universität wien

MASTERARBEIT / MASTER'S THESIS

Titel der Masterarbeit / Title of the Master's Thesis

"Political Regime Type and the Securitization of Climate Change by State Actors:

Searching for Mechanisms behind Discourses and Actions in China and Japan"

verfasst von / submitted by

Florian Manuel Klumpp

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2023 / Vienna 2023

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / degree programme code as it appears on the student record sheet:	UA 066 864
Studienrichtung lt. Studienblatt / degree programme as it appears on the student record sheet:	East Asian Economy and Society
Betreut von / Supervisor:	Steven Denney, BA MA PhD

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CAT	Climate Action Tracker
CBDR	Common but differentiated Responsibilities
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CISS	Tsinghua University Center for International Security and Strategy
CMC	Central Military Commission
COP	Conference of the Parties
CS	Copenhagen School
DPJ	Democratic Party of Japan
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
FWI	Freedom in the World Index
FYP	Five-Year Plan
GDI	Global Development Initiative
GFI	Green Future Index
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LDI	Liberal Democracy Index
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party
LGCEE	Leading Group on Climate Change, Energy Conservation, and Emission Reduction
LGCPN	Leading Group on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality
MEE	Ministry of Ecology and Environment (China)
METI	Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Japan)
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China)
MOD	Ministry of Defense (Japan)
MOE	Ministry of the Environment (Japan)
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan)
MOND	Ministry of National Defense (China)
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution

NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NEA	National Energy Administration
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PM	Prime minister
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy

List of Tables

List of Figures

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose and Relevance

> Security, unlike any other concept in world politics, has the power to catapult a formerly neglected issue to the top of the political agenda, where it can be dealt with swiftly, irrespective of democratic rules and regulations. (Floyd 2007, 343)

The quote mentioned above exemplifies that security is a powerful concept, that some even associate with non-democratic actions. However, it also insinuates its dynamic nature. Through being invoked in a wide variety of contexts to justify a wide range of actions, the meaning of security itself can be broadened or narrowed down. Due to this characteristic, security is today understood to cover more than traditional, military-related aspects of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Already for some time, governments have understood the challenges issues like infectious diseases, resource scarcity, or transnational crime can pose to their countries and responded to them in ways not necessarily challenging democratic boundaries (Caballero-Anthony 2016, 8–10; Collins 2022b, 8–10). Among non-traditional issues, climate change is widely recognized as being one of the most pressing ones in academia and real-world politics (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016a, 1–4). Being a global phenomenon, climate change requires countries to cooperate to prevent the most devastating consequences. Yet, bilateral and multilateral efforts have not resulted in the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or the accumulation of climate finance at levels necessary to reach targets set by the international community in the UN-centered climate change regime, based on the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, and the 2015 Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2022a). Accordingly, many governments, irrespective of political-institutional or socio-economic parameters, do not seem to perceive climate change as threatening security to an extent justifying immediate and substantial countermeasures that might take a toll on other policy priorities.

Yet, we do not know whether this is actually the case as we are unable to capture veritable threat perceptions held by governments. Still, the concept of securitization, proclaiming that certain actors can construct threats to security by declaring them as such in speech acts, depicts how governments intend to shape perceptions about climate change as a security issue (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998b, 21–31). While we can never be certain about the real intentions behind securitizing moves, this thesis follows the understanding that the decision to initiate them comes closest to their actual perceptions. This makes it even more problematic that the applicability of this concept to contexts outside the liberal-democratic one it was originally defined for, is unclear. While some have applied the concept of securitization to non-democratic contexts following minor adaptations, they have often limited themselves to unsystematic description, noting the impact of political system type without actually assessing how it is related to securitization processes (Nyman and Zeng 2016; Trombetta 2019).

