universität wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

„The Cold War on Drugs: Intersections of Anti-Drug and Anti-Communist Ideologies and Myths in Nixon's Vietnam War"

Verfasst von / submitted by

Margit Schulze, B.A. B.A

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master (MA)

Wien, 2019 / Vienna 2019

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / degree programme code as it appears on the student record sheet:	A 067 805
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt / degree programme as it appears on the student record sheet:	Individuelles Masterstudium Globalgeschichte
Betreut von / Supervisor:	Mag. Dr. Rolf Bauer

UNIVERSITÄT LEIPZIG

universität wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit /Title of the Master Thesis

„The Cold War on Drugs: Intersections of Anti-Drug and Anti-Communist Ideologies and Myths in Nixon's Vietnam War“

Verfasser /Author

Margit Schulze, B.A. B.A.

angestrebter akademischer Grad / academic degree aspired

Master (MA)

Wien, 2019 / Vienna, 2019

Studienkennzahl / degree programme code:	UA 067 805
Studienrichtung / degree programme:	Individuelles Masterstudium Global Studies – a European Perspective
Betreuer/Supervisor:	Mag. Dr. Rolf Bauer

Contents

Abstract

This thesis analyses the public discourse concerning drug use and the Vietnam War during the years of the Richard Nixon presidency (1969-1974). The most prevalent metaphors and myths concerning drug use in Vietnam by U.S. soldiers are identified and it is demonstrated how these myths and metaphors about drug use in the U.S. constitute an interventionist logic that intersected with the predominant discourse of the pre-Nixon years that suggested that containment of communism was a cause for foreign invasions. I contend that the Vietnam War functioned as a catalyst for the invention of the so-called War on Drugs as an interventionist logic that superseded the containment of communism as the main logic of U.S. interventionism.

Diese Masterarbeit analysiert den öffentlichen Diskurs über den Drogenkonsum und den Vietnamkrieg während der Jahre der Präsidentschaft von Richard Nixon (1969-1974). Die am weitesten verbreiteten Metaphern und Mythen über den Drogenkonsum von US-Soldaten in Vietnam werden identifiziert und es wird gezeigt, wie diese Mythen und Metaphern über den Drogenkonsum in den USA eine interventionistische Logik darstellen, die sich mit dem vorherrschenden Diskurs der Vor-Nixon-Jahre überschneidet. Dies traf auf den vorherrschenden Diskurs der Vor-Nixon-Zeit, der darauf hinwies, dass die Eindämmung des Kommunismus Anlass für ausländische Invasionen war. Ich behaupte, dass der Vietnamkrieg als Katalysator für die Erfindung des sogenannten Drogenkrieges als interventionistische Logik fungierte, die schlussendlich die Eindämmung des Kommunismus ablöste.

List of Abbreviations

ABC	American Broadcasting Company
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnamese Army)
BNDD	Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
CBS	Columbia Broadcasting System
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPV	Communist Party of Vietnam
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DEROS	Date eligible for return overseas
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam, sometimes DRVN)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBN	Federal Bureau of Narcotics
GOP	Grand Old Party, the Republican Party
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MIA	Missing in Action
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
NLF	National Liberation Front
NSC	National Security Council
NYT	New York Times
ODALE	Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement
OJ	Opium Joint
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
POW	Prisoner(s) of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government
PTSD	Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

RVN	Republic of Vietnam, South Vietnam
SAODAP	Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or Soviet Union
VVAW	Vietnam Veterans Against the War

List of Figures

List of Tables

1 Have You Ever Seen the Rain

On May 16, 1971, on the cover page of *The New York Times* the article "G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic in Vietnam" was published, stating that an estimated 60,000 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam are addicted to heroin, that deaths from overdoses were surging and that these addicted G.I.'s would return home and resort to crime in order to finance their heroin habit.[1] By summer 1971 reports on drug use by American[2] soldiers in Vietnam were a daily occurrence, constituting an atmosphere of panic and fear concerning Vietnam War veterans and heroin use. The American war in Vietnam, by summer 1971 a highly controversial issue, was increasingly linked to heroin consumption by the media and politicians alike. Exaggerated and sensational media coverage about the so-called 'heroin epidemic' dominated the public discourse of the early 1970s. Yet not only newspapers and newsmagazines reported about drug use by U.S. soldiers in Vietnam. The marijuana or heroin smoking G.I. turned into a mythical figure that is represented in novels, movies, memoirs and academic publications about the Vietnam War. The fine line between myth and reality is particularly blurry concerning the American experience in Vietnam and specifically the soldier's drug use was continuously re-imagined and turned into a fantasy that served political purposes.

This thesis aims to critically examine the media discourse of the Richard Nixon presidency (1969-1974) and the closure of the American war in Vietnam, and by doing so identifies the most prevalent metaphors and myths concerning drug use in Vietnam. I will demonstrate how these myths and metaphors about drug use in the U.S. constitute an interventionist logic that intersected with the predominant discourse of the pre-Nixon years that suggested that containment of communism was a cause for foreign invasions. Thus I contend that the Vietnam War functioned as a catalyst for the invention of the so-called War on Drugs as an interventionist logic.[3]

---

[1] Alvin Shuster, "G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/16/archives/gi-heroin-addiction-epidemic-in-vietnam-gi-heroin-addiction-is.html.

[2] In this thesis the terms 'American' and 'U.S.' are both used interchangeably to denote the United States of America. For reasons of readability and shortness both terms are employed, yet being aware that the term 'U.S.' also refers to other countries, yet in this thesis only the USA are meant. Further, being aware that 'America' indicates the entire continent, it is used synonymously with 'U.S.'

[3] In this thesis I am using the word 'invasion' interchangeably with 'intervention.' I am aware of the constituting power that language and specific words have – in fact I am dedicating a significant part of my analysis in part 7 to the power of language – and I am consciously choosing to use both words synonymously, refusing to follow a specific standpoint on whether the U.S. involvement was an invasion or only an intervention. 'Involvement' or 'engagement' serve in my thesis as the most neutral terms.

The memory of the Vietnam War is highly contested because the war challenged assumptions about U.S. identity and ideology. By tracing the origins of core assumptions of U.S. ideology the American presence in Vietnam is explained as well as how containment functioned as an interventionist logic. Further, American exceptionalism and other core principles of U.S. ideology are historically and theoretically explored in order to show how they constitute a logic of interventionism that avoids the label of imperialism. Tracing back to the ideas of containment allows to establish parallels with the underlying ideologies of the War on Drugs and how it was reconstructed as an interventionist logic to justify additional engagement in Indochina during the Nixon administration.

Officially President Richard Nixon declared the War on Drugs in 1971. Nixon's drastic call to arms against drugs transpired against the backdrop of the Vietnam War and mounting anti-war protests. Globally, the War on Drugs proclaimed by Nixon unfolded in a world characterized by ongoing anti-colonization struggles in the so-called Global South and against the backdrop of a Cold War framework. In the American war in Vietnam these issues intersected, framing the memories and myths that constitute the discourse concerning drug use in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War is one of the most controversial topics among U.S. historians, scholars, politicians, and the public. Nowadays, the American war in Vietnam is firmly rooted in the collective memory of the U.S. Yet memories of the Vietnam War should not be considered fact but significantly influenced by ideological preconceptions.

Thus, the guiding question for this thesis concerning the American war in Vietnam is not *What happened?* But rather: *How did the Nixon administration influence and shape the Vietnam War? How and why did the Nixon administration (re-)construct the War on Drugs? How did the War on Drugs relate to the Vietnam War? What are the underlying ideologies of Nixon's War on Drugs? How did the media narrative on drug consumption look like and how did it shape the public discourse in the early 1970s? How did the imagery of drug consumption enable the War on Drugs as an interventionist logic? How did the inherent racism of the drug discourse constitute an interventionist logic? What were the effects of the increased media coverage of drug use by U.S. soldiers in Vietnam?*

Scholarship and literature that was used for this thesis about the Vietnam War can loosely be grouped in three categories and time periods: Critical texts that condemned the war that were published during and immediately after the war; revisionist and apologetic texts primarily in the 1980s and 1990s; and recent texts analyzing the memory and symbolism of the war as a liberal critique.

Critical texts about the American war in Vietnam started to be published in the immediate years following the war that defined the collective memory by dispatched journalists. Prominent figures among them were Michael Herr, David Halberstam and Neil Sheehan.[4] Novels, memoirs and movies continued to influence the immediate post-war perception of Vietnam, conveying dramatically the high costs, the hardships, the damages and the feeling of randomness and lack of purpose of the war.[5] Thus the immediate post-Vietnam War reception was that the U.S. engagement was bound to fail from its inception, being portrayed as either misguided or imperial.[6] Scholars that can be grouped in this category are Noam Chomsky and Alfred McCoy.[7]

Revisionist historians are outnumbered by liberal or realist scholars, however, they influenced the debate and aided ongoing mythmaking processes. Revisionist works are defined by depicting the Vietnam War as unavoidable, seeing the opponents as dedicated communist, not questioning the logic of containment, and contending that the war might have been won. Further, they blamed the media, weak politicians and anti-war protests for the lost war.[8] Guenter Lewy's *Vietnam in America* is one of the first instances in an academic context the so-called stab-in-the-back myth is revived. Lewy does not question the reasons why the U.S. soldiers were fighting in Vietnam and perpetuates that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was based on benevolence.[9]

Yet recent scholarship brought studies that examine the arguments that led to the Vietnam War, drawing parallels to the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The field is extending,

---

[4] Prominent works are among others: David Halberstam, *The Making of a Quagmire and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era* (New York: Random House, 1965) and Michael Herr, *Dispatches* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1977). The novel *Dispatches*, a mix between memory and fiction, was constitutive for the memory of Vietnam, depicting the trauma of the soldiers, as well as heavy drug use.

[5] Among scholars that argue this are Bruce H. Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000) and Andrew Wiest, "Introduction: Historians and the Vietnam War," in *Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War*, ed. Andrew Wiest and Michael J. Doidge (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010). Influential movies in this regard were: *The Green Berets* (1968), *Taxi Driver* (1976), *The Deer Hunter* (1978), and *Apocalypse Now* (1978) among others.

[6] Wiest, "Introduction: Historians and the Vietnam War," 8. Among the mistakes that were agreed upon were that the nationalism of Ho Chi Minh was misinterpreted being obstructed by the belief in containment and that the U.S. applied the wrong tactics throughout the war – being too brutal and not adapting to local conditions.

[7] Both texts are used as secondary sources in this thesis, being aware of the limitations that texts from the 1970s might propose. However, both add valuable insights to my arguments. Noam Chomsky, *At War with Asia* (News York, NY: Vintage Books, 1970) and Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1972).

[8] Wiest, "Introduction: Historians and the Vietnam War," 8-9. Wiest lists Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), Henry Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1981), and Michael Lind, *Vietnam: The Necessary War* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1999) among these revisionist works.

[9] Marilyn B. Young, "Epilogue: The Vietnam War in American Memory," In *Vietnam and America: A Documented History*, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman et al. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 517-518.

new arguments and methodologies defining recent scholarship.[10] Liberal scholars of the war assess that although Marxist ideas were constituting for the North Vietnamese administration, self-determination was equally important, aiming for independence. Liberal-realist critique investigates the reasons for the U.S. engagement in Vietnam, pointing out how misjudgments of Vietnamese realities led to faulty efforts of containment. Marxist and neo-Marxist critique of the Vietnam War conceptualize the United States as capitalist state, opening and trying to control Southeast Asian markets, undertaking a neocolonial mission.[11] While a wide range of literature was consulted this thesis primarily relies on recent and critical scholarship in order to answer the questions above as these approaches appeared to be the most relevant for the scope of the analysis.

Throughout this thesis the term 'drugs' will be used as a neutral phrase to indicate legal and illegal psychoactive substances.[12] The literature consulted on the War on Drugs includes texts by David T. Courtwright, Paul Gootenberg, Michael M. Cohen, Lukasz Kamienski, Jeremy Kuzmarov and Daniel Weimer.[13] These scholars point out the socio-politically constructed nature of concepts such as addiction and also comment on the implications of the classification of certain psychoactive substances as illegal. Similarly they also examine the imagery, metaphors and myths concerning drug use that have become part of the public discourse since first drug control efforts.

Furthermore, the rather journalistic publications by Dan Baum and Edward J. Epstein that discuss the drug policies of the Nixon administration in detail are used in this thesis. Even

[10] Among those are: David L. Anderson (ed.), *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War and Its Enduring Historical Relevance* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011); Bruce H. Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000); Jeremy Kuzmarov, *The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009); Jerry Lembcke, *The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam* (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1998); David F. Schmitz, *Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); William V. Spanos, *American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008); and Rolf Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg: Ein Furchtbarer Irrtum* (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2018).

[11] Anderson, "Introduction," 3.

[12] David T. Courtwright, *Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 2. Courtwright points out that 'drugs' automatically signify addiction and abuse but the term is rather useful for its brevity.

[13] Relevant publications for my thesis are in alphabetical order: Michael M. Cohen, "Jim Crow's Drug War: Race, Coca Cola, and the Southern Origins of Drug Prohibition," *Southern Cultures* 12, no. 3 (2006): 55-79; David T. Courtwright, *Addicts Who Survived: An Oral History of Narcotic Use in America 1923-1965* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1989); Paul Gootenberg, "Talking Like a State: Drugs, Borders, and the Language of Control." in *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization*, ed. Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 101-127; Lukasz Kamienski, *Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Jeremy Kuzmarov, *The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009); and Daniel Weimer, "Drugs-as-a-Disease: Heroin, Metaphors, and Identity in Nixon's Drug War," *Janus Head* 6, no. 2 (2003): 260-281.

though the tone of these books is journalistic, they are based on well-documented interviews and archival documents and add new insights to the thesis.[14]

Drawing from diverse fields such as cultural and global history, literary and critical theory, linguistics and sociologies of race, class and gender, a critical and interdisciplinary interpretivist epistemology is followed. Further, the method of a critical discourse analysis is employed in order to show how U.S. ideologies function in the drug-Vietnam nexus. The dominant and representative discourses in the news media and academic publications during and after the war are identified and analyzed to show how ideas of anti-communism and the War on Drugs converged. Thus further sources for this thesis concerning the discourse of the drug-Vietnam nexus are newspaper articles from *The New York Times Archive*, *Newsweek* and *LIFE* articles, novels, psychological studies from the early 1970s, the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive*, and a speech by Richard Nixon.

This thesis and the critical discourse analysis are limited to English and German sources. Further, the scope of this thesis does not allow an all-encompassing discourse analysis of the drug-Vietnam nexus. The sources examined in the analysis were selected based on accessibility, exemplariness and their impact on the discourse. Additionally, reliable data and sources concerning drug use are rare. Political motivations, preconception and the issue of illegality obstruct the field of drug research. Quantitative data on drug use by G.I.'s in Vietnam is rare and reliable and objective records are hard to come by. Scholarship that discusses drug use in Vietnam perpetuate exaggerated estimates that were published in attention attracting newspaper articles and thus constitute a biased and self-referencing discourse.[15]

The wounds the Vietnam War inflicted on U.S. society were often emphasized and the fact that the U.S. chose to invade Vietnam, led by misguided notions of American exceptionalism and superiority, fades to the background. This is the power of discourse.

Being born in a generation long after the Vietnam War ended and by not growing up in the U.S. and being exposed to the collective memories regarding the topic gives me a more neutral distance to U.S. identity and ideologies, yet I can only access the issues through above named sources and texts.

The discursive construction of reality based on assumptions stemming from core U.S. ideals has political consequences. I assert that the War on Drugs was a discursive construction

[14] Dan Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure* (New York, NY: Little, Brown, 1997); Edward J. Epstein, *Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America* (New York, NY: Verso, 1990).
[15] The only exception to this are Lee Robins' studies on drug use in Vietnam and the United States by U.S. servicemen and texts that directly use the results of Robins' central study *The Vietnam Drug User Returns* (1974).

by the Nixon administration and media outlets that profited from a so-called drug 'epidemic' in multiple ways. Through Nixon's War on Drugs a logic of interventionism was invented that shared the same ideological foundation as containment of communism.

The thesis is divided in six main parts. The chapter 2 *House of the Rising Sun* defines core principles of U.S. ideology, traces their origins and racist consequences in order to assess how these core principles constitute the logic of containment. Ideas about U.S. identity and claims of American interventionism are discussed. Further, ideological similarities between the idea of containment of communism and the War on Drugs are traced, revealing its inherent racism. The chapter 2.4 *All Along the Watchtower* traces the logic of containment over the course of the Vietnam War and how the principle of containment gained an unstoppable momentum since the end of World War II culminating in a war that was neither wanted nor able to be won. The Vietnam War is conceptualized as a signifier of American interventionism on one hand and its continued setbacks as an aberration in the American exceptionalist self-perception on the other hand.

The chapter 3 *Magic Carpet Ride* discusses how ideas of psychoactive substance control were emerging at the turn of the 19th century. It is shown how U.S. narcotic control and the crusade against drugs was in its origins based on puritan morale and racist notions. Tracing the history of U.S. drug control it is analyzed how Harry J. Anslinger linked his crusade against drugs to the containment of communism in order to gain political power in the 1940s and 1950s. With Anslinger's tenure ending in 1962 the early 1960s were rather unremarkable in terms of drug control. Yet by chronologically depicting the sudden surge in newspaper headlines that were concerned with G.I. drug use in Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s the chapter concludes, demonstrating how the 'drug epidemic' dominated the discourse.

Castles Made of Sand, the fourth chapter, examines Nixon's war in Vietnam on one side and his War on Drugs on the other. Nixon's paradoxical strategy of ending the war through escalation is examined, as well as the forays into Laos and Cambodia. Further it is analyzed how Nixon's War on Drugs is significantly different to Anslinger's drug crusade. The chapter outlines how drugs were constructed as a foreign threat by the Nixon administration in order to gain control over U.S. government agencies and how first foreign interventions were carried out in the name of fighting drugs the inception of the War on Drugs as an interventionist logic.

Inspecting Lee Robins' studies on G.I. drug use in Vietnam and in the United States the chapter 5 *Run Through the Jungle* investigates the extent of the drug 'epidemic' in Vietnam. Reasons and conditions for drug use in wars in general and for the American war in Vietnam specifically are explored. Furthermore, CIA involvement in the heroin production of the so-

called Golden Triangle era is examined to show how anti-drug and anti-communist interests intersected in the interventionist practices of the CIA.

In part 6 *We've Gotta Get Out of This Place* the constituting power of a discourse and language is discussed as well as how the war metaphor and the disease metaphor function in relation to Nixon's War on Drugs. Further, it is established how U.S. core beliefs shape the drug war and its inherent racism is unveiled. 6.2 *Chain of Fools* analyzes the language and metaphors of the academic and media discourse concerning drug use by American soldiers in Vietnam, while in chapter 6.2.2 *Gimme Shelter* the Vietnam-drug discourse in *The New York Times* and in television news is traced and visualized, showing that it peaked in summer 1971. By utilizing the *Google Books Ngram Viewer* it is demonstrated how drugs as a topic surpassed communism in English publications at this point.

The final chapter 7 *Riders on the Storm* analyzes the political consequences of the Vietnam-drug discourse and discusses the so-called stab-in-the-back myth, the spat-upon-veteran myth and the myth of the addicted army. Finally, the intersections between anti-communist rhetoric and the language of the War on Drugs are resumed, showing how metaphors and discourse can construct and justify a political reality of military interventions.

Overall I argue that during Nixon's Vietnam War an inherently racist discourse that employed metaphors of war and disease concerning drug use – particular in relation to drug use by G.I.'s in Vietnam. This discourse was constructed by the media, academics and the Nixon administration that all benefitted from the fear-inducing discourse. Further, I contend that the Vietnam War acted as a catalyst that allowed the War on Drugs to be constituted on similar ideological foundations as containment of communism and ultimately superseded containment as the main logic of U.S. interventionism.

2 House of the Rising Sun

2.1 The Chain

The logic of containment characterized U.S. foreign policy after World War II. President Harry Truman (1945-1953) laid the groundwork with his speech in March 1947 which later came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. The Doctrine and the secret NSC 68 in 1950 both emphasized that the United States were obliged to defend freedom in the global area by confronting Soviet communism.[16] Furthermore, the anti-communist hysteria following World War II was amplified by U.S. politicians such as Harry Truman to dispute preceding domestic policies such as Roosevelt's New Deal.[17]

Guenter Lewy however does not question the logic of containment in justifying foreign intervention. Lewy legitimizes the Truman administration's support for the French imperial war in Indochina as being coherent and plausible, considering that China had turned communist. Further, Lewy argues that the "outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1959 confirmed the United States in the view that the issues in Vietnam were far greater than those of a mere colonial war and that French resistance to the Chinese-supported Việt Minh was a crucial link in the containment of communism."[18]

Yet as early as 1970, at the height of the Vietnam War, the containment ideology is questioned. Noam Chomsky calls containment "the American crusade against Communism," underlines the racist undertones of containment policies and exposes economic motivations in the ideology of anti-communism.[19] He points out that containment is directed mainly "against the effort of indigenous movements to extricate their societies from the integrated world system dominated largely by American capital."[20] Further, Chomsky observes that the idea of anti-communism "has served as a highly effective technique of popular mobilization in support of American policies of intervention and subversion in the postwar period."[21] Anti-communism serves as a justifying ideology for intervention and the expansion of the American empire

[16] Matthew R. Pembleton, "Imagining A Global Sovereignty: U.S. Counternarcotic Operation in Istanubl during the Early Cold War and the Origins of the Foreign 'War on Drugs,'" *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 40. The NSC 68 is officially called the *United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, a top secret strategy paper by the Department of Defense.
[17] Douglas C. Kinder, "Cold Warrior: Harry J. Anslinger and Illicit Narcotics Traffic," *Pacific Historical Review* 50, no. 2 (May 1981): 169.
[18] Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 3-4. Lewy belongs to a number of revisionist scholars that reframed the Vietnam War in the 1980s. He does not question the logic of containment as an intervening principle.
[19] Noam Chomsky, *At War with Asia* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 4-8.
[20] Ib., 5.
[21] Ib., 8.

"when the civilizing mission of the white race can no longer be invoked."[22] The Philippine-American War (1899-1902) was validated as the civilizing mission of the White Man's Burden, whereas the Korean War (1950-1953) and primarily the French Indochina War (1946-1954) were framed as safeguarding the free people from communism.[23] Chomsky assesses that the primary aim of interventionist U.S. foreign policy was to open capitalist markets for U.S. private investments and was part of a larger attempt to restrain autonomous economic growth.[24] By contending that anti-communism is an imperial logic that enables the U.S. administrations to expand the "system of military state capitalism," Chomsky concludes in 1970 that it is unlikely that the Cold War would come to an end as long as it still serves a function.[25]

Observing that the Cold War ultimately came to an end twenty years after Noam Chomsky published *At War with Asia*, I argue that a new interventionist logic had to be constructed that is in accord with the core principles of U.S. identity and serves just as well as containment as a strategy to mobilize public support for imperial actions. I contend that this interventionist logic would be the so-called War on Drugs, surpassing containment in the 1970s and 1980s, as shown in part 6. The logic of containment as an instrument of imperialism and interventionism was not suddenly invented by Cold Warriors in the aftermath of World War II but rather is based on a number of core American beliefs that structured U.S. American identity since the inception of the nation. Understanding these core ideals is key to examine how interventionist logics such as containment and the War on Drugs function. Recognizing how core ideological beliefs constitute containment and further the War on Drugs – and ultimately the War on Terror – is necessary in order to uncover the mechanisms of interventionism. U.S. imperial structures are hidden behind a wall of exceptionalism that claims that the American experience is unique, that its morals and values are superior, and that only American liberty is truly free. However, racism is exceptionalism's Achilles heel. Uncovering the inherent racism in the containment and – more importantly – drug discourses, racist and 'othering' practices can be observed that allow a critical reassessment of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and other conflicts.

Central U.S. American beliefs become visible in the political and media discourse, yet to examine the discourse along the lines of these core ideals that justify why the United States intervened in Vietnam in the first place, why drugs are demonized in U.S. society, and how the ideas of containment and the War on Drugs became powerful categories for domestic and

[22] Ib.
[23] Ib.
[24] Ib., 16-22.
[25] Ib., 27.

foreign policies, it is necessary to scrutinize the foundation and roots of U.S. ideology. In the following the inception and evolution of U.S. core principles such as exceptionalism, capitalism, individualism, liberty, modernity and interventionism is explored.

2.2 For What It's Worth

Specifically during the times of the Cold War the United States perceived themselves as 'special' and 'exceptional' and were convinced of the universal and teleological claim of "what America is today will be the world tomorrow."[26] These notions of American universalism date "back to the revolutionary origins of the state" while "their ideological manifestations developed more slowly."[27] Thus, U.S. ideology can be seen as over two hundred years old yet continuously evolving. Westad interestingly claims that the "history of America's interventions in the Third World is very much the history of how this ideology developed over time and how it framed the policies of the U.S. foreign policy elite."[28] Vietnam can be seen as a focal point where core ideas of U.S. ideology led to a single-minded worldview that damaged entire generations of Vietnamese people and U.S. American soldiers alike. Westad assesses that from the birth of the United States in the 18th century its foreign policy was established as expansionist.[29]

Since the inception of the United States, U.S. self-conception has been coined by "the conviction that the United States represents a virtuous alternative to an old world resigned to its own amorality," which reflects on foreign relations throughout the centuries.[30]

The U.S. American concepts of liberty, anti-collectivism, modernity, expansion, the market and anti-centralization are core ideas of U.S. ideology.[31] These core ideas that led to the foundation of the American state were identical to those that drove them to acquire territory from European colonizers and Native American nations, expanding the U.S. American nation across the entire continent in the 18th and 19th century. This development is referred to as Manifest Destiny. This idea that dates back to the 1840s states that it is the white settlers' manifest destiny to expand westwards across the continent and seize the territories of the Native American nations. Further, Manifest Destiny was a "concrete imperialist program."[32] The often violent expansion of white settlers across the continent was marked by Puritan notions and ideas

[26] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Intervention and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), 9.
[27] Ib.
[28] Ib.
[29] Ib.
[30] Kendrick Oliver, "Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism: (Ir)rationalizing the Massacre at My Mai," *Journal of American Studies* 37, no. 2 (2003): 254.
[31] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 10-13.
[32] Ib., 12.

about conquering and penetrating the wilderness in the west. The philosopher and scholar William Spanos links U.S. American interventionist and expansionist actions to this historical Puritan mission in the wilderness. The Vietnam War and the visual representation of a green and impenetrable jungle as its setting "provided the context for the renewal of America's exceptionalist errand in the global wilderness."[33]

The defining principle of liberty for American citizens distinguished the nation from others in the 18th century and "gave meaning to the existence of a separate American state."[34] As seen with the Native American people, the promise of liberty was only sincere for educated white male individuals. Notions of racism clearly determined that Native and Latin American people were excluded from the nation-building process, as well as African Americas. Further, anti-collectivism was central to being American: only individuals could be republicans. Leading up to the Cold War this idea became central to oppose communist and collectivist ideas that had grown in Europe and came into state structures from 1917 onwards. Throughout the generations an echo lingered that American individuality and liberty had to be defended, fearing that mass migration would subvert American freedom by bringing collectivist beliefs into the U.S. that undermined the cultural identity of the U.S. ruling elite.[35]

In U.S. ideology the core ideas of modernity and science imply for that rationality and the principles of enlightenment matter, connecting technology and science to the idea of liberty. Thus, U.S. American policy makers saw certain areas of the world in need of modernization through technology as the only path to liberty.[36] This idea of superiority of technology ties into the assumption that it seemed logical and rational that the Vietnam War must be won since the U.S. possessed better technological means. Further, U.S. interventions in the so-called Global South in the 20th century followed this core idea of U.S. ideology that 'non-rational' natives needed to be controlled. Coincidentally, these 'non-rational' natives were usually people of color.

Additionally, the capitalist markets are a defining feature of U.S. ideology and foreign policy: "faith in the market transformed itself into a self-serving belief in open international markets."[37] The successes of capitalist open markets, fueled by rapid industrialization and mass migration in the late 19th century and the subsequent transformation of national industrial capability into international power validated core ideological beliefs not only about the power

[33] William V. Spanos. *American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam* (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2008), ix.
[34] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 10.
[35] Ib.
[36] Ib., 11.
[37] Ib., 12.

of the market but further "about the uniquely righteous character of American civilization."[38] The U.S. American elite perceived that the ascension of the U.S. as a global economic power "was evidence of the blessings bestowed upon a worthy people by an approving God."[39] The success of American industrialization after the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the emphasis on the individual led to a capitalist society.

The close of the 19th century brought the Spanish-American War in 1898, where the U.S. was fighting their first global war in the theatres of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Hawaii and the Philippines, defeating the last European colonial power in the Americas.[40] For the first time the U.S. faced the questions whether they wanted to be a global imperial power. Until today Puerto Rice remains an unincorporated territory, the Philippines were taken as a colony. With the closure of the so-called American frontier signaling an end of territorial expansion on the North American continent, cultural anxieties over immigration led to the idea that overseas territories were needed as an outlet of the demographic pressure that was created by migration. Frederick Jackson Turner's lecture at the Chicago World Exhibition in 1893 concluded that the U.S. was running out of the frontier and thus opportunities beyond the continental U.S. must be sought. Hence, the so-called 'Turner's Thesis' can be seen as the theoretical foundation of an expansionist foreign policy that materialized in 1898.

The term 'frontier' in relation to U.S. global history is often used by historians to veil U.S. imperial interests. 'Frontier,' as well as 'superpower' are nouns that enable U.S. exceptionalist historiography and indicate a way of not denominating the U.S. as imperial or empire.[41] Further the dimension of the imperial can be seen as a crucial instrument to discern U.S. global entanglements in past and present. The definition of the imperial as "a dimension of power in which asymmetries in the scale of political action, regimes of spatial ordering, and modes of exceptionalizing difference enable and produce relations of hierarchy, discipline, dispossession, traction, and exploitation" emphasizes the notion of difference and the importance of categories such as race, class, and gender for structuring societies.[42] Furthermore, the imperial is constituted by its consequences and effects and should not be confined to single historical actors or events.[43] This thesis does not ask whether there was an U.S. Empire, but

[38] Oliver, "Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism," 254.
[39] Ib.
[40] Henry Heller, *The Cold War and New Imperialism: A Global History, 1945-2005* (New York: Monthly Review, 2006), 23.
[41] Paul A. Kramer, "Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States and the World," American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1358-1361.
[42] Ib., 1349. The category of race in relation to empire and drugs and empire is especially important for this thesis.
[43] Ib., 1350.

rather takes the notion of the imperial to serve as an analytical tool to challenge assumptions and dominant discourses.

Yet in the United States and in U.S. historiography the idea that nation-state and empire are mutually exclusive was constitutive in U.S. exceptionalist thought and have hidden imperial history.[44] For instance the category race matters for explaining how President Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination only applied to certain peoples. For certain kind of peoples – non-white, colonized – it was believed that real freedom and liberty from the colonizers "would only lead to more instability and suffering" and that self-determination only applied to rational people.[45] Despite the fact that a number of non-white nation states were acknowledged throughout the 20th century, the determining matter of race becoming evident "in American backing for the white Cuban elite after 1898, Woodrow Wilson's refusal to acknowledge self-determination for non-white peoples, and the United States' lasting support for Afrikaner racial nationalism."[46]

The tradition of American interventionism can be traced back as far as 1823 when the Monroe Doctrine was ratified. The doctrine stated that the United States had the right to intervene in Latin America in order to keep European rivals out of what the U.S. considered its sphere of influence. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine in 1904 denotes an important instance of U.S. empire building; the corollary stated the right to intervene when financial or economic interests were in danger. This came to be known as 'dollar diplomacy' and signified an increasing number of interventions in Latin America.[47]

The idea of American exceptionalism became particularly prominent post World War II. Military and economic successes of the war "blended in American thought with the assumption of righteousness. The cultural myth of American exceptionalism – of the goodness of America vanquishing the evils of autocracy, dictatorship, and militarism – seemed to have been realized."[48] The Philippines however, acquired in the Spanish-American War in 1898,

[44]Ib., 1366. The notion of the opposition of empire and nation-state led to a number of narratives that established U.S. exceptionalism, for instance how colonizing the Philippines were rather nation-building practices.
[45] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 16-17. Wilson also witnessed the Mexican Revolution and concluded – feeding from racist notions – that Latin American people were clearly non-rational and that self-governing and self-determination for the people in the Third World would only end in insecurity, hardships and misery.
[46] Kramer, "Power and Connection," 1370.
[47] Jill Lepore, *These Truths: A History of the United States* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2018), 234-235.
[48] David L. Anderson, "Introduction: The Vietnam War and Its Enduring Historical Relevance," in *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War,* ed. David L. Anderson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011): 22.

reveal the hypocrisy of this idea and show how a discourse of liberty is used "to try to discourage economic barriers that worked against U.S. interests."[49]

As such, one of the central core principles of U.S. American identity and ideology is anti-collectivism. The turn of the century signified hope for new markets and the U.S. tried to protect and balance a world system defined by capitalism.[50] Yet in the 1920s following the Russian Revolution of 1917, fears of instability in the global arena were aggravated. Particularly the authoritarian collectivism and the alternate modernism proposed by the Bolsheviks ignited a sense of direct opposition and competition. As early as 1919 a first so-called Red Scare can be observed in the United States: fears that Bolshevist ideas would spread through the arrival of new immigrants and large strikes by labor unions ignited anti-communist and anti-collectivist sentiments. In the 1920s and 1930s immigration into the U.S. reached its peak accompanied by post-war isolationism.[51] The central hindrance to Americanize immigrants were the ideologies that they already have been exposed to prior to their arrival in the United States: "By the 1920s the most threatening of these were Communism, both because of its revolutionary collectivism and because it purported to represent a version of modernity more advanced than that presented by America."[52] To prevent the spread of communist ideas in the U.S. they were actively categorized as anti-modern and traditionalist.[53]

After the victory of World War II the United States "had the possibility, many in Washington believed, to remake the world."[54] This was tried to be achieved through the principles of 'emancipation' and 'guidance' that had emerged from 19th century conflicts over slavery and the reconstruction era. President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) defined American foreign policy through the concept of 'positive nationalism' meaning that the U.S. would support certain nations and peoples in defining these nationalisms. Westad further argues that the end of World War II has shown that most of the world desired American ideas and products.[55] U.S. policy makers, among them Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963), tried to reconstruct the world after the war in terms of a free

[49] Ib. It should be noted that David L. Anderson, a U.S. American scholar, avoids the term empire or imperial in his text.
[50] Ib., 15.
[51] Lepore, *These Truths*, 324-330 and 477.
[52] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 18.
[53] Ib.
[54] Ib., 24.
[55] Ib., 20.

capitalist market. Once postcolonial left-leaning nationalist governments defied these markets, the United States interfered.[56]

The Philippines proved to be a first opportunity to export American ideals and try to emancipate and guide "a culture regarded as alien," leading to the belief that U.S. was able to bring 'positive nationalism' to Asian people.[57] Tools to shape decolonizing countries in order to oppose Soviet communism and support U.S. capitalist ideas were among other "the political and cultural seduction of local elites, access to local markets, and military aid and training."[58] The 20th century was marked by a wave of decolonization processes. U.S. policy makers felt responsible to guide these processes since communist ideologies were also appropriated by the local people to challenge the colonizers. Primarily the Chinese communist revolution and the failure in Indonesia where a lack of appreciation and gratitude for U.S. efforts was perceived led President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-1961) to favor covert strategies in battling for the 'hearts and minds' of the people, to gain economic influence and oppose communist ideologies.[59] Furthermore, after the Korean War (1950-1953) it became clear that "there were limits to the sacrifices most Americans were willing to make in order to extend Americanism abroad."[60]

However, by exporting liberal ideas to the decolonizing people and nations it was also a way of averting domestic resentments. Thus, he argues, U.S. foreign involvement cannot be analyzed without reflecting on U.S. societal developments. The strength of the U.S. economy in the 1950s and 1960s and the need for foreign export markets, as well as growing social discontents thus led to the increased interventions.[61]

Overall ideas of liberty, individualism, the capitalist market, anti-collectivism, modernity, expansion and anti-centralization constituted U.S. American identity since the inception of the nation. These principles define U.S. ideology and position it in opposition to the communist and collectivist ideologies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Further, these ideas determined foreign policy in the 20th century and were the constituting components of the 20th century interventionist logics such as Containment, the War on Drugs or the War on Terror. The exceptionalist self-

[56] Robert Buzzanco, Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life (Malden MA: Blackwell, 1999), 18. Robert Buzzanco lists the following examples for such leftist governments: Congo and Patrice Lumumba, Indonesia and Sukarno, Cuba and Fidel Castro, Iran and Mohammad Mossadegh, Guatemala and Jacobo Arbenz, and India and Jawaharlal Nehru.
[57] Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 23.
[58] Ib., 25.
[59] Ib., 27.
[60] Ib., 26.
[61] Heller, *The Cold War and the New Imperialism*, 163-164.

conception of American identity through these concepts disguises imperial actions and is not seen as such by U.S. policy makers, society, and historians.

2.3 A Horse with no Name

Parallels between the logic of containment and the War on Drugs can be drawn. For instance the principle of modernization remedy both for communist thought and drug addiction. Further, containment and the War on Drugs individually depended on the 'rotten apple' metaphor to prove the contagious nature: one rotten apple will spoil the entire batch.[62] This sentiment resonates in the so-called 'domino theory' that Eisenhower coined in April 1954.

Furthermore, I argue that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a tool of interventionism and the logic of the imperial. As argued in part 5 the actions of the CIA show how anti-communist and anti-drug ideas intersect. Particularly the CIA's involvements in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, investigated by Alfred McCoy, are exemplary for the CIA's role as intervening in the name of containment and anti-drug policies.

McCoy states, supporting Noam Chomsky's assessments, that CIA agents and U.S. policy makers rationalized their "entanglement in foreign adventures" by adopting a "militantly anti-Communist ideology."[63] Hence, containment functioned as a tool that the CIA wielded. The organization "became the vanguard of America's anti-Communist crusade" that recruited dubious allies.[64] By portraying Asian anti-colonial and nationalist battles as pawns of either Soviet or Chinese communism, neutrality was condemned as 'immoral' and dictatorships such as the military governments in Taiwan or South Vietnam since 1954) were constructed as 'free China' or 'free Vietnam.'[65]

Furthermore, by reducing the Cold War as a bilateral conflict between the USSR and the United States policy makers on both sides were caught in a net of misunderstandings concerning conflicts in the decolonizing worlds. Framing phenomena and conflicts such as the Vietnam War or the War on Drugs in a Cold War binary aids in disguising interventionist and imperial notions that go beyond simple capitalist or communist explanations. The so-called Sino-Soviet Split between the PRC and the USSR demonstrates that both capitalism and communism are not homogenous concepts, as seen in the struggle over global communist leadership.[66]

---

[62] Pembleton, "Imagining a Global Sovereignty," 41.
[63] Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 7.
[64] McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin*, 7.
[65] Ib.
[66] Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015) 215-223. For instance the Soviet Union was majorly anti-capitalist, while the PRC defined their brand of communism as anti-imperialist. The Sino-Soviet Split also becomes visible over the course

In the case of aid for the North Vietnamese Army it meant that the U.S. administration perceived Soviet support as strategies fashioned to obstruct the American army, however, "Soviet policy in Vietnam might actually have been a product of […] the struggle for a revolutionary leadership with the PRC" taking priority over U.S.-Soviet relations.[67]

Both, the U.S. and the USSR, only reacted to dynamics of the Vietnamese revolution, driven by their interventionist ethos rooted in their specific ideologies.[68] Besides, seeing the Cold War as a bilateral rivalry excludes the agency of regional and local peoples that were struggling against colonialism and trying to form a nation.

Containment proved to be a powerful tool to justify financial, economic, and military interventions in developing countries in the first decades following World War II. In the logic of containment the ideas of Manifest Destiny resonate. It took the disrupting force of the Vietnam War that containment as an interventionist logic was questioned. The memory of the Vietnam War remains the "specter that refuses to be accommodated to the imperial exceptionalist discourse of post-Vietnam America," as William Spanos phrased it.[69]

2.4 All Along the Watchtower

The American Vietnam War can be seen as an exceptionalist charge into a global wilderness, U.S. motivations being driven by the unfailing belief in U.S. superiority concerning their technology and their ideas how a nation should be ruled. In the following, it will be traced how Vietnam became a new American frontier that would fundamentally change and challenge U.S. core ideals and identity.

2.4.1 Hello Vietnam

The territories of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam today – called Indochina – were colonized by France in the late 19th century to extract raw materials such as rubber from the region as well as a strategic position vis-à-vis China.[70] Vietnamese identity is thus shaped by the ideas of resisting against 'foreign' invaders: the Chinese, then the French, the Japanese and ultimately

---

of the Vietnam War: Détente, beginning with Nixon in 1969, was seen by the Chinese leadership as a betrayal by the USSR to sacrifice the fight against imperialism in order to allow 'peaceful co-existence.' The cases of Congo, Algeria, and Vietnam show how the USSR and PRC were rivals in gaining influence and spreading their ideas in the Global South.

[67] Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*, 223.

[68] Westad, *Global Cold War*, 180.

[69] Spanos, *American Exceptionalism*, x.

[70] A brief overview of the events of the First Indochina War, the American Vietnam War, and U.S. policy decision can be found in the appendix on page XLV. The events of the Vietnam War described in this chapter focus on ideology and drug trade. Further, the term 'Indochina' will be used in this thesis as way to describe the region of (former) French colonialism, being aware that 'Indochina' is a term that European geographers used to demarcate their colonies.

the United States. Anti-colonialism and national liberation were the motivations that brought Ho Chi Minh to Paris in January 1919 to lobby for a free Vietnam, being denied by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and encountering communist ideas for the first time. During World War II the Japanese took Vietnam from the French in 1941 and Minh started working out of China. Once the Japanese were finally defeated, Minh returned to Vietnam and proclaimed independence including elements of the U.S. American Declaration of Independence. Yet Charles de Gaulle demanded that Indochina was to be placed under French rule again. De Gaulle received support from Winston Churchill, the U.S. conceded and did not recognize Vietnamese independence – in hindsight a tragedy. Once the French restituted their rule in 1945, the independence movement that fought against Japanese rule resumed violent resistance. In the First Indochina War (1946-1954) between the French occupiers and Vietnamese independence fighters, the Việt Minh, 74.000 French soldiers and estimated 250.000 Vietnamese died.[71] Under the French rule in Indochina an opium franchise was established and "became a lucrative source of income for the French colonial administrators."[72] Throughout the Japanese occupation Indochinese opium production grew to estimated 60 tons in 1944 and reached self-sufficiency in the late 1950s.[73] Alfred McCoy investigates ties between the French and American secret service and opium smugglers in Saigon. He accuses the French and the American administrations of giving the intelligence agencies free reign in the 1950s to control Saigon's underworld. McCoy traces ties from the French secret police to the *Binh Xuyen*, Saigon river pirates that smuggled opium, in order to assist their war against the Việt Minh. Further, he connects the CIA to the Corsican mafia that was active in shipping opium and heroin out of Vietnam to the ports in Marseille, claiming that control over Saigon was essential in the first days of the U.S.-supported Diem regime.[74]

U.S. American financial and material support for the French imperialists was justified by the Truman administration (1945-1953) by the principle of containment. The State Department, led by Dean Acheson, argued that Ho Chi Minh functioned as a Soviet agent, showing that the logic of anti-communism was the defining mode of analysis for any kind of global occurrence.[75] However, being aware of the contradiction of supporting the French imperial effort and constructing the United States as an anti-imperial nation in opposition to the

[71] Rolf Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg: Ein Furchtbarer Irrtum* (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2018), 7.
[72] Peter Brush, "Higher and Higher: American Drug Use in Vietnam," Vietnam Magazine 15, no. 4 (2002).
[73] Ib.
[74] Alfred McCoy, "Heroin and Politics in Saigon," in *Vietnam and America: A Documented History*, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1995), 97-99.
[75] Chomsky, *At War with Asia*, 31.

