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„Leaders under Pressure: Drivers and Consequences of Intra-Party Power Dynamics“

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1. Introduction

Party behavior largely derives from choices made by relatively small circles of leaders. In most instances, party elites set the agenda and have the final say in important party-internal decisions over party policy, organizational reform as well as over appointments. These elites are in many ways "the real actors" (Sjöblom, 1968) within political parties and their power typically extends far beyond the party organization (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Particularly in parliamentary regimes, they form the core of the 'political elite', who personally hold the highest public offices in the state, who select others for public office, and who make public policy. The choices they make in party bodies and in public office tie government actions to voter preferences and are thus of paramount significance for the legitimacy of governance in parliamentary democracies (Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000).

Party elites are tasked with leading an organization composed of a variety of people with heterogenous interests (Ceron, 2012; Greene & Haber, 2016; Haute & Carty, 2012) to achieve a set of common goals. This necessarily involves difficult trade-offs between the party's policy, electoral and office goals (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Yet, it also requires party elite members to make accurate assessments of their own power within the organization relative to other intra-party actors. They need to know which intra-party demands may be ignored at times, for the sake of competitive party strategies, and which should better be answered to avoid damage to the party or to their own political careers.

The Austrian Social Democrats First of May celebrations in 2016 mark the culmination of a clear case of misjudgment in this regard. In the aftermath of a painful loss in the presidential election, the movement's historic holiday developed into a staggering display of rank-and-file unrest. The conflict evolved over the party leadership's strategic shift towards more restrictive stances in asylum policy. The decision was deemed at odds with the party's core principles by many activists, who felt that an aloof party elite had ignored their views for too long. While security personnel initially thwarted activist attempts to block the party elite's way to the podium, they were greeted with protest signs when they eventually entered the stage. The speeches of their core proponents – including party leader and chancellor Werner Faymann – were drowned out by whistles, boos and chants, amongst which "resignation" was a comparatively friendly one.

The Social Democrats' coalition partner at the time, the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), was soon to be equally shaken by intra-party quarrels. Yet, in the ÖVP's case, the rank and file played no part in the matter. Intra-party pressure was rather directed from one ambitious leader, supported or tolerated by other party elite members, to the party's chairman Reinhold Mitterlehner.

According to investigations of the Austrian Public Prosecutor's Office against Economic Crimes and Corruption (WKStA), the party's rising star Sebastian Kurz and a devoted group of young followers allegedly developed an elaborate scheme in 2016. Investigators argue that the plot aimed at placing then-foreign affairs minister Kurz in the top positions of the party and the government and that it involved active sabotage of party goals. Opinion polls were reportedly 'doctored' to make the party appear weaker under the current leadership than it already was and Mitterlehner (2021) claims that he felt party elite members in his cabinet team had attempted to provoke snap elections. Note that most of the accused (including Kurz) deny any involvement in the alleged processes.

While Faymann and his supporters in the SPÖ party executive had miscalculated their intra-party leverage when ignoring rank-and-file policy preferences, Mitterlehner got caught up in past recruitment decisions, placing powerful intra-party competitors in too powerful positions. Episodes like these, where leaders crumble under intra-party pressure – originating from the rank-and-file, from within the party elite or simultaneously from both levels – can be found in almost any party around the world. Only the more spectacular ones involving news-worthy éclats, leadership change or particularly persistent power struggles are usually noticed outside of the party organization.[1] However, the relevance of intra-party power struggles is not confined to such extreme events. Party elite members are constantly exposed to varying levels of pressure from their co-partisans, even if in more nuanced ways. These pressures condition the choices party elites make in specific situations, the strategies they choose for the party in competition and their behavior in public office.

The political science literature has acknowledged these processes as an integral feature of democratic politics from its infancy (Michels, 1949; Ostrogorski, 1902). It has since made great achievements in demonstrating how parties' internal power relations affect different types of party behavior (Abou-Chadi & Orlowski, 2016; Gauja, 2016; Harmel et al., 1995; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Lehrer, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Panebianco, 1988; Schumacher, de Vries, et al., 2013). Notwithstanding these important advances, there are still significant gaps to fill and limitations to overcome with regard to our understanding of the power dynamics that govern intra-party decision-making. While this dissertation does not purport to address all the questions that have so far remained unanswered in this field, it aims at exploring the following key research gaps:

[1] The British Labour elite's woes over party stands on public ownership, the German Green Party's internal quarrels over the accumulation of party and public offices, the Democrazia Cristiana's eventually degenerative factionalism or the AFD's notorious backstabbing within the party elite are prominent examples for the latter.

Theories of party behavior provide very different perspectives on the power distribution between the party elite and the rank-and-file and on the potential drivers of change in intra-party power relations. The notion of a secular trend towards 'oligarchy' has dominated much of the party organization literature (Duverger, 1954; Katz & Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966; Michels, 1949). An alternative theoretical perspective, however, proposes a much more dynamic understanding of intra-party power, where the power-balance shifts back and forth between the party elite and the rank and file (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1966). Extant empirical contributions thus far provide mixed results with regard to the former perspective (Loxbo, 2013; Pettitt, 2012; Rohrschneider, 1994; Saglie & Heidar, 2004) and lack systematic evidence on the power dynamics implied by the latter. Unravelling this theoretical puzzle requires to go beyond established measures of intra-party power building on parties' formal rules ('the official story'). It requires to consider situational change in intra-party actors' behavior ('the real story').

Relatedly, research on power relations within the party leadership is generally rare. Studies touching upon this topic are typically qualitative examinations of specific party decisions or focus on the 'horizontal' power divides between party factions that extend beyond the party elite group (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Boucek, 2009; Ceron, 2012, 2014; Lehrer & Lin, 2018). Variance in the 'vertical' power disparity within the party elite, between *the* party leader and the remainder of the elite, is understudied. The existing literature so far provides general assessments of individual leaders' overall power in the party organization (again, predominantly based on statutory rules) (Aylott & Bolin, 2017; Cross & Katz, 2013; Cross & Pilet, 2015; Pilet & Cross, 2014) or studies the factors conditioning party leader survival (Andrews & Jackman, 2008; Bynander & t'Hart, 2007; Ennser-Jedenastik & Müller, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021). It is therefore unclear to what extent the party leader may actually dominate the party elite to shape party behavior autonomously, as implied by various accounts (Katz & Mair, 1995; Passarelli, 2015; Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Webb et al., 2012). What is missing are systematic behavioral analyses of intra-party power, for the power relations between the leader and the remainder of the elite.

Finally, the extant literature has already contributed important insights on the consequences of intra-party power. It has demonstrated how rank-and-file involvement may constrain party elites in policy decisions (Abou-Chadi & Orlowski, 2016; Lehrer, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Schumacher, de Vries, et al., 2013), in matters of party organizational reform (Bale, 2012; Barnea & Rahat, 2007; Eldersveld, 1998; Gauja, 2016; Wauters, 2014) and in the selection of legislative candidates (Cordero & Coller, 2018; Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kenny & Verge, 2016; Rahat, 2007a; Tuttnauer

& Rahat, 2022). Yet, the impact of intra-party politics on the selection of government personnel – arguably the most important recruitment decisions in parliamentary democracies (Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000) – has received only limited attention in the literature. The few studies considering such processes explain the selection of MPs for ministerial office based on individual-level characteristics (e.g. their policy preferences) (Bäck et al., 2016; Kam et al., 2010) or study the allocation of portfolios among party factions (Ceron, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a; Mershon, 2001). Beyond these factors, our knowledge about the potential effects of intra-party power on the composition of governments is very limited. This is surprising as the selection of government personnel is fundamentally tied to the party as organization. The group of individuals who makes these important personnel decisions in practice is typically the party elite (Andeweg, 2000a; Laver & Shepsle, 1990). The choices they make in ministerial selection condition their ability to respond to rank-and-file demands for patronage and policy achievement. At the same time, they impact the party's competitiveness and individual elite members' personal career advancement. How party elites balance such potentially conflicting incentives in ministerial selection remains undertheorized in the existing literature. For one, it is thus largely unclear whether and how rank-and-file demands might affect party elites' choices in ministerial selection. Secondly, we know next to nothing about the potential effects of intra-elite power dynamics on the composition of a party's government team.

This dissertation addresses these gaps in the existing literature by studying the following overarching research questions and sub-questions:

RQ1: What are the drivers of intra-party power dynamics?

> *RQ1.1: What are the drivers of power dynamics between the party elite and the rank and file?*
>
> *RQ1.2: What are the drivers of power dynamics between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite?*

RQ2: How does intra-party power affect ministerial selection?

> *RQ2.1: How do rank-and-file preferences constrain party elite decisions in ministerial selection?*
>
> *RQ2.2: How do power dynamics between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite affect ministerial selection?*

The three empirical papers compiled in this dissertation answer the above questions by exploring drivers of change in party elite behavior in different decision-making areas (party policy, party organizational reform, ministerial selection) and arenas (party congress, party executive). They generate hypotheses on intra-party and party-external pressures driving party elites' choices and test expectations based on original data. In contrast to the dominant approach in the empirical literature, variation in intra-party power is thus studied based on change in behavior (e.g. the relative influence of different intra-party actors on specific decisions) rather than inferred from statutory rules.

Paper 1 explores the drivers of party elite responsiveness towards policy and organizational demands voiced by the rank and file at party congress. By explaining variance in party activists' actual influence on these party decisions, the paper contributes a rare 'behavioral' account on intra-party power and identifies drivers of the power dynamics between the party elite and the rank and file (RQ1.1). Paper 2 theorizes on how party elites manage delegation problems by selecting different types of ministers (party insiders vs. party outsiders; experts vs. non-experts) for specific portfolios and on how they anticipate rank-and-file demands in the selection processes. Along with other factors, the empirical analysis explores pressures from the rank and file (for the enactment of core policies, for patronage and for career options) as potential constraints on party elites' choices in ministerial selection (RQ2.1). Finally, Paper 3 develops the theoretical argument that the recruitment of government personnel involves a consequential intra-elite bargain between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite group. The paper proposes party leader performance as a key driver of the power balance between these actors (RQ1.2) and demonstrates how intra-elite power dynamics condition party elites' access to government office (RQ2.2). Table 1.1 displays an overview over the three empirical papers included in this dissertation.

Empirical analyses in all three papers use novel data on Austria, an archetypical party democracy and extreme case with regard to several key characteristics. The case selection provides for significant levels of generalizability based on most-likely or least-likely case considerations. Paper 1 builds on a comprehensive dataset covering party congress motion treatment in the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) (1945—2014; n=3249), the party with the most centralized decision-making structures (Müller et al., 1992; Müller & Meth-Cohn, 1991) in a party system marked by very low levels of intra-party democracy compared to other countries (Poguntke et al., 2016). Findings pertaining to the drivers of rank-and-file influence on party decisions should thus travel well to other contexts. Papers 2 and 3 use data on all ministerial and junior ministerial appointments made in Austria over the entire post-war period (Paper 2: 1945—2020; n=672 | Paper

3: 1945—2017; n=603). Due to institutional and party characteristics favoring 'party government', Austria is an unlikely case to see appointments of party outsiders and party leader autonomy in ministerial selection (Andeweg, 2000b; Luther & Deschouwer, 1999; Müller, 2003; Müller & Philipp, 1987). Generalizability should thus be high for inferences on the factors driving outsider appointments (Paper 2) and party leader control over ministerial selection (Paper 3). In addition, due to parties' access to comparatively large expert recruitment pools in corporatist institutions (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2017), Austria is a critical case to disentangle the specific drivers of outsider and expert appointments, which are usually conflated in a 'technocrat' category in the existing literature.

In conjunction, these empirical studies contribute in the following ways to the literatures on party organization and party government:

1. *The drivers of intra-party power dynamics (RQ1):* The dissertation contributes to the literature on party organization by identifying party performance as an important driver of short-term change in intra-party power. The relative influence of the party elite vis-a-vis party activists increases the more they deliver on the party's electoral and office goals (Paper 1). Likewise, the party leader's power within the party elite group depends on the former's capacity to provide goal achievement (Paper 3). Paper 1 contributes additional evidence indicating that a proportionality logic governs party elites' selective responsiveness towards the demands of different intra-party groups.
2. *Goal orientations along the party hierarchy*: Papers 1 and 3 carry implications for systematic differences in the goal orientations of intra-party actors (Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021; Müller & Strøm, 1999). Findings are in line with the perspective that political professionals in the national party elite and in regional and subgroup leadership positions (sub-elites) prioritize office achievement over other party goals.
3. *Party congress data*: Paper 1 adds to a growing strand of research proposing party congress documents as a valuable data source for the study of intra-party politics (Ceron, 2012; Ceron & Greene, 2019; Greene & Haber, 2016; Schumacher et al., 2019). The article proposes a novel approach to measure shifts in the power equilibria between party elites and the rank and file, which – unlike most of the existing measures of intra-party power – is sensitive to short-term change.
4. *Effects of intra-party power on ministerial selection (RQ2):* Papers 2 and 3 provide the first systematic empirical examination of how power relations between actors from different levels of the party hierarchy condition the outcomes of ministerial selection. Both papers

thus add to the literatures on party behavior and party government. Results suggest that intra-elite power dynamics, between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite, affect the 'partyness' of ministerial appointments.

5. *Outsider, expert and party elite appointments to ministerial office*: Papers 2 and 3 contribute novel perspectives to the literatures on party government and technocracy by studying drivers of different types of ministerial appointments beyond the system and party levels. They identify distinct explanatory factors for outsider, expert and party elite appointments to government office. Importantly, portfolio-specific agency-loss considerations and intra-party power relations are found to affect party elites' choices in ministerial selection.
6. *Measuring expertise*: Paper 2 advances the measurement of ministers' expertise (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a), which is an important variable in research on technocracy. The article proposes a categorical scheme of occupational areas where expertise can be acquired for every ministerial portfolio, which may be applied to other contexts with slight modifications.

The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical perspective on the drivers and consequences of intra-party power dynamics applied in the three empirical studies and reviews the extant literature. Chapter 3 outlines the empirical strategies used in the articles, discussing case selection, data and statistical methods. Chapters 4 to 6 then present the three papers in the final versions submitted to the publishers. Finally, Chapter 7 answers the dissertation's research questions based on the findings of the three empirical studies and discusses their implications as well as their limitations.

Table 1. 1: Overview of publications.

Paper	Title	Co-Author(s)	Publication Date	Publication
1	Appeasement and Rewards: Explaining Patterns of Party Responsiveness towards Activist Preferences	Katharina Heugl, Wolfgang C. Müller	1 March 2021	*Party Politics*
2	Who's fit for the job? Allocating ministerial portfolios to outsiders and experts	Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik	1 November 2022	*European Political Science Review*
3	The Intra-Party Bargain over Ministerial Appointments: How Party Leader Performance Affects the 'Partyness' of Government	-	12 September 2022 (First View)	*West European Politics*

2. Theoretical Framework

Party elites dominate political parties and political parties dominate politics in modern democracies. Building on theories of party organization and party government this dissertation contributes novel perspectives on the internal politics of political parties and on their role in the delegation from voters to governments in parliamentary democracies. The following chapter outlines the theoretical framework applied in the three empirical studies, reviews the extant literature and addresses the research goals of this dissertation. I first discuss theoretical perspectives on actors' intra-party roles, their preferences and their relative power in the party organization. In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I further elaborate on likely drivers of change in intra-party power as well as on the consequences of these dynamics for party behavior and for the delegation from the electorate to the executive.

Roles, Preferences and Power in the Party Organization

"*The most salient characteristics of the entities called 'parties' shift as functions change and attempts are made to reconcile the conflicting pressures arising from the bundle of roles, individuals and institutions normally lumped together under one omnibus heading.*" (Rose, 1964)

While much of the literature on party behavior heuristically conceives political parties as 'unitary actors' or as 'teams of leaders', real-world parties are obviously more than that. The vast majority of parties are complex organizations. They gather thousands (often hundreds of thousands) of members, they are subdivided into varieties of subgroups and they are governed by their own sets of rules and institutions. As noted already by some of the earliest accounts on political parties (Michels, 1949; Ostrogorski, 1902), any such organization requires coordination to pursue the common goals of its members effectively. This coordination is the core task of the party elite (Sjöblom, 1968). From the perspective of principal-agent theory, the membership organization delegates competences to a group of leaders to solve the collective action problems associated with party organization (Meyer, 2013). To varying degrees, national party elites thus assume responsibility over important party decisions pertaining to party policy, party organizational matters and political recruitment.[2] It is this transfer of authority to a group of leaders that enables the party to be effective in inter-party competition; to act strategically, united and timely to achieve its goals. However, the differentiation of roles tied to party organization likely entails a differentiation of interests as well among the 'like-minded individuals' who form it (Strøm, 1990).

[2] Empirically, the formulation of party policy (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Cross, 2018; Katz & Mair, 1995) and the selection of government personnel (Andeweg, 2000a) are the most common prerogatives of the central party leadership, while their influence on the selection of legislative candidates is often more limited.

Role Conceptions in the Party Hierarchy

This dissertation focuses on interactions between two sets of actors defined by their respective roles in the party's organizational hierarchy. For one, it examines dynamics in the relations between rank-and-file activists and the national party elite. Secondly, the dissertation zooms in on the systematic divide within the party elite group between *the* party leader (as an individual actor) and the remaining members of the party elite (as a collective). For analytical reasons, these theoretically distinct intra-party divides are studied separately: Papers 1 and 2 study power relations between the rank and file and the party elite, Paper 3 explores power dynamics between the party leader and the remainder of the party's leadership group. While role-differentiation stemming from 'horizontal' intra-party divides (e.g. factional or regional affiliation) is further considered in the theoretical discussion, research questions and empirical analyses primarily pertain to these two types of 'vertical' divides.

Empirically, rank-and-file, party elite and party leader are somewhat fuzzy concepts as they have been applied to actors holding very different formal functions throughout the literature. For instance, 'party elite' and 'party leaders' regularly denote party executive members, small groups of party heavy-weights, party officials on different levels, the party's MPs and government members or the concepts remain unspecified altogether (e.g. Giannetti & Benoit, 2008; Luther & Deschouwer, 1999; Müller, 1997; Rehmert, 2022; Reif et al., 1980; Scarrow, 2021; Sjöblom, 1968; Von dem Berge & Poguntke, 2017). Naturally, such differences may be attributed to varying research interests. Yet, they are also due to country and party-level variation in decision-making structures determining which intra-party actors substantively assume leadership roles in terms of their involvement and authority in party decisions.

Considering the characteristics of the empirical cases studied, the dissertation uses the following approach. The categories *party elite* and *party leaders* (in the plural) are used synonymously to refer to the national leadership group of the extra-parliamentary party ('the party in central office') (Katz & Mair, 1993). These are the members of national party executives, who are formally and substantively the dominant actors in intra-party decision-making in the cases studied. Likewise, *the party leader* (in the singular) is defined as the person formally heading the extra-parliamentary party (e.g. party chairperson, party president, party speaker), which is a role that typically comes with various prerogatives in decision-making processes. The concepts *rank and file* and *party activists* generally denote the 'party on the ground' (Katz & Mair, 1993), thus members of the lowest echelon of the party hierarchy. Finally, Paper 1 introduces *sub-elites* as an intermediate category between a party's national elite and 'ordinary' activists, encompassing actors with

leadership roles on the level of regional branches and other party subgroups. These different intra-party roles are expected to shape the preferences of the people who hold them.

Preference-Divides between the Party Elite and the Rank-and-File

Notwithstanding the factional interest divides that cut through all levels of the party organization (Boucek, 2009; Ceron, 2019; Harmel et al., 1995), hierarchy itself has been conceived as a source of systematic intra-party disagreement in much of the literature. The seminal perspective echoing through many classic studies is that lower-level party activists are more ideologically extreme than members of the party elite, all else equal (May, 1973; Michels, 1949, p. 387; Ostrogorski, 1902). This law-like proposition of a specific correlation between intra-party roles and preferences is so far reflected much clearer in the historical anecdotes employed to substantiate its formulation than in more recent accounts testing its empirical implications (Bäckersten, 2021; Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995; Van Holsteyn et al., 2017). In part, this may certainly be attributed to the conceptual and methodological challenges involved in testing the proposition systematically and in different empirical contexts (Bäckersten, 2021). It might as well be that "May's Law" – or at least its interpretation in the subsequent literature – somewhat oversimplifies the connection between roles and preferences. This relates directly to the question why we should expect disagreement between the lower and the upper echelons of the party in the first place.

May's study (1973) and others suggest various causes of 'vertical' preference divides. Amongst other things, these include the psychological transformation of leaders due to the "exercise of responsibility" (Duverger, 1954, p. 159; see also Michels, 1949), systematic class differences between leaders and activists as well as the relative "insularity" of activists, which reinforces extreme beliefs. While all these factors are certainly plausible drivers of disagreement, the most influential 'causes' listed by May, in terms of further developments in party organization theory, are differences in actors' incentive structures stemming from their specific roles in the organization (Cotta, 2000; Eldersveld, 1966, p. 12; Müller & Strøm, 1999).

Specifically, party elite members are very likely to benefit personally from the spoils of public office. They are 'natural' candidates for the various prestigious, well-paid, and influential offices the party may gain access to through elections and/or coalition negotiations. They may also deploy the resources that come with these posts as reward for their followers to solidify their intra-party backing. Gaining and maintaining access to office therefore has intrinsic value for a party's elite group, creating strong incentives to value access to office higher than mere electoral success or policy achievement (Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021; Müller & Strøm, 1999). Conversely, typical rank-and-file activists are political amateurs,

who have no realistic chance to be considered for public office on the national level. Hence, policy is likely to trump votes and office as the primary motivation for their activism (e.g. contributing to 'the cause' financially as well as in terms of unpaid labor) (Müller & Strøm, 1999). To be sure, the policy preferences of the rank-and-file are not homogenous (Ceron, 2019; Greene & Haber, 2016; Haute & Carty, 2012), but they cluster around core ideological beliefs and values they are all committed to. Office achievement and electoral success have the mere instrumental value to activists of allowing the party to actually act on these beliefs. However, office and vote maximization strategies typically involve the risk of diluting the party's policy stances as well.

These systematic differences in intra-party actors' goal priorities are likely to lead to disagreement along the party hierarchy in situations where party goals conflict (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Accordingly, this dissertation builds on the theoretical assumption that systematic variation in goal orientations between the party elite and the rank and file will regularly lead their preferences to diverge in party decisions. More often than not, party elites will be relatively prone to act strategically and to sacrifice policies for the sake of office or vote gains, while activists will seek to minimize such attempts. The crucial factor conditioning whose preferences will prevail when the party elite and the rank-and-file disagree over party decisions is the distribution of decision-making power between these actors.

Power Relations between the Party Elite and the Rank and File

The dominant, 'hierarchical' perspective on party organization portrays the rank-and-file as a bystander in party decisions, conceding little leverage to them in terms of constraining the strategic moves of party leaders. In its original formulation, party hierarchy assumes that power in any party – or any organization, for that matter – will be monopolized by its leaders: "Who says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels, 1949, p. 401). The mechanical necessity to delegate certain competencies to a group of leaders, that characterizes any organization above marginal size, will eventually enable these leaders to dominate decision-making (see also Ostrogorski, 1902). The core argument of Michels' "iron law", that organizational growth and professionalization lead to a centralization of power, has had a lasting impact on much of today's literature. In particular, the idea of secular 'oligarchization' is reflected in the seminal party models. While these models suggest a less mechanical process and describe transformations of party organization as multi-faceted phenomena that relate to various developments (e.g. socio-economic factors, electoral, party organizational), the historical sequence of party ideal types implies a continuous concentration of power in the hands of the party elite. In the transition from Duverger's mass party (Duverger, 1954) to catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966) and eventually cartel party types (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2018), the shrinking membership organization (Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Scarrow &

Gezgor, 2010; Van Biezen et al., 2012; Whiteley, 2011; Whiteley et al., 1994) has lost much of its original value to the elite as a provider of financial support (Gunlicks, 1993; Naßmacher, 1987; Poguntke et al., 2016), expertise and policy-input (Plasser & Plasser, 2002; Webb et al., 2012). At the same time, party leaders expand their autonomy in decision-making to redirect party strategy from particular social constituencies towards the general electorate (Epstein, 1980; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988) and to consolidate their influence in the state through the formation of inter-party cartels (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009, 2018). The rank-and-file is thus increasingly marginalized by a more and more powerful party elite. The appearance of intra-party democracy is still upheld throughout this process, via the formal persistence of traditional party institutions (e.g. the party congress) and sometimes by introducing novel plebiscitary forms of rank-and-file involvement. Substantively, however, the rank-and-file's influence on party decisions is continuously hollowed out (Mair, 2013; Scarrow et al., 2022).

Various empirical studies building on this perspective have accordingly tested hypotheses on a continuous decline in rank-and-file influence. However, the results they present point to a much more nuanced reality than the hierarchical perspective on party organization suggests. While some studies find empirical support for a secular process of power centralization around the party elite in specific parties and decision-making areas (Hagevi, 2018; Hertner, 2015; Müller et al., 1992), other contributions stress that the rank-and-file has maintained (Widfeldt, 1999) or even expanded its influence on party decisions over time (Krouwel, 2012; Loxbo, 2013; Rohrschneider, 1994; Saglie & Heidar, 2004). Contrary to the more or less uniform trend towards 'oligarchy' implied in the hierarchical perspective on party organization, the empirical literature suggests substantial system and party-level variation in terms of the power balance between the party elite and the rank and file (Katz & Mair, 1992; Pettitt, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016).

The stratarchy perspective on party organization is generally less concerned with secular trends in intra-party power and thus more compatible with these empirical findings. Coordination within the party organization is not solely achieved by transferring authority to a group of leaders but by establishing spheres of mutual autonomy for different intra-party actors. In stark contrast to Michels' (1949, p. 35) view that "a strong organization needs an equally strong leadership", Samuel Eldersveld's (1966, p. 9) conception of party stratarchy assumes that "the very heterogeneity of membership, and the subcoalitional system, make centralized control not only difficult but unwise". Power is thus not centralized but shared among the different echelons of the party. Specifically, intra-party actors negotiate power-sharing agreements, assigning individual actors specific spheres of relative decision-making autonomy. While Eldersveld's original

version[3] of party stratarchy emphasizes the autonomy of decision-makers in their respective spheres of competence, recent re-conceptualizations stress the mutual dependence of intra-party actors in all decision-making areas (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Carty & Cross, 2006; Cross, 2018).

The various echelons of the organization (the national party leadership, regional and local branches) divide decision-making powers in different areas amongst them, but none of these actors "is able to fully dominate the other" (Bolleyer, 2012, p. 319; see also Cross, 2018). Party stratarchy is thus characterized by a division of decision-making power, complemented by checks-and-balances-type mechanisms. Those not primarily concerned with a specific decision-making area retain varying levels of residual influence in that sphere. Importantly, the power of the (central) party elite over the (locally organized) rank-and-file thus varies across different decision-making areas. Moreover, the elite's level of autonomy in a specific decision-making area is not a fixed entity but is constantly contested by both sides. The party elite and the rank and file engage in a continuous bargain over influence in all decision-making spheres and the outcomes of specific decisions are driven by the latest equilibrium the bargain has reached (Cross, 2018). Hence, the stratarchy perspective on party organization proposes a much more dynamic perspective on intra-party power than party hierarchy does. As intra-party power relations stem from a constant struggle over influence, the power-balance between the party elite and the rank-and-file is likely to shift back and forth towards more or less party elite autonomy.

Conceiving intra-party power in such a dynamic way has important repercussions for its measurement in empirical studies. For one, these dynamics are likely to materialize first and foremost in intra-party actors' behavior rather than in the relatively stable formal rules set out by the party statute. Studying these processes therefore goes beyond the scope of the well-established comparative research strategies building on formal party rules (Janda, 1980; Katz & Mair, 1992, 1994, 2018; Krouwel, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Poguntke et al., 2016; Scarrow et al., 2017). Similarly, expert ratings of intra-party power (Laver & Hunt, 1992; Polk et al., 2017; Schumacher & Giger, 2017) are likely to be based on the experts' observations of intra-party politics over extended periods of time and on their knowledge about party rules. These ratings will thus again reflect general evaluations of a party's internal power distribution rather than the current state of intra-party power struggles at a specific point in time. Estimates of intra-party power based on surveys of party members and activists (Allern et al., 2015; Kölln & Polk, 2017; Loewen & Rubenson,

[3] The concept was originally developed in the light of the Democratic and Republican parties of Wayne County, Michigan, and later adopted by Katz and Mair as a characteristic of the cartel party (Eldersveld, 1966; Katz & Mair, 1995).

2010; Reif et al., 1980; Rohrschneider, 1994; Saglie & Heidar, 2004; Scarrow, 2015; Van Haute & Gauja, 2015) would generally be suitable to account for such granular variation in intra-party power, but they are usually only available for one point in time or for relatively short periods. Hence, short-term power dynamics within parties have so far only been considered in aspects in qualitative studies (Bille, 1997; Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Carty & Cross, 2006; Cross, 2018; Dittberner, 1973; McKenzie, 1982; Minkin, 1978; Müller, 1997), with obvious limitations in terms of external validity.

While these different empirical approaches have contributed important insights, much of the theoretical puzzle of intra-party power therefore remains unresolved. In particular, the factors driving behavioral change in intra-party decision-making power are yet to be studied systematically. Hence, the following research question of this dissertation is addressed in Paper 1 (Chapter 4):

RQ1.1: What are the drivers of power dynamics between the party elite and the rank and file?

Preference Divides within the Party Elite

The party elite group is itself not a homogenous entity. While their function in the party leadership incentivizes them to act united vis-à-vis the rank-and-file more often than not, these leaders will certainly not always agree over party decisions. Notwithstanding personal alliances between leaders in the form of "camarillas" or "teams" (Duverger, 1954, p. 152), individual party elite members adhere to and often lead different party subgroups. Most of them also hold public offices in legislatures and governments at various levels in addition to their function in the extra-parliamentary party. These additional roles are likely to spawn systematic disagreement over policy, organizational and recruitment decisions among the elite (Cotta, 2000).

Factionalism is clearly the most studied form of such behavior, although typically analyzed as a feature of the entire organization rather than the elite specifically (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Boucek, 2009; Budge, 1985; Budge et al., 2010; Ceron, 2012, 2014, 2015a; Cox et al., 2000; Giannetti & Laver, 2008; Harmel et al., 1995; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Leiserson, 1968; Mershon, 2001). Like affiliations to regional party branches (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013) and tendencies, factions denote 'horizontal' divides running through all levels of the party organization, thus splitting the membership organization and the party elite alike.[4] Any type of disagreement among these groups will thus be present in the party's leadership bodies (Duverger, 1954). Moreover,

[4] While sometimes interpreted as an indicator for higher levels of membership influence (Ignazi, 2020), factionalism might not necessarily be "a sign of the liberty of members and of a weakening in the authority of the leaders" but it may simply point "to differences of opinion between members of the ruling class" (Duverger, 1954, p. 174).

opportunity structures vary between different types of public office holders represented in the party elite (Cotta, 2000; Katz & Mair, 1993). For instance, party elite MPs may prioritize electoral performance to retain their parliamentary mandates, while party elite ministers might be more willing to risk manageable electoral losses in order to preserve the party's access to government office (e.g. by making compromises with a coalition partner) .

This dissertation theorizes that party elite members' different roles in the internal hierarchy of the party's central leadership will also generate a preference divide in that group. Much like the preference differentiation between the party elite and the rank-and-file outlined above, it separates intra-party actors along the lines of competencies. Specifically, the incentive structures of the party leader and the remainder of the party elite are likely to differ systematically. In most instances, the individual presiding over the party organization is more influential in important party decisions than other members of the party elite are. [5] This may be due to party-specific formal prerogatives in decision making (Katz & Mair, 1992; Poguntke et al., 2016; Scarrow et al., 2017), but I also relates to the common practice in many parties of granting the leader the most important public office available. Notwithstanding cross-party variation, the party leader will seek to attain the highest possible level of control over party decisions in most instances. This will allow them to follow consistent strategies to achieve their goals. More often than not, these goals will relate to the overarching objective of staying in power (Luebbert, 1986). Other party elite members, however, may constrain the leader in this endeavor. They will seek to retain and potentially expand their own influence in party decisions. After all, substantive involvement is key for party elites to push the outcomes of party decisions towards their own ideal points, stemming from their affiliations to different components of the party as well as from their personal career goals. When disagreement arises between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite due to such differences in opportunity structures, the power relations between them are again likely to determine the way it is resolved.

Power Relations within the Party Elite

So far, much of our knowledge on how intra-elite power relations mediate party decisions pertains to horizontal preference divides. Empirical studies suggest an almost mechanical relationship between the relative organizational strength of a party subgroup and its influence on party decisions. Specifically, factional leaders claim policy influence and access to office spoils in proportion to the size of their group (Ceron, 2012, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a). The power

[5] Note, however, that this is not always the case. For instance, exceptions to the rule may occur temporary (e.g. the SPD in the Schmitt/Brandt-era) or in specific parties (e.g. parties with a truly collective leadership; Duverger, 1954, p. 177).

struggles leading to such solutions may take various forms ranging from cooperative deals between leaders to open competition between intra-party groups (e.g. allowing factional candidates to compete in inter-party and intra-party elections) (Boucek, 2009). Particularly the latter involves an increased risk of having detrimental or degenerative effects on the party. In the most extreme cases, inter-factional competition my lead the party to split (Boucek, 2009; Ceron, 2015a; Ceron & Volpi, 2019; Lehrer & Lin, 2018). The relative power of the party leader moderates these processes. Most importantly, a strong leader may enforce unity by the use of discipline (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Ceron, 2014, 2015b). The more powerful the party leader, the more they may employ positive and negative incentives (e.g. offering or threatening to withhold career opportunities) to sway the party elite into uniform behavior.

Yet, what determines the relative power of the party leader? The boundary conditions of the vertical power struggle between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite differ considerably compared to the horizontal power dynamics between party subgroups. In particular, deals based on proportionality heuristics are not applicable among intra-party actors, whose relative 'weight' can hardly be quantified.[6] Most studies on intra-party power focus on the power-relations between the party leadership and the rank-and-file or between intra-party groups and thus rarely provide clear conceptualizations of the vertical power relations within the party leadership. However, the scholarly debate on the 'presidentialization of politics' (Poguntke & Webb, 2005) carries important implications in this regard. While controversial due to its conceptual and empirical underpinnings (Dowding, 2013; Karvonen, 2010; Samuels & Shugart, 2010), 'presidentialization' generally denotes a development towards a state of affairs where public policy is dominated by the head of government, where electoral competition revolves around the personal characteristics of top candidates and where political parties are controlled by their individual leaders (Poguntke & Webb, 2005). A centralization of intra-party power in the hands of the party leader is thus a key component of this process: the leader's autonomy in party decisions increases and accountability towards other intra-party actors decreases (Passarelli, 2015; Webb et al., 2012). In this view, party elites (along with the rank and file) continuously lose influence on party decisions relative to the leader.

The presidentialization thesis builds strongly on hierarchical conceptions of party organization and particularly on the seminal party models discussed in the previous sections (Duverger, 1954; Katz & Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988). The transformation of party organization is

[6] After all, what reference do the leader (individually) and the remainder of the party elite (collectively) have for their own contribution or importance to the cause?

conceived as a diachronic trend fueled by membership decline (Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Scarrow & Gezgor, 2010; Van Biezen et al., 2012; Whiteley, 2011; Whiteley et al., 1994) and a growing independence of the party leadership from the resources of the membership organization (Gunlicks, 1993; Naßmacher, 1987; Poguntke et al., 2016). These processes also correspond with the introduction of plebiscitary decision-making mechanisms in many parties. Arguably these statutory innovations enable the leader to by-pass party elites and other intra-party veto players in decisions formerly reserved to party assemblies (Mair, 2013; Passarelli, 2015). The empirical literature primarily points to institutional and party-level drivers affecting parties' susceptibility to these processes (Passarelli, 2015). However, results are again mixed in terms of a general trend towards leader-domination. Likewise, the effects of plebiscitary decision-making mechanisms on the party leader's relative power appear less clear-cut considering empirical evidence (Cross & Pilet, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2015; Gauja, 2016; Poguntke et al., 2016; Scarrow et al., 2022).

Overall, empirical evidence for a 'presidentialization' of political parties is thus as scant as for their 'oligarchization'. Alternatively, studies on party leader survival suggest short-term variance in party performance as the key determinant of a party leader's fate. The more successful the leader is in terms of delivering electoral success and access to office, the more likely they can prolong their tenure (Andrews & Jackman, 2008; Bynander & t'Hart, 2007; L. Ennser-Jedenastik & Müller, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2015). Naturally, these findings come with two important limitations with regard to the power-balance within the party elite. By definition, they cover only the most extreme form of power-loss, namely the leader's deselection. Findings of these studies do not pertain to the party leader's maneuverability while in power. Secondly, these contributions predominantly present absolute assessments of the party leader's intra-party backing. They do not provide a relational perspective accounting for the power of the party leader relative to specific intra-party actors.

Hence, despite party elites' centrality in determining party behavior, we know surprisingly little about the factors driving the power dynamics within this group, between the party leader and other party elite members. This research gap is addressed in Paper 3 (Chapter 6) by answering the following research question:

RQ1.2: What are the drivers of power dynamics between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite?

The Drivers of Intra-Party Power Dynamics

"When you are successful, you don't need the statute. When you are unsuccessful, the statute doesn't help." (Herrmann Schützenhöfer; long-standing ÖVP party elite member; Hagen, 2021; translation by the author)

This dissertation theorizes on the drivers of intra-party power dynamics, building on the literatures on party change (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988) and party stratarchy (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Carty & Cross, 2006; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1966). Shifts in parties' internal power relations are conceptualized as a form of internal party change that should be driven by party-external competitive pressures – like other types of party change (Abou-Chadi & Orlowski, 2016; Adams et al., 2004; Bale, 2012; Fagerholm, 2016, 2016; Gauja, 2016; Greene & Haber, 2016; Harmel et al., 1995; Lehrer, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Panebianco, 1988; Quinn, 2004; Scarrow, 2015; Schumacher, de Vries, et al., 2013; Somer-Topcu, 2009). These factors are expected to shape the bargaining positions of intra-party actors when re-calibrating their power-sharing agreements and thus their relative influence on specific decisions.

