

**Language Diversity and Loyalty in the
Habsburg Army, 1868-1918**

Mag. Dr. Tamara Scheer

*Eingereicht als Habilitationsschrift an der
Historisch-Kulturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Wien
Jänner 2020*

Table of Contents

Introduction	3
Note on Sources, Methods, and Language Use	20
Part I: The Legal Framework of the Habsburg Army Language System	
Chapter 1: Army Reform and Military Institutions	28
Chapter 2: The Army Language System	51
Conclusion	82
Part II: The Habsburg Army Language System and the Military Personnel	
Chapter 3: The Rank and File	85
Chapter 4: The Officers	118
Conclusion	161
Part III: The Habsburg Army Language System in the Public Sphere	
Chapter 5: Garrison Life	165
Chapter 6: Language and Politics	193
Conclusion	218
Part IV: The Habsburg Army Language System during the Great War	
Chapter 7: The Organization of Language Diversity during Wartime	221
Chapter 8: Language Diversity on the Frontlines	244
Conclusion	264
Summary: Between Civil Rights and Practicality: The Habsburg Army Language System, 1868-1918	267
Bibliography	277

Introduction

The Habsburg lands are renowned as the locus classicus of a polity whose ethnicities were notably marked by language.

Robert Evans¹

In 1938 as another major war seemed likely, the Viennese university professor Wilhelm Czermak published a study of the Habsburg army during the First World War, *In deinem Lager war Österreich. Die österreichisch-ungarische Armee, wie man sie nicht kennt* (In your camp was Austria. The unknown Austro-Hungarian army). The subtitle promised his readers that the author would show them the Habsburg army they had never known. During the 1920s and 1930s, hundreds of memoirs and novels were published across Central Europe that focused on the Habsburg Monarchy's final war. Czermak may have simply wanted a catchy title to increase sales in an already saturated literary market, because for the most part the author provided a narrative that informed readers largely already knew. Like most contemporaneous authors, Czermak stressed the Habsburg army's diversity, its mixture of ethnicities, religious affiliations, and languages, painting a picture of soldiers fighting for or against their homeland. Czermak also made an unusual assertion: he blamed the myriad languages used in the Habsburg army's regiments and battalions for its operational failures instead of the usually argued national. He briefly mentioned the reason why concluding that way: He, himself, had fought in the ranks of a Hungarian artillery regiment without speaking the language.² However, Czermak did not indicate whether he meant operational ineffectiveness arising from that linguistic difference or if and how this difference affected the willingness to fight and the morale of the soldiers. In contrast to Czermak's assertion, however, autobiographical and military sources from wartime demonstrate that soldiers' language diversity neither greatly hampered operations nor increased desertions. For example, the Procurement Officer Josef Leb asserted in his 1933 memoirs that "every officer commanded soldiers of all nationalities, and they would agree that diversity alone would not have caused major problems."³ Who was correct, Czermak or Leb, or maybe both to a certain

¹ Evans, *Language and State Building*, 1. See also: ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 13th Corps Command Zagreb/Agram, box 76, no. 70, 8 October 1911

² Czermak, *In deinem Lager war Österreich*, 27-8. This argument is also apparent in literature. For example: Wawro, *The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire*. See also: Rauchensteiner, *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie*.

³ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers, unpublished manuscript, autumn 1933, 6.

degree?

The First World War, which began in August 1914, ended with the destruction of the centuries-old Monarchy. Before the war, some Habsburg army officials had already questioned the loyalty of a number of the Monarchy's nationalities. They even expected some of them to refuse to mobilize en masse.⁴ In fact, for the duration of the war, the vast majority of military-aged men fulfilled their obligations irrespective of their backgrounds.⁵ The policies of Austria-Hungary for the first two and a half years of the First World War eliminated many of its own *Rechtsstaat* traditions of respecting citizens' rights. Of course, many European states whether empires or nation states restricted citizens' civil rights during the war. As a result, they incurred significant popular opposition. But in the cases of Austria and Hungary, these restrictions were often framed specifically in nationalist terms as attacks on particular nationalities.⁶ During the war Habsburg bureaucrats and army officers increasingly accused some nationalities of being disloyal to the throne and the army.⁷ But what did loyalty mean in an army in which soldiers belonged to eleven recognized nationalities and languages?

Drawing on years of research about the nature of loyalty and the late Habsburg Monarchy, Jana Osterkamp and Martin Schulze Wessel recently published a cross-disciplinary study, "*Texturen von Loyalität: Überlegungen zu einem analytischen Begriff*" (The fabric of loyalty: Reflections of an analytical term). The authors analyze this complex term, loyalty, which scholars of different disciplines so often employ. They stress that historians in particular have often used the term not as an analytical category, but rather uncritically accept the term as it is employed in the sources (*Quellensprache*), and are examining without interrogating the context in which the various authors were writing. Osterkamp and Schulze Wessel also argue that loyalty should not be considered only unidirectional, that is, of the citizens-subjects to the ruler. Rather, loyalty should reflect the complexity of a society and state, in particular when these two are characterized by ethnic and linguistic diversity.⁸ I argue that the Habsburg

⁴ A general suspicion was also traceable for other armed forces of that time. For example, Russian army officials suspected all Yiddish-speaking Jews being German spies because they considered Yiddish a German dialect, one that enabled Jews to conspire with the enemy: Bischitzky, and Schreiner, Einführung, 18.

⁵ Scheer, *Ringstraßenfront*, 9-10. The front experience stood in contrast to the home front experience where thousands of civilians were arrested owing to their alleged disloyalty to the state: Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary*.

⁶ Judson, *Critical Issues for a History of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 381.

⁷ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*.

⁸ Osterkamp, Schulze Wessel, *Texturen von Loyalität*, 553-73.

military, owing to its administrative structure, ethnic and linguistic diversity, offered a multi-layered environment for loyalty and disloyalty during the last decades of the Monarchy.

My aim is to debunk the notion that loyalty or disloyalty in a multilingual army was so often connected to people of a particular nationality, or language, and that many decisions reflected national convictions. The army is the test case par excellence for this argument, because its functioning was essential to the security of the Monarchy and due to compulsory military service, it affected annually many thousands of new conscripts. In this study, I demonstrate that the army's language system offers an example of how the conscripts and officers were affected by the army language system, shaped it, and identified with it despite their linguistic and ethnic backgrounds. Moreover, this study contributes to what historians such as Pieter M. Judson have argued that even in the case Habsburg citizens preferred a particular language or identified with a particular nationality did not necessarily mean that they turned against the monarch and the state. I build on Judson's notion who explores in his recent book, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* that even in late modern times, the ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous citizens who were loyal to their nationality as defined by language use often also identified with the state and army simultaneously.⁹ Unlike many historians, who have analyzed the *loyalty* and *disloyalty* of particular Habsburg nationalities, I examine the military bureaucrats, officers and conscripts who interpreted language rules, and how and why they did so. Archival sources I have examined reveal that there were numerous motives for flexible interpretation of the army language system, and nationalism was only one. This is a novel perspective for the most important and widespread institution of the late Habsburg Monarchy: the army. No other study has focused on the army's language diversity, which probably became its most important characteristic – for the military and civilians.

The examples of other scholarly studies referred to throughout this book demonstrate that when dealing with the army language system four main topics have to be treated separately. In the first part of my study I analyze the legal framework and the language regulations. They stipulated that conscripts were allowed to use their language during their military service. I demonstrate that these regulations permitted elasticity in interpreting them. As a result, state authorities until 1914 were regularly asked for changes, or more suitable and clearer definitions and interpretations. Although army bureaucrats were aware of the language system's shortcomings, between 1868 and 1914 the Ministry of War issued virtually no orders to clarify

⁹ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 368.

and explain to army officials of how to adequately implement them. I demonstrate that the flexible interpretation of the language rules might be the result of misinterpreted or wrongly understood regulations instead of being exclusively an outcome of a particular political or national(ist) standpoint. The army language system was influenced by army bureaucrats' conviction that every Habsburg citizen had to have a distinct nationality that was first and foremost related to the language use. The army language system did not only allow conscripts to use their native tongues during military service, but they were also obliged to serve among soldiers who spoke the same languages.

The second part of my study takes a closer look at how the conscripts and the officers interpreted, navigated, and affected the army language system. Historians have often tended to treat the rank and file as recipients of the language system, while they depicted officers as active adherents of it. The army language diversity affected the millions of male Habsburg conscripts, and like the military authorities and the officers, they, too, helped shape the acceptance of the army language system. I argue that the rank and file often affected the implementation of the system, while officers sometimes were required to obey orders and had no opportunity to influence it. Recruits' as well as officers' flexible adaptation of the language system were often not owing to their linguistic backgrounds (and therefore nationality), but rather often depended on a particular undertaking by making use of the elasticity of the rules.

The army language system and its flexible interpretation played an important role in the political, social, cultural, and public history of the late Habsburg Monarchy. It had a significant impact on the state and its citizens which is discussed in the third part. There was virtually no city or town in the Monarchy where at least one Habsburg army institution was deployed.¹⁰ Thus, the army's language system became known and affected also civil residents. Indeed, in a modern empire, no longer just imperial bureaucrats, but also ordinary civilians, journalists, and politicians contributed in debating and shaping the system.¹¹ The army language system was often part of the political discussion across the Monarchy: in the parliaments, provincial diets, and mayors' offices. Until 1914 the most widespread press was in German, although since 1867 other languages increased in importance.¹² When the word, "language," appeared in print or

¹⁰ See: *Seidels kleines Armeeschema*.

¹¹ Parsons, *The Rule of Empires*, 7. He asserts that premodern empires were relatively stable, because local customs and identities were strong enough to mitigate the crushing effects of foreign rule. Nationalisms, which imagined that populations were culturally and ethnically homogenous, made it more difficult to recruit citizens as allies.

¹² Hantsch, *Die Nationalitätenfrage im alten Österreich*, 33-4.

was mentioned in the parliaments in any Habsburg tongue, it tended to launch a public debate. I demonstrate that not every public criticism, even when it was primarily raised as a national issue and the full range of nationalist rhetoric was used, was necessarily disregarding the language rules or disloyal to the army and the state. However, army bureaucrats tended to downplay public criticism as being exclusively nationally motivated, and rejected it, even when they were fully aware that it was correct.

Before 1914, a variety of political military aims and hopes were tied to the army's language system. However, the most important peacetime duty of every army of conscripts is training to ensure successful wartime combat. The first three parts of this study demonstrate that the army officials became increasingly concerned about the war readiness and efficiency of the army, in particular in terms of the linguistic diversity and the loyalty of its speakers. But which role did language actually play when soldiers who spoke more than ten idioms were mobilized and sent to the front, and even during the First World War – at least officially – the military leadership had to respect the language rights of the conscripts. I show that prejudices toward so-called disloyal nationalities influenced many officers and conscripts. They then treated their comrades or subordinates and their languages worse than those of alleged loyal soldiers. The last part therefore shows that it was not the legal framework of language rules that hardened soldiers' life, rather how superiors treated the soldiers of particular nationalities.

The Late Habsburg Monarchy

The Habsburg army's language system dates from 1867. It was among the results of the attempt to end the domestic conflicts that had led to the revolutions of 1848 and in the next two decades, had regularly threatened imperial Austria's integrity. Firstly, politicians and nobles from the Hungarian provinces demanded their historic right for self-government, including their own constitution, parliament, and territorial defense. The *Ausgleich*, an imperial settlement, fulfilling these demands and creating Austria-Hungary, was negotiated to in 1867. Among the consequences of this settlement was the division of many formerly centralized state responsibilities between Austria and Hungary. Three joint ministries remained in the Monarchy: the army, foreign affairs, and finance. Joint ministers and the minister presidents of both halves of the now dual monarchy regularly met in the so-called delegations and the joint Council of Ministers (*Delegationen* and *gemeinsamer Ministerrat*), in either Vienna or

Budapest.¹³ These two were the most important political institutions for joint army issues, such as the number of soldiers recruited annually, and the budget.¹⁴ Historians such as Kurt Peball and Gunther Rothenberg called the army's role in the late Habsburg Monarchy on the one hand as the "the Achilles heel of the dualist system," but at the same time they argued that it was perceived to be "the vital link of the two halves of the Monarchy."¹⁵ When the delegations met, Austrian/joint and Hungarian representatives regularly disagreed about a variety of army issues. Indeed, the joint army language system would be among the hotly contested topics throughout my period of investigation.¹⁶

Another immediate cause of the revolution of 1848, one that afterward had regularly threatened Austrian integrity, was the lack of political participation. Liberals from across imperial Austria demanded constitutions granting civil rights, and parliaments based on male suffrage. In addition to parliaments, Francis Joseph¹⁷ promulgated a Hungarian constitution of 1867 and that same year, Austrian constitutional laws, the so-called *Dezemberverfassung*.¹⁸ Article 19 of the Austrian constitution gave all ethnic groups or nationalities (the so-called *Volksstämme*) the right to use their language in public institutions.¹⁹ Although the Hungarian constitution differed from the Austrian as it imposed Hungarian as state language,²⁰ the Habsburg army language system employed Austrian language requirements throughout the Monarchy. The Austrian and Hungarian constitutions both implemented compulsory military

¹³ Between 1867 and 1906 they met 459 times. During the first four years, there were 120 meetings. Somogyi, *Der gemeinsame Ministerrat der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie*, 92-5. See also: Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867 betreffend die allen Ländern der österreichischen Monarchie gemeinsamen Angelegenheiten und die Art ihrer Behandlung (Delegationengesetz), in: *RGBl.* 142/1967; Galántai, *Der österreichisch-ungarische Dualismus*, and Katus, *Hungary in the Dual Monarchy*.

¹⁴ Vogt, *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*, 42. The delegation members renegotiated the number of recruits each decade. Until 1889, it was about 800,000. See also on the initial debate: Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*, 266f.

¹⁵ Peball, and Rothenberg, *Der Fall U*, 89-90.

¹⁶ Somogyi, *Der gemeinsame Ministerrat der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie*, 95. In addition to the delegation meetings, the Hungarian parliament had the opportunity once in a decade during the course of the settlement negotiations (*Ausgleichsverhandlungen*), to influence army efforts, budget and number of recruits: Peball, and Rothenberg, *Der Fall U*, 90. See also: Zsuppán, *Die politische Szene Ungarns*, 108f.

¹⁷ After the Ausgleich Emperor Francis Joseph became also the Hungarian king. To ease reading I decided not to mention his titles. Thus, he is only referred to as Francis Joseph or the monarch throughout this study.

¹⁸ The Habsburg provinces that were not part of the kingdom of Hungary, collectively Cisleithania or Austria, were after 1867 represented in the *Reichsrat*, the imperial parliament in Vienna. These were the hereditary lands (*Erblände*), Tyrol, Carniola, Lower Austria, and Upper Austria, as well as Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Salzburg, the Littoral, Galicia, Bukovina, and Dalmatia.

¹⁹ Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. Dezember 1867 über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger für die im Reichsrat vertretenen Königreiche und Länder. In: *Reichsgesetzblatt* (1867), Nr. 142. Instead of the term used in the Austrian constitution, peoples (*Volksstämme*), bureaucrats usually referred to the citizens as nationalities.

²⁰ The Hungarian nationality law of 1868 sought to combine a civic that is Western European interpretation of the nation and an ethnic with Central and Eastern European interpretation of the nation: Marác, *Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire*, 277. After 1868, tolerance for languages and cultures other than Hungarian gradually declined: Romsics, *Dismantling of Historic Hungary*, 13.

service making a fundamental army reform necessary.²¹ After 1867, the Habsburg army no longer comprised professional soldiers, but was rather an army of conscripts who had constitutional civil rights, although as concerned language use they differed in Austria and Hungary. Francis Joseph expected his newly created joint army “a brotherly unity and enthusiastic cooperation [...] reliable support for the throne, a horde of my peoples, respectful toward foreign countries, protecting the domestic legal order.”²² The focus of imperial debates and concerns in 1867/68 was, however, the unity of Austria and Hungary. Conscripts’ language rights became a focus only later as part of this unity.

The conscripts’ language rights in the years after 1867 posed a challenge to state bureaucrats because they confronted a Habsburg society whose language use changed over time. Generational affiliation is important in a study of the army language system that spans five decades. Language teaching in primary and secondary schools underwent significant changes between 1868 and 1914. Fewer students attended German-language grammar schools and gymnasia in Cisleithanian Austria. They were increasingly educated in their mother tongue, except in Galicia, where many speakers of other languages were obliged to attend Polish-language schools.²³ In the Hungarian half of the Monarchy, education served as tool of Magyarization that aimed to transform a multi-lingual population into a political nation on the French model.²⁴ László Károly Marác has argued that roughly seventy-seven percent of Hungary’s population was monolingual in 1867, a percentage that rose with forced education in the Hungarian language, which mostly affected German- and Slovak-speaking residents. However, he concluded about the limits of Magyarization that by 1910 seven million Hungarian citizens still did not speak Hungarian,²⁵ although an increasing number of public schools used only the state language, Hungarian, for instruction.²⁶ Joachim von Puttkamer has written that

²¹ RGBI. Nr. 151/1868, Gesetz womit für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder die Art und Weise der Erfüllung der Wehrpflicht geregelt wird vom 8.12.1868. On the results of the compulsory military service, see: Hämmerle, *Die Allgemeine Wehrpflicht in der multiethnischen Armee der Habsburgermonarchie*.

²² ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 82-3/14, 1868, *Armeebefehl bei Sanctionierung des Wehrgesetzes und Landwehr-Statutes*.

²³ Stourzh, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten*. Walter Wagner has written about the decrease of German-speakers among cadets and NCOs from Galicia, the territory of the 11th Corps Command which recruited from around Lviv: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 2, 240. Ignac Romsics compares the Galician with the Hungarian linguistic environment in terms of the linguistic abilities of the military in the regiments: Romsics, *Dismantling of Historic Hungary*, 5. There were only a handful of so-called gymnasia that employed more than one language for instruction (*gemischtsprachig*) across the Monarchy. For just one example, these in Bukovina: Hannelore Burger, *Sprachen und Sprachenpolitiken. Niederösterreich und die Bukowina im Vergleich*, 122f.

²⁴ A brief overview on Hungarian school laws: Puttkamer, *Nationale Peripherien*, 97-110. See also: Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*.

²⁵ Marác, *Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire*, 281, and 293.

²⁶ Dolmányos, *Kritik der Lex Apponyi*, 233-304. See also: Galántai, *Der österreichisch-ungarische Dualismus*, 93.

this process of linguistic and cultural magyarization was not primarily an outcome of a political effort, but rather resulted from demographic and social dynamics. Economic prosperity and social mobility were increasingly connected to the use of the Hungarian state language.²⁷ National-language policies became apparent across the Monarchy and affected all army members, soldiers, officers, reservists and the rank and file. “It must be remembered,” Nándor F. Dreisziger asserts, “that it was a strong political statement on the part of an educated Ruthene in Galicia not to consider himself a Pole, just as was for educated Slovaks, Serbs, or Romanians not to identify themselves as Magyars in Hungary.”²⁸ In addition, family ties played a role in perceptions about national belonging as Ernst Bruckmüller argues.²⁹ This was the case in both halves of the Monarchy especially when a family was multilingual or the father was employed in an imperial institution, for example, the Habsburg army.

Local civil society’s acceptance of the Habsburg army’s presence changed over time. In Cisleithanian Austria the reaction of civil residents (or parts of it) had a variety of reasons, nationalism, was not the sole determinant. In his memoirs, General Eduard Hentke von Heshart later asserted that the German-speaking population of Sankt Pölten in Lower Austria in 1904 was “not exactly unfriendly to the military, but residents kept their distance.” In his opinion, the reason for their attitude was the Social-Democratic mayor. Following the mayor’s departure, Hentke wrote, the army’s relationship with the population improved.³⁰ The military was welcome – or at least tolerated – in other locations of the Monarchy.³¹ In a variety of autobiographical sources, authors asserted having experienced harmony between army members and locals. This positive attitude does not appear to have depended on a particular linguistic composition of the population, or to which part of the Monarchy a region belonged to. In his memoir career officer Theodor Lerch recalled that residents of Transylvania, although it was part of Hungary, were friendly to the military, although in many other parts of Hungary the Habsburg army members experienced contempt and hatred from among local residents.³²

²⁷ Puttkamer, *Magyarisierung*, 480-6.

²⁸ Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 35.

²⁹ Bruckmüller, *Zur Problematik kollektiver Identitätsstiftung*, 20.

³⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/98:77, Eduard Hentke von Heshart, *Leben und Wirken, 1858-1919*, unpublished manuscript, undated, unpaginated. See for Social-Democrats: Brügel, *Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie*.

³¹ Laurence Cole provides a comprehensive overview of the military society’s relationship with civilians through the prism of veteran associations, and the numerous reasons for tensions and conflicts in *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*.

³² ÖStA/KA/NL, B:33/4, Theodor von Lerch, *Die Todgeweihten*, undated unpublished manuscript, 30.

Following the violence of the 1848-revolution, Habsburg soldiers were seen in some quarters as occupiers. Fighting and devastation of cities and villages had affected Hungary the most, and for a long time, many native Hungarian speakers did not welcome Habsburg soldiers.³³ Peball and Rothenberg concluded that “radical Hungarian nationalists saw the presence of the joint army in their kingdom as provocation, because it reminded them of their defeat in 1849.” Less than twenty years had passed since this defeat when the *Ausgleich* was signed in 1867. Some veterans of the battle against Habsburg rule were still living when the army was reformed, and compulsory military service initiated. Sometimes, even one’s own relatives ignored men when they were in uniform. National festivities took place annually throughout Hungary remembering the struggle for independence. These events regularly brought residents into conflict with locally deployed Habsburg army units.³⁴ In many Habsburg regions the acceptance of army presence changed over time. As Tibor Hajdu has noted, it was not until the 1890s that Hungarian residents became friendlier toward Habsburg soldiers stationed in their midst.³⁵

Many resident native speakers of Hungarian not only had a negative attitude toward the joint army in general, but also directed their ire at Croats. They still remembered the Hungarian defeat at the hands of the Croatian Ban, General Josip Jelačić. “It was not an easy task to eliminate the initially hostile attitude towards the Croats,” General Hentke later recalled.³⁶ Croatia-Slavonia was part of the Kingdom of Hungary, but was described in officer autobiographical sources for a long time to be friendly toward the Habsburg army, despite the increase in Croatian nationalism.³⁷ Many autobiographical records mentioned that South Slavs’ inhabited Bosnia-Herzegovina that Austria-Hungary had occupied in 1878 and would annex in 1908 to be a pleasant garrison too. For example, General Adolf Auffenberg-Komarow recalled in his memoirs that this was especially the case in Sarajevo, the capitol.

³³ Hajdu, *Das Alltagsleben österreichischer Offiziere in Ungarn*, 111. This was not only the case for Hungary, but also for those provinces that later became part of the Kingdom of Italy. In both the imperial Austrian army was a symbol for „centralistic absolutisms“ (*Das Heer als Vollstrecker des zentralistischen Absolutismus*): Schmidt-Brentano, *Die Armee in Österreich*, 335.

³⁴ Peball, and Rothenberg, *Der Fall U*, 90.

³⁵ Hajdu, *Das Alltagsleben österreichischer Offiziere in Ungarn*, 103-11.

³⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/98:77, Eduard Hentke von Hehshart, *Leben und Wirken*, 1858-1919, unpublished undated unpaginated manuscript.

³⁷ Cornwall, *Loyalty and Treason in Late Habsburg Croatia*, 97f. See also: Veliz, *The Politics of Croatia-Slavonia 1903-1918*.

However, Auffenberg reported that the residents of different religions tended to struggle against one another rather directed their ire at the Habsburg army.³⁸

In addition to Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were some other regions of the Monarchy where national activists struggled not only against central Habsburg power represented in the army, rather over local political power.³⁹ In his memoirs, the reserve officer Robert Nowak asserted that there would have been not only conflicts “between Germans and non-Germans [but also] among Czechs and Poles, Poles and Ruthenians, Croats and Italians, in particular in Dalmatia, Slovenes and Italians, and Croats and Serbs.”⁴⁰ In some parts of the Monarchy officers increasingly feared being drawn into conflicts among local nationalities. What often heated up the situation was that usually not all companies of a regiment were deployed in their recruiting region. For example, soldiers from Bosnian-Herzegovinian regiments were sent to Vienna, Graz, and Budapest.⁴¹ Battalions and companies replaced these soldiers in their home provinces that were transferred from other Habsburg regions. This deployment policy of the Habsburg army enriched local linguistic landscapes, and many officers and conscripts experienced in these garrisons for the first time other national struggles than the ones they knew from their home provinces.

In addition to general trends of varying levels of civilian acceptance of the army being stationed locally, the symbolic character of language use changed until 1914. Finally, the very act of communication was politicized. In the late nineteenth century as Peter Urbanitsch has noted, “language was no longer a primary means of communication, but a distinctive feature for a group that wanted to be different from others.”⁴² Domestic nationalist struggles were not only fought over political influence, but also over language use in civil administration and the army. What is of additional importance was that the same language did not hold the same status throughout the Monarchy. German was the dominant language in the army, but in Hungarian civil society it played an increasingly subordinate role. While Polish, Hungarian, and Croatian only had the status of soldier languages among many others in the army, in Galicia, Hungary, and Croatia they dominated in bureaucracy. This superiority of certain local languages over

³⁸ Auffenberg-Komarow, *Aus Österreichs Höhe und Niedergang*, 103. See also: ÖStA/KA/NL, B/862:1, Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished and undated memoir, 15-6.

³⁹ See: Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*.

⁴⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, *Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen*, undated and unpaginated.

⁴¹ See: Neumayer/Schmidl, *Des Kaisers Bosniaken*.

⁴² Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 65.

others continued to a minor degree in other Habsburg provinces. In the Cisleithanian Littoral Croatian-, Slovenian-, and Italian-speaking national activists struggled against one another. In the capitol Trieste, the Italian language dominated public life, while German and Slovene were minority languages.⁴³ Although German use predominated in the Habsburg army, regiments and battalions were legally obliged to use the conscripts' languages. The army language system gave preference to German, but at no point one other language dominated even when this language dominated in a particular province. They all had the status of a regimental language. The only exception was Hungarian following 1905, when Francis Joseph approved exceptions that resulted in an increase in the use of Hungarian in Habsburg army regiments recruited from Hungary.

Linguistic diversity has characterized the Habsburg Monarchy and its army for many centuries, but for a long-time language categorization was not formalized. There was a flexible use of terms. Until the second half of the nineteenth century the scholarly debate about what was a language and what only a vernacular was not ended. For example, native speakers of what would later be categorized as Slovenian, other terms were in use such as Styrian or Carniolan.⁴⁴ However, only what state bureaucrats perceived to be a language was granted the right to be become recognized in the army, and served as the basis to make up a distinct nationality.⁴⁵ During my period of investigation, the Habsburg army recognized the following language categories: Bohemian, Croatian, German, Hungarian, Italian, Polish, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovak, and Slovene.⁴⁶ Although these language categories were often criticized in the public sphere, and even among officers, army bureaucrats continued to insist on their use. Archival records as well as the parliamentary and press debates I have examined indicate that the public was aware of the army's categorization, and the percentages of speakers presented.

In addition to the army, as it was also the case in other multinational empires, in particular the civil census helped affirm categories of national identification often defined by language use.⁴⁷ Austria-Hungary's bureaucratic practices, however, were inconsistent. The

⁴³ Czeitschner, *Discourse, Hegemony, and Polyglossia*, 71.

⁴⁴ Brix, *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation*, 67-96.

⁴⁵ See: Stergar, and Scheer, *Ethnic Boxes*.

⁴⁶ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes, dann Kadetten im k.k. Heere* (1884), 3. Rubrik, Sprachkenntnisse.

⁴⁷ Evans, *Language and State Building*, 2; see also: Kertzer, and Arel, *Census and Identity*; and Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 168-74.

army's language categorization differed from the categories and methods Austrian and Hungarian civil administration used. The first official census in Cisleithanian Austria was in 1880 and employed the following language categories: German, Bohemian-Moravian-Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Serbian-Croatian, Italian-Ladin, Romanian, and Magyar.⁴⁸ Citizens were asked for their language of daily use (*Umgangssprache*) and in contrast to the army, every respondent was permitted to claim only one language.⁴⁹ The introductory remarks of the Austrian statistical handbook made it clear that "language is a marker for nationality," but it was added that "different conceptions of the nature of language use during the survey often lead to uncertainty among the people who are called to contribute or collect the information for the survey."⁵⁰ In five censuses conducted in 1869, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, the Hungarian government employed a third method. They asked for and reported only the mother tongue (*anya nyelvé*) of the inhabitants.⁵¹

In sum, Habsburg citizens were increasingly obliged to declare their native or preferred language, which was interpreted as a nationality. There was less and less opportunity to escape an assignment to a particular national category.⁵² Judson has noted: "As long as the respondents did not link their own language use to a larger national identity, [these percentages] conveyed little more than nationalist potentials, and certainly not national realities."⁵³ In the course of a state-imposed modernization process that took place throughout the nineteenth century the changed meaning of language use and the state's categorization of citizens across the Monarchy became increasingly important.⁵⁴ Many historians connect modernisation with rising nationalization. Puttkamer, for example, argues that the nationality conflicts of the nineteenth century resulted from modernization efforts.⁵⁵ Dreisziger has called it a "vicious circle" that meant "giving up these pre-modern values would have involved surrender to nationalism."⁵⁶

⁴⁸ k.k. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910*, 59.

⁴⁹ Kleeberg, *Die Nationalitätenstatistik*, 160-70. On the debate to use this term, see: Brix, *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation*, 102f. Brix's study also includes a survey on all Austrian census divided along provinces; see part IV.

⁵⁰ k.k. Statistische Zentralkommission, *Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910*, 58-9.

⁵¹ Marác, Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 277. See also: Gal, *Polyglot Nationalism*, 42; Varga, *Multilingualism in Urban Hungary*, 967.

⁵² Stergar, Scheer, *Ethnic Boxes*, 575-91.

⁵³ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 14 and 23.

⁵⁴ Evans, *Language and State Building*, 3.

⁵⁵ Puttkamer, *Magyarisierung*, 491.

⁵⁶ Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 46.

Modernization was also closely connected to nineteenth-century bureaucratization, both of which were trans-European, indeed, global phenomena, as Peter Becker has shown. Citizens were becoming increasingly likely to interact directly with state authorities on a regular basis as bureaucracy expanded. In this context, Becker draws the reader's attention to the increasing importance and effects of statistical data.⁵⁷ During the period I investigate, both contemporary scholars and bureaucrats were convinced of the need for a modern bureaucracy, one that intended to count their people in all possible ways. State officials asked residents among many other so-called facts about family size, education, religious affiliation, profession. Crucial for the political discussion, language use was often interpreted as marker for a distinct nationality.⁵⁸ Urbanitsch has called these bureaucratic efforts a kind of "compulsory national membership."⁵⁹ I demonstrate that in the Habsburg army, conscripts were sometimes even assigned a particular native tongue, thus, nationality to ensure an efficient training, even when they might never have characterized themselves that way.

Bureaucrats found in language use a suitable category, because they were primarily interested in an efficient (and inexpensive) administration. The main protagonists of nationalizing language use, however, were national activists. They imagined their nations' cultural characteristics for which language use played an important role.⁶⁰ Nationalist activists aimed at raising the percentage of their nationality in order to outnumber other local nationalities and demonstrate their political importance. Both nationalists and bureaucrats considered language use the most important element of national belonging and created viable categories of identification for which language use became decisive for deciding a particular Habsburg nationality.⁶¹ In his analysis of so-called institutionalized ethnicity, sociologist Siniša Malešević stresses the "important distinction [...] between the normative or official ideological narrative of the particular political order and its operative, which is to say institutionalized, counterpart."⁶² In the late Habsburg Monarchy, the supranational image was the official narrative, but bureaucratic categorization became its operational counterpart.

⁵⁷ Becker, *Sprachvollzug. Kommunikation und Verwaltung*, 9-10. A number of historians have recently analyzed the impact of modernism on the multilingual Habsburg bureaucracy and bureaucrats, for examples: Deak, *Forging a Multinational Empire*; Heindl, *Bürokratie und Beamte in Österreich*; and Gammerl, *Subjects, Citizens, and Others*.

⁵⁸ Kleeberg, *Die Nationalitätenstatistik*, 160.

⁵⁹ Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 71-2. See also: Stergar, and Scheer, *Ethnic Boxes*.

⁶⁰ See: Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

⁶¹ See: Cole, *Differentiation or Indifference*; Judson, Introduction, *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*; and King, *The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond*.

⁶² Malešević, *Identity as Ideology*, 161.

Linguistic diversity characterized Habsburg citizens, including a large number who spoke more than one language. Bruckmüller has argued that many contemporary political actors not only interpreted language use as an affiliation to a particular nationality, but also considered monolingualism modern. Thus, this conviction became inevitably crucial for a state and its army whose citizens spoke more than eleven languages and aimed at modernizing.⁶³ These speakers of more than one language were seen to be harder to assign to a particular nationality. They left space for nationalists identifying with the empire's constituent nations to attempt to win them over as Judson has written. In particular bi- or multilingualism enabled what historians have termed with "national indifference" that Pieter M. Judson has recently explained with to be more "a particular strategy for understanding the situational character and appeal of nationalism, than as a particular substantive position of its own."⁶⁴ Speaking more than one language enabled to decide upon one's nationality, respectively decide upon an identity based on other motives than so-called real national belonging, and to change it. Judson has characterized many Habsburg citizens with "people who continued to act, shop, vote, attend school, and respond to census questionnaires as if the very concept of "nation" meant nothing to them."⁶⁵ Anthropologist and linguist Susan Gal draws on an assertion from Johann Gottfried Herder who was in addition of being a poet, philosopher, and theologian, also a translator. Gal wrote that language was "assumed to change thought, and thus national character. Multilingualism was considered dangerous in that framework, raising the possibility that speakers had loyalties to more than one state [or nationality]."⁶⁶ As shown above, methods and categories that state and army used made the recognition of multiple identities increasingly difficult, thus, bureaucratizing states required citizens to decide for one.⁶⁷

Throughout the nineteenth century, there were contemporaneous authors – often overlooked in these years – who drew attention to the positive character of bi- and multilingualism for institutions of linguistically diverse states. For example, Max Graf von Coudenhove, the governor of multilingual Cisleithanian Silesia (1908-1915), and later of Bohemia (1915-18), considered personal and state multilingualism to be a useful basis for

⁶³ Bruckmüller, *Zur Problematik kollektiver Identitätsstiftung*, 40.

⁶⁴ Judson, *Critical Issues for a History of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 367.

⁶⁵ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 5. See also: Zahra, *Kidnapped Souls*; Zahra, *Imagined Noncommunities*; Struve, *Polish Peasants in Eastern Galicia*.

⁶⁶ Gal, *Polyglot Nationalism*, 33.

⁶⁷ Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 71-2.

successfully managing multi-ethnic communities.⁶⁸ Ursula Prutsch has pointed to the overall “linguistic adaptability of state representatives” in Habsburg administrative self-assessment.⁶⁹ This was also the case for the army. The military historian Christoph Allmayer-Beck has argued that the Habsburg officers themselves believed that they were far more “flexible and empathetic” when commanding their soldiers of different nationalities than their peers in so-called mono-national armies which nonetheless often comprised speakers of other languages than just these of the dominant or state language.⁷⁰

The army language system, at least officially, left no space for choosing one’s own language and therefore one’s own nationality. Most conscripts were assigned to a unit that used one particular language, and soldiers of different nationalities were usually trained separately from one another to ensure efficiency. Urbanitsch called these state and army efforts a “separation leading only to the alienation of the peoples [*Volksstämme*], in the end, meaning to alienate them from the supra-national imperial state.” He argued that “rather than living together, they live side by side”⁷¹ – or in the case of the army service, they were trained side-by-side. According to the *Zeitgeist* this alienation could have resulted only in no longer identifying with a supra-national state and army, rather only with a particular nationality. This study demonstrates, however, that this was not the case for many of Habsburg soldiers, officers and the rank and file.

Historians often tend to portray the Habsburg army language system as unique compared to the many other multinational armies of that same time. Indeed, studies of other armed forces demonstrate that general and particular problems states and bureaucrats faced were similar, although no other army of the time era employed the same system, and no other state granted similar language rights. However, there is scope for comparison. Some similarities can be found when it comes to language use, although many armies served different political aims, and the soldiers had been granted other language rights. Tomasz Kamusella has shown that modern European states pursued a wide range of strategies for dealing with language heterogeneity in the army. In most contemporaneous armies the declaration of more than one

⁶⁸ Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 82. Urbanitsch refers to Max Graf von Coudenhove.

⁶⁹ Prutsch, *Historisches Gedächtnis in kulturpolitischer Machtstrategie*, 75. She reflects on an administrative report from an Austrian consul who emphasized the difference between imperial German and Habsburg bureaucrats.

⁷⁰ Allmayer-Beck, *Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte*, 381. See also: Allmayer-Beck, *Die bewaffnete Macht in Staat und Gesellschaft*.

⁷¹ Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 82.

language per person was not permitted, which “by default excluded the phenomenon of bi- and multilingualism from official scrutiny. The logic of this exclusion stemmed from the conviction that a person can belong to one nation only.”⁷²

In their edited volume, *Languages and the Military*, Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly published some historical case studies of multi-lingual armies, among them the French and the British, and the situation of (language) minorities such as the Irish, that range from attempts to homogenize soldiers of different language backgrounds by using only one language to taking linguistic diversity into account.⁷³ For example, native Polish- and French-speaking conscripts who served in the imperial German army had no linguistic rights. For a long time, these recruits were not even permitted to take the oath in their native tongues.⁷⁴ In the French army, the process of transforming multiethnic “peasants into Frenchmen” as Eugen Weber has demonstrated only succeeded insofar as French-language schooling already ensured that all soldiers, including these from the colonies, at least spoke basic French.⁷⁵ Some armies, however, recognized the rank and files’ languages in training. British officers in the Indian army, for example, were expected to learn the soldiers’ languages, primarily Hindi.⁷⁶ In his path-breaking monograph, *Beyond Nationalism: A social and political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918*, István Deák concludes that the British army in India was maybe the only one that could be compared with the Habsburg army in terms of the language system.⁷⁷

In addition to studies of other contemporaneous armies, this work has drawn on numerous case studies dealing with the Habsburg army. The publications of Christoph Allmayer-Beck, M. Christian Ortner, Erwin A. Schmidl, Peter Schweizer, and Walter Wagner dealing with the organizational structure of the army were a useful basis for contextualizing and framing my primary sources.⁷⁸ In addition, there are some historians whose analytical case studies are particularly important. In addition to Deák’s classic monograph on the army bureaucrats’ challenge to classify Habsburg officers according to a certain nationality,

⁷² Kamusella, *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe*, 9-10. See also: Blumenwitz, Gornig, Murswiek, eds., *Ein Jahrhundert Minderheiten- und Volksgruppenschutz*, 25.

⁷³ Footitt, Introduction, 1-11. See also: Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*.

⁷⁴ Boysen, *Preußische Armee und polnische Minderheit*.

⁷⁵ Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen*. For language use in the French army see also: Heimburger, *Fighting Together: Language Issues in the Military Coordination of First World War Allied Coalition Warfare*; and Heimburger, *Imagining coalition warfare? French and British Military Language Policy before 1914*. See also: Göderle, *Zensus und Ethnizität*, 96.

⁷⁶ Innes, *A Short History of the British in India*, 353. See also: Gammerl, *Subjects, Citizens, and Others*, 82f.

⁷⁷ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 5.

⁷⁸ A detailed list of publications of the authors referred to in this paragraph can be found in the bibliography.

published in 1990, there is more recent research, although most often focusing on one particular province of the Monarchy, or one nationality. For example, Irina Marin's article on Romanian-speaking generals in the Habsburg army is important to my work, because she demonstrates that generals who were multilingual often strongly identified with their nationality while at the same time were loyal to the army.⁷⁹ Rok Stergar has analyzed in numerous publications the role Slovene-speaking soldiers and local national activists played when it came to the criticism of shortcomings in the army's interpretation of the language rules. During their military service many German- and Slovene-speaking recruits in what is today Slovenia were labelled as members of either German or Slovene nationality, although many of them would have not identified as such. Slovene as sole language category for Slavic-speaking conscripts from Carinthia, Styria, and Carniola was also not unquestioned. In addition to the work of Marin and Stergar, Laurence Cole's study on veterans, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*, is important because they showed the daily practice of employing different languages in military associations, and how and when the army language system gained public attention.⁸⁰

In sum, what was a gap in historiography on the Habsburg army that this study aims to bridge, is to demonstrate how Habsburg language diversity was organized in the army, and how the army language system affected officers' and recruits' perceptions of loyalty and identity to the army, the state, and the monarch by employing a wide-range of primary and secondary sources from across the Monarchy. Thus, this study offers the first comprehensive overview on similarities and particularities among the many Habsburg nationalities and languages. I conclude that it was not exclusively a soldiers' nationality, respectively native language that influenced decisions rather they had a variety of other motives of which nationality was only one. Thus, I am stepping into recent historiography that argues that throughout the late nineteenth century Habsburg citizens' decisions were not exclusively an outcome of national affiliation.

⁷⁹ Marin, *World War I and Internal Repression*.

⁸⁰ Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*.

Note on Sources, Methods, and Language Use

In a complex governing system like the Habsburg Monarchy's, imperial, provincial, and regional laws sometimes contradicted one another. I am analyzing a representative sample of archival sources from both halves of the Monarchy, as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina. This sample includes a selection of institutions engaged in the implementation and interpretation of the army language system. In addition to printed primary sources such as handbooks, army regulations, parliamentary minutes, and press, I have used a wide variety of unpublished archival material, including institutional sources from the Ministry of War and other army institutions, and the Military Chancelleries, all of which are housed in the Viennese State Archives. Other administrative material comes mostly from the archival military collections in Budapest, Innsbruck, Lviv, Prague, Salzburg, Sarajevo, and Zagreb. When I refer in the text to "military archival records," or "the internal debate," I sum up general trends after having analysed the documents mentioned above. Administrative archival documents often do not include records of the debate that took place before an approval or decision was made, therefore in many cases they lack the intentions and motives. I have sought to fill these gaps by employing autobiographical comments of some of the army members involved. Throughout the text even when the chapter is not about army members' experiences with the army language system, rather dealing with the legal framework, I refer to personal experience to better frame how and why decisions were made.

Different types of autobiographical sources have become a major source for my work because there are few authors who did not mention the army language system at least once, thus, indicating that the army language diversity and system played a role in someone's army experience.⁸¹ Following the start of my research in 2012, and thanks to generous financial support and increasing digitalization projects, I have been able to analyze the personal records of more than 500 Habsburg soldiers preserved mostly in archives and private collections all over the former Habsburg Monarchy. Thus, when mentioning "autobiographical records," I am referring to published and unpublished material, including diaries, memoirs, letters, as well as political pamphlets and journal articles with autobiographical background. I have counted everyone's autobiographical writings with "from an army member perspective" who had served in the army, regardless if they spent their entire professional life in the army, merely fulfilled

⁸¹ Dusini discusses the particularities of a variety of autobiographical writings: Dusini, *Tagebuch. Möglichkeiten einer Gattung*.

their three-year peace time service requirement, or were called to arms during the First World War. These records differ by length, and character of sources. In some cases, someone's *Nachlass* consisted only of a letter or five-page summary of his army experience, while others contain both diaries that cover an entire professional life, and dozens of letters exchanged with comrades. I also call "of autobiographical character" when (former) army members published an article about the army as long as they supposedly rely on own experience. Thus, autobiographical sources had to meet the criteria that authors reflected on own experience, rather drawing their knowledge from second hand. As even many Habsburg-era politicians and journalists have served in the army, their speeches, political pamphlets, and articles can also be called as of first-hand army perspective.

My sources also differ greatly due to the purpose for which a text was written. Especially diaries are a critical source because they were often not for private use only, but many of them were written with the intention to be later read by others. What particularly influenced authors with literate background and secondary school grade is that writing a diary was a literary genre. Literary scholar Arno Dusini has argued that it had to meet certain criteria, and always reflected the author's interest to "stage-manage his own lifetime."⁸² In addition to private lifetime diaries, there were so-called war diaries of which officers were asked to note important incidents at the front that were only in few cases enriched by more personal experience, or political thoughts. This study also takes novels into account, but only these of authors who served in the army, and supposedly draw their knowledge from firsthand, even when the image of the army language system is exaggerated. Many novels and memoirs of army veterans, even when published years later, still tended to parallel actual experience as outlined in private diaries and letters.

This study spans a broad time frame. Most of my autobiographical sources that are preserved in archives or private collections today deal with wartime or were written or compiled on the basis of earlier diaries or memorized experience after the dissolution of the Monarchy in 1918. I needed stop research after a while of material that was written during wartime or in retrospective because the experiences described became redundant. I spent most of the time to find autobiographical sources that originated from the long period of peace between 1868 and 1914. These records are rare. One reason might be that ordinary daily duty was not worth to be written down and preserved for such a long time, and the other that most of the material in archives was either donated by the author himself or his children or grandchildren after the

⁸² Dusini, *Tagebuch. Möglichkeiten einer Gattung*.

First, or even Second World War. The writings of officers who were born in 1840 and served in the army in the first years after the settlement with Hungary simply did not that often survive in archives, or private collections. At least, I have not found many of them.

When I started analyzing autobiographical sources, my approach was to in addition to present the internal army perspective, to bring in the actual experience, by avoiding a post-Habsburg perspective to which historians often reflect with that authors created a Habsburg myth about a peaceful (multilingual) glorious past when compared to the post-war European political situation. Interestingly, my analysis of the soldier experience, regardless if the author was an officer or from the rank and file, with the Habsburg army language system in texts written before 1914 or after 1918 did not greatly differ. Authors portray the language system, its shortcomings, aims, challenges, stereotypes of certain linguistic groups, and their own role similarly. However, of course, in post-1918 records authors often added comparisons with the current political situation in one of the so-called Habsburg successor states, and also the characterization of particular Habsburg nationalities differed which mostly resulted from wartime experience.

What will become apparent in this study is that I sometimes refer more detailed to an author's background, when and where an incident he described has happened, and framing the particular source I refer to. Over the past eight years, I have sought to gather enough context on the authors, their professional careers, when and where they served in the army. However, a complete portrait was not always possible. For example, in particular in memoirs authors often mentioned the army language system, mentioned places and comrades, but often did not indicate when and where exactly this experience took place. Even with the help of their personnel files, if preserved in archives, it was in some cases impossible to present their ranks when they described an incident, or where it exactly happened. However, these lacks should not undervalue an author's experience, thus, I decided to refer to them by providing other important information to understand the role they played in the army, such as if they were career or reserve officers, army bureaucrats, war volunteers, or conscripts.

Historical scholarship often focuses on the officer perspective. This shortcoming usually resulted from the fact that the bulk of records preserved nowadays are from officers who more often tended to write or to prepare their army experience for other readers. An exception is the time of the First World War. Owing to the increased interest all over Europe in the course of

the centenary of the First World War (2014-2018), many private owners of diaries made them public, either uploaded them, for example on *Europeana*,⁸³ or donated these soldier diaries to state archives. However, these often-called ordinary soldier perspective has to be treated cautiously, because many of these texts originate from authors who were better educated, even with a secondary school degree, and consciously refused to serve as reserve officers often out of political motives. A “real ordinary soldier” perspective, on the other hand, would have been an author with primary school education, who lived in a rural area. These soldiers made up the vast majority of the Habsburg army’s rank and file, but their diaries are often written in school essay style using short sentences most often dealing with rationing, and one’s own physical condition.

I had another interest, in addition to portraying the internal army perspective by including members of all army ranks. As this study deals with language diversity, I aimed to bring in examples from all nationalities at least roughly based on their percentages as presented in the army yearbooks (*Militärstatistische Jahrbücher*).⁸⁴ While for some languages I was able to analyze primary sources myself, German, Italian, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian, and Hungarian, the autobiographical perspective from authors writing in the other Habsburg languages is mostly taken from scholarly work or translations of memoirs and diaries in one of the languages mentioned above. However, there is still an overhang of soldier autobiographical sources written in German because many of officers preserved in archives today were written in German. This is because Habsburg army officers most commonly used the German army language. I was often the language, they were most literate in. Many officers used German for autobiographical writings even after they have completed their army service. Thus, the use of German can not be called an indicator for identifying with a particular Habsburg nationality. For just two examples: Stjepan Sarkotić and Imre Suhay. I refer to these high-ranking Habsburg officers throughout this study. Both were most literate in German but identified themselves in their diaries with a Croat and a Hungarian nationality.⁸⁵ Although, both kept diaries in German they were not presenting a so-called German perspective when it comes to the army language system.

⁸³ Europeana Collections offer a free research in “1914-18. Explore the untold stories and official histories of World War I in 378,386 items from across Europe” that also comprises private collections dealing with the peacetime until 1914: www.europeana.eu/portal/en/collections/world-war-i.

⁸⁴ All yearbooks published between 1870 to 1911 are digitalized, and researchable by keyword in the collection of the Digital Reading Room of the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic (*Digitální studovna Ministerstva obrany ČR*): www.digitalniknihovna.cz/dsmo.

⁸⁵ HDA, Sarkotić, War Diary, and HL, Personalia, Suhay Diaries.

My study shows that language use was not an indicator with which nationality the author identified. This was not only the case for officers but also for some of the rank and file. Two soldiers from Tyrol, Paolino Zardini and Vijo Vittur, offer an example. Both served during the First World War and identified as Ladins. While Zardini kept his diary in Italian, the military physician Vittur used German, which he learned in school because his parents spoke Ladin at home.⁸⁶ There are plenty of other autobiographical sources which are referred to throughout this book, where the self-proclaimed nationality did not correspond with the language used for personal writings. What becomes apparent in the subsequent chapters is that I carefully use terms that indicate a certain nationality. I avoided whenever possible using categorizations such as a Croat officer, or a Czech soldier rather than native Croatian or Czech speaker or more often I just added the region of a person's origin or the languages someone spoke. This does not mean that these men had to nationality or better did not identify with one of them. It becomes obvious when analyzing the assessment of the army language system that these authors' assertions regardless of when they wrote, their ranks, or which language backgrounds they had, did not greatly differ in their assessment of the army language system. Differences occur out of other motives such as the character of the person involved, or in which Habsburg province they did their army service. If a particular assessment of the army language system greatly differed from others, I discuss it in the text.

When it comes to given and family names, I most often employ the language and spelling used in the archival sources. The Habsburg army's administrative sources tend to translate – if possible – given names into German (Josef instead of Josip), and long time Germanized the spelling of family names (Jellatschitsch instead of Jelačić). Hungarian military sources tended to Hungarianize the spelling of names. There was also an internal ministerial discussion of how to treat citizens' names that had no equivalent in German or a German form that differed greatly. In such cases the other forms were added in brackets such as Constantin (Szilard, Costa).⁸⁷ In the case of Hungarian citizens Habsburg army sources sometimes used the Hungarian version, while in another case the German. Tomán János, whose name was noted in the published list of war casualties (*Verlustliste*) in July 1916, was actually the same person as Johann Tomann, a Brno-born NCO, who got wounded, and was noted in the list of war

⁸⁶ Zardini, *Diario di Guerra 1915-1918*, and Vittur, *Na recordanza al dotur de Pescol Vijo Vittur*.

⁸⁷ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 8, 26 February 1897.

casualties of the War Ministry in that same month.⁸⁸ These sources demonstrate that even the army sometimes used different spellings. If a person is widely known, I use the most commonly employed spelling, for example, Stjepan Sarkotić instead of Stephan. For all others I refer to in my study I decided to use the spelling most often employed in my archival sources.

Finally, Habsburg language diversity caused that often more than one term for a place was in use. Historical studies employ different methods of naming. Most often in recently published studies in English or German, historians tend to use in the text a place name in all historical local languages, for example Ljubljana/Laibach. To ease reading, I decided to use the English version, if there is a commonly used. I even employ current names when the place was re-named only after the dissolution of the Monarchy, such as in the case of Pozsony/Pressburg/Prešporok, since 1919 Bratislava. If there is no commonly used English expression I use the term in nowadays main state language, even when this state allows other languages to be used, for example Bressanone instead of Brixen. This goes for the main text, while in original quotations I employ the term used in the sources by adding the today more commonly used in English in brackets.

⁸⁸ k.u.k. Kriegsministerium. *Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der in den Verlustlisten angeführten Namen*. Vienna: k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 21 July 1916, 49, and: k.u.k. Kriegsministerium, *Verlustliste ausgegeben am 22.7.1916*, 55.

Part I: The Legal Framework of the Habsburg Army's Language System

The army language system and its legal framework date from 1867, when the Austrian constitution was promulgated in which Article 19 gave all so-called *Volksstämme* (later referred to as nationalities)⁸⁹ the right to use their language in public institutions which the army was.⁹⁰ The Austrian article also applied to conscripts from Hungary, and from Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Habsburg occupation in 1878, when in 1881 compulsory military service was introduced.⁹¹ Compulsory military service was implemented for all male citizens making a fundamental army reform and the need to make allowances in 1868 necessary. The language rights of conscripts in the years to come would challenge the bureaucrats because they confronted a Habsburg society whose language use was changing. Beginning from the late eighteenth through the early nineteenth century convictions about and attitudes towards language use also changed drastically among state and army bureaucrats. They increasingly considered someone's native tongue to be the most decisive factor for national belonging.⁹²

A regulation of language use in the Habsburg armed forces was already the case before the army reform of 1867/68. For many centuries the imperial army reflected the linguistic diversity of the Austrian empire. Even German, which would later become lingua franca, was not always dominant. Historian Attila Réfi has written that the imperial army became more centralized only in the mid-eighteenth century with the imposition of the exclusive use of German for commands and for bureaucratic communication. German replaced languages like Italian and French that had been used locally.⁹³ Robert Evans explains that “the issue was whether the Austrian monarchy could create enough state loyalty and structural coherence to flourish among its increasingly centralized, tightly administered European rivals. This raised national, but above all – for current purposes – linguistic complications of an unprecedented and unparalleled kind in terms of official policy.”⁹⁴ The necessity of regulating linguistic

⁸⁹ On the difference between these two terms, see: Brix, *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation*, 26f.

⁹⁰ ALEX, RGBl. no. 151/1868, Gesetz womit für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder die Art und Weise der Erfüllung der Wehrpflicht geregelt wird vom 8.12.1868.

⁹¹ Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 152.

⁹² Judson *Guardians of the Nation*, 3. See also: King, *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans*.

⁹³ Réfi, *Die Vorgeschichte der institutionellen Mehrsprachigkeit in der kaiserlich-königlichen Armee*. In addition, Habsburg military regulated the soldiers' languages by calling them the regimental languages. On the organization of the War Ministry and the Army before 1867, see: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 1.

⁹⁴ Evans, *Language and State Building*, 3.

diversity was neither only an invention of the constitution nor the result of implementing compulsory military service in 1867, rather resulted from practicality and efficiency of training conscripts who spoke that many languages.

In the first chapter I analyze the army reform, the army language system's legal framework, and the military institutions involved in the implementation. I demonstrate that the constitutional language rights as outlined in Article 19 permitted elasticity in interpreting these rights because subsequent regulations were often vaguely defined. I show that it was often not an easy task to respect the legal framework and act accordingly. Flexible interpretation of the language rules might be the result of misinterpreted or wrongly understood regulations instead of being exclusively an outcome of a particular political or national(ist) standpoint. The second chapter deals with the language rights of the recruits that became most obvious in the so-called regimental or soldiers' languages. Both chapters show that army bureaucrats were aware of the system's shortcomings between 1868 and 1914, but they issued virtually no orders to clarify and explain to army officials of how to adequately implement the conscripts' language rights.

Chapter 1: Army Reform and Military Institutions

We do not like to talk a lot about nationality in the army.

Anonymous author in *Danzers Armeezeitung*, 1899⁹⁵

The *Ausgleich* with Hungary caused that many formerly centralized state responsibilities to be divided between the two halves of the Monarchy. Only three joint ministries remained: the army, foreign affairs, and finance. The new Austrian and Hungarian constitutions both implemented compulsory military service, making a fundamental army reform necessary that resulted in Defense Acts in 1868.⁹⁶ In addition to army reform, this chapter discusses the most important institutions to become involved in the army language system: The War Ministry that oversaw the corps commands, and the military schools, the Office of the Chief of General Staff, and the Military Chancelleries. Although the fundamental language rights demanded numerous institutions and laws to regulate the conscripts' linguistic diversity, this chapter demonstrates that the degree to which they were implemented was limited. Regulations were also vaguely defined, thus opening a variety of possibilities for a flexible interpretation out of other motives such as practicability and efficiency.

The Army Reform of 1867/68

Starting in the early nineteenth century, particularly during the Napoleonic-era, and in the end against modern notions of national belonging, imperial Austrian army bureaucrats updated military service books. These guidelines stipulated that soldiers had to be treated equally, irrespective of the languages they spoke. Following the end of the French occupation of Habsburg lands in 1809, the army stopped mentioning the native languages of officers and soldiers in their personnel files. The same was the case for the soldiers' *natio*,⁹⁷ a term used in administrative records since the Middle Ages, indicating the region from which a person originated. Initially, *natio* was connected to neither language use nor ethnicity.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ N.N., Zum 18. August, *Danzers Armeezeitung*, 17 August 1899, 1.

⁹⁶ RGBl. Nr. 151/1868, Gesetz womit für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder die Art und Weise der Erfüllung der Wehrpflicht geregelt wird, 8 December 1868. The work and the debate on the Austrian and Hungarian Defense Acts are analyzed in detail in chapter 3: Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*.

⁹⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

⁹⁸ On the use and the changing meaning of the term *natio*, see: Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 43-4.

Before 1867, most officers were career officers who usually served in the same regiment during their entire professional life. In these years it was easier for the (usually aristocratic) heads of regiments (*Regimentsinhaber*) to require officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) to learn German to a certain degree, as well as the languages of their subordinates. As a prominent but not isolated example, Archduke Charles, who was an experienced military leader in the early nineteenth century, proposed that all officers should learn a second domestic language (*Landessprache*) in addition to German.⁹⁹ Afterwards, the language education of the officers became more important, although in the cadet schools only classical Latin, French, Italian, Czech, and Hungarian were taught, in addition to German.¹⁰⁰ Officers after 1868 often looked back proudly on these rules; for example, the procurement-officer Joseph Leb emphasized that in a modern Habsburg army, the soldiers' education should be more in focus than the previously applied drilling. Educating the rank and file increased the importance of officers' language abilities that became also apparent in the regulations for other military specialists of officer rank. In the 1850s, Catholic military priests were required to speak not only German, but also one of the other locally used languages.¹⁰¹ The same was required for military physicians.¹⁰²

Officers and NCOs were responsible for the education and training of the rank and file. Already before the army reform, regulations stipulated that at the beginning of the NCO education students should be taught in their native tongues because the army needed for large numbers of NCOs who spoke other languages than German. Only later did the language of instruction change to German.¹⁰³ NCOs were considered being the intermediaries between the officers and the rank and file.¹⁰⁴ In practice "intermediation" often caused officers to use these NCOs as interpreters instead of learning their subordinates' languages. This practice was regularly criticized in the press.¹⁰⁵ As early as 1862, there was anonymous criticism in one of the most important military journals in the Monarchy, *Streffleurs Militrische Zeitschrift*, of

⁹⁹ StA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers, unpublished manuscript, autumn 1933, 7.

¹⁰⁰ Regimental languages were taught in the cadet schools: Wagner, *Die k.(u.)k. Armee: Gliederung und Aufgabenstellung*, 495.

¹⁰¹ Wagner, *Die k.(u.)k. Armee: Gliederung und Aufgabenstellung*, 266.

¹⁰² *Dienst-Reglement fuer die kaiserlich-koenigliche Kavallerie* (1807), 54.

¹⁰³ Wagner, *Die k.(u.)k. Armee: Gliederung und Aufgabenstellung*, 494.

¹⁰⁴ Mikoletzky, *Ernst Wurmbrand*, 84.

¹⁰⁵ See several examples: Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War*, and Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph*.

officers' practice of using NCOs as interpreters for training the rank and file.¹⁰⁶ The author reminded officers not to leave entire lectures to the NCOs but rather to learn the soldiers' languages, and teach them personally. He also reminded the officers that during wartime interpreters would not always be available. He called the officers' lack of ability to speak other languages the most severe shortcoming of the imperial Austrian army, noting "they [the officers] constantly made fools of themselves when speaking a language only in broken form." This appeal was not only addressed to the officers, but also to army bureaucrats. The author emphasized that they should consider officers' existing language abilities, when assigning them to a unit. These officers should then train soldiers of the same language jointly which would enable them to accept their officers more easily, "serving more joyfully," and upon returning home, they would infect their neighborhood and family with their loyalty to the army and the monarch, "as is so often observed with former soldiers from the German provinces."¹⁰⁷ With "German provinces" the author stressed the predominantly German-speaking provinces of the Monarchy, such as Lower and Upper Austria, Styria, Salzburg, and Tyrol.

In addition to authors from among the military, civilian journalists regularly criticized the officers' language abilities. An anonymous author in *Neues Fremden-Blatt* emphasized in January 1867 that upon assignment to a new regiment, officers were expected to learn the soldiers' languages within six weeks. He concluded that virtually no one was able to learn a hitherto unknown foreign language in such a short time, and that many officers did not care about this requirement, as failure to do so did not harm their careers.¹⁰⁸ Regiment owners decided upon their promotion. Only after the army reform of 1868, did officer appointment and promotion become a prerogative of the monarch, based on specified criteria, among them language proficiency.¹⁰⁹

The army reform had become inevitable after the settlement with Hungary, and the promulgation of Austrian and Hungarian constitutions in that same year, both implementing a compulsory military service. The army reform of 1868 considered many of the above-cited authors' suggestions. Many of them were, however, never fully implemented. When army

¹⁰⁶ The military journals are an important source in terms of the officers' mindset, in particular as criticism was often published anonymously. For the impact of military journals, see: Foster, *Military Newspapers and the Habsburg Officers' Ideology after 1868*, 175-95.

¹⁰⁷ D.N., Über die Truppensprachen unserer Armee, *Streffleurs Militärische Zeitschrift* 3, 2 (1862): 365-8, 366-8.

¹⁰⁸ N.N., Kurzmeldung, *Neues Fremden-Blatt*, 21 January 1867, 4.

¹⁰⁹ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 167f. See also: Foster, *Military Newspapers and the Habsburg Officers' Ideology after 1868*, 175-95.

bureaucrats debated the reform, Francis Joseph repeatedly pointed to that the army should ensure his peoples' (*Völker*) unity, meaning almost exclusively the "unity" (*Eintracht*) between Austria and Hungary. The reform debate that followed among army officials focused on their opposition to what a report from the head of Francis Joseph's Military Chancellery Friedrich von Beck-Rzykowsky, called: "the partition of the army."¹¹⁰ Of less importance in this internal debate was unity among the soldiers of various nationalities who were expected to serve jointly in this army. The historian Peter Schweizer has written that only after the reform did army bureaucrats recognize that they should have focused on the future organization of the conscripts' language rights, and the regulations they required, instead of exclusively dealing with the implementation of the reform in Hungary.¹¹¹ However, it was impossible to ignore the claims of the Hungarian politicians.

During the debate on the army reform state representatives from Austria and Hungary met regularly. Both aimed to see their interests respected as much as possible. From the Austrian and imperial point of view all of Hungarian minister president Gyula Andrassy's demands threatened the army's united and supposedly supra-national character. Among them, the exclusive employment of Hungarian officers in regiments recruited from Hungary. There was some confusion among Habsburg bureaucrats about what Andrassy had in mind when he used the phrase, "Hungarian officers." Sometimes these officers were referred to as of "Hungarian nationality;" other times, as being "from the lands of the Hungarian crown."¹¹² The two phrases had different meanings. In Habsburg bureaucratic terminology, the first referred exclusively to native speakers of Hungarian, while the second meant all Hungarian citizens irrespective of their native tongues. Archival sources indicate that imperial bureaucrats did not make a great deal of effort to understand precisely what Andrassy meant, because they considered both unacceptable. In fact, as a result of the 1848-revolution native Hungarian speakers were almost not represented in the Habsburg officer corps in the years following the army reform. Schweizer has written that Beck stressed as the main reason for the lack of interest among middle- and upper-class Hungarians in becoming officers in what was still called an enemy army; thus, officers from other nationalities had to fill these gaps.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 82-3/14, 1868, 27 November 1867. On Beck see: Lackey, *The Rebirth of the Habsburg Army*, as well as: Glaise-Horstenau, *Das Leben des Generalstabschefs Grafen Beck*.

¹¹¹ Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*, unpaginated foreword.

¹¹² ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 71-1/76, 1868, MKSM to Andrassy, 20 July 1868, as well as Andrassy to Francis Joseph, 27 July 1868.

¹¹³ Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*, 114. Wagner, too, stressed the lack of Hungarian speaking officers: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, 42.

Andrássy also demanded that Hungarian should replace German as the sole language of command in joint regiments stationed in and recruited from Hungary.¹¹⁴ The Habsburg authorities rejected this demand, because they believed it threatened the dominance of the German language, and thus would weaken the army's military strength and efficiency. Beck also stressed a third reason for rejecting the demand that was connected to the fact that native Hungarian speakers in the future would constitute only a minority in the bulk of the regiments recruited from Hungary. Beck, like Francis Joseph, was concerned that such concession would immediately result in similar demands from other Hungarian nationalities and would lead to unrest in particular among Serbs and Romanians. To end the debate, Francis Joseph decided that the language issue should be mentioned at all neither in the Defense Acts nor in any regulations referring to it.¹¹⁵

In the end, the future military organization on Hungarian soil dominated the debate aimed at reforming the joint army. Francis Joseph sanctioned the Austrian Defense Act (*Wehrgesetz*) in December 1868 followed by the Hungarian. Beginning in 1869, the language system of the army was reformed, stipulating the three levels of language use in the army: the language of command (*Kommandosprache*) and the bureaucratic language (*Dienstsprache*), both German, as well as the regimental language (*Regimentssprache*) which recognized the conscripts' language rights (to be discussed in chapter 2). In his dissertation, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze der Jahre 1868/69* (1980), Peter Schweizer analyzes the army reform debate among military bureaucrats. He shows meticulously how important the language issue was. The Act referred neither to the conscripts' language rights nor to how to regulate them in the future. The language of command and of internal correspondence among army institutions were mentioned only in a very limited manner. Army bureaucrats did not debate the language rights of the soldiers and the future organization of the regimental languages.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 14-5/3, 1868, Konv. Diskussion um Wehrgesetz.

¹¹⁵ Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 2, 41-9. Wagner cites: ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 82-3/2, 1868, Sitzung in Ofen, Vorsitz Kaiser, Beust, Beck, 18-29 April 1868.

¹¹⁶ ALEX, Reichs-Gesetz-Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich, Gesetz vom 5 Dezember 1868, womit für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder die Art und Weise der Erfüllung der Wehrpflicht geregelt wird, 437-48. There was no mention of the language system in the new Defense Act issued in 1912: ALEX, Reichsgesetzblatt für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, Gesetz vom 5 Juli 1912, betreffend die Einführung eines neuen Wehrgesetzes, 411-37. For the debate in Hungary see: Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*.

Schweizer notes that the military issued no general handbook for the future organization of the language system in the course of the reform or immediately afterward. In this, the army language system paralleled what Urbanitsch has termed the Austrian civil administration's "scarcity of subsequent regulations."¹¹⁷ The army reform, however, necessitated the publication of many new handbooks and guidelines. References to the language system can be found among general educational orders for recruits, curricula for cadet schools, orders dealing with enlistment and officer promotion. The Ministry of War updated these handbooks and guidelines regularly. Over the course of forty years these updates show that language rules changed little, but army bureaucrats saw a necessity in developing them. It is likely that the experience with the language system showed that military officials and lower-level officers applied them inappropriately. Thus, the sections in the numerous handbooks referring to the language system became increasingly detailed and incomprehensible, as demonstrated in detail in the following chapters.

In addition to the language system, the settlement with Hungary, the two constitutions, and the army reform required a reform of the main military institutions. Following the passage of the Defense Acts, a number of army institutions became involved with the execution of the language regulations. Between 1868, the year of the army reform, and 1914, the year of the outbreak of the Great War, the Ministry of War (*Reichskriegsministerium*) and His Majesty's Military Chancellery (*Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät*) were the two most influential military institutions in terms of the implementation and development of the army language system. The chiefs of the general staff, and the army inspectors, as well as the Military Chancellery of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne, were involved to a lesser degree.

In addition to military institutions that organized the Habsburg joint army, other armed forces were set up or reformed in 1867. Among these were the two territorial defenses (in Austria, the k.k. *Landwehr*, in the Kingdom of Hungary, the *Honvédség* and the Croatian *Domobranstvo*, as well as the Navy, the *Kriegsmarine*). In addition to having their own personnel and language rules, the other armed forces were also differently administered. While the Ministry of War in Vienna was responsible for the joint army and the navy, the Austrian Ministry of Defense and the Hungarian Ministry of Defense headed their territorial defenses. For this study these other armed forces are important insofar, as there was a regular exchange of army personnel during peacetime, and during wartime they had to operate jointly. My study

¹¹⁷ Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 64.

focuses mainly on the joint army because of its standard organization across the Monarchy, which affected all recruits irrespective of their citizenship, language use, and nationality, while the others were limited to their territory.

The Defense Act stipulated for the Austrian Territorial Defense the same language system as for the joint army. The language of written communication and commands was German. The languages of the conscripts had to be recognized. Nineteen units were to be monolingual, forty-four bilingual, and one recognized three languages.¹¹⁸ In the *Honvédség*, only Hungarian was used for bureaucratic communication and commands.¹¹⁹ The recruits' languages were not, at least officially, recognized. However, the *Honvédség*-soldiers were as linguistically diverse as in the joint army and the Austrian Territorial Defense. Regiments such as the Budapest *Honvédség* Infantry Regiment No 1, with ninety-one percent Hungarian speakers, were an exception. For example, the Infantry Regiment No 15 which recruited from northwestern Hungary around Trenčín, comprised eighty-five percent Slovak speakers, and only a few among the conscripts of this so-called Hungarian *Honvédség*-regiment spoke Hungarian as their first language.¹²⁰ Following the Hungarian-Croatian settlement (*Nagodba*) in 1869 there were two territorial forces in the Kingdom of Hungary, the *Honvédség* and the *Domobranstvo*. The latter recruited from Croatia-Slavonia and employed Croatian for bureaucratic correspondence and commands. The *Domobranci*, as the soldiers were named, recruits were permitted to speak only Croatian with their superiors.¹²¹ Because most *Domobranci* spoke Croatian and/or Serbian the force was almost monolingual.

In terms of peacetime troop deployment, the Austrian and Hungarian territorial defenses were limited to their territory while the joint army had garrisons and recruited from across the Monarchy, including Bosnia-Herzegovina after 1880.¹²² When in 1886 the Habsburg army deployed forty-seven infantry regiments, eighteen cavalry regiments, six artillery regiments, and some other military service branches in Hungary, the *Honvédség* had twenty-eight infantry regiments and ten hussar regiments.¹²³ In addition to the joint army, the territorial defenses were responsible for training the annually enlisted conscripts. Recruits were assigned to them in increasing numbers. During peacetime some of them served more to provide an

¹¹⁸ Allmayer-Beck, *Die bewaffnete Macht in Staat und Gesellschaft*, 98. See also: Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 24.

¹¹⁹ Allmayer-Beck, *Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte*, 380.

¹²⁰ Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 22-4.

¹²¹ Gumplowicz, *Das österreichische Staatsrecht*, 288.

¹²² Neumayer, and Schmidl, eds., *Des Kaisers Bosniaken*.

¹²³ Horel, *Soldaten zwischen nationalen Fronten*, 179.

administrative framework that could be filled up in case of war.¹²⁴ Archival records indicate that sometimes the respective commanders decided how many recruits were transferred to a territorial defense unit each year, a process which differed throughout the Monarchy.¹²⁵ For example, the 1840 Slavonia-born general staff officer Marko Crljen noted in his autobiographical report that in 1876 he found the *Domobranstvo*-battalion, to which he was newly assigned, existed “on paper only.” He recalled taking over a battalion from his predecessor that consisted only of forty-eight recruits.¹²⁶

Many officers from the Habsburg army regardless of their linguistic background asked to be transferred to the *Honvédség* or *Domobranstvo*. They did so, in part, because a promotion was often possible in a shorter time than in the joint army, as long as they spoke Hungarian or Croatian. After a few years, some of these men returned to the joint army with a higher rank than their comrades of the same age. The Hungarian Territorial Defense simply needed officers to serve for example as much needed instructors for the conscripts’ military education. Not until 1897 were *Honvédség/Domobranstvo* officers educated in an own officer school, the Ludovika Academy in Budapest. There, for purely practical reasons, German and Hungarian were initially the languages of instruction. Many of the applicants and many of the teachers – who were originally enlisted in the joint army – did not speak Hungarian. In later years, this changed, and German was taught together with Croatian as a foreign language, but classes were obligatory for all students. Other languages that the *Honvéd*-conscripts spoke, such as Romanian, Serbian, and Slovak, were not taught.¹²⁷

There was another Habsburg armed force. In contrast to the territorial defenses had less exchange of personnel with the joint army. Like the *Honvédség* and *Domobranstvo*, the navy did not recognize the conscripts’ languages. The main navy ports of the Habsburg Monarchy were Kotor and Pula. For centuries most sailors were native speakers of Italian, but as early as the 1860s, this was no longer the case, although many of them were of Croatian-Dalmatian

¹²⁴ HDA, 1190, Varaždin Infantry Regiment No 16, box 1, Regimentsgeschichte, unpaginated. In the *Honvédség*, in the first stage (from 1870) it was eight weeks of training and a two to three weeks long military manoeuvre in autumn. Following 1896 this changed and every man had to serve for two consecutive years. See: Szurmay, *A Honvédség fejlődésének története*.

¹²⁵ In the territorial defenses the compulsory military service lasted for three years, reduced to two in Hungary 1890, and in Austria 1893. Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 152.

¹²⁶ NSK, R 6151:4, Marko Czerlien, Spuren meiner militärischen Tätigkeit, undated and unpaginated. For his biography see: NSK, R 6151:1, Marko Czerlien, Mein Lebenslauf.

¹²⁷ Horel, *Soldaten zwischen nationalen Fronten*, 116. See also: Allmayer-Beck, *Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte*, 275.

origin and spoke Italian.¹²⁸ As a consequence of the loss of the provinces after 1859 that constituted the Kingdom of Italy, the navy solely recognized German, and no longer Italian, as language of command. As Italian and Croatian speakers constituted the vast majority of sailors and the employees on land-based installations, the so-called ship language (*lingua borda*) was often a mixture of German, Croatian, and Italian. In contrast to the land forces, ships' personnel were never separated by languages. This had a purely practical reason. In addition to ordinary sailors, many specialists were needed who recruited from across the Monarchy, although native Croatian speakers increased, and finally accounted for more than a third of total naval personnel.¹²⁹ An admiral's order of July 1907 even called for the implementation of Croatian instead of German as the official colloquial language on board. Francis Joseph and the Ministry of War never took this claim into consideration.

The Ministry of War, the Corps Commands, and Military Schools

The Ministry of War was responsible for the organization of the joint army, its administration, its jurisdiction, and the deployment of the troops and other military service branches. It consisted of some fifteen departments headed by the *Präsidialbureau*, the ministers' office. All departments from time to time dealt with the language regulations, but most often the personnel department played a role. The heads of the departments often brought contradictory solutions before the minister, who then often decided by consulting Francis Joseph's Military Chancellery. The Minister of War was only responsible to the monarch and the delegations, and decided what to present to the monarch, or how to answer a political query from the parliaments (to be discussed in chapter 6).¹³⁰

¹²⁸ See: Sondhaus, *The naval policy of Austria-Hungary*, as well as: Donko, *Österreichs Kriegsmarine*. Owing to its Venetian history, it was the Italian language and literature that had influenced Dalmatia culturally despite the fact that over ninety per cent of the population spoke a Slavic dialect, Kirchner Reill, *Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice*, 118-9. On the organization of the navy before 1867, see: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 1, 90f.

¹²⁹ Hugelmann, Boehm, *Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich*, 251-252.

¹³⁰ Following the 1867 Settlement, the Ministry of War was named k.k. Imperial Ministry of War (*Reichskriegsministerium*). The term Reich was used to demonstrate its joint character. In 1889, the Ministry was renamed to k.u.k. Imperial Ministry of War (*Reichskriegsministerium*). A u. was added between the ks' in the prefix k.k. to distinguish it from the Austrian k.k. Territorial Defense. In that same year, the joint army, heretofore using the prefix k.k., also got a u. in between (*k.u.k. Heer*). There was another renaming in 1911. The word *Reich* (k.u.k. *Kriegsministerium*) was dropped by considering Hungarian demands. In this study – except for direct quotations – I avoid using these prefixes (k.k., k.u.k., k.u.) by referring to the Ministry of War, or joint/Habsburg army, and Austrian/Hungarian Territorial Defenses. Vogt, *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*, 42. Peball, and Rothenberg, *Der Fall U*, 91. On the organization and duties of the War Ministry before the reform, see: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 1.

All ministers of war were army officers. Following their appointment by Francis Joseph, they usually reached the peaks of their military careers. Between 1868 and 1918 eleven war ministers were appointed. Many held their posts for years. Most were nobles, while others were descendants of high-ranking bureaucratic or military families.¹³¹ Both ministers and many high-ranking ministerial bureaucrats were long-time veterans of the army, but they experienced the army language system differently. Some of them left troop service very early and worked exclusively in offices where they were only required to speak the German army language adequately. Others served for a long time as troop commanders, and therefore were aware of the practical challenges language diversity posed for both the officers and the rank and file. How ministers and military bureaucrats interpreted the language rules often depended on both their language abilities and their social as well as nationality backgrounds, as I will demonstrate in this study. Ministers and their bureaucrats regularly had to decide on requests, complaints, and questions from military institutions, parliaments, and provincial governments across the Monarchy. Answering political queries in the parliaments or during delegation meetings required abilities beyond bureaucratic and military competence. Political-diplomatic abilities were often critical whether parliamentarians were satisfied with an answer (at least for a while) or a conflict escalated. The ministerial archival records indicate, however, that even a multilingual minister with empathy for soldiers' language rights could have failed when serving during times of severe political crisis, while others never got into trouble just because there was no such crisis to resolve (to be discussed in chapter 6).

Beginning in 1882, the War Ministry headed sixteen corps commands. These military-territorial areas did not always follow civil-administrative borders. In ascending numerical order, the corps commands were responsible for the areas surrounding the following cities and towns: Cracow, Vienna, Graz, Budapest, Bratislava, Košice, Timișoara, Prague, Josefov which is today part of Jaroměř, Brno, Lviv, Sibiu, Zagreb, Innsbruck, Sarajevo, and after 1909 Dubrovnik. The commanders of these corps were the highest military authority in these areas, and were responsible for the troop deployment, and for communication with civil authorities.¹³²

¹³¹ Wagner separates his book chapters along the ministers of war: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*. These ministers were: Franz Kuhn von Kuhnenfeld (1868-1874), born 1817 in Prostějov, Moravia; Alexander Freiherr von Koller (1874-1876), born 1813 in Prague; Arthur Maximilian von Bylandt-Rheidt (1876-1888), born 1821 in Vienna; Ferdinand von Bauer (1888-1893) born 1825 in Lviv; Edmund von Krieghammer (1893-1902) born 1832 in Lanžot, Moravia; Heinrich von Pitreich (1902-1906) born 1841 in Ljubljana; Franz Xaver von Schönauich (1906-1911), born 1844 in Vienna; Moritz von Auffenberg (1911/12), born in 1852 in Opava; Alexander von Krobotin (1912-1917), born 1849 in Olomouc; and Rudolf von Stöger-Steiner von Steinstätten (1917-1918), born 1861 in Pernegg, Styria.

¹³² On the organization and duties of the corps commands: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*.

Thus, corps commanders could prove decisive for acceptance of or frictions over the language use among conscripts in the barracks, as well as among civil residents in a garrison town. General Stjepan Sarkotić, who became the commander of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the First World War, asserted that the corps commanders were not only military leaders, but also administrators (*Verwalter*)¹³³ with duties comparable to those of provincial governors.¹³⁴ Corps commanders were responsible for many military bureaucrats who administered sanitation and food supply, and had jurisdiction over all locally employed army members. Based on a corps commander's leadership abilities and language knowledge, his duties enabled him to understand the mood of both his uniformed subordinates and civilians. Sarkotić emphasized that commanders regularly came into close contact with local nationalist debates and therefore "were no greenhorns" (*Neulinge auf diesem Gebiet*).¹³⁵

Corps commanders were required to regularly submit lengthy reports to the Ministry of War. These reports allow a deep insight into the implementation and interpretation of the army language rules across the Monarchy.¹³⁶ My sources reveal that some corps commanders showed flexibility in interpreting the language regulations, making them more suitable for provincial linguistic practices, while some followed their own agendas, depending on their prejudices against particular nationalities. The corps command reports often caused debates among ministerial bureaucrats which resulted in new orders of how to properly implement language rules, or how to react on political queries. In addition, all corps commands regularly published orders directed at all subordinate military institutions in their territory indicating how and when language diversity mattered.¹³⁷ Companies recruiting from a particular Habsburg province were often deployed in another corps command area. Thus, the home commanders had to deal not only with the language composition of their own areas and soldiers, but also with those of others. Both reports and orders of corps commands are a useful source for the organization and implementation of the army language system, as well as shortcomings, thus they are referred to throughout this study.

¹³³ HDA, Sarkotić, box 5, War Diary, 23 September 1918.

¹³⁴ On the role of civil governors for example see: Wullschleger, Running the show in the Adriatic provinces, 129-47.

¹³⁵ HDA, Sarkotić, box 5, War Diary, 23 September 1918.

¹³⁶ Not all reports of all corps commands are preserved in archives. Almost entirely preserved are the records of the 9th Corps Command in the VHA in Prague.

¹³⁷ These orders consisted of the so-called secret orders, for officer use only, and open orders which commanders had to address also to the rank and file. The most comprehensive collection of corps command orders today is preserved in the Austrian State Archives.

The Habsburg army consisted of roughly 300 regiments, and so-called other service branches (*Truppenkörper*). Many regiments had centuries-old traditions that long predated the army reform in 1868. Each regiment had its own regimental day, and regularly celebrated victories in famous battles. The regimental commanders were often decisive for the linguistic training environment of the recruits. Their abilities to assign officers and NCOs in accordance with their language knowledge often influenced the acceptance of or frictions over the language system (to be discussed in chapters 3 and 6). Conscripts' autobiographies indicate that they identified with the corps commands only to very limited degrees. It was the smaller units, battalions, or regiments in which they served that became their so-called military homes. This was the case for officers, to a limited degree, because they changed regiments and battalions quite often. Regiments were often also a strong point of reference for civilian residents. Many civilians were proud of regiments deployed locally (*Hausregiment*), even in cases where the soldiers originated neither from the area nor spoke the local language(s).¹³⁸ For example, the so-called *Deutschmeister*, Infantry Regiment No 4, was the Viennese *Hausregiment*. Although bearing the word *Deutsch* (German) in its name, it comprised a great number of native Czech speakers who resided in and around Vienna. Salzburg was proud of its *Rainer*, Infantry Regiment No 59. Most of the conscripts were recruited from Salzburg, while officers hailed from across the Monarchy, as was standard in the Habsburg army.¹³⁹

The Ministry of War was also responsible for the organization of military schools. These ranged from military preparatory schools for young boys, through cadet schools, to military academies.¹⁴⁰ Schools were located throughout the Monarchy. Christoph Allmayer-Beck has written that the main purpose of these schools was to “form a uniformed type of officer who was committed to the emperor alone.”¹⁴¹ Overall, these schools' purpose was to prepare students for a future army officer career, including teaching the languages that these men might be required to use during the course of their careers. German was the dominant language of instruction in all schools, although there were some exceptions to this rule. Regimental languages were also taught, although not all of them were taught everywhere.

Military preparatory schools for boys were located throughout the Monarchy. An application to one of these schools was not bound to a particular linguistic background,

¹³⁸ Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 40.

¹³⁹ Spitzl, *Die Rainer*, 45.

¹⁴⁰ For a comprehensive overview see: von Poten, *Geschichte des Militär-Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens*.

¹⁴¹ Allmayer-Beck, *Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte*, 275.

respectively nationality. Potential students could apply to a school anywhere in the Monarchy, and they did. The classes were in German, although first-year students were permitted to sit for exams in the language in which they were most fluent. The army's approach was to encourage boys from all nationalities to become officers, and also to ensure that given other excellent abilities, a lack of German knowledge would not threaten an admission. Even students of upper grades were permitted to take their exams in a language other than German, as long as there were committee members who spoke the said languages. An exception was made for candidates who before admission had attended a Hungarian-language school. These boys were always allowed to take the exams in Hungarian.

Seemingly, the right to use one's own language in the admission process was not always guaranteed. For example, Jožef Pogačnik, a member of the parliament from Carniola and delegate of the Croatian-Slovene Club, argued in a 1905 speech that "in some army and navy schools the degree to which applicants were expected to speak German, was so high that only a minority of our applicants pass the exam successfully. Pogačnik emphasized this ignorance of students' rights would result in the army lacking highly requested officers who spoke more than one language fluently. Non-native German speakers would already bring knowledge of another regimental language while "German students" would have to learn them. He ended with the rhetorical question: "What is more important for the army – the missing German knowledge of a fourteen-year-old boy, or the missing regimental language knowledge of an officer in front of the enemy?"¹⁴² Because there were not standardized examinations the application process often depended on the examiners' own language skills and their willingness to support a particular candidate. Indeed, all military preparatory schools enrolled students from a variety of language backgrounds. For example, the annual report of the most renowned military school in the Monarchy, the Academy in Wiener Neustadt in Lower Austria, recorded for the 1913 cohort: 63.2 percent Germans, 16.2 percent Hungarians, 8.0 percent South-Slavs (Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), 6.4 percent Czechoslovaks, 3.7 percent Poles, 1.1 percent Italians, 0.7 percent Romanians, and 0.2 percent Ruthenians.¹⁴³

All students in all types of military schools were expected to learn German fluently which the bulk of them did. Although not mentioned in the school regulations one reason for

¹⁴² ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Pogačnik.

¹⁴³ *Auszüge aus dem Jahresbericht der k. und k. Theresianischen Militärakademie in Wiener Neustadt (1912/13)*, 75-8. There were also two Chinese students.

this might be as the Carniolan parliamentarian Ignac Žitnik, a delegate from the Slovene-Club, complained “that it was forbidden for non-German students to communicate with comrades of the same nationality in their native tongues.”¹⁴⁴ To ensure that all students soon understood the German-language instructions, they were obliged to use only German, when speaking to one another during their first year in school. Deák has argued that this ban on speaking any languages other than German often forced many students to later acquire better knowledge of their native tongues.¹⁴⁵

The military preparatory schools were very popular even among parents without a military background and even among those who did not plan a military career for their sons. Military schools were simply cheaper than other boarding schools. Some families had additional motives for sending their sons to these schools as Jaro Zeman, son of a naval officer, described his schooling in Istrian Pula: “Croatian schools did not exist yet. The children had to attend either Italian- or German-language institutions. The naval school was popular among Croats, because proficiency in German laid the groundwork for a career in the navy or in other state institutions, and the supranational attitude of the Austrian military made denationalization impossible. Moreover, in the Italian community schools, children did not just learn Italian,” but were nationalized.¹⁴⁶ Francis Joseph, himself a polyglot, had a clear point of view on language classes’ purpose in the military schools. He believed that the officers’ language knowledge was the most important tool to win over the hearts and minds of the recruits. In his memoirs, Vienna-born cavalry career officer Willy Elmayer recalled his days as a student in a military preparatory school. In 1897 Francis Joseph visited his school in St. Pölten, in Lower Austria: “The emperor reminded us not only to behave well and become good soldiers. The monarch’s words showed that the old gentleman in his innermost nature was not so unfashionable.” Francis Joseph reminded him and his classmates: “An officer must be an educator first [...] he must know a lot. To educate is not just commanding [...] educate yourselves as well as you can. Above all: learn languages! Languages are the bridges from one person to another.”¹⁴⁷

German was the dominant language of instruction in all schools, but classes were also offered in the other regimental languages. Students could choose freely. An exception was the schools in Eisenstadt, Košice, and Kőszeg, all in Hungary, where students with Hungarian

¹⁴⁴ ALEX/SPAR, 1907, Žitnik, 42276.

¹⁴⁵ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 78f.

¹⁴⁶ Zeman, *Pola, Verlorene Heimat*, 58.

