities/regions within each country study.

Finally, it is relevant to mention that this analysis takes into consideration only the drug policy developed to combat trafficking of *illegal* drugs. This means that other types of drugs regulated by the international conventions, such as prescription drugs, will not be included in this analysis. Legal drugs require a different framework to assure their rightful use and avoid their deviation to the illicit market; their production process differs from that of illicit drugs, involving pharmaceutical companies in most of the cases. Another activity not assessed in depth in this master thesis is money laundering, which is a transnational criminal activity closely related to drug trafficking. The legal framework in place to combat money laundering encompasses a set of complementary policies that require further analysis and deserves a separated research paper. Thus, both topics, control of legal substances (prescription medication as sedatives and painkillers) and money laundering, are only briefly addressed in this thesis with the purpose of giving context to the drug policies in place to combat illegal drug trafficking.

1.5. Background to the Problem

1.5.1. Drug Trafficking as a Global Problem

The UNODC defines drug trafficking as the "global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws" (UNODC 2010a). This international organization classifies it as a transnational crime, together with human trafficking and migrant smuggling, cybercrime, illicit arms trade, piracy, terrorism and money laundering. In particular, the las two types of transnational crime are closely interrelated with drug trafficking, as shown in UNODC's world trade reports (UNODC 2017b, 2018b).

By 2016, almost 275 million people worldwide had consumed drugs at least one time, with 70 million consuming opioids and ATS (Amphetamines and Prescription Stimulants). Despite only

amounting to roughly 11% of all drugs consumed, opioids are the most harmful of all drugs according to reports from UNODC, with over 76% of deaths and PWIDs attributed to their use. One of the reasons for their high mortality rate is that consumers of the drug must inject it, hence becoming prone to contract hepatitis C or HIV, among other diseases associated to the misuse of needles (UNODC 2018c). In spite of the severe risks inherent to the use of injected drugs, UNODC estimates than only 4 out of the 79 countries that offer needle exchange programs and opioid substitution therapies have high levels of implementation (UNODC 2018b, 17).

Figure 1. Percentage of Users per Drug - 2016



Source: (UNODC 2018b, 7)

Table 1. Number of users per drugs – 2016

Year	Cannabis	Opioids**	ATS	Ecstasy	Opiates*	Cocaine
2016	192	34	34	21	19	18

Note: Numbers in millions.
*Opiates refer to the drug naturally derived from the poppy plant.
**Opioids include a broader category of substances (natural and synthetic) to control pain.
Source: (UNODC 2018b, 7) Own design.

In addition, there is growing concern on the gender differences in drug use, with women consuming more opioids for non-medical uses (tranquilizers and painkillers) than men do. In addition, although women start using drugs at a later stage in life, they have a higher vulnerability to contract an infectious disease related to drug-use, and have a faster rate of drug consumption than men have (UNODC 2018f, 16). The following section of this literature review will summarize the current state of the illicit drug market according to the most consumed drugs. For a full list of illicit drugs and their categorization according to effect or type of ingestion, please see annexes 1 and 2 of this document.

Cannabis: Between the Legal and Illegal Spectrum

Dominating the market based on its level of consumption, Cannabis (including Marijuana, Hashish, THC, among others) had more than 190 million users worldwide, increasing about 16% between 2015 and 2016 (UNODC 2018b, 11). The traffic of Cannabis roughly splits into two forms: Cannabis herb and Cannabis resin. The former is traded within the region of production while the latter is geographically focused, with over 50 percent of seizures of cannabis resin taking place in Middle East/Southwest Asia (UNODC 2018d, 40).

Figure 2. Global Seizures of Drugs 2006-2016 (metric tonnes)



Source: (UNODC 2017a). Own design.

Nonetheless, there has been a decline in the global amount of cannabis seized in the same period, explained partially by the legalization of cannabis for recreational and medical use in countries like the United States (UNODC 2018d, 44). Although the legalization of cannabis has taken place very recently, initial reports have shown an increase in uses of emergency services due to drug poisoning, as well as a higher number of minor crimes such as driving under the influence. However, it is required to do further monitoring to understand the impact of this approach to the regulation of cannabis for non-medical uses (UNODC 2018d, 48).

Cocaine and Opioids: an Increasing Threat

According to the most recent statistics available, drug production has reached record levels, in particular for plant-based drugs such as cocaine and opioids. This correlates with the proportion of the primary drug of use in drug treatments between 2003 and 2016 (figure 3), with cocaine dominating in the Americas, while treatment for addiction to opioids accounted for the largest share in Asia, Europe and Oceania. Cocaine also reached its highest level of production in 2016 with more than 1.400 tons coming from Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. This amounts to roughly a 25% increase between 2015 and 2016, in what UNODC considers a dramatic rise of production

as reduction strategies (eradication or substitution of coca crops) have failed (UNODC 2018c, 8–9). In overall, 2016 saw a rise of 23% in cocaine seizures worldwide, with the Americas accounting for 90% of the amount. Western and Central Europe follows in second place, with 8% of the cocaine seized in the same year, a considerably smaller share. In addition, North America, Oceania and Western Europe presented the highest rates of cocaine use among the population in 2016 (UNODC 2018d, 32–35).

Figure 3. Proportion of Primary Drug of use in Drug Treatment Admissions 2003 - 2016



Note: Trends presented by region
Source: (UNODC 2018c, 14)

Similarly to cocaine, opioid production increased 65% between 2016 and 2017, with Afghanistan seeing a rise in production of 87% during this period, reaching 9.000 tons of opium poppy cultivation (UNODC 2018c, 8–9). The lack of success in reducing the cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan continuously possess a threat for neighbour countries in Central Asia –the so-called Golden Crescent-, with most routes controlled by or passing through Taliban territory. The group not only handles the traffic of heroin, but also chargers opium farmers a tax for trading their goods (Le Cussan et al. 2011, 29–30).

Routes for trafficking opioids have not changed substantially in the last decade, with the Balkans remaining a main entry point for the drug shipments coming from Afghanistan, through Iran and Turkey. The countries part of this route account for 80% of the entire heroin entering the European market (UNODC 2018d, 16). Within this context, the UNODC has established that the

global opiate market continues to grow, in particular in West and Central Europe, where opioid related deaths have been on the rise in countries like England, Poland and Germany, among others (UNODC 2018d, 19–20).

ATS and New Psychoactive Substances (NPS)

The market of synthetic drugs has experienced a considerable growth in the last decade, in particular concerning the diversity of available drugs from its two main groups: ATS (like amphetamines, methamphetamines and ecstasy) and NPS (synthetic cannabinoids, cathinones and tryptamines, among others) (UNODC 2018d, 54). Although compared to other types of drugs, ATS seizures are considerably smaller; there has been a significant rise in trade of this substance in East Asia, in both its purest form ("crystal meth") and low purity tables (like "Yaba"). Conversely, Ecstasy remains the most common ATS in Western and Central Europe, in spite of temporary shortages of one of its main components (MDMA[1]) in 2005 (UNODC 2018d, 57).

A relative new category of synthetic drugs, NPS include over 800 different substances for which there is not enough information about their effects on the consumer. Moreover, the existing international conventions on drug control do not include this group, resulting in a variety of legal statuses depending on the country (UNODC 2018j). The NPS portfolio is very dynamic, with some reported substances disappearing shortly after entering the market, while others have remained relevant since UNODC began their monitoring in 2009. This level of complexity is challenging when attempting to track their trade, as decreasing numbers in drug seizures of NPS might not mean their production has reduced, but rather that other new substances have entered the market (UNODC 2018d, 62).

Prescription Medication: Painkillers and Addiction

The use of prescribed medication for recreational and other non-medical purposes has increased significantly in the last decade. In particular, the United States has seen a rise in consumption of prescription opioids like fentanyl, codeine, oxycodone or tramadol at a level categorized as epidemic (CDC 2017). There is a link between misusing prescribed medication and other drugs like heroin. In this case, consumers of heroin (especially the youth) make use of painkillers and tranquilizers no just as drug substitutes but as means to boost the effects of heroin, increasing the risk of overdose (UNODC 2018e, 22). Another concern is the trade of counterfeited painkiller medication such as Fentanyl, which is usually mixed with other narcotics resulting in a highly dangerous cocktail for consumers unaware of what they are really taking (UNODC 2018d, 8).

[1] MDMA stands for 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine.

Drug Trafficking, Money Laundering and Corruption

The UNODC also monitors other transnational crimes closely related to drug trafficking, as is the case with money laundering. Money laundering is the bridge that links profits from drug trafficking with the illicit financial flows into criminal and terrorist organizations. According to UNODC statistics, in 2016 at least 30 percent of the profits from cocaine trade were laundered (UNODC 2018f, 9). Since the establishment of the '1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances', UNODC has developed international legislation to assist countries in their fight against money laundering. These are the '2005 UNODC and IMF Model-Legislation on Money-Laundering and Financing of Terrorism' and the '2009 Model Provisions for Common Law Legal Systems on Money-Laundering, Terrorist Financing, Preventive Measures and the Proceeds of Crime'. These are aimed at giving states the necessary tools to implement the legislation needed to counter money laundering, as well as promote the enhancement of regional and international cooperation to track and combat illicit financial flows that could reach criminal and terrorist organizations (UNODC 2018i). In spite of international efforts, though, according to UNODC statistics, proceeds from drug trafficking laundered in 2009 (most recent estimate) amounted roughly to $870 US billions, or 1.5% of the global GDP in that year (Pietschmann and Walker 2011, 42–43).

Another relevant feature in the chain of drug trafficking is the corruption in the public sector and the weak institutional capacity of states combating this transnational crime. Especially in those countries that have developed a '*narco*-economy', criminal organizations invest a large amount of resources on neutralizing law enforcement by bribing police and customs agents, and weakening the criminal justice system by buying judges and delaying trials (UNODC 2017e, 30–31). The UNODC has sought to provide an international framework to tackle corruption, thus establishing the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2003. UNCAC aims to promote preventive measures to corruption, as well as technical assistance for asset recovery and assistance to strengthen the management of public affairs and properties (UNODC 2004, 7). Both, money laundering and corruption are relevant components of the drug trafficking network. However, as previously stated earlier in this chapter, this master thesis will not review the national policies developed in response to the international conventions set to combat both of those criminal activities.

1.5.2. East Asia and Drug Trafficking

The region of East Asia has seen yearly increases in the amounts of seized drugs between 2006 and 2016, as portrayed in figure 4. Peaks in 2008 and 2009 correspond to large quantities

of cannabis seized in Indonesia, while 2016 recorded the highest amount of confiscated drugs in the last ten years, due to the seizure of more than 180 tonnes of Marijuana in Myanmar (UNODC 2017f). Figure 5 shows how East Asia, much alike to the rest of the world, has cannabis as the drug of most common use. Even so, the region differs substantially in the type of drugs traded aside from cannabis. East Asia's second largest amount of drug seized in 2016 corresponds to ATS (21%), while cocaine is second (17%) in the ranking of drugs seized in that same year on a global scale (UNODC 2017f).

Figure 4. Seizures of Drugs in East Asia 2006-2016 (metric tonnes) 206-2016



Source: (UNODC 2017a). Own design.

Figure 5. Composition of Drug Seizures Worldwide vs. East Asia 2016



Source: (UNODC 2017a). Own design.

ATS and Opioids

In the last decade, East Asia has seen a rise in production of ATS drugs, being one of the two key regions for methamphetamine trafficking, the second being the United States. The market

for ATS has continually increased in the last 5 years, with East and Southeast Asia toping the rank in production of crystalline methamphetamines (UNODC 2018d, 9). This creates health and security threads for the countries in this region, and demands a coordinated effort among the countries involved in the trafficking of this drug (UNODC 2018b, 25). Just in 2016, seizures of ATS drugs in East Asia reached over 60 tonnes, with the drugs traded on routes to North America, Oceania and within East Asia, as shown in figure 6. Concerning treatments against addiction in Asia, ATS, and in particular crystal methamphetamine, ranks second as primary drug for treatment after opioids (see figure 3).

Figure 6. Main Opioid and ATS Flows into and out of East Asia 2012-2016



Note: ATS flows in green, opioid flows in yellow
Source: (UNODC 2018c). Own design.

Concerning opioids, Southeast Asia as a region continues to be the main route for heroin to reach Northeast Asia and Oceania, with China, Thailand and Australia as the major markets for consumption (UNODC 2018d, 17). This group of drugs, including opium in its raw form and opium processed into heroin or morphine, accounted for more than 5% of drugs seized in East Asia in 2016, ranking third place after cannabis and ATS. Nonetheless, in 2016 the region experienced a decrease in opioids consumption, more specifically heroin, mainly in China, Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. Similarly, the region accounted for only 7% of global seizure of prescribed opioids (UNODC 2018d, 23).

1.5.3. The International Legal Framework

Early agreements of the international legal framework to combat drug trafficking, such as the Shanghai Opium Commission, Hague Opium Convention or Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, had a stronger focus on controlling the production of drugs rather than ending it. However, in spite of the international efforts undertaken to reduce the trade of drugs, by mid 1950s, almost half a century since the internationally community began taking measures against the uncontrolled production, trade and consumption of illicit drugs -both natural and synthetic-, remained at an all-time high. A major problem laid in the amount of existing international treaties on illegal drugs, and the fact that not all the countries had signed every treaty, and that there were overlapping provisions in many cases. This resulted in an inefficient implementation of the legal agreements to regulate the market for narcotics (Öner 2014, 82–83).

The lack of coordination on the institutional level led to the establishment of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (ratified by 180 states), and its subsequent amendment in 1972 (ratified by 175 states). It was the most ambitious and important international agreement on regulation of narcotics up to that point in history. Its relevance lays in its capacity to unify the provisions previously introduced by former international treaties, and the establishment of a system that classified narcotics according to their medicinal potential as well as their risks of abuse (Aoyagi 2006, 577). These conventions aim to establish a framework to combat drug trafficking and the components of the illicit market for drugs: cultivation, production, trafficking, distribution and consumption (M. Jenner S. 2013, 65).

Nowadays, the United Nations, through its Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), is in charge of implementing the provisions set by the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, and United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (UNODC 2013b). According to Babor et al. (2010, 204–10), the extensiveness of the international framework for drug control has a strong influence on domestic legislation. This results in constant changes in national law in order to keep up-to-date with regulations that go from establishing an official national agency to coordinate efforts to control drug trafficking, to taxation and regulation of advertising for prescription medication and addictive substances (like alcohol and tobacco). Table 2 summarizes some of the key changes in regulations with the implementation of each of the three main conventions on drugs.

Table 2. Current International Drug Treaties

Year	Treaty	Key aspect	Drugs
1961	Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs & amendment in 1972	• Ratified by 184 countries (1961) and 181 (1972) • Consolidated existing intern national regulation into one convention • Stronger control of the demand of drugs, criminalizing distribution and punishing non-medical consumption • Stronger border control	Opium, cannabis, coca leaves and first group of synthetic drugs
1971	Convention on Psychotropic Substances	• Ratified by 179 countries • Extension of the list of illicit drugs, in order to cover most recent synthetic drugs (ATS, sedatives synthetic opioids). • Differentiate between criminalization and control of plant-based drugs and synthetic drugs	New addition: Benzodiazepines, amphetamines, LSD and barbiturates
1988	Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	• Ratified by 180 countries • Redefines the mechanisms to control criminal activities related to the illicit drug market. • Emphasizes risks on national security and links with corruption. • Sets provisions to combat money laundering • Psychotropic and narcotic substances for non-medical use as a criminal offence	Precursor chemicals (for drug production)

*Number of countries that ratified the amendment in 1972
Source: (Babor et al. 2010, 204–5). Own design.

The United Nations' policy framework for illicit drugs has also evolved in the last decade. In 2009, the "Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards and Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem" included only three pillars to combat drugs: supply reduction, demand reduction and countering money laundering. These pillars broadened to seven during the 'United Nations General Assembly Special Session on Drugs' - UNGASS 2016, including aspects such as human rights, the challenge posed by the NPS drugs, the sales of drugs on the internet and new mechanisms for international cooperation and established shared responsibility in the fight against illegal drugs. Advancements in this front have been criticised by independent international organizations, such as the Global Commission on Drug Policy, for failing to include progressive legislation and successfully reduce harms associated to drug abuse (Gutheil et al. 2016, 22–23).

The yearly World Drug Report from the UNODC, published since 1997, offers access to the latest available data on the drug market while trying to standardize the information from each country member. UNODC, as the administrative body, also interacts with two other agencies: The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the International Narcotics Control Board

(INCB). The former promotes countries' compliance with the provisions of the treaties, and presents annual reports on this matter (Babor et al. 2010, 212). Complementary, the World Health Organization (WHO) also produces reports and policy reviews on global strategies to reduce drug consumption. WHO emphasizes the relevance of updated information on the impact of drug consumption on people's welfare. Literature from the WHO includes analysis on HIV patterns in drug consumers, health effects on Cannabis use, and drug overdose, among others (UNODC and World Health Organization 2013; WHO 2016).

Figure 7. International Organizations – Policy Control



Source: (Fazey 2007, 767)

Aside from the aforementioned agencies, there is a larger group of international institutions that provide statistical data, contribute to the enforcement of the law, allow monitoring of the illicit drug market and help with policy development. Figure 7 summarizes the different institutions

involved in the implementation of policy control of the illicit drug market. Major donors contributing amount to 21 countries, including several states from the European Union (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and France, among others), plus the United States, Canada and Australia. Donors from this group follow the interpretation of the international conventions set by the U.S. State Department, showing the level of influence from United States in policy making for the illicit drug market (Fazey 2007, 768). For more details on the role of each institution, see annex 3.

1.6. State of the Art

1.6.1. Research done on Drug Trafficking

Research of history has recorded the use of drugs in early civilizations during rituals, pharmacology and even with recreational purposes (Hugh-Jones 1997; Nadelmann 1990). However, it was not until the mid-1800s that drug use gained its negative connotation. The Chinese Opium crisis starting in the 1820s product of the large amounts of the narcotic entering the country with British support, posed a threat to the public health, weakened the Chinese labour force and prompted the creation of legislation to rid the country from its addiction (Fang et al. 2006; Roth 2013).

Since then, scholars, policy makers and journalists have published extensively on drug production, its trade and consumption. However, scholars have found a challenge in the field of drug policy research. Its multidisciplinary nature, which requires the understanding a variety of aspects from the scientific, social, economic and political dimensions, results in disagreements on how to compare drug policies, what constitutes as drug policy and which aspects should be analysed in first place (Ritter, Hughes, and Hull 2016). According to Houborg et al. (2018), research in this field could be done according to the following structures: a) Focus on what the policy prioritises b) Focus on the interaction and impact of drug policy in relation to other government policies.

The following part of the state of the art will summarize the works that fall into the aforementioned categories. Nonetheless, it is worth to mention that there are other ways to review the drug policy in academia. There are approaches that take into consideration the role of ideology, government legitimacy and history in policy-making. These sources deal with the question of whether the historical context shaped the current drug control policy, or if it was the emergence of a drug control policy and the establishment of illegal drugs that shaped the patterns of drug consumption in society (Gaylord and Traver 1992). Furthermore, sources can also focus on the existing differences in the application of the drug policy on an international, national and local

level (Ford 2013). In addition to this, there is substantial research done on national policies in general, and how they respond to a prohibition, harms reduction or legalization approaches (Ford 2013).

Supplementary, substantial research assess the economic impact of policies to control the illicit drug market. These sources mostly focus on the need to re-evaluate the use of resources aimed at reducing drug supply, namely interdiction efforts to curb imports of drugs, the penalisation of consumption in the internal market, and how these have failed to reduce consumption of drugs (Caulkins and Kleiman 2018; Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006; Reuter 1988, 1992). The state of the art will not directly discuss these dimensions of research on drug policy -influence of historical context, international vs. national policy implementation, and economic effects of the drug policy-, as the author considers that the four case studies on national policy addressed later in this chapter will include these dimensions in their analysis.

Focus on what the Policy Prioritises

Assessment of the public policy on drugs translates into identifying its different components, or 'policy areas'. This allows to establish what the policy prioritises: reduction of the drug supply, reduction of the drug demand and/or reduction of harms related to drug consumption (Houborg, Bjerge, and Frank 2018). Sources from this category seek to understand how the state balances the different aims of the policy on drugs and which goal(s) prevail(s) over another (Ritter et al. 2016). They establish a correlation between the existing drug policy and the way society sees drug consumption, as well as the interaction between individual and collective rights. They also aim to establish the difference in drug policies between countries that see drug consumption as a product of internal problems, and those that see it as a consequence if international drug trafficking. For the former, the Netherlands is an example, with the country correlating drug use to unemployment, segregation and poverty. For the latter, Mexico is an example with a drug policy strongly focused on the rise of drug consumption and violence as a result of the drug traffic from South America through Mexico, with United States as destination market (Babor et al. 2010, 230–35).

The risk of this type of policy analysis is that most research tends to focus on one aspect of the policy (e.g. supply reduction) and ignores or misses other integral components of said policy (e.g. harms reduction measures). An example is the research done on countries like Colombia, which focuses strongly on the policy to reduce the supply of drugs by targeting crops either with eradication, crop substitution or increasing interdiction operations, and ignores the efforts undertaken by the government on the treatment of drug addiction (Rincón-Ruiz et al. 2016; Ritter,

Hughes, and Hull 2016, 143). This gives an incomplete picture on the focus of Colombia's fight against illicit drugs and diminishes the problematic of the internal drug consumption, which has substantially increased in the last 20 years (Camacho, Gairia, and Rodiguez 2015). Another challenge of this approach lays within the quality of the data available to compare different countries in relation to the accomplishment of a policy-goal. The data, which is compared to test the effectiveness of the policy, might not follow the same standards as each country compiles it in a different manner, and thus the used data could result in a distortion of the findings (Houborg, Bjerge, and Frank 2018).

Focus on the Interaction between Drug Policy and Other Public Policies

Understanding the drug policy of a country also requires an analysis on how other public policies interact and affect the results of the drug policy concerning the reduction of supply, demand or harm to users (Houborg and Bjerge 2011; Houborg, Bjerge, and Frank 2018). Research done taking this approach not only focuses on how the drug policy is often framed within a larger policy, like the penal or welfare policies, but also how it can go against the goals established in other public policies. Drug policies have implications on public health, security, economic and environmental dimensions, among others, and the following segment will summarize some of those interactions.

Drug Policy and Public Health

From the health perspective, articles deal with issues like addiction, treatments, legislation to protect users, and effectiveness of rehabilitation programs. Sources from this category often have a background in either medicine or scientific research on drug abuse and addiction (Houborg and Bjerge 2011; Jacobs and Dubois 2012; Moore 2001; Strang et al. 2012), which explains why there is a strong emphasis in reviewing the effectiveness of drug prevention and treatment programs in decreasing consumption. For example, Moore (2001) emphasizes the need to alter between measures aimed at reducing supply and those aimed at treating addiction. He argues that, although supply reduction and law enforcement prove to be highly effective policies to control drug consumption in early stages, it is necessary to improve the availability of treatment options and preventive measures once there is strong evidence of 'epidemic' drug consumption. This could be the case of United States' current opioid addiction (CDC 2017).

This is further developed by Kleiman (2001; 2011) and Vaillant (2001) who, albeit recognizing the importance of drug supply control on reducing consumption, highlight the success of addiction treatment programs that bring more people out of consuming drugs in spite of the unchanging trend in drug sales. For them, these type of treatments do not belong exclusively to either a

medical or a law enforcement approach, as they do not punish the user of drugs or exonerate from any responsibility, but rather make him/her responsible for overcoming addiction through coercive measures. Nonetheless, coercion is a topic highly debated in sources that study drug policy and public health, as the term usually relates to "forcing someone to do something against their will" (Stevens et al. 2005, 207). Research questions the ethical approach of coercive treatments in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the unintended negative effects it could bring by placing the reduction of collective harm (drug-related violence) over personal harm (help to overcome addiction willingly) (Hunt and Stevens 2004).

Drug Policy and Environment

Research focusing on environmental issues includes academic studies and reports that review the efficiency of strategies to eliminate crops and how they affect ecosystems and quality of natural resources, as well as how they contravene with existing policies on environmental protection. This research has a strong focus on countries with high levels of production of cocaine (Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) and heroin (Afghanistan) (McSweeney 2015; Rincón-Ruiz et al. 2016; UNODC (ICMP) 2006; Vargas 2002). Another major topic of research is the use of chemical substances such as glyphosate in the forceful eradication of coca crops, highlighting its negative impact for the environment, with fields sprayed with the herbicide unable to grow any other product afterwards, and health problems of indigenous and farming communities close to affected areas (Rincón-Ruiz et al. 2016; Sherret 2005).

Notwithstanding, Solomon (2007, 2005; 2009) has done extensive research on the use of chemical substances in the eradication of coca and poppy crops, finding that there are even more toxic pesticides than glyphosate, which affect all type of wildlife and pose higher risks to humans than glyphosate. These studies have also criticized the position of regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), whose studies have proved no substantial damage from the use of pesticides, especially glyphosate, in the fight against drug production.

Another impact from drug production and trafficking is reviewed in the work from McSweeney (2015; 2014, 2017), who identifies drug traffickers as key actors in environmental change in Central America, a known route for cocaine heading to United States. Here, the main concern is deforestation, as a product of uncontrolled illegal trafficking that destroys the forest by creating routes to move the drugs through the forest, as well as landing strips and production facilities to produce cocaine or heroin in isolated areas. Thus, a failed drug policy to control drug supply as well as a weak presence of the state results in a higher negative impact in environment. Finally, these studies also criticise the effectiveness that crop eradication and substitution have on drug

supply. They argue that temporary reduction in production of drug because of these imposed measures does not compensate the damage on the environment, quality of natural resources and health of farmers and minority groups behind coca production. (Grisaffi 2016; Sherret 2005; Vargas 2002).

Drug Policy and Economic Impact

Literature on the economic impact of the drug policy is diverse and focuses on different aspects of the policy. Some sources focus on what the drug policy budget prioritises and why it does so, while other sources focus on assessing the inequalities inherent to the application of the drug policy. In addition, there is a third aspect of interest concerning the economic impact, and that is the burden of drug addiction and what this means for both consumers and the state. For the first group, there is a predominant focus on reviewing how high is the cost of implementing the drug policy is, and if this correlates to the official government policy.

In particular, Peter Reuter (1988, 1992, 2006) has done research on the countries United Kingdom, United States, the Netherlands and Sweden, which are countries that differ in their way to control the drug market. He found that in spite of having different official drug policies, they organize their budgets in a similar way, with most of the investment used on programs to control the supply of drugs, and only a fraction dedicated to prevention and treatment efforts. A reason for this, according to Babor et al., (2010, 145–50) is that governments believe that the higher the price for a drug, the less demand there is for it, and thus much of their efforts aim to increase drug prices. This translates into more interdiction and law enforcement measures, such as capture of drug shipments, incarceration of drug dealers, confiscation of money, properties and drugs, etc., looking to increase the transaction costs and transferring them to the end consumer with the goal of reducing drug use.

There is, however, an ongoing debate on whether such efforts are effective or not. Some sources (Kleiman 2001; Reuter 1992; Reuter and Kleiman 1986) consider that drug demand is inelastic, in particular in the cases of marijuana and cocaine. This would mean that whatever increase in prices resulting from the state's efforts to curb supply, would not affect consumption amongst users significantly. On the contrary, users would continue to spend more on drugs, becoming more impoverished while the government spends more resources to raise prices (Dave 2008). These sources also caution that, if consumers are partially sensitive to rises in the price of drugs, they could also opt for other substitute substances.

As previously mentioned, other sources concerned with the economic impact of drug policies address the issue of inequality. There is an ongoing debate on how drug policies contributed to increasing the gap between the rich and the poor, in particular concerning minorities. Research done by Katherine Beckett (2012; 2006; 2004) discusses how the American drug policy deliberately targets minority groups, in particular black people, increasing racial disparity and alienating communities. This has resulted in drug trafficking and consumption being perceived as a race problem, increasing socioeconomic inequality and marinating black and Hispanic communities in the United States. Poor black neighbourhoods experience tougher policing and stricter penalisation of drug-related offences, with convicted African Americans facing larger imprisonment periods and being unable to reintegrate successfully into society afterwards (Roberts 2004).

Finally, there is a group of literature focusing on the costs of drug abuse. These sources have traditionally focused on consumer countries, like the United States, Australia or Canada, among others. There is a significant focus on the heroin and opioid addiction in United States, with authors highlighting the need to increase government's expenditure in more preventive programs and treatment for drug users. These measures should be aimed at countering the economic costs derived from losses in productivity (due to incarceration, unemployment, premature dead), criminal activities (violence associated to gangs, destruction of property, payments to victims), and health care (rehabilitation, medicines, therapies) associated with drug use (Cartwright 2008; Harwood et al. 1999; Mark et al. 2001).

These sources also recognize the challenges in identifying the right way to measure the costs of drug use for the criminal justice system, the health and social systems, as it is difficult to determinate how much of the economic burden truly correlates to drug abuse (Clark and Dufton 2015; West 1997). This group of studies also identify different patterns in the costs related to drug abuse, with countries like Spain or Taiwan facing a higher burden in their health system in comparison to indirect costs on their criminal justice system (García-Altés et al. 2002; Lin et al. 2013). This establishes a stark contrast to the costs of drug abuse for countries like the United States or the United Kingdom, where a larger share of the economic burden falls on the criminal justice system (Cartwright 2008, 226; Healey et al. 1998, 161).

Drug Policy and Security

As a transnational crime, drug trafficking interconnects with other criminal activities that benefit from the profits of drug trade. Thus, sources that review drug policy and its impact in security

focus on the existing links between drug trafficking networks, terrorism and insurgency. In particular, the term "*narco*-terrorism" is a common label for the link between Transnational Criminal Organizations (TOCs) like drug cartels and Terrorist Organizations (TOs) that profit from the illegal trade of drugs (Öner 2014, 71). First mentioned by former Peruvian president Belaunde Terry in the late 1990s, the term aimed at establishing the seemingly logical relation between these two groups (Chouvy 2014). However, further research has discredited this 'catchword' by warning that its use places the drug-terrorism relation as the result of a 'global conspiracy', when evidence points out that both TOCs and TOs have independent goals that don't necessarily translate in the need of forming alliances (Carrapico, Irrera, and Tupman 2014; Wardlaw 1988).

Alex Schmid (2009; 2004) further emphasizes in the need to rethink the use of the term *narco*-terrorism when developing policies against drug trafficking. The scholar's work places drug trafficking as *one* of the activities financing terrorist and insurgent groups, together with state-sponsorship, individual financing, ethnic groups and diaspora community, among others. This is further supported by Chris Dishman (2001), who explains that most times both TOs and TOCs will work separately advancing their own goals, with very few successful collaborative efforts recorded. There are, however, exceptions to the rule as is the case of insurgency groups working closely with drug cartels in Colombia; or the Taliban controlling the larger share of opium poppy in Afghanistan (Kenney 2007b, 2007a).

National Case Studies on Drug Policy

Research done on national drug policies places countries in a spectrum between "use reduction" and "harms reduction". The former has a *zero tolerance* view of drug use and thus supports the reduction of supply and the increase of law enforcement for this purpose. Conversely, the latter implies that the main goal is not the reduction of drug use per se, although this is an associated consequence of programmes implemented by the government. Hence, the execution of "harm-reduction" policies aims at reducing violence, health issues, lack of productivity and poverty, among others (Caulkins and Reuter 1997; Moore 2001; Reuter 2006). Bearing this in mind, the following segment of the state of the art will summarize research done on the national policy against drugs in the countries: United States of America, Colombia, the Netherlands and Afghanistan. These are some of the most common countries for studies on drug policies, with substantial work done on their approach to regulating the illicit drug market.

The Role of the United States in the Fight against Drug Trafficking

A common topic of discussion amongst scholarly work is the strong influence of the United States on the policy-making on the illicit drug market. The country's war against drugs began in

1971 with Richard Nixon labelling illegal narcotics as the main enemy of the American public. Similar to the prohibitionist approach on alcohol production and trade in the late XIX century, the criminalization of drug consumption had its roots in the moral views, puritan militancy and racism that placed minorities and foreigners as a threat to society (Rodrigues and Labate 2016).

A number of works focus on the interdiction approach, product of the prohibitionist view, which has monopolized most of the policies to combat drug production, trafficking and consumption during the 1960s and onwards (Ford 2013; M. S. Jenner 2011; Reuter 1988; Schiray 2001). These sources address United States' 'prohibitionist diplomatic activism', which translates into bilateral agreements, policy statements and unilateral action in many cases. Highly criticised documents such as 'major list of drug producers' or the requirement of a "drug certification" are some of the examples mentioned when discussing the level of inherence of United States in the global fight against drugs (Babor et al. 2010; Rodrigues and Labate 2016, 215).

Additionally, the concept of 'war on drugs' is a common term in these works, tracking the influence of the United States in the public policies to tackle drug trafficking, particularly in Central and South America and Central Asia (Hernández 2013; Le Cussan et al. 2011; Rocha 2003). These sources see the development of strategies such as 'Plan Colombia' in Colombia or 'Merida Initiative' in Mexico as a direct result of the American efforts to control drug trafficking in their attempt to 'securitise' the continent.

Against this context, there is a substantial amount of academic research done on the efficiency of the US' approach towards drug trafficking. A number of sources criticise how the interdiction and law enforcement approach has failed to decrease drug consumption within the US (Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006; Ford 2013; M. S. Jenner 2011; Reuter 1988, 2006). These compare the increase in imports of cocaine and its falling retail prices against the interdiction expenditures, seeing very little to no cost-benefit. In addition, other sources that criticize United States' stance, focus in the difficulty to develop mechanisms and implement law enforcement successfully when drug-cartel's resilience translates into new forms of smuggling drugs into the country and circumvent border and customs control (Kenney 2003, 2007b; Vellinga 2004).

There is a growing number of sources doing research on specific states within the United States. This group of research usually measures the impact of a specific type of policy within the territory of study. Such is the case of the legalization of cannabis for non-medical purposes in Colorado and Washington (Room 2014) where most of the focus lays on the way states have regulated the transition of the drug from the illegal to legal market, the behaviour in consumption trends

and the need to review the mechanisms of current international conventions. In general, there is an open debate on whether supply-restriction approaches have a significant impact in the retail price of drugs, which is supposed to discourage drug consumption. Sources also criticise the supply-reduction approach in the United States. They recognize some positive results in reduction of drug consumption in middle and high-income classes, but highlight the marginalization of the lower classes. The latter has access to illegal drugs that remain cheaper in spite of interdiction efforts, or in case of facing a sudden rise in price there is always an alternative substitute drug (Becker, Murphy, and Grossman 2004; Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006; Grossman 2004).

The Netherlands and Legalization of Cannabis

Varying significantly in its approach to control the illicit drug market, the Netherlands focuses on harms-reduction measures to reduce the negative effects of drug use to both consumers and society. This results in the avoidance of criminalisation tactics for drug use, concentrating in penalising trafficking. The country also has a clear division between hard drugs and soft drugs, which shapes the way law enforcement is undertaken (Gutheil et al. 2016, 130). One of the most common topics of research of Dutch drug policy is the depenalization of cannabis in 1976, and the implications this has had in drug consumption levels and crimes related to drug use. In particular, Robert MacCoun (2011; 1997, 2001) argues that the Dutch tolerant approach to consumption of cannabis (while penalising production) has resulted in lower consumption of the drug in comparison to other more restrictive legislation as is the case of the United States or the United Kingdom. The author also highlights the relative stability in the price of marijuana even after the legalization of the substance.

Other sources question the causality between drug policy and consumption of cannabis in the Netherlands. They suggest that the use of cannabis does not significantly change with the application of a different drug policy, mostly due to the fact that price maintains its level (Korf 2002; Monshouwer, Laar, and Vollebergh 2011). These authors note that there may be temporary increases in consumption, as it happened when coffee shops begun selling cannabis; but that the market tends to regulate itself after the initial measure takes place. Wouters et al (2010, 315) quoting Reuban K.-H., concludes that consumption trends of cannabis are independent of drug policy, with liberal countries showing no substantial increase in consumption in comparison to those states that have a “zero-tolerance” attitude towards drug use. However, despite its progressive approach to drug consumption, academic research has established that the Dutch policy, in particular the one condoning the use of cannabis, is changing its course. This has translated into measures that set obstacles for the youth to access [soft] drugs so easily, as well

as restrict the amount of retail options available to purchase drugs (like the famous coffee shops), and in overall move from a libertarian to restrictive approach to drugs (Koopmans 2011).

'Plan Colombia' as a Strategy to Curb Cocaine Production

Sources dealing with drug production and trafficking in Colombia have a strong emphasis in the evolution of 'Plan Colombia' as the core strategy to combat the illicit drug market in the country, since 2000. They place it as a part of a broader American strategy to stabilize South America, and in particular those countries with the presence of insurgent groups. They highlight the US' anti-drugs efforts in Colombia as a key example of the extension of the prohibitionist approach in the international sphere (Ford 2013; M. S. Jenner 2011; Rodrigues and Labate 2016).

In particular, Thiago Rodrigues (2012; 2016) has noted that 'Plan Colombia's' original approach defined during US President Clinton's period changed substantially after the 9/11 attacks. Initially, the plan had a more comprehensive approach not only aiming to use military enforcement to combat drug trafficking, but also to promote police reform and investment of resources in order to strengthen the criminal justice system. This later changed during US President Bush's 'war against terror' strategy, where focus laid in implementing securitization strategies with the purpose of defeating insurgent groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN).

This view is further supported by Adam Isaacson (2000, 2005, 2010; 2004) who is critical about the results of American military intervention in Colombia. He argues that the results from this strategy are marginal, and that the few substantial gains are very limited especially taking into account the collateral damage on society in terms of deaths, forced migration and economic instability caused by continuous military action. He also considers that 'Plan Colombia' is not a good example of an efficient strategy to combat drug trafficking, in spite of it accounting for the largest share of aid that the country has received from the United States. Moreover, results from his research establish a connection between the emergence of paramilitary insurgence in the country and their involvement with politicians (*parapolitics*) with the purpose of bending legislation to avoid extradition and other measures to control drug supply through interdiction.

In addition to the research done on the impact of military involvement inherent to Plan Colombia, there are also a number of sources dealing with other aspects of this strategy. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there is substantial research focusing on assessing the impact and results of the strategies to reduce and/or eradicate coca crops in Colombia (Rincón-Ruiz et al. 2016; Rocha 2003; Sherret 2005). These sources, while admitting that eradication efforts have reduce

production temporarily, also warn that coca crops migrate to other countries like Peru and Bolivia, meaning that the output of coca production regionally remains similar. Furthermore, they argue that the success of eradication programs lays not just with the reduction of supply, but also in fostering the development of other economic activities for those involved in the cultivation of coca leaves. This would require the coordination with other government areas in order to facilitate access to resources to substitute coca crops with other agricultural products that guarantee equal or more revenue for the farmers.

Finally, other scholars have researched the impacts of the mechanisms to eradicate coca crops defined by the Plan Colombia, and in particular the aerial spraying of illicit crops (Solomon et al. 2007, 2005; Solomon, Marshall, and Carrasquilla 2009; Vargas 2002). The practice of aerial spraying pesticides to destroy coca plantations, which is an activity only approved in Colombia, has brought concerns over its impact on human health. Citing the respiratory illnesses, allergies and other affections suffered by farmers in the border between Colombia and Ecuador, researchers argue that the negative impact by aerial spraying surpasses the temporary benefits it could bring.

Afghanistan, Opium and Terrorism

Similarly, to Colombia, a substantial amount of literature on the fight against the illicit drug market in Afghanistan addresses the supply reduction measures undertaken by its government, aiming to reduce the production of opium poppy and heroin while dealing with the presence of insurgent groups that interlink with the drug trafficking networks (Le Cussan et al. 2011). Concerning this topic, sources have kept track of opium poppy production and its correlation to the low levels of economic development of the country, as well as the weak presence of the government institutions in the areas with crops of this kind and the emergence of jihadist groups (Farrell 1998).

Research also focuses on the link between opium poppy production and warlord groups in Afghanistan, which controlled most of the heroin production in the country (Chouvy 2012, 2013, 2013; Farrell 2005). These sources have emphasized the influence of the Taliban insurgency in the output of drug production of the country. They have attributed the decrease in production during the early 2000s as a product of a Taliban crackdown on the warlord groups, and they have partially explained the exponential increase in opium poppy production to the same Taliban group now benefitting from the revenues of drugs exports and other illegal industries. The link between opium poppy production and the insurgent and terrorist organizations has led to the use of the term “*narco*-terrorism” in most of the research on Afghanistan and the combat of

drug trafficking (Omelicheva and Markowitz 2018). This approach sees insurgent groups tacking advantage of the trade of opiate, which transcends the borders of their country and alters the stability of its regional neighbours, in particular Pakistan and Iran (Hernández 2013). This has resulted in Central Asia being addressed as the "Golden Crescent", given is relevance as the major supplier of opium poppy and heroin to the global market (Chouvy 2010).

Some sources have identified other links between drug trafficking and terrorism in Afghanistan, aside from the purely economic benefit (Le Cussan et al. 2011; Piazza 2012). These include the need to guarantee the security of those involved in the drug trafficking network, with insurgent groups threatening or killing government officials and military in order to guarantee the safe passing of the drugs; or strategic alliances between groups in order to facilitate the laundering of their finances. In particular, Phil Williams (2012, 4–6) specifically addresses three factors that shape the drug-insurgency alliance, and could apply to the Afghanistan case: poor economic development, the labour-intensive characteristic of the illegal economy, and the weak presence of state in spite of the military operations undertaken together with the United States and the United Kingdom, among other allies. Nonetheless, other scholars criticize the use of '*narco*-terrorism' as a basis to design policies to combat drug trafficking. Sources in this category warn about over-emphasizing the relation between drug traffickers and insurgent/terrorist organizations, especially when organizations such as the Taliban have other sources of financing themselves aside from drug trafficking (Wardlaw 1988).

A Geographic Focus for Supply and Demand

Although the previous national case studies on drug policy mention and interconnect the different components of the illicit drug market, they tend to vary in focus according to the geographical region. The works on drug production and distribution focus heavily on: Central and South America, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. There is extensive research on drug production and trafficking (mostly cocaine) on countries like Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, with an emphasis in the drug cartel business, law enforcement and military operations coordinated together with the United States (Kenney 2007a; Rincón-Ruiz et al. 2016; Rocha 2003; Vargas 2002; Vellinga 2004).

In Central Asia, the focus lays mostly on Afghanistan and the consequences of the opium trade in its population's health (Mravcik et al. 2014; Walsh and Maher 2013) as well as the complexity of the opium production chain, its correlation to terrorist organizations, and opium routes to East Asia and Western Europe. On the other hand, Southeast Asia's research strongly emphasizes the role of Thailand, Laos and Myanmar, countries of the so-called Golden Triangle. They have

a strong focus on production of drugs and the economic reasons for the increasing number of production in spite of policies set to curb it (Chin 2016; Chouvy 2013).

