

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

We against Them:

How Gender Issues serve the Construction of Populist
Radical Right Antagonisms

verfasst von / submitted by

Jutta Bichl, BA BA

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2021 / Vienna, 2021

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme code as it appears on
the student record sheet:

UA 066 824

Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt /
degree programme as it appears on
the student record sheet:

Masterstudium Politikwissenschaft

Betreut von / Supervisor:

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Birgit Sauer

Acknowledgment/Danksagung

Mein großer Dank geht an Univ.-Prof. Dr. Birgit Sauer, die mir stets mit Rat und Unterstützung zur Seite gestanden ist, nicht müde wurde meine Fragen ausführlich und verständlich zu beantworten und mir mit Anregungen und Hinweisen weitergeholfen hat, wenn ich in einer Sackgasse war. Danke, für Ihre Betreuung und Begleitung auf dem Weg hin zu dieser Arbeit.

Auch möchte ich mich bei meiner Familie bedanken. Besonders dankbar bin ich meinen Eltern, Magrit und Andreas, ohne die mein Studium nicht möglich gewesen wäre. Danke, dass ihr mich immer unterstützt, ermutigt und an mich geglaubt habt.

Schließlich auch ein herzliches Dankeschön an meine Freundinnen und Freunde, die mich in schwierigen Phasen motiviert und wenn nötig auch abgelenkt haben. Danke vor allem an Leni. Danke, dass du mir immer zugehört hast, wenn ich nicht weiterwusste, von Fortschritten berichtet habe oder nur meine Gedanken sammeln musste.

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1. Introduction

Populist radical right parties have become an important and successful party family in Europe and globally. Hence, populism, especially right-wing populism, is a subject, which has been broadly discussed, not only in academia but also in the media. There is a great variety of aspects one can focus on when discussing the rise of populist radical right parties, from political actors, ideology and party programs to rhetoric, media coverage and electorate. In general, populist radical right parties are likely to be seen as anti-immigrant parties due to the fact that their position against immigration is one of their best-known party characteristics (cf. Akkerman 2015:38).

Therefore, a policy field always associated with populist radical right parties is migration and related issues like asylum, multiculturalism, national identity and Islam. However, another trend in populist radical right parties has emerged, a stronger focus on gender issues (cf. Kitschelt 1997). In the context of rising Islamophobia in Europe, gender and women's rights issues are at the center of current controversies and debates on multiculturalism, which is an issue traditionally owned by populist radical right parties (cf. Han 2015). On the one hand, populist radical right parties present themselves as the defenders of Western traditions and liberal values, which include gender equality and women's rights (cf. Hollomey 2011). On the other hand, populist radical right parties are known for supporting rather traditional ideas about sex and gender, gender roles and family constellations. Thus, populist radical right parties often support campaigns against so-called Gender Ideology, Gender Studies in academia or sexual diversity (cf. Sauer 2017:3). Therefore, scientific interest in the relation between gender and populist radical right parties has grown in recent years. Especially the gender gap in support for populist radical right parties and electoral preferences among men and women as well as the female and male representation of party members have been widely researched (cf. Meret/Siim 2013).

However, comparatively little research has been done on how gender is used, framed and instrumentalized by populist radical right parties in order to create antagonisms; even though some scholars argue that a gender-sensitive analysis is essential for the understanding of how populist radical right parties and right-wing populism in general work (cf. Sauer 2017).

To contribute to the current state of research, this thesis aims at finding out how specific populist radical right parties use the category gender as an instrument to create antagonisms. The examined populist radical right parties are the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) and the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland,

AfD). These two parties offer a solid ground for the analysis, as they are not only classic examples of populist radical right parties in Europe but also embedded in similar cultural and political systems. Even if they have a different party history, their environment is quite similar and therefore differences in results due to the environment of the respective party are less likely. The analyzed material consists of their election programs. The study period comprises the general elections in 2013 and in 2017 in both countries. As the aim of this master thesis is to examine the usage of gender issues by populist radical right parties, the research question is *How do the Freedom Party of Austria and The Alternative for Germany use gender issues in order to construct antagonisms?* It is expected that the examination of this research question will allow an insight on how specific policy issues can be used by populist radical right parties to construct antagonisms. Moreover, this thesis shows how these issues are framed in order to create an image of “us vs. them”, which is an essential element of populist radical right parties and thus an important aspect of their political and communicative strategy.

In order to examine the usage and the framing of issues related to the category gender by populist radical right parties, this thesis firstly offers an overview over the state of the art concerning populist radical right parties and their stances on different gender related (policy) issues. This includes different clusters of gender issues (the heteronormative cluster and the othering through gendering cluster) and the different line of arguments regarding these issues as found in literature. The following chapter presents the theoretical framework for this thesis, which consists on the one hand of a rather general definition of what populism actually is as well as a more precise elaboration on populist radical right parties and their Gender Ideology or rather their “anti-genderism”. On the other hand, an insight on populist radical right antagonisms is provided. Chapter four presents the expectations regarding the research question on the base of the state of the art and the theoretical framework. Chapter five offers an insight on the case selection. This insight includes a country comparison of Austria and Germany with respect to their gender regimes. The case selection also presents the two respective parties, the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria, a short summary of their history, an ideological localization according to literature and concludes with a comparison of the similarities and differences of the two parties. Chapter six presents the methodological approach of this thesis. The examined material of this thesis consisting of the election programs from 2013 and 2017 of the respective parties, is presented. Furthermore, this chapter includes a presentation of content analysis as well as of the concept

of framing. The chapter is concluded by an overview of the execution of the analysis and a table summarizing the detected frames, codes and subcodes. Chapter seven presents the findings. This includes an explanation and justification of the procedure of the analysis and a summary of the results of the individual cases. The last chapter offers an interpretation of the results regarding the research question as well as a comparison of the different cases. The chapter is concluded by a possible outlook on further research fields.

2. State of the Art

In the following, the current state of research concerning populist radical right parties' stance and discourse on different gender issues and policies will be summarized and presented. This is divided into the two main clusters in accordance with Ajanović, Mayer, Sauer and Šori (2018). The cluster "othering through gendering" consists of the subchapters socio-economic marginalization of migrant and minority communities, gender and integration, gender and migration agenda and gender and security issues. The "heteronormative cluster" consists of the subchapters LGBTIQI-rights and sexual orientations, gender equality and feminism and family and reproduction.

2.1. Othering through Gendering

It can be observed that gender and migration issues are frequently linked by populist radical right parties. Concerning the topic of gendered discourses and practices around cultural differences between majority and minority populations different narratives can be found in literature. First, there is an argument on the basis of the socio-economic situation of minority and migrant communities and how this consequently forms an "ethnic underclass". Women with a lack of education raise the children of the next generation but do not have the formal education or the right skills to teach their children how to succeed in society. Hence, they play an important role in the continuation of reproducing socio-economic inequalities. (Joppke 2007).

The second line of arguments follows the idea that the resurrection of the importance of national identities within Europe have put women from minority or migrant communities in the center of the discussion around multiculturalism. Gender issues and women's rights issues have become essential aspects regarding debates about integration or even assimilation as they are presented as fundamental elements of liberal democracies. Practices, which are attributed to minority and migrant communities, especially Muslim communities,

are seen as incompatible with the values of liberal democracies and therefore targeted in order to protect these values, including gender issues and women's rights issues (cf. Adamson et al. 2011).

The third line of arguments also builds on the phenomena of femonationalism (Farris 2017). This term summarizes the idea that gender equality and women's rights are fundamental parts of liberal democracies and endangered by migrant and minority communities. In order to prove that gender issues are considered important for liberal democracies governments take action in implementing policies with respect to these issues. It is claimed that these policies protect women within minority and migrant communities and protect liberal values all at the same time. However, these policy initiatives which should promote gender equality and women's rights may support more restrictive immigration agendas and also reinforce negative stereotypes about said minority and migrant communities and in a longer run ideas about Western and non-Western societies. Depending on the frame, this preoccupation with women's rights and gender equality can demonize migrant and minority groups and become a proxy for attacking them (Phillips/Saharso 2008).

Fourthly, immigration and integration policies have been increasingly connected with security agendas. In this context, gender issues are important for populist radical right parties as they allow them to target practices like the wearing of veils or headscarves as being a threat to security and also a discrimination against women and "Western values" (Akkermann 2015).

2.1.1. Socio-economic Marginalization of Migrant and Minority Communities

The first line of arguments refers to the socio-economic situation of minorities and immigrant communities. Employment has been seen as essential for the integration process thus socio-economic integration and self-sufficiency, meaning independence from the state and its welfare programs, has become one of the main focuses of integration policies in Europe (Joppke 2007a:268). This not only envisions full inclusion in the labor market, which is tightly connected with inclusion in society, but also a reduction of the welfare and social protection costs. On the other hand, socio-economic marginalization is seen as a reinforcing factor concerning the overlapping of "ethnic and cultural differences" (Bonjour 2010:32). Moreover, globalization also plays an essential role with respect to the integration of migrant and minority communities into the labor market. The self-contained nation-state in which

immigrants should integrate themselves has been replaced by a state, which is in global competition. Instead of cultural assimilation or multicultural recognition, integration is framed as social inclusion, “which is economically instrumentalist and subordinate to the exigencies of globalization” (Joppke 2007a:269). This can also be seen in “common basic principles” of the European Union, which state “Employment is a key part of the integration process”. The concentration on the labor market with regards to integration and social inclusion roots in the belief that individuals from the mainstream society as well as from migrant and minority communities who are not dependent from state-welfare increase the competitiveness of states (cf. Joppke 2007b:17-18).

In a gender-specific context, the socio-economic marginalization of migrant and minority communities is also placed in the discussion surrounding the wearing of a veil. There is the argument that women, who are veiled (in the public discourse, this predominantly affects Muslim women and girls) cannot be fully integrated into society and they cannot fully participate in society, thus they are not completely integrated in and contribute to the labor market (cf. Ataç/Rosenberger/Sauer 2012:87).

2.1.2. Gender and Integration

The second line of arguments focuses on integration and Western liberal values as well as a backlash on multiculturalism. It treats the relation between the idea of liberalism, migration issues, identity and belonging as well as the demands, which are put on migrant and minority communities.

As Akkerman (2007) has argued, one change in right-wing politics has been the move away from pure ethnic chauvinism toward forms of nationalism that are more compatible with liberal values. Framing the national identity, they seek to defend in terms of the enlightenment and the achievements of liberalism – including gender equality and sexual liberation – has been one such strategy. Hence, populist radical right parties might present national identity in reference to liberal values, which include women’s rights and issues of gender equality as well as sexual liberation. Politicians might use these liberal values to construct a contrast between liberal societies and traditional societies, whereby traditional societies are associated with migrant and minority communities, especially Muslim communities (Akkerman 2007).

In the context of integration, liberalism can turn into exclusion if multiculturalism is rejected in order to defend liberal values. This might lead to exclusionary policies towards religious or cultural practices or demands which are seen as opposed to or incompatible with liberal values (Stolcke 1999).

Similarly, Tebbe (2006) talks about “identity liberalism”, an idea that is against a multicultural approach on compromise between different communities and supports exclusive policies in order to enforce liberal values and ways of life. Regarding gender issues, such policies can result in political demands to dress or rather not to dress in a certain way. It is argued, that there is a need for assimilation, as otherwise minorities would not be able “to operate effectively within and thus will be excluded by wider society” (Tebbe 2006:472). Furthermore, the facilitation of inclusion of minority and migrant communities in wider society is not the only argument found within this narrative. It is also argued by supporters of identity liberalism that the assimilation of minority and migrant communities serves the protection of certain members (“subgroups” (Tebbe 2006:473)) of the minority and migrant communities. Otherwise, they might face pressure to submit to traditions and customs within their own community, which deprives them of their individual freedom. In order to ensure that the populace lives by liberal values, exclusive policies can be adopted (Tebbe 2006:472-474).

2.1.3. Gender and Migration Agenda

The third line of arguments on gendering through othering found in literature is on the connection between an (Islamophobic) anti-immigration agenda and right-wing support of gender equality and women’s rights.

In general, it is found in popular and academic discourse that gender issues and women’s rights issues have become a vital aspect in the critique of multiculturalism and in policy initiatives building on this critique (Phillips/Sharso 2008:292). Similar to the second narrative on gender and integration, gender equality and women’s rights are framed as essential aspects of liberal democracies. Moreover, minority communities are often presented as being misogynist and carrying out discriminating practices against women, such as forced marriages, the pressure of wearing a veil or female genital mutilation. The minority community’s stance on gender issues is often taken as one of the measurements of the degree of its integration in the majority community. To varying degrees, this has led to interventions

from the state and public policies. Consequently, governments have increased their focus on addressing such practices and made them an element of the political agenda. Hence, numerous policy initiatives treating gender issues and women's rights within migrant and minority communities can be found across Europe (Philips/Sharso 2008:292-294.). There are two different approaches when it comes to supporting a more restrictive immigration agenda due to gender and women's rights issues. On the one side, gender equality and women's rights are presented as being essential elements of modern democracies, which must be defended. On the other side it is argued that more restrictive policies will also serve girls and women with migrant and minority communities as they will be protected from oppressive and discriminating practices.

It can be observed that gender issues, gender relations and women's rights issues in minority communities can be used to support restrictions in the immigration agenda or promote stereotypes about minority communities. Gender equality and women's rights are portrayed as core values of liberal democracies; hence, they are seen as elements, which differentiate between liberal and modern societies and illiberal, traditional ones. This feeds into the stereotype of "non-Western" and "backward" minority communities that are in contrast to the "Western society" (cf. Philips/Sharso 2008:295). The entanglement of gender and women's rights issues with multiculturalism and minority communities can be seen all over Europe with debates on similar issues like forced marriage, female genital mutilation, hijabs and honor crimes (cf. Philips/Sharso 2008:299).

In sum, it can be observed, that issues related to gender equality, gender relations and women's rights offer various discursive possibilities to those who want to establish stricter policies for migrant and minority communities. A focus on the concerns about the treatment and well-being of women allows a stricter and more restrictive immigration agenda while framing it as the defense of liberal values and protection of women within minority and migrant communities (Morgan 2017:899).

2.1.4. Gender and Security Issues

The fourth line of arguments treats gender and women's rights issues in the context of othering under the aspect of security issues. As already shown, there is an extensive focus on girls and women in Muslim minority communities when it comes to the entanglement of gender issues and migration. Especially after 9/11, populist radical right parties have

presented Islam as a threat to modern democracies. The following “war on terror” and its rhetoric have also extended to Europe and influenced the framing of Muslims as potential terrorists. This threat has been portrayed as an external threat as well as a domestic threat to democratic values and society. In sum, it can be said that a securitization of Islam and Muslim communities has emerged (Ajala 2014).

Muslim girls and women as well as issues and practices connected to them play a special role within the discourse about Islam and security. Gender issues such as the wearing of veils have not only been put in the context of female oppression and incompatibility with liberal values, but also in the context of security (Akkerman 2015). The veil has also been framed as a symbol of a dangerous political Islam. This narrative follows the idea that radical Islamists would recruit girls for their political ideology if there were no limits to claims of recognizing religious symbols like the veil. Hence, this freedom of Muslim women and girls of wearing a veil could be used to bring political ideas of radical Islamists to Europe. Consequently, political actors, especially right-wing populists, present the wearing of veils as a threat to (European) society. Women and girls who wear veils thus are seen as representatives of a potentially fundamentalist Islam (Adreassen/Lettinga 2012).

In the context of post-colonial international relation, the discussions surrounding the veil are instrumentalized to feed into the fear of Islamic terrorism. In this discourse, migrant and minority communities of (visible) Islamic origin are likely to be stereotyped and stigmatized as terrorists or fundamentalists who threaten liberal democracies (Avramopoulou/Çorbacıoğlu/Sanna 2012). Moreover, public spaces such as educational institutions tend to play an important role in the discussion surrounding the wearing of the veil. Put in the context of security issues, there is the argument that wearing a veil is not to be understood as the practice of individual religious freedom but as a strategic practice of fundamental Islamists who use “public schools as their battleground” (Gresch/Rostock/ Kiliç 2012:64).

2.2. Heteronormative Cluster

The heteronormative cluster summarizes arguments, which aim at naturalizing differences between genders as well as traditional gender roles and gender relations. Typical topics in this cluster are LGBTQ-rights and sexual orientation, gender equality and feminism as well as family and reproduction. Although some tendencies concerning the position on these topics exist, populist radical right parties are found to have varying stances and views on issues within the heteronormative cluster. (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2018).

Regarding LGBTQI-rights and sexual orientations, some populist radical right actors are against all visible homosexual activities, whereas others are more tolerant as long as these activities do not interfere with their idea of the “natural order” of family and society. Additionally, populist radical right parties might use critique on homophobia in order to attack (Muslim) migrant and minority communities that are according to populist radical right parties prone to homophobia. Nevertheless, populist radical right parties generally see “the people” as a heterosexual society and more than homosexuality itself, its (possible) equality before the (family) law is considered a problem. This means, homosexuality and especially homosexual marriages and families are put in the frame of the loss of privileges of heterosexual marriages’ and families’ (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2018:272-273).

Most populist radical right parties avoid directly attacking the idea of gender equality. Instead, they tend to portray and condemn feminism as an ideology, which is only supported by a small elitist group in society, and, according to populist radical right narratives, destroys traditional families, gender roles and gender relations. Moreover, there is the populist radical right argument, that feminism only distracts from the “real” problems of women (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2018:273).

The third topic within the heteronormative cluster are issues surrounding family. (Heterosexual) Families are, in the narrative of populist radical right parties, in the center of the societal “gender order”. However, family is defined in different ways. Some populist radical right ideas accept single parents and their offspring as wholesome families, whereas others present single parents as problematic. The “ideal family” is not only considered as a value on its own, but also as a base unit of society, which is, depending on the point of view, seen as a nation, culture, ethnicity, republic or civilization (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2018:274). Consequently, the “ideal family” should be protected and therefore reproductive rights, in particular the right to have an abortion, are also endangered. Thus, one can observe populist radical right campaigns to tighten abortions laws and women’s reproductive rights (Bierbach 2017).

2.2.1. LGBTQI-Rights and Sexual Orientations

Traditionally, populist radical right parties tend to see LGBTQI-people as a contradiction to (sexual) values and moral of the nation and its natives. There has been a tendency of populist radical right parties to be in defense of the “homogenous nation state” (Lubbers/Spierings/Zaslove 2017:220), which includes traditional, conservative believes

about morals and values concerning ideas about (sexual) relations and identity (Lubbers/Spierings/Zaslove 2017:219-220). One can trace this stance on sexual relations and identity issues back to the so-called counter-cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, where homosexual social movements played an essential role in challenging traditional (gender) norms and expectations. These movements managed to change and impose policies as they organized transnationally and worked together with supranational organizations such as the European Union (Siegel 2017). However, this counter-cultural revolution has experienced social and political headwind. This so-called anti-genderism movement consists of religious actors, especially the Catholic Church as well as Evangelical and Russian Orthodox groups, and in recent years also populist radical right parties. Especially the Vatican and Catholic Intellectuals have become central figures in the European anti-genderism movement (Sauer 2019). Especially the Vatican has produced important discourses and some strategies on what they call Gender Ideology, which also includes LGBTQI rights, over the last decades. This can be understood as a counterstrategy to the UN conference in Cairo on Population and Development in 1994 and the Fourth World Conference in Beijing in 1995. These conferences were the base for the official recognition of sexual and reproductive rights, which were opposed by The Holy See. The Church was afraid that these recognitions would lead, inter alia, to the legitimization of homosexuality and consequently to the destabilization of the “natural family” (Paternotte 2015).

Regarding sexual identities and relations, populist radical right parties tend to think about sexual identities and relations other than heterosexual ones as a threat to society and the “ideal family”. Their beliefs rather build on the idea that sexual identity and preferences might jeopardize “the people’s” solidarity as it might promote individualism than on religious principles. Moreover, LGBTQI organizations may work together with national and international institutions in order to impose or change laws, which makes them, in the eyes of populist radical right parties, unwarrantable to “the people” as national sovereignty, values and morals are “undermined”. At the level of policymaking, it shows that most populist radical right parties tend to vote against same-sex partnerships, marriages or adoptions or for reproductive benefits exclusively for heterosexual couples (Siegel 2017).

Yet, a change concerning the populist radical right stance on issues surrounding sexual relations, orientations or identity has occurred over the last years. The populist radical right views on LGBTQI-rights and different sexual orientations have become strongly shaped by anti-immigration and anti-Islam agendas due to the fact that a liberal stance on these issues

might be used to enforce stricter migration agendas. However, the liberal principles concerning LGBTQI-rights mostly remain of rhetorical nature and concrete policies tend to be shaped by traditional views on sexual identity and relations. Although it has become less salient for characterizing these parties, this mirrors the traditional populist radical right view on sexual relations and orientations. In general, populist radical right parties are not very likely to speak up in defense of LGBTQI-rights but might do so to demonstrate differences between “us” (liberal democracies) and “them” (migrant or minority communities) (Akkerman 2015). This means that the support of LGBTQI-rights does not fit the profile of populist radical right parties in principle. Nevertheless, the growing importance of the emphasis on Islam might have led to a turning point concerning these issues. Even though not all populist radical right parties present themselves in favor of LGBTQI-rights, there is now some space to defend them, be it implicitly or explicitly (Lubbers/Spierings/Zaslove 2017:220).

2.2.2. Gender equality and Feminism

Traditionally, populist radical right parties’ positions on gender equality are considered traditional and rather conservative due to their ideas about family values and family life. As populist radical right parties tend to glorify the “traditional life of the common man” (Spierings/Zaslove 2015:142), they have positioned themselves in favor of conservative ideas about gender roles and also how the household should be divided by gender. This understanding of gender roles sees men as the “bread-winner” and the “head of the family”, whereas women are responsible for care work and generally considered subordinate to men (Spierings/Zaslove 2015:142-143).

However, there are some inconsistencies in the populist radical right framing of gender equality as gender equality issues are instrumentalized by populist radical right parties in order to construct an image of “us” and “them”. Within these constructions, there are narratives about gender equality, which sometimes do not line up, hence there are inconsistencies to be found. It shows that populist radical right parties might re-frame narratives about gender equality according to who they want to reach. Therefore, populist radical right parties might frame gender equality as “an individual choice, a question of ‘common sense’, of traditional (family) values or ‘nature’” (Ajanović/ Mayer/ Sauer 2014:259). The “individual choice” approach on gender equality is likely to be used in traditional gender relations, meaning native, heterosexual couples (and their offspring). In this frame, (native) women are presented as having the free choice to perform care work.

Though, this freedom can be endangered by feminists or also “left-wing ideology” who want, according to populist radical right parties, take this freedom away from women. In contrast, populist radical right parties think of themselves as being on “the women’s side” and concerned about their freedom of choice. However, in the eyes of populist radical right parties, feminism and “left-wing ideology” are not the only threat to women. Another potential threat to gender equality per se and women in particular are, according to populist radical right parties, migrant and minority communities. Also, and this overlaps with the cluster “othering through gendering”, migrant and minority communities, especially Muslims, are portrayed as oppressive and discriminating towards women. Thus, they are a danger to gender equality, a crucial value of liberal democracies. This re-framing of gender equality enables populist radical right parties to speak to a broader audience, as the “we” can change its composition (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer 2014:263).