Thus, we are still missing a detailed account of how exactly, that is through which paths and processes, regime type affects securitization of climate change by state actors. As long as the impact of regime type on securitization processes and the very applicability of the concept of securitization remains an unquestioned and untested assumption, securitization loses much of its explanatory power in non-democratic, but also in democratic contexts for which regime type has often been used as an excuse to assume overly simplistic relationships. Therefore, research claims made by scholars applying the concept of securitization to discuss issues like climate change need to be re-evaluated, complementing its inherent use of discourse analysis to answer the how of securitization with research methods that can help grasp the conditions under which securitization takes place and why it plays out in the way it does. Following from this reasoning, this thesis aims to answer the following research question: *How is political regime type shaping the securitization of climate change by state actors?*

Answering this question is far from an academic problem alone. The number of people living in autocracies is rising, as is the number of autocratizing countries, while democracy is in recession (Carothers and Press 2022; Herre 2022; Papada et al. 2023). This trend is worrying in itself. Moreover, it also gives reason to be concerned about even weaker international cooperation on climate change specifically. Authoritarian regimes have been found to face greater cost of losing office and a greater number of non-institutionalized domestic threats, suggesting that they are preoccupied with more urgent threats to regime survival (Debs and Goemans 2010; Svolik 2012). In addition, authoritarian regimes are believed to perform worse on the provision of public goods and the commitment to cooperate on the issue of climate change (Bailer and Weiler 2015; Bättig and Bernauer 2009; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013). Simplified depictions of the correlation of regime type with climate policy ambition and effectiveness, like those attempted in Figure 1, add to these concerns even though they clearly fall short of providing a comprehensive picture. Figure 1 displays the correlation between regime type as measured by the Varieties of Democracy Institute's (V-Dem Institute) 2023 edition of the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) and MIT Technology Review's 2023 Green Future Index (GFI) climate policy component. The latter measures the ambition and effectiveness of 76 countries' climate policies, including by evaluating policy action to reach official climate goals, carbon financing initiatives, or the degree to which pandemic recovery spending accelerated decarbonization (O'Brien 2023, 8–11). The former is a widely used index ranking countries according to their values on 71 indicators capturing liberal and electoral components of democracy (Papada et al. 2023, 50). The result suggests that there is a significant positive correlation between both variables ($r = .75$; $r^2 = .57$; p-value $< .05$).

Figure 1 Regime Type and Climate Policy Ambition and Effectiveness



Source: Data from Coppedge et al. 2023b; MIT Technology Review 2023.

In any case, a rising number of autocracies will only aggravate the bifurcation of the world into democratic and autocratic camps accelerated by the Sino-US competition (Rudolf 2021). Understandably, more rigid boundaries between both ends of the spectrum are unlikely to help find common ground and agree to compromise on major stumbling blocks slowing down progress in international climate negotiations.

Accordingly, the concept of securitization provides us with an important way to better understand how national and international climate policies come to be and why they are not in line with commitments made under the Paris Agreement. Only a better understanding of these relations will help create a foundation for more constructive climate diplomacy by revealing novel ways for pro-climate politicians, environmental non-governmental organizations (NGO) and those parts of the civil society advocating for greater climate action to overcome negotiation barriers and become more efficient in influencing national and international policies through illustrating those access points to increase leverage that are most promising. Companies, financial institutions, and investors intending to profit from the greening of energy systems and industrial sectors should be equally interested in comprehending the underlying forces shaping climate policies across regime types. However, to be able to use securitization in this way, we have to first gain knowledge on how securitization processes are shaped by different country-specific contexts. In this endeavor, regime type is only one of a number of relevant aspects. Yet, it is argued that it is the most urgent one to be addressed since it is at the center of a crucial unquestioned assumption limiting the explanatory power of the concept of securitization and is bound to become at least as important of a fault line in climate diplomacy as is the often-entertained distinction between developed and developing countries (based on the definition of Annex I and Non-

Annex I countries in the UNFCCC in 1992 (United Nations 1992, 2, 32); all references to developed and developing countries in this thesis should be considered against this backdrop).

1.2 Research Method and Case Selection

Following from the research objective to illuminate the widely held, but unquestioned assumption that regime type is a key component of context shaping the securitization of climate change, the research question will be answered by conducting a structured, focused comparison. Applying this method allows to perform exploratory, comparative, and hypotheses-generating case studies to unearth the mechanisms at play between political regime type and the securitization of climate change. At the core of this method is a set of general, theoretically founded questions that are asked of each case to enable the systematic collection of comparable data (George and Bennet 2005, 45–46). To comprehensively answer the research question, these sub-questions address the impact regime type might have on actor-audience constellations, the perception of climate change effects on national, human, and planetary security, as well as the countermeasures proposed in the realm of climate diplomacy.