Soviet Union, the initial U.S. involvement was tried to be kept secret.[76] The U.S. did condone colonialism, but after the Chinese Revolution communism was the bigger worry for the U.S. and aid for France was increased. Being aware of the American position, Anderson claims that "French officials frequently characterized their military effort as an anti-Communist fight, not a colonial war."[77] Further, Anderson assesses, "[t]he legacies of the Open Door Policy, Wilsonian internationalism, appeasement at Munich, victory in World War II, and the Truman Doctrine directly influenced U.S. assessments of the strategic importance of the conflict in Vietnam to the United States."[78]

2.4.2 Going Up the Country

The Cold Warriors in Washington saw the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 as the affirmation that Asian communist movements were aggressive and ought to be stopped yet in the beginning of the 1950s U.S. policy makers advocated for the French to take on that role in Vietnam.[79] However the French Expeditionary Forces suffered critical losses between 1950 and 1952, while the United States continuously increased financial aid. In 1954 President Eisenhower publicly mentions the domino principle for the first time, defining the containment strategy for the following decades. In July 1954 the Geneva Conference took place, where a ceasefire between the French and the Việt Minh was agreed.[80] France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) agreed upon separating their military forces among the seventeenth parallel and to hold national elections in the next eighteen months. Drawing on the so-called Pentagon Papers, Bruce Franklin reasons that even though the DRV demanded democratic elections, these efforts were obstructed by the Pentagon, Eisenhower, and the Saigon puppet regime that feared that Ho Chi Minh would win.[81] In this context Franklin points out a number of "dominant fantasies" that most Americans seem to believe in, among them the idea, that "there were two separate nations called South Vietnam and North Vietnam" before the U.S. entanglement started.[82] Another American fantasy is according to Franklin that the leadership in South Vietnam was democratically elected and that ultimately, "South Vietnam was being invaded by North Vietnam, a communist dictatorship."[83]

---

[76] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 25.
[77] Anderson, "Introduction," 25.
[78] Ib., 23.
[79] Ib., 25.
[80] Ib., 27.
[81] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 29-30.
[82] Ib., 27.
[83] Ib., 27-28. These three conceptions about the Vietnam War, only three out of Franklin's fourteen-point list, show that the American memory of the war is distorted. The issue of memory and myth will be discussed extensively in chapter 6.

According to John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under Eisenhower, the French defeat meant that now the USA were able to start from scratch without the taint of colonialism. The struggle in Vietnam was redefined under Eisenhower as a fight against communism and for democratization and nation-building, along the lines of the domino theory.[84] Following the 1954 French defeat in Indochina, Ngo Dinh Diem is installed as the leader of the newly founded South Vietnamese State (RVN). Drawing on the U.S. experience in Korea and Germany, a divided Vietnam to contain Chinese aspirations was seen as preferable to a communist Vietnam.[85] Diem, a catholic in a predominantly Buddhist country, introduced a number of disputed reforms and ruled as a brutal and corrupt dictator. Widespread opposition against Diem spread in South Vietnam, culminating in the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in December 1960, fighting a guerilla war against the Diem and demanding a unified Vietnam.[86]

The elections that were promised at the Geneva Conference in 1954 never took place. Instead, the U.S. continued their financial support to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) – 85 percent of the army's expenses were funded by the United States – and assessed that military security of South Vietnam was more important than democratic development.[87] For Secretary of State Dulles it was sufficient that Diem was anti-communist and determined hence the agreed on elections were no longer necessary.[88] The Eisenhower administration also extended the powers of the CIA significantly, on one hand to avoid congressional restrictions and on the other hand to bypass international agreements. By the mid-1950s, after the successful CIA covert operations in Guatemala (1954) and Iran (1953), covert missions against the communist enemy in North Vietnam were authorized while in South Vietnam the United States succeeded the French in training the ARVN and nation-building.[89]

Between 1954 and 1963 the U.S. administrations were unwaveringly increasing their military engagement in Vietnam. These also marked the period where domestic protests against the Cold War were silenced through communist witch-hunts and daily repression. Therefore, "by the early 1960s, the aftershocks of that earlier political hammering, combined with the stifling of foreign policy debate by 'bipartisanship' between the two ruling political parties and

[84] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 19. Eisenhower signed on August 12, 1954, the NSC 5429/2, stating that all available means are to be utilized to avoid further communist victories in the region.
[85] Heller, *The Cold War and the New Imperialism*, 164.
[86] Ib., 165-167; and Anderson, "Introduction," 28-32. The NLF was dubbed as 'Vietcong' by Diem, whether the insurgents were communists, Buddhists, or nationalists. Using the derogatory term Vietcong means that the logic of containment in opposing the NLF is not questioned.
[87] Anderson, "Introduction," 32.
[88] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 21.
[89] Charles DeBenedetti, An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 12.

supersaturation in Cold War culture, had stripped the American people of any dissenting political consciousness or even a vocabulary capable of accurately describing global political reality."[90] Thus, a language that could comprehend what was happening in Vietnam that was not interspersed with the logic of containment did not exist to discuss the war in more neutral terms during and after the war. Any form of critique was unfailingly labeled as anti-communist. The public and media outlets that attempted a diverse critique or opposition to the American war in Vietnam were seen as traitors and communists. This anti-communist discourse buried the notion that U.S. actions could be classified as 'imperial,' although French strategies were continued.

2.4.3 The Unknown Soldier

President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) was convinced that communism in the Global South had to be faced resolutely, persuaded by the ramifications of the Cuban Revolution. By 1963 about 16,000 U.S. military advisers were active in Vietnam despite failing efforts by the U.S. administration to democratize Diem's government.[91] Throughout the Kennedy-presidency, the media supported the anti-communist stance and the growing engagement in Vietnam. Until Kennedy's assassination on 22. November 1963, only 78 U.S. soldiers died in Vietnam. The Cuban crisis reinforced the public's perception that communism had to be stopped and the editors of the major news outlets did not question American methods in Vietnam.[92]

A speech before the American Friends of Vietnam by Senator John F. Kennedy in 1956 shows patronizing attitudes of the U.S. governing elite towards Vietnam:

> "Vietnam represents a test of American responsibility and determination in Asia. If we are not the parents of little Vietnam, then surely we are the godparents. We presided at its birth, we gave assistance to its life, we helped to shape its future … This is our offspring – we cannot abandon it, we cannot ignore its needs. And if it falls victim to any of the perils that threaten its existence – Communism, political anarchy, poverty and the rest – then the United States, with some justification, will be held responsible; and our prestige in Asia will sink to a new low."[93]

By depicting Vietnam as 'little' and toddler-alike, Vietnamese agency is denied and the U.S. principle of guidance is presented by Kennedy as the only logical conclusion. The Vietnamese are illustrated as weak-willed that will be swayed by any populist ideology, denying that the

[90] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 53.
[91] Heller, *The Cold War and the New Imperialism*, 167.
[92] Christoph Pöll, "Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg: Die Rolle der Medien während des Vietnamkrieges," *Historia Scribere* 4 (2012): 336.
[93] Sen. John F. Kennedy, "America's Stake in Vietnam" (speech), American Friends of Vietnam, June 1956, in Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1980): 12-13.

Vietnamese have nationalist interests. Racist notions of educating and guiding people of color are seen in these attitudes that were shared by a broad majority in the United States.

During his brutal reign Diem had alienated the majority Buddhist population and the U.S. administration was increasingly dissatisfied with Diem yet U.S. military aid steadily progressed: in 1961 400 Green Berets (U.S. Army Special Forces advisers) were in South Vietnam to train the ARVN, in 1962 the Kennedy administration escalated military aid and sent 9,000 advisers to Vietnam. Diem was assassinated on November 2, 1963, during a military coup a few weeks before Kennedy, with over 16,000 Green Berets being active at that time.[94]

2.4.4 Bring Them Home

The American War in Vietnam escalated with the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969). From 1964 to 1973, 58,269 U.S. military personnel died in Vietnam and over 300,000 soldiers were injured. An estimated 500,000-800,000 Vietnam veterans suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with high suicide rates in this group.[95]

The Johnson and later the Nixon administration "would often justify the American war in Vietnam as an effort to defend an ally, the RVN, from an outside aggressor, the DRVN."[96] However, the escalation of the U.S. engagement in Vietnam was not a reaction to an invasion by the DRV, but rather a series of decisions by the Johnson administration that were guided by the containment logic and the tactical and ideological decisions of his predecessors.[97] David Anderson determines that Johnson was "in many ways implementing what could also be termed 'Truman's War,' 'Eisenhower's War,' or 'Kennedy's War.'"[98] The so-called Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 where due to bad weather conditions an attack on an U.S. Navy espionage patrol by North Vietnamese torpedo boats may or may not have happened led to Johnson authorizing a series of retaliatory air raids against North Vietnam. Johnson employed the Tonkin incident as a means to secure the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on August 10, 1964 from Congress, granting U.S. forces the right "to repel aggression in Southeast Asia."[99] According to David Anderson, Johnson is to be held accountable for the escalation of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam, however, the options he had concerning the conflict were determined by the preceding presidents and their ideological directions.[100]

[94] Anderson, "Introduction," 35-37.
[95] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 7.
[96] Buzzanco, *Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life*, 61.
[97] Anderson, "Introduction," 38-39.
[98] Ib., 39.
[99] Ib., 41.
[100] Ib., 43.

Two events during the Johnson administration characterized the American memory of the war and changed its course: The My Lai massacre on March 16, 1968, and the Tet Offensive in January and February 1968. The Tet Offensive, named after the Vietnamese New Year's celebrations, was a coordinated attack by the North Vietnamese forces at multiple locations over the south. Christoph Pöll argues that Tet for the first time heavy fighting happened in front of American television cameras. Since the cameras used to be rather heavy and difficult to transport, heavy fighting and devastating images from the front have by 1968 not yet reached American households. The U.S. public was suddenly confronted with images of overwhelmed officers, urban warfare, countless bodies littering the streets of Saigon, and injured U.S. soldiers. The war in Vietnam appeared suddenly in an entirely different light to the American public and promises of the Johnson administration that the war would soon be won were not believed any longer.[101] The discursive framework of the Vietnam War was disturbed by the surge of news. Before Tet, the public discourse concerning the war illustrated "a correlation between the United States' progress towards victory in Vietnam and advances in the welfare of the Vietnamese people."[102] Even though the North Vietnamese troops were pushed back, Tet marked a strategic victory for the North Vietnamese, considering the psychological impression it left on the American public and armed forces.[103]

President Johnson and the leader of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, General Westmoreland, followed a policy of attrition. So-called search-and-destroy operations to kill as many North Vietnamese fighters as possible, also put U.S. soldiers at a high risk.[104] The average American soldier that served in Vietnam was nineteen or twenty years old and belonged to the working class. The army fighting in Vietnam was the youngest army ever deployed.[105] The aims of the Vietnam War were perceived as vague and a high enemy body count was the only measurable scale of success leading to random violence and high casualties on both sides. When the number U.S. casualties rose, desire for revenge grew.[106]

The My Lai massacre in March 1968 marked the most discussed instance of revenge. Although no enemy fire was encountered, the U.S. army Charlie Company of the 11th Light Infantry Brigade killed over 500 unresisting villagers of the hamlets called My Lai 4, most of them women and children. Instances of rape were also accounted. Over a year later in April

[101] Pöll, "Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg," 335-344. *The New York Times* was one of the few media outlets that reported critically before the Tet Offensive.
[102] Oliver, "Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism," 255.
[103] Anderson, "Introduction," 52-53.
[104] Heller, *The Cold War and the New Imperialism*, 170, and Anderson, "Introduction," 47.
[105] Anderson, "Introduction," 47. The average age of the foreign combat troops in World War II was twenty five.
[106] Ib., 47-48.

1969, after the report of a guilt-ridden G.I. that witnessed the massacre, an investigation was opened. The media started covering the My Lai atrocity and the trial against William Calley, the lieutenant in charge, in November 1969.[107] In the aftermath of the massacre that unfolded publicly one and a half years later many aspects of the war in Vietnam and American exceptionalism were questioned. Public opinions varied between the massacre being an aberration and being the fault of Lt. Calley, and the budding realization that there might be many My Lais that the American public did not know about.[108]

The banality of atrocities that came to light in the late 1960s and the images of the Tet Offensive that upset many Americans in 1968 as well as mounting anti-protests led to Johnson's announcement that he would not run for office for a second term as U.S. president. The approval ratings for President Johnson's and Robert McNamara's (his Secretary of Defense) conduct of war in Vietnam had reached new lows.[109] Since the assassination of Diem in 1963 there had been no stable leadership in Saigon and democratization and nation-building efforts evaporated in the misunderstood circumstances of Vietnam. The years 1968 and 1969 marked a "pivotal period" according to Anderson, where the realization among the Johnson administration set in that this war could not be won.[110]

Richard Nixon won the 1968 presidential elections by promising to end the war in Vietnam and to bring 'law and order' back to the streets of the United States. The question for Nixon and his team in 1967 was how to win an election against strong democrats: unemployment was low, as was inflation. The economy was flourishing due to the war and Johnson and the democrats had already emphasized the notion of anti-communism and intensified the war. The crusade against drugs was evolved from Nixon's law and order election campaign, drawing on imagery of street crime and rioting African Americans. In the following chapters it will be shown how the Nixon administration transformed a domestic issue into a tool of interventionism by constructing drugs as a threat that evoked the same fears as communism did.

[107] Oliver, "Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism," 247-248.
[108] Ib., 249-251. The My Lai massacre became a central part of cultural representations of the Vietnam War. Oliver lists movies that feature rape and the killings of Vietnamese civilians: *Apocalypse Now* (1979), *Platoon* (1986), *Born on the Fourth of July* (1989), and C*asualties of War* (1989).
[109] In the appendix on page XXVIII the approval ratings for Lyndon Johnson's handling of the Vietnam War are depicted in Figure 33 and 34, as well as Richard Nixon's approval ratings in Figure 35.
[110] Anderson, "Introduction," 51.

3 Magic Carpet Ride

3.1 Inner City Blues

In the United States the idea of a 'war' against drugs dates back to the beginning of the 19th century. Different politicians throughout the decades have used and redefined the idea of the War on Drugs unfailingly for their own means. Harry J. Anslinger was the first anti-drug warrior in the United States that connected anti-communist and anti-drug sentiments in order to extend the power of his Federal Bureau of Narcotics. I argue that various Wars on Drugs fought in the last century, Harry J. Anslinger's crusade amongst them, all have common ideological foundations that can also be found in the logic of containment: expansionism, racism, modernity, fear of anarchy, and scapegoating. I contend that Anslinger was the first to benefit politically from relating anti-drug ideas to fears of communism, although he did not employ the drug war as an interventionist logic. Ultimately it was Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War as a powerful catalyst that created the War on Drugs as a powerful tool of intervention.

Applying Paul Gootenberg's definition of drugs as "psychoactive substances and commodities which for a variety of reasons since 1900 have been construed as health or societal 'dangers' by modern states, medical authorities, and regulatory cultures, and which are now globally prohibited in production, use, and sale,"[111] the entanglements with U.S. American ideology, racism and othering, and anti-communism will be brought to light.

Drugs are more than commodities, they inherently transport values and emotions and take on a certain role in societies. Michael Shiner states that drugs function as "a barometer of social change – one that is rooted in the twin forces of globalization and modernization."[112] Further, Shiner defines drugs as global commodities that entered the global economy after overcoming geographical constraints.[113]

The history of drug prohibition reveals the two-faced nature of the illicitness of psychoactive substances. If a certain substance was classified as either 'medicine' or 'poison' this classification was rarely related to the actual danger of the substance. Suzanna Reiss assesses that legality must be seen as "a political and historical construction rather than a

[111] Paul Gootenberg, "Talking like a State: Drugs, Borders, and the Language of Control," in *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization*, ed. William van Schendel and Itty Abraham (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 101-102. In my thesis I am using the term 'drugs' synonymous with 'psychoactive substances,' being aware that 'drugs' is a more contested and less neutral term, yet is wonderfully short.
[112] Michael Shiner, *Drug Use and Social Change: The Distortion of History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.
[113] Ib.

neutral, descriptive category."[114] Reiss sees drugs and particularly drug control as instruments for a global U.S. hegemony. She observes parallels between the development of the United States as a global capitalist power and the global drug control regime from the late 1940s to the early 1960s, arguing that "drugs emerged as critical weapons for both waging of war and the encouragement of particular models of economic development prioritized by U.S. policymakers for maintaining peace."[115] Before drugs were used as tools of U.S. imperialism in the global Cold War, however, drugs were appropriated as domestic policy instruments to keep certain minorities in check.

From the 1890s to the 1930s the circumstances surrounding drugs and drug users fundamentally changed.[116] The unregulated and free consumption of any drug changed into drug use – especially narcotics – which became criminalized and rigorously regulated.[117] Michael M. Cohen claims that racism is "the root of the drug-prohibition movement in the United States."[118] A racist agenda based on the policies of the Jim Crow era targeted specific minorities: marijuana was prohibited to criminalize Mexican immigrants, while the ban of cocaine was aiming to "scapegoat black cocaine users."[119] Thus Cohen argues "the drug-prohibition movement in the United States took shape against the backdrop of racial anxieties-fears of African American 'cocaine fiends,' of 'shifty' European immigrants and of the stereotyped Chinese opium addict."[120]

The first War on Drugs wages in the United States in the 1920s and can be characterized as a nativist backlash against the pressures of immigration. Alcohol was prohibited in 1920, being linked to distrusted groups such as Catholic immigrants, corrupt machine politicians, and urban African Americans.[121] In this period addiction was reconceptualized as a stigma and a contagious disease rather than being only a pathetic condition.[122] Arthur Benavie adds that addiction was constituted as a danger to the order of society, and during the First World War as

[114] Suzanna Reiss, *We Sell Drugs: The Alchemy of U.S. Empire* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2014), 7.
[115] Ib., 8-9.
[116] In this thesis the more neutral term 'drug use' instead of 'drug abuse' is consciously employed. Speaking of 'abuse' invokes associations of addiction, loss of control and criminal behavior. The chapter 6 analyses the power of language in relation to drug discourses in detail.
[117] Michael M. Cohen, "Jim Crow's Drug War. Race, Coca Cola, and the Southern Origins of Drug Prohibition," *Southern Cultures* 12, no. 3 (2006): 56.
[118] Ib.
[119] Ib., 57.
[120] Ib., 58.
[121] David T. Courtwright, *Addicts Who Survived: An Oral History of Narcotic Use in America, 1923-1965* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 2.
[122] Ib., 5.

a threat to the war effort.[123] According to Benavie, the War on Drugs was from its inception "a crusade, driven by harsh moralistic ideology favoring punitive prohibition."[124]

The drug crusade – and 'crusade' being an oddly fitting term here, considering that evangelical Christians remain to be the most tenacious adversaries of decriminalizing certain drugs, conceiving them as sinful and as a menace to the order of the society and their idea of the American nation – focused mainly on three minorities and their preferred choice of drugs in the first years: the Chinese and opium, African Americans and cocaine, and Mexicans and cannabis.[125] The drug crusaders "whipped up 'moral panics' with racial overtones," as Paul Gootenberg observes, "blaming uppity 'negroes' and prostitutes for spreading cocaine pleasures in the Jim Crow south; targeting Chinese immigrants for 'opium dens' that 'enslaved' others (mainly white women) […]; blaming Mexicans and back jazz musicians for the 'killer weed' marijuana during the American Great Depression."[126] David Musto suggests that the racist dimension of drug control even preempted the moral dimension, showing the ingrained racist fears of a white elite. Images of African Americans being able to withstand bullets while taking cocaine were invoked associating particular minorities to specific drugs and stereotypes.[127] Already in the 1910s and 1920s drugs were depicted in popular cartoons as foreign and coming from the outside: the imagery resolved around orientalist illustrations in the forms of snakes attacking unsuspecting youth seemingly polluting a pure white body.[128] In the 1920s, drugs were also connected to crime. Following the logic of the 'enslavement theory,' believing that drugs 'enslave' the user by insatiable needs that ultimately lead to criminal behavior, prohibitive drug legislation was passed. Eventually, in the early 1960s and in the Nixon administration, the 'enslavement theory' would again be retrieved.[129] Nevertheless, empirical evidence dispels the 'enslavement theory' as a myth as shown in part 5.1.

The practice of othering and linking drugs and drug consumption to foreign forces was continued in the following decades. Harry Jacob Anslinger became the first commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) of the U.S. Treasury Department in 1930, keeping this position for 32 years until 1962. Courtwright sees the era under Anslinger as the "classic period

[123] Arthur Benavie, *Drugs: America's Holy War* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 27.
[124] Ib., 111.
[125] Ib., 13-24.
[126] Gootenberg, "Talking Like a State," 118.
[127] David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 294-295.
[128] Gootenberg, "Talking Like a State," 118.
[129] Edward J. Epstein, *Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America* (New York, NY: Verso, 1990), 30-31.

of narcotic control," meaning that the drug policy was punitive, rigid, and persistent.[130] During the classic period of drug control consumption habits changed and building on the racist stereotypes of the 1920s the image of the African American urban male was recast as the 'heroin fiend.' The stereotype of the black junkie was constructed, not taking into consideration that drug use is an accompanying symptom of poor urban neighborhoods. In the 1940s and 1950s whites moved out of these neighborhoods to the suburbs.[131] The 1951 Boggs Act and the 1956 Narcotic Control Act passed in Congress, further restricting narcotics and introducing compulsory sentences for trade and possession, indicating "the zenith of the punitive approach."[132] However, in the early 1960s, the drug crusaders and U.S. policy makers started to be disillusioned, realizing that narcotics were still bought and sold, the consumers undeterred by the punitive approach.[133] Douglas Kinder argues that it was "also attempted with some success to exploit Cold War passions for the advantage of his hard-pressed agency," by "updating an older anti-narcotics tradition of linking supposedly foreign sources of narcotics with complex and disturbing domestic problems."[134] Proposing that narcotics use and origin were both foreign Anslinger responded to "deep nativistic undercurrents in the American tradition" to legitimize the punitive approach.[135]

Furthermore, Anslinger rejuvenated a drug rhetoric that had been used in the 1920s: the drug-as-a-cancer metaphor and the idea of an epidemic in order to receive more funds for the FBN.[136] During World War II the FBN launched a press campaign, trying to persuade the American public that "Japanese militarists" were narcotic traffickers and trying to addict its enemies.[137] The Korean War gave occasion for Anslinger to denounce the PRC for supplying the world with narcotics, as well as addicting the troops fighting in Korea.[138] The drug consumption of soldiers was blamed on the communist enemy that used subversive tactics to undermine morale, constructing drugs as substances that introduced soldiers to communism.[139] The long list of linking communist enemies to drug trade includes Iranian nationalists after the oil nationalization in 1951, Cuba was accused of exporting marijuana after the revolution, and

[130] Courtwright, *Addicts who Survived*, 1.
[131] Ib., 14-18.
[132] Ib., 19-21.
[133] Ib., 21.
[134] Kinder, "Bureaucratic Cold Warrior," 170.
[135] Ib., 171.
[136] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 30-33. As Epstein elaborates, the cancer metaphor was invoked by a certain Richmond P. Hobson that saw drug addiction as a disease – a cancer – that spread across the boundaries of class. Anslinger then implemented the same rhetoric onto marijuana and heroin use.
[137] Ib., 33 and 81.
[138] Kinder, "Bureaucratic Cold Warrior," 171.
[139] Lukasz Kamienski, *Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 147-148.

"the Soviet Union and its satellites were named in the *New York Times* at the height of the Cold War as major smugglers of heroin."[140] Conjuring the same dichotomy of freedom and slavery, good and evil, as was done in the logic of containment, drug crusaders went down a familiar path. Matthew Pembleton argues that by the FBN employing this rhetoric shows the hegemonic aspirations that was deeply embedded in U.S. policy makers in the 1950s.[141] Tentatively, U.S. imperial inclinations were expressed for the first time through drug control under Anslinger, Pembleton observes: "the foreign drug war became a mechanism through which the United States cultivated influence over foreign police forces in key strategic regions."[142] By the end of Anslinger's reign in 1962, disillusionment about the radical drug policies set in yet the racial stereotypes of certain groups remained. In the 1960s narcotic consumption behavior patterns changed: smoking marijuana was now associated with opposing the Vietnam War and challenging the system.[143]

Harry J. Anslinger's tenure as the drug czar not only matters because of the restored stereotyping of minorities, but because he linked anti-communist sentiments to narcotics control. Trying to advance the FBN's position and lobbying for more funds, Anslinger connected anti-communist attitudes and drug consumption. I argue that this case shows the similarities between the logic of containment and the inherent ideology of the War on Drugs. Anslinger understood how to use one ideology to support the other, drawing on parallels such as othering, racism, individualism, and expansionism. Anslinger's idea of an anti-drug discourse was the precursor of the War on Drugs that would emerge as a powerful interventionist and racist logic in the 1970s and 1980s that would ultimately supersede the logic of containment as the driving ideology of state intervention abroad and at home.

3.2 Saigon Bride

During the Lyndon B. Johnson administration narcotic control was not on the agenda. The Vietnam War dominated foreign policy decisions and domestically the civil rights movement and issues of social injustice were central. During the ascension of Richard Nixon in the late 1960s drug use reappeared in the public eye. Jeremy Kuzmarov cites a 1968 article in the *Washingtonian* magazine by John Steinbeck IV as the impetus of a renewed drug discourse that would focus on the drug-Vietnam nexus.[144] The controversial article "The Importance of Being

[140] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 81.
[141] Pembleton, "Imagining a Global Sovereignty," 40.
[142] Ib., 29.
[143] Courtwright, *Addicts Who Survived*, 27.
[144] Jeremy Kuzmarov, "From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drugs," *Journal of Policy History* 20, no. 5 (December 2011): 344.

Stoned in Vietnam" stated that potent marijuana grew naturally in Southeast Asia, was very cheap and easily obtained. Steinbeck believed that every third out of four soldiers got stoned on a regular basis however he later admitted that he exaggerated the numbers for his own political benefits.[145] The mass media publications that followed the *Washingtonian* article duplicated Steinbeck's figures unquestioningly and began covering drug use in Vietnam. First reports of soldiers being stoned in combat appeared although these were uncommon occurrences.[146] At the height of the Vietnam War media outlets now started focusing on the morale of the troops and particularly their drug use in Vietnam.[147] A month after the initial Steinbeck article the *New York Times* published a report for the first time that focused on the issue: "Pentagon Steps Up Fight on Drug Use in Vietnam, Sharp Rise Noted in Inquiries Into Marijuana Cases for G.I.'s in Last 2 Years."[148] The rather sensational news coverage concerning G.I.'s using drugs in Vietnam soon reached beyond the United States: The German newsmagazine *Spiegel* reports in November 1968 that drugs were "Wunderwaffe" and that "Mit ihnen [drugs] erscheinen den G.I.'s kommunistische Raketengeschosse wie Feuerwerk."[149] Further, the article specifies that for many U.S. warriors drugs were the only viable solution against homesickness and fear because only weed would numb the 'hours of fear.'[150] The *Spiegel* article states that roughly 60 percent of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam were regularly smoking marijuana, these numbers most likely stemming from the Steinbeck article.

In 1969 New York Times headlines include "Courts-Martial of G.I.'s Linked to Marijuana"[151] and "Hero Fined in Marijuana Case."[152] 1970 signifies the year when the number

---

[145] Jeremy Kuzmarov, *The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), 5. Steinbeck had been on a tour in Vietnam starting 1966. By the end of his service he was a convinced opponent of the war and once he was back home in California he was seized for possession of cannabis. Thus the *Washingtonian* article has to be read with caution, considering that he wrote to point out hypocrisies and the bad treatment of Vietnam War veterans.

[146] Ib., 7.

[147] The newspaper articles listed in this chapter only represent a fraction of the mass media discourse. The main focus is put on articles of the *New York Times*, on one hand due to the accessibility of the NYT archive, on the other hand the NYT can count as rather neutral and having a high standard of reporting.

[148] "Pentagon Steps Up Fight on Drug Use in Vietnam; Sharp Rise Noted in Inquiries Into Marijuana Cases for G.I.'s in Last 2 Years," The New York Times, February 16, 1968, https://www.nytimes.com/1968/02/16/archives/pentagon-steps-up-fight-on-drug-use-in-vietnam-sharp-rise-noted-in.html?searchResultPosition=9.

[149] "Rauschgift Vietnam: Krieg in Farbe," *Der Spiegel*, November 18, 1968. A translation of the quote: "Through the magical weapon communist missiles looked like fireworks for the G.I.'s."

[150] "Rauschgift Vietnam." The literal quote: "Viele US-Krieger sehen in ihnen [Marijuana cigarettes] die einzig wirksame Waffe gegen Heimweh und Furcht. Denn allein das Kraut betäubt für Stunden die Angst – vor der nächsten Attacke, dem Bauchschuß, dem Tod."

[151] "Courts-Martial of G.I.'s Linked to Marijuana," *The New York Times*, January 15, 1969, https://www.nytimes.com/1969/01/15/archives/courtsmartial-of-gis-linked-to-marijuana.html?searchResultPosition=10. The New York Times articles represented here were selected on the basis that they stand exemplary for articles that cover a similar topic and/or cover a particularly interesting aspect.

[152] "Hero Fined in Marijuana Case," *The New York Times*, November 2, 1969, https://www.nytimes.com/1969/11/02/archives/hero-fined-in-marijuana-case.html.

of reports about drug use in Vietnam rises increasingly and an alarmist attitude is reflected in the headlines. In 1968 and 1969 the reports resolved around the use of marijuana while in 1970 to a greater extent heroin is featured. The NYT article "4 Ex-G.I.'s Report Vietnam Drug Use" speaks of "widespread use of narcotics by servicemen in Vietnam and Korea" and recounts demands that drug use should no longer be a reason for dishonorable discharge for servicemen.[153] The article "Allies in Vietnam Burn Marijuana" on March 22 discusses how the marijuana crop in Vietnam can be destroyed and that the South Vietnamese Army also regularly smokes cannabis.[154]

The media discourse also increasingly connected unsuccessful army operations to drug use. The "Senators Told G.I's in Songmy Unit Smoked Marijuana Night Before Incident" article reports that the night before the Songmy massacre five members of the squad involved were smoking marijuana, implying that the drug use might be connected to the atrocities committed the next day.[155] A few days later the article "Marijuana Is Part of The Scene Among G.I.'s In Vietnam" appeared in the *New York Times*, discussing that since almost every G.I. in Vietnam used marijuana in some form, the Songmy massacre cannot solely be explained by drug use.[156]

Throughout the year 1970 the stream of articles discussing drug use in Vietnam continues steadily.[157] The first half of 1970s has more articles discussing the use of marijuana, while heroin use of G.I.'s in Vietnam dominates the second half of the year. Headlines that announce "Combat G.I.'s Tell of Using Marijuana,"[158] or "3,800 Discharged by Navy On Drug Charges Last Year"[159] paint a picture of widespread drug use in Vietnam that impairs the war effort. In June 1970 the New York Times announces that the "Extent of Drug Use and Addiction in Armed Forces Appears Wider Than Pentagon's Statistics Show," describing the case of a 18-

---

[153] Barbara Campbell, "4 Ex-G.I.'s Report Vietnam Drug Use," *The New York Times*, March 21, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/21/archives/4-exgis-report-vietnam-drug-use-tell-experiences-to-assist-drive.html.

[154] Gloria Emerson, "Allies in Vietnam Burn Marijuana," *The New York Times*, March 22, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/22/archives/allies-in-vietnam-burn-marijuana-us-officers-worried-over.html.

[155] Robert M. Smith, "Senators Told G.I's in Songmy Unit Smoked Marijuana Night Before Incident," *The New York Times*, March 25, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/25/archives/senators-told-gis-in-songmy-unit-smoked-marijuana-night-before.html.

[156] B. Drummond Ayres, "Marijuana Is Part of The Scene Among G.I.'s In Vietnam," *The New York Times*, March 29, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/29/archives/marijuana-is-part-of-the-scene-among-gis-in-vietnam.html.

[157] In the appendix on pages I-XV a number of graphs depict the NYT drug discourse. Further, part 6 extensively discusses shifts, language and effects of the drug-Vietnam discourse.

[158] James P. Sterba, "Combat G.I.'s Tell of Using Marijuana," *The New York Times*, April 4, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/04/archives/combat-gis-tell-of-using-marijuana.html.

[159] "3,800 Discharged by Navy On Drug Charges Last Year," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/22/archives/3800-discharged-by-navy-on-drug-charges-last-year.html.

year-old solider from Minnesota who died of a heroin overdose in Vietnam.[160] The article also declares that the Pentagon increased its anti-drug efforts yet critically remarks that "Pentagon officials have tended to discount reports that drug taking has become a widespread practice in the military."[161] First reports about rehabilitation of addicts in the U.S. forces also appear in June 1970, for instance "G.I. Drug Project Tested on a Base," where it is considered how the army classified drug addiction as "a character-behavior disorder" and not as a disease.[162] It is reported how a rehabilitation ward is assembled in Vietnam yet funds for addiction treatment are low.[163]

The rather sensationalist sounding headline "2 Vietnam Amputees Seized With 21 Kilos of Heroin Here" on July 19, 1970 shows how Vietnam War veterans, heroin, and crime are linked in the drug-Vietnam discourse.[164] The first public fears about addicted Vietnam veterans returning and committing crimes in the United States are voiced by mid-1970, adding a new dimension to the discourse.

Articles that show that the United States Army is starting to help drug using soldiers are a recurring theme, such as "G.I.'s in Vietnam Who Use Marijuana Aided in 'Amnesty.'"[165] Yet stories that publicize extensive drug use of soldier and the dangerous acts they supposedly commit while being under the influence continuously dictate the discourse. The article "Foe of Marijuana Says G.I. Threw a Grenade at Him" asserts that marijuana led to live-threatening actions.[166] Further, in the article it is stated that "John Steinberg of Philadelphia, testified that marijuana smoking had reached epidemic proportions among United States troops in Vietnam, but that the American command 'steadfastly refuses' to face the problem."[167]

---

[160] Barbara Campbell, "Extent of Drug Use and Addiction in Armed Forces Appears Wider Than Pentagon's Statistics Show," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/06/08/archives/extent-of-drug-use-and-addiction-in-armed-forces-appears-wider-than.html.

[161] Campbell, "Extent of Drug Use and Addiction in Armed Forces Appears Wider Than Pentagon's Statistics Show."

[162] Homer Bigart, "G.I. Drug Project Tested on a Base," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/06/14/archives/gi-drug-project-tested-on-a-base-ft-bragg-addicts-retained-for.html.

[163] Bigart, "G.I. Drug Project Tested on a Base."

[164] "2 Vietnam Amputees Seized With 21 Kilos of Heroin Here," *The New York Times*, July 19, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/19/archives/2-vietnam-amputees-seized-with-21-kilos-of-heroin-here.html.

[165] "G.I.'s in Vietnam Who Use Marijuana Aided in 'Amnesty,'" *The New York Times*, July 23, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/23/archives/gis-in-vietnam-who-use-marijuana-aided-in-amnesty.html.

[166] "Foe of Marijuana Says G.I. Threw a Grenade at Him," *The New York Times*, August 19, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/19/archives/foe-of-marijuana-says-gi-threw-a-grenade-at-him.html.

[167] "Foe of Marijuana Says G.I. Threw a Grenade at Him."

By August 1970 the news agenda continued to resolve around an addicted army in Vietnam: articles such as "3 Out of 10 G.I.'s Said to Try Drugs"[168] and "G.I.'s Find Marijuana Is Plentiful"[169] show the public that the army's efforts to curb drug use in Vietnam are not effective and the sons of American citizens in Vietnam will encounter not only the evils of communism but also the evils of drug abuse. The headline "Deaths From Drug Abuse Rise Among Vietnam G.I.'s" in October 1970 demonstrates that the Vietnam-drug discourse has just began and is far from dwindling down.[170] The year ends with articles that proclaim "Rising Use of LSD Worries the Navy"[171] and "G.I.'s in Vietnam High on Hope's Marijuana Jokes."[172]

The year 1971 marks a sharp increase in newspaper and newsmagazine articles that feature heroin.[173] The most noticeable headlines were among others (in chronological order): "U.S. Colonel in Saigon Faces Marijuana Trial,"[174] "G.I.'s in Vietnam Get Heroin Easily,"[175] "40 U.S. Airmen in Vietnam Held in Drug Investigation,"[176] "Marijuana is Dangerous,"[177] "G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic in Vietnam,"[178] "G.I.'s Find It All in Saigon's Scag Alley,"[179] "Pentagon Unsure of Total on Drug Use in Vietnam,"[180] "President Gives 'Highest Priority' To

[168] "3 Out of 10 G.I.'s Said to Try Drugs," *The New York Times*, August 21, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/21/archives/3-out-of-10-gis-said-to-try-drugs-senate-panel-is-told-users-mainly.html.
[169] James P. Sterba, "G.I.'s Find Marijuana Is Plentiful," *The New York Times*, September 2, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/02/archives/gis-find-marijuana-is-plentiful.html.
[170] Titer Peterson, "Deaths From Drug Abuse Rise Among Vietnam G.I.'s," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/10/31/archives/deaths-from-drug-abuse-rise-among-vietnam-gis.html.
[171] Felix Belair Jr., "Rising Use of LSD Worries the Navy," *The New York Times*, November 18, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/11/18/archives/rising-use-of-lsd-worries-the-navy-investigator-tells-house-unit-of.html.
[172] Alvin Shuster, "G.I.'s in Vietnam High on Hope's Marijuana Jokes," *The New York Times*, December 23, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/12/23/archives/gis-in-veitnam-high-on-hopes-marijuana-jokes.html.
[173] This is also discussed further in part 6. The scope of this thesis is not sufficient to list all the articles that discuss marijuana or heroin use in Vietnam, but the most interesting cases are listed here.
[174] "U.S. Colonel in Saigon Faces Marijuana Trial," *The New York Times*, January 21, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/21/archives/us-colonel-in-saigon-faces-marijuana-trial.html.
[175] Gloria Emerson, "G.I.'s in Vietnam Get Heroin Easily," *The New York Times*, February 25, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/25/archives/g-is-in-vietnam-get-heroin-easily-gis-in-vietnam-obtain-heroin.html.
[176] "40 U.S. Airmen in Vietnam Held in Drug Investigation," *The New York Times*, February 28, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/28/archives/40-us-airmen-in-vietnam-held-in-drug-investigation.html.
[177] Abraham Walker, "Marijuana is Dangerous," *The New York Times*, April 3, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/04/03/archives/marijuana-is-dangerous.html.
[178] Alvin Shuster, "G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/16/archives/gi-heroin-addiction-epidemic-in-vietnam-gi-heroin-addiction-is.html.
[179] Iver Peterson, "G.I.'s Find It All in Saigon's Scag Alley," *The New York Times*, May 17, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/17/archives/gis-find-it-all-in-saigons-scag-alley.html.
[180] "Pentagon Unsure of Total on Drug Use in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, May 17, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/17/archives/pentagon-unsure-of-total-on-drug-use-in-vietnam.html.

Drug Problem,"[181] "Nixon, Drugs and the War,"[182] "Addiction in Vietnam Spurs Nixon and Congress to Take Drastic New Steps,"[183] "G.I.'s in Vietnam Say Test for Heroin Addiction Can Be Beaten,"[184] "U.S. Gets Warning on Army Addicts,"[185] "More G.I.'s in Vietnam Joining Drug Users' Amnesty Program,"[186] "2 in House Say U.S. Hides Extent of G.I. Drug Use,"[187] "Agents From 3 Nations Seize $4-Million in Narcotics in Vietnam,"[188] "Drug Use Up Among Vietnamese,"[189] "Asians Doubt That U.S. Can Halt Heroin Flow,"[190] "Bases in U.S. Face G.I. Drug Problem,"[191] "Drive Fails to Halt Drug Sale in Vietnam,"[192] "Figures on Heroin in Vietnam Differ,"[193] "A Major in Vietnam Gives All He's Got to the War on Heroin,"[194] "39 G.I.'s in a Vietnam Unit Arrested in Drugs Roundup,"[195] "Drug Dependency of Servicemen In

[181] James M. Naughton, "President Gives 'Highest Priority' To Drug Problem," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/02/archives/president-gives-highest-priority-to-drug-problem-pledges-a-national.html.

[182] James Reston, "Nixon, Drugs and the War," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/02/archives/nixon-drugs-and-the-war.html.

[183] Dana Adams Schmidt, "Addiction in Vietnam Spurs Nixon and Congress to Take Drastic New Steps," *The New York Times*, June 16, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/16/archives/addiction-in-vietnam-spurs-nixon-and-congress-to-take-drastic-new.html.

[184] Iver Peterson, "G.I.'s in Vietnam Say Test for Heroin Addiction Can Be Beaten," *The New York Times*, June 24, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/24/archives/g-is-in-vietnam-say-test-for-heroin-addiction-can-be-beaten.html.

[185] Richard Severo, "U.S. Gets Warning on Army Addicts," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/27/archives/us-gets-warning-on-army-addicts-doctor-urges-rehabilitation-before.html.

[186] Dana Adams Schmidt, "More G.I.'s in Vietnam Joining Drug Users' Amnesty Program," *The New York Times*, July 13, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/13/archives/more-gis-in-vietnam-joining-drug-users-amnesty-program.html.

[187] "2 in House Say U.S. Hides Extent of G.I. Drug Use," *The New York Times*, July 21, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/21/archives/2-in-house-say-us-hides-extent-of-gi-drug-use.html.

[188] "Agents From 3 Nations Seize $4-Million in Narcotics in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, July 29, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/29/archives/agents-from-3-nations-seize-4million-in-narcotics-in-vietnam.html.

[189] "Drug Use Up Among Vietnamese," *The New York Times*, August 4, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/04/archives/drug-use-up-among-vietnamese.html.

