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„Georgia's Pro-Western Aspiration – Perspectives  
And Hindering Factors“

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis aims to underline and analyze Georgia's aspirations and aims with regard to Euro-Atlantic integration in its endeavor to achieve development through close cooperation with the progressive and contemporary developed world. It also examines its relations with Russia.

First, Georgia's integration process in Europe is explored. The historic aspiration of Georgia is to return to European civilization. It shows the measures to be taken to achieve this integration, which should ensure that the implementation of the most difficult obstacles to the development of the country, eliminate them and maximally facilitate the facilitating factors. Taking into consideration globalization and localization trends, issues of elaboration and implementation of optimal strategy for resurgence.

Second, in the process of its integration in the EU, the problems and perspectives Georgia's experiences are discussed. This chapter will discuss the prospect of involvement in European structures, harmonization and sharing of advanced European achievements, which should ensure the establishment of high level civil society as the main source of Georgia's progress and political economic progress.

Finally, the perspectives of cooperation between Georgia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), development and its membership are dealt with. The role of the NATO as a military political organization in Georgia and not only in Georgia, but also in South Caucasus, to maintain peace and balance.

The research is conducted using a descriptive, comparative and analytical method: an analysis is carried out on the basis of generalized examples and historical facts illustrating that Georgia's westernization can only be achieved using the approach it has chosen. A literature research is carried out.

Keywords: European Union, European integration, Geopolitics, Georgia, NATO, Russia.

## **ABSTRACT**

Diese Master-Thesis behandelt das Streben Georgiens, Teil der Euro-Atlantischen Integration zu werden und analysiert die Entwicklung der Zusammenarbeit mit der fortschrittlichen Welt. Außerdem wird die Beziehung zu Russland miteinbezogen.

Zunächst wird der Integrationsprozess Georgiens in Europa untersucht. Das historische Bestreben Georgiens ist die Rückkehr zur europäischen Zivilisation. Es werden die Maßnahmen aufgezeigt, die für die Verwirklichung dieser Integration ergriffen werden müssen, um sicherzustellen, dass Hindernisse beseitigt werden und dadurch die Entwicklung des Landes gefördert wird. Dabei werden Globalisierungs- und Lokalisierungstrends miteinbezogen.

Zweitens werden im Zuge der Integration in die EU die Probleme und Perspektiven der Erfahrungen Georgiens erörtert. In diesem Kapitel wird die Aussicht auf Beteiligung an europäischen Strukturen, sowie die Harmonisierung und Weitergabe fortschrittlicher europäischer Errungenschaften erörtert, die den Aufbau einer hochrangigen Zivilgesellschaft als Hauptursache für den Fortschritt Georgiens und den damit verbundenen politischen wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt sicherstellen sollen.

Abschließend werden die Perspektiven der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Georgien und der NATO, sowie die Entwicklung der georgischen Mitgliedschaft erörtert.

Die Rolle der NATO als militärpolitische Organisation in Georgien und nicht nur in Georgien, sondern auch im Südkaukasus, um Frieden und Gleichgewicht zu erhalten.

Die Untersuchung wird mit einer deskriptiven, vergleichenden und analytischen Methode durchgeführt: Eine Analyse anhand von Beispielen und historischer Fakten zeigt, dass die Verwestlichung Georgiens nur mit einem georgisch gewählten Ansatz erreicht werden kann. Eine Literaturrecherche wird durchgeführt.

Schlüsselwörter: Europäische Union, Europäische Integration, Geopolitik, Georgien, NATO, Russland.

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# INTRODUCTION

Georgia is one of the main centres of ancient civilization. Early human fossils found at an archeological site near Dmanisi (Georgia) represent one of the earliest known human presence in the world and known as first Europeans. Georgia is a small country with very ancient history and culture in Eastern Europe on the border of Asia. In particular, it is located in the Caucasus next to the Black Sea. The neighboring countries of Georgia are Armenia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia. From 1991 after Georgia gained its independence from Soviet Union, it aims to strengthen its freedom and embraces Western values of liberal democracy, which is expressed through sustainable human rights protection and most importantly, the formation of structures for the rule of law.

Georgia's constant strive to Western values in terms of geopolitical space, as a model of political, social and economic progress and as the cradle of modern civilization. These expectations had a significant impact on Georgia's history, and was interrupted in different times by different empires, which continued after the overthrow of Russian Emperor by the creation of the first Georgian state and ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However new challenges emerged on the difficult path to independence, democracy, progress and civilized world, such as territorial conflicts, more than 20% of Georgia is occupied by Russia – Abkhazia and Samachablo (Tskhinvali region). Georgia is the country where live many small ethnic groups, who have their own languages, culture and traditions, some even have their religion.

Georgia is a country on the path to strengthening freedom. This path can be achieved through independence, democratic values, sustainable human rights protection, and most importantly, the formation of structures for the rule of law. However there are many obstacles that hinder the process of development. The issue is that since the current events do not have an analogy, there is no correct, simple or effective recipe to reform them, but some works provide a good basis to get closer to this issue and analyse in order to set the right goal.

Thanks to its long-term historical experience and common cultural practices with many states and regions, Georgia can potentially identify itself with a number of regions. These include the post-Soviet space, the Caucasus or even the Middle East. Georgia could equally have simply avoided selecting a sole vector. However, ignoring all of these options, Georgia focused on its European identity, which became the main cultural focus of political discourses that gradually emerged throughout the country's turbulent history and constant struggle for survival among various empires. European identity is also a ticket to Euro-Atlantic integration, which for almost two decades has been a priority of the country's foreign policy.

Therefore, this thesis aims to analyze Georgia's aspirations and aims towards to European and Euro-Atlantic organizations in its endeavor to achieve development through close cooperation with the progressive and contemporary developed world. It also examines its relations with Russia.

This Thesis is divided into three Chapters. Firstly it is discussed Georgia's integration process in Europe and that the historical aspiration of Georgia is to return to European civilization. It shows the measures to be taken to achieve this integration, which should ensure that the implementation of the most difficult obstacles to the development of the country, eliminate them and maximally facilitate the facilitating factors. Taking into consideration globalization and localization trends, issues of elaboration and implementation of optimal strategy for resurgence.

Research questions in this chapter are:

- What is European about Georgia – its identity, history or culture?
- What is the reason for Georgia's aspirations to Western values and Western civilization, from ancient times to medieval and modern epochs?
- What were the factors driving Georgia's pro-Western course?
- What were the factors hindering Georgia's pro-Western aspiration?

In the second chapter, Georgia's integration process in the EU is explored – the problems and perspectives. As the source of Georgia's political and economic progress contribution to the common European family. This chapter will discuss the prospect of involvement in European structures, harmonization and sharing of



advanced European achievements, which should ensure the establishment of high level civil society as the main source of Georgia's political economic progress. This chapter also analyzes the EU's role in the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. Moreover, the importance of European projects such as EaP and AA, and other project programs are explored. The reforms that will be implemented in the political, economic and social fields and the integration of these measures will be made to facilitate the process of approximation with the EU.

Research questions in this chapter are:

- When did Georgia's relations with the EU begin and what do they include?
- When did Georgia-EU relations entered in a more intense phase?
- What role does the European Union play in resolving Georgia's conflicts, especially in the Russia-Georgia war?
- What are the requirements and criteria that EU demands from the candidate countries in order to become the member?
- What structures and agreements are actively working towards the EU-Georgia rapprochement?
- What are the hindering factors of EU-Georgia relationship?
- What will Georgia and the EU gain if they deepen their relations?

Finally, the perspectives of cooperation between Georgia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), development and its membership are dealt with. The role of the NATO as a military political organization in Georgia, but also in South Caucasus, to maintain peace and balance from the harmful nature of the policies of Russia. The article explores possible NATO enlargement to the East. The study is based on case study analyses and has two objectives: to provide analyses of the dynamics of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic process, and to show how this process corresponds to existing experience and practice. Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations, integration path, and domestic and external factors have all been taken into consideration, as have the degree to which Russia can negatively influence the eastward enlargement process and what candidate/aspirant countries can offer NATO

to secure future membership. Georgia strives for a common family of countries and international organizations with democratic values. NATO aims to embody the idea of a united, free, secure and peaceful Europe. Georgia's membership in an organization with such goals will guarantee the peaceful, secure and democratic development of the country. NATO membership should be legally enforced by internationally recognized borders, including the occupied territories of Georgia. The history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a precedent for joining a number of allied countries (Germany, Greece, Turkey, etc.), and the existence of Russian-occupied territories in Georgia cannot therefore be considered a hindrance to NATO membership. NATO integration will provide solid guarantees of national security for Georgia and will promote peace and stability in both the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region.

Research questions in this chapter are:

- What factors hinder Georgia's integration into NATO?
- How much will NATO be able to provide security for Georgia?
- What are the important factors in NATO membership?
- What are threats that could hinder Georgia's integration into the NATO?
- What are the criterias of NATO membership?

The research is conducted using a descriptive, comparative and analytical method: an analysis is carried out on the basis of generalized examples and historical facts illustrating that Georgia's westernization can only be achieved using the approach it has chosen. A literature research is carried out.

The findings show the implementation of the European and North-Atlantic standards in Georgia ensures progress, stable development, social-economic prosperity, peace and security.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The following literature review aims to provide the reader with necessary information, relevant discussions from previously conducted research, required to assemble and understand the following analysis and conclusions related to the Westernization process of Georgia – prospects and hindering factors of Georgia and the development of democracy. These literatures describe and analyze both Georgia's perspectives and hindering factors into joining European and Euro-Atlantic structures. The sources describe the influence of international trends, positive and negative factors of foreign policy on the process of transformation to progress.

The literature review moves on to reviewing the constructivist approach to European integration and continuing with introducing the constructivist views on identities. Directed by these discussions and the research question presented in the introduction, the focus will be shifted towards the key concepts that are needed for analyzing and answering the research questions.

Most of the work is devoted to articles on the political history of Georgia, the most important of which today are demonstrations of the consequences of the communist era, which hinder the democratic transformation in Georgia. Consequently, the need for constitutional, legal, law enforcement and institutional reforms, transparency and independence of the judiciary, overcoming corruption in all areas, simplifying the bureaucratic system as a key moment for reforms and a necessary condition for success. The aim of used literatures is to see a better future through democratic transformations and due to approaches to a single European family and the Euro-Atlantic system, which is considered, on the one hand, as a reinforcing stimulating factor in economics and politics, and on the other hand, the neighborhood policy with Russia is considered as a hindering factor for the development of Georgia.

The main literatures used in this research paper are: Kornely Kakachia's „Georgia's Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny" (Tbilisi; 29 March 2012), it describes Georgia as the member of Europe and its identity as European. The second important journal is „Road Leading Georgia to the European

Union Membership” (Journal of Social Sciences, ISSN:2233-3878; 2012) by Ketevan Chakhava. This is a journal, which describes Georgia’s perspectives and hindering factors towards EU membership. Furthermore, it should be noted the book of Michael Emerson and Tamara Kovziridze – „Deepening EU–Georgian Relations – What, why and how?” (USA, 2018). The book is explaining the EU’s Association Agreements and DCFTAs with Georgia. Nika Chitadze’s books „Geopolitics” (Tbilisi, 2011) and „NATO: One of the Main Guarantees of Peace and Security in South Caucasus” (Tbilisi, 2008) made a huge contribution in this research paper. The first is about about geopolitics and its regulations, moreover, it defines the status of geopolitical territories, global players of Georgia and the world according to geopolitical interests. The other one is about establishment and structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its role during and after the Cold War, also definition its policy, decision-making processes and broader activities. The research paper also used some documents. Such as, document about the study on NATO Enlargement. This document describes expansion strategy in detail.

Undoubtedly this study will also be very receptive towards understanding the conclusions of other scholars, but what is another important task of this literature review, is to see how such research been conducted.

# METHODOLOGY

This Thesis uses an explanatory, descriptive, comparative and analytical qualitative case study methodology<sup>1</sup>, where the theory is widely used in international relations and political science literature. The theory is used to guide the collection of secondary information<sup>2</sup>, which is then analyzed by categorization and comparison among the relevant stakeholder<sup>3</sup>, as recommended in the literature on the research methodology.<sup>4</sup> The text sampling method was a purposive and strategic choice of books, academic articles, newspapers and speeches (mostly by statesmen). Also were analysed Georgia's, as well as the world's biggest TV channels and mass media editions, academic articles and books, which explore the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia.

The research methodology helps to solve the set of objectives and will achieve the main goal of the thesis – to study the role of the European Union and NATO in the development of democratic institutions in Georgia and to identify the factors that influence this process.

As sources for evidence, I used open source articles, reports and websites. Additional insight was developed by observation during the life in Georgia. The analysis is carried out on the basis of generalized examples and historical facts, which illustrate Georgia's westernization, can only be achieved using the path it has chosen.

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<sup>1</sup> Yin, R.K.; "The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers"; *Administrative Science Quarterly*; March 1981; Volume 26, PP 58-65. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2392599>

<sup>2</sup> Yin, R.K.; "Case Study Research: Design and Method"; Sage Publications; London; 2013; Vol. 26, No 1, PP 58-65. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2392599?origin=crossref&seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2392599?origin=crossref&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

<sup>3</sup> Ferrier, W.J.; "Navigating the Competitive Landscape: The Drivers and Consequences of Competitive Aggressiveness"; *Academy of Management Journal*; 2001; Vol. 44, PP 858-877. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3069419?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3069419?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

<sup>4</sup> Ferrier, W.J.; "Navigating the Competitive Landscape: The Drivers and Consequences of Competitive Aggressiveness"; *Academy of Management Journal*; 2001; Vol. 44, PP 858-877. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/3069419?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/3069419?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

# CHAPTER ONE

## GEORGIA'S ASSIMILATION OF EUROPEAN STANDARDS AND INTEGRATION IN EUROPE

Geography and identity define Georgia's political options and determine many aspects of its state behavior. Georgia is located between the Black Sea, Russia, and Turkey, gives it strategic importance far beyond its size.<sup>5</sup> As a Black Sea and South-Eastern European state, the country has historically been a geographic, political and cultural part of greater Europe.<sup>6</sup> Ancient Georgian civilizations not only gained the achievements from the West, but also made a great contribution to the development of Europe through various discoveries, inventions and innovations.<sup>7</sup>

There was a claim in Georgia that the country was and remains part of Europe, as it precisely because of its desire for progress and a better future. After Georgia gained independence, the desire of Georgian population is to emphasize and realize democratic and liberal values, which is an expression of membership of the Western world. Georgian society gradually adopted the principles of equality before the

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<sup>5</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia's Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 37; Tbilisi; 29 March 2012; P:4.

<sup>6</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia's Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:5.

<sup>7</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; საქართველოს მაცნე; მე-3 გამომცემლობა; თბილისი; 2003; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:39.

<sup>7</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:39.