To be sure, intra-party power dynamics are constrained by at least two factors. For one, intra-party actors have a common interest not to destroy the power-sharing agreement altogether (Cross, 2018). This would likely trigger inefficiency in the pursuit of the party's goals, detrimental image effects and potentially a dissolution of party structures.[7] Secondly, each decision-making area is characterized by a relatively stable – yet alterable (Gauja, 2016) – distribution of decision-making power to specific actors, which is typically institutionalized in the party's statute (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1966). These factors define a range of 'potential influence' for individual actors based on established decision-making procedures, means of participation and conceptions of acceptable behavior. For instance, the rank-and-file typically has stronger formal means of participation to salvage in the selection of legislative candidates than in the formulation of party policy or in the recruitment of government personnel (Andeweg, 2000a; Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Cross, 2018; Katz & Mair, 1995; Poguntke et al., 2016). These rules define somewhat flexible upper and lower bounds of intra-party actors' potential influence in different decision-making areas, thus rendering their involvement in these areas more or less likely. However, they do not determine a specific actor's say in a given decisions. Intra-party actors' 'actual influence'

[7] The scope of this constraint stems from the bargaining actors' evaluations of the costs of challenging the power-sharing agreement relative to the costs of accepting a party decision they do not agree with (Ceron, 2019). It may be best conceptualized using Hirschman's (1970) framework, as a process where actors weigh their loyalty to the party against other loyalties (e.g. to their faction or regional branch) and against their personal goals to determine whether to voice disagreement and/or whether to exit the party (Close & Gherghina, 2019).

on a specific party decision will rather vary within the broad statutory boundaries in most instances.

Beyond these general constraints, party performance is likely to be the primary driver of power dynamics between the party elite and the rank-and-file as well as between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite. In both scenarios, one actor is typically given a certain advantage with regard to potential influence. The respective other actor will challenge this arrangement when goal achievement is perceived to be suboptimal. Specifically, when the party's performance in national party competition is negative, activists will blame the party elite for unsuccessful strategies and they will demand more involvement in upcoming strategic decisions. To prevent a misguided leadership from making further mistakes, rank-and-file members will exhaust their formal competencies, they will increasingly voice demands and they will hold leaders accountable (Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1966). These processes should effectively increase rank-and-file influence in decision-making and decrease the party elite's relative power. What is more, party elites will seek to safeguard support among the rank-and-file despite malperformance, to keep members and activists motivated (e.g. to pay their membership fees or to contribute in the form of campaign work) (Müller & Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990) and to avoid deselection in extreme cases (Andrews & Jackman, 2008; Bynander & t'Hart, 2007; Ennser-Jedenastik & Müller, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021). This requires the elite to provide 'public goods' other than goal achievement to the large and heterogeneous group of rank-and-file members (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Such appeasement strategies can be expected to pertain primarily to two forms of public goods. For one, party leaders will give the rank-and-file more say in the formulation of party policy and in terms of organizational reform (Müller & Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990). Secondly, party elites will strengthen career incentives for activists by relying more on the membership organization in political recruitment (Müller & Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990).

Likewise, party performance should have similar effects on the power distribution within the party elite. While these factors are already well-established predictors for a party leader's ultimate loss of power (Andrews & Jackman, 2008; Bynander & t'Hart, 2007; L. Ennser-Jedenastik & Müller, 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021; Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2015), they are likely to affect their relative decision-making power over the course of their tenure in a similar vein. A failing leader, unable to deliver on the party's goals, will be under increased scrutiny in the party's leadership bodies and will be confronted with party elite attempts to take the lead in party decisions. Leader prerogatives may be called into question and party elite members will put

pressure on the leader to follow their substantive demands in party decisions. As party elite members are typically crucial to a party leader's intra-party support coalition (see Appendix C, Section 2), their threat-potential in these processes will be substantial. Party elite members' position in the organization often rests on the support of a particular intra-party group, which they can (threaten to) mobilize against the current the leader. Ultimately, attempts to replace a party leader will often start within the party elite and the leader's most likely challengers will be among the members this group. The leader's primary options to manage such dynamics and to restore a sufficient support axis among the party elite are, again, giving in on substantive policy or organizational demands or supplying elite members with career opportunities. In contrast to rank-and-file appeasement, compensating the relatively small circles of office-oriented elites (Müller & Strøm, 1999) for malperformance will be most efficient as provisions of 'private goods' for individual elite members (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). In particular, the leader may 'buy' back support by offering individual elite members attractive party or public offices.

Accordingly, one of the core theoretical arguments put forth in this dissertation is that a party's performance in competition drives its internal power dynamics. The party elite (collectively) and the party leader (individually) are the more constrained in decision-making by bottom-up demands, the less they are capable to deliver success according to their job descriptions. The following section discusses the consequences of these processes for party behavior and their implications for the delegational logic of party-based representation.

The Consequences of Intra-Party Power Dynamics

Party Behavior: Policy, Organizational Reform, Political Recruitment

Much of the literature conceives party behavior as the strategic reactions of isolated teams of leaders to party-external pressures (Downs, 1957). Parties' internal power relations are thus usually omitted as an explanatory factor. Different strands of empirical research, however, challenge this perspective by considering intra-party power as a mediating factor in these processes. As intra-party power structures grant different echelons of the party (holding different sets of preferences) varying levels of influence, variance in these structures leads to different outcomes. Change in intra-party power can thus be conceived as a mechanism that may bring about (or hinder) change in party behavior. This pertains to party policy, organizational reform and the selection of personnel for public office.

For one, recent studies on party policy change suggest that the centralization of parties' decision-making structures indeed affects their propensity to shift policy positions strategically (Abou-Chadi & Orlowski, 2016; Lehrer, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Schumacher, de Vries, et al., 2013). These

studies have made groundbreaking first steps to integrate intra-party factors in the empirical analyses of party policy change. Like most of the literature, however, they conceive intra-party power as a static characteristic of the party stemming from statutory rules. Critically, these contributions do not account for the potential effects of diachronic shifts in intra-party power on a party's policy platform. Likewise, various qualitative accounts on party organizational reform demonstrate that these processes are often driven by changes in parties' internal power equilibria (Bale, 2012; Barnea & Rahat, 2007; Eldersveld, 1998; Gauja, 2016; Wauters, 2014). While analyzing these processes in great depth – also considering situational shifts in actual intra-party power configurations – the external validity of these small-N studies is naturally limited. Finally, an important strand of research on candidate selection provides a wealth of information on how formal selection mechanisms in this area of political recruitment affect the composition of legislatures (e.g. their representativeness of the general electorate) as well as the behavior of legislators (e.g. their propensity to vote against their own party or to switch to another party's parliamentary group) (Bille, 2001; Carey, 2007; Cordero & Coller, 2015, 2018; Gauja & Cross, 2015; Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kenny & Verge, 2016; Krook, 2010; Rahat, 2007b; Rahat & Hazan, 2001; Tuttnauer & Rahat, 2022; Vandeleene, 2014). Similar to studies on party policy change, however, information on intra-party power is largely inferred from formal party rules and the behavioral aspects of these processes are rarely considered.

Despite great achievements, the extant empirical literature thus still lacks systematic evidence on how situational variance in intra-party power might affect party policy, party organizational reform and parties' recruitment decisions. The three articles compiled in this dissertation relate to different aspects of this research gap. Paper 1 examines how party performance and other likely drivers of intra-party power affect the rank and file's relative influence on party-internal policy and organizational decisions. Papers 2 and 3 shift the focus to political recruitment. Paper 2 studies how party elites' choices in ministerial selection may be constrained by pressures from the rank-and-file. Paper 3 explores how power struggles within the party elite condition the outcomes of these decisions. The second and third papers of this dissertation thus tap into a particularly consequential area of party behavior. Studies on the selection of parliamentary candidates have already established a connection between the distribution of power in political parties and the delegation process in parliamentary democracies (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Katz, 2001; Mitchell, 2000; Pennings & Hazan, 2001; Rahat, 2007a). Although the selection of government personnel is arguably even more critical for the delegation from voters to government (Müller, 2000a), we know very little about the effects of intra-party power on these processes so far (Bäck et al., 2016; Ceron, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a; Kam et al., 2010; Mershon, 2001).

The following section first discusses the general implications of party elites' recruitment decisions for the delegation from voters to governments and reviews the related literature on party government and technocratic government. The remainder of the section then presents the theoretical perspective on the party-internal selection process and outlines the research questions studied in Papers 2 and 3.

Party Government

"*Democracy may be conceived as a process by which voters delegate policy-making authority to a set of representatives, and political parties are the main organizational vehicle by which such delegation takes place.*" (Müller & Strøm, 1999, p. 1)

In parliamentary democracies, government legitimacy rests on parties' capacity to tie government actions to their programmatic agendas. Elections confer a popular mandate to political parties to implement their policies and the party delegates trusted representatives to government office to do so (Mair, 2008; Rose, 1974). The academic concept of party government pertains to the degree to which parties are capable of providing this connection (Rose, 1969). The literature has carved out several conditions for its existence. Amongst other things, party government requires competitive elections between parties offering clear policy alternatives, these policies have to derive from party-internal decisions, voters need to choose between parties based on their policy programs and public (particularly government) officials have to be selected by the party, through its organization (Katz, 1986; Mair, 2008; Rose, 1974; Thomassen, 1994). Hence, party government generally relates to the strength of party mediation in the 'chain of delegation' (Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000). Formally, this chain runs from the electorate via MPs to the cabinet, from the cabinet to individual ministers and from ministers to the civil service. In real-world parliamentary regimes, however, parties by-pass the delegation sequence laid out by the constitution. They effectively assume the role of the principle vis-à-vis MPs and government members, who act as their agents in public office (Müller, 2000a). The critical question in terms of parties' "operational control of government" (Rose, 1969, p. 413) is to what extent the party (as principle) can prevent government minister (as agents) from deviating from the party agenda.

The risk of agency-loss in this delegation step is substantial for the party and typically greater than in the parliamentary arena. This is because, the work of government ministers involves a high potential for hidden information and action, which the agents may salvage for shirking (Müller, 2000a). Parties thus have to rely primarily on ex-ante mechanisms of agency-loss containment, specifically a careful screening and selection of ministerial candidates (Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000). Accordingly, the literature has emphasized the party-internal recruitment of government ministers as the crucial step towards party government and has used ministers' party ties as a

yardstick for its measurement. Specifically, most studies focus on appointments of party members ('insiders') to government office, assuming that their self-selection into the party organization (Strøm, 1990) and their socialization into its norms and ideology will tie their actions in office to party decisions. Extant research has so far identified specific institutional drivers of insider appointments (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009) and has demonstrated decreasing shares of party insiders in government office in various countries (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Cotta, 2018; Dowding & Dumont, 2009; Strøm, 2002). In several accounts, the latter has been interpreted as an indication that parties lose control over governments as part of a wider process of party decline (Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Krouwel, 2012; Strøm, 2002). While it remains to be determined whether these developments actually represent a general trend, a decay of the party government mode would clearly raise questions with regard to the legitimacy of governments in parliamentary democracies. If parties are no longer capable to tie government actions to voter preferences, what else can legitimate governance build on?

A growing strand of research proposes that appointments of technocrats, party-independent policy experts, to government office relate to this problem. These studies argue that technocrats fill the legitimacy void declining parties leave behind. Specifically, the basis for legitimate government shifts from responsiveness towards responsibility: government members are selected due to their knowledge (rather than their party ties), they act rationally, in the best interest of society as a whole and they do so without concerns of popular approval (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; Caramani, 2017; Centeno, 1993; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; F. Fischer, 2009; Habermas, 1973; Majone, 1994; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017). From this perspective, expertise and 'outsiderness' – as opposed to 'insiderness' (e.g. party membership) – become the crucial criteria for the selection of government personnel. Accordingly, empirical studies in this field largely conceive party government and technocratic government as polar opposites and either focus solely on the outsiderness of government members or on some combination of outsiderness and expertise to identify shifts from one mode to the other (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; Cotta, 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014).[8] Beyond secular trends, the literature so far proposes system-level explanations for the apparent rise of technocratic ministers. Most importantly, economic crises (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; Wratil & Pastorella, 2018) and electoral volatility (Emanuele et al., 2022) have been found to drive technocrat appointments. Specifically, party selectors use technocrat appointments strategically to send signals to international creditors in situations of

[8] Note that a handful of studies also considers expertise in more nuanced ways to answer different research questions (Alexiadou, 2016; Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; Diodati & Verzichelli, 2017; Lavezzolo et al., 2021).

economic stress and to avoid electoral punishment when their competitive environment is turbulent.

However, the insiderness (or outsiderness) of ministerial appointees might be the wrong criterion to assess parties' operational control over government in the first place. Core contributions on party government suggest that the strength of the link between party decisions and government actions depends on the recruitment of party elite members – not party members – for government office (Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Helms, 1993; Müller & Philipp, 1987; Rose, 1974). Despite self-selection into the party organization and socialization into a broad canon of party values, preferences (Bäckersten, 2021; Ceron, 2015b; Greene & Haber, 2016; Haute & Carty, 2012; Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995; Van Holsteyn et al., 2017), motivational orientations (Müller & Strøm, 1999) and skill-sets (Alexiadou, 2016) vary considerably throughout the membership organization. Hence, uncertainty with regard to a minister's behavior in office might still be substantial, even when selecting insiders for the job.

In contrast, party elite members have internalized the party agenda (Cox & McCubbins, 1993) and they have been personally involved in its development (Rose, 1974). This will streamline their behavior in accordance with the party line. Ex ante, these actors should thus be the safest choice for the party in terms of its agents in government office. What is more, party elites' office orientation and their commitment to a career in politics make them more susceptible to ex-post control. Specifically, they will respond strongly to positive and negative career incentives the party may employ (Andeweg, 2000a; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Müller, 2000a). Extant empirical studies indicate that the party elite is an important recruitment pool for ministerial office overall (De Winter, 1991; Dowding & Dumont, 2009; Müller & Philipp, 1987) and that members of this group may indeed be the most effective party agents in government (Alexiadou, 2016). Moreover, party elite members have better chances to progress in their government careers (Diodati & Verzichelli, 2017). Otherwise, existing empirical accounts addressing the topic mostly provide descriptive assessments of over-time and cross-country variance in shares of party elite ministers (Alexiadou, 2016; Andeweg, 2000a, 2000a; Blondel, 2000; Cotta, 2000; Dowding & Dumont, 2009). Evidence on a general decrease of party control over governments is again inconclusive, also when employing party elite appointments as a more rigid threshold.

Altogether, the empirical literature demonstrates that individual ministers' party ties and technocrat status affect government behavior, broadly in line with the assumptions proposed by theoretical accounts (Alexiadou, 2016; Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2015). Yet, important limitations remain with regard to the drivers of different types of appointments (party insiders, technocrats,

party elite members). Notwithstanding the specific type studied, explanations largely pertain to the system level. Hence, we know very little about the factors driving variation in appointment patterns between cabinets and parties. This dissertation engages with this gap in the literature. Specifically, Paper 2 argues that characteristics of the specific ministerial posts a party has to fill affect appointment decisions. The paper theorizes that party elite selectors manage delegation problems by appointing outsider and expert ministers to specific ministerial portfolios. The theoretical model considers rank-and-file demands alongside other factors as potential constraints on party elites' choices in these processes. Paper 3 proposes that power-relations between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite will help explain appointments of party elite members to government office. The following three subsections discuss the theoretical view on the party-internal selection process developed in the two papers.

The Party Elite as Selectorate: Managing Delegation Problems in Outsider and Expert Appointments to Ministerial Office

In parliamentary democracies, the selection of government personnel is reserved to political parties (Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Laver & Shepsle, 1990) and it is typically party elites who make these crucial recruitment decisions. Specifically, the actors involved in the selection process will be the party leader – who plays a double-role as a selector and as a set candidate for the cabinet in most instances – and the remainder of the party's leadership group (Andeweg, 2000a, p. 131). This group of selectors has to balance vast sets of requirements for the appointees. Amongst other things, their selection has to comply with constitutional criteria for government personnel (e.g. a previous parliamentary mandate in Westminster systems) and with the preferences of veto players (e.g. presidents) in some countries (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006). The cabinet team also has to fulfill certain standards with regard to gender (Goddard, 2021), regional (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a) and factional representation (Ceron, 2014; Mershon, 2001). Moreover, minsters should neither be too young nor too old, nor should they have 'skeletons in the closet', which might evolve into a scandal after their appointment (Andeweg, 2000a; Rose, 1974). Most importantly, however, party elites have to consider individual-level factors pertaining to ministerial candidates' suitability as party agents. Specifically, the overall competence of the candidates, their policy expertise, their loyalty to the party and their policy preferences (Andeweg, 2000a; Bäck et al., 2016; Diodati & Verzichelli, 2017; Kam et al., 2010; Rose, 1974) are important cues for the selectors to assess whether ministerial candidates will serve the party well in government office.

When assembling a cabinet team, the party elite (including the party leader) has strong collective incentives to recruit ministers from the party organization. It provides a pool of potential appointees with at least some ideological congruence with the party line (Haute & Carty, 2012)

and the necessary infrastructure for a thorough screening of individual candidates in terms of all types of requirements (Andeweg, 2000a; Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000). In particular, the selectors can judge the competence, scandal-proneness, party loyalty and policy preferences based on party insiders' past behavior. This will be much more difficult to assess for people without a party record. Hence, due to higher levels of uncertainty relative to selecting insiders, appointing outsiders to ministerial office generally involves a higher risk of agency loss in the delegation from the party (and thus its leadership bodies) to the minister. As individual ministers have substantial discretion over policies, appointments and patronage within their department (Alexiadou, 2016; Bäck et al., 2022; Laver & Shepsle, 1990, 1996; Müller, 2000b), such agency loss will likely produce suboptimal outcomes for the party. Likewise, it will be damaging for the party elite group specifically, whose intra-party support and career perspectives crucially depend on goal achievement.

Notwithstanding the risk that outsider appointments typically involve, party elites are still clearly willing to take it in certain situations. For instance, party elite selectors might deem such appointments advantageous out of electoral considerations (Emanuele et al., 2022; Marsh et al., 2010; Street, 2012) or to send signals to international creditors (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019). The key theoretical argument put forth in Paper 2 is the following. Whenever party elites seek to appoint outsiders for any reason, they will act strategically and put them in positions where they can do as little harm as possible. Specifically, party elites are expected to carefully weigh the benefits of an outsider appointment against the risk and the potential costs of agency loss in a specific ministry. This is because some ministerial portfolios will ex-ante involve a lower risk of agency loss for a particular party than others (e.g. due to the political leaning of the ministerial bureaucracy) (Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Huber & Shipan, 2006). Likewise, some ministries will produce less damage compared to others when agency loss occurs (due to low issue salience of the ministry's policy jurisdictions, limited financial resources or narrow appointment powers) (Batista, 2017; Meyer-Sahling, 2008; Müller, 2000b; Schumacher, Vis, et al., 2013).

Paper 2 further argues that portfolio-specific agency-loss considerations will affect expert appointments in a similar vein. While the literature on technocrat appointments usually conflates outsiderness and expertise (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; Cotta, 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014), the paper studies them as two distinct selection criteria for government personnel. After all, expertise is not only an advantageous trait in a minister when combined with party independence, but it may generally increase the minister's effectiveness (Alexiadou, 2016) and popularity (Diodati & Verzichelli, 2017; Lavezzolo et al., 2021). Moreover,

empirically, outsiderness is not necessarily associated with expertise and insiderness does not always imply a lack thereof. On the contrary, party organization and interest groups linked to the party (Allern et al., 2015; Otjes & Green-Pedersen, 2021) may serve as recruitment pools for policy experts. Hence, Paper 2 hypothesizes that the availability of politically compatible experts through these channels for specific portfolios will affect party elites' risk evaluations and thus the likelihood of expert appointments. Furthermore, party elites may want to place subject-matter experts in ministries where a politically hostile bureaucracy might be prone to shirking (Huber, 2000; Huber & Shipan, 2006; Müller, 2007).

Extant research already suggests that intra-party politics are woven into these complex considerations party elites have to make (Bäck et al., 2016; Ceron, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a; Kam et al., 2010; Mershon, 2001). The following subsections discuss how vertical preference and power divides in the party organization may specifically condition different types of ministerial appointments.

Party Elite Responsiveness towards Rank-and-File Demands in Ministerial Selection: Outsider Appointments to Ministerial Office

Considering formal party rules and known decision-making practices, the rank-and-file has little or no means of participation in ministerial selection (Andeweg, 2000a; Laver & Shepsle, 1990). It is the decision-making area where they are probably least involved when compared to decisions over party policy, organizational reform and other types of political recruitment. The recruitment of government personnel is one of the classic prerogatives of the party elite and only activists in parties that are particularly devoted to intra-party democracy may – at least – rubber stamp the elites' final selection at party congress (e.g. in the Austrian Green Party). In part, this can certainly be attributed to the very nature of the task. After all, these decisions need to be made timely and in the light of hardly predictable circumstances (e.g. with regard to coalition partners or the allocation of ministerial portfolios). They also involve complex, time-consuming screening processes and require the selectors to weigh the benefits and costs of a multitude of possible scenarios. All these characteristics of the process render the direct involvement of rank-and-file members – who have limited time and informational resources and who are difficult to summon on short notice – less likely than in other decision-making areas. Hence, the 'potential' influence of party activists on ministerial selection can be considered marginal at best.

Naturally, this does not automatically imply that the rank-and-file is indifferent to ministerial selection, nor that their preferences are inconsequential for the composition of a party's government team. Party activists will generally prefer ministers who have completed a "cursus

honorum" through the party machine (insiders) over meteoric rises of "new faces" (outsiders) (Duverger, 1954, p. 160). For one, the selection of insiders will signal activists that their own commitment to the organization is valued by the party (Müller & Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990). Secondly, activists may expect that insider ministers will act broadly in line with their own interests in terms of policy, patronage distribution and appointments. Hence, whenever party elites select outsiders over insiders, they will likely be asked to justify why they did not opt for 'one of our people' – at least off the record (see Appendix C, Section 3). Particularly excessive outsider appointments to ministerial office can even be expected to cause actual unrest in the membership organization. This should lead party elites to pay attention to the overall share of outsiders when putting together a cabinet team.

What is more, the party elite has collective incentives to anticipate bottom-up pressures in their portfolio-specific agency-loss considerations. This pertains to rank-and-file demands for policy achievement, for patronage and for career options. Specifically, the more important the policy areas within a portfolio's jurisdiction, the greater the potential intra-party damage from agency loss in that ministry. This is because failing to deliver on core policies will likely generate negative reactions among the policy-oriented rank and file (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Moreover, the more money can be spent and the more appointments can be made in a given portfolio, the higher its value in terms of distributing patronage (Müller, 2000b) and jobs among the party faithful (Gilardi, 2005; Kopecký et al., 2012). Hence, the larger the budgetary resources and the greater the appointment powers of a ministerial portfolio, the higher the potential intra-party damage from agency loss. Accordingly, Paper 2 conceptualizes rank-and-file demands as part of a wider set of pressures that party elite selectors are exposed to in ministerial selection. The paper argues that party elites will consider the specific intra-party costs of agency loss in a ministry in their appointment decisions alongside other factors. To avoid detrimental intra-party effects, they should be less willing to appoint outsiders to high-salience and resourceful portfolios as well as to ministries with extensive appointment powers. Hence, the article adds to this dissertation by answering the following research question:

RQ2.1: How do rank-and-file preferences constrain party elite decisions in ministerial selection?

In addition to this assessment of portfolio-specific intra-party constraints in ministerial selection, the supplemental analysis (Appendix C, Section 6) tests further expectations on change in insider appointments due to party performance. Assuming that party activists generally prefer insiders over outsiders in ministerial office, the analysis explores whether performance-related shifts in

intra-party power condition outsider appointments (analogous to the theoretical reasoning of Papers 1 and 3). Results of the supplemental analysis also pertain to RQ2.1.

Intra-Elite Bargaining in Ministerial Selection: Party Elite Appointments to Ministerial Office

Notwithstanding potential constraints stemming from rank-and-file demands, a 'real' bargain over ministerial selection is likely to take place within the party's leadership group, between the party leader and the other members of the party elite. This is the central theoretical argument put forth in Paper 3. While both the party leader and the remainder of the party elite have incentives to rely on insider recruitment in most instances, their preferences will systematically diverge over the inclusion of party elite members in the cabinet. Party elite members will generally seek to bind the government team as closely as possible to the party's leadership bodies to safeguard involvement in their decisions. They will thus prefer ministers to be recruited from their midst. What is more, ministerial office is one of the most desired 'prizes' elite members may get a hold of in their careers, which would provide them with generous personal benefits in terms of power, access to resources and prestige. In most instances, these benefits will exceed those of their current party and public offices (Cotta, 2000, p. 69), which will incentivize individual elite members to claim a cabinet post for themselves (Müller & Strøm, 1999; see also Appendix C, Section 3).

These incentives conflict with those of the party leader, who will seek to minimize party elite appointments to government office. As a set candidate for the highest post available to the party, the leader will prioritize a surrounding government team that is primarily loyal to them personally as opposed to the party or to some party subgroup (Rose, 1974, p. 363). This enables the leader to strategically steer government behavior – in terms of policies, patronage distribution and appointments – in whatever direction they deem optimal for staying in power (Luebbert, 1986). In essence, the leader thus has incentives to personally assume the role of the principal vis-à-vis the party's government ministers. This will obviously be least effective with party elite ministers, whose intra-party standing typically builds on general rank-and-file support or, more often, the backing of specific party branches. Due to their independent power-base, party elite ministers are typically harder to control for the leader than lower-level partisans or outsiders are. They are also least likely to agree with deviations from the party agenda that the leader may seek, due to their direct involvement in its design (Alexiadou, 2016; Rose, 1974). Moreover, party elite members may be particularly engaged in defending the interests of the specific party branches or factions they represent in the party executive as they will often be held accountable by these groups (Appendix C, Section 2). In instances where the preferences of the leader and party elite ministers collide for any of these reasons, elite members' threat potential – that builds on formal intra-party powers, mobilization potential and the fact that the leader requires a stable support coalition among

them – may also allow them to push the leader towards their own ideal points. Not least, the prestige, power and media presence government office entails, might strengthen potential challengers of the leader in the party elite group.

Building on the theoretical reasoning outlined above, Paper 3 argues that the party performance will tip the power-balance between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite. It should thus affect whose preferences will prevail in their bargain over ministerial selection. Specifically, the party leader's record in terms of delivering electoral success and office achievement is expected to condition party elite members' access to government office appointments. The less successful the party leader, the more likely they will 'buy' back the support of party elite members with government jobs. Building on these theoretical expectations, Paper 3 answers the final research question of this dissertation:

RQ2.2: How do power dynamics between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite affect ministerial selection?

Summing up, this dissertation proposes intra-party power as important factor mediating parties' operational control over the government. For one, pressures from rank-and-file should affect the likelihood of insider appointments to different ministerial portfolios. This relates to the lower threshold for the 'partyness' of appointments applied in the literature. Secondly, performance-related shifts in the power balance between party selectors should drive appointments of party elite ministers, the higher 'partyness' threshold.

3. Empirical Strategy

The three empirical papers compiled in this dissertation study the behavior of party elites in two party-internal decision-making arenas. Paper 1 investigates drivers of party elite responsiveness towards substantive activist demands at party congress. The article draws inferences on the rank-and-file's and the party elite's relative influence on party-internal policy and organizational decisions. Papers 2 and 3 focus on the national party executive as decision-making arena for ministerial selection. They examine party elites' susceptibility to rank-and-file pressures and potential effects of intra-elite power dynamics on these important recruitment decisions. The papers develop theoretical expectations on the decision-making processes in each arena as well as on the actors involved and test empirical implications for the outcomes of the processes: party elites' treatment of rank-and-file party congress motions (Paper 1) and the selection of different types of ministers (Papers 2 and 3). The empirical analyses employed in the dissertation thus build primarily on two types of original data, information on the treatment of party congress motions and data on the career trajectories of individual ministers.

All three papers use data on Austria, a typical party democracy, providing for considerable levels of generalizability based on most-likely or least-likely case reasoning. Paper 1 specifically zooms in on intra-party decision-making in the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), one of the two parties that have dominated the political system over most of the post-war period. Due to the extremeness of crucial party characteristics, findings should also have high external validity. The case study approach is considered particularly suitable to study the research questions at hand. Restricting variation on the country and party levels allows to consider a wider range of explanatory variables beyond the established institutional drivers of the main independent variables. Moreover, this research design facilitates to substantiate the inferences drawn in the statistical analyses with qualitative information. The following sections of this chapter discuss the case selection as well as data, key variables and statistical methods used in the empirical studies.

Case Selection

Compared to parties in most other democracies around the world, Austrian party organizations are exceptionally strong. Despite some symptoms of decline over the last four decades, party membership numbers are still staggering relative to other countries (Van Biezen et al., 2012) and parties' organizational structures have remained relatively stable over the post-war period (Dachs et al., 2006; Müller, 1992a; Müller et al., 1992). Parties have also retained their dominance over the state and over substantial segments of society (Andeweg, 2000b; Scarrow et al., 2017). Along with other characteristics of the polity (Müller & Philipp, 1987), these traits make Austria a likely

case for party government (Müller, 2003). Outsider appointments should be less common than in other countries and findings on the factors driving such appointments should therefore travel well to other parliamentary democracies (Paper 2). Compared to party elites in most other countries, Austrian elites should also have a better bargaining position relative to the party leader. This is because, party elite members' intra-party power base and mobilizing potential should be more substantial in Austria than in other contexts (due to large membership organizations). Results on the drivers of party leader autonomy in ministerial selection should thus have high external validity as well (Paper 3). Furthermore, Austria is a particularly well-suited case to disentangle the drivers of outsider and expert appointments. This relates to Austrian parties' traditionally strong linkages to corporatist interest organizations (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2017; Luther & Deschouwer, 1999) and their important role in society more generally (Andeweg, 2000b) (Paper 2). While parties in other countries may be more confined to selecting outsiders when they seek expertise in a minister, Austrian parties can draw on substantial pools of partisan experts, thus reducing the correlation between outsiderness and expertise. Hence, studying the Austrian case allows to differentiate between the specific factors motivating party selectors to choose outsiders and experts respectively.

Austrian party organizations are not only exceptionally strong, they are also relatively extreme in terms of the centralization of decision-making structures (Luther & Deschouwer, 1999; Müller et al., 1992; Poguntke et al., 2016). Decision-making in Austrian parties is particularly dominated by the national party elite. Hence, the potential influence of the rank-and-file on party decisions is generally weaker than in most other countries. Results in Paper 2 suggesting that the party elite is effectively constrained by bottom-up demands in ministerial selection will thus have high generalizability. Similarly, Paper 1 explores party elite responsiveness towards rank-and-file demands in the most 'oligarchic' of Austrian parties, the SPÖ (Müller et al., 1992; Müller & Meth-Cohn, 1991). As the most centralized party in a party system characterized by comparatively high levels of decision-making centralization, the SPÖ is a particularly unlikely case to find rank-and-file influence on party decisions. Hence, findings pertaining to rank-and-file influence should again have considerable external validity.

Data and Key Variables

Paper 1 studies the responsiveness of the SPÖ party elite towards activist demands. Empirical analyses are based on comprehensive data on party elites' motion treatment at 41 party congresses between 1945 and 2014 (n=3249). This approach builds on a growing strand of research employing party congress materials as a systematic data source for the study of intra-party politics. These

studies focus on the preferences of different intra-party actors voiced in party congress speeches and motions and demonstrate that they are consequential for parties' externally directed behavior (Ceron, 2012, 2014, 2015a; Ceron & Greene, 2019; Giannetti & Laver, 2008; Greene & Haber, 2016; Schumacher et al., 2019). Paper 1 proposes the party elite's motion treatment at party congress as a novel, systematic measure for the relative influence of the party elite and the rank-and-file on party decisions. The article thus goes beyond the formal distribution of power as defined by the party statute and contributes a rare behavioral assessment of actual power shifts within the party organization. Party congress documents have been collected in public and party archives and were then coded based on a comprehensive coding scheme.[9]

Papers 2 and 3 use original data on the career trajectories of Austrian ministers and junior ministers. These data were collected via the official Website of the Austrian Parliament, the Munzinger biographical database and Wikipedia. Information on key variables (e.g. party office) was additionally validated and complemented with data provided by the projects "Party Congress Politics" (Müller et al., forthcoming) and AUTELITE (Müller et al., n.d.). The career data approach is in line with the dominant empirical strategy employed in the literature to study the 'partyness' of government appointments (e.g. Alexiadou, 2016; Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; Andeweg, 2000a; Blondel, 1985; De Winter, 1991; Dowding & Dumont, 2009; Emanuele et al., 2022; Müller & Philipp, 1987; Strøm, 2002). Due to the timespan between the respective first submissions of the papers to journals, observation periods and numbers of cases vary between Paper 2 (1945–2020; n=672) and Paper 3 (1945–2017; n=603).[10]

Party Elite Responsiveness towards Rank-and-File Demands at Party Congress

In Paper 1, party elite responsiveness is operationalized based on the motion-treatment recommendation of the commission of examination and approval. The latter is a party-elite-controlled organ of the party congress, largely composed of national party elite members. The commission's formal purpose is to evaluate motions in advance and to propose a treatment they seem fit to party congress delegates, who then cast a vote. This procedure has hardly changed and it has been the most important means of activist participation over the entire 70-year observation period. Moreover, it has de-facto been employed as an instrument of leadership control over the party's highest decision-making organ (see Appendix A). SPÖ party congress delegates almost always vote in accordance with the commission's recommendation. In contrast to the formal

[9] Paper 1 served as a pilot-study for the Project "Party Congress Politics" (Müller et al., forthcoming), where data on party congress proceedings are compiled for all Austrian parties.

[10] Note that the period between 2017 and 2020 was a particularly tumultuous stretch for Austrian standards, with high cabinet and ministerial turnover. Triggered by the so-called "Ibiza-scandal", these three years saw four cabinets.

institutional design, the crucial step with regard to rank-and-file influence is thus primarily party elites' recommendation for the treatment and not the actual vote. Hence, these recommendations provide for a suitable measure of party elite responsiveness towards activist preferences in the case studied. Specifically, we measure responsiveness by recoding seven types of possible recommendations into a binary dependent variable (acceptance and non-acceptance) for each individual rank-and-file motion. Categories build on a thorough qualitative evaluation of the substantive meaning of each motion treatment (Appendix A). With slight modifications, the treatment of party congress motions may be a suitable approach to study rank-and-file influence on party decisions in other parties relying on assembly-based variants of intra-party democracy (Poguntke et al., 2016).

Outsider, Expert and Party Elite Appointments to Government Office

Papers 2 and 3 draw inferences on the relative influence of rank-and-file, party elite and party leader preferences on ministerial selection based on the appointments of different types of ministers. Ministers are coded as outsiders if they were neither party members nor elected public officials for the appointing party prior to their appointment (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a; Cotta, 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014) (Paper 2). Conversely, government members who held either of these positions before assuming a government role are coded as insiders. Note that Paper 2 uses the appointees' outsider status as one of two dependent variables, in line with most of the literature on party government. In contrast, the supplementary analysis to Paper 3 (Appendix C, Section 6) utilizes insider status, mirroring the main regression analysis on party elite appointment. Naturally, the outsider and insider measures are substantially equivalent (e.g. opposite values of the same binary measure). In Paper 3, party elite ministers are defined as individuals who held a seat in a national party executive body before assuming government office. Conversely, lower-level partisans and outsiders are coded as non-party-elite (Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Helms, 1993; Müller & Philipp, 1987; Rose, 1974).

Finally, the second dependent variable used in Paper 2 is the appointees' expert status. Appointments are classified as expert appointments if the minister has acquired expertise in an occupational area that matches the policy jurisdiction of the portfolio they receive (Paper 2). Specifically, we record each career episode of each individual minister and recode them into various broader occupational areas. We then code appointments of ministers with at least one prior career episode in an area defined as a source of expertise for their portfolio as expert appointments. All other ministerial appointments where this does not apply are categorized as non-expert appointments. The fine-grained operationalization of expertise applied in this dissertation

advances the measurement of ministers' expertise, which is typically biased towards expertise in the natural sciences and economic policy (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a).

Perceptions of Party and Party Leader Performance

Papers 1 and 3 use indicators of the party's performance in national party competition as main independent variables, with two qualifications. For one, all indicators aim at measuring specific intra-party actors' subjective perceptions of goal achievement rather than generating an objective measure thereof. After all, it is intra-party actors' own perceptions that will effectively drive their behavior, which is in the focus of all papers compiled in this dissertation. Secondly, Paper 3 specifically measures the party leader's record in terms of delivering success in party competition. It therefore accounts only for goal achievement (or non-achievement) that the party leader is responsible for (e.g. the person has already headed the party at the time of the election or when the government was formed). This is because, the party leader's own ability to deliver success is expected to drive their relative power in decision-making.

Accordingly, electoral performance is measured as change in the party's vote share between the last two election before the party congress (Paper 1) and before the ministerial appointment (Paper 3) respectively. In Paper 3, a neutral value is assigned for any party leader, who assumed this role only after the last election. In Paper 1, the measure for office achievement accounts for the likely expectations of SPÖ rank-and-file members. As the party has governed over most of the post-war period, intra-party actors are accustomed to having access to government office. Hence, the party elite will not get much credit for preserving the status quo, but a loss of executive power will be perceived as a true performance shock that the party's leadership group is likely to be punished for (Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021). We use a dummy variable indicating whether the party has lost executive power before the party congress. This happened three times over the course of the observation period – in 1966 and 1999 when the party dropped out of government altogether and in 1983 when the SPÖ had to form a coalition government after 13 years of single-party rule.

As Paper 3 examines ministerial appointments, all parties studied are in government. However, party leader performance, in terms of providing access to spoils and policy influence, still varies significantly in the eyes of intra-party actors. In coalition governments, intra-party actors will expect 'fair shares' of spoils and policy influence based on their party's relative strength (Browne & Franklin, 1973; Ecker & Meyer, 2019). Accordingly, Paper 3 develops two distinct measures for the spoils and policy components of office achievement, building on the portfolio allocation literature. The party leader's success in securing spoils is operationalized by subtracting the party's contribution to the coalition's parliamentary seat share from its portfolio-weighted cabinet seat

share (Druckman & Warwick, 2005; Gamson, 1961). Party leaders managing to overcompensate the party (e.g. delivering a surplus of government posts relative to the parliamentary seat contribution) receive positive values. Undercompensation is marked by negative values. If a party leader was not yet involved in the government formation process or if the party's cabinet posts are proportional to its parliamentary seat contribution (e.g. in single party government) the office spoils variable is zero. Differences in the spoils value of individual ministerial portfolios in terms of power, resources and prestige are accounted for by integrating well-established portfolio weights in the calculation (Druckman & Warwick, 2005).

