

Ingarden on the varieties of dependence

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Abstract

In the third chapter of his major work, the *Controversy over the Existence of the World*, Roman Ingarden discusses four varieties of dependence entities might exhibit. The aim of this essay is to explore these varieties and to put the claims Ingarden makes concerning them on a rigorous footing.

1 | INTRODUCTION

Recent work in metaphysics is marked by a renewal of interest in relations of dependence, in particular ontological dependence. Thus, a set is taken to depend ontologically on its members (Fine, 1995); a whole is meant to be ontologically dependent on its parts (Cameron, 2014); a particularized property on its bearer (Mulligan, Simons, & Smith, 1984); a fictional character upon its creator (Thomasson, 1998); and so on.

The writings of Husserl on this subject, in particular his remarks on foundation, essence, and the part-whole relation in the third of his *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 1901, III) are recognized as an important source of insight to contemporary debates. Although remarkably less discussed, the notion of ontological dependence is also center stage in the writings of one of Husserl's pupils, Roman Ingarden. Building upon and extending the view of his mentor on this, Ingarden distinguished four main varieties of dependence and independence entities might exhibit. The aim of this essay is to explore these varieties and to put the claims Ingarden makes concerning them on a rigorous footing.

Although part of the interest is of course historical, the adopted reading of Ingarden's texts is oriented towards making their content workable for modern purposes. Thus, sometimes faithfulness to the text is sacrificed in the interest of clarity and convenience of the resulting definitions; and while it is my intent to cover Ingarden's own examples, I present further ones which help illustrate the definition in each case. In fact, as I hope to make clear as we proceed, I think the interest in Ingarden goes beyond recognizing a historical source: not only does Ingarden notoriously anticipate concepts and views on them which are currently in play in metaphysics, but besides being interesting in their own right, the notions of dependence Ingarden sorts out, once properly defined, might be significant to present-day discussions related to the notion of fundamentality.¹

Ingarden is mostly known for his criticism of Husserl's idealism, the period of Husserl's philosophy established after the so-called *transcendental turn* (see e.g. Wallner, 1987 for discussion). As Ingarden understands it, this

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position is captured by the thesis that objects are generally *dependent* upon the mind, more precisely the “pure consciousness”, to use Husserl's term. Now a proper grasp of this claim requires a thorough analysis of the concept of dependence involved. In this context, Ingarden distinguishes four varieties of dependence – or “existential moments”, as he labels them – and their corresponding pairs: autonomy – heteronomy; originality – derivativity; self-sufficiency – non-self-sufficiency; and independence_i – dependence_i.² Interestingly, according to Ingarden, none of these pairs on its own suffices to make sense of the thesis above, or of any stance in debates involving the notion of dependence, among these paradigmatically the debate on idealism versus realism concerning the material world, which is his main target of discussion. Rather, the classifications of an entity with regard to each of the notions involved taken together determine its “mode of being”, which is then seen to be in play in such debates.³ In the next section, I will discuss the pairs in turn, followed by a brief comment on the resulting modes. In the final section, I will conclude by suggesting two topics of current interest for which the application of Ingarden's notions might prove fruitful, namely the mind–body problem and the debate around priority monism.

2 | THE FOUR VARIETIES

2.1 | Autonomy and heteronomy

The first pair of notions of dependence discussed by Ingarden is that of autonomy and heteronomy.

An entity (in the sense of any something at all [irgend Etwas überhaupt]) exists autonomously (is existentially autonomous) if it has the foundation of its being [Seinsfundament] within itself. And it has it within itself if it is something that is immanently determined within itself. On the other hand, an entity is existentially heteronomous (exists heteronomously) if it has the foundation of its being outside of itself. Ingarden (2013, p. 109)⁴

It is hard to make precise sense of this quote. For one, it is far from clear what a *foundation of being* of an object should be, and what “within itself” amounts to. That an entity has the foundation of its being within itself if it is “immanently determined within itself” hardly takes us any further.

As Ingarden stresses in a footnote (248), the term “entity” (Gegenständlichkeit) should be taken to cover individual objects, properties, states-of-affairs, relations, ideas, and ideal qualities. For present purposes we need not enter into the details of Ingarden's conceptions of these entities, but some comment on the last two of these is called for. A *pure or ideal quality*, also named an “essentiality” (Wesenheit), is a *property* taken *in specie*, that is in abstraction from its instances: for example, redness, colorless, sadness, squareness, and so on. In contrast, Ingarden speaks of *ideas* in the sense of *ideal objects*, such as the human “in general” (überhaupt), the geometric figure “in general”, the square “in general”, and so on. *Qua* ideas, these instantiate a stock of ideal qualities, such as invariance, atemporality, and so on. In addition, ideas have a *content*, that is, a stock of qualities that objects falling under them must instantiate (or “concretize”, as Ingarden writes: 2013, p. 68; notice that, alongside the instantiation of qualities by concrete individuals, Ingarden allows for qualities to be concretized in further ideas' contents, which might not sit well with more intuitive uses of “instantiate”. I shall use “concretize” in the sense employed by Ingarden henceforth). Thus, the ideal qualities of rationality, bipedness, vitality, belong to the content of the human in general. Importantly, ideas might have *variables* (Veränderliche) in their contents, a special kind of qualities that are indeterminate, or arbitrary. Thus, the triangle in general has an *arbitrary length* for each of its sides, and an *arbitrary area*; the human in general has the *having of some skin complexion* in its content; and so on (Ingarden, 2013, p. 69). These variables are open to determination by other objects. This might occur in other, “subordinated”, ideas, as for instance the square in general determines the parallelogram in general, which in turn determines the geometric figure in general, and so on; or in concrete individuals, which are as such devoid of variables entirely. Finally, Ingarden also makes room for particular

ideas, that is, ideas without variables, whose content would “correspond one-to-one” to the stock of qualities instantiated by concrete individuals (2016, p. 253).⁵