Building the foundation for answering these questions is a detailed disaggregated analysis of regime type and the securitization of climate change. As far as regime type is concerned, an extensive number of mid-level indices and indicators from three attempts of measuring political system type ((V-Dem Institute's Dataset), Bertelsmann Stiftung's Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) and Freedom House's Freedom in the World Index (FWI)) will be combined with the description of country-specific aspects that cannot be depicted by these indices and indicators. This allows for the greatest degree of correctly reflecting the nuances that offer a more complete account of a country's regime type. When it comes to the securitization of climate change, the qualitative analysis of securitization discourses (composed of the identification of a threat or risk to a referent object and the suggestion of appropriate countermeasures) and their acceptance during the period of time from September 2020 to December 2022 is a crucial part. Adding aspects of content analysis (word frequency and co-occurrence), categorizing discourses in an eight-fold matrix, and combining discursive with non-discursive ways to measure discourse acceptance, provides for a greater degree of structure and robustness.

Given that regime type is of interest just as much as the region of East Asia, the cases of the People's Republic of China (China) and Japan are particularly suitable as they are situated at opposite ends on the political regime spectrum and thus form diverse cases. In fact, in the most recent editions of the LDI and FWI (the BTI does not cover liberal democracies like Japan), China ranks as the second most autocratic and least free behind North Korea, whereas Japan ranks as most democratic and most free of all countries analyzed in East Asia respectively (Freedom House 2023; Papada et al. 2023, 44–45). As East Asian countries both have for a long time been outside the study focus of those applying securitization theory. Even though this has recently changed somewhat, works covering them still have to go some

way to better adapt a euro-centric concept to diverse country-specific backgrounds. Finally, both countries at first glance also share puzzling features in that they have been found to be highly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change, but are not adopting climate policies nor achieving emissions reduction to a degree that would decrease vulnerability (Climate Action Tracker 2023a; 2023b; Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative n.d.). In fact, both have even received public blame at recent Conferences of the Parties (COP) under the UNFCCC (Gupta et al. 2022; Jiang 2021; Messner 2022). However, this has not prevented them from positioning themselves as green actors through international initiatives and, particularly in the case of China, investments in climate-relevant industries (Abe 2015; China National Development and Reform Commission 2022a; Macro Polo n.d.; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2021). The cases are explicitly not chosen for their performance on the securitization of climate change to avoid selection and confirmation bias as discussed by Balzacq (2011, 34–35). Consequently, treating China and Japan as cases in this thesis is justified as they can help to improve our understanding of the connection between regime type and the securitization of climate change.

Climate change will remain one of the most pressing issues troubling the international community throughout this century (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2022b; Wuebbles 2018). Therefore, gaining a better comprehension of how security perceptions are shaped by regime type will only become more important, not least against the backdrop of being a facilitator for more successful climate diplomacy and possibly allowing for a less politicized discussion of climate-related problems. The cases of China and Japan are well-suited to make a small contribution to this endeavor.

1.3 Findings and Contribution

The thesis finds that regime type plays a complex role in answering all sub-questions entertained by the structured, focused comparison covering actor-audience constellations, the referent objects of securitizing moves, and suggested countermeasures. More specifically, weak values on all components of democracy accounted for, paired with rising personalism, help understand why an ever-smaller core executive is virtually free to initiate securitization processes and countermeasures in China. This core executive is believed to concentrate on the effects of climate change for non-traditional instead of traditional national security, because it is preoccupied with concerns about regime legitimacy based on performing well on the provision of economic growth and energy security. Concerns about regime stability similarly play a part in constructing climate change as a threat to human and planetary security, which are both subsumed under the concept of national security and are thus to be tackled by state-centric, top-down approaches. Here, extending securitization moves to the international level is a cheap add-on as it does not challenge long-held Chinese argumentations, nor does it force it to markedly increase its assistance to other countries' climate efforts. This is due to China's unchallenged core executive portraying its combination of cooperative and uncooperative positions in climate diplomacy as representing its position as a responsible great power leading the developing world in its

