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## **„Migration Management and Sustainable Development“**

The problematic of contemporary developmentalism in migration governance  
and the ambivalent neutrality of international organizations in managing  
migration from the Horn of Africa to Europe  
(Joint Valletta Action Plan)

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
BMM	Better Migration Management
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
DG HOME	Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund for Africa
GAMM	Global Approach to Migration and Mobility
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HoA	Horn of Africa
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRCP	(Inter-) Regional Consultative Process
JVAP	Joint Valletta Action Plan
KP	Khartoum Process
MMD	Migration Mobility Dialogue
MDG	Millenium Development Goals
MP	Mobility Partnership
RP	Rabat Process
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SOM	Senior Officials' Meeting
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Following the colonial era, Africa has increasingly gained a global reputation, as the continent of mass displacement brought about by poverty, political corruption, war and the overall developmental failure. The concept of development aid, as we know it – especially in the African context, is deeply rooted in an understanding that development will regulate emigration from the continent. Bakewell (2008: 1341) states that, “[...] development interventions across Africa [...] have sedentary roots which are focused on the control of mobility and tend to cast migration as a symptom of development failure.” Migration can be understood as a process of moving, whether across an international border or within a country, this includes any kind of movement of people regardless of length, composition and causes. (cf. IOM 2019: 135). To this end, human migration, whether in search of food or as a result of threats, took place before the start of structured theorization of human and social issues. “Across the millennia, migration or seasonal movements of people have been a significant aspect of the human experience of space and time.” (Schiller; Salazar 2012: 185) Migration, as an innate social phenomenon, that influences and also is influenced by circumstance, both organic and inorganic, is a response to changes in the environment as well as an adaptation to stay alive. The framework of migration, be it voluntary or involuntary, extends from an internal, personal desire to explore other worlds, to external influences, such as political, economic and/or natural threats. However, “international migration is widely seen to be driven by relative poverty and the lack of opportunity in developing countries (push factors) and by a growing demand for labour in industrialised states (pull factors).” (Bakewell 2008: 1345) Confining the causes of migration to a simplistic neoclassic and eurocentric understanding of development, defeats the purpose when exploring innovative ways to better manage migration. In order to understand the ever-changing definition of mobility and migration, we must first place the concepts of development, migration and mobility within a context of unequal power relations (cf. Schiller; Salazar 2012: 195). “The distinctive feature of Eurocentrism is either to view the particular European way of articulating nation, state, and classes as a model that reveals the specificity of the European spirit (and, therefore, a model for others to follow, if they can) or the expression of a general law that will be inevitably reproduced elsewhere, even if delayed.” (Amin 2009: 256) Consequently, I examine why the economic domination or advancement experienced

by Europe will not suffice to justify migratory behaviors and decision-making on the African continent, insisting that power relations play a role in so-called European partnerships and dialogues with African nation states, which are consequently imbued with productive power.

Before and during the colonial era, the majority of international migrants originated in Europe but since the postcolonial period, Europeans have accounted for an increasingly small fraction of world immigration flows, and emigration from Africa, Asia and Latin America has increased dramatically. During the 1990s external European Union (EU) migration policies centered, predominantly, on the Western Balkan migratory route. However, towards the 2010s, due to the large number of irregular migrants arriving (with many lives lost along the way) at the shores of southern Europe, the EU quickly saw a shift of attention to the African continent. Migration from Africa to Europe has seen an increasing focus on restrictive policies by the EU since the adoption of the Global Approach to Migration in 2005, which arguably do not necessarily limit migration, but instead boost dangerous forms of migration that cause and increase border death rates. Consequently, “although border controls and restrictive policies obviously reduce the flow of immigrants below what it would be in the absence, all borders remain ‘porous’ to some degree. Undocumented migrants enter and work by clandestine means, while other enter through legal exceptions... In all cases, the size of actual inflow exceeds that specified by policy or envisioned by officials and the public as ideal.” (Massey et al. 1998: 14) Moreover, as a result of restrictions on legal migration into the EU, the world saw a drastic increase of migrants arriving to Europe via dangerous and risky migration routes. On the European continent this was perceived as a major crisis and “in 2015, in response to the dramatic increase in the number of people crossing the Mediterranean to seek asylum in Europe, the European Union created a new €2bn fund to address multiple aspects of migration along the so-called ‘Central Mediterranean route’. The ‘European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa’ (EUTF for Africa) was adopted within the framework of the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP), in connection with the European agenda for Migration.” (Oxfam 2017: 2) In the absence of open borders and free movement, African migration within and out of the continent, was widely perceived as a direct product of a lack of economic development and growing political instability the continent has experienced since the decolonisation era. The EUTF is widely sold as a development aid initiative, whilst intentionally overlooking the externalisation of European



border policies to Africa. “This monetisation of the relationship with African countries opens up a trade logic that appears to skate over questions of human rights and the fate of thousands of people on the African continent.” (Prestianni 2016: 5). The Khartoum and Rabat Process, which are platforms for political cooperation and dialogue for countries along the respective migration route, monitor the initiatives and actions under the JVAP, which are in fact fully funded by the EU and implementation is solely managed by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), which functions in this context similar to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). “IOM represents a novel form of neoliberal governance and is indicative of the transformations of sovereignty that extend beyond capital flows to include the management of migrant bodies. Federal governments contractually employ the IOM to carry out a range of migration-related services that governments find themselves unable or unwilling to carry out for legal and political purposes.” (Ashutosh; Mountz 2011: 22) Only in the case of ICMPD, the federal government is replaced by a supranational entity, such as the EU. Further down, we will scrutinize the often bias role that international organisations (IOs) play in the implementation of (Inter-)regional Consultative Processes (IRCPs) on Migration, such as the Khartoum Process (KP). Seeing that, “there is no single theory widely accepted by social scientists to account for the emergence and perpetuation of international migration” (Massey et al. 1998: 17), this thesis aims to analyse economic and historical-structural theoretical approaches and their relevance for an African migration and development context, the intentions and outcomes of European funds to Africa under the EUTF as a development aid initiative as well as the trans-nationalization of state activities through international organisations, allowing them to enact neo-liberal projects in the name of humanitarianism – all with the sole aim to halt migration and mobility. Hence, the central supporting assumption is that a universal, homogenous understanding of sustainable development or the lack thereof, is in fact inadequate to justify and explain migration from Africa to Europe, whilst ignoring power relations and failing to reconceptualise development for a non-European context. Hence, restrictive migration policies, enforced by the European Union and implemented by international (and also national) organisations, disguised under a development initiative do in fact reinforce unequal power relations and mostly benefit the European agenda.

This thesis begins by introducing general theories of migration and analysing their

relevance in contemporary developmentalist context, followed by the third chapter, which introduces the development-migration nexus, by refining the concept of development, and understanding its relationship to dependency and power, followed by an analysis of development strategies such as the Global Development Agenda 2030 and the EU Agenda on Migration and the existing European paternalism in order to contextualise the dynamics of EU partnerships and dialogues with developing countries. In Chapter four, this thesis pays particular attention to EU migration management policies in the African context, by means of Regional Migration Dialogues and Mobility Partnerships (MPs). The role of international organisations, such as ICMPD specifically, is also scrutinized in chapter four, this allows an explicit insight into the initiative and roles played by different actors and how/whether it benefits the African counterparts. Chapter five is dedicated to the analysis of EU migration management policies and initiatives, which takes place by means of the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP), as an example of European efforts to engage Africa in the management of mobility within and out of Africa, specifically the Horn of Africa (HoA). This analysis take place by means of the EU - Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process) for regional specificity and context and the most recent Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) report 2018. Subsequently, I conclude with the sixth chapter, where I provide an overarching viewpoint for an inclusive framework to managing migration, that may encourage and support a development, specific to the African continent.

## 2. THEORIES OF MIGRATION

The following questions are important in order to be able to understand and analyse migration: What is migration? What are root causes of migration? Where does migration take place? What are consequences of migration? Migration theories tend to homogenously describe certain economic and social factors as root causes of migration, without examining and acknowledging the importance of context. In order to analyse migration incentives and propensity from an economic perspective, it is paramount to take a closer look at the neo-classical approach to migration as well as the push-pull model, which more or less derived from a classical school of thought. These will explain migration stimulants on a micro-level, stressing the individual viewpoint of migrants. Subsequently, the world-systems theory will, at the macro-level, assist in understanding the historical and structural factors of unequal growth sustained by unequal power relations and contribute to the understanding as to why European countries are particularly attractive to African migrants. This is of utmost significance when dissecting the migration incentives of people from the HoA region, which may to whatever extent be influenced by the eurocentrism and coloniality that haunts the relationships between their country of origin and destination.

	<b>Micro-level</b>	<b>Macro-level</b>
<b>Migration cause</b>	Individual economic interests Developmentalist - modernisationalist approach (eurocentrism)	Historical-structural approach Product of capitalism (asymmetric growth) “the development of underdevelopment”
<b>Theory</b>	<b>Neoclassic Theory Push-Pull Theory</b>	<b>World Systems Theory</b>

*Table 1: Theories categorized by level of analysis<sup>1</sup>*

<sup>1</sup> (cf. de Haas 2008: 1-7)

## 2.1 The Neo-classic Perspective

The origin of the human capital approach first emerged in Adam Smith's 1776 work "Wealth of Nations". According to the micro-level neoclassic approach, migrants function as rational, autonomic individuals who move for the purpose of income maximisation. This portrays the decision to migrate as an investment made by the migrants, expecting in return, higher wages associated with better paying jobs, which should exceed the costs of moving (cf. Mitze; Reinkowski 2010: 5). The net return or profit of this investment is "estimated by taking the observed earnings corresponding to the individual's skills in the destination country and multiplying these by the probability of obtaining a job there (and for illegal migrants the likelihood of being able to avoid deportation) to obtain 'expected destination earnings'." (Massey et al. 1993: 434) The neoclassical theory argues that when individuals migrate, the wages increase in the area of origin and decrease in the area of destination. Therefore individuals must migrate until equilibrium is reached and wages are equivalent in both areas. Although wage differences as migration motivators, seems fairly logical, it is not sufficient to explain why people migrate, because although many migrate due to wage differences, many don't. There are examples of considerable wage disparities between countries within Europe – although wages differ, there is little migration from Southern European to Northern European states (cf. Massey et al. 1998: 8-9). Hence, this approach proves void or incomplete as it does not analyze or even consider other determining factors for migration that are non-economical.

## 2.2 The Push-Pull Framework

Similarly, Lee's Push-Pull theory argues that there are factors in both, area of destination and area of origin, which contribute to the individual making a decision to migrate (cf. Lee 1966: 50). To this end, "some factors of economic character (unemployment, low level of the income, heavy taxes) can belong to the pushing; social and political (poverty, discrimination, restrictions on a freedom of worship and religions, wars); adverse natural and climatic conditions, etc. The high level of economic development, higher income, safety, opportunity to get access to labor market (including in informal sector that is especially important for illegal

immigrants) and other factors belong to pulling ones.” (Gurieva 2015: 102) Lee categorizes these factors as pro (+) and con (-) factors. “While migration may result from a comparison of factors at origin and destination, a simple calculus of +’s and -’s does not decide the act of migration. The balance in favor of the move must be enough to overcome the natural inertia which always exists.” (Lee 1966: 51) This natural inertia may for example be one’s natural inclination to the area and culture of origin, which can complicate the decision to migrate. Unlike the neoclassical approach which describes the decision to migrate as strictly rational one, Lee differentiates between individuals and their decision-making process and he argues that the migration decision-making process is never really a rational one (cf. *ibid*). In this theory, much attention is paid to the econometric characteristics of migrants and although it is stated that individuals respond differently to the push and pull factors, it was not considered why this is the case. “Push-pull models also tend to ignore the heterogeneity and internal stratification of societies, while general contextual factors habitually defined as either push or pull factors are likely to work out in a differentiated way on the individual level, and might subsequently encourage some people to leave and others to stay.” (de Haas 2008: 9) The neoclassic approach and the push-pull model, alike, have been subject to extensive criticism due to their limited analytical and practical use. Both theories - although for the push and pull theory, never explicitly stated - focus on economic factors and therefore ignore political and social determinants. “Although the truism holds that economic and other opportunity differentials generally play a major role in migration, this alone cannot explain the actual, patterned and geographically clustered morphology of migration[...] Structural forces majeures in the international political economy such as warfare, colonialism, conquest, occupation and labour recruitment as well as factors such as shared culture, language and geographical proximity often play a crucial role in the initiation of migration processes.” (de Haas 2010: 1589) Massey et al. (1998:10) similarly argue that economic factors alone do not suffice, although often essential, to explain the inclination to migrate. In sum, they have proven inadequate to explain the complexities of migration as a phenomenon embedded in broader socio-economic and political processes (cf. de Haas 2008: 11). Therefore, as mentioned frequently throughout this thesis, economic growth alone will not suffice to reduce migration, but political and social development, in the form of structural equality will set the stage for a more symmetric discussion on who migrates where and why.

