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MASTER THESIS

Titel der Master Thesis / Title of the Master's Thesis

„Will the German *Zeitenwende* lead to higher integration in the Security and Defense Politics of the European Union?“

verfasst von / submitted by

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angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Advanced International Studies (M.A.I.S.)

Wien 2023 / Vienna 2023

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt
Postgraduate programme code as it appears on the
student record sheet:

A 992 940

Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt
Postgraduate programme as it appears on the
student record sheet:

Internationale Studien / International Studies

Betreut von / Supervisor:

Priv. Doz. Robert Schuett Ph.D.



diplomatische
akademie **wien**

Vienna School of International Studies
École des Hautes Études Internationales de Vienne

***“On my honor as a student of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien,
I submit this work in good faith and pledge that
I have neither given nor received unauthorized assistance on it”***

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Abstract of the Master Thesis (English Version)

War reigns in Europe. The War in Ukraine is threatening international law, the sovereignty of States, and the functioning of international organizations. In the face of War and Destruction, the European Union is required to act and decide on its future security strategy.

This master thesis aims to analyze and deepen the available knowledge on Europe's stance on Security and Defense as well as its current and potential future role in military operations. It focuses on determining whether the German Zeitenwende will lead to more Integration in EU Security and Defense Politics and can thus lead to the development and establishment of a European Defense System.

The current Security Climate regarding a European Defense System is as favorable as it could possibly be, with political and social support within Germany for investments in its military, the EU's two main powers, Germany, and France, on good terms, political stability within Europe providing the necessary environment for such a huge project to come to fruition, and War raging in Europe providing the necessary incentive to build a strong Defense System.

The legal, political, and social framework for a European Defense System is in place, but it is still unclear whether the political elite in Europe will have the courage and rationality to follow it.

Abstract of the Master Thesis (German Version)

Es herrscht Krieg in Europa. Der Krieg in der Ukraine bedroht das internationale Recht, die Souveränität des Staates sowie das Funktionieren internationaler Organisationen. In Angesicht von Krieg und Zerstörung muss die Europäische Union handeln und über ihre zukünftige Sicherheitsstrategie entscheiden.

Diese Masterarbeit zielt darauf ab, das verfügbare Wissen über Europas Haltung zu Sicherheit und Verteidigung sowie seine aktuelle und potenzielle zukünftige Rolle in militärischen Operationen zu analysieren und zu vertiefen.

In diesem Zusammenhang konzentriert sich diese These auf die Frage, ob die deutsche Zeitenwende zu mehr Integration im Bereich der EU-Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik führen wird und somit zur Entwicklung und Etablierung eines europäischen Verteidigungssystems führen kann.

Das derzeitige Sicherheitsklima in Bezug auf ein europäisches Verteidigungssystem ist so günstig wie nur möglich, mit politischer und sozialer Unterstützung innerhalb Deutschlands für Investitionen in sein Militär, die beiden Hauptmächte der EU, Deutschland und Frankreich, pflegen ein gutes Verhältnis und streben mehr Kooperation an, existierende politische Stabilität in Europa die das notwendige Umfeld für die Verwirklichung eines so großen Projektes schafft, und der in Europa tobende Krieg, der den nötigen Anreiz zum Aufbau eines starken Verteidigungssystems bietet.

Es gibt rechtliche, politische und gesellschaftliche Voraussetzungen für die Schaffung eines europäischen Verteidigungssystems, aber die Frage bleibt, wann die europäischen politischen Eliten den Mut und die Vernunft aufbringen werden, diesen Weg zu gehen.

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Professor Robert Schuett, for his unwavering support and guidance throughout the research process. Professor Schuett provided invaluable feedback on my work, challenged me to think critically, and pushed me to do my best. Without his guidance, this thesis would not have been possible.

I am also grateful to the members of the thesis committee of the Diplomatic Academy, for their time and efforts in reading and providing feedback on my thesis. Their constructive criticism and insightful comments helped me to refine my work and produce a better final product.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge my family and friends for their constant support throughout my academic journey. Their love and encouragement kept me motivated during difficult times and made the journey much more enjoyable.

Thank you all for your support and guidance throughout this process.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Section 1.1. War in Europe

The current tragic security crisis has shown us that War is a phenomenon not only found in a distant past or in a distant country but also a disaster that can happen anywhere, anytime, even in Europe. The War in Ukraine has been raging since the 24th of February 2022 but a peaceful end to this deathly conflict is nowhere near at the current time.

While the Ukrainians need to continue to muster up their courage in their fight against the Russians, Europe must also brace for a harsh and cold winter. Europe's decadence and ignorance regarding its geopolitical delicate position have put it in a vulnerable spot. Indeed, Europe, while being highly energy-dependent on Russia, is nonetheless militarily dependent on the West, especially the United States of America. Thus, Europe is in between two seats and must find its own independent strategic solution. Europe needs to wake up if it aspires to be anything more than a mere puppet in the power play between the East and the West.

Although brutal and disastrous, the Ukraine War has nonetheless presented Europe with an opportunity. Europe must realize that the time of military neutrality and disarmament must come to a stop as it otherwise risks becoming totally strategically vulnerable and dependent on external support.

Hence, the true problem resides in Europe's inability to adequately promote and defend its interests and guarantee its sovereignty through military capabilities.

This problem, European Defense, is intrinsically linked to other challenges and there are multiple obstacles that Europe needs to overcome if it aspires to be militarily independent, both on the European and International Levels.

On the *European level*, such challenges are:

First, the lack of military capabilities of individual Member States. Indeed, with the exit of the UK, France remains the sole EU Member state with nuclear capabilities. Germany, while being the economic heart of the EU, has, through its adopted position of pacificism, become militarily weak and strategically vulnerable.

Second, the difficulties regarding military interoperability among Member States due to different military equipment. The use of different military equipment also results in a loss of financial resources as there is a duplication of equipment. This lack of harmony regarding the choice of defensive weapons, military facilities, and vehicles is, however, closely linked to the third major challenge.

Third, the area of Security and Defense is highly critical among Nations as each State intends to safeguard its sovereignty through its own means without having to consult others. This makes cooperation in this domain particularly difficult as it touches on the fundamental aspect of a State: its survival.

On the *International level*, such obstacles include:

First, the competition with the USA. Indeed, the European Union is currently a strong military ally of the USA and while it would seem logical to assume that a military revival in Europe would allow it to become a stronger ally for the USA, it is also possible that the USA might feel threatened by a militarily stronger Europe. Furthermore, the USA might want Europe to be militarily weak in order for Europe to be more easily controllable as it continues to be dependent on the military assistance stemming from the USA.

Second, based on the first international obstacle (competition with the USA), if the European Union is able to achieve a European Defense System, then this European Defense System might be in competition with NATO. While it is desirable that NATO and a European Defense System cooperate in order to be more effective (because Europe could act independently of the resources of the USA) it is also possible to perceive a European Defense System as being a direct competitor of NATO.

The impact of the War in Ukraine is huge: through his aggressive annexation attempts of Ukraine, Russia under Putin has breathed new life into NATO, caused the Russian economy to crumble, **united the European Union**, **ended** Swiss neutrality together with **German postwar pacifism**, and truly gave Ukraine its national identity (Cohen 2022).

Section 1.2. Research Question

Jean-Claude Juncker, former President of the European Commission, already believed and highlighted in 2017 the role of the European Union as a security community when he said during a Citizen's Debate in Malta:

"I do think that the European Union as a concept, as a construction, as a history is a guarantee against war and a guarantee for peace."

(Juncker 2017)

It is precisely Germany's new strategic options, available through its rearmament, that present a decisive moment in the history of the military autonomy of the European Union. Whether or not Jean-Claude Juncker's statement of 2017 and his belief in the role of the EU as a guarantor of peace will become true depends on key military players in Europe. Indeed, if one aspires to be the protector of peace, one also needs to be willing and capable of going to War to defend it.

With regards to the German Zeitenwende, four scenarios can be envisaged:

- 1) The German Zeitenwende will have no considerable impact, neither for NATO nor with regards to furthering the EU integration in the area of Security and Defense.
- 2) The German Zeitenwende will be beneficial to NATO but not to the Security and Defense politics of the EU.
- 3) The German Zeitenwende will be beneficial to NATO and increase the EU integration in the area of Security and Defense, but it will not lead to the establishment of a European Defense System.
- 4) The German Zeitenwende will be beneficial to NATO, and it will lead to higher EU integration in the area of Security and Defense and thus contribute to the development and establishment of a European Defense System.

This master thesis aims to analyze and deepen the available knowledge on Europe's stance on Security and Defense as well as its current and potential future role in military operations.

In this context, this Thesis focuses on determining whether the German Zeitenwende will lead to more Integration in EU Security and Defense Politics and can thus lead to the realization of the fourth scenario.

Section 1.3. Methodology

I will conduct a Qualitative Analysis (i) as well as a Quantitative Analysis (ii) throughout this master thesis.

i. Qualitative Analysis

The main angle of analysis of this master thesis will be a Qualitative Analysis. Indeed, I will limit the scope of my master's thesis to the case of Germany. Indeed, I will analyze only the political climate within Germany, by studying the discourses of German party leaders as well as the agenda of various political groups.

The reason for neglecting the impact of other EU countries (except France which I will study shortly in 4.3. "*Aspects of Further Research*") is that Germany is one of the major, if not even the biggest military player in the European Union. The European Union has numerous important military powers such as France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Finland, Sweden, and Spain. In the hierarchy of military powers, Germany, due to its immense size, is likely to occupy the first or at least second place (given that France possesses nuclear weapons of mass destruction).

As France clearly favors European Strategic Autonomy and an EU Army, one needs to turn to Germany to analyze the likelihood of this project. Germany is divided when it comes to a European Defense project and this is why I believe that there is no need to look further down the list of less powerful military powers if already the second (or even most powerful) military power is unsure about a European Defense Project.

ii. Quantitative Analysis

Next to the Qualitative Analysis contained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 (3.1. ; 3.2. ; 3.3.) a brief Quantitative Analysis will be conducted in 2.2.1. ("*Germany's military assets*") and in 3.4.

In 3.4., particularly in 3.4.1.2. ("*European Armory*"), we will conduct a Quantitative Analysis by analyzing and comparing popular weapon systems of militarily powerful EU Member States (Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) and the USA.

The aim of 3.4.1.2. is to highlight the economic waste that results from the lack of unity in the choice of weapons (higher procurement and higher maintenance costs).

Section 1.4. Literature Review

The significance of the topic of European Security has been highlighted through two major events that changed Europe's classical way of thinking about security:

- Germany's military rearmament
- Ukraine-Russia War

Another reason why people should listen to our analysis of the problem of European Security is that our approach has a twist that is that the existing literature is not yet very elaborate. Indeed, our approach to European Security has at its basis the two current triggers that I mentioned beforehand: War in Ukraine and the military revival in Germany (although we will limit/focus on the German trigger).

Given the freshness and recency of the topic of European Security with regard to these two pivotal events in the history of Europe, the literature on the issue of a *Zeitenwende* in Europe is rather scarce.

While there are numerous books, articles, and research papers published regarding the Security and Defense of the European Union, there are far fewer documents that deal with the idea of a "*Zeitenwende* in European Security", meaning a **Germany-focused EU-Defense approach** as Germany was for a long time not a key military player in Europe. The former books, articles, and research papers surrounding the topic of European Security will be crucial in understanding the basic and complex notions and concepts of Europe and Security.

Among others, key **books** that have been consulted in the drafting of this master thesis are:

First, the Oxford Handbook of Populism, especially Chapter 3 “*Populism – A Political-Strategic Approach*” written by Weyland Kurt was crucial to defining Populism in 1.5.1.2. Therefore, this book provided the required theoretical basis for our qualitative analysis (3.3.2.1.) of the German political landscape, especially the danger of its populist parties regarding a European Defense System.

Second, the book “*The Military Balance of 2022*” was crucial to our quantitative analysis and comparison of EU/US military capabilities in 3.4.1.2. (“*European Armory*”).

Furthermore, relevant **articles stem from Web Sites** such as:

First, the NATO website contained numerous information on its historical roots, its evolution, and its current role as a Security Organization.

Second, the different websites of EU institutions contained important information on their purpose, their historical development, and their current role.

Third, the article “*The making of Vladimir Putin*” written by Roger Cohen, a journalist for the New York Times, and published on the 26th of March 2022, documented the evolution of the Russian Head of State and was insofar important as the Russian War of Aggression provides, next to the German military revival, another trigger for a European Defense System.

Moreover, **research papers and commentaries** that have been of tremendous importance are:

First, Tagarev Todor's research paper “*The Art of Shaping Defense Policy: Scope, Components, Relationships (but no Algorithms)*” was crucial to the development of this thesis because it provided insights into how a Nation selects its Defense Policy and served as the foundation for defining the purpose, nature, range, and degree of defensive measures.

Second, the paper “*The Concept of Security*” written by Baldwin David was important in determining the actors, values, degrees, and means to obtain Security.

Third, the commentary “*WASHINGTON SHOULD HELP EUROPE ACHIEVE ‘STRATEGIC AUTONOMY,’ NOT FIGHT IT.*” written by Kunz Barbara and Kempin Sonja was vital for determining the impact of a strong and independent European Defense System on EU/US relations.

Additionally, we analyzed speeches and messages of key political figures, such as Olaf Scholz or Lars Klingbeil in order to determine the current position of the German political elite on national and EU Security and Defense Politics.

Further relevant academic contributions used in this Thesis stem from the Encyclopedia Britannica concerning the general definitions of Security, Defense, Deterrence, and Geopolitics.

This master thesis aims to add value to the already impressive quantity and quality of existing literature surrounding European Security, by aiming to capture the freshness and recency of this topic through its political-military approach consisting in evaluating the probability and possibility of a European Defense System, as well as analyzing the quality of existing triggers (revised German security politics combined with brutal military realities observable through the War in Ukraine) whose impact is crucial on Europe's Security and Defense politics.

Section 1.5. Theoretical Framework

1.5. is divided into two sub-sections, each dealing with fundamental elements surrounding the topic of European Security.

Whereas 1.5.1. deals with the core military and political concepts of European Security, 1.5.2. is designed to provide further information, stemming from a variety of disciplines, on European and Security matters.

Sub-section 1.5.1. Conceptual Framework

Paragraph 1.5.1.1. Military Concepts

I. What is Security?

Security as a concept has become increasingly important in current political discussions due to the ongoing War in Ukraine which is posing a Security-threat to Europe.

David A. Baldwin, the author of the Journal Article entitled “*The Concept of Security*”, has defined Security as “*a low probability of damage to acquired values*” (Baldwin 1997, 13). Hence, he divides Security matters into two categories:

First, it is crucial to note that there are different perceptions of “Security”: **Security for whom?**

Second, while there are multiple perceptions of security, that allow judging a situation differently, depending on one’s perspective (Individuals, States, NGOs, or International Organizations), the content of Security may vary from one situation to another: **Security for which values?**

Often, actors determine security on the basis of certain values such as the physical safety as well as the psychological well-being of individuals or the economic welfare within a certain area. In the case of national security, the list of values that require protection also includes territorial integrity, together with political independence, sovereignty, and autonomy (Baldwin 1997, 13).

General Jacob L. Devers argues that security is absolute, a situation is either secure or insecure:

“National security is a condition which cannot be qualified. We shall either be secure or we shall be insecure. We cannot have partial security. If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all.” (Brodie 1950)

However, we believe in the existence of varying degrees of security. Indeed, we further argue that no situation can ever be truly secure. We will later during 1.5.2. mention the doctrine of Realism, according to which smaller States will form alliances in order to defeat a bigger enemy.

Having defined the actors, values, and degrees of security we also need to determine the means to obtain security.

Security can be achieved through various means: Diplomacy and negotiations being the political solution to solve security issues between sovereign Nations and military interventions being the last resort to solve conflicts and restore security.

As the main focus of this Thesis does not lie on diplomatic but military interventions, we will focus on this latter method of conflict resolution.

Security on the State level can be achieved through strong military capabilities. These military capacities can be used for defensive purposes as well as for offensive purposes.

Lastly, obtaining security does not only depend on the actor and his subjective territorial perspective but it also depends on the time period within which security policies are adopted. Indeed, while it may be tempting to attack a provoking enemy, this might not always be the most beneficial decision in the long run as it is sometimes better to build relations than to build walls that separate us. Indeed, short-term and long-term security policies may be in conflict with each other (Dahl and Lindblom 1953).

For further information regarding “Security for whom”, “Security for which values” and the varying degrees of security, please consult Appendix A.

II. What is Defense?

A Nation's Defense Policy analyses not only WHAT needs to be achieved (= objectives) but also HOW to achieve them (= capabilities) (Tagarev 2006).

Procedure to determine the objectives of the armed forces (Tagarev 2006, 19-21):

First, **Security Objectives** need to be elaborated on the basis of:

- The values and interests of a State or Alliance
- Analysis of the Security Environment, meaning the perceived threats (f.i. International Terrorism, Organized crime, Human Rights Violations, ...)

Second, **Defense Objectives** are established through the:

- Security Objectives
- Security Strategy
- Importance of the Military on the national level

Procedure on how to define the capabilities needed to achieve the objectives of the armed forces:

Capabilities can vary in accordance with three variables, namely: (Tagarev 2006, 24-25)

- The Defense Objectives / Defense Missions of the Nation
- The scenarios in which a State wishes to attain these Defense Objectives / Defense Missions
- The level of performance a State wishes to possess when completing its Defense Objectives / Defense Missions

Having defined the objectives and the capabilities of a State regarding its Defense policymaking, we also need to analyze the **purpose, nature, and range of defensive measures** themselves.

The **purpose of a defensive measure** is to safeguard the core values of a State that are crucial for its existence and its proper functioning, such as:

- National sovereignty
- Territorial integrity
- Independence

As already mentioned before, the **nature of military capacities** can vary depending on the surrounding situation. Indeed, military capacities can sometimes be used for defensive purposes as well as for offensive purposes.

In order to understand the right to Self-Defense contained in Article 51 of the UN Charter, it is crucial to understand what defines a “*defensive measure*” and comprehend the **range of defensive measures** available to a State in assuring its Defense.

First, Article 51 only mentions the possibility of defending yourself once you have already been attacked. Hence, it defines the right to Self-Defense as a right to Counterattack.

Second, Article 51 also mentions the “inherent right to self-defense”. The relevant case law regarding this inherent right stems from the *Caroline Case of 1843*, where it was decided that one can strike first and does not need to wait until one is being attacked if:

- There is an imminent threat
- There is a need for Self-Defense

The Caroline Case criteria of 1843 are also known as Preventive Self-Defense.

Third, Anticipatory Self-Defense is another angle to look at the right to Self-Defense.

The Bush Doctrine adopted this perspective of Self-Defense in its war against Iraq (Murphy 2005). Whereas a counterattack Self-Defense strategy or a preventive Self-Defense strategy are both based on the aspect of the imminence of danger, the anticipatory Self-Defense strategy loses this aspect of imminence as the mere potential of an attack suffices to attack this possible aggressor. Indeed, as long as the other side has military destructive capabilities, one can attack this potential enemy when one has a genuine belief it will attack.

Thus, this strategy is not based on facts or truths but on beliefs and this makes this strategy highly vulnerable as there is a strong risk of possible abuse, meaning that States will be able to attack anybody who threatens their well-being by claiming they have reason to believe that the enemy is in possession of weapons of mass destruction and is willing to use them.

Therefore, the scope of Defense measures ranges from Counterattack (Article 51 of the UN Charter) to Preventive Self-Defense (Caroline case criteria), up to Anticipatory Self-Defense. We will exclude the possibility of Anticipatory Self-Defense in our further reasoning as the risk of abusing them or simply miscalculating the intentions of the enemy is too high to be accurately used. Hence, we will only consider Strategies based on Counterattacks or Preventive Self-Defense as legitimate Defense policies.

Lastly, we will analyze the **degree to which a weapon can be considered merely defensive**.

We mentioned earlier that the purpose of a defensive weapon is to protect oneself from an enemy's attack. However, the question arises whether a defensive weapon can ultimately lead to the destruction of the enemy?

We believe that the key to answering this question resides in the **principle of proportionality**. Indeed, the retaliation needs to be proportionate to the danger. Hence, if the enemy is destroying a road, then it would be disproportionate to neutralize it.