<sup>7</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:40.

elections of the government, the rule of law and the importance of the protection of human rights and freedoms. Georgia's Western aspiration is the result of tight relationship with ancient Greeks, who had colonies in the Western parts of Georgia<sup>8</sup>, after ancient Greeks, Georgia passively assimilated with Roman Empire,<sup>9</sup> later actively with Byzantine civilization.<sup>10</sup>

According to historical analysis, Greek mythology and the Uartuan historical sources mentions about an ancient and highly cultural Kingdom of Colchis, which is considered as the first Georgian settlement (present-day Western Georgia).<sup>11</sup> The ancient Greek myth of the Argonauts tells story of a journey of the group of heroes to Colchis more before the Trojan War. They were led by the Greek Prince Jason to find the Golden Fleece. The name - Argonauts - comes from the ship name of Argo. The history of the Argonauts contains valuable material about the Georgian tribes – Kolkhida or also known as Aiya. The history of the Argonauts is an ancient script. The main object of mythology is the Golden Fleece – this method of obtaining gold with sheepskin is still preserved in the mountains of Svaneti – the gold is piled on sheepskin leather, then these skins are dried, sanded with gold and separated from other impurities. This is an ancient tradition of gold mining in the Svaneti Mountains. – The main theme of the mythology of Argonauts is the love between the Greek prince Jason and the Colchian princess Medea.<sup>12</sup> The princess Medea had knowledge in chemistry and healing, and with one of the many theories, her name became the basis for the ancient Greeks to call medicine for medical treatment.<sup>13</sup>

From the 6<sup>th</sup> century BC, the ancient Greeks founded settlements on the eastern coast of the Black Sea - Phasis (present-day Poti), Gyenos (present-day Ochamchire), Dioscurias (present-day Sokhumi).<sup>14</sup> Also in the territory of Adjara the archeological

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<sup>8</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:39.

<sup>9</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:49.

<sup>10</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia's Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:5.

<sup>11</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:31.

<sup>12</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:34.

<sup>13</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:35.

<sup>14</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:35.

finds prove that it was an ancient Greek trade settlement. These colonies did not survive, they themselves fell under the influence of Colchis. Nevertheless, these colonies made a great contribution to the country's political, economic and cultural development. The Greeks attached the great importance to trade with Colchis and Colchis itself was quite advanced in viticulture, growing grain, animal husbandry, cultivation of fruit, it was also well known for the processing of bronze, iron and precious metal, which is also confirmed by Georgian archaeological excavations.<sup>15</sup>

Iberia-Roman relations are also interesting, thanks to these interactions, Iberia is known in Europe.<sup>16</sup> Iberia is the ancient name for the Georgian kingdom of Karti. It was a significant monarchy in the Caucasus. Iberia was centered on present-day Eastern Georgia and bordered by Colchis in the west, Caucasian Albania in the east and Armenia in the south.<sup>17</sup> At the time of Roman expansion in the East, Iberia was actively involved in the process of international trade and economic relations, as a result Iberia strengthened economy in the country, became acquainted with the most important achievements of classical culture, science and technology, mastered them creatively and presented them on local soil.<sup>18</sup>

Therefore, the ancient Georgian kingdoms (Colchis and Iberia) had close trade-economic, cultural and political ties with both Greece and Rome, as well as with developed Asian countries, such as Persian Empire. These relations affected the cultural development of the country. Georgia, with its geographical position, was a natural bridge between the East and the West, so an interesting fusion of traditions from the East and the West occurred. This circumstance gave a very interesting look at Georgian culture throughout its existence.<sup>19</sup>

The formation and development of Byzantine Empire brought Georgia closer to Europe and it's values and vice versa. Byzantium directly bordered Georgia from the South-West and had almost permanent relations firstly with separate Georgian

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<sup>15</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:40.

<sup>16</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:70.

<sup>17</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:43.

<sup>18</sup> See. Lordkipanidze, Otar D; „The Greco-Roman World and Ancient Georgia (Colchis and Iberia)”; Publications de l'École française de Rome; Rome; 18.01.2019; P:142.

<sup>19</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:69.



political units and then with the United Kingdom of Georgia, also known as Georgian Empire, which emerged approximately 1010 AD. Relations between the Byzantine Empire and Georgia are a complex cycle of long-term political, economic, cultural and religious relations that continued until the fall of the Byzantine Empire. Georgia was introduced to Roman law through the influence of Byzantine Empire. High impact of Byzantium on the legal culture of Georgia is well seen through the adoption of the Nomocanon and the Lesser Nomocanon, which are legal monuments of the Byzantine canon law. The Influence of Byzantine Empire can be seen in the 1103 Ruis-Urbnisi Code of Canons as well.<sup>20</sup> This period in Georgia is considered as renaissance - industry was developed, agriculture became more intense, Georgia was promoted by hand working, and new towns were founded as centers for trade and hand working; Culture and science were brought before the state policy. For example David IV The Builder (1089-1125)<sup>21</sup> built the Gelati and Ikalto academies, where he brought together Georgian and foreign scientists and philosophers and created the most favorable conditions for creative work.<sup>22</sup> However, the western course and the very process of civilization stopped and put on its mark the invasion of the Mongols, which lasted almost a century between in XIII-XIV centuries. The Mongolian influence actually killed the early renaissance in Georgia and stopped the progress and development of the state.<sup>23</sup> By the middle of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the fall of Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire sealed the Black Sea, cutting off the Christian states in this area from Europe and from the rest of the Christian world. As a result of these changes, Georgia suffered from economic and political decline and became a battleground for two great rival powers—Safavid Persia and the Ottoman Empire.<sup>24</sup> After these invasions Georgia was weakened. Enemies appeared inside the country, which then led to the disintegration of Georgia.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> See. Karumadze Zurab, Rakviashvili Mariam & Shatirishvili Zaza: „Georgia’s European Way – Political and Cultural Perspectives”; National Archives of Georgia; Tbilisi; 2015; P:16.

<sup>21</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:158.

<sup>22</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:146.

<sup>23</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:213.

<sup>24</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:5.

<sup>25</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:241.

Since then, the shattered Georgian kingdoms struggled to remain connected with Europe, first through the Genoese colonies in Crimea and then through the Russian Empire.<sup>26</sup> During the reign of Russian Empress Catherine II, when in 1783 in the town of Georgievsk a treaty was signed between Russia and King Erekle II, which was providing for Russian protection against Persian attacks. Georgia searched for protection and partnership with Russia but was simply annexed by the Russian Empire in 1801<sup>27</sup> and in 1811 they took control the Church hierarchy, revoked the independent status (autocephaly) of the Georgian Orthodox Church and instead created a „Georgian Exarchate” under the immediate governance of the Synod (Russian Orthodox Church).<sup>28</sup> Russia destroyed Georgia as a state, Georgians viewed this annexation as a great tragedy.<sup>29</sup> The fact that Georgians and Russians shared a common faith and church did not concern the Russian government.<sup>30</sup> In addition, Russia started to filter Western influence from Georgia, such as:

- Loss of independence and incorporation into the Russian state.
- Loss of democracy - Electoral and multi-party government replaced as single-party (Communists) and were appointed by Russia.
- The abolition of the right to private property, including the seizure of land and common property, which was actually owned by the communist elite.
- The fight against freedom of expression that was revealed in censorship as well as against religion and belief. Deprivation of independence for the Georgian Church, persecution of the Georgian clergy and, finally, the agitation of atheism by force.
- Massive persecution, expulsion or execution of pro-Western intelligence representatives that appreciated progressive values.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:5.

<sup>27</sup> See. ასათიანი, ნოდარ; საქართველოს ისტორია – ანტიკური ხანებიდან XIX საუკუნემდე; Asatiani, Nodar; „History of Georgia - Ancient times before the XIX Century”; Saqartvelos Macne; Vol.3; Tbilisi; 2003.; P:367.

<sup>28</sup> See. Gvosdev, Nikolas K.; „Imperial Policies and Perspectives towards Georgia, 1760–1819”; Palgrave mamillan, in association with ST ANTONY’S COLLEGE, OXFORD; Great Britain; 2000; P:136.

<sup>29</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:5.

<sup>30</sup> See. Gvosdev, Nikolas K.; „Imperial Policies and Perspectives towards Georgia, 1760–1819”; Palgrave mamillan, in association with ST ANTONY’S COLLEGE, OXFORD; Great Britain; 2000; P:X.

<sup>31</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:5.

After collapse of Russian and Ottoman Empires, on May 26<sup>th</sup>, 1918, with the support of Germany, an independent Georgian Democratic Republic appeared.<sup>32</sup> Most importantly it became possible for Georgia to return to the West. Georgian Democratic Republic had existed for only three years, the country sought to create a democratic system of high standard, to approve equal rights, justice, rule of law, to ensure freedom of speech, to encourage self-government in the regions, to create conditions for healthy competition and private entrepreneurship - all that and what Western and all progressive humanity are proud of.<sup>33</sup> At that time there were 6 women in parliament and one of them was a Muslim woman who was the first Muslim woman in parliament in the world. But unfortunately this freedom did not last long and Bolshevik Russia seized Georgia in 1921<sup>34</sup> and Georgia became part of the Soviet Union.<sup>35</sup> Because of the weak foreign policy of the ruling Georgian Social-Democratic government, which was actually part of the Russian Social-Democratic party<sup>36</sup> and because of the aggressive policy of the Bolshevik Russia, which is not inclined to the independence of its former colonies, the Russian army under the command of Lenin and Stalin 25 February 1921 invaded Georgia. Unequal war, with weak external support ended with the seizure, occupation and annexation of Georgia and loss of independence. The Russian invaders established the so-called "Socialist" system and at the head of the power was Communist government.<sup>37</sup>

Again Russian started to filter Western influence from Georgia, which continued until the fall of the Soviet Union. Despite having no direct diplomatic ties or access to West, Georgians stayed in tune with European civilization and maintained cultural, political and spiritual connections with Europe.<sup>38</sup> „Blue Jeans Generation” is a great example, which clearly shows the attitude of the Georgian people to the West. „Blue Jeans Generation” is David Turashvili’s 2008 novel. The novel is based on the most

<sup>32</sup> See. Javakhishvili, Irakli; „THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS OF THE GREAT POWERS 1918-1921”; DISSERTATIO AD LAUREAM IN FACULTATE SCIENTIARUM SOCIALIUM APUD PONTIFICAM UNIVERSITATEM S. THOMAE IN URBE; Rome; 2017; P:16.

<sup>33</sup> See. Karumadze, Zurab, Rakviashvili, Mariam & Shatirishvili, Zaza: „Georgia’s European Way – Political and Cultural Perspectives”; National Archives of Georgia; Tbilisi; 2015; P:40.

<sup>34</sup> See. უგრეხელიძე, მარიამ; ხუთი ქალი, რომლებმაც საქართველოს კონსტიტუცია შექმნეს; Ugrehelidze, Mariam; Five women who created the Georgian Constitution; JAM News; 25 May, 2018; <https://jam-news.net/%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%9B%E1%83%A4%E1%83%A3%E1%83%AB%E1%83%9C%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%94%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%93%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%98/?lang=ka>

<sup>35</sup> See. Dunbar, William; The world's first democratically elected Muslim woman was from Georgia; Eurasianet; Mar. 8, 2018; <https://eurasianet.org/the-worlds-first-democratically-elected-muslim-woman-was-from-georgia>

<sup>36</sup> See. საქართველოს ეროვნული არქივი; ნოე ჟორდანიძე; The National Archives of Georgia; Tbilisi; 2014; <http://www.archives.gov.ge/ge/page/noe-jordania>

<sup>37</sup> See. Toria, Malkhaz; „The Soviet occupation of Georgia in 1921 and the Russian – Georgian war of August 2008 - Historical analogy as a memory project”; Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group; January, 2014; P:317.

<sup>38</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:5.

tragic and scandalous story of the 1980s Soviet Georgia. In 1983, seven young Georgians, six boys and one pregnant girl, they were in their 20s and all came from the intellectual elite families of the country and were famous for wearing jeans as a sign of protest and a pro-West political statement. They tried to hijack an airplane to escape from the Soviet Union and to get in America. It was an exceptional action, because at that time even a thought of escaping from the USSR was criminal. As a result, they failed; Except a girl, the Soviet Georgian Court executed them all and the 23-year-old girl was sentenced 14 years of jail and an induced abortion, but after the protest rallies, she was soon released from prison. The Soviet Union also executed a priest, who even was not in the plane, but was the friend of kidnappers. Even today, this case remains very debatable in Georgia, some see them as heroes of a generation starving for freedom, while others consider them as terrorists.<sup>39</sup>

On April 4, 1989, in Soviet Georgia began demonstrations, protesting recent appeals made by Abkhaz leaders ruled by Moscow for the right to declare self-determination for Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.<sup>40</sup> The manifestation began by the Iliia Chavchavadze Society<sup>41</sup> and the protesters were led by the Independence Committee of Merab Kostava, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Irakli Bathiashvili and Irakli Tsereteli demanding the punishment of Abkhaz secessionists.<sup>42</sup> National Democratic Party, led by Giorgi Chanturia, launched demonstration demanding independence of Georgia, which was shared by all of Georgian society.<sup>43</sup> When the local Soviet

<sup>39</sup> See. Bolkvadze, Eva. "Story of Jean Boys." *Georgian Journal*, December 2013;

<https://www.georgianjournal.ge/blog/25553-story-of-jeans-boys.html>

<sup>40</sup> See. ღამბაშიძე, თამარა; 9 აპრილი: ტრაგედიის ქრონოლოგია; Ghambashidze, Tamara; „9

April: Chronology of Tragedy"; NEWS.On.ge; 2016; [https://on.ge/story/505-9-](https://on.ge/story/505-9-%E1%83%90%E1%83%9E%E1%83%A0%E1%83%98%E1%83%9A%E1%83%98-%E1%83%A2%E1%83%A0%E1%83%90%E1%83%92%E1%83%94%E1%83%93%E1%83%98%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%A5%E1%83%A0%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9C%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9A%E1%83%9D%E1%83%92%E1%83%98%E1%83%90?fbclid=IwAR12SAxMuhaXuyI-Tor8CDscYPVgZ0nNJKcoj88V9CwDFhJ6KrOkYJIDmM)

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<sup>43</sup> See. წამბაღაშვილი, ეკა; დამოუკიდებლობის გაცვეთილები – მომავლისკენ წარსულის გააზრებით – გორგი ჭანტურიას მოხსენება (1 მაისი 1989) – “გაუმარჯოს რუსეთის იმპერიისგან თავისუფად, დამოუკიდებელ საქართველოს!"; სააკაშვილის საპრეზიდენტო ბიბლიოთეკა; Tsamalashvili, Eka; „Lessons of Independence - with a sense of the past to the future - Giorgi Chanturia's speech (1 May 1989) - Long live a free, independent Georgia from the Russian Empire"; Saakshvili Presidential Library; 2016

<https://lessonsgeo.wordpress.com/1989/05/01/%E1%83%92%E1%83%90%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9B%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0%E1%83%AF%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A1->

authorities lost control over the situation in the capital, the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Jumber Patiashvili asked USSR leadership to send troops to restore order and impose curfew. Colonel General Igor Rodionov commanded the troops.<sup>44</sup> In the hours before the attack, the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church Iliia II made an impassioned address to the crowd, beseeching the demonstrators to leave the square. They refused.<sup>45</sup> Minutes before 4am on 9 April, General Rodionov told his troops to clear the square by all means available.<sup>46</sup> Among the deceased were 17 women and 4 men, including 1 pregnant and many 16-year-old students as well as women of different ages. After the brutal raid, unknown gas poisoned peaceful protesters and many of them were severely injured. Protesters eventually required some form of medical help.<sup>47</sup> The night of April 9 remained in the history of Georgia as one of the most tragic but at the same time heroic dates when whole country united to fight for its independence. On April 10, in protest against the attack, 40-day of national mourning was declared. People brought a huge amount of flowers to honor the memory of the deceased.<sup>48</sup>

The 9 April 1989 tragedy in Tbilisi pushed Georgia towards independence and the end of Soviet domination. 300 000 people rallied in the streets after massacre, especially large demonstration were held on 26 May to mark the anniversary of the declaration of the Georgian Democratic Republic in 1918, prior to Georgia's incorporation into the Soviet Union.<sup>49</sup>

On 9 April 1991, Georgia adopted a Declaration of Independence. By this time, Georgia was under the leadership one of the leaders of protesting movement Zviad Gamsakhurdia and also he became the first democratically elected President of Georgia. April 9 is a public holiday in Georgia to mark this Day as a National Unity.<sup>50</sup>

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[%E1%83%A0%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A1%E1%83%94%E1%83%97%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1-%E1%83%98%E1%83%9B%E1%83%9E%E1%83%94%E1%83%A0/?fbclid=IwAR3PVYgjGjY7a1EjqmwY2JpFlxIJWAorusQCtZTLW- F73q1zIcKo8BkO3c](#)

<sup>44</sup> See. Jones, Stephen: Georgia: A Political History Since Independence; I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd; 2015; P:32.

