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„Lucky guess? Linking morally relevant choices to political preference, tax morale, and greed."

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Abstract

Moral responsibility is the prevailing assumption in Western societies. Apart from philosophical studies, only a few studies have looked into perceptions of moral responsibility. To close the gap, Cappelen et al. (2016) conducted an economic experiment, where they studied the perception of minimal criteria for morally relevant choices, which are causality and having acceptable alternatives, using a third-party redistribution setting. Their key result was that the third-party participants redistributed less between the other participants, when the latter faced a choice beforehand, even though the choices did not meet minimal criteria. Furthermore, they showed, that left-wing voters are more willing to reduce inequality. The present vignette-based replication study adapted the research paradigm by Cappelen et al. (2016) and investigated an (unaffected) third-party redistribution between two fictitious agents. In the scenarios, inequality was established by luck, with the third party being able to reduce inequality or even establish equality. To get a broader insight into who distributes more or less, the replication was extended, and the third party's political affiliation, attitudes towards taxes, and dispositional greed was measured. The results of the present study indicate that having an alternative that is not acceptable (i.e. a minor payout instead of a lottery participation), still is regarded as such. Decisions that do not affect an outcome causally are not regarded as morally relevant (i.e. picking heads or tails in a coin-toss). The third party's political preference, tax morale, and dispositional greed do not affect the result mentioned above. Thus the results by Cappelen et al. (2016) could not be replicated entirely. Differences between the two studies are discussed.

Keywords: morally relevant choice, political preference, tax morale, greed, and fairness

1. Introduction

Since inequality in Western societies is rising (Piketty & Saez, 2014), the question needs to be asked, when those inequalities are legitimate, and when do they need to be addressed politically? To answer this question, the origin of inequality is essential for the evaluation and also a primary concern for redistributive policies (Krawczyk, 2010; Mollerstrom, Reme, & Sørensen, 2015). There are two kinds of origins for inequality – factors that an agent is able to influence (e.g. effort) and those out of an agent's control (e.g. family background) (Klimm, 2018). This thesis tries to investigate if individuals redistribute according to those factors.

In Western societies, there is the prevailing principle that people should be held responsible for the choices they make (Greenfield, 2011). This principle can be seen as a foundation of institutions like the labor market, implying that people can affect the situation (i.e. the job) they find themselves in (Oshana, 1997). Especially in health care and health insurance (Brown, 2013; Buetow & Elwyn, 2006), the topic of moral responsibility is widely discussed. To pin it down, the question is asked, how much influence an individual has on his or her health condition, so how (morally) responsible he/she is. When it comes to a lifelong smoker who has lung cancer, the answer might be more evident than for a child who has leukemia. Thus, the issue of moral responsibility becomes apparent. In this master's thesis, the question is asked, whether people consider a choice as morally relevant, even though it does not meet the minimum criteria to qualify as such, with the decision itself does not affect the outcome directly. More specifically, I look into whether people are held responsible, in the sense that they bear the cost of those choices.

To clarify what a morally relevant choice is, this thesis sticks to the concept of morally relevant choices as active decisions that people should be held responsible for. It is distinguished from other decisions with criteria such as the need for an alternative and the necessity of the choosing person being fully informed and a specific cognitive capacity to reflect and act upon his or her beliefs, intentions, and desires (Vallentyne, 2008, p. 60). Adding to this, the individual has to be able to change the outcome by choosing differently (causal responsibility) or avoid the outcome facing smaller cost (an acceptable alternative, Frankfurt, 1969).

The first minimal criteria, causal responsibility, requires a clear (causal) connection between the choice and a particular outcome. To be causally responsible, the person needs to have the possibility to change the likelihood of an outcome

(Cappelen et al., 2016). For example, the decision to stop smoking should reduce the likelihood of suffering from lung-cancer.

The second minimal criteria, acceptable alternatives, means that individuals should have had the possibility to choose a different option or behavior. For instance, a person that is engaged in a dangerous sport activity, such as base jumping, could easily engage in something less dangerous for pleasure, for instance trekking. This criterion is widely discussed in the philosophical literature (i.e. Fischer & Ravizza, 2000) because one can argue that there are always acceptable alternatives. To clarify this, an acceptable alternative is supposed to be an alternative that does not come at an unreasonably higher cost. Thinking of a gun-point scenario, where the robber asks for "money or life", there are no reasonable alternatives to giving away one's money.

Cappelen, Fest, Sorensen, and Tunggoden (2016) conducted an economic experiment to shed light on the perception of morally relevant choices. In an experimental setting, they observed how people assess a morally relevant choice in a distribution situation. Using a between-subject design, different degrees of moral responsibility (causal responsibility and acceptable alternatives) were manipulated, and subsequent redistributions were compared. Their results indicate that people are more willing to accept inequality between two parties, when they had a choice, without causal responsibility (choosing between a blue or green ball) or acceptable alternatives (lottery vs marginal pay-out) and thus, not judge according to minimum criteria of morally relevance. Additionally, they found an effect of political preference, with right-wing voters being more restrictive in the redistribution when a nominal or forced choice was introduced (Cappelen et al., 2016).

This paper aims to replicate their results and extend them to a broader set of German-speaking participants. The original approach was adopted and enhanced adding tax morale and greed to gain a more in-depth insight into the psychological mechanisms of the perception of moral responsibility. On a general level, the experiment by Cappelen et al. (2016) reassembles a tax scenario, with the participants acting as finance authority and redistribute money between society’s winners and losers. What they manipulate is the degree to which losers can be perceived as responsible for their losing situation. To further test this, the concept of tax morale was added to the experiment.

Additionally, Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, van de Ven and Breugelmans (2019) linked greed as a person's disposition to unethical behavior. In this line of thought, the respective paper tries to connect greed and perceived morally relevant choices. So the question is asked, whether people differ in their willingness to establish equality according to their perception of moral responsibility and if personal traits (i.e. political preference, tax morale, and greed) influence this process?

Before data collection, this study has been pre-registered (see https://osf.io/8eh2v/). Supplementary materials are available under the same domain. The thesis starts with a brief literature review, to establish a theoretical foundation out of which the hypotheses are deduced. Afterwards, the methods and measures are introduced before the results are presented and discussed. Eventually, the major findings are concluded.

2. Related Literature

In the following chapter, a brief review of the most relevant literature is presented. In particular, morally relevant choices, political preference, tax morale, and greed are covered. At the end of each chapter, the hypotheses of this paper are derived.