¹⁴⁷ Elmayer, *Vom Sattel zum Tanzparkett*, 22.

citizenship were obliged to learn the Hungarian language. Students from Cisleithanian Austria had the right to choose between learning Czech or Hungarian as second language in addition to German. Following a ministerial decree in 1891, Czech-language instruction was dropped, and Hungarian became obligatory for all students at these three schools for the first and second year, irrespective of the students' citizenship. Hungarian became the educational language for subjects such as history, physics, chemistry, and religion in 1904, as long as at least fifteen students spoke fluent Hungarian. In addition, students were required to enrol in two hours of weekly conversational courses in their native tongue. The privileging of Hungarian over the other languages for Hungarian citizens was not limited to schools in Hungary. At the Technical Military Academy, and the Military Junior Secondary School (*Militärunterrealschule*) in St. Pölten, Hungarian language classes were compulsory for Hungarian citizens, while other students were permitted to choose between Hungarian and Czech.¹⁴⁸ The Hungarian government argued for this prioritization by claiming that, "although these changes severely affect the children of Austrian background, these students are given the opportunity to learn another language, a language some have already basically acquired by being in contact with Hungarian classmates."¹⁴⁹ Autobiographical records, however, indicate that this statement was unproven. Indeed, career officer Theodor von Zeynek recalled one of his native Hungarian-speaking classmates during the first year in a military academy: "On the one hand we had a student named Thorday who initially had only basic German knowledge but by the end of the first year had learned to speak German very well. I learned only a few words in Hungarian."¹⁵⁰

While all of the students appear to have learned to speak German fluently, my analysis of these schools' curricula indicates that the quantity and quality of courses for the other languages differed throughout the Monarchy and over time. What is relevant for this study is that in addition to the German educational language, Hungarian classes were those most often provided, followed by Czech, and Polish. Politicians as well as army bureaucrats repeatedly insisted that more classes should be offered at more places in all regimental languages. These demands most often went unfulfilled. As a result, even young men who later became officers and attended military preparatory schools often did not have the opportunity to apply for courses in all these languages they later needed in their regiments or battalions to train their recruits themselves. Army bureaucrats and politicians regularly debated teaching methods and the

¹⁴⁸ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 14-10/3, Änderungen im Sprachen-Unterricht der Militär-Realschulen, 1 January 1891.

¹⁴⁹ Horel, *Soldaten zwischen nationalen Fronten*, 119.

¹⁵⁰ Broucek, *Theodor Ritter von Zeynek*, 32.

weekly amount of hours used for already offered language classes. The Ministry of War decided it was necessary to focus on speaking instead of grammar knowledge. Additional conversation classes were thus introduced in all schools in 1891.¹⁵¹ The limited amount of language education, attending classes for only one or two hours weekly, did not enable all students to become fluent in a new language. The Plzeň-born general Julius Lustig-Prean von Preanfeld attended a military preparatory school in the 1880s, before the implementation of language conversation classes. He noted in his memoirs that “no one has ever learned an additional language in one of these schools, neither foreign nor regimental: basic grammar, basic pronunciation, but no one learned to speak.”¹⁵² The 1898 curriculum stipulated that in addition to German other languages had to be taught two hours weekly, to enable students to teach their future recruits themselves. The technical academies offered only one hour of language class per week. In the first two years, the teaching methods were a mixture of grammar lessons and translations of parts of the military training regulations (*Exerzier- und Dienstreglement, Adjustierung*). Only in the third and last year was there more emphasis on speaking and understanding.¹⁵³ In addition to pedagogical methods, army bureaucrats stressed the quality of the teachers. Language teachers in the military schools were usually officers who did not themselves learn the languages they taught at universities.

A quantitative analysis of students' language acquisition in these schools is virtually impossible. The Ministry of War never published figures. Only officer personnel files offer insight into language acquisition because they sometimes contain school certificates. When comparing these certificates with the officers' later language proficiency as assessed by their army superiors, it becomes obvious that some students managed to learn a language adequately for use in daily military interaction, but many did not. Some were even given a good mark in school but afterwards were assessed as not speaking a language. For example, Captain Eduard von Handel-Mazetti, born in 1885 in Innsbruck, attended the Technical Military Academy in 1905-6, where he received a second grade in Italian. His superiors assessed him in 1909 as speaking Italian fluently when serving in a regiment which comprised Italian-speaking recruits from Trento.¹⁵⁴ The Bohemian-born career officer Engelmund Kube, on the other hand, learned

¹⁵¹ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 14-10/3, MKSM to RKM, 22 December 1891.

¹⁵² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/5:1, Julius Lustig-Prean von Preanfeld, Aus den Lebenserinnerungen eines alten k.u.k. Offiziers, unpublished manuscript, winter 1940-1, 4.

¹⁵³ *Lehrplan der k.u.k. Militär-Akademien* (1898), 8, and 41.

¹⁵⁴ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Eduard Freiherr von Handel-Mazzetti, born 1885.

Italian in Innsbruck, but his personnel file indicates that he was later assessed as having only basic speaking knowledge.¹⁵⁵

In addition to military preparatory schools, there were cadet schools, which educated men who later became officers. Applicants to these schools had either already attended military preparatory schools but failed to gain a place at a military academy or finished a civil secondary school. These schools were located throughout the Monarchy, in Bratislava, Budapest, Innsbruck, Karlovac, Královo Pole, today a district of Brno, Liebenau, today a district of Graz, Lobzow in the vicinity of Cracow, Lviv, Maribor, Petrovaradin, Prague, Sibiu, Timișoara, Trieste, and Vienna.¹⁵⁶ An application was not linked to citizenship, or a particular nationality. With only a few exceptions, students were allowed to apply from throughout the Monarchy. Applicants were asked to name three schools that they wanted to attend. The army then decided on the basis of existing language knowledge, as well as of the languages the applicants intended to learn.¹⁵⁷ Students and their parents considered some places in the Monarchy as fashionable and/or exclusive. Students of these schools, such as those in the capital, Vienna, came from a broader variety of nationalities, than those located on the periphery. Sopron-born career officer Anton Lehár recalled his days in the Viennese cadet school: “The students hailed from all nationalities. There were even Muslims from Bosnia. There was therefore a love for national peculiarities, while all of them eagerly studied Czech or Hungarian.”¹⁵⁸ Since some schools, like that located in Vienna, were more often requested, it happened that many applicants did not get their school choices and were enrolled elsewhere. For example, career officer Kube later wrote his father that he had been assigned to the cadet school in Innsbruck, although he applied elsewhere. Kube wrote that he assumed that army bureaucrats sent him there because he spoke German.¹⁵⁹

In Cisleithanian Austria, cadet school exams were held in German, while in Hungary they were also held in Hungarian and Croatian. In all schools, regardless of where they were located, students had to have some German knowledge in order to understand the instructions. However, when there was something students could only explain in their native tongues, they

¹⁵⁵ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Engelmund Kube, born 1894.

¹⁵⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/401:15, Engelmund Kube, *Studentenkalender für Mittelschule* (1909), Wien 1908, Verlag Perles, 133.

¹⁵⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/401:7, Engelmund Kube, k.k. Landwehrkadettenschule, *Einteilung der Zöglinge des 1. bis 3. Jahrgangs*, 1 March 1912.

¹⁵⁸ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, vol. 2, 13.

¹⁵⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B 401:17, Engelmund Kube, *Letter to his father*, Vienna, 1912.

were allowed to do so.¹⁶⁰ In one of his satirical short stories published after the dissolution of the Monarchy, career officer and future novelist Colonel Rudolf von Eichthal, born 1877 in Třebová, in Moravia, recalled such an exam during which language diversity played a crucial role. He himself had attended the Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt in the 1890s, and he described the moment when students had to pass the exam. At this time, they were already informed about their future regiment or battalion, and knew which languages they were expected to speak in the near future. The examination contained questions asked in their future regimental language. The examiner for the Czech language was an army veterinarian. His German was bad and barely comprehensible even to the attending native speakers. The examiner asked the student to translate just one sentence meaning that a squirrel is jumping from one tree to the next: “*Eichkutz springt sich von des Baumes eines des Baumes zweiten.*” The student responded in fluent Czech that he was unable to carry out the translation. Another examiner, of higher military rank than the veterinarian stepped in to help out the student, and decided that he had successfully passed as even he, as fluent Czech speaker, would not have been able to provide a translation.¹⁶¹ My archival research shows that not many portraits of these examinations are provided in archives. Thus, this satirical episode, which is certainly exaggerated, is a rare one. It is likely that similar happened across the Monarchy regularly. The episode offers two important points: first, that it was difficult to provide examiners who spoke all necessary languages adequately, and second, that it was often unclear to students what passing a language exam signified.

Army bureaucrats were aware of the shortcomings in language classes, their methods, and the quality of the teachers. In their opinion, the school curriculum was to be sufficient to enable students to learn a language as long as the officers in these schools respected them. Thus, as early as 1872, the Minister of War presented Francis Joseph with a new curriculum for the cadet schools. Language courses were planned to ensure a sufficient number of officers for recruits' education. The local military commands had the opportunity to decide which languages should be taught in the cadet schools located in their area. The choice was to be based on the number of recruits speaking a particular language. The cadets then had to be grouped according to their native tongue. When a language group of soon to become officers did not reach a certain number, they were given the opportunity of deciding themselves which language class they

¹⁶⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/401:15, Engelmund Kube, *Studentenkalender für Mittelschule* (1909), Wien 1908, Verlag Perles, 133-5.

¹⁶¹ Eichthal, *Zapfenstreich*, 68.

preferred to take. The curriculum stipulated that teaching was to focus on learning to speak, instead of grammar knowledge. Army bureaucrats considered three hours weekly to be sufficient. In addition, the Minister of War suggested assigning career officers as teachers, but only temporarily.

Francis Joseph approved all of the suggestions in the Ministry of War's draft from 1872, except for one. He suggested employing professional language teachers instead of temporarily assigned career officers.¹⁶² It does not appear that Francis Joseph's suggestion was realized. Indeed, the anonymous author of an article about the cadet schools in the army journal *Danzers Armeezeitung* insisted in 1899 that officers only needed to teach military subjects, while languages should be taught by civilians who had at least studied a few semesters at a university.¹⁶³ Until 1914, temporarily assigned career officers continued to teach the bulk of the language classes, an obligation they often had to fulfil in addition to their regular work. For example, the career officer Robert Michel, born 1876 in Kutná Hora, taught German for a couple of years in the cadet school in Innsbruck. He had studied neither the German language at university nor pedagogy.¹⁶⁴ Not only did army bureaucrats and army journalists discuss the language curricula and the teaching methods, but members of the parliaments in Vienna and Budapest also often targeted them.¹⁶⁵ My analysis shows that the complaints made in the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments were only in a few cases followed by a serious debate in the Ministry of War on how to improve the system accordingly. However, the internal debate among military bureaucrats demonstrates that these complaints were correct.

We do not know to which languages students spoke, or to what degree, before joining the cadet schools. Their personnel files indicate that some of them apparently managed to learn a language sufficiently, while others failed. As in the military preparatory schools, officers who graduated from cadet schools and learned a language there were in many cases later assessed as not speaking it. For example, career officer Lothar Weindorfer, born in Wolfsberg, in Carinthia, learned Slovene in the Infantry Cadet School in Liebenau-Graz. Following graduation, he was stationed at numerous garrisons among them Celje, Graz, Klagenfurt, Lviv,

¹⁶² ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 14-5/3, MKSM to RKM, 22 November 1872, Ah. Entschließung, 23 November 1872.

¹⁶³ N.N., Militärische Nachrichten. Österreich-Ungarn, Neue Bestimmungen für die Lehrer der Cadettenschulen, *Danzers Armeezeitung*, 1 June 1899, 4.

¹⁶⁴ ÖL/NL Robert Michel, box 125/99, 125/W403, Robert Michel, Mein Weg als Dramatiker, undated manuscript, 12.

¹⁶⁵ See for example: N.N., Die Delegationen, Bericht des k.k. Telegraphenkorrespondenzbureaus, *Wiener Zeitung*, 18 May 1904, 6; and: N.N., Aus den Delegationen. Die Rede des Kriegsministers, *Grazer Tagblatt*, 16 June 1893, 13.

Maribor, Mezzolombardo, Riva, and Trento. Although Weindorfer had earlier been assessed as speaking Slovene, he was now given a deadline to learn it. Apparently, his lack of language abilities did not harm his career because he retired at the rank of captain.¹⁶⁶ Second Lieutenant Robert von Wohlgemuth, born in a small town in Lower Austria, learned Hungarian in the infantry cadet school in Bratislava. When assigned to his first regiment his knowledge of Hungarian was assessed as being sufficient for recruit education.¹⁶⁷ Apparently, many other officers whose language abilities were assessed as sufficient did indeed speak the given language. First Lieutenant Eduard Breitenfeld, born in Požega in Slavonia, got the best mark in Croatian in his certificate from the Infantry Cadet School in Karlovac, in Croatia. After graduation, he was deployed in Croatia, in Bjelovar and Zagreb. His personnel file assessed him from the beginning as fluent in Croatian.¹⁶⁸ In addition to already existing language knowledge, it mattered where a school was located, and which languages local civil residents spoke. Joining the cadet school in Innsbruck without knowing a word of Italian, having classes only two or three hours per week, by not living in an Italian-speaking environment would have needed a great deal of additional ambition, and talent. It is important to consider that many of these young men hardly spoke German when they joined these schools. They therefore had to focus on first reaching a certain level in the army language.

After they graduated from a cadet school, future officers had the right to name two regiments or battalions to which they wanted to be posted. In many cases, they were assigned elsewhere, because most of the cadets named the same places, among them Graz, Prague, and Vienna. For example, General Julius Lustig-Prean von Preanfeld, born in 1871 in Plzeň, wrote in his memoirs that his wishes were not considered. He was sent to the Monarchy's easternmost garrison, Brody in Galicia, although he spoke none of the local languages, Ruthenian and Polish. Only later in his career, in 1897, was he deployed in Graz, which had been his first choice.¹⁶⁹ The military academy graduates were attached to their first regiment or battalion with the ranks of officers (second lieutenants). The cadet school graduates were not in officer rank (*Kadett-Offiziersstellvertreter*) and belonged to the rank and file. However, they were already expected to fulfil officer duties, and were closely involved in the training and education of the rank and file. Those who attended cadet schools had to sign up for at least three years of so-

¹⁶⁶ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Lothar Weindorfer, born 1867.

¹⁶⁷ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Robert Freiherr von Wohlgemuth, born 1887.

¹⁶⁸ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Eduard Breitenfeld, born 1879.

¹⁶⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/5:1, Julius Lustig-Prean von Preanfeld, Aus den Lebenserinnerungen eines alten k.u.k. Offiziers, unpublished manuscript, winter 1940/41, 6.

called troop service.¹⁷⁰ Usually, it took three years before the cadets were promoted into the lowest officer rank that of a second lieutenant.¹⁷¹

The Military Chancelleries and the General Staff

In addition to the Ministry of War, His Majesty's Military Chancellery (*Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät*) played an important role in the implementation of the army language system.¹⁷² Aside from supreme command (*allerhöchster Oberbefehl*) during peacetime, the Chancellery was responsible for all agendas "reserved for the monarch."¹⁷³ These included human resources, including officer appointments, and the sanctioning of orders.¹⁷⁴ In addition, Francis Joseph appointed military inspectors to ensure the correct and consistent implementation of the language rules across the Monarchy. Archduke Albrecht was the sole inspector for all service branches of the army from 1869 to 1895. Afterwards, several high-ranking generals were appointed to regularly assess the training of recruits and the language abilities of their commanding officers.¹⁷⁵ These inspectors had to intervene when officers' language abilities were not assessed or were noted adequately in their personnel files.

The records of the Military Chancellery offer a unique insight into Francis Joseph's opinion on the language system, particularly how and why he made decisions. Many historians and contemporaneous authors, such as General Josef Stürgkh in his memoirs, assert that Francis Joseph's politics "was to let things go."¹⁷⁶ The Chancellery's correspondence indicates however that the general standpoint towards the language system was an intentional tactic that the head of the Chancellery, Beck had proposed to Francis Joseph in 1871. It was to avoid any fundamental decision (*keine prinzipiellen Entscheidungen*), when the language system was criticized and improvements demanded, and to decide only on a case-by-case basis.¹⁷⁷ Both

¹⁷⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/401:15, Engelmund Kube, *Studentenkalender für Mittelschule* (1909), Wien 1908, Verlag Perles, 133.

¹⁷¹ Holler, *Offizier in der alten Armee*, 65.

¹⁷² Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 2, 25f.

¹⁷³ During the constitutional reorganization of the state and the army in July 1867, and taking the *Ausgleich* into account, a renaming took place. From that time onwards, it was called Military Chancellery of His Majesty the Emperor and King. On the history of the Supreme Command, see: Führ, *Das k. u. k. Armeoberkommando*. On the time before the reorganization, see: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 1.

¹⁷⁴ Vogt, *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*, 42.

¹⁷⁵ *Verordnungsblatt für das k.u.k. Heer, Normalverordnungen* (1895), 9. Stück.

¹⁷⁶ Stürgkh, *Politische und Militärische Erinnerungen*, 300.

¹⁷⁷ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 16-1/10, 1871, Beck to Francis Joseph, reflecting on the new statutes of the *Bürgerliches Schützencorps* in Jičín, 11 September 1871, as well as Ah. Entschliebung, 11 September 1871. This tactic endured and was also adopted by subsequent ministers of war: ÖStA/KA/RKM, 2. Abt., 31-3/2, internal note, 4 March 1899.

Francis Joseph and generations of his army officials maintained that principle. In 1899 the Minister of War, Edmund von Krieghammer was still ordering his subordinates to avoid “giving a general statement, and to decide only on a case-by-case basis.”¹⁷⁸ Military archival records indicate that army officials followed this principle until 1914. In the rare cases when a fundamental decision was absolutely inevitable revised regulations were approved, but not executed immediately. Military bureaucrats were ordered to take them up step-by-step (*sukcessives Übergehen*), and to avoid publicity at all cost.¹⁷⁹

Francis Joseph’s Chancellery was called the *Schönbrunn*-party, after his residence. For a short period, there was also a *Belvedere*-circle named after its resident, heir apparent to the throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand.¹⁸⁰ A Military Chancellery (*Militärkanzlei Franz Ferdinand*) was set up for Francis Ferdinand, the heir apparent to the throne, via a resolution from Francis Joseph on March 29, 1898. This Chancellery aimed to introduce Francis Ferdinand slowly but steadily to his future military duties. Thus, an increasing number of responsibilities were transferred from His Majesty’s Military Chancellery to Francis Ferdinand’s Chancellery. Although the Archduke’s office never held decisive power over the language system, the public was increasingly interested in his opinion on the nationality question and the army language system.¹⁸¹ When Francis Joseph acceded to Hungarian demands in 1905 to increase the use of Hungarian in the Habsburg army, Francis Ferdinand sought to uphold the privileged position of the German language, and met with representatives from the German minority in Hungary.¹⁸² Günther Kronenbitter has written that the Archduke and the Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf advocated the same ends, but for different reasons. While Francis Ferdinand advocated “political and tactical reasons”¹⁸³ for language equality in the army (with the exception of German), Conrad argued on the basis of “efficiency.” As Francis Joseph grew older, both officers and journalists carefully oversaw Francis Ferdinand’s opinion on the language system. Deák has concluded on the Archduke’s standpoint: “Passionate hatred of the Magyars, whose language he was unable to speak, because unlike many of the other members of the Habsburg family, he was utterly untalented for languages.”¹⁸⁴ Because Francis Ferdinand had no decisive power, he is only rarely mentioned in this study. When Gavrilo Princip

¹⁷⁸ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 2. Abt., 31-32, Minister of War to 1st Department, 4 March 1899.

¹⁷⁹ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 14-10/3, MKSM to RKM, 22 December 1891.

¹⁸⁰ Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 67.

¹⁸¹ Francis Joseph’s political style was also recognized in foreign countries, such as in Great Britain. See: Otte, *The British “Official Mind” and the Habsburg Monarchy*, 145.

¹⁸² Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 287.

¹⁸³ Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 209.

¹⁸⁴ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 66.

assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 the activities of this Chancellery of course ended abruptly.

In addition to the Ministry of War and the Military Chancelleries, the chiefs of general staff affected the army language system from time to time. They were initially only allowed to report to Francis Joseph via the Minister of War. After 1881, they had the right to report directly to His Majesty's Military Chancellery. When Conrad became Chief of the General Staff in 1906, he finally became a member of the exclusive circle of the Supreme Command (*Allerhöchster Oberbefehl*).¹⁸⁵ The chiefs of general staff oversaw the General Staff Officer Academy (*Kriegsschule*), the Military Geographical Institute (*Militärgeographisches Institut*), and the War Archive. All of them were located in Vienna. Following the army reform in 1868, the duties of the general staff officers increased. In 1914 they were deployed in all military branches, commands, and foreign military missions. The chiefs of general staff intervened in cases where subordinate general staff officers were criticized for not speaking particular languages or where more language knowledge was required of them, as well as in the terms of language education in the General Staff Officer Academy.

¹⁸⁵ On the history of the Supreme Command see: Führ, *Das k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando*.

Chapter 2: The Army Language System

The language system of the army was reformed following the Defense Acts in 1868. Three levels of language use were stipulated in the army: the language of command (*Kommandosprache*), the bureaucratic language (*Dienstsprache*), and the regimental or soldier languages (*Regimentssprachen/Soldatensprachen*). The bureaucratic and command language were often mentioned together, and referred to as army language (*Armeesprache*).¹⁸⁶ The Habsburg army's language of command referred to a set of about eighty orders in German.¹⁸⁷ The bureaucratic language was German, and its usage was required in correspondence among military institutions and with civilian authorities.¹⁸⁸ All official documents, orders, handbooks and forms were published in German. German was also the language officers and NCOs were to use when speaking to one another. The German army language was implemented as a symbol of unity, for reasons of efficiency, and as the Hungarian politician Gyula Andrassy commented in 1903 "the monarch [Francis Joseph] aimed avoiding Babylonian language confusion."¹⁸⁹

Francis Joseph declared in 1868 that instead of drilling mercenaries, a modern army had to "teach" soldiers and "gain their confidence."¹⁹⁰ He maintained this conviction in the coming years, and so did most of his officers. For example, in 1906, someone – most likely a Habsburg officer – published a lengthy article about the purpose of taking the conscripts' languages into consideration in the German-language Budapest daily, *Pester Lloyd*. The author asserted that "modern warfare demands individualized soldier education to enable them to act independently."¹⁹¹ Indeed, modern military training, education, and duty consisted of more than just daily exercises, during which soldiers learned to follow German-language commands.

¹⁸⁶ Von einem k.u.k. Feldmarschall-Lieutenant, Die Kommando- und Dienstsprache, *Pester Lloyd*, 2 March 1906, 2.

¹⁸⁷ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 100.

¹⁸⁸ Only one other contemporaneous state institution employed German as lingua franca: the state railway, which with the exception in Galicia during a mobilization used German for internal and outbound communication and correspondence: Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums (vol. 2)*, 245. German was also the colloquial language (*Umgangssprache*) among officers: Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 40.

¹⁸⁹ N.N., Die Wehrevorlagen in Ungarn, *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*, 6 February 1903, 4. In 1867 this daily was Austria's newspaper with highest circulation, and remained widely read until 1918: Olechowski, *Die Entwicklung des Preßrechts in Österreich bis 1918*, 479.

¹⁹⁰ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 82-3/14, 1868, Sanction of the statute (*Wehr- und Landwehrstatut*), December 1868.

¹⁹¹ N.N., Die Regimentssprache, *Pester Lloyd*, evening number, 2 July 1906, 1.

Army Reforms and the Language System

Following the 1868 army reform, there was a brief attempt to translate all military administrative terms into the soldier languages to ensure the conscripts rights. Army authorities aimed finding proper expressions for administrative and military terms such as back area command (*Etappenstationskommando*) or sanitary unit (*Sanitätstruppe*). The Army General Inspector Archduke Albrecht commented in 1886 on the outcome of this attempt. He emphasized to Francis Joseph that “a mutual understanding was made virtually impossible.” Moreover, he argued, it would be a complete waste of time teaching all these terms to soldiers who did not really need them.¹⁹² Furthermore, especially during wartime, the Archduke continued, it would be absolutely necessary for joint combat denoting place names and military institutions precisely. In his comparative study on European armies, Hermann Vogt commented the initial years after the army reform with “an inefficient addiction to translation.”¹⁹³

In 1886, Minister of War Arthur Maximilian von Bylandt-Rheidt called the still ongoing extensive translational work a “covert attack on the German army language.” It was not until 1886 that a ministerial decree forbade translating the administrative military terms into the other languages.¹⁹⁴ Afterwards, soldiers had not only to memorize command words in German, but also administrative terms. Stone has concluded that the purpose for this requirement was “that a Pole and a Magyar serving the field-gun might know to which parts the other was referring.”¹⁹⁵ His comment reveals that the army bureaucrats did not only forbid the translation of administrative terms, but also these of military items. Translations were majorly narrowed down and – at least officially – the army more often used German. Ministerial records indicate that the expanded use of German was aimed at improving military efficiency and did not stem from German nationalist convictions.

While there was a debate about the translation of administrative terms and military items into the soldier languages, the German command language was beyond debate. It was a set of some eighty military terms and orders in German that every soldier, independent of his native language, had to memorize. The set of terms differed owing to the service branch

¹⁹² ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 21-2/1, Archduke Albrecht to RKM, 24 February 1886.

¹⁹³ Vogt, *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*, 42-3.

¹⁹⁴ Hugelmann/Boehm, *Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich*, 152. The authors refer to the ministerial order from 26 February 1886.

¹⁹⁵ Stone mentioned about 1,000 of these so-called technical terms were in German. Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 100.

(*Waffengattung*). To make teaching these terms easier, manuals were printed for the most part on privately or at the initiative of officers, but with ministerial approval. Manuals were usually meant to serve as a guide for commanding officers and NCOs rather than for recruit use. As a result, most of the books' content was in German, and did not explain the meaning of the commands. The manuals explained how to teach the commands and how soldiers were to memorize them. Often commands were not a single word, but a sequence of words and phrases. The officer commanded and the soldiers had to answer and/or perform. For example, a handbook stipulated that at prayer time, the officer was to command: "*Stellt Euch zum Gebet*" (To Prayer!). The word *Gebet* (prayer) was in bold face. The officer was to stress it. The order "Prayer" was followed by: "*Helm ab, zum schwören!*" (Helmet off! Vow!). Here the words *ab* (off) and *schwören* (swear) were highlighted. The highlighting indicates that soldiers were not expected to memorize the entire sentence or phrase, but only the highlighted words.¹⁹⁶ Other commands were *vorwärts* (advance), or *Feuer* (shoot). Many of these so-called German commands were not of German origin. The use of some French terms, such as *pariren* (fence) and *exerziren* (practice), reflected the historical importance of French as military language.¹⁹⁷ Ernst Bruckmüller has argued that the late nineteenth century was the period of the "language cleansing of foreign words."¹⁹⁸ However, only some of these traditional terms in French were dropped over the years following the army reform in 1868. Thus, the command language did not strictly follow the *Zeitgeist*, and until the First World War still many French terms were used in the army such as *Menage* for ration.¹⁹⁹

Francis Joseph and his military bureaucrats mainly advocated practicality and efficiency as the reason for the use of German as the sole bureaucratic language. German was the only language permitted in correspondence among military branches of the same and different administrative levels, and for the daily reports. Even when an incident in a garrison took place in one of the other languages and no one involved had German as native language, the officer had to write his report in German. There were templates for this.²⁰⁰ Officers learned the required reporting style in the military academies and cadet schools. German was also the language to

¹⁹⁶ *Kommando-Worte aus dem Abrichtungs-Reglement für die k.k. Kavallerie* (1857).

¹⁹⁷ *Kommando-Worte aus dem Abrichtungs-Reglement fuer die k.k. Linien- und Grenz-Infanterie* (1854). See also: *Kommando-Worte aus dem Abrichtungs-Reglement fuer die k.k. Kavallerie* (1857).

¹⁹⁸ Bruckmüller, *Zur Problematik kollektiver Identitätsstiftung*, 40.

¹⁹⁹ During the First World War when France had become an enemy of Austria-Hungary the use of these French terms was forbidden. However, soldiers still used them: HGM/Archivalien, *Kriegstagebücher*, 2004/43/6/3-4, *Kriegstagebuch des Feldwebels Franz Klojpustek*.

²⁰⁰ Bancalari, and Kuderna, *Lehr- und Handbuch für den Unterricht im deutschen Aufsätze militärischen Inhaltes*, 125.

be employed in oral and written communication among officers, NCOs, and military specialists such as clergy, physicians, and auditors during their service hours.

Military archival records indicate that Francis Joseph most likely had efficiency rather than political values in mind when insisting on German as a sole language for commands and army bureaucracy. He and the majority of his officers argued in internal and public correspondence with military necessity, practicality, and efficiency. They sought to ease administration in peacetime, and to ensure successful operations during a war. A joint language of command in the end had to raise the combatants' possibility for survival. I have found no ministerial document in the archives from the times of the Monarchy indicating that the domination of German aimed at demonstrating German superiority over the other languages, or to germanize conscripts as many politicians and journalists have argued (to be discussed in chapter 6). As was the case in the debate over the language of command, there was on-going criticism among politicians over the Germanizing character of the bureaucratic language – not only affecting conscripts, but the army in general. Stone has correctly concluded that this dominating “German element made it difficult for the army to maintain itself as a true supranational force capable of attracting the lesser peoples of the empire,” simply because it appeared German.²⁰¹ The German army language was the reason why the army and its personnel across the Monarchy appeared in public to be of German character. For example, many South-Slavic-speaking residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina referred to Habsburg officers as Schwabians (*Švabas*), because they often heard them speaking to one another in German. The word Schwabian was even employed in cases where the officer had a South-Slavic background.²⁰² In South-Slavic languages the term *Švaba* has a double meaning. It either refers to people from Swabia, civilian German residents who had lived there for centuries, or means cockroaches.

Some German nationalists among military officials, however, publicly asserted that employing German as the language of command aimed at ensuring the German character of the army, and its privileged position of the other – to them – less important languages. Francis Joseph tended to reject such argumentation vehemently throughout his reign. Thus, in 1907 the Chief of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf emphasized that “each recruit, whatever his nationality is, should feel that he has equal rights in the armed forces, and that nothing

²⁰¹ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 101.

²⁰² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, Bd. 2, 22. See also: Bethke, *Einwanderung und Kolonisten im k.u.k. Bosnien-Herzegowina*, 240.

should give rise to an impression that there exists in the army a privileged master race (*Herrenvolk*).”²⁰³ Archival material indicates that it often happened that army officers advocated the German character of the Habsburg military. Thus, even Jaroslav Hašek's character Dauerling in *Good Soldier Švejk* who addressed recruits during training with “you do not even get to the gallows with your Czech. Our supreme warlord is also a German. [...] I also want you all to answer German,” is only partially exaggerated.²⁰⁴

In addition to the language of command and the bureaucratic language, there were the soldier languages which had to be used during military training. Archival records employed different terms for the soldier languages, although they all referred to the conscripts' language rights. Because the bulk of recruits were assigned to an infantry regiment the system was most often called regimental language (*Regimentssprache*). When recruits served in a military service branch that was not in regiment size such as so-called independent battalions the term battalion language (*Bataillonssprache*) was applied. Within a regiment, conscripts of different languages were separately trained at the company level if possible. Thus, the system was also called company language (*Kompaniesprache*).²⁰⁵ In military handbooks, or when officers who were not serving in a multilingual regiment were required to learn a language other than German the term national language (*Nationalsprache*) was used.²⁰⁶ Army bureaucrats employed the term national language also for particular service branches such as the sanitation. In these, not the percentage of speakers determined the language(s) to be recognized, but the Ministry of War made the final decision. Quite often, contemporary witnesses referred to the soldier language (*Soldatensprache* or *Truppsprache*) meaning the language spoken by the recruits.²⁰⁷ Sometimes archival sources employed the term soldier colloquial language (*Umgangssprache*),²⁰⁸ or more specifically referring to the military education the term language of instruction (*Ausbildungssprache*).²⁰⁹ In this study, I am exclusively using the terms, regimental or soldier language, because they are the terms that appear most often in the military archival records.²¹⁰

²⁰³ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 98.

²⁰⁴ Hašek, *Die Abenteuer des braven Soldaten Schwejk*, part 2, 125.

²⁰⁵ Pitreich, *Meine Beziehungen zu den Armeeforderungen Ungarns*, 33.

²⁰⁶ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes, dann Kadetten im k.k. Heere* (1884), 3. Rubrik, Sprachkenntnisse.

²⁰⁷ Allmayer-Beck, *Die bewaffnete Macht in Staat und Gesellschaft*, 98.

²⁰⁸ N.N., Telegramme des Pester Lloyd, *Pester Lloyd*, 28 June 1891, 2.

²⁰⁹ N.N., Aus dem Reichstage, *Pester Lloyd*, 6 February 1907, 9.

²¹⁰ These two terms were also most often employed in archival records that were in other Habsburg languages, such as *ezred nyelv* and *katonák nyelv* in Hungarian.

Annually, the army evaluated the conscripts' language abilities. They became decisive for two reasons. The first was to ascertain how many officers and non-commissioned-officers were needed for training particular languages every autumn when the new cohort of recruits started their military service. Second, the information was published every year in the army yearbook. Although the recruits were exclusively asked for their language abilities, the tables in these statistics presented affiliations to particular nationalities based on their supposed first language.²¹¹ The first army yearbook published after the army reform appeared in 1871, and did not provide any percentages for nationalities of the NCOs and recruits.²¹² This changed in 1876 when the following categories for nationalities were noted: Germans, Magyars, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovenes, Croats, Bulgarians, Romanians, and Italians. Each of them constituted an individual category. Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks were put together in a joint category. There was also a category called "Serbs (including Slavonians and Dalmatians)."²¹³ Indeed, the categories employed in the yearbooks differed from those permitted as categories for regimental languages, perhaps reflecting the difference between possible spoken languages, and recognized nationalities. Until the early 1880s, the above-mentioned categorization remained unaltered in the army yearbooks. In 1886, Slovaks constituted a separate category. The phrase "including Slavonians and Dalmatians" was dropped, and Croats and Serbs noted jointly. This categorization remained the norm up until the First World War.

The army yearbooks distinguished between NCOs, conscripts, and officers. Each group was presented in an own table. A table in the 1894 yearbook listed the officers' possible nationalities: Germans, Hungarian/Magyars, Bohemians/Moravians, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovenes, Croats/Serbs/Serbo-Croats, Bulgarians, Romanians, and Italians.²¹⁴ An analysis of these yearbooks' language/nationality categories shows that bureaucratic classification and assignment methods were inconsistent for both officers and conscripts, and changed regularly over the years. I have found almost no mention in my archival sources about

²¹¹ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-31/1, War Ministry to Austrian Minister President, 18 November 1905, attached: RKM-Erlass, Abt. 1, 27 January 1876, Über die Regimentssprachen. ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 93-2, Comments on the draft, 15 January 1876.

²¹² *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1871*. Kann distinguishes between national groups with independent national history (Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Croats, and Italians), and these without, among them Slovaks, Serbs, Slovenes, Rumanians, and Ruthenians: Kann, *The Multinational Empire*.

²¹³ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1876*. There was no ministerial order clarifying, for example, if only Slavic speakers from Dalmatia had to be categorized as Serbian, or everybody from this province, in particular native Italian speakers. Bulgarian was among the recognized language categories in Hungary: Marác, *Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire*, 275. Most of these Bulgarian speakers lived in the Banat, in Hungary: Belić, and Nomachi, Banat Bulgarian and Bunyev. The authors call the language Banat-Bulgarian.

²¹⁴ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 87-2/1, 1894, List of troop officers (*Offiziere des Soldatenstandes*).

the internal debate. Maybe there was none, or it is not preserved. The Ministry of War added a new table to the army yearbook in the mid-1890s. Now, not only soldiers but also regiments, independent battalions, and other service branches were listed according to the languages used in recruit education, called “national languages” (*Nationalsprachen*). For example, in the 1896 issue the following languages were listed: German, Magyar, Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Italian. Bohemian and Moravian were categorized together, as were Croatian, Serbian, and Serbo-Croatian.²¹⁵ This categorization remained unchanged until the First World War.

The regimental language system based on a fundamental right, but not all conscripts were trained in their languages while fulfilling their compulsory military service. Limitations were imposed from the beginning. As early as 1868, Friedrich von Beck who headed Francis Joseph’s Military Chancellery informed the Minister of War Franz Kuhn that “all the peculiar linguistic conditions of the Monarchy have to be taken into account, but only to an extent as efficient service and an efficient warlike formation of the army require.”²¹⁶ Thus, up until the end of the First World War the army language system was characterized by two main often contradicting aims: they were either argued with military efficiency and practicality, or with the fulfillment of a constitutional right. This dichotomy affected the system’s implementation as efficiency and practicality often required to ignore soldiers’ rights, while taking these rights fully into account would have often resulted in spending much more effort, budget, and personnel on the military training. Archival sources demonstrate that army bureaucrats sought to avoid higher expenses at all cost. However, military officials were also required to avoid a public debate, which increased as soon as the soldiers’ rights were not fully guaranteed. This vicious circle characterized the internal and public debate up until 1914 (to be discussed in chapter 6).

Categorization and Restrictions of the Regimental Language System

Four main restrictions were imposed from the beginning on the conscripts’ right to use their language while fulfilling their military duty. The first restriction of the conscripts’ language rights had a military administrative reason and aimed easing officers’ duties. The bureaucrats of the Ministry of War claimed the main reason for this restriction was “to prevent that the

²¹⁵ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1896*.

²¹⁶ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 71-1/76, Beck to RKM, July 1868.

linguistic requirements posed on officers and NCOs from becoming too extended.”²¹⁷ The greater the number of languages recognized in a regiment, battalion, or service branch, the more officers and NCOs had to be assigned who spoke the various languages. Officers were only required to learn a regimental language up to that rank when they were no longer responsible for training the rank and file. Thus, the rank and file had only the right to use their language when communicating with their superiors lower than the rank of a captain.²¹⁸

The second restriction was that only particular languages were recognized. There had long been linguistic diversity in the Habsburg Monarchy, and many idioms were spoken until the second half of the nineteenth century that both state bureaucrats and linguists later assessed as not being specific languages but rather vernaculars. Thus, only what was officially perceived to be a language in 1867 was granted the right to be recognized as a regimental language. The following language categories were employed for possible regimental languages: “German, Hungarian, Bohemian [Czech], Polish, Ruthenian [Ukrainian], Slovene, Slovak, Croatian, Romanian, and Italian.”²¹⁹ These recognized languages in the army also served to make the basis for a distinct nationality.²²⁰

The military’s third restriction came from Austrian civil bureaucratic practice. Even when a language was recognized as regimental this still did not mean that all conscripts had the right to be trained in their language. Speakers of particular languages had to reach twenty percent in a regiment or battalion for their language to be recognized.²²¹ The twenty percent most often made sense for military practice because the army aimed at assigning speakers to monolingual training units. Most recruits were trained in infantry regiments that often consisted of five battalions, and each battalion of five companies.²²² In service branches such as pioneers or sanitation often no other language than German reached the required twenty percent as the personnel was recruited from across the Monarchy. In these cases, the Ministry of War decided

²¹⁷ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-31/1, Note to the Austrian minister president, 18 November 1905, Annex: Regimentssprachen.

²¹⁸ *Beförderungsvorschrift für die Personen des Soldatenstandes im k. und k. Heere* (1895).

²¹⁹ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes, dann Kadetten im k.k. Heere* (1884), 3. Rubrik, Sprachkenntnisse.

²²⁰ See: Stergar, and Scheer, *Ethnic Boxes*.

²²¹ Stourzh, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten*, 122. See also: Allmayer-Beck, *Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte*, 380. A ministerial decree from 1905 specified more than nineteen percent: ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-31/1, War Ministry to Austrian Minister President, 18 November 1905, Annex: RKM-Erlass, Abt. 1, 27 January 1876 about regimental languages.

²²² HDA, 1190, 16th Varaždin Infantry Regiment, box 2, *Konv. Geschichte*, Bd. II, 1818-1872, 1. Band.

which additional language(s) were to be recognized.²²³

The military employed a fourth restriction from Cisleithanian bureaucratic practice. A language had to be recognized in the soldiers' home province (*landesüblich*). Austrian provincial constitutions (*Landesstatute*) laid out which locally used languages received this status. Which language was *landesüblich* and where had been specified in 1867 and virtually never changed. German was a regional language (*Landessprache*) in much of Cisleithanian Austria: Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Salzburg, Tyrol, Vorarlberg, Trieste, Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Bukovina, and Galicia. German was not a regional language in Dalmatia, Gorizia, and Istria. Czech was a regional language in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, while Polish was a regional language in Galicia, and Silesia, Ruthenian in Galicia and Bukovina, Slovene one in Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Trieste, Gorizia, and Istria, Italian in Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Tyrol, and Dalmatia, Serbo-Croatian in Dalmatia, and Istria, and Romanian in Bukovina.²²⁴ Peter Urbanitsch has asserted that provincial autonomy as stipulated in the Austrian constitutional law resulted in "inconsistent" language rules across Cisleithanian Austria. Laws and regulations were often vaguely defined and left open the possibility of different interpretations. Indeed, provincial courts regularly ruled on language regulations that finally had no effect on the army language system.²²⁵

Austrian conscripts were usually enlisted at the location of their so-called right of residence (*Heimatzuständigkeit*). This right was automatically passed from father to son. To change the right of residence was very difficult until 1896.²²⁶ Afterwards anyone who lived in a community for more than ten years received it automatically. My analysis of recruits' files had demonstrated that in many Habsburg provinces, the majority of them were born and had right of residence in the same province, among them, for example, Salzburg and Galicia.²²⁷ There, the languages conscripts spoke for the most part paralleled the locally recognized. Bearing in mind increasing labor mobility in the second half of the nineteenth century, right of

²²³ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes, dann Kadetten im k.k. Heere* (1884), 689.

²²⁴ Hugelmann/Boehm, *Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich*, 150-51. See also: Brix, *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation*, 60f.

²²⁵ Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 64-5. See also: Brix, *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation*, 46f.

²²⁶ For a detailed overview on the development of right of residency on Habsburg soil, see: Heindl, and Saurer, eds. *Paßwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremden gesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie*.

²²⁷ LAS, Evidenzreferat, Grundbuchblätter, box 37a, 1876, H-K; and: LAS, Evidenzreferat, Grundbuchblätter, box 51, 1880, L-Q; and: TDIAU/OBVO, 780, 3: no. 126, 130, 133, 355, 366, and 370, for 489 rank and file with right of residency in Galicia.

residence sometimes did not correspond to the actual place of residency. Thus, many young men had right of residence in a part of Austria where their native tongues were not *landesüblich*. They then had no right to have military training in their native tongue. This was the case above all in cities where there had been large-scale internal migration from other-speaking areas, including Vienna, Trieste, and Graz. The imperial capital, for example, was part of Lower Austria, where solely German was *landesüblich*. During the nineteenth century Czech and German speakers from Bohemia and Moravia migrated to Vienna en masse for labor work.²²⁸ As a result, even when Czech speakers reached the twenty percent in a regiment that recruited from Lower Austria, their language was not recognized (to be discussed in the next subchapter).²²⁹ Military records I have examined indicate that the case of the Czechs in Lower Austria was exceptional as no other place in Austria had such a large number of migrants who spoke a language other than a recognized in the respective province.

There was also mass internal migration to Budapest throughout the late nineteenth century.²³⁰ Because there was no *landesüblich*-system in Hungary, the actual linguistic percentages were more often reflected in the army than in Austria. The Hungarian civil administration had a set of recognized language categories. For example, in the 1910 census residents of Hungary were noted to speak German, Slovak, Romanian, Ruthenian, Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, Bunjev, Czech, Polish, Rome, and Italian.²³¹ The annual army statistic showed all army branches that recognized one, two, or three languages. Regiments and battalions that recruited from Hungary more often tended to recognize more locally spoken languages.²³² The Habsburg army recognized the languages of all Hungarian conscripts as long as they were among the categories of possible regimental languages, and their speakers reached twenty percent within a regiment or battalion. Thus, the regiments and battalions that recruited from Hungary more tended to reflect the actual linguistic composition of conscripts than did those that recruited from Cisleithanian Austria. In the Kingdom of Hungary two more languages became possible regimental languages, Hungarian and Slovak, which were nowhere *landesüblich* in Austria. Thus, from the above-mentioned categories employed in the Hungarian

²²⁸ Zahra, Roma, Migration Panics, and Internment in the Habsburg Empire, 715-6. Steidl, Wanderungsmuster nach Wien, 379f. The statistical yearbook from Vienna from 1883 demonstrates that beside Vienna (127,909), the second most often birth-places of male residents were Bohemia (54,688), followed by Lower Austria by excluding Vienna (45,011), and Moravia (34,830): *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien* (1883), 20.

²²⁹ In contrast to schooling in Lower Austria, archival records indicate that there was no serious debate to recognize Czech as second language in regiments: Burger, Sprachen und Sprachenpolitiken. Niederösterreich und die Bukovina im Vergleich, 125f.

²³⁰ John, Vielfalt und Heterogenität, 52f.

²³¹ Marácz, Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 275.

²³² *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1910*, 192-4.

census only Bunjev and Roma were never recognized in the Habsburg army. In Bosnia-Herzegovina compulsory military service was implemented in the early 1880s, and the army employed four language categories for conscripts: Croatian/Serbian/Serbo-Croatian, and German.

Classification Methods

The army imposed a set of restrictions from the very beginning. However, more than only these restrictions became decisive if a regiment or battalion recognized another language, and conscripts were allowed to be trained in their native language. In particular, the classification methods and how to count conscripts who spoke more than one language influenced the army language system. The army noted the language(s) conscripts' spoke in their personnel files. In addition to implement restrictions, the army bureaucrats issued orders of how to categorize recruits, in particular, when someone spoke more than one language which was the case for many Habsburg regions. Army officials who recorded recruits' language knowledge in their personnel files had to list them in a particular order. This started with German, followed by Hungarian, Croatian, Bohemian (Czech), Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Slovak, Serbian, Romanian, and Italian.²³³ The Ministry of War required until 1904 that only the alleged native tongue of the recruits, the "*Umgangssprache (Nationalität)*," be counted for the regimental language and the annual army statistics. Following years of Hungarian political pressure aimed at increasing the percentage of Hungarian speakers and the use of Hungarian in the joint army, after 1904 the Ministry of War ordered to take into account all language abilities listed in the personnel files which meant that speakers of two or more languages were counted more than once in the army yearbook.²³⁴ This practice resulted in an increase in languages that were most often spoken as second languages across the Monarchy such as German, Hungarian, and Polish. At the same time, the Ministry of War ordered army officials to ask recruits about their language/nationality (*Umgangssprache/Nationalität*),²³⁵ or mother tongue (*Muttersprache*).²³⁶ In an internal report to Francis Joseph, the Minister of War explained in 1905 that this was already the practice when assigning recruits to training units, although not when reporting the overall language knowledge of the recruits every year (I provide examples of how these two

²³³ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes, dann Kadetten im k.k. Heere* (1884), 3. Rubrik, Sprachkenntnisse.

²³⁴ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-31/1, 1905, War Ministry to Austrian Minister President, 18 November 1905, Annex: Regimentssprachen. See also: ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 33-1/75, 14 July 1906.

²³⁵ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 9-2/2, 1905.

²³⁶ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 33-1/75, 14 July 1906.

classification rules influenced percentages in training units and in statistics below).²³⁷ In the course of the passing of new regulations in 1904/1905 the Ministry of War informed all subordinate army offices of the language categories to be employed from that point in the personnel files and the annual reports: “German, Hungarian (Magyar), Bohemian, Slovak, Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Croatian/Serbian/Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Italian-Ladin.”²³⁸

The military asked recruits, what languages they spoke during the enlistment process. Recruits’ language abilities were first noted in the enlistment protocols (*Assent-Protokolle*), then in their personnel files (*Grundbuchblätter*), distinguishing between writing and speaking abilities. Conscripts’ military personnel files were not centralized at the Ministry of War in Vienna, but maintained in military institutions across the Monarchy.²³⁹ All of the languages a recruit spoke were listed, although *all* often meant only those languages a conscript mentioned, or those army officials noted. The army needed this information for two reasons in terms of the obligatory military service. The first was to ascertain if a language reached the twenty percent to be recognized. Second, the information was needed to know how many officers and NCOs were needed every autumn when the new cohort of recruits started their training.²⁴⁰ Third, the results were published annually in the army yearbook.

Those recruits listed as speaking only one language were for the most part easily classified. There were many Habsburg regions where the overwhelmingly majority of conscripts tended to be monolingual throughout my period of investigation. I have taken examples from two boxes containing information on recruits from Salzburg born in 1867 and

²³⁷ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 9-2/2, 1905.

²³⁸ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Abt. 2, 49-3/3, 1904.

²³⁹ The dissolution of the Monarchy in 1918 caused the relocation of the personnel files often more than once. Many files were lost, while others grouped in a different order. Today, these files are not organized according to regiment, so this analysis can only offer a rough insight into the language abilities of recruits in a particular year. In Austria they are divided by province (*Bundesland*) and can be found in the Austrian State Archives in Vienna, except for Salzburg and Tyrol. In the Tyrolian provincial archive in Innsbruck, an Italian archival delegation took all of the files of men whom they considered Italians. These files are now housed in the Trento Archive. The files for the majority of soldiers from the Kingdom of Hungary have been lost. One exception is Burgenland, which was annexed to Austria in 1921, and some regions of Slovakia that are in the military archive in Prague. Files for soldiers from Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and Austrian-Silesia are organized alphabetically according to their year of birth. There are also files in Trieste for recruits from this province, and in Lviv for soldiers from Galicia (containing also some files for recruits from Bukovina and Silesia). The files of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian soldiers are no longer available. A few files for Croatia and Dalmatia can be found in the Croatian State Archive in Zagreb.

²⁴⁰ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-31/1, War Ministry to Austrian Minister President, 18 November 1905, Annex: RKM-Erlass, Abt. 1, 27 January 1876 about the regimental languages. ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 93-2, Internal notes on the draft from the 1st and 2nd Department, 15 January 1876.

1880. The first example shows 278 solely German-speakers faced by only one who spoke two languages, and one who spoke three.²⁴¹ The second example shows 254 solely German-speaking recruits, and five who spoke two languages.²⁴² The personnel files from Salzburg where only one language was *landesüblich*, German, demonstrate that there was no increase in bilingual conscripts, and that in such provinces language categorization as well as classification methods would not become decisive for changing language percentages in regiments and battalions.

Army officials had more opportunity to flexibly interpret and count in provinces where a large number of conscripts spoke more than one language, and more than one language was locally recognized (*landesüblich*), thus changing the official linguistic composition of a unit and statistical data. Conscripts' personnel files indicate that sometimes army officials sought to highlight the language that they assumed was the conscript's mother tongue. Some army officials underlined one language, while others intentionally ignored the requested sequence to highlight the mother tongue. They aimed at easing the work for their compads who wrote the annual report and requested the officers who spoke particular languages to train the next cohort of recruits. When I began my research, I assumed that army officials either did not know or ignored the language rules. I became convinced that most of them probably ignored the sequence, because they aimed at easing the categorization of the bi- and multilingual conscripts. We do not know if this highlighting took place, because a recruit mentioned the language as his first, or if the army official decided on his own. It is virtually impossible to trace how often mistakes occurred, or which motives were dominant in designating a first language. The Ministry of War regularly addressed notes to the Corps Commands – which they forwarded to all subordinate military offices in their territory – indicating that the data in the personnel files often appeared not to reflect the actual mother tongues, thus nationalities to which the recruits belonged to.²⁴³

My analysis reveals that army officials when categorizing bi- or multilingual recruits to particular native tongues often favored German over other language abilities. Military archival records I have examined indicate that the most common motive for a preference of the German language over other languages was convenience because there were always sufficient numbers

²⁴¹ LAS, Evidenzreferat, Grundbuchblätter, box 37a, 1876, H-K.

²⁴² LAS, Evidenzreferat, Grundbuchblätter, box 51, 1880, L-Q.

²⁴³ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 43, 30 June 1899.

of German-speaking military personnel available to train the recruits. Norman Stone has also observed that “the use of the German language remained largely a matter of convenience rather than prejudice.”²⁴⁴ Military records from my period investigation, however, indicate that the practice of favoring German over other languages also appeared of nationalist motives to uphold a regiment’s alleged historic German character, or to demonstrate German superiority. Ministerial archival records show that at least officially both Francis Joseph and his ministerial bureaucrats did not welcome such nationalist reasons for flexible interpretations of the language rules, but in many cases, misconduct was not punished. It might have been possible that army officials tended to ignore such manipulative practices to avoid a public debate in the parliaments and the press.

My analysis of some rank and file personnel files shows how it was possible to change (or in some cases, perhaps, manipulate) nationality statistics and the linguistic composition of training units, thus, ignoring the conscripts’ language rights and the army’s own language rules. Personnel files reflect language abilities usually by the end of a recruit’s military service. We do not know which languages recruits learned after they joined the military. It is thus virtually impossible to trace the classification methods in the corps commands and regiments at a particular moment in time. However, it is possible to analyze how many soldiers spoke one or more languages, how their language knowledge changed over time owing to the changing educational system, and which categories were employed for languages. The information in these files also provides insight into possible methods of classification and categorization which determined the officially recognized languages in a particular regiment or battalion, and the annual nationality statistics.²⁴⁵ Below, I analyze examples from various regions of Austria and Hungary, in particular these where more than one language was spoken, and demonstrate the various results that can be achieved when different classification methods are applied.

In my first example of recruit personnel files, I analyze two Austrian provinces, Bohemia and Moravia, where two languages, Czech and German, had the status of *landesüblich* and could therefore be given the status of a regimental language. Surviving personnel files for recruits from Bohemia and Moravia are housed in Prague’s Military Archive. They are organized by birth years in alphabetical order. I analyze here four sample boxes from recruits

²⁴⁴ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 100.

²⁴⁵ For this study I recognized only Habsburg domestic languages, and not the so-called foreign languages. Among the most often noted were Russian, English, and French.

who were born in 1874, 1880, 1884, and 1885. They contain the files for 337 recruits. There are files for 114 men who were reported to be fluent only in German, and 132 who were listed as fluent only in Czech. In ninety-one cases, soldiers spoke both German and Czech.²⁴⁶ I do not take here into account the other languages noted in these files.

Before 1904/5 the army bureaucrats could have designated 205 recruits as native speakers of German, and 132 recruits as native speakers of Czech, if they designated all those who were listed as bilingual as native German speakers. This would mean some sixty percent to be categorized as of German, and forty percent of Czech nationality. The army officials could also have designated all of those who were bilingual as native Czech speakers. The result would have been 114 Germans (thirty-three percent), and 223 Czechs (sixty-seven percent). Under the new regulations adopted in 1904/1905 – to count all languages – the result would have been 205 Germans (forty-five percent), and 246 Czechs (fifty-four). There is an increase in the percentage of these recruits categorized as German who previously made up only thirty-three percent, and now an almost equal number with these of Czech nationality. In this sample, both languages irrespective of the classification method reached the required twenty percent needed to be recognized as regimental language, before and after the 1904/1905-regulations were decreed. However, there were many places in Bohemia and Moravia where the classification method could have become decisive as one language-group or the other did not reach the twenty percent necessary for recognition as a regimental language.

Galicia is another useful example for a multilingual Habsburg province in which the classification method could have become decisive for the recognition of regimental languages. I analyze a sample from the Ukrainian State Archive in Lviv of six boxes more closely that contains information on 489 conscripts born between 1868 and 1898. These men had the right of residency in Galicia.²⁴⁷ All boxes demonstrate that most of rank and file spoke more than one language, for the most part Ruthenian, Polish, and German are noted. The few examples where soldiers spoke other Habsburg languages were mostly these who were not born in this province but received residency there later. The overwhelming bulk of the rank and file who were noted to speak German were of Jewish faith, respectively, almost all Jews were noted to speak German. Yet, we do not know if they spoke standard German or more likely their

²⁴⁶ VHA/KL, box 69 (1880, surnames begin with Dolezal through Don), box 427 (1884, Tyl-Ulb), box 315 (1874, Ma), box 397 (1885, Uh-Ulman).

²⁴⁷ The Lviv-collection also contains some rank and file with right of residency in Silesia, and Bukovina.

Yiddish idiom. Thus, army bureaucrats noted Yiddish as German, and Jews from Galicia ended up in the army statistics as of German nationality.

One of my sample boxes contains information on ninety-eight conscripts. Most had been born in 1868, and their surnames started with Jabloner through Jurwoce. Seventeen spoke German and Polish, thirty-one spoke Polish, and Ruthenian. There were four who spoke German, Polish, and Ruthenian. Fifteen were noted to speak solely Ruthenian, twenty-seven solely Polish.²⁴⁸ Classification was easier in Galicia, as in contrast to Bohemia, where most rank and file were Roman-Catholics regardless if they spoke solely German or Czech. In Galicia, faith might have been an indicator to count someone as of Polish or Ruthenian nationality. My sample shows that almost all Roman-Catholics were noted to speak Polish, while almost all Greek-Catholics spoke Ruthenian.

The more languages were spoken in a province, the more variations for deciding how to designate speakers to a particular native language were possible. For example, in Western Hungary, which in 1921 became part of Austria as Burgenland, three languages were spoken that the army recognized as possible regimental languages. In Hungary all languages recognized as regimental languages spoken by conscripts had to be recognized as long as they reached twenty percent. Employing samples from two different birth years, I also show how the Hungarian government's policy of Magyarization, meaning more and more schools used Hungarian as language of instruction, changed which languages citizens spoke. I begin with 1872, a generation who went to primary school at the beginning of Magyarization, and was primarily enlisted in the 1890s.²⁴⁹ The second example I analyze is the birth years 1897 through 1900.²⁵⁰ This period marks the peak of Magyarization.²⁵¹ These recruits enlisted in the final year of the First World War.

The first sample box from 1872 contained a total of 239 recruits. Among them were 153 men who spoke German, thirty-eight who spoke German, and Hungarian, twenty-three men who spoke German, and Croatian, and eighteen spoke German, Hungarian, and Croatian. There

²⁴⁸ TDIAU/OBVO, 780, 3, 366, Jabloner to Jurwoce. A rest of four spoke each solely Romanian, German/Ruthenian, German/Hungarian, and German/Hungarian/Polish.

²⁴⁹ ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, box 5775, 1872, Burgenland, surnames begin with A through Z.

²⁵⁰ ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, box 5804, 1897 through 1900, Burgenland, surnames begin with W through Z.

²⁵¹ Even during the peak of Magyarization large numbers of Hungarian citizens did not attend schools in the state language. However, between 1890 and 1914, a growing number of citizens either identified with a Hungarian nationality, or spoke the language: Zsuppán, *Die politische Szene Ungarns*, 115.

were only two recruits who spoke Hungarian and German/Slavic, while one each spoke German, Hungarian, and Slovak, German, and Czech, and German, Hungarian, Serbian, and Romanian. Employing the pre-1905 designation method, when only the supposedly first language was counted, army officials already had more than one option for classification. For example, if the officer who edited the annual report for the Ministry of War at the local level exclusively prioritized German over Hungarian, and Croatian over Hungarian, the recruits would have been categorized: 214 Germans (89.53 percent), twenty-three Croats (9.62 percent), and two Hungarians (0.84 percent). These numbers would have meant that a regiment whose recruits hailed from Western Hungary would have had only one regimental language, German. Conversely, army bureaucrats might have prioritized Hungarian speakers over German and Croatian speakers, although that seems unlikely. In that case the number of Hungarian speakers would have increased. Ministerial and autobiographical archival material indicate that many army officials opposed Magyarization, thus they tended to recognize other languages soldiers spoke before taking the Hungarian language into account. The Burgenland example demonstrates that the recruits might have been categorized as: 153 Germans (64.01 percent), sixty Magyars (25.10 percent), twenty-four Croatians (10.04 percent), and one Czech. Employing this method the same regiment would have been bilingual, employing German and Hungarian, and not only German.

Following the army reform in 1868, Hungarian politicians regularly sought to increase the use of Hungarian in the joint army. In 1904, the Hungarian Minister President István Tisza insisted that Hungarian replace German as the army's bureaucratic language for regiments recruiting from the Kingdom of Hungary. Francis Joseph resisted his demand.²⁵² While Francis Joseph also rejected the implementation of Hungarian as language of command in 1905, he acceded to what was then called the special or expanded regimental language (*besondere* or *erweiterte Regimentssprache*).²⁵³ Norman Stone has concluded that the Hungarian demand for the extended regimental language aimed at extending Magyarization efforts on to the so-called last remaining German bastion in Hungary: the joint army.²⁵⁴ The Hungarian political interest behind the changed classification method was the hope that Magyarization and school education had reached a point where almost all Hungarian citizens spoke the state language.

²⁵² N.N., Ungarn. Ministerieller Plan wegen der magyarischen Regimentssprache, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1905, 210.

²⁵³ Anton Chroust, Die österreichische Frage III, *Hochland* 16, 2, 1919, 178.

²⁵⁴ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 104.

Hungarian citizens irrespective of their native languages who at least spoke limited Hungarian, had to take their military training in Hungarian. In 1904, Albert Apponyi, a Hungarian parliamentary delegate who had opposed the *Ausgleich*, and became Minister of Education in 1906, that the expanded regimental language would soon prove to be far more effective than a Hungarian language of command could have ever been, because “the latter is simply a mechanical memorizing of a lot of terms.”²⁵⁵ The parliamentary delegate Franz Stein in 1905 emphasized in the Hungarian parliament that their demands were successful as the War Ministry confirmed that in the future regiments had to count no longer the native-speakers to determine the recognized languages rather count these who spoke Hungarian. Stein concluded with: “Thus, the regimental language system will become the most suitable tool for Magyarization.”²⁵⁶ Stone has concluded that “the emperor viewed this programme [of expanding the use of Hungarian in the army] with sympathy, thus showing that he preferred to sacrifice Slovaks and Romanians to denationalization instead of breaking his alliance with the Magyar gentry.”²⁵⁷

Indeed, the new classification method resulted in an increase in Hungarian-speaking conscripts. Samuel Uhercsik who was born in 1884 in a suburb of Bratislava exemplifies what the new counting method meant for the rank and file. He was listed as speaking German, Hungarian, and Slovak in his personnel file. Following the pre-1904 designation method, an army official would have decided his first language and therefore his nationality. Under the new system, officials had to count all three languages for statistical purposes, but Uhercsik would have been put into a Hungarian-language training unit.²⁵⁸ Of the earlier cohort for Burgenland mentioned above 25.1 percent spoke Hungarian, the second sample shows 39.8 percent. This is an increase in about fourteen percent. It appears that General Maximilian Csicseric was correct when he wrote in a diary entry that “despite intense Magyarization effort, often not without violence, soldiers still spoke only to a limited extent Hungarian.”²⁵⁹ At least in my example for Western Hungary, the process of Magyarization is not very visible in the soldier files. The following examples that I analyze show the categorization of western Hungarian recruits after 1904/05, following the enactment of the new classification method. The example I analysed

²⁵⁵ N.N., Ungarisches Abgeordnetenhaus, Die ungarische Kommandosprache, Redner: Tisza, *Grazer Volksblatt*, 4 March 1904, 3. For the so-called Lex Apponyi, see: Marácz, Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 269-98.

²⁵⁶ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Stein, 31263.

²⁵⁷ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 105.

²⁵⁸ VHA/KL, Samuel Uhercsik, born 1884.

²⁵⁹ Eder, *Der General der k.u.k. Armee und geheime Rat Maximilian Csicseric*, 194.

above now totaled 341 recruits, in contrast to 239 before 1904, because from now on, recruits who spoke more than one language were counted more than once. The nationality categorization of recruits was: 236 Germans (69.20 percent), sixty Hungarians (17.59 percent), forty-one Croats (12.02 percent), and one each Czech, Romanian, Serb, and Slovak. The 1905-regulations, at least in my example for Western Hungary, resulted in an increase in languages other than Hungarian.

Following the implementation of the 1905-classification method percentages of languages that were recognized in the army changed throughout the Monarchy. In November 1905, the Ministry of War presented a statistic about recognized languages in the army's regiments and battalions. From among fifty-five regiments recruiting from Austria, in twelve one more language had to be recognized for training. Two regiments from Bohemia in which German had previously been the sole regimental language became bilingual, Czech and German. There were two regiments in which the Slovene language had to be recognized. Five regiments that formerly recognized only Ruthenian as a regimental language now recognized both Ruthenian and Polish, while three in which solely Polish had been the regimental language now also recognized Ruthenian. Excluding the six from Croatia-Slavonia, among forty-one regiments in Hungary, three regiments now also recognized Hungarian, three, Croatian/Serbian, two, Romanian, and one, Ruthenian. One regiment from Hungary now no longer had Slovak as regimental language.²⁶⁰ For example, in 1903 twenty-five regiments had a majority of Hungarian speakers. Three years later, after the implementation of the expanded regimental language system, there remained only four regiments in which Hungarian was not recognized, because less than one fifth of the rank and file were able to speak at least basic Hungarian.²⁶¹ Although Hungarian politicians aimed at increasing the percentages of Hungarian speakers, thus, an increase in regiments which recognized Hungarian, this did not always result in that conscripts from Hungary were trained in that language. The reason was purely practical. The expanded regimental language system meant that army commanders had a greater need for Hungarian-speaking personnel. The reserve officer Robert Nowak referred to the practical challenges the expanded regimental language system posed in his undated memoirs: "There

²⁶⁰ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-31/1, War Ministry to Austrian Minister President, 18 November 1905, Annex: Regimentssprachen. See also: ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 9-2/2, 1905.

²⁶¹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

were not nearly enough Hungarian-speaking officers and NCOs available from one year to the next.”²⁶²

The annual military handbook for 1910 for all regiments, battalions, and other service branches show that 130 recognized one regimental language, most often German and Hungarian, 145, two languages, most often German/Czech, German/Hungarian, and Polish/Ruthenian, while nineteen recognized three regimental languages. The regiments which recognized three or even more regimental languages were among others the Infantry Regiment No 66 which recruited from around Hungarian Uzhorod, where recruits spoke Hungarian, Slovak, and Ruthenian, the Infantry Regiment No 72 which recruited from around Bratislava, where recruits spoke German, Hungarian, and Slovak, Infantry Regiment No 85 which recruited from Maramureş, where recruits spoke Hungarian, Ruthenian, Romanian, and Infantry Regiment No 100 which recruited from Silesian Cieszyn/Český Těšín, where recruits spoke German, Czech, and Polish. More than only infantry regiments, also many other service branches recognized three languages such as the Pioneer Battalion No 9 which was located in Melk, in Lower Austria, and recognized German, Czech, and Polish.²⁶³ The numbers present in the yearbook demonstrate that it was more likely that units recruiting from Hungary tended to recognize more than one language. This certainly resulted from the fact that the *landesüblich*-restriction was not employed in Hungary, but all languages conscripts spoke had to be recognized.

Many conscripts were aware of the language categories, the sequence noted down in their personnel files, as well as the classification methods. Their military identity passes contained the same information.²⁶⁴ Thus, in addition to the classification methods that army officials employed, also the languages recruits mentioned during enlistment could have become decisive if languages were recognized. Archival sources indicate that many, particularly these recruits who spoke more than one language, were able to outwit the system because they might not mention all of the languages they spoke. However, so far, I have found neither any autobiographical record that a conscript wrote about such an intention nor that army bureaucrats suspected recruits to withhold a particular language. Thus, examples for a manipulation on

²⁶² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

²⁶³ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1910*, 192-4.

²⁶⁴ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 2. Abt., 12-13, 15th Corps Command to Ministry of War, 4 December 1902. See also: ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-29/3, Petitionen mährischer Gemeinden um Einführung der böhmischen Dienstsprache, 1905.

behalf of recruits can only be traced second hand through their personnel files. For example, the personnel files for Bohemia and Moravia indicate that there were many educated and workers among conscripts whose job required the knowledge of German. However, many of their personnel files only noted Czech. In many cases, army bureaucrats later added German which indicates that the recruits during enlistment probably refused to mention it.²⁶⁵ We also do not know if these recruits learned German during their military service or if army officials discovered that these recruits had failed to list all of their language abilities, or if someone failed to note it during the enlistment process. It is likely that some recruits did so, because they wanted to avoid being put into a wrong language training unit, while others did so, based on nationalist reasons to strengthen their languages' and nationalities' percentages in the Habsburg army. There were also these who preferred one over another language out of private motives such as being trained together with villagers whom they knew and stemmed from a different mother tongue.²⁶⁶ Others may have simply wanted to be put into another language training unit to learn another language (to be discussed in chapter 3). However, it is a source unrelated to the army classification method that indicates the army bureaucrats' awareness: In orders referring to soldiers who aided in the civil census taking in 1910-census in Austria. Recruits went from house to house by collecting information on local residents, thus, the Ministry of War informed all corps commands "that it has to be looked upon that an unbiased and correct answering of the questions in the forms takes place [...] in particular that the information given by the citizens about their language of daily use and mother tongue, moreover, proceed with the utmost conscientiousness and strictly avoid any influence whatsoever."²⁶⁷

I assume that in some cases, in particular in Hungary and Galicia, recruits refused to list all of the languages they spoke, because they wanted to avoid to be categorized as Hungarians or Poles. As army bureaucrats had already feared in 1868, this concession caused demands from Galicia where German language knowledge has decreased steadily even among officers and cadets.²⁶⁸ A suitable example is the rank and file from western Hungary that I have discussed above. Owing to the Budapest government's Magyarization efforts increasing numbers of citizens had to learn Hungarian in school. In his comparative European study from 1915, Rudolf Kleeberg referred to the weaknesses of the classification methods used in censuses, in particular

²⁶⁵ VHA/KL, box 69 (1880, surnames begin with Dolezal through Don), box 427 (1884, Tyl-Ulb), box 315 (1874, Ma), box 397 (1885, Uh-Ulman).

²⁶⁶ An example is described in: Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 154.

²⁶⁷ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 13th Corps Command Zagreb/Agram, box 76, no. 88, 19 December 1910.

²⁶⁸ Wagner, *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 2, 240-1.

in Austria-Hungary. He argued that respondents might often have answered out of a “national creed” (*nationales Glaubensbekenntnis*), in particular in terms of their Hungarian knowledge.²⁶⁹ It is likely that many non-Hungarian native speakers did so during their army enlistment. However, not everybody in Hungary opposed Magyarization. The Bunjevci who settled in southern Hungary are a suitable example for the other way round. They were a South Slavic tribe, sometimes described as Catholic Serbs or Serbo-Croats. In the Hungarian census Bunjev was used as a language category, but not in the army.²⁷⁰ The Bunjevci spoke a Slavic idiom that was often mixed with Hungarian and German words. Eric Beckett Weaver has asserted that as early as the 1880s, most Bunjevci would have tended to “assimilate with Hungarians,” by nationality but also through language use.²⁷¹ Although their own language, Bunjev, was Slavic, they perhaps increasingly tended to be categorized as Hungarians when serving in the army and it is possible that they highlighted their Hungarian-language knowledge.

Methods applied and categories employed often became decisive if a particular language was recognized in a Habsburg regiment, battalion, or other service branch. Interestingly, although the Hungarian political aim was to increase the use of Hungarian as a training language in the joint army, in the end it resulted in that more other languages had to be recognized. This subchapter analysed mostly languages that were recognized in the army, although personnel files show that sometimes other languages were noted, which is demonstrated below.

The Marginalization of Languages

Wolfgang Göderle has written that the nineteenth century nationalist and state efforts to categorize and educate citizens in standard languages, resulted in that vernaculars across Europe steadily wittled away.²⁷² Deák has written that during the same time the “peoples of the Monarchy spoke ten major and scores of minor languages.”²⁷³ The examples discussed in the previous subchapter shed light on the conscript languages from Bohemia, Moravia, and western Hungary. These cases show recognized ones, or in Deák’s words, recruits spoke some of “the ten major languages.” However, there were some Habsburg provinces where terms for

²⁶⁹ Kleeberg, *Die Nationalitätenstatistik*, 139-40. Göderle analyzes Kleeberg’s study in the framework of European statisticians during the late nineteenth, and early twentieth century: Göderle, *Zensus und Ethnizität*, 218f.

²⁷⁰ Marácz, *Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire*, 275.

²⁷¹ Beckett Weaver, *Hungarian Views of the Bunjevci*, 84-9. See also: Mandić, and Belić, *Eine Fallstudie zur bunjewatzischen Sprache*.

²⁷² Göderle, *Zensus und Ethnizität*, 96.

²⁷³ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 5.

languages were used that were not recognized as possible regimental languages to which Deák most likely referred to as “scores of minor languages.” This opened up the question of how to categorize the recruits who spoke them. The existence of recognized language categories as presented above did not exclude others from being used in military administrative files. This practice indicates that both army bureaucrats and officers failed to act uniformly. Wrongdoings posed a challenge to army officials of how counting these men or better assigning them to a distinctive linguistic training company, thus, nationality. My analysis of thousands of both recruit (*Grundbuchblätter*) and officer personnel files (*Qualifikationslisten*) reveals that many other language categories were noted, often resulting in a – above all in Austria and Bosnia-Herzegovina – energetic discussion about the army’s language categorization. The examples below analyze only the most often used and discussed terms: Ladin, Windisch, Bosnian, and Yiddish.

Some personnel files contained popularly used local terms for languages. For example, until the mid-nineteenth century, linguists and politicians regularly argued about the categorization of the Slavic language spoken in Carinthia, Carniola, and Styria.²⁷⁴ Although army guidelines stipulated that only Slovene could be employed as a regimental language (by following the local civil administrative practice), the terms *windisch*, *krainerisch* (Carniolan), and *steirisch* (Styrian) still appeared in recruits’ personnel files. A sample archival box in the Austrian State Archives for Carinthian conscripts born in 1864 and with last names starting with “G,” contains a total of 288 recruits. The various languages noted in the files reveal that 203 recruits spoke solely German, thirty-three spoke German and Slovene, twenty-three spoke German and Windisch, fifteen solely Windisch, twelve solely Slovene, one-each spoke German, and Italian, and German, and Croatian. As in western Hungary, Carinthia offers a variety of opportunities to classify the rank and file. The additional challenge for army officials was how to categorize the (solely) Windisch-speaking recruits.

The pre-1905-regulations required army officials to count only the recruits’ alleged native language. If an army official was interested in having as many German speakers as possible for a particular regiment or battalion in the army yearbook, he could have classified all German/Windisch and all German/Slovene speakers as Germans. Those who spoke only Windisch could only be classified as Slovenes. This classification would have resulted in the following figures: 261 Germans (90.62 percent), and twenty-seven Slovenes (9.3 percent). The

²⁷⁴ See: Stergar and Scheer, *Ethnic Boxes*.

officer who counted might have counted in favor to support the German character of a regiment or followed the army's interest in treating all recognized languages equally. In the second case he could have classified all bilingual recruits as Slovenes. The result would have been 205 Germans, and eighty-three Slovenes. In this case, the regiment would have comprised of 71.18 percent Germans, and 28.81 percent Slovenes.²⁷⁵ In the first case, Slovene- or Slavic-speaking recruits would have never reached the required twenty percent to be recognized in the regiment. Therefore, Slovene and Windisch speakers had to be assigned to training units that used the German language exclusively. In the second case, both German and Slovene would have become regimental languages.

Rok Stergar has argued that Slovene-speaking citizens claimed that some regiments lost Slovene as their second language owing to manipulation during classification. For example, Infantry Regiment No 7, which recruited from Carinthia, for many years recognized two languages, German and Slovene. In the early 1890s the regiment turned into a solely German-speaking when Slovene speakers no longer reached the twenty percent. Beginning in 1892, Slovene members of the parliament had regularly – and unsuccessfully – demanded their language to be again be recognized in this regiment. Following the 1905-reform, both languages German, and Slovene automatically had to be recognized. The regiment became bilingual again.²⁷⁶ Army officials no longer had the opportunity to categorize speakers of both local languages as Germans. The figures for that regiment after 1904 would have been: 261 Germans (75.43 percent), eighty-three Slovenes (23.98 percent), as well as one Italian, and one Croat.²⁷⁷

Elsewhere in Austria, for example in Tyrol a term was used in personnel files as a language which was not among the possible regimental languages.²⁷⁸ Ladin, in contrast to Windisch for the Carinthian example, had however been employed for a while in the army's nationality statistics where it was categorized together with Italian as "Italian-Ladin."²⁷⁹ By the late nineteenth century, a lively Ladin cultural movement in Tyrol aimed at distinguishing its speakers from speakers of the other local languages, German and Italian. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, local cultural activists used the term "Ladin nation." Many Ladin-speakers

²⁷⁵ ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, box 5154, Carinthia, 1864, Gr.

²⁷⁶ Stergar, *Fragen des Militärwesens in der slowenischen Politik*, 397.

²⁷⁷ ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, box 5154, Carinthia, 1864, Gr.

²⁷⁸ I have yet to find Ladin, as well as Windisch, mentioned in officer personnel files. Probably the reason was that in officer files only regimental and foreign languages were noted. This practice differed from that of the rank and file as in their personnel files these terms were regularly used.

²⁷⁹ As just one example from 1904: ÖStA/KA/RKM, Abt. 2, 49-3/3, 1904.

resisted the army's practice to categorize them jointly with Italians, thus this movement tended to highlight the non-Italian elements of their idiom. The Ladin Association published its calendar in Ladin and German language and often asserted that Ladins preferred to speak German instead of Italian as second language.²⁸⁰ Italian nationalists in Tyrol and in the Kingdom of Italy on the other hand regularly argued that Ladin should be treated as a form of Italian vernacular instead of a separate language.²⁸¹

As Ladins for a long time were categorized together with Italians in Habsburg army statistic indicates that army bureaucrats classified Ladin speakers as Italians and tended to assign them to Italian-speaking training units. Indeed, the Ministry of War apparently never issued general orders on how to deal with Ladin-speaking conscripts. Autobiographical records of Ladin-speaking soldiers indicate that many of them were unhappy with the army's categorization, and that they would have preferred to have been placed in German-speaking training units as many of them spoke this language. For example, the volunteer Franz Pizzinini asserted in his diary having preferred to be assigned to a training unit that employed German, instead of serving among Italian-speakers.²⁸² It is difficult to show the exact number of Ladin-speaking recruits from Tyrol on the basis of personnel files. From a sample of 505 recruits from what is nowadays South Tyrol, in Italy, where most of Ladin speakers lived, only eleven were noted to speak Ladin. This low number might be a result of that in particular years Ladin had to be used in personnel files, while in others it was not allowed (like Windisch). As Ladin shared a box with Italian in the other years, my assumption is that local officers tended to classify them as Italian speakers in the years where the term was not allowed to be used. However, we do not know how an army official decided over mother tongue in the case a recruit spoke Ladin and German fluently. He could have decided in favor of the German language out of practicality, or out of nationalist motives to outnumber Italian speakers. From the eleven recruits mentioned above, seven were noted to speak German, and Ladin, three, German, Italian, and Ladin, while there was only one solely Ladin speaker.²⁸³ These numbers indicate that Ladins tended to speak German in addition to their native tongue, or that some refused to mention Italian during enlistment.

²⁸⁰ A.L., Cie sons-a nëus Ladíns? Über Wesen und Zusammengehörigkeit der Ladiner, *Calënder de Gherdëina per l' an 1912 / Ladinischer Kalender für das Grödnertal*, 36-9.

²⁸¹ Pescosta, *Geschichte der Dolomitenladiner*, 257-309.

²⁸² PP, Chiara Costner (Brixen), Abschrift des Feldtagebuchs von Franz Pizzinini, geschrieben während der Kriegsjahre 1915-18, gedient im II. Kaiserschützenregiment.

²⁸³ TL, Gbbl, Südtirol, Konv. 100, Innerkofler-Janes; Mayr-Malfatti; and Konv. 147, Mosheimer-Munding.

There was a third example of a language term which was regularly used in personnel files. Bosnian was noted in both in the files of officers, and the rank and file, although the Ministry of War regularly reminded its subordinate military institutions that they were not allowed to employ this term. In the contrast to Ladin, ministerial bureaucrats and subordinate military officers in Bosnia-Herzegovina had a lively discussion about the use of Bosnian in military documents and personnel files. Locally stationed army bureaucrats insisted on its use for two reasons: firstly, they supported the local civil administration's aim to create an overarching Bosnian identity among Roman-Catholic, Orthodox, and Muslim residents through a joint language category.²⁸⁴ Secondly, many locally deployed army bureaucrats were convinced that the existing language categories would marginalize recruits of Muslim faith, because only the Serbian and the Croatian languages and therefore nationalities were recognized. The army practice caused that Muslim recruits from Bosnia-Herzegovina were classified as Croats or Serbs in the army yearbooks. Muslim recruits were aware of the categories used because they were given military identity passes (*Militärpässe*). Therein the same language categories were noted as in their personnel files. Muslim soldiers regularly sent petitions to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian army bureaucrats protesting that they did not want to "become" Serbs or Croats when fulfilling their compulsory military service.²⁸⁵

Army bureaucrats in Bosnia-Herzegovina increasingly experienced soldiers of Muslim faith as reliable and loyal, thus, became convinced that they deserve their own language category. However, archival records indicate that most army officers were convinced that in Bosnia-Herzegovina only one local language was spoken for which three different terms were in use. For example, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government emphasized towards the Ministry of War in 1903 that the bulk of Bosnia-Herzegovinian "inhabitants [...] speak one and the same language."²⁸⁶ Nevertheless, they asked for the recognition of Bosnian as regimental language more than once. The Ministry of War always rejected these demands.²⁸⁷ Even after the passing of the ministerial decrees which insisted on the exclusive use of Croatian and Serbian, the terms Bosnian-Herzegovinian language or Bosnian were noted as language category in personnel files. For example, career officer Scherif (Šerif) Kosmić was born in 1881, three years after the Habsburg army occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina, in a village near Jajce. Starting his military

²⁸⁴ Ress, Versuch einer Nationenbildung um die Jahrhundertwende, 64-7. See also for the Habsburg Government's effort to create a Bosnian identity: Okey, *The Habsburg Civilizing Mission in Bosnia, 1878-1914*, and Hajdarpašić, *Whose Bosnia? Nationalism and Political Imagination in the Balkans, 1840-1914*.

²⁸⁵ ABH, ZMF, no. 16659, Governor to Ministry of War, 4 December 1902.

²⁸⁶ ABH, ZMF, no. 10724, Government to Ministry of War, 31 August 1903.

²⁸⁷ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 10-39/1, War Ministry Decision, 5 August 1903.

career in 1901, he was assigned to a variety of garrisons outside his home provinces before returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina where he was deployed in Trebinje and Mostar. His personnel file shows that Kosmić's superiors noted that he spoke both Bosnian and German.²⁸⁸ Kosmić was a Muslim and born in the occupied territories, but my analysis of personnel files demonstrates that military officials employed the term Bosnian as a language category for local officers and recruits of all major domestic denominations, Muslim, Orthodox, and Roman-Catholic. For example, his military file dating from 1905 indicates that the Roman-Catholic reservist Stjepan Sukić born in 1883 in Bihać spoke Bosnian.²⁸⁹ The category Bosnian was even employed for soldiers who were born neither in these provinces nor served among Bosnian-Herzegovinian recruits. For example, Pietro Tisot was born in Hungarian Arad and enlisted in Tyrol. He was recorded as speaking Italian, Bosnian, and basic German.²⁹⁰

Following the annexation of occupied territories in 1908, and the implementation of a provincial parliament (*Landtag*) in 1910, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government advocated Serbo-Croatian to become the term used in local administration.²⁹¹ Instead of previously used Croatian and Serbian a language table from 1912 published for the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Corps Command now recognized only one language category, Serbo-Croatian.²⁹² According to the linguist Gordana Ilić Marković, a couple of years before the advent of the First World War the term "Serbo-Croatian" increasingly replaced the terms "Serbian" or "Croatian", and became exclusively used throughout the Monarchy in administration and education.²⁹³ Although Serbo-Croatian was a newly added category, there is nothing preserved in Ministry of War's records explaining who advocated this category, and which soldiers were included. Only in 1918 a table indicated that speakers of Serbo-Croatian can only be found in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian regiments by constituting an individual category in addition to Croats and Serbs. This indicates that this category was exclusively used for the recruits of Muslim faith. This 1918-table, probably the last one the military issued, employed the following categories: Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovenes, Serbo-Croats, Croats, Serbs, Romanians, Italians, and Ladins.²⁹⁴

²⁸⁸ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Scherif Kosmić, born 1881.

²⁸⁹ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Stjepan Sukić, born 1883.

²⁹⁰ TL, Grundbuchblätter, Südtirol, Pietro Tisot, born 1874.

²⁹¹ Ekmečić, *Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 269.

²⁹² ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 15th Corps Command, no. 17, 5 March 1912.

²⁹³ Ilić Marković, *Creating a Name for a Pluricentric Language: From Serbian to Serbo-Croatian*, Bosnia/Croatian/Serbian, 443.

²⁹⁴ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 30-1/2, 1918. Ladin was occasionally used in military archival records (to be discussed in chapter 3).

Yiddish, the language spoken by many Jews in Galicia and Bukovia, offers yet another example of a language which was not recognized in the army, but in contrast to Bosnian, and Windisch, was almost never noted in personnel files.²⁹⁵ Yiddish speakers overwhelmingly lived in Galicia and Bukovina, both part of Cisleithanian Austria. Jews were enlisted as citizens of other faiths. There were no exceptions or limits for military careers as was the case in other armies of that time.²⁹⁶ Yiddish was never recognized as a language in Habsburg Monarchy's administration, although some politicians regularly demanded its recognition. Yiddish never became a language category in the joint army. As a result, speakers were forced to associate with one of the recognized languages. Jan Fellerer has emphasized that many Galician Yiddish speakers typically chose German, but there was an ongoing shift towards Polish as the then-dominant language of the province.²⁹⁷ Nino Gude has recently written that in Galicia there were a limited number of Yiddish speakers who preferred the Ruthenian language.²⁹⁸ Gerald Stourzh has argued that especially in Galicia, Yiddish speakers tended to prefer being categorized as Germans because they aimed at avoiding being counted as Poles.²⁹⁹ In the Austrian census, however, Yiddish speakers were usually counted as Germans,³⁰⁰ although some regularly resisted this practice as Joshua Shanes has argued.³⁰¹

Similar to other language categories, the Ministry of War seemingly never issued orders of how to classify Yiddish speakers. Thus, soldiers of Jewish faith were only recognizable in the category indicating religious denominations. In my sample of 489 conscripts with right of residency in Galicia, the term Yiddish (*jüdisch*) was only noted twice as language category. The bulk of army bureaucrats were apparently convinced that Yiddish was not a real language, but a "German idiom from the Middle Ages," or "an idiom related to German."³⁰² Military archival sources indicate that army bureaucrats tended to count Yiddish speakers as Germans primarily for practical reasons, because a communication with German-speaking officers and NCOs was almost always possible. The First World War volunteer officer, later novelist, Józef

²⁹⁵ TDIAU/OBVO, 780, 3, 126, Babij to Bilec. I have analyzed a representative sample of six boxes (126, 130, 133, 355, 366, and 370) for 489 rank and file with right of residency in Galicia.

²⁹⁶ See: Schmidl, *Habsburgs jüdische Soldaten*.

²⁹⁷ Fellerer, *Reconstructing Multilingualism in Everyday Life*, 223.

²⁹⁸ Gude, *Ukrainisch werden, jüdisch bleiben*.

²⁹⁹ Stourzh, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten*, 75-77.

³⁰⁰ Wagner, *Die Bukowina und ihre Deutschen*, 17.

³⁰¹ Shanes has shown that many Jews in Galicia never identified with any of the "approved" ethno-linguistic nations although they could not choose Yiddish or Hebrew as their language of daily use in the census: Shanes, *Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia*, 36.

³⁰² Bischitzky, Schreiner, *Simon Dubnow*, 18.

Wittlin sheds light on how this army practice may have functioned. In his war time novel, based on his own military experience, during mobilization and examination language speakers from Galicia were grouped for swearing the oath: “First, he [the officer] separated the small German-speaking group, which was mainly Jews, from the Polish, and the Ukrainian [Ruthenian] group.”³⁰³ Most Yiddish speakers spoke more than one local language. In contrast to the Bosnian example, the military archival records do not indicate that Yiddish-speaking recruits officially complained to army institutions about this assignment, at least the Corps Command seemingly never forwarded a request to the Ministry of War.