The party leader's ability to secure policy influence is operationalized as the share of policy intentions in the party's electoral manifesto that is covered by the ministerial portfolios the party receives. Hence the measure aims at recording the leader's ability to secure instrumental portfolios with regard to the party's policy goals. Building on extant accounts on qualitative portfolio allocation (Bäck et al., 2009; Ecker et al., 2015; Ecker & Meyer, 2019), the variable is constructed by first matching policy areas in party manifestos with portfolios' policy jurisdictions. Information on party manifestos is retrieved from the AUTNES coding of electoral manifestos (Dolezal et al., 2016; Müller et al., 2012). In a second step, the relative importance of each portfolio's policy areas is recorded in the party's most recent manifesto (e.g. the manifesto used in the last election before government formation). Finally, the resulting portfolio-salience scores are summed up across all portfolios the party receives in a given cabinet. Note that the measure again accounts for the party leader's involvement in the government formation process by assigning a neutral value if the leader was selected after the cabinet was formed. Moreover, the variable uses absolute levels of policy influence, as opposed to the difference between them and the parliamentary seat contribution. This is because the inter-party allocation of policy payoffs does not follow the logic of a zero-sum game (e.g. portfolios' policy-payoffs are rated differently by different parties) (Bäck et al., 2009; Browne & Feste, 1975; Ecker & Meyer, 2019; Laver & Shepsle, 1996; Warwick & Druckman, 2001).

Sub-elite Motions, Rank-and-File Motions and District Contribution to Party Vote

Paper 1 argues that characteristics of the motion-submitting party subunits condition the party elite's responsiveness towards their demands at party congress. For one, we differentiate between two types of motion authors. The lowest echelon of party activists (the 'real' rank-and-file) are typically active in the party's district organizations. They are mostly non-professional politicians and have no realistic chance to be nominated for ministerial office. In contrast, the middle-level of the party hierarchy, between the rank-and-file and the national party elite, is usually engaged in the party's regional branches or in affiliated organizations (e.g. the party's union group, women and youth wings). More often than not, delegates of these subunits are professional politicians who

hold public office at the regional level or top-level positions in corporatist interest organizations and they form an important recruitment pool for government office. To take systematic variance in party elite responsiveness towards these actors into account, we consider motions put forward by district organizations as rank-and-file motions. Motions authored by regional branches or affiliated organizations are categorized as sub-elite motions. Secondly, we use each district organization's contribution to the SPÖ's national vote in the last parliamentary election before the party congress as an indicator for the group's vote-mobilizing potential. The latter is expected to drive party elites' responsiveness towards the demands of the district organization (Ceron, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a; Gamson, 1961).

Ministerial Portfolio Characteristics

Papers 2 and 3 examine party elites' choices for different types of ministers on the level of individual ministerial appointments. Characteristics of the portfolio a person is selected for are considered important factors to explain the outcomes of these processes in both papers. Paper 2 accounts for the relative importance of the policy areas within a portfolio's jurisdiction, again based on manifesto salience (Bäck et al., 2009; Dolezal et al., 2016; Ecker et al., 2015; Ecker & Meyer, 2019; Müller et al., 2012). Secondly, ministries' shares of the overall budget are used to measure their relative value in terms of access to financial resources. These data were retrieved from annual reports of the Austrian Court of Audit (*Bundesrechnungsabschluss*), which are publicly available for the years 1961—2021. As these shares do not vary substantially across the tenure of individual cabinets, we assign the shares budgeted for the second year to each portfolio within a cabinet. Third, we account for variance in ministries' appointment powers using two separate variables. The first measure records the number of departments in a ministry based on the official registry of state institutions and public administration (*Amtskalender*). Secondly, we use a binary variable indicating whether a ministry has substantial appointment powers in state-owned enterprises (e.g. the ministries of finance, state industries, economic affairs and infrastructure) (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013b). Finally, Paper 2 considers support for the appointing party among a ministry's bureaucracy as an explanatory variable. This information was derived from the results of staff representative elections, where public employees elect candidates from party lists (1967—2020).

Paper 3 considers the 'objective' and 'subjective' (e.g. party-specific) salience of the individual portfolio a minister is appointed to as control variables. These characteristics will likely affect the attractiveness of government posts for party elite members and thus the stakes involved in specific appointment decisions (Cotta, 2000). Objective salience is operationalized using on expert-survey based portfolio ratings (Druckman & Warwick, 2005). Subjective salience is measured utilizing

the manifesto salience approach outlined for Paper 2 (Bäck et al., 2009; Ecker et al., 2015; Ecker & Meyer, 2019).

Analysis

All three papers rely on statistical methods to test theoretical expectations. Paper 1 employs logistic multilevel regressions, due to the hierarchical structure of the party congress motion data. Individual motions are the unit of analysis, which cluster in submitting organizations (e.g. party subunits regularly submit more than one motion at each party congress) and party congress meetings. The dependent variable is a binary measure indicating whether the party elite recommended to accept or to reject the motion. Explanatory variables at all three levels are included in the regression analysis. Papers 2 and 3 use logistic regressions with individual appointments as unit of analysis. The appointed minister's outsider, expert (Paper 2) and party elite status (Paper 3) are used as the dependent variables. In both papers, interdependence between appointments made in the same cabinet and unobserved heterogeneity between cabinets is addressed by specifying cabinet-level random effects and cabinet-clustered standard errors in the regression models.[11] In addition to the main regression models displayed in the individual articles, the Appendices (A, B, C) to each paper provide various supplemental regression analyses and face-validity checks. They further present additional information on data and measurement as well as anecdotal evidence corroborating the robustness of the findings.

The illustration in Figure 3.1 summarizes the empirical strategy employed in this thesis. The following Chapters (4, 5 and 6) present the three empirical papers in the respective final versions submitted to the publishers. Except for the numbering of tables and figures (which have been adapted for reasons of consistency and readability) the contents of the papers are identical to those of the published articles.[12] This also applies to the supplementary materials presented in Appendices A, B and C, which have been published online on the respective journal websites.

[11] This approach is more suitable to the hierarchical data structure in this case than a multilevel design. This is because core independent variables correlate at the cabinet level, but they do not exclusively vary between cabinets (or between parties within the same cabinet).

[12] Note that only Paper 3 uses British English spelling in line with the submission requirements of the publisher.

Figure 3. 1: Illustration of empirical strategy (Papers 1-3). Bold solid boxes and arrows indicate observed processes, bold dashed boxes and arrows denote inferred mechanisms.



4. Paper 1: Appeasement and Rewards: Explaining Patterns of Party Responsiveness towards Activist Preferences [13]

Co-authored with Katharina Heugl and Wolfgang C. Müller

Abstract: Intra-party democracy calls for party elites' being responsive towards party activists. Yet, empirically, we know relatively little about how responsive parties are towards their rank and file and the factors influencing these processes. This paper investigates drivers of party responsiveness towards activists, using a novel data source. Following a case study approach, the paper analyses how motions submitted at 41 post-war party congresses of the Austrian Social Democratic Party were treated by party elites (n=3249). Results indicate that elite responsiveness is a means to appease activists when the party under-performs in party competition. Elites vary responsiveness across intra-party groups. They are more ready to accept the demands of those groups that are affected most by the party's failure to deliver. Party elites are also more responsive towards electorally successful sub-units.

Keywords: party organizations, stratarchy, party change, intra-party power, democratic linkage

[13] Kaltenegger, M., Heugl, K., & Müller, W. C. (2021). Appeasement and rewards: Explaining patterns of party responsiveness towards activist preferences. *Party Politics* 27(2), 363–375.

Introduction

How power is distributed within political parties is the question that has inaugurated modern party research (Michels [1911]1949). It is important, given the crucial role of parties in providing 'linkage' between society and government, in running the machinery of the state, and making public policy. Yet most of the party organization literature examines intra-party power distribution based on parties' statutory rules, thus focusing on relatively stable formal party institutions. While important, formal rules are rarely deterministic with regard to the outcome of the processes they regulate. Looking beyond these formal rules, we know surprisingly little about the factors conditioning activists' actual influence in party decision-making. Drawing on the party change literature, this article contributes by developing a more dynamic perspective on intra-party power distribution. We provide rare systematic evidence on the empirical reality of intra-party decision-making and on short-term shifts in the balance of power between party elites and the rank and file over the post-war period.

Using a novel data source, we seek to overcome some of the limitations that the party organizations literature usually faces. We analyze how the party elite treated motions submitted at 41 post-war party congresses of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. Our case study shows that the party elite's level of responsiveness towards activists is driven by party performance in inter-party competition. Specifically, the less party elites are able to 'deliver' in terms of reaching party goals, the more they appease their membership organization by responding to rank-and-file demands. These effects, however, are not uniform across intra-party groups. Rather the party elite differentiates its responsiveness strategically. First, it compensates those groups within the party who are hurt most by a given performance shock. Second, the party elite is generally more responsive towards intra-party groups, who have performed well in electoral competition, thus rewarding valuable groups. In identifying these drivers of elite responsiveness, the paper carries important implications in terms of intra-party power and party change.

Intra-Party Democracy, Stratarchy, and Responsiveness

Ever since Robert Michels ([1911]1949), the notion that party elites exercise oligarchical control over the parties has been a widely shared assumption in political science and beyond. In this vein, the seminal party models (Duverger, 1954; Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009; Kirchheimer, 1966), suggest a continuous decoupling of party elites' actions from the preferences of the rank and file. As parties transform from mass-organizations to catch-all and cartel parties, intra-party democracy is reduced to empty formalities and party members are degraded to cheerleaders of an ever more powerful party elite. These expectations have shaped much of the party organizations literature in terms of theory, and there are individual empirical studies suggesting that responsiveness is in decline

(Hertner, 2015). Yet there is empirical evidence which points into a different direction and the overall picture is at best a mixed one (Enroth & Hagevi, 2018; Krouwel, 2012; Loxbo, 2013; Rohrschneider, 1994; Saglie & Heidar, 2004; Widfeldt, 1999). Rather than increasingly uniform and oligarchic patterns, there seems to be remarkable variance in terms of intra-party democracy across parties, party families, and party systems (Pettitt, 2012; Poguntke et al., 2016). Thus, the empirical literature does not support the classic argument of a general decline in intra-party democracy. Rather than gradually monopolizing intra-party decision-making, party elites seem to be sometimes more, sometimes less responsive towards the party on the ground.

While at odds with the classic literature on party models, this is largely in line with the 'power-sharing arrangements' described by Cross (2018) as a defining characteristic of party stratarchy. Party stratarchy generally states that the different levels of the party[14] agree to share or divide the authority over key areas of intra-party decision-making (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Carty & Cross, 2006; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1966). In the original formulation of Eldersveld (1966), power-sharing was mainly conceived as a 'separation of powers', where areas of mutual autonomy were distributed among the levels of the party. Recent contributions rather stress a model of shared authority, a 'checks-and-balances' approach, in which 'no single level has absolute authority within any of the party's principal decision-making areas' (Cross, 2018: 208; also Bolleyer, 2012). Thus, party elites and the party on the ground share decision-making power in all areas, but the specific power equilibria they reach will differ between these areas. Most notably, the balance of power they reach will necessarily be fluid, since all levels of the party will constantly try to increase their influence in any area, however, avoiding to destroy the 'power-sharing agreement' as a whole (Cross, 2018). Hence, instead of a party elite one-sidedly marginalizing the party on the ground, elites and activists should constantly engage in a constrained struggle for more authority. Party's responsiveness towards activists, in this sense, is a function of the current state of the struggle.

The empirical literature has addressed this struggle by focusing on activists' and party congress delegates' attitudes with regard to intra-party decision-making (Rohrschneider, 1994; Saglie and Heidar, 2004), studying change in leadership and candidate selection rules (Cross, 2018), by holistically characterizing parties' decision-making processes (Pettitt, 2012), or by means of focused comparison of a limited number of decision-making processes (Loxbo, 2013). Notwithstanding the relevance of such evidence, what is still missing is studying the dynamics of

[14] In this paper, we use the term 'party elite' in order to account for the party in central office, which in the case studied, is largely congruent with the party in public office. For the party on the ground we also use the terms 'rank and file' or simply 'party activists'.

leadership–activists relations in quantitative terms in the long term. Our article contributes by analyzing leadership responsiveness and its causes with regard to policy and party organizational party congress motions. We think that our fine-grained empirical mapping of responsiveness over time is better suited to the stratarchy perspective's theory of constantly changing power equilibria than the data used hitherto.

Manin, Przeworski and Stokes (1999: 9) characterize responsiveness as adopting 'policies that are signaled as preferred', hence requiring a prior 'signal' and subsequent action. Leaders then 'are responsive to the extent to which their actions follow the preferences signaled' by the constituency. To be sure, responsiveness may not mean a mechanical acceptance of rank-and-file demands. Discursive engagement with demands may compensate for some substantive concession (Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson, 2017; Öhberg and Naurin, 2016). Still, the acceptance of bottom-up demands is generally seen as the core of responsiveness. Hence, the more bottom-up signals lead to substantive acceptance of demands, the greater the responsiveness. This is the approach we follow in our empirical mapping of party responsiveness towards activists. Analytically, we seek to identify the crucial factors responsible for shifting the internal power equilibrium in one or the other direction.

Our study contributes to the party change literature in two ways. On the one hand any temporary shift of power constitutes *internal* party change itself, on the other hand it is a mechanism to bring about change of *external* party behaviour, in particular with regard to parties' issue attention and issue stances.

Theory and Hypotheses

In trying to understand why party elites vary their responsiveness towards activists, we start building our argument from the literature on party change (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988). This literature generally suggests that competitive pressures and performance shocks in particular cause parties to change. Much of this literature takes a holistic view of the party or, in the tradition of Downs (1957), proceeds from parties as teams of leaders. In bringing about party change, party leaders then react strategically to external challenges such as shifts in voters' preferences, electoral losses or moves of competing parties (Abou-Chadi & Orlowski, 2016; Adams et al., 2004; Fagerholm, 2016; Harmel et al., 1995; Lehrer, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Schumacher, de Vries, et al., 2013; Somer-Topcu, 2009). Yet this perspective leaves out that parties are also organizations. As such, they consist of different layers and groups, have specific mechanisms of decision-making, and vary in how power is distributed internally. A few contributions have taken this into account, incorporating such organizational characteristics as

independent variables to explain party policy change (Abou-Chadi & Orlowski, 2016; Lehrer, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Schumacher, de Vries, et al., 2013). These important studies have begun to unravel the role of party organizational factors in party change processes.[15] Yet, while these studies have assumed parties' internal balance of power to be a relatively stable organizational feature, we add to the general understanding of party change by examining whether parties' internal power distribution is itself driven by party performance.

In line with the party change literature, we hypothesize that competitive pressures shape parties' responsiveness towards the party on the ground. Our general expectation is that the party on the ground will gain influence when the party's overall performance is bad. Conversely, it will lose influence when the party's performance is good. This is because, whenever a party leader and her leadership team are not able to secure the party's goals, they have to look for other ways to keep the organization content, since under-performance may trigger accountability processes and lead to leadership replacement (Andrews and Jackman, 2008; Bynander and t'Hart, 2007; Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015). Notwithstanding the leadership issue, under-performance in competition may also deprive the party from public resources, making elites even more dependent on the party organization and the resources it can generate. Under-performance thus should lead elites to increase responsiveness towards the rank and file as a means of appeasement and resource mobilization (Strøm, 1990).

One way in which party elites may fail to deliver good party performance, and usually a substantial shock for any party organization, is losing executive power (Bale, 2012; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Scarrow, 2015, p. 25). Whenever a party exits government or has to form a coalition government after a period of single-party rule, it deprives the organization from spoils and party elites from the opportunity of distributing them among loyal followers. Moreover, activists will be frustrated about the party's reduced influence on public policy. In order to counter-balance these effects, party elites have to compensate the rank and file by giving up a proportion of their authority, hence increasing activist's influence in intra-party decision-making (Strøm, 1990). Our first hypothesis therefore states:

H1: *Party elites' responsiveness will be greater after a loss of executive power.*

Following the same logic, we expect that parties' electoral performance will affect their level of responsiveness towards activists (Andrews and Jackman, 2008; Bale, 2012; Bynander and t'Hart,

[15] Qualitative studies on party organizational change (Bale, 2012; Gauja, 2013, 2016; Kavanagh, 1998; McKenzie, 1963; Minkin, 1978; Müller, 1997; Quinn, 2004; Russell, 2005) naturally account more comprehensively for the role of parties' organizational features in specific processes of party transformation.

2007; Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015; Gauja, 2016; Greene and Haber, 2016; Harmel and Janda, 1994; Quinn, 2004). Specifically, party elites will be more willing to respond to the preferences of the party on the ground when their position is undermined by losing votes in elections. When a party's electoral performance is positive, however, this will increase its elites' authority and minimize responsiveness towards activists.

H2: *Party elites' responsiveness will be the greater, the worse the party's electoral performance.*

While arguing that party performance should have these general effects on party elite's responsiveness, we also expect that the two types of malperformance affect different intra-party layers to different degrees. This builds on the assumption that various levels of the party organization are likely to differ in the hierarchy they attribute to different party goals (Müller & Strøm, 1999). In order to minimize the costs of responsiveness, rational party elites should take into account these differences. For instance, if one particular intra-party layer is more interested in office than in votes or policy, elites will primarily need to be more responsive towards its' demands when the party loses office.

Specifically, we expect that those activists who form the party's primary recruitment pool for government office, the party's sub-elite, will have more at stake when the party loses executive power. Regularly, these activists will be professional politicians, having a relatively strong influence within the national party organization. A loss of executive power immediately deprives such sub-elites from career perspectives, which ordinary rank-and-file members do not have. Consequently, we argue that party elites will have to compensate sub-elites more for a loss of executive power than the 'true' rank and file. For the latter group of activists, having no realistic chance to be selected for government office, the party's hold on executive power will not be equally attractive. In many cases, and especially in coalition situations, the compromises necessarily involved with governing will undermine party policy ideals, with which the party on the ground will be most concerned (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Sometimes the rank and file might even conceive exiting government as a relief as it sets an end to policy compromises and allows returning to ideological purity. Yet, naturally, rank and file members also favor a party that is a successful competitor at the national level, not least because they depend on the party's resources for their own political work at the local or district levels. Since electoral performance is the primary indicator of the party's success, we argue that the ordinary rank and file will react more strongly to the electoral performance of the party than sub-elites. Hence, party elites will have to compensate the rank and file more for electoral performance failure than sub-elites. Accordingly, we specify Hypotheses 1 and 2 as follows:

H1a: *Party elites' responsiveness towards sub-elites will be greater after a party loses executive power.*

H2a: *Party elites' responsiveness towards the rank and file will be the greater, the worse the party's electoral performance.*

Finally, in addition to the appeasement-argument represented in Hypotheses 1, 1a, 2 and 2a, we expect that party elites will unequally redistribute influence among intra-party groups, since they will privilege successful and resourceful sub-units. From the party elites' perspective, not every intra-party group is equally valuable in electoral competition. Thus, the more a specific sub-group has to offer to the party elite, the more it should be rewarded (Ceron, 2014; Gamson, 1961). Therefore, we hypothesize that the more a specific group contributes to the party's vote share, the more likely it is that the party elite will be responsive towards its demands.

H3: *The more votes intra-party groups contribute to the party's total vote in national elections, the more responsive party elites will be.*

Data and Operationalization

While the bulk of the comparative literature derives data from parties' statutory rules ('the official story'), only few quantitative studies account for the actual behavior of intra-party actors ('the real story').[16] In this paper, we use a novel data source, which goes beyond party statutes and allows for a behavioral quantitative analysis of party responsiveness towards activists. Following a case study approach, we analyze the treatment of motions at 41 party congresses of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) between 1945 and 2014.

Case Selection

Austria is a well-suited case for studies of party organizations in terms of being an extreme case in at least two respects. First, Austria has the largest party organizations per capita in the Western World (Van Biezen et al., 2012) and the SPÖ has been the key party of the left over the entire post-war period, maintaining high organizational continuity. Among the 122 parties across 19 countries covered by the Political Parties Data Base (PPDB), the SPÖ ranks third with regard to party strength (Scarrow et al., 2017). Second, Austrian party organizations, are amongst the least internally democratic according to recent comparative accounts (Poguntke et al., 2016, p. 672). The SPÖ, specifically, has been identified as the most oligarchic organization of the Austrian established parties (Müller et al., 1992; Müller & Meth-Cohn, 1991). Thus, SPÖ elites should be

[16] See Andrews and Jackman, 2008; Bynander and t'Hart, 2007; Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015.

less likely to respond to the demands of the rank-and-file than party elites in most other organizations should.

Measuring Responsiveness

We measure responsiveness as the party elites' treatment of motions submitted by party activists at party congresses. According to the SPÖ's intra-party decision-making rules, proposing motions at party congress is a crucial tool for activists to voice demands, following a highly institutionalized procedure. The rules governing this process have hardly changed during the last 70 years. For most of the observation period it also has been the only formal means of the rank and file to influence the party's course. While (elite-controlled) plebiscitary instruments of intra-party democracy were introduced in 1993, the SPÖ had not used them until the end of the observation period. The treatment of motions thus allows for a long-term examination of intra-party responsiveness.

The SPÖ's party statute requires motions to be submitted in advance to a commission for examination and approval ('Antragsprüfungskommission', 'Antragskommission' since 1991). The commission is elected by the party congress *en bloc* on the proposal of the party leadership in a show-of-hands vote and composed of officials of the federal, Land and district levels, as well as representatives of affiliated organizations. It is typically headed by a party 'heavyweight'. The commission's task then is to issue recommendations how the party congress shall (and usually does) decide on the proposed motions. In order to measure party elites' degree of responsiveness, we recode the seven possible recommendations[17] into a binary dependent variable, indicating whether elites recommended to accept or not to accept a particular motion (Table 4.1; Appendix A).

Table 4. 1: Distribution of the dependent variable.

Recommendation (DV)	freq.	perc.
Non-acceptance	2,116	58.36
Acceptance	1,510	41.64
Total	3,626	100.00

[17] Possible recommendations are: full acceptance; partial acceptance; submission of the motion to a standing party body (typically the party executive, or the parliamentary party group); settlement by another motion; acknowledgement without further action; adjournment of a decision; and rejection.

Measuring Competitive Pressures and Intra-Party Groups' Contribution

The first main independent variable we use is executive power loss (H1). For most of the time under examination (1945–2014), the SPÖ participated in the national government. The party exited government only twice before 2017, after the 1966 and 1999 general elections. In addition to these cases, we treated the ending of a 13-year period of Social Democratic single-party reign as executive power loss. Although the SPÖ continued in government, it had to face reduced policy influence and reduced access to spoils.[18] Thus, this event should trigger the same appeasement mechanisms theorized for total loss of office. Electoral performance (H2) is measured as the party's change in vote share between the last two general elections before the party congress. Thus, negative values indicate vote loss, while positive values mark vote gains. Naturally, both executive power loss and electoral performance vary only at the party congress level (e.g. all motions made at one party congress share the same values for these two variables).

In contrast, our third variable of interest, group contribution to vote share (H3), varies on the level of motion-submitting organizations. All sub-units of the party, represented at the party congress, may put forward motions. Besides the party executive representing the party elite (and therefore excluded from the analysis), these are district organizations, Land organizations, affiliated organizations and working groups. We restrict our test of H3 to motions submitted by district organizations (about 50% of all motions) as we can only measure vote-mobilizing potential for these territorial sub-units in a comparable way.[19] In order to measure each district's contribution to the party's electoral performance, we calculated their respective shares of the SPÖ's total national vote in each parliamentary election between 1945 and 2014.

Sub-Elites and the Rank and File

For Hypotheses 1a and 2a we differentiate between the party's sub-elites and the ordinary rank and file. While sub-elites are a group of regularly influential professional politicians, forming the party's primary recruitment pool for government office, rank-and-file activists do not act in the national political arena, they have much less influence within the national party organization and they are usually not considered for government office.

[18] While it is true that the SPÖ remained more powerful in the coalition with the FPÖ than in the 'grand coalitions' with the ÖVP, the party still had to make important policy concessions to its partner, including to compromise the policy of taxing capital the SPÖ had campaigned on, relaxing rent control, and investing in military aircrafts. All these measures where highly unpopular within the party.

[19] While Land organizations would also qualify in this regard, due to the small N and unequal distribution over time of their motions we restrict the analysis to district motions.

For the case studied, we treat the SPÖ's affiliated[20] and Land organizations as sub-elites, because they indeed feature the characteristics specified above. The leadership and many delegates of these sub-organizations are professional politicians having a nation-wide reputation. Moreover, affiliated and Land organizations represent the most important stepping stones for a career in government office. Looking only at the highest level of government, the SPÖ's federal ministers and secretaries of state since 1945 (N=289), close to 50 % held – regularly high-ranking – functions in either one affiliated or Land organization before their appointment to cabinet. Taking into account those government officials who already held a high-ranking position in the national party organization before entering government, only one third of all SPÖ ministers and secretaries of state had a different course of political career. In contrast, district organizations represent the SPÖ's rank and file, the lowest level of the organizational hierarchy, focusing on political work at the local and district levels. Their delegates are usually neither full-time politicians, nor do they have realistic chances for appointment to government office. However, district organizations account for half of the SPÖ's party congress delegates and submit 50% of all motions.

Controls

We control for several potentially influential factors at the party congress level, at the level of submitting organizations, and at the level of individual motions. On the party congress level, we control for the party's participation in government. In line with our appeasement argument, we expect parties to be most responsive when in opposition and least responsive in single-party government. Moreover, the more party leaders control government the less they can blame others (coalition partners, the government) for preventing the actual implementation of party congress resolutions. Accounting for the transformation of party organizations, particularly the changing role of members, we control for party members' contribution to party finance (membership fees' share of total party finance) (Müller, 1992, 1996; Sickinger, 2009), expecting responsiveness to be lower the more financially independent the party organization is from its members. We account for leadership change by including a control variable for each first party congress with a new party leader. We expect responsiveness to be lower when a new leader takes over, since leaders' legitimacy should be strongest when newly elected. In order to cover the effects of party system transformation , we account for the effective number parties (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979) expecting responsiveness to decrease the more competition the party faces. This is because more

[20] These include various organizations representing the youth, students, women, pensioners, trade unionists, entrepreneurs, academics, and farmers.

competitors in the electoral arena will force elites to behave more strategically, thus constraining their ability to respond towards activist demands.

At the level of submitting organizations, we control for the organization type of every submitting unit: district organization, Land organization, affiliated organization or working group/special committee. Our conjecture is that party elites will generally be least responsive towards district organizations, since they usually have the least authority within the national party organization. Conversely, we expect elites to be most responsive towards the sub-elites of affiliated and Land organizations, who regularly act on the national level and have a larger sphere of influence. Since the last category of submitting organizations, working group/special committee, is very heterogeneous, we do not have clear expectations regarding this group of sub-units. Note, however, that working group motions represent only a marginal fraction of our data set (barely 3 % of all motions).

Finally, at the level of individual motions, we use the binary variable motion type, indicating whether the motion is primarily about organizational issues (statutory/organizational reform, the fixing of membership fees, etc.) or about policy. The policy category also includes motions dealing with current or potential future coalitions, since there is a strong overlap between the two topics. Motions were assigned to either category by hand-coding. Our expectation is that party elites will be more willing to make policy concessions than changing organizational structures. This is because, in contrast to organizational matters, there is a long way from congress motions to actual decision-making in government institutions involving many more actors (and thus providing for many potential excuses if a motion remains inconsequential).

Analysis

The empirical analysis is structured as follows: We first address the appeasement argument by testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 using our full data set (general models). We then specify our analysis by calculating separate models for sub-elites (affiliated and Land organizations) and the rank and file (district organizations), testing Hypotheses 1a and 2a.[21] Finally, we turn to the rewards argument by testing Hypothesis 3 based exclusively on the motions of district organizations.

Given the hierarchical structure of our data, we use logistic multi-level regressions. The unit of analysis is the individual motion (Level 1; n=3249). Since sub-units can make several motions per party congress, motions cluster by submitting organization (Level 2; n=1046) and by party congress (Level 3; n=36). Regression models include explanatory variables at all three levels: the

[21] Given our data structure, we chose this variant over cross-level interactions to avoid biased multi-level regression results (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016).

party congress level, the level of the submitting organization, and the level of the individual motion. In addition to the regression models discussed in the paper, we report further models using alternative control variables in the Appendix. These include the number of party members, media attendance, the number of submitted motions, and motions' policy positions. Results consistently support the findings presented below (Appendix, Section 4).

We first test Hypotheses 1 and 2 using our full data set (n=3249) (Table 4.2; Figure 4.1). Results of the general models indicate that a loss of executive power has the expected positive effect on responsiveness (H1). On average, executive power loss increases the probability of a motion being recommended for acceptance by 25 % (Model 1). Coefficients are statistically significant in all models, except model 3. However, we still have quite some uncertainty about the effect size (see Figure 4.1). This of course is due to the fact that there were only very few instances of executive power loss in our observation period. In contrast to the loss of executive power, regression models suggest that party's electoral performance does not affect party elite's responsiveness towards activists (H2). Coefficients are not consistently negative and remain insignificant across all models.

Among control variables, we find rather surprising effects of government participation on responsiveness. Unlike our expectations, party elites appear to be less responsive when the party is in opposition than when in government, with an average marginal effect of -0.2 (Model 1). Again, this result loses statistical significance in model 3. The effect of the 'new leader' variable, however, fits our expectations. When a new leader takes over, the party is less responsive all else equal. On average, the probability of a motion being accepted decreases by 15 % at the first party congress with a new leader (Model 3). Controlling for 'new leader' also affects the explanatory power of executive power loss and government participation. Yet, for the effect of executive power loss, we argue that this is due to the substantial correlation between these variables, as party leadership is very likely to change after the party loses office. Thus, the effects found in models 1, 2, 4 still make a strong case in favour of Hypothesis 1 (see also Appendix, Section 4). The remaining control variables on the party congress level, members' contribution to party finance and the effective number of parties, do not show any significant effects on responsiveness.

Moving beyond the party congress-level variables, we find substantial effects of organization type (Level 2) and motion type (Level 1). As expected, party elites are less responsive towards district organizations than towards the sub-elites of Land and affiliated organizations. The latter two groups are similar in terms of their chances for party elite responsiveness. District organizations' disadvantage compared to the reference category Land organization, however, is substantial in

terms of effect size and statistical significance (AME=-0.11; Model 1). Contrarily, working groups' motions are clearly the most likely to be recommended for acceptance (AME=0.29; Model 1). However, the latter represent only under 3 % of all motions in our data. The effect of motion type indicates that party elites are indeed significantly more responsive towards activists' policy demands than proposals on party-organizational issues. Yet with an average marginal effect of 0.04 the effect is not particularly strong (Model 1).

Figure 4. 1: Average marginal effects on responsiveness, Models 1–4.



Table 4. 2: Logistic multi-level regressions on motion acceptance (responsiveness).

	General			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Performance				
Executive power loss	1.368*	1.368*	0.931	1.418*
	(2.09)	(2.09)	(1.47)	(2.16)
Change in party's vote share between the last two elections (%)	-0.00104	-0.000550	-0.0310	0.00613
	(-0.02)	(-0.01)	(-0.63)	(0.12)
Government Participation				
Single-Party Government (Reference)				
Coalition Government	-0.288	-0.284	-0.167	-0.355
	(-0.68)	(-0.65)	(-0.42)	(-0.81)
Opposition	-1.208+	-1.208+	-0.799	-1.293*
	(-1.92)	(-1.92)	(-1.31)	(-2.00)
Submitting Organization				
Land Organization (Reference)				
District Organization	-0.640***	-0.640***	-0.642***	-0.634***
	(-3.35)	(-3.34)	(-3.35)	(-3.31)
Affiliated Organization	0.330+	0.330+	0.335+	0.332+
	(1.73)	(1.73)	(1.75)	(1.74)
Working Group/Special Committee	1.562***	1.563***	1.570***	1.566***
	(4.67)	(4.67)	(4.68)	(4.68)
Motion Type				
Motion Type: Organizational (Reference)				
Motion Type: Policy or Coalition	0.255*	0.255*	0.259*	0.252*
	(2.16)	(2.15)	(2.19)	(2.13)
Party Organization				
Membership Fees: Share of Total Party Finance (%)		-0.000207		
		(-0.04)		
First party congress with new party leader			-0.931*	
			(-2.01)	
Party System				
Effective Number of Parties (Parliament)				0.153
				(0.54)
Constant	-0.559	-0.549	-0.536	-0.906
	(-1.34)	(-1.11)	(-1.37)	(-1.18)
Level3	0.735**	0.735**	0.619**	0.716**
	(2.86)	(2.86)	(2.80)	(2.81)
Level2	0.647***	0.647***	0.649***	0.648***
	(4.67)	(4.67)	(4.68)	(4.67)
Observations	3249	3249	3249	3249
AIC	4013.4	4015.4	4011.6	4015.1
BIC	4080.4	4088.5	4084.6	4088.2

Note: Logit coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Looking at the separate regression models for district organizations (rank and file) and affiliated/Land organizations (sub-elites), results support Hypotheses 1a and 2a (Table 4.3). Losing executive power has a significant positive effect on elite's responsiveness towards affiliated and Land organizations (H1a). However, as in the general models, this effect loses statistical significance when controlling for leadership change. In models 1b and 2b the effect is significant at the 10% level, in model 4b at the conventional 5 % level. Again, given that we record only three instances of executive power loss over the observation period, there remains considerable uncertainty about the effect size. While party elites are more responsive towards affiliated and Land organizations after a loss of executive power, such failure to realize the party's office goals does not significantly change the elites' responsiveness towards district organizations (Figure 4.2). Likewise, electoral performance has the expected negative effect on elites' responsiveness towards district organizations (H2a). A 1 % increase in the party's national vote share, decreases the probability that a district motion is accepted by 1 %, on average (Model 1a). The effect is significant at the 5%-level in models 1a and 3a, and at the 10%-level in models 2a and 4a. Conversely, we do not find any effect of electoral performance on responsiveness towards affiliated and Land organizations. Hence, losing elections leads party elites to respond more towards the rank and file (district organizations), however, they do not change their behaviour vis-à-vis the sub-elites of the affiliated and Land organizations (Figure 4.3). The support we find for Hypothesis 2a is particularly interesting, as we do not find support for H2 on the general level.

Regarding control variables, only government participation and leadership change remain influential once we split our data set. Again, the two groups of sub-units differ in terms of which factors impact party elites' responsiveness towards them. Only for district organizations, government participation matters. Specifically, elites respond less towards their demands when the party is in a coalition government compared to the reference category single-party government (AME=-0.1; Model 1a). Intriguingly, we do not find the same negative effect of being in opposition on responsiveness, which we find based on the full data set. Yet, considering the necessity of policy compromise linked to coalition government, it seems plausible that party elites have to decline more of the party on the ground's demands for the sake of coalition peace. Again, mirroring the general models, having a new leader negatively affects responsiveness towards affiliated and Land organizations (AME=-0.18; Model 1b), while it has no effect on district organizations. We find no further effects for any other independent variable. Motion type, as well, loses statistical significance, once we split our data set.

Table 4. 3: Logistic multi-level regressions on motion acceptance (responsiveness) – by submitting organization type.

	District Organizations					Affiliated and Land Organizations			
	Model 1a	Model 2a	Model 3a	Model 4a	Model 5	Model 1b	Model 2b	Model 3b	Model 4b
Performance									
Executive power loss	0.200	0.198	0.159	0.276	0.148	1.513+	1.513+	1.031	1.597*
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.35)	(0.59)	(0.33)	(1.96)	(1.96)	(1.36)	(2.08)
Change in party's vote share between the last two elections (%)	-0.0733*	-0.0717+	-0.0775*	-0.0661+	-0.0752*	0.0169	0.0165	-0.0174	0.0287
	(-2.04)	(-1.90)	(-2.10)	(-1.77)	(-2.11)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(-0.29)	(0.46)
District contribution to total SPÖ vote share (%)					0.200*				
					(2.23)				
Government Participation									
Single-Party Government (Reference)									
Coalition Government	-0.557*	-0.544+	-0.536*	-0.612*	-0.556*	-0.105	-0.108	0.0370	-0.221
	(-2.08)	(-1.93)	(-1.97)	(-2.20)	(-2.09)	(-0.21)	(-0.21)	(0.08)	(-0.42)
Opposition	-0.135	-0.125	-0.101	-0.244	-0.116	-1.099	-1.099	-0.651	-1.232+
	(-0.25)	(-0.23)	(-0.19)	(-0.44)	(-0.22)	(-1.50)	(-1.50)	(-0.91)	(-1.65)
Motion Type									
Motion Type: Organizational (Reference)									
Motion Type: Policy or Coalition	0.223	0.221	0.226	0.216	0.231	0.201	0.201	0.209	0.191
	(1.42)	(1.40)	(1.44)	(1.37)	(1.48)	(1.12)	(1.12)	(1.17)	(1.06)
Party Organization									
Membership Fees: Share of Total Party Finance (%)		-0.000561					0.000161		
		(-0.14)					(0.02)		
First party congress with new party leader			-0.189					-1.026+	
			(-0.51)					(-1.87)	
Party System									
Effective Number of Parties (Parliament)				0.153					0.241
				(0.66)					(0.73)
Constant	-0.867***	-0.840**	-0.866***	-1.205*	-1.081***	-0.352	-0.360	-0.328	-0.889
	(-3.40)	(-2.63)	(-3.38)	(-2.10)	(-3.92)	(-0.76)	(-0.62)	(-0.75)	(-1.02)
Level3	0.163+	0.163+	0.165+	0.158+	0.165+	0.962**	0.963**	0.815**	0.915**
	(1.69)	(1.69)	(1.70)	(1.68)	(1.73)	(2.69)	(2.68)	(2.59)	(2.59)
Level2	0.349*	0.348*	0.349*	0.351*	0.277+	0.848***	0.848***	0.847***	0.850***
	(2.12)	(2.12)	(2.12)	(2.13)	(1.73)	(3.72)	(3.72)	(3.72)	(3.72)
Observations	1448	1448	1448	1448	1437	1690	1690	1690	1690
AIC	1735.2	1737.1	1736.9	1736.7	1719.8	2171.8	2173.8	2170.5	2173.3
BIC	1777.4	1784.6	1784.4	1784.2	1767.3	2215.3	2222.7	2219.4	2222.2

Note: Logit coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Figure 4. 2: Executive power loss and responsiveness by organization type. Plot based on Models 1a and 1b.



Figure 4. 3: Electoral performance and responsiveness by organization type. Plot based on Models 1a and 1b.



Finally, we examine whether party elites use responsiveness in order to reward valuable intra-party groups. Specifically, we test whether party elites are more responsive, the more district organizations contribute to the party's national vote (H3). Results (Table 4.3, Figure 4.4) indicate that districts' electoral contributions indeed matter. Party elites are significantly more responsive towards the demands of district organizations mobilizing more voters. On average, a 1 % increase in district contribution to the national vote increases the probability of a motion being accepted by 3 % (Model 5). The negative effect of the party's overall electoral performance, remains virtually unchanged when adding the district contribution variable (AME=0.01; Model 5). Again, there is support for Hypothesis 2a. Likewise, we find approximately the same negative effect of coalition government on responsiveness (AME=-0.11, Model 5), while none of the other controls is influential.

Figure 4. 4: District contribution to party's national vote share and responsiveness. Plot based on Model 5.