[190] Henry Kamm, "Asians Doubt That U.S. Can Halt Heroin Flow," *The New York Times*, August 11, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/11/archives/asians-doubt-that-us-can-halt-heroin-flow-southeast-asians-doubt.html.

[191] Nancy Hicks, "Bases in U.S. Face G.I. Drug Problem," *The New York Times*, August 15, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/15/archives/bases-in-us-face-gi-drug-problem-views-of-officials-vary-on.html.

[192] Henry Kamm, "Drive Fails to Halt Drug Sale in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, August 30, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/30/archives/drive-fails-to-halt-drug-sale-in-vietnam-heroin-price-unchanged.html.

[193] "Figures on Heroin in Vietnam Differ," *The New York Times*, September 5, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/05/archives/figures-on-heroin-in-vietnam-differ-new-tests-cut-the-number-of-gi.html.

[194] Gloria Emerson, "A Major in Vietnam Gives All He's Got to the War on Heroin," *The New York Times*, September 12, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/12/archives/a-major-in-vietnam-gives-all-hes-got-to-the-war-on-heroin.html.

[195] "39 G.I.'s in a Vietnam Unit Arrested in Drugs Roundup," *The New York Times*, September 17, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/17/archives/39-gis-in-a-vietnam-unit-arrested-in-drugs-roundup.html.

Vietnam Is Said to Level Off,"[196] "G.I.'s and O.J.'s In Vietnam,"[197] and "Army Discharges Many Addicts in Vietnam Despite U.S. Pledges."[198]

Listing the selected headlines in chronological order further emphasizes the compelling story of how the Vietnam War and drug use were connected. In 1971 dozens of articles in the *New York Times* alone circled around the drug-Vietnam nexus.[199] The topics that now dominated the Vietnam discourse were drug addiction, how the government and the army tried to battle the issue, the effectiveness of the measures undertaken and ultimately crimes committed by drug using G.I.'s in Vietnam or as veterans back in the United States.

In 1972 the number of articles discussing heroin or marijuana use in Vietnam dropped, but so did the number of troops employed to Vietnam. The articles in the *New York Times* that are concerned with the drug-Vietnam nexus in 1972 cover predominantly Vietnam veterans and their struggles adjusting. NYT headlines were among others: "Military Tests Find Most Use of Drugs Is by Vietnam G.I.'s,"[200] "U.S. Starting a Drug Check on G.I.'s Arriving in Vietnam,"[201] "Addicted Ex-G.I. Sentenced,"[202] "Most Veterans of Vietnam Fail To Seek Aid Under the G.I. Bill,"[203] "Delayed Trauma in Veterans Cited,"[204] "Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting Asian Drug Traffic,"[205] "Asian Drug Inflow Found 'Greater Than Realized,'"[206] "Ex-Officer

[196] Dana Adams Schmidt, "Drug Dependency of Servicemen In Vietnam Is Said to Level Off," *The New York Times*, October 13, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/10/13/archives/drug-dependency-of-servicemen-in-vietnam-is-said-to-level-off.html.
[197] Norman E. Zinberg, "G.I.'s and O.J.'s In Vietnam," *The New York Times*, December 5, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/05/archives/gis-and-ojs-in-vietnam-gis-and-ojs-in-vietnam.html.
[198] Iver Peterson, "Army Discharges Many Addicts in Vietnam Despite U.S. Pledges" *The New York Times*, December 19, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/19/archives/army-discharges-many-addicts-in-vietnam-despite-u-s-pledges.html.
[199] Exact numbers of articles that feature heroin or marijuana in connection with Vietnam are found in the appendix starting on page XVI.
[200] "Military Tests Find Most Use of Drugs Is by Vietnam G.I.'s," *The New York Times*, January 17, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/01/17/archives/military-tests-find-most-use-of-drugs-is-by-vietnam-gis.html.
[201] "U.S. Starting a Drug Check on G.I.'s Arriving in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, March 9, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/03/09/archives/us-starting-a-drug-check-on-gis-arriving-in-vietnam.html.
[202] "Addicted Ex-G.I. Sentenced," *The New York Times*, March 19, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/03/19/archives/addicted-exgi-sentenced.html.
[203] Iver Peterson, "Most Veterans of Vietnam Fail To Seek Aid Under the G.I. Bill," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/04/09/archives/most-veterans-of-vietnam-fail-to-seek-aid-under-the-gi-bill-most.html.
[204] Boyce Rensberger, "Delayed Trauma in Veterans Cited," *The New York Times*, May 3, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/05/03/archives/delayed-trauma-in-veterans-cited-psychiatrists-find-vietnam.html.
[205] Seymour M. Hersh, "Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting Asian Drug Traffic," *The New York Times*, July 24, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/07/24/archives/report-to-us-sees-no-hope-of-halting-asian-drug-traffic-report-to.html.
[206] Seymour M. Hersh, "Asian Drug Inflow Found 'Greater Than Realized,'" *The New York Times*, July 28, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/07/28/archives/asian-drug-inflow-found-greater-than-realized.html.

Says Vietnam Report On G.I. Addicts Was Withheld,"[207] "President Pledges an End To 'Era of Permissiveness,'"[208] and "Drug Feared Sent in Bodies of G.I.'s."[209]

In 1973 the drug discourse dwindles down. Articles that were published in this year were called "Mixing of Mind-Altering Drugs Rises as Spread of Heroin Addiction Slows,"[210] "The Lessons of Vietnam,"[211] or "Army Reports Few In War in 1970-'72 Are Addicts Today."[212]

Reading *The New York Times* headlines in chronological order tells a powerful story of how drugs, particularly heroin, were increasingly connected to the Vietnam War and how drugs were depicted as an increasingly dangerous phenomenon. The deliberately shocking and attention-seeking headlines express a certain helplessness concerning the 'crisis,' yet also stereotypes from Anslinger's times and earlier were reiterated. Yet the above listed NYT articles represent only a fraction of the U.S. American drug-Vietnam discourse that reached its peak in 1971.[213] Other newspapers, newsmagazines, and TV channels also covered this issue extensively. Further, speeches by politicians, movies, novels, music, and other media are part of that discourse. Describing and observing the discourse is one part. Analyzing how the discourse and its inherent power relations shape policies and perception is the other part.

---

[207] "Ex-Officer Says Vietnam Report On G.I. Addicts Was Withheld," *The New York Times*, August 16, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/16/archives/exofficer-says-vietnam-report-on-gi-addicts-was-withheld.html.

[208] "President Pledges an End To 'Era of Permissiveness,'" *The New York Times*, November 10, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/11/10/archives/new-jersey-pages-president-pledges-an-end-to-era-of-permissiveness.html.

[209] "Drug Feared Sent in Bodies of G.I.'s," *The New York Times*, December 17, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/12/17/archives/drug-feared-sent-in-bodies-of-gis-court-told-that-smugglers-used.html.

[210] James M. Markham, "Mixing of Mind-Altering Drugs Rises as Spread of Heroin Addiction Slows," *The New York Times*, March 25, 1973, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/03/25/archives/mixing-of-mindalterning-drugs-rises-as-spread-of-heroin-addiction.html.

[211] George W. Ball, "The Lessons of Vietnam," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1973, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/04/01/archives/have-we-learned-or-only-failed-the-lessons-of-vietnam-vietnam.html.

[212] John W. Finney, "Army Reports Few In War in 1970-'72 Are Addicts Today," *The New York Times*, April 24, 1973, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/04/24/archives/army-reports-few-in-war-in-197072are-addicts-today-study-finds-few.html.

[213] The thorough discourse analysis can be found in chapter 6.

4 Castles Made of Sand

4.1 Volunteers

Richard Milhous Nixon won the election in 1968 by the small margin of half a million votes against the democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey. Nixon is from California, fought in the Pacific War in World War II, was elected to Congress in 1946 and became a reliable anti-communist. Eisenhower looked for a young, strictly anti-communist running mate to balance the ticket and Richard Nixon fit that description. Under Eisenhower Nixon served as Vice President from 1953 to 1961. Since Eisenhower was already elderly during his tenure, Nixon often travelled in Eisenhower's place and established a number of important contacts all over the globe. Nixon ran for president in 1960 and lost by a scant margin to John F. Kennedy. In 1962 Nixon ran for governor in California and was defeated by Pat Brown. Turning his back on politics, Nixon went into private law yet continued to support republican candidates. After the, for the republicans disastrous, 1964 elections with conservative Barry Goldwater arguing in favor of segregation in the South, the GOP realized it needed a more moderate candidate for the 1968 election.[214]

The 1968 presidential election focused primarily on issues such as the Vietnam War, the Civil Rights Movement, the debate about a social welfare agenda, and urban violence. Following Johnson's withdrawal as the democratic candidate on March 31, 1968, the most likely democratic presidential candidate Robert Kennedy was assassinated shortly after he won the Californian primary elections on June 6, 1968. By 1968, over 500,000 U.S. soldiers fought in Vietnam and over 400 died every week in the first half of 1968.[215] Richard Nixon's 'law-and-order' campaign as well as his promise to end the war in Vietnam secured him the presidency, similar to the 1952 elections where Eisenhower's promise to end the Korean War swayed the majority of the voters.[216] Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger as his National Security Adviser, acting as the central architect of American foreign policy and designing the Vietnam strategy of the Nixon administration.[217]

4.2 Where Are You Now, My Son?

The first years of the Nixon tenure were a "paradoxical process" because he escalated the bombing war, increased Vietnamese casualties, and extended the war to Laos and Cambodia,

[214] Lepore, *These Truths*, 540-541 and 631-633.
[215] Anderson, "Introduction," 56.
[216] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 33.
[217] Lepore, *These Truths*, 640-642.

while still holding the objective to end the U.S. military invasion.[218] Trying to publicly promote a policy of de-escalation, in 1969 and 1970 Nixon still assumed that a military victory was possible. Nixon preferred to intensify the war in order to break the stalemate, believing that superior technology would ultimately bring victory.[219] This escalation happened in secret to avoid a further aggravation of the steadily growing anti-war movement. For instance the top secret *Operation MENU*, from March 1969 to May 1970, targeted Vietnamese bases in Cambodia.[220] Further, trying to contain the anti-war movement and to rally for support for his Vietnam strategy, Nixon gave the so-called 'Silent-Majority' speech in November 1969, asking the U.S. citizens that were not loudly protesting against the war for their loyalty:

> "And so tonight-to you, the great silent majority of my fellow Americans-I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge. The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely, the enemy is to negotiate at Paris."[221]

Nixon was aware that he needed more time to realize his strategy of widening the war to compel the North Vietnamese to U.S. American terms in the peace negotiations in Paris. However, "Nixon's quest for military victory lasted eighteen months and ended in defeat."[222] Further he argues that Nixon's escalation of the war "became a missed opportunity to bring the war to an earlier end."[223] The so-called 'mad man theory' defined Nixon's strategy in 1969 and 1970 as follows: The North Vietnamese enemies were supposed to believe that Nixon would be ready to employ nuclear weapons in the war. The total destruction of Hanoi and Haiphong were considered under codename 'Duck Hook,' yet, Steininger asserts, Nixon was not able implement 'Duck Hook' due to mounting anti-war protests.[224]

The mad-man theory was abandoned in mid-1970, the realization setting in that the war could not be won through superior military technology. Nixon defined a successful Vietnam strategy from this point onwards as creating a deceptive peace through continuously

---

[218] Anderson, "Introduction," xi.
[219] Schmitz, David F., *Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), xiii-xiv.
[220] Anderson, "Introduction," 33. Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia had tried to keep his country out of the war, yet accepted – or was unable to stop – the so-called Ho Chi Minh Path in the eastern region of Cambodia. On March 18, 1969, the Sihanouk government was overthrown by the pro-American Lon Nol. Until today a possible CIA involvement in the coup is not yet cleared up.
[221] Nixon, Richard M. "President Nixon's Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam." November 3, 1969, https://watergate.info/1969/11/03/nixons-silent-majority-speech.html.
[222] Schmitz, *Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War*, xiv.
[223] Ib.
[224] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 34-35.

withdrawing U.S. forces and supporting the South Vietnamese administration until he was reelected in 1972. The Nixon administration shifted their strategy towards the so-called 'Vietnamization' of the war and the reduction of Cold War tensions.[225]

Despite Nixon's campaign promise to end the war in Vietnam, U.S. and South Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia in April 1970 to raid headquarters of the communists. Roughly 11,000 communists were killed and the country was lastingly destabilized, ultimately leading to the Red Khmer terror regime that started in 1973. Nixon and Kissinger did also not anticipate the public outcry and wave of protests that followed the Cambodian incursion.[226] When in 1975 the U.S.-backed leader Lon Nol was overthrown and Pol Pot's rudimentary and brutal communist regime took over Phnom Penh, the U.S. administration interpreted that following Vietnam Cambodia would now become communist too, leaning on the 'domino theory.' Yet I would argue that only due to U.S. intervention in the country the destabilization that led to the communist reign was made possible.

The American war in Vietnam ultimately came to an end in 1973. The Watergate affair and not telling Congress the truth about *Operation MENU*, the secret bombing war against Cambodia, led to impeachment proceedings against Nixon. Once *Operation MENU* was leaked to the public central figures in the Nixon administration started wire-tapping the White House to find the leak.[227] The Watergate discoveries significantly impaired Nixon's credibility in Congress and thus his capability to lead the war in Vietnam.[228]

The Nixon Doctrine, also referred to as 'Vietnamization,' was designed to end the war and to hand over responsibility to the ARVN, but focused still on the idea of the superiority of U.S. modernity and technology. Air power and an extensive bombing campaign were now not only concentrated on North Vietnamese forces but on all of Indochina.[229] The morale of the troops was at an absolute low by 1971. The drafted G.I.'s only wanted to survive the 365 tour of duty in Vietnam and instance of insubordination accumulated.[230] As seen in part 3.2 the public discourse progressively discussed occurrences of drug consumption, atrocities, and corruption. The U.S. army had reached the end of the line in the beginning of 1971. Thus, the Vietnamization of the war was, considering these developments, an absolute necessity.[231] Jeremy Kuzmarov asserts that for Nixon "Vietnam was always a sideshow that detracted from

[225] Schmitz, *Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War*, xiv-xv.
[226] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 36-38.
[227] Tom Wells, *The War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 5. The illegal activities of the so-called 'Plumbers'
[228] Wells, *The War Within*, 5.
[229] Buzzanco, *Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life*, 103.
[230] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 38.
[231] Ib.

his grander ambition of easing Cold War tensions through détente and gaining international acclaim for promoting world peace."[232] Vietnamization was thus, according to Kuzmarov, an attempt to "salvage American credibility without sacrificing any of its strategic interests, while at the same time minimizing public dissent."[233] For the German journalist and foreign correspondent Peter Scholl-Latour this strategy meant 'Vietnamization of the coffins.' By spring 1972 only 50,000 G.I.'s remained in Vietnam, handing over the South Vietnamese to their fates.[234]

Nixon demanded a solution for Vietnam before the November 1972 presidential elections and urged that the Paris peace negotiations that had been proceeding since 1968 would finally bear results. Nixon's visit to China from February 21st to the 28th in 1972 and the Easter Offensive or *Operation Linebacker,* as well as the naval blockade of Vietnam took place during the peace process in Paris. Secret back-channel negotiations by Kissinger and representatives of North Vietnam lead to preliminary peace agreements. Thus in October 1972, one month before the presidential election, the Paris Peace Talks come, to the conclusion that the United States will withdraw all their military forces immediately.[235] The bombing campaigns of *Operation Linebacker* only demonstrated the world that the survival of the South Vietnamese government depended on U.S. air support.[236] The government in Saigon led by the general Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was aware that the survival of the state relied on U.S. protection. Seeing that the Paris agreement from October 1972 would remove this protection, Văn Thiệu refused to comply. Nixon, being embittered by both Saigon and Hanoi, launched *Operation Linebacker II,* or also called Christmas-Bombing, on December 18, 1972. The massive bombing of Hanoi, Haiphong and other populated areas in North Vietnam for twelve days was aiming to pressure North Vietnam into admitting changes to the Paris accords.[237] The DRV, by 1972 in possession of anti-aircraft weapons, managed to inflict serious casualties on the U.S. air force for the first time, aggravating the anti-war sentiments in the U.S. air force.[238] Bruce Franklin maintains that

> "The Christmas bombing was designed […] to create the postwar myth that the United States had forced the DRV 'back to the bargaining table.' But the peace agreement signed by Richard Nixon

[232] Kuzmarov, "From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency," 356.
[233] Ib.
[234] Peter Scholl-Latour, *Der Tod im Reisfeld: Dreißig Jahre Krieg in Indochina* (Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980), 157. 'Vietnamisierung der Särge.'
[235] Anderson, "Introduction," 62-63.
[236] Scholl-Latour, *Der Tod im Reisfeld*, 157.
[237] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 67.
[238] Ib., 68. The Pentagon claims that 21 B-52s and 13 fighter-bombers were lost, the DRV announced that it had shot down 34 B-52s and 47 fighter-bombers. 121 airmen were killed, 44 captured. A number of individual pilots refused to fly the mission on moral grounds. Further, the air crews did not understand why they had to risk their lives, when it was already decided that the United States would pull out.

> in January 1973 was in fact almost total capitulation to terms Washington had been offered throughout the war."[239]

Ultimately the United States were forced to admit that Vietnam was one country instead of two, a fact that had been denied since 1954. On January 27, 1973, the United States, the DRV, the RVN and the PRG signed an agreement to end the war. U.S. POWs were to be released and all U.S. troops should be withdrawn. Military Aid to Văn Thiệu was guaranteed yet with the Watergate developments and Nixon successively losing his powers and resigning in 1974, Congress gradually reduced the money that was sent to South Vietnam. In spring 1975 the war ended rapidly: panic and confusion prevailed in South Vietnam; Congress refused a last-minute aid package of $300 million to the RVN, and Văn Thiệu left the country, accusing the United States of discarding him and South Vietnam.[240] The images of U.S. marine helicopters evacuating the U.S. Embassy in Saigon on April 29 and 30, 1975, at the last minute because the ambassador Graham Martin had refused to abandon the post, became iconic. Anderson concludes: "Three decades of American policy in Vietnam had failed."[241]

4.3 Flashing Lights

After Nixon won the election in 1968 he did not only had to deliver on his promise to end the war in Vietnam, but also follow through with his campaign promise of reducing crime in the United States. Dan Baum argues that Nixon's War on Drugs was born in the 1968 presidential campaign. Crime was a central issue of the election and the GOP presented itself as the only way towards law and order. The idea of returning law and order to the American people was also instrumentalized to portray the Democrats as undermining public safety with their policies.[242] Further, to oppose the Democrats Great Society project, Nixon and his team had to persuade the voters that poverty and crime were not caused by greater social pressures that the society at large had to amend but rather that poor and criminal people were 'bad' individuals.[243] Invoking the idea of individualism – a core principle of American ideology – worked out well for Nixon. Further, Baum argues, drug use was the ideal crime because it "could be framed as purely escapist and pleasure driven."[244] In Nixon's War on Drugs the individual drug user became the villain.

[239] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 68.
[240] Anderson, "Introduction," 64-65.
[241] Ib., 58.
[242] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 60.
[243] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 6.
[244] Ib.

Jeremy Kuzmarov sees the election of Richard Nixon as "part of a Middle American backlash toward the hippie counterculture," installing the War on Drugs as the logical answer to the crime problem he invoked during his campaign.[245] Fighting street crime, as Nixon promised, proved to be difficult since local safety was in the hands of the communities. Thus, Nixon had to construct a federal responsibility in fighting crime and drugs: Drugs were usually imported from abroad and border control was a federal matter.[246]

In 1967 marijuana use was not feared and was not a part of the public agenda.[247] Yet by blending heroin and marijuana into a single narrative, drugs started to appear on the agenda of major news outlets.[248] The next step of the Nixon administration was strategically linking drugs and crime. By drug testing prison inmates in spring 1969 first statistics appeared that constructed a connection between the criminal behavior of individuals and their alleged drug use.[249] Further, Baum observes, that "[d]rugs were one thing that the young, the poor, and the black all seemed to have in common."[250] John Ehrlichman, Nixon's counsel for domestic affairs, admitted in a 1994 interview with Dan Baum that the Nixon administration had two opponents: the anti-war movement and people of color: "We knew we couldn't make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities."[251] This statement shows that there was concrete political rationale behind the inception of the War on Drugs in the late 1960s. In 1969, in order to deliver results on the promise to fight crime, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act was proposed by Nixon, updating drug policies that partially stemmed from 1909.[252]

Edward J. Epstein's central argument in *Agency of Fear* circles around how various government agencies eluded from Nixon's control and he could not trust the agencies to work for him. Hence, Epstein claims, to expand his power and to control the agencies, Nixon needed

---

[245] Kuzmarov, "From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency," 351.
[246] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 12-13.
[247] See the results of my discourse analysis in part 6.2 and the graphs in the appendix.
[248] Ib., 7-8.
[249] Ib., 19. The study that was conducted in spring 1969 drug testing prison inmates is called by Baum "small, obscure, and imperfect."
[250] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 21.
[251] John Ehrlichman, qtd. in Dan Baum, "Legalize it All: How to Win the War on Drugs," *Harper's Magazine*, April 2016, https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/. Since John Ehrlichman was prosecuted as one of the Watergate conspirators, he was sentenced to prison. In a sense Watergate and the prosecution of Nixon's closest consultants led to specific insights into the administration. For once, the people involved knew that they had nothing to lose if they disclosed the secrets of the administration since career-wise they could never again work in politics. Thus people from Nixon's closest circle came forward and told their stories. John Ehrlichman was among them.
[252] David T. Courtwright, *Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 163.

to find a central issue that would justify a fundamental reorganization that would in essence undermine congressional control mechanisms and a system of checks and balances. The central issue the Nixon's men found was the heroin crisis.[253] The heroin crisis "touched on the rawest nerves in middle-class America: anxiety over the alienation of children from their parents, the deterioration of urban life, the increase in crime and violence, and the corruption of the police."[254] The fundament of the War on Drugs was laid by the Nixon administration by exploiting and instigating these fears. The drug war enabled Nixon to bring several new agencies, funded independently from Congress, to life, among them the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE) in 1972 and eventually the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in 1973.[255] Further, the drug war allowed Nixon to exchange personnel in the powerful FBI and CIA and "to rewire the chain of command so that these agencies reported directly to the administration."[256] However, before Nixon was able to reap the fruits of the heroin crisis and the drug war construction, the Watergate affair removed him from power.

Yet in 1969 the crux of the matter was that there was no heroin crisis yet, thus it had to be designed. In 1969 the number of U.S. Americans that died from legal or illegal drug use was 1,601. In the same year however 1,824 U.S. citizens died falling down the stairs and 2,641 choked to death on food. Furthermore, 29,866 cases of cirrhosis of the liver were reported.[257] Heroin or drug use were not a serious problem. Yet in 1970 a 'heroin epidemic'[258] was proclaimed: that year 1,899 people died from drugs, and in 1971 that number rose to 2,313 deaths. In 1971, only 2,227 people chocked to death on food, while 24,097 people in the United States committed suicide.[259] The proclaimed drug problem continued to be statistically insignificant.

The comparatively small number of heroin users in the United States had to be converted into a nation-wide plague that concerns everyone. Through subtle direction of the media simple but highly effective stereotypes about drug use were circulated drawing on images of addiction

[253] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 8-10. Even though *Agency of Fear* was first published in 1977, the investigative journalist Epstein's arguments still hold weight today. First and foremost the extensive use of files and documents that Egil Krogh, a confidant of Nixon that was also persecuted due to the Watergate affair, supplied to Epstein and numerous interviews with officials of the Nixon administration form the empirical bases of the book. Since the interviews were conducted only a few years after the events, Epstein acquired detailed information.
[254] Ib., 10.
[255] Ib.
[256] Ib.
[257] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 28.
[258] Part 6.1.2 elaborates on the utilization of the word 'epidemic' in connection to heroin and drugs.
[259] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 47 and 66.

that were coined in the 1920s.[260] Further the scale of the 'heroin epidemic' was enlarged by statistical reworking of 1969 data.[261]

Yet connecting drug use to crime was a central part of Nixon's agenda and the presumption that drug use – primarily heroin use – would keep people from working legitimate jobs was constructed as threatening to tax-paying and upstanding citizens. However, considering that the supposedly heavy drug use of the U.S. army in Vietnam did not impair the their combat capabilities and that heroin use by the G.I.'s was almost unheard of until mid-1970 proves that drug users – heroin users among them – can function in society and do their jobs.[262]

To invoke deep-seated fears in the U.S. society about drug addiction threatening each sector of public life, the help of the media was necessary that would rejuvenate old stereotypes of drug users and employ a language that was interspersed with terms such as 'plague,' 'epidemic' and 'infestation,' suggesting that drug addiction was exponentially spreading and that no one was safe. Yet once this public fear was invoked and the Nixon administration established new agencies, solutions had to be presented to the American public. Since the drug 'epidemic' was constructed as a foreign threat, interventions in Mexico and Turkey followed.

The so called *Operation Intercept* in September 1969 was a reaction to the Mexican government not persecuting marijuana cultivation and traffic in the way the Nixon administration demanded. Thus, the U.S.-Mexican border was blocked for twenty days with thorough body searches. Effects of the twenty-day border blockade were that drug trafficking adapted and started using small planes.[263]

The CIA estimated in 1970 that India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Laos, Thailand, and Burma all grew and manufactured more illegal opium than Turkey. However, Turkey was a NATO ally and would respond to U.S. drug control efforts. Thus, in spring 1970, Turkey was publicly accused of suppling the 80 percent of the illegal heroin in the United States.[264] Egil

[260] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 165. The stereotypes about addiction and the drug imagery are extensively discussed in part 6.2.
[261] Ib., 174.
[262] Ib., 182. Nixon and his team borrowed the idea of linking drugs to crime in order to gain political power from Nelson Rockefeller, the governor of New York State (1959-1973). Rockefeller used in his campaign and throughout his tenure images of heroin as an 'infectious disease' and 'plague,' arguing that addicts should be incarcerated. Epstein shows how Rockefeller adjusted the number of drug users in New York to his own purposes and how he invoked a general fear of drugs and crime to then promise to protect the city from addicts (Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 38-45).
[263] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 23-24; Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 82-83. Baum goes so far and claims that the lack of marijuana in these days led to people trying out more dangerous drugs, yet I doubt this assumption. Yet also Epstein notes that there were newspaper articles in October 1969 that claimed that young people tried heroin because of the lack of marijuana.
[264] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 86-88. The CIA estimated that Turkey produced 3-8 percent of illegal opium in 1970. India, the largest illicit opium producer during that time, could not be pressured because the Nixon men were afraid that India would denounce the U.S. efforts of global drug control as imperialist, Epstein argues.

Krogh, served as the White House liaison to the FBI and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), was a Nixon confidant that was later involved in the Watergate affair, drew up a carefully timed scenario for June 1971. In the beginning of that June news were leaked that certain ambassadors were recalled to the United States concerning the drug crisis. In mid-June the climax would be Nixon giving a speech in Congress that would announce a national crisis about the heroin 'epidemic,' and finally, successfully resolving the emergency in the end of June by declaring that Turkey complied to an opium ban.[265] Egil Krogh was instructed by Nixon to arrange a deal where $ 35 million were paid as 'aid' to the Turkish government in order to eradicate opium cultivation and support alternative crops. On June 30, 1971, a press conference with the Turkish ambassador was praising the Turkish government for its decision to stop opium cultivation.[266] The Turkey-Nixon deal resulted in Turkish farmers being deprived of their subsistence on one hand,[267] and on the other hand in "unbalancing notions of national sovereignty," as Matthew Pembleton argues. "Turkey was expected to surrender control over its own economy (and diet) solely to mitigate drug use in the United States."[268]

However, the careful construction of Nixon winning the War on Drugs was interrupted by *The New York Times* publishing the so-called *Pentagon Papers* on June 13, 1971. The papers – a collection of over 4,000 documents and roughly 3,000 pages of describing the events that led to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War from 1945 to 1968 – were compiled on orders of Robert S. McNamara in 1967. The *Pentagon Papers* essentially proved that four U.S. presidents deceived the public about the real backgrounds and scope of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia.[269] The public debate now focused on the *Pentagon Papers* revelations. Thus, Nixon's 'Message on Drug Abuse Control' on June 17, 1971 can also be seen as a reactionary attempt to divert attention from the *Pentagon Papers*. In this speech Nixon proposes the formation of yet another agency that is directly controlled by the White House:

> "The magnitude of the problem, the national and international implications of the problem, and the limited capacities of states and cities to deal with the problem all reinforce the conclusion that

[265] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 139.
[266] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 61. Baum notes that paying Turkey to eradicate all opium production led to shortages for legal morphine and codeine production and the United States had to discreetly request that Turkey would resume some of its opium production. Turkey asked for an additional payment and other nations that cultivated opium also wanted to be paid. Not wanting to be in a position to be susceptible to blackmail, the U.S. administration returned to prior policies of crop eradication.
[267] Alfred W. McCoy, "The Stimulus of Prohibition: A Critical History of the Global Narcotics Trade," *in Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes*, ed. Michael K. Steinberg et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 47.
[268] Pembleton, "Imagining a Global Sovereignty," 58.
[269] Neil Sheehan, "Einführung," in *Die Pentagon-Papiere: Die Geheime Geschichte des Vietnamkrieges*, ed. Neil Sheehan (Stuttgart: Deutscher Bücherbund, 1971), xv.

> coordination of this effort must take place at the highest levels of the Federal Government. Therefore, I propose the establishment of a central authority with over-all responsibility for all major Federal drug abuse prevention, education, treatment, rehabilitation, training, and research programs in all Federal agencies. This authority would be known as the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention. It would be located within the executive office of the President and would be headed by a director accountable to the President."[270]

Further, Nixon calls the establishment of the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention (SOADAP) an "emergency response to a national problem," seeing that the drug problem is "urgent" and needs "immediate action."[271] Nixon asks Congress for more funds to treat and rehabilitate addicts, as well as announces that he ordered a series of measures in order to assist "the rehabilitation process of Vietnam veterans" who came home addicted.[272] Culminating the speech, Nixon states that:

> "The threat of narcotics among our people is one which properly frightens many Americans. It comes quietly into homes and destroys children, it moves into neighborhoods and breaks the fiber of community which makes neighbors. It is a problem which demands compassion, and not simply condemnation, for those who become the victims of narcotics and dangerous drugs. […]But time is critical. Every day we lose compounds the tragedy which drugs inflict on individual Americans. The final issue is not whether we will conquer drug abuse, but how soon."[273]

Emphasizing that drugs are a subversive force that destroy middle-class families, Nixon purposely perpetuates the myths that drugs are an omnipresent threat for the United States, that extensive funds are necessary to halt the 'epidemic,' and that the president personally will oversee the war against drugs, relocating power from the relatively independent agencies towards the White House. Further, a consequence of Nixon's crusade against heroin and marijuana ultimately created the perfect market for cocaine in the United States. In the early 1970s Andean cocaine had just started to infiltrate upper U.S. societies as a flashy and seductive substance.[274] By attacking marijuana and heroin the door for cocaine was opened. The federal drug budget was increased from $3 million in 1968, to $224 million in 1974.[275]

In May 1971 Congress had been alerted, by the report of the Republican congressmen Morgan F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele who had travelled to Vietnam, that an estimated 25,000

---

[270] "Excerpts From President's Message on Drug Abuse Control." *The New York Times*, June 18, 1971, sec. Archives. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/18/archives/excerpts-from-presidents-message-on-drug-abuse-control.html. The complete message can be found in the appendix on page XXXIV.
[271] Ib.
[272] Ib.
[273] Ib.
[274] Paul Gootenberg, "Cocaine's Long March North, 1900-2010," *Latin American Politics and Society* 54, no. 1 (2012): 165.
[275] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 189.

to 37,000 soldiers were addicted to heroin.[276] The report signifies the climax of the "crisis of the 'addicted army.'"[277]

Dr. Jerome Jaffe was consulted as an expert on addiction by the Nixon administration and consequently made director of the newly established SOADAP. Jaffe instituted that heroin could be discovered in urine and contrived the plan that G.I.'s in Vietnam should be tested for heroin before returning to the United States.[278] However, Jaffe realized that his urinalysis program would lead to a number of dishonorable discharges. He appealed to Nixon to change the military drug policy in order to avoid that numerous G.I.'s would be indicted; Nixon conceded.[279] The SOADAP immediately started setting up a urine testing program in Vietnam, also called *Operation Golden Flow*: Each soldier that departed from Vietnam had to submit a urine sample. In fall 1971 subsequently less soldiers were tested positive, and the rate in February 1972 was below two percent.[280] Daniel Weimer claims that "[b]y identifying a population of individuals deemed a threat to the United States and subjecting returning soldiers to urinalysis the U.S. government helped construct and maintain a modern anti-(illegal) drug identity."[281] G.I.'s that tested positive for heroin were redirected to a medical center "where physical examinations, drug history, and other clinical observations were obtained."[282] The soldiers stayed for about a week in these centers, the delay being an incentive to test negative and leave Vietnam as soon as possible. The U.S. Army deemed *Operation Golden Flow* as sufficient in reversing the 'heroin epidemic.'[283]

Jerome Jaffe had also lobbied for the recently discovered methadone maintenance to treat heroin addicts, yet the U.S. Army relied on counseling only. Another observation of the urinalysis program was that many soldiers simply stopped using heroin once they returned to the United States:

> "Take a man out of a pestilential jungle where people he can't see are trying to kill him for reason he doesn't understand, and – surprise! – his need to shoot smack goes away. If there was a lesson there about environmental factors contributing to drug abuse, it went unlearned." [284]

[276] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 208.
[277] Kuzmarov, "From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency," 352.
[278] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 50-51. In 1971, marijuana could not yet be detected in urine.
[279] Ib., 52.
[280] Daniel Weimer, "Drugs-as-a-Disease: Heroin, Metaphors, and Identity in Nixon's Drug War," *Janus Head* 6, no. 2 (2003): 264.
[281] Ib.
[282] M. Duncan Stanton, "Drugs, Vietnam, and the Vietnam Veteran: An Overview," *The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse* 3, no. 4 (1976): 564.
[283] Ib.
[284] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 65.

The summer of 1971 marks the high point of Nixon's War on Drugs: The deal with Turkey, his speech on drug abuse, and the installment of the urinalysis program in Vietnam show that despite there being only a small addict population in the United States, drugs were a number one domestic and foreign policy concern. The public media discourse reflected and fueled the fear of drugs. By mid-1971, especially the heroin use of G.I.'s in Vietnam were in the center of the discourse, as *The New York Times* headlines in chapter 3.2 show. Nevertheless, the Nixon administration also demanded reliable numbers about heroin addiction of Vietnam veterans and commissioned the renowned psychologist Dr. Lee Robins to conduct an extensive study.

5 Run Through the Jungle

5.1 What's Going On

Although the Nixon administration instigated the War on Drugs and benefitted indirectly from the 'heroin epidemic,' reliable numbers were scarce. Once the idea was invoked that thousands of addicted G.I.'s would return to the United States, intensifying the 'heroin plague,' concrete data was requested. In summer 1971 only estimated numbers about addiction and drug use in Vietnam were circulating, as articles such as "G.I.'s in Vietnam Get Heroin Easily,"[285] "Pentagon Unsure of Total on Drug Use in Vietnam,"[286] and "Figures on Heroin in Vietnam Differ"[287] show.

Jerome Jaffe, director of SOADAP, contacts Dr. Lee Robins, a professor of social science and psychiatry at Washington University, in July 1971 to conduct a study about drug addiction in the U.S. Army. SOADAP was responsible for ensuring that Dr. Robins had access to the G.I.'s leaving Vietnam and that sufficient funding for the study was acquired.[288] Jaffe remembers that when Dr. Lee Robins and her team presented the initial findings to U.S. Army generals in April 1973 they "were greeted with more than incredulity; there were accusations of data fabrication, gross misrepresentation, and political shenanigans."[289] Even though Lee Robins' study has been accused of being government funded and thus not being conducted independently, there is broad academic consensus that her findings represent the only reliable and accountable data of drug use in Vietnam as well as drug use of Vietnam veterans.[290] Yet it should be noted that secondary interpretations of Lee Robins' studies results may be distorted by political notions thus the original publication should be consulted.[291] Given the emotionally charged nature of the topics of heroin addiction and the Vietnam War, as well as the language at our supply that is already interspersed with ideology and presuppositions about addiction, one has to tread really carefully. In the following, the most relevant results for this thesis of Lee Robins' study "The Vietnam Drug User Returns," published in September 1973, will be discussed.

---

[285] Emerson, "G.I.'s in Vietnam Get Heroin Easily."
[286] "Pentagon Unsure of Total on Drug Use in Vietnam."
[287] "Figures on Heroin in Vietnam Differ."
[288] Jerome H. Jaffe, "A Follow-Up of Vietnam Drug Users: Origins and Context of Lee Robins' Classic Study," *The American Journal on Addiction* 19 (2010): 213. Jaffe states explicitly that he had ensured Robins that there would be no spinning of the data nor suppression of the results.
[289] Ib.
[290] Wayne Hall and Megan Weier, "Lee Robins' Studies of Heroin Use Among U.S. Vietnam Veterans," *Addiction* 122 (2016): 176.
[291] Ib.

In September 1971 approximately 1,400 tested positive in the urinalysis proceedings out of 13,760 G.I.'s returning from their tour of duty in Vietnam. 470 returnees were randomly selected from all of the retuning soldiers as the general sample, while from the group that tested positive for drugs a sample of 495 was selected. From May 1972 to September 1972 the veterans were interviewed and their urine was tested again, while their military records were examined again.[292] Central results of Robins' studies were that of the men whose Vietnam tour ended in September 1971, 45 percent had used narcotics, amphetamines, or barbiturates on at least one occasion in Vietnam.[293] Regular narcotic use was reported by 29 percent of the men, usually administered by smoking.[294] The men who used drugs in Vietnam were "disproportionately young, single, regular Army men from large cities. They tended to have had less education, more drug experience before Service, more civilian arrests, and more disciplinary history in Service than men who did not use drugs in Vietnam."[295]

Concerning drug use and addiction of the returning soldiers, Robins states that ten percent of the men had used narcotics, and only one percent became readdicted. Fifty percent of the veterans had used marijuana since their return.[296] Concluding the major findings, Robins' comments that:

> "These findings were striking in two ways: they showed a surprisingly high remission rate for heroin addiction, and they showed that many men who reported addiction in Vietnam had used narcotics occasionally thereafter without having become readdicted. The low rate of post-Vietnam was reflected in a lack of felt need to treatment for drug problems."[297]

In a 1993 article Lee Robins' comments on the results of her studies. She states that widespread opium use among the soldiers had been an unexpected result, considering that the media reports focused on heroin use.[298] Further she discussed that the situation in Vietnam was unique concerning the relation between alcohol and narcotics use: in Vietnam those who consumed alcohol on a daily basis consumed seldom drugs, and vice versa. Before and after the tour in Vietnam heavy drinking and narcotics use belonged together, yet in Vietnam there was an

---

[292] Lee N. Robins, *The Vietnam Drug User Returns* (Washington D.C.: SAODAP Monograph Series, 1974), vii.
[293] Ib. Central results of the study are also visually presented in the appendix on pages XXX-XXXIII.
[294] Ib., viii. Regular use means here more than ten times in total and more than weekly.
[295] Ib.
[296] Ib. Here the timeframe were eight to twelve months between return from Vietnam and the time of the interview.
[297] Ib.
[298] Lee N. Robins, "Vietnam Veterans Rapid Recovery From Heroin Addiction: A Fluke or Normal Expectation?," *Addiction* 88 (1993), 1044. However, reading for instance Graham Greene's novel *The Quiet American*, first published in 1955 and broadly received, this claim seems questionable. Throughout *The Quiet American* the protagonists continue to consume vast amounts of opium. Greene was a war correspondent in Vietnam from 1951 to 1954 and highly critical of the growing American involvement in the war. The novel was adapted into a movie twice, the first adaption in 1958.

inverse correlation.[299] Yet the most outstanding result of Lee Robins' studies was that she and her team "found little to justify the view of heroin as an especially dangerous drug."[300]

Robins recalls measured responses to her study. On one hand the Department of Defense (DOD) appreciated the results: Although the scope of drug use in Vietnam had been underestimated by the DOD, the results indicated that Vietnam veterans would not have to battle life-long drug dependency. On the other hand the media and parts of the academic community were unconvinced: "They resisted giving up the beliefs that heroin was a uniquely dangerous drug, to which a user became addicted very quickly and addiction to which was virtually incurable."[301] Robins argues that the main cause for drug use in Vietnam was not the "misery of war" but, according to her findings, the men interviewed stated that drug use was "enjoyable" and "made life in the service bearable."[302] Further reasons for drug use other than its "euphoria-producing effects" were "reduction of irritations of Army regulations, homesickness, boredom, depression, and insomnia."[303] Ninety percent of the men interviewed did not think that narcotic use had long-term damaging effects.[304]

Preceding Robins' study that was published in 1973, Joel H. Kaplan and Stewart L. Baker researched the phenomenon of G.I. drug use in Vietnam. Joel Kaplan served in Vietnam in 1968 and 1969 as commanding officer of a medical detachment, observing and treating drug overdoses. In a 1971 publication Kaplan estimates that of the 550,000 soldiers stationed in Vietnam between 50 and 80 percent were using marijuana.[305] Kaplan speaks of "drug abuse" and describes that heavy marijuana users start to smoke early in the morning and might finish the day with an "OJ," – an opium joint. He claims that twenty marijuana joints can be bought for about one U.S. dollar.[306] Kaplan observes that the Vietnamese army did not have an issue with marijuana but primarily with opium addiction.[307]

Throughout Kaplan's article there is an undertone of accusing the Vietnamese of seducing and addicting the U.S. soldiers to opium. He claims that in the opium dens operated by 'Papasans' or 'Mamasans' the American soldiers who came in search of marijuana would

[299] Robins, "Vietnam Veterans Rapid Recovery From Heroin Addiction," 1045. Robins explains this inverse correlation by pointing out that many soldiers were under the legal drinking age of 21 and for this group heroin was more easily available than alcohol.
[300] Ib., 1046.
[301] Ib., 1047. The results were suspected to be wrong and the media and research community reasoned that drug use in Vietnam was due to the strenuous setting and the anguish of war.
[302] Ib., 1048. On page XXXIII in the appendix a table with the reasons for drug use in Vietnam is shown.
[303] Robins, *The Vietnam Drug User Returns*, ix.
[304] Ib.
[305] Joel H. Kaplan, "Marijuana and Drug Abuse in Vietnam," *Annals New York Academy of Sciences* 191, no. 1 (1971): 261.
[306] Ib.
[307] Ib.

receive OJs instead. Then the 'Papasans' or 'Mamasans' would gradually increase the dose and inject the G.I.'s with opium. The opium den owner kept count of each soldier's tolerance. Yet once the soldiers had to leave due to a mission the soldier might overdose on return because his tolerance dropped, Kaplan observes.[308]

Kaplan also notes an age discrepancy between marijuana users and alcohol users. Young soldiers distinguish between so-called 'potheads' and 'juicers,' while the term 'juicers' described older officers using heavy amounts of alcohol.[309] Kaplan further recounts stories of individual soldiers misbehaving while being high and lists why marijuana use is especially dangerous in combat situations. However, Kaplan does not touch upon the negative effects that alcohol use might have.[310]

Stewart L. Baker was Colonel of the U.S. Army and Chief Psychiatry and Neurology Consultant. In 1972 he published his conceptions about drug use in Vietnam, speaking of "epidemiological characteristics of the opiates."[311] Not only perpetuating the idea of a 'drug epidemic,' Baker continues to criminalize drug users by stating that it is "inevitable" that narcotics use will be accompanied by a "rise in other crimes committed to obtaining money for narcotics."[312] Here Baker maintains the Nixon administration's notion that drug use and criminal behavior are linked.