There was another group of Habsburg citizens, speaking a language hitherto not mentioned. They lived in many places throughout the Monarchy, belonged to several different tribes, and spoke a variety of idioms, although Roma were the numerically largest group. Army bureaucrats until 1918 tended to refer to them as *Zigeuner* (Gypsies). In contrast to Jews and Ladins, they did not organize a national movement.³⁰⁴ There was no public debate, and no representatives were speaking in their names in the parliaments or diets. Thus, it is almost impossible to analyse how they experienced the army language system who following the Hungarian census estimated 274,900.³⁰⁵ In Austria, Roma language was not a recognized language category. Roma was also never recognized in the Habsburg army. In the personnel files of the rank and file they are not visible as most of them were of Catholic or Orthodox faith. As many of Roma spoke more than one locally used language, they were possibly categorized according to one of them in the army, or as László Maráczi argued, Roma of Hungarian citizenship were massively registered as Hungarians.³⁰⁶

While the recognition of Bosnian was debated among army bureaucrats, many other languages were not, including Slavonian, Friulian, Hanáci, Istrian, Triestine, and Goral. It is therefore impossible to analyze how conscripts who spoke these languages were categorized in the army.³⁰⁷ These languages were recognized neither in provincial law nor in the army. Thus, these idioms never constituted a separate language and therefore nationality, and became prone

³⁰³ Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 100f.

³⁰⁴ Zahra, Roma, Migration Panics, and Internment in the Habsburg Empire, 708-10.

³⁰⁵ Maráczi, Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 275.

³⁰⁶ Maráczi, Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 275.

³⁰⁷ For these and some more see: Stern, Nomachi, and Belić, eds. *Linguistic Regionalism in Eastern Europe and Beyond Minority, Regional and Literary Microlanguages*. As well as: ÖStA/KA/NL, B/862:1, Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished manuscript, undated, 26. Some of them I have never found in personnel files across the Monarchy, except for Slavonian that was sometimes used in personnel files from conscripts recruiting from Croatia-Slavonia: HDA, 152, box 138, Stefan Babić, born 1841.

for a flexible interpretation, enabling army officials to change percentages in a regiment or battalion. In most cases, however, marginalization of recruits' languages appeared in Austria, because they were not *landesüblich*. The army personnel files for conscripts indicate that many Moravia- and Bohemia-born native Czech speakers successfully applied for right of residence in municipalities in Lower Austrian. Some of them were even noted not to speak German.³⁰⁸ Their language was never recognized during training. I analyzed a representative sample of 343 soldier personnel files (*Grundbuchblätter*) that included recruits who were *heimatzuständig* in Vienna.³⁰⁹ The files are preserved in the Austrian State Archives in alphabetical order by year of birth. The first box I analyzed contains files of men born in the 1870s whose family names begin with *Ich*. From a total of 171 recruits, eighty-seven recruits solely spoke German, twenty-one solely Czech, and fifty-one spoke both Czech and German.³¹⁰ These numbers reveal that native German speakers accounted for at least fifty-one percent, and native Czech speakers, at least twelve percent of recruits from Vienna. But, how do we evaluate the thirty percent of recruits who were bilingual? If we assume that most of Vienna residents who spoke two languages, Czech and German, were native Czech-speakers rather than German native-speakers learned Czech, at least in my sample Czechs made up forty-two percent of recruits from Vienna.

The second box I examined contains the files of recruits from Vienna who were born in 1870. Their family names start with *Hoe* through *Hyn*. From a total of 169 recruits, 122 recruits spoke solely German (seventy-two percent), six solely Czech (3.5 percent), and thirty-one spoke both German and Czech (eighteen percent).³¹¹ For the first sample shown above, if Czech would have been recognized in Lower Austria, it would have become a regimental language in addition to German regardless to which category the bilingual speakers would have been assigned to. In the second example, the recognition of Czech would have been dependent on how army bureaucrats assigned the bilingual recruits. According to the later introduced classification method, all language knowledge had to be considered. Thus, Czech would have become a regimental language in the second example irrespective of the assignment method. Despite the percentages shown above, Czech never became a regimental language for recruits from Vienna.

³⁰⁸ *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien für 1883*, 20.

³⁰⁹ So far, historians used these personnel files mostly only for particular soldier biographies. An exception is Alexander Losiev who analysed files from Galicia for Ruthenian speaking officers, NCOs and rank and file.

³¹⁰ ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, box 251, Vienna, 1870, Ichlitzka.

³¹¹ ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, box 250, Vienna, 1870, Högler to Hyněk.

Owing to internal migration during my period of investigation, the language landscapes of the Monarchy changed. Local Czech politicians' attempts to have their language recognized as the second *Landesübliche* in addition to German in Lower Austria, including Vienna, failed. They even brought their requests before the imperial court which finally decided that Czech speakers were not "historical residents" of Lower Austria.³¹² Despite politicians' and journalists' harsh criticism of the *landesüblich*-system, the set of recognized languages was never expanded. Thus, some of the recruits mentioned above never got the right to use their native language during their military service. Even if recruits were not trained in their mother tongue archival records indicate that they most likely spoke with their comrades in their native language. For example, it could be argued for the Infantry Regiment No 4, the so-called *Deutschmeister*, the Viennese house regiment, that they had a Czech character too, simply because around twenty percent were Czech (native) speakers.

³¹² Stourzh, *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten*, 81-2.

Conclusion

The Defense Acts and the army reform that imposed a new language system on the army, affected numerous military institutions. For the most part, the departments of the Ministry of War were engaged in regulating the linguistic diversity of both the officers and the conscripts. This chapter analysed that the initial debate about language regulations in Hungary stopped all future efforts to discuss shortcomings openly and publicly. Thus, many of the new language regulations had not been adequately defined, and thus offered army officials and officers the possibility for flexible interpretations.

The army language system comprised three different levels: the language of command, for bureaucratic communication, and the so-called regimental languages, the languages spoken by the recruits. The army bureaucratic language was of internal and political importance and concerned mainly the army staff. They had to have excellent spoken and written knowledge of German. Owing to efficiency, German continued to dominate the army language system, but other languages were increasingly used. The regimental language system, however, affected both officers and the conscripts because the recruits' languages became decisive in terms of communication during military training and education. The conscripts' language rights were recognized in the so-called regimental language system that granted recruits to use their native tongues during military service. Francis Joseph and his subordinate bureaucrats took the conscripts' languages into account for military efficiency and were convinced that only soldiers who fully understand orders, and knew what they were fighting for, would be successful in battle. Thus, they advocated a modern method of training recruits that was based on education instead of drill. But several restrictions were posed from the very beginning based on a variety of motives. Thus, not all conscripts were educated in their native tongues.

In the army language system German was the predominant language. However, after 1904/05 concessions were given to Hungary which resulted in a preference of Hungarian over the other regimental languages. The figures and percentages analyzed in chapter 2 reflect only particular moments in time. There were cases in which a language lost the status or (re)gained the status as a regimental language. Among the reasons for this change could have been internal migration or the educational system, but most often it resulted from the army officials' categorization method, and army officials' flexible classification, particularly of these recruits who spoke more than one language. Recognizing only a limited number of languages in the

army, might have been the result of practicality, but local practices of using language categories that were forbidden posed a challenge to army officials' classification method, and opened possibilities for misconduct. The records of the Ministry of War indicate that there was no internal debate, although bureaucrats were aware of flexible interpretation. The Ministry never gave orders in terms of the army's own classification methods, thus, enabling both officers and conscripts to ignore language rules. However, misconducts were usually not an outcome of nationalist prejudices, rather of practicality, ignorance, and/or convenience.

Part II: The Habsburg Army's Language System and the Military Personnel

This chapter analyzes how the military personnel navigated, affected, and interpreted the army language system. These men must be analyzed along the most distinguishing lines of an army system: the rank and file and the officers. Neither group, however, constituted a monolith. The recruits hailed from a wide variety of social, ethnic, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. Moreover, the rank and file included the NCOs who were on the one hand affected by the system, but on the other, also influenced it, because they applied the system to the recruits. Officers were a heterogeneous group, and most importantly, they have to be distinguished between career and reserve officers. In addition, there were other members of the military who were also in officers' rank: the military specialists. They included clergy, attorneys, physicians, and veterinarians. All of the specialists met different language requirements.

Many historians have tended to treat the rank and file as passive recipients of the language system, while depicting the officers as active adherents of it. I argue that the rank and file often actively shaped the system, and officers sometimes were required to obey orders and had no opportunity to influence the system. Both groups sometimes shaped the language system as the legal framework offered numerous opportunities for flexible adaptations, and therefore were able to influence its acceptance among other soldiers and civilians. This chapter demonstrates that the rank and file's as well as officers' flexible adaptation of the language system were often not owing to their linguistic backgrounds (and therefore nationality), rather often depended on a particular undertaking by making use of the elasticity of the rules. In addition, the system was influenced by army bureaucrats' conviction that every Habsburg citizen had a distinct nationality, which was first and foremost related to the language use. Conscripts had not only the right to use their native tongues during military service but were also obliged to fit into a recognized language category, thus, nationality.

Chapter 3: The Rank and File

Following the implementation of compulsory military service in 1867/8 more men served in the Habsburg army irrespective of their social classes, native tongues, ethnic backgrounds, or religious affiliations than previously. In 1869, the Habsburg military journal *Die Vedette* noted that the army headcount doubled within a few months.³¹³ Norman Stone has written about the challenges Francis Joseph and his army bureaucrats faced: “When the principle of universal conscription was first introduced [...] the army became too large to permit extensive denationalizing of conscripts, and the language problem became of much greater importance.”³¹⁴ Compulsory service lasted for twelve years, but only three (and, after 1904 two) years was active duty, which was undertaken in one of the many garrisons across Austria-Hungary.³¹⁵ For the remaining time the rank and file was in reserve, which meant in case of mobilization they were called to arms. The Military Statistical Handbook shows for 1885 the following nationalities among recruits: 29.7 percent Germans, 18.7 Magyars, 14 percent Czechs and Moravians, 8.1 Ruthenians, 7.9 percent Poles, 7.1 percent Croats and Serbs, 5.4 percent Romanians, 4.8 percent Slovaks, 3.5 percent Slovenes, and 0.8 percent Italians.³¹⁶ The 1910-issue indicates that percentages did not change significantly: 25.3 percent Germans, 23 Magyars, 13 percent Czechs and Moravians, 8.8 percent Croats and Serbs, 7.9 percent Poles, 7.7 percent Ruthenians, 6.8 percent Romanians, 3.6 percent Slovaks, 2.6 percent Slovenes, and 1.3 percent Italians.³¹⁷

For many conscripts, especially those from rural monolingual regions, their army service was the first time that they experienced the Monarchy’s linguistic diversity. This chapter demonstrates how army bureaucrats employed the language system in the conscripts’ enlistment and military training. In addition, there were many other daily military undertakings when the regimental language system mattered. Daily orders (*Tagesbefehle*) were addressed in front of the assembled soldiers in the barracks’ yards, and had to be given first in the army language followed by translations into the recognized regimental languages.³¹⁸ The army was also required to provide medical and spiritual support in the many languages of the soldiers. As

³¹³ N.N., Was wir wollen, *Die Vedette*, 20 October 1869, 1.

³¹⁴ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 99. See also: Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*, unpaginated foreword.

³¹⁵ Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*, 273f.

³¹⁶ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1886*, 131.

³¹⁷ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1910*, 146.

³¹⁸ Manescul, *Meine Dritte Kompanie*, 18.

was the case for the classification method and language categorization, rules were often unclear and left much space for a flexible interpretation of the language regulations. As shown in the earlier chapters the reasons for misinterpretation were not exclusively nationally motivated, but often resulted from practicality, convenience, and ignorance.

Enlistment

The year they turned twenty-one, the Monarchy's male citizens were required to appear for enlistment at a location based on their residential right (*Heimatzuständigkeit*). Annually in early autumn, district authorities (in Austria, they were usually the *Bezirksbehörde*, in Hungary, they were the *szék/Stuhlbezirk*) began developing lists of conscripts. In Austria, these lists were compiled on the basis of parish documents, while in Hungary they were based on registration office data.³¹⁹ The list of conscripts had to be publicly announced in October, either by poster or by another locally accepted practice. Even in the late nineteenth century, this might have meant that a town-hall employee, equipped with a drum or a bell, called out the information in town squares and at road crossings.³²⁰ Under threat of punishment all of the men whose names were listed had to report to their district authorities by November of the same year. They were to appear in person or if unable to do so respond by letter.³²¹ They then were summoned for the examination at their place of residence.

Many more men turned twenty-one annually than the Habsburg army needed in recruit. Indeed, Austrian statistics showed that 881,636 men reached the age of maturity in 1888. Among them were 55,114 men who had been temporarily exempted from army service (because they were students or had to work in their family business), failed to respond to the call, or did not show up for their examination. Only 826,522 men were declared fit for service.³²² The number of recruits trained every year in Austria was 96,000, and 91,000 in Hungary.³²³ These numbers reveal that the compulsory military service affected less than a quarter of male citizens of an annual cohort. The proportions did not change severely in the period of investigation.

³¹⁹ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1871*. See also: Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*, 259f.

³²⁰ Berecz, *German and Romanian in Town Governments*, 155.

³²¹ Grießl, *Vorschriften in Militär-Angelegenheiten. Für den Seelsorge-Clerus*, 16-35.

³²² *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1886*, 131.

³²³ Vogt, *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*, 43.

However, the number of conscripts rose from around 800,000 to 1,400,000, comparable to the overall number of Habsburg citizens.³²⁴

The enlistment examinations started between mid-January and mid-March in Hungary, while in Austria they took place between early April and end of May.³²⁵ A committee (*Stellungskommission*) organized and carried out these examinations that local civil authorities set up. The committees comprised representatives of the local civil authorities and army officers. Some of the members had decisive vote on a candidate's suitability, while others had only advisory vote such as interpreters.³²⁶ Committee members travelled from district to district to the various enlistment locations. The Ministry of War stipulated one committee to examine a maximum of 200 recruits per day.³²⁷

Communities organized the enlistment, including examination localities (*Musterungsorte*). The location employed depended on the size of the community. In larger towns and cities, the examinations took place in military barracks, while in smaller towns and villages, they were often held in town halls, or even restaurants and pubs.³²⁸ The locality was publicly announced. The local press usually commented the entire procedure. Newspapers from across the Monarchy indicate that journalists regularly reported in which language the announcement was published, in which language the call for the examination was sent,³²⁹ which languages the committee members spoke, if the conscripts would have the opportunity to speak in their native tongue, and are understood. Austrian parliamentary delegates and journalists regularly demanded that both the committee members and the conscripts should have the right to use their native tongues during the examination process. There was regular public criticism about the committee members' language proficiency.

German was obligatory for committee members when speaking to one another. While the community representatives insisted on their right to use the locally recognized language(s), the Ministry of War argued that in this particular case imperial recruitment law had to be respected and not provincial law which allowed the use of all locally recognized languages.³³⁰

³²⁴ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1910*, 145.

³²⁵ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1871*.

³²⁶ Grießl, *Vorschriften in Militär-Angelegenheiten*, 16-35.

³²⁷ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1871*.

³²⁸ N.N., Wildon, *Grazer Tagblatt*, 8 March 1899, 6.

³²⁹ Parliamentarians regularly insisted that calls were sent in German to native Czech-speaking citizens. For just one example: ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Reichstädter, 27375.

³³⁰ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 33-1/3-2, 1898.

Complaints and demands like that were regularly raised. Ministerial archival records indicate that Francis Joseph and his army bureaucrats never considered them or even seriously discussed them. For example, a 1905-petition from communities across Moravia called for the Ministry of War to ensure that committee members should speak both of the local languages that is German and Czech.³³¹ In 1911, Václav Fresl, a delegate from the Czech National Socialist Party, criticized the committee members' language use and abilities in the parliament: "The mayor does not speak one word of Bohemian [Czech], the captain only basics, and the physician not at all."³³² In addition to the recruitment procedure, newspapers often reported the outcome of the recruitment by publishing the names of local recruits and the units to which they were assigned. These reports often indicated in multilingual places which language group was allegedly more often enlisted. For example, the northern Bohemian daily *Leitmeritzer Zeitung* in 1883 concluded, or better complained, that unlike in earlier years this time "the number of the city's children compelled to serve rose extraordinarily."³³³

During the recruitment procedure young men underwent medical examinations to ascertain if and for what kind of military duty they were qualified. That was another undertaking which was regularly discussed in public. Among the issues raised was whether the committee members spoke the language of these men. As indicated above, this was not always the case. Language was crucial as medical examinations started with a recruit's self-evaluation of his physical condition. Only afterwards physicians examined him.³³⁴ Interpreters were used when the military physicians did not speak the recruits' languages.³³⁵ The examination for conscripts lasted for several days and all of them were obliged to remain in town for swearing in on the last day. Sometimes the swearing in became a public event in a town square which often resulted in public discussions as the men spoke with local residents about the procedure and the language(s) used. Sometimes incidents occurred, and nationalist slogans were raised in discussions. Army officials tended to equate the reason with personal frustration over the results of the examination, and that the discussions became animated because of alcohol consumption.³³⁶ In cases officers expected unrest the swearing-in ceremonies were held in the

³³¹ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-29/3, Petitionen mährischer Gemeinden um Einführung der böhmischen Dienstsprache, 1905.

³³² ALEX/SPAR, 1911, Fresl, 5533.

³³³ N.N., Assentierung, *Leitmeritzer Zeitung*, 14 March 1883, 6.

³³⁴ Myrdacz, *Handbuch für Militärärzte*, 108.

³³⁵ Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 94.

³³⁶ See for example: N.N., Wildon, *Grazer Tagblatt*, 8 March 1899, 6, and N.N., Assentierung, *Leitmeritzer Zeitung*, 14 March 1883, 6.

barracks (if there were some).³³⁷

The recruits swore an oath to the monarch as the highest authority of the army (*allerhöchster Kriegsherr*). They did not swear to the constitution as in other countries because there were two, for Austria and for Hungary.³³⁸ The articles of war had to be read out loud and explained to the recruits in their native tongue.³³⁹ The conscripts did not take the oath individually. They were grouped according to their native language. The oath was read out to the recruits and they had to repeat. Every ceremony had to start in German followed by the other languages in the same order as stipulated for the personnel files: German, Hungarian, Croatian, Bohemian (Czech), Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Slovak, Serbian, Romanian, and Italian.³⁴⁰ A 1904 article in the *Pettauer Zeitung* reported that in the German- and Slovene-speaking town of Ptuj the German speakers would have been sworn in first, followed by the “Slavic” speakers.³⁴¹ This was a local newspaper and perhaps the use of Slavic was indicating that it was not necessary to name the language; it was clearly Slovene. Rudolf Kučera has written in his book chapter about the wartime experience of Czech soldiers that while one group was being sworn in, the other “uninvolved nation was standing at ease.”³⁴² Peter Urbanitsch has written that already in these first minutes of the army service “a pacification through separation” took place, because not all swore at the same time rather one language group after another. Grouping these men who later became recruits according to their first language was an easy task in the case they spoke only one. The challenge to army officials was to find out the recruits’ native tongue when they were bi- or multilingual.³⁴³

Especially the assignment of bi- or multilingual recruits left room for flexibility for officers as well as the new recruits to decide on a particular native tongue (and practically nationality) for other reasons than their so-called real affiliation. There are only few sources where authors described this process, and almost no one mentioned motives. An exception is Józef Wittlin’s wartime novel, in which he most likely reflected his own army experience. In *Das Salz der Erde* (The Salt of the Earth), the bilingual protagonist from Galicia decides to join the Polish-speaking recruits, although he identified himself as Hutsul with a Ruthenian father.

³³⁷ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 12th Corps Command, box 72, no. 82, 16 October 1895.

³³⁸ N.N., Die Delegationen, *Pester Lloyd*, 3 December 1891, 2-3, 2.

³³⁹ Griebel, *Vorschriften in Militär-Angelegenheiten. Für den Seelsorge-Clerus*, 16-35.

³⁴⁰ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes, dann Kadetten im k.k. Heere* 1884, 3. Rubrik, Sprachkenntnisse.

³⁴¹ N.N., Truppenbeeidigung, *Pettauer Zeitung*, 19 June 1904, 2.

³⁴² Kučera, Entbehnung und Nationalismus, 125.

³⁴³ Urbanitsch, Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen untereinander, 68-9.

He joins the Poles as most of his fellow villagers were in this group. Wittlin also describes the swearing in ceremony: “The sergeant divided participants into three groups based on their language. He separated the small German group, which was mainly Jews, from the Polish, and Ukrainian [Ruthenian]. [...] The German group was sworn in first, then the Ukrainian, finally the Polish.”³⁴⁴ Perhaps Wittlin was taking artistic freedom because the usually required sequence stipulated that the Polish-speaking group came before the Ruthenian-speaking.³⁴⁵ The language assignment before 1914 in some cases failed to follow the army’s language rules, but during wartime became increasingly unmanageable. For example, Franz Pizzini, a 1915-recruit, hailed from a Tyrolian valley where three languages, German, Italian, and Ladin, were spoken. In his war diary, this German-speaking volunteer recalled that during the recruitment process the army officials assigned him to an Italian-speaking unit, because of his “Italian-sounding surname.” He sought help from his father who called upon a high-ranking provincial official for intervention. Only then Pizzini was assigned to a German-speaking company, what he wished for at the beginning of his service.³⁴⁶

During enlistment and examination of the conscripts, the committee members set up protocols (*Assentprotokolle*) including each man who had been assessed as fit for service. Later every recruit got a personnel file (*Grundbuchblatt*). These records contained the results of the medical examination as well as other data, including foot size, height, vaccination record, profession, and religion. In contrast to the protocols, personnel files distinguished between a man's reading and writing abilities in a particular language. All communities afterwards reported the examination results to the Ministry of War. Usually, they emphasized the number of speakers, but authorities in Bihać, in Bosnia, reported for 1907 a total of forty-one recruits, divided according to their religion: twenty-nine Muslims, five Orthodox, and seven Catholics.³⁴⁷ For the Bosnian-Herzegovinian case where most of recruits spoke the same language, army officials were primarily interested in the religious composition to provide food requirements and spiritual support. Usually, the army needed the number of speakers because it became decisive for the linguistic training unit of the rank and file, and the officially recognized language(s) in a regiment the subsequent year. The information was also used for

³⁴⁴ Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 100.

³⁴⁵ I have analyzed a sample of six boxes for 489 rank-and-file soldiers from Galicia. The term Ukrainian was only used once in these files. This case was the desertion file of Wasyl Iwanów from August 1918. TDIAU/OBVO, 780, 3, 355, Ilnicki to Jużyn.

³⁴⁶ PP, Chiara Costner (Brixen), Abschrift des Feldtagebuchs von Franz Pizzini, geschrieben während der Kriegsjahre 1915-18, gedient im II. Kaiserschützenregiment.

³⁴⁷ ABiH/ZVS, Opšta Grada, 32-131, 1907.

the annual army statistics. In addition, the language data was reported to the regimental and other unit commanders to help them decide the number of officers and NCOs they needed for the next training cohort. The number was crucial when language percentages changed, particularly when a language newly reached the twenty percent. In this case, at least a company had to be equipped with training personnel that usually comprised two officers and twenty-one NCOs who were responsible for about 180 conscripts.³⁴⁸

In addition to language knowledge and religion, the army officials were interested in the number of specialists among the new conscripts such as cooks, drivers, and craftsmen. These men were most likely assigned according to their profession rather their language abilities. For the most, there were no restrictions for speakers of particular languages to be designated to one or another military service branch. Military regulations stipulated only some exceptions from this rule. For example, recruits who spoke solely Romanian, Slovene, or Windisch should not be assigned to the technical branch. The sanitary branch required at least basic German knowledge. Army regulations stipulated that as many native Hungarian-speaking recruits as possible had to be assigned to the Cavalry.³⁴⁹

Active military service began for most men in September. Conscripts gathered in their barracks and were – at least in theory – assigned to a training company according to the language noted as their first. Across the Monarchy, the bulk of the recruits was assigned to one of the about 150 infantry and cavalry regiments located in or recruited from their home province. Thus, most infantry regiments' recruits, NCOs, and many reserve officers reflected the local civil population. For example, the recruiting district of Infantry Regiment No 94 was in and around the town Turnov, in Bohemia. In August 1914, the regiment's make up was seventy-six percent recruits of German nationality, twenty-two percent of Czech, and two percent of "other" nationality. Infantry Regiment No 95 recruited from around the Galician town Tschortkiw. Its recruits were twenty-one percent of Polish, seventy percent of Ruthenian, and nine percent of "other" nationality.³⁵⁰ While the first regiment used two languages, German and Czech, the Galician regiment recognized Polish and Ruthenian, although in both cases percentages barely reached the necessary twenty percent to be recognized.

³⁴⁸ For an infantry regiment roughly seventy-five officers and 490 NCOs were needed to train about 2,500 recruits.

³⁴⁹ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1871*.

³⁵⁰ See: *Seidels kleines Armeeschema*, 1914.

But what happened with the two percent or nine percent of others? There was almost always a group of speakers whose numbers were below twenty percent, thus were not recognized. Dreisziger has asserted that “members of the same unit were more likely than not to speak several different languages.”³⁵¹ General Maximilian Csicseric remembered that a “one hundred percent coverage was impossible.”³⁵² Army officials usually tended to assign these men to one of the other training units, or if their number was sufficiently large they grouped them in a linguistically mixed company. Rudolf Kučera provides the example of the Infantry Regiment No 91 which recruited from around České Budějovice, in which one company was divided into a German-speaking, a Czech-speaking, and two mixed-language platoons.³⁵³ I assume that officers usually tended to fill up the monolingual companies first with these recruits who spoke only one language. Then they decided over the rest usually these who spoke more than one language. My assumption is that officers tended to put these bilingual recruits together who in addition to another language spoke German. They tended to make up another German-speaking training unit, most likely out of convenience to avoid requesting more training personnel who speak the other language(s).

Recognized languages in a regiment or battalion sometimes changed. There were various reasons for this. These changes most often happened, because the linguistic composition of the recruits from one cohort to the next changed, but they also happened, because the officers who classified bi- or multilingual recruits changed from one year to the next. This was most often the case in recruitment areas where the number of speakers of a language barely reached the twenty percent. For 1897, the Ministry of War reported that a battalion that formerly employed solely Slovene now recognized also Italian.³⁵⁴ What many Italian-speaking recruits certainly welcomed, meant for local army officers that they had to employ a sufficient number of Italian-speaking training personnel. My sources indicate that the motives behind the assignment procedure to either a particular language/nationality during the recruitment, and afterwards to one of the training units appear to have been a mixture of convenience, ignorance and/or nationalist interest, in particular when recruits who spoke more than one language were not grouped according to their first. I have found very few ministerial archival sources that contain information on the assignment procedure. One exception is an example from Klagenfurt in 1873. The officers of the Infantry Regiment No 7 asked the Ministry of War for an exception

³⁵¹ Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 24.

³⁵² Eder, *Der General der k.u.k. Armee und geheime Rat Maximilian Csicseric*, 194.

³⁵³ Kučera, *Die Erfahrung tschechischer Soldaten der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 125.

³⁵⁴ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 33-16/5, 1898, Einsichtsakt RKM, 1. Abt., 8 April 1898.

from the obligatory use of the second recognized language, Slovene. It was argued that most Slovene-speaking soldiers understood German, the rest “can learn it rapidly,” and there was no need to have additional Slovene-speaking personnel assigned to this regiment that had “traditionally” a “German character.” The Ministry of War immediately rejected this petition.³⁵⁵ In this case army bureaucrats respected the language regulations. However, in other cases ministerial bureaucrats tended to keep quiet about any wrongdoing by their subordinate officers. My assumption is that in this case the Ministry of War decided in favor of the Slovene-speaking soldiers, because the request was made officially.

Over time it was exceptional that officers openly showed their unwillingness towards the Ministry of War to recognize the recruits’ languages and raised arguments which were clearly nationally motivated. In many cases subordinate military officers simply decided without asking the Ministry of War first. While ministerial archival records deal with shortcomings of the language system only to a very limited degree, journalists and politicians often criticized the assignment method (to be discussed in chapter 6). The Ministry of War usually responded to public criticism with the argument that regiments were often obliged (*genötigt*) to take recruits’ other languages into account instead of their native tongues when assigning them to training units.³⁵⁶ This most often happened to recruits who spoke German as second language, because there was always a sufficient number of officers and NCOs who spoke the army language.

The Training Personnel

In addition to the assignment to a particular unit, as shown above, the language environment in which recruits spent their military service depended on the availability and distribution of officers and NCOs. Archival material indicates that officers were often required to train recruits in languages which they did not speak. This was one of the most commonly criticized issues in the parliaments and in the printed press in terms of the army language system. Considering the officers’ language knowledge as shown in the nationality statistics public critics seemed to be correct. For example, army institutions reported that in 1895 officers constituted roughly seventy-one percent Germans, thirteen percent Magyars, 4.5 percent Poles and Ruthenians, and

³⁵⁵ NUK, Manuscripts, no. 1387, Andrej Komel, Correspondence. The correspondence is preserved in the personnel files of officer Andrej Komel, who also authored military manuals in Slovene. I thank Rok Stergar for this material.

³⁵⁶ ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs, 50-31/1, 1905, Annex: Regimentssprachen.

ten percent of “other Slavs.”³⁵⁷ A similar result can be taken from the officer personnel files which are preserved in the Austrian State Archives in Vienna. I analyzed a sample of a total of 243 officers: 239 spoke German, sixty-six Hungarian, sixty-three Czech, thirty-seven Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, thirty-three Italian, twenty-nine Polish, twenty-one Romanian, thirteen Slovak, thirteen Slovene, and eight Ruthenian.³⁵⁸ In *Beyond Nationalism*, Istvan Deák has argued that there were the always marginalized languages when it came to the officers’ language abilities. He mentioned in particular Polish, Romanian, and Ruthenian. These were the languages which only a small number of officers spoke.³⁵⁹ Historians for a long time tended to argue that the joint army never provided a sufficient number of officers who trained the recruits in these languages. Indeed, my analysis below demonstrates that it was not the officers’ overall language abilities that primarily mattered, but where they were deployed.

Officers' job descriptions were often published in corps commands orders. However, they never targeted officers who were needed for training the recruits, rather only specialists. They show local military institutions looking for candidates by listing up the required skills, including language abilities. This indicates that army bureaucrats considered language knowledge more important for office or technical duties than for training the recruits. Only officers were then hired who spoke these languages fluently which was checked. For example, the Corps Command in Zagreb in 1911 announced an open post for an administrative officer for which proficiency in Croatian and Italian was required.³⁶⁰ In Bruck an der Leitha, a town in Lower Austria that bordered Hungary, an officer was needed in 1897 who spoke Hungarian.³⁶¹ Another job description from 1899 sought an officer responsible for the military food distribution in the Arad garrison, in Hungary, who had to speak Hungarian, and Romanian.³⁶² Such detailed job descriptions were usually not done in the case these officers were responsible for the training of recruits, but commanders relied on the information presented in the personnel files.

The Ministry of War published a military handbook called *Militär-Schematismus* annually. It listed all officers by name, rank, and deployment as well as the officer corps of

³⁵⁷ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 87-2/2, 1895.

³⁵⁸ ÖStA/KA/Quall, box 207, Blaschko to Blašković; box 274, Breitenegger to Brendl; box 2046, Michalsky to Michel; box 3393, Stunić to Sturm; box 3401, Sugár to Sukup; box 2343, Panc to Panek; box 3721, Weinberger to Weiner; and box 3821, Wohlfahrt to Wohlmutheder.

³⁵⁹ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 165f.

³⁶⁰ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 13th Corps Command Zagreb/Agram, box 76, no. 70, 8 October 1911.

³⁶¹ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 52, 16 September 1897.

³⁶² ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 7, 6 February 1899.

each regiment, battalion, and other service branch. Considering that it was usually the officers of ranks up to second lieutenants who were responsible for training the recruits, their language abilities in that respective year became decisive. I have analyzed an example from a Galician regiment, because Galician regiments usually had Polish and Ruthenian as recognized languages which according to the statistic only a very limited number of officers spoke. The Infantry Regiment No 9 was headquartered in Stryi, and its rank and file comprised of about seventy-four percent Ruthenians, and twenty percent Poles. In 1875 the officer corps made up about seventy-five officers.³⁶³ I checked for a sample of twenty-one second lieutenants who served in this regiment in 1875 their language abilities in their personnel files at around that year. All of them spoke German. Three were fluent Ruthenian, and five spoke it sufficiently. Thus, thirty-eight percent spoke Ruthenian. Eight officers spoke Polish fluently, and five sufficiently. This makes up sixty-one percent Polish-speaking officers. The second lieutenants' other language knowledge included seven who spoke Czech fluently, and five sufficiently. Only two of the officers spoke solely German. These numbers indicate a more than sufficient number of Polish-speaking officers assigned to this regiment, while in the Ruthenian case their number was much lower. My analysis of personnel files from Galicia has shown that many of the recruits were bilingual, and spoke both recognized languages, Polish and Ruthenian.³⁶⁴ My assumption is that army commanders tended to gather the bilingual Ruthenians in a joint company or platoon commanded by a Polish-speaking officer. The percentages for this regiment show that in this particular year – 1875 – almost all recruits had, at least in theory, the opportunity to be educated in their native tongue as long as commanders assigned their officers in accordance with their language abilities.

For the Galician regiment mentioned above, I have counted all officers whose superiors assessed them as of speaking a language sufficiently as speaking this language. Indeed, my sources indicate that the assessments often did not reflect reality. In addition to the availability that informed about the language abilities of officers in a particular training unit, regiment commanders were aware that in many cases the officers' language knowledge was wrongly assessed in personnel files. As a result, they often had to consult the Ministry of War before posing a request for an assignment.³⁶⁵ Historian Günther Kronenbitter has pointed to the

³⁶³ *Seidels kleines Armeeschema. Dislokation und Einteilung des k.u.k. Heeres, der k.u.k. Kriegsmarine, der k.k. Landwehr und der königlich ungarischen Landwehr* (1876).

³⁶⁴ For just one example: TDIAU/OBVO, 780, 3, 366, Jabloner to Jurwoce.

³⁶⁵ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 71-1/79, 1868, Besetzung.

“mostly very friendly evaluation of the [language] abilities.”³⁶⁶ Wrong assessments had a variety of reasons that were regularly raised and criticized in public. For example, member of the parliament Jožef Pogačnik, a delegate from Carniola in the Croatian-Slovene Club, argued in a 1905 speech that “We all know how it really is. One has no talent for language, the other has to play billiards, and the comrade-teacher closes both eyes and writes sufficient, just because he does not want to harm his comrade’s career.”³⁶⁷ Not only politicians complained about mis-management of the officers’ language assessment, so, too, did army officers themselves. For example, the military bureaucrat Oswald Straub mentioned in his memoirs that often someone who was “only able to count up to twenty and to scold” was assessed as knowing a language sufficiently.³⁶⁸ Ivano-Frankivsk-born General Alfred Jansa mentioned that in the early-1900s in his Infantry Regiment No 72, which recruited from around Bratislava and thus had many Slovak-speaking recruits, officers who spoke “a bit of a Slavic language” could get good assessments.³⁶⁹ Even Chief of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf criticized the “lenient way in which this classification was often awarded.”³⁷⁰

The examples I have provided above demonstrate that personnel files as well as statistics indicating the officers’ language abilities have to be treated cautiously. Although even high-ranking, influential army officers such as Conrad and Jansa criticized the assessment practice, the administrative archival material demonstrates that only little effort was made to improve the system. The Galician regiment mentioned above was not totally lacking officers who spoke Polish and Ruthenian, but it is impossible to know precisely how many of these officers spoke Polish and Ruthenian well enough to educate recruits, and for how many superiors wrongly noted sufficient language abilities. In the end, officers’ language abilities were in many cases far away of sufficiently ensuring that the rank and file were properly trained in their native tongues. In contrast to the complaints from politicians and journalists, but also army officers, there are only rare examples of recruits criticizing the officers’ language abilities. Of course, some of them mentioned it, but seemingly they did not care that much as journalists and politicians did, or because in the bulk of cases they dealt with superiors who spoke their language, at least a bit, and because it was not only officers who were responsible for their training.

³⁶⁶ Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 24.

³⁶⁷ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Pogačnik, 27524.

³⁶⁸ Straub, *Erlebtes und Erlauschtes aus dem alten Pola*, 16.

³⁶⁹ Broucek, *Feldmarschallleutnant Alfred Jansa*, 156.

³⁷⁰ Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*, 330.

The men who were for the most part responsible for training the conscripts were the non-commissioned officers, the NCOs. In 1913, the joint army numbered about 50,000 NCOs.³⁷¹ Unlike in many other contemporaneous armies, the joint army had no career NCOs rather the Habsburg army recruited them annually from among the conscripts. Each year, some recruits were offered the opportunity to become NCOs. They were called the longer-serving (*Längerdienende*), because they served for longer than the required three, later two, years. For each company, the army needed twenty-one NCOs who were meant to support two officers in training some 180 recruits. At a regimental level that meant that in addition to seventy-five officers there were 493 NCOs available to help train some 2,474 men. As a result, regimental commanders every year needed a large number of NCOs that spoke the recognized languages. Indeed, every year, a larger number of recruits had to start training, because many would later be assessed as incapable for NCO duties.

Annually, the so-called “educable” (*Bildungsfähigen*) were separated from the other recruits in the very beginning of their army service.³⁷² They were trained in NCO schools (*Unteroffiziers-Bildungsschule*) instead of being educated in soldier schools (*Mannschaftsschule*).³⁷³ If they did not speak the army language, German, they were offered the opportunity to learn it.³⁷⁴ This is the reason that some NCO classes were – at least initially – held in one of the other languages.³⁷⁵ These men were expected to speak German after graduation, at least enough that they could “understand a brief instruction (*einen einfachen Auftrag*).”³⁷⁶ Owing to the need of NCOs, at least some who did not speak German were promoted.³⁷⁷ The requirement to speak German was dropped in 1903, when the duration of compulsory military service was reduced from three to two years. The Ministry of War then allowed men to be promoted to an NCO rank without speaking German.³⁷⁸ This improvement of the language system that supported recruits from other nationalities than German to become NCOs, was publicly discussed and heavily criticized. An anonymous author argued in a

³⁷¹ N.N., Die Delegationen, *Wiener Zeitung*, 20 December 1913, 4-10, 7.

³⁷² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

³⁷³ Hämmerle, ed., *Des Kaisers Knechte*, 91.

³⁷⁴ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

³⁷⁵ Vogt, *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*, 43.

³⁷⁶ N.N., Oesterreichisch-Ungarisches Reich, 4. November, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1885, 54.

³⁷⁷ Atanas von Guggenberg, Zum jüngst kundgewordenen Sprachenerlass für das Heer, *Brixener Chronik*, 4 February 1904, 1.

³⁷⁸ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 29-7/4, RKM-Erlass an alle Militärterritorialkommanden, 19 November 1903.

political pamphlet published in 1908 that this decree “lessened the German national property (*Schmälerung des deutschen Besitzstandes*)” of the Habsburg army.³⁷⁹ Francis Joseph and his army bureaucrats usually ignored such nationalist phrases. The main problem army bureaucrats faced was not the lack of German knowledge among NCOs rather that many NCOs had been promoted owing to their language knowledge even when they were assessed as lacking any leadership skills.³⁸⁰ At least officially an NCO could have been promoted until 1903 when not having mastered German if his other abilities were outstandingly good, and he had demonstrated his willingness to learn it. In such cases Francis Joseph ordered that exceptions be made.³⁸¹

Only one NCO rank always required fluent German that of a military accountant (*Rechnungsunteroffizier*) which was the highest NCO rank. These men were primarily engaged in office work and procurement. Therefore, they not only needed to speak and write German correctly, but they also often had to master other regimental and local languages.³⁸² Announcements of open positions were to be found in the regularly issued orders of the Corps Commands and highlighted requirements. For example, in 1898 the Budapest Corps Command was seeking an NCO as auxiliary worker who had to speak and write German, and Hungarian.³⁸³ In 1912, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Corps Command was seeking a military accountant. Among requirements were writing and speaking German, Hungarian, and Slovak, “pretty and legible” handwriting, good military assessment (*Konduite*), and reliability. The application had to be handwritten and submitted together with a certificate of good behavior (*Sittenzeugnis*).³⁸⁴

The Ministry of War collected data annually about the NCOs language abilities by regiments, battalions, and other service branches. For example, the Infantry Regiment No 43 recruited from around Caransebeş a town in the Hungarian Banat. This regiment’s recruits were reported to be seventy-eight percent Romanians, twenty percent Hungarians, and two percent from other nationalities. In 1883 this regiment had 125 NCOs. Fifty-five spoke solely Romanian (forty-four percent), one solely Hungarian (1.25 percent), and forty-one solely German (32.8

³⁷⁹ Mercator, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die ungarische Reichsidee*, 25.

³⁸⁰ Atanas von Guggenberg, Zum jüngst kundgewordenen Sprachenerlass für das Heer, *Brixener Chronik*, 4 February 1904, 1-2.

³⁸¹ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 76-1/1, RKM-Vortrag, 13 November 1896.

³⁸² N.N., Oesterreichisch-Ungarisches Reich, 4. November, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1885, 54.

³⁸³ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 98, 23 December 1898.

³⁸⁴ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 15th Corps Command Sarajevo, no. 10, 7 February 1912.

percent), while four spoke German and Romanian (3.2 percent), and twenty-four, German, Romanian, and Hungarian (19.2 percent).³⁸⁵ Of 125 NCOs, 66.4 percent spoke Romanian, the language used by the majority of recruits (seventy-eight). There were twenty percent of NCOs who were able to speak with the twenty percent of Hungarian speakers. These numbers and percentages indicate that there was a sufficient number of NCOs to ensure the recruits' training in their native languages, although the fifty-six NCOs who spoke solely Hungarian and Romanian were unable to communicate with many of the regiment's officers. I assume that the forty-one exclusively German speakers were usually used for office work, rather than for the more arduous military training. The knowledge of German was therefore often an advantage for a more convenient army career in an office instead of training the rank and file.

Infantry Regiment No 62 recruited from around Târgu Mureș, in Hungary, and consisted roughly of an equal number of Hungarian, and Romanian speakers. Army statistics for 1904 show that about forty-nine percent of the regimental NCOs had Hungarian as their first language, forty-six percent Romanian, and five percent spoke one of the other recognized languages. Twenty-four (13.3 percent) of the regiment's 181 NCOs were fluent in three languages (German, Romanian, and Hungarian), fifteen (28.3 percent) spoke German, and Hungarian, six (3.3 percent), German and Romanian, and twelve (6.6 percent), Hungarian and Romanian. The largest group of those who spoke only one language were the 112 NCOs who spoke solely Hungarian, followed by twelve who spoke solely German. No NCO spoke solely Romanian.³⁸⁶ This means that 163 NCOs spoke Hungarian (ninety percent), fifty-seven German (31.5 percent), and forty-two Romanian (23.2 percent). In addition, this large number of Hungarian-speaking NCOs indicates that even after the implementation of Hungarian as expanded regimental language there was a sufficient number of training personnel.

These numbers and percentages indicate that these NCOs who spoke solely Romanian usually had much less opportunity to become an NCO in this regiment that recruited from Hungary, while there were seemingly no obstacles when someone spoke solely Hungarian. Again, those men who spoke solely German were overrepresented among NCOs, although there were virtually no recruits of German nationality in this regiment. This indicates that among a small group of German native-speaking recruits, a much higher number of them were asked to

³⁸⁵ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-24/1, 1903, Verzeichnis der Sprachkenntnisse jener Unteroffiziere, welche im Jahre 1883 im Regimente praesent gedient haben, 28 January 1904.

³⁸⁶ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-24/1, 1903, Verzeichnis der Sprachkenntnisse jener Unteroffiziere, welche im Jahre 1883 im Regimente praesent gedient haben, 31 January 1904.

become NCOs. In terms of training the rank and file, Hungarian speakers could communicate with 163 NCOs, while Romanian speakers to only forty-two, although these two nationalities constituted approximately an equal number of the regiment's recruits. NCOs who spoke Romanian even when they could also speak German were more likely to be assigned to provide military education rather than to do office work that offered more job opportunities after their military service. NCOs who spoke Romanian were needed to train the units that recognized Romanian. There were about sixty-two percent of solely Hungarian-speaking NCOs who were unable to communicate with the majority of the officers.

NCO's personnel files can be found among the files of the conscripts, but they tend to contain much more information as many of them served for over ten years. Similar to officer personnel files their annual performance assessment of their superiors, additional military education, as well as language acquisition is noted. My sample of personnel files for Galicia demonstrates that most of the NCOs spoke after a while all languages needed, German, Polish, and Ruthenian. Many of them learned German, or one of the other local languages during their military service. For example, the NCO Johann Iwanski was enlisted in 1888 by speaking Polish, and poorly German. Over the years he learned to speak Ruthenian, and German perfectly, and made career in the army.³⁸⁷

The examples analyzed above indicate that at least in theory the language abilities of NCOs were sufficient to provide military training in the recruits' native languages as long as they were deployed accordingly. However, archival documents contain many examples of NCOs who were unable to communicate with the regimental rank and file (as it was the case for officers). For example, General Jansa recalled his Infantry Regiment No 72 which recruited from around Bratislava, in Hungary, and had three recognized languages, German, Slovak, and Hungarian. This regiment had a "thoroughbred Slovak" (*Vollblutslowake*) among its NCOs who did not speak his soldiers' language, Hungarian, a man who openly demonstrated his unwillingness to learn it. Jansa concluded that this NCO was favored by his captain, and therefore his attitude did not have a negative effect on his career.³⁸⁸ The army bureaucrat Oswald Straub reflected in his short stories about his military experience an encounter with an NCO who had to teach Hungarian speakers, but spoke only German. Being asked of how he manages to teach them, the NCO answered that he would need to know only five words in

³⁸⁷ TDIAU/OBVO, 780/3/355, Johann Iwanski, born 1888.

³⁸⁸ Broucek, *Feldmarschallleutnant Alfred Jansa*, 156.

Hungarian: “If they do their job well, I tell them [you are doing] very well, guys (*jol van emberek*), if they are doing it incorrectly, I say, not good, you oxes (*nem jo ökörök*).”³⁸⁹ Both above-mentioned examples show that the rule that NCOs are only allowed to be promoted when lacking languages skills when they have outstanding other abilities, was often ignored as it was the case for many officers (to be discussed in chapter 4).

All examples above indicate that NCOs in the bulk of cases ensured that officers' lack of language abilities was bridged as long as the NCOs were assigned from among the recruits carefully and then correctly deployed to a training unit in accordance with their language abilities. Officers' autobiographical material demonstrates that these NCOs were not only used as interpreters but were the key for a successful military training. For example, career officer Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz who was sent to Cracow in 1892, still was required to speak the regimental language. His Infantry Regiment No 20 consisted of a majority of Polish speakers, to whom he was unable to speak. He recalled that an NCO, who spoke basic German, helped him out to provide military education for his recruits.³⁹⁰ The young German-speaking career officer Franz Xaver Schubert recalled in his diary that upon arrival in Kolomyia, in Galicia, he was unable to speak with his recruits, because only his NCO spoke German, and helped him out.³⁹¹

Many archival records highlight that language proficiency was only among some criteria an advantage for a successful military training of the recruits. In 1911, *Danzer's Arme-Zeitung* concluded that because the German army employed career NCOs, these men had much more working experience than their peers from the Habsburg army.³⁹² Indeed, the Habsburg army often faced the problem that NCOs had to gain respect and authority over recruits who had served only slightly shorter and were about of the same age. However, in the late nineteenth century Habsburg Monarchy, there was virtually no undertaking in which the nationality question did not play a certain role. There had usually been a sufficient number of educable recruits who spoke the necessary languages but were not asked to become an NCO. Who was given the opportunity to become an NCO was therefore in some cases a matter of supporting a particular nationality, rather than taking into consideration that the training of recruits needed a

³⁸⁹ Straub, *Erlebtes und Erlauschtes aus dem alten Pola*, 16.

³⁹⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/862:1, Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished manuscript, undated, 26.

³⁹¹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/833:2, Franz Xaver Schubert, *Tagebuch*, unpublished manuscript, compiled in 1943, 33.

³⁹² P., Am Vorabend der zweijährigen Dienstzeit, *Danzer's Arme-Zeitung*, 12 January 1911, 1-8, 2.

range of personnel who spoke the recognized languages.

The archival sources I have seen indicate that both officers and NCOs involved in NCO recruitment from time to time made decisions based on nationalist motives. Archival sources only rarely mention these assignments, and even rarer are the motives. Recruit Emil Geissler, born in 1876 in Vienna, in 1895 was enlisted in the Pioneer Battalion No 15 which was located in Klosterneuburg, in Lower Austria. The battalion mostly comprised rank and file from Pula, Trieste, and Rijeka, thus, were mostly Italian and Slovene speakers. As Geissler graduated from a technical school, he was asked to become an NCO. In his memoirs he recalled his NCO school where the bulk of men who later became NCOs did not speak German. The reason, he mentioned, was that the “Italian” sergeant preferred to offer this opportunity to recruits whose native tongue was Italian. When according to Geissler a “German” first lieutenant inspected his company, Geissler raised objections to the sergeant’s assignment practice. The lieutenant answered: “You are right, I visited this school, and was unable to speak to anyone there.” The lieutenant then went to the sergeant and told him that he was to “immediately remove the non-German speakers from the course.” Geissler’s memoirs show he criticized the sergeant more than once.³⁹³ As indicated earlier, men who later became NCOs did not necessarily need to speak German when the classes started, because the army was in need for NCOs who spoke the recruits’ languages. In this case the sergeant may have been interested in educating enough NCOs to speak with the pioneer’s Italian- and Slovene-speaking recruits. In this particular case, it was Geissler and the lieutenant who seemed to ignore the army’s language regulations. If the sergeant had made decisions solely because of nationalist motives, Geissler would have been right to call up an officer, but the rest of his memoirs indicate that his motivation was presumably to strengthen the German character of his unit. That the lieutenant reacted on Geissler complaints without any obstacles indicates that he probably had a similar interest. This incident also demonstrates that it is not easily classifiable if someone did not know the language regulations, or ignored them, because of nationalist motives.

I have found less internal debate in the Ministry of War archival records, that shortcomings in the assignment of NCOs was seriously discussed, although it is likely that such cases happened regularly throughout the Monarchy. From the army reform in 1868 through the outbreak of the First World War, the NCO-assignments only at the first glance tended to discriminate these “educable” conscripts who did not speak German at the beginning of their

³⁹³ Hämmerle, ed., *Des Kaiser Knechte*, 82-94.

military service. German, and increasingly Hungarian, knowledge was often the key to a successful army career. These NCOs were suitable for a variety of duties, in addition to support officers in training the rank and file. Even when the system preferred German speakers over non-German speakers, this did not mean that non-German speakers were excluded from an army career. Most often, the system prioritized these among rank and file who spoke more than one language; these men usually did not speak German as a first language. However, shortcomings might have occurred regularly even in regiments and battalions where the officers needed interpreters because they did not speak the recognized languages themselves.

After their extended military service, NCOs had the possibility to apply for a permanent post in the civil bureaucracy, which many of them did. Becoming an NCO therefore provided an excellent opportunity to climb the social ladder. Especially the military accountants were requested for office work throughout the Monarchy because they had to speak and write German and had to be reliable because they were often responsible for a unit's budget. For example, in 1907, the former NCO Nikola Gjurgjević applied for a post with the provincial government in Sarajevo. He argued that as a Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizen he spoke the local language and was able to write both the Cyrillic and Latin script. In addition, he spoke German sufficiently well to carry out office work independently. His job application also contained his personnel file, and a recommendation letter from his superiors. They assessed this son of an Orthodox peasant as being "absolutely honest and reliable."³⁹⁴ Unfortunately, archival sources do not mention if Gjurgjević' application was successful.

The Military Education and Training

The theory lessons of the rank and files' military education took place in soldier schools (*Mannschaftsschulen, Truppschulen*) located throughout the Monarchy. Officers of lower ranks taught in these schools. The classes had to be held in the language of the recruits, which would have required that the recruits were to be grouped accordingly and headed by instructors who spoke their languages adequately. Thus, promotion requirements stipulated that officers should speak a language to a degree to "be able to give theoretical instructions" themselves.³⁹⁵ Officers and NCOs were assigned to a particular group of recruits at the beginning of their military service, and they remained together until the recruits had fulfilled their military service.

³⁹⁴ ABiH, ZVS, Opšta Grada, 32-105, Nikola Gjurgjević to Provincial Government, 13 February 1907.

³⁹⁵ *Beförderungsvorschrift für die Personen des Soldatenstandes im k. und k. Heere* (1895).

The curricula of soldier schools included the teaching of the German command language,³⁹⁶ how to wear the uniform, the use of a rifle and ammunition, as well as how to greet and report to superiors. In addition, writing and reading lessons in the soldiers' languages were given, as well as basic knowledge of mathematics was taught.³⁹⁷ In addition, the clergy of the recruits' respective denomination gave religious lessons (to be discussed later in this chapter). History lessons had to go beyond the history of the recruits' own regiment or battalion, and aimed at developing the recruits' awareness of their fatherland, Austria-Hungary, and the role their nationality played in the Monarchy (*staatsbürgerliches Bewusstsein und historisches Verständnis*).³⁹⁸ Army bureaucrats were aware what *Danzer's Armee Zeitung*, a widely read army journal, in 1911 wrote: "While the Germans, the French, and the Italians, who join the army as recruits, usually already consider themselves citizens, and identify with their state, and only need to be trained to become a soldier, recruits join our army every year that had often already undergone an anti-Austrian, nationalist pre-school, [...] out of this material [...] we have to form sacrificing citizens [...] which is not always possible in three years."³⁹⁹ There were almost no books published for that purpose, and often officers were solely responsible for the teaching content. It is therefore likely that the content sometimes hugely differed, because it depended on an officer's own educational background, interests, but also prejudices towards particular nationalities.

In theory, the soldier school curricula would have been manageable owing to its amount and content to ensure an organization in accordance with the army language regulations. But as archival material indicates, parliamentarians, journalists, and army officials regularly reported shortcomings. Criticism usually stressed the same issues. Historians, however, have to consider this archival material carefully. Usually, there is a tendency to reflect on problems, even when in the majority of cases these schools were organized in accordance with the required language system. Even when a generalization is virtually impossible, archival material enables us to get to know who usually acted not in accordance with the army regulations, and why they did so. Archival evidence indicates that even when leaving aside the official restrictions (*Landesüblichkeit, Heimatzuständigkeit*, and the twenty percent), there were many cases when a recruit was not trained in his own language (properly).

³⁹⁶ Vogt, *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*, 43.

³⁹⁷ *Dienst-Reglement für das k.u.k. Heer Infanterie und Jägertruppe* 1889.

³⁹⁸ Gooß, *Der Anteil der Dynastie an der Entwicklung Österreich-Ungarns*, 3.

³⁹⁹ P., Am Vorabend der zweijährigen Dienstzeit, *Danzer's Armee-Zeitung*, 12 January 1911, 1-8, 1.

In addition to trying to master teaching duties with the help of a fellow officer, NCO, or even a soldier, officers tended to teach recruits as much as German as possible, an effort that went beyond than just teaching them the command words. Many of the soldier schools held courses either entirely or partially in German, although officially they were to be exclusively held in the other regimental languages. It was not only the army language that dominated the daily military practice. General Jansa remembered that Infantry Regiment No 72 comprised German, Slovak, and Hungarian speakers. Although the regiment was officially trilingual, knowing “German and Slovak was sufficient, and the few recruits who only spoke Hungarian learned so many German and Slovak words in a short time, that they could easily follow instructions.”⁴⁰⁰ Although many among the rank and file had no difficulties with learning other languages during their army service, such practices violated the army language regulations.

Former recruits only to a very limited degree reflected on the officers’ language use in these schools. It was most often the officers, who discussed the schools in their diaries and memoirs. However, they tended to highlight their duty as a challenge that they in the end mastered successfully despite missing language abilities. Success usually meant that it did not harm their future careers. Officers rarely referred to the long-term impact of their missing language abilities on the recruits. Officers' autobiographical material also reveals that some of them spent a great deal of time and effort on recruit education, while others made only a minimal investment. My assumption is that the effort to be spent on education often depended on officers’ own disposition rather than based on language knowledge or nationalist prejudices. However, I assume that an officer who did not speak the language of his recruits tended to minimize the amount of time teaching the rank and file and expected his NCOs to teach, including, the above mentioned, history lessons, and civic education.

Army bureaucrats spent little effort to improve officers’ and NCOs language abilities. To ease officers’ and NCOs duties, handbooks were published in the soldiers' languages to facilitate teaching. Dozens of handbooks were printed between 1868 and 1914. They included Heinrich Ulrich Edler von Trenckheim's training manual for NCOs in Croatian,⁴⁰¹ and Marian von Jasinski's handbook in Polish for infantry and cavalry NCOs.⁴⁰² Another handbook in

⁴⁰⁰ Broucek, *Feldmarschallleutnant Alfred Jansa*, 156.

⁴⁰¹ Mentioned in: Schmidl, *Habsburgs jüdische Soldaten*, 88.

⁴⁰² Jasinski, *Podrecznik dla podoficerow piechoty i strzelcow w pytaniach i odpowiedziach*.

German and Slovene explained how to teach by the question-and-answer method, which was often used.⁴⁰³ In addition, officers and NCOs were handed out so-called field dictionaries (*Feldwörterbücher*) providing them with the most important terms and sentences to interact with soldiers but also civilian residents.⁴⁰⁴ In addition, many handwritten booklets were compiled on private initiative. Stergar analyzes in *Slovenci in vojska* (The Slovenes at war) the notebook of a Slovene-speaking NCO who put together the most important phrases and terms to be used in the soldier schools. It was primarily in Slovene, but also contained German words.⁴⁰⁵ General staff officer Franz Xaver Schubert remembered a private phrase book that one of his former classmates had compiled. This booklet contained about 200 words and phrases: “I go barracks, and you go left, for there was no modification of the nouns and verbs. But it worked!”⁴⁰⁶

The bulk of the manuals were published on officers’ private initiative, although publicity announced and advertised in the orders of the corps commands. However, the Ministry of War could have spent much more effort and pay for these booklets instead of leaving this important work to their officers’ initiatives. The deficit of ministerial initiatives to organize the language learning of their personnel was regularly criticized. In addition to politicians, corps commanders sent petitions to the Ministry of War asking for support in organizing professional language classes, or the printing of language handbooks. The Ministry regularly rejected requests, usually with the argument that it would be too costly. They expected that if they acceded to one such request, other corps commands would soon make a similar demand.

The Ministry of War expended slightly more effort in terms of the recruits’ needs. To them instruction cloth (*Instruktionstücher*) was passed. These were in the size of a handkerchief which then everyone was required to wear in his pocket. They contained the most important military terms in German with translations into the various languages. In addition, they often pictured a military item such as parts of the weaponry, or the uniform. With this cloth the army recognized that many soldiers were poorly literate. There was different cloth available for the infantry, cavalry, and for sanitary units.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰³ See: Comel, *Sluzbovník slovensko-nemski. Dienst-Reglement slovenisch-deutsch*.

⁴⁰⁴ Mocharitsch, *Ruthenische Militärterminologie*, 42-43.

⁴⁰⁵ Stergar, *Slovenci in vojska*.

⁴⁰⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/833:2, Franz Xaver Schubert, Tagebuch, unpublished manuscript, compiled in 1943, 42.

⁴⁰⁷ These items were not exclusively used by Habsburg armed forces, but also used in the French and Italian army. I thank Christoph Hatschek of the Military Museum in Vienna for this information. This museum shows two of these cloth in their permanent exhibition (www.hgm.at).

Both Francis Joseph and army bureaucrats were aware that more elements than language knowledge led recruits to accept and respect officers. Many autobiographical records show that officers were challenged with a multi-cultural army that also required a degree of respect for cultural particularities. Career officer Alexander Rosenfeld better known by his *nome de plume* Roda Roda of course by simplifying mentioned a few particularities of Habsburg nationalities: “ambitious Magyars, willing undaunted Croats and Serbs, Swabians a little slow, but hardworking.”⁴⁰⁸ Werner Schachinger, the editor of a Bosniak soldier’s memoir has called it “not only sensitivity, but being absorbed by the foreign way of thinking.”⁴⁰⁹ The reserve officer Robert Nowak emphasized in his memoirs that even when speaking their languages, recruits of the various nationalities “had to be treated in accordance with their [cultural] peculiarities.” For him and many of his comrades a “peasant from the Alpine region” had to be trained and educated differently than a “warlike Croat,” or “a good-willing Slovak.” Nowak concluded with that “Bosniaks were unable to follow the tact of the marshes but were the best soldiers.”⁴¹⁰ The General Staff Officer Franz Xaver Schubert, born in 1883 in Vinohrady, remembered in his diary his days as young officer in the Carpathians. He travelled regularly across the region and mentioned that he and other young officers often regretted that they “were so unfamiliar with the cultural history of the peoples whose sons we had to train.”⁴¹¹

While regimental languages were offered in officer schools, these additional skills were not taught. Deák has associated it with to be taught to understand the ethnic and cultural complexity of the Habsburg Monarchy.⁴¹² Many authors of archival autobiographical sources point on this additional shortcoming in the military school curricula, and so did the press. As early as 1868, a military journal, *Die Vedette*, highlighted that not only language knowledge mattered for successful training, but officers should also be “completely familiar with the characteristics and peculiarities of the nationality of which the regiment (battalion) recruits from.”⁴¹³ Internal ministerial correspondence reveals that this subject was never seriously debated, although it was to a limited degree mentioned in the *Dienstreglement*. The clause entitled “Nationality” stipulated that commanders should take into account the nationalities’

⁴⁰⁸ Roda Roda, *Roda Rodas Roman*, 384.

⁴⁰⁹ Schachinger, *Die Bosniaken kommen*, 248.

⁴¹⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated. These positive stereotypes were not an invention of post-Habsburg times, see: Strigl, *Schneidige Husaren, braven Bosniaken, feige Tschechen*.

⁴¹¹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/833:2, Franz Xaver Schubert, *Tagebuch*, unpublished manuscript, compiled in 1943, 50.

⁴¹² Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 78f.

⁴¹³ N.N., *Mannschaftsschulen (Ein Entwurf)*, *Die Vedette*, 20 October 1869, 25.

particularities: “The soldier’s efficiency partially depends on the correct utilization of his national qualities.”⁴¹⁴

The marginalization of cultural particularities did not seriously affect peacetime training but would become of vital importance during the First World War, which some autobiographical records indicate. For example, the Roman-Catholic military priest Bruno Spitzl emphasized that the deficit to teach cultural patterns of Habsburg nationalities would have caused higher casualty rates among Ruthenians, both soldiers and civilians. During the war, hundreds of Ruthenians were accused of being disloyal Russophiles, and many afterwards sentenced to death. Spitzl who served in Galicia at the Russian border guessed about the reasons: “If at least the officers had known the religious and ethnological conditions of the country [Galicia and Bukovina] well, it would not have been possible to suspect every Greek-Catholic church to be Russian [Orthodox], and to consider every Ruthenian priest in such a church, most of whom (usually legally) married, to be a Russian priest.”⁴¹⁵ Ministerial archival records did not directly address it, but it is likely that this ignorance of teaching national patterns resulted from the army’s aim as becoming supra-national. They therefore tended to downplay diversity in order to create an esprit de corps. However, Deák has written that such subject can not be found in any officer school curricula in any other European countries in the late nineteenth century.⁴¹⁶

In addition to officers’ language abilities, their teaching skills affected the rank and file’s military service. None of the officers learned teaching methods in military schools. While some officers became talented teachers, others were reported to be incompetent. In 1911, an incident was discussed in the Vienna parliament that had happened in Prague. “Czech” soldiers were ordered “to write down a German phrase (*Meldung*) overnight 200 times.”⁴¹⁷ Indeed, such practice had already been forbidden since 1886, when army inspector Archduke Albrecht stipulated that teaching the language of command should not be that the rank and file is “harrassed by parrot-like memorizing of entire phrases.”⁴¹⁸ A Hungarian parliamentary debate highlighted what sometimes worsened the situation that “this ordinary man will never accept

⁴¹⁴ *Dienst-Reglement für das k.u.k. Heer, Infanterie und Jägertruppe* 1889.

⁴¹⁵ Spitzl, *Die Rainer*, 119.

⁴¹⁶ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 78f.

⁴¹⁷ ALEX/SPAR, 1911, Fresl, 5532.

⁴¹⁸ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 21-2/1, Generalinspektor des k.k. Heeres (Erzherzog Albrecht) an RKM, 24 February 1886.

an officer, who is unable to speak to him, rather can only ensure discipline through harassment.”⁴¹⁹

Dialects were another important issue in terms of language knowledge. Dialects were not only widespread in German, but also among other regimental languages.⁴²⁰ General Staff Officer August von Urbański remembered his military duty when being a young officer. His infantry company stationed in Transylvania in Hungary consisted of “Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, Gypsies, and Jews” who were trained jointly: “The Transylvanian Saxons’ idiom was difficult to understand, and the Jews spoke Yiddish.”⁴²¹ Even when a native speaker of Croatian or Czech spoke standard German (*Hochdeutsch*) fluently, this did not mean that he was able to communicate easily with Tyrolians or Schwabs, and vice versa. Many recruits with limited schooling had simply never learned standard German properly or practiced it in daily communication at home. Indeed, even the Roman-Catholic military priest Pius Parsch, born 1884 in Olomouc, noted in his diary that he had to practice speaking standard German to be properly understood by all German-speaking soldiers.⁴²²

The language rights of the conscripts were much more than just providing a sufficient number of officers and NCOs who spoke their languages for military education and training. In addition, the army had to organize their medical and spiritual support. Certainly, in a peacetime army recruits most often needed to speak with their superiors during their education and military training, therefore not being able to communicate did not affect their physical survival. However, already before 1914 the organization of the medical and spiritual welfare offered a pre-view on what to expect during a war. Similar to the military training personnel, organizing the army language system adequately included providing both a sufficient number of physicians, nurses, and clergy, and ensuring that they were deployed adequately where they were needed to be able to communicate with the recruits.

In the Habsburg army, only a limited number of physicians were career military physicians. These career army medical personnel were usually not responsible for the treatment of recruits, but responsible for administrative work, and training future military physicians who mainly recruited from among the reserve officers. The medical treatment of the rank and file

⁴¹⁹ Képviselőházi napló, 1901, 444.

⁴²⁰ ALEX/SPAR, 1883, Wurmbrand, 10378.

⁴²¹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/58:4, August von Urbański, Das Tornisterkind, unpublished undated manuscript, 95.

⁴²² PPA, Pius Parsch, War Diary, no. 6, 1916.

was therefore in many cases left to the reservists who were often students at a nearby university, and therefore reflected the linguistic composition of the recruits. As long as these reservists were deployed adequately, there was always a physician nearby who was able to communicate with the recruits. Although archival material points to these physicians' insufficient knowledge of the regimental languages, at the same time it mentions that there were always nurses in NCO rank available who accompanied the physicians and helped out.⁴²³

Handbooks for military physicians that used a question-and-answer method in the recognized languages were already in use before the army reform in 1868.⁴²⁴ In addition to handbooks in the soldiers' languages for the use of the military personnel, the army issued instruction leaflets (*Merkblätter*). These were usually affixed to the barracks' walls. They explained to recruits how to avoid diseases. Corps commands orders regularly informed about plans of the Ministry of War to produce leaflets. Subordinate military institutions were asked to report how many of them were needed, and in which languages. Newly published leaflets were regularly announced in the orders of the corps commands. For example, in February 1914 a Corps Command order informed about the publication of a leaflet for recruits that informed about the nature and the dangers of venereal diseases.⁴²⁵

The medical branch of the Habsburg army was much easier to organize as patients had only to be distinguished by linguistic lines while religious support had to provide sufficient members of clergy not only in all the languages of the recruits, but also in the seven recognized denominations. The army statistical handbook from 1910 listed the religion of the recruits as follows: 990,613 were Roman-Catholics, 159,868, Greek-Catholics, 132,056, Greek-Oriental, 64,267, Protestants of Augsburg Confession, 81,128, Protestants of Helvetic Confession, 46,573, Jews, and 11,498 were Muslims.⁴²⁶ What is not visible in these army statistic is that with the exception of the Muslims all denominations lived in different parts of the Monarchy, and their adherents spoke a variety of languages. Roman-Catholic spiritual care had to be provided throughout Austria-Hungary for recruits speaking almost all regimental languages. Protestants also lived across the Monarchy and used a variety of Habsburg languages.⁴²⁷ Jews

⁴²³ N.N., Der Divisions-Chefarzt im Frieden. *Der Militärarzt*, 10 August 1883, 116-9, 118.

⁴²⁴ Allmayer-Beck, *Die bewaffnete Macht in Staat und Gesellschaft*, 98.

⁴²⁵ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 15th Corps Command Sarajevo, no. 14, 18 February 1914.

⁴²⁶ *Militärstatistisches Jahrbuch für 1910*, 190-1. Other denominations constituted 4,456, including 244 who had no denomination (*konfessionslos*).

⁴²⁷ In the mid nineteenth century the legal framework across Habsburg lands changed: Schwarz, *Zusammenbruch und Neuanfang – Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie und der österreichische Protestantismus*, 329-50.

lived across the Monarchy. Many of them spoke Yiddish, but others identified with local nationalities, and preferred to speak one of their languages. Jews posed an additional challenge because they included a variety of practices. Some more traditional Orthodox Jews spoke Yiddish, while “liberal-progressive” often used the language/one of the languages of the non-Jews among whom they lived. Still others did not practice their religion at all but were free thinkers.⁴²⁸

Another important factor was that religion had different status across the Monarchy, particularly the role it played in the civil communities and in the political (national) movements. In some places, Roman-Catholic priests were at the forefront of local nationalist movements.⁴²⁹ Indeed, some priests were members of the parliaments.⁴³⁰ Thus, the army had to deal with military priests regularly who spread nationalist ideas among recruits, although officially the Roman-Catholic church hierarchy during the nineteenth century advocated a supra-national or transnational character. Andreas Gottsmann has argued that similar to Austria-Hungary, the popes and their bureaucrats reacted on the ever-growing questions relating to nationalist movements first with “cluelessness,” while only later they tried to counter this *Zeitgeist* through tough policies of centralization.⁴³¹ In contrast to the Roman-Catholic Church, the Greek-Catholic Church in Galicia was not exclusively a religious community. Willibald Rosner has argued that it was the most important “national point of reference for Ruthenians.” To be Greek-Catholic meant to distinguish Ruthenians from Roman-Catholic Poles, and Orthodox Russians. There was another distinguishing line in the Greek-Catholic Church. While the Romanian-speaking Greek-Catholic Church in Bukovina in Austria advocated Magyarization, and called for Hungarian to replace Old Church Slavonic, Greek-Catholics from Transylvania in Hungary claimed their historic belonging to the Romanian nation, and preferred Romanian.⁴³²

In addition to the various nationally motivated interests of some adherents of the recognized denominations, the variety of religious requirements that had to be respected posed a challenge to army bureaucrats. Some of them were easily resolved, such as food requirements, not only for Muslims and Jews, but also for Christians as avoiding meat for

Following the army reform the number of the Protestant officers increased: Tepperberg, *Evangelische in Habsburgs Heer*, 134-5.

⁴²⁸ Rozenblit, *Reconstructing a National Identity*, 83. See also: Schmidl, *Habsburgs jüdische Soldaten*.

⁴²⁹ Rosner, *Allentsteig 1848 bis 1918*. The author demonstrates that in many communities of Lower Austria priests, together with physicians and teachers, because of their higher school education were national activists.

⁴³⁰ Stergar, *Slovenci in vojska*, 302-5.

⁴³¹ Gottsmann, *Rom und die nationalen Katholizismen in der Donaumonarchie*, 16, and 74.

⁴³² Rosner, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 266-9.

Friday meals or during fasting periods. The greater challenge to army bureaucrats was when recruits needed a clergy member for religious ceremonies that required communication, or pastoral care. The moment before a recruit died and the necessity that the clergy fully understood him was of major importance for Roman-Catholics, while for others, such as Muslims, it was more important how the corpses were treated which could have been ensured either by an imam or by an ordinary believer. Army bureaucrats therefore spent more effort to ensure that someone of Muslim faith was assigned to hospitals instead of providing a sufficient number of imams in all the garrisons where Bosniaks were deployed.⁴³³

The regularly published orders of the local military commands demonstrate that the practice of moving entire companies around the Monarchy posed an additional challenge to army bureaucrats. They had to provide spiritual care for ever changing troops. Even foreigners were aware of the army language diversity and the challenges it posed for providing spiritual support. For example, in the 1890s, a Bavarian colonel visited garrisons throughout the Habsburg Monarchy. He reported that “All these garrisons have their military chaplains. [...] So he [the priest] recently rode to a post, fifty kilometres of poor trail. He met four Catholics there, one of them spoke German, the second Hungarian, the third Bohemian, and the fourth Serbian, and to all of them he had to say something which comforted their poor souls.”⁴³⁴ The corps command reports provide an overview of how military spiritual care was organized in peacetime, and when and why the army sometimes failed to provide it appropriately. For example, the Zagreb Corps Command ordered its local commanders in October 1911: “Spiritual service has to be organized in Agram [Zagreb], Peterwardein [Petrovaradin], Esseg [Osijek] und Semlin [Zemun] (for the Hungarian rank and file) three times weekly, in the other places only two times [...] in Semlin (for the Czechs) chaplan Vesely will offer services.”⁴³⁵ This short note already indicates that clergy for some religions were available in sufficient numbers while others were not.

Corps command orders indicate that army officials began preparations for some annual religious holidays much earlier than the participating clergy did. The army sought to organize religious holiday as efficiently as possible by trying to ensure for all soldiers’ ceremonies in their native tongues. As for Easter or Christmas the army regulations stipulated that clergy had

⁴³³ Myrdacz, *Handbuch für Militärärzte*, 107.

⁴³⁴ Baumann, *Militärtouristische Wahrnehmungen im Sandschak Novibazar*, 13.

⁴³⁵ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 13th Corps Command Zagreb/Agram, box 76, no. 70, 8 October 1911.

to report in time how many recruits would attend service and in which languages. Clergy who spoke the soldiers' languages were particularly needed for Roman Catholics for their confessions and religious exercises. As the army was aware that one priest can not ensure the service for all places outside the main garrison town where also hundreds of additional recruits were stationed, usually priests of the local parish were asked for this duty, if they spoke the needed languages.⁴³⁶ In the case that at one locality no local priest was available, they deployed a military priest there.⁴³⁷ Jews, except in regiments from Galicia and Bukovina, did not make up a significant number among recruits to provide military rabbis, they were usually required to attend local synagogues.⁴³⁸

Indeed, organizing, for example, Easter celebrations often began in early February when corps commands ordered their subordinate offices to report the precise number of believers, where they were deployed and which languages they spoke. For example, the Budapest Corps Command in February 1895 asked for “the number of first, Roman- and Greek-Catholics, second, Greek-Orientals, third, Protestants of Augsburg, and fourth, Protestants of Helvetic Confession. In all places except for Budapest, Polna and Rakos-Palota, the commanders had to contact the local clergy of the mentioned denominations, and to find out if they were capable of providing Easter devotions in the rank and files' languages. [...] For the Greek-Oriental recruits in Stuhlweißenburg [Székesfehérvár] and Polna a military priest will be assigned who speaks the regimental language.” The order was followed by a table showing when and where military clergy was available, and which languages they spoke. Interestingly, this order distinguished between all languages, except for Slavic which was categorized as one.⁴³⁹ I assume that for a Polish-speaking priest providing Easter confessions for Croats would not have been an easy task.

The Corps Command order shown above also demonstrates that civil clergy was often requested to provide religious services for the rank and file in the case that there was not a sufficient number of recruits at a place to send a military clergy member. However, in many cases army bureaucrats avoided asking local clergy for help, because some of them were already known for their nationalist attitudes. Archival material indicates that some clergy members, even the military ones, did not only strongly identify with a particular nationality, but were

⁴³⁶ *Dienstvorschrift für die Militär-Geistlichkeit (A-16c)* 1887 in comparison with 1904, 23.

⁴³⁷ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 9, 28 January 1890.

⁴³⁸ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 57, 4 October 1897.

⁴³⁹ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 8, 3 February 1895.

openly nationalist. In case that the clergy was openly nationalist, it often took a long time to replace them, in particular when their language abilities were desperately needed. Therefore, in some cases, corps command orders had to add to their information that no service can be offered: “that for the recruits in Stuhlweißenburg [Székesfehérvár], and these of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Regiment No 3 no service can be offered, because of the lack of Croatian-speaking clergy.” As in the case of officers, it was not only language knowledge that mattered. Some members of the clergy were reported to be incapable of providing spiritual care and celebrating liturgy in a military setting, or they lacked abilities of providing religious guidance for young recruits.

Habsburg army clergy were not only expected to provide spiritual service, but also to give religious instruction as part of the recruit education as well as to provide spiritual exercises in the local religious facilities.⁴⁴⁰ Being well aware that officers often did not speak the languages of the rank and file, the clergy was even expected to give speeches during regimental jubilee days. One regimental history book even suggested to “relocate” these speeches from the garrisons into the “places of worship and to entrust the clergy, bringing the regiments' historical glories up in their homilies” and to remind the rank and file of their regiments' “success in combat, and their regimental heroes.”⁴⁴¹ The transfer of these propaganda tasks to the clergy posed a challenge in particular to commanders of multilingual garrisons. The historian van Drunen has analysed the numerous patriotic celebrations that were held in connection with the bicentennial of Chernivtsi's home regiment in 1901. He concluded that in Bukovina the religious services in the Roman-Catholic and Protestant churches, as well as in the synagogues, were to be held in German, in the Uniate church in Ruthenian, and in the Orthodox Cathedral in both Romanian, and Ruthenian.⁴⁴² This meant that not only clergy had to be provided who spoke these languages, but such tasks also required lecturing skills, as well as that they had to identify with the army and the state.

The Ministry of War was aware of the difficulty to provide clergy who spoke the relevant languages where they were needed. However, it was not the Ministry which compiled, printed, and paid for handbooks helping clergy out of the language dilemma, rather the military clergy issued most of them on own initiative – as was the case for officers' language manuals.

⁴⁴⁰ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 13th Corps Command Zagreb/Agram, box 76, no. 86, 12 December 1910.

⁴⁴¹ Dvořák, *Geschichte des k. und k. Infanterie-Regiments Erzherzog Eugen Nr. 41*, 88.

⁴⁴² Van Drunen, *Habsburg Bukovina's Celebrated Multilingualism*, 255.

Over the years, hundreds of manuals were printed across the Monarchy in all regimental languages providing, for example, Catholics with homilies for every military occasion. The Roman-Catholic military priest Rudolf Zhanel who belonged to the Brno diocese and spoke German and Czech⁴⁴³ published more than one manual: one was published in 1909 in Czech,⁴⁴⁴ a year later a German translation followed.⁴⁴⁵ A second issue of the handbook in German was published only three years later.⁴⁴⁶ Many of these books had an immediate second print. The many issues indicate that these manuals met the needs of the clergy.

Homilies for recruits (*Rekrutenpredigten*) did not only serve religious purposes, but also aimed at preparing recruits for an unfamiliar linguistic environment: “At home, dear young friend, you have heard only the sweet sound of your familiar mother tongue, here and elsewhere often unknown words and languages come to your ears.” These lectures also aimed to prepare recruits for the unfamiliar food and to remind them that they were not going to be awakened in the morning by their mothers, but by their superiors.⁴⁴⁷ The homilies also served propaganda purposes, for example, explaining to recruits the meaning of swearing the oath to the monarch: “Breaking the oath by desertion is a terrible offense against God.” The manuals also provided explanations for the meaning of the Ten Commandments in a military environment. Interestingly, in Zhanel’s widely used manual that comprised homilies for recruits, the Commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”, was passed by.⁴⁴⁸

In addition to manuals for clergys’ use, randomly on more local initiative religious short readings (*kleine Lectüren*) were published which often consisted only of a few pages. They were also for the use of recruits. Neither the Ministry of War nor regional military institutions published them on their own effort but approved them and advocated their distribution. For example, the Budapest Corps Command informed its subordinate officers in February 1895 that the military chaplain Adalbert S(z)uchy had published a pocket booklet in German and Hungarian that dealt with the military spirit and the morale of young soldiers. It was added: “This small work is recommended for the troops.”⁴⁴⁹ The same chaplain authored another

⁴⁴³ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Rudolf Zhanel, born 1867.

⁴⁴⁴ See: Zhanel, *Pomocná vojenská duchovní správa*.

⁴⁴⁵ Zhanel, *Rekrutenpredigten*.

⁴⁴⁶ Zhanel, *Garnisonspredigten*.

⁴⁴⁷ Zhanel, *Rekrutenpredigten*, 16.

⁴⁴⁸ Zhanel, *Rekrutenpredigten*, 77. This was not a Habsburg phenomenon. The interpretation of the Decalogue for army purposes, in particular during the First World War, became a “problem” for all Christian states and armies: Kurtz, *The Decalogue in a Kaiserreich at War*, 113. The Decalogue was regularly discussed in religious, philosophical, and “profane” literature during crisis and war: Markl, *The Decalogue in History*, 283f.

⁴⁴⁹ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 10, 11 February 1895.

booklet in the same languages entitled “With god for our supreme warlord and the fatherland,” which the Corps Command recommended that officers should also use in the soldier schools.⁴⁵⁰ Another example is a Soldier Lord’s Prayer in German that the Roman-Catholic military priest Heinrich Kranjec published in 1898. The Budapest Corps Command added: “This prayer booklet, which was also approved by the Church, could be published also in Czech, Slovene, and Croatian if there is sufficient interest. It is available from *Styria* publishing house in Graz. Price: 10 *Kreuzer*.”⁴⁵¹ Until the First World War, this manual had more than one edition. The Ministry of War usually expected members of the clergy, officers, and the rank and file to purchase these manuals on their own.

The military administration found it easiest to organize religious service for Muslims because all of the imams had only to speak the South-Slavic idiom. While Muslims concentrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, other believers were scattered across the Monarchy. The effectiveness of the pastoral care and additional propaganda purposes required an assignment of the adequate clergy. Not only their overall language abilities, could have become decisive for an effective spiritual support. My sources reveal that it made a difference if the members of the clergy previously headed monolingual parishes, or bi- or multilingual civil parishes where they became already aware of how to navigate linguistic diversity. In the late nineteenth century most parts of a Roman-Catholic mass were in Church Latin, including chants. Priests decided whether they would chant in Latin or use another language. The homily was always in the language of the faithful, and so the prayer for the monarch. German- and Czech-speaking Roman-Catholic clergy employed in Bohemian regiments could have decided to provide two separate Holy Masses with homilies in both Czech, and German, or put all recruits together, holding the mass in Church Latin, but providing in the same mass a homily in Czech followed by German, and the other day or week vice versa. The Roman-Catholic priest Pius Parsch, who later supported masses in the believers’ language, compared the symbolic and practical character of Church Latin with the German army language: “And I realize that it is quite good to have Latin: Why is there the German command language in the army? [...] And the mass, which is always the same in general, could be understood by all Catholics.”⁴⁵² It was very important for Protestants that ceremonies were held in the language of the faithful. Military priests employed in regiments recruiting from Vojvodina or Bukovina with Romanian- and

⁴⁵⁰ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 9, 5 March 1897.

⁴⁵¹ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 55, 6 August 1898.

⁴⁵² PPA, Pius Parsch, War Diary, no. 4, 27 July to 11 November 1916.

Serbian-speaking Greek-Orientals could have decided to celebrate the entire mass in Old Church-Slavonic, or they marginalized one language over another. Orthodox priests for the most part had the right to choose freely whether to say most of the mass in Old Church Slavonic or in the language of the faithful. The rabbis in the liberal synagogues decided for themselves which language they would use. Indeed, in some bilingual communities they changed language weekly. In any case, religious leaders of all denominations were ordered to say a prayer for the Monarch during the service in the language of the faithful.⁴⁵³ While there were some priests who were able to use several languages, most military clergy did not speak another regimental language other than their own. This was not that much of a problem during peacetime because members of the clergy often served exclusively in their regiment or garrison reflecting their own linguistic backgrounds.

In addition to provide spiritual care, members of the military clergy reported that informal chats were most effective for the morale of the recruits. Many young recruits had left their families and businesses behind often for the first time in their lives. Some recruits had conflicts with their comrades or superiors. When there were no members of the clergy available who spoke their language, this important psychological moment to influence these recruits positively passed. It was not the shortcomings in the ceremonies which parliamentary delegates regularly criticized, but the lack of daily spiritual guidance. For example, Leo Pastor, member of parliament who represented rural provinces in Galicia emphasized: “The military chaplains should not wait until soldiers need pastoral care, but actively address them and approach them. During the training period they are to remind them more often in the church or in the barracks of their duties from a religious and moral point of view and to encourage them.”⁴⁵⁴ In addition, Pastor was critical of those members of the military clergy he believed would be too “engaged in bureaucratic duties,” because recruits considered them as officers instead of in the civil world as spiritual guides: “If a soldier has a spiritual need, he must report it officially, and wait until his request is accepted. Usually, the military clergy is not even able to speak the regimental language.”⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵³ *Dienstvorschrift für die Militär-Geistlichkeit (A-16c)* 1887 in comparison with 1904, 24.

⁴⁵⁴ N.N., Die Delegationen, *Wiener Zeitung*, 20 December 1913, 4-10, 6.

⁴⁵⁵ N.N., Inland. Abgeordnetenhaus, Rede Abgeordneter Pastor, *Wiener Zeitung*, 19 February 1903, 5-8, 6.

Chapter 4: The Officers

What we want! [...] We stand for [...] each officer speaking the language of his men quite well and correctly in order to become a teacher, counsellor, and benefactor of the rank and file.

An anonymous Habsburg officer in the military journal *Die Vedette*, 1869⁴⁵⁶

In discussing the Defense Act in 1868, Friedrich von Beck-Rzikowsky who headed Francis Joseph's Military Chancellery, reminded all Habsburg army officers of the "repeatedly issued regulations" to learn the regimental languages. He insisted that the officers' existing language abilities should be considered, "if possible," when assigning them to a regiment, battalion or other service branch.⁴⁵⁷ Beck's suggestion remained the norm until 1914, and indicated that army bureaucrats only to a limited degree were required to take existing language abilities of officers into account when deciding about their assignment to a new regiment or battalion. This had a practical reason. There were many regiments and battalions that needed training personnel in languages for which the army never managed to provide a sufficient number of officers. The Habsburg officers analysed in this chapter were a heterogenous group. The 30,000 officers in the Habsburg army in 1913 were recruited from all over the Monarchy.⁴⁵⁸

My sample discussed in chapter 3 demonstrated that from total of 243 officers: 98.3 percent spoke German, 27.3 percent spoke Hungarian, 25.9 percent spoke Czech, 15.2 percent spoke Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, 13.6 percent spoke Italian, 11.9 percent spoke Polish, 8.6 percent spoke Romanian, 5.3 percent spoke Slovak, 5.3 percent spoke Slovene, and 3.3 percent spoke Ruthenian.⁴⁵⁹ These officers faced according to the Military Statistical Yearbook the following recruits in 1885: 29.7 percent Germans, 18.7 Magyars, 14 percent Czechs and Moravians, 8.1 Ruthenians, 7.9 percent Poles, 7.1 percent Croats and Serbs, 5.4 percent Romanians, 4.8 percent Slovaks, 3.5 percent Slovenes, and 0.8 percent Italians.⁴⁶⁰ This chapter demonstrates that it was not primarily native German speakers who benefited from the language system, but rather those officers who spoke a second regimental language fluently in addition to German, regardless of their native tongues. Indeed, most of the officers hailed from a variety

⁴⁵⁶ N.N., Was wir wollen, *Die Vedette*, 20 October 1869, 5.

⁴⁵⁷ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 71-1/76, MKSM/Beck to RKM, July 1868.

⁴⁵⁸ N.N., Die Delegationen, *Wiener Zeitung*, 20 December 1913, 4-10, 7. See also: Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 165f.

⁴⁵⁹ ÖStA/KA/Quall, box 207, Blaschko to Blašković; box 274, Breitenegger to Brendl; box 2046, Michalsky to Michel; box 3393, Stunić to Sturm; box 3401, Sugár to Sukup; box 2343, Panc to Panek; box 3721, Weinberger to Weiner; and box 3821, Wohlfahrt to Wohlmutheder.

⁴⁶⁰ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1886*, 131.

of religious, social, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds. They were both advocates and targets of the regimental language system, often at the same time, although historians as well as contemporaneous Habsburg politicians and journalists have often depicted officers as active adherents of the army language system. This chapter, however, demonstrates that officers sometimes were required to obey orders and had no opportunity to influence the system. In contrast to the conscripts, officers' interpretation of the language system not only affected their own career, but also the military service of other soldiers. I argue that officers often interpreted the language rules flexibly for their own convenience or for career motives, undertakings in which they made use of the elasticity of the language rules. It was most often not their linguistic backgrounds (and therefore nationalities) that influenced their decisions.

