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ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND DÉTENTE, AND THE PROSPECTS  
REMARKS TO THE AUSTRIAN SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
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I am very pleased to have this opportunity to speak to the Austrian Society for International Affairs. This is by no means my first visit to Vienna and every one of them has left most pleasurable memories. I am particularly happy to be able to speak to you today about arms control, disarmament and détente and their prospects at a time when there is at long last some grounds for optimism.

Working in the field of arms control and disarmament as I do, one is apt to acquire what the French call a "déformation professionnelle", which consists of looking towards the future with hope for opportunities to come, rather than to the past with anguish over opportunities lost. The subject is also one which is overladen with clichés; for disarmament and détente are things, which like virtue, everyone is for, without doing very much about.

Here in Vienna, in this great city which has been the fulcrum of so much of the world's diplomatic history, and which is shortly to be the stage for laying new foundations for whatever cautious optimism we have in the field of arms control and disarmament - I believe that the subject which I have come to talk to you about is not without current interest.

SALT, or the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which are to open here on April 16, are not the only manifestation in what appears, after so many false starts, to be a trend toward the lessening of world tensions or détente through negotiation and measures of arms control.

Other significant events are: (a) the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the USA and the USSR and the signing of this agreement by the Federal German Government - actions which open up the prospects of its coming into effect some time early this year; (b) the recent declaration of President Nixon recommending the ratification of the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 and banning of all bacteriological and biological weapons from the arsenals of the U.S. armed forces; and (c) the coming into effect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which prohibits the emplacement or testing of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Other indications of a favourable trend in world relations emerged from recent meetings of the two alliances in Europe - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There was the indication for instance, from the communiqués issued at the end of both meetings toward the end of last year, to the effect that a process may be beginning towards East-West discussions on European Security. There was also the NATO prognosis which indicated readiness to start negotiations on reciprocal balanced force reductions ( a subject, I might add, on which Canada has been urging action for some time ). Particularly noteworthy in this connection is the manifest intention of the Federal Republic of Germany to work out new relations with the USSR and other Eastern European countries.

I should also not overlook the recent debate on disarmament questions which took place in New York at the 24th session of the United Nations General Assembly. Virtually 100 states spoke during the discussion, which was of unprecedentedly high calibre and demonstrated a growing awareness by the vast membership of the international community of the complexities as well as of the importance of arms control negotiations.

I mention these favourable trends towards international security and peace because, in my opinion, they are inter-related. That is, SALT, the proposed discussions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the discussions between the German Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, as well as the negotiations in Geneva and the UN, all complement one another in what I believe is a welcome and I hope benign escalation toward détente and the possibility of substantial arms limitation.

We do, however, have to maintain some reserve and not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of détente prematurely. For we must be wary of unbridled optimism because the process of negotiations, whether it be at the bilateral talks in Vienna, or the multilateral talks in Geneva or between the alliances in Europe, could turn sour because of national security involved and then we could be faced with extremely grave prospects.

On the other hand, the very process of negotiations, especially SALT, helps to increase momentum towards détente and to reduce the risks of the action-reaction phenomenon which is main cause of the escalating arms race. The building of confidence through the exchange of information about weapons capabilities, for example, should help to ease some of the severe political tensions that so much aggravate the arms race. Moreover, each small step taken, each small agreement concluded, makes additional measures easier, because each side acquires in this way a certain additional sense of confidence that the undertakings agreed upon will be fulfilled.

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I should like to turn now, for a moment, from general considerations and say a few words about the particular arms control and disarmament discussions which have been, and continue to be, active in the forums where I have been directly concerned - that is the negotiations at the Conference of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva and in the United Nations.

Before doing so, let me admit at once that we in the Conference of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva recognize the primacy of the strategic arms limitation talks which are to take place here in Vienna. (There might even be a touch of professional jealousy in the lively interest with which we will be following developments in the talks between the superpowers here.)

We have of course been encouraged by the outcome of the preliminary talks which took place in Helsinki. These contacts were an essential step in the process by which, to quote the communiqué, "each side is better able to understand views of the other with respect to the problems under consideration".

It has at least been apparent from the general atmosphere which prevailed in Helsinki, that both the USA and the USSR have approached these talks with the sincere desire to make them succeed. What the two sides have agreed to, according to the statements released after the talks, is a "work programme" to be discussed in Vienna.