## 2.3 The World-Systems and Unequal Growth

This historical-structural approach supports the argument that unequal power relations, be it political and/or economic, play a major role in the underdevelopment of regions, which function as migrant-sending areas. Emmanuel Wallerstein championed the world systems theory, which constructed the unequal political and economic structures between the 'core' (dominant capitalistic powers), 'semi-periphery' (slightly independent) and the 'periphery' (dependent) (cf. 1974: 401). In this case, peripheral countries were ambushed by their disadvantaged position within a power structure, which assisted and sustained their poverty (cf. Massey et al. 1998: 34-5). The same power structures mentioned here had played a strong and vital role in global history. Colonial regimes once controlled and capitalised on poorer regions for their own economic benefit. Today, colonialism does not exist, per say, however "it is made possible by neocolonial governments and multinational firms that perpetuate the power of national elites who either participate in the world economy as capitalists themselves, or offer their nation's resources to global firms on acceptable terms." (Massey et al. 1993: 445) Peripheral states are often restricted in their political and economic decision-making due to their dependency on powerful capitalist states. The colonial relations play an important role, in this approach, due to the often still-ongoing associations between core countries and the former-colonial, peripheral countries.

The Trans-Atlantic slave trade was the first-ever mass movement, fueled by capitalistic-gain, which can be explained via the world systems theory. From the extraction of raw materials, to the cheap/unpaid labour of African and indigenous people, European countries enjoyed the fruit of this labor, while African countries suffered the consequences (cf. Gerbeau 2017: 3). This was an undeniable setback for the enslaved people, and it may also explain the poor economic situation of their descendants in contemporary America and Africa. When analysing the political and economic relations of Europe and Africa, it is essential to observe historical power relations and their continuities. In the context of international migration, the world-systems-theory "views these transnational relocations of people as generated by the structure of the global capitalist economy conceived as the interrelated whole composed of the unequal parts referred to by the already-introduced terms of core and periphery." (Morawska

2007:3) Accordingly, such economic and political inequalities are very likely to provoke population flows, which are often linked to past colonial relations, taking into account “the pre-existing connections in transportation and communications infrastructure, administrative links, and linguistic and cultural commonalities.”(ibid) In other words, this theory cannot only be used to explain why people migrate but also to analyse certain linkages between migrant sending and receiving countries. Especially in regard to international migration, the world-systems theory links the relation between country of origin and country of destination and why collectively individuals choose to move from the former to the latter, be it cultural, economic, or even linguistic links. Therefore, contrary to micro-level theories, the world-systems approach argues, that the migration decision-making process is not an individual choice but more so a product of a global capitalistic structure. Eventhough this approach may seem closer to finding explanations for migration decision-making processes, it is nevertheless not exempt from criticism. Critics have repeatedly described this approach as simplistic and inadequate. “[This] political economy theory of migration has been reprobated, like its macro-economic competitor-models, for its single-factor explanation that does not account for the complexity of the examined phenomenon and the excessive causal weight accorded the macro-level political forces in shaping international migration flows at the cost of human actors and their local environment.” (ibid: 8)

## **2.4 Practical Implications on Developmentalism, thus the contention between Political and Economic Migration: Conclusion**

The political connection to migration grew out of the conception of the nation-state, which is in fact not an ancient phenomenon. “Only with the advent of the nation-state in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, did the notion of legally tying populations to territorial units and to specific forms of government become commonplace.” (Moch qtd. in Hollifield 2000: 139) Since the establishment of the modern international system, eurocentric standards have been the basis of measuring policies, laws, economics, politics, culture and general human exchanges, making Europe the center of the world and the rest of the world peripheries to it. “The identification of northwest Europe and its overseas populations with modernity has

had substantial implications for the DI cultural model, most significantly the assumption that the attributes of northwest Europe are those that all societies must adopt to become developed or modern.” (Thornton et al. 2016: 6) According to Said (cf. 1993: 220-223), the European system of expanding the nation-state, through conquest, colonization, and scientific exploration, allowed Europe and its people an absolute control and dominance over their colonies (Africa, India, etc.) and its people. This relationship between the colony and its colonizer was a strictly eurocentric one, culturally, linguistically and mentally. The importance of such disparities when analyzing international migration between Africa and Europe is undeniable. This colonial structure has since decolonization (ca. 60 years ago) somehow maintained itself in postcolonial ideas of development. The concern over how to best gain control over the movement of people and make profit of it, is one that dates back to Europe’s invasion of the African continent as well as the gruesome transatlantic slave trade (cf. Bakewell 2008: 1343-4).

As previously mentioned, economic, social, but also political aspects enfolded in the concepts of migration, must be scrutinized, in order to understand contemporary dynamics. Social boundaries (i.e. language, religion, ethnicity, climatic conditions, and more) undoubtedly influence how people perceive themselves as well as their surroundings. Political and economic eurocentric ideologies and paradigms trigger migration from the Horn of Africa to the Europe and as any other system, law and policies in line with the interest of the state as primary legal persona then regulate migration. This allows the state to regulate the influx of migration without much consideration of the right of those migrating. Today, modernity and the centre-periphery divide created intergenerational migration patterns that are difficult to erase. Coloniality and modern thinking and propagation of information imply that the West is the centre of the world. Such patterns sometimes may not be politically and economically viable; they may even be completely false, but since they are an intergenerational habit or pattern created and served to people, it becomes difficult for them to stop. “The process of systematically locating the Eurocentric deformations in dominant ideologies and social theories, retracing their genesis and bringing out their weakness is not sufficient. An outmoded paradigm disappears only on the condition that another paradigm, freed from errors of the first, is positively expressed.” (Amin 2009: 219)



Further, the export of European migration policy implementation through IOs, such as ICMPD, IOM and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), reinforces the position Europe holds, economically and politically, as a centre while condemning Africa to an underdeveloped periphery. “[...] Nation-states operate transnationally in enacting projects of exclusion and excision through non-governmental entities that effectively use the language of human rights and international civil society to thwart migrants and refugee claims.” (Ashutosh; Mountz 2011: 21) Policies, which naturally serve a European agenda, are in recent years increasingly implemented by supposedly non-biased international organisations. Raghuram (2009: 108) argues that, “equally significant is the invisibility of migration of development workers, researchers and policy-workers, a mobility that is so central to keeping developmentalism in circulation. The migration of development officials, who act, as agents of modernization, is never brought into the rubric of migration-development. However, migration is an important tool that helps maintain universalized claims of certain knowledge, which is central to development.” Further, this thesis will take a closer look at restrictive EU policies and what power and purpose they hold in international migration and migration management followed by the practical example of the Joint Valletta Action Plan, the EU - HoA Migration Route Initiative (also known as the Khartoum Process) and what role IOs play in the implementation process. This thesis will be defended on the basis of the centre/periphery divide, dependency, power and asymmetry, supported by the world-systems theory. This will contribute to analysing the economic, social and political reality of migration in the context of the HoA in relation to the EU.

### 3. THE MIGRATION – DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

Typically, international migration, as per the economic theories, occurs as a consequence of a development disparity between countries of destination and countries of origin and transit for that matter. The most common notion is that when the economic growth fails to match the population growth, this will trigger the population to move to a more developed country. However, depending on context, this is not entirely the case because access to resources can facilitate migration. On the contrary, in classical theory, for example, migration eventuates by reasons of a combination of supply-push and demand-pull factors, whereas poverty emerges as the main supply factor. “People in developing countries require resources and connections to engage in international migration. In response to their increasing displacement, the poor have made mobility a part of their livelihood strategies. There is, however, little evidence of a direct link between poverty, economic development, population growth, social and political change on the one hand and international migration on the other. The “migration hump” suggests that some economic development generates both the resources and the incentives for people to migrate. By implication, poverty reduction is not in itself a migration-reducing strategy. As long as poverty reduction is the overriding goal of aid and development cooperation, there is no direct link between aid and migration control.” (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002: 40) On the contrary, “in the last five years, migration has arisen to the top of the development agenda after being of marginal interest to development studies and development policy and practice for many years. Today, the potential contribution of migration to development is being trumpeted by states – especially industrialised states – multilateral organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs or non-profits), wider civil society and academics.” (Bakewell 2008: 1) As the migration-development nexus gains plenty attention, in recent years, very often the definition and history of development is sidelined and neglected. Development, in a world divided by socio-economic disparities, can often be used to scrutinise states of the global south for not catching up with their counterparts, therefore for this context the eurocentric notion of a linear and universal development must be reconsidered. This results in the root cause approach which is often implemented by European policy-makers (such as in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)), which consequently sees development aid as part of control policies and ‘stay at home’ strategies. This approach derives from the idea that migration is an obstacle stemming from the underdevelopment of states (cf. Geiger; Pecoud 2012: 1).

The perception of development within the migration sphere, takes on two forms, the migration optimists and pessimists (cf. de Haas 2008: 23). The optimists see migration as a key benefactor to development. Here the discussion often focuses on migrants' remittances and their influence on development – especially in the migrant-sending societies. The pessimists on the other hand, view the lack of development as a root cause of migration. This skepticism has in recent years, post-2015, largely been adopted by EU Agencies on migration. However for the purpose of this thesis, prior to linking the two phenomena, migration and development, it is of utmost significance to reconceptualise the development idea. “In order to understand and explain processes of development, we need to become more sensitive to the complexities of various development experiences and to forge more appropriate conceptual tools within development theory for interpreting such experiences.” (Brohman 1995: 121) As in more traditional neoclassic, modernisation paradigms, mainstream development theory has been almost entirely rooted in the historical and social experiences of a few Western societies. The world systems theory offers here a perspective on how this affects the societies of the periphery and how they suffer from an economic and political exploitation at the hands of said Western societies.

When theorising on how mobility directly and indirectly affects the development of sending countries, and/or vice versa, without dissecting the concept of development, the problematic of this nexus increases further. This has perpetuated the idea that development is about halting migration, which fails to consider transnationalism and people's different goals (cf. Bakewell 2008: 1342). Since its inception and specifically in response to the massive inflow of refugees in 2015, the EU implied the urgent need to bring about 'development' in the migrant-sending countries, in an attempt to halt the 'mass' arrival of people (cf. European Commission 2015). As such, the concept of development is often understood “as a place-bound process that focuses on enabling people to achieve a better quality of life 'at home', implying that migration is an indicator of development failure.” (Nijenhuis; Leung 2017: 51) Like any other historical concept, development has throughout the years evolved, by way of the increasing mobility of people and goods and globalisation. Migration and Mobility have become distinctive attributes of this globalised world.