Conversely, authors addressing the topic of drug trafficking and consumption, have a stronger focus on North America (USA and Canada) and Europe (Western Europe, namely United Kingdom, Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands; and Eastern Europe). These sources address topics like drug addiction the economic burden associated to it; the impact of drug addiction in public health and illnesses associated to drug use. They also assess the impact of prohibitionists policies, with interdiction efforts to curb drug trafficking; and harms-reduction policies, with depenalization and legalization (Becker, Murphy, and Grossman 2004; Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006; Reuter 1992, 2006). One significant exception is the literature assessing United States drug policy, where a substantial amount of research focuses also on the efforts to curb the drug production outside of their territory (Caulkins and Kleiman 2018; Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006; Rodrigues and Labate 2016).

More importantly, scholarly articles in the last decade have placed increasing attention on alternatives to prohibition, criticising its limited success in the fight against drug, as it is the case in Colombia, Mexico and Afghanistan, among other producers (Rengert, 1996). These works not only shine light on legalization of some drugs as an alternative, but also mention the need to redefine the policy-making process in a way that it incorporates both interdiction and decriminalization in different levels of current policy for drug trafficking and consumption (J. P. Caulkins & Kleiman, 2018; J. Caulkins P. et al., 2006; Ford, 2013; Kenney, 2003). Regardless of the component of the policy reviewed (e.g. measures to control supply or control demand) most drug policy analysis places the country of study within the spectrum of drug policies going from most restrictive (prohibition) to less restrictive (harms-reduction).

1.6.2. Research done on Drug Trafficking in East Asia

As previously mentioned, an important amount of scholarly work done on East Asia focuses on Southeast Asia, and in particular in the Golden Triangle region (Laos, Myanmar and Thailand) (Chin 2016; Chouvy 2013; Dupont 1999). In particular, Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy delves into the connection between the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia and the Crescent Triangle in Central Asia, with the two networks interacting in order to traffic opiates (namely heroin). He reviews the important role of illegal militias and warlord groups that rose after the end of the Cold war, reinforcing the notion that the end of the Soviet Union brought a rise in drug trafficking (Chouvy 2004, 2010, 2012, 2013). There are, however, academic works focusing on countries outside

the Golden Triangle, although most of them establish a link with the drugs coming from this region.

China

Academic research done on the topic of drug trafficking in China, has an important focus on the southern provinces like Guangdong, Guangxi and Yunnan, in close proximity to Myanmar and Laos. These works emphasize the challenge that the Chinese government faces attempting to reduce drug consumption, not only in opioids but in methamphetamines as well. They keep track on the consumption trends, in particular since after the 1980s, when China experience a resurge in consumption of illicit drugs. The works from the 2000s onwards also see the topic of drug abuse in china from a perspective of harms reduction policies, following the example of western scholars using a human centred approach to drug trafficking (Deng 2001; Fang et al. 2006; Huang 2007; Huang et al. 2012; L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008).

Conversely, the works from Zhou, Yongming aimed to establish a correlation between the implementation of Chinese drug policies and the concepts of nationalism and national identity, especially since illegal groups handling drug trafficking correspond to ethnical minorities (Zhou 1999, 2000). More importantly perhaps is the work of Lu Hong (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009), where the scholar does a comprehensive analysis of the measures and policies undertaken by the Chinese Government against drug trafficking, as well as a consolidated a large amount of information on drug consumption since mid-1800s. The author has highlighted the complexity of the drug abuse problem in China and the challenges that China's law making process poses to "most western theories of law and society". He also concludes that China needs to improve law enforcement and adhere to the principles established in the international conventions and protocols the country has supported in the past, if it wishes to see substantial achievements in the war against drugs (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009, 188).

Japan

Scholarly works on drug trafficking in Japan are considerably fewer as those with a focus on China. Initial literature review shows sources focusing more on the role of Japan during the opium wars, and drug trafficking at the period of Japanese imperialism. It places Japan in the role of enabler of the opium dependency of the Chinese, with the aim of strengthening its influence on the neighbour country (Tamura 1992). The work hardly delves in policy-making with the purpose of curbing the opioid epidemic and does not go beyond the end of WWII (Jennings 1997; Wakabayashi 2000).

There is some research done on the role of the Yakuza, the Japanese mafia, in drug trafficking of methamphetamines coming [mostly] from China, and their control of traffic routes and supply since 1970s (Chawla and Pietschmann 2005; Tamura 1992; Ward and Mabrey 2013). Very few articles deal with the concept of a "third epidemic" wave, referring to the rise of methamphetamine consumption since 1990s, and they only do so reviewing the consumption patterns while neglecting the Japanese policy tackling drug abuse (Edström 2015).

The Philippines

Alike to the case of Japan, literature on the Philippines' policy approach to combatting drug trafficking is scarce. However, while Japan's existing literature goes back to the policies between mind-1800s and mid-1900s, research on Philippine's approach to curb drug trafficking and consumption focuses on its most recent strategy. Current academic work reviews the legality of current president, Rodrigo Duterte's "war on drugs" approach. The research includes revision of human rights' violations and extra-judicial killings credited to the so-called death squads, as well as the lack of due process for both traffickers and consumers. Here the emphasis lays on the violence associated with drug trafficking and law enforcement, questioning if individual rights are less important than collective rights and the guarantee of security (Boehringer 2017; Johnson and Fernquest 2018; Simangan 2018).

1.6.3. Drug trafficking as a Transnational Crime

Another common aspect drawn from academic research is the correlation between globalization and the increase in scope and size of the illicit drug market. Some scholarly work sees the origin of this after the end of the Cold War, when emergence of weak states meant higher levels of corruption and limited institutional capacity to enforce law, thus creating a perfect environment for drug cartels, gangs and other non-state actors to take on drug trafficking (Boister 2003; Hernández 2013; M. Jenner S. 2013; Öner 2014). In addition, research sees the increasing economic interdependence among countries, a product of globalization, as an opportunity for organized crime to have easier access to larger global markets. These studies review the impact of fewer controls at borders, more freedom of mobility across countries and the mutability of criminal organizations in charge of drug trafficking networks (Öner 2014; Rengert 1996; Swanstrom 2007).

Stating a correlation between globalization and the enlargement of the illicit drug market has given drug trafficking the category of a transnational crime. Both academic research and reports from international organizations address this topic, placing drug trafficking in the same category as smuggling, illegal arms trade, human trafficking and terrorism (Boister 2003; Roth 2013;

UNODC 2010b). In particular, the works of Michael Jenner (2013; 2011) and Phil Williams (1998, 2001, 2008) focus on identifying the routes for trafficking different types of narcotics, as well as understanding the structures of the criminal networks behind drug trafficking. They also review the interaction of drug traffickers and other criminal transnational organizations, and the way these networks interconnect in order to guarantee the distribution of drugs. Academic research after the 2000s increasingly focused in the correlation between the illicit drug traffic, drug cartels and their link with other transnational crimes such as smuggling and money laundering (Hernández 2013; Kleiman, Hawken, and Caulkins 2011; Swanstrom 2007), as well as their often contested relation with terrorist groups (Isralowitz 2002; Rollins and Wyler 2013; Wyler 2010).

1.6.4. Research gap

After a review of the existing literature on drug trafficking first generally and then focused on East Asia only, the author of this thesis evidences the lack of cross-country policy comparisons of the most recent public policies aimed at reducing drug trafficking. The literature on the topic extends to cover various dimensions of society, which results in the difficulty to define what counts as relevant when doing a “comparative drug policy analysis” (Houborg, Bjerge, and Frank 2018). Concerning policy analysis, the majority of works focus on cases in South America and Central Asia (production), with considerably less up-to-date information on East Asia. Research on drug consumption and addiction focuses on the developed world, which provides little arguments to develop the right drug policy in countries more affected by drug production and traffic (Babor et al. 2010, 97). Concerning studies on the effect of government policy on the control of drug supply, literature is even scarcer, without a solid methodological approach and strongly influenced by the US perspective (Babor et al. 2010, 166).

Nonetheless, there are points of convergence among academic sources that see globalization as a catalyser for drug trafficking (Chawla and Pietschmann 2005; M. Jenner S. 2013; M. S. Jenner 2011; Öner 2014). They have reviewed the challenges posed by the decentralized networks of traffickers, as well as the links between drug trafficking, money laundering, corruption, insurgency and terrorism. However, this type of research has failed to see how governments interpret the provisions of the existing international conventions, and adapt them to their own perception of what is necessary to reduce drug consumption. In addition, policy analysis often ignores that there is a difference between policy as written law and politics as implemented (Ritter et al. 2016).

Furthermore, when it comes to East Asia, contemporary academic work focuses on the Golden Triangle (Thailand, Laos and Myanmar) and, up to a certain degree, the extension of the drug trade routes originating in this region and their impact in neighbouring countries. Other work features analysis of a countries policy, as it is the case of China, but it does not establish parallels with other regional actors. Nevertheless, this particular juncture provides the opportunity of to develop a separate policy analysis for each of the countries selected for this research (China, Japan and the Philippines), and draw a further comparison between them. Such a comparative analysis across countries facing different phases of drug trafficking in East Asia will contribute to establish if there is a regional trend in how governments tackle the “war on drugs” on a policy level.

1.7. Analytical Framework

1.7.1. General Approach

As previously mentioned, research on the field of drug policy, and in particular that of comparative analysis, is very complex given its multidisciplinary nature (Ritter et al. 2016). In addition, given the limitations of this master thesis, it is necessary to narrow-down the focus of the analysis to a few criteria correlating, in this case, to the policy design to combat drug trafficking. This also limits the scope of the research to the illegal drug market, which accounts for the largest part of the drug policy's focus, and its directly associated with increase in violence, disorder and damages to society (R. MacCoun and Reuter 2001). Babor et al. (2010, 65–70) characterize the illegal market as a network rather than a hierarchy in nature, given its illegal nature. Figure 8 details its composition according to the level of the market, with the majority of drug trafficking relaying on retailers who only interact with their direct supplier without any knowledge on who is in the command chain further up. This is a challenge to designing effective drug policies to combat drug trafficking (Kenney 2007b, 2007a).

Figure 8. Composition of the Illicit Drug Market at the Different Levels



Source: (Babor et al. 2010, 66)

For this analytical framework, drug policy is defined as "*any targeted effort on the part of governments to minimize or prevent drug use and drug-related harm to both individuals and society*" (Babor et al. 2010, 98). Given the broadness of this definition, this master thesis uses an eclectic framework as basis for the analysis. The criteria selected aims to analyse the drug policy of each country in two different dimensions**: International** (cooperation with other countries or

International Organizations) and **national** (domestic policy because of the interpretation of provisions from international treaties).

Figure 9. National and International Levels of the Policy to Combat Drug Trafficking



Source: (Babor et al. 2010; Boister 2003). Own design. Author selected criteria related directly to the reduction of drug trafficking. Services for drug users included as part of a reduction of demand strategy.

Other studies have made use of this approach, such as the European Union's assessment of its drug policy, which provided evidence of the drug policy at the EU level as well as the member-state level (Gutheil et al. 2016). In order to develop this two-level analysis, this thesis makes uses of the criteria proposed by Babor et al (2010) and Boister (2003) to review the domestic policy, as well as each country's interpretation of the international conventions and the international law enforcement cooperation aimed to combat drug trafficking as a transnational crime.

In particular, Babor's framework for the national policy-level takes into account the most recent research done on drug policies in different countries, including only studies with a well-developed research design (Babor et al. 2010, 103). Thus, their resulting framework is able to assess the variety of existing strategies to combat the illicit drug market, reducing significantly a potential bias in the analysis.

1.7.2. International Dimension

This first dimension of the framework addresses the transnational nature of drug trafficking. In comparison to the national dimension, it encompasses a smaller set of criteria as the emphasis of this master thesis is the national drug policy itself. However, since drug trafficking interconnects producing and consuming countries regardless of their region, and interacts with other transnational crimes such as money launder and terrorism (Carrapico, Irrera, and Tupman 2014; Chawla and Pietschmann 2005; Rollins and Wyler 2013), it is important to address the international mechanisms that countries use to combat this illegal activity.

The international dimension includes the existing conventions on illicit drugs, as well as transnational law enforcement initiatives to reduce the supply and demand for drugs. The thesis uses Boister (2003) as basis for selecting the criteria for the international dimension. He defined two main requirements that countries should comply with in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the international illicit drug control system: "(i) control illicit drug production and trafficking in the territories under their control and (ii) coordinate these efforts globally" (Boister 2012, 50). In accordance, the two components of this dimension reflect these two requirements points.

International Conventions

The international conventions on illicit drugs, as summarized in Table 2 in the first chapter of this thesis, establish a framework to combat drug trafficking and the components of the illicit market for drugs: cultivation, production, trafficking, distribution and consumption (M. Jenner S., 2013, p. 65). Parties develop their own national drug policy based the recommendations from UNODC and the INCB; and provisions set in by the conventions of 1961, 19777, 1988 and UNGASS 2006. Thus, each country sets their own criminal jurisdiction to make sure that transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking, do not make use of boundaries to escape punishment (Boister 2012).

Concerning drug trafficking, according to the international drug control conventions, signatory countries require (UNODC 2013b):

1. Annual reports on advances in the fight against drug trafficking (consumption of drugs, seizures and disposal of drugs),
2. Development of national laws and regulations giving effect to the conventions' provisions,
3. Establishment of governmental authorities in control of legal and illegal drugs,
4. National level arrangements for preventive and repressive measures against trafficking

5. Close cooperation with international organisations (share information with the purpose to prosecuting criminals)
6. Prosecution of offenders, nationals or foreigners, in the territory where the crime (drug trafficking) has taken place.

International Law Enforcement Cooperation

The national implementation of the provisions from international conventions can result in jurisdictions overlapping among countries within the same region; hence, there is a great need of close cooperation between neighbouring states. According to Boister (2012), the following are the international enforcement cooperation mechanisms addressing drug trafficking: information storage and exchange, operational cooperation, and extradition.

Information Storage and Exchange

The '1988 Drug Trafficking Convention' defined that all signatory parties should "establish and maintain channels of communication between their competent agencies and services to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all aspects of offences [including drug trafficking]". This includes the sharing of information on identity of alleged transnational criminals, criminal networks, assets and proceeds related to drug trafficking and movement of narcotic and psychoactive drugs (see annex 1) (UNODC 2010b, 2013b). A challenge posed for this type of mechanism is the variety of systems and methodologies used by governments to collect information on drug trafficking. While some states develop complex systems to keep track and analyse data, others have little funding to establish efficient mechanisms. Deficient data collection affect the states' ability to identify new trends in drug trafficking, smuggling methods and, in overall, design new instruments to combat drug trafficking (Boister 2003, 2012; Kenney 2007a)

Operational Cooperation

There are diverse forms of inter-state operational cooperation with some of them initially developed by governments and later on included in the international conventions to combat drug trafficking (Boister 2012). In particular, law enforcement agencies from the United States and Latin America have contributed significantly to the development of effective enforcement operations, including the creation of a specialized drug police force, as well as task forces to track down leaders of drug cartels (Isaacson 2000; Kenney 2003, 2007a). According to Boister (2012), there are three major types of operational cooperation between governments:

1. Liaison: Which involves police cooperation through diplomatic missions, especially after the Cold War period. Agencies like the US' Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and

Brazil's Federal Police (DPF), make use of liaison officers stationed abroad not just to track criminal activities, but to exchange information and transfer/acquire knowledge

2. Joint investigations: Involves extraterritorial policing in cooperation with a third party. The '1988 Drug Trafficking Convention' introduced the term in order to foster international cooperation at the law enforcement level. However, not every country has developed the national legal framework necessary to regulate this type of activities.
3. Extradition: "allows states lawfully to acquire custody of alleged criminals located in other states in order to exercise an already established criminal jurisdiction" (Boister 2012, 214). Although it is not directly included in any of the Drug Conventions, the mechanism is an essential component of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). However, states do not rely directly on the provisions set by UNTOC, preferring to develop their own bilateral extradition treaties.

The increasing use of these operational cooperation tactics has resulted in criticism caused by its proclivity to infringe human rights, with joint operations and complementary mechanisms falling into a *grey area* where neither national or international law is fully enforced (Boister 2012, 2003). For a summary of the international dimension and its components, please refer to annex 4 of this document.

1.7.3. National Dimension

The national drug policy of a country results from its interpretation of the provisions from the international conventions designed to combat drug production, trafficking and consumption. Despite the existence of a well-defined international framework, national drug policies are very diverse in their structure and their main objectives (M. S. Jenner 2011). Some states see illegal drugs as a threat to public health, condemning their use as morally wrong. Thus, their policies focus on *reducing use* through law enforcement, suppression of drug trafficking and penalisation of consumption. Other states focus their policy on the problems associated to drug use like transmitted diseases, addiction and violence. Their measures aim to *reduce harm* through prevention, education and treatment to users (Caulkins and Reuter 1997). In both cases, however, both type of measures attempt to increase the opportunity cost for drug users (Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006; Reuter and Kleiman 1986).

The Illicit Drug Market: Assessment of the Drug Problem

Bearing this in mind, this master thesis uses the analytical framework proposed by Babor et al (2010) for the analysis of the drug policy on the national level. This multidisciplinary framework facilitates not only the analysis of each country's drug policy, but also allows the development

of a regional comparison. First, it is necessary to summarize the main characteristics of the drug problem in each country, since context varies in each case and it correlates with what the national drug policy prioritises. Bearing this in mind, Babor et al (2010, 227–30) list the relevant aspects to include in the summary of the drug problem for each country:

a) Problematic of drug use: Includes identifying the most common drugs of use, the scope of the problem (national scale or specific regions), and the annual prevalence[2] in drug consumption. Estimation of annual prevalence can vary widely as there are different methodologies to collect information (e.g. general population survey, registration of users, medical tests, etc.) (Mathers et al. 2008, 1734). Hence, this thesis uses the data collected by UNODC Statistics, which provides a range of annual prevalence use with low, medium and high percentages based on the different data collected from various surveys.
b) Crime related to drugs: Includes both violence and drug trafficking figures. The former refers to violence related to the trade of drugs (e.g., gangs' violence, drug use among arrested people, etc.). The latter refers to yearly seizures of trans-shipments of drugs (Babor et al. 2010, 230). UNODC Statistics offers the latest data on seizures per country.
c) Associated illnesses to drug use: Assessments of the drug problem in a country include data on HIV and HCV/HBV (Hepatitis C and B) acquired through unsafe injecting practices (UNODC 2018c, 14–16). It is preferred to use this type of data instead of the mortality rate due to drug use, as most countries fail to provide reliable statistics (Babor et al. 2010).

Table 3. Assessment of the Drug problem - National level

Problematic of drug use	Crime related to drugs	Associated illnesses to drugs
Most common drug(s) of use	Drug consumption among convicted criminals	HIV among users of injected drugs
Scope of the problem (national/regional)	Drug seizures	HCV or HBV among users of injected-drugs
Annual Prevalence		

Source: (Babor et al. 2010, 228). Author regrouped the criteria.

Review of the National Drug Policy According to the Strategy

Once the context for the drug problem in each country of the study has been clearly defined, the adapted framework includes 3 of the 5 strategies comprised by the national drug policy, according to Babor et al (2010, 101). These are: Services for users, supply control, and criminal sanctions (the other two not included are prevention and regulation of prescription medication)

[2] Annual prevalence refers to the estimated proportion of people who have used drug(s) during a determined year. Data refers to the population between 15 and 64 years, unless indicated otherwise (Mathers et al. 2008, 1734)

(idem). This structure allows reviewing the drug policy strategies with the highest impact on reducing drug trafficking either by reducing production (less quantity of drug in the market), reducing sale (less expenditure in drugs) or reducing demand (less consumers of drugs) (Caulkins and Reuter 1997). The following segment breaks down each of the three strategies to combat drug trafficking, in order to identify the measurable variables that serve as criteria for the framework. Although these strategies are official part of the drug policy of every country, there are other measures not included in this list that could contribute to combatting drug trafficking and drug use (e.g. social programmes, economic subsidies, public health activities to reduce transmission of diseases, etc.) (Babor et al. 2010; Boyum and Reuter 2009). However, this thesis does not include them in the analysis, as their main aim does not target drug related problems per se.

Strategy 1: Health and Social Services for Drug Users

This type of strategy focusses strongly on reducing drug-related harm either by reducing drug use or reducing the problems associated with drug consumption (Caulkins and Reuter 1997). However, given that the illicit drug market results from the interaction of supply and demand, the framework used in this master thesis will only review the type of treatments with an impact on the reduction of demand for drugs in the market, as this is an important complement in the fight against drug trafficking (Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006). Treatments in this category can vary according to: accessibility, coordination (by the state or privately), and whether they are coercive or voluntary (Babor et al. 2010, 239).

Interventions for Users of Heroin and Other Opioids

Programmes from this group belong to one of the following types: Opioid Substitution Therapy (OST) or Opiate Antagonist Therapies. OST has a high rate of success in reducing consumption (hence, demand) of heroin, other opioids and even prescribed painkillers, by making use of substitute substances like Methadone and Buprenorphine (Strang et al. 2012). Addicts subjected to this kind of programmes reduce their intake of heroin as well as violent behaviour related to drug use.

OST takes the drug users out of the drug trafficking networks, providing a temporary substitute in a safe environment, until addiction has been overcome (Amato et al. 2005). Contrary to OST, Opiate Antagonist Therapies make use of a substance, most commonly Naltrexone, to reduce the effect of heroin and other opiates. A low percentage of heroin addicts are willing to give up the pleasing effects of the drug, so effectiveness is contested, as compliance with the treatment is a major component to guarantee its success (Babor et al. 2010, 128).

Psychosocial and Self-help Treatments

This boarder category of treatments includes psychological therapy, behavioural treatment, rehabilitation houses, medical interventions and/or self-help organizations that provide mechanisms to reduce drug consumption. It often works in combination with a drug treatment alike to OST for heroin addicts. By addressing the social causes behind addiction, these type of therapies "change interactional patterns [in a way] that they reinforce reduction of drug use and related problems, and support efforts to improve social and coping skills" (Babor et al. 2010, 1335). Thus, they are highly cost-effective, reduce demand for drugs, and have a smaller economic burden on government budget than interdiction efforts (Strang et al. 2012). For a summary of strategy 1 and its components, please refer to annex 5 of this document.

Strategy 2: Supply Control

Supply control strategy is the most common mechanism used to combat drug trafficking. In its ideal form, it measures for supply control would increase the difficulty for consumers to purchase drugs because of the lack of dealers in their area or their higher prices (Strang et al. 2012, 72). This strategy considers that the illicit drug market is similar to any other legal market. In it, demand equals the "willingness of the population to purchase drugs at a given price" and supply is defined as the "relationship between price and the quantity of drugs that producers and distributors are willing to provide at a certain price" (Babor et al. 2010, 139).

Supply control measures affect the illicit drug trade by a sudden shock in supply, disrupting the market with producers and traffickers caught off-guard by unanticipated law enforcement operations (e.g. drug seizures taking place in a new route, unexpected regulation on chemical precursors used to produce drugs, etc.) (Babor et al. 2010, 144). However, when supply control measures try to attack an already established market, they only shift the market's equilibrium. This means that drug traffickers increase prices enough to cover the extra costs associated with the drug trade (e.g. failed shipments, conviction of street dealers, violence associated to drug trade) (Reuter and Kleiman 1986). This strategy includes the measures: source-country control, interdiction, and retail enforcement, and imprisonment, which affect the different levels of the illicit drug market (see figure 8) (Babor et al. 2010; Strang et al. 2012).

Source-country Control

Given that, except for cannabis, production of plant-based and synthetic illicit narcotics is highly concentrated in specific states, key components of the supply control strategy are the programmes to reduce production in source-countries. These are: 1) crop eradication, 2) crop substitution, 3) control of chemical precursors and 4) in-country enforcement (Babor et al. 2010,

146–50). Among these, the programme more closely related to the East Asian context is the control of chemical precursors. 'Precursor control policies' translate into stronger government regulations to limit the trade of chemicals necessary to produce ATS drugs (Babor et al. 2010, 147). Thus, it directly affects production of methamphetamines, which is the second largest drug traded in east and southeast Asia after cannabis (UNODC 2017a). In spite of the general assumption that these type of programmes, when successful, contribute to reduce the flows of illicit drugs; consuming countries spend a limited share of their budget for source-country control programmes. This leaves source-countries unilaterally assuming the burden of investing in these programmes. Even the United States, which is the country with the biggest influence in the agenda of the 'war on drugs' on a global scale, spent less than 3% of its budget to combat illicit drugs on source-country control in 2002 (Babor et al. 2010, 147).

Interdiction Efforts

Interdiction programmes focus on seizing drugs in the transit areas that interconnects source-countries and consuming-countries. In their ideal form, interdiction efforts have the capacity to disrupt the drug market temporarily, with the purpose not only to reduce the amount of drugs available but also to increase the retail price of illicit drugs. Specialized unites of interdiction are in charge of reporting drug seizures periodically to the UNODC, with the majority of the operations taking place at custom control or through joint surveillance operations (Babor et al. 2010, 151).

Success of interdiction efforts is often short lived due to the mutability of the drug trafficking networks. Their impact on retail price of drugs is negligible in the long term, yet they remain a key component within the supply-control strategy. Interdiction can impose high transaction costs to drug traffickers, but it demands constant adaptation from law enforcement units (Kenney 2007a, 2007b; Williams 1998). Smugglers make use of a variety of routes and methods to move drugs and their business model takes into account the losses from seizures of drug shipments or incarceration of members from the network (Reuter 1988, 1992).

High Level and Retail Law Enforcement

High level enforcement has a strong impact on destabilizing the illicit drug market by taking down the head of the network, as well as seizing assets and large amounts of drugs already in the domestic market; hence, it has a higher cost-benefit ratio (Caulkins and Reuter 1997; Caulkins, Reuter, and Taylor 2006). Retail enforcement tackles the largest component of the illicit drug market: street-level vendors (see figure 8). Nonetheless, despite the emphasis in law

enforcement operations on this level, they have a lower cost-benefit ratio than high-level captures, as street dealers are replaceable, most of the final purchases are done privately and the markets shift constantly (Babor et al. 2010; Reuter and Kleiman 1986, 156–57).

Imprisonment

Conviction and incarceration of drug traffickers are complimentary components of high level and retail enforcement. Averages in length and severity in sentences vary across countries, with some states establishing different type of penalties for first time offenders and PWIDs (Possession With Intent of Distribution) related to soft drugs, in order to reduce over-burdening the prison system (Strang et al. 2012). Other governments make use of harsher penalties for drug trafficking, including the death penalty, regardless the type of drug confiscated. The Severity of the sanctions accounts for the larger share of Human Rights violations related to the fight against drug trafficking. (Babor et al. 2010, 159; Rope and Sheahan 2015). For a summary of strategy 2 and its components, please refer to annex 6 of this document.

Strategy 3: Criminal Sanctions

While the supply-control strategy focuses primarily on producers and traffickers, the criminal sanctions punish the user and aim to deter consumption. Criminalization of drug possession also facilitates capture and prosecution of drug suppliers. These strategy responds directly to the provision established in 1988 UN Convention (art. 3, sec. 1) which “required possession or purchase of controlled substances to be punished as ‘criminal offences under domestic law’” (Babor et al. 2010, 163). Since the existing conventions do not clarify the extent of the sanctions, relying on each country’s own criminal justice system, there is a wide range of severity in the penalisation of drug use across the world. (Kleiman 2001; McBride et al. 2009; Nadelmann 1990). Babor et al (2010, 164–66) define the three components of the criminal sanctions to drug use as: deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation.

Deterrence

Deterrence measures vary across countries, depending on the severity of penalties imposed. This category includes other types of sanctions that may not involve the use of incarceration, often considered as counter-criminalization measures. (Strang et al. 2012). These measures aim at increasing the perceived risk to buy or consume drugs, ultimately reducing the demand of illegal substances. It possesses less economic burden to the criminal justice system, as in many occasions the introduction of a new measure is sufficient to scare potential users from acquiring drugs (Babor et al. 2010; Benfer et al. 2018; Kleiman 2001).

Deterrence systems can either *decriminalize* (remove criminal penalties) or *de-penalize* (reduce the severity of the sanctions). An extreme version of decriminalization would be labelled *legalization*, where all forms of penalties on possession or use of (a) certain drug(s) are removed (Aoyagi 2006; Caulkins and Kleiman 2018; Kahler 2000). The different measures within the scope of deterrence from less to more liberal are:

Table 4. Types of Deterrence Measures and Implications for the Drug Policy

Type of Deterrence Measure	Application form	Example
Shift from criminal to non-criminal sanctions	• Fines • Reduction of social benefits	Cannabis decriminalization in Australia
Change level of criminal penalty	• From 'severe' to 'misdemeanour'	Oregon's (US) shift from criminal offence to civil violation for use of Cannabis
Informal handling of users	• Issue of 'formal caution' instead of arresting	British police does not arrest, but keeps offence in criminal record.
Diversion to education or treatment programmes	• Possession not criminalized but user encouraged to get treatment	Portugal's removal of personal possession from criminal law, refers users to medical panel
Abolishing of criminal law for specific drug *(extreme form: legalization)*	• Free possession (certain amount) • Extreme form is *de facto* legalization with a controlled market	Coffee shops allowed to sell Cannabis in the Netherlands

Source: (Babor et al. 2010, 166–72). Information summarized by author. Own design

Incapacitation and Rehabilitation

Another measure within the criminal justice system is the incarceration of users of drugs. This is less common in comparison to other deterrence measures, and results in a heavier burden for the prison system. Imprisonment usually applies to drug traffickers or producers, with users facing jail sentences when they have committed crimes related to drug use (Strang et al. 2012). Only the most severe strategies to combat drug trafficking make use of this measure to reduce demand for illegal substances, although imprisonment does not guarantee complete lack of access to illicit drugs. (Babor et al. 2010, 165).

Complementary to imprisonment, government can establish rehabilitation programmes for people convicted of crimes related to drug-use. These can have a coercive nature and take the form of drug courts, prison-based counselling programs, syringe exchange programmes, therapeutic counselling post-imprisonment and parole monitoring through medical tests (Babor et al. 2010, 241). These defer considerably from other health and social services for drug users coordinated by the public health system, which do not penalize the use of drugs and are not necessarily a part of the criminal justice system. For a summary of strategy 3 and its components, please refer to annex 7 of this document.

1.7.4. Final Framework

This last segment presents the final overall version of the eclectic analytical framework use in this master thesis in order to answer the following research question:

1. "What strategies do China, Japan and the Philippines have in common and in which ones do they differ when it comes to combat illegal drug trafficking?"

Table 5. Summary of Analytical Framework – Assessment of National Illicit Drug Policy

Dimension	Level	Criteria
1. International	**1.1. Response to International Conventions**	**1.1.1. Ratification of International Conventions:** 1961 Single Convention, 1971 Psychotropic Substances, 1988 Illicit Traffic of drugs.
		1.1.2. National Legislation on illicit Drugs: Date of enforcement, main objective, drugs categorized as illicit, difference between hard/soft drugs (if exists).
		1.1.3. Institutional organization to combat drug trafficking: Structure of the system, ministries and agencies responsible for control of illicit drugs.
	1.2. Law Enforcement Cooperation	**1.2.1. Type of participation on international level:** Forums, international organizations, regional platforms.
		1.2.2. Bilateral or multilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking: Existence of regional agreements, joint task forces to monitor international waters/borders, countries or international organizations working with the government.
2. National	**2.1. Assessment of the illicit drug market** (Drug Problem)	**2.1.1. Drug use:** top three drugs of most common use, scope (national or regional/localized problem), and annual prevalence.
		2.1.2. Crime related to drug trafficking: use of drugs in prison, drug seizures (in the last ten years).
		2.1.3. Associated illnesses: HIV, HCV, HBV (among injected users).
	2.2. Demand reduction (through Services for drug users)	**2.2.1. OST and Antagonist Therapies:** Managed privately or by government, costs covered by state or individual, national or regional/local coverage, number of patients rehabilitated.
		2.2.2. Psychosocial and self-help treatments: Managed privately or by government, costs covered by state or individual, national or regional/local coverage, number of patients rehabilitated.
	2.3. Supply reduction (through control of production and trade)	**2.3.1. Source-country control measures:** government invests in source-country control programs (crop eradication or substitution), established regulation to trade of precursor chemicals.
		2.3.2. Interdiction efforts: agency in charge of border control, places with custom control (airports, ports), maritime operations to capture drug traffickers.
		2.3.3. High-level and retail enforcement: penalties for dealers and heads of criminal bands are different (or not), statistics of people arrested.
		2.3.4. Imprisonment: producers and dealers convicted, types of penalties and level of severity according to offence (is there a difference according to drug trafficked or first/second offenders?)

	2.4. Demand reduction (through criminal and non-criminal sanctions)	**2.4.1. Deterrence mechanisms defined by law:** Non-criminal sanctions (e.g. fines, community service or limitation of access to government's subsidies), depenalization and decriminalization of certain substances (e.g. Cannabis for medical/non-medical use).
		2.4.2. Incapacitation measures: incarceration for consumers (severity in accordance to type of drug and first time use/relapse), coercive treatment for users, capital penalty.

Source: (Babor et al. 2010; Boister 2012). Author selected and summarized criteria related to drug policy to combat drug trafficking

As previously mentioned, the framework's purpose is to categorize the drug policy used in each country, identifying what the policy prioritises: a) reduction of use (prohibition) through criminalization of production and trade, and criminal sanctions to users, or b) harms reduction through services discouraging drug use and addressing drug-related problems. In addition, the international dimension included in the framework will allow identifying if there is a trend in increasing or decreasing regional integration with the aim of combatting drug trafficking.

The aim of this analytical framework is not to reach a conclusion whether a drug policy is efficient in reducing consumption of drugs. As discussed in at the beginning of this section and earlier in the state of the art, measuring the success of the illicit drug policy on consumption can be difficult. This occurs as positive results can be also correlated to other public policies that indirectly discourage consumption or elevate the opportunity costs of purchasing illicit drugs (Babor et al. 2010; Boyum and Reuter 2009; Ritter, Hughes, and Hull 2016).

Chapter 2: Empirical Analysis

1.1. International Dimension

1.1.1. Response to International Conventions

This set of criteria splits into three segments: i) ratification of international conventions by each country: including the three conventions on drugs and its amendments; ii) national legislation on illicit drugs: date of enforcement, main objects and classification of illicit drugs; and iii) institutional organization to combat drug trafficking: detailing main agencies and government departments involved in this area.

China

Ratification of International Conventions

As an original member of the United Nations, the Government of the Republic of China singed the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs on behalf of China. However, from 1971 on, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was recognized as "the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations" (UNODC 2018h). The PRC thus proceeded to reaffirm its commitments to the fight against illicit drugs, ratifying the subsequent conventions. Figure 10 shows the dates for signature and ratification of the different documents on this matter.

Figure 10. International Drug Control Conventions - China's participation

Convention	Signature	Ratified
1961 - Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs	30-Mar-61	12-May-69
1972 - Amendment to 1961 Single Convention		
1975 - Amendment to 1961 Single Convention		25-Aug-85
1971 - Convention on Psychotropic Substances		23-Aug-85
1988 - UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	20-Dec-88	25-Oct-89

Source: (UNODC 1961, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1990)

Given China's historical context, the country included additional notes to each treaty (declaration) in order to define the treatment for Hong-Kong and Macao as especial territories, upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty on the previous colonies of England and Portugal respectively. The Chinese Government declared both territories as a "special Administrative Region [that] is a separate region for the purpose of the Convention", although for Macao, the government "assume[s] responsibility for the international rights and obligations arising from the application of the Convention to the Macao Special Administrative Region." (UNODC 1976, 1990). This explains why China's reports to the UNODC provide separate figures for China, Macao and Hong Kong, with the latter's statistics managed directly by Hong Kong's authorities.

The Chinese government also included reservations on the three main international conventions on drugs, mainly concerned with the interference of the International Court of Justice in those cases where disputes between parties of the conventions cannot be settled in the prescribed manner (UNODC 2013b, 62). Concretely, reservations apply to: Paragraph 2, Article 8 of the 1961 Convention; Paragraph 2 Article 31 of the 1971 Convention; and paragraphs 2, 3, 4, Article 32 of the 1988 Convention (UNODC 1976, 1990).

National Legislation on Illicit Drugs

Chinese legislation on illicit drugs has evolved from their historical context. According to Lu et al (2009), the country's dug law and regulations changed during four different periods: i) Imperial era (pre-1911), ii) Republic era (1992-1949), iii) Pre-reform era (1949-1978) and iv) Reform era (1978-present). Since the aim is not a historic review of the legislation on illicit drugs in China, but rather an analysis of the current state of the system, only the papers corresponding to the Reform era are assessed.

Since the 1990s, the country stepped up its prohibition mechanisms and increased its cooperation with other countries in the fight against illicit drugs. This "new phase witnessed a significant transition of [China] from a passive player who was defending its own border to a progressive player who sought increasing roles in drug prohibition movements in both Asia and the rest of the globe" (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009, 170). Since 1979, the Chinese government has increased efforts in order to formalize its mechanisms against illicit drugs. This has translated into 12 different decrees and laws on illicit drug activities between 1979 and 2007. These thesis reviews the most prominent regulations on this topic. For a summary of the 12 documents, please see annex 8.

The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China and its amendments

The second session of the fifth National People's Congress on July 1st, 1979 adopted this law. It summarized all sort of activities considered criminal by the Chinese government, it dedicated section 7 to the offenses of manufacturing, selling, transporting and smuggling narcotic drugs into and within the country (Government of the PRC 1979). Two revisions on China's Criminal Law have focused on illicit drugs: The revisions of 1997 and 2002. They increased the punitive policy by broadening the definition of narcotic offenses and, more importantly, they "required that severe drug offenders involved in smuggling, selling, transporting, and manufacturing would be held criminally liable no matter of the amount of narcotic drugs involved" (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009, 112).

Death Penalty for Severe Drug Offences

The inclusion of the death penalty as maximum punishment for drug offences took place in 1982, as a response to the increasing figures in drug production and trafficking in China. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued a 'Decision on severely punishing those who disturb the Economy', which increased the maximum penalty for offenders from 15 years to death penalty. Further on, the 1987 'Response on Sentencing Standards for Imposing the Death Penalty on Narcotics Traffickers' which specified the threshold for amount of drugs seized in order to apply the death penalty; e.g. 500 grams for heroin (L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008, 110). By 2005, with the introduction of the Anti-Drug Law, a especial provision was included so high-courts of the Yunnan and Guangdong Provinces (most burdened with drug trafficking) could decide to apply the death penalty directly without the approval of the government (L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008, 113)

Resolution on Prohibiting Narcotic Drugs

Passed by the National People's Congress in 1990, this resolution was the first of its kind to set the path for specific legislation on narcotic drugs. Among its achievements, this piece of legislation (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009, 111):

- Allowed for an exact definition as illicit narcotic and psychotropic drugs as included in the 1961 and 1988 UN Conventions,
- Broadened the types of punishment for drug-related offences to include sanctions like fines or confiscation of goods,
- Made it possible to prosecute not just individuals but also public officers and institutions for violations of the drug law, and
- Established China's jurisdictional authority for all drug related offences taking place on Chinese territory, including those committed by foreign nationals, if there are no bilateral or extradition treaties. More important, it established the National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) as the regulatory body for illicit drugs.

Anti-Drug Law

China had its first comprehensive law on illicit drugs approved on December 2007 by the Standing Committee of the People's Congress. It entered into effect on June 2008, and thus became the guideline for combatting the Chinese illicit drug market. It reflected the position of the government who saw illegal narcotics as a threat to public health and social order, hence its strong punitive measures against this type of crime (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009).

The Drug Control Law built on the advances in regulations set by the 'Resolution on Prohibiting Narcotics' from 1990. The law established a 'National Anti-Drug Committee' in charge of the policy-making and setting the guidelines for the fight against illicit drugs (Article 5), and it consolidated the drug control strategy (Chapter III) with the treatment for drug addiction, perceived as an illness (Chapter IV) (Government of the PRC 2007).

Institutional Organizations to Combat Drug Trafficking

China's fight against the illicit drug market involves several ministries and agencies within the government. In addition, provinces and autonomous territories have their local drug control organs, as well as their anti-drug squads. The National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) coordinates this highly complex structure, as established within the 'Resolution on Prohibiting Narcotics Drugs' passed by the National People's Congress in 1990. The NNCC is in charge of the domestic policy and drug control, as well as the cooperation with international organizations and third parties on this issue (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009).

Figure 11. Drug Law Enforcement in China – Main Departments



*The NNCC works with 25 departments of the State Council of the PRC. Figure shows most relevant ones.
Source: (State Council of the PRC 2000). Own design.

The NNCC works together with 25 departments of the State Council of the PRC, in order to advance in the following five strategies: i) promotion of drug prevention through education, ii) drug treatments and rehabilitation, iii) drug blocking through interdiction operations; iv) law enforcement on domestic level; and v) drug control administration, specifically for regulation of precursor chemicals (NNCC 2008).

Among the 25 departments working with the NNCC, the three most important are: Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Ministry of Health and the General Administration of Customs (see figure 11). Established in 1998 with the approval of the State Council of the PRC, the operational agency of the NNCC, the Drug Control Bureau, is under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Public Security. Through this Bureau, the NNCC coordinates the domestic efforts to combat illicit drugs together with local authorities in provinces and autonomous territories. On a national level, the NNCC also works together with the "Chinese People's Armed Police, frontier defence force of the public security authorities, judicial departments, customs, supervision and control organs of pharmaceuticals, and administration departments for industry and commerce" (State Council of the PRC 2000).

The Philippines

Ratification of International Conventions

The Philippines is a founding member of the United Nations and signatory to the three main international conventions on drugs (table 6). However, since the rise of Rodrigo Duterte to power, the government's approach to regulate illicit drugs have been highly criticised by the international community. In particular, UNODC's Executive Director voiced out his concerns over reports of extra-judicial killings, stating: "such responses contravene the provisions of the international drug control conventions, do not serve the cause of justice, and will not help to ensure that 'all people can live in health, dignity and peace, with security and prosperity'" (UNODC 2016b).

Table 6. International Drug Control Conventions - the Philippines' Participation

Convention	Signature	Ratified
1961 - Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs	30-Mar-61	02-Oct-67
1972 - Amendment to 1961 Single Convention	25-Mar-72	07-Jun-74
1975 - Amendment to 1961 Single Convention		
1971 - Convention on Psychotropic Substances		07-Jun-74
1988 - UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	20-Dec-88	07-Jun-96

Source: (UNODC 1961, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1990)

International condemnation on Duterte's approach to illicit drug trafficking has led the Philippine's president to announce in March 2018 that the country would withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC), although the process could take up to a year (Singh 2018).