It can be observed that even though nowadays populist radical right parties are likely to (rhetorically) support the general idea of gender equality, they tend to follow anti-feminist narratives, so-called “anti-genderism”. In the European context there are several argumentative narratives regarding the fight against “genderism”. Some of them can also be found in other populist radical right discourses on gender due to the fact that gender equality summarizes many different aspects of the category gender as a whole. Therefore a few of the following arguments have already been presented in the chapters above in greater detail. The first one roots in the belief that there is a “natural” order of the two genders, which corresponds to the idea of traditional gender roles presented above. The second one has its focus on “protecting the family”, meaning the traditional heterosexual family. In the populist radical right discourse this nuclear family might be threatened by “genderism” or “gender mainstreaming”. The third argumentative narrative is closely linked to the second one and refers to children. This encloses sexual education in public institutions and subsequently the relation between public education and private education. The fourth line of arguments accuses supporters of “genderism” of patronizing citizens. This might be in line with the populist radical right characteristic element “anti-elites” as “genderists” are associated with inter- and supranational actors like the EU or the UNO. The fifth argumentative narrative has already been broadly discussed and summarizes the “othering through gendering” cluster – the emancipated West and the intolerant and discriminating – against – women rest, which legitimizes the exclusion of migrant and minority communities. The sixth and last line of arguments can be summarized under “anti-intellectualism”. Populist radical right parties

might argue that the concept of gender is incomprehensible for the “common people” and comes from political and intellectual elites. This, again, is in line with the “anti-elites” element of populist radical right parties. To sum up, populist radical right parties tend to position themselves in favor of gender equality if it serves their migration policies but are likely to support traditional gender roles and gender relations at the same time. Furthermore, “anti-genderism” can be used as a double antagonism as it works as an instrument against “the elites” as well as an instrument against “the others” (Sauer 2019:344 – 345).

In addition to these “anti-genderism” narratives, there may be a general (possibly intended) misunderstanding of the concept gender by populist radical right parties. This misunderstanding consists of the argument, that “gender mainstreaming” wants to eliminate “all kinds of gendered expressions” (Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2017:87) and promote the idea, that everyone can freely chose one’s gender identity. This critique of the gender concept allows populist radical right parties to frame it as a danger “to the nation, the country and civilization” (Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2017:88). In this line of arguments, the concept of gender is tied to the idea that elites intentionally want to cause a “demographic collapse of the native population” (Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2017:88). Hence, it is directly linked to the anti-elite element of populist radical right parties.

2.2.3. Family and Reproduction

For populist radical right parties, the construct family is generally in the center of the “right gender order”. However, there are different ideas about how family should be defined and what or who it consists of. It shows that there are several populist radical right interpretations of family in Europe. There are more modernized ideas about family and gender roles, the idea that family and nation or “the people” are closely linked to each other, the so-called neo-traditional views on gender and family, as well as the modern-traditional gender discourse (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2018; De Lange/Mügge 2015).

The more modernized discourse on gender roles and family tends to be in favor of labor market participation of women and against a gender pay gap. With regards to family related policies this means that propositions like a more flexible and affordable childcare system might be made in order to facilitate female labor market participation (De Lange/Mügge 2015:72). Furthermore, populist radical right parties that pursue a more modernized discourse of gender roles and family might also advocate for a better work-life balance of mothers and a general improvement of the situation of (working) mothers. However, women

remain responsible for care-work per se, also in the more modernized populist radical right discourse of family and gender roles (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2018:275).

The neo-traditional view on family and gender roles generally supports the idea of women as mothers and housewives. In contrast to more modernized gender and family discourses, populist radical tight parties who follow neo-traditional ideas do not tend to advocate for policies that facilitate the labor market participation of mothers. They tend to support policies, which benefit large families with traditional gender roles and division of work (De Lange/Mügge 2015:71). Moreover, motherhood is not seen as something exclusively private, but also in the interest of the nation and “the people”. In this line of arguments, the survival of the nation depends on the birth rates of (native) families. Within the neo-traditional discourse on families and gender roles there are different lines, one populist radical right party might focus on birth rates national demographic. On the other hand, other populist radical right parties not only see families in relation to increasing birth rates but also as a question of values and traditions. Hence, the family is understood as a central institution, which combines the biological and cultural reproduction of “the people” (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2018:275-276).

The third discourse on family and gender roles found within the populist radical right party family is the modern-traditional discourse. It combines progressive elements such as policies which facilitate the labor market participation of women with traditional views and values (De Lange/Mügge 2015:71)

To sum up, it can be said that even though there are some differences in populist radical right discourses on family and gender, especially regarding labor market participation of mothers and attitudes towards single-mothers, there are no attempts to re-define the general concept of family and gendered work division. Also, being a mother is generally considered as one of the most essential tasks of women, regardless how more or less modernized the party in question is (cf. Mayer/Sauer/ Šori 2017:98). It also should be mentioned that populist radical right parties are not the only parties, which support traditional family ideas as most European conservative parties are also in favor of them. However, populist radical right parties are the only ones to link family policies to demographic policies and therefore to nativism what especially shows in the neo-traditional discourse (Amesberger/Halbmayer 2002).

This nativist dimension of family policies also influences populist radical right parties’ stance on reproductive rights. As they want to extend or at least preserve the “native

population”, measures to increase birth rates of “native” women are supported. This includes a negative stance on abortion and a conservative view on reproductive rights. Yet, the intensity with which they oppose these issues and the importance of these issues within their political agenda might vary between the different populist radical right parties (Amesberger/Halbmayer 2002). To conclude, populist radical right parties tend to see reproductive rights in the light of the “survival of the nation” and abortion as a threat to the “native population” and its growth.

In general, it can be said that populist radical right parties first and foremost see women as (potential) mothers and thus as reproducers of the “native population” of a nation. Consequently, populist radical right parties are likely to equate family policies with women’s policies. Also, there is a tendency in the populist radical right discourse to superordinate a family’s need or society’s need to women’s needs. This manifests itself in their negative stance on feminism. Feminism is considered as being dangerous for traditional values and hence a threat to traditional family ideas (Amesberger/Halbmayer 2002).

This state of the art roughly summarizes populist radical right parties’ stance on different gender-specific issues. These issues are quite disparate and cover a wide range of thematic fields. However, the focus here is on the content-related position of populist radical right parties. As the theoretical framework suggests, the construction of antagonisms is essential for populist radical right parties and their communication with their possible electorate. This thesis aims at connecting populist radical right parties’ position on gender-specific issues with their construction of antagonisms. As comparatively little research on how these issue positions can be used in elections campaigns has been conducted to far, this thesis wants to fill this particular research gap.

3. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework consists of an overview of how populism can be defined and how it is understood in this thesis. This is followed by a closer look on populist radical right parties and their “gender ideology”. The second part of this chapter focuses on a central aspect of populist radical right parties: the construction of antagonisms, the idea of “us vs. them”. This part includes the construction of an antagonism between “the people” and “the elites” as well as between “the people” and “the others”. These constructed antagonisms also include the populist radical right idea of who “the people”, “the elites” and “the others” are.

3.1. Populism

In order to examine the research question of this thesis it has to be explained how populism in general and more specifically populist radical right parties are understood and defined. There are different approaches in literature defining and characterizing populism and populist radical right parties. There is not only a variety of terms being used, but also a different focus on issues, which are seen as relevant for populism and populist radical right parties. This thesis will work with Cas Mudde's concept of populism and populist radical right parties as it is to be found well structured, clear and straight forward.

Mudde argues that populism is an "ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004:543). Hence, the core concept of populism are "the people" and its opposite, "the elite". This distinction is a normative one and not based on any empirical differences in behavior or attitudes. Moreover, Mudde describes populism as a "thin-centered" ideology, which needs to be combined with and attached to other ideologies (Mudde 2004). These ideological aspects populism is attached to are crucial for the promotion of political projects that are appealing to a broader public. By combining populism with other sets of ideas, populists are able to address and politicize issues that are relevant in their own context. Hence, the reason why there are many different types of populist actors is that there is a very diverse range of "host ideologies". Although all populists share the distinction between "the people" and "the elite", the idea who "the people" and "the elite" are, varies a lot (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2018). Mudde concludes that populist parties are monist and people are seen homogeneous in terms of ethnicity and moral. Pluralism is seen as a threat that undermines this homogeneity of "the people" and their will and as a way of protecting interests not mattering to "the people" (Mudde 2011).

3.2. Populist Radical Right Parties

As populism itself is understood as a thin ideology, populist radical right parties are defined by other ideological aspects as well. According to Mudde nativism, populism and authoritarianism are the core elements of populist radical right parties' ideology.

Nativism is according to Mudde (2011) an idea that combines nationalism and xenophobia. This leads to the believe that only members of the native group should live in the nation-state. All other people who are non-native as well as customs, languages and ideas that are

considered non-native by the native group are seen as a threat to the homogeneous nation-state. Authoritarianism means the idea of a strictly hierarchially organized and ordered society. Also, there is the idea that violations against the rules put in order by the authorities should be persecuted and punished hard. Last but not least, as already discussed above, Mudde describes populism as an ideology that thinks of the society of being split in two groups, “the people” and “the elite”. In this case, populist political actors see themselves as representatives of “the people”, “the elite” tend to vary, according to the position of the populist political actors and their enemy stereotype. For example, ruling parties, the EU or academia are often portrayed as “the elite”. A combination of all these aspects makes, according to Mudde, a party a populist radical right party. In addition to this description of populist radical right parties’ characteristic aspects, Mudde also argues that these parties are in general democratic. Therefore, popular sovereignty and majority rule are accepted. In addition, populist radical right parties are very likely to agree to parliamentary democracy. Moreover, most of them support the idea of a stronger executive. In contrast to the basic idea of democracy, in many cases, there are tensions between populist radical right parties and liberal democracies, especially when it comes to the constitutional protection of minorities, whether they are ethnic, political or religious minorities (Mudde 2011).

3.3. “Us vs. Them” – the Populist Radical Right Antagonism

As already discussed, the idea of society being split into groups, one being “the people”, is one of the core elements of populist radical right parties. Concerning the ones who are, in the populist radical right worldview, not part of “the people”, a double antagonism can be observed. On the one hand, “the establishment” or “the ruling elite” including governing parties, academia and intellectuals as well as mainstream media or Brussels as a synonym for the European Union are portrayed as not being part of “the people”. On the other hand, “others”, including immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers but also feminists and LGBTQI people are portrayed as not being part of “the people” (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer 2018:637).

3.3.1. We – The People

Research on the populist radical right-wing double antagonism suggests that the “us”- group is constructed vertically as well as horizontally. In the first case, the “we - the people” is seen

as an opposition to “the elite”. In the second case, the “we – the people” is seen as an opposition to “the others” (Ajanović/Mayer/Sauer 2018:637).

In the vertical construction of “the people”, they are constructed as the counterpart to “the elites”, which consist of the politically and economically established power-holders as well as academia and media. Additionally, populist radical right parties are likely to portray these “elites” as being “left wing, liberal and/or multiculturalist, as well as divided along national/international and economic/political lines” (Šori and Pajnik, 2014:37).

The characteristics of “the people” as an opposition to “the elite” can vary according to context, the political climate and the dominant discourse of the elites. For instance, if values like liberalism, individualism and internationalism/globalism are generally presented and received as aspirational, radical right populists tend to present themselves as being opposed to these values. Thus, the self-presentation of populist radical right parties can be understood as a reaction to the established environment (Canovan 1999:3-4).

However, right-wing populism is not only an opposition to the established power-holders, but also the approach of claiming to be the representor and speaker of “the people”. There are several rhetorical possibilities populist radical right actors might use in order to present themselves as speakers for “the people”. Canovan points out three different ways, which might also be combined in practice. The first possibility consists of “an appeal to the united people, the nation or country, as against the parties and factions that divide it” (Canovan 1999:5). This idea of “the people” as a united whole includes impatience with party strife. Hence, it can be used to strengthen the support for a strong and charismatic individual leadership by someone who stands for “the interests for the nation” (ibid.) and thus “the people”. The first possibility can be combined with the second one, “the appeal to our people” (ibid.). “Our people” is likely to be meant with respect to ethnic groups. This appeal separates “our people” from the ones who do not belong to this group. Therefore, the appeal to “our people” is a divisive one, whereas the appeal to the “united people” is an integrative one. The third possibility is the appeal to “the common/ordinary people”. These are framed as a contrast to “the elites” by whom they and their needs and opinions are ignored on a regular basis. Populist radical right actors present themselves as the ones who say what “the (common/ordinary) people” think but do not say (ibid.).

Also, Taguieff introduces two different anti-elitist approaches. The first one considers “the people” as “demos”. The “demos” consists of the idea of common people who have the same

values, knowledge and believes. Here, “the elites” are regarded as being unable to be representatives of “the people”. The populism creating this kind of antagonism is called “protestatory populism”. The second approach considers “the people” as “ethnos” which implies an attachment to the idea of the nation. The populism creating this kind of antagonism is called “identitarian populism” (Taguieff 2002).

Mény and Surel summarize three main aspects concerning the relation between “the people” and “the elites”, which are also to be found in the center of populist radical right rhetoric. First, “the people” are one of the core elements in the suggested version of the world. Here, the sense of community is especially highlighted. Second, a rhetoric which puts “the people” as the good, fair and pure ones in opposition to “the elites” who are presented as being responsible for the current situation. Third, the assertion that an authentic democracy can be installed, and the people’s sovereignty restored when the representative institutions are changed (Mény/Surel 2000).

In addition to the vertical construction of “the people”, there also exists the horizontal construction of “the people”. This is especially relevant for populist radical right actors and supplements the vertical construction of “the people” which is generally used by populists and not only radical-right populists. The horizontal construction of “the people” also creates an antagonism between “us” and “them”. However, in the vertical construction the “we”-group mainly refers to a nation-state or a region and includes xenophobic aspects. In the horizontal construction, “the people”, hence the nation, are regarded as an opposition to “the others”, the ones from “outside”. As a consequence, a horizontal exclusivity is created. Thus, a certain part of the population is excluded from “the people”. This excluded part of the population which does – according to populist radical right actors – not belong to “the people” is likely to consist of migrant and minority groups (Pelinka 2002:284-285).

In both cases, populist radical right actors try to present themselves as the real, true representatives of “the people”, acting in their best interest and in order to protect them. They claim that “they and only they represent the ‘real people’ in a nativist and culturalist sense” (Wodak 2017:554). “The people” in general are portrayed as “good, innocent, and hard-working” (ibid.:553). “The people” is thought of as a monolithic, homogeneous group authentically embodying traditional values and simple virtues while not having any divisions within this entity (Taggart 2000:92). Populist radical right actors thus construct a feeling of belonging together based on a common identity (Tarchi 2003:22).

3.3.2. Them

An essential aspect in the construction of “the people” is the construction of those who are not part of “the people”, the “them-group” as an opposition to the “we-group”. “Them”, the ones who are portrayed as not being part of the “we-group”, “the people”, can be categorized in two different out-groups, “the elites” and “the others”. Populist radical right parties tend to frame “the elites” as acting against “the people” whereas “the others” are framed as being a threat to “the people”, the autochthonous population. Here, “the elites” are part of the respective society. However, they are not part of “the people”. “The others” on the other hand are constructed as being a danger from “outside” (the national borders). Populist radical right actors do not regard them as a part of the respective society nor “the people”. Interestingly, in some cases populist radical right parties construct a conspirative alliance between these two out-groups working against “the people” (Wodak 2017:556). Moreover, populist radical right parties think of “the people” as a victim. Hence, scapegoating is an important mechanism for populist radical right actors when constructing “the people”, vertically and horizontally. The scapegoats might vary depending if “the people” are constructed vertically or horizontally and the global and national context. Thus, migrant or minority communities, refugees, Muslims, Jews, capitalists, socialists, the European Union, the United Nations, governing parties, feminists, intellectuals, the media and so forth can be framed as scapegoats (ibid.:553).

The so-called “establishment” is likely to be seen as being part of “the elites” if not as “the elites” in general. Populist radical right actors try to create an image of them neglecting as well as not protecting “the people” and ignoring their needs and fears while pursuing their own interests (ibid.:552). Who “the elites” and therefore also “the people” are, can differ “in their inclusionary and exclusionary specifics” (ibid.:555) and is dependent on the history and political discourse of the country. For example, in Europe some intellectuals are accepted by members of populist radical right parties. In the United States however they are more likely to be seen as “the elites” or “the establishment” and thus not part of “the people”. On the other hand, rich people are not necessarily considered elitist as in the United States there is a strong discourse that everyone could become rich if the person works hard enough (ibid.). When populist radical right parties talk about “the elites”, they are likely to refer to elites in culture, politics or education. Economical elites are not the main target of populist radical right parties as long as they are not tied to political-economic institutions. “The elites” which populist radical right parties regard as being a threat to “the people” are likely to engage in

cosmopolitan liberalism and/or the sociocultural left (Rydgren 2017:490). Furthermore, populist radical right parties see no problem or threat in elites when they themselves are part of them (Müller 2016:29).

Generally, populist radical right parties regard “the people” as good and pure, hence contemporary societal problems and difficulties cannot be their fault. However, “the elites” can be seen as being in charge of everything that is going wrong or against the vision of the world and society of populist radical right parties. Populist radical right parties make “the elites” responsible for everything that threatens or endangers. This may interfere with conspiracy theories insofar as “the elites” are presented as secret elites who work behind the scenes (Müller 2016:32). Their work and their goals are presented as being “against the ‘little people’ of the ‘heartland’” (Rydgren 2017:488-489). Hence, the main reason populist radical right actors attack “the elites” is for not being in touch with “the people” (Tarchi 2003:26).

The second out-group populist radical right parties are likely to be opposed to can be summarized under the term “the others”. The mechanism of “othering” is a core aspect of the majority of populist radical right discourses and of high importance regarding the success of populist radical right parties. This can be seen all over Europe as well as in the United States of America (Kamenova/Pingaud 2018:108). It excludes people who are presented as being outside “the people”, which are seen as an ethnic nation (Canovan 2002) These “others” are associated with or even made responsible for negative developments within the nation. This leads to feelings of fear and suspicion towards these “others” (Kamenova/Pingaud 2018:108).

The definition of who those “others” exactly are varies according to the circumstances and the national and historical context. “The others” can consist of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, women, homosexuals and so on (Krasteva/Lazaridis 2016:11). Hence, the “otherness” can build on racial, religious, sexual, ethnic grounds. Populist radical right actors do not regard these “others” as a part of “authentic, morally pure people” (Kamenova/Pingaud 2018:110).

One of the main “other” subjects addressed by populist radical right parties is “the migrant” and also “the refugee” or “the asylum seeker”, who is constructed as a threat to the nation and “the people”, as the “external enemy”. “The migrant” is regarded as threatening more or less everything from the economy and the social construction of society to personal security and the essence of the majority group, “the people”, itself. Especially the “existential threat”

(Kamenova/Pingaud 2018:112) is often interlinked with the presentation of Muslims as “others”. Moreover, populist radical right actors also construct a linkage between “the migrant” and “the Muslim” as “others” and “the elites”, “who did not see the threat coming or were not able or even worse, not willing to take the necessary actions to protect society” (Kamenova/Pingaud 2018:113). Consequently, populist radical right actors might state that their criticism is mainly addressed to “the elites” who are seen as being in charge of and responsible for immigration and asylum policies (Benveniste/Lazaridis/Puurunen 2017:57). Another main “other” subject addressed by populist radical right parties is based on ideas about gender relation and roles, sexuality as well as sexual orientation and feminism. Populist radical right parties also construct antagonisms rooted in these issues and consequently exclusivity. In order to construct these antagonisms and exclusivity different approaches can be made. The first one is the bio-political argumentation. This line of arguments “is concerned with mostly essentialist and nationalist ideas about proper gender and sexual roles, which are seen as ‘natural’ and considered as the basis of the existence of the nation” (Ajanović/Kuhar/Saarinen/Sauer 2017:110). In this discourse, everyone who does not fit the “natural” roles, for example homosexuals, non-binary people or trans-people, is regarded as being “other” from and a threat to “the people” and their well-being as well as being “unnatural” and “sick” (whereas heterosexuality is regarded as “normal” and “healthy”). Another populist radical right discourse focuses on gender equality, the perseveration of the traditional family model with a focus on the role and idea of motherhood. Thus, populist radical right actors do not only construct the ethnicized and the homosexual “other” as threatening “the people” but also gender equality as danger to the nation, its ongoing existence as well as “its sanity and national or ethnical purity” (Ajanović/Kuhar/Saarinen/Sauer 2017:112). In contradiction to the first line of arguments, which construct homosexuals as “the others”, there is another populist radical right discourse supporting LGBTQI rights as part of Western values. However, this support is interlinked with exclusivity as it regards ethnicized “others”, especially Muslims, as being against those rights and hence against Western values (cf. Ajanović/Kuhar/Saarinen/Sauer 2017:114). Thus, it can be observed that “the basic aim of protection in the discourse of populist parties and movements is not the protection itself, but rather the pragmatic politics of exclusion of the others – the racialised others” (Ajanović/Kuhar/Saarinen/Sauer 2017:118)

As already mentioned, the idea of who “the people”, “the elites” and “the others” are, can vary according to the context. Thus, the central aspects and objects stay the same, but their

surrounding narratives can differ. This mechanism, which is inherent to populist radical right parties, is called “calculated ambivalence” (Krasteva/Lazaridis 2016:13). Ruth Wodak states that “the “strategy of calculated ambivalence” serves to convey at least two contradictory messages in one utterance which address different audiences (which also oppose each other and have different stand points and ideologies)” (Wodak 2013:80). Hence, calculated ambivalence conveys dual messages (Wodak 2013:91). It is used to discuss controversial issues while allowing different interpretations with opposite meanings. This rhetoric is essential for populist radical right actors in order to enlarge their acceptable possibilities (Hatakka/Niemi/Välimäki 2017:11).

3.4. “Gender Ideology” and Anti-Genderism

De Lange and Mügge (2015) define Gender Ideology as “the part of a political ideology that contains structured beliefs and ideas about ways power should be arranged according to social constructs associated with sexed bodies” (De Lange/Mügge 2015:65). However, the term “gender ideology” itself has its roots in the Vatican and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and was originally designed for a discourse and a strategy that opposes progressive ideas regarding gender-specific issues. Paternotte describes Gender Ideology in this context as “not just an expression to denounce the development of Gender Studies and gender equality claims, but the name of a counterstrategy carefully designed by the head of the Church since the drawbacks of the UN conferences of Cairo and Beijing” (Paternotte 2015:135). Populist radical right actors, especially in Europe, the United States and Russia, have joined this discourse, also referred to as anti-genderism, and promote it in order to support their nationalistic and nativist concept of society (Sauer 2019).

According to De Lange’s and Mügge’s definition of Gender Ideology, there are different categories of so-called gender issues. They identify “classical” gender issues, which include economic participation, family structures and reproduction as well as (political) representation. In the context of “classical” gender issues party campaigns for family insurance, fiscal advantages for families, higher social security benefits for larger families and benefits for stay-at-home parents can be found in the context of Western European populist radical right parties (De Lange/Mügge 2015:70-74). Moreover, there is a general support for the nuclear family to be found within the populist radical right party family. Since the early 2000s, there has been increasing demands put upon immigrants to adopt cultural values of majorities in host countries. These policies include gender relations and sexuality

and portray them as constitutive elements of the host country (Korteweg/Yurdakul 2009). Hence, new gender issues include cultural and religious differences between majority and minority populations concerning discourses and practices around gender relations, gender equality, sexuality and women's rights in general (Kofman/Saharso/Vacchelli 2015).