As a starting point for spelling out the quote above, let us search for guidance in the examples provided by Ingarden. Ideal qualities are examples of autonomous entities. Thus for instance redness “has the foundation of its being within itself in the sense that in itself it is through and through what it is, in the sense that it is determined by something which is wholly contained within itself, indeed by what itself is.” (2013, p. 111). An individual object is also said to be autonomous if it only contains in itself concretizations of ideal qualities (112).⁶ In contrast, a purely intentional object, such as a fictional character or a thing thought or dreamt of, is heteronomous, in the sense that it is “an entity which draws its being and its collective stock of attributes from the enactment of an intentional conscious experience” (113). In passing Ingarden also includes “social and national institutions” and “legal statuses” among heteronomous entities (114).⁷

Talk of containment and immanence in the examples is strongly suggestive of a mereological interpretation of “within itself”, according to which the foundation of being is somehow related to the parts of the entity in question. As in Husserl, the sense of part intended is wider than usual. That is, it includes not only detachable parts, such as the head of a horse or the handle of a coffee mug, which can exist without their wholes – “pieces” (Stücke) in Husserlian terminology–, but also non-self-sufficient parts, for instance particularized properties, which depend on further objects, their bearers, to exist – “moments” (Momente) in Husserlian terminology–, such as this particular horse’s brownness, its particular size, and so on.⁸ In addition, it allows for abstract objects, such as ideas and ideal qualities, to have and be parts (cf. Husserl, 1901, III, §17; the pair sufficiency – non-sufficiency is discussed below).

Furthermore, the locutions “being determined by”, “drawing its being and attributes from” suggest pretty unequivocally that the *foundation of being* be conceived of as *explanatory* of the instantiation of properties by the entities in question, that is, that it provides a *reason why* the entities instantiate the properties in each case (more on this shortly).

Finally, Ingarden seems to oscillate between readings of autonomy and heteronomy which take them as relative or absolute notions. In the former case, an entity would be *P*-autonomous relative to a property expressed by a predicate “*P*”. On the latter reading, an entity would be autonomous *simpliciter*. (Starting with the relative notion, one might straightforwardly define the absolute in terms of universal quantification over the values for predicates, for example, properties.)

Putting these pieces together, we arrive at the following definitions of autonomy and heteronomy:

- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is } P\text{-autonomous} \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} Px \wedge \forall y_1 \dots y_n \forall Q ((Px \text{ because } Qy_1 \dots y_n) \rightarrow y_1 \dots y_n \sqsubseteq x))$.
- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is } P\text{-heteronomous} \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} \exists y_1 \dots y_n \exists Q (\sim(y_1 \dots y_n \sqsubseteq x) \wedge (Px \text{ because } Qy_1 \dots y_n)))$.
- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is autonomous} \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} \forall P (Px \rightarrow x \text{ is } P\text{-autonomous}))$.
- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is heteronomous} \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} \forall P (Px \rightarrow x \text{ is } P\text{-heteronomous}))$.

In these definitions, “ \sqsubseteq ” should be read as (improper) part; “ $y_1 \dots y_n$ ” is a first-order variable for pluralities; quantification in the position of predicates (“*Q*” and “*P*”) might be read either as a sui generis higher-order quantification, or substitutionally (provided no restriction in the language in question is imposed), or even as a first-order quantification in disguise (provided that no restriction in the ontology of the corresponding values, for instance properties, is imposed). Since a choice on this matter has no bearing on present purposes, I will leave it open in what follows. For ease of expression, I will use “property” and “quality” interchangeably for the semantic values of predicates. The connective “because” included in the definitions expresses both causal and non-causal explanatory relations, which are explicitly recognized by Ingarden, as we shall see in the next section.⁹ Boxes express metaphysical necessity.¹⁰

Accordingly, necessarily, an entity is *P*-autonomous if and only if (“iff” henceforth) it is *P*, and only facts concerning it or its parts, if any, explain that it is *P*. Thus a red apple is autonomous with respect to being red, or red-autonomous, insofar as plausibly it is red because some of its parts are; an object is autonomous with respect to mass due to its having a

certain mass because of the mass of its parts; and a sports team is autonomous with respect to having a great campaign due to its having a great campaign because its players, taken as a plurality, had good performances.

An entity is *P*-heteronomous iff some of the reasons why it is *P* concern objects which are neither identical to nor proper parts of it. Thus the red apple is heteronomous with respect to being smaller than a given pineapple, since a reason why it is so plausibly cites the size of the latter; Sherlock Holmes is heteronomous with respect to being a detective, since he is a detective because Conan Doyle wrote that he is so; and a house might be heteronomous with respect to its being expensive, given that a reason why it costs so much cites its location relative to other places in town.

Finally, necessarily, an entity is autonomous in the absolute sense iff the having of every one of its properties is either not explained or explained by a fact concerning it or its parts; and necessarily, an entity is heteronomous in the absolute sense iff the having of every one of its properties is explained by truths which do not concern it nor its parts.

Ingarden speaks of a conscious intentional act, that is a mental act directed at a purely intentional object such as a fictional character, as “*the source of existence, of the properties and of the intentional structure*” of the latter (2016, p. 269, my italics), or as the ground of its being (Seinsgrund) (Ingarden, 1973, §20); and of the actually obtaining states-of-affairs *determining* the empirical possibilities at the time instant in question (see note 7). As already mentioned, I take it that these idioms and the plausibility of the resulting claims underwrite the interpretation in terms of “because” suggested.¹¹

Ingarden is not explicit as to whether any restrictions on the properties of entities should be in play in either of these definitions. However, although he mentions existence when discussing the examples, there is enough evidence that Ingarden would *not* include existence as a value of the variable “*P*” above, that is, that explanations concerning the existence of an entity do *not* have a bearing on its autonomy or heteronomy.¹² For it is clear from the text that the “immanence” of *properties*, that is, of *properties* applying to an object or its parts, are distinctive of autonomy (2013, p. 112), and that Ingarden does *not* consider existence a property (Ingarden, 2013, §9; 2016, p. 101; Haefliger, 1994, 184ff.) Furthermore, including existence among the properties responsible for the autonomy of an entity would conflate this notion with other notions of dependence he discusses, in particular *originality* and *independence*, and would make it difficult to render intelligible some of the claims he puts forward concerning the relations between them, as will become clear in due course.¹³