Development theories, often pertaining to economic growth, vary from free market to socialist orientation and remain the inception of European states. Therefore, “the problem is that the post-colonial African nations are still firmly tied to the economic theories and programmes of their erstwhile colonisers. Thus the solutions offered by way of the West are no more than palliatives.” (Amaizo 2012: 117) Africa’s progress or lack thereof, since independence, is best described by Samir Amin as manifested in characteristic structural features, namely “the extreme unevenness that is typical of the distribution of productivities in the periphery, and in the system of prices transmitted to it from the center, which results from the distinctive nature of the peripheral formations and largely dictates the structure of the distribution of income in these formations; the disarticulation due to the adjustment of the orientation of production in the periphery to the needs of the center, which prevents the transmission of the benefits of economic progress from the poles of development to the economy as a whole; and economic domination by the center, which is expressed in the forms of international specialisation (the structures of world trade in which the center shapes the periphery in accordance with its own needs) and in the dependence of the structures whereby growth in the periphery is financed (the dynamic of the accumulation of foreign capital).” (1976: 201-2) This centre-periphery argument thoroughly illustrates the post-colonial economic relations between African states and their European counterparts, which collect the advantages and benefits of these unequal transactions, while the periphery is deemed ill-fated. Although, several African countries are effortly trying to catch up with the centre’s development, especially in the technological and social sector, it is worth stating that “this deepening of dependent peripheral development follows paths that in the future will constitute the main forms of advanced underdevelopment. Technological domination manifests itself through the priority given to the development of sectors that must be competitive at the international level, whether this involves exports or luxury goods, the promotion of which reflects the adoption of Western consumption patterns.” (ibid: 380) All this, is to say that there is a need to unlearn colonial, paternalistic, and eurocentric paradigms of development, and relearn the concept as a “multidimensional process of change and reorganisation of the economy and society in a country with the aim to improve the quality of life of its inhabitants.” (Perchinig; Noack 2016: 10)

While promoting the economic advancement of the African continent for purposes of well-being and human rights, the underlying motivator should ideally not be to control the mobility of people because realistically an economic growth and policies pertaining thereto will prove erroneous in halting migration from one place to another, in fact they might even increase them (cf. Massey 1988: 384). Therefore an alternative understanding or reconceptualisation is paramount, assuming that such a “reconstruction of development leads to a transformations and development processes which do not necessarily correspond to economic development visions as articulated by international organisations, donor agencies, or Northern-biased development and migration thinking.” (Dannecker 2009: 120) The following subchapter highlights the alternative ways to understand development, away from its rather presumed economic impact, and in a social context of culture and power.

### **3.1 Development, Dependency and Power**

Development is growth often times specific only to economic growth and modernity or as defined by Gerald Berthoud, “a product of this simplistic vision of history, that is born of a linear progression of the material conditions of existence.” (1990: 24) An analysis of development, dependency and power are hereby interlinked - namely Samir Amin’s conception of Eurocentrism to describe the cultural aspect of development and power, which to some extent goes hand in hand with Wallerstein’s centre-periphery argument and both concepts are supported here with Foucault’s (cf. 1980: 51-2) understanding of power and its connection to knowledge and the governance of a people. “Postwar development studies, for example, have been largely dominated by the concept of modernisation—the equation of development with modernisation and the construction of a single model of modernity based on the experience of a few (industrialised) countries. If this model is followed, it is assumed that all countries may reach the goal of a similar type of ,modern society’. This type of grand theorisation is prone to problems of reductionist bias, whereby simplistic monocausal explanations are sought for complex development realities.” (Brohman 1995:122) Developmentalist modernization theories, such as Rostow’s schema (1960) provide a model that depicts how supposedly a society evolves from a traditional society to a modern one. Therefore development in a modernist perspective is linear and universal. As identified above, the centre-periphery methodologies

debunk the idea of a eurocentric, idealistic, linear and universal understanding of development. The dependency theory was developed for and within the context of the Latin American periphery. Dependency theory authors, such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso and André Gunder Frank, developed a set of ideals, which debunk a modernizationist view of development. To name a few for the purpose of this thesis, firstly, they argue that development or lack thereof in the centre-periphery context is a product of the capitalist world-system. Secondly, they believe that structures of domination and exploitation are not to be ignored, as is often done in theories of modernity. Thirdly, they mention the diffusion and expansion of eurocentric values unto societies of the periphery, which according to dependistas, does not generate growth, but instead subordinates the periphery to the centre (cf. Grosfoguel 2000: 360).

The structures of domination and exploitation in development are evidently reflected in the world systems-theory, often referring to the core as capitalistic powers practicing this domination over a dependent periphery (cf. Wallerstein 1974: 401). From a non-structuralist perspective, Foucault conducts an idea of power that connects the concept to knowledge and truth. "The power-knowledge dyad is welded together by causality in both directions: power and knowledge "directly imply" one another. First, the exercising of power opens new relations of power and creates new objects of understanding or rational inquiry. Second, knowledge immediately "presupposes and constitutes" power relations. Turning to the Third World, it is frightening to consider the prominent role played by knowledge of the beneficiaries in development projects [...] The acquisition of knowledge does not merely justify an intrusion of power, it is an intrusion of power." (DuBois 1991: 7) Knowledge and truth alike, their production and dissemination, are concepts that play a tremendous role in the development and development policy-making. "One can see that truth, just as knowledge, supports and constitutes power relations, such as those between the development expert and peasant farmer in rural Mali, allowing the discourse of the former to take precedence over the discourse of the latter, even in the realm of the affairs of the latter. Herein lies one of development's most serious flaws." (ibid) Hence, development as a discourse comprises of several subcontexts, such as knowledge, power, dependency and truth. However, it is not merely an ideology but a reality that has crystallized in practices that contribute to regulating the everyday whereabouts of people in the developing countries (cf. Escobar 1995: 222)

It is perspicuous that development, although constantly scrutinized and in reconstruction, often reappears as a construct with the same old eurocentric, modernistic underlying fundamentals. “Popular groups in many parts of the Third World seem to be increasingly aware of these dilemmas. Caught between conventional development strategies that refuse to die and the opening of spaces in the wake of ecological capital and discourses on cultural plurality, biodiversity, and ethnicity, some of these groups respond by attempting to craft unprecedented visions of themselves and the world around them. Urged by the need to come up with alternatives lest they be swept away by another round of conventional development, capitalist greed, and violence—the organizing strategies of these groups begin to revolve more and more around two principles: the defense of cultural difference, not as a static but as a transformed and transformative force; and the valorization of economic needs and opportunities in terms that are not strictly those of profit and the market.” (ibid 1995: 225-226) Therefore the defense portrayed in this paper of African migrants’ right to exist where they please and the opposition of a eurocentric understanding of development that is infested with unequal power relations, must become the foremost principle of an African people when addressing global matters. By means of the upcoming subchapters, we will see how development is reconstructed, yet not really for a migration context and understand better the connectivity of migration to development in global and regional policies, we will take a look at a few of those in detail, namely the Global Development Agenda 2030, the European Agenda on Migration and specifically the Global Approach on Migration and Mobility, which serves as the underlying framework of current EU policy on migration.

### **3.2 The Global Development Agenda**

Unlike preexistent development initiatives, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the 2030 Agenda, which were adopted in September 2015, display a universal nature, which not only applies to all countries of the world but also perceives matters as a global problem and not one of the global south exclusively. The 2030 Agenda consists of seventeen goals of which seven directly or indirectly reference migration and migrants. The 2030 Agenda does not only mention migration specifically (10.7) but also includes several migration-related targets, as can be seen in Figure 1. This is indeed a step ahead from former development initiatives, such



as the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), however it remains still far from the maximum potential that migration can offer development goals. “If countries are to achieve the SDGs, they need to consider the impact of migration at all levels and on all outcomes, beyond the targets in Table 1. Our analysis, which has explored the links between migration and 15 of the 17 SDGs, shows that migration is not a development ‘problem’ to be solved (as is the subtext of SDG 10.7), but a mechanism or a strategy that can contribute to the achievement of many of the goals.” (Foresti et al. 2018: 5)

4.b	By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries in particular LDCs, SIDS and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and ICT, technical, engineering and scientific programmes in developed countries and other developing countries
5.2	Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation
8.7	Take immediate and effective measures to eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all its forms
8.8	Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment
10.7	Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies
10.c	By 2030, reduce to less than 3% the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%
16.2	End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture of children
17.18	By 2020, enhance capacity building support to developing countries, including for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts

Figure 1: Migration in the Sustainable Development Goals and targets (ibid)

“In the context of globalization, migration brings both development opportunities and challenges. While many migrants are able to move, live and work in safety and dignity, others are compelled to move as a result of poverty, lack of decent work, and environmental degradation.” (Global Migration Group 2013: 2) For that matter another global approach was undertaken specific to migration, namely the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. As for the SDGs, as a universal development agenda with clear targets and indicators, it could have and should have addressed specifically all migrants’ realities. “Goals and targets on health, education, productive employment and decent work for all, good governance, protection or gender equality, amongst others, would become more relevant if they contain indicators that are disaggregated so that the situation and human rights of migrants, including migrant children and other ‘at risk’ groups, can be appropriately assessed and monitored.” (idib: 5) In summary, although the 2030 Agenda has



not explored the potential of migration in its entirety, it is nevertheless an important step towards recognising the multidimensional reality of migration and migrants.

There is a lack of global and internationally-binding regulation on migration. As such, one recent example of international migration governance is the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)<sup>2</sup>, an agreement designed to:

- mitigate the adverse drivers and structural factors that hinder people from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin;
- reduce the risks and vulnerabilities migrants face at different stages of migration by respecting, protecting and fulfilling their human rights and providing them with care and assistance;
- address the legitimate concerns of states and communities, while recognizing that societies are undergoing demographic, economic, social and environmental changes at different scales that may have implications for and result from migration;
- create conducive conditions that enable all migrants to enrich our societies through their human, economic and social capacities, and thus facilitate their contributions to sustainable development at the local, national, regional and global levels.

This intergovernmentally negotiated agreement, although non-binding, is a step further from the SDGs in acknowledging “The Global Compact is rooted in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and builds upon its recognition that migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the sustainable development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses. Migration contributes to po-

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2 <https://www.un.org/en/conf/migration/faqs.shtml>

sitive development outcomes and to realizing the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, especially when it is properly managed. The Global Compact aims to leverage the potential of migration for the achievement of all Sustainable Development Goals, as well as the impact this achievement will have on migration in the future.” (United Nations 2018: 5) An important aspect in the implementation of this agreement is to accept that although the framework is global and internationally pursued, still it must be locally led and embedded in local contexts and realities involving local stakeholders (cf. Foresti 2017: 3). Only then will the full potential of migration within development and development within migration be explored. Global migration policy is guided by a universality of knowledge, that is undeniably constructed by powerful states. Therefore when taking a look at the SDGs as we have done here, we can quickly recognise the resemblance with European migration policy. For the purpose of this thesis and to deeper understand frameworks, such as the Joint Valletta Action Plan, the European Union has put into place regional policies and frameworks specifically to act as guiding tools to better manage migration.

### **3.3 The EU Agenda on Migration**

As mentioned in the introduction, “the relationship between country of origin and country of destination is characterised by a fundamental power asymmetry, whereby destination states are the rule-makers and have the power to open or close their borders, while origin states generally have to accept these decisions”. (Perchinig; Noack 2016: 13) This is often scrutinised when analysing Europe’s approach toward migration management, which is widely believed to have, in recent years, since the inception of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), outsourced its problems to neighboring countries and/or regions. In the guise of addressing root causes of migration, the EU promotes close cooperation with countries of origin as well as transit countries in order to halt any human mobility before it reaches external EU borders. This cooperation also aims to foster development in these countries in order to discourage potential migrants from travelling to Europe (cf. European Commission 2015: 7). This assumption on the European side affirms that the lack of development in the countries of origin and transit is the most significant “root cause” of migration. Therefore the assumption here is firstly, that there is a root cause and secondly, that if these countries are developed

as per European standards, migration will decline significantly. Both theories have been debunked more than once as mentioned several times in this thesis. The European Agenda on Migration presented by the European Commission in 2015, states four pillars to better manage migration, namely the mitigation of irregular migration, the security and management of external borders, the coherent implementation of the Common European Asylum System, and lastly the development of a new legal migration policy. Some of the key actions to achieve the implementation of these pillars, include close cooperation with developing countries, capacity building of developing countries to manage their borders, platforms for dialogue and a stronger action to link migration and development policy (cf. *ibid*: 6-16).