We in Canada view the progress to date with satisfaction, but in no way minimize the complicated nature of the problems involved, affecting as they do the delicate strategic balance between the two super powers. When the talks resume here on April 16, one can only hope that, at long last, the spiralling arms race in nuclear weapons may be slowed and eventually arrested.

Elsewhere, both in Geneva and at the United Nations General Assembly, Canada, together with many others, has devoted considerable attention to the question of concluding a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which would prohibit completely all nuclear weapons testing. In order to try to solve the very vexing problem of the verification of such a test ban, the Canadian Delegation put forward in Geneva a proposal to investigate the establishment of an international seismic data exchange, which was eventually adopted by an overwhelming vote by the General Assembly.

We realize, of course, that agreement between the great powers must await the increased reciprocal confidence which would permit them to make the political decisions necessary to stop testing, but our proposal had the aim of trying to break out of the vicious circle of the longstanding argument, as to whether verification of a test ban would be adequate if based solely on the national systems of verification ( as the USSR contends ), or whether this information would have to be supplemented by actual on-site inspection ( as the USA contends ).

I must confess that the attitude of the Soviet Government to our proposal so far has been reserved and disappointing, but (again following my "déformation professionnelle") we do not rule out the possibility of their co-operation in due course. The Soviet Union has at least expressed a willingness to exchange information on seismic data on a strictly voluntary basis, and it has of course taken part in technical conferences dealing with seismic matters in the past and we hope will continue to do so in the future.

Related also to the nuclear arms race and more particularly to the build-up of the mosaic of areas and environments in which the emplacement of nuclear weapons has been preempted through international agreement ( e.g., Treaty of Tlatelolco, Outer Space Treaty, Antarctic Treaty ), the Geneva Conference concerned itself mainly last year with the elaboration of a treaty intended to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor.

On this subject, non-nuclear States like Canada have been mainly concerned to see that what I have in the past called a "self-denying ordinance" between the two great powers, should contain sufficient safeguards to protect the rights of smaller coastal States if the agreement, as seems to be the intention, is to take the form of a multilateral treaty.

To this end the Canadian Delegation concerned itself with obtaining a verification clause which would on the one hand assure signatories of the right of inspection of suspected installations which seem to threaten them, and at the same time assure them that such inspections were carried out with the participation of coastal States and with a proper regard to their rights under existing international law, particularly in regard to the continental shelf.

Unfortunately there was insufficient time to complete the negotiations on this treaty before the General Assembly adjourned, but we hope and expect that the work on it will be completed early in the next session of the Disarmament Committee in Geneva.

The other subject which is active on the arms control scene at the moment is the question of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare. This subject was fully debated at the United Nations General Assembly and we expect it will be a major topic during the 1970 session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol is the basis of international law in this field but, because of the reservations of many signatories which keep open their right to retaliate, this instrument is, in effect, merely a prohibition of first use.

The main possibilities for progress therefore lie in going to the heart of the matter and preventing the development

and production of chemical and biological weapons and in destroying existing stockpiles, as well as the means of making such weapons, on a reciprocal basis. Countries would then be in a position of having a reasonable assurance that they need not fear this type of warfare, and therefore need not retain defensive reservations.

The Geneva conference will have for its consideration in the coming year a UK draft banning biological weapons and a Soviet draft banning both B and C weapons. In addition there was a Swedish proposal passed at the United Nations General Assembly which sought to interpret the Geneva Protocol as including all chemical substances, including tear gas, defoliants, etc., which presented some difficulties to signatories of the Geneva Convention, which believe that treaty interpretations should be negotiated rather than made the subject of Assembly resolutions, especially if voted by narrow majorities.

From these specifics, I should now like to turn briefly to the factors which in my opinion render the climate at the present time favourable to arms control negotiations and therefore, in my opinion, hold out better prospects for arms control and disarmament as we enter into a new decade.

First, there are the political factors. It has obviously been recognized widely in the USA as well as in the Soviet Union that the continuation of the nuclear arms race makes no sense, in a situation where both super powers are fully capable of destroying each other several times over with the weapons they already have.