To be sure, without restrictions on the predicate variables, it is quite implausible that any entity satisfies the definitions of autonomy and heteronomy in the absolute sense. To see this, note that under the reading proposed, Ingarden's notion of autonomy is intimately related to the contemporary notion of *intrinsicity*, which applies to properties. Accordingly, an absolutely autonomous entity would be an entity whose properties are all intrinsic, and an absolutely heteronomous entity would be one whose properties are all extrinsic. (Cf. Ingarden on “unconditionally proper properties”, Ingarden, 2016, §57.) Indeed, the definition just suggested mirrors closely a definition of intrinsicity recently suggested in the literature (Rosen, 2010, p. 112).¹⁴ But no entity is exempted from having extrinsic properties altogether: even Ingarden's examples of autonomous objects, the red apple for instance, instantiate plenty of them: being smaller than a given pineapple, being sweeter than broccoli, and so on. (An analogous line of reasoning shows the difficulty with absolute heteronomy thus defined.)¹⁵

Now this might be taken to show that Ingarden has the relative sense in mind all along. Alternatively, one might pursue some restriction of the variables with the purpose of making the extensions of the absolute notions non-empty. Of the several options for restricting the characteristics in question, one seems to stand out as the most natural solution: namely, to restrict the values of “*P*” to *essential* properties of the entities in question (more on essence in the next section). Even though Ingarden does not give clues to this amendment expressly, it would seem in line with his examples and the notion he spells out himself: “literary works, musical compositions, social and national institutions, legal statuses” plausibly have their essential properties explained in terms of further objects, and stand out as plausible candidates for absolutely heteronomous entities; while the possibility is open that what belongs to the essence of some ordinary objects such as this red apple, or less ordinary such as particles, is not explained by objects extraneous to them (2013, p. 114).¹⁶

It is noteworthy that Ingarden makes room for heteronomous objects depending on further heteronomous objects, that is, it is allowed in his account that explanations of why a heteronomous object is a certain way concern objects which are themselves heteronomous. As an example, he mentions the sentence-meanings in a literary work, themselves heteronomous, which determine “out of themselves” the objects presented in the sentences inside the fiction. The objects have thus the *immediate* foundation of their being in, that is, are immediately “founded upon”, the sentence-meanings, and are *mediately* founded upon the “sentence-building operations” on which the latter are based according to Ingarden. Though making the example clearer would lead us far from our purposes, it should be plain that, in the definitions proposed, the overall idea is readily captured by the parallel distinction between immediate and mediate *explanantia*, and the corresponding feature of transitivity of “because”, which allows for the chaining illustrated by the example. Importantly, in this context Ingarden endorses the intuitively plausible thought that every heteronomous entity is ultimately founded on autonomous entities, and seems sympathetic to the claim that no heteronomous entity can *produce* (schaffen) an autonomous one (2013, pp. 116–117). The notion of production leads us to the second pair discussed by Ingarden.

2.2 | Originality and derivativeness

An entity is existentially original if, in accordance with its essence, it cannot be produced [geschaffen] by any other entity. In contrast, an entity is existentially derivative if it can be so produced. Ingarden (2013, p. 118)

To spell out this quote, we need to dig into Ingarden's conception of essence a bit. In line with a broadly Aristotelian tradition, Ingarden thinks of the essence of an object as a selected group of properties “without which the object would not be the one that it is” (2013, p. 401). Beyond this common characterization, the details of Ingarden's conception are by no means clear from the extensive remarks he provides. For present purposes, we might restrict ourselves to the following points.

Firstly, Ingarden distinguishes within the essence of an object what he calls its “constitutive nature”. In the case of individual objects, the constitutive nature is composed of a quality that answers to what the object is, which one naturally thinks of as its lowest species in the Aristotelian sense, for instance humanity in the case of Socrates (Ingarden, 2016, §40; this seems to correspond roughly to Husserl's conception of essence; cf. Husserl, 1901, III, §11); and a moment of individuality, responsible for its being this particular individual (Ingarden, 2016, pp. 368–373; 1925, 151ff.).¹⁷ Ingarden holds that every object has an essence, and that essences are not shareable, that is, no two objects have the very same essence.

The constitutive nature and the properties it *requires* build the essential core of the object in question, from which further essential properties *follow* (2016, §58). Thus, a particular square has as its constitutive nature squareness, which requires, among others, rectangularity, the property of being a geometrical figure, and so on. From these properties, other essential properties follow, for instance that it is divisible by two right-angle triangles of equal size. We have thus a three-level hierarchy of the essential properties of an object: its constitutive nature; the properties the latter *requires* (which Ingarden describes as “equivalent” to the nature in question); and the essential properties which *follow* from the constitutive nature, while not belonging to it in a stricter sense (cf. Fine 1994b on the distinction between constitutive and consequential essence).

Secondly, the necessary connections between properties of a concrete object, including its essential ones, are in some sense derivative of relations between the contents of ideas (2016, §49, esp. 226; in this, he echoes Husserl, 1901, III, §14). That necessarily, every yellow object is colored, for instance, is based upon the fact that yellowness and coloredness are somehow related in the content of *color in general* (2016, p. 238).¹⁸

Finally, Ingarden notoriously holds that, though essential properties all pertain to the object necessarily, not all properties had by an object as a matter of necessity are essential to it:

(...) the essence of the object in the sense examined is something that is necessary for the given object. This already follows from the object's nature being contained in its essence, since without the nature the respective object would not exist at all. (...) But whoever wished to conceive of the object's essence as the totality of what is necessary for it, would at least not have become fully aware of what truly belongs to its essence in the sense examined here. (...) But then two points of view should not be confounded with each other: that of whether some determination of an object is essential for it, and that of whether something is necessary for it. It is true, on the other hand, that everything that does *not* belong to an object's essence – even if it were indispensable for its existence or conditioned some of its properties in a necessary manner – is, from the perspective of its essence, just a something that only “befalls” (συμβεβηκός) it, that only “happens” to it, and is therefore *in this sense* purely “contingent”. Ingarden (2016, p. 375)

For those acquainted with Fine's famous criticism of modal conceptions of essence (Fine, 1994a), the similarity is striking.¹⁹

Even though Ingarden's formulations strongly suggest a regimentation of essence-talk by means of a singular-term forming operator – “the essence of x ”, comprising all the properties had essentially by x –, for simplicity and to allow for a more ready comparison with contemporary views, I will adopt an operator on sentences, symbolized by “ \Box_x ”, with the singular-term subscript indicating the entity to which the essence pertains, to be read “it is essential to x that”.²⁰ (I will come back to Ingarden's notion of essence in the next section.)