Different approaches regarding the question if there is a consistency concerning gender issues and women's rights issues among populist radical right parties can be observed in literature. An example is Kofman (1998), who concludes that there does not exist a single and consistent attitude to these issues among populist radical right ideology in Europe. On the other hand, Mudde (2007) observes a consistency that, as he argues, consists of three tenets. First, women's politics and family politics are seen as one issue. Second, there is the belief that natural differences between men and women exist and third, women have to be under protection as they birth children and are therefore essential for the survival of a nation. Hence, populist radical right ideas see men as heads of the family and women as mothers, who are responsible for care-work (Norocel 2013). Moreover, de Lange and Mügge (2015) argue that the inclusion of gender in the ideology of populist radical right parties is hardly new. However, it has changed over time. Most populist radical right parties in Europe touch upon gender issues only sporadically and integrate them within other topics such as economic development, labor market participation (classical gender issues) or the integration of immigrants and the defense of liberal values (new gender issues).

Ajanović, Mayer, Sauer and Šori (2018) identify two main clusters in which most of the populist radical right discourses on gender issues can be embedded. The first one is the so-called "heteronormative cluster". This cluster summarizes arguments, which naturalize gender differences, inequalities and heteronormative gender relations. It shows that this cluster is in line with Mudde's argument of the believed natural differences between the sexes. The second one is called "othering through gendering" and summarizes discourses with regard to anti-Islam and anti-migration arguments. Moreover, they also identify frames, which can be found in both clusters, which are an anti-elite attitude, criticism on "ruling ideologies" and references to national values and traditions.

Akkerman (2015) follows the idea that populist radical right parties have traditionally included gender in their ideology as well. She also refers to classical and new gender issues and the two main clusters in which most of the populist radical right discourses on gender issues are found. Populist radical right parties are described as conservative with regards to gender relations, gender roles, reproductive rights and family. Although populist radical right

parties in general are found to support a conservative agenda which foresees these elements, differences between parties within the populist radical right party family in Europe can be found. Some populist radical right parties might be more flexible and modern than others when it comes to labor market participation or gender relations. Additionally, it has to be mentioned that parties have changed, and new parties have emerged. With respect to new gender issues, Akkerman states that “populist radical-right parties have shown renewed interest in gender issues as part of their anti-immigration programs” (Akkerman 2015:39).

4. Expectations

In this thesis, the interaction of populist radical right stances on gender issues and the construction of antagonisms is of special interest with regard to the research question. Taken from the presented literature, several general assumptions on how gender issues can be used by populist radical right actors in order to construct antagonisms and an image of “us vs. them” can be made. The findings in the corresponding literature suggest that different issues can be used in order to create populist radical right antagonisms between “we - the people” and “them”, in this case them being either “the elite” or “the others”. As the state of the art concerning populist radical right parties and their stance and rhetoric on gender issues shows, gender issues are one of them.

The cluster “othering through gendering” largely correlates with the constructed antagonism between “we – the people” and “others”. The presented literature shows that mostly migrant and minority communities, especially Muslims, are regarded as “the others” with respect to gender issues. To summarize the state of the art, one can say that women within migrant and minority communities are constructed as “the others” as populist radical right actors present them as being less likely to be included in the national labor market and therefore as less likely to be included in society. Furthermore, migrant and minority communities (especially men within those groups) are portrayed as having “other” views (often presented as “backwards”) on gender issues than “the people” and thus are incompatible with Western liberal democracies and their values. In this line of argument, men in migrant or minority communities are constructed as a threat not only for “the people” but also for women in migrant or minority communities. Moreover, populist radical right actors securitize gendered practices of migrant and minority communities (especially the wearing of a veil) and portray them as a threat to “the people” and not being part of “the people’s culture”.

The heteronormative cluster correlates with the constructed antagonism between “we – the people” and “the others” as well as between “we – the people” and “the elites”. Concerning LGBTQI-rights and sexual orientations, literature shows that on the one hand populist radical right parties tend to be in defense of the “homogenous nation state” and thus support traditional and conservative beliefs concerning ideas about (sexual) relations and identity. In this case, homosexuals and people who do not fit the heteronormative idea about gender are seen as “the others” who are not part of “the people” and hence an antagonism is constructed. On the other hand, populist radical right parties also portray migrant and minority communities as being against LGBTQI rights and therefore against liberal values. In this case, LGBTQI rights are presented as part of “the people” and an antagonism between “the people”, who are supportive of liberal values including LGBTQI rights, and migrant and minority communities, is constructed. A similar mechanism, the already discussed calculated ambivalence, can be observed when it comes to gender equality and feminism. On the one hand, populist radical right parties tend to be opposed to feminism and Gender Studies as they are regarded as an elitist ideology which will lead to the “demographic collapse of the native population” (Mayer/Sauer/Šori 2017:88). In addition, feminists themselves are seen as “the others” as they do not fit the populist radical right vision of female behavior within “the people”. An antagonism between “the people” and “the elites” is constructed. On the other hand, populist radical right actors regard migrant and minority communities as being opposed to gender equality (a value portrayed as being essential for Western democracies in this case). Hence, an antagonism between “the people” and migrant and minority communities – or “the others” – is constructed. Regarding family and reproduction, populist radical right parties regard women first and foremost as potential mothers and thus as reproducers of “the people”. Organizations, parties and institutions in favor of reproductive rights are thus seen as a threat to “the people” and the persistence of the “native population”.

This thesis focuses on two specific populist radical right parties, the Freedom Party of Austria and the Alternative for Germany, and their usage of gender issues in constructing antagonisms. The assumptions taken from the literature might correlate with these cases, but do not necessarily have to do so. To examine this usage of gender issues, the used material will be screened for gender issues. The according statements will be examined in accordance with the frame they put gender issues into and also how and which antagonism they construct.

5. Case Selection

This chapter offers an overview of and justifies the case selection. First, the two respective countries, meaning Germany and Austria, are presented with respect to their gender regimes. This is followed by a short summary of the two parties' history as well as an examination of their characteristics and ideological localization as found in literature. The chapter is concluded by a comparison of the two parties showing their similarities and differences. The party histories should also offer some insights in the ideological background, development and current localization of the parties in question. These aspects are in interest of this thesis, as they play a crucial role regarding the comparison of the findings.

5.1. Country comparison: Austria and Germany

The respective countries in this thesis are Germany and Austria. These two countries have been chosen as they have quite similar welfare and gender regimes. Moreover, they share the same language and a similar culture, are neighboring countries and have been connected throughout history (cf. Auswaertiges-Amt 2020). Nevertheless, their party history differ, as will be shown later in this chapter.

5.1.1. Gender Regimes

Austria and Germany both have a similar welfare system, which has a direct influence on the country's gender norms and gendered work division. Both countries have a rather conservative welfare state regime. A conservative welfare state regime is characterized by care work being mainly done in private, most of the time by the family, medium decommodification, and relatively high stratification due to the principle of equivalence. Thus, the systems has a relatively big influence on the development of social classes, employment-related social security, which takes place through transfer payments, and social welfare depending on contributions (Esping-Andersen 1990). Regarding gender norms, roles and the division of work this has great impact. Due to the fact that care work is supposed to happen in private in a conservative welfare state regime and is most of the time done by women, the traditional male breadwinner-model enforcing traditional gender roles and work division is supported by this kind of welfare state regime.

In general, all those structures, norms, policies and laws influencing gender relations within a political system can be referred to as gender regime. Heather MacRae (2006) defines a

gender regime, with reference to other authors, as “a set of norms, values, policies, principles and laws that inform and influence gender relations in a given polity (Connell 1987; Liebert 2003; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999; Sainsbury 1999). A gender regime is constructed and supported by a wide range of policy issues and influenced by various structures and agents, each of whom is in turn influenced by its own historical context and path” (MacRae 2006: 524-525). Daly and Rake (2003) examine the influence of the welfare state on gender relations in three dimensions: care, wage labor and welfare. Care relates to the conditions under which care work takes place. This includes the structure and provision of direct and indirect care work by the welfare state as well as the social organization of care. Wage labor relates to presence and situation of men and women at the labor market as well as to the gender specific work division between paid and unpaid labor. This includes labor market access and the divide of paid and unpaid work. Welfare relates to the distribution of resources along the category gender while differentiating between resources for families and resources for individuals. This includes the access to resources like money, time and opportunities as well as state activities for welfare production and how these activities affect households and individuals (Daly/Rake 2003).

The interaction between welfare state regimes and gender regimes becomes visible as different welfare state regimes represent different gender regimes. Austria and Germany, as already mentioned both belonging to the conservative welfare state type, also are examples for a classic conservative gender regime. Defining aspects of such a gender regime are “a relative passive social policy, values like minimisation of (labour) market distributed welfare and the preservation of traditional family ties and norms” (Nordenmark 2013:210). Moreover, the state primarily supports family policy tailored for the male-breadwinner system and only few policies aim at breaking traditional gender roles (ibid.).

In both countries, some of these policies aimed at outsourcing domestic tasks to paid workers like maids or cleaners in order to lighten the burden of doing unpaid care-work and domestic work on mothers and wives. Additionally, formal contracts for the employees are brought into the rather informal sector of domestic labor. This shows, that these policies that should support families and break with the male-breadwinner system have been interrelated with aims concerning employment issues. One of the most important aspects of care-work in Austria and Germany is the care for the elderly as both countries have a rapidly aging society. Traditionally, there are rather few public infrastructures, which take care of the elderly. Also, in both countries there are values which are in favor of private, domestic-based care-work in

comparison to institutional care-work. This leaves the families, most of the times mothers, daughter and wives, in charge of the care-work. As more and more women have entered the labor market, the number of families, which have turned to migrant workers to take care of their elderly relatives at home, has increased. This has also been supported by reforms concerning “tax credit, vouchers and immigration restriction for household and care workers” (Shire 2015:196). However, the care-work itself remains primarily domestic even if it is (partly) carried out by low-wage domestic workers and not family member themselves. Even if there is the attempt to modernize the male breadwinner model, rather little attention has been given to formalizing migrant care-workers’ status, improving working conditions or generally making domestic-care work a public issue (Shire 2015). The care-work sector and its reforms are also directly related to the sector of the formal labor market. Research has brought to attention that these attempts of modernizing the male breadwinner model also promote part-time work for women (Daly 2011). This shows that there are gendered differences and inequalities not only in the informal, but also in the formal labor market. A factor that visualizes these inequalities is the gender pay gap. Within the European Union, Austria and Germany are countries with a rather high gender pay gap. This is at least partly due to their conservative welfare and gender regime. Both countries have similar arrangements concerning “family policies, childcare arrangements, working time, female employment rates and industrial and social partnership relations” (Bergmann/Scheele/Sorger 2018:670-671), which are important factors of the gender regime and also have a big influence on the gender pay gap. This gender related income differences are especially prominent in the private sector as well as among people working in management and university graduates (Bergmann/Scheele/Sorger 2018:671).

In general, the women’s employment rate in Austria and Germany is higher than the average in the EU-28, however this high rate is directly related to the increase in part-time work in formal as well as informal labor sectors. In both countries the female part-time employment rate is quite high, in general but also compared to the part-time employment rate for men. In Austria in 2019, 47,7 % of women were working in part-time jobs, compared to 10,7 % of men (Statista 2020). In Germany in 2019, 48,4 % of women were working in part-time jobs compared to 11,5 % of men (sozialpolitik-aktuell 2020). An important reason for women to be in a part-time employment are children and the aforementioned male breadwinner model.

In both countries, there is a widespread narrative that especially young children should be looked after in private, preferably by their mothers, and not by institutions providing

childcare. This led to a low childcare coverage in both countries regarding availability but also opening hours. However, there have been changes in both countries also due to implementing the EU Barcelona targets in 2002. In the case of Austria, this becomes visible through the fact that several agreements on extending childcare facilities have been reached between provinces and the federal government since 2007. These agreements include extending (full-day) childcare institutions as well as the increases of the proportion of children under the age of 3 in childcare facilities. The German system has undergone a similar transformation. In response to the Barcelona targets, the “Children’s Support Act” was passed by the government in 2008. This act required governments on federal-, state-, and local-level to create full-day childcare facilities for 35 % of all children younger than 3 years. Also, every child has the legal entitlement for a place in a day nursery. However, there are notable differences concerning opening hours or the price for a place in a childcare institution by regions. Even though in both countries there have been policy changes aiming at more gender equality, the general ideas and values implied by a conservative welfare and gender regime are still present to a certain part. This shows in “wage structures, in the tax system, in the social insurance system and in the slow expansion of public childcare facilities” (Bergman/Scheele/Sorger 2018:672).

5.2. Parties

In addition to their welfare and gender regimes, the respective countries also offer interesting opportunities for comparison on party-level. The Freedom Party of Austria and the Alternative for Germany have their differences, but also striking similarities. In the following, their histories will be summarized and an ideological localization according to research will be made.

5.2.1. Freedom Party of Austria

The Freedom Party of Austria is represented in the Austrian federal parliament, the National Council, in all nine state parliaments (Landtag) and has three seats in the European Parliament group “Identity and Democracy”.

The predecessor party of the Freedom Party of Austria, the Federation of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen), was founded in 1949 after the ban on political participation of former NSDAP members had been lifted. Due to the heterogeneity of the party members

(ranging from liberals over monarchists to former NSDAP members), the Federation of Independents never managed to mobilize bigger parts of the electorate. The Federation of Independents was replaced by the Freedom Party of Austria in 1955 as the Federation of Independents had suffered from organizational difficulties and inner-party tensions between the different fractions. The then party leadership was rather liberal whereas the base tended to be drawn to the German-national fraction. The German-national fraction was generally against Austrian national autonomy and in favor of the idea of Great Germany. As the newly founded Freedom Party of Austria also had a focus on extreme right-wing and German-national issues, the party remained in a niche and was not able to gain more than 7 % of the votes until the mid-1960s. In the 1970s there was a programmatic reform and “The Freedom Party of Austria's manifesto on social policy” (Freiheitliches Manifest zur Gesellschaftspolitik) of 1973 presented economically liberal ideas and values and, for example, highlighted individual responsibility and hard work. These factors were regarded as necessary in order to establish a meritocracy. In the 1980s there was a further opening of the party and in 1983 the Freedom Party of Austria became part of the government in coalition with the Social Democrats. However, inner-party tensions occurred again. In 1985, the party dissociated itself from the ideological German cultural and national community (deutsche Volks- und Kulturgemeinschaft) for the first time and also agreed to gender equality and the necessity of a free market economy. These liberalizations led to a growing opposition within the Freedom Party of Austria and supported the rise of the Carinthian state party leader Jörg Haider, who established himself as the unofficial party leader of those who were against these liberalizations. This was followed by a coup within the Freedom Party and Jörg Haider becoming the official party leader in 1986 (Heinisch/Hauser 2015:92-94). Under the leadership of Haider, the Freedom Party was able to get 9,7 % of the votes in the general election in 1986 (a gain of 4,5 % compared to the previous general election). Although Haider stuck to the relatively liberal election program of 1985, he transformed the Freedom Party from a national-liberal party into a populist radical right party. The party changed from an originally pro-European party into a euro-skeptical party and distanced itself from the former liberal party roots as it criticized economic liberalization as social dumping. One of the most important strategies was a campaign against immigration and its linkage to crime problems. In 1997, a new election program, the so-called contract of Austria (Österreichvertrag), was adopted. Contrary to previous election programs, this one did not highlight the tight connection between Austria and the German nation and culture but instead positioned itself in favor of a Christian based Austrian patriotism. Important aspects were

the fight against the corrupt elite, resistance against the corporatist state and the extension of direct democratic participation possibilities (Luther 2008:117). Until the late 1990s, the Freedom Party managed to become the second strongest party in five out of nine Austrian states and in Carinthia the party became the strongest one. In the general elections in 1999 the party had its biggest success (26,9 % of the votes) until then and became part of the government again (alongside the Austrian People's Party). This government participation of the Freedom Party was disputed within the country and internationally criticized. Due to the negative international reception of Haider and conflicts within the party, he resigned as national party leader. The party leadership conformed to the liberal policies of the Austrian People's Party, which was frowned upon by the party base and also by parts of the electorate. In 2005, the party split, and Haider and other party member founded the Alliance for the Future of Austria. The Freedom Party elected Heinz-Christian Strache as its chairman, who brought the party back to the so-called Haider-era due to a strong opposition approach and radical right populism. Islamophobic and xenophobic positions were the center of his campaign, which also continued in the following years. In 2009, the Freedom Party of Austria presented itself as extremely euro-skeptical and, once again, xenophobic in the election campaign for the European Parliament elections. In 2011, the party released a new election program, the Grazer program (Grazer Programm), in which the cultural heritage of Austria, embedded in German nationalism, was highlighted, European solidarity was denied, and more democracy was demanded (Heinisch/Hauser 2015). In 2013, the Freedom Party gained 20,51% of the votes in the Austrian general election. In 2016, presidential elections were held in Austria, in which the Freedom Party's candidate narrowly lost to the Green's candidate in the second ballot. In 2017, the general election led to a coalition between the Austrian People's Party and the Freedom Party, which thus became once again part of the Austrian government (Pelinka 2019). However, this government did not last its intended term of office and was dissolved in 2019 after the so-called Ibiza incident.

In the early elections following the dissolution of the government, the Freedom Party gained 16,2% of the votes and thus lost 9,8% in comparison to the general election in 2017 (URL wahl19). The Freedom Party differs from other European populist radical right parties insofar as it clearly has roots in right-wing extremism. The party has a factual monopoly, as it is the only relevant populist radical right party in Austria. Though, the competition-based Austrian party system allows other parties to make use of populist radical right contents and general populist techniques. Even though the Freedom Party is the only explicit populist

radical right party in Austria, it does not have a monopoly on right-wing populism per se nor on Austria-patriotism, ethno-nationalist rhetoric or othering. Furthermore, the Freedom Party features a lot of catch-all party elements. Their electorate can be found in all layers of society and is not specifically tied to class, gender or age (Pelinka 2019).

5.2.2. The Alternative for Germany

The Alternative for Germany is represented in the German Federal Parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) and in all sixteen state parliaments. The party has eleven seats in the European Parliament group “Identity and Democracy”.

For a long time, Germany was a special case within Europe, as it had no relevant populist radical right party. There had been two attempts to found radical right parties before the Alternative for Germany was founded. However, both attempts failed, one in the longer run and the other one quite fast. The Alternative for Germany, founded in 2013, is therefore the first extreme right-wing party to be in the German parliament since 1949. Hence, it is the party’s unique characteristic to be the strongest opposition party as no other extreme-right wing party has managed to achieve such an electoral success in the German postwar history (Häusler 2018). However, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), founded in 1964, should not be ignored when referring to right wing populism in Germany and the Alternative for Germany. The National Democratic Party of Germany is an extremist right-wing party. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the party represents a political concept that wants to abolish the liberal democratic constitutional order and replace it with an authoritarian nation-state oriented towards an ethnically defined national community (Volksgemeinschaft). The party’s concept disregards human dignity and is incompatible with the principle of democracy (Budrich 2017:130). Hence, the National Democratic Party of Germany cannot be defined as a populist radical right party, as populist radical right parties are according to Mudde democratic and likely to respect parliamentary democracy. However, there are connections between the National Democratic Party of Germany and the Alternative for Germany and the relation between these two parties is of interest regarding the role of the Alternative for Germany in the German party system. Formally, the Alternative for Germany distances itself from the National Democratic Party of Germany and there is no fixed cooperation between the two parties. This formal distancing is strategically relevant for the Alternative for Germany as it allows the party to portray itself as a conservative, reputable party and not an extremist right-wing one. Furthermore, there is

a certain competition between the two parties as they both address similar issues and discourses. Moreover, their electoral groups are similar regarding political attitudes and social characteristics. With regards to electoral success, it can be said that the Alternative for Germany is more successful in reaching and mobilizing these electoral groups. Hence, an official and open cooperation would be counterproductive for the Alternative for Germany as it would hurt its public image. Even though there is no cooperation in an organizational sense due to the presented reasons, it should be mentioned that there has always been contact between function holders of the Alternative for Germany and members of the National Democratic Party of Germany (Pfahl-Traughber 2019:27).

The background of the development of the Alternative for Germany was the crisis of the European Monetary Union starting in 2010, which followed the international financial market crisis. The handling of this crisis by the European Union and its member states is generally regarded as failed by the Alternative for Germany. Academics tend to describe the party as rather euro-critical and liberal-conservative than a populist radical right party in its founding and building phase. The populist radical right profile has started to evolve since 2014 (Decker 2018). The Alternative for Germany itself was founded on February 6th, 2013, the founding party congress took place on April 14th, 2013. With regards to extra-parliamentary networks like the so-called civil coalition (Zivile Koalition) or alliance for the will of the citizens (Bündnis Bürgerwille), the party presented itself as a euro-critical force, which was opposed to European integration. The Alternative for Germany closely failed to enter the parliament in the parliamentary elections 2013. In 2014, the party entered the European parliament. Also, the party managed to get elected into three state parliaments in 2014 and two more in 2015. However, there were some internal disputes. Bernd Lucke, who was the top candidate for the European parliament elections, left the Alternative for Germany in 2015 after losing to Frauke Petry in a crucial vote at the party congress in Essen. Under Petry and her vice federal spokesman Jörg Meuthen the party intensified its populist radical right character. In the course of the refugee movements in 2015, the party could clearly increase its electoral response and became stronger (Jesse 2019).

The refugee movement in 2015 was, as Alexander Gauland, group chairman in the Bundestag and honorary chairman of the Alternative for Germany, rightly said, a gift to his party. The German society was insecure and frightened due to the arrival of refugees. The Alternative for Germany managed to represent itself as the mouthpiece of the German society and thus gained approval in polls. The party also benefited from the Islamist terror

attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice and Berlin as well as from disputes within the government about the asylum packages and the criticism of the chancellor and her path within her own party. In 2016, the Alternative for Germany was able to continue its success in several state elections in Western and Eastern Germany. In 2017, the party entered the German parliament (Bundestag) as third strongest party with 12,6 % of the votes and formally leads the opposition with 9 seats (Decker 2018).

Regarding the party's political development, different phases and metamorphosis can be observed. Generally, one can talk about different steps towards right-wing radicalization. That process is in line with a change in the public and scientific perception of the Alternative for Germany. The primordial phase was characterized by the party's euro-skepticism. At the same time, the Alternative for Germany already had ties to the New Right through the newspaper Junge Freiheit, the Institut für Staatspolitik and the magazine Compact. The second phase is characterized by a clear gain of power of the national-conservative wing of the party. In the course of the East German state elections, an Eastern nationalist counterpart to the Western neoliberal wing of the party was formed. The third phase was also characterized by the nationalist right-wing part of the Alternative for Germany, the so-called Flügel (wing). The Flügel initiated a change of course and leadership within the party. The fourth phase started with a change of leadership. This change led to the separation of the neoliberal, pro-Atlantic part of the Alternative for Germany. The fifth phase was characterized by the refugee movement in 2015. The party strongly mobilized against refugees and migration and heavily criticized the asylum policies of the government. The sixth phase was characterized by the growing utilization of nationalist vocabulary reminding of the language of Nazi Germany. The seventh phase has been characterized by the party's entry in parliament (Bundestag) and a new change of leadership (Häusler 2018).

