universität wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

Explaining populist right wing vote choice in Europe: The role of subjective economic insecurity, anti-immigration sentiments and intergroup conflict

verfasst von / submitted by

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angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2018 / Vienna 2018

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / degree programme code as it appears on the student record sheet:	A 066 824
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt / degree programme as it appears on the student record sheet:	Masterstudium Politikwissenschaft
Betreut von / Supervisor:	Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Sylvia Kritzinger

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I. Introduction and research questions

In Europe, populist right-wing parties (PRWP) are experiencing unprecedented growth. While these parties have achieved various successes in previous decades, they have celebrated even greater triumphs in recent years. Some right-wing parties have made it into government, for example the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in Austria, the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy, the Progress Party (FrP) in Norway and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. Although not winning, some candidates, for example the 2016 FPÖ candidate Norbert Hofer in Austria and the 2017 National Front (FN) candidate Marine Le Pen in France, have participated quite successfully in presidential elections. Furthermore, they have gained a decisive number of seats in the last national elections in Germany, where the Alternative for Germany (AfD) made it into parliament; in Denmark, where the Danish people's party (DPP) emerged as the second largest party; and in the Netherlands, where the Party for Freedom (PVV) gained second place. A right-wing party (UK Independence Party, UKIP) has also successfully influenced the Brexit referendum in the UK. These election results of recent years have confirmed that these parties are not a once-off phenomenon. Rather, they are intending to stay and have proven themselves as serious contenders. The crucial question that not only Europeans, but also other parts of the world, now ask is: What makes these populist right-wing parties so successful?

Indeed, many scholars today focus on explaining the rise of PRWP in Europe. Their explanations have concentrated on the supply, the institutional, the media and the demand side of the political process. Concerning the demand side, which deals with the importance of voters' individual values or beliefs in their vote choice, there appear to be three approaches, which focus on (see Ziller & Schubel, 2015: 369f):

1. economic aspects and theories such as the globalization loser thesis (e.g. Betz, 1994; Kriesi et al., 2008);
2. immigrant-threat and anti-immigration sentiments (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; Coeffé, 2009);
3. political alienation, including distrust in the political system and political protest (e.g. van der Brug et al., 2000; Norris, 2005; Ziller & Schubel, 2015).

However, what many analyses have overlooked thus far is that what actually shapes public opinion and vote choice is not only the intensity or extent of transformations in the social, economic or

political spheres, but rather "*the manner in which they are **perceived and interpreted***" by individuals and societies (Guibernau, 2010: 9).

Although perception obviously plays a role in the second and third approaches, as they both aim at capturing people's feelings, perception has not always been taken into account with regard to the first approach, which deals with economic aspects. Rather, the focus has been much more on objective economic aspects, especially the effects of globalization on the voters of the populist right-wing parties. Not surprisingly, research in this regard has thus far often been contradictory. For example, according to Mierina et al. (2015), the effect of unemployment rates on predicting the success of populist right-wing parties is inconsistent (e.g. Esses et al., 1998, or Arzheimer, 2009, who find a significant effect contrary to Lubbers et al., 2002, as well as Arzheimer and Carter, 2006, who find a negative effect). First steps in including perception in this field were taken by Mols and Jetten (2016: 282), who investigated why populist right-wing parties can be successful in countries where the economy is prospering. They found that "*crafty*" populist right-wing party leaders will often frame voters' vision of social reality creatively, so that their perception of socio-structural conditions might no more match objective and real socio-structural conditions (2016: 289f). This could lead to a situation where in terms of opinion formation or vote choice, it might "*not be the objective economic situation that **matters most but the way that the economic situation is appraised and interpreted***" by individuals (2016: 289).

Therefore, when looking at economic aspects to explain the rise of populist right-wing parties in Europe, it is important not only to take into account national context factors or objective factors regarding individuals' economic situations. Instead, it is vital to look at how individuals perceive their own economic situations, which leads to the following first research question:

> ***RQ1: How does subjective economic insecurity in comparison to objective factors of economic insecurity predict populist right-wing voting (PRWV) in Europe?***

Linked to this first research question is the reflection as to why people who feel economically insecure or can be considered as economically in an unsatisfactory situation end up voting for populist right-wing parties in the first place, as there are also other parties courting the economic losers. A main reason can be attributed to the fact that populist right-wing parties seem to articulate successfully the conflict not only between the economic losers and winners (Kriesi et al., 2012),

but also between the economic losers and immigrants, making the latter the scapegoats for the (perceived) economic decline.

Indeed, right-wing populist parties' rhetoric about scapegoating immigrants for the bad, or sometimes only "allegedly bad", economic situation of individuals and countries is currently prevalent all over Europe (e.g. Ignazi, 1992; Jaegers & Walgrave, 2007; Eger & Valdez, 2015). Accordingly, it has been found that a healthy economy and receptivity to anti-immigration messages can go hand in hand: "*PRWP leaders will divert attention away from the healthy state of the national economy* […] *and instead portray society (and its economy)* ***as the battleground of a power struggle between different groups***" (Mols & Jetten, 2016: 288). Esses et al.'s theory of group conflict is interesting in this regard, since perception plays a strong role in it. The theory states that the perception of resource stress and the awareness of an outgroup can lead to a power struggle between groups (intergroup conflict). Specifically, the ingroup will try to find ways to remove the source of competition (1998: 702), hence a populist vote choice might be a possible strategy. As populist right-wing parties frame immigrants as scapegoats for the bad or perceived bad economic situation of individuals or a country, which can serve as fruitful ground for intergroup conflict, the second research question will be:

> ***RQ2: Is there a connection or an impact between subjective economic insecurity and anti-immigration sentiments in predicting populist right-wing voting in Europe? And if so, what form does it take?***

Prior to investigating the above research questions, a definition of populist right-wing parties will be given. Then, as the main purpose of this thesis is investigating the connection between Esses et al.'s theory of group conflict (1998) and voters' choice for populist right-wing parties, two theoretical preconditions will be elaborated for a better understanding. First, certain theoretical considerations of economic factors for predicting populist right-wing voting will be provided, followed by the differentiation of subjective and objective economic insecurity. In accordance with the first research question, it will be developed whether perception of one's economic situation is more relevant for the prediction of PRWV than objective factors concerning one's economic situation. Second, in order to investigate the second research question, the importance of anti-immigration sentiments for predicting PRWV will be reviewed briefly. It will be explained why a multidimensional approach is required when studying the effects of anti-immigration sentiments

and PRWV, which will highlight the distinction between these sentiments resulting from cultural threats on the one hand, and economic threats on the other hand. The last section of the theoretical part will focus on Esses et al.'s theory of group conflict. A model based on their instrumental model of group conflict will be developed to investigate a possible connection between subjective economic insecurity, economic anti-immigration sentiments and the prediction of populist right-wing voting.

For the sake of completeness, it has to be mentioned that this thesis does not deal with voters' ideological preferences on the economic dimension. Rather, it focuses on the roles played by subjective economic insecurity, anti-immigration sentiments and intergroup conflict on voting for populist right-wing parties. In general, it is assumed that these voters make their voting choices independent of their ideological preferences on the economic dimension, as previous studies have indicated. In other words, populist right-wing parties usually do not gain their voters by their approaches to issues of the economic dimension, but rather manage to mobilize voters with anti-immigration messages (Lefkofridi et al., 2014: 80; Arzheimer, 2009; Ivartsflaten, 2008). It has been demonstrated that mobilization over grievances about immigration plays a consistent role in the electoral success of populist right-wing parties, whereas the mobilization of voters with right-wing economic preferences is not part of these parties' winning formula (Ivartsflaten, 2008). Moreover, it has to be considered that current party conflicts deal with questions of cultural identity and community, not with issues of market regulation or state redistribution (Oesch, 2012: 48).

II. Conceptualization

Before outlining the theoretical considerations, populist right-wing parties have to be defined, as well as how they can be distinguished from other parties in Europe. Although the research of populism and right-wing populist parties has gained much attention recently, "*there is still a lack of a commonly accepted definition, and quite a lot of conceptual confusion*" (Mierina et al., 2015: 185). This can be illustrated by the different terms for the right spectrum that have emerged in recent years: from "extreme right" (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006), to "radical right" (Kitschelt, 2007, and Norris, 2005, who argue that there is no need to qualify most current radical right-wing parties as "populist"), or "populist radical right" (Mudde, 2007). Whether populism can be considered as an ideology itself is not productive, since people probably would not consider themselves "populist" as they would consider themselves "liberal" or "conservative". This goes hand in hand with the definition by Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013), who argue that populism is a thin-centered ideology that rarely exists on its own and mostly attaches itself to other ideologies, for example the radical right or socialism.

Concerning a clear definition of populism, according to Reinemann et al. (2016) there seems to be increasing agreement that references to, or the communicative construction of, "the people" should be regarded as the key component of populist messages, with anti-elitism and anti-outgroup stances serving as optional additional elements. This is congruent to the definition by Jagers and Walgraves (2007: 322), who consider three elements as common denominators of these theoretical and historical shapes of populism: references to and justification of actions by appealing and identifying with "the people", rooted in "anti-elite" feelings, and consideration of the people as a uniform group without internal differences except for some very specific categories that are subject to exclusion strategies.

However, not all populist parties can be regarded as populist right-wing parties. There are populist parties such as Podemos in Spain and Syriza in Greece, which for example hold more leftist views on cultural issues and therefore do not fall within the scope of right-wing populism. Yet, concerning the "right" spectrum on the cultural scale, comparing Reinemann et al.'s elements to Heinen and Kreuzmann (2015), there at least seems to be some harmony among European parties. As they state, although the profiles of the various populist movements in Europe are fundamentally different, there seems to be consensus concerning the fact that right-wing populist parties are anti-elitist ("the people against the corrupt elite"), anti-immigration and anti-EU

(although to varying degrees). Lastly, Cas Mudde's definition also needs to be considered: he regards nativism as the key feature of what he calls the "populist radical right". He argues that their ideology holds that "*states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state*" (Mudde, 2007: 19).

To break the above-mentioned points down for the purpose of this research, populist right-wing parties in Europe are defined as parties using anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric, that are anti-immigration (or anti-immigrants), anti-EU, pro-nationalism and on the right side of the political left-right spectrum.

III. Theoretical considerations

A. Economic aspects and economic insecurity

The contextual factors of a country's economic situation might not be the best predictors of populist right-wing voting. Scholars have studied the factors of individual countries quite thoroughly, although the results are often contradictory. As stated above, the results of unemployment rates in predicting voting for populist right-wing parties are inconsistent (see Mierina et al., 2015). Kitschelt (2007) once proposed that far-right voting is more likely to take place in countries with encompassing welfare systems that offer considerable social benefits, also to immigrants. Others have found that generous and employment-oriented welfare states hinder the rise of far-right parties (Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009, see also Mierina et al., 2015: 187f).

There seems to be disagreement among scholars about the actual role of the economic situation of individuals. On the one hand, certain scholars argue that there are winners and losers of globalization, and that the losers of globalization tend to be more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties, since these parties successfully articulate this new conflict between the two groups (e.g. Kriesi et al., 2008; Kriesi et al., 2012; Teney et al., 2014). In a nutshell, the winners of globalization are represented by highly educated young people living in urban centers who see their life chances increased by globalization. The losers, however, composed of less educated, older and working-class people, consider themselves to have suffered as a result of globalization (see Teney, 2014: 575, and Hobolt, 2016: 8).

On the other hand, others doubt that the rise of right-wing populism is purely due to economic changes, since many wealthy people attach to these parties as well (e.g. Mudde, 2007). They argue that one should be more skeptical of the idea that the rise of populist right-wing parties is purely due to rising unemployment and job insecurity in Europe, or that it can be ascribed to the "*resentment among the 'new social cleavage' of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in inner-city areas*" (Norris, 2005: 257). Norris (2005: 257) has argued that "[*t*]*he social profile is more complex than popular stereotypes suggest*."

Accordingly, it would be a misinterpretation or underestimation to think that populist right-wing parties attract only the losers of globalization (Guibernau, 2010: 8). These these parties have had a great deal of success in wealthy countries or countries across Europe experiencing economic growth, such as Austria, Denmark and Norway. In these countries, the unemployment rates have

generally been below the OECD average[1] and their welfare systems are well equipped to compensate possible globalization losers (Betz, 2003: 86, see also Guibernau, 2010; Mols & Jetten, 2016).

It seems that it might not be a country's economic situation that serves as a proper predictor of populist right-wing voting. Inglehart and Norris (2016: 15) have also questioned the range of the immigration rate in a country as a predictor of populist right-wing voting due to only mixed evidence in the literature (e.g. Norris, 2005), and consider the perception of the increasing presence of immigrants in a country as a far better predictor. This might likewise be the case for economic factors: how individuals actually perceive their countries' and their own situations could be a much better predictor of PRWV than objective economic factors.[2] To better distinguish between the economic situation of individuals and their perception of their situation, these two conditions will be labeled "objective economic insecurity" on the one hand, and "subjective economic insecurity" on the other hand. In a nutshell, objective economic insecurity defines individuals' economic situation and subjective economic insecurity takes into account how people actually feel about their own economic situation. This differentiation is supported by Mau et al. (2012: 656), who highlight the problem that too many researchers focus only on objective conditions, as well as that "*many analyses of insecurity do not explicitly distinguish between objective and subjective insecurity.*"

1. Objective economic insecurity of individuals

Concerning factors affecting individuals' objective economic insecurity, which have received wide attention in the literature to date, researchers have found that individuals who are unemployed, part of the working class or lower-middle-class citizens are very likely to support populist right-wing parties (Lubbers et al., 2002; van der Brug et al., 2005; Kitschelt, 2007; Arzheimer, 2009; see Mieriņa et al., 2015). Inglehart and Norris (2016: 12) have also stated that according to the argument of growing divergence between the winners and losers of global markets or globalization, populist support should be high among, for example, people who are unemployed, unskilled and dependent on welfare benefits. However, according to their study, objective insecurity does not

[1] https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm, last accessed 11/13/2018.

[2] People's perception of their countries' situations in predicting PRWV would be interesting to look at, as there might also be differences between how the country is doing in reality and how its performance is perceived by the masses. However, since the focus of this thesis is on people's perception of their own economic situation, it will highlight the role of individuals' own economic situation and their perception of it in predicting PRWV only.

seem capable of effectively predicting populist right-wing voting: Although Inglehart and Norris (2016: 27) found further support that the experience of unemployment can predict populist right-wing voting, contrary to their assumptions they noted that "*populists received significantly less support (not more) among those dependent on social benefits as the main source for their household income (defined as excluding pensions, to reduce contaminating with the age effects).*" This lends support for the argument that people who are in an economically insecure situation due to objective parameters could also be satisfied with their situation and therefore not that open to populist right-wing parties' rhetoric, which underlines the possible importance of subjective economic insecurity in predicting populist right-wing voting.