2.1 Morally relevant choices

Morally relevant choices are the basis of accountability (Frankfurt, 1969; Oshana, 1997) and a vast amount of studies concludes that people are held responsible for the choices they make (e.g. Konow, 2003). On the other hand, the political and philosophical debate argues that people should only be held (morally) responsible to the extent that their choice affected the particular outcome (Vallentyne, 2008). Those so-called autonomous or voluntary choices require a person to be fully informed and cognitively able to express his or her intentions accordingly. Furthermore, acceptable alternatives must be given (Frankfurt, 1969). As already stated in the introduction, those criteria, causal responsibility and acceptable alternatives are the matter of this thesis. The cognitive capability of making a choice thus, is only briefly discussed, before the basic paradigm is introduced.

In their comprehensive work, Fischer and Ravizza (2000) argue that moral responsibility is unique to humanity, and thus distinguishes us from other creatures. Additionally, the social character of moral responsibility is highlighted, since only

humans are usually held accountable on an institutional level (e.g. in front of a court). For instance, if your clumsy dog destroys an expensive vase, you would not judge them by the same standards as you would a teenaged visitor. Even though they both are causally responsible, only the visitor is morally responsible since the dog lacks not only cognitive capacity but also the accountability (adapted from Fischer & Ravizza, 2000, p. 1f).

Alongside such a negative example, it needs to be mentioned, that moral responsibility applies to both kinds of consequences, positive and negative ones. For example, one can also be held morally responsible for a positive outcome, like being promoted at work. While extensively deriving moral responsibility, Fischer and Ravizza (2000) fail to offer a systematic approach, since they base their derivation on a lot of assumptions (Vallentyne, 2008). Therefore, the initial framework of a morally relevant choice as a choice that people can be held responsible for, with the criteria of causality and acceptable alternatives, will be used throughout this paper.

Moral responsibility has been mainly discussed in the medical literature (e.g. Brown, 2013; Glannon, 2003; Guttman & Ressler, 2001; Wikler, 2002) and philosophy (e.g. Fischer & Ravizza, 2000; Frankfurt, 1969; Oshana, 1997; Vallentyne, 2008). Thus, the following chapter tries to connect similar concepts like choices and moral to the ideas of Cappelen et al. (2016).

So far, psychology research explored the development of morale and inequality acceptance (Almås, Cappelen, Salvanes, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2017; Almås, Cappelen, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2010; Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977). However, it teaches us little about how people evaluate the morally relevance of a decision and thus is less relevant in this chapter.

Using the example of financial investments, Hofmann, Hoelzl, and Kirchler (2008) compare different models of moral decision-making, namely the multiple attribute utility theory (MAUT, Baron, 2000), the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), and the issue-contingent model (Jones, 1991). Since Hofmann et al. (2008) argue that the theory of planned behavior is well suited to predict moral decision-making and is commonly used for this purpose, it is briefly explained in the following. According to Ajzen (1991), behavior is the result of a person's intention regarding the behavior. The intention is the result of attitudes towards the specific behavior, a subjective norm and perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991, 2002). Applying this to the context of moral decision-making, people might differ in the antecedents of

behavioral intentions, with different subjective norms what a moral decision might look like, their attitudes towards them and the perceived possibility to enact on their beliefs. Therefore, the aim of this study is to identify antecedents and subjective norms.

Moral responsibility is closely tied to fairness and justice considerations (Konow, 2003). In this line of thought, moral relevance is also connected to inequality acceptance (Cappelen, Halvorsen, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2017). Inequality acceptance is also higher when policies are frames as choices (Savani & Rattan, 2012). Considering this literature and the results by Cappelen et al. (2016), it is hypothesized that participants account moral responsibility to choices, even though they do not meet the minimal criteria. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:

> *Hypothesis 1:* Different degrees of moral responsibility, stated in the conditions are hypothesized to result in differences in the amount that is redistributed between participants. Furthermore, participants are expected to transfer less money in the "nominal choice" condition, than they do in the "no choice" condition. Additionally, participants should redistribute less money in the "forced choice" condition than they do in the "no choice" condition.

2.2 Political Preference

Besides the different degrees of moral responsibility, political preferences had an effect on the redistributed amount in the original experiment (Cappelen et al., 2016), where left-wing voters redistributed larger amounts. Further studies confirm this effect, with right-wing voters being less willing to redistribute resources (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Klimm, 2018; Piketty, 1995). One argument in this line of thought is that right-wing voters support a somewhat Meritocratic view, implying that success is the result of personal effort and making the right choices (Piketty, 1995). On the other hand, left-wing voters instead tend to attribute success to luck and therefore are more willing to redistribute resources (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005).

Piketty (1995) even derivates that there are right and left-wing dynasties, that differ in their preferences for redistributing, leading to persistent differences across countries. In a recent experiment, it has been found that Americans are more willing to accept inequality than Norwegians and fairness considerations undermine efficiency-seeking of redistribution policies (Almås, Cappelen, & Tungodden, 2019).

Therefore, one can argue that Piketty's so-called dynasties manifest on a country-level, making comparative research more relevant.

Including psychological research, right and left-wing voters also differ in their personality, with left-wing affiliates tending to score higher on the openness scale (Furnahm & Fenton-O'Creevy, 2018; Veccione et al., 2011). In his study, Klimm (2018) had a look at whether political affiliation impacts the amount of redistribution in Germany, and how cheating (e.g. tax evasion) affects this political divine. Using a similar approach as Cappelen et al. (2016), his study argues that when participants have the opportunity to cheat, third-party dictators with right-wing affiliations are not affected in their redistribution preference, but left-wing dictators increase their redistributive effort. His effect is not affected by norms, indicating that even though people differ in their perception of cheating, political preference shape redistribution preferences fundamentally. Therefore, it is assumed that participants' political affiliation affects the redistribution, leading to the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2*: Participants who identify themselves as left-wing voters are expected to distribute more money throughout all conditions; thus, a moderation of the effect of moral responsibility on redistributed resources is hypothesized.

2.3 Tax morale

Most people pay their taxes accurately, even though the likelihood of being audit is relatively low (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1992). Therefore, there should be more considerations in the taxpaying decision, then purely economic ones. One of these additional factors is referred to as tax morale, which is the "intrinsic motivation to pay taxes" (Alm & Torgler, 2006, p. 225). Additionally, tax morale is tied to the perception of paying taxes as a civic duty and driven by the concern for society (Kirchler, 2007).