Overall, Lee Robins' studies of drug use of soldiers in Vietnam and beyond remain the most reliable and transparent source for determining the scope and effects of heroin and marijuana use as well as addiction. Further, Robins does not exclude alcohol from her studies, while Baker and Kaplan dismiss alcohol use in their assessments of drug use in Vietnam. However, Robins' results were only published in 1973, when the 'heroin epidemic' was no longer a central element of the discourse, as shown in chapter 6.2.

5.2 Masters of War

Examining drug use by soldiers in wars across cultures and centuries, Lukasz Kamienski concludes three reasons why drugs are used in wars: First, "soldiers are afraid of the fear of battle," second, "a true warrior wants to perform to his best of ability," and third that "soldiers are stressed and anxious not only before battle."[313] Of the intoxicants used alcohol is the most

[308] Ib., 262.
[309] Ib.
[310] Ib., 263-264. Kaplan describes soldiers in support units that were 'abusing marijuana' as not motivated, passive, ambitionless, and irresponsible.
[311] Stewart L. Baker, "U.S. Army Heroin Abuse Identification Program in Vietnam: Implications for a Methadone Program," *American Journal of Public Health* 62, no. 6 (1972): 857.
[312] Ib.
[313] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 2-4.

common and least controversial substance.[314] For instance it was believed that wine saved the French army in World War I, yet the inebriated state of the troops in World War II was cited as a reason why the French lost against the German blitzkrieg.[315] Concerning the American Vietnam War, "the gravest threat causing a breakdown of discipline among American troops was not the highly publicized drug addiction but a rather concealed issue of drunkenness."[316] About 88 percent of G.I.'s in Vietnam used alcohol while being on duty and 30 percent of officers were observed as 'heavy' or 'binge' drinkers. Further two cans of beer were issued to each soldier per day and since December 1970 alcohol use in the camps was allowed. Also soldiers in Vietnam received alcohol as a benefit for confirmed kills of the enemy.[317] In general, alcohol use by soldiers is observed as the most popular way of coping with combat stress and enhancing courage in battle.[318]

Yet not only self-medication by the soldiers was common in wars, but also command structures across cultures and armies have used psychoactive substance to enhance the soldiers' performance. In the Pacific battles with the Japanese in World War II the American soldiers were supplied with amphetamines in order to face the vicious opponents.[319] Kamienski calls the war in Vietnam the first "pharmacological war," considering not only the unparalleled self-administered substance use of American soldiers but also the administration of dextroamphetamine by the military command.[320] The U.S. Army "readily supplied its troops in Vietnam with speed," and further that there was "no attention given to [the] recommended dose or frequency of administration."[321] The dextroamphetamine (or Dexedrine) pills were supposed to keep the soldiers alert on long search-and-destroy missions, as well as enhance the courage of the soldiers.[322] Michael Herr, Vietnam War correspondent for the *Esquire magazine* from 1967 to 1969, processed his Vietnam experience in the memoir-novel *Dispatches* first published in 1977:

> "Going out at night the medics gave you pills, Dexedrine breath like dead snakes kept too long in a jar. I never saw the need for them myself, a little contact or anything that even sounded like contact

[314] Ib., 5.
[315] Ib., 21-22.
[316] Ib., 25.
[317] Ib. Receiving a reward for a confirmed kill might be an explanation why G.I.'s removed certain body parts (ears, penises) of their kills.
[318] Ib., 26. Looking at the alcohol use of the U.S. military today, around ten percent of soldiers are observed to have a drinking problem. Kamienski states that during the Afghanistan and Iraq War the troops used alcohol regularly and excessively.
[319] Ib., 122.
[320] Lukasz Kamienski, "The Drugs that Built a Super Soldier," *The Atlantic*, April 8, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/04/the-drugs-that-built-a-super-soldier/477183/.
[321] Ib.
[322] Ib.

> would give me more speed than I could bear. […] I was living too close to my bones as it was, all I had to do was accept it. Anyway, I'd save the pills for later, for Saigon and the awful depressions I always had there. I knew one 4th Division Lurp who took his pills by the fistful, downs from the left pocket of his tiger suit and ups from the right, one to cut the trail for him and the other to send him down it."[323]

Herr's book reads like a psychedelic nightmare of the American experience in Vietnam, referring to drug use – primarily opium and marijuana – on various pages. Yet this specific passage supports Kamienski's assumption of the U.S. Army supplying the soldiers with amphetamines.

Two phases of G.I. drug use in Vietnam can be identified: primarily marijuana – with the exception of the occasional joint dipped n opium, the OJ – was used until potent heroin became available throughout the country in early 1970. The heroin influx came from the so-called Golden Triangle region where Burma, Thailand and Laos shared borders.[324] Stanton assesses that heroin was "clearly a *Vietnam* phenomenon," while many G.I.'s had used marijuana prior to their detachment to Vietnam.[325] Further he claims that these substances functioned as a surrogate for alcohol consumption.[326] Since the mid-1960s there have been reports of marijuana use among the troops however these remained largely ignored until the fall of 1970. Congressional subcommittees demanded a hard stance against marijuana, culminating in a U.S. Army campaign against the local marijuana plant.[327] The massive campaign against marijuana might also led towards an increased heroin use. Kamienski also argues that the new restrictions on marijuana were facilitating heroin use and that is was ultimately realized that marijuana "was not a problem at all."[328] In Vietnam heroin was extraordinarily pure, cheap, and easily available thus being an alluring choice of intoxication.

The average American G.I. in Vietnam was in his late teens or early twenties and comparatively poor. Until Nixon changed the draft to the so-called 'lottery system,' going to college meant successfully avoiding the draft call, meaning that young men from wealthier families could avoid the war. Draftees in general, African Americans, and white soldiers from the poor southern states were the social groups with exceptional high casualty rates. G.I.'s without a high school diploma were three times more likely to get injured or killed than those

[323] Michael Herr, *Dispatches* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1977; London: Picador, 1997), 4-5. Citations refer to the Picador edition.
[324] Stanton, "Drugs, Vietnam, and the Vietnam Veteran," 561.
[325] Ib., 562. Emphasis by author.
[326] Ib., 557.
[327] Ib., 558.
[328] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 194.

that had a degree.[329] The men that were shipped home in body bags were on average twenty years old.[330] Further, as the war continued, many soldiers "came to believe that the stated reasons for the war – anti-Communism and bringing 'democracy' to the Vietnamese – were lies; their disillusionment, as well as antagonism from the local population, grew and led to a breakdown in the military order."[331] Buzzanco claims that drug use among the troops as well as listening to musicians such as The Doors, Jefferson Airplane, or Jimi Hendrix became a symbol for anti-war protest within the army.[332] Additionally, marijuana smoking was a group ritual in Vietnam and shows the social meaning of drugs in the war. Marijuana use in a group "became an important element of initiation for the newcomers."[333]

The soldier drug subculture had a clear ranking of which drug users had a higher or lower status. Marijuana users were on top of the hierarchy, while "habitual users of amphetamines, known as 'speed freaks,' were disliked because of their constant talking and overactivity."[334] Heroin users were seen as somewhere in the middle of the order, still being able to function within the army structures. Further, Weimer notes, even though drug use in Vietnam can be framed as a form of protest, psychoactive substances were not conceived "as a path to religious or eternal truth, as some of the counterculture did."[335] Both the labels 'junkie' and 'hippie' were rejected by drug using soldiers.[336] Yet looking at the rising numbers of drug consuming soldiers, one should keep in mind that throughout the late 1960s drug use – particularly marijuana use – was also increasing. In 1967 about 5 percent of college students admitted to smoking marijuana, while in 1971 the number increased tenfold to 51 percent.[337]

The returning Vietnam G.I.'s felt the disillusionment when the fears of heroin addicts 'flooding' the country materialized in gruff military police controls letting German shepherds sniff through the soldier's luggage, searching for heroin.[338] Some commanders "would allow prostitutes into the barracks so that the soldiers could avoid the downtown brothels, where illicit substances were sold and bought easily."[339] Further, drug and alcohol proposed an opportunity to cope with the mounting disillusionment and the perceived lack of purpose.[340] Kamienski also

[329] Buzzanco, *Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life*, 91 and 115.
[330] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 199.
[331] Buzzanco, *Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life*, 91.
[332] Ib.
[333] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 201.
[334] Weimer, "Drugs-as-a-Disease," 270.
[335] Ib., 271.
[336] Ib.
[337] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 200.
[338] Scholl-Latour, *Der Tod im Reisfeld*, 158.
[339] Buzzanco, *Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life*, 114.
[340] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 197.

states that the physical exhaustion and the "psychologically devastating" conditions of the war were reasons for drug use in Vietnam, opposing Lee Robins' findings with this assessment.[341] Escapism is also seen as a central motive for drug use and on this reason Lee Robins, Jeremy Kuzmarov and Lukasz Kamienski agree upon.[342] Kamienski states that drugs were "a means to escape from the hopelessness, tragedy, nonsense, and brutality of the surroundings."[343]

Yet there were also soldiers who refused taking drugs in Vietnam. Lee Robins' studies find that the most important reasons given for rejecting drugs in Vietnam were among others the fear of death or bodily harm if narcotics were used, that the ability to do ones job was severely impaired, as well as fears of addiction. For many that refused narcotics alcohol was already a sufficient drug.[344]

Apart from Lee Robins' studies and very recent publications, an undertone of blaming the Vietnamese for selling drugs very cheaply to the American soldiers is very apparent throughout the literature. The accusation that the Vietnamese 'other' was seducing upstanding American boys into marijuana and heroin use can not only be observed in newspaper and newsmagazine articles of the time but also in scholarly publications after the war. Claims of subversion of troops through psychoactive substances that were unfailingly constructed as 'foreign' were not only a Vietnam phenomenon.[345]

The cheap price and easy availability of heroin and marijuana in Vietnam are emphasized throughout the literature. In the following the causes for the accessibility of heroin in Vietnam are examined.

5.3 Sympathy for the Devil

During the French colonial regime in Indochina opium trade and consumption was permitted. United Nations pressure on France led to the prohibition of opium in 1950 and the French military then unofficially assigned the opium trade to the French secret service in order to continue financing the war against the Việt Minh.[346] With the end of the French occupation of Indochina the CIA gradually took over from the French secret service. The CIA's involvement in the illicit drug trade in Southeast Asia dates back to the early 1950s when, as a reaction to the Chinese communist revolution, a Chinese nationalist guerilla force was formed in Burma

[341] Ib., 196. Lee Robins' study findings for reasons of drug use in Vietnam can be found in the appendix on pages XXX-XXXIII.
[342] Ib.; Kuzmarov, *The Myth of the Addicted Army*, 22; Robins, *The Vietnam Drug User Returns*, 32.
[343] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 196.
[344] Robins, *The Vietnam Drug User Returns*, 30. The table on page XXXI in the appendix states the reasons in detail.
[345] As discussed in chapter 2.3.
[346] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 83.

with CIA help, Alfred McCoy claims.[347] In 1972, the Chinese nationalist army was in charge of a third of the globe's illicit opium. Until 1970, McCoy observes, Southeast Asia's opium cultivation was comparatively low and designed for regional markets. 1970, however, marks a turning point. McCoy argues that because Nixon declared the War on Drugs it "would produce a radical transformation in Asia's drug trade, inadvertently integrating it more fully into the international traffic."[348]

1970 signifies a turning point in opium and heroin production and trafficking, yet he argues that the U.S. led ARVN invasion of Cambodia led to additional smuggle routes into Vietnam. From 1965 to 1967 opium was transported by the South Vietnamese Air Force from Laos to Saigon, but when the pro-American regime in Cambodia was installed after the invasion trade and traffic between the neighboring countries intensified.[349]

The so-called Golden Triangle is a 380,000 square kilometer mountainous border area where Laos, Thailand, and Burma connect.[350] Opium from the Golden Triangle region was primarily shipped to South Vietnam until 1975 by corrupt Vietnamese or Laotian officials, Chin observes.[351] From the 1960s to the 1980s Khun Sa was a central figure in the Burmese heroin trade. Peter Chalk argues that the warlord was able to build an "empire" on the opium and heroin trade, enabled by CIA support.[352]

Furthermore, weak states which are close to war zones make ideal territories for drug production. Heroin producing areas across the globe, such as the so-called Golden Crescent area of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Golden Triangle region, the Afghani-Pakistani border region at the Durand Line, southern Colombia, and the Sierra Madre Sinaloa region in Mexico, are all border regions, with limited state control and "where drug production finds not only security but a committed material or even ideological base among destitute, refugee, or colonizing peasants and regional middlemen."[353] Gootenberg states that the "armed 'hill tribes' of the Golden Triangle are a classic example."[354] The people – or armed hill tribes – growing

[347] McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin Southeast Asia*, 8. Alfred McCoy's sources for his 1972 book on global heroin trade and connections to the CIA were primarily interviews he conducted. He continues to be one of the central researchers for drug trade in the 20th century in Asia, however he reproduces the U.S. 'heroin epidemic' and the 'myth of the addicted army' in this publication.
[348] McCoy, "The Stimulus of Prohibition," 46.
[349] Brush, "Higher and Higher."
[350] Ko-lin Chin, *The Golden Triangle: Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016), 8.
[351] Ib., 117.
[352] Peter Chalk, "Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle's Heroin Trade: Threat and Response," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 23, no. 2 (2000): 92. By 1980, Khun Sa's militia was responsible for roughly 50 percent of heroin production in the Golden Triangle.
[353] Gootenberg, "Talking Like a State," 109.
[354] Ib.

and harvesting the poppy plants in the mountains of the Golden Triangle were minority groups. The minorities living in the remote mountain ranges of the border region had a singular advantage in smuggling opium: "the topography, geography, and climate augured against central government control."[355] Further, certain rural minorities understood their communities as independent nation-states and did not identify with the Laotian state.[356]

The rural population of the Golden Triangle was at a clear disadvantage concerning education or employment opportunities and opium production was considered by some a legitimate source of income. Further, the poppy plant had clear advantages for the farmers, since the plant needed less nutrients from the soil than for instance corn or rice.[357] Until 1971 cultivating poppy plants in Laos had been legal, yet due to pressure by the United States an anti-opium law was passed. Until the law passed there had been no opium-related corruption in Laos, but with the prohibition coming into effect corruption surged.[358] Further, until 1971 and the introduction of the anti-opium law, heroin had not been known in Laos. Since the passage of the law heroin was gradually introduced to the consumers in Vientiane.[359] Opium was rather bulky and had a distinct smell, thus was easily detected by the police. Heroin however "was a smuggler's dream: difficult to detect, odorless, powdery, and easily hidden in small volumes."[360]

The farmers in the Golden Triangle mountains harvested an estimated 1,000 tons of raw opium in 1972. At the cultivation sites morphine is distilled from the raw product because morphine is easier transported. The process of distilling heroin from morphine is more complex and happened in heroin laboratories that had been established in Marseille or Hong Kong after World War II. Yet in the 1970s the first heroin laboratories appeared in the Golden Triangle, McCoy asserts.[361] Seven large heroin laboratories started manufacturing heroin in 1970. These laboratories were operated by criminals from Hong Kong and were supervised by the National Chinese guerillas, allies of the CIA stationed in northern Thailand, and by the general of the Royal Laotian Army, Ouane Rattikone.[362] The Laotian troops played a key role in the heroin trade and production in the early 1970s, Steiniger argues. Further, the secret army of the CIA,

[355] Joseph Westermeyer, "Opium and the People of Laos," in *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes,* ed. Michael K. Steinberg et al. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 116.
[356] Ib.
[357] Ib.,116-117.
[358] Ib., 122. For instance in 1972 the ambassador of the Royal Laotian Government to France was arrested at the airport in Paris with over 60 kg of pure heroin.
[359] Ib., 129.
[360] Ib.
[361] McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, 11-12.
[362] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 83.

about 30,000 men of the Hmong tribe, were financially dependent on opium smuggled by the CIA airline 'Air America.'[363]

U.S. involvement in the illicit narcotics trade in Southeast Asia happened on three levels, McCoy claims: Firstly, on a coincidental level when diplomats or secret agents allied within a narrow Cold War framework with a group that was financing their communist resistance through narcotics traffic; secondly, facilitating the illegal traffic by turning a blind eye and/ or actively hiding known smugglers; and thirdly when agents and diplomats participated actively in the shipping of heroin and opium.[364] McCoy illustrates that "[s]ince ruthless drug lords made effective anticommunist allies and opium amplified their power, CIA agents, operating alone half a world away from home, tolerated trafficking by their covert-action allies."[365]

In Saigon the Corsican underworld and the Binh Xuyen river pirates were heavily implicated in the heroin trade. Further, the Corsicans maintained connections to Marseille, shipping surplus heroin to Europe where it reinforced the cities' position as Europe's central heroin hub.[366]

The laboratories in the Golden Triangle were able to produce heroin of a remarkable purity of 80 to 99 percent. Once the pure product reached South Vietnam, "teenagers sold it to American soldiers on the highways; street dealers gave it to G.I.'s as they walked through Saigon, and maids sold it to military personnel while cleaning their living quarters."[367]

Drug use by G.I.'s in Vietnam became visible to the American public from 1970 onwards. Heroin and marijuana were available and cheap and the young and comparatively uneducated soldiers were bored, afraid, annoyed, depressed, or simply wanted to get high. Drug use happened. Drugs in Vietnam became part of the G.I. identity through including them in social initiation rituals and as symbols of anti-war protest within the army. Yet as Lee Robins' studies show, drug use was not necessarily leading to addiction. The high purity of the heroin that was accessible to the soldiers and thus smoking the substance instead of injecting it reduced the risk of overdoses. Robins shows that heroin use was not dangerous in Vietnam, contradicting everyone's beliefs about the demonized drug.

However, the actual drug use by American soldiers in the Vietnam War, their addiction rates, and their relapses once they returned to the United States was not of importance for the

[363] Ib.
[364] McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, 14.
[365] McCoy, "The Stimulus of Prohibition," 44.
[366] McCoy, "Heroin and Politics in Saigon," 98. McCoy also refers in this chapter to Graham Greene's novel.
[367] Brush, "Higher and Higher."

media and politicians.[368] Of relevance were how the rumors of G.I. drug use were received in the United States. Once reports of the soldiers' drug use reached the United States, the mass media and politicians constructed the idea of an 'addicted army' and the 'heroin epidemic.' In the following it will be examined how the mass media and politicians shaped G.I. drug use according to their own means, turned it into a myth and used it as a political instrument. Further, the question how core American beliefs helped create the drug discourse will be answered. At the same time, it will not only be examined how G.I. drug use was instrumentalized to achieve societal and political means and shape American identity during the conclusion of the American war in Vietnam. Heroin and marijuana use in Vietnam continued to play a central role in the memory of the war – in movies, novels, memoirs, and scholarship – and distorted and reframed lessons that could have been learned from the war. The critical discourse analysis in the following will show how the theater of the Vietnam War generated an interventionist anti-drug ideology that ultimately superseded anti-communist ideology, already determining at the closure of the war in Vietnam that the Vietnamese enemy was not only envisioned as the communist 'other,' but also as a drug-supplying 'other.'

[368] The compiled results of Lee Robins' studies are found in the appendix pages XXX-XXXIII.

6 War

6.1 We've Gotta Get Out of This Place

The narrative of the drug using soldier in Vietnam influenced the perception and reality of the American war in Vietnam. Narratives are stories that can have a collective and individual impact through constructing meaning and identity. Narratives carry values and emotions and can either consolidate or question hegemonies. Our perception of reality (and history) is characterized by narratives, and these narratives are shaped by reality. Narratives and reality cannot be separated.[369] Myths are narratives that convey identity, explanations, and orientation. Narratives thus influence our perception of the world by creating meaning and by carrying norms and values.[370] Political myths consist of certain narratives, images and enactments that are not seeking the 'truth' behind the myth, but rather contrast their own truth through the myth.[371] Thus this thesis examines how political myths function given they constitute social reality and political power and the ways they can be exploited by the ruling class.

6.1.1 I'd Love to Change the World

Myths structure and constitute public discourses as well as rely on mass media to construct realities. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is a research perspective which includes larger relationships in the analysis and is used as a methodical approach to the empirical material to be analyzed. One of the central aims of CDA, according to Ruth Wodak, is "to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use."[372] Further, an aim is "to 'demystify' discourses by deciphering ideologies."[373] Thus analyzing a discourse unmasks the connection between language and political as well as institutional hierarchies, investigates relationships of power, and visible and invisible structures of discrimination and control.[374] Therefore the notions of power, history and ideology are central to CDA.[375] Additionally, a CDA should include not just public discourses, but also semi-public

[369] Jörg Wischermann and Gerhard Will, "Einleitung: Politische Mythen, Begriffe und Funktionen," in *Vietnam: Mythen und Wirklichkeiten*, ed. Jörg Wischermann and Gerhard Will (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2018): 7.
[370] Ib., 10.
[371] Ib., 10-12.
[372] Ruth Wodak, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 8.
[373] Ruth Wodak, "What CDA is About – A Summary of its History, Important Concepts and Developments," in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), 10.
[374] Ib., 2.
[375] Historical context is essential to enable the uncovering of myths, thus the chapters on the history of the Vietnam War and the Nixon administration.

and private discourses. However, due to the scope of this thesis the discourse analysis will be limited to public material.[376] To ensure an encompassing analysis political speeches, newspaper and newsmagazine articles as well as academic articles provide a multifaceted set of empirical data to examine in part 6.2.

6.1.2 Dead Flowers

Public discourses depend on hidden and apparent metaphors which "symbolically transfer aspects of one object to another."[377] The war metaphor, employed in the idea of the 'War on Drugs,' as well in the 'War on Terror,' is so frequently applied in the United States that it is hardly recognized as a metaphor any longer. Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills argue that the war metaphor "reduced an imposingly large, abstract, or disconcertingly complex problem to a well-defined, simplified, and ultimately manageable entity."[378] Daniel Weimer agrees to this and adds that metaphors "function within a culture by making a complex or not fully understood phenomenon familiar; they make what is complex simple."[379] The War on Terror, for instance, proposes a strategic frame wherein an impalpable terror can be addressed and defeated. The allegorical war is constituted by an imagery that invokes patriotic feelings of identity and the mother nation by using images such as flags or banners.[380]

The war metaphor, particularly in the U.S. American context, invokes stories of victory, patriotism and triumphalist narratives are invoked, and questioning the suitability of the war framework is considered unpatriotic and disloyal.[381] Employing a metaphor of war can be rather tempting because of "the simplification of the complex [and] the clarification of the subtle."[382] The war metaphor portrays unmistakable binaries of friends and foes, attackers and defenders, winning and losing, and – in the case of Vietnam – U.S. soldiers and insurgents. The lexicon of war guides the war metaphor and constructs the identities of us versus them. Further, the vocabulary of war invokes language such as 'defend,' 'attack' or 'strike,' active words that carry a sense of movement and progress.[383] Through the language of war the idea of being an assertive defender rather than a victim is conjured. Even more important the vocabulary of war supports military norms such as authority and hierarchy. Hence in the frame of the war

[376] Semi-public and private material, such as archival documents of the Nixon administration would add another dimension to the analysis. This will be a research project for the future.
[377] Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills, *At War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008), 3.
[378] Ib., 8.
[379] Weimer, "Drugs-as-a-Disease," 275.
[380] Steuter and Wills, *At War with Metaphor*, 8.
[381] Ib., 8-9.
[382] Ib., 9.
[383] Ib., 10-11.

metaphor "part of the price of our recovered security is to defer to those in government and military who are seen as experts in the necessary deployments of war."[384] Civilians or the public at large have a limited importance in war, relying power to the governing authorities. Using the metaphor of war, victory and protection are promised to the public. A further aspect of the metaphor is its inherent self-justification: retribution against a perceived attack is wanted and imminent.[385] It "negates any other non-military possibility as a way to defend the country."[386]

By employing the metaphor of war in relation to drugs, the War on Drugs thus becomes an issue of national security that can only be solved by military intervention. Hence the war metaphor emphasizes the inherently interventionist and even imperialist nature of the War on Drugs. Further, by framing drugs as foreign they are constructed as 'other' and an enemy that penetrates the good nation. Dominic Corva assesses that both the War on Terror and the War on Drugs "are connected by a shared discourse that partitions identifies specific global spaces that need to be governed in other ways."[387] Corva claims that both concepts endorse "imperialist geopolitics" in the name of propagating liberty, revealing the interventionist core of the war metaphor.[388]

Besides, the topic of war dominates every political agenda and other concerns are always subordinated to war. Steuter and Wills add in relation to the War on Terror that race is the most relevant frame.[389] I argue that this also holds true for the War on Drugs: as seen in part 3 racism laid the groundwork for the War on Drugs by linking certain minority groups to psychoactive substances. Also in Nixon's War on Drugs racist ideas play an important role: Drugs are constructed as a foreign threats to the United States.

The power of the imagery and language one employs in the rhetoric constitutes how "we think about and treat other human beings."[390] How dehumanization through language works becomes evident when examining the My Lai massacre of March 1968. During the trial of Lt. Calley it was remarked that he did not think he was murdering unresisting humans, but rather inferior creatures beyond reason. In general, G.I.'s in Vietnam regarded the Vietnamese as 'lesser animals' – which can partially be linked back to the prevailing metaphor constructed the U.S. soldiers as 'hunters' searching for Vietnamese 'prey.' Steuter and Wills point out that

[384] Ib., 11.
[385] Ib., 11-12.
[386] Ib., 12.
[387] Dominic Corva, "Neoliberal Globalization and the War on Drugs: Transnationalizing Illiberal Governance in the Americas," *Political Geography* 27 (2008): 191.
[388] Ib.
[389] Steuter and Wills, *At War with Metaphor*, 13-14. For instance within the framework of the War on Terror a number of so-called 'home security' legislation was passed that curtailed a number of civil rights.
[390] Ib., x.

in war "successfully dehumanizing an enemy is effective because it allows soldiers to kill without guilt."[391]

6.1.3 Fortunate Son

The War on Drugs – itself containing the war metaphor – conjures further associations and metaphors. As seen in chapter 6.1.2 and 3.2, the idea of an 'epidemic' as well as 'addiction' are explicitly stated. Further, the U.S. War on Drugs contains an influential moralistic impulse. The Puritan heritage becomes visible in the American drug crusade by not only condemning the consumption of specified substances but rhetorically by calling drugs a 'serious evil.' The power of narrow-minded and sectarian interests concerning U.S. efforts of drug control manifests itself in the language.[392]

The parochial U.S. War on Drugs resolves around the imagery of drug use as a disease. Robin Room claims that over the course of the 20th century the central drug-disease imagery is dominated by three ideas: First, the concept of drug use as 'contagious' or an 'epidemic,' second, the idea that drug use is a 'cancer,' and third the notion that drug use inevitably leads to addiction and dependence, so that one is ruled by irresistible cravings.[393] Room adds that the idea of drug use as an 'epidemic' that advances through communities is a fundamental image particularly in the United States and even "social policies have on occasion been built around taking the image literally."[394] Similarly drugs are also often seen as a 'cancer,' an almost incurable disease that everyone might develop. The cancer-image suggests that a society is an organic body that can be 'polluted' by a foreign substance.[395]

The imagery of addiction works at the individual level connecting to the assumption that drug use supposedly 'enslaves' the user. The so-called 'enslavement theory,' briefly touched upon in chapter 3.1 and the 'cancer' metaphor also reveal racist undertones: it was feared that the cancerous drug use would spread across racial boundaries.[396] Also the 'epidemic' metaphor invokes the same fears: an epidemic or a plague does not distinguish between race, class, or gender. Further, an epidemic might be "involuntarily contracted by innocent and guilty alike."[397] Epstein examines the image of the 'drug epidemic' from an economic angle and

[391] Ib., 49-50.
[392] David R. Bewley-Taylor, *International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 9 and 24.
[393] Robin Room, "The Rhetoric of International Drug Control," *Substance Use and Misuse* 34, no. 12 (1999): 1692-1693.
[394] Ib., 1692.
[395] Ib., 1693.
[396] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 33. Further, the Vietnam data from Lee Robins' studies dispels the idea that heroin 'enslaves' the user, since the heroin using soldiers were still functional.
[397] Ib., 11.

argues that by calling drug use 'epidemic' the government disregards that drugs are imported because consumer demand prevails and not simply because foreign forces cultivate drugs. Using the image of a 'plague' or 'epidemic,' it is concealed that the consumer of the substances "is not a passive victim but an active consumer" who wants to "relieve the pain and tedium of everyday life."[398]

Paul Gootenberg points out the "exterminationist" aspect of the drug discourse: When drugs are depicted as 'evil' it is logical that they should be "wiped out" or "radically controlled."[399] Hence the aim is a 'drug-free' United States since an 'evil' must be exterminated. Gootenberg calls this specific form of anti-drug discourse "essentialist" yet realizes that the extermination-idea has historical roots and a number of drug wars were fought with the language and the aim to eliminate all drugs on American soil.[400] While less pervasive during Nixon's Drug War in the 1970s and increasingly barbarian language has been applied to the anti-drug discourse with the accelerating globalization processes in the 21st century and drugs "are cast as the antithesis of borderless free-trade capitalism, as a warring medieval black-and-white spectacle of evil."[401]

Further, the War on Drugs is fighting the 'drug trade,' 'drug traffickers' or 'narco-terrorist' depicting the enemy only as a vague entity that is nonspecific and not personified.[402] Hence the image of the enemy can readily be adjusted to suit underlying interventionist goals. Fighting the drug war, the assumed opponent is not a tangible army but rather "a set of social and economic forces that sustain the trade," Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin argue.[403] Nevertheless, the U.S. governments have seen the issues of drug control, drug trade and drug consumption as a 'foreign' problem that is a matter of national security policy.[404] As shown in part 4 the succeeding administrations profited from constructing a drug problem in the first place and then framing it as a national security issue.

Fighting the War on Drugs abroad also successfully deflects from domestic concerns of substance use and drug control. Further, regarding certain U.S. interventions in foreign

[398] Epstein, *Agency of Fear*, 11.
[399] Gootenberg, "Talking Like a State," 120.
[400] Ib. Harry J. Anslinger for instance was one of the first to use the exterminationist discourse.
[401] Ib.
[402] Room, "The Rhetoric of International Drug Control," 1693.
[403] Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, "The U.S. 'War on Drugs': Its Impact in Latin American and the Caribbean," in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005): 4.
[404] Ib.

territories, the rhetoric of the War on Drugs is the main argument to not concede that the United States intervenes for economic self-interest in other countries.[405]

In contrast, the language of drug control, permeated with disease imagery, racialized images and fear of loss of control and puritanical morale, culminates in portraying all drug concerns as impalpable, mystical and alarming. Particularly the notion of losing control of oneself when consuming has powerful implications for drug control: only a punitive stance can provide a remedy. The idea of drug use leading to addiction has two discursive origins, Gootenberg states. First, by reducing scientific results to the notion that psychoactive substances are "brain altering alkaloids" that "work overpowering effects on people," and second the fixation on the notion of 'control' and how socially and morally accepted boundaries might be crossed when losing control through drug use.[406] The idea of being 'out of control' once psychoactive substances are consumed refers to deeply-rooted uncertainties about self-control from Victorian times in England where the anti-drug discourse originates from.[407]

Addiction is seen as the contradiction of capitalist modernity, primarily due to the idea that the loss of control and the obsession with continuously acquiring more drugs would oppose any form of productivity. Further, the core principles of U.S. identity, such as rationality, individualism, capitalism, and modernity are all threatened by the idea of addiction. The way the drug discourse constructs drug use as a disease and addiction as obsessive, it is framed as the antithesis of U.S. ideology. Daniel Weimer asserts that drug use also threatens the U.S. core principle of liberty: "Besides irrationality, non-productivity, and withdrawal from mainstream society, drug addiction deletes a central aspect of an individual living within a modern society: free will and limitless self-development."[408] Further Weimer assesses that the drugs-as-disease discourse veiled helpful notions of addiction and alternatively "presented a discursive device upon which a grab bag of stereotypes and stigmas could be attached."[409] Additionally, the drugs-as-disease language is related to the idea of 'national security,' another unspecific rhetoric that enforces racist conceptions, a foreign threat, and sentiments of Us vs. Them.[410]

By constructing drug use and drug trade as the antithesis of core U.S. American identity through the disease metaphor, it seems only logical to eradicate and even wage a war against any form of drug trade or consumption at home or abroad. Through employing the war

[405] Rachel Massey, "The 'Drug War' in Colombia: Echoes of Vietnam," *Journal of Public Health Policy* 22, no. 3 (2001): 283. For instance interventions in Columbia or Nicaragua in the 1980s and 1990s.
[406] Gootenberg, "Talking Like a State," 117.
[407] Ib.
[408] Weimer, "Drugs-as-a-Disease," 267.
[409] Ib., 276.
[410] Ib.

metaphor interventions on multiple levels are justified. In the drug discourse the disease and the war metaphor both summon essentialist racist undertones and processes of othering. Since the phenomenon of addiction remains mysterious, the disease metaphor is sustained because it serves as an explanatory model for addiction and makes it more tangible. Steuter and Wills assert concerning the War on Terror that the language and metaphors used in the media and by politicians and other public figures "ironically makes us less safe by creating a world of discourse characterized by fundamental and insoluble divisions."[411] I claim that this also applies for the War on Drugs. Alfred McCoy already concludes in 1972 that by "[r]ecognizing the power of paradigms to shape concepts and thereby frame policy it might be helpful to abandon the drug war rhetoric and adopt a medical metaphor of treatment and healing."[412] Yet a metaphor of healing does not assist politicians in winning elections or does propose a reason for foreign interventions.

U.S. soldiers in Vietnam were supposedly fighting for the core U.S. ideals of democracy, freedom, capitalism and modernity. When first reports of G.I. drug use reached the United States they were particularly frightening for the public because drugs were seen as the antithesis of U.S. identity. By examining the origins, depictions and effects of the narratives of drug using soldiers in Vietnam the power of the drug discourse is shown and how it relates to the constitution of U.S. ideology. Further, it will be analyzed how the language that used to describe the drug use of G.I.'s in Vietnam and in the United States contributed to American exceptionalism and myths about the Vietnam War. U.S. American soldiers represent American values and patriotism. When the drug use of these soldiers is characterized as a 'heroin epidemic,' the American core identity was attacked.

6.2 Chain of Fools

To render the drug discourse during the Nixon presidency visible the discourse will be examined critically on multiple levels. First, I will look at specific language and metaphors used in academic texts and studies, newsmagazines and newspaper articles, novels and a speech by Richard Nixon. Second, I will investigate the drug discourse on a meta level going beyond the years of the Nixon administration, showing how the drug discourse intersected with and superseded the logic of containment concerning the Vietnam War.

The guiding questions of the critical discourse analysis are: When did the drug discourse start? How did the drug discourse proceed and what were particularly intense phases? Did it

[411] Steuter and Wills, *At War with Metaphor*, xi.
[412] McCoy, *The Stimulus of Prohibition*, 96.

intersect with the anti-communist discourse? When did it supersede the anti-communist discourse, if at all? How and when did the drug discourse overlap with narratives of the Vietnam War? What were the defining elements, metaphors, and key words of the drug discourse and of the Vietnam-drug nexus specifically?

6.2.1 Sister Morphine

6.2.1.1 Text Analysis: Academic Discourse

The compelling imagery of drugs-as-disease were particularly expressed in the idea of a drug 'plague' or 'epidemic.' By combining the drug that is seen as the most dangerous and most addictive – heroin – with an unstoppable and all-encompassing epidemic, fears and alarms are raised. However, a number of researchers and historians have reproduced the idea of a 'heroin epidemic' without question. On one hand, seemingly 'objective' texts that analyze addition and drug use in Vietnam reproduce the idea of the 'heroin epidemic' without further scrutiny, on the other hand a number of historians and writers about the Vietnam War and the Nixon era give the impression that the American 'heroin epidemic' in Vietnam and at home is a historical fact.

A number of publications that examine drug use in Vietnam from a more medical and psychological angle tend to refer to "drug abuse." I found that calling marijuana and heroin smoking "drug abuse" were the more moderate words that were used. For instance in the 1971 and 1972 publications by Colonel Stewart L. Baker, army psychologist, the G.I drug consumer is called an "heroin abuser" and in Vietnam "heroin abuse" is prevailing.[413] Baker is not conjuring the 'epidemic' yet he states that "[d]rug abuse is a serious problem across the nation."[414] Baker also perpetuates the notion that drug use and addiction are problems on the individual level and that the individual is responsible for her or his drug use. However, Baker portrays drug use primarily as an issue of younger people. He states how the "Deputy Chief New York Medical Examiner recently reported that the use of heroin has become the leading cause of death among teen-agers in New York City," and that the "term 'epidemic' would seem to apply to abuse of drugs on college campuses."[415] Interestingly, Baker does not differentiate between heroin use and marijuana use and thus implicates that marijuana might be as dangerous as heroin. Concerning drug use in the U.S. Army, he states that there is "this deadly strain of heroin" and in Vietnam "the deadly nature of heroin" must be widely announced in order to

[413] Baker, "U.S. Army Heroin Abuse Identification Program in Vietnam," 857; and Baker, "Drug Abuse in the United States Army," 541.
[414] Ib.
[415] Ib.

prevent further deaths.[416] By emphasizing the 'deathly nature' of heroin a sense of urgency and alarm is conveyed. Yet ultimately Baker declares that "it is clear that the Army […] has acted rapidly and vigorously to meet the challenge of controlling drug abuse."[417] This statement shows that Baker, being a member of the army himself, sees the role of the army in handling G.I. drug use in Vietnam as fulfilled, as it was established that drug use was a problem of the individual.

By employing a rhetoric of 'control' and 'abuse' Baker is supporting a punitive approach and is contributing to the fears surrounding drug use, first by not distinguishing between marijuana and heroin use and second by highlighting its deadly nature.

A scientific article by Joel H. Kaplan, published in 1971, also refers to G.I. drug use in Vietnam as "drug abuse" and specifies that it is "referring to a soldier who is using drugs heavily day in and day out."[418] Kaplan further describes a number of instances where marijuana using soldiers committed either crimes or were prone to odd behavior that endangered either the soldiers themselves or their comrades. Kaplan identifies "a serious problem of drug abuse among the helicopter units stationed in the Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa areas, including our own dust-off (medevac) unit."[419] By pointing out that even medical personnel was 'abusing' drugs, the supposedly all-encompassing scope of drug use of the troops in Vietnam is underlined.

M. Duncan Stanton refers in his 1976 article to drug use in Vietnam as an "epidemic."[420] He further uses imagery that refers of water: actions "to stem the tide of drug abuse" had to be undertaken.[421] The metaphor of drug use as a 'tide' constructs drug 'abuse' as unstoppable and inevitable. A 'tide,' similar to the image of the 'flood,' symbolizes that the individual is weak and helpless in the face of such an event. Further, a 'tide' or a 'flood' simply happens and there is no one responsible for such an event: no politicians or society at large could cause or stop it. Even Lee Robins and her colleagues perpetuate the metaphor of an 'epidemic' once in the introduction of a 1974 article: "During the summer and fall of 1971, drug use by United States servicemen in Vietnam had, by all estimates, reached epidemic proportions."[422]

However, the above discussed publications were all published during the height of the Vietnam drug discourse and there are good reasons to assume that the researchers were not

[416] Ib., 545.
[417] Ib., 549.
[418] Kaplan, "Marijuana and Drug Abuse in Vietnam," 261.
[419] Ib., 262.
[420] Stanton, "Drugs, Vietnam, and the Vietnam Veteran," 562.
[421] Ib., 562-563.
[422] Robins et al., "How Permanent Was Vietnam Drug Addiction?," 38.

isolated and did witness and were partly influenced by a predominant public discourse that continuously declared a 'heroin epidemic.'

Historians of the Vietnam War and of the Nixon administration who published years or decades after the early 1970s do not have the excuse of being affected by an ongoing public discourse that maintained the drug 'epidemic.' For instance David Courtwright perpetuates the idea of the 'heroin epidemic' in *Dark Paradise* (2001) and calls an entire chapter "The Great Epidemic."[423] Courtwright states that the Nixon administration had to be "dealing with the epidemic, which had assumed catastrophic dimensions by the early 1970s."[424] Not only is the idea of the 'epidemic' preserved, but he turned it into an 'epidemic of catastrophic dimensions,' engaging the metaphor of an unstoppable catastrophe and implying that there are tens of thousands of victims.

In the *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War* Benjamin C. Dubberly assesses that "[d]rug use was a serious problem in Vietnam" and after the Tet Offensive "drug use rose dramatically."[425] Dubberly employs the rather neutral term of 'drug use' yet he assesses that "opiates produced more lasting addictions than marijuana or amphetamines and led some veterans to crime to support their habits back in the United States."[426] By criminalizing Vietnam War veterans and linking drug use to crime Dubberly sustains the prevailing myths.

Also Rolf Steininger emphasizes G.I. drug use in Vietnam and states that drug consumption "explodierte" and "außer Kontrolle greaten war."[427] He further calls drug use in Vietnam "dramatisch," exaggerating and dramatizing G.I. drug use although Steininger's history of the Vietnam War was published in 2018.[428]

The German journalist and scholar Peter Scholl-Latour also reproduces the notion of an 'epidemic': "Der Heroin-Konsum unter den Amerikanern in Indochina hatte erschreckende Ausmaße angenommen, und nun befürchtet man, daß die Seuche auf die Heimat übergreifen könnte."[429] Ko-lin Chin refers to a "heroin epidemic among American G.I.'s in Vietnam," not questioning the implications of the term 'epidemic.'[430] Further Lukasz Kamienski maintains the idea of a 'heroin epidemic' among G.I.'s in Vietnam and the general population in the United

[423] Courtwright, *Dark Paradise*, 165.
[424] Ib.
[425] Benjamin C. Dubberly, "Drugs and Drug Use," in *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History:1*, ed. Spencer T. Tucker (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 179.
[426] Ib., 180.
[427] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 82. Translation of the quotes: 'exploded' and 'went out of control.'
[428] Ib., 83. 'Dramatically.'
[429] Scholl-Latour, *Der Tod im Reisfeld*, 158. Translation of the quote: 'Heroin consumption among Americans in Indochina had reached alarming proportions, and it is now feared that the epidemic could spread to the homeland.'
[430] Chin, *The Golden Triangle*, 117.