With these remarks in place, let us consider again Ingarden's conception of originality and derivativeness. The quote pretty unequivocally underwrites the following definition²¹:

- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is original} \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} \Box_x \sim \exists y (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow (y \text{ produces } x)))$.

Even though no mention of essences is made with respect to derivativeness in the quote above, it is clear from the remainder of §13 that it hinges on essential matters as well. Thus, Ingarden writes “when an entity is existentially derivative, then *it lies in its essence* that it can only exist or exists indeed by being produced by another object” (emphasis added). In the case of derivativeness, the quote allows for at least two readings, differing by the scope of the existential quantifier:

- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is derivative}^1 \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} \exists y \Box_x (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow y \text{ produces } x))$.
- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is derivative}^2 \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} \Box_x \exists y (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow y \text{ produces } x))$.

In the first case, the derivative entity is derived from a particular entity; in the second, it is only part of its essence that *some* entity produces it whenever it exists. (Plausibly, the first notion implies the second, but not vice-versa.) To be sure, Ingarden does not seem to be aware of this scope ambiguity.²² However, both seem of interest and might be used to interpret some of his claims using these notions.

Before addressing these claims, let us make sense of the notion of production in the definitions. From some remarks in the text, it is plain that Ingarden assumes that no entity produces itself. Moreover, the text provides enough evidence for the claim that if an entity x produces an entity y , then x *brings y into existence*. In contrast with the previous pair of notions we discussed, the originality and derivativeness of an entity thus concern solely whether something else is responsible for its *origination*, or its *coming into existence* (Entstehen). Three comments might shed light on what Ingarden means at this point. First, though one would expect some activity involved on the part of the entity which “produces”, the candidate examples Ingarden discusses make clear that he relies on a less stringent notion here: that of the real world *being produced by* God; that of Plato's ideas *producing* particular objects; and that sets, or complexes are *derivative upon* its members, or constituents (2013, p. 153, fn. 451). Secondly, as also illustrated by the examples, the relation between a derived entity and that upon which it originates need not be a causal

one.²³ Finally, and relatedly, the “origin” or “coming into existence” should not be read as requiring that any of the entities thus related are *in time*: as Ingarden is explicitly aware, his examples, according to traditional accounts of the entities in each case, only make sense if we allow for production to take place “outside” of time, as it were.

Ingarden explicitly claims that originality and derivativeness are exclusive *and exhaustive* of the realm of entities. Solely in light of the interpretations we have been considering thus far, it is difficult to make sense of the latter of these claims. Ingarden seems to think it necessary that, for every entity, it either lies in its essence that it be produced by another object or it does not.

- $\Box \forall x (\Box x \exists y (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow y \text{ produces } x) \vee \Box x \sim \exists y (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow y \text{ produces } x))$.

Accordingly, essences of objects in general are in a sense complete with respect to production: every object either requires by its essence that it is produced if it exists, or it requires that it is not. As a consequence, necessarily, every object is either necessarily produced by other objects when it exists, or it is necessarily not produced when it exists. This claim immediately supports – indeed it arguably expresses – the exhaustivity of both notions.

Besides, after the quote, Ingarden immediately goes on to claim that, as a consequence of its originality, an entity exists by necessity, as if “demanded” by its own essence. Again, as interpreted it is hard to see how necessary existence follows from originality on its own. To make sense of this, Ingarden would seem to rely on another claim, namely that contingent existence just amounts to a possible failure of being produced as required in the object’s essence.²⁴ Indeed, if necessarily, every failure to exist hinges on a failure of being produced, when the object essentially requires it, then an original object cannot fail to exist. In this sense, its essence “implies” existence, as Ingarden puts it. The example of an original object according to a long-standing tradition is God, which is characterized as an entity whose existence is essential. (Originality presents Ingarden’s own suggested interpretation of the famous “*causa sui*” locution. See 2013, p. 118, fn. 300.)

2.3 | Self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency

The third pair of dependence notions discussed by Ingarden is directly reminiscent of Husserl’s third logical investigation.

An entity is self-sufficient if in accordance with its essence it requires for its being the being of no other entity which would have to coexist with it within the unity of some whole, or, in other words, if its being involves no necessary coexistence with some other entity within the unity of a whole. In contrast, an entity is non-self-sufficient if, as implied by its essence, its being involves a necessary coexistence with some other entity (which may have to be quite specifically qualified in its material essence) in the unity of a whole. (2013, p. 147)

Ingarden seems to endorse the following definition of self-sufficiency²⁵:

- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is self-sufficient} \leftrightarrow_{df} \sim \exists y ((y \neq x) \wedge \Box x (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow \exists z \exists y_1 \dots y_n (y \text{ is among } y_1 \dots y_n \wedge x \sqcup y_1 \dots y_n = z))))$.

(where “ $y_1 \dots y_n$ ”, as before, is a first-order variable for pluralities; and “ \sqcup ” is a symbol for the mereological fusion of entities; in line with standard mereology, I assume that there is no “null” element, that is, an element x such that for every y , $x \sqcup y = y$.) That is, an entity is self-sufficient if and only if no further entity is such that it lies in the essence of the former that both, maybe alongside other entities, form a whole whenever the entity exists.

Ingarden explicitly recognizes at least two senses of non-self-sufficiency: an entity might require the existence of a *particular* entity within the unity of a whole composed by both; or it might require only that *some entity* of a

specific sort exists within the unity of a whole. In the first case, we are dealing with univocal (eindeutig), in the second with multivocal (vieldeutig) non-self-sufficiency (Ingarden, 2013, p. 149; cf. Fine, 1995, pp. 287–289).