5.2.3. Similarities and Differences between the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria

In the case of Austria, right-wing populism has played a long and important role in its party history. The country is often used as the example of how a populist radical right party can emerge and grow in a political system. On the one hand, the populist radical right party in Austria, the Freedom Party, is one of the oldest populist radical right parties in Europe. Additionally, the party has had some big electoral successes so far, was part of the government as well as of the opposition. This success was also due to the fact, that the party

was able to adjust itself to the general political environment and sentiment in Austria and respond to the electorate's demands. Hence, there have been changes in personnel, targeted electorate, saliency of issues and ideological positioning. On the other hand, the Freedom Party is a textbook example for populist radical right parties and fulfills the general characteristics of this party family. Its history and development demonstrate different precepts of populist radical right parties to be successful, which are authoritarian and charismatic leaders, opportunity structures and being ideologically flexible, meaning having, what Mudde (2004) calls it, a "thin ideology" (Heinisch 2008:42).

Germany on the other hand didn't have a relevant populist radical right party on federal level for a long time compared to its European neighbors, even though there were similar political and socioeconomical circumstances (cf. Giebler/Lewandowsky/Wagner 2016:257).

Until 2013, populist radical right parties were only successful at state levels but not on the federal level. Since then, the Alternative for Germany, the new populist radical right party on the German political landscape has been able to achieve several successes (Giebler/Lewandowsky/Wagner 2016:257). There have been potential right-wing attitudes in society, but until recent years, there was no party in federal government to represent these attitudes (Häusler/Roeser 2016:102).

Although the populist radical right parties in Austria and Germany vary regarding the length of their party history and the Freedom Party of Austria could be described as a modernized old right party whereas the Alternative for Germany could be described as a new political actor, there are also significant similarities. Both parties are embedded in a similar context regarding their country and both parties have seats in the European Parliament group "Identity and Democracy". Also, there are several content and ideology-related similarities. First, there is the aggressive-nationalist positioning in debates about asylum and refugees. This is related to a focusing on Islam as one of the most important concept of the enemy. Second, both parties campaign against the European Union and promote national sovereignty as well as "the will of the people". Concerning foreign policy issues, the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria express admiration for and seek proximity to Putin's Russia (Grigat 2017:11). In addition to these similarities, both parties can benefit from the other one. For the Alternative for Germany, as a relatively young party, it is important to have an ally like the Freedom Party of Austria with long experience in the political business and in the handling of the media and the public. The Freedom Party of Austria also has a lot of experience in mobilizing an electorate that goes beyond convinced

right-wingers and can be a helpful conversation partner for the Alternative for Germany as well as a possible alliance partner. For the Freedom Party on the other hand, there is the possibility of a successful sister party in Germany, which agitates on the right side from the conservative party on the political spectrum but, other than the National Democratic Party of Germany, reaches a wide electorate, also on federal level.

Despite the wide-ranging similarities, there are also content-related differences between the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria. These are especially located in the field of economic and social policies. The Freedom Party of Austria is in favor of certain economic securities guaranteed through state regulation. Even if hard work and individual responsibility is of high importance in the agenda of the Freedom Party of Austria, there should be some sociopolitical support for those in need. The Alternative for Germany on the other hand supports a certain economic anti-statism, which, if realized into concrete policies, would significantly cut that state guaranteed securities (Grigat 2017:12). Furthermore, it has to be mentioned, that the post World War 2 history regarding denazification and reeducation was different in Austria and Germany. While denazification in Germany was a wide-reaching process (for example: media outlets all over the world covered the Nuremberg Trials), the situation in Austria was quite different. For one, Austria was declared the first victim of Nazi Germany in the Moscow Declaration. This victim myth resulted in Austria largely neglecting its culpability regarding the atrocities of the Third Reich. Only very limited legal measures were taken against high-ranking Nazis (Goodson 2020). This has had an effect on the articulation possibilities of explicit and implicit antisemitism and created different conditions for political parties and movements on the right side of traditional conservative parties (Grigat 2017:13). Regarding the parties' development and history, it shows that the Alternative for Germany comes from a conservative revolt which has been influenced by economic liberal nationalists and national reactionists from the beginning and has been radicalized since 2016. The Freedom Party of Austria on the other hand has its roots in an organization that was clearly tied to The Nationalist Socialist German Workers' Party and the "Schutzstaffel" (Grigat 2017: 13). This connection to the National Socialist Party and its "Schutzstaffel" (SS) can not only be seen in the ideology of the German nationalism, but also personnel-wise. When the Freedom Party of Austria was founded, some of the leading positions were filled by former National Socialists. An example to illustrate this connection is Anton Reinthaller. He was founding member and party chairman of the Freedom Party of Austria. Reinthaller was a leading member of the Nazi Party in Upper

Austria and SS-Brigadeführer. Moreover, he was part of the national socialist government under Seys-Inquart in 1938 as minister of agriculture. Also, his successor as party chairman was a member of the 1st SS infantry brigade (Schiedel 2017:108).

6. Methodological Approach

This chapter presents the analyzed material, consisting of the election programs from 2013 and 2017 from the Alternative from Germany as well as from the Freedom Party of Austria. Furthermore, this chapter offers an overview of frame analysis and content analysis. The methodological approach of the thesis consists of a qualitative content analysis, which is connected to the concept of framing. In general, the analysis is carried out through a qualitative content analysis. However, the qualitative content analysis also includes frames in addition to the traditional codes and subcodes. Thus, the material is not only examined with respect to codes and subcodes mirroring its content but also with respect to the frames, the respective content is put into.

6.1. Material

The analyzed material consists of election programs of the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria. In both cases the, election programs of 2013 and 2017 have been the base for the empirical analysis. Election programs are formulated in order to pursuit certain objectives and hence, they are of strategic nature (Garry/Laver 2000:620). Election programs offer a representation of where parties stand on the different issues on the political agenda. Thus, it is possible to locate the parties in the political sphere without the necessity of knowing their policy record (Dinas/Gemenis 2010: 427-428). Election programs fulfill different functions: An overview of party positions and a way to directly inform voters about them as well as streamlining the campaign (Eder/Jenny/Müller 2017).

The overview of party positions has several purposes. First, it can be a tool for voters in order to elaborate for themselves which party is closest to offering their ideal policies. Election programs (or a condensed version) can be part of giveaways at campaigning events or distributed on the street. Second, mass media can use election programs as an input for their news coverage and reporting. Third, election programs as summaries of party positions can be useful for candidates and activists in order to spread the party message (for example in face-to-face contacts to possible voters or candidates of competing parties). Concerning election programs streamlining the campaign, it has to be noted that they are not the only

document where political actors can make policy statements. However, “the more relevant a manifesto is, the more unique it is in defining the party’s policy, and less so if there are alternative (and probably not fully congruent) statements of party policy, from which candidates can freely choose” (Eder/Jenny/Müller 2017:76). Apart from manifesto supremacy (supremacy over other party documents on party policies), election programs also clearly define the party’s official position on issues on which members within the same party have different positions. Additionally, the public presentation of the election program is often a symbolic act that might indicate the start of the most important phase of the campaign, the so-called hot face. This public presentation is likely to be covered by mass media and hence offers publicity for the party and its visions and demands (Eder/Jenny/Müller 2017:76-77).

These specific election programs examined in this thesis are of special interest regarding the research question due to the point of time they were published. Between the elections in 2013 and 2017, Austria and Germany (like many other countries) experienced refugee movements, whereof large parts came from North Africa, the Middle East and Afghanistan. The issue of asylum and refugees dominated the public, media and politics. An event that is of special interest in this case is New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne. On the one hand, this event marked a turning point (especially in Germany, but also in the whole of Europe) in the public, political and medial discourse on refugees. On the other hand, it has also widely led to the reproduction of the image of the male foreigner as a threat to Western women and enhanced the connection between migratory and asylum issues with gender specific issues. A few days after New Year’s Eve, reports on sexual offenses on New Year’s Eve have accumulated (cf. Bielicki 2019:184-185). Those reports in German and Austrian media were dominated by mentions of how the arrested suspects were refugees or belonged to migratory groups. This enhanced the construction of a “racist stereotype about male refugees and migrants being a threat to western women” (Schuster 2020:1).

6.1.1. Election program 2013 Alternative for Germany

The German national election in 2013 showed a trend towards fragmentation of the party system, which complicated the formation of government and resulted in extensive coalition negotiations. One of the central issues in the legislative period before the national elections 2013 in Germany was the European debt crisis. However, the German economy developed quite positively compared to many of its European neighbors. This was also noted by the

public, which led to an increasing approval of chancellor Merkel and her party, the Christian Democratic Union. However, not everyone approved of her commitment to the rescue of the Euro. This led, inter alia, to the emergence of the Alternative for Germany. The Alternative for Germany originally mobilized against the governmental way of handling the European debt crisis, as, according to the Alternative for Germany, the German share of rescuing insolvent debtor countries was disproportional high (Bieber/Roßteutscher 2014:24-29). The results for German national election in 2013 were 34,1 % for the Christian Democratic Union, 25,7% for the Social Democrats, 8,6% for the Left, 8,4% for the Greens, 7,4% for the Christian Social Union, 4,8% for the Liberal Democratic Party and 4,7% for the Alternative for Germany. The general voter turnout was 71,5% (URL Bundeswahlleiter 2013).

The Alternative for Germany's election program 2013 is called "Election program" (dt. Wahlprogramm). The manifesto is four pages long and consists of eight chapters. The chapters are: "Monetary policy", "European politics", "Rule of law and democracy", "State finances and taxes", "Pension system and family", "Education", "Energy policy" and "Integration policy". The first page consists partly of the chapter "Monetary policy" and partly of the chapter "European politics": The second page consists of the second part of "European politics" and "Rule of law and democracy". The third page consists of the chapters "State finances and taxes", "Pension system and family" and partly "Education". The last page consists of the second part of "Education" as well as "Energy policy" and "Integration policy". Each chapter consists of several bullet points summarizing the party's position and demands on the respective issue.

6.1.2. Election program 2017 Alternative for Germany

The German national election in 2017 was characterized by an increasing fragmentation. Seven parties in six parliamentary groups entered the Bundestag. The formation of government turned out to be quite difficult and took 170 days. The governing parties lost votes and newcomers were strengthened by a re-politicized society. Many reasons had led to this complicated formation of government. However, policies on asylum and refugees were a pivotal factor in the changes of coordinates in German politics. On the base of global refugee movements towards Europe in 2015, migration, integration, refugees and asylum were the dominant political issues, which also led to a polarization in politics and society. The code "refugee policy" led to a change in party competition and a shift towards right-

wing politics (Korte 2019:1-4). The German national elections in 2017 had a voter turnout of 76,2 %. The Christian Democratic Union gained 26,8% of the votes, the Social Democrats gained 20,5% of the votes, the Alternative for Germany gained 12,6% of the votes, the Liberal Democratic Party gained 10,7 %, the Left gained 9,2%, the Greens gained 8,9% and the Christian Social Union 6,2% of the votes. 5,0% of the votes went to “other parties” (URL Bundeswahlleiter 2017).

The Alternative for Germany’s election program 2017 is called “Program for Germany” (dt. Programm für Deutschland). The manifesto is 76 pages long and consists of 15 chapters. The chapters are: “Defending the democracy in Germany”, “The Euro has failed: Currency, monetary and financial policy”, “Foreign- and Security Policy: Imposing German Interests”, “Internal Security”, “Asylum needs borders: Immigration and Asylum”, “Islam in conflict with the liberal and democratic order”, “Welcoming culture towards children: Family support and population development”, “Education and Schools: Courage to differentiate”, “Culture and Media”, “Taxes and Finances, Economy and Labor”, “Social Policy”, “Our health system is in danger”, “End technology aversion: Energy and climate”, “Expanding and preserving traffic routes, enhancing housing, developing the rural area” and “Environmental, nature and animal protection, consumer protection and agriculture”. Nearly every chapter consists of several subchapters on the respective topic. The first chapter consists of fifteen subchapters and is six pages long. The second chapter consists of five subchapters and is three pages long. The third chapter consists of six subchapters and is four pages long. The fourth chapter consists of nine subchapters and is three pages long. The fifth chapter consist of ten subchapters and is five pages long. The sixth chapter has no subchapters and is three pages long. The seventh chapter consists of seven subchapters and is four pages long. The eighth chapter consists of ten subchapters and is three pages long. The ninth chapter consists of six subchapters and is two pages long. The tenth chapter consists of eight subchapters and is five pages long. The eleventh chapter consists of nine subchapters and is three pages long. The twelfth chapter consists of twelve subchapters and is four pages long. The thirteenth chapter consists of three subchapters and is two pages long. The fourteenth chapter consists of three subchapters and is two pages long. The fifteenth chapter consists of six subchapters and is three pages long. Each chapter consists of general statements on the party’s position regarding the respective issue as well as critique on the status quo. Furthermore, there are sentences highlighted in italics summarizing the party’s demands on the respective issue.

6.1.3. Election program 2013 Freedom Party of Austria

The Austrian national election in 2013 was stamped by the global economic crisis. However, Austria was not hit as hard as other countries in the European Union and also the unemployment level remained comparatively low in comparison. This was also mirrored by society's life satisfaction, which remained stable, while it decreased in countries harder hit by the crisis. There also were some changes in the party landscape and within existing parties. For one, new parties like Team Stronach, and NEOS (a liberal party) emerged (Aichholzer/Jenny/Kritzinger/Müller/Schönbach/Vonbun 2014). The most important results for this election were 26,8% for the Social Democrats, 24% for the Austrian People's Party, 20,5% for the Freedom Party of Austria, 3,5% for the Alliance for the Future of Austria (a splinter party from the Freedom Party of Austria), 5,7% for Team Stronach and 5% for NEOS. The voter turnout was 74,9% (URL Bundeswahlen 2013).

The Freedom Party of Austria's election program 2013 is called "Love your next one. For me, that are our Austrians" (dt: Liebe deinen Nächsten. Für mich sind das unsere Österreicher). The manifesto is twelve pages long and consists of ten chapters. The chapters are: "Supporting socially deprived Austrians in need of help", "Affordable housing and secure employment with a salary to get by", "Austrians first in the social system and regarding employment", "Secured retirement and pension", "Supporting our families and the own youth", "Stop billion euro liability for bankrupt EU states – Reduction of EU contributions", "Relieving domestic small and medium-sized companies", "Direct democracy without fuss or quibble", "Protection against crime and asylum abuse" and "Preservation of identity, culture and autonomy". The title of every chapter starts with "The policy of love your next means:" followed by the actual name of the chapter (for example: "The policy of love your next means: Supporting socially deprived Austrians in need of help"). The title is followed by a statement on the respective issue, including critique on the competing parties and their policy position on the issue as well as a summary of the Freedom Party of Austria's position. The last part of each chapter has the headline "That is why we demand" which is followed by bullet points summarizing the party's demands regarding the respective issue.

6.1.4. Election program 2017 Freedom Party of Austria

The current chancellor of Austria, Sebastian Kurz, became the new party chairman of the Austrian People's Party in May 2017 and demanded early elections, which took place in October 2017. One of the dominating topics surrounding this election were refugee policies. It was expected that the Freedom Party of Austria, the traditional populist radical right party in Austria, would focus on this issue. However, the newly formatted Austrian People's Party under Sebastian Kurz adopted topics and suggestions of the Freedom Party of Austria and thus experienced a shift to the right (Wodak 2018:324). The main results of the Austrian national election in 2017 were 31,47% of the votes for the Austrian People's Party, 26,86 % for the Social Democrats, 25,97% for the Freedom Party of Austria, 5,30% for the NEOS, 4,41% for PILZ (founded by a former politician of the Greens in July 2017) and 3,80 % for the Greens (URL BMI 2017). Team Stronach and the Alliance for the Future of Austria did not compete in the 2017 elections (Ennsner-Jedenastik 2017).

The Freedom Party of Austria's election program 2017 is called "Austrians deserve Fairness" (Österreicher verdienen Fairness). The manifesto is fifty-six pages long and consists of twenty-five chapters. The chapters are: "Securing our Borders – Austria is no immigration country", "Protecting our sovereignty and autonomy", "Preserving our culture, values and traditions", "Letting our population direct democratically decide", "Ensuring our public security and order", "Defending our country – Say yes to neutrality and compulsory military service", "Supporting our families as the basic unit of society", "Enabling our youth to a future as independent citizens", "Making our education system competitive", "Enabling our youth to a free university access", "Ensuring equal right for our women and protecting them against discrimination", "Enabling our seniors to a retirement in dignity", "Designing our labor market and our social system in a fair way", "Making our housing affordable", "Making our health care system more efficient", "Designing and preserving our villages livable", "Protecting our farmers as guarantors for food security", "Respecting our animals as fellow creatures", "Protecting our environment and our water", "Rewarding and not punishing our top performers", "Relieving our businesses from bureaucratic and financial chicane", "Expanding and renewing our infrastructure", "Defending our constitutional state", "Sustainably reforming our administration" and "Preserving our Identity in Europe". Every chapter covers a double page and includes a symbolic image. Moreover, each chapter consists of three different parts. The first one covers one page and is a rather general statement presenting the party's policy position on the respective issue. The second and the

third part cover, next to the symbolic image, the second page of the double page. The second part of each chapter has the title “it is unfair that” (dt.Unfair ist) which is followed by bullet points summarizing the party’s critique concerning the issue. The third part has the title “Austrians deserve Fairness” (dt.Österreicher verdienen Fairness) which is followed by bullet points summarizing the party’s demands concerning the issue.

6.2. Framing

In this thesis, the qualitative content analysis will be applied to frames used in the analyzed material. The concept of framing goes back to Erving Goffman, who describes a frame as an organizational principle. It controls subjective opinions, which we assign to social happenings. He talks about interpretation schemata (*frames*) which help recipients to locate, identify, perceive and describe information and events. Hence, it is assumed that people actively organize, interpret and classify the input they receive (Goffmann 1975).

Regarding the research question of this thesis, issue framing (the framing of a certain issues) is especially relevant. According to Sloth and de Vreese (2010) issue framing is one of the most important tools to influence public opinion. Thus, parties are in competition over how issues are understood by the potential electorate. Opposing parties may talk about the same issue, but they might talk about it in different ways. A political party not only wants to identify advantageous issues, but also to identify the position and wording on that issue that is most persuasive. Similarly, a political party may feel compelled to address an issue, either because the issue is high on the national agenda or because their opponent has succeeded in putting the issue on the agenda. A party needs to figure out how to make the issue redound to its benefit despite not being the issue the party in question traditionally owns. Both circumstances require a rhetorical strategy to figure out how to talk about an issue. It is not only about what to talk about but also about how to talk about it, the question is how a political party is framing its message to voters (Arbour 2014). In general, a frame is understood as a way of presenting an issue or an idea in a message. In framing, a campaign will “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient” (Entman 2004:417). Framing thus does not persuade individuals to adapt a candidate’s position on an issue, but instead to increase the weight given to a particular aspect of an issue (Ajzen /Fishbein 1980). As a rhetorical device, frames then serve as “bridges between elite discourse about a problem or issue and popular comprehension of that issue” (Clawson/Nelson/Oxley

1997:224). Thus, framing is used to encourage people to think about policies along particular lines.

In a way, framing theory can be seen as connected to issue ownership theory which holds that parties have an “effect when a candidate successfully *frames* the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing the country that he is better able to ‘handle’ than his opponent” (Petrocik 1996:826, emphasis added). Even when compelled to trespass onto issues owned by their opponent (Buchanan/Norpoth 1992), parties will use frames that “can be interpreted in a way to highlight some feature of the issue on which they are likely to be regarded as more competent” (Petrocik 1996:828–829). To frame an issue in a way the party can benefit from, parties might highlight certain aspects of the issue through key words, phrases and stereotypes (Boomgaarden 2007:58).

Particularly relevant for a study focusing on frames is the analysis of the discursive opportunities and constraints, the “political-cultural or symbolic opportunities that determine what kind of ideas become visible for the public, resonate with public opinion and are held to be ‘legitimate’ by the audience” (Kriesi 2004:74). Instrumentally or culturally, parties tend to make their discourses resonant in the public they want to address, by linking their own traditional frames with those present in the environment (Snow/Benford 1986).

The research material of this thesis consists of populist radical right election programs and election campaign material. The aim is to examine the frames gender issues are put into in order to construct antagonisms. To analyze the frames on the base of a qualitative content analysis, a category system has been created. The categories, codes and subcodes have been built inductively; the material has been examined by open coding. In this method, the categories are created during the reading process of the material. Relevant text passages are assigned to these categories. Thus, different text passages are assigned to the same category. Thereby, a systematic relation between different, originally unrelated data sections can be made. In this thesis the codes consist of the different frames populist radical right parties use in their party programs to talk about gender issues. Furthermore, the category system includes the cluster to which the respective statement can be assigned as well as the type of antagonism it aims at constructing. Those are created deductively, which means they are taken from existing literature and based on theory.

Concerning the determination and following interpretation of the frames, the issues the respective statements were put in relation to were of great interest. Gender issues per se do

not necessarily construct antagonisms. In order to create an image of “us vs. them” there is the need of an “out-group” that works against the interests of the “in-group” or is opposed to the “in-group”. In the case of gender issues, this “out-group” can consist of different actors. Who these actors are, depends on the framing and the “bigger picture” gender issues are connected to.

6.3. Content Analysis

One can find a great variety of different definitions of content analysis in literature. However, Mayring (2015) summarizes the specific characteristics of content analysis as a social science method in six points. First, content analysis’ subject matter consists of communication. Most of the time this involves language. However, music, images, gestures etc. can also be part of a content analysis. Second, content analysis works with symbolic materials. Hence, the analyzed communication is recorded, it is a “fixed communication” (Mayring 2015:12). Third, content analysis wants to work systematically and can therefore be differentiated from most of the hermeneutical methods. Forth, this systematical approach is displayed in the following of rules. Thus, one can understand, reproduce and review the analysis. Fifth, a scientific content analysis should have a theoretical base. Content analysis does not aim at just reporting a text but analyzes the data through the eyes of a theory-based research question. In addition, the results are also interpreted against a theoretical background. Sixth, content analysis does not exclusively analyze the data itself but also as part of the whole communication process. Hence, content analysis is a concluding method. It aims at drawing conclusions about specific aspects of the communication and deriving statements about the transmitter and its intentions and about the effect on the recipient (Mayring 2015:12-13).

Mayring also suggests a procedure to follow when a content analysis is conducted. This procedure consists of several steps: the definition of the material, the analysis of the circumstances under which the material was produced, the presentation of the formal characteristics of the material, the definition of the direction of the analysis, the theoretical differentiation of the research question, the determination of the analysis technique, the definition of the category system, the definition of the analysis units, the analysis itself and the review of the category system based on theory and material, a summary of the results and an interpretation regarding the research question and at last the application of quality criteria (Mayring 2015:62).

As already stated, content analysis examines fixed communication. In order to decide what parts of the material to interpret, it has to be studied carefully. In general, there are three steps to take. First, one must define which exact material will be part of the analysis. This corpus should only be changed during the analysis if there is a justifiable necessity. Second, it is important to describe under what circumstances the material was produced and by whom. Third, the formal characteristics are also of great interest as a content analysis is most likely based on a written text (Mayring 2015:54-55). Concerning the direction of the analysis, Mayring states that a content analysis is only possible with a specific research question. This research question should be theoretically sound, tied to the current research state concerning the topic and if necessary divided into sub questions. Crucial for the analysis technique and the analysis units is the category system. The category system is tied to data and theory, it can be created deductively or inductively. If it is created deductively, the categories are based on the theory, if it is created inductively, the categories are based on the analyzed material. There are three main analysis techniques, which can be used, summary, explication and structuring. The summary technique wants to reduce the material in order to maintain the essential material and to create a manageable corpus, which still represents the original material. The explication technique wants to add extra material to specific parts of the original material to extend the understanding. The structuring technique wants to filter out specific aspects of the material according to previously set criteria.