For the EU, this shift towards international cooperation as a means to better manage migration, often referred to as the “externalisation of migration control”, dates back to the adoption of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2005. This framework, which will be analysed in detail in the following subchapter, has since its inception served as an overarching framework for future EU migration management partnerships. Such partnerships and cooperations primarily targeted countries neighboring the EU, but expanded in scope to target countries and regions further away that served as transit countries for migrants on their journey to Europe. “The EU has [...] developed various instruments to cooperate with States further from its borders, for instance through the EU Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) launched in 2016.” (Pijnenburg et al. 2018: 366) Under this approach the EU strategically targets countries, such as Senegal, Niger, Ethiopia, etc. to establish bilateral partnerships, which consist of funding and training authorities in those countries to carry out migration control (cf. *ibid*). In current events, the North African countries, namely Morocco, Tunisia and especially Libya, play an utmost important role in halting migration from Africa to Europe. The European Union depends largely on the work of the so called “cordon sanitaire” which handle the deterrence and return of predominantly Sub-Saharan migrants (cf. Duennwald 2011: 111). Such cooperation on the side of the Global South, while considering asymmetric power relations, nevertheless calls for an equal scepticism and criticism of the accountability and responsibility of the aforementioned North African states for carrying out forceful migration control on the behalf of European states. The need for a shared responsibility is evidently mentioned in the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

### 3.3.1 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)

At the EU level the Global Approach to Migration (2005) which was in the year 2011 renewed and renamed to include the term “mobility” as an acknowledgment of the importance of the mobility of third country nationals, serves as an “overarching framework of EU external migration policy.” (European Commission 2011: 3-4) This renovated approach (ibid: 8), which aims to manage migration from EU neighbouring countries more effectively, has incorporated the concept of migration and development as one of its four pillars. The four themes include the following:

1. organising and facilitating legal migration and mobility;
2. preventing and reducing irregular migration and trafficking in human beings;
3. promoting international protection and enhancing the external dimension of asylum policy;
4. maximising the development impact of migration and mobility.

The main instrument of cooperation with third countries under the GAMM is the Mobility Partnership (MP). “Taking the form of a political declaration between the partner third country, the European Commission and the participating member states, the MP is presented as an instrument elaborated to better manage circulation [of norms] between the EU and the partner countries, by addressing the facilitation of legal migration, the fight against irregular migration, the enhancement of the link between migration and the development of the external dimension of asylum.” (Brouillette 2018: 2)

Although the idea behind the strategy is to portray a win-win situation, due to the extent of negative consequences this discourse is perceived simply as rhetoric to conceal the externalization of harmful EU policy (cf. Carrera; Hernandez 2009: 18-19). Hence, partnership with third countries can not be genuine if preventing further migration is the principal European

migration policy goal. The EU mentions that third country's cooperation under the MPs will be backed up by a support package geared to capacity-building and cooperation in all areas of shared interest (cf. European Commission 2011: 6). Unfortunately, there is more to the support package than is openly communicated. "The strings explicitly attached to recent EU Commission proposals also introduce elements of blackmail by threatening states that refuse to close their borders, while rewarding those which repress their own citizens or refugees in transit in the name of cooperation with Europe". (Prestianni 2016: 6) Fair and balanced dialogues and partnerships based on conditionality are neither fair nor balanced. Similar conditionalities were used in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s and early 2000s, in the form of a prospect of future EU membership, which has led numerous countries to give in to EU pressures and adopt measures on asylum and migration. This was the case in Albania, where the government had little choice but to sign a readmission agreement after the Commission had announced the negotiation of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement that posed as a first step towards EU accession. While analyzing EU mobility partnerships with Georgia and Moldova, "few and vaguely formulated development objectives and legal migration possibilities have emerged and appear diluted when compared to the control-oriented measures. This reality exposes the gaps that subsist between the hegemonic security-oriented vision shared by the authors of this policy and illusion of a transparent and harmonious collaboration proposed to the third countries". (Brouillette 2018: 17) Such erroneous cooperation and partnerships that are founded on unequal power relations will only produce further frameworks and projects that will not produce what is promised instead only benefit the European Union through control and repression of migrants at African borders. In the upcoming chapters, we will take a closer look at similar agreements and regional dialogues that have emerged under the GAMM framework and how these, while following the suggestion that development will eradicate the root cause of migration, continue falling short. But first, we must take a closer look at the root cause approach and how it is often utilised by EU migration policy makers.

### 3.3.2 The Root Causes Approach

In this subchapter, we will debunk the assumption often pushed by EU policy makers, that migration can be considered the product of development failures. “Conventional ideas that development in origin countries will reduce international migration are ultimately based on “push-pull”, neoclassical and other equilibrium models which assume an inversely proportional relationship between absolute levels and relative differences of wealth and migration. The logic here goes that the decision to emigrate is, solely or predominantly, based on the economic opportunities or lack thereof in the countries of origin. On the contrary, other migration theories attest that migration increase is not a product of low economic welfare but rather of development itself.” (De Haas 2010: 38; Massey et al 1998: 227) Before delving into further theoretical specifics that undermine this logic, one must simply consider some non-economic but rather social and political motivators of migration, such as, political persecution, education and most importantly, citizenship. Often “in communities experiencing emigration, studies have repeatedly found that it is households higher up the income scale, not the poorest, that send family members abroad – they have resources to do so”. (Fratzke; Salant 2018: 1) Therefore, more often than widely believed, the driving factor of migration, especially from Africa to Europe, are more social or political, with aims to obtain a European education and/or citizenship, for the purpose of effortless travel, prestige and/or stability. The hypothesis here is that economic advancement on the African continent will not halt migration but might even increase it and for as long as unequal political, social relations between Europe and Africa exist, there is no way to address the issue while ignoring the North-South divide. “[This] divide is, of course, not a geographical expression, but a political and social one. Nor is it absolute, since the North includes areas and groups subject to social exclusion, while the South has prosperous cities and elite groups. There are also important regions and groups in intermediate or transitional growing disparities in income, social conditions, human rights and security linked to globalization. These create considerable pressure to migrate in search of better living conditions and greater personal freedom and security. [...] Migration control is essentially about regulating North-South relations.” (Castles 2004: 211)

When it comes to the root causes approach, it has been argued since the beginning of the 21st century, that this approach and its incorporation in European Union policy is in reality more so concerned with the restriction of immigration at any cost rather than with mitigating the causes of emigration in countries of origin (cf. Gent 2002: 15). To give an instance, “of the 934 million Euros programmed for external aid in 2000-2006, only 13 percent is allocated to „development“ and that for only two countries, Morocco and Somalia. The major share of the budget is allocated to „management of migration flows“ (read strengthening border control and mitigating illegal or irregular migration).” (Russell 2003) The defensive nature of the root causes approach is not only a smoke screen for the readmission of undocumented migrants; it also resorts to development aid as an instrument for the externalization of migration control to the countries of origin and transit (cf. Chetail 2008: 193). The above-mentioned policies date back to the Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council. According to paragraph I, article 11, “The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development.” (European Council 1999: 3) This paragraph laid the foundation for further coercive European policymaking, which saw the Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council stating in Paragraph III, article 33, “The European Council considers that combating illegal immigration requires a greater effort by the European Union and a targeted approach to the problem, with the use of all appropriate instruments in the context of the European Union’s external relations. To that end, in accordance with the Tampere European Council conclusions, an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackle the root causes of illegal immigration must remain the European Union’s constant long-term objective. With this in mind, the European Council points out that closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby reducing the underlying causes of migrati-

on flows. The European Council urges that any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which the European Union or the European Community concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration.” (European Council 2002: 8) This was followed by articles 35 and 36, which explicitly state that insufficient cooperation on migration governance issues from third countries can result in the worsening of relations and measures being taken by the European Council (cf. *ibid*: 2002: 9). In response to the quite threatening Seville Conclusions, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) released the Nadi Declaration, which expressed the following under Paragraph IV, article 64, “We note that while ACP migrants in industrialised countries contribute significantly to economic development, they are often marginalized. We further reject the implicit link established in the Seville Declaration between immigration and development aid provided by EU and its Members States”. (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States 2002: 18)

Since this turn of events in the early 2000s, the European Union has in fact adjusted the narrative to paint a more inclusive and balanced nature. Whether this more collaborative approach is also put into action, is disputable. Nevertheless, the mention of the root causes remains very prevalent in contemporary EU migration management policies. As per the Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process, the root cause of irregular migration are addressed via the promotion of sustainable development (cf. Khartoum Process 2014: 4). A quite vague and generalised way to suppose that if sustainable development, in its mostly economic and short-term construction is achieved, the root cause of irregular migration will have been tackled and done with. Therefore development aid is the remedy, by which the root cause of migration is addressed and tackled, according to EU policy officials. “The opportunities for development cooperation to reduce migration movements are burdened with huge expectations; longer-term structural measures are replaced with short-term measures to prevent migration. The principles of both humanitarian aid and development cooperation are watered down. The barriers to cooperating with authoritarian regimes have noticeably lowered. Taken together, all these factors are giving rise to the fear that the measures initiated under the umbrella term of reducing the “root causes” are just about combating the symptoms – the irregular migration to Europe.” (Kipp; Koch 2018: 17) As mentioned above, the lack of mention



and deliberate ignorance on the European side towards the North-south divide in matters of economic prosperity, social conditions, security and human rights, will continue to serve as a barrier to the genuineness of this approach (cf. Castles 2004: 221).

#### **4. REGIONAL MIGRATION DIALOGUES AND PARTNERSHIPS AND THE CONTEMPORARY DOMINANT ACTORS IN THEIR DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION**

Although African migration to Europe today is widely perceived as a product of displacement by internal political and economic failure and civil war, “colonial occupation and concomitant practices of the slave trade and the systematic use of forced labour and recruitment have in many ways shaped contemporary migration patterns within and from the continent.” (Flahaux; De Haas 2016: 5) Some of the remnants of the colonial period are Africa’s borders today. “The international borders that divide mainland Africa into 48 separate states are another legacy of the colonial period that has had a profound influence on migration across the continent. Most of these were agreed by European powers in the late nineteenth century. These colonial lines on the map paid little respect to language and cultural boundaries, cutting across traditional chieftainships and separating kinsfolk.” (Bakewell 2011: 140) Such borders have separated tribes and kins and put together some that might not have lived together prior. An example thereof is the long-lasting civil war between the Southern Sudanese people and those of the north, which resulted in a separation of Sudan and South Sudan in 2011. Prior to that, the country suffered a 20+ year civil war between people that differed religiously, ethnically and linguistically. It is also worth noting that African migrants predominantly travel to destination countries where they have family members, networks or a cultural and linguistic advantage, which would be the former colonial power in many cases (e.g. Congo - Belgium, Senegal - France, Nigeria – United Kingdom). As mentioned above when analysing the drivers of African mobility to Europe, lack of economic development alone will not suffice to explain the complex phenomenon. There are deep-rooted structures of social and political inequality that are often ignored in the migration-development nexus. Such socio-political inequalities can be understood as the motivators of migration of those Africans that have the means to travel, to receive what is globally perceived as a privilege of a European education, passport or even just merely to be associated to the continent of opportunities.

Specifically, for the purpose of this thesis, regarding the Horn of Africa route to Europe, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency has claimed that “Eritreans represent the main nationality on this route, followed by Sudanese and Somali migrants. Eritrean migrants are

approached in their home country by Eritrean smugglers and taken to Sudan. Khartoum in Sudan is the main smuggling hub on this route. The smuggling network in Sudan mostly consists of locals who take migrants to the border with Libya in private pickups. From here, migrants are transported by members from Tuareg tribes to coastal cities in Libya, from where they are taken to departure areas on the coast.” (Frontex 2017<sup>3</sup>) This supports the assumption made throughout this thesis, that the poorest people can not afford migration from Africa to Europe, be it regular or irregular migration. It is an expensive journey that requires a thought-through decision and thus, as mentioned prior, short-term economic development/growth will result in the poorest people being able to afford a journey to Europe. And as long as Europe closes its borders to legal arrivals from the African continent, human trafficking and smuggling of people will remain an unfortunate reality of young men and women attempting to reach Europe.

African migration governance proves to be at a futile stage of development, as the African Union has yet to identify a continent-wide or even regional agreement or policy on how to manage migration internally and externally. This of course being a direct product of the above-mentioned power asymmetries and dependency still haunting the postcolonial reality of the continent. Not only is there a dependency on the financial part but also on the knowledge-level. Foucault describes training as a principal function of disciplinary power (cf. Foucault 1995: 170). This idea of training is nowadays in the political sphere referred to as capacity building or support. “With support from the European Union (EU), many African countries (particularly those north of the Equator) have begun developing more comprehensive, often security-oriented migration policies. Since 2015, the continent has witnessed a flurry of activity in migration policy-making through efforts funded by the European Union and implemented by IOM and International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD).” (Landau; Kihato 2018: 17) Hence, the lack of convergence on the issue of migration, leaves more room for external actors, such as the European Union to distribute their knowledge in the form of capacity building and modernistic policies. The EU’s need to influence migration policy-making in countries of origin and transit is reflected in the inception of so-called Inter-regional Consultative Processes, such as, pertaining to the African continent, the Rabat Process and the Khartoum Process.