Thus, as long as the State employs a policy that is based on the strategy of counterattacks or Preventive Self-Defense and as long as the weapons are used in order to safeguard the Security Objectives of a State and are utilized in accordance with the principle of proportionality, we believe that the State uses a Defense Policy and not an Offense/Attack Policy.

We have now analyzed the concept of Defense from a policy-making perspective, and have determined the purpose, nature, range, and degree of defensive measures.

For further information regarding the Security objectives, the Defense objectives, or the MAD System, please consult Appendix A.

III. What is Deterrence?

Deterrence “discourages an adversary from pursuing an undesirable action [...] by changing the adversary's calculation of costs, benefits, and risks.” (Krepinevich 2019).

There are two types of Deterrence that aim to dissuade a rational enemy from attacking: (Krepinevich 2019)

- **Deterrence through denial** aims at rendering the chance of success of an enemy's attack so slim that the enemy does not even attempt to attack
- **Deterrence through punishment** aims at convincing the enemy that its attack would be returned with a heavy retaliation possibly leading to its destruction

Having defined Defense and defensive measures as well as Deterrence, it is important to distinguish Defense from Deterrence. Although Deterrence can sometimes be seen as a form of Defense, we argue that while Deterrence and Defense are connected, they are nonetheless distinct. Indeed, while the goal of Deterrence and Defense is the same, as they both aim to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a Nation, their approach can be different.

Deterrence in itself is not to be confused with Defense insofar as it strives to dissuade the enemy from even considering the possibility of violating the sovereignty of a State in the first place.

If Deterrence is efficient, Defense is no longer required.

The first type of Deterrence, Deterrence through denial, is completely distinct from Defense as these deterrence measures cannot be mistaken for defensive measures due to the absence of their ability to strike back. Indeed, an example of Deterrence through denial measures would be a country that relied solely on a system of bunkers, thereby making enemy rocket strikes ineffective. In this scenario, the Deterrence measures do not offer a perfect Defense as the enemy is able to invade the country and let the resistance starve to death in their impenetrable bunkers and annex the territory of the country.

The second type of Deterrence, Deterrence through punishment, is much closer to our understanding of Defense. Indeed, Deterrence through punishment consists of a counterattack, a retaliation, that is supposed to be so devastating that no rational enemy would consider attacking.

As we already mentioned before, defensive measures also have offensive capabilities and can thus be used as means of deterrence. Whereas defensive means (for example conventional bombs) aim to retaliate in case of attack, means of deterrence (for example bunkers that render the enemy's attack ineffective) aim to dissuade the enemy from attacking. It is, however, also possible to consider rockets simultaneously as a means of defense and as a means of deterrence.

Hence, depending on the type of weapon (ex. Rocket) or infrastructure (ex. Bunker), the distinction between Defense and Deterrence can be important but it can also be purely theoretical.

As one type of Deterrence (Deterrence through denial) is completely distinct from Defense, and the second type of Deterrence (Deterrence through punishment) is interconnected with Defense, it would be inaccurate to stipulate that Deterrence and Defense are interchangeable terms.

For further information on the challenges to Deterrence, and people's perception of fairness please consult Appendix A.

IV. What is Pacifism?

For the past decades, Germany has adopted a position characterized by Pacifism. We will not yet investigate the reasons for Germany's pacifism, as Germany's history will be treated in 1.5.2. nor analyze Germany's current and future security strategy options as they will be studied in Chapter 2.

This section aims to define the concept of Pacifism.

Pacifism can be described as “[...] *the principled opposition to war and violence as a means of settling disputes*” (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 1998).

Pacifism can be seen as a weak form of Deterrence through denial. The local population of a country that follows a foreign policy based on Pacifism, although being prohibited from striking back or retaliating, can, nonetheless, lead a non-violent resistance through non-cooperation with the aggressor (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 1998).

Finally, it is important to note that while Pacifism can be frequent on an individual basis, it is far more seldom for it to be adopted by an entire Nation. It is for this reason, that we will investigate in 1.5.2. the particular reasons that led Germany to adopt a pacifist position.

For further information on pacifist movements, please consult Appendix A.

Paragraph 1.5.1.2. Political Concepts

I. What is Geopolitics?

According to David Crikemans:

“Geopolitics is the scientific field of study belonging to both Political Geography and International Relations, which investigates the interaction between politically acting (wo)men and their surrounding territoriality (in its three dimensions; physical geography, human geography and the spatial dimension)” (Crikemans 2022).

The popularity of Geopolitics depends on its historical context: while Geopolitics was in stark decline after the Second World War, because of its association with Nazi Germany and imperial Japanese aggression, together with the emergence of nuclear missiles which reduced the importance of geographical factors, the Cold War, however, boosted the popularity of Geopolitics through the adoption of the geopolitical strategy of containment by the United States against the USSR (Deudney 1998).

The recent War in Ukraine has also contributed to this practical requirement of Geopolitics as the European Union needs to determine its geostrategic focus.

Besides this practical need favoring the revival of Geopolitics, there is also a theoretical necessity. According to the before-mentioned definition of Geopolitics by David Crikemans, Geopolitics is a scientific field with double roots as it is linked to Political Geography and International Relations.

The connection between Geopolitics and Political Geography allows Geopolitics to be actively involved in World Politics and thereby stay up to date regarding pressing global political matters.

The connection between Geopolitics and International Relations renders Geopolitics timeless: Geopolitics encompasses the visible spectrum of International Relations as well as fundamental elements of human nature. Indeed, it analyses the political, diplomatic, economic, legal, and cultural dimensions but it also studies fear: a key motivating factor behind the actions/priorities of political agendas of decision-makers is fear.

Moreover, Geopolitics studies each of its roots from three angles (Crickemans 2022):

- Physical geography: location, resources, energy, landscape, climate
- Human geography: religion or ethnic groups
- Spatial dimension: spheres of influence

As a result of its two roots and the three different perspectives from which it analyses modern problems, Geopolitics is omnipresent. Given that Geopolitics is rooted in the fear of individuals, it is, by extension, also rooted in the fear of States. Hence, the Security dilemma of States is a sociological issue that will persist as long as there are Humans and States.

In order to evaluate Geopolitics, one must be conscious that one's analysis depends not only on the school of thought of Geopolitics one has chosen to study but also on the viewpoint one has decided to adopt while doing so. In fact, the perspective (constructivism, liberalism, or realism) through which we view the World has a significant influence on the outcome of our analysis and we will study this lens, meaning the theories of international relations through which one may study the structure of Geopolitics, in 1.5.2.

Hence, we will now briefly study the structure, meaning the schools of thought of Geopolitics. There are three main schools of thought in Geopolitics.

"Classical Geopolitics" is the name of the **first school of thought** in Geopolitics.

It has two branches:

First is the German Classical School of Geopolitics, which is represented by well-known writers like Friedrich RATZEL and Rudolf KJELLÉN. RATZEL views States as distinct individuals and bases a State's power on its size and location, but KJELLÉN adds the idea of "Morphopolitik," which further considers the influence of a State's geographical form and width to determine its strength.

Second is the Anglo-Saxon Classical School of Geopolitics, which includes significant writers such as Halford John MACKINDER and Alfred Taylor MAHAN. While MACKINDER created the "Heartland" thesis, which contends that land forces are essential in the war for territory and resources because they frequently outperformed rival sea forces (Deudney 1998), MAHAN concentrates on the significance of maritime power in the battle for territory and resources.

"Cognitive Geopolitics" is the name of the **second school of thought** in Geopolitics.

This school of thought's principal writers, Harold and Margaret SPROUT, assert that environmental factors can affect human actions in two different ways (Criekemans 2022). They can either restrict the impact of foreign policies or they can affect foreign policies themselves (although this influence only occurs if the environmental factors are recognized and taken into account by the decision-makers). Thus, it is necessary to create a distinction between the "operational milieu," which refers to the real environment in which the policy will be applied, and the "psychological milieu," which refers to the environment as it is experienced by the decision-maker.

"Critical Geopolitics" is the name of the **third school of thought** in Geopolitics.

Supporters of this school of thought contend that rather than being a natural phenomenon, Geography is the outcome of conflicts between competing powers for control over and management of space (Criekemans 2022).

Regarding the Geopolitics of the EU, the Classical School of Geopolitics together with the Critical School of Geopolitics will be the most important angles of our analysis.

II. What is Populism?

Populism is a movement that, despite its seeming simplicity—the majority will decide on the country's future—has profound moral ramifications and the potential to have disastrous political effects.

Populism is a phenomenon that exists in many forms all throughout the world and is not specific to any one area, nation, or continent.

A political movement known as populism separates the populace into two groups: "Pure people" and "Corrupt elite". The moral standards of authenticity and purity serve as the foundation for this separation.

In order to distinguish between the honest masses and the corrupt elite, populist parties frequently tie their moral division of society to a particular ideology (nationalism, liberalism, socialism, etc.). The elite has particular interests that are distinct from the broad preferences of the pure populace.

The disconnect between theoretical goals and practical outcomes is where populism poses a threat: While populism seeks to empower the people, in reality, it just empowers the leader, who may decide on his or her own whatever types of policies to implement by recognizing the components of the general will that are important to them (Weyland 2017, 53).

Additionally, populists think politics should reflect the overall desire of the populace (Mudde 2017). The fundamental problem with populism is that, if the general will of the pure people demanded it, it would theoretically be acceptable to establish a society that openly discriminates against particular races, faiths, nationalities, etc.

We will study the negative effects of the rise of ideologies in Europe regarding common sensitive projects such as European Defense in 3.4.2.

For further information regarding the role of ideologies within populism, please consult Appendix A.

Sub-section 1.5.2. Background Section

Paragraph 1.5.2.1. Discipline of Law

1.5.2.1. will be divided into two sub-sections. We will first study the evolution of the European Union, and thus we will include aspects of EU Law. In the second sub-section, we will analyze certain aspects of International Law by studying the formation and objectives of the biggest security Organization: NATO.

I. EU Law

The evolution of the European Union can be traced back by looking at its treaties. Indeed, there is no European Constitution (yet) despite an attempt in 2004 and thus, the legal foundation of the European Union is to be found in a series of treaties that have each increased or amended the competencies of the EU.

The first important treaty in the history of the European Union is the **Paris Treaty of 1951**.

Following the birth of NATO on the 4th of April 1949 and the birth of the Council of Europe on the 5th of May 1949, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented on the 9th of May 1950, today known as Europe Day, a plan for deeper political cooperation in Europe known as the Schuman plan. This plan consisted of the integration of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe and six countries, the founding Member States of the European Union, agreed to sign the Treaty of Paris on the 18th of April 1951, thereby officially creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 (European Union s.d.).

This Treaty's aim was to prevent another World War by putting European coal and steel industries under common management.

The second memorable treaty is the **Treaty of Rome of 1957**.

This Treaty, which officially came into force in 1958, created the European Economic Community (EEC) and it also established the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, also known as EURATOM) (European Union s.d.).

The third crucial step in the development of the European Union happened with the **Single European Act of 1987**.

This act aimed to get rid of national differences regarding trade and thereby create a Single Market. Moreover, it aimed at empowering the European Parliament which was created on the 19th of March 1958 (European Union s.d.).

Fourth, the **Treaty of Maastricht of 1992** came into force in 1993 and it was important for various reasons:

- The European Economic Community (EEC) was formally renamed the European Community (EC)
- The Maastricht Treaty also set up a system of three pillars that constitute the European Union
 - 1) European Communities (consisting of the EC, the ECSC, and EURATOM)
 - 2) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
 - 3) Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM)

Fifth, the **Treaty of Porto of 1992** came into force in 1994 and it was a further enhancement of the European Union as it installed the European Economic Area (EEA) which allows non-EU States, which are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), to nonetheless fully participate in the Single Market of the EU, established through the Single European Act of 1987.

Sixth, the **Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997** slightly modified the Treaty on the European Union by simplifying the codecision procedure and by allowing the European Parliament to approve the President of the Commission (European Union s.d.).

The Euro was introduced in on the 1st of January 1999 (European Union s.d.).

Seventh, the **Treaty of Nice of 2001** allowed the European Union to obtain a proper legal personality. Furthermore, it amended certain elements of EU legislation and strengthened the role of the EU Parliament by giving it additional legislative and supervisory powers (European Union s.d.). Lastly, it also introduced the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, although it was not yet legally binding.

Eighth, the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004** has, although it failed due to the vetoes stemming from France and the Netherlands, nonetheless shown that the political will for a deeper Union is there as there were 25 EU Member States which signed the proposed Constitution. Although the time for a deepening of the Union was not ripe at the time, recent events and France's new pro-Europe position under Macron allow space for hope in a second attempt at establishing an EU Constitution, the basis for Cooperation in sensitive areas such as Defense.

Ninth, the **Treaty of Lisbon of 2007** has truly transformed the Economic Union into a Union of Law, by linking the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, declared in 2000, as a Protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby making the Charter legally binding and of the same legal value as an EU Treaty. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, also attributed more powers to the European Parliament by bestowing upon it the right to appoint (and not simply approve) the President of the Commission.

Hence, we can conclude that the European Union came into existence for the maintenance of peace in Europe and was soon given economic power.

This Economic Union then also became a Union of Law through its own judicial institution, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and its own Charter of Fundamental Human Rights which came into force in 2009.

However, the most important evolution of the EU is yet to happen: The Security Union.

We will further analyze this existing legal foundation (or lack thereof) in EU Law regarding European Defense when discussing the political obstacles to creating a European Army.

For further information regarding the evolution and role of the EU, please consult Appendix B.

II. International Law

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was officially created on the 4th of April 1949 through the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty.

Its 12 founding members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America) have defined the role of this International Organization in the short Treaty, containing only 14 Articles.

The key Article in this defensive Alliance is Article 5 which states:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

Having outlined the principal legal foundations of NATO, it is crucial to study this Organization's objectives and determine its purpose.

NATO was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, and thus, its primary purpose was to guarantee peace in Europe and to promote cooperation among its members (NATO s.d.).

Simultaneously, NATO aimed to counter the ideological and military threat posed by the USSR through the Warsaw Pact (NATO s.d.).

Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, and the first President of the United Nations General Assembly, declared during the formal signing procedure of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. on April 4th, 1949, that:

“The new pact is purely defensive, it is directed against no one, it threatens no one; it should therefore disturb no one, save, of course, any person or persons who might foster the criminal idea of having recourse to war.”

(Spaak 1949)

While many argued that NATO lost its purpose with the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact on the 1st of July 1991, the recent Ukraine-Russia War has reminded us that the initial, primary, purpose of NATO, to secure peace in Europe, is still as relevant today as it was during its inception.

Furthermore, the importance of NATO has also been highlighted through the recent accession of Sweden and Finland, two traditionally neutral countries, to this Defense Organization. Sweden and Finland thereby displayed NATO’s Open-Door policy contained within Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

While this Open-Door policy can be seen as an enlargement policy whose sole purpose consists in threatening the territorial sovereignty of neighboring non-NATO States, this perspective is incoherent with the objectives of NATO. Indeed, the existential fears of Russia are unfounded as NATO has re-affirmed in its first Chapter “Principles and Purposes” of a key document of 2022, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, and entitled “NATO 2022 – Strategic Concept”, that: “*We are a defensive Alliance.*” (NATO 2022).

Furthermore, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of NATO, has highlighted during a speech following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on the 12th of January 2022, that:

“[...] countries that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact of the Soviet Union, they have actually freely, through independent democratic processes, chosen to join NATO [...]” (Stoltenberg 2022)

The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an action-oriented think tank, recently advised in their brief entitled “NATO’s Tunnel Vision” of August 2022 that:

“The path to peace must begin with settling the conflict in Ukraine, and the key to a settlement is securing Ukraine’s independence as a neutral state outside NATO.” (Beebe 2022)

While the idea of a neutral Ukraine, functioning as a buffer zone between the Russian Federation and NATO-Territory is in theory a brilliant concept, it is unlikely to happen in reality, due to the wish of Ukraine to join NATO, already expressed back in 2008.

Indeed, The NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, mentioned on the 12th of January 2022, at the end of the NATO-Russia Council that there is a *“right for all countries to do, to choose their own path, including what kind of security arrangements they want to be part of”*.

He further noted the existence of *“[...] the danger of re-establishing a system of spheres of influence in Europe, where a big power like Russia can decide what smaller neighbors can and cannot do [...]”*.

Lastly, he mentioned that *“Russia doesn’t have a veto on whether Ukraine can become a NATO member.”*

During an interview at the Kultaranta talks on the 12th of June 2022, Jens Stoltenberg mentioned that Russia wants *“a different world order”* by going against two fundamental principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (Stoltenberg 2022):

- *“Territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations”*
- *“The right for every nation to choose its own path, including what kind of security arrangements they wanted to be part of”*

As stated in Article 1 of NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid on the 29th of June 2022, the objectives of NATO are as follows:

“NATO is determined to safeguard the freedom and security of Allies. Its key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure our collective defence, against all threats, from all directions.” (NATO 2022).

Currently, NATO's support to Ukraine is also symbolical of NATO's support for international Law as NATO, by helping Ukraine to defend itself, also upholds the Helsinki Final Act, a key document of international Law and the right for each country to choose its own path based on the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Thus, while NATO no longer serves as a shield against the ideological sword of the Soviet Union, it nonetheless continues to function as a shield against the territorial annexation attempts of Russia and thereby upholds the rule of Law and the values of Democracy in Europe.

Having defined the legal foundation, purpose, and current objectives of NATO, we are now going to discuss the pacifist position of Germany by looking at its historical background.

For further information regarding the roots and purpose of NATO as well as the scenario of Russia joining NATO, please consult Appendix B.

Paragraph 1.5.2.2. Discipline of History

While Militarism was highly popular in Germany during the First and Second World Wars, Pacifism had the biggest appeal in the era that followed these World Wars.

First, as a result of the severe loss of life suffered in both World Wars, Pacifism was very popular during the era of the Cold War (1945 – 1991).

However, it is important to note that Pacifism as a movement had different levels of success in West Germany and in East Germany as it was more popular in the former than in the latter (Boutwell 1983).

Indeed, Pacifism in West Germany was very popular as was seen through the peace demonstration held in Bonn in 1981. This event, whose aim was to protest both the existence of nuclear weapons and the presence of American and British bases on German soil, had around 300,000 supporters and was thus a very big pacifist movement (Hoering 1982).

Pacifism in East Germany was an exception as there were generally no peace movements in other Soviet-bloc countries (Pond 1984). The East German Government allowed protests against War and weapons as long as these protests also happened in Western Germany (German Culture 2015).

Second, Pacifism after the Cold War continued to be a very strong movement in Germany.

Two recent examples demonstrate the German Governments use of pacifism:

- Germany was the first allied Nation of the USA to condemn the latter's declaration of war on Iraq and Germany also refused to participate in the war (Rathbun 2006)
- Germany refused to participate in the Kosovo War

Germany's initial political pacifist position was divided in the early 2000s between the left-wing and the right-wing political parties. While the left-wing parties argued in favor of pacifism, the right-wing parties insisted on the need for Germany's ability to militarily defend itself (Shand 1975).

The division of politics and society in Germany regarding its Military as well as the role of Defense and Security is ultimately due to the moral war guilt that has clouded Germany's sense of reality. Indeed, German pacifism has caused Germany to become ignorant and decadent:

First, Germany is ignorant because it refuses to let go of its policy of pacifism that it is not adapted to exist in a World of Violence and War as currently demonstrated by the War in Ukraine as a result of Russia's annexation attempts.

Second, Germany is decadent because it is not worried about its Security dependence on the West. On top of Germany's lack of concern for the severe shortcomings of its military capabilities, Germany's political elite is also acting against its own interests.

While some anti-war groups, peace activists, and experts are against the military support to Ukraine or the military revival of Germany, out of fear of further provoking Russia, it is equally logical to argue that Russia has dared to attack Ukraine because of the weak position of the West which constantly tries to negotiate instead of setting hard limits through a strong policy of Deterrence.

The consequences of Germany's pacifist position will be studied in Chapter 2.

For further information regarding Germany's pacifist roots and the current shortcomings of Germany's political elite, please consult Annex B.