Summing up, the empirical analyses largely confirm our expectations that party elites use responsiveness as appeasement and rewards for party activists (Table 4.4). Executive power loss has the expected positive effect on responsiveness in the general models as well as for sub-elites. In contrast, we find that electoral performance only affects elites' responsiveness towards the 'true' rank and file. Results also indicate that party elites are more responsive towards electorally valuable intra-party groups. Among control variables we find the expected effects of sub-

organization type, while there is no or inconclusive evidence for the remaining controls. Note in particular, that neither long-term transformations of party organization nor party system transformation affect party responsiveness.

Table 4. 4: Overview of results.

Hypothesis	Variable	Expected effect on responsiveness	Conclusion
H1	executive power loss	positive	confirmed
H1a	executive power loss	positive (sub-elites)	confirmed
H2	electoral performance	negative	inconclusive
H2a	electoral performance	negative (rank and file)	confirmed
H3	contribution to vote	positive	confirmed

Conclusion

The question of how power is distributed within political parties has traditionally been one of the core interests of party organizations research. The power issue is particularly relevant given the parties' role in filling government office and making public policy. The question is also highly relevant from a normative perspective, when considering parties' role as providers of 'democratic linkage'. This study adds to a better understanding of the intra-party balance of power by providing a systematic quantitative account on intra-party responsiveness based on intra-party actors' behaviour ('the real story'), rather than on statutory rules ('the official story').

Results indicate that party elites use responsiveness as a means of appeasement towards party activists. Thus, when party performance is bad, activists gain influence relative to the party elite. As we demonstrate, however, party elites' reaction to external stimuli is group specific. Since different intra-party groups have different priorities, party elites are only responsive towards those groups, who are substantially hurt by bad party performance regarding a specific party goal. In this way, while indeed employing responsiveness in order to compensate the rank and file for performance failure, party elites minimize the costs of responding towards activists. In addition to the appeasement strategy, we find that party elites also use responsiveness to reward valuable intra-party groups. Specifically, party elites are more responsive towards intra-party groups, contributing more to the party vote in general elections.

Our results speak to the literatures on intra-party democracy and party change. For one, they confirm skepticism about the classic argument of a monotonous decline of intra-party democracy (Duverger, 1954; Enroth and Hagevi, 2018; Hertner, 2015; Katz and Mair, 1995, 2009; Kirchheimer, 1966; Krouwel, 2012; Loxbo, 2013; Michels, 1949; Rohrschneider, 1994; Saglie and Heidar, 2004; Widfeldt, 1999). Our findings rather support the idea of fluid 'power sharing

agreements' implied by a stratarchical understanding of party organizations, as parties' responsiveness towards activists varies in response to competitive pressures (Bolleyer, 2012; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1966). However, we see the party leadership still in the driving seat in this process, making concessions where considered necessary and withholding them in other instances.

As most other work in this area, the present study is a case study. The generalizability of our findings thus remains an issue. Given that we follow an unlikely case logic, we argue that the effects found in this study should have high external validity. Nonetheless, future research should aim at studying the topic using cross-sectional research designs. While the availability of systematic behavioural data is traditionally a problem for accounts on intra-party politics, we suggest that party congress data, as used in this study, qualify as a fruitful data-source for future comparative research.

With regard to party change, our study indicates that a party's internal balance of power is indeed affected by similar factors as were identified as drivers of other variants of party change (Abou-Chadi and Orlowski, 2016; Andrews and Jackman, 2008; Bale, 2012; Bynander and t'Hart, 2007; Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller, 2015; Gauja, 2016: 50; Greene and Haber, 2016; Harmel and Janda, 1994, 1995; Quinn, 2004; Scarrow, 2015: 25). The concessions responsive party leaders make constitute party-internal change: a temporary shift of power. Yet at the same time accepted congress motions influence external party change: the issues parties advance and the policy-stances they take. What future research should try to investigate is how important the congress motions mechanism is in making external party changes compared to leadership-driven issue entrepreneurship and strategic policy adaptation.

5. Paper 2: Who's Fit for the Job? Allocating Ministerial Portfolios to Outsiders and Experts[22]

Co-authored with Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik

Abstract: Why do parties appoint outsiders and experts to ministerial positions? Extant research offers explanations based on institutional arrangements and external shocks (e.g. political or economic crises). We go beyond such system-level variables to argue that the characteristics of ministerial appointees are a function of the portfolio they are being appointed to. Drawing on theories of political delegation, we argue that outsider and expert appointments to ministerial office are affected by a portfolio's policy jurisdiction, its financial resources and appointment powers, and the partisan leanings of the ministerial bureaucracy. We test these arguments on all appointments of senior and junior ministers in Austria between 1945 and 2020. The analysis shows that outsiders are more likely to be appointed to ministries with greater party support in the bureaucracy, while experts are more likely appointed to portfolios dealing with high-salience issues.

Keywords: ministers, outsiders, experts, technocrats, party government

[22] Kaltenegger, M. & Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2022). Who's fit for the job? Allocating ministerial portfolios to outsiders and experts. *European Political Science Review 14*(4), 618-634.

Introduction

How are members of government selected? The extant literature locates the answer to this question on a single dimension between the poles of party government and technocratic government. Under party government, ideologically distinct parties compete in elections, the winning parties place party members in government offices, and these partisan ministers then implement the party agenda (or, in coalition governments, some compromise between different party agendas). The popular mandate confers legitimacy on governments (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Katz, 1986; Mair, 2008; Rose, 1974). By contrast, under technocratic government, expertise provides an alternative source of legitimacy. Government ministers are selected based on their subject-matter knowledge and enact 'rational' solutions, unconstrained by short-term popular approval or electoral considerations (Caramani, 2017, 2020; Centeno, 1993; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; F. Fischer, 1990; Habermas, 1973; Majone, 1994; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2017).

Conceptualizing party government and technocratic government as polar opposites on one underlying dimension (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; Cotta, 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014), the empirical literature has so far either studied appointments of outsiders (people with no or weak party affiliation) or technocrats, lumping 'outsiderness' and expertise together.[23] We argue that, while correlated, 'outsiderness' and expertise should be conceived as two distinct properties of government ministers and that party leaders have different incentives to select outsiders and experts, depending on characteristics of the specific government post they need to fill.

Drawing on theories of political delegation, we present arguments about how portfolio characteristics shape who becomes a minister. More specifically, we argue that issue salience, a ministry's budgetary and patronage resources, as well as the ideological leanings of the ministerial bureaucracy should affect the probability of outsiders and experts being appointed. We test these expectations with data on postwar ministerial appointments in Austria. Our paper thus contributes novel perspectives on the process of ministerial selection with implications for governments' legitimacy and effectiveness in parliamentary democracies.

Conceptual Premises

Why do parties appoint ministers with varying degrees of 'outsiderness' and expertise? A number of studies have examined this question, using system-level explanations such as

[23] For notable exceptions see Alexiadou (2016), Alexiadou and Gunaydin (2019) and Lavezzolo et al. (2021).

economic crises (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; Wratil & Pastorella, 2018) or institutional features of the polity (e.g. semi-presidentialism) (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009). Our paper provides a novel perspective by focusing not just on the number of outsiders and experts appointed, but on the specific role they are given. We therefore theorize how the characteristics of ministerial portfolios shape the appointment of party insiders vs. outsiders and experts vs. non-experts. More specifically, we examine the role of issue salience, financial resources, patronage powers, and bureaucratic support.

Before we delve into the theoretical discussion, three important premises need to be clarified. First, we assume in our discussion that outsiderness and expertise are two independent dimensions. While the literature on technocrats often combines these two dimensions and defines technocrats as experts without political or partisan affiliation (McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014), we argue that outsiders are not necessarily experts (Marsh et al., 2010; Street, 2012) and insiders are not necessarily non-experts (Lavezzolo et al., 2021).

Second, we conceptualize outsiderness in relation to a specific party, not to politics in general, which is in line with the delegational logic of party-based representation (Müller, 2000a). While most political insiders are also party insiders, there are cases of political insiders without (strong) attachment to any party. For example, senior bureaucrats or diplomats are highly involved and experienced in the practice of politics (and should therefore count as political insiders), but may be unaffiliated to a party. Another group to which these criteria may apply is party switchers: individuals who used to be party (and thus political) insiders, but whose transition to another party has turned them into party outsiders – at least temporarily.

Third, we do not expect party leaders to have carte blanche when selecting government personnel, but to be constrained in various ways. Besides formal selection rules set out by the constitution (e.g. recruiting ministers from the legislature in Westminster systems or formal appointment powers of the head of state), party leaders need to account for the representativeness of their government team (Andeweg, 2000a; Rose, 1974) in terms of gender (Goddard, 2021), region (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a), party faction or tendency (Ceron, 2014; Mershon, 2001). Naturally, several other characteristics such as the candidates' age, their scandal-proneness, their policy preferences and their competence need to be considered as well in the selection process (Bäck et al., 2016; Kam et al., 2010; Rose, 1974).

Theoretical Framework

We develop our argument from theories of political delegation. Delegation typically means that a principal asks an agent to perform a task that the principal cannot do him- or herself and that

the agent may be better equipped to do. The appointment of ministers is a crucial step in the chain of delegation that runs from voters to the bureaucracy (Strøm, 2000). Formally, ministers thus act as agents of the cabinet, yet their more important principal is typically the cabinet party that appoints them (Müller, 2000a). In addition, ministers themselves act as principals by delegating tasks to the ministerial bureaucracy whose expertise they require to achieve their policy goals (Huber, 2000; Huber & Shipan, 2006). In normative terms, both these steps in the delegation process are essential for parties to make the chain of delegation from voters to the governing apparatus work in parliamentary democracies (Müller, 2000a).



All delegation potentially produces agency loss, as agents may deviate from the preferences of their principals (Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004). Parties typically anticipate the potential for agency loss and thus chose ministerial appointees in ways that mitigate delegation problems (Müller & Meyer, 2010). Our core theoretical contribution is to argue that both, the political damage from agency loss and the overall risk of agency loss to happen in the first place vary systematically with portfolio characteristics. Some portfolios are substantively or strategically more important to a party (Bäck et al., 2011), which will increase the costs of agency loss. Some are more likely to cause delegation problems, either in general terms or for specific types of appointments. Portfolio characteristics should therefore influence the calculus by which parties appoint outsider and expert ministers.

Insiders vs. Outsiders[24]

Choosing insiders over outsiders for government office allows party leaders to minimize problems in the delegation from party to minister. For one, uncertainty with regard to relevant selection criteria (Andeweg, 2000a; Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000) is lower for insiders than for

[24] Given the two dimensions of outsiderness and expertise, it would, in theory, be possible to build our argument with respect to four types of ministers: expert and non-expert insiders, expert and non-expert outsiders. Yet, this would require theorizing the effects of the independent variables on the prevalence of each of the four ministerial types and thus make our argument unwieldy. For the benefit of theoretical clarity, we thus put forward our hypotheses with respect to the two dimensions independently of each other.

outsiders. In particular, ministerial candidates' previous party career will be informative in terms of their competence in various fields, their loyalty to the party and their policy preferences. Secondly, insiders have had years of socialization within the party and have thus internalized the party's norms, values, and policy commitments, ensuring at least a basic level of ideological congruence with the party agenda (Haute & Carty, 2012).

In contrast, appointing outsiders to ministerial office is usually a riskier choice. All else equal, information on crucial characteristics of outsider candidates is not as easily accessible and outsider ministers are less socialized into party norms and less steeped in party ideology. Consequently, outsiders are more likely to pursue different issue priorities, to hold deviant policy positions, and should therefore act as less faithful agents of the party in government than partisan appointees would. The appointment of outsiders thus increases the risk of agency loss (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009). While ministers in real-world politics may not act as the policy dictators that, for example, Laver and Shepsle's portfolio allocation model envisages (Laver & Shepsle, 1990, 1996), they still have a substantial impact on policy outcomes (Alexiadou, 2016; Bäck et al., 2022). Appointing outsiders will therefore produce outcomes further away from a party's ideal point (and that of its voters).

Despite this obvious disadvantage of outsider appointments for governing parties, they are an empirical fact and the literature has pointed to various reasons why party leaders recruit outsiders for ministerial office. For one, there are instances when party leaders view outsiders' distance to party policy as an asset – especially, when they seek to shift the party's position in a policy area (e.g. for electoral reasons or to send signals to investors and creditors in the context of economic crises) (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019). Second, outsiders are, by definition, characterized by a weak or even non-existent power base within the party that appoints them, which allows party leaders to keep them on a shorter leash than insiders, who will often have intra-party networks and factional support. Finally, outsiders may be appointed because of their celebrity status or media savvy (Marsh et al., 2010; Street, 2012), thus creating potential electoral benefits.

Notwithstanding these (and potentially other) incentives to choose outsiders over insiders for ministerial office, we argue that party leaders will manage delegation problems associated with outsider appointments – in terms of both delegation steps, from cabinets/parties to ministers and from ministers to the bureaucracy – by selectively placing them in portfolios with specific characteristics.

Experts vs. Non-Experts

Unlike outsiderness, expertise is always a desirable trait in ministerial candidates. Expert ministers are likely to govern more effectively than non-experts (Alexiadou, 2016) and voters prefer to be governed by people who know what they are doing (Lavezzolo et al., 2021). Expertise among government personnel also functions as an additional source of political legitimacy, independent of the party label.

Contrary to the insider–outsider dimension, there is thus no trade-off along the expertise dimension. Rather, constraints on expert appointments arise from the limited availability of experts (with ministerial ambitions as well as sufficient compatibility with the party line) or the fact that party leaders may prioritize expertise lower than other requirements such as descriptive representation or maintaining an intra-party power balance. In addition, expertise in ministerial appointees becomes more desirable when bureaucratic expertise is less accessible (e.g. due to the partisan leanings of bureaucrats).

Parts of the literature suggest that the objective demand for experts in ministerial office has increased over the course of the 20th century – in terms of government effectiveness and legitimacy. These studies argue that effective governance requires more and more technical knowledge of systemic characteristics and dynamics, as well as legal frameworks due to the expansion of state regulation into various sectors of economic and social life and the increasing interdependence of economic systems (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; F. Fischer, 1990; Meynaud, 1964). Likewise, as declining trust in and identification with political parties threatens to undermine party-based representation in parliamentary democracies (Brunclík & Parízek, 2019; Müller, 2000c), ministers' individual expertise might serve to compensate the legitimacy deficit of political parties (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; Habermas, 1973).

While appointing experts (from within or from outside the party organization) will thus undoubtedly be beneficial for party leaders in most instances, we argue that expert appointments, too, are governed by portfolio-specific considerations of agency loss in the delegation from cabinets/parties to ministers and from ministers to the bureaucracy.

Damage from Agency Loss

We now turn to generating specific expectations about how portfolio characteristics relate to outsider and expert appointments. As outlined earlier, we expect the potential damage from agency loss in a ministerial portfolio to affect party leaders' choices in ministerial selection. The more valuable a portfolio is to the party, the greater these potential costs, and thus the less

willing party leaders should be to take the risk of outsider appointments. As expertise, per se, is not associated with a higher propensity to cause delegation problems, expert appointments should not be affected by damage control considerations. These expectations pertain to the delegation step from cabinets/parties to ministers.

Issue Salience

For one, the salience of policy issues within a portfolio's jurisdiction should affect how party leaders perceive the value of a ministerial portfolio and thus the potential costs associated with agency loss in that ministry. Specifically, the damage from agency loss should be smaller in portfolios that fall outside of a party's core issue commitments (Bäck et al., 2011). Most real-world parties vary considerably in how much attention they devote to certain issues (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Green-Pedersen, 2007) and how competent they are viewed by voters on certain issues (Lefevere et al., 2015; Walgrave et al., 2009).

For governing parties, failure to deliver on their core issues is likely to be electorally harmful (Schumacher, Vis, et al., 2013). What is more, constituencies inside the party (e.g. trade unionists in social democratic parties, farmers' organizations in agrarian or Christian democratic parties, or business representatives in conservative and liberal parties (Allern et al., 2021) will react particularly negatively to malperformance on core issues, and might eventually punish party leaders by withholding their support in subsequent electoral campaigns or in party leadership elections. As party leaders will seek to minimize electoral and intra-party damage, we expect outsider appointments to be less common in portfolios that cover a party's core issues.

Hypothesis 1: *Outsider appointments are less common in portfolios that deal with issues of high salience for the appointing party.*

Resources

In addition to their policy value for specific parties, ministerial portfolios differ in terms of their access to financial resources (Bojar, 2019). While correlated to some extent with governing parties' policy priorities – as more money will be budgeted for more important ministries – different government activities also objectively require different sets of resources. For instance, a comparatively modest budget will often suffice to cover the state's tasks in the field of cultural affairs. In contrast, public expenditures on welfare state programs or education cover a sizeable chunk of most industrialized countries' economies (Garritzmann & Seng, 2016; Savage, 2019).

Naturally, these resources are instrumental for governing parties to act on their policy goals (e.g. to implement certain redistributive policies), but they also have the intrinsic value of

allowing parties to engage in clientelistic behavior (Batista, 2017). Governing parties may pursue the latter in various ways, ranging from typical pork barrel politics to handing out government contracts or licenses to private businesses that are close to the party (Müller, 2000b). Access to financial resources is thus crucial in determining a portfolio's value for political parties. As ministers have substantial discretion with regard to how money is spent within their jurisdiction, the impact of agency loss for the party in terms of its policy goals and patronage distribution is greater in portfolios with more extensive access to these resources. Hence, we hypothesize that outsiders are less likely appointed to ministries with larger budgetary resources.

Hypothesis 2: *Outsider appointments are less common in portfolios with larger budgetary resources.*

Appointment Powers

Ministers do not only make policy and spend money, they also make appointments. Most obviously, many civil servants are appointed by ministers (or their subordinates), and these appointment powers are among the most important tools that ministers have to influence the implementation of policy in their jurisdictions (Huber, 2000; Huber & Shipan, 2006). But appointment powers go far beyond the core civil service to include, among others, regulatory agencies (Gilardi, 2005), policy and advisory commissions (Hesstvedt & Christiansen, 2022), and the boards of state-owned enterprises (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). While such appointments can be instrumental in that they may advance a party's or minister's policy goals (as the old adage goes: 'personnel is policy', see Lewis, 2008), they also have an intrinsic value as private (patronage) goods. They can thus serve a 'control' as well as a 'reward' purpose (Kopecký et al., 2012).

Ministerial portfolios differ widely in how much appointment powers they provide. This is largely a function of the number of staff that is directly or indirectly appointed by the minister, but it also depends on the established rules and norms regulating the (non-)politicization of bureaucratic appointments. To be sure, the most valuable positions in terms of controlling policy are top-level administrators (Page & Wright, 1999).

No matter whether appointments are viewed as instrumentally ('control') or intrinsically ('reward') relevant, the value of a ministerial portfolio is clearly affected by its appointment powers. Greater appointment powers may mean greater policy influence and/or a larger pool of jobs to hand out to party loyalists (Meyer-Sahling, 2008). In both cases, agency loss becomes more damaging to the party, as the party either suffers in terms of policy implementation or

patronage goods (or both). Therefore, we assume that appointment powers are negatively correlated with outsider appointments.

Hypothesis 3: *Outsider appointments are less common in portfolios with greater appointment powers.*

Risk of Agency Loss

Notwithstanding how parties manage varying levels of potential damage from agency loss, portfolio characteristics should also affect how party leaders evaluate the risk associated with expert appointments in a particular ministry (delegation from cabinet/parties to ministers) and a portfolio's propensity to cause problems in the delegation from the minister to the bureaucracy. We expect such portfolio-specific risk evaluations to condition party leaders' choices in terms of outsider and expert appointments.

Issue Salience

Besides the implications of issue salience for outsider appointments outlined earlier, the relative importance of a ministry's policy jurisdiction for a governing party will determine the risk associated with expert appointments. Specifically, expertise is more likely to be present in or available to a party on issues of high salience. Parties have stronger links to interest groups that represent core voter constituencies and central issue demands (Allern et al., 2021; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017). Also, parties' issue attention is linked to their ties with interest groups (Otjes & Green-Pedersen, 2021). The supply of politically compatible experts will therefore be greater in policy areas that are central to the party. As parties will be able to recruit from a pool of experts that are politically and ideologically aligned, expert appointments will involve a lower risk of agency loss in portfolios that cover core policy issues, all else equal.

Hypothesis 4: *Expert appointments are more common in portfolios that cover issues of high salience for the appointing party.*

Bureaucratic Support

As argued above, ministers depend on bureaucrats to be effective (Huber, 2000; Huber & Shipan, 2006). In particular, ministers facing a politically hostile ministerial bureaucracy run a higher risk of having their policy agenda sabotaged than ministers sharing common goals with their civil service. This phenomenon has been termed the 'ally principle': politicians are more likely to delegate tasks and grant discretion to bureaucratic agents who share their preferences (Bendor & Meirowitz, 2004; Huber & Shipan, 2006). After all, policy outcomes are assumed to be a function of politicians' and bureaucrats' ideal points.

Party leaders thus have incentives to act strategically and take bureaucratic preferences into account when recruiting individuals for ministerial office (Bertelli & Feldmann, 2007). In particular, they will seek to contain the risk of agency loss by appointing partisan insiders to ministries with a more hostile bureaucracy, whereas ministries with a high proportion of co-partisan bureaucrats may see more outsider appointments.

Hypothesis 5: *Outsider appointments are more common in portfolios with high party support in the bureaucracy.*

Likewise, we expect bureaucratic support in a ministry to affect expert appointments. After all, the central purpose of delegating tasks to the bureaucracy is to tap into its expert knowledge (Huber, 2000). Loyal bureaucrats will happily assist ministers with their know-how and will have little reason to exploit their informational advantage over the minister to obstruct party policy (Huber & Shipan, 2006). Ministers facing a hostile bureaucracy, however, cannot expect the same level of cooperation, which will constrain their access to the bureaucracy's expertise (Müller, 2007). In the latter scenario, expertise on part of the minister should be an important asset for parties to counteract potential sabotage by the ministerial bureaucracy. Party leaders will thus have stronger incentives to appoint experts to portfolios where their ministers face a potentially non-cooperative civil service than in ministries where bureaucrats share the party's policy goals. Following this line of reasoning, we expect expert appointments to be more likely in portfolios with low bureaucratic support for the nominating party.

Hypothesis 6: *Expert appointments are more common in portfolios with low party support in the bureaucracy.*

Case Selection and Data

To answer our research question we study the appointments of Austrian postwar ministers and junior ministers (1945–2020). Austria is a typical party democracy, resembling many other parliamentary democracies regarding key characteristics of the political system. In terms of outsider appointments, it is an unlikely case compared to other countries, given Austrian parties' organizational strength and traditionally strong roots in society (Andeweg, 2000b; Müller & Philipp, 1987; Scarrow et al., 2017). Findings on outsider appointments should thus be likely to generalize to other European parliamentary democracies. Notwithstanding change over time due to the state of modernization and integration in supranational organizations, we expect the overall demand for expertise in ministerial office to be similar across contemporary democracies. However, Austria should be a critical case in terms of the relationship between outsiderness and expertise. Given political parties' dominant role in society and state – and their

linkages to corporatist interest organizations in particular (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2017) – Austrian parties should have larger recruitment pools for experts within the party (that is, insiders who are also experts) than governing parties in other countries. As a consequence, the correlation between outsiderness and expertise should be modest compared to other countries, where expertise may be more exclusively confined to outsider appointees. The Austrian case therefore provides a particularly suitable empirical basis to disentangle the drivers of outsider and expert appointments. We analyze original data on the career trajectories of cabinet members, collected from three online sources: the official website of the Austrian Parliament, Wikipedia, and the Munzinger biographical data base.

Table 5. 1: Summary of hypotheses, expected effects of independent variables, and theoretical reasoning.

	Dependent variable	Independent variable	Exp. effect	Rationale
H1	outsider appointment	issue salience	–	damage control
H2	outsider appointment	budgetary resources	–	damage control
H3	outsider appointment	appointment powers	–	damage control
H4	expert appointment	issue salience	+	risk containment
H5	outsider appointment	bureaucratic support	+	risk containment
H6	expert appointment	bureaucratic support	–	risk containment

In line with most of the extant literature, ministers and junior ministers without elected public office or party affiliation prior to their appointment are classified as outsiders (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a; Cotta, 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014). Furthermore, we also code as outsiders those ministers who held public office for or were affiliated to any party other than the nominating party before their appointment (e.g. party switchers).

We then define occupational areas where expertise can be acquired for each ministerial portfolio and code ministers as experts when their area of expertise matches the portfolio they are appointed to. For instance – amongst other things – a prior position in the central bank qualifies a minister as an expert finance minister, the education portfolio requires a career in the educational system, lawyers and judges are experts for the justice portfolio, diplomats are considered foreign policy experts and a career in business (e.g. management positions),

business associations or trade unions qualifies a minister as an expert for the economic affairs and employment portfolios. We also coded individuals with jobs in the state bureaucracy that relate to their ministry, with sub-national executive offices matching their portfolio's policy jurisdictions, with leading functions in related parliamentary committees and with academic careers in corresponding fields as expert ministers.[25] Using these detailed portfolio-specific measures for expertise, we seek to extend the scope of previous empirical studies on the topic (Alexiadou, 2016; Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014) and to anticipate the biases towards economic training and the natural sciences that exist in the extant literature (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a).

To test H1 and H4 we operationalize parties' core issues based on issue salience in election manifestos. Specifically, we build on the Austrian National Election Study's coding of electoral manifestos (Dolezal et al., 2016; Müller et al., 2012), assigning issue-areas to every portfolio and recording the proportion dedicated to these areas in each manifesto (Bäck et al., 2011; Ecker et al., 2015). In cases where two or more policy portfolios are combined in one ministry, we use the sum of the salience scores of all portfolios bundled in a ministry to accurately reflect the post's value to the party. We utilize individual ministries' shares of the overall budget (across all portfolios within a cabinet) to measure portfolios' budgetary resources (H2). Given that there are only minor variations across the annual budgets of individual ministries within the same cabinet, we use the financial resources budgeted for each ministry in the second year of the government's tenure. This information was extracted from annual reports (*Bundesrechnungsabschluss*) published by the Austrian Court of Audit, which are available for the years 1961–2021. Due to skewness of the issue salience and budgetary resources measures, we use the logged versions of both variables in our regression models. To operationalize ministers' appointment powers (H3) we use two indicators. First, we count the number of departments (*Sektionen*)[26] per ministry as listed in the *Amtskalender*, the official registry of state institutions and public administration. Second, we code a dummy variable that equals one for the few ministries that control the bulk of appointments to state-owned enterprises: finance, economic affairs, state industries, and infrastructure (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013b). Parties' support in the bureaucracies of each ministry (H5, H6) is measured based on the results of staff representatives' elections which are available for the years 1967–2020. In these elections, all public employees at the federal level elect their representatives from party lists.

[25] For additional information on our expertise measure see Appendix, Table B5.
[26] Ministries are divided into departments (*Sektionen*), subdepartments (*Gruppen*), divisions (*Abteilungen*), and subdivisions (*Referate*) (Müller & Liegl, 1999).

In addition to the main explanatory variables, we include various controls in our statistical models. To account for residual differences in the 'objective' value of ministerial portfolios (e.g. stemming from the prestige associated with specific portfolios), we use portfolio salience ratings by Druckman and Warwick (2005).[27] Moreover, we include a dummy variable for ministries that are the traditional domains of the Austrian social partnership: social affairs, economic affairs, health, and agriculture. Due to the close linkages between corporatist interest organizations (unions, chambers) and the two (erstwhile) major parties, SPÖ and ÖVP (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2017), there is a large pool of partisans with high levels of expertise in these domains. Hence, we expect these ministries to have fewer outsider and more expert appointments.

As the party leader of a governing party – who typically also receives the most valuable government post available to the party – plays a crucial role in nominating ministerial candidates (Andeweg, 2000b; Strøm et al., 2010), we account for party leaders' career trajectories in the statistical models. We expect outsider appointments to be more likely when the party leader did not take the traditional party route to office as such leaders should have smaller personal networks within the party organization than traditional party leaders would. We therefore include a dummy variable indicating whether the party leader was a member of the party executive before appointment to government office.

Anticipating likely differences in ministerial selection dynamics between first-round appointments (usually following elections and coalition negotiations) and appointments in cabinet reshuffles, we incorporate a dummy for cabinet reshuffles in our regression models. We also use control variables for appointments to two types of junior minister posts to account for different job-requirements in terms of insiderness and expertise that the roles senior minister, co-partisan junior minister and watchdog junior minister might entail. For instance, while insiders should be a better fit for the watchdog role (e.g. monitoring a coalition partner in the best interest of the party) than outsiders, experts might be a good choice for junior ministers supporting a co-partisan senior minister. Finally, we include fixed effects for decades and

[27] In cases where two or more portfolios are bundled in one ministry, we use the salience rating of the most important portfolio. This is because some relatively unimportant portfolios – which are frequently bundled with portfolios of higher value – are not included in the Druckman and Warwick (2005) expert survey. Using the sum of the salience ratings for bundled portfolios would thus introduce bias due to missing values for such 'secondary' portfolios. Note, however, that maximum portfolio salience and total portfolio salience are closely correlated (r=0.79).

parties in all statistical models to account for variation due to party-specific factors and time trends.

Analysis

We first present some descriptive information. Figure 5.1 displays the percentage of four ministerial types over time: non-expert insiders, expert insiders, expert outsiders, and non-expert outsiders. Outsider appointments were relatively common in the immediate post-war period (around 20 percent), as new elites that were untarnished by the preceding twelve years of authoritarian rule were sought after. Once the political system had stabilized, outsider appointments become a more marginal phenomenon. Only from around 2000 has there been a significant increase to, again, one in five appointments in the recent decade.

Figure 5. 1: Minister types over time and for selected portfolios (1945–2020)



Expert appointments (which include insiders) are more common in general. They experience a first peak during the social democratic single-party cabinets of the 1970s, then again during the grand coalitions of the 1990s, and reach an all-time high in the 2010s. This increase holds when

excluding the non-partisan cabinet Bierlein that was installed following the 2019 'Ibiza affair' and the subsequent vote of no confidence in the first cabinet of Sebastian Kurz.

Looking across portfolios[28] there is a significant gradient between those that do not typically feature expert ministers (Interior, Finance, Defense) and those that do (Justice, Social Affairs, Agriculture). Given the significant prosecutorial powers of the minister of justice (he or she can give instructions to all public prosecutors in individual cases), this position has often been filled with non-partisans (and thus outsiders). Outsiders were also common in the finance ministry during the early post-war period. To illustrate the relationship between outsider and expert status, Table 5.2 shows a cross-tabulation of the two variables. There is a moderately strong and statistically significant correlation between the two (Cramer's V is 0.34, $p < 0.001$). This largely reflects the fact that there are hardly any nonexpert outsiders[29]: While 26 percent of expert appointments are also outsider appointments, the same is true for only three percent of non-expert appointments. Overall, the largest group by far are non-expert insiders who make up more than half of all appointments.

Table 5. 2: Outsider and expert appointments (1945–2020).

	Non-experts	Experts	Total
Insiders	366	218	584
Outsiders	12	76	88
Total	378	294	672

Next, we present binary logistic regressions with outsider and expert status as the dependent variables (Table 5.3).[30] To account for heterogeneity between and dependence within governments, we specify cabinet-level random effects and cabinet-clustered standard errors. Models I and III use all available data points, whereas models II and IV exclude appointments

[28] We present numbers for those nine portfolios that remain relatively stable over longer periods of time and thus provide at least N>30 in terms of appointments.
[29] There are idiosyncratic reasons for the twelve appointments of non-expert outsiders in our data-set that go beyond our theoretical model. For instance, Austria's first post-war cabinet included a member of the resistance movement 'O5' who was neither a partisan at the time nor a policy expert.
[30] As an alternative, we present multinomial logit models predicting three ministerial types (non-expert insiders, expert insiders, and expert outsiders) in Table 4 in the appendix. The substantive conclusions are identical to the ones presented here.

to junior minister positions (JMs) from the analysis. Note that the variable 'party support in bureaucracy' is only available from 1967 (when elections for employee representatives were introduced). In addition, the variable has some missing data points in later years, for example, when a ministry was newly created (often through splits and mergers). In such cases, the variable only has values after the next round of elections which take place every four (up until 1999) or five (after 1999) years.

Let us first examine the results pertaining to outsider appointments. In Models I and II, we find no statistically significant effects for issue salience and thus no support for H1. Outsiders are no more likely to be appointed to portfolios dealing with high- or low-salience issues. Likewise, results are inconclusive with regard to our expectation that ministries controlling greater budgets see fewer outsider appointments H2. While coefficients are negative in Models I and II, as expected, they do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.[31] We also find no significant effects for appointment power, at least in the full model. Neither the number of departments nor the indicator for portfolios controlling the bulk of potential patronage appointments yield significant coefficients in Model I. Only when excluding junior ministers (who have no appointment powers) do we find a positive effect of the number of departments (counter to H3). While patronage powers sustain a negative impact on outsider appointment (in line with H3) in Model II, the effect is insignificant. Overall, there is thus only limited evidence in support of H3.

The strongest finding in Models I and II pertains to the effect of party support in the bureaucracy. Here we find a statistically significant positive effect that is in line with H5: As predicted by the ally principle, greater party support among bureaucrats is associated with more outsider appointments. What is more, Figure 5.2 shows that this effect is by no means small. Across the empirical range of the party support variable, the predicted probability of an outsider appointment increases from below five to around 33 percent. This result holds when limiting the sample to experts or first appointments (thus excluding re-appointments of ministers in subsequent cabinets) or when examining only SPÖ or only ÖVP ministers (who, together, constitute the¨ vast majority of appointments). Our analysis thus yields strong support for the expectation that the partisan leanings of the bureaucracy are correlated with the probability of outsiders being chosen as ministers.

[31] Note that the issue salience and budget share variables correlate (r=0.51). Still, eliminating either variable from the estimation does not alter the result for the other one.

Table 5. 3: Explaining outsider and expert appointments (1967–2020).

	Outs.	Outs. (no JMs)	Exp.	Exp. (no JMs)
Issue salience in manifesto (ln)	0.13	0.048	0.41**	0.41**
	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Share of cabinet budget (ln)	-0.093	-0.15		
	(0.21)	(0.24)		
# Departments in ministry	0.13	0.18*		
	(0.09)	(0.10)		
Patronage ministry	-0.60	-0.71		
	(0.46)	(0.50)		
Party support in bureaucracy	0.035***	0.040***	0.0088	0.0098
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Portfolio salience	0.35	0.30	-0.73	-0.73
	(0.74)	(0.77)	(0.51)	(0.53)
Social partnership portfolio	-1.15**	-1.49***	2.07***	2.24***
	(0.46)	(0.54)	(0.32)	(0.38)
Insider as party leader	-1.01	-1.36*	-0.44	-1.18
	(0.63)	(0.81)	(0.45)	(0.54)
Reshuffle appointment	0.88**	1.24***	-0.28	-0.31
	(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Junior minister position (co-partisan)	0.00067		-1.49***	
	(0.77)		(0.49)	
Junior minister position (watchdog)	0.90		-1.63**	
	(0.92)		(0.64)	
SPÖ	-2.43***	-2.80***	-1.81***	-2.27***
	(0.71)	(0.87)	(0.54)	(0.63)
ÖVP	-2.49***	-3.01***	-1.18**	-1.98***
	(0.70)	(0.90)	(0.53)	(0.65)
Constant	-2.34	-1.94	0.14	1.72
	(1.45)	(1.66)	(1.16)	(1.34)
ln(σ2u)	-13.1	-15.6	-13.3	-15.4
	(41.27)	(41.58)	(41.01)	(41.68)
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	386	301	386	301
Log likelihood	-132	-103	-204	-163
AIC	305	241	443	357

Note: Cabinet-clustered standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Next, we turn to expert appointments. Model III yields strong evidence that experts are more likely to be appointed to high-salience portfolios as measured by manifesto data, thus supporting the argument that such appointments are less risky in salient portfolios. This result holds when limiting the sample to senior ministers (Model IV). As the graph in Figure 5.2 shows, the probability of an expert appointment increases from around 40 to around 60 percent when moving from a low-salience issue (two percent of the manifesto) to a high-salience one (a third of the manifesto). Parties are thus more likely to put experts into portfolios that they

deem more electorally important, as predicted by H4. Finally, there is no effect of party support among ministerial bureaucrats on the probability of experts being appointed to a portfolio and thus no support for H6. Hence, while nominating parties use loyal bureaucracies to monitor outsider ministers (as well as insider ministers to deal with bureaucracies of a different political leaning) (H5), they do not employ expert ministers to minimize the potential for sabotage posed by a hostile body of bureaucrats.

Figure 5. 2: Predicted probabilities of outsider and expert appointments for selected independent variables (based on models I and III).



Among control variables we find substantial effects of the social partnership portfolio variable on outsider and expert appointments, as expected. Likewise, outsider appointments are less likely in cabinet reshuffles (Models I and II) and under party leaders who worked their way to government through the party machine (Model II). Unexpectedly, we also find pronounced negative effects of the junior minister post variables (co-partisan and watchdog) on expert appointments in Model III, while outsider appointments are not affected.

Discussion and conclusion

This paper contributes novel perspectives to the study of ministerial appointments. Conceptualizing outsiderness and expertise as independent dimensions, the paper identifies distinct drivers of outsider and expert appointments based on theories of political delegation. By demonstrating how portfolio characteristics condition appointments of different types of ministers this study also extends the scope of the existing literature, which largely focuses on country and cabinet-level explanations.

The empirical analysis supports the theoretical argument that nominating parties anticipate the potential for agency loss in individual portfolios and select ministerial candidates accordingly. Outsiders are more likely appointed to portfolios where a friendly ministerial bureaucracy might contain deviations from the party agenda. Likewise, parties minimize delegation problems by appointing experts to portfolios where they have access to larger pools of ideologically compatible experts, while refraining from expert appointments elsewhere. Only one of three expectations derived from that line of reasoning, namely that expert ministers are more likely appointed to portfolios with a high risk of sabotage by the ministerial bureaucracy, is not supported by the statistical models.

In contrast, a portfolio's value to the party in terms of policy, budgetary resources and appointment powers does not affect outsider appointments – at least not in a statistically significant way. Parties are thus no more willing to make risky appointments to portfolios where the stakes are comparatively low than to ministries where agency loss comes at a higher cost. Overall, our findings therefore indicate that, while parties minimize the risk of agency loss when making ministerial appointments, they avoid taking chances even for portfolios where the potential damage from agency loss is relatively small.

Due to specific characteristics of the case, studying Austria provides the opportunity to disentangle drivers of outsider and expert appointments, which are independent in theory, yet correlated empirically. This correlation is asymmetric, though: Most outsiders in our sample are experts, yet most experts are not outsiders. Thus, the appointment of ministers who cannot claim legitimacy from a party mandate needs to be justified on the basis of their portfolio-specific qualification. While results on both variables – outsiderness and expertise – should generalize reasonably well to other parliamentary democracies with multiparty systems, the high level of politicization in the Austrian ministerial bureaucracy and the social partnership model may constrain their external validity. Comparative research will therefore be required to test the validity of the findings in other contexts.