In the case of the material analyzed in this thesis, these presented characteristics of content analysis are all given. The analysis' subject matter is indeed a form of communication. More precisely, it is communication between political parties and their potential electorate. Secondly, this communication process is recorded as it is in written form. It exists digitally as well as in an analog version. The analysis is also conducted systematically and every assignment of the material to a category is based on respective theory and can be logically traced back. This theoretical background, which is also essential for the interpretation of the analysis and its results, refers to populist radical right parties' construction of antagonisms and their views on gender issues. The concluding aspect of this analysis shows in its aim to examine how the framing of specific issues, in case of this thesis gender issues, has to be done and can be used in order to construct antagonisms.

Concerning the suggested procedure to follow when conducting a content analysis, the material, its formal characteristics as well as the circumstances under which it was produced, meaning the election programs as well as the general elections in Austria and Germany in

2013 and 2017, have been described. Also, the theoretical differentiation of the research question, populist radical right parties, their stances on gender issues and the construction of antagonisms, has been set out. The analysis units consist of all the statements found in the respective election programs, which refer to so-called gender issues. The analysis itself as well as a summary of the results and the interpretation of these results with regards to the research question are presented in the following chapters of this master thesis.

Crucial for this analysis is the category system, which is the center of the analysis. There is a category system for each election program. However, these category systems are carried out the same way and consist of the same categories. In order to analyze the data, each of the presented election programs is studied carefully and all statements with respect to gender issues are filtered out. These are defined regarding the antagonism they are aimed at constructing, the cluster to which they belong and the frame they are put into as well as the code and if applicable the subcode appropriate for the respective statement. This means, all gender-specific statements, meaning statements regarding women's and men's lives and their situation in society, to the way they interrelate, their differences in access to and use of resources, their activities, and how they react to changes, interventions and policies (URL European Institute for Gender Equality) are of great interest of this thesis. Additionally, it has to be taken into account whether they serve the construction of antagonisms, either between the people and the elites or the people and the others or under certain circumstances even both. Thus, if a quote contains a statement concerning gender issues (in the context of this thesis these are issues regarding explicitly people in their role as men or women in private and society, family and children as well as institutions dealing with men, women, families and children) and additionally serves the construction of an antagonism, it is taken into account in the analysis.

6.4. Execution

The core elements of the analysis are the category systems, which were created for each election program. Each system consists of the categories Antagonism, Cluster, Frame Category, Code, Subcode, Quote and #. Antagonism refers to the antagonisms presented in the theoretical part of this thesis, either the antagonism between the people and the elites or the antagonism between the people and the others. In this case, the selected statements from the election programs were examined with regard to the antagonism they construct while using gender-specific issues. The central aspect in the construction of antagonisms is to

figure out what group is regarded as being opposed to or working against the interest of “the people”. Cluster refers to the clusters as mentioned in the state of the art. The selected statements are assigned to either the othering through gendering cluster or the heteronormative cluster. The assignment depends on the content of the statement and the line of arguments as found in the literature the respective statement is part of. Antagonism and cluster were built deductively. This means, they were taken from literature and the material of the analysis was assigned to the already existing terms. Concerning the antagonism, these are either the antagonism between the people and the elites or the antagonism between the people and the others. Concerning the cluster, these options are either the heteronormative cluster or the othering through gendering cluster. Frame category refers to the frame the respective statement puts gender issues into. The frame refers to the broader context of the selected statements, to the highlighted aspects and also to which other subject areas and issues the specific statement connects gender issues. Thus, the statements were embedded in greater interpretive patterns. Code directly refers to the content of the respective statement and mirrors it. The code should not be a summary of the respective statement but have a rather abstract character and work as a more general classification. Subcode basically works like the code but is more specific and narrowed down in order to precisely fit the particular statement. One code can have several subcodes, which present different aspects of the respective code. The categories frame category, code and subcode were built inductively. This means, the categories were built directly from the material. Quote consists of the selected statements (the coding units) from the election programs These statements serve as the base for the whole analysis as they refer to gender-specific issues and construct antagonisms. # contains the abbreviation for the selected statements. These abbreviations are used in the explanation of the analysis in order to facilitate the written presentation of the coding process.

The frames, codes and subcodes found in the material are summarized in the table listed below.

Frame	Code	Subcode
Institutions	Family policy	Financial aspects
		Benefits for families
		Fathers' rights

		Childcare
	Quota regulations	
	Integration policy	
	Gender pay gap	
	Judiciary system	Harder penalties concerning violence towards women/children
Demographics	Persistence of autochthonous society	
Culture and religion	Oppression of women	Veil
		Incompatible with Western values
	Migration as a threat to women	
Marriage and family	Traditional values	
Reproductive rights	Alternatives to abortion	
	Protection of “unborn life”	
	Reporting obligation	
	Support for women with unwanted pregnancies	
Gender Ideology	Not scientific/in interest of the people	
	Natural differences between the sexes	
	No (financial) support/place at universities	

Sexual orientations	Promotion of different sexual orientations	
Migration	Migration as a threat to autochthonous families	
Symbolic measures	Not in interest of women	

7. Analysis: The Construction of Antagonisms

In this analysis, an overview over the main findings as well as the results for each election program are presented, explained and justified. Moreover, the category system of each election program as well as the analyzed statements will be presented.

One of the main frame categories found in all four election programs are institutions, which covers statements concerning tax models for families, financial support for families, anti-discrimination laws, gender quota, different policies, legal regulations. Another frame category is family and marriage. This category summarizes all statements with regards to traditional values, the (missing) support for families, child-raising period, single-parenting and split families. Also, the frame demographics can be detected, which includes statements with respect to the persistence of (the autochthonous) society. Moreover, the frame culture and religion can be found. This frame category consists of statements regarding the (full body) veil, costumes seen as incompatible to Western values as well as migrant and minority communities as a threat to women. Another frame is sexual orientation, which summarizes statements on sex education and the teaching about homo- and transsexuality in schools. Furthermore, the frame category Gender Ideology can be found. It summarizes statements about Gender Studies at university, denies its scientific character, its relevance for the people, and the threat to traditional values that it presents. Another frame category found in the analyzed data is reproductive rights. This frame includes all statements about abortion and alternatives, unwanted pregnancies and reporting legal regulations concerning doctors who perform abortions. The findings show that the main code of the material is family policy with the subcodes financial aspects, benefits for families, childcare and fathers' rights. Moreover, the codes traditional values, natural differences between the sexes, promotion of different sexual orientations, alternatives to abortion, protection of "unborn life", reporting obligations (of doctors who perform abortions), support for women with unwanted

pregnancies, quota regulations, not in interest of women (referring to so-called symbolic measures) and not scientific as well as no support for/place at universities (both referring to so-called Gender Ideology) were found. Further codes are oppression of women with the subcodes veil and incompatible with Western values, persistence of autochthonous society, integration policy, migration as a threat to women, migration as a threat to autochthonous families, gender pay gap, and judiciary system with the subcode harder penalties concerning violence towards women and children.

7.1. Analysis Election program 2013 Alternative for Germany

The Alternative for Germany's election program from 2013 contains two statements on gender issues, which also construct antagonisms. The two frame categories institutions and demographics were found. The according category system (Category System A) to which the following analysis refers can be found in the appendix.

The frame category institutions contains the statements A1 and A2 and focuses on family policy. The statement A1, *We demand to take children stronger into account in the calculation of pensions*, is assigned to the frame category institutions, as it refers to the social security system. The code family policy can be detected due to the fact that A1 focuses on the role of children in the calculation of pensions. Hence, the subcode financial aspects is assigned. The statement creates an antagonism between the people and the elites as the state is presented as not offering enough financial benefits and support to families. In addition, the statement falls into the heteronormative cluster as families with children are central figures. The statement A2, *Germany has too little children. That is why the pension and health care system are in danger. Germany has to become more family- and child-friendly*, is also part of the frame category institutions as it associates the problem of childlessness with the social security system. The code family policy can be detected. In this case, the code family policy can be narrowed down to the subcode benefits for families as it suggests that Germany has to become more child friendly. It constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites because it suggests that policies are not child or family-friendly enough. The statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as families and children play an essential role.

The frame category demographics also contains the statement A2. A2 could be assigned the code persistence of the autochthonous society because it states that Germany needs more

children. In this case, the statement still constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites and is part of the heteronormative cluster.

The analysis of the Alternative for Germany's election program from 2013 yields exclusively the construction of an antagonism between the people and the elites, no construction of an antagonism between the people and the others could be detected. All statements in interest with regard to the research question are part of the heteronormative cluster, there is no case where the othering through gendering cluster applies. This can be interpreted as being directly linked to the fact that there is no construction of an antagonism between the people and the others with respect to gender issues to be found in this election program. As for the frame categories, codes and subcodes, one can observe that the frame category institutions is used twice. In both cases, this is accompanied by the code family policy. Even though both subcodes relate to the support of families with children, they go into slightly different directions. The second frame category found in this election program is demographics accompanied by the code persistence of autochthonous society. This frame category and code are only used once in the respective material. The Alternative for Germany's election program 2013 contains the fewest statements on gender issues, which also create antagonisms compared to the other cases examined in this thesis. However, it has to be taken into consideration that this election program is also the shortest. The fact that there is no mentioning of an antagonism between the people and the others and no statement could be assigned to the othering through gendering cluster can be seen in relation to the party's history and development. As already described, the Alternative for Germany had a strong focus on Euro-skepticism and economic issues in its founding phase, which was 2013 thus the year in which the respective election program was released. The party's populist radical right profile really started to evolve one year later, in 2014. This might be a possible reason why gender issues were not connected to othering, especially migrant or minority communities, in 2013. All statements of interest for this thesis have some kind of relation to the welfare state and the social security system.

Content wise, the state of the art on populist radical right parties and gender issues, which was presented at the beginning of this thesis, is of great interest. As for the Alternative for Germany's election program regarding the national elections in 2013, it can be observed, that all respective material can be assigned to the line of arguments regarding family and reproduction. In these statements, motherhood is not seen as something exclusively private but also in interest of the nation and "the people" as the social security system depends on a

new generation of children. This narrative is also found in the presented literature on populist radical right parties and gender issues. The “survival of the nation” therefore depends on the (native) birth rates and family issues are also seen in the light of demographics. To sum up, gender issues and the targeted construction of antagonisms were not that prominent in the Alternative for Germany’s election program in 2013. However, all statements found in the material have some relation to the welfare state and the social security system.

7.2. Analysis Election program 2017 Alternative for Germany

The Alternative for Germany’s election program from 2017 contains thirty-four statements on gender issues, which also construct antagonisms. There are the frame categories institutions, demographics, culture and religion, marriage and family, reproductive rights, Gender Ideology and sexual orientations. The according category system (Category System B) to which the following analysis refers can be found in the appendix.

The frame category institutions contains the statements B1, B2, B4, B9, B10, B11, B12, B13, B14, B15, B16, B17, B18, B20, B21, B29, B34. This frame category mainly targets family policy but also refers to the judiciary system and quota regulations. The statement B1, *The Alternative for Germany stands up for equality before the law. That is why we are against so-called quota-regulations*, is assigned to the frame category institutions as it refers to the code quota regulations. B1 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as quota regulations, something prescribed “from above”, are regarded as being unfair to the people. The statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it distinguishes between men and women and follows the idea of gender polarity. The statement B2 says *In a free state under the rule of law it can never be the legitimate objective to enforce randomly set gender-quotas in randomly set subdivisions of society. A difference in treatment prescribed by law cannot be a way to realize equality. Laws, which prescribe this, are unconstitutional and to be rejected*. This statements is assigned to the frame category institutions. It also refers to the code quota regulations and how they are unconstitutional and should be rejected. That is the reason why the construction of an antagonism between the people and the elites can be detected as the judiciary is presented as the enemy and not acting in the interest of the people. The statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it distinguishes between men and women and hence follows the traditional idea of gender polarity. The statement B4 reads *Family policy and demographic policy measures take precedence over migration, especially*

“activating family policy”, but also the reduction of emigration of qualified workers from Germany. Hence, B4 can be assigned to the frame category institutions and the code family policy as it targets policies regarding families and demographic development. An antagonism between the people and the others is constructed as migrants are regarded as opponents to the autochthonous society and families. Also, the cluster othering through gendering can be detected. The statement B8 reads *The Alternative for Germany regards the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 2015, which states that a general ban of the veil for Muslim teachers is unconstitutional, as a barrier to successful integration policy.* B8 can be assigned to the category institutions and the code integration policy as it criticizes the German Constitutional Court for its decision and its integration policy. In this case, an antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed as the elites, meaning the judiciary system in form of the German Constitutional Court, are not acting in the interest of the people. This statement is part of the cluster othering through gendering. The statement B9 says *The ban of religious advance ceremony (religiöse Voraustrauung) for example by imams should come into force again. The abolishment of §§ 67 and 67a in the personal statute law of 2009 should be reversed. That is the only way to counter imam-marriages, which often enable polygamy, child-marriage or intermarriage. Marriages contracted abroad according to the family law of the Sharia which are against our laws and moral values should not be legally recognized in Germany.* B9 can be assigned to the frame category institutions and the code integration policy, as it says that certain laws, for example concerning religious advance ceremonies for marriages, should be reversed or come into force again. In this case, the statement creates an antagonism between the people and the elites, who are seen as being responsible for the ban or revision of the aforementioned laws. B9 is part of the cluster othering through gendering because it focuses on believed “Muslim practices” that endanger women. The statement B10 reads *The drastic increase in childlessness and marriagelessness as the disappearance of normal medium-sized families – which has been accepted as being without alternatives by the established parties for a long time – are the reason for the shrinkage of 250000 autochthonous people per year, with a rising trend. The Alternative for Germany is against this trend towards self-abolition and wants to make Germany friendlier for families and children.* B10 can be assigned to the category institutions and the code family policy as the statement demands better framework conditions for families in Germany. This statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the established parties are regarded as being responsible for the shrinkage of the autochthonous society because they accept the increase in childlessness and

marriagelessness and have not made Germany child and family friendly enough. The statement B10 is also part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families and children. B11 reads *Germany needs a paradigm shift towards a national population policy*. Hence, it can be assigned to the frame category institutions with the code family policy. It creates an antagonism between the people and the elites because it is suggested that the parties in charge fail at securing the persistence of the autochthonous society with their current policies. B11 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it targets birth rates and ways to increase them. The statement B12 states *Family policy should be the standard for related policy fields, especially social, tax and education policies*. Thus, B12 can be assigned to the category institutions and the code family policy as it talks about the importance of family policy. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed because parties in charge of family policy and related fields are portrayed as not acting in interest of the people. B12 belongs to the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families and their importance for the state. The statement B13 reads *Germany needs more stable families with more children, without a balanced birth rate, social peace is in danger as far as it is based on our social, pension and health care system. That is why measures to increase birth rates of the autochthonous population at medium-term are essential, also to stabilize the social security system*. B13 can be assigned to the category institutions and the code family policy as it refers to the connection between families and the social security system. The statement creates an antagonism between the people and the elites as the current system is seen as suboptimal for families to have children and hence is also responsible for the low birth rates. B13 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on traditional families with children. The statement B14 reads *The Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth should be turned the Ministry for Family Affairs and Population Development that coordinates and supports population development according to scientific criteria*. This statement can be assigned to the frame category institutions and the code family policy as it puts families in relation to public authorities. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed because the current Ministry for Family Affairs is not portrayed as not fulfilling its job in supporting population development. B14 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on birth rates and the reproduction of the autochthonous society. The statement B15 says *The preservation of the national population is the primary task of policies and of every government. Considering the current German demographic situation, this can only be achieved through activating family policy*. B15 can be assigned to the frame category institutions and the code family policy because it regards the demographic situation

as being dependent on certain policies. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed. The current family policy is regarded as inefficient with respect to the persistence of the autochthonous society, thus the politicians in charge are portrayed as not supporting the interests of the people. B15 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it sees families with children as the center of a functioning society. The statement B16 reads *We want to enable and encourage young people through information and aids to start and preserve a family. We want to abolish unnecessary barriers so stable marriages and families can form and remain. We want to start this soon by making accepted rules concerning partnership and family, housekeeping, protection of life and child education a fixed part of schoolbooks and the syllabus in schools.* It can be assigned to the code family policy and the subcode benefits for families as it demands information and aids for young people starting a family. It constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the current system is regarded as not supporting young families enough. It is part of the heteronormative cluster as it promotes the traditional family model. B17 reads *Although there are alarming realizations concerning the impact on children's development, nearly all parties are in favor of unconditional support of single parents.* Thus, this statement can be assigned to the category institutions and the code family policy as it refers to political support of single parenting. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed as other parties are accused of unconditionally supporting single parenting, which is not regarded as being in interest of the children, hence the people. B17 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it targets traditional ideas regarding family models. The statement B18 reads *The Alternative for Germany wants to help single parents to have an independent life. However, the Alternative for Germany is against every form of financial support of organizations which propagate single parent families as a normal, progressive or even desirable way of life* B18 is part of the frame category institutions and the code family policy due to its focus on organizations dealing with single parent families. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed. The aforementioned organizations are regarded as acting against the interest of the people. B18 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on the traditional family model. The statement B20 reads *Many fathers in split relationships suffer from rules in family law and want to have more contact with their children* This statement can be assigned to the category institutions and the code family policy with the subcode fathers' rights as it deals with the topic on the juridical level. This statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. In this case, the elites are the judiciary and people responsible for laws regarding family policy that do not act in interest of the fathers,

hence the people. B20 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it targets family models and parental roles. The statement B21 says *Children under the age of three feel best when they are looked after by their own parents. It should be possible again for a family with little children to live off one salary so parents can freely choose between a job and an employment break to look after their children. Therefore, the state should finance parental care the same ways it finances baby-minders and daycare centers.* Hence, B21 can be assigned to the category institutions and the code family policy with the subcode childcare because it refers to the role of the state concerning the parental child-raising period. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed as it is suggested that the state does not support families enough, at least financially. This statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on family models and parenting. The statement B29 reads *The Alternative for Germany wants the family policy to be oriented towards the family model consisting of father, mother and children. We are against all attempts to extend the sense of the word "family" in article 6, paragraph 1 of the constitutional law to other forms of communities and hence withdraw the family's special state protection.* B29 can be assigned to the category institutions and the code judiciary system as it refers to the definition of family in constitutional law. B29 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. In this case, the elites are the ones attempting to extend to legal sense of the word family, hence the judiciary. The statement B29 is part of the heteronormative cluster because it focuses on the protection of the traditional family model. The statement B34 reads *The tax burden for families is too high. Although the Federal Constitutional Court has requested to make the subsistence level of children and parents tax-free, the legislator has not appropriately complied. The Alternative for Germany stands for sustainable tax reliefs for families through the implementation of family splitting, which distributes the family heritages to family members before taxation.* B34 can be assigned to the category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects because it demands a tax relief for families. The statement B34 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as parts of the judiciary systems are regarded as not working in interest of the people. The statement B34 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children.

The frame category demographics contains the statements B3, B4, B10, B11, B13, B14, B15 and focuses on the development and composition of society. The statement B3 states *While the European population gets older and shrinks, the population in Africa and Arab-Muslim countries in the Near and Middle east explodes. In Africa, every woman has 4,5 children on*

average. At the same time, child mortality decreases due to international aid. In contrast, the average birth rate in Europe is 1,6 – in Germany even 1,4. This means that the African population, including all Arab countries, will have increased from the current 1,2 billion people to 2,4 billion people by the year 2050. By the same time, the 590 million people who are currently living in Europe will be reduced to 540 million. B3 is assigned to the frame category demographics. It suggests that the persistence of the autochthonous (German) society is in danger as birth rates are decreasing while in other parts of the world, namely Africa and the Near and Middle East, birth rates are much higher. An antagonism between the people and the others is created as the others, in this case the population in Africa and the Near and Middle East, are regarded as a threat to the European society in general and especially the German society. The statement B4 reads *family policy and demographic policy measures take precedence over migration, especially “activating family policy”, but also the reduction of emigration of qualified workers from Germany*. It can be assigned to the frame category demographics and the code persistence of the autochthonous society, which is regarded as being in danger. An antagonism between the people and the others is constructed as migrants are regarded as opponents to the autochthonous society and families. Also, the cluster othering through gendering can be detected. The statement B10 says *The drastic increase in childlessness and marriagelessness and the disappearance of normal medium-sized families – which has been accepted as being without alternatives by the established parties for a long time – are the reason for the shrinkage of 250000 autochthonous people per year, with a rising trend. The Alternative for Germany is against this trend towards self-abolition and wants to make Germany friendlier towards families and children*. B10 is assigned to the frame category demographics and the code persistence of the autochthonous, which is regarded as being in danger. This statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites because the established parties are regarded as being responsible for the shrinkage of the autochthonous society. They accept the increase in childlessness and marriagelessness and have not made Germany child and family friendly enough. The statement B10 is also part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families and children. The statement B11 reads *Germany needs a paradigm shift towards a national population policy*. B11 is assigned to the frame category demographics and the code persistence of autochthonous society as it highlights the importance of a national population policy. It creates an antagonism between the people and the elites because it is suggested that the parties in charge fail at securing the persistence of the autochthonous society with their current policies. B11 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it targets birth rates and ways

to increase them. The statement B13 reads *Germany needs more stable families with more children, without a balanced birth rate, social peace is in danger as far as it is based on our social, pensions and health care system. That is why measures to increase birth rates of the autochthonous population at medium-term are essential, also to stabilize the social security system.* B13 can be assigned to the category demographics and the code persistence of the autochthonous society as it talks about the need to increase autochthonous birth rates. The statement creates an antagonism between the people and the elites as the current system is seen as suboptimal for families to have children and hence is also responsible for the low birth rates. B13 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on traditional families with children. The statement B14 reads *The Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth should be turned into the Ministry for family Affairs and Population Development, that coordinates and supports population development according to scientific criteria.* This statement can be assigned to the frame category demographics and the code persistence of the autochthonous society as it demands measures to support population development. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed because the current Ministry for Family Affairs is not fulfilling its job in supporting population development. B14 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on birth rates and the reproduction of the autochthonous society. The statement B15 reads *The preservation of the national population is the primary task of policies and of every government. Considering the current German demographic situation, this can only be achieved through activating family policy.* B15 is part of the category demographics and the code persistence of autochthonous society as it has a focus on the preservation on the national population. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed. The current family policy is regarded as inefficient with respect to the persistence of the autochthonous society, thus the politicians in charge are portrayed as not supporting the interests of the people enough. B15 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it sees families with children as the center of a functioning society.