2. Subjective economic insecurity of individuals

Although Western et al. (2012: 341) define economic insecurity overall as "*the risk of economic loss faced by workers and households as they encounter the unpredictable events of social life*," subjective economic insecurity refers more to how workers or households would feel, and therefore this definition gives a good idea of the meaning of subjective economic insecurity. As Mau et al. (2012) put it, subjective insecurity relies on specific subjective expectations and mentalities that have been shaped over time and are adapted from the objective parameters of security. Hence, "*these perceptions of insecurity are by no means mere unique states of mind*" (Mau et al., 2012: 655). Inglehart and Norris (2016: 12) have described subjective economic insecurity by stating that "*populist support should also be predicted by subjective feelings of economic insecurity, such as among those reporting difficulties in making ends meet.*"

In this regard, it has to be added that PRWP are indeed the ones who try to talk people into believing that they are in a bad situation. As stated above, PRWP leaders will often frame voters' vision of social reality creatively, so that their perception of socio-structural conditions no longer match objective and real socio-structural conditions (Mols & Jetten, 2016: 289f). This could lead to a situation that, in terms of opinion formation or vote choice, it might "*not be the objective economic situation that matters most but the way that the economic situation is appraised and interpreted*" by individuals (2016: 289). Moreover, the success of PRWP in countries where the economy is doing well supports the argument that in order to understand PRWP support, both the supply and demand sides need to be taken into account when analyzing the success of these parties (Koopmans, 1996; Rydgren, 2005; see Mols & Jetten, 2016: 289). Since subjective economic

insecurity takes into account what people feel about their situation rather than how their situation looks like, it is postulated that subjective economic insecurity serves as a better predictor of populist right-wing voting than the objective situation of individuals (objective economic insecurity).

H1: Subjective economic insecurity predicts populist right-wing voting better than objective economic insecurity.

As explained in the introduction, the connection between subjective economic insecurity, economic anti-immigration sentiments and populist right-wing voting will be investigated. For this purpose, the importance of anti-immigration sentiments in predicting PRWV also needs to be elaborated, which will be done in a twofold manner in the next section. For this analysis, a distinction between anti-immigration sentiments resulting from cultural and economic threats is essential, because Esses et al.'s model of group conflict involves only economic threats, as will be described in the last part of the theoretical section.

B. Anti-immigration sentiments

Anti-immigration attitudes are by far the most commonly agreed factors that seem to predict populist right-wing voting, since negative sentiments towards immigrants "*have a stronger effect on preferences for anti-immigrant parties than on preference for other parties*" (van der Brug et al., 2000: 77; see also e.g. Betz, 1994; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Inglehart & Norris, 2016). However, an important distinction should be made regarding the reason why people are afraid of immigrants and therefore develop anti-immigrant sentiments that can then eventually lead to populist right-wing voting. As argued in the literature, anti-immigration sentiments can have their origin in the perception of economic and cultural threats from immigrants (e.g. Lubbers & Güveli, 2007; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Still, the experience of threats from immigrants is often used in a unidimensional way, not distinguishing between cultural and economic threats. Norris, for example, regards economic and cultural threats from immigrants as one factor, labeling them together as "*negative attitudes towards immigrants and multiculturalism*" (e.g. Norris, 2005: 177, see Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012: 5). In a similar vein, Kriesi et al. (2008: 8) assume that "*individuals do not perceive cultural and material threats as distinct phenomena*." They base their

reasoning on Martin Kohli (2000: 118), who has argued that identity and interest equally reinforce social integration.

Although cultural competition of course accompanies and exacerbates economic competition (Kriesi et al., 2008: 7), it is still important to see how they differ from each other when explaining a vote choice for a populist right-wing party and therefore to use them in a multidimensional manner (Sniderman et al., 2004; Lubbers & Güveli, 2007; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Particularly, research has demonstrated that economic and cultural threats autonomously influence prejudice (Sniderman et al., 2004, see Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012: 548). Poletti and Regalia (2014: 6) have condensed the two main approaches in the literature thus far: "*citizens' fear of immigrants is originated by the fact that they are either 'taking their job' or 'taking their country'.*" Following the already developed categorization, anti-immigration sentiments can therefore have their origins in economic threats on the one hand, or in cultural threats on the other hand. Respectively, populist right-wing parties hold anti-immigration sentiments on both issues (e.g. O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; see Poletti & Regalia, 2014: 6).

1. Economic threats

As populist right-wing parties typically blame immigrants for the bad economic situation of a country or of nationals, economic anti-immigration sentiments play an important role in predicting populist right-wing voting. According to Guiberna (2010: 5), the success of populist right-wing parties can be explained by the perception of nationals, "*that immigrants come to their countries to 'steal' their jobs as well as the view, substantiated or not, that asylum seekers and refugees receive greater social benefits than nationals.*" Especially nationals who feel that they are in some kind of competition with immigrants are prone to vote for populist right-wing parties (Lubbers, 2002). Studies have indicated that particularly low-skilled or manual workers fear the economic consequences of the perceived competition for jobs with immigrants (e.g. Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Sides & Citrin, 2007; see Poletti & Regalia, 2014: 6). In times of refugee waves coming to Europe as well as strict austerity measures in some countries, groups are prone to "*seek strong, authoritarian leaders to protect them from what are perceived as dangerous outsiders seen as threatening jobs and benefits*" (see also Inglehart, 2016: 11). Populist right-wing parties seem to take on that role eagerly, since their rhetoric about scapegoating immigrants for the bad, or sometimes only "allegedly bad", economic situation of individuals and countries and their promises

to protect nationals is nowadays all over Europe (e.g. Ignazi, 1992; Jaegers & Walgrave, 2007; Eger & Valdez, 2015). As these parties push the view of immigrants being responsible for the (perceived) economic struggles that nationals face, the following is assumed:

H2a: People with economic anti-immigration sentiments are more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than people with positive economic sentiments towards immigrants.

2. Cultural threats

As other studies have demonstrated, fear of immigration is not only created by economic issues such as labor-market competition, but also by differences in ideologies, beliefs and national attachment between "natives" and "newcomers" (Tajfel, 1982; Poletti & Regalia, 2010: 6). Therefore, events such as the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks in European countries are supplying populist right-wing parties with material to promote negative attitudes towards immigrants. Indeed, they consider the rising number of Muslims in Europe as a threat to Western or even Christian values, traditions and national identity (Guibernau, 2010: 10).

Betz has criticized the failure of governing parties to control the number of refugees and to protect national identity through effective policies. He has argued that it is not surprising "*that the emergence and rise of radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe coincided with the growing tide of immigrants and particularly the dramatic increase in the number of refugees seeking peace, security, and a better life in the affluent societies of Western Europe. The reaction to the new arrivals was an outburst of xenophobia and open racism in a majority of West European countries.* [...] *This has made it relatively easy for the radical populist Right to evoke, focus, and reinforce preexisting xenophobic sentiments for political gain*" (1994: 81; see also Inglehart & Norris, 2016: 15).

As also indicated by other scholars mentioned at the beginning, Coffé has proposed that the actual presence or number of foreigners in a country might not be that important. Her study, focusing on the populist right-wing party Vlaams Blok in Belgium, suggested that it is rather the fear of the foreign lifestyle, in the Belgian case especially the "*Islamic way of living*", pushed by populist right-wing parties that leads to voting for these parties (Coeffé, 2009: 153). Therefore, regardless of what leads to the development of cultural anti-immigration sentiments, as populist

right-wing parties are the ones framing immigrants as a cultural threat to Western societies (e.g. Betz, 1994; Coeffé, 2009; Guibernau, 2010; Inglehart & Norris, 2016), the next hypothesis is as follows:

> **H2b: People with cultural anti-immigration sentiments are more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than people with positive cultural sentiments towards immigrants.**

Now that the distinction between economic and cultural anti-immigration sentiments has been described, the next section deals with the theory of intergroup conflict, which provides the theoretical basis for the link between subjective economic insecurity and economic anti-immigration sentiments as a predictor of populist right-wing voting. It will be argued that it is not economic insecurity as such that leads to voting for a populist right-wing party, but rather that economic insecurity leads to economic anti-immigration sentiments and these in turn lead to voting for a populist right-wing party.

C. Intergroup conflict

As discussed above, it is hypothesized that subjective economic security and anti-immigration sentiments predict populist right-wing voting, but the social profile might be more complex than it seems at first sight (see also Norris, 2005). According to Poletti and Regalia (2014), anti-immigration sentiments are developed through a perception of immigration as a threat to the material and economic world or the national and cultural identity world. This perception of threat has its roots in the framing and politicization of immigration discourse at the national level. What is important to mention is that the perception of immigrants as a threat seems to be a much stronger indicator of anti-immigration sentiments than the real conditions of a country, for example the outcome of the eurozone financial crisis (Poletti & Regalia, 2014) or the number of immigrants in a country (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Therefore, concerning economic aspects, presuming that, first, economic threats can lead to economic anti-immigration sentiments and, second, economic anti-immigration attitudes can lead to PRWV, there could to be a bigger picture of the relationship between subjective economic insecurity, economic anti-immigration sentiments and voting for a populist right-wing party.

Esses et al. (1998: 708) investigated whether perceptions that jobs are rare and that immigrants can successfully compete for these jobs influence attitudes towards immigrants and people's willingness to help immigrants. They constructed a model of group conflict (1998: 702) which suggests that "***the combination of resource stress and the salience of a potentially competitive outgroup leads to perceived group competition for resources. In turn, this perceived competition leads to attempts to remove the source of competition****, using a variety of strategies.* [...] *The resources involved may include economic resources, such as money and jobs, as well as power, which is in practice closely aligned with economic resources*" (for a detailed model, see Figure 1 below). In their paper, Esses et al. **found a causal relation between group competition and negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration** (1998: 707ff).



Fig. 1. An instrumental model of group conflict.

Figure 1: Model of group conflict (Esses et al., 1998: 703)

Esses et al. built their model on the framework of realistic group conflict theory, a theory of intergroup relations which assumes that as the competition for resources between groups increases, intergroup threat and conflict increase. Another proposal of realistic group conflict theory is that the hostility towards the source of the threat depends on the extent of the intergroup threat and conflict. The greater the conflict and threat between the groups, the greater is the hostility expressed towards the opposing group, which serves as an excuse for the bad treatment of outgroup members (LeVine & Campbell, 1972; see Esses et al., 1998: 701).

Realistic group conflict theory places the main emphasis on threats to substantial resources and the assumption that the source of the threat will be treated with hostility (Esses et al., 1998: 701f). To better distinguish this theory from other theories of intergroup relations, the above authors mentioned similar concepts and remarked that the processes of these related theories are not incompatible, but should rather be considered as possible complementary means for the

determination of intergroup relations. For example, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that a person's self-concept depends on the group to which he or she belongs. As individuals seek positive self-concepts, it is proposed that the perceived belonging to one group (labeled as the "ingroup") and not to other group/s (the "outgroup") leads to positive attitudes towards the ingroup and negative attitudes towards the outgroup/s. This results in the enrichment of the group's own self-image. In essence, concerning the source of conflict, the theory suggests that positive group identity is at risk and it does not broach the issue of scarce resources (Esses et al., 1998: 702). Another example is the scapegoat theory of prejudice (Zawadzki, 1948), which proposes that when hostility is aroused in times of frustration and deprivation, and the source of the hostility is not present, not identifiable or too powerful, the hostility is redirected to a weak outgroup – a minority group would be the safest scapegoat, as its members cannot retaliate (Esses et al., 1994: 78). Moreover, negative stereotyping of the outgroup serves as a justification and prejudice is understood as the consequence of the "*hostile drive*" (Esses et al., 1994: 78). The difference is that in this theory the hostility is displaced onto the outgroup, rather than the source of the threat (Esses et al., 1998: 702).

Although Esses et al. (1998: 719) suggested that people are more likely to have negative attitudes towards immigrants when their country's economy is suffering and their country struggles with a high unemployment rate, they also stated that their theory does not require the existence of actual competition over resources, but "*rather it is the **perception** of competition that leads to conflict and intergroup hostility,*" (1998: 701), which was also emphasized in previous sections of this thesis.

Looking at young adults in Europe, Mierna et al. (2015: 194) found support for Esses et al.'s instrumental model of group conflict. They stated that unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants are more widespread among youth in less advantageous socio-economic situations, for example those **whose families struggle financially** or whose parents are not part of the highest social class. Although they included a measure of subjective economic insecurity, the model only goes so far as to predict negative attitudes towards immigrants. The current research wants to test an adaptation of the model one step further, by investigating whether the model not only predicts support for far-right ideology and anti-migrant attitudes among youth in Europe, but also predicts populist right-wing voting among Europeans.

To build an argument, it is important to note that subjective socio-economic insecurity can likely contribute to resource stress and fuel group competition (Mau et al., 2012; Mierna et al.,

2015: 198). This confirms the assumption that subjective economic insecurity, which is the perceived subjective view of one's own economic situation, might be more important than objective factors of economic insecurity or the economic situation of a country in leading to group conflict or anti-immigration attitudes as discussed in the previous section. By taking as a starting point Esses et al.'s theory that perceived group competition (over resources) leads to anti-immigration attitudes, as well as the fact that anti-immigration sentiments are widely accepted to predict PRWV, the following hypothesis is proposed:

> **H3: Subjective economic insecurity of individuals predicts voting for populist right-wing parties; however, this effect is mediated by economic anti-immigration sentiments.**

"Mediated" is a term used in mediation analysis, and basically means what was stated above, as it helps to describe how an effect comes about. In a nutshell, mediation analysis seeks to provide insight into the underlying relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable by way of including a third "mediator" variable in the analysis. The model suggests that the independent variable affects the mediator variable, which in turn affects the outcome variable. Hence, the mediator variable helps to clarify the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (McKinnon, 2008).

This assumption combines the instrumental model of group conflict with theories on how economic factors and anti-immigration attitudes can lead to PRWV. An essential aspect of this model is the assumption that subjective economic insecurity might not automatically lead to PRWV. Rather, subjective economic insecurity first leads to the development of economic anti-immigration sentiments. Subsequently, these economic anti-immigration sentiments lead to voting for a populist right-wing party. Put even more simply, this means that subjective economic insecurity, as a part of socio-economic insecurity, can likely contribute to resource stress and fuel group competition. Due to this group competition, subjective economic insecurity can lead to anti-immigration sentiments. In turn, these anti-immigration sentiments can lead to attempts by

individuals to remove the source of competition (immigrants). Therefore people who feel economically insecure end up voting for a populist right-wing party (see Figure 2).[3]

Figure 2: Illustration of the mediated effect

Following this analysis, a more accurate understanding of the process of making a populist right-wing vote choice can be achieved. To be precise, the analysis can demonstrate whether people's insecurity regarding their economic situation makes them more likely to develop economic anti-immigration sentiments and therefore choose to vote for populist right-wing parties. **This would mean that economic insecurity alone does not necessarily lead to PRWV. Rather, it indicates that economic insecurity makes people receptive to anti-immigrant messages from populist right-wing parties and leads them to develop economic anti-immigration sentiments.** As a result, and to overcome the (sometimes only perceived) competition with immigrants for jobs and social benefits, these people end up voting for a populist right-wing party.

[3] Note: There will not be a distinct variable for resource stress. Rather, as briefly addressed above, subjective economic insecurity is sought to contribute to resource stress and fuel group competition (Mau *et al.* 2012, Mierna *et al.* 2015: 198).

IV. Data and method

A. Operationalization to identify populist right-wing parties

Before beginning the operationalization of the hypotheses, the populist right-wing parties to whom the above definition (see section II) applies need to be classified in order to identify their voters in the next step. Having determined a definition, all parties in Europe to whom this definition applies have to be identified to identify their voters. There are some data sets that could be useful for this classification, for example the Manifest Project 2016[4] and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2014 (Bakker et al., 2015; CHES, 2014), as they both contain party positions on a variety of issues. However, the Manifesto Project does not contain any measurement for anti-establishment or anti-elite rhetoric, whereas the CHES does include a measurement for "*salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric*," which can be used to identify populist attitudes in the observed parties. The CHES was therefore chosen to identify populist right-wing parties in Europe. This survey contains data on the positioning of 268 political parties in respect of political ideology, European integration, and policy positions in 31 countries, including all EU member states as well as parties in Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. The data file used contains average expert judgments per political party.