Officers' Linguistic Backgrounds and Nationalities

In the late nineteenth century, the Habsburg army officers became increasingly ethnically and socially mixed owing to the reformed army system that dated from 1868. But they were already stemming from a variety of linguistic backgrounds in earlier centuries. However, until 1868 most officers hailed from wealthy and/or noble backgrounds.⁴⁶¹ Following the 1848-revolution there were virtually no native Hungarian-speaking officers in the Habsburg military, rather so-called German officers were assigned to regiments stationed in Hungary. There were two reasons for the lack of native Hungarian-speaking officers. One reason was that bureaucrats in imperial institutions distrusted so-called ethnic Hungarians. The other reason was that many Hungarian nobles from whose ranks, officers were usually recruited refused to join an army, which they still considered an enemy. In the late 1850s the career officer Ernst Wurmbrand remembered that in the Innsbruck cadet school among all students there was only one native Hungarian speaker.⁴⁶² The Military Statistical Handbooks show that the number of native-Hungarian speakers increased steadily, at the turn of the century they made up the second largest group after these of alleged German nationality.⁴⁶³

Officers were also heterogenous owing to their military ranks. According to their ranks the officers were divided as follows: about fifty-seven percent of them were second and first lieutenants, twenty-eight percent were captains (*Hauptmann*, *Rittmeister*), seven percent,

⁴⁶¹ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 165f.

⁴⁶² Mikoletzky, ed., *Ernst Wurmbrand*, 84.

⁴⁶³ *Militär-Statistisches Jahrbuch für 1905*, 222.

majors, three percent, lieutenant colonels, two percent, colonels, and about one percent were at the rank of general. Thus, only a minimum of career officers reached a higher rank than that of first lieutenant by the end of their army careers.⁴⁶⁴ In addition to their ranks, officers can be divided in three main categories: career officers, reserve officers, and military specialists of officer rank. The officers in each group had had different language education before joining the army, and different language knowledge was required of them.

The first officer category was the career officers who (usually planned to) spent their entire professional life in the army. Many of them were educated in military preparatory schools from first years in school (discussed in chapter 1). When they became officers, they were therefore already familiar with the language system and knew precisely what was expected of them. Most of them were deployed as troop officers (*Truppenoffiziere*) in one of the numerous regiments and battalions. Others were responsible for the organization of the military life in the barracks. They were required to speak the language of the recruits until they reached the rank of captain. General staff officers (*Generalstabsoffiziere*) were also career officers, but constituted a numerically small group, and were required to have other language abilities than troop officers (to be discussed later in this chapter). The second category was the reserve officers. Coming from across the Monarchy, though not in the same proportion from all nationalities, they usually had graduated from civil secondary schools (*Gymnasium, Realschule*) where they often did not learn another Habsburg language. Although they served for a few months only they were often responsible for the training and education of the recruits and they were expected to speak their languages. The third category was the specialists of officer rank, comprised military auditors, clergy, veterinarians, pharmacists, and physicians. This group was the most heterogenous as some of these men spent their entire career in the army, while others did only a few years active duty. During their military career some of them never came into close contact with recruits, and therefore the regimental language system. Others, particularly physicians and clergy, dealt with the rank and file when they were sick and dying and proper communication was even more needed than during military training.

Officer personnel files (*Grundbuchblätter*) from 1868 to 1914 reveal that their linguistic and family backgrounds changed dramatically from the late nineteenth century through the outbreak of the First World War. Between 1868 and 1914 a growing number of officers were the sons of officers or bureaucrats, or of men whose employment, such as the railroads, required

⁴⁶⁴ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 165f.

them to live far from their place of origin.⁴⁶⁵ The officers' autobiographical material I have examined shows that these young men were often referred to as *Tornisterkinder*. *Tornister* was the military term for a rucksack. The term referred to those families that followed their fathers from garrison to garrison. Some of them had lived in more than five Habsburg regions before their twentieth birthday. Career officer Alexander Rosenfeld better known by his *nome de plume* Roda Roda described these offspring in his novel: "This officer had no national feeling. May he be born in [Galician] Tarnopol, or in Riva [del Garda]: he was Austrian. And spoke Army-German. All the larger and smaller peoples (*Völker und Völkchen*) of the Monarchy had smeared (*bekleckert*) this military German with their linguistic mistakes."⁴⁶⁶ In his unpublished memoirs, career officer Karl Nowotny described the image these officers often advocated of themselves: "Through marriages in the various garrisons they often mixed up with the different nationalities of the Monarchy, a German officer's son often had to attend schools in Polish or Hungarian language. Thus, these sons early got to know the different nationalities, and so they became the best leaders of these heterogenous recruits."⁴⁶⁷

One of the main characteristics of many of these *Tornisterkinder*-officers was their proficiency in more than one Habsburg language. Although their parents might have had a variety of native tongues, all career officers spoke fluent German. Recalling the postings of his father, a Habsburg officer, Jaro Zeman, commented his childhood. His father was deployed in Pula in Istria, where Croatian, Italian, and Slovene were the locally recognized languages. Zeman wrote that "father's position now requires Italian that he does not speak. But he obviously has some talent for language, his school French helps him, he can communicate with his workers soon in an idiom that at least he himself calls Italian. Even mother quickly learns a kind of kitchen and colloquial language. Our maids are for the most part Italians, father's military servants usually Croats. At home, languages are buzzing around, but the parents make sure that family members speak German to one another. [...] Outside our home and in school, we speak as our friend or classmate does."⁴⁶⁸ Men like Zeman who already spoke more than one Habsburg language when starting his army service, certainly had an advantage in making career in the military. Others, without such family background, had to learn languages during their school or officer education, or had only a few months before joining a new regiment.

⁴⁶⁵ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 184.

⁴⁶⁶ Roda Roda, *Roda Rodas Roman*, 269.

⁴⁶⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, Karl Nowotny, B/417:13, 1. Band Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben während der Zeit von 1868-1918.

⁴⁶⁸ Zeman, *Pola, Verlorene Heimat*, 68.

In addition to multilingualism, there was another characteristic of *Tornisterkinder*-officers: Their family backgrounds made them not easily assignable to a particular nationality for army bureaucrats. For example, the career officer Hugo Kerchnawe has written that his subordinate First Lieutenant Erich Pospischill, whose father was an army officer, and who, despite his Czech surname did not speak a single word in this language: “He had served until recently in Hungary and therefore liked to play the Hungarian. [...] The cradle of his artillery ancestors had, of course, been in Bohemia, but scarcely a tribe of the great Danube Empire exists, whose blood does not flow through his veins. He had gone to German, Croatian, and Slovene schools before the *Fisolenhaus* [the officers’ school in Wiener Neustadt] accepted him, and injected him with a spirit that made him look for his home only where Old Austria's banner was blowing.”⁴⁶⁹ What becomes apparent is that such a *Tornister*-life opened the opportunity to claim a variety of nationalities. The motives contemporaneous authors have stressed are different. Some argue that officers had simply lived for a long time somewhere in the Monarchy where another language was spoken and adopted the particular nationality out of cultural sympathy, while others married women who hailed from a different linguistic background.⁴⁷⁰ The reserve officer Robert Nowak pointed to marriage as the most frequent reason why officers claimed for another nationality.⁴⁷¹ Others attended military preparatory schools from early childhood where they spoke almost exclusively German. Zagreb-born Habsburg diplomat Alexander Musulin von Gomirje recalled in his memoirs a particular general: Petar Preradović, who hailed from the Croatian-Slavonian military border and was educated at the military academy in Wiener Neustadt. Musulin asserted that Preradović had “served for so long in the Habsburg army that he almost completely forgot his Croatian mother tongue.” He asserted that Preradović was one of many examples of Habsburg officers who “unified loyalty to the state, and deeply inherited Croatian patriotism.”⁴⁷² Parliamentary minutes indicate that delegates – regardless of their nationality – often criticized that military school students would become denationalized. In a 1910 speech, member of the Austrian parliament, Wladimir Kozłowski-Bolesta, delegate of the Polish Club, responded to the question of “Officers and nationality:” “Why should an officer not identify in the warmest manner with his homeland and nation to which he belongs [...]. It would be absurd – I am speaking openly and honestly here – if

⁴⁶⁹ Kerchnawe, *Das Vermächtnis eines alten kaiserlichen Soldaten*, 10.

⁴⁷⁰ Husová, *Die österreichisch-ungarische Garnison und ihre Rolle in der Literaturvermittlung*, 271.

⁴⁷¹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, *Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen*, unpaginated and undated.

⁴⁷² Musulin, *Das Haus am Ballhausplatz*, 18.

someone worked to destroy or deny that feeling.”⁴⁷³ István Deák has argued that many bi- or multilingual career officers identified with an – officially non-existent – “Austrian” nationality, one that Habsburg citizens usually interpreted across the Monarchy to be loyal to the monarch, the state and the army.⁴⁷⁴

Students at officer schools came from throughout the Monarchy. Most of them spoke German fluently by the time they left, even if German was not their native language. Deák has written that these students themselves distinguished between those who only spoke German, irrespective of their nationality, and those who were ethnic, that is “real,” Germans. There were regular conflicts between these two groups. They called one another as being either Army-Germans, which implied to be a loyal Austrian, or “Prussians,” which meant disloyal ethnic Germans, and was often used in Habsburg times as swearword.⁴⁷⁵ My autobiographical sources demonstrate that also these officers who had a distinct national feeling and identified themselves with one of the Habsburg nationalities not necessarily acted disloyal to the supra-national state or strongly identified themselves with the army.

It is almost impossible to analyze how army bureaucrats categorized bi- or multilingual officers. Because all officers had to speak fluent German, it is possible that army bureaucrats tended to classify these officers as of German nationality, because army statistics for a long time showed an absolute majority of German officers. Norman Stone has asserted that the “career officers were overwhelmingly German in character. No nationality without a large middle class could provide many reserve officers; and virtually all of the civilian officers [reserve officers] were drawn from three nationalities: German, Magyar, and Czech.”⁴⁷⁶ Stone’s claim that most officers had a “German character” is correct only insofar as the colloquial language of daily use among the officers was overwhelmingly German. However, this German language use did not indicate with which nationality they identified, or if they identified with one particular at all.⁴⁷⁷ The officers’ personnel files do not contain information on assignments to a particular nationality by self-declaration or by army officials (contrary to the recruit files where in some cases army officials highlighted one of the spoken languages to indicate a presumed native tongue, discussed in chapter 3). The following three examples demonstrate

⁴⁷³ ALEX/SPAR, 1910, Kozłowski, 1370.

⁴⁷⁴ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 165f.

⁴⁷⁵ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 83.

⁴⁷⁶ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 98-9.

⁴⁷⁷ Vogt, *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*, 43.

that multilingual officers could have been categorized in a number of ways: by self identification, by army bureaucrats, by their comrades, and finally by historians.⁴⁷⁸

Colonel Johann Fieldorf was the son of a railway official. He was born in Galicia in 1861. During the first year in the army, his superiors assessed him as able to speak three languages (in this order): correct German, sufficient Ruthenian, and fluent Polish.⁴⁷⁹ Although the term correctly was forbidden in personnel files, it was often used, in particular in cases where someone was not fluent in a language, but spoke it much better than sufficiently for training the recruits (*zum Dienstgebrauch genügend*). Almost every second year an officer's language ability was reassessed. In the years to come Fieldorf's superiors noted that his German became much better. At the end of his career, it was categorized to be fluent. Fieldorf offered the Habsburg army bureaucrats more than one option for assignment to a particular Habsburg nationality. Considering only Fieldorf's latest entry in his personnel file it would have been possible to assign him a Polish, or a German nationality, but considering earlier assessments when he spoke solely fluent Polish, the army might have categorized him as of Polish nationality. Franz Xaver Schubert, who was one of Fieldorf's fellow officers, described him in his diary thusly: "Captain Fieldorf, a Pole, speaks poor German."⁴⁸⁰ However, in particular for soldiers from Galicia an important distinguishing factor was religion. Fieldorf was a Roman-Catholic, thus, army bureaucrats would not have assigned him a Ruthenian-nationality. I have found no record of whether or with which nationality Fieldorf himself identified.

Born in Vukovar in Slavonia in 1889, First Lieutenant Oskar Wohlgemuth was the son of an army career captain. His personnel file indicates that when he joined the army, he spoke fluent German and Croatian.⁴⁸¹ We do not know which nationality army statistics assigned to someone who already spoke two languages fluently when starting their careers. Deák would have categorized him as of "mixed nationality," a category that he employed for those who spoke more than one language fluently.⁴⁸² Army bureaucracy never had such a category, they could have assigned him as of German or Croatian nationality, but usually they tended to categorize these officers as of German nationality. I have found no record with which nationality Wohlgemuth identified, if he did so, but one autobiographical record of one of his

⁴⁷⁸ Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 23-4; and: Scheer, Konstruktionen von ethnischer Zugehörigkeit und Loyalität in der k.u.k. Armee, 155-76.

⁴⁷⁹ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Johann Fieldorf, born 1861.

⁴⁸⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/833:2, Franz Xaver Schubert, Tagebuch, unpublished manuscript, compiled in 1943, 41.

⁴⁸¹ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Oskar Wohlgemuth, born 1889.

⁴⁸² Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 185.

fellow officers credited him a distinct nationality. In his memoirs the career officer Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz asserted that Wohlgemuth was a “full-blooded Croat from the Military Border [*Vollblutcroate aus der Militärgrenze*].”⁴⁸³

In the two examples mentioned above, both officers had German surnames, but were not necessarily of German nationality. There were also many examples of officers who had surnames from other Habsburg languages who were probably categorized as of German nationality. The career officer Rudolf von Eichthal remembered having met a “real Tyrolian soldier (*echter Tiroler Kaiserjäger*)” during his military service: “This Colonel Hadaszczok, despite his Ruthenian surname, which was so difficult for German tongues to pronounce and so difficult for Germans to remember, came from northern Moravia, and was of good German origin.”⁴⁸⁴ Josef Hadaszczok was born in 1865 in Frýdek on the Silesian border. According to his first language assessment of his army career he spoke fluent German and Slovak.⁴⁸⁵ Similar to the examples shown above, Hadaszczok offered more than one opportunity for a nationality. While army bureaucrats had to decide between a German and a Slovak nationality, Deák might have categorized him of “mixed nationality.”⁴⁸⁶

Officers’ Language Acquisition

Parliamentary and press debates highlighted that a large number of officers did not speak the languages of the recruits they trained. Public critics were partially correct, but it has to be asked for the reasons of officers’ lack of language preparation throughout my period of investigation. Thus, how did army bureaucrats organize language courses for officers? This chapter shows that the most important reason was often the result of the army’s assignment practice which remained throughout my period of investigation. Career officers were, at the latest after four years, assigned to another regiment in a different part of the Monarchy. Roda Roda did not exaggerate when he wrote: “Hardly anyone seriously sought to learn the language of the regiment. Why, when he expected to be deployed elsewhere in the near future.”⁴⁸⁷ Despite army organization, my sources reveal that many officers were also unwilling, and sometimes, unable to learn another language when they were already in officer rank.

⁴⁸³ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/862:11, Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, part 2, 19.

⁴⁸⁴ Eichthal, *k.u.k. Heitere Geschichten aus dem alten Österreich*, 46.

⁴⁸⁵ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Josef Hadaszczok, born 1865.

⁴⁸⁶ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 185.

⁴⁸⁷ Roda Roda, *Roda Rodas Roman*, 384.

The first section of this chapter describes how Habsburg career officers looked back on varying language knowledge and education when they began their military careers. The army's language requirements favored these officers who looked on a multilingual family background, were educated in a military preparatory school, or military academy where they learned another regimental language (discussed in chapter 1). However, the army's assignment practice often meant that even these officers were deployed in a regiment or battalion where they did not speak the recruits' language(s). The personnel files show that most career officers after only three to five years were assigned to a different regiment, battalion, or service branch, located elsewhere in the Monarchy. Some high-ranking career officers changed regiments as many as ten times during the course of their careers. Many of the career officers were therefore required to learn more than one other language.

Only at first glance does the army language system favor native German speakers in terms of career advancement. Thus, Kronenbitter is partially correct when arguing that German-native-speaking officers had it easier when starting their careers (*Startvorteil*).⁴⁸⁸ The officer personnel files I have examined indicate that these officers who spoke only German when joining the army more often failed in their career than those who spoke already another language in addition to German.⁴⁸⁹ The best route for a successful officer career therefore was to come from a non-German speaking background and to learn fluent German, the language most used and taught in the army. From among these bilingual non-native German speakers the linguistic landscape of the Monarchy favored speakers of Slavic languages, because six of the eleven regimental languages were Slavic: Czech, Croatian, Polish, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovene, and Slovak. Autobiographical archival records and novels demonstrate that authors regularly mentioned comrades of Slavic language background who had it easier to communicate with soldiers of another Slavic language.⁴⁹⁰ For example, the reserve officer Wladislaus Michejda who spoke Polish and German at the start of his army career,⁴⁹¹ more easily learned another Slavic language such as Czech, than did his fellow officer Theodor Michalsky who spoke fluent German and Hungarian. Michalsky's career ended abruptly when he had to learn Slovene within

⁴⁸⁸ Kronenbitter, *Die Führung der k.u.k. Armee und die Großmachtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns*, 209.

⁴⁸⁹ A total of 243 career and reserve officers: ÖStA/KA/Quall, box 207, Blaschko to Blašković; box 274, Breitenegger to Brendl; box 2046, Michalsky to Michel; box 3393, Stunić to Sturm; box 3401, Sugár to Sukup; box 2343, Panc to Panek; box 3721, Weinberger to Weiner; and box 3821, Wohlfahrt to Wohlmutheder.

⁴⁹⁰ For example: Henz, *Ein Roman von Krieg und Liebe*, 32

⁴⁹¹ ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, Wladislaus Michejda, born 1867.

three years, and his superiors assessed him as still not speaking the language.⁴⁹² Many officers left the army service after the expiration of the given deadline to learn a regimental language. The officer personnel files demonstrate that some officers managed to be assigned to a new regiment before the expiration of their deadline as long as they had other outstandingly well abilities (to be discussed later in this chapter).

There were several reasons why officers were unable to learn a particular language. My sources reveal that some were untalented while others simply unwilling. Ministerial archival records indicate that it was also the War Ministry who failed to organize classes on a large-scale and to ensure that officers were given enough free time beside their daily duties or before being assigned to a new regiment, to learn them. The author of an article published in an 1882-issue of *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, among the most important and widely read military journals in the Monarchy, referred to “military autodidactics,” meaning that army bureaucrats expected officers to acquire language knowledge primarily on their own. The author recommended officers to use text-books that focused less on grammar, but would enable them to quickly train soldiers by themselves.⁴⁹³ Indeed, the joint army’s organization could have offered numerous opportunities to organize language classes more appropriately. Over the years, the Corps Commands and the Ministry of War were faced with many suggestions about how to improve language classes, which they usually rejected with high cost.

At least in theory, there was an institution located in many garrisons that might have been suitable for organizing officers' language courses. The officer clubs (*Offizierscasinos*) were not only smoker's salons or restaurants,⁴⁹⁴ but also included libraries with books in many languages.⁴⁹⁵ Administrators organized lectures on a wide variety of themes. In their autobiographies, many officers criticized the scientific or cultural level of these clubs. For example, Procurement Officer Josef Leb recalled that “officers had to be commanded to attend the scientific lectures, because only few would have gone voluntarily. Officer clubs had their own libraries, but what was read was mostly inferior.” Leb also mentioned that the officer clubs were only rarely used for language classes: “Officially we had Russian lessons every year. I

⁴⁹² ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, Theodor Michalsky, born 1877.

⁴⁹³ Piers, Wilhelm. Über militärische Autodidaktik, *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 23, 3 (1882), 12-3, 12.

⁴⁹⁴ As just one example for the statutes of a k.u.k. casino: ÖStA/KA/RKM, 5. Abt., 56-3/2, 1907, Statuten für das Offizierscasino in Plevlje, 1897.

⁴⁹⁵ HL, Jegyzék, no. 1717, Katalog der Offiziersbücherei in Bestschanka.

remember a single attempt to organize such a lesson, which has never been repeated.”⁴⁹⁶ Because all officers stationed in a particular garrison were obliged to become members of these clubs, this would have been an appropriate place to offer language classes.

Suggestions for self-acquisition of language abilities were regularly raised in the press. An anonymous author in the widely read military journal *Danzers Armee-Zeitung* in 1904 suggested to officers how they could spend their winter break: “The weapons usually get out of hand, the books at hand. [...] In officers' circles it becomes very theoretically and lively. War games chase each other, lectures, meetings, tactical tasks, lessons in regimental languages [...]. Everything in an abundant tiring amount.” This article’s introduction was followed by suggestions of several other activities, but the writer did not mention the officers’ language education again.⁴⁹⁷ In garrisons, where few events took place, the organization of language classes functioned bit better. For example, career officer Karl Nowotny recalled in his memoirs having spent six winter months at a small fortress. He did not indicate the name of the fortress but remembered that he and some other German-speaking officers used the lack of other entertainment to ask a native speaking Polish officer to teach them his language. Unfortunately, Nowotny did not mention the results of this language class.⁴⁹⁸

The Ministry of War did not only spend limited effort on organizing language classes, they were also not active in providing officers with language handbooks. Military language handbooks were available, but usually they were compiled on an officer's private initiative. These handbooks can be distinguished by their two main teaching methods. Military language handbooks of the seemingly most common type were these mainly in German by offering translations of standard phrases into one of the other regimental languages. The second type used two languages equally, German with one of the other languages. Seidel, a publishing house specializing in military topics, issued many of these handbooks.⁴⁹⁹ In addition to the widely used handbooks, hundreds of smaller-scale publications were published across the Monarchy regularly, and announced in the corps command reports.

⁴⁹⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers, unpublished manuscript, autumn 1933, 9-10.

⁴⁹⁷ M., Die Verantwortlichkeit des Unterabteilungskommandanten, *Danzers Armee-Zeitung*, 10 November 1904, 3-4, 3.

⁴⁹⁸ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/417:13, Karl Nowotny, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben während der Zeit von 1868-1918, vol. 1, 106.

⁴⁹⁹ Lebensaft, Seidel Ludwig Wilhelm, *ÖBL*.

The subtitles of the Seidel books explained their main purpose: “Manual for superiors who have to communicate with subordinates.” These books were for use by career and reserve officers as well as military specialists and NCOs who either wanted to improve their German or aimed to acquire knowledge of another regimental language. Beszédes' main approach was highlighted in a review of its second edition from 1880: “The scholar finds all the terminology that he needs for his duty, words and phrases he would otherwise have to acquire on his own from many other books and specialized literature.”⁵⁰⁰ The language handbooks were very popular. Indeed, Friedrich Beszédes' Hungarian Military Language Handbook, first published in 1875, was already in its fifth edition in 1902. In the foreword, the author described the teaching method, the approach, and the aim of his volume: “Proficiency in words is especially necessary in order to learn a language quite intelligibly in a short time. Unabridged words are in many cases sufficient to be understood.” Indeed, this handbook provided such long sentences and phrases, formulated in such a complicated way, that I assume that even native speakers rarely understood and memorized them, let alone those who spoke the language poorly. For example, with the following sentence Beszédes wanted to emphasize that soldiers should only use trees for defense when there is nowhere else nearby to hide: “*Bäume bieten selbst bei großer Stärke nicht genügenden Schutz, decken kaum nach vorne und nicht gegen seitwärts, sind daher nur dann als Deckung zu benützen, wenn keine andere vorhanden ist.*”⁵⁰¹ The Hungarian translation was just as long and sophisticated. Beszédes taught Hungarian at the Military Academy in Wiener Neustadt. It is likely that his sophisticated style was an outcome of his approach to be judged as being fluent in the German bureaucratic language. In addition to long phrases, the handbook provided much shorter sentences provided for the use in daily occurrences in the barracks such as: “I have already sent soldiers out to find you? Do you not know that you are on duty today?”⁵⁰² In addition, it contained phrases that might have been used in conversation with the civil population. They included questions such as “Where does the judge live? Does this village offer enough space to house a battalion?”⁵⁰³

This handbook's method appears to have met the needs of the officers, because most of the other Seidel handbooks were modelled after Beszédes' work. Entire sentences were translated into one of the other regimental languages. In 1894 a book reviewer noted: “Everyone in the army knows the Beszédes-method, according to which several other language handbooks,

⁵⁰⁰ N.N., Literatur, *Die Vedette*, 3 November 1880, 5.

⁵⁰¹ Beszédes, *Ungarische Militär-Sprache*, 135.

⁵⁰² Beszédes, *Ungarische Militär-Sprache*, 122.

⁵⁰³ Beszédes, *Ungarische Militär-Sprache*, 127.

among them for Romanian and Croatian, have already been published, and that have proven themselves useful at all time.”⁵⁰⁴ Alexander von Truszkowski was the author and editor of the Polish Military Language handbook. In contrast to other handbooks, Truszkowski edited his book with official order (*über dienstlichen Auftrag*) as the cover page showed.⁵⁰⁵ In addition to Beszédes' handbook, many of the other language handbooks were published in more than one edition. They included Basilius Sangeorzanu's handbook for Romanian,⁵⁰⁶ Alois Dukovic for Croatian, Josef Bauer for Czech,⁵⁰⁷ and Josef Pfeiffer for Slovene.⁵⁰⁸ Josef Edler von Jäger, the editor of the Italian handbook used a slightly different teaching method. The book consisted of two parts. One part read like a dictionary. It provided commands and military terms in German and Italian. The second part provided useful short phrases/orders such as “Don't take the weapon out of your hand,” or “Make up your bed neatly,” thus, following the Beszédes-method.⁵⁰⁹ An analysis of most handbooks reveals that the bulk of them focused on providing short sentences and phrases, as well as pronouncement, but almost none of them explained the grammar.

Josef Dumek's New Military German-Bohemian Dictionary used a different method. It used two languages, Czech and German, on an equal basis. It had a foreword in both languages and was directed also at reserve officers who did not speak German. It contained short and easy understandable phrases,⁵¹⁰ as well as military regulations and abbreviations that officers had to memorize and then teach to recruits. Another example that did not use German as main language was Bertold Scharf's handbook. It contained normalized abbreviations by explaining their meaning in Polish.⁵¹¹ He also published a handbook using a question and answer method for teaching the rank and file (*Dienstreglement für den Felddienst vereinfacht in Fragen und Antworten*) in Polish.⁵¹²

In addition to handbooks, officers during their service sometimes collected phrases and noted them down in a regimental language. Usually, these handwritten private notebooks were only for their own use, but sometimes they passed them over to their newly assigned comrades.

⁵⁰⁴ T., Buecherschau, *Österreichischer Soldatenfreund*, 29 July 1894, 6.

⁵⁰⁵ Truszkowski, *Polnische Militärsprache*.

⁵⁰⁶ Sangeorzanu, *Rumänische Militär-Sprache*.

⁵⁰⁷ Bauer, *Böhmische Militär-Sprache*.

⁵⁰⁸ Pfeiffer, *Slovenische Militär-Sprache*.

⁵⁰⁹ Jäger, *Italienische Militär-Sprache*, 62-89.

⁵¹⁰ See: Dumek, *Neues militärisches deutsch-böhmisches Wörterbuch/Nový Vojenský Slovník Německo-Český*.

⁵¹¹ See: Scharf, *Przepisane skrocenia i ich znaczenie w jezyku polskim*.

⁵¹² See: Scharf, *Regulamin sluzbowy dla c. i k. wojska Czesc II. (Sluzba polna) w pytaniach i odpowiadziach*.

For example, later general staff officer Franz Xaver Schubert was sent to Kolomyja in Galicia where he had to educate recruits of Hutsul, Polish, and Czech backgrounds. He did not speak any of their languages. He noted in his diary that he had only survived with the help of a private phrase book that one of his former classmates had compiled. This booklet contained about 200 words and phrases: “I go barracks, and you go left, for there was no modification of the nouns and verbs. But it worked!”⁵¹³

In addition to language learning with the help of handbooks, officers used a variety of other methods. The wife of the Chief of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Gina Reininghaus mentioned one of them in her memoirs. She recalled that from a certain moment, Conrad and his best friend, another officer, decided to speak only in Serbian to one another.⁵¹⁴ Another method to learn a language was to choose the batman (*Offiziersdiener*) accordingly. However, many autobiographical sources indicate that the servant might not help the officer learn a language, but rather ended up to be used as an interpreter exclusively. The officers’ attempts to learn the required regimental languages were often targeted with humor or even mockery. Regularly, satirical journals referred to these, often desperate, attempts to learn languages. For example, in 1908 the Vienna-based weekly satirical *Die Muskete* published a special edition on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among the many exaggerated stories about the residents’ culture, the method of Lieutenant-Colonel Hussein Mehemed Beg Kapetanovich sought to learn regimental languages was depicted. The anonymous author emphasized that Kapetanovich aimed at being a good Muslim and therefore planned to marry more than one woman: “And because he was transferred to a regiment with Hungarian regimental language, he did not marry a Turk or a Serb, but a Hungarian, and also employed a German governess.”⁵¹⁵ From its first appearance in 1905, nearly half of the articles in each issue of *Die Muskete* dealt with the joint army, and the language diversity was often targeted. The anonymous authors were often officers. Thus, it gives a useful insight into the daily challenges in garrison life. Much of the content is certainly exaggerated, thus the journal editors were often heavily criticized for portraying the army and its officers in such a disgusting way.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹³ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/833:2, Franz Xaver Schubert, Tagebuch, unpublished manuscript, compiled in 1943, 42.

⁵¹⁴ Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Mein Leben mit Conrad von Hötzendorf*, 188.

⁵¹⁵ Sascha, Oberleutnant Hussein Mehemed Beg Kapetanowitsch, *Die Muskete*, 4 June 1908, 293.

⁵¹⁶ Stürgkh, *Politische und Militärische Erinnerungen*, 277.

Army bureaucrats aimed to organize language classes for officers more efficiently after 1903 in the course of the shortening of compulsory military service from three to two years.⁵¹⁷ With the reduction in the length of the compulsory service, officers had less time for the same amount of training, and recruits picked up less knowledge of German during their military education. The Ministry of War ordered the corps commands not to expect officers to attend classes in their spare time, but to assign them during their working hours,⁵¹⁸ and that more emphasis should be spent on speaking instead of grammar. Roughly two years later, most corps commands reported that the newly introduced language classes are already showing positive results. The Cracow Corps Commander, for example, insisted that there was still an insufficient number of Polish-speaking officers. This commander – as many others did – blamed the language teachers for the deficit who would not apply proper methods in their classrooms. Teachers still insisted on teaching grammar instead of focusing on speaking. The Cracow Corps Commander suggested a more Berlitz-oriented method that focuses on speaking. He asked the Ministry of War to assign Polish-speaking officers for studying this method. The Ministry of War rejected this request owing to a lack of funds. In the *pro domo* – for information within the Ministry only – the reason for the rejection was outlined in detail: “The [...] expenses would be for this Corps alone 1,200 crowns, which could be covered [...] But we have to take into account that other corps will soon after come up with similar requests.”⁵¹⁹

The Ministry of War often rejected suggestions to improve the army language system claiming there was a lack of funds. In the period I have investigated the Ministry of War never provided a sufficient number of language classes for officers. Moreover, they increasingly expected their officers to learn languages, sometimes more than once, as otherwise it threatened their careers. Language proficiency was regularly noted and commented in the officer personnel files, thus these documents are useful source for analyzing which languages Habsburg officers spoke, learned, but also what happened in the case they failed.

⁵¹⁷ On the debate on the shorting of the military service: Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 171f.

⁵¹⁸ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 29-7/4, RKM-Erlass to all *Militärterritorialkommanden*, 19 November 1903.

⁵¹⁹ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-12/1, 1st Corps Command to Ministry of War, 15 January 1905.

Assessing Officers' Language Proficiency

Army bureaucrats expended only limited effort in supporting the officers in increasing their language proficiency. Thus, many officers were required to train recruits whose languages they did not speak. Nonetheless, chapter 3 has demonstrated that it was not the army officers' overall language proficiency that was most important, but rather their proper deployment based on their language abilities. I have already demonstrated in chapter 3 that the officers' language proficiency was often wrongly assessed. In the end this meant that recruits had teachers who were unable to communicate with them adequately. Below I analyze the men who assessed the officers' language ability, and how, which languages officers spoke and which languages they learned during their military service. I also analyze how army bureaucrats treated officers who failed to learn a language as well as the officers' career tactics when they were required to learn another language.

The army reform in 1868 changed the composition of the officers corps. Heretofore, becoming an officer primarily depended on social rank, personal or family networks, and economic wealth. Although these still played a role, the army reform in 1868 aimed at professionalizing the officer corps. This implied that promotion was strictly bound to the fulfillment of so-called objective criteria of which knowledge of the recruits' languages played an important role. The officer promotion guidelines stipulated that following transfer, officers had three years to learn the recognized language(s) of this regiment, battalion or other service branch. When they failed to do so, they were not promoted. About every second year, superiors assessed their subordinate officers' overall performance, and noted the results in personnel files (*Qualifikationslisten*). They noted military qualities, including how they treated their subordinates, and how they behaved towards superiors. All of the information provided in these assessments became decisive for a promotion. In addition to language proficiency, these files mentioned religion, birthplace and place of *Heimatzuständigkeit*, fathers' profession, and where the officers have been deployed throughout their careers.⁵²⁰ These files were of internal use only. Officers who were interested in any part of their assessment had to apply for ministerial approval. If an officer gained this approval, a superior officer would read out loud those parts of the assessment that interested the particular officer.⁵²¹

⁵²⁰ Myrdacz, *Handbuch für Militärärzte*, 197. So far, historians used these personnel files mostly only for officer biographies. Deák is an exception because for *Beyond Nationalism* he analyzed hundreds of these personnel files to find out the officer corps nationality backgrounds, social origin, and language knowledge.

⁵²¹ Myrdacz, *Handbuch für Militärärzte*, 207.

Military guidelines stipulated how complete information for these personnel files correctly. Guidelines required that superiors were to get to know their subordinates as well as possible, and to evaluate them without any “outer influence and personal prejudice.”⁵²² The army guidelines also listed the permitted categories to be used for languages and their quality. The following categories were employed for regimental languages: German, Hungarian, Bohemian (Czech), Polish, Ruthenian, Slovene, Slovak, Croatian, Romanian, and Italian.⁵²³ Superiors were asked to assess an officer’s proficiency in German first, followed by the languages of the regiment that the officer was assigned to. If an officer spoke other regimental languages, his evaluator was also to mention this. Proficiency in domestic languages was followed by foreign languages.⁵²⁴ Over the years, the parts of the military guidelines which explained the language assessment became less and less comprehensive, indicating that many army officials noted language knowledge incorrectly, and army bureaucrats felt the need to explain them more appropriately.

To the language category in the officers' personnel files it had to be added to which degree the officers spoke and wrote it. There were four possible categories: fluent/perfect (*vollkommen*), speaks it sufficiently for service use (*spricht zum Dienstgebrauch genügend*), makeshift (*notdürftig*), and does not speak (*spricht nicht*). In the last two cases, superiors had to note when the three-year-deadline to learn the language(s) would expire.⁵²⁵ There was a box at the end of each table where superiors had to indicate whether they proposed a promotion or not. In both cases, the superior had to add the reasons. When the deadline had already expired the phrase had to be added: passed by for promotion as long as this shortcoming has not been overcome (*in der Beförderung übergangen, solange der Mißstand nicht behoben*).⁵²⁶ This phrase was not only used when an officer failed to learn a language, but also when officers were on a vacation for longer than a year, went into war captivity, came before the court of honor

⁵²² Myrdacz, *Handbuch für Militärärzte*, 197.

⁵²³ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Militärgeistliche, A-16d* (1904). In earlier versions, there was no strict sequence given.

⁵²⁴ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes* (1884), 68.

⁵²⁵ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes* (1884), 68. An exception was made for these who were already serving in the army before the language reform in 1868. They were not required to fulfil the new language requirements: Wilhelm Piers, *Über militärische Autodidaktik*, *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* 23:3 (1882), 12-3.

⁵²⁶ *Beförderungsvorschrift für die Personen des Soldatenstandes im k. und k. Heere* (1895), 50. As well as: *Verordnungsblatt für das k.u.k. Heer, Beiblatt. Erlass vom 28.3.1912, Abt. 1, Nr. 1795/I. Aufgrund der Wahrnehmungen bei Durchsicht der Quallisten für 1911 wird folgendes angeordnet, Pkt. 3.*

(*Ehrengericht*), or fell seriously ill.⁵²⁷ The officer personnel files show that many officers did not learn a language, but indicate they were promoted later either because they had learned the language, or – as more often happened – managed to change their regiment or battalion. The files also indicate that many officers who failed to learn a language quit army service after a while.

What is of additional importance for this study is what the army expected to be sufficient (*zum Dienstgebrauch genügend*) that was the level required officers to be assessed as speaking a language. The army handbook stipulated that an officer had to be capable of giving theoretical lectures to recruits in a proper, yet not perfect, manner (*einen ganz korrekten Vortrag besitzt*). Perfect grammar knowledge was not required.⁵²⁸ The same phrase was used in the officers' promotion regulations (*Beförderungsvorschrift*).⁵²⁹ In later orders, a phrase was added that dealt with wartime. Officers had to be able to “instruct soldiers at the front, during field service, and combat.”⁵³⁰ However, learning a regimental language was only required until the officer reached the rank of captain. The Ministry of War decided that from the rank of captain upwards officers were not personally involved in the recruits' education any more, thus, proficiency in soldier languages would no longer be needed.⁵³¹

The number of languages an officer was required to speak changed between 1868 and 1914. Personnel files indicate that initially they were expected to learn all languages used in their regiment or battalion. There were many regiments that recognized two languages in addition to German.⁵³² Afterwards this requirement was reduced to one of the non-German languages in which an officer had to be proficient. In addition, it was ordered that even in cases where an officer was assigned to a purely German-speaking regiment or battalion he had to learn another language.⁵³³ A ministerial decree issued in 1884 that officers in the procurement and sanitary branches were to choose between Hungarian or a Slavic language regardless whether recruits of those tongues served in their units.⁵³⁴ In addition to these special rules for

⁵²⁷ *Beförderungsvorschrift für die Personen des Soldatenstandes im k. und k. Heere* (1895), 50.

⁵²⁸ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes*, 1884, 68.

⁵²⁹ *Beförderungsvorschrift für die Personen des Soldatenstandes im k. und k. Heere*, 1895, 50.

⁵³⁰ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 29-7/4, RKM-Erlass an alle Militärterritorialkommanden, 19 November 1903.

⁵³¹ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 33-16/5, War Ministry *Einsichtsakt*, 8 April 1898.

⁵³² For example: *Militärstatistisches Jahrbuch für 1895*, 186.

⁵³³ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 15th Corps Command Sarajevo, box 90, no. 61, 26 September 1908, Verzeichnis aller Erlässe, die sich auf die Beschreibung der Stabs- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes, dann der Kadetten im k.u.k. Heere beziehen. 1904, Abt. 1, 9865, Erlass bleibt in Kraft.

⁵³⁴ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 86-19, 1884, 15th Infantry Brigade to 14th Corps Command, 16 December 1884.

the smaller military branches, there were exceptions from these rules for the general staff officers who all were career officers. Although most of them were deployed in one of the regiments or battalions they were never responsible for training the rank and file, thus, were excluded from the other career officers' language requirements.⁵³⁵

The army expected general staff officers to learn foreign languages, in particular those spoken in (neighboring) countries that might become future war allies or opponents. Every general staff officer had at least to become proficient in one of the following foreign languages: Albanian, Bulgarian, English, French, Greek, Italian, Russian, or Turkish.⁵³⁶ Chief of General Staff Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf commented: "The international languages, Russian, Italian, English, and especially French."⁵³⁷ Thus, the only language taught to all future general staff officers was French. As early as 1887, the army decreed that officers who applied for the General Staff Officer Academy (*Kriegsschule*) should speak one regimental language in addition to the educational language German.⁵³⁸ Conrad considered requiring additional domestic language knowledge unacceptable, because he believed that the focus of the staff education had to be on foreign languages. Moreover, he emphasized, that general staff officers should not have "a one-sided preference for language masterminds, rather the main emphasis must be placed on the fact that applicants have the necessary intellectual, moral, and physical abilities."⁵³⁹ The Ministry of War ended this debate by stipulating that after having graduated, general staff officers should always "proceed with a good example towards younger officers in regiments and battalions. They should strive to learn the language of the regiment to the best of their abilities, so that they can supervise their subordinates, and instruct them during wartime combat. They should at least be able to give brief instructions in the regimental language, and to understand messages given in this language."⁵⁴⁰

The missing abilities to speak domestic languages did not cause major problems in peacetime, but chapter 7 and 8 will demonstrate that they met with difficulties during wartime when staff officers had to work together with reserve and *Honvédség*-officers. During a joint

⁵³⁵ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 33-16/5, War Ministry *Einsichtsakt*, 1. Abt., 8 April 1898.

⁵³⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/35, Franz Putz, Vienna Corps Command order, no. 1, 9 January 1907.

⁵³⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/35, Franz Putz, Memoire, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Über die erforderlichen Sprachkenntnisse im k.u.k. Generalstab und das Verhältnis der Generalstabsoffiziere zu den Regimentssprachen.

⁵³⁸ Broucek, *Theodor Ritter von Zeynek*, 31. Allmayer-Beck, Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte, 377.

⁵³⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/35, Franz Putz, Memoire, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf „Über die erforderlichen Sprachkenntnisse im k.u.k. Generalstab und das Verhältnis der Generalstabsoffiziere zu den Regimentssprachen“.

⁵⁴⁰ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 29-7/4, RKM-Erlass to all *Militärterritorialkommanden*, 19 November 1903.

delegation meeting in 1906 in Budapest, the Hungarian participants demanded that all general staff officers speak Hungarian to ensure in war time joint operations with the *Honvédség*. Conrad immediately rejected this claim, and continued to oppose the introduction of further language courses in the General Staff Academy.⁵⁴¹ Shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, Conrad issued “Instructions for the Training and the Education of the General Staff Officers” which left it to the officers to choose which additional regimental language they learn. Superiors should then only approve their choice.⁵⁴² General staff officers constituted only a minority among career officers. It is therefore more important to analyze closely the language abilities of the bulk of career officers who were mostly involved in the education of the rank and file.

The already mentioned personnel files are the only available source for a quantitative analysis of the officers' language proficiency between 1868 and 1918. Most of them are preserved in the War Archive in Vienna and arranged alphabetically. They contain the files of the career and reserve officers as well as of military specialists. The bulk of these officers were born between 1830 and 1890.⁵⁴³ Owing to their low number and different language requirements I omitted the military specialists whom I will discuss later in this chapter. My analysis distinguishes between two groups: first the second lieutenants (career officers as well as reservists), who were mainly responsible for educating the rank and file, second, the ranks starting with the first lieutenants up to the generals of which the overwhelming majority were career officers who spent most of their professional life in the army. I analysed a sample that consists of a total of 243 career and reserve officers of which 130 belonged to the first group. The second group consists of 113 officers. I analyzed a representative number by considering that some surnames tend to be more common among particular nationalities. The sample includes the following boxes: Blaschko to Blašković, Breitenegger to Brendl, Michalsky to Michel, Stunić to Sturm, Sugár to Sukup, Panc to Panek, Weinberger to Weiner, and Wohlfahrt to Wohlmutheder.⁵⁴⁴ I counted language abilities of Serbian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian, and Bosnian in one group and refer to them as Croatian/Serbian. I did not consider proficiency in non-Habsburg languages. Most frequently French, Russian, and English were noted. According

⁵⁴¹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/35:1, Franz Putz, Diary, 5 December 1906.

⁵⁴² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/1689:1, Karl Zausner, letter to Conrad, 18 December 1913.

⁵⁴³ For this particular survey I have omitted the cadets who, although involved in recruit education, were not in officer rank, but are also part of this collection.

⁵⁴⁴ ÖStA/KA/Quall, box 207, Blaschko to Blašković; box 274, Breitenegger to Brendl; box 2046, Michalsky to Michel; box 3393, Stunić to Sturm; box 3401, Sugár to Sukup; box 2343, Panc to Panek; box 3721, Weinberger to Weiner; and box 3821, Wohlfahrt to Wohlmutheder.

to the army's regulations I counted languages assessed as fluent and sufficient as speaking a language. However, quite often other categories were used, although forbidden, including well (*gut*), casual (*geläufig*), and correct (*korrekt*). I counted these categories as speaking a language.

Among the 130 second lieutenants there were thirty-six who spoke solely one language (mostly German), seventy-one who spoke two languages (mostly German and one other language), twenty-two spoke three languages, two spoke four, and one spoke five regimental languages. Thus, the vast majority of officers of lower rank who were responsible for training the rank and file spoke two languages. In addition to German, thirty-five spoke Hungarian, twenty-seven, Czech, fourteen, Italian, thirteen, Polish, ten, Croatian/Serbian, ten, Romanian, five, Slovak, four, Slovene, and two, Ruthenian. At first glance, these numbers indicate that there were not nearly enough officers to educate all recruits in their own languages. As already demonstrated in chapter 3, these figures appeared to be less drastic considering in which regiments or battalions these officers were deployed. The second officer group constitutes 113 officers who reached ranks ranging from first lieutenant to general. Nine of them spoke solely one language which was German, forty-seven spoke two languages, forty-seven spoke three languages, eleven, four languages, and one spoke five languages. Thus, the average officer of higher rank in this group spoke two or three languages. In addition to German, thirty-six spoke Czech, thirty-one, Hungarian, twenty-seven, Croatian/Serbian, sixteen, Polish, nineteen, Italian, eleven, Romanian, nine, Slovene, eight, Slovak, and six, Ruthenian.

The numbers shown above shed light only on officers' language proficiency by the end of their military careers. Thus, it has to be analysed how many of these officers spoke these languages already before their army career started, and how many were required to learn another language at one point in their professional life. Again, the personnel files are a useful source for analyzing how many officers were required to learn a language, how many succeeded or failed. Contrary to the recruits' personnel files that contained only one box for their entire army service (with the exception of NCOs), officers' linguistic abilities had to be assessed regularly by completing a new column. From my sample of a total of 130 second lieutenants, fifty-seven had been required to learn another language when they were assigned to a new regiment or battalion. Thirteen officers had to learn Czech, eight, Polish, Seven, Slovene, seven, Hungarian, seven, Croatian/Serbian, five, Romanian, five, Ruthenian, three, Slovak, and two, Italian. From a total of 113 first lieutenants up to general rank seventy-nine had been required to learn another regimental language. Seventeen officers were expected to learn Czech,

seventeen, Hungarian, twelve, Polish, ten Croatian/Serbian, seven, Romanian, six, Ruthenian, four, Italian, four, Slovene and two, Slovak. Both groups demonstrate that at least once in their career, a large number of officers had been required to learn a language.

As already indicated earlier, the language assessment in the officers' personnel files was in many cases far away of reflecting reality. There was no standardized language test, rather an officer commission that consisted of superiors responsible of assessing their subordinates' language proficiency.⁵⁴⁵ Army inspectors regularly had to intervene when the personnel files were not completed correctly or the language assessment did not reflect reality. As a result, the figures presented above have to be treated with caution. There were many examples where someone's language ability was attested incorrectly, wrong deadlines were set, or wrong categories used. For example, in 1884, a medical unit in Innsbruck was seeking a Czech-speaking officer. When the newly assigned officer whose personnel file noted that he had already learned Czech sufficiently in the cadet school, arrived, his superiors immediately rejected him with the comment: "Knowledge that has probably passed away."⁵⁴⁶ A lieutenant-colonel whose Hungarian knowledge was assessed as being fluent, left the joint army to become an officer in the Hungarian Territorial Defense. After some time, he sought to re-join the Habsburg army, because of his insufficient proficiency in Hungarian.⁵⁴⁷ Such incidents were often reported, and the Ministry of War regularly ordered that the assessments have to reflect reality.⁵⁴⁸ The promotion guidelines ordered superiors to assess the language skills without "outer influence and personal prejudice."⁵⁴⁹ In 1905 Jožef Pogačnik, a member of the Austrian parliament and delegate of the Croatian-Slovene Club, asserted that language assessment to be still dependent on someone's personal affection.⁵⁵⁰ In addition, ministerial archival records reveal that the assessment depended on the evaluation skills, and linguistic abilities of committee members.

My analysis of ministerial records shows that not only was language proficiency often wrongly assessed, but also other language rules were often ignored, including that officers had to speak only one of the other non-German regimental languages in a regiment, battalion or

⁵⁴⁵ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 94, 5 December 1895. Among these superiors was also a general staff officer.

⁵⁴⁶ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 86-19, *Sanitätstruppe* to 15th Corps Command Innsbruck, 10 December 1884.

⁵⁴⁷ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 12-1/31, RKM-Vortrag, 24 September 1896, Transferierung des Obstlt. Albert Vajna de Pava.

⁵⁴⁸ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 12-1/31, RKM, 25 September 1896.

⁵⁴⁹ Myrdacz, *Handbuch für Militärärzte*, 197.

⁵⁵⁰ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Pogačnik, 27524.

other service branch. For example, in 1897, the artillery inspector reported to the Ministry of War that a dragoon was assessed negatively (*Mangel*), because he did not speak Hungarian, although this officer already spoke the other regimental language, Romanian.⁵⁵¹ In the next year, the Human Resources Department of the Ministry of War sent out a reminder to all subordinate military institutions and informed them about the guidelines. It is likely that the situation mentioned above happened more often throughout the Monarchy as ministerial reminders like these were given regularly.⁵⁵² My analysis of officer personnel files indicates that there were many inconsistencies in the language assessment. However, it is almost impossible to provide precise numbers how many officers were required to learn a regimental language, and how many failed. From among my sample presented above, the 243 career and reserve officers, fifty-five were given a deadline to learn a language. This number has to be treated with caution. It appears that sometimes an officer did not speak a language, but no deadline was given. Sometimes someone left the army who did not speak the required language of his regiment, but no reason was noted. Thus, in addition to the quantitative analysis presented above and the reported shortcomings in ministerial records, a qualitative analysis by using particular examples can help to provide a more comprehensive picture of the shortcomings in officers' language requirements and the assessment.

Lothar Weindorfer was a career officer born in 1867 in Wolfsberg, in Carinthia, who attended Slovene classes in the cadet school. He served in many garrisons throughout the Monarchy during his career, among them Klagenfurt, Graz, Mezzolombardo, Trento, Riva del Garda, Maribor, Celje, and Lviv, before he was retired at the rank of captain. His first promotion assessment was in 1888 when his superiors noted fluent German as well as sufficient Slovene. He received the same assessment in 1889 and 1890. In 1891, he was also assessed as speaking Russian. Four years later, he was assigned to a new regiment, and Slovene was no longer mentioned, and he was given a deadline of three years to learn the regimental language, Italian. According to the rules, all languages an officer spoke had to be mentioned in his file, even when he did not need them in his new regiment. Seemingly, Weindorfer learned sufficient Italian within the deadline. In the same year, French was mentioned instead of Russian. In 1901, he was again assigned to a regiment that required Slovene. Although having been assessed as speaking Slovene in earlier years, he was given a deadline to learn it. What is not noted in the file is why that could have happened. Was he wrongly assessed earlier, or did he forget the

⁵⁵¹ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Inspector of Artillery, Corrections of officer personnel files, 1897.

⁵⁵² ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 33-16/5, *Einsichtsakt*, 8 April 1898.

language? His deadline passed without being assessed as speaking Slovene, and in 1907, he was assigned to a Galician infantry regiment, and again a deadline was given. This time he was required to learn both regimental languages, Polish and Ruthenian. Indeed, according to the rules one of them would have been sufficient. He did not learn a language, and the deadline passed, but he was assigned immediately afterward to another regiment that recruited from around German-speaking Graz.⁵⁵³ Although Weindorfer missed more than once the required language skills, it obviously did not harm his career.

Like Weindorfer many others made it to higher ranks without speaking the required regimental language(s) properly or at all, and whose language abilities were once noted, but afterwards downgraded. For example, Captain Johann Michel was born in Pest (today part of Budapest) in 1839. His personnel file indicates that he spoke German, Hungarian, and Italian fluently at the start of his army career. Five years later his Italian was downgraded to virtually non-existent.⁵⁵⁴ According to his superiors, Second Lieutenant Theodor Pandurov, who had been born in Timișoara in 1881, spoke fluent German, and basic Hungarian when he joined the army. His personnel file indicates that he learned the Hungarian regimental language sufficiently. In 1907, his Hungarian was assessed as being non-existent.⁵⁵⁵ Unlike in the other two cases mentioned above that of Michel and Weindorfer Pandurov's negative language assessment ended his army career prematurely.

The examples mentioned above indicate that even when someone's deadline to learn a language expired, he could have been promoted, as long as he managed to change his regiment or battalion. Exceptions from the rule were granted in many cases.⁵⁵⁶ Personnel files indicate that superiors in many cases did not insist consequently that officers learned a language or allowed officers to advance without learning it. This often happened when an officer had an overall excellent assessment. Indeed, the Ministry of War answered to queries regularly, such as one in 1901 of the Military Command in Zadar with "exceptions are possible only in cases where an otherwise very efficient officer, despite all efforts to learn the language fails as he lacks any language talent, and the condition of his unit is impeccable that can undoubtedly be traced back only to his personal influence."⁵⁵⁷ These officers were usually soon after assigned

⁵⁵³ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Lothar Weindorfer, born 1867.

⁵⁵⁴ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Johann Michel, born 1839.

⁵⁵⁵ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Theodor Pandurov, born 1881.

⁵⁵⁶ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 33-3/9, 1901, Dossier: Johann Cantarutti.

⁵⁵⁷ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 33-3/9-4, Ministry of War to Military Command in Zadar, 8 December 1901.

to another regiment where they did not longer had to learn the language in which they already failed.

The example from the Military Command in Zadar mentioned a case when supervisors intervened in favor for an officer, but there were also cases reported in autobiographical records that officers themselves became active by using their personal or family networks. It is rare that officers made their intervention public on their own, usually their comrades described such efforts. One of these rare cases was General Carl von Bardolff, a high-ranking military bureaucrat. In his memoirs, he meticulously outlined his – in the end successful – intervention. He recalled a talk in an officer club in Graz in 1887 when being a young officer. The other officers present pointed to his complete lack of any Slavic language. In the course of a war, they told him, he would play “a very poor role in front of his platoon of fifty Croats.” Bardolff asserted that it was his comrades who motivated him to intervene directly at the Ministry of War to be assigned to a solely German-speaking regiment, what he did. The ministerial bureaucrats quickly rejected his claim with the comment that he should learn the language. One of his comrades then suggested going straight before Francis Joseph, while another one told him not to do so, because it would be outrageous to ask for something that is an important part of officer duties. Bardolff decided to follow the first suggestion. Equipped with a letter from his uncle, a high-ranking officer, Bardolff travelled from Graz to Vienna to speak to Francis Joseph in person.

This time Bardolff’s intervention was successful. Moreover, Francis Joseph approved his deployment in Vienna. Afterwards, he immediately went to visit his uncle who worked in Francis Joseph’s Military Chancellery. There he met with the head of the office, Arthur Bolfras, who reprimanded him: “Do you have any idea how many reserve officers we have? [...] If they all go to the Emperor, for about half a year, the emperor would have nothing else to do, but meet with reserve officers who do not want to learn a language.” In the end, Bardolff was rewarded for his unwillingness to learn another language. He served for many years in a German-speaking regiment in Vienna and was then transferred to a general staff office. However, staff officers had to return to troop service after a while, and he again struggled with the language requirements. Again, he came before the Ministry of War asking to be transferred to a regiment which uses solely German. This time, he was not welcomed, and even worse, assigned to a Transylvanian regiment.⁵⁵⁸ This regiment was reported to consist of about seventy

⁵⁵⁸ Bardolff, *Soldat im alten Österreich*, 44.

percent native Romanian speakers, and twenty-five percent German speakers. Thus, the vast majority of the recruits did not speak German, furthermore at that time, parts of this regiment were deployed in the Ottoman Sanjak Plevlje, Southern of Bosnia-Herzegovina where Bardolff was confronted with civil residents who spoke exactly that language, he had refused to learn at the beginning of his officer career.⁵⁵⁹

Bardolff's episode demonstrates that officers in some cases were able to intervene successfully. In this case, Francis Joseph accepted the request, while the ministerial bureaucrats were stern. However, in most cases, Francis Joseph did not support such claims. Many officers therefore did not even try to intervene at the highest bureaucratic level. They were aware that in contrast to Francis-Joseph's well-known standard statement "it was a pleasure," in terms of regimental languages, he was direct, and even cynical. For example, the career officer Eduard Zanantoni was promoted head of a Corps Command's general staff that oversaw Croatia-Slavonia. He aimed to thank Francis Joseph in person, thus met him in an audience. He recalled that the monarch asked many questions: "Whether I know the country and its people, and if I also speak the local language. When I answered with no, Francis Joseph said rather indignantly: And how could you then have become the chief?"⁵⁶⁰ Indeed, Zanantoni did not anything wrong. According to the language rules, he had reached a rank when he was no longer required to speak a language. Although in his case, it would have been suitable for his task as general staff officers were expected to oversee the political opinion and mood of civil residents.

As soon as an officer reached the rank of captain or became a general staff officer, and had other outstandingly good abilities, he was promoted. For all others, particularly at the beginning of their careers when personnel files indicate that they were assessed negatively, they were never promoted, and were not assigned to another regiment in accordance with their language abilities. As consequence, many of them left the army. For example, Second Lieutenant Alois Weinelt, born in 1868 in Moravia, was deployed in Olomouc and Cracow. As solely German speaker he had joined the army as a reservist in 1893 but aimed to become a career officer. In 1896, it was noted that he still did not speak the regimental languages, Czech and Polish. His superior officer had incorrectly already mentioned this as a deficiency before the deadline expired. Weinelt did not succeed in learning the language within three years. His career

⁵⁵⁹ See: Scheer, *Österreich-Ungarns Präsenz im Sandžak von Novipazar (1879-1908)*. As well as: Scheer, A Micro-Historical Experience in the Late Ottoman Balkans.

⁵⁶⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/6:1, Eduard Zanantoni, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished manuscript, 1922, 142.

ended when he was judged “not suitable to become a career officer.” He remained second lieutenant in the army for another five years, but was never promoted, because of his language shortcoming.⁵⁶¹

For most of the time analyzed in this book, Francis Joseph's standpoint towards the language system was of prime importance. Following 1898, when Archduke Francis Ferdinand's Military Chancellery was set up, the heir to the throne began interfering in army politics. Although he had no direct means of adopting the regimental language system, many officers began to take into consideration Francis Ferdinand's opinion as the soon-to-be-expected monarch. Officer autobiographical records often referred to anecdotes, when meeting with the heir to the throne. While Francis Joseph always emphasized the high value of language learning, and aimed at respecting all regimental languages, the Archduke was usually depicted of having a radical different standpoint. Günther Kronenbitter has written that Francis Ferdinand always aimed at upholding the privileged position of German as the dominant language in the Habsburg army.⁵⁶² Archival material indicates that it would have been likely that Francis Ferdinand would have more tended to turn a blind eye on a solely German-speaking officer who was unwilling to learn another language, in particular when this officer had to learn Hungarian, a language he himself did not speak and often disqualified. Autobiographical records also indicate that, unlike Francis Joseph, he neither especially welcomed officers who were learning a language nor when they already spoke more than one language. For example, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf's wife Gina remembered an episode dealing with the languages her husband spoke. When Conrad became chief of general staff for the first time in 1906, he started learning Hungarian. When he met the heir of the throne, Francis Ferdinand addressed him: “I have heard, Conrad, that you learn Hungarian. Better to learn Chinese than this *Nöcknöcknöck*.”⁵⁶³ I have not found any evidence so far that Francis Joseph ever directed such an offensive comment to an officer. It is therefore not surprising that the officer mentioned above, Carl Bardolff, who refused to learn another domestic language, and even intervened at the monarch, was later awarded head of Francis Ferdinand's Military Chancellery.

In the course of the shortening of the compulsory military service from three to two years in 1903, the importance of officers' language abilities for training duties increased. In

⁵⁶¹ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Alois Weinelt, born 1868.

⁵⁶² Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 287.

⁵⁶³ Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Mein Leben mit Conrad von Hötzendorf*, 190.

addition, such a shortening requested a better organization of the language system. For this reason, the internal and published debate on the regimental languages gained a climax. From now on, even officers, who were serving in a service branch that only recognized German, were required to learn another language. There was only one exception when someone already spoke a second regimental language. In other cases, the corps commanders decided which language courses officers and cadets had to attend. However, this rule gave superiors autonomy over the officer promotion, and was prone to be misused based on personal affection and prejudices. Thus, in 1903 the Ministry of War decreed to set up committees at the corps commands. Headed by a high-ranking officer the examiners had to prove the officers' abilities of the regimental languages. The focus had to be on speaking when instructing non-German-speaking soldiers and instruct them during field service and combat. Already before 1903, but particularly in the years after the turn of the century, army guidelines had started to focus more on wartime efficiency of the army language system. Thus, the Ministry of War informed corps commanders: "Is the knowledge of the soldiers' mother tongues for officers and NCOs already of outstanding value for peacetime service, education, and prosperity, in wartime, it will become an indispensable necessity, in particular after the introduction of the two-year service, during which the recruits can not acquire much knowledge in German."⁵⁶⁴

Francis Joseph decreed in 1905 that in assigning any officer to a new regiment, battalion or other service branch the most important factor had to be the officer's existing language abilities.⁵⁶⁵ The Minister of War, Heinrich Pitreich, added: "Because the soldier should be trained and educated in that language, which he most easily and securely understands, in which he is accustomed to think, and therefore does not have to translate, which ensures that misunderstandings are as much as possible avoided." Indeed, ministerial bureaucrats as well as politicians and journalists had already regularly demanded such assignment practice following the army reform in 1868.⁵⁶⁶ However, at around the same time some requirements became less strict. The officer promotion guidelines (*Beförderungsvorschrift*) from 1908 stipulated that officers who were transferred to a unit without their own request can only be excluded from promotion "when they obviously do not show any willingness to learn another language."⁵⁶⁷ This order again enabled superior officers to flexibly interpret language rules, and to decide out of other motives than objective criteria.

⁵⁶⁴ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 29-7/4, War Ministry Decree to all military territorial commands, 19 November 1903.

⁵⁶⁵ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 9-2/2, 1905.

⁵⁶⁶ ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs, 50-31/1, 1905, Addendum: Regimental Languages.

⁵⁶⁷ *Beförderungsvorschrift für die Personen des Soldatenstandes im k.u.k. Heere* (1908).

The Reserve Officers

The first part of this chapter has focused on career officers, rather than on the reserve officers who in addition to their own officer education were primarily responsible for the recruits training and education. The status of reserve officers was implemented in the course of the army reform in 1868. The Defense Act has stipulated that men who graduated from secondary schools had the opportunity to avoid serving for three years among the rank and file. They were offered to serve only for one year by leaving the army as a reserve second lieutenant. This is the reason why they were often called the One-Year-Volunteers. This opportunity, to avoid a three-year army service, was also granted to artists. In contrast to the secondary school graduates, they had to apply for permission from the Ministry of War.

Historian Ernst Zehetbauer has emphasized the purpose of the reserve officers to be the “link” between the officer society and the civil middle-class society, which was precisely the army bureaucrats’ aim. In addition, they were interested in to ensure that the army has a sufficient number of quickly mobilized officers of lower ranks during wartime.⁵⁶⁸ In 1910, for example, reserve officers constituted a total of 13,717.⁵⁶⁹ In his memoirs, the reserve officer Robert Nowak concluded that the reserve officers always “reflected the rank and file's linguistic composition” (*Spiegelbild der Mannschaft*). Nowak’s assertion shows a far too rosy scenery, when comparing it to other archival records.⁵⁷⁰ According to Zehetbauer the reserve officers’ nationality-backgrounds were as follows: 60.2 percent Germans, 23.7 percent Magyars, 9.8 percent Czechs and Slovaks, 3.1 percent Poles and Ruthenians, 2.1 percent Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, and 0.5 percent Italians.⁵⁷¹ As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, these categorizations had to be treated cautiously as army officials tended to count speakers who know also German fluently as being of German nationality. However, these numbers prove correct what Norman Stone has argued that “no nationality without a large middle class could provide many reserve officers; and almost all of the civilian officers were drawn from three nationalities: German, Magyar, and Czech.”⁵⁷² What nationality statistics do not show is the reservists’ religious composition. Indeed, by 1900, around eighteen percent of the Austro-

⁵⁶⁸ Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 9-10.

⁵⁶⁹ Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 119.

⁵⁷⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

⁵⁷¹ Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 119.

⁵⁷² Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 99.

Hungarian reserve officers were Jewish (not including the Jewish medical officers in the reserve), which was few times higher than the proportion of Jews in the Monarchy (4.5 percent).⁵⁷³ Although Deák already showed a high percentage, autobiographical records tended to exaggerate by showing ever higher numbers. For example, the procurement-officer Josef Leb noted: “It is true that in the school for one-year volunteers there had been up to thirty percent Jews.”⁵⁷⁴

The nationality and social backgrounds of career officers became increasingly mixed until 1914, and so were these of the reservists. In 1868 reserve officers primarily recruited from the wealthier middle class or even upper class, while later they increasingly originated from the lower middle class. All of them needed to speak the army language to a certain degree⁵⁷⁵ which soon became a problem as an increasing number of young men graduated from secondary schools where they had not learned that language. The Ministry of War regularly reported a steady decrease of particular nationalities among reservists, in particular native speakers of Czech, Hungarian, and Polish. Army officials regularly debated of how to attract all nationalities to become reserve officers because they were in constant need for officers of lower rank to train the conscripts in their native tongues. The reported motives to become reserve officers were not always loyalty to the state and the army or an interest in the military, rather they wanted to avoid the many years of army service among peasant and working-class men. These men, irrespective of their linguistic backgrounds, usually joined the army when they were already politicalized, some of them (including native German speakers) were even very active in their local national movements. It is likely that what *Danzer's Armee-Zeitung* mentioned for the rank and file was also valid for these young men who had an intellectual background: they had “often had already undergone an anti-Austrian, nationalist pre-school.”⁵⁷⁶ While career officers, according Dreisziger, would have resisted nationalist fervor, some reserve officers and part of the rank and file were more likely to become imbued with nationalism.⁵⁷⁷ This study demonstrates that even exaggerated national loyalty did not necessarily prevent soldiers from being loyal to the army and its language rules.

⁵⁷³ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 133.

⁵⁷⁴ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers, 13.

⁵⁷⁵ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

⁵⁷⁶ P., Am Vorabend der zweijährigen Dienstzeit, *Danzer's Armee-Zeitung*, 12 January 1911, 1-8, 1.

⁵⁷⁷ Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 8.

All who aimed at becoming reserve officers had to attend the annual recruitment for the rank and file at their place of residence (*Heimatzuständigkeit*). In contrast to the rank and file's recruitment process, there are only rare examples of autobiographical records which deal with the reservists, but it is likely that the same language shortcomings became apparent as for the rank and file (discussed in chapter 3). Robert Nowak, for example, was among the last peacetime cohort. His examination took place in 1913 in Moravia: "There was a lot of activity in the large hall of the municipal building in Brünn [Brno]. On that day, only the one-year-volunteers were examined. Several hundred gathered here, Germans and Czechs [...] These two nations [...] usually lived side by side and did not mix up. [...] But here, in the *Redoutensaal*, the spirit of k.u.k. Army was already traceable, they enjoyed equal rights and were treated the same."⁵⁷⁸ As shown for the rank and file, they were separated along native tongues, thus, German- before Czech-speaking volunteers were sworn in. Following the implementation of the compulsory military service in the occupied lands in the early 1880s, army bureaucrats extended concessions for young men to become reserve officers. They wanted to have as many as reserve officers from Bosnia-Herzegovina, to ensure that the local recruits were educated by so-called own commanders. As a promotion into an officer's rank was very costly – uniforms and weapons were to be purchased privately – many reservists from Bosnia-Herzegovina got the right to apply for financial support from their local government.⁵⁷⁹

At least officially, reserve officers in contrast to the young career officers were allowed to decide freely to which regiment or battalion they liked to be assigned to. Autobiographical sources I have examined indicate that sometimes local commanders practiced different assignment methods. Career officer and later novelist Rudolf Henz was born in 1897 in Lower Austria. He recalled in his autobiographical novel published in 1935 his assignment as one-year-volunteer: "There was a reason that I wore a fez and spoke broken Croatian. It was eight days before Christmas, in the Krieau [in Vienna], when the first lieutenant grouped us about 120 one-year-volunteers, and ten by ten we were assigned to Italian, Slovenian, Bosnian, and Romanian regiments. I was assigned to the Infantry Regiment No 87, one of the Slovene regiments. It was stationed in Cilli [Celje]. Budapest [where Bosniaks were garrisoned] lured me more, and luckily I found a comrade who preferred the Slovenians over the Bosniaks."⁵⁸⁰ This reference indicates that there were the more fancyer places most reservists sought to be

⁵⁷⁸ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726, Robert Nowak, *Der letzte Friedensjahrgang*, undated unpaginated manuscript.

⁵⁷⁹ ABiH/ZVS, Opšta Grada, 32-17, 15th Corps Command to Government, 9 May 1907.

⁵⁸⁰ Henz, *Ein Roman von Krieg und Liebe*, 34.

assigned to, and the other, less convenient places. It is likely, that one-year-volunteers who spoke Ruthenian, Romanian, or Polish, therefore languages the army bureaucrats often desperately needed, not in all cases really decided on their own where to be deployed. Superiors tended to assign them to Galician and Transylvanian regiments where their language abilities were needed. Thus, proficiency in particular languages often resulted in that these future reservists were assigned to the less attractive places, among them very often these who stemmed from these provinces. What was a bitter experience of these men, on the other hand, ensured that recruits from these provinces were trained in their native tongues.

The education of the reservists started in early autumn every year. In the first two months they were taught military basic knowledge, and how to educate recruits. In the subsequent six months they already exercised at company level with recruits. For the remaining time they were expected to educate and train recruits themselves.⁵⁸¹ When being a young officer, Plzeň-born General Julius Lustig-Prean von Preanfeld taught in a reservist school in Graz which was attached to the Infantry Regiment No 7, and had only German as regimental language. In contrast to the recruits, he recalled, the reservists hailed from across the Monarchy. About half of them were native German speakers. The rest had Hungarian, Czech, Slovene, Romanian, and Italian language backgrounds. Prean assumed that most of them opted for Graz in order to improve their German, although he recalled that many of them were assigned to this regiment without speaking it. He remembered that Czechs mastered German fastest, while Hungarian and Italian speakers needed much longer to learn it.⁵⁸² While the army's assignment system perhaps met the interests of future reserve officers, to escape their home provinces for a while and to learn German, this meant on the other hand that many recruits were confronted with educators who did not speak their languages adequately. As for Prean's example, training conditions worsened as many recruits there spoke their local dialects rather than standard German (*Hochdeutsch*).

At the end of the year the reservists had to pass an exam. Between 1868 and 1878 4,785 men applied in Austria to become reserve officers, while in Hungary the number was 4,506. A total of 4,265 Austrians passed the exam, while in Hungary only 1,602 men passed. Some others passed the exam to a degree that they qualified to become an NCO, while others did not qualify

⁵⁸¹ Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 50-1.

⁵⁸² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/5:1, Julius Lustig-Prean von Preanfeld, Aus den Lebenserinnerungen eines alten k.u.k. Offiziers, unpublished manuscript, winter 1940/41, 9.

at all and had to serve among the rank and file which meant being in army service for another two years.⁵⁸³ Archival material I have examined indicates that the reasons for this high drop out rate were as colorful as the applicants' linguistic backgrounds. Some of them failed, because they were assessed as untalented to become officers, others were rejected because of political reasons, when superiors accused them as being nationalists. A high number of recruits failed, because of their missing language abilities. That was especially the case for applicants from Hungary. While many Austrian citizens regardless of their native tongues still spoke German, at least basically, an increasing number of native Hungarian-speaking conscripts who graduated from secondary schools in Hungary had learned only Hungarian as second language, while non-native Hungarian speakers learned the state language Hungarian. Native German-speaking volunteers from Hungary had it easier.

As early as 1889, the Minister of War Friedrich von Bauer, informed Francis Joseph about the high drop out rate, and decrease of German-speaking applicants. He suggested that applicants should be gathered in the future in classes according to their first language, rather than educating them jointly in German. Teaching officers should be elderly officers who spoke their languages.⁵⁸⁴ Corps commands were also ordered to spend more emphasis on the linguistic abilities of the committee members who were responsible for the exams. For example, the Sibiu Corps Command needed to ensure a sufficient number of Romanian, Hungarian, and German-speaking examiners.⁵⁸⁵ Officially, this was already the rule since the army reform in 1868 when local commands were required to put the exam committees together accordingly, meaning that at least one member spoke a reservist's native tongue.⁵⁸⁶ However, army bureaucrats still expected non-German-speaking reservists to learn the army language adequately within a couple of months.⁵⁸⁷

Army archival records show that the linguistic diversity of the reservists posed a challenge to army bureaucrats. For example, in 1885 reservist Marian Masovic joined his regiment which recruited from around Graz. His German was assessed as so poor that his superiors allowed his transfer to enable him to pass his volunteer year successfully. He was deployed in the Infantry Regiment No 22 that recruited from around Sinj, in Dalmatia, where

⁵⁸³ Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 37-9.

⁵⁸⁴ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 82-1/1, RKM to MKSM, 10 February 1889.

⁵⁸⁵ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 12th Corps Command Hermannstadt, box 72, no. 40, 4 June 1895.

⁵⁸⁶ N.N., Militärische Notizen. Durchführungs-Bestimmungen zum neuen Wehrgesetz in Oesterreich-Ungarn, *Militair-Wochenblatt* 2 (1869), 14-5.

⁵⁸⁷ Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 82.

most recruits spoke his native tongue.⁵⁸⁸ In 1893, a company commander of Infantry Regiment No 27 reported from Ljubljana to his regimental commander, because two Hungarian-speaking volunteers asked for relocation. These reservists had declared being unable to follow the German classes. The request was approved, although the personnel files of both indicate that they spoke German to a certain degree.⁵⁸⁹ In addition to officers, sometimes even the fathers of reservists handed in requests for relocations.⁵⁹⁰ Corps command orders regularly mentioned that such cases occurred, in particular in terms of the reservists' poor German abilities. Subordinate army offices were therefore regularly reminded to ignore the language assessments as noted in the personnel files, but to check themselves as soon as possible.⁵⁹¹

In addition to army bureaucrats, journalists regularly discussed reservists' language abilities, because they did not speak German, the languages of the recruits, or both. In many cases, regardless of the language used, journalists described these shortcomings with a nationalist undertone. For example, the *Agramer Zeitung* was based in Zagreb, but printed in German, and according to Milka Car tended to reflect in their coverage the conflict between imperial and Croatian/South Slavic loyalties.⁵⁹² In 1896, an anonymous author published a lengthy article by picking up the story of a one-year-volunteer who spoke solely Croatian. While starting the report with more empathy for this young man who was expected to communicate with officers in a language he did not speak, and upon becoming an officer would never become accepted, the author concluded with a "serious reminder to young Croats: Learn as many foreign languages as possible, so that you can demonstrate your value everywhere, [...] because to speak foreign languages does not hinder you from placing the most beloved, our Croatian mother tongue, above all the other languages."⁵⁹³

Both Francis Joseph and his ministerial bureaucrats were aware of the need to provide a sufficient number of officers who could speak the recruits' languages. They classified as more important that reserve officers recruited from all Habsburg nationalities, instead of being able to adequately communicate in German. Finally, army bureaucrats had accepted the changed educational system across the Monarchy and the overall decrease of German speakers. They

⁵⁸⁸ ÖStA/KA/AdT, IR 27, box 255, 267, k.u.k. *Militärverpflegungsmagazin* in Vienna to Infantry Regiment No 27 in Graz, 26 March 1885.

⁵⁸⁹ ÖStA/KA/AdT, IR 27, box 255, 83, 7th *Feldkompanie* to Regimental Command in Ljubljana, 21 October 1893.

⁵⁹⁰ ÖStA/KA/AdT, IR 27, box 255, no. 83, Paul Poth to Ministry of War, 6 December 1893.

⁵⁹¹ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 86, 21 October 1890.

⁵⁹² Car, Narratives of Modernization in Periodicals. On the German-Language *Agramer Tagblatt* in 1918.

⁵⁹³ N.N. Local-Chronik. Ein gegebener Fall, *Agramer Zeitung*, 2 October 1896, 4.

ordered that “nobody should be excluded from the one-year-volunteer service, only because for not speaking German.”⁵⁹⁴ In 1909, the army leadership finally responded to the changed primary and secondary school education across the Habsburg Monarchy. There was not only a decline in the number of German speakers, but also an overall decrease of one-year volunteers from among all nationalities. Afterwards German knowledge was no longer required of reservists, but also the degree they had to speak a particular regimental language was reduced. However, it was expected that the reservists would at least “acquire enough language knowledge to be able to understand and give messages appropriate for a wartime scenario,” both in German and in another regimental language.⁵⁹⁵

In contrast to the career officers, most reservists after a year or maximum two took off their uniforms. They were only from time to time called back for trainings and maneuvers. Most of their lifetime, they spent in civil professions. They returned to their estates, offices, or universities. They became landowners, physicians, journalists or politicians. Many of them profited from the German knowledge they acquired during their military service. To some of them, I refer to throughout this book as journalists or politicians. They regularly commented and criticized the language system of the army publicly but were able to look back on their own experience as reserve officers.

Military Specialists in Officer Rank

The regimental language system encompassed more than military education and training of the recruits. In addition, the army had to ensure that members of the rank and file were able to express themselves in their native tongues when brought before a military court, needing spiritual or medical care. The army therefore had to provide a sufficient number of physicians, members of the clergy, and auditors who spoke the regimental languages, and had to assign them adequately at places where they were needed. These military specialists were a very heterogenous group not only owing to their professional education but owing to their varied social and linguistic backgrounds. One of the few things they shared was that they were in officer rank. While some of them spent their entire professional career in the army, others served in the military for only a year or two – many of these were reservists.

⁵⁹⁴ Griebel, *Vorschriften in Militär-Angelegenheiten für den Seelsorge-Clerus*.

⁵⁹⁵ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 29-7/4, War Ministry Decree to all military territorial commands, 19 November 1903
Addendum: *Verordnungsblatt für das k.u.k Heer*, Beiblatt, Erlass, 22 September 1909, Abt. 5, No. 3929., Pkt. 4.

The Ministry of War imposed very different language requirements on military specialists in officer rank. Some needed solely excellent German, while others needed to speak the regimental languages. While some of them almost never dealt with the rank and file, others had to do with them in life-threatening situations. Rather than being deployed in an infantry regiment or battalion, many of these military specialists served in one of the so-called special service branches (*Spezialwaffen*) which recruited from across the Monarchy. The recruits assigned to the units of special military service branches had a wider variety of language backgrounds than the infantry regiments because they were often deployed according to their civil profession. This diversity posed a challenge to army bureaucrats' organizational abilities.⁵⁹⁶ For example, the institutions of the medical branch were scattered across the Monarchy. Physicians were not only employed in military hospitals. They were also assigned to regiments and battalions. There, they were responsible for the medical treatment of all army members in a garrison, and had to ensure sanitation and hygiene not only in the barracks but also in the surrounding area.⁵⁹⁷ In first place, therefore their professional abilities were important, instead of their language abilities to communicate with the rank and file.

Many military physicians and pharmacists were reserve officers. Medical students among the one-year-volunteers were usually assigned to one of the military hospitals as assistants nearby their university. Military hospitals were located in all larger garrison towns. These reservists who had already finished their academic education were assigned to a military hospital somewhere in the Monarchy. The same was the case for pharmacists. In addition to being educated with the other soon-to-become reserve officers, they had to attend lectures and practical exercises that career military physicians and pharmacists held. To their reserve officer exam military medical and pharmaceutical knowledge was added. In 1879, there had been all together 1,872 reserve physicians, pharmacists, and veterinarians in the Habsburg army.⁵⁹⁸ In addition to reservist-physicians, there were career physicians who spent virtually all of their professional life in the army. However, because they were a limited number, these men were usually responsible for management and administrative work.

⁵⁹⁶ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 86-19, 15th Infantry Brigade to 14th Corps Command, 16 December 1884.

⁵⁹⁷ Myrdacz, *Handbuch für Militärärzte*.

⁵⁹⁸ Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 51-3.

The sanitary branch (*Sanitätstruppe*) recruited from across the Monarchy, physicians as well as nurses. In addition, this military branch needed many recruits, including for the kitchens, as guards, and in the stables. According to army statistics from 1883 the sanitary branch comprised forty-one percent “Germans”, forty percent “Slavs,” fifteen percent “Hungarians,” and four percent “Romanians.”⁵⁹⁹ As explained above these percentages did reflect neither all the language abilities nor an affiliation with a particular nationality. They only indicate that about half of the members spoke a Slavic language, and that there were many Hungarian speakers. All medical personnel were required to have perfect German knowledge.⁶⁰⁰ These percentages could have been sufficient as long as they were deployed accordingly which was not an easy task. Sickened recruits from all units stationed in a particular garrison were usually sent to the nearby hospital or sanitary unit. As regularly companies were sent to other Habsburg provinces, garrison towns were confronted with ever-changing linguistic backgrounds of their patients. In a letter exchanged among a sanitary unit, its local military command, and the Ministry’s Department of Human Resources it was emphasized in 1884: “A company which consisted in 1881 out of German and Croats only, today has only German and Polish soldiers, and perhaps in the next only Germans and Slovaks.”⁶⁰¹

The army leadership was aware of the impossibility to issue general orders regarding the assignment of the medical personnel and their language abilities. They preferred to decide on a case-by-case basis.⁶⁰² The Ministry of War informed commanders of the sanitary branch to ensure whenever possible to employ personnel who cover all or at least the “most important languages.” This assignment procedure had to ensure that there was at any time someone on duty whom physicians and nurses could use as interpreter in case of an emergency. The Ministry of War regularly ordered its subordinate commands to take the officers' language abilities into account when assigning them, but owing to the ever-changing linguistic composition of deployed companies, this was not sufficient to ensure that their language knowledge met local needs.⁶⁰³ Regulations stipulated that in addition to German, the medical personnel had to speak another language to a decree to ensure communication with patients.⁶⁰⁴ Officers’ personnel files indicate that this order often remained theory, but the army tended to assign reserve officers to

⁵⁹⁹ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 86-19, Gutachten der 2. Abt. RKM, 1884.

⁶⁰⁰ Myrdacz, *Handbuch für Militärärzte*, 181.

⁶⁰¹ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 86-19, *Sanitätstruppe* to Command of the 15th Infantry Brigade, Innsbruck, 10 December 1884.

⁶⁰² ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 86-19, *Sanitätstruppe* to Command of the 15th Infantry Brigade, Innsbruck, 10 December 1884.

⁶⁰³ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 86-19, Gutachten der 2. Abt. RKM, 1884.

⁶⁰⁴ *Dienst-Reglement für das k.u.k. Heer* (1889), 368.

ensure the recruits' language rights. For example, the Vienna-born reserve-physician Walter Stupka spoke solely German and was assigned to the military hospital in Vienna.⁶⁰⁵ The reserve-physician Carl Fiedler, born in Prague in 1867, was assessed as speaking fluent Czech, and sufficient German. He was assigned to the Military Hospital in Prague.⁶⁰⁶ Career military physicians were usually deployed across the Monarchy regardless of their language knowledge. Another attempt was to send already employed personnel to language classes. A sanitary unit reported in 1884 their attempt to require physicians and other officers to learn another language, particularly Hungarian, or a Slavic language.⁶⁰⁷ Such attempts often failed.

Personnel files indicate that many career physicians spoke already more than one language when they joined the army. However, even they became sometimes challenged when they were not deployed accordingly or had to change garrison more than once. For example, the physician Emil Blasius was born in 1849 in Budapest. He started his career in the Hungarian Territorial Defense. In 1872, he joined the Habsburg army where he served until his retirement with a general rank (*Generalstabsarzt*) in 1909. His personnel file indicates that in the early years he spoke German and Hungarian fluently, as well as English and French. In the subsequent years, it was added that he learned Czech, Croatian, and Italian to a degree to communicate with his patients. He certainly needed this language as in the course of his army service he was assigned to regiments with recruits who spoke almost solely Czech and Hungarian. Later in his career he was promoted chief physician in Osijek, in Croatia. Finally, he headed the military hospital in Transylvanian Sibiu.⁶⁰⁸

By the end of his career, the military physician Nathan Weindling reached a high rank that of a regimental physician (*Regimentsarzt*). Born in 1866 in Klasno, Galicia, he studied medicine in Cracow. When he joined the army, he was already fluent in German and Polish, but spoke also French. In addition, superiors rated him as speaking sufficient Ruthenian. During his career he served in Przemyśl, in Galicia, and Nyíregyháza, in Hungary. His first regiment, the Galician Infantry Regiment No 58, recruited from around Ivano Frankivsk, and comprised many native Ruthenian speakers. Later he was assigned to a Hussar regiment that recruited from around Budapest and comprised almost only native Hungarian speakers. His personnel

⁶⁰⁵ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Walter Stupka, born 1885.

⁶⁰⁶ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Carl Fiedler, born 1867.

⁶⁰⁷ ÖStA/KA/RKM, 1. Abt., 86-19, *Sanitätstruppe* to Command of the 15th Infantry Brigade, Innsbruck, 10 December 1884.

⁶⁰⁸ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Emil Blasius, born 1849.

file indicates that his language knowledge was sufficient for a Galician regiment. By the time he was deployed in Budapest, his rank was already high enough that he was not required to learn Hungarian.⁶⁰⁹ In addition to the above analysed examples of multilingual military career physicians, there were many others promoted who did not have the needed language abilities.

In addition to human medical specialists, the army had to employ veterinarians. They were responsible for the physical conditions of many thousands of horses and dogs used in the army. To this branch many recruits were assigned to serve as horse or dog keepers, thus, veterinarians dealt with these conscripts and had to communicate with them. The career veterinarian Ignaz Weinberger, born in 1866 in a small village in the Hungarian province of Pozsony, spoke German and Hungarian fluently when he joined the army. In 1905, he was assessed as speaking basic Slovenian, but only two years later his Slovenian was categorized as fluent. Until 1909 he acquired sufficient Romanian, and basic Slovak knowledge.⁶¹⁰ In contrast to human medical personnel no specific orders were issued stipulating the degree they had to speak these languages. Some spoke another language than German, others did not. Archival sources indicate that veterinarians were officially required to learn their regimental or unit language. However, usually army bureaucrats did not care as much as in the cases of career officers and physicians, or as the next example demonstrates the members of the clergy.

The members of the military clergy were a very heterogeneous group, not only because of the many denominations they represented and the different religious obligations they had to ensure. They also differed owing to their status in the army. There were military clergy who spent virtually their entire professional lives in the army, but the bulk was assigned for a shorter period, while at the same time headed a local religious community. According to army statistics, for example in 1905, the members of the military clergy numbered 360 men.⁶¹¹ This number was considered to be sufficient in peacetime. The table presented in chapter 3 has shown that the overwhelming majority of soldiers were Roman-Catholics as Roman-Catholicism was the most widespread religion in the Habsburg Monarchy. They were followed by Jewish, Protestant Augsburg Confession, while Greek-Orthodox, Greek-Catholic, and Protestant Helvetic

⁶⁰⁹ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Nathan Weindling, born 1866. I thank Paul Weindling for providing me with his oral family history.

⁶¹⁰ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Ignaz Weinberger, born 1866.

⁶¹¹ *Militärstatistisches Jahrbuch für 1904*, 149.

Confession constituted a much lower and roughly equal number.⁶¹² According to their language proficiency, the overwhelming majority of the clergy was noted as Germans, followed by Czechs/Moravians, Magyars, Poles, and Croats/Serbs.⁶¹³ As already analyzed above, it is almost impossible to find out if someone such as the Roman-Catholic priest, Rudolf Zhanel, who was born in Moravia and spoke German and Czech fluently, was counted as a German or as a Czech.⁶¹⁴ The Greek-Catholic priest Victor Blasian, born in Transylvania, spoke Hungarian and Romanian fluently. He could have been noted down as either Hungarian or Romanian.⁶¹⁵

Military spiritual welfare was reformed in 1868 for all recognized denominations: Roman-Catholic, Greek-Catholic, Greek-Oriental, Protestants Augsburg Confession, Protestants Helvetic Confession, Jewish, and Muslim.⁶¹⁶ From 1868 onwards not only the Catholic religion was fully recognized in the army, but also all other recognized religions organized equally based on the number of believers in a particular regiment, battalion, or service branch. Protestant welfare was headed by a newly introduced military superintendent,⁶¹⁷ who headed eight preachers. For the Greek-Catholics, it was specified that they were attached to the Roman-Catholic military ordinate. However, there was only one Greek-Oriental military priest to be employed in peacetime.⁶¹⁸ Thus, during peacetime in total fifteen priests were systemized for a thousand recruits, to which during wartime, eleven had to be added.⁶¹⁹ Following the implementation of a compulsory military service in the occupied lands in 1881, one imam per Bosniak regiment was foreseen. These three imams were headed by a military mufti located in Sarajevo. For the rank and file of Jewish faith the local rabbi was responsible. During wartime a reserve field rabbi was foreseen.⁶²⁰ The regulations stipulated one member of the clergy employed per regiment, who had to represent this denomination that had the majority among the rank and file, and who should speak this recognized language most recruits spoke.⁶²¹ Army bureaucrats were unwilling to hire more clergy in peacetime because they feared an increase in

⁶¹² *Militärstatistisches Jahrbuch für 1904*, 151. The table becomes tricky taking a closer look at this case not only in terms of their categorization to a particular nationality. It is likely, that also these were counted who were not yet clergy, but still students or seminarists of which many served among the rank and file.