The frame category culture and religion contains the statements B5, B6, B7, B8, B9. This frame category focuses on the apparent danger of “other” (in this case predominantly Muslim) cultures for gender equality and women’s rights. The statement B5 reads *Burka and niqab build a barrier between the wearer and her environment and thus complicate the cohabitation on society.* B5 can be assigned to the frame category culture and religion as its main message is, that religious symbols of Islam are a barrier for integration and thus

incompatible with Western values. Hence, the code oppression of women with the subcode veil can be assigned. An antagonism between the people and the others is constructed as women who wear burqas or niqabs, meaning Muslim women, are regarded as others who are not part of the people. B5 is also part of the cluster othering through gendering. The statement B6 reads *The Alternative for Germany demands a general ban of full body veil in public and public service*. The statement is assigned to the frame category culture and religion and the code oppression of women with the subcode veil. Its main message is that full body veil and its wearers are not part of the autochthonous public (and society). That is why the statement B6 constructs an antagonism between the people and the others. It is also part of the cluster othering through gendering. The statement B7 reads *The equality of men and women guaranteed by the constitution and the free expression of personality are contradictory to the veil as a religious-political symbol of submission of Muslim women*. is assigned to the frame category culture and religion and the code oppression of women and the subcode veil. It regards the veil as a religious-political symbol of submission of Muslim women and hence incompatible with Western values such as the equality of men and women or the free expression of personality. Thus, the statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the others because it frames practices of the Muslim community as contradictory to the values and habits of the autochthonous society. The statement B7 is part of the cluster othering through gendering. The statement B8 reads *The Alternative for Germany regards the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 2015 which states that a general ban of the veil for Muslim teachers is unconstitutional, as a barrier to successful integration policy*. It can be assigned to the frame category culture and religion and the code oppression of women with the subcode veil. In this case, the wearing of the veil is regarded as being incompatible with Western values. Hence, its wearers are not seen as being part of the people and an antagonism between the people and the others is constructed. B8 is part of the cluster othering through gendering. B9 reads *The ban on religious advance ceremony (religiöse Voraustrauung) for example by imams should come into force again. Also, the abolishment of §§ 67 and 67a in the personal statute law of 2009 should be reversed. That is the only way to counter imam-marriages, which often enable polygamy, child-marriage or intermarriage. Marriages contracted abroad according to the family law of the Sharia which are against our laws and moral values should not be legally recognized in Germany*. B9 can be assigned to the frame category culture and religion and the code oppression of women and the subcode incompatible with Western values. In this case, an antagonism between the

people and the others is constructed as certain Muslim marriage practices are regarded as being incompatible with Western values. B9 is part of the cluster othering through gendering. The frame category marriage and family contains the statements B16, B17, B18, B19, B21, B23, B29, B31. This frame category focuses on the role, composition and way of life of families and married couples. The statement B16 reads *We want to enable and encourage young people through information and aids to start and preserve a family. We want to abolish unnecessary barriers so stable marriages and families can form and remain. We want to start this soon by making accepted rules concerning partnership and family, housekeeping, protection of life and child education a fixed part of schoolbooks and the syllabus in schools.* This statement can be assigned to the category marriage and family and the code traditional values as it focuses on the importance of stable families with children and how rules and values concerning partnership, family and housekeeping should be taught to young people. B16 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it suggests that the current system fails at educating and supporting young people when it comes to starting a family. The statement B16 is also part of the heteronormative cluster because it centers on families with children and follows the traditional family image. The statement B17 says *Although there are alarming realizations concerning the impact on children's development, nearly all parties are in favor of unconditional support of single parents.* B17 can be assigned to the frame category marriage and family and the code traditional values as it highlights the importance of the traditional family model and portrays single parenting as a danger to children. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed as other parties are accused of unconditionally supporting single parenting, which is not regarded as being in interest of the children, hence the people. B17 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it targets traditional ideas regarding family models. B18 states *The Alternative for Germany wants to help single parents to have an independent life. However, the Alternative for Germany is against every form of financial support of organizations, which propagate single parent families as a normal, progressive or even desirable way of life.* This statement can be assigned to the category marriage and family and the code traditional values as it does not regard single parenting as “normal”, hence it suggests that the traditional family model should be the norm. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed. The aforementioned organizations are regarded as acting against the interest of the people. Also, B18 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on the traditional family model. The statement B19 reads *The benefit of special support by the community should only be granted*

to single parents who do not expel the other parents from educational responsibilities or practical parenting. B19 can be assigned to the category marriage and family and the code traditional values as it centers on single parenting, thus a model deviating from the traditional family model, and how the community should not unconditionally support them. It constructs an antagonism between the people and the others. However, in this case the others are not people from migrant or minority communities but single parents who exclude the other parent from raising a child. The statement B19 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on family models. B21 states *Children under the age of three feel best when they are looked after by their own parents. It should be possible again for a family with little children to live off one salary so the parents can freely choose between a job and an employment break to look after their children. Therefore, the state should finance parental care the same way it finances baby-minders and daycare centers.* This statement can be assigned to the category marriage and family and the code traditional values as it talks about the upbringing of children and how they should be looked after by their parents, hence it is in favor of a traditional family-based care system for children. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed as it is suggested that the state does not support families enough, at least financially. This statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on family models and parenting. The statement B23 reads *Society has to create a positive image of respect for life, marriage and parenthood in families and media in advance.* It can be assigned to the category marriage and family and the code traditional values as it focuses on the importance of the way society thinks about life, marriage and parenthood. This statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. In this case, the elites are schools and media that do not convey the right image concerning this topic. Also, the statement B23 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to family models. B29 states *The Alternative for Germany wants the family policy to be oriented towards the family model consisting of father, mother and children. We are against all attempts to extend the sense of the word "family" in article 6, paragraph 1 of the constitutional law to other forms of communities and hence withdraw the family's special state protection.* This statement can be assigned to the category marriage and family and the code traditional values as it promotes and wants to protect the traditional family model. B29 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. In this case, the elites are the ones attempting to extend to legal sense of the word family, hence the judiciary. The statement B29 is part of the heteronormative cluster because it focuses on the protection of the traditional family model. The statement B31 reads *The Alternative for Germany is clearly against all attempts to abolish the*

traditional family image through state supported reeducation programs in kindergartens and schools. It can be assigned to the category marriage and family and the code traditional values. B31 warns against the abolishment of the traditional family model through state reeducation programs. Thus, it creates an antagonism between the people and the elites, who are regarded as being responsible for said programs. B31 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it sees the traditional family image as worthy of protection and aspirational.

The frame category reproductive rights contains the statements B22, B24, B25 and focuses on “the protection of life”. The statement B22 reads *Unborn children also have the right to live. Too many times this right is subordinated to fear of the future and self-realization. The Alternative for Germany wants to prevent such fears through specific aids for families in all life situation and especially ease and promote the lifesaving option of adoption.* It can be assigned to the category reproductive rights and the code alternatives to abortion. The statement B22 constructs an antagonism between the people and the others. In this case, people who have abortions and, according to the Alternative for Germany, put themselves and their self-realization before their unborn child, are portrayed as others. However, one can also observe elements of an antagonism between the people and the elites as B22 states that the Alternative for Germany wants to offer special aid for families in need with regards to family planning and pregnancy. Thus, it is suggested that the current system does not offer such aid, or enough aid. B22 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families and children. The statement B24 reads *The counselling of conflict during pregnancy has to serve the protection of life. The effectiveness of the consultation arrangement should be regularly examined as requested by the Federal Constitutional Court. If necessary, statutory change should be made in order to ensure the protection of life.* B24 can be assigned to the category reproductive rights and the code protection of “unborn life”. This statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it questions the counselling of conflict during pregnancy. Thus, the statement B24 queries medical professionals who carry out the consultation process. This statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to parenthood and family. B25 states *to acquire realistic numbers on abortion, the reporting obligations on abortion have to be improved. The failure of reporting from the performing doctor has to have noticeable sanctions. The anonymity of the pregnant person has to be assured.* This statement can be assigned to the category reproductive rights and the code reporting obligations of doctors who perform abortions. B25 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites insofar as medical professionals who perform abortions

and do not report them accordingly are portrayed as acting against the interest of the people. The statement B25 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to parenthood.

The frame category Gender Ideology contains the statements B26, B27, B28, B32, B33. This frame category focuses on “natural differences between the sexes”, traditional gender images and Gender Studies as an instrument of so-called Gender Ideology. The statement B26 reads *Gender Ideology marginalizes natural differences between the sexes and questions gender identity*. It can be assigned to the frame Gender Ideology and the code natural differences between the sexes. It constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it sees academia promoting Gender Ideology as acting against the nature of the people. The statement B26 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it assumes natural differences between the sexes. The statement B27 says *Gender Ideology wants to abolish the classic family as a life and role model*. B27 can be assigned to the frame category Gender Ideology and the code traditional values as it portrays Gender Ideology as a threat to traditional values concerning family. It creates an antagonism between the people and the elites as it regards academia promoting Gender Ideology as a threat to the values of the people. B27 is also part of the heteronormative cluster because it focuses on the traditional ideas concerning family models. B28 states *Gender Ideology contradicts scientific findings in biology and developmental psychology as well as the everyday experience of many generations. That is why we are against national and international aspirations to implement that ideology through instruments such as Gender Studies, quota regulations, propaganda campaigns like the equal pay day or gender-neutral language*. This statement can be assigned to the frame category Gender Ideology and the code not scientific/in interest of the people as it targets Gender Ideology as a contradiction to scientific findings as well as to real-life experience of the people. Thus, an antagonism between the people and the elites is created. In this case, the elites are the ones responsible for the implementation of gender-neutral language, Gender Studies or quota regulations. B28 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it promotes traditional gender understanding and concept of gender. The statement B32 reads *Gender Studies are not a serious science but follow the ideology that sex and gender are fully separated. The final goal is to abolish the natural gender polarity*. It can be assigned to the category Gender Ideology and the code not scientific as it denounces Gender Studies as being unscientific. This statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites, who are seen as the academics studying and promoting Gender Studies. B32 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it follows the idea of heteronormativity and its binary gender

order. The statement B33 reads *The state should not be allowed to provide means for Gender Studies or hire professors for this field. Existing funding lines should be ended and equal opportunities representatives at universities bound to Gender Ideology should be abolished.* B33 can be assigned to the category Gender Ideology and the code not scientific. In this case, the elites are academia in the field of Gender Studies and the state, which enables Gender Studies at universities through (financial) means. B33 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it follows the idea of heteronormativity and its binary gender order.

The frame category sexual orientations consists of the statement B30, which says *The one-sided highlighting of homo and transsexuality in schools, like it is practiced by the so-called sex education of diversity (Sexualpädagogik der Vielfalt) is an inadmissible interference with our children's development and with the parental right to education guaranteed by the constitution.* The code promotion of different sexual orientations can be assigned. B30 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites whereby the educational system is regarded as the elites who are working against the interest of the parents hence the people. The statement B30 is part of the heteronormative cluster because it postulates heterosexuality as the social norm.

The Alternative for Germany's election program from 2017 shows forty-seven usages of frame categories with respect to the topic of this thesis. In eighteen cases the frame category institutions is used. Fourteen of these cases can be assigned to the code family policy. Five of the Fourteen cases can be subcategorized. The subcode benefits for families is used once, the subcode financial aspects is used twice, the subcode father's rights is used once and the subcode childcare is used once. Another code found within the frame category institutions is gender quota regulations, which is used twice. Also, the code integration policy is used twice. All eighteen frame categories institutions construct an antagonism between the people and the elites. sixteen of them are part of the heteronormative cluster, two are part of the othering through gendering cluster. In seven cases, the frame category demographics with the code persistence of the autochthonous society could be detected. Three of these cases construct an antagonism between the people and the others, four cases construct an antagonism between the people and the elites. The cases, which construct an antagonism between the people and the others are part of the othering through gendering cluster, the four cases that construct an antagonism between the people and the elites are part of the heteronormative cluster. Another frame category found in the Alternative for Germany's election program 2017 is culture and religion. This frame category is used five times. Each one has the code

oppression of women. For of these show the subcode veil, one the subcode incompatible with Western values. All five cases are part of the othering through gendering cluster and construct an antagonism between the people and the others. Eight cases can be applied to the frame category marriage and family from which all of them show the code traditional values. All eight cases are part of the heteronormative cluster. Seven cases construct an antagonism between the people and the elites, one case constructs an antagonism between the people and the others. Three cases can be assigned to the frame category reproductive rights. One shows the code alternatives to abortion, one the code protection of unborn life and one the code reporting obligations. All three cases are part of the heteronormative cluster. Two of them construct an antagonism between the people and the elites; one constructs an antagonism between the people and the others. In five cases, the frame category Gender Ideology could be detected. Two of these cases have the code not scientific, one case shows the code no support/place at universities, one case shows the code differences between the sexes and one shows the code traditional values. All five cases are part of the heteronormative cluster and construct an antagonism between the people and the elites. The last frame category found in this election program is sexual orientation with the code promotion of different sexual orientations. This frame category is used once, constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites and is part of the heteronormative cluster.

In general, the Alternative for Germany's election program from 2017 shows a quite broad spectrum of frame categories as seven different frame categories could be detected. This indicates that gender related issues are associated with a wider variety of other issues. Consequently, the Alternative for Germany has created its own opportunity to address an according variety of issues, which might be higher on their agenda or which might be more ascribed to them by the public than gender issues per se. As for the construction of antagonisms, the striking majority of the examined material constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. However, some of the frame categories aim at constructing an antagonism between the people and the elites. Even though the number of frame categories constructing an antagonism between the people and the elites is significantly higher, there are attempts to construct an antagonism between the people and the others in comparison to the material from 2013, where exclusively antagonisms between the people and the elites were constructed. Concerning the clusters the examined material could be assigned to, it can be observed that in the most cases the statements constructing an antagonism between the people and the elites are part of the heteronormative cluster and

most of the statements constructing an antagonism between the people and the others are part of the cluster othering through gendering. However, this does not apply to all cases and there are some exceptions. Three cases, which construct an antagonism between the people and the elites are part of the othering through gendering cluster and one case which constructs an antagonism between the people and the others is part of the heteronormative cluster. Nonetheless, there is a clear tendency that arguments constructing an antagonism between the people and the elites are part of the heteronormative cluster and statements constructing an antagonism between the people and the others are part of the cluster othering through gendering.

Regarding the content of the respective program concerning the presented literature, a few statements can be assigned to the line of arguments gender and feminism found in the literature. Specifically, the aspect of “anti-genderism” is of high interest. Indeed, there is no direct argument against the general idea of gender equality found within the Alternative for Germany’s election program from 2017. However, the positioning against gender quota regulations or gender-neutral language follows an anti-feminist narrative. Moreover, there is the narrative that the traditional family and the “natural order of the two sexes” might be threatened by “genderism”. Finally, the “anti-intellectualism” aspect proposed by the literature can also be detected in the program. The Alternative for Germany advocates against Gender Studies at universities and states that Gender Ideology is contradictory to the practical experience of “the people”. Hence, the concept gender is seen as incomprehensible for “the common people” and thus elitist. In the vast majority of the cases, discourses from the line of arguments on family and reproduction could be detected. Here, the connection to demographics is an important factor. Concerns that the native population shrinks are articulated. This is also put in comparison to Africa and “Arab-Muslim countries in the Near and Middle East”, where, according to the Alternative for Germany, the population explodes. In these cases, the line of arguments concerning family and reproduction is linked to the line of arguments on gender and the migration agenda. The decline of birthrates is seen as a threat to the nation, its social security system and thus and “the people”. Therefore, the importance of family policy and measures to increase birth rates are highlighted in the material. These measures include a benefitting taxation system for families with children. Another aspect of the line of arguments on family and reproduction are traditional values and the traditional family image (mother, father, children), which should be promoted according to the Alternative for Germany. The “free choice of women”, which is explicitly mentioned in the

literature, can also be found in the program. The Alternative for Germany wants to “give” women the possibilities to stay home and look after their children through a state financed parental wage. The Alternative for Germany also takes a stance on reproductive rights in their election program from 2017. The party advocates for the “protection of unborn life” and wants reporting obligation from doctors who perform abortion. Here, the party also follows the direction proposed in the literature, having a rather negative stance on abortion. One case can be assigned to the line of arguments on LGBTQI and sexual orientation. In this case, the narrative on the defense of the homogenous nation state as well as traditional and conservative believes about morals and values on sexual relations and identity can be detected. The party positions itself against the sexual education of diversity and accuses schools of promoting homo- and transsexuality. The remaining cases can be assigned to the line of arguments on the gender and migration agenda, with two cases overlapping with the already mentioned line of arguments on family and reproduction. Two more cases are overlapping with the line of arguments concerning gender and integration. Regarding the gender and integration agenda, the issue of the (full body) veil is of high importance as the Alternative for Germany highlights in several cases that the wearing of the veil is oppressive towards women, incomprehensible with Western, liberal values and hence a barrier regarding the integration Muslim women. Here, the overlapping of gender and integration with gender and migration agenda is visible. Explicit demands concerning the migration agenda are articulated (the ban of full body veil in public/public services) as well as arguments regarding “moral values” like the free expression of personality or equality between men and women. To sum up, there was a clear increase in quantity and variety compared to the party’s election program 2013. The Alternative for Germany’s focus concerning gender issues is on institutions, especially those related to family policies. The main critique is on the current system or those regarded as being responsible for it.

7.3. Analysis Election program 2013 Freedom Party of Austria

The Freedom Party of Austria’s election program from 2013 contains 10 statements concerning gender issues, which also construct antagonisms. The frame categories found in this election program are institutions and migration. The according category system (Category System C) to which the following analysis refers can be found in the appendix.

The frame category institutions consists of the statements C1, C3, C4, C5, C7, C8, C9 and C10 and focuses on family policy. The statement C1 reads *Increasing of family benefits and yearly value adjustment of child benefits*. C1 can be assigned to the frame category institutions and the code family policy with the subcode financial aspects as it refers to the offering of financial benefits to families and the adjustment of child benefits. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed as the current family benefits provided by the state are regarded as being insufficient. Thus, the ones being responsible for family benefits are portrayed as the elites, who are not acting in interest of the people. The statement C1 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement C3 reads *That is why we put the interest of our own citizens in the center: concerning housing, social benefits and family benefits as well as workplace and education*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode benefits for families because it demands a stronger focus on the interests of autochthonous families regarding family benefits. The construction of an antagonism between the people and the elites can be found. Here, the elites are the ones being in charge of policies concerning family benefits. They are accused of not putting the people's interest in the first place. C3 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement C4 reads *More crediting of the child-raising period for pension rights*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions and the code family policy with the subcode childcare. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed because it implies that the current pension system is not working in interest of the people, at least when it comes to crediting the child-raising period as working time. The statement C4 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families and parenthood. C5 states *Families and children secure our future. Instead of supporting them, the SPÖ and the ÖVP have reduced benefits unfairly*. This statement can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects as it talks about financial benefits for families provided by the state. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed. The governing parties are regarded as the elites working against the people because they have reduced financial benefits for families. The statement C5 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on the role of families with children in society. The statement C7 reads *The FPÖ will make Austria the most family and child friendly country in Europe for its citizens. We will create framework conditions, where no Austrian has a disadvantage because he or she takes the time to raise his or her children*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode benefits for

families as it focuses on framework conditions for Austrian families. This statement creates an antagonism between the people and the elites as it implies that the governing parties failed at creating those family and child-friendly framework conditions for the people. The statement C7 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement C8 says *Tax relief for Austrian families with several children due to a new taxation model for families*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects as it refers to a beneficial taxation model for Austrian families with children. C8 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the current tax system is regarded as not being fair for Austrian families with children, hence the people. This statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on autochthonous families with children. C9 states *Full freedom of choice between job and family due to the opportunity of a parental wage*. This statement can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode childcare. The statement C9 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it implies that the elites do not provide the necessary means for parents to freely choose if they want to work or stay at home with their children. This statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families and parenthood. The statement C10 reads *High quality childcare and education in kindergartens and schools with the possibility of all-day schooling without extra costs for parents*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode childcare as it focuses on childcare facilities and educational facilities. This statement creates an antagonism between the people and the elites as the offered facilities are insufficient for the people's needs. The statement C10 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to children, parenthood and care work.

The frame category migration consists of the statements C2 and C6 and focuses on the apparent threat migration poses towards autochthonous families. The statement C2 reads *Stop exporting family benefits abroad*. C2 can be assigned to the frame category migration and the code migration as a threat to autochthonous families as it demands a stop of the export of family benefits to other countries. In this case, an antagonism between the people and the others can be found insofar as the others are the people with families living abroad and receiving Austrian family benefits. C2 can not clearly be assigned to one of the presented clusters. It shows aspects of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families. However, the element of autochthonous families being treated unfairly in comparison to the others also fits the othering through gendering cluster. C6 states *The Greens want to shatter the family*

model. Like SPÖ and ÖVP they prefer migration over family support. This statement can be assigned to the frame category migration and the code migration as a threat to autochthonous families. The statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. In this case, the elites are other parties, namely the Greens, the Social Democrats and the People's Party, that are acting against the interest of the people. The statement C6 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children.

The analysis of the Freedom Party of Austria's election program from the 2013 national elections shows eight usages of the frame category institutions. Each one of these frame categories can be assigned to the heteronormative cluster and constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. Every frame category institutions consists of the code family policy. The eight family policy-codes found on the Freedom Party of Austria's election program 2013 can be split into the subcategories financials aspects (two usages), childcare (three usages) and benefits for families (three usages). In addition to the frame category institutions, there are also two usages of the frame category migration. One case is both part of the othering through gendering cluster and the heteronormative cluster and constructs an antagonism between the people and the others. Also, the code migration as a threat to autochthonous families can be assigned to both cases.

One can observe, that the variety of frame categories used in the material from the Freedom Party of Austria's election program from 2013 is rather small as there are only two different frame categories and two different codes. However. The code family policy offers three different subcodes. Nevertheless, the overall variety remains small. This means that the Freedom Party of Austria did not associate gender issues with many other issues, generally gender issues were not a big part of the Freedom Party of Austria's election program 2013. As for the constructed antagonisms, the vast majority of the cases construct an antagonism between the people and the elites and only a small amount construct an antagonism between the people and the others.

Content wise, the Freedom Party of Austria's election program for the national elections 2013 has a very strong focus on the line of arguments on family and reproduction. Within the spectrum of family and reproduction, the aspect of supporting families is of high importance. This support is demanded in form of a benefitting taxation system for families, childcare facilities and an improvement in the work-life balance of parents. This clearly follows the main ideas of the arguments concerning family and reproduction found in the respective literature as family policies are linked to demographic policies and the future of the nation

is seen as being depended on families with children. However, a more modernized approach could be detected as the labor market participation of women is not neglected and there are demands to improve the situation of working mothers. Moreover, two cases also refer to migration issues but are still in the line of arguments on family and reproduction. Here, migration is seen as a threat to Austrian families as they might receive and export family benefits. Hence, these benefits cannot be used by autochthonous families. Additionally, migration is portrayed as a contradiction to family support, meaning you could either have migration or family support, but not both. Thus, supporting migration would be a direct disadvantage for autochthonous families. To sum up, gender issues are used rather rarely to construct antagonisms in the Freedom Party of Austria's election program 2013. When they are used, the focus is clearly on families and most of the time on institutional level. Hence, the main critique is on the current system, its policies and those regarded as being in charge of it.

7.4. Analysis Election program 2017 Freedom Party of Austria

The Freedom Party of Austria's election program from 2017 consists of twenty-four statements on gender issues, which also construct antagonisms. The frame categories found in this election program are institutions, demographics, symbolic measures, culture and religion and reproductive rights. The according category system (Category System D) to which the following analysis refers can be found in the appendix.