While there is a long and broad discussion about tax morale (Strümpel, 1966), linking it to phenomena like protestant work ethics (Furnham, 1983), happiness (Lubian & Zarri, 2011), and education (Rodriguez-Justicia & Theilen, 2017), little research was dedicated to exploring its antecedents. They were long regarded as a black box (Feld & Frey, 2002). Feld and Frey (2002) identified the opportunity to participate in legislative decisions regarding taxes as antecedents. One primary focus

of tax morale research is the comparison between cultures and possible antecedents. Using data from the World Value Survey, Alm and Torgler (2006) point out, that countries differ in their tax morale significantly, with the United States, Austria and Switzerland showing the highest degree of tax morale. Furthermore, the size of the shadow economy negatively correlates with tax morale (Alm & Torgler, 2006). On the other hand, higher institutional quality shows a positive correlation with tax morale (Frey & Torgler, 2007).

One general finding is that a higher degree of tax morale enhances actual tax compliance (Cummings, Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, & Torgler, 2009). Paying taxes is one of the most direct ways of resource redistribution. Therefore it is assumed that participants who report a more positive attitude towards taxes are more willing to establish equality. To have a closer look whether people with higher tax morale also enact upon their beliefs, and thus redistribute more, the third hypothesis is:

> *Hypothesis 3:* Participants with higher tax morale are expected to redistribute more resources throughout all conditions. Therefore, tax morale is assumed to moderate the effect of moral responsibility on the redistribution.

2.4 Greed

Greed is as old as humanity, but there is little research exploring this trait. Earlier perceptions of greed were mainly coined negatively. For instance, greed is one of the seven deadly sins mentioned in the bible (Tickle, 2004). Other major religions share this negative opinion (e.g. Nath, 1998; Oka & Kuijt, 2014; Sundararajan, 1989). In ancient Athens, greed has been seen as the root of immoral behavior (Balot, 2001).

Even though most people have an intuitive definition of greed, in this thesis, I stick to the neutral definition by Seuntjens et al. (2015, p. 919), who define greed as “the insatiable hunger for more”. More recently, academic views of greed turned into a double-edged sword, as it does not only promote antisocial behaviors but also embodies a motivational component (Hume, 2001). Greed not only has the potential to motivate people to commit crimes to increase one's wealth (e.g. tax evasion) but also the motive force to push people to work more hours or buy more goods than they would need, which might be beneficial for the society (Dommen, 2011).

Looking at empirical results, the ambiguity of greed becomes apparent. While it is linked to indebtedness and less saving, greedy people also tend to earn more money (Seuntjens, van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & van der Schors, 2016). Furthermore, CEO's greed is negatively related to shareholder returns (Haynes, Campbell, & Hitt, 2017).

A prototype analysis conducted by Seuntjens et al. (2014) points out that greed is as an antisocial trait and greedy people "do not care about the consequences of their behavior for others" (Seuntjens et al., 2015, p. 920). Looking at this expression scientifically, Seuntjens, Zeelenberg, van de Van, and Breugelmans (2019) used three laboratory experiments to link greed to unethical behavior. In their experiment, greedy people were more likely to engage in transgression, such as keeping money from a lost wallet. Adding to this, data collected by Krekels and Pandelaere (2015) show that greed is positively related to non-generosity and correlates with empathy negatively. Therefore, a positive association between greed and inequality acceptance might be reasonable.

On the other hand, there is evidence of a positive relation between greed and productivity orientation (Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015) and greedy people showing a higher sense of entitlement (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). Therefore, the last hypothesis is formulated as a bidirectional hypothesis because the theory does not allow an unambiguous prediction:

> *Hypothesis 4*: The participants' self-reported dispositional greed is hypothesized to moderate the effect of moral responsibility on the redistributed amount of resources.

3. Method

To test the deduced hypotheses, an online survey was conducted. Its participant structure and used materials are introduced before the process is explained.

3.1. Participants

The sample size was predetermined by an a-priori power analysis using G*Power (Erdfelder, Faul, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) and thus planned to be 234. [1] The

[1] A-priori power analysis was conducted using α = .05, β = .20 and an effect size *f* = .20*,* assuming a small to medium effect size.

final sample consisted of 266 in total, with 118 being male (44.4%), 146 female (54.9%) and two participants (.7%) being non-binary. The mean age was 32.36 (*SD* = 13.36). Most participants were either from Austria (42.9%) or Germany (55.6%). A significant proportion of the participants hold a university degree (67.3%), 16.5 per cent reported a high-school diploma as their highest degree and 12.8 per cent graduated from vocational training. Further demographics can be found in Table 2.

3.2. Materials

In the study by Cappelen et al. (2016), an economic experiment was conducted, where the payouts of two participants was determined by a lottery with a third participant having the opportunity to redistribute between a lottery winner and a lottery loser, to decrease inequality. Due to economic reasons, I chose to replicate the experiment as online questionnaire, transferring their experimental conditions into vignettes, that outline what happened in one of three fictitious treatments (Cavanagh & Fritzsche, 1985). In the following, the three different conditions/scenarios are introduced, before the follow-up questions are presented. To increase comprehensibility, the lottery in Cappelen et al. (2016) was replaced with a simple coin-toss. The whole questionnaire can be found in the appendix.

3.2.1. No choice (Baseline). In the no choice condition, the participants were given a scenario which stated that two (fictitious) participants did a work-intensive task, without a determined payout. After they both completed the task successfully, the financial compensation was decided by a coin-toss, where “heads” resulted in a payout of 50 Euro and “tails” led to no payout at all. Like in the experiment by Cappelen et al. (2016), this period was followed by a redistribution phase, where a winning and a losing party were matched anonymously. The (actual) participants in our study could redistribute money from player A (receiving 50 Euro) to player B (receiving 0 Euro) using a slider and a table showing how much they redistribute in Euro and per cent (Appendix Figure F).

3.2.2. Nominal choice. In the nominal choice condition, the scenario included a choice for the fictitious participants. In contrast to the *no choice* condition, in the nominal choice condition participants had to choose between heads and tails before the coin was tossed. If the described participants predicted the coin-toss correctly,

they were rewarded with 50 Euro. Otherwise, they did not receive any compensation. Furthermore, the scenario stated that a winner and a loser were matched after the coin-toss. Like in the baseline condition, participants of the respective study were asked whether they want to redistribute resources from player A to player B, using a slider. This scenario intends to simulate the lack of causal responsibility since participants could not affect the likelihood of the outcome.