⁶¹³ *Militärstatistisches Jahrbuch für 1904*, 151.

⁶¹⁴ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Rudolf Zhanel, born 1867.

⁶¹⁵ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Victor Blasian, born 1875.

⁶¹⁶ *Militärstatistisches Jahrbuch für 1910*, 190-1. Other denominations constituted 4,456 including 244 non-denominational (*konfessionslos*).

⁶¹⁷ Trauner, *Die Militärseelsorge bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg im Überblick*, 28.

⁶¹⁸ Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 66-7.

⁶¹⁹ Rosner, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 271-2; and: Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 67.

⁶²⁰ Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 69.

⁶²¹ Rosner, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 271-2; and: Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 67.

costs. While these numbers were reported to be partly sufficient in peacetime, during wartime they became quickly insufficient (to be discussed in chapters 7 and 8).

Army bureaucrats sought to regulate the duties and requirements of all denominations jointly, in one handbook (*Dienstvorschrift für die Militär-Geistlichkeit*). This handbook was confusing, because there were many particularities and exceptions for each denomination. One edition followed another, all comprising clarifications. I have compared the handbook issued in 1887 (when imams were already added) with the one from 1904 after the reduction of the compulsory military service from three to two years. The members of the clergy were appointed by the head of their religious authority, for example the local bishops. Applicants had to meet certain criteria: a good degree in theological studies, a maximum of forty years old, an impeccable conduct (*tadelloses Vorleben*), an Austrian, Hungarian or Bosnian-Herzegovinian citizenship, healthy and strong physical condition, at least three years of experience in civil pastoral care, as well as capability of doing the pastoral care independently (without previous orders given by their religious authority). In a later version these requirements differed only in one point. The clergy had to consent to take the oath on the monarch (*Dienstleid*), previously they were the only group among the military who were excluded from being sworn in.⁶²² The ranks of the clergy corresponded with the ones from the officers. For example, a clergy heading a military parish was in the rank of a major.⁶²³

As was the case for the officers, the earlier guidelines place less emphasis on outlining work requirements in detail.⁶²⁴ The handbooks outlined the peacetime tasks of the clergy. They had to advocate among soldiers: “to fulfil their duties, respect the law, obedience to superiors, and love for the monarch.” There was no mention of required language knowledge in the clauses about the clergy promotion rules in the 1887-handbook. In 1904, guidelines stipulated that military clergy were only promoted, when in addition to other existing requirements they spoke German and at least one other regimental language. However, if a member of the clergy failed at learning a second language, while passing his other requirements, he was still allowed to serve. He was simply not promoted.⁶²⁵

⁶²² *Dienstvorschrift für die Militär-Geistlichkeit (A-16.c.)* (1887 compared with 1904).

⁶²³ Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 20-1. The borders of local religious communities most often paralleled local military commands' borders.

⁶²⁴ *Dienstvorschrift für die Militär-Geistlichkeit (A-16.c.)* (1887 compared with 1904).

⁶²⁵ *Dienstvorschrift für die Militär-Geistlichkeit (A-16.c.)* (1887 compared with 1904), 19.

In addition to organization of pastoral care for soldiers, the clergy worked in military hospitals, prisons, and schools.⁶²⁶ Clergy handbooks stipulated that if there was no clergy of the respective faith or with the necessary language knowledge, they were responsible for finding a member of the local civilian clergy of their faith. They were even requested to ask clergy from one of the other denominations to help out when there was no clergy of their own faith nearby. When they had to assist the gravely ill of another religion, they were required “to lovingly remind them of the duties of a sick person close to death, to comfort them and to encourage them in their trust in God, without, however, becoming annoying or intrusive, even when someone refused to accept their assistance.”⁶²⁷ Clergy members were also required to write diaries, in which they had to note “remarkable occurrences and professional experience.” The Roman-Catholic clergy was given additional duties as all Catholic recruits and officers together with their families were no longer under their local civil but the military parish’s jurisdiction and the register books (*Matriken*). The Catholic military clergy was therefore responsible for weddings, funerals, and baptisms of their entire garrison.⁶²⁸ Although the duties of the military clergy often required to speak the languages of the conscripts, the handbook left it to the clergy to organize themselves, even when that meant that for example an exclusively Bosnian-speaking imam had to offer spiritual service for a dying Ruthenian-speaking Greek-Catholic recruit.

Clergy members constituted an almost equal number of army specialists with military auditors in peace time. The number of auditors remained almost unchanged in the period of investigation, for example, according to the army statistics for 1904 they numbered 350.⁶²⁹ Military trials were usually conducted in German, but if the recruit did not speak the language the trial was conducted in his native tongue, as long as it was among the recognized and *landesüblich*. From time to time the question arose whether the court language system should be similarly organized to that of the regiments.⁶³⁰ Every recruit had the right to use his own language when dealing with military courts. Courts had to provide interpreters. In peacetime military courts often had to interact with local civil courts.⁶³¹ Thus, debates regularly indicated the different language obligations for Austria and Hungary. In Austria, it was debated if military

⁶²⁶ Members of the clergy had to provide religious classes in the military preparatory schools for the students of their denomination. Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee* 25

⁶²⁷ *Dienstvorschrift für die Militär-Geistlichkeit (A-16.c.)* (1887 compared with 1904), 23.

⁶²⁸ Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee* 15-6.

⁶²⁹ *Militärstatistisches Jahrbuch für das Jahr 1904*, 149.

⁶³⁰ Pitreich, *Meine Beziehungen zu den Armeeforderungen Ungarns*, 31-3.

⁶³¹ Brezina, *Österreichische Militärgerichtsakten*, 35f.

courts had to accept letters from civil courts in the local languages, or if parts of the trial should be in the defendants' language. Overall, the army bureaucrats were more likely to ensure that in Hungary the state language was always recognized. There was a debate to which extent Hungarian had to be recognized in Croatia-Slavonia.⁶³² For Austria which lacked “a single state language” it was ordered that it should be decided case by case (“the practical need and the courtesy towards the defendants are decisive”).⁶³³

The language knowledge of the military legal specialists differed from that of the other specialists.⁶³⁴ They needed to speak fluent German, and one other domestic language. Their personnel files indicate that speaking a second language had positive career implications. For example, attorney Alois Suitner began his army career in Innsbruck, his hometown, where he had been born in 1869. Through his career he exclusively served in his home region, in Rovereto, Cavalese, and Trento. His superiors assessed him as speaking fluent German, and sufficient Italian throughout his career. As some army units from Tyrol comprised an approximately equal number of native German and Italian speakers, his knowledge appears sufficient to have been promoted.⁶³⁵ The Prague-born auditor Josef Stupetzky (1848) spoke Czech and German fluently. Throughout his career he was solely deployed in a Bohemian regiment, for which his language abilities appear to have been sufficient.⁶³⁶

The personnel files I have examined show that – as in the cases of Suitner and Stupetzky – the army often deployed auditor in their home region or in accordance with their language abilities. However, there were many cases in which they were required to learn another language and failed. The personnel files indicate that this lack did usually not harm their career, as long as they met the other requirements. For example, Franz Panek, who was born in 1869 in Lang Enzersdorf, in Lower Austria, and spoke solely German, was required to learn the regimental language Czech. He failed. Only later his superiors assessed him as speaking adequately in Czech.⁶³⁷ It is likely that his other abilities were rated outstanding. Thus, he was promoted to major (*Major auditor*) and deployed in the Ministry of War.⁶³⁸

⁶³² N.N., Gemeinsame Angelegenheiten. Die neue Strafprozeßordnung. Die babylonische Sprachverwirrung, *Grazer Tagblatt*, 21 January 1911, 29.

⁶³³ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 33-1/79, KM-Einsichtakt, 22 July 1906.

⁶³⁴ Brezina, *Österreichische Militärgerichtsakten*, 90.

⁶³⁵ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Alois Suitner, born 1869.

⁶³⁶ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Josef Stupetzky, born 1848.

⁶³⁷ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Franz Panek, born 1869.

⁶³⁸ N.N., *Verordnungsblatt des k.u.k. Heeres, Pester Lloyd*, 24 April 1907, 4.

Conclusion

Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the Habsburg career officers were a heterogeneous group. What they shared was that a large number of them spoke more than one language. Although all of them spoke German and used it in daily communication, they were not necessarily of German nationality. Many officers, whom the army possibly categorized of German nationality, could have also identified with one of the other Habsburg nationalities, or vice versa. The three examples presented above should underline why I avoid throughout this study to categorize particular officers (as well as NCOs and soldiers) with a certain nationality. However, even when many of the officers were already bilingual at the beginning of their careers, during their careers many were assigned to regiments and battalions where they were required to learn another language. Chapter 4 has demonstrated that the linguistic backgrounds and language proficiency of officers increasingly enabled the Ministry of War to ensure that conscripts were educated in their own language – at least in theory when these officers were deployed in accordance with their language abilities. However, the army did not always take existing language knowledge into account when it comes to officer assignment. That language assessments of officers noted in their personnel files were often not reflecting reality worsened the training conditions of both officers and the rank and file. In particular career officers were required to change their garrison about every fourth year which implied that their subordinates spoke other languages. Thus, many officers were given a deadline to learn another language. Many officers failed, but the Ministry of War never spent enough emphasis on supporting their language acquisition. As a result, some officers, in particular those who spoke already another language in addition to German when joining the army, had an easier time of making a successful career than those who spoke only German. Both Francis Joseph and his bureaucrats were aware of the language system's shortcomings, but until 1914 they spent only less effort to improve the system.

I demonstrated that the army managed to organize the military training for all recruits in their languages as long as army officials deployed officers and NCOs appropriately. Some of them were able to use their existing language abilities, either because they had acquired them earlier, or they were from the same linguistic backgrounds as the recruits. However, there were also many examples where recruits were not trained in their native tongues. That often resulted from the ever-changing linguistic landscape, and from the impossibility of organizing the system always everywhere appropriately. It was not only language abilities of officers which

affected the training of the recruits. Additional skills were important too, including teaching competency, and empathy for the soldiers' cultural backgrounds. However, this chapter has shown that many shortcomings appeared from the very beginning of which army bureaucrats were aware of, but they spent only little effort on improvements was it the organization of a sufficient number of language classes, or punishing officers who refused to learn or use the recognized languages.

Part III: The Habsburg Army Language System in the Public Sphere

In the first part of this study I analyzed the legal framework of the army language system. This provides an essential background information when drawing attention in part II on how the system affected the officers' and the rank and file's military service. In many cases the legal framework and its subsequent regulations permitted an unexpected elasticity in interpreting the army language rights. A flexible interpretation of the rules, however, was not exclusively nationally motivated: convenience and personal interest often played an important role in how they were interpreted. What was hitherto left open was how and when the army language system became visible or better audible in the public sphere, although earlier chapters already indicated that the army language system was commented and criticized in political institutions and in the press regularly.

The public character of the army language system has to be divided into two spheres. First, the so-called garrison life when army members' language use got involved in the local civil society, and second, the political debate that took place in the parliaments, diets, and the print media. In the third part of this book, I analyze how the army language system became increasingly visible in the public sphere, and who criticized it and how. Because there were few towns across the Monarchy where not at least one Habsburg army institution was located, the public debate of the regimental language system offers a unique overview of the Habsburg political discourse by reflecting all provinces and all nationalities. It is important in this context to highlight that one or two battalions of each regiment were usually not stationed in their home region. Thus, thousands of recruits served in a different linguistic civil environment than their own.

The third part of this study shows that politicians as well as journalists took advantage of the army language system: whenever the word, "language," appeared in print in any Habsburg tongue, it attracted attention. Through the press coverage Habsburg citizens were increasingly confronted to reflect upon the connection of the army's language use with their national rights.⁶³⁹ In multilingual places, Judson argues, political movements attempted to

⁶³⁹ Hantsch, *Die Nationalitätenfrage im alten Österreich*, 33. There were some topics not allowed to be discussed in Austrian press. It was not permitted to write negatively about the monarch and his family, and state institutions such as the army. For the legal basis see: Olechowski, *Die Entwicklung des Preßrechts in Österreich bis 1918*. This study also briefly mentions the legal framework in Hungary, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 509-11.

mobilize popular support by demanding linguistic equality for their side. As political conflict developed around language issues, representatives of each “side” scoured the region for potential voters, attempting to mobilize people of a variety of nationalities for nationalist political parties.⁶⁴⁰ These efforts of national(ist) activists met with army bureaucrats who were required to respect the recruits’ language rights while being ordered to avoid a public debate, and spending too much effort and budget on the implementation of the army language system.

⁶⁴⁰ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 9.

Chapter 5: Garrison Life

There was virtually no larger town or city in the Monarchy where at least one joint army institution was not deployed.⁶⁴¹ In this context, it is important to note that one or two battalions of each regiment were usually not stationed in the home province from which the rank and file had been recruited. Thus, thousands of recruits served in a different linguistic civil environment than their own. For example, recruits from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the so-called Bosniaks, were stationed in Vienna's *Alserkaserne*, while hundreds of rank and file together with their officers from across the Monarchy were sent out to the occupied lands.⁶⁴² Thus, the Habsburg army's deployment policy caused civilians to be regularly mixed with soldiers from elsewhere in the Monarchy. This mixture was often highlighted in autobiographical sources. For example, Bohemia-born Carl Patsch, a museum director in Sarajevo, recalled in his autobiography a railway journey to Bosanski-Brod: "There was military here from all branches speaking the many languages of the Monarchy."⁶⁴³ The career officer Karl Künzl spoke German, and basic Polish, and was sent with his mainly Polish-speaking recruits to the South-Slavic-speaking environment in Jabuka close to the Bosnian-Herzegovinian border.⁶⁴⁴ In addition to Czech- and German-speaking recruits, numerous Hungarian speakers were stationed in Josefov, a military fortress town in Eastern Bohemia.⁶⁴⁵

The Army and Local Society

The overwhelming majority of the Habsburg army recruits were housed in military buildings for the entire duration of their military service. Barracks were usually located on the periphery of towns, close to the busier roads,⁶⁴⁶ or in city centers. The presence of the military, a daily experience for many civilians, played an important role in accelerating cultural and linguistic exchange as well as helping boost local economies. Economic life grew around barracks and garrisons that specialised in the soldiers' needs. Marcella Husová has written that "of course, the special amusements of the military were not missing."⁶⁴⁷ Tobacco stores, pubs selling cheap

⁶⁴¹ See: *Seidels kleines Armeeschema*.

⁶⁴² See: Urrisk, *Wien. 2000 Jahre Garnisonsstadt*; as well as: Neumayer, and Schmidl, eds., *Des Kaisers Bosniaken*.

⁶⁴³ BH/Südost-Institut, 14.5, Carl Patsch, no. 261, *Autobiography*, compiled after 1935, 49. I thank Dejan Zadro for providing me his transcript.

⁶⁴⁴ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Karl Künzl, born 1884.

⁶⁴⁵ Husová, *Die österreichisch-ungarische Garnison*, 270.

⁶⁴⁶ See: *Seidels kleines Armeeschema*, 1914.

⁶⁴⁷ Husová, *Die österreichisch-ungarische Garnison*, 270.

alcohol, and many brothels opened their doors nearby.⁶⁴⁸ A local garrison often had a positive impact on the local economy, while at the same time worsening some aspects of daily life, owing, for example, to crowds of drunken soldiers. Garrisons were also considered to pose a threat to local morals, especially of the female population.⁶⁴⁹ Unlike officers who often met in their messes, most of the rank and file attended local pubs, as messes for the rank and file (*Soldatenheime*) were not to be founded until the First World War.⁶⁵⁰

The army language system was not only apparent in the aural landscape of garrison cities and towns, but also visible in the inscriptions inside and outside the various military buildings. In addition to portraits of Francis Joseph and images of famous battles, there were also lists of restaurants recruits were forbidden to visit, or sanitary orders on the barracks' walls. The posters were, for the most part, in both the German army language and the languages of the resident recruits.⁶⁵¹ Inside the buildings, army officials tended to use the other regimental languages more often; outside, German was dominant. Owing to the army language, the written character of the regimental language system was overwhelmingly German across the Monarchy. This practice often reflected the languages neither of the recruits nor of civil residents.

Politicians, as well as members of the army, regularly criticized inscriptions and posters that used solely German, or in which one or another local language was omitted.⁶⁵² For example, in 1904, the Austrian parliamentarian Karel Kramář, delegate of the Bohemian Club, requested additional Czech signage on an army building in Kutná Hora, a small town near Prague, in addition to German. The Minister of War had apparently already promised to add Czech signage, but the task had not yet been carried out.⁶⁵³ In 1905, the city council of Ivano-Frankivsk, in Galicia, demanded the Ministry of War put up Polish signs in addition to German ones on local garrison buildings. The Ministry approved the demand but responded with the “principal position” that any public debate had to be avoided, as it would ensure that other towns immediately afterward put forward similar requests. In this case, the Ministry decided to permit the use of other languages, but German was to be placed most prominently. Ministerial

⁶⁴⁸ See in particular the first map: Wingfield, *The World of Prostitution in Late Imperial Austria*, 18.

⁶⁴⁹ See in particular these parts discussing the army presence and local prostitution: Wingfield, *The World of Prostitution in Late Imperial Austria*.

⁶⁵⁰ Lankes, *München als Garnison im 19. Jahrhundert*, 535.

⁶⁵¹ Kisch, *Das Lied von Jaburek*, 60.

⁶⁵² Auffenberg-Komarow, *Aus Österreichs Höhe und Niedergang*, 216.

⁶⁵³ N.N., Reichsratsdelegation, Redner: Kramarz, *Das Vaterland*, 18 May 1904, 3.

army bureaucrats noted that this would be ensured if German was used on the left side of a building, or above the other language(s). The signage of all languages used had to be in the same size and font. Although the Polish-dominated city council in this case insisted only on the use of Polish, the Ministry of War also called for recognizing Ruthenian because local residents included speakers of that language.⁶⁵⁴ The army bureaucrats in many cases supported local claims for language parity, but ministerial archival records clearly indicate that such decisions were never followed by a general order rather army officials retained their practice of deciding case-by-case.⁶⁵⁵

Language use in the army was also visible in the many military cemeteries, or military graveyards within local civil cemeteries. The bulk of officers and many of the rank and file's gravestone inscriptions were in German. Some of these gravestones are still visible today, and show that only some officers – or their descendants – decided to use other languages than German regardless of their native tongues and in which Habsburg province the graves were located. For example, at Mirogoj, Zagreb's main cemetery, some family tombs of former officers used both German and Croatian inscriptions. The inscription on the gravestone of a career officer buried in the Catholic Lviv cemetery used all local regimental languages, German, Ruthenian, and Polish. It was still visible when I visited the graveyard in 2016. Archival material does not indicate that any complaints were raised about these multilingual gravestones by Habsburg soldiers.

In addition to the language used for signage on army buildings, the local regiments and battalions were represented and commemorated in publications referring to their histories. The library of the War Archive in Vienna preserves a collection of the histories of almost all regiments, battalions, and other service branches. An anonymous author – most likely an officer – published an article in 1876 in one of the most important military gazettes, *Österreichische*

⁶⁵⁴ ÖStA/KA/RKM, Präs, 50-14/2, Ministry of War to k.k. Ministry of Territorial Defense, 8 July 1905.

This practice was similar to the civil linguistic landscape: Bilingual or even multilingual signage on buildings and businesses were a daily experience in many of the Monarchy's cities and towns. For example, in Ostrava, on the Galician-Moravian-Slovak border the cathedral's façade still reflects multilingual practices that followed the army's advice. On the left above the main entrance, an inscription in German with Czech below reads "The construction of this church was started on 4 October 1883." On the right-hand side above the main entrance, the inscription with Czech above German reads "finished and inaugurated on 3 March 1889." Just a few streets away, a house still bears an advertisement from Habsburg times which runs from the left-hand side in German to right in Czech, as a band above the former shop.

⁶⁵⁵ The language used on administrative buildings other than military and for street signs was regularly discussed publicly, and each Habsburg territory followed its own agenda. As just one example: Berecz, *The Language of Street Signs in Dualist Transylvania and the Banat*, 23-36.

Militärische Zeitschrift, and highlighted the purpose of these histories: “There is rarely any other medium which is so suitable to raise the military spirit, to revive the noblest virtues of warriors: love for the emperor and the fatherland, faithfulness, courage and self-sacrifice, because these reviews of the glorious past of military units which the soldiers belong to as family members.”⁶⁵⁶ The majority of these histories were in German. The others were mainly in Hungarian.⁶⁵⁷ One might therefore wonder if these history books enabled these so-called soldier-sons to identify with their army-family, when their so-called parents did not use their native tongues. Indeed, autobiographical archival material from the rank and file that I have examined never mentioned this issue.

The anonymous author mentioned above highlighted the purpose of these history books, and strongly recommended the publication of excerpts in a popular style in the other regimental languages to be used for recruit education. He emphasized that at least one copy of each history book should be available for the officers of a battalion, and one copy per company for recruits.⁶⁵⁸ Such brief histories were published, but often on a small-scale, and without the Ministry of War’s financial support. For example, in 1890 the Budapest Corps Command announced that Infantry Regiment No 38, which recruited from around Kecskemét, had compiled such a brief history to be used for the education of NCOs and recruits. It was published in German and Hungarian, and “can be purchased in German for 50 *Kreutzer*, and in Hungarian for 34 *Kreutzer*.”⁶⁵⁹ The Ministry of War expected officers and recruits to purchase their own copies.

Besides the written character, army language diversity most often became public through oral communication. The languages officers used when speaking with one another, or with recruits and local residents, influenced how they appeared in public. There were many occasions when army members marched through towns and villages or swarmed out during their spare time. Thus, the army’s language practice became audible for civilians on a daily basis. In addition to general trends of increasing or decreasing acceptance of the army across the Monarchy, as discussed in the introductory chapter, the symbolic character of language use

⁶⁵⁶ N.N., Ueber die Verfassung der Specialgeschichte eines Truppenkoerpers, *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 1876, 3, 14-5, 14.

⁶⁵⁷ As only one example: Radnitzky, *Emléklap a cs. és kir. 10 számú III. Frigyes Vilmos porosz király névet viselő huszár ezred Történéből*.

⁶⁵⁸ N.N., Ueber die Verfassung der Specialgeschichte eines Truppenkoerpers, *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, 1876, 3, 14-5.

⁶⁵⁹ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 4th Corps Command Budapest, box 44, no. 81, 1 October 1890.

changed during my period of investigation. In the late nineteenth century, as Urbanitsch has noted, “language was no longer a primary means of communication, but a distinctive feature for a group that wanted to be different from others.”⁶⁶⁰ Robert Evans has pointed to the constant “politicization” of language use.⁶⁶¹ These developments also influenced the relationship between the army and the civilian residents across the Monarchy.

Military education and training comprised far more than daily exercises in which the ranks learned to follow German-language commands. Recruits needed to be able to express themselves clearly in a variety of military activities, including presenting their demands and desires during the daily or weekly garrison meeting (*Garnisonsrapport*), or when they came before the military court, needed a military physician, or needed spiritual support. The education and training of the rank and file was the Habsburg army’s most important and time-consuming peacetime task. Garrison life did not necessarily take place solely within army facilities. There was a variety of reasons why officers and recruits regularly left, mainly for exercises and leisure. From time to time the army supported the local police or gendarmes. These so-called *Assistenzeinsätze* occurred in cases of unrest or environmental disasters.

The army was regularly called in to support the local police during numerous violent political protests, including demonstrations and strikes across the Monarchy. Conflicts were not solely nationally motivated, although they were often presented as such among local politicians and journalists.⁶⁶² Domestic military interventions often caused enmity among parts of the population as incidents in which army units confronted mass demonstrations were often staged by members of their own nationalities. Only in rare cases did officers’ autobiographical writings refer to this challenge and proof of their troops’ obedience. General August von Urbanski mentioned in his memoirs that his soldiers were called on for support during a worker strike in 1902 in Trieste, in the Austrian Littoral. After his soldiers had successfully countered the strikers, Urbanski was summoned to Vienna to appear before Francis Joseph. He recalled that the monarch was seemingly positively surprised about the “behavior of the regiment’s [native] Italian[-speaking] soldiers [...] as from among the striking crowd even relatives and party comrades yelled at the soldiers, accusing them of betrayal.” Urbanski concluded that at no time

⁶⁶⁰ Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 65.

⁶⁶¹ Evans, *Language and State Building*, 3.

⁶⁶² For examples in Brno in 1905, and in Prague in 1908: Wingfield, *Flag Wars and Stone Saints*. Or during the Badeni Crisis in 1897 in Graz: Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 68.

had he “feared that his men would refuse to obey his orders.”⁶⁶³ The historian Emil Dreisziger has concluded that in general “the troops as a whole did their duty. There were, however, individual cases of disobedience.”⁶⁶⁴

In addition to military support during unrest, there were many other more regular reasons why army members came into close contact with civil residents, most prominently daily military exercises. Several times a week, recruits and their commanding officers and NCOs left the barracks for military exercises, which were met with crowds of civilians who stopped by to watch them or even accompanied them on the roads for a while. While marching, local residents became aware of the languages the soldiers spoke when communicating with one another. Often the rank and file started to sing or superiors intoned a song. In terms of the army’s daily linguistic practices in the garrisons, such singing, in particular, is often reflected in archival sources. The civil residents carefully watched which songs were sung in which languages. Singing is therefore a suitable example of how the army language system appeared and was discussed in public, as well as how army institutions dealt with the issue.

In the late nineteenth century, singing in public was a daily experience. Both civilians and soldiers had a wide repertoire of songs for virtually every occasion. Each regiment had its own regimental march, which sometimes had official – and sometimes unofficial – lyrics.⁶⁶⁵ There were military song books, but most often the marching men decided occasionally what to sing. Thus, songs were often a mixture of historical military soldier songs, more recent popular ones, and so-called patriotic folk songs.⁶⁶⁶ Military archival sources indicate that the Ministry of War did not regulate in which languages songs were to be sung, but there were discussions about which songs might not be suitable. Many officers recalled the singing practice in their diaries and memoirs. For example, the career officer Franz Karl Ginzkey, born 1871 in Pula, wrote about a military exercise – of course, from a romanticized perspective: “Soon there was play, laughter, and singing; we sang in groups, in Slovak, Italian, and German.”⁶⁶⁷ The Sopron-born career officer Anton Lehár recalled a maneuver in the vicinity of Braşov in Transylvania where the recruits sang songs in a variety of regimental languages: “In chorus we

⁶⁶³ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/58:4, August von Urbanski. Das Tornisterkind, 87f.

⁶⁶⁴ Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 41-2. As just one other example for the so-called *Szeklerland*: Hajdu, Das Alltagsleben österreichischer Offiziere in Ungarn, 103.

⁶⁶⁵ Hois, *Die Musikhistorische Zentrale*, 217f. During the war it was planned to issue a volume with German soldiers' songs, as well as with Hungarian and Czech songs.

⁶⁶⁶ Hois, *Die Musikhistorische Zentrale*, 217f.

⁶⁶⁷ Ginzkey, *Der seltsame Soldat*, 135.

sang our most beautiful songs, *Österreich Dein Ehrenkleid, trug ich Freud und Leid, Maros vize folyik csendeszen, Du alter Stefansturm, Ti si moja, and Sti tu.*⁶⁶⁸ Mixing up songs of different languages, in Lehár's case German, Hungarian, Croatian, and Romanian, was not limited to recruits but was also common practice among officers. For example, the career officer Rudolf Henz, recalled in his novel that while officers spoke with one another only in German, when it came to singing, "we started with a German soldier's song, followed by a Hungarian, Czech, Croatian, Polish, Ruthenian, Romanian, Slovene, and Italian song, with everyone singing every song. However, the Hungarians, Czechs, and Croats jealously oversaw a strict sequence."⁶⁶⁹

Officers and the rank and file also sang during maneuvers when they had to practice on a larger scale, or jointly with other regiments and military service branches.⁶⁷⁰ Often, Francis Joseph, together with generals, archdukes, and foreign representatives, visited these maneuvers. Language use played an important role during them. For example, the career officer Karl Nowottny recalled a maneuver around the turn of the century in Silesia in which he and his fellow officers, NCOs, and recruits had to line up before the high-ranking spectators. Francis Joseph went from one to the other, and "with everyone, he talked about the most current theme for his home province, in the probably most common language."⁶⁷¹ On the last day of a maneuver, Nowottny recalled that Francis Joseph passed by his battalion and asked the commanders to which regiment they belonged. When they answered, "fourth battalion of the Infantry Regiment No 13," Francis Joseph immediately addressed some phrases in Polish to the rank and file.⁶⁷² Autobiographical records of the rank and file demonstrate that the use of their own language during these occasions seemingly left a deeper positive long-term impact on their identification with the army and the state than did officers who were able to communicate with them properly during daily military training. An indication of this is that language use in daily military service is almost never mentioned in recruits' diaries.

In addition to military exercises and maneuvers, officers and the rank and file left the barracks for a variety of other (semi-)official activities. They attended religious and other local

⁶⁶⁸ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, vol. 2, 35.

⁶⁶⁹ Henz, *Ein Roman von Krieg und Liebe*, 217.

⁶⁷⁰ N.N., *Die Delegationen*, *Wiener Zeitung*, 20 December 1913, 4-10, 5. See also: Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 10.

⁶⁷¹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/417:13, Karl Nowottny, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben während der Zeit von 1868-1918*, vol. 1, 123.

⁶⁷² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/417:13, Karl Nowottny, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben während der Zeit von 1868-1918*, vol. 1, 105.

(patriotic) events regularly. The most prominent event of the year was Francis Joseph's birthday, which was celebrated on 18 August. There were also occasions when the barracks opened for the public, for example on a regimental day or to commemorate historical battles in which the Habsburg army had been victorious. In the course of these events, officers gave speeches, marches were played, and songs were sung. On such occasions Habsburg army language practices met with the local linguistic environment as these events were often performed in public. Laurence Cole correctly demonstrates throughout his study about veteran associations, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria*, that the Habsburg military and civil world could never be completely separated, because each carefully oversaw the others' activities, and language use, participated at one another's events, and often even co-organized festivities.⁶⁷³ However, for most of participants, it was not the language use that mattered. Deák has argued correctly something that is also reflected in autobiographical sources I have examined: "Watching the military passing by was for the peasants, what was for the town dwellers the regular Sunday concerts of the regimental band, the most colorful events in their lives."⁶⁷⁴

Jeroen van Drunen has analysed the two-hundredth anniversary of Chernivtsi's home regiment, Infantry Regiment No 41, in April 1901, which resulted in extensive patriotic celebrations. He argues that across the Monarchy civil state authorities faced similar challenges, but "multilingual Bukovina required creative solutions in order to ensure the event's success."⁶⁷⁵ The locally employed army branches were called to "present the most outstanding military feats of the regiment and its heroes." Moreover, Karl Dvořák, the author of this regiment's history emphasized that "such a representation must be made with oratorical verve in the mother tongues of the men, clearly audible to everyone and free from disturbing influences, which is completely unfeasible in front of such a large number of troops with its multitude of languages."⁶⁷⁶ On this occasion, seemingly the only monument for a regiment throughout the Monarchy was erected that used all recognized languages: German, Ruthenian, and Romanian.⁶⁷⁷ The career officer Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz remembered that annually on his battalion's foundation day a field mess was celebrated, after which he "as every year,

⁶⁷³ Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*.

⁶⁷⁴ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 67.

⁶⁷⁵ Van Drunen, Habsburg Bukovina's Celebrated Multilingualism. On language politics in Bukovina see: Burger, *Sprachen und Sprachenpolitiken. Niederösterreich und die Bukowina im Vergleich*.

⁶⁷⁶ Dvořák, *Geschichte des k. und k. Infanterie-Regiments Erzherzog Eugen Nr. 41*, 88.

⁶⁷⁷ N.N., View of the Street with Soldier Monument, Chernivtsi, *Lviv-Center. Urban Media Archive*, no. 03808 (online: <http://www.lvivcenter.org/en/uid/picture/?pictureid=3808>).

addressed a speech first in German, then in Czech to the officers and the rank and file [...] I always had the latter translated. Without understanding a word of this difficult language, I learned to memorize the entire speech. This caused astonishment and admiration among my officers, and pleased the Czech part of the rank and file.”⁶⁷⁸ Although the German language dominated in the army, it would have met severely negative reactions from both civil residents and the rank and file if speeches were not delivered in their languages too, or at least parts of them. In addition to Stillfried von Rathenitz, there were other commanders who did not give the speeches themselves in the other languages, but instead passed this task over to other officers.⁶⁷⁹ Hitherto, I have found only a few examples in archival sources of officers who disrespected this tradition based on nationalist motives, more often they did so out of convenience. In both cases, neither the Corps Commands nor the Ministry of War issued general orders for how to respect the regimental language(s) on the occasion of festivities. Steven Beller has analysed the parade on the occasion of Francis Joseph’s sixteenth jubilee of reign in June 1908: “Which language used, in which language the crowd shouted – all this was of concern for newspapers, in their conclusion reflecting separateness more than unity.”⁶⁸⁰ Yet, it was only the journalists who interpreted the use of the different languages as reflecting separateness. Soldiers’ autobiographical archival material indicates that using different languages one after another did indeed reflect the diversity of the army, but at the same time it supported the development of an esprit de corps.

The programs of festivities were usually announced and afterwards commented on in the local press. In bi- or multilingual regions, observers reported on who gave speeches, in which languages, and which languages songs were sung. For example, in 1888, the *Gazzetta di Trento* reported that the commander of the local regiment had attended a local civil event. He had given his speech solely in German, adding that he had emphasized that the Habsburg army, despite its linguistic diversity, was among the very first rank in Europe. In this case the newspaper did not comment, but just reported about the event, mentioning that the speech was followed by enthusiastic cheers.⁶⁸¹ The public also watched carefully over the repertoire when bands performed. Even the emperor's or peoples’ anthem (*Kaiser- bzw. Völkerhymne*), which it was emphasized should “unite the linguistically divided peoples,”⁶⁸² regularly caused debates.

⁶⁷⁸ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/862:1, Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished undated manuscript, 123.

⁶⁷⁹ Manescul, *Meine Dritte Kompanie*, 38.

⁶⁸⁰ Beller, *State Consciousness Raising in the 1908 Jubilee Parade in Vienna*, 46-71.

⁶⁸¹ N.N., *Festa militare in Lavarone*, *Gazzetta di Trento*, 23 April 1888.

⁶⁸² Hois, *Die Musikhistorische Zentrale*, 157.

The lyrics of the anthem were translated into all domestic languages, and the debate often arose about which language singers started in, if a regimental commander sang only in German, or which language was omitted.⁶⁸³

In addition to important state and military events, there were numerous festivities that the military regularly organized or co-hosted. For example, the Sopron-born career officer Anton Lehár recalled the Braşov garrison, in Transylvania, where each nationality had their own casinos and balls. The festivities local garrisons organized were very much requested because many military and civil residents saw them, as Lehár has argued, to be “neutral ground, and believed they simulated a unity that was already in the process of dissolving, as later events demonstrated.”⁶⁸⁴ Locally deployed officers were regularly invited to attend civil events during which their knowledge of the local residents’ languages mattered more than that of the rank and file. As Chief of the General Staff in the Zagreb Corps Command, Eduard Zanantoni was invited to the funeral of the local Greek-Oriental patriarch in Sremski Karlovci. A dinner was afterwards prepared during which speeches were given in Serbian, a language he did not speak.⁶⁸⁵ Zanantoni’s fellow career officer, Franz Xaver Schubert recalled his days as a young officer in the Carpathians: “I aimed to always be commanded to the various local church festivals of the Greek-Orthodox, Greek-Catholics, and Jews. I was very much interested, but had no clue about their culture, because I was never educated for these tasks.”⁶⁸⁶ In addition to not knowing the local cultures, he did not speak the languages of the residents.

Events without publicity were these organized inside the officer clubs. They were increasingly founded across the Monarchy during my period of investigation.⁶⁸⁷ There, officers and their wives met with local middle- and upper-class society. These clubs were often located in city centers. For the most, German was the colloquial language there. In addition, officers and their families participated in the clubs of the local civil associations. However, they always had to be careful not to get into an alleged nationalist circle. As all officers spoke German, they usually ended up prioritising German cultural clubs, although many of these associations

⁶⁸³ See: Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 101.

⁶⁸⁴ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, vol. 2, 29-30.

⁶⁸⁵ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/6:1, Eduard Zanantoni, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished manuscript, 1922, 155.

⁶⁸⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/833:2, Franz Xaver Schubert, *Tagebuch*, unpublished manuscript, compiled in 1943, 50.

⁶⁸⁷ An increasing number of clubs were to be found across the Monarchy, serving different purposes and pursuing different political/cultural aims, some met with great interest of behalf of military members. However, there were also cross-nationality clubs. See for a couple of examples presented throughout the monograph: Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria*.

followed a clearly nationalist agenda. Perceived to be loyal to the Habsburgs as well, nationalist clubs were found among all nationalities, and many changed their political character over the years, also owing to the changes in their membership. It was often not easy for officers to determine the real political character of a particular club. When officers were invited by their resident family members, they often had to choose between loyalty to their family (and nationality) and the Habsburg army. To avoid risking their careers, many career officers decided to attend only events in Habsburg loyalist circles or in the military officer casinos.

The degree of politicization in the national clubs depended on the respective province. These clubs, although named similarly (for example, Czech club, German association), often did not follow the same ideology everywhere. For example, General Josef Stürgh reported that associations in Austrian Trieste usually had a nationalist character, irrespective of the language they used. He recalled the result in his memoirs: particular career officers and their wives preferred to engage only in the so-called “black-yellow community,” which meant other officers and imperial bureaucrats.⁶⁸⁸ Officer autobiographical records indicate that they considered this question important, because they often wrote about their leisure time and relationships with local middle- and upper-class society. The career officer Eduard Hentke recalled that Ljubljana was from the late 1880s to the early 1890s a “pleasant garrison [...] the officers harmonized with the Slovene population” and participated in local clubs, the German Casino, and the Slovene National House, the *Narodni Dum*. Rok Stergar has argued that officers regularly appeared at so-called Slovene events to demonstrate their neutrality of the army towards all nationalities.⁶⁸⁹ It is likely that most of the officers tried so across the Monarchy until 1914. However, while the relationship with residents in Ljubljana was often described positively, for example, Hentke reported the opposite for Moravian Brno. The officers would have had no contact with the Czech-speaking upper class, and therefore never attended local civil clubs.⁶⁹⁰ Indeed, not only were these clubs of nationalities depicted as prone to disloyalty, but many officers highlighted that local German institutions in particular were very nationalist. In contrast to career officers, autobiographical archival records reveal that reserve officers tended to join their various national associations’ clubs, regardless of whether they were seen to be nationalist, patriotic, or loyal to the Habsburgs.

⁶⁸⁸ Stürgh, *Politische und Militärische Erinnerungen*, 257. This was also the case for Bosnia-Herzegovina: ÖStA/KA/NL, B/862:1, Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished and undated memoir, 15-6.

⁶⁸⁹ Stergar, *The Evolution of Linguistic Policies and Practices of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces*, 67.

⁶⁹⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/98:77, Eduard Hentke von Hehshart, *Leben und Wirken, 1858-1919*, unpublished undated unpaginated manuscript.

Music and singing played a major role in all festivities, regardless of whether they were organized by the army or local civil associations. These events had in common that military bands were often hired. Simon Kotter has argued that Francis Joseph aimed, when allowing their public performance to address a sense of commonality among all the social strata and nationalities of his citizens.⁶⁹¹ Each regiment and battalion had its own band, which employed career military musicians, and recruits. Their engagement in local events was often followed by a public and bureaucratic discussion for which association they played, for which they did not, and of which songs were performed. First and foremost, these bands were criticized for being more likely to play for civil associations and events than for the military, for the sake of earning money.⁶⁹² In 1911, an incident was discussed in the Austrian parliament. Some delegates reported that a military band had performed for the German national *Südmarkfest* in Klagenfurt, the provincial capital of Carinthia, but had not attended a so-called “Slovenian festivity.” Delegates claimed that all nationalities should be treated equally when regiment commanders permitted a performance for civil association festivities.⁶⁹³ This demonstrates that even nationalist associations were interested in hiring military bands. The musicologist Fritz Trümpi argues that they often did so simply because military bands were much cheaper than civil bands, thus they and their associations regularly criticized not only this practice, but often reported allegedly disloyal playlists.⁶⁹⁴ However, the Ministry of War usually did not issue general orders about where and for whom they were allowed to perform. The Ministry left it to regimental commanders to investigate for themselves the character of a festivity for which military bands had asked permission to perform.⁶⁹⁵ The only general order stipulated that bands were forbidden from being hired when political demonstrations seemed likely afterwards.⁶⁹⁶

In addition to corps command orders and newspapers, travel guides announced local events with music performances. The wide-spread travel guide Hölzel recommended that tourists, when travelling to Olomouc, visit the town’s park, where in summer the military band gave concerts once or twice weekly for which “the upper-class society gathers.”⁶⁹⁷ Another widely used travel guide, *Woerl*, emphasized the tourist spots of Cracow where the military

⁶⁹¹ Kotter, *Die k.(u.)k. Militärmusik*, 56.

⁶⁹² Kotter, *Die k.(u.)k. Militärmusik*, 107f.

⁶⁹³ ALEX/SPAR, 1911, Jarc, 5500.

⁶⁹⁴ Trümpi, *Der Oesterreichisch-Ungarische Musiker-Verband im imperialen Kontext*, 235-53

⁶⁹⁵ Kotter, *Die k.(u.)k. Militärmusik*, 59.

⁶⁹⁶ VHA/9. KK, Präs, 794, 9th Corps Command to all subordinate infantry regiments, 13 November 1885.

⁶⁹⁷ *Hölzel's Illustrierter Führer durch die königliche Hauptstadt Olmütz*, 4.

band performed every Sunday and more than once a week, on the street in front of the military casino.⁶⁹⁸ Local newspapers carefully watched the playlists of these bands, in particular which languages were used in the lyrics. For example, a journalist of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslim newspaper *Musavat* complained in 1911 that the repertoires of military bands in Sarajevo were dominated by “German” composers and lyrics. The author declared himself to be Habsburg-loyal, but emphasized his disappointment that public events saw only German lyrics regularly used.⁶⁹⁹ The career officer Lehár, son of the famous composer Franz Lehar, recalled that his father, who was a military bandmaster, “avoided all extremes. In the nationalist hotspot of Prague, he was heading a purely Czech band, but performed virtually solely in German localities.” His band was often asked to play *Die Wacht am Rhein*, and they did so. Only afterwards did his superiors remind him that *Die Wacht am Rhein* would be “a purely German song, and the Austrians shall not care about it.”⁷⁰⁰ Rok Stergar has written that in Ljubljana they performed so-called Slovene marches, including the unofficial national anthem.⁷⁰¹ The reports of the corps commands indicate that army officials carefully watched that all regimental languages, as well as all nationalities, were treated equally during performances.

When private associations hired military bands, they decided upon the repertoire, but had to seek for permission from the corps or regimental commanders. For example, in 1885, General Leopold Croy, Commander of the Ninth Corps located in Josefov, sent a secret order to his subordinate regiment commanders that they had to ensure that no anti-Habsburg songs were performed. For his corps command area, parts of Bohemia, he put special emphasis on *Die Wacht am Rhein*, *Kde domov muj*, *Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland*, and *Hej Slovane*.⁷⁰² In contrast to the songs in Czech, *Kde domov muj*, and *Hej Slovane*, the German song *Die Wacht am Rhein* was forbidden in Cisleithanian Austria.⁷⁰³ However, until 1914, even military bands performed it in public regularly. In Bohemia, two songs regularly caused debates: the German, *Die Wacht am Rhein*, and the Czech, *Kde domov muj*. Both were performed very often. While the first was clearly forbidden, there was a regular debate about if the character of *Kde domov muj* was patriotic or nationalist. The title can be translated as either “where is my home”, or

⁶⁹⁸ *Woerl's Reisehandbücher. Illustrierer Führer durch die königliche Hauptstadt Krakau und Umgebung*, 15.

⁶⁹⁹ N.N., Njemački jezik, *Musavat*, 3 June 1911, 2-3.

⁷⁰⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, vol. 1, 49.

⁷⁰¹ Stergar, *The Evolution of Linguistic Policies and Practices of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces*, 68.

⁷⁰² VHA/9. KK, Präs, 794, 9th Corps Command to subordinate infantry regiments, 13 November 1885.

⁷⁰³ *Entscheidungen des k.k. Obersten Gerichts- also Cassationshofes*, Neue Folge, I. Band, No. 2389, 24 June 1899, Vienna: Manz'sche k. u. k. Hof-Verlags- und Universitäts-Buchhandlung, 1900, 357-8.

with “where is my fatherland,” because the Czech word *domov* can mean both. The lyrics were a-political and simply praised nature and countryside. It was therefore more the purpose for which it was sung, when, and by whom that caused debates. *Kde domov muj* was not forbidden until 1915 (to be discussed in chapter 8). Today this song is the national anthem of the Czech Republic.

The reports of the Bohemian Corps Command indicate that before 1908, there were virtually no conflicts with recruits who sang *Kde domov muj*. In that year, a so-called partial mobilization was announced in the course of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian annexation crisis. German and Czech-speaking soldiers gathered in the barracks to be sent to the Habsburg borders with the Ottoman Empire, and Serbia, as a military conflict seemed likely. The situation heated up, because neither the rank and file nor their officers knew if they were going to war and would return home. The Corps Command frequently reported to Vienna about incidents which occurred during mobilization and transport. They often reflected on press reports that commented on military preparations. Military bureaucrats then started to investigate the reported incidents by interviewing the officers and NCOs involved. For example, Second Lieutenant Ernst Wahla from the Infantry Regiment No 98 reported that he took part in a transport. He and two other officers were at the end of a column when soldiers started to sing *Kde domov muj*. Wahla informed his comrade, who commanded the column, and did not speak Czech, of this song’s “Czech national” character and that “this song should not be sung because of the present political condition in Bohemia, and because of the German soldiers who constitute approximately an equal number of the transport, and could answer with a counter-song,” most likely *Die Wacht am Rhein*.⁷⁰⁴ Czech-language newspapers afterwards reported about the incident in a way that suggested all the soldiers had been forbidden to sing *Kde domov muj*. The Corps Commander then sent an address to Wahla’s regiment and claimed that *Kde domov muj* was in no way meant to be an inciting song (*Hetzlied*) but was rather the “Bohemian national anthem.” The regimental officers therefore had to be informed that “a ban of this song is inopportune,” and Wahla was criticized for his “overzealous” activity. The Corps Command encouraged all officers in their area to intonate this song as often as possible, “as soldiers were in a very emotional condition, leaving their home for Bosnia.”⁷⁰⁵ Interestingly, the Corps

⁷⁰⁴ VHA/9. KK, Präs, 1937, IR 98, Lt. Ernst Wahla to the battalion’s command in Hohenmauth, 12 December 1908.

⁷⁰⁵ VHA/9. KK, Präs, 1937, 9th Corps Command to Infantry Regiment No 98, 22 December 1908.

Commander in no way shared Wahla's concern about the expected reaction of the so-called German soldiers.

The annexation crisis ended without a war. The bulk of soldiers returned home safely. However, in the tense years before the First World War, all corps commands increasingly blamed civilians for influencing the rank and file with nationalist ideas. When another partial mobilization was announced in 1912, during the course of the First Balkan War, troops were again called to the Monarchy's south-eastern borders. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire finally caused another war in 1913, and some of the new Balkan states fought against one another over former Ottoman territory. Austria-Hungary was the great European power most affected by these developments, particularly as both wars were fought in the vicinity of Habsburg territory in south-eastern Europe, affecting civilians who shared nationalities with Habsburg citizens, such as Serbs and Romanians.⁷⁰⁶ This time, the Corps Command's reports emphasized that civilians from Bohemia who accompanied the soldiers more often started to sing *Kde domov muj*. They assumed that the motives for singing the song had slowly but surely turned from patriotic to nationalist. The officers who commanded regiments from Bohemia now avoided this song more often than they had in 1908.⁷⁰⁷

Even during the final year of the First World War, *Kde domov muj* was still sung, as chapter 8 will show. In more than just the Czech case, ministerial bureaucrats as well as many officers were still convinced that patriotic songs helped to improve the morale of soldiers regardless of their native tongues. There would have been, therefore, a variety of examples to show how the joint army's language system in the garrisons became publicly debated in peace time. What is clear is that the Ministry avoided giving general orders on how to deal with language issues, and often decided their response on a case-by-case basis to avoid the spread of claims among other nationalities. Thus, officers who worked in the many garrisons were often required to make decisions ad-hoc. As long as no conflict arose, the Ministry of War and the army commands did not intervene. The language practices therefore allowed flexibility in interpretation – thus laying the ground for misinterpretation and decisions based on nationalist motives or personal prejudices.

⁷⁰⁶ Mulligan, *The Origins of the First World War*, 23.

⁷⁰⁷ VHA/9. KK, Präs, 2550, 8th Corps Command to Ministry of War, 5 December 1912.

Mixed Languages as a Result of Language Contact

Earlier parts of this study demonstrated that the army language system affected soldiers' military training. In addition, my various archival records demonstrate that army language diversity had another impact on soldiers. Owing to the army's deployment policy a large number of officers and recruits were confronted on a daily basis for three years with other languages than their own. As many recruits did not serve in their home region, they experienced a different linguistic environment in nearby civil societies. Thus, most men increasingly used words, grammar, and phrases from other languages; most often, their linguistic practice was affected by the dominating German language. Officers, NCOs, and recruits tended to mix languages often. Both officers and rank and file autobiographical records indicate that almost none of them assessed this result of language contact negatively. Officers and the rank and file often had fun mixing languages or assessed it positively as a way to become more multilingual because of their army service. Moreover, autobiographical sources reveal that the mixing of languages became an important characteristic of army members, and thus probably enhanced the development of an esprit de corps, probably even more than did the shared uniform, the oath to the monarch, or army propaganda. Politicians and journalists however assessed the mixing of languages completely differently. In particular, national(ist) activists advocated for upholding the so-called purity of a language as the most important feature of a nation. They did so because many officers and recruits maintained the language practice they had adopted in the army even after they had fulfilled their military service, and upon their return home, influenced their family members, neighbors, and friends. My sources indicate that nationalist activists' concerns and rhetoric did not differ; rather, similar criticism was raised among all nationalities across the Monarchy.

Mixing languages was not exclusively an army phenomenon, but rather characterized speakers across the Monarchy in all places where people of different languages lived and worked together. Like for the army, it was most often nationalists (and linguists) who complained about such practice. For example, in multilingual Bukovina where German, Ruthenian, and Romanian speakers lived, it was common practice to consider one of the domestic languages as "Bukovina German." A brochure published in 1901 listed the "mistakes

and peculiarities” of this “mixed language.”⁷⁰⁸ Jeroen Van Drunen has called it a nationally indifferent practice, an “indifference not limited to nationalism as such, but extended deep into one of its core elements: language. Slavic grammar found its way into German, German words entered Romanian, Romanian expressions surfaced in Bukovinian Hungarian.”⁷⁰⁹ Novels about Habsburg society portrayed numerous examples of how and when citizens learned another language, or mixed them. It is likely that the Moravian clerk’s family described by novelist Franz von Saar ended up mixing up the two local languages on a daily basis. His protagonist, Mister Fridolin, requested his offspring talk to him exclusively in German, their mother and their housemaid in “Bohemian.”⁷¹⁰

Van Drunen has already mentioned two mixed languages, Bukovina-German and Bukovina-Hungarian, but the Habsburg army, owing to the variety of languages officers and recruits spoke and their deployment practices, knew more than just one so-called mixed language. Archival sources, memoirs, and novels refer to a variety of terms, although they often did not further explain what these meant. Among these mixed army languages were the so-called “military Polish,”⁷¹¹ *Ponanski*, “a mixture of Italian and Slavic,”⁷¹² and Army-Hungaro-Slavic.⁷¹³ Autobiographical records regularly mentioned comrades who mixed two languages when speaking to the rank and file. For example, the officer Engelmund Kube wrote that his commander, Tyrolian-born Colonel Igenio Castelpietra spoke a mixture of Italian and German.⁷¹⁴ Career officer Rudolf Henz serving with a Bosniak-regiment, mentioned his subordinate Cadet Jerabek, who spoke perfect German but communicated with the rank and file in Czech-Croatian (*tschechisches Kroatisch*).⁷¹⁵ Soldiers’ autobiographical records up until the First World War also contain many French terms, still in common use by the Habsburg army. For example, the NCO Franz Klojpustek almost exclusively used the term *Menage* when he referred to military food provisions.⁷¹⁶

⁷⁰⁸ Van Drunen, Habsburg Bukovina’s Celebrated Multilingualism. He refers to: Theodor Gartner et al., *Bukowiner Deutsch. Fehler und Eigenthümlichkeiten in der deutschen Verkehrs- und Schriftsprache der Bukowina*. Vienna: Schulbücher-Verlag, 1901.

⁷⁰⁹ See: Urbanitsch, Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities. 136-7. Urbanitsch focuses on mutual loanwords among Habsburg domestic languages.

⁷¹⁰ von Saar, *Mährische Novellen* (Herr Fridolin und sein Glück), 51.

⁷¹¹ Torresani, *Aus der schönen wilden Lieutenants-Zeit*, 34. He mentions one example: „Obzaci na dol, psia krew, szlusowac lokcie (Absätze durchdrücken, Elbogen schließen!)“

⁷¹² Forgács, *Német Jövevényszavaka a Magyar katona nyelvben*, 32.

⁷¹³ By referring to an example: N.N., Herr Stabsfeldwebel, meldige horzám, já szom Horchpost!: *Hatvanhatos Tábori Újság*, 66, 1, 1, 5.

⁷¹⁴ ÖStA/KA/NL, B 401:9, Engelmund Kube, Das Ersatz-Bataillon des ehem. Schützenregiments Czernowitz 22 während des Weltkrieges 1914/1918, compiled on the basis of his war diary in September 1937.

⁷¹⁵ Henz, *Ein Roman von Krieg und Liebe*, 32.

⁷¹⁶ HGM/Archivalien, Kriegstagebücher, 2004/43/6/3-4, War Diary of Franz Klojpustek.

The mixed languages most often employed in my sources are Army-German and Army-Slavic.⁷¹⁷ Army-German was already mentioned in chapter 4, when the career officer Alexander Rosenfeld, better known under his pen name Roda Roda, described the language of officers' offspring, the so-called *Tornisterkinder*, as well as of other professionals who worked outside their home region. He asserted in his autobiographical novel that all the *Tornisterkinder*-officers spoke Army-German as “all the bigger and smaller peoples (*Völker und Völkchen*) of the Monarchy had smeared their military German with their linguistic mistakes.”⁷¹⁸ Army language diversity, however, affected not only the linguistic practice of this offspring but that of all officers, native German speakers as well as those who learned German in the army. Autobiographical records demonstrate that many officers tended to call the use of this language one of the most important army characteristics. Indeed, the career officer Theodor von Lerch recalled in his memoirs, “one could also recognize an officer, even when he wore a civilian suit.”⁷¹⁹ The novelist Franz Theodor Csokor in his famous play *Third of November 1918*, instructed theatre directors on the first page about how actors needed to speak to ensure that the audience gets the spirit of the army: “All men speak the so-called k.u.k. Army-German, which is colored by everyone's own language.”⁷²⁰ Even women's novels in journals presented officers as being real Habsburg officers only when speaking Army-German. The Bohemian novelist Aloisia Kirschner publishing under her nom de plume Ossip Schubin, wrote in *Prager Abendblatt* (1877), a story about a young woman who emphasized at a ball in Prague that since she had an officer fiancé, “it has a special charm for me, if someone speaks Army-German.”⁷²¹

Army-German was mentioned in many novels that depicted the Habsburg military, regardless of the language in which they were written. Most often, when addressing the Habsburg army and its officers, they highlighted the mixed languages as an important characteristic. For example, the novelist Friedrich Torberg commented satirically, “the German language is far too limited to meet the need for expression that the k.u.k. army had,” which was why phrases and words in other languages enriched it. Torberg provided readers with some examples, including a full sentence in German that uses Slavic grammar (*Es ist sich anher zu*

⁷¹⁷ Although the army languages were often used in Habsburg public, it was not until the late twentieth century that scholars began to analyze these languages. What all these scholarly approaches have in common is that it is virtually impossible to define them as Habsburg citizens across the Monarchy used them often differently, and often occasionally. For just one example, for a recently published article, see: Meyer, *Armeeslawisch*.

⁷¹⁸ Roda Roda, *Roda Rodas Roman*, 269.

⁷¹⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/33:4, Theodor von Lerch, *Die Todgeweihten*, unpublished undated manuscript, 30.

⁷²⁰ Csokor, *3. November 1918*, 10.

⁷²¹ O. Schubin, Wips Seynsberg, *Prager Abendblatt*, 20 July 1877, 5.

melden), or the fact that the soldiers' underwear was called *gattje* (from the Polish word *gacie*,) while for a particular uniform, *Zwilchgarnitur*, the German term was not used; rather, this was called *cvilinky*. NCOs were often called *Zupak*, from the South Slavic word *župak*, meaning the inner part of the bottom.⁷²²

Officers apparently had no objections to use Army-German, because it simply reflected their language abilities, the garrisons in which they had served, and the recruits they had worked with. National activists, however, regularly called it an attack on the purity of the German language. For example, Georg Auffahrt published a booklet in 1910 entitled *Das Buch vom Offizier. Ein Mahnwort zur Erhaltung soldatischer Ideale* (The book about officers. A warning to uphold soldier ideals). One of the so-called threatened ideals was the German language Habsburg officers spoke. Auffahrt also criticized how all other languages were practiced in the joint army: "The purity of language is very poor in the army. [...] Where there is so much influence from so many languages [...] the character of each language must involuntarily suffer. Therefore, we have reason to claim that there is a need for special emphasis on the purity of languages."⁷²³ A journalist referred to Army-German in the liberal Viennese daily *Neue Freie Presse* in 1873 by criticizing that it was used not only in oral communication but also in army correspondence.⁷²⁴ Both army bureaucrats and officers tended to ignore such warnings and critics. Thus, Auffahrt's suggestion that army bureaucrats ensure that, at least, teachers be employed who themselves used the standard languages (*Hochsprachen*) was never recognized.⁷²⁵

In addition to Army-German, national activists, and in this case also army bureaucrats and officers, accused soldiers of speaking another mixed language: Army-Slavic. Authors of archival records for the most part used the term "Army-Slavic" to refer officers to who mixed different Slavic languages by simultaneously using German terms and phrases.⁷²⁶ Unlike Army-German, national activists regularly criticized Army-Slavic for ignoring the recruits' language rights, either out of convenience or from nationalist motives. They accused officers of being unwilling to properly learn a particular Slavic language. For example, Austrian parliamentarian Josef Kadlčák, delegate of the Bohemian Catholic-National Party from Moravia, referred to

⁷²² Torberg, *Kaffeehaus war überall*, 216f.

⁷²³ Auffahrt, *Das Buch vom Offizier*, 84.

⁷²⁴ N.N., Inland, *Neue Freie Presse*, 4 September 1873, 2. See also: N.N., Preußischer Schwindel in österreichischer Officiersuniform, *Wiener Sonn- und Montags-Zeitung*, 19 April 1875, 1.

⁷²⁵ Auffahrt, *Das Buch vom Offizier*, 85.

⁷²⁶ Meyer, *Armeeslawisch*.

Army-Slavic in a speech in 1908 as a “Gallimaufry which has to be stopped once and for all.” He called such practice unacceptable “neither from the national nor from any other standpoint should the Bohemian [Czech] language in the regiment become such gibberish. It is a Chinese language that neither a Bohemian nor a German understands.” The parliamentary protocol mentioned an interjection at this point. Someone in the audience shouted, “it is an Austrian language.” Kadlčák replied: “Unfortunately, you can call it an Austrian regimental language, the real language of the peoples (*Volkssprache*).”⁷²⁷

Unlike Army-German, even some (career) officers considered Army-Slavic in their autobiographical sources to be unacceptable. Like Kadlčák, the career officer Ludwig Hessheimer called it a “strange gibberish,” in his autobiographical novel.⁷²⁸ One of his comrades, reserve officer Robert Nowak, added that “some superiors did not tolerate the use of Army-Slavic.” They characterized it as stemming from officers’ unwillingness to learn a language properly.⁷²⁹ Officers tended to refer to the use of Army-Slavic as a practical way or a desperate attempt to master the education of soldiers who spoke a variety of Slavic languages, in particular when not themselves having a Slavic background. Most often its use was not nationally motivated. For example, the Moravian-born career officer Otto von Kiesewetter mentioned that officers who did not speak the soldiers’ language “soon spoke the regimental language, broken Army-Slavic (*radebrechte diese Regimentssprache*).”⁷³⁰ The military physician in Roda Rodas short story “Galician journey” asked a patient questions in “Army Slavic, a mixture of all Czech-Croatian-Polish tongues and dialects of Austria-Hungary.”⁷³¹ The protagonist of Józef Wittlin's novel, a Hutsul soldier, called it something “which you had to get your ear used to first, a ragout of all Slavic languages.”⁷³²

Officers’ memoirs and diaries often refer to the language challenge, in particular when they were newly transferred to a regiment/battalion or were passed a new cohort of recruits in the autumn. Many of them remembered that their commanders immediately ordered them to start teaching, regardless of if they spoke the languages. This practice was a bitter experience,

⁷²⁷ ALEX/SPAR, 1908, Kadlčák, 4487. He also offered examples for Army-Slavic such as “strosaky na gangu pucovat, klenkübunky a kvergryvy.”

⁷²⁸ Hessheimer, *Ein k.u.k. Offizier erzählt mit dem Zeichenstift*, 29.

⁷²⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

⁷³⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/861, Otto von Kiesewetter Edler von Wiesenbrunn, Aus der Goldenen Leutnantszeit. Der Offizier der alten österr. ungar. Armee, January 1936, 11.

⁷³¹ Roda Roda, Galizische Fahrt, *Neue Freie Presse*, 3 September 1915, 1-3, 2.

⁷³² Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 188.

in particular for those officers not assigned in accordance with their language abilities. It is likely that superiors often made fun of their younger comrades by throwing them in cold without preparation. This undertaking can be interpreted as a kind of initiation ritual that, according to Christoph Ulf, helped shape a common identity.⁷³³ The career officer Ludwig Hessheimer was only one among many officers who outlined such practices in detail. A native speaker of German, the first garrison he was sent to as a lieutenant, was the Hungarian capital, Budapest. Immediately upon his arrival, his captain ordered him to take over a soldier school. He remembered, “I did not really understand. First, I was dressed formally; second, and more important, I had to learn the regimental language first, a mixture of Serbian, and Hungarian, as recruits were Bunjevci from the Banat.” Hessheimer replied to his captain that he would be unable to do so at the moment, but his superior insisted he take over his duties: “A long, bony finger pointed to the soldier room: Get going.”⁷³⁴ Officers’ autobiographical writings reveal that many of them felt lost and uncomfortable. In some cases, this experience even laid the groundwork for future animosities directed at particular languages, and therefore nationalities. Many of these young officers felt themselves incapable and ineffective and were afraid that their lack of language proficiency would harm their careers.

The novelist and former career officer Rudolf von Eichthal pointed to the probably most important outcome of these language shortcomings, which officers were reminded of almost daily: loss of prestige. In one of his short stories, an officer asked a recruit who guarded the *Hofburg* in Vienna to report. The guard answered in his own language, probably Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian because many Bosniaks were deployed in Vienna. The officer nodded and pretended to understand him. Immediately afterward the officer left the scene, and all guards would have burst out laughing because they were aware that the officer had not understand their report at all.⁷³⁵ Józef Wittlin's novel also mentions a lieutenant colonel who prepared himself to give a speech to a Galician audience: “He mentally repeated the speech he should give to the recruits in Ukrainian. He had mastered this language quite well, and yet he felt the rush of stage fright all over his body. His consciousness of the stage fright humbled him all the more, as he was supposed to talk to people who were so much lower than him.”⁷³⁶ The career officer Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, who spoke Polish poorly, was sent to Cracow to train the recruits of the Infantry Regiment No 20, which recruited from Nowy Sacz and

⁷³³ Ulf, *Von Sinn und Unsinn identifikationsstiftender Rituale*, 46.

⁷³⁴ Hessheimer, *Ein k.u.k. Offizier erzählt mit dem Zeichenstift*, 30.

⁷³⁵ Eichthal, *Ich hatt' einen Kameraden*, 23 and 72.

⁷³⁶ Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 306.

consisted for the most part of Polish speakers. He remembered that “he was often in a great deal of embarrassment, even in despair,” and mentioned that in the end he managed to educate his recruits, but only with the help of interpreters. He was aware that he totally missed out on “the important personal contact” with recruits, although superiors assessed his company in the end as being very well trained. In his own opinion, Stillfried was only successful, because of his “diligence, conscientiousness, and sense of responsibility. In spite of all that, I had the conviction that if there had not been a language barrier, I could have been much more profitable.”⁷³⁷ The bulk of officers helped themselves out using interpreters. A Second Lieutenant supported Stillfried: “He was my interpreter for everything about which I had to talk to the recruits.”⁷³⁸ Newly arrived in a Galician regiment, career officer Franz Xaver Schubert recognized that many of his Ruthenian-speaking recruits for whom he had to organize the school, were illiterate. He confided in his diary that he did not speak the Ruthenian regimental language, but had to teach them reading and writing. Schubert commented that he succeeded at this task only with the help of an NCO.⁷³⁹ Awareness of not being capable of performing officer duties on their own did not help raise their confidence in themselves.

Officers’ language knowledge was regularly criticized in the state and provincial parliaments, and in newspapers. For example, the Austrian parliamentarian František R. Reichstädter, delegate of the Bohemian National-Socialist Club, described an incident during a 1905-speech that had seemingly happened in a town in Moravia: “An officer sat in the coffee shop and wanted to report to his captain. He ordered an orderly to repeat his report. The recruit, a Slav, I do not know whether he was a Pole or a Czech, did not understand a word of German and the officer did not understand a word of Slavic; therefore, they were unable to communicate. At first the officer tried to use hand signs, but the recruit did not understand. The officer then asked the waiter to interpret. It is awkward that an officer has to command a recruit with whom he cannot communicate. Some bystanders who heard the failed communication afterwards commented publicly that the officer would probably better take the waiter to the next battle to ensure the ability to communicate with his own soldiers.”⁷⁴⁰ It is likely that the way in which such incidents were regularly described to the public, affected officers’ opinions about particular languages, and therefore nationalities.

⁷³⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/862:1, Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished undated manuscript, 33.

⁷³⁸ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/862:1, Adolf Stillfried von Rathenitz, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished undated manuscript, 26.

⁷³⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/833:2, Franz Xaver Schubert, unpublished diary, compiled in 1943, 49.

⁷⁴⁰ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Reichstädter, 27375.

Even when their lack of language abilities did not harm their careers, and officers were able to train their recruits in their languages, either poorly by themselves or with the help of an interpreter, it often negatively influenced their acceptance as leaders, thus threatening success in combat. The career officer and novelist Robert Michel outlined that a lieutenant who spoke the soldiers' languages would more easily be accepted than military leaders who did not.⁷⁴¹ For example, the Sopron-born career officer Anton Lehár was able to communicate, and recalled his time as company leader in Komárom/Komárno: "The recruits with whom I was able to speak in their mother tongue – which not all company commanders were able to – went through the fire for me."⁷⁴² Many officers' memoirs and diaries demonstrate that recruits were more likely to consider officers their own when they spoke their language, regardless of whether they were of the same nationality. Plzeň-born General Julius Lustig-Prean von Preansfeld remembered an episode where a first lieutenant violently disciplined a recruit, but concluded that the same officer "was one of the few in the battalion who was fluent in Czech, and therefore enjoyed great popularity among the [Czech-speaking] rank and file."⁷⁴³ Roda Roda emphasized, "thus, Slavs and Magyars were grateful to an officer who spoke their language, even if he otherwise harassed them."⁷⁴⁴

In addition to communication, officers had to perform with their recruits during exercises and maneuvers when superiors were in attendance. For example, during inspections, attending generals usually addressed the same questions in the same order to the recruits: "How old are you? How long have you been serving? Are your parents still alive?"⁷⁴⁵ As most inspectors did not speak the soldiers' languages, their officers were expected to translate. Officers therefore tended to prepare themselves and their recruits in advance by practicing the expected standard questions. Some inspectors used this opportunity to check the language proficiency of the officers. General Ernst Wurmbrand remembered an occasion when an inspector proved his mastery of Czech. In front of his Czech-speaking colonel, he was asked to tell his corporal to report in Czech: "I knew that the general could not even say good morning in Czech, so I remained calm, and spoke to my corporal in a gawking gibberish, mixed with all the Bohemian swear words I knew. The Corporal, who spoke German, remained quite serious

⁷⁴¹ Michel, *Die Verhüllte*, 66.

⁷⁴² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, vol. 2, 56.

⁷⁴³ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/5:1, Julius Lustig-Prean von Preansfeld, *Aus den Lebenserinnerungen eines alten k.u.k. Offiziers*, unpublished manuscript, winter 1940/41, 19.

⁷⁴⁴ Roda Roda, *Roda Rodas Roman*, 383-4.

⁷⁴⁵ Eichthal, *Altösterreichische Soldatengeschichten*, 24-6.

and answered in Czech. The general asked, what did he say? I answered: He said that when the enemy saw them, he immediately withdrew. Very well, the general said to me, I was very happy with everything and most of all that you learned Czech so quickly, because this language is very difficult but necessary. My colonel was speechless.”⁷⁴⁶ Officers often tended to remember such scenes with amusement, although when they happened it made them feel inferior and incapable. Officers were afraid that their superior officers would afterwards assess them negatively, and that such incidents would harm their careers.

Recruits’ autobiographical sources indicate that irrespective of their native tongues, and therefore nationalities, they did not experience the use of mixed languages and/or officers’ poor language abilities all that negatively. However, there are fewer recruits’ diaries preserved in archives than there are those of officers, and most often they do not deal with the language and nationality question in detail. What does still exist is often oral. In past years, I have spoken with many Habsburg soldiers’ offspring who contacted me after they read one of my academic articles or press interviews. For example, Hazel Bargiel, the offspring of Josef Kolbe, a Habsburg soldier who served in the Infantry Regiment No 50, which recruited from around Alba Iulia, was told as a child a story that of course now overlaps with her own interpretation: “Usually, he [her grandfather] took himself very seriously, but when he was addressing the Hungarian or Romanian soldiers of his company, he must have said something in their language that had a double meaning, because they all burst out laughing.”⁷⁴⁷ In some families in Slovenia, there is still a story told that their grandfathers, when serving as recruits, made jokes about a German command word that they had to use very often because it was the standard answer to a given order. The command-answer *Jawohl* (yes, sir) reminded them of the Slovenian word for ox (*vol*). It is likely that in many cases the Slovene-speaking recruits followed an officer’s or NCO’s order, they thought of answering with yes, or ox, and burst out laughing after their superior had left the scene. Most recruits (and also reserve officers) tended to criticize the shortcomings of their army service when they had, as the army journal termed it, “undergone an anti-Austrian, nationalist pre-school.”⁷⁴⁸ Those who were already politically active in a nationalist movement before joining the army often interpreted the weakness in officers’ language skills as a violation of their language rights.

⁷⁴⁶ Mikoletzky, ed., *Ernst Wurmbrand*, 291-2.

⁷⁴⁷ I thank Hazel Bargiel for sharing her family story (www.josefkolbe.com/military/officer-cadet-school).

⁷⁴⁸ P., Am Vorabend der zweijährigen Dienstzeit, *Danzer's Armee-Zeitung*, 12 January 1911, 1-8, 1.

As long as someone was around who spoke their language, be it an officer, an NCO, or a fellow conscript, peacetime recruits apparently had no issues with superiors who spoke their languages brokenly. Archival material shows that not only did this experience make them feel slightly superior, but they also used language diversity by learning new languages, in particular German. They too tended to mix up languages, and this became a characteristic of former recruits, a sign of recognition, and in the end produced an esprit de corps. It was almost exclusively nationalist activists who criticized this practice and accused the army of having caused the dilemma. For example, in 1887, the Hungarian weekly *Eger* entitled a lengthy article *A katonai szellem* (the spirit of infantrymen). The anonymous author complained about native Hungarian-speaking soldiers mixing their language with German. He provided readers with lots of examples, including that many soldiers were likely to say *pite ujláb* when they asked for vacation. These are two German words (*bitte Urlaub*), but their pronunciation was Hungarianized. The author added another daily phrase from military life, meaning that someone reported to superiors about a damaged boot, “*melybe kórság, csizma cseresnye,*” mixing German and Hungarian.⁷⁴⁹ In 1900, the novelist István Tömörkény entitled an article *Katona a kötélén* (the language of infantrymen), providing examples from his own experience. He had been an NCO in Infantry Regiment No 46, which was stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late 1880s. As just one example that is employed more than once, *meldige horzám* was Hungarian spelling but means one of the most common used German phrases in the army: I report with obedience.⁷⁵⁰ Despite heavy criticism, the German language of command even regularly made its way into speeches given in the Hungarian parliament. When delegates stressed the army language system and raised examples from their own military experience they often had to use German words. In 1887, Miklós Gabányi emphasized that he was enlisted as one-year-volunteer in 1869 into the Infantry Regiment No 62 that recruited from Marosvásárhely and comprised in almost equal number native Hungarian and Romanian speakers. Among some other sentences that used German terms, he used the German term for training (*abrichten*): “*Mikor ki voltunk abrichtolva* (When we were out for training).” The protocols mention laughter in the auditorium, meaning that many understood the German parts.⁷⁵¹

⁷⁴⁹ Z., *A katonai szellem*, *Eger*, 29.3.1887, 1-2, 1.

⁷⁵⁰ Tömörkény, *Katona a kötélén*, 7-11.

⁷⁵¹ OK/G, Képviselőházi napló, 1901, 367.

Archival sources reveal that the mixing of languages was not only a daily army experience but became an important characteristic of members of the Habsburg army. National activists opposed this language practice, but seemingly with only little, or even without any, success. However, they tended to criticize the practice whenever possible, bringing up examples. Therefore, it is likely that they even helped spread knowledge of the mixed languages to an even wider audience. Although the journalists' aim was obviously to draw readers' attention to the negative impact of the German language of command on the purity of the other Habsburg languages, most people laughed about mixing languages in this way, and increasingly tended to use these German phrases. Christa Hämmerle analyzed for many years soldier diaries from Habsburg times. She is correct when claiming that Habsburg soldiers' autobiographical records were not only written in a way that "reads like colloquial language" (*stark an Mündlichkeit orientiert*) but often intermingled with terms and phrases from other languages, which the soldiers had learned during their army service.⁷⁵² Journalists mainly reported about army members mixing languages in oral communication, but they did so in their autobiographical writings and when they exchanged letters, too. Soldiers' diaries, regardless of their native tongues, were full of words and phrases from other languages. However, the dominance of the German army language is clearly visible because most German words used were connected to military service. The soldier Paolino Zardini, born in 1897 in a Ladin-family near Cortina d'Ampezzo, served during the First World War. His war diary is in Italian. However, there is hardly any paragraph in which he does not use a German word such as *maschineg*, from the German word for machine gun (*Maschinengewehr*) instead of the Italian *mitragliatrice*.⁷⁵³ The war diary of the Roman-Catholic military chaplain Jan Eybl hardly a single sentence that does not contain at least one German word, although it is written in Czech: "Když byl *Plünderung*, vojáci zahazovali střelivo a brali, co mohli." In this sentence, in which he emphasized soldiers throwing away their weaponry and plundering, he used the German term for plunder, *Plünderung*.⁷⁵⁴

In colloquial language, many of German command words and phrases survived the First World War and the dismantling of the Habsburg army in 1918. They were even used by subsequent generations. Ediltrud Felszhegy published a list of German army terms which were still in use in Hungary in 1939. She noted Hungarianized words first, followed by the German

⁷⁵² Hämmerle, ed., *Des Kaiser Knechte*, 13.

⁷⁵³ Zardini, *Diario di Guerra 1915-1918*, 24

⁷⁵⁴ Garkisch, ed., *První světová válka v denících feldkuráta P. Jana Evangelisty Eybla*, 24 November 1914.

word and ending with the “real” Hungarian expression: “*tagvake – Tagwache – ébresztő* (reveille), *urlap – Urlaub – szabadság* (vacation), *lénung – Löhnung – zsold* (payment), *linkcum – Links um! – Balra át!* (Left around!), *mansaft – Mannschaft – legénység* (squad), *manéber – Manöver – gyarkorlat* (manouever).”⁷⁵⁵ I have put the word real into quotation marks because the word *zsold* is also not of Hungarian origin, deriving from the German word *Sold*. Felszhegy’s effort was only an early attempt to show how the German command language influenced the other domestic languages, in particular army terms. Recently, many scholars from different disciplines have dealt with this topic for the other Habsburg languages.⁷⁵⁶ Even centuries after the dismantling of the army, this linguistic practice is used to demonstrate the “military spirit” and the real language used in the Habsburg army and daily interactions in garrisons. The 1985-film *c.k. Dezerterzy* (k.k. Deserters) is set in the last year of the First World War, in 1918, in a garrison in Upper Hungary, which is today Slovakia. Although the film is in Polish, officers and soldiers often use German terms and phrases. There is only one main actor who speaks exclusively German throughout the film: the commanding officer’s parrot.⁷⁵⁷

Language contact in the army affected both linguistic practices in communication and jokes and songs. The best-known example was probably the military song *Kanonýr Jabůrek* (Cannonier Jaburek). The lyrics of this song are primarily in Czech, but the song also incorporates – sometimes “Czechized” – German command words and phrases. The song tells the story of a valiant cannoneer named Jabůrek, who, according to the song, took part in the Battle of Königgrätz, where the Austrian army was defeated by the Prussians in 1866. Even after the enemy cannonballs tore off his arms, he continued to load his cannon with his bare feet. Finally, his head was blown off, flew to the Austrian general in charge, and informed him, “sorry, I cannot salute.” One part of the lyrics reads as follows: “*A u kanonu stál a pořád ládo* [from the German word *laden/load*], *a u kanonu stál a furt* [from the German word *immerfort/ongoing*] *jen ládoval. Vzdor hroznému dešti kulek, fójervertr* [Feuerwerker/artillerymen] *Franz Jabůrek s luntem* [Lunte/fuse] *u kanonu stál a pánvičku pucoval. V tom ho zahlíd Kronprinc Fridrich, herje den Kerl erschiess ich* [this part is entirely in German, and means: I am going to shoot this man], *a už hází potvůrka rachejtle na*

⁷⁵⁵ See: Felszhegy, *A császári és királyi hadsereg nyelve Magyarországon*; see also: Korcsmáros, *Adatok a magyar katonanyelvhez*, 5496, as well as: Forgács, *Német Jövevényszavaka a Magyar katonanyelvben*.

⁷⁵⁶ For Ruthenian: Mocharitsch, *Ruthenische Militärterminologie in der Habsburgermonarchie*. For Polish: Suchorzewska, *Zur Geschichte der polnischen Militärsprache in der Habsburgermonarchie*.

⁷⁵⁷ Janusz Majewskiego, *C.K. Dezerterzy*, 1985 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vmef_8MY46w). Based on a Kazimierz Sejda’s novel from 1937.

Jabůrka.⁷⁵⁸ The meaning of the lyrics was interpreted differently: on the one hand, as an anti-war persiflage on and a criticism of diehard Czech loyalty to the empire, and on the other, as a “true miracle of valor.”⁷⁵⁹

Archival records show that many of the rank and file, independent of their nationalities and language backgrounds, sang Cannonier Jaburek and laughed about mixing one language with another. For example, General August von Urbanski recalled in his memoirs that during a maneuver in the 1870s, his soldiers consisted “for the most part of Croats, some Hungarians, and only a few Germans.” The only non-German lyrics they sang were this song, which he called was in “Barrack Czech” (*Kaserntschechisch*).⁷⁶⁰ The song became more widespread when the novelist Egon Erwin Kisch titled one of his feuilletons in the *Prager Tagblatt* after it. The story dealt with a pub fight in Prague between recruits from the Austrian Territorial Defense and the joint army. Kisch explained that the only moment when they stopped beating one another was when they started singing this song: “The epipo has seventeen four-line stanzas and is written in Czech-German. Actually, it is Czech, but is so interspersed with military terms [...] and German curses that there is not much Czech left.”⁷⁶¹

⁷⁵⁸ Frant. Kolára, Udatný rek Kanonýr Jabůrek. Kratochvílná píseň na světlo vydaná na příklad všem mládeňcům od civilu a milítéru (<http://svejkmuseum.cz/Pisnicky/jaburek.htm>).

⁷⁵⁹ Heinrich Holec, Das Lied vom heldenmütigen Kannonier Jaburek, *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 18 July 1926, 10.

⁷⁶⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/58:4, August von Urbanski. Das Tornisterkind, 29.

⁷⁶¹ Kisch, *Das Lied von Jaburek*, 60-2.

Chapter 6: Language and Politics

The k.u.k. army had to disintegrate when politicians made the national affiliation of soldiers and officers the most important and decisive question.

Ludwig Hesshaimer, career officer and novelist⁷⁶²

Hesshaimer was not alone in his opinion. Most officers' memoirs and diaries reflect the seemingly common conviction that politicians focused on the army language system's shortcomings insofar as it harmed their national rights rather than on the hardships organizational shortcomings caused. The reserve officer Robert Nowak emphasized in his memoirs the role politicians played in the army language system: "Someone was always able to get along with the rank and file, certainly, but as soon as politicians were involved, the situation became critical."⁷⁶³ However, it is impossible to clearly separate the two opponents, politicians on the one side and soldiers on the other. Although army members were forbidden to actively take part in politics and even to vote during their military service, politicians and journalists included hundreds of reserve officers, former NCOs, conscripts, and even members of the military clergy and retired career officers. There were even some career officers who left the army and afterwards, looking for a new profession, became politicians or journalists.⁷⁶⁴

Earlier chapters have already demonstrated that parliamentarians from all nationalities regularly commented on and criticized the army language system. They also often proposed improvements. When reading the minutes of the parliamentary debates from Vienna and Budapest, it becomes obvious that the regimental language system was most often discussed in the former. Reasons for this are outlined later in this chapter. Indeed, the two parliaments in Vienna and Budapest, the many provincial governments across the Monarchy, and the later diet in Sarajevo provided numerous platforms for debating the shortcomings of the army language system. However, this chapter does not simply repeat the complaints politicians and journalists raised, rather, it analyses their rhetoric and the reaction of army bureaucrats. I demonstrate that army bureaucrats tended to reject all complaints about the army language system's shortcomings, however justified they might have been, as solely nationally motivated. Pieter

⁷⁶² Hesshaimer, *Miniaturen aus der Monarchie*, 32.

⁷⁶³ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated.

⁷⁶⁴ See for example on political activity of retired career officers: Marin, *World War I and Internal Repression*, 199.

M. Judson detects a similar outcome for debates at a regional civil level: “Although the government recognized the existence of nationalist claims, they [ministers and bureaucrats] refused to treat them as anything more than the overheated rhetoric of particular political parties.”⁷⁶⁵ Thus, over the course of more than forty years, the army language system was never seriously corrected. There were also voices which focused on shortcomings by not connecting it (exclusively) to a national cause. These voices were rare and usually ignored.

The Austrian Political Debate

The army language system was often on the agenda, although roughly half of the debate stressed the German language of command and bureaucracy. Debates heated up regularly, delegates or crowds from the gallery interfering with those who spoke too loudly. Especially in the Viennese parliament, the k.k. *Reichsrat*, almost every issue raised was immediately transformed into a national issue. Here delegates met who were elected from across Cisleithanian Austria with its variety of locally employed language rules by representative voters from a wide range of ideological backgrounds.⁷⁶⁶ For a foreigner, such as the American writer Mark Twain, who attended meetings from the gallery in 1898-99, it was an unusual experience to see how Austrian parliamentarism presented itself. He published his experience soon after his trip in *Stirring Times in Austria* and explained to his English-speaking readers: “The House draws its membership of 425 deputies [...]. These men represent peoples who speak eleven languages, meaning eleven distinct varieties of jealousies, hostilities, and warring interests.”⁷⁶⁷ However, as overheated as debates often became, the parliament was not dismantled before spring 1914, and as such scenes became normality for Austrian citizens.

In *Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich* (Parliament and Constitution in Austria), published in 1911, Gustav Kolmer a novelist, journalist, and for a couple of years a parliament stenographer, depicted a debate between Francis Joseph and some delegates from Bohemia in 1900. One of them emphasized that state bureaucrats should seriously consider when parliamentary delegates proposed improvements to the language system in parliament “because then the population relies on mediation through politicians” and would be less prone to unrest. Kolmer drew readers’ attention to Francis Joseph’s opposing opinion, which claimed that

⁷⁶⁵ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 200.

⁷⁶⁶ For a concise overview see: Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary*, 70.

⁷⁶⁷ Twain, *Stirring Times in Austria*.

politicians should calm the population's mood rather than stirring them up. For the monarch, the delegates' "extreme positions" (*scharfe Ausfälle*) during parliamentary meetings would exclusively result in "disquietude among the population, who would then tend to react even more violently on the streets."⁷⁶⁸

After having analysed the debates in the Austrian parliament it becomes obvious that many parliamentary delegates never raised criticism of the army language system in general speaking on behalf of all conscripts; rather, they spoke only for their own nationalities. In Vienna, delegates from a variety of parties met, including Christian-Democrats, Conservatives, and Socialists/Social Democrats. Most of the parties formed around particular nationalities. Even the self-proclaimed supranational Christian and Socialist parties were divided along linguistic, and therefore national lines. Many of their voters therefore expected their delegates to speak (exclusively) for their nationalities.⁷⁶⁹ Although delegates from all parties and all nationalities regularly raised almost the same issues, there was virtually no case where criticism of the army language system was brought up jointly, spanning more than one province, or nationality. More often, the same criticism was raised by one delegate after another, each, as Twain has emphasized, "jealously" watching that the government did not favour one nationality over another. Twain concluded: "Nearly every day someone explains to me that a revolution would not succeed here. It could not, you know. Broadly speaking, all the nations in the empire hate the government, but they hate one another, too, with devoted and enthusiastic bitterness; [...] the nation that rises must rise alone; then the others would joyfully join the government against it."⁷⁷⁰

There are only a few examples of a delegate addressing the shortcomings of the army language system by representing all soldiers, and not exclusively those of his own nationality. "I know from my own experience – I was a soldier myself for two years – that knowledge of the regimental language is necessary for the officer, like fins are for a fish. He can not help himself, otherwise he is dumb," Ignac Žitnik, an Austrian parliamentarian, reminded his audience in 1907, concluding: "So it is not a purely chauvinistic question, but a practical one."⁷⁷¹ Žitnik, a Roman-Catholic priest born in 1857, was a delegate of the Slovene Club from

⁷⁶⁸ Kolmer, *Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich*.

⁷⁶⁹ On Socialists see: Pelinka, and Scheuch, *100 Jahre AZ*, 57. And: Bunzl, *Zur Geschichte des Antisemitismus in Österreich*, 35. On Christian Socialists see: Boyer, *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna*.

⁷⁷⁰ Twain, *Stirring Times in Austria*.

⁷⁷¹ ALEX/SPAR, 1907, Žitnik, 42276.

Carniola. He was among the very few parliamentarians who openly criticized the officers' language abilities without transforming it immediately into a national concern. In particular, the last comment is a rarity. Yet, did Žitnik aim to criticize army bureaucrats who tended to reject all criticism as being nationally, and therefore “chauvinistically,” motivated? Or did he address his fellow delegates, who overwhelmingly tied criticism about real shortcomings exclusively to nationalist claims? Perhaps he just wanted to emphasize that the issue was overly nationalized by all sides? Žitnik was an important Slovene politician, but in his rhetoric, he did not speak exclusively for Slovene-speaking recruits. He went on to say that “we have to demand that, both in the interest of the military service and as equal citizens.”⁷⁷² Again, it was left open who he was precisely targeting with the *we*. Comparing Žitnik's rhetoric with that of his parliamentary contemporaries, one finds the use of *we* usually implied only the recruits of someone's own nationality. Having read more of Žitnik's speeches, I assume that he might have sought to hit two or three birds with one stone. He used more general rhetoric to avoid military bureaucrats calling him a nationalist, while at the same time aiming to satisfy his Slovene voters.