Family ID	Family	Dummies for Party Families
1	Radical Right	**RADRT**
2	Conservatives	**CON**
3	Liberal	**LIB**
4	Christian-Democratic	**CD**
5	Socialist	**SOC**
6	Radical Left	**RADLEFT**
7	Green	**GREEN**
8	Regionalist	**REG**
9	No family	**NOFAMILY**
10	Confessional	**CONFESS**
11	Agrarian/Center	**AGRARIAN/CENTER**

Figure 3: CHES Trend File 1999-2014 for party families (2016: 15)[5]

Although the CHES contains a party family variable that includes radical right-wing parties ("RADRT Family", see Figure 3 above) in its 1999-2014 trend file, the identification of PRWP is

[4] https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/, last accessed 11/13/2018.
[5] See https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5975c9bfdb29d6a05c65209b/t/599d0c06bebafbcd8c66edfa/1503464455314/1999-2014_CHES_codebook.pdf, last accessed 11/13/2018.

somewhat different and therefore the CHES party-family variable is not a good fit for this research study's goals for two reasons. First, populist parties are not classified in the CHES, and although for example radical right-wing parties can be regarded as similar to populist parties, they are still different in terms of their definition. That it is not a good fit is even clearer in the second point, which is that just by looking at some parties to whom the criteria would apply, for example a high anti-elite measurement, they are not classified as populist right-wing parties (or in this case as radical right parties). For example, the Portuguese MPT (the Earth Party Movement) is classified as a "green" party. Also, the Austrian Party Team Stronach does not belong to any party family (see Table 1 below).

Table 1: CHES Trend File 1999-2004, party examples

Country	***Party***	***Year***	***Anti-elite_salience***	***Family***
Portugal	MPT	2014	8	green
Austria	Team Stronach	2014	7.90	no family

Although it is not argued that these parties cannot be regarded as, for example, belonging to the green party family, since they clearly demonstrate attributes for those party families, for the current study goals it makes more sense to classify them as populist parties, which is why the original CHES classification of party families cannot be used. Moreover, the CHES only coded six parties in the countries of interest in 2014 as radical right-wing parties and in its codebook, advised users to review family coding to ensure they match their research goals.

Therefore, a new identification method will be used as follows. To detect the parties of interest in the CHES data set, certain CHES measures were applied that fit the populist right definition above (see Table 2).

Table 2: PRWP-definition with CHES-variables

PRWP-Definition	**CHES-Definition of variable**	**Variable name (CHES)**	**Variable range**	**Used ranges[6]**

[6] The used ranges do not follow a specific theory but rather take into account the above definition. For example, to obtain all the parties where anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric is important, the variable range 5.1-10 is used. 5.1 is used instead of 5 because it is more a neutral choice in the middle of the range, whereas everything higher than 5 (starting with 5.1) is considered to be in the right spectrum.

populist rhetoric and anti-establishment[7]	Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric	antielite_salience	0 = Not important at all : 10 = Extremely important	5.1-10
anti-immigration	Position on immigration policy	immigrate_policy	0 = Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration : 10 = Fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration	5.1-10
Multiculturalism (anti-immigrants)	Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation)	multiculturalism	0 = Strongly favors multiculturalism : 10 = Strongly favors assimilation	5.1-10
anti-EU	Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in 2014	eu_position	1 = Strongly opposed 2 = Opposed 3 = Somewhat opposed 4 = Neutral 5 = Somewhat in favor 6 = In favor 7 = Strongly in favor	<4
pro nationalism	Position towards nationalism	nationalism	0 = Strongly promotes cosmopolitan rather than nationalist conceptions of society : 10 = Strongly promotes nationalist rather than cosmopolitan conceptions of society	5.1-10
right side of the political left-right spectrum	Position of the party's overall ideology in 2014	lrgen	0 = Extreme left : 5 = Center : 10 = Extreme right	5.1-10

[7] This measure does not specifically include a measure of parties' references to "the people", however, some authors suggest abandoning "the people" as the core of populism because of the term's inherent vagueness and substituting it with other concepts, such as "the heartland" (Taggart, 2004; see Reinemann *et al*., 2016).

Applying these measures lead to a classification of 27 parties in 16 European countries as populist right wing parties in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014 data set:

Table 3: Identified populist right wing parties with relevant CHES values

Country	Party[8]	Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric	immigration policy	Multiculturalism vs. assimilation	EU integration	overall ideology (left/right)	nationalism
Austria	FPO	8	9.888	9.899	1.9	8.699	9.399
Austria	BZO	6.888	8.666	8.555	2.7	7.800	8.300
Austria	Team Stronach	7.900	7.333	7.625	2.900	7.599	6.75
Belgium	VB	9	9.600	9.600	2.599	9.199	10
Belgium	PP	6.5	8.5	9	2.5	7.75	10
Czech Republic	USVIT	9.461	9.399	9.666	2.266	7.692	9.230
Czech Republic	SVOBODNI	7	7.625	7.727	1.333	8.714	7.666
Denmark	DF	6.900	9.699	9.5	1.909	6.900	9.111
Finland	PS	9.125	9	9.375	1.6	5.111	9.25
France	FN	9.545	9.800	9.727	1.214	9.636	8.818
France	MPF	7.333	9.555	9.399	1.230	9.100	8.5
Germany	NPD	9.111	9	10	1.666	10	9.888
Germany	AfD	7.777	9.300	9.222	1.615	8.923	8.699
Hungary	JOBBIK	9.071	9.333	9.538	1.214	9.714	9.692
Lithuania	TT	7.5	6.454	7.5	3.2	6.615	7.75
Lithuania	DK	9.416	5.25	7.400	3.111	6.875	8.25
Netherlands	PVV	9.428	9.875	9.777	1.090	9.25	9.75
Norway	FrP	6.666	9	8.666	3.5	8.25	8
Poland	PiS	7.470	6.199	8	3.823	7.941	8.176
Poland	KNP	9.470	8.399	10	1.058	9.529	8.588
Poland	SP	7.75	7.444	9	3	8.294	8.625
Portugal	MPT	8	7	7.5	3.400	6.75	6.666
Sweden	SD	8.894	9.777	9.842	1.272	7.761	9.777
Switzerland	SVP/UDC	8.375	8.625	9.5	1	8.25	8.625
Switzerland	EDU/UDF	6.25	7.625	8.75	1.625	8.5	7.875
Switzerland	LdT	7	8.375	8.625	1.5	7.5	7.75
United Kingdom	UKIP	9.285	10	9.800	1.142	9.142	9.833

[8] Party names can be found in Appendix, A.

B. Operationalization of hypotheses

In the following section, the data and variables for the analysis of the above hypotheses will be identified and explained.

1. Data

European Social Survey – Round 7 (2014)

To test the above hypotheses, data from the European Social Survey – Round 7 (2014) were used. According to the European Social Survey (ESS) data documentation (2016), the ESS is an academically-driven multi-country survey, whose last round (7) covered 22 countries.

> "*The survey involves strict random probability sampling, a minimum target response rate of 70% and rigorous translation protocols. The hour-long face-to-face interview includes questions on a variety of core topics repeated from previous rounds of the survey and also two modules developed for Round 7 covering Social Inequalities in Health and their Determinants and Attitudes towards Immigration and their Antecedents*" (European Social Survey data documentation, 2016: 6).

In the ESS data set, there are a total number of 94.945 observations. However, this research study only uses the countries where at least one right-wing populist party has been identified (see below); the units of observation are individuals from specific countries.

2. Variables / Measurements

- ***dependent variable:*** **vote for a populist right-wing party**

The dependent variable is a dummy variable named *populist* with two outcomes: people who voted for a populist right-wing party in their country's last national election (1), and people who voted for other parties (0). For the creation of the populist variable, I used the country-specific variable that gives information about which party individuals voted for in their country's last national election.[9] Basically, I filtered the parties that were identified above from the CHES in the ESS data set individually for each country, using the country-specific vote choice variable (see Table 4 below). Applying the filters, I created a dummy variable with the two already mentioned outcomes. Values such as "Not applicable (66)", "Refusal (77)", "Don't know (88)", and "No answer (99)"

[9] According to ESS, a "country's last national election" refers to the last election of a country's primary legislative assembly.

were coded as missing values. This led to a total of 24 parties in 15 countries, including 28.768 observations. Still, three parties are not included in the ESS: for the Czech Republic the Party of Free Citizens ("*Strana svobodných občanů*", Svobodni), for Portugal the Earth Party ("*Movimento Partido da Terra*", MPT), and for Poland the party United Poland ("*Solidarna Polska*", SP). It makes sense that the latter was not included in the ESS data set, since United Poland was only founded in 2012 and therefore could not participate in the 2011 Polish election used in the ESS 2014.[10] Concerning MPT and Svobodni, a possible explanation why these parties were not included in the ESS might be that they did not earn a significant number of votes in the last election used in the ESS 2014. Svobodni won only 2.47% in the 2013 Czech election and MPT garnered only 0.41% in the 2011 Portuguese election.[11] Nevertheless, all the other identified right-wing populist parties of the CHES are part of the present ESS survey.

Table 4: Populist right wing parties in ESS[12]

Country	Parties and their values in ESS
1. Austria	Freedom Party of Austria 'Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ' (3), Alliance for the Future of Austria 'Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ' (4), Team Stronach (9)
2. Belgium	Flemish Interest 'Vlaams Belang, VB' (7), People's Party 'Parti Populaire, PP' (15)
3. Czech Republic	Dawn - National Coalition 'Úsvit' (7)
4. Denmark	Danish people's party 'Dansk Folkeparti, DPP' (5)
5. Finland	True Finns 'Perussuomalaiset, PS' (4)
6. France	National Front 'National Front, FN' (2), Movement for France 'Mouvement pour la France, MPF' (8)
7. Germany[13]	Alternative for Germany 'Alternative für Deutschland, AfD' (6), National Democratic Party of Germany 'Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD' (8)
8. Hungary	Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary 'Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Jobbik' (2)
9. Lithuania	The Way of Courage 'Drąsos kelias, DK' (6), Order and Justice 'Tvarka ir teisingumas, TT' (9)
10. Netherlands	Party for Freedom 'Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV' (3)
11. Norway	Progress Party 'Fremskrittspartiet, FRP' (8)
12. Poland	Congress of the New Right 'Nowa Prawica, KNP' (1), Law and Justice 'Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS' (6)
13. Sweden	Sweden Democrats 'Sverigedemokraterna, SD' (10)

[10] http://www.solidarna.org/, last accessed 11/13/2018.
[11] https://volby.cz/pls/ps2013/ps and http://eleicoes.cne.pt/raster/index.cfm?dia=05&mes=06&ano=2011&eleicao=ar, last accessed 11/13/2018.
[12] Although Estonia, Ireland, Slovenia and Spain are included in ESS 2014, there were no parties in these countries that were classified as populist right-wing parties in the CHES data set 2014. Therefore, these countries are not included in the analysis.
[13] For Germany and Lithuania the second vote in the election was used, since it is the crucial one.

14. Switzerland	Swiss People's Party 'Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP' (1), Federal Democratic Union 'Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union, EDU' (9), Ticino League (10)
15. United Kingdom	UK Independence Party 'UKIP' (7)

- ***independent variables***

For a better overview, the original coding from the ESS of all used variables is presented in a table in Appendix B, Table 14. Furthermore, to make the interpretation of the regression results in the analysis easier, certain variables were also recoded, as sometimes mentioned in the detail below.[14]

- **subjective economic insecurity**

To measure subjective economic insecurity, I used the question "Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?", with the response options *Living comfortably on present income* (1), *Coping on present income* (2), *Finding it difficult on present income* (3), and *Finding it very difficult on present income* (4).[15] In the discussion, people who chose answers 3 and 4 will be regarded as feeling economically insecure and people who chose answers 1 and 2 will be regarded as feeling economically secure.

- **objective economic insecurity**

To measure objective economic insecurity, three separate questions were used. First, respondents were asked if they had ever been unemployed for more than three months; the original answers *Yes* (1) and *No* (2) were recoded in *No* (0) and *Yes* (1). Second, respondents were asked what their main source of household income was; the response options included *Wages or salaries* (1), *Income from self-employment, excluding farming* (2), *Income from farming* (3), *Pensions* (4), *Unemployment/redundancy benefit* (5), *Any other social benefits or grants* (6), *Income from investments, savings, etc.* (7), and *Income from other sources* (8). These were recoded in the values *Other* (0) and *Unemployment/redundancy benefit, any other social benefits or grants* (1). Finally, respondents were asked about their household's total net income from all sources, with the original answers ranging from the country-specific 1st decile to the 10th decile. Here, for a more appropriate interpretation, a new variable *hinctnta3* based on the original variable was created, consisting of

[14] Concerning all variables, values like *Refusal*, *Don't know*, *No answer*, and *Other* were coded as missing values.
[15] Inglehart and Norris (2016: 26) use the same variable to measure subjective economic insecurity.

only three categories instead of the original ten, indicating whether the household income is within the 1st decile to the 3rd decile (1= low), the 4th decile to the 6th decile (2 = medium), or the 7th decile to the 10th decile (3 = high).

- **immigration**

Since the ESS data set includes many different variables measuring attitudes towards immigration, I decided to create two new variables, one measuring economic view about immigration and one measuring cultural view.

- **economic view on immigration**

Since in this context the relationship between economic insecurity and the economic view of immigration is relevant, I only took those questions from the survey that measure economic view of immigration and created a summed index variable, divided by the number of used variables (in this case three). The measurement includes respondents' opinions on whether immigration is bad or good for the country's economy (ranging from 0 Bad for the economy to 10 Good for the economy), whether immigrants take jobs away or create new jobs in the country (0 Take jobs away to 10 Create new jobs), and whether immigrants take out more of taxes and services than they put in or not (0 Generally take out more to 10 Generally put in more). Finally, the values 0 to 10 were recoded into a range from 1 to 5 and reversed, with 1 representing a pro-immigration position and 5 representing an anti-immigration position. The new value 1 consists of the old values 8, 9 and 10; the new value 2 consists of the old values 6 and 7; the new value 3 consists of the old value 5; the new value 4 consists of the old values 3 and 4; and the new value 1 consists of the old values 0, 1 and 2. The aim of this inversion and recoding was to enable easier interpretation. Last but not least, Cronbach's alpha of the three used variables is reported as 0.77, which indicates that the creation of the index variable is acceptable.

- **cultural view on immigration**

For cultural view of immigration, similar to above, I also only used the questions that measure cultural view of immigration and created a summed index variable, divided by the number of used variables (in this case three). The measurement includes respondents' opinions on whether the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants (ranging from 0 Cultural life undermined to 10 Cultural life enriched), whether immigrants make the country a worse or better

place to live (0 Worse place to live to 10 Better place to live), and whether the individuals would mind someone of a different race or ethnic group majority to be their boss (0 Not mind at all to 10 Mind a lot). Before creating the index variable, the last-mentioned item had to be recoded the other way around to match the outcomes of the other two variables, so that the variable range starts with negative sentiments towards immigrants (0) and ends with positive sentiments (10). It was thus recoded with a range from 0 Mind a lot to 10 Not mind at all. After the index variable was then created, similar to the above, the values 0 to 10 were recoded into a range from 1 to 5 and reversed, with 1 representing a pro-immigration position and 5 representing a anti-immigration position. Likewise, Cronbach's alpha of the three used variables was reported as 0.72, which indicates that the index variable is in this case also acceptable.

- ***controls***

As for socio-demographic controls, I will control for gender and education, since men and people with lower education are supposed to be more likely to support populist right-wing parties (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer, 2009; Mierna et al., 2015). Moreover, as young people and people that are 65 and older, on average, are supposed to be more likely to support populist right-wing parties (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009; Mierna et al., 2015), I will control for age.[16] Similar to Inglehart and Norris (2016), I will also include a control for people belonging to an ethnic minority, because they are supposed to be less likely to vote for populist right-wing parties since these parties often stir up hatred against them.