fight for a climate-just world. In Japan, despite being a liberal democracy, the role of most powerful actor and enabling audience is also held by a core executive group led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and centered on the prime minister (PM), who is able to securitize climate change relatively freely from pressures of a weak legislative and general public. This group can act on its own preferences of generating economic growth, ensuring stable and cheap energy supplies, upholding a strong alliance with the US, and prolonging its role as a frontrunner for the cause of human security. Accordingly, it selects to highlight climate change effects on non-traditional instead of traditional national security, focuses on human and planetary security as referent objects domestically and abroad, and chooses to back up its ambitious language on climate diplomacy only insofar as it does not conflict with policy objectives deemed more important or does help to promote broader goals.

The findings are relevant in that they contribute to the refining of the concept of securitization and its application to better understand the making of climate policies. In the absence of better methods to measure and verify governmental threat perceptions as one important driver of these policies, the concept of securitization helps unearth attempts to shape and frame discussions about climate change and suitable countermeasures. However, so far, the impact of country-specific contexts on securitization processes has remained largely unaddressed. This is particularly problematic when it comes to the aspect of regime type whose detailed effects remain an unquestioned assumption that continues to cast doubt on its applicability to answer questions in both democratic and non-democratic contexts. Answering the sub-questions posed by the structured, focused comparison about actor-audience constellations, reference objects, and countermeasures in Chinese and Japanese climate security discourses between September 2020 and December 2022, allows for defining initial, contingent mid-level generalizations. In this regard, the great need for ensuring regime stability through performance-based and identity-based legitimation strategies that helps understands the securitization of climate change in China might be equally relevant in other closed authoritarian regimes, especially those experiencing a personalist rise. At the same time, ambiguous definitions underlying the UN-centered international climate change regime enable China to seize the unique role of the developing world's climate leader pushing back against selfish interests of developed countries. Similarly, in regimes like Japan in which electoral and liberal democratic qualities coexist with a strong party-led executive virtually unchallenged by parliamentary opposition or public scrutiny, securitization processes might be equally dominated by party preferences and foreign pressures. Considering that this thesis pursues an exploratory approach, more efforts are needed to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the paths and processes linking country-specific contexts with the construction of climate change as a security issue. To achieve this goal, diverse research methods have to be applied to further refine and complement the constructivist concept of securitization and define more robust generalizations concerning regime type and other relevant independent and intervening variables.

In the non-academic realm, answering the research question is timely in the light of ongoing democratic backsliding and an autocratizing trend. Even though we do not fully grasp the effects this might have on climate action yet, research results so far suggest that authoritarian regimes are less well-suited for international cooperation on climate change. In any case, the bifurcation of the international community into a democratic and autocratic camp is unlikely to contribute to reducing the number of stumbling blocks that are in the way of more ambitious policies. Against this backdrop, this thesis and ensuing research offer new insights into relevant actors, causes for their argumentations and actions, and leverage points for pro-climate politicians, environmental NGOs, and those parts of the civil society interested in overcoming negotiation barriers hampering progress in climate diplomacy. Moreover, companies, financial institutions, and investors hoping to profit from the undergoing transformation of energy systems and industrial sectors can benefit from a more solid understanding of risk factors and security considerations in the context of climate policymaking in China and Japan.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The remainder of the thesis is divided into four chapters. In the next chapter (Literature Review), relevant concepts are introduced and critically discussed to establish a strong theoretical foundation according to which the Analytical Framework will be structured. Firstly, this requires situating the concept of securitization in the broader field of international security studies and debating the core features of the theory as defined by the Copenhagen School. Subsequently, the key debates driving the theoretical development of securitization theory will be discussed in detail to establish the notion of securitization followed in this thesis. After this has been accomplished, the Literature Review also addresses how the combination of features from discourse and content analysis can improve the investigation of securitization discourses as well as what empirical literature exists on climate change as a subject of securitization theory in China and Japan. Finally, the Literature Review develops a solid understanding of how conducting a structured, focused comparison is a valuable tool to improve the investigation of securitization processes and how regime type can be measured in a sufficiently disaggregated way.