Earlier in this study I referred to Pieter M. Judson and Rok Stergar, who argue that nationalists often criticized men like Žitnik as nationally indifferent, meaning disloyal to their own nationality. An analysis of the debates of the Austrian parliament indicates that those delegates who represented voters from more than one nationality tended to adopt more general rhetoric. Some might have argued more cautiously to avoid disappointing their voters, who stemmed from a variety of nationalities. The auditor Wilhelm Binder from Cracow, a delegate from Galicia for the towns of Biała, Neusandec, and Wieliczka pointed to “our wish that every officer and NCO speak the languages. In doing so, however, I would like to say that it should be avoided that soldiers of our people [*unseres Volkes*] be assigned to units with a foreign regimental language.”⁷⁷³ In Binder's case, it is likely that when he referred to “our people,” he meant all Galician voters he represented, Polish-, Ruthenian- and Yiddish-speaking, irrespective of their native languages and therefore nationalities.

In a speech in 1910, the Galician parliamentarian Wladimir Kozłowski-Bolesta, a delegate of the Polish Club, referred to the increased necessity for language abilities among officers after the reduction of military service from three to two years. Ministerial archival

⁷⁷² ALEX/SPAR, 1907, Žitnik, 42276.

⁷⁷³ ALEX/SPAR, 1907, Binder, 42377-8.

sources I have examined indicate that army bureaucrats themselves called it an urgent necessity to organize language courses more properly when the rank and file served for a shorter time. While Kozłowski-Bolesta started his speech by addressing shortcomings valid for all soldiers, regardless of their languages, he quickly turned to address only the Polish speakers by emphasizing that “we were awarded an extension of the rights of the Polish language in the cadet schools.”⁷⁷⁴ Both Žitnik and Kozłowski-Bolesta represented particular nationalities, the Slovene and the Polish, who usually tended to speak exclusively for their own nationalities. However, they are examples of delegates who concentrated on the shortcomings of the army language system in general than exclusively arguing nationally, as will be discussed later.

Nationalist delegates’ claims were usually clearly made only on behalf of one nationality, and therefore language, and in many were cases fully subordinated to their ideological (national) program. Often the same phrases were used more than once during one speech. For example, parliamentarian Jožef Pogačnik, a delegate of the Croatian-Slovene Club from Carniola, claimed: “During peacetime it would be fine if the officer orders his NCO, tell the soldiers this and that in Slovene, but during a war there will never be enough time for that.”⁷⁷⁵ The core of this criticism certainly stressed that officers did not speak their subordinates’ languages themselves, instead using their NCOs as interpreters. Kasimir Rzeszódtko, a delegate for the Polish Club, exclusively referred to the poor training conditions of soldiers of Polish nationality “who should be assigned to Polish regiments only.” He went on: “The sons of other nations are allowed to have confessors and preachers in their native languages, while the Poles enlisted in regiments where the regimental language is not Polish are not even given the opportunity to talk with their priests in their mother tongue. That is a fact.” This rhetoric, bringing up examples such as “Polish soldiers can not speak to priests,” was usually not followed by detailed information, such as in which regiment and when exactly this had happened, and who played a role. However, although Pogačnik’s and Rzeszódtko’s rhetoric differed from Binder’s, Kozłowski-Bolesta’s, and Žitnik’s, in all cases state bureaucrats tended to accuse delegates of arguing exclusively out of nationalist motives, and thus dismissed them.

Like Rzeszódtko, many other parliamentarians started their speeches by referring to particular incidents. These incidents were usually immediately printed in newspapers across the

⁷⁷⁴ ALEX/SPAR, 1910, Kozłowski, 1369.

⁷⁷⁵ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Pogačnik, 27524.

Monarchy, but in very many cases the necessary information – when and where exactly they had happened, and who was involved – was not provided. The Ministry of War was often accused of having caused such shortcomings; thus, it afterwards had to find out the context and the complete story. Ministerial archival records reveal that in many cases, ministerial bureaucrats started an investigation and sometimes even proved the incident described in parliaments to be wrong. However, the public audience, and not only the nationalists, already believed their delegates, and became concerned about the language rights of “their” sons, husbands, and brothers serving in the army. In an attack hidden in half a sentence, Rzeszódsko accused army officials that their officers’ lack of language knowledge often resulted in more violence towards recruits (*Soldatenmisshandlungen*),⁷⁷⁶ which of course made the interested public, relatives, family members, and friends even more concerned about their fellows’ situation. Violence towards recruits was a serious issue, but as this delegate (and often others) employed a nationalist tone, he made it relatively easy for army bureaucrats to dismiss claims immediately and easily. My analysis reveals that, in the end, the government almost never reacted seriously to critics, regardless of who brought them up in parliament and how.

A regular criticism stressed that officers learned the soldier languages only to a degree, in order to better insult their men. In 1907, the widely read popular satirical magazine *Simplicissimus* published a caricature that described this phenomenon. Two former conscripts were talking about the language system while walking along a street. One, an alleged native German speaker, asked the other: “Hey, Wenzl, in which language do they command you, German or Bohemian?” Wenzl, usually used to indicate a native Czech speaker, answered: “They command in German so that we learn it, but they insult us in Bohemian to ensure that we understand.”⁷⁷⁷ The historian Alexander Jordan is therefore correct to a certain degree that the “old army joke about the real character of Habsburg regiments is right, in that they were commanded in German but insulted and cursed in the other languages.”⁷⁷⁸ In a parliamentary speech in 1905, Václav Klofáč, a delegate from the Bohemian National Socialists, claimed that the exclusive purpose of the regimental system was to “enable officers to even more efficiently insult citizens who are trained for war service in their mother tongue.”⁷⁷⁹ The parliamentarian Evgen Jarc, a delegate of the Croatian-Slovene Club from Carniola, asserted his “wish” that

⁷⁷⁶ ALEX/SPAR, 1908, Rzeszodko, 4087.

⁷⁷⁷ J.B. Engl, Aus Oesterreich, *Simplicissimus*, 20 May 1907, 121.

⁷⁷⁸ Jordan, *Krieg um die Alpen*, 156.

⁷⁷⁹ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Klofáč, 26941.

officers should not speak the regimental languages only to the degree of knowing the “bad words and curses.”⁷⁸⁰ Autobiographical records reveal that this practice was widespread.

Even when many delegates spoke only for one nationality, this did not necessarily mean that they connected misadministration of the army language system to the violation of national pride or turned it exclusively into what army officials and Žitnik might have termed “chauvinistic.” Many Austrian parliamentary delegates, when dealing with the army language system, started their speeches with some words about soldiers’ grievances, bringing up particular incidents, but they usually used them only as a starting point for more general national demands. This rhetoric was used not only in the Viennese parliament, but also in the many Austrian provincial diets. An example is the rhetoric Emanuel Engel (Young Bohemians) and Bedřich Pacák (Young Czechs) used during a meeting in 1899 in Prague. Both delegates declared that if the army leadership would not respect its own legal regulations regarding officers’ language proficiency, they would not consider “our nationality’s sentiment” (*Nationalitätengefühl*).⁷⁸¹ Václav Klofáč, a Bohemian National Socialist, questioned the purpose of the regimental language system, which would have by no means been introduced “out of respect for our national rights.”⁷⁸²

The examples shown in previous chapters already demonstrate that parliamentary delegates, in addition to the officers’ poor language abilities, often criticized the dominance of German in the joint army. However, many complaints were not exclusively directed against German as the language of command and bureaucracy, but rather at the fact that some other regimental language dominated in a regiment or battalion over another locally used language. Complaints were raised in parliament and delegates of the allegedly marginalized language – and therefore nationality – sought support among army bureaucrats. For example, the above-mentioned delegate from the Ruthenian Club, Lewycky, tied the high rate of suicide among soldiers to the lack of a sufficient number of Ruthenian-speaking officers. However, Lewycky took the bad conditions in the army for Ruthenian-speakers only as a starting point, because he seemingly mostly wanted to criticize the growing dominance of Polish in Galicia: “Before being assigned to a [Galician] regiment, the officers should take an exam in the Ruthenian, and not just the Polish, language.”⁷⁸³

⁷⁸⁰ ALEX/SPAR, 1911, Jarc, 5500.

⁷⁸¹ N.N., Bericht Landtagssitzung April/Mai, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1899, 232.

⁷⁸² ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Klofáč, 26940.

⁷⁸³ N.N., Die Delegationen, *Wiener Zeitung*, 20 December 1913, 4-10, 8.

Delegates in the Austrian parliament had the right to speak in their native languages, although speeches were usually given in German to be understood by most of the audience. For example, Josef Kadlčák from Moravia, delegate of the Bohemian Catholic-National Party, started his speech during a meeting of the Lower House in Vienna's parliament in 1908, as many of his peers did, in his own language, in this case Czech. After having spoken a few sentences in Czech, Kadlčák switched to German. This practice was widespread. In 1908, the regimental language system could already look back on forty years since its implementation. Thus, Kadlčák's speech was meant to be a summary stressing all the critical issues that had been on the table since 1868. He mainly referred to the conditions in his home region but added that similar complaints had been raised across the Monarchy: the officers' lack of language abilities, in particular Czech, Slovene, and Polish. The latter specific example, however, Konstantin Lewycky (Lewyckzj Kost), delegate of the Ruthenian Club, would have contradicted immediately.⁷⁸⁴ A joint movement occurred only in rare cases, for example, in terms of what bureaucrats then termed Pan-Slavic sentiment. Regardless, of what the Pan-Slavic movement meant, to whom, where, and at what point in time,⁷⁸⁵ for the army language system, it meant that delegates who represented different Slavic Habsburg nationalities sometimes raised criticism on behalf of *the* Austrian or Habsburg Slavs. Kadlčák's and other parliamentarians' Pan-Slavism usually addressed only Austrian Slavs, while Hungarian Slavs, including Serbs, Croats, Ruthenians, and Slovaks, who were represented in the Hungarian parliament, were most often omitted. When analysing the debates in the Austrian parliament between 1868 and 1914, it becomes obvious that when the army language system and its shortcomings were stressed, most politicians raised criticisms one by one, but they never put them forward jointly to more strongly emphasise army bureaucrats, even when their critiques stressed the same issues.

Parliamentary speeches regularly caused public debates about particular shortcomings of the army language system. However, they usually did not last for longer than a couple of weeks or heated up in one particular Austrian province only. Only once was there a widespread and long-term debate connected to the army language system between 1868 and 1914: the so-called *zde*-affair. This affair gained public attention throughout the Monarchy and was heavily

⁷⁸⁴ ALEX/SPAR, 1908, Kadlčák, 4487.

⁷⁸⁵ For a brief overview that already shows the complexity, see: Stergar, *Panslavism*. Veliz depicted the political debate in Croatia-Slavonia from being alternately dominated by Illyrianism, Yugoslavism, and Croatian nationalism: Veliz, *The Politics of Croatia-Slavonia*, 87f.

discussed several years, mostly from 1898 to 1903. This affair was not only debated in the printed press throughout the Monarchy but also kept both law courts and regional parliaments busy.⁷⁸⁶ When reading the press reports, it is almost impossible to trace the affair back to a particular incident. Pieter M. Judson concludes, as the following chapter discusses, that in the end, “printed media sources tell the historian far more about their producers than about their subjects.”⁷⁸⁷ The core of the affair was that “Czech soldiers” had answered a command with the Czech word for here, *zde*, instead of the required German command word, *hier*. The soldiers were punished for disobedience. Newspapers then referred to the allegedly Czech standpoint this was an unjustified mistreatment of their language by the army, and the German command language’s attempt to denationalize them. In December 1899, the parliamentarian Karel Kramář, member of the Bohemian Club, resumed discussion in a delegation meeting about the *zde*-affair by claiming that “the *zde*-affair resulted from the contradistinction that while Czechs are allowed to take the oath in their native language, they are urged to report exclusively in German.”⁷⁸⁸ During a meeting of the Bohemian provincial parliament, a politician called it: “A serious insult to the Czech nation [...] as if one wanted to spit into the face of the Czech nation.”⁷⁸⁹

In 1902, parliamentarians of Czech nationality referred to the *zde*-affair and shouted in the Vienna parliament, “down with the German command-language.” They did so in German to ensure that all present on that day could understand.⁷⁹⁰ These parliamentarians expressed their worries that the German command language would denationalize and Germanize Czech soldiers. Both parliamentary delegates and journalists spoke on behalf of the soldiers, but what about these soldiers whose rights they defended so vehemently? Were they discontented with the language system, and did they themselves feel denationalized? As the previous chapter has demonstrated, most recruits for the most part thought neither that they were losing their national identity nor that they were being Germanized. The few autobiographical sources housed in archives today indicate that virtually no recruit ever mentioned that the language of command had an effect on their identities. Recruits, regardless of their native tongues, simply learned these German terms and often used them even after they finished their military service (discussed in chapter 5). Officers on the other hand often highlighted the purpose of the army’s

⁷⁸⁶ N.N., Bericht über Landtagssitzung, April/Mai, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1899, 231.

⁷⁸⁷ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 182.

⁷⁸⁸ Kolmer, *Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich*.

⁷⁸⁹ As only one example the Prager Tagblatt reported about the Dr. Baxa’s comment at a meeting of the Bohemian diet (*Böhmischer Landtag*): N.N., Böhmischer Landtag, *Prager Tagblatt*, 30 December 1898, 1-5, 4.

⁷⁹⁰ Peball, Rothenberg, Der Fall U, 93.

language laws. They argued that while the regimental languages preserved cultural identity, the language of command advocated commonality – therefore, it had been precisely this set of words and phrases that all recruits had to memorize which enabled soldiers to create an esprit de corps.⁷⁹¹ Perhaps no one expressed the lack of a denationalizing character to the command language more drastically than one Hungarian. As early as 1889, on the occasion of the new Defense Acts, the Hungarian minister president Gyula Andrassy stated in a speech: “The common army has neither the occasion nor the opportunity to Germanize, because in three years one can not Germanize people, nor undress them of their nationality, nor replace their patriotism with another.”⁷⁹² However, the denationalization argument was stressed by all sides. An anonymous author claimed in *Pester Lloyd* in 1906: “Nothing is therefore more unjust and wrong than the accusation that the Hungarian soldier is denationalized in the army. The German command and bureaucratic language can hardly even achieve in the short service time the most necessary understanding of military commands and expressions. [...] Those who claim the opposite do not know the army.”⁷⁹³ Žitnik also argued for a common language of command in which “no soldier was ever denationalized.”⁷⁹⁴

Often, incidents were brought before the parliaments and diets or raised in the press in which it was not clear what had actually happened. The archival records of the Ministry of War indicate that they often worked hand in hand with the Ministry of the Interior to gain more information. For example, in 1898, the Ministry of the Interior informed the Ministry of War that in the course of a demonstration in Prague, a delegate allegedly forbade an officer to speak German, which would have caused additional unrest.⁷⁹⁵ Unfortunately, archival records often do not indicate the results of such investigations. I have found no archival source that discussed in which framework the *zde*-affair actually happened. The army language system did not always forbid recruits from responding to officers’ questions with *zde* during their military service. When the question was framed as an order, the German language of command had to be used, but if the soldiers were asked something during daily duty, they would have been permitted to answer in their native tongues. Interestingly, this difference within the army’s language system

⁷⁹¹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:1, Robert Nowak, Die Klammer des Reichs. Das Verhältnis der elf Nationalitäten Österreich-Ungarns 1915, unpublished manuscript, undated (after 1945).

⁷⁹² Horel, *Soldaten zwischen nationalen Fronten*, 13. She refers to: Gyula Andrassy: *Die Einheit der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee. Rede über die Wehrgesetz Vorlage, gehalten am 5.4.1889*. Wien 1889. On the new Defense Acts see also: Kronenbitter, *Krieg im Frieden*, 152f.

⁷⁹³ Von einem k.u.k. Feldmarschall-Lieutenant. Die Kommando- und Dienstsprache, *Pester Lloyd*, 2 March 1906, 2.

⁷⁹⁴ Stergar, Fragen des Militärwesens in der slowenischen Politik, 418. Ignac Žitnik cited the speech in parliament: N.N., Ein Slave für die einheitliche Armeesprache, *Reichspost*, 20 June 1912, 3.

⁷⁹⁵ ÖStA/KA/KM, Präs, 1898, 52-7/1, Note (*Einsichtakt*) of the k.k. Ministry of the Interior.

was never considered in the public discourse. Owing to the officers' lack of language abilities – and of course, nationalism played a role too – some officers already felt offended when Czechs demanded the right to speak or answer in their native language during daily service. On the other hand, nationalists from all sides carefully awaited incidents that could start an affair, or as was reported in the case of the *zde*-affair, they sometimes actively motivated soldiers to create them.⁷⁹⁶ It is also likely that in some cases unsatisfied or politically active recruits themselves talked with the press. Although the German command language and its effects were criticized regularly in the Austrian parliament and press, these criticisms had no short-term effect: army bureaucrats rejected all claims. However, there was a long-term effect, because the *zde*-affair certainly helped heat up the general Habsburg nationality debate. What actually happened was that the name *Zde*-affair turned into a political phrase. In 1908, the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina caused an international crisis. A couple of years later, in 1912, when a war in the Balkans with Serbia seemed likely, Habsburg troops were mobilized again and sent to the border. Some soldiers openly demonstrated their support for Serbia, shouting pro-Serbian slogans and refusing to reply to a German command during a parade in German with *hier*, doing so rather in Czech with *zde*.⁷⁹⁷

In addition to criticism of the domination of German in the Habsburg army, officer assignment practice was also often debated in parliament. In 1905, the parliamentarian František R. Reichstädter, delegate of the Bohemian National-Socialist Club, argued that “officers who spoke the Bohemian language and considered themselves to be Bohemian were deployed in regiments stationed in Hungary and Galicia, just because it was feared that they got along too easily with the Bohemian conscripts.” He ended with a plea that “officers of Bohemian nationality should remain in their motherland.”⁷⁹⁸ When delegates, regardless of their native tongues, referred to Bohemians, they usually exclusively meant native Czech-speakers. Parliamentarian Jožef Pogačnik, delegate of the Croatian-Slovene Club, demanded that “Slavic” officers not be assigned to regiments in which they did not speak the languages of the recruits. They should exclusively be deployed in accordance with their native tongues, to educate the recruits themselves and to enable them “to get to know these men’s souls.”⁷⁹⁹ The army’s assignment practice was regularly criticized. I have already demonstrated in chapter 3

⁷⁹⁶ N.N., Bericht über Landtagssitzung, April/Mai, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1899, 231.

⁷⁹⁷ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 101. On the different reactions of Habsburg citizens during the First Balkan war, see: Scheer, *Habsburg Empire’s German speaking Public Sphere and the First Balkan War*, 301-319.

⁷⁹⁸ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Reichstädter, 27375.

⁷⁹⁹ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Pogačnik, 27524.

that army bureaucrats and commanders were also aware of the shortcomings it caused, but they tended to avoid making officers of given nationality become exclusively responsible for training recruits of that same nationality. Members of the parliament also often argued that the use of the German colloquial language among officers was intending to maltreat speakers of all other native tongues. The parliamentarian Václav Klofáč, a delegate from the Bohemian National Socialists, spoke of such a “punishment” of “members of the Bohemian/Czech nation” when they were using their own idiom.⁸⁰⁰ The Ministers of War usually responded that no officer or soldier would be punished for identifying with his nationality, using his native tongue, or associating only with comrades of the same nationality. Army bureaucrats emphasized that they would only prosecute “a one-sided, ostentatious emphasis on one's own nationality, which could at least be interpreted as a political activity.”⁸⁰¹

So far, this chapter has focused on parliamentary delegates who were not native German speakers. However, Austrian parliamentarians who claimed to represent so-called German voters were also elected from across Austria. They often used similar rhetoric to the other nationalities insofar as most of them turned a responsibility to their voters exclusively into one to their own nationality. However, the self-proclaimed Germans advocated an additional standpoint, that of speaking on behalf of state interests. The so-called German delegates advocated their nationality's historical role as the sole defender of imperial institutions, including the army and its language system. They loudly claimed that they would always follow Francis Joseph's will, even when the monarch adopted a totally different position. The German nationalists often denied the other delegates' critiques and claims – even when they were justified. Moreover, they even tended to criticize when army bureaucrats advocated for the claims of the other nationalities, by always pointing to the threat this posed to the historical German character of the Habsburg army.

Parliamentary minutes usually became public as newspapers from across Austria published them and journalists commented on them. Therefore, a similar dichotomy of rhetoric as outlined above for the Austrian parliament, becomes visible in the press. Based on the language used, the journalists almost exclusively spoke for their own nationalities. For example, the German nationalist *Grazer Tagblatt* concluded: “We can assure the reader that it is already enough of a concession [...] that the army cares a thousand times more for the [other] national

⁸⁰⁰ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Klofáč, 26940.

⁸⁰¹ N.N., Die Delegationen, *Wiener Zeitung*, 20 December 1913, 4-10, 7.

languages, for the so-called regimental languages, than in the blessed times [before 1867-8]. Every year, numerous otherwise very diligent officers were not promoted because they did not learn the regimental languages.”⁸⁰² As this more often happened to native German-speaking officers, as outlined in chapter 4, it is likely that the *Grazer Tagblatt*-author was speaking exclusively for them. Thus, this newspaper supported a group of army members who were punished for something they were officially required to do. German national activists regularly claimed it as their duty to preserve German dominance. For example, the Viennese writer Karl Hron, who started his professional life as Habsburg career officer, published a study on German National politics in 1897. In the chapter “Experience of a long-term career soldier,” he emphasized that the German language should remain dominant “because it has become a world language again and would now rise in importance among non-German nationalities.”⁸⁰³ In 1905, parliamentarian Franz Stein, a delegate of the All-German-Club, emphasized that the army practice of putting speakers of the same languages into the same training units would have caused “each nationality to remain among themselves,” and thus would “deprive them of German influence.”⁸⁰⁴

In their speeches, parliamentarians and journalists of German nationality often tended to reflect regional language struggles. They accused the other local nationality or nationalities of enjoying more rights in the army than did Germans. Brno-born author Wilhelm Kosch, professor of German literature in Switzerland, published a political pamphlet in 1909, *The Germans in Austria*. He concluded that “the Czechs, after having flooded the churches, schools, and civil administration, now sought to bring the language question into the army. Where the language of command had heretofore been German, they are now demanding a Slavic regimental language for Slavic regiments. That the efficiency of the army will be greatly threatened by this, the Czechs do not care. They hate black-yellow Austria.”⁸⁰⁵ Pamphlets which used such a German nationalist rhetoric were often widely read. However, almost the same nationalist rhetoric can be found among all Habsburg national activists, regardless of which language it was brought up in. The only exception is that Kosch, and many other German nationalist authors, connected their claim to an alleged support for the efficiency of the army and the survival of the overall state. In this, they differed from authors who spoke in favor of

⁸⁰² N.N., Die Armeesprache und die Tschechen, *Grazer Tagblatt*, evening number, 3 March 1899, 1. The *Grazer Tagblatt* was founded in 1891 to oppose already established liberal newspapers: Olechowski, *Die Entwicklung des Preßrechts in Österreich bis 1918*, 508.

⁸⁰³ Hron, *Deutschnationale Politik*, 196.

⁸⁰⁴ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Stein, 31263.

⁸⁰⁵ Kosch, *Die Deutschen in Österreich*, 46.

the other Habsburg nationalities. Kosch was not even right – he totally ignored that the native Czech speakers had the right to use their language in the army, as was the case for the speakers of all other recognized Slavic languages. Interestingly, a year later, Kosch returned to Austria to teach at the university of the provincial capital of Bukovina. Multilingual Cernivtsi housed a regiment that often recognized three languages, Polish, Romanian, and Ruthenian.

Until 1914, the army language system was regularly discussed in the Viennese parliament, the provincial diets, and the press, usually by focusing on its shortcomings. Positive comments on the army language system were rare. Therefore, when reading only parliamentary minutes and political pamphlets, regardless of the author's origin and language, one might conclude that the recruits' language rights were never fully implemented and that all soldiers who were forced to serve were thoroughly unsatisfied. One might therefore wonder if there was any time between 1868 and 1914 when the army language system was not criticized but was described positively. My analysis of the political discussion indicates that there was only one particular year when the army language system was assessed positively across the Monarchy, at least by some, during the Badeni Crisis. The Badeni Crisis in 1897 followed the Austrian minister president Kasimir Felix Badeni's proposal to require provincial bureaucrats in Bohemia to speak both locally recognized languages, German and Czech, which most Czech native speakers already did.

Across the Monarchy, German nationalists turned against the Badeni-Decree. They argued that native German-speaking officials could not be expected to learn the second recognized language of the province, Czech.⁸⁰⁶ Hungarian nationalists too turned against this Austrian law, because they feared it could serve as a precedent for minorities in Hungary to claim language rights.⁸⁰⁷ The crisis resulted in unrest across Cisleithanian Austria, and most violently in Graz, the capital of another bilingual province, Styria, where both German and Slovene were recognized as *landesüblich* in civil administration. The unrest became so violent that the army was sent to calm down protests, during which one protestor was shot.⁸⁰⁸ In his memoirs, Plzeň-born General Julius Lustig-Prean von Preansfeld described Graz as a pleasant garrison, despite its “German national orientation.” During the Badeni unrest, however,

⁸⁰⁶ See: Sutter, *Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen von 1897*.

⁸⁰⁷ Romsics, *Dismantling of Historic Hungary*, 9.

⁸⁰⁸ Deák, *Beyond Nationalism*, 68.

conflicts arose between the military and civilian residents.⁸⁰⁹ Even many reserve officers, whom the army expected to be links between the military and civil middle-class society, were directly engaged in the protest. In 1898, eight of them came before the army court of honor after having spread leaflets publicly that argued for the “revocation of the Badeni decree” and the implementation of “German as the state language” in Austria. These reserve officers were reported to have taken part in demonstrations by singing the *Die Wacht am Rhein* which was forbidden in Austria because of its alleged German nationalist character. In Graz, thirty-three officers took part in demonstrations and all of them afterwards lost their officer rank.⁸¹⁰ The German-language newspaper *Pustertaler Bote*, located in multilingual Tyrol, emphasized: “we honestly confess that we do not quite understand the big spectacle. [...] The state demands from the officers’ proficiency in the second language of a regiment, so why should it not be required of its provincial bureaucrats.”⁸¹¹ Voices like this in German were rare, as most German-language newspapers from across Austria, especially these in bilingual provinces usually criticized the Badeni Decree and did not refer to the army language system and the requirements it posed on officers as a positive model.

During the Badeni Crisis there was a debate about to what extent Bohemian bureaucrats already spoke the other languages. While there was no debate about native Czech-speaking officials’ German proficiency, there usually was about the missing language abilities of native German speakers. The Bohemian-born president of the Joint Supreme Audit Office (*Oberster Rechnungshof*), Ernst von Plener, concluded that while it could have not be expected for them to speak and write Czech perfectly, they should do so to a degree that matched the regimental language requirement to speak a language “sufficiently for service use” (*zum Dienstgebrauch genügend*).⁸¹² While Plener downplayed the requirement by arguing that “sufficient” was enough, Innsbruck-born Robert Ehrhart, a high-ranking bureaucrat in the minister president’s office, mentioned that most “German officials in Bohemia spoke Czech only sufficiently for duty, meaning that they were barely able to respond to citizens’ requests, but were totally unable to professionally advise citizens or to correspond with local offices.”⁸¹³ Even an anonymous author in the *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, a biannual so-called calendar that reported from

⁸⁰⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/5:1, Julius Lustig-Prean von Preanfeld, Aus den Lebenserinnerungen eines alten k.u.k. Offiziers, unpublished manuscript, winter 1940/41, 13.

⁸¹⁰ Zehetbauer, *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns*, 117.

⁸¹¹ N.N., Die Ministerkrise, *Pustertaler Bote*, 9 April 1897, 1.

⁸¹² Ernst von Plener, Eine Kreisordnung für Böhmen, *Zeitschrift für Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik und Verwaltung*, 1899/3, 31-2.

⁸¹³ Ehrhart, *Im Dienste des alten Österreich*, 71.

“German lands”, asserted that “the gentlemen from the provincial offices simply do not want to learn the citizens’ language [...] the debate is only about that a couple of hundred young people who annually join state service [and] do not want to learn the second provincial language.”⁸¹⁴

Many army officers, especially career officers, emphasized in their autobiographical writings that they did not understand why the Badeni Decrees caused so much anger. In their view, the decrees required something they were already obliged to fulfil following the army reform in 1868. Vienna-born novelist and First World War reserve officer Otto Friedländer dealt with pre-war Habsburg society in his 1949 novel. He dedicated several pages to the Badeni Crisis by setting his story in a career officer’s family environment. The protagonist’s grandfather is a Habsburg general born in Udine, which later became part of the Kingdom of Italy. He has “a surname that sounds German but is the son of a Croatian major and an Italian mother.” The general joins the family for lunch and asks his grandson, who is a state official: “I have no idea why you always come up with the language issue? Any decent officer has to speak the language of his men [...] I speak five languages, three of them perfectly: German, Italian, and Croatian.” His son, the protagonist’s father, answers: “That is all very nice, what you say, but above all, Austria must remain a German country, we can not give it to the Czechs. [...] You are a naive soldier. You do not recognize this subtle hypocrisy. The Czech officials can all speak German, and the Germans do not speak Czech – the decree would mean that in the short term there would be only Czech officials employed in the Bohemian lands.” The grandfather suggests that these “German officials” should learn Czech as the army officers have to, while his son, an army captain emphasizes that “only because you civil officials are too lazy to learn Czech do we now have a severe parliamentary crisis.”⁸¹⁵ In addition to showing the differences in language requirements for the Austrian civil administration and the army, Friedländer demonstrates that although everyone involved in the discussion was a state official, their self-image utterly differed. At the turn of the century, the recognition of languages in the army and the officers’ requirements to learn them had become such a normality that most army officers would never have brought them into question. At the same time, there was another group of state representatives who had a totally different position about language use toward citizens, and what the state should be allowed to require of them. In the episode described above, the protagonists were specifically reflecting upon language requirements and the political

⁸¹⁴ N.N., Oesterreichisch-Ungarisches Reich, 4. November, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1885, 29.

⁸¹⁵ Friedländer, *Wolken drohen über Wien*, 83-90.

debate in Cisleithanian Austria. The debate in Hungary differed in many respects, even though the army implemented the same language system there, at least until 1905, when some exceptions were granted (discussed in chapter 3).

The Hungarian Political Debate

The Hungarian political debate of the army language diversity was different from that in Austria. The most important reason was that the Hungarian constitution did not have a fundamental law comparable to Austria's Article 19 that had served as basis for the army language system.⁸¹⁶ Thus, the topics discussed and the rhetoric used in Hungary often reflected the constitutional differences of the two halves of the Monarchy. However, much of the criticism stressed similar issues. Like in Austria, politicians and journalists regardless of their nationalities, most often stressed the army language system's shortcomings and the hardship they posed on "their" conscripts, in Hungary, two other army language related themes dominated the parliamentary debate.⁸¹⁷ First, as already indicated in the first chapter, during the army reform in 1868, parliamentary delegates opposed the dominance of German in the Habsburg regiments and battalions recruiting from Hungary. Second, politicians and journalists alike criticized that the regimental language system would downgrade the Hungarian state language to a regimental language, thus, sharing rank with Hungarian minority languages such as German, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, and Slovak. Moreover, Peball and Rothenberg have emphasized correctly that for a long time many Hungarian politicians did not only criticize the language system implemented in army regiments recruiting from Hungary, but already saw in the army's presence a "provocation and constant remembrance of the 1849 defeat."⁸¹⁸

The Hungarian constitutional framework on the bureaucratic use of languages differed from that in Austria. While in Austria, the regimental language system was based on a fundamental right, the Article 19, and its restrictions respected provincial language laws (discussed in chapter 2), in Hungary, the army language system contradicted civil language laws. Initially, the dominance of Hungarian in administration was argued with the need of a

⁸¹⁶ Galántai, *Der österreichisch-ungarische Dualismus*, and Katus, *Hungary in the Dual Monarchy*.

⁸¹⁷ An analysis of the Zagreb based *Agramer Zeitung* between 1868 and 1912 indicates that the Croatian debate more or less followed the Austrian press debate. Journalists most often wrote about the regimental language system and conscripts and reserve officers from Croatia-Slavonia, although bulk of articles simply reported about new orders or informed readers about the system itself. However, as chapter 4 has demonstrated, Croatian/Serbian knowledge was widespread among the officers, thus, the lack of language abilities did not exaggerate in a way like with other Habsburg languages.

⁸¹⁸ Peball, and Rothenberg, *Der Fall U*, 90.

lingua franca, that the politicians of other nationalities did not oppose.⁸¹⁹ However, as Ignac Romsics has written, after 1868 tolerance for languages other than Hungarian gradually whittled away.⁸²⁰ Thus, Hungarian citizens experienced that Hungarian increasingly had to dominate public administration, and many local officials who used other languages were regularly reprimanded to use Hungarian more often.⁸²¹ At the same time, annually, thousands of more Hungarian men were confronted with the Habsburg army language system that respected their languages. Like Austrian parliamentarians, many Hungarian delegates were elected to represent their compatriots, in Hungary called minorities. They were often totally overheard in parliamentary debates. In contrast to the broad variety and ever-changing spectrum of parties, delegates represented in the Austrian parliament, two main opposing Hungarian ideologies dominated the political sphere until 1914: the so-called supporters of the *Ausgleich* in 1867, and those who opposed it, the so-called independent.⁸²² However, similar to Austria, delegates of the various parties often stressed the same issues when criticizing the army language system.

Following the army reform in 1868, Hungarian politicians, regardless of their party background, regularly demanded that the Habsburg army should more often use Hungarian. They regularly called for the introduction of Hungarian as language of command, and to be used in correspondence among regiments recruiting from their Kingdom arguing with the need of the Hungarian state for “internal national consolidation.”⁸²³ Francis Joseph regularly rejected these claims. The head of his Military Chancellery, Friedrich von Beck-Rzykowsky considered a Hungarian command language not only to be totally impracticable, but that it would “subjugate other nationalities in Hungary under Hungarian.” Beck countered the Hungarian criticism that the army language system would “always marginalize Magyars” with that in forty joint infantry regiments recruiting from Hungary, only in fourteen Hungarian native speakers made up more than fifty percent. In the smaller military service branches, they would only account for around ten to twelve percent. The only joint troops that had an overwhelming majority of native Hungarian speakers were fourteen Hussar regiments to which mostly Hungarian native speakers were assigned (discussed in chapter 4).⁸²⁴ The other critique of Hungarian politicians stressed

⁸¹⁹ Galántai, *Der österreichisch-ungarische Dualismus*, 92.

⁸²⁰ Romsics, *Dismantling of Historic Hungary*, 13.

⁸²¹ Berecz, German and Romanian in Town Governments of Dualist Transylvania and the Banat, 135-59.

⁸²² For a brief overview, although changing names and political aims: Zsuppán, *Die politische Szene Ungarns*, 114.

⁸²³ Hungarus, *Die Sprachenfrage der Armee und der Dualismus*, 10.

⁸²⁴ This resulted from the order to assign native Hungarian speakers to the cavalry, discussed in chapter 3.

the nationality backgrounds of officers stationed in Hungary: they would tend to be non-native speakers of Hungarian. In response, Beck noted the widespread unwillingness of native Hungarian speakers to become officers in the joint army.⁸²⁵ Beck's assertion was correct, at least for the initial years following the army reform in 1868. Afterwards native Hungarian speakers more often decided to join the *Honvédség*. The reasons were a mixture of national motives, but also because an advancement was easier than in the joint army.⁸²⁶

In addition to demand a Hungarian language of command and the deployment of so-called native-speaking Hungarian officers, Hungarian politicians regularly strongly criticized the downgrading of the Hungarian state language to a regimental language.⁸²⁷ “*Magyar nyelv állam nyelv és nem ezred nyelv*” (Hungarian is a state language and not [only] a regimental language) became the dominating phrase in the Hungarian political discourse targeting the army language system. *Honvédség*-General and Hungarian parliamentarian Ernst Hollán concluded in his speech in 1892: “Thus one can justifiably demand that the Hungarian knowledge of officers serving in Hungarian [joint] regiments needs to be more carefully overlooked not only as the knowledge of a regimental language, but as the knowledge of the state language.”⁸²⁸ The historian Imre Röss calls this assertion an effort of Hungarian politicians to achieve parity between German and Hungarian in the joint army, which should parallel the equality of the two states following the 1867-settlement. In addition, Hungarian parliamentary delegates regularly criticized the “Austrian principle” that recruits would have “the right to choose” the language in which they wanted to be trained, thus putting Hungarian “at an equal level with Romanian and Czech.”⁸²⁹ The Hungarian political discourse was well observed and known across Austria. The German nationalist Austrian writer Paul Samassa published a political survey in 1910 entitled “The Peoples’ Strife in the Habsburg State,” and mentioned another problem for Hungarian nationalist politicians: “While usually proficiency in Hungarian offers numerous benefits, it is in no way beneficial in the joint army, where benefits are still connected to proficiency in German.”⁸³⁰

⁸²⁵ Schweizer, *Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze*, 113-4.

⁸²⁶ On *Honvédség*-officers see: Horel, *Soldaten zwischen nationalen Fronten*.

⁸²⁷ N.N., Der heutige Stand des oesterreichisch-ungarischen Heeres, *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung*, 52 (1906), 214.

⁸²⁸ N.N., Aus den Delegationen, Ungarische Delegation, *Pester Lloyd*, 26 October 1892, 5.

⁸²⁹ OK/G, Képviselőházi napló, 1896, 141.

⁸³⁰ Samassa, *Der Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat*, 91.

The Budapest daily *Pester Lloyd* regularly published the minutes of the Hungarian parliament. As the newspaper was in German, it became the most important media that enabled non-Hungarian speakers across the Monarchy to inform themselves about the Hungarian political debate. In 1891, an anonymous author summarized the speech of the parliamentarian Edmund von Gajári who responded to War Minister Ferdinand von Bauer in a delegation meeting: “He can not be satisfied with the fact that the Hungarian language is recognized only as a regimental language. [...] We who hold firmly to our constitutional law, have the right to expect that in our joint army both states’ laws are respected.”⁸³¹ In 1893 the *Pester Lloyd* again reported about a debate during a delegation meeting. Delegates from Hungary had demanded to increase the use of the Hungarian language in the joint army, and that: “The Hungarian language should not be only recognized as a regimental language, but as a state language. The citizens of Romanian and Saxon tongues are also Hungarians of whom we require to speak Hungarian.”⁸³² That the army language system contradicted the role of Hungarian in Hungary, was only one critique, indeed, the other was that the system would encourage and constantly remind Hungarian minorities to insist on language rights, instead of being magyarized. Kálmán Thaly, a politician and poetrist who published a widely-read book *Ne bánts d a magyart* (Do not hurt Hungarians) in 1857, emphasized in his parliamentary speech in 1896 that the regimental language system would aim at “encouraging the other nationalities at the expense of the Hungarian nation.”⁸³³ Samassa has concluded in his book that serving in the Habsburg army was for “a Slovak or Hungarian Schwab peasant the first time in his Hungarian fatherland when he recognized that his native language had rights.” He concluded with that they would have been deduced from magyarization for a while.⁸³⁴ Parliamentary comments and speeches in Budapest proved right what Samassa wrote. During a delegation meeting in 1892 Ernst Hollán emphasized what Hungarian politicians feared would be the army language system’s impact on the conscripts: “The young man who was educated in such an institution [the army] should not only become a good soldier, but also remain a fine [Hungarian] patriot.”⁸³⁵

⁸³¹ N.N., Wien, 16. November, Heeresausschuss der Ungarische Delegation, Replik auf gemeinsamen Kriegsminister über den obligatorischen Unterricht der ungarischen Sprache in den in Ungarn befindlichen Militäranstalten, *Pester Lloyd*, 11 November 1891, 2-3, 3.

⁸³² N.N., Die Delegationen, Ungarische Delegation, Heeresausschuss der ungarischen Delegation, Wien, 2 June, *Pester Lloyd*, 3 June 1893, 2-3, 3.

⁸³³ OK/G, Képviselőházi napló, 1896, 294. See also: OK/G, Képviselőházi napló, 1896, 15-6. Thaly, *Ne bánts d a magyart*.

⁸³⁴ Samassa, *Der Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat*, 91-2.

⁸³⁵ N.N., Aus den Delegationen, Ungarische Delegation, *Pester Lloyd*, 26 October 1892, 5.

The effect the regimental language system had on Habsburg army conscripts of both Hungarian native speakers as well as Hungarian minorities was not only part of the Hungarian political discourse. Politicians across the Monarchy regularly commented the situation in Hungary. For example, in his 1905-speech the Austrian parliamentarian Josef Tschan, delegate of the All-German Club, and a future Schönerer-follower, cited a Hungarian delegate: “If a recruit joins the army, to whom it was always advocated that the Hungarian state and language are of the highest value, now finds a foreign language, a psychological conflict arises in his soul [...]: his language that he considered the highest, does now share the status of Romanian and Serbian, and he will be punished if he does not report in the foreign and hated German language.”⁸³⁶ The use of “a recruit” without adding a native tongue or nationality can be called typical for the Hungarian political debate. Although parliamentarians in Budapest were almost as linguistically heterogeneous as their peers in Vienna, the bulk of speeches which directed the regimental language system advocated for “Hungarian soldiers.” However, there is a language challenge posed not only to historians. My assumption is that also contemporaries struggled with the translation of Hungarian parliamentary speeches and pamphlets into German. While most sources in German between 1868 and 1918 carefully distinguished between native Hungarian speakers, the so-called Magyars, and Hungarians as Hungarian citizens regardless of their native tongues, there was and still is no such distinction in Hungarian. Therefore, when analyzing the debates in Hungarian, the context is important, to determine what exactly politicians referred to when for example speaking on behalf of *Magyar katonák* which could mean in Hungarian either native Hungarian-speaking soldiers, or soldiers of Hungarian citizenship. The latter included native speakers of German, Slovak, Serbian, Romanian, and Ruthenian.⁸³⁷ Taking a closer read on the archival sources, it becomes obvious that Hungarian parliamentarians virtually exclusively referred to native Hungarian speakers, even in cases where a regiment virtually consisted only of non-native-speaking Hungarians. Adopting responsibility only for *our* officers and recruits (of the same nationalities) as it was described for the Austrian parliamentarians’ rhetoric, thusly, slightly differed in Budapest.

Similar to the Austrian parliament, the delegates often underlined their arguments by including examples from their own military experience. The parliamentarian Miklós Gabányi mentioned that he was enlisted as one-year-volunteer in 1869 into the Infantry Regiment No 62

⁸³⁶ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Tschan, 28245.

⁸³⁷ N.N., Die Delegationen, Ungarische Delegation, Heeresauschuss der ungarischen Delegation, Wien, 2 June, *Pester Lloyd*, 3 June 1893, 2-3, 3. See also: Bánffy, *Die Schrift in Flammen*, 373.

that recruited from Marosvásárhely and comprised in almost equal number native Hungarian and Romanian speakers. Their captain, who was born in Moravia, he emphasized, did speak neither any word of Romanian nor Hungarian, and so did his second lieutenant. When recruit education started, his lieutenant would have come over to him with the teaching material in German ordering him to help out as interpreter. In that case, it would have been impossible to use the NCO, a Croat, who solely spoke Croatian.⁸³⁸ According to Gabányi, he would have ended up in a one-year-volunteer school were the teaching language was exclusively German, and had to educate conscripts together with his comrades who did not speak the languages of the recruits. What is different to the Austrian political debate, Géza Polónyi, like Gabányi, pointed to the situation of native Hungarian speaking one-year-volunteers. As already demonstrated in chapter 4, the drop out rate of native Hungarian speaking reserve officer candidates was extraordinarily high when being compared to other nationalities. Polónyi criticized that there were not nearly enough officers who were able to train one-year-volunteers in Hungarian.⁸³⁹ In 1892, Pázmány Dénes wordly recalled an incident that had happened in Maros-Vásárhely. He emphasized that a Hungarian Croatian conscript would have cried, when his lieutenant forbade him to report in Hungarian.⁸⁴⁰

The main critique in the Hungarian debate stressed that one-year-volunteers were forced to learn or use German, and that their commanding officers did not speak Hungarian. However, there were also – although more silent voices – in the Hungarian political sphere who argued against this – in their eyes purely nationalist arguments. In 1889, Gyula Andrássy commented in the Upper House of the Hungarian parliament the new Defense Act by posing the questions: “First, whether it is for the Hungarian nation in general and for the volunteers in particular bad, if they are required to learn and speak German? Second, whether there is anything humiliating in this demand, whether from the point of culture or any other interest? I can not share the opinion that it is detrimental to a nation if it is forced to learn a foreign language besides its own, and I see in it a definite advantage. I think nobody will be able to say that a soldier who speaks beside Hungarian also German, is at a lower level of culture than, for example, a German soldier who speaks only his own language.”⁸⁴¹ Unheard, as Géza Fejérváry in 1892 demanded

⁸³⁸ OK/G, Képvisezőházi napló, 1901, 367.

⁸³⁹ OK/G, Képvisezőházi napló, 1887, 69.

⁸⁴⁰ OK/G, Képvisezőházi napló, 1892, 185.

⁸⁴¹ *Die Einheit der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee. Rede des Grafen Julius Andrássy über die Wehrgesetz-Vorlage, gehalten im Ausschusse des ungarischen Magnatenhauses am 5. April 1889.* Wien 1889, 8-9.

that “based on Hungarian law a one-year-volunteer- who speaks only Hungarian deserves to become a reserve officer.”⁸⁴²

Francis Joseph never acceded to Hungarian demands in terms of the army language system until 1904-05 when he granted Hungarian a superior status above all other languages. The expanded regimental language system required from all Hungarian speakers regardless of their native tongues to be trained in Hungarian (discussed in chapter 3). This concession to Hungary was heavily criticized in the Austrian parliament, while for Hungarian national activists this concession was not nearly sufficient. An anonymous author in the German nationalist daily *Grazer Tagblatt* commented this concession: “So, we give in, again! [...] As we know, only a few Hungarian regiments are purely Magyar. The non-Magyar soldiers will have to adopt the Magyar regimental language in addition to the German command language. However, as languages do not allow themselves to be drilled as easily as how to handle a rifle, the military service will suffer from these concessions. But we shall ask ourselves if we want continue to pay for an army that is now transforming into a Magyar national army.”⁸⁴³ In 1908, the Austrian parliamentarian Karel Kramář, delegate of the Bohemian Club who usually tended to criticize the army language system in his parliament this time emphasized: “We will not accept that non-Magyars in Hungary are now going to be denationalized in the army, an army we pay for with our money.” Also the *Pester Lloyd* commented Kramář’s parliamentary speech: “The speaker surely supports the regimental language, but resists the introduction of the Hungarian regimental language in non-Hungarian regiments, in particular that the joint army is used for denationalization.”⁸⁴⁴ War Minister Franz Schönaich, replied to all criticism with: it would be incorrect that “someone is now forced to use Hungarian.”⁸⁴⁵ The Bohemian delegate Franz Stein added that the joint army “would now serve as the most useful tool for magyarization.”⁸⁴⁶ Julius Bunzel in his political pamphlet *Ungarn und wir* (The Hungarians/Hungary and us) argued that “finally the German-Hungarian officers and peasants who so far resisted all efforts to be de-Germanized, are now shown the right path they were expected to follow” to finally become “proper Hungarians.”⁸⁴⁷ Other parliamentarians from Bohemia criticized that concessions were always only granted to Hungarians and never to all other nationalities.

⁸⁴² OK/G, Képviseelőházi napló, 1892, 281-2.

⁸⁴³ N.N., Die magyarische Nationalarmee, *Grazer Tagblatt*, 31 March 1905, 1.

⁸⁴⁴ N.N., Österreichischer Ausgleichsausschuss, *Pester Lloyd*, 28 November 1907, 4.

⁸⁴⁵ N.N., Oesterreich-Ungarn. Gemeinsame Angelegenheiten, *Deutscher Geschichtskalender*, 1908, 295-6.

⁸⁴⁶ ALEX/SPAR, 1905, Stein, 31263.

⁸⁴⁷ Bunzel, *Ungarn und wir*, 39.

In addition, to the criticism of the language requirements for soldiers and one-year-volunteers it was often criticized that officers who were deployed in Hungary did not speak Hungarian, or only communicating to everyone in German, even Hungarians. In 1905 a letter was addressed to the Head of Francis Joseph's Military Chancellery, Arthur Bolfras. The anonymous author who signed with "a patriot" complained that the commander of the castle guards in Budapest did not speak Hungarian, while two Hungarian guard officers who were of "Hungarian nationality" served in Vienna: "Why are you assigning officers of Austrian nationality to such exposed duties? We demand to send Hungarians to Budapest in the future, and to stop such deployments which only bring Hungarian blood into life, in particular as this officer is already the second on this post which does not speak Hungarian, while his subordinate guards are Hungarian speakers."⁸⁴⁸ Although this was the only such letter I found in the documents of the Chancellery, its arguments are not exceptional rather reflecting the general critique raised in Hungary against the army's language system. That this critique met reality is demonstrated in officer autobiographical sources. Newly appointed staff-officer Anton Lehár was sent for his first duty to Budapest. There, he recalled, even his boss did not speak Hungarian, "unfortunately," as he added, and went on: "there was an inherent lack of the Hungarian state language among officers, which – in such a chauvinistically overheated atmosphere – often caused justified difficulties. After all, we were not in an occupied land but in the equal kingdom of Hungary. Old Austrians who sometimes wanted to overlook this have deliberately or unconsciously done so much mischief."⁸⁴⁹

Indeed, even before 1904-05 with the introduction of the expanded regimental language, there were many exceptions for the Hungarian language, especially in terms of the officer language education. It was not equally treated with the army language, but it took over a prominent position above the other regimental languages. Even when exceptions were granted, Hungarian politicians still claimed that the "use of Hungarian is not recognized with due care."⁸⁵⁰ In 1909 the Hungarian parliamentary delegate Zsigmond Farkasházy still summarized: "It is nothing less than insulting the [Hungarian] nation."⁸⁵¹

Hungarian politicians regularly criticized the dominance and spread of German in the Kingdom of Hungary through the army. They demanded the introduction of Hungarian as

⁸⁴⁸ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 9-2/3, 1905, anonymous letter to Bolfras.

⁸⁴⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, vol. 2, 47.

⁸⁵⁰ OK/G, *Képviselőházi napló*, 1881, 244.

⁸⁵¹ N.N., *Sitzung des Abgeordnetenhauses, Pester Lloyd*, 16 February 1909, 3.

language of command for joint regiments recruiting from Hungary, which was in line with their attempts to introduce Hungarian into other parts of the imperial bureaucracy/institutions on Hungarian soil. Bruno Korea Gajski and Livia Kardum called the German command language Hungary's symbolic "last bond" with the overall state.⁸⁵² However, there were some who valued the regimental language system more than the effect of the German command language in Hungary. In the course of the second army reform in 1889, Hungarian parliamentarian Gyula Andrassy spoke in the Upper House of the Parliament stressing that the "geographic situation between Orient and Occident requires for the Monarchy and in particular Hungary the need for a multi-lingual army which consists of a variety of national elements." Thus, he argued against his peers who claimed for all joint army recruits to use only Hungarian during training. He asserted that the language of command was Germanizing soldiers only to a very limited extent.⁸⁵³ In 1906, the *Pester Lloyd* published a note of a Habsburg army general who had seemingly replied to a Hungarian query: "Nothing is therefore more unjust and wrong than the accusation that the Hungarian soldier would be denationalized in the army. The German army language can hardly affect the soldiers that much in such a short time than only the most necessary understanding of military commands and expressions."⁸⁵⁴

⁸⁵² Gajski, and Kardum, The case of language of command in the Austro-Hungarian Army, 361.

⁸⁵³ *Die Einheit der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee. Rede des Grafen Julius Andrassy*, 14-5.

⁸⁵⁴ Von einem k.u.k. Feldmarschall-Lieutenant, Die Kommando- und Dienstsprache, *Pester Lloyd*, 2 March 1906, 2.

Conclusion

Chapter 5 has demonstrated that although military barracks were closed communities, their military residents came into close contact with civil residents on a daily basis throughout the Monarchy. Therefore, the army language system met with local linguistic practice. Using examples, festivities, songs and language use, I analyzed how conscripts experienced their army service, when language mattered outside military training, and how it affected their language use. Again, many recruits were not trained in their languages, and officers often spoke their idiom only poorly, or not at all. Although nationalist motives played a certain role when the rank and file's fundamental language rights were ignored, this chapter has demonstrated that convenience and poor leadership skills, and the disposition of the officers involved, played a much greater role.

In *Guardians of the Nation*, Pieter M. Judson compares the activities of nationalists in several linguistically mixed provinces of Cisleithania. He concludes that “nationalist activists took every opportunity to transform rural social conflicts into national ones and to forge from them enduring national loyalties and identities.”⁸⁵⁵ In the case of army's language system nationalist activists took every opportunity or incident to transform shortcomings of the army language rights quickly into issues of national concern. With this rhetorical twist they aimed at achieving loyalty from their rank and file, or better their voters of the same nationality whose rights they loudly advocated. Nationalists sought to convince their audience – in that case conscripts – to be their exclusive supporters because army officials were unwilling to do so. In April 1918, General Stjepan Sarkotic, governor of Bosnia-Herzegovina, asserted that in “Austria-Hungary the mutual aspirations of the peoples cancel each other out, therefore the monarchy will never perish because of them.”⁸⁵⁶ This chapter about the Austrian and Hungarian debate has proven his claim correct. Both parliamentarians and journalists regardless of their nationality and the language they used often adopted responsibility only for their own nationality exclusively. They never brought criticism before the ministers jointly which made it relatively easy for army authorities to reject them all by nationally motivated, even when they were fully aware that it was correct.

⁸⁵⁵ Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*, 10.

⁸⁵⁶ HDA, Sarkotić, box 5, War Diary, 17 April 1918. I thank Marc Stefan Peters for providing me his transcript of this diary.

Indeed, there were many garrisons in the Kingdom of Hungary, where in one and the same place a *Honvedség* and a joint army regiment were stationed both following different language rules. Thus, the dichotomy became public on a daily basis for conscripts as well as for civil residents. However, the Kingdom of Hungary – with the only exception of Croatia – was as multilingual as the rest of the Monarchy, and many citizens opposed Hungarian politics, while thousands of conscripts for their first time in their lives came into close contact with the other half's language laws, and got to know which rights Austrian citizens were granted when it came to their language use. Although the Austrian and the Hungarian parliaments looked upon different civil language rights and regulations, and parliamentarians represented voters from various linguistic and political-ideological backgrounds, most of them used similar rhetoric. Criticism was also similar, and the way it was reflected in soldiers' autobiographical writings: usually not at all. Interestingly, politicians' concerns were not reflected in officers' and the rank and file's autobiographical writings. In these, the Hungarian situation is similarly described as the Austrian. Seemingly, many of them did not feel being denationalized and/or insulted.

I demonstrated that many politicians accused the army of causing soldiers' denationalization. This argument can be found for all nationalities. However, arguments to the contrary can also be found: that it had no impact at all on loyalty and identity. Although the German language of command did not denationalize soldiers, it certainly had an impact on their daily and longterm linguistic practice, which was also heavily discussed by the public. Both autobiographical sources and newspapers show that soldiers tended to include the German command terms in their daily language use. Even after they had finished their military service, they often continued to follow this practice for a long time. Across the Monarchy, irrespective of the soldiers' native languages, these German terms helped create a common esprit de corps. Soldiers did not replace their patriotism with another but added another reference of belonging – being or having been soldiers of the same army. This was a practice regularly criticized by nationalists from across the Monarchy.

Part IV: The Habsburg Army's Language System during the Great War

The army language system's primary aim was to ensure the efficient training of recruits. Thus, most peacetime criticism of the army language system and its implementation stressed actual shortcomings instead of criticizing the system itself or its wartime efficiency. This peacetime focus on the efficiency of the army language system had already started to change at the turn of the century, when owing to the Bosnian Annexation Crisis (1908) and the Balkan Wars (1912-13), an armed conflict seemed increasingly likely. Army bureaucrats grew more concerned about the wartime readiness of the Habsburg military system. Earlier chapters have demonstrated that army handbooks and officers' language requirements were expanded step-by-step with clauses dealing with wartime conditions. The situation worsened when compulsory military service was reduced from three to two years in 1903, as there was now less time for conscripts to learn German during their training, and officers' language abilities were even more required.

The last part of this book analyses the role of the army language system in wartime. Chapter 7 deals with the organizational challenges it posed for the army leadership, while the last chapter demonstrates how soldiers, officers, and the rank and file experienced the army language system during wartime. Even before the war, some Habsburg army officials had questioned the loyalty of some of the Monarchy's nationalities. They expected these men to refuse to mobilize en masse. The peacetime regulations respecting the conscripts' language rights remained largely unchanged during war, and army bureaucrats and officers continued to interpret them flexibly, often out of convenience. However, many of them increasingly tended to distrust speakers of particular languages, including Czech, Italian, Ruthenian, and Serbian. This differentiation resulted in uncertainty among soldiers who increasingly felt betrayed by their army and their state. However, for the duration of the war, the vast majority of military-aged men fulfilled their military obligations irrespective of their linguistic backgrounds and therefore nationalities.

Chapter 7: The Organization of Language Diversity during Wartime

The Babelish language confusion caused an additional hardship for the soldiers of every imaginable nationality who had been thrown into this rolling coffin.

Stefan Zweig, *The World of Yesterday*⁸⁵⁷

In 1906, an anonymous author – very likely a high-ranking Habsburg army officer – published a long essay about the regimental language system in Budapest’s German-language daily, *Pester Lloyd*. The author not only considered officers’ language proficiency essential for operational success but argued that when officers spoke the language of the men it would enable the commanded to report more detailed impressions about their fighting experience. The author emphasized that officers could more easily win soldiers’ confidence and loyalty if they were able to communicate with them in their own languages. He concluded that “each officer who has already taken part in a campaign knows the high value and the powerful effect of appeal and encouragement during a difficult undertaking and under critical conditions when they are given in the soldiers’ native tongues; how much it spurs and elevates their courage and their willingness to sacrifice.”⁸⁵⁸ It was unusual for someone who was likely an officer to draw readers’ attention to the precarious situation of the rank and file rather than writing about the political and practical challenges language diversity posed for officers. Indeed, in 1914, virtually no Habsburg officer had taken part in a military campaign. However, the mobilization of some regiments during the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 had offered insight into the challenges that language diversity would pose to the organization of the army during wartime (discussed in chapter 5).

In the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, Stefan Zweig, in his famous novel *The World of Yesterday*, was referring not only to the most important and fastest means of transporting hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the front, the railways, but also to army language diversity.⁸⁵⁹ In previous chapters, I have shown that army officials had already in peacetime become increasingly concerned about the army’s war readiness, in particular in terms of the soldiers’ linguistic diversity. While it might have been easiest for Habsburg soldiers to blame language diversity for failed operations and high casualty rates during the war,

⁸⁵⁷ Zweig, *Die Welt von Gestern*, 337.

⁸⁵⁸ N.N., *Die Regimentssprache*, *Pester Lloyd*, evening number, 2 July 1906, 1.

⁸⁵⁹ What the military use of railway lines meant for the civilian population, see: Moll, *Heimatfront Steiermark*, 191.

autobiographical and military archival records I have examined reveal that they usually blamed incompetent military leaders, bad organization, and nationalism. Thus, this chapter analyzes how the army language system was organized and functioned during wartime, and what role language diversity played at the front and behind the lines.

Mobilization and Battle

Soon after Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, streets across the Monarchy were covered with mobilization posters.⁸⁶⁰ In those regions of Austria-Hungary where more than one language was recognized public announcement posters were bi- or even multilingual. At the same time, the Habsburg Monarchy's and the army's linguistic diversity became better known across Europe and beyond. Many male citizens of Austria-Hungary had permanent residences outside the Monarchy, were economic migrants, or took summer employment abroad.⁸⁶¹ With the outbreak of the war, those men of military age also received their calls to arms in foreign newspapers. For example, the *Luxemburger Wort* on 3 August, 1914, announced mobilization in three countries, Germany, the Netherlands, and Austria-Hungary. While the German announcement was monolingual, the Dutch call used, in one box, German and Dutch. The Austro-Hungarian consulate in Luxemburg, however, needed far more space than the others. The Habsburg announcement was repeated in six languages: German, followed by Italian, Hungarian, Czech, Polish, and Serbo-Croatian. It spanned an entire page.⁸⁶²

Mobilization announcements informed men to join their units as quickly as possible. Many wartime autobiographical records of officers and the rank and file refer to mobilization and language diversity. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers soon gathered at around the same time in summer 1914 in barracks across the Monarchy. At first, many soldiers already knew their superiors from peace time training.⁸⁶³ Most of them were therefore familiar with the army language system, German command words, and standard military procedures. The career officer Robert Michel recalled in his wartime novel the mobilization of his Bosnian-

⁸⁶⁰ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 100.

⁸⁶¹ For the United States, see: Phelps, *Austro-Hungarian Enemy Aliens*.

⁸⁶² k.u.k. Österreichisch-Ungarisches Konsulat in Luxemburg, Kundmachung/Notificazione/Hirdetmeny/Vyhlasaka/Obwieszczenie/Obznana, *Luxemburger Wort für Wahrheit und Recht*, 3 August 1914, 3. Seemingly, the sequence was sometimes chosen by the newspapers out of place management. The same announcement was made in another newspaper one day later in *Escher Tagblatt* (4 August 1914). Here languages were announced in a different order.

⁸⁶³ Norman Stone has written that in 1914 only about half of Habsburg male citizens had had three, later two, year military service. Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 96-7.

Herzegovinian soldiers: “The first days in Vienna were full of work. [...] In the morning, I addressed my men briefly in their mother tongue, and as soon as I ended my speech, all of them rushed, surrounded me, and lifted me onto their shoulders.”⁸⁶⁴ Michel’s experience in Vienna with his Bosniaks, showing that soldiers did not react negatively to mobilization, was repeated in many Austro-Hungarian garrisons. For example, the procurement officer Rudolf Giay, stationed in Dubrovnik, wrote in his diary: “At three o’clock in the afternoon, battalion members gathered between the municipal Church and the Blasius Church, where the commander gave a rousing speech, also in Croatian, to which residents enthusiastically responded with *Živio* [he uses the Croatian word for Hail in his German-language diary].”⁸⁶⁵ These soldiers’ and residents’ response is similar to what was reported across the Monarchy.

Little resistance to mobilization occurred during the war’s first weeks among soldiers and civilians. The army leadership was pleasantly surprised, because there had long been fears that particular nationalities would resist mobilization.⁸⁶⁶ In *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, Maureen Healy argues that even Social Democrats essentially supported the cause in the first year of the war.⁸⁶⁷ Norman Stone has concluded that “even the Czechs [were] giving no cause for complaint. [...] In fact, the nationalist agitation that had characterized Austro-Hungarian politics before 1914 vanished almost completely in 1914.”⁸⁶⁸ Army reports indicate only minor incidents throughout the Monarchy and among all nationalities. For example, the 9th Corps Command reported from Bohemia that a shouting match and fight broke out between drunken German- and Czech-speaking soldiers on their territory. While the first group shouted *Heil*, and sang *Wacht am Rhein*, a song which had already been forbidden in Austria before the war because of its German nationalist character, the Czech speakers sang their own patriotic or national songs. The Corps Command in any case downplayed the incident, asserting that all of the soldiers involved had been falling-down drunk. Moreover, the Corps Command reported that the Czech-speaking soldiers sang songs directed against their officers, but not against the Monarchy. Thus, army officers did not intervene to stop the singing. The officers of the Corps Command, however, were aware that many officers who had observed such incidents could not adequately assess these songs, because they did not understand the Czech lyrics. Officers might

⁸⁶⁴ Michel, *Briefe eines Hauptmannes an seinen Sohn*, 17.

⁸⁶⁵ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/412, Rudolf Giay, Diaries, 27 July 1914.

⁸⁶⁶ Scheer, *Ringstraßenfront*, 9. Stone called it the “red menace” the army had to deal with which became confused with anti-dynastic nationalism and added that “even” the Czechs remained obedient: *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 102.

⁸⁶⁷ Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 129-30.

⁸⁶⁸ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 102.

have therefore only guessed about their content and meaning. There was some discussion among ministerial and Corps Command army bureaucrats concerning which songs in which languages should be permitted and which should be forbidden. For Bohemia, it was almost the same songs as debated before 1914, including *Die Wacht am Rhein* and *Kde domov můj* (discussed in chapter 5).⁸⁶⁹ I have analyzed the debate for the 9th Corps Command most closely, but the records of the other corps commands demonstrate that similar debates occurred across the Monarchy.

Autobiographical records dealing with mobilization indicate that most career officers quickly recognized the increased need to speak the languages of their subordinates. Not only did soldiers tend to accept officers who spoke their languages more readily as leaders, but as inexperienced as both were with war, officers felt more confident when able to communicate with their subordinates. In Bratislava, career officer Anton Lehár, born in Sopron, was already offered a glimpse of what to expect at the front: “In Preßburg many residents, as well as most of the soldiers from Wieselburg county [today part of the Western Hungarian town Mosonmagyaróvár], spoke solely German, members of the civil service, many craftsmen and people from the surrounding villages [...] spoke solely Hungarian. Most of the older soldiers were Slovaks. Thus, communication among the officers, the NCOs, and the rank and file was difficult. I was partly fine, because I spoke Hungarian and also had some Slavic knowledge from my time in Prague. In my battalion, one-third of the officers spoke solely German, the rest Hungarian; only a few were able to communicate in Slovak.”⁸⁷⁰ Mobilization also meant that many soldiers left their home region for the first time, and dealt with members of other nationalities of the Monarchy when they were transported to the front.

Authors of wartime diaries and memoirs often reflected on the different languages their comrades spoke during transportation to the various front lines. For example, the twenty-two-year-old technician Alois (Luis) Trenker from the Ladin-speaking Tyrolean village of St. Ulrich in Gröden, a future filmmaker and actor, was sent to Cracow with his fortress artillery battalion. Recalling his journey through the Monarchy, Trenker commented: “We stopped in small train stations. [...] All of the languages of the Danube Monarchy are buzzing around, slogans in all languages are painted in chalk on the train wagons. It is a departure like never before, a mass

⁸⁶⁹ VHA/9. KK, Präs, 73-4/5, Corps Command report, 1914.

⁸⁷⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, vol. 3, 86-7.

migration (*Völkerwanderung*) of fantastic size.”⁸⁷¹ Galician-born wartime volunteer officer and later novelist Józef Wittlin wrote about the war in his novel *Das Salz der Erde* (The Salt of the Earth). The main character, an ordinary soldier, recalls the railway journey from his home in Galicia through the Monarchy to the front: “*Na zdar*, the Czechs call out of the carriages to the Magyars when they roll past, Eljen, call the Csikós-men who had turned into Honvéds: *Živio, Hoch, Niech zyje, Hurra, Evviva, Daj Bože harazd*. The battalions of the colourful Monarchy greeted one another in passing.”⁸⁷² Archival sources demonstrate that starting with the early railroad transports to the front, there were problems not only owing to the many languages soldiers spoke but also to the languages used in local administration.

The different language regulations employed in the Austrian and Hungarian bureaucracies had already concerned military authorities, ever since the army reform in 1868. During the war, they affected mobilization and transport in many ways. The Galicians, who Wittlin mentioned above, were Austrian citizens who were a mixture of Poles, Ruthenians, Hutsuls, and Yiddish-speaking Jews. Becoming thirsty in the summer heat, they left the train at a station in Hungary and tried to drink from a well. A local Hungarian-speaking police officer sought to stop them, but the soldiers pushed him away. Wittlin’s protagonist explained: “The gendarme has ears, why does he not understand what Semen Baran, a very smart man, explained in German? [...] if he were at least an enemy, a Russian, a Serb, but this is one of ours, an imperial (*ein Kaiserlicher*), no, this was not an imperial man (*ein kaiserlicher Mensch*), an imperial person will always somehow understand another imperial person, even if it is in German. This gendarme is a royal man. [...] And if it were not for the Jews, who were already in the world before the tower of Babel, and who speak all the languages, it would have come already at Huszt station [today Chust in Ukraine] to a great war between the emperor’s and the king’s peoples. The station official called in broken German for some Jews to tell the angry crowd that the police officer was not letting them drink from the well for their own good.”⁸⁷³ The well was suspected to contain infected water. The Prague-born journalist Egon Erwin Kisch served as an NCO during the First World War. He recalled in his wartime diary *Schreib das auf Kisch* (Write it up, Kisch), published in 1930, that as soon as his Bohemia-based battalion left Austria travelling through the Kingdom of Hungary en route to the Balkans, not only civil officials’ linguistic usage but also street and building signs changed from German to Hungarian

⁸⁷¹ Trenker, *Sperrfort Rocca Alta*, 29.

⁸⁷² Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 28.

⁸⁷³ Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 189-91.

and then Croatian.⁸⁷⁴ In his war diary, General Stjepan Sarkotić, military commander of Bosnia-Herzegovina since January 1915, mentioned a railway journey in December of that same year. At Lješnica, the station commander was a *Honvédség*-officer who had not only retired long before the war and was only activated for easy war service, but also spoke solely Hungarian. Sarkotić noted that this officer's German knowledge was exceptionally poor.⁸⁷⁵

In addition to internal language diversity, there was a second important linguistic challenge in wartime, because Habsburg army units soon mixed with Hungarian-commanded *Honvédség* and Croatian-commanded *Domobranstvo*.⁸⁷⁶ Until 1914, German was to be used as the sole language for joint combat of all Habsburg armed forces.⁸⁷⁷ This principle had, however, become increasingly weakened even before the declaration of war on 28 July, 1914. An army order maintained the superiority of German, "but at the same time acknowledge that other languages can be used as well [and] that the language should be used that best ensures rapid and secure communication."⁸⁷⁸ This order aimed at easing joint combat with the *Honvédség* at the command level. However, archival sources indicate that at the command level, the officers of the joint army and the Hungarian Territorial Defense also retained their bureaucratic language practices for political reasons, despite the need to discuss operations jointly. For example, Sarkotić wrote that he more than once insisted on the use of the German army language when organizing his military territory, but *Honvédség*-officers under his command in Bosnia-Herzegovina continued to speak in Hungarian, despite being proficient in German.⁸⁷⁹

Even during peacetime, Habsburg officers had often served in regions far from their birth places, where they commanded recruits whose languages they did not speak. During wartime, this situation worsened, particularly because all reserve officers were mobilized. Bruno Spitzl, the Roman-Catholic military priest of Infantry Regiment No 59 from Salzburg, recalled in his war memoirs the composition of the reserve officers of his almost exclusively German-speaking regiment. It was already mixed during peacetime, but when the war started, volunteer reservists had the right to choose their regiment. As a result, officers whose native languages were Hungarian, Polish, and Ruthenian commanded his *Salzburger*.⁸⁸⁰ Bodo

⁸⁷⁴ Kisch, *Schreib das auf Kisch*, 24.

⁸⁷⁵ HDA, Sarkotić, box 1, War Diary, 5 December 1915.

⁸⁷⁶ Czermak, *In deinem Lager war Österreich*, 27-8.

⁸⁷⁷ Peball, and Rothenberg, Der Fall U, 86. The army leadership already sent out orders to corps commands in Hungary and Slavonia of how to take over civil administration.

⁸⁷⁸ Horel, *Soldaten zwischen nationalen Fronten*, 232-3.

⁸⁷⁹ HDA, Sarkotić, box 1, War Diary, 7 December 1915.

⁸⁸⁰ Spitzl, *Als Feldkurat mit IR 59 im Weltkrieg*, 45.

Kaltenboeck served as a reserve officer during the First World War. He wrote in his war novel *Armee im Schatten* (Army in the Shade), published in 1932, that his Slovene-speaking fellow officers consisted of the following: “the first is lieutenant Törös, a Hungarian, who spoke only broken German; the second, a first-aid attendant who has a Czech name, Adamek, but was a Pole, who speaks German fluently but only broken Slovene; the third is a Czech officer with the German surname Herzog; and the fourth is first lieutenant Goglia, an Italian from Trieste who speaks German and Croatian as his mother tongue.”⁸⁸¹ Sarkotić wrote that his Hungarian-speaking general staff officers were excellent from a professional point of view, but none of them spoke German or Croatian, the languages mainly spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina, his area of command.⁸⁸² The examples mentioned above mainly concerned interaction among officers, NCOs, and rank and file, who for the most part had received peacetime training. This situation soon changed.

The first campaigns caused high casualty rates. Thus, less experienced reserve officers and rank and file had to replace career officers and soldiers who had fulfilled their compulsory military service already during peacetime. Between August 1914 and January 1915, the total number of officers decreased from 53,000 to 25,000, while the rank and file decreased from 1,180,000 to 546,000. By mid-1916, the army was able to raise the number of rank-and-file soldiers through mobilization to almost the same levels as in 1914, but there were never again more than 36,000 officers fit for service. Erwin A. Schmidl has concluded that “the army never recovered from the initial casualty rate.” This resulted in an increase in reserve officers, who now had to take over command duties for which they had not been adequately trained. Together with newly mobilized and quickly trained soldiers, they were sent to the front lines, where, meanwhile, soldiers who survived the initial campaigns were often promoted to NCO rank.⁸⁸³ Virtually none of those who were now expected to command and fight had received proper military training, and many of the reserve officers and newly promoted NCOs were not familiar with the German army language.⁸⁸⁴ Indeed, Sarkotić recalled that in late 1915, reserve officers on the front lines even commanded entire companies and therefore became responsible for duties usually reserved for experienced career officers. He ended his diary entry by posing the rhetorical question: “How will that end!”⁸⁸⁵

⁸⁸¹ Kaltenboeck, *Armee im Schatten*, 14.

⁸⁸² HDA, Sarkotić, box 1, War Diary, 7 August 1914.

⁸⁸³ Schmidl, *Habsburgs jüdische Soldaten*, 130.

⁸⁸⁴ See on Bohemian regiments: Lein, *Pflichterfüllung oder Hochverrat*, 56-7. See also: Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 100.

⁸⁸⁵ HDA, Sarkotić, box 1, War Diary, 6 November 1915.

Historians have often argued that the reserve officers tended towards disloyalty more often than the career officers, owing to their alleged nationalist attitudes. The military historian Christoph Allmayer-Beck argues that it was primarily Habsburg reserve officers who stood out in terms of insubordination and desertion. He argues this was the case because they were not as integrated into the army system as their career comrades. Therefore, they “could be more easily carried away by the nationalist currents of their home regions.”⁸⁸⁶ Allmayer-Beck has asserted that the reservists lacked integration, but it was again their unfamiliarity with the language system and the tasks they were expected to fulfil that caused dissatisfaction. More than only nationalism caused insubordination and desertion among reserve officers; they also regularly experienced a higher casualty rate among the rank and file and were less successful in operational terms than their better trained, more experienced, and more multilingual (career) comrades. It is likely that many reservists were overwhelmed by their duties. While the army leadership criticized the alleged nationalist convictions of reserve officers in general, the career officers and the public often blamed only one group among them: the Jews.

Jewish officers were accused of causing operational failures, owing to their alleged socialist-internationalist and Habsburg nationalist attitudes, which reflected the Monarchy’s nationalities.⁸⁸⁷ Schmidl has concluded that one-fifth of all reservists had been of Jewish faith or family background; thus, after 1915, they played an important role in commanding at the front.⁸⁸⁸ As Jews constituted such a high number of reserve officers, they were very often portrayed in the other officers’ autobiographical writings. Jews were prominent targets of criticism. As reserve officers mostly replaced career officers of lower ranks, Jewish war engagement in all military service branches rose.⁸⁸⁹ Because about 25,000, educated middle-class Jews held commissions as reserve officers, Marsha Rozenblit concludes that “in theory, Jewish participation in the army should have led to increased integration,” but the reality was different.⁸⁹⁰ Overall, career officer autobiographical sources reveal that all reserve officers, regardless of their religious and nationality backgrounds, were depicted as outsiders, not being

⁸⁸⁶ Allmayer-Beck, *Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte*, 377. Desertion was terminated with “eigenmächtige, nicht entschuld bare Abwesenheit“ (arbitrary, non-excusable absence). Brezina, *Österreichische Militärgerichtsakten*, 142.

⁸⁸⁷ The author has analysed several examples from the final year of the First World War and demonstrates how soldiers blamed Jews when expressing their general mood against the war and the state: Plaschka, *Avantgarde des Widerstands*, 229-30. See also: Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 146.

⁸⁸⁸ Schmidl, *Habsburgs jüdische Soldaten*, 130.

⁸⁸⁹ Rozenblit, *Reconstructing a National Identity*, 86.

⁸⁹⁰ Rozenblit, *Reconstructing a National Identity*, 82-3.

“real” officers. This great mistrust, envy, and anger can be traced back to peace time, when it took much longer time for career officers to gain officer status than reservists, who had fewer military professional skills and less experience (discussed in chapter 4).⁸⁹¹

The longer the war lasted and the higher the casualties rose, the more difficult it was to take into account the officers’ and NCOs’ language abilities when assigning them to a unit. Communication became increasingly difficult.⁸⁹² The remaining officers and NCOs fit for combat were deployed where they were needed. In addition, army officials increasingly avoided sending reservists from supposedly disloyal nationalities, Czechs, Italians, Romanians, and Ruthenians, to command soldiers of the alleged same nationalities. Thus, in times when mutual understanding became increasingly decisive, not only for military efficiency and success but also for combatants’ survival, language knowledge was considered much less than it had been during peacetime. This situation affected more than just the commanding officers and NCOs. Rank-and-file soldiers who had recovered from wounds or illnesses, as well returning POWs later in the war, were assigned to units where they were needed, irrespective of their language abilities. Indeed, Infantry Inspector General Karl Pflanzner-Baltin concluded in 1918 that this situation had begun in late 1914 and since then increased dramatically: “I found the units put together without regard to language abilities.”⁸⁹³

In addition to promotions and re-enlistment, there was another reason for soldiers to be demoralized on a large-scale. Career officer Ernst Horsetzky recalled in his autobiographical report, published in 1920: “We were overwhelmed by their sheer numbers, were not prepared for their reintegration, none took care of their mental condition (*Seelenzustand*), and many of them were only granted four weeks of vacation.”⁸⁹⁴ Iris Rachamimov concluded that only a small percentage were labelled as “suspected of disloyal activity,” and thus were immediately sent back to their units.⁸⁹⁵ Richard Georg Plaschka has analyzed the situation in Kragujevac, in Habsburg-occupied Serbia, where from April 1918 onwards, 2,400 returnees from Infantry Regiment No 71, mostly Slovak-speaking, were assigned to one of the spare battalions (*Ersatzbataillone*). Most were given only four weeks vacation, the food supply quickly became

⁸⁹¹ Scheer, *Habsburg Jews and the Imperial Army before and during the First World War*, 55-78.

⁸⁹² Horel, *Soldaten zwischen nationalen Fronten*, 232-3. Czermak, *In deinem Lager war Österreich*, 27-8.

⁸⁹³ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 29-1/1-6, 1918, Infantry Inspector Pflanzner-Baltin to MKSM, 20 May 1918.

⁸⁹⁴ Horsetzky, *Die vier letzten Kriegswochen*, 21. The army treatment of the returnees influenced the fighting morale of the former POWs. In *Innere Front*, Plaschka, Haselsteiner, and Suppan analyze examples from across the Monarchy and considering all nationalities.

⁸⁹⁵ Rachamimov, *Austro-Hungarian Censors during World War I*, 172.

insufficient, and they soon rioted in the barracks and in the nearby town. Plaschka emphasizes that their ire was directed particularly against “officers, military clergy, Jews, and Germans.”⁸⁹⁶

During the First World War, despite the rising mutual distrust, language regulations had not changed. At least officially, the military leadership, commanding officers and NCOs were still obligated to respect the soldiers’ language rights. Although the Austrian and Hungarian governments declared states of emergency across the Monarchy, which limited or abandoned civilian rights altogether, the language rights of Article 19 were not among them.⁸⁹⁷ However, the Austrian and Hungarian emergency laws introduced wide-scale censorship of communication and the exchange of information. In addition to soldiers, food, and military goods, there was therefore another steady exchange between the front lines and the rear. In addition to letters, censors had to ensure that no newspapers and magazines that could possibly harm morale were read on the front lines.⁸⁹⁸ In *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, Maureen Healy has argued that “the greatest challenge to state censors [was] trying to maintain an information barrier between the front and the home front.”⁸⁹⁹ Thus, many language limitations resulted from the army leadership’s and government’s need to hinder the spread of anti-state propaganda and military information about the front lines.⁹⁰⁰ Restrictions were imposed on the use of languages, as, for example, not all military censorship offices accepted letters in all languages. Iris Rachamimov has analyzed the challenge of censors who had to label the content according to categories such as “suspicious, disloyal, and unpatriotic.”⁹⁰¹ Gustav Spann has summarized that state authorities were interested in the loyalty, reliability (*Zuverlässigkeit*), and general mood (*allgemeine Stimmung*) of citizens. Censorship offices were thus separated based on languages used for correspondence instead of the alleged nationalities of the authors.⁹⁰²

Language diversity posed a challenge for the censorship of letters to and from the front

⁸⁹⁶ Plaschka, *Avantgarde des Widerstands*, 229-30.

⁸⁹⁷ Führ, *Das k. u. k. Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik in Österreich*, 17f, and: Scheer, *Ringstraßenfront*.

⁸⁹⁸ Olechowski, *Die Entwicklung des Preßrechts in Österreich bis 1918*, 511-21.

⁸⁹⁹ Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 131.

⁹⁰⁰ The censors were regularly reminded to work “objectively,” meaning without being influenced of personal prejudices towards particular nationalities: Lukan, *Die politische Meinung der slowenischen Bevölkerung*, 223. See also: Scheer, *Ringstraßenfront*, 9-10; Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 122-59; and Hasiba, *Das Notverordnungsrecht in Österreich*. See on the historic character of state of emergencies: Lütke, and Wildt, eds., *Staats-Gewalt. Ausnahmezustand und Sicherheitsregimes*.

⁹⁰¹ See also: Rachamimov, *Austro-Hungarian Censors during World War I*, 158.

⁹⁰² The Habsburg censorship offices were grouped according to Habsburg languages, but included also other languages such as Hebrew, English, and French: Spann, *Vom Leben im Kriege*, addendum 3, and 150.

across the Monarchy. In October 1914, Trieste, as only one example, faced with about 1,000 telegraphs and 6,000 letters daily.⁹⁰³ Military commands reported frequently that there were never enough censors to read the Bable of languages employed in the post that passed through the military offices. Censorship slowed the post, because letters (in extralocal or less-known languages) had to be sent elsewhere to be read to make sure the content was properly judged. An example of censorship from southern Hungary demonstrates that after numerous complaints from other army offices about missing correspondence, army authorities started an investigation. They detected that for a couple of weeks, the postal officials in Novi Sad had destroyed all letters written in Cyrillic because there were simply no censors available that could read it.⁹⁰⁴ Another challenge was to find sufficient and suitable personnel for censorship. Usually, these censors were insured and retired officers or women with higher school degrees, who usually were the daughters or wives of officers. Their work was regularly, because they often not only blackened out military information and political propaganda but also censored from the point of view of morale.⁹⁰⁵ Assessing content in so many languages often resulted in the press taking months to reach its readers, or not reaching them at all. For example, in December 1914 the military priest Iuliu Hossu asked the army to allow wounded native Romanian speakers to receive copies of *Românul*, arguing: “Our heroes deserve this little sacrifice from us. They suffer a lot [...] without hearing any Romanian word. [...] In their names, please, [...] support me in this regard.”⁹⁰⁶

As letters to and from the front often needed weeks or even months for delivery, the army produced pre-printed postcards. The so-called *Ich bin gesund, es geht mir gut*-cards, named after the sentence printed in the center of the postcard in nine different languages “I am healthy, I am well” may have been the most widely used multilingual war witness. The nine languages appeared in the following order: German, Hungarian, Czech/Slovak, Polish, Ruthene, Italian, Slovene, Croatian/Serbian, and Romanian. These were surrounded by the comment that it was forbidden to write anything else on the card. This card provided soldiers the opportunity to evade censorship, sending home the all-important message without delay and at no cost. However, the other wartime source that showed language diversity was reporting the very opposite. The list of war casualties (*Verlustlisten*), which become longer and longer

⁹⁰³ Klabjan, *Od Trsta do Sarajeva in nazaj*, 762f. See also: Rachamimov, *Austro-Hungarian Censors during World War I*, 157-77. As well as: Ulrich, *Feldpostbriefe im Ersten Weltkrieg. Bedeutung der Zensur*, 40-83.

⁹⁰⁴ Scheer, *Ringstraßenfront*, 97f.

⁹⁰⁵ Busch, *Major Kwaplitschka*, 110, and 146.

⁹⁰⁶ N.N., *Românul*, 14/27 December 1914, 1.

following the outbreak of the war in summer 1914, employed the same name in ten languages on its cover page, in two to columns: on top left side in German, followed by Hungarian, Czech, Polish, and Ruthenian, and on the right side, Croatian, Romanian, Slovene, Slovak, and Italian.⁹⁰⁷

Spiritual and Medical Support

In addition to organizing mobilization, man-power, joint combat, and censorship, army bureaucrats had to ensure spiritual and medical support in all needed languages. The second chapter has demonstrated that the organization of medical and spiritual welfare was sometimes already insufficient in peacetime. There were many conscripts for whom the army officials could not ensure clergy who offered Easter or Christmas celebrations in their languages, or physicians who were able to communicate with them. Peacetime had already offered a glimpse of what to expect. During the war, the quickly and constantly changing linguistic landscape of the soldiers made the task of providing sufficient medical and spiritual care almost impossible. Both posed additional hardships to all men involved and thus can often be found in autobiographical sources. The native German-speaking soldier Karl Außerhofer from Vorarlberg, Austria, appears to have been very pious. He devoted large parts of his diary to religious thoughts. He recalled the summer of 1915 at the front. For two months, no Roman-Catholic mass was held on Sundays because no priest was assigned to his unit.⁹⁰⁸ Außerhofer's assertion indicates that even the Roman-Catholics, the largest and best organized Habsburg denomination, lacked personnel during the war, not to mention, one whose clergy at least spoke the language of the soldiers. As in peacetime, the army leadership expected members of the clergy to offer religious service for soldiers whose languages they did not speak, and spiritual support for soldiers of other denominations when no clergy of that respective faith was available. Moreover, members of the clergy were required to fulfil additional tasks during the war.⁹⁰⁹ They were responsible for recording the last will, supporting officers in writing condolence letters to families, administering the funerals and filling out the military parish registers meaning, during a war, mostly death registers.⁹¹⁰ They also had to support army

⁹⁰⁷ k.u.k. Kriegsministerium. *Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der in den Verlustlisten angeführten Namen*. Vienna: k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1914-1919.

⁹⁰⁸ Wisthaler, ed., *Karl Außerhofer. Das Kriegstagebuch*, 22 August 1915.

⁹⁰⁹ Recently argued also for the Romanian-speaking clergy: Zaharia, *Habsburg Romanian Military Chaplains and Wartime Propaganda*, 290.

⁹¹⁰ They completed the soldier identification tags. Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 58.

officials in keeping up fighting morale, whenever possible in the soldiers' languages, both at and behind the front lines.

Military regulations required the clergy to speak the soldiers' languages to a degree in order to work “in the confessional, at the hospital beds, and to motivate soldiers to endure fighting.”⁹¹¹ Front line service brought many priests into life-threatening situations or into captivity, and thus the number of clergy from all denominations decreased during wartime. As early as November 1914, the Roman-Catholic military bishop Emerich Bjelik called on all dioceses to allow priests to volunteer in the army, in particular those who spoke more than one language. Local bishops did not welcome this “allowance.” It meant that they had to ensure spiritual care for civilians at the home front with fewer priests, because the army had already called hundreds of priests to arms. For example, the Tyrolian diocese of Brixen-Bressanone noted that in 1916, forty-four priests were serving in the army, two of whom had already died.⁹¹² Despite bishops' concerns about losing priests, within only a few weeks, 450 priests enlisted and were assigned to units and military hospitals.⁹¹³ The Roman-Catholic field vicariate, also responsible for the Greek-Catholics, reported that not until September 1916 did they manage to provide at least twelve to twenty-two priests for each division. Many priests who responded to the bishop's call spoke solely German, which enabled the vicariate to provide at least one priest for each battalion from Tyrol. The Roman-Catholic priest Viktor Lipusch cynically asserted that army bureaucrats would have “called this a sufficient number.” At that time, a total of 1,874 Roman-Catholic and 177 Greek-Catholic clergy had already been deployed to the front.⁹¹⁴ At first glance, these numbers seem to be high, but upon closer examination, they meant that one priest had to provide spiritual support for more than a hundred soldiers, who were often fighting along a several-kilometre wide front line. Many priests had to carry the heavy field mass suitcase themselves, or to wait for carriers for many hours, sometimes unsuccessfully.⁹¹⁵

Soldier autobiographical records indicate that there was never a sufficient number of clergy of all religions available, and this is not to say that those assigned spoke the soldiers' languages. For example, the above-mentioned Außerhofer noted in his diary that he and his comrades had to wait months until a new priest was assigned to their unit. Although this priest

⁹¹¹ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Militärgeistliche* (1904), §33-34.