States. Concerning the measurements that were undertaken in order to control drug use among American soldiers in Vietnam he states that these actions were "thought essential to prevent the *epidemic of addiction* spreading across the United States."[431]

In the *Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* by Alfred McCoy the heroin trade and trafficking in Indochina are closely examined, however in the introduction, most likely on order to accentuate the relevance of the 1972 publication, almost all of the stereotypes and metaphors surrounding drug used are reproduced. McCoy states that "America is in the grip of a devastating heroin epidemic which leaves no city or suburb untouched, and which runs rampant through every American military installation both here and abroad."[432] He adds that "the plague is spreading […] into high schools and now grammar schools."[433] Further, he also uses the metaphor of unstoppable water: "The sudden rise in the addict population has spawned a crime wave that has turned America's inner cities into concrete jungles."[434] Here the image of the 'jungle' is particularly interesting: It is referring to the jungle in Vietnam and the drug use by the American soldiers, yet at the same time the usage of the term implicates underlying racist tendencies. A 'jungle' can refer to African Americans living in certain sections of the city that are primarily associated with the drug use of the population there. Furthermore, perpetuating the myth that drug use leads to crime, McCoy states that "[a]ddicts are forced to steal in order to maintain their habits, and they now account for more than 75 percent of America's urban crime."[435] Further, heroin supposedly turns "the average person into a slavish addict," proving that the 'enslavement theory' was accepted in academic circles of the early 1970s.[436] McCoy repeatedly states that addiction leads to criminal behavior: "Heroin addiction […] turns the addict into a lone predator who willingly resorts to any crime."[437] Here also the usage of 'lone' shows that addiction was thought to be an individual shortcoming. McCoy criticizes that "heroin continues to flood into the country in unprecedented quantities,"[438] disregarding that the import of drugs reflected consumer demand as mentioned earlier. As stated above, using metaphors of a 'wave' and a 'flood' invoke the conception of powerlessness in the light of an overpowering natural disaster.

Concerning G.I. drug use in Vietnam McCoy states that heroin use "spread like a plague" and that "suddenly no. 4 heroin was everywhere: fourteen-year old girls were selling

[431] Kamienski, *Shooting Up*, 209.
[432] McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, 1.
[433] Ib.
[434] Ib.
[435] Ib., 1-2. McCoy cites numbers that were published in a *Newsweek* article on July 5, 1971, on page 28.
[436] Ib., 2.
[437] Ib.
[438] Ib.

heroin at roadside stands on the main highway from Saigon to the U.S. army base at Long Binh."[439] McCoy likewise states that "base after base was overrun by these ant-armies of heroin pushers."[440] By comparing Vietnamese drug sellers to insects explicit racism and othering become visible in the academic drug discourse.

A 1971 article in the *Armed Forces Journal* by a certain Colonel Robert D. Heinl does not speak of an 'epidemic,' instead, Heinl states that "the Armed Forces (like their parent society) are in the grip of a drug pandemic."[441] Surpassing the idea of an 'epidemic,' drug use in Vietnam and by military personnel in the United States has reached a new dimension in Heinl's essay and became a 'pandemic.' Heinl further observes that the "drug-ridden" troops are "near-mutinous" and thus pose a serious threat to the American mission in Vietnam.[442]

Overall, the academic reproduction of the idea of the 'heroin epidemic' is particularly disconcerting because a metaphor that serves distinct political objectives and frightens the public should be debunked in an academic context and not recreated. Concerning heroin use in the United States there is no substantial data available that describes its scope to support these scholars' claims of an 'epidemic' and for drug use in Vietnam Lee Robins' studies, first published in 1973, were the only reliable contribution.[443] The continued perpetuation of the metaphor of the 'heroin epidemic' in a scholarly context further legitimizes the political objectives it enables and increases the metaphor's impact.

6.2.1.2 Text Analysis: Newsmagazines

Newsmagazines such as *Newsweek* or *LIFE* contributed to the media landscape by presenting in depth analyses of contemporary phenomena during the years of the Vietnam War, while television or newspapers usually reported on episodic events. James Landers argues that newsmagazines did not profess to be objective, but rather evaluated current events and took a rather critical stance.[444] Combined, the newsmagazines Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News and World Report reached over 38 million readers every week during the Vietnam War. Integrating opinion and reportage, newsmagazines covered the political discussions and the anti-war protests, interpreting them according to their position towards to war. Public opinion about the

[439] Ib., 181-182. No. 4 heroin is a particularly pure product.
[440] Ib., 182.
[441] Robert D. Heinl, "The Collapse of the Armed Forces (1971)", in *Vietnam and America: A Documented History*, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman et al. (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1995), 333.
[442] Heinl, "The Collapse of the Armed Forces (1971)," 327.
[443] It is only known how many people died in the United States of legal and illegal drugs: in 1969 1,601 people died from legal and illegal drugs, in 1970 1,899 and in 1971 2,313. In 1969 29,866 people died in the U.S. of cirrhosis of the liver and 2,641 choked on food (Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 28, 47, 66).
[444] James Landers, *The Weekly War: Newsmagazines and Vietnam* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004), 4.

Vietnam War changed in the late 1960s and the newsmagazines followed this trend, changing their perspective. Landers argues that late 1969 and first reports about the My Lai massacre becoming public marks a turning point: from now on the American soldiers in Vietnam were more critically assessed and instances of poor moral, drug use and misconduct were scrutinized in detail. Overall, newsmagazines contributed significantly to the public discourse and influenced public opinion to a large extent.[445]

In the following, two articles of newsmagazines covering G.I. drug use in Vietnam in July 1971, the height of the Vietnam-drug discourse, are discussed. The articles are exemplary for the drug discourse concerning the Vietnam War in newsmagazines.

6.2.1.2.1 Newsweek

On July 5, 1971, the article "The Heroin Plague: What Can Be Done?" was the cover story of this *Newsweek* edition.[446]

According to Landers, *Newsweek* "provided the most accurate portrayals of war" and "identified fundamental flaws in American military methods from early 1966 onward."[447] *Newsweek* endorsed a liberal stance and originally backed the U.S. invasion in Vietnam, yet at the same time *Newsweek* was among the first news outlets, that, by late 1966, already doubted that an American victory in Vietnam was possible.[448] By spring 1968 the newsmagazine suggested that the U.S. should put a stop to all military operations in Vietnam and condemned Nixon's decision to invade Laos and Cambodia. Paradoxically they also "caricatured the Vietnamese as incapable of effective governance and reluctant to assume responsibility for the war."[449] Overall, newsmagazines tended to represent the Vietnamese in rather racist and 'other' terms; the South Vietnamese ally in a "derogatory and stereotypical" way, the North Vietnamese enemy "with hateful descriptions."[450]

Forty one editions of *Newsweek* featured a cover story that concerned the Vietnam War. Throughout the war, the readership of *Newsweek* grew increasingly: in 1965 about 1.8 million

[445] Ib., 2-4. The changing public opinion about the Vietnam War is featured in Gallup polls on page XXVIII in the appendix.
[446] "The Heroin Plague: What Can Be Done?," *Newsweek*, July 5, 1971, https://archive.org/details/newsweekjuly519700news. In the appendix on pages XXIV-XXVI the complete article and the cover of this *Newsweek* edition are depicted.
[447] Landers, *The Weekly War*, 274.
[448] Ib., 276. When *Newsweek* was acquisitioned by the *Washington Post* in 1961 the newsmagazine underwent distinct shift towards a more liberal coverage.
[449] Ib.
[450] Ib., 9.

editions were sold weekly, in 1973 that number rose to 2.9 million copies a week.[451] Thus *Newsweek* profited indirectly from the Vietnam War.

Although *Newsweek* belonged to the more liberal side of the gamut of newsmagazines, the magazine perpetuated assumptions and metaphors discussed in part 6.1 concerning drug use. The article "The Heroin Plague" begins by telling the story of a young white couple that started using heroin and in order to finance the heroin habit went shoplifting. Once more the idea that heroin use leads upstanding white suburban citizens down the path to crime is perpetuated. Further, the notion that heroin users are particularly young is emphasized: "New heroin users are turning up every week in the glossiest suburban high schools."[452] Again, the fear that heroin is spreading across neighborhoods and thus beyond class and race boundaries is invoked.

Concerning drug use in Vietnam the article states that "[p]erhaps most disturbing of all is the fact that the ranks of GI's returning from Vietnam contain thousands of wretched heroin addicts who learned to snort the stuff in the back alleys of Saigon and Long Binh."[453] It is spoken of a "heroin emergency" and "epidemic" or "heroin menace" yet the article also admits that "the heroin crisis is real because so many persons have come to believe that it's real."[454] Furthermore the article distinguishes explicitly between heroin and other drugs and states that marijuana for instance is non-addictive while juxtaposing the highly addictive potential of heroin. The *Newsweek* article also admits that there are conflicting numbers concerning heroin use and addiction and thus the true extent of the 'epidemic' cannot be stated.[455]

Heroin use in Vietnam is discussed in length in the cover story. It is claimed that "limitless supplies of cheap, potent heroin began flooding into Vietnam," enabled by smugglers that were high-level officials of the South Vietnamese government.[456] A proposed solution to the issue of heroin use in Vietnam is to send the addicted soldiers home for treatment yet the facilities that would offer a detoxification and rehabilitation "are barely able to maintain a handhold against the avalanche of established addicts who turn up for help wherever help is offered."[457] Utilizing the imagery of an 'avalanche,' another unstoppable force of nature, fears that the population will be 'snowballed' by not only the addicts that are already consuming drugs in the United States, but also by the added strain of returning drug users from Vietnam.

[451] Ib., 9-12.
[452] "The Heroin Plague," 27.
[453] Ib.
[454] Ib., 28.
[455] Ib., 29.
[456] Ib., 30.
[457] Ib.

The cover of the July 5, 1971 issue of *Newsweek* depicts in bold yellow letters the words "The Heroin Plague" next to the arm of a white young male that is in the process of intravenously administering a substance – supposedly heroin – through a syringe.[458] Daniel Weimer argues that "the most recognizable and powerful symbol of addiction is the hypodermic syringe, a symbol that often denotes heroin addiction."[459] The syringe, a medical instrument is turned into an instrument that "violates the boundary between the body and the outside world," and 'pollutes' through the injection of heroin the body.[460] The whiteness of the young blonde men on the *Newsweek* cover is especially visible contrasted with the dark background. Thus the cover demonstrates that drug use by white Americans is worth worrying over.

6.2.1.2.2 Text Analysis: LIFE

LIFE magazine featured an eight-page photography spread called "Trying to help the GI addicts" on July 23, 1971.[461] *LIFE* was a weekly publication focusing on photojournalism, belonged since 1936 to the *TIME* newsmagazine and had a circulation of about 8.5 million copies in 1971. The black and white photographs in the article shows portraits of young white men in a treatment facility in the United States.[462] The accompanying text to the photographs cynically states that next to 'missing in action' or 'killed in action' there is now a new body count for soldiers in Vietnam: "addicted in action." The article claims that "[f]or most veterans, heroin addiction is just one more souvenir of Vietnam."[463]

The photographs that were taken in the Palo Alto Veterans Administration Hospital by Arthur Schatz give heroin using veterans a voice. The article does not even once suggest that addicted veterans turn to crime. Quite the opposite: individual fates and their struggles to stop using heroin are discussed. Additionally, the treatment methods are detailed and a methadone program is said to be combined with group and family therapy. Further, the article draws connections between PTSD and heroin addiction, stating that continued heroin use might stem from traumas obtained in Vietnam.[464] Further, the article does not use the term 'epidemic,' but it suggests that the veterans treated in Palo Alto "are just the tip of the iceberg."[465] Further, the

[458] The *Newsweek* cover is depicted in the appendix on page XXIII.
[459] Weimer, "Drugs-as-a-Disease," 268.
[460] Ib.
[461] "Trying to Help the GI Addicts." *LIFE* 71, No. 4. July 23, 1971, pp. 20-27. https://books.google.at/books?id=OEAEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=de#v=onepage&q&f=false.
[462] The article and photographs can be found in the appendix on pages XXVI to XXVII.
[463] "Trying to Help the GI Addicts," 21.
[464] Ib., 25. I am aware that the term PTSD was not yet coined in 1971, yet the symptoms the article describes show that PTSD is as play here.
[465] Ib., 26.

article only features white Vietnam veterans, adding to the fears that heroin use crossed racial boundaries, but also proposing that only white men seek treatment.

Overall, the LIFE article was one of the most balanced and neutral depictions of the heroin use of Vietnam veterans.

6.2.1.3 Text Analysis: Newspapers

The New York Times counts as one of the most objective daily newspapers in the United States. Yet during 1970 and 1971 a number of articles discussed the 'heroin epidemic' among U.S. servicemen in Vietnam.[466] The article "G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic in Vietnam" on May 16, 1971 states that the U.S. military command in Vietnam "has been slow to awaken to the crisis" and that the problem is considered very "serious."[467] Further, the article describes "the danger to American society when the addicted return craving a drug that costs many times more in the United States than it does here [in Vietnam]."[468] Here, fears of addicted soldiers returning and committing crimes to finance a heroin habit are invoked. A military officer that is quoted in the article states: "'Tens of thousands of soldiers are going back as walking time bombs.'"[469] The article also points out "confusion" and "uncertainty" of the military command suggesting a certain amount of helplessness.[470] Another interviewed psychiatrist suggests that the conditions in Vietnam are like "a ghetto," implying a racial order to drug consumption since ghettos in the United States during that time were known to be populated by African Americans. Further the article claims that "the crackdown and the arrests for smoking marijuana may have driven some soldiers to heroin" because heroin smoke is odorless as opposed to marijuana.[471] The article ends with quoting a twenty one year old G.I. who started smoking heroin because of his Vietnamese girlfriend: "I tell you it ruined my life."[472] By elaborating on the fate of this particular soldier, the notion that the Vietnamese were to blame for addicting the American servicemen in Vietnam is hinted at. Further, by implying that a female Vietnamese hooked the young soldier on heroin, the idea that heroin poses a form of oriental seduction is proposed.

The article "G.I.'s in Vietnam Get Heroin Easily" on February 25, 1971 describes how soldiers in Vietnam can purchase heroin close to their bases in plastic vials for $3. Vietnamese

[466] I chose the articles of the NYT as exemplary material because they are online accessible and the NYT counts as one of the most influential newspaper in the United States.
[467] Alvin Shuster, "G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/16/archives/gi-heroin-addiction-epidemic-in-vietnam-gi-heroin-addiction-is.html.
[468] Ib.
[469] Ib.
[470] Ib.
[471] Ib.
[472] Ib.

children that "sell the narcotic nearly every day of the week can be found directly across the highway from the entrance to the headquarters."[473] The article claims that the military command in Saigon "lumps the heroin situation with the rest of the drug problem, which, in Vietnam, appears to involve marijuana for the most part," suggesting that the 'problem' is not taken serious enough.[474] The article further explains that Vietnamese girls or young women sell the heroin to the G.I.'s since an approaching young man might be mistaken for a Vietcong. Again, a racial and gendered dimension of heroin use in Vietnam is portrayed, subtly conveying ideas of an equally dangerous yet exotic and seductive drug.

Further, the theme of army ignorance in the face of G.I. heroin use can be noted throughout articles in *The New York Times*. The June 8, 1970 article "Extend of Drug Use and Addiction in Armed Forces Appears Wider Than Pentagon's Statistics Show" claims that "Pentagon officials have tended to discount reports that drug taking has become a widespread practice in the military."[475] Already in summer 1970 drug use among the troops in Vietnam was assumed to be a common phenomenon and from the beginning the army command was criticized for either not recognizing the problem or not doing enough against it.

The June 2, 1971 article "Nixon, Drugs and the War" argues that although Nixon announced in a conference that "he would be getting at the sources of drugs in the world," he is refusing to "deal with the tragic realities of the troops on the battle field."[476] The article asserts that "[t]he quickest way for an American soldier to avoid combat in Vietnam and get back home these days is to take to drugs."[477] This shows that heroin or other drug use was constructed as self-evident patterns of behavior in Vietnam and that it thus only seemed logical to use drugs to avoid the American war in Vietnam. The article states that about 20,000 men are using drugs, but "maybe twice the number," revealing that there are still many insecurities and rumors about drug use in Vietnam and that the numbers of drug using servicemen are estimates that are continuously perpetuated. The article further implicates that the Nixon administration does not provide enough opportunities for addicted veterans and that thus the returning drug using G.I.'s have to resort to crime in order to finance continued drug use in the United States. "But hooked

[473] Gloria Emerson, "G.I.'s in Vietnam Get Heroin Easily," *The New York Times*, February 25, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/25/archives/g-is-in-vietnam-get-heroin-easily-gis-in-vietnam-obtain-heroin.html.
[474] Ib.
[475] Barbara Campbell, "Extent of Drug Use and Addiction in Armed Forces Appears Wider Than Pentagon's Statistics Show," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/06/08/archives/extent-of-drug-use-and-addiction-in-armed-forces-appears-wider-than.html.
[476] James Reston, "Nixon, Drugs and the War," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/02/archives/nixon-drugs-and-the-war.html.
[477] Ib.

on this powerful, cheap stuff in Vietnam, a discharged veteran in any normal American community has the means neither of curing the habit nor of affording the habit, without stealing."[478] By linking Vietnam drug use to criminal behavior in the United States the returning soldier is consequently criminalized and constructed as an addict.

The article describes the "menace of drugs in America," yet also sees Vietnam 'flooded' with drugs and claims that "drug corruption, which reaches the highest levels of the Saigon government" is mostly responsible for the increase of drugs in Vietnam at least.[479] This illustrates how *The New York Times* participated in a discourse that portrayed the Vietnamese other as corrupt and guilty in addicting U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.

Overall, the above discussed articles are only a few select examples of the drug discourse in *The New York Times*. As shown in chapter 3.2 since the beginning of 1970 *The New York Times* reported exhaustively about the topic of drug use in Vietnam. Further, the disease metaphor as well as the war metaphor are both employed generously throughout the coverage. The South Vietnamese people are indicated as the perpetrators of G.I. drug use. The idea that heroin using soldiers that are returning to the United States will resort to crime in order to finance a 'heroin habit' is perpetuated throughout the articles in the newspaper. It is not questioned that the living and working conditions for Vietnam War veterans change completely upon return to the United States and that drug use might have been a reaction to the situation in Vietnam. Further, the articles all assume that heroin use necessarily leads to addiction and that then heroin addiction cannot be healed. Additionally 'heroin epidemic' and 'drug epidemic' were prevalent phrases that were used on a day to day basis in a newspaper that had the reputation to be 'objective.'

6.2.1.4 Text Analysis: Novels

The news media was central to the Vietnam-drug discourse, yet also fiction writers, movies, song writers, and memoirists coined the memory and discourse of the war. Vietnam War fiction was a way of processing the intense experience of the American encounter with Vietnam. The novels *The Quiet American* by Graham Greene published in 1955 and *Dispatches* by Michael Herr first published in 1977 both portray war correspondents in the tangles of the French and American Vietnam War.[480] *The Quiet American* was published well before the American war in Vietnam began, yet it addresses growing U.S. involvement in the war, questions the

[478] Ib.
[479] Ib.
[480] I chose to include two novels into my analysis because a discourse goes beyond media publications. Further, these two novels were picked because they were both very successful and reached many readers in the United States. The scope of this thesis limits the analysis to two exemplary pieces of literature.

American idea of containment relating to Vietnam and is critical of American exceptionalism – rather outstanding considering that the novel was published in 1955. *Dispatches*, however, was published after the American engagement in Vietnam ended and is part memoir, part fiction.[481]

The protagonist in *The Quiet American* is the English journalist Fowler who is investigating U.S. American involvement in the 1950s in Vietnam.[482] Fowler resides with a significantly younger Vietnamese women who is providing him with opium on a regular basis. Fowler's opium habit is portrayed in detail throughout the entire novel:

> "I could smell the opium. There is no smell like it. […] The lamp lit her face as she tended the long pipe, bent above it with the serious attention she might have given a child. I was fond of my pipe: more than two feet of straight bamboo, ivory at either end. Two-thirds of the way down was the bowl, like a convolvulus reversed, the convex margin polished and darkened by the frequent kneading of the opium. Now with a flick of the wrist she plunged the needle into the tiny cavity, released the opium and reversed the bowl over the flame, holding the pipe steady for me. The bead of opium bubbled gently and smoothly as I inhaled."[483]

This detailed description of preparing and consuming opium only marks one example of repeatedly mentioned opium use. Fowler's young and beautiful Vietnamese girlfriend prepares the drug with great care. The language Greene employs to depict these scene is quite sensual: a needle – a rather phallic object – is 'plunged' into a 'tiny cavity.' The idea that particular Vietnamese women literally seduce American – or in this case English – men with opium or heroin is made explicit in *The Quiet American*. Thus conceptions about drug use in Vietnam do not only have a racial but also a gendered dimension. Throughout the discourse on the Vietnam War Vietnamese women were commonly referred to as exotic and beautiful objects that posed a threat to upstanding white women left in the United States. By connecting drug use, also seen as a selfish and unrestrained pleasure, to Vietnamese women the ultimate seduction of 'evil' and 'foreign' forces is constructed. White, honest soldiers or war correspondents were seduced down the path of immoral drug addiction by colored women.

This narrative of the Vietnamese women seducing American servicemen towards heavy drug use takes the responsibility away from the individual soldier and from the structure of the army and blames a female 'other.' Thus this particular narrative remains a popular item in the Vietnam-drug discourse.

---

[481] Michael Herr served as a war correspondent in Vietnam for the *Esquire magazine* from 1967 to 1969.
[482] Graham Greene also served as a war correspondent for *The Times* and *Le Figaro* in Vietnam (or French Indochina at the time) from 1951 to 1954.
[483] Graham Greene, *The Quiet American* (Melbourne [etc.]: William Heinemann LTD, 1955), 6.

Dispatches by Michael Herr reads like a psychedelic trip through the battles of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s. Adopting the brutal and cynical language of the soldiers, Herr describes the battles at Khe Sanh and the Tet Offensive through the haze of marijuana smoke. Drug use is omnipresent in the novel, either by the main protagonist, a war correspondent, or the U.S. soldiers he accompanies.

> "In the Highlands, where the Montagnards would trade you a pound of legendary grass for a carton of Salems, I got stoned with some infantry from the 4th. One of them had worked for months on his pipe beautifully carved and painted with flowers and peace symbols. There was a reedy little man in the circle who grinned all the time but hardly spoke. He pulled a thick plastic bag out of his pack and handed it over to me. It was full of what looked like large pieces of dried fruit. I was stoned and hungry, I almost put my hand in there, but it had a bad weight to it. The other man were giving each other looks, some amused, some embarrassed and even angry. Someone had told me once, there were a lot more ears than heads in Vietnam; just information. When I handed it back he was still grinning, but he looked sadder than a monkey."[484]

This paragraph from the novel depicts marijuana use as taken-for-granted among the U.S. troops in Vietnam. By juxtaposing 'flowers and peace symbols' with cut off ears Herr demonstrates the cynical nature of the war as well as its daily horrors. *Dispatches* creates the narrative that drug use was the only thing that made the horrors of war bearable. The drug use by war correspondents and American soldiers alike is constructed as a coping mechanism to handle the Vietnam War. However, sexual undertones of drug use are absent in *Dispatches*. Women do not appear in *Dispatches*, and neither do any other members of the Vietnamese population. Drug use by U.S. servicemen in Vietnam is presented as an unquestioned facet of the American presence. Marijuana and opium are both explicitly named as drugs consumed in the novel. Implicitly the consumption of other drugs is hinted at:

> "He had a few joints left, wrapped up in a plastic bag (he hadn't smoked them, because, like most Marines at Khe Sanh, he'd expected a ground attack, and he didn't want to be stoned when it came), and gave these to his best friend, or, rather, his best surviving friend. […] He had always wondered whether Gunny, the company gunnery sergeant, had known about all the smoking. After three wars Gunny probably didn't care much; besides, they all knew that Gunny was into some pretty cool shit himself."[485]

Overall, *Dispatches* constructs drug use – primality marijuana smoking – as a daily and casual activity by the U.S. soldiers in Vietnam that was an undisputed part of the American experience.

[484] Michael Herr, *Dispatches* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1977. Reprint, London: Picador, 1997), 34.
[485] Ib., 88.

The memoir-novel illustrates the American encounter in Vietnam as a dreadful hallucination or a bad trip, portraying drug use among the troops as normal and self-evident.

Even though completely different in plot, time of publication and army of occupation, both novels reveal surprising similarities. In both narratives the main protagonists are war correspondents that are continuously immersed in the war proceedings, both portray and question masculinity, and both depict Vietnam as a dangerous yet exotic country, and most importantly, both portray drug use as commonplace.

6.2.1.5 Text Analysis: Nixon's 'Message on Drug Abuse Control'

Alongside media publications, politicians themselves can influence a particular discourse by introducing topics to the agenda, employing a specific language and coining certain key phrases. President Richard Nixon's "Message on Drug Abuse Control" to Congress on June 17, 1971, was published the next day in excerpts in *The New York Times*.[486]

In this speech Nixon states that "drug abuse" has reached "dimensions of a national emergency." Further he points out that drug use is no longer a "class problem," but "a national problem which we intend to bring under control."[487] By emphasizing the 'national' dimension of drug use Nixon shows that drug control efforts should thus be answered on a national level and not on a local or state side. Declaring drug use as a 'national' matter Nixon shifts power from the federal to the national level.

Nixon assesses that "[t]he threat of narcotics among our people is one which properly frightens many Americans. It comes quietly into homes and destroys children, it moves into neighborhoods and breaks the fiber of community which makes neighbors."[488] By implying that children are affected by 'drug abuse,' Nixon further fuels the fears the drug discourse invokes instead of reassuring the public. Yet Nixon claims that his administration and the American public "have the moral resources to do the job."[489] By appealing to a superior morality, Nixon constructs drugs as 'evil' and those who abstain and 'fight' drugs as 'good.' The idea of good versus evil and Us vs. Them is perpetuated. Finally Nixon argues: "Every day we lose compounds the tragedy which drugs inflict on individual Americans. The final issue is not whether we will conquer drug abuse, but how soon. Part of this answer lies with the Congress now and. the speed with which it moves to support the struggle against abuse."[490]

---

[486] "Excerpts From President's Message on Drug Abuse Control." *The New York Times*, June 18, 1971, sec. Archives. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/18/archives/excerpts-from-presidents-message-on-drug-abuse-control.html. The excerpts are replicated in the appendix on pages XXXIV-XXXVII.
[487] Ib.
[488] Ib.
[489] Ib.
[490] Ib.

Overall, Nixon's speech states that there is a very urgent emergency of drug abuse that is threatening American children. He does not use the phrase drug or heroin 'epidemic,' but he might as well have. Nixon does not halt a panic-invoking drug discourse, if anything he further stokes it.

6.2.2 Gimme Shelter

6.2.2.1 Visualizing the Discourse: The New York Times Archive

To show how the drug discourse and Vietnam discourse have transformed in the critical years of the Nixon administration and over the decades before and after, *The New York Times Archive* was used to collect data on the drug discourse. *The New York Times Archive* was chosen because the newspaper has a long traditions, a high circulation and is known for well-researched articles and a fairly objective disposition. Further, *The New York Times Archive* is accessible online. The data extracted from the archive can be found in tables in the appendix on pages XVI to XX. In order to measure the drug discourse in relation to the Vietnam War, the keywords and phrases 'heroin Vietnam,' 'marijuana Vietnam,' 'Golden Triangle heroin,' and 'War on Drugs' were used to search the archive, as well as 'heroin' and 'marijuana' and 'heroin epidemic' and 'contain communism.' Since marijuana and heroin were the two psychoactive substances that dominated in the drug discourse, as found out through reading and analyzing newsmagazines and newspaper articles in the early 1970s, these two terms are seen as the indicators for 'drugs.'

The New York Times Archive has a search bar where the key terms and phrases were entered. The search results were then filtered by the date range: For the time period January 1st, 1970 to December 31st, 1974 it was counted how many articles contained the key phrases 'heroin Vietnam,' 'marijuana Vietnam,' 'Golden Triangle heroin,' and 'War on Drugs' per month.[491] For the time period January 1st, 1940 to December 31st, 1999 it was calculated how many articles published in this time frame contained the keywords 'heroin' and 'marijuana' on a yearly basis.[492] Further, for the period January 1st, 1964 to December 31st,1974 *The New York Times Archive* was also searched for the key phrases 'heroin Vietnam,' 'marijuana Vietnam,' 'Golden Triangle heroin,' and 'War on Drugs.'[493] From January 1st, 1969 to December 31st, 1975 the number of articles that contained the phrases 'heroin epidemic' and 'contain communism' were also counted.[494]

[491] The data from this search can be found on page XVI in Table 1: NYT Drug Discourse Data 1970-1974. Irregularities observed in the search process are discussed in the appendix on page XVI.
[492] The data from this search can be found on page XVIII in Table 2: NYT Drug Discourse Data 1940-1999.
[493] The data from this search can be found on page XIX in Table 3: NYT Drug Discourse Data 1964-1974.
[494] The data from this search can be found on page XX in Table 4: NYT Drug and Communism Discourse Data 1969-1975.

Evaluating the data the following observation was made: Independent from the phrase entered into the search bar in the NYT Archive, the number of articles that were found containing the phrase starkly increased from January 1st, 1970 onwards. Investigating this matter I realized that the search function of the archive only searches if the headlines of the articles contain the entered key word or phrase from 1851 to December 31st, 1969, while from January 1st, 1970 onwards the headlines and the entire articles are checked for the phrase or term. This becomes particularly evident in the visual representation of the data: a significant increase of articles containing the searched phrase can be noted following January 1970. Being aware of this flaw in the data collected, the yearly *The New York Times* drug discourse is thus split in two: a figure covering the years 1940 to 1969 and a figure covering the years 1970 to 1999. Figure 4 depicts how often 'heroin' and 'marijuana' were mentioned in headlines and articles from 1940 to 2009 in five year steps and demonstrates above discussed flaw in the data:



Figure 4. NYT Drug Discourse 1940-2009.

Thus, recognizing that different scales need to be applied for the data before and after January 1st, 1970, this is the yearly drug discourse for 1940 to 1969:



Figure 7. NYT Drug Discourse 1940-1969.

Examining Figure 7, it becomes clear that in the year 1964 'heroin' and 'marijuana' were quite prevalent in *The New York Times* and were significantly more discussed than in previous years. From 1966 onwards a steady increase of the appearances of 'heroin' and 'marijuana' in the discourse can be noted.[495] Particularly the year 1964 marks the peak of the drug discourse in the NYT before 1970. The word 'heroin' was mentioned in 99 headlines, while 'marijuana' occurred in 68 headlines, thus 167 times drugs were indicated in a headline. Hence every two to three days *The New York Times* mentioned either (or both) substances in a headline in 1964, showing that the drug discourse was launched this year, the same year the American Vietnam War intensified. After a sharp decrease in 1965 with only 20 headlines featuring 'heroin' and 17 mentioning 'marijuana,' from 1965 onwards drugs were steadily discussed in *The New York Times*. However, for the years 1967 to 1969, 'marijuana' was twice as often mentioned as 'heroin' in the headlines, demonstrating that marijuana was the substance that the public discourse was most concerned about. As shown in the graph covering the years 1970 to 1999, 'heroin' and 'marijuana' are both equally often discussed in 1970 and appeared respectively in 612 and 588 articles. But from 1970 to 1975, 'heroin' remains the dominating drug in the discourse, as seen in Figure 8.

[495] Figure 7 can be found in full size in the appendix on page V.



Figure 8. NYT Drug Discourse 1970-1999.

Figure 8 demonstrates that in the years 1971 and 1972 the key words 'heroin' was mentioned in 748 and 822 articles, while 460 and 511 articles contained the term 'marijuana.'[496] By contextualizing these numbers with data from the following decades, it becomes clear that 1971 and 1972 were extraordinary years and the drug discourse was at its absolute height.

The year 1980 identifies an aberration in the data. Entering the key words repeatedly and on different days, the results stayed the same: In 1980 forty articles contain a mentioning of 'heroin' and sixty two the term 'marijuana.' In 1979 the key phrases appeared in 272 and 357 articles respectively, and in 1981 in 309 and 330 articles. Thus 1980 stands out as an oddity among the data. Cross-checking with the results from the Vanderbilt TV Indices that are discussed in part 6.2.2.2, in 1980 'heroin' is also half as often indicated as the year before and after, 'marijuana' however appears twice as much on TV in 1980 than in 1979 and 1981. Nevertheless, the results of the yearly *The New York Times Archive* analysis for 'heroin' and 'marijuana' demonstrate that the drug discourse increased significantly from 1966 onwards and reached and an all-time high in the years 1971 and 1972.

A more detailed look at the years 1970 to 1974 reveals further nuances in the drug discourse in relation to the Vietnam War. In order to show that the intensifying drug discourse is linked to the war in Vietnam, it was examined if the terms 'heroin' and 'marijuana' appeared

[496] Figure 8 can be found in full size in the appendix on page VI.

in articles that also mentioned 'Vietnam.' Hence, the following graph shows how many articles in the NYT contained the key phrases 'heroin Vietnam,' 'marijuana Vietnam,' 'Golden Triangle heroin' and 'War on Drugs' on a monthly basis.[497]



Figure 6. NYT Drug Discourse 1970-1974.

Figure 6 shows that from May to August 1971 the heroin-Vietnam nexus reached its peak. Whereas marijuana in relation to Vietnam was discussed in *The New York Times* on a seemingly consistent level throughout the months from 1970 to 1971, hereby declining slightly, the heroin-Vietnam discourse in the newspaper shows a distinct spike in 1971. June 1971 marks the peak with 34 articles mentioning 'heroin Vietnam,' while in May 1971 'heroin Vietnam' appeared in 22 articles and in July 1971 in 27 articles. In 1969 'heroin Vietnam' did not appear in a single headline, but might also be mentioned in articles – yet this was not discernible. From 1970 onwards, 'heroin Vietnam' is present in *The New York Times*, yet – at least over the course of 1970 – marijuana still dominates the drug discourse in relation to Vietnam. This changes after

[497] The phrase War on Drugs was entered in quotation marks in order to indicate how often the exact phrase was used. The other phrases were entered without quotation marks, thus only showing for instance if the words 'heroin' and 'Vietnam' appeared in the same article. In the appendix on page IV the graph is shown in its full size and details can be observed.

the peak of heroin in 1971: marijuana and heroin seem to be equally discussed concerning Vietnam. As the Vietnam War was coming to a close, so did the debate concerning drug use in Vietnam, as Figure 6 shows.

Further, the phrase 'War on Drugs' does not seem to be present in the discourse of the early 1970s. 'Golden Triangle heroin' appears in NYT articles in the late summer months of 1972 and reappears in summer of 1973, yet only in an insignificantly small number of articles.

More variations and arrangements of the data from *The New York Times Archive* can be found in the appendix on the pages I to VI.

6.2.2.2 Visualizing the Discourse: Vanderbilt Television News Archive

The *Vanderbilt Television News Archive* allows to examine the television news discourse concerning the Vietnam War and drugs. The TV news archive catalogues television news broadcasts and programs of the U.S. American TV channels *American Broadcasting Company* (ABC), *Columbia Broadcasting System* (CBS) and *National Broadcasting Company* (NBC) since August 5, 1968. In 1995 the news channel CNN has also been included in the archive. In order to keep the data comparable, the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive* is only searched until 1994.[498] As with *The News York Times Archive*, in a search bar key words were entered and then limited to a specific time frame. For the years 1969 to 1994 the TV archive was searched for 'heroin' and 'marijuana,' first combined for all three channels and then split by channel in order to identify if a certain TV channel is either specifically promoting or ignoring the drug discourse.

Examining the data it becomes clear that the year 1971 marks an all-time peak for the key word 'heroin' in the TV news discourse. In 1971 'heroin' appears in 94 news broadcasts of the channels ABC, CBS and NBC combined, while 'heroin' only appeared 28 times in 1970 and 59 times in 1972. 'Marijuana,' however, it at its peak in 1970 with 78 mentions, while in 1971 the number declines slightly to 64, yet rises again in 1972 to 72 mentions. The following graph shows the TV drug discourse of the three channels combined:[499]

[498] The *Vanderbilt Television News Archive* can be freely searched and a list of results is being shown. However, in order to actually view a specific TV news segment, one must be a member of Vanderbilt University or purchase an access key. In the appendix on page XX flaws in the data collection of the archive are discussed and the raw data is presented in tables.

[499] The graph can be found in full size on page VIII of the appendix.



Figure 10. ABC, CBS, NBC Drug Discourse 1969-1994.

Split by channel, the television drug discourse is visualized in the following figure:[500]



Figure 11. TV Drug Discourse Split by Channel 1969-1994.

[500] As with the other graphs, the figure can be found in full size in the appendix on page IX.

Both graphs support the results of the discourse analysis from *The New York Times Archive*: 1971 marks an all-time peak in the drug discourse, particularly concerning the discussion of heroin. While the drug discourse declines slowly in *The New York Times* and then stays at a rather consistent level, the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive* shows that the interest concerning the drug discourse in television news abated after 1974. Except from 1971, 1986 and 1988, 'marijuana' was constantly more present in the American television news. Furthermore, the Vanderbilt drug discourse corresponds to the NYT findings that marijuana dominated the discourse until 1970 and then heroin prevailed in the drug discourse until the mid-1970s.

Splitting the TV channels it becomes clear that all three broadcasters covered 'heroin' and 'marijuana' in equal degrees. Only in the late 1970s and early 1980s NBC focusses on marijuana more than the other two news channels. Yet regarding the years of the Nixon administration and the Vietnam War, heroin was reported on in very similar numbers.

Thus, combining the results of *The New York Times Archive* and the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive*, 1971 can undoubtedly be cast as the peak of the heroin discourse in relation to Vietnam.

6.2.2.3 Visualizing the Discourse: Google Books Ngrams

The *Google Books Ngram Viewer* is a service provided by Google that allows to search the entire Google Books corpora of texts for a phrase or key word. Once this phrase appears in more than forty books, a graph can be plotted. Limiting the time frame from 1940 to 2008 and only considering texts that are in English, the results give a broad overview over the topics and themes discussed in the discourse. Thus, intersections of an anti-communist and anti-drug discourse can be visualized.[501]

[501] The Ngram Viewer is discussed in more detail on page X in the appendix. Further, various phrase combinations are visualized on the pages X to XV. It is also looked at the sub-category of 'English fiction' that also shows interesting results.



Figure 17. Ngram. Heroin, Marijuana, Communism, Containment, War on Terror, Terrorism.

In Figure 17 the phrases 'communism' and 'containment' are used to indicate the anti-communist discourse, while 'marijuana' and 'heroin' indicate the drug discourse and out of interest the phrases 'war on terror' and 'terrorism' were used. The phrase 'war on drugs' is excluded from this graph because – as seen in Figure 20 – the phrase has significantly lower results than 'heroin' or 'marijuana' and is thus not representative for the drug discourse. Further, as seen with the NYT analysis, 'war on drugs' was not a term used in the drug discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 17 shows that for the corpus 'English' the 1960s signify the peak of 'communism' in the discourse. However, since 1964 the mentions of the word 'communism' in English language publication is steadily declining. Figure 17 also shows that in the period 1965 to 1970 the terms 'marijuana' and 'heroin' started to appear in the discourse, while 'communism' is already on the decline – yet still mentioned twice as often. 'Marijuana' and 'heroin' reach their peak in 1972 and 1973 yet hardly recline after the peak and remain at a rather steady high level. Out of interest, the phrases 'terrorism' and 'war on terror' were also included in the Ngram and show that since the late 1990s 'terrorism' became the defining phrase of the discourse, indicating that the anti-communist discourse and the anti-drug discourse are ultimately being superseded by an anti-terrorism discourse.



Figure 18. Ngram. Drugs, Terrorism, Communism.

Figure 18 contrasts 'drugs,' 'terrorism' and 'communism' over the years 1940 to 2009. Although 'drugs' may also signify medicine and thus it had been previously indicated by 'heroin' and 'marijuana,' it becomes evident that the 1960s signify a steady rise in English language publications that mention 'drugs.' 'Communism,' however, steadily declines after a soft peak in 1964 and the discrepancy between 'communism' and 'drugs' in the discourse continues to widen over the course of the Vietnam War and later years.

Examining English fiction publications concerning the drug discourse in Figure 20 the peaks for 'heroin' and 'marijuana' are in 1976 and 1972 respectively. I assume that English fiction publications are not as flexible as news publications in reacting to a particular trend in the discourse and thus there appears to be a slight delay. However, the steady increase of the drug discourse in the late 1960s and early 1970s becomes particularly visible in 'English fiction.' Furthermore, the phrase 'war on drugs' was included in this graph to show that the phrase itself does not function as indicator of the anti-drug discourse. Concerning the phrases 'heroin' and 'marijuana' it can be assumed that the overwhelming majority of the publications portray these substances in a negative light – as seen in 6.2.1 – and can thus indicate an anti-drug discourse.

Figure 20 does also support the assumption that marijuana as the major concern of the anti-drug discourse was superseded by heroin in 1970, as already seen in the NYT archive and the Vanderbilt TV analysis.



Figure 20. Ngram. English Fiction. Heroin, Marijuana, War on Drugs.

6.3 Purple Haze

Overall the discourse analysis shows that drugs were indeed a central feature of the public discourse from the late 1960s until the middle of the 1970s. An opinion survey that was read by Nixon in May 1971 showed that "23 percent of Americans now believed drugs were the country's number one problem, up from 3 percent in 1969."[502] Examining the years preceding the peak in the drug discourse, it has been demonstrated that prior to this point the public discourse concerning drug use was insignificant. Thus I argue that during the Nixon administration and the final years of the Vietnam War (1969-1974) the drug discourse reached heights never seen before. The connection of the drug discourse to the Vietnam War becomes visible in the numerous NYT headlines that discuss drug use by U.S. soldiers in Vietnam as well as the data from the NYT archive that shows how many articles contain both 'marijuana' or 'heroin' and 'Vietnam.'

That said, the war metaphor concerning the idea of a War on Drugs is not as prevalent in the drug discourse of the late 1960s and early 1970s as initially assumed. Yet observing how specific psychoactive substances and their users were criminalized – even though no data or evidence proved a drug-crime connection – and the panic-inducing imagery that dominated the drug discourse I argue that a War on Drugs was waged in all but its name.