Paragraph 1.5.2.3. Discipline of Political Science

Lastly, it is important to include the theoretical aspect of the discipline of “Political Science” in order to understand our further reasoning. Indeed, three main different types of schools of thought are present in international relations and we are going to indicate which school of thought has influenced this thesis the most.

There are three main doctrines in international relations: Constructivism, Liberalism, and Realism.

The social, diplomatic, military, and political crisis in Ukraine has served as a reminder that our world is anarchic and that realist political theory is still relevant today. As we live in a self-help World where each State must ensure its security and existence, and in which there is no World Government or hierarchical organization. As a result of this observation, we will put our main focus on the doctrine of Realism.

Most importantly for our thesis, **Realism** stresses that the world is anarchical, just like Liberalism does. Realists, as opposed to Liberalists, take a different approach to this risky situation. Realists think that in order for a State to thrive and protect itself, it is necessary to pursue power, in contrast to liberals who emphasize the value of collaboration and international institutions/organizations. While realists primarily contemplate cooperation for survival's sake (self-defense alliances), liberals view it as a strategy to decrease the likelihood of war by strengthening socio-economic links between States. Realists are motivated by practical concerns, and they only need little cooperation or coalitions to defeat a more formidable shared foe.

Although Realism is our primary analytical perspective, we acknowledge that Realism may have certain drawbacks because it only focuses on evaluating the military might of States and material goals. To understand the harsh realities of Geopolitics (material geostrategic objectives visible through the lens of Realism) and at the same time comprehend the concepts that drive political actors (ideologies or subjective World views of political Leaders visible through Constructivism), we believe that a **combination of Realism and Constructivism** seems to be the appropriate perspective.

For further information on Liberalism and Constructivism, please consult Appendix B.

Chapter 2: What is the German *Zeitenwende*?

Section 2.1. What is meant by “*Zeitenwende*”?

The term *Zeitenwende* was coined in the speech of the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, on the 27th of February 2022 at the German Parliament. In his speech, Olaf Scholz announced several consequences resulting from the Russia-Ukraine War¹:

First, military support for Ukraine must be guaranteed as Ukraine is, according to the German Chancellor, not only fighting for its freedom but also for the values of Democracy: “*Sie kämpfen für Freiheit und ihre Demokratie, für Werte, die wir mit ihnen teilen.*” (Scholz 2022).

Second, attempts to divert Putin from continuing the War against Ukraine by Germany together with its allies will be undertaken through the effective use of sanctions by targeting Russian Banks, Oligarchs as well as Officials.

Third, Germany has repeated its allegiance to the collective defense clause, Article 5, of NATO.

Fourth, Germany has pledged itself to invest highly in its military capabilities. As a result, Olaf Scholz announced a special fund of 100 billion euros aimed to finance the necessary investments and rearmament of the German Army. Furthermore, Germany will forthwith invest each year more than 2% of its gross domestic product in defense (thereby it would also fulfill the requirement of NATO). Moreover, Germany will also pursue common military projects with its allies, especially France. Lastly, Germany will revise its energy policy by avoiding another situation of energy dependence from particular energy suppliers.

¹ <https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/regierungserklaerung-von-bundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-am-27-februar-2022-2008356>

Fifth, Scholz announced that Germany will, as a result of Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine, revise its foreign policy. Indeed, Germany will aim for diplomatic solutions but Scholz also stressed the need for Putin to be willing to accept peaceful solutions.

When analyzing Olaf Scholz's *Zeitenwende* speech, we concluded that he announced a *Zeitenwende* for Germany in four key domains:

First, a *Military Zeitenwende* will have decisive consequences for Germany:

- In a narrow sense, this speech, a reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, has marked
 - o Germany's will to deliver military aid to Ukraine
 - o Germany's reaffirmed loyalty to NATO
 - o Germany's military revival through extensive investments and rebuilding of the German military
 - o Germany's will to pursue common EU Defense and Security politics through investments in EU military projects (f.i. tanks and planes)
- In a broad sense, this speech marks a pivotal moment concerning the German Defense policies as it breaks with the traditional pacifist position of Germany and allows Germany to consider security strategies that are not based on socio-economic interactions.

Second, a *Political Zeitenwende* consisting of common EU sanctions against Russia, thereby strengthening the unity of the European Union.

Third, an *Energy Zeitenwende* consisting of a revision of the German Energy Policy, meaning no longer Energy dependencies on individual Energy suppliers.

Fourth, a *Foreign Policy Zeitenwende*, meaning a revision of the German Foreign Policy. Hence, Germany will no longer pursue blind diplomatic efforts but will limit its diplomatic outreach to situations where both parties are actively seeking a peaceful solution.

As a result of these four major changes that have been announced in the speech of the German Chancellor, German and ultimately EU politics in various domains are about to undergo dramatic evolutions.

Sub-section 2.1.1. Germany's current security strategy

As already described in 1.5.2.2. regarding Germany's history, its aggressive and destructive past has pathed its way towards pacifism. Indeed, while other big military powers, such as France, Italy, the United Kingdom, or the United States of America, have invested in and increased their military capabilities gradually throughout the past decades, Germany has constantly adopted a pacifist attitude and relied on strong socio-economic ties with other countries (f.i. Russia) in order to avoid a military conflict.

Thus, Germany's current security strategy has not relied, with regards to Russia, on military deterrence but on socio-economic integration, visible through two Gas pipelines that connect(ed) Germany to Russia, such as the recently exploded/sabotaged Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

The consequences of Germany's past and current anti-violence pacifist position are numerous.

First, Germany's reluctance to use weapons can be perceived as a sign of strength if interpreted from an idealistic point. However, given that our main angle of analysis is Realism, a reluctance to use hard power to defend one's interests will be perceived as a weakness as a State must rely on soft and hard power to efficiently defend its interests and ultimately to survive.

Second, Germany's fear and mistrust of its own army. Through the abuse of its military strength in the past, Germany has grown an inherent distrust towards its own military. This attitude has a negative impact on the state of the German Army in two ways:

The first observation is of a geostrategic nature. The German Army is in bad shape and poorly equipped. Indeed, it lacks ammunition² and most of its fighter jets are not operable³.

The second observation is of sociological nature. The German Army has a bad reputation among the German population as most Germans “[...] regard their own army with suspicion [...]” (Bowlby 2017). This persistent distrust explains why few investments

² <https://www.dw.com/en/german-government-urged-to-address-ammunition-shortage/a-63979130>

³ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43134896>

have been made to strengthen the German military and why few Germans aspire to become German soldiers or officers. The negative attitude and distrust of the German population toward its own army have been summarized well by the military expert Sophia Besch from the Centre for European Reform according to whom: *“If you were a soldier [in Germany] you could not really ride a train in your uniform. You'd be approached by passengers calling you a 'murderer'.”* (Bowlby 2017).

In order to accurately describe the current Security and Strategy options of Germany, one needs to compare past and current investments of Germany in its Defense industry. While West German Defense spending was at 3.13% of its gross domestic product in 1975, German Defense spending in 2016 was only 1.6% of its GDP (Kunz 2018) and even decreased to 1.2 % of its GDP in 2017⁴.

Germany's past Nazi Regime paved the way for pacifism and pushed it to pursue socio-economic integration and military alliances instead of investing and rebuilding its own military.

Given the current security climate, consisting of uncertainty (f.i.: the current Energy crisis in Europe), distrust (f.i.: the relation between China and Taiwan), and War among Nations (f.i. the current War between Russia and Ukraine), the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced on the 27th of February 2022 in his speech a *“Zeitenwende”*.

2.1.2. will analyze how this epochal change translates regarding Germany's security strategy options in the future.

⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43134896>

Sub-section 2.1.2. Germany's future security strategy

2.1.2. analyses two future security strategy options for Germany.

The first future security strategy consists of a military revival, allowing Germany to be military autonomous (meaning to be able to act without requiring the support of other countries) and to take the lead, together with France, with regard to establishing a European Army.

The second future security strategy consists of a stronger military dependence on other countries. In this scenario, Germany will continue its pacifist security policy and rely more and more on socioeconomic ties with other countries.

Whereas this option is theoretically even better than a military revival it also causes Germany to be vulnerable, as it is unable to defend itself or its allies and to require the assistance of others to pursue its own interests.

To decide which of these future developments is most likely to come into existence, we will study the discourses of German political leaders, and analyze the agenda and stance of various political parties as well as the position of the German population regarding the project of a German *Zeitenwende*.

First, we will analyze which **political parties** support or are against the prospect of a militarily revived Germany.

a) AFD

Members of Parliament stemming from the AFD showed great signs of disapproval when the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, announced the extra funding (100 billion Euros) for the German Military (Connolly 2022). The AFD rejected the proposal to amend the German Constitution to include the special fund for the German Military⁵.

b) Linke

Members of Parliament stemming from Linke showed great signs of disapproval when the German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, announced the extra funding (100 billion Euros) for the German Military (Connolly 2022). The Linke rejected the proposal to amend the German Constitution to include the special fund for the German Military⁶.

c) CDU/CSU

The CDU/CSU alliance has “[...] backed the German government's plans to massively increase military spending.” (DW 2022).

d) SPD

In 2017, the SPD agreed to support and invest in the German Army, but it did not support the idea of increasing the defense budget to 2% of the German GDP (Werkhäuser 2017). In 2022, following the Ukraine War, the view of the SPD shifted. The speech of the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, a member of the SPD, which we already analyzed in 2.1.1. is a clear illustration of the SPD's will to strengthen the German Army.

⁵ <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundeswehr-sondervermoeegen-107.html>

⁶ <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundeswehr-sondervermoeegen-107.html>

To get another perspective of the SPD on Security and Defense matters, we will briefly study the speech by Lars Klingbeil, chairperson of the SPD, at the FES Tiergarten Conference entitled “Watershed Moment – The Start of a New Era”⁷.

To begin with, he mentions that:

“Germany must aspire to be a leading power. After almost 80 years of restraint, Germany now has a new role in the international coordinate system. Germany has built up a high level of trust over the past decades. But with this trust come expectations. [...]”

Further, he proclaims that “[...] Germany is increasingly the center of attention. We should fulfil these expectations.”

Moreover, it is important to highlight that he states: *“In recent years, we all went along with the mainstream approach in security policy of neglecting national and alliance defence. [...] I welcome his [Chancellor Olaf Scholz] decision to station more German troops on NATO’s eastern flank and to step up the protection of our Eastern European partners. Better equipment for the Bundeswehr is also urgently needed for this purpose.”*

Lastly, he summarizes the position of the SPD by stating: *“It is good that we have launched the 100 billion euro special fund for the Bundeswehr.”*

Based on these sections of the speech of the chairperson of the SPD, we can deduce that the SPD supports German military spending with the aim of not only stopping the weakening of the German Army but also strengthening its Army.

⁷ (Klingbeil 2022)

e) FDP

Christian Lindner, Minister of Finance and Federal Chairman of the FDP, tweeted on the 31st of May 2022: *“Wir antworten auf die sicherheitspolitische #Zeitenwende mit einer Stärkung unserer Streitkräfte”*⁸ meaning that Germany will respond to the Security challenges with a strengthening of its Armed Forces. Furthermore, the website of the FDP has published an article on the 3rd of June 2022 entitled: *“Bundeswehr zu einer der modernsten Armeen der Welt machen”*⁹ in which they explain why the investments in the German Army are necessary.

f) Grüne

Founded as a pacifist movement, the current political agenda of this party still strongly supports disarmament and arms control: *“Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle bedeuten global mehr Sicherheit für alle. Angesichts der wachsenden militärischen Risiken in Europa ist eine Wiederbelebung der konventionellen Rüstungskontrolle unabdingbar.”* (BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 2021, 249)¹⁰.

However, despite its pacifist history, the state council of this party agreed to heavy weapons deliveries to Ukraine, and it authorized the special fund of 100 billion Euros for the German Bundeswehr (MDR AKTUELL 2022).

⁸https://twitter.com/c_lindner/status/1531572080642244610?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Eetw%7Ctwterm%5E1531572080642244610%7Ctwgr%5E3c77161d230a3a4970db46e1bcd4790cf2e8ca4%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.fdp.de%2Fbundeswehr-zu-einer-der-modernsten-armeen-der-welt-machen

⁹ <https://www.fdp.de/bundeswehr-zu-einer-der-modernsten-armeen-der-welt-machen>

¹⁰ https://cms.gruene.de/uploads/documents/Wahlprogramm_DIE_GRUENEN_Bundestagswahl_2021.pdf

Second, we will study certain discourses/opinions of important **political individuals** in Germany.

a) Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler)

The Federal Chancellor of Germany, Olaf Scholz, delivered the speech *Zeitenwende* as a reaction to the Russian War of Aggression against Ukraine. The opinion of Chancellor Scholz regarding the military revival of Germany can be summarized through extracts of his speech:

"It's clear we need to invest significantly more in the security of our country. In order to protect our freedom and our democracy. [...] The goal is a powerful, cutting-edge, progressive Bundeswehr that can be relied upon to protect us. " (Scholz 2022).

b) Federal President (Bundespräsident)

Being tasked with important representative functions, the views of the Federal President are crucial in shaping the views of the public. His views are clearly illustrated in his speech at the 17th Federal Assembly on the 13th of February 2022¹¹:

"[...] Frieden ist nicht selbstverständlich. Er muss immer wieder erarbeitet werden, im Dialog, aber wo nötig, auch mit Klarheit, Abschreckung und Entschlossenheit. All das braucht es jetzt."

From this speech, which precedes the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we can understand that the Federal President was already in favor of more deterrence to preserve peace.

¹¹ <https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2022/kw06-bundesversammlung-rede-steinmeier-880568>

c) Prime Ministers of the three biggest Federal States in Germany

The Prime Minister of Bavaria, Markus Söder, a member of the CSU, tweeted on the 30th of May 2022: *“Wir machen unser Land sicherer! Das Sondervermögen ist ein Erfolg für @bundeswehrInfo. Damit wird eine langjährige @CSU Forderung umgesetzt: eine angemessene Ausrüstung für unsere Soldatinnen und Soldaten.”*¹². Hence, he is clearly in favor of the special fund, intended to modernize the German Military.

The Prime Minister of Lower Saxony, Stephan Weil, member of the SPD, supports the special fund for the German military as he states that a fundamental lesson from the Ukraine-Russia War is that: *„Der Friede muss bewaffnet sein; das geht nicht ohne funktionstüchtige Armee.“* (Idel 2022).

According to the Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg, Winfried Kretschmann, a member of the Grüne: *“Der Staat kann nicht pazifistisch sein. Der Staat muss die Bürger schützen.”*, and he further argues that Germany needs an operational and functional Army¹³.

¹² https://twitter.com/Markus_Soeder/status/1531218525901180928

¹³ https://www.zeit.de/news/2022-05/09/winfried-hermann-gegen-lieferung-schwerer-waffen-an-ukraine?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

Third, we will analyze the view of the **German population** regarding higher investments in the area of Defense.

According to polls, “[...] 78% of Germans backed the decision” (Wintour 2022) regarding the 100 billion Euro investment in the German Defense. Thus, a majority of the German population is in favor of reviving the German military as a reaction to the Russian War of Aggression.

More recent polls in 2023 indicate that although “[...] 32% were against the idea [...]” (DW 2023), “62% of Germany would support investing more money in the Bundeswehr military, even beyond the special additional fund of €100 billion (just over \$100 billion) announced by the government in the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.” (DW 2023).

Higher investments in the military go hand-in-hand together with more responsibility and according to a poll conducted by the ARD in March 2023, a clear majority of the voters believe that military support for Ukraine is appropriate¹⁴ (this majority has even increased from February 2023 to March 2023).

The German Parliament, Bundestag, has voted in favor of the “*Sondervermögen*”, the one-off investment for the German Bundeswehr¹⁵, and the German Federal Council, Bundesrat, has agreed to amend the German Constitution to include this special investment (Moritz 2022).

To conclude our threefold analysis of the impact of the concept of a militarily revived Germany on political parties, political individuals, and the German population, we notice a clear and decisive position on all three levels in favor of a militarily revived and strong Germany.

Although the German population favors a military-revived Germany and even wants Germany to have more responsibility and importance on the international level regarding Security and Defense (given the German majority in favor of weapon deliveries to Ukraine), the political leadership of **Germany is still struggling to put the will of the people and of the majority of the political parties in a concrete plan.**

¹⁴ <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend/deutschlandtrend-3313.html>

¹⁵ <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bundeswehr-sondervermoegen-107.html>

Thus, given that there is no consensus among the political leaders in Germany concerning the precise strategy of German Defense and Security, we can conclude that the German military and strategic issues ultimately come down to “[...] *political **leadership problem**, a reflection of a lack of willingness to accept realities, and a lack of ideas. Such leadership is currently absent [...] To provide it, Germany [...] will need to work on its approach to defense and strategy [...]*” (Kunz 2018).

Finally, the first future security strategy, a military revival of Germany seems to be more likely than the second future security strategy (stronger military dependence on other countries) if Germany manages to sort out its leadership issues and establishes a concrete plan on how to invest the special fund to grant Germany the international central position in Security matters it ought to have.

Section 2.2. Germany's central role in EU Security Politics

Having analyzed the impact of the German Zeitenwende on Germany in 2.1., we will now analyze why Germany is a key player in European Security Politics.

Germany demonstrated its destructive force and military capabilities during both World Wars and as a result, it is impossible to think of European Security without investigating the situation of Germany.

Despite Germany's pacifist position, it is still an important player in Security Politics due to its size and central geographical position in Europe. Hence, it is important to analyze Germany's military assets (weapons, vehicles, army size) as well as its political assets (NATO membership, and possible future accession to the UN Security Council,).

Analyzing Germany's military and political assets allows us to determine Germany's power – a key concept in World politics from a realist perspective.

Sub-section 2.2.1. Germany's military assets

2.2.1. is aimed to give a brief overview of Germany's military assets, meaning the size and branches of its Army, as well as important weapons and vehicles used by its Army.

The German Armed Forces possess an active military personnel of 184 000 men and women, and it has three components¹⁶:

- Ground: *Heer*
- Sea: *Marine*
- Air: *Luftwaffe*

¹⁶ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ueber-die-bundeswehr>

The **German Army**, Heer, is composed of 60 000 men and women operating in 10 different branches (Infantry, Artillery, Logistics, ...) ¹⁷.

Examples of weapons used by the German Army are ¹⁸:

- Stinger 2, a man-portable air-defense system
- G36, rifle
- G22A2, sniper rifle
- MG4, machine gun

Examples of vehicles used by the German Army are ¹⁹:

- Panzerhaubitze 2000, a self-propelled howitzer
- MARS II, a rocket launcher
- Leopard 2, a tank

The **German Navy**, Marine, is composed of 16 000 men and women ²⁰.

Examples of weapons used by the German Navy are ²¹:

- DM2A4, torpedo with a range of up to 50 km
- RBS15 Mk3, rocket with a range of up to 200 km

Examples of vehicles used by the German Navy are ²²:

- Fregatten der Sachsen-Klasse
- Korvetten der Braunschweig-Klasse
- U-Boot Klasse 212A, a submarine

¹⁷ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/army>

¹⁸ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausruestung-technik-bundeswehr/ausruestung-bewaffnung>

¹⁹ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausruestung-technik-bundeswehr/landsysteme-bundeswehr>

²⁰ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/marine>

²¹ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausruestung-technik-bundeswehr/seesysteme-bundeswehr>

²² <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausruestung-technik-bundeswehr/seesysteme-bundeswehr>

The **German Air Force**, Luftwaffe, is composed of 27 725 active soldiers who are deployed on 6 missions worldwide²³.

Examples of weapons used by the German Air Force are²⁴:

- METEOR, an air-to-air missile for long distances
- AIM-9L/I Sidewinder, an air-to-air missile for short distances equipped with infrared targeting sensors
- BGU-54, a 250 kg bomb equipped with a targeting system

Examples of vehicles used by the German Air Force are²⁵:

- Airbus A400M, a military transport plane
- Tiger, an attack helicopter
- Eurofighter, a fighter jet

Although Germany is currently facing ammunition shortages²⁶, and inoperable vehicles that require repairing or maintenance, such as the low amount of fully functional fighter jets (10 out of 128 were fully functional in 2018)²⁷, given the versatility of the German Armed Forces, they can be deployed all over the Globe and are thus a crucial ally to security organizations such as NATO and are the key to establishing a European Defense System.