⁹¹² *Schematismus des Säkular- und Regular-Klerus der Diözese Brixen* (1916), 195-6.

⁹¹³ Reichl-Ham, *Militärseelsorge im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 285-6.

⁹¹⁴ Lipusch, ed., *Österreich-Ungarns katholische Militärseelsorge*, 98f.

⁹¹⁵ Garkisch, ed., *První světová válka v denících feldkuráta P. Jana Evangelisty Eybla*, 10 July 1915.

hailed from the same region as Außerhofer, he was unable to communicate with him because the priest was a Ladin speaker who did not know German.⁹¹⁶ In this case, Außerhofer's Italian-speaking comrades were probably able to talk to the priest, while German speakers did not understand him at all. Ionela Zaharia has demonstrated for the rank and file that their confidence in these priests increased because they considered them their own when they spoke the same language(s).⁹¹⁷ Similar findings were reported for the officers. Autobiographical records show that to speak with one another, priests and physicians often helped themselves out by using vulgar Latin, as did reserve officers who had learned that language in gymnasia. Greek-Catholic and Orthodox clergy often similarly used Old Church Slavonic. In addition to offering spiritual support to soldiers, members of the clergy were often expected to help out in local religious communities when there were no other available. For example, the Roman-Catholic military priest Jan Eybl, born 1882 in Prachatic in Bohemia, and a Czech native speaker, recalled in his war diary that he was asked to conduct a funeral at a nearby cemetery, where cholera had taken the local population.⁹¹⁸

In the last minutes before a battle, language and mutual understanding increasingly mattered for confidence and morale, not to mention the moment before a soldier died. In the end, clergy had to prepare soldiers for possible sudden death. The army leaders expected them to convince soldiers that their war commitment had a deeper meaning. The Roman-Catholic military priest Drexel recalled a field mass during which, as he preached, enemy planes flew over head, indicating a coming Russian attack: "I had just prepared the soldiers of my regiment for this hour."⁹¹⁹ What Drexel did not mention was that he did so in German exclusively. My sources indicate that for soldiers, their last words, addressed to their families at home, were most important. The native German-speaking soldier Josef Pölzleitner recalled the situation in his military hospital: "Linn had become unconscious, he fantasized, moaned and moaned, nearby, Dubowy, without arms and with only one leg; beside him, many other wounded, Ruthenians and Poles, whose language we did not understand. It was heartbreaking and none of us will ever forget those agonizing hours."⁹²⁰ Wounded and dying soldiers desperately sought someone nearby to talk to. Owing to the army's language diversity, thousands of last words

⁹¹⁶ Wisthaler, ed., *Karl Außerhofer – Das Kriegstagebuch*, 16 July 1916.

⁹¹⁷ Zaharia, *Habsburg Romanian Military Chaplains and Wartime Propaganda*, 290.

⁹¹⁸ Garkisch, ed., *První světová válka v denících feldkuráta P. Jana Evangelisty Eybla*, 25 December 1914, and 2 March 1915.

⁹¹⁹ Drexel, *Feldkurat in Sibirien*, 9-11.

⁹²⁰ Pölzleitner, *Landsturm im Hochgebirge*, 109-10.

were not understood during the war, nor noted down properly. Many letters with last words letters to the beloved at home therefore tended to be short and impersonal.⁹²¹

Army authorities were aware that religious rules could not entirely be followed during wartime. The second chapter has demonstrated army bureaucrats' awareness that, in terms of the spiritual support of wounded and dying soldiers, different religious practices had to be respected. For example, in the cases of Muslims and Jews, the treatment of the corpses, the funeral ceremony, and how they were to be buried was of primary importance. Roman-Catholics and Greek-Catholics needed to confess, and most importantly to be absolved before death. According to religious rules, priests had not only to hear confessions but to fully understand the confessor in order to recognize when he showed repentance. Owing to the seal of confession, church authorities forbade the use of interpreters until 1917.⁹²² The duty of the members of the clergy was to go from wounded to wounded, offering spiritual support and noting last words for families at home, even in cases where they were unable to communicate. In his wartime novel, Wittlin described an incident in which a priest who spoke Hungarian and German was called to a military hospital to absolve a dying Hutsul who, in addition to his vernacular, spoke basic Polish. The physician offered to organize an interpreter, but the priest refused. He then listened to sins he did not understand. Wittlin wrote: "After a prolonged struggle with his own conscience, however, he decided that valor was to be valued above language knowledge. [...] First, he forgave him all sins in a language that neither Les [the soldier] nor his compatriots nor the Honveds [...] understood. And not even many officers, especially the career officers who had been taught at the cadet schools, understood this language. Perhaps Dr. Badian [the physician] would have understood, if he been there. *Miseratur tui omnipotens Deus [...]*"⁹²³

To ease the Catholic clergy's duties, the Military Bishop Emerich Bjelik published a multilingual confession booklet in 1914, the so-called *Notbeichtspiegel*.⁹²⁴ This booklet aimed to permit priests to take confessions even when they did not speak the soldiers' language. All

⁹²¹ Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 58.

⁹²² 1. Codex Iuris Canonici (1917) can. 890, § 2: "Obligatione servandi sacramentale sigillum tenentur quoque interpretes aliique omnes ad quos notitia confessionis quoquo modo pervenerit." I thank Anselm Kleinlangehorst for this information.

⁹²³ Wittlin, *Die Geschichte vom geduldigen Infanteristen*, 319-22.

⁹²⁴ There was already the so-called *Polyglottus* available, see Houlihan, but the *Notbeichtspiegel* was especially for Habsburg wartime service in the regimental languages. As early as 1901, Bjelik compiled an overview over the military spiritual welfare and the work of the vicariate: Bjelik, *Geschichte der k. u. k. Militär-Seelsorge und des apostolischen Feld-Vicariates*.

Catholic priests read Latin; thus, it was used in this book. In addition to Latin, the booklet contained seventeen languages: the regimental languages, as well as French and Church Latin, with numbered questions and answers. The booklet's foreword explains in Latin (*Usus Chartarum*) how it is to be used. The priest reads the Latin version out loud, and shows, using the number, the part to be read by the soldier. If a soldier was illiterate or unable to read because of his wounds, the priest read the question out loud in the soldier's language. Each question provided possible answers in the regimental languages, and when, the soldiers pointed to the number (associated with a given answer). The absolution was given in Latin.⁹²⁵ A practical detail was that the pages were perforated, thus enabling priests to easily take out only the languages needed and to duplicate them easily if necessary. Most autobiographical sources by priests do not mention this booklet, although it was widely used. The Roman-Catholic priest Pius Parsch mentioned in his wartime diary that in only one day at the front, he heard confessions from about one hundred soldiers, among them "very many who spoke other languages, including Ruthenians," which meant mostly Greek-Catholics.⁹²⁶

Catholic priests were permitted to perform a so-called general absolution. They had already been required to familiarize soldiers with this unusual form of absolution during peacetime.⁹²⁷ Autobiographical sources I have examined show that many priests were uncomfortable with this exceptional absolution, as were many soldiers. For example, the Roman-Catholic military priest Pius Parsch questioned the legitimacy of a general absolution. His war diary shows that he regularly travelled around the Russian and Italian fronts to hear the confessions of as many soldiers as possible in person. Although a native German speaker, he was responsible for Czech-speaking soldiers, and he busied himself by learning Czech during his wartime service. Parsch tried to provide mass at least once a week in Czech and in German for all his soldiers. He emphasized that many other clergy dealt similarly with believers who spoke a variety of languages. However, he recalled that not all of them were as highly engaged. Some of them tried to spend most of their military duty safely behind the front.⁹²⁸ Trying to learn a language during wartime was not exceptional and did not occur only among clergy and officers. For example, the military physician Vijo Vittur, born in 1882 to a Ladin-speaking family, served on the Tyrolian front. He entrusted to his war diary that during bombardment in

⁹²⁵ I thank Fabian Tirlor for sharing with me a copy of the booklet, and explaining how it was used. The booklet is part of the historic collection of the diocesan school Vizentinum in Bressanone-Brixen.

⁹²⁶ PPA, Pius Parsch, War Diary no. 6, 30 November 1916.

⁹²⁷ Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 56.

⁹²⁸ PPA, Pius Parsch, War Diary, 1915-1918.

June 1915, he learned Italian while working in a field hospital, being responsible for wounded Italian-speaking Habsburg soldiers, as well as captured Italian and Romanian soldiers who were used as auxiliary workers.⁹²⁹ In his monograph about military resistance, Richard Georg Plaschka has mentioned several examples of military priests who were met with antipathy from soldiers because they were simply unable to fulfil their war service properly or had no skills for treating soldiers. Others simply encouraged them to advance “with the cross in their hands,” and immediately after left the front.⁹³⁰ However, it is likely that those priests who were unable to communicate with the soldiers tended to spend less effort doing so, as was the case for officers.

Many prayer books were already available in peace time in the various languages. Many published during wartime aimed to ease the duties of clergy of all denominations. Handbooks needed approval from the relevant highest religious military authority and from civil censors. The second chapter has shown that Corps Commands usually announced planned publications and asked subordinate military institutions how many were needed and in which languages. During war, these documents became increasingly in demand, while planning became almost impossible owing to the continually evolving linguistic landscape of soldiers on front lines. Both military and religious authorities expected clergy to preach to soldiers that the war was a consequence of sin and secularism; thus, obedience, following orders, doing their duty, and even sacrifice – Imitation of Christ – were promoted as the only contributions soldiers could make that would bring them back home to their loved ones.⁹³¹ In addition to prayer books, there were handbooks containing sermons for soldiers in all regimental languages available for the use of the clergy. The handbooks provided texts for every wartime occasion. For example, the Roman-Catholic priest Alois Hudal published such a handbook in 1917, with such chapters as: “Departure to the Front,” “Our Oath of Allegiance,” “Before the Attacks,” “After a Battle,” and “In the Field Hospital.”⁹³² This handbook met with great interest and was even reviewed. The reviewer, the Roman-Catholic priest Josip Pazman, highlighted its purpose, in particular because it was available in German, Italian, and Slovene, and said that “it serves a need that was already great in peacetime, but now is recommended for all priests serving in the field.”⁹³³

⁹²⁹ Vittur, *Na recordanza al dotur de Pescol Vijo Vittur*, 601, and 619.

⁹³⁰ Plaschka, *Avantgarde des Widerstands*, 233-4.

⁹³¹ Zaharia, *Habsburg Romanian Military Chaplains and Wartime Propaganda*, 290.

⁹³² Hudal, *Soldatenpredigten*, table of content.

⁹³³ Pazman, Hudal: *Soldatenpredigten*, *Bogoslovska smotra*, 300.

In 1915, Arnold Frankfurter, head of the Habsburg Israelite Military Welfare in Vienna, published a pocket-sized prayer booklet addressed to the “Jewish warriors in combat.” In addition to the emperor’s anthem, as in the Roman-Catholic booklets, it offered prayers for the many situations on the front lines, such as “Prayer before the Battle,” in German, Hebrew, and Hungarian.⁹³⁴ The bulk of these prayer books avoided speaking about killing, and instead highlighted the soldiers' sacrifices for their monarch, homeland, and for god (often mentioned therein, in this sequence). In addition to prayers, these booklets often contained die-hard propaganda. Hudal’s read as follows: “Soldiers! Loyalty to the Emperor is God's command. [...] Your Emperor, who is at the helm of the kingdom, is the representative of God.”⁹³⁵ The members of the clergy handed such prayer booklets out to soldiers.⁹³⁶

In addition to depending on disposition and leadership skills, as described in chapter 2, rank-and-file soldiers’ acceptance of officers often resulted from the latter’s language abilities, regardless of their native tongues. My sources show that this was also the case for the members of the clergy, whose compassion for the soldiers mattered, as did their not adhering too strictly to religious rules. Many clergy visited the wounded of all denominations when there was no other priest nearby, and they listened and tried to record last words. The members of the clergy were responsible for “all the wounded,” irrespective of which regiment they belonged to, whether the soldier was an enemy or one of their own, and what the soldier’s religion was.⁹³⁷ Clergy memoirs and diaries I have examined indicate that many would have behaved in this way even had they not been instructed to do so. Indeed, the Roman-Catholic military priest Viktor Lipusch characterized his peers' attitude thus: “Practical necessity and humanity were for most of us more important than religious rules. The soldiers were grateful for every kind word.”⁹³⁸ The war volunteer and novelist Wittlin wrote even Protestant clergy from Hungary to whom service in their native tongues was so important, as celebrating in Church Latin for nearby Roman-Catholic soldiers and giving only the homily in Hungarian.⁹³⁹

Oftentimes, members of the clergy were expected to help officers who did not speak the

⁹³⁴ Frankfurter, *Andachtsbüchlein für jüdische Krieger im Felde*, 10 and 42. Field Rabbi Ernst Deutsch translated Frankfurter’s text into Hungarian.

⁹³⁵ Hudal, *Soldatenpredigten*, 105. Available in German, Slovene, and Italian.

⁹³⁶ Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 58.

⁹³⁷ *Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Militärgeistliche* (1904), §33.

⁹³⁸ Lipusch, *Österreich-Ungarns katholische Militärseelsorge im Weltkrieg*, Chapter: Die Militärseelsorge an der Front. Die Feldseelsorge that is based on his own experience as military priest during the First World War, 140.

⁹³⁹ Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 318.

languages in front of soldiers. The Roman-Catholic military priest Jan Eybl, born 1882 in Prachatic, in Bohemia, and a Czech native speaker, recalled in his war diary that upon arrival, the officer asked him to hold a speech, and afterwards another officer requested adoration from him in front of the entire regiment.⁹⁴⁰ The army leadership also regularly organized huge field masses. They then published pictures of them in magazines or issued them as postcards. Thus, religious service often also had to serve propaganda purposes. Images show priests, sometimes bishops, speaking in front of hundreds of soldiers. What they do not indicate is the languages the clergy were using. The Roman-Catholic priest Alois Spielmann, director of the Vincentinum boys' school in Brixen-Bressanone, reported throughout the war what happened in his school and in his town, which was located next to the southwestern front and in which military hospitals had been set up. In August 1918, he recalled: "Service for the Hungarian soldiers in the Church of the Vincentinum, celebrated by His Excellency Bishop Majlath from Karlsburg in Transylvania. Afterwards, address in the church in Hungarian, and to all Hungarians in the middle courtyard of the Vincentinum."⁹⁴¹ In addition to these more significant events, Spielmann regularly reported about the situation of the wounded, food shortages, and religious services provided. Travelling bishops held large-scale ceremonies which mainly served propaganda purposes. They were organized regularly, across the Monarchy and on all front lines. When hundreds of former POWs returned from Russian camps, a huge mass was celebrated for them. Ionela Zaharia has outlined: "To strengthen the men's loyalty, [...] all chaplains celebrated [...] everyone in his own rite, in the languages of the returnees, which included a renewal of the pledge of allegiance to the Emperor, and a speech that sought to emphasize the holiness of swearing oaths."⁹⁴² Before being granted a four-week leave, returning POWs were required to undergo a sorting process in "reception stations," including medical quarantine and so-called "disciplinary re-education" (*disziplinäre Nachschulung*).⁹⁴³

The Habsburg-army's lack of clergy, already apparent in the summer of 1914, increased dramatically during the war. From among approximately 3,000 Catholic priests, fifty-three died, fifty-one were seriously injured, and 150 were captured.⁹⁴⁴ The army reported in September 1916 that twelve to twenty-two Roman-Catholic priests were provided for each division; two years later, there were only up to eight members of the clergy to provide spiritual

⁹⁴⁰ Garkisch, ed., *První světová válka v denících feldkuráta P. Jana Evangelisty Eybla*, 10 July 1915.

⁹⁴¹ BIV, Spielmann-Chronik, 20 August 1918.

⁹⁴² Zaharia, *Habsburg Romanian Military Chaplains and Wartime Propaganda*, 297.

⁹⁴³ Rachamimov, *Austro-Hungarian Censors during World War I*, 171-2.

⁹⁴⁴ Legler, *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*, 57.

support for all denominations. For example, the Roman-Catholic priest Benno Kobal reported for his division that in September 1918, among these eight, one Roman-Catholic and one Orthodox were missing at the front, the Greek-Catholic had fallen ill, and one Roman-Catholic was on vacation. The clergy available for this division thus consisted only of himself, who spoke German, Slovene, and basic Croatian; Franz Beranek, who spoke German, Czech, and basic Slovene; and Richard Zorn, who spoke German and Czech. To these Roman-Catholic priests could be added the field imam Hazif Salih Hotić, who spoke Croatian, Arabic, Turkish, Persian, and basic German.⁹⁴⁵ Considering that the Catholic spiritual support was the best organized in the army and that their believers could be found among soldiers of all nationalities, these numbers indicate that the situation for the other believers was even worse. There is no single member of the clergy reported in this list for soldiers of Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish faith.

Members of the clergy spent a huge amount of their war service in hospitals, where they worked hand in hand with another group of military specialists whose language abilities were of vital importance: the physicians and nurses.⁹⁴⁶ Army bureaucrats were already aware during peacetime that they were often unable to provide all patients with physicians with whom they could communicate. As was the case with religious services, this deficit accelerated during the war. The Hungarian Minister President István Tisza complained to his *Honvédség*-minister Samu Hazai in January 1915: “The fact that a relatively large proportion of soldiers are sent to hospitals in which no one can communicate with them in their mother tongues not only has a detrimental effect on their mental state but also affects their medical treatment unfavourably.”⁹⁴⁷ During the war, the army command began collecting field reports from military physicians serving on a number of fronts. Some of these reports were lengthy providing detailed medical figures and even suggestions for how to avoid the spread of venereal diseases, but only a minority mentioned language diversity. Among these few was one by the Bohemia-born physician Gottlieb Arnstein, who worked at the Balkan front. While soldiers employed at this front hailed from all Habsburg language groups, Arnstein reported that most physicians originated from the Corps Command area that recruited from Lower Austria and Moravia. Most spoke only German and Czech. He recalled that most physicians were completely unable to

⁹⁴⁵ ÖStA/KA/AdT, IR 47, box 296, Evidenzdaten der bei der 28. Infanteriedivision eingeteilten Militärgeistlichen, Ausweis an das Feldsuperiorat der k.u.k. 11. Armee, gez. Divisionspfarrer Benno Kobal, 1 September 1918.

⁹⁴⁶ The role of the clergy and their work in the military hospitals together with physicians and nurses is described in: Mader, ed., *Feldkaplan Karl Gögele und seine Verwundetenspital*.

⁹⁴⁷ Wertheimer, *Graf Stefan Tisza. Briefe 1914-1918*, Tisza to Hazai, 17 January 1915, 157.

communicate with their patients.⁹⁴⁸ Autobiographical records of army physicians I have examined show that most of them – while often presenting detailed numbers of the injured and ill, and their own medical achievements – did not mention language diversity at all.⁹⁴⁹

While physicians seldom mentioned the language diversity of soldiers, the rank and file often reflected on the language dilemma in terms of the provision of medical treatment. For example, the Viennese NCO Alfred Trendl was wounded on the Balkan front in September 1914 and sent to a hospital in Zagreb, where doctors and nurses spoke solely Croatian. He was unable to communicate with them because he did not speak the same language.⁹⁵⁰ Trendl recovered, only to be wounded again at the Eastern front in November 1914. He recalled that the few words of Romanian he had picked up when visiting his sister in Romania helped him to communicate with Romanian-speaking military nurses. He was better treated than other wounded soldiers who were unable to communicate.⁹⁵¹ During his way to the front, military technician Luis Trenker passed a transport of wounded soldiers. The coachman was “an old Bosniak with whom he exchanged only a few words, because he speaks as much German as I speak Serbo-Croatian.”⁹⁵² The Zagreb-born novelist Miroslav Krleža who served in a military hospital during the war, emphasized the situation of the wounded soldiers in his wartime novel, *The Croatian God Mars*, published in 1922. Soldiers were often unable to speak to one another: “Dear brothers, I beg you to be quiet, it hurts (*es tut weh*), it hurts so much (*mir tut's so schrecklich weh*)! Vidovic shouted” in German, while Hungarian-speakers asked one another what *weh* meant (*Mindig ez a Weh! Mi az Weh?*) Afterwards a Slovak explained that it means “it hurts.”⁹⁵³

The army provided physicians and nurses with expedients to ease their duties.⁹⁵⁴ For example, postcard-sized leaflets that contained terms in nine languages for the most important medical classifications for the wounded: slightly wounded, wounded, badly wounded, ill, seriously ill.⁹⁵⁵ The army also printed posters and booklets to remind soldiers of sanitary care and how to protect themselves from illnesses. For example, the military physician Emanuel

⁹⁴⁸ ÖStA/KA/AOK, Qu. Abt., Sanitätschef, box 2317, A-K, no. 7, Generalstabsarzt Dr. Gottlieb Arnstein.

⁹⁴⁹ Vittur, *Na recordanza al dotur de Pescol Vijo Vittur*.

⁹⁵⁰ PP, Trendl, War Diary, 8 September 1914.

⁹⁵¹ PP, Trendl, War Diary, 27 November 1914.

⁹⁵² Trenker, *Sperrfort Rocca Alta*, 161.

⁹⁵³ Krleža, *Der kroatische Gott Mars*, 294.

⁹⁵⁴ Houlihan, *Catholicism and the Great War*, 101.

⁹⁵⁵ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/401, Engelmund Kube, Sprachkarte, Reservespital des Roten Kreuzes in der Straka'schen Akademie in Prag III., undated.

Freund published a wide-read handbook, *How to protect against Syphilis*, in 1916, which came out first in German but was then reissued in several translations.⁹⁵⁶ Immediately after this, it was publicly criticized for its style, as it graphically described not only the effects on the diseased men but also how syphilis would spread to their wives and children especially after they returned home.⁹⁵⁷

During the war, many thousands of soldiers died. Especially right at front, there was often no time to separate them according to their languages, or even denominations. The Roman-Catholic military priest Viktor Lipusch remembered a typical scene for the clergy in military hospitals: “The priest went through a room of severely injured soldiers, to find out who was likely to die soon and asked them of which nationalities they were: Are you German, Magyar, Russian, [...] Are you Roman-Catholic, Serb, Jewish?” When there was no communication possible, the clergy looked for the soldiers’ identification tags.⁹⁵⁸ Many soldiers were then buried in mass graves. The languages used during the funeral proceedings mattered to the mourning comrades who gathered around the burial places. Usually, all available clergy attended these ceremonies, and language diversity was considered as much as possible. Officers gave speeches in which they sought to use the languages of all attending soldiers. Doro Manescul recalled in his wartime novel the actions of an officer: “Lieutenant Colonel Szeparowicz sprinkles holy water on the dead with a branch, then he takes a pioneer’s shovel and plants crosses on the four sides of the grave, speaking in all locally used languages. [...] After, I said the Lord’s Prayer in Romanian and Ruthenian [...] the Jews took prayer books from their backpacks and prayed to Jehovah for the salvation of the souls of the fallen.”⁹⁵⁹

Photographs indicate that most inscriptions on Habsburg army mass graves and cemeteries during the war were in German, although sometimes there were inscriptions in the other languages. The Roman-Catholic priest Karl Drexel who went into captivity and spent many years in a POW camp in Siberia wrote in his memoirs that fellow prisoners erected a large cross in the center of their cemetery. On the four sides of the pedestal were inscriptions in German, Hungarian, Ruthenian, and Russian. The unveiling ceremony took place in July 1919, and the residents of the camp gathered to bid farewell to their comrades. Drexel's homily was

⁹⁵⁶ For one example: Freund, *Kako da se čuvate od sifilitike*.

⁹⁵⁷ R.G., Rezension von Dr. Emanuel Freund, *Wie bewahrt Ihr euch vor Syphilis*, *Zeitschrift für die Bekämpfung von Geschlechtskrankheiten* (1916), 245.

⁹⁵⁸ Lipusch, *Österreich-Ungarns katholische Militärseelsorge im Weltkrieg*, 422.

⁹⁵⁹ Manescul, *Meine Dritte Kompanie*, 63-5.

in German. Another Habsburg military priest followed with a homily in Romanian. Finally, a Protestant concluded in Hungarian.⁹⁶⁰

⁹⁶⁰ Drexel, *Feldkurat in Sibirien*, 192-3.

Chapter 8: Language Diversity on the Frontlines

In the midst of the war, we not only fight against the enemy, but we also fight against one another, and harm ourselves as much as the enemy harms us.

General Stjepan Sarkotić, wartime commander of Bosnia-Herzegovina⁹⁶¹

Starting with the outbreak of the war in 1914 a growing number of men had to fight in the Habsburg forces, and a large number of women were in a way integrated into the home front machinery of supply.⁹⁶² The initial war euphoria passed quickly when the first casualty rates were announced across the Monarchy.⁹⁶³ In addition, thousands of suspects were imprisoned or even worse punished by death, and daily needed goods were increasingly shortened.⁹⁶⁴ After the war, the public increasingly accused the army and its members of having planned the war, started the war, and lost it in the end. Following 1918, the joint army was called by many Habsburg successor states' politicians as having been the uniformed expression of foreign imperial rule, of the so-called prison of peoples (*Völkerkerker*), with which none of its suppressed nationalities could have ever identified with. Even more, many former Habsburg soldiers, officers and rank and file, found themselves in post-war states celebrating veterans that had fought for the enemy.⁹⁶⁵

Throughout this study I have argued that most army bureaucrats were convinced that every Habsburg citizen had a distinct nationality, one that was first and foremost related to native tongues. Thus, conscripts had not only the right to use their native languages, but the obligation to suit into one of the recognized language categories, and therefore nationalities. This study has also shown that following or ignoring language rights and rules was not always an outcome of someones nationality rather was often a situational decision resulting from a variety of motives, including practicality, convenience, and ignorance. The previous chapter has demonstrated that the flexible interpretation of language rights out of other motives than national continued into the summer of 1914, although it changed steadily. Thus, how did

⁹⁶¹ HDA, Sarkotić, box 2, War Diary, 20 July 1916.

⁹⁶² See for Austria: Scheer, *Ringstraßenfront*; for Vienna: Healy, *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*; and for Styria: Moll, *Heimatfront Steiermark*, 181-95. For Hungary: Pastor, *The Home Front in Hungary*, 124-34. As most comprehensible overview: Rauchensteiner, *Der erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie*.

⁹⁶³ k.u.k. Kriegsministerium. *Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der in den Verlustlisten angeführten Namen*. Vienna: k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1914-1919.

⁹⁶⁴ Führ, *Das k. u. k. Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik in Österreich*, 49f.

⁹⁶⁵ Gerwarth, *The Vanquished. Why the First World War failed to end, 1917-1923*; Newman, *Croats and Croatia in the Wake of the Great War*; as well as: Di Michele, *La Grande Guerra degli Italiani d'Austria*.

language diversity affect soldiers' identification with the army, the state, and the monarch? During wartime an increasing number of officers, but also rank and file, became convinced that loyal or disloyal behavior was not an outcome of personal decisions rather characterized particular nationalities in general. "The fight against one another," as Sarkotić has emphasized above, often reflected the different languages Habsburg soldiers spoke. The political nationalization of language use that had become evident during peacetime, therefore extended and radicalized during the war.

Language Diversity and Wartime Experience

The previous chapter has shown the organizational challenges that the language diversity of soldiers posed to army leaders during wartime. Indeed, many of the problems were the same as in peacetime, but they accelerated as Habsburg army units became soon more mixed and proper communication became decisive for someone's survival. As soon as troops arrived at the fighting front, the first experiences there with language diversity offered only a glimpse of what could be expected. Thus, many in their autobiographical sources reflected on the linguistic diversity, in particular officers of their subordinates. In his memoirs, General August von Urbanski recalled his first warlike situation at the front. His battalion comprised about fifty percent Czech, twenty percent German, twenty percent Polish, and ten percent Italian-speakers: "Half of the Czechs spoke German, while virtually no Pole spoke it. The Italians spoke Italian and German."⁹⁶⁶ The procurement-officer Josef Leb recalled in his memoirs that officers and soldiers of his magazine located in St. Marein im Mürztal, in Styria, hailed from across the Monarchy: "Initially, they consisted of seven Germans, three Czechs, one Pole, one Slovak, and two Ruthenians."⁹⁶⁷ As it was in peacetime-autobiographical sources, authors usually assigned officers and rank and file nationalities, and almost never used a phrase such as (native) speakers of particular languages, as I do throughout this study.

In the initial months, officers almost exclusively highlighted the linguistic and ethnic mixture as it posed an operational and organizational challenge on them. They highlighted situations, in which they did not understand their soldiers, or even soldiers were unable communicating with one another. However, as long as units were very mixed it was more or less guaranteed that interpreters were always easily available. Many officers reported that the

⁹⁶⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/58:4, August von Urbanski, *Das Tornisterkind*, 249.

⁹⁶⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, *Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers*, 18.

mixing of troops became so intense that there was always someone around who spoke the necessary language.⁹⁶⁸ As already in peacetime, NCOs were often expected to help out as multilingual intermediaries between the officers and the rank and file. The career officer Theodor von Lerch noted in his memoirs that his “Sergeant Bicske strode through the ranks by speaking Hungarian, German, and Romanian.”⁹⁶⁹ After having been assigned to a Hungarian-speaking unit, a German-speaking reservist wrote that he had to speak English to be understood by at least some of his soldiers.⁹⁷⁰ Already in peacetime, English was sometimes the only opportunity to communicate, because lots of soldiers worked in the United States before the war and had returned earlier or recently for their military service.⁹⁷¹ Despite censorship, Austrian newspapers reported that some soldiers were only able communicating with officers by hands.⁹⁷²

Language diversity posed a challenge to commanding officers not only when having to fight with own soldiers from the joint army, but in particular when mixing with the other Habsburg forces. Perhaps basic communication between units of the different Habsburg forces was sufficient when soldiers had had pre-war training. For joint operations with one of the allied armies such as the Ottoman, Bulgarian and German requested additional knowledge. For example, an order of the Habsburg occupation regime in Montenegro asked subordinate military institutions to report not only officers fit for war combat, but also to mention if they speak Turkish or Bulgarian.⁹⁷³ Historians show that the Ottoman army leadership who themselves had to organize multilingual soldiers, was well aware of the language challenges. The Ottoman army had many officers who until 1914 were educated in the Imperial German or Habsburg army. Thus, many Ottoman officers were familiar with their army organization, and languages used. In particular officers who spoke German were deployed on front lines where they had to cooperate with Habsburg army commands and units.⁹⁷⁴ Although joint combat would have been easier for the Imperial German army, because of the the same language of command, autobiographical sources I have examined indicate that German officers were not that skilled in fighting with soldiers from different language backgrounds as the Habsburgs and

⁹⁶⁸ Walzel, *Kémszolgalat a háborúban*, 90.

⁹⁶⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/33:4, Theodor von Lerch, *Die Todgeweihten*, unpublished undated manuscript, 100.

⁹⁷⁰ Stone, *Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy*, 100.

⁹⁷¹ N.N., *Das Englische als Regimentsprache*, *Agramer Zeitung*, 30 June 1911, 4. Yet, I have never found any recruit personnel file proving this right. However, the overwhelming majority of Hungarian conscripts’s files are not preserved in archives.

⁹⁷² Gammerl, *Subjects, Citizens and others*, 133.

⁹⁷³ DACG, *Fondi Austrisko vojno Guvernerstvo u Crnoj gori*, fasc. 1 und 2, *Kreiskommandobefehl Ipek* no 20, 19 January 1917.

⁹⁷⁴ See: Grüßhaber, *The “German Spirit” in the Ottoman and Turkish Army*.

the Ottomans were. Wilhelm Czermak called it the “unimaginable situation for German army officers being unable to talk to their subordinates.”⁹⁷⁵ They therefore often tended to blame the linguistic diversity of their ally of hampering operations. The Imperial German army officer Gerhard Velburg recalled his assignment to a Habsburg unit: “They handed over to me these three guys to build a new communication line. The first is a Bosniak, the second a Czech, and the third a Hungarian. None of them speak German. Moreover, they are even unable communicating with one another.”⁹⁷⁶

In addition to challenges language diversity posed on allied warfare, most of daily combat had to be organized and carried out together with the other Habsburg armed forces, the k.k. *Landwehr*, the Hungarian *Honvédség*, and the Croatian-Slavonian *Domobranstvo*. Autobiographical records I have examined often referred to front line situations in which soldiers and their commanding officers of lower rank mixed. Officers had to plan and carry out joint operations, or even for a while they commanded everyone’s other soldiers. For example, the German-speaking career officer Robert Nowak recalled that he had to communicate with *Honvédség*-officers who did not even speak basic German.⁹⁷⁷ Some officers – who were able to do so – helped themselves out by commanding in two languages. For example, the career officer Theodor von Lerch recalled a general passing a group of resting soldiers on the way to the front. The soldiers stood up and saluted. The general greeted them with a mixture of German and Hungarian, and commanded soldiers to remain in place: “*Bleiben, Maradni, Nicht aufstehen, Guten Morgen, Jo reggelt, dem Regiment.*”⁹⁷⁸ The Viennese soldier Alfred Trendl wrote in his diary about an incident when a *Honvédség*-captain commanded *Elöre*: “That meant march, or something like that in the *Honvédség*, and we marched.”⁹⁷⁹ Situations as mentioned above occurred regularly while repeatedly given secret orders insisted on the importance of a close cooperation and steady oral communication between commanders and subcommanders at all levels, between infantry and artillery, and of course between the different Habsburg armed forces.⁹⁸⁰ Indeed, many *Honvédség*-soldiers did not speak Hungarian, rather were native German, Slovak, Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, or Croatian-speakers. They did in the best case

⁹⁷⁵ Czermak, *In deinem Lager war Österreich*, 28.

⁹⁷⁶ Velburg, *Rumänische Etappe*, 126.

⁹⁷⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/726:4, Robert Nowak, Sammelsurium an kürzeren und längeren Fronterlebnissen, unpaginated and undated. Czermak reported something similar: Czermak, *In deinem Lager war Österreich*, 27-8.

⁹⁷⁸ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/33:4, Theodor von Lerch, *Die Todgeweihten*, unpublished undated manuscript, 101.

⁹⁷⁹ PP, Trendl, *War Diary*, 8 September 1914.

⁹⁸⁰ k.u.k. Armeeoberkommando, *Geheim! Abschnitte aus der Gefechtslehre*, Teil XII. (Entwurf) *Der Angriff*, April 1918. See too: K.u.k. Armeeoberkommando/Op. Nr. 32698, *Geheim! Erfahrungen der Armeegruppe von Eben im Stellungskampf*, October 1916.

understand the Hungarian commands.⁹⁸¹ For many of them it was perhaps easier to mix with units of the Habsburg army, or the Austrian Territorial Defense, the k.k. *Landwehr*, than to fight in the ranks of their Hungarian army. As already stipulated during peacetime it soon became a survival strategy that orders directed at soldiers were read out loud in front of them and were immediately translated.⁹⁸²

An order issued in the first days of the war at the Balkan front indicated another challenge. This rule aimed easing to distinguish between commands given by own army members, and the Serbian enemy, particularly when front lines were close. At the Monarchy's southeastern borders, thousands of soldiers and officers were deployed who spoke the same language as the enemy did. The order stipulated that field guards should be really careful because "Croatian" is "in general identical with the Serbian language." The order insisted that even guards from the Croatian Territorial Defence, the *Domobranstvo*, should always employ German commands to avoid confusion among own soldiers.⁹⁸³ More than once it happened that enemy troops used this situation as war tactic. Sarkotić recalled in his diary more than just one such incident. Serbian soldiers were allegedly told to speak German close to the front to confuse Habsburg soldiers. They therefore came closer and closer by shouting "Živio Franjo Josip!" (Long live Francis Joseph), and soon after began throwing hand-grenades.⁹⁸⁴

Autobiographical records offer a wide range of examples in which particular situations language diversity posed a challenge to officers. This was during advancements and retreats, in the trenches, when organizing procurement, and providing medical and religious support. The career officer Ludwig Hesshaimer recalled the delicate challenge of collecting scattered soldiers after a battle. They belonged to different units, and therefore spoke different languages.⁹⁸⁵ Patrols were sent out regularly into the direction of the enemy to ascertain its position and military strength. The career officer Oscar Strubecker recalled in his memoirs when his artillery patrol had to cross its own lines and went into the no man's land to find out suitable artillery positions. He and his comrades had to pass guarding *Honvéds*: "From the Magyars no other word is to be brought out than *Nem tudom* [I do not know]. We managed to find an at least a

⁹⁸¹ Nachtigal, *Privilegiensystem und Zwangsrekrutierung*, 168.

⁹⁸² Manescul, *Meine Dritte Kompanie*, 143.

⁹⁸³ ÖStA/KA/Terr, Befehle, 13th Corps Command Zagreb/Agram, box 76, no. 8, 13 August 1914.

⁹⁸⁴ HDA, Sarkotić, box 2, War Diary, 29 May 1915.

⁹⁸⁵ Hesshaimer, *Ein k.u.k. Offizier erzählt mit dem Zeichenstift*, 30.

little bit German-speaking officer and to report him about our duty.”⁹⁸⁶ The career officer Leo Schuster needed to pass front line guards. Usually, all soldiers from the same frontline section were given a password. The guards had to shout the so-called *Feldruf* and the soldiers and officers knew the correct answer. Schuster remembered that once a *Honvédség*-guard who did not understand his reply, stopped him when trying to get back to his unit.⁹⁸⁷ The worst outcome for all examples mentioned above could have been that own guards or soldiers thought they are confronted with enemy soldiers, and began to shoot. We do not know how many died, because of mutual misunderstanding. Diaries and memoirs, I have examined, and which are accessible today tend to portray that even delicate situations were mastered. In the end, these who got lost and died because of such confusions were unable to report any more.

In addition to operational success, language diversity tended to increasingly threaten someone’s physical survival. The military clergy was often in the first line. The Roman-Catholic priest Karl Drexel served in a Tyrolian infantry regiment. In his war memoirs, he remembered a moment in which language knowledge became not only tactically decisive. At the Eastern front a patrol was sent out to ascertain the exact location of the Russian enemy. The patrol sneaked to a camp at the edge of a forest. It was dark, and they were unable to see the people gathering there. From a distance they tried to listen to their conversation. They understood only one word: *Skolko* (How much) and were still not sure if these foreigners were Russian soldiers or what they assumed could also be own Slavs, such as Slovaks, Poles, or Serbs. They had to come even closer. Only then, as one soldiers of the patrol understood Polish, and another one Croatian, they recognized that they have come too close to the Russian lines. Drexel afterwards was among many thousands of other Habsburg soldiers who went into Russian captivity. He recalls after having spent many years in Siberia: “Subconsciously, we all recognized the difficulties of our old army, which was so multilingual.”⁹⁸⁸

Not only advancement and retreat, even the more stable trench or mountain warfare knew a steady exchange between the rear area and the front. The soldier Karl Außerhofer who fought at the Italian mountain front noted in his diary that “every day about thirty men go and come. Virtually all of them are speaking another language: ten percent Germans, the others

⁹⁸⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/748, Oscar Strubecker, Die 12cm Kanonen-Batterie 11 des k.u.k. Festungsartillerie-Regiments Kaiser Nr. 1/6. Feldkompanie 1914-1918, unpublished undated manuscript, 91.

⁹⁸⁷ Kloss, ed., *Leo Schuster*, 89.

⁹⁸⁸ Drexel, *Feldkurat in Sibirien*, 20.

Czechs, Poles, and Bosniaks.”⁹⁸⁹ The military physician Vijo Vittur mentioned a coming and going of “Bohemians, Galicians, and Croats.”⁹⁹⁰ There was another situation in addition to fighting where language diversity became an important issue: before the martial court. Frontline officers were enabled to punish soldiers’ misbehavior immediately afterward without any trial. In many cases, soldiers had no opportunity at all to explain what actually happened. There are no archival documents provided which indicate in how many cases it happened that someone was sentenced to death and executed because of mutual misunderstanding. Even when language diversity was not the main reason for death penalties and failed military operations, it certainly brought both soldiers and officers more often into delicate and lifethreatening situations, and it helped that all of them more often felt themselves left alone. Journalist and NCO Egon Erwin Kisch in his wartime novel recalled when his Bohemian unit reached the suburbs of Belgrade in December 1914: “It rained and became darker and darker, comrades lost one another, I ended up in a column of Magyar Honvéds, whose language I did not speak, and felt even more lonely, than ever before.”⁹⁹¹

Autobiographical records reveal that the language diversity often led to loneliness, despite soldiers were always surrounded by others, and lived in trenches and burrows like in sardin cans.⁹⁹² This was particularly the case where there was none nearby to speak with. NCO Alfred Trendl, a native speaker of German, after assignment to a unit with Czech-speaking soldiers wrote in his diary: “Considering that I did not have any friends among the Czechs. I not even once had a proper conversation. I spent my lonely hours with my diary, my only friend, and wrote and wrote.”⁹⁹³ In his wartime novel that mainly refers to the last weeks of the war and home-coming young artillery officer Eugen Weber more than once reported about loneliness. For example, he reported about the situation of a young cannonier, Jurichich who “was a Croat and was unable to speak five words in German, he is unable to communicate with anyone in his battery. In his sparetime he sits around and stares, the other soldiers explain by hands what he has to do, like to a Negro from Central Congo.”⁹⁹⁴ Another soldier, Weber depicted, was Leopold Hauer who hailed from one of Vienna’s proletarian suburbs. He shared his war experience with a first lieutenant by using his Viennese dialect: “All of a sudden, I was in Italy, among Slovaks only or whatever they might have been, I was alone and just kept on

⁹⁸⁹ Wisthaler, ed., *Karl Außerhofer – Das Kriegstagebuch*, 11 July 1916.

⁹⁹⁰ Vittur, Na recordanza al dotur de Pescol Vijo Vittur, 621.

⁹⁹¹ Kisch, *Schreib das auf Kisch*, 232.

⁹⁹² Recently argued: Zaharia, *Habsburg Romanian Military Chaplains and Wartime Propaganda*, 290.

⁹⁹³ PP, Trendl, *War Diary*, 29 March 1917.

⁹⁹⁴ Weber, *Das Ende der Armee*, 19-20.

marching (*auf amal war i mitten in Italien und unter lauter Slowaken oder was dös war'n, und bin muattaseel allan in der ganzen Remasuri weiterg'hatscht*).⁹⁹⁵ As was already reported for peacetime even when the officer had to speak German, this not necessarily meant that they were able to understand all of its many dialects.

The examples shown above demonstrate that the situation was only gradually better in the case of native German-speaking soldiers as most of them were at least able to express themselves towards NCOs and officers. These who spoke a Slavic language had it easier to at least communicate with other Slavic speakers. The situation was worst for exclusive Hungarian, Italian, or Romanian speakers who ended up among speakers of other languages. Many autobiographical records indicate that most of the rank and file mixed languages to communicate with one another. Werner Schachinger, the editor of a Bosniak soldier's memoir, has concluded that soldiers "who originated from all the provinces, communicated properly in a conglomeration of words composed of all sorts of languages."⁹⁹⁶ However, autobiographical records I have examined demonstrate that even when an increasing number of soldiers felt lonely, this did not necessarily affect their loyalty towards the army and the Monarchy, irrespective of their linguistic backgrounds.

Like the Roman-Catholic priest Drexel mentioned above, an increasing number of Habsburg soldiers went into captivity. In the camps they were often divided by nationality, thus along their supposed to be native languages, often separated into alleged Habsburg loyal and disloyal. For example, those who were categorized as Germans and Hungarians, whom enemy countries such as Italy and Russia alleged a Habsburg loyal nationality were usually separated from the others. This division only to a limited degree influenced war operations as many of them did not return before the end of the war.⁹⁹⁷ During the war, Habsburg bureaucrats tried to assign official visitors according to language abilities, usually through the Red Cross Society. One of these many Red Cross nurses was the noble woman Nora Kinsky who was assigned because of the many languages she spoke. Kinsky travelled through Russia to visit POWs. In August 1916 she went to a camp in St. Petersburg and recalled in her diary: "The poor prisoners looked very devastated. [...] A *Honvédség*-Captain was almost crying as he was able to speak with me in Romanian, he did not speak any other language."⁹⁹⁸ Probably he was one of the

⁹⁹⁵ Weber, *Das Ende der Armee*, 106.

⁹⁹⁶ Schachinger, *Die Bosniaken kommen*, 24.

⁹⁹⁷ Zaharia, *Habsburg Romanian Military Chaplains and Wartime Propaganda*.

⁹⁹⁸ Huyn, *Nora Gräfin Kinsky. Russisches Tagebuch*, 30.

quickly promoted reserve officers, as usually all *Honvédség*-officers spoke Hungarian. Kinsky also spoke Hungarian. One of the POWs, she visited, Rodion Markovits, remembered her in his wartime diary: “Now she walked through the hall, shaking hands with everyone, and then she began to speak Hungarian.” Afterwards, the POWs asked Kinsky to support their camp library, and the question came up in which languages books were needed. The POWs decided out of practical motives, and requested solely German ones because it was the language spoken by most prisoners.⁹⁹⁹ German also often dominated in official camp activities as it was seen as the *lingua franca*, and most captured spoke or at least understood a bit of it.¹⁰⁰⁰

War captivity was another place where Habsburg language diversity mattered, although it was mainly the officers’ and soldiers’ self-organization of how they experienced it. Markovits recalled that a major lectured in German and Hungarian, and plays were performed in different languages.¹⁰⁰¹ Language diversity in POW camps also posed a challenge on spiritual support. The Roman-Catholic military priest Johannes Legler reported after the war that the pope donated prayer books to Habsburg prisoners in Italy, in total 60,000, including books in German, Hungarian, Czech, Polish, and Ruthenian language. In addition to official visits and camp libraries, captured officers and soldiers aimed to respect the languages in other activities too. Army authorities sought not only to publish prayer books in all languages, but also propaganda leaflets and booklets. Doro Manescul remembered a booklet in Romanian with a patriotic poem to which an image of the monarch was added. He translated the poem in front of his soldiers into other languages, and then handed them over, irrespective of the soldiers’ languages.¹⁰⁰²

The examples shown above demonstrate that language diversity did affect the soldiers but probably not in a sense that most army commanders expected. While most of the rank and file wrote that language diversity led to increasing loneliness and sometimes even threatened their physical survival, officers’ autobiographical records as well as administrative records reveal that they more feared a decrease in their fighting morale. For example, as early as 1906, an anonymous author in the Budapest German-language daily, *Pester Lloyd*, has claimed that speaking to soldiers in their native tongues would have a “powerful effect” on “their courage

⁹⁹⁹ Markovits, *Sibirische Garnison*, 148.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Markovits, *Sibirische Garnison*, 166.

¹⁰⁰¹ Markovits, *Sibirische Garnison*, 131.

¹⁰⁰² Manescul, *Meine Dritte Kompanie*, 142.

and their willingness to sacrifice.”¹⁰⁰³ The peacetime debate already highlighted the challenges of providing suitable propaganda, such as having holding-on slogans in the many languages precisely at the time and place when they were needed. Keeping up fighting spirit whenever needed posed a challenge to army authorities. There was not only a need to address speeches in all languages in front of the soldiers, the multi-ethnic character of the Monarchy made it also necessary to use different content for soldiers of different nationalities. Doro Manescul has written in his war novel that in some companies, war propaganda was not addressed to all soldiers at the same time. They were often divided by “national groups” – languages – and taught about “cowardice” and the correct “behavior before the enemy.”¹⁰⁰⁴

Wartime autobiographical records mention clearly that during war it became increasingly impossible to inspire fighting morale and war aims without speaking the languages of the soldiers adequately. Many officers, among them the career officer Ernst Horsetzky, have claimed that it was virtually impossible to get insight into soldiers' feelings and to ascertain their intentions without speaking their languages. He added that this purpose was not exclusively an outcome of language knowledge, but also the rhetorical talent of the officers. Only when officers met these two criteria, Horsetzky emphasized, did they have a chance to influence the soldiers.¹⁰⁰⁵ He himself was assisted by a Hungarian-speaking officer who informed the soldiers “what negative consequences there would be for their homeland [*Vaterland*] and their homes [*Heim*]” if they did not hold on loyally. Yet, Horsetzky continued, even this speech given in the soldiers' own language did not affect their mood.¹⁰⁰⁶ These officers who were able to do so, addressed speeches in the soldiers' languages to motive them. For example, a German-speaking soldier remembered that his commander, a cadet and reservist, gave his speech in German first, and afterwards in Ruthenian, as their railway transport also comprised many soldiers from Galicia.¹⁰⁰⁷ Kaltenböck recalled his colonel who talked to the soldiers in German and Slovene: “The colonel spoke, in German. Then – after a short while – he repeated his words Slovenian. Not fluid, but jerky, laborious, but the soldiers' eyes lit up when they heard their mother tongue.”¹⁰⁰⁸ Again, it was often reported that NCOs helped officers. For example, a Slovene-speaking NCO who spoke basic German supported career

¹⁰⁰³ N.N., Die Regimentssprache, *Pester Lloyd*, evening number, 2 July 1906, 1.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Manescul, *Meine dritte Kompanie*, 18.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Horsetzky, *Die vier letzten Kriegswochen*, 23.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Horsetzky, *Die vier letzten Kriegswochen*, 18.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Pölzleitner, *Landsturm im Hochgebirge*, 66.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Kaltenboeck, *Armee im Schatten*, 9.

officer Otto von Kieseletter to motivate and to encourage his rank and file.¹⁰⁰⁹ In his war memoirs, the officer Engelmund Kube recalled the efforts of his battalion commander, Tyrol-born Colonel Igenio Castelpietra who was able to address speeches in Italian and German himself. However, Kube concluded that these efforts met with only little success because Castelpietra lacked any speaking skills.¹⁰¹⁰

The army expected the members of the clergy to help out of the language dilemma and to take over officer tasks. The Roman-Catholic military bishop Emerich Bjelik was fluent in German, Hungarian, and Slovak.¹⁰¹¹ He regularly visited the front, celebrated field masses, and was expected to raise the soldiers' confidence. The career officer Eduard Zanantoni emphasized the high value of the bishop's multilingualism: "After the field mass, the bishop addressed a fluent, heartfelt speech in German, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian to those present, officers and soldiers from all nationalities."¹⁰¹² The procurement-officer Rudolf Giay depicted a scene that happened in December 1914 in the Bosnian town of Bratunac. Following an invitation by the local imam, he and his fellow officers went to the mosque. The imam gave the sermon in "Croatian," before ending with some words in "German" mix with his native tongue: "*Pfui Srbi, Abzug Russija, Živio Car Franjo Josip!*"¹⁰¹³ It was not until early 1918 that the army began to organize a patriotic instruction program (*Vaterländischer Unterricht*) for soldiers.¹⁰¹⁴ Thus, the effect of this program was only to a limited extent reflected in diaries and memoirs. Procurement-officer Josef Leb, stationed in Tyrolian Bressanone, attended such an event. In a huge hall, he recalled, all the soldiers and many officers gathered to listen to a lecture entitled: "Why we are fighting." He remembered that when the second lecture started, officers were already no longer present. Moreover, the speeches were given only in German, even though many soldiers did not understand this language.¹⁰¹⁵

Officers often helped themselves out by intoning songs in the soldiers' languages to raise their confidence in themselves and their fighting morale. Superiors could have called these

¹⁰⁰⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/861, Otto von Kieseletter Edler von Wiesenbrunn, Aus der Goldnen Leutnantszeit. Der Offizier der alten österreichisch-ungarischen Armee, January 1936, 12.

¹⁰¹⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B 401:9, Engelmund Kube, Das Ersatz-Bataillon des ehem. Schützenregiments Czernowitz 22 während des Weltkrieges 1914/1918, compiled on the basis of his war diary in September 1937.

¹⁰¹¹ ÖStA/KA/Quall, Emerich Bjelik, born 1860.

¹⁰¹² ÖStA/KA/NL, B/6:1, Eduard Zanantoni, Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben, unpublished manuscript, 1922, 434.

¹⁰¹³ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/412, Rudolf Giay, Diary No 1, 25 December 1914.

¹⁰¹⁴ Cornwall, *Undermining of Austria-Hungary*, 270.

¹⁰¹⁵ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers, unpublished manuscript, autumn 1933, 65.

actions, to be unjustified but they usually did not as long as the rank and file than went on fighting loyally. Wartime corps command reports also emphasize that often officers did not know what was permitted and what was forbidden to be sung. In July 1915 an artillery unit asked the Corps Commander if a particular Czech song is allowed by writing that “it is supposed to be allowed to sing in public in Bohemia.” Their commander had forbidden the song out of its alleged “treacherous content.” Unfortunately, the result of this query is not among archival records.¹⁰¹⁶ Most officers simply reacted immediately, while an official query to superior institutions often needed a couple of days. NCO Alfred Trendl encouraged his native Czech-speaking soldiers to sing their patriotic anthem, *Kde domov muj*. From then on, he recalled, “their eyes glittered,” and they followed him enthusiastically into the battle.¹⁰¹⁷ Trendl remembered that he let his soldiers sing *Kde domov muj* even during attacks. Indeed, Trendl allowed his soldiers to sing a song that was already forbidden to be sung at that time.¹⁰¹⁸

In his 1917-book on the Austrian parliament, Wladimir Gettlich has concluded that during peacetime “an officer’s slightest insult to the national feelings of soldiers was severely punished.”¹⁰¹⁹ During the war, this standpoint changed. Soldiers of particular nationalities were increasingly treated worse and suspected of disloyal behavior just because of their nationalities and their language use. Archival records demonstrate that many officers treated the rank and file in a way that would have caused a different reaction of their superiors before 1914. For example, the procurement-officer Josef Leb recalled an event that occurred in Tyrol. A “Czech” military priest held a holy mass for his regiment that was on its way to the front. Military authorities expected him to offer the homily in Czech. “As soon as he started,” Leb wrote, “some artillery officers who were otherwise regularly in the church demonstratively stood up and left the church.” Leb criticized these officers, because after the mass the military priest started to sing the emperor's anthem in Czech “and all soldiers sang enthusiastically.”¹⁰²⁰ Superiors could have called these actions, such as leaving the mass, to be unjustified but they did no longer.

Nationalist actions and political demonstrations against particular nationalities increased during wartime. NCO Kisch recalled a general’s order at the front in January 1915

¹⁰¹⁶ VHA, 9. KK, 52-10/2, k.k. *Schwere Haubitzbatterie* no 9 to Corps Command, 11 July 1915

¹⁰¹⁷ PP, Trendl, War Diary, 28 June 1916.

¹⁰¹⁸ PP, Trendl, War Diary, 13 July 1916.

¹⁰¹⁹ Gettlich, *Österreichs Schicksalsstunde*, 8.

¹⁰²⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers, unpublished manuscript, autumn 1933, 49.

that ordered “every soldier, regardless of his nationality, to memorize the emperor’s anthem in German,”¹⁰²¹ although there were lyrics in all Habsburg languages, and soldiers usually sang the anthem in their own languages. Kisch did not write about the response to this order. In peacetime, usually these officers would have been punished as long as the army bureaucrats expected a debate in public to be followed. In wartime, usually such unjustified actions were not punished any more. During peacetime such an incident could have caused problems for these officers. During the war, and in particular after the mass desertion of the predominantly Czech regiments, no army authority cared about that any more. Who more likely cared were the Czech-speaking soldiers in the church mentioned above, who increasingly felt unwanted in their own army as well as soldiers of other nationalities whose languages were increasingly called disloyal.

A variety of autobiographical as well as administrative sources show that even major shortcomings owing to language diversity did not significantly influence soldiers' and officers' overall loyalty or was even the primary cause for disloyal behavior. What had a negative effect was the growing suspicion of particular nationalities, including the use of their languages. It was worst for these Habsburg nationalities and languages, which had so-called co-nationals fighting for the enemy, including Serbs, Ruthenians, Romanians, and Italians. This situation posed additional hardship on soldiers of these nationalities. For example, Paolino Zardini was born in 1897 in a Ladin-speaking family from Cortina d' Ampezzo. He was enlisted during the First World War and wrote his diary in Italian while serving in an Italian-speaking unit. Throughout his diary he refers to himself and his comrades as the Austrians fighting together with Germans against the Italians.¹⁰²² Even if not identifying with an Italian nationality, soldiers, like Zardini, were often categorized in the army as Italian, assigned to Italian-speaking companies, and often officers and NCOs of Italian nationality commanded them. Although most of them did not indicate which situations arose, it is likely that it posed a great challenge on these soldiers' loyalty when being constantly addressed of being of the same nationality as the enemy and suspected of disloyal behavior.

Ongoing incidents at home and at the front exacerbated the tensions towards particular nationalities, especially when soldiers and officers were increasingly involved in incidents where they were unable to communicate with one another. Stories about these minor incidents

¹⁰²¹ Kisch, *Schreib das auf Kisch*, 271.

¹⁰²² Zardini, *Diario di Guerra 1915-1918*, 24.

were spread throughout the army and increasingly worsened the relationship among soldiers of all Habsburg nationalities. Portrayals of incidents can be found in most of autobiographical sources I have examined. For example, the Tyrolian soldier Karl Außerhofer remembers that his unit had no priest for a long time, because their previous one had been arrested: “He was a Czech [*Böhme*], but was he really a spy? We did not know.”¹⁰²³ The Roman-Catholic priest Pius Parsch described a regimental priest, a Jesuit who openly announced that he was first and foremost a Pole, then a priest, and only thirdly an Austrian. Army officials suspected him of disloyalty and sent him home.¹⁰²⁴ In both cases, regardless if the priest involved was really disloyal, the soldiers lacked spiritual support. It posed a challenge to army bureaucrats what to higher rank: diehard loyalty or language proficiency. The historian Aliaksandr Piahanau has convincingly argued on the example of the Roman-Catholic priest Jozef Tiso that some priests (but also officers and rank and file) might have also changed their opinion toward the army and the state during the war. Tiso was multilingual, spoke Hungarian, German, and Slovak, thus, would have been a perfect match for being employed at the frontlines. He joined the army in the very beginning expressing that it would be Austria-Hungary’s “just war.” However, his wartime experience, including the treatment of Slovak-soldiers, caused that he changed his opinion during the war.¹⁰²⁵

Many of the rank and file blamed not only the shortcomings of the army, but also increasingly emphasized their suspicion towards Czech- and Polish-speaking soldiers. Officers regularly interpreted these increasing experiences with soldiers or comrades of particular nationalities with enriching their already existing suspicion towards them. For example, the career officer August von Urbanski recalled his trench experience: “I failed to talk with the Czechs. They would have always answered: No, German, Pan Hetman. Only after several days, when I used some Czech words – the only ones, I knew – they started speaking in broken German.”¹⁰²⁶ The NCO Alfred Trendl entrusted his diary that especially the Czechs “understand German but no one wants to speak it.”¹⁰²⁷ Trendl’s situation exemplifies what thousands of officers and soldiers experienced. Autobiographical records tend to highlight such cases primarily for Czechs, and not for the other nationalities. Seemingly, it was almost only Czech speakers who were always expected to speak German, which was usually not the case for the

¹⁰²³ Wisthaler, ed., *Karl Außerhofer. Das Kriegstagebuch*, 22 August 1915.

¹⁰²⁴ PPA, Pius Parsch, Diary no. 6, the third Sunday, February 1918.

¹⁰²⁵ Piahanau, Jozef Tiso Changing Social Identities in the First World War, 721-41.

¹⁰²⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/58:4, August von Urbanski, *Das Tornisterkind*, 250.

¹⁰²⁷ PP, Trendl, War Diary, 30 August 16.

speakers of the other recognized languages. The longer the war lasted the more officers and rank and file experienced disloyal behavior on part of particular nationalities. Autobiographical sources most often described incidents in which soldiers of Czech nationality were involved, followed by Polish, Italian, Serbian, and Ruthenian.

In April 1915 a mass desertion happened from two Bohemian regiments at the Eastern front to the Russians. Both consisted of a large number of Czech native speakers. Francis Joseph dissolved these regiments and stipulated that from that moment onwards so-called disloyal nationalities should not concentrate in entire regiments and batallions. Their officers, NCOs and rank and file should be mixed with units that comprised alleged loyal nationalities. Richard Lein has recently convincingly argued that the driving force behind this mass desertion was not nationalism or general unwillingness among Czechs to fight for Austria-Hungary, rather starvation and the experience of being commanded by officers and NCOs who did not speak their language.¹⁰²⁸ In the end, dismantling these regiments did not punish the deserters or the Czech nationalists, but it significantly affected the many thousands of rank and file in these regiments who were afterwards assigned to so-called reliable regiments and battailons, in which they were often unable to communicate with their commanding officers and even comrades. Czech NCOs, reservists, and even career officers were attached to non-Czech-speaking units. Autobiographical sources show that most of these alleged disloyal soldiers felt betrayed by army authorities and, in the end, by Francis Joseph.

The order to mix soldiers of alleged disloyal with these of loyal nationalities also affected the latter. The career officer Paul Meixner entrusted his diary that his Czech fellow officers were assigned to so-called loyal regiments: “Unfortunately, a lot of loyal officers were relocated and were upset and angry at being suspected of disloyalty.”¹⁰²⁹ Thus, at a moment when native Czech-speaking officers were increasingly needed to motivate “their” soldiers, they were deployed in other regiments and bataillons where they had to command soldiers whose languages they did not speak. The career officer Eduard Zanantoni recalled his time at the Eastern Front, close to Przemyśl, in April 1915. He desperately sought to motivate the remaining soldiers of the dismantled Bohemian regiments in their mother tongue. The only reason why he and his peers succeeded, he argued, was that they were backed by their

¹⁰²⁸ Lein, *Die tschechischen Soldaten Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 56-7.

¹⁰²⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/1544, Paul Meixner, Tagebuch. I thank Richard Germann for providing me with the manuscript.

commander: “Major Lašek. He was a Czech, a member of one of the abandoned regiments, and loyal.”¹⁰³⁰ The novelist and reserve officer Józef Wittlin explained that each Galician company was filled with Germans, Italians, and Czechs. Like in the Czech case, army officials hoped that Ruthenians would no longer be disloyal when “each nation takes care of the other.” Wittlin emphasized that Ruthenians who hoped to fight among their compatriots (*Landsleute*), felt themselves entirely punished by Francis Joseph only because of the betrayal from some individuals.¹⁰³¹

In addition, there were also these nationalities regularly reported as loyal who now had to mix up with the others. NCO Trendl, who only spoke German,¹⁰³² complained in his diary that after the dismantling of the Bohemian regiments, he had to fight at the Russian Front among solely Czech-speaking superiors and soldiers.¹⁰³³ Eduard Lakom in his war diary more than once emphasized that the “absolutely trustworthy Bosnians” were mixed with Czech soldiers whom he called “the foreigners” in his unit.¹⁰³⁴ After a while the rhetoric used in autobiographical sources changed because authors did not only fear betrayal on behalf of particular nationalities, instead of expected it. There is no particular incident that can be blamed for that shift, not even the mass desertion in April 1915. Native German-speaking soldier Pölzleitner remembered that during field guard three of his comrades deserted and added “of course they were Ruthenians.” He offered an explanation. Ruthenians, he argued, had a difficult situation, they had to fight for a country, they wanted to leave, and officers and NCOs commanded them who were often unable to communicate. Moreover, he argued, usually their commanders were native Czech-speakers who additionally influenced them negatively. Pölzleitner’s own battalion in these days comprised “496 Germans faced with 137 Ruthenians, seventy-three Serbo-Croats, seventy Czechs, forty-five Poles, fifteen Italians, and two Romanians.”¹⁰³⁵

Already before 1914, a growing number of officers were deployed to train soldiers of the same nationality to ensure proper communication. Peacetime experience has demonstrated that for these officers it was easier to be accepted and to gain respect from soldiers of the same

¹⁰³⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/6:1, Eduard Zanantoni, *Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben*, unpublished manuscript, 1922, 368-9.

¹⁰³¹ Wittlin, *Das Salz der Erde*, 232.

¹⁰³² ÖStA/KA/Gbbl, Wien, Alfred Trendl, born 1888. In addition to German, Trendl spoke French and English.

¹⁰³³ PP, Trendl, *War Diary*, 14 December 1916.

¹⁰³⁴ ÖStA/KA/NL/B2007:6, Eduard Lakom, *War Diary*, 24 September 1917, and, B2007:9, Eduard Lakom, Masić, *der Meldeläufer*, undated manuscript.

¹⁰³⁵ Pölzleitner, *Landsturm im Hochgebirge*, 125.

nationality. Roda Roda highlighted that soldiers were more willing to follow officers who spoke their languages. The best was when they belonged to the same the nationality, as he argued, and concluded, that such situations made it also easier for entire monolingual units to go over to the enemy.¹⁰³⁶ During the war, army authorities were increasingly concerned about whether they should rank practicality, or distrust towards officers of particular nationalities higher. In the end, distrust succeeded. In addition, the lack of language abilities on the part of the officers broadened a (social) gap that was already enormous during peacetime, between officers and the rank and file.

Another outcome of a general suspicion was that officers increasingly avoided to assign soldiers, NCOs and officers of particular nationalities to delicate duties. Many of these duties were among the most dangerous. This posed an additional threat to these nationalities that were perceived to be loyal because they had to replace them. As a result, these so-called loyal soldiers after a while began to disapprove comrades of these other nationalities owing to blame them of having caused additional hardship. But even in the last weeks of the war, officers very often highlighted that many soldiers and officers of perceived disloyal nationalities were still reliable. There were officers who still sought to treat all soldiers equally irrespective of their native tongues, thus, nationalities. For example, career officer Anton Lehár who reached the rank of a colonel in 1918, recalled “an experiment about which my superior shook his head.” Most of Lehár’s subordinates were “Italians,” and none of them spoke German. Lehár ordered his “Italians” to observe a tactical important point close to the Italian enemy. He remembered that they held out over months and none of them deserted.¹⁰³⁷ In 1918, when Lehár experienced soldiers who were still loyal regardless of their Italian nationality, the multilingual Habsburg army had already fought a war for more than four years, and many incidents had happened that proved his experiment a bad idea.

Autobiographical records demonstrate that there would have been several times throughout the war when officers and the rank-and-file expected an immediate end of fighting. There were regular rumors about the war’s ending. My sources indicate that such expectations raised soldiers’ hopes that soon turned into disappointment. These false hopes for peace regularly affected soldiers’ morale. However, these gossips about a soon-to-be-expected end of the war until late summer 1918 were usually strongly depended on the respective

¹⁰³⁶ Roda Roda, *Roda Rodas Roman*, 384.

¹⁰³⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, vol. 3, 173-4.

frontlines. It was not before the weeks before the actual end of the war, when most writers tended to entrust their diaries that they are now convinced that war will soon be over. Probably no one else put it more forward than General Horsetzky who posed the question: “Which fool would have let himself shot today if tomorrow or the day after there will be peace?”¹⁰³⁸ Vienna-born Fritz Weber was a young artillery career officer who served at the Italian front. He asked in his autobiographical wartime-novel: “What keeps people still together? [...] Loyalty, comradeship, the fear of being alone?”¹⁰³⁹ Many soldiers entrusted their diaries reflections about how their country would look like in the future,¹⁰⁴⁰ and what to do upon return. In particular many officers feared losing their jobs in a post-war state.¹⁰⁴¹ Prospects on the future can often be found in autobiographical sources. However, in this study, I pay attention on the role language diversity played during the last weeks of the war, the experienced dissolution, and the soldiers’ homecoming.

Both officers and rank-and-file autobiographical testimonies provided impressions of their comrades, often divided or generalized along nationalities and their convictions of the end of the war. General Horsetzky distinguished soldiers along these “who were already infected by the revolutionary plague: Croats, Serbs, Serbo-Croats, Slovenes, Magyars, and Slovaks,” while “Poles, Ukrainians, and Romanians” were distant, “only the Germans remained untouched.” However, Horsetzky also mentioned that the overall morale remained “unaffected” (*unerschüttert*) until October 1918, and even after, the relationship would have been well between soldiers and officers regardless of their nationalities, “even among Czechs.”¹⁰⁴² Horsetzky, however, was a high-ranking general who was not directly engaged with soldiers. In general, autobiographical sources demonstrate that it is almost impossible to generalize as for most cases the same number of authors can be found who reported the contrary. Historian Arnold Suppan has concluded that at the Italian front already on October 20, 1918, the organized retreat of troops caused increasing mutinies and subordination. Thus, soldiers regardless of their nationalities were no longer keen to hold the front, because they were increasingly confronted with food shortages, and affected by so-called *Kriegsmüdigkeit* (war weariness).¹⁰⁴³ In *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, Maureen Healy characterizes

¹⁰³⁸ Horsetzky, *Die vier letzten Kriegswochen*, 15.

¹⁰³⁹ Weber, *Das Ende der Armee*, October 1918.

¹⁰⁴⁰ HDA, Sarkotić, box 5, War Diary, 17-19 October 1918. See also: Weber, *Das Ende der Armee*, 135.

¹⁰⁴¹ HL, Personalalia, box 161, Suhay Diaries, 14 October 1918.

¹⁰⁴² Horsetzky, *Die vier letzten Kriegswochen*, 24.

¹⁰⁴³ Suppan, *Umsturz und Neuordnung im südöstlichen Mitteleuropa 1918/20*, 35.

the overwhelming majority of soldiers with their lack of “willingness to sacrifice and holding out,” regardless of their nationalities.¹⁰⁴⁴

Horsetzky, as many others, often pointed to the Germans as being the almost exclusively reliable soldiers, but there is the same number of autobiographical records that indicate the contrary. The situation was very much depended on the place, and often changed on a daily basis at the several frontlines as well as in the hinterland.¹⁰⁴⁵ Procurement-officer Josef Leb recalled in his memoirs compiled on the basis of his diaries in 1933 that in late October, which he spent in Bressanone-Brixen nearby the Italian frontline, officers received an order to group the soldiers in accordance with their nationalities. This order did not result in any unrest among his subordinates. Moreover, he recalled, “the Czechs' confidant whom I determined, was a committed Social Democrat, but kept discipline until the last moment. It was the same with the Croats and Serbs. [...] I was deeply hurt by the fact that under the command of an NCO twelve Upper Austrian peasants left my department during night. That was a gross ingratitude.”¹⁰⁴⁶ Upper Austria indicates that these soldiers were mostly of German nationality. Career officer Lehár recalled that in his railway transport “Czechs” and “Hungarians” were separated who until they reached the station “marched in exemplary discipline.”¹⁰⁴⁷ General Sarkotić entrusted his war diary an incident that took place at the last day of October 1918 when he was located in Dobož, in Bosnia: “The worst of the bad news was the order to let soldiers vote, whether they are monarchic or republican-minded [...] We woke them up during the night. At 8 o'clock in the morning I was told: fifty-seven percent monarchists, forty-three percent republicans. Strangely enough, among the latter, the cadre of the *Kaiserschützen*-Regiment [recruiting mostly from Tyrol] took first place.”¹⁰⁴⁸ *Kaiserschützen* meant that most of the soldiers were of German nationality.

Usually autobiographical sources reflect only the experience of one person, within his closer environment at one particular part of the frontline. A comparison, however, demonstrates that the behavior of the troops was to a large extent dependent on the particular frontline, earlier casualties in fighting, food supply, as well as the leadership skills and disposition of their

¹⁰⁴⁴ Healy, Maureen. *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 122.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Suppan gives an overview over several places, including the Italian front, Prague, Ljubljana, Budapest, Cracow, Sarajevo, and Zagreb, Suppan, *Umsturz und Neuordnung im südöstlichen Mitteleuropa 1918/20*.

¹⁰⁴⁶ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, *Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers*, unpublished, compiled in autumn 1933.

¹⁰⁴⁷ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/600:1, Anton Lehár, *Geschichten erzählt*, 6-14 November 1918.

¹⁰⁴⁸ HDA, Sarkotić, box 5, *War Diary*, 30/31 October 1918.

commanding officers and NCOs, instead of only an outcome of their belonging to particular nationalities. To a certain extent also linguistic abilities of officers and NCOs could have become decisive, whether they were able to communicate when organizing the repatriation. For example, Engelmund Kube and his regiment were deployed in Chernivtsi, where he observed growing unrest and plunder among soldiers: “Unfortunately, we, officers, from the other crown lands no longer had any influence on these men, nor spoke their Romanian or Ukrainian regimental languages. Some brave officers of their nationalities, I believe, would have managed to put an end to this unnecessary destruction.”¹⁰⁴⁹ Procurement officer Leb concluded that “like him, thousands of other commanders would agree that all units did their duty until the end of the war.”¹⁰⁵⁰

As already demonstrated above in the last war days it was ordered to return home with soldiers not in line with their units, but to group them along nationalities, respectively native languages. Even in these last days of the war or immediate afterward, soldiers’ language diversity posed a challenge. Horsetzky recalled that it was not an easy task to re-organize smaller military units according to nationalities by looking for suitable new commanders who spoke the needed languages.¹⁰⁵¹ This separation along nationalities also happened when soldiers were already captured. Again, it was these who spoke more than one language for whom the situation was easier to manage. Vienna-born officer Ludwig Schwenk had a native German-speaking father, and a Croatian-speaking mother, but did not speak his mother’s tongue. When Montenegrin soldiers captured him and his comrades in November 1918, a Czech comrade told him having been asked to set up a list of his fellow-officers according to “who is politically reliable.” Most decisively, the Montenegrin army was interested in the nationalities of the Habsburg officers. Schwenk mentioned that there had been no other option than German, while his Czech comrade tried to convince him to mention Croatian as his mother tongue. Schwenk asked himself how this could work when not speaking any Slavic language.¹⁰⁵² Being finally categorized as German, caused worse treatment and longer imprisonment.

¹⁰⁴⁹ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/401:9, Engelmund Kube, Das Ersatz-Baon des ehem. Schützenregiments Czernowitz Nr. 22 während des Weltkrieges 1914/1918, unpublished manuscript, September 1937, 10. It was not exclusively soldiers who increasingly plundered, but also local civil residents, see for example: Moll, *Heimatfront Steiermark*, 192.

¹⁰⁵⁰ ÖStA/KA/NL, B/580, Josef Leb, Aus den Erinnerungen eines Trainoffiziers, unpublished manuscript, compiled in Autumn 1933, 74.

¹⁰⁵¹ Horsetzky, *Die vier letzten Kriegswochen*, 39.

¹⁰⁵² Schwenk, *Als Kriegsgefangener durch Serbien 1918-1919*, 66.

Conclusion

Chapter 7 has argued that the organizational failure to fully implement the language rules during peacetime continued into wartime, but soon became insufficient. The lack of officers and NCOs, clergy, and physicians who were able to communicate with the rank and file was not only a matter for satirical caricatures or a political issue; rather, it turned into a question of military success and physical survival. While soldiers in these units hailed from a variety of language backgrounds, they at least learned standard procedures and exercised jointly. These peacetime recruits became experienced with the army language diversity, and aware of its challenges. When fighting at the front, soldiers often did not remain in their units. Especially during advances, they mixed with neighboring units. Failure to understand commands properly when in a group of other soldiers was less of a problem, as those who did not understand the given command could simply follow their comrades. Nonetheless, they might also get lost in no man's land or be sent back to organize food or other needed goods from magazines at the rear. They therefore often went into situations where they had to interact with speakers of other languages. In addition to rank-and-file soldiers, the language diversity increasingly complicated officers' operational qualities.

In terms of the army's language diversity, my sources indicate that wartime can be roughly divided into three phases. In summer 1914, recruits and officers who already knew one another from peacetime were mobilized and sent to the frontlines. Officers they already knew, who were familiar with their regiments and battalions, cultures, and languages, commanded these recruits. The first operational challenge was to combine and operate jointly with *Honvédség* and *Domobranstvo*-units that used Hungarian and Croatian as their command languages. The first months of fighting were disastrous for the Habsburg military. High casualty rates resulted in an on-going need for new soldiers and commanders. The many wounded who recovered were only sent back to their original units in theory. In practice, they had to fill units where they were needed; they were usually re-assigned to their original regiments, but not necessarily to a company in which the other soldiers spoke their languages. This second phase at the front overlapped with the third. After an alleged mass desertion of Czech-speaking soldiers in 1915, the situation worsened as army authorities' conviction that Czechs were prone to disloyalty increased. With Italy's and Romania's entries into the war on the enemy side in 1915 and 1916, respectively, two more Habsburg nationalities had to fight against so-called co-nationals. This caused increasing hardship for Habsburg Italians and Romanians, who were now

even more strongly suspected of disloyalty.¹⁰⁵³ This resulted in an army order which stipulated that nationalities thought to be loyal were to be mixed with those thought to be disloyal. How soldiers of different nationalities experienced this mixing is analysed in the next chapter.

While chapter 7 focused on operational and administrative challenges during war, the final chapter of this study analysed the political purpose of wartime language use. Ministerial and army command reports, as well as autobiographical records I have examined, indicate that no one seems to have blamed the language diversity, even though, I have shown that language diversity caused more hardship and higher casualty rates, and led to a decrease in fighting morale, and an increase in soldiers' loneliness and fear. During peacetime manouvers most officers and rank and file remained in their regiments and battalions. There are almost no wartime autobiographical records in which authors did not emphasized the linguistic diversity of soldiers. However, for a long time, they noted down this mixture by not suspecting one or another group of speakers of being necessarily disloyal. They mentioned diversity as something worth to be mentioned, a peculiarity, although many of them did army service in peacetime and should have been familiar with the language diversity. In the first months of the war, officers only highlighted the linguistic and ethnic mixture as it posed a personal challenge on them. The highlighted situations, in which they did not understand their soldiers, one another, or even soldiers were unable to communicate with one another. But language use became increasingly connected to an expected behavior of its speakers, be it loyal or disloyal.

Most of sources deal with the language diversity, but neither autobiographical nor administratice records trace one's disloyal behavior back to an incident where he was not fully understood. What is therefore of even greater importance is what authors did not mention. It is certain that the language diversity hardened the duty of both officers and the rank and file. It also added another component to the worsening of the overall fighting spirit and attitude towards the army, the monarch and the state. Autobiographical sources indicate that as long as all nationalities met similar challenges, language diversity did not have a major impact on loyal or disloyal behavior. However, soon a process accelerated which already began before the war: to connect the use of a language automatically to disloyalty, and to suspect the speakers of

¹⁰⁵³ What I terminate here with co-nationals meant that "another European state might claim to embody their national project" to refer to Rachamimov who beside Italia, Serbia and Romania, also included Germany: See also: Rachamimov, *Austro-Hungarian Censors during World War I*, 159. Such labelling through military authorities was a daily life experience during wartime, however, it did not say anything about with which state or nation they identified with.

particular languages of tending to disloyalty. What has actually changed in the recent years before the outbreak of the war was the public debate about language as the most decisive element for national affiliation has accelerated and had affected convictions of many conscripts and officers who believed that national ideas to be reality. However, this did not necessarily negatively influence their loyalty towards the army and the state. Thus, many who believed in their national belonging, still served loyally and respected the legal framework.

In the introduction, I referred to Wilhelm Czermak's book, *In deinem Lager war Österreich. Die österreichisch-ungarische Armee, wie man sie nicht kennt* (In your camp was Austria. The unknown Austro-Hungarian army) in which he blamed the myriad languages used in the Habsburg army's regiments and battalions for its operational failures.¹⁰⁵⁴ This part has shown that soldiers' language diversity did not greatly hamper operations, but it contributed to soldiers' desertions. Thus, Alexander Jordan is also correct when summing up "the more mixed units proved to be as effective as the more nationally homogeneous ones."¹⁰⁵⁵ However, that many soldiers were unable to communicate led to a decrease in confidence, and increased anger toward particular nationalities. Language did serve propaganda purposes during the First World War. In addition, the use of particular languages increasingly already led to an accusation of the speakers to be disloyal.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Czermak, *In deinem Lager war Österreich*, 27-8. This argument is also apparent in literature. For example: Wawro, *The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire*.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Jordan, *Krieg um die Alpen*, 156.

Summary

Between Civil Rights and Practicality: The Habsburg Army Language System, 1868-1918

The debate that followed the settlement with Hungary in 1867, and the subsequent constitutions in both halves of the Monarchy in that same year, implemented compulsory military service. In 1868, the administration of language use in the Habsburg army was reformed. Even before this reform, army officials had discussed the language in which military commands would be given and to what extent the soldiers' native tongues should be used during their military training and education. After the 1868-reform, the Habsburg army language system followed Article 19 of the Austrian constitution. It guaranteed all conscripts the right to use their native tongues while fulfilling their three-year (later two-year) compulsory military service. This right was also implemented for recruits from Hungary, and in the early 1880s, for those from Bosnia-Herzegovina. At least in theory, all languages recognized were treated equally, with the exception of German, the army's *lingua franca*. It was to be used for commands and administration. Until 1867/68, the main purpose of Habsburg armed forces had been to train professional soldiers for fighting wars, and to counter domestic riots and unrest. Thereafter, Francis Joseph and his military bureaucrats also expected soldiers to become adherents of the supra-national state, to distance themselves from daily nationalist politics, and to propagate among other citizens to love the Monarchy especially after their return to civilian life.

Military authorities were convinced that the recognition of the conscripts' native tongues was the most suitable tool for both: training effective soldiers and transforming conscripts of varying nationalities into loyal citizens. However, in a Monarchy in which citizens spoke more than eleven recognized languages and numerous additional dialects, organizing military education posed a challenge to the army bureaucrats who sought to follow two basic principles in implementing the language system that Francis Joseph had approved in 1868. The army leadership maintained these principles until 1914. The first principle was persistence, that is, avoiding taking any general decision. Decisions were usually made on a case-by-case basis. Army bureaucrats decided occasionally to improve shortcomings of the language system by often targeting only one or two languages in one province. Thus, any public debate was usually limited to a particular province. The second principle was to avoid public debate in terms of criticism of the army language system's shortcomings. The first aim was easier to achieve than the second because the bureaucrats could not control public debate. This study demonstrates it

was the first principle that ensured that the army language system endured some fifty years with only few changes.

The debate over the army language system's shortcomings had two opposing parts: the internal administrative debate and the public political debate. The first group, Francis Joseph and his army bureaucrats, instructed subordinate officers that the effort to spent on the implementation of the army language system should be limited at all cost, but still ensure efficiency and practicality during peace and wartime. As early as 1868, Friedrich von Beck, head of Francis Joseph's Military Chancellery, informed the Minister of War Franz Kuhn that "all the peculiar linguistic conditions of the Monarchy have to be taken into account, but only to the extent that efficient service and an efficient warlike formation of the army require."¹⁰⁵⁶ Several restrictions were imposed on the conscripts' language rights from the beginning. First, the army recognized only specific languages. Second, only these languages could be used in the regiments and battalions that were recognized in a particular Cisleithanian Austrian province as *landesüblich* (in Hungary and Bosnia-Herzegovina all Habsburg languages soldiers spoke were recognized). Third, conscripts had to hold right of residency in the province where their languages were recognized to be able to use them. Fourth, speakers of a particular language had to reach twenty percent of the total soldiers in a regiment or battalion. Finally, recruits had only the right to speak with superiors up to the rank of a captain in their native tongues. Officers therefore had to learn the languages of the rank and file only up to this rank. The army leadership maintained these principles and restrictions until 1914 despite the ever-changing educational background of Habsburg citizens, and language use through ongoing internal migration. Even with the limitations mentioned above it would have been possible to ensure that the bulk of conscripts are trained in their native tongues, but a variety of other shortcomings caused that many more where not. My study demonstrates that shortcomings occurred particularly in terms of the bureaucrats' language categorization, classification methods, and officers' language proficiency.

Both army bureaucrats and the public were aware of the army language system's shortcomings. Politicians and journalists regularly debated the army language system across the Monarchy. They argued that the language system needed to be implemented in a manner that ensured all conscripts were trained in their native tongues. Some nationalist activists argued that shortcomings of the army language system would target their nationalities' most important

¹⁰⁵⁶ ÖStA/KA/MKSM, 71-1/76, 1868, MKSM/Beck an RKM, July 1868.

national treasure, their languages. The rhetoric national activists employed in the public discussion of the army language system differed only to a limited extent among the various nationalities. Army bureaucrats, however, rejected most of politicians' and journalists' demands for improvement of the system. They did so even when the demands came from their own personnel who experienced the system on a daily basis when they trained recruits. The bureaucrats in the Ministry of War often rejected suggestions on how to improve the army language system, often owing to their concerns about the anticipated high cost of such projects. This study has shown that many of the guidelines and handbooks that referred to the army language system were incomprehensible. They often caused misinterpretation on behalf of officers. Over the years, however, ministerial bureaucrats issued virtually no orders to clarify and explain to their army officials of how to, for example, categorize the recruits by language adequately, in particular these who spoke more than one language. The shortcomings of the army language system remained for the most part unsolved until the dissolution of the Habsburg army and the state at the end of the First World War in November 1918.

Politicians, journalists, and others regularly criticized the army language system and its administration. After the dissolution of the Monarchy in 1918, career officer Ludwig Hesshaimer argued what most of his comrades were convinced that army had to disintegrate when politicians made the question of the national affiliation of soldiers and officers the most important and decisive.¹⁰⁵⁷ My study has proven this assertion incorrect, at least until the outbreak of the First World War. Most of officers' memoirs and diaries reflect the common conviction that politicians and journalist would have focused on the army language system's shortcomings only insofar as harming their national rights instead of which hardships shortcomings caused. My analysis of the army language system's public debate demonstrates that national activists considered almost every shortcoming because, for example, whenever the word "language" appeared in print in any Habsburg tongue, it attracted attention. However, not every public criticism, even when it was primarily framed as a national issue and the full range of nationalist rhetoric was used, was necessarily disregarding the army language system's legal framework. Many politicians and journalists simply fulfilled their duty of representing their voters, or to inform the public about shortcomings. Many of these politicians looked back on their own army service. Laurence Cole has argued that the Habsburg military and civil world could never be completely separated.¹⁰⁵⁸ Army bureaucrats, however, usually tended to

¹⁰⁵⁷ Hesshaimer, *Miniaturen aus der Monarchie*, 32.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Cole, *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism*.

downplay all criticism of the language system as exclusively nationally motivated, and rejected it, even when they were aware that the criticisms had merit. Both politicians and journalists often took only responsibility for their own nationalities. They almost never raised criticism before ministers jointly, thus enabling the army bureaucrats to easily reject all criticism as nationally motivated. My study has proven General Stjepan Sarkotić's assertion correct that "in Austria-Hungary the mutual aspirations of the peoples cancel each other out, therefore the Monarchy will never perish because of them."¹⁰⁵⁹

There were many shortcomings in the implementation of the army language system, but this study has demonstrated that such a complex legal framework with such a large number of recognized languages could never satisfy everyone. That army bureaucrats managed the system some fifty years owed to the fact that its implementation was characterized by certain flexibility on the part of both bureaucrats who implemented the rules, and the soldiers who were affected. The flexibility in interpreting rules for a particular situation or linguistic environment reflected a certain adaptability of language regulations: all military men involved in the language system tended to make exceptions to the rules, sometimes in favor of someone, sometimes not. This study has shown that one reason the system functioned for such a long time was that army bureaucrats and soldiers alike accepted not only its shortcomings, but also the exceptions to the rule. Their acceptance of linguistic diversity resulted in flexibility. I demonstrated that a large number of soldiers were aware that in a state of so many different languages, it was normal not to understand everything at all times, be it other comrades or officers' orders, and that not everything was always appropriately organized owing to the impossibility to recognize all languages at all places at all times. These officers' and conscripts' flexibility probably made up the difference between empire-armies, respectively multilingual states, and so-called nation states' armies that sought to impose only one language on all citizens regardless of their native tongues, thus, missing this flexibility. Ursula Prutsch was correct to highlight the overall "linguistic adaptability of state representatives" in Habsburg administrative self-assessment.¹⁰⁶⁰ Also Christoph Allmayer-Beck correctly emphasized the self-image of Habsburg officers being far more "flexible and empathetic" than their peers in so-called mononational armies when they commanded soldiers of various nationalities.¹⁰⁶¹

¹⁰⁵⁹ HDA, Sarkotić, box 5, War Diary, 17 April 1918.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Prutsch, *Historisches Gedächtnis in kulturpolitischer Machtstrategie*, 75. She reflects on an administrative report from an Austrian consul who emphasized the difference between imperial German and Habsburg bureaucrats.

¹⁰⁶¹ Allmayer-Beck, *Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte*, 381. See also: Allmayer-Beck, *Die bewaffnete Macht in Staat und Gesellschaft*.

However, not only state officials, military bureaucrats, and officers, were characterized by flexibility. This study had shown that it was also the case for many among rank and file who constituted the vast majority of army members.