The drugs as disease metaphor dominates the discourse not only in news publications during the Vietnam War but also in academic publications until today. The drug-disease idea constructed drugs as unstoppable 'epidemic' or 'cancer' that spreads across previously

[502] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 55.

segregated neighborhoods across divisions of class and race. The idea that by using drugs the body is polluted by a foreign substance shows how drugs were constructed as a 'foreign' threat. Through racialized images of drug use on multiple levels the racist dimension of the anti-drug discourse becomes apparent as well as the Us vs. Them notion. That the initial movement to criminalize drugs was racially motivated was argued in part 3.1 however the racist dimension is also further illustrated by the fact that mainstream media only started reporting about the matter once white people were observed using drugs, illustrated among other things by the July 5, 1971 *Newsweek* cover depicting a white men injecting a substance.

Further the fears of losing control and puritan ideas of morale structured the drug discourse. Not only was the metaphor of an epidemic, but also of a 'flood' and 'tide' employed to compose drugs as omnipresent in society, even though reliable data shows that alcoholism killed ten times the people narcotics did.[503]

Particularly concerning G.I. drug use in Vietnam imagery of an 'epidemic' was invoked. Returning soldiers were constructed as heroin addicts that would need to resort to stealing in order to finance their continued drug use. As shown in part 6.2.2 the drug discourse was particularly intense in the closing years of the American War in Vietnam, demonstrating a perceived link between the war and drug use. I argue that the drug-Vietnam nexus also exposed a gendered dimension additionally to the racial dimension in the drug discourse that was specific to the American experience in Vietnam: Objectified and sexualized Vietnamese women – the racial and gendered 'other' – were seen as purposely addicting and corrupting 'upstanding' American soldiers. This idea is perpetuated in newspaper articles but also in novels and movies that were published after the war.

1970 signifies the year in which heroin supersedes marijuana as the substance that is most discussed in the discourse. Even more so than drugs in general heroin is illustrated as an unforeseen evil that overtakes the entire population in a 'flood' or an 'epidemic.' Heroin is constructed as the ultimate curse that must be 'eradicated' and no other way than complete extermination is thus a solution. For the Nixon administration it was clear that heroin was a 'foreign' substance and thus foreign interventions were a necessity in order to contain the ultimate evil of heroin as the examples of Turkey and the Golden Triangle in part 4.3 show.

The drug discourse observed and analyzed in this chapter shows how drugs were increasingly constructed as the antithesis to American identity, threatening core ideals such as

[503] In 1971 2,323 people died of legal or illegal drugs according to Dan Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 66. The U.S. population in 1971 was at 207,700,000. Thus about 0.001 percent of the U.S. population died of legal or illegal drugs.

freedom, individualism and the free market. Further, key characteristics of U.S. ideology enabled inherent racism in the drug discourse, such as the criminalization of certain drugs and their users, as well as the conception of drugs as a foreign entity. Hence I argue that the drug discourse contained and employed the same fears and threats concerning core American identity as the anti-communist discourse in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. The idea of free will and individuality are seen as under threat not only by communist ideas but also by drug use. Racist ideas are inherent in both discourses and structure and constitute a white American, capitalist, drug-free 'Us' against a colored, unfree, communist 'Other.' Yet most importantly, as shown in part 2 anti-communism was used as an interventionist and expansionist logic. Seeing the similarities in the anti-communist and anti-drug discourse, I claim that the anti-drug discourse was used as an interventionist logic that superseded anti-communism as the main interventionist justification in Nixon's Vietnam War. The anti-drug discourse as an interventionist logic allowed for an extension of the Vietnam War, for instance concerning the Cambodian invasion.

7 Riders on the Storm

The post-Vietnam War discourse was dominated by a number of myths that structured how the war was remembered. The painful memory of the war led to an aversion to investigate what the war meant for the U.S. in the immediate aftermath and only in the 1980s, instigated by Vietnam veterans who needed to process their trauma, the war was reconsidered.[504] Losing a war despite perceived superior technology and morale – such as liberty, capitalism and democracy – did not fit into American exceptionalist self-conception. Denial and extensive scapegoating defined how U.S. politicians, the media and other publications constructed the American memory of the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War had posed the chance to reassess U.S. core ideological principles that ultimately led to massive destruction and death. Yet in order to preserve American exceptionalism and the belief in all-encompassing superiority scapegoats had to be constructed in order to deflect responsibility. Three scapegoating myths stand out: The so-called stab-in-the-back myth, the spat-upon-veteran myth and the myth of the addicted army.

7.1 Give Peace a Chance

The stab-in-the-back myth blames the media for losing the war. The myth entails that the news reports about the war had generated a negative attitude in the U.S. population.[505] Particularly reports on the Tet Offensive were seen as 'backstabbing' since the view prevails that the "enemy took a desperate gamble, was soundly beaten back, and was extremely vulnerable to counterattack, but that distortions in the media caused civilian leaders in Washington to hesitate and reassess Vietnam policy."[506] However this view is rather deceptive considering that especially the editors of the major news outlets did not challenge the reasonableness of the war for a long time and the fairly patriotic news coverage until the Tet Offensive obstructed an objective depiction of the American war in Vietnam that could have enabled a critical stance of the U.S. society.[507] Although the newspapers and newsmagazines had a particular journalistic autonomy in reporting on the war and reports remained relatively uncensored, they restricted their accounts by an anti-communist and ethnocentric framework until 1968.[508] Reports on the Tet Offensive however suggested that the Johnson administration's reassurances concerning the progress of the war did not correspond to the images in newsmagazines and on TV. During Tet American anguish in Vietnam was brought right in front of the camera lenses and this

[504] Anderson, "Introduction," 9.
[505] Pöll, "Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg," 335.
[506] Anderson, "Introduction," 54.
[507] Pöll, "Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg," 337.
[508] Landers, *The Weekly War*, 49.

"glimpse of the war's reality [was] so horrendous and so influential that these images have been scapegoated as one of the main causes of the United States' defeat."[509]

Yet the most shocking single image during the Tet Offensive was a picture by AP photograph Eddie Adams from January 31st, 1968, showing how a NLF prisoner is executed by the South Vietnamese General Loan.[510] The Eddie Adams photograph confronted the American public that the forces supposedly fighting for freedom and democracy were ruthlessly executing helpless prisoners thus undermining the perception that the U.S. Army and the ARVN were morally superior to the communists. Yet in the American memory of the war Eddie Adams' iconic image is reversed and reimagined in order to shift the blame.

Figure 40. Eddie Adams. Headshot in Saigon. Spiegel.



Figure 41. The 'Nam Cover. #24. November 1988.

The cover of the Marvel comic *The 'Nam* in November 1988 turns the image around and focusses now on the photographer instead of the victim, of which only his arm is visible.[511] The comic cover reverses Eddie Adams picture, focusing on the journalist instead of the victim. The reporter is thus portrayed as a figure that takes action and sides in the war, constructing him as an adversary of the United States. Bruce Franklin assesses that "[t]he logic of the comic book militarism is inescapable: photographers should be allowed to show the public only what the military deems suitable."[512] After Vietnam U.S. war coverage and dispatched reporters have become tightly controlled, for instance journalists had to be pre-approved and it was banned to depict dead U.S. soldiers. Following the Vietnam War the imagery of war changed: Images of distant bombings instead of mutilated

[509] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 13.
[510] Pöll, "Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg," 344.
[511] The comic book cover and the Eddie Adams photograph can be found in full size in the appendix on pages XXXVIII to XL.
[512] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 18.

dead bodies started to dominate the coverage.[513] This change in coverage and portrayal of journalists in Vietnam as seen above illustrates how dominant the stab-in-the-back myth became as it clearly resulted in restricting press access to wars the United States continued to wage. Thus the comic book cover discussed above is exemplary for the stab-in-the-back myth that blames the media undermining the American war in Vietnam.

7.2 Carry on Wayward Son

Contrary to the stab-in-the-back myth, the spat-upon-veteran myth however blames the anti-war movement for losing the war. The anti-war protests were mounting in 1969 and especially people of color and students fought actively against the American engagement in Vietnam. Further thousands of Vietnam War veterans joined the anti-war movement and protested against the war.[514] The anti-war movement was portrayed as a form of communist subversion by the Nixon administration in order to delegitimize the protests yet the majority of the anti-war protests had nothing to do with communist elements.[515]

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the anti-war movement and the civil rights movement started to overlap. In Vietnam African Americans were killed in higher proportions than whites, exposing racial inequalities in relation to the war.[516] The anti-war movement was thus a further facet of how the U.S. invasion in Vietnam intersected with domestic issues.

Yet the public discourse nowadays discredits the anti-war movement even though for every Vietnam combat veteran there are twenty more people that took part in the anti-war protests. Furthermore, the central role of Vietnam veterans in the anti-war movement particularly is forgotten and disparaged. In the 1980s and 1990s the anti-war movement was recast as contemptible and drug-ridden, as seen in movies such as *Forrest Gump* (1994).[517] By discrediting the anti-war movement during the Vietnam War and in the collective memory, the internal opposition to interventionist ventures of the United States is silenced. The particular reimaging of the anti-Vietnam protests as anti-patriotic and drug-ridden in the 1980s and 1990s aided the Reagan and Bush administration in quelling voices that questioned interventions in Latin America and the Middle East. The myth of the spat-upon-veteran is also perpetuated in current academic texts. In a publication from 2018 about the Vietnam War for instance it is said that "Wenn man Glück hatte, überlebte man die 'tour of duty', den berühmten 365-Tage Dienst, und wurde in die Heimat zurückgeflogen, wo es bei der Ankunft keine Siegesparaden gab, aber

[513] Ib., 22-24.
[514] Ib., 57.
[515] DeBenedetti, *An American Ordeal*, 205.
[516] Buzzanco, *Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life*, 2.
[517] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 48.

man nicht selten bespuckt und als 'baby-killer' beschimpft wurde."[518] This shows that the myth of the spat-upon veteran is still prevalent, even in academic texts.

The myth of the spat-upon-veteran is not only called as such because of the metaphorical image but because of a very real perception that U.S. soldiers returning from the Vietnam War were very literally spat on by anti-war protestors. Yet Jerry Lembcke asserts that the idea that Vietnam veterans were spat upon by especially female protesters only arose during the year 1990 when the Bush administration looked for support for the Gulf War.[519] The anti-Vietnam War protests were continuously strengthened and legitimized by veterans that had experienced the war as unnecessarily cruel and unjust. The protesting Vietnam War veterans founded their own organization called *Vietnam Veterans Against the War* (VVAW) that had a significant impact on the anti-war movement. Yet in order to undermine the anti-Vietnam War protests, the Nixon administration tried to divide the protesting groups. Since the demonstrating veterans particularly empowered the anti-war protest Nixon aimed to split this group from the protesting masses. By invoking the image that the anti-war protestors spat upon the returning soldiers, it was hoped that it "would turn the American people and Vietnam veterans against the movement."[520] Jerry Lembcke assesses that in fact veterans of the Vietnam War were quite respected by the protestors and that relations were amiable. To divide and weaken the opposition to the war the authenticity of the veterans protest was doubted.[521] U.S. soldiers that questioned the war were particularly threatening to the U.S. engagement in Vietnam and thus by "broad-brushing Vietnam veterans as crazy, prone to violence, and otherwise disabled by the war, all Vietnam veterans were stigmatized and pushed to the margins of American consciousness."[522]

The myth of the spat-upon veteran delineated two groups of Vietnam War veterans: the 'good' veteran and the 'bad' veteran. The 'good' veterans was rather conservative, patriotic American, dutifully fighting for their country in a just war, while the 'bad' veteran betrayed the nation by protesting against the patriotic war. The 'good' veteran was thus constructed as spat upon by the protesters since he backed the war.[523] The myth depicted the anti-war protesters as

[518] Steininger, *Der Vietnamkrieg*, 49. A translation of the quote is: 'If you were lucky and you survived the 365-day tour of duty and your got flown back to the U.S., there were no victory parades but you were often spat upon and berated as a baby killer.'
[519] Jerry Lembcke, *The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 2. By the end of 1990 protests against Bush's Gulf War gained momentum and the idea of the Vietnam veteran that was spat upon discredited these protests.
[520] Ib., 4.
[521] Ib.
[522] Ib.
[523] Ib., 5.

refusing to acknowledge the veterans service and sacrifice. Ironically, the documented cases of people spitting during the anti-war protests were by war supporting people that acted aggressively towards the protestors.[524]

The Nixon administration's strategy was thus to divide the anti-war movement and remove the veterans physically and in the public awareness from the protests. Lembcke observes that a propaganda campaign by the administration depicted the anti-war protests as an "alien, un-American, and violent phenomenon."[525] Invoking the element of 'otherness' and 'foreignness' in relation to the anti-war movement the protests are declared as an enemy within and the spat-upon-veteran myth thus expresses that not the Vietnamese defeated the U.S., but fifth colonists. The blame for the lost war was shifted from the U.S. government and the policy makers towards those that protested against these policies from the very beginning.[526] By scapegoating the anti-war movement for the lost war in Vietnam, the fighting spirit and resourcefulness of the Vietnamese enemies was not acknowledged and "the credibility and chapter of Vietnam veterans, who were the most convincing witnesses for the case against the government, was attacked."[527] Ultimately, the 'bad' and protesting Vietnam War veterans were reconstructed as 'mad' in later years, while for instance World War II veterans were considered heroes.[528]

Thus I argue that the mounting anti-Vietnam War movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s shows that the containment of communism was no longer accepted as a decent reason for the involvement of the U.S. in Vietnam. Hence the anti-war protests can be seen as a symptom of containment not functioning properly any longer as a widely accepted logic of interventionism. Another way to undermine the influential anti-war movement was to cast the protestors as drug consuming hippies that therefore could not be taken seriously. Subverting the credibility of the protesters – particularly the demonstrating Vietnam veterans – by linking them to drug addiction and crime proved to be a powerful tool to keep the criticism of the war that also attacked U.S. core ideological principles at bay.

7.3 White Rabbit

Based on Jerry Lembcke's arguments for the spat-upon-veteran myth, Jeremy Kuzmarov coined the so-called myth of the addicted army. The myth of the addicted army originated from the

[524] Ib., 6. Lembcke also notes that the idea of spitting on soldiers carries a gendered dimension: Spit as a body fluid is generally associated with female bodies, and thus the image of young women spitting on male soldiers relates to anxieties of soldiers that have lost a war.
[525] Ib., 49.
[526] Ib., 184
[527] Ib.
[528] Ib.

broad media coverage discussing G.I. drug use in Vietnam, stating that drugs in Vietnam were so common that they diminished the U.S. military's abilities to wage and win the war.[529] This myth was constituted by a discourse that was increasingly saturated with words such as 'epidemics' or 'plagues,' as shown in part 6. Further, the myth of the addicted army negated the differences in the consumed psychoactive substances in Vietnam and put marijuana smoking on equal footing with heroin consumption. By disregarding the social circumstances in which soldiers in Vietnam used drugs, the substances were condemned as the main cause for prevailing issues in the military in the early 1970s in Vietnam, for instance sabotage, so-called fragging instances, the erosion of military discipline and massacres and atrocities that were committed.[530]

Notably in the spring 1970 hearings about the My Lai massacre of 1968, drugs were blamed for the slaughter of civilians. The reports on the My Lai massacre had undermined how the U.S. military was seen by the American public. The exceptionalist conception of the U.S. military as "a force for good in the world, an instrument of liberation and the advance of social progress" was subverted and the reasons for U.S. Army presence in developing contexts were increasingly questioned.[531] Ron Ridenhour, a helicopter gunner that had flown over the My Lai hamlets while the bodies were buried, had filed a report about the incident. Yet in the hearings he was primarily questioned about marijuana use of the soldiers and "slowly it dawned on Ridenhour that they were cooking up a theory about My Lai, that the massacre was nothing more than a drug trip turned homicidal."[532] As the only eye-witness, Ridenhour mostly had to report on drug use in his unit and not on what he observed concerning the massacre.[533]

The story of Ron Ridenhour and the accounting of the massacre is a prime example how drugs were used as scapegoats in the later years of the Vietnam War. The myth of the addicted army, reaching its culmination in June 1971, aided in deflecting public attention from the failure of the containment strategies in Vietnam.[534] Further, the myth endorsed existing fears of a growing domestic drug cultures, resulting in enlarged federal institutions that gained money and power from fighting drugs, as discussed in part 3. The myth of the addicted army did not only deflect blame during the war but also distorted the collective memory of the war "by advancing the impression that pure and innocent American youth had been corrupted by illegal

[529] Kuzmarov, *Myth of the Addicted Army*, 5.
[530] Ib., 5-6. 'Fragging' describes the intentional killing or maiming of a superior officer that was strongly disliked. The Vietnam War saw a number of fragging instances, even though the scope of these incidents is contested.
[531] Oliver, "Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism," 258.
[532] Baum, *Smoke and Mirrors*, 40.
[533] Ib.
[534] Kuzmarov, *Myth of the Addicted Army*, 6.

drugs – and not by flawed policies, institutional failings, or cultural chauvinism, as most historians would conclude."[535] Kuzmarov adds accordingly that this myth corresponds well with the ingrained U.S. American belief of exceptionalism and greatness which stems in part from 2 discussed core beliefs that constitute the logic of containment. The core principle of freedom of U.S. ideology translated in the language of containment as spreading democracy and having 'honorable' intentions was not able to be realized in Vietnam, having mistakenly assumed that U.S. core beliefs would apply to the entire world. The myth of the addicted army, however, averted the reflection on American core ideology that had led to the defeat in Vietnam. Ultimately, these myths and the underlying racist ideologies of American liberty and exceptionalism led to extensive scapegoating.

The American public was not willing to recognize that the greatest and most powerful nation on earth lost a war against 'inferior people' in a developing country. Thus the sense of cultural and racist superiority led to substitute justifications that gradually became institutionalized.[536] Above discussed myths redirected public opposition and hostility towards a number of scapegoats that deflected the blame from the real reasons why Vietnam turned out to be such a complete catastrophe on multiple levels. Among these scapegoats are antiwar activists, liberal media outlets, useless paper pushers and, of course, the malicious evil of drugs. The Nixon administration utilized the all-encompassing drug 'epidemic' as a "symbol of the war's 'tragedy' and whose eradication was deemed necessary to restore America's international credibility and prestige."[537] Nixon had promised in his election campaign to precipitate an 'honorable' peace in Vietnam. Following its failure, Nixon welcomed drugs as a scapegoat.[538]

By 1971, Richard Nixon had spectacularly managed to create a drug 'epidemic' that surpassed the Vietnam War as the number one national worry. The War on Drugs became an essential cultural component, the myth of the addicted army being perpetuated by Hollywood movies, TV shows and other mass media representations. I argue that these images aided in constructing the War on Drugs as the new interventionist logic and conveyed powerful ideas about U.S. foreign policy in the Global South.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s these cultural images and corresponding academic scholarship portrayed Vietnam veterans as mad and crime-committing addicts, undermining the veteran participation in the anti-war movement.[539] The memory of the war was obliterated by

[535] Ib.
[536] Ib., 7.
[537] Ib., 7.
[538] Ib., 8.
[539] Ib., 20.

these depictions, burying the flawed policies and strategies and thus evading a critical examination of them. Ultimately, this continued process of perpetuated scapegoating enabled a resurrection and reconstruction of U.S. interventionist logic that justified the atrocities of the Vietnam War, avoided facing uncomfortable truths about American exceptionalism, led to further invasions and culminated in the so-called War on Terror.

8 The End

> "Smoking dope, listening to the Mothers and Jimi Hendrix, remembering compulsively, telling war stories. But then, there's nothing wrong with that. War stories aren't really anything more that stories about people anyway."[540]

In the end the American war in Vietnam during the Nixon presidency can be seen as a portal that helps to understand how the anti-drug and anti-communist ideologies and myths intersect. By discussing the origins of U.S. ideologies and how they justify interventions the parallels between the interventionist logics of containment of communism and the War on Drugs are shown, revealing dominant racist undercurrents. By tracing the course of the Vietnam War it is identified how the constructions of containment and eventually drugs functioned as justifications and scapegoats at the same time. Analyzing the history of U.S. drug prohibition and the inception of the concept of the War on Drugs its racist roots and ideological conceptions are established, showing how a government administration profited from manipulating the fears of the people and linking communism to drug trade among others. Focusing on the Nixon administration it is shown how a domestic issue of drug control was turned into a powerful logic of interventionism within the theater of the Vietnam War. Discussing heroin trade and use in Indochina, drug use in Vietnam is closely examined, demonstrating that yes, there was drug use by American G.I.'s in Vietnam, yet not to the severe extent that the U.S. military and public made it out to be. Even though the drug use of soldiers was not something that was statistically speaking very concerning, this thesis demonstrates how U.S. reports of the soldiers' drug use were exaggerated and instrumentalized in U.S. media publications as well as the political and academic discourse. By determining how metaphors and language construct threats to the nation and society, the discourse surrounding drug use in Vietnam is scrutinized, revealing how drugs are shaped as a disease and how gender and primarily race work within the discourse to construct first a Vietnamese 'other' and later a veteran 'other'. By visualizing the discourse using statistical tools it is detected that the early 1970s under Nixon marked an all-time high in the drug discourse across various media forms and outlets. Further, it is shown how the usage of drugs or the so-called drug 'epidemic' started to dominate the news agenda and began to displace the communist threat as a fear-mongering instrument. Through this politicians gained power and the media gained circulation. The myths that have originated from this exaggerated and distorted discourse are discussed in the final chapter and it is shown how these myths thwarted an urgent reassessment of U.S. core values and ideology. The myths such as the stab-

[540] Herr, *Dispatches*, 245.

in-the-back myth, the spat-upon-veteran myth and the myth of the addicted army provided excellent scapegoats for a racist logic of interventionism to endure that ultimately led to many innocent deaths, only no longer called 'containment,' but the 'War on Drugs.'

Particularly in the 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed and containment was ultimately out of fashion, the shift towards the War on Drugs becomes increasingly obvious in policy making decisions. With the closure of the Cold War, hopes arose that the pattern of U.S. interventions in the so-called Third World would come to an end. Yet, Adam Isacson observes: "The Cold War drew to a close about 1990, ushering in a period of peace and reform that brought hope for a break with these patterns. But that break never came. Instead, the 'war on drugs' quickly filled the vacuum."[541] Isacson places the shift from containment to the War on Drugs as happening in the 1990s. Yet, as I have shown in this thesis, this shift started in the early 1970s during the Nixon administration.

The Vietnam War turned into a symbol and no longer represented Vietnam with real people and interests. The two million Vietnamese deaths and the over fifteen million refugees in the Indochina area fade to the background in an overwhelming array of U.S. American myths and explanations about the war. The specter of Vietnam continues to survive until today.

Countless Vietnamese and U.S. soldiers have not survived the war yet American exceptionalism did. The idea of the U.S. as an exceptional nation withstood "the experience of moral and military failure in Southeast Asia and remained a rhetorical resource for the country's policymakers in the post-Vietnam era."[542] Yet in order to keep the idea of American exceptionalism alive, the war had to be re-imagined and "new fantasies to substitute its reality" had to be cultivated.[543] American identity and ideology was under duress during the American war in Vietnam. Particularly the anti-war movement and the civil rights movement challenged the fabric of which America was woven. These movements openly questioned the American war in Vietnam, yet Nixon's War on Drugs reversed these efforts and criminalized the protestors. American identity thus could remain as it was: racist, capitalist and based on Puritanical morals.

Overall, the American war in Vietnam can be seen as a signifier of American imperialism on one hand and an aberration in the American exceptionalist self-conception on the other. American exceptionalism's Achilles' heel remains racism. This has been irrevocably illustrated in this thesis by analyzing the discourse on the Vietnam War, in the discourse on

[541] Adam Isacson, "The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs," in *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, ed. Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 15.
[542] Oliver, "Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism," 266-267.
[543] Young, "Epilogue," 515.

drug use, and ultimately in the discourse about the drug-Vietnam nexus. From its inception global drug prohibition and the War on Drugs were motivated by racism.[544] Over the course of the 20th century the War on Drugs continued to be predominantly aimed at specific minority groups that were perceived as foreign and constructed as 'other.' This creation of 'otherness' is also demonstrated in the drug-Vietnam nexus. First; in the 1960s; the colored Vietnamese – completely disregarding differences between South Vietnamese allies and North Vietnamese enemies – were established as 'other,' than in the early 1970s the Vietnam War veterans were continuously installed as 'other' in Nixon's War on Drugs. The Vietnam War veteran embodied failure, violence, imperialism and ultimately drug addiction and thus epitomized the antithesis to the proud U.S. identity.

The addicted G.I. and later veteran presented to be a useful figure to silence the challenges that the protesting soldiers and veterans posed to the interventionist logics and U.S. core values and ideology. Further, the drug using Vietnam War veteran can be seen as an exception to race being a central category in the War on Drugs, although many soldiers in Vietnam were African American. People of color primarily were the victims of criminalization in the War on Drugs. Similarly, race is also a defining feature in the War on Terror that is nowadays mostly being waged against a colored 'other.' In the War on Communism race however did not play much of a central role, yet I contend that when containment was the defining interventionist logic from the late 1940s to the 1960s, the U.S. was still segregated, African Americans did not possess civil rights and continued to systematically discriminated and subjugated. At this point in time the white male policy making elite did not feel threatened by African Americans, but this soon changed with the civil rights movement gaining influence over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s. The War on Drugs with its focus on race constituted a tool that would then aim at controlling and overpowering black neighborhoods and areas.

The Vietnam War and the massive protests against it revealed that the War on Communism as a white American interventionist ideology was not enough to keep the ruling elite in power. Thus the War on Drugs with its racist elements was an ideal mechanism to sustain the existing power relations. Hence Nixon's War on Drugs as the new American ideology, as shown in this thesis, encompassed racist elements, the idea of U.S. moral supremacy, veiled imperialism and the consolidations of interventionism in the U.S. and abroad through strengthened and enlarged government agencies and authorities.

[544] For instance the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 that criminalized the Chinese by illegalizing opium.

After World War II the War on Communism was needed for a coherent national identity since a threat that is constructed as 'foreign' unifies. Yet the Vietnam War soon proved that containment of communism did not work any longer as a nation-building ideology. A new logic or idea was thus need to strengthen U.S. identity to justify interventions in foreign countries and to explain and maintain the Vietnam War.

The idea of a War on Drugs presented the opportunity to construct U.S. identity along the well-walked paths of Us vs. Them with drugs posing as the foreign threat to Americanness; as a tool of interventionism that would justify U.S. involvement in the so-called Third World countries in order to enforce U.S. economic and security interests; and ultimately drug use in the discourse on the War on Drugs served as a powerful tool of scapegoating policy and military failures in the American war in Vietnam.

Overall I argue that the War on Drugs was a more auspicious ideology than the containment of communism because addiction and drugs are more tangible than communism. Addicts and heavy drug use are easy to depict. Powerful images showing symbols such as the syringe constitute the discourse on drugs. Addiction can be seen and represented in the media, whereas communism remains an abstract and impalpable construct.

Yet interestingly in Nixon's War on Drugs a number of paradoxes can be observed. It should be noted that Nixon's drug war was research-based and particularly Lee Robins' studies concerning drug use by G.I.'s in Vietnam and in the U.S. stand out as a remarkable research publication that was enabled and financed indirectly by the Nixon administration. Yet observing how Robins' study results of rather low addiction and re-addiction rates were met with incredulity by members of the Nixon administration and the leadership ranks of the U.S. military shows the power of the ongoing drugs-Vietnam discourse. Contrary to Robins' results, heroin and drug use were continued to be depicted in the discourse as the most pernicious and nefarious thing and further the entire army in Vietnam was constructed as addicted.

In the American war in Vietnam the shift from the U.S. War on Communism to the U.S. War on Drugs manifests. I argue that the Vietnam War was thus the catalyst that enabled the replacement of containment of communism by Nixon's War on Drugs. Further Vietnam acted as a catalyst or juncture where global heroin trade flows intersected and were enabled through first the French Indochina War and then the American war in Vietnam.

I contend that the underlying U.S. ideologies that can be found in the containment of communism, the U.S. War on Drugs and since the 1990s in the War on Terror have twofold usages for governing administrations: First, by constructing a vague and undefined enemy these logics win elections, emphasize the Us vs. Them differentiation and compose communism,

drugs and terrorism as foreign and utterly un-American. This in turn avoids addressing failures in domestic policies. Second, on a global scale, these ideologies justify imperial interventions where main goals are the extension of U.S. security and economic interests around the world.

The drug-Vietnam discourse determined the meta-narrative and the frame through which the Vietnam War and Nixon's policy decision continue to be interpreted. As shown in part 6.2.1.1 historians continue to value the war influenced by the drug-Vietnam discourse. Usually the winners of a war write its history. Yet due to the continued U.S. hegemony the losers of the Vietnam War got to write its history. Thus it is no surprise that blame and scapegoating are prevalent in the U.S. memory and history of the war. Particularly blaming the media, the anti-war protests and G.I. drug use are the dominant modes of scapegoating and shifting the blame concerning the American war in Vietnam. Popular movies, books, yet also particularly powerful academic scholarship continues to reproduce myths about the war that condemn those that advocated peace. Further, these myths helped to avoid the uncomfortable scrutiny of American identity and exceptionalism that should have been the logical consequence of the lost war.

Following the Vietnam War the United States continued to believe they were exceptional. Yet the American war in Vietnam often remains the "specter that refuses to be accommodated to the imperial exceptionalist discourse of post-Vietnam America."[545] Although this thesis focusses on the years of the Nixon administration, the War on Drugs was revived under the Ronald Reagan presidency and continues to be waged until today in parallel and occasionally intersecting with the War on Terror.

Infamously, on September 14, 1986, Ronald Reagan gave a speech on TV together with his wife Nancy Reagan, declaring – anew – the War on Drugs. The language employed in the address and the metaphors used mirror the drug discourse in the early 1970s. The intertextuality of these metaphors becomes visible.[546] Reagan also reframed the Vietnam War as a 'noble cause,' fully approving of the Cold War ideologies that led to the American anguish in Vietnam.[547] Reagan also announced in 1986 that drugs posed a threat to national security and accordingly intervened in Latin America.[548] Further, one can observe the same racist elements in Reagan's War on Drugs that appear in Anslinger's and Nixon's Wars on Drugs. In Reagan's

[545] Spanos, *American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization*, x.
[546] Here further research could delve into a comprehensive study on U.S. or global drug discourses throughout the 20th century.
[547] Franklin, *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*, 29.
[548] Youngers and Rosin, "The U.S. 'War on Drugs,'" 3. How anti-communism and the War on Drugs intersect in Latin America – particularly in Nicaragua – would be a worthwhile starting point for further research into this topic.

War on Drugs in the 1980s "the criminalized victims tended to be Latino and African American."[549]

Generally, the War on Drugs has and will be "costly, destructive and failing in its stated mission" and yet "we soldier on, speaking the language of war, writing the budgets of war, carrying the weapons of war, and suffering casualties of war."[550]

Overall, in its inception the American war in Vietnam was unarguably motivated by the containment of communism that encompassed imperial designs. But as the war progressed and with Nixon's expansion of the war into Laos and Cambodia being partially motivated by drug control efforts, and further the exaggerated concerns about G.I. drug use in Vietnam, slowly changed the reason for the American presence in Indochina. The ongoing anti-war protests and left leaning intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky further questioned the logic of the containment of communism as the main American intention in Vietnam and pointed out U.S. imperial designs.

However, as mentioned, the critique of the War on Drugs did not result in the end of the U.S. interventionist logic but it rather shifted into its newest form, the War on Terror. The underlying ideological principles remain the same. Drug cartels and terrorist groups intersect – and as do the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. Today, the War on Terror remains besides the War on Drugs the main logic of U.S. interventionism. Yet the foundations of the logics are slowly crumbling away. So the question arises what will be the next interventionist logic? What will come after the War on Terror once this logic is deconstructed by progressive and liberal academics and journalists? And if there is no new interventionist logic, will the U.S. be able to uphold its sense of exceptionalism given that so many atrocities were founded on mere constructions?

[549] Oliver Villar, *Cocaine, Death Squads, and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Columbia* (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2011), 19.
[550] Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, xii.

9 Bibliography

9.1 Primary Sources

9.1.1 Archives

The New York Times Archive. https://www.nytimes.com/search/?srchst=p.

Vanderbilt Television News Archive. https://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/.

9.1.2 Images and Maps

"The 'Nam" *Marvel* comic cover #24 November 1988, Doug Murray (author) and Wayne Vansant (illustrator): https://marvel.fandom.com/wiki/The_%27Nam_Vol_1_24

Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "Indochina Atlas 1970." *Perry-Castañeda Map Collection*, UT Library Online. Accessed June 5, 2019. https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/indochina_atlas/.

Gallup. "The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison." Gallup.com. Accessed July 2, 2019. https://news.gallup.com/poll/11998/IraqVietnam-Comparison.aspx.

Murray, Doug, Michael Golden, and Stan Lee. *The 'Nam. 1:* ... 2. pr. Marvel Comics. New York: Marvel, 1987. [includes #4].

Photograhs by Eddie Adams in Sator, Christoph, and Jochen Leffers. "Ein Bild und Seine Geschichte: Als der General einen Vietcong Erschoss." Spiegel Online, February 1, 2018. https://www.spiegel.de/einestages/vietnamkrieg-foto-toedlicher-kopfschuss-in-saigon-a-1190819.html.

9.1.3 Medical Articles and Studies

Baker, Stewart L. "Drug Abuse in the United States Army." *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine* 47, no. 6 (1971): 541-549.

Baker, Stewart L. "U.S. Army Heroin Abuse Identification Program in Vietnam: Implications for a Methadone Program." *American Journal of Public Health* 62, no. 6 (1972): 857-860.

Kaplan, Joel H. "Marijuana and Drug Abuse in Vietnam." *Annals New York Academy of Sciences* 191, no. 1 (1971): 261-269.

Robins, Lee N. *The Vietnam Drug User Returns*. Washington D.C.: SAODAP Monograph Series, 1974.

Robins**,** Lee N., Darlene H. Davis, David N. Nurco. "How Permanent Was Vietnam Drug Addiction?." *American Journal of Public Health Supplement* 64 (1974): 38-43.

9.1.4 Novels

Greene, Graham. *The Quiet American*. Melbourne [etc.]: William Heinemann LTD, 1955.

Herr, Michael. *Dispatches*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1977. Reprint, London: Picador, 1997.

9.1.5 Other Newspaper and Newsmagazine Articles

"The Heroin Plague: What Can Be Done?" *Newsweek*, July 5, 1971, https://archive.org/details/newsweekjuly519700news.

"Rauschgift Vietnam: Krieg in Farbe." *Der Spiegel*, November 18, 1968. http://www.spiegel.de/ spiegel/print/d-45922137.html.

"Trying to Help the GI Addicts." *LIFE* 71, No. 4. July 23, 1971, pp. 20-27. https://books.google.at/books?id=OEAEAAAAMBAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=de#v=onepage&q&f=false.

9.1.6 Speeches and Essays

"Excerpts From President's Message on Drug Abuse Control." *The New York Times*, June 18, 1971, sec. Archives. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/18/archives/excerpts-from-presidents-message-on-drug-abuse-control.html.

Heinl, Robert D. "The Collapse of the Armed Forces (1971)." In: *Vietnam and America: A Documented History*, edited by Marvin E. Gettleman et al., 326-335. New York: Grove Press, 1995.

Nixon, Richard M. "President Nixon's Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam." November 3, 1969, https://watergate.info/1969/11/03/nixons-silent-majority-speech.html.

9.1.7 The New York Times Articles in Chronological Order

"Pentagon Steps Up Fight on Drug Use in Vietnam; Sharp Rise Noted in Inquiries Into Marijuana Cases for G.I.'s in Last 2 Years," *The New York Times*, February 16, 1968,

https://www.nytimes.com/1968/02/16/archives/pentagon-steps-up-fight-on-drug-use-in-vietnam-sharp-rise-noted-in.html?searchResultPosition=9.

"Courts-Martial of G.I.'s Linked to Marijuana," *The New York Times*, January 15, 1969, https://www.nytimes.com/1969/01/15/archives/courtsmartial-of-gis-linked-to-marijuana.html?searchResult Position=10.

"Hero Fined in Marijuana Case," *The New York Times*, November 2, 1969, https://www.nytimes.com/1969/11/02/archives/hero-fined-in-marijuana-case.html.

Barbara Campbell, "4 Ex-G.I.'s Report Vietnam Drug Use," *The New York Times*, March 21, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/21/archives/4-exgis-report-vietnam-drug-use-tell-experiences-to-assist-drive.html.

Gloria Emerson, "Allies in Vietnam Burn Marijuana," *The New York Times*, March 22, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/22/archives/allies-in-vietnam-burn-marijuana-us-officers-worried-over.html.

Robert M. Smith, "Senators Told G.I's in Songmy Unit Smoked Marijuana Night Before Incident," *The New York Times*, March 25, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/25/archives/senators-told-gis-in-songmy-unit-smoked-marijuana-night-before.html.

B. Drummond Ayres, "Marijuana Is Part of The Scene Among G.I.'s In Vietnam," *The New York Times*, March 29, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/03/29/archives/marijuana-is-part-of-the-scene-among-gis-in-vietnam.html.

James P. Sterba, "Combat G.I.'s Tell of Using Marijuana," *The New York Times*, April 4, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/04/archives/combat-gis-tell-of-using-marijuana.html.

"3,800 Discharged by Navy On Drug Charges Last Year," *The New York Times*, April 22, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/04/22/archives/3800-discharged-by-navy-on-drug-charges-last-year.html.

Barbara Campbell, "Extent of Drug Use and Addiction in Armed Forces Appears Wider Than Pentagon's Statistics Show," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/06/08/archives/extent-of-drug-use-and-addiction-in-armed-forces-appears-wider-than.html.

Homer Bigart, "G.I. Drug Project Tested on a Base," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/06/14/archives/gi-drug-project-tested-on-a-base-ft-bragg-addicts-retained-for.html.

"2 Vietnam Amputees Seized With 21 Kilos of Heroin Here," *The New York Times*, July 19, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/19/archives/2-vietnam-amputees-seized-with-21-kilos-of-heroin-here.html.

"G.I.'s in Vietnam Who Use Marijuana Aided in 'Amnesty,'" *The New York Times*, July 23, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/23/archives/gis-in-vietnam-who-use-marijuana-aided-in-amnesty.html.

"Foe of Marijuana Says G.I. Threw a Grenade at Him," *The New York Times*, August 19, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/19/archives/foe-of-marijuana-says-gi-threw-a-grenade-at-him.html.

"3 Out of 10 G.I.'s Said to Try Drugs," *The New York Times*, August 21, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/21/archives/3-out-of-10-gis-said-to-try-drugs-senate-panel-is-told-users-mainly.html.

James P. Sterba, "G.I.'s Find Marijuana Is Plentiful," *The New York Times*, September 2, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/02/archives/gis-find-marijuana-is-plentiful.html.

Titer Peterson, "Deaths From Drug Abuse Rise Among Vietnam G.I.'s," *The New York Times*, October 31, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/10/31/archives/deaths-from-drug-abuse-rise-among-vietnam-gis.html.

Felix Belair Jr., "Rising Use of LSD Worries the Navy," *The New York Times*, November 18, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/11/18/archives/rising-use-of-lsd-worries-the-navy-investigator-tells-house-unit-of.html.

Alvin Shuster, "G.I.'s in Vietnam High on Hope's Marijuana Jokes," *The New York Times*, December 23, 1970, https://www.nytimes.com/1970/12/23/archives/gis-in-veitnam-high-on-hopes-marijuana-jokes.html.

"U.S. Colonel in Saigon Faces Marijuana Trial," *The New York Times*, January 21, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/21/archives/us-colonel-in-saigon-faces-marijuana-trial.html.

Gloria Emerson, "G.I.'s in Vietnam Get Heroin Easily," *The New York Times*, February 25, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/25/archives/g-is-in-vietnam-get-heroin-easily-gis-in-vietnam-obtain-heroin.html.

"40 U.S. Airmen in Vietnam Held in Drug Investigation," *The New York Times*, February 28, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/02/28/archives/40-us-airmen-in-vietnam-held-in-drug-investigation.html.

Abraham Walker, "Marijuana is Dangerous," *The New York Times*, April 3, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/04/03/archives/marijuana-is-dangerous.html.

Alvin Shuster, "G.I. Heroin Addiction Epidemic in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, May 16, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/16/archives/gi-heroin-addiction-epidemic-in-vietnam-gi-heroin-addiction-is.html.

Iver Peterson, "G.I.'s Find It All in Saigon's Scag Alley," *The New York Times*, May 17, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/17/archives/gis-find-it-all-in-saigons-scag-alley.html.

"Pentagon Unsure of Total on Drug Use in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, May 17, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/05/17/archives/pentagon-unsure-of-total-on-drug-use-in-vietnam.html.

James M. Naughton, "President Gives 'Highest Priority' To Drug Problem," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/02/archives/president-gives-highest-priority-to-drug-problem-pledges-a-national.html.

James Reston, "Nixon, Drugs and the War," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/02/archives/nixon-drugs-and-the-war.html.

Dana Adams Schmidt, "Addiction in Vietnam Spurs Nixon and Congress to Take Drastic New Steps," *The New York Times*, June 16, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/16/archives/addiction-in-vietnam-spurs-nixon-and-congress-to-take-drastic-new.html.

Iver Peterson, "G.I.'s in Vietnam Say Test for Heroin Addiction Can Be Beaten," *The New York Times*, June 24, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/24/archives/g-is-in-vietnam-say-test-for-heroin-addiction-can-be-beaten.html.

Richard Severo, "U.S. Gets Warning on Army Addicts," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/27/archives/us-gets-warning-on-army-addicts-doctor-urges-rehabilitation-before.html.

Dana Adams Schmidt, "More G.I.'s in Vietnam Joining Drug Users' Amnesty Program," *The New York Times*, July 13, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/13/archives/more-gis-in-vietnam-joining-drug-users-amnesty-program.html.

"2 in House Say U.S. Hides Extent of G.I. Drug Use," *The New York Times*, July 21, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/21/archives/2-in-house-say-us-hides-extent-of-gi-drug-use.html.

"Agents From 3 Nations Seize $4-Million in Narcotics in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, July 29, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/07/29/archives/agents-from-3-nations-seize-4million-in-narcotics-in-vietnam.html.

"Drug Use Up Among Vietnamese," *The New York Times*, August 4, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/04/archives/drug-use-up-among-vietnamese.html.

Henry Kamm, "Asians Doubt That U.S. Can Halt Heroin Flow," *The New York Times*, August 11, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/11/archives/asians-doubt-that-us-can-halt-heroin-flow-southeast-asians-doubt.html.

Nancy Hicks, "Bases in U.S. Face G.I. Drug Problem," *The New York Times*, August 15, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/15/archives/bases-in-us-face-gi-drug-problem-views-of-officials-vary-on.html.

Henry Kamm, "Drive Fails to Halt Drug Sale in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, August 30, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/08/30/archives/drive-fails-to-halt-drug-sale-in-vietnam-heroin-price-unchanged.html.