National Legislation on Illicit Drugs

Origins of the Philippines' modern legislation against illicit drugs trace back to president Ferdinand Marcos, who imposed the martial law in the country and, among several decrees to regulate criminal activities, enacted the 'Dangerous Drug Act of 1972' (Republic Act 6425). This law established the creation of a Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) as the main organ to coordinate national efforts against illicit drug. Nonetheless, given the increase of illicit drug trade and consumption in the country during the 1990s, as well as the implementation of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the country needed to update its national legal framework on illicit drugs. Thus, they issued the 'Dangerous Drug Act of 2002' (Republic Act 9165). This piece of legislation enforced stricter laws against illicit drugs as well as increased funds for combating production, traffic and use of narcotics in the country (DDB 2013a). Between 2002 and 2018, the DDB issued more than 80 Board Resolutions, most of them to update procedures or include new substances in the dangerous drugs list. Some of the most important ones summarized in annex 9.

The comprehensive scope of the Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 included:

- Better mechanisms to regulate the trade and use of precursor chemicals, including stronger penalties for those infringing the law (Art. II, Sec. 4),
- Severe sanctions to owners of drug dens, including lifetime imprisonment and the death penalty as options (Art. II, Sec. 6),
- Criminalization of drug use with penalties from 6 months to 12 years depending on recidivism (Art. II, Sec. 15), and
- Involvement of the private sector, local governments and civil society in the fight against illicit drugs (Arts. IV, VI, VII) (Government of the Philippines 2002)

Other major accomplishments of the Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 were increasing the number of departments working with the DDB from 6 to 17, creating of the Philippines' Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) (Executive Order 218), as well as provide the grounds for additional strengthening of the mechanisms to combat drug trafficking per se. This was done through the Republic Act 10640, which regulated the "Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment." (PDEA 2013,

Section 1). The Republic Act 10640 was a direct respond to the provisions set by the UN 1988 Convention, which aimed to increase efforts to fight drug trafficking as well as the smuggling of precursor chemicals. The Philippines' complete strategy against illicit drugs is detailed in the "National Anti-Drug Plan of Action 2015-2020" established by the presidency of Benigno Aquino III (DDB 2014).

A major ongoing debate is the use of death penalty as a maximum punishment for severe drug crimes. The Philippines banned the death penalty as maximum punishment for all types of crimes in 2006; however, the current Drug Law allows the application of this sanction. This law remains unchanged to date, and the current government of Rodrigo Duterte has shown to be fully in favour of the use of this punishment to curb drug trafficking (Elemina 2016). Despite the abolition of the death penalty, "the Philippine police acknowledged that approximately 4,000 suspected drug users or sellers had been killed in the war on drugs, while Human Rights Watch put the number at 12,000 and Philippine human rights advocates claimed it was more than 16,000." (Johnson and Fernquest 2018, 2).

Institutional Organizations to Combat Drug Trafficking

The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)

As previously mentioned, the DDB coordinates the illicit drugs strategy of the Philippines, since its establishment in 1972. The DDB works closely with two departments of the government: It is directly attached to the Department of Health, and its chairmanship is exercised by the Department of Justice (DDB 2014). Since 2002, the DDB expanded its board members to 17, among them the Department of National Defence and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The DDB is the primary body of drug prevention and control in the Philippines. Its mandate is to "develop and adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified and balanced national drug abuse prevention and control strategy" (DDB 2014, 5).

Another main component of the drug law enforcement in the country is the PDEA, established in 2002 with the main purpose to implement the guidelines of the DDB under one centralized agency. The PDEA has 18 regional offices across the country, and has the capacity to direct investigation operations, eradication programs, operations to capture drug offenders, seizure and destruction of illicit drugs, monitoring of dubious cargo and parcels, maintenance of the national drug intelligence system, and prevention campaigns. Notwithstanding, concerning interdiction operations, aside from the PDEA there are two other organs with the right to perform

drug busts and high-level captures: the National Bureau of Investigations (NIB) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) (PDEA 2016). Figure 12 summarizes the structure of drug law enforcement in the country.

Figure 12. Drug Law Enforcement in the Philippines – The Structure of the DDB



Source: (DDB 2014, 6)

The Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD)

As president Duterte has made the fight against illicit drugs a priority of his presidency, in 2017 his office established, through the executive order 15, the creation of the ICAD. This new founded agency is chaired by the PDEA, with the purpose of combating the Philippine's drug epidemic more efficiently (Government of the Philippines 2017). The ICAD "encompasses bodies from police, military and coastguard to health, education and social welfare, and aims to rehabilitate users and suppress dealers large and small", including a new drug enforcement

group of around 500 police that will “target drug financiers, manufacturers, distributors and protectors, including elected officials” (Zeldin 2017).

The implementation of ICAD did not replace the job done by the DDB, although it shares many common elements and works with many of DDB’s board members. However, the ICAD does not include in its structure the representation of the civil society (via NGOs), and has a stronger emphasis on law enforcement operations. Hence, its structure includes permanent representation from government offices like the AFP, PCG, PNP and NBI (Government of the Philippines 2017). This correlates with the punitive approach to illicit drugs of Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency. Table 7 details ICAD’s organizational structure.

Table 7. Composition of ICAD - New Drug Enforcement Agency of the Philippines

Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD) Chairmanship on the PDEA	Categories of work: Environment, Justice, Advocacy, and Rehabilitation and Integration:	Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
		Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
		Department of Justice (DOJ)
		Department of Health (DOH)
		Department of Education (DepEd)
		Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
		Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
		Department of Agriculture (DA)
		Department of National Defence (DND)
		Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)
		Philippine Information Agency (PIA)
		Public Attorney's Office (PAO)
		Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
		Philippine Coast Guard (PCG)
		Philippine National Police (PNP)
		National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
		Bureau of Customs (BOC)
		Bureau of Immigration (BI)
		Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
		Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC)

Source: (Government of the Philippines 2017, Executive Order No. 15:2)

Japan

Ratification of International Conventions

Japan has ratified all three main international conventions on drugs. The country has been a strong supporter of the current system for control of illicit drugs, opposing some of the more

progressive suggested modifications to the existing international regime, such as depenalization and legalization of softer drugs like Cannabis. Thus, Japan stands closely to the position of countries like the United States, Sweden and the Arab Nations (Bewley-Taylor 2003). Figure 13 summarizes the country's track of approval of international conventions on illicit drugs.

Figure 13. International Drug Control Conventions - Japan's Participation

Convention	Signature	Ratified
1961 - Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs	26-Jul-61	13-Jul-64
1972 - Amendment to 1961 Single Convention	15-Dec-72	27-Sep-73
1975 - Amendment to 1961 Single Convention	27-Sep-73	
1971 - Convention on Psychotropic Substances	21-Dec-71	31-Aug-90
1988 - UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	19-Dec-89	12-Jun-92

Source: (UNODC 1961, 1972, 1975, 1976, 1990)

The country has also increased its involvement with regulations complementary to the existing conventions, as it's the case of the UN Convention against Transnational Crime (UNTOC), which the country ratified in 2017 (UNODC 2017g).

National Legislation on Illicit Drugs

Modern legislation on illicit drugs in Japan dates back to the 1950s, with exception of the Cannabis Control Act of 1948. Initial regulation applied to opium, first ATS-type drugs and narcotics. The country started reviewing its laws in order to update them to the requirements of the international conventions on drugs, in particular of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.

Japan has four main pieces of legislation for control of illicit drugs depending on their type: Cannabis (Act No. 124 of 1948); Stimulants (Act No. 252 of 1951); Narcotics and Psychotropic (Act No. 14 of 1953); and Opium (Act No. 71 of 1954). The Cannabis Control Act was the first type of legislation to ban the import, export, cultivation, manufacture, trade and use of Marijuana in Japan. The law allows use of Cannabis only for research purposes, establishing a strict mechanism to obtain a license for its use (Chapter II). In addition, the document defines the type of sanctions for those violating the law, including penalties for up to 5 years of imprisonment, to be extended by 2 more years if it is a sell with intent on profit (Art. 24-2). This law has been amended 7 times between 1950 and 1999, with cannabis remaining banned (Government of Japan 1948).

The year 1951 brought the enactment of the Stimulants Control Act, which prohibited the import, export, possession, manufacture and use of both stimulants and raw materials (precursor chemicals) in Japan, with exception of those licensed manufacturers for research or medical use (Art. 14). The law's strongest point was the regulation of the prescription drug market, establishing links with existing legislation pharmaceuticals and medical devices (Chapter II). This law included the first group of stimulants and raw materials to be declared illegal for recreational use (Government of Japan 1951).

However, the most comprehensive law against illicit drugs is the 'Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Act of 1953. This legislation specified which drugs and precursors where illicit, with authorities updating the lists regularly until 2015. Currently, the law bans over 85 narcotics and psychotropic substances, and 14 raw materials (plant-based substances and synthetic precursor chemicals) (Tables I to IV). Aside from updating the guidelines to regulate the use of these substances for research and medical purposes, the law included a chapter on treatment of addicts (Chapter V). This chapter established that drug users should be included in a data-base of offenders, serve time in a correctional institution and, if proven to be recidivists, be coerced to receive treatment at a 'Medical Facility for Treating Narcotics Addicts' in their prefecture (Government of Japan 1951). This legislation sees addiction mostly as a criminal behaviour and not an illness.

In addition to the previous laws, the Japanese government has enacted the Offenders Rehabilitation Act, with further guidelines on treatment for drug offenders (Government of Japan 2007); and the Law Concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropic Control. The latter includes provisions on how to treat foreign nationals committing drug-related crimes in Japanese territory. It also implements mechanisms to improve revision of suspicious cargo and parcels, procedures for confiscation of drugs and goods related to criminal activity, among others (Government of Japan 1991). For the full summary of the legislation, see annex 10.

Institutional Organizations to Combat Drug Trafficking

The duties of law enforcement against illicit drugs fall on the National Police Agency (NPA) of Japan. This institution belongs to the National Public Safety Commission of the Cabinet Office. The NPA's Criminal Affairs Bureau controls the Drug and Firearms Division, is in charge of undertaking the operations to reduce supply of drugs in Japan, as well as coordinating collaborations with third parties internationally. It also cooperates with the intelligence office of the Criminal Affairs Planning Division (see figure 14).

Since the use of any kind of illicit drug is a criminal offense, the structure does not include an agency in charge for rehabilitation of drug users. The Ministry of Health is in charge of offering this service, through treatment centres in each prefecture. However, access to these kind of treatment goes together with a penal sanction (NPA 2015).

Figure 14. Drug Law Enforcement in Japan



Source: (NPA 2017a, 3). Author focused only on branches related to control of illicit drugs

1.1.2. Law Enforcement Cooperation

This set of criteria splits into two segments: i) Type of participation on international level: through forums or regional platforms, and ii) bilateral or multilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking: especially those that facilitate exchange of intelligence on drug-related activities with other law enforcement agencies).

China

Type of Participation on International Level

In addition to the different organizations intervening in the domestic drug law enforcement in China, the State Council authorized the establishment of the National Anti-Drug Committee (Anti-Drug Law of 2007, Article 54). This committee works together with the NNCC and is in

charge of organizing “international anti-drug cooperation, and [is] responsible for performing the obligations prescribed by the international anti-drug convention” (Government of the PRC 2007).

As mentioned before, since 1978 (Reform era), the Chinese government has aimed at strengthening its legislation on illicit drugs, as well as leading the fight against drugs regionally. A main example of this was China’s involvement in the drafting and the enactment of the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1988. The country begun to actively send official delegations to the UN General Assembly Special Sessions (UNGASS) on Drug Control, as well as the regular sessions of the UNODC, the International Crime Police Organization, the World Customs Organization and the World Health Organization, among others (State Council of the PRC 2000).

Since 2000, China has also been an active member of the Heads of Narcotic Law Enforcement Agencies (HONLEA) for Asia and the Pacific, as well as the ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs (ACCORD). The former holds periodical task force meetings and has set a series of specific actions to combat drug trafficking beyond national efforts, which include the establishment of a drug cooperation program among Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, Thailand and the UNODC (UNODC 2000). The country has stressed the importance of improving international cooperation mechanisms to combat transnational drug crimes, including the channels of communication between national drug agencies, as well as the sharing of up-to-date information (X. Zhang 2007).

Finally, among other relevant International Organizations that have China as a member, the International Crime Police Organization (ICPO-INTERPOL) is worth mentioning. The country has been a member since 1961, coordinating its work with the INTERPOL through the International Police Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). INTERPOL has two bureaus in China (Hong Kong and Macao), which coordinate the country’s work with other members of the organization, and facilitate exchange of information with Chinese authorities to help enforce criminal law and assist in extradition processes (INTERPOL 2018a).

Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements to Combat Drug Trafficking

The Chinese government has established several cooperation mechanisms to fight illicit drug trafficking across the globe. Efforts include the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and multilateral agreements mostly with neighbouring and source countries. These include the Golden

Triangle (Myanmar, Thailand and Laos), ASEAN, the Golden Crescent and Central Asia (Afghanistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), South Asia (India and Pakistan), and Japan (see figure 15). The cooperation mechanisms with Japan will be addressed in Japan's segment for international bilateral cooperation.

In addition, China has cooperation mechanisms with non-source countries like the United States (L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008). Given the extend of Chinese international cooperation on illicit drugs, this paper will focus on the most relevant ones within Asia and with the United States, since these correlate closely with China's main challenges on narcotics: ATS and Opioids (see segment 2.1.2. of this text for more details on main threats to China concerning illicit drugs). Furthermore, they are examples of the two types of international cooperation of China on illicit drugs (multilateral and bilateral).

Figure 15. Most relevant Chinese International Cooperation Agreements on Drugs



*Figure includes year were official cooperation begun. Applies for modern cooperation agreements since 1980s.
Source: (State Council of the PRC 2000; L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008, 178–81). Summary with main MOUs. Own Design.

China and the Cooperation on Illicit Drugs in the Golden Triangle

Modern cooperation mechanisms between China and the Golden Triangle countries can be grouped into one of the following categories: i) ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3 agreements; Framework for Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS); and agreements between Chinese local government (most prominently Yunnan Province) and third parties (Lijun 2006). Figure 16 shows the

main provinces and territories affected by drug trafficking between China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.

Concerning ASEAN+1, initial collaboration took place in 2000 at the International Congress in Bangkok 'In Pursuit of a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015' with led to the establishment of the ACCORD mechanism in 2002. In addition, under the ASEAN+3 platform, China also issued a MOU on 'Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues' together with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea (Lijun 2006, 107). Nonetheless, despite the multilateral nature of these agreements, most implementation occurs on a bilateral basis, with China's leading role increasing over the years (L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008, 183).

Figure 16. Golden Triangle Regions Bordering with China

Source: (Scott 2010, 2)

Chinese international cooperation with the countries of the Great Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) is complementary to the work with ASEAN. This work begun in 1990 with initial visits from China's MPS to Thailand and Myanmar (back then Burma), as well as meetings between the NNCC and its counterparts in these countries, setting the bases for initial multilateral cooperation on illicit drugs. This resulted in the 1993 MOU on Narcotic Drugs Control between China, Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, which established working groups between high-rank officials of the involved countries. Cooperation with the GMS consolidated in 1995 with the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and the Sub-Region Drug Control Program for Action. The provisions concerning illicit drugs included cooperation not only through joint operations to capture members

of drug trafficking networks, but also on measures to reduce drug consumption and financing of alternative cultivation to reduce drug supply (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009; Lijun 2006).

The third category, agreements between local governments in China and neighbouring countries, mostly involves the Yunnan Province. The most renowned collaborations are those between the Yunnan Provincial Office on Drugs & Crime and its partners in bordering cities of Myanmar and Laos. For Myanmar, it applies mostly to the Shan Province, which has several criminal groups of former members of the 'People's Army of Burma Communist Party' (BCP) handling the illicit drugs operation. Initial agreement took place in 1993 with the supervision of the UNODC Crime Programme (UNODC CP) for East and Southeast Asia. This included targets in reduction of drug demand and HIV rates among drug users, as well as the establishment of 5 liaison points across the border. These points allowed police units to exchange intelligence and organize joint operations for drug seizure Similar cooperation began with Laos in 1997 and with Vietnam in 1999 (Lijun 2006, 110).

China and the United States Cooperation on Illicit Drugs

The United States, the largest consumer of illicit narcotics in the world, stepped up cooperation mechanisms with China in the late 1980s, after the end of the Cold War affected relations between both countries and limited their joint work on illicit drugs. In 1987 both countries reinstated their commitment with the Sino-U.S. Memorandum of Cooperation in Narcotic Drugs Control (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009, 178). This set the basis for a Sino-U.S. Joint Statement during the 1997 Presidential Summit between Clinton and Jiang Zemin, which included a segment on bilateral drug enforcement cooperation. Perhaps more significantly, in the next year they signed an MOU establishing a Joint Liaison Group to exchange intelligence information on illicit drugs between the US' Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)A and China's MPS (Y. Zhang 2012, 13).

International disputes have put pressure on and often affected the implementation of the MOUs between the United States and China; however, their collaboration on the issue of illicit drugs has maintained over time. In 2000, they signed the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAA) for sharing intelligence on drug-related criminal activities, especially those aimed at capturing members of drug trafficking organizations and seizing illicit narcotics in both territories. Two more Memoranda of Intent followed this agreement: One to create a 'Bilateral Drug Intelligence Working Group' (BDIWG) between the NNCC and the DEA, focused on exchange of information; and one to increase cooperation against drug trafficking, between the NNCC and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), focused on joint interdiction operations (Y. Zhang 2012).

Sharing intelligence between both countries has shown some success in the captures of drug traffickers, as well as the seizure of drugs. Such is the case with the 2006 joint investigation between the DEA and custom agents from Hong Kong, which resulted in the seizure of almost 140 kilograms of Colombian cocaine in Chinese territory. Similarly, joint operations in 2007 and 2010 resulted in the seizure of 26 kilos of cocaine in the US and Chinese territory (Y. Zhang 2012). The need for cooperation has become more imperative in the last years, with the increasing opioid epidemic in the United States. In particular, the smuggling of Chinese fentanyl into the United States is one of the main concerns nowadays, when US$1,000 worth of this product can result in retail profit of up to US$7.8 Million (Deprez, Li, and Wills 2018). This has resulted in China banning new precursor chemicals related to fentanyl manufacture, as well as increasing the number of joint investigations with the United States, focusing on prescription opioids of these type (Yan 2017).

The Philippines

Type of Participation on International Level

The Philippines' government has stressed the need to combat the illicit drug market through regional and international cooperation. The country sees the exchange of information on best practices, as well as data on Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) as highly valuable; thus, it is committed to attending regional and international conferences and training workshops for its officials (DDB 2014). Most significantly, the Philippines has developed a strong cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to fight drug trafficking in Southeast Asia, dating back to the 'ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Narcotics Drugs' in Manila, on 26 June 1976. The country was one of the key proponents of this cooperation among all members of ASEAN, including the exchange of information on suspects of drug-related crimes: cultivation, production, traffic (ASEAN 1976).

The Philippines further strengthened its regional cooperation with ASEAN, by supporting the 'Bangkok Political Declaration in Pursuit of a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015' in Bangkok, Thailand, 11-13 October 2000. This document set an ambitious agenda to reduce the consumption of illicit drugs significantly in the region by 2015. The declaration also linked ASEAN's initiatives with funding from international organizations like the G8, the European Union, Organizations of the UN System, and from other parallel programs within ASEAN, such as ACCORD (ASEAN 2012). The country is also a member of the Colombo Plan, which is an organization for the cooperative economic and social development of Asia and the Pacific. Among its initiatives, they have the Drug Advisory Programme (DAP), established in 1973. The programme is

strongly focused on drug users, by improving the options and the quality of rehabilitation centres, as well as establishing prevention networks with the help of local communities (CPS 2018).

In addition, the Philippines has been a member of the INTERPOL since 1956. The country works with this agency through the Philippine Centre on Transnational Crime (PCTC), with a strong focus on illicit traffic of narcotics and psychotropic drugs. INTERPOL has an office in Manila, which operates under the PCTC and works together with all of Philippines' 22 law enforcement agencies, including the PDEA and the DDB. It helps monitor and coordinate joint operations on transnational crimes and provides training for national government agencies in the country. Furthermore, the INTERPOL maintains close communication with the National Central Bureau (NCB), an inter-ministerial body which is directly under the Office of the President, aiming at facilitating approval of major joined operations and data sharing (INTERPOL 2018c).

Nonetheless, despite Philippines' legislation stressing the importance of international cooperation and advancements of the country on this matter since the late 1970s, the Philippines current stance within the international community has hampered further efforts to integrate into the global fight against illicit drugs. Criticism on Duterte's aggressive stance on drug trafficking, the increasing number of extra-judicial killings and the potential violations of Human Rights have ostracised the country's chances to implement further agreements to tackle its drug epidemic (ABS-CBN 2017; Patel 2018).

Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements to Combat Drug Trafficking

The Philippines government, through the PDEA and DDB, has worked since the end of the cold war to increase the number of MOUs concerning cooperation to combat the illicit drug market, especially as the country has faced a spike in drug abuse since the 1990s. By 2012, the Philippines had MOUs on illicit drugs with 11 countries, aside from its regional cooperation mechanism with ASEAN (PDEA 2012). In addition, the country has approved several 'Partnership Agreements' which involve cooperation of different aspects promoting economic development and stability, including the fight against illicit drugs. Given the limitations of this paper, the focus lies on the agreements with Japan and the European Union, on the category of partnership agreements, while China will be the focus on the category of specific international cooperation mechanisms to control drugs, given its increasing relevance in the Philippines' regional strategy.

Partnership Agreements

The Philippines has signed a series of Economic Partnership Agreements with other countries or regional organizations, with some of them including specific provisions on cooperation

against illicit drug trafficking. With the Japanese government, for example, they had such an agreement since 2006. Its provisions concerning drug trafficking (arts. 1 and 2) strongly focus in improving the control procedures on the Philippines' Customs, by means of mutual technical assistance, exchange of best practices as well as establishing channels of communication between law enforcement agencies from both countries (DFA 2006). Similarly, the Philippines has signed a 'Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation' with the European Union, which includes specific provisions on illicit drugs (Title IV, arts. 21 and 22). Technical cooperation includes the drafting of national legalisation on drugs, establishment of national institutions and information centres, training of personnel, information exchange, research on illicit drugs, drug profiling and in overall measures to reduce manufacture of drugs in the Philippines (Council of the EU 2011).

Cooperation with China under Duterte's Term

Among Philippines' most relevant international cooperation partners is China, which has remained a supporter of president Duterte's drastic measures against illicit drugs since his appointment to office. China is a major supplier of methamphetamine to the Philippines, while it is one of the most important transhipment territory for Chinese narcotics to reach north and south East Asia, as well as Oceania and the United States (see figure 17). Additionally, Chinese criminal networks are one of the main suppliers of precursor chemicals to the Philippines' drug syndicates in charge of manufacturing of ATS-type drugs, most commonly 'Shabu' (Mirasol 2017).

Reinstating the importance of their cooperation, both governments signed a MOU on the 'Protocol on Cooperation between the PDEA and the NNCC of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of China' (Mirasol 2017). In their Joint Statement, presidents Duterte and Xi highlighted the key commitments of both countries in order to establish better mechanisms for combating illicit drugs. These included increasing exchange of intelligence, technology and training for police operatives, as well as continuing their preventive education and rehabilitation centres to reduce the demand for drugs (DFA 2016).

More importantly, the MOU set the mechanisms to increase cooperation between the PDEA, China's Bureau of Customs (BC) and the Fujian Provincial Drug Enforcement Agency; as well as the Joint Coast Guard Committee (JCGC) between the Philippine's and China's Coast Guards (Mirasol 2017). Bilateral cooperation on illicit drugs with China has not only increased in the last years, but has also managed to substantially improve the Philippines' relations with the neighbour country, leaving temporarily leaving aside issues over border disputes (South China Sea) (Heydarian 2017).

Figure 17. Meth Outflows from Mainland Asia – Routes to the Philippines

Source: UNODC quoted by Mirasol (2017, 2).

Japan

Type of Participation on International Level

Similar to most countries that are committed to fight illicit drugs, Japan considers international cooperation a requirement to successfully counter the threat of transnational criminal organizations behind drug trafficking. The country, a member of the G8, also finds that opportune and up-to-date exchange of information between national agencies is highly relevant, hence it continuously participates in international forums, where its investigators work in technical cooperation with third parties (NPA 2009).

Through ASEAN+3 (ASEAN + Japan, China and South Korea), the Japanese government has established the grounds for cooperation on illicit drugs. The group's main division concerned with drugs is the 'ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime' which has taken place every two years since 2004, and reviews and sets cooperation guidelines to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking and money laundering, among others (NPA 2017a). For the group's working plan 2018-2022, the country is part of the of 'Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime' (SOMTC), as well as the 'Plus Three Working Group on Narcotics to eradicate the scourge of drugs' (ASEAN 2017).

The country has also been a member of the INTERPOL since 1956. Japan works together with other members of INTERPOL sharing information and coordinating joint task forces to capture transnational criminals, including those involved in drug trafficking. INTERPOL has National Central Bureau that is part of the National Police Agency (NPA), with over 50 officers working with other law enforcement agencies of Asia and the Pacific (INTERPOL 2018b). Japan's commitment to international cooperation is particularly evident on forums in East Asia. The country attends conferences like the 'Conference on Amphetamine-Type Stimulants in East and South-East Asia', as well as regional seminars on maritime drug law enforcement and intelligence-collection mechanisms (MOFA 2000). In addition, the NPA has been organizing the 'Asia-Pacific Operation Drug Enforcement Conference' (ADEC) with its own budget since 1995 (NPA 2008b), reaching its 22nd edition in 2017.

Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements to Combat Drug Trafficking

Japan has been handling international cooperation on illicit drugs through the 'International Affairs Division', of the Commissioner-General's Secretariat of the NPA, since 1994. The work falls under one of these 4 categories (NPA 2017b):

- Exchange of know-how and technologies to reduce supply of illicit drugs,
- Coordination of international conferences,
- Negotiation of international treaties, and
- Exchange of overseas law enforcement and security agencies/departments.

Concerning the execution of projects in any of these categories, the NPA can decide to coordinate them directly, together with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), or with assistance of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). With JICA, however, cooperation mostly translates to training seminars in line with the agency's expertise on international cooperation mechanisms (NPA 2008b).

Figure 18. Structure of International Cooperation on Illicit Drugs - Japan



Sources: (NPA 2017b, 2008b; MOJ, n.d.; JICA 2017b, 2009; NPA 2008a). Author selected information on key initiatives on illicit drugs. Own Design.
MLAT = Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty

NPA and Direct International Cooperation

Japan works with several law enforcement agencies in other countries, interested in combatting drug trafficking more efficiently. Among its most prominent work is the bilateral cooperation with the Philippines. The NPA works together with the PDEA sending experts to train Philippine enforcement agents on better practices to identify suspects, including fingerprint tracing methods. This takes place under the project 'Philippine Drug Enforcement Capacity Improvement Project' that started in 2005 (NPA 2008b, 4). Furthermore, the NPA has supported regional mechanisms such as the 'Greater Mekong Sub-region MOU' (MOU6)[3], providing US$1,82 million for communication equipment and vehicles to increase their law enforcement capacity (Tsunekawa 2005). Additionally, the NPA holds regular bilateral 'Law Enforcement and Security Authority Meetings', which include working-level exchange of information on practices to combat transnational crimes. These meetings have taken place with China, Russia, United States and South Korea, among others (NPA 2017b, 2008a, 2008b).

Among bilateral cooperation led by the NPA, the China-Japan framework for consultation and cooperation is important for the Japanese government, since most of the methamphetamine in the market comes from the neighbouring country. The framework includes three mechanisms:

[3] Drug control effort coordinated by the UNDCP with Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, China, Cambodia and Vietnam.

i) annual meeting of vice ministers of both countries' police agencies (since 1997), ii) the Japan-China Consultation for Domestic Security (since 1999), and iii) the meeting of custom officers (since 2002). Thanks to these agreements, the NPA has worked together with law enforcement authorities from Hong Kong, Shanghai and Guangdong in joint operations against drug smuggling groups (Tsunekawa 2005).

NPA and JICA on Combatting Illicit Drugs

NPA's international cooperation through JICA covers a wide range of topics, including human trafficking, prostitution, money laundering and other transnational crimes. The country sponsors yearly trainings on topics like drug enforcement, drug analysis, and control of drug offenses for countries across the globe (NPA 2008b). However, for matters of illicit drugs, Japan's cooperation mostly focuses on its neighbour countries, and more prominently on Southeast Asian nations. Agreements aim at improving the quality and effectiveness of rehabilitation treatments, or at the reduction of supply. For the latter, the Philippines is the most recent example for cooperation on two aspects of rehabilitation of drug users between JICA and the country's DOH: i) Increase the offer of treatment centres and ii) review the effectiveness of such programmes. For this purpose, the countries signed the 'Record of Discussions on Technical Cooperation Project with the Philippines: Developing evidence-based drug dependence treatment and rehabilitation programs' and the program 'Consolidated Rehabilitation on Illegal Drug Users (CARE)' in 2017. Both these agreements have the ultimate goal of reducing demand for illicit narcotics in the Philippines (JICA 2017a, 2017b).

On the front of drug reduction, the most relevant cooperation with JICA is the "Project on Assistance for Improvement of Drug Law Enforcement in Thailand and Neighbouring Countries Phase 2". This had an initial phase in 2002 and received approval for a second period from 2006 to 2009 (JICA 2009). Coordinated with Thailand's Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB), the project aimed at improving technology for drug analysis skills, as well as the drug control mechanisms in Thailand. During these times, Japanese experts worked not only with Thai authorities, but also with officials from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. In addition, the NPA organizes training seminars on control of drug offences and other transnational criminal activities, with the help of JICA (NPA 2008b, 4–5).

NPA, the MOJ and the Framework for Mutual Legal Assistance

The NPA makes use of the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) Framework designed by the MOJ to provide assistance for a criminal investigation undertaken by a foreign country, including

drug-related crimes (MOJ, n.d.). Japan has established bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with six countries/special territories: The United States (since 2003), South Korea (2006), China (since 2007), Hong Kong (since 2008), Russia (since 2009) and the European Union (since 2009). These agreements aim to facilitate the exchange of information and evidence of criminal suspects, including: identification of people, examination, taking of testimonies and transferring of people in custody, among others (MOJ 2009b, 2007, 2003, 2008, 2006, 2009a).

Additionally, Japan has MLA framework on the matter of illicit narcotics, which applies in case the requesting party does not have a bilateral agreement with Japan. The provisions appear in chapter VI of the 'Organized Crime Punishment Law' and Articles 21-22 of the 'Law Concerning Special Provisions for the Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Law, etc. and Other Matters for the Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conducts and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation. Unofficial Translation'. Requests from third parties may be accepted except in cases where the criminal case is pending before a Japanese Court, or when the offense for which assistance is requested is not penalized under Japanese law (Government of Japan 1991).

1.2. National Dimension

1.2.1. Assessment of the Illicit Drug Market (Drug Problem)

This set of criteria is organized in three segments: i) Drug use: the most common illicit drugs used in each country and the annual prevalence rates in drug abuse, ii) Crime related to drug trafficking, drug seizures and use of drugs in prison, and iii) Associated illnesses to injected drug use (HIV, HCV, HBV). Each country has a brief introduction that highlights a key aspect of the market, followed by the review of the three segments.

China

China's role in the illicit drug market is that of a producer, transit and destination country. Its rapid economic growth in the last decade, as well as the size of its population and its location, place the country in the heart of the drug trafficking hub of East Asia. China has become one of the most important suppliers of chemical precursors to produce illegal narcotics (mostly ATS) and a traffic route for NPS (fentanyl, methamphetamine), given the amount of airports and ports that connect the country locally and internationally (BINLEA 2018, 133).

Key Aspect: Precursor Chemicals

Although, not included in the statistics concerning drug use, the production of chemical precursors in China is worth reviewing. The country is one of the largest producers of substances required to manufacture and process narcotics. Its proximity with the Golden Triangle facilitates the sale through border; however, trafficking networks also reach markets in Central and South America and Africa (e.g. Ephedrine sent to Nigeria, Potassium permanganate sent to Ecuador) (BINLEA 2018, 55, 63, 65).

Figure 19. Controlled Precursor Chemicals in China (2005-2017)



Source: (O'Connor 2016, 17; State Council of the PRC 2017). Own design.

By 2014, China had around 160,000 companies that manufactured precursor chemicals, with factories across the country, and became the third largest exporters of these type of substances in the world (BINLEA 2014). According to figure 19, since the implementation of the 'Regulation on the Administration of Precursor Chemicals in 2005 (State Council of the PRC 2005), the Chinese has included 10 new substances, accounting for a 45% increase, mostly in the category of high risk substances.

Drug Use

Most Common Consumed Drugs

Reports from the UNODC as well as China's National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) warn on the increasing trend in consumption of synthetic drugs within the country, in particular the use of ketamine and methamphetamine (also known as 'ice', 'crystal' and 'glass') (APAIC 2017; China Daily 2016). The NNCC's Annual Drug Report recorded that in 2016 China had 2,505,000 registered drug users, with 60,6% of them belonging to the age range 18 to 35 years (BINLEA 2018, 134). This clearly sets an increasing pattern of use of narcotics among the youth. In addition, in 2015, of the 445,000 newly registered drug users, 80% reported a synthetic substance as primary drug of consumption (Levissianos et al. 2017, 15).

Figure 20. Registered Drug Users 2010-2016 *



*Data from the National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC)
Source: (BINLEA 2012, 167, 2014, 129, 2016, 131, 2016, 134)

As figure 20 shows, between 2010 and 2016 ATS narcotics overtook the larger share among drugs consumed by registered users. While in 2010, heroin dominated the ranking with 69% of consumers. By 2016, it reached only 34% while ATS accounted for almost 55% of the total of drugs reported by registered users. Reported separately from the rest of China, Hong Kong

follows a similar pattern in drug use, with methamphetamine consumption increasing 43% between 2011 and 2015, reaching a total of 2,195 consumers (Levissianos et al. 2017, 18). Statistics on drug consumption based on registered users can by biased, as information only takes into account a fraction of total users. This is particularly true for China, with the NNCC estimating that the country had around 14 million drug users by 2015, versus the 2,5 million registered drug users (BINLEA 2018; Tiezzi 2015). Nonetheless, the sample taken from registered drug users correlates closely with the trends on drug use in China; as reported by the UNODC's Global Smart Program in 2017, informing that the consumption of crystal meth and other ATS had continued to increase in use over Heroin between 2011 and 2015 (see table 8).

Table 8. Trends in Use of Selected Drugs in China (2011-2015)

Drug Type	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Crystalline Methamphetamine	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
Methamphetamine Tablets	↑	↑	↑	↑	↑
MDMA (Ecstasy)	↓	↑	↑	↑	↓
Cannabis	•	•	•	↑	↓
Heroin	↔	↑	↑	↓	↓
Ketamine	↑	↑	↑	↑	↔
Opium	↔	↑	↑	↑	↓

Source: (Levissianos et al. 2017, 16)
Conventions: ↑ = Increasing, ↓ = Decreasing, ↔ = Stable, • = Not reported

Annual Prevalence in Drug Use

Concerning prevalence, as seen in table 9, information reported to the UNODC is not up-to-date for most substances. 2008 and 2012 are the latest years with information on drug abuse in mainland China.

Table 9. Annual Prevalence Drug Use in China

Drug Type	Year*	Percentage**
Amphetamines	2008	0.35
Cannabis	2008	0.4
Cocaine	2008	0.25
MDMA	2008	0.24
Opiates	2012	0.19
NPS (Ketamine)	2012	0.13

*Latest year available for information
**Best percentage (average between upper and lower results among surveys)
Source: (UNODC 2018a)

Annual Prevalence is higher for Amphetamines and MDMA, both ATS type of drugs. The trend has remained unchanged as established by BINLEA's International Narcotic Control Strategy Report (INCRS). It highlights that in 2015 the Amphetamines and MDMA drugs replaced heroin

(opiates) as most consumed drugs; while Ketamine (NPS) became the third largest drug of use according to annual prevalence levels (BINLEA 2016, 130).

Crime Related to Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking in China takes places on the domestic and the international sphere. Local trafficking networks associate with drug cartels in Central America and criminal networks in Africa, in order to export NPS and chemical precursors. Trafficking of Chinese illicit narcotics has a strong impact on the international drug market, with routes connecting the Golden Triangle with the Yunnan Province, and later expanding to Guangxi and Guangdong Provinces in order to reach Hong Kong and Macao. From there, trafficking networks use the ports to export drugs to East Asia, Oceania and the United States (Huang 2007). Figure 21 highlights the main routes for illicit substances, including chemical precursors for the manufacture of synthetic drugs.

Figure 21. Illicit Drug and Chemical Precursors Flows in and out of China 2016

Source: (Broadhurst 2016; Hruby 2017). Map modified to reflect only drug flows related to China.

Considered one of the hottest spots for drug smuggling in China, the Yunnan Province (red area on figure 21) shares a highly porous border with Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. It's capital, Kunming, is a key redistribution point for all of China (UNODC 2013a). In 2016 alone, drug seizures in this province reached 23.6 tonnes: 93.7% of the national total of captured methamphetamines in China in that year (Hruby 2017).

Trends in Drug Seizures

The most commonly seized drug in 2016 was methamphetamines, which accounted for 61% of all confiscated drugs during that year (UNODC 2017a). The Chinese authorities reported 6,330 kg of methamphetamines impounded in interdiction operations in 2006, with the number increasing to 31,097 kg of the same substance in 2016 (see figure 22). This translates into an increase of almost 400% within 10 years. In comparison, seizures of heroin and morphine (in all forms) only increased 48% over the same time. This correlates with the reports from the BINLEA, NCB and UNODC that warn on the exponential increase in methamphetamine manufacturing in China (BINLEA 2018; UNODC 2017d).

Figure 22. Trends in Drug Seizures in China 2006-2016



*China includes Mainland China + Hong Kong and Macao
**Ecstasy and Hashish (minor amounts)
Source: (UNODC 2017a). Author collected and organized disaggregated data. Own Design

Another significant figure of China's illicit drug market is the seizures of chemical precursors within the country. China saw an increase of 60% in seizures of precursor chemicals (powder type) of the category I (see annex 11 for details on precursor in that category) (INCB 2018, 2016). According to figure 23, 2006 saw 10,250 kg worth in seized precursors Type I, while

2016 reached the 16,460 kg, in spite of efforts to regulate trade of these type of substances. This correlates directly with the amount of methamphetamines seized in the same period.

Figure 23. Seizures of Dry Precursor Chemicals - China and Rest of East Asia (2010 - 2016)



*Measures in Kilograms, applies only for precursor chemicals from Category I from INCB.
Source: (INCB 2016, 67–68, 2018, 73–74). Own design.

Arrests from Drug-Related Crimes

Between the period of 2012 and 2017, China's NCB reported 724,000 drug-related incidents with over 530,000 arrested people and 370 tonnes of seized drugs. The country also participated in 16,000 different international interdiction operations in that same period, which resulted in the capture of 19,000 suspects and the seizure of 22,7 tonnes of illicit narcotics (Xinhua 2017).

Figure 24. Trends in Arrests for Drug Trafficking in China 2012-2016



Source: (UNODC 2018g, 202–3). Own design.

Figure 24 shows the statistics only for arrests of drug traffickers between 2012 and 2016, according to reports from the NNCB to the UNODC. Data shows that the majority of arrests for drug trafficking correspond with smuggling of ATS-type drugs and Opioids, which is consistent with the trends in drug consumption in the country.

Associated Illnesses

China presents a relatively moderate HVI prevalence rate among Injected Drug Use (IDU), which was 5.9% in 2015 in comparison with the 6.33% of 2013. This is partially possible due to high level of safe injecting practices (86,5%) in the country (UNAIDS 2017a; AVERT 2017). This positive statistic only reflects a national average, which, in the case of China, can vary widely if compared to provinces with higher Injected Drug Use (IDU) rates in the country. This is the case for Guangxi, where 69% of HIV cases in 2014 were product of a contagion through IDU (AVERT 2017). Concerning HCV prevalence rates, statistics are higher, with China reporting a medium of 67% among IDUs for 2010 (latest available data), only surpassed by Russia (72.5%) and the United States (73.4%) (Nelson et al. 2011).

The Philippines

The country is both a transit territory and a final destination for illicit drugs. Domestically, the problem involves high consumption levels of Marijuana and methamphetamines by its population; while internationally, the problem is mostly the increasing number of people using ‘drug couriers’ (drug mules) to transport drugs into China (BINLEA 2012). The arrival of president Rodrigo Duterte to power in the Philippines revamped the fight against drug trafficking in the country, making it a top priority in his government (BINLEA 2018). Duterte’s approach has been highly criticized by the excessive use of force against suspected criminals, including the implementation of ‘death squads’ accused of committing extra-judicial killings. Although the government does not provide official statistics, independent organizations and NGOs talk about at least 7000 extra-legal executions for drug-related suspected crimes by 2016 (McLean 2018).

Key aspect: Drug Trafficking of ATS

The Philippines meets certain conditions that have increased the levels of production and transnational trafficking of ATS drugs, in particular methamphetamines. The country’s geography makes its borders highly porous, given its number of islands; while its weak regulation on precursor chemicals has resulted in a peak in production of synthetic drugs. In addition, corruption levels and a limited budget in the law enforcement sector, in spite of Duterte’s focus on fighting drug trafficking, makes it harder for police to patrol borders and ports, investigate and prosecute the members of trafficking networks (BINLEA 2018).

Currently, the country has three large groups (syndicates) of Drug Trafficking Organizations: The African Drug Syndicates (ADS), the Chinese Drug Syndicate and the Mexican Sinaloa Drug Syndicate (PDEA 2016). The first two own most of the clandestine laboratories as well as illicit warehouses for ATS and chemical precursors (PDEA 2012). As figure 25 shows, between 1991 and 2016 most of the routes for drug trafficking were located in the Luzon area, which is the largest island (area and population) in the country. Of the total of 20 major drug smuggling incidents recorded during this period, 14 took place in Luzon (70%), while Visayas and Mindanao had only 6 in total (30%) (PDEA 2016, 25).

Figure 25. Critical areas for Drug Smuggling in the Philippines (1991-2016)

Source: (PDEA 2016, 24). Selected variables, Own Design.

Drug Use

Despite the government's efforts and harsher law enforcement operations, crystal methamphetamine (also known as 'Shabu') remains the second largest drug used among people right after Cannabis. Although president Duterte has proclaimed that the country has about 4 million drug users, official statistics from the Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) show that the Philippines had

around 1,8 million drug users in 2016, which is roughly 1,8% of its population (Levissianos et al. 2017; PDEA 2016).

Figure 26. Drug Consumption According to Treatment in Philippines (2004-2011)



[1] Methamphetamine
[2] Marijuana, Hashish
[3] Contact, Cement or Adhesives
[4] Cocaine, MDMA, Solvent, Nubain
Source: (DDB 2017a). Selected indicators only for years with disaggregated data.