²³ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/luftwaffe>

²⁴ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausrustung-technik-bundeswehr/alle-ausruestungsgegenstaende>

²⁵ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ausrustung-technik-bundeswehr/luftsysteme-bundeswehr>

²⁶ <https://www.dw.com/en/german-government-urged-to-address-ammunition-shortage/a-63979130>

²⁷ <https://www.dw.com/en/only-4-of-germanys-128-eurofighter-jets-combat-ready-report/a-43611873>

Sub-section 2.2.2. Germany's political assets

Next to its military assets, Germany possesses important political assets in the field of Security, such as its NATO membership and possibly a future permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council, which render it an important ally and actor in EU Security Politics.

First, Germany, specifically West Germany, is a founding member of the **European Union** and it therefore has an important political weight within the EU given its historical effort to establish the Union.

Second, Germany possesses the third highest defense spending among all 30 **NATO** members as it has invested over 50 billion Euros in 2021 (NATO, Public Diplomacy Division 2021, 6).

Third, Germany is a member of the **OSCE** and has not only pushed for establishing a Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine on March 21, 2014, but it even assumed the Chairmanship of this International Security Organization in 2016 (Zellner 2021).

Fourth, Germany is a member of the **UN** and has already been a temporary member of the UN Security Council from 2011 to 2012. Given Germany's central position as an important actor in international Security Politics, plans for it to obtain a permanent seat in the UN SC have been put into motion but have not yet been successful.

To sum up Chapter 2, while the problems with European Strategic Autonomy boil down partly to Germany's modest military capabilities they also touch upon Germany's lack of political leadership.

Monetary investments can help make up for the past shortcomings in material acquisition, but they cannot mend a broken spirit when it comes to the past German attitude toward Military, Defense, and Security. Indeed, the material problems could be easily solved through more military investments, but “[...] *defense spending is only a means to an end, not the end in itself.*” (Kunz 2018). Hence, the psychological blockade in Germany and the accompanying lack of political leadership and unity must be resolved to increase Germany's weight as a global actor.

Having analyzed the German situation, we will study in Chapter 3 Security and Defense Politics from the perspective of the European Union.

Chapter 3: EU Security and Defense Politics

Section 3.1. In how far the European Union is not a Security Union

To tackle this question, we need to define the scope of the European Union (3.1.1.), determine the precise meaning of Security in the context of the European Union (3.1.2.), and lastly, analyze whether a German *Zeitenwende* can lead to a *Zeitenwende* in the European Union (3.1.3.).

Sub-section 3.1.1. What is the scope of the European Union?

We will begin by defining Europe as the European Union.

In order to maximize the potential scope of a European Defense System, we deem it important to note that countries that are not (respectively no longer) a part of the EU, may nonetheless participate in a European Defense System, such as Switzerland or the United Kingdom.

What about traditionally neutral countries in the European Union such as Austria?

Although Austria has technically an obligation to assist, because of Article 47.2 TEU (mutual defense clause) and Article 222 of the TFEU (solidarity clause)²⁸, neutrality is also a part of the Austrian constitutional identity²⁹.

Nonetheless, to render a European Defense System as effective and as militarily strong as possible, even countries such as Austria which typically prefer neutrality to direct military confrontation, should be encouraged to participate in this project.

²⁸ (European Parliament s.d.)

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_/sede200612mutualdefsolidarityclauses_en.pdf

²⁹ Austria's declaration of neutrality is made within Article I (1) of the Austrian Constitution

Sub-section 3.1.2. What is the precise meaning of security in the context of the EU?

With regards to the definition of **Security**, we already mentioned in 1.5.1.1.:

“Security on the State level can be achieved through strong military capabilities. These military capacities can be used for defensive purposes as well as for offensive purposes.”.

Concerning the definition of “**Legitimate Self-Defense Policy**”, we already mentioned in 1.5.1.1.: “[...] we will only consider Strategies based on Counterattacks or Preventive Self-Defense as legitimate Defense policies.”.

Based on both definitions and given that Europe is mostly very pacifistic nowadays³⁰, a coherent Security Strategy for the European Union needs to be focused on defensive military capabilities that are operated solely as a means to counterattack or to prevent certain attacks on the basis of a Preventive Self-Defense policy.

Hence, an appropriate EU Security and Defense strategy must refrain from anticipatory Self-Defense as this would be closer to an act of aggression (given that such action would be based on beliefs rather than on facts) and would therefore be contradictory to the pacifist attitude of the EU.

³⁰ The pacifist, peace-seeking and defensive attitude of EU countries is reflected by the fact that no Ministry of War exists. Indeed, only Ministries of Defense (or in some case only Departments of Defense within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs) exist nowadays.

Sub-section 3.1.3. Zeitenwende in Germany and the European Union?

Olaf Scholz states in his speech that a German *Zeitenwende* ipso facto means a European *Zeitenwende*: “[...] *die Zeitenwende trifft nicht nur unser Land; sie trifft ganz Europa.*” (Scholz 2022).

While he stresses that this interconnectivity between Germany and the European Union regarding the *Zeitenwende* that is happening on both levels (national and supra-national) is a challenge, it can also be seen as an opportunity. Indeed, according to the German Chancellor, the War in Ukraine is a challenge to maintaining and protecting the sovereignty of the EU but it also presents the EU with the opportunity to further integration and strengthen unity (f.i. through common sanctions against Russia).

The German Chancellor highlights in his speech the value of Germany's Alliances: “*Unsere größte Stärke sind unsere Bündnisse und Allianzen.*”. He further adds that one must do everything to protect and preserve the unity of the EU and the strength of NATO: “*Zusammenhalt der Europäischen Union, für die Stärke der NATO*“

In his speech at the FES Tiergarten Conference in 2022, Lars Kingbeil, chairperson of the SPD, stated: “*As a leading power, Germany must massively promote a sovereign Europe. Germany can only be strong if Europe is strong.*”

Hence, both speeches indicate that the German political leadership recognizes the interdependence of national and supra-national (meaning EU) Defense and is in favor of strengthening European Defense.

European Defense and European Strategic autonomy are omnipresent issues in times of increasing military and geopolitical uncertainties.

Indeed, this topic is of relevance because of current events happening in the sphere of Security and Defense, namely:

- The War in Ukraine
- The military revival in Germany

We will now analyze why these two triggers may favor a European Defense System:

First, the *War in Ukraine*. War in Europe seems to be the first and most important trigger in the construction of a European Defense System. Indeed, the War between Russia and Ukraine raging since the 24th of February 2022, marks a decisive moment in European History. Although brutal and disastrous, the Ukraine War has nonetheless presented Europe with an opportunity. Europe must realize that the time of military neutrality and disarmament must come to a stop as it otherwise risks becoming totally strategically vulnerable and dependent on external support.

Second, the *military revival in Germany*. Whereas France has continuously invested in its military throughout the past, Germany has adopted a pacifist attitude and relied on stronger socio-economic ties with for instance Russia in order to avoid military conflict. Following the War in Ukraine, Germany was faced with the failure of its choice and needed to rashly re-think by modernizing and reviving its military power. This rethinking is characterized by Olaf Scholz's speech of "*Zeitenwende*".

However, can a *Zeitenwende* in Germany lead to a military revival across the EU?

Germany is in a period of transitioning from a traditional pacifist position to becoming a revived military force. It must change its current security strategy of socioeconomic integration to a strategy of military hard power.

Germany's military *Zeitenwende* may also lead to a potential existence of a much larger project: A European Defense System. Indeed, Germany may be a trigger that might lead to a militarily revived Europe, and with it a true European Army.

Germany invests more in its military and although we mentioned earlier that Germany possesses several security options, it is highly likely that German military spending will also benefit the EU through the support of Germany to strengthen the military autonomy of the EU. However, there are already voices in the German Parliament, Bundestag, that question the necessity and the proper use of the sum of 100 billion Euros.

While France, under President Emmanuel Macron, is a strong supporter of the European Army, Germany is more skeptical and hesitant regarding investments in the military. It is precisely Germany's new strategic options, available through its rearmament, that present a decisive moment in the history of the military autonomy of the European Union.

If both major European powers, France, and Germany, go in the same direction by supporting the idea of a European Army, then this idea of a common European Defense might become true. Olaf Scholz announced in his *Zeitenwende* speech the prospect of a common military projects between Germany and France: *“Darum ist es mir zum Beispiel so wichtig, dass wir die nächste Generation von Kampfflugzeugen und Panzern gemeinsam mit europäischen Partnern und insbesondere Frankreich hier in Europa bauen.”* (Scholz 2022)

Alongside the psychological motivation (through the War in Ukraine), the political willingness (visible through speeches of the German political leadership), the legal framework for a Defense Union in Europe also exists through the CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy):

*“CSDP includes the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. **This is intended to lead to a common defence.** This means that, in accordance with the mutual defence clause in the Treaty of Lisbon [Article 42(7)], EU member states have an obligation towards one another to provide aid and assistance by all means in their power if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory.”* (Federal Government of Germany 2016, 73).

Given that these three pillars (psychological motivation, political willingness, and legal framework) all exist, we can conclude that the path to a European Defense System is set.

It is, however, unclear at this time whether the psychological motivation within the European population and political willingness among EU Member States' political elite are strong enough and will last long enough for such a huge project to come to fruition.

Section 3.2. Why is a European Defense System necessary?

We have concluded 3.1. by stating that the European Union is not yet a Security Union. 3.2. addresses this issue by stating the reasons why the European Union needs to focus on Security issues. In this regard, we will first explain EU Geopolitics (3.2.1), before analyzing the aim of a European Defense System: Strategic and military autonomy (3.2.2.).

Thirdly, we will highlight the positive impact an EU Security Organization can have on its allies such as NATO (3.2.2.).

Sub-section 3.2.1. Geopolitics of the EU

We will proceed in 3.2.1. by analyzing the Geopolitics of the EU from a theoretical as well as practical perspective.

On the theoretical level, we will explain the pertinent schools of thought on Geopolitics (3.2.1.1.).

On the practical level, we will first explain current EU threats (3.2.1.2.) and then determine the areas on which the EU Geostrategic Focus needs to be (3.2.1.3.).

Paragraph 3.2.1.1. Pertinent Schools of thought on EU Geopolitics

As already mentioned in 1.5.1.2. two schools of thought on Geopolitics are most important when analyzing European Geopolitics:

- Classical School of Geopolitics
- Critical School of Geopolitics

To begin with, both strands of the Classical School of Geopolitics (German and Anglo-Saxon) as well as the Critical School of Geopolitics are important in our analysis.

First, the *German Classical School of Geopolitics* under KJELLÉN is important for our analysis as he measures a State's strength according to three variables of that State:

- Space
- Location
- Territorial form and width

While the European Union is not a small Nation, its territory is certainly not as big as Russia's, China's, or the United States of America's territory.

Furthermore, Europe is placed in the middle of these three superpowers, as it is situated between Russia and China on the one hand, and the United States on the other hand.

Moreover, Europe's territorial form is not landlocked but has access to the ocean. While this aspect can be seen as an advantage, meaning that Europe can have advanced military capabilities such as Battleships, Destroyers, Aircraft carriers, or submarines, it also can be interpreted as a further crucial area of Defense where Europe needs to invest heavily in order to become globally competitive.

Second, the *Anglo-Saxon Classical School of Geopolitics* under Halford John MACKINDER is important for European Geopolitics as it revolves around the Heartland theory. According to this theory, whoever is able to conquer the Heartland can conquer the World Island, and the Nation who controls the World Island will be able to control the World.

Thus, Europe's location is theoretically very interesting as Europe's geographical position is crucial in fending off attempts from the East to control the Heartland and thereby fend off attempts at World domination.

Third, the *Critical School of Geopolitics* deepens our analysis regarding the current War in Europe. Indeed, this school of thought stipulates that Geography is the product of battles for space among great Powers. Hence, we currently live in an era where Geography is formed, as the victor of the Ukraine-Russia War will be able to draw new territorial borders on the World Map, thus actively shaping and changing Geography as we know it.

If Europe wishes to keep its borders, it needs to be aware that Ukraine's current geopolitical crisis might become a global crisis.

Paragraph 3.2.1.2. Current EU threats

The European Union faces a complex situation in which multiple actors with different interests clash together. The EU, in order to remain/become a strong geopolitical power, needs to acquire more power and independence.

A diversity of crises threatens the EU, ranging from Security threats to Energy, Environment, Health, and Social issues. We will address four of these issues in 3.2.1.3.

Two main threats for the EU are its Energy dependence, a former threat from the East due to the Energy dependence on Russian gas and Russian oil, and a still ongoing Military dependence, a threat from the West due to Europe's heavy Security reliance on the USA.

To tackle these challenges, *“Europe must acquire greater weight as a geopolitical player.”* (Klingbeil 2022). Europe already demonstrated its ability to be a strong geopolitical actor, because: *“After the end of the Cold War, the EU already showed once that it is capable of acting geopolitically and strategically. It was a political objective to enable the former Eastern Bloc countries to quickly join the EU.”* (Klingbeil 2022)

Paragraph 3.2.1.3. EU Geostrategic Focus

Given the current EU threats, the Geostrategy of the European Union needs to be focused on four key areas.

First, the Geostrategy of the EU needs to focus on **Military- and Security-related areas**. We acknowledged in Chapter 1 Europe's inability to adequately promote and defend its interests and guarantee its sovereignty through military capabilities.

Hence, it is of vital importance that the EU acquires military capabilities to be able to defend and promote its interests and thereby truly become a Global Sovereign Actor. In 3.3. and 3.4. we will further analyze which steps, from a political and military perspective, need to be taken for the European Union to become a strong independent geopolitical power.

Second, the Geostrategy of the EU must focus on **Energy-related areas**. Energy dependence, similarly to Military dependence, gives one Nation leverage over another. To be able to act sovereignly and independently, such leverage, at least to the current extent, must not exist.

To assess how vulnerable the European Union is regarding Energy acquisition, we will briefly examine how big countries in the EU acquire their Energy.

France, under President Emmanuel Macron, has recently declared its plans to revive the French nuclear industry with the installment of up to 14 new nuclear plants (Chrisafis 2022). Thus, it is unsurprising that France highly supports and depends on nuclear energy. Indeed, 68% of France's electricity supply stems from nuclear power, 11% from hydro energy, 7% from wind energy, 6% from natural gas, and 3% from biofuels³¹.

Germany has been highly investing in renewable energy sources and as a result, 39.2% of Germany's electricity in 2021 has been produced through renewable energy sources such as wind power, water power, solar energy, and biomass energy³². Moreover, 18.8% of Germany's electricity needs have been covered through Lignite, 15.2% through natural gas, and 11.8% through nuclear energy³³.

³¹ <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx>

³² <https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economic-Sectors-Enterprises/Energy/Production/Tables/gross-electricity-production.html>

³³ <https://www.destatis.de/EN/Themes/Economic-Sectors-Enterprises/Energy/Production/Tables/gross-electricity-production.html>

Poland met 72% of the country's energy demands through fossil fuels and 17% through renewable energies in 2021³⁴.

Italy mostly relies on fossil fuels too (in total: 75%) as 43% of the country's energy needs were satisfied through fossil gas and 32% of the country's energy needs were satisfied through oil³⁵. Italy uses only 18% of renewable energy to meet its energy requirements³⁶.

Spain, met 43%³⁷ of its energy requirements through renewable energy sources, especially wind³⁸. 57% of Spain's energy requirements were met in 2021 through non-renewable energy sources, especially fossil fuels³⁹.

Having briefly analyzed the main Energy sources of major EU countries, we can conclude that certain countries, given their heavy reliance on nuclear energy or heavy investments in renewable energy sources, seem to be independent, or in the process of becoming independent, but this is not necessarily true.

While nuclear power may seem at first to allow a country to produce energy autonomously and independently, this is not entirely correct because of supply chains. Once the Uranium has reached France, it can produce energy on its own but the way to France from Kazakhstan, the biggest global supplier of Uranium⁴⁰, is long, hazardous, and crosses numerous borders, each potentially blocking the supply chain.

Furthermore, while countries such as Germany that are in a strong Energy transition phase are on the way to becoming Energy independent, these countries will struggle during this transition phase to reach their political aims and satisfy their energy needs. Indeed, the political agenda might be directed against countries from which Germany obtains its energy and thus the political aims might come into conflict with the energy requirements. Lastly, countries that heavily rely on fossil fuels are also at the mercy of global supply chains.

³⁴ <https://ember-climate.org/countries-and-regions/countries/poland/>

³⁵ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/873552/energy-mix-in-italy/>

³⁶ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/873552/energy-mix-in-italy/>

³⁷ [https://www.irena.org/-](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Statistics/Statistical_Profiles/Europe/Spain_Europe_RE_SP.pdf)

[/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Statistics/Statistical_Profiles/Europe/Spain_Europe_RE_SP.pdf](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Statistics/Statistical_Profiles/Europe/Spain_Europe_RE_SP.pdf)

³⁸ <https://e360.yale.edu/digest/wind-became-spains-biggest-power-source-in-2021>

³⁹ [https://www.irena.org/-](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Statistics/Statistical_Profiles/Europe/Spain_Europe_RE_SP.pdf)

[/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Statistics/Statistical_Profiles/Europe/Spain_Europe_RE_SP.pdf](https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Statistics/Statistical_Profiles/Europe/Spain_Europe_RE_SP.pdf)

⁴⁰ <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/mining-of-uranium/world-uranium-mining-production.aspx>

In all three situations, complete energy independence is not achieved and will to a certain extent never be achieved (even renewable energy sources will not be able to completely replace fossil fuels or nuclear energy in the short to medium term). Hence, the way to guarantee energy security is through military power as it is easier to threaten a militarily weak country than to threaten a country whose counterattack could be potentially much more harmful.

These important differences among EU countries result from Article 194 TFEU:

1. [...] Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to

- (a) ensure the functioning of the energy market;*
- (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union;*
- (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and*
- (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks*

*2. [...] the European Parliament and the Council [...] shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objective in paragraph 1. Such measures **shall not affect a Member State's right to determine** the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, **its choice** between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply [...]*

The second sentence in the second paragraph defines the core issue: Energy is a domain where individual EU countries want to remain in control by deciding on their own, sovereignly, which Energy sources to adopt.

Hence, Article 194 of the TFEU is only Soft Law. An efficient EU Energy Policy requires Article 194 TFEU to be Hard Law, meaning that the measures adopted by the European Parliament and the EU Commission are binding on Member States.

To obtain a sustainable and durable EU Energy Policy, a diversity of clean and renewable Energy sources must be supported through the EU Taxonomy, ranging from Wind to Solar, to Hydro, and to a certain extent even Nuclear (at least during the Transition phase from fossil fuels to renewable Energy sources).

Third, the Geostrategy of the EU must also address **Migration issues** as the Poland-Belarus incident of 2021 (Evans 2021) has illustrated the potential danger of migration being used as a weapon. While immigration can be beneficial (exchange of ideas, cultural enrichment through new traditions, ...) migration can also be negative as migration is also responsible for:

- Imported terrorism
- Imported organized crime
- Challenges to established norms and values
- Costs of integration (financial and social)
- Diseases carried by Migrants

Fourth, the Geostrategy of the EU must address **Health issues** as these can be used to threaten EU unity. The most recent Pandemic, Covid-19, has had a negative impact on the unity of the EU, by putting the Schengen System on hold through the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls between March 2020 and June 2021 (European Court of Auditors 2022).

Sub-section 3.2.2. Strategic and military autonomy of the EU

Whereas some believe the prospect of an EU Army is dead along with the idea of European strategic autonomy we want to show the importance, necessity, and feasibility of European Strategic and Military Autonomy.

To begin with, we need to define the “strategic autonomy of the EU”. According to Jason W. Davidson, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, professor of political science at the University of Mary Washington, and author of various articles in the Magazine “*The National Interest*”: “[...] *strategic autonomy, in the view of its leading proponent [Emmanuel Macron], would mean an EU that is capable of defending its members without assistance from the United States.*”

Given that the United States of America is by far the biggest financial and military power within NATO⁴¹, the definition of Jason W. Davidson can be interpreted and understood as follows:

Strategic and military autonomy allows the EU to defend itself without assistance from its allies and without interference from international security organizations such as NATO.