"Figures on Heroin in Vietnam Differ," *The New York Times*, September 5, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/05/archives/figures-on-heroin-in-vietnam-differ-new-tests-cut-the-number-of-gi.html.

Gloria Emerson, "A Major in Vietnam Gives All He's Got to the War on Heroin," *The New York Times*, September 12, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/12/archives/a-major-in-vietnam-gives-all-hes-got-to-the-war-on-heroin.html.

"39 G.I.'s in a Vietnam Unit Arrested in Drugs Roundup," *The New York Times*, September 17, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/17/archives/39-gis-in-a-vietnam-unit-arrested-in-drugs-roundup.html.

Dana Adams Schmidt, "Drug Dependency of Servicemen In Vietnam Is Said to Level Off," *The New York Times*, October 13, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/10/13/archives/drug-dependency-of-servicemen-in-vietnam-is-said-to-level-off.html.

Norman E. Zinberg, "G.I.'s and O.J.'s In Vietnam," *The New York Times*, December 5, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/05/archives/gis-and-ojs-in-vietnam-gis-and-ojs-in-vietnam.html.

Iver Peterson, "Army Discharges Many Addicts in Vietnam Despite U.S. Pledges" *The New York Times*, December 19, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/19/archives/army-discharges-many-addicts-in-vietnam-despite-u-s-pledges.html.

"Military Tests Find Most Use of Drugs Is by Vietnam G.I.'s," *The New York Times*, January 17, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/01/17/archives/military-tests-find-most-use-of-drugs-is-by-vietnam-gis.html.

"U.S. Starting a Drug Check on G.I.'s Arriving in Vietnam," *The New York Times*, March 9, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/03/09/archives/us-starting-a-drug-check-on-gis-arriving-in-vietnam.html.

"Addicted Ex-G.I. Sentenced," *The New York Times*, March 19, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/03/19/archives/addicted-exgi-sentenced.html.

Iver Peterson, "Most Veterans of Vietnam Fail To Seek Aid Under the G.I. Bill," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/04/09/archives/most-veterans-of-vietnam-fail-to-seek-aid-under-the-gi-bill-most.html.

Boyce Rensberger, "Delayed Trauma in Veterans Cited," *The New York Times*, May 3, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/05/03/archives/delayed-trauma-in-veterans-cited-psychiatrists-find-vietnam.html.

Seymour M. Hersh, "Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting Asian Drug Traffic," *The New York Times*, July 24, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/07/24/archives/report-to-us-sees-no-hope-of-halting-asian-drug-traffic-report-to.html.

Seymour M. Hersh, "Asian Drug Inflow Found 'Greater Than Realized,'" *The New York Times*, July 28, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/07/28/archives/asian-drug-inflow-found-greater-than-realized.html.

"Ex-Officer Says Vietnam Report On G.I. Addicts Was Withheld," *The New York Times*, August 16, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/16/archives/exofficer-says-vietnam-report-on-gi-addicts-was-withheld.html.

"President Pledges an End To 'Era of Permissiveness,'" *The New York Times*, November 10, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/11/10/archives/new-jersey-pages-president-pledges-an-end-to-era-of-permissiveness.html.

"Drug Feared Sent in Bodies of G.I.'s," *The New York Times*, December 17, 1972, https://www.nytimes.com/1972/12/17/archives/drug-feared-sent-in-bodies-of-gis-court-told-that-smugglers-used.html.

James M. Markham, "Mixing of Mind-Altering Drugs Rises as Spread of Heroin Addiction Slows," *The New York Times*, March 25, 1973, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/03/25/archives/mixing-of-mindalterning-drugs-rises-as-spread-of-heroin-addiction.html.

George W. Ball, "The Lessons of Vietnam," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1973, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/04/01/archives/have-we-learned-or-only-failed-the-lessons-of-vietnam-vietnam.html.

John W. Finney, "Army Reports Few In War in 1970-'72 Are Addicts Today," *The New York Times*, April 24, 1973, https://www.nytimes.com/1973/04/24/archives/army-reports-few-in-war-in-197072are-addicts-today-study-finds-few.html.

9.2 Secondary Sources

Anderson, David L. "Introduction: The Vietnam War and Its Enduring Historical Relevance." In *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*, edited by David L. Anderson, 1-92. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011.

Baum**,** Dan. "Legalize it All. How to Win the War on Drugs." *Harper's Magazine*, April 2016. https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/?single=1.

_____, Dan. *Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure*. New York, NY: Little, Brown, 1997.

Benavie**,** Arthur. *Drugs: America's Holy War*. New York, London: Routledge, 2009.

Bewley-Taylor, David R. *International Drug Control: Consensus Fractured*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Brush, Peter. "Higher and Higher: American Drug Use in Vietnam." *Vietnam Magazine* 15, no. 4 (2002). https://circle.org/jsource/higher-and-higher-american-drug-use-in-vietnam/.

Buzzanco, Robert. *Vietnam and the Transformation of American Life*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999.

Chalk**,** Peter. "Southeast Asia and the Golden Triangle's Heroin Trade: Threat and Response." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 23, no. 2 (2000): 89-106.

Chin, Ko-lin. *The Golden Triangle: Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.

Chomsky, Noam. *At War with Asia*. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1970.

Cohen, Michael M. "Jim Crow's Drug War: Race, Coca Cola, and the Southern Origins of Drug Prohibition." *Southern Cultures* 12, no. 3 (2006): 55-79.

Corva, Dominic. "Neoliberal Globalization and the War on Drugs: Transnationalizing Illiberal Governance in the Americas." *Political Geography* 27 (2008): 176-193.

Courtwright**,** David T. *Addicts Who Survived: An Oral History of Narcotic Use in America, 1923-1965*. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1989.

_____**,** David T. *Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

_____, David T. *Forces of Habit: Drugs and the Making of the Modern World*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

DeBenedetti, Charles. *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990.

Dubberly**,** Benjamin C. "Drugs and Drug Use." In *Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History: 1*, edited by Spencer T. Tucker, 179-180. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1998.

Epstein, Edward J. *Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America*. New York, NY: Verso, 1990.

Franklin, Bruce H. *Vietnam and Other American Fantasies*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000.

Friedman, Jeremy. *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015.

Gootenberg, Paul. "Cocaine's Long March North, 1900-2010." *Latin American Politics and Society* 54, no. 1 (2012): 159-180.

_____, Paul. "Talking Like a State: Drugs, Borders, and the Language of Control." in *Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders, and the Other Side of Globalization*, edited by Willem van Schendel and Itty Abraham. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005: 101-127.

Hall, Wayne and Weier, Megan. "Lee Robins' Studies of Heroin Use Among U.S. Vietnam Veterans." *Addiction* 112 (2016): 176-180.

Heller, Henry. *The Cold War and the New Imperialism: A Global History, 1945-2005*. New York, NY: Monthly Review, 2006.

Isacson, Adam. "The U.S. Military in the War on Drugs." In *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 15-60. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

Jaffe**,** Jerome H. "A Follow-up of Vietnam Drug Users: Origins and Context of Lee Robins' Classic Study." *The American Journal on Addiction* 19 (2010): 212-214.

Kamienski, Lukasz. "The Drugs that Built a Super Soldier." *The Atlantic*, April 8, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/04/the-drugs-that-built-a-super-soldier/477183/.

_____**,** Lukasz. *Shooting Up: A Short History of Drugs and War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Kinder**,** Douglas C. "Cold Warrior: Harry J. Anslinger and Illicit Narcotics Traffic." *Pacific Historical Review* 50, no. 2 (May 1981): 169-191.

Kramer, Paul A. “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States and the World.” *American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (December 2011): 1348-91.

Kuzmarov, Jeremy. “From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Insurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drugs.” *Journal of Policy History* 20, no. 3 (2008): 344-378.

_____, Jeremy. *The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs*. Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009.

Landers, James. *The Weekly War: Newsmagazines and Vietnam*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2004.

Lembcke, Jerry. *The Spitting Image: Myth, Memory, and the Legacy of Vietnam*. New York: New York University Press, 1998.

Lepore, Jill. *These Truths: A History of the United States*. First edition. New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018.

Lewy**,** Guenter. *America in Vietnam*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1978; New York, NY: Oxford University Press paperback, 1980.

Marez, Curtiz. *Drug Wars: The Political Economy of Narcotics*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.

Massey, Rachel. “The ‘Drug War’ in Colombia: Echoes of Vietnam.” *Journal of Public Health Policy* 22, no. 3 (2001): 280-285.

McCoy, Alfred W. “Heroin and Politics in Saigon.” In: *Vietnam and America: A Documented History*, edited by Marvin E. Gettleman et al., 97-103. New York: Grove Press, 1995.

_____. “The Stimulus of Prohibition: A Critical History of the Global Narcotics Trade.” In: *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes*, edited by Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs and Kent Mathewson, 24-111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

_____. *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Musto, David F. *The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Oliver**,** Kendrick. “Atrocity, Authenticity and American Exceptionalism: (Ir)rationalizing the Massacre at My Lai.” *Journal of American Studies* 37, no. 2 (2003): 247-268.

Pembleton, Matthew R. “Imagining a Global Sovereignty: U.S. Counternarcotic Operation in Istanbul during the Early Cold War and the Origins of the Foreign ‘War on Drugs.’” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 28-63.

Pöll, Christoph. “Heiße Kriege im Kalten Krieg: Die Rolle der Medien während des Vietnamkrieges.“ *Historia Scribere* 4 (2012): 333-352.

Reiss, Suzanna. *We Sell Drugs: The Alchemy of US Empire*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2014.

Robins**,** Lee N. “Vietnam Veterans’ Rapid Recovery From Heroin Addiction: A Fluke or Normal Expectation?.” *Addiction* 88 (1993): 1041-1054.

Room, Robin. “The Rhetoric of International Drug Control.” *Substance Use and Misuse* 34, no. 12 (1999): 1689-1707.

Schmitz**,** David F. *Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014.

Scholl-Latour, Peter. *Der Tod im Reisfeld: Dreißig Jahre Krieg in Indochina*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980.

Sheehan**,** Neil. “Einführung.” In *Die Pentagon-Papiere: Die Geheime Geschichte des Vietnamkrieges*, edited by Neil Sheehan, xv-xiv. Stuttgart: Deutscher Bücherbund, 1971.

Shiner, Michael. *Drug Use and Social Change: The Distortion of History*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Spanos**,** William V. *American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2008.

Stanton**,** M. Duncan. “Drugs, Vietnam, and the Vietnam Veteran: An Overview.” *The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse* 3, no. 4 (1976): 557-570.

Steininger, Rolf. *Der Vietnamkrieg: Ein Furchtbarer Irrtum*. Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2018.

Steuter, Erin and Wills, Deborah. *At War with Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008.

Villar**,** Oliver. *Cocaine, Death Squads, and the War on Terror: U.S. Imperialism and Class Struggle in Columbia*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 2011.

Weimer, Daniel. “Drugs-as-a-Disease: Heroin, Metaphors, and Identity in Nixon’s Drug War.” *Janus Head* 6, no. 2 (2003): 260-281.

Wells, Tom. *The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994.

Westad, Odd Arne. *The Global Cold War: Third World Intervention and the Making of our Times*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007.

Westermeyer, Joseph. “Opium and the People of Laos.” In: *Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes*, edited by Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs and Kent Mathewson, 115-132. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004.

Wiest, Andrew. “Introduction: Historians and the Vietnam War.” In *Triumph Revisited: Historians Battle for the Vietnam War*, edited by Andrew Wiest and Michael J. Doidge, 1-14. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010.

Wischermann, Jörg and Will, Gerhard. “Einleitung: Politische Mythen: Begriffe und Funktionen.” In *Vietnam: Mythen und Wirklichkeiten*, edited by Jörg Wischermann and Gerhard Will, 1-20. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2018.

Wodak, Ruth. “What CDA is about – A Summary of its History, Important Concepts and its Developments.” In *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, edited by Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, 1-13. London: SAGE Publications, 2001.

_____, Ruth. *The Discursive Construction of National Identity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.

Young, Marilyn B. “Epilogue: The Vietnam War in American Memory.” In: *Vietnam and America: A Documented History*, edited by Marvin E. Gettleman et al., 515-522. New York: Grove Press, 1995.

Youngers, Coletta A. and Rosin, Eileen. “The U.S. ‘War on Drugs’: Its Impact in Latin America and the Caribbean.” In *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy*, edited by Coletta A. Youngers and Eileen Rosin, 1-14. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

Appendix

New York Times Graphs

I created the following graphs using the data I collected from the New York Times Archive. The data used is listed in 0.



Figure 2: NYT Drug Discourse 1969-1974.



Figure 1: NYT Drug Discourse 1965-1975.



Figure 3. NYT Drug Discourse 1970-1979.



Figure 4. NYT Drug Discourse 1940-2009.



Figure 5. NYT 'Heroin Epidemic' and 'Contain Communism.'



Figure 6. NYT Drug Discourse 1970-1974.



Figure 7. NYT Drug Discourse 1940-1969.



Figure 8. NYT Drug Discourse 1970-1999.

Vanderbilt Television Index Graphs

I created the following graphs using data from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. The data used is listed in 0.



Figure 9. ABC, CBS, NBC Drug Discourse 1969-2009.



Figure 10. ABC, CBS, NBC Drug Discourse 1969-1994.



Figure 11. TV Drug Discourse Split by Channel 1969-1994.

Ngram Google Books Graphs

The Google Books Ngram Viewer is a program that searches a corpora of texts between 1500 and 2008 for a phrase or a key word. If this word or phrase appears in more than forty books, a graph is plotted. The Ngram Viewer searches Google's text corpora. For my analysis I used the 'English' and 'English fiction' corpora and set the time frame from 1940 to 2008. The graphs shown here are screenshots of my searches.

English



Figure 12. Ngram. Communism, Containment.



Figure 13. Ngram. Heroin, Marijuana, War on Drugs.



Figure 14. Ngram. Terrorism, War on Terror.



Figure 15. Ngram. War on Terror, War on Drugs.



Figure 16. Ngram. Communism, Containment, Marijuana, Heroin.



Figure 17. Ngram. Heroin, Marijuana, Communism, Containment, War on Terror, Terrorism.



Figure 18. Ngram. Drugs, Terrorism, Communism.

English Fiction

Figure 19. Ngram. English Fiction. Vietnam.



Figure 20. Ngram. English Fiction. Heroin, Marijuana, War on Drugs.



Figure 21. Ngram. English Fiction. Terrorism, War on Terror.



Figure 22. Ngram. English Fiction. Containment, Communism.



Figure 23. Ngram. Drugs, Communism, Terrorism.

Data for NYT and Vanderbilt TV Index Analysis

New York Times Archive Data

The numbers listed in the following tables stem from *The New York Times Archives* that was accessed in June 2019. In the key word search of the archive the words 'Heroin Vietnam,' 'Marijuana Vietnam,' 'Golden Triangle Heroin,' and 'War on Drugs' were entered respectively. Then, using the function of the archive that limits the time range of the articles, the search was constricted to either a months or years. I counted the number of articles that were listed.

After thoroughly searching and counting the number of articles in the archive, I observed a number of irregularities. First, no matter the key word, since the year 1970 the number of articles that contained that key word increased significantly. I suspect that this stark gap in the number of articles between the years 1969 and 1970 stems from a technical issue of the archive. Until 1969 the search function of the archive only searches the headlines of the articles for the key word, whereas since 01/01/1970 the entire articles are searched for the key words. Thus, I reflect this gap in my analysis. Second, *The New York Times Archive* does not guarantee the completeness of the archive. Although I assume that the overwhelming majority of articles published in *The New York Times* since its inception are represented in the archive, single articles or editions may be missing. Third, the newspaper articles in the archive were digitalized through an automatic process. Thus errors in orthography and spelling might distort the key word search slightly. However, cross-reading a number of articles, I assume that this effect is insignificant. Of further relevance for my discourse analysis is that the page length of *The New York Times* has increased over the years and thus more issues and articles appeared.

The numbers in the tables represent the number of articles that contained the key word in the specific time frame.

NYT DRUG DISCOURSE 1970-1974 DATA

Months	Heroin Vietnam	Marijuana Vietnam	Golden Triangle Heroin	'War on Drugs'
1970 J	5	13	2	1
F	3	5	2	1
M	6	15	3	0
A	8	15	5	0
M	9	5	0	0
J	10	5	0	0

J	2	5	0	1
A	7	8	0	0
S	2	5	0	0
O	8	14	0	0
N	6	10	0	2
D	6	13	0	0
1971 J	6	12	0	0
F	5	11	0	0
M	7	4	0	0
A	4	7	0	0
M	22	14	0	0
J	34	11	1	0
J	27	6	0	0
A	13	4	0	0
S	16	8	1	0
O	3	4	0	0
N	8	4	0	0
D	6	5	0	0
1972 J	6	8	0	0
F	1	8	0	0
M	7	5	1	1
A	4	5	0	1
M	4	6	0	0
J	5	6	0	0
J	9	11	2	0
A	12	9	2	0
S	7	8	2	3
O	9	12	2	0
N	4	11	0	0
D	5	3	1	1
1973 J	12	8	1	1
F	6	5	0	0
M	8	5	1	0
A	8	4	0	0
M	4	7	0	2
J	2	2	0	0
J	6	0	3	0
A	0	8	0	1
S	2	2	1	1
O	1	2	0	0
N	2	2	0	0
D	4	4	0	0
1974 J	1	1	0	1
F	0	1	0	0
M	8	4	0	1

A	0	0	0	0
M	2	1	0	0
J	1	1	0	0
J	4	1	1	0
A	2	3	0	0
S	4	3	0	0
O	4	2	0	0
N	2	1	1	0
D	1	1	0	0

Table 1. NYT Drug Discourse Data 1970-1974.

NYT DRUG DISCOURSE 1940-1999 DATA

Years	Heroin	Marijuana
1940	1	1
1941	3	0
1942	4	0
1943	3	0
1944	1	3
1945	8	7
1946	0	4
1947	5	2
1948	10	5
1949	8	7
1950	8	4
1951	27	41
1952	22	11
1953	18	6
1954	17	2
1955	16	5
1956	19	4
1957	13	2
1958	17	1
1959	21	6
1960	11	4
1961	11	4
1962	12	0
1963	10	8
1964	99	68
1965	20	17
1966	16	39
1967	33	82
1968	33	69

1969	**35**	**88**
1970	**612**	**588**
1971	748	460
1972	822	511
1973	779	543
1974	478	360
1975	380	309
1976	267	323
1977	334	489
1978	239	392
1979	272	357
1980	40	62
1981	309	330
1982	322	320
1983	289	299
1984	381	312
1985	374	327
1986	476	476
1987	378	406
1988	464	363
1989	454	339
1990	355	296
1991	276	217
1992	337	283
1993	331	230
1994	377	270
1995	436	302
1996	479	440
1997	469	429
1998	506	393
1999	402	343

Table 2. NYT Drug Discourse Data 1940-1999.

NYT DRUG DISCOURSE 1964-1974 DATA

Years	Heroin Vietnam	Marijuana Vietnam	Golden Triangle Heroin	'War on Drugs'
1964	0	1	0	0
1965	0	0	0	0
1966	0	1	0	0
1967	1	3	0	0
1968	0	3	0	0
1969	1	3	0	0

1970	72	113	0	5
1971	151	90	2	0
1972	73	92	10	6
1973	55	49	6	5
1974	29	19	2	2

Table 3. NYT Drug Discourse Data 1964-1974.

NYT DRUG AND COMMUNISM DISCOURSE 1969-1975 DATA

Years	'Heroin Epidemic'	'Contain Communism'
1969	0	0
1970	42	32
1971	32	34
1972	30	39
1973	27	29
1974	12	20
1975	15	35

Table 4. NYT Drug and Communism Discourse Data 1969-1975.

Vanderbilt Television Index Data

The following data stems from the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive* that was accessed online in June 2019. The Vanderbilt TV Archive lists since August 5, 1968 news broadcasts and news programs of the U.S. TV channels ABC, CBS, and NBC. Since 1995 also the channel CNN is included in the archive, in 2004 Fox News was added. I chose to focus on the three channels ABC, CBS, and NBC in my analysis. To avoid contaminating the data with CNN news programs, I ended my analysis in 1994.

To determine the television coverage of the issues discussed in this thesis, I used the key word search and the filters for the specific channels and time frame. I counted the number of news segments, commercials, program introductions, specials, evening news, and Good Night Segments that contained the respective key word in the time frame. As with the NYT archive, it cannot be guaranteed that the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive* is complete.

The numbers in the tables indicate how often the key word appeared in a specific year in a TV segment.

VANDERBILT TV INDEX DRUG DISCOURSE 1969-1994 DATA
ABC, CBS, NBC COMBINED

Years	Heroin	Marijuana
1969	11	57
1970	28	78
1971	94	64
1972	59	72
1973	25	38
1974	11	25
1975	18	46
1976	20	41
1977	21	44
1978	22	60
1979	10	20
1980	5	40
1981	10	24
1982	14	36
1983	16	30
1984	20	33
1985	19	23
1986	21	18
1987	8	29
1988	28	23
1989	10	13
1990	13	14
1991	15	18
1992	7	25
1993	4	3
1994	12	21

Table 5. TV Archive Drug Discourse Data 1969-1994. Channels combined.

VANDERBILT TV INDEX DRUG DISCOURSE 1969-1994 DATA
ABC, CBS, NBC SPLIT BY CHANNEL

Years	ABC		CBS		NBC	
	Heroin	Marijuana	Heroin	Marijuana	Heroin	Marijuana
1969	2	14	5	25	4	18
1970	4	18	12	35	12	25
1971	32	16	33	24	29	24
1972	19	17	22	30	18	25
1973	5	11	11	17	9	10
1974	3	7	5	6	3	12
1975	6	12	3	14	9	20
1976	5	12	6	17	9	12

1977	7	16	8	14	6	14
1978	9	16	4	18	9	26
1979	3	5	2	10	5	5
1980	1	11	2	10	2	19
1981	3	3	4	12	3	9
1982	5	10	3	14	6	12
1983	5	8	7	10	4	12
1984	8	12	9	13	3	8
1985	7	6	7	11	5	6
1986	10	7	5	8	6	3
1987	1	6	4	15	3	8
1988	3	8	13	8	12	7
1989	3	4	1	3	6	6
1990	6	7	4	0	3	7
1991	3	4	5	8	7	6
1992	1	11	3	2	3	9
1993	0	1	2	1	2	1
1994	1	4	4	8	7	9

Table 6. TV Archive Drug Discourse Data 1969-1994. Split by channel.

Newsweek July 1971



Figure 24. Newsweek Cover July 5, 1971.



comply with this subcommittee," Staggers shot back angrily. "I respectfully decline," said Stanton. "In my opinion," the white-haired, ruddy-faced Staggers then declared, "you are now in contempt."

Whether Stanton is actually in contempt of Congress, however, will not be decided by Staggers alone but the whole House membership. First, both the subcommittee and the full Commerce committee must vote on the question, and a battle is expected in each arena. And even if the full House eventually upholds Staggers, there is little doubt that Stanton and CBS are prepared to go all the way to the Supreme Court in defense of television's right to share the protection of the First Amendment with newspapers and magazines. "The chilling effect of both the subpoena and the inquiry is plain," Stanton told the subcommittee.

"If newsmen are told that their notes, films and tapes will be subject to compulsory process so that government can determine whether the news is satisfactorily edited . . . reporting activities will inevitably be curtailed."

Staggers, for his part, was no less determined. "Television is an awesome power that can control America," he said. "If we can't do something about it, I think the era of Big Brother has arrived."

AMERICANA:

The Old Glory

In Boston, the Declaration of Independence will be read from the balcony of the old, brick Statehouse, as it has been each year for more than a century. In Milwaukee, the Schlitz Brewing Co. will host its famed circus parade, complete with elephants, caged lions, painted clowns and circus wagons. Oklahoma City will stage its third annual Stars and Stripes Show in Stars and Stripes Park—a celebrity-studded gala that will include Miss America and the U.S. Army Band, with free admission for anyone wearing red, white and blue. Americans will be unfurling their colors all across the U.S. next week, as the nation celebrates the 195th anniversary of Independence Day —the first day of what President Nixon has proclaimed the Bicentennial Era, the five years leading up to 1976.

The festivities marking the Fourth will be as diverse as the nation itself. "Everybody wants to keep the old-fashioned Fourth," says Mrs. Mary Lou Kieswetter, an Indiana lady who heads the National Council for the Encouragement of Patriotism, Inc. And that's doubtless true. But America's idea of an old-fashioned Fourth ranges all the way from solemn historical ceremonies and traditional picnics with fireworks to rough-and-ready frontier festivals and rousing armed forces parades and fly-bys. And n't a few Americans this year are planning a distinctly new-fashioned Fourth dedicated to anti-Vietnam activities.

A sense of history will perhaps be most strongly felt in the thirteen original states. In Boston, along with the reading of the Declaration, wreaths will be laid on the graves of John Hancock and Samuel Adams. In a ceremony at Monticello, the Virginia home of Thomas Jefferson, a group of aliens will be formally accepted into citizenship—a yearly ritual evocative of America's melting-pot heritage. In nearby Williamsburg, a bell cast from the same mold in which the Liberty Bell was forged will toll Independence Day as it tolled the news of the first Fourth of July, and other momentous events ever since 1762. And in Philadelphia itself, the nation's birthplace, a wreath will be laid upon the tomb of the Revolutionary War's Unknown Soldier, while a uniformed fife-and-drum corps solemnly sounds Taps.

Many of the states that were not around for the first Fourth will be drawing on their own past—and fireworks. All 810 residents of tiny Tekoa, Wash., are expected to turn out for the annual Slippery Gulch Celebration—a day-long bash that will include a beard-judging contest and a buffalo-meat barbecue. Boise, Idaho, will be throwing a chuck-wagon breakfast along with a parade featuring bewhiskered, buckskinned mountain men and real live Indians. And what will probably be the nation's gaudiest fireworks display is set to go off at the Rose Bowl, in Pasadena, Calif. Some 40,000 people are expected to be on hand to watch a $30,000 pyrotechnic pageant that will include Mount Vesuvius erupting in the sky, and, for a finale, a blazing Spirit of '76, including fifer, drummer and flag-bearer.

Peace: For others, the Fourth will have a decidedly antimilitary purpose. Anti-war rallies are planned for Austin, Texas, New York and Detroit. And in Chicago, twin peace picnics, complete with guerrilla theater and peace balloons for the youngsters, are scheduled to take place in Lincoln and Columbus parks. Explains Sylvia Cushner, one of the organizers: "We're trying to show that peace is patriotic."

But peace activists are not alone in shunning the military this year. "The tenor of the country is different," explains Tommy Walker, director of the Rose Bowl fete. "We're not going into battle or war things as much as we used to." Nor are others. What will probably be the nation's largest parade is planned for Huntington Beach, Calif., in the heart of conservative Orange County, with 3,000 marchers and more than 200,000 spectators. But only one color guard will be in the line of march. And the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars, which together used to turn out as many as seventeen marching units for the gigantic parade, will be restricted this year to a handful of stalwart officers riding in a single decorated car.

Newsweek

California flag bearers

Unfurling the colors: Confederate honor guard at Faith, N.C.

Ghetto poster: 'It's just so good, so out of sight. There's nothing in the world like it.'

The Heroin Plague: What Can Be Done?

Rosemary is 20, the willowy, intelligent daughter of a Detroit delivery-truck driver, and she was brought up the old-fashioned way: no drinking, much church, no dates at all until she was 18. Even after she left high school at 17 and began working variously as cashier, receptionist and waitress, her father insisted on an 8:30 evening curfew, including weekends. Last August Rosemary met Herb, then 25, an auburn-haired construction worker who made $300 to $400 a week and introduced Rosemary to her first taste of money and freedom. He also introduced her to heroin, which he had been using for about six months. In the beginning their dual habit cost about $150 a week. By November, it rose to nearly $500 a week—at the same time that Herb was laid off work because of the economic slump. "First he sold the TV and radio and other appliances like that," Rosemary says. "He got rid of the furniture and a lot of clothes. He even sold the refrigerator and the stove. Then he had to get rid of his house. And they repossessed the car."

Dead broke in January, Herb and Rosemary got married in a quick civil ceremony and moved in with his parents in their neat brown house on the outskirts of Detroit. "It's awful not to have a place of your own," she says. "They watch us a lot and keep asking us why we don't eat. And they wonder why we're so in debt and why we're sick so much. But we tell 'em we have the flu when we get boge" —have withdrawal symptoms—"which we are a lot of the time lately."

Herb and Rosemary make their heroin money by an improved form of shoplifting. One night last week Rosemary boosted a $17 universal socket from a store; five minutes later Herb returned it to the same store as an unwanted birthday gift, netting $17 plus tax. Their connection in the white neighborhood in which they live has been turned off, so they have to go to a downtown "dope-house" for heroin now. "It terrifies me," she says. "All those guys sitting there with a gun trained at your head while you stand in line to get the Jones. And we can't afford enough to get high any more—only enough not to get sick."

Rosemary talks of kicking heroin by putting the two of them into a city methadone program. "I never thought in my wildest dreams that I would ever be hooked on something like heroin," she says. "I drank a lot when I could get out, but I never touched even pot before. But when I met Herb and went over to his place, everybody there was shooting up all the time. I felt kinda left out, so I used to tease Herb about giving me some. I decided I was really hooked when I shut off for six days in September and couldn't sleep. I went to my family doctor—he's the only one who knows—but he wouldn't give us any methadone." At the end of the rainbow, on the other side of the city methadone program, she would like to go to Arizona and start all over again without drugs. "Herb keeps saying that once we get off the Jones and the methadone, then we'll shoot up once in a while just for fun," she says. "I know we can't do that." Then she fondles the old green eyeglasses case that holds the measuring spoon, their three precious needles and their cotton. "It's just so good," she says, "so out of sight. There's nothing in the world like it."

Ten years ago, even three years ago, heroin was a loser's drug—a powerful and often lethal opium derivative that was said to have made helpless addicts out of thousands of ghetto Negroes, a few jazz musicians and a handful of show-business types. For years the official figure was pegged at 68,000 addicts, but neither the Federal government nor any private agency knew if this estimate was even close—nor did they much care as long as the heroin users stayed out of sight. Even when heroin-inspired burglaries and muggings began to contort the crime charts and bedevil the lives of the urban middle-class, addiction was still looked on as a felony and an aberration afflicting the blacks and longhair minorities.

Hip Legions

Now all that has changed. In the past two years the official guess on the scope of heroin addiction alone—and not counting any other drug—has risen to 200,000, then 250,000, finally recently to 300,000 Americans. New heroin users are turning up every week in the glossiest suburban high schools, on factory assembly lines, and in the hip legions of the drug subculture, which once spurned smack as they spurned napalm. And it's killing them in record numbers: there were 237 teen-agers out of 1,205 total narcotic related deaths in New York City last year, and 16 out of 47 even in a sunny, middle-sized place like Albuquerque.

The spectrum of drug addicts is widening. UCLA psychiatrist Dr. J. Thomas Ungerleider says that since the heroin plague began, "Nice Jewish boys are coming out of the woodwork"—as well as Mormon kids, Japanese-Americans and all the other exemplars of healthy, hard-working, middle-class ideals. Perhaps most disturbing of all is the fact that the ranks of GI's returning from Vietnam contain thousands of wretched heroin addicts who learned to snort the stuff in the back alleys of Saigon and Long Binh—using heroin twelve to twenty times more powerful than the heavily cut powder sold in the streets of the U.S.

For the first time in U.S. history, doctors and public officials are speaking in

Figure 25. Newsweek. 'The Heroin Plague.' July 5, 1971. pp. 26-27.



near unison of a heroin emergency, an epidemic or–in the words of President Nixon's new drug-control chief, Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe–a full-fledged crisis. "Heroin has exploded on us like an atomic bomb," says John Gianardi, president of the New Mexico Pharmaceutical Association. Los Angeles claims 30,000 addicts. Cleveland as many as 25,000, New York City 100,000, Pittsburgh has had more heroin deaths so far this year than in all of 1970, and Atlanta's Assistant D.A. John Nuckolls, who never tried a heroin case until 1970, tried three armed robberies by junkies in one week last month. No one knows how many soldiers now at home picked up the habit in Vietnam, but the working guess is 40,000. Addicts are held responsible for 75 per cent of the muggings and burglaries in some cities, and semi-official estimates (often hyped by evangelical ex-users themselves) of the amount of property stolen by fix-hungry addicts approach the semi-hysterical: $2 billion to $5 billion in New York City alone, and $8 billion for the nation as a whole, figures that some knowledgeable, cooler heads believe may be about 10,000 times too high.

Rehabilitation

In one sense, the heroin crisis is real because so many persons have come to believe that it's real. A recent Gallup poll showed that just since March, "drug addiction" has risen from seventh to third place on the public list of "most important" national problems. The prime symbol and expression of that concern is certainly Mr. Nixon's massive $370 million crash program against the heroin menace, with its new and significant emphasis on addict "amnesty" and rehabilitation, as well as destruction of the illicit opium trade (Newsweek, June 28). But the Federal effort is in fact a step or two behind many of the cities and states of the U.S., which have been moving with galvanic speed to establish or reinforce a whole range of sometimes complementary, sometimes contradictory programs involving public hospitals, private agencies like Synanon, psychotherapy, anti-heroin drugs such as methadone–plus more men on the narcotics squad.

One of the troubles in dealing with heroin is that it is a drug that almost demands exaggeration. Isolated by a German researcher in 1898 as a "non-addictive" opiate–soon to be effective but dangerous painkiller morphine, heroin soon proved to be even more addictive. It also proved to be even more pleasurable, giving the user an initial sweet surge of super-orgasmic intensity and then four or five hours of daydreamy release from what Herton Brownell once called "the intolerable clutch of reality."

But heroin exacts a terrible price. Only a few users–certainly less than 10 per cent–have ever been able to use heroin in a controlled way, taking a sniff or needleful now and then, never increasing the dose, never becoming daily users, never becoming dependent. For the huge majority of experimenters, the first sweet hit sets off an overpowering urge for a second and quickly a third; within as brief a period as a week (and some say on the first needle), the new addict's central nervous system becomes as demanding as a baby's stomach, requiring a gradually more powerful fix every four to six hours on threat of wracking the addict with gradually more powerful cramps, nausea, sweating, palpitations and, rarely, fatal convulsions. For most addicts, the orgasmic high eventually comes to require an impossible superhuman jolt of heroin, and avoidance of the agony of withdrawal becomes the only real reason for shooting up.

No one knows how or why any of this works the way it does: "We do not have an understanding of the basic psychopathology or pathophysiology of this disease process," Dr. William Pollin, director of the nation's leading addiction researchers, recently told a House select committee looking into the connection between addiction and crime, "and we do not have effective and non-toxic therapeutic measures to deal with more than a small proportion of the patients."

Congress outlawed heroin in 1924–but over the following years the drug solidified its reputation as the mysterious evil prince of the illegal pharmacopoeia, at once more enticing and more dangerous than cocaine (the very powerful, very addictive extract of the South American coca plant), hashish or marijuana (relatively mild, non-addictive intoxicants from the cannabis plant, grown around the world), mescaline (non-addictive agent of peyote, bringing powerful visions and hallucinations, eventually matched synthetically by LSD), amphetamines (chemical stimulants and energizers, habit-forming but non-addictive, ostensibly available only by prescription) and barbiturates (chemical sedatives and calming agents, heavily addictive, also supposedly requiring prescriptions).

But for the most part, heroin users stayed out of sight. Even when epidemic numbers of GI's brought home heroin habits from World War II and Korea–Chicago had 8,000 heroin arrests in 1948, the largest number of any year before or since–government and public health authorities managed to keep the news to themselves.

What has happened in the past year or two, in the wry words of Iowa Sen. Harold Hughes, the leading Congressional expert on addiction, is that smack "moved out of the black ghettos and into the suburbs and the small towns and it moved right next door. That's when it became a crisis." A modestly increasing ratio of whites are indeed getting hooked –51 per cent of all addicts today are white, according to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, against 44 per cent in 1959–and they are doing it younger; the average age for discovered addicts has dropped from 35 in 1950 to 23 today. But even those who agree that there is an epidemic do not agree on its extent. Most of the big cities figure their addiction rate by the so-called Baden formula (after Dr. Michael M. Baden, New York City's deputy chief medical examiner), multiplying the number of heroin deaths by 200 to get the total addict population. It was this formula that led the city of Washington to multiply its estimated number of addicts from 1,200 in 1968 to 16,800 now–a statistical crisis that has been duplicated in other cities from Boston to Los Angeles.

It is not certain, however, that these figures are even approximately correct. The only city that actually goes into the streets and counts its addicts, rather than relying on a formula of arrests or OD body-counts, is Dr. Jaffe's Chicago–and Chicago admits to only 7,500 addicts, thousands less than are claimed for Detroit or just the suburbs of Los Angeles.

King of Drugs

The confusion multiplies when drug experts from the different disciplines attempt to analyze the reasons for the sudden popularity of smack across a whole range of young people–from flower children to valedictorians–who had once viewed it with horror. Psychiatrists, theologians and sociologists theorize about family stress, spiritual weakness and social unrest, and street revolutionaries are fond of pointing to Operation Intercept, Mr. Nixon's drive in 1969 against Mexican marijuana, as the trauma that dried up the supply of grass and pushed the kids into smack. But many of the most knowledgeable people on the drug scene, doctors and users alike, lean toward the opinion that heroin is simply a drug whose time had come–for a variety of psychological and pharmacologi-

WHITE, SUBURBAN MIDDLE-CLASS

For years, the despair of the ghetto dominated the literature of heroin addiction. The slum addict is still all too common, but today he is being joined in misery by the privileged young of the white suburban middle class. Newsweek's Martin Kasindorf took the case history of one such new-style heroin user. His report:

Mr. and Mrs. Harry Kobler* live with their four children and a Labrador retriever in an affluent residential tract in Long Beach, Calif. On the face of it, there is nothing that sets the Koblers apart from their neighbors in the privately guarded development. Their house is a two-year-old, $70,000, brown shingle and stucco affair with a miniature Oriental rock garden on the front lawn and four cars, including two Cadillacs, in the driveway–all testimony to the fact that Kobler is one of the most prosperous dealers in auto accessories in the area.

But in one chilling respect, the Koblers are different from their neighbors. For the past three and a half years, their eldest child, Michael, has been a heroin addict. A clean-cut, gangling 24-year-old, Mike was a promising kid with an IQ of 140, and as a young man he served with distinction in Vietnam. Today, the Koblers still brag about their son's war service; his dozen or so military decorations–the ones he didn't dump in the Pacific out of shame–are still hanging in the family den. What they don't talk about is their son's addiction. "It is something I never thought would happen in my family," says Harry Kobler. Only lately have the Koblers begun to understand how it did happen–despite all their middle-class security.

"Addiction in a person like Mike," says Dr. Ted Lindauer, a county-paid psychiatrist, "is clearly a family neurosis." He is by no means the typical drug addict (a staffer in Mike's predominantly poor methadone group calls him "Portnoy's Complaint' with a hypodermic") but he is an increasingly common sort, and Lindauer–a drug-wise young doctor with positive ideas on the subject–thinks such cases are highly predictable as well. The family, in his view, is the key: "I tell Mike, 'You're not addicted to heroin –you're addicted to your parents'."

It is an addiction to a kind of contained inner chaos. Harry Kobler tends to bottle up rages at work six days a week and vent them on the family at home. One consequence is that the Koblers constantly shout at one another even out of love ("Oh, sheer decibels," says a friend, "I wouldn't live there") but rarely communicate. Mike himself was the oldest and, as it happened, the healthiest child, and so, says Lindauer, suffered "the golden-boy syndrome . . . He had to be the greatest–or, if he couldn't be the greatest, he'd be the worst." As a child, his impulses were pampered. The ghetto addict, says Lindauer, is often a kid who never knew where his next meal was coming from; the middle-class kind more typically had "an overanxious mother whose response is always that the child is hungry, so she puts a bottle in his mouth."

Army Daze: Mike was an indifferent student in high school, interested mainly in cars, girls and a dashing image. He dropped out of the University of Arizona in his freshman year to join the Army. During his seven months in combat in Vietnam, he acquired–in addition to his medals–a nasty bullet wound in his back and a taste for drugs. He frequently smoked marijuana, experimented with morphine supplied by Army medics and even tried opium. Back in the States at Fort Ord, Calif., he gave up all drugs–for awhile. Soon, however, he got depressed ("You come back feeling like a hero, but nobody else thinks so"), and began taking LSD and Seconal.

Then one damp winter evening in 1967, his wound began to ache (the bullet remains inoperably in his back), and a friend offered him a shot of heroin to ease the pain. "It really took care of the pain," Mike recalls. "After that I made excuses that it was the pain, but I really took the heroin because I liked it. I kept nodding and dreaming. It meant I wasn't where I was. Where I was was in the Army."

Throughout this period, Mike dutifully flew down to Long Beach every weekend to see his parents. One weekend, he told them of his not-quite-yet daily habit. "I listened to him in utter disbelief," recalls Eleanor Kobler, sitting in her mirror-filled living room. Says her politically conservative husband: "I believe there is a concentrated Communist-led effort to inveigle these soldiers into drugs." At one point, they ordered Mike out of the house for six months. "Don't come home," his mother told him, "until you think straight and live straight."

For seven months after Mike got his discharge in September 1968, he was "clean"–living at home with his parents, attending state college in Long Beach and working part-time for his father. One evening, he met a heroin dealer at a party and abruptly quit college. Soon he was back on his habit and stealing from his parents to come up with the $70 to $100 a day necessary to support it. "He would lie and I would be willing to believe it," remembers his father. "But I knew he was doing it. I would see him come out of the bathroom, rolling down his sleeve. He's a dumb dope addict, you know."

'Binge Addict': Like other heroin users of his background, Mike was a "binge addict." Periodically, he would kick the habit, build up his cash supply, then spend it all on heroin. "Every time a problem would arise," he says, "I'd know it was easier to stick a needle in my arm and not worry about it."

For a long time, Mike balked at his parents' efforts to obtain help, rejected psychiatrists ("nuttier than I was") and Synanon ("too much like the Army"). Finally, he enrolled in the Orange County methadone program, and except for a few lapses to "test" whether the synthetic really dulls the kick in heroin, he has been "clean" ever since. Lately, he began taking some courses at Long Beach City College in hopes of applying to a school of oceanography in two years. And with the help of Lindauer, he and his parents are trying to forge a new relationship. Recently, he told his father: "I'm sure there are times you want to cast yourself adrift on your boat and get away from the problems of 1971. But they've arrived. They're here at your door–through me."

Heroin detection in Vietnam: The scag is waiting on arrival

Lester Sloan—Newsweek

Mike: 'I wasn't where I was'

*Not their real name.

Figure 26. Newsweek. 'The Heroin Plague.' July 5, 1971. pp. 28-29.

cal reasons. "Junk is the farthest you can go," said an 18-year-old Boston girl who once shot eighteen bags a day. "It's the king of drugs. Everyone else is into acid and speed and you know you can head the mystique if you get into smack."