<sup>45</sup> See. Jones, Stephen: Georgia: A Political History Since Independence; 2015; P:31.

<sup>46</sup> See. Jones, Stephen: Georgia: A Political History Since Independence; 2015; P:32.

<sup>47</sup> See. Eke, Steven; Georgia recalls Soviet crackdown; 2009;

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986282.stm?fbclid=IwAR0juiN4k\\_QJJnwd1jS5A1e2\\_XV2--faavAXxoS8r7sihWEk34dfimmSLWA](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986282.stm?fbclid=IwAR0juiN4k_QJJnwd1jS5A1e2_XV2--faavAXxoS8r7sihWEk34dfimmSLWA)

<sup>48</sup> See. Eke, Steven; Georgia recalls Soviet crackdown; 2009;

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986282.stm?fbclid=IwAR0juiN4k\\_QJJnwd1jS5A1e2\\_XV2--faavAXxoS8r7sihWEk34dfimmSLWA](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986282.stm?fbclid=IwAR0juiN4k_QJJnwd1jS5A1e2_XV2--faavAXxoS8r7sihWEk34dfimmSLWA)

<sup>49</sup> See. Eke, Steven; Georgia recalls Soviet crackdown; 2009;

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986282.stm?fbclid=IwAR0juiN4k\\_QJJnwd1jS5A1e2\\_XV2--faavAXxoS8r7sihWEk34dfimmSLWA](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986282.stm?fbclid=IwAR0juiN4k_QJJnwd1jS5A1e2_XV2--faavAXxoS8r7sihWEk34dfimmSLWA)

<sup>50</sup> See. Eke, Steven; Georgia recalls Soviet crackdown; 2009;

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986282.stm?fbclid=IwAR0juiN4k\\_QJJnwd1jS5A1e2\\_XV2--faavAXxoS8r7sihWEk34dfimmSLWA](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986282.stm?fbclid=IwAR0juiN4k_QJJnwd1jS5A1e2_XV2--faavAXxoS8r7sihWEk34dfimmSLWA)

After Georgia gained independence from the Soviet Empire, it got back on a path towards high civilization, progress and development, which can be achieved through the support and close cooperation with the Western world. Such steps constitute a serious threat to Russia as the success of the free, independent and democratic existence of the former colony can serve as a role model and infect various people living in Russia and will play a catastrophic role for Russian traditional totalitarian and dictatorial rule, because the Russian Empire for two hundred years, justifying its dominance in Georgia, that only Russia is the guarantor of peace and prosperity in this region, moreover, the population would have been destroyed either by another country, or by economic poverty, or by false Western democracy, anarchy and internal wars.<sup>51</sup> Reforms are momentarily reflected on the welfare of society and one can immediately see the preference of a democratic, free and legal state over dictatorial or autocratic governance in which individuals usurp power. In order to maintain its influence, the northern neighbor in Georgia initiated and encouraged separatist movements on ethnic and religious grounds. The most successful outcome was in case of Russia in the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region also known as South Ossetia, which was created during the Soviet Union (Abkhazia in 1937<sup>52</sup> and South Ossetia in 1922<sup>53</sup>), in the native Georgian lands of Abkhazia and Samachablo. To achieve this goal, informal alliances formed by KGB agents in the 80s, "Aidgilara" in Abkhazia<sup>54</sup> and Adamon Nihaz<sup>55</sup> in Samachablo, came to the force. They represented anti-Georgian and separatist groups. Moreover, Russia provided not only ideological encouragement and support to the informal and illegal formations, but also armed them with Soviet Russian guns and even heavy artillery. It should be noted that if not the Soviet Russian provision of the military

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<sup>51</sup> See. On.ge; 20 მიზეზი, თუ რატომ არ უნდა ვენდოთ და ვემეგობროთ რუსეთს (20 reason, why we can not be „friends” with Russia); 8 Sep. 2016; <https://on.ge/story/3374-20-%E1%83%9B%E1%83%98%E1%83%96%E1%83%94%E1%83%96%E1%83%98-%E1%83%97%E1%83%A3-%E1%83%A0%E1%83%90%E1%83%A2%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9B-%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0-%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9C%E1%83%93%E1%83%90-%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9C%E1%83%93%E1%83%9D%E1%83%97-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90-%E1%83%95%E1%83%94%E1%83%9B%E1%83%94%E1%83%92%E1%83%9D%E1%83%91%E1%83%A0%E1%83%9D%E1%83%97-%E1%83%A0%E1%83%A3%E1%83%A1%E1%83%94%E1%83%97%E1%83%A1?fbclid=IwAR1ZA0SnHgMxVWwLUQDgpwJmKtfsESwkq1Ssixz6KfGpY7E0Eqksh2qE7pk>

<sup>52</sup> See. აფხაზეთის ავტონომიური რესპუბლიკის უმაღლესი საბჭო; აფხაზეთი: მოკლე ისტორიული ცნობა; Supreme Council of Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia; Abkhazia: A Brief Historical Note; Last accessed in July 10, 2019; <https://scara.gov.ge/en/2010-03-17-12-47-30/history/51-afkhazethis-mokle-istoriuli-cnoba.html>

<sup>53</sup> See. Махарадзе, Филипэ; Кавтарадзе, С. Каландадзе, Ф.; Декрет №2 Об образовании автономной области Юго-Осетии; 1922; Makharadze, Philipe; Kavtaradze, S. Kalandadze Ph.; Decree No. 2 On the Formation of an Autonomous Region of South Ossetia; 1922; [http://dSPACE.nplg.gov.ge/bitstream/1234/23065/4/Dekret\\_N2.pdf](http://dSPACE.nplg.gov.ge/bitstream/1234/23065/4/Dekret_N2.pdf)

<sup>54</sup> See. GOVERNMENT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF ABKHAZIA; Conflict Chronology: Military conflict in Abkhazia in 1992-1993: Short introduction; 2017; <http://abkhazia.gov.ge/page/conflictCronology?fbclid=IwAR2S4anHbMqIQNBTP4-9jTTNgyU0fd228063DlkEMrOLDtXqUP3ehsZRCu>

<sup>55</sup> See. Guseynova, Esmira; The Russia's Interest Behind The Involvement In Georgia – South Ossetian Conflict; Central European University Nationalism Studies Program; Budapest, Hungary; 2012; P:8.

equipment, it was absolutely impossible to get them in that period of time and within that region. Their appeals were based on as if alleged attempts by Georgians against oppression of ethnic minorities of Abkhazians and Ossetians, as well as by an attempt to falsify the history.<sup>56</sup> Abkhazia<sup>57</sup> and the so-called South Ossetia demanded for recognition of the independence. Moreover, Soviet Russian agents successfully found “anti-forces” in ethnic Georgians that contributed to the escalation of conflicts and the emergence of hostilities through informal armed groups.<sup>58</sup> All of this, eventually, became the basis of large-scale bloodshed on ethnic grounds and hostilities in Abkhazia<sup>59</sup> and the so-called South Ossetia.<sup>60</sup>

After April 9, 1989, a number of chauvinistic-extremist groups provoked ethnic violence and killings. They were controlled by the Soviet Russian government. Law enforcement and security services didn’t react properly, but even contributed to violence and war.<sup>61</sup>

On July 16 1989, the Soviet Russia interrupted the opening of the Sukhumi branch of Georgia State University. The protests of the Abkhazians crossed first in vandalism, and then in violence and bloodshed and led to large-scale clashes between ethnic Georgians and Abkhazians.<sup>62</sup>

On November 23 1989, after thousands of Georgians gathered on the outskirts of Tskhinvali (according to various sources, from 15 to 60 thousand), it was an attempt to protest oppression against Georgians, which was expressed in racial discrimination by Abkhaz and so-called South Ossetian forces through attacks against and mass

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<sup>56</sup> See. Institute For War & Peace Reporting (IWPR); ომი აგვისტოში არ დაწყებულა (The war did not begin in August); 24 Oct. 09; <https://iwpr.net/ka/global-voices/%E1%83%9D%E1%83%9B%E1%83%98-%E1%83%90%E1%83%92%E1%83%95%E1%83%98%E1%83%A1%E1%83%A2%E1%83%9D%E1%83%A8%E1%83%98-%E1%83%90%E1%83%A0-%E1%83%93%E1%83%90%E1%83%AC%E1%83%A7%E1%83%94%E1%83%91%E1%83%A3%E1%83%9A%E1%83%90?fbclid=IwAR3TtMEkrCuwrRma4ydw3Ut3BFsklEw9W3KpseK7-02-pPQ0xmR1NQGRrU>

<sup>57</sup> See. Lobjanidze, Tamar; HISTORY THAT MATTERS: GEORGIA’S ENDLESS TRAGEDY, ABKHAZIA; Adjapsandali; September 2013; <https://adjapsandali.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/abkhazia/>

<sup>58</sup> See. Pitskhelauri, Nana; Occupation of History, i.e. Putin’s messages; 04.08.2019; <https://www.kvirispalitra.ge/politic/55356-istoriis-okupacia-anu-putinis-gzavnilebi.html?fbclid=IwAR3hfqPWKNCzQCMYvrpC1aP3EhgeaiO33vhCSQ0Y1SecoCF7-z6XPvg6Yng>

<sup>59</sup> See. Lobjanidze, Tamar; HISTORY THAT MATTERS: GEORGIA’S ENDLESS TRAGEDY, ABKHAZIA; Adjapsandali; September 2013; <https://adjapsandali.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/abkhazia/>

<sup>60</sup> See. ღივბეღაური, ნანა; ეტყობა, პუტინმა მასწავლებლად კოვითი დაიყენა" – ისტორიის ოკუპაცია, ანუ პუტინის გზავნილები; Pitskhelauri, Nana; Occupation of History, i.e. Putin’s messages; 04.08.2019; <https://www.kvirispalitra.ge/politic/55356-istoriis-okupacia-anu-putinis-gzavnilebi.html?fbclid=IwAR3hfqPWKNCzQCMYvrpC1aP3EhgeaiO33vhCSQ0Y1SecoCF7-z6XPvg6Yng>

<sup>61</sup> See. GOVERNMENT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF ABKHAZIA; Conflict Chronology: Military conflict in Abkhazia in 1992-1993: Short introduction; 2017;

<http://abkhazia.gov.ge/page/conflictCronology?fbclid=IwAR2S4anHbMqIQNBTP4-9jTTNgyU0fd228063DlkEMrOLDtXqUP3ehsZRcU>

<sup>62</sup> Lobjanidze, Tamar; HISTORY THAT MATTERS: GEORGIA’S ENDLESS TRAGEDY, ABKHAZIA; Adjapsandali; September 2013; <https://adjapsandali.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/abkhazia/>

expulsions of ethnic Georgians. Unfortunately, the blockade of the rally by Ossetian gangs and the 8th regiment of the Soviet army ultimately turned the conflict into a bloody confrontation.<sup>63</sup>

Finally, after several years of hostilities, a significant part of Abkhazia and Samachablo began to be devastated by ethnic Georgians. As a result of these conflicts and Russian pressure, on December 3 1993, the Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze forced the country to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was established in 1991. Subsequently, the status of Russian military units was reinforced by the so-called UN Peace Mandate, which eventually supported the prolonged freezing of conflicts in favor of the separatists and Russian politics.<sup>64</sup>

Since Georgia's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia, as a developing country, has been striving for direct relations with the West. After centuries of domination by the Russian Empire and Soviet Union, Georgia finally set its national interests. Firstly, it was not easy to develop foreign and security policy towards the West, because of inherited policy from the Soviet Union, Georgia was lacking democratic values and had low financial resources. Even at this difficult stage, Georgia's foreign policy was strongly determined by its identity to continue its path to the West.<sup>65</sup>

The former Georgian Prime Minister and former Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Zurab Zhvania, declared on Georgia's accession to the Council of Europe in February 1999 – „I am Georgian, therefore I am European.” This statement emphasized the desire of the Georgian people to achieve integration into the European political institutions.<sup>66</sup>

Since the „Rose Revolution” in November 2003, Georgia had set new goals – EU and NATO membership. Georgia's Western aspiration can be also seen in the main document, such as the National Security Concept of Georgia, which emphasizes the national desire of Georgia to achieve full-fledged integration into NATO and the EU,

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<sup>63</sup> See. არაბიძე, მაია; 1989 წლის 23 ნოემბრის ცხინვალის შეტაკება; Arabidze, Maia; Clash of Tskhinvali on November 23, 1989; Georgian News Agency; 23 November, 2018; <http://ghn.ge/news/215887-1989-tslis-23-noembers-tskhinvaltan-shetakebas-mskhverpli-mohqva?fbclid=IwAR0uAu-BDuDrm23sAVUq03p7KeWJdKn5YKMnjgUFw3vgz1IGg34ber81SrY>

<sup>64</sup> See. კუნჭულია, ლელა; რას ფიქრობენ საქართველოში 13 წლის დღს-ზე; რადიო თავისუფლება; Kunchulia, Lela; What people think about CIS in Georgia?; Radio Tavisupleba; 21 December, 2004; [https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/1538849.html?fbclid=IwAR21d49b3bdGg7jtYRTs63Jod\\_PH-F9IRcKVx19\\_DpJrapP9M5Y2ygaif4](https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/1538849.html?fbclid=IwAR21d49b3bdGg7jtYRTs63Jod_PH-F9IRcKVx19_DpJrapP9M5Y2ygaif4)

<sup>65</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia's Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:5.