In short, strategic, and military autonomy would allow the European Union to be able to act independently in matters of Security and Defense. The European Union is in dire need of this independence if it aspires to be anything more than merely a prolonged arm of the United States.

How exactly is European Strategic and Military Autonomy to be achieved?

While we will study specific aspects, from a political and military perspective in 3.3. and in 3.4., we will now analyze three aspects relating to European Strategic and Military Autonomy throughout this Sub-section:

- Eurocorps (3.2.2.1.)
- Military cooperation between Germany and other EU members (3.2.2.2.)
- Sociological perspective: Reputation of Defense in Europe (3.2.2.3.)

⁴¹ “US defence expenditure represents approximately two thirds of the defence spending of the Alliance as a whole” (NATO 2023)

Paragraph 3.2.2.1. Eurocorps: Curse and Blessing

Eurocorps is a multinational autonomous headquarter designed to carry out military operations to the benefit of international organizations, especially the European Union and NATO. Although Eurocorps consists of soldiers stemming from EU nations, it can, according to the SACEUR agreement of 1993, be placed under the command of NATO. Eurocorps consists currently of 1100 soldiers, with a maximum capacity of 60000 soldiers⁴².

Concretely, Eurocorps possesses *EU Battlegroups*, carrying out EU CSDP objectives and acting under the authority of the Council of the EU⁴³, and a *NATO Response Force* that NATO can use to quickly react to a diversity of challenges (from crisis management to collective defense)⁴⁴.

While the integration of EU military power into the NATO structure is favorable to both NATO and the EU as it shows the EU's willingness to contribute to NATO and also renders the interoperability between EU-US Armed Forces more efficient, the SACEUR agreement, meaning the concept that EU Armed Forces could be placed under the direct command of the US, is completely opposed to EU Strategic and Military autonomy.

Hence, the political and military leadership of a future European Defense System must be fully accorded to an EU body, such as the *Political and Security Committee (PSC)*⁴⁵ or the *European Union Military Committee*⁴⁶, without the possibility of interference from non-EU countries. In this regard, Eurocorps is a curse and a blessing at the same time.

It is a blessing because it shows that multinational cooperation between EU countries in the domain of Security and Defense is possible.

However, it is also a curse, as it shows that strong EU military cooperation is only feasible under the overarching umbrella and supervision of the USA.

⁴² <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/heer/organisation/eurocorps>

⁴³ https://www.eurocorps.org/readiness_trashed/european-battle-group/

⁴⁴ https://www.eurocorps.org/readiness_trashed/nato-response-force/

⁴⁵ The Political and Security Committee is responsible for implementing the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and it is composed of Ambassadors of all Member States

⁴⁶ The European Union Military Committee is the highest military body set up within the Council of the EU and it is composed of the Chiefs of Defense of the EU Member States

Hence, while the EU has the theoretical potential to become a militarily strong power, it is doubtful whether the EU will be permitted to fully develop this potential. We will further address this issue in 3.2.3.

Eurocorps started off as a Franco-German Corps and evolved into a multinational operation.

While the idea of a European Defense System is primarily reliant on the successful and efficient cooperation between Germany and France, this huge project is not feasible without the input of other EU Nations (3.2.2.2.).

Paragraph 3.2.2.2. Military cooperation between Germany and other EU members

Germany cultivates close military relations with multiple EU countries through bilateral corps.

First, the *German-Netherlands Corps*, based in Münster (Germany), operates in joint operations across various branches of the armed forces (Land, Air, and Sea)⁴⁷.

Second, the *Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast*, located in Szczecin (Poland) serves as deterrence and guards the northeast territory of NATO⁴⁸. The three founding nations of the Corps are Denmark, Poland, and Germany.

Third, the *Allied Rapid Reaction Corps*, based in Gloucester (United Kingdom), is composed of soldiers stemming from 20 different NATO countries and its aim is to serve as a Headquarter that can easily be relocated and adapted to any given situation⁴⁹.

Fourth, the *Rapid Reaction Corps France*, based in Lille, is composed of soldiers stemming from 14 different NATO countries, and its aim is to serve as a Headquarter of the French Armed Forces that can be relocated to the location of an operation⁵⁰. It can fulfill missions under the authority of France as well as missions stemming from the EU or NATO.

Fifth, German jet fighter pilots will undertake a part of their training in the USA to foster cooperation and ensure the transfer of knowledge⁵¹.

⁴⁷ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/heer/organisation/1-deutsch-niederlaendisches-corps>

⁴⁸ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/heer/organisation/multinationales-korps-nordost>

⁴⁹ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/heer/organisation/allied-rapid-reaction-corps>

⁵⁰ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/heer/organisation/rapid-reaction-corps-france>

⁵¹ <https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/organisation/luftwaffe/organisation->

Paragraph 3.2.2.3. Sociological perspective: reputation of Defense in Europe

Next to a European political and military leadership and a functioning interaction and interoperability between EU countries, a European Defense System requires also the general willingness of the population across the EU.

First, we will analyze the **reputation of the public Defense Sector** in major EU countries, meaning how the EU population perceives soldiers, officers, and members of the Ministry of Defense:

- France: According to a survey conducted in 2022, 86% of the French population has positive feelings toward the members of the French Armed Forces⁵².
- Germany: According to a survey conducted in 2020, 82% of the German population supports the German Armed Forces⁵³.
- Italy: The majority of Italians support the Italian Armed Forces and its missions. The support ranges from 90% (in a situation where the military should support civil authorities in response to natural disasters) to 59% (in a situation requiring Italy to defend a NATO ally in case of an attack); and even down to 52% (regarding the Italian support for ongoing missions of the Italian Armed Forces) (Muti et Marrone 2019, 1-2).
- Spain: According to a study conducted in 2011, 55.6% of the Spanish citizens support the Spanish Armed Forces and around 47% prefer a common EU Army over each country possessing its own individual army (Gomez et del Val Cid 2011, 140).

⁵² <https://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/les-francais-plebiscitent-leur-armee-mais-doutent-de-ses-capacites-20221110>

⁵³ <https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/bevoelkerungsumfrage-2020-so-steht-deutschland-zur-bundeswehr-5029586>

Second, we will study the **growing pacifism** among the EU population as this poses a threat given that the national will to defend one's own country is low. Indeed, according to a study conducted in 2014⁵⁴, there is a clear separation concerning the willingness among the EU population to defend their country from East to West.

While Eastern EU countries such as Finland (74%), Sweden (55%), and Poland (47%) measured a high willingness of the national population to defend their country, Western EU countries have lower numbers:

- France: 29%
- United Kingdom: 27%
- Austria: 21%
- Spain: 21%
- Italy: 20%
- Germany: 18%

Given this East-West division and given the fact that the major EU military powers (France, Germany, UK, Spain, and Italy) are Western Powers except for Poland, we must conclude that a European Defense System at least in 2014 was unthinkable from a sociological perspective.

Although the current situation of uncertainty and insecurity through the War in Ukraine might have ameliorated this situation to some extent, it is uncertain whether all major EU countries have resolved their psychological issues regarding the willingness of the national population to defend their country.

From these two aspects, we can deduce the ambivalence of the EU population regarding Defense: while the public Defense Sector is generally valued among the EU population, the EU population lacks, however, the willingness to defend its country.

⁵⁴ <https://brilliantmaps.com/europe-fight-war/>

Third, there is hope for a common European Defense System as 77% of Europeans are in favor of a **common Defense and Security policy among EU Member States**, according to a survey conducted by the European Commission between January 2022 and February 2022⁵⁵.

While these three aspects briefly explained through each of the three before-mentioned paragraphs are vital to establishing Strategic and Military Autonomy in the European Union, we have not yet addressed the elephant in the room: The United States of America. Europe's biggest military ally, the US, may in this regard, also be its biggest competitor/enemy.

We will investigate the consequences of Europe's Strategic and Military autonomy on its relationship with the US and with NATO in 3.2.3.

⁵⁵ <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2553>

Sub-section 3.2.3. Added value to NATO

3.2.3. is dedicated to studying the (positive) effects of a European Defense System and European Strategic and Military Autonomy with regard to NATO and the USA.

If the EU were to become military independent, this could theoretically put its relationship with the US in a tough spot, as the EU is a big client of the US when it comes to purchasing military power. Next to this financial support, if the EU becomes military independent, the USA will lose its influence in EU Security Politics.

The presidency of Donald Trump has highlighted the fragility of EU hard power and the vulnerability of the US support, and thereby NATO support, to Europe and it is for this reason that *“[...] in light of an evolving transatlantic relationship, ideas for future European defense must also acknowledge the possibility that the United States will no longer be there to guarantee the continent’s security.”* (Kunz 2018).

While this particular US presidency has hurt EU-US relations from a strategic point of view, it might simultaneously have been a positive trigger for European cooperation in the Defense Sector. The willingness to cooperate in this sensitive domain already existed in 2016 as the following paragraph is an extract from a White Paper of the Federal Government of Germany in 2016 regarding the Security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr:

“One way to make progress towards more reliable cooperation among those who see the need for it is permanent structured cooperation in the defence sector; which is provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon (Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU). This objective does not conflict with NATO – on the contrary, it strengthens NATO’s European pillar and reaffirms Europe’s willingness to permanently and reliably assume its share of responsibility.” (Federal Government of Germany 2016, 73).

This extract demonstrates the German perspective according to which more integration of the EU in the domain of Security and Defense is needed for the sake of strengthening Europe’s and NATO’s strategic position.

“In the end, the goal must be for us to effectively pool resources and build a strong European pillar in NATO. The European states in NATO should in future be able to jointly defend European territory. This is not a policy against the transatlantic alliance, but one that strengthens the alliance.” (Klingbeil 2022).

While Klingbeil, chairperson of the SPD, believes that the EU's power within NATO needs to be strengthened we would like to argue even further by claiming that the EU needs to develop a power, independent of NATO, an autonomous European Defense System. Indeed, regardless of US political developments, the EU must detach itself from its dependence on NATO because *“If Europe is to be whole, NATO cannot serve as its overarching security arm”* (Beebe 2022).

Hence, if the EU were to become politically and militarily united and stronger, this would have two major consequences.

First, a stronger European Union that is able to pursue its interests autonomously without having to constantly rely on US support. Hence, the EU would not require US resources for pursuing its own interests and this would allow the US to focus its resources on areas that are more pressing from its perspective given that *“Strengthening the European Union as a security provider is the key step toward fairer transatlantic burden-sharing [...]”* (Kunz and Kempin 2018).

Second, a stronger European Union also serves as a more powerful ally that is able to participate more intensely in US and NATO missions, because *“A strategically autonomous Europe is no threat to transatlantic security, but, in light of ever-decreasing resources, increasing isolationist tendencies in America, and a gloomy global security environment, a prerequisite for it.”* (Kunz and Kempin 2018).

While it is possible to interpret a strong European Defense System as a potential threat, the positive potential outweighs the negative risks as the US will remain militarily stronger and has therefore no reason to fear, from a realist perspective, an attack stemming from the EU. Hence, *“The worry for Washington should not be that Europeans strive for strategic autonomy. The real worry should be that they might not make it.”* (Kunz and Kempin 2018).

Having determined the necessity of a European Defense System, we will analyze the political and military requirements, obstacles, and benefits of a European Defense System in 3.3. and 3.4.

Section 3.3. Political Dimension of a European Defense System

Whereas 3.2. has demonstrated the need for a European Defense System, 3.3. addresses the political aspects regarding the establishment and implementation of the former.

Sub-section 3.3.1. Requirements & Benefits

Paragraph 3.3.1.1. Political unity in Europe: United States of Europe

The first political requirement for a common European Defense System is the political framework. A federal system like the one found in the United States of America is favorable as it allows individual nations to retain sovereignty in most areas while giving up their sovereignty in certain key areas such as foreign affairs, migration, health, energy, and defense (3.2.1.3. demonstrates the issues resulting from a lack of unity in these domains).

The current problem with this system is the tactic used to evolve European Policies: *Lowest Common Denominator*. This plan is not viable in the long run as European Politics suffer from a lack of efficiency given that policies are often accepted by a light majority and thus many countries are unhappy with the policies, while none are entirely satisfied with the policies either.

Paragraph 3.3.1.2. Political stability in Europe

In order to set up a huge project such as a European Defense System, a stable political environment is required. Indeed, leaders with extreme ideologies are dividing public opinion. However, it is not division but unity that is required if one wants to set up such a difficult project.

To analyze the political stability in Europe, we will study to which degree the far-right and far-left parties have acquired seats in Parliament within EU countries that are key to establishing a European Defense System:

- **France:** The *Rassemblement National* has acquired 89/577 seats ($\approx 15\%$) in the French Parliament under the leadership of Marine Le Pen in 2022⁵⁶.
- **Germany:**
 - The *Alternative für Deutschland* has acquired 67/736 seats ($\approx 9\%$) in the German Parliament under the leadership of Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla in 2021⁵⁷.
 - The *Die Linke* has acquired 39/736 seats ($\approx 5\%$) in the German Parliament under the leadership of Janine Wissler and Martin Schirdewan in 2021⁵⁸.
- **Italy:**
 - The *Brothers of Italy* has acquired 118/400 seats ($\approx 30\%$) in the Italian Parliament under the leadership of Giorgia Meloni in 2022⁵⁹.
 - The *League* has acquired 66/400 seats ($\approx 17\%$) in the Italian Parliament under the leadership of Matteo Salvini in 2022⁶⁰.
- **Spain:** The *Vox* has acquired 52/350 seats ($\approx 15\%$) in the Spanish Parliament under the leadership of Santiago Abascal in 2019⁶¹.

⁵⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_nationalist_parties_in_Europe

⁵⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_for_Germany

⁵⁸ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Left_\(Germany\)#Election_results](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Left_(Germany)#Election_results)

⁵⁹ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brothers_of_Italy

⁶⁰ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lega_\(political_party\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lega_(political_party))

⁶¹ [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vox_\(political_party\)#Electoral_performance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vox_(political_party)#Electoral_performance)

- **Poland:**
 - The *United Right* has acquired 235/460 seats ($\approx 51\%$) in the Polish Parliament under the leadership of Jarosław Aleksander Kaczyński in 2019⁶².
 - The *Law and Justice* has acquired 197/460 seats ($\approx 43\%$) in the Polish Parliament under the leadership of Jarosław Aleksander Kaczyński in 2019⁶³.
- **Hungary:** The *Fidesz* has acquired 117/199 seats ($\approx 68\%$) in the Hungarian Government under the leadership of Victor Orbán in 2022⁶⁴.
- **Austria:** The *Freedom Party of Austria* has acquired 31/183 seats ($\approx 17\%$) in the Austrian Parliament under the leadership of Herbert Kickl in 2019⁶⁵.
- **Sweden:** The *Sweden Democrats* have acquired 73/349 seats ($\approx 21\%$) in the Swedish Parliament under the leadership of Per Jimmie Åkesson in 2022⁶⁶.
- **Switzerland:** The *Swiss People's Party* has acquired 53/200 ($\approx 27\%$) in the Swiss Parliament under the leadership of Marco Chiesa in 2019⁶⁷.

From these results, we can conclude that although there is a slight rise of populist, extreme political parties in Europe, the overall political landscape, with the exceptions of Poland and Hungary, is not yet extreme. Hence, the threat of Euroscepticism is not yet big enough to block a European Defense System. We will further analyze why populist parties pose a threat to a European Defense System in 3.3.2.1.

⁶² [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Right_\(Poland\)#Electoral_performance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Right_(Poland)#Electoral_performance)

⁶³ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_and_Justice

⁶⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fidesz#Electoral_results

⁶⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_Party_of_Austria#Election_results

⁶⁶ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sweden_Democrats#Electoral_results

⁶⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_People%27s_Party#Election_results

Paragraph 3.3.1.3. European Constitution

The project of a Federal State, such as the United States of Europe, requires besides political stability also a Constitution that clearly defines EU interests and EU values.

These interests and values are key to a European Defense System as a military alliance requires moral and ethical guidelines that would be defined through this Constitution.

However, a clear step back for the European Union was the failed project of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004 due to the rejection of the document by French and Dutch voters.

Public opinion of the EU population on the image of the European Union has improved: *“Almost two thirds (65%) of Europeans see EU membership as a good thing. This is the highest result since 2007, when it was at 58%.”* (European Union 2022).

The mentality of the French population regarding higher EU integration has improved according to a survey conducted by the European Parliament in Spring 2022 (European Union 2022):

- 59% of the French believe that it is a good thing that France is a member of the EU and only 10% believe it is a bad thing
- 48% of the French have a positive image of the EU and only 16% have a negative image of the EU

The mentality of the Dutch population regarding higher EU integration has improved according to a survey conducted by the European Parliament in Spring 2022 (European Union 2022):

- 75% of the Dutch believe that it is a good thing that the Netherlands are a member of the EU and only 8% believe it is a bad thing
- 55% of the Dutch have a positive image of the EU and only 16% have a negative image of the EU

The sociological environment is in favor of higher integration within the EU given that the overall public opinion has become more favorable on the matter of the European Union. Indeed, 52% of the EU population has a positive image of the EU (European Union 2022), and this change of mentality also occurs in countries that previously rejected more integration in 2004 such as France and the Netherlands. Hence, a new project regarding a Constitution in the EU would have a higher chance of being successful than it did back in 2004.

In the context of an EU Constitution, it is important to analyze the already existing legal foundations concerning EU Security and Defense Politics.

The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in 2009 and introduced the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the EU. Moreover, this Treaty includes a mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 TEU) as well as a solidarity clause (Article 222 TFEU).

It is, however, important to note that the EU cannot at this stage, according to Article 42(2) “*[...] conduct self-defence operations within the framework of the CSDP (only its Member States), unless the Treaty is amended or the European Council decides unanimously on the establishment of common defence [...]*” (Cîrlig 2015, 4).

“*If the Member State affected makes a request for assistance, it ensues from Article 42(7) TEU there is a legal obligation to assist incumbent on all the other Member States [...]*” (Cîrlig 2015, 4) but this obligation to assist does not yet exist towards the European Union. In order for the EU to become a true Security Organization from a political and legal perspective, this obligation to assist needs to exist with regard to the European Union and not to its Member States.

Hence, while the legal basis for the development of a common Union Defense policy exists, an autonomous European Defense System is yet to be negotiated by the EU Member States.

Next to a European Defense Fund, introduced in 2017 and responsible for supporting “[...] collaborative defence research and development, and to foster an innovative and competitive defence industrial base.” (European Union External Action Service 2021), the EU is also equipped with a Strategic Compass for Security and Defense that “[...] identifies the threats and challenges the Union faces.” (European Union External Action Service 2021).

Although the legal foundations for common EU military operations exist and the EU population trusts and believes in the EU, a true European Army does not yet exist. The problem might not be a lack of legal foundation but a lack of credibility regarding the EU’s military capacities that have been highlighted by Sweden and Finland joining NATO (see 3.3.2.3.).

Sub-section 3.3.2. Obstacles

Paragraph 3.3.2.1. Populism

Far-right and far-left parties with their anti-EU ideology have become more dominant in Europe (for example France with Front National, Germany with AFD, or Austria with ÖVP).

Given that our angle of analysis regarding the establishment of a European Defense System is based on the military revival in Germany, it seems appropriate to also highlight the already existing internal political divisions within Germany.

The extreme populist parties "Die Linke" and "AFD" are both opposed to EU integration, although the populist right-wing parties are often more radical in this respect (Verbeek et Zaslove 2017, 398). In fact, the populist left-wing parties are still open to engaging in constructive dialogue (Verbeek et Zaslove 2017, 397) with the EU, whereas the populist right-wing groups are largely against the European Union when it comes to immigration, economic integration, loss of sovereignty, and the bureaucratization of domestic politics (Verbeek et Zaslove 2017, 398).

The platform of the AFD is far more extreme than the agenda of the Linke, illustrating the prevalent pattern between left- and right-wing populist parties.

In fact, the AFD opposes the notion of a "United States of Europe" and is strongly against the loss of sovereignty with reference to the European Union.

Furthermore, it is strongly opposed to the notion of a European Army, and it is in favor of bettering ties with Russia. Lastly, it intends to restrict NATO's influence in Germany, and it advocates for a withdrawal from the EURO-area.