3.2.3. Forced choice. In the forced choice condition, the scenarios was formulated similar to the baseline condition, but included the fact that the fictitious participants had the opportunity to elude the lottery by taking a save option of a three Euro payout. If they decided to play the lottery, the procedure was the same as in the baseline condition. After reading this scenario, participants in this study were asked whether they want to redistribute from player A to player B, using a slider. Since the outcome in this scenario (0 Euro) is almost as unfavorable as the safe payout (3 Euro), with the latter being only 12% of the expected outcome (25 Euro), this scenario does not offer an acceptable alternative. Therefore it constitutes the forced choice condition, where no acceptable alternative is given.

3.2.4. Post-experimental questionnaire. To further test what influences participants' decision to redistribute or not to redistribute, additional scales (i.e. political preference, tax morale, and greed) were included in the questionnaire. Those scales and exploratory items are explained in the following.

As a manipulation check participants in the nominal choice were asked, if they think that there are people, who are better at predicting the outcome of a coin-toss. Since the idea in the nominal choice scenario is, that people cannot affect the likelihood of an outcome, leaving it to chance, participants should respond that people do not differ in their ability to predict heads or tails.

To check whether participants would prefer the safe payout themselves, in the forced choice condition they were asked "*In the given scenario, participants had the opportunity to elude the lottery and take a safe payout of 3 Euro. If you would be in their position, would you prefer the 3 Euro over the lottery?"*. The condition is supposed to constitute a lack of acceptable alternatives. Therefore participants should not prefer the marginal payoff over the lottery.

Cappelen et al. (2016) assessed the political preference through the party the participants voted for in the last election. Since this study focuses on German-speaking countries (i.e. Austria, Germany, and Switzerland), with each country having a broad set of different parties, a commonly used one item scale was included. In this item, participants were asked

> *These days there is a lot of chatter about the political right and left. Here, you can see a seven-level scale, which spans from the political left all the way to the political right. Where would you put yourself on this scale?*

and assessed their affiliation on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = "*extremely left*" to 7 = "*extremely right"*. The item was translated by the author and backward translated (Brislin, 1970) by an independent translator, who was not aware of the research question.

Participants' attitudes towards taxes were measured using four items from Braithwaite's commitment scale out of her motivational postures (Braithwaite, 2003, p. 20) in German (Rechberger, Hartner, & Kirchler, 2009). The original scale consists of eight items, but only four were selected to keep the questionnaire short. The items asked participants whether they agree or disagree with statements like '*Paying taxes is the right thing to do'* and '*Paying my tax ultimately advantages everyone'* using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = "I fully disagree - 7 = "I fully agree"). Therefore not actual tax morale is measured, but rather if people agree with the basic principles of taxation. The Cronbach's Alpha for the four items is .83, implying a satisfying internal consistency (Cortina, 1993)

To measure greed as participants' trait, the Dispositional Greed Scale (DGS) by Seuntjens et al. (2015) was used. This decision was made after evaluating the psychometric criteria of several greed measurements, showing that they barely differ and highly correlate with each other (Mussel, Rodrigues, Krumm, & Hewig, 2018). The dispositional Greed is measured using participants' agreement on seven items like "*I always want more*" and "*It does not matter how much I have. I'm never completely satisfied"* (1 = "*I fully disagree*" - 7 = "*I fully disagree"*). As suggested (Brislin, 1970), the items were translated forwards and backwards. Using the data, the scale showed a Cronbach's Alpha of .80 (Cortina, 1993).

Apart from the scales, some exploratory items were included. Like Cappelen et al. (2016), two items measuring the locus of control were included. Locus of control in this context refers to the "perceived control of the performance of a behavior"

(Ajzen, 2002, p. 668). To measure the perceived locus of control, participants were asked if they think that there are people who are better at predicting a coin toss. Furthermore, participants were asked how much control the fictitious participants had in the scenario, using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = "*No control at all*" - 7 = "*Full control*"). From a psychological perspective, it is also interesting to clarify how fair people perceive different scenarios. Additionally, research points out that fairness perception is a critical factor in redistributive scenarios (e.g. Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, & Tungodden, 2013; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Thus, participants were asked to rate the fairness of the initial situation, before they had the opportunity to redistribute, on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = "*Not fair at all*" - 7 = "*Completely fair*").
Eventually, participants' socio-demographics (i.e. age, gender, residence, education, and occupational status) were measured. To make sure that the participants understood the first scenario correctly, they were asked two questions regarding the initial distribution and procedure stated in the scenario, at the end of the questionnaire.

3.3. Procedure

In line with the behavioral economic paradigm, in their original study Cappelen et al. (2016) used an economic laboratory experiment. The present study is a replication of their general experiment with certain additions. It comprises a between-subject design with three groups, which are explained more thoroughly in the preceding. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, namely the baseline, the nominal and the forced choice condition. For economic reasons and due to the scope of this thesis, an online questionnaire was used to collect the data. It was provided through the platform SoSci Survey (Leiner, 2019). The data collection took place between March and April 2019. Participants were sampled in a convenience sample using Social Media and survey platforms, such as SurveyCircle. While Cappelen et al. (2016) offered financial incentives, with an average payout of approximately 80 US Dollars, in the respective study no incentivization was offered to the participants.

All analyses were done using IBM SPSS Statistics 24 (IBM Corp, 2016) and R (R Core Team, 2013). The corresponding syntax is available at https://osf.io/8eh2v/. In the multiple linear regressions, independent variables were mean centered, the

conditions (i.e. nominal choice and forced choice), gender, and country of origin (Austria and Germany) were dummy-coded.

4. Results

The result section is divided into three parts: the comprehension and manipulation check, the confirmatory analyses, and the exploratory analyses. Preliminary results and descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2.

4.1. Comprehension and manipulation check

To check whether the scenarios were comprehensible, two items regarding the initial distribution and procedure, had to be answered by the participants. Even though most of them (58.3 %) managed to answer both correctly, a large proportion failed to recall the right initial redistribution (38.7%) and / or the procedure (12.8%) stated in the presented scenarios. To clarify that a coin-toss is determined by luck and not through personal skills, the participants were asked if they believe that there are people, who are better at predicting the outcome of a coin toss correctly. The results show that 10.5% believe that this is the case, while 88.3 % do not. Furthermore, participants in the forced choice condition were asked if they would prefer the safe payout of three Euros for themselves, with 11.2 % agreeing and 88.8 % that would prefer to play the lottery. Thus, it is concluded that in general eluding the lottery is not preferred by the participants and thus, by a majority, not seen as an acceptable alternative. To summarize, quite a lot of participants did not manage to reproduce the essential features stated in the scenarios correctly, but agree with the basic framing of a coin-toss being a nominal choice and offering a minor fee constitutes a forced choice. Looking at Table 1, this comes apparent with a negligible difference between the no choice and the nominal conditions. On average, participant redistributed 37.64% (*SD = 21.34*), with minor differences between the conditions, as Figure 1 and Table 1 indicate.