The rise of populist ring-wing parties is supposed to be partly due to political alienation, as Guibernau (2010) has put it, for example people having less trust in politicians, and dissatisfaction with governments and democracy. The distrust in political elites seems to arise for the most part from political corruption scandals, which play into the hands of populist right-wing parties (Della Porta & Mény, 1997). These parties are eager to create a separation in the public's view between the corrupt politicians of the elite and themselves. In addition, some voters seek to express their disillusionment with politics by voting for populist right-wing parties, although they do not necessarily agree with their policies (Kitschelt, 1995; Rydgren, 2005; see Ivarsflaten, 2008: 8f). Hence, I will include measurements for these factors as controls.

[16] Whether young or old people are a better predictor of populist right-wing voting is not of interest in this thesis. Therefore, these age groups are not recoded as dummies (for details on coding, see below).

Lastly, people with a negative view about European integration tend to be more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties. It has been found that links between PRWP and their electorate seem to be stronger if they hold a more negative position on European integration (Gómez-Reino & Llamazares, 2013). It is suggested that these anti-European immigration stances of PRWP supporters are partly due to citizens' fear of the weakening of the nation-state (Held, 1999; Guibernau, 2010), the threat of cultural diversity, and greater competition due to growing labor mobility (Guibernau, 2010). Therefore, I will also control for people's opinions about European integration.

As before, variables were recoded with the aim of easier interpretation of the results of the subsequent analysis (for more details on the variables see Table 14).

- **gender**

Answers to the question asking for the gender of respondents with the response options Male (1) and Female (2) were recoded as Female (0) and Male (1).

- **Level of education**

Concerning the level of education, the question reports the highest level of education respondents successfully completed. For the response options ISCED 1997-coding (ISCED = International Standard Classification of Education) was used. ISCED classifies education systems and forms around the world.[17] The variable was recoded and now comprises five values, with 1 representing low education and 5 high education. The values 000 (Not completed ISCED level 1), 113 (ISCED 1, completed primary education) and 129 (Vocational ISCED 2C < 2 years, no access ISCED 3) were recoded into the value 1; the values 212 (General/pre-vocational ISCED 2A/2B, access ISCED 3 vocational), 213 (General ISCED 2A, access ISCED 3A general/all 3), 221 (Vocational ISCED 2C >= 2 years, no access ISCED 3), 222 (Vocational ISCED 2A/2B, access ISCED 3 vocational), 223 (Vocational ISCED 2, access ISCED 3 general/all) and 229 (Vocational ISCED 3C < 2 years, no access ISCED 5) were recoded into the value 2; the values 311 (General ISCED 3 >=2 years, no access ISCED 5), 312 (312 General ISCED 3A/3B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A), 313 (General ISCED 3A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5), 321 (Vocational ISCED 3C >= 2 years, no access ISCED 5), 322 (Vocational ISCED 3A, access ISCED 5B/ lower tier 5A) and

[17] For more information on ISCED 1997 coding see http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/doc/isced_1997.htm, last accessed 11/13/2018.

323 (Vocational ISCED 3A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5) were recoded into the value 3; the values 412 (General ISCED 4A/4B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A), 413 (General ISCED 4A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5), 421 (ISCED 4 programs without access ISCED 5), 422 (Vocational ISCED 4A/4B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A) and 423 (Vocational ISCED 4A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5) were recoded into the value 4; and the values 510 (ISCED 5A short, intermediate/academic/general tertiary below bachelor), 520 (ISCED 5B short, advanced vocational qualifications), 610 (ISCED 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from lower tier tertiary), 620 (ISCED 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from upper/single tier tertiary), 710 (ISCED 5A long, master/equivalent from lower tier tertiary), 720 (ISCED 5A long, master/equivalent from upper/single tier tertiary) and 800 (ISCED 6 doctoral degree) were recoded into the value 5.

- **Age group**

Concerning the question asking for respondents' birth year, their ages were calculated by the ESS; the oldest respondent was reported as 114 years old. A new variable *agegroup* was created based on the original age variable. It consists of seven age categories: 14-18 years old (1), 19-24 years old (2), 25-34 years old (3), 35-44 years old (4), 45-54 years old (5), 55-64 years old (6), and 65 years or older (7).

- **Belonging to a minority ethnic group**

The question "Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in your country?", with the original response options Yes (1) and No (2), was recoded as Yes (0) and No (1).

- **Trust in politicians and political parties**

To capture trust in politicians and political parties, I created a summed index variable, divided by the number of used variables (in this case two). The measurement includes opinions on whether people have trust in politicians and whether people have trust in political parties, both with an original value range from 0 No trust at all to 10 Complete trust. To enable easier interpretation, these values were recoded into a range from 1 to 5 and reversed, with 1 representing Complete trust and 5 No trust at all. The new value 1 consists of the old values 8, 9 and 10; the new value 2 consists of the old values 6 and 7; the new value 3 consists of the old value 5; the new value 4 consists of the old values 3 and 4; and the new value 5 consists of the old values 0, 1 and 2. Cronbach's alpha

of the two used variables is reported as 0.92, which indicates that the creation of the index variable is fitting the overall underlying concept.

- **Satisfaction with the national government**

To measure respondents' satisfaction with their country's national government, the question "Now thinking about your country's government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?" will be used. The possible responses initially had a range from 0 Extremely dissatisfied to 10 Extremely satisfied. The values were again recoded and reversed, with a new range from 1 Extremely satisfied to 5 Extremely dissatisfied. The new value 1 consists of the old values 8, 9 and 10; the new value 2 consists of the old values 6 and 7; the new value 3 consists of the old value 5; the new value 4 consists of the old values 3 and 4; and the new value 5 consists of the old values 0, 1 and 2.

- **European unification should go further or has gone too far**

To measure respondents' opinions about European unification, the question asking whether it has gone too far or should go further will be used. The responses had an original range between 0 Unification has already gone too far and 10 Unification should go further. As before, these values were recoded to a range from 1 to 5 and reversed, with 1 representing Unification should go further and 5 Unification has already gone too far. The new value 1 consists of the old values 8, 9 and 10; the new value 2 consists of the old values 6 and 7; the new value 3 consists of the old value 5; the new value 4 consists of the old values 3 and 4; and the new value 5 consists of the old values 0, 1 and 2.

- ***weights***

As explained under "Weighting European Social Survey Data" in the ESS,[18] "*analysis that is based on combining data from countries should use the design/post-stratification weights in combination with population size weights.*" Since there are certain advantages to post-stratification weights over design weights,[19] for example reduction of the sampling error and existing non-response bias, I will

[18] https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf, last accessed 11/13/2018.
[19] For further information see source above, p1f.

create a new weight by multiplying the post-stratification weight *pspwght* with the population size weight *pweight*.

C. Analysis

The descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent variables will be followed by the creation of a weighted summary statistics table. To obtain a picture of the distribution of the independent variables, bar charts will be generated. Concerning the main variables (vote for a populist right-wing party, subjective economic insecurity, and economic view about immigration), bar charts will be created indicating the distribution in each of the 15 countries to see whether there are any main outliers.

The main analysis will be conducted separately for each of the three hypotheses; the unit of analysis comprises individuals from specific countries. For the analysis, only the observations from individuals who voted in the last national parliamentary election of each country will be used. In general, to investigate the hypotheses, first the relationship between the independent and dependent variables will be explored. To that end, weighted bar charts will be plotted and described. Second, all the hypotheses will be tested using regression analyses, to get an even clearer picture of the relationship. Finally, tests for statistical significance and goodness of fit will be calculated, depending on the type of regression.

1. Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 aims to clarify whether subjective economic insecurity or objective economic insecurity is a better predictor of populist right-wing voting. The examination of hypothesis 1 is threefold. First, the relationship between subjective economic insecurity and populist right-wing voting will be investigated. Second, the relationship between objective economic insecurity and populist right-wing voting will be explored. Third, once the results have been evaluated statistically, they will reveal whether subjective or objective economic insecurity serves as a better predictor of populist right-wing voting.

For the analysis, bar charts will be plotted for each independent variable (variables measuring subjective and objective economic insecurity) and the PRWV variable in order to get a first picture of the relationship. The bar charts will display the allocation separately for voters and non-voters of PRWP and the results will be weighted.

Subsequently, logistic regressions with PRWV as a binary outcome variable will be run. For H1, three models will be calculated. In the first model, the effect of subjective economic insecurity on PRWV will be identified. In the second model, the same will be done for objective

economic insecurity and its effect on PRWV. Finally, the last model will encompass all variables measuring subjective and objective economic insecurity. In addition, for each model the control variables will be added, and for the last model, odds ratios will be reported in graphs. If independent variables have a statistically significant influence on the predicted probability for PRWV, they will be plotted in graphs.

2. Hypotheses 2a and 2b

In this part, the impact of economic (H2a) and cultural (H2b) anti-immigration sentiments on populist right-wing voting will be analyzed. First, weighted bar charts will be plotted to get a first view of the relationship between economic anti-immigration sentiments and PRWV on the one hand, and between cultural anti-immigration sentiments and PRWV on the other hand. As with H1, the bar charts will display the allocation separately for voters and non-voters of PRWP. Second, three logistic regression models with PRWV as outcome variable will be run. While the first model will encompass only economic anti-immigration sentiments, the second model will include only cultural anti-immigration sentiments. Finally, the third model will encompass both economic and cultural anti-immigration sentiments. Again, for each model, the control variables will be added. For the last model, odds ratios will be reported in graphs and independent variables which have a statistically significant influence on the predicted probability for PRWV will be plotted.

3. Hypothesis 3

For the third hypothesis, which proposes that the effect of subjective economic insecurity in predicting populist right-wing voting is mediated by economic anti-immigration sentiments, a mediation analysis will be conducted. As explained above, mediation analysis seeks to provide insight into the underlying relationship between an independent variable and a dependent variable by way of including a third "mediator" variable in the analysis. To put it in an analytical context, according to Newsom (2018), "[*m*]*ediation is a hypothesized causal chain in which one variable affects a second variable that, in turn, affects a third variable. The intervening variable, M, is the mediator. It 'mediates' the relationship between a predictor, X, and an outcome Y.*"

While generally the total effect of a predictor variable X on an outcome variable Y is of interest (see Figure 4 with the total effect "**c**"), mediation analysis investigates the indirect effect of X on Y. This effect is also called the "mediation" or "mediational" effect and signifies to what

extent the relationship between X and Y is mediated by M (see e.g. Newsom, 2018, or Mascha et al., 2013: 983). In Figure 5, the important effects of mediation are presented: "a" represents the effect of predictor X on mediator M and "b" represents the effect of mediator M on outcome Y. Path "c´" is called the direct effect of X on Y while adjusting for M. Moreover, the total effect equals the sum of the direct effect and the indirect effect (c = a x b + c´; see Mascha et al., 2013: 983).



Figure 4: Total effect of X on Y



Figure 5: Mediation model (indirect effect of X on Y through mediator M)

Concerning the assumptions for claiming mediation, it is necessary that the arrows in the mediation model X → M → Y are not bidirectional (Mascha et al., 2013: 985): X is supposed to predict M, but not vice versa. Such reverse causal effects can often be ruled out theoretically if a causal effect in the other direction is illogical (Kenny, 2015). In this case, subjective economic insecurity is assumed to predict economic anti-immigration sentiments, but economic anti-immigration sentiments are not assumed to predict subjective economic insecurity. Moreover, economic anti-immigration sentiments are assumed to predict PRWV; however, PRWV is not assumed to predict economic anti-immigration sentiments.

Originally, mediation is tested in a four-step approach (Baron & Kenny, 1986: 1177, see similar in Judd & Kenny, 1981, and James & Brett, 1984). These steps have been summarized by Newsom (2018),[20] as illustrated in Figure 6.

[20] These steps are also identical to the steps proposed by David Kenny on his website (see Kenny 2015).

	Analysis	*Visual Depiction*
Step 1	Conduct a simple regression analysis with X predicting Y to test for path *c* alone, $Y = B_0 + B_1X + e$	
Step 2	Conduct a simple regression analysis with X predicting M to test for path *a*, $M = B_0 + B_1X + e$.	
Step 3	Conduct a simple regression analysis with M predicting Y to test the significance of path *b* alone, $Y = B_0 + B_1M + e$.	
Step 4	Conduct a multiple regression analysis with X and M predicting Y, $Y = B_0 + B_1X + B_2M + e$	

Figure 6: Mediation steps by Newsom (2018)

The objective of the first three steps is to check whether there is a correlation between the variables (Newsom, 2018). When no significance is observed in either of these correlations, it is normally concluded that mediation is impossible or unlikely (although this is not always the case: see MacKinnon et al., 2007, for details; see Newsom, 2018). If there are significant correlations throughout steps 1 to 3, the next step is to test whether mediation can be identified. In step 4, if the effect of M on Y (path b) remains significant after controlling for X, some form of mediation is supported. Complete or "perfect" mediation is claimed if X is no longer significant when M is controlled. Partial mediation is claimed when X is still significant, for example when X and M both predict Y significantly (see Newsom, 2018) and when the prediction of X on Y is reduced when the mediator is controlled (Kenny, 2018).

However, as David Kenny (2018) has stated, in contemporary mediational analysis the indirect effect is used to measure the extent of mediation. The causal steps method of Baron and Kenny (1986) does not provide for an estimation of the indirect effect, and therefore it has to be calculated additionally. For continuous outcome variables, this can be done in two ways, using either the difference method or the product method. The difference method calculates the mediation effect by determining the difference between the total and the direct effects (c - c´; see Figure 4 and Figure 5.) In the product method, the mediation effect is calculated as the product of a and b (a x b; see also Figure 4 and Figure 5), where a represents the effect of X on M, and b the effect of M on Y while adjusting for X (Mascha et al., 2013: 984). As regards the interpretation of the indirect effect, the indirect effect represents "*the change in Y for each unit change in X as mediated through M*" (Newsom, 2016).

Still, in terms of binary outcomes, the two methods no longer correspond if either M or Y is binary (Newsom, 2016). Due to the fixed residual variance in logistic regressions, the scale of the outcome variable is different across other equations with different predictors (MacKinnon, 2008; Mascha et al., 2013: 984). Although no commonly accepted method has been established yet, various research studies have tackled this problem and come up with possible solutions (e.g. MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993; Imai et al., 2010; see Mascha et al., 2013: 984). One method is to standardize the coefficients before calculating the indirect effect (MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993). Another way to tackle the scaling issue is to use structural equation modeling (SEM) (MacKinnon & Cox, 2012), for example with the R package *lavaan* (see Newsom, 2018).

For the mediation analysis of H3, I will thus run the regressions based on the following model:



Figure 7: Mediation model for H3

Following this model and the steps of Newsom (2018), I will first run a **logistic regression** with subjective economic insecurity as independent variable and PRWV as outcome variable, to test for path ***c*** alone. Second, I will run a simple **ordinary least squares (OLS) regression** with subjective economic insecurity as independent variable and economic anti-immigration sentiments as outcome variable, to test for path ***a*** alone. Third, I will run a **logistic regression** with economic anti-immigration sentiments as independent variable and PRWV as outcome variable, to test for path ***b*** alone. Finally, I will conduct a **multiple logistic regression** with subjective economic insecurity and economic anti-immigration sentiments as independent variables and PRWV as outcome variable. The control variables will be added to each regression.

To obtain the indirect effect, I will use SEM with the R package *lavaan*. Statistical inference of the direct effect and the other coefficients from the four-step approach will be identified as usual with hypothesis testing (or confidence intervals). Statistical inference of the indirect effect will be obtained by the bootstrapping method in *lavaan* (1000 draws).