The frame category institutions contains the statements D1, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11, D12, D17, D18, D21, D22, D23, D24. This category system focuses on family policy but also refers to the gender pay gap and the judiciary system. The statement D1 reads *It is unfair that taxpayers massively support federal museums but at the same time the entry is hard to afford for Austrian families. [...] The Freedom Party of Austria demands free entry to our museums for Austrian families.* D1 can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode benefits for families. The statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites because the ones being in charge of the price policy of museums are regarded as not acting in interest of Austrian families, hence the people. D1 is part of the heteronormative cluster because it focuses on families with children. The statement D2 reads *The wish for family and offspring should not lead to a risk of poverty because the birth rate of autochthonous families has strongly decreased in the last several*

decades. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects. This statement refers to the financial struggle people who want to start a family might encounter. D2 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites because it criticizes the current system and portrays it as being unfavorable towards families. The statement D2 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to families with children. The statement D3 says *Appeals for family formation have to be created and support measures have to be made*. D3 can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode benefits for families. The statement demands appeals and means to make family formation more attractive to the people. D3 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the ones in charge of family policy are regarded as working insufficiently. D3 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement D4 reads *Because of the high costs of living expenses and the enormous tax burden, financial discharge and the creation of a carefree life for families is paramount for us. The decision to have one child or several children should not lead to poverty. In addition to family friendly tax models, the reconciliation of family and working life is an essential requirement*. D4 can be assigned to the frame category institution and the code family policy. The subcodes childcare as well as financial aspects can be detected as D4 refers to combining working life and family and additionally to financial difficulties and taxation. The statement D4 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the current family policy system is regarded as not working in the best interest of the people. D4 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to families with children. D5 states *It is unfair that the decision to have children is not sufficiently supported by the state regarding taxes*. This statement can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspect as it refers to tax models for families. D5 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the elites are portrayed as being in charge of a taxation system, which does not support families, hence the people, sufficiently. The statement D5 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement D6 reads *It is unfair that the child raising period is not credited to the pension*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode childcare. D6 can also be assigned to the subcode financial aspects as it associates the child-raising period with the pension system. This statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it criticizes the current system with regards to childcare and pension. The statement D6 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement D7 reads *It is unfair that missing childcare facilities complicate*

the reconciliation of family and work life. D7 can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode childcare. The statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it regards the infrastructure concerning childcare facilities as insufficient. D7 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement D8 says *Make having a family affordable through a family friendly tax system as an alternative to regular taxation.* It can be assigned the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects. The statement D8 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it regards the current tax system as being suboptimal for families with children. Hence, the ones in charge are not working in the best interest of the people. D8 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement D9 reads *Yearly adaption of family allowance, tax credit for children and childcare allowance to the inflation rate.* It can be assigned to the frame category institution, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects. It constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it regards the current adaption of these credits and allowances to the inflation rate as insufficient. Hence, the ones in charge are not working in the best interest of the people. D9 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement D10 reads *Improving reconciliation of work life and family through the expansion of childcare facilities and childminder as a professional career.* It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode childcare. D10 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the current childcare system is regarded as improvable. Thus, the people in charge are not working in the best interest of the people. The statement D10 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to families with children. The statement D11 reads *Extension of the dismissal protection to the maximum period of childcare allowance.* It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode childcare. The statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it regards the current system as improvable. The statement D11 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement D12 says *Real freedom of choice for women means that a mother can freely decide if she wants to stay at home with her children and educate them or go back to work without financial pressure.* D12 can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects as well as the subcode childcare. On the one hand, the statement refers to the financial pressure for women to go back to work after having a child. On the other hand, it refers to the child-caring period of women. The statement constructs an antagonism between the

people and the elites as it criticizes the current system as disadvantageous for mothers. The statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children and shows a traditional understanding of gendered division of labor as women are regarded as the ones staying at home and looking after the children. D17 states *It is unfair that women earn less than men in the same professional position*. This statement can be assigned to the frame category institutions and the code gender pay gap. D17 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the elites are regarded as the ones being responsible for the gender pay gap and doing nothing against it. The statement D17 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it follows the idea of traditional gender polarity. The statement D18 reads *Close the gender pay gap – equal pay for equal value!* It can be assigned to the frame category institutions and the code gender pay gap. The statement demands the abolition of the gender pay gap and equal pay for equivalent professional positions. D18 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the elites are regarded as the ones being responsible for the gender pay gap and doing nothing against it. The statement D18 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it follows the idea of traditional gender polarity. The statement D21 reads *In order to eliminate the financial burden concerning the wish for more children, the Freedom Party of Austria has developed a relief system for families which can be chosen as an alternative to regular taxation. The yearly tax saving can be up to 7000€ per family*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects. D21 suggests an alternative to the regular taxation system for families with children. The statement D21 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the current taxation system is presented as being disadvantageous and a burden for families with children. Hence, the people in charge are working against the interest of the people. D21 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. The statement D22 reads *It is unfair that families, which are the foundation of our society, are disadvantaged by the tax system*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects. An antagonism between the people and the elites, who are seen as being responsible for the current taxation system, is constructed. D22 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on families with children. D23 states *More money for families through a tax model which leads to a lower tax burden for families with more children*. This statement can be assigned to the frame category institution, the code family policy and the subcode financial aspects. D23 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as the latter are regarded as being in charge of the current taxation system, which is disadvantageous towards the people. The statement

D23 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to families with children. The statement D24 reads *The often relatively mild penalty for violent or sexual crimes shakes the trust in justice, especially when there is the suspicion that the cultural background of the offender is taken into account*. It can be assigned to the frame category institutions with the code judiciary system and the subcode harder penalties for violent crimes towards women. The statement accuses the judiciary system of being too soft on offenders with migratory background as the “cultural background” is taken into consideration when it comes to violent or sexual crimes towards women. An antagonism between the people and the elites is constructed. The elites are seen as being part of the judiciary system, which is failing at protecting the people. The statement is part of the othering through gendering cluster, as it suggests that especially people with a certain “cultural background” are sex offenders.

The frame category symbolic measures consists of the statements D13, D16, D19 and refers to measures, which are, according to the Freedom Party of Austria, not contributing to “real gender equality”. The statement D13 reads *The Freedom Party of Austria stands for real gender equality. However, that does not mean egalitarianism between men and women. That is the reason why we are against hypocritical measures like the promotion of women, which are not suitable for increasing women’s roles*. It can be assigned to the frame category symbolic measures and the code not in interest of women. The statement suggests that certain measures do not really help women to reach full equality. Moreover, the statement is not in favor of egalitarianism between men and women. The statement D13 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites, who promote such measures. The statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it follows the traditional idea of gender polarity and natural differences between men and women. The statement D16 reads *It is unfair that hypocritical measures like gender-sensitive language or the mentioning of daughters in the national anthem distract from the real problems of women*. D16 can be assigned to the frame category symbolic measures and the code not in interest of women. D16 states that certain measures like gender sensitive language or the mentioning of the daughters (next to the original sons) in the national anthem do not solve problems of women but rather distract from them. The statement constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites because the ones in charge of and responsible for these measures are portrayed as not acting in interest of the people. The statement is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to the traditional gender polarity. D19 states *Real gender equality instead of hypocritical egalitarianism*. It can be assigned to the frame category symbolic measures and the code not

in interest of women. It constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites because it suggests that “real gender equality” (what would be in interest of the people) is ignored for the benefit of “hypocritical egalitarianism”, an elitist idea that is not part of the everyday life of “the people”. D19 is part of the heteronormative cluster.

The frame category culture and religion consists of the statements D14, D15, D24 and focuses on oppression of women coming from an out-group. The statement D14 reads *We do not accept oppression of women and that is why we are strictly against forced marriages or compulsory headscarves*. It can be assigned to the frame category culture and religion, the code oppression of women and the subcode veil. D14 constructs an antagonism between the people and the others as the statement suggests that practices associated with Muslim communities are oppressive towards women. Hence, the statement D14 is part of the cluster othering through gendering. The statement D15 reads *It is unfair that new discrimination against women is happening due to a migratory wave coming from patriarchal cultures*. It can be assigned to the frame category culture and religion and the code oppression of women. D15 suggests that new migration flows lead to increasing oppression towards women. Thus, D15 constructs an antagonism between the people and the others as it directly and explicitly blames migrant and minority communities for the oppression of women. That is also the reason why statement D15 is part of the cluster othering through gendering. D24 states *The often relatively mild penalty for violent or sexual crimes shakes the trust in justice, especially when there is the suspicion that the cultural background of the offender is taken into account*. This statement can be assigned to the frame category culture and religion with the code migration as a threat to women. People with a certain “cultural background” are presented as being especially threatening towards women. An antagonism between the people and the others is constructed, as the others, meaning people with a certain “cultural background”, different from the cultural background of the people, are seen as a threat. The statement is part of the othering through gendering cluster.

The frame category reproductive rights consists of the statement D20. It states *Medical and social counselling before the planned termination of pregnancy and support for pregnant women in difficult life situations*. D20 has the code support for women with unwanted pregnancies. It constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites as it regards the current medical system concerning counselling and support for people with unwanted pregnancies and/or in difficult situations as improvable. The statement D20 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it focuses on women and their role as potential mothers.

The frame category demographics consist of the statement D2 and reads *The wish for family and offspring should not lead to a risk of poverty because the birth rate of autochthonous families has strongly decreased in the last several decades*. The code persistence of autochthonous society can be assigned. D2 constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites because it criticizes the current system and portrays it as being unfavorable towards families. The statement D2 is part of the heteronormative cluster as it refers to families with children

The Freedom Party of Austria's election program for the national elections in 2017 shows twenty-eight usages of frame categories regarding the research question of this thesis. The frame category institutions is the most common and the code family policy is most frequently assigned. The code family policy can be subcategorized in the subcodes benefits for families, financial aspects and childcare. Other codes found within the frame category institutions are the gender pay gap, which is used twice as well as the judiciary system, which is used once. The latter can be subcategorized into the subcode harder penalties concerning violence towards children and women. All frame categories institutions construct an antagonism between the people and the elites. The majority of them is part of the heteronormative cluster, only the one with the code judiciary can be assigned to the cluster othering through gendering. Moreover, the analysis of the Freedom Party of Austria's election program for the national elections in 2017 includes three usages of the frame category symbolic measures. All three cases consist of the code not in interest of women, are part of the heteronormative cluster and construct an antagonism between the people and the elites. Furthermore, this election program contains three cases where the frame category culture and religion applies. The frame category culture and religion can be split into the code oppression of women, which is used twice, and the code migration as a threat towards women, which is used once. In one case, the code oppression of women can be subcategorized in the subcode veil. All three cases are part of the cluster othering through gendering and construct an antagonism between the people and the others. Additionally, there is one usage of the frame category demographics with the code persistence of autochthonous society, which is part of the heteronormative cluster and constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. Also, there is one case where the frame category reproductive rights with the code support for women with unwanted pregnancies is used. This case is part of the heteronormative cluster and creates an antagonism between the people and the elites.

It shows, that the variety of frame categories used and also the frequency they are used increased compared to the Freedom Party of Austria's election program from 2013. This means that the Freedom party of Austria not only had a stronger focus on gender issues but also connected them to a wider spectrum of other issues. The vast majority of the frame categories found in the material belong to the frame category institutions, this is followed by the frame categories symbolic measures and culture and religion, which are both used three times. The frame categories demographics and reproductive rights are both used once. As for the constructed antagonisms, the overwhelming majority of the frame categories construct an antagonism between the people and the elites and only in three cases construct an antagonism between the people and the others. Regarding the clusters the respective material can be assigned to, it can be observed, that most of it is part of the heteronormative cluster and constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites. Only one statement, which constructs an antagonism between the people and the elites, can be assigned to the othering through gendering cluster. All the statements constructing an antagonism between the people and the others can be assigned to the othering through gendering cluster.

Regarding the content of the analyzed program, it could be observed that the vast majority of the cases can be assigned to the line of arguments regarding family and reproduction. One of the main focuses within this line of arguments is on financial aspects, benefits and the taxation system in Austria. Generally, measures to facilitate starting and also having a family are promoted and demanded by the Freedom Party of Austria. This implies that motherhood is regarded as an issue in interest of the nation and not as something exclusively private. Thus, family policies are clearly linked to demographic policies. In the material, one can also find aspects of a more modernized discourse on family and reproduction in addition to this rather neo-traditional approach. An improvement of the conditions for working mothers is demanded. This includes an increasing number of child care facilities and the “freedom of choice” for mothers concerning the question if they want go back to work or stay at home with the children. Furthermore, the Freedom Party of Austria speaks out against the gender pay gap in the program. In addition, reproductive rights are also addressed. Even though the Freedom Party of Austria highlights the importance of families with children, their stance on reproductive rights is formulated rather neutral and not as reactionary as the state of the art on this issue suggests. However, it is not safe to say that the party positions itself “pro-choice” either, as a medical and social counselling before the planned termination of a pregnancy is demanded which might slow down the process and complicate it. Another line of arguments

found within the material focuses on gender equality and feminism. Here, the Freedom Party of Austria abstains from directly speaking out against gender equality per se but replicates the “anti-genderism” narrative found in the respective literature as the party positions itself against “egalitarianism”. Moreover, they reproduce anti-feminist arguments by devaluing gender-sensitive language or the explicit mentioning of “daughters” (next to the original “sons”) in the national anthem as hypocritical measures and not in the interest of the common people. The last line of arguments found in the Freedom Party of Austria’s election program from 2017 is on gender and integration. On the one hand, the party follows the narrative of the contrast between traditional (meaning migrant/Muslim) communities and the Western, liberal values and women, that need to be protected from discriminating practices of migrant and minority communities. Additionally, to these discourses, which are also found in the state of the art, the Freedom Party of Austria not only accuses men from migrant and minority groups of being a threat to women, the party also accuses the Austrian judiciary system of shielding offenders of violent or sexual crimes due to their cultural background. To sum up, this election program mainly focuses on gender issues on the institutional level. Hence, the focus of the Freedom Party’s critique is on the elites. In this case, the elites are regarded as the ones in charge of current policies and laws, which are, according to the Freedom Party of Austria, not in interest of the people. The dominating cluster in this program is the heteronormative cluster. This is because the Freedom Party of Austria mainly refers to family policy when addressing institutions. Hence, the idea of the traditional family model (parents with children) is in the center of attention in the 2017 election program from the Freedom Party of Austria.

8. Discussion and Conclusion

The analysis of all four cases shows, that the main focus from both the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria is on constructing an antagonism between “the people” and “the elites”. One case, the Alternative for Germany’s election program regarding the general election in 2013, exclusively constructs antagonisms between “the people” and “the elites”. In this case, “the elites” are regarded as the ones in charge of social security policies regarding families. The Alternative for Germany presents these policies as not being and working in interest of families. The party regards families with children as a core element of the social security system and hence these policies are also working against “the people” in general. The other three programs also construct antagonisms between the people and the others, but the majority in each case are the antagonisms between “the people” and “the elites”. Moreover, it is striking how the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria both significantly increased their number of statements on gender issues, which aim at constructing antagonisms. The increased number of statements combined with the greater variety of constructed antagonisms suggests that both parties not only addressed gender issues more often in 2017 than in 2013, but also used a greater diversity of issues they put gender issues in relation to or connected with. This can be seen by the fact that the Alternative for Germany as well as the Freedom Party for Austria used more different frames and codes in 2017 than they did in 2013. This assumption is supported by the fact that both parties followed a greater variety of the line of arguments from the state of the art in 2017 than in 2013. The election programs from 2013 focus on the line of arguments on family and reproduction whereas both election programs from 2017 consist of statements that could be assigned to the lines of arguments on gender equality and feminism, family and reproduction as well as gender and integration. Moreover, the Alternative from Germany’s election program from 2017 also includes statements that could be assigned to the lines of arguments on gender and migration agenda and LGBTQI and sexual orientations.

Generally, there are interesting aspects regarding the content of the programs themselves and also in relation to the presented literature. For one, the line of arguments used most in all of the examined cases is the one focusing on family and reproduction, whereby the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria both put a stronger focus on the family part and not as extensively on the aspect of reproductive rights. In sum, (autochthonous) families with children are portrayed as being in need of more state support as they are seen as the base for the social security system and the persistence of the native population, thus “the

people”. Hence, they should receive all the benefits they need, which are, according to both parties, not provided by the current system. These benefits mostly include institutional aspects like taxation, financial support, childcare facilities and regulations focusing on the improvement of the situation of working parents (especially mothers). In this context, parenthood and especially motherhood is not understood as something exclusively private but also in the interest of the nation and thus of “the people”. With regards to the presented literature, the analysis shows that both parties follow a modern traditional discourse with respect to family and reproduction. On the one hand, they link family policies to demographics and the nation depending on native birth rates. On the other hand, both parties state that they want to improve the situation of working mothers and they do not advocate against the labor market participation of women in general. Rather, they promote the idea of “free choice” between going back to work or staying at home with the children.

Another line of arguments found relatively often in the material is on gender equality and feminism. Here, both parties generally refrain from positioning themselves explicitly against gender equality. However, the Alternative for Germany as well as the Freedom Party follow anti-feminist and “anti-genderism” narratives when they advocate against “hypocritical” measures like gender-sensitive language as they are, according to both parties, not in the interest of “the people” and not part of their daily experiences. Furthermore, the Alternative for Germany also addresses Gender Studies as an academic field and clearly positions itself against its place at universities and any support these studies might receive. Apart from one statement made by the Alternative for Germany in 2017, none of the analyzed programs addresses LGBTQI rights and sexual orientations. This one statement does not even explicitly refer to LGBTQI rights but to sex education in schools and how it apparently promotes homo- and transsexuality. To sum up, from all narratives found in the respective literature which were assigned to the heteronormative cluster earlier in this thesis, the one on family and reproduction dominates the examined material. The line of arguments on gender equality and feminism and especially on LGBTQI rights and sexual orientations are underrepresented in comparison to the lines of arguments on family and reproduction and gender equality and feminism.

The usage of the narratives found in the respective literature assigned to the othering through gendering cluster also offers some interesting insights. It is striking, that the Alternative for Germany does not use any arguments that could be assigned to these narratives in its election program from 2013. The Freedom Party of Austria uses this cluster only once in its election

program from 2013. However, both parties reproduce several narratives from the othering through gendering cluster in their election programs 2017. The line of arguments from this cluster found most frequently in the examined material is the one focusing on gender and migration agenda. In this case, the aspect of gender and integration is primarily discussed on a policy level. Generally, more repressive policies are demanded, especially regarding religious practices like the wearing of a (full body) veil. This line of arguments is frequently interlinked with the line of arguments on gender and integration. Statements, which could be assigned to the line of arguments on gender and integration, follow a similar logic as the statements, which could be assigned, to the line of arguments on gender and migration agenda: the incompatibility of migrant and minority “values” and practices with liberal, Western “values” and the defense of said values like women’s rights and gender equality. However, the issues are not specifically discussed on a policy level but rather on ideas of morality and values. Neither the line of arguments on socio-economic marginalization of migrant and minority communities nor those on gender and security issues could be found in any of the examined programs. Although the state of the art suggests that discourses on wearing of the veil can be part of the line of arguments on gender and security issues, none of the cases where the veil is addressed explicitly securitizes the issue. It is rather discussed in the context of integration and compatibility with liberal, Western values than on a security level.

The main finding of this research are that gender-related issues in general have become more important for populist radical right parties. Furthermore, it is striking that the othering through gendering cluster including the correspondent narratives and an antagonism between the people against the others are not the dominating factor in any of the programs. As already shown, there are hardly any statements in the material from 2013 that could be assigned to these categories, clusters or this type of antagonism. This is insofar surprising as populist radical right parties are in general most known for and associated with their restrictive positions on issues surrounding migration, asylum, integration and refugees, The reason why this changed in 2017 could possibly be the refugee movement towards Europe starting in 2015 and especially the so-called New Year’s Eve in Cologne 2015 (Kölner Silvesternacht). As already described earlier in this thesis, this event not only marked a change in discourse (especially in Germany, but also in the rest of Europe) on refugees, but also strongly enhanced the stereotype of male refugees and migrants being a threat to (Western) women. In any case, it could be detected, that the dominating antagonism in the examined programs

is clearly the antagonism between the people and the elites. Particularly the narrative that the current system is not supportive and attractive enough for families with children is salient. Even though the broad public might associate populist radical right parties first and foremost with conservative views and restrictive policies on migration and asylum issues, this strong anti-elitist narrative focusing on the persistence of the autochthonous society and the nation in general perfectly fits the characteristics of populist radical right parties as found in the literature. As stated in the theoretical part of this thesis, Mudde (2004) sees the centerpiece of populism in the separation into two groups that are as homogenous as they are antagonistic: the pure people and the corrupt elites. Concerning the aspect of persistence of the autochthonous society, the nativism element of populist radical right parties is of particular interest. Nativism focuses on the nation-state, which is considered homogenous, and its inhabitants. The main idea is that only members belonging to the native group should live in the nation-state. Hence, the native group has to reproduce in order to ensure the nation state's persistence. This narrative is one of the dominating narratives in all of the examined material.

Regarding the comparison of Germany and Austria, one can observe that both countries show a significant increase in the quantity and variety of gender issues used in order to construct antagonisms. In the case of Germany, this increase is higher. The election program of the Alternative for Germany in 2013 has the lowest amount of antagonisms related to gender issues. Even if the variety of frames and codes detected in the Alternative for Germany's election program 2013 is the same as in the Freedom Party of Austria's election program 2013, the 2013 material from Austria has a greater variety in the subcodes, which suggests a broader spectrum regarding the content of the analyzed material. As for the material from the 2017 elections, the Alternative for Germany's program shows the highest amount and variety of constructed antagonisms related to gender issues. Concerning the detected frames, there are some differences between the Austrian election programs and the German election programs. The frame categories marriage and family, Gender Ideology and sexual orientations were only used by the Alternative for Germany whereas the Freedom Party of Austria exclusively used the frame categories migration and symbolic measures. Also, the Alternative for Germany has a stronger focus on demographics and the persistence of the autochthonous society. Apart from that, both parties show a similar tendency in the usage of the remaining frame categories. Both parties most frequently use the frame category institutions in order to construct antagonisms. They also show a similar usage of the frame categories culture and religion as well as reproductive rights. Taking into consideration the

codes and subcodes, the results are similar. There are some differences but there clearly is a resemblance in the overall tendency. Both parties mainly use the code family policy when putting gender issues in the frame institutions. Also, the frame category demographics is always associated with the code persistence of autochthonous society and both parties mainly associate the frame category culture and religion with the code oppression of women. Differences between the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria could be detected in the frame category reproductive rights. The Alternative for Germany uses the codes alternatives to abortion, protection of “unborn life” and reporting obligation for doctors who perform abortion whereas the Freedom Party of Austria uses the code support for women with unwanted pregnancies.