<sup>66</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia's Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:6.



and to contribute to the security of the Black Sea region as a constituent part of the Euro-Atlantic security system.<sup>67</sup>

NATO Secretary General Jonas Flodager Rasmussen, in an article published in the Project Syndicate, confirms: “Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Georgia a few months after the summit and since then Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region were occupied by Russia. The war and destruction significantly impeded the development of Georgia, but it could not change the western vector chosen by the country.”<sup>68</sup>

Georgia no longer wants to be called a post-Soviet state and does not want to be identified with an unstable Caucasus region, Georgia views its ties with the Black Sea community as a way to be connected with the rest of Europe. During these years since independence, Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy is the removal itself from the Soviet past and from the Russian influence. As the result, Georgia left post-Soviet institutions, such as the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS); The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which was established in 2002; The Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), which was established in 2000 and others. These organizations were dominated by Moscow.<sup>69</sup>

Georgia in process of forming its identity and defining its respective national interests, developed national narrative that viewed Russia as a threat, and its political and socio-economic model – not attractive, as Russians do not generate new interesting political, cultural or civilizational ideas that can change the world in better way.<sup>70</sup> Russia is a danger to Georgia’s national security, Georgia's ongoing political, economic, and social reforms as well as legal reforms that have been successfully developing the country, have become a threat to the Russian authorities as enemies of progress. Consequently, Russia provoked the August 2008 war in so-called South Ossetia – Samachablo and launched a large-scale military attack, as well as in Abkhazia. Today more than 20% of the territory of Georgia is occupied by Russia and moreover Russians keep creeping occupation. As the result, Georgia’s point of view Russia is the direct successor of the Soviet Empire, which attempts to restore the post-

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<sup>67</sup> See. The National Security Concept of Georgia; Last accessed in June 29, 2019; P:3; <https://mod.gov.ge/uploads/2018/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf>

<sup>68</sup> See. Jonas Flodager Rasmussen, Andres Fogh; NATO’s Duty at 70; Project Syndicate; Apr. 4 ,2019; <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nato-accession-for-ukraine-georgia-without-russia-veto-by-anders-fogh-rasmussen-2019-04?fbclid=IwAR3fVmlxAdpkMu2JwirL3TUPIhaOLowmGD-GlsYPUvJeNI-PBG6TXCH701U&barrier=accesspaylog>

<sup>69</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:6.

<sup>70</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; „Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:6.

Soviet space under the auspices of the CIS or any other post-Soviet regional organizations.<sup>71</sup>

Today, Georgia does not consider either the Russian or the Soviet empires as „European”, because of their autocratic and anti-Western ideology. Briefly speaking, Georgians want to see their country in the long-term perspective as „European” and part of the united Europe and in no way with Russia.<sup>72</sup>

Fortunately, because of the history of Georgia it was always considered as a part of European civilization.<sup>73</sup> Moreover, Georgia has great perspectives in Euro-Atlantic structures - as mentioned above, Georgia is the natural bridge between East and West. The shortest way from Europe to China goes through Georgia and is known as “Silk Road”. Due to its strategic geographic location Georgia has a great potential to become a wealthy and prosperous European country, but frequent conflicts and political instability are the major obstacles to the economic development and progress, which prevent Georgia’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:7.

<sup>72</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:7.

<sup>73</sup> See. Kakachia, Kornely; Georgia’s Identity-Driven Foreign Policy and the Struggle for Its European Destiny”; 2012; P:7.

<sup>74</sup> See. Modebadze, Valeri; Sayin M. Faith; GEORGIA’S PRO-WESTERN PATH: ANALYSIS OF THE GEORGIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD; AIBU Journal of Social Sciences; Vol:14, Year:14, P:340;

# CHAPTER TWO

## GEORGIA AND EU

Georgia has been striving to join the European Union from the very first day of its independence, but the relations between Georgia and the EU began in 1992 after EU recognized Georgia as an independent state and started cooperation with Georgia under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). TACIS was established in 1991 and the objective of the programme is to help individual states to develop effectively functioning market economies based on private ownership and initiative and to encourage the development of pluralistic democratic societies.<sup>75</sup> The collapse of the Soviet Union occurred crises, such as internal conflicts, political instability, social destitution, the loss of economic markets, which was noticeable on Georgia's GDP – compared to 1989 it decreased to 76.4%. Because of these factors, the EU began to provide Georgia with aid.<sup>76</sup> From 1999 to 2004 EU spent more than a billion Euro supporting Georgia with various programs and projects, it helped to solve the country's economic and social problems, but the EU's main political aim was to protect Georgia's independence and sovereignty, also these projects helped the country's integration into the European community.<sup>77</sup>

The formal relationship between Georgia and EU began on March 22 1996, when they signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which enforced

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<sup>75</sup> See. European Commission; TACIS; 25-07-2019; [https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_MEMO-92-54\\_de.htm](https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-92-54_de.htm)

<sup>76</sup> See. Georgian Center for Security and Development; EU-Georgia Relations, Future Perspectives; Policy Paper; Open Society Georgia Foundation; Tbilisi; 2017; P:6; [https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia\\_Relations\\_and\\_Future\\_Perspectives.pdf](https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia_Relations_and_Future_Perspectives.pdf)

<sup>77</sup> See. Georgian Center for Security and Development; Tbilisi; 2017; P:7; [https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia\\_Relations\\_and\\_Future\\_Perspectives.pdf](https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia_Relations_and_Future_Perspectives.pdf)

starting from 1997.<sup>78</sup> A partnership and cooperation agreement is a legally binding agreement between the EU and third countries. The main objectives of PCA are the strengthening of democracy and human rights, and the market liberalisation in the country.<sup>79</sup> Thanks to the EU's political support, Georgia joined the Council of Europe in 1999, which is an international organisation whose stated aim is to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe and was founded in 1949. The EU also supported Georgia to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000. WTO is an intergovernmental organization that is concerned with the regulation of international trade between nations. The WTO officially commenced on 1 January 1995 under the Marrakesh Agreement, signed by 123 nations on 15 April 1994, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which commenced in 1948. It is the largest international economic organization in the world.<sup>80</sup>

After the „Rose Revolution“ in 2003 gave birth to the new government led by Mikheil Sakaashvili, he changed radically policy towards Russia and instead he continued the ancient aspiration of Georgia to the West.<sup>81</sup> Also, President Saakashvili promoted an ambitious program of political and economical reforms. Georgia started to fight against corruption, the business and investment climate was improved, tax revenue was increased, armed forces were modernized and etc. Georgia successfully strengthened its relations with EU, USA and NATO as well.<sup>82</sup> So, Georgia, step by step, approached the road leading through the membership of Euro-Atlantic organizations. US administration also pushed Georgia's development towards the West, especially after the 9/11 terrorists attacks in USA and Georgia joined the mission in Afghanistan and the „coalition of the willing“ in Iraq.<sup>83</sup>

Georgia was also trying to build relationships to Europe. The new President Saakashvili, in order to underline the importance of cooperation with Europe, decided to use officially both the Georgian and the European flag. As a member of the

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<sup>78</sup> See. Carbone, Roberta; Georgia between the European Union and Russia – Does Russia constitute an obstacle to Georgian Europeanization?"; C.E.S.I.; Torino, Italia; November 2012; P:7.

<sup>79</sup> See. Morari, Cristina; EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF GEORGIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS; Moldova State University, Faculty of international Relations, Political and Administrative Science; Chisinau; 2017; P:2.

<sup>80</sup> See. Georgian Center for Security and Development; Tbilisi; 2017; P:7;

[https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia\\_Relations\\_and\\_Future\\_Perspectives.pdf](https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia_Relations_and_Future_Perspectives.pdf)

<sup>81</sup> See. Carbone, Roberta; Georgia between the European Union and Russia – Does Russia constitute an obstacle to Georgian Europeanization?"; 2012; P:6.

<sup>82</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:45

<sup>83</sup> See. Carbone, Roberta; Georgia between the European Union and Russia – Does Russia constitute an obstacle to Georgian Europeanization?"; 2012; P:6.

Council of Europe, Georgia had the right to use it. The political message was that to show the perception as a fully European country and part of the Western world.<sup>84</sup>

In 2004 Georgia entered in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is a framework program for bilateral agreements between the EU and the neighbouring countries: it is made up of „Action Plans“ written by mutual agreement, which determine the priorities of each country<sup>85</sup> and which the EU uses for enlargement.<sup>86</sup> The ENP was first outlined by the European Commission in March 2003.

The purpose of this policy is the European integration of neighbouring countries and their transformation into legislative and institutional systems, relevant to those existing in the EU. The ENP also implies free trade agreements, ensuring their access to EU markets, and higher-level co-operation in various spheres such as security, energy, transportation, agriculture, etc.<sup>87</sup>

The ENP is important project between EU and Georgia, which includes the creation of the market economy and developing commercial relations; also the implementation of the rule of law and democracy in the country under the initiatives such as the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, or cooperation program in the field of criminal justice and fight against corruption under the EUJUST Themis and also most importantly the cooperation in security matters, for instance in the field of border management, for which the EU developed the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), which promotes peaceful resolution of internal conflicts, in the field of the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region.<sup>88</sup> EUMM began in 2008 after OSCE quit mission in Georgia.<sup>89</sup> The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the world's largest security-oriented intergovernmental organization. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, promotion of human rights, freedom of the press, and fair elections and has its roots in the 1973 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).<sup>90</sup> EUMM led the EU to create a Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus specifically addressing the Georgian issue since the Russian-

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<sup>84</sup> See. Carbone, Roberta; Georgia between the European Union and Russia – Does Russia constitute an obstacle to Georgian Europeanization?"; 2012; P:6.

<sup>85</sup> See. Carbone, Roberta; Georgia between the European Union and Russia – Does Russia constitute an obstacle to Georgian Europeanization?"; 2012; P:7.

<sup>86</sup> See. Georgian Center for Security and Development; Tbilisi; 2017; P:8; [https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia\\_Relations\\_and\\_Future\\_Perspectives.pdf](https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia_Relations_and_Future_Perspectives.pdf)

<sup>87</sup> See. Georgian Center for Security and Development; Tbilisi; 2017; P:8; [https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia\\_Relations\\_and\\_Future\\_Perspectives.pdf](https://www.osgf.ge/files/2017/Publications/EU-Georgia_Relations_and_Future_Perspectives.pdf)

<sup>88</sup> See. Carbone, Roberta; Georgia between the European Union and Russia – Does Russia constitute an obstacle to Georgian Europeanization?"; 2012; P:7.

<sup>89</sup> See. Stöber, Silvia; The Failure of the OSCE Mission to Georgia – What Remains?"; OSCE Yearbook 2010; Baden-Baden; 2011; P:219.

<sup>90</sup> See. OSCE; History; Last accessed in September 16, 2019; <https://www.osce.org/who/87>

Georgian war in August 2008. The ENP also includes programs such as fighting against terrorism, controlling of illegal immigration, reducing poverty or improving agricultural production in the country and etc.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>91</sup> See. Carbone, Roberta; Georgia between the European Union and Russia – Does Russia constitute an obstacle to Georgian Europeanization?"; 2012; P:7.

## RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR

There was historical and political background to the armed conflict of August 2008. In the 1990s, Georgian independence emerged out of a severe crisis, and even the downfall of its powerful northern neighbor. Much of the political class as well as public opinion in Georgia took a sharp pro-Western turn. There was one important legacy from the Soviet era, though: the subdivision of Georgia into three political-territorial entities, including the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region also known as Autonomous Oblast' (RU:district) of so-called South Ossetia. The fighting that finally broke out between Georgian forces and separatist forces, first in Tskhinvali region in 1991 - 1992 and then in Abkhazia 1992 - 1994 ended with Georgia losing control of large parts of both territories.<sup>92</sup> The Russian Federation engaged in a systematic policy of ethnic discrimination directed against the ethnic Georgian population and other groups in those regions. Russia's actions from 1990 directly or indirectly resulted in the death or disappearance of thousands of civilians and the internal displacement of approximately 300,000 people. As a result, the ethnic demography of both Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia altered dramatically. Russia now seeks to make this situation permanent by denying the right of return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) through recognition and support of the de facto separatist authorities, and the use of armed force to prevent Georgia from exercising its jurisdiction in allowing its citizens to return to their homes.<sup>93</sup> Subsequently, peacekeeping arrangements that were established with the help of the international community. At the turn of the millennium it became apparent that the unresolved political status of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia got more difficult to manage and that there was no clear-cut solution in sight. Relations between Georgia and Russia were in a period of continued deterioration, marked by incidents as well as by unfriendly and sometimes even aggressive rhetoric.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. 1; September 2009; P:12; [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC\\_38263\\_08\\_Annexes\\_ENG.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf)

<sup>93</sup> See. Ambassador of Georgia to the Republic of Kingdom of the Netherlands and agent of the Republic of Georgia Panjikidze, Maia; REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA; The Hague; 13.08.2008; P:2; <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/140/14663.pdf>

<sup>94</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. I; September 2009; P:12; [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC\\_38263\\_08\\_Annexes\\_ENG.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf)

In the months leading to the August 2008 conflict, tensions increased in and around Tskhinvali region between the Georgian and so-called South Ossetian sides. Throughout July 2008, there were reports of armed clashes, detention of Georgian military personnel by so-called South Ossetian forces, shelling and firing on Tskhinvali and southern environs causing several casualties and property damage, violation of Georgian airspace by four Russian military aircraft and shooting incidents.<sup>95</sup>

According to reports so-called South Ossetian troops shot at Georgian peacekeepers before the outbreak of hostilities. In the night of the 1<sup>st</sup> – 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2008 series of intense exchanges of fire occurred between Georgian and so-called South Ossetian controlled areas causing casualties. Exchanges of fire continued during the nights of the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> August 2008 but in lesser extent. In the afternoon of August 6, 2008, firing took place along the entire line of contact between the Georgian and so-called South Ossetian sides and intensified again on August 7, 2008 involving mortars and artillery and reportedly causing human casualties.<sup>96</sup>

On August 8, 2008, the Russian Federation launched a full-scale military invasion against Georgia in support of ethnic separatists in Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia. Russia justified its aggression by claiming that Georgia committed "genocide" against so-called South Ossetians simply because Georgian forces responded to artillery attacks by ethnic separatists against villages resulting in the death of several civilians. Contrary to these incendiary assertions, impartial observers concluded that "there is little evidence civilians were specifically targeted by Georgian troops, as Russia claims."<sup>97</sup>

Russia's military aggression resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths, extensive destruction of civilian property, and the displacement of virtually the entire ethnic Georgian population in Tskhinvali region. Despite the withdrawal of Georgian armed forces and the unilateral declaration of a ceasefire, Russian military operations continued beyond Tskhinvali region into Georgian government control territories and resulted in the extensive destruction of towns such as Gori and the forced displacement of almost its entire population. Georgian authorities registered 19,482

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<sup>95</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. I; September 2009; P:20; [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC\\_38263\\_08\\_Annexes\\_ENG.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf)