As a further check, mediation analysis will also be conducted with cultural anti-immigration sentiments as mediator. If the results indicate similar mediation for economic and cultural anti-immigration sentiments, the results of H3 would be less meaningful. Moreover, this would indicate that a differentiation between anti-immigration sentiments resulting from economic and cultural threats might not be that important after all. However, if the mediation is supported for economic anti-immigration sentiments and not or only partially for cultural anti-immigration sentiments, this would provide further support for the validity of H3.

Finally, mediation analysis with economic anti-immigration sentiments as mediator will also be conducted separately for Eastern, Western and Northern European countries, to see whether there are any important differences. While differences would not be that surprising, due to different welfare systems, rhetoric of PRWP, or even other socio-economic factors in these countries, no differences would suggest that populist right wing party voting in this regard is independent from country specific characteristics.

V. Results

Before the presentation of the results of the above hypotheses, a descriptive analysis of the variables will be conducted as follows. First of all, a summary statistics table will be created with the independent variables used in the analysis. Second, bar charts will be generated for each of the independent variables to obtain their distribution. Third, three bar charts of the main variables (vote for a populist right-wing party, subjective economic insecurity, and economic view about immigration) will display the distribution in each of the 15 countries to see whether there are any differences or outliers.

Table 5: Summary statistic table

	Main variables of interest	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
1	Right wing populist party			0.00	1.00
2	Subjective economic insecurity	1.87	0.77	1.00	4.00
3	Unemployment			0.00	1.00
4	Main source of household income			0.00	1.00
5	Household's total net income	2.13	0.82	1.00	3.00
6	Economic view about immigration	3.03	1.22	1.00	5.00
7	Cultural view about immigration	2.28	1.24	1.00	5.00

Note: Weighted data.

Looking at the summary statistics table (Table 5), concerning subjective economic insecurity, it seems that in general respondents are coping with their economic situation (mean = 1,87). However, the standard deviation is reported as 0,77, which indicates that the data are still spread.

Moreover, respondents seem to have a decent net income (mean = 2,13), although, again, the data are quite spread (sd = 0,82). In addition, according to the table, people generally have a more positive view about immigration and immigrants with regard to cultural aspects (mean = 2,28) than economic ones (mean = 3,03). As the results of the summary statistics table only give a first indication of the distribution of the variables, for the purpose of a more accurate descriptive analysis the following bar charts of the main variables of interest will be interpreted.

Figure 8[21]



Note: Weighted data, n = 17.639.

Concerning populist right-wing voting (8), the data comprise 28,768 respondents, but only 17,639 gave an answer regarding their vote choice in the last national election. Overall, only about one out of ten respondents had voted for a PRWP.

[21] In general, graphs are not tested for statistical significance throughout the thesis.

Figure 9



Note: Weighted data, n = 28.502.

Regarding subjective economic insecurity (Figure 9), it can be observed that almost half of the respondents (48,3%) are coping with their present income and one third (34%) live comfortably on their present income. Hence, four out of five respondents considers him- or herself to be in an economically secure situation. Of the respondents who consider themselves to be in an economically insecure situation, 14,5% reported finding it difficult and only 3,2% reported finding it very difficult to live on their present income.

Figure 10



Note: Weighted data, n = 28.648.

Figure 11



Note: Weighted data, n = 28.204.

Figure 12



Note: Weighted data, n = 24.470.

Concerning objective economic insecurity, almost one third of the respondents had experienced unemployment for more than three months at least once (Figure 10). The graph reporting the main source of household income (Figure 11) indicates that almost all of the respondents reported to receive their income from other sources than social benefits (94,4%). In this case, the variable itself seems to be quite a crude measure. Unfortunately, the ESS does not report the different sources from which respondents receive their income, which would serve as a better measure. Furthermore, concerning a household's total net income (Figure 12), 28% of the respondents reported a low income, 30,7% a medium income, and 41,3% a high income.

Figure 13



Note: Weighted data, n = 26.350.

Figure 14



Note: Weighted data, n = 25.035.

The graphs reporting the overall distribution for economic (Figure 13) and cultural views about immigration (Figure 14) are quite similar, but still different. Only 9,5% of the respondents reported a very positive economic view about immigration, while 32,3% reported a very positive cultural

view about immigration. Moreover, respondents more frequently have a negative economic view about immigration (46,1%) than a negative cultural view about immigration (25,6%).

In the last part of the descriptive analysis, three bar charts will be displayed in order to observe the allocation of specific variables and their respective country differences.

Figure 15



Note: Weighted data, n = 17.639.

Figure 15, depicting the extent of populist right-wing votes per country, indicates that PRWP supporters are the strongest in Poland (34,7%), Switzerland (20,8%), and Hungary (19,8%). Support for these parties is weakest in Belgium (3,4%), the Czech Republic (4%), and Germany (5%).

Figure 16



Note: Weighted data, n = 28.502.

Concerning country differences in terms of subjective economic insecurity (Figure 16), the most struggling respondents live in Hungary (10,5%), Lithuania (7,9%), and the Czech Republic (7,1%). In the northern countries, Denmark (65,3%), Norway (63%), and Sweden (61,6%), the people feel the most comfortable about their economic situation.

Figure 17



Note: Weighted data, n = 26.350.

Figure 17 reveals that respondents who feel that immigrants are harming their country economically are most strongly represented in Hungary (26,2%), the Czech Republic (20,9%), and Belgium and the UK (both 13,3%). The most positive attitude is found in Sweden (22,8%), Germany (13,9%), and Norway (12,9%).

Overall, the above bar charts indicate that there are indeed some differences concerning the distribution of the examined variables among countries, especially concerning subjective economic insecurity. As a next step, the main analysis of the three hypotheses will be conducted.

A. Hypothesis 1

H1: Subjective economic insecurity predicts populist right-wing voting better than objective economic insecurity.

1. Descriptive statistics H1

The first part of the analysis aims to get a picture of the allocation of the respective variables and their correlation to PRWV. The first bar chart concerns subjective economic insecurity.

Figure 18



Note: Weighted data, n = 17.568.

As can be observed in Figure 18, 40,8% of people who did not vote for populist right-wing parties live comfortably on their present income, while only almost half as many (22,8%) of the people who voted for a PRWP live comfortably on their present income. The difference concerning "coping on present income" (value 2) is not that significant; however, it can be observed that respondents who voted for a populist right-wing party find their present economic situation more difficult (values 3 and 4) compared to respondents who did not vote for a populist right-wing party (18% vs. 10,1% and 2% vs. 3,5%). This gives a first indication that subjective economic insecurity seems to predict populist right-wing voting.

Regarding the variables measuring objective economic insecurity and their relationship to populist right-wing voting, the first bar chart displayed below deals with the question whether respondents have ever been unemployed for more than three months.

Figure 19



Note: Weighted data, n = 17.586.

As can be observed in Figure 19, while 32,3% of respondents who voted for PRWP have at least once been unemployed for more than three months, this is the case for only 27% of non-PRWV respondents. Correspondingly, only 67,7% of the PRWV respondents have never been unemployed for more than three months, whereas this is true for 73% of non-PRWV respondents. This result goes in the same direction as Figure 18, meaning that experience of unemployment also seems to predict populist right-wing voting. However, the differences are not that strong as the ones concerning subjective economic insecurity, which could indicate support for H1.

The next figure deals with the allocation of the variable measuring whether the main source of household income derives from unemployment, redundancy benefits or any other social benefits or grants (value 1), or whether it comes from other sources such as wages or salaries (value 0).

Figure 20



Note: Weighted data, n = 17.423.

As can be observed (Figure 20), the source of household income does not really seem to predict populist right-wing voting. While 96,6% of populist right-wing voters obtain their household income from sources other than social benefits, this is the case for only 96,1% of non-PRWV respondents. Moreover, only 3,4% of PRWV respondents acquire their household income from social benefits, while 3,9% of non-populist right-wing voters survive on these. However, it was already indicated at the beginning of the analysis that this variable might not be the best predictor of PRWV.

Concerning the variable measuring a household's total net income, three categories are differentiated: low income, medium income and high income.

Figure 21



Note: Weighted data, n = 15.947.

Figure 21 illustrates that the intention of people to vote for populist right-wing parties is higher among respondents with a low or medium household income than among respondents with a high household income: 30,9% of PRWV respondents report a low household income (compared to 22,1% of non-PRWV respondents), 35% of PRWV respondents have a medium income (compared to 29,7% of non-PRWV respondents), and only 34,1% of PRWV respondents report a high household income (compared to 48,1% of non-PRWV respondents).

Overall, it can be observed that the descriptive analysis lends support for H1, although it is hard to draw conclusions at this stage. Therefore, H1 (subjective economic insecurity predicts populist right-wing voting better than objective economic insecurity) will be tested further in the next step, via regression analysis.

2. Regression analysis H1

As stated in the analysis section, three models have been computed with logistic regression to test H1. In the first model, the effect of subjective economic insecurity on PRWV is tested. In the second model, the same is done for objective economic insecurity and its effect on PRWV. Finally, the last model encompasses all variables measuring subjective and objective economic insecurity.

The control variables are added to each model and the odds ratios as well as the probabilities of the third model are reported in graphs.

Table 6: H1 logistic regression with coefficients

	Dependent variable:		
	populist vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Economic insecurity	0.111***		0.102**
	(0.034)		(0.040)
Unemployment		0.062	0.044
		(0.062)	(0.062)
Main source of household income		-0.162	-0.210
		(0.128)	(0.130)
Total household income		-0.113***	-0.083**
		(0.037)	(0.039)
Gender	0.395***	0.385***	0.393***
	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.056)
Education	-0.268***	-0.246***	-0.241***
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age group	-0.124***	-0.123***	-0.121***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ethnic minority	1.140***	1.105***	1.134***
	(0.224)	(0.235)	(0.236)
Trust in politicians and political parties	0.183***	0.198***	0.190***
	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Satisfaction with government	0.257***	0.257***	0.252***
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)
EU integration	0.328***	0.339***	0.340***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Constant	-4.752***	-4.454***	-4.722***
	(0.289)	(0.307)	(0.324)
Observations	16,579	15,011	14,997
Log Likelihood	-5,119.524	-4,563.011	-4,551.690

Akaike Inf. Crit.	10,257.050	9,148.022	9,127.379
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Looking at the regression results in Table 6, the coefficient of subjective economic insecurity is positive and significant (at a significance level of 1% in model l and at a level of 5% in model 3). As it is positive, one can say that the more economically insecure respondents feel, the higher is the predicted probability that they will vote for populist right-wing parties. However, although the coefficient of unemployment is positive, which would support indicating PRWV, and the coefficient of the main source of household income is negative, which would not support indicating PRWV, the coefficients are both insignificant in models 2 and 3. Concerning objective economic insecurity, only the coefficient of total household income is significant. As it is reported negatively, one can say that a lower household income leads to a higher predicted probability of voting for a populist right-wing party.

Concerning the goodness of fit of all models, the AIC is reported as the lowest in model 3, namely 9,127.379. Moreover, the log likelihood is also the lowest in model 3 (-4,551.690), which indicates that model 3 has the best model fit in this case. The interpretation of results will therefore be done for model 3 only.

For the comparison and testing of H1, to determine whether subjective economic insecurity predicts populist right-wing voting better than objective economic insecurity or not, only the two significant variables can be used. Concerning subjective economic insecurity, the coefficient in model 3 reports that, holding the other variables at a fixed value, one will see an 11% increase in the odds of voting for a populist right-wing party for a one-unit increase in the feeling of economic insecurity, since the odds ratio is reported as 1,11 (see Figure 22). Concerning objective economic insecurity, a one-unit increase in total household income decreases the odds of voting for a populist right-wing party by 8 %. In terms of probabilities (see also Figure 22), support for H1 indicates a probability of 0,53 for subjective economic insecurity and of only 0,48 for objective economic insecurity (total household income). As the probability is higher for subjective economic insecurity than for objective economic insecurity, it could be concluded that H1 is true. However, as two of the three variables measuring objective economic insecurity are not included in this reasoning, one would still have to be cautious about this result.

Figure 22: Odds ratios and probabilities of H1



Looking at the controls, all of their coefficients are significant. The controls are all reported positively, except age and education. However, for education this makes sense because it was indicated in the theory that the higher the education level, the lower the chances of voting for a populist right-wing party. For age, it was stated that young people and people that are 65 and older are on average supposed to be more likely to support populist right-wing parties. In this case, the coefficient of the control variable age only indicates that young people are more prone to PRWV, but not older people. A one-unit increase in age group decreases the odds of PRWV by 0,89 or 11% in model 3. Similarly but with an even stronger effect, a one-unit increase in education decreases the odds of PRWV by 0,79 or 21% in model 3. Concerning gender, if x equals 1, that is, if the respondents are men, then the odds of voting for a populist right-wing party are 1,48 times or 48% higher compared to if x equals 0, that is, if the respondents are women. Moreover, concerning belonging to an ethnic minority, if x equals 1, that is, if the respondents do not belong to an ethnic minority group, then the odds of voting for a populist right-wing party are 3,11 times or 211% higher compared to if x equals 0, that is, if respondents belong to an ethnic minority group. Finally, the odds ratios of the last three variables, trust in politicians and political parties (1,21), satisfaction with government (1,29), and EU integration (1,40), all point in the same direction. The less people trust politicians and political parties, the more likely it is that they vote for populist right-wing parties: a one-unit increase increases the odds of PRWV by 21%. The less people are satisfied with the government, the more likely they are to vote for a populist right-wing party: a one-unit increase increases the odds of PRWV by 29%. The more respondents think that the EU

unification has already gone too far, the more likely they are to vote for a populist right-wing party: a one-unit increase increases the odds of PRWV by 40%.

As only subjective economic insecurity and total household income have a statistically significant effect on the predicted probability for PRWV, graphs are presented for these variables.

Figure 23: Predicted probabilities for model 3 (subjective economic insecurity)



Figure 24: Predicted probabilities for model 3 (total household income)



Figure 23, concerning subjective economic insecurity, indicates that the more people feel economically insecure, the higher is the predicted probability for PRWV. Figure 24 illustrates that the less household income respondents have (1 = low income, 2 = medium income, 3 = high income), the higher is the predicted probability that they vote for PRWP. Again, one can observe that subjective economic insecurity seems to be a better predictor of PRWV than objective economic insecurity, as the predicted probability in respect of "finding it very difficult on present income" (value 4) is slightly higher than for "low household income" (value 1).

B. Hypotheses 2a and 2b

H2a: People with economic anti-immigration sentiments are more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than people with positive economic sentiments towards immigrants.

H2b: People with cultural anti-immigration sentiments are more likely to vote for populist right-wing parties than people with positive cultural sentiments towards immigrants.

1. Descriptive statistics H2

Figure 25



Note: Weighted data, n = 16.546.

Concerning the economic view of immigration (Figure 25), the picture seems clear, as most people who voted for a PRWP have a negative view of immigration (almost 70%). By contrast, only about 40% (39,1%) of people who voted for other parties have a bad economic view of immigration.

Figure 26



Note: Weighted data, n = 15.746.

Regarding the cultural view of immigration (Figure 26), the results are not as clear as the results concerning the economic view above: 48,9 % of PRWP voters believe their country's cultural life is undermined by immigrants, while 21,4% of non-PRWV voters feel the same. Although the gap between PRWP voters and non-PRWP voters is similar as above, the degree of bad feelings differs between the two groups by approximately 20% (70% compared to 48,9% and 40% compared to 21,4%).

Looking at the two bar charts above, it is evident that people generally have a more positive view concerning the cultural aspects of immigration (37,3% and 12,8% have a very good view) versus the economic aspects of immigration (only 11,9% and 2,3 %). Moreover, only 2,5% and 11,7% of respondents have a very bad cultural view about immigration and 6,5% and 21,6% have a very bad economic view about immigration. Unsurprisingly, support for both H2a and H2b can still be found with these results. How strong the connection is will be identified in the next step of the analysis.