6. Paper 3: The Intra-Party Bargain over Ministerial Appointments: How Party Leader Performance Affects the 'Partyness' of Government[32]

Abstract: In parliamentary democracies, the logic of delegation from voters to government requires that political parties control government actions. Recruiting government personnel through the party organisation is the primary mechanism for parties to retain such a dominance over the government. Existing research has examined secular trends and cross-sectional variance in ministers' party ties, mostly focusing on appointments of party members to government office. By contrast, the present paper centres on the appointment of members of the party elite as a yardstick for party control over government. It explores short-term variance in the 'partyness' of appointments, arguing that performance-related shifts in the intra-party power balance condition party elites' access to ministerial office. Utilising data on ministerial appointments in Austria (1945–2017; n=603), the paper demonstrates that successful party leaders can relax party control by minimising appointments of party elite members, while relatively unsuccessful leaders have to compensate party elites with government jobs.

Keywords: party government; ministerial selection; intra-party politics; party organisation; political careers

[32] Kaltenegger, M (2022). The Intra-Party Bargain over Ministerial Appointments: How Party Leader Performance Affects the 'Partyness' of Government. *West European Politics* (First View).

Introduction

Parties' operational control over governments is a crucial mechanism for safeguarding governments' responsiveness to voter preferences. Through elections, parties receive a popular mandate to implement party policy and party representatives in government office assure that the government sticks to the party agenda (Mair, 2008; Rose, 1974). The recruitment of ministers 'by and through' the party (Katz, 1986) thus plays an important role in making the chain of delegation work in parliamentary democracies (Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000). Despite its potential ramifications for governments' responsiveness and parties' linkage function between state and society (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2018; Lawson, 1980), we know surprisingly little about the factors driving the 'partyness' of ministerial appointments. Empirical studies are rare and have focused predominantly on cross-sectional variance (Blondel, 1985; De Winter, 1991; Dowding & Dumont, 2009, 2014) and long-term trends (Andeweg, 2000a; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; Strøm, 2002). However, much of the variation in the 'partyness' of appointments is yet to be explored. For one, this phenomenon differs substantially in the short term between cabinets and parties. Secondly, while much of the theoretical literature has claimed that the appointment of members of the party elite to government will provide for reliable party agents in public office, most empirical studies focus on appointments of party members to ministerial office, which is a much more inclusive category, comprising all individuals with formal party membership.

By exploring the short-term drivers of party elite appointments to ministerial office, this paper addresses both gaps in the existing literature, arguing that power dynamics within political parties are crucial to understanding change in the 'partyness' of ministerial appointments. Based on a comprehensive data set of ministerial appointments in Austria (1945–2017; n=603), the paper demonstrates that the power balance between the primary selectors in ministerial appointments (the party leader and the remainder of the national party elite) affects the composition of a party's team in the cabinet.

The article advances the following theoretical argument. While the party leader has incentives to appoint outsiders and low-level party members to increase their manoeuvrability in office and to keep potential challengers at a distance, their choice in these processes is constrained by the preferences of party elites, who claim such attractive job opportunities for themselves in exchange for their support for the leader. Although the leader cannot ignore these demands at will, their ability to maintain intra-party support by delivering on the party's goals allows them to minimise appointments of party elite members, thereby effectively reducing party control

over the government. By studying the relationship between intra-party power and ministerial appointments, this article adds to the literature on party government and party organisation, contributing new empirical insights into an understudied phenomenon with substantial implications for the legitimacy of party-based representation.

Parties and Governments

In parliamentary democracies, political parties link government actions to the preferences of the electorate, thus establishing legitimacy through responsive governance. The concept of party government denotes parties' varying capacity to fulfil this task (Rose, 1969). Where it applies, '[p]opular election gives the governing party […] the authority to claim popular compliance with what it says is right' (Rose 1974: 380) and government actions 'are influenced by values and policies derived from the institutions of party' (Rose, 1974: 379). Besides several general conditions for party government – including electoral competition between parties with different policy proposals (Thomassen 1994), the formulation of these proposals by the party and the impact of voters' evaluation of them on vote choice – the recruitment of government ministers 'by and through parties' (Katz, 1986) is crucial for parties' ability to 'translate possession of the highest formal offices of a regime into operational control of government' (Rose, 1969, p. 413; Mair, 2008).

Many studies assume that recruiting ministers from the pool of party members (*insiders*, as opposed to outsiders without ties to the nominating party) will ex-ante minimise the risk of agency loss (Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000), granting the party control over the government via ministers' self-selection into the party organisation (Strøm, 1990) and their subsequent political socialisation into party norms and ideology. Several of these studies have identified substantial increases in outsider appointments in various European countries (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Cotta, 2018; Dowding & Dumont, 2009; Strøm, 2002), calling parties' grip on governments into question. While definitions of outsider-ministers still differ considerably throughout the literature (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; Cotta, 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014; Seixas & Costa, 2019), several contributions have associated the apparent rise of outsiders in government with general tendencies of party decline (Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Krouwel, 2012; Strøm, 2002). As parties lose their rooting in society and trust among voters, insiders increasingly give way to a specific type of outsiders, namely technocrats, whose political independence and expertise substitute for parties' waning ability to provide the basis for legitimate government (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; Habermas, 1973). Technocrats' explicitly non-partisan attributes and their technical knowledge

– which is also a popular trait among voters (Lavezzolo et al., 2021) – render their appointments particularly likely in times of political or economic crisis (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; Centeno, 1993; F. Fischer, 1990; Lavezzolo et al., 2021; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014). Beyond these specific situations, however, outsider appointments are still clearly the exception, not the rule (Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Kaltenegger & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2022; Strøm, 2002), and secular increases in outsider appointments – while present in some countries – are hardly a universal pattern (Costa Pinto et al., 2018, p. 277; Dowding & Dumont, 2009).

Much of the party government literature sets a higher threshold for the 'partyness' of appointments, implying that the relatively imprecise conceptual distinction between insiders and outsiders is an insufficient criterion to assess party control over government. Instead, these studies suggest that only a fraction of the insider group, namely members of the national party elite, will reliably act in the best interest of the party. After all, the wider pool of insiders (party members, activists, party officials, elected public officials) is a quite heterogeneous group in terms of policy preferences (Bäckersten, 2021; Ceron, 2015b; Greene & Haber, 2016; Haute & Carty, 2012; May, 1973; Van Holsteyn et al., 2017), goal orientations (Müller & Strøm, 1999) and skills (Alexiadou, 2016). The ex-ante criterion of self-selection and socialisation into a relatively broad set of party norms and values might therefore be too weak to contain the risk of agency loss effectively. The significantly smaller subgroup of the party elite, however, will have internalised the party's policy agenda to the highest degree (Rose, 1974, p. 414) and will prioritise its implementation in government due to direct involvement in the development of policy programmes (Rose 1974: 414).[33] In addition, while lower-level party members have ongoing non-political careers in tandem to their political ones, professional politicians in the party elite are particularly vulnerable to the threat of withholding office in the future, which provides the party a valuable tool for ex-post control (Andeweg, 2000a; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Müller, 2000a). With some qualifications, the available empirical evidence on the subject supports this perspective, as high-ranking party officials are indeed the most effective ministers in terms of implementing the party agenda in government office (Alexiadou, 2016)

Rose's (1974) seminal account and others have accordingly assessed the 'partyness' of ministerial appointments based on the share of members of the party elite in the cabinet (Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Helms, 1993; Müller & Philipp, 1987). The more cabinet positions they fill, relative to lower-level party members and outsiders, the stronger party control is over government actions. Applying this more rigid criterion, parties still appear to exercise

[33] Note that this does not imply complete homogeneity of the party elite group.

meaningful control overall. According to De Winter (1991: 44), over 40% of all ministers in 13 European democracies held positions in their respective national party organisations. Müller and Philipp (1987) report similar numbers among Austrian ministers, and more recent evidence on Swedish, Portuguese and Belgian cabinets indicates that national party office continues to be an important stepping stone to government office in the 21st century (Dowding & Dumont, 2009). Descriptively, these studies show substantial variation between countries and over time (Alexiadou, 2016; Andeweg, 2000a; Dowding & Dumont, 2009). While some of the cross-sectional variation can be attributed to institutional differences between political systems (Andeweg, 2000a; Blondel, 2000; Cotta, 2000), there is (again) no conclusive evidence of a secular downward trend in the 'partyness' of government appointments (Dowding & Dumont, 2009). Strikingly, short-term national swings in party elite appointments, which are evident from the literature, are yet to be studied systematically.

The Intra-Party Bargain over Ministerial Appointments

The theoretical starting point to understand short-term dynamics in the 'partyness' of appointments is to acknowledge that party–government relations are essentially an intra-party affair in parliamentary democracies (Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Laver & Shepsle, 1990). As parties cut across institutions, different components of the party (its membership organisation, the party central office, the parliamentary party and eventually the party in government) face different sets of opportunity structures, causing various tensions between different 'strata' of the party (Cotta, 2000, p. 94; May, 1973; Müller & Strøm, 1999). When the party enters government and individual party nominees get government posts, a new component of the party, with its own set of constraints and opportunities, temporarily emerges (Cotta, 2000). The party's government ministers then have access to administrative resources, can shape government policy, make appointments in the public service as well as the state sector, and distribute patronage. As their interests in these fields will systematically diverge from those of the party in central office due to different opportunity structures, they have incentives to break the chain of delegation (Müller, 2000a), either by gaining autonomy from party institutions or by even reversing the relationship, instrumentalising the party organisation (Andeweg, 2000a; Blondel, 2000).

In this way, systematic tensions between intra-party actors continuously 'threaten' the party government model and shape the party-internal processes of ministerial selection. The national party elite typically negotiates nominations for government office with the party leader, who will, in most instances, also preside over the party's team in the cabinet (Andeweg, 2000a, p. 131). The party leader thus plays a double-role in these appointment processes. For one, they

stand at the helm of the extra-parliamentary party organisation and will – as a nominator/selector – have a strong say in the selection of government personnel (Strøm et al., 2010). Secondly, however, they are a natural choice for the highest government office available to the party and thus a set nominee. As such, the party leader may steer the intra-elite bargain over the selection of their cabinet peers to increase their own (and the government's) autonomy in office (Andeweg, 2000a).

When making these decisions, the selectors do not have complete freedom of choice. In addition to constitutional constraints (such as recruiting from the pool of MPs in Westminster systems or formal prerogatives of the head of state in the selection process), the final group of ministers on which the selectors agree has to fulfil certain criteria of representativeness (Andeweg, 2000a, p. 126; Rose, 1974, p. 363). Amongst other things, they have to arrive at a 'balanced package' in terms of gender (Goddard, 2021), region and faction (Ceron, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a; Mershon, 2001). The competence of ministerial candidates, their age and their policy preferences (Bäck et al., 2016; Kam et al., 2010; Müller, 2000a; Rose, 1974) are additional factors to take into account. To comply with these criteria, insiders are the standard recruitment pool for government office (Andeweg, 2000a, p. 133), allowing the selectorate to draw on ample information about various characteristics of party nominees, while uncertainty is higher when appointing outsiders (Müller, 2000a; Strøm, 2000). Selectors generally benefit from this informational advantage and the insider pool will usually be large enough to find suitable candidates. Even if the party leader occasionally wants to use outsider appointments to proactively shift the party position on specific issues (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019), or seeks to appeal to voters by appointing 'celebrities'(Street, 2012), excessive deviations from the in-house recruitment norm will likely generate costly resistance throughout the party organisation (Strøm, 1990).

In contrast, the decision over the integration of party elites into the cabinet should be divisive. Party elites will often put pressure on the party leader to recruit ministers from the top of the party hierarchy. Such appointments tie ministerial decisions closely to the party elite and reward elite members personally; after all, a ministerial post would be the highpoint of most political careers. Hence, it is likely that party elite members' office ambitions (Müller & Strøm, 1999) are the catalyst for party control over government.[34] By contrast, for the party leader, appointing

[34] The individual preferences of party elite members will depend on the attractiveness of their current public and party offices relative to a potential government position (Cotta, 2000, p. 69). In most instances, the latter will provide generous benefits.

from the party elite carries substantial risks, which incentivises them to avoid this if possible. The leader will generally prefer candidates who choose loyalty to them over party loyalty (Rose, 1974, p. 363) in order to consistently pursue the coalitional and electoral strategies they deem optimal for their political survival. While these strategic decisions will sometimes require the leader to carefully 'bend' the party line or to disregard certain factional interests (e.g. for electoral reasons), party elite ministers will constrain the leader's ability to do so. Not only are they the most effective party agents in government overall (Alexiadou, 2016), they are also held accountable by various intra-party selectorates (see Appendix, Section 2), which will at times lead their preferences to collide with those of the party leader. In these situations, the leader's options to keep party elite ministers on course will be limited due to the independent power base such heavy-weights have within the party organisation. As the party leader also directly depends on party elites' support in leadership elections to remain in office, members of the party elite might even utilise their intra-party standing (e.g. formal decision-making powers, mobilising potential) to pressure the leader into following *their* demands. What is more, by adding government office to their pre-existing standing in the party, elite members might evolve into more dangerous challengers for the party leadership in the future.

Given these divided preferences in ministerial selection, I expect the share of party elite members in the cabinet, and thus the level of party control over the government, to result from a bargain between the party leader and the other selectors from the party elite. Notwithstanding factional and regional intra-party divides (which will exist within and outside of the party elite), the stronger the leader's bargaining position relative to that of the party elite, the fewer candidates should be appointed from this group. Based on the literature, party performance should be the main determinant of the power balance between the selectors (Abou-Chadi & Orlowski, 2016; Adams et al., 2004; Fagerholm, 2016; Gauja, 2016; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Meyer, 2013; Panebianco, 1988; Schumacher, de Vries, et al., 2013). Party leaders who are unable to provide in terms of the party's policy, office and electoral goals are likely to see their intra-party support coalition crumble, and thereby run a heightened risk of being replaced (Andrews & Jackman, 2008; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Bynander & t'Hart, 2007; Ennser-Jedenastik & Müller, 2015). To maintain intra-party support despite malperformance, party leaders have to compensate intra-party actors by granting them more influence in decision-making ((Gauja, 2016; Greene & Haber, 2016; Kaltenegger et al., 2021) and access to public office (Strøm, 1990). While better performance should thus strengthen the party leader's position in the bargain and decrease the 'partyness' of appointments, weaker performance will lead the party leader to 'buy back' the support of party elites by accepting their demands for

government jobs. Party elite appointments should therefore be more likely when the party performs relatively poorly in competition.

For one, the party's electoral performance will trigger these dynamics. Electoral success is key to a party's access to office and policy influence (Müller & Strøm, 1999). As such, it is instrumental for achieving the party organisation's common goals, as well as for elite members' ambitions for public office. Electoral success is thus a 'public good' in terms of the party organisation, but one which has important repercussions for the 'private goods' that a party leader may distribute among party elites. Party leaders with reduced access to these goods, on account of poor electoral performance, will have to compensate party elites by integrating them into the cabinet.

H1: *The less successful party leaders are electorally, the more ministers are drawn from the party elite.*

Office achievement will have similar effects on the party leader's leeway in ministerial selection. While electoral success is of mere instrumental value to parties, government office has the intrinsic value of granting power, resources and prestige – in fact, probably the most generous set of spoils available in parliamentary democracies – to a relatively small number of appointees (Müller & Strøm, 1999). In this way, government posts are important 'private goods' that a party leader may selectively allocate to consolidate their intra-party support coalition. As party elites are particularly office-oriented (Müller & Strøm, 1999; Strøm, 1990), they will react strongly to any perceived shortage in the supply of government jobs (Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2015; Kaltenegger et al., 2021). Moreover, executive office has the added instrumental value of giving the party the best opportunity to implement party policy. It is therefore also a 'public good', which is appreciated, to varying degrees, by all echelons of the party. Failing to provide policy influence via government participation will thus weaken the party leader's backing throughout the party hierarchy.

To be sure, office is a constant when studying governing parties. All party leaders have succeeded in getting their party into government through electoral performance and/or coalition negotiations. By convention, even the party's specific role in the government (e.g., junior or senior coalition partner) is largely determined by its relative electoral strength. However, there is meaningful variation across governing parties in terms of the price the party leader is required (and eventually is willing) to pay for government participation. Specifically, when forming a coalition government, the party leader can be more or less successful in getting the most, as

well as the most valuable government posts out of a coalition deal. Intra-party actors will scrutinise these deals based on the number and the value of the ministerial portfolios that the party attains; and they will demand, at least, an appropriate share of the spoils and sufficient policy influence for the party. Party leaders who, in the perception of party elites, make too many concessions to the coalition partner – giving up too many or too important ministries for the sake of government participation – will have to compensate party elites in the ministerial appointment process. Conversely, the leader's autonomy in this process, and therefore opportunities to appoint non-party-elites, will be greater when the outcome of coalition negotiations is more favourable to the party.

With regard to the intrinsic value of office achievement, each ministerial post, as well as the type of posts the party receives, directly affect party elites' access to spoils. The more ministries the party controls and the more important, prestigious and resourceful these ministries, the better the outlook for party elites. Hence, the less favourable the deal the leader has brokered, the more elites will demand compensation in the distribution of the available spoils.

H2: *The less successful party leaders are in securing office spoils for the party, the more ministers are drawn from the party elite.*

Likewise, the more leaders fail to provide instrumental ministries to implement party policy, the more they will have to consolidate their intra-party support coalition by following party elites' demands for government jobs.

H3: *The less successful party leaders are in securing policy influence for the party, the more ministers are drawn from the party elite.*

A plausible alternative explanation for correlations between party performance and party elite appointments would be that the party leader forces party elites into government in hard times, in order to show a disgruntled rank and file a united leadership front. This might be necessary if party elites, despite their natural desire for office, decline positions in the current cabinet to avoid association with an unsuccessful leader, which could harm their long-term career prospects. From this perspective, the driver of party elite appointments might be the party leader managing discontent among the rank and file. The hypotheses at hand at least allow the plausibility of the two arguments to be weighed against each other based on variance in goal orientations across the party hierarchy (Müller & Strøm, 1999). Specifically, if the party leader, shielding themself from rank-and-file unrest, were the dominant mechanism, party elite appointments would be strongly influenced by the leader's success in securing the rank and

file's prioritised goal: policy influence (H3). Similarly, since the party's access to spoils hardly affects rank-and-file members, support for Hypothesis 2 should be limited. Evidence in line with Hypothesis 2 and weak or no support for Hypothesis 3, by contrast, point to the bargaining mechanism due to party elites' office-orientation. While Hypothesis 1 is generally uninformative in terms of the specific mechanisms at work, equal support (or non-support) for Hypotheses 2 and 3 will also preclude inferences in this regard.

Empirical Strategy

This study uses individual-level data on the appointments of Austrian ministers and junior ministers from 1945 to 2017, excluding only the non-elected provisional government of the immediate post-war months. As a textbook party democracy, traditionally having 'parties that play an important role in society and governments that have brought large sectors of the state under their control' (Andeweg, 2000b, p. 48), Austria is a likely case to find patterns of party government. While its institutional characteristics generally resemble those of many other parliamentary democracies, specific features of its constitutional framework (e.g. the PR-electoral system) additionally favour the party government mode (Müller & Philipp, 1987).[35] Given these characteristics of the Austrian case, findings indicating that successful leaders may effectively limit the 'partyness' of appointments should have high external validity. Conversely, generalisability should be more limited for results suggesting stable party influence over appointments.

Data on individual ministers have been collected via the official website of the Austrian Parliament[36], Wikipedia[37] and the Munzinger biographical database[38]. The data set is complemented by additional biographical information from the AUTELITE (Müller et al., n.d.) and the Party Congress Politics projects (Müller et al., forthcoming). Statistical analyses use a dichotomous dependent variable, indicating whether a member of the national party elite (vs. non-party-elite) is appointed. Ministers with membership in national party executive bodies (this group typically includes deputy party leaders, the leader of the parliamentary party, leaders of regional branches and functionally defined subgroups) before their initial appointment to government qualify as party elites (Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Helms, 1993; Müller & Philipp,

[35] Despite its semi-presidential constitutional framework, the Austrian political system can clearly be categorized as parliamentary. In government formation, the president's involvement is largely a formality. Also note that ministerial nominations are unconstrained by any formal requirements with regard to ministerial candidates' prior political mandates or their qualification.
[36] https://www.parlament.gv.at/.
[37] https://www.wikipedia.org/.
[38] https://www.munzinger.de/.

1987; Rose, 1974). Government personnel that do not fall into this category are coded as 'non-party-elite', regardless of formal party membership, lower-level party office or public office. While the organisational structure of the parties studied is relatively stable over the observation period, the measure is sensitive to changes due to organisational reform.

The main independent variables are the party leader's record in the last general election and two variables measuring the spoils and policy influence components of office achievement. Since the party leader's standing will crucially depend on intra-party actors' perception of their performance (Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021), rather than a strictly absolute assessment, the measures applied take the likely expectations of intra-party stakeholders into account. In this vein, I operationalise electoral performance as the change in a party's vote share between the last two general elections. Negative values represent vote loss and positive values indicate vote gains for the party. For appointments during a party leader's 'grace period', where they have not yet competed in a general election – and is therefore not responsible for the party's previous electoral performance – the variable is set to the neutral value zero (Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2015).

Building on the literature on portfolio allocation, I operationalise the party leader's success in securing office spoils as the difference between the share of parliamentary seats the party contributes to the government's majority and the party's portfolio-weighted share of cabinet posts. This is because intra-party actors will adapt their expectations to the party's bargaining position in coalition negotiations. In these processes, proportionality of a party's share of ministerial portfolios to the share of parliamentary seats it provides is the main criterion to evaluate the fairness of a coalition deal. It is actively used as a bargaining convention in coalition negotiations (Bäck et al., 2009) and the final allocation of portfolios among coalition parties is typically very close to proportional (Gamson, 1961; Warwick & Druckman, 2001). Party elites, demanding an appropriate piece of the pie for their party (Browne & Franklin, 1973; Ecker & Meyer, 2019), will therefore judge the party leader's success in securing office based on the leader's ability to claim a fair share of cabinet posts in coalition negotiations. Party leaders who manage to exceed intra-party stakeholders' expectations by securing a surplus of government posts (relative to the party's seat contribution) will be perceived as winners, while those who receive less will be branded as losers (Ecker & Meyer, 2019). Positive values on this variable again mark a surplus of government posts, while negative values indicate that the party is undercompensated. The value for parties receiving cabinet posts in perfect proportion to their seat contribution is zero, which is always the case for single-party governments and (analogous

to the electoral performance variable) if the party leader took over the leadership position after the government was formed. To account for objective differences in spoils (e.g. relative power, resources and prestige) that the various ministerial portfolios offer, I use Druckman and Warwick's (2005) expert-survey based portfolio weights.

Finally, I operationalise party leaders' ability to provide instrumental ministries for the realisation of party policy, building on the work of Bäck et al. (2011; Ecker et al., 2015; Ecker and Meyer, 2019). Policy areas are matched with ministerial portfolios based on their formal competencies. Using coded manifesto data provided by the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES) (Dolezal et al., 2016; Müller et al., 2012), I then assess the relative importance of a ministry for a particular party at a specific point in time by calculating the share of manifesto core-sentences dealing with the respective policy areas. I use the sum of these salience scores across all portfolios the party receives in a cabinet to measure the party leader's performance in securing policy influence. The resulting variable reflects the total share of a party's policy intentions that is covered by its cabinet posts. For single-party governments, where the governing party controls all portfolios, the value is set to 100. Again, if the party leader did not yet participate in coalition negotiations, I assign a neutral value, which in this case is the mean value of policy influence across all cabinets. I use absolute levels of policy influence in the regression models, instead of adjusting the measure to the party's parliamentary seat contribution, because portfolio allocation does not follow the rules of a zero-sum game when portfolio payoffs are valued differently by the coalition parties (Bäck et al., 2009; Browne & Feste, 1975; Ecker & Meyer, 2019; Laver & Shepsle, 1996; Warwick & Druckman, 2001). As gains for one coalition party are not necessarily associated with losses for the other, intra-party actors cannot draw on the proportionality heuristic (Ecker & Meyer, 2019) to evaluate the outcome of coalition negotiations. I therefore assume that intra-party actors will react to the overall potential to enact party policy.

Controls

Besides the main independent variables, the analysis controls for the party's specific role in government (single-party government, senior/junior coalition partner) to account for uneven distributions of the performance measures across these groups (Browne & Franklin, 1973; Ecker & Meyer, 2019) and to pick up potential independent effects on party elite appointments. Single-party government, in particular, should increase the attractiveness of ministerial office for party elites (Cotta, 2000, p. 69), promoting fusion of the cabinet and party executive bodies (Andeweg, 2000a; Blondel, 2000). I further control for the absolute number of posts that a party

holds in a particular cabinet as access to more ministries will enable the party leader to appoint the number of party elite members necessary to consolidate their (the leader's) intra-party backing, while giving them greater freedom of choice in the selection process for each additional post. A higher number of cabinet posts should therefore decrease the likelihood of party elite appointments (Andeweg, 2000a, p. 137).

Since more valuable portfolios should offer more attractive career opportunities to party elites (Cotta, 2000, p. 69), I account for each individual portfolio's spoils value (objective portfolio salience) (Druckman & Warwick, 2005) as well as its value in terms of policy influence (subjective portfolio salience) (Bäck et al., 2011; Ecker et al., 2015), expecting that party elite appointments will be more likely the higher the payoffs the portfolio provides (Diodati & Verzichelli, 2017; Rose, 1974) and the more instrumental the portfolio.

Moreover, I control for selector characteristics that should affect the likelihood of party elite appointments (Andeweg, 2000a). First, party leaders who have risen through the ranks of the party will have a larger network of trusted allies within the party elite than relative newcomers, and should therefore be more likely to support party elite appointments. Accordingly, I include a dummy variable indicating whether the party leader was themself a member of the national party elite before their appointment to government office. Secondly, the smaller the group of selectors, the easier it is for party leaders to buy themselves freedom of choice in ministerial selection by paying off a sufficient number of co-selectors. While larger selectorates will require party leaders to provide 'public goods', benefitting wider strata of the party organisation, smaller selectorates will incentivise party leaders to offer individual selectors ministerial posts ('private goods'), thus fostering party elite appointments (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Drawing on information from party statutes, the variable shows the number of members in party bodies that were formally responsible for nominations to government office at a specific point in time. Since the selectorates in the cases studied are almost exclusively party executive bodies, this control variable also picks up variations in the supply of party elite candidates for ministerial office.

Furthermore, appointments in cabinet reshuffles might differ from the first nomination round (Blondel, 2000; Krouwel, 2012), due to smaller numbers of ministerial posts to re-assign, and because they are decoupled from previous elections and coalition formation. For instance, the party leader might be able to manage upcoming replacements in advance in these situations, thus minimising the involvement of the party elite. To address this issue, I include a dummy variable for appointments in cabinet reshuffles in Models 1–4 and omit these cases in Model 5,

limiting the analysis to the initial round of appointments made in each cabinet. Party fixed effects are included in all regression models to control for residual inter-party variance stemming from party-organisational features as well as party-specific recruitment conventions. Finally, 20-year period fixed effects account for potential secular trends or periodic patterns. The Supplementary Material provides additional information on key variables, descriptive statistics, anecdotal evidence and robustness checks.

Analysis

To test the hypotheses outlined above, I run binary logistic regressions with individual appointments as the unit of analysis and the appointee's party elite status as the dependent variable. Random effects on the cabinet level and cabinet-clustered standard errors are included in all regression models to account for unobserved heterogeneity between cabinets and interdependence between appointments to the same cabinet.[39] The respective party leaders are excluded from the regression analysis as their role in the cabinet is, de facto, beyond debate.

Results indicate that a party leader's electoral and office achievement records indeed affect the 'partyness' of ministerial appointments (Table 6.1). Electoral performance has significant negative effects on party elite appointments in Models 1, 4 and 5, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. With each percentage point of the vote the party gains, the probability that a cabinet member is drawn from the party elite decreases by 0.7% (Model 4) on average. Given the empirical range of the variable, this effect is substantial in size (Figure 6.1).[40] In line with Hypothesis 2, party leader success in securing spoils also significantly decreases the likelihood of party elite appointments (Models 2, 4 and 5). A 1% surplus in spoils, relative to the party's seat contribution, renders party elite appointments 0.9% less likely (Model 4), again amounting to sizable differences across the variable's range (Figure 6.2). Regarding Hypothesis 3, regression results are inconclusive. While the party leader's ability to provide instrumental portfolios has the expected negative effect on party elite appointments in Models 3, 4 and 5, coefficients do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance (Figure 6.3).

[39] This approach suits the hierarchical data structure and allows to control for potentially influential variables on the appointment level (e.g. portfolio value, cabinet reshuffle).
[40] Section 4 of the Appendix provides a discussion on potential 'mechanical' effects of electoral performance on party elite appointments.

Table 6. 1: Logistic regressions on party elite appointment.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Vote share (% change)	-0.0433**			-0.0417*	-0.0306+
	(0.0142)			(0.0174)	(0.0180)
Office spoils (surplus)		-0.0517**		-0.0535**	-0.0569*
		(0.0187)		(0.0198)	(0.0255)
Policy intentions covered by portfolios (%)			-0.00911	-0.00510	-0.00488
			(0.0103)	(0.0116)	(0.0134)
Single-party government (dummy)	1.135*	1.619**	1.185*	1.810**	1.332+
	(0.556)	(0.544)	(0.581)	(0.615)	(0.725)
Senior coalition party (dummy)	0.180	0.308	0.142	0.346	0.337
	(0.310)	(0.265)	(0.284)	(0.264)	(0.305)
Number of portfolios	-0.0643	-0.116**	-0.0498	-0.0943*	-0.0947*
	(0.0416)	(0.0362)	(0.0481)	(0.0396)	(0.0438)
Portfolio spoils value (objective salience)	0.207	0.256	0.215	0.252	0.250
	(0.320)	(0.302)	(0.314)	(0.304)	(0.372)
Portfolio policy value (subjective salience)	-0.116	-0.103	-0.0761	-0.123	-0.0533
	(0.142)	(0.138)	(0.146)	(0.150)	(0.173)
Party leader (party elite)	1.236***	1.274***	1.091***	1.342***	1.225***
	(0.229)	(0.235)	(0.238)	(0.187)	(0.221)
Selectorate (size)	-0.00632	-0.0102	-0.00360	-0.0134*	-0.0149*
	(0.00723)	(0.00652)	(0.00642)	(0.00659)	(0.00742)
Cabinet reshuffle	-0.244	-0.332	-0.292	-0.284	
	(0.385)	(0.376)	(0.373)	(0.394)	
Party (reference: SPÖ)					
ÖVP	-0.854**	-0.922***	-0.942***	-0.941***	-0.835**
	(0.284)	(0.211)	(0.255)	(0.253)	(0.266)
Other	-0.0529	0.0782	-0.00902	-0.0861	0.184
	(0.418)	(0.389)	(0.385)	(0.358)	(0.268)
Period (reference: 1940-1959)					
1960-1979	-0.293	-0.223	-0.288	-0.173	-0.219
	(0.183)	(0.203)	(0.198)	(0.193)	(0.183)
1980-1999	0.555*	0.768**	0.563*	0.703**	0.542*
	(0.265)	(0.249)	(0.256)	(0.232)	(0.263)
2000-2020	0.261	0.338	0.319	0.422*	0.321
	(0.293)	(0.238)	(0.287)	(0.198)	(0.242)
Constant	-0.928*	-0.408	-0.513	-0.381	0.0510
	(0.460)	(0.517)	(0.565)	(0.604)	(0.658)
Panel-level variance	-15.53	-15.50	-13.52	-15.65	-15.77
Panel-level SD	0.000424	0.000430	0.00116	0.000400	0.000376
N	514	527	527	514	415

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 6. 1: Average marginal effect of vote share (% change) on party elite appointment (Model 4).



Figure 6. 2: Average marginal effect of office spoils (surplus) on party elite appointment (Model 4).



Figure 6. 3: Average marginal effect of party policy intentions covered by portfolios (%) on party elite appointment (Model 4).



Among controls, being the larger coalition party does not affect party elite appointments in a systematic way, while single-party government has a strong and significant positive effect, as expected. By tendency, the results also show a negative correlation between party elite appointments and the number of government posts a party controls. Surprisingly, there is no consistent evidence that portfolio value (objective or subjective) significantly affects party elite appointments, although the coefficients for portfolios' spoils value are positive in all models, as was expected. While the party leader's route to office has substantial and highly significant effects on party elite appointment in all models, the coefficients for selectorate size have the expected negative sign but are less pronounced overall. Cabinet reshuffles do not affect party elite appointments in a significant way (Models 1–4), nor do they appear to bias the regression results (Model 5; Appendix, Section 5.3). Finally, party dummies suggest significant residual differences between parties and period dummies show periodic swings in the 'partyness' of ministerial appointments but do not indicate a secular decline.

Conclusion

This paper advances a theoretical argument on how intra-party power dynamics condition ministerial selection and tests its implications using individual-level data on ministerial

appointments in Austria (1945–2017). It presents a rare quantitative assessment of the factors driving party elite appointments to government office, which engages with theories on party government and party organisation. Statistical analyses support the core argument that a party leader's success in securing party goals is an important short-term driver of the 'partyness' of ministerial appointments. Party elite appointments are the more likely, the less successful party leaders are electorally and in terms of securing office spoils. Only the party leader's success in providing instrumental ministerial portfolios for the implementation of party policy does not reduce party elite appointments in a significant way.

These results are in line with the view that ministerial appointments stem from a consequential bargain between the party leader and the party elite, where party leaders seek to keep party elites out of the cabinet and are more able to do so when they are more successful in terms of party competition. The alternative explanation, that the party leader forces reluctant party elites into government to divert the blame for suboptimal performance, might still occasionally apply. However, results for the two office achievement variables suggest that the party leader conceding cabinet positions to office-seeking party elites is the more plausible explanation overall. A more thorough qualitative examination would still be required to disentangle the specific mechanisms at work. Moreover, despite high external validity of these findings due to Austria's characteristics as a likely case, there are also natural limits to any case study. Specific features of the case, such as little alternation in government, the convention that the party leader always assumes a government role or idiosyncrasies of Austrian parties' organisational structures affect the incentives of the actors involved in the bargain over ministerial appointments and might therefore impact the external validity of the findings. Comparative research is needed to confirm the inferences drawn.

7. Summary and Discussion

The puzzle that stood on the outlet of this dissertation project was the internal distribution of power in party organization. While much of the political science literature has conceived these organizations as machines directed entirely by the decisions of small groups of leaders (Adams et al., 2004; Downs, 1957; Duverger, 1954; Fagerholm, 2016; Harmel et al., 1995; Katz & Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966; Michels, 1949; Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Somer-Topcu, 2009), there are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt this rather strong assumption (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Cross, 2018; Eldersveld, 1966; Müller & Strøm, 1999). However, the empirical basis to judge the actual power of these party elites in different party decisions has been relatively thin so far. In particular, the bulk of research on this topic has perceived decision-making power as a function of parties' formal rules or has focused on 'snapshots', drawing inferences from specific decision-making episodes. The overarching goal of the project was to address this problem by contributing systematic evidence on the drivers and consequences of behavioral change in intra-party decision-making power. Specifically, the three empirical papers focus on different aspects of intra-party power pertaining to three broad research gaps: the drivers of change in the power relations between the party elite and the rank file, between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite as well as the consequences of intra-party power relations for the recruitment of government personnel. These phenomena were analyzed in three quantitative case studies along the following two overarching research questions:

RQ1: What are the drivers of intra-party power dynamics?

RQ2: How does intra-party power affect ministerial selection?

What conclusions can we now draw from the evidence provided in Chapters 4—6? How do these findings relate to the existing literature? And to what extent can we generalize from the cases studied to other contexts? This final chapter discusses and contextualizes the main results.

The Drivers of Intra-Party Power (RQ1)

What are the drivers of intra-party power dynamics? This first research question is addressed in Papers 1 and 3. The papers provide rare empirical evidence on behavioral change in intra-party decision-making power, examining variation in the 'actual' influence of different intra-party actors on specific party decisions. Both studies identify party performance as a key driver of intra-party power dynamics, between the party elite and the rank and file (RQ1.1) as well as between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite group (RQ1.2). Specifically, leaders' ability to deliver on the party's electoral and office goals conditions their relative

influence on party decisions or, conversely, the relative influence of their 'subordinates' in the party hierarchy. Malperformance leads the party elite (collectively) to appease the rank-and-file by responding more to their substantive policy and organizational demands (Paper 1). Likewise, the less successful a party leader (individually), the more likely they will have to 'buy' back support from the party elite by offering party elite members attractive career opportunities in government (Paper 3). An important specification to this general argument is that party elites and the party leader act strategically when compensating lower-level actors for malperformance. They appear to take the different goal orientations of specific intra-party actors into account by responding more to the demands of those actors who are hit harder by a given performance shock (Müller & Strøm, 1999).

These findings demonstrate that the reality of intra-party power is much more fluid and situational than formal party rules, 'hierarchical' or leader-centered theories of party organization would suggest (Duverger, 1954; Katz & Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966; Michels, 1949; Webb et al., 2012). Collectively and individually, party leaders are pressured into responsive behavior when failing in their core task: leading the party to achieve the goals of the people who form it. This is in line with recent re-conceptualizations of party stratarchy (Eldersveld, 1966), where power-sharing agreements and bargaining between intra-party actors are deemed to determine the outcomes of party decisions (Bolleyer, 2012; Carty, 2004; Carty & Cross, 2006; Cross, 2018). This perspective appears to be a suitable theoretical approach for the behavioral study of intra-party power. In contrast, results of the empirical studies do not support the seminal notion of a secular centralization of power in party organization (Cross & Katz, 2013; Duverger, 1954; Enroth & Hagevi, 2018; Hertner, 2015; Katz & Mair, 1995, 2018; Kirchheimer, 1966; Krouwel, 2012; Michels, 1949; Passarelli, 2015; Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Saglie & Heidar, 2004; Widfeldt, 1999).

To be clear, however, this dissertation does not claim that established explanatory factors of intra-party power are altogether unimportant. In setting the ground rules for any bargain between different intra-party actors, party institutions, statutory regulations and informal conventions matter as they define a broad range of potential influence for intra-party actors in different decision-making areas. Not least, the null results pertaining to rank-and-file influence on ministerial selection (Chapter 5; Appendix C, Section 6) quite clearly suggest that actual influence on a decision requires a minimum level of potential influence in terms of the actors' means of participation. The central argument put forth here is thus not that party statutes and decision-making conventions are inconsequential. It is rather that the range of potential

influence they define is typically wide as well as flexible and that the variation within its upper and lower bounds stems from competitive pressures.