Figure 26 shows the drugs reported by users in detoxification treatments between 2004 and 2011, with a higher share for 'Shabu' (62.5% in 2011) and Cannabis (26.9% in 2011) over all other illicit drugs. This data only reflects the consumption among drug users that have registered to receive any kind of treatment to quit consumption, and it is different from drug abuse statistics among users overall. In general, Cannabis is the most consumed drug, followed by 'Shabu'. Statistics on overall drug consumption are not up-to-date, with the most recent data available for 2015 establishing that of the 1.8 million drug users in the Philippines, 48.9% used 'Shabu' while 72% consumed Cannabis at some point in the year (Levissianos et al. 2017). Drug use of NPS, MDMA and Cocaine is very limited in the country, given its high retail prices in the market, it mostly occurs in clubs (BINLEA 2018; APAIC 2014b).

Annual Prevalence in Drug Use

According to the most recent available data, Cannabis remains the drug with the highest level of annual prevalence among users, followed in second place by amphetamines. All other drugs have much lower scores (see table 10).

Table 10. Annual Prevalence Drug Use in the Philippines

Drug Type	Year*	Percentage**
Amphetamines	2016	1.1
Cannabis	2016	1.64
Cocaine	2016	0.07
MDMA	2012	0.2
Opiates	2011	0.04

*Most recent year available
**Best Percentage (average between upper and lower results in surveys)
Source:(UNODC 2018a)

Consumption of illicit narcotics is widespread across the country. According to statistics from 2016, of the 42,036 villages (*barangays*) in the Philippines, 46.91% are affected by a drug-related activity (production, consumption, trade). The DDB classifies these villages in three groups: Seriously affected (which includes a production facility and 3 or more drug dens), moderately affected (between 2 and 20% of villagers related to illicit-drug activity), and slightly affected (less than 2% or villagers related to illicit-drug activity) (PDEA 2016, 24).

Crime Related to Drug Trafficking

Both PDEA and the Philippines' National Police organize major interdiction operations in order to bust laboratories for drugs (methamphetamines), cannabis plantations and drug dens across the country.

Figure 27. Drug Seizures in the Philippines (2006 - 2016)



*Ecstasy and Hashish (minor amounts)
Source: (UNODC 2017a). Author collected and organized disaggregated data. Own Design

Although, in 2006 Marijuana accounted for the largest share in drug seizures (89%), by 2016 this drug accounted only for 28% of the total amount of narcotics confiscated (UNODC 2017a).

Conversely, seizures of crystal methamphetamine began to increase since 2012 (see figure 27), reaching 2,219 kg in 2016 (for more details see annex 12). In total, between 2010 and 2015, "a total of 25 facilities manufacturing crystalline methamphetamine were dismantled, including two laboratories in 2015 […]. In 2016, Philippine national authorities dismantled 10 methamphetamine facilities, one of them a 'floating laboratory' found off Subic Bay in July 2016" (APAIC 2014b).

Arrests for Drug-Related Crimes

In the Philippines, the PDEA coordinates most of the domestic counter-narcotic operations, although other law enforcement offices undertake their own operations and report to the agency, as is the case of the Armed Forces of the Philippine (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). Statistics compiled by the PDEA show a substantial increase in counter-narcotic operations in the country, going from less than 10,000 in 2012 to more than 34,000 in 2016 (see figure 28). This 244% increase is the result of an increase in operations against the so-called 'Drug Syndicates' handling most of the drug trafficking and distribution operations in the country. This includes the Chinese Drug Syndicate, the Mexican Sinaloa Drug Syndicate and the ADS. In addition, most of the arrests that take place involve men, as recorded in 2016 with only 1 woman arrested per every 7 men (PDEA 2016).

Figure 28. Anti-drug Operations Arrests in the Philippines 2012-2016



Source: (PDEA 2016, 29, 40, 2014, 16, 18, 2012, 20, 26)

In addition, the Philippines' local authorities keep a close track on foreign nationals who could be involved in drug-related activities, including tourist capture while buying or consuming illicit narcotics. According to 2016 statistics, the PDEA arrested 112 foreigners as part of counter-narcotic operations during that year, which is an increase of 30% in comparison with the 86 captured in 2012. More importantly, more than 50% of all arrested were Chinese (figure 29),

which correlates to the links between criminal networks from the neighbour countries that import chemical precursors and methamphetamines into the Philippines.

Figure 29. Foreign Nationals Arrested in the Philippines for Drug-Related Violations 2016



* Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, UK, Canada, Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Switzerland and Venezuela
Source: (PDEA 2016, 43, 2014, 19, 2012, 28)

Associated Illnesses

The Philippines used to be one of the countries in East Asia with the lowest rates of HIV among drug users, partially because of the low numbers of injected drug use, but also because of its needle-exchange programmes. However, this panorama has changed as currently the Philippines has one of the fastest HIV growing rates in the world (Doyle 2016). An important factor contributing to this is the increasing number of people sharing contaminated needles. According to the UN Development Programme (UNDP), out of 2761 HIV cases in 2012, 168 (6%) were related to IDU (de Jesus et al. 2012). The trend remained similar with 5% of HIV cases being product of IDU in 2016 (Epidemiology Bureau 2016, 7) .

HIV and HCV prevalence among users of injected drugs is very high in the Philippines: For 2015, HIV had a prevalence of 29%, while HCV was at 28% (UNAIDS 2017b). Most cases are registered in the Cebu Province, where needle exchange programmes officially ended in 2009, leading to an impressive increase in HVI prevalence rates among IDU from 1% to 53% (McQuie 2016).

Japan

Japan's drug problem has a domestic characteristic, as the country is only a destination for illicit narcotics. The country, given its level of economic development and geographic location, is one

of the most profitable markets for illicit drugs in East Asia, in particular for ATS (BINLEA 2012). Despite how lucrative the market is, Japan's consumption rate of illicit narcotics is substantially lower than the world's average (Ikeda et al. 2017). Nonetheless, the country remains at the heart of the drug trafficking networks in East Asia, with the addition of the recent flow of meth-amphetamines coming from Mexico (APAIC 2014a). The problem may be harder to measure though, as people are in overall reluctant to provide information on drug use, given the public condemnation of the use of illicit narcotics in any form (Ryall 2018; Hari 2018). This could result in the under-reporting of drug use, which would partially explain Japan's low statistics.

Key aspect: Retail Drug Prices

In general, high-income countries tend to report higher retail prices for illicit drugs: However, as figure 30 shows, Japan's retail price of crystal methamphetamine, one of its most consumed drug, is particularly high when compared to other countries in East Asia. According to the most recent statistics available, this drug's price for consumers was almost 13 times higher as that of the Chinese market in 2015. The country ranked higher than South Korea, only followed closely by retail price in Australia.

Figure 30. Retail Price of Crystal Meth in 2015 *



*Average Price.
Source: (Levissianos et al. 2017, 4)

Drug Use

Among the different illicit drugs reported by the policy department (arrests for drug use) between 2012 and 2016, the larger share belongs to the ATS category, as showed by figure 31. Japan's problems with drugs from this category, and in particular with crystal methamphetamine, are not

new: The country has experienced 2 previous 'Meth Epidemics' between 1951 and 1957, and between 1970 and 1994 (Wada et al. 2013). The current and third one, starting in 1995, extends to other types of ATS and NPS including the so-called "dangerous drugs" (e.g. synthetic cannabinoids, crystals from the cathinone family), which have higher levels of neurotoxicity and unpredictable effects in many cases (Ikeda et al. 2017). Aside from these drugs, demand for substances like cocaine, heroin and other opioids is very low in the country (APAIC 2014a).

Figure 31. Type of Drugs According to Drug Arrests in Japan 2012-2015



Source: (Ikeda et al. 2017, 481). Own Design.

In particular, NPS have become more popular among users; as reported by the 'Nationwide Mental Hospital Survey on Drug-related Psychiatric Disorders' in 2014, with users of these drugs accounting for the largest share of synthetic drug abusers in that year, surpassing methamphetamines (Shimane 2017). NPS are also known as 'loophole drugs' since some of its components have not been banned yet as they are new to the market. Hence, young people (largest share of consumers of these type of substances) acquire them without breaking the law. Between 2012 and 2014, Japan saw an increase from 64 to 1,370 NPS identified in the market (Edström 2015).

Table 11. Annual Prevalence Drug Use Japan

Drug Type	Year*	Percentage**
Amphetamines	2011	0.3
Cannabis	2011	0.3
MDMA	2009	0.1
NPS	2016	0.1

*Latest year available for information
**Best percentage (average between upper and lower results among surveys)
Source: (UNODC 2018a)

Concerning prevalence rates, the UNODC's current information on annual prevalence rates in drug use depends on reports from the Japanese government and these are sporadic. Table 11 shows some information on annual prevalence but only to the most recent year available. Since annual prevalence rates are so low to establish a comprehensive analysis in usage trends, the Japanese government normally uses the 'lifetime prevalence' rates (figure 32) in order to have more robust data (Edström 2015). This, however, fails to show an accurate assessment of the current trend on drug use in the country.

Figure 32. Pattern in Lifetime Prevalence of Drug Use (2001-2015)



*Note: Heroin is not included, as there was no official report of use during period of survey.
Source: (Shimane 2017, 120–21). Own design.

Crime Related to Drug Trafficking

As mentioned earlier, Japan's drug problem is mainly domestic, as the country is not a transit territory nor a manufacturer of illicit narcotics. Hence, most of counter-narcotic actions take place as interdiction operations in ports and airports, capturing either Japanese or foreigners from criminal networks (BINLEA 2012).

Methamphetamine is the most common seized drug; increasing from 149 kg to 1,521 kg between 2006 and 2016 (see figure 33). As for other drugs, such as Marijuana and Cocaine, trends in drug seizures show a decreasing participation in the last decade. Not included in the figure below, NPS have become another prominent substance among drug seizures. In an effort to keep better track of these type of synthetic drugs entering the market, the "Japanese government has a total of 2,356 substances controlled under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law" (APAIC 2014a).

Figure 33. Drug Seizures in Japan (2006 – 2016)



*Heroin, Morphine and Opium (minor amounts)
Source: (UNODC 2017a). Author collected and organized disaggregated data. Own Design

Although methamphetamines come from many countries, almost 40% comes from China (China + Hong Kong), according to reports from Japan's National Police Agency (NPA) to the UNODC (see figure 34). Nonetheless, Mexico is starting to become more prominent among drug suppliers to the Japanese Market, showing how appealing this market is for transnational criminal networks outside of the East Asian region (APAIC 2014a).

Figure 34. Methamphetamine Seizures According to Drug Origin 2016



Source: (APAIC 2014a)

Drug Arrests and Criminal Organizations

Concerning arrests for drug use, the trend has remained more or less unchanged between 2012 and 2016 (see figure 35). The year 2015 presented the highest peak when the NPA arrested 10,282 people for using an ATS-type of drug. Arrests for drug trafficking also reported ATS as

the most common drug group found in counter-narcotics operations. In total, Japanese authorities captured 1,554 drug traffickers in 2016, a considerable increase from the 248 people in 2014 (UNODC 2018g). In addition to these numbers, 1,196 were captured for smuggling or consuming an NPS-type of drug. Analysis by the Asia and Pacific ATS Information Centre (APAIC) concluded that the increase in arrests for NPS use could be partially correlated to the expansion in the number of controlled substances in the country during that year (APAIC 2014a).

Figure 35. Trend in Arrests for Drug Use in Japan 2012 - 2016



*Includes Hallucinogens and Ketamine
Source: (UNODC 2018g, 102–3). Own Design

Japanese gangs, known as *Boryokudan* (Japanese: violence groups) are behind most criminal activities in Japan, they have monopolized drug trafficking operations, with ATS smuggling account for a larger share of income for these groups (NPA 1991, 3). People often refers to *Boryokudan* as *yakuza*, although Japanese National Police refrains from using that term, given the increasingly positive connotation of the word in Japanese. Despite their many criminal activities, the yakuza also do charitable acts, have helped during natural catastrophes, and are idolized in popular media. Currently there are approximately “80.000 members of hundreds of *Boryokudan*, […] with the largest being the Yamaguchi-gumi, Inagawa-kai, and Sumiyoshi-kai” (Editors Encyclopedia Britannica 2016). The role of the Yakuza on methamphetamine traffic increased substantially since the prohibition of these substances by the ‘Stimulants Control Law’ in 1951. Since then, these groups have controlled the black market for ATS-type drugs (Edström 2015).

Associated Illnesses

Information on prevalence rates on HIV and HCV among users of injected drugs is very limited for Japan. A main issue is that this information is usually collected through questionnaires at

rehabilitation centres, and Japan mostly has such a service for alcohol addiction, with very few options dedicated exclusively to illicit narcotics (Wada et al. 2002). In addition to this, the share of people in Japan that use injected drugs is relatively low, with a prevalence rate of 0.47 in 2004 (around 400,000 in average) (Mathers et al. 2008, 1737). According to the latest available statistics from UNODC, Japan's HIV prevalence rate among injected drug users in 2014 was of 1.02. Numbers for HCV are so low that Japan uses the lifetime prevalence rate for any type of analysis. For the latest available data on 2015, the rate was of 56.8, but this hardly serves to identify a current trend in rise or decline of HCV among injected drug users in Japan.

1.2.2. Demand Reduction (Services for Drug Users)

This set of criteria splits into two segments according to the existing treatments to quit drug use: i) OST and Antagonist Therapies: including their availability, type of services and institutions offering them; and ii) Psychosocial and self-help centres: including the offer per country according to latest data available.

China

OST and Antagonist Therapies

According to the 2010 Atlas of Substance Use Disorders from the WHO, China has a defined drug abuse policy, which includes obligatory rehabilitation treatment for Substance Use Disorders (SUD), and some minor options for voluntary treatment. The Chinese government is in charge of more than 90% of all treatments available for drug users, with the remaining options managed by the private sector or NGOs. Although the social health insurance covers the costs of treatment against alcohol addiction, the patients of rehabilitation from drug abuse must ultimately pay for this treatment (WHO 2010a).

According to the Chinese government, the main purpose of their treatment and rehabilitation centres is to "protect the physical and mental health of Chinese citizens, maintain public order, and wipe out once and for all the scourge of drugs" (State Council of the PRC 2000). The Chinese Police is the authority in charge of coordinating and surveying treatments for SUD. The have the mandate to detain drug users for days or even to months in rehabilitation centres, where they not only receive a therapy to quit drug use, but also receive health education courses, do physical exercise and train a skill to more easily reintegrate into society (D. Werb et al. 2016). Until early 2000s, recidivist users had to go to Re-education-Through-Labour (RTL) centres managed by the local judicial authority in each province, which are now called Compulsory Isolated Rehabilitation (CIR) centres.

Although, treatments use a variety of substances in OST and antagonist therapies (see table 12), the most common ones are the Methadone Maintenance Treatment (MMT) Programmes (an OST-type of treatment). The government established the first clinics of this type in 2004 in the provinces with the highest rates of drug use (e.g. Yunnan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou and Zhejiang). MMT is part of the official Law on Drug Control since its revision in 2008, with 1,27 million users registered in 2009 (Yin et al. 2010).

Table 12. Pharmacotherapy for Maintenance or Withdrawal of Drugs - China

Purpose	Substance
Pharmacotherapy used for treatment of opioid dependence for detoxification	Methadone
	Buprenorphine
	Clonidine tablets
	Lofexidine
	Benzodiazepines (alprazolam)
	Antipsychotics/neuroleptics (clozapine)
Pharmacotherapy used for treatment of opioid dependence for maintenance	Methadone solution/syrup
	Naltrexone implant

Source: (WHO 2010a, 3). Criteria includes medication only for SUD.

MMT has proven to be only partially effective in the reduction of drug use, resulting in many dropouts, primarily caused by relapses and detentions. The latter is particularly worrisome as police has the right to demand random urine test from citizens in order to identify drug users and arrest them, even if they are already part of an MMT programme. This dual approach has been highly criticised, with the public demanding that authorities rely more on community-based rehabilitation before forcing users to go through mandatory treatments or facing detention and imprisonment (L. Zhang et al. 2013). In practice, access to MMT programmes can be difficult as the requirements to qualify for rehabilitation are difficult to meet. For example, having a record of previous failed detoxification treatments, which is something common in opioid addicts, reduces the chances of receiving treatment. In addition, MMTs use very low doses of methadone, not giving the patient enough time to adjust to the abstinence symptoms, resulting in higher chances of the programme failing (Marienfeld 2019).

Psychosocial and Self-help Treatments

Although, legally drug addicts must have options in pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical therapies, there are limited options available for the latter category. Nonetheless, psychosocial treatments have slowly gained relevance due to the high relapse rates of drug use in China. The treatments include self-help groups with 12-step programmes for addicts, as well as the publication of magazines with advice and information on how to cope with drug addiction (Zhao

et al. 2004). Other facilities, such as the Shanghai Drug Abuse Treatment Centre, offer group therapy, relapse prevention counselling and workshops with the families of addicts in order to increase the support from their social circle (UNODC 2006a). There are also 'Community Rehabilitation' places that offer completely open environments whilst facilitating treatment for drug users. These type of treatments, though established by law, are very limited and do not have national coverage. Furthermore, the "people [managing these facilities] are generally entirely untrained and incapable of assisting with effective community-based treatment for substance users" (Xiao et al. 2015, 193).

Rehabilitation treatments for drug addicts in China have been criticised by the international community. For instance, there have been reports that the police, in order to meet arrest quotas, increased the amount of random urine tests among drug users registered for treatment. Law enforcement authorities also encourage the community to report drug users in rehabilitation during "high profile" periods, forcing patients to seclude themselves to avoid detention. This level of social pressure resulted in recovering addicts that were unable to access HIV testing facilities or their methadone treatments. Thus, despite of the legislation demanding that drug users have access to medical and psychological treatment, users, fearing police targeting and confinement in rehab programmes, have limited options to get access (Cohen and Amon 2008). For rehabilitation programmes in particular, there are multiple testimonials about the lack of substantial treatment, with most users returning to drugs afterwards (Yardley 2005).

The Philippines

OST and Antagonist Therapies

According to the 2010 Atlas of Substance Use Disorders from the WHO, the Philippines has a detailed drug policy, which includes both voluntary and compulsory treatment and rehabilitation for people with SUD. The government considers drug addiction to be an illness; hence, there is no prosecution of patients by the criminal justice system, unless they have committed other crimes while under the influence. The government is in charge of the majority of treatments available for drug users (over 60%), with patients responsible to assume the costs for their rehabilitation (WHO 2010c). In accordance to law, there must be at least one Treatment and Rehabilitation Centre (TRC) in each province of the country, coordinated by the Department of Health (DOH). However, lack of funding has reduced the quality of the treatment offered by these facilities, while poor families often lack the resources to access such services (DDB 2014).

The government's 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act' of 2002 established the guidelines for voluntary treatment and rehabilitation of drug users (art. VIII), which include the submission

of a request to the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) to enter one of these programs with the possibility of undergoing treatment between 6 months and 1 year. The DOH is in charge of the coordination of the clinics to quit drug use, and it is the entity in charge of certifying whether a person has successfully gotten rid of drugs or requires further treatment as a drug dependent. After finishing, the program former drug users must continue to report to the DOH and are periodically tested for the next 18 months after their release (section 57). Compulsory treatments can apply in case the drug dependant commits a criminal offence, with the person avoiding jail time (if sentence is less than 6 years and 1 day) by being register in a rehabilitation programme (section 62) (Government of the Philippines 2002)

Figure 36. Trends in Patients for Rehabilitation Treatments in the Philippines 82011-20169



Source: (DDB 2017b). Own design.

Available statistics from the DDB show that the number of registered patients for rehabilitation treatments doubled between 2011 and 2016, with the majority being new admissions (see figure 36). President Duterte's anti-drug policy has had an impact in the trends of registration of drug users in rehabilitation programmes. Nowadays, one of the main reasons to seek treatment is to avoid death from extra-judicial killings and not because users are committed to quit drug, which is a major component to guarantee the success of the programmes. Thus, although legally drug users are defined as people suffering from an illness and requiring help to overcome addiction, in practice they are perceived as criminals with little right to due process (Wiess 2017).

Psychosocial and Self-help Treatments

Rehabilitation Centres in the Philippines can be residential and non-residential, in accordance to the severity of the addiction or of the sanction in case of compulsory treatment. All patients

must go through an evaluation session which includes a psychological assessment to complement the pharmacological treatment, in accordance to the 'Manual of Operations for Drug Abuse Treatment & and Rehabilitation Centres' of 2003 (DOH 2003).

Concerning modalities of psychosocial treatments in the Philippines, patients can access 5 different types, according to the DDB's official website (DDB 2013b):

- Multidisciplinary Approach: which includes psychiatric and psychologic assessment, and occupational therapy guided by a social worker in cooperation with the user's family.
- Therapeutic Community Approach: which focuses largely on the emotional, social, physical or spiritual problems behind drug use.
- Hazelden-Minnesotta Model: which considers addiction a disease that the user cannot control. This type of programs aims at empowering the individual, relying strongly on self-help principles like the 12-step programs of Alcoholic Anonymous.
- Spiritual Approach: which uses religious services to strengthen the resolve of the patient. This includes, among others, bible study, organized by religious and civic organizations.
- Eclectic Approach: which includes 'spiritual and cognitive components of the 12-step programmes', as well as medical professionals.

The DDB has this information available on their official website, together with the information of all available treatment and rehabilitation centres in the country. However, although there is a legal framework for these services, the country has been criticised by International Organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW). These organizations have manifested concerns that "instead of evidence-based drug treatment services, the rehabilitation services may mirror abusive models documented [by HRW] elsewhere in Southeast Asia", including the use of forced labour, military drills and even torture (HRW 2017).

Japan

OST and Antagonist Therapies

According to the 2010 Atlas of Substance Use Disorders from the WHO, the Japanese government has a defined drug policy that criminalizes drug use, mandating compulsory treatment for all people with SUD (drug offenders). Social health insurance covers the costs of the rehabilitation process, although the private sector is the one in charge of managing 85% of the available treatments, (the government directly coordinates only 10%). In addition, treatment against SUD is part of a criminal sentence, thus patients are still becoming part of the criminal justice system (WHO 2010b).

As previously mentioned, drug use in Japan is considerably smaller than in the rest of the world, and much less in comparison with its neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia. The annual prevalence rates are so small that most researchers make use of the lifetime prevalence rates to better understand how big drug consumption in the country is (Edström 2015). Nonetheless, public authorities and society itself consider the problem of drug use, and especially methamphetamines, to be very dangerous. Drug users usually belong to one of these three groups: i) users of stimulant and other types of dangerous drugs, ii) users of drugs for partying or in clubs, and iii) users with a history of depression and other mental illnesses who self-treat and become addicts. Despite the public condemnation to drug use, medical centres in charge of rehabilitation often lack specific programs against SUD, treating all types of addicts (alcohol, drug, gambling) together (Ikeda et al. 2017).

Within this context, Japan's 'Fourth Five-Year Drug Abuse Prevention Strategy', from 2013-2018 included measures to improve the medical service system for drug abusers in the country. It incorporated building a network of institutions involved in the rehabilitation process (private, public and NGOs), under the coordination of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). The strategy, however, does not specify the type of therapies offered to drug users, nor the pharmaceutical substances available to facilitate detoxification (MHLW 2013).

Psychosocial and Self-help Treatments

The Ministry of Justice of Japan (MOJ) also enacted the 'Emergency Measures for the Prevention of Repeated Offences by Drug-Dependent People, Elderly Criminals, and Others' and the 'Act Pertaining to Promotion of Recidivism Prevention'. Both compile guidelines that apply to those law-offenders that have served their sentence and must reintegrate into society and avoid relapse into drug abuse. It involves probation officers as well as community work. For those inmates who are still drug-dependent, jails offer special facilities as well as trained personal (in field of welfare and psychology) to help them in their rehabilitation process (MOJ 2017).

Despite drug users having the status of law offenders, the Japanese government considers drug use as addiction that requires immediate treatment. Authorities also understand the importance of coordinating help among different actors, giving relevance to mental care as a key component to guarantee the success of rehabilitation. There are not many examples that show how law enforcement, medical treatment centres and civil society work together to combat drug addiction and reduce demand for drugs. However, a recent study by Ikeda Sunichiro (2017) provides an insight on how this collaboration might take place, using the Osaka Prefecture as example (see figure 37).

As previously mentioned, the private sector and NGOs are in charge of offering most services treating drug abusers, which results in a lack of general coordination as each actor pursues individual efforts to reduce drug use. Because of this, Osaka Prefecture has served as a pilot project to increase coordination since 2014. The program includes the participation of addiction-related experts, working groups with families of addicts and self-help centres working with clinics and hospitals to reduce relapse. The inclusion of family members in the process is a relatively new component of the strategy, one that is expected to be replicated across the country (Ikeda et al. 2017).

Figure 37. Structure for Attention to Drug Users – Japan



*Example taken from Osaka Addiction Centre: Green applies for those members involved in psychological treatments and self-help groups for drug addicts.
Source: (Ikeda et al. 2017, 484)

In addition, the Japanese government has taken another step towards implementing a more human approach to combat drug addiction and reduce demand for illicit narcotics. By the end of 2017, the fifth 'Five-Year Drug Abuse Prevention Strategy' set to start in 2018, included considerations on "promoting drug offenders' rehabilitation through the utilization of withdrawal services offered by medical and other institutions, instead of consigning them to prison" (Jiji Press 2017).

1.2.3. Supply Reduction (Control of Production and Trade)

This set of criteria splits into four sub-categories: i) source-country control measures: initiatives in crop eradication or substitution; ii) interdiction efforts: border control and operations to seize drugs before entering the country; iii) domestic law enforcement: aimed at dealers and heads of criminal networks; and iv) imprisonment: current statistics (if available), and penalties for drug traffickers. Since not all of the three studied countries are producers of drugs or their domestic production is limited, the sub-category of source-control measures also applies to programs that these governments support in other countries that are main suppliers of drugs.

China

Source-Country Control Measures

China has a long history of implementing measures to reduce the cultivation of plants used for drug production, mostly opium poppy. By the year 1880, the annual domestic production of this plant was 2 to 4 times larger than the imported amount. After the ban of opium in 1909, the country's domestic production reduced drastically, thanks to the initial substitution measures such as the promotion of alternative crops of cotton, tea, corn, peas, wheat and soybeans among others. However, despite these efforts, southern provinces like Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu remained heavy producers of opium poppy, reaching million hectares of production by late 1940s (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009). Since the instauration of the PRC, the aggressive regulation has significantly reduced what was once one of the largest domestic production of opium in the world. Nonetheless, the industry has expanded to cannabis crops and clandestine manufacture of ATS-type drugs (S. X. Zhang and Chin 2016). Concerning drug eradication, the UNODC reports most relevant results in Cannabis, with almost 10 hectares with 1,390,000 plants destroyed between 2011 and 2016 (UNODC 2018c).

Source-Country Reduction: Initiatives Abroad

Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has been a part of regional efforts to curb drug supply in East Asia. Most prominently, China has established cooperation agreements with Myanmar and Laos, implementing measures to promote alternative development to reduce production of opium poppy. This has included the transfer of technology and the support of the agricultural and tourism sectors. The main objective is to promote economic development in the Golden Triangle, main supplier of heroin to China (State Council of the PRC 2000). In addition, the country also exerts pressure on its neighbours to step up efforts to eradicate opium poppy crops in the cases where substitution is unlikely to happen (S. X. Zhang and Chin 2016).

Concerning Myanmar, the government established a first program in 1998 with the help of the UNDPC. It focused on Myanmar's Wa Region, promoting substitution of opium poppy crops for buckwheat and sugar (UN 1998). By 2005, a more comprehensive initiative was coordinated, this time no just with Myanmar but also with Laos. This included the provision of economic incentives so Chinese companies would directly invest in alternative development with crops of tea, rice, corn and rubber, among others. This program also received support from the UNODC, in charge of monitoring the reduction in opium poppy production (UNODC 2015).

Nonetheless, the international community has remained critical about China's initiatives in Myanmar and Laos, despite the positive remarks from the Chinese government, assuring that these projects have successfully created new sources for those previously involved with illicit drug production. A major criticism is that Chinese companies invest in areas with existing infrastructure to guarantee the movement of goods (roads, electricity, etc.), which does not target the poorer zones most likely to plant opium poppy and cannabis. Additionally, although the initiatives are supposed to diversify the types of crops, most of them are actually mono-plantations that offer very little improvement for income in local farmers (TNI 2010). Moreover, "the scheme is controversial as it mainly benefits local authorities and Chinese businessmen instead of the local opium growing communities" (ICAD 2015, 14).

Interdiction Efforts

Chinese police only started specializing on drug crimes in 1982, when the police of Yunnan Province received training on anti-narcotics as a response to the rising numbers of heroin imports from the Golden Triangle. This explains why the Yunnan local police is the most advanced in drug law enforcement compared to other provinces in the country. However, local police continues to face limited budget, personnel and outdated equipment, increasing the number of casualties when facing criminal drug trafficking networks. In addition, the country does not have enough anti-narcotic laboratories to conduct proper research on drugs (S. X. Zhang and Chin 2016).

The 'General Administration of Customs' of the PRC (GAC), is one of the main agencies involved with interdiction operations to seize illicit narcotics before they enter the country. GAC has stepped up its operations to identify and confiscate drugs, improving considerably its results, especially in hot spots like the Yunnan Province. While the annual reports recorded drug seizures at a total of 806 kg in 2004 and 788 kg in 2006 (GAC 2005, 2007), statistics show a substantial increase for 2013 and 2016, with 5.5 t and 4.9 t of seized drugs respectively (GAC 2017, 2014). Partially, a reason for the success on interdiction efforts led by the GAC is the

establishment of ‘specialized operation plans’ to make more efficient use of resources. This is the case of the “Operation National Sword” of 2015 or the “Operation Five Battles” of 2015, which boosted revenue collection through anti-smuggling efforts (GAC 2017, 2016).

Another major actor in interdiction operations is the Chinese Coast Guard, which has been under the control of the Chinese Armed Police Force since early 2018 (Zhen 2018). The MPS, through the Narcotics Control Bureau, coordinates joint operations between the Coast Guard and local authorities in coastal provinces such as the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. There, in January 2017, more than 80 suspects of drug trafficking were captured and 2.4 t of methamphetamines were seized. November that same year, as product of the cooperation with Peruvian authorities, a shipment with 116.9 kg of cocaine was captured at Hebei Province (Xinhua 2018).

High-Level and Retail Enforcement

The 2008 Anti-Drug Law of the PRC allows law enforcement agencies, in particular the NPA, to conduct tests on persons suspected of using or trafficking illicit narcotics. These actions are usually part of campaigns coordinated by the Ministry of Public Security through the National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC), and involve the participation of China’s National Police Agency and local law enforcement authorities in each province. For example, the NNCC annual report in 2012 recorded 1,220,000 drug-related criminal cases within mainland China, seizing 45.1 t of illicit narcotics (Dai 2014).

Recent efforts to capture people involved in domestic drug trafficking networks and seize illicit narcotics include operations “Drug-Free Peace” and “Hundred-City Anti-Drug War” organized by the MPS in 2014. These resulted in the seizure of 26.5 and 43.3 t of drugs, respectively. That same period reported 168,900 arrests for drug-related crimes (BINLEA 2016). Figures concerning people captured remained more or less the same, with 168,000 people arrested in 2016. However, Chinese law enforcement authorities managed to seize 82.1 t of illicit narcotics, which amounts to an 18% increase in volume of confiscated drugs in comparison to 2014. Part of the increase in drug seizures relates to the inclusion of 116 NPS in the list of illicit narcotics in attempts to have better control over synthetic drugs on the market (BINLEA 2018).

Imprisonment

China’s drug control strategy relies heavily on severe punishment of drug-related crimes, especially those concerning drug trafficking and smuggling of drugs into the country. The 2008 Anti-Drug Law of the PRC joined other 30 pieces of legislation, stipulating, “Fighting against narcotic

drugs is the duty of the entire society, under the unified leadership of the government, within the budgetary plans of the people's governments at or above the county level as part of national economic and social development" (Dai 2014, 202)

Chapter VI of the current anti-drug law details the type of penal sanctions faced for the following activities related to manufacture of illicit drug trade (Government of the PRC 2007, sec. 59):

- Smuggling, selling, transporting or manufacturing narcotics;
- Illegally cultivating the mother plants of narcotic drugs;
- Illegally trafficking in, transporting, carrying or possessing the seeds or seedlings of the mother plants of narcotic drugs, which are not inactivated;
- Illegally imparting the methods for manufacturing narcotic or psychotropic substances or the chemical materials that can easily be transformed into narcotic drugs;
- Compelling, or instigating another person to ingest or inject drugs, or luring or inveigling him into doing so; or
- Providing narcotic drugs to another person

In addition, Chinese authorities also consider people as criminal offenders when they protect individuals involved in drug trafficking, or attempt to warn them of investigations against them (art. 60). The '2008 Anti-Drug Law' does not specify the punishment for drug traffickers, stating only that "a penalty for administration of public security shall be imposed [in accordance] to law" (Government of the PRC 2007, sec. 59). However, 1980 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued two pieces of legislation, the 'Customs Law of the PRC' and the 'Regulations of the PRC on Administrative Penalties for Public Security', which raised the maximum punishment to drug-related crimes to the death penalty (State Council of the PRC 2000).

Concerning death penalty for drug traffickers, there are no current official statistics, with the latest dating back to the 2000 Annual Report from the NNCC, which indicated that 54 people on the death row were there for drug trafficking offences (S. X. Zhang and Chin 2016). For drug trafficking, the following sentences apply (Government of the PRC 1979, sec. 347):

- Minimum sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment or death penalty if the person has more than 1,000 g of opium, or more than 50 g of heroin and other narcotics.
- Minimum of 7 years in prison to life imprisonment if the person has between 200 to 1,000 g of opium, or between 10 to 50 g of heroin and other narcotics.
- If the person smuggles less than 200 g of opium or less than 10 grams of other narcotic drugs, small quantities according to the law, the person faces a maximum of 3 years in prison. Aggravating circumstances could increase prison time to a total of 7 years.

The capital punishment can also apply to members of a criminal organization, drug trafficking network and government officials deviating drugs to the illicit market even without possession of drugs at the time of the capture. Execution takes place via lethal injection, with convicts often given a two-year suspended sentence, which can result in commuted sentence or execution. Media reports on death sentences vary in numbers and the international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch consider that the numbers are only a fraction of the total amount of executions (CCDPW 2018).

The Philippines

Source-Country Control Measures

Most of the Philippine government's effort in the field of source-country control aim at reducing the production of Cannabis, which has experienced substantial growth in the recent decades (UNODC 2017c). The government has faced obstacles to implement some of its manual eradication programmes, especially in the early 2000s, with illegal criminal groups like the 'Communist New People's Army' and the 'Abu Sayyaf Group' providing protection against payment to farmers of marijuana (UNODC 2006b).

Figure 38. Marijuana Sites Eradicated in the Philippines 2002-2016



Source: (PDEA 2016, 37).

Efforts in the eradication of cannabis plantations have shown positive results in the last years, with an increasing number of marijuana sites discovered in the country (see figure 38). For 2011, the PDEA undertook 80 marijuana eradication operations, seizing and destroying plants (pieces of plants, seeds and dried leaves, among others) for the value of 951,587,893,84[4] Philippine Peso (₱) (PDEA 2011). The number in value of drugs increased almost 5,4 times by

[4] Approximately US $21,886,500 in 2011

2016, when the agency coordinated 65 eradication operations to reduce marijuana plantations, seizing plants with a value of ₱5,184,648,605[5] (PDEA 2016).

The 2015-2020 'Anti-Drug Plan of Action' of the DDB, emphasized the need to continue working with 'Local Government Units' (LUGs) to identify cannabis plantations across the Philippines. In addition, the government is set to provide economic incentives to develop alternative crops among farmers, including seed money to start legal businesses. In essence, there are three lines of work led by the DDB (DDB 2014):

- Financial and technical support to profitable business initiatives;
- Strengthening the role of the LGUs and involve local community leaders in the implementation of alternative development initiatives;
- Encourage the involvement of other government agencies to guarantee successful new businesses. This includes working with the 'Technical Education & Skills Development Authority' (TESDA) and the 'Department of Trade & Industry' (TDI).

Despite a clear plan to promote successful alternative developments to farmers in the Philippines, the DDB faces considerable challenges in its implementation. For instance, there is no specific allocation of a budget for crop substitution initiatives, and the Bureau has a lack of resources and personnel to coordinate and supervise each project. Finally, the places where most of the alternative developments takes place suffer from poor infrastructure to guarantee the transport of goods, thus limiting the options to trade and increasing the transactional costs of the new legal activity. This makes it less appealing for farmers to voluntary quit cultivating cannabis, which remains the more lucrative option (DDB 2015).

The PDEA also coordinates operations to identify and destroy clandestine laboratories that produce 'Shabu' (methamphetamine) in the country. They work in cooperation with the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Annual reports give statistics on the value of drugs seized, which reached the record value of ₱2.85 billion[6] for 2016. This is a substantial increase compared to 2011, when drugs seized from clandestine laboratories amounted to only ₱59.1 million[7]. Furthermore, the PDEA coordinates operations to dismantle chemical warehouses in efforts to reduce access to chemical precursors to manufacture ATS-type drugs (PDEA 2012, 2016).

[5] Approximately US $108,877,600 in 2016
[6] Approximately US $ 59,850,000 in 2016
[7] Approximately US $1,360,000 in 2011

Interdiction Efforts

The PDEA also coordinates interdiction operations in the Philippines; however, since the agency has limited resources and the country has so many potential points of entry for illicit narcotics, the PDEA again works together with other law enforcement bodies in the country. Since December 2017, president Duterte has issued an order so the PNP, AFP and the National Bureau of Intelligence (NBI) would re-join the drug war, superseding an initial order to yield all operations solely to the PDEA (PNA 2017b).

Interdiction operations take place in airports (mail and parcel interdiction) as well as seaports, with the latter including not only revision of containers and packages at port, but also revision of vessels at sea (PNP 2014). Most of the airport operations involve the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Manila, where the PDEA and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) together seized over ₱289 million[8] in 2016. This airport has its own Inter-Agency Drug Interdiction Task Group (IADITG), which coordinates the exchange of information and join operations between the PDEA, BOC and the PNP (PNP 2014). Airport and seaport security also rely on K-9 operations (using drug-sniffing dogs) to identify packages with drugs or chemical precursors, with a total of 73 narcotic detention dogs across the country (PDEA 2016, 2012). PDEA officials wear mandatory body cameras in order to keep full track of anti-narcotic operations and seized drugs, as an attempt to reduce corruption, misconduct or violation of the due process of the captures on site (PNA 2018). In practice though, cameras are tampered with or unplugged before officers commit a killing of a suspected drug-offender (Baldwin and Marshall 2017).

In addition, given the Philippines' geographic characteristics with more than 7,000 islands, the PDEA formed Seaport Interdiction Units (SIUs) in all of its regional offices across the country in 2017. These units aim to increase the control at seaports, and are responsible for preventing the entry and exit of illicit narcotics, processing information on suspected passengers, conducting investigations and undertaking interdiction operations (PNA 2017a). In 2018, the PDEA added 200 new agents to improve its capacity to identify, seize and destroy illicit narcotics entering the country (Orellana 2018).

High-Level and Retail Enforcement

In the Philippines, most of the counter-narcotic operations are 'buy-bust' types, meaning that the targeted level is low retail. According to the PDEA's 2016 annual report, of the 34,077 operations undertaken in that year, 21,655 (63.5%) were 'buy-bust' and only 305 (0.9%) aimed at high-levels of the drug trafficking networks (PDEA 2016). This correlates with the percentages

[8] Approximately US $6,070,000 in 2016

in drug arrests according to the role of the people within the criminal network (see figure 39). In average, between 2012 and 2016, almost 60% of the drug offenders arrested, were classified as 'pushers' (person encouraging others to use drugs), followed by dealers (known as 'possessors'). Both roles are located at the lower-end of the illicit drug market.

The PDEA not only targets the 'Drug Syndicates' in the Philippines (from China, Africa and Mexico mostly), but also focuses on local drug groups in charge of retail distribution on the streets or in drug dens. Captures of members of these groups involve leaders, dealers and their cohorts, affecting most of the levels of the retail distribution of illicit drugs. However, statistics reported by the PDEA and other law enforcement agencies involved in this kind of operations vary widely. For example, 2012 recorded 233 neutralized local groups (PDEA 2012, 28), while 2016 reported only 8 operations of this type (PDEA 2016, 42).

Figure 39. Drug Arrests in the Philippines According to the Role 2012-2016



Source: (PDEA 2016, 40, 2014, 18, 2012, 26)
* Others include cultivator, clandestine laboratory worker, courier, facilitators and financers.

Annual reports from the PDEA are vague, when talking about the direct consequence from Philippines' radical stance against illicit narcotics: increasing numbers of suspected drug offenders. The agency talks about 4,075 dead people through anti-drug operations between July 2016 and march 2018 (PDEA 2018), in contrast to HRW's report of more than 12,000 between 2016 and 2017 (HRW 2018). However, to understand the severity of Duterte's 'War on Drugs' approach, one does not need comprehensive official statistics. It is enough to follow the news, e.g. a recent article from the Deutsche Welle described the view in *barangays* (villages) near manila as such,

“bodies of suspected drug users turned up in dark alleys, under bridges and in dump sites — many branded with a cardboard sign that warned: "I am a drug addict/pusher. Do not be like me."” (Santos and Ebbighausen 2018).

Imprisonment

The Philippines’ current legislation on illicit drugs, the ‘Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act’ of 2002, has defined the type of punishment for producing and trafficking narcotics in its Article II, ‘Unlawful Acts and Penalties’. The following activities and its punishments appear listed:

- Section 4 ‘Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals’: Smuggling drugs across the border could result in imprisonment, death penalty and fines ranging from ₱500,000 up to ₱10 million. Smuggling chemical precursors could result in 12 up to 20 years in prison and fines from ₱100,000 to ₱500,000. The last provision similarly applies to those protecting drug-offenders.
- Section 5 ‘Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals’: Trafficking drugs can result in lifetime imprisonment or death penalty, and fines from ₱500,000 to ₱10 million. Trafficking of precursor chemicals can result in 12 to 20 years imprisonment and fines from ₱100,000 to ₱500,000. The same penalty also applies to those codling offenders described in this section.
- Sections 6 to 7 describe the penalties for members of drug dens, allowing lifetime imprisonment for the owners, while workers and visitors have can have between 12 to 20 years in prison.

As previously mentioned, the Philippines banned the death penalty as a maximum punishment in 2006, yet the existing drug law has suffered no modification to reflect this change. In addition, reports on extra-judicial executions of suspects of drug trafficking by 2018 went from 4,000 to 16,000 deaths (Johnson and Fernquest 2018). Within this context, the office of the president has proposed the re-instauration of the death penalty with the purpose of strengthening the government’s tools to combat drug trafficking. By 2017, the bill had received initial approval by the Lower House of Congress by an overwhelming majority, and is now waiting for the approval by the Senate (DW 2017).