In contrast, the die Linke emphasizes the significance of the European Union, although it intends to change it. In addition, it acts against the militarization of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and opposes the notion of a European Army. Lastly, it aims to disband NATO and replace it with a different system of international security that includes Russia.

Even though the left-wing populist party recognizes the value of the EU, it wants to fundamentally alter the EU's CFSP policy. Both populist parties vehemently oppose the militarization of the European Union and seek to restrict or even abolish NATO's authority.

Therefore, proposals for military integration and collective security institutions, such as the CFSP or CSDP portion of the EU or NATO, would be severely harmed by the rise of either populist party in Germany.

However, in the 2021 elections, neither of the radical populist parties fared well:

The populist left-wing party "Die Linke" received only 5% of the vote. With 9% of the vote, the populist right-wing party "Alternative für Deutschland" showed increased popularity among German voters.

The populist left-wing party "Die Linke" has lost 30 seats in Parliament, while the populist right-wing party "Alternative für Deutschland" has lost 11 seats. As a result, both populist parties have seen significant declines in popularity among the German populace.

After determining the current amount of populism in Germany, we must describe potential future variations of German populism by taking into account various forces of impact⁶⁸:

First, radical political parties with oversimplified answers to complicated problems benefit from the overall **anxiety and uncertainty** among the German populace caused by recent events (the Ukraine War, Germany's energy dependency on Russia, and the remilitarization of Germany). In fact, because it divides the country by driving citizens to the extremes of the national political spectrum and dividing society into ideological groupings, international instability has impacts not just on a global but also on a national level. When examining Trump's speech patterns, HOMOLAR A. and SCHOLZ R. noted the same result: people's demand for security, or ontological security, is accompanied by cognitive closeness, loss frames, and nostalgia effects. (Homolar et Scholz 2019). One can succeed in building devoted followers who, because of their anxiety, will no longer think sensibly by instilling worries and then positioning oneself as the solution to those identical fears.

Second, the 2015 **refugee crisis** demonstrated that rising immigration to Germany also increases support for the far-right populist party⁶⁹. There is reason for anticipating that the AFD's popularity will increase as a result of the War between Russia and Ukraine, which triggers immigration from Ukraine to Germany.

Third, the AFD's popularity is boosted by its **online presence**. According to a survey by Oxford University, the AFD was the most active group on social media⁷⁰. This direct connection with people will become more significant over time as a result of the increasing amount of information that society receives via platforms like Twitter and Facebook, and the AFD's prominent position in the digital world enables it to effectively communicate its political agenda to its supporters.

⁶⁸ <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artikel/politik/afd-5-reasons-for-the-far-right-rising-in-germany-e403522/>

⁶⁹ <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artikel/politik/afd-5-reasons-for-the-far-right-rising-in-germany-e403522/>

⁷⁰ <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/projekte/artikel/politik/afd-5-reasons-for-the-far-right-rising-in-germany-e403522/>

Therefore, I think that the growth of the populist right-wing party is more probable in the future than a rise of the populist left-wing party for the aforementioned reasons as well as the AFD's already-existing popularity among the German populace.

The AFD and the die Linke share a philosophy since they are both populist parties. In fact, populist parties frequently link a certain ideology to the moral classification of society.

This particular ideology emphasizes the significance of the individual nation and is formed of nationalism and Euroscepticism in the case of the AFD and the Linke. Thus, **nationalism** is the favored ideology to which populist parties in Germany would affix themselves with regard to institutions that provide collective security, such as NATO or the CFSP or CSDP component of the EU.

This leads us to conclude that if these populist parties are to gain more support in the German population, their anti-European position will cause a huge European project, such as the European Defense System, to fail.

Paragraph 3.3.2.2. UN Security Council (France VS the European Union)

The Federal Foreign Office of Germany published an article in 2022 regarding a Reform of the United Nations Security Council: “[...] *the Federal Government’s long-term objective is an EU seat. Assuming further development of the European Union and the United Nations, the Federal Government is aiming for a permanent seat for the European Union. However, the Charter of the United Nations does not provide for membership for regional organisations.*” (Federal Foreign Office 2022).

Hence, for the EU to become a permanent member of the UN SC, either the Charter of the UN needs to be amended or the EU needs to become a Federal State, similar to the model of the USA.

While it is already unclear, whether an organization consisting of 27 members can be amended in such a profound manner, it is even less feasible, given the current climate of insecurity and distrust among Nations, that the UN Charter will undergo such delicate modifications.

Hence, France must give up its permanent seat in the UN Security Council in the future in order for the EU to take its place if this objective of a European Army is to be successful.

Paragraph 3.3.2.3. Finland and Sweden joining NATO

By joining NATO, Finland, and Sweden have demonstrated their lack of faith in the capacities of the EU to step up as a security provider, given that collective Defense is already foreseen in Article 47.2 TEU (mutual defense clause) in combination with Article 222 of the TFEU (solidarity clause).

Paragraph 3.3.2.4. The EU's failed unity in its mediation/negotiation attempts with the Russian Federation

In order to have the biggest impact, decisions regarding foreign policy and defense should be made at the highest level feasible with the participation of the greatest number of States.

But in practice, when it comes to matters of utmost significance, EU politics are less unified and more divided than is necessary. Being the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell should have expressed the stance of the entire European Union in order to demonstrate unity. The European Union, however, decided to act separately as Germany and France each sent their respective Heads of State to meet with Vladimir Putin in private and on a one-on-one basis.

The French President and German Chancellor both pushed Russia to end the War, but they also used their talks to stress the national interests of their respective member states, demonstrating the lack of diplomatic cohesion within the EU.

Furthermore, the EU's top diplomat was only allowed to talk to Russia's foreign minister, demonstrating once again how Russia dismisses the EU's role as a major player in the World while nations like France and Germany were able to speak with Putin directly.

Hence, the absence of unity in negotiation attempts with Russia has highlighted the weakness of the European Union: Its division in the domain of high politics.

Sub-section 3.3.3. Preliminary Conclusion

Although the legal foundations of a European Army exist, the EU's political environment is stable and the overall public opinion has become more favorable on the matter of the European Union, the ambitious project of a European Defense System is still out of reach from a political perspective.

Indeed, populism in combination with Euroscepticism remains a threat to unity in the EU. The recent adhesion of Sweden and Finland to NATO had a negative impact on the credibility of EU military capabilities.

Finally, the possibility of a permanent EU seat in the UN Security Council has become more distant with the failed mediation attempts of the European Union with Russia that displayed the EU's lack of unity.

Section 3.4. Military Dimension of a European Defense System

Whereas 3.3. approached the issue of establishment and implementation of a European Defense System from a political perspective, 3.4. adopts a military approach.

Sub-section 3.4.1. Requirements & Benefits

Paragraph 3.4.1.1. European military education

Whereas a European Constitution forms the theoretical basis of interests and values, there also needs to exist an Institution that actively promotes them.

A European Military Academy replacing national Military Academies and teaching European values is crucial to establishing a European Army. Indeed, for an EU soldier stemming from one EU State to be willing to give his life in order to defend the sovereignty of another EU State, he needs to put EU values and interests above all else. Unity, common values, and EU interests can only be achieved through a common European military education.

Paragraph 3.4.1.2. European Army

A common EU Army would allow for greater efficiency and greater levels of specialization in different countries.

First, a common EU Army allows for greater levels of efficiency because its increased size allows it to have a broader range of capabilities as well as an increased Deterrence effect. Indeed, Deterrence becomes more difficult in a World with “[...] *multiple centers of gravity* [...]” (Krepinevich 2019) as more actors possess nuclear and conventional weapons capable of mass destruction. Given that the EU has never shown its destructive military capabilities, its Deterrence factor is small. Hence, the EU needs to build up its army to strengthen its Deterrence effect because the more organized, the more destructive, and the more efficient an EU army is, the less likely a scenario becomes in which the EU would have to make use of its destructive military capabilities.

A concrete example where a bigger army with increased capacities is needed in the 21st century is the area of cyber-security. Not only is it very costly to invest in equipment and the training of soldiers to compete in this field, but this field is vast, meaning that the amount of equipment and personnel needed is high.

Second, a common EU Army allows for greater levels of specialization because each EU country could specialize in a certain field of warfare. Instead of having to cover all aspects of War, from building tanks to training snipers, a country could decide to focus on aerial warfare or naval warfare, etc. However, “[...] *any decision on the specialization of the armed forces needs to be reflected in definitions of their roles and missions.*” (Tagarev 2006), meaning that the specialization of a country in a certain aspect of War needs to be logical.

For example, if Luxembourg were to decide to specialize solely in alpine warfare, this choice would be illogical given that Luxembourg has not the correct geographical dispositions to adequately train EU soldiers specialized in alpine warfare. However, if Austria were to decide to specialize in the training of EU soldiers in alpine warfare, then this choice would be rational given that Austria has a lot of mountains and alpine regions. There already exist numerous interactions between EU countries, such as Eurocoprs, which started off as Franco-German Corps and is nowadays a multinational operation, albeit with US interference through NATO.

An example of interoperability among purely EU countries is presented through the bilateral battalion between Luxembourg and Belgium. Although this joint reconnaissance battalion is of limited dimensions, consisting of 700 soldiers (Heindrichs 2022), it clearly demonstrates the spirit and feasibility of an EU army. Next to this joint battalion, Luxembourg also operates jointly with Belgium one Airbus A400M Transport Plane (Lambert 2021).

Paragraph 3.4.1.2. European Armory

„I am firmly convinced, for example, that now is the right time to finally forge ahead with a European defence and security policy. 27 countries that maintain their own procurement systems, have their own defence contractors and negotiate individually with these contractors – it is impossible to explain why we are not finally bundling these resources at European level.“ (Klingbeil 2022).

To have a common European Armory would mean that EU Member States were to increase their interoperability through the usage of identical weapon systems and simultaneously, they would also reduce procurement costs greatly. Instead of each country investing in exotic weapon systems that are only being used by that specific country, an EU Army would buy the same weapons and vehicles and, in the process, reduce the procurement and maintenance costs.

A first example of cooperation among EU countries in the development and acquisition of weapon systems is the Franco-German project to build military vehicles, such as Fighter Jets or Tanks. Indeed, Olaf Scholz announced in his *Zeitenwende* speech the prospect of a common military projects between Germany and France: *“Darum ist es mir zum Beispiel so wichtig, dass wir die nächste Generation von Kampfflugzeugen und Panzern gemeinsam mit europäischen Partnern und insbesondere Frankreich hier in Europa bauen.” (Scholz 2022).*

A second example of cooperation between EU countries is Eurodrone. Eurodrone is a project between four nations: Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. This project is intended to *“[...] strengthen European sovereignty by establishing and expanding an independent technological base in the field of unmanned aviation.” (Airbus s.d.).*

Furthermore, this project *“[...] promotes European cooperation in the field of security and defence and confirms the initiative to increasingly rely on multinational armament projects.” (Airbus s.d.).*

Lastly, given that the *“Development, procurement and operation will be carried out jointly [...]” (Airbus s.d.)* the common acquisition of the Eurodrone by four major military EU powers *“[...] saves costs and increases efficiency.” (Airbus s.d.).*

However, these two examples of cooperation between EU countries in the sector of Security and Defense are still rare as differences regarding the weapon systems of EU countries remain numerous as the following brief comparison between the USA and the EU demonstrates⁷¹:

Table 1: Comparison of four weapon systems between the EU and the USA

Type of weapon system	United States of America	European Union
Fighter Jet	<p>F-16</p> <p>F/A-18</p> <p>F-22</p> <p>F-35</p> <p>A-10C Thunderbolt II</p>	<p>France:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rafale B - Rafale C - Mirage 2000 <p>Germany:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Eurofighter Typhoon - Tornado <p>Spain:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Eurofighter Typhoon - F-5B Freedom Fighter <p>Italy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Eurofighter Typhoon - Tornado
Attack Helicopter	<p>AH-1Z Viper</p> <p>73 MH-60M Black Hawk</p> <p>AH-6M/MH-6M Little Bird</p>	<p>France:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tiger HAP - Tiger HAD - NH90 NFH <p>Germany:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tiger - H145M <p>Spain:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Tiger HAP-E - Tiger HAD-E <p>Italy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AW129CBT Mangusta - AW139

⁷¹ The information used for this comparison stem from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of book “*The Military Balance*” published on the 15th of February 2022 and written by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Strategic Submarine	Ohio-class	France: - Triomphant-class Germany: - Type 212-2A Spain: - Agosta-class Italy: - Sauro Class - Type 212A
Tank	M1 Abrams	France: - Leclerc Germany: - Leopard 2A5/A6 - Leopard 2A7/A7V Spain: - Leopard 2A4 - Leopard 2E Italy: - C1 Ariete

Although this overview is superficial and very basic, it nonetheless manages to show striking differences between the USA and the EU in terms of armament. While the four major EU military powers have certain overlaps regarding weapon systems (f.i. the type of fighter jet used in Germany, Spain, and Italy), there are nonetheless multiple areas where these EU countries have opted for entirely different weapon systems. The impact of these differences becomes clear when analyzing the example of tanks.

While the USA has one type of tank, there are multiple types of tanks in the EU. As a result, interoperability between these tanks is difficult as not all tanks can tackle the same kind of terrain and cover the same distance without having to refuel or engage the same kind of enemies. Moreover, reparation and maintenance costs are high as each country must ensure the operability of its tanks and the specific training of the soldiers on its own.

Although a proper *European armament agency*⁷² does not yet exist, a *European Defence Agency* exists nonetheless. However, the competencies of this European Defence Agency are limited insofar as it does not have the initiative to buy military equipment for the entire EU but can only support and help “[...] *its members buy, develop and operate new assets together.*” (European Defence Agency s.d.).

This brief quantitative analysis, contrasting EU and US weapon systems, concludes our military analysis in terms of requirements and the benefits of a common EU Army.

⁷² The creation of a European armament agency has been pursued since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 (Hunter 2002, 78-79) but have not yet come to fruition. Instead, a European Defence Agency was funded in 2004 to promote collaboration among EU Member States in the domain of Defense.

Sub-section 3.4.2. Obstacles

Paragraph 3.4.2.1. Importance of the role of national Defense

We have highlighted the importance of a theoretical basis, the European Constitution, and a practical implementation of these values through a European Military Academy.

However, people prefer their own Defense, meaning they cling to national values, such as Honor in defending one's own country and thus, they seek to protect and promote the reputation of their national army.

These strong feelings of affection for one's national army, while being positive insofar as they run against movements of pacifism, are counterproductive because they render an EU Army with EU values and EU interests less likely.

Hence, Valor, Honor, National Sovereignty, and strong feelings for a Nation's Defense, are good in themselves but problematic in the context of a European Defense System.

Paragraph 3.4.2.2. Lack of trust among Nations

Generally, Collaborative Security and Cooperative Security are difficult because States live in an anarchic self-help World where every failure of a security policy could potentially lead to a State losing its independence or existence. Hence, States always need to assume the worst possible scenario to prepare adequately.

Given these omnipresent security concerns, the international psychological climate is filled with inherent mutual distrust.

An example that highlighted how fragile cooperation among countries, even among highly integrated EU member States can be, was provided by the Covid-19 health crisis which had a negative impact on the unity of the EU, as it put the Schengen System on hold through the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls.

Although trust-building mechanisms are needed more than ever if a European Defense System is to exist in the future, the current global uncertainty and insecurity, caused by the War in Ukraine, have rendered collaboration and cooperation improbable in the near future.

Sub-section 3.4.3. Preliminary Conclusion

So far, none of the military requirements for a European Defense System have been met. While some are in the process of being met, such as a common European Arsenal, others are still far away, such as a true EU Army.

First, a single **European military education** does not yet exist as countries prefer to send their soldiers and officers to their own Military Academies to educate them according to their national values and interests.

Second, a common **EU Army** is not yet in sight. Although France, under President Emmanuel Macron, is a huge supporter of this idea, and common EU military projects exist, the will among Member States to give up an important aspect of their sovereignty by putting their national Army under EU leadership is not yet strong enough.

Third, while certain EU countries share some weapon systems and while the political will in Germany exists to increase cooperation with other EU countries, especially France, in the development of weapon systems, the overall efforts in harmonizing the **European Arsenal** are far too little. As a result, interoperability between these different weapon systems is limited and the reparation costs together with the maintenance costs of these numerous weapon systems are high as individual countries do not have the same buying power as a combined EU Army would have.

Chapter 4: Conclusion

Section 4.1. Main findings

Similarly to the overall structure of this master thesis, we will also divide our main findings into two categories, summarizing our key observations regarding a German and an EU Zeitenwende.

Sub-section 4.1.1. German Zeitenwende

Even if the military investments and the resulting rearmament are successful, the psychological issues of the Germans to trust their Army remain. Hence, the German Army will most likely remain modest as long as German soldiers and officers are not allowed to be proud of serving their country.

The announced one-off military investment of 100 billion Euros will be able to modernize the German Army, but the pacifist perspective of the German population remains outdated, overshadowed by the guilt of the past, and ultimately unable to face upcoming challenges.

As the Chairperson of the SPD, Lars Klingbeil stated: *“Standing up for the Bundeswehr in society was often viewed critically. I hope that we as a society will develop a new normality with the Bundeswehr.”* (Klingbeil 2022). The psychological blockade that hinders Germans from being proud of their Army needs to be resolved for their Army to regain its prestige and ultimately its strength.

While there are first signs of German pacifism going away, such as the support of the German population for a modernization of the Bundeswehr and providing military support to Ukraine, the German leadership is divided and lacks a clear and coherent strategy for strengthening Germany’s military capabilities.

Thus, a German Zeitenwende, from a military and social perspective, is in process, but the political dimension, while possessing the overall drive as demonstrated by our analysis of the political parties within Germany, requires more leadership to unite the will of the parties into one coherent Security Policy of Germany.

Sub-section 4.1.2. EU Zeitenwende

4.1.2. analyses whether the political and military requirements for an EU Zeitenwende, meaning for the establishment of a European Defense System, have been met.

First, we will analyze whether the **political requirements** are met.

While political stability exists in the European Union, with populist parties being overall rather weak, political unity does not yet exist in the EU. Hence, the prospect of a United States of Europe is not yet feasible.

A third and last political requirement, a European Constitution, failed in 2004. Although it has become increasingly difficult to amend the EU Treaties due to the higher number of EU Member States, there is reason to be optimistic as the overall mentality of the EU population is favorable toward more integration because 65% of the EU population believes that EU Membership is a good thing.

Other political obstacles regarding the establishment of a European Defense System include Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO and the EU's failed negotiation attempt with the Russian Federation. These signs of lack of credibility and lack of unity render a future accession of the EU to the UN Security Council and the annexed exit of France from the UNSC less likely.

To achieve political unity, meaning a federal system with an EU Constitution, several possibilities exist.

The least likely and the most rewarding solution would be to establish such a system with the current members of the EU.

A more likely but also less rewarding possibility is to create within the EU a Security Union, meaning an association of countries with deeper integration in the area of Defense and Security. This seems more probable as it will allow establishing a restricted/narrow European Defense System soon while allowing other EU Members to join this EU Security Union later.

Second, we will analyze whether the **military requirements** are met.

A common EU military education provides the necessary intellectual, moral, and ethical basis to conduct missions as a united EU Force.

A common EU Army allows for greater levels of efficiency and specialization.

A common EU Armory allows for increased levels of interoperability.

Currently, neither a common EU Military Academy nor a common EU Army exists.

A common EU Armory exists partly through common projects between EU countries.

Although these projects set the EU on the right path toward strategic autonomy, they are too few to have an important impact at this time.

Finally, while the bodies that can constitute the political and military leadership of a future European Defense System already exist, such as the *Political and Security Committee (PSC)* or the *European Union Military Committee*, the legal problem resides in the limits of Article 42(7) that only sets the legal basis for a European Defense System but does not in itself entitle the EU to conduct Self-Defense operations autonomously within the framework of CSDP. On top of that, even if the EU were to establish its own Army within the Eurocorps framework, EU Battlegroups can, according to the SACEUR agreement, be placed under NATO, and thereby US command. Overcoming the EU's dependency and subordination to US military leadership is key to achieving EU strategic and military autonomy.