2. Regression analysis H2

Three logistic regression models with PRWV as outcome variable have been calculated (Table 7). As stated, while the first model encompasses only economic anti-immigration sentiments, the second model includes only cultural anti-immigration sentiments. Finally, the third model encompasses both economic and cultural anti-immigration sentiments. Again, the control variables are added to each model and the odds ratios and probabilities of the third model are reported in graphs.

Table 7: H2 Logistic regression with coefficients

	Dependent variable:		
	populist vote		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Economic view about immigration	0.337***		0.195***
	(0.026)		(0.032)
Cultural view about immigration		0.326***	0.249***
		(0.023)	(0.027)
Gender	0.417***	0.410***	0.425***
	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.058)
Education	-0.228***	-0.215***	-0.195***
	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age group	-0.119***	-0.137***	-0.122***
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ethnic minority	1.022***	0.959***	0.886***
	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.233)
Trust in politicians and political parties	0.147***	0.137***	0.124***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.030)
Satisfaction with government	0.232***	0.256***	0.235***
	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)
EU integration	0.269***	0.246***	0.227***
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Constant	-5.291***	-4.891***	-5.233***
	(0.295)	(0.295)	(0.304)

Observations	15,808	15,025	14,483
Log Likelihood	-4,774.096	-4,409.496	-4,218.415
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,566.191	8,836.991	8,456.831
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The results listed in Table 7 indicate that all independent variables as well as the controls are significant at a significance level of 1% in each of the three models. The independent variables are also all reported with a positive coefficient, which means that the more prevalent both economic and cultural anti-immigration sentiments are, the greater is the predicted probability that people will vote for populist right-wing parties.

Regarding the goodness of fit of all models, the AIC is reported as the lowest in model 3, namely 8,456.831. Furthermore, the log likelihood is also the lowest in model 3 (-4,218.415), which indicates that model 3 has the best model fit in this case. Again, the interpretation of results will therefore be done for model 3 only.

Accordingly, in model 3, the coefficient for the economic view on immigration indicates that, holding the other variables at fixed values, there will be a 22% increase in the odds of voting for a populist right-wing party for a one-unit increase, since the odds ratio is reported as 1,22 (Figure 27). In respect of the cultural view about immigration, the increase is slightly higher than for the economic view about immigration. A one-unit increase in the cultural view about immigration increases the odds of voting for a populist right-wing party by 28%. In terms of probabilities, support for H2a and H2b is indicated in model 3: the probability is 0,55 for economic anti-immigration sentiments and 0,56 for cultural anti-immigration sentiments. The analysis thus demonstrates support for both H2a and H2b: economic and cultural anti-immigration sentiments both predict PRWV, although the prediction is slightly stronger for cultural anti-immigration sentiments.

Figure 27: Odds ratios and probabilities of H2



As stated, economic and cultural anti-immigration sentiments both have a statistically significant effect on the predicted probability for PRWV. The following graphs of the predicted values are therefore not surprising, as the line for the predicted probabilities becomes higher, the more negative respondents' views are (1 = positive view, 5 = negative view). Moreover, by comparing Figure 28 and Figure 29, one can again observe that a very negative cultural view of immigration seems to be an even stronger predictor of PRWV than a very negative economic view of immigration.

Figure 28: Predicted probabilities for model 3 (economic view about immigration)



Figure 29: Predicted probabilities for model 3 (cultural view about immigration)



C. Hypothesis 3

H3: Subjective economic insecurity of individuals predicts voting for populist right-wing parties; however, this effect is mediated by anti-immigration sentiments.

The first part of the mediation analysis for testing H3 is the four-step approach, the results of which are displayed in Table 8.

Table 8: Mediation – four-step approach

	Dependent variable:			
	populist vote	economic anti-immigration	populist vote	
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic insecurity	0.111***	0.168***		0.047
	(0.034)	(0.009)		(0.036)
Economic view about immigration			0.337***	0.333***
			(0.026)	(0.026)
Gender	0.395***	-0.074***	0.417***	0.422***
	(0.052)	(0.014)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Education	-0.268***	-0.151***	-0.228***	-0.222***
	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Age group	-0.124***	-0.011***	-0.119***	-0.117***
	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Ethnic minority	1.140***	0.457***	1.022***	1.028***
	(0.224)	(0.033)	(0.231)	(0.231)
Trust in politicians and political parties	0.183***	0.134***	0.147***	0.142***
	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Satisfaction with government	0.257***	0.087***	0.232***	0.230***
	(0.025)	(0.006)	(0.026)	(0.026)
EU integration	0.328***	0.212***	0.269***	0.271***
	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Constant	-4.752***	1.484***	-5.291***	-5.388***
	(0.289)	(0.051)	(0.295)	(0.303)
Observations	16,579	24,334	15,808	15,762
R^2		0.213		
Adjusted R^2		0.213		
Log Likelihood	-5,119.524		-4,774.096	-4,752.538

Akaike Inf. Crit.	10,257.050		9,566.191	9,525.076
Residual Std. Error		1.064 (df = 24325)		
F Statistic		822.649*** (df = 8; 24325)		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Looking at the table, one can observe that the conditions for claiming mediation are met. The coefficients are significant throughout step 1 to step 3 (see Table 8). Economic insecurity in model 1 is reported with a coefficient of 0,111 and significant at a significance level of 1%; it is reported with a coefficient of 0,168 and significant at a significance level of 1% in model 2; and the economic view about immigration is reported with a coefficient of 0,337 and significant at a significance level of 1% in model 3. Moreover, in step 4, the effect of the economic view about immigration (M) on PRWV (Y) remains significant after controlling for X (economic insecurity); this indicates that some form of mediation is supported. In addition, complete mediation can be claimed in this case, since economic insecurity is no longer significant when controlling for the economic view about immigration.

As an interim conclusion, complete mediation can be claimed, which provides support for H3. Still, it is unclear how strong the indirect effect of X on Y mediated by M is. Therefore, the indirect effect is calculated with the R package *lavaan* (for detailed results see Appendix). Concerning model fit of the SEM model, the *lavaan* output reports a variety of fit indices. For SEM, Kline (2010: 209f) recommends reporting the Chi-squared test, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). However, as the Chi-squared test is usually only a reasonable measure of fit for models with approximately 75 to 200 cases, it will not be taken as a measure of fit for this model, since the number of observations used in *lavaan* equals 15,762. Therefore, only RMSEA, CFI and SRMR will be utilized in the following analysis. A RMSEA of 0,06 or less is accepted as a good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). In the *lavaan* model, the RMSEA equals 0,036, which indicates a good fit. A CFI of 0,95 or higher serves as an indicator of good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). In this case, the CFI equals 0,955 and thus serves as an indicator of good fit. The SRMR in this case is reported as 0,009. If the SRMR equals less than 0,08, the model is generally considered a good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999; see also Kenny, 2015); the model thus demonstrates a good fit. To conclude, the fit indices above indicate that the model has a good fit.

The results of *lavaan* indicate that the indirect effect equals 0,028 (CI: [0.023; 0.035]). Now, the estimated proportion of the total effect is calculated as (a * b) / TE, where TE represents the estimated total effect (*lavaan*: 0.059 with CI: [0.021; 0.094]), calculated as the direct effect plus the mediation effect (see Mascha et al., 2013: 987). In this case, this leads to an estimated proportion of 0,474, or 48%. The estimated proportion of the total effect of subjective economic insecurity on populist right-wing voting mediated by economic anti-immigration sentiments is thus 48%, and therefore H3 is confirmed. The results thus indicate that economic insecurity alone does not necessary lead to PRWV. Rather, it seems that economic insecurity makes people prone to anti-immigrant messages from populist right-wing parties and lets them develop economic anti-immigration sentiments. As a result of this and to overcome the (sometimes only perceived) competition with immigrants for jobs and social benefits, these people end up voting for populist right-wing parties.

To test the mediation analysis results with the economic anti-immigration sentiments as mediator for validity, the analysis (the four-step approach) will be conducted with cultural anti-immigration sentiments as a mediator. The results are displayed below.

Table 9: Mediation – 4 step approach with cultural anti-immigration sentiments as a mediator

	Dependent variable:			
	populist vote	cultural anti-immigration	populist vote	
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic insecurity	0.111***	0.184***		0.070*
	(0.034)	(0.010)		(0.037)
Cultural view about immigration			0.326***	0.322***
			(0.023)	(0.023)
Gender	0.395***	0.041***	0.410***	0.418***
	(0.052)	(0.015)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Education	-0.268***	-0.162***	-0.215***	-0.207***
	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Age group	-0.124***	0.057***	-0.137***	-0.133***
	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Ethnic minority	1.140***	0.349***	0.959***	0.976***
	(0.224)	(0.036)	(0.231)	(0.232)
Trust in politicians and political parties	0.183***	0.155***	0.137***	0.130***

	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Satisfaction with government	0.257***	0.031***	0.256***	0.252***
	(0.025)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.027)
EU integration	0.328***	0.198***	0.246***	0.249***
	(0.021)	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Constant	-4.752***	0.647***	-4.891***	-5.051***
	(0.289)	(0.055)	(0.295)	(0.305)
Observations	16,579	23,066	15,025	14,978
R^2		0.191		
Adjusted R^2		0.190		
Log Likelihood	-5,119.524		-4,409.496	-4,385.294
Akaike Inf. Crit.	10,257.050		8,836.991	8,790.589
Residual Std. Error		1.119 (df = 23057)		
F Statistic		678.503*** (df = 8; 23057)		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

As can be observed in Table 9, the results are different to the mediation analysis with economic anti-immigrations sentiments (Table 8). Although economic insecurity and cultural anti-immigration sentiments are reported positively and at a significance level of 1% throughout step 1 to step 3, the significance level of economic insecurity is only reported at 10% in step 4. So while, in step 4, the effect of the cultural view about immigration (M) on PRWV (Y) remains significant at a 1% level after controlling for X (economic insecurity), which indicates that some form of mediation is supported, the smaller significance level of economic insecurity in step 4 (10%) only provides support for partial mediation. Since mediation with cultural anti-immigration sentiments is only partially supported, while mediation with economic anti-immigration sentiments is fully supported, this provides support for H3. Still, the results also indicate that people who feel economically insecure, in part, tend to vote for PRWP due to the development of cultural anti-immigration sentiments.

Lastly, the mediation analysis (four-step approach) with economic anti-immigration sentiments as a mediator was conducted separately for Eastern, Western and Northern European countries, to see whether there are any important differences. Concerning Eastern European countries, mediation cannot be claimed or even really tested, as economic insecurity is not significant in predicting PRWV (see step 1).

Table 10: Eastern European countries (CZ, HU, LT, PL)[22]

	Dependent variable:			
	populist vote	economic anti-immigration	populist vote	
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic insecurity	0.027	0.152***		0.049
	(0.075)	(0.020)		(0.080)
Economic view about immigration			-0.044	-0.054
			(0.050)	(0.051)
Observations	3,206	5,638	2,924	2,903
R^2		0.128		
Adjusted R^2		0.126		
Log Likelihood	-1,240.336		-1,133.248	-1,120.867
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,498.672		2,284.496	2,261.734
Residual Std. Error		1.055 (df = 5629)		
F Statistic		102.824*** (df = 8; 5629)		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Similarly, in Western European countries mediation cannot be claimed or tested either, as economic insecurity is again not significant in predicting PRWV (step 1). Still, it is worth noting that economic anti-immigration sentiments significantly predict PRWV in Western European countries; this is not the case for Eastern European countries (see Table 9).

Table 11: Western European countries (AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, GB, NL)

	Dependent variable:			
	populist vote	economic anti-immigration	populist vote	
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic insecurity	0.010	0.109***		-0.047

[22] For the following tables, control variables were added to the regressions but are not displayed. The full results can be redeemed in the Appendix, D.

	(0.053)	(0.013)		(0.055)
Economic view about immigration			0.390***	0.398***
			(0.042)	(0.042)
Observations	8,630	12,642	8,273	8,258
R^2		0.236		
Adjusted R^2		0.236		
Log Likelihood	-2,277.430		-2,148.011	-2,138.807
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,572.861		4,314.022	4,297.613
Residual Std. Error		1.043 (df = 12633)		
F Statistic		488.869*** (df = 8; 12633)		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, partial mediation can be claimed for Northern European countries. Economic insecurity and economic anti-immigration sentiments are reported positively and at a significance level of 1% throughout step 1 to step 3. Still, the significance level of economic insecurity is only reported at 5% in step 4. So while in step 4 the effect of the economic view about immigration (M) on PRWV (Y) remains significant at a 1% level after controlling for X (economic insecurity), which indicates that some form of mediation is supported, the smaller significance level of economic insecurity in step 4 (5%) only provides support for partial mediation.

Table 12: Northern European countries (DK, FI, NO, SE)

	Dependent variable:			
	populist vote	economic anti-immigration	populist vote	
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic insecurity	0.220***	0.076***		0.162**
	(0.069)	(0.020)		(0.072)
Economic view about immigration			0.563***	0.559***
			(0.050)	(0.050)
Observations	4,743	6,054	4,611	4,601
R^2		0.176		

Adjusted R^2		0.175		
Log Likelihood	-1,461.537		-1,338.572	-1,335.141
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,941.073		2,695.144	2,690.283
Residual Std. Error		1.055 (df = 6045)		
F Statistic		161.205^{***} (df = 8; 6045)		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

To conclude, the different results for Eastern, Western and Northern European countries are slightly surprising. Mediation could only be proven in Northern European countries, which partially indicates that in these countries people who feel economically insecure might not necessarily vote for a PRWP, but because of the economic anti-immigration rhetoric of these PRWP, people tend to vote for them. As only partial mediation can be claimed, subjective economic insecurity predicts PRWV only partially because of economic anti-immigration sentiments in these countries; therefore other factors besides economic anti-immigration sentiments have an impact on the prediction of subjective economic insecurity on PRWV in this case as well.

D. Discussion of results

The result of testing the first hypothesis, whether subjective economic insecurity predicts populist right-wing voting better than objective economic insecurity, proved, overall, the hypothesis to be true. However, two out of the three variables that were used for testing objective economic insecurity as a predictor of PRWV were found to be insignificant. Although unemployment for more than three months was found to predict PRWV, no statistical significance was found. For the main source of household income, a negative prediction was even found, but this result could be due to its crude measurement, as the variable only reports respondents' main source of household income. Yet, the variable does not specify whether respondents have other sources of income or in what proportions they receive their income from different sources. As already indicated, unfortunately the ESS does not include a measurement indicating the distribution of different sources from which respondents receive their income – this would give a more precise result.

Still, when comparing the significant results for subjective and objective economic insecurity, subjective economic insecurity was found to be a better predictor. This demonstrates

that a person's perception of his or her economic situation has an important impact in predicting PRWV. This is in line with research studies that have opted for differentiating between objective and subjective economic insecurity on the one hand (Mau et al., 2012), as well as research studies that have emphasized the role of perception of one's economic situation (Mols & Jetten, 2016) when analyzing the electorates of PRWP. Future studies looking at the economic situation of individuals should therefore take into account people's perception of their own economic situation and not focus on objective criteria only. Moreover, as indicated at the beginning, this lends support for the argument that people who are in an economically insecure situation due to objective parameters could also be satisfied with their situation and therefore not that open to populist right-wing parties' rhetoric, which underlines the possible importance of subjective economic insecurity in predicting populist right-wing voting.