Japan

Source-Country Control Measures

Japan is not a source country of drugs. Hence, its efforts in control of drug supply through eradication or substitution of crops focus on other countries. The Japanese provide most of their

help through bilateral cooperation managed by the JICA, with a strong focus on its East Asian neighbours, most prominently the Golden Triangle. For example, since 1997 JICA has led efforts to eradicate opium poppy cultivation through alternative development and poverty reduction in one of Myanmar's region most affected by drugs, the Shan State (Council of the EU 2015). This included initiatives like the 1998 MOU between Japan and Myanmar granting aid for ¥800 million to allocate food and resources to poor areas developing alternative crops (MOFA 2001).

Between 2005 and 2011, JICA led a second project for US $11 million, which sought a more comprehensive approach to alternative development. This included investment on infrastructure and technology for agriculture, as well as support on health and education for the most vulnerable. More recently in 2014, JICA, MOF and the local government of the Shan State signed a MOU on a 5-year plan that includes technical cooperation and support for former opium poppy farmers, in line with the previous projects of 1998 and 2005 (Council of the EU 2015). But, there have been challenges to the implementation of these projects. E.g. the quality of the alternative crops, in that case buckwheat, failed to meet quality standards or mark-up prices to access the Japanese market. This resulted in difficulties for farmers to turn a profit, thus often choosing to return to opium poppy plantations (Tsunekawa and Murotani 2016).

Interdiction Efforts

Although Japan's NPA oversees most operations to reduce supply and demand for illicit drugs, Japan Customs, and in particularly its intelligence division, is in charge of interdiction operations in the country. "Japan Customs gives the first priority to the interception of goods harmful to the society such as illicit drugs and firearms at the border, [it is] actively engaged in the efforts to promote a range of measures, including strengthening collaboration with related organizations, raising the level of collection and analysis of information and improving the equipment for detection, with the aim of reinforcing law enforcement activities at the border" (Japan Customs 2008, Preface).

Interdiction operations include seizure of drugs from air passengers, commercial cargo, international mail and ship's crews, with methamphetamine being the main drug in most cases. Most operations take place at international airports, with the majority of smuggled drugs set to enter the country as 'commercial cargo' (see figure 40). Methamphetamine in this category amounted to 2,017 kg seized between 2012 and 2016, with roughly 53% of all drugs confiscated through interdiction operations in airports and seaports. Nonetheless, the largest single drug seizure of

2016 was 600 kg of methamphetamine concealed on a boat intercepted by Okinawa Regional Customs (Japan Customs 2016). For details on drugs seized, see annex 13.

Figure 40. Methamphetamine Seizures through Interdiction Operations 2012-2016 in Japan



Source: (Japan Customs 2016, 2). Author summarized all variables in one chart. Own design.

In 2016, drugs seized through interdiction operations amounted to 1,460 kg, they came from China (71.8%), Mexico (17.8%), Taiwan (7.1%), Uganda (2.5%) and the United States (0.8%). Although, usually Mexico ranks first in terms of value of seized drugs according to origin, methamphetamine from China has been growing steadily, jumping to first place recently due to results of interdiction operations in the Okinawa Prefecture (Japan Customs 2016).

High-Level and Retail Enforcement

In Japan most of the domestic law enforcement against illicit drugs focuses on organized crime groups called *Boryokudan*. The government implemented the 'Anti-Boryokudan Act' in 1992 in order to stop the growing trend of members with these groups. By 2016, there were 39,100 people affiliated to one of the existing 22 *Boryokudan*. Not all of these groups are directly involved with drug trafficking, but many are, such as the *Dojin-Kai* in Fukuoka (NPA 2017a).

Although, 53% of arrests for drug trafficking within Japan in 2009 corresponded to members of *Boryokudan* (NPA 2010), there has been a declining trend in captures in recent years: While in 2006 the NPA reported the arrest of 6,052 members for trafficking ATS-type drugs, reports in 2015 show only 5,627 captures. The 7% reduction can be accredited to the fact that membership numbers have been declining during the last 10 years. Still, the sale of illicit narcotics remain one of the main sources of income for these gangs, with 26% of arrests of members corresponding to drug trafficking, in comparison to 21% in 2006 (NPA 2016).

Imprisonment

Japanese legislation on illicit drugs, namely the 1948 ‘Cannabis Control Act’, the 1951 ‘Stimulants Control Act’, and the 1953 ‘Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Act’, do not establish different penalties for first-time offenders or people with previous convictions for drug trafficking. However, there is no death penalty for these types of crimes. The penalties are:

- Cannabis (Art. 24-2): Cultivation without license and smuggling of cannabis in any form, with the purpose of gaining a profit, results in imprisonment for no more than 10 years and a fine of ¥3 million (Government of Japan 1948).
- Stimulants Trafficking (Art. 41-2): Smuggling stimulants into the country with the purpose of selling can result in 3 years up to a lifetime in prison and a fine not exceeding ¥10,000 (Government of Japan 1951).
- Other Narcotics and Psychotropic Drugs (Art. 64-2): Smuggling any of the drugs listed in this law, with the purpose of gaining a profit from distribution, results in 3 years up to lifetime imprisonment and a fine of ¥10,000 (Government of Japan 1953a).

1.2.4. Demand Reduction (Criminal and Non-Criminal Sanctions)

This set of criteria splits into two segments according to the type of mechanism involved in the sanction: i) deterrence mechanisms defined by law, including non-criminal sanctions and possible depenalization measures (if any), and ii) incapacitation measures, which would involve incarceration and coercive treatments for users of illicit drugs.

China

Deterrence Mechanisms Defined by Law

China’s current ‘Anti-Drug Law’ includes provisions for drug users arrested for breaking the law. Art. 62 defines that a drug user must be given a penalty in accordance to the law, but if they voluntarily approach a public security organ in search of medical treatment, there should be no penalty against the person (Government of the PRC 2007). A key deterrence mechanism used by Chinese law enforcement are random tests to identify drug users. Art. 32 of the ‘Anti-Drug Law’ gives public security organs the authority to perform such tests on suspected drug users, without people having the option to refuse. (Government of the PRC 2007, sec. 32).

People caught with large quantities of drugs can face imprisonment of up to 3 years, other non-criminal sanctions include temporary detention and public surveillance to avoid relapse into criminality. This applies to those caught with between 200 and 1,000 g of opium or between 10 and 50 g of any other narcotic (Government of the PRC 1979, sec. 348). Furthermore, there are

non-criminal sanctions also for those helping drug users or people involved in drug trafficking, be that by sheltering criminals or colluding with law enforcement. In these cases, when the offence is not serious enough, people face between 10 and 15 days in detention, and are forced to pay a fine of CN¥ 3,000. Penalties are up to 5 days in temporary detention and CN¥ 500 if circumstances are relatively minor according to law (Government of the PRC 2007, sec. 61).

Incapacitation Measures

In case authorities capture Chinese citizen or foreign national with a substantial amount of illicit narcotics, China's 'Criminal Law' severely punishes them. The legislation sets a minimum penalty of 7 years up to a lifetime imprisonment for large quantities of drugs; more than 1,000 g of opium or more than 50 g of heroin or other illegal narcotics (Government of the PRC 1979, sec. 348).

Under the 'Anti-Drug Law' users can end up in prison, but the initial sanction is compulsory treatment. This is an incapacitating measure, as people must undergo treatment for drug addiction in the community where their residence is. Users identified as addicts, even first time users, are forced to treatment centres between 3 to 6 years and if the community or authorities see any evidence of relapse during this period, the person is reported to the local public security organ (Government of the PRC 2007, arts. 31-35). For those who repeatedly violate the conditions of the treatment centres or have relapses several times, the public security organ can impose compulsory isolation for drug rehabilitation (CIR), with the only exception being breastfeeding mothers with babies younger than one year old (Government of the PRC 2007, sec. 38). CIR meant to replace the use of 'Re-education through Labour' (RTL) centres for treatment of drug use; however, it continues to be a part of the criminal justice system and uses similar methods to the previous RTL. The average stay of 2 years includes forced work and limited access to medical or psychiatric treatment. Hence, in China, rehabilitation is seen as a punitive measure not a choice to quit drug use (Xiao et al. 2015).

The Philippines

Deterrence Mechanisms Defined by Law

The Philippines has established a series of non-criminal sanctions, which apply to first time offences or when the offence is not grave enough to be considered a criminal violation. According to the country's 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002', first time offenders between the age of 15 and 18, have the privilege to receive a suspended sentence and only require supervision and rehabilitative surveillance. However, this privilege is lost when the offender violates the conditions of the suspended sentence, resulting in conviction (Government of the

Philippines 2002, secs 68–69). The law also permits the use of community service for first-time/ minor offenders as a means to avoid prison sentences. In this case, the offender is placed under probation time, supervised by the DOH, the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation Administration (Government of the Philippines 2002, sec. 70).

Although, drug possession could result in criminal sentences, which this paper addresses in the next segment, the offenders could also pay heavy fines between ₱500,000 and ₱10,000,000, for the following amounts (Government of the Philippines 2002, sec. 11):

- 10 g or more of opium;
- 10 g or more of morphine;
- 10 g or more of heroin;
- 10 g or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
- 50 g or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or ‘Shabu’;
- 10 g or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
- 500 g or more of marijuana; and
- 10 g or more of other dangerous drugs (NPS)

If the quantities found are smaller, the fines vary between ₱300,000 and ₱500,000.

Incapacitation Measures

With very few exceptions, people caught possessing illicit narcotics cannot avoid jail time, unless they are minors without no previous criminal offences. The ‘Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002’ established the possibility of life imprisonment for those with 10 g or more of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine, ecstasy and NPS-type drugs, more than 50 g of ‘Shabu’, or more than 500 g of marijuana. Smaller amounts of an illicit narcotic, between 5 to 10 g for all drugs (except marijuana with 300 to 500 g), can result in 20 years up to life imprisonment. Finally, less than 5 g of any drug (except marijuana with less than 300 g), can result in 12 up to 20 years in prison (Government of the Philippines 2002, sec. 11).

Furthermore, there are severe incapacitation measures for those people arrested for owning equipment to “smoke, consume, administering, injecting, ingesting or introducing” illicit narcotics, going from 6 months up to 4 years in prison (Government of the Philippines 2002, sec. 12).

In addition to prison, as previously mentioned, the Philippines forces compulsory rehabilitation treatment on identified drug users. Apprehended people face a minimum of 6 months in a government rehabilitation centre in case of a first offence. For recidivists, the person no longer goes to a rehabilitation centre, but serves from 6 up to 12 years in prison. In case the person tested

is also found possessing any type of illicit drugs, these provisions do not apply, and instead the sanctions of section 11 of the law apply (Government of the Philippines 2002, sec. 15).

Japan

Deterrence Mechanisms Defined by Law

Most of Japan's non-criminal sanctions for drug use are complimentary to a prison sentence. Thus, the payment of the fine does not exempt the law-offender from serving time in jail. Cannabis users caught by the police must pay a fine of not more than ¥2,000,000 (Government of Japan 1948, secs 24–3) and users of any type of ATS drug face a fine of up to ¥5,000,000 (Government of Japan 1951, secs 41–3).

Although it is not officially included in the anti-drug legislation, an important 'mechanism of deterrence' in Japan is society itself. Culturally, drug use has a very negative image, with society strongly opposed to it. Hence, casual users and addicts face the pressure of being reported by any citizen who discovers or suspects consumption of illicit narcotics (Ryall 2018). It is not uncommon to see actors and celebrities being prosecuted and publicly shamed for drug use (Oh 2009; Brasor 2017). Social pressure acts as an effective deterrence mechanism, especially when no one seems to be exempt of using drugs without facing the backlash of the society.

Incapacitation Measures

The Japanese government has a zero-tolerance approach to drug use, with drug offences resulting in lengthy periods of imprisonment regardless if it is a first-time offence or if the person has a criminal record with drug use. Authorities strictly prohibit drug use, imposing the following incapacitation measures:

- Users of ATS-type drugs facing imprisonment with required labour between 1 to 10 years (Government of Japan 1951, p. art. 41-2).
- Users of marijuana face imprisonment with required labour for no more than 7 years. If the user are only caught with raw cannabis for later consumption, they face up to 3 years in prison (Government of Japan 1953a, p. art. 24-3).

Authorities can detain suspects of drug use for an indefinite amount of time in solitary confinement, with conviction taking place after testing positive for any illicit drug through a blood or urine test. This applies not only to Japanese citizens but also to foreign nationals who are deported from the country after serving their sentence (US Department of State 2011).

Chapter 3: Discussion of the Findings

3.1. China

3.1.1. International Dimension

Response to International Conventions

The People's Republic of China is a signatory of all the main international conventions on illicit drugs (1961, 1971 and 1988). In this sense, the country is not different to any other nations involved in the fight against drug trafficking. However, in comparison to other signatories of these agreements, the country defined that certain regions are special territories, as is the case of Hong Kong and Macau. The two autonomous regions report to the UNODC separately from the rest of mainland China, and "assume responsibility for the international rights and obligations arising from the application of the Convention to the Macao Special Administrative Region" (UNODC 1976, 1990). In addition to the existence of special regions, some Chinese provinces like Yunnan have greater independence in coordinating the 'Anti-Drug Law' enforcement, as well as in imposing criminal sanctions, including death penalty for drug-related offences without needing the approval from the national government (L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008, 113).

The historical context has greatly influenced the evolution of the anti-drug policies in China. Scholars like Lu Lin consider the period from 1978 onwards, the Reform Era, as the one that set the basis for China's modern illicit drug legislation (L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008). More prominently, the country has stepped up its prohibitionist approach since the 1990s, having a more assertive role in the international fight against drug trafficking. The efforts have resulted in 12 decrees and laws aimed at controlling illicit drug activities in the country between 1979 and 2007. This included two major pieces of legislation: The 'Criminal Law' of 1979 and the 'First Comprehensive Anti-Drug Law' of 2007.

The introduction of the 'Criminal Law' expanded the scope of drug offences, penalising possession of any amount of an illicit narcotic. This was the first step in a series of measures that increased the severity of the punitive measures against drugs. In 1982, the Standing Committee of the NPC issued a 'Decision on severely punishing those who disturb the Economy'. This increased the maximum penalty for drug-related offences from 15 years to execution, making China one of 33 territories in the world that use death penalty as a maximum punishment for this type of offence (Gallahue et al. 2012). The 1990's 'Resolution on Prohibiting Narcotic Drugs' was a much-needed update to the type of substances considered illegal in accordance to the

international conventions on drugs. Through this measure the Chinese government: i) specifically defined the types of illicit narcotic and psychotropic drugs, ii) included non-criminal sanctions to drug-related offences, and iii) established punitive sanctions not only against individuals but also organizations and public officers involved in a drug crime (L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008).

Several Chinese ministries are involved in the fight against drug trafficking, the most relevant is the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), which has the National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) under its command. The NNCC is in charge of coordinating the drug police for both domestic and international levels and provides the guidelines for all other 24 ministries and agencies involved in the control of illicit drugs (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009). They focus on five strategies: i) drug prevention through education, ii) drug treatments and rehabilitation, iii) interdiction operations, iv) law enforcement on domestic level, and v) regulation of precursor chemicals (NNCC 2008). An interesting feature of the Chinese model is that each ministry must allocate a share of its budget to anti-drug law enforcement, although there are no official statistics on the amount of resources invested. The success of the NNCC's efforts depends not only on the guidelines it establishes, but also on how well it can coordinate their strategy between the national and local levels. This is a difficult task, with the NNCC having to work with local authorities in provinces and autonomous territories, and national actors like the armed police, military, customs, intelligence bureau and trade departments (State Council of the PRC 2000).

The implementation of the anti-drug strategy has been difficult in China, given the size of the country, the many possible entry points for drugs and the clandestine nature of illicit drug manufacture. Certain provinces, like Yunnan or Shanghai, have a trained narcotics police force, while other areas do not have the sufficient personnel to undertake interdiction operations, or the equipment to conduct research on illicit drugs (S. X. Zhang and Chin 2016). Moreover, some regions, like Hong Kong, have better statistics on drug use than the rest of the country, posing a challenge to researchers that need current data on a national level.

Law Enforcement Cooperation

The NNCC works together with the National Anti-Drug Committee to define the priority for international cooperation between Chinese authorities and third parties, including the UNODC (Government of the PRC 2007). The State Council established this committee in 1990 as part of a strategy to boost China's leadership on the fight against drugs. The country's passive stance on narcotics has changed considerably in the last decades, with the government sending officials to all major international forums, including special sessions from the General Assembly on Drugs (UNGASS 2016) and meetings from the Heads of Narcotic Law Enforcement Agencies

(HONLEA) for Asia and the Pacific (Government of the PRC 2007). Leaving aside the topic of death penalty for drug-related crimes, which goes against the international conventions on drugs, the Chinese government is in overall attuned with the international approach. Unlike other policies China's punitive anti-drug stance matches the prohibitionist nature of the existing international framework, despite complains about human right violations from NGOs like the HRW.

China also works closely with the INTERPOL on several investigations on transnational crimes, including drug trafficking. INTERPOL has headquarters in Hong Kong and Macao, where it coordinates operations to capture high-level members of criminal networks, and helps with extradition requests (INTERPOL 2018a). China has manifested its commitment to increase cooperation with third parties in order to combat transnational drug crimes, stressing the relevance of having open channels of communication between national drug agencies (X. Zhang 2007).

Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements to Combat Drug Trafficking

China's current bilateral and multilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking focus on neighbouring countries along the borders to the east and west, aiming to reduce the inflow of illicit narcotics and chemical precursors into the country. There is a very strong emphasis on cooperation with Southeast Asia: in particular, with the Golden Triangle states of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, and with ASEAN; thus, most of the available information on cooperation mentions this region. However, another highlight is the cooperation partnership between the United States and China, as the country is one of the largest suppliers of opiates to American (State Council of the PRC 2000; L. Lu, Fang, and Wang 2008).

The cooperation with the Golden Triangle is an insightful example on how China coordinates multilateral agreements on topics considered highly important for national security. The country has led efforts not only involving the states of the Great Mekong Sub-region, but also made sure to involve a regional organization like ASEAN. Although, China remains the main provider, it channels a lot of efforts through initiatives, like ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3, to boost the relevance of the fight against drugs. Moreover, the government is aware that it must redirect its efforts to areas most vulnerable to drug trafficking, so a lot of MOUs mostly concern the Yunnan Province and local authorities in cities across the Chinese Border with the Golden Triangle (Lijun 2006).

Although, this multi-level kind of cooperation has assured that the issue of drug trafficking gains attention regionally, it holds the challenge of how to measure the results. There is no unified source of information on the advances of the Chinese-Golden Triangle-ASEAN cooperation; any statistical data is not up-to-date. More importantly, there is no way to confirm if a specific

result (e.g. reduction of seized drugs by customs in Yunnan) is due to cooperative efforts from a bilateral initiative between local governments, or a multilateral agreement through the GMS or through one of the ASEAN platforms.

The Chinese-American partnership against illicit drugs is a better-coordinated bilateral effort but has not always been successful, as the relationship between the countries has been troubled. Mechanisms such as the 'Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement' (MLAA) from 2000, or the 'Bilateral Drug Intelligence Working Group' (BDIWG) between the NNCC and the DEA, are good examples of initiatives exchanging information on transnational drug networks (Y. Zhang 2012).

3.1.2. National Dimension

Assessment of the Illicit Drug Market (Drug Problem)

China's illicit drug problem involves all levels of the illicit drug market, since the country is a destination for narcotics, a source for ATS-type drugs, and a point of transit of illicit narcotics into Northeast Asia, Oceania and America. Its complex geography and extensive borders provide plenty of points of enter and exit for illegal substances, raw material and even profits from illegal drug trade (BINLEA 2018). The problem does not affect the country evenly, with most hot spots involving southern provinces, or key port cities facilitating access to other Asian countries.

China's drug problem is twofaced, as the country is a heavy producer and consumer of drugs. Furthermore, it is one of the main suppliers of chemical precursors to manufacture ATS, NPS and prescription medication worldwide (e.g. Fentanyl), involving clandestine laboratories across the country (BINLEA 2014). This correlates with society's narcotic user trends, where ATS consumption among registered drug users is increasing while heroin continues to diminish. Crystal Methamphetamine presents one of the highest annual prevalence rates among users, so the government has made it a priority to fight the production of ATS-type drugs. Not so much because of international pressure, but more because of the domestic epidemic in drug use.

China's drug problem mostly focuses on the border provinces, in particular in the south of China. Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong are territories with heavy trafficking of narcotics, although it is difficult to establish which percentage of drug arrests actually take place in these provinces, as Chinese statistics are very general. Nonetheless, the amount of seized drugs is continuously growing, with methamphetamines leading the statistics, accounting for 61% of all confiscated drugs in 2016 (UNODC 2017a). The trend is similar for drug arrests, with China's NCB reporting 724,000 drug-related incidents with over 530,000 arrested people between 2012 and 2016, the majority of these associated with methamphetamine production or trade (Xinhua 2017).

Precursor chemicals production and trade, another major problem of the drug market, remains at an all-time high, with international community putting emphasis on China's ability to regulate these substances. According to the INCB, China sourced almost 78% of all chemical precursors manufactured in East Asia (INCB 2018), making this a problem just as big as drug consumption in the country. Precursor chemicals production, as well as manufacture and trade of ATS-type drugs, cover the entire spectrum of the illicit market for synthetic drugs, challenging law enforcement authorities. In addition, manufacturing takes place in underground laboratories that can be virtually anywhere in the country, which increases the difficulty to identify and shut them down. The problem does not only affect law enforcement, but also poses a considerable challenge for regulating agencies that need to update the lists of banned substances used for the manufacturing of synthetic drugs constantly.

Demand Reduction (Services for Drug Users)

China's services for drug users are compulsory in nature. Authorities classify drug use as illegal, with law offenders going to rehabilitation centres before receiving a criminal sanction. The government oversees most of the treatment centres, but patients must pay for their treatment. More important is the fact that any kind of treatment for Substance Use Disorders is part of the criminal justice system (WHO 2010a). This is characteristic for most countries that penalise drug use, with authorities keeping a register on all people in treatment and surveying out patients.

Therapies for drug users, which are mostly Methadone Maintenance Therapies (MMT), are provided in order to "protect the physical and mental health of Chinese citizens, maintain public order, and wipe out once and for all the scourge of drugs" (State Council of the PRC 2000). MMT receive significant criticism from the international community, as they remain part of the criminal justice system instead of the public health section. Authorities do not have sufficient resources to administer the necessary doses of methadone, thus relapse rates are very high. In addition, users with previous failed MMTs cannot apply to readmission to these treatment centres, instead having to go to Compulsory Isolation Rehabilitation (CIR), which is not too different from its predecessor Re-education Through Labour (RTL) Centres (D. Werb et al. 2016).

Although, there is some literature addressing the psychosocial and self-help treatments for drug users in China, there is very little information on the implementation across the country. Most of the data reflected the limited use of these kind of therapies, highlighting that the country does not invest enough in training personnel to provide this services, and patients rarely have psychological or psychiatric treatments (Xiao et al. 2015, 193).

Supply Reduction (Control of Production and Trade)

China has implemented source control measures throughout its fight against drug traffic. Academic sources have reviewed the country's problem with opium in the XIX century, which managed to reach a production of 2 to 4 times the amount of opium poppy to what was imported from central Asia (H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009). However, source-country measures have evolved in modern times, as Chinese drug production has shifted from heroin to ATS drugs. Thus, nowadays, domestic measures mostly target regulation of precursor chemicals and intelligence operations to identify and close clandestine laboratories of methamphetamines.

Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has stepped up its involvement in operations to reduce production of opium poppy in the Golden Triangle, with the purpose of reducing the inflow of heroin to the country. Bilateral agreements with Myanmar (Shan State), Thailand (Chian Rai and Chian Mai) and Laos (Luang Prabang) have established mechanisms to foster economic development and investment from Chinese companies in this region. Ultimately, most efforts concentrate on the development of alternative crops such as tea, rice, corn and rubber (UNODC 2015). In practice though, these mono-plantations offer little improvement to the economic situation of the impoverished regions who lack the necessary infrastructure to produce and export their product. Forums such as the International Conference on Alternative Development (ICAD), have denounced the inefficiencies of the Chinese source-country control measures in the Golden Triangle (ICAD 2015). Without the right investment in infrastructure, technological and knowhow transfer, and access to markets to sell the legal product, it is very difficult to modify the trend in illegal cultivation of plants for drug production. In addition, in the cases when there is a successful result, production shifts to nearby areas where there is less control of illicit crops.

Chinese authorities specialized in anti-drugs operations relatively late. In 1982, the first training in counter-narcotic operations took place with the local police of Yunnan, and up to this date there are reports on the limited budget and personnel for law enforcement against drugs in some regions in the country (S. X. Zhang and Chin 2016). Currently interdiction operations fall under the 'General Administration of Customs' (GAC), which annually reports on drug seizures in transit to China. In overall, statistics show a growing trend in recent years, going from 806 kg of seized narcotics in 2004 to 4.9 t in 2016 (GAC 2017, 2014). The Chinese Coast Guard undertakes operations at key seaports like Hong Kong, where they confiscated more than 2.4 t of methamphetamines in 2017 (Xinhua 2018).

Although, there are national campaigns against illicit drugs, most of the domestic counter-narcotic operations take place in selected provinces where the illicit drug market is most relevant. These operations involve efforts among national law enforcement authorities and local police, and have no set frequency; hence, they tend to temporarily disrupt the market and provide immediate results in terms of drug seizure and capture of retail sellers and manufacturers of synthetic drugs (BINLEA 2018; Dai 2014). Statistical information in English on the amount of people arrested is not up-to-date and, while the NNCC's 2012 annual report talks about 1,220,000 people detained because of drug-related offenses, numbers are kept general with little detail on the type of role these people played, not clarifying the level of involvement with illicit drug trafficking. Statistics on arrest could even include drug users, even those who are under treatment, blurring the line between those addicted (suffering an illness) and those trafficking drugs (committing a crime).

Criminal penalties for people related to the cultivation, manufacture, smuggling and sale of illicit narcotics are severe in China. The current 'Anti-Drug Law' (2008) and the 'Criminal Law' (1979) mandate a minimum of 15 years of prison, with death penalty as the maximum sanction for grave drug-related offences. Over 1,000 g of opium or 50 g of any other illegal narcotic Chinese citizens or foreign nationals can face lifetime in prison (Government of the PRC 2007, 1979). Convicted people, in particular foreigners, have very little chances of receiving legal counselling or a suspended sentence. In addition, there are no official statistics on executions for drug-related offences China since 2000, when the NNCC last reported 54 (S. X. Zhang and Chin 2016). The use of death penalty as a maximum punishment for drug crimes remains one of China's most controverted practices, with the country showing no plans to ban its use.

Demand Reduction (Criminal and Non-Criminal Sanctions)

The emphasis of the current 'Anti-Drug Law' lies in incapacitating measures for drug users, although the Chinese government has implemented some strategies to deter people from using illicit narcotics. Law enforcement authorities make use of random testing on suspected drug users, as they do not need any special permission to perform these tests, often targeting people registered in rehabilitation treatments (L. Zhang et al. 2013). Authorities also encourage citizens to report potential drug users, especially during periods of national campaigns against illicit drugs. This practice, which in principle sounds very effective, of fostering fear among people to reduce the use of drugs, can be highly counterproductive for users who require treatment to combat addiction, as they prefer to hide instead of looking for help (Cohen and Amon 2008).

Contrary to most western countries, where drug users rarely receive prison time unless they have committed other crimes while under the influence, Chinese legislation convicts drug users, although usually sending them to compulsory rehabilitation treatment first. This is an incapacitation measure, as it falls under the competence of the criminal justice system. Users must report to local authorities and those with previous records of drug use receive CIR, which has been severely criticised for using forced labour and having little to no medical and psychological treatment options (Xiao et al. 2015).

Please refer to annex 14 for a summary of the key findings per criteria on the assessment of the national illicit drug policy of China.

3.2. The Philippines

3.2.1. International Dimension

Response to International Conventions

The Philippines is a signatory of the three main international conventions on illicit drugs (1961, 1971 and 1988). In practice though, the country's measures to fight drug trafficking have been highly criticised since the arrival of the current president. Rodrigo Duterte has been known for his aggressive stance against drugs since his time as major of Davao City and has been accused of promoting extra-judicial killings of suspects of drug-related crimes, thus, contravening the very basic principles of the international conventions on illicit drugs (UNODC 2016b).

The main piece of legislation to combat illicit drugs in the Philippines is the 'Dangerous Drugs Act' of 2002, which expanded the scope of mechanisms to reduce production of narcotics, in particular methamphetamines, defining regulations for trade and use of precursor chemicals. In addition, it increases the severity of criminal sanctions for owners of drug dens to lifetime imprisonment and encourages the participation of civil society, local government and private sector to combat drug trafficking (Government of the Philippines 2002).

The law also imposes death penalty as maximum punishment for some drug-related crimes (e.g. smuggling, owning a drug den), although the Philippines banned execution from the criminal justice system on 2006. Despite this, "the Philippine police acknowledged that approximately 4,000 suspected drug users or sellers had been killed in the war on drugs, while Human Rights Watch put the number at 12,000 and Philippine human rights advocates claimed it was more than 16,000" (Johnson and Fernquest 2018, 2). Thus, the Philippines is a good example for the discrepancies between written law and actual law enforcement against illicit drugs.

Drug law enforcement in the Philippines is highly complex as it involves many actors with functions that often overlap, especially for matters such as interdiction operations, intelligence and capture of members of drug syndicates. Officially, the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) formulates the guidelines for the anti-drug strategy. The DDB works together with several ministries and government departments, which appoint a representative to the board and allocate a share of their budget to initiatives against illicit drugs. The Department of Justice and the Department of Health are some of the most relevant members of the DDB board, together with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, which is in charge of law enforcement operations (DDB 2014).

In practice, control over law enforcement spreads throughout different government agencies, although they are supposed to report to the PDEA. The Philippine Armed Forces (PAF), the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau of Investigations (NIB) are able to perform counter-narcotic operations, and they each have their own guidelines on how to conduct them. The government has attempted to improve the organizational structure by designating the PDEA as the sole agency to undertake counter-narcotic law enforcement in the country. The office of the president had to annul the order later, simply because the PDEA does not have the budget or personnel to perform and supervise all initiatives to combat illicit drugs (PNA 2017b). Another attempt to centralize efforts resulted in the establishment of the Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD), in order to better attune the communication channels between law enforcement agencies, avoiding overlapping efforts (Government of the Philippines 2017). Results have been underwhelming, and currently each agency reports numbers of arrests and casualties in drug busts independently, making it hard to measure the success of law enforcement against illicit drugs. This is another example of the level of difficulty that governments face when trying to establish a coordinated effort to combat drug trafficking.

Law Enforcement Cooperation

Much like other countries in East Asia, the Philippines has stressed its commitment to combat illicit drugs and cooperate with other countries and international organizations with the same purpose. Up until the arrival of Rodrigo Duterte to office, the country was an active contributor to ASEAN's initiatives against transnational crimes like drug trafficking. Milestones in cooperation include the 'ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Narcotics Drugs' in Manila in 1976, which defined mechanisms to exchange information on suspected members of drug trafficking networks (ASEAN 1976). The Philippines supported the 'Bangkok Political Declaration in Pursuit of a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015' in Thailand in 2000 and is part of the 'ASEAN-China Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs' (ACCORD) (CPS 2018).

The DDB and the PDEA coordinate most of the bilateral and multilateral agreements on illicit drugs involving the Philippines. The country's interest in establishing international cooperation on narcotics has resulted in MOUs with over 10 countries since the 1990s. The government also promoted partnership agreements that included initiatives to promote economic development and stability in the country, including the exchange of knowhow, technology and information to better equip their national agencies combating drug trafficking (DFA 2006). Some of the most relevant agreements include the European Union and Japan. The Philippines has worked with them in the past, with the purpose of improving its capacity to intercept drugs at customs, to train counter-narcotic officers, for drug research and for establishing measures to reduce the production of methamphetamine 'Shabu' in the country (Council of the EU 2011).

However, since 2016, Philippines' international cooperation on illicit drugs is under re-evaluation by most countries and international organizations criticising the government's approach to the drug problem. Overall criticism on the lake of due process and human rights violations has substantially affected the implementation of more MOUs and other bilateral initiatives. An unexpected consequence from this is the increasing closeness between the Philippines and the Chinese government as Beijing has shown support for Duterte's drastic strategy.

Disagreements on topics like the South China Sea have been left aside temporarily in order to strengthen cooperation between the countries as the archipelago grows distant from previous allies, like the United States (Heydarian 2017). China and the Philippines have recently signed a MOU on the 'Protocol on Cooperation between the PDEA and the NNCC of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) of China', where they established mechanisms to increase exchange of intelligence between agencies, as well as undertake joint anti-narcotic operations and training for police officers (Mirasol 2017). The increasing cooperation between the countries is not only a result of Duterte's affinity to Xi Jingping, but also a direct consequence of the amount of methamphetamines and chemical precursors coming from mainland China into the Philippines.

3.2.2. National Dimension

Assessment of the Illicit Drug Market (Drug Problem)

The drug problem in the Philippines is characterised by high consumption levels of marijuana and methamphetamines, and an increasing production of synthetic drugs for the domestic market and for export using 'drug couriers' (BINLEA 2012). The rising numbers have served as an argument to increase counter-narcotic operations focusing on Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

Estimates on the numbers of drug users in the Philippines vary widely. While the president states that the country has around 4 million drug users, the official statistics of the DDB speak of 1,8 million people, no more than 1.8% of the entire population (Levissianos et al. 2017; PDEA 2016). In overall, amphetamine use poses the greatest challenge as it is intrinsically connected to the underground drug manufacturing industry of the country. Although, people consume synthetic drugs like MDAMA (Ecstasy) in the club scene in the Philippines (APAIC 2014b), most users of 'Shabu' come from a vulnerable background, using it not for recreational purposes but to perform better at work, like truck drivers consuming the drug to stay awake for longer hours (Gamil 2014). There are areas more affected than others, but in overall consumption of illicit drugs is widespread, with almost 50% of villages reporting drug related activities.

The last decade has seen a surge in seizures of methamphetamines, while cannabis has reduced considerably, amounting to only 28% of the total amount of narcotics confiscated in 2016 (UNODC 2017a). Between 2010 and 2015 there has been an increase in the dismantling of clandestine laboratories across the country, through operations led by PDEA, AFP and the PNP. Arrests of people related to drug activities has spiked reaching 37,000 people captured in over 34,000 counter-narcotic operations (PDEA 2016).

In addition, authorities have reported an increase in captures of foreign nationals involved with transnational drug networks. Detainees are mostly people coming from mainland China, accounting for 54% of foreigners convicted for drug trafficking in the Philippines in 2016 (PDEA 2016). The connection between underground production of methamphetamines and the Chinese drug syndicates importing chemical precursors is a result of China's difficulty to efficiently regulate the trade of these substances, and it is another reason explaining the close collaboration between Chinese and Philippine authorities on drug trafficking. The Philippines, a country that had one of the lowest HIV rates in East Asia, has seen a substantial rise of people infected in recent years (Epidemiology Bureau 2016). One reason for the increasing numbers of HIV diagnoses among Injected Drug Users (IDU) is the change in the approach to combat illicit drug use since the arrival of Rodrigo Duterte to office: Needle-exchange programs, which often took place unofficially, have reduced considerably since law enforcement officials target such places to look for and arrest drug users. An undesired result is that the Philippines has now one of the fastest HIV growing rates in the world (Doyle 2016).

Demand Reduction (Services for Drug Users)

The Philippines has a detailed drug policy that includes the option of medical therapies for people with Substance Use Disorders (SUD). According to law, drug use is an illness, so authorities

cannot prosecute people for this, unless they have committed a crime under the influence. Thus, the existing Treatment Rehabilitation Centres (TRC) are managed by the Department of Health (DOH) and are not part of the criminal justice system (WHO 2010c).

TRCs are supposed to be available for all citizens, with at least one centre in each province and treatment options ranging from 6 months to 1 year. In practice, the number of facilities is limited, with most of them understaffed and suffering from lack of funding (DDB 2014). While most of the resources go to interdiction efforts, as discussed in the next segment, government does not consider rehabilitation treatments a priority even in the face of increasing drug consumption. In addition, demand for rehabilitation services continues to rise but not precisely for the right reasons: Users seek TRCs to avoid the risk of capture or murder by law enforcement officers, turning these centres into refuge (Wiess 2017). A main reason for the success of OST therapies is individual commitment to quit drugs, not fear of being killed; thus, the effectiveness of current rehabilitation treatments in the Philippines is under question.

According to the 'Manual of Operations for Drug Abuse Treatment & and Rehabilitation Centres', there are a wide range of options for psychosocial treatments to quit using drugs. Approaches are meant to include psychiatric and psychological assessments, as well as a strong focus on emotional and social roots behind drug use. Some TRC also offer 12-step programmes similar to those from Alcoholic Anonymous, as well as spiritual and religious counselling to deal with abstinence (DOH 2003). Unfortunately, there are no statistics on success rates for this kind of treatments, nor proof that the government currently provides them. In addition, organizations like the HRW question the quality of these rehabilitation services, accusing authorities of following abusive models from other countries in East Asia (HRW 2017).

Supply Reduction (Control of Production and Trade)

Source-country control measures in the Philippines focus strongly on reducing the amount of Cannabis cultivated and the manufacture of crystal methamphetamine in the country. For the case of Cannabis, the authorities have sought to establish manual eradication programmes, yet the presence of illegal groups in the affected areas has significantly diminished the impact of such initiatives (UNODC 2006b). In the last years, efforts to identify and destroy cannabis plantations have shown better results, with authorities destroying marijuana plants for a total value of almost US $60 (₱5,184,648,605) million in 2016 (PDEA 2016).

Although, there has been recent success in eradication efforts, development of alternative crops yields fewer positive results despite efforts to work with local authorities to implement these

programs with former farmers of Cannabis. A main problem is the lack of resources to provide financial and technical support, as well as the deficient infrastructure capacity in rural areas. Thus, whatever farmers manage to produce incurs high transaction costs and is often not up to the standards to export it to other countries. This is a common problem for such initiatives, with farmers preferring to switch back to plantations of 'mother plants' for drugs, as they are more profitable (DDB 2015).

Interdiction efforts are a more common measure to reduce the supply of illicit drugs in the country. The PDEA usually works together with several law enforcement agencies, although the most important for this type of operations are the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC), which focus their operations on international airports and the many seaports. Interdiction operations do not differ strongly from standard models of other countries: authorities make use of technology to test suspicious parcels and identify passengers leaving and entering the country with nervous behaviour. In addition, the PNP relies on K-9 operations (drug sniffing dogs) to check cargo and luggage in airports with high traffic of people (PDEA 2016, 2012).

Domestic counter-narcotic operations in the Philippines have increased considerably in recent years, going from 10,159 drug arrests in 2012 to 28,056 in 2016. Most of the captured people belong to the lower levels of the illicit drug market, with over 65% of them identified as 'pushers' (people looking for users interested in buying drugs) in 2016 (PDEA 2012, 2016). Although, this approach results in more arrests, the impact on the overall reduction of drug supply is less relevant, as criminal networks easily replace pushers or dealers. In the meantime, high-level captures are less common. Another feature of the counter-narcotic operations is the inclusion of users as a target for law enforcement officers, who also count them in the numbers of arrests and casualties of drug bust operations. As previously mentioned, there are no reliable sources to know how many people have been killed in this kind of operations, with official statistics of the PDEA talking about 4,000 deaths between 2016 and 2018, while HRW denounced over 12,000 between 2016 and 2017 (PDEA 2018; HRW 2018).

Criminal sanctions for people involved in the production, smuggling and sale of illicit narcotics are severe in the Philippines. Although legally there is no death penalty for any type of crime in the country, convicted people can spend between 12 to 20 years in prison for importing or exporting drugs or precursor chemicals, selling them or owning a drug den. Sanctions often include fines that go from ₱500,000 to ₱10,000,000 regardless if it is a first time offence or not (Government of the Philippines 2002).

Demand Reduction (Criminal and Non-Criminal Sanctions)

The 'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act' of 2002 allows the use of suspended sentences for first-time offenders between the age of 15 and 18. These people instead undertake community service and are subjected to supervision by the Department of Health (DOH) (Government of the Philippines 2002). There are fines contemplated for those who caught possessing more than 500 g of marijuana, 50 g of 'Shabu' or 10 g of any other illicit narcotics, ranging from ₱500,000 to ₱10,000,000.

Despite existing non-criminal sanctions, most people captured using or possessing small amounts of drugs face jail time. Penalties do not differentiate between drug dealers and users, with the latter group facing the same sentence if it is proven that they have a record in drug use: 12 to 20 years in prison. For first time offenders, conviction involves the reclusion in a rehabilitation centre. Although, this is what has been established by law, most drug users captured in drug busts end up dead under unclear circumstances (Santos and Ebbighausen 2018). Law enforcement officers must carry body cameras to keep track of any domestic counter-narcotic operation, but they often tamper with recordings or disable cameras to hide evidence of any extra-judicial killings. Most of those captured in drug dens or even in their own houses arrive dead at the hospital, to be reported as a casualty of the drug war (Baldwin and Marshall 2017).

Please refer to annex 15 for a summary of the key findings per criteria on the assessment of the national illicit drug policy of the Philippines.

3.3. Japan

3.3.1. International Dimension

Response to International Conventions

Japan has ratified the three main international conventions on drugs (1961, 1971 and 1988). The country is a strong supporter of the prohibitionist approach to combating the illicit drug market, opposing progressive changes suggested by other parties from the UNODC (Bewley-Taylor 2003). Thus, Japan supports positions from the United States, which considers drugs a threat to public health and security. Aiming to improve the mechanisms to combat drug trafficking, Japan has also ratified the 'UN Convention against Transnational Crime' (UNODC 2017g).

Modern legislation on drugs in Japan begun with the implementation of the 'Cannabis Control Act' of 1948. Before this time, the country had not directly prohibited the use of this drug, although opium and other narcotics had been banned since the Edo Period (Vaughn, Huang, and Ramirez 1995). Some researchers consider that the influence of the United States was behind

the modern bans on cannabis, stimulants and narcotics in Japan. However, the country faced a surge in drug use after the end of the Second World War, forcing the government to implement legislation to punish the use of ATS-type of drugs (Stimulant Drug Control Act in 1951) and narcotics (Narcotic and Psychotropic Control Act of 1953) (Edström 2015; Vaughn, Huang, and Ramirez 1995). Among other major changes brought by these laws, they updated the guidelines for the use of these substances for medical or research purposes, as well as the implementation of a database of drug offenders (including users). Thus, Japanese legislation on drugs follows an intrinsically prohibitionist approach considering drug users law-offenders.

Japan's drug legislation differs from that of other Asian countries, as it is not just one comprehensive law, but also rather a series of laws that focus on groups of drugs, detailing specific measures for the control. In terms of criminal sanctions, there is hardly a variation in punishments, further discussed in the segment of National Dimension for Japan. Another key characteristic of Japan's approach to combat drug trafficking, is the implementation of the 'Anti-Boryokudan Act' in 1992. *Boryokudan,* Japanese criminal gangs, monopolize the illicit drug trade and this law established mechanisms to counter their illicit activities, as well as setting specific criminal sanctions to reduce their role in the drug trade (NPA 2017a).