Section 4.2. Outlook on the future of European Security

How far is the unification process of the European Union able to go at the current stage and to what degree has Germany's postwar pacifism evolved to tackle the security challenges of the 21st century?

To tackle these questions is to answer our key question: **In how far can Germany be the driver for more integration in the Security and Defense Politics of the European Union?**

A European Defense System cannot be successful, unless the two biggest military powers, Germany and France are supporting this project. Currently, however, only France, under the leadership of Emmanuel Macron seems to aim for an independent autonomous EU Army. While France is the nuclear deterrent of the EU, France alone cannot establish a European Defense System. France relies on Germany, and it is precisely Germany's lack of leadership that hinders this project from coming to fruition.

Currently, Germany possesses the political willingness, legal framework, and social support to further invest and build up its military, but there is a lack of leadership in Germany as there is no clear consensus among the current political elite regarding a precise strategy for Germany's Defense and Security Policies.

A leadership problem in Germany leads to a leadership problem on the EU level in the area of Security and Defense. Indeed, as already mentioned before, a dual leadership, consisting of the combined efforts of France and Germany is required for a European Defense System to exist.

Thus, Germany is the driver that can make a European Defense System come to fruition, but not at this time as the required German political leadership does not yet exist. As a result, our outlook on European Security is mixed.

On the one hand, there is reason to be pessimistic about the current Security Climate in Europe because the German political leaders cannot be exchanged from one day to another but only through the democratic process of election.

On the other hand, there is reason to be optimistic in the long run as the next federal elections in Germany are happening in 2025 and numerous elements within the current Security Climate in Europe are in favor of higher EU military integration:

First, the **International Context of War** is a trigger for establishing a European Defense System.

Second, the **Military revival of Germany** through the *Zeitenwende* and the *Sondervermögen* to save the *Bundeswehr*:

Third, the **Political support in Germany** (political parties, federal chancellor, and federal President) for investing in the domains of Security and Defense.

Fourth, the **Social support in Germany** as 78% of the German population backs the decision of investing 100 billion Euros in the German Defense Sector (Wintour 2022) and 62% would even support higher investments thereby moving further away from German post-war pacifism allowing Germany to have more responsibility and importance on the international level (DW 2023).

Fifth, the **EU legal foundation** of CSDP and the treaty of Lisbon through its Article 47.2 TEU and its Article 222 TFEU have transformed the EU, from a legal perspective, and set the path to becoming a Security Organization.

It can be argued that while these pillars exist, they may not yet be developed enough for a European Defense System to exist at the current time:

- Germany's lack of political leadership prevents it from formulating a coherent Security Strategy
- Cooperation between Germany and France might need to be increased
- Political stability, while existing in Europe, is far from being perfect, with countries such as Poland or Hungary, being led by far-right parties
- As devastating as it is for Ukraine, the War might not be damaging the EU enough. A more devastating War might be required for Europeans to realize that their pacifism does not lead to peace and that a European Defense System is the only logical way to guarantee their independence and sovereignty.

Finally, based on our analysis, we can conclude that the current German political leadership favors option three of the four potential future outcomes of a German Zeitenwende, which means that NATO and European Security will be strengthened but not yet to the point where a European Defense System could be established.

Section 4.3. Aspects of further research

We analyzed the *Zeitenwende* speech by Olaf Scholz on the 27th of February 2022 in 2.1. and we concluded that the *Zeitenwende* happening in Germany consists of four different kinds of *Zeitenwende* (Military, Political, Energy, and Foreign Policy).

Before going into detail regarding the impact of other EU countries (4.3.1.) as well as non-EU countries (4.3.2.) on the Security and Defense Politics of the EU, it is important to note that we mainly analyzed the **Military** as well as **Political *Zeitenwende*** (change of the German position with regards to War and importance of the EU as a supra-national security organization). We did not go into further detail regarding the Energy *Zeitenwende*, nor did we further study the change of Foreign Policy happening in Germany.

While the choice of Energy sources as well as the impact of German Foreign Policy are both important regarding the Security and Defense Politics of the European Union, we believe that they have an indirect influence, because the main driving factors behind EU Security and Defense Politics are Military and Politics.

Sub-section 4.3.1. Impact of other EU countries on EU Security and Defense Politics?

The key reference point throughout our analysis was the German position and the impact of Germany on a European Zeitenwende. Although we briefly introduced statistics and interests of other EU countries throughout this thesis, it would be interesting to analyze EU Security and Defense Politics from a different angle, meaning from the perspective of other major EU countries such as France, Poland, Italy, Spain, or Sweden to understand their perspective on EU Security and Defense Politics.

Sub-section 4.3.2. Impact of non-EU countries on EU Security and Defense Politics?

Whereas we analyzed the potential conflict with the United States of America (and by extension with NATO) if Europe were to become militarily independent and autonomous, we did not discuss the impact a militarily revived Europe could have on other superpowers such as Russia or China.

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Appendix A – Conceptual Framework

Military Concepts

I. What is Security

Security as a concept has become increasingly important in current political discussions due to the ongoing War in Ukraine which is posing a Security-threat to Europe.

David A. Baldwin, the author of the Journal Article entitled “The Concept of Security”, has defined Security as “*a low probability of damage to acquired values*” (Baldwin 1997, 13).

Hence, he divides Security matters into two categories:

- Security for whom?
- Security for which values?

First, it is crucial to note that there are different perceptions of “Security”: **Security for whom?**

On an *international level*, Security among Nations can be a topic of discussion, as the same situation can be perceived differently. Indeed, if State A possesses long-range rockets and State B does not possess the same military capabilities, this situation will be perceived by State A as secure while State B will feel insecure.

On a *national level*, “[...] *the state’s pursuit of security for itself may conflict with the individual’s pursuit of security [...]*” (Baldwin 1997, 12). While a State may feel more secure if it monitors and surveils its citizens, the citizens may, however, feel limited in their freedom of movement or in their freedom of speech which makes them feel insecure or at least uncomfortable.

Second, while there are multiple perceptions of Security, that allow judging a situation differently, depending on one’s perspective (Individuals, States, NGOs, or International Organizations), the content of Security may vary from one situation to another: **Security for which values?**

Often, actors determine security on the basis of certain values such as the physical safety as well as the psychological well-being of individuals or the economic welfare within a certain area. In the case of national security, the list of values that require protection also include territorial integrity, together with political independence, sovereignty, and autonomy (Baldwin 1997, 13).

General Jacob L. Devers argues that Security is absolute, a situation is either secure or insecure:

“National security is a condition which cannot be qualified. We shall either be secure or we shall be insecure. We cannot have partial security. If we are only half secure, we are not secure at all.” (Brodie 1950)

However, we believe in the existence of varying degrees of Security. Indeed, we further argue that no situation can ever be truly secure. In 1.5.2. we will mention the doctrine of Realism, according to which smaller States will form alliances in order to defeat a bigger enemy. In this regard, if one single State were to acquire a lot of territories, for instance through the annexation of neighboring countries, it would thereby become very powerful and feel very secure. However, smaller States would simultaneously form alliances in order to defeat this powerful State and restore a balance of power.

Hence, no State can ever become omnipotent or all-powerful because this will trigger other countries to form an alliance and defeat it. It is for this reason, that in order to be secure, a State must neither be too weak nor too strong. As there are varying degrees of strength/weakness with regard to States, there are also varying degrees of Security.

Having defined the actors, values, and degrees of Security we also need to determine the means to obtain Security.

Security can be achieved through various means: Diplomacy and negotiations being the political solution to solve security issues between sovereign Nations and military interventions being the last resort to solve conflicts and restore Security.

As the main focus of this Thesis does not lie on diplomatic but military interventions, we will focus on this latter method of conflict resolution.

Security on the State level can be achieved through strong military capabilities. These military capacities can be used for defensive purposes as well as for offensive purposes. Whereas bunkers increase a State's defensive military capacity by rendering a potential attack ineffective, rockets can either increase a State's offensive or defensive capabilities, depending on their use as means of attack or means of retaliation.

Lastly, obtaining Security does not only depend on the actor and his subjective territorial perspective but also depends on the time period within which Security policies are adopted. Indeed, while it may be tempting to attack a provoking enemy, this might not always be the most beneficial decision in the long run as it is sometimes better to build relations than to build walls that separate us. Indeed, short-term and long-term Security policies may be in conflict with each other (Dahl and Lindblom 1953).

II. What is Defense?

A Nation's Defense Policy analyses not only WHAT needs to be achieved (= objectives) but also HOW to achieve them (= capabilities) (Tagarev 2006).

Procedure to determine the objectives of the armed forces (Tagarev 2006, 19-21):

First, **Security Objectives** need to be elaborated on the basis of:

- The values and interests of a State or Alliance
- Analysis of the Security Environment, meaning the perceived threats (f.i. International Terrorism, Organized crime, Human Rights Violations, ...)

As a consequence of the political, social, and moral origins, Security Objectives are rather vague and quite large. Indeed, they encompass a State's strategic compass concerning current and potential upcoming threats.

Second, **Defense Objectives** are established through the:

- Security Objectives
- Security Strategy
- Importance of the Military on the national level

Whereas Security Objectives have a strong tendency to be broad, generalized goals, a Security Strategy needs to be the exact opposite: Clear, precise, and realistic. Paired with the Security Objectives and the role of the Military on a national level, the Security strategy establishes the Defense Objectives. Defense Objectives are also referred to as Defense Missions, as they outline the concrete roles of the armed forces.

Procedure on how to define the capabilities needed to achieve the objectives of the armed forces:

Capabilities can vary in accordance with three variables, namely: (Tagarev 2006, 24-25)

- The Defense Objectives / Defense Missions of the Nation
- The scenarios in which a State wishes to attain these Defense Objectives / Defense Missions
- The level of performance a State wishes to possess when completing its Defense Objectives / Defense Missions

Hence, more extensive Defense Objectives / Defense Missions, a broader variety of scenarios, or a higher degree of performance all require a State to increase its military investments in order to achieve this level of military capabilities.

Indeed, if the mission and the level of performance are unchanged, but the scenario becomes more difficult, different capabilities are required regarding the situation in which the mission needs to take place.

For instance: Landing a military plane on a proper airstrip is less difficult than landing the same military plane on an uneven surface. In both situations, the objective and the level of performance are the same: Landing the plane. However, the required capabilities of the pilot to complete the mission are different as the scenario is different.

As the Defense Objectives / Defense Missions have already been fixed and the level of performance is too arbitrary (what one country considers good might be average for another country) we will further elaborate on the planning of scenarios regarding the establishment of military capabilities of a Nation. The planning of scenarios is not intended to predict the future but to prepare the Armed Forces for a variety of potential future missions that fall within the scope of the Security Objectives of the Nation or the Alliance. (Tagarev 2006, 25-26).

Having defined the objectives and the capabilities of a State regarding its Defense policy-making, we also need to analyze the **purpose, nature, and range of defensive measures** themselves.

The **purpose of a defensive measure** is to safeguard the core values of a State that are crucial for its existence and its proper functioning, such as:

- National sovereignty
- Territorial integrity
- Independence

Indeed, as already mentioned before, the **nature of military capacities** can vary depending on the surrounding situation. Indeed, military capacities can sometimes be used for defensive purposes as well as for offensive purposes.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

However, there are certain exceptions to this basic core principle of the UN Charter, such as:

- Article 51 of the UN Charter concerning the right to Self-Defense
- Authorization of the UN Security Council (If the UN itself is engaged in a military conflict)
- Responsibility to protect (R2P), meaning the international community, after having obtained the approval of the UN Security Council, may intervene if a State fails or refuses to protect its citizens
- Consent, for instance, State A may consent that State B builds military bases on its territory

As the UN Charter generally prohibits the use of force, except in extraordinary situations, we will discuss Article 51 regarding the right to Self-Defense:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

In order to understand the right to Self-Defense contained in Article 51 of the UN Charter, it is crucial to understand what defines a “defensive measure” and comprehend the **range of defensive measures** available to a State in assuring its Defense.

First, Article 51 only mentions the possibility of defending yourself once you have already been attacked. Hence, it defines the right to Self-Defense as a right to Counterattack.

Second, Article 51 also mentions the “inherent right to self-defense”. The relevant case law regarding this inherent right stems from the *Caroline Case of 1843*, where it was decided that one can strike first and does not need to wait until one is being attacked if:

- There is an imminent threat
- There is a need for Self-Defense

The Caroline Case criteria of 1843 are also known as Preventive Self-Defense.

Third, Anticipatory Self-Defense is another angle to look at the right to Self-Defense.

The Bush Doctrine adopted this perspective of Self-Defense in their war against Iraq (Murphy 2005). Whereas a counterattack Self-Defense strategy or a preventive Self-Defense strategy are both based on the aspect of the imminence of danger, the anticipatory Self-Defense strategy loses this aspect of imminence as the mere potential of an attack suffices to attack this possible aggressor. Indeed, as long as the other side has military destructive capabilities, one can attack this potential enemy when one has a genuine belief it will attack.

Thus, this strategy is not based on facts or truths but on beliefs and this makes this strategy highly vulnerable as there is a strong risk of possible abuse, meaning that States will be able to attack anybody who threatens their well-being by claiming they have reason to believe that the enemy is in possession of weapons of mass destruction and is willing to use them.

Therefore, the scope of Defense measures ranges from Counterattack (Article 51 of the UN Charter) to Preventive Self-Defense (Caroline case criteria), up to Anticipatory Self-Defense. We will exclude the possibility of Anticipatory Self-Defense in our further reasoning as the risk of abusing them or simply miscalculating the intentions of the enemy is too high to be accurately used. Hence, we will only consider Strategies based on Counterattacks or Preventive Self-Defense as legitimate Defense policies.

Lastly, we will analyze the **degree to which a weapon can be considered merely defensive**.

We mentioned earlier that the purpose of a defensive weapon is to protect oneself from an enemy's attack. However, the question arises whether or not a defensive weapon can ultimately lead to the destruction of the enemy?

We believe that the key to answering this question resides in the **principle of proportionality**. Indeed, the retaliation needs to be proportionate to the danger. Hence, if the enemy is destroying a road, then it would be disproportionate to neutralize them.

However, if the enemy (country B) is using nuclear weapons in its attack and it plans to wipe out the population of country A, can country A use as a legitimate defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, its nuclear arsenal leading to the destruction of the population of country B?

This example illustrates the problem of the **MAD system** (Mutually Assured Destruction System). Can this system be considered a defensive system or is it an offensive system that is prohibited by UN Law?

According to the Prisoner's Dilemma, one can never trust the other prisoner and it is therefore in the interest of each prisoner to distrust the other one. This leads both prisoners to choose the least optimal solution to their problem⁷³.

In World politics, it is possible to conceive the States as prisoners. Although there is no World Police, there is nonetheless a fundamental distrust among Nations which drives them to opt for the most optimal solution only on rare occasions. Although it seems logical and obvious that higher levels of cooperation can change the relations between States in a peaceful and sustainable manner, mankind, to its own deprivation, often chooses to build walls instead of striking them down. Similarly, instead of building more bridges, we build more weapons.

⁷³ In the case of the prisoner's dilemma the least optimal solution consists in admitting the guilt of having committed the crime and thus receiving a longer sentence than if both prisoners had denied having committed the crime.

The MAD system is nonetheless a perfect defensive system for two reasons:

- Its efficiency is absolute. No one attacks an enemy if he knows he will be destroyed as a result of his attack.
- Its probability of being used is very small, because of diplomatic channels between States that constantly work to maximize trust and cooperation among States in order to avoid at all costs a situation where the option of the MAD system is even on the table.

Thus, as long as the State employs a policy that is based on the strategy of counterattacks or Preventive Self-Defense and as long as the weapons are used in order to safeguard the Security Objectives of a State and are utilized in accordance with the principle of proportionality, we believe that the State uses a Defense Policy and not an Offense / Attack Policy.

We have now analyzed the concept of Defense from a policy-making perspective, and have determined the purpose, nature, range, and degree of defensive measures.

III. What is Deterrence?

Deterrence “discourages an adversary from pursuing an undesirable action [...] by changing the adversary's calculation of costs, benefits, and risks.” (Krepinevich 2019).

There are two types of Deterrence that aim to dissuade a rational enemy from attacking: (Krepinevich 2019)

- **Deterrence through denial** aims at rendering the chance of success of an enemy's attack so slim that the enemy does not even attempt to attack
- **Deterrence through punishment** aims at convincing the enemy that its attack would be returned with a heavy retaliation possibly leading to its destruction

According to Krepinevich, a member of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy for the United States of America, there are four new challenges for Deterrence:

First, the MAD system (=Mutually Assured Destruction system) of the Cold War risks disappearing as we no longer live in a bipolar but multipolar World with the rise of China and Russia. If China continues to invest in its nuclear arsenal, then the US will follow suit and this might trigger Russia to do the same as each of the three Nations sees the other two as competitors. Thus, the MAD system is susceptible to disappear because it is not possible to achieve a balance of military capabilities in a World with more than two superpowers (Krepinevich 2019). As we currently live in such a Multipolar World, it is not unlikely to see a new arms race taking place as there is a constant imbalance of military capabilities.

Second, Deterrence is uncertain as the current dangers of military capabilities are unknown for two reasons:

- The scarcity of War between major powers has led them to question whether or not a balance of power between them still exists
- The arrival of advanced weaponry adds to this uncertainty as their true destructive potential is yet to be determined

Third, Deterrence has become less effective for two reasons:

- The relative ease to attack crucial infrastructures such as pipelines, satellites, and cables
- The increased difficulty to identify and neutralize the enemies responsible for attacks on critical infrastructures

Fourth, new understandings of the decision-making psychology of individuals render an effective Deterrence policy more difficult to establish. This difficulty is due to reference points. People's perception of risk varies in accordance with the circumstances. Indeed, people are more accepting of risk if it serves the purpose of reacquiring something they already possessed before, but they are more critical of risk if it serves the purpose of obtaining something new.

For example, when individuals gain territories, they set their new reference point to these newly acquired territories. Any subsequent loss of these newly acquired territories will seem to them like a loss. However, when individuals lose territories, their reference point does not change as they want to regain these lost territories.

For this reason, Deterrence is therefore difficult in times of War as the reference point of the Winner adapts to the new situation but the reference point of the loser stays unchanged and he cannot be easily deterred from regaining what he thinks is rightfully his.

People's perception of fairness (= what they believe is rightfully theirs) is so strong that they are willing to fight for it even if the facts are against them.

An example has been provided by the Cuba Missile Crisis of 1962, a time in which the nuclear weapon arsenal of the USA largely outnumbered the one of the USSR. Regardless of this factual disadvantage, Khrushchev refused to accept Kennedy's offer (= USSR will remove its missiles from Cuba and the USA will not invade Cuba) as he insisted on fair treatment consisting of the USA removing its missiles from the doorstep of the USSR (Krepinevich 2019).

Having defined Defense and defensive measures as well as Deterrence, it is important to distinguish Defense from Deterrence. Although Deterrence can sometimes be seen as a form of Defense, we argue that while Deterrence and Defense are connected, they are nonetheless distinct. Indeed, while the goal of Deterrence and Defense is the same, as they both aim to safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a Nation, their approach can be different.

Deterrence in itself is not to be confused with Defense insofar as it strives to dissuade the enemy from even considering the possibility of violating the sovereignty of a State in the first place.

If Deterrence is efficient, Defense is no longer required.

However, it is important to note that while this argument may be true in theory, it is not in reality. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how Deterrence measures are able to completely replace defensive measures. To analyze further the relationship between Deterrence and Defense, we need to divide Deterrence into two strands:

- Deterrence through denial
- Deterrence through punishment

The first type of Deterrence, Deterrence through denial, is completely distinct from Defense as these deterrence measures cannot be mistaken for defensive measures due to the absence of their ability to strike back. Indeed, an example of Deterrence through denial measures would be a country that relied solely on a system of bunkers, thereby making enemy rocket strikes ineffective. In this scenario, the Deterrence measures do not offer a perfect Defense as the enemy is able to invade the country and let the resistance starve to death in their impenetrable bunkers and annex the territory of the country.

The second type of Deterrence, Deterrence through punishment, is much closer to our understanding of Defense. Indeed, Deterrence through punishment consists of a counter-attack, a retaliation, that is supposed to be so devastating that no rational enemy would consider attacking.