- $\Box \forall x(x \text{ is univocally non-self-sufficient} \leftrightarrow_{df} \exists y (y \neq x \wedge \Box_x (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow \exists z \exists y_1 \dots y_n (y \text{ is among } y_1 \dots y_n \wedge x \cup y_1 \dots y_n = z)))$.
- $\Box \forall x(x \text{ is multivocally non-self-sufficient} \leftrightarrow_{df} \exists P \Box_x (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow \exists y \exists y_1 \dots y_n \exists z (P y \wedge y \neq x \wedge y \text{ is among } y_1 \dots y_n \wedge x \cup y_1 \dots y_n = z)))$.

For instance, a moment of redness is univocally non-self-sufficient with respect to the particular moment of color in an object, while the moment of color requires for its existence only a moment of *some* specific color within the object to which it belongs (Ingarden, 2013, p. 149).

Crucially, it is allowed that the values of “z” and “x” be the same. This is consonant with Ingarden’s example of an event being univocally non-self-sufficient with respect to its subject: Caesar’s assassination is non-self-sufficient with respect to Caesar, given that it plausibly lies in its essence that if it exists (or occurs) then Caesar is among the things which compose it (Ingarden, 2016, §30).²⁶

Of course, the notion of a whole plays a crucial role in these definitions. Ingarden distinguishes four types of wholes and unities their parts conform to (Ingarden, 2016, 53ff.). Details of this distinction aside, for our purposes, it is important to highlight that not any kind of whole comes into consideration for determining whether an entity is self-sufficient. Thus, under the seemingly weakest notion of a whole, what Ingarden labels a “summative whole” (2016, §43), a whole does not require any essential connection between its parts in order for it to exist.²⁷ Objects standing only as parts of a summative whole are thus not thereby non-self-sufficient with respect to one another: only wholes whose parts exhibit an “essential unity” (2016, p. 42), that is which are related via the essence of one of them to some whole, come into consideration at this point.

The (univocal) non-self-sufficiency of an entity can be either *unilateral* or *reciprocal*. Thus, the sides of a particular triangle are reciprocally non-self-sufficient relative to one another. And the moment of redness of an object is *unilaterally* univocally non-self-sufficient with respect to its moment of color. Further examples of reciprocal, or symmetric, dependence can be found in recent literature on ontological dependence: the two poles of a magnet; Socrates and Socrates’s humanity (assuming he is essentially human); an event-part and a more encompassing event which is essential to it, such as the evacuation at Dunkirk and the Second World War; and so on (see Barnes, 2018 for discussion).^{28,29}

Ingarden makes further distinctions that generate more specific notions of non-self-sufficiency, which I should mention for completion of this section. Firstly, following Husserl, Ingarden distinguishes between the *formal* and the *material* essence of an entity. While Ingarden’s remarks on form and matter are again packed with obscurities, it is safe to say that he treats the notions of being an object, being a property, and being a relation as pertaining to the form of entities; while any “contentful” characterization belongs to their matter (cf. Husserl, 1901, III, §11).³⁰ Now according to Ingarden the non-self-sufficiency of an entity might lie in its formal or its material essence. Thus, a moment of redness is *materially* non-self-sufficient with respect to the moment of color; and a property is *formally* non-self-sufficient with respect to objects, inasmuch as it lies in the formal essence of any property that it requires an object as its bearer within the unity of the whole both of them compose (2013, p. 150).

2.4 | Independence; and dependence;

The last pair of dependence notions is introduced by Ingarden as follows:

Another important existential distinction still needs to be noted *within the compass* of self-sufficient entities. Namely, it is possible for an entity to be self-sufficient and still require, in virtue of its

essence, the existence of some other *self-sufficient* entity for its own continued subsistence [Fortbestehen]. We then refer to the first entity as *existentially dependent*. (...) On the other hand, if in virtue of its essence a self-sufficient entity requires the existence of *no* other *self-sufficient* entity for its own existence (and hence, of no other entity whatever), then it is independent in the absolute sense. (2013, p. 153)

Independence_i and dependence_d are notions applying to self-sufficient entities in the sense previously discussed. In contrast with originality and derivativeness, they do not concern *the coming into existence* of entities, that is, their *production*, but their *continued subsistence* (Fortbestehen). Ingarden's candidate examples are: the human organism depends_d on a heat source which keeps it at a specific range of temperature, and it also depends_d on oxygen for its (continuous) existence (2013, p. 154); a purely intentional object – an object imagined, dreamt, or thought of, which includes for Ingarden fictional objects – would be examples of dependent_d entities provided that it be shown that it “(a) requires certain acts of consciousness not only for its coming into being, but also for its existence (more precisely: for its continued subsistence), and that (b) it is self-sufficient (hence, ‘transcendent’) vis-à-vis these acts” (2013, p. 154; cf. 2016, §47, esp. 211).³¹

It is natural to interpret “continuous subsistence” as existence through time intervals or instants.³² The resulting definition of independence_i and dependence_d then becomes³³:

- $\Box \forall x (x \text{ is independent}_i \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} x \text{ is self-sufficient} \wedge \sim \forall t \exists y (y \text{ is self-sufficient} \wedge x \neq y \wedge \Box_x (x \text{ exists at } t \rightarrow y \text{ exists at } t)))$.
- $\Box \forall x \forall y (x \text{ is dependent}_d \leftrightarrow_{\text{df}} x \text{ is self-sufficient} \wedge \forall t \exists y (y \text{ is self-sufficient} \wedge x \neq y \wedge \Box_x [x \text{ exists at } t \rightarrow y \text{ exists at } t]))$.

Thus construed, further potential examples of dependent_d entities include the world with respect to the Cartesian God who conserves its existence; perhaps the ontological dependence of sets upon their members (or arguably complexes upon their constituents in general, for instance facts and events upon their subjects); and so on.

As with non-self-sufficiency, cases of reciprocal dependence_d are possible according to Ingarden. Though he provides no example, one suggested in (Barnes, 2018) is worth considering in this context, namely the reciprocal dependence_d between numbers on a structuralist view, according to which for instance the number 5 depends for its existence upon the existence of 4 and 6.³⁴

2.5 | Wrapping up: Ingardenian modes of being

As mentioned above, Ingarden presents his analyses of notions of dependence with the main aim of disambiguating a metaphysical thesis, namely that of the dependence of objects upon the mind. However, Ingarden does not think that one should simply plug in one of the notions he analyses to obtain a precise claim: the notions of dependence relate in a slightly more complicated fashion. Namely, these notions – the “existential moments” – combine into several *modes of being* entities might exhibit. In effect, modes of being are nothing other than “dependence profiles”, that is, they display how entities stand with respect to each of the pairs of dependence-notions spelled out in previous sections.