The results for H2a and H2b are quite unsurprising. Economic anti-immigration sentiments as well as cultural anti-immigration sentiments both predict PRWV. This is in conformity with existing research mentioned in the theoretical section (e.g. Betz, 1994; Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Guiberna, 2010; Poletti & Regalia, 2014; Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Interestingly, as an important distinction was made in this thesis between economic and cultural anti-immigration sentiments, it can be concluded from the regression results in Table 7 that cultural anti-immigration sentiments seem to be a better predictor of PRWV than economic ones. Accordingly, existing literature also reports that cultural sentiments against immigration are a stronger predictor than economic ones (e.g. Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Poletti & Regalia, 2014).

Finally, the results of hypothesis 3 (whether the effect of subjective economic insecurity in predicting PRWV is mediated by economic anti-immigration sentiments) seemed to indicate strong support for its verification. In addition, the results of the mediation analysis in respect of cultural anti-immigration sentiments indicated further support for H3. This suggests that Esses et al.'s theory of group conflict (1998) in fact plays an important role in explaining populist right-wing voting in Europe. The results indicate that people who feel economically insecure only tend to vote for PRWP when they have the impression that they are in some sort of competition with immigrants and that immigrants take jobs or social benefits away from them (intergroup conflict). This is what the mediation analysis indicates, because subjective economic insecurity was no longer significant in predicting PRWV when economic anti-immigration sentiments were controlled for. These results are also congruent with research on the supply side, as it is indeed the case that populist right-wing parties blame immigrants for the (perceived) bad economic situation of nationals (e.g.

Ignazi, 1992; Jaegers & Walgrave, 2007; Eger & Valdez, 2015). However, the separate mediation results of H3 for Northern, Western and Eastern European countries indicate the vulnerability of H3, because mediation, and only partial mediation, could just be proven for Northern European countries. This means that explaining populist right-wing voting using intergroup conflict theory is only possible in Northern European countries. Interestingly, these are the countries with the most generous welfare systems in Europe.

What was quite surprising is that in Eastern European countries the economic anti-immigration view does not seem to predict PRWV. Still, the coefficient is not significant. By comparison, in Western and Northern European countries the economic anti-immigration view does predict PRWV significantly. The cultural anti-immigration view might possibly serve as a better predictor of PRWP in Eastern Europe, although this is only an assumption and was not tested in the analysis. In essence, future research would be necessary to determine this.

VI. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to explain populist right-wing vote choice in Europe, with a special focus on the roles of subjective economic insecurity and economic anti-immigration sentiments. The research was guided by two main questions. First, it was investigated how subjective economic insecurity in comparison to objective factors of economic insecurity predicts PRWV in Europe. Second, the question was raised as to whether there is a connection or impact between subjective economic insecurity and anti-immigration sentiments in predicting populist right-wing voting in Europe and what form this connection takes.

First of all, the results have revealed that, indeed, subjective economic insecurity serves as a better predictor of PRWV. This indicates that perception should be taken into account more often when testing the impact of individuals' economic situation, instead of relying on objective factors only. Second, although subjective economic insecurity serves as a better predictor of PRWV than objective economic insecurity, the results demonstrate that subjective economic insecurity alone does not necessary lead to PRWV. Rather, this effect is mediated by economic anti-immigration sentiments. However, this result is not equally significant when tested for Northern, Eastern and Western European countries separately. Mediation could only be proven for Northern European countries. As the welfare systems in Northern European countries tend to be the most generous in Europe, it is interesting to find that in these countries, people who feel economically insecure are most likely to develop economic anti-immigration sentiments and consequently vote for PRWP to remove the competing outgroup, the immigrants.

However, the results raise certain questions that this thesis cannot answer. What this thesis cannot do is to state whether economic anti-immigration rhetoric is more prevalent in Northern European countries or in the rest of Europe. As economic anti-immigration sentiments were not significant in predicting PRWV in Eastern European countries, it could be that in these countries, it is more on a cultural conflict and in Northern and Western countries more on an economic conflict that leads to PRWV. Therefore, it would be interesting for future research to investigate in which countries populist right-wing parties' rhetoric is strong on economic group conflict, and in which countries it is strong on cultural group conflict. Another way to investigate the differences in the mediation results between Eastern, Western and Northern European countries could be to compare the integration of immigrants in these countries' welfare systems or the generosity of a specific country's welfare system and the focus of anti-immigrant rhetoric of PRWP in this regard.

To conclude, this thesis revealed that there is definitely a connection between subjective economic insecurity, economic anti-immigration sentiments and PRWP. However, how and why this connection differs among individual European countries or between Northern, Western and Eastern European countries leaves room for future research to investigate. As indicated, a closer look at the difference in welfare systems and how PRWPs' rhetoric influences perception and facilitates group conflict could be possible starting points.

VII. Appendix

A. Party names

Table 13

Abbreviation	Party name (English)	Party name (original)
FPO	Freedom Party of Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
BZO	Alliance for the Future of Austria	Bündnis Zukunft Österreich
TeamStronach	Team Stronach for Austria	Team Stronach für Österreich
VB	Flemish Interest	Vlaams Belang
PP	People's Party	Parti Populaire
USVIT	Dawn - National Coalition	Úsvit – Národní koalice
SVOBODNI	Party of Free Citizens	Strana svobodných občanů
DF	Danish people's party	Dansk Folkeparti
PS	True Finns	Perussuomalaiset
FN	National Front	Front National
MPF	Movement for France	Mouvement pour la France
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
AfD	Alternative for Germany	Alternative für Deutschland
JOBBIK	Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary	Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom
TT	Order and Justice	Tvarka ir teisingumas
DK	The Way of Courage	Drąsos kelias
PVV	Party for Freedom	Partij voor de Vrijheid
FrP	Progress Party	Fremskrittspartiet
PiS	Law and Justice	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
KNP	Congress of the New Right	Nowa Prawica
SP	United Poland	Solidarna Polska
MPT	The Earth Party Movement	Movimento o Partido da Terra
SD	Sweden Democrats	Sverigedemokraterna
SVP/UDC	Swiss People's Party	Schweizerische Volkspartei/ Union Démocratique du Centre/ Unione Democratica di Centro
EDU/UDF	Federal Democratic Union	Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union/ Union Démocratique Fédérale/ Unione Democratica Federale
LdT	Ticino League	Liga der Tessiner/ Ligue des Tessinois/ Lega dei Ticinesi
UKIP	UK Independence Party	/

B. Overview of variables

Table 14[23]

Variable name	Question/Input	Coding	Coding ESS
Subjective economic insecurity			
hincfel	Subjective economic insecurity: feeling about household's income nowadays	1 Living comfortably on present income 2 Coping on present income 3 Difficult on present income 4 Very difficult on present income	1 Living comfortably on present income 2 Coping on present income 3 Difficult on present income 4 Very difficult on present income 7 Refusal 8 Don't know 9 No answer
Objective economic insecurity			
uemp3m	Ever been unemployed for more than 3 months	0 No 1 Yes	1 Yes 2 No 7 Refusal 8 Don't know 9 No answer
hincsrca	Main source of household income	0 Other 1 Unemployment/redundancy benefit, any other social benefits or grants	1 Wages or salaries 2 Income from self-employment (excluding farming) 3 Income from farming 4 Pensions 5 Unemployment/redundancy benefit 6 Any other social benefits or grants 7 Income from investments, savings etc. 8 Income from other sources 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
hinctnta	Household's total net income, all sources	1 J - 1st decile 2 R - 2nd decile 3 C - 3rd decile 4 M - 4th decile	1 J - 1st decile 2 R - 2nd decile 3 C - 3rd decile 4 M - 4th decile

[23] Values like *Refusal*, *Don't know*, *No answer*, and *Other* were coded as missing values. The grey color means that these variables were not used for the analysis, but were relevant for the creation of similar variables.

		5 F - 5th decile 6 S - 6th decile 7 K - 7th decile 8 P - 8th decile 9 D - 9th decile 10 H - 10th decile	5 F - 5th decile 6 S - 6th decile 7 K - 7th decile 8 P - 8th decile 9 D - 9th decile 10 H - 10th decile 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
hinctnta3	Recoding of above variable, Household's total net income, all sources, in categories	**1** 1st decile to 3rd decile = low **2** 4th decile to 6th decile = medium **3** 7th decile to 10th decile = high	
Anti-immigration sentiments (economic threat)			
imbgeco	Immigration bad or good for country's economy	0 Bad for the economy : 10 Good for the economy	0 Bad for the economy : 10 Good for the economy 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
imtcjob	immigrants take jobs away in country or create new jobs	0 Take jobs away : 10 Create new jobs	0 Take jobs away : 10 Create new jobs 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
imbleco	taxes and health/welfare services: immigrants take out more than they put in or less	0 Generally take out more : 10 Generally put in more	0 Generally take out more : 10 Generally put in more 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
immi_eco	Combination of upper 3 variables, economic view about immigration	1 Good : 5 Bad	
Anti-immigration sentiments (cultural threat)			
imueclt	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	0 Cultural life undermined : 10 Cultural life enriched	0 Cultural life undermined : 10 Cultural life enriched 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer

imwbcnt	Immigrants make country worse or better place to live	0 Worse place to live : 10 Better place to live	0 Worse place to live : 10 Better place to live 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
imdetbs	different race/ethnic group majority: your boss	0 Mind a lot : 10 Not mind at all	0 Not mind at all : 10 Mind a lot 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
immi_cul	Combination of upper 3 (15+16+17), cultural view about immigration	1 Good : 5 Bad	
Controls			
gndr	gender	0 Female 1 Male	1 Male 2 Female 9 No answer
edulvlb	Level of education	1 Low education : 5 High education	000 Not completed ISCED level 1 113 ISCED 1, completed primary education 129 Vocational ISCED 2C < 2 years, no access ISCED 3 212 General/pre-vocational ISCED 2A/2B, access ISCED 3 vocational 213 General ISCED 2A, access ISCED 3A general/all 3 221 Vocational ISCED 2C >= 2 years, no access ISCED 3 222 Vocational ISCED 2A/2B, access ISCED 3 vocational 223 Vocational ISCED 2, access ISCED3 general/all 229 Vocational ISCED 3C < 2 years, no access ISCED 5 311 General ISCED 3 >=2 years, no access ISCED 5 312 General ISCED 3A/3B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A 313 General ISCED 3A, access

			upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5 321 Vocational ISCED 3C >= 2 years, no access ISCED 5 322 Vocational ISCED 3A, access ISCED 5B/ lower tier 5A 323 Vocational ISCED 3A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5 412 General ISCED 4A/4B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A 413 General ISCED 4A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5 421 ISCED 4 programmes without access ISCED 5 422 Vocational ISCED 4A/4B, access ISCED 5B/lower tier 5A 423 Vocational ISCED 4A, access upper tier ISCED 5A/all 5 510 ISCED 5A short, intermediate/academic/general tertiary below bachelor 520 ISCED 5B short, advanced vocational qualifications 610 ISCED 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from lower tier tertiary 620 ISCED 5A medium, bachelor/equivalent from upper/single tier tertiary 710 ISCED 5A long, master/equivalent from lower tier tertiary 720 ISCED 5A long, master/equivalent from upper/single tier tertiary 800 ISCED 6 doctoral degree 5555 Other 7777 Refusal 8888 Don't know 9999 No answer
agea	Age		1 : 114

agegroup	Age group	**1** 14-18 years old **2** 19-24 years old **3** 25-34 years old **4** 35-44 years old **5** 45-54 years old **6** 55-64 years old **7** 65 years or older	Age
blgetmg	belong to minority ethnic group in country	0 Yes 1 No	1 Yes 2 No 7 Refusal 8 Don't know 9 No answer
trstplt	Trust in politicians	1 Complete trust : 10 No trust at all	0 No trust at all : 10 Complete trust 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
trstprt	Trust in political parties	1 Complete trust : 10 No trust at all	0 No trust at all : 10 Complete trust 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
trstp2	Trust in politicians and political parties	1 Complete trust : 5 No trust at all	
stfgov	satisfaction with the national government	1 Extremely satisfied : 5 Extremely dissatisfied	0 Extremely dissatisfied : 10 Extremely satisfied 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer
euftf	European union: European unification go further or gone too far	1 Unification go further : 5 Unification already gone too far	0 Unification already gone too far : 10 Unification go further 77 Refusal 88 Don't know 99 No answer

C. Lavaan results from mediation

```
Lavaan: 31.7.2018 (with control variables):

lavaan 0.6-2 ended normally after 38 iterations

  Optimization method                           NLMINB
  Number of free parameters                         20
  Number of equality constraints                     7

                                                  Used       Total
  Number of observations                         15762       28768

  Estimator                                       DWLS
  Model Fit Test Statistic                     147.882
  Degrees of freedom                                 7
  P-value (Chi-square)                           0.000

Model test baseline model:

  Minimum Function Test Statistic             3129.223
  Degrees of freedom                                17
  P-value                                        0.000

User model versus baseline model:

  Comparative Fit Index (CFI)                    0.955
  Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)                       0.890

Root Mean Square Error of Approximation:

  RMSEA                                          0.036
  90 Percent Confidence Interval          0.031  0.041
  P-value RMSEA <= 0.05                          1.000

Standardized Root Mean Square Residual:

  SRMR                                           0.009

Parameter Estimates:

  Standard Errors                             Bootstrap
  Number of requested bootstrap draws              1000
  Number of successful bootstrap draws             1000

Regressions:
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
  immi_eco ~
    hincfel    (a)    0.179    0.012   15.355    0.000    0.179    0.113
    gndr       (c1)   0.009    0.014    0.626    0.531    0.009    0.004
    edulvlb    (c2)  -0.151    0.006  -24.127    0.000   -0.151   -0.162
    agegroup   (c3)  -0.027    0.005   -5.616    0.000   -0.027   -0.035
    blgetmg    (c4)   0.404    0.049    8.244    0.000    0.404    0.059
    trstp2     (c5)   0.118    0.007   16.025    0.000    0.118    0.126
    stfgov     (c6)   0.078    0.007   10.619    0.000    0.078    0.085
    euftf      (c7)   0.197    0.006   32.995    0.000    0.197    0.226
  populist ~
    immi_eco   (b)    0.159    0.013   11.892    0.000    0.159    0.163
    hincfel    (c)    0.030    0.019    1.615    0.106    0.030    0.020
    gndr       (c1)   0.009    0.014    0.626    0.531    0.009    0.004
    edulvlb    (c2)  -0.151    0.006  -24.127    0.000   -0.151   -0.166
    agegroup   (c3)  -0.027    0.005   -5.616    0.000   -0.027   -0.036
    blgetmg    (c4)   0.404    0.049    8.244    0.000    0.404    0.060
```

```
    trstp2    (c5)    0.118    0.007   16.025    0.000    0.118    0.129
    stfgov    (c6)    0.078    0.007   10.619    0.000    0.078    0.088
    euftf     (c7)    0.197    0.006   32.995    0.000    0.197    0.231

Intercepts:
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
   .immi_eco          1.632    0.079   20.656    0.000    1.632    1.381
   .populist          0.000                               0.000    0.000

Thresholds:
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
    populist|t1       2.835    0.167   16.995    0.000    2.835    2.458

Variances:
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
   .immi_eco          1.132    0.010  111.772    0.000    1.132    0.810
   .populist          1.000                               1.000    0.752

Scales y*:
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
    populist          0.986                               0.986    1.000

R-Square:
                   Estimate
    immi_eco          0.190
    populist          0.248

Defined Parameters:
                   Estimate  Std.Err  z-value  P(>|z|)   Std.lv  Std.all
    ab                0.028    0.003    9.193    0.000    0.028    0.018
    total             0.059    0.019    3.162    0.002    0.059    0.038

> parameterestimates(fit_c)
        lhs  op      rhs label    est    se       z pvalue ci.lower ci.upper
1  immi_eco   ~  hincfel     a  0.179 0.012  15.355  0.000    0.157    0.200
2  immi_eco   ~     gndr    c1  0.009 0.014   0.626  0.531   -0.021    0.037
3  immi_eco   ~  edulvlb    c2 -0.151 0.006 -24.127  0.000   -0.163   -0.138
4  immi_eco   ~ agegroup    c3 -0.027 0.005  -5.616  0.000   -0.037   -0.017
5  immi_eco   ~  blgetmg    c4  0.404 0.049   8.244  0.000    0.305    0.501
6  immi_eco   ~   trstp2    c5  0.118 0.007  16.025  0.000    0.104    0.134
7  immi_eco   ~   stfgov    c6  0.078 0.007  10.619  0.000    0.063    0.093
8  immi_eco   ~    euftf    c7  0.197 0.006  32.995  0.000    0.185    0.209
9  populist   ~ immi_eco     b  0.159 0.013  11.892  0.000    0.133    0.185
10 populist   ~  hincfel     c  0.030 0.019   1.615  0.106   -0.008    0.066
11 populist   ~     gndr    c1  0.009 0.014   0.626  0.531   -0.021    0.037
12 populist   ~  edulvlb    c2 -0.151 0.006 -24.127  0.000   -0.163   -0.138
13 populist   ~ agegroup    c3 -0.027 0.005  -5.616  0.000   -0.037   -0.017
14 populist   ~  blgetmg    c4  0.404 0.049   8.244  0.000    0.305    0.501
15 populist   ~   trstp2    c5  0.118 0.007  16.025  0.000    0.104    0.134
16 populist   ~   stfgov    c6  0.078 0.007  10.619  0.000    0.063    0.093
17 populist   ~    euftf    c7  0.197 0.006  32.995  0.000    0.185    0.209
18 populist   |       t1        2.835 0.167  16.995  0.000    2.556    3.202
19 immi_eco  ~~ immi_eco        1.132 0.010 111.772  0.000    1.111    1.153
20 populist  ~~ populist        1.000 0.000      NA     NA    1.000    1.000
21  hincfel  ~~  hincfel        0.561 0.000      NA     NA    0.561    0.561
22  hincfel  ~~     gndr       -0.017 0.000      NA     NA   -0.017   -0.017
23  hincfel  ~~  edulvlb       -0.212 0.000      NA     NA   -0.212   -0.212
24  hincfel  ~~ agegroup       -0.003 0.000      NA     NA   -0.003   -0.003
25  hincfel  ~~  blgetmg       -0.010 0.000      NA     NA   -0.010   -0.010
26  hincfel  ~~   trstp2        0.218 0.000      NA     NA    0.218    0.218
27  hincfel  ~~   stfgov        0.225 0.000      NA     NA    0.225    0.225
28  hincfel  ~~    euftf        0.113 0.000      NA     NA    0.113    0.113
29     gndr  ~~     gndr        0.250 0.000      NA     NA    0.250    0.250
30     gndr  ~~  edulvlb       -0.004 0.000      NA     NA   -0.004   -0.004
31     gndr  ~~ agegroup        0.004 0.000      NA     NA    0.004    0.004
```