Similarly, this dissertation's primary focus is on power dynamics between actors located at different levels of the party hierarchy. The inferences drawn on the drivers of intra-party power dynamics thus relate exclusively to such vertical power struggles. Horizontal power dynamics between actors on the same hierarchical level – or rather between intra-party groups encompassing actors at all levels – are considered in the theoretical models but are partly abstracted from in the statistical analyses. After all, these divisions generate entirely different preference divides and the power relations between these groups should be driven by very different factors (Boucek, 2009; Ceron, 2019; Harmel et al., 1995). Papers 2 and 3 assume that such divisions will not interfere with appointments of ministers from different levels of the party hierarchy as factional ministerial candidates may be drawn from any level. Paper 1 accounts for such dynamics, contributing novel empirical evidence. Results indicate that the 'Gamsonian' logic that has been found to govern party factions' relative influence in other contexts (Ceron, 2012, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a; Gamson, 1961, 1961) also applies to intra-party groups on the lowest echelon of the party. Specifically, district organizations with higher vote-mobilizing potential are granted more influence in party decisions.

Finally, these results relate to the literature on party change (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988). They suggest that behavioral shifts in intra-party power should be understood as a form of internal party change driven by competitive pressures and that these processes further condition party behavior. Considering the findings of Papers 1 and 3, the effects of short-term change in parties' internal power equilibria on their behavior may be substantial. To be sure, inferences drawn in Paper 1 on policy and organizational decisions are confined to the party-internal decision-making arena. This is because the analysis does not account for the actual implementation of these decisions in party manifestos or party statutes, where party elites have additional leeway to water down concessions made to the rank-and-file at party congress (Ceron & Greene, 2019). In contrast, Papers 2 and 3 directly explore the consequences of intra-party power for parties externally directed behavior, specifically, for ministerial selection.

Intra-Party Power Relations and Ministerial Selection (RQ2)

How does intra-party power affect ministerial selection? The extant literature demonstrates how horizontal intra-party power relations, between factions and regional branches, affect the composition of governments (Ceron, 2014; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2013a; Giannetti & Benoit,

2008; Mershon, 2001). Papers 2 and 3 provide the first empirical studies on how the vertical distribution of power in party organization, between different levels of the party hierarchy, conditions the outcomes of ministerial selection. They contribute novel insights into an important area of party behavior with strong implications for the delegational logic of party-based representation. As the selection of different types of ministers affects parties' operational control over government, party elites' choices in these recruitment decisions are consequential for the connection between voter preferences and government actions (Alexiadou, 2016; Katz, 1986; Mair, 2008; Müller, 2000a; Rose, 1974; Strøm, 2000).

Findings indicate that, first and foremost, performance-related shifts in the power balance within the party elite matter for the 'partyness' of appointments. The party leader can minimize appointments of party elite members to the cabinet when successful, while party elites are compensated with government jobs when the leader's position is weakened by malperformance (Paper 3; RQ2.2). Party elite appointments are thus the more likely, the weaker the party leader. In contrast, rank-and-file demands do not affect party elites' portfolio-specific agency-loss considerations in a significant way (Paper 2; RQ2.1). Specifically, party elites are not less willing to risk outsider appointments in portfolios where the potential intra-party damage from agency loss (in terms of party policy, patronage distribution and appointment powers in the civil service and state-owned enterprises) is high. Likewise, the supplementary analysis does not indicate that performance-related power dynamics have significant effects on outsider appointments (Appendix C, Section 6; RQ2.1).

Overall, these findings suggest that the selection of government personnel rests firmly in the hands of the party elite (Andeweg, 2000a; Blondel & Cotta, 2000; Laver & Shepsle, 1990) and that power relations within that group are consequential for the outcomes of these processes. The party leader and the remainder of the party elite engage in a bargain, where the former seeks to fend off incursions from the latter in their cabinet team. As the leader's ability to deliver success in competition determines their ability to do so, there appears to be a somewhat unfortunate correlation for political parties. Specifically, a party's control over the government is the higher, the worse its performance. The governing party, as a collective body, is thus caught between a rock and a hard place where success in inter-party competition is tied to party leader autonomy in government and where control over the actions of the government team comes at the price of relative underperformance. Party elite members, specifically, may use periods of malperformance to their personal advantage, as they can pressure the leader into

granting them access to the highest offices in the state. From this perspective, party elite members' ambition may be an important catalyst for party government.

In contrast, rank-and-file activists do not have a seat at the table in these decisions. This seems plausible overall, considering the complexity and time-sensitivity of these decisions, the limited resources of party activists and the typical allocation of competencies in party rules. The inconsistent findings with regard to activist influence might also relate to the preference divide between the rank and file and the party elite, which may be less pronounced than the divide within the party leadership over party elite appointments. After all, activists should prefer appointments of party insiders to government office and the selectors in the party elite have strong incentives to draw ministerial personnel from that group as well.

Note, however, that the party government mode does not require rank-and-file involvement in the selection of government personnel. It requires, amongst other things, that the selection is made in party bodies and that the selectees are drawn from the ranks of the party (Katz, 1986; Mair, 2008; Rose, 1974). At least for the case studied, both conditions are met more or less over the entire observation period. Party insiders clearly represent the standard recruitment pool for government office. While the share of outsider appointments has increased since the 2000s to about 20% in the last decade, they are still outnumbered by far by party insiders. The share of party elite members in the cabinet, the higher threshold for party government, generally varies more substantially between cabinets than the share of insiders does, but there is no indication for a trend towards declining party control over government. Obviously, since Austria is a likely case to find patterns of party government, this might be very different in other countries as extant research has already pointed out (Alexiadou, 2016; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Bertsou & Caramani, 2020b; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; Dowding & Dumont, 2009; Emanuele et al., 2022; Strøm, 2002).

Further Key Implications

Beyond the main conclusions discussed above, results of this dissertation carry further implications for the literatures on party organization, party government and technocratic government. For one, findings are in line with the underlying expectation that party elites act as a rational collective in party decisions. While they will certainly often disagree internally, they find ways to cooperate. They act strategically when confronted with rank-and-file demands and usually uphold a united leadership front when facing them at party congress (Paper 1). Likewise, the collective choices they make in ministerial selection are based on complex considerations that effectively minimize agency-loss for the party (Paper 2). However, as

indicated by Paper 3, competition among the elite is also a latent feature of their behavior. Party elite members have their personal agendas and will take opportunities to pursue them if they emerge. This is demonstrated in Paper 3 for ministerial selection but it likely applies to other decision-making areas as well.

Furthermore, Papers 1 and 3 carry implications for the goal orientations of different groups of intra-party actors. Findings of both papers support the notion that political professionals in the national party elite as well as in regional and subgroup leadership positions (sub-elites) are office oriented (Ennser-Jedenastik & Schumacher, 2021; Müller & Strøm, 1999). Sub-elites are compensated with decision-making power by national party elites when the party has lost access to government office (Paper 1). Likewise, the party leader deems it necessary to 'buy' back support from the national party elite when failing to provide a fair share of office spoils in a coalition deal (Paper 3). Interestingly, the leader's ability to secure instrumental ministries to implement party policy does not have the same effect (Paper 3). This may indicate – but is certainly not sufficient evidence – that party elites predominantly value the access to spoils associated with office and not necessarily the policy influence it provides. Results are less consistent with regard to the relative value of electoral success for different actors across the party hierarchy.[41]

Finally, Paper 2 contributes novel perspectives to the literature on party government and technocracy. While the extant literature so far provides system-level explanations for variance in outsider and technocrat appointments (Alexiadou & Gunaydin, 2019; Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009; Wratil & Pastorella, 2018), the paper identifies portfolio-level drivers of outsider and expert appointments based on theories of political delegation. Results indicate that the specific posts a governing party has access to indeed condition party selectors choices. Moreover, while the bulk of the literature lumps the theoretically distinct dimensions outsiderness and expertise together (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi, 2014), party selectors differentiate between the two. Outsider appointments are more likely in ministerial portfolios where the ministerial bureaucracy is politically aligned with the appointing party and where bureaucrats

[41] Party elites deem it necessary to compensate the rank and file with decision-making power for electoral malperformance, while a loss of executive office does not lead them to the same behavior (Paper 1). This implies that the rank and file may prioritize electoral performance over office achievement (Müller & Strøm, 1999). In contrast, party elites apparently see no need to appease sub-elites when the party has lost at the polls, while they do grant them more decision-making power when office achievement is suboptimal (Paper 1). National party elite members, however, are again compensated for electoral underperformance in ministerial selection, to a very similar degree as in the case of suboptimal access to office spoils (Paper 3).

may thus exercise ex-post control over the minister. Expert appointments are more likely in portfolios where the appointing party can draw on larger recruitment pools of politically compatible experts. In both scenarios, party elite selectors minimize the risk of agency loss in the delegation from the party to the minister (Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Müller, 2000a). Importantly, and counter to the expectations of Paper 2, party elite selectors are not willing to take any chances in ministerial selection. Specifically, they do not appear to vary their selection based on the relative value of a portfolio in terms of policy influence, budgetary resources or appointment powers. After all, the stakes involved in the delegation from the party to a minister might be too high in any ministry to live with agency loss, even in relatively 'unimportant' ones.

Methodological Contributions

Papers 1 and 2 contribute novel approaches for the measurement of key variables in the study of intra-party politics and ministerial selection. Paper 1 builds on a growing strand of research generating data on intra-party politics based on party congress documentation (Ceron, 2012, 2015a; Ceron & Greene, 2019; Greene & Haber, 2016; Müller et al., forthcoming; Schumacher et al., 2019). While, in reality, party congresses rarely function as the democratic fora as which they were designed in party statutes (Dittberner, 1973; Minkin, 1978), they are spyholes into the black box of intra-party politics. Intra-party actors from various levels of the party hierarchy, from different branches, factions and tendencies gather regularly and express their preferences. Researchers may observe these processes to draw inferences on various variables of interest (e.g. party cohesion, intra-party power, activism). In this vein, Paper 1 proposes party congress motion treatment as a novel measure for short-term change in intra-party power. While the article studies the power shifts between the party elite and the rank and file, motion treatment potentially relates to the relative power of various groups of intra-party actors. Naturally, this approach requires a substantial data collection effort. Party congress documents need to be located in archival research. More often than not, access to these materials will also depend on the cooperation of individual parties. Eventually, the documents have to be digitized and coded. While resource-intensive, the approach is feasible and should provide for suitable measures of decision-making power in most parties with a traditional membership organization.

Paper 2 develops a comprehensive expertise measure for the study of ministerial appointments. While indicators used in the existing literature often focus primarily on economic training and education in 'hard' sciences (Bertsou & Caramani, 2020a), different ministerial portfolios clearly require different types of expertise. To minimize portfolio-level bias in expertise

measures, Paper 2 employs a scheme of occupational categories where expertise may be acquired for each ministerial portfolio, including those typically requiring experience in the education and social sectors or elsewhere (see Appendix B). This categorical scheme may be used in other contexts with slight modifications.

External Validity, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

This dissertation builds on two types of quantitative case studies examining variance in party elite behavior over observation periods covering more than 70 years, respectively. Paper 1 analyses patterns of party elite responsiveness towards activist demands at SPÖ party congresses. Papers 2 and 3 use comprehensive data on ministerial and junior ministerial appointments in Austria made by six different parties. This empirical strategy allowed to thoroughly substantiate the theoretical reasoning on the processes studied with qualitative information. In particular, this pertains to accurate interpretations of motion treatment procedures at SPÖ party congresses (e.g. the substantive meaning of different types of motion treatments) as well as to specific aspects of the decision-making processes in ministerial selection (see Appendices A and C). Importantly, the 'depth' of the empirical strategy also facilitated to focus on exploring various explanatory factors beyond the party and system levels that have so far been largely overlooked in the empirical literature.

Cases were selected based on most-likely or least-likely case considerations. Despite the case study design, the main results of this dissertation should thus generalize well beyond the cases studied. According to existing comparative accounts, the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) is an unlikely case to find patterns of party elite responsiveness towards the rank and file (Müller et al., 1992; Müller & Meth-Cohn, 1991; Poguntke et al., 2016). The drivers of rank-and-file influence on party decisions identified based on the SPÖ case should therefore have at least similar effects in most other parties. Likewise, findings with regard to the drivers of outsider and non-party-elite appointments to ministerial office should have high external validity due to characteristics of the Austrian political system that favor party control over ministerial appointments (Andeweg, 2000b; Müller & Philipp, 1987). However, any case study involves limitations in terms of generalizability. For instance, results of Paper 3 may not travel well to contexts, where the accumulation of party and public office is generally less common or where the leader of the extra-parliamentary party does not 'automatically' receive the highest public office available to the party. Generalizability should also be more limited for results on expert appointments than for the other ministerial types, as Austria is neither a particularly unlikely nor likely case in this regard. Likewise, plebiscitary forms of rank-and-file

participation might generate different dynamics between party leaders and activists than the ones identified in Paper 1. Hence, cross-sectional studies are certainly needed to examine whether the patterns described in all three papers also apply to other countries and parties.

Party congresses, in particular, provide a suitable data source for future comparative research on behavioral change in intra-party power. Amongst other things, studies using such data should further consider to what extent formal decisions of the party's highest organ translate into actual change in a party's externally directed behavior. This may contribute important new insights on how institutions of 'intra-party democracy' mediate party change (Abou-Chadi & Orlowski, 2016; Bale, 2012; Barnea & Rahat, 2007; Eldersveld, 1998; Gauja, 2016; Lehrer, 2012; Meyer, 2013; Schumacher, de Vries, et al., 2013). The study of ministerial appointments has already developed into a burgeoning field of research with impressive data collection efforts (Alexiadou, 2016; Costa Pinto et al., 2018; Emanuele et al., 2022). However, comparative studies may profit from considering appointment-level factors (e.g. portfolio characteristics and intra-party competition) when examining different types of ministerial appointments. What is more, results of this dissertation illustrate the added value of using more fine-grained typologies than the established outsider and technocrat categories. In particular, a minister's party membership, party rank and expertise carry different implications for their behavior in office and appointments of such ministers are subject to varying drivers. These properties should thus be considered as separate dimensions in future research on ministerial selection.

Finally, the empirical analyses used in this dissertation are not suited to account for all the mechanisms at work in party elite decisions. For analytical reasons, two types of power dynamics affecting their decisions are studied separately. Papers 1 and 2 examine the party elite's collective reactions to pressures from the rank and file. Paper 3 specifically zooms in on intra-elite power relations. However, the two vertical power dynamics studied in this dissertation may – in reality – reinforce each other. For instance, bottom-up pressure will at times motivate party elite members to challenge the party leader and disunity within the party elite might conversely push the rank-and-file to intervene in their decisions. What is more, vertical power dynamics will interact with individual leaders' affiliations to party subgroups and with personal alliances among them. These multiple interactions will be very case specific and temporary, suggesting that qualitative approaches (e.g. based on interviews, party executive minutes, and public statements of individual leaders) are needed to explore them.

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Appendix A: Appeasement and Rewards: Explaining Patterns of Party Responsiveness towards Activist Preferences

Co-authored with Katharina Heugl and Wolfgang C. Müller

Descriptive Statistics

Table A 1: Distributions of main independent variables.

	executive power loss (H1, H1a)	change in party's vote share (H2, H2a)	district contribution to vote (H3)
mean	.078	-1.38	1.18
median	0,00	-.3	.99
sd.	.27	3.12	.83
min.	0,00	-7.9	.005
max.	1,00	5.8	5.51

Table A 2: Distribution of motions over sub-organization types.

Organization Type	freq.	perc.
Party Executive	183	4.18
Land Organization	417	9.52
District Organization	2,187	49.94
Affiliated Organization	1,464	33.43
Working Group/Special Committee	118	2.69
Other	10	0.23
Total	4,369	100

Face Validity – Party Congress Level

In order to emphasize the validity of H1 and H2, figures A1 and A2 display the bivariate relationships between the two performance variables and responsiveness at the aggregate level. Executive power loss and change in the party's vote share both have the expected effects on responsiveness when aggregated at the party congress level. Responsiveness is higher after a loss of executive power and after the party lost votes in general elections. However, neither correlation is statistically significant, given the very low number of cases (n=13).[42]

[42] Note: We restrict the aggregate representations in Figure A1 and Figure A2 to those congresses, where we have full information on the dependent variable for all motions (n=13). Results do not change substantially when lowering the threshold.

Furthermore, as demonstrated in the paper, the effect of electoral performance disappears in the multi-level regression models.

Figure A 1: Degree of responsiveness (the percentage of motions recommended for acceptance per party congress), means by executive power loss.



Figure A 2: Electoral performance and party elites' degree of responsiveness. Labels display the year of the party congress.



Responsiveness – Operationalization

Using Party Congress Motions as Data

Naturally, besides the formal mechanisms of intra-party democracy, there is continuous informal communication between the different levels of the party allowing to influence party

decisions. There is, however, no systematic way to account for these informal processes in a quantitative study.[43] While acknowledging this limitation of our measure, we argue that our operationalization allows for valid inferences. The party congress represents the party's highest decision-making organ. For activists, it is an important arena to (semi-)publicly voice demands, to form alliances with their peers, and thus to put pressure on party elites. One indication of the substantial relevance of the party congress is the myriad of cases of party congress éclats not only in the SPÖ, but also across party organizations all over the world. With regard to party congress motions and the specific case studied, we argue that the mere number of motions that SPÖ activists submit, tolerating the non-trivial costs involved with drafting these motions (intra-group coordination, risk of alienating party elite etc.) reflects the value of these motions for the party on the ground. Put simply, why would activists take the trouble of drafting on average 110 motions per party congress if they were not hoping to have an impact on party decisions?[44]

Coding of Motion-Treatment Recommendations

The commission for examination and approval ("Antragsprüfungskommission", "Antragskommission") may recommend party congress one of the following seven treatments for each motion: 1) full acceptance of the motion by the party congress, 2) partial acceptance of the motion by the party congress, 3) submission of the motion to a standing party body (typically the party executive, or the parliamentary party group), 4) settlement by the congress' decision on another motion, 5) acknowledgement of the motion by the party congress without further action, 6) adjournment of a decision, and 7) rejection of the motion by the party congress (see Table A3).

During the period under examination (1945–2014), the party congress hardly ever decided against the commission's recommendations. In fact, there is almost perfect correlation between recommendation and party congress' decision on the treatment (Cramer's V = 0.99). Out of 3209 motions, for which we have information on both variables, the SPÖ party congress accepted only 15 without the commission's prior recommendation. Thus, party elites remain in almost full control over the treatment of motions, as congress delegates merely rubber-stamp the commission's recommendations. While this might appear problematic from an intra-party

[43] A more holistic perspective on intra-party decision making with a special focus on the role of the party congress is presented in the classic qualitative studies of Minkin (1978) and McKenzie (1963; see also Kavanagh, 1998). Butler et al. (2017) present survey-based evidence on when individual politicians engage informally to influence party behavior ('lobbying' within the party).

[44] Previous quantitative contributions (Ceron, 2014, 2015b, 2015a) have already used the content of party congress motions as data-source for the study of Italian intra-party politics.

democracy perspective, it does not affect the operationalization of our dependent variable. Since we are interested precisely in how responsive *party elites* are towards activists' preferences, these recommendations are very well suited for our measurement.

Table A 3: Motion-Treatment Recommendations at SPÖ Party Congresses (1945–2014).

Recommendation	freq.	perc.
Full acceptance	1,253	34.0
Partial acceptance	257	7.0
Submission to party body	1,411	38.3
Settlement by other motion	523	14.2
Acknowledgement	25	0.7
Adjournment	30	0.8
Rejection	182	4.9
Total	3,681	100.0

For the analysis, we subsumed the possible treatments into two categories: acceptance (treatments 1 and 2) and non-acceptance (treatments 3, 4 and 7).[45] This decision might seem counterintuitive at first glance, yet it is backed by a careful study of party congress protocols. Speeches of congress delegates clearly indicate that all possible variants of non-acceptance are in fact functionally equivalent, since SPÖ elites usually avoid openly rejecting motions (see Table A3). Instead, they prefer de facto rejections by submitting motions to the party executive, working groups, standing party bodies, etc. where these motions can quietly die in order to avoid visible conflicts. This practice is commonly known among SPÖ activists and is regularly referred to as "first class funerals" of motions (Maurer & Moser, 1988, p. 431; Weber, 2011, p. 145; Welser, 2011).[46] Likewise, however less frequently, party elites recommend the treatment of "settlement by other motion", meaning that the motion under examination is obsolete, due to the acceptance of another motion covering the same topic. While this treatment is obviously only viable whenever there are two motions on the same issue, SPÖ-elites rather lavishly judge the similarity of motions. Thus, regularly, party elites get rid of inconvenient motions by

[45] The small group of motions (55 motions in total), which was either 'acknowledged' (treatment 5) or 'adjourned' (treatment 6), was coded missing on the dependent variable. This is because, the party congress did not take a substantive decision.

[46] E.g. at the party congress 2006, even the then-speaker of the commission of examination, long-time MP and influential member of the party executive Josef Cap, openly admitted that motions have been routinely submitted to the party executive in order to get rid of them without risking open conflict. In defense of the commission's recommendation to collectively submit all motions of the 2006 congress to the party executive he argued: "But this is a new kind of submission, because they [the motions] should really be treated there [in the party executive]"(SPÖ, 2006, p. 29). Notably, one of said motions demanded that the party should not form a coalition government with the ÖVP. Nonetheless, a grand coalition was formed four months after the party congress.

accepting another motion, more in line with their preferences, yet only loosely related to the demands of the initial motion.[47]

Alternative Control Variables

In addition to the controls included in models 1–5, we ran further regressions (Models 6–10b) using alternative control variables. Since party membership decline has been identified as an important driver of other forms of organizational change (Kölln, 2015), we control for the number of SPÖ party members (Müller, 1992a, 1996; Sickinger, 2009; Zirnig, 2014) in models 6, 6a and 6b. Furthermore, we control for media attendance at the party congress in models 7, 7a and 7b. For every party congress, we record whether the protocol contains any reference to journalists in the audience.[48] Since party elites will try to avoid the bad publicity of intra-party conflict, they should be more responsive when journalists are attending. However, results show that neither party membership numbers nor media attendance affect responsiveness towards activists (see Table A4). Since rank-and-file activity might correlate with both our main independent variables and motion acceptance, we also control for the number of motions submitted at each party congress in models 8, 8a and 8b (Table A6). Results show that the number of submitted motions does not affect responsiveness. With regard to our main independent variables, models 6–8b consistently support the findings presented in the paper.

[47] E.g. at the party congress 1968, several motions of the party's youth organization demanding progressive foreign policy stands were "settled by" the resolution of the party executive, much to the annoyance of socialist youth delegates (SPÖ, 1968, p. 200). Likewise, at the 1946 party congress, a leftist motion by a Viennese district organization demanding better relations with the Soviet Union shared the same fate (Weber, 2011, p. 145).

[48] If journalists are present at a party congress it is common practice to at least welcome them in the welcome address at the beginning of the congress meeting.

Table A 4: Logistic multi-level regressions on motion acceptance (responsiveness) – alternative control variables.

	General		District Organizations		Affiliated and Land Organizations	
	Model 6	Model 7	Model 6a	Model 7a	Model 6b	Model 7b
Performance						
Executive power loss	1.425*	1.419*	0.300	0.202	1.616*	1.585*
	(2.16)	(2.17)	(0.64)	(0.44)	(2.10)	(2.05)
Change in party's vote share between the last two elections (%)	0.00220	0.00986	-0.0677+	-0.0678+	0.0222	0.0308
	(0.04)	(0.19)	(-1.87)	(-1.80)	(0.37)	(0.49)
Government Participation						
Single-Party Government (Reference)						
Coalition Government	-0.340	-0.138	-0.616*	-0.484	-0.208	0.0598
	(-0.78)	(-0.30)	(-2.25)	(-1.60)	(-0.40)	(0.11)
Opposition	-1.360+	-1.134+	-0.358	-0.0589	-1.370+	-1.018
	(-1.92)	(-1.80)	(-0.59)	(-0.11)	(-1.68)	(-1.40)
Submitting Organization						
Land Organization (Reference)						
District Organization	-0.635***	-0.632***				
	(-3.32)	(-3.30)				
Affiliated Organization	0.332+	0.331+				
	(1.74)	(1.73)				
Working Group/Special Committee	1.565***	1.564***				
	(4.67)	(4.67)				
Motion Type						
Motion Type: Organizational (Reference)						
Motion Type: Policy or Coalition	0.252*	0.250*	0.214	0.218	0.192	0.189
	(2.13)	(2.11)	(1.35)	(1.38)	(1.06)	(1.05)
Party Organization						
Number of Party Members (100 000)	-0.0522		-0.0754		-0.0935	
	(-0.46)		(-0.76)		(-0.72)	
Media Attendance		0.329		0.147		0.395
		(0.86)		(0.55)		(0.83)
Constant	-0.195	-0.898	-0.333	-1.014**	0.309	-0.749
	(-0.22)	(-1.56)	(-0.45)	(-2.72)	(0.30)	(-1.13)
Level3	0.714**	0.724**	0.153	0.169+	0.905*	0.935**
	(2.79)	(2.87)	(1.64)	(1.73)	(2.56)	(2.66)
Level2	0.648***	0.646***	0.353*	0.343*	0.852***	0.849***
	(4.67)	(4.67)	(2.14)	(2.10)	(3.72)	(3.72)
Observations	3249	3249	1448	1448	1690	1690
AIC	4015.2	4014.7	1736.6	1736.8	2173.3	2173.1
BIC	4088.2	4087.7	1784.1	1784.3	2222.2	2222.0

Note: Logit coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure A 3: Wordscores scaling of party congress motions – word scores.



Motion Content

In our analysis, we generally abstract from the content of individual motions. However, motion content might be an influential intervening variable. According to May (1973; also Kitschelt, 1989; Norris 1995; Van Holsteyn et al., 2017) we should generally expect systematic differences between the policy preferences of party elites and activists. Moreover, performance shocks might shift sub-groups' positions to the left or right, which might then affect party elites' responsiveness towards activist demands. In order to account for this possibility, we briefly explore the content of motions. This section is supposed to give a condensed overview over the distribution of intra-party positions, the relation between performance shocks and these positions, and their potential effects on motion acceptance.

We measure intra-party positions by scaling the available motion documents using the Wordscores approach (Laver et al., 2003; Lowe, 2008). We use the manifestos of all major Austrian parties since 1945 as reference texts (n=87), assigning them a left–right position (-1 to 1) based on the AUTNES hand-coding scheme (Dolezal et al., 2016; Müller et al., 2012). The manifesto positions are then used as reference scores to scale the SPÖ party congress motions – our virgin texts. In this way, we place the motions on a general left–right dimension, applicable to the Austrian political system, across our entire observation period. Face validity of the estimated Wordscores model is high. For one, concepts regularly associated with left-wing policies are assigned lower scores (e.g. "Grundsicherung", "Sozialist", "Prekariat"), than those associated with right-wing policies (e.g. "Heimat", "Privatisierung", "Schulden") (see Figure A3). Secondly, motions of specific intra-party groups are scaled as a careful observer of Austrian politics might expect. For instance, motions submitted by the party's youth organizations have the most left-wing content and party executive motions are the most right-wing, relative to the motions of all other sub-organization types (Table A5).

Figure A 4: Wordscores scaling of party congress motions – motion positions, group median and manifesto position.



Results overall indicate that motion positions are relatively stable over time. While the party executive performs moderate shifts on the left–right dimension with its' motions, the average position of activists' party congress motions is remarkably stable (Figure A4). Average motion positions are also uncorrelated with our main independent variables (electoral performance: r= -0.065; and executive power loss: mean-difference= -0.015). Hence, there is no indication that performance shocks lead activists to shift their positions either to the left or to the right.

Table A 5: Wordscores left–right scaling of motions – by SPÖ sub-group.

	Obs	Wordscore (Mean)	SD	Min	Max
Party Executive	125	-0.08453	0.355264	-0.87153	1.023543
Land Organization	258	-0.12755	0.268854	-1.7086	0.894786
District Organization	1,648	-0.14365	0.39125	-2.48396	2.072272
Affiliated Organization	850	-0.18093	0.287907	-1.94077	1.332742
Youth Organization	364	-0.19623	0.280361	-1.94077	0.923126

Finally, we also account for motions' policy positions in regression models 9, 9a, 9b and 10, 10a, 10b (Table A6). In models 9, 9a and 9b we control for the Wordscores left–right estimate, in models 10, 10a and 10b we control for the extremism of the content, measured as motions' distance to the mean motion position at each party congress. Note, however, that the full content of motions is only available for a subset of our data. We lose over one third of motions (1294 cases) for the general models (n=1955). The number of cases even drops below 1000 for district and affiliated/Land models. Moreover, we lose important variance on our main explanatory variables since the number of party congresses included in the analysis drops to 25. This is particularly problematic for executive power loss, as only one instant of power loss is represented in the analysis.

While running multi-level regressions is generally problematic given these limitations, we nonetheless show the results in Table A6 for the sake of transparency. Overall, results are stable regarding effect sizes (general models) and directions (general, district and affiliated/Land models). By tendency, executive power loss increases responsiveness in general and for affiliated and Land organizations. Likewise, the party gaining votes in national elections decreases elite responsiveness towards district organizations, while the effect of electoral performance is inconclusive in general and affiliated/Land models. Yet, given the data limitations discussed above, these effects lose statistical significance. Regarding motions' left–right positions, results indicate that right-wing motions are less likely to be accepted. This effect

is significant in the general model (Model 9) as well as in the district model (Model 9a). Furthermore, we find some indication that more extreme motions are less likely to be accepted than moderate ones (Models 10, 10a, 10b). However, effects of motion extremism do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Table A 6: Logistic multi-level regressions on motion acceptance (responsiveness) – alternative control variables.

	General			District Organizations			Affiliated and Land Organizations		
	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 8a	Model 9a	Model 10a	Model 8b	Model 9b	Model 10b
Performance									
Executive power loss	1.310*	1.462	1.483	0.165	16.78	17.54	1.483+	0.585	0.574
	(2.03)	(1.29)	(1.29)	(0.37)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(1.92)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Change in party's vote share between the last two elections (%)	0.0145	-0.0435	-0.0408	-0.0676+	-0.0605	-0.0548	0.0283	-0.0113	-0.0100
	(0.28)	(-0.90)	(-0.83)	(-1.85)	(-1.38)	(-1.23)	(0.44)	(-0.16)	(-0.14)
Government Participation									
Single-Party Government (Reference)									
Coalition Government	-0.0856	-0.284	-0.269	-0.472	-0.602	-0.578	0.0298	-0.0167	-0.0129
	(-0.19)	(-0.64)	(-0.59)	(-1.63)	(-1.57)	(-1.48)	(0.05)	(-0.03)	(-0.02)
Opposition	-0.887	-1.596	-1.594	0.0131	-16.74	-17.44	-0.884	-1.117	-1.117
	(-1.30)	(-1.64)	(-1.62)	(0.02)	(-0.00)	(-0.00)	(-1.10)	(-0.95)	(-0.94)
Submitting Organization									
Land Organization (Reference)									
District Organization	-0.641***	-0.518*	-0.500*						
	(-3.35)	(-2.09)	(-2.00)						
Affiliated Organization	0.331+	0.456+	0.475+						
	(1.73)	(1.79)	(1.85)						
Working Group/Special Committee	1.565***	2.262***	2.272***						
	(4.68)	(4.52)	(4.52)						
Motion Type									
Motion Type: Organizational (Reference)									
Motion Type: Policy or Coalition	0.257*	0.0636	0.0876	0.232	0.237	0.263	0.200	-0.0988	-0.0799
	(2.17)	(0.44)	(0.61)	(1.47)	(1.27)	(1.40)	(1.11)	(-0.44)	(-0.36)
Number of motions submitted	0.00168			0.000616			0.00116		
	(1.06)			(0.69)			(0.61)		
Motion Position (Left–Right)		-0.378+			-0.477+			-0.228	
		(-1.79)			(-1.82)			(-0.63)	
Motion Position (Extremism)			-0.249			-0.183			-0.177
			(-0.78)			(-0.47)			(-0.32)
Constant	-0.936+	-0.580	-0.512	-1.030**	-0.929*	-0.841*	-0.610	-0.239	-0.186
	(-1.71)	(-1.23)	(-1.06)	(-2.97)	(-2.49)	(-2.16)	(-0.97)	(-0.43)	(-0.32)
Level3	0.712**	0.406*	0.425*	0.150	0.220+	0.234+	0.953**	0.651*	0.671*
	(2.86)	(2.33)	(2.35)	(1.57)	(1.65)	(1.70)	(2.69)	(2.00)	(2.01)
Level2	0.645***	0.658***	0.681***	0.347*	0.319	0.327+	0.848***	0.878**	0.900**
	(4.66)	(3.61)	(3.69)	(2.11)	(1.64)	(1.66)	(3.72)	(2.75)	(2.79)
Observations	3249	1955	1955	1448	962	962	1690	943	943
AIC	4014.3	2375.8	2378.4	1736.7	1133.2	1136.4	2173.5	1211.2	1211.5
BIC	4087.3	2442.8	2445.4	1784.2	1177.1	1180.2	2222.3	1254.8	1255.1

Note: Logit coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Additional Robustness Checks

Endogeneity

In this section, we account for the possibility that our unit of analysis might be endogenous to responsiveness. This is because high responsiveness in the past could induce a higher number of motions at the next party congress, as the rank and file might get bolder in voicing its demands, when experiencing periods of high responsiveness. Thus, we examined whether past responsiveness is driving the number of motions. Results show however, that this is not the case. There is no substantial correlation between past responsiveness and the number of submitted motions (see Figure A5).

Figure A 5: Test of endogeneity. Does responsiveness at t-1 affect rank-and-file activity at t?



Figure A 6: Test of overrepresentation. Are certain periods overrepresented in the dataset?



Overrepresentation

Since we use multi-level regressions, the potential problems arising from the overrepresentation of certain periods are already contained to some extent. In addition, Figure A6 illustrates that the distribution of motions over time is relatively smooth. The sole outlier is the party congress of 1976. However, since information on the recommended treatment was only available for ca. 30% of the motions, the 1976 congress is not overrepresented in our analysis. Moreover, results of our regression analyses do not change substantially when excluding the 1976 motions.

Executive Motions

Given that there might be differences in the extent to which party elites want to control the output of a party congress, we could expect to see lower levels of responsiveness the more motions the party executive submits. Thus, we test whether the share of executive motions (as a proportion of the total number of motions) affects party elites' level of responsiveness. However, this is not the case. There is no substantial correlation between the share of executive motions and responsiveness (see Figure A7).

Figure A 7: Does the number of executive motions affect rank-and-file activity?



Timing Effects

The timing of party congresses in the electoral cycle could also affect party responsiveness towards activists. With elections looming, party elites might be more willing to respond towards activist demands in order to keep them content and motivated for the election campaign. On the other hand, party elites might also be more reluctant to be responsive, since activist's preferences could clash with the party's electoral strategy. On the aggregate level, there is a moderate positive correlation between the number of days to the next election and responsiveness (r = 0.36). Hence, party elites are less responsive, the closer the next election. However, when including the distance to the next election as a control variable in our multi-level models, it has no effect on responsiveness. All other coefficients remain virtually unchanged. Only the effect of executive power loss loses statistical significance for the Affiliated/Land organizations, while the coefficient remains stable compared to the models presented in the paper.

Overall Trends in Responsiveness

General trends in party elites' level of responsiveness represent another potential limitation to the validity of our inferences. Since some of our controls are already close correlates of time[49],

[49] This applies in particular for the effective number of parties (r=0.75).

we do not include the year of the party congress as additional control variable in our regression models. However, looking at the degree of elite responsiveness by party congress (Figure A8), there is clearly no general increase or decrease of responsiveness over time. Hence, there is no indication that overall trends in responsiveness (overall democratization or oligarchization) could bias the results of our analysis.

Figure A 8: Is there a general trend in elite responsiveness?



Serial Correlation

When testing hypothesis 3, we regress motion acceptance on district organizations contribution to the party's national vote (Model 5). Naturally, district organizations electoral performance at one election correlates with its performance at the last and the next elections. While multi-level regression analysis already accounts for autocorrelation to some extent, we nonetheless re-ran the district models presented in the paper using clustered standard errors for district organizations in order to account specifically for potential bias introduced by serial correlation. Since not every district organization submits motions at every party congress, thus, not every party congress is represented in each cluster; we use ordinary logistic regressions instead of multi-level logistic regressions.[50] Results (Table A7), however are almost identical to those of

[50] Note that intraclass correlation at the party congresses level is very low for district organizations. Only roughly 4% of the variance in responsiveness are at this level. Thus, using regular logistic regression instead of multi-level logit is unproblematic for district organizations.

multi-level regressions presented in the paper (Table 4.3; Models 1a–4a, 5), thus giving further support to hypotheses 2a (Models 1c–4c) and 3 (Model 5c).

Table A 7: Logistic regressions on motion acceptance (responsiveness) – clustered standard errors by district organizations.

	District Organizations				
	Model 1c	Model 2c	Model 3c	Model 4c	Model 5c
Performance					
Executive power loss	-0.0807	-0.0867	-0.0830	-0.0168	-0.138
	(-0.36)	(-0.40)	(-0.36)	(-0.07)	(-0.62)
Change in party's vote share between the last two elections (%)	-0.0772**	-0.0762**	-0.0775**	-0.0726*	-0.0786**
	(-2.77)	(-2.71)	(-2.88)	(-2.54)	(-2.85)
District contribution to total SPÖ-vote share (%)					0.213*
					(2.20)
Government Participation					
Single-Party Government (Reference)					
Coalition Government	-0.673***	-0.664***	-0.672***	-0.720***	-0.660***
	(-3.45)	(-3.36)	(-3.35)	(-3.62)	(-3.61)
Opposition	0.0179	0.0345	0.0197	-0.0687	0.0327
	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(-0.23)	(0.11)
Motion Type					
Motion Type: Organizational (Reference)					
Motion Type: Policy or Coalition	0.0366	0.0345	0.0370	0.0285	0.0594
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.37)
Party Organization					
Membership Fees: Share of Total Party Finance (%)		-0.000459			
		(-0.17)			
First party congress with new party leader			-0.00989		
			(-0.04)		
Party System					
Effective Number of Parties (Parliament)				0.129	
				(0.78)	
Constant	-0.526*	-0.504*	-0.526*	-0.809+	-0.794***
	(-2.53)	(-1.98)	(-2.53)	(-1.93)	(-4.21)
Observations	1448	1448	1448	1448	1437
AIC	1757.5	1759.5	1759.5	1758.8	1737.6
BIC	1789.2	1796.4	1796.5	1795.7	1774.5

Note: Logit coefficients; z statistics in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Party Congress Motions – Examples

In this final section, we present three illustrative examples for SPÖ party congress motions in the German original version and English translation.