However, not all combinations of the notions result in admissible modes of being. Besides incompatibilities between the notions in the respective pairs, Ingarden highlights that he takes heteronomy to exclude both independence_i and originality. Though these claims do not follow simply from the notions themselves, by using the definitions laid out above, with the aid of additional premisses, one can construct arguments for each of the corresponding claims (the possibility of which is envisaged by Ingarden himself: 2013, p. 157).

To briefly illustrate this, let us consider the claim that heteronomy is incompatible with independence_i. Take an independent_i object, say God, and suppose they have temporal existence. Being independent_i, at some point in time

t , there is no distinct object such that it lies in the nature of God that, if God exists at t , then the object exists at t . An additional premise we might make use of is this: if an object is autonomous, it lies in its essence that it is autonomous (the same with heteronomy).³⁵ If God were heteronomous (in the absolute sense), then it would lie in their essence that the having of every essential property of theirs is explained in terms of further entities (which are not parts of God). Among these properties, many – if not all – would be eternal to God, that is, would be had by them at all times, including t itself. But, at least for some of these properties, objects can only partake in facts explaining the having of them by God if the objects exist at the corresponding time (which would be a second, additional premise). However, this latter claim together with further plausible assumptions on essential claims³⁶ contradicts God's independence. Hence independence is incompatible with heteronomy. Though surely the additional premisses brought into play and the generalization from God's example are in need of a more careful examination, I take it that the argument stated illustrates at least one plausible way of making sense of Ingarden's contention at this point. An argument along similar lines could be devised to support the claim that heteronomy excludes originality as well.

Even though Ingarden explicitly does not want to commit himself to particular examples, it is instructive to provide illustrations of entities falling under the permissible modes. Thus, a long standing tradition has it that God is an autonomous, original, self-sufficient, and independent being; a person, say Elizabeth II, is autonomous, derivative (upon her parents, for instance), self-sufficient, and dependent; (upon oxygen, to stay faithful to Ingarden proposed example); {Socrates} is heteronomous (it is identical to {Socrates} because Socrates is its sole member, say), derivative, self-sufficient, and dependent; (on Socrates himself); Sherlock Holmes is plausibly heteronomous, derivative, self-sufficient, and independent; finally, Socrates's wisdom, conceived of as a moment, is autonomous, derivative, and non-self-sufficient (inasmuch as Socrates himself might be considered a whole in the sense relevant to the definition).

3 | CONCLUSION

Dependence is commonly taken to be responsible for ordering entities according to what is more fundamental than what: ideally, it enables us to identify an elite class of fundamental entities lying at the bottom layer of the structure, from which everything else somehow stems. But for Ingarden, dependence is not one notion, but many, which should all be deemed responsible for the classification of entities in that structure. To put it in contemporary terms, the notion of fundamentality countenanced by Ingarden to assess dependence-claims does not take it to be an all or nothing matter, but to admit of a more fine-grained classification determined by a plurality of relations of dependence.

At several points Ingarden's discussion of dependence might be seen to anticipate notions encountered in contemporary debates, and even where it does not, the particular notions Ingarden proposes might prove fruitful in providing a more detailed account of how entities relate with respect to fundamentality. However, it is worth pointing out that the most promising lesson to be drawn from Ingarden's account might simply lie in his pluralism: not so much in the recognition that dependence is not one notion, but a family of them – a claim arguably not open to dispute, which finds consent from Aristotle to the present day (Bennett, 2017; Corkum, 2008; Lowe, 2013) –, but in the claim that the metaphysician should take into account all the axes of dependence corresponding to these notions, if she is to do justice to the structure she proposes to unravel.

To illustrate this latter point by way of conclusion, let me tentatively sketch two interesting positions in ongoing debates Ingarden's notions pave the way for. First, consider the celebrated mind–body problem. It is not unusual to frame the discussion in terms of dependence (e.g., Kim, 1996, p. 11): accordingly, the problem centers around the question of whether, and if so how, the mental (conceived of as an object, the mind, or as mental properties or states) *depends* on the physical (conceived of in a similar way). To mention two of the main positions, a *physicalist* holds that the mind is somewhat dependent upon some physiological basis, while the *dualist* holds that at least some mental states are not thus dependent. Once more than one dependence notion is in play, related positions more

nanced than these might be fleshed out. In terms of Ingarden's notions, one in particular stands out as especially interesting: the mind is *autonomous*, that is, the having of its essential properties is not explainable in terms of entities which are not itself or its "parts" (if it has parts at all), in particular plausibly not in terms of any physical entity; but the existence of the mind is *derivative* upon a physical basis, that is, it exists *because* the latter does; while both are *not self-sufficient*, requiring one another reciprocally to exist as parts of a living organism. While its prospects surely call for further discussion, this position might be seen to concede claims made by both sides of the debate, and might provide us with an attractive midway between them.³⁷

As a further example, consider the discussion between priority monists and priority pluralists (Schaffer, 2010). According to the former, the cosmos, as a mereological all-encompassing whole, is the sole independent entity, on which every other entity ultimately depends; according to the latter, there are proper parts of the cosmos which are independent, on which every other entity ultimately depends. Again, an application of Ingarden's notions makes room for an interesting position: the cosmos is *autonomous*, that is, every one of its essential properties is explainable only in terms of it or its parts; it is *original*, that is, nothing is responsible for its coming into existence, as a matter of its essence (theists notwithstanding); but *not self-sufficient*, inasmuch as it requires further entities to exist "within" it as a matter of its essence. Again, the position calls for further clarifications, but it arguably draws on both sides to form a potentially attractive, to my knowledge unexplored, stance between them.