The third chapter elaborates on the Analytical Framework according to which the empirical analysis will be conducted. More specifically, this chapter will include the discussion of the logic of case selection, before moving on to address the aspects of data generation and methodology. As far as the latter is concerned, the section establishes a solid understanding of how exactly the method of structured, focused comparison will be applied and how regime type and securitization of climate change will be measured.

The ensuing fourth chapter covers the empirical analysis. Following the logical conception of a structured, focused comparison, the empirical part starts with the disaggregated discussion of the regime types of China and Japan based on an extensive number of mid-level indices and indicators taken from the V-Dem Institute, Freedom House's FWI, and Bertelsmann Stiftung's BTI. The trend from single-party to personalist authoritarian regime

and the role of censorship in China as well as the implications of the de facto one-party democratic systems under a strong LDP-led executive in Japan will be addressed separately, as they are not adequately reflected by these indices and indicators. Next is the in-depth analysis of securitization processes regarding the issue of climate change in China and Japan between September 2020 and December 2022. After defining the actor-audience structure, relevant texts from each of the individuals and institutions are identified and subsequently analyzed to highlight the security discourses used in governmental documents and speeches on climate change. Considering that audience acceptance cannot always be evaluated based on speech acts, certain non-discursive actions (use of regulatory and capacity instruments, approval ratings, and voting behavior) will also be adduced. Finally, the method of structured, focused comparison is applied to allow for the comparative investigation of the paths and processes connecting regime type to different aspects of the securitization of climate change so as to thoroughly answer the research question. To display the concept of securitization as completely as possible, the comparison separately addresses the respective actor-audience constellations, the choice of referent object, and suggested countermeasures in the realm of climate diplomacy.

The fifth and final chapter concludes the thesis, revisiting the research question, method, and results, before discussing their reliability, specifying the research contribution and broader relevance of the thesis, and putting the findings into a broader context.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Situating Securitization in International Security Studies

Security studies is one, if not the most fundamental, sub-discipline of international relations (Collins 2022b, 2). Similarly to the core interest of international relations itself, security studies, generally defined as having its origins in the post-World War Two USA, have for a long time mainly dealt with questions about war and conflict (today sometimes subsumed under the term strategic studies) (Wæver and Buzan 2022, 439). Driven by Cold War considerations and the nuclear threat accompanying it, security studies developed into an influential field of studies during the 1950s and 60s, with its thought children, such as game theory and deterrence theory, becoming integrated into the broader field of international relations (Wæver and Buzan 2022, 439–41). However, understanding war and conflict does not exclusively make up security studies, let alone the concept of security (Collins 2022b, 2). After a period that has sometimes been called a decline of security studies (Baldwin 1995, 124), ambitious theorizing in the 1980s saw first attempts at broadening security studies to cover issues like those concerning the environment (Tuchman Mathews 1989; Wæver and Buzan 2022, 446; Williams 2008b, 3–4). At the same time, importing fundamental aspects from the US, security studies increasingly became of interest in Europe, leading to a number of approaches critical of what is today referred to as the traditional views on security. Part of this is also what is called Critical Security Studies, an approach that covers major concepts relevant for other critical approaches but which is often discussed separately from them (Bilgin 2008; Mutimer 2016). Traditional views on security mainly concern explanations associated with realism and liberalism which have dominated questions about the why and how of state-centric security for at least the second half of the 20th century (Collins 2022b, 4). Beyond the controversy about whether the state should be the prevalent referent object, novel approaches to international security studies can be classified along their perspectives on what security is, how it is achieved, and what can amount to a security issue (Buzan and Hansen 2009a, 9–13; Williams 2008b, 5–10). Moreover, reflecting epistemological considerations and the broader debate about rationalist versus reflectivist (critical) research approaches taking place in international relations in the 1980s (Keohane 1988), distinctions central to comprehend contemporary international security studies also have to be drawn between objective, subjective, and discursive conceptions of security as well as related positivist or post-positivist research methods (Buzan and Hansen 2009b, 32–35). In general, works attempting to provide an overview of the various approaches existing in contemporary international security studies by drawing somewhat artificial lines to simplify matters have come up with widely differing categories and understandings covering approaches like constructivism, post-structuralism, postcolonialism, human security, or feminist security studies (Buzan and Hansen 2009c; Collins 2022a; Dunn Cavelty and Balzacq 2016; Williams 2008a). These difficulties originate in the fact that positioning the novel flows of literature challenging traditional security studies in broader international relations theory debates is challenging, as they have often incorporated aspects from various schools of thought before

becoming part of the international relations canon themselves (Wæver and Buzan 2022, 450). This holds specifically true for the concept or theory of securitization as will be discussed in more detail in the upcoming section.