Table 1

Redistribution of resources within the three conditions

	Condition		
	No choice	Nominal choice	Forced choice
N	88	89	89
Mean redistribution	40.60	39.46	32.91
SD	18.75	18.54	25.42

Note. *N = 266*. Mean redistribution in percent.

Table 2

Descriptive statistics and inter-item correlation

	Descriptive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Age	*M* = *32.36* *SD* = *13.36*	-										
2. Gender	*Female* = 54.9% *Male* = 44.4%	- .03										
3. Education	*Mdn* = 5.00 *IQR* = 1.00	- .04	.17**	-								
4. Redistributed amount	*M* = 37.64 *SD* = 21.24	- .04	- .09	- .15*	-							
5. Nominal choice	0 = 66.5% 1 = 33.5%	.11	.05	.00	.06	-						
6. Forced choice	0 = 66.5% 1 = 33.5%	- .09	.00	.09	- .16**	- .50**	-					
7. Political preference	*M* = 3.48 *SD* = .96	- .02	.06	- .07	- .08	.00	- .05	-				
8. Tax morale	*M* = 5.75 *SD* = 1.15	.03	.12	.04	- .06	.03	.05	- .23**	(.83)			
9. Greed	*M* = 3.27 *SD* = 1.14	- .35**	.19**	.06	- .04	- .11	.08	.31**	- .06	(.80)		
10. Locus of Control	*M* = 1.91 *SD* = 1.52	-.05	.03	- .09	- .16**	- .05	.30**	.21**	- .07	.16*	-	
11. Fairness	*M* = 2.94 *SD* = 2.15	- .02	.09	.12	- .51**	- .09	.32**	.13*	- .04	.05	.30**	-

Note. *p < .05; ** p < .01, two-tailed. *N* = 266. Gender was dummy coded (0 = female, 1= male), depending on the level of measurement and distribution of each variable, Pearson *r* or Spearman r_s was calculated. Cronbach's Alpha in parentheses.

4.2. Confirmatory analyses

The first hypothesis tested whether participants regard decisions as morally relevant, even though they do not meet the minimal criteria of causality (nominal choice) and acceptable alternatives (forced choice). In the forced choice condition, a significant effect between the baseline condition and the forced choice is shown. One can argue, that the nominal choice does not affect the redistribution significantly, β = - .03 p = .720, while the forced choice condition leads to significantly less redistribution, β = -.17, p = .016, from the scenario's winning to the losing party, R^2 = .03, $F(5,260) = 3.43$, p = .034 (see Table 4) (see Table 3). Looking at the effect size, the f-value of .16 suggests a minor effect (Cohen, 1992). In Figure 1, this effect is illustrated, showing a negligible difference between the baseline and the nominal choice condition.



Figure 1. Means and confidence intervals of the redistributed amount in the conditions.

Table 3

Multiple linear regression analysis of moral choice manipulations on the amount of participants redistribute

	Redistributed amount		
	B	*β*	*SE*
Intercept	40.60**		2.25
Nominal Choice	- 1.14	- .03	3.18
Forced Choice	- 7.70*	- .17	3.18
R^2		.03	
F		3.43*	

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. $N = 266$. The condition variables were dummy coded with the baseline condition as reference category.

The second hypothesis included the political preference as moderator. As stated above, the more participants report their selves as left-wing voters, the more resources they are assumed to redistribute. Our data does not support this assumption, since neither the political preference, $\beta = - .062$, $p = .661$, nor its interaction with the dummies of the conditions were significant, $\beta = - .071$, $p = .406$; $\beta = .02$, $p = .786$, to affect the redistributed amount significantly, $R^2 = .038$, $F(5,260) = 2.074$, $p = .069$ (see Table 4). According to Cohen (1992), the effect size of $f = .20$ can be classified as small effect.

Table 4

Multiple linear regression of moral relevance and political preference on the redistributed amount

	Redistributed amount		
	B	β	*SE*
Intercept	40.70**		2.26
No choice	- 1.21	- .03	3.18
Forced choice	- 7.83	- .17	3.19
Political preference	- 1.36	- .06	2.28
Nominal choice x Political preference	- 2.70	- .07	3.24
Forced choice x Political preference	0.91	.02	3.34
R^2		.04	
F		2.07	

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. $N = 266$. The condition variables were dummy coded with the baseline condition as reference category. Political preference was mean centered.

Since the fictitious scenario describes a scenario that is similar to taxation, where a higher entity – the participant – redistributes money from (society's) winners to losers, a positive effect of tax morale on the redistribution was hypothesized. The results, summarized in Table 5, indicate that this hypothesis is not supported by the collected data, $F(5,260) = 1.592$, $p = .163$, and tax morale as predictor, $\beta = -.033$, $p = .734$, and as moderator, $\beta = .003$, $p = .970$; $\beta = -.044$, $p = .575$, has no significant effect on the redistribution. Like the previous model, the effect size is fairly small, $f = .18$ (Cohen, 1992).

Looking at the influence of greed on perceived moral responsibility in Table 6, it becomes apparent that greed has no significant influence as predictor, $\beta = -.021$, $p = .847$, or in interaction with nominal, $\beta = .013$, $p = .962$, or forced choice, $\beta = -.040$, $p = .878$; $F(5,260) = 1.402$, $p = .224$. The standardized effect size *f* of .17 indicates a small effect (Cohen, 1992).

Table 5

Linear regression morally relevance and tax morale on the redistributed amount

	Redistributed amount		
	B	*β*	*SE*
Intercept	40.53**		5.18
Nominal choice	- 1.05	- .02	3.20
Forced choice	- 7.44*	- .17	3.20
Tax morale	- 0.61	- .03	3.39
Nominal choice × Tax morale	0.10	.00	2.26
Forced choice × Tax morale	- 1.62	- .04	2.57
R^2		.03	
F		1.59	

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. $N = 266$. *The condition variables were dummy coded with the baseline condition as reference category.* Tax morale was mean centered.