As Dr. Donald B. Louria, president of the New York State Council on Drug Addiction, points out, heroin is the logical outgrowth of the pot-and-acid cultures–though not in quite the way that middle-class mothers always said it would be. It seems to be true enough that experimenting with drugs leads to further experimenting with drugs. But it is also true that most middle-class parents out of ignorance or fear misinformed their children about the dangers of marijuana. "Pot is fun," as Louria says, "and it's no big deal"–and after the kids discovered these facts they were in no mood to pay attention to the strikingly similar warnings they heard about heroin, true or not.

The drug culture led to smack in a couple of other ways. As the doctors of San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury Free Clinic have noted in a recent monograph, young people in the drug culture progressed logically from pot to acid and on to methedrine (or speed), the amphetamine that relieves the anxiety of LSD. But speed has its own horrors–notably the terrible crash that comes at the end of several days of sleepless, foodless hyperactivity. There is only one drug that will get the speed freak down to earth gently, and that is heroin. Furthermore, methedrine itself is often taken by injection. "The minute you put a needle in your arm," said a recently arrested junk dealer in Boston, "you're going to get into heroin." And once a few kids in any school or community got up the nerve to try smack, many of the rest followed. "It may have been true two decades ago that skin color, social class and family disruption provided correlations with drug addiction," says Dr. Matthew P. Dumont, the head of drug rehabilitation for the Massachusetts Mental Health Department, "but it is not true today. Now it's openly and unashamedly a peer-group phenomenon."

Vietnam Scag

The epidemic in Vietnam is a slightly different story. About a year ago, limitless supplies of cheap, potent (95 per cent) heroin began flooding into Vietnam from the poppy fields of nearby Laos, Burma and Thailand (Vietnam grows no opium of its own)–apparently sped along by a widespread smuggling network headed by "high-level members of the Vietnamese Government," according to a recent U.S. provost-marshal's report. The impact on American troops–most of them bored, frightened, resentful, ignorant–was immediate and stark. "I got into scag four hours after I got to Nam," one hooked soldier said. "We were all smoking grass and this guy gave me some scag, put it in the end of my joint. Man, I just wanted to get out of Nam and scag took me out–for a while, at least."

The experience for thousands of American troops has been roughly the same. Young soldiers began snorting and smoking the pure Vietnamese heroin in the tragically mistaken impression that they could only become addicted by shooting it into a vein. This mistake was compounded by the Army's indoctrination efforts–mostly a mindless training film that lumped the ubiquitous Vietnamese marijuana with heroin as a common danger. "They gave us all that bulls--- about grass being bad," said one soldier who turned to scag.

By last December the Army–and most Vietnam correspondents–knew that heroin was spreading wildly among the troops, but the brass did not acknowledge the epidemic until a report in April by two congressmen, Robert Steele of Connecticut and Morgan Murphy of Illinois, made the military and the White House jump for cover. President Nixon's new anti-heroin package calls for urinalyses, detoxification and freedom from punishment for all military users, but the whole thing was put together so rapidly that the Army does not yet know whether it will hold these amnestied addicts in the service or if the Army will accept lasting responsibility for servee-incurred addictions. Army Deputy Assistant Secretary John Kester was booed at last week when he told a National Heroin Symposium at the University of California Medical School: "I can assure you, a serviceman's addiction will not show up in any permanent records." "I think it ought to show up," retorted Bill Dunn, a drug program coordinator for the Veterans Administration Hospital in Menlo Park, "so people will know it's service-connected and the poor f---- can get disability pay."

The only answer to the question of troop addiction, says one Army doctor in Saigon, is to "get everybody out of Vietnam as fast as possible–there is no other way." But this prospect is just what most frightens civilian doctors and drug counselors whose treatment facilities–chemical, psychiatric or communal–are barely able to maintain a handhold against the avalanche of established addicts who turn up for help wherever help is offered. So far, however, the veterans have not appeared. "It's a real puzzlement," says Al Wiesse, the newly appointed Coordinator of Alcohol and Drugs for the city of Seattle. "We're sure not seeing that 25 to 40 per cent addiction problem among returning vets, yet it feels like we're sitting on the edge of a volcano."

Some doctors hypothesize that most GI users simply pick up only "light habits" in Vietnam and can kick them without help when they get home. But the puzzlement deepens as it becomes evident that the Army is sending over a significant number of troops who are addicts before they reach Vietnam. At Fort Bragg, N.C., the drug-riddled home base of the "jumping junkies" of the 82nd Airborne Division, half the addicts who turned themselves in for treatment had never been to Vietnam–and thousands of additional users presumably went undetected. What happens to them all after they get to Vietnam and come back, no one yet knows.

Even if the vets never contribute to the problem, the nation will remain swamped in its home-grown supply of addicts for the foreseeable future. Treatment facilities have been springing up everywhere –there are now about 2,500 centers of one kind or another–but the addicts have been queuing up even faster. As recently as two years ago, all public and private treatment facilities in metropolitan Detroit could handle only 260 addicts. Now there are centers of different kinds for 3,450 users–and a waiting list of 2,500 more. The state-funded Morris J. Bernstein Institute of the Beth Israel Medical Center in New York runs 37 methadone clinics treating 3,000 addicts–with as many waiting to get in. Two and a half years ago the city of Boston set up a methadone program of drug treatment–and ended up attracting an estimated 800 extra addicts into the city from outlying towns.

2 Per Cent Success

The long waiting lines for existing programs reflects not only the growing numbers of addicts but also the growing hope of effective treatment. Until the late 1950s, the only avenues open to a reform-minded junkie were incarceration (notably in one of the huge Federal "hospitals" at Fort Worth, Texas, and Lexington, Ky.) or psychotherapy–but alone or in combination these disciplines produced a dismal success rate of 2 per cent.

Then, thirteen years ago, came Synanon, the tough, puritanical little beach-front commune in Santa Monica, Calif., whose addict-members relied on ruthless honesty, austerity, hard work and above all their own fierce mutual support to stay free of drugs. Synanon is now a $13 million foundation with branches in Oakland, Detroit and San Diego, a four-story headquarters building and several apartment projects housing a total of 1,500 resident members, ex-addicts all, still abiding by the same rules: no drugs, no drinking, no money, even no smoking.

Synanon has spawned a number of copies and adaptations–Phoenix House and Odyssey House in New York and Chicago's state-funded Gateway Houses –which are built on the same principle of member control and group support. All of them have a high early dropout rate –about 50 per cent–but about 30 per cent stay to finish the program. The long-range trouble is that only one Synanon graduate in ten stays clean for as long as two years if he chooses to leave the formal community, and apparently the other in-house therapeutic groups do no better. One of Phoenix House's statistical successes, a man who was a director of the house for fourteen months, shot up on heroin within an hour after leaving the community and is now–like the majority of the hopeful new crowd of heroin-kickers–on methadone.

Methadone is the single greatest cause for guarded optimism on the whole heroin scene, and it is a measure of the depth–and irony–of the problem that methadone itself is a synthetic opiate, and slightly more addictive than heroin to boot. But methadone (which was developed in Germany during World War II) has several strong advantages. Taken orally, it blocks all the withdrawal symptoms of heroin, allowing the addict to function normally, but it does not provide any opium-like high of its own. What's more, methadone in sufficiently large daily doses completely blocks the irresistible heroin high, no matter how much heroin the addict shoots into his arm. Relieved of the need for a physiological fix, deprived of the reward of a high, the addict is theoretically freed of the burden of his heroin compulsion–and of the allied burden of finding $50 to $100 a day to pay for it.

To a remarkable extent, methadone maintenance has worked out according to plan. The original, full-maintenance methadone project was begun seven years ago in New York City by doctors Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander; the largest of the city's methadone programs now claims a success rate of 80 per cent under continuing methadone maintenance. University of California at Irvine psychiatrist John Kramer, who runs Orange County's small methadone program, reports a success rate of 85 per cent, and comparable figures are being reported for most of the estimated 25,000 persons receiving methadone maintenance in the U.S. It was the results of a Washington, D.C., high methadone maintenance project–86 per cent are still in the program six months after entering, with a small resultant drop in the crime rate–that was said to have persuaded Mr. Nixon to include rehabilitation funds in his anti-heroin package.

Cheap Habit

Nevertheless, methadone maintenance has come in for serious condemnation on several fronts. "Methadone is just substituting a cheap habit for an expensive one," says Baylor University medical professor Dr. Eric Comstock, echoing a view that is also held by such cold-turkey institutions as Daytop and Odyssey House. What particularly frightens methadone's critics is the real possibility that young people will indiscriminately be switched from an early, easily kicked heroin habit to an all but unbreakable dependence on methadone; some black leaders complain further that methadone is just a white "colonial" device to keep the Negro passive and gradualized.

Critics also point to the ease with which methadone can be abused: maintained rather than swallowed, it can pro-

Tony Ballo—Newsweek

Songfest at Odyssey House: Honesty, austerity and mutual support

Synanon: Up from the beachfront

FROM WHOLESALER TO HUSTLER

The traditional heroin community organizes itself into a structure as clearly differentiated as an army battalion. Dr. Jerome Jaffe's Illinois Drug Abuse Program discovered that Chicago's addicts separate themselves naturally into about twenty "copping" communities, each one made up of 100-odd addicts and dealers who flock around a certain geographical location to do business. At the top of one typical copping community are eight wholesale dealers (only one a nonaddict), who sell to eight retailers, called street dealers, (again, all but one an addict) handling the transactions with customers. Below these come part-time dealers (men without the patience or capital to become full-time entrepreneurs), "bag followers" (hookers and girl friends of dealers), the "touts" (tired old-timers who make their money by steering loose addicts into the community–and often by informing to the police) and finally the bulk of the community, the workers and "hustlers." Workers work for their heroin money; the hustlers are the infamous addicts who support their habit by shoplifting, purse-snatching, burglary and armed robbery. Most laymen–and many police departments–assume that nearly all addicts must steal to pay for their habit, and many of the wilder statistics about the cost of addiction to society reflect this assumption; but Jaffe found that only 40 per cent of all the addicts in a copping community support themselves by theft.

Robert R. McElroy—Newsweek

Methadone patient: No shooting

Figure 27. Newsweek. 'The Heroin Plague.' July 5, 1971. pp. 30-31.



NATIONAL AFFAIRS

duce a high almost as good as heroin's, and addicts have been quick to establish a modest black market. In some wholesale methadone operations run by private doctors in New York, New Orleans and other cities, addicts were able to sign up for more than one supply and sell the excess; others boiled off the orange juice that the liquid methadone had been combined with, then shot up with the residue. Many programs now require patients to take daily urinalyses to prove their freedom from drugs and to drink the methadone with a nurse watching. A methadone disc has also been developed that melts down into a sludge too viscous to draw into a syringe.

At the heart of the argument is the still-mysterious nature of addiction. Dole and his followers are convinced that heroin addiction produces permanent metabolic changes that will preserve a craving for drugs no matter how long a user has been clean—a view shared by Dr. William Martin, head of the National Institute of Mental Health's addiction research center. "We are now beginning to have increasing evidence that maybe a drug can induce an appetite for the same drug, even after its use is discontinued," he said last week. "Most of us who like Scotch have known this for some time."

Blocked Passion

If this evidence is correct, then no amount of time or psychotherapy will erase an addict's yearning for heroin, and the best that can be done for him is to block him off chemically from the object of his passion. Widespread tests are under way for two blocking drugs—naloxone and cyclazocine—that negate the kick of heroin without being addictive, but their disadvantage, according to a Boston doctor, is that "they offer no reward." Some experimenters are testing methadol, a longer-lasting cousin of methadone that needs to be taken only every third day and greatly simplifies administration.

Still, chemotherapy will never do the job alone. "If people are going to look at my patients as criminals," says James Sall, head of Detroit's drug abuse program, "and not let them back into society or let them get a job or education, instead of looking at them as sick persons, like diabetics or epileptics, who have to take their medicine—then we're all going to have a hard time getting anywhere."

But jobs and friendly support and purpose are in short supply in the ghetto. A special New York City drug commission has concluded that the only way even to reach 75 per cent of New York's street addicts is to offer them free heroin maintenance, an experimental idea that infuriates most drug professionals and many black leaders, who call it "wholesale genocide." The scheme is taken from Britain's long-standing policy of maintaining its few addicts with readily available heroin prescriptions; the English program came in for jeers from American experts when the number of British addicts suddenly multiplied tenfold in the '60s, but British authorities restricted dispensing powers to a few well-controlled clinics, made methadone available as well, and stabilized the addiction population at 2,600.

There is no stabilization in sight for the U.S., however. "You can't eradicate the problem," said one frustrated Army doctor, "until you eradicate the opium poppy"—and the Nixon Administration is addressing itself to that goal with vigor. Having failed two years ago to persuade the Turks to permit the U.S. to buy up its whole opium crop (which could be done for about $10 million), Mr. Nixon has stepped up diplomatic pressure on Turkey to curtail production and to tighten surveillance of illegal poppy farms. The Turkish Government cut back specified areas of poppy production from 21 provinces to seven, and this may be reduced shortly to only four. The French

Overdose: 'Just a dumb thing to do'

have begun to show real interest in shutting down the immensely profitable opium-conversion plants in Marseilles now that France's own addict population has jumped from 500 to an estimated 15,000 in just two years. The anti-narcotics squad of the Police Judiciaire has ten times the number of men it did a year ago; French narcs have seized almost twice as much heroin and morphine base so far this year as they did in all of 1970, and Max Fernet, head of the Police Judiciaire, now worries aloud "that our efficiency will so frighten off the gangs that they will locate their operations elsewhere, in Spain, Italy or West Germany."

Optimistic U.S. officials believe that cutting off the Turkish-French assembly line—which supplies 80 per cent of U.S. heroin—would deal a serious blow to the international heroin trade, regardless of Far Eastern production. "The Corsican-French heroin syndicates that handle this stuff have been in this trade for 50 years," says a U.S. agent. "These kinds of relationships are not going to be so easy to set up in the Far East or in another producing area."

This view has been disputed by the U.S.'s own anti-smuggling agencies within the Treasury Department and Customs Bureau, which argued to the President that it is impossible to change the economy, life-styles and political realities of a dozen foreign countries. The real solution, Treasury insisted, was "to give us a chance and we can halt a large portion by tightening the border." Mr. Nixon will probably approve $18 million in extra funds to help Customs make the border a little less slack. Customs has in fact been doing well of late: it snagged over 900 pounds of heroin as it came through in the past eleven months, four and a half times as much as the Justice Department's BNDD.

Still, the problem remains a little dizzying. The whole U.S. heroin supply for a year—8,000 to 10,000 lbs.—can be carried across the line in two truckloads. The U.S. has 6,000 miles of land frontier with Canada and Mexico, and 290 ports of entry, and the only effect of all the heroin seizures to date has been to drive up the price of smack for a couple of weeks.

Unlikely Coup

The immense profits of the trade make glistening bribes an everyday reality; in the past year, for instance, drug money has filtered into many levels of the New York City police. One convicted heroin gang is still operating full-blast out of a Tijuana prison. But morale is high among U.S. narcotics agents. "A few months ago I wouldn't have believed we could stop the heroin flow," says a high Federal official. "But it's easier by far than trying to halt marijuana. With heroin we can zero in on a group that has little public sympathy or free-lance cooperation. I think there's a good chance."

Even if that unlikely coup comes off, some drug experts wonder if the triumph will not prove to be a little quixotic. "We cannot hope to stamp out chronic drug abuse by eliminating heroin any more than we would affect the suicide rate by outlawing high buildings and manila rope," said Tufts University's Dr. George Vaillant. As Dr. E. Leong Way pointed out at the National Heroin Symposium itself, alcohol and barbiturate addiction are incomparably larger, costlier and uglier problems than smack, and "heroin is considered the most serious drug of abuse only because society has willed it so." But if society has willed it so, society may also will it not so—a change that may slowly be taking place. "Heroin was more fashionable at the high-school level a year ago than it is today," says James Breay, a Boston drug program administrator. "Now the risks have been taken and noted, and there is no longer the heroic feature. Many high-school kids are now saying that shooting smack is just a dumb thing to do."

32

Newsweek, July 5, 1971

Figure 28. Newsweek. 'The Heroin Plague.' July 5, 1971. p. 30.

LIFE July 1971

Eleventh-hour search for an answer to heroin

VOL. 71, NO. 4
LIFE
JULY 23, 1971

Trying to help the GI addicts

Wars are measured by the grim totals of men killed, men wounded. There is yet another count for Vietnam: that of men "addicted in action." The number of addicts is still not confirmed—Congressman Robert Steele and many returning veterans estimate that 15% of the men in Vietnam are hooked on heroin. The military claims the figure is 2%. Dr. Jerome Jaffe, the expert just named by President Nixon to try to solve the national drug mess, suspects it is close to 5%. No matter who is right, thousands of Vietnam veterans now at home—and thousands more yet to come—are heroin addicts like Chad Harris.

Harris, a marine who was wounded at Khesanh, did not use heroin until he was home and out of the corps, although he became hooked on a wide variety of other drugs while he was being shunted from hospital to hospital in Vietnam. For most veterans, heroin addiction is just one more souvenir of Vietnam, where incredibly high-grade (95% pure) heroin has been widely available at $2 a fix. Some of those who come back will manage to kick the habit by themselves. But the real victims need help desperately. Chad Harris has been lucky enough to get into an innovative program that offers at least the possibility of returning to some kind of normal life. For men who aren't in such programs, for those who stay out on the street, the odds are less than even on any life at all.

The tears that rolled down Chad Harris's cheeks were partly a symptom of withdrawal: he hadn't had a fix in 14 hours. But he was also crying out of fear that he wouldn't be accepted into the drug treatment program at California's Palo Alto VA Hospital. As he waited for a decision, he folded his arms in an involuntary gesture to hide the needle marks (above) and crouched beside his wife (left). Harris had to sweat it out until a committee of hospital staff and patients already in the program voted to accept him.

Figure 29. LIFE. 'Trying to Help the GI Addicts. July 23, 1971. pp. 20-21.

Methadone can ease an addict's return to earth but it can't remove the problems that led to his addiction. At Palo Alto, encounter techniques are being used to help the patients "get their heads on straight." At the regular Thursday "family nights" (above), parents, wives and even girl friends join the session. Guilt feelings on both sides are talked out gently, and the families are led into what is usually their first real understanding of what the addict has been going through. The patient's days are full of encounter therapy—some of it planned, as when he meets one-to-one with a psychiatrist, some of it as casual as Chad Harris talking with Jewel Barnes (right), a VA group therapist. Harris says, "It's not just the shrinks. You can talk to other guys who've been where you are now. They're making it, and you begin to think that you can too."

Photographed by
ARTHUR SCHATZ

Methadone only buys them time

On Ward 48Z of the Palo Alto Veterans Administration Hospital, an oddly matched group of researchers is working desperately to find an effective answer to heroin addiction. There are doctors from Stanford University, VA nurses and therapists, and a handful of conscientious objectors serving their times as nursing assistants. And there are the 21 patients, most of them veterans of Vietnam, most with records of addiction to heroin.

The therapy usually starts with methadone, a synthetic opiate that has a number of immediate advantages. It allows an addict to withdraw from heroin without unbearable agonies. In large daily doses, it blocks the body's demand for heroin—and even the ability to get high on it. But methadone itself is addictive, and while its effects are much milder than heroin (a man can hold a job while taking it), critics argue that swapping one opiate addiction for another is not much gain. Some methadone proponents reply that, realistically, a lifetime of daily doses is the best a true heroin addict can hope for.

The Palo Alto program is aimed at breaking this circle. Methadone is used to buy time. The real search for an answer to addiction is centered on "encounter groups" and other forms of therapy which force a man to face his addiction and admit to himself whatever it is he has been trying to evade. If the formula works—and so far Palo Alto has as good a recovery rate as any program in the country—doctors hope it will be possible to wean the addict gradually away from his dependence on methadone and free him permanently from any craving for drugs. Nobody knows yet if that can be done.

The real business of Ward 48Z is done in small groups where the men dig deep into each other's

program. Chad Harris (hand to forehead, above) was drawn into a group of patients and staff trying

get ready for his family's first visit. As all had predicted, the reunion that followed was stormy

Figure 30. LIFE. 'Trying to Help the GI Addicts. July 23, 1971. pp. 22-23.



Figure 31. LIFE. 'Trying to Help the GI Addicts.' July 23, 1971. pp. 24-25.



Figure 32. LIFE. 'Trying to Help the GI Addicts.' July 23, 1971. pp. 26-27.

Gallup Opinion Polls Vietnam War

Source of the following graphs: Inc, Gallup. "The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison." Gallup.com. Accessed July 2, 2019. https://news.gallup.com/poll/11998/IraqVietnam-Comparison.aspx.



Figure 33. Gallup. Johnson's Approval Ratings.



Figure 34. Gallup. Johnson Handling of Vietnam.



Figure 35. Gallup. Nixon's Approval Ratings.



Figure 36. Gallup. Was it a mistake sending troops to Vietnam?.

Lee Robins' Study Tables

The following tables and data are taken from Lee Robins' studies about the U.S. army and drug use. Sources: Robins, Lee N. *The Vietnam Drug User Returns*. Washington D.C.: SAODAP Monograph Series, 1974. and Robins, Lee N. "Vietnam Veterans' Rapid Recovery From Heroin Addiction: A Fluke or Normal Expectation?." Addiction 88 (1993): 1041-1054. I compiled the data and arranged it visually.



Figure 37. Substance Use in Vietnam. Robins. 'Vietnam Veterans' Rapid Recovery,' p. 1044.

REASONS FOR USING NARCOTICS AMONG THE 196 USERS

	Spontaneous	Agreed When Asked	Total Agreed
To get a high	41%	47%	88%
More tolerant of Army rules and regulations	13	61	74
Less homesick and lonely	12	*	
Less bored	10	72	82
Less depressed	9	64	73
To sleep better	9	*	
Made time seem pass quickly	7	66	73
Improved social skills: patience, sensitivity, communication	7	*	*
Less fearful	6	40	46
Fitted in better with other soldiers	3	43	46

Table 7. Reasons for Using Narcotics. Robins. 'The Vietnam Drug User Returns,' p. 32.

WHAT KEPT MEN FROM USING NARCOTICS IN VIETNAM

(Among General Sample non-users, N = 255)

Feared death or bodily harm	29%*
Could not do one's job	23
Feared addiction	22
Alcohol was a sufficient drug	18
Family or friends would have disapproved	18
Feared detection or bad military record	13
Disapprove use of drugs	10
Army educational program advised against	7
Too expensive	4

* Percent add to more than 100 because some men gave several reasons.

Table 8. What Kept Men from Using Narcotics in Vietnam. Robins, 'The Vietnam Drug User Returns,' p. 30.

DANGEROUS DRUGS USED IN AND SINCE VIETNAM

	General Sample (N = 451)		Drug-Positive Sample (N = 469)	
	In Vietnam %	Since Vietnam %	In Vietnam %	Since Vietnam %
Any drug: narcotics, amphetamines, barbiturates	45	23	97	55
Narcotics	43	10	97	33
Amphetamines	25	19	59	38
Barbiturates	23	12	77	30
Combinations of drug types:				
- All 3: narcotics, amphetamines, barbiturates	18	6	54	14
- Amphetamines and barbiturates	0	3	0	6
- Narcotics and amphetamines	6	2	4	7
- Narcotics and barbiturates	5	1	23	6
- Narcotics only	15	1	15	7
- Amphetamines only	2	9	0	10
- Barbiturates only	*	2	*	5

Table 9. Dangerous Drugs Used in and since Vietnam. Robins, 'The Vietnam Drug User Returns,' p. 57.

BAD EFFECTS OF NARCOTICS IN VIETNAM AMONG 196 USERS

	Spontaneous	Agreed When Asked	Total Agreed
Poor health, weight loss, etc.	25%	*	*
Nausea	19	45%	64%
Aggression, irritability	13	*	*
Anxiety	7	*	*
Apathy, loss of interest in environment	6	*	*
Trouble thinking	6	*	*
Could not do job properly	**6**	**27**	**33**
Dependence	4	43	47
Depression	4	13	17
Disciplinary Problems	3	26	29
Expense	3	*	*
Dishonesty	3	*	*
Careless about danger	**2**	**30**	**32**
Disapproval from others	2	*	*
Overdose	2	8	10
Felt guilty, ashamed	2	*	*

*not asked specifically

Table 11. Bad Effects of Narcotics in Vietnam. Robins, 'The Vietnam Drug User Returns,' p. 33.

NARCOTIC USE IN 3 TIME PERIODS

	Since Return %	In Vietnam %	Before Vietnam %
Any narcotic use	10	43	11
Any heroin use	7	34	2
Narcotics more than weekly for a month or more	4	27	1
Addicted to narcotics at any period	1	20	<0.5
Urine positive for narcotics	1	10.5	-

Table 10. Narcotic Use in Three Time Periods. Robins, Davis, and Nurco, 'How Permanent was Vietnam Drug Addiction?, p. 39.



Figure 38. Availability of Drugs in Vietnam. Robins, 'The Vietnam Drug User Returns,' p. 26.

WHY MEN USED NARCOTICS IN VIETNAM

Reason volunteered	%
To feel high	40
Tolerate Army regulations	13
Relieve boredom	9
Relieve depression	9
Relieve fear	8
Pass time	5
Be one of the group	3

Table 12. Why Men Used Narcotics in Vietnam. Robins, 'Vietnam Veterans' Rapid Recovery,' p. 1050.

Richard Nixon Speech in New York Times

"Excerpts From President's Message on Drug Abuse Control." *The New York Times*, June 18, 1971, sec. Archives. https://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/18/archives/excerpts-from-presidents-message-on-drug-abuse-control.html.

WASHINGTON, June 17 (UPI)—Following are excerpts from President Nixon's message to Congress today proposing an emergency program to combat narcotics addiction:

We must now candidly recognize that the deliberate procedures embodied in present efforts to control drug abuse are not sufficient in themselves. The problem has assumed the dimensions of a national emergency. I intend to take every step necessary to deal with this emergency, including asking the Congress for an amendment to my 1972 budget to provide an additional $155-million to carry out these steps. This will provide a total of $371million for programs to control drug abuse in America.

A Coordinated Federal Response

Not very long ago, it was possible for Americans to persuade themselves, with some justification, that narcotic addiction was a class problem. Whether or not this was an accurate picture is irrelevant today, because now the problem is universal. But despite the increasing dimensions of the problem, and despite increasing consciousness of the problem, we have made little headway in understanding what is involved in drug abuse or how to deal with it.

The magnitude of the problem, the national and international implications of the problem, and the limited capacities of states and cities to deal with the problem all reinforce the conclusion that coordination of this effort must take place at the highest levels of the Federal Government.

Therefore, I propose the establishment of a central authority with over-all responsibility for all major Federal drug abuse prevention, education, treatment, rehabilitation, training, and research programs in all Federal agencies. This authority would be known as the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention. It would be located within the executive office of the President and would be headed by a director accountable to the President.

Because this is an emergency response to a national problem which we intend to bring under control, the office would be established to operate only for a period of three years from its date of enactment, and the President would have the option of extending its life for an additional two years if desirable.

A Sense of Urgency

This office would provide strengthened Federal leadership in finding solutions to drug abuse problems. It would establish priorities and instill a sense of urgency in Federal and federally supported drug abuse programs, and it would increase coordination between federal, state, and local rehabilitation efforts.

More specifically, the Special Action Office would develop over-all Federal strategy for drug abuse prevention programs, set program goals, objectives and priorities, carry out programs through other Federal agencies, develop guidance and standards for operating agencies, and evaluate performance of all programs to determine where success is being achieved.

I urge the Congress to give this proposal the highest priority, and I trust it will do so. Nevertheless, due to the need for immediate action, I am issuing today, June 17, an Executive order establishing with the executive office of the President a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. Until the Congress passes the legislation giving full authority to this office, a special consultant to the President for narcotics and dangerous drugs will institute to the extent legally possible the functions of the Special Action Office.

Rehabilitation A New Priority

When traffic in narcotics is no longer profitable, then that traffic will cease. Increased enforcement and vigorous application of the fullest penalties provided by law are two of the steps in rendering narcotics trade unprofitable. But as long as there is a demand, there will be those willing to take the risks of meeting the demand. So we must also act to destroy the market for drugs, and this means the prevention of new addicts, and the rehabilitation of these who are addicted.

To do this, I am asking the Congress for a total of $105-million in addition to funds already contained in my 1972 budget to be used solely for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug-addicted individuals.

I will also ask the Congress to provide an additional $10-million in funds to increase and improve education and training in the field of dangerous drugs. This will increase the money available for education and training to more than $24-million.

In order to expedite the rehabilitation process of Vietnam veterans, I have ordered the immediate establishment of testing procedures and initial rehabilitation efforts to be taken in Vietnam. This procedure is under way and testing will commence in a matter of days.

The Department of Defense will provide rehabilitation

Lion programs to all servicemen being returned for discharge who want this help, and we will be requesting legislation to permit the military services to retain for treatment any individual due for discharge who is a narcotic addict,

Additional Enforcement Needs

Although I do not presently anticipate a. necessity for alternation of the purposes or principles of existing enforcement statutes, there is a clear need for some additional enforcement legislation.

We are asking the Congress to provide legislation which would permit the United States Government to utilize information obtained by foreign police, provided that such information was obtained in compliance with the laws of that country.

We are also asking that the Congress provide legislation which would permit a chemist to submit written findings of his analysis in drug cases. This would speed the process of criminal justice.

I am asking the Congress to provide $2 million to be allotted to the research and development of equipment and techniques for the detection of illegal drugs and drug traffic.

I am asking the Congress to provide $2-million to the Department of Agriculture for research and development of herbicides which can be used to destroy growths of narcotics-producing plants without adverse ecological effects.

I am asking the Congress to authorize and fund 325 additional positions within the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to increase their capacity for apprehending those engaged in narcotics trafficking here and abroad and to investigate domestic industrial producers of drugs.

Finally, I am asking the Congress to provide a supplemental appropriation of $25.6-million for the Treasury Department. This will increase funds available to this department for drug abuse control to nearly $45-million.

International

It is clear that the only really effective way to end heroin production is to end opium production and the growing of poppies. I will propose that as an international goal. It is essential to recognize that opium is, at present, a legitimate source of income to many of those nations which produce it. Morphine and codeine both have legitimate medical applications.

It is the production of morphine and codeine for medical purposes which justifies the maintenance of opium production, and it is this production which in turn contributes to the world's heroin supply. The development of effective substitutes for these derivatives would eliminate any valid reason for opium production.

While modern medicine has developed effective and broadly used substitutes for codeine. Therefore, I am directing that Federal research efforts in the United States be intensified with the aim of developing at the earliest possible date synthetic substitutes for all opium derivatives.

At the same time I am requesting the director general of the World Health Organization to appoint a study panel of experts to make periodic technical assessments of any synthetics which might replace opiates with the aim of effecting substitutions as soon as possible.

Conclusion

The threat of narcotics among our people is one which properly frightens many Americans. It comes quietly into homes and destroys children, it moves into neighborhoods and breaks the fiber of community which makes neighbors. It is a problem which demands compassion, and not simply condemnation, for those who become the victims of narcotics and dangerous drugs. We must try to better understand the confusion and disillusion and despair that bring people, particularly young people, to the use of narcotics and dangerous drugs.

We are not without some understanding in this matter, however, and we are riot without the will to deal with this matter. We have the moral resources to do the job. Now We need the authority and the funds to match our moral resources. I am confident that we will prevail in this struggle as we have in many others. But time is critical. Every day we lose compounds the tragedy which drugs inflict on individual Americans. The final issue is not whether we will conquer drug abuse, but how soon. Part of this answer lies with the Congress now and. the speed with which it moves to support the struggle against abuse.

[Website accessed on July 2, 2019.]

The ‘Nam Covers and Eddie Adams Photographs

Famous photographs by Eddie Adams 1968 in Vietnam:

Figure 39. Eddie Adams Portrait of a Soldier. Spiegel.

Figure 40. Eddie Adams. Headshot in Saigon. Spiegel.

The 'Nam Covers 1988 and 1987:



Figure 41. The 'Nam Cover. #24. November 1988.

Figure 42. The 'Nam Cover. #4. 1987.

Indochina Atlas

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



Indochina Atlas, 1970.

Vegetation.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "Indochina Atlas 1970." Perry-*Castañeda Map Collection*, UT Library Online.

Indochina Atlas, 1970.

Indochina Area.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "Indochina Atlas 1970." Perry-*Castañeda Map Collection*, UT Library Online.

Indochina Atlas, 1970.

Population.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "Indochina Atlas 1970." Perry-*Castañeda Map Collection*, UT Library Online.

Overview of Events

1859	The French occupy Saigon; 1883-1954 French Colony of Indochina.
1919	Ho Chi Minh in Paris, influenced by Wilson's self-determination approach, contact to French communists.
1930	February: Founding of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) by Ho Chi Minh.
1940	September: After the French defeat in Europe, Japan occupies the northern part of French Indochina.
1941	March: Indochina becomes part of Japan's military zone. May: Founding of the Việt Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam).
1944	December: Founding of the Revolutionary Army by General Vo Nguyen Giap.
1945	March 9: Japan end the French colonial administration; arrests the administration and detains the French troops. **April 12: Death of U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt; Harry S. Truman new president.** April 16: Provisory government by Ho Chi Minh. September 2: Surrender of Japan. Ho Chi Minh proclaims the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). October: First French troops arrive in Saigon with British help, reassert French colonial rights and encounter armed resistance. November 11: Ho Chi Minh dissolves the Communist Party.
1946	March 6: Ho-Sainteny-Agreement. Vietnam is declared an independent country within the French Union. March 9: French troops land in Tonkin. July: France pursues the separation of Cochinchina from Vietnam. September 14: French-Vietnamese Conference in Fontainebleau acknowledges that Vietnam stays within the French Union. France's military presence in Tonkin is accepted by Ho Chi Minh. November: French bombardment of seaport Haiphong, 6,000 deaths. December 19: Start of the First Indochina War. Ho Chi Minh calls for resistance against the France. The French army starts with systematic actions of war against the Viet Minh.
1948	June: France announces Emperor Bao Dai as head of state of Vietnam.

1949 August 29: Soviet nuclear bomb test.

October 1: Communist victory in China.

December: Mao Zedong's army conquer south Chinese province Yunnan and are at the Tonkin border. Viet Minh has Chinese communist support from now on.

1950 **June: Outbreak of the Korean War.**

July: U.S. military and economic support for France in Indochina.

September: U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (renamed 1955).

December 23: U.S. defense agreement with France, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

1952 January: Evacuation of Hoa Binh, surrounded by the Viet Minh.

1953 May: Viet Minh advance into Laos is averted by the French troops.

July 27: End of the Korean War.

1954 May 7: The for weeks encircled jungle fortress Dien Bien Phu surrenders after heavy fighting to the Vietnamese commander-in-chief, Vo Nguyen Giap.

May-July: Geneva Conference. July 21st final declaration: a demarcation line, explicitly not a border, at the 17th parallel. Withdrawal of French troops from the North. Elections planned for July 1956; Cambodia and Laos receive complete independence.

August 12: NSC 5429/2 for Southeast Asia.

September 8: South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) founded – until 1977.

1955 November 1: U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group Vietnam (MAAG-V) supports Saigon.

1956 April 26: Withdrawal of the last French troops in Vietnam (south).

1959 Ho Chi Minh Trail is formed.

1960 December 20: National Liberation Front (NLF) for South Vietnam is founded, also referred to as Viet Cong.

1962 February 8: U.S.-Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).

1963 January 2: despite a clear military advantage defeat of the South-Vietnamese Army at Ap Bac.

Since June: demonstrations and self-immolations by Buddhist monks in South Vietnam.

November 1: coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem, he gets killed and overthrown.

November 22: President John F. Kennedy is shot and killed. Lyndon B. Johnson becomes president.

December 31: about 16,300 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam and ‘Resolution 9’ Hanoi decides to fight the soldiers.

1964 Ho Chi Minh deprived of his power, Le Duan new leader in Hanoi.
August 2: First alleged Gulf of Tonkin incident.
August 4: Allegedly another incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, north-Vietnamese patrolling boats supposedly attacked an U.S. Destroyer, retaliatory air strikes against north-Vietnam.
August 7: Tonkin Resolution.

1965 February 7: Operation ‘Flaming Dart’ – more air strikes against north-Vietnam.
General Nguyen Van Thieu is new president of south-Vietnam.
March 2: Operation ‘Rolling Thunder’ – begin of the U.S. bombing war against north-Vietnam.
March 8: Arrival of U.S. Marines in Da Nang.
July 28: U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson orders a massive military intervention in Vietnam.
December 31: ca. 184,300 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.

1966 December 31: ca. 385,200 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.

1967 December 31: ca. 485,600 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.

1968 January 30: Tet offensive by the North Vietnamese Army and the NLF.
March 16: My Lai massacre.
March 31: Johnson announces partial stop of the bombings and will not run for re-election.
April 4: Martin Luther King is murdered.
May 12: begin of the Paris Peace Talks between Washington and Hanoi, later participation of Saigon and the NLF.
June 5: assassination of Robert F. Kennedy.
December 31: ca. 549,000 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam (highest number).

1969 **January 20: inauguration of Richard M. Nixon as U.S. President.** Vietnamization strategy by Nixon, new 8 point peace plan for Vietnam. Partial withdrawal of the U.S. troops.
September 2: death of Ho Chi Minh.
October 15: Moratorium to End the War in Vietnam – nation-wide protest against the Vietnam War, largest protest so far.
November 15: 750,000 people protest in Washington, D.C. against the war, 250,000 in San Francisco.

1970 March 18: The head of state of the neutral kingdom of Cambodia, Prince Sihanuk, is overthrown by his own army. General Lon Nol assumes power with U.S. approval in Phnom Penh. The Cambodian Civil War begins.
April 30: U.S. invasion of Cambodia.
May: Anti-war protests continue, four students are shot and killed at Kent State University and two students are killed by the National Guard at Jackson State College.
October: Lon Nol proclaims a republic in Cambodia.

1971 February 8: ARVN troops with U.S. aerial support invade southern Laos – Operation 'Lam Son 719.'
May 25: Murphy and Steele Report: Congress alerted of drug use in Vietnam by GIs.
May 27: Report 'The World Heroin Problem'
June 13: *Pentagon Papers* are being published in the *New York Times*.
June 17: Nixon Special Message to Congress about Drug Abuse Control, published in the NYT on June 18.
July: Operation Golden Flow
December 31: ca. 157,000 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.

1972 February 21-28: Nixon in Beijing.
March 30: New major offensive of the communist division at the 17th parallel and in Cochinchina. 'Easter Offensive' is answered with unrestricted air strikes and bombings against North Vietnam. B-52 attacks 'Linebacker I' from May to October.
May 26: Nixon in Moscow.
June 23: Watergate break-in.
July: Renewal of the Paris Peace Talks. Saigon is resisting substantial political agreements between Hanoi and Washington.
October: Agreement between Kissinger and the north-Vietnamese delegation in Paris.
November 7: Re-election of Richard M. Nixon as U.S. President.
December: 'Christmas bombings' – massive air strikes against Hanoi and Haiphong, 'Linebacker II' – massive global protests. Hanoi agrees to further peace talks.
December 31: ca. 24,000 U.S. soldiers in Vietnam.

1973 January 27: USA, South Vietnam, DRV (North Vietnam) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG) sign in Paris the 'Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet Nam.'
January 28: end of the draft in the USA.
February: ceasefire in Laos.
March 29: the last U.S. soldier leaves Vietnam.
August 14: end of all U.S. operations in Indochina.
November 7: War Powers Resolution.

1974	July: renewed offensive by the Khmer Rouge against the Lon Nol regime in Cambodia. **August 9: resignation of Richard M. Nixon. Gerald R. Ford new U.S. president.** November: Lt. Calley gets released from prison (he was judged responsible for the My Lai massacre). December: offense by the North Vietnamese in the Vietnamese-Cambodia border region.
1975	March: After the fall of the military bases in the highlands retreat of the ARVN and unstoppable advance of the communist armed forces. The coastal cities Hue and Da Nang are occupied by the North Vietnamese. April: The Khmer Rouge take over Phnom Penh. April 30: Resignation of Nguyen Van Thieu, escape of the last Americans and invasion of Saigon by the communist troops. South Vietnam capitulates unconditionally.
1976	Reunification of North- and South Vietnam. Spring: first border skirmishes between the communist armies of Vietnam and Cambodia. December: IV. Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
1977	**January 20: Jimmy Carter is inaugurated as President of the USA**, amnesty for the majority of the draft evaders.
1978	November 3. Soviet-Vietnamese Pact of friendship and assistance. December 25: Vietnam occupies Cambodia (until September 1985).
1979	January 7: Vietnamese troops conquer Phnom Penh. The Pol Pot regime flees. February 17 – March 5: Chinese border offensive against Vietnam and subsequent withdrawal.
1981	**Ronald Reagan new U.S. President.**
1982	November 11: Opening of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C.
1995	Diplomatic relations between Vietnam and the USA.

List of Songs

I borrowed the following songs as my chapter headlines (listed in order of appearance):

SONGS USED AS CHAPTER HEADLINES

Year	Title	Artist
1970	Have You Ever Seen the Rain	Creedence Clearwater Revival
1964	House of the Rising Sun	The Animals
1977	The Chain	Fleetwood Mac
1967	For What It's Worth	Buffalo Springfield
1971	A Horse With no Name	America
1968	All Along the Watchtower	Jimi Hendrix
1965	Hello Vietnam	Johnny Wright
1968	Going Up the Country	Canned Heat
1968	The Unknown Soldier	The Doors
1971	Bring Them Home	Pete Seger
1968	Magic Carpet Ride	Steppenwolf
1971	Inner City Blues	Marvin Gaye
1967	Saigon Bride	Joan Baez
1967	Castles Made of Sand	Jimi Hendrix
1969	Volunteers	Jefferson Airplane
1973	Where Are You Now, My Son?	Joan Baez
1970	Flashing Lights	Screaming Lord Sutch
1970	Run Through the Jungle	Creedence Clearwater Revival
1971	What's Going On	Marvin Gaye
1963	Masters of War	Bob Dylan
1968	Sympathy for the Devil	The Rolling Stones
1970	War	Edwin Starr
1964	We've Gotta Get Out of This Place	The Animals
1971	I'd Love to Change the World	Alvin Lee
1971	Dead Flowers	The Rolling Stones
1969	Fortunate Son	Creedence Clearwater Revival
1967/1968	Chain of Fools	Aretha Franklin
1971	Sister Morphine	The Rolling Stones
1969	Gimme Shelter	The Rolling Stones
1970	Purple Haze	Jimi Hendrix
1971	Riders on the Storm	The Doors
1969	Give Peace a Chance	Plastic Ono Band
1976	Carry on Wayward Son	Kansas
1967	White Rabbit	Jefferson Airplane
1967	The End	The Doors