2.2 Securitization as Concept and Theory

2.2.1 Introductory Remarks

Building on more recent classifications of critical approaches to international security studies, securitization is used here as the umbrella term for a set of works that have incorporated aspects from realism, constructivism, and post-structuralism (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 518–19; Trombetta 2019, 100). Accordingly, although being widely described as critical to the traditional rationalist approaches using positivist methods, securitization is not a unified framework offering a single answer to the questions regarding security laid out above. On the contrary, securitization is varyingly understood as one ideal-type concept underpinning different theories or as a concept with different versions that builds the foundations of broader securitization theories (Balzacq 2014; Wæver 2014). In any case, specific theoretic frameworks tailored to narrow research questions can integrate several concepts or even theories which holds true in the case of securitization (Vuori 2016, 68–71). In the following, an overview of what most understand to be the origins of using the concept of securitization will be provided, before discussing the various debates that have dominated its academic development and have led some to talk about different schools of securitization theory or different theories of securitization. All this will culminate in the definition of the understanding of securitization followed in this thesis, which will not only make a small contribution to a more sophisticated securitization study field transgressing rigid boundaries that have been built up over time, but will also be the foundation upon which the empirical part of the thesis is structured.

2.2.2 The Copenhagen School

Most works applying the concept of securitization start their derivative journey with the Copenhagen School (CS). In fact, a large part of the literature still views and uses securitization theory as being almost equivalent to how it was originally circumscribed by the CS in the 1990s. Originating at the Copenhagen Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, the CS builds mainly on the works of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 452). Reflecting its central constructivist element, the CS holds that threats endangering security are not an objective given that can be discovered and dealt with, but are constructed in intersubjective processes (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998b, 31; Wæver 1995, 51). More specifically, they conceive a securitizing move to be a speech act, through which a relevant actor declares something to be an existential threat to a referent object which, provided that the relevant audience accepts this argumentation, allows for extraordinary measures to be taken to counter that threat (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998b, 21–31). This then amounts to successful securitization of an issue. Importantly, speech act theory distinguishes between locutionary (an act of saying something; to say something is to

do something), illocutionary (an act in saying something; in saying something we do something, e.g. issue a warning) and perlocutionary (an act by saying something; by saying something we do something, e.g. effecting a change of action) acts that are performed when speaking (Austin 1975, 94–108). Accordingly, "people interact with the language they use by infusing it with illocutionary forces, which are used to produce (perlocutionary) effects in other people that can affect the feelings, attitudes, and subsequent behavior of the hearer(s)" (Vuori 2016, 66). Wæver (2015, 122–23) insists on focusing on the illocutionary act when analyzing securitization, holding the view that uttering security is more than just describing something but rather creating a whole new reality around a certain issue (Stritzel 2007, 361). This requires following the grammar of security which entails an existential threat, a point of no return, and a possible way out (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998b, 32–33), and has let some to label the CS the philosophical approach to securitization (Balzacq 2010a, 1).

Paying tribute to the debate about a too narrow scope of security studies coinciding with the foundational years of the CS, it considers securitization and security itself as concepts that can somewhat carefully and to a limited extent also be applied to non-military threats (Buzan and Hansen 2009c, 214; Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998a, 2–5). A number of facilitating conditions determine the probability of acceptance by the audience. These include the position of power of the securitizing actor, the correct form of speech act, and the features of the alleged threat (Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998b, 31–33). Although not explicitly restricted in its focus, securitization theory as defined by the CS is geared towards nation-states as securitizing actors (McDonald 2008a, 69). In addition, introducing concepts like de-securitization as the counterpart of securitization to bring issues back into the realm of "normal" politics based on the rule of law and free expression demonstrates that securitization was originally defined for application to Western liberal democracies (McDonald 2008a, 69–70). While not setting any formal boundaries to what can be a threat, the CS adds a normative component insofar as successful securitization is considered to be inherently linked to undemocratic, opaque, and excessively drastic measures and thus to be prevented from happening (Thomson and Baele 2022, 174).