Table 6

Multiple linear regression of manipulated morally relevance and greed on the amount of participants redistribution

	Redistributed amount		
	B	*β*	*SE*
Intercept	39.02		8.46
Nominal choice	- 0.60	- .01	11.91
Forced choice	- 9.35	- .21	11.75
Greed	- 0.88	- .03	4.54
Nominal choice × Greed	0.30	.01	6.40
Forced choice × Greed	- 0.98	- .04	6.41
R^2		.03	
F		1.40	

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. $N = 266$. The condition variables were dummy coded with the baseline condition as reference category. Greed was mean centered.

Including socio-demographic information (i.e. gender, age, country of origin, and education) did not affect the results of the hypotheses. In the subsequent section, exploratory results are reported.

4.3. Exploratory analyses

To explore the phenomenon of perceived morally relevant choices more in-depth, several analyses were conducted additionally. At first, the exploratory analyses, that were pre-registered (e.g. excluding participants that failed the manipulation check) are presented, before further results are drawn on. The latter include a robustness check using the same inequality coefficient as Cappelen et al. (2016) and the inclusion of procedural fairness.

As stated in the pre-registration as exploratory analyses, participants who failed the manipulation check and thus were unable to reproduce the information of the scenarios correctly were excluded. In Table 7, the results, where Model 1 included participants who managed to answer one item correctly and Model 2 included every participant that successfully answered both items of the manipulation check, are summarized. Compared to the previous analysis, the effect of forced choice persists, β = - .251, p = .005, in Model 1, while becoming little stronger, F(2,263) = 3.789, p = .024, f = .179.The same can be said about Model 2, with a stronger increase of the effect size, F(2,263) = 4.016, p = .020, f = .023.

Apart from the manipulation-check participants in the forced choice condition were asked, whether they would have taken the minor payout, if they were in the position to do so. Excluding those who affirmed this question, leads to Model 1 (Table 3) being non-significant (p = .097).

Table 7

Multiple linear regression analysis, robustness check of hypothesis 1

	Redistributed amount					
	Model 1			Model 2		
	B	*β*	*SE*	*B*	*β*	*SE*
Intercept	40.82 **		2.45	43.04**		2.84
Nominal Choice	- 2.09	- .05	3.42	- 4.93	- .11	3.88
Forced Choice	- 9.00**	- .19	3.44	- 13.13**	- .25	4.63
R^2		.03			.05	
F		3.79*			4.01*	
N	240			155		

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. The condition variables were dummy coded with the baseline condition as reference category.).

The study of this paper is based on (i.e. Cappelen et al., 2016) used an inequality measurement similar to the Gini-coefficient, instead of equality as a dependent variable. To ensure robustness, the results were checked using the original calculation:

$$\text{Inequality} = \frac{|\text{Income lucky player (A)} - \text{Income unlucky player (B)}|}{\text{Total income}}$$

Exchanging the redistribution as the dependent variable with the inequality index by Cappelen et al. (2016) did not affect the results of the previous analyses. For a graphical comparison, see Appendix Figure A.

As indicated by Table 2, the perceived fairness is highly correlated with the amount participants redistributed. Therefore it was included into a multiple linear regression analysis. Participants' fairness rating did not differ between the baseline and the nominal choice condition, but the initial scenario in the forced choice condition was rated significantly fairer. The results in Table 8 show that the effect of forced choice turns non-significant, if fairness is included into the model.

Table 8

Multiple linear regression analysis using the inequality coefficient by Cappelen et al. (2016)

	Inequality		
	B	*β*	*SE*
Intercept	36.92***		2.15
Nominal choice	1.29	.05	2.91
Forced choice	0.80	.08	3.02
Perceived fairness	- 5.87***	- .23	1.18
Nominal choice × fairness	1.29	.13	1.50
Forced choice × fairness	.87	.03	1.47
R^2		.25	
F		18.37***	

Note. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$. $N = 266$. The condition variables were dummy coded with the baseline condition as reference category. Fairness was mean centered.

5. Discussion

This thesis tried to shed light onto whether people differ in their willingness to establish equality according to their perception of moral responsibility, and if personal traits (i.e. political preference, tax morale, and greed) influence this process. For this purpose, an enhanced replication was conducted. In the following, the results are discussed, before differences between the original and the respective study are outlined, and the weaknesses and strengths are derived.

In hypothesis 1 it was assumed, that participants redistribution neglect the minimal criteria of morally relevant choices and redistribute less regardless of the lack of influence (nominal choice) or acceptable alternatives (forced choice). The data showed that this is only the case for the latter. This indicates, that participants do not perceive a nominal choice, where the fictitious participants only had the choice between heads or tails, as morally relevant and thus establish equality more willingly. Even though most participants in the forced choice condition reported that they would not elude the lottery, the results draw a different picture with significantly less redistribution compared to the baseline. It might indicate that despite participants

would choose differently for themselves, they consider the marginal but safe payout as an acceptable alternative.

A second discrepancy to Cappelen et al. (2016) is the missing effect of political preference on the redistribution, stated in hypothesis 2. One possible explanation might be the student sample, Cappelen et al. (2016) used in their sample. Another possible explanation might be the party system in Austria and Germany. Additionally, literature (i.e. Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; Klimm, 2018) argues that the effect of political preference is only present when the origin of inequality is ambiguous. Since the inequality in this study is the result of brute luck, and therefore, quite clear, the redistribution might not be affected.

Tax morale is usually linked to tax compliance (Cummings et al., 2009). Thus, I hypothesized that people with a high attitude towards taxes might also redistribute more. Since the data does not support this hypothesis, the stated scenarios might be too notional for the participants to draw on the similarities to tax scenarios. Looking at the mean and the distribution of the tax morale scale, it becomes apparent that the values are above average in our sample. One possible explanation might be that Austrian citizens have respectively high tax morale (Alm & Torgler, 2006).

One possible explanation for the missing effect of greed might lay in the bidirectional hypothesis. Since there is evidence for greedy people being less ethical (Seuntjens et al., 2019), but also more productivity-oriented, those two extremes might offset each other, resulting in a null-effect. Thus, I conclude that greed probably does not influence the perception of morally relevant choices.

As the exploratory analysis shows, the perceived fairness appears the be a significant, influential factor, which predicts how much people redistribute from player A to player B. People might not differ in their perception, whether a decision is morally responsible or not, but in the fairness perception of the outlined scenario. Adding to this, they do not only perceive fairness differently but also reinforce fairness by redistributing monetary resources. Therefore it could be concluded, that while reading the scenarios, participants might not judge the initial redistribution according to moral standards, but rather to their own fairness considerations. To address this limitation, and to enhance the understanding of the perception of moral responsibility, future research should focus on the interaction of fairness and moral responsibility regarding participants.