Moreover, nuclear war is generally recognized as ruled out as an instrument of national policy, once the bluff of the other side is called, because its effects are obviously suicidal, and suicide is not a policy, except perhaps in the last resort.

It may have taken too long to arrive at such a startling vision of wisdom, but I believe that this is a view widely held by the leaders of both super powers that limiting their **respective** risks through carefully controlled and balanced limitation of armaments is preferable to taking unlimited risks with an escalating arms race.

Then perhaps too, the emergence of China as a thermo-nuclear power, with "bones to pick" with both the USA and the USSR, may have added a further incentive to hasten a nuclear understanding between the super powers.

As evidence of this growing understanding, I would say that the discussions at Geneva, on the whole, are conducted in a business-like, non-propagandistic manner, with both sides trying to define areas of mutual interest and thus laying the groundwork for substantive negotiations.

In fact Canada and others in Geneva have recently found it necessary to challenge the tendency of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to dominate proceedings on a bilateral basis, to the extent of indicating by prior agreement what they are willing to accept or not from the other members of the Conference. In other words, some of us are beginning to perceive a danger that co-operation between the super powers, replacing cold war confrontation, could in some instances at least tend towards super power condominium.

If this state of accord is helpful in arriving at a broader international consensus, which after all is the main aim of the United Nations, then this is benign and to be welcomed. If it is for the purpose of great power domination, then it is less acceptable.

The economic consequences of the arms race are known to you. The most recent edition of the SIPRI Yearbook, 1968-1969, points out that, while the world's national product has risen at least five-fold in the last 50 years, the military spending in real terms has probably risen ten-fold. The reason for this is not so much that the world's standing armies are getting bigger, but that the weapons used are immensely increasing in cost and complexity.

The same report points out that in the absence of some kind of arms limitation agreements, the rise in world military spending in the next twenty years will probably be as fast as in the last twenty. It is significant in this report that the USA and USSR made up between them some 70 % of the world military expenditure in 1968 and between them accounted for over 80 % of the rise in world military expenditure between 1965 and 1968.

Technologically, both sides realize that the point has been reached with intercontinental missiles carrying multiple war-heads ( called MIRVs ) where the equilibrium of offensive capabilities and defensive capabilities would have to be established at much higher and much more dangerous levels of stability, in the relations between the super powers.

Moreover, as a result of the nuclear arms race, both sides have already attained a level of capability which tend to cancel out whatever advantage may be obtained from their developing technological accomplishments.

All in all, because of the costs and risks attendant to the use of military force involving missiles with nuclear war-heads both super powers, particularly since the Cuban missile and Middle East crises, have of necessity turned to cautious collaboration, instead of confrontation.

Thus one of the paradoxes of the atomic age is that the nuclear powers seem to have learned from hard experience that they perhaps have more to fear from the outbreak of violence than the non-nuclear powers, who can at least keep their heads down under the fence.

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In conclusion I should like to try to view the prospects of arms control and disarmament in the broader frame of historic trends as I see them.

The challenge of foreign policy these days, in my opinion, is to discern the necessities of changing circumstances and the currents of international relationships and to try to adapt to them.

Thus, as we move into the 70's and look back upon the 60's, I see at least four important areas of advance towards security through diplomacy, rather than through reliance on force alone.

First, the two giant nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, learned the necessity of avoiding dangerous confrontations with each other and of limiting their use of military power when they did find themselves in potentially dangerous confrontations.

Secondly, the two super powers also learned that military power is not the same as political control and influence, and that in some areas vast military power is no substitute for diplomatic influence.

From the acceptance of the necessity of avoiding the risk of suicide through nuclear war, the nuclear giants finally got down to serious negotiations on the control of nuclear weapons through SALT.

In other words, over the Great Divide between the nations - aligned and non-aligned - in relation to the cold war, a bridge is gradually being built of self-concern; concern at the cost and waste of the arms race, as well as its threat to human survival in the nuclear/missile age.

While I have no pretence to prophecy, and hindsight is easier and more prudent than foresight, it is necessity which in my view is driving the two super powers at long last to negotiation and accomodation in order to survive in the Atomic Age; and as we know, "even the Gods cannot strive against necessity". I can only hope that the SALT meetings in Vienna will bear out this ancient and wise saying.