Law enforcement against illicit drugs is coordinated through the National Police Agency (NPA), overseen by the National Public Safety Commission of the Cabinet Office. The NPA, through its Drugs and Firearms Division, coordinates the work of other law enforcement agencies that are involved in counter-narcotic operations on the different levels of the illicit drug market. Thus, other organs like Japan Customs and the Division of Criminal Affairs Planning report to the NPA on drug initiatives. The Ministry of Health oversees the rehabilitation services for users.

Law Enforcement Cooperation

The Japanese government has manifested its commitment with international cooperation to combat illicit drug trade. Among the different areas for cooperation, Japan considers the exchange of intelligence on transnational drug networks essential, as well as the sharing of technology and best practices in order to improve the detection of illicit narcotics and stimulants before they enter the country (NPA 2009). The country is also interested in sharing its advances in technology used for interdiction operations at airports and seaports, especially with countries in Southeast Asia and China, who is Japan's main supplier of methamphetamines

Japan is a supporter of ASEAN's initiatives to combat drug trafficking; thus, the country's representatives have regularly attended the 'ASEAN plus Three Ministerial Meeting of Transnational Crime' since 2004. It is also part of the 'Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime' (SOMTC), as well as the 'Plus Three Working Group on Narcotics to eradicate the scourge of drugs' (ASEAN 2017). Cooperation with East Asia is pivotal to Japan's anti-drug strategy, so the country sends representatives to various regional forums like the 'Conference on Amphetamine-Type Stimulants in East and South-East Asia' and also organizes the 'Asia-Pacific Operation Drug Enforcement Conference' (ADEC) with its own budget, established in 1995 (NPA 2008b). Japan establishes bilateral or multilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking in order to: i) exchange knowhow and technology, ii) coordinate international conferences and training seminars, iii) negotiate international treaties and iv) exchange intelligence between national law enforcement agencies (NPA 2017b). Although, the NPA coordinates all of these agreements, the agency relies on the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) for some of these initiatives.

Together with the MOJ, Japan's NPA has established a series of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with neighbouring countries like China and South Korea, as well as with some of the biggest consumers of illicit drugs, the United States and the European Union. The main objective is to speed up the exchange of information and coordinate joint investigations to arrest members of transnational drug networks. Complementary, the NPA through JICA works to provide financing and training to improve rehabilitation services for drug users in East Asian countries heavily affected by SUDs, like the Philippines. There is an MOU between JICA and the country's DOH to increase the amount of treatment centres and the effectiveness of rehabilitation programmes (JICA 2017a, 2017b). Similarly, JICA coordinated the 'Project on Assistance for Improvement of Drug Law Enforcement in Thailand and Neighbouring Countries' which focused on improving technology to identify drug shipments and training law enforcement authorities (NPA 2008b, 4–5). Evidently, most of Japan's cooperation through bilateral and multilateral agreements focuses strongly on East Asia, as the region of origin of most of the illicit drugs entering the country. This is a major argument to explain why Japan would deliberately ignore international calls to end cooperation with countries accused of human rights violations in the drug fight, as is the case with the Philippines (Kine 2017).

3.3.2. National Dimension

Assessment of the Illicit Drug Market (Drug Problem)

Japan is one of the most profitable markets for methamphetamines in the world. Given its level of economic development, as well as its geographic location, the country's purchasing power

for drugs results in retail prices reaching US $700 versus US $5 in China per g of Crystal Meth (Levissianos et al. 2017). But, the numbers of drug users are lower than in other developed countries, and there are several reasons why consumption of illicit narcotics and synthetic drugs is relatively low in Japan (Ikeda et al. 2017). For one, society is very outspoken about the damaging effects of drugs, condemning their use and shaming those who are caught breaking the law. However, this level of condemnation and social prejudice together with harsh law enforcement operations discourages users from seeking help to rehabilitate, thus making it harder to establish if statistics actually reflect current trends in drug use in Japan (Ryall 2018; Hari 2018).

The use of ATS-type drugs has been on the rise in Japan since the early 1970s. The country's economic growth resulted in a larger capacity to acquire synthetic stimulants from abroad. Thus, *Boryokudan* increased their import of methamphetamines, while the new Japanese middle class had the money to purchase Cannabis and Crystal Meth (Vaughn, Huang, and Ramirez 1995). The trend has so far remained unchanged, thus ATS and NPS currently account for almost 70% of drugs reported during arrests of users (Ikeda et al. 2017). Japan is an example on how countries with higher developed economies become desirable markets for transnational drug networks, even if they have established strict control mechanisms to curb the inflow of illicit drugs.

As Japan is a destination for drugs, the country's statistics on drug-related crimes involve smuggling, retail sale and use. There is no substantial production of ATS or cultivation of 'mother plants' for manufacture of cocaine, heroin or marijuana in the country. Data on drug arrests is kept general, making it difficult to determine what percentage corresponds to drug trafficking, as users of drugs are also considered law-offenders. Once again, most common drugs among arrested people are methamphetamines, followed by Cannabis. Other types of narcotics like cocaine, MDMA or Heroin are uncommon (UNODC 2018g). China is the biggest supplier of stimulants for Japan, with almost 40% of all seized drugs in 2016 coming from the neighbouring country. The second largest supplier of drugs is the United States, providing 17% of methamphetamines entering the Japanese market in the same year (APAIC 2014a). This explains why the NPA works closely together with the NNCC from China and the DEA from the United States in order to curb the inflow of ATS-type drugs into the country.

Similar to other countries suffering from drug trafficking, Japan is no stranger to criminal gangs controlling the trade of illicit drugs. The country's *Boryokudan* also called '*Yakuza'*, have monopolized the smuggling of stimulants into the Japanese market since the 1950s, when these type of substances where officially banned under modern legislation (Edström 2015). Over 80,000 people belong to a *Boryokudan* in Japan, although membership numbers have been

decreasing since the introduction of the 'Anti-Boryokudan Law' in 1991 (Editors Encyclopedia Britannica 2016). The relationship between the NPA and several *Boryokudan* is complex, as not all of these gangs are involved in drug trafficking and the public media often idolizes them. In addition, these gangs are often hide behind legal businesses to launder their profits, making it harder to track their movements on the illicit market (Reilly 2014).

Demand Reduction (Services for Drug Users)

Japanese anti-drug policy criminalizes drug use, which means that users face prison time even if it is a first-time offence. In addition, rehabilitation treatment is compulsory for any person with an SUD, with social health insurance covering the costs. Private organizations are mostly in charge of running the system, although the Ministry of Health (MHLW) supervises it. This results in disorganisation among different actors. Furthermore, treatment centres often just offer generalized services for any type of addiction, resulting in inadequate programmes for drug users dealing with abstinence symptoms, which differ from alcohol abuse (Ikeda et al. 2017). Understanding the deficiencies within the system, the Japanese government has been working on initiatives to coordinate the medical services for drug users better. However, there is little information on the type of therapies used, the coverage they have or their success rate, which poses a challenge to evaluating their success in reducing demand for synthetic drugs.

Through the regulations established by the 'Emergency Measures for the Prevention of Repeated Offences by Drug-Dependent People, Elderly Criminals, and Others' and the 'Act Pertaining to Promotion of Recidivism Prevention', Japan's MOJ defined the guidelines to rehabilitate drug users and avoid relapse by means of psychosocial treatments (MOJ 2017). This is particularly important, as authorities must offer these treatments in prisons where drug users serve their sentence. The Japanese government has a dual approach to drug use: on the one hand, it is a crime that must be sanctioned, but on the other, it is also an illness that must be treated.

Alike to OST and Antagonist therapies, there is very limited information in English that explains the kind of options available as psychosocial treatment. There seems to be a similar challenge in coordinating the role of several actors, private and public, in the implementation of these services. Nonetheless, the Japanese government's recent efforts include a pilot programme in Osaka, where a comprehensive approach to treat addiction with the help of private and public health organizations as well as local law enforcement authorities is used (Ikeda et al. 2017). This pilot includes the psychological assessment of patients, working groups with families of the patients and self-help programmes to strengthen the patients' resolve and avoid relapse. The

fact that the government is investing in such an initiative shows their interest in shifting the focus of treatments from merely a criminal punishment to a way to reintegrate people into society.

Supply Reduction (Control of Production and Trade)

Japan's efforts in source-country control measures focus on supporting eradication or alternative development of crops in countries in Southeast Asia. Although, heroin is not among the main drugs of use in Japan, most bilateral cooperation on alternative development aims to give opium poppy farmers the means to switch to legal crops in the Golden Triangle (MOFA 2001). Aid mostly translates into investments on infrastructure and technology for agriculture projects, as well as support for health and education in the poorest areas most vulnerable to the illicit drug market (e.g. Shan State in Myanmar). However, much like similar alternative development projects, the resulting crops fail to meet the necessary standards for export to the Japanese market, supposedly one of the main goals of the programmes. Despite the substantial amount of financial aid delivered for this purpose (e.g. the US $11 million for the JICA-Myanmar cooperation project in the Shan State between 2005 and 2011), results are underwhelming, with many farmers returning to opium poppy plantation (Tsunekawa and Murotani 2016).

Japan Customs is in charge of interdiction operations in the country. The country has invested strongly in technology and training of personnel at airports and seaports with the purpose of curbing the inflow of drugs into the archipelago. Although, the amount of drug seizures alone cannot provide a measure on how successful the fight against drug trafficking is, it can put in context how effectively law enforcement authorities disturb the illicit drug market. In this sense, Japan Customs has shown positive results in interdiction operations, managing to capture over 1,500 kg of methamphetamines before entering the country via commercial cargo in 2016 (Japan Customs 2016). This has been an unprecedent amount of drugs seized that shows that despite interdiction efforts criminal networks continue to attempt to smuggle drugs into Japan.

Although, the government considers drug users law-offenders, most of the domestic counter-narcotic operations involve members of *Boryokudan*. Current trends show a 7% decline in numbers of captures of gang members involved with drug trafficking (NPA 2017a). Such a pattern in decreasing number of arrests cannot be attributed solely to effective police control that has discouraged people from selling drugs. As acknowledged by the NPA, the main reason is that *Boryokudan* membership has been decreasing in recent years (NPA 2016). This is a good example on how positive or negative results in drug traffic indicators are not necessarily the product of the implementation of a policy but can correlate to external factors or other government policies that unexpectedly affect the illicit drug market.

Criminal sanctions for smuggling and selling illicit narcotics and stimulants can result in lifetime imprisonment, even as a first-time offence. There are shorter sentences in the cases of cannabis, which sets the limit of jail time at a maximum of 10 years. However, for most cases penalties are very high and include payment of fines from ¥10,000 to ¥3,000,000 (Government of Japan 1948, 1951, 1953b). There are no current statistics in English providing information on the amount of people serving a prison sentence for drug-related offenses, available information only shows data on arrests.

Demand Reduction (Criminal and Non-Criminal Sanctions)

Japan is a good example of the impact of unofficial deterrence mechanisms to discourage drug use. Legally, users of cannabis must pay up to ¥2,000,000, and ATS users face fines up to ¥5,000,000 (Government of Japan 1951, 1948). However, a more effective method of dissuasion is society itself: Condemnation for drug use is high in the country. Society strongly opposes drug use, considering it a threat to public health and security. Drug users are publicly shamed and they are perceived as 'weak', regardless of their social status (Oh 2009; Brasor 2017). Such a level of social pressure could be the reason behind Japan's low consumption rates, although it could also be the reason behind underreporting of drug use because of the fear of losing social status (Ryall 2018). While in countries like the United States, being caught with a marijuana cigarette can result in a misdemeanour offence in the worst case; in Japan, it translates into the possibility of losing your job and going to prison.

Concerning incapacitating measures, the Japanese government's zero-tolerance approach means that drug offenses can carry long prison sentences. Users of synthetic drugs face up to 10 years in prison with labour, while consumers of Cannabis can face up to 7 years in jail. The sanctions do not take into consideration if it was a first-time offence or the amount of drug the user had in possession or in the organism (evaluated through blood test). There is simply no leeway to avoid a criminal sentence if you are caught using narcotic or stimulant drugs in Japan.

Please refer to annex 16 for a summary of the key findings per criteria on the assessment of the national illicit drug policy of Japan.

3.4. Conclusion

Drug trafficking in East Asia has been in the agenda of policy makers and international organisations, in particular since the end of the Cold war, with the rise in use of synthetic stimulants and heroin. This master's thesis focused on drug trafficking from a comparative viewpoint, analysing and contrasting the policies designed to combat it. Contrasting national policies against illicit drugs may seem an easy task initially, as they share a common purpose: the reduction of available illegal narcotic and stimulants in the market. In practice, though, there are several challenges to provide an accurate description of what a drug policy is and what should be included in a policy comparison among countries. The researched focused on three countries affected differently by the illicit drug market: People's Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines and Japan.

Although most governments are signatories of the same international conventions, and are thus bound to meet their provisions, each one interprets them differently. To begin with, China is a main producer of methamphetamine and chemical precursors in the region, and a market for consumption of stimulant drugs and opioids. The sheer size of the country already makes it a challenge for the government to design effective policies against illicit drugs. On the other hand, the Philippines, a country implementing one of the toughest approaches to drug trafficking, is a major consumer of crystal meth (*Shabu*) and Cannabis, and it is a transit point for illicit drugs to reach the Pacific and Oceania. Here, the size is not so much the problem as it is the geographic characteristics of the country, an archipelago with dozens of points of entry and exit of illicit drugs. Finally, Japan provided the opportunity to review the drug policy of a developed country with a highly restrictive approach to drug use and illicit drug trade controlled by criminal gangs (*Boryokudan*). Despite this, Japan has a low, yet persistent, use of synthetic stimulants and psychotropic substances among its citizens, currently going through what is consider its third epidemic wave of synthetic drugs. From production to use, passing by smuggling and illegal distribution, these three countries allowed the opportunity to review the anti-drug policy for every level of the illicit drug market.

The research question for this master's thesis was relatively straightforward and research demanding: "*What strategies do China, Japan and the Philippines have in common and in which ones do they differ when it comes to combating illegal drug trafficking?*". In order to answer this, however, it was necessary to resolve the following correlated context questions:

- What are the relevant aspects of an anti-drug policy?
- How does the national policy reflect the provisions of the international conventions on illicit drugs?
- What are the dimensions of the anti-drug policy?
- How can anti-drug policies be translated into measurable criteria?

The drug problem is multidisciplinary in nature and it demands a holistic approach that considers the social, economic and political dimensions of this topic. Thus, it was necessary to answer the

context questions before developing any comparison among the three countries chosen as case studies.

For this purpose, the research used Babor et al (2010) and Jenner (2013) to develop an eclectic analytical framework. This allowed reviewing both national and international levels of the anti-drug policy for each country. On one hand, Babor's approach to reviewing the national drug policy focused in identifying what the policy of a country emphasizes in its strategy: reduction of supply or reduction of demand for illicit narcotics. On the other hand, Jenner's approach allowed reviewing the transnational level of the drug policy, identifying the mechanisms that countries establish to cooperate against illicit drugs. The resulted framework included 16 criteria: 5 for the international level and 11 for the national level.

International Conventions and Cooperation

Concerning the international level, there are several points in common among the strategies of China, the Philippines and Japan. First, all three countries are signatories of the three main international conventions on drugs. They have manifested their full commitment to cooperate with other states, international and regional organizations in order to facilitate the exchange of intelligence and technology to improve their tactics to detect illicit drugs and identify members of transnational drug networks. The three countries also have a strong focus on regional cooperation, namely East Asia, with the majority of their bilateral and multilateral agreements working on common areas like research on drugs, technology for customs, joint interdiction operations, improvement of rehabilitation treatments and promotion of alternative development to curb the production of 'mother-plants' for manufacturing drugs.

Concerning international cooperation to reduce drug supply, the three countries followed a similar pattern, supporting alternative development programs to promote crops substitution of opium poppy or cannabis, and to grow legal crops instead. Programmes included similar components like financing, exchange of technology for agroindustry and facilitating access to other markets to export the final legal product. They all repeated a similar recipe that other countries have attempted in different drug-producing regions (e.g. substitution of opium poppy in the Golden Crescent and cocaine in South America: Colombia, Peru and Bolivia). As expected, these initiatives face the same type of setbacks, with crops unable to meet international quality standards, farmers unable to trade the product due to deficient infrastructure, and a regression towards illicit cultivation in affected regions. Despite these negative results, China, the Philippines and Japan continue to finance these initiatives with very little modifications to the strategy.

Structure of Anti-Drug Law Enforcement

Additionally, all countries have a defined drug policy, with legislation addressing the drug problem in detail, including the establishment of law enforcement departments or agencies in charge of developing anti-drug policies as well as implementing it. For China, there is the National

Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC), for the Philippines, there is the Dangerous Drugs Bureau (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and for Japan, it is the National Police Agency (NPA) through its Division on Drugs and Firearms. This also results in a common characteristic of the anti-drug law enforcement among the three countries: the agencies in charge of controlling the illicit drug market concerning both supply and demand reduction measures are attached to the criminal justice systems.

A main point of divergence is the manner in which anti-drug law enforcement takes place in each country. While Japan has a strong centralization of all counter-narcotic operations on the NPA and all other agencies must report and coordinate their activities with it; the law enforcement structure in China and the Philippines is different. Given China's extension, local law enforcement agencies must coordinate most of day-to-day operations against illicit drugs, and some provinces like Yunnan have a higher degree of independence to prosecute and sanction law offenders without the review of the NNCC. Although this seeds up procedures locally, it also possess a challenge to coordinate nation-wide counter-narcotic operations. In addition, it results in some law enforcement agencies having better training, resources and trained personal to deal with drug trafficking than others (e.g. Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hong Kong). For the case of the Philippines, the problem lies in the lack of coordination between the PDEA and other law enforcement agencies that perform counter-narcotic operations in parallel (e.g. the Philippine National Police –PNP and the Armed Forces of the Philippine –AFP)This results in overlapping efforts, lack of consolidated statistical data and even differences in procedures.

The National Legislations and Severity of Sanctions

Concerning the nature of the anti-drug legalisations from the three countries, a main observation is that all of them have a strong punitive approach towards drug trafficking, establishing high penalties even for first time offenders. Criminal sanctions for drug trafficking hardly take into consideration if authorities caught the offender with soft or hard drugs, and they place a very low threshold for amount of drugs required for lengthy to lifetime imprisonment. In the case of China, smuggling 50 g or more of any narcotic can result in 7 years to lifetime in prison or death. For the Philippines, the penalties for smuggling 500 g or more of cannabis, 50 g or more of crystal meth and 10 g or more of any other narcotic are the same, resulting in lifetime prison. For the case of Japan, any amount of smuggling or attempting to sale any synthetic stimulant can result in 3 years to lifetime in prison. Similar penalties apply for drug users, with differences in treatment or criminal sanction between traffickers and consumers.

However, there is a significant difference in the use of maximum penalties in the three countries. While Japan seems to be the least severe case, since there is no death penalty for any drug-related crime, the situation is different for China and the Philippines. In the case of China, legislation allows the use of the death penalty as a maximum punishment for drug-related crimes, even though it contravene the international conventions on drugs. Perhaps more relevant is that

such a penalty can apply even for small amounts of illicit drugs and it does not take into consideration the nationality of the law-offender. Both, Chinese citizens and foreign nationals could face execution for smuggling drugs into the country. Foreigners have very limited access to contact the consular representation of their country of origin, nor their families, and the Chinese authorities tend to use them as examples to discourage other people from following their path. A more worrisome aspect is that China does not offer up-to-date statistics on the number of executions for drug-related offences, leaving international organizations in the blind.

A more critical situation is currently present in the Philippines, where the congress abolished the use of death penalty for any kind of crime in 2006. However, since the arrival of President Rodrigo Duterte the number of extra-judicial killings for drug-related crimes has been on the rise, with official sources providing contradictory data on casualties from counter-narcotic operations. International organizations, NGOs and news outlets continually report on violations on the due process of people suspected of committing a drug-related crime, not to mention the times when local authorities conduct private household's searches without a warrant and point-blank kill a drug user. Philippine's disregard of what is legal or not is at the heart of the challenges of anti-drug law enforcement. Although the country is an extreme example of what happens when authorities do not follow a due process, the country is hardly an isolated case concerning anti-drug law enforcement.

Anti-Drug Enforcement and Human Rights

All three countries seem to have a dual approach in how they should handle demand and use of illicit drugs. On one hand, they penalise the consumption of illicit narcotic and synthetic drugs, but on the other hand, they recognize addiction as an illness. This contradiction affects the implementation of the anti-drug policy, making it look more like a "carrot and stick" approach, which is not so different from the approaches of countries like United States. Such a conflictive approach leaves room for authorities to overstep their boundaries, as is the case of China and the Philippines, incurring in a series of human rights violations not only on drug traffickers but also on drug users.

The use of compulsory rehabilitation treatments, regardless whether the public health department or a private organization manages them, has been highly criticised by the international community. Although international conventions require that countries provide treatments to combat drug use, forcing them upon users not committed to quit drugs or mentally or physically unable to undergo treatment, considerably reduces the chances for such programmes to work. In addition, the lack of funding and trained personnel for these kind of programmes results in higher dropout and relapse rates, only strengthening the vicious cycle of consuming-getting caught-rehabilitation-relapse. Moreover, the lack of access to clear statistics on success rates of rehabilitation treatments, or the specific information on the methodology they use, increases international concern on their impact in society. Allegations of forced labour, under-medication

to combat abstinence symptoms, and lack of psychological counselling are just the tip of the iceberg in the UNODC reports on countries like China and the Philippines.

Priorities of the National Policies

Using the analytical framework to review the national policies of China, the Philippines and Japan, brings light to their prioritization of supply-control measures to combat drug trafficking in their territories. Reports from law enforcement authorities in each country highlight the type of interdiction operations, counter-narcotic operations, major drug seizures and arrests of members of drug trafficking networks. It is easier to find statistics on these type of subjects over information on demand reduction efforts like treatments for drug users or implementation of deterrence mechanisms (e.g. fines, community service) and their effectiveness reducing drug demand.

Additionally, governments of the three country have invested more efforts in developing legislations with detailed mechanisms for reducing the supply of drugs, detailing procedures to tackle production of chemical precursors, detect illicit drugs in customs, arrest and convict producers, smugglers and sellers of illicit drugs. There are defined guidelines to share intelligence between national drug enforcement agencies, as well as definition of responsibilities to enforce anti-drug law in their territories. All of the reviewed legislations have defined roles for the actors within the criminal justice system and how they contribute to capture and prosecution the people involved with any form of drug trafficking.

In comparison, the provisions set to reduce demand of drugs by offering rehabilitation services to drug users are limited and often not even detailed enough. With the exception of the information provided by the World Health Organization on the topic of services to cope with Substance Use Disorders (SUDs), there was very little to be found in official government sources for the three country study cases. Within this context, research has showed that China and Japan are implementing some minor changes in their approaches to rehabilitation treatments with the purpose of reducing relapse among drug users, as well as providing more psychological support not just for users but also for their families. However, there is not enough evidence to talk about a major shift in anti-drug policies, more so when drug users remain seen as criminals not just under the law but also by society.

The Challenges for the National Policies

After reviewing the literature on policies against drug trafficking, as well as the national strategies from China, the Philippines and Japan to counter this threat, a main challenge that comes across is the difficulty to stay up-to-date with the modern methods to smuggle drugs. Lawmakers and drug enforcement agencies seem to be one-step behind transnational drug trafficking networks, and so they continue to re-directing their efforts on establishing more control points, and use better technology and trained personnel to arrest criminals and seize more drugs before

the can reach consumers. There are some victories with this approach, of course; otherwise, there would not be an increasing number of drugs seized through interdiction operations in these three countries. However, there is no form to guarantee that the confiscated drugs are not just the tip of the iceberg of the entire amount available in the illicit market. This is not a criticism aiming to demerit the importance of supply-control strategies in combatting drug trafficking, but rather a warning that countries cannot solely rely on these measures to reduce the availability of illegal drugs in their territory.

Another challenge for anti-drug policies is the increasing relevance of New Psychotropic Substances (NPS) among drug users, and the difficulty to regulate their trade. Drugs like K2/Spice, which is a synthetic cannabinoid, are harder to control when anyone can produce them in clandestine laboratories. In the meantime, national legislations in China, the Philippines and Japan are in early stages of establishing concrete measures to regulate NPS. There is also limited research done on these type of drugs, with authorities unable to understand or measure the type of damage they can cause to users, or how they interact with other illicit narcotics and stimulants. In addition, while stronger regulation and sanctions to curb the use of “traditional” drugs like heroin, methamphetamine or cannabis have had an impact in reducing their consumption; there is the risk of shifting the demand towards unregulated synthetic stimulants. Law enforcement authorities may be solving one problem while creating a new one.

Finally, countries like China, Japan and the Philippines ought to review their policies to curb demand for illicit drugs. Their strong emphasis in supply-reduction strategies makes their one-sided approach inefficient when considering that the illicit drug market, like any other market, is the result of interaction between supply and demand forces. Inefficient mechanisms to help users quit drugs and deter others from acquiring them are part of the problem in most fights against drug trafficking. As long as there is demand, there will be offer.

Obstacles and Future Research

The access to standardized statistical data was one of the main problems for developing anti-drug policy comparison among China, the Philippines and Japan. Although all of the countries are signatories of the main international conventions on drugs, which means that they must follow similar criteria to report their advances in combating drug production, trafficking and use, in practice they do not follow the same pattern. Countries like Japan channel their information in English through one agency, the NPA, while the Philippines provides reports through different law enforcement agencies and not just the PDEA. China presented the most difficulties, as the NNCC, which is in charge of providing annual reports with the results of their initiatives, hardly

provides English summaries, with the latest version available dating back to 2012. Analysis done only with English-written sources means that the researcher has to look for secondary sources that have reviewed the official reports from the NNCC.

In terms of the anti-drug laws of each country, documents were available, making it clearer to analyse regulatory aspects. The Philippines legislation has an official version in English, and there are unofficial translations of the anti-drug laws for Japan and China. However, it was difficult to find up-to-date data on topics like prevalence rates in drug use, rehabilitation treatments, international cooperation mechanisms and deterrence initiatives to reduce demand for drugs. Countries provide easier access to information to measure results of supply-reduction actions, but less data on demand reduction. This made it harder to provide a comprehensive analysis on the national anti-drug policy as a whole, although it could also be a symptom of the countries' overreliance on prohibitionist actions over a harms reduction approach.

Notwithstanding, bearing in mind the limitations of this research, analysis of the policies against drug trafficking is a good starting point to develop further research on the topic of illicit drugs in East Asia. For example, assessing the socio-economic roots of drug use focusing in one country could provide enough evidence to develop better policies to reduce demand for illicit drugs. The increasing use of NPS as well as the addiction to opiates and prescription medication provide the opportunity to review anti-drug policies that must interact with public health strategies to deal with pain treatment. Concerning alternative development, cross-country comparisons between East Asia and South America could help developing better-coordinated strategies for reducing cultivation of mother-plants for drug production. These are just some of the topics for further research on illicit drugs.

This thesis presented the case of Mr. Ismael Enrique Arciniegas as a starting point: a Colombian executed in a prison in China for smuggling cocaine into the country. Like him, in East Asia dozens of people are punished with the death penalty for drug-related crimes and hundreds face lengthy convictions for even first time offences. In other cases, suspects do not reach the jury and instead end up directly in the morgue, with extra-judicial killings being justified in the name of public safety. The last decade of the fight against drug trafficking seems to have prioritized the number of causalities and convictions of law-offenders, while the statistics of illicit drug use continue on the rise. More research on how effectively combat drug trafficking could help change this paradigm.

Reference List

ABS-CBN. 2017. ‘39 U.N. Member-States Express Serious Concern over PH Drug War’. ABS-CBN News. 29 September 2017. http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/09/29/17/39-un-member-states-express-serious-concern-over-ph-drug-war.

Amato, Laura, Marina Davoli, Carlo A. Aperucci, Marica Ferri, Fabrizio Faggiano, and Richard P. Pmattick. 2005. ‘An Overview of Systematic Reviews of the Effectiveness of Opiate Maintenance Therapies: Available Evidence to Inform Clinical Practice and Research’. *Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment* 28 (4): 321–29.

Aoyagi, Melissa T. 2006. ‘Beyond Punitive Prohibition: Liberalizing the Dialogue on International Drug Policy’. *Journal of International Law and Politics* 37 (3): 555–610.

APAIC, Asia and Pacific ATS Information Centre. 2014a. ‘National Trends: Japan’. Synthetic Drug Trends. 1 December 2014. http://www.apaic.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=375&Itemid=806.

———. 2014b. ‘National Trends: The Philippines’. Synthetic Drug Trends. 1 December 2014. http://www.apaic.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=380&Itemid=811.

———. 2017. ‘National Trends: China’. Synthetic Drug Trends. 14 February 2017. http://www.apaic.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=373&Itemid=804.

ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 1976. ‘ASEAN Declaration of Principles to Combat the Abuse of Narcotics Drugs Manila, 26 June’. ASEAN | One Vision One Identity One Community. June 1976. http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-declaration-of-principles-to-combat-the-abuse-of-narcotics-drugs-manila-26-june-1976.

———. 2012. ‘Bangkok Political Declaration in Pursuit of a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 Bangkok, Thailand, 11-13 October’. ASEAN | One Vision One Identity One Community. October 2012. http://asean.org/?static_post=bangkok-political-declaration-in-pursuit-of-a-drug-free-asean-2015-bangkok-thailand-11-13-october-2000.

———. 2017. ‘ASEAN plus Three Cooperation Work Plan 2018 - 2022’. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. http://asean.org/storage/2017/08/APT-Corp-WorkPlan-2018-2022-Final.pdf.

AVERT. 2017. ‘HIV and AIDS in China’. Global Information and Education on HIV and AIDS. 27 June 2017. https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-around-world/asia-pacific/china.

Babor, Thomas, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Griffith Edwards, Benedict Fischer, David Foxcroft, Keith Humphreys, Isidore Obot, et al. 2010. *Drug Policy and the Public Good*. 1st Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Baldwin, Clare, and Rew R. c Marshall. 2017. ‘Manila Police Tell One Story of a Drug Killing. Videos Tell Another.’ Reuters. 27 November 2017. http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/philippines-drugs-surveillance/.

Becker, Gary S., Kevin M. Murphy, and Michael Grossman. 2004. ‘The Economic Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case of Drugs’. Working Paper 10976. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10976.

Beckett, Katherine. 2012. ‘Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement’. *Criminology & Public Policy* 11 (4): 641–53.

Beckett, Katherine, Kris Nyrop, and Lori Pfingst. 2006. ‘Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests’. *Criminology* 44 (1): 105–37.

Beckett, Katherine, and Theodore Sasson. 2004. ‘The Politics of Crime’. In *The Politics of Injustice: Crime and Punishment in America*, 2nd Ed., 45–72. London: SAGE Publications.

Benfer, Isabella, Renee Zahnow, Monica J. Barratt, Larissa Maier, Adam Winstock, and Jason Ferris. 2018. ‘The Impact of Drug Policy Liberalisation on Willingness to Seek Help for Problem Drug Use: A Comparison of 20 Countries’. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 56 (June): 162–75.

Bewley-Taylor, David R. 2003. ‘Challenging the UN Drug Control Conventions: Problems and Possibilities’. *International Journal Drug Policy* 14 (2): 171–79.

BINLEA, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 2012. ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control’. Washington,

D.C.: United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187109.pdf.
———. 2014. ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control’. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222881.pdf.
———. 2016. ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control’. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253655.pdf.
———. 2018. ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control’. Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253655.pdf.
Boehringer, Gill. 2017. ‘Duterte’s Drug War: Violating Rights for a Quick Fix’. *Alternative Law Journal* 42 (3): 233–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/1037969X17730700.
Boister, Neil. 2003. ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’ *European Journal of International Law* 14 (5): 953–76.
———. 2012. *An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law*. 1st ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Boyum, David, and Peter Reuter. 2009. ‘Reflections on Drug Policy and Social Policy’. In *Drug Addiction and Drug Policy*, edited by William N. Brownsberger and Philip B. Heymann, 239–64. Cambridge, MA: Hardvard University Press.
Brasor, Philip. 2017. ‘Once a Drug User in Japan, Always an Outcast’. *The Japan Times Online*, 1 July 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/07/01/national/media-national/drug-user-japan-always-outcast/.
Broadhurst, Roderic. 2016. ‘Asia Is in the Grip of a Transnational Crime Crisis - but Governments Look Away’. The Conversation. 6 December 2016. http://theconversation.com/asia-is-in-the-grip-of-a-transnational-crime-crisis-but-governments-look-away-69780.
Camacho, Adriana, Alejandro Gairia, and Catherine Rodiguez. 2015. ‘Drug Consumption in Colombia’. In *Anti-Drug Policies in Colombia: Successes, Failures, and Wrong Turns*, 28–50. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press.
Carrapico, Helena, Daniela Irrera, and Bill Tupman. 2014. ‘Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism: Different Peas, Same Pod?’ *Global Crime* 15 (3–4): 213–18.
Cartwright, William S. 2008. ‘Economic Costs of Drug Abuse: Financial, Cost of Illness, and Services’. *Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment* 34 (2): 224–33.
Caulkins, Jonathan P., and Mark Kleiman. 2018. ‘Lessons to Be Drawn from U.S. Drug Control Policies’. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 24 (2): 125–44.
Caulkins, Jonathan P., and Peter Reuter. 1997. ‘Setting Goals for Drug Policy: Harm or Use Reduction? Reduction’. *Addiction* 92 (9): 1143–50.
Caulkins, Jonathan P., Peter Reuter, and Lowell J. Taylor. 2006. ‘Can Supply Restrictions Lower Price? Violence, Drug Dealing and Positional Advantage’. *Contributions to Economic Analysis Policy* 5 (1): 1–18.
CCDPW, Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide. 2018. ‘The Death Penalty in China’. Cornell Center on the Death Penalty Worldwide. 28 April 2018. https://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=China.
CDC, Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 2017. ‘Opioid Overdose. Overview of an Epidemic’. Data Overview | Drug Overdose | CDC Injury Center. 18 July 2017. https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/index.html.
Chawla, Sandeep, and Thomas Pietschmann. 2005. ‘Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Crime’. In *Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice: Special Offer Edition*, edited by Philip L. Reichel, 160–80. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
Chin, Ko-lin. 2016. ‘Heroin Production and Trafficking’. In *The Golden Triangle. Inside Southeast Asia’s Drug Trade*. Ithaca, USA: Cornell University Press.
China Daily. 2016. ‘The Most-Used Illegal Substances’. Chinadaily.Com.Cn. 19 2016. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-04/19/content_24654923.htm.

Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud. 2004. 'Methamphetamine Production and Traffic in Mainland'. In *Yaa Baa: Production, Traffic, and Consumption of Methamphetamine in Mainland Southeast Asia*, edited by Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy and Joël Meissonnier, 23–52. Singapore: Singapore University Press.

———. 2010. 'The Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent'. In *Opium: Uncovering the Politics of the Poppy*, 23–36. Cambridge, MA, USA: Hardvard University Press.

———. 2012. *An Atlas of Trafficking in Southeast Asia: The Illegal Trade in Arms, Drugs, People, Counterfeit Goods and Natural Resources in Mainland Southeast Asia*. London: I.B.Tauris.

———. 2013. 'Drug Trafficking in and out of the Golden Triangle'. In *An Atlas of Trafficking in Southeast Asia. The Illegal Trade in Arms, Drugs, People, Counterfeit Goods and Natural Resources in Mainland*, 1–32. IB Tauris. ´´.

———. 2014. 'Narco-Terrorism in Afghanistan'. *Terrorism Monitor* 2 (6).

Clark, Claire D., and Emily Dufton. 2015. 'Peter Bourne's Drug Policy and the Perils of a Public Health Ethic, 1976-1978'. *American Journal of Public Health* 105 (2): 283–93.

Clarke, Ryan. 2008. 'Narcotics Trafficking in China: Size, Scale, Dynamic and Future Consequences'. *Pacific Affairs* 81 (1): 73–93.

Cohen, J. Elizabeth, and Joseph J Amon. 2008. 'Health and Human Rights Concerns of Drug Users in Detention in Guangxi Province, China'. *PLOS Medicine* 5 (12): 1682–88.

Cosoy, Natalio. 2017. 'Who was Ismael Enrique Arciniegas, the first Colombian Executed for Narco-Traffic in China [Quién era Ismael Enrique Arciniegas, el Primer Colombiano Ejecutado por Narcotráfico en China]'. *BBC News Mundo*, 28 February 2017, sec. América Latina. http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias-america-latina-39111188.

Council of the EU. 2011. *Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the Other Part*.

———. 2015. 'Regional Report on South East Asia and China'. 7849/51. Brussels: Australian Regional Chair of the Dublin Group. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7849-2015-INIT/en/pdf.

CPS, Colombo Plan Secretariat. 2018. 'DAP Initiatives'. Drug Advisory Programme. 2018. http://www.colombo-plan.org/index.php/programmes/drug-advisory-programme/dap-initiatives/.

D. Werb, A, M. C Kamarulzaman, C Meacham, B Rafful, S. A Fischer, and E. Wood Strathdee. 2016. 'The Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systematic Review'. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 28: 1–9.

Dai, Mengyan. 2014. 'Perceptions about the Police in Drug Control: A Survey of Drug Users in Kunming, China'. *Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles* 87: 201–10.

Dave, Dhaval. 2008. 'Illicit Drug Use among Arrestees, Prices and Policy'. *Journal of Urban Economics* 63 (2): 694–714.

DDB. 2015. 'National Anti Drug Program of Action 2015-2020'. Manila: Dangerous Drugs Board. http://www.ddb.gov.ph/images/NADPA2015-2020draft.pdf.

DDB, Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines. 2013a. 'History of the Dangerous Drugs Board'. About the DDB. 22 May 2013. http://www.ddb.gov.ph/about-ddb/history.

———. 2013b. 'Treatment and Rehabilitation'. Dangerous Drugs Board. 23 May 2013. http://www.ddb.gov.ph/46-sidebar/64-treatment-and-rehabilitation.

———. 2014. 'National Anti-Drug Plan of Action 2015-2020'. Quenzon City: Dangerous Drugs Board. http://www.ddb.gov.ph/images/NADPA_2015-2020_final_draft.pdf.

———. 2017a. 'Reported Cases According to Treatment - Drug Use 2015-2010'. Research and Statistics. April 2017. http://www.ddb.gov.ph/component/content/category/45-research-and-statistics.

———. 2017b. 'Statistics'. Dangerous Drugs Board of the Philippines. April 2017. http://www.ddb.gov.ph/component/content/category/45-research-and-statistics.

Deng, Zhelai. 2001. 'Drug Trafficking and Consumption in China: Two Case Studies'. *International Social Science Journal* 53 (169): 415–20.

Deprez, Esmé E, Hui Li, and Ken Wills. 2018. 'Deadly Chinese Fentanyl Is Creating a New Era of Drug Kingpins'. *Bloomberg*, 22 May 2018. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-05-22/deadly-chinese-fentanyl-is-creating-a-new-era-of-drug-kingpins.

DFA, Department of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2006. 'Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and Japan for an Economic Partnership'. Philippine Treaties Online. A Project of Legal Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs. 9 September 2006. https://web.archive.org/web/20120206181944/http://dfa.gov.ph:80/treaties/ola/index.php/list-of-articles.

———. 2016. 'Joint Statement of the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China'. Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. https://www.dfa.gov.ph/newsroom/dfa-releases/10748-joint-statement-of-the-republic-of-the-philippines-and-the-people-s-republic-of-china.

Dishman, Chris. 2001. 'Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 24 (1): 43–58.

DOH, Department of Health of the Philippines. 2003. 'Manual of Operations for Drug Abuse Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers'. Manila: Department of Health of the Philippines. http://www.ddb.gov.ph/images/MANUAL%20OF%20OPERATIONS%20-%20DRUG%20REHAB.pdf.

Doyle, David. 2016. 'Is the Philippines' "War on Drugs" Fuelling an HIV Epidemic?' *Reuters*, 27 September 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-drugs-hiv/is-the-philippines-war-on-drugs-fuelling-an-hiv-epidemic-idUSKCN11X0BE.

Dupont, Alan. 1999. 'Transnational Crime, Drugs, and Security in East Asia'. *Asian Survey* 39 (3): 433–355.

DW. 2017. 'Philippines Moves to Restore Death Penalty for Drug Offenses'. DW.COM. 7 July 2017. https://www.dw.com/en/philippines-moves-to-restore-death-penalty-for-drug-offenses/a-37841088.

Editors Encyclopedia Britannica. 2016. 'Bōryokudan | Japanese Organized Crime'. Encyclopedia Britannica. 26 January 2016. https://www.britannica.com/topic/boryokudan.

Edström, Bert. 2015. 'The Forgotten Success Story: Japan and the Methamphetamine Problem'. *Japan Forum* 27 (4): 519–43.

Elemina, Camilla. 2016. 'The Dangers of the Dangerous Drugs Act'. Rappler. 28 August 2016. http://www.rappler.com//newsbreak/in-depth/144055-dangers-dangerous-drugs-act-implementation.

Epidemiology Bureau. 2016. 'The State of the Philippine HIV Epidemic 2016: Facing Challenges, Forging Solutions'. Manila: Department of Health of the Philippines. http://www.doh.gov.ph/sites/default/files/publications/publication__nonSerials_State%20of%20HIV%20Epidemic%20in%20the%20Philippines.pdf.

Fang, Yu-xia, Yan-bo Wang, Jie Shi, Zhi-min Liu, and Lin Lu. 2006. 'Recent Trends in Drug Abuse in China'. *Acta Pharmacologica Sinica* 27 (2): 140–44.

Farrell, Graham. 1998. 'A Global Empirical Review of Drug Crop Eradication and United Nations' Crop Substitution and Alternative Development Strategies'. *Journal of Drug Issues; Thousand Oaks* 28 (2): 395.

———. 2005. 'Where Have All the Flowers Gone? Evaluation of the Taliban Crackdown against Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan'. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 16 (2): 81–91.

Fazey, Cindy. 2007. 'International Policy on Illicit Drug Trafficking: The Formal and Informal Mechanisms'. *Journal of Drug Issues* 37 (4): 755–79.

Ford, Brian A. 2013. 'From Mountains to Molehills: A Comparative Analysis of Drug Policy'. *Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law* 19 (1): 197–235.

GAC, General Administration of Customs of the PRC. 2005. 'China Customs Report 2005'. Beijing: General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China. http://english.customs.gov.cn/Uploads/Reports/2005%20China%20Customs.pdf.

———. 2007. 'China Customs Report 2007'. Beijing: General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China. http://english.customs.gov.cn/Uploads/Reports/2007%20China%20Customs.pdf.