„*1. Bei aller Anerkennung des Wertes des Lohn- und Preisabkommens für die schlechter gestellten Schichten ist durch Außerachtlassung einer strengen Wirtschaftskontrolle und Ausbleiben einer Währungsregelung seine Bedeutung für die Lebenshaltung der Massen vermindert worden. Zur Sicherung und Hebung des Realeinkommens fordern wir daher:*

a) Strengste Überwachung der Löhne und vor allem der Preise unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der lebenswichtigen Güter;

[…]

4. Durch die Verstaatlichungsgesetze ist ein großer Teil der Urproduktion und der Schlüsselindustrie in die Verfügungsgewalt des Staates übergegangen. Zur Neuorganisierung und Planung fordern wir daher:

a) Übergabe des Ministeriums für Vermögenssicherung und Wirtschaftsplanung an einen Sozialisten;

b) Ausdehnung der Verstaatlichung auf die Auto-, Lebensmittel- und Papierindustrie;

c) Einordnung der Privatwirtschaft in einen Gesamtwirtschaftsplan;

[…]

[Our translation]

1. While acknowledging the value of the agreement on wages and prices for the disadvantaged classes, its relevance for the living conditions of the masses has been limited by the absence of currency regulation. For the protection and increase of real earnings, we therefore demand:

a) Strict monitoring of wages and particularly prices, with a special focus on essential goods;

[…]

4. Nationalization laws have transferred the power of disposition over large parts of primary production and key industries to the state. For its reorganization and planning, we demand:

a) Appointing a socialist to the Ministry of Wealth Protection and Economic Planning;

b) Extending nationalization to automobile, food and paper industries;

c) Integration of the private sector into an overall economic plan;

[…]"

Antrag 54; Bezirksorganisation Ottakring (SPÖ, 1947)

„*Schon wenige Monate der ÖVP-Alleinregierung haben genügt, um zu beweisen, daß die ÖVP-Politik eine schlechte Politik für alle arbeitenden Österreicher ist.*

Es ist das offensichtliche Ziel der ÖVP-Alleinregierung, in der ersten Hälfte ihrer Amtszeit die Forderungen der Industriellen, der Hausherren und der Großbauern auf Kosten der Konsumenten zu erfüllen, um dann vor den nächsten Wahlen mit einigen optischen Maßnahmen die österreichischen Wähler wieder zu täuschen.

Der Parteitag beauftragt daher den Parteivorstand, das Zentralsekretariat und den Klub der sozialistischen Abgeordneten, alles in ihrer Macht Stehende zu unternehmen, um alle Österreicher über die wahren Ziele der ÖVP-Politik aufzuklären. Insbesondere gilt es, darzustellen, daß die ÖVP-Bundesregierung alles daransetzt, die unter sozialistischer Verwaltung stehenden Länder, Gemeinden und Städte zu schädigen. Es muß gemeinsame

Aufgabe aller Sozialisten sein, eine konstruktive Alternative zur ÖVP-Politik zu entwickeln. Ausgehend vom Parteiprogramm 1958 sind wissenschaftlich fundierte Entscheidungsgrundlagen auszuarbeiten, die als Basis der sozialistischen Politik der nächsten Jahre dienen sollen. Durch intensive, wirkungsvolle Aufklärungsarbeit und Werbung sind die Voraussetzungen für einen künftigen Wahlsieg zu schaffen.

[Our translation]
A few months of ÖVP single-party government have proven that ÖVP-policies are bad policies for all working Austrians. It is the ÖVP government's obvious goal to fulfill the demands of industrialists, landlords and large-scale farmers at the expense of consumers during the first half of its term, only to deceive the Austrian voter with some make-believe measures before the next election.

The party congress therefore instructs the party executive, the central office and the socialist parliamentary group to do everything in their powers to enlighten all Austrians about the ÖVP's true goals. In particular, we have to clarify that the ÖVP federal government spares no effort to harm regions, communities and cities under socialist administration. Developing constructive alternatives to ÖVP-policies has to be the common goal of all socialists. Building on the party programme of 1958, we have to map out the scientific decision-making basis for the socialist policies of the years to come. The conditions for a future electoral victory have to be created by intensive and effective educational work and campaigning."

Antrag 51; Bezirksorganisation Floridsdorf (SPÖ, 1967)

„*Bildung ist der Motor für Fortbestand und Weiterentwicklung der Gesellschaft. Sie soll selbständig denkende und kritikfähige Menschen schaffen und liefert die nötigen Werkzeuge zum Erkennen, zur Bewältigung gesellschaftlicher Probleme, Gefahren und potentieller Risiken. Bildung ermöglicht eine Gesellschaft selbstbestimmter Menschen. Deshalb muss Bildung in Ziel, Inhalt und Form den Grundwerten der Gleichheit, Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität verpflichtet sein. Sie hat sich in erster Linie an den Menschen und ihren Bedürfnissen zu orientieren. Bildung muss allen Menschen in gleichem Maße zugänglich sein und ein Instrument für die Umverteilung von Wissen, gesellschaftlicher und wirtschaftlicher Güter und die Möglichkeit der Teilnahme an der Gesellschaft darstellen. […]*

Der 43. ordentliche Bundesparteitag der SPÖ möge daher beschließen:

- *Entkoppelung der Wissenschaft von der Wirtschaft. Das aktive Auftreten aller SPÖ Funktionärinnen und -Mandatsrinnen in allen politischen Gremien und Ämtern sowie bei allen öffentlichen Auftritten gegen die Ökonomisierung von Bildung. Die Schaffung eines eigenständigen Bildungsministeriums, das sowohl die Agenden des Unterrichtsministeriums als auch die Agenden des Wissenschaftsministeriums umfasst, um Bildung ganzheitlich zu betrachten.*
- *Die Einführung von freien Wahlfächern in allen Curricula.*

[Our translation]
Education is the engine of the persistence and progression of society. It should spawn people who think for themselves and who are able to take criticism and it provides the necessary tools to understand and to overcome societal problems, dangers and potential risks. Education allows for a society of self-determined individuals. Therefore, education has to be committed to equality, freedom, justice and solidarity in its goal, content and form. It has to orient itself primarily towards the people and their needs. Education has to be equally accessible to all people and represent a means for the redistribution of knowledge, societal and economic goods and the possibility of participating in society. […]

The 43st party congress of the SPÖ may therefore decide:

- The decoupling of science and economy. The active opposition of all SPÖ party and public officials in all political bodies and offices and at all public events against the economization of education. The creation of a separate Ministry of Education, comprising the agendas of the Ministry of [School, M.K.] Education and the Ministry of Science in order to allow for a holistic approach to education.
- The introduction of elective subjects in all curricula."

Antrag 4.10, Verband Sozialistischer Student_innen Österreich (SPÖ, 2014)

Appendix B: Who's Fit for the Job? Allocating Ministerial Portfolios to Outsiders and Experts

Co-authored with Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik

Robustness Checks

In the following section, we provide additional regression models corroborating the robustness of our findings. Table B1 displays the results of multinomial logit regressions predicting the three empirically relevant ministerial types (non-expert insiders, expert insiders, and expert outsiders) (see also Figure B1) as an alternative empirical strategy. The regression models presented in Table B2 re-run the main logistic models using cabinet fixed effects instead of cabinet-level random effects. Neither the use of a multinomial logit design, nor the specification of cabinet fixed effects alter our substantive results.

In Tables B3 and B4 we introduce additional control variables. Specifically, we use a dummy variable for portfolios, which we expect to be of particular 'national interest' (Defense, Justice, Foreign Affairs) in Table B3. This is because, certain sensitive policy areas may see more appointments of politically 'neutral' candidates (outsiders) and experts. While the variable has positive and significant effects on outsider and expert appointments, as expected, the support for H4 and H5 persists.[51] Table B4 presents the results of regression models controlling for government type (single-party/coalition government) and standard economic indicators (GDP growth, unemployment, inflation) (Alexiadou, 2016).[52]None of these variables display significant effects on outsider or expert appointments. Again, our main results remain unaffected when including these controls.

[51] We decided not to include this variable in the main regression models as there are no clear ex-ante criteria to decide which portfolios actually are of particular national interest and – even more so – which ones are not.

[52] Economic performance indicators are derived from the official database of the Austrian Ministry of Employment (https://www.dnet.at/amis/Datenbank/).

Table B 1: Explaining outsider and expert appointments: multinomial logit (1967-2020), reference group: non-expert insiders.

	Full		No JMs	
	Exp. insiders	Exp. outsiders	Exp. insiders	Exp. outsiders
Issue salience in manifesto (ln)	0.53**	0.25	0.39	0.15
	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.32)
Share of cabinet budget (ln)	-0.22	-0.20	-0.14	-0.23
	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.26)
# Departments in ministry	0.18**	0.18	0.19**	0.23**
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Patronage ministry	-0.093	-0.67	-0.19	-0.82
	(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.44)	(0.55)
Party support in bureaucracy	-0.0034	0.041***	-0.000022	0.044***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Portfolio salience	-1.63**	-0.34	-1.47**	-0.28
	(0.72)	(0.85)	(0.74)	(0.86)
Social partnership portfolio	2.46***	0.41	2.49***	0.12
	(0.37)	(0.54)	(0.42)	(0.63)
Insider as party leader	-0.29	-0.88	-1.15*	-1.65*
	(0.52)	(0.68)	(0.61)	(0.87)
Reshuffle appointment	-0.75*	0.65	-0.95**	0.85*
	(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.46)	(0.48)
Junior minister (co-partisan)	-0.83	-1.32		
	(0.63)	(1.01)		
Junior minister (watchdog)	-1.81**	0.20		
	(0.88)	(0.99)		
SPÖ	-0.92	-3.30***	-1.46*	-3.79***
	(0.67)	(0.84)	(0.77)	(0.99)
ÖVP	-0.63	-2.76***	-1.66**	-3.68***
	(0.66)	(0.80)	(0.80)	(1.01)
Constant	-0.63	-1.40	1.38	-0.48
	(1.57)	(1.59)	(1.78)	(1.81)
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	375		293	
Log likelihood	-271		-220	
AIC	619		508	

Note: Cabinet-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$

Figure B 1: Predicted probabilities of ministerial type for selected independent variables (based on full model in Table B1).



Table B 2: Explaining outsider and expert appointments (1967–2020).

	Outs.	Outs. (no JMs)	Exp.	Exp. (no JMs)
Issue salience in manifesto (*ln*)	0.21	0.11	0.45***	0.44**
	(0.24)	(0.30)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Share of cabinet budget (*ln*)	-0.13	-0.16		
	(0.21)	(0.24)		
# Departments in ministry	0.11	0.19*		
	(0.09)	(0.10)		
Patronage ministry	-0.49	-0.60		
	(0.46)	(0.49)		
Party support in bureaucracy	0.031***	0.035***	0.0092	0.0092
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Portfolio salience	0.15	0.10	-0.90*	-0.87
	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.52)	(0.54)
Social partnership portfolio	-1.21***	-1.63***	2.02***	2.12***
	(0.46)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Insider as party leader	-1.42	-1.71	0.29	-0.69
	(0.97)	(1.12)	(0.75)	(0.86)
Reshuffle appointment	1.02**	1.60***	-0.20	-0.21
	(0.41)	(0.48)	(0.33)	(0.37)
Junior minister (co-partisan)	-0.12		-1.50***	
	(0.77)		(0.50)	
Junior minister (watchdog)	0.56		-1.43**	
	(0.90)		(0.62)	
SPÖ	-2.01**	-2.20**	-1.27**	-1.82**
	(0.84)	(0.98)	(0.59)	(0.72)
ÖVP	-2.32***	-2.86***	-0.65	-1.62**
	(0.80)	(0.98)	(0.61)	(0.76)
Cabinet fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Decade dummies	No	No	No	No
Observations	358	279	386	301
Log likelihood	-102	-74	-167	-130
AIC	229	171	353	276

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

$^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table B 3: Explaining outsider and expert appointments (1967–2020).

	Outs.	Outs. (no JMs)	Exp.	Exp. (no JMs)
Issue salience in manifesto (*ln*)	0.056	0.22	0.41**	0.42**
	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Share of cabinet budget (*ln*)	0.28	0.48		
	(0.25)	(0.31)		
# Departments in ministry	0.012	-0.024		
	(0.11)	(0.13)		
Patronage ministry	0.15	0.47		
	(0.53)	(0.63)		
Party support in bureaucracy	0.037***	0.041***	0.011	0.011
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
National interest portfolio	1.72***	2.30***	0.79**	0.54
	(0.54)	(0.69)	(0.32)	(0.34)
Portfolio salience	0.92	0.87	-0.56	-0.62
	(0.78)	(0.84)	(0.52)	(0.54)
Social partnership portfolio	-0.75	-0.97	2.27***	2.38***
	(0.52)	(0.62)	(0.33)	(0.39)
Insider as party leader	-0.92	-1.12	-0.39	-1.12**
	(0.63)	(0.82)	(0.46)	(0.55)
Reshuffle appointment	0.87**	1.33***	-0.28	-0.29
	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.32)	(0.37)
Junior minister (co-partisan)	0.55		-1.27**	
	(0.84)		(0.50)	
Junior minister (watchdog)	1.61*		-1.26*	
	(0.98)		(0.66)	
SPÖ	-1.92***	-2.06**	-1.57***	-2.06***
	(0.73)	(0.89)	(0.56)	(0.66)
ÖVP	-2.16***	-2.21**	-1.07*	-1.85***
	(0.73)	(0.93)	(0.55)	(0.67)
Constant	-4.02**	-4.82**	-0.46	1.24
	(1.58)	(1.97)	(1.20)	(1.38)
$\ln(\sigma^2_u)$	-12.9	-13.0	-13.4	-15.3
	(41.59)	(55.92)	(47.48)	(41.69)
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	386	301	386	301
Log likelihood	-127	-96	-201	-162
AIC	297	231	439	356

Note: Cabinet-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B 4: Explaining outsider and expert appointments (1967–2020).

	Outs.	Outs. (no JMs)	Exp.	Exp. (no JMs)
Issue salience in manifesto (ln)	0.14	0.034	0.42**	0.42**
	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.17)	(0.20)
Share of cabinet budget (ln)	-0.096	-0.14		
	(0.21)	(0.24)		
# Departments in ministry	0.13	0.19*		
	(0.09)	(0.10)		
Patronage ministry	-0.61	-0.74		
	(0.47)	(0.50)		
Party support in bureaucracy	0.036***	0.041***	0.0092	0.0099
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Single-party government	1.18	0.16	2.35	1.70
	(1.66)	(1.73)	(1.58)	(1.64)
GDP growth (percent)	-0.023	-0.044	-0.029	-0.031
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Unemployment (percent)	0.27	0.24	0.12	0.053
	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.35)
Inflation (percent)	-0.010	0.041	0.019	-0.049
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.16)	***
Portfolio salience	0.28	0.29	-0.84	-0.82
	(0.76)	(0.78)	(0.52)	(0.54)
Social partnership portfolio	-1.17**	-1.51***	2.07***	2.24
	(0.47)	(0.54)	(0.32)	(0.38)
Insider as party leader	-0.84	-1.35	-0.22	-0.97
	(0.65)	(0.86)	(0.47)	(0.57)
Reshuffle appointment	0.95**	1.33***	-0.33	-0.32
	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.34)	(0.38)
Junior minister (co-partisan)	-0.0015		-1.53***	
	(0.78)		(0.50)	
Junior minister (watchdog)	0.95		-1.60**	
	(0.92)		(0.64)	
SPÖ	-2.29***	-2.72***	-1.77***	-2.20***
	(0.72)	(0.88)	(0.54)	(0.64)
ÖVP	-2.37***	-3.03***	-1.07**	-1.87***
	(0.70)	(0.92)	(0.54)	(0.65)
Constant	-4.17	-2.64	-2.36	0.22
	(3.16)	(3.35)	(2.73)	(2.86)
ln(σ2u)	-15.1	-14.7	-14.2	-15.3
	(41.62)	(41.61)	(41.55)	(41.65)
Decade dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	386	301	386	301
Log likelihood	-132	-102	-203	-163
AIC	311	248	447	363

Note: Cabinet-clustered standard errors in parentheses.

$^{*}p < 0.1$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Expertise Coding Rules

Table B5 provides a list of all occupational areas that we consider sources of expertise for individual ministerial portfolios. Appointees who spent at least one career episode in one of these categories prior to their appointment are coded as expert ministers if they receive the matching portfolio.

Table B 5: Ministerial portfolios and occupational areas where expertise can be acquired.

Ministerial Portfolio	Occupational Area
Finance	Austrian National Bank
	European Central Bank
	Academia (economics)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (finance)
	Sub-national executive office (finance)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (finance)
Social Welfare/Affairs	Chambers of Labor and Commerce
	Trade unions
	Social charities
	Academia (economics or social sciences)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (social affairs)
	Sub-national executive office (social affairs)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (social affairs)
Interior	Police force
	Legal professions (lawyers and judges)
	Academia (law/legal studies)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (interior)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (interior)
Economic Affairs	Business (management)
	Chambers of Labor and Commerce
	Trade unions
	Academia (economics)
	Ministerial bureaucracy
	(economic affairs or employment)
	Sub-national executive office
	(economic affairs or employment)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (economic affairs or employment)
Foreign Affairs	Diplomatic service
	Supranational organizations
	International organizations
	Academia (international law or international relations)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (foreign affairs)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (foreign affairs)
Employment	Business (management)
	Chambers of Labor and Commerce
	Trade unions

Ministerial Portfolio	Occupational Area
	Academia (economics)
	Ministerial bureaucracy
	(employment or economic affairs)
	Sub-national executive office
	(employment or economic affairs)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (employment or economic affairs)
Justice	Legal professions (e.g. lawyers, judges, notaries)
	Academia (law/legal studies)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (justice)
	Sub-national executive office (constitutional affairs)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (justice)
Education	Educational staff (e.g. teacher, pedagogue)
	State school board
	Academia (educational sciences)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (education)
	Sub-national executive office (education)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (education)
Science/Research	Academia (any field)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (science and research)
	Sub-national executive office (science and research)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (science and research)
Reconstruction	Business (management)
	Chambers of Labor and Commerce
	Trade unions
	Academia (economics)
	Ministerial bureaucracy
	(reconstruction, economic affairs, employment)
	Sub-national executive office (reconstruction, economic affairs, employment)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (reconstruction, economic affairs, employment)
Agriculture	Agricultural sector (e.g. farmer, forest worker/manager)
	Chamber of Agriculture
	Interest groups (agriculture)
	Academia (agricultural sciences)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (agriculture)
	Sub-national executive office (agriculture)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (agriculture)
Family Affairs	Interest groups for families, women or children
	Charities for families, women or children
	Ministerial bureaucracy
	(family affairs or women's affairs)
	Sub-national executive office
	(family affairs or women's affairs)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (family affairs or women's affairs)
	Management of state-owned enterprises
	Academia (economics)

Ministerial Portfolio	Occupational Area
State Enterprises/Nationalized Industries	Ministerial bureaucracy (state enterprises)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (state enterprises)
Transport	Management of transportation corporations
	Ministerial bureaucracy (transport)
	Sub-national executive office (transport)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (transport)
Health	Health professions (e.g. doctors, nurses)
	Social insurance apparatus
	Academia (health sciences)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (health)
	Sub-national executive office (health)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (health)
Construction/Technology	Construction industry
	Technology sector
	Academia (structural or civic engineering)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (construction and technology)
	Sub-national executive office (construction and technology)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (construction and technology)
Environment	Environmental protection interest groups and NGOs
	National park or water resources management
	Academia (environmental sciences)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (environment)
	Sub-national executive office (environment)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (environment)
Consumer Protection	Consumers' interest groups
	Ministerial bureaucracy (consumer protection)
	Sub-national executive office (consumer protection)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (consumer protection)
Defence	Armed forces (e.g. professional military)
	Ministerial bureaucracy (defence)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (defence)
Electricity/Electrification	Management of energy providers
	Ministerial bureaucracy (electricity/electrification)
	Sub-national executive office (electricity/electrification)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (electricity/electrification)
Women's Affairs	Interest groups for women
	Charities for women
	Ministerial bureaucracy (women's affairs)
	Sub-national executive office (women's affairs)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (women's affairs)
Sports	Professional sports
	Sports management
	Ministerial bureaucracy (sports)
	Sub-national executive office (sports)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (sports)

Ministerial Portfolio	Occupational Area
Arts	Creative and cultural sector (e.g. artist)
	Management of cultural institutions
	Ministerial bureaucracy (arts)
	Sub-national executive office (arts)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (arts and cultural affairs)
Youth	Interest groups for youth and children
	Charities for youth and children
	Ministerial bureaucracy (youth ministry)
	Sub-national executive office (youth portfolio)
	Leading function in parliamentary committee (youth, children)

Appendix C: The Intra-Party Bargain over Ministerial Appointments: How Party Leader Performance Affects the 'Partyness' of Government

1. Descriptive Statistics

Table C 1: Descriptive statistics of main variables.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Party elite	.2719735	.4453457	0	1
Insider	.8606965	.3465504	0	1
Vote share (change)	-.0923835	4.480074	-16.89	15.4
Office surplus	-.6959518	4.069028	-12.7276	9.492491
Manifesto issues covered by portfolios (%)	65.65098	21.58077	22.39748	100
Single-party government (dummy)	.1890547	.3918772	0	1
Senior coalition party	.4328358	.4958798	0	1
Number of portfolios	10.36639	3.875184	5	18
Portfolio salience (objective)	1.012163	.4195163	.44	2.11
Portfolio salience (manifesto)	1	.929454	0	4.548683
Party leader (party elite)	.4560531	.4984784	0	1
Selectorate (size)	47.72696	13.64108	1	70
Cabinet reshuffle	.1824212	.3865119	0	1
State Funding (Share of Total Party Income)	24.20734	24.73224	0	84.19147

1.1. Party Elite and Insider Appointments

Table C2 and Figure C1 display descriptive information on the distribution of the dependent variable, party elite appointment. In addition, they present an overview over interrelations between party elite and insider appointments, the lower threshold for party appointments used in the literature. Ministers are coded as insiders if biographical data indicate that they have been party members, party officials, or public office holders on a party ticket before their nomination for government office (Amorim Neto & Strøm 2006; Bertsou & Caramani 2020; Cotta 2018; McDonnell & Valbruzzi 2014; Strøm 2002). Note that the insider group includes party elites. Cabinet members lacking pre-existing ties to the nominating party are categorised as outsiders.[53] As outlined in the paper, only members of national party executive bodies prior to

[53] Note that the outsider group also includes party switchers, e.g. ministers who were insiders in any other than the nominating party before their appointment.

their initial appointment to government qualify as party elites (Blondel & Cotta 2000; Helms 1993; Müller & Philipp 1987; Rose 1974).[54]

Table C 2: Cross-tabulation of party elite and insider appointments.

	Outsider	Insider	Total
Non-party-elite	84	355	439
	100%	68.4%	72.8%
	19.1%	80.9%	100%
Party elite	0	164	164
	0%	31.6%	27.2%
	0%	100%	100%
Total	84	519	603
	100%	100%	100%
	13.9%	86.1%	100%

Out of 603 ministers and junior ministers, appointed between 1945 and 2017, 86% were insiders and 27% were members of the party elite. While, by definition, all outsiders are non-party-elites, over 68% of insiders fall into that category as well, amounting to a moderate bivariate correlation (Cramér's V=0.25, p=0.000) between the two variables. The vast majority (81%) of non-party-elite ministers are thus drawn from the lower echelons of the party organization. Only the remaining 19% of that group have no prior ties to the nominating party, but frequently bring technical knowledge or expertise relevant to the portfolio they are appointed to (Kaltenegger & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2022). These numbers indicate that the issue of party elite (vs. non-party-elite) appointments is only loosely related to the problem of technocratic appointments.

When looking at the shares of insiders and party elite members in individual cabinets, shifts in the 'partyness' of appointments are evident. However, there is no clear secular trend towards more outsiders or non-party-elites in government. Insider appointments increased steadily from the immediate post-war period to reach their first peak at the beginning of the 1960s, where all

[54] Since the government might itself influence appointments to the top ranks of the party organisation, the measure also accounts for the possibility of the government 'colonising' the party leadership beforehand (Andeweg 2000; Blondel 2000). Specifically, the party leader might appoint loyal followers to government office and subsequently place them in party central office to extend their (the leader's) grip over the extra-parliamentary party organisation. To exclude these 'straw men' of the party leader from the party elite measure, I code only those ministers who held national party office before their first of potential consecutive appointments to government as party elite members. In this way, only those who have the credentials of genuine party elites (e.g. mobilising potential, independent intra-party support) are coded 1 for the party elite variable (Müller & Philipp 1987).

ministers were insiders. This happened a second time in the early 1980s, when party elite appointments also reached a singular 50% high point. When aggregating over 20-year periods, the share of insiders is remarkably stable, ranging from 84% to roughly 87%. Party elite appointments vary more strongly (20.9%-38.4%), with the lowest values in the 1960-1979 and the 2000-2020 periods. However, strikingly, the 27.2% overall share of party elite members across the 1945-2017 observation period is almost identical to the numbers reported by Müller and Philipp (1987) for the 1945-1987 period.[55] While there have never been below 73% insiders in any Austrian cabinet, the short-lived SPÖ-ÖVP coalition government under chancellor Christian Kern included not a single party elite appointee.

Figure C 1: Shares of party elite members and insiders in the cabinet.



1.2. Spoils and Policy Value of Ministerial Portfolios

This section provides additional information on the measurement of individual portfolios' value in terms of spoils and policy influence. To account for objective differences in spoils (relative power, resources and prestige) that the various ministerial portfolios offer, I use Druckman and Warwick's (2005) expert-survey based portfolio weights, where 1 represents the average portfolio and ratings below 1 indicate posts less valuable than average (Table C3). A score of

[55] Specifically, Müller & Philipp (1987) demonstrate that the share of formal party elites in the cabinet was 42% on average, while the share of real party elite members, accounting for colonisation of the party executive, was 27% between 1945 and 1987 (see footnote 2).

1.8, for instance, indicates that a portfolio is 80% more salient than the average post. As these ratings originally denote each portfolios overall importance, comprising their value in terms of distributable spoils and their non-party-specific ('objective') value regarding policy influence, they are a proxy rather than a direct measure. However, since more influential portfolios will also be associated with higher levels of prestige and access to larger pools of resources for the appointees, it should be a reasonably close approximation to the exclusive spoils value of a portfolio. While the use of these portfolio weights is well established in the literature, they are static, which will – at least to some extent – affect the accuracy of the measure across the observation period.

In contrast, the measure for policy influence varies across parties and over time. Since ministries' salience scores (originally a percentage of manifesto core-sentences dealing with policy areas within the ministry's competencies) have been standardised (by dividing each value by the average salience across all issues), the interpretation of the values is similar to the objective salience variable (Bäck et al. 2011; Ecker et al. 2015; Ecker & Meyer 2019). The value 1 represents the average portfolio in terms of policy influence. The value 0.83, for instance, indicates that the respective portfolio is 17% less important than the average portfolio, while a 1.76 score denotes a portfolio that is 76% more important than average. Table C4 displays mean standardised values by party, aggregated over the observation period, to demonstrate the face validity of these scores.

Table C 3: Portfolio spoils value based on expert salience ratings for ministerial portfolios in Austria (Druckman & Warwick 2005). Table C3 displays objective portfolio salience (which is used as proxy measure for each portfolio's spoils value), standard errors and the number of experts answering the survey question.

Portfolio	Salience	SE	N
Chancellor	2.11	0.24	14
Finance	1.64	0.14	14
Vice-Chancellor	1.41	0.17	14
Social Welfare/Affairs	1.25	0.09	14
Interior	1.25	0.09	14
Economic Affairs	1.2	0.1	12
Foreign Affairs	1.18	0.1	14
Trade	1.1	0.11	12
Employment	1.09	0.12	12
Justice	0.99	0.06	14
Education	0.98	0.06	14
Science & Research	0.89	0.05	13
Reconstruction	0.88	0.09	10
Agriculture	0.86	0.06	14
Family Affairs	0.86	0.08	14
State Enterprises/Nationalized Industries	0.85	0.08	12
Transport	0.83	0.04	14
Health	0.79	0.08	13
Construction & Technology	0.76	0.08	10
Environment	0.75	0.05	13
Consumer Protection	0.72	0.08	11
Defence	0.71	0.06	14
Electricity/Electrification	0.66	0.07	10
Women's Affairs	0.62	0.05	13
Sports	0.59	0.09	12
Arts	0.58	0.07	12
Youth	0.53	0.08	12
Secretary (Minister) of State – Chancellery	0.5	0.07	13
Secretary (Minister) of State – Other Departments	0.44	0.06	13

Table C 4: Mean portfolio policy value based on issue salience in electoral manifestos (Bäck et al. 2011; Dolezal et al. 2016; Müller et al. 2012). Table C4 displays mean standardised values by party (1945-2017).

Portfolio	ÖVP	SPÖ	FPÖ
Finance	0.87	0.46	0.73
Social Welfare/Affairs	1.84	1.70	1.71
Interior	2.04	1.76	2.62
Economic Affairs	1.74	1.37	0.96
Foreign Affairs	0.71	0.76	0.56
Employment	1.82	2.04	1.87
Justice	1.55	1.37	1.93
Education	0.83	1.19	1.00
Science & Research	0.30	0.50	0.45
Reconstruction	0.84	0.94	0.24
Agriculture	0.38	0.32	0.39
Family Affairs	0.42	0.40	0.45
State Enterprises/Nationalised Industries	0.39	0.45	0.15
Transport	0.19	0.28	0.34
Health	0.21	0.37	0.36
Construction & Technology	0.11	0.16	0.09
Environment	0.25	0.39	0.60
Consumer Protection	0.44	0.76	0.34
Defence	0.13	0.17	0.41
Electricity/Electrification	0.16	0.21	0.34
Women's Affairs	0.43	0.58	0.66
Sports	0.07	0.07	0.10
Arts	0.16	0.24	0.23
Youth	0.40	0.34	0.42

2. Party Leader and Party Elite Selection

The following section provides information on the processes of party leader selection and party elite selection in all parties included in the analysis. These formal rules and informal conventions are crucial determinants of the relationship between the party leader and the party elite and thus represent important boundary conditions for the theoretical model.

In almost all cases included in the statistical analysis, the party leader has been formally selected by party congress. The 'real' decision, namely the nomination for the party leadership, is typically made by the party elite beforehand and party congress only rubber-stamps the selection (Müller & Meth-Cohn 1991). SPÖ leaders before 1967 were – also formally –selected

by the party executive with party congress subsequently ratifying the decision. Selection mechanisms for national party executives vary more strongly between parties and over time. Varying portions of party executive members are selected by the respective party congresses in all three parties (again based on nominations by the party elite), by co-option or via ex-officio membership for specific office holders. Large shares of these positions, however, are regularly filled through delegation by various geographically and functionally defined subgroups (Müller et al., 1992). The composition of the national party executive is therefore determined by multiple selectorates in all parties studies. In practice, party elite membership typically requires support in a party subgroup with delegation rights to the national party executive (e.g. a regional branch or a functionally defined intra-party group representing trade unionists, entrepreneurs, famers, students etc.) or alternatively in the national party elite, which may co-opt members or nominate candidates for the party executive at party congress.

The relationship between the party leader and the party elite in SPÖ, ÖVP and FPÖ can thus be conceptualized as follows: Party leaders depend on a support coalition among party elites, because they are – at least informally – selected by that group. Beyond de/selection (the ultimate threat), party elites can put pressure on the party leader by threatening to withhold the support of the intra-party groups they represent in election campaigns or in the legislature. It is thus crucial for the party leader to sustain a sufficient level of support in the party elite group, which she can achieve by delivering on the party's goals or – in malperformance situations – by offering party elite members government jobs (Strøm, 1990). As a seat in the party executive can be acquired through multiple selectorates (this applies to all three parties and across the entire observation period), party elite members are usually relatively independent from the party leader's support. While this independence *enables* party elite members to stand up to the party leader in the cabinet when the party line or the interests of the intra-party group they represent are violated by the leader's course, sustaining a support coalition amongst their respective selectorate will also *require* them to do so at times.

2.1. Party Leader and Party Elite as Selectors of Ministerial Personnel

As outlined in the paper, the party leader and the remainder of the national party elite decide over the recruitment for government office in all parties studied. Specifically, ministerial candidates are either selected by the full party executive (SPÖ, ÖVP 1945-1989) or by the party executive (FPÖ, ÖVP 1989-2016) (Müller, 1992). The only exception included in the data set is the ÖVP in 2017, where nominations were made by the party leader alone – the respective

statutory rule changes were demanded by Sebastian Kurz when he took over the party leadership. However, excluding the Kurz I cabinet from the analysis does not alter the results. While it is likely that the 'real' decisions over appointments will often be made in smaller circles of party heavy-weights before a formal vote in the party executive is held, I assume that the size of the formal selectorate will – to a reasonable extent – reflect the difficulty a party leader faces when gathering support for her preferred nominations.

Due to organizational reform, the total number of formal selectors varies not only between parties but also over time between appointments of the same party. Descriptive statistics on the variable's distribution are displayed in Table C1 and Figure C2.

Figure C 2: Distribution of selectorate size.



3. Anecdotal evidence

The paper's core theoretical argument is that the process of ministerial selection is characterized by an intra-party bargain between the party leader and the party elite, where members of the party elite seek to be included in the cabinet and the party leader prefers to keep them out of government office to maximise her manoeuvrability in office. The study tests hypotheses on how the party leader's performance affects these processes by shifting the power balance between the actors involved in the bargain and finds support for this expectation in the statistical

analysis. While there exist – to the best of my knowledge – no qualitative accounts that directly link the process of ministerial selection to party leader performance, this section provides anecdotal evidence substantiating different aspects of the paper's theoretical argument.

A fairly well documented debate in the SPÖ party executive over the selection of a foreign affairs minister for the Kreisky II government supports the perspective that the party leader has incentives to minimize party elite appointments, while the party elite favours ministerial candidates from within this group. In a party executive session in 1974, Bruno Kreisky denied demands of the party elite to appoint SPÖ heavy-weight and foreign policy expert Karl Czernetz as foreign affairs minister (Schefbeck, 1995, p. 98). Instead of the long-serving party executive member Czernetz, Kreisky chose to nominate the technocrat Erich Bielka-Karltreu, who worked as a diplomat during Kreisky's time as foreign affairs minister (1959-1966). This was a controversial decision. Czernetz was widely respected within the party for his influential role in developing the party's foreign policy stances over decades. Bielka-Karltreu, on the other hand, was not even a party member and his aristocratic family background made him seem like an odd choice for a socialist government. While Kreisky justified his preference for Bielka-Karltreu in the party executive, arguing that he needed a technocrat to avoid 'troubles with the bureaucrats' (Schefbeck, 1995, p. 98; translation by the author), Kreisky's former confidant Heinz Fischer (1993, p. 238) recalls that Kreisky favoured outsiders in the foreign affairs ministry to personally stay in control over the government's foreign policy agenda.

Relatedly, the paper considers party elite members' individual office ambitions to be an important factor in the systematic preference divide between the leader and the party elite over ministerial selection. Naturally, the assumption that ministerial posts are attractive career opportunities for party elite members has been made elsewhere (Cotta, 2000; Müller & Strøm, 1999) and is hardly controversial. Nonetheless, long-term leader of the ÖVP's parliamentary group Andreas Khol provides a nice example of how party heavy-weights actively communicate their interest for such posts in government formation processes. As party whip, party executive member and member of the ÖVP team in the coalition negotiations of 1999/2000, Khol was an influential figure in the ÖVP during the formation of the first ÖVP-FPÖ cabinet. When the party assembled its team for the nationally and internationally controversial government, Khol (unsuccessfully) requested to be nominated for the interior ministry:

'*I ask him [note: party leader and soon-to-be chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel] in a one-to-one conversation, whether he would transfer me from the parliamentary party to the interior ministry. I would like to be minister of the interior, civil society minister. Schüssel says no: You have to stay party whip. We have sanctions now [note: EU-sanctions against Austria], the game will be very difficult, I need an experienced party whip who also has good relations to the FPÖ and who knows the other parliamentarians inside out. I comply reluctantly, because I see the logic – have to see it.*' (Khol, 2001, p. 129 ; translation by the author)

Although Wolfgang Schüssel's answer to Khol's request is not perfectly in line with the paper's theoretical model, it is rather unlikely that potential alternative (or additional) reasons for keeping Khol out of the cabinet – such as maximizing Schüssel's autonomy in government and his control over the government team – would be mentioned in such a conversation. In fact, the situation might have been similar to the one Kreisky was in when he gave the party executive an 'official' reason for denying its demand to appoint Czernetz to the foreign affairs ministry, while sharing his 'real' intentions only with his inner circle.

Moreover, the notion that a party leader's intra-party standing heavily depends on her ability to provide electoral success and access to government office is supported by various empirical studies (Andrews and Jackman 2008; Bynander and t'Hart 2007; Ennser-Jedenastik and Müller 2015; Ennser-Jedenastik and Schumacher 2021; Kaltenegger et al., 2021). Beyond mere correlations, however, it is also in line with how high-ranking political actors evaluate the impact of these factors on the party leader, as former Viennese ÖVP leader and party executive member Bernhard Görg's very blunt and somewhat bitter analysis of the ÖVP's intra-party struggles during Alois Mock's party leadership (1979-1989) illustrates:

'*[T]he party chairman is evaluated, first and foremost, based on power and majority acquisition. That is his function. It is not so much his function to lead an ideological movement [note: Gesinnungsgemeinschaft], but it is his function to provide power. […] [P]arty chairmen are treated badly if they are unable to achieve the ultimate goal […].*' (Wachter, 1994, p. 202 ; translation by the author)

Finally, the following sub-section presents a qualitative discussion of SPÖ ministerial appointments during the party leadership of Bruno Pittermann (1957—1967). The appointments made over the course of his leadership – which saw periods of relative success as

well as periods of perceived malperformance – underpin the overall plausibility of the paper's core theoretical argument. Pittermann's electoral record correlates negatively with the share of party elite members in the cabinet team, as expected. In addition, specific characteristics of the individual appointees (beyond party elite membership) support the notion that the party leader's choice was more constrained by the preferences of the party elite when he was unsuccessful than when he was successful.[56] Note that similar dynamics could be documented for other party leaders competing in multiple elections.[57]

3.1. SPÖ Ministerial Appointments under Party Leader Bruno Pittermann

Bruno Pittermann was elected SPÖ party leader in 1957 after his predecessors' (note: Adolf Schärf) successful presidential campaign. He also immediately took over the vice chancellorship – the highest government office available to the SPÖ in the Raab II cabinet – previously held by Schärf. From the outset, Pittermann was not an undisputed leader. The party was going through a period of perceived stagnation and Pittermann was confronted with several strong challengers in the party executive (Müller, 1995a). Under these circumstances, the party executive grew significantly more important in terms of its actual decision-making power (when compared to most other periods in party history), which led Pittermann himself to refer to it as a "*collective leadership*" (Müller, 1995a, p. 448; translation by the author).