Generally speaking, one can identify a similar development and tendency concerning gender issues and antagonisms. Both parties show an increase in quantity and variety, a focus on institutions and family policies, mainly presenting “the elites” in the sense of people in charge of the current system, policies or laws as an antagonism to and not working in interest of “the people”. The main differences are that the Alternative for Germany has a stronger focus on the othering through gendering cluster and the constructed antagonism between the people and the others than the Freedom Party of Austria (even though both parties mainly use the heteronormative cluster and the antagonisms between the people and the elites). This seems surprising as the Freedom Party of Austria has a far longer tradition as an “anti-immigration” party than the Alternative for Germany. Furthermore, the Alternative for Germany refers to Gender Ideology, including Gender Studies at universities as well as “natural differences between the sexes” and the apparent promotion of homo- and transsexuality in schools whereas the Freedom Party of Germany does not address these topics at all in its examined election programs. This suggests a higher relevance of “anti-genderism” for the Alternative for Germany than for the Freedom Party of Austria. Moreover, the Alternative for Germany refers to marriage and family with reference to traditional values, a topic that is not touched upon by the Freedom Party of Austria. In this case, it can be suggested that the Alternative for Germany has a stronger focus and a more traditional view on family and its composition. The Freedom Party of Austria on the other hand addresses symbolic measures (like gender sensitive language or the new mentioning of the daughter next to the original sons in the Austrian national anthem) unlike the Alternative for Germany. The Freedom Party’s main message regarding this topic is that those so-called symbolic measures are not in real interest of women and do not lead to “real gender equality”. The

Alternative for Germany however does not refer to gender equality at all. Finally, the two parties have a slightly different stance on reproductive rights. The Alternative for Germany clearly positions itself as “pro-life” and focuses on the fetus whereas the Freedom Party of Austria demands support for women with unwanted pregnancies and thus focuses on the pregnant person.

Overall, the main findings, although they might seem surprising at first, clearly align with both the theoretical background concerning right-wing populism in general and its double antagonism in particular as well as with the state of the art on populist radical right parties and their stance on gender issues. Regarding the research question, it can be said that both parties definitely use gender issues in order to construct antagonisms. Furthermore, the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria use gender issues with the goal to construct antagonisms in very similar ways. If the aim is to construct an antagonism between the people and the elites, the focus is on family policy and on how the current system fails at providing satisfying framework conditions for (autochthonous) families. If the aim is to construct an antagonism between the people and the others, the focus is on the apparent incompatibility of so-called liberal, Western values like women’s rights and gender equality with practices of migrant and minority communities (predominantly Muslim communities). According to the respective parties, they oppress women and thus there is an apparent risk male migrants and refugees might pose towards women. Obviously, the analysis shows that other lines of arguments are used as well. However, both parties clearly focus on the aforementioned narratives that dominate the examined programs in order to construct antagonisms that feed into their overall party profile.

In terms of research outlook, several interesting aspects and fields have been distilled in the course of this thesis. For one, the examined material could be expanded. On the one hand, more populist radical right parties located in more countries could be the subject of the analysis. This would give some insights on if and how populist radical right stances on gender issues vary depending on the country they are located in. On the other hand, a broader spectrum of time could be analyzed. It would also be interesting for further research to examine if and how party positions change depending on if they are part of the opposition or the government. If the second case applies, it might be more difficult to construct an antagonism between the people and the elites and to blame the current system for insufficient family support for example. Another aspect that might be interesting for further research is the policy level: how populist radical right parties actually vote and voted in the past on

questions concerning gender issues, which policies they support or even push through. Moreover, further research could be conducted on the populist radical right double antagonism and how it is constructed. Here, gender issues could be substituted by other policy issues as the populist radical right ideology is, as already mentioned, a “thin” one and hence easily loaded up with other issues.

Concluding, the umbrella theme “populist radical right parties and gender issues” offers a wide variety of research fields, which have not been extensively examined so far, even though ring-wing populism (and also extremism) and gender have become more prominent in political science (and related fields of study) in recent years. This suggests that this field is relatively new in academia and more research is expected in the coming years.

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Appendix

Category System A

Antagonism	Cluster	Frame Category	Code	Subcode	Quote	#
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	We demand to take children stronger into account in the calculation of pensions.	A1
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	benefits for families	Germany has too little children. That is why the pension and health care system are in danger. Germany has to become more family and child-friendly.	A2
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	demographics	persistance of autochthonous society		Germany has too little children. That is why the pension and health care system are in danger. Germany has to become more family and child-friendly.	A2

Category System B

Antagonism	Cluster	Frame Category	Code	Subcode	Quote	#
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	quota regulations		The Alternative for Germany stands up for equality before the law. That is why we are against so-called "quota regulations".	B1
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	quota regulations		In a free state under the rule of law, it can never be the legitimate objective to enforce randomly set "gender quotas" in randomly separated subdivisions of society. Also, a difference in treatment prescribed by law cannot be a way to realize equality. Laws, which prescribe this, are unconstitutional and to be rejected.	B2

the people vs the others	othering through gendering	demographics	persistence of autochthonous society		While the European population gets older and shrinks, the population in Africa and Arab-Muslim countries in the Near and Middle East explodes. In Africa, every woman has an average of 4.5 children. At the same time, child mortality decreases due to international aid. In contrast, the birthrate in Europe is 1.6 - in Germany even 1.4. This means, that the African population, including all Arab countries, will have grown from the current 1.2 billion people to 2.4 billion people by 2050. By the same time, the 590 million people who are currently living in Europe will be reduced to 540 million.	B3
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	demographics	persistence of autochthonous society		Family policy and demographic policy measures take precedence over migration, especially "activating family policy", but also the reduction of emigration of qualified workers from Germany.	B4
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		Family policy and demographic policy measures take precedence over migration, especially "activating family policy", but also the reduction of emigration of qualified workers from Germany.	B4
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	culture and religion	oppression of women	veil	Burka and niqab build a barrier between the wearer and her environment and thus complicate the cohabitation in society.	B5
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	culture and religion	oppression of women	veil	The Alternative for Germany demands a general ban of full body veil in public and public service.	B6
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	culture and religion	oppression of women	veil	The equality of men and women guaranteed by the constitution and the free expression of personality are contradictory to the veil as a religious-political symbol of submission of Muslim women.	B7
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	culture and religion	oppression of women	veil	The Alternative for Germany regards the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 2015, which states that a general ban of the veil for Muslim teachers is unconstitutional, as a barrier to successful integration policy.	B8

the people vs the elites	othering through gendering	institutions	integration policy		The Alternative for Germany regards the decision of the German Constitutional Court of 2015, which states that a general ban of the veil for Muslim teachers is unconstitutional, as a barrier to successful integration policy.	B8
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	culture and religion	oppression of women	incompatible with Western values	The ban on religious advance ceremony (religiöse Vorastrauung) for example by imams should come into force again. The abolishment of §§ 67 and 67a in the personal statute law of 2009 should be reversed. That is the only way to counter imam-marriages, which often enable polygamy, child-marriage or intermarriage. Marriages contracted abroad according to the family law of the Sharia, which are against our laws and moral values, should not be legally recognized in Germany.	B9
the people vs the elites	othering through gendering	institutions	integration policy		The ban on religious advance ceremony (religiöse Vorastrauung) for example by imams should come into force again. The abolishment of §§ 67 and 67a in the personal statute law of 2009 should be reversed. That is the only way to counter imam-marriages, which often enable polygamy, child-marriage or intermarriage. Marriages contracted abroad according to the family law of the Sharia, which are against our laws and moral values should not be legally recognized in Germany.	B9

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	demographics	persistance of autochthonous society		The drastic increase in childlessness and marriagelessness and the disappearance of normal medium sized families - wich has been accepted as being without alternatives by the established parties for a long time - are the reason for the shrinkage of 250000 autochthonous people per year, with a rising trend. The Alternative for Germany is against this trend towards self-abolition and wants to make Germany friendlier towards families and children.	B10
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		The drastic increase in childlessness and marriagelessness and the disappearance of normal medium sized families - wich has been accepted as being without alternatives by the established parties for a long time - are the reason for the shrinkage of 250000 autochthonous people per year, with a rising trend. The Alternative for Germany is against this trend towards self-abolition and wants to make Germany friendlier towards families and children.	B10
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	demographics	persistance of autochthonous society		Germany needs a paradigm shift towards a national population policy.	B11
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		Germany needs a paradigm shift towards a national population policy.	B11
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		Family policy should be the standard for related policy fields, especially social, tax and education policy.	B12
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		Germany needs more stable families with more children. Without a balanced birth rate, social peace is in danger as far as it is based on our social, pensions and health care system. That is why measures to increase the birth rates of the autochthonous population at medium-term are essential, also to stabilize the social security system.	B13

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	demographics	persistance of autochthonous society		Germany needs more stable families with more children. Without a balanced birth rate, social peace is in danger as far as it is based on our social, pensions and health care system. That is why measures to increase the birth rates of the autochthonous population at medium-term are essential, also to stabilize the social security system.	B13
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	demographics	persistance of autochthonous society		The "Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth" should be turned into a "Ministry for Family Affairs and Population Developement", that coordinates and supports population development according to scientific criteria.	B14
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		The "Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth" should be turned into a "Ministry for Family Affairs and Population Developement", that coordinates and supports population development according to scientific criteria.	B14
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		The preservation of the national population is the primary task of politics and of every government. Considering the current German demographic situation, this can only be achieved through activating family policy.	B15
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	demographics	persistance of autochthonous society		The preservation of the national population is the primary task of politics and of every government. Considering the current German demographic situation, this can only be achieved through activating family policy.	B15
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	marriage and family	traditional values		We want to enable and encourage young people through information and aids to start and preserve a family. We want to abolsih unnecessary barriers so stable marriages and families can form and remain. We want to start this soon by making accepted rules concerning partnership and family, housekeeping, protection of life and child-education a fixed part of schoolbooks and the syllabus in mainstream schools.	B16

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	benefits for families	We want to enable and encourage young people through information and aids to start and preserve a family. We want to abolish unnecessary barriers so stable marriages and families can form and remain. We want to start this soon by making accepted rules concerning partnership and family, housekeeping, protection of life and child-education a fixed part of schoolbooks and the syllabus in mainstream schools.	B16
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		Although there are alarming realizations concerning the impact on child development, nearly all parties are in favor of unconditional support of single parents.	B17
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	marriage and family	traditional values		Although there are alarming realizations concerning the impact on child development, nearly all parties are in favor of unconditional support of single parents.	B17
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	marriage and family	traditional values		The Alternative for Germany wants to help single parents to have an independent life. However, the Alternative for Germany is against every form of financial support of organizations which propagate single-parent families as a normal, progressive or even desirable way of life.	B18
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		The Alternative for Germany wants to help single parents to have an independent life. However, the Alternative for Germany is against every form of financial support of organizations which propagate single-parent families as a normal, progressive or even desirable way of life.	B18
the people vs the others	heteronormative cluster	marriage and family	traditional values		The benefit of special support by the community of solidarity should only be granted to single parents who do not expel the other parent from educational responsibilities or practical parenting.	B19
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	fathers' rights	Many fathers in split relationships suffer from rules in family law and want to have more contact with their children.	B20

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	Children under the age of three feel best when they are looked after by their own parents. It should be possible again for a family with little children to live off one salary so the parents can freely choose between job and an employment break to look after their children. Therefore, the state should finance parental care the same way it finances baby-minders and daycare centers.	B21
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	marriage and family	traditional values		Children under the age of three feel best when they are looked after by their own parents. It should be possible again for a family with little children to live off one salary so the parents can freely choose between job and an employment break to look after their children. Therefore, the state should finance parental care the same way it finances baby-minders and daycare centers.	B21
the people vs the others	heteronormative cluster	reproductive rights	alternatives to abortion		Unborn children also have the right to live. Too many times this right is subordinated to fear of the future and self-realization. The Alternative for Germany wants to prevent such fears through specific aids for families in all life situations and especially ease and promote the life saving option of adoption.	B22
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	marriage and family	traditional values		Society has to create a positive image of respect for life, marriage and parenthood in families, schools and media in advance.	B23
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	reproductive rights	protection of "unborn life"		The counselling of conflict during pregnancy has to serve the protection of life. The effectiveness of the consultation arrangement should be regularly examined as requested by the Federal Constitutional Court. If necessary, statutory change should be made in order to ensure the protection of life.	B24

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	reproductive rights	reporting obligation		To acquire realistic numbers on abortion, the reporting obligations on abortion have to be improved. The failure of reporting from the performing doctor has to have noticeable sanctions. The anonymity of the pregnant person has to be assured.	B25
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	gender ideology	natural differences between sexes		Gender-Ideology marginalizes natural differences between the sexes and questions gender identity.	B26
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	gender ideology	traditional values		Gender Ideology wants to abolish the classic family as a life and role model.	B27
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	gender ideology	not scientific/in interest of the people		Gender Ideology contradicts scientific findings in biology and developmental psychology as well as the everyday experience of many generations. That is why we are against national and international aspirations to implement that ideology through instruments such as Gender Studies, quota regulations, propaganda campaigns like the equal pay day or gender neutral language.	B28
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	marriage and family	traditional values		The Alternative for Germany wants the family policy to be oriented towards the family model consisting of father, mother and children. We are against all attempts to extend the sense of the word "family" in article 6 paragraph 1 of the constitutional law to other forms of communities and hence withdraw the family's special state protection.	B29
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy		The Alternative for Germany wants the family policy to be oriented towards the family model consisting of father, mother and children. We are against all attempts to extend the sense of the word "family" in article 6 paragraph 1 of the constitutional law to other forms of communities and hence withdraw the family's special state protection.	B29

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	sexual orientations	promotion of different sexual orientations		The one-sided highlighting of homo and transsexuality in schools, like it is practiced by the so-called sex education of diversity (Sexualpädagogik der Vielfalt) is an inadmissible interference with our children's development and with the parental right to education guaranteed by the constitution.	B30
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	marriage and family	traditional values		The Alternative for Germany is clearly against all attempts to abolish the traditional family image through state supported reeducation programs in kindergardens and schools.	B31
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	gender ideology	not scientific		Gender Studies are not a serious science but follow the ideology that sex and gender are fully seperated. The final goal is to abolish the natural gender polarity.	B32
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	gender ideology	no (financial) support/no place at universities		The state should not be allowed to provide means for Gender Studies or hire professors for this field. Existing funding lines should be ended and equal opportunities representatives at universities bound to Gender Ideology should be abolished.	B33
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	The tax burden for families is too high. Although the Federal Constitutional Court has requested to make the subsistence level of children and parents tax-free, the legislator has not appropriately complied. The Alternative for Germany stands for sustainable tax relief for families through the implementation of family splitting which calculatorily distributes the family heritages to family members before taxation.	B34

Category System C

Antagonism	Cluster	Frame Category	Code	Subcode	Quote	#
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	Increasing of family benefits and yearly value adjustment of child benefits	C1
the people vs the others	othering through gendering /heteronormative cluster	migration	migration as a threat to autochthonous families		Stop exporting family benefits abroad	C2
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	benefits for families	That is why we put the interest of our own citizens in the center: concerning housing, social- and family benefits and also workplace and education	C3
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	More crediting of the child-raising period for pension rights	C4
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	benefits for families	Families and children secure our future. Instead of supporting them, the SPÖ and the ÖVP have reduced benefits unfairly.	C5
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	migration	migration as a threat to autochthonous families		The Greens want to shatter the family model. Like SPÖ and ÖVP they prefer migration over family support.	C6
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	benefits for families	The FPÖ will make Austria the most family and child-friendly country in Europe for its own citizens. We will create framework conditions, where no Austria has a disadvantage because he or she takes the time to raise children.	C7
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	Tax relief for Austrian families with several children due to a new taxation model for families.	C8
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	Full freedom of choice between job and family due to the opportunity of a parental wage.	C9
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	High quality childcare and education in kindergardens and schools with the possibility of all-day schooling without extra costs for parents.	C10

Category System D

Antagonism	Cluster	Frame Category	Code	Subcode	Quote	#
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	benefits for families	It is unfair that taxpayers massively support federal museums but at the same time the entry is hard to afford for Austrian families. [...] The Freedom Party of Austria demands free entry to our museums for Austrian families.	D1
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	The wish for family and offspring should not lead to a risk of poverty because the birth rate of autochthonous families has strongly decreased in the last several decades.	D2
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	demographics	persistence of autochthonous society		The wish for family and offspring should not lead to a risk of poverty because the birth rate in autochthonous families has strongly decreased in the last several decades.	D2
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	benefits for families	Appeals for family formation have to be created and support measures have to be made.	D3
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	Because of the high costs of living expenses and the enormous taxburden, financial discharge and the creation of a carefree life for families is paramount for us. The decision to have one child or several children should not lead to poverty. In addition to family friendly tax models, the reconciliatin of family and working life is an essential requirement.	D4
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	Because of the high costs of living expenses and the enormous taxburden, financial discharge and the creation of a carefree life for families is paramount for us. The decision to have one child or several children should not lead to poverty. In addition to family friendly tax models, the reconciliatin of family and working life is an essential requirement.	D4

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	It is unfair that the decision to have children is not sufficiently supported by the state regarding taxes.	D5
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	It is unfair that the child-raising period is not credited to the pension.	D6
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	It is unfair that the child-raising period is not credited to the pension.	D6
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	It is unfair that missing childcare facilities complicate the reconciliation of family and work life.	D7
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	Making having a family affordable through a family-friendly tax system as an alternative to regular taxation.	D8
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	Yearly adaption of family allowance, the tax credit for children and childcare allowance to the inflation rate.	D9
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster		family policy	childcare	Improving reconciliation of working life and family through the expansion of childcare facilities and childminder as a professional career.	D10
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	Extension of the dismissal protection to the maximum period of childcare allowance.	D11
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	Real freedom of choice for women means that a mother can freely decide, if she wants to stay at home with her children and educate them or go back to work without financial pressure.	D12
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	childcare	Real freedom of choice for women means that a mother can freely decide, if she wants to stay at home with her children and educate or go back to work without financial pressure.	D12

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	symbolic measures	not in interest of women		The Freedom Party of Austria stands for real gender equality. However, that does not mean egalitarianism between men and women. That is the reason why we are against hypocritical measures like the promotion of women, which are not suitable for really increasing women's roles.	D13
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	culture and religion	oppression of women	veil	We do not accept oppression of women and that is why we are strictly against forced marriage or compulsory headscarves.	D14
the people vs others	othering through gendering	culture and religion	oppression of women		It is unfair that new discrimination against women is happening due to a migratory wave coming from patriarchal cultures.	D15
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	symbolic measures	not in interest of women		It is unfair that hypocritical measures like gender-sensitive language or the mentioning of daughters in the national anthem distract from the real problems of women.	D16
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	gender pay gap		It is unfair that women earn less than men in the same professional position.	D17
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	gender pay gap		Close the gender pay gap – equal pay for equal value!	D18
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	symbolic measures	not in interest of women		Real gender equality instead of hypocritical egalitarianism	D19
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	reproductive rights	support for women with unwanted pregnancies		Medical and social counselling before the planned termination of pregnancy and support for pregnant women in difficult life situations.	D20
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	In order to eliminate the financial burden concerning the wish for more children, the Freedom Party of Austria has developed a relief system for families which can be chosen as an alternative to regular taxation. The yearly tax saving can be up to 7000 € per family.	D21

the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	It is unfair, that families, which are the foundation of our society, are disadvantaged by the tax system.	D22
the people vs the elites	heteronormative cluster	institutions	family policy	financial aspects	More money for families through a tax model which leads to a lower tax burden for families with more children	D23
the people vs the others	othering through gendering	culture and religion	migration as a threat to women		The often relatively mild penalty for violent or sexual crimes shakes the trust in justice, especially when there is the suspicion that the cultural background of the offender is taken into account.	D24
the people vs the elites	othering through gendering	institutions	judiciary system	harder penalties concerning violence towards women/children	The often relatively mild penalty for violent or sexual crimes shakes the trust in justice, especially when there is the suspicion that the cultural background of the offender is taken into account.	D24

Abstract

In recent years, gender-specific issues have gained importance among populist radical right parties. Depending on the framework in which these issues are set, they allow populist radical right parties to construct antagonisms. The idea of society being divided into groups is one of the core elements of right-wing populism. One of these groups is usually “the people”. In the populist radical right imagination, this group is in contrast to "the elites" on the one hand and "the others" on the other. “The elites” as well as “the others” are not seen as part of “the people.” The populist radical right interpretation of who belongs to these two groups is flexible and can be adapted depending on the context and the goal pursued. For example, “the elites” can consist of governing parties, academia and science, intellectuals, (mainstream) media, and (supranational) organizations such as the European Union or the United Nations. “The others” traditionally include migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. This paper examines how gendered issues are used by populist radical right parties in order to construct these antagonisms. For this purpose, the 2013 and 2017 election programs of the Alternative for Germany and the Freedom Party of Austria were subjected to a content analysis with a focus on frames in order to elaborate which gender-related content was placed in which frame to construct antagonisms. It shows that both parties have increased the quantity as well as the variety of gender-related topics in their 2017 election programs compared to 2013. The analysis also provides the insight that both parties focus on the construction of an antagonism between “the people” and "the elites" in all their election programs. This is due to a focus on criticism at the institutional level, mainly referring at family policies. According to both parties the current system does not conceive and implement family policies in the interest of (autochthonous) families and thus not in the interest of "the people. The construction of an antagonism between “the people” and "the others" could be detected in election program from both parties, but is less present. It is noticeable that the connection between gender-specific issues and issues concerning migration, refugees and asylum was stronger in 2017 for both parties. The country-specific differences are small and both parties show a similar development

Keywords: populist radical right parties, gender, construction of antagonisms

Zusammenfassung

In den letzten Jahren haben geschlechtsspezifische Themen für rechtspopulistische Parteien an Bedeutung gewonnen. Je nachdem, in welchen Rahmen diese Themen gesetzt werden, erlauben sie es rechtspopulistischen Parteien Antagonismen zu konstruieren. Die Vorstellung, dass die Gesellschaft in Gruppen gespalten ist, ist eines der Kernelemente des Rechtspopulismus. Eine dieser Gruppen ist für gewöhnlich „das Volk“. Diese Gruppe steht in der rechtspopulistischen Vorstellung einerseits „den Eliten“ und andererseits „den Anderen“ gegenüber, die nicht als Teil des „Volkes“ gesehen werden. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, wie geschlechtsspezifische Themen von rechtspopulistischen Parteien verwendet werden, um ebendiese Antagonismen zu erzeugen. Hierfür wurden die Wahlprogramme 2013 und 2017 der Alternative für Deutschland und der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs einer Inhaltsanalyse mit Fokus auf Frames unterzogen, um zu elaborieren, welche Inhalte mit geschlechtsspezifischem Bezug in welchen Rahmen gesetzt wurden, um Antagonismen zu konstruieren. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Parteien die Quantität wie auch die Varietät von geschlechtsspezifischen Themen in ihren Wahlprogrammen von 2017 im Vergleich zu 2013 erhöht haben. Die Analyse liefert außerdem die Erkenntnis, dass beide Parteien in all ihren Wahlprogrammen die Konstruktion eines Antagonismus zwischen „dem Volk“ und „den Eliten“ forcieren. Dies geschieht durch einen Fokus auf Kritik an der institutionellen Ebene, das Hauptaugenmerk beider Parteien liegt hierbei auf Familienpolitik. Diese ist ihres Erachtens nach nicht im Interesse von (autochthonen) Familien und demnach auch nicht im Interesse „des Volkes“ konzipiert und umgesetzt. Die Konstruktion eines Antagonismus zwischen „dem Volk“ und „den Anderen“ findet bei beiden Parteien statt, ist jedoch weniger präsent. Hierbei fällt auf, dass dies bei beiden Parteien 2017 häufiger auftritt als 2013, was bedeutet, dass die Verbindung zwischen geschlechtsspezifischen Themen und Themen betreffend Migration, Flucht und Asyl stärker miteinander in Verbindung gesetzt wurden. Die länderspezifischen Unterschiede sind gering und beide Parteien weisen eine ähnliche Entwicklung auf.

Schlagwörter: Rechtspopulismus, Geschlecht, Konstruktion von Antagonismen