<sup>96</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. I; September 2009; P:15; [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC\\_38263\\_08\\_Annexes\\_ENG.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf)

<sup>97</sup> See. Ambassador of Georgia to the Republic of Kingdom of the Netherlands and agent of the Republic of Georgia Panjikidze, Maia; REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA; The Hague; 13.08.2008; P:2; <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/140/14663.pdf>



IDPs thus far.<sup>98</sup> The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which was founded in 1863 and is the neutral and independent organization, it operates worldwide by helping people and promotes the laws of the protection of war victims, its mandate stems essentially from the Geneva Conventions of 1949.<sup>99</sup> The ICRC confirms that there are continuing reports of "widespread displacement throughout the region."<sup>100</sup> The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that since Russia's invasion on August 8, an additional 128,000 Georgian citizens have been internally displaced. IDPs now constitute almost 10% of Georgia's total population of 4.5 million.<sup>101</sup>

In response to the Russian aggression and violation of territorial integrity, Georgian armed forces launched shelling of Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, 2008, which marked the beginning of a large-scale armed conflict in Georgia, but this was only the culmination of a long period of growing tension, provocations and incidents,<sup>102</sup> such as:

- The long-term ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Georgians from conflict zones in order to homogenize the populations and strengthen political control;<sup>103</sup>
- An illegal campaign of passportization in conflict zones starting in July 2002 to manufacture „Russian citizens” to protect. This was a false claim about the „protection” of these citizens, which Moscow subsequently invoked, when it invaded Georgia in August 2008;<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> See. Ambassador of Georgia to the Republic of Kingdom of the Netherlands and agent of the Republic of Georgia Panjikidze, Maia; AMENDED REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GEORGIA; The Hague; 25.08.2008; P:2; <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/140/14689.pdf>

<sup>99</sup> See. International Committee of the Red Cross; Last accessed in September 30, 2019; <https://www.icrc.org/en/who-we-are>

<sup>100</sup> See. Ambassador of Georgia to the Republic of Kingdom of the Netherlands and agent of the Republic of Georgia Panjikidze, Maia; REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA; The Hague; 13.08.2008; P:2; <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/140/14663.pdf>

<sup>101</sup> See. Ambassador of Georgia to the Republic of Kingdom of the Netherlands and agent of the Republic of Georgia Panjikidze, Maia; AMENDED REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF PROTECTION SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GEORGIA; The Hague; 25.08.2008; P:2; <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/140/14689.pdf>

<sup>102</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. 1; September 2009; P:20; [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC\\_38263\\_08\\_Annexes\\_ENG.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf)

<sup>103</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

<sup>104</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

- The abrogation of international agreements regarding economic and arms sanctions in the proxy territories; Closure of border, transport communication channels with Georgia; deportation of Georgian citizens from the Russian Federation; An economic embargo imposed on Georgian products;<sup>105</sup>
- Suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) on December 12, 2007.<sup>106</sup> The CFE Treaty was signed at the end of the Cold War on November 19, 1990, eliminated the Soviet Union's overwhelming quantitative advantage in conventional weapons in Europe by setting equal limits on the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. The treaty was designed to prevent either alliance from amassing forces for a blitzkrieg-type offensive, which could have triggered the use of nuclear weapons in response. Russia suspended implementation of the CFE Treaty in 2007, claiming it was responding to NATO member states' decision to condition their ratification of the 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty on the resolution of a dispute over Russian military deployments in parts of Moldova and Georgia. But Moscow continued to participate in the consultative group, saying that it hoped that dialogue could lead to the creation of an effective, new conventional arms control regime in Europe.<sup>107</sup> Also on December 12, 2007, an extensive military build-up in close proximity to Russian-Georgian borders, as well as in conflict regions;<sup>108</sup>
- The extension of legal ties between Russia, Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia in April 2008;<sup>109</sup>
- An intensive anti-Georgia propaganda campaign;<sup>110</sup>
- A rapid escalation of illegal military build-up in the conflict zones – starting from spring 2008 onwards, including restoration by Russian Railway Troops

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<sup>105</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

<sup>106</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

<sup>107</sup> See. Reif, Kingston; Russia Completes CFE Treaty Suspension; Arms Control Association; April, 2015; <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2015-04/news-briefs/russia-completes-cfe-treaty-suspension>

<sup>108</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

<sup>109</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

<sup>110</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

of railway and transportation infrastructure in the areas clearly demonstrating Russia's main aim of preparing the necessary logistical infrastructure for the rapid transit of heavy military equipment;<sup>111</sup>

- Targeted assassinations and other armed provocations in the territories for several weeks immediately before the invasion;<sup>112</sup>

The Georgian forces faced significant armed opposition from the so-called South Ossetian forces with the support of Russian armed forces. In the morning of August 8, 2008, the Russian air forces reportedly attacked locations in central Georgia and gradually extended their attacks to other parts of Georgia, including Tbilisi. Russia also launched a large-scale military attack as well as in Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetian militias joined the Russian forces.<sup>113</sup>

Experiencing resistance, the Georgian forces withdrew from the centre of Tskhinvali in the evening of August 8, 2008. The Georgian armed forces were pursued by Russian and so-called South Ossetian troops that moved beyond the administrative boundary of Tskhinvali region and occupied adjacent areas on August 12, 2008 and they still keep creeping occupation in Kartli Region.<sup>114</sup>

Human Rights Watch (HRW), which was founded in 1978 as “Helsinki Watch” investigates and reports on abuses happening in all corners of the world.<sup>115</sup> On August 12, HRW reported that Russia burned down at least three villages in Gori district – Koshki, Guguaankari, Zariantkari. These were just a few of the villages in undisputed Georgian territory that were destroyed over the following weeks. HRW observed that in the Gori District the following villages were among those that were “particularly hard hit by destruction and pillage”: Koshki, Ergneti, Nikozi, Megvrekisi, Tirdznisi and Tkviavi. Destroyed Georgian villages in Kareli District, included Dvani, Knolevi, Avlevi and Tseronisi. In all cases, HRW determined that the looting and burning commenced just after Russian troops began their occupation. Indeed, HRW observed that Russian forces maintained a checkpoint just outside these villages.<sup>116</sup> Russian

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<sup>111</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

<sup>112</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. III; September 2009; P:8 [https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG\\_Volume\\_III1.pdf](https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_III1.pdf)

<sup>113</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. I; September 2009; P:20; [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC\\_38263\\_08\\_Annexes\\_ENG.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf)

<sup>114</sup> See. Boesen, Henrik; Larsen, Lindbo; The Russo-Georgian War and Beyond: towards a European Great Power Concert; Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS; Copenhagen; 2009; P:5.

<sup>115</sup> See. Human Rights Watch; Last Accessed in September 30, 2019; <https://www.hrw.org/about-us>

<sup>116</sup> See. International Court of Justice (ICJ); APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION – GEORGIA v. RUSSIAN

forces also perpetrated abuses, including the burning of ethnic Georgian houses, in the ethnic Georgian village of Meghvrekisi: UNHCR, Emergency Operation Daily Update, New Humanitarian Tragedy Unfolding in Gori (August 26, 2008), reported that “IDPs from the village Megvrekisi, which is about 6 kilometers from the Tskhinvali region border, reported that there were only some 80 old people remaining in the village, as everybody else fled when the conflict broke out two weeks ago. Militias repeatedly entered the village, looted the houses, tried to extort money and harassed the inhabitants, severely beating some of them up. This is why another 65 villagers decided to flee. They walked towards Gori in small groups and spent the night under the open air.”<sup>117</sup>

The Russian-Georgian War simply shocked the European Society and Politics. In August 2008, Georgia became the center of world attention. Unlike to the previous regional events, this five-day war was a shock wave for international politics, which provoked fierce international reactions. This war changed the relationship between the EU and Georgia and took it to a new level.<sup>118</sup>

On December 2, 2008, the Council of the European Union established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG). It was the first time the European Union decided to intervene actively in a serious armed conflict. The European Union established a Fact-Finding Mission as a political and diplomatic tool for the conflict. The Mission assisted and advised by a Senior Advisory Board. The core team of the mission consisted of three members led by Swiss Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini, who was appointed as a Head of the IIFFMCG by the, giving her all decision-making on the Mission’s procedures and working methods as well as decisions on the selection of the staff.<sup>119</sup>

Until the five-Day War, the EU has not shown a political image in the conflict regions. After the end of the war, EU started to play an important role as a political mediator. This is mainly due to the decision of the US government. The primary goal of the EU was to end the war and avoid a new cold war between the West and Russia, thus not to place too much strain on relations between the EU and Russia, therefore,

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FEDERATION; MEMORIAL OF GEORGIA; VOL I; 2 September 2009; P:48; <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/140/16097.pdf>

<sup>117</sup> See. International Court of Justice (ICJ); APPLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION – GEORGIA v. RUSSIAN FEDERATION; MEMORIAL OF GEORGIA; VOL I; 2 September 2009; P:69; <https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/140/16097.pdf>

<sup>118</sup> See. Boesen, Henrik; Larsen, Lindbo; The Russo-Georgian War and Beyond: towards a European Great Power Concert; Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS; Copenhagen; 2009; P:5.

<sup>119</sup> See. Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia; Report; Vol. I; September 2009; P:6; [https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC\\_38263\\_08\\_Annexes\\_ENG.pdf](https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/HUDOC_38263_08_Annexes_ENG.pdf)

the EU avoided sanctions or negative conditionality towards Moscow. The main role in the negotiations was played by the President of France Nicola Sarkozy and his Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner.<sup>120</sup>

On 12 August, the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, in cooperation with the OSCE Group, developed a peace plan, which was accepted by Saakashvili. Subsequently, it had to be negotiated in Moscow. Suddenly, President Sarkozy began to negotiate a draft developed by his national security adviser with Moscow. However, the draft was not acceptable for Moscow and right at the negotiating table, the parties decided to come up with a plan. As a result, the so-called Six-Point Ceasefire Plan emerged with the following points:

1. No resort to force;
2. A definitive halt to hostilities;
3. Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance;
4. Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they are usually stationed;
5. the Russian armed forces will be pulled back on the line, preceding the start of hostilities. While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures;
6. Opening of international discussions on security and stability modalities in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region.<sup>121</sup>

Neither full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia, nor the forms of international accompaniment were mentioned in the plan. In addition, the draft was very indeterminate and there were possibilities for interpretation. Especially point five and six were not acceptable for the Georgian government and left a lot of uncertainty. Saakashvili was not ready to sign the contract. However, his area of maneuvering was limited. Regardless of the general readiness of both sides to sign a corresponding agreement, the fighting still continued on 12 and 13 August. The

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<sup>120</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; Journal of Social Sciences, ISSN:2233-3878; 2012; P:43.

<sup>121</sup> See. Documented by the Government of Georgia; Six Point Peace Plan; Last accessed in August 3, 2019; <http://smr.gov.ge/Uploads/9bbbc7.pdf>

Russian troops controlled the country's main highway and there was a danger of a Russian invasion of Tbilisi with the aim of overthrowing the Georgian government.<sup>122</sup>

Saakashvili did not want to sign the contract without any guarantees from USA. The roles between the USA and the EU have been divided, so the USA should have taken the responsibility for Georgia and the EU for Russia. Saakashvili has signed the EU-negotiated agreement only after arrival of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Tbilisi.<sup>123</sup> At the joint press conference, the president showed his suspiciousness of Europe. He accused Europe of not acting hard enough against the Russian armed conflict and he claimed, that the EU did not keep its warnings about Russia's intentions before the war. He warned Europe that the Georgian conflict will be just the beginning and if Europe does not take appropriate actions, Russia will be encouraged to take more aggressive actions, which is a prime example of Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014.<sup>124</sup> Therefore, he accused Europe of having reacted weakly to the Russian arms race. In addition, in his point of view, the refusal of NATO membership for Georgia has encouraged Russia to military aggression. Therefore, he gave Europe a complicity in the five-day war.<sup>125</sup>

However, Europe played very important role in stopping Russia's aggression in Georgia. Without the European Union's intervention and rapid reaction on the part of the French president the Russian army already might have made Tbilisi theirs. Unfortunately, Russians ignored the requirement to pull their troops out of Georgia but still military tension in Georgia was stopped and the threat of war was overcome. But the most surprising thing that could not be left without attention was the political response of France, Germany and Italy that has been completely opposite to that of Britain, Sweden and the east Europeans. The French and Germans, eager to preserve their links to Moscow have tried to be neutral, while Italians have blamed the entire war on Mr. Saakashvili. The British, Swedes and most east Europeans have loudly condemned Russia's aggression. So, unfortunately EU's common foreign policy is not strong enough to have mutual understanding and assistance. Europe did not share the same political viewpoints at the moments of expressing their own analysis of the Georgian-Russian War. In spite of the great help that France made for Georgia, still, the key to understanding the EU's attitude to Georgia is the factor of Russia. Without

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<sup>122</sup> See. Bochorishvili, Mariam; Die EU im geopolitischen Wettbewerb mit Russland; Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden; 2015; P:67.

<sup>123</sup> See. Kramer, Andrew E. & Levy, Clifford J.; Rice, in Georgia, Calls on Russia to Pull Out Now; The New York Times; Aug. 15, 2008; <https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/16/world/europe/16georgia.html>

<sup>124</sup> See. Toal, Gerard; Putin, The West And The Contest Over Ukraine And The Caucasus; OXFORD, University Press; 2017; P:208.

<sup>125</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; Journal of Social Sciences, ISSN:2233-3878; 2012; P:46.

taking Russia into account it is impossible to explain why the EU's policy towards Georgia and the entire South Caucasus has been so slow and cautious. Today when Europe receives significant amount of energy resources such as natural gas and oil as well as raw materials from Russia, the European leaders have been reluctant to spoil their relationship with Russia for such a small country as Georgia. This was the case even when Russia was directly breaching international law, for instance, violating Georgia's air space or indirectly supporting the separatist regimes in the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region. Being increasingly dependent on Russian energy resources, many European countries have chosen to ignore Russia's actions towards Georgia and to turn a blind eye to the damage Russia inflicts on Georgia. In his interview Nika Chitadze gives quite good response of this question: The clearest example of the lack of consensus in European Union is the political reaction of the European Union in the War of 2008 and the meeting of European Council in September 1, 2008, when several opinions and initiatives were represented concerning Russia. Poland proposed to impose sanctions against Russian Federation while Italy proposed to impose some formal procedures against Russia. So, this fact also displays the different political viewpoints of European Union. But nowadays, this problem is partly overcome and after 3 years the countries that had very friendly and warm relations with Russia supported the resolution that blamed Russia in invasion. Of course the main factor was energy resources. As we know Germany is depended on Russia's energy resources for 30 percent, Italy-for 20 percent, France consumes for Russia 12 milliard cubic meter energy resources. Although, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia are depended on Russia's energy resources for 90 percent but they expressed a different political position. Besides political reasons, there are some private interests to mention, like the close, friendly and business relations with Putin.<sup>126</sup>

After the war, EU starts strengthening its involvement in Georgia. In September 2008, following the EU-mediated six-point agreement, the Civil European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was deployed. Within the mission, civil forces were monitoring the behavior of the parties, including full compliance with the Six Points Agreement and subsequent implementation measures in the whole Georgia. The Mission also contributes to the realization of a European policy to support a long lasting political solution for Georgia. The formal declaration of independence of the Secession areas and the subsequent diplomatic recognition by Russia on 26 August 2008 will not only inhibit the implementation of the Six Points Plan by the EUMM but also conflict-resolving negotiations. The de facto states and Russia deny the

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<sup>126</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; Journal of Social Sciences, ISSN:2233-3878; 2012; P:46.