———. 2014. ‘China Customs Report 2014’. Beijing: General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China. http://english.customs.gov.cn/Uploads/Reports/2014%20China%20Customs.pdf.
———. 2016. ‘China Customs Report 2016’. Beijing: General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China. http://english.customs.gov.cn/Uploads/Reports/2016%20China%20Customs.pdf.
———. 2017. ‘China Customs Report 2017’. Beijing: General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China. http://english.customs.gov.cn/Uploads/Reports/2017%20China%20Customs.pdf.
Gallahue, Patrick, Ricky Gunawan, Fifa Rahman, Karim El Mufti, Najarn U. Din, and Rita Felten. 2012. ‘Death Penalty for Drug Offences Global Overview 2012: Tipping the Scales for Abolition’. London: Harm Reduction International. https://www.hri.global/files/2012/11/27/HRI_-_2012_Death_Penalty_Report_-_FINAL.pdf.
Gamil, Jaymee T. 2014. ‘Bus Drivers’ “Shabu Supplier” Nabbed At Muntinlupa Terminal’. *Inquirer.Net*, 7 August 2014. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/627049/bus-drivers-shabu-supplier-nabbed-at-muntinlupa-terminal.
García-Altés, Anna, Josep Ma Ollé, Fernando Antoñanzas, and Joan Colom. 2002. ‘The Social Cost of Illegal Drug Consumption in Spain’. *Addiction* 97 (9): 1145–53.
Gavilan, Jodesz. 2016. ‘DDB: Philippines Has 1.8 Million Current Drug Users’. Rappler. 19 September 2016. http://www.rappler.com//nation/146654-drug-use-survey-results-dangerous-drugs-board-philippines-2015.
Gaylord, Mark S., and Harold Traver. 1992. ‘Introduction’. In *Drugs, Law and the State*, edited by Mark S. Gaylord and Harold Traver, 1–12. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
Government of Japan. 1948. *Cannabis Control Act, with Amendment of Act No. 160 of 1999. Unofficial Translation [大麻取締法]*. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=3&re=2&dn=1&ia=03&ct_x=64&ct_y=22&bu=2048&ky=&page=58.
———. 1951. *Stimulants Control Act, with Amendment of Act No. 103 of 2013. Unofficial Translation [覚せい剤取締法]*. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=2&dn=1&yo=&ia=03&alpha_x=12&alpha_y=11&al[]=S&ky=&page=4.
———. 1953a. *Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act, with Amendment of Act. 50 of 2015. Unofficial Translation [麻薬及び向精神薬取締法]*. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=1&re=2&dn=1&x=0&y=0&co=01&ia=03&ky=drug&page=28.
———. 1953b. *Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Act, with Amendment of Act. 50 of 2015. Unofficial Translation [麻薬及び向精神薬取締法]*. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=1&re=2&dn=1&x=0&y=0&co=01&ia=03&ky=drug&page=28.
———. 1991. *Law Concerning Special Provisions for The Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Law, Etc. and Other Matters for The Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conducts and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances Through International Cooperation. Unofficial Translation*. https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Japan/Japan_Anti_Drug_Special_Provisions_Law_1991.pdf.
———. 2007. *Offenders Rehabilitation Act, with Amendment of Act No. 49 of 2013. Unofficial Translation [更生保護法]*. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=3&re=2&dn=1&ia=03&ct_x=73&ct_y=18&bu=16&ky=&page=12.
Government of the Philippines. 2002. *The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act 2002*. https://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2002/ra_9165_2002.html.
———. 2017. *Creation of an Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD) and an Anti-Illegal Drug Task Force to Supress the Drug Problem in the Country 'Anti-Illegal Drug Task Force" to Supress the Drug Problem in the Country*. Vol. Executive Order No. 15.
Government of the PRC. 1979. *Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China*. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm.
———. 2007. *Anti-Drug Law of the People’s Republic of China*. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471610.htm.

Grisaffi, Thomas. 2016. 'Social Control in Bolivia: A Humane Alternative to the Forced Eradication of Coca Crops'. In *Drug Policies and the Politics of Drugs in the Americas*, edited by Beatriz C Labate, Clancy Cavnar, and Thiago Rodrigues, 149–66. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing.

Grossman, Michael. 2004. 'Individual Behaviors and Substance Use: The Role of Price'. Working Paper 10948. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w10948.

Gupta, Dipak K., John Horgan, and Alex P. Schmid. 2009. 'Terrorism and Organized Crime: A Theoretical Perspective'. In *The Faces of Terrorism: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*, edited by David V. Canter, 123–36. New Jersey, United States: John Wiley & Sons.

Gutheil, Mirja, Quentin Liger, Aurelie Heetman, James Eager, and Solveig Bourgeon. 2016. 'A Review and Assessment of EU Drug Policy'. Policy Department C: Citizens' Rigths and Constitutional Affairs. Brussels: Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/571400/IPOL_STU(2016)571400_EN.pdf.

Hari, Johann. 2018. 'Japan, the Place with the Strangest Drug Debate in the World'. OpenDemocracy. 11 May 2018. https://www.opendemocracy.net/johann-hari/japan-place-with-strangest-drug-debate-in-world.

Harwood, Henrick J., Peter Reuter, Mark A. R. Kleiman, Pierrre Kopp, and Mark A. Cohen. 1999. 'Cost Estimates for Alcohol and Drug Abuse'. *Addiction* 94 (5): 631.

Healey, Andrew, Martin Knapp, Jack Astin, Michael Gossop, and John Marsden. 1998. 'Economic Burden of Drug Dependency: Social Costs Incurred By Drug Users at Intake to the National Treatment Outcome Research Study'. *The British Journal of Psychiatry* 173 (2): 160–65.

Hernández, Joel. 2013. 'Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and the Globalization of Supply'. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 7 (4).

Heydarian, Richard. 2017. 'Manila's War on Drugs Is Helping Philippines-China Relations'. *South China Morning Post*, 1 October 2017. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2113357/manilas-war-drugs-helping-build-bridges-between-china.

Houborg, Esben, and Bagga Bjerge. 2011. 'Drug Policy, Control and Welfare'. *Drugs: Education, Prevention & Policy* 18 (1): 16–23.

Houborg, Esben, Bagga Bjerge, and Vibeke Frank A. 2018. 'Editorial: Comparing Drug Policies'. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 56: 128–30.

Hruby, Denise. 2017. 'China's Drug Addicts Call for Divine Intervention'. Sixth Tone. 22 May 2017. http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1000239/chinas-drug-addicts-call-for-divine-intervention.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. 2017. 'Japan: Don't Fund Abusive Philippine Drug Rehab Services'. Human Rights Watch. 17 May 2017. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/17/japan-dont-fund-abusive-philippine-drug-rehab-services.

———. 2018. 'Philippines: Duterte's "Drug War" Claims 12,000+ Lives'. Human Rights Watch. 18 January 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/philippines-dutertes-drug-war-claims-12000-lives.

Huang, Kaicheng. 2007. 'Drug Problems in China. Recent Trends, Countermeasures, and Challenges'. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology* 51 (1): 98–109.

Huang, Kaicheng, Jianhong Liu, Ruohui Zhao, Guoling Zhao, and Paul C. Friday. 2012. 'Chinese Narcotics Trafficking. A Preliminary Report'. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology* 56 (1): 134–52.

Hugh-Jones, Stephen. 1997. 'Coca, Beer, Cigars and Yagé. Meals and Anti-Meals in an Amerindian Community.' In *Consuming Habits: Drugs in History and Anthropology*, edited by Jordan Goodman, Paul Lovejoy E., and Andrew Sherratt, 2nd Ed., 46–64. New York, USA: Routledge.

Hunt, Neil, and Alex Stevens. 2004. 'Whose Harm? Harm Reduction and the Shift to Coercion in UK Drug Policy'. *Social Policy and Society* 3 (4): 333–42.

ICAD. 2015. ‘Alternative Development: Towards Impremention’. Background Paper. Bangkok: International Conference on Alternative Development. http://www.icad2.com/backoffice/data/-y81nks9i2.pdf.

Ikeda, Sunichiro, Yasushi Nakamori, Leonides Canuet, Ryouhei Ishii, Takeshi Kitamoto, Daiki Wada, Masatoshi Kyo, Tatsuya Matsuda, and Toshihiko Kinoshita. 2017. ‘Emerging Risks of New Types of Drug Addiction in Japan’. *Mental Health in Family Medicine* 13: 480–85.

INCB, International Narcotics Board. 2016. ‘Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 2015.’ E/INCB/2015/4. Vienna: International Narcotics Control Board. https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2015/2015-PreAR_E.pdf.

———. 2018. ‘Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 2017.’ E/INCB/2015/4. Vienna: International Narcotics Control Board. https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2017/E_ebook_with_annexes.pdf.

INTERPOL. 2018a. ‘China Country Profile’. International Crime Police Organization - Asia & South Pacific. 2018. https://www.interpol.int/Member-countries/Asia-South-Pacific/China.

———. 2018b. ‘Japan Country Profile’. International Crime Police Organization - Asia & South Pacific. 2018. https://www.interpol.int/Member-countries/Asia-South-Pacific/Japan.

———. 2018c. ‘The Philippines Country Profile’. International Crime Police Organization - Asia & South Pacific. 2018. https://www.interpol.int/Member-countries/Asia-South-Pacific/Philippines.

Isaacson, Adam. 2000. ‘The United States’ Security Assistance in the Andean Region Countries, 2001–2003 [La Asistencia Estadounidense a la Seguridad en los Países de la Región Andina 2001-2003]’. *Colombia Internacional* 49–50 (May): 62–81.

———. 2005. ‘Failing Grades: Evaluating the Results of Plan Colombia’. *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 1 (1): 138–54.

———. 2010. ‘Colombia: Don’t Call It a Model’. Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, WOLA. https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/Drug%20Policy/notmodel.pdf.

Isaacson, Adam, Joy Olson, and Lisa Haugaard. 2004. ‘Diluting Divisions: Trends of the United States Military Programs for Latin America [Diluyendo las Divisiones. Tendencias de los Programas Militares de Estados Unidos para América Latina]’. Washington, D.C.: Latin American Working Group - LAWG. http://www.lawg.org/storage/documents/diluyendo%20las%20divisiones.pdf.

Isralowitz, Richard. 2002. ‘Drugs and Terrorism: The Need for Immediate Policy Change’. *Journal of Social Work Practice in the Addictions* 2 (2): 97–99.

Jacobs, Nathan, and Laura C. Dubois, eds. 2012. *Drug Addiction : Science & Treatment*. New York, USA: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Japan Customs. 2008. ‘Trends in Illicit Drugs and Firearms Smuggling in Japan (2008 Edition)’. Tokyo: Customs and Tariff Bureau. http://www.customs.go.jp/english/enforcement/report2008_e/index.htm.

———. 2016. ‘Trends in Illicit Drugs and Firearms Smuggling in Japan (2016 Edition)’. Tokyo: Customs and Tariff Bureau. http://www.customs.go.jp/english/enforcement/report2016_e/index.htm.

Jenner, Matthew S. 2011. ‘International Drug Trafficking: A Global Problem with a Domestic Solution’. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies* 18 (2): 901–27.

Jenner, Matthew, S. 2013. ‘Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Crime’. In *Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice*, edited by Philip L. Reichel and Jay S. Albanese, 2nd Ed., 65–87. Los Angeles: Sage.

Jennings, John M. 1997. *The Opium Empire: Japanese Imperialism and Drug Trafficking in Asia, 1895-1945*. Westport, CT, US: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Jesus, Armando F de, Minerva P Calimag, Maria C. A Gonzalez, and Frederick I Rey. 2012. ‘Unsafe Injecting Drug Use, a Growing Source of HIV Transmission in the Philippines: Implications to Policy’. Poliy Brief. Manila: United Nations Development Programme.

JICA, Japan International Cooperation Agency. 2009. 'The Regional Cooperation Project on Capacity Building of Drug Analysis for Improvement of Drug Law Enforcement Phase 2 (Drug II)'. Overview of JICA's Cooperation in Thailand. 31 March 2009. https://www.jica.go.jp/thailand/english/activities/coop05.html.

———. 2017a. 'JICA, DOH Ink Cooperation for Drug Rehab Facility, Treatment'. Press Reselares from the Japan International Cooperation Agency. 3 April 2017. https://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/english/office/topics/news/170403.html.

———. 2017b. 'Signing of Record of Discussions on Technical Cooperation Project with the Philippines: Developing Evidence-Based Drug Dependence Treatment and Rehabilitation Programs'. Press Releases. 21 December 2017. https://www.jica.go.jp/english/news/press/2017/171221_01.html.

Jiji Press. 2017. 'Japan to Promote Drug Offenders' Rehabilitation Outside Prison'. *International Drug Policy Consortium*, 15 December 2017. https://www.nippon.com/en/genre/society/l10672/.

Johnson, David T., and Jon Fernquest. 2018. 'Governing through Killing: The War on Drugs in the Philippines'. *Asian Journal of Law and Society*, May, 1–32.

Kahler, Miles. 2000. 'Legalization as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case'. *International Organization* 54 (3): 549–71.

Kenney, Michael. 2003. 'From Pablo to Osama: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the War on Drugs'. *Survival* 45 (3): 187–206. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2003.9688585.

———. 2007a. 'Competitive Adaptation: Trafficking Networks versus Law Enforcement Agencies'. In *From Pablo to Osama: Trafficking and Terrorist Networks, Government Bureaucracies, and Competitive Adaptation*, 103–33. University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press.

———. 2007b. 'The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: Network Forms of Organisation in the Colombian Cocaine Trade'. *Global Crime* 8 (3): 233–59.

Kine, Phelim. 2017. 'Japan's Abe Should Denounce Philippines' Murderous "Drug War"'. Human Rights Watch. 27 October 2017. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/27/japans-abe-should-denounce-philippines-murderous-drug-war.

Kleiman, Mark. 2001. 'Controlling Drug Use and Crime with Testing, Sanctions, and Treatment'. In *Drug Addiction and Drug Policy: The Struggle to Control Dependence*, 168–92. Cambridge: Hardvard University Press.

Kleiman, Mark, Angela Hawken, and Jonathan P. Caulkins. 2011. 'How Much Crime Is Drug Related?' In *Drugs and Drug Policy: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Koopmans, Frans. 2011. 'Going Dutch: Recent Drug Policy Developments in the Netherlands'. *The Journal of Global Drug Policy and Practice* 5 (3): 1–9.

Korf, Dirk J. 2002. 'Dutch Coffee Shops and Trends in Cannabis Use'. *Addictive Behaviours* 27 (6): 851–66.

Le Cussan, Renée, Hayder Mili, Hakan Demirbüken, and UNODC. 2011. *The Global Afghan Opium Trade : A Threat Assessment*. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Publications.

Levissianos, Sabrina, Martin Reithelhuber, Inshik Sim, and Tun Nay Soe. 2017. 'The Challenge of Synthetic Drugs in East and South-East Asia Global: Trends and Patterns of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants and New Psychoactive Substances'. Global SMART Programme. Bangkok: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime.

Lijun, Sheng. 2006. 'China-ASEAN Cooperation against Illicit Drugs from the Golden Triangle'. *Asian Perspective* 30 (2): 97–126.

Lin, Shih-Hsien, Kao Chin Chen, Sheng-Yu Lee, Chih-Yin Hsiao, and Hui Lee. 2013. 'The Economic Cost of Heroin Dependency and Quality of Life among Heroin Users in Taiwan'. *Psychiatry Research* 209 (3): 512–17.

Lu, Hong, Terance D. Miethe, and Bin Liang. 2009. *China's Drug Practices and Policies : Regulating Controlled Substances in a Global Context*. Farnham Surrey, England: Routledge.

Lu, Lin, Yuxia Fang, and Xi Wang. 2008. 'Drug Abuse in China: Past, Present and Future'. *Cellular and Molecular Neurobiology* 28 (4): 479–90.

MacCoun, Robert J. 2011. 'What Can We Learn from the Dutch Cannabis Coffeeshop System?' *Addiction* 106 (11): 1899–1910.

MacCoun, Robert, and Peter Reuter. 1997. 'Interpreting Dutch Cannabis Policy: Reasoning by Analogy in the Legalization Debate'. *Science; Washington* 278 (5335): 47–52.

———. 2001. 'Evaluating Alternative Cannabis Regimes'. *The British Journal of Psychiatry* 178 (2): 123–28.

Marienfeld, Carla. 2019. 'Heroin Addiction, Methadone, and HIV in China'. *The Lancet Psychiatry* 3 (9): 799–800.

Mark, Tami L, George E Woody, Tim Juday, and Herbert D Kleber. 2001. 'The Economic Costs of Heroin Addiction in the United States'. *Drug and Alcohol Dependence* 61 (2): 195–206.

Mathers, Bradley M, Louisa Degenhardt, Benjamin Phillips, Lucas Wiessing, Matthew Hickman, Steffanie A Strathdee, Alex Wodak, et al. 2008. 'Global Epidemiology of Injecting Drug Use and HIV among People Who Inject Drugs: A Systematic Review'. *The Lancet* 372 (9651): 1733–45.

McBride, Duane, C., Yvonne Terry-McElrath, Henrick Harwood, James Inciardi A., and Carl Leukefeld. 2009. 'Reflections on Drug Policy'. *Journal of Drug Issues* 39 (1): 71–88.

McLean, Katherine. 2018. 'A Kind of Peace: Tracking the Reflexive and Resilient Drug War'. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 51 (January): 117–20.

McQuie, Hilary. 2016. 'Philippines: A Bloody Drug Crackdown, a Surging HIV Epidemic'. *Huffington Post* (blog). 19 October 2016. https://www.huffingtonpost.com/hilary-mcquie/philippines-a-bloody-drug_b_12429742.html.

McSweeney, Kendra. 2015. 'The Impact of Drug Policy on the Environment'. New York, USA: Open Society Foundations. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/impact-drug-policy-environment-20151208.pdf.

McSweeney, Kendra, Erik A. Nielsen, Matthew J. Taylor, David J. Wrathall, Zoe Pearson, Ophelia Wang, and Spencer T. Plumb. 2014. 'Drug Policy as Conservation Policy: Narco-Deforestation'. *Science* 343 (6170): 489–90.

McSweeney, Kendra, Nazih Richani, Zoe Pearson, Jennifer Devine, and David J. Wrathall. 2017. 'Why Do Narcos Invest in Rural Land?' *Journal of Latin American Geography* 16 (2): 3–29.

MHLW. 2013. 'The Fourth Five-Year Drug Abuse Prevention Strategy'. Tokyo: Council for Promoting Measures to Prevent Drug Abuse. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan. https://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/06-Seisakujouhou-11120000-Iyakushokuhinkyoku/4_5strategy-e.pdf.

Mirasol, Jeremy D.B. 2017. 'Cooperation with China on the Philippine's War on Drugs'. *Center for International Relations & Strategic Studies* 4 (10): 1–3.

MOFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2000. 'Anti-Drug Conferences, Tokyo 2000'. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Juanry 2000. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/narcotics/conf2000.html.

———. 2001. 'International Measures and Japanese Assistance for Dealing with Drug Issues'. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 21 May 2001. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/narcotics/measure0105.html.

MOJ, Ministry of Justice of Japan. 2003. 'Treaty between Japan and the United States of America on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters'. Washington, D.C.: Ministry of Justice of Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000059668.pdf.

———. 2006. 'Treaty between Japan and the Republic of Korea on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters'. Washington, D.C.: Ministry of Justice of Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000059669.pdf.

———. 2007. 'Treaty between Japan and the People's Republic of China on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters'. Washington, D.C.: Ministry of Justice of Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000059670.pdf.

———. 2008. 'Agreement between Japan and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China On Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters'. Hong Kong: Ministry of Justice of Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000059671.pdf.

———. 2009a. ‘Treaty between Japan and the Russian Federation on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters’. Washington, D.C.: Ministry of Justice of Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000073608.pdf.
———. 2009b. ‘Treaty between Japan and the European Union on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters’. Tokyo: Ministry of Justice of Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000073607.pdf.
———. 2017. ‘Ministry of Justice, 2017’. Tokyo: Ministry of Justice of Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001221539.pdf.
———. n.d. ‘Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters’. Ministry of Justice of Japan. http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/liai0002.html.
Monshouwer, Karin, Margriet Van Laar, and Wilma A. Vollebergh. 2011. ‘Buying Cannabis in “Coffee Shops”’. *Drug and Alcohol Review* 30 (2): 148–56.
Moore, Mark, H. 2001. ‘Toward a Balance Drug-Prevention Strategy_A Conceptual Map’. In *Drug Addiction and Drug Policy: The Struggle to Control Dependence*, 18–50. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mravcik, Viktor, Tomas Zabransky, Ave Talu, Ernestas Jasaitis, Nuriya Gafarova, Zhannat Musabekova, and Furkat Ganiev. 2014. ‘Mortality of Registered Drug Users in Central Asia’. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 25 (6): 1215–20.
Nadelmann, Ethan A. 1990. ‘Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society’. *International Organization* 44 (4): 479–526.
Nelson, Paul K, Bradley M Mathers, Benjamin Cowie, Holly Hagan, Don D Jarlais, Danielle Horyniak, and Louisa Degenhardt. 2011. ‘Global Epidemiology of Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C in People Who Inject Drugs: Results of Systematic Reviews’. *The Lancet* 378 (9791): 571–83.
NNCC, National Narcotics Control Commission of the PRC. 2008. ‘Annual Report on Drug Control in China 2008’. Beijing: National Narcotics Control Commission. https://abusedrug.com/lib/Annual-Report-on-Drug-Control-in-China-2008/preface.html.
NPA, National Police Agency of Japan. 1991. ‘Police White Paper, Chapter 3: Drug Criminal Organization [第3節　薬物犯罪組織]’. White Paper. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan. http://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h03/h030103.html.
———. 2008a. ‘Progress of International Cooperation and Exchange in 2005’. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan. https://www.npa.go.jp/english/keidai/seisaku1/int_coop2005.pdf.
———. 2008b. ‘Progress of International Cooperation and Exchange in 2007’. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan. https://www.npa.go.jp/english/keidai/seisaku1/int_coop2007.pdf.
———. 2009. ‘White Paper on Police 2009’. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan.
———. 2010. ‘White Paper on Police 2010’. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan. https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h22/english/White_Paper_2010.pdf.
———. 2015. ‘White Paper on Police 2017’. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan. https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h29/english/full_text_WHITE_PAPER_2017_E.pdf.
———. 2016. ‘White Paper on Police 2016’. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan. https://www.npa.go.jp/hakusyo/h28/english/WHITE_PAPER_ON_POLICE_2016/full_text_WHITE_PAPER_2016_.pdf.
———. 2017a. ‘Police of Japan 2017 Report’. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan. https://www.npa.go.jp/english/kokusai/pdf/Police_of_Japan_2017_full_text.pdf.
———. 2017b. ‘Progress of International Cooperation and Exchange in 2003’. Tokyo: National Police Agency of Japan. https://www.npa.go.jp/english/seisaku6/20070528.pdf.
O’Connor, Sean. 2016. ‘Meth Precursor Chemicals from China: Implications for the United States’. Staff Research Report. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Oh, Hyun. 2009. ‘Japan “Sweetheart” Actress Sentenced for Drug Use’. *Reuters*, 9 November 2009. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan/japan-sweetheart-actress-sentenced-for-drug-use-idUSTRE5A80ZW20091109.

Omelicheva, Mariya Y., and Lawrence Markowitz. 2018. 'Does Drug Trafficking Impact Terrorism? Afghan Opioids and Terrorist Violence in Central Asia'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 0 (0): 1–23.

Öner, Mehmet Z. 2014. 'Drug Trafficking as a Transnational Crime'. *Law & Justice Review* 5 (9): 55–126.

Orellana, Faye. 2018. 'PDEA to Deploy More than 200 New Agents in War vs Drugs'. 19 June 2018. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1002183/pdea-to-deploy-more-than-200-new-agents-in-war-vs-drugs.

Patel, Champa. 2018. 'The International Criminal Court Challenges Duterte's Drug War'. East Asia Forum. 27 February 2018. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/02/28/the-international-criminal-court-challenges-dutertes-drug-war/.

PDEA, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. 2011. 'Annual Report 2011'. Quezon City: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. http://pdea.gov.ph/our-accomplishments/annual-reports#2011-annual-report.

———. 2012. 'Annual Report 2012'. Quezon City: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

———. 2013. 'Republic Act 10640 of the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002"'. Laws and Regulations. 22 July 2013. http://pdea.gov.ph/laws-and-regulations#republic-act-10640.

———. 2014. 'Annual Report 2014'. Quezon City: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

———. 2016. 'Annual Report 2016'. Quezon City: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

———. 2018. '#RealNumbersPH Update July 1, 2016 - March 20, 2018'. Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. 2 April 2018. http://pdea.gov.ph/2-uncategorised/279-realnumbersph.

Piazza, James A. 2012. 'The Opium Trade and Patterns of Terrorism in the Provinces of Afghanistan: An Empirical Analysis'. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24 (2): 213–34.

Pietschmann, Thomas, and John Walker. 2011. 'Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crimes'. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf.

PNA, Philippine News Agency. 2017a. 'PDEA to Form Seaport Interdiction Unit'. Update Philippines. 1 August 2017. https://www.update.ph/2017/08/pdea-to-form-seaport-interdiction-unit/19580.

———. 2017b. 'Duterte Orders PNP, AFP, NBI, Other Agencies to Re-Join Drug War'. Update Philippines. 5 December 2017. https://www.update.ph/2017/12/duterte-orders-pnp-afp-nbi-other-agencies-to-rejoin-drug-war/23141.

———. 2018. 'These Are the 7 Guidelines Issued in the Conduct of Anti-Drug Operations (Body Cameras)'. Update Philippines. 30 January 2018. https://www.update.ph/2018/01/pdea-issues-rules-use-body-cameras-anti-drug-ops/24069.

PNP, Philippine National Police. 2014. 'Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operations and Investigation'. PNPM-D-0-2-14 (DO). Manila: Philippine National Police. https://pro9.pnp.gov.ph/index.php/downloads/finish/6-pnp-manuals/278-revised-pnp-manual-on-anti-illegal-drugs-operations-and-investigation/0.

Reilly, Edward F. 2014. 'Criminalizing Yakuza Membership: A Comparative Study of the Anti-Boryokudan Law'. *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* 13 (4): 801–29.

Rengert, George F. 1996. 'Introduction'. In *The Geography of Illegal Drugs*, 1st Ed., 160. New York: Routledge.

Reuter, Peter. 1988. 'Can the Borders Be Sealed?' *National Affairs* 36 (summer): 51–65.

———. 1992. 'After the Borders Are Sealed: Can Domestic Sources Substitute for Imported Drugs?' In *Drug Policy in the Americas*, 129–50. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press.

———. 2006. 'What Drug Policies Cost: Estimating Government Drug Policy Expenditures'. *Addiction* 101 (3): 315–22.

Reuter, Peter, and Mark A. R. Kleiman. 1986. 'Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement'. *Crime and Justice* 7: 289–340.

Rincón-Ruiz, Alexander, Hyarold Leonardo Correa, Daniel Oswaldo León, and Stewart Williams. 2016. 'Coca Cultivation and Crop Eradication in Colombia: The Challenges of Integrating Rural Reality into Effective Anti-Drug Policy'. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 33 (July): 56–65.

Ritter, Alison, Caitlin E. Hughes, and Phillip Hull. 2016. 'Drug Policy'. In *The SAGE Handbook of Drug & Alcohol Studies: Social Science Approaches*, edited by Torsten Kolind, Betsy Thom, and Geoffrey Hunt, 135–63. London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Ritter, Alison, Michael Livingston, Jenny Chalmers, Lynda Berends, and Peter Reuter. 2016. 'Comparative Policy Analysis for Alcohol and Drugs: Current State of the Field'. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 31 (May): 39–50.

Roberts, Dorothy E. 2004. 'The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities'. *Stanford Law Review* 56 (5): 1271–1305.

Rocha, Ricardo. 2003. 'Drug Trafficking and Its Impact on Colombia: An Economic Overview'. *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies,* 28 (55–56): 277–304.

Rodrigues, Thiago. 2012. 'Drug Trafficking and Militarization in the Americas: The Addiction to War'. *Contexto Internacional* 34 (1): 9–41.

Rodrigues, Thiago, and Beatriz Labate C. 2016. 'Prohibition and the War on Drugs in the Americas: An Analytical Approach'. In *Drug Policies and the Politics of Drugs in the Americas*, edited by Beatriz C Labate, Jahlani Niaah, Andres Antillano, Ana Jacome, Aldo F Ponce, and Veronica Zubillaga. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. https://www.academia.edu/30335887/Drug_Policies_and_the_Politics_of_Drugs_in_the_Americas.

Rollins, John, and Liana S. Wyler. 2013. 'Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Foreign Policy Issues for Congress'. CRS Report for Congress R41004. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf.

Room, Robin. 2014. 'Legalizing a Market for Cannabis for Pleasure: Colorado, Washington, Uruguay and Beyond'. *Addiction* 109 (3): 345–51.

Rope, Olivia, and Francis Sheahan. 2015. 'Global Prison Trends 2015. Special Focus Drugs and Imprisonment.' Global Prison Trends Series. London, United Kingdom: Penal Reform International. https://www.unodc.org/documents/ungass2016/Contributions/Civil/PenalReform/Drugs_and_imprisonment_PRI_submission_UNGASS.pdf.

Roth, Mitchel P. 2013. 'Historical Overview of Transnational Crime'. In *Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice*, edited by Philip L. Reichel and Jay S. Albanese, 2nd Ed., 5–22. Los Angeles, United States: Sage.

Ryall, Julian. 2018. 'Japan Struggles with Growing Cannabis Use'. DW.Com - Asia. 6 June 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/japan-struggles-with-growing-cannabis-use/a-44094855.

Santos, Ana P, and Rodion Ebbighausen. 2018. 'Investigating Duterte's Drug War in Philippines — Facts and Fiction'. *DW.COM*, 9 April 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/investigating-dutertes-drug-war-in-philippines-facts-and-fiction/a-43695383.

Schiray, Michel. 2001. 'Introduction: Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime, and Public Policy for Drug Control'. *International Social Science Journal* 53 (169): 351–58.

Schmid, Alex P. 2004. 'Links between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: A Case of "Narco-Terrorism"?' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, September, 14.

Scott, Peter D. 2010. 'Operation Paper: The United States and Drugs in Thailand and Burma'. *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 8 (44): 1–14.

Sherret, Lauren. 2005. 'Futility in Action: Coca Fumigation in Colombia'. *Journal of Drug Issues* 35 (1): 151–68.

Shimane, Takuya. 2017. '2015 Nationwide General Population Survey on Drug Use in Japan'. H27-Iyaku A-Ippan-001. Health and Labour Sciences Research Grants 2015. Tokyo: Department on Drug Dependence Research, National Institute of Mental Health.

Simangan, Dahlia. 2018. 'Is the Philippine "War on Drugs" an Act of Genocide?' *Journal of Genocide Research* 20 (1): 68–89.

Singh, Param-Preet. 2018. 'Philippines' Duterte Tries to Run from Justice'. Human Rights Watch. 14 March 2018. https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/14/philippines-duterte-tries-run-justice.

Solomon, Keith R., Arturo Anadón, Richard A. Brain, Antonio L. Cerdeira, Angus N. Crossan, Jon Marshall, and Lesbia Smith. 2007. 'Comparative Hazard Assessment of the Substances Used For Production and Control of Coca and Poppy in Colombia'. *Rational Environmental Management of Agrochemicals: Risk Assessment, Monitoring, and Remedial Action. ACS Symposium Series* 966: 87–99.

Solomon, Keith R., Arturo Anadón, Antonio L. Cerdeira, Jon Marshall, and Luz-Helena Sanin. 2005. 'Environmental and Human Health Assessment of the Aerial Spray Program for Coca and Poppy Control in Colombia'. Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) Section of the Organization of American States (OAS).

Solomon, Keith R., E. J. P. Marshall, and Gabriel Carrasquilla. 2009. 'Human Health and Environmental Risks from the Use of Glyphosate Formulations to Control the Production of Coca in Colombia: Overview and Conclusions'. *Journal of Toxicology and Environmental Health, Part A* 72 (15–16): 914–20.

State Council of the PRC. 2000. 'Narcotics Control in China'. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States. June 2000. http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/mzpkz/t36387.htm.

———. 2005. *Regulation on the Administration of Precursor Chemicals [Revised]*. http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=59923&lib=law.

———. 2017. 'China Adds New Precursor Chemicals to Its Catalogue'. Policies, State Council. 5 December 2017. http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/12/05/content_281475965862848.htm.

Stevens, Alex, Tim McSweeney, Marianne van Ooyen, and Ambros Uchtenhagen. 2005. 'Editorial on Coercion'. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 16: 207–9.

Strang, John, Thomas Babor, Jonathan Caulkins, Benedikt Fischer, David Foxcroft, and Keith Humphreys. 2012. 'Drug Policy and the Public Good: Evidence for Effective Interventions'. *The Lancet* 379 (9810): 71–83.

Swanstrom, Niklas. 2007. 'The Narcotics Trade: A Threat to Security? National and Transnational Implications'. *Global Crime* 8 (1): 1–25.

Tamura, Masayuki. 1992. 'The Yakuza and Amphetamine Abuse in Japan'. In *Drugs, Law and the State*, edited by Mark S. Gaylord and Harold Traver, 99–119. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

Tiezzi, Shannon. 2015. 'China's Growing Drug Problem'. *The Diplomat*, 28 May 2015. https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/chinas-growing-drug-problem/.

TNI, Transnational Institute. 2010. 'Alternative Development or Business as Usual? China's Opium Substitution Policy in Burma and Laos'. Drug Policy Briefing No. 33. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. https://www.tni.org/files/download/brief33.pdf.

Tsunekawa, Keiichi. 2005. 'Why so Many Maps There? Japan and Regional Cooperation'. In *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*, edited by T. J Pempel, 101–48. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Tsunekawa, Keiichi, and Ryutaro Murotani. 2016. 'Working for Human Security: JICA's Experience'. In *Post-Conflict Development in East Asia*, edited by Brendan M Howe, 175–94. London: Routledge.

UN. 1998. 'Illegal Crop Eradication and Alternative Development'. UN General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem. 10 June 1998. http://www.un.org/ga/20special/featur/crop.htm.

UNAIDS, Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS. 2017a. 'China 2017'. Country Factsheets. 2017. http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/china.

———. 2017b. 'Philippines 2017'. Country Factsheets. 2017. http://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/philippines.

UNODC (ICMP), UNODC's Illicit Crop Monitoring Programme. 2006. 'Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region. A Survey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru'. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/andean/Andean_full_report.pdf.

UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 1961. 'Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961'. United Nations Treaty Collection. 30 March 1961. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-15&chapter=6&clang=_en.

———. 1972. '1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961'. United Nations Treaty Collection. 8 March 1972. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-17&chapter=6&clang=_en#2.

———. 1975. '1975 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961'. United Nations Treaty Collection. 8 August 1975. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-18&chapter=6&clang=_en#1.

———. 1976. 'Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971'. United Nations Treaty Collection. 16 August 1976. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-16&chapter=6&clang=_en#4.

———. 1990. 'United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988'. United Nations Treaty Collection. 11 November 1990. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=VI-19&chapter=6&clang=_en.

———. 2000. 'ASEAN and China Join Forces in Pursuit of a Drug Free ASEAN by 2015'. *Eastern Horizons*, December 2000.

———. 2004. 'United Nations Convention against Corruption'. United Nations. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.

———. 2006a. 'Shanghai Resource Centre China'. Treat Net. International Network of Drug Dependence Treatment and Rehabilitation Resource Centres. 2006. https://www.unodc.org/treatment/en/China_Shanghai_resource_centre.html.

———. 2006b. 'World Drug Report 2006. Volume 1: Analysis'. E.06.XI.10. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2006/wdr2006_volume1.pdf.

———. 2010a. 'Introduction to Drug Trafficking'. UNODC. 2010. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/index.html.

———. 2010b. 'The Globalization of Crime. A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment.' Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf.

———. 2013a. *Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment*. Bangkok; Thailand: United Nations Publications.

———. 2013b. *The International Drug Control Conventions*. https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_Conventions/Ebook/The_International_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf.

———. 2015. 'Working Paper: Reframing Alternative Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion'. Mekong MOU on Drug Control Thematic Area 5. Bangkok: UNODC Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific. https://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//Publications/2015/Alternative_Development_Working_Paper_2015.pdf.

———. 2016a. 'Drug Treatment in Asia 2016'. Statistics and Data. 2016. https://dataunodc.un.org/drugs/treatment/asia.

———. 2016b. 'Statement by the UNODC Executive Director on the Situation in the Philippines'. 3 August 2016. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2016/August/statement-by-the-unodc-executive-director-on-the-situation-in-the-philippines.html.

———. 2017a. 'Annual Seizures of Main Drug Groups 2006-2016'. Statistics and Data. 2017. https://dataunodc.un.org/drugs/seizures_map.

———. 2017b. 'Booklet 1: Executive Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications'. World Drug Report 2017. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime.

———. 2017c. ‘Booklet 3. Market Analysis of Plant-Based Drugs. Opiates, Cocaine, Cannabis.’ World Drug Report 2017. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime.
———. 2017d. ‘Booklet 4. Market Analysis on Synthetic Drugs. Amphetamine-Type Stimulants, New Psychoactive Substances.’ World Drug Report 2017. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime.
———. 2017e. ‘Booklet 5.The Drug Problem and Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flows, Corruption and Terrorism’. World Drug Report 2017. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime.
———. 2017f. ‘Global Seizures of Drugs by Region, Sub-Region and Country’. Statistics and Data. 2017.
———. 2017g. ‘UNODC Chief Welcomes Japan’s Decision to Join Crime and Corruption Conventions’. 12 July 2017. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2017/July/unodc-chief-welcomes-japans-decision-to-join-crime-and-corruption-conventions.html.
———. 2018a. ‘Annual Prevalence of Drug Use’. Statistics and Data. 2018. https://dataunodc.un.org/drugs/prevalence_table.
———. 2018b. ‘Booklet 1: Executive Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications’. World Drug Report 2018. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_1_EXSUM.pdf.
———. 2018c. ‘Booklet 2. Global Overview of Drug Demand and Supply. Latest Trends, Cross-cutting Issues’. World Drug Report 2018. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_2_GLOBAL.pdf.
———. 2018d. ‘Booklet 3. Market Analysis of Plant-Based Drugs. Opiates, Cocaine, Cannabis, Synthetic Drugs.’ World Drug Report 2018. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_3_DRUG_MARKETS.pdf.
———. 2018e. ‘Booklet 4. Drugs and Age. Drugs and Associated Issues among Young People and Older People’. World Drug Report 2018. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_4_YOUTH.pdf.
———. 2018f. ‘Booklet 5. Women and Drugs. Drug Use, Drug Supply and Their Consequences’. World Drug Report 2018. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_5_WOMEN.pdf.
———. 2018g. ‘Drug Related Crime Report, 2012-2016’. World Drug Report 2018. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drug and Crime. http://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/9.1_Drug_Related_Crimes.pdf.
———. 2018h. ‘Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General’. United Nations Treaty Collection. 2018. https://treaties.un.org/pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx?clang=_en.
———. 2018i. ‘Objectives of the Global Programme against Money-Laundering (GPML)’. 2018. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/programme-objectives.html?ref=menuside.
———. 2018j. ‘What Are NPS?’ UNODC Early Warning Advisory on New Psychoactive Substances. 2018. https://www.unodc.org/LSS/Page/NPS.
UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and WHO World Health Organization. 2013. ‘Opioid Overdose: Preventing and Reducing Opioid Overdose Mortality’. New York, New York: United Nations. http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/opioid_overdose.pdf?ua=1.
US Department of State. 2011. ‘Criminal Penalties in Japan’. Country Reports - Safe Travel. 23 February 2011. https://www.state.gov/safetravel/japan/criminalpenalties.htm.
Vaillant, George E. 2001. ‘If Addiction Is Involuntary, How Can Punishment Help?’ In *Drug Addiction and Drug Policy: The Struggle to Control Dependence*, 144–67. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Vargas, Ricardo. 2002. ‘The Anti-Drug Policy, Aerial Spraying of Illicit Crops and Their Social, Environmental and Political Impacts in Colombia’. *Journal of Drug Issues* 31 (1): 11–60.

Vaughn, Michael S, Frank F.Y Huang, and Christine R Ramirez. 1995. 'Drug Abuse and Anti-Drug Policy in Japan: Past History and Future Directions'. *British Journal of Criminology* 35 (4): 491–524.

Vellinga, Menno. 2004. 'Some Observations on Changing Business Practices in Drug Trafficking: The Andean Experience'. *Global Crime* 6 (3–4): 374–86.

Wada, Kiyoshi, Masahiko Funada, Toshihiko Matsumoto, and Takuya Shimane. 2013. 'Current Status of Substance Abuse and HIV Infection in Japan'. *Journal of Food and Drug Analysis*, Promoting Global Health—Treatment and Prevention of Substance Abuse and HIV in Asia, 21 (4, Supplement): S33–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfda.2013.09.030.

Wada, Kiyoshi, Sharyn B Greberman, Kyohei Konuma, and Shinji Hirai. 2002. 'HIV and HCV Infection among Drug Users in Japan'. *Addiction* 94: 1063–69.

Wakabayashi, Bob T. 2000. 'From Peril to Profit. Opium in Late-Edo to Meiji Eyes'. In *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan, 1939-1952*, 55–76. Berkley, CA, US: University of California Press.

Walsh, Nick, and Lisa Maher. 2013. 'HIV and HCV among People Who Inject Drugs in Central Asia'. *Drug and Alcohol Dependence*, HIV and People Who Use Drugs in Central Asia: Confronting the Perfect Storm, 132 (November): S37–40.

Ward, Richard G., and Daniel J. Mabrey. 2013. 'Organized Crime in Asia and the Middle East'. In *Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice*, edited by Philip L. Reichel and Jay S. Albanese, 2nd Ed., 443–58. Los Angeles: Sage.

Wardlaw, Grant. 1988. 'Linkages between the Illegal Drugs Traffic and Terrorism'. *Conflict Quarterly* 8 (3): 22.

West, Robert. 1997. 'Addiction, Ethics and Public Policy'. *Addiction* 92 (9): 1061–70.

WHO, World Health Organization. 2010a. 'ATLAS of Substance Use Disorders. Resources for the Prevention and Treatment of Substance Use Disorders (SUD). Country Profile: China'. Geneva: World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/atlas_report/profiles/china.pdf.

———. 2010b. 'ATLAS of Substance Use Disorders. Resources for the Prevention and Treatment of Substance Use Disorders (SUD). Country Profile: Japan'. Geneva: World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/atlas_report/profiles/japan.pdf?ua=1.

———. 2010c. 'ATLAS of Substance Use Disorders. Resources for the Prevention and Treatment of Substance Use Disorders (SUD). Country Profile: PHILIPPINES (The)'. Geneva: World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/atlas_report/profiles/philippines.pdf?ua=1.

———. 2016. 'The Health and Social Effects of Nonmedical Cannabis Use'. Geneva: World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/publications/cannabis/en/.