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3 <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/focus/people-smuggling-in-the-central-mediterranean-t1XR06>

## 4.1 (Inter-) Regional Consultative Processes (IRCPs)

(Inter-)Regional Consultative Processes on Migration (IRCPs)<sup>4</sup> are regional Inter-state Consultation Mechanisms on Migration (ICSMs) that provide a platform for information-sharing and policy dialogue on migration-related issues. “RCPs are composed of member states; they can have also observer states and /or observer organizations. [They] are usually chaired by a country (on rotation or permanent basis) and supported by Secretariats. Upon RCP Member States’ requests the Secretariat functions can be provided by an international or regional organization, e.g. IOM, International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), League of Arab States, etc.”<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, “the aim [of regional dialogues] should be systematically to move towards strong, close partnerships that build on mutual trust and shared interests, paving the way for further regional integration.” (European Commission 2011: 8) This is an active attempt from the European Union to move away from the root-causes approach to a more interactive and mutually-benefitting nature. Although thoroughly mentioned in the GAMM, such processes have existed long before. The first of such RCPs was established in 1991 between Central and Western European Countries, the Berlin Process. This was followed by the Budapest Process in 1993, which is still active and covers the silk route of migration from Asia to Europe. Similarly, covering the African continent in 2004, a European regional migration dialogue was established, namely the Rabat Process covering the mediterranean route from West Africa. In the east of the continent, exists a much younger European regional dialogue, the Khartoum Process, which covers the Horn of Africa migration route to Europe. For the purpose of this paper, the Join Valletta Action Plan, and the Khartoum Process specifically, will be examined further. Such regionally-established partnerships represent a transgovernmental migration governance between countries of origin and destination, reflecting Wallerstein’s unequal power structures between the core and the peripheries.

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4 The terms Regional Consultative Process (RCP); Regional Migration Dialogue (RMD) and Regional dialogue, will be used interchangeably.

5 <https://www.iom.int/regional-consultative-processes-migration>

## 4.2 Asymmetries in Mobility Partnerships

Migration and Mobility Partnerships and Dialogues are arguably a large step in the right direction for involving countries of origin and transit in cooperative international migration governance. However, power relations between the actors involved are seldom considered. European member states enter these forums and partnerships as the European Union dealing with individual African states (in this case). This undoubtedly increases the bargaining power of EU member states vis-à-vis third countries, and may reinforce existing asymmetries between nations. Geiger and Pecoud (2012: 18) argue that, “in a context marked by massive inequalities between states, asymmetric ›cooperation‹ may amount to the unilateral imposition of powerful states’ concerns upon less powerful countries. This is for example clear in the agreements between hegemonic European states and politically and discursively subordinated sending countries/countries of origin, which – under the cover of ›cooperation‹, ›partnership‹, ›development‹ or ›good governance‹ purposes – pursue mainly security- and control-oriented objectives.” The Khartoum Process, like most other EU partnerships with third countries, can therefore be “understood as a forum for norm diffusion, whereby powerful states impose their regulatory norms on weaker states, engaged in unilateral policy-transfer by softer means.” (Kunz; Maisenbacher 2013: 203) To this end, drawing on racialised and postcolonial literature, Edward Said (1979: 4) describes cultural hegemony as “It is hegemony [...] that gives Orientalism the durability and the strength I have been speaking about so far. Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying „us“ Europeans as against all „those“ non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. There is in addition the hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness, usually overriding the possibility that a more independent, or more skeptical, thinker might have had different views on the matter.”

Further, Abrahamsen (2004: 1459) argues that power “works through systems of knowledge and discursive practices to provide meanings, norms, values and identities that not

only constrain actors, but also constitute them.” As for the understanding of migration management and governance, the knowledge is often held by the European Union or its member states and is shared via EU partnerships and dialogues with third countries, in a teacher-student manner, especially with African states. There is a constant portrayal of the African states that need help. (cf. Kunz, Maisenbacher 2013: 207; 209). Within the framework of dialogues, the agenda is usually set by the Secretariat, which is in the case of most EU dialogues, the European Union or an organisation, such as ICMPD, working closely and directly under the guidance of the European Commission. “This paternalistic portrayal of countries of origin has the effect of lending legitimacy to the migration management approach that associates migration policy with progress, and normalizes the development of migration policies as ‘good governance’. Moreover, it transfers the responsibility for pushing for a stronger focus on the migration-development nexus onto third country partners. This obscures the fact that it is mainly EU and Switzerland that have been emphasizing measures regarding the control of irregular migration in the context of [mobility partnerships], instead of focusing on development-related issues. This can be rendered visible when focusing on the productive power of partnerships.” (ibid 2013: 208) Building on this understanding of power, hegemony and knowledge production, European mobility partnerships and dialogues serve as a façade concealing the European paternalism deeply embedded in EU policy. The role of IOs in such ambivalent migration governance projects only deepens the ambiguity further. The role IOs play within mobility partnerships is one of the service-provider, and although all IOs claim to have their own agenda – one that benefits all (as per the SDGs), in this case they function as the implementing part of the EU’s agenda.

### **4.3 The Ambivalent Neutrality of Stakeholders**

“When it comes to the humanitarian care and registration of refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is the most important partner. The International Organization for Migration offers a wide range of services: information campaigns, programmes to support returnees, and advice to partner countries on the drafting of migration-related legislation. It also acts as a secretariat for many regional dialogue processes in which the EU participates. The lesser-known International Centre for Migration Policy Development, which has

played a decisive role in the Europeanisation of the policy field of migration since the 1990s, 24 fulfils some similar functions; it currently manages the funds for DG HOME to enable partner countries to implement Mobility Partnerships and GAMMs (Mobility Partnership Facility)". (Kipp; Koch 2018: 16) In the arena of Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs), the fundamental implementing actors are the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and most recently increasingly the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). Both organisations were initially established as European organisations mandated to implement on behalf of European states and gradually through the years evolved into so-called international stakeholders representing the global mandate and interest of all. With the deepening external magnitude of EU migration policies, international organisations have increasingly accepted the responsibility of the subcontractors of EU projects, channeling eurocentric knowledge to third countries, determined by EU funding (cf. Lavenex 2016: 567).

IOs function, or are widely-believed to function, as neutral and unbiased actors. This is perceived in the lack of criticism around IOs, which might be caused by the widespread assumption that they do what they are mandated to do. It is common to criticise certain states for designing inappropriate policies but IOs barely deal with any such reproval (cf. Geiger; Pecoud 2014: 871) Within the framework of Mobility Partnerships (MPs) and Regional Consultative Processes (RCPs), these IOs, arguably work for the interest of those who mandate them to implement on their behalf. Even if not directly mandated by the European Union, "from a realist perspective, powerful states exert the greatest influence; IOs are then logically forced to act in a way that is compatible with these states' interests and their claimed 'universality' is therefore inherently flawed. On the other hand, this universality is crucial as it hides the real power relations between states and enables IOs to intervene in a neutral, technical and (potentially) more efficient manner." (ibid 2014: 875) Such dependency on the part of IOs on more powerful states, is inevitably tied to the funding. "Generally speaking, the more an IO is dependent on external funding and project activities for its survival, the more likely it is to be instrumentalised for external governance purposes through strategies of subcontracting and the mobilisation of IOs as rule-transmitters." (Lavenex 2016: 557) In the case of ICMPD, which in the case of the Khartoum – and Rabat Process, functions as the official Secretariat (although in the case of KP, unofficially taking on this role), the funding transpires 100% from the European Union

and Switzerland. Therefore, even if ICMPD acts impartial and attempts to steer the discussion in the interest of African states, the European Commission nevertheless holds the position of power to approve or reject whatever ICMPD proposes. Even though, in the case of the Puebla and Colombo Processes<sup>6</sup>, for example, there might be more room to maneuver for IOM as the secretariat, whereby funding is not necessarily one-sided, the influence of the powerful states will nevertheless prevail. IOM and ICMPD alike, are often regarded as service organisations, because they lack a clear *mandate* and base which would constitute a position of authority, therefore they serve as distributors or agents of eurocentric information and knowledge (cf. *ibid* 557-8).

Furthermore, for this thesis it is imperative to thoroughly consider ICMPD's role in the europeanization of migration politics. As argued by Sabine Hess (2010: 101), "although it has widened its activity radius in the last few years, geographically as well as in regard to content, in global terms, ICMPD is still a small and European-based institution when compared to the internationally active organizations such as UNHCR or IOM. However, it came especially to the fore when, in the course of their EU accession and as part of the *acquis communautaire*, Eastern European countries had to adopt EU migration policy. Against this background of its leading role as a consultancy organization in the EU-accession process, critical observers defined ICMPD as the 'spearhead of fortress Europe'. Today, it is still active in supporting official EU migration policy – as outlined in the 'Global Approach on Migration' by the European Commission – moderating the externalization of the European border regime towards Africa, Central Asia and the Far East." As mentioned prior, ICMPD, via its role as secretariat of several MPs and RCPs such as the Khartoum Process, operates as an agent of knowledge management and distribution. In interviews, a staff member of the organisation has informed that "ICMPD's political ethics is that they never do politics themselves', rather they 'pass on information' as 'a reliable actor for the states". (*ibid*: 105) This statement clearly describes what is called the europeanisation of migration politics, creating a scenario where African states will gladly implement policies that suit their European counterparts after having been fed a eurocentric understanding of the context of migration between the continents. This takes us back to the ar-

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6 The Puebla Process is an Interregional Migration Dialogue Forum established in 1996 and covering the regions of North and central America. The Colombo Process is the Regional Consultative Process covering Asia, which was established in 2003.



gument that MPs and RCP, and arguably most political and economic “partnerships” between Europe and Africa are tainted by a context of power and hegemony, which constitutes for a knowledge production by the EU and its member states and the knowledge distribution at the hand of organisations like ICMPD.

#### 4.3.1 ICMPD and the IRCPs

Since 1994, ICMPD has served as secretariat for various (Inter-)Regional Consultative Processes, from the Budapest Process in 1994, the Prague Process, Rabat Process, until the most recent one, the Khartoum Process. Unlike the other, ICMPD does not act as official secretariat for the KP but more as technical and logistical support for the Secretariat which is the European Commission (EC) and the African Union Commission (AUC). However, the role of the AUC is very limited in this dialogue platform, and the main implementing party remains ICMPD, with the quite micromanaged guidance of the European Commission. The lack of interest or action on the AUC side is attributed to their own decision partially but also to a lack of involvement and consultation on the EC side in decision-making processes. Therefore in the KP, it is very evident where the knowledge production and distribution lies. In a scenario of an African counterpart chairing a specific thematic meeting, for example, the respective African country will suggest ideas and issues to be discussed, the idea will then be run by the EC focal point for approval, and only if approved will ICMPD add the point to the agenda of the dialogue. ICMPD staff handles all communication with counterparts, drafts background notes and agendas, meeting reports and simultaneously manages all logistical arrangements. For the purpose of meetings held within the framework of the Khartoum process, the European Union pays for travel arrangements, accommodation and sundry expenses of African government officials. This is surely indicative of whom these dialogues are to benefit. If African states saw the benefit in such dialogues, they would probably gladly fund their officials to go and learn some useful information, however it seems that only the European counterparts see the benefit in such dialogues and therefore incentivise the African attendance with funding. To this end, dialogues function as nothing more than a platform to distribute eurocentric knowledge and a form of agenda-setting. Such programmes, Hess explicitly observed during her scien-

tific observation at ICMPD, as “the Europeanization and indeed globalization of EU migration management policy in association with the European Commission, IOM and various individual Western countries.” (ibid: 111-112)

Ashutosh and Mountz (cf. 2011: 25) describe such consultative processes as coercive apparatuses hiding behind a language of consensual legitimacy and humanitarianism. This soft coercion can be interpreted as an alternative way to utilise power for policy implementation. Geiger and Pecoud (2014: 874) describe it as “a form of global governmentality [...] by setting standards, and by monitoring states’ behaviour, [IOs] work would amount to the ‘conduct of conduct’ of states. Even without exercising direct coercive power, they would determine the ‘right’ policies to be implemented by governments and develop instruments through which to assess their compliance with these principles. Governments would not perceive norms of IOs as imposed on them from more powerful external actors; on the contrary, they would ‘self-discipline’ themselves, ‘socialise’ with and adhere to these norms, understood as unquestionable universal values.” Therefore, dialogues may either function as the means used to exercise this coercive power of deciding policies or it is most likely also used to assess the compliance of African states with European principles. Fundamentally and to bring this analysis back to the nexus of migration, development and migration governance, essentially IOs, especially those based in the West – and therefore intrinsically biased – casting mobility as an issue that urgently necessitates a solution, conveniently fit a eurocentric understanding of development that expels the underdeveloped (cf. Bakewell 2008: 1355). Essentially the hypothesis here, for which I explore in the upcoming chapter, the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP), the Khartoum Process and the 2018 JVAP Summit Conclusions, is that European restrictionist migration policies or partnerships, in all its forms, adheres to eurocentric and modernistic development theory, entrenched in a postcolonial dependency that re-births and maintains an unequal power structure. To this end, contemporary european migration policies, “look like an apparently sound and balanced policy orientation, but with the sole purpose of enabling powerful receiving states to steer migration flows according to their political and economic interests.” (Geiger; Pecoud 2012: 12)

## 5. THE JOINT VALLETTA ACTION PLAN

This chapter is based on scientific research that I carried out specifically on the Joint Valletta Action Plan and related initiatives, such as the Khartoum Process. The aim here is to portray how concepts, analysed above such as dependency, power and development play into European migration management frameworks. This will be shown in detail at hand the language used in the most recent JVAP Senior Officials' Meeting Report. It was made possible by an extensive qualitative content analysis of theories, concepts and declarations, that tie together but also contradict each other at times to represent contemporary European migration policies.