EUMM access to the provinces, although the European monitoring mandate applies to the entire territory.<sup>127</sup> However, Russia still continues violating Georgian territories. Since 2011, there have been at least 56 instances of borderization – including surveillance cameras, illegal fences, green signs erected reading: "Attention! State Border! Passage Forbidden!" And other barriers - across 48 locations in Georgia by Russian forces, Some of the instances include “Creeping Annexation” in which Russia has taken additional territories from Georgia and keeps taking.<sup>128</sup> In April 2018, Georgia announced a ‘peace initiative’ aimed to facilitate the movement of trade and people across the administrative borders with the separatist territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region. While this has not met with a positive reaction from the leadership of these two territories, it represented a significant policy change and opening on the part of Tbilisi. As it seems the most significant security action by the EU in Georgia so far is its Monitoring Mission (EUMM) along the occupation lines of the separatist regions of Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia<sup>129</sup>

Georgia aligns itself on many EU positions adopted in international diplomacy and is one of the most active non-members state partners of the EU in several military missions. The second important event is the Eastern Partnership (EP), which is generated as a consolidation of the ENP. In contrast to ENP, the public-private partnership has a clear political emphasis. Although the public policy issue is of common interest, it still plays a minor role. In summary, it should be noted that while the public service considers a solution, important for regional conflicts, it is not geared to such one.<sup>130</sup>

The second important event happened in spring 2009, the EU launched the Eastern Partnership (EP) with the objective of supporting political and socio-economic reforms in Georgia, as well as in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The EP was generated from ENP, but in contrast to ENP, has a clear political accent. Although the issue of public policy is main interest, it still plays a secondary role. EP considers important to solve regional conflicts, it is not focused on it.<sup>131</sup> Until the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia the EU was the largest

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<sup>127</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; Journal of Social Sciences, ISSN:2233-3878; 2012; P:46.

<sup>128</sup> See. Georgian Journal; European Parliament adopts resolution on Georgia's occupied territories 10 years after Russian invasion; 14.06.2018; <https://www.georgianjournal.ge/politics/34598-european-parliament-adopts-resolution-on-georgias-occupied-territories-10-years-after-russian-invasion.html>

<sup>129</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how? Rowman & Littlefield International, Ltd; 2018; P:8.

<sup>130</sup> See. European Parliament; The European Neighbourhood Policy; 04.2019; <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/170/the-european-neighbourhood-policy>

<sup>131</sup> See. European Parliament; The European Neighbourhood Policy; 04.2019; <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/170/the-european-neighbourhood-policy>



donor in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region. Despite the fact that they still support projects for the local population in Abkhazia, EC-funded projects inside the Tskhinvali region came to an end after the August 2008.<sup>132</sup>

In spite of the fact that Georgia is not the EU member, it still receives some social, political and financial support from EU. Therefore, not only Georgia has the strategic interest in the EU but also the EU has some interests towards Georgia, which are related to the geo-strategic location of Georgia and energy issues. Europe consumes energy resources from Russia. However, Russia uses resources as the political tool to feel superior in Europe. In winters of 2006 and 2009 Russia stopped supplying the gas to all Europe and proved its monopoly on energy resources. Afterwards, Europe began to look for the reliable energy partner in the South Caucasus, such as Georgia.<sup>133</sup>

Georgia, which played important role serving as the transit country connecting Europe to Asia in terms of trade and transportation was weakened by the invasions and territorial conflicts. Due to the social and territorial conflicts these problems were provoked even harder in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. Two main projects: “Silk Road Project” and “Caspian energy Project” played very important role to survive Georgia from these crises. Eventually, Georgia regained the status of the transit country, which connects South Europe with South Caucasus.<sup>134</sup> In addition, Georgia borders by the Black Sea that encourages Sea-Trade.<sup>135</sup>

The interests of Georgia towards to the EU is clear: Georgia seeks political, financial and economic shelter in the EU, also to establish trade relations and solve territorial conflicts; The EU helps Georgia to develop democracy, rule of law and freedom; to provide the modern educational, social and political reforms and etc. Briefly speaking, Georgia would get a great benefit from joining the EU. Georgia is still under the process of developing and the EU membership would provide it with a great encouragement in order to make better changes in ongoing political, democratic and economic processes and gain the status of the prominent, worthy member country of the EU.<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; Journal of Social Sciences, ISSN:2233-3878; 2012; P:44.

<sup>133</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:44.

<sup>134</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:44

<sup>135</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:45

<sup>136</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:45

But the question is what will the EU gain by accepting Georgia in its union? These benefits may be the following factors: firstly, attracting the interests of Post Soviet Countries and prove that the EU is enlarging; Secondly, developing trade relations from Asia to Europe, where Georgia would serve as the transit country; Thirdly, development of „Silk Road” and „TRACECA” projects, which will increase European Investments in Georgia; Fourthly, improvement of civilian factors.<sup>137</sup>

The enlargement of the European Union makes positive impact in its international prestige. At the beginning there were only 6 countries in the EU (Germany, Italy, France, BeNeLux), which at that time was known as ECSC, currently the number of members has increased to 28.<sup>138</sup> Joining Georgia, as the member of the EU will be an approval that the EU is still improving. This fact proves that the EU has supporters and European values are also acceptable even in the Post Soviet Countries. Moreover, Georgia can bring benefit from a Geopolitical point of view, enlargement of the EU in the South Caucasus Region. After the accession of Romania and Bulgaria the EU entered in the area of Black Sea region. In addition, some scholars believe that if Georgia joins the EU, then the EU will have a guarantee that stability will be achieved in Georgia. Achieving stability means that development of trade issues will be encouraged - „Silk Road Project” will be re-developed and „TRACECA” Project will be strengthened. As we know, the aim of EU is to accomplish and realize „Nabucco pipeline” and “TRACECA” Projects. The aim of the Nabucco pipeline was to diversify the natural gas suppliers and delivery routes for Europe, thus reducing European dependence on Russian energy.<sup>139</sup> In these projects Georgia plays an important and active role, as the transit country. So, the stability of Georgia will have the positive influence on the politics of the European Union and will increase foreign investments from Europe as well. Also, the civil factor plays crucial role, after joining the EU, democratic values in Georgia will be strengthened, which will contribute to a stable and secure environment for the European Union. The economy in Georgia will be increased; therefore the number of illegal migrants from Georgia will decrease. Because of the terrible economic conditions many Georgian citizens migrate in Europe where they are involved in crime and illegal activities.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:45

<sup>138</sup> See. Hemmerich, Inka; Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) und Europäische Atomgemeinschaft (Euratom) Anfänge und Umsetzung; GRIN Verlag; Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg; 2007; P:2.

<sup>139</sup> See. European Commission; Gas interconnection Gas bridge between Asia & Europe (Nabucco); October 2013; [https://ec.europa.eu/energy/eepr/projects/files/gas-interconnections-and-reverse-flow/nabucco\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/energy/eepr/projects/files/gas-interconnections-and-reverse-flow/nabucco_en.pdf)

<sup>140</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:45

## CRITERIA

Before Georgia joins the European Union, it has to fulfill some criterias. They are: geographic criteria, political criteria, economic criteria, institutional adaptation and legislation system.<sup>141</sup>

Geographic Criteria – Geography plays an important role: if a country wants to join the EU, it should be European. The case Morocco, which was rejected from membership of the European Union, due to not being an European country. Therefore, the main criteria of applying for membership is „Europeaness”. Before applying the membership of the European Union, the country should gain the status of European. Georgia has already maintained this status. The Georgian former Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, played a crucial role at the Council of Europe on January 27, 1999, when he declared – „I am Georgian, therefore I am European”.<sup>142</sup>

Political Criteria, also known as „Copenhagen Criteria” are the special principles and define the membership of any country into the EU. These criterias were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 22<sup>nd</sup> June 1993 and was strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995. For the EU accession, negotiations to be launched, a country must satisfy the first criteria – stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights protection and respect of minorities.<sup>143</sup> Moreover, the country should achieve its political, monetary and economical aims.<sup>144</sup>

The economic criteria of „Copenhagen” require a free, liberal market economy, macroeconomic and fiscal stability, human resources, physical capital, the development of small and large enterprises, a trading system with Europe, independence of the central bank, a legal inflation rate and stability of the national currency.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47

<sup>142</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47

<sup>143</sup> See. EUR-Lex; Glossary of summaries; Accession Criteria (Copenhagen); Last accessed in August 4, 2019;

[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/print-pdf.html?pageTitle=Glossary+of+summaries&currentUrl=%2Fsummary%2Fglossary%2Faccession\\_criteria\\_copenhague.html](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/print-pdf.html?pageTitle=Glossary+of+summaries&currentUrl=%2Fsummary%2Fglossary%2Faccession_criteria_copenhague.html)

<sup>144</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47.

<sup>145</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47.

Institutional Adaptation: The enlargement of the European Union caused disbalance in the votes, small states would have a monopoly on making decisions, which concerned big states. Therefore, in 2001, „Treaty of Nice” was adapted and it balanced the votes of EU states after expansion. Now, each state has the votes proportional to their number of population. The European Union prefers to unite several states, rather than join them separately, while each enlargement depends on the institutional changes in the EU.<sup>146</sup>

Legislation System means that every state who applies for membership should share almost 80-100 000 pages of EU legislation called: “acquis communautaire” to its own national legislation. Adoption and implementation of the acquis are the basis of the accession negotiations.<sup>147</sup> The acquis is the body of common rights and obligations that is binding on all the EU member states and is constantly evolving and comprises:

- the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties;
- legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice;
- declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union;
- instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy;
- international agreements concluded by the Union and those entered into by the member states among themselves within the sphere of the Union's activities.<sup>148</sup>

In the above written criterion there is not mentioned the territorial integrity of the member states. Some scholars say that the candidate country should not have territorial conflicts for EU accession, the territorial integrity of the member states, is very important.<sup>149</sup> As for Georgia, one of the main problems is the territorial integrity of the country. Despite the fact that in the history of EU there was a precedent in 2009, when Cyprus with territorial conflicts, joined the European Union. Currently, territorial conflict in this country is still not solved, but regardless of this fact, Cyprus satisfies certain standards of EU, such as: protecting human rights, the rule of law, development of market economy, etc. But in case of Georgia, in order to join the EU,

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<sup>146</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47.

<sup>147</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47.

<sup>148</sup> See. European Commission; Acquis; Last accessed in August 4, 2019; [https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en)

<sup>149</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47.

the country tries to complete its goals – establishment of democratic institutions, development of perfect election systems and independence of media and legislative systems, moreover Georgia continues to improve reforms concerning social-economical issues. As the main objective of Georgia is to join the European Union, it should struggle to achieve the standards of the EU, otherwise Georgia will always be in the list of consideration. Generally, it takes years to success the standards of EU, but for the country such as Georgia, these reforms will help to find its own place in the global world. However, when it comes to Georgia's EU accession, Russia's influence cannot be ignored. Despite this fact, international organizations and Europe should be more active, for example they should force Russia to disclose its own intereseets towards to South Caucasus region and to respect Georgia's democracy, independence in its external and internal policy and support Georgia's own interests towards the West. Unfortunately for Georgia, in the European Union there are several countries that are in friendly relationships with Russia, which somehow hinder the integration of Georgia into the EU. Even though Georgia leads to EU with patience, hope and encouragement.<sup>150</sup>

Of course, strengthening of democratic institutions plays an important role in the development of the country, but still, there are some political parties and certain politicians who prevent further development of the country. Therefore, it is extremely important to increase the level of political culture in Georgia, in order to achieve this goal and develop democracy in the coutry without a pro-Russian government, President Mikheil Saakshvili brought many young politicians into government, who got education abroad. This fact makes quite good influence on the country's future success and prominence, which stimulate the process of getting closer to the EU. Close relations with the EU should exceed geographical, economic and political relations and go far beyond the development of political ideas, views and culture. Georgia should achieve all of the above-mentioned objectives not only for joining the EU but also for the country itself, in order to give its citizens a better and more prosperous life, with high level of living standards, rule of law, democracy, freedom and security.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47.

<sup>151</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47.

## ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT

On 27 June 2014 Georgia signed the Association Agreement (AA) with the European Parliament and all 28 EU Member States. The AA came into force on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2016. The treaty is covering Georgia's political and economic relationship with the EU and main achievement of the AA is the establishment of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). This Agreement is significance for Georgia and it's future, it will bring benefits for the country's future growth, opening new markets and creating job opportunities, moreover the Agreement is approving Georgia's European identity and and its strategic foreign policy priority of developing closer ties with the EU.<sup>152</sup>

The political and economic objectives of the Agreement are fundamental for Georgia, as an independent and secure European state. The political purpose of this Agreement is to deepen the realisation of Georgia's „European path“. As well Georgia is strengthening fundamental European values, namely democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and the norms of the European security order. Unfortunately, for Georgia, the membership of the EU is not regulated in the Agreement, but neither it is excluded in the long term. The economic purpose is to develop Georgia's economy, by boosting trade with the EU and other major trading partners worldwide and by reforming economy in accordance with best European practice. These steps should ultimately lead to the highest level of economic integration between Georgia and the EU. Of all the countries of Eastern Europe, Georgia moved forward after the 2003 Rose Revolution with the radical liberalization of the economy and a political reform programs. Georgia succeeded in reducing corruption and establishing a highly favourable business climate.<sup>153</sup>

The Association Agreement and DCFTA are built on a most perspective basis. This Agreement brings modernization and Europeanization for Georgia by European standards, which generally correspond to the best international practice. Since Georgia has already adapted to the discipline of international competitiveness, the EU market offers only new opportunities. In addition, financial support is available to

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<sup>152</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:1.