Wiess, Brennan. 2017. 'How to Rehabilitate Addicts in the Philippines' Vicious Drug War?', 11 April 2017. https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-04-11/how-rehabilitate-addicts-philippines-vicious-drug-war.

Williams, Phil. 1998. 'The Nature of Drug-Trafficking Networks'. *Current History* 97 (618): 154.

———. 2001. 'The Transnational Criminal Networks'. In *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, edited by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 61–98. Santa Monica, CA, USA: Rand Corporation.

———. 2008. 'Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security'. *Survival, Global Politics and Strategy* 36 (1): 1994. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396339408442726.

Williams, Phil, and Wanda Felbab-Brown. 2012. 'Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability'. Strategic Studies Institute. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1101.pdf.

Wouters, Marije, Annemieke Benschop, and Dirk J. Korf. 2010. 'Local Politics and Retail Cannabis Markets: The Case of the Dutch Coffeeshops'. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 21: 315–20.

Wyler, Liana S. 2010. 'International Drug Control Policy'. Report for Congress RL34543. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc501655/m1/1/high_res_d/RL34543_2010Mar08.pdf.

Xiao, Shui-Yuan, Mei Yang, Liang Zhou, and Wei Hao. 2015. 'Transition of China's Drug Policy: Problems in Practice'. *Addiction* 110 (2): 193–94. https://doi.org/10.1111/add.12689.

Xinhua. 2017. 'China Reports Progress on Drug Control'. The State Council of the PRC. June 2017. http://english.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2017/06/27/content_281475700301718.htm.

———. 2018. 'China Publicizes Major Cross-Border Maritime Drug Trafficking Cases'. *Xinhua-Net*, 27 June 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/27/c_137284953.htm.

Yan, Zhang. 2017. 'China, US Team up in Drug Fight'. *China Daily*, 4 November 2017. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/04/content_34097641.htm.

Yardley, Jim. 2005. 'Issue in China: Many in Jails without Trial'. *The New York Times*, 9 May 2005, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/09/world/asia/issue-in-china-many-in-jails-without-trial.html.

Yin, Wenyuan, Yang Hao, Xinhua Sun, Xiuli Gong, Fang Li, Jianhua Li, Keming Rou, et al. 2010. 'Scaling Up the National Methadone Maintenance Treatment Program in China: Achievements and Challenges'. *International Journal of Epidemiology* 39 (suppl_2): ii29-ii37. https://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyq210.

Zeldin, Wendy. 2017. 'The Philippines: New Agency Created to Support Drug Enforcement Agency | Global Legal Monitor'. Library of Congress. 15 March 2017. //www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/the-philippines-new-agency-created-to-support-drug-enforcement-agency/.

Zhang, L., E. P. Chow, X. Zhuang, Y. Liang, Y. Wang, C. Tang, L. Ling, J. D. Tucker, and D. P. Wilson. 2013. 'Methadone Maintenance Treatment Participant Retention and Behavioural Effectiveness in China: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis'. *PLoS One* 8: e68906.

Zhang, Sheldon X, and Ko-lin Chin. 2016. 'A People's War: China's Struggle to Contain Its Illicit Drug Problem'. Improving Global Drug Policy: Comparative Perspectives and UNGASS 2016. Washington, D.C.: Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/A-Peoples-War-final.pdf.

Zhang, Xinfeng. 2007. 'China Recommends Guidelines for Future Drug Control in the Region'. *Eastern Horizons*, 2007.

Zhang, Yong-an. 2012. 'Asia, International Drug Trafficking, and U.S.-China Counternarcotics Cooperation'. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/02_drug_trafficking_zhang_paper.pdf.

Zhao, Chengzheng, Zhimin Liu, Dong Zhao, Yanhong Liu, Jianhui Liang, Yilang Tang, Zeyuan Liu, and Jiw A Zheng. 2004. 'Drug Abuse in China'. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 1025 (1): 439–45.

Zhen, Liu. 2018. 'China's Coastguard Put under Control of Military Police Force'. South China Morning Post. 21 March 2018. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2138257/chinas-military-police-given-control-coastguard-beijing.

Zhou, Yongming. 1999. 'AntiDrug Campaigns and Ethnic Minorities in Southwestern China 1950s and 1990s'. In *Anti-Drug Crusades in Twentieth-Century China: Nationalism, History, and State Building*, 149–68. Boston, MA, US: Rowman & Littlefield.

———. 2000. 'China's Anti-Drug Campaign in the Reform Era'. *East Asian Institute Contemporary China Series*, no. 26: 64.

Annexes

Annex 1. Existing Psychoactive Substances and their Effect on Consumers

Drug Class	Related Substances	Pharmacological Effects
Opioids	Heroin, Morphine, Codeine, Methadone, Pethidine, Buprenorphine, OxyContin, Fentanyl	The generic term applied to alkaloids from the opium poppy, or similar synthetic substances, which have the capacity to relieve pain, produce euphoria, and induce respiratory depression, drowsiness, and impaired judgement.
Cannabis	Hashish, THC, Marijuana, Bhang, Ganja	A derivation of the plant, *Cannabis sativa*. Intoxication produces feelings of euphoria, lightness of limbs, increased appetite, tachycardia, and impaired judgement.
Cocaine	Crack, Rock	Feelings of confidence. Acute toxic reactions include hypertension, cardiac arrhythmias, auditory and visual hallucinations, seizures.
Amphetamines – Other Stimulants	Dexamphetamine, Methamphetamine, Methylphenidate, Phenmetrazine, Diethylpropion	A diverse group of synthetic substances whose effects include euphoria, anorexia, nausea, vomiting, insomnia, and abnormal behaviour such as aggression, grandiosity, hyper-vigilance, agitation, and impaired judgement.
Hypnotics – Sedatives	Benzodiazepines, Barbiturates, Methaqualone	A group of substances that induce muscle relaxation, calmness, and sleep. Impairs concentration, memory, and coordination. Other effects include slurred speech, drowsiness, and unsteady gate.
Hallucinogens	Lysergide (LSD), Dimethyltryptamine (DMT), Psilocybin, Mescaline, MDMA, Phencyclidine	A group of natural and synthetic substances that produce feelings of euphoria/dysphoria, mixed mood changes, altered perceptions, and visual illusions. Adverse effects include panic reactions, flashbacks, and mood disorders.
Psychoactive Inhalants	Industrial Solvents, Glue, Aerosol, Paints, Lacquer Thinners, Petrol, Cleaning Fluids, Amyl Nitrite	Signs of intoxication include belligerence, hallucinations, lethargy, psychomotor impairment, euphoria, impaired judgement, dizziness, nystagmus, slurred speech, tremors, muscle weakness, unsteady gate, stupor, and coma.

Source: (Babor et al. 2010, 11)

Annex 2. Categories to distinguish among narcotic drugs

Structure	Ingestion Form	Legal Status
Natural [Raw, unprocessed] Example: Opium and Coca leaves.	Through Mouth	Use only with prescription [many sedatives and opioids]
Synthetic [Highly concentrated form] Example: Heroine, Crack, Benzo diazepam, LSD.	Insufflate across mucous membranes	Use with some controls [Morphine, Amphetamines]
	Through inhalation	Prohibited for medical use [LSD, Cocaine, Heroin]
	Through injection [fastest absorption]	

Source: (Babor et al. 2010, 13)

Annex 3. International Organizations of Policy Control of Illicit Drugs

International Organization	Establishment	Functions
UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs - CND	1946	• 53 members (from originally 15) • Policy guidance for UNODC • Highly politicized • Difficulty to find consensus • Resolutions are often non-binding
International Narcotics Control Board - INCB	1967	• Monitoring enforcement restrictions on illicit substances • Monitors governments' regulation of precursor's chemicals • It has been criticised for extending its mandate, when criticising the harms-reduction measures • Lacks power to enforce its Resolution
UN Office on Drug and Crime - UNODC	1997	• Implements the policy set by the CND • Works with countries to control drug trafficking • Interlinks with other UN organizations like WHO, UNDO (Economic alternatives to drug production)
World Customs Organization - WCO	1952	• Collects data on drug seizures (drugs/ precursors) • Keeps track of drug trafficking routes that follow legal ones, identifying 'hot spots'.
Interpol	1923	• Cross-border police cooperation • Identifies new drug trafficking mechanisms and criminal organizations behind it
Europol	1992	• Carries projects against production/trafficking of heroin, cocaine, synthetic drugs and precursors.
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission - CICAD	1986	• 34 members • Part of the Organization of American States • Works in cooperation with UNODC and WCO, with strong focus on money laundering • Provides database on arrests, prosecution and convictions for illicit drug trafficking
Financial Action Task Force - FATF	1989	• Develops policies to combat money laundering and terrorism financing
Chemical Action Task Force - CATF	1990	• Focuses on policy for precursor control • Most duties taken up by INCB
The Dublin Group	1990	• Informal coordination group to review international drug problems, on production, traffic and abuse
The Paris Pact	2003	• Consultative mechanism on illicit drug trade from Central Asia to Europe (Afghan Opiates passing by Balkan Region)
The Egmont Group	1995	• Exchange of information between financial intelligence units (national and regional); strongly focused on anti-money laundering measures

Source: (Fazey 2007, 761–71)

Annex 4. Summary of International Dimension and its Components

Component	Goals applied to drug trafficking	Requirements	Comments
International Conventions	• Address transnational nature of drug trafficking • Foster international cooperation • Guide the establishment of national law to combat drug trafficking	• Establishment of agencies in charge of monitoring and enforcing law • Reporting advance in fight against drug trafficking (annual reports) • National Agencies to cooperate with each other	• International Conventions do not force but rather encourage implementation of provisions • Subjected to interpretation by governments • System continues to focus on criminalization and avoids alternatives to reduce drug demand
International Law Enforcement Cooperation	• Establish communication channels between national agencies concerning all aspects related to drug trafficking	• Data storage data • Treaties or agreements to share up-to-date data	• Deficient data collection makes it hard to maintain efficient communication
		• Operational Cooperation (Liaison with diplomatic missions, joint investigations between national agencies, extradition treaties)	• Risk of violation due process of alleged criminals • Tactics from this group take place in areas where there is a vacuum in legislation (international vs. national law)

Source: (Boister 2012). Own design.

Annex 5. Summary of Strategy 1 and its Components

Strategy	Broad Policy Goals	Components	Comments
Services for Drug Users	• Reduce use (and demand) of drugs, improve health (transmitted diseases and overdoses), reduce crime, and treat psychiatric disorders associated to drug-use • Aimed at: drug users (especially opioid users – injected drugs)	• OST (Methadone or Buprenorphine maintenance, Heroin Substitution) • Opiate Antagonist Therapies (Naltrexone)	• Mostly for opiate addicts • OST shows better results than Antagonist Therapies • Important: offer complementary psychosocial therapy
		• Psychosocial and self-help treatments (Counselling, therapeutic communities, intervention, rehabilitation houses)	• Require higher commitment from the individual and have highest rates of success • Less burden for criminal justice system and high cost-benefit ratio

Source: (Babor et al. 2010). Own design.

Annex 6. Summary of Strategy 2 and its Components

Strategy	Broad Policy Goals	Components (measures)	Comments
Supply Control	• Keep prices high and reduce availability of illicit drug on the market • Aimed at: producers and drug traffickers	• Source-country control (crop eradication or substitution, control of chemical precursors, in-country enforcement)	• Implementation cost higher, negligible long-term impact • Production shifts within countries, regional output does not change • Precursor chemicals control demands costly law enforcement, producers find replacement substances
		• Interdiction (border control, customs control, joint operations among countries)	• Implementation of interdiction programmes highly costly • Requires constant innovation against new mechanisms to smuggle drugs • Negligible impact on retail price
		• High-level and retail enforcement (operations to capture drug network leaders, drug-related assets, drugs in domestic market and street dealers)	• Conviction of high-level bosses is more cost-effective than focusing on street dealers. • High cost to maintain programmes • Dealers can be easily replaced
		• Imprisonment (conviction and incarceration of producers and drug traffickers)	• Higher economic burden on criminal justice system and prison system. • Dealers often reengage in drug trade • Disparity in severity of sanctions imposed, including death penalty in some countries

Source: (Babor et al. 2010). Own design.

Annex 7. Summary of Strategy 3 and its Components

Strategy	Broad Policy Goals	Components	Comments
Criminal Sanctions	• Deter drug use; reduce demand; prevent normalization and contagious spread of drug use • Aimed at: Drug users (specially Cannabis)	• Deterrence (shift from criminal to non-criminal sanctions, reduce level of penalties, abolishing criminal law for certain drug, *de facto* legalization)	• Applies mostly to users of soft drugs like cannabis. • When used, reduces burden on criminal justice system, but no concrete evidence that it reduces or increases consumption/demand of cannabis.
		• Increase penalties for drug possession and use (incarceration and coerced rehabilitation to inmates)	• More expensive for prison system • Coercive rehabilitation seen as violation to Human Rights. • Inmates reengage in use after leaving prison

Source: (Babor et al. 2010). Own design.

Annex 8. Decrees and Laws on Drug Activities in China (1978-2007)

Year	Law/Decree	Commentaries
1979	The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China	Article 171 defined as offence the manufacturing, selling and transporting [of] narcotics drugs.
1981	The State Council issued a Notice on Prohibiting Opium	Highlighted the increase in "cultivation, manufacturing, selling and smoking of opium".
1982	The State Council issued an Emergency Notice on Banning Opium	This note gave grounds for the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to a 'Decision on Severely Punishing Those who Disturb the Economy', which allowed the use of the death penalty for drug-related crimes (i.e., manufacturing, selling, and transporting drugs).
1986	Punishment Regulation of the Public Security Management	Approved by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Established that drug addicts should stay up to 15 days in custody and/or pay up to 200 yuan in fines, or warning. Those cultivating drugs faced up to 15 days of custody and/or up to 3,000 yuan in fines.
1987	The Supreme People's Court issued a Response on Sentencing Standards for Imposing the Death Penalty on Traffickers	Increased severity of penalties for heroin production and manufacturing. This included in: >500 grams of heroin would result in death penalty, <500->300 grams of heroin and aggravating circumstances would also result in death penalty.
1988	The Supplemental Regulations regarding the Punishment of Smuggling	Drug smuggling became a capital offence.
1990	Resolution on Prohibiting Narcotics Drugs	The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed one of the most important pieces of legislation on illicit drugs: It specified which drugs are illicit, expanded the scope of narcotic offenses, expanded sanctions to fines and confiscation of property, and imposed detoxification on recurrent drug addicts, among other provisions.
1995	State Council issued a measure on How to Carry out Forced Detoxification	"Detailed the responsibilities and authorities of agencies to supervise, execute and manage the process of forced detoxification" (Lu et al 2009, 111).
1997	Review of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China	Expanded the definition of narcotic offenses (i.e., illegal trading, transporting, carrying, and possessing opium, poppy plants, or other narcotic plants) and required more severe punishment of drug offenders (i.e., offenders who were involved in smuggling, selling, transporting, and manufacturing narcotic drugs would be held criminally liable regardless the amount of drugs involved).
2002	Review of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China	The definition and punishment for narcotic offenses stipulated in the 1997 Criminal Law remained intact.
2005	The State Council issued Regulations on Administration of Precursor Chemicals, and Regulations on Administration of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	Precursor Chemicals: Decree of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, No. 445. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances: Decree of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, No.442
2007	First comprehensive Anti-Drug Law	Passed by the National People's Congress, the new law expanded the police power in cracking down on drug trafficking and defined the qualifications and conditions of drug treatment programs.

(H. Lu, Miethe, and Liang 2009, 109), with additional input from pages 110-112.

Annex 9. Main Decrees and Laws on Drug Activities in the Philippines

Year	Law/Decree	Commentaries
1972	Dangerous Drugs Acts	Republic Act No. 6425. Among major accomplishments was the creation of the Dangerous Drugs Board, under the supervision of the Office of the President
1975	Memorandum to move the DDB under the Department of Health	
1996	Memorandum on DDB's chairmanship	Order No. 406 gave the chairmanship of the DDB to the Department of Justice
2002	Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act	Republic Act No. 9165. "The Government shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances" (DDB 2014, 5). It also established the FDEA.
2007	Board Regulation No. 4	Implementation of measures against increasing abuse of inhalants
2009	Board Regulation No. 3	Implementation of the random drug testing in schools aimed at "determining extent of drug abuse among students and help those who will be found positive on drugs to be treated and rehabilitated" (DDB 2014, 12)
2013	Board Regulation No. 1	Re-evaluate guidelines for drug testing on officers
2013	Republic Act No. 10586	Penalisation of people driving under the influence (both for alcohol and narcotics)
2017	Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD)	Executive Order No. 15, which also implemented the 'Anti-Illegal Drug Task Force" to supress the drug problem in the country. The FDEA would hold the chair of this new committee created to support the drug enforcement agency.

Source: (DDB 2014, 5,12). Selected regulation. Own design.

Annex 10. Main Decrees and Laws on Drug Activities in Japan

Year	Law/Decree	Commentaries
1948	Cannabis Control Act	Act No. 124 of 1948. First law to ban the consumption of a drug, in this case Marijuana. Substance only allowed for research (special license).
1951	Stimulants Control Act	Act No. 252 of 1951. Prohibition of import, export, possession, manufacture of both stimulant-type drugs and raw materials.
1953	Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Act	Act No. 14 of 1953. Expanded list of narcotic and psychotropic drugs (to 86 by 2015), as well as precursor chemicals (plant and synthetic). It also established guidelines for treatment of drug addicts, and sanctions according to drug.
1954	Opium Control Act	Act No. 71 of 1954. Regulation of use of opium only for medical or research purposes.
2007	Offender's Rehabilitation Act	Act No. 88 of 2007. Update of guidelines for law-offenders, including drug-related crimes
1991	Law Concerning Special Provisions for The Narcotics and Psychotropic Control Law, etc. and Other Matters for The Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conducts and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances Through International Cooperation. Unofficial Translation	Provisions on how to treat foreign nationals committing drug-related crimes in Japanese territory. Mechanisms to improve revision of suspicious cargo and parcels, procedures for confiscation of drugs and goods related to criminal activity, among others.

Source: (Government of Japan 1991, 2007, 1951, 1948, 1953b). Author summarized key characteristics per law decree. Own Design.

Annex 11. Substances in the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988

Table I		Table II
Acetic anhydride	Norephedrine	Acetone
N-Acetylanthranilic acid	N-Phenethyl-4-piperidone (NPP)a	Anthranilic acid
4-Anilino-N-phenethylpiperidine	Phenylacetic acid	Ethyl ether
(ANPP)a	alpha-Phenylacetoacetonitrile (APAAN)	Hydrochloric acidb
Ephedrine	1-Phenyl-2-propanone	Methyl ethyl ketone
Ergometrine	Piperonal	Piperidine
Ergotamine	Potassium permanganate	Sulphuric acidb
Isosafrole	Pseudoephedrine	Toluene
Lysergic acid	Safrole	
3,4-Methylenedioxyphenyl-2-pro-panone		

Source: (INCB 2018, 54)

Annex 12. Drug Seizures in China, Japan and the Philippines (2006 - 2016)

Country	Drug Type	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016
China	ATS*	6,329.93	6,201.37	10,080.31	16,250.94	28,045.45	31,097.33
	Heroine & Morphine	6,026.22	4,352.93	5,420.50	7,357.25	9,782.68	8,947.95
	Opium	1,697.00	1,557.72	1,014.00	846.95	1,741.00	3,104.81
	Marijuana	149.60	79.27	3,194.80	4,258.97	4,024.62	6,151.89
	Cocaine	373.10	599.27	1,020.29	843.57	401.14	922.02
	Others (1)	165.69	341.72	389.11	143.18	147.60	389.45
	Total	**14,741.54**	**13,132.28**	**21,119.01**	**29,700.86**	**44,142.49**	**50,613.45**
Japan	ATS*	149.16	400.98	312.54	468.24	570.20	1,521.41
	Marijuana	232.80	382.30	181.74	332.84	166.58	159.67
	Cocaine	9.90	5.60	7.15	6.85	2.26	113.31
	Hashish	98.70	33.40	13.89	42.51	36.71	1.04
	Ecstasy	1.58	65.36	4.95	1.11	-	1.58
	Opioids (2)	30.62	7.64	4.47	0.27	0.20	0.72
	Total	**522.76**	**895.28**	**524.74**	**851.82**	**775.95**	**1,797.73**
The Philippines	Marijuana	6,248.96	3,724.28	1,127.63	425.60	897.81	1,615.76
	ATS*	766.79	853.51	766.79	112.10	719.41	2,218.90
	Cocaine	-	-	341.93	15.40	69.85	1,930.60
	Others (3)	24.56	0.15	1.50	37.46	1.30	6.52
	Total	**791.35**	**853.66**	**1,110.22**	**164.96**	**790.56**	**4,156.02**

*Does not include Ecstasy
1) Ecstasy and Hashish (minor amounts)
2) Heroin, Morphine and Opium (minor amounts)
3) Ecstasy and Hashish (minor amounts)
Source: UNODC 2017 Map of Annual Seizures. Author collected and organized disaggregated data. Own Design

Annex 13. Number of Meth seizures (kg) per type of smuggling - Japan

Year	Air Passengers	Commercial Cargo	International Mail	Ship's Crews	Cases
2012	204	236	35	8	141
2013	304	539	7	10	154
2014	246	261	16	27	174
2015	84	328	3	6	83
2016	79	653	53	716	104
Total	**917**	**2017**	**114**	**767**	**656**

Source: (Japan Customs 2016, 2)

Annex 14. Assessment of National Illicit Drug Policy - China

	Level	Criteria	Key Findings
1. International	**1.1. Response to International Conventions**	1.1.1. Ratification International Conventions	• Signatory of all main international conventions on drugs, • Special provision for autonomous territories (Hong Kong, Macao), that must report independently on advances against illicit drugs.
		1.1.2. National Legislation on illicit Drugs	• Historical context shaped the Chinese anti-drug policy, • The Criminal Law (1979) and the Anti-Drug Law (2008) are key legislations to control illicit drugs, • The only difference in punishment for drug trafficking lies in the amount of drugs in possession, regardless if it is soft or hard drug, • Death penalty applicable as maximum punishment for drug-related crimes
		1.1.3. Institutional organization to combat drug trafficking	• The Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the National Narcotics Control Commission (NNCC) and the National • Anti-Drug Committee are the main bodies developing the strategy against illicit drugs, • The NNCC is in charge of coordinating efforts among 21 government departments and local authorities in provinces most affected by illicit drugs.
	1.2. Law Enforcement Cooperation	1.2.1. Type of participation on international level	• As member of UNODC, China participates in regular meetings including the UNGASS on Drugs (2016), and is also part of specialized groups like HONLEA, • China works with INTERPOL targeting transnational drug networks in East Asia, • There is no consolidated information on complete list of anti-drug forums & IOs where China has a membership
		1.2.2. Bilateral or multilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking	• China has an extended list of MOUs with east and west neighbour countries in order to combat drug trafficking, • Particular efforts take place in Southeast Asia, working together with the Golden Triangle countries through bilateral agreements, in cooperation with ASEAN (ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3), and through the GMS agreement.
2. National	**2.1. Assessment of the illicit drug market** (Drug Problem)	2.1.1. Drug use	• Country is producer, transit territory and destination of drugs, • China is a heavier producer of Methamphetamines and chemical precursors for synthetic drugs and prescribed medication, • Crystal Meth ranks highest in drug use, followed by heroin. The synthetic drug also has the highest prevalence level among registered drug users
		2.1.2. Crime related to drug trafficking	• Most seizure of drugs and arrest of people committing drug-related offences takes place in southern provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong, • Precursor chemical production and trade main problem, • Law enforcement faces a challenge to identify and close clandestine production of ATS-type drugs, 2012 reported 724.000 drug-related incidents, with 530.000 arrested people.

		2.1.3. Associated illnesses	• The national prevalence rate of HIV among drug users is moderate, thanks in part to the high level of safe injecting practices, but certain regions, like Guangxi, have abnormal rates of HIV prevalence among IDU • HCV prevalence among IDU one of highest in the world.
	2.2. Demand reduction (through Services for drug users)	2.2.1. OST and Antagonist Therapies	• Compulsory treatment for drug users coordinated by the government and part of the criminal justice system, • Therapies are mostly Methadone Maintenance Treatment (MMT), a OST-type of therapy,
		2.2.2. Psychosocial and self-help treatments	• There are psychosocial and Self-help treatments but very limited to certain regions, understaffed and with few options to combine with OST therapies.
	2.3. Supply Reduction	2.3.1. Source-country control measures	• Chinese current source-control measures focus strongly on helping countries of the Golden Triangle reduce opium poppy production, • Measures include alternative development, although it is mostly of mono-plantations (tea, rubber, etc.), which offer very little improvement to affected areas.
		2.3.2. Interdiction efforts	• Most interdiction operations coordinated by the General Administration of Customs (GAC) and the Chinese Coast Guard (CGG), with emphasis in southern provinces and port cities, • Substantial increase in amount of seized drugs by the GAC between 2004 and 2016, going from 806 kg to 4.9 tonnes, respectively, • Difficulty to find disaggregated statistics per region/province, or per type of drug.
		2.3.3. High-level and retail enforcement	• Training on counter-narcotic operations only started in 1982 (Yunnan Police), and local law enforcement agencies are often understaffed and under equipped to fully combat illicit drug production and trade, • Uneven national High-level and retail law enforcement • Domestic operations often target users and traffickers without distinction.
		2.3.4. Imprisonment	• Criminal penalties for people related to the cultivation, manufacture, smuggling and sale of illicit narcotics is severe in China, • Minimum of 15 years to life in prison or death penalty for major drug-related crimes, and it applies equally to Chinese citizens or foreign nationals.
	2.4. Demand reduction (through criminal and non-criminal sanctions)	2.4.1. Deterrence mechanisms defined by law	• Authorities hardly use deterrence methods, relying mostly on criminal sanctions, • Law enforcement officials perform random test on suspected drug users and citizens encouraged to report drug use.
		2.4.2. Incapacitation measures	• Emphasis lies strongly on incapacitation measures, with prison possible for drug users, including first time offence, • Criminal sanctions involve taking mandatory rehabilitation treatment, and recidivists must take Compulsory Isolation Rehabilitation (CIR), • CIR criticised for use of forced labour and limited medical and psychological treatments for drug users.

Annex 15. Assessment of National Illicit Drug Policy - the Philippines

	Level	Criteria	Key Findings
1. International	1.1. Response to International Conventions	1.1.1. Ratification of International Conventions	• Signatory of the three main international conventions on drugs • In practice, country violates treaty's provisions on treatment of suspects of drug-related crimes and drug users, • Increasing number of reports of extra-judicial killings
		1.1.2. National Legislation on illicit Drugs	• Main piece of legislation is the ' Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act' of 2002 • Law expanded scope of drug-related crimes, defined regulations to produce and trade chemical precursors and promoted cooperation between public sector, private sector and civil society to combat illicit drugs, • Death penalty legally banned in 2006, although extra-judicial killings increased since presidency of Duterte.
		1.1.3. Institutional organization to combat drug trafficking	• By law, the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) sets the guidelines to combat illicit drugs, and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) coordinates law enforcement, • In practice, several law enforcement agencies like the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) are involved in counter-narcotic operations, • Lack of coordination between law enforcement agencies with overlapping initiatives to combat illicit drugs.
	1.2. Law Enforcement Cooperation	1.2.1. Type of participation on international level	• Country was actively working with ASEAN on combatting transnational drug crimes, but cooperation has reduced since presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, • The country has signed MOUs with 11 countries since the 1990s, aiming to increase technical cooperation, sharing of intelligence and training of counter-narcotic officers,
		1.2.2. Bilateral or multilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking	• Partnerships with the European Union and the United States have lost relevance over current Sino-Philippine efforts to combat drugs, especially the smuggling of precursor chemicals and methamphetamines.
2. National	2.1. Assessment of the illicit drug market (Drug Problem)	2.1.1. Drug use	• Disagreement in statistics concerning drug use, with president stating that the country has 4 million users, versus data from the DDB assuring there are 1.8 million users, • Cannabis and Methamphetamine 'Shabu' are the two most common drugs of use.
		2.1.2. Crime related to drug trafficking	• Methamphetamine has become the most common seized drug, with confiscation of cannabis reducing to 28% in 2016, • Over 37.000 people were arrested in 34.000 counter-narcotic operations in 2016, • Most foreign nationals captured for drug-related crimes come from mainland China, correlating to the increasing illicit trade of ATS-type drugs and chemical precursors.
		2.1.3. Associated illnesses	• The Philippine has now one of the highest HIV transmission rates in the world, partly due to reduction of needle-exchange programs since Rodrigo Duterte's presidency.
	2.2. Demand reduction (through Services for drug users)	2.2.1. OST and Antagonist Therapies	• The country offers OST therapies through Treatment Rehabilitation Centres managed by the Department of Health (DOH), • There is no reliable source of information describing the type of medical therapies available for drug users, • Treatment is compulsory for those arrested for drug use.
		2.2.2. Psychosocial and self-help treatments	• Legally, there are mechanisms set to provide a variety of psychosocial and self-help treatments, • Treatments include psychiatric and psychological assessments, spiritual counselling and 12-step programmes, yet treatment centres are understaffed and have limited budget, reducing quality of these treatments.
	2.3. Supply Reduction	2.3.1. Source-country control measures	• Most of source-country control measures aim at reducing cannabis cultivation in the country, as well as manufacture of crystal methamphetamine, • Eradication efforts faced challenge due to presence of illegal groups in production areas,

			• Alternative Development of legal crops not so successful due to lack of resources to provide financing and technical assistance, and low infrastructure capacity in rural areas.
		2.3.2. Interdiction efforts	• Most of interdiction operations coordinated by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), • Strong focus on international airports and seaports, • Use of standard mechanisms like random revision of parcels, suspicious passengers and K9 forces to identify drug in containers and luggage.
		2.3.3. High-level and retail enforcement	• 28.056 drug-related arrests in 2016, • Most arrests (65%) involve low-level dealers (pushers) and there is little success in high-level (heads of criminal networks) captures, • Drug users captured in drug busts are also considered criminals, • No reliable sources on the amount of people killed in counter-narcotic operations, although HRW talks about more than 12.000 casualties between 2016 and 2017.
		2.3.4. Imprisonment	• Legally, death penalty was banned in 2006, so maximum conviction is 20 years in prison for producers, smugglers and sellers or illicit narcotics, • There are also fines between $500.000 and $10.000.000 for drug trafficking
	2.4. Demand reduction (through criminal and non-criminal sanctions)	2.4.1. Deterrence mechanisms defined by law	• First-time offenders between 15 and 18 years can receive a suspended sentence, instead doing community service supervised by the DOH, • There are fines for possession of small amounts of drugs.
		2.4.2. Incapacitation measures	• Despite existing non-criminal sanctions, most people captured using or possessing small amounts of drugs must face jail time, • Recidivist users no longer go to compulsory treatment, but face between 12 to 20 years in prison, alike to drug traffickers, • Law enforcement officials accused of not following due process on people arrested for using drugs, often committing extra-judicial killings and deleting evidence of it.

Annex 16. Assessment of National Illicit Drug Policy - Japan

	Level	Criteria	Key Findings
1. International	**1.1. Response to International Conventions**	1.1.1. Ratification of International Conventions	• Country ratified all international conventions on drugs, • Strong supporter of prohibitionist approach, opposing the progressive stances of members of the UNODC.
		1.1.2. National Legislation on illicit Drugs	• Main laws are: Cannabis Control Act (1948), Stimulant Drug Control Act (1951) and the Narcotic and Psychotropic Control Act (1953), • Legislation differentiates among the different kind of drugs, establishing different mechanism to control their use.
		1.1.3. Institutional organization to combat drug trafficking	• Law enforcement is coordinated by the National Police Agency (NPA), through its Drug and Firearms Division, • Other agencies involve in counter-narcotic and interdiction operations include Japan Customs and the Division of Criminal Affairs Planning.
	1.2. Law Enforcement Cooperation	1.2.1. Type of participation on international level	• The country actively participates in international and regional forums to combat drug trafficking, • Permanent representatives to 'ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting of Transnational Crime', the 'Plus Three Working Group on Narcotics to eradicate the scourge of drugs' and the 'Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime', • Japan organizes the 'Asia-Pacific Operation Drug Enforcement Conference' since 1995.

		1.2.2. Bilateral or multilateral agreements to combat drug trafficking	• International cooperation against illicit drugs is coordinated by the NPA, with the support from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), • Cooperation strongly focuses in Southeast Asia, on topics like improvement of rehabilitation treatments, exchange of technology and knowhow to improve interdiction operations.
2. National	**2.1. Assessment of the illicit drug market** (Drug Problem)	2.1.1. Drug use	• ATS-type drugs, in particular methamphetamine, is the most common drug of used among law-offenders, • Cannabis consumption has reduced over time, • There is a growing risk of NPS entering the market, in replacement of ATS, as they are unregulated.
		2.1.2. Crime related to drug trafficking	• Data on drug arrests is global, without possibility to differentiate between drug users and drug traffickers as they are both drug-offenders, • Strong role of Boryokudan in control of the illicit drug market.
		2.1.3. Associated illnesses	• Since drug use is very limited, annual prevalence rates are not significant enough for research, Information on annual prevalence shows Crystal Meth with highest scores among illicit drugs.
	2.2. Demand reduction (through Services for drug users)	2.2.1. OST and Antagonist Therapies	• The system is supervised by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), but private organizations are in charge of operating it, • There is lack of coordination among private actors, reducing efficiency of treatment, There is no available statistics on success rates of treatments.
		2.2.2. Psychosocial and self-help treatments	• The MOJ defined the guidelines to rehabilitate drug users and avoid relapse by means of psychosocial treatments, • These type of therapies are also offered in prison to former drug users, • Although there is limited information on these therapies on a national level, recent Osaka pilot made use of a comprehensive approach including working groups and psychological counselling.
	2.3. Supply Reduction	2.3.1. Source-country control measures	• Most efforts on source-country control measures focus in countries in the Golden Triangle, • Japan supports alternative development programmes by providing infrastructure and technology for agriculture initiatives, • Challenges in making these projects successful as product does not meet standards to export to Japan.
		2.3.2. Interdiction efforts	• Japan Customs is in charge of most interdiction operations in airports and seaports, • Numbers in drug seizures have been growing, disrupting the stability of the illicit drug market, • Most seized drug in interdiction operations comes from China, Hong Kog and the United States (data available only for methamphetamine).
		2.3.3. High-level and retail enforcement	• Most of the domestic counter-narcotic operations involve members of Boryokudan behind illicit drug trade, • Decreasing numbers in arrest of Boryokudan members involved in drug traffic is not entirely result of police efforts, but also due to declining membership levels.
		2.3.4. Imprisonment	• There are shorter sentences in the cases of cannabis, which sets the limit of jail time to maxi-mum 10 years, • For most cases, penalties are very high and include payment of fines from ¥10,000 to ¥3,000,000.
	2.4. Demand reduction (through criminal and non-criminal sanctions)	2.4.1. Deterrence mechanisms defined by law	• By law, users must pay heavy fines for breaking the law, going from ¥2,000,000 to ¥5,000,000 depending on the drug, • Most effective deterrence mechanism is society, which condemns drug use. Users of any drug face public shaming in media, as well as loosing social status and their job.
		2.4.2. Incapacitation measures	• Users of synthetic drugs face up to 10 years in prison with labour, while users of cannabis could face up to 7 years in jail, • During period in jail, inmates must also go through mandatory rehabilitation.

Annex 17. Primary drug among persons treated for drug problems in Asia - 2016

Country	Year*	Cannabis	Opioids	Cocaine	Hallucinogens	ATS	Tranquilizers - Sedatives	Solvents - Inhalants	Other †	Treatment
Brunei	2016	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	104
China	2016		100.0%							162
China, Hong Kong SAR	2008/ 2009	6.0%	57.9%	0.0%	0.0%	8.7%	0.0%	0.0%	27.4%	12,557
China, Taiwan Province of China	2009	0.1%	73.1%	0.0%	0.0%	22.3%	4.2%		0.0%	19,125
Cambodia	2015									12,712
Indonesia	2016	11.9%	4.9%	0.1%		69.4%	2.8%		3.9%	13,617
Japan	2005/ 2012	2.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	55.1%	0.0%	14.5%	28.2%	18,131
Laos	2015	0.1%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	99.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1,419
Macao SAR, China	2016	3.3%	43.3%	3.3%		11.3%	0.3%		30.7%	573
Malaysia	2016	2.6%	57.4%	0.0%		39.7%	0.1%	0.0%	0.2%	8,568
Myanmar	2016	0.3%	71.5%			7.6%				9,258
Philippines	2016	18.7%	0.6%	0.8%	0.4%	77.7%	1.0%		0.7%	6,079
South Korea	2016	21.2%	1.5%			77.3%				885
Singapore	2016	7.5%	11.6%	0.0%	0.0%	72.9%	0.5%	1.7%	5.7%	1,263
Thailand	2016	8.8%	4.3%	0.0%		80.4%		1.0%	5.4%	172,518
Viet Nam	2015									49,52

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to incomplete reporting from countries.
***** Last year of available information. For multiple years given, information corresponds to the second year.
† Includes substances not under international control
Source: (UNODC 2016a)

Annex 18. Global seizures of drugs 2006-2016 (metric tonnes*)

Year	Opium			Marijuana			Heroine & Morphine			Cocaine**			ATS		
	World	East Asia	%	World	East Asia	%	World	East Asia	%	World	East Asia	%	World	East Asia	%
2006	383,90	10,57	2,75%	5.953,00	32,83	0,55%	102,88	7,89	7,67%	732,70	0,43	0,06%	52,90	14,34	27,10%
2007	520,90	13,67	2,62%	6.118,00	53,37	0,87%	92,35	6,75	7,31%	731,30	0,41	0,06%	50,00	11,56	23,11%
2008	646,30	5,87	0,91%	5.697,00	165,65	2,91%	91,23	5,41	5,93%	765,50	0,64	0,08%	52,80	10,63	20,13%
2009	668,40	2,91	0,44%	6.347,00	133,78	2,11%	102,49	8,15	7,95%	754,70	0,46	0,06%	66,60	12,09	18,16%
2010	493,80	2,25	0,45%	6.488,00	50,15	0,77%	94,97	6,45	6,79%	633,50	1,42	0,22%	88,40	20,24	22,89%
2011	460,10	1,88	0,41%	5.995,00	50,25	0,84%	152,83	9,14	5,98%	640,50	0,95	0,15%	141,60	24,24	17,12%
2012	556,60	2,67	0,48%	5.523,00	56,72	1,03%	123,83	8,03	6,49%	701,00	0,94	0,13%	148,70	31,69	21,31%
2013	634,30	4,21	0,66%	5.710,00	60,69	1,06%	115,12	11,80	10,25%	659,90	0,76	0,12%	153,10	39,64	25,89%
2014	526,50	3,61	0,69%	5.886,00	103,87	1,76%	106,23	12,35	11,62%	651,80	0,58	0,09%	170,80	45,87	26,85%
2015	586,80	3,94	0,67%	6.011,00	76,93	1,28%	92,08	12,41	13,47%	918,60	0,60	0,07%	194,40	64,00	32,92%
2016	658,00	4,35	0,66%	4.682,00	216,93	4,63%	156,11	11,67	7,47%	1.128,60	3,30	0,29%	232,00	61,08	26,33%

*Quantities reflect bulk weight of seizures. Measures are converted to their equivalent in kilograms
** Cocaine quantities include cocaine salts, bases, crack, and non-specific cocaine
Source: (UNODC 2017a)

Abstract in English

Drug trafficking in East Asia has been on the agenda of policy makers and international organisations since the rise of synthetic stimulants and heroin after the end of the Cold War. This master thesis focused on drug trafficking from a comparative viewpoint, analysing and contrasting the policies designed to combat it. Comparing national drug policies opens the possibility to design competitive strategies both nationally and regionally, aimed at reducing drug trade in East Asia. Breaking down the drug policies into different components provides an opportunity to understand the rationale behind them and find areas where countries can work together to fight against drugs more effectively.

The thesis focused on the People's Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines and Japan, which are three countries differently affected by drug trafficking. China is a main producer of methamphetamine and chemical precursors. The Philippines, a country implementing one of the toughest approaches towards drug trafficking, is a major consumer of Crystal Meth. Japan, a highly developed country with a very restrictive approach to drug use, is still a persistent consumer of synthetic stimulants. An analytical framework allowed the review of the anti-drug policies on a national and international level. The evidence showed that the countries have a similar prohibitionist approach towards illicit drugs, focusing their efforts on supply-reduction strategies, and imposing heavy sanctions on drug traffickers and users. Furthermore, the research showed discrepancies between existing legislation on drugs and law enforcement, with authorities overstepping boundaries and violating the rights of suspected law-offenders. The findings serve as a basis for future research on illicit drugs in East Asia and on how to design a more comprehensive policy to combat drug trafficking.

Zusammenfassung in Deutsch

Der Drogenhandel in Ostasien steht spätestens seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges auf der Agenda von Politikern und internationalen Organisationen, insbesondere aufgrund des seither steigenden Konsums von synthetischen Drogen und Heroin. Diese Masterarbeit analysiert Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Drogenhandels dreier Länder in Ostasien. Der Vergleich nationaler Richtlinien eröffnet die Möglichkeit, sowohl national als auch regional bessere Drogenbekämpfungsstrategien zu entwickeln, um den Abbau des Drogenhandels in Ostasien voranzutreiben. Die Aufgliederung der Richtlinien in ihre verschiedenen Bestandteile ermöglichte es Hintergründe zu beleuchten und aufzuzeigen in welchen Bereichen Länder zusammenarbeiten können, um den Kampf gegen Drogen noch effektiver zu gestalten.

Im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen standen die Volksrepublik China, die Republik der Philippinen und Japan, drei Länder die vom Drogenhandel ganz unterschiedlich betroffen sind: China ist einer der Hauptproduzenten von Methamphetaminen und chemischer Grundstoffe benötigt für die Herstellung von Drogen; die Philippinen, mit einem der härtesten Ansätze gegen Drogenhandel, sind ein Hauptverbraucher von Crystal Meth; und Japan ist ein hoch entwickeltes Land mit einem sehr restriktiven Ansatz gegenüber Drogen und einem dennoch anhaltenden Konsum jener. Die Analyse der Anti-Drogenpolitik der Länder auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene ergab, dass die drei Länder sehr ähnliche, repressive Ansätze in Bezug auf illegale Drogen verfolgen, dass sich die Bekämpfungsstrategien auf die Angebotsreduzierung konzentrieren und dass sowohl Drogenhändler als auch Konsumierende mit hohen Strafen zu rechnen haben. Außerdem zeigten die Untersuchungen Diskrepanzen zwischen den bestehenden Rechtsvorschriften und der Strafverfolgung auf, wobei die Behörden Grenzen überschreiten und die Rechte der mutmaßlichen Straftäter verletzen. Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit dienen als Grundlage für zukünftige Forschung zu illegalen Drogen in Ostasien und für die Entwicklung einer umfassenden Drogenbekämpfungsstrategie.