Although constantly resisting Habsburg nationalistic practices and arguments, most army bureaucrats were convinced that every Habsburg soldier had a nationality that was first and foremost related to his language use. This perception also affected the implementation of the language system. Finally, the very act of communication was politicized. Peter Urbanitsch has noted that “language was no longer a primary means of communication, but a distinctive feature for a group that wanted to be different from others.”¹⁰⁶² The army language system did not only grant recruits the right to use their native tongues, but they were obliged to fit into one particular nationality-category. Urbanitsch has also asserted that in the Monarchy “a pacification through separation” took place.¹⁰⁶³ This was also partially the case for the army because most conscripts were trained among comrades of the same native tongues, thus, nationalities. However, this study has proven that even these units in which recruits were mixed did their duty loyally, often even during wartime regardless of their native tongues. However, through the army's categorization practice, annually thousands of male citizens became more aware of their nationality based on language use as it career officers, reserve officers, military professionals, NCOs, or conscripts. This study, however, demonstrated that even exaggerated national loyalty did not necessarily prevent soldiers, regardless of their army ranks, from being loyal to the army and its language rules. This was even the case for these among soldiers, who were often depicted in historiography as being more disloyal. Dreisziger and Allmayer-Beck were therefore only partially correct when they argued that reserve officers and some of the rank and file were more likely than career officers to become imbued with nationalism and to be insubordinate and desert.¹⁰⁶⁴ Not only nationalism resulted in insubordination and desertion among reserve officers, but also that they regularly experienced causing probably a higher casualty rate among the rank and file, and being less successful in operational terms than their better trained, more experienced and more multilingual career comrades. It is likely that many reservists were overwhelmed by their military duties. This study's chapters on wartime show that disloyalty more often owed to overburden or the feeling of unfair treatment rather than to nationalist convictions.

¹⁰⁶² Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen*, 65.

¹⁰⁶³ Urbanitsch, *Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen untereinander*, 68-9.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Dreisziger, *Ethnic Armies*, 8. Allmayer-Beck, *Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte*, 377.

The army leadership categorized soldiers with a particular nationality, but still expected them to identify with the supra-national army and state. Although the army advocated itself as being supra-national, standing away from nationalist attitudes, language regulations permitted the expression of national feelings, but only if gratitude towards the monarch and the state were expressed at the same time. Pieter M. Judson has recently correctly argued that “institutional multilingualism had the effect of strengthening both nationalist and imperial patriotic tendencies at the same time” which is exactly what happened with the army language system.¹⁰⁶⁵ However, in the age of nationalism the co-existence of two, or even more, loyalties and identities, to the supra-national army on the one hand, and to nationality on the other, met great resistance from national activists.

Methods that state and army used to categorize citizens made the recognition of multiple identities increasingly difficult, thus, bureaucratizing states required citizens to decide for one. In the case a soldier spoke more than one language, the army bureaucrats decided over his native language, thus nationality. Susan Gal asserted partially correctly that language was “assumed to change thought, and thus national character. Multilingualism was considered dangerous in that framework, raising the possibility that speakers had loyalties to more than one state [or nationality].”¹⁰⁶⁶ However, in the army, although spending much effort to categorize speakers of more than one language to fit into a particular nationality, finally, usually these army members language proficiency ended in a career benefit, regardless if it was officers or recruits who became NCOs. The dominance of German in the army favored German-speaking officers and conscripts only at first glance. Thus, Günther Kronenbitter’s assertion that officers who spoke German as their native tongue had an easier time starting their careers (*Startvorteil*) is only partially correct.¹⁰⁶⁷ Most of the men who became career officers or NCOs spoke another language than German fluently at the beginning of their careers. It was therefore not primarily native speakers of German who profited, but speakers of two languages.

Certainly, the army language system was easier to implement in regions where conscripts were monolingual. However, the Habsburg Monarchy was characterized by widespread bi- and multilingualism among conscripts which posed a challenge to bureaucrats

¹⁰⁶⁵ Judson, *The Habsburg Empire*, 368.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Gal, *Polyglot Nationalism*, 33.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Kronenbitter, *Die Führung der k.u.k. Armee und die Großmachtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns*, 209.

seeking to count and categorize them, but also offered numerous opportunities for misinterpretation about recruits' so-called "real" belonging to a particular language, thus, nationality. These misinterpretations resulted from a variety of motives that meant why military protagonists involved did not interpret rules accordingly to ensure the conscripts' rights appropriately. Even in the age of nationalism, these motives were only to a certain degree exclusively nationally motivated. Army bureaucrats and officers often based decisions and argued with military efficiency and practicality resulting in ignoring soldiers' rights from time to time. To them taking these rights fully into account would have meant spending much more effort, budget, and personnel that army bureaucrats sought to avoid at all cost. Sometimes someone decided out of motives stemming from his own nationality, but more often they resulted from convenience, practicality, and ignorance. I demonstrated that the rank and files' as well as officers' interpretation of the language system were often not owing to their linguistic (and therefore nationality) backgrounds, but rather depended on a particular undertaking by making use of the elasticity of the rules in a specific situation. It is a situation that Pieter M. Judson has recently described as the meaning of the concept of national indifference: "A particular strategy for understanding the situational character and appeal of nationalism than a particular substantive position of its own."¹⁰⁶⁸ To summarize: Most of protagonists, bureaucrats, officers, and conscripts, still decided out of other motives than their national belonging, although decisions were often based on a particular situation. For these who were affected by the army language system this meant almost no one based all of his entire professional life's decisions on the nationality with which he identified most of the time, rather motives differed from one decision to another. However, it was not the recruits (but also officers) who were mainly targeted by misinterpretation and shortcomings of the language system who criticized it most, rather national activists regardless of their nationalities.

In addition to the flexibility and adaptability of Habsburg army members that resulted from the language diversity, the balance between equality and inequality supported the acceptance of the army language system, despite its shortcomings. Although German dominated the Habsburg army, army bureaucrats, on top the monarch, sought to treat all other languages equally. At the same time each language recognized in the army was spoken in Habsburg provinces where they dominated, but at the same time there were other provinces where these languages were spoken only by a minority and were not represented in civil administration. This was even the case for German. Being only a minority language in Hungary,

¹⁰⁶⁸ Judson, *Critical Issues for a History of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 367.

the army's lingua franca, therefore shared status with Romanian, Ruthenian, Serbian, and Slovak, in civil administration. However, recently, Ágoston Berecz has convincingly argued that the sole use of Hungarian across the Kingdom was often only a wish rather than reality because many municipal officials still used other languages.¹⁰⁶⁹ The Habsburg Monarchy imposed the army language system not only in Austria where provincial governments often recognized more than one language, but also on Hungary. In Transleithnia, forced Magyarization caused many conflicts with politicians during my period of investigation. They criticized the downgrading of their state language to a minority language. Their debate on the army language system confirmed what the historian Imre Rössler has called their effort to achieve parity between German and Hungarian in the joint army, which should parallel the equality of the two states following the 1867-settlement. However, this study demonstrated that as long as speakers of particular languages, and therefore nationalities, were dominant and marginalized at the same time somewhere in the Monarchy, the system was balanced, and as long as – archival records demonstrate that clearly – the ordinary conscripts felt that the army, the state, and most importantly the monarch, spent enough emphasis respecting them and their languages, and nationalities, on an equal basis. This study has shown that in most cases when unfair treatment and shortcomings happened, soldiers blamed their superiors instead of it affected their loyalty and identification with the army, state or the monarch. The balance was also visible in who made career in the army, regardless if they were officers or NCOs.

When I started my research in 2012, I read parliamentary minutes and posed the initial question whether the army language system had a negative effect on soldiers, and, if so, whether they all were dissatisfied. Were these parliamentary delegates correct? After several years of research, I concluded that archival records clearly demonstrate that regardless in which language soldiers wrote, they tended to describe a similar situation: Of course, some soldiers were displeased by the army language system's shortcomings, but almost no one mentioned that this experience affected him so negatively that made him no longer identifying with the army, the state, and the monarch. The issues discussed in parliaments of masses of dissatisfied soldiers, are not visible in my archival sources. Politicians and journalists often argued that the language system's shortcomings, and the ignorance of soldier language rights would never satisfy them, and never lead to loyalty and identification with the army. In fact, even soldiers who trained during peace time experienced officers and NCOs did not speak their language correctly, or at all, were not necessarily influenced in a way that they did no longer identify

¹⁰⁶⁹ Berecz, German and Romanian in Town Governments.

with the army, and the state as long as there was a certain balance of shortcomings among speakers of all recognized languages. I disagree with Robert Evans' assertion concerning the army language system that "the Monarchy was destroyed not so much by national conflicts as by linguistic diversity in itself."¹⁰⁷⁰ Quite the contrary. Soldiers speaking a language badly, or mixing one language with another, over time became functional elements of the Habsburg army. One may conclude that they supported the development of an esprit de corps, as much as, or even more than, imperial symbols such as double eagles on uniforms and having sworn an oath to the monarch, Francis Joseph.

Equal treatment of all soldiers regardless of their native tongues, thus, nationality, changed before the First World War. The balance of equality and inequality of treatment did not end abruptly with the advent of war in August 1914. Rather, it had a longer history. Already at the turn of the century language regulations started dealing with wartime scenarios, and army bureaucrats started to question the war readiness of the army with its complex and often-contradictory language system. Partial mobilizations during the Balkan Wars (1912/13) then offered a glimpse of the army's readiness in wartime. It was not so much the language diversity of soldiers, but rather some particular incidents caused that all army members, regardless if they were bureaucrats, officers, NCOs or recruits, started to suspect comrades of particular nationalities to be prone to disloyal behavior. However, during wartime, military leadership still had to follow the peacetime language system, which only officially they did. However, many officers interpreted the rules differently, and narrowed them. Official wartime limitations of the army language system resulted from the army bureaucrats' efforts to reject nationalist political propaganda of particular languages, to avoid the possibility that speakers of so-called disloyal languages were spreading their anti-Habsburg ideas among the rank and file. This could harm military success. Shortcomings were now more often argued with military practicality and necessity. Increasingly, there was too little time to group soldiers at frontlines according to their native languages, even less to deploy officers and NCOs accordingly based on the principle of native languages. The same was the case for providing enough military auditors, members of the clergy, and physicians who were able to speak with all soldiers in their native tongues. This happened when proper communication often decided over survival or death was it by the enemy or by Habsburg military courts.

This study demonstrated that it was not the linguistic diversity that hampered successful

¹⁰⁷⁰ Evans, *Language and State Building*, 2.

war operations, as Wilhelm Czermak argued in his post-war study of the Habsburg army during the First World War discussed in the introduction, *In deinem Lager war Österreich. Die österreichisch-ungarische Armee, wie man sie nicht kennt* (In your camp was Austria. The unknown Austro-Hungarian army).¹⁰⁷¹ Thus, this study confirms what Alexander Jordan asserted that “the more mixed units proved to be as effective as the more nationally homogeneous ones.”¹⁰⁷² The reason for a decrease in acceptance of the army among soldiers was that some languages, and their speakers were less well treated than other. Indeed, the balance of equality and inequality of treatment that characterized the years between 1868 and 1914 slowly changed and finally vanished.

This study also expands upon Richard Lein’s recent argument that the driving force even behind large-scale mass desertion was not nationalism or general unwillingness to fight for Austria-Hungary, rather starvation and the experience of being commanded by officers and NCOs who did not speak their languages.¹⁰⁷³ However, language diversity and its effects were only one reason among many others. In their wartime diaries, many soldiers expressed a growing feeling of loneliness even when packed in trenches like sardines in a can. However, these were not the moments that the rank and file experience most negatively rather that many officers, NCOs and comrade-rank and file were influenced by prejudices toward particular so-called disloyal nationalities, in particular the Czech-, Italian-, Romanian-, Ruthenian-, and Serbian speakers. My last chapter shows that it was not the legal framework of the army language system that made soldiers’ daily lives more difficult, rather it was how superiors interpreted the language rules, in particular when treating speakers of particular languages differently than others, not to speak that some were more often punished. Thus, it was the evaporation of the *Rechtsstaat*, argued by many historians, among them, Pieter Judson and Mark Cornwall, the at least attempt to treat all citizens regardless of their native tongues, equally, that mostly influenced all soldiers’ war experience.¹⁰⁷⁴ However, the bulk of soldiers – even the ones whose native tongues were badly treated – still identified with the army and the state, and did their duty until they died, were captured, or the war ended.

¹⁰⁷¹ Czermak, *In deinem Lager war Österreich*, 27-8. This argument is also apparent in literature. For example: Wawro, *The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire*.

¹⁰⁷² Jordan, *Krieg um die Alpen*, 156.

¹⁰⁷³ Lein, *Die tschechischen Soldaten Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg*, 56-7.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Judson, *Critical Issues for a History of the Habsburg Monarchy*, 381. Cornwall, *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary*.

Bibliography: Primary Sources

Archives and Library Collections

Austria:

Heeresgeschichtliches Museum (HGM), Vienna

Archivalien, Kriegstagebücher

Österreichisches Literaturarchiv (ÖL), Vienna

Nachlass Robert Michel

Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (ÖNB), Vienna

Historische Rechts- und Gesetzestexte online (ALEX)

Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl)

Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses des Reichsrats (SPAR)

Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA)/Kriegsarchiv (KA), Vienna

Archiv der Truppenkörper (AdT)

Armeeoberkommando (AOK), Quartiermeisterabteilung (Qu.Abt.)

Grundbuchblätter (Gbbl)

Manuskripte-Allgemeine Reihe (Ms-AR)

Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät (MKSM)

Qualifikationslisten (Quall)

Nachlassammlung (NL)

Reichskriegsministerium/Kriegsministerium (RKM/KM)

Territorialkommanden (Terr)

Landesarchiv Salzburg (LAS)

Evidenzreferat: Grundbuchblätter, Assent-Protocolle

Pius-Parsch-Archiv (PPA), Klosterneuburg

Kriegstagebuch von Pius Parsch 1915-1918

Stadtarchiv Dornbirn (StAD)

Miszellen

Tiroler Landesarchiv (TL), Innsbruck

Grundbuchblätter

Bosnia-Herzegovina:

Arhiv Bosne i Hercegovine (ABiH), Sarajevo

Zajedničko ministarstvo financija – Odjeljenje za Bosnu i Hercegovinu (ZMF)

Zemaljska Vlada za Bosnu i Hercegovinu (ZVS)

Croatia:

Hrvatski Državni Arhiv (HDA), Zagreb

Fond Stjepan Sarkotić

Fond Salis Seewies

k.u. Varaždin Infantry Regiment

Umirovcjeni Časnici

Nacionalna i Sveučilišna Knjižnica (NSK), Zagreb

Zbirka rukopisa i starih knjiga (ZRSK)

Czech Republic:

Vojenský Historický Archiv (VHA), Prague

Kmenový listy (KL)

9. Korpskommando (KK)

Germany:

Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv München (BH)

Südost-Institut

Hungary:

Hadtörténelmi Levéltár (HL), Budapest

Manuskripte (Ms)

Jegyzék

Magyar Országos Levéltár (MOL), Budapest

Bécsi Levéltárokból Kiszolgáltatott Iratok

Országgyűlési Könyvtár (OK), Budapest

Gyűjteményei, Képviselőházi napló

Italy:

Archiv des Päpstlichen Instituts Santa Maria dell' Anima (PISMA), Rome

Bischöfliches Institut Vinzentinum (BIV), Brixen-Bressanone

Spielmann-Chronik

Diözesanarchiv Brixen-Bressanone (DAB)

Schematismen

Montenegro:

Cats Museum, Kotor

Post Card Collection

Državni Arhiv Crne Gore (DACG), Cetinje

Fondi Austrisko vojno Guvernerstvo u Crnoj gori

Slovenia:

Narodna in Univerzitetna Knjižnica (NUK), Ljubljana

Manuscripts

Ukraine:

Tsentral'nyy derzhavnyy istorychnyy arkhiv Ukrayiny (TDIAU), Lviv

Ob'yednane byuro viys'kovoho obliku, m. Viden' (OBVO)

Private Possession (PP)

Chiara Costner (Brixen), Abschrift des Feldtagebuchs von Franz Pizzinini, 1915-18.

Alfred Trendl (Vienna), Alfred Trendl: Meine Erinnerungen vom September 1911 bis November 1916.

Printed Army Handbooks and Regulations

Auszüge aus dem Jahresbericht der k. und k. Theresianischen Militärakademie in Wiener Neustadt, 1912/13. Wiener Neustadt: Theresianische Akademie, 1913.

Bancalari, Gustav, and Kuderna, Béla. *Lehr- und Handbuch für den Unterricht im deutschen Aufsätze militärischen Inhaltes (Militär-Stilistik)*. Prague: K. Bellmann, 1899.

Bauer, Josef. *Böhmische Militär-Sprache. Ein Handbuch für den Vorgesetzten im Verkehre mit den Untergebenen*. Vienna, 1898.

Beförderungsvorschrift für die Personen des Soldatenstandes im k. und k. Heere. Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1895.

- Beförderungsvorschrift für die Personen des Soldatenstandes im k.u.k. Heere, A-45.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1908.
- Bestimmungen für die Militärseelsorge und für die Matrikelführung im Kriege, A-16f.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1914.
- Beszédes, Friedrich. *Ungarische Militär-Sprache. Ein Handbuch für den Vorgesetzten im Verkehre mit den Untergebenen. Seidels Militär-Sprachbücher.* Vienna: Seidel, 1902.
- Büro der k.k. Statistischen Zentralkommission, ed. *Die Ergebnisse der Volkszählung vom 31. Dezember 1910 in den im Reichsrate vertretenen Königreichen und Ländern. 1 Heft. Die summarischen Ergebnisse der Volkszählung.* Vienna: Staatsdruckerei, 1912.
- Czapp, Karl. *Das Wehrgesetz für Bosnien und die Hercegovina von 1912.* Vienna: Streffleur, 1912.
- Edler von Socebran, Andrej Comel. *Sluzbovnik slovensko-nemski. Dienst-Reglement slovenisch-deutsch für das k.u.k. Heer mit Fragen und Antworten.* Klagenfurt: Hermagoras-Gesellschaft, undated.
- Dienst-Reglement fuer die kaiserlich-koenigliche Kavallerie, Erster Theil.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1807.
- Dienst-Reglement für das k.u.k. Heer, III. Teil, Infanterie und Jägertruppe.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1889.
- Dienstvorschrift für die Militär-Geistlichkeit (A-16.c.).* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1887.
- Dumek, Josef. *Neues militärisches deutsch-böhmisches Wörterbuch/Nový Vojenský Slovník Německo-Český.* Vienna: Seidel, 1898.
- Dvořák, Karl. *Geschichte des k. und k. Infanterie-Regiments Erzherzog Eugen Nr. 41.* Czernowitz: R. Eckhardts'sche k.k. Universitätsbuchdruckerei, 1905.
- Frankfurter, Arnold. *Andachtsbüchlein für jüdische Krieger im Felde.* Vienna: Schlesinger, 1915.
- Freund, Emanuel. *Wie bewahrt ihr Euch vor Syphilis? Ein Mahnwort an Soldaten und junge Männer.* Graz: Jos. A. Kienreichs, 1916.
- Freund, Emanuel. *Kako da se čuvate od sifilitike?* Vienna: Tisak c.k. dvorske i državne tiskare, 1916.
- Grießl, Anton. *Vorschriften in Militär-Angelegenheiten. Für den Seelsorge-Clerus und die Candidaten des geistlichen Standes.* Graz: Moser, 1892.
- Gumplowicz, Ludwig. *Das Österreichische Staatsrecht (Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsrecht). Ein Lehr- und Handbuch.* Vienna: Manz, 1907.

Hölzel's Illustrierter Führer durch die königliche Hauptstadt Olmütz, Olmütz 1901.

Hudal, Alois. *Soldatenpredigten*. Graz/Leipzig: Moser, 1917.

Edler von Jäger, Josef. *Italienische Militär-Sprache. Ein Handbuch für den Vorgesetzten im Verkehr mit den Untergebenen*. Vienna: Carl Schneid, 1905.

Ritter von Jasinski, Marian. *Podrecznik dla podoficerow piechoty i strzelcow w pytaniach i odpowiedziach*. Lwow: Piller, 1905.

Kombol, Mihovil. *Kroatische Sprachlehre*. Pola: Kleinmayr & Fed. Bamberg, 1918.

Kommando-Worte aus dem Abrichtungs-Reglement fuer die k.k. Kavallerie. Mit den nothwendigsten Erläuterungen. Prague: Betterlsche Druckerei, 1857.

Kommando-Worte aus dem Abrichtungs-Reglement fuer die k.k. Linien- und Grenz-Infanterie 1851. Vienna: Leopold Sommer, 1854.

k.u.k. Kriegsministerium. *Alphabetisches Verzeichnis der in den Verlustlisten angeführten Namen*. Vienna: k.k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1914-1919.

k.(u.)k. (Reichs)Kriegs-Ministerium. *Militär-Statistische Jahrbücher für die Jahre 1871-1911*. Vienna: Kaiserliche und königliche Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1872-1912.

Lehrplan der k.u.k. Militär-Akademien, F-6. Vienna: 1898.

Myrdacz, Paul. *Handbuch für Militärärzte*. Vienna: Verlag Josef Šafář, 1913.

Pfeiffer, Josef. *Slovenische Militär-Sprache: Ein Handbuch*. Vienna: Seidel 1896.

Sangeorzanu, Basilius. *Rumänische Militär-Sprache ein Handbuch für Officiere im Verkehre mit Untergebenen und für Cadetenschulen*. Vienna: Seidel, 1883.

Scharf, Bertold. *Przepisane skrocenia i ich znaczenie w jezyku polskim*. Lviv: Szczesny Bednarski, 1913.

Scharf, Bertold. *Regulamin sluzbowy dla c. i k. wojska Czesc II. (Sluzba polna) w pytaniach i odpowiedziach*. Lviv: Szczesny Bednarski, 1913.

Schematismus des Säkular- und Regular-Klerus der Diözese Brixen. Brixen: A. Weger, 1916.

Seidels kleines Armeeschema. Dislokation und Einteilung des k.u.k. Heeres, der k.u.k. Kriegsmarine, der k.k. Landwehr und der k.u. Landwehr. Vienna: W. Seidl und Sohn, 1914.

Somogyi, Éva, ed. *Die Protokolle des gemeinsamen Ministerrates der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie (1867-1870)*. Budapest: Verlag d. österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.

Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Wien für das Jahr 1883. Vienna: Verlag des Wiener Magistrats, 1885.

Studentenkalender für Mittelschule (1909). Vienna: Perles, 1908.

Szurmay, Sándor. *A Honvédség fejlődésének története annak felállításától napjainkig, 1868-*

1898. Budapest: Pesti Könyvnyomda-Részvénytársaság, 1898.
- Ritter von Truszkowski, Alexander. *Polnische Militärsprache. Ein Handbuch für den Vorgesetzten im Verkehre mit der Mannschaft.* Vienna: Seidel, 1894.
- Verordnungsblatt für das k.u.k. Heer, Normalverordnungen* (1895).
- Vorschrift für die Aufnahme in den Berufsstand, die Beförderungen und die Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten im k.u.k. Militärärztlichen Offizierskorps.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1911.
- Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Militärgeistliche, A-16d, vom Jahre 1904.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1905.
- Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Militärgeistliche.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1887.
- Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikations-Listen über Personen des Auditoriates.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1881.
- Vorschrift zur Verfassung der Qualifikationslisten über Stab- und Oberoffiziere des Soldatenstandes, dann Kadetten im k. und k. Heere.* Vienna: Hof- und Staatsdruckerei, 1884.
- Woerl's Reisehandbücher, ed. *Illustrierter Führer durch die königliche Hauptstadt Krakau und Umgebung.* Leipzig: Woerl, around 1900.
- Zháněl, Rudolf. *Pomocná vojenská duchovní správa.* Prague: Tiskem kníž. arcib. Knihtiskárny, 1909.
- Zhanel, Rudolf. *Rekrutenpredigten. Religiöse Unterweisungen für die Neueingerückten.* Prague: Cyrillo-Method'sche Buchdruckerei, 1910.
- Zhanel, Rudolf. *Garnisonspredigten.* Prague: Cyrillo-Method'sche Buchdruckerei, 1913.

Diaries and Memoirs

- Auffenberg-Komarow, Adolf. *Aus Österreichs Höhe und Niedergang. Eine Lebensschilderung.* Munich: Drei Maskenverlag, 1921.
- Bardolff, Carl. *Soldat im alten Österreich. Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben.* Jena: Diederichs, 1938.
- Baumann, Gabriele, ed. *Das Tagebuch eines Leutnants. Eine Collage.* Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2019.
- Bischitzky, Vera, and Schreiner, Stefan, eds. *Simon Dubnow. Geschichte eines jüdischen Soldaten. Bekenntnis eines von vielen.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 2012.

- Blašković, Pero. *Mit den Bosniaken im Weltkrieg*. Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2001.
- Broucek, Peter, ed. *Theodor Ritter von Zeynek. Ein Offizier im Generalstabskorps erinnert sich*. Cologne: Böhlau, 2017.
- Broucek, Peter, ed. *Feldmarschallleutnant Alfred Jansa. Ein österreichischer General gegen Hitler. Erinnerungen*. Vienna: Böhlau, 2011.
- Busch, Tristan [Arthur Schütz]. *Major Kwaplitschka. Entlarvter Geheimdienst*. Vienna: Danubia, 1950.
- Czermak, Wilhelm. *In deinem Lager war Österreich. Die österreichisch-ungarische Armee, wie man sie nicht kennt*. Breslau: Wilh. Gottl. Korn Verlag, 1938.
- Conrad von Hötzendorf, Franz. *Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1906-1918*. Vienna: Rikola 1921-1923.
- Conrad von Hötzendorf, Gina. *Mein Leben mit Conrad von Hötzendorf*. Leipzig: Grethlein, 1935.
- Czánt, Hermann. *Militaergebirgsdienst im Winter. Beherrschung des hohen Schnees*. Vienna: Stern, 1907.
- Drexel, Karl. *Feldkurat in Sibirien, 1914-1920*. Innsbruck-Leipzig: Rauch, 1940.
- von Eichthal, Rudolf. *Servus. Altösterreichische Soldatengeschichten*. Vienna: Albrecht, 1962.
- von Eichthal, Rudolf. *Ich hatt' einen Kameraden. Ernste und heitere Geschichte aus der alten k.u.k. Armee*. Vienna: Albrecht, 1961.
- von Eichthal, Rudolf. *Zapfenstreich. Geschichten aus Alt-Österreich*. Vienna: Albrecht, 1960.
- von Eichthal, Rudolf. *k.u.k. Heitere Geschichten aus dem alten Österreich*. Vienna: Albrecht, 1958.
- Ehrhart, Robert. *Im Dienste des alten Österreich*. Vienna: Bergland, 1958.
- Elmayer, Willy. *Vom Sattel zum Tanzparkett*. Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau, 1966.
- Garkisch, Miloš, ed. *První světová válka v denících feldkuráta P. Jana Evangelisty Eybla*. In *Minulosti Berounska* 17/2014, 139-158.
- Garkisch, Miloš, ed. *První světová válka v denících feldkuráta P. Jana Evangelisty Eybla*. In *Minulosti Berounska* 18/2015, 185-222.
- Giacomel, Paolo, ed. *Un Ladino-Tirolese di lingua italiana. Don Isidoro Alverá 1915-1916 diario di Guerra e prigionia 1939 le opzioni*. Cortina: Ghedina Editore, 1999.
- Hämmerle, Christa, ed. *Des Kaiser Knechte. Erinnerungen an die Rekrutenzeit im k.(u.).k. Heer 1868 bis 1914*. Vienna/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau, 2012.
- Hesshaimer, Ludwig. *Miniaturen aus der Monarchie. Ein k.u.k. Offizier erzählt mit dem Zeichenstift*. Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau, 1992.

- Holler, Gerd. *...für Kaiser und Vaterland. Offizier in der alten Armee*. Vienna et al.: Amalthea, 1990.
- Horsetzky, Ernst. *Die vier letzten Kriegswochen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Auflösung der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee*. Vienna/Leipzig: Harbauer, 1920.
- Huyn, Hans Graf, ed. *Nora Gräfin Kinsky. Russisches Tagebuch 1916-1918*. Stuttgart-Degerloch: Seewald, 1976.
- Kaltenboeck, Bodo. *Armee im Schatten. Die Tragödie eines Reiches*. Innsbruck et al.: Tyrolia 1932.
- Kerchnawe, Hugo. *Unser letzter Kampf. Das Vermächtnis eines alten kaiserlichen Soldaten*. Vienna/Leipzig: Stern, 1907.
- Kisch, Egon Erwin. *Schreib das auf, Kisch! Das Kriegstagebuch*. Berlin: Reiss, 1930.
- Kloss, Peter Paul, ed. *Leo Schuster. „...Und immer wieder mussten wir einschreiten!“ Ein Leben im Dienste der Ordnung*. Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1986.
- Lerch, Lea, ed. *Das Kriegstagebuch von Pius Parsch 1915–18*. Freiburg: Verlag Herder 2020.
- Lipusch, Viktor. *Österreich-Ungarns katholische Militärseelsorge im Weltkriege*. Vienna: Göth, 1938.
- Mader, Monika, ed. *Hinter den Fronten Galizien. Feldkaplan Karl Gögele und sein Verwundetenspital. Aufzeichnungen 1914-1915*. Bozen: Edition Raetia, 2016.
- Ritter von Manescul, Doro. *Meine Dritte Kompanie. Tagebuchblätter des Lst.-Oberleutnants*. Vienna: Selbstverlag, 1916.
- Mikoletzky, Lorenz, ed. *Ernst Wurmbrand. Ein Leben für Alt-Österreich*. Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1988.
- von Musulin, Alexander/Janko. *Das Haus am Ballhausplatz. Erinnerungen eines österreichisch-ungarischen Diplomaten*. Munich: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1924.
- Pölzleitner, Josef. *Landsturm im Hochgebirge. Das österreichische Landsturm-Infanteriebataillon Nr. 165 an der italienischen Front*. Salzburg: Selbstverlag, 1929.
- Schwenk, Ludwig. *Als Kriegsgefangener durch Serbien 1918-1919. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen*. Klagenfurt: Mohorjeva-Hermagoras, 2016.
- Spitzl, Bruno. *Die Rainer. Als Feldkurat mit IR 59 im Weltkrieg*. Salzburg: Salzburger Druckerei, 1953.
- Straub, Oswald. *In Memoriam. Erlebtes und Erlauschtes aus dem alten Pola*. Vienna: Selbstverlag, 1933.
- Stürgkh, Josef. *Politische und Militärische Erinnerungen*. Leipzig: P. List, 1922.
- Torresani, Carl Baron. *Aus der schönen wilden Lieutenants-Zeit*. Dresden/Leipzig, 1894.

- Trenker, Luis. *Sperrfort Rocca Alta. Der Heldenkampf eines Panzerwerks*. Berlin: Knauer, 1938.
- Velburg, Gerhard. *Rumänische Etappe. Der Weltkrieg, wie ich ihn sah*. Minden: W. Köhler, 1930.
- Walzel, Kelemen. *Kémszolgalat a háborúban. Egy hírszerző tiszt emlékiratai*. Sopron: Rabakózi 1939.
- Twain, Mark. *Reportagen aus dem Reichsrat 1898/1899. Stirring Times in Austria*. Salzburg/Wien: Residenz Verlag, 2018.
- Vittur, Maria Magdalena, ed. Na recordanza al dotur de Pescol Vijo Vittur (1882-1942). In Werner Pecosta, ed. *Cronica dla Val Badia* (2008), 583-626.
- von Wertheimer, Oskar, ed. *Graf Stefan Tisza. Briefe 1914-1918*. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1928.
- Wisthaler, Sigrid, ed. *Karl Außerhofer – Das Kriegstagebuch eines Soldaten im Ersten Weltkrieg*. Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press, 2011.
- Zardini, Paolino. *Diario di Guerra 1915-1918*. Cortina d'Ampezzo: Edizioni ULdA, 2010.
- Zeman, Jaro. *Pola, Verlorene Heimat. Arbeit und Leben im k.u.k. Kriegshafen. Städtebauliche Entwicklung der Stadt Pola am Beispiel des K.u.K. Militärhafens*. Vienna: Österr. Archäologie-Bund, 2010.

Novels

- Bánffy, Miklós. *Die Schrift in Flammen*. Vienna: Zsolnay, 2012.
- Csokor, Franz Theodor. *3. November 1918. Drei Akte*. Hamburg/Vienna: Zsolnay, 1936.
- Friedländer, Otto. *Letzter Glanz der Märchenstadt*. Vienna: Ueberreuter, 1985.
- Friedländer, Otto. *Maturajahrgang 1907*. Graz et al.: Styria, 1963.
- Friedländer, Otto. *Wolken drohen über Wien. Lebens- und Sittenbilder aus den Jahren vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg*. Vienna: Ring Verlag, 1949.
- Ginzkey, Franz Karl. *Der seltsame Soldat*. Leipzig: L. Staackmann Verlag, 1925.
- Hašek, Jaroslav. *Die Abenteuer des braven Soldaten Schwejk während des Weltkrieges*. Prague: Synek, 1926.
- Henz, Rudolf. *Dennoch Mensch... Ein Roman von Krieg und Liebe*. Salzburg: A. Pustet, 1935.
- Kisch, Egon Erwin. *Das Lied von Jaburek. Prager Reportagen*. Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 2015.
- Krleža, Miroslav. *Der kroatische Gott Mars. Kriegsnovellen*. Klagenfurt: Wieser, 2009.
- Lernet-Holenia, Alexander. *Die Standarte*. Berlin: S. Fischer, 1934.

- Markovits, Rodion. *Sibirische Garnison. Roman unter Kriegsgefangenen*. Berlin: Propyläen-Verlag, 1930.
- Michel, Robert. *Briefe eines Hauptmannes an seinen Sohn*. Berlin: Fischer, 1916.
- Michel, Robert. *Die Verhüllte. Novellen*. Berlin: Fischer, 1907.
- Roda Roda, *Roda Rodas Roman*. München: Drei Masken Verlag, 1925.
- von Saar, Ferdinand. *Mährische Novellen*. Berlin: Nicolai 1989.
- Thaly, Kálmán. *Ne bántsá a magyart! Költői beszédek, regék és balladák*. Pest: Lauffer és Stolp, 1857.
- Tömörkény, István. *Katona a kötélén*. Budapest: Szépirodalmi, 1989.
- Torberg, Friedrich. *Kaffeehaus war überall. Briefwechsel mit Käuzen und Originalen*. Munich: Langen Müller Verlag, 1982.
- Weber, Fritz. *Das Ende der Armee*. Leipzig/Vienna/Berlin: Steyermühl, undated (1933).
- Wittlin, József. *Die Geschichte vom geduldigen Infanteristen. Teil 2. Ein Gesunder Tod*. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1986.
- Wittlin, Joseph. *Das Salz der Erde*. Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer, 1969.
- Zweig, Stefan. *Die Welt von Gestern, Erinnerungen eines Europäers*. Vienna: Bermann-Fischer, 1948.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

Books

- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised ed. London, New York: Verso, 2006.
- Graf Andrassy, Julius. *Die Einheit der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee. Rede des Grafen Julius Andrassy über die Wehrgesetz-Vorlage, gehalten im Aussschusse des ungarischen Magnatenhauses am 5. April 1889*. Vienna: Manz, 1889.
- Auffahrt, Georg. *Inhalt und Form. Das Buch vom Offizier. Ein Mahnwort zur Erhaltung soldatischer Ideale*. Vienna: Perles, 1910.
- Baier, Dietmar. *Sprache und Recht im alten Österreich: Art. 19 des Staatsgrundgesetzes vom 21. Dezember 1867, seine Stellung im System der Grundrechte und seine Ausgestaltung durch die oberstgerichtliche Rechtsprechung*. Munich/Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1983.
- Bister, Feliks J. „Majestät, es ist zu spät...“ *Anton Korošec und die slovenische Politik im Wiener Reichsrat bis 1918*. Vienna: Böhlau, 1995.
- Bjelik, Emmerich. *Geschichte der k.u.k. Militär-Seelsorge und des apostolischen Feld-Vicariates: Über Auftrag seiner bischöflichen Gnaden Coloman Belopotoczky*. Vienna: Selbstverlag, 1901.
- Blumenwitz, Dieter, Gornig, Gilbert H., and Murswiek, Dietrich, eds. *Ein Jahrhundert Minderheiten- und Volksgruppenschutz*. Cologne: Verlag Wiss. und Politik, 2001.
- Boyer, John W. *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna. Christian Socialism in Power, 1897-1918*. Chicago/London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Boysen, Jens. *Preußische Armee und polnische Minderheit. Royalistische Streitkräfte im Kontext der Nationalitätenfrage des 19. Jahrhunderts (1815-1914)*. Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2008.
- Brix, Emil. *Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation: Die Sprachenstatistik in den Zisleithenischen Volkszählungen 1880 bis 1910*. Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1982.
- Brubaker, Rogers. *Ethnicity without Groups*. Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

- Brügel, Ludwig. *Geschichte der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie, vol. 5: Parlamentsfeindlichkeit und Obstruktion/Weltkrieg/Zerfall der Monarchie (1907-1918)*. Vienna: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1925.
- Bunzel, Julius. *Ungarn und wir*. Berlin: Swetschke, 1918.
- Burger, Hannelore. *Sprachenrecht und Sprachgerechtigkeit im österreichischen Unterrichtswesen 1867-1918*. Vienna: Verlag d. österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995.
- Clewing, Konrad. *Staatlichkeit und nationale Identitätsbildung: Dalmatien in Vormärz und Revolution*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2001.
- Cohen, Gary B. *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- Cole, Laurence. *Military Culture and Popular Patriotism in Late Imperial Austria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Cole, Laurence, ed. *The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the late Habsburg Monarchy*. New York: Berghahn, 2009.
- Cole, Laurence, ed. *Different Paths to the Nation: Regional and National Identities in Central Europe and Italy, 1830-70*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007.
- Cole, Laurence. "Für Gott, Kaiser und Vaterland:" *Nationale Identität der deutschsprachigen Bevölkerung Tirols 1860-1914*. Frankfurt: Campus, 2000.
- Cornwall, Mark. *The Undermining of Austria-Hungary. The Battle for Hearts and Minds*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000.
- Csáky, Moritz, Kury, Astrid, and Tragatschnig, Ulrich, eds., *Kultur-Identität-Differenz. Wien und Zentraleuropa in der Moderne*. Innsbruck et al.: Studien-Verlag, 2004.
- Deák, István. *Beyond Nationalism. A social and political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Deák, István. *Die rechtmäßige Revolution. Lajos Kossuth und die Ungarn, 1848-1849*. Budapest: Akad. Kiadó, 1989.
- Deak, John. *Forging a multinational State. State making in Imperial Austria from the Enlightenment to the First World War*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2015.
- Die Einheit der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee. Rede des Grafen Julius Andrassy über die Wehrgesetz-Vorlage, gehalten im Aussschusse des ungarischen Magnatenhauses am 5. April 1889*. Vienna: Manz, 1889.
- Di Michele, Andrea. *Tra due divise. La Grande Guerra degli Italiani d'Austria*. Bari: Editori Laterza, 2018.

- Donko, Wilhelm M. *Österreichs Kriegsmarine. Eine Seemacht und ihr Ende*. Schleinbach: Edition Winkler-Hermaden, 2018.
- Dreisziger, Nándor F. *Ethnic Armies. Polyethnic Armed Forces from the time of the Habsburgs to the Age of the Superpowers*. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990.
- Dusini, Arno. *Tagebuch. Möglichkeiten einer Gattung*. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005.
- Evans, Robert J. W. *Austria, Hungary, and the Habsburgs: Essays on Central Europe, 1683-1867*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Fellerer, Jan. *Mehrsprachigkeit im galizischen Verwaltungswesen (1772-1914): Eine historisch-soziolinguistische Studie zum Polnischen und Ruthenischen (Ukrainischen)*. Cologne et al.: Böhlau, 2005.
- Felszeghy, Ediltrud. *A császári és királyi hadsereg nyelve Magyarországon*. Budapest: Német nyelvészeti és néprajzi Intézet, 1939.
- Footitt, Hillary, and Kelly, Michael, eds. *Languages at War: Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict*. London: Plagrave, 2012.
- Footitt, Hillary, and Kelly, Michael, eds. *Languages and the Military. Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012.
- Führ, Christoph. *Das k. u. k. Armeeoberkommando und die Innenpolitik in Österreich*. Graz et al.: Böhlau, 1968.
- Galántai, József. *Der österreichisch-ungarische Dualismus, 1867-1918*. Budapest: Corvina K., 1990.
- Gammerl, Benno. *Subjects, Citizens, and Others. Administering Ethnic Heterogeneity in the British and the Habsburg Empires, 1867-1918*. New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2018.
- Gerwarth, Robert. *The Vanquished. Why the First World War failed to end, 1917-1923*. London: Pinguin Books, 2017.
- Gettlich, Wladimir. *Österreichs Schicksalsstunde. Bemerkungen zur Einberufung des Wiener Parlaments*. Genf: ATAR, 1917.
- Glaise-Horstenau, Edmund. *Franz Josefs Weggefährte: Das Leben des Generalstabschefs Grafen Beck*. Vienna et al.: Amalthea, 1930.
- Göderle, Wolfgang. *Zensus und Ethnizität. Zur Herstellung von Wissen über soziale Wirklichkeiten im Habsburgerreich zwischen 1848 und 1910*. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2016.
- Goß, Roderich. *Der Anteil der Dynastie an der Entwicklung Österreich-Ungarns*. Vienna: Phoebus, 1918.

- Gottsmann, Andreas. *Rom und die nationalen Katholizismen in der Donaumonarchie. Römischer Universalismus, habsburgische Reichspolitik und nationale Identitäten 1878-1914*. Vienna: Verlag der Österr. Akad. der Wissenschaften, 2010.
- Grüßhaber, Gerhard. *The "German Spirit" in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018.
- Hajdarpasic, Edin. *Whose Bosnia? Nationalism and Political Imagination in the Balkans, 1840-1914*. London: Cornell University Press, 2015.
- Halecki, Oskar. *The Limits and Divisions of European History*. London: Sheed & Ward, 1950.
- Hameršak, Filip. *Tamna Strana Marsa. Hrvatska Autobiografija i Prvi Svjetski Rat*. Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2013.
- Hanák, Petér, ed. *Die nationale Frage in der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie, 1900-1918*. Budapest: Akad. Kiadó, 1966.
- Hannan, Kevin. *Borders of Language and Identity in Teschen Silesia*. New York/Vienna: Lang, 1996.
- Hantsch, Hugo. *Die Nationalitätenfrage im alten Österreich. Das Problem der konstruktiven Reichsgestaltung*. Vienna: Herold, 1953.
- Hasiba, Gernot D. *Das Notverordnungsrecht in Österreich (1848-1917). Notwendigkeit und Missbrauch eines „staatserhaltenden Instruments.“* Vienna: Verlag d. österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985.
- Haslinger, Peter. *Nation und Territorium im tschechischen politischen Diskurs 1880-1938*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2010.
- Healy, Maureen. *Vienna and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire: Total War and Everyday Life in World War I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Heindl, Waltraud. *Josephinische Mandarine. Bürokratie und Beamte in Österreich 1848-1907*, vol. 2. Vienna: Böhlau, 2013.
- Heindl, Waltraud, and Saurer, Edith, eds. *Grenze und Staat. Paßwesen, Staatsbürgerschaft, Heimatrecht und Fremden gesetzgebung in der österreichischen Monarchie 1750-1867*. Vienna: Böhlau, 2000.
- Hois, Eva Maria. *Die Musikhistorische Zentrale. Ein Kultur- und Zeitdokument ersten Ranges. Die Soldatenliedersammlung beim k.u.k. Kriegsministerium im Ersten Weltkrieg. Geschichte, Dokumente, Lieder*. Vienna: Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, 2012.
- Horel, Catherine. *Soldaten zwischen nationalen Fronten. Die Auflösung der Militärgrenze und die Entwicklung der königlich-ungarischen Landwehr (Honvéd) in Kroatien-Slawonien, 1868-1914*. Vienna: Verlag d. österr. Akademie d. Wissenschaften, 2009.

- Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985.
- Houlihan, Patrick J. *Catholicism and the Great War. Religion and Everyday Life in Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
- Hroch, Miroslav. *Das Europa der Nationen. Die moderne Nationsbildung im europäischen Vergleich*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005.
- Hroch, Miroslav. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Hron, Karl. *Deutschnationale Politik. Eine zeitgemässe Studie*. Vienna: Selbstverlag, 1897.
- Hugelmann, Karl Gottfried, and Boehm, Max Hildebert. *Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich*. Vienna: Braumüller, 1934.
- Hungarus. *Die Sprachenfrage der Armee und der Dualismus*. Budapest: 1905.
- Hye, Hans Peter. *Das politische System in der Habsburgermonarchie. Konstitutionalismus, Parlamentarismus und politische Partizipation*. Prague: Karolinum, 1998.
- Innes, Arthur D. *A short History of the British in India*. London: Methuen, 1902.
- Johann Salvator. *Drill oder Erziehung? Vortrag gehalten im militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereine zu Wien am 3. Nov. 1883*. Vienna: Verlag d. militär-wissenschaftlichen Vereines, 1883.
- Jordan, Alexander. *Krieg um die Alpen. Der Erste Weltkrieg im Alpenraum und der bayerische Grenzschutz in Tirol*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008.
- Judson, Pieter M. *The Habsburg Empire. A New History*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Judson, Pieter M. *Guardians of the Nation. Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
- Judson, Pieter M., and Rozenblit, Marsha L., eds. *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*. New York: Berghahn, 2005.
- Juzbašić, Dževad, and Šehić, Zijad, eds. *Lične zabilješke generala Oskara Potioreka o unutrašnjopolitičkoj situaciji o Bosne i Hercegovini*. Sarajevo: Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, 2015.
- Kamusella, Tomasz. *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009.
- Kann, Robert A. *The Multinational Empire. Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950.

- Katus, László. *Hungary in the Dual Monarchy 1867-1914*. Boulder, CO.: East European Monographs, 2008.
- Kertzer, David I., and Arel, Dominique. *Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- King, Jeremy. *Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics, 1848-1948*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Kleeberg, Rudolf. *Die Nationalitätenstatistik, ihre Ziele, Methoden und Ergebnisse*. Weida i.Th.: Thomas & Hubert, 1915.
- Kolmer, Gustav. *Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich, 1898-1900*. Vienna: Fromme, 1911.
- Kordić, Snjezana. *Jezik i nacionalizam*. Zagreb: Durieux, 2010.
- Kosch, Wilhelm. *Die Deutschen in Österreich und ihr Ausgleich mit den Tschechen*. Leipzig: Verlag Grackauer, 1909.
- Kotter, Simon. *Die k.(u.)k. Militärmusik. Bindeglied zwischen Armee und Gesellschaft?* Augsburg: UVA, 2015.
- Kronenbitter, Günther. „Krieg im Frieden.“ *Die Führung der k.u.k. Armee und die Großmachtpolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1906-1914*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003.
- Kulacz, Sławomir. *Germanizmy w gwarze polskich żołnierzy armii austro-węgierskiej*. Rzeszów: Wydawnictwo Oświatowe Fosze, 2018.
- Lackey, Scott W. *The Rebirth of the Habsburg Army: Friedrich Beck and the Rise of the General Staff*. London: Praeger, 1995.
- Lankes, Christian. *München als Garnison im 19. Jahrhundert*. Herford: Mittler, 1993.
- Leerssen, Joep. *National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006.
- Legler, Johannes. *Militärseelsorge in der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee von 1867 bis 1918*. Vienna: Wiener Katholische Akademie, 1979.
- Lein, Richard. *Pflichterfüllung oder Hochverrat? Die tschechischen Soldaten Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg*. Münster: LIT, 2011.
- Lüdtke, Alf, and Wildt, Michael, eds. *Staats-Gewalt. Ausnahmezustand und Sicherheitsregimes. Historische Perspektiven*. Göttingen: Wallstein, 2008.
- Malešević, Siniša. *Identity as Ideology: Understanding Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006.
- Mercator. *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die ungarische Reichsidee*. Budapest: Moritz Rath, 1908.

- Mulligan, William. *The Origins of the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Nemes, Robert. *Another Hungary: The Nineteenth-Century Provinces in Eight Lives*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016.
- Neumayer, Christoph, and Schmidl, Erwin A., eds. *Des Kaisers Bosniaken. Die bosnisch-herzegowinischen Truppen in der k. u. k. Armee. Geschichte und Uniformierung von 1878 bis 1918*. Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2008.
- Okey, Robin. *Taming Balkan Nationalism. The Habsburg "civilizing mission" in Bosnia, 1878-1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Olechowski, Thomas. *Die Entwicklung des Preßrechts in Österreich bis 1918. Ein Beitrag zur österreichischen Mediengeschichte*. Vienna: Manz 2004.
- Ortner, M. Christian. *Organisationshandbuch der k.u.k. Armee im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1918: Heeresstruktur, Aufbau und Gliederung*. Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2018.
- Parsons, Timothy H. *The Rule of Empires. Those who built them, those who endured them, and why they always fall*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Pelinka, Peter, and Scheuch, Manfred. *100 Jahre AZ*. Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1989.
- Pescosta, Werner. *Geschichte der Dolomitenladiner*. San Martin de Tor: Istitut Ladin Micurà de Rü, 2013.
- von Pitreich, Heinrich. *Meine Beziehungen zu den Armeeforderungen Ungarns verbunden mit der Betrachtung dermaliger internationaler Situation*. Vienna/Leipzig: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1911.
- Plaschka, Richard, Haselsteiner, Horst, and Suppan, Arnold. *Innere Front: Militärassistentz, Widerstand und Umsturz in der Donaumonarchie 1918*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1974.
- Plaschka, Richard Georg. *Avantgarde des Widerstands: Modellfälle militärischer Auflehnung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*. Vienna: Böhlau, 1999.
- Prokopovych, Markian, Bethke, Carl, and Scheer, Tamara, eds. *Language Diversity in the Late Habsburg Empire*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019.
- Radnitzky. *Emléklapok a III. Frigyes Vilmos porosz király nevét viselő 10-ik huszárezred történetéből. 1741–1899. (8-r. 42 l.)*. Nyiregyháza: Piringer J. könyvny, 1900.
- Rauchensteiner, Manfred. *Der Erste Weltkrieg und das Ende der Habsburgermonarchie, 1914-1918*. Vienna: Böhlau, 2013.
- Reill, Dominique. *Nationalists who feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste, and Venice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012.

- Romsics, Ignac. *The Dismantling of Historic Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920*. Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 2002.
- Rothenberg, Gunther E. *The Army of Francis Joseph*. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1976.
- Rozenblit, Marsha. *Reconstructing a National Identity: The Jews of Habsburg Austria during World War I*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Ruthner, Clemens, and Scheer, Tamara, eds. *Bosnien-Herzegowina und Österreich-Ungarn, 1878–1918. Annäherungen an eine Kolonie*. Tübingen: Narr Francke, 2018.
- Samassa, Paul. *Der Völkerstreit im Habsburgerstaat*. Leipzig: Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1910.
- Schachinger, Werner. *Die Bosniaken kommen! Elitetruppe in der k.u.k. Armee, 1879-1918*. Graz-Stuttgart: Stocker, 1989.
- Scheer, Tamara. „Minimale Kosten, absolut kein Blut!“ *Österreich-Ungarns Präsenz im Sandžak von Novipazar (1879-1908)*. Frankfurt et al.: Peter Lang, 2013.
- Scheer, Tamara. *Die Ringstraßenfront. Österreich-Ungarn, das Kriegsüberwachungsamt und der Ausnahmezustand während des Ersten Weltkriegs*. Vienna: Heeresgeschichtliches Museum, 2010.
- Schmidl, Erwin A. *Habsburgs jüdische Soldaten, 1788-1918*. Vienna: Böhlau, 2014.
- Schmidt-Brentano, Antonio. *Die Armee in Österreich: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft, 1848-1867*. Boppard am Rhein: H. Boldt, 1975.
- Sehić, Zijad. *U smrt za cara i domovinu! Bosanci i Hercegovci u vojnoj organizaciji Habsburške monarhije 1878-1918*. Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing, 2007.
- Shanes, Joshua. *Diaspora Nationalism and Jewish Identity in Habsburg Galicia*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Somogyi, Éva. *Der gemeinsame Ministerrat der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie 1867-1906*. Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1996.
- Sondhaus, Lawrence. *The Naval Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1867-1918: Navalism, Industrial Development, and the Politics of Dualism*. West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue Univ. Press, 1994.
- Stauter-Halsted, Keely. *The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-1914*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 2001.
- Stergar, Rok. *Slovenci in vojska. Slovenski odnos do vojaških vprašanj od uvedbe dualizma do začetka I. svetovne vojne*. Ljubljana: Oddelek za Zgodovino Filozofske Fakultete, 2004.

- Stourzh, Gerald. *Die Gleichberechtigung der Nationalitäten in der Verfassung und Verwaltung Österreichs 1848-1918*. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1985.
- Struve, Kai. *Bauern und Nation in Galizien: Über Zugehörigkeit und soziale Emanzipation im 19. Jahrhundert*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005.
- Sutter, Berthold. *Die Badenschen Sprachenverordnungen von 1897. Ihre Genesis und ihre Auswirkungen vornehmlich auf die innerösterreichischen Alpenländer* (2 vols.). Graz-Cologne: Böhlau, 1960/65.
- Unowsky, Daniel L. *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria, 1848-1916*. West Lafayette Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2005.
- Urrisk, Rolf M. *Wien - 2000 Jahre Garnisonsstadt*, vols. 1-5. Gnas: Weishaupt, 2009-2018.
- Veliz, Fernando. *The Politics of Croatia-Slavonia 1903-1918. Nationalism, State Allegiance and the Changing International Order*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2012.
- von Vogt, Herrmann. *Die europäischen Heere der Gegenwart*. Rathenow: M. Babenzien, 1888.
- Wagner, Rudolf. *Die Bukowina und ihre Deutschen*. Vienna: Österreichische Landsmannschaft, 1979.
- Wagner, Walter. *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 2: 1866-1888. Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1971.
- Wagner, Walter. *Geschichte des k.k. Kriegsministeriums*, vol. 1: 1848-1866. Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 1966.
- Wandruszka, Adam, and Urbanitsch, Peter, eds. *Die Völker des Reiches*. Vienna: Verlag d. Österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2003.
- Wandruszka, Adam, and Urbanitsch, Peter, eds. *Die bewaffnete Macht*. Vienna: Verlag d. Österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1987.
- Wawro, Geoffrey, *A Mad Catastrophe. The Outbreak of World War I and the Collapse of the Habsburg Empire*. New York: Basic Books, 2014.
- Wawro, Geoffrey, *The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen. The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914*. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1976.
- Wingfield, Nancy M. *The World of Prostitution in Late Imperial Austria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
- Wingfield, Nancy M. *Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.

- Winkler, Wilhelm. *Der Anteil der nichtdeutschen Volksstämme an der öst.-ung. Wehrmacht*. Vienna: Seidel, 1919.
- Wolf, Michaela. *Die vielsprachige Seele Kakaniens: Übersetzen und Dolmetschen in der Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918*. Vienna: Böhlau, 2012.
- Zahra, Tara. *Kidnapped Souls. National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Zehetbauer, Ernst. *Das Reserveoffizierssystem Österreich-Ungarns. Die alte Armee und ihre "Einjährigen", 1868-1914*. Hamburg: tradition, 2016.

Articles and Chapters

- Allmayer-Beck, Johann Christoph. Die Führung vielsprachiger Streitkräfte: Die k.u.k. Armee als Beispiel. In Peter Broucek, Erwin A. Schmidl, eds. *Militär, Geschichte und politische Bildung. Aus Anlass des 85. Geburtstages des Autors*. Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2003, 370-384.
- Allmayer-Beck, Johann Christoph. Die bewaffnete Macht in Staat und Gesellschaft. In Adam Wandruszka, ed. *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918: Die bewaffnete Macht*. Vienna: Verlag d. österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1987, 1-141.
- Baumann, J. Militärtouristische Wahrnehmungen im Sandschak Novibazar, in Montenegro und in der Krivošije. *Jahrbücher für die deutsche Armee und Marine* 92 (1894), 1-43.
- Becker, Peter. Sprachvollzug. Kommunikation und Verwaltung. In Peter Becker, ed. *Sprachvollzug im Amt. Kommunikation und Verwaltung im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts*. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011, 9-44.
- Beckett Weaver, Eric. Hungarian Views of the Bunjevci in Habsburg Times and the Inter-war Period. *Balkanica* 42, 77-115.
- Belić, Bojan, and Nomachi, Motoki. Banat Bulgarian and Bunyev. A language emancipation perspective. In Dieter Stern, Motoki Nomachi, and Bojan Belić, eds. *Linguistic Regionalism in Eastern Europe and Beyond Minority, Regional and Literary Microlanguages*. Berlin/Vienna: Peter Lang, 2018, 66-84.
- Beller, Steven. Kraus's Firework. State Consciousness Raising in the 1908 Jubilee Parade in Vienna and the Problem of Austrian Identity. In Maria Bucur, and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds. *Staging the Past. The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2001, 46-71.
- Berecz, Ágoston. The Language of Street Signs in Dualist Transylvania and the Banat. In *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Philologica* 11, 1 (2019), 23-36.

- Berecz, Ágoston. German and Romanian in Town Governments of Dualist Transylvania and the Banat. In Prokopovych, Markian, Bethke, Carl, and Scheer, Tamara, eds. *Language Diversity in the Late Habsburg Empire*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019, 135-159.
- Bethke, Carl. Einwanderung und Kolonisten im k. u. k. Bosnien-Herzegowina. Überblick mit „bosniakischen“ Perspektiven. In Clemens Ruthner and Tamara Scheer, eds. *Bosnien-Herzegowina und Österreich-Ungarn, 1878–1918. Annäherungen an eine Kolonie*. Tübingen: Narr Francke, 2018, 237-250.
- Broucek, Peter. Die Mehrsprachigkeit und Sprachenpolitik in den Einheiten der k. und k. Armee in den böhmischen Ländern. In Josef Ernst, ed. *250 Jahre Fremdsprachenausbildung im österreichischen Militär am Beispiel des Tschechischen*. Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2003, 16-21.
- Bruckmüller, Ernst. Zur Problematik kollektiver Identitätsstiftung innerhalb der Donaumonarchie. In Pierre Bèhar, and Eva Philippoff, eds. *Von der Doppelmonarchie zur Europäischen Union. Österreichs Vermächtnis und Erbe*. Hildesheim: Olms, 2011, 17-44.
- Bruckmüller, Ernst. Was There a “Habsburg Society” in Austria-Hungary? *Austrian History Yearbook* 37 (2006), 1-16.
- Bunzl, John. Zur Geschichte des Antisemitismus in Österreich. In John Bunzl, and Bernd Marin, eds. *Antisemitismus in Österreich. Sozialistorische und soziologische Studien*. Innsbruck: Inn, 1982.
- Burger, Hannelore. Sprachen und Sprachenpolitiken. Niederösterreich und die Bukowina im Vergleich. In Endre Hárs, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, Ursula Reber, and Clemens Ruthner, eds. *Zentren, Peripherien und kollektive Identitäten in Österreich-Ungarn*. Tübingen: Francke, 2006, 111-127.
- Car, Milka. Narratives of Modernization in Periodicals. On the German-Language *Agramer Tagblatt* in 1918. In Chovanec, Johanna; Heilo, Olof, eds. *Narrative Identities in the Late Habsburg and Ottoman Empires: Alternatives to Nationalism*. Palgrave: 2020.
- Case, Holly. The Jews of Kolozsvár (Cluj) and the Hungarian Administration, 1940-1944. In Wolfgang Müller, Michael Portmann, eds. *Ostereuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende*. Vienna: Verlag d. österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, 39-54.
- Cohen, Gary B. Nationalist Politics and the Dynamics of State and Civil Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1867-1914 *Central European History* 40.2 (2007), 241-278.
- Cole, Laurence. Differentiation or Indifference? Changing Perspectives on National Identification in the Austrian Half of the Habsburg Monarchy. In Maarten Van Ginderachter

- and Marnix Beyen, eds. *Nationhood from Below: Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011, 96-119.
- Cornwall, Mark. Loyalty and Treason in Late Habsburg Croatia: A Violent Political Discourse before the First World War. In Jana Osterkamp, and Martin Schulze Wessel, eds. *Exploring Loyalty*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017, 97-120.
- Cornwall, Mark. The Habsburg Elite and the Southern Slav Question 1914-1918. In Francis Roy Bridge, ed. *A living Anachronism? European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy*, Vienna: Böhlau, 2010, 239-269.
- Czeitschner, Susanne. Discourse, Hegemony and Poliglossia in the Judicial System of Trieste in the 19th Century. In Rosita Rindler Schjerve, ed. *Diglossia and Power. Language Policies and Practices in the 19th Century Habsburg Empire*. Berlin/New York: deGruyter, 2003, 69-105.
- Dolmányos, István. Kritik der Lex Apponyi. In Petér Hanák, ed. *Die nationale Frage in der Österreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie, 1900-1918*. Budapest: Akad. Kiadó, 1966, 233-304.
- Donko, Wilhelm M. Baron Ferdinand Julius Wedel-Jarlsberg, ein norwegischer Seeoffizier in österreichischen Diensten. *Österreichischen Militärischen Zeitschrift* 4 (2019), 448-457.
- Ekmečić, Milorad. Impact of the Balkan Wars on Society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Béla Király, and Dimitrije Djordjević, eds. *East Central European Society and the Balkan Wars*. Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 1987, 260-285.
- Evans, Robert J. W. Language and State Building: The Case of the Habsburg Monarchy. *Austrian History Yearbook* 35 (2004), 1-24.
- Feller, Jan. Reconstructing Multilingualism in Everyday Life: The Case of Late Habsburg Lviv. In Prokopovych, Markian, Bethke, Carl, and Scheer, Tamara, eds., *Language Diversity in the Late Habsburg Empire*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019, 218-243.
- Fellerer, Jan. Discourse and Hegemony: The Case of the Ukrainian Language in Galicia under Austrian Rule (1772-1914). In Rosita Rindler Schjerve, ed. *Diglossia and Power. Language Policies and Practices in the 19th Century Habsburg Empire*. Berlin/New York: deGruyter, 2003, 107-166.
- Footitt, Hillary. Introduction. In Hillary Footitt and Michael Kelly, eds. *Languages at War: Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict*. London: Plagrave, 2012, 1-11.
- Foster, Ian. Military Newspapers and the Habsburg Officers' Ideology after 1868. In Ricarda Schmidt, Martina Lauster, eds. *Patterns of Knowledge in the Nineteenth Century*. Münster: Monsenstein und Vannerdat, 2010, 175-195.

- Gal, Susan. Polyglot Nationalism. Alternative perspectives on language in 19th century Hungary. *Langage et société* 2 (2011), 31-54.
- Göderle, Wolfgang. Administration, Science, and the State: The 1869 Population Census in Austria-Hungary. *Austrian History Yearbook* 47 (2016), 61-88.
- Haid, Elisabeth. Galicia: A Bulwark against Russia? Propaganda and Violence in a Border Region during the First World War. *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* (2017).
- Hajdu, Tibor. Das Alltagsleben österreichischer Offiziere in Ungarn. In Waltraud Heindl et al., eds. *Eliten und Außenseiter in Österreich und Ungarn*. Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2001, 99-116.
- Hämmerle, Christa. Ein gescheitertes Experiment? Die Allgemeine Wehrpflicht in der multiethnischen Armee der Habsburgermonarchie. In *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift für moderne europäische Geschichte/Revue d'histoire européenne contemporaine* 5/2, 222-243.
- Heimburger, Franziska. Fighting Together: Language Issues in the Military Coordination of First World War Allied Coalition Warfare. In Hilary Footitt, ed. *Languages at War. Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 47-57.
- Heimburger, Franziska. Imagining Coalition Warfare? French and British Military Language Policy before 1914. *Francia* 40 (2013), 397-408.
- Husová, Marcella. Die österreichisch-ungarische Garnison und ihre Rolle in der Literaturvermittlung. In Joseph P. Strelka, ed. *Im Takte des Radetzkmarschs [...]: Der Beamte und der Offizier in der österreichischen Literatur*. Bern et al.: Peter Lang, 1994, 267-283.
- Ilić Marković, Gordana. Creating a Name for a pluricentric Language: From Serbian to Serbo-Croatian, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian. In Rudolf Muhr, ed. *Pluricentric Languages and Non-dominant Varieties worldwide*. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2016, 433-448.
- John, Michael: Vielfalt und Heterogenität. Zur Migration nach Wien um 1900. In Elisabeth Röhrlich, ed. *Migration und Innovation um 1900. Perspektiven auf das Wien der Jahrhundertwende*. Vienna et al.: Böhlau, 2016.
- Jones, David R. The Imperial Army in World War I, 1914-1917. In Frederick W. Kagan, and Robin Higham, eds. *The Military History of Tsarist Russia*. New York: Palgrave, 2002, 227-248.
- Judson, Pieter M. Critical Issues for a History of the Habsburg Monarchy. In *East Central Europe* 46 (2019), 343-384.

- Judson, Pieter M. Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe: Introduction. In Pieter M. Judson, and Marsha Rozenblit, eds. *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2005, 1-18.
- Juzbašić, Dževad. Die Sprachenpolitik der österreichisch-ungarischen Verwaltung und die nationalen Verhältnisse in Bosnien-Herzegowina, 1878–1918. In *Südost-Forschungen* 61/62 (2002/2003), 235-272.
- von Kállay, Benjamin. Ungarn an den Grenzen des Orients und des Occidents. In *Ungarische Revue* (1883), 428-489.
- King, Jeremy. The Nationalization of East Central Europe: Ethnicism, Ethnicity, and Beyond. In Maria Bucur, and Nancy M. Wingfield, eds. *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present*. West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2011, 112-152.
- Klabjan, Borut. Od Trsta do Sarajeva in nazaj: Dinastična Lojalnost in nacionalna pripadnot v Habsburškem Trstu na predvečer Prve Svetovne Vojne. *Acta Histriae* 21:4 (2013), 749-772.
- Korcsmáros, Nándor. Adatok a magyar katonanyelvhez. *Magyar Nyelvőr* (1925), 54-96.
- Korea Gajski, Bruno, and Kardum, Livia. Language as a political issue: The case of language of command in the Austro-Hungarian army. *Jezikoslovlje* 13.2 (2012), 351-371.
- Kučera, Rudolf. Entbehrung und Nationalismus: Die Erfahrung tschechischer Soldaten der österreichisch-ungarischen Armee 1914-1918. In Bernhard Bachinger, Wolfram Dornik, eds. *Jenseits des Schützengrabens: Der Erste Weltkrieg im Osten: Erfahrung, Wahrnehmung, Kontext*. Innsbruck et al.: StudienVerlag, 2013, 121-137.
- Kurtz, Paul Michael. Thou shalt not kill, unless...: The Decalogue in a *Kaiserreich* at War. In A. Mein, N. MacDonald and M. A. Collins, *The First World War and the Mobilization of Biblical Scholarship*. London: T&T Clark, 2019, 111-134.
- Lukan, Walter. Die politische Meinung der slowenischen Bevölkerung 1917/18 im Spiegel der Zensurberichte des Gemeinsamen Zentralnachweisbureaus für Kriegsgefangene in Wien (mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Verfassers der Berichte, Milan Hodža). In Jiří Pokorný, Jiří Kořalka, and Alice Velková, eds. *Nacionalismus, společnost a kultura ve střední Evropě 19. a 20. Století: pocta Jiřímu Kořalkovi k 75. Narozeninám*, 217-283.
- Mandić, Marija, and Belić, Bojan. Die nationalen Standardisierungsregime in Europa. Eine Fallstudie zur bunjewatzischen Sprache. In Jusufi Lumnije, ed. *The Potentiality of Pluricentrism. Albanian Case Studies and Beyond*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2018, 231-250.
- Marácz, László Károly. Multilingualism in the Transleithanian part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918): Policy and Practice. *Jezikoslovlje* 13/2 (2012), 269-298.

- Marin, Irina. K.u.K. Generals of Romanian Nationality and Their Views on the Language Question. In Prokopovych, Markian, Bethke, Carl, and Scheer, Tamara, eds. *Language Diversity in the Late Habsburg Empire*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019: 115-134.
- Marin, Irina. World War I and Internal Repression: The Case of Major General Nikolaus Cena. *Austrian History Yearbook* 44 (2013), 195-208.
- Markl, Dominik, The Decalogue in History: A Preliminary Survey of the Fields and Genres of its Reception. *Zeitschrift für Altorientalische und Biblische Rechtsgeschichte* 18, 2012, 279-293.
- Maxwell, Alexander. Why the Slovak Language has Three Dialects: A Case Study in Historical Perceptual Dialectology. *Austrian History Yearbook* 37 (2006), 141-162.
- Melichar, Peter, and Mejstrik, Alexander, Die bewaffnete Macht. In Ulrike Harmat, ed. *Soziale Strukturen. Von der feudal-agrarischen zur bürgerlich-industriellen Gesellschaft*. Vienna: Verlag d. österr. Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2010, 1263-1326.
- Meyer, Anna-Maria. Was ist Armeeslavisch? In Ivana Lederer, Anna-Maria Meyer, Katrin Schlund, eds. *Linguistische Beiträge zur Slavistik. XXVI. und XXVII. JungslavistInnen-Treffen in Bamberg und Heidelberg*. Berlin et al.: Peter Lang, 2020.
- Moll, Martin. „Heimatfront Steiermark.“ Ein gemischtsprachiges Kronland im ersten „totalen Krieg.“ In Hermann, Kuprian, ed. *Der Erste Weltkrieg im Alpenraum. Erfahrung, Deutung, Erinnerung*. Innsbruck: Wagner, 2006, 181-195.
- Nachtigal, Reinhard. Privilegiensystem und Zwangsrekrutierung. Russische Nationalitätenpolitik gegenüber Kriegsgefangenen aus Österreich-Ungarn. In Jochen Oltmer, ed. *Kriegsgefangene im Europa des Ersten Weltkrieges*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2006, 167-193.
- Newman, John Paul. Croats and Croatia in the Wake of the Great War. In *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 24 (December 2014), 165-181.
- Norton, Claire. Nationalism and the Re-Invention of Early-Modern Identities in the Ottoman-Habsburg Borderlands. *Ethnologia Balkanica* 11 (2007), 79-101.
- Okey, Robin. A Trio of Hungarian Balkanists: Béni Kállay, István Burián and Lajos Thallóczy in the Age of High Nationalism. *The Slavonic and East European Review* 80/2 (2002), 234-266.
- Osterkamp, Jana, and Schulze Wessel, Martin. Texturen von Loyalität. Überlegungen zu einem analytischen Begriff. *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 42/4 (2016), 553-573.

- Otte, Thomas G. "Knavery" or "Folly?" The British "Official Mind" and the Habsburg Monarchy, 1856-1914. In Lothar Höbelt, and Thomas G. Otte, eds. *A Living Anachronism, European Diplomacy and the Habsburg Monarchy*. Vienna: Böhlau, 2010, 119-156.
- Pastor, Peter. The Home Front in Hungary, 1914-18. In Béla Király, ed. *East Central European Society in World War I*. Boulder Calif.: Social Science Monographs, 1985, 124-134.
- Pazman, Josip. Recenzija, Prikaz: Alois Hudal, Soldatenpredigten, Verlag von Ulr. Mosers, Graz, 1917. In *Bogoslovska Smotra*, 8/3 (1917), 300.
- Peball, Kurt, and Rothenberg, Gunther. Der Fall U. In Direktion, ed. *Aus drei Jahrhunderten. Beiträge zur österreichischen Heeres- und Kriegsgeschichte von 1645 bis 1938*. Vienna: Österr. Bundes-Verl. für Unterricht, Wiss. u. Kunst, 1969, 85-126.
- Phelps, Nicole M. Austro-Hungarian Enemy Aliens (USA). 1914-1918-online. *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08.
- Piahanau, Aliaksandr. A Priest at the Front. Jozef Tiso Changing Social Identities in the First World War. In *Revue des études slaves* LXXXVIII-4 (2017), 721-741.
- Pojić, Milan. Ustroj Austrougarske Vojske na Ozemlju Hrvatske 1868.-1914. *Arh. vjesnik* 43 (2000), 147-169.
- Prutsch, Ursula. Historisches Gedächtnis in kulturpolitischer Machtstrategie: Deutschland, Österreich-Ungarn, und die polnische Frage (1915-1918). In Moritz Csaky, and Klaus Zeyringer, eds. *Ambivalenz des kulturellen Erbes – Vielfachcodierung des historischen Gedächtnisses. Paradigma: Österreich*. Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2000, 69-91.
- Rachamimov, Alon. Arbiters of Allegiance: Austro-Hungarian Censors during World War I. In Pieter M. Judson, and Marsha L. Rozenblit, eds. *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*. New York: Berghahn, 2005, 157-177.
- Reichl-Ham, Claudia. Militärseelsorge im Ersten Weltkrieg. Die religiöse Betreuung von Soldaten im Ersten Weltkrieg. In Werner Freistätter, Gerhard Dabringer, eds. *Religionen im Krieg 1914-1918*. Vienna: BMLVS, 2017, 277-353.
- Ress, Imre. Versuch einer Nationenbildung um die Jahrhundertwende. Benjámín Kállays Konzeption der bosnischen Nation. In Endre Kiss, and Justin Stagl, eds. *Nation und Nationenbildung in Österreich-Ungarn, 1848–1938: Prinzipien und Methoden*. Vienna/Münster: LIT, 2006, 59-72.

- Rill, Robert. Wie katholische Priester den Ersten Weltkrieg sahen. Aus den Nachlässen und Sonderbeständen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs. In Werner Freistätter, and Gerhard Dabringer, eds. *Religionen im Krieg 1914-1918*. Vienna: BMLVS, 2017, 277-353.
- Rosner, Willibald. Die griechisch-katholische Kirche Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg. In Werner Freistätter, Gerhard Dabringer, eds. *Religionen im Krieg 1914-1918*. Vienna: BMLVS, 2017, 265-276.
- Rosner, Willibald. Allentsteig 1848-1918. Eine ländliche Kleinstadt in der Gründerzeit. In Ernst Bezemek, ed. *Heimat Allentsteig, 1848-2002. Mit Beiträgen zur Geschichte der Katastralgemeinden Bernschlag, Reinsbach, Thaua und Zwinzen*. Allentsteig: 2002, 19-84.
- Scheer, Tamara. Konstruktionen von ethnischer Zugehörigkeit und Loyalität in der k.u.k. Armee der Habsburgermonarchie (1868-1914). In Alexandra Millner, Katalin Teller, eds. *Transdifferenz und Transkulturalität: Migration und Alterität in den Literaturen und Kulturen Österreich-Ungarns*. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2018, 155-176.
- Scheer, Tamara. Habsburg Jews and the Imperial Army before and during the First World War. In Jason Crouthamel, Michael Geheran, Tim Grady, Julia B. Köhne, eds. *Beyond Inclusion and Exclusion: Jewish Experiences of the First World War in Central Europe*. New York: Berghahn, 2018, 55-78.
- Scheer, Tamara. Habsburg Empire's German speaking Public Sphere and the First Balkan War. In Dominik Geppert, William Mulligan and Andreas Rose, eds., *The Wars before the Great War: Conflict and International Politics before the Outbreak of the First World War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, 301-319.
- Scheer, Tamara. Lebenskonzepte, politische Nationenbildung, Identitäten und Loyalitäten in Österreich-Ungarn und Bosnien-Herzegowina. In Michael Geyer, Helmuth Lethen, Lutz Musner, eds. *Zeitalter der Gewalt. Zur Geopolitik und Psychopolitik des Ersten Weltkrieges*. Frankfurt a.M.: Campus, 2015, 177-198.
- Scheer, Tamara. A Micro-Historical Experience in the Late Ottoman Balkans: The Case of Austria-Hungary in Sanjak Novi Pazar (1879-1908). In Hakan Yavuz, Isa Blumi, eds., *War and Nationalism. The Balkan Wars (1912-13) and Socio-Political Implications*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2013, 197-229.
- Schmidl, Erwin A. Die k.u.k. Armee: integrierendes Element eines zerfallenden Staates? In Michael Epkenhans, Gerhard Gross, eds., *Das Militär und der Aufbruch in die Moderne 1860 bis 1890*. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003, 143-150.

- Schwarz, Karl W. Zusammenbruch und Neuanfang. Der Untergang der Donaumonarchie und der österreichische Protestantismus. In Karl-Reinhard Trauner, ed., *Religionen im Krieg 1914–1918. Evangelische Kirche in Österreich*. Vienna: HGM, 2014, 329-350.
- Somogyi, Éva. Im Dienste der Monarchie oder der Nation? Ungarische Führungsbeamte am Ballhausplatz. *Österreichische Osthefte* 44/3-4 (2002), 565-574.
- Spann, Gustav. Vom Leben im Kriege. Die Erkundung der Lebensverhältnisse der Bevölkerung Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg durch die Briefzensur. In Rudolf G. Ardelt, Wolfgang J.A. Huber, Anton Staudinger, eds. *Unterdrückung und Emanzipation. Festschrift für Erika Weinzierl zum 60. Geburtstag*. Vienna-Salzburg: Geyer, 1985, 149-165.
- Sujoldžić, Anita, Mirna, Jernej, and Glovacki Bernardi, Zrinjka. Multilingualism in Northwestern part of Croatia during Habsburg rule. *Linguistics (Jezikoslovje)* 13/2 (2012): 327-350.
- Steidl, Annemarie. Ein attraktiver Anziehungspunkt für Zuwanderer aus ganz Europa. Wandlungsmuster nach Wien, 1740-2010. In Weigl, Andreas, Peter Eigner, eds. *Sozialgeschichte Wiens, 1740-2010*. Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2015.
- Stergar, Rok. The Evolution of Linguistic Policies and Practices of the Austro-Hungarian Armed Forces in the Era of Ethnic Nationalisms: The Case of Ljubljana-Laibach. In Markian Prokopovych, Carl Bethke, and Tamara Scheer, eds., *Language Diversity in the Late Habsburg Empire*. Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019, 50-71.
- Stergar, Rok, and Scheer, Tamara. Ethnic Boxes. The Unintended Consequences of Habsburg Bureaucratic Classification, *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity* 4 (2018), 275-291.
- Stergar, Rok. Panslavism. In *1914-1918-online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War*. ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08.
- Stergar, Rok. Die Bevölkerung der slowenischen Länder und die Allgemeine Wehrpflicht. In Laurence Cole, Christa Hämmerle, Martin Scheutz, eds. *Glanz-Gewalt-Gehorsam: Militär und Gesellschaft in der Habsburgermonarchie (1800 bis 1918)*. Essen: Klartext, 2011, 129-151.
- Stergar, Rok. Fragen des Militärwesens in der slowenischen Politik, 1867-1914. *Österreichische Osthefte* 46 (2004), 391-422.
- Stone, Norman. Army and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1900-1914. *Past & Present* 33 (April 1966), 95-111.

- Strigl, Daniela. Schneidige Husaren, braven Bosniaken, feige Tschechen. Nationale Mythen und Stereotypen in der k.u.k. Armee. In Endre Hárs, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, Ursula Reber, Clemens Ruthner, eds. *Zentren, Peripherien und kollektive Identitäten in Österreich-Ungarn*. Tübingen: Francke 2006, 129-143.
- Struve, Kai. Polish Peasants in Eastern Galicia. Indifferent to the Nation or Pillars of Polishness? National Attitudes in the Light of Jozef Chalasiński's Collection of Peasant Youth Memoirs. *Acta Poloniae Historica* 109 (2014): 37-59.
- Suppan, Arnold. „Und jetzt werden die Ketten gesprengt!“ Umsturz und Neuordnung im südöstlichen Mitteleuropa 1918/20. In Harald Heppner, Eduard Staudinger, eds. *Region und Umbruch 1918. Zur Geschichte alternativer Ordnungsversuche*. Frankfurt a.M. et al.: Peter Lang, 2001, 35-53.
- Tepperberg, Christoph. Evangelische in Habsburgs Heer. In Gustav Reingrabner, ed., *Evangelische in Österreich. Vom Anteil der Protestanten an der österreichischen Kultur und Geschichte*. Vienna: Evang. Presseverband, 1996, 130-136.
- Trauner, Karl-Reinhart. Die Militärseelsorge bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg im Überblick. In Karl-Reinhart Trauner, ed. *Es gibt nie ein Zuviel an Seelsorge: 50 Jahre Evangelische Militärseelsorge im Österreichischen Bundesheer*. Vienna: Gra & Wis, 2007, 22-30.
- Trümpi, Fritz. Herausfordernde Musiker/-innenorganisation. Der Oesterreichisch-Ungarische Musiker-Verband im imperialen Kontext. In Bernhard Bachinger, Wolfram Dornik, and Stephan Lehnstaedt, eds., *Österreich-Ungarns imperiale Herausforderungen. Nationalismen und Rivalitäten im Habsburgerreich um 1900*. Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2020, 235-253.
- Uhl, Heidemarie, et al. Gedächtnis/Erinnerung und Identität. Konstruktionen kollektiver Identität in einer pluriethnischen Region. In Moritz Csáky, Astrid Kury, Ulrich Tragatschnig, eds. *Kultur-Identität-Differenz. Wien und Zentraleuropa in der Moderne*. Innsbruck et al.: Studienverlag, 2004, 215-254.
- Ulf, Christoph. Von Sinn und Unsinn identifikationsstiftender Rituale. In J.W.H. Kuprian, ed. *Ostarrichi-Österreich. 1000 Jahre – 1000 Welten. Innsbrucker Historikergespräche 1996*. Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 1997, 39-61.
- Ulrich, Bernd. Feldpostbriefe im Ersten Weltkrieg. Bedeutung der Zensur. In Peter Knoch, ed. *Kriegsalltag: Die Rekonstruktion des Kriegsalltags als Aufgabe der historischen Forschung und der Friedenserziehung*. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1989, 40-83.
- Urbanitsch, Peter. Der Ausgleich zwischen den Nationen untereinander und zwischen den Nationen und dem Staat in Cisleithanien. In Pierre Bèhar, Eva Philippoff, eds. *Von der*

- Doppelmonarchie zur Europäischen Union. Österreichs Vermächtnis und Erbe.* Hildesheim: Olms, 2011, 63-92.
- Urbanitsch, Peter. Pluralist Myth and Nationalist Realities: The Dynastic Myth of the Habsburg Monarchy: A Futile Exercise in the Creation of Identity? *Austrian History Yearbook* 35 (2004), 101-141.
- Van Drunen, Jeroen. How Jesus *Became a Woman, Climbed the Mountain, and Started to Roar*: Habsburg Bukovina's Celebrated Multilingualism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century. In Prokopovych, Markian, Bethke, Carl, and Scheer, Tamara, eds., *Language Diversity in the Late Habsburg Empire.* Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2019, 244-268.
- Varga, Bálint. Multilingualism in Urban Hungary, 1880-1910. *Nationalities Papers* 42/6 (2014), 965-980.
- Versteegh, Kees. Language of Empire, Language of Power. *Language Ecology* 2/1-2 (2018): 1-17.
- von Poten, Bernhard. Geschichte des Militär-Erziehungs- und Bildungswesens in Österreich-Ungarn (Berlin 1893). In *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918*, Band V. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
- von Puttkamer, Joachim. Magyarisierung! Sprachliche Assimilation und nationale Mobilisierung in Ungarn um 1900. In Wolfgang Dahmen, Petra Hirnstedt-Vaith, Gerhard Ressel, eds. *Grenzüberschreitungen. Traditionen und Identitäten in Südosteuropa. Festschrift für Gabrielle Schubert.* Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2008, 480-493.
- von Puttkamer, Joachim. Nationale Peripherien. Strukturen und Deutungsmuster im ungarischen Schulwesen 1867-1914. In Endre Hárs, Wolfgang Müller-Funk, Ursula Reber, Clemens Ruthner, eds. *Zentren, Peripherien und kollektive Identitäten in Österreich-Ungarn.* Tübingen: Francke, 2006, 97-110.
- Wagner, Walter. Die k.(u.)k. Armee. Gliederung und Aufgabenstellung. In Adam Wandruszka, ed. *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918: Die bewaffnete Macht.* Vienna: Verlag d. österr. Akad. d. Wissenschaften, 1987, 142-633.
- Wullschleger, Marion. Running the Show in the Adriatic Provinces. The last three Austrian governors in Trieste (1898-1918). In Franz Adlgasser and Fredrik Lindström, eds. *The Habsburg civil service and beyond.* Vienna: Verlag d. österr. Akad. d. Wissenschaften, 2019, 129-147.
- Zaharia, Ionela. For God and/or emperor: Habsburg Romanian military chaplains and wartime propaganda in camps for returning POWs. *European Review of History/Revue européenne d'histoire* 24:2 (2017), 288-304.

Zahra, Tara. "Condemned to Rootlessness and Unable to Budge:" Roma, Migration Panics, and Internment in the Habsburg Empire. *The American Historical Review*, 122/3-1 (June 2017), 702-726.

Zahra, Tara. Imagined Noncommunities: National Indifference as a Category of Analysis. *Slavic Review* 69/1 (2010), 93-119.

Zsuppán, F. Tibor. Die politische Szene Ungarns. In Mark Cornwall, ed. *Die letzten Jahre der Donaumonarchie. Der erste Vielvölkerstaat im Europa des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts*. Essen: Magnus, 2004, 107-229.

Unpublished Manuscripts

Brennan, Christopher. Reforming Austria-Hungary: beyond his control or beyond his capacity? The domestic policies of Emperor Karl I November 1916-May 1917. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012.

Brezina, Gregor. Österreichische Militärgerichtsakten des Obersten Militärgerichtshofs im Ersten Weltkrieg. MA-Thesis, University of Vienna, 2012.

Eder, Hans. Der General der k.u.k. Armee und geheime Rat Maximilian Csicsics von Bacsány. PhD-Thesis, University of Vienna, 2010.

Forgács, Márton. Német Jövevénysszavaka a Magyar katonanyelvben az első világháború idején. PhD-Thesis, ELTE Budapest, 2014.

Gillinger, Theresa. Jüdische Identitätsdiskurse der österreichischen Sozialdemokratie in den Zeitungen *Jüdische Volksstimme* und *Arbeiter-Zeitung* in der späten Habsburgermonarchie. MA-Thesis, University of Vienna, 2019.

Gude, Nino. Ukrainisch werden, jüdisch bleiben. Eine Verflechtungsgeschichte von Juden und Ukrainern in Lemberg und Przemyśl 1867-1919. PhD-Thesis, University of Vienna, 2019.

Mocharitsch, Thomas. Ruthenische Militärterminologie in der Habsburgermonarchie. MA-Thesis, University of Vienna, 2010.

Refi, Attila. Die Vorgeschichte der institutionellen Mehrsprachigkeit in der kaiserlich-königlichen Armee, mit besonderem Blick auf die ungarischen Bezüge.

Schweizer, Peter. Die österreichisch-ungarischen Wehrgesetze der Jahre 1868/69, 2 vols. PhD-Thesis, University of Vienna, 1980.

Suchorzewska, Ewelina. Zur Geschichte der polnischen Militärsprache in der Habsburgermonarchie. MA-Thesis, University of Vienna, 2009.

Online Resources

Frant. Kolára, Udatný rek Kanonýr Jabůrek. Kratochvílná píseň na světlo vydaná na příklad všem mládencům od civilu a militéru (<http://svejkmuseum.cz/Pisnicky/jaburek.htm>).

Janusz Majewskiego, C.K. *Dezerterzy*, 1985 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vmef_8MY46w).

Lviv-Center. Urban Media Archive (www.lvivcenter.org/en/uma).

Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB) (www.deutsche-biographie.de).

Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815-1950 (ÖBL) (www.biographien.ac.at)

Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des österreichischen Reichsrates (<http://alex.onb.ac.at/spa.htm>).

Periodicals

Agramer Zeitung

Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung

Arbeiter-Zeitung

Bukowinaer Post

Danzers Armee-Zeitung

Das Vaterland

Der Deutsche

Der Militärarzt. Zeitschrift für das gesammte Sanitätswesen der Armeen

Deutscher Geschichtskalender

Die Muskete

Die Vedette

Eger

Gazzetta di Trento

Grazer Tagblatt

Grazer Volksblatt

Hatvanhatos Tábori Újság

Hochland

Leitmeritzer Zeitung

Militair-Wochenblatt

Musavat

Neue Freie Presse

Neues Fremden-Blatt
Neues Wiener Tagblatt
Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift
Österreichischer Soldatenfreund
Pester Lloyd
Pettauer Zeitung
Prager Abendblatt
Prager Tagblatt
Pustertaler Bote
Reichspost
Românul
Simplicissimus
Slovan
Streffleurs Militärische Zeitschrift
Wiener Sonn- und Montags-Zeitung
Wiener Zeitung
Zeitschrift für die Bekämpfung von Geschlechtskrankheiten