As the results indicate, our data do not support the results of Cappelen et al. (2016) entirely. Therefore the differences between the studies are discussed before the strengths and weaknesses of this thesis are highlighted. Since the respective master's thesis did not use an experimental setting and thus does not qualify as close replication in the sense of Brandt et al. (2014), there are some possible explanations for the discrepancy within the design. First of all, this study did not take place in a laboratory, coming with the advantage of less effort and higher external validity, but the disadvantage of less validity. Looking at the data, this comes especially apparent. Even though very fast responders were excluded, without changing the respective results, the question of the data's quality is hard to answer.

One major limitation is the quality of the data, e.g. much noise within it. Manipulation check shows that 41.8 per cent of participants have not read the scenario carefully enough to answer both check-up questions correctly. Additionally, some participants finished the questionnaire at an unreasonable speed, making their response questionable. Using a laboratory set-up and more strict exclusion criteria could address this issue.

A second limitation results from the fact that participants had no costs of increasing equality between the two fictitious players, they simply had to drag a slider without a direct effect on them. In a real-life tax setting, redistribution goes hand in hand with costs (i.e. taxes). Future studies might include a payout that is marginally reduced, when more resources are transferred from A to B, to increase validity and generalizability.

Apart from the shortcomings, this thesis had a first look at possible influencing factors of morally relevant choices, namely attitudes towards taxes and greed. Even though, both did not affect the redistribution and thus the inequality acceptance, according to Ajzen's theory of planned behavior (1991) one can argue, that the subjective norm (i.e. tax morale) does not affect redistribution, while the perceived behavioral control does.

Furthermore, the respective thesis showed that there is a clear gap that future (psychological studies) need to fill. Since inequality around the globe is rising, the question, why people accept it quite broadly, needs to be answered. Finally, this study showed, that in German-speaking countries, the results of Cappelen et al. (2016) could not be replicated. This offers a few theoretical implications, namely that the forced choice condition, where an unreasonable payout was suggested, appears

to be perceived as morally relevant. In line with Cappelen et al. (2016) this further hints at the blurriness between a free and a forced choice. Additionally, greed and tax morale, apparently, do not influence participants' considerations of morally relevant choices.

6. Conclusion

This study aimed to replicate research done by Cappelen and colleagues (2016) and to transfer their results to DACH countries. Unlike in their study, nominal choice or political preference did not affect the redistribution. Thus, it is concluded that people in the respective sample do not distinguish between people who face a choice with no causal impact. Furthermore, having an alternative option, even though it is not adequate, affect peoples' judgement. Adding to this, greed, tax morale, and political preference do not appear to influence perceptual differences of moral relevance. Since the quality of the data is a limitation, further research might address this issue while also introducing a fee for transferring resourced to enhance the scenario.

7. Author note

Supplementary materials and pre-registration are available at https://osf.io/8eh2v/

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Zusammenfassung

Moralische Verantwortung ist eine vorherrschende Annahme in westlichen Gesellschaften. Neben der philosophischen Forschung haben sich nur wenige Studien mit der Wahrnehmung moralischer Verantwortung beschäftigt. Um die Lücke zu schließen, führten Cappelen et al. (2016) ein ökonomisches Experiment durch, bei dem sie die Wahrnehmung von Mindestkriterien welche Entscheidung erfüllen muss um als moralisch relevant zu gelten, die Kausalität der Entscheidung und das Vorhandensein akzeptabler Alternativen, unter Verwendung eines Umverteilunsszenarios untersuchten. Ihr Hauptergebnis war, dass die verteilenden Personen weniger zwischen anderen Teilnehmer/innen umverteilten, wenn letztere vorher vor einer Entscheidung standen, obwohl diese Entscheidungen nicht den Mindestkriterien entsprachen. Darüber hinaus zeigten sie, dass die linken Wähler/innen eher dazu bereit sind, Ungleichheiten abzubauen. Die vorliegende vignettenbasierte Replikationsstudie passte das Forschungsparadigma von Cappelen et al. (2016) an und untersuchte eine/n (nicht betroffene/n) Dritte/n, welche/r Ressourcen zwischen zwei fiktiven Untersuchungsteilnehmer/innen umverteilte. In den Szenarien wurde durch eine Lotterie Ungleichheit geschaffen, wobei der/die Dritte in der Lage war, diese Ungleichheit zu reduzieren oder gar Gleichheit herzustellen. Um einen breiteren Einblick zu erhalten, wer mehr oder weniger verteilt, wurde die Replikation erweitert und neben der politische Zugehörigkeit, die Einstellung zu Steuern und Gier erhoben. Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Studie zeigen, dass eine nicht adäquate Alternative (d.h. eine geringe Auszahlung anstelle einer Lotterieteilnahme) immer noch als ädaquat angesehen wird. Entscheidungen, die ein Ergebnis nicht kausal beeinflussen, werden nicht als relevant angesehen (z.B. die Vorhersage von Kopf oder Zahl bei einem Münzwurf). Politischen Präferenzen, die Steuermoral und die dispositionelle Gier haben dabei keinen Einfluss auf die oben genannten Effekte. Die Ergebnisse von Cappelen et al. (2016) konnten nicht vollständig repliziert werden. Wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Studien werden diskutiert.

Schlagwörter: Moralisch relevante Entscheidung, Politische Präferenz, Steuermoral, Gier und Fairness.

Appendix



Figure A: Mean inequalities in the respective (left) and the original study by Cappelen et al. (2016) (right)



Figure B. Moderation of political on the redistributed amount, with the blue line indicating rather right-wing and the green line rather left-wing voters.

B



Figure C. Moderation of tax morale on the redistributed amount, with the blue line indicating lower and the green line higher degrees of tax morale.



Figure D. Moderation of greed on the redistributed amount, with the blue line indicating lower and the green line higher values on the dispositional greed scale.

D

Questionnaire



Figure E. Introduction

10% ausgefüllt

Bitte lesen Sie sich das folgende fiktive Szenario aufmerksam durch:

Stellen Sie sich vor, eine Gruppe von Personen nimmt an einer Studie teil. Die Studie beginnt mit einer arbeitsintensiven Aufgabe, die von allen Personen erfolgreich gelöst wird.

Ob eine Person für die Bearbeitung der Aufgabe nun eine Bezahlung erhalten soll, entscheidet ein fairer Münzwurf. Bei „Zahl“ soll die Person 50 Euro erhalten, bei „Kopf“ hingegen 0 Euro. Die Münze wird geworfen, aber die Person erfährt das Ergebnis des Münzwurfs nicht.