32	gndr	~~	blgetmg		-0.001	0.000	NA	NA	-0.001	-0.001
33	gndr	~~	trstp2		-0.009	0.000	NA	NA	-0.009	-0.009
34	gndr	~~	stfgov		-0.018	0.000	NA	NA	-0.018	-0.018
35	gndr	~~	euftf		-0.004	0.000	NA	NA	-0.004	-0.004
36	edulvlb	~~	edulvlb		1.619	0.000	NA	NA	1.619	1.619
37	edulvlb	~~	agegroup		-0.409	0.000	NA	NA	-0.409	-0.409
38	edulvlb	~~	blgetmg		-0.002	0.000	NA	NA	-0.002	-0.002
39	edulvlb	~~	trstp2		-0.208	0.000	NA	NA	-0.208	-0.208
40	edulvlb	~~	stfgov		-0.172	0.000	NA	NA	-0.172	-0.172
41	edulvlb	~~	euftf		-0.261	0.000	NA	NA	-0.261	-0.261
42	agegroup	~~	agegroup		2.409	0.000	NA	NA	2.409	2.409
43	agegroup	~~	blgetmg		0.014	0.000	NA	NA	0.014	0.014
44	agegroup	~~	trstp2		0.062	0.000	NA	NA	0.062	0.062
45	agegroup	~~	stfgov		-0.015	0.000	NA	NA	-0.015	-0.015
46	agegroup	~~	euftf		0.140	0.000	NA	NA	0.140	0.140
47	blgetmg	~~	blgetmg		0.029	0.000	NA	NA	0.029	0.029
48	blgetmg	~~	trstp2		-0.002	0.000	NA	NA	-0.002	-0.002
49	blgetmg	~~	stfgov		-0.001	0.000	NA	NA	-0.001	-0.001
50	blgetmg	~~	euftf		0.002	0.000	NA	NA	0.002	0.002
51	trstp2	~~	trstp2		1.579	0.000	NA	NA	1.579	1.579
52	trstp2	~~	stfgov		0.868	0.000	NA	NA	0.868	0.868
53	trstp2	~~	euftf		0.376	0.000	NA	NA	0.376	0.376
54	stfgov	~~	stfgov		1.671	0.000	NA	NA	1.671	1.671
55	stfgov	~~	euftf		0.383	0.000	NA	NA	0.383	0.383
56	euftf	~~	euftf		1.840	0.000	NA	NA	1.840	1.840
57	populist	~*~	populist		0.986	0.000	NA	NA	0.986	0.986
58	immi_eco	~1			1.632	0.079	20.656	0.000	1.478	1.797
59	populist	~1			0.000	0.000	NA	NA	0.000	0.000
60	hincfel	~1			1.745	0.000	NA	NA	1.745	1.745
61	gndr	~1			0.502	0.000	NA	NA	0.502	0.502
62	edulvlb	~1			3.582	0.000	NA	NA	3.582	3.582
63	agegroup	~1			5.170	0.000	NA	NA	5.170	5.170
64	blgetmg	~1			0.970	0.000	NA	NA	0.970	0.970
65	trstp2	~1			3.363	0.000	NA	NA	3.363	3.363
66	stfgov	~1			3.141	0.000	NA	NA	3.141	3.141
67	euftf	~1			3.082	0.000	NA	NA	3.082	3.082
68	ab	:=	a*b	**ab**	**0.028**	0.003	9.193	0.000	**0.023**	**0.035**
69	total	:=	c+(a*b)	**total**	**0.059**	0.019	3.162	0.002	**0.021**	**0.094**

D. Mediation tables (East, West, North) with controls

Table 15: Eastern European countries (CZ, HU, LT, PL)

	Dependent variable:			
	populist vote	economic anti-immigration	populist vote	
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic insecurity	0.027	0.152***		0.049
	(0.075)	(0.020)		(0.080)
Economic view about immigration			-0.044	-0.054
			(0.050)	(0.051)
Gender	0.336***	0.047	0.336***	0.343***
	(0.103)	(0.028)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Education	-0.315***	-0.087***	-0.333***	-0.326***
	(0.053)	(0.013)	(0.055)	(0.057)
Age group	-0.196***	0.011	-0.192***	-0.193***
	(0.035)	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Ethnic minority	1.842***	0.409***	1.811***	1.803***
	(0.520)	(0.078)	(0.520)	(0.522)
Trust in politicians and political parties	-0.017	0.009	-0.00003	0.00004
	(0.055)	(0.015)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Satisfaction with government	0.591***	0.096***	0.563***	0.572***
	(0.054)	(0.013)	(0.057)	(0.057)
EU integration	0.097***	0.222***	0.112***	0.118***
	(0.037)	(0.011)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Constant	-4.119***	1.862***	-3.850***	-3.993***
	(0.669)	(0.128)	(0.664)	(0.696)
Observations	3,206	5,638	2,924	2,903
R^2		0.128		
Adjusted R^2		0.126		
Log Likelihood	-1,240.336		-1,133.248	-1,120.867
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,498.672		2,284.496	2,261.734

Residual Std. Error	1.055 (df = 5629)
F Statistic	102.824*** (df = 8; 5629)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: Western European countries (AT, BE, CH, DE, FR, GB, NL)

	Dependent variable:			
	populist vote	economic anti-immigration	populist vote	
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic insecurity	0.010	0.109***		-0.047
	(0.053)	(0.013)		(0.055)
Economic view about immigration			0.390***	0.398***
			(0.042)	(0.042)
Gender	0.264***	-0.139***	0.301***	0.302***
	(0.079)	(0.019)	(0.081)	(0.082)
Education	-0.329***	-0.160***	-0.263***	-0.268***
	(0.033)	(0.007)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Age group	-0.179***	-0.018***	-0.171***	-0.172***
	(0.026)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Ethnic minority	1.013***	0.493***	0.852***	0.831***
	(0.306)	(0.041)	(0.309)	(0.310)
Trust in politicians and political parties	0.111**	0.091***	0.084*	0.085*
	(0.044)	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Satisfaction with government	0.254***	0.109***	0.224***	0.228***
	(0.040)	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.042)
EU integration	0.530***	0.244***	0.417***	0.420***
	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.037)	(0.037)
Constant	-4.628***	1.617***	-5.410***	-5.342***
	(0.408)	(0.067)	(0.411)	(0.424)
Observations	8,630	12,642	8,273	8,258
R^2		0.236		
Adjusted R^2		0.236		

Log Likelihood	-2,277.430		-2,148.011	-2,138.807
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,572.861		4,314.022	4,297.613
Residual Std. Error		1.043 (df = 12633)		
F Statistic		488.869*** (df = 8; 12633)		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 17: Northern European countries (DK, FI, NO, SE)

	Dependent variable:			
	populist vote	economic anti-immigration	populist vote	
	logistic	*OLS*	*logistic*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Economic insecurity	0.220***	0.076***		0.162**
	(0.069)	(0.020)		(0.072)
Economic view about immigration			0.563***	0.559***
			(0.050)	(0.050)
Gender	0.662***	0.003	0.672***	0.685***
	(0.101)	(0.027)	(0.106)	(0.106)
Education	-0.147***	-0.157***	-0.097**	-0.084**
	(0.039)	(0.010)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Age group	0.028	-0.010	0.031	0.038
	(0.032)	(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Ethnic minority	0.477	0.324***	0.306	0.327
	(0.433)	(0.078)	(0.478)	(0.477)
Trust in politicians and political parties	0.375***	0.179***	0.282***	0.276***
	(0.047)	(0.013)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Satisfaction with government	0.045	0.068***	0.018	0.005
	(0.043)	(0.012)	(0.044)	(0.045)
EU integration	0.355***	0.165***	0.299***	0.295***
	(0.043)	(0.011)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Constant	-5.475***	1.625***	-6.295***	-6.566***
	(0.546)	(0.106)	(0.583)	(0.596)

Observations	4,743	6,054	4,611	4,601
R^2		0.176		
Adjusted R^2		0.175		
Log Likelihood	-1,461.537		-1,338.572	-1,335.141
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,941.073		2,695.144	2,690.283
Residual Std. Error		1.055 (df = 6045)		
F Statistic		161.205^{***} (df = 8; 6045)		
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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IX. Abstract

A. English

The aim of this thesis is to explain populist right-wing vote choice in Europe, with a special focus on the roles of subjective economic insecurity and economic anti-immigration sentiments. As the connection of these two factors is hypothesized to result from intergroup conflict, two theoretical preconditions are elaborated at the outset. First, it is developed why perception of one's economic situation is more relevant for the prediction of populist right-wing voting than objective factors concerning one's economic situation. Second, it is explained why a multidimensional approach is required when studying the effects of anti-immigration sentiments and PRWV, which highlights the distinction between these sentiments resulting from cultural threats on the one hand, and economic threats on the other hand. Then, a theory of intergroup conflict provides the theoretical basis for the link between subjective economic insecurity and economic anti-immigration sentiments as a predictor of populist right-wing voting. It is argued that it is not economic insecurity as such that leads to PRWV, but rather that economic insecurity leads to economic anti-immigration sentiments and these in turn lead to voting for a populist right-wing party. The analysis of the European Social Survey 2014 data reveals that, indeed, subjective economic insecurity serves as a better predictor of PRWV than objective economic insecurity. Still, as proposed, subjective economic insecurity alone does not necessary lead to PRWV; rather, the effect is mediated by economic anti-immigration sentiments. This indicates that people who feel economically insecure only tend to vote for populist right-wing parties when they have the impression that they are in some sort of competition with immigrants and that immigrants take jobs or social benefits away from them. When tested for Northern, Eastern and Western European countries separately, mediation could only be proven for Northern European countries, which are interestingly the countries with the most generous welfare systems in Europe.

B. German

Das Ziel dieser Masterarbeit ist es zu erklären, warum Menschen rechtspopulistische Parteien in Europa wählen, wobei insbesondere der Zusammenhang zwischen subjektiver ökonomischer Unsicherheit und negativen ökonomischen Immigrationsempfindungen untersucht wird. Da angenommen wird, dass die Beziehung dieser beiden Faktoren aus einem Gruppenkonflikt

resultiert, werden zu Beginn zwei theoretische Voraussetzungen erarbeitet. Erstens wird entwickelt, warum die Wahrnehmung der wirtschaftlichen Situation des Einzelnen für die Vorhersage einer Stimme für eine rechtspopulistische Partei relevanter ist als die objektiven Faktoren der wirtschaftlichen Situation des Einzelnen. Zweitens wird erläutert, warum ein multidimensionaler Ansatz erforderlich ist, um die Auswirkungen von negativen Immigrationsempfindungen und der Wahlentscheidung für eine rechtspopulistische Partei zu untersuchen. Dabei wird die Unterscheidung zwischen Empfindungen, die sich aus kulturellen Bedrohungen ergeben und solchen, die sich aus wirtschaftlichen Bedrohungen ergeben, hervorgehoben. Ein Ansatz über Konflikte zwischen Gruppen bildet in weiterer Folge die theoretische Grundlage für die Verbindung zwischen subjektiver wirtschaftlicher Unsicherheit und negativen ökonomischen Immigrationsempfindungen als Vorhersage für eine rechtspopulistische Wahlentscheidung. Es wird argumentiert, dass nicht wirtschaftliche Unsicherheit als solche zur Wahl einer rechtspopulistischen Partei führt, sondern vielmehr, dass wirtschaftliche Unsicherheit zu negativen ökonomischen Immigrationsempfindungen führt und diese wiederum zu einer Stimmabgabe für eine rechtspopulistische Partei. Die Analyse der Daten des European Social Survey 2014 zeigt, dass subjektive wirtschaftliche Unsicherheit tatsächlich eine bessere Vorhersage für die Wahl von rechtspopulistischen Parteien ist als objektive wirtschaftliche Unsicherheit. Dennoch führt, wie angenommen, subjektive wirtschaftliche Unsicherheit allein nicht zwangsläufig zu solch einer Wahlentscheidung; vielmehr wird der Effekt durch negative ökonomische Immigrationsempfindungen vermittelt. Dies deutet darauf hin, dass Menschen, die sich wirtschaftlich unsicher fühlen, nur für rechtspopulistische Parteien stimmen, wenn sie den Eindruck haben, dass sie sich in einer Art Konkurrenz zu Einwanderern befinden und dass Einwanderer ihnen Arbeitsplätze oder soziale Leistungen nehmen. Bei Trennung der Analyse in nordeuropäische, ost- und westeuropäische Länder konnte die Mediation nur für nordeuropäische Länder nachgewiesen werden, welche interessanterweise die Länder mit den großzügigsten Sozialsystemen in Europa sind.