In 2015 European and African states came together at the Valletta Summit and adopted the JVAP. The latter is built around five domains as illustrated in Figure 2.



Figure 2: The five domains of the Valletta Action Plan<sup>7</sup>

7 <https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/news/joint-valletta-action-plan-conclusions-2018>

The Rabat Process and Khartoum Process have been mandated to monitor the implementation of the Joint Valletta Action Plan, which is currently being implemented by ICMPD's Migration and Mobility Dialogues (MMD) project in the form of thematic meetings, trainings, workshops and a database. "The Rabat and Khartoum Processes were mandated to follow-up on the concrete implementation of the JVAP, which translated operationally in the set-up of a database compiling all initiatives taken since November 2015 and related to the five domains of the JVAP."<sup>8</sup> In light thereof, the five above-mentioned domains have served as the base and foundation of discussion held within the framework of both dialogues. The Khartoum Process, and the Rabat Process alike, have since their inception, held over a dozen meetings and trainings covering predominantly domains 1, 3, and 4. The establishment of the Valletta Action Plan led to the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). In 2015, the European Commission established the EUTF for Africa providing a total fund of 1.8 billion provided by EU member states, Norway and Switzerland. The fund is meant to be used for issues pertaining to migration, displacement and instability in the regions of the Sahel, North Africa and the Horn of Africa. "To support the implementation of the Action Plan, the EU, its Member States and associated countries will use their relevant financial instruments available for cooperation with African partners in line with their legal and financing frameworks. Substantial EU funds are available to implement actions in the areas prioritised by this Action Plan. The EU, its Member States and associated countries will step up efforts to mainstream migration into their development cooperation." (European Council 2015: 1)

"[The Action Plan] went into the most detail concerning the first objective, «addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement». In a departure from standard international political discourse, it did not draw an explicit distinction between flight (mainly for political reasons) and other forms of migration and mobility; but all forms of not explicitly welcome migration movements should be prevented at source. This would be achieved not only through [development cooperation] measures and improving returns of nationals abroad, but would take, in particular, conflicts, crises and instability in the countries of origin into account, by supporting their rule of law and good governance. By contrast, there is only a short section on the second objective, that of «advancing legal migration and mobility possibilities», which

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8 <https://www.icmpd.org/our-work/capacity-building/regions/africa/mmd-migration-mobility-dialogue/>

talks vaguely about promoting regular migration and mobility channels between European and African countries for students, researchers and entrepreneurs. Within this process, negotiations on visa facilitation would be expressly linked to cooperation in other areas, such as improving returns and the reintegration of migrants from Europe (fourth objective).” (Bartels 2019: 10) Amongst the priority initiatives, under domain 1, the first mentioned is to “Support African countries, regional and pan-African institutions, in particular the African Union, in developing or further strengthening national and regional migration strategies while taking note of individual countries specificities”. (European Council 2015: 2) This statement reflects the eurocentric knowledge dissemination, done either directly by the EU or via international organisations (cf. Lavenex 2016: 568). Terms such as capacity building and here, specifically, “support” also reflects Foucaults concept of training, as described above in Chapter 4 as a form of disciplinary power, maintaining an unequal structure. Hence the language in this Action plan reflects a eurocentric and power-structure-maintaining viewpoint that African governments are in dire need of European support to develop policies and strategies to halt migration. Here, we can question whom the said strategies and policies as suggested by the European counterparts are meant to benefit primarily.

## **5.1 Qualitative Content Analysis of Western theories, concepts and declarations**

Following the last few chapters, which provided a theoretical background as well as a political one, here I address the methodological approach in relation to the empirical part of this thesis. This was done by means of the qualitative content analysis. The strength of the qualitative content analysis as per Mayring is that it strictly methodically controls that material is analysed in steps. It dismantles material into units, which are processed one after another. The focus of this approach is a categorical system, which is theory driven, through which aspects are determined, which were filtered from the material (cf. 2002: 114). In the upcoming subchapters, I describe the background to my analysis, the exact methodological approach as well as limitations I faced during this procedure.

### 5.1.1 Background to the Research and Methodological Approach

This methodology was used to analyze literature to support the underlying hypothesis. Firstly, by identifying three theories of migration, two strictly economical and one historical-structural. This was done using directed content analysis within the content analysis spectrum, in order to create reference points later on when analyzing the language within specific declarations and reports. “The goal of a directed approach to content analysis is to validate or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory. Existing theory or research can help focus the research question. It can provide predictions about the variables of interest or about the relationships among variables, thus helping to determine the initial coding scheme or relationships between codes.” (Hsieh; Shannon 2005: 1281) Further, I proceeded with an inductive category formation, while looking at European policy, declarations and reports, referencing them back directly to the identified theories. “The inductive ongoing has great importance within qualitative research. It aims at a true description without bias owing to the preconceptions of the researcher, an understanding of the material in terms of the material.” (Mayring 2014: 79)

As mentioned prior, I identified mostly Western theories and concepts, such as the Neo-classical theory, Push-Pull, World Systems but also concepts of power, dependency as per western authors. I believed it to be coherent to explain certain EU initiatives and policies by means of western theory and concepts, whether complimentary or critical viewpoints. The analysis of literature and authors was an extensive one that led to a categorization as seen above, allowing me to identify theories and concepts to support my hypothesis. Hence, I categorized the theories and subcategorized the concepts to support in connecting the dots between initiatives such as the Khartoum Process and reports such as the Joint Valletta Action Plan Conclusions and theories such as the World Systems theory.

The media and public opinion played a monumental role throughout the process of my research. This thesis was carried out during a time of instability and change in the Horn of Africa region. Between October 2018 and May 2019, much of the media’s focus was on Sudan and the ousting of a 30 year long dictatorship, however this was not left dissociated to EU policy on migration management and their role. Simultaneously, articles followed scrutinizing the work

of the EU with countries such as Eritrea, while ignoring human rights violations for the benefit of the EU. The media played a large role nevertheless in shaping the narrative around EU policy on migration management, especially in the region of the Greater Horn of Africa.

Also imperative, though nonetheless problematic during my research, was my personal involvement in the research matter. I had been personally involved in the organisation of the Joint Valletta Action Plan Senior Officials' Meeting in Ethiopia in 2018 and attended the event. The positive aspect of my personal involvement was the first-hand analysis I was able to carry out during the conference, understanding the dynamic and overall ambiente at such events, which can at times be different to what is described in a report for diplomatic purposes. During the conference I was able to speak to high-level officials from African, as well as European countries and listen to their interests and concerns. As for the limitations that my personal involvement brought to this research process, that is described further in the upcoming sub-chapter.

### 5.1.2 Limitations of the Research

The first research restriction I encountered during the research process, prior to being personally involved with ICMPD and the Khartoum Process and Valletta specifically, I had requested an interview with ICMPD regarding this topic. However I was informed that as regards Valletta and specifically the Khartoum Process, ICMPD is not directly authorised to speak on the matter and must direct any requests to the European Commission. Therefore an interview was not possible at the time. It was clear that eventhough ICMPD was the implementing agent, the European Commission managed any form of external communication on this matter. This is partially why I settled for a qualitative literature analysis., which allowed me to move freely with whatever communication and narrative is out there. Further, I faced limitations when looking for specific documents and reports from events carried out by ICMPD under the framework of Valletta. Several of the documentation were not publically available, which meant I was not able to use them for this thesis. I was restricted to work only with what is publically available, which often reflects a very similar and repetitive narrative.



Secondly, my personal experience within this research procedure proved to be quite challenging, not so much limiting but rather exacting. Considering my African heritage, and having been born and raised in Europe, specifically Austria, and being involved in this project directly has proven to be quite the experiment. It was difficult at times to separate personal ideas and experiences from theory and concept. During the analysis process, I frequently found myself caught in my personal emotions on the topic, which is obviously not advantageous in this case. This however was inevitable when I decided to research a topic specific to Africa and Europe, because as people we are undoubtedly shaped and moulded by our personal experiences and environments. Additionally, as mentioned prior, I was able to attend the JVAP Senior Officials' Meeting first-hand, which again provided challenges in separating myself from the subject matter and focusing strictly on theory and concept and not so much on what I experienced or observed while on-site.

Lastly, for the purpose of my conclusion, I looked specifically for African authors that speak on the matter of migration management, specifically on EU migration management in Africa, but I was unfortunately dissatisfied to find very little on the topic matter written by African authors or authors of African descent. Of course there was plenty on issues regarding power structure between the two countries or matters of development, but not much specifically analysing the migration reality. This, however, proved unproblematic, as often times the relation between the two continents is characterized by the same issues throughout the fields and arenas.

## **5.2 EU – Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process)**

A massive subject of scrutiny and backlash, since its inception, has been the European migration dialogue platform commonly referred to as the Khartoum Process, also known as the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, which functions as one of the monitoring bodies of the Joint Valletta Action Plan, covering the Greater Horn of Africa (GHOA) region. This platform for political cooperation was established by the European Commission (EC) in 2014 to facilitate dialogue on issues of migration and mobility amongst countries along the migration



route between the Horn of Africa and Europe.<sup>9</sup> The Process consists of 41 member states, of which 30 are European and 11 from the GHoA region and is governed by an annually rotating chair and navigated by a Steering Committee, consisting of 5 African and 5 European member states. The Secretariat is managed jointly by the EC and the AUC with logistical and technical support from ICMPD's "Support to the Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue" (MMD) project. The Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process, which serves as the dialogue's key strategic document, was signed and adopted at the Ministerial Conference held in Rome on 28th November 2014, whereby the respective actors involved agreed "to undertake concrete actions to prevent and tackle the challenges of human trafficking and smuggling of migrants between the Horn of Africa and Europe." (Khartoum Process 2014: 3). The five-page declaration lists ten key areas, among which the fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants play an immense role. The eighth point for cooperation, as per the declaration (ibid), states a key focus on "promoting sustainable development in countries of origin and transit in order to address the root causes of irregular migration", which assumes development aid as the cure for the perceived root cause for the decision to illegally migrate.

Out of the framework of the Khartoum Process, several capacity building initiatives have been formed, the most decisive one being the 'Better Migration Management' (BMM) project, implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). The funding for this project amounts to 40 million Euros coming directly from the European Trust Fund.<sup>10</sup> The BMM project functions under the umbrella of the Khartoum Process, but has nevertheless identified the four objectives: fight against trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants; strengthen the capacity of all institutions and agencies responsible for migration and border; identify, assist and provide protection for victims of trafficking in human beings and vulnerable smuggled migrants, especially women and children and other vulnerable groups; and to raise awareness of the dangers of irregular migration and the benefits of alternative options.