Nun werden Zweierpaare aus allen Personen gebildet. Die Paare bestehen aus einer Person bei der „Zahl“ geworfen wurde (Person A) und aus einer bei der „Kopf“ geworfen wurde (Person B). Somit soll Person A 50 Euro für die Bearbeitung der Aufgabe erhalten, Person B hingegen 0 Euro.

Ihre Aufgabe ist es jetzt die Aufteilung der Bezahlung zwischen Person A und Person B zu bestätigen oder nach Ihrer persönlichen Präferenz zu ändern. Unten sehen Sie dafür einen Schieberegler. Wie Sie sehen können, erhält Person A derzeit 50 Euro, wohingegen Person B 0 Euro erhält.

0 % / 0 € (keine Umverteilung) — 100 % / 50€ (vollständige Umverteilung)

Bitte bewegen Sie den Schieberegler auf 0 Euro, falls Sie nichts umverteilen möchten, beziehungsweise auf einen höheren Wert, falls Sie umverteilen möchten.

Person	Vor Ihrer Umverteilung	Nach Ihrer Umverteilung
A	50 €	
B	0 €	

Weiter

Figure F. Scenario for the *no choice / baseline* condition

F



Figure G. Scenario for the *nominal choice* condition

10% ausgefüllt

Bitte lesen Sie sich das folgende fiktive Szenario aufmerksam durch:

Stellen Sie sich vor, eine Gruppe von Personen nimmt an einer Studie teil. Die Studie beginnt mit einer arbeitsintensiven Aufgabe, die von allen Personen erfolgreich gelöst wird.

Jede Person kann sich entscheiden entweder 3 Euro als Bezahlung für die Bearbeitung der Aufgabe zu erhalten, oder an einem Münzwurf teilzunehmen, mit der Aussicht 50 Euro oder aber 0 Euro zu erhalten. Wer nun eine Bezahlung erhalten soll, entscheidet ein fairer Münzwurf. Bei „Zahl“ soll die Person 50 Euro erhalten, bei „Kopf“ hingegen 0 Euro. Die Münze wird geworfen, aber die Person erfährt das Ergebnis des Münzwurfs nicht.

Nun werden Zweierpaare aus allen Personen gebildet, die am Münzwurf teilgenommen haben. Die Paare bestehen aus einer Person bei der „Zahl“ geworfen wurde (Person A) und aus einer bei der „Kopf“ geworfen wurde (Person B). Somit soll Person A 50 Euro für die Bearbeitung der Aufgabe erhalten, Person B hingegen 0 Euro.

Ihre Aufgabe ist es jetzt die Aufteilung der Bezahlung zwischen Person A und Person B zu bestätigen oder nach Ihrer persönlichen Präferenz zu ändern. Unten sehen Sie dafür einen Schieberegler. Wie Sie sehen können, erhält Person A derzeit 50 Euro, wohingegen Person B 0 Euro erhält.

Bitte bewegen Sie den Schieberegler auf 0 Euro, falls Sie nichts umverteilen möchten, beziehungsweise auf einen höheren Wert, falls Sie umverteilen möchten.



Person	Vor Ihrer Umverteilung	Nach Ihrer Umverteilung
A	50 €	25 €
B	0 €	25 €

Weiter

Figure H. Scenario for the *forced choice* condition



Figure I. Follow-up: Locus of control and fairness



Figure J. Follow-up: Political affiliation



Figure K. Dispositional greed scale (Seuntjens et al., 2015)



Figure L. Motivational postures (Braithwaite, 2003; Rechberger et al., 2009)

J

60% ausgefüllt

Wir bitten Sie abschließend ein paar Fragen zu Ihrer Person zu beantworten:

Wie alt sind Sie?

Ich bin _____ Jahre alt.

Welchem Geschlecht fühlen Sie sich zugehörig?

- ○ weiblich
- ○ männlich
- ○ Ich möchte mich nicht einordnen

In welchem Land wohnen Sie?

- ○ Österreich
- ○ Deutschland
- ○ Schweiz
- ○ anderes Land: _____

Was ist Ihr höchster abgeschlossener Bildungsgrad?

- ○ kein Abschluss
- ○ Pflichtschule
- ○ Berufs- / Fachschule / mittlere Lehranstalt ohne Matura
- ○ Matura / Abitur
- ○ Hochschulabschluss (Universität / Fachhochschule)
- ○ keine Angabe

Figure M. Demographics: Basic information.

Was ist Ihr aktueller Beschäftigungsstand?
[Mehrfachantworten sind möglich]

- ☐ Angestellter / Angestellte
- ☐ Arbeiter / Arbeiterin
- ☐ Student / Studentin
- ☐ selbstständig
- ☐ arbeitssuchend
- ☐ Pensionist / Pensionistin
- ☐ anderer: _____
- ☐ keine Angabe

Wenn Sie einen Beruf ausüben, in welchem Ausmaß sind Sie beschäftigt?

- ○ geringfügig (weniger als 10 Stunden / Woche)
- ○ Teilzeit (zwischen 10 und 38 Stunden / Woche)
- ○ Vollzeit (mehr als 38 oder 40 Stunden / Woche)

Weiter

Figure N. Demographics: Occupation

Bitte erinnern Sie sich nochmals an die Instruktionen zu Beginn des Fragebogens.

Wie wurden die Auszahlungen vor Ihrer eventuellen Umverteilung für die Personen A und B bestimmt?

- ○ Bei Zahl bekamen die Versuchspersonen 50 Euro.
- ○ Bei richtiger Vorhersage bekamen die Versuchspersonen 50 Euro.
- ○ Bei Ausstieg aus der Lotterie bekamen die Versuchspersonen 3 Euro, ansonsten bei Zahl 50 Euro.
- ○ Durch ihre Leistung bei der arbeitsintensiven Aufgabe.
- ○ Ich weiß es nicht.

Wie viel würde Person A und Person B verdienen, falls Sie keine Umverteilung vorgenommen haben / hätten?

- ○ Person A 0 Euro; Person B 0 Euro
- ○ Person A 25 Euro; Person B 25 Euro
- ○ Person A 50 Euro; Person B 0 Euro
- ○ Person A 20 Euro; Person B 30 Euro
- ○ Ich weiß es nicht

Weiter

Figure O. Manipulation check

80% ausgefüllt

Haben Sie abschließend noch Fragen oder Anregungen, die Sie uns mitteilen möchten?

Weiter

Figure P. Open question for feedback and comments