<sup>153</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:1.

provide technical assistance and investments in case of large adjustment costs, with the help of grants from the EU, as well as loans or investments from the European financial institutions. As a young democracy, Georgia has progressed in establishing democratic institutions. Georgia continues to make reforms in this direction, which is crucial for the overall success of the AA and Georgia's economic future. These reforms helped Georgia to get visa-free access on March 2017 for Georgian citizens to travel to the EU.<sup>154</sup> Of course, the Agreement cannot solve Georgia's political and economic challenges. But its conditions affect a significant part of the program of political and economic reforms of Georgia. As the result, Georgia can achieve very high standards of economic and social development. As the AA's essential elements are democracy, respect of human rights and the rule of law, if they are seriously violated, the Agreement would be suspended.<sup>155</sup>

As mentioned above the DCFTA is an economic core part of the Association Agreement signed in June 2014.<sup>156</sup> The DCFTA upgraded EU-Georgian relationship into the new level. The basic starting point of creation a free trade area is tariff liberalization. Georgia unilaterally and radically liberalized its external trade policies starting from 2006, which made the country an exceptional case, after 2014, EU completed the free trade area and fully liberalized tariff for imports from Georgia.<sup>157</sup>

The DCFTA is not a standard free trade agreement, it is aiming not only strengthening trade relations between the EU and Georgia, but it also facilitates the connection with EU standards in various regulatory acts, such as food safety, technical standards, public procurement, competition policy, intellectual property rights and etc.<sup>158</sup> The DCFTA countries are Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and they belong to the lower-middle-income level group. The three countries have been facing serious macroeconomic and geopolitical challenges.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>154</sup> See. Survey Report; Knowledge of and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia; Europe Foundation; Tbilisi; 2017; P:15.

<sup>155</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:3.

<sup>156</sup> See. Chakhava, Ketevan; Road Leading Georgia to the European Union Membership; 2012; P:47.

<sup>157</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:4.

<sup>158</sup> See. Adarov, Amat & Havlik, Peter; "Benefits and Costs of DCFTA: Evaluation of the Impact on Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine"; The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) and Bertelsmann Stiftung; December 2016, with corrections in March 2017; P:1.

<sup>159</sup> See. Adarov, Amat & Havlik, Peter; "Benefits and Costs of DCFTA: Evaluation of the Impact on Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine"; The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) and Bertelsmann Stiftung; December 2016, with corrections in March 2017; P:3.

## ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Until 2003, Georgia was a broken country: riddled with corruption, devoid of natural resources, and in economic decline. After Rose Revolution, the change of government led to liberal regulatory reforms and economic growth. The reforms enabled Georgia to achieve improvements in doing business – business environment became friendly and international investors began to invest money.<sup>160</sup> In spite of these reforms and successes the country also suffered serious economic problems, especially in 2008 after the war, which was followed by the global financial crises. However, liberal regulatory system enabled Georgia to recover relatively quickly from the crisis.<sup>161</sup>

The EU is supplying significant financial assistance to the country, including macroeconomic loans alongside the IMF, budget grants and major investment from the EIB and EBRD.<sup>162</sup> The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an organization working to foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce poverty around the world. It was established in 1945. The IMF's primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system—the system of exchange rates and international payments that enables countries and its citizens to transact with each other.<sup>163</sup> The European Investment Bank (EIB) is the crucial part of the European Union and the biggest multilateral financial institution in the world and one of the largest providers of climate finance. It was established in 1958 under the Treaty of Rome and helps the economy, creates jobs, promotes equality and improves lives for EU citizens and for people in developing countries.<sup>164</sup> The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was founded in 1991 to help build a new, post-Cold War era in Central and Eastern Europe. Now, the EBRD is furthering

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<sup>160</sup> See. Gilauri, Nika: Practical Economics - Economic Transformation and Government Reform in Georgia 2004-2012; Palgrave macmillan; Springer Nature; 2017. P:VII.

<sup>161</sup> See. Emerson, M. Kovziridze, T.; Georgia and Europe; Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels; Reformatics, Tbilisi; 2016; P:19.

<sup>162</sup> See. Emerson, M. Kovziridze, T.; Georgia and Europe; Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels; Reformatics, Tbilisi; 2016; P:19.

<sup>163</sup> See. International Monetary Fund; About The IMF; Last accessed in September 16, 2019; <https://www.imf.org/en/About>

<sup>164</sup> See. European Investment Bank; EIB at a glance; Last accessed in September 16, 2019; <https://www.eib.org/en/about/index.htm>



progress towards market-oriented economies and the promotion of private and entrepreneurial initiative.<sup>165</sup>

The financial market of Georgia is mainly represented by a relatively well-developed banking sector, while other parts of the financial system are less developed. Most of the EU legislation is very difficult for Georgia to fulfill. Rapprochement to the EU legislation gives Georgia the opportunity to provide a reliable and reasonable financial system.<sup>166</sup>

Transport plays key role for the internal market of the European integration process. As a result, the EU has a well-established body of law and policies in this field. Georgia aims to become a transport and logistics center in the Black Sea - Caucasus - Caspian Sea region and to fully integrate its infrastructure into the international and regional transport system. The DCFTA sets out the EU's detailed rules for sea, road, rail and inland waterways. For air transport, the EU and Georgia concluded a Common Aviation Agreement in 2010. There are now more low-cost airlines connecting Georgia with Europe, reinforced by the new opening for visa-free travel. Georgia is well positioned to benefit from the joining up of China's Silk Road Initiative with EU transport networks.<sup>167</sup>

The energy sector in Georgia is one of the highest economic and geopolitical importances. In recent years, in addition to hydropower capacity, major investments have been made in oil and gas pipeline connections with Azerbaijan, which leads to Turkey and across the Black Sea. These also gave Georgia energy independence from Russia.<sup>168</sup> The energy sector in Georgia underwent radical change, creating a competitive regulatory and tariff system to attract significant investment and diversify energy supplies to ensure energy security. Georgia joined the Energy Community Treaty in 2017, which includes aligning with EU energy policy with derogations, taking local circumstances into account. Advantageous cooperation with international institutions and partners in the energy sector, in particular the EU, is important for Georgia, as it sees itself as an energy transit corridor as alternative to Russia. Georgia's prospective membership in the Energy Community could be beneficial,

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<sup>165</sup> See. European Bank For Reconstruction And Development; History of the EBRD; Last accessed in September 16, 2019; <https://www.ebrd.com/who-we-are/history-of-the-ebrd.html>

<sup>166</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:110.

<sup>167</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:118.

<sup>168</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:127

however, it has limited benefits, while none of Georgia's neighbors are yet members of the Community.<sup>169</sup>

Under the Agreement Georgia is obliged to cooperate in all environmental issues, which eventually lead the country's radical improvement in the quality of the environment and the modernization of the economy. Georgia has to manage waste and dangerous chemicals, to take into account quality of water and air and to protect and develop forests and natural habitats.<sup>170</sup>

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT), is a crucial strategic part of the economic reform and modernisation process in Georgia. The ICT sector rapidly develops especially thanks to e-services, provided by the government.<sup>171</sup>

Agriculture is a socially important sector of the Georgian economy, accounting for 9.2% of its GDP. Georgian agriculture suffered disastrous losses in the early post-Soviet period. Still, there are small family farms with lack of modern technology and skills, which is why only a few sectors, such as wine and hazelnuts are internationally competitive. However, the EU and the EIB are funding considerable technical assistance and investment projects.<sup>172</sup>

The fundamental reform of Georgia's Labour Code began in 2006, which led to the modernisation of labour regulations and the adoption of the major ILO conventions, and more recent reforms in 2013 already implementing the EU's requirements on key issues of labour law and anti-discrimination.<sup>173</sup> ILO is the International Labour Organization, which was founded in 1919 to set labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and men.<sup>174</sup> The EU signed its first cooperation agreement with the ILO in 1958.<sup>175</sup> Other domains for

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<sup>169</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:135.

<sup>170</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:136.

<sup>171</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:145.

<sup>172</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:162.

<sup>173</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:167.

<sup>174</sup> See. International Labour Organization; About The ILO; Last accessed in September 16, 2019; <https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm>

<sup>175</sup> See. International Labour Organization; The European Union ILO Cooperation; Factsheet; May, 2019; [https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---exrel/documents/publication/wcms\\_350516.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---exrel/documents/publication/wcms_350516.pdf)

legislative approximation under the Agreement include company law, corporate governance and consumer protection.<sup>176</sup>

Since 2004, Georgia has been implementing a set of reforms in the education sector to increase competition and quality in public and private education. These reforms are supported in the Agreement, in particular, for higher education through the Bologna process, and with the Erasmus+ providing large numbers of Georgian students with exchanges in EU universities.<sup>177</sup>

There is a wide opportunity to involve Georgia in the activities of the many EU programs that have potential to develop institutional capabilities and advance policy reforms. In 2016 Georgia became a participant in the EU's main research funding instrument, Horizon 2020.<sup>178</sup>

A comprehensive, joint institutional framework will monitor the implementation of the Agreement and provide a platform for political dialogue. The Association Council has a broad competence to amend the annexes of the Agreement, but not the main body of the Agreement. Implementation of the Agreement is supported by well-defined mechanisms for dispute settlement. The meetings of the Association Council and its committees are held regularly, and the system is functioning correctly.<sup>179</sup>

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<sup>176</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:173.

<sup>177</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:174.

<sup>178</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:178

<sup>179</sup> See. Emerson, Michael & Kovziridze, Tamara: Deepening EU-Georgian Relations – What, why and how?; 2018; P:199.

# CHAPTER THREE

## GEORGIA AND NATO

In 2002 at the NATO Summit in Prague Georgia officially declared its Euro-Atlantic aspiration.<sup>180</sup> Membership in NATO is the choice of citizens of Georgia.<sup>181</sup> The goal of NATO member states, as well as other European countries, is to embody the idea of a united, free and peaceful Europe. To realize this idea, it is essential that all European countries be stable and peaceful. Accordingly, NATO is interested in the development of democratic Georgia, which will ultimately ensure the security of the South Caucasus.<sup>182</sup> For Georgia as well, this path will bring democracy, progress, security and welfare to the country.<sup>183</sup>

NATO-Georgia cooperation began since 1992, when Georgia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The NACC was established by the Allies on 20 December 1991 as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO's former Warsaw Pact adversaries. The NACC was a manifestation of the "hand of friendship" extended at the July 1990 summit meeting in London, when Allied leaders proposed a new cooperative relationship with all countries in Central and Eastern Europe in the

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<sup>180</sup> See. Kavadze Amiran & Kavadze Tina; NATO Expansion to the East: Georgia's Way to NATO Membership, Perspectives and Challenges; Journal of Social Sciences; Volume 3, Issue 2, 2014; P:21.

<sup>181</sup> See. Mikheil Janelidze (Vice Prime Minister); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia & LEPL Information Center on NATO and EU; Georgia's European Way; #14; 04.2018; P:6

<sup>182</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; კავკასიის უნივერსიტეტი; აღმოსავლეთ ევროპის უნივერსიტეტი; ფრიდრიხ ებერტის ფონდი; გამომცემლობა „რეგტიმი“- თან თანამშრომლობით; თბილისი; 2016; Mgeliashvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016. P:32.

<sup>183</sup> See. Janelidze, Mikheil; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia & LEPL Information Center on NATO and EU; Georgia's European Way; #14; 04.2018; P:6

wake of the end of the Cold War.<sup>184</sup> In 1997 Georgia succeeded the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC was formed on May 29, 1997 in the ministers meeting of Sintra, Portugal, as the successor to the NACC and represents the main political forum for the partner countries, a post-Cold War NATO institution, is a multilateral forum created to improve relations between NATO and non-NATO countries in Europe and those parts of Asia on the European periphery.<sup>185</sup> States meet to cooperate and go to the range of political and security issues.<sup>186</sup> In 1994, Georgia joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PfP). The PfP was established in 1994 to enable participants to develop an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation, and the level and pace of progress<sup>187</sup> and in 1996 Georgia elaborated the first NATO-Georgia Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (previously called the Individual Partnership Program) which represents activities tailored to partner country's specific interests and needs. Since 1996 Georgia has actively participated and hosted a number of NATO/PfP trainings and exercises.<sup>188</sup>

By developing multiple partnership mechanisms through the PfP program, NATO-Georgia relations have considerably improved. In 1999, Georgia joined the PfP Planning And Review Process (PARP), which contributed the development of effective, affordable and sustainable Georgian Armed Forces (GAF).<sup>189</sup> The PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) aims to promote the development of forces and capabilities by partners that are best able to cooperate alongside NATO Allies in crisis response operations and other activities to promote security and stability. It provides a structured approach for enhancing interoperability and capabilities of partner forces that could be made available to the Alliance for multinational training, exercises and operations. The PARP also serves as a planning tool to guide and measure progress in defence and military transformation and modernisation efforts.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> See. NATO; North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (Archived); Last updated: 30 Jan. 2017;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_69344.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_69344.htm)

<sup>185</sup> See. NATO; Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; Last updated: 09 Jun. 2017;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_49276.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49276.htm)

<sup>186</sup> See. სეფერთელაძე, ნანა; საქართველოს ნატოში განწევრიანების გეოპოლიტიკური პრობლემები და პერსპექტივები; კავკასიის საერთაშორისო უნივერსიტეტი (კსუ); თბილისი; Seperteladze, Nana; Geopolitical aspects of Georgia's membership in NATO. Problems and challenges; Caucasus International University (CIU); Tbilisi; 2018. P:12.

<sup>187</sup> See. NATO; Partnership for Peace program; Last updated: 07 Jun. 2017;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50349.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50349.htm)

<sup>188</sup> See. სეფერთელაძე, ნანა; საქართველოს ნატოში განწევრიანების გეოპოლიტიკური პრობლემები და პერსპექტივები; Seperteladze, Nana; Geopolitical aspects of Georgia's membership in NATO. Problems and challenges; Caucasus International University (CIU); Tbilisi; 2018.P:13.

<sup>189</sup> See. Georgian Embassy in USA; Chronology of major events of Georgia-NATO Cooperation; Last accessed in August 5, 2019; <http://georgiaembassyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Chronology-of-major-events-in-Georgia-NATO-Cooperation.pdf>

<sup>190</sup> See. NATO; Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process; Last updated: 05 Nov. 2014;

[https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_68277.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68277.htm)

The most important step for Georgia to become closer to NATO was at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, which was reflected in the Bucharest Summit Declaration. Although no specific dates have been specified as to when Georgia will become a NATO member state, it has been stipulated that Georgia will inevitably become a NATO member. This record indicates the willingness of NATO member states to work closely with Georgia and accept it as an equal state.<sup>191</sup> Consecutively, allies confirmed their support to Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration aspiration at Stasbourg/Kehl Summit (2009), Lisbon Summit (2010), Chicago Summit (2012) and Wales Summit (2014). Also in 2008 the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) was established. The NGC provides the framework for cooperation between NATO and Georgia and serves as a forum for both political and practical cooperation to assist Georgia in the NATO membership process.<sup>192</sup>

In August 2010, according to the decision of the North Atlantic Council of NATO, developed NATO-Georgia Military Cooperation Working Plan. The work plan defines the main objectives and priorities of the NATO military cooperation in Georgia.<sup>193</sup>

The Declaration adopted at the 2014 Wales Summit is one of the largest in NATO history. At the summit, Georgia joined the Compatibility Initiative, along with four NATO partner countries. The Allies also endorsed a "NATO-Georgia essential action package" aimed at enhancing the country's defense capability and preparing the ground for membership in the alliance.<sup>194</sup>

Georgia is an important contributor to Euro-Atlantic security and was/is actively involved in peacekeeping operations of NATO, such as: Kosovo Force – KFOR in 1999-2008; Active Endeavour, which is an active anti-terrorist operation in the

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<sup>191</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; კავკასიის საერთაშორისო უნივერსიტეტი (კსუ); თბილისი; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Caucasus International University (CIU); Tbilisi; 2018; P:66-67.