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9 <https://www.khartoumprocess.net/>

10 <https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/40602.html>

Countries in the region looked forward to a migration cooperation with the European Union, however expectations and interests were quite contrasting between the two regions. There is a key disagreement between the countries in the GHoA and Europe on the reason for flight and emigration. This is especially true for countries such as Sudan and Eritrea, both political dictatorships which have been the of much oppression and displacement. “The governments in Sudan and Eritrea emphasise economic push factors and assume that the lack of jobs is the reason for the large number of departures. Europeans, on the other hand, consider the repressive policies and human rights situation in the two countries to be crucial.” (Weber 2018: 44) An issue of the EU’s involvement within this region, that has received substantial media coverage in the first half of 2019, is the assumption that the Rapid Support Forces of Sudan (RSF), also known as the Janjaweed, whom are very active in the control and surveillance of Sudan’s borders, receive some of their funds for border management from the European Union. Major General Mohammed Hamdan (often referred to as Hemedti), is considered one of the richest and most influential war lords in Sudan. His militia is widely believed to be responsible for the war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Darfur conflict. He has, several times, described the duty of the RSF to secure borders and halt migration to be on behalf of the European’s. (cf. *ibid*: 52; Tubiana et al. 2018: 53-54) During the Sudanese revolution of early 2019, which resulted in the ousting of dictator of 30 years, Omar El Bashir, protesters and activists repeatedly called for an end of European cooperation with and funding to the Sudanese regime. The European Union’s need to implement its own interest in the region is reflected in their disregard to plain human right violations by repressive governments in the GHoA region. “The structure of the Khartoum Process allows EU members to channel funding directly into the region, potentially guided by their individual national interests. Likewise, GHoA governments are able to use resources in support of their own interests.” (Capici 2018: 17) The European Union has repeatedly denied any form of direct collaboration with the RSF in Sudan or any direct funding towards the government. Upon many requests from journalists and activists, the European External Action Services has released several documents, factsheets and statement making it clear that, the EU does not provide any direct or indirect funding to the Sudanese government and/or the Rapid Support Forces of the Sudanese military (cf. European Commission 2016: 20). EU communication of activities in the region, but specifically in Sudan and Eritrea, usually emphasises strongly on the implementation that is carried out by (inter-)

national organisations and not by the European Union directly, therefore claiming to have no direct financial link to the governments in the region. According to Bartels (cf. 2019: 37), 36% of the EUTF funding in the Horn of Africa region is distributed through IOs and 22% by EU member states' national implementation organisations. The ambivalence of involving a third implementing party, such as IOM or ICMPD, as analysed above, serves not only to disguise the application of soft coercion on third countries but also to conceal the role of the European Union. "For a contemporary multilateral process led by the EU and its member states, there is a remarkable lack of transparency around the Khartoum Process" (Reitano 2016: 4)

### **5.3 The 2018 JVAP Senior Officials' Meeting Conclusions: An Analysis**

From the 14th – 15th November 2019, the ICMPD's Migration Mobility Dialogue (MMD) Project, alongside the European Commission and the African Union Commission, organised the 2018 Joint Valletta Action Plan Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM)<sup>11</sup>, which was hosted by Ethiopia and took place at the UNECA premises in Addis Ababa. Invited to this meeting, were High Level Officials from EU member states, Switzerland, African member countries of the Rabat Process and the Khartoum Process, as well as national and international organisations, such as GIZ, IOM, ILO, Interpol, etc. The purpose of this summit was for member states of the KP and RP to report on what progress has been made in the arena of migration management, taking into account the five domains laid out by the Valletta Action Plan. Most of the progress takes place in the form of dialogue under the frameworks of the Khartoum – and Rabat Process, via thematic meetings, where policy-makers and experts discuss several topics within the migration sphere, such as human trafficking, labour migration, root causes of migration and border management. Other forms of efforts undertaken are trainings and/or workshops on said topics. This takes us back to Foucault's (1995: 170) idea on the functionality of "trainings" within a disciplinary power structure. "As far as training is concerned, much of the process of development involves transfer of technologies and techniques from development agent to beneficiary. With new technology, the body must be re-educated; it must enter into

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11 <https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/news/joint-valletta-action-plan-conclusions-2018>

new relationships not just with [migration] but with new knowledges (how to operate, maintain, and repair [migration]) and the power relations attached to those knowledges (dependence upon the possessors of [migration] knowledge or spare parts).” (DuBois 1991:20) This issue of knowledge dissemination is not only portrayed within the thematic meetings and capacity building initiatives under the Valletta Action plan, but generally western development cooperation tends to absorb and exude a eurocentric and neocolonial ideology, which stimulates and maintains the dependency of the periphery on the core.

In commencement, the JVAP Joint Conclusions introduce a very strong inclusive partnership language, one that resembles what has been reflected several times throughout this thesis. “The Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP) on Migration, adopted by Heads of State and Government of Africa and Europe in November 2015, has facilitated the transition to an even stronger, mutually beneficial alliance between the two continents, working in a partnership of equals. The JVAP has helped the mutual understanding of policies (such as the Migration Policy Framework for Africa and the European Agenda on Migration) and provides a framework for the numerous actions being pursued.” (Joint Valletta Action Plan 2018: 1) The first few sentences of this document already provide a sense of false contextualisation, due to the blindness towards existing power structures between the two continents, even falsely claiming to be equals. In an ideal world, they would be, however in the contemporary neoliberal capitalistic context, built on a colonial power dynamics, this is not the case and ignoring such an essential part of the relationship between the continents is indeed counterproductive. Additionally, it is of utmost importance to note that this document was drafted by the ICMPD, and revised by the European Commission. Therefore, what is portrayed here is undoubtedly a eurocentric perspective. The AUC, although, supposedly equally a part of the secretariat, did not play an active role in the drafting of this document, therefore lacking the viewpoint of the African counterparts. Hence, the assumption of equality and partnership, diminishes any understanding of the realistic roles played by the two actors in this case. “The world would indeed be merely composed of states juxtaposed to each other, with no consideration of history or of their unequal capacity to shape the world order in their interests. Yet, in a context marked by massive inequalities between states, asymmetric ›cooperation‹ may amount to the unilateral imposition of powerful states’ concerns upon less powerful countries.” (Geiger; Pecoud 2013: 18) Fair and

productive collaboration on migration between the EU and countries in Africa, especially in the form of dialogue and partnership, requires a genuine and honest discourse on postcolonial remnants of the power structures, the contextualisation of the situation on the ground and possibly a leveled and more genuine engagement of the people concerned. “Arbitrary historical demarcations by the European occupying powers across the entire African continent play a role for current migration policies and countries’ willingness to cooperate that should not be underestimated. [...] In countries such as Algeria, Eritrea and Sudan, where weapons were used to rebel against colonial rule and to create a national identity-building, anti-colonial consensus, there is a sceptical distance to European politics.” (Koch et al. 2018: 70) This scepticism was quite visible on the part of Eritrea as the Khartoum Process chair for 2019 – they portrayed a skepticism not only skeptical towards the European counterparts but also towards ICMPD as the implementing/supporting organisation. This calls for a serious reconsideration of EU policy– to understand and acknowledge their role in this asymmetric power dynamic between them as receiving country and the countries of origin and transit.

The Joint Conclusions list a total of eleven points, which describe the progress made and where more is to be done. The first of those points narrates the language of inclusivity, solidarity, shared responsibility and ownership by all actors (cf. Joint Valletta Action Plan 2018: 1). Again, here serving as a smokescreen to a different reality, profoundly scrutinised throughout this thesis. At the SOM, African members states voiced their concern about the lack of interest and efforts in domain 2 of the JVAP, namely legal and/or regular migration, from the European side (cf. *ibid*: 2). Out of that concern, was born point four of this document, which states “Valletta partners note the importance of promoting constructive and long-term approach to migration and mobility, which can benefit countries of origin, transit and destination. They reiterate that attention should be given with an equal importance to all five domains of the JVAP. While acknowledging the achievements to date, Valletta partners recognise that further concerted efforts should be made in domain 2 concerning legal migration and mobility, in particular for young people and women: entrepreneurs, students and researchers, moving within Africa and between Africa and Europe, taking into account national competences and labour market realities and paying attention to the integration of migrants in host societies as appropriate; and domain 5 bearing in mind the obligation of each state under international law to readmit

its own nationals in full respect of human dignity and of the principle of non-refoulement, and recognising a preference for assisted voluntary return, more need to be done among countries of origin, transit and destination to strengthen the fight against irregular migration and facilitate return, readmission and reintegration.” (ibid) The points made about the lack of efforts made on domain 2, legal migration was discussed and voiced loudly by the African side with not much counter-arguments from the European side. As a matter of fact, 2019 saw a shift towards more discussions on legal migration in the form of labour migration between the two continents, this however manifested strictly in the form of thematic discussions, between experts from both regions.

Over the passed 4 years, both the Khartoum Process as well as the Rabat Process have focused predominantly on issues related to the root causes of migration, border management, law enforcement and human trafficking, while completely disregarding domain 2 because from the European side the interest and focus is not in this arena. Critiques of the EU’s migration management approach are aware of the dominance of “short-term interest in curbing irregular migration to Europe, whereby the facilitation of legal migration from and within the African continent serves as an incentive for partner countries that has yet to be fulfilled.” (Kipp; Koch 2018: 18) The European Union has over the years focused mainly on issues of irregular migration and tackling of trafficking networks, without giving much intent to their responsibility to provide legal ways for migrants to enter Europe. This portrays the “failure to acknowledge that restrictive migration control, coupled with absence of sufficient safe and legal ways for people to reach Europe risk providing a space for trafficking networks.” (Capici 2018: 14) Tackling domain 2 is especially important for the countries of origin and transit, because it is the only domain where more work – and arguably all the work- needs to be done by the European Union. “[The] objectives agreed upon in Valletta have in practice not been supported equally. Whilst more than half of the funding has been allocated to projects aiming to «address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement», with a further tenth having been made available for «improving cooperation on return and sustainable reintegration» of migrants from Europe – the two objectives pursued by many European states – just 1% has actually been spent on «advancing legal migration and mobility possibilities» – which is very much in the interests of the African countries, due to the scale of remittances from Europe.” (Bartels 2019: 3)

Point five in the JVAP Senior Officials' Meeting Conclusions states "To address the root causes of irregular migration, the Rabat and Khartoum Processes call for intensified efforts on the creation of economic opportunities, decent jobs, vocational education and training, especially for youth and women, step up support to SMEs and increased access to finance. Both processes also reiterate the importance of investing in agriculture, reducing disaster risks and preventing the negative effects of climate change and land degradation as emphasized by the JVAP." (Joint Valletta Action Plan 2018: 2) Here, again, the argument is made that the promotion of economic advancement on the African continent will in fact contribute to halting or managing migration. As so often discussed throughout this thesis, the assumption that economic development can be steered and programmed in order to benefit migration management is unfounded. This stems from the understanding that poverty and unemployment is the leading root cause of migration from Africa. This is also proven false, because as mentioned prior, it is most often times, not the poorest who migrate, especially when speaking of intercontinental migration. Short-term development aid therefore leads to an increase in migration, allowing those who can now afford it, to attain their perception of a better life (cf. Dannecker 2016: 17). To this end, we must understand that development is firstly not a universal and linear process. It is a mechanism that encompasses several different actors and socio-political perspectives. The North-South divide is one that cannot be explained simply by a neoclassical ideology of economic push-pull factors, but indeed this divide is a social and political expression instead (cf. Castles 2004: 211). Additionally and specific to the African context, it is of utmost importance to acknowledge neocolonial continuities that hinder a development, be it economic, political or even social/cultural.