Surely, the formulation of these positions does not *depend* on Ingarden's specific notions, and these sketches might be considered a modest plea for pluralism about dependence. As I hope to have shown, however, Ingarden's framework, as presented here, is an option to be pursued.³⁸

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ See (Schaffer, 2009) for an overview of these discussions. The available essays in English related to Ingarden on this subject, (Simons, 2013) and (Chrudzinski, 2015), do not address the commonalities between the notions employed by Ingarden and contemporary notions. Though their interpretations of the notions of dependence also diverge substantially from the present text, for reasons of space, I set aside the task of comparing their views with my own.
- ² Since "existential moments" are all concepts of dependence, in today's philosophical jargon, and one of the particular concepts is homonymous in the terminology of Ingarden, a subscript "i" is added whenever the particular sense is intended.
- ³ Ingarden does not hold that these four pairs exhaust the notions of dependence and by themselves capture the different modes of being in the background of the debate around idealism. Later in the same work (Ingarden, 2013, esp. 33§), he discusses further existential moments – directly pertaining to temporal existence – and modes of being. For the sake of space, and since the pairs discussed here build the core of Ingarden's views on dependence, I will leave this further development aside.
- ⁴ I have changed the translation of the German "Seinsfundament" from "existential foundation" in (Ingarden, 2013) to "foundation of being", which I think better preserves linguistic meaning and is less suggestive of a misleading interpretation of the notions discussed in this section. The reason for this modification will be made clear shortly. See Ingarden's footnote 249 in 2013, p. 109.
- ⁵ Ingarden's remarks on ideas are deeply suggestive of a parallel with the notion of an arbitrary object as defended for example by Fine (1983). In contrast with Fine's approach, however, Ingarden is explicitly reluctant to apply the notion to variables in mathematics. See Ingarden (1925, p. 178).
- ⁶ It is suggestive to treat concretizations of ideal qualities by individual concrete objects along the lines of tropes, or particularized properties in the contemporary sense (Williams, 1953; Mulligan et al., 1984; Ingarden, 2013, p. 148; cf. §12, 112, fn. 266).
- ⁷ Empirical possibilities are also mentioned as examples of heteronomous entities. Leaving aside many of the details, these are possible states-of-affairs determined by the obtaining of the states-of-affairs at a certain point in time, and contrast with pure possibilities, which are not thus determined 2013, pp. 66–67. Ingarden's treatment of modalities is idiosyncratic, and it is beyond the scope of this essay to go into its details.

- ⁸ Notice that plausibly particularized properties are but a special case of a moment. Thus someone's smile, for instance, is a non-self-sufficient part, that is, a moment, but nonetheless it is at least contentious that it is a particularized property. Thanks to a referee for pressing me to be clearer on this.
- ⁹ I follow (Schnieder, 2011) in treating "because" as asymmetrical and transitive, and as a device for expressing both full and partial explanations. In addition, I assume that because-sentences are factive in the sense that if they are true, then the sentences flanking the connective are true as well. See Schnieder (2011, p. 451) for details. For ease of expression, I will speak of facts, understood broadly as correlates of true sentences, as *relata* of explanation.
- ¹⁰ An interesting strengthening of the first two definitions is obtained by prefixing further necessity operators to the second conjuncts on the right-hand side. Since the versions in the main text suffice to capture Ingarden's examples and are interesting in their own right, I will concentrate on them.
- ¹¹ To be clear, I do not take these quotes to suggest unequivocally that a concept of non-causal dependence or explanation, in line with extant discussions on *grounding*, is explicitly invoked by Ingarden. More modestly, I claim that the phrasings employed have uses in natural language in which they express this notion, and that one can make good sense of the quotes once we adopt this interpretation. Besides, Ingarden acknowledges a form of non-causal dependence when spelling out the notion of "production" involved in his definition of originality and derivativeness (see Section 2.2). Though Ingarden was acquainted with the work of Bolzano, who was arguably the first to give a thorough account of non-causal dependence (Abfolge), I have found no explicit remark of his indebtedness on this score. It should be noted, however, that the explicit recognition of a non-causal sense of "Grund" was commonplace at least since C. Wolff in German philosophy, which should make Ingarden's use less surprising to contemporary readers.
- ¹² Ingarden does hold that every heteronomous entity has its existence explained by a fact concerning an entity "outside" it in the relevant sense – that it is *derivative* in the sense to be discussed shortly–, which makes sense of his mention of existence when providing examples.
- ¹³ More specifically, this would make trouble for the claim that autonomy is compatible with derivativeness and dependence. Notice that in a footnote to the quote above Ingarden writes "I distinguish terminologically the 'foundation of being' (Seinsfundament) and the 'existential basis' (existenziale Grundlage). The reasons for this distinction will be given later." (2013, pp. 109–110, fn. 249). Even though, as far as I can tell, he does not indicate where he meets this promise explicitly, under the present interpretation he is pointing to the fact that the foundation of being of an object does not concern its existence.
- ¹⁴ "F is an intrinsic property iff, as a matter of necessity, for all x: (i) If x is F in virtue of $\phi(y)$ —where $\phi(y)$ is a fact containing y as a constituent—then y is part of x; and (ii) If x is not-F in virtue of $\phi(y)$, then y is part of x." (Rosen, 2010, p. 112)
- ¹⁵ One might point to ideal qualities and fictional objects as potential examples of absolute autonomy and heteronomy, respectively. Though perhaps in line with Ingarden's own suggestions, these examples turn on contentious views of these entities, and a more neutral reading is still preferable.
- ¹⁶ Even with this amendment in place, one might argue that the notion of (absolute) heteronomy turns out empty in view of properties such as self-identity, which are plausibly essential and not explainable in terms of entities other than the entity in question (or its parts). Without going into detail on this, it seems at least debatable that the candidate examples for heteronomous objects do not have their self-identity explained in other terms. Be that as it may, one might want to restrict the properties further (to non-logical ones, for instance) in light of these cases. For the sake of space, I will leave these questions aside.
- ¹⁷ Admittedly, this is a simplification of what one can grasp from Ingarden's somewhat enigmatic remarks. He also distinguishes five types of essence (2016, 419ff.). Spelling out these types precisely would demand much more space than I can provide here.
- ¹⁸ The example is Ingarden's, and there is a potential tension with the example of the red apple being autonomous with respect to being red stated in the previous section, since neither ideal qualities nor ideas are parts of the apple. One might of course dispute this based on the restriction to essential properties suggested previously, but the problem remains for essential properties of concrete objects as such. Leaving aside a proper discussion of this, it seems recommendable to distinguish Ingarden's own views, stated only later in the *Controversy*, from the examples he provides in the chapter on the varieties of dependence we are discussing. In the chapter, Ingarden repeatedly expresses caution with respect to his examples, saying that they are solely illustrative, and as such need not reflect any particular metaphysical view. (See for example, 2013, p. 113.)
- ¹⁹ Fine famously argues, for instance, that it does not lie in the nature of Socrates that it belongs to {Socrates}, even though this holds of necessity.
- ²⁰ Fine's regimentation allows for claims of collective essence, that is, claims pertaining to the essence of a plurality of objects. Since the cases to be discussed do not call for such claims, I leave this detail aside. (Fine, 1994a).