Pittermann did not change the composition of the SPÖ's government team between his inauguration as vice chancellor in May 1957 and his first federal election as party leader in 1959. However, changes were made after the 1959 election, which turned out as a significant success for the party. With Pittermann as its leader, the SPÖ managed to gain 1.8% of the vote share. The SPÖ was widely perceived as the election winner, not only because it could increase its share of the vote while the ÖVP lost 1.7%, but also because the party was able to secure a relative majority (44.8%) of the vote.[58] Based on this promising electoral record, Pittermann nominated four new members for the Raab III government over the course of the cabinet's tenure, none of which were members of the party elite.[59] While the party elite members Eduard Weikhart and Karl Waldbrunner retained the cabinet posts they held in the previous government, Oskar Helmer – party executive member, deputy party leader and head of the

[56] For the sake of simplicity, the discussion focuses on electoral performance only.
[57] E.g.: Adolf Schärf, SPÖ party leader 1945—1957; Franz Vranitzky, SPÖ party leader 1988—1997; Julius Raab, ÖVP party leader 1952—1960; Wolfgang Schüssel, ÖVP party leader 1995—2007.
[58] Due to the electoral system in place at the time, this did not translate into a parliamentary majority.
[59] These new government members were Josef Afritsch and Max Eibegger in the initial round of appointments. Otto Rösch and Christian Broda were appointed later on, replacing Max Eibegger and Otto Tschadek respectively.

powerful Lower Austrian party branch – was replaced by non-party-elite Josef Afritsch (from Pittermann's stronghold, the Viennese party branch) as minister of the interior. Overall, the share of party elite members in the SPÖ government team dropped from 43% in the previous government (Raab II) to 28% in the Raab III cabinet.

While the following two cabinets[60] (which were formed without prior elections) saw no personnel changes on part of the SPÖ, the party elite expanded its direct influence in government after the relatively unsuccessful 1962 elections. Although the SPÖ had only lost close to one percent compared to its 1959 result and despite Pittermann's relative success in the subsequent coalition negotiations (Müller, 1995a, p. 449), the election outcome was perceived as a "disappointment" (SPÖ Zentralsekretariat, 1963, p. 78; translation by the author) within the party, reinforcing doubts about Pittermann's capacity to lead the party to a parliamentary majority. With the party leader weakened in the wake of the lost election, two party elite members were added to the SPÖ government team. Both new cabinet members, Otto Probst and Franz Olah, were text-book party heavy-weights. Otto Probst served as party central secretary (1946—1970), as MP (1945—1978) and was one of the most powerful players in the SPÖ party elite. As Probst and party leader Pittermann had their differences in terms of the party's coalitional strategy after the 1962 election (Müller, 1995b, p. 464), it is unlikely that Probst – who allegedly had aspired to government office for some time (Müller, 1995b, p. 462) – was Pittermann's preferred candidate. Arguably, the more plausible explanation for Probst's appointment might be that it was a necessary concession by the party leader to sustain his intra-party support.

The selection of Franz Olah for government office seems all the more hazardous from the party leader's standpoint. As president of the Austrian Trade Union Federation (1959—1963) and MP (1948—1961; 1962; 1964—1966) he played a crucial role in the SPÖ party executive of the early 1960s. Olah's personal ambition, his media savvy and his populist approach to politics must have made him a particularly uncomfortable choice for the 'traditionalist' party leader Pittermann (Lechner, 1995). Throughout his political career, Olah had proven himself to be a charismatic leader with a tendency to disregard party rules as well as the party line at times to promote his own political agenda. For instance, Olah had already caused significant trouble and unwanted media attention for Pittermann and the SPÖ in 1961 (not long before his inauguration

[60] Note: Raab IV and Gorbach I.

as minister of the interior), when he resigned from his parliamentary mandate to publicly express his opposition to a coalition compromise on income tax reform.[61] Given Olah's record and intra-party standing, it is unlikely that party leader Pittermann would have wanted Olah in his cabinet team. Again, the more plausible scenario is that Pittermann was 'buying back' support among the party elite by giving in to their demands in ministerial selection. While Otto Probst replaced party elite member Karl Waldbrunner as minister for transport and electrification – a move that did not interfere with the balance between party elite and non-party-elite ministers in the cabinet – Franz Olah took over the powerful interior ministry from non-party-elite Josef Afritsch. The overall share of party elite members among SPÖ ministers and junior ministers in the Gorbach II government thus rose again to 43% (three out of seven SPÖ cabinet members), in line with the theoretical model.

4. 'Mechanical' Effects of Electoral Performance on Party Elite Appointments?

An alternative explanation for the negative correlation between electoral performance and party elite appointments might be that the share of party elite members in the party's parliamentary group is higher after a lost election (as these candidates will usually have more promising positions on the party list) and that the party leader is therefore 'stuck' with more party elite candidates for ministerial office. In the following section, I examine the plausibility of this mechanism. Note, however, that it pertains to only one of the three types of party leader performance. In particular – unlike the bargaining mechanism proposed in the paper – mechanical shifts in the composition of the parliamentary party cannot explain the negative correlation between the party leader's performance in securing office spoils and party elite appointments.

The 'mechanical' explanation for the correlation between electoral performance and party elite appointments rests on the assumption that government personnel are exclusively (or almost exclusively) recruited from the party's parliamentary group. In Austria, however, there is no legal requirement or convention to draw ministerial candidates solely from this pool. Comparatively, Austrian cabinets are thus characterized by relatively low shares of ministers with parliamentary experience (De Winter 1991, p. 48). Party leaders typically have various recruitment pools besides the party's parliamentary group to select ministers from (such as party

[61] Olah's scandal-proneness would later cause even bigger problems for the party, leading to his resignation from government, to his exclusion from the SPÖ, to the foundation of splinter party, and finally to a one-year prison sentence for embezzlement.

and public offices at different levels, interest groups, the ministerial bureaucracies and academia) (Kaltenegger & Ennser-Jedenastik, 2022). While parliamentarians are still an empirically relevant group among Austrian ministers and junior ministers overall, the share of former MPs in government offices varies substantially between parties and cabinets, ranging from below 13% to 100%.[62] Accounting for this variation in the empirical analysis does not alter the findings. Results of the regression analysis are robust to interacting the electoral performance variable with the share of former MP's in the cabinet (as well as to controlling for the latter). This indicates that electoral performance retains an independent negative effect on party elite appointments, notwithstanding recruitments from the parliamentary party group. For the sake of transparency, the following subsection nonetheless provides empirical examples on party elite members' placement on candidate lists and on the composition of parliamentary groups after electoral gains and losses, respectively.

4.1. Party Elite Members as Candidates and MPs

As expected, party elite candidates rank higher on parties' candidate lists than lower-level partisans according to Austrian candidate survey data. Roughly 28% of national party officials included in the 2013 candidate survey reported that they had a 'safe seat' in parliament or that they at least had high chances to secure a mandate, while only 5% of the candidates without national party office were as optimistic (Müller et al., 2017). With slight variation, this pattern applies to all three parties studied in the paper.

To explore whether this leads to higher shares of party elites in the parliamentary group when the party loses at the polls I coded party elite membership (and non-membership) of SPÖ MPs in three legislatures.[63] Specifically, I selected the 25th legislature (where the SPÖ had lost 2.44% of its vote share and 5 seats; 2013) and the subsequent 26th legislature (where the SPÖ had recorded a marginal vote gain of 0.04% and retained all of its 52 seats; 2017). In addition, I coded the 20th legislature (1995) to be able to compare the composition of the parliamentary party after the vote loss of 2013 to a situation where the party had more substantial electoral success (3.14% vote gain) and where it was also represented in government. Table C5 provides

[62] Overall, more than 60% of all Austrian government members have had a parliamentary mandate at any time before their appointment to government office (e.g. not necessarily in the current legislation).

[63] While there is substantial variation across cabinets, all parties studied have very similar shares of former MPs amongst their ministers when aggregated over the observation period and should therefore be comparable. The SPÖ case was selected here for data availability reasons. Specifically, the SPÖ's party congress documentation contains the most comprehensive information on the composition of its party executive bodies (Müller and Kaltenegger forthcoming). This allows for matching individual MPs with lists of party executive members instead of more extensive biographical research on each individual MP.

an overview of the size and composition of the SPÖ's parliamentary group and its respective cabinet teams for these legislatures. Table C5 also includes information on the share of party elite members among SPÖ respondents in the 2013 candidate survey. Naturally, the latter should be taken with a grain of salt, due to potential selection bias. The share of party elite MPs after the 2013 election loss was indeed substantially higher (38%) than after the electoral success of 1995 (24%), which is in line with the 'mechanical' explanation outlined earlier. After the 2017 election, where the party's vote and seat shares stagnated, the share of party-elite MPs decreased slightly when compared to 2013 (33%). Also note that there is little variation with regard to the absolute number of party elite MPs across the three legislatures (N_{1995}=17, N_{2013}=20, N_{2017}=17).

Table C 5: SPÖ candidates (national elections 2013), MPs and cabinet members of the 20th, 25th, and 26th legislatures and respective shares of party elite members. Note that the numbers displayed do not include the party leader.

25th Legislature (2013) | 2.44% vote loss	N	Share of Party Elite Members (%)
SPÖ candidate survey respondents	172	15.7
SPÖ MPs	52	38.46
SPÖ ministers recruited from PP	5	40
SPÖ cabinet members (Faymann II)	9	22.22
26th Legislature (2017) | 0.04% vote gain		
SPÖ MPs	52	32.69
SPÖ ministers recruited from PP	none	
SPÖ cabinet members	none	
20th Legislature (1995) | 3.14% vote gain		
SPÖ MPs	71	23.94
SPÖ ministers recruited from PP	8	12.5
SPÖ cabinet members (Vranitzky V)	8	12.5

To what extent do such shifts in the composition of the parliamentary group affect the make-up of the party's government team? For one, these examples illustrate that recruitment patterns from the party's parliamentary group to its government team are not static. While 5 out of 9 SPÖ members of the Faymann II government were recruited from the parliamentary party, all

8 SPÖ ministers and junior ministers of the Vranitzky V cabinet had won a parliamentary mandate. As argued above, party selectorates are thus flexible in terms of the extent to which they use the parliamentary party as a recruitment pool for government office. What is more, while the share of party-elite MPs selected for the Faymann II government was slightly higher (40%) than the overall share of party elite MPs in the respective legislation (38.46%), party-elite MPs were clearly underrepresented in the government team (12.5%) relative to their overall share in the parliamentary group (23.9%) when the party had won the 1995 election. Again, this indicates that changes in the composition of the parliamentary group do not mechanically alter the composition of the government team. By tendency, these examples rather point to the bargaining mechanism as a disproportionately low share of party elite members was recruited from the pool of MPs after the electoral success of 1995, while party-elite MPs were marginally overrepresented in election loser Faymann's second cabinet. The notion that party elite appointments to government office are driven by an intra-party bargain between the party leader and the remainder of the party selectorate thus retains plausibility for the case studied, also when taking the alternative, 'mechanical' explanation into account. However, more comprehensive biographical data on political elites is needed to systematically investigate how changes in the composition of different recruitment pools might generally condition ministerial selection. Future research needs to address this issue.

5. Robustness Checks

This section provides additional regression models, corroborating the robustness of the main findings. Models 6–9 (Table C6) include alternative operationalisations of the main independent variables, alternative control variables, and rerun the main regression models with a subsample of ministerial appointments, omitting re-appointments. Models 10–13 (Table C7) and Models 14–17 (Table C8) provide further robustness checks by including a junior minister control variable and by re-running the regression analysis for first-round appointments only. Finally, Models 18–21 (Table C10) display aggregate-level OLS regression results, demonstrating that the paper's main findings are largely unaffected by the choice of empirical strategy.

5.1. Alternative Operationalisations, Alternative Controls and Sequential Appointments

In Model 6 the two office achievement variables are replaced by a more conservative measure, namely a dummy variable indicating whether the party has just entered government office. This is in line with Ennser-Jedenastik and Schumacher (2021), arguing that change in government

participation is an important driver of intra-party power. However, when studying governing parties, only one of two possible forms of change, gaining office, can occur. The arguably more impactful loss of government participation (Ennser-Jedenastik and Schumacher 2021) is logically impossible. Contrary to the operationalisation used in the main models, entering government does not affect party elite appointments in a significant way, while the effects of electoral performance persist. Model 7 utilises an adjusted measure for parties' potential policy influence in the cabinet. Analogous to the office spoils measure, I use the difference between a party's contribution to the coalitions parliamentary seats (in percent) and the policy-weighted seat share (Bäck *et al.* 2011; Ecker *et al.* 2015). This accounts for the possibility that, contrary to the theoretical expectation (Bäck *et al.* 2009; Browne and Feste 1975; Ecker and Meyer 2019; Gamson 1961; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Warwick and Druckman 2001), the proportionality criterion is also used to judge the party leader's performance in securing policy influence. As expected, however, the surplus version of the variable does not affect party elite appointments and coefficients of electoral performance and the office spoils variable are stable compared to Models 1–5.

Model 8 uses an alternative approach to assess potential long-term trends in party elite appointments. A substantial body of literature argues that these trends might be driven by the transformation of party organisation (Blondel and Cotta 2000; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Krouwel 2012; Strøm 2002). As parties depart from the archetypical mass party type and approach the cartel party form, intra-party power is increasingly centralised and the party in public office tends to overpower the party in central office (Duverger 1954; Katz and Mair 1995; 2018; Kirchheimer 1966; Michels 1949). Leaders of cartel parties should thus be less constrained by party organisation when selecting government personnel. Since party cartelisation is fundamentally associated with a changing composition of parties' financial resources – where state funding substitutes for the shrinking resources of parties' membership organisations (Gunlicks 1993; Kölln 2016; Krouwel 2012; Mair and Van Biezen 2001; Scarrow 2013) – I include the contribution of state funding to party finance as a proxy measure to account for these processes. Specifically, I control for the share of state funding in each party's yearly income, expecting larger shares of state funding to decrease the likelihood of party elite appointments. Since much of the variance in the composition of party finance stems from long-term change, I refrain from using period fixed effects in these models. For the years up to 1990, I draw on party finance information provided by Müller (1992). For the period between 1990 and 2013, I collected parties' financial reports – parties are obliged to publish yearly reports in

the official gazette section of the *Wiener Zeitung* – from public archives. Party income after 2013 is published online by the Austrian Court of Audit. I accessed this information in aggregated form via the non-profit platform *Parteispenden.at*. Contrary to the expectation that higher levels of party cartelisation will decrease the likelihood of party elite appointments, higher shares of state funding in party finance render these appointments more likely by tendency. This very small positive effect (AME: 0.002) passes the 0.01 threshold of statistical significance.

Model 9 uses each minister's initial appointment to government office only, to check for potential bias in the regression results due to reappointments. Since sequential appointments are the rule rather than the exception, restricting the regression models in such a way severely affects the number of cases, which drops from 514 to 225. As a result, uncertainty with regard to the regression coefficients increases strongly, leading almost all coefficients to lose statistical significance. Beyond that, regression results are still in line with the main findings presented in the paper. However, a thorough investigation of these effects, exclusively for first-time appointees, would require a larger sample.

Table C 6: Additional regression models using alternative operationalisations of the main explanatory variables as well as additional control variables (Models 6–8) and using each minister's initial appointment only (Models 9).

	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Vote share (% change)	-0.0465**	-0.0426**	-0.0483**	-0.106
	(0.0149)	(0.0144)	(0.0184)	(0.0648)
Office spoils (surplus)		-0.0659**	-0.0497*	-0.0225
		(0.0230)	(0.0203)	(0.0342)
Policy intentions covered by portfolios (%)			-0.0125	-0.00952
			(0.0121)	(0.0240)
Party new in government	0.149			
	(0.297)			
Policy intentions covered by portfolios (surplus)		0.0110		
		(0.0139)		
Single party government (dummy)	1.057+	1.920***	1.351*	1.980+
	(0.623)	(0.469)	(0.622)	(1.055)
Senior coalition party (dummy)	0.191	0.421	0.421+	-0.664
	(0.297)	(0.266)	(0.230)	(0.764)
Number of portfolios	-0.0596	-0.112**	-0.0401	-0.0607
	(0.0446)	(0.0369)	(0.0314)	(0.129)
Portfolio spoils value (objective salience)	0.211	0.284	0.288	0.443
	(0.317)	(0.308)	(0.301)	(0.336)
Portfolio policy value (subjective salience)	-0.116	-0.146	-0.127	-0.153
	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.204)
Party leader (party elite)	1.198***	1.449***	1.245***	1.664**
	(0.266)	(0.195)	(0.201)	(0.588)
Selectorate (size)	-0.00751	-0.0145*	-0.0106*	-0.00355
	(0.00675)	(0.00709)	(0.00532)	(0.0260)
Cabinet Reshuffle	-0.244	-0.244	-0.250	-0.642
	(0.388)	(0.397)	(0.416)	(0.401)
State Funding (Share of Total Party Income)			0.0114**	
			(0.00423)	
Party (reference: SPÖ)				
ÖVP	-0.864**	-0.838**	-1.067***	-1.236+
	(0.270)	(0.268)	(0.253)	(0.648)
Other	-0.130	-0.0882	-0.194	-0.622
	(0.352)	(0.385)	(0.403)	(0.866)
Period (reference: 1940-1959)				
1960-1979	-0.292	-0.221		1.257
	(0.182)	(0.173)		(0.976)
1980-1999	0.515+	0.742***		2.217*
	(0.309)	(0.218)		(0.956)
2000-2020	0.206	0.281		1.745+
	(0.380)	(0.206)		(0.908)
Constant	-0.828	-0.554	-0.417	-1.781
	(0.558)	(0.570)	(0.668)	(2.283)
Panel-level variance	-13.82	-15.63	-13.67	-14.83
Panel-level SD	0.00100	0.000404	0.00108	0.000601
N	514	514	514	225

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

5.2. Appointments to Junior and Regular Ministerial Positions

Table C 7: Additional regression models controlling for junior minister appointments.

	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13
Vote share (% change)	-0.0458***			-0.0440*
	(0.0139)			(0.0173)
Office spoils (surplus)		-0.0483*		-0.0482*
		(0.0192)		(0.0203)
Policy intentions covered by portfolios (%)			-0.00885	-0.00489
			(0.0104)	(0.0117)
Single party government (dummy)	1.129*	1.575**	1.169*	1.747**
	(0.532)	(0.560)	(0.580)	(0.631)
Senior coalition party (dummy)	0.178	0.295	0.138	0.332
	(0.300)	(0.266)	(0.279)	(0.266)
Number of portfolios	-0.0647	-0.114**	-0.0513	-0.0913*
	(0.0404)	(0.0369)	(0.0470)	(0.0402)
Portfolio spoils value (objective salience)	-0.168	0.0364	-0.0344	-0.0858
	(0.474)	(0.442)	(0.455)	(0.456)
Portfolio policy value (subjective salience)	-0.0982	-0.0906	-0.0632	-0.106
	(0.143)	(0.139)	(0.147)	(0.152)
Party leader (party elite)	1.265***	1.280***	1.109***	1.357***
	(0.219)	(0.244)	(0.238)	(0.191)
Selectorate (size)	-0.00709	-0.0102	-0.00403	-0.0133*
	(0.00700)	(0.00658)	(0.00628)	(0.00670)
Cabinet Reshuffle	-0.234	-0.320	-0.281	-0.272
	(0.396)	(0.381)	(0.378)	(0.403)
Junior minister	-0.536+	-0.317	-0.364	-0.479+
	(0.277)	(0.286)	(0.286)	(0.276)
Party (reference: SPÖ)				
ÖVP	-0.855**	-0.926***	-0.946***	-0.938***
	(0.276)	(0.208)	(0.251)	(0.255)
Other	-0.0292	0.0876	0.00803	-0.0638
	(0.416)	(0.399)	(0.389)	(0.366)
Period (reference: 1940-1959)				
1960-1979	-0.277	-0.222	-0.280	-0.168
	(0.183)	(0.203)	(0.198)	(0.196)
1980-1999	0.524*	0.739**	0.542*	0.660**
	(0.252)	(0.253)	(0.250)	(0.230)
2000-2020	0.206	0.295	0.274	0.359+
	(0.281)	(0.245)	(0.285)	(0.197)
Constant	-0.376	-0.206	-0.171	0.104
	(0.628)	(0.578)	(0.702)	(0.684)
Panel-level variance	-15.47	-15.46	-13.50	-15.58
Panel-level SD	0.000438	0.000440	0.00117	0.000415
N	514	527	527	514

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Junior minister positions differ substantially from regular ministerial posts in terms of their formal and actual role in the cabinet. While the portfolio spoils value variable accounts for these differences in the main regression models displayed in the paper (Table 1, see also Table C3), Models 10–13 include a separate control variable for appointments to junior minister positions as additional check on the robustness of the findings. The results of these models, displayed in Table C7, support the inferences drawn for the main explanatory variables. While insignificant in Models 11 and 12, the consistently negative coefficients for the junior minister dummy also match the overall expectation that party elite appointments are the less likely, the less valuable the respective government position.

5.3. First-Round Appointments and Appointments in Cabinet Reshuffles

As discussed in the paper, ministerial appointments in cabinet reshuffles differ from first-round appointments in various ways. While Models 1–4 account for these differences by including a reshuffle dummy variable, the fact that uncertainty increases substantially when excluding reshuffle appointments in Model 5 merits a further evaluation of the robustness of the findings. Models 14–17 therefore re-run all statistical models for the initial round of appointments only. Results again support the inferences drawn in the main models (Table C8). With regard to the specific differences between first-round and reshuffle appointments, a bivariate inspection supports the perspective that party elite appointments are less common in cabinet reshuffles (Table C9). While this is in line with the general expectation suggested in some of the theoretical literature that the autonomy of the 'party in government' vis-à-vis the 'party in central office' increases over the cabinet's tenure (Andeweg 2000, Blondel 2000, p.105; Krouwel 2012, p. 47), these differences are relatively small and do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in the main regression models (Table 6.1). Investigating whether the relative underrepresentation of party elite candidates in reshuffle appointments stems from a strategic advantage of the party leader vis-à-vis party elite nominators, as it was theorised in the paper, would require a qualitative examination of these processes.

Table C 8: Additional regression models using first-round appointments only.

	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17
Vote share (% change)	-0.0322*			-0.0306+
	(0.0156)			(0.0180)
Office spoils (surplus)		-0.0565*		-0.0569*
		(0.0239)		(0.0255)
Policy intentions covered by portfolios (%)			-0.00807	-0.00488
			(0.0116)	(0.0134)
Single party government (dummy)	0.640	1.223*	0.707	1.332+
	(0.495)	(0.589)	(0.540)	(0.725)
Senior coalition party (dummy)	0.169	0.306	0.146	0.337
	(0.312)	(0.295)	(0.298)	(0.305)
Number of portfolios	-0.0644+	-0.115**	-0.0501	-0.0947*
	(0.0360)	(0.0400)	(0.0460)	(0.0438)
Portfolio spoils value (objective salience)	0.189	0.249	0.193	0.250
	(0.380)	(0.370)	(0.371)	(0.372)
Portfolio policy value (subjective salience)	-0.0474	-0.0345	-0.00953	-0.0533
	(0.161)	(0.157)	(0.168)	(0.173)
Party leader (party elite)	1.084***	1.217***	0.994***	1.225***
	(0.245)	(0.253)	(0.243)	(0.221)
Selectorate (size)	-0.00771	-0.0132+	-0.00569	-0.0149*
	(0.00701)	(0.00740)	(0.00690)	(0.00742)
Party (reference: SPÖ)				
ÖVP	-0.771**	-0.812***	-0.836**	-0.835**
	(0.291)	(0.229)	(0.266)	(0.266)
Other	0.211	0.256	0.203	0.184
	(0.314)	(0.292)	(0.305)	(0.268)
Period (reference: 1940-1959)				
1960-1979	-0.351*	-0.287	-0.381*	-0.219
	(0.160)	(0.194)	(0.174)	(0.183)
1980-1999	0.364	0.593*	0.326	0.542*
	(0.242)	(0.293)	(0.236)	(0.263)
2000-2020	0.138	0.236	0.149	0.321
1960-1979	(0.306)	(0.266)	(0.302)	(0.242)
Constant	-0.642	-0.281	-0.312	-0.133
	(0.542)	(0.455)	(0.635)	(0.668)
Panel-level variance	-15.69	-15.71	-15.62	-15.77
Panel-level SD	0.000391	0.000388	0.000406	0.000376
N	415	421	421	415

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C 9: Crosstabulation of party elite appointments and appointments in cabinet reshuffles.

	Initial appointment round	Appointment in cabinet reshuffle	Total
Non-party-elite	351	88	439
	71.2%	80%	72.8%
Party elite	142	22	164
	28.8%	20%	27.2%
Total	493	110	
	100%	100%	

5.4. Aggregate-level OLS Analysis

As a final check on the robustness of the findings to different model specifications, Table C10 provides the results of OLS regressions with the share of party elite members aggregated by cabinet and party as dependent variable. While the logistic regressions presented in the paper also account for the hierarchical data structure, this more conservative strategy employs a dependent variable that is on the same level of analysis as the main explanatory variables. Although it comes with the caveat that theoretical expectations for appointment-level drivers (portfolio spoils value, portfolio policy value, cabinet reshuffle) cannot be considered, this approach supports the main findings of the paper. Results indicate that party leaders providing electoral gains and a surplus in office spoils have lower shares of party elite members in their cabinet teams. These negative associations of the two performance indicators with the share of party elites in the 'party in government' are statistically (Model 21: vote change: $p<0.1$; office spoils: $p<0.01$) and substantially significant. Gaining one percentage point of the vote share is associated with a 0.5% drop in the share of party elite members in the party's cabinet team, while receiving a surplus of 1% in terms of office spoils leads to a 1% decrease in party elite appointments. Similar to the logistic regressions, coefficients for policy influence (policy intentions covered by portfolios) have a negative sign but do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance in Models 20 and 21.

Table C 10: OLS regression models at the cabinet/party level with the share of party elite members in the cabinet team as dependent variable.

	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21
Vote share (% change)	-0.00596+			-0.00615+
	(0.00352)			(0.00322)
Office spoils (surplus)		-0.0114**		-0.0118**
		(0.00382)		(0.00406)
Policy intentions covered by portfolios (%)			-0.00204	-0.00125
			(0.00179)	(0.00172)
Single party government (dummy)	0.123	0.210*	0.134	0.233*
	(0.101)	(0.0895)	(0.103)	(0.0955)
Senior coalition party (dummy)	0.0261	0.0502	0.0203	0.0543
	(0.0490)	(0.0444)	(0.0475)	(0.0460)
Number of portfolios	-0.00854	-0.0164*	-0.00434	-0.0105
	(0.00905)	(0.00755)	(0.00979)	(0.00789)
Party leader (party elite)	0.201***	0.223***	0.178***	0.227***
	(0.0371)	(0.0341)	(0.0366)	(0.0309)
Selectorate (size)	-0.00246+	-0.00352*	-0.00180	-0.00392*
	(0.00142)	(0.00156)	(0.00164)	(0.00170)
Period (reference: 1940-1959)				
1960-1979	0.00116	0.0130	-0.000801	0.0293
	(0.0435)	(0.0417)	(0.0442)	(0.0419)
1980-1999	0.129*	0.156***	0.109*	0.151***
	(0.0523)	(0.0447)	(0.0503)	(0.0450)
2000-2020	0.0595	0.0742+	0.0627	0.101*
	(0.0572)	(0.0424)	(0.0609)	(0.0404)
Party (reference: SPÖ)				
ÖVP	-0.167***	-0.171***	-0.179***	-0.178***
	(0.0451)	(0.0381)	(0.0460)	(0.0445)
Other	0.00247	0.0294	0.0118	0.00349
	(0.0856)	(0.0717)	(0.0808)	(0.0793)
Constant	0.355***	0.428***	0.434***	0.455***
	(0.0957)	(0.0842)	(0.120)	(0.129)
R-squared	0.67	0.71	0.66	0.73
N	51	53	53	51

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

6. Exploring Insider Appointments

Table C11 displays logistic regression results with the appointees' insider status as the dependent variable. Otherwise, Models 22–26 mimic Models 1–5 as presented in the paper. This is to test whether drivers of party elite appointment affect the lower threshold for party appointments in a similar way. Findings indicate that the dynamics of insider and party elite appointments differ substantially. Contrary to party elite appointments, insider appointments are largely unaffected by party leader performance. Out of the three main explanatory variables, only electoral performance has a statistically significant effect on insider appointments in Model 26 (AME=0.005). Yet, the coefficient is positive, countervailing the theoretical expectation. The office achievement indicators show the expected negative sign, but are insignificant in all models. While the party leader might have incentives to promote outsider appointments (Marsh *et al.* 2010; Street 2012), these results suggest that the choice between insiders and outsiders is not a controversial issue in the intra-party bargain over ministerial appointments. Overall, this is in line with the theoretical argument that insider appointments are the standard approach for the selectors, while party elite appointments polarise more strongly.

Interestingly, the effects of different government types and the number of portfolios available to the party also differ starkly from Models 1–5. Unexpectedly, coefficients for single-party government and senior coalition party are negative, while the number of portfolios has a positive effect. However, neither of these coefficients reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. In contrast to party elite appointments, a portfolio's spoils and policy values affect the likelihood of insider appointments. Intuitively, handling the most salient policy fields is predominantly reserved for insiders (AME=0.03, Model 25). In contrast, insider appointments are the less likely, the higher the portfolio's spoils value (AME=-0.09, Model 25). Thus, the likelihood of outsider appointments is higher for more prestigious and resourceful portfolios. In part, this rather unexpected effect may be driven by the historically recurring practice in Austria of depoliticising the particularly sensitive and comparatively valuable ministries of finance, foreign affairs, and justice by nominating independent experts.

While the party leader's route to office affects insider and party elite appointments similarly, selectorate size has a highly significant, but positive coefficient in Models 22–26 (AME=0.004, Model 25). This divergence in the effects of selectorate size on insider and party elite appointments is still in line with selectorate theory. While smaller selectorates encourage party

leaders to pay off party elites with government posts ('private goods'), larger selectorates require the distribution of 'public goods' to keep the leader's support coalition intact (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). As recruiting public officials from the pool of party members is in the best interest of the entire party organisation (Strøm 1990) – as opposed to just a small circle of elites – insider appointments qualify as such 'public goods'.

By tendency, insider appointments are less likely in cabinet reshuffles. However, these effects are relatively weak (AME=-0.6, Model 25) and on the verge of statistical significance. Excluding reshuffle appointments from the regression analysis again does not alter the results in a substantial way (Model 14). Finally, and contrary to party elite appointments, differences between parties and time periods are inconclusive, indicating that insider appointments are of similar importance to all parties studied and have maintained their relevance across the observation period.

Table C 11: Logistic regressions using insider appointment (0=outsider; 1=insider) as dependent variable.

	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26
Vote share (% change)	0.0304			0.0424+	0.0545*
	(0.0211)			(0.0251)	(0.0264)
Office spoils (surplus)		-0.0507		-0.0440	-0.0482
		(0.0341)		(0.0376)	(0.0310)
Policy intentions covered by portfolios (%)			-0.0175	-0.0219	-0.0191
			(0.0113)	(0.0135)	(0.0144)
Single party government (dummy)	-0.806+	-0.481	-0.507	-0.391	-0.430
	(0.487)	(0.455)	(0.492)	(0.418)	(0.566)
Senior coalition party (dummy)	-0.387	-0.264	-0.363	-0.515	-0.451
	(0.327)	(0.309)	(0.316)	(0.348)	(0.399)
Number of portfolios	0.0529	0.0510	0.121+	0.102	0.0628
	(0.0624)	(0.0556)	(0.0674)	(0.0697)	(0.0769)
Portfolio spoils value (objective salience)	-0.900*	-0.866+	-0.915*	-0.866*	-0.463
	(0.435)	(0.442)	(0.435)	(0.426)	(0.498)
Portfolio policy value (subjective salience)	0.238*	0.234*	0.275*	0.267*	0.259+
	(0.115)	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.120)	(0.154)
Party leader (party elite)	1.036**	1.190**	1.068*	0.968*	0.986*
	(0.399)	(0.367)	(0.421)	(0.403)	(0.484)
Selectorate (size)	0.0345***	0.0273***	0.0356***	0.0408***	0.0386***
	(0.00768)	(0.00689)	(0.00819)	(0.0113)	(0.0114)
Cabinet Reshuffle	-0.545+	-0.553+	-0.521+	-0.576+	
	(0.316)	(0.305)	(0.313)	(0.325)	
Party (reference: SPÖ)					
ÖVP	0.826*	0.883**	0.866**	0.882**	0.677+
	(0.333)	(0.301)	(0.294)	(0.319)	(0.397)
Other	0.852	0.727	0.565	0.986+	0.751
	(0.553)	(0.451)	(0.468)	(0.541)	(0.660)
Period (reference: 1940-1959)					
1960-1979	0.620	0.696	0.672	0.723	1.134*
	(0.551)	(0.544)	(0.549)	(0.558)	(0.466)
1980-1999	0.721	0.763	0.596	0.677	0.836
	(0.557)	(0.536)	(0.580)	(0.556)	(0.594)
2000-2020	0.296	0.451	0.548	0.635	0.916
	(0.533)	(0.512)	(0.587)	(0.567)	(0.614)
Constant	0.388	0.304	0.355	0.967	0.497
	(0.765)	(0.732)	(0.840)	(0.841)	(1.057)
Panel-level variance	-13.48	-13.47	-13.37	-13.40	-23.30
Panel-level SD	0.00118	0.00119	0.00125	0.00123	0.00000871
N	514	527	527	514	415

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Abstracts

English

The bulk of the party organization literature conceptualizes intra-party power as a relatively stable characteristic of the party defined by its formal rules. Hence, we still know surprisingly little about the situational shifts in intra-party power that exist beyond party statute change. This paper-based dissertation explores the drivers and consequences of these intra-party power dynamics. The three empirical papers address key gaps in the literature and contribute novel theoretical perspectives on the intra-party pressures party elites are exposed to in different situations. The individual contributions are guided by two overarching research questions: What are the drivers of intra-party power dynamics? And how does intra-party power affect ministerial selection? The first paper studies drivers of party elite responsiveness towards rank-and-file policy and organizational demands at party congress, using original data on motion treatment at 41 party congresses of the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ). The paper contributes rare systematic evidence on short-term change in the relative influence of party activists on party decisions. The second and third papers shift the focus to a decision-making area where intra-party power has rarely been considered a relevant factor: the selection of government personnel. Based on a novel, comprehensive dataset on ministerial appointments in Austria, the second article explores the portfolio-specific constraints rank-and-file demands impose on party elite selectors. The third paper then zooms in on the power struggle at the top of the party hierarchy – between the party leader and the remainder of the party elite – over the latter's access to government office. Both papers add to the ongoing academic debate on party and technocratic government. Findings of the three empirical studies indicate that intra-party power is a much more fluid phenomenon than anticipated in most of the literature. Results suggest that parties' internal power equilibria shift in response to the competitive pressures the party is exposed to. Party elites (collectively) as well as the party leader (individually) are the less constrained by bottom-up demands, the more they deliver on the party's electoral and office goals. In ministerial selection, party elites' choices are largely unaffected by rank-and-file demands but the relative power of the party leader within that group conditions to what extent cabinet members are recruited from the party executive.

German

Der Großteil der Literatur zu Parteiorganisationen versteht innerparteiliche Machtverhältnisse als relativ konstante Eigenschaften politischer Parteien, die vom statutarischen Regelwerk vorgegeben werden. Zu parteiinternen Machtdynamiken innerhalb des statutarischen Rahmens und darüber hinaus existieren hingegen kaum systematische Studien. Diese kumulative Dissertation untersucht Ursachen und Auswirkungen solcher Machtdynamiken. Die drei empirischen Papiere setzen sich mit zentralen Forschungslücken auseinander und entwickeln neue theoretische Perspektiven auf den innerparteilichen Druck, der in unterschiedlichen Situationen auf Parteieliten einwirkt. Die individuellen Beiträge behandeln folgende übergreifende Forschungsfragen: Welche Faktoren beeinflussen innerparteiliche Machtdynamiken? Und wie wirken sich innerparteiliche Machtverhältnisse auf die Selektion von Regierungspersonal aus? Auf Basis eines innovativen Datensatzes zur Behandlung von Anträgen an 41 Parteitagen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) untersucht das erste Papier Einflussfaktoren auf die Responsivität von Parteieliten gegenüber policy- und organisationsbezogenen Forderungen von Parteiaktivist:innen. Der Artikel präsentiert seltene systematische Evidenz zu situativen Verschiebungen im relativen Einfluss verschiedener innerparteilicher Akteur:innen auf Parteientscheidungen. Das zweite und dritte Papier fokussieren auf einen Entscheidungsbereich, für welchen bislang innerparteiliche Machtverhältnisse selten als potenzielle Einflussfaktoren untersucht wurden: die Selektion von Regierungspersonal. Unter Verwendung eines umfassenden Datensatzes zur Ernennung von Minister:innen in Österreich untersucht der zweite Artikel inwiefern Forderungen der Parteibasis die Entscheidungsfreiheit von Parteieliten bei der Ernennung von Minister:innen in unterschiedlichen ministeriellen Portfolios einschränken. Der dritte Artikel befasst sich schließlich mit den Machtkämpfen innerhalb der Parteielite, zwischen dem/der Parteiführer:in und den übrigen Mitgliedern der Parteielite, über den Zugang Letzterer zu Regierungsämtern. Beide Papiere leisten Beiträge zur aktuellen akademischen Debatte über Parteienregierung und technokratische Regierungsformen. Die Ergebnisse der drei empirischen Studien legen nahe, dass innerparteiliche Machtverhältnisse wesentlich weniger starr sind als bisher vom Großteil der Literatur angenommen wurde. Innerparteiliche Machtverschiebungen werden insbesondere von der Performanz der Partei im Parteienwettbewerb beeinflusst. Die Handlungsspielräume der Parteielite (als Kollektiv) und des/der Parteiführers:in (als Individuum) sind umso weniger von den Forderungen unterer Hierarchieebenen beschränkt, je besser es ihnen gelingt elektorale Ziele der Partei zu erreichen und Zugang zu öffentlichen Ämtern zu gewährleisten. Bei der Selektion von Minister:innen werden die Entscheidungen der Parteielite nicht wesentlich von

den Anliegen der Parteibasis beeinflusst, aber die relative Macht des/der Parteiführers:in innerhalb der Parteielite hat Auswirkungen auf die personelle Verflechtung zwischen dem Regierungsteam und den Führungsgremien der Partei.