<sup>192</sup> See. Georgian Embassy in USA; Chronology of major events of Georgia-NATO Cooperation; Last accessed in August 5, 2019; <http://georgiaembassyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Chronology-of-major-events-in-Georgia-NATO-Cooperation.pdf>

<sup>193</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:67.

<sup>194</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:67.

Mediterranean Sea; International Security Assistance Force – ISAF in Afghanistan; Since 2015, Georgia has been involved in NATO's "Strong Support" mission in Afghanistan, where it is the second largest contributor to the number of military personnel after the United States. Same year, Georgia joined NATO's Response Force (NRF). Georgia is one of four non-NATO countries (Finland, Ukraine, Sweden) participating in the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, which points to the high compatibility of the Georgian Armed Forces.<sup>195</sup>

Georgia is striving to join NATO, to maintain its interests such as political, military, security and economic:

Political interest: Georgia, as a country on the path to democratic development, aspires to a common family of developed countries with democratic values. Accordingly, Georgia's membership in NATO is a guarantee of peaceful, secure and democratic development of the country.<sup>196</sup>

Military Interest: The development of NATO's active cooperation contributes to strengthening Georgia's defense capability and enhancing Georgia's interoperability with NATO. As mentioned above, Georgia is one of NATO's largest and most important partners in international peacekeeping missions.<sup>197</sup>

Security interest (inner state): Georgia's integration into NATO will create solid national security guarantees and will promote peace and stability in both the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region. Georgia, as a small country with limited resources, needs the common efforts of NATO and its member states to counter existing threats. Security is a necessary condition without which the statehood of the country is unthinkable. It is an important factor in political, economic, social, cultural and scientific development. Georgia's accession to the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization remains a viable alternative to security. The Alliance will bring security

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<sup>195</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:67.

<sup>196</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliasvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:33.

<sup>197</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliasvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:33.

to Georgia for a long time, guaranteed by the world's leading democratic, developed, economically and militarily strong states.<sup>198</sup>

Economic Interest: NATO membership will significantly contribute to Georgia's economic development that will bring overall well-being of the country and will attract investments, as Alliance membership is a guarantee of stability for investors.<sup>199</sup>

In fact, NATO membership, in legal terms, means Georgia's accession to internationally recognized borders, of course, along with Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. There are examples of different countries having problems with territorial and border demarcation when joining NATO and the EU. For example, after World War II Germany was divided into two states and East Germany was occupied by the Soviet occupation troops. In 1955, West Germany joined NATO, leading to Germany's political and economic strength and steady development. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany united and is today one of the most powerful members of NATO and the European Union. NATO membership has contributed to the secure and stable development of West Germany and since the fall of the Berlin Wall, united Germany has a stronger and more solid voice in the alliance.<sup>200</sup>

An interesting example is the Baltic states that joined NATO in 2004. These countries did not have border settlement issues with the neighboring state. Nevertheless, the Allies made a political decision to invite Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia to NATO. This decision led to the stable and peaceful development of the Baltic states. The example of Greece and Turkey's membership in NATO in 1952 should also be mentioned. The two countries still have disputes over part of Turkey's occupied island of Cyprus. These examples prove that having territorial problems is not an obstacle to NATO membership, moreover, NATO membership is a factor contributing to the restoration of territorial integrity and the secure development of the country.<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>198</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliashvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:33.

<sup>199</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliashvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:34.

<sup>200</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliashvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:34.

<sup>201</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliashvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:34.



When discussing about Georgia-NATO military security aspects, there is a logical question – what interests the North Atlantic Alliance might have over Georgia. First, it is perhaps necessary to emphasize the fact that the Alliance's policy towards Georgia should be considered in close connection with the Caucasus region. NATO's interests cover the entire South Caucasus, as a significant geopolitical location. NATO towards Georgia may have the following interests: geostrategic, geopolitical and geoeconomic.<sup>202</sup>

Geostrategic interests: NATO-as a military-political bloc in the Caucasus region also has its military-strategic interests, which must necessarily take into account military, geographical and political factors. We can focus on the military-strategic factor. The military planning principle of the North Atlantic Alliance is based on a "flexible response" strategy, which implies rapid response when necessary to conduct military action, and in this regard, a region with a favorable strategic location, such as the South Caucasus, deserves much attention from the Alliance.<sup>203</sup>

Currently, as the political processes in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East are perceived by the Alliance as a major source of danger, NATO is forced to pursue and intensify its policy in these regions of Asia. Therefore, Georgia's strategic importance for the Alliance is growing.<sup>204</sup>

Geopolitical interests: The geopolitical interests of NATO in the Caucasus can be related to the concept of a "Anaconda Strategy", which was practiced by NATO.<sup>205</sup> This strategy was directed against the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. General Winfield Scott was the first who defined the "Anaconda Strategy" during the American Civil War (1861–1865). The essence of this strategy is to block enemy's territories from the sea along coastlines. Cutting off access to ports will lead to weakening the enemy in

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<sup>202</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:70.

<sup>203</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:70.

<sup>204</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:70.

<sup>205</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:71.

strategic terms. In the era of the Cold War, the "Anaconda strategy" was redeveloped. The American strategist and theorist Henry Kissinger called this strategy "chain links". The goal was to extend the influence of NATO to the entire coastline of the Eurasian continent – from Western Europe through the Middle East to the Far East.<sup>206</sup> Briefly speaking, it means the reception of countries in the geopolitical space of NATO, which are close (as territory) or directly adjacent to Russia. Despite of the existence of several NATO-Russia cooperation agreements, controversy has arisen over many issues and the threat from Russia has not yet been mitigated. Enlargement of NATO in east and south is vital, enabling the alliance's immediate borders with Russia to further limit Russia's actions. In accordance with the above-mentioned theory, the logical extension of NATO's eastward expansion should be seen as a significant rapprochement with Georgia and Ukraine, which ultimately will join the organization.<sup>207</sup>

Geoeconomic interests: Georgia is important to NATO because of its strategic geographical location and favorable transit potential. Accordingly, the alliance's interests include the existence of a strong and credible partner country in the region in the form of Georgia.<sup>208</sup> Also, one of the main reasons for the Alliance's interest in the South Caucasus is the energy resource in the Caspian region, projects related to the transportation of these resources westward through the territory of Georgia. The issue of diversifying energy sources gained particular prominence for Europe in the view of the fact that Europe is seeking alternative ways of importing oil and gas to ensure its energy security in order to avoid energy dependence on politically unstable Russia or the Persian Gulf. Energy resources in the Caucasus and the Caspian region and their steady supply to Europe are already a priority area of interest for NATO and as well as for the EU. This also means to get control of the shortest path to Central Asia and here primarily concerns energy security issues.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> See. Pichugin, A. V. & Seden-ool A. A.; US-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "ANACONDA" STRATEGY; Siberian federal university, Russia, Krasnoyarsk Scientific supervisor – candidate of political sciences, assistant professor Yu. I. Dzis Law School, Siberian federal university, Russia, Krasnoyarsk; 2019; P:2.

<sup>207</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:71.

<sup>208</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliasvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:33.

<sup>209</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:71-72.

It is very important for Georgia that, in close consultation with the Alliance, formulate concrete action plans for an active cooperation with NATO in all possible forms of strengthening the Black Sea security and maintain Membership Action Plan (MAP). Black Sea Security includes a full range of actions to develop defenses against land, sea and air, as well as hybrid threats. Based on preliminary consultations, it can be said that NATO is interested in cooperating with Georgia in the exchange of information related to Black Sea security,<sup>210</sup> especially, after the annexation of the Crimea and the mobilization of Russian military in this territory. In this regard, the Warsaw Summit Declaration underlined the importance of Romania's initiative to establish a multinational brigade. It was also noted that various opportunities to enhance NATO presence in the region would be discussed. The Declaration clearly states that the Alliance will strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine on Black Sea security issues<sup>211</sup> and will continue to support the Republic of Moldova.<sup>212</sup> Georgia is doing its best to become a full-fledged member of the Black Sea security architecture, further enhancing the country's security and chances for peaceful development.<sup>213</sup> The MAP is a NATO program of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudice any decision by the Alliance on future membership. Current participants are Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of North Macedonia.<sup>214</sup>

Georgia's NATO integration is not aimed against anyone, no one is in danger, but is aimed at ensuring the security of the country and its entire population, while at the same time contributing stability and security in the geopolitically important Caucasus region. By joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Georgia should become an even more reliable, predictable and promising partner for its immediate neighbors in the South Caucasus region. NATO's open door policy and enlargement to the east is

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<sup>210</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliasvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:33.

<sup>211</sup> See. ერისთავი, შოთა; ასიმეტრიული ომის გავლენა ევროატლანტიკური უსაფრთხოების სისტემაზე და ნატოს სტრატეგიული მიდგომა ახალ გამოწვევებთან; Eristavi, Shota; The impact of asymmetrical war on the Euro-Atlantic security system and NATO's strategic approach to new challenges; Tbilisi; 2018; P:72.

<sup>212</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliasvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:36.

<sup>213</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliasvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:33.

<sup>214</sup> See. North Atlantic Treaty Organization; Membership Action Plan (MAP); 18 Feb. 2019; [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_37356.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_37356.htm)

crucial for Georgia as a reliable and stable partner to achieve the ultimate goal of full membership of the Alliance.<sup>215</sup>

Today, NATO is an organization that is very different from the institution it was created in 1949. Permanent changes within NATO are a key precondition for strengthening the security of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as of the Partner countries and ensuring peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.<sup>216</sup>

It is important to note that the Alliance has moved to a new stage of development; Most important in the military sphere, given the military potential of NATO, the independence and territorial integrity of each member state has been, and will be, safeguarded. In spite of NATO membership, it is important not only to take into account the political and military aspects, but also to consider economic factors. Alliance membership therefore plays a vital role in creating a stable, secure environment on the territory of each country. This, in turn, creates fertile ground for attracting foreign investment in member countries, strengthening trade-economic links with foreign partners, and developing tourism infrastructure, which has a positive impact on local employment and remuneration. As for Georgia-NATO relations, it is important to note that Georgia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and the development of democratic institutions, economic growth, and the socioeconomic or political development of Georgia as a European state are really in the interests of the Alliance. However, despite the support of the majority of NATO member states, it all depends on Georgia itself, on how prepared the Georgian society is to contribute to the strengthening of its statehood and the building of a truly stable, democratic state.<sup>217</sup>

In conclusion, it can be said that joining NATO as a military political organization in the case of Georgia is to pursuit of purely security interests and political tendencies. First of all, it derives from the geostrategic location of the Caucasus region and Georgia in particular. Due to Georgia-NATO cooperation and partnership

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<sup>215</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliashvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:35.

<sup>216</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliashvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:37.

<sup>217</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამოწვევები; Mgeliashvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:37.

mechanisms, it is technically possible for Georgia to become a member of NATO, though there are political interests and trends that hinder Georgia's accession to NATO at this stage. Turning Georgia into the North Atlantic will make the country a strong and accountable force, a stronger one with more responsibility, more dignity, more solidarity and more reliability.<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> See. მგელიაშვილი, ბაკურ; საქართველოს ნატოში ინტეგრაციის პერსპექტივები და გამწვანებები; Mgeliasvili, Bakur; Georgia's Integration Perspectives and Challenges into NATO; Caucasus University, East European University, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, by the collaboration with „Ragtime“; Tbilisi; 2016; P:38.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis analyzes the history and present of Georgia's geopolitical course. The studies of the cause-and-effect relationship, which, despite the influence of many internal and external factors throughout Georgia's history, has been a major foreign policy vector of the country in close connection with Western civilization and its development. From ancient times Georgia's ties with ancient Greece and later with the Roman and Byzantine Empires have actually laid the foundation for political, economic and cultural relations and unity. This is proved by the existence of Greek colonies in the Black Sea and ancient Greek mythology. Subsequently, with Georgia's conversion to Christianity and West's patronage, the country eventually became part of the Europe.

Unfortunately, maintaining Georgia's ties to the West needed a lot of effort. The main obstacle to European integration has historically always been the invasion of much stronger enemies from the East and the North, which, in addition caused the material cultural and spiritual damage. As a result, especially in Soviet times Georgia was forced out of Europe and deviated from its course for a long time.

Georgian-European relations are analyzed, including conflicts with Russia, Tskhinvali region. Attention was paid on implementation of the announced reforms of Georgian president, Mikheil Saakashvili. The West bears significant responsibility to induce Georgia into pursuing a democratic path. Currently, the military conflict is over. International Society and Europe assist Georgian government to promote the rule of law, create an independent judiciary, defend human rights, establish democratic election, freedom and democracy, strengthen decentralization and guarantee property rights.

Of course, the war with Russia dramatically changed political situation in Georgia. Defacto authorities of Tskhinvali region willing to integrate with North Ossetia are aiming to become the part of Russia. Moreover, they carry out the policy directed by Russians. The thing Georgia should do in this case is to concentrate on economic, social and political development, be the candidate country to join European Union Structures, it should become more and more attractive for Abkhaz or South Ossetians;

convince them that their right and democratic values will be respected and their freedom and independence will be guaranteed within Georgia. If Georgia fulfills and realizes this goal then it will be easier and real for Georgia to pass the road leading through the European Union successfully and find its place in European Structures, finally join the big, prominent family of Europe and become the member, part of European Union.

Georgia-EU rapprochement is currently in active phase and they enjoy a very close and positive relationship. The main driving structures of these relationships are ENP, EaP and most importantly AA and DCFTA. Deepening of these relations is mutually beneficial, for both EU and Georgia. Georgia's accession to the European Union will be the final step to fully return to a united European family. Getting closer to the Euro-Atlantic system is unthinkable without close ties with NATO.

However, there are still many loose ends in the discussion of the enlargement of the EU and NATO.

## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AA – Association Agreement

BeNeLux – Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg

CFE – Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States

CIU – Caucasus International University

CSCE – Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

EACU – Eurasian Customs Union

EAPC – Euro Atlantic Partnership Council

EC – European Commission

ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community

ECU – European Currency Unit

EFTA – European Free Trade Area

EMS – European Monetary System

ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy

EaP – Eastern Partnership

EP – European Parliament

EU – European Union



EUJUST – European Union Rule of Law Mission

EUMM – European Union Monitoring Mission

EU – European Union Special Representative

GAF – Georgian Armed Forces

GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GDP – Gross domestic product

HRW – Human Rights Watch

ICJ – International Court of Justice

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

ICT – Information and Communications Technology

IDP – Internally Displaced Persons

IIFMCG – Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia

KGB - Russian: Комитет Государственной Безопасности (КГБ); English: Committee for State Security

MAP - Membership Action Plan

NACC – North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO – North-Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGC – NATO-Georgia Commission

NRF – NATO's Response Force

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PARP – Planning And Review Process

PCA – Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PfP – Partnership for Peace program

TACIS – Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States

TRACECA - Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia

USA – United States of America

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WTO – World Trade Organization

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