As we already mentioned before, defensive measures also have offensive capabilities and can thus be used as means of deterrence. Whereas defensive means (for example conventional bombs) aim to retaliate in case of attack, means of deterrence (for example bunkers that render the enemy's attack ineffective) aim to dissuade the enemy from

attacking. It is, however, also possible to consider rockets simultaneously as a means of defense and as a means of deterrence.

Hence, depending on the type of weapon (ex. Rocket) or infrastructure (ex. Bunker), the distinction between Defense and Deterrence can be important but it can also be purely theoretical.

As one type of Deterrence (Deterrence through denial) is completely distinct from Defense, and the second type of Deterrence (Deterrence through punishment) is interconnected with Defense, it would be inaccurate to stipulate that Deterrence and Defense are interchangeable terms.

IV. What is Pacifism?

For the past decades, Germany has adopted a position characterized by Pacifism. We will neither investigate the reasons for Germany's pacifism, as Germany's history will be treated in 1.5.2. nor analyze Germany's current and future security strategy options as they will be studied in Chapter 2.

This section aims to define the concept of Pacifism.

Pacifism can be described as “[...] *the principled opposition to war and violence as a means of settling disputes*” (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 1998).

Buddhism can be seen as the first pacifist movement as Buddha demanded that his followers, the Buddhists, refrain at all times from using violence against other creatures (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 1998).

While there are many reasons why an individual or even an entire Nation adopts a pacifist attitude, common arguments include idealistic and moral elements such as:

- The aspiration of creating a World that renounces War and violence altogether
- The ethical conviction that every type of War and every act of violence is against human nature as these former types of conflict-resolution methods are linked with human suffering and loss of life

Following the 19th century as well as two World Wars in the course of the 20th century, the pacifist movement gained momentum through the creation of Pacifist Organizations, International Courts, and Treaties aimed at disarmament (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 1998).

Examples of disarmament conferences and treaties are:

- SALT (= Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and START (= Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) between the USA and the USSR
- Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty of 1968

Examples of pacifist movements in the International Community to solve international conflicts in a peaceful manner:

- League of Nations after WWI with its Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
- United Nations after WW2 with its International Court of Justice (ICJ)
- International Criminal Court (ICC)
- Council of Europe with its European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
- European Union with its Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)

Pacifism can be seen as a weak form of Deterrence through denial. The local population of a country that follows a foreign policy based on Pacifism, although being prohibited from striking back or retaliating, can, nonetheless, lead a non-violent resistance through non-cooperation with the aggressor (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 1998).

Finally, it is important to note that while Pacifism can be frequent on an individual basis, it is far more seldom for it to be adopted by an entire Nation. It is for this reason, that we will investigate in 1.5.2. the particular reasons that led Germany to adopt a pacifist position.

Political Concepts

I. What is Populism?

Populism is a movement that, despite its seeming simplicity—the majority will decide on the country's future—has profound moral ramifications and the potential to have disastrous political effects.

Populism is a phenomenon that exists in many forms all throughout the world and is not specific to any one area, nation, or continent.

A political movement known as populism separates the populace into two groups: "Pure people" and "Corrupt elite". The moral standards of authenticity and purity serve as the foundation for this separation.

In order to distinguish between the honest masses and the corrupt elite, populist parties frequently tie their moral division of society to a particular ideology (nationalism, liberalism, socialism, etc.). The elite has particular interests that are distinct from the broad preferences of the pure populace.

The disconnect between theoretical goals and practical outcomes is where populism poses a threat: While populism seeks to empower the people, in reality, it just empowers the leader, who may decide on his or her own whatever types of policies to implement by recognizing the components of the general will that are important to them (Weyland 2017, 53).

Additionally, populists think politics should reflect the overall desire of the populace (Mudde 2017). The fundamental problem with populism is that, if the general will of the pure people demanded it, it would theoretically be acceptable to establish a society that openly discriminates against particular races, faiths, nationalities, etc.

Mudde Cas claims that *“Populist perception is usually related to the self-perception of the targeted people”* (Mudde 2017).

There are problems with this self-perception as a result of new threats to European unity. As a result, populist parties will employ ideology to identify the "pure people" more and more. Because of this, populism, which in principle is not an ideology per se, will not only be blended with other ideologies increasingly frequently but will also depend more and more on them to separate society into the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite."

Isaiah Berlin claims that *“populism is the belief in belonging to a group or culture”*. (McRae 1969) Therefore, for populists, the need to belong is of utmost significance. People who support populism do not, in fact, believe in personal or "specific" interests; rather, they solely believe in the interests of the "pure people" as a whole. The demand to belong to a particular group also grows stronger if these shared interests are threatened to a greater extent (economic inflation, military invasion, humanitarian/migration crisis, etc.). The employment of beliefs that simplify this complicated world in which we live will satiate this demand.

Populism as a concept is important as it allows us to study the negative effects of the rise of ideologies in Europe regarding common sensitive projects such as European Defense in 3.4.2.

Appendix B – Background Section

I. Discipline of Law – EU Law

The evolution of the European Union can be traced back by looking at its treaties. Indeed, there is no European Constitution (yet) despite an attempt in 2004 and thus, the legal foundation of the European Union is to be found in a series of treaties that have each increased or amended the competencies of the EU.

The first important treaty in the history of the European Union is the **Paris Treaty of 1951**.

Following the birth of NATO on the 4th of April 1949 and the birth of the Council of Europe on the 5th of May 1949, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented on the 9th May 1950, today known as Europe Day, a plan for deeper political cooperation in Europe known as the Schuman plan. This plan consisted of the integration of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe and six countries, the founding Member States of the European Union, agreed to sign the Treaty of Paris on the 18th of April 1951, thereby officially creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 (European Union s.d.).

This Treaty's aim was to prevent another World War by putting European coal and steel industries under common management.

The second memorable treaty is the **Treaty of Rome of 1957**.

This Treaty, which officially came into force in 1958, created the European Economic Community (EEC) and it also established the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, also known as EURATOM) (European Union s.d.).

The third crucial step in the development of the European Union happened with the **Single European Act of 1987**.

This act aimed to get rid of national differences regarding trade and thereby create a Single Market. Moreover, it aimed at empowering the European Parliament which was created on the 19th of March 1958 (European Union s.d.).

Fourth, the **Treaty of Maastricht of 1992** came into force in 1993 and it was important for various reasons:

- The European Economic Community (EEC) was formally renamed the European Community (EC)
- The Maastricht Treaty also set up a system of three pillars that constitute the European Union
 - 1) European Communities (consisting of the EC, the ECSC, and EURATOM)
 - 2) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
 - 3) Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM)

Fifth, the **Treaty of Porto of 1992** came into force in 1994 and it was a further enhancement of the European Union as it installed the European Economic Area (EEA) which allows non-EU States, which are members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), to nonetheless fully participate in the Single Market of the EU, established through the Single European Act of 1987.

Sixth, the **Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997** slightly modified the Treaty on the European Union by simplifying the codecision procedure and by allowing the European Parliament to approve the President of the Commission (European Union s.d.).

The Euro was introduced in on the 1st of January 1999 (European Union s.d.).

Seventh, the **Treaty of Nice of 2001** allowed the European Union to obtain a proper legal personality. Furthermore, it amended certain elements of EU legislation and strengthened the role of the EU Parliament by giving it additional legislative and supervisory powers (European Union s.d.). Lastly, it also introduced the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, although it was not yet legally binding.

Eighth, the **Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2004** has, although it failed due to the vetoes stemming from France and the Netherlands, nonetheless shown that the political will for a deeper Union is there as there were 25 EU Member States which signed the proposed Constitution. Although the time for a deepening of the Union was not ripe at the time, recent events and France's new pro-Europe position under Macron allow

space for hope in a second attempt at establishing an EU Constitution, the basis for Cooperation in sensitive areas such as Defense.

Ninth, the **Treaty of Lisbon of 2007** has truly transformed the Economic Union into a Union of Law, by linking the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, declared in 2000, as a Protocol to the Treaty of Lisbon, and thereby making the Charter legally binding and of the same legal value as an EU Treaty. Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, also attributed more powers to the European Parliament by bestowing upon it the right to appoint (and not simply approve) the President of the Commission.

Hence, we can conclude that the European Union came into existence for the *maintenance of peace in Europe* and was soon given economic power.

This *Economic Union* then also became a *Union of Law* through its own judicial institution, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and its own Charter of Fundamental Human Rights which came into force in 2009.

However, the most important evolution of the EU is yet to happen: *The Security Union*.

The evolution of the European Union would then truly be complete as it would have developed from being an organization that was born because of the fear and potential of War in Europe to being an organization of economic prosperity and justice, and finally, to become a System that stands for peace and the maintenance of Security in the World.

While it was impervious that the European Union grew rapidly by including Eastern countries and thereby creating a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe, this also poses a problem regarding the integration process. Indeed, with a higher amount of Member States in the European Union, it also becomes increasingly difficult to find common ground. Hence, to introduce new, revolutionary ideas such as the concept of a “United States of Europe”, meaning a Federal System with a common army and a common Defense System, becomes very difficult.

While the problem of integration is already visible, there are numerous voices that are in favor of widening, meaning accepting new Members to the European Union and thus reject the idea of Deepening, meaning improving the functioning of the European Union. We will further analyze this existing legal foundation (or lack thereof) in EU Law regarding European Defense when discussing the political obstacles to creating a European Army.

II. Discipline of Law – International Law

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was officially created on the 4th of April 1949 through the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty.

Its 12 founding members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America) have defined the role of this International Organization in the short Treaty, containing only 14 articles.

The key Article in this defensive Alliance is Article 5 which states:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

To determine whether or not Article 5, the heart of NATO, is in violation of International Law, we need to study the UN Charter, which is the legal instrument of the UN that is binding on the UN Member States and also used by the International Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the UN.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

The UN Charter states in Article 51 an exception to the prohibition on the use of force that is declared in Article 2(4):

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.

Structure

Hence, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has been drafted in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and is therefore not bound by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

Having outlined the principal legal foundations of NATO, it is crucial to study this Organization's objectives and conclude its purpose.

NATO was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War, and thus, its primary purpose was to guarantee peace in Europe and to promote cooperation among its members (NATO s.d.).

Simultaneously, NATO aimed to counter the ideological and military threat posed by the USSR through the Warsaw Pact (NATO s.d.).

Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, and the first President of the United Nations General Assembly, declared during the formal signing procedure of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. on April 4th, 1949, that:

“The new pact is purely defensive, it is directed against no one, it threatens no one; it should therefore disturb no one, save, of course, any person or persons who might foster the criminal idea of having recourse to war.”

(Spaak 1949)

While many argued that NATO lost its purpose with the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact on the 1st of July 1991, the recent Ukraine-Russia War has reminded us that the initial, primary, purpose of NATO, to secure peace in Europe, is still as relevant today as it was during its inception.

Furthermore, the importance of NATO has also been highlighted through the recent accession of Sweden and Finland, two traditionally neutral countries, to this Defense Organization. Sweden and Finland thereby displayed NATO's Open-Door policy contained within Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

While this Open-Door policy can be seen as an enlargement policy whose sole purpose consists in threatening the territorial sovereignty of neighboring non-NATO States, this perspective is incoherent with the objectives of NATO. Indeed, the existential fears of Russia are unfounded as NATO has re-affirmed in its first Chapter "Principles and Purposes" of a key document of 2022, adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid, and entitled "NATO 2022 – Strategic Concept", that: "*We are a defensive Alliance.*" (NATO 2022)

Furthermore, Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary-General of NATO, has highlighted during a speech following the meeting of the NATO-Russia Council on the 12th of January 2022, that:

"[...] countries that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact of the Soviet Union, they have actually freely, through independent democratic processes, chosen to join NATO [...]" (Stoltenberg 2022)

The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, an action-oriented think tank, recently advised in their brief entitled "NATO's Tunnel Vision" of August 2022 that:

"The path to peace must begin with settling the conflict in Ukraine, and the key to a settlement is securing Ukraine's independence as a neutral state outside NATO." (Beebe 2022)

While the idea of a neutral Ukraine, functioning as a buffer zone between the Russian Federation and NATO-Territory is in theory a brilliant concept, it is unlikely to happen in reality, due to the wish of Ukraine to join NATO, already expressed back in 2008.

Indeed, The NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg, mentioned on the 12th of January 2022, at the end of the NATO-Russia Council that there is a "*right for all countries to do, to choose their own path, including what kind of security arrangements they want to be part of*".

He further noted the existence of “[...] *the danger of re-establishing a system of spheres of influence in Europe, where a big power like Russia can decide what smaller neighbors can and cannot do [...]*”.

Lastly, he mentioned that “*Russia doesn't have a veto on whether Ukraine can become a NATO member.*”.

During an interview at the Kultaranta talks on the 12th of June 2022, Jens Stoltenberg mentioned that Russia wants “*a different world order*” by going against two fundamental principles of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (Stoltenberg 2022):

- “*Territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations*”
- “*The right for every nation to choose its own path, including what kind of security arrangements they wanted to be part of*”

Some also argued in favor of Russia, the former USSR and thereby former ideological enemy of NATO, joining NATO: “*Russia should become a member of NATO*” (Kupchan 2010, 101).

However, the discussions were not productive and it is highly likely that if Russia were to join NATO, the organization would be dysfunctional as Russia is currently posing the very Security-threat, through its invasion of Ukraine, to which NATO reacts.

As stated in Article 1 of NATO’s Strategic Concept, adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid on the 29th of June 2022, the objectives of NATO are as follows:

“*NATO is determined to safeguard the freedom and security of Allies. Its key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure our collective defence, against all threats, from all directions.*” (NATO 2022)

Currently, NATO’s support to Ukraine is also symbolical of NATO’s support for international Law as NATO by helping Ukraine to defend itself also upholds the Helsinki Final Act, a key document of international law and the right for each country to choose its own path based on the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Thus, while NATO no longer serves as a shield against the ideological sword of the Soviet Union, it nonetheless continues to function as a shield against the territorial annexation attempts of Russia and thereby upholds the rule of law and the values of democracy in Europe.

Having defined the legal foundation, purpose, and current objectives of NATO, we are now going to discuss the pacifist position of Germany by looking at its historical background.

III. Discipline of History

As a result of WWI, Germany has been defeated but it also turned into a revisionist power as it lost part of its territory and was forced to pay reparations. Domestically, the Weimar Republic was not able to establish a stable domestic order, and it thereby favored the rise of the Nazis.

Germany loses WWII and the European Coal and Steel Community is established in 1952 through the Paris Treaty of 1951 in order to secure long-lasting peace in Europe by putting European coal and steel industries under common management.

While Militarism was highly popular in Germany during the First and Second World Wars, Pacifism had the biggest appeal in the era that followed these World Wars.

First, as a result of the severe loss of life suffered in both World Wars, Pacifism was very popular during the era of the Cold War (1945 – 1991).

However, it is important to note that Pacifism as a movement had different levels of success in West Germany and in East Germany as it was more popular in the former than in the latter (Boutwell 1983).

Indeed, Pacifism in West Germany was very popular as was seen through the peace demonstration held in Bonn in 1981. This event, whose aim was to protest both the existence of nuclear weapons and the presence of American and British bases on German soil, had around 300,000 supporters and was thus a very big pacifist movement (Hoering 1982).

Pacifism in East Germany was in itself an exception as there were generally no peace movements in other Soviet-bloc countries (Pond 1984). The East German Government allowed protests against War and weapons as long as these protests also happened in Western Germany (German Culture 2015). Two reasons explain the tolerance of the East German Government regarding peace protests:

- Economic reasons, in order not to offend the West German Government as a huge credit deal between West and East Germany (315 million \$ loan), is being prepared (Drozdiak 1984)
- They were meant to encourage the protests happening in Western Germany regarding new NATO missile deployments (Pond 1984)

Second, Pacifism after the Cold War continued to be a very strong movement in Germany.

Two recent examples demonstrate the German Governments use of pacifism:

- Germany was the first allied Nation of the USA to condemn the latter's declaration of war on Iraq and Germany also refused to participate in the war (Rathbun 2006)
- Germany refused to participate in the Kosovo War

Germany's initial political pacifist position was divided in the early 2000s between the left-wing and the right-wing political parties. While the left-wing parties argued in favor of pacifism, the right-wing parties insisted on the need for Germany's ability to militarily defend itself (Shand 1975).

The division of politics and society in Germany regarding its Military as well as the role of Defense and Security is ultimately due to the moral war guilt that has clouded Germany's sense of reality. Indeed, German pacifism has caused Germany to become ignorant and decadent:

First, Germany is ignorant because it refuses to let go of its policy of pacifism that it is not adapted to exist in a World of Violence and War as currently demonstrated by the War in Ukraine as a result of Russia's annexation attempts.

"It is better to be a warrior in a garden, than a gardener in a War"

Chinese Proverb

Indeed, it is easier to prepare for tough times in times of prosperity and peace than to prepare for difficult times in times of unrest and uncertainty. However, Germany did not prepare for War and the current psychological blockade that Germany is facing with regard to its required military revival is going to be even more difficult to overcome as Inflation, increased energy and food prices, paired with an upcoming migration crisis (stemming from the Russia-Ukraine War) increase social tensions among the population.

Second, Germany is decadent because it is not worried about its Security dependence on the West. On top of Germany's lack of concern for the severe shortcomings of its military capabilities, Germany's political elite is also acting against its own interests:

- The initial refusal and still existing opposition of certain members of the political elite to support Ukraine is incomprehensible as this gives Putin the right to annex any country without the risk of German opposition.
- Furthermore, there is a reluctance to accept the need for investments in the domain of Defense as some Politicians of the German Bundestag, such as Albrecht Müller, a close advisor to former Chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, even argue after Russia's invasion of Ukraine whether the 100 billion € investment into the German military is necessary (Anadolu Agency staff 2022).

While some anti-war groups, peace activists, and experts are against the military support to Ukraine or the military revival of Germany, out of fear of further provoking Russia, it is equally logical to argue that Russia has dared to attack Ukraine because of the weak position of the West which constantly tries to negotiate instead of setting hard limits through a strong policy of deterrence.

The consequences of Germany's pacifist position will be studied in Chapter 2.

IV. Discipline of Political Science

It is important to include the theoretical aspect of the discipline of “Political Science” in order to understand our further reasoning. Indeed, three main different types of schools of thought are present in international relations and we are going to indicate which school of thought has influenced this Thesis the most.

There are three main doctrines in international relations: constructivism, liberalism, and realism.

The social, diplomatic, military, and political crisis in Ukraine has served as a reminder that our world is anarchic and that realist political theory is still relevant today. As we live in a self-help World where each State must ensure its security and existence, there is no World Government or hierarchical organization.. As a result of this observation, we will put our main focus on the doctrine of Realism.

First, **Liberalism** contends that utilizing force frequently has more bad effects than positive ones. Every country should cooperate internationally as a result, and according to liberals, international organizations may promote trust and collaboration.

Second, **Constructivism** is predicated on the notion that society constructs the world. In fact, actors give objects a specific meaning, and these meanings might change throughout time. Constructivists can only explain the use of force if the actors are motivated and driven by an ideology. Constructivism is thus effective at illuminating the effects of ideologies but is unable to assess the significance of simply material geostrategic goals (f.i. material resources).

Third, and most importantly for our thesis, **Realism** stresses that the world is anarchical, just like liberalism does. Realists, as opposed to Liberalists, take a different approach to this risky situation. Realists think that in order for a State to thrive and protect itself, it is necessary to pursue power, in contrast to liberals who emphasize the value of collaboration and international institutions/organizations. While realists primarily contemplate cooperation for survival's sake (self-defense alliances), liberals view it as a strategy to decrease the likelihood of war by strengthening socioeconomic links between

States. Realists are motivated by practical concerns, and they only need little co-operation or coalitions (to defeat a more formidable shared foe and so live as individuals).

Although Realism is our primary analytical perspective, we acknowledge that Realism may have certain drawbacks because it only focuses on evaluating the military might of States and material goals. To understand the harsh realities of geopolitics (material geostrategic objectives visible through the lens of Realism) and at the same time comprehend the concepts that drive political actors (ideologies or subjective World views of political Leaders visible through Constructivism), we believe that a **combination of Realism and Constructivism** seems to be the appropriate perspective.