- ²¹ One could in principle offer the alternative: $\Box\forall x (x \text{ is original}^* \leftrightarrow_{df} \sim \exists y \Box_x (x \text{ exists} \rightarrow y \text{ produces } x))$. Besides being arguably more distant from Ingarden's formulation than the definition in the main text, under the assumption that some objects could have existed which actually do not, originality* would make room for cases of contingently original objects, which seems at odds with some of Ingarden's remarks.
- ²² He does acknowledge a relative notion of derivativeness, whose negation would only deny that the entity in question is derived from a given entity (2013, p. 118), and an absolute, whose negation would amount to originality. Since no reasonable interpretation of originality seems to satisfy this latter claim, we might do well in leaving it aside. Note, however, that with the exhaustivity claim to be stated shortly, the negation of derivativeness implies originality.
- ²³ "Of course, it is not to be denied that: (1) a material-ontological opposition can, or even must, be associated with the existential opposition between originality and derivativeness; (2) causal relations can obtain, although they do not have to, between an original object and a derivative one. But the existential opposition that we have in mind here must first be grasped for itself, without being influenced by material-ontological or metaphysical considerations. Proximally, it has nothing to do with the causal relation, that is, with the opposition between 'cause' and 'effect'." Ingarden (2013, p. 121).
- ²⁴ See for example, Ingarden (2013, p. 146) for some textual support for both of the previous interpretative choices.
- ²⁵ In contrast to Husserl, Ingarden does not discuss a notion of self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency with respect to species, which is central to the Husserlian account. Husserl, 1901, III, §14; Correia, 2004.
- ²⁶ Ingarden's definition of non-self-sufficiency is also different from Husserl's in this regard. Note that corresponding to "coexist within the unity of some whole" in Ingarden's definition Husserl has the phrasing "is in a more comprehensive unity", which has been interpreted as demanding non-identity of the non-self-sufficient entity and the whole in question. (Simons, 1987, pp. 124–125; Correia, 2004, p. 6.)
- ²⁷ Even with respect to this notion of whole, existence of the parts alone is not sufficient for its existence (110). Ingarden would thus seemingly deny the thesis of unrestricted composition in every sense of "whole" acknowledged by him.
- ²⁸ Some authors would dispute these cases based on a connection between dependence and priority. That is, if it being the case that x depends on y implies that y is prior to x , then since priority is an asymmetrical relation, then dependence is as well. (See Schnieder, 2020, section 2.1.)
- ²⁹ In addition to these, Ingarden also discusses a comparative notion of *being more self-sufficient than* (2013, p. 148). Since his own discussion does not hinge on this notion, and this opens up new questions of its own, I will leave it aside.
- ³⁰ It is suggestive to think of the formal essential truths as the results of generalizations on material essential truths. In the interest of keeping the paper short, going into the details of this account must be left for another opportunity. I rely on an intuitive assessment of the distinction here.
- ³¹ He also states that a father is dependent, on his son, that a husband is dependent, on his wife, and so on. This might suggest that he makes room for notional dependencies, which would apply to an object under a certain description, or *qua object* of a certain sort. Since Ingarden does not seem to place much weight on this kind of example, I leave it aside in the main text. See Simons, 2013, p. 50 for discussion.
- ³² This not without a potential interpretative cost. Commenting on the notions he has just presented, Ingarden writes that "no existential moments appear in the concepts set forth that are intimately connected with the existence of entities in time." (2013, p. 157) Indeed, the notions of dependence that he discusses later in the same work have mainly to do with existence in time (see note 3). Though I shall not linger on the issue, I believe a careful reading of the whole paragraph of the quoted sentence shows that Ingarden might have meant, more precisely, that the concepts in these four pairs still *do not provide an exhaustive account of what it is for entities to exist in time* (cf. 2013, pp. 157–158), which is not in tension with the definition of some of the concepts mentioning or quantifying over time instants and intervals.
- ³³ Cf. the notion of "permanent dependence" in Correia (2005, p. 120). It bears mentioning that "continued subsistence" is absent in Ingarden (1929), where the notion of dependence_e is first presented. Notice the order of quantifiers in the proposed definition: it need not be one and the same entity that accompanies a dependent, entity throughout its existence (as a matter of the latter's essence). Though there are potential difficulties with respect to the mentioning of specific time parameters in an object's essence, it would take us far afield to spell out proper solutions, and an intuitive assessment should suffice for our purposes.
- ³⁴ See note 28.
- ³⁵ This additional premise arguably follows from some of Ingarden's claims, for instance: "one and the same [entity] cannot first exist in one mode of being and then in another; the disparity [*Verschiedenheit*] in mode of being excludes the identity of the object." (2013, p. 104).

- ³⁶ In this step, the argument might rely on the notion of essence being closed under some sort of “metaphysical” entailment. While this is not plausible under every conception of essence (cf. Fine, 1994b), it surely holds for some of them, arguably in particular that envisaged by Ingarden, as briefly discussed in §2.2.
- ³⁷ Ingarden himself explores applications of his notions to the mind–body problem. See 2016, §78.
- ³⁸ I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for their careful reading and extremely helpful comments on a previous version of this paper.

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