The sixth paragraph in the Joint Conclusions mentions the engagement of the diaspora and how they can be utilized as agents of growth in their countries of origin to boost development. "Valletta partners agree to encourage and support African diaspora's engagement in countries of origin with a view to boosting local development and investment, to participate in information campaigns on the risks of irregular migration and to encourage the use of legal pathways, and as appropriate, to engage in integration programmes in countries of destination; and to facilitate faster, cheaper and safer transfers of remittances through legal channels in both source and recipient countries, including by reducing transaction costs." (Joint Valletta



Action Plan 2018: 2-3) The engagement of diaspora, is a separate but correlated focus of European policy-makers in the arena of migration management. Over the years, several initiatives and projects, some even managed by ICMPD on behalf of the European Commission, were born out of this simplistic understanding that the diaspora communities must be interested in boosting the economic development of their country of origin, in order to, one day return back home. “By proposing essentialized understandings of ethnicity and belonging, diaspora–engagement discourse generates over-simplistic expectations about why and where diaspora groups engage in development. In the latest turn of migration–development thinking, an increased focus on return migration further corroborates these biased understandings. The idea of return assumes that migration is disruption to a sedentary equilibrium and aims at restoring the original status quo. This interpretation rests on an equally essentialist assumption that migrants wish to return to their places of ancestral origin because this is where they belong.” (Sinatti; Horst 2014: 147-8) Similarly, here power structures undoubtedly play a role, because even though the diaspora communities appear to be neutral zones within this neoliberal, unequal balance of power, chances are that these communities will be agents of eurocentric knowledge and information, be it knowingly or unknowingly. “The relations of power structuring transnational interactions by tracing parallel dynamics between contemporary transnational agents and cultural brokers in colonial and settler empires who navigated a profoundly unequal terrain and whose acts of mediation cannot be considered separately from the power relations of colonialism.” (De Jong, Dannecker 2018: 502)

The following three to four points in this document, restate the importance of tackling irregular migration, via border security, civil registry and the protection and reintegration of migrants. Even though, it seems, that the EU is attempting to mould a full picture policy that comprises the developmentalist as well as the securitarian concepts, it is unfortunately void, due to the eurocentric modus operandi. “Inspired by the international discourse on the migration–development nexus and induced by the inherent deficiencies of an exclusively repressive external migration policy, the EU has started to revise its originally securitarian frame of migration policy to adopt the migration–development nexus and include issues relevant for development, such as legal migration opportunities and the facilitation of remittances. Yet, the review of relevant policy documents reveals an impressive persistence both of the original policy



frame and the components of the EU's external migration policy. Despite a changing rhetoric, the main focus of recent initiatives is still on the aspect of immigration control and proposals for measures pertinent for development remain not only very vague but also non-committal and discretionary." (Lavenex; Kunz 2008: 452-3)

In conclusion, the JVAP Senior Officials' Meeting Conclusions, like many reports and declarations of the European Union, echo a neoliberal, developmentalist and eurocentric language that may only be challenged with an alternative developmentalism. In order to reflect this equality, partnership, mutual trust and respect that is echoed in this document – we must first and foremost unshackle, reshape and build Africa to face Europe as an equal, otherwise the status quo relationship of dominant centre and subservient periphery will remain the norm. Yves Ekoue Amaizo (2012: 137) finds this alternative developmentalism within an "Africa-centred Pan Africanism according to which the goal will be maximum and autonomous African growth and development in an environment of political and economic federalism funded by African governments. In the context of an African-centred autonomy, the embarrassment of having, for example, the African Union funded by the West will not be tolerated."

## 6. CONCLUSION

While migration can be viewed as an integral part of development processes, what Skeldon (2008: 15) calls the “accommodationist policies, or those that are likely to occur in any particular development scenario, are likely to be more appropriate than proactive policies that seek to channel migration in a particular direction to promote development.”, we must accept that development, whichever form it may take, cannot be used to halt migration. Development processes are hereby referred to as an umbrella term for any form of political, economic, social growth, because a universal conception is by means of this thesis veraciously rejected. “The theory is criticized for failing to consider the poor as the centerpiece in poverty reduction initiatives. By ignoring the involvement and participation of the target community, modernity achieves the marginalization of their commitment, creativity and support of the intervention strategies. The intervention strategy becomes an imposed strategy and such a strategy fails to construct adequate notions of both the causal powers of social structures and the role of human agency in shaping social relations in general.” (Matunhu 2011: 67) Therefore, when integrating international migration and development, it is of utmost importance to develop common agenda setting strategies, away from restrictive migration policies and linear models of development. Because when dealing with a migration-development nexus in the context of the EU and Africa, often agendas overlap, namely the development agenda and the migration control agenda. And as we have seen from several above-mentioned examples, the latter is definitely much more influential than the former (cf. Dannecker 2013: 27). Eventhough contemporary European migration policies intend to move away from a securitarian outlook to a more development-friendly and inclusive framework, it is nevertheless evident that the EU remains focused on issues of border management and security and less on matters such as legal/labour migration (cf. Lavenex; Kunz 2008: 452). Therefore protectionist and securitarian policies focused on finding and mitigating some sort of economic, homogenous root cause to migration is unrealistic and inconsistent with the promotion of development in third countries. This is because, as mentioned several times in this thesis, “particularly in the poorest countries (e.g., the sub-Saharan African target countries of much international aid), any “take-off” development is likely to lead to accelerating “take-off” emigration for the coming decades, which is the opposite of what many “development instead of migration” implicitly or explicitly aim to

achieve. Of course this should be no reason not to promote development in poor countries, however, development is important in its own right because it improves people's wellbeing and freedom, regardless of its impact on migration. Therefore, advocates of stay-at-home development policies seem to be right for the wrong reasons." (De Haas 2006: 32) To this end, I believe that as long as the EU as well as los are unable and/or unwilling to move away from restrictive policies and provide legal, realistic and safe ways to migrate, initiatives and dialogues, such as the Khartoum Processn and the Valletta Action Plan, will go down in history as another failed attempt, which has further exacerbated the North-South divide. In fact, Stephen Castles (cf. 2004: 221) argues that this economic, social and political gap between North and South may be considered a cause of migration, whether forced or economic. Hence, when formulating policies pertaining to migration and development of the Global South, ideally, we must integrate the perspectives of the Global South (cf. Dannecker 2016: 18).

Further, "the vast disparities of wealth and power in the emerging global order mean that not all citizens are equal and that some passports are better than others. Such hierarchies may be the basis of a new system of global economic stratification, in which migration – in all its guises – is a key element. In this context, migration control is really about regulating the North-South power dynamic and maintaining inequality. Only when the central objective shifts to one of reducing inequality will migration control become both successful and – eventually – superfluous." (ibid 223-224) European policy-makers, whether migration-related or not, must acknowledge the disparities and that these disparities are not a force of nature but man-made. They must invite partners to the table on equal terms – not only favoring their interest but most importantly the interest of the third countries – for this it is required to understand that many, if not all, of the socio-economic circumstances of the African continent are a product of European exploitation. Europe needs to acknowledge this and share the burden instead of fencing itself off into a fortress Europe (cf. Dimitriadi 2016: 10). The metaphor "fortress Europe" implies that due to a threat such as the increase of flow of migrants from Africa, Asia and South America, the national member states within the European Union are more than willing to draw up immigration policies that will see to it that such a threat is minimized. One of the main aspects that is relevant on all EU scales (national, regional, local, national state, supranational and beyond) is keeping out people who have no right to come into the European Union, while

at the same time integrating those who do. In the context of Neil Brenner's (2001: 600) plural definition of politics of scale and its relation to the process of scaling we can be able to draw a conclusion relating to the understanding that "Fortress Europe" as a metaphor also implies to scales that are non static but in constant establishment, differentiation and positioning based on certain conditions and relevance.

Besides, taking responsibility for their role in the stagnation of the African continent, the European Union must acknowledge the problematic of conditionality in their policy-making. Linking migration control with different policy areas, such as development aid, trade agreements, foreign direct investments and security in order to ensure a return on their support/ assistance to Africa is indeed counteractive. "This new conditionality appears transversally at different levels of the Euro-African relations, always as a pressure instrument to foster the conclusion of an agreement. Particularly in the deeply unbalanced framework of the Euro-African relations, there is a rise of a new specific 'migratory conditionality'. Therefore, it is possible to consider that in the specific Euro-African framework, this 'migratory conditionality' linked to development aid becomes the central pillar upon which the delegation is based." (Gabrielli 2009 qtd. in Gabrielli 2016: 26) Contemporary EU migration management policies and initiatives have therefore excluded communities and entire nations from the so-called 'global mobility infrastructure', which "consists not only of the physical structures and manifestations of migration control, but also the services and laws that enable some people to move across the globe with high speed, low risk and at low cost, while others, who have no access to this infrastructure, travel slowly, with high risk and at high cost. [Therefore,] the externalisation of migration control has resulted in the discriminatory denial of access to the global mobility infrastructure." (Pijnenburg et al. 2018: 371)

Noteworthy, however, is that "a number of processes are underway that may reshape how the EU engages with Africa on migration issues at policy and programming level. These include negotiations over the next EU budget and the establishment of the future framework for EU development-related engagement with countries of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). Likewise, on the African continent and despite mixed commitment among states in practice, ambitions on regional integration and RFM are growing, as manifes-

ted in the continental Protocol on Free Movement agreed in 2018. Both in the EU and Africa, the potential of [regional free movement] RFM in Africa and the value of long-term regional level engagement in this context are being recognised in principle.” (Castillejo et al. 2019: 4) Such developments, may indeed play a positive role in the management of African migration internally and externally, however as mentioned before, as long as Africa and it’s people do not play the leading role in this “European quest towards migration control from and in Africa”, the agenda will never be set to prioritize the continent’s people. “It appears the “European game” which denies Africans agency can only be resolved through a simultaneous process of decolonization and deimperialization. These processes require constructive dialogue between the erstwhile colonizers and the colonized. In addition, deimperialization is required to de-structure the racially hierarchical modern world-system and re-structure the assymetrical power relations in this system. [...Decolonization] must be deepened to deal with profound cultural, psychological and epistemological issues. Without these processes taking place, the possibility of African people excercising extra-structural agency remains pie in the sky.” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013: 349-350)

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## **APPENDIX**

### **ABSTRACT ENGLISH**

The European Union approach towards migration management policies for Africa has over the years changed and possibly evolved from a strictly securitarian to a more development-oriented framework, from Mobility Partnerships to Regional Processes and Dialogues. However, often times the underlying matters haunting the two continents, Europe and Africa, namely decolonization, assymetric power structures, exploitation and underdevelopment, are left tacit and unsettled. When studying EU migration agendas and dialogues, such as the Joint Valletta Action Plan or the Khartoum Process specifically, it is evident that the colonial remnants hide in plain sight under an “agenda for all” or a “win-win-win” situation. Such ambivalence is further exacerbated by the role that international organisations, such as ICMPD, play in this unstable relationship of two regions, namely the neutral friend of both. This neutrality has been proven time and again to be non-existent in an assymetrical power structure and therefore organisations function as a state apparatus or smoke screens for the implementation of the dominant agenda. Therefore it is crucial here that the African Union Commission, African nation states, but even more importantly African civil societies and migrants themselves, play a leading role in setting agendas for the continent’s borders, socio-economic growth and it’s people.

## ABSTRACT GERMAN

Der Ansatz der Europäischen Union für die Migrationssteuerungspolitik für Afrika hat sich im Laufe der Jahre verändert und möglicherweise von einem rein sicherheitspolitischen zu einem entwicklungsorientierten Rahmen entwickelt, von Mobilitätspartnerschaften zu regionalen Prozessen und Dialogen. Oftmals bleiben jedoch die zugrunde liegenden Themen, die die beiden Kontinente Europa und Afrika heimsuchen, nämlich Dekolonisierung, asymmetrische Machtstrukturen, Ausbeutung und Unterentwicklung, stillschweigend und ungelöst. Bei der Untersuchung von EU-Migrationsagenden und Dialogen, wie beispielsweise dem Joint Valletta Action Plan oder dem Khartoum Process, ist es offensichtlich, dass sich die kolonialen Überreste unter einer „Agenda für alle“ oder einer „Win-Win-Win Situation“ verstecken. Diese Ambivalenz wird noch verstärkt durch die Rolle, die internationale Organisationen wie die ICMPD in dieser instabilen Beziehung zwischen zwei Regionen spielen, nämlich dem neutralen Freund beider. Diese Neutralität hat sich in einer asymmetrischen Machtstruktur immer wieder als nicht existent erwiesen und so fungieren Organisationen als Staatsapparat oder Nebelwände für die Umsetzung der dominanten Agenda. Deshalb ist es hier von entscheidender Bedeutung, dass die Kommission der Afrikanischen Union, die afrikanischen Nationalstaaten, vor allem aber die afrikanischen Zivilgesellschaften und die Migranten selbst eine führende Rolle bei der Festlegung der Agenden für die Grenzen des Kontinents, das sozioökonomische Wachstum und seine Menschen spielen.