Nowadays, the objective of scholars applying securitization theory can be described as trying "to gain an increasingly precise understanding of who (securitizing actors) can securitize (political moves via speech acts) which issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why (perlocutionary intentions/ how-causality), with what kinds of effects (inter-unit relations), and under what conditions (facilitation/impediment factors)" (Vuori 2016, 65). Even though most questions were already touched on in the foundational works of the CS (Wæver 1995), this understanding of what the theory might achieve has not been widely followed for a long time. On the contrary, over the last decades, securitization theory has been significantly broadened beyond its original, and back-then very innovative focus on how actors securitize threats through speech acts, i.e. what strategies they use to socially construct a threat. While this departure from a narrower concept is also driven by its originators (Wæver 2014, 30), the process has been greatly influenced by scholars not associated with the CS.

Attempts to further develop securitization theory as defined by the CS and add aspects to resolve its perceived shortcomings have been mainly confined to analytical, political, and normative implications of the theory, as opposed to criticism concerning a lack of positivist explanatory power of cause-effect relationships (Buzan and Hansen 2009c, 215). In general, the former encompass those who are arguing for a more in-depth discussion of aspects that were in their view left under-theorized by the CS and those who have called for a significant broadening of the concept of securitization in a theoretical and empirical sense.

2.2.3 Debates

2.2.3.1 Criteria for successful Securitization

First of all, there has been a lot of discussion about the fact that the criteria that make securitization successful were not sufficiently defined by the CS. Part of this discussion is the question of whether concrete policy measures need to be observable for substantiating this claim. There have been differing views on this problem with one side arguing that tangible effects are inherently linked with securitization (Patomäki 2015). On the other side, some consider securitization as "neither necessary, nor sufficient, to achieve 'security' understood as a policy or some means to repel an existential threat" (Vuori 2016, 68). Closely related to this debate is the fact that normal politics, a counterpart necessary to be understood to establish any account of extraordinary measures, remains undefined by the CS (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 455). As has been discussed above, the audience and its acceptance of the securitizing move are similarly key to establishing successful securitization. At the same time, however, the audience has been described as "one of the least developed concepts in the initial formulation of the theory" (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 499). This is highly problematic as it makes it a daunting task to establish whether a securitizing move has been successful or not (McDonald 2008b, 572). In fact, there might even exist several possible audiences relevant in a particular constellation. Accordingly, it is all the more important to identify what Balzacq (2016, 500) calls the "enabling audience", that is the audience who is in a position to enable the securitizing actor or another authority to take specific action. For instance, Roe (2008) demonstrates that formal agreement by the enabling audience might suffice to successfully securitize an issue even in the absence of moral support from another audience. In the eyes of some securitization scholars, the role of the audience becomes all the more problematic in that it reveals conceptual discrepancies in the CS theory treating security speech acts simultaneously as self-referential, subjective practices (illocutionary acts; performing an action irrespective of the audience) and intersubjective processes of securitization (perlocutionary effects dependent on audience acceptance) (Balzacq 2005, 174–79; McDonald 2008b, 572–73; Stritzel 2007, 363–64). This understanding also conflicts with the distinction made between securitizing move and successful securitization, since treating speech acts as illocutionary acts directly suggests successful securitization (Floyd 2010a, 52–54; 2011). Therefore, it is an improvement to treat the speech act identifying a security issue and a respective countermeasure as the securitizing move which needs to be accompanied by actions of the audiences signaling their

approval to count as securitization. Depending on the respective audience, acceptance can be established based on the reproduction of securitizing moves in speech acts by the audience, the use of policy instruments, voting behavior, or public opinion polls (more details on this will be provided in the Analytical Framework). Related to the shortcomings outlined above, securitization should also be broadened in its discussion of power relations that influence and are influenced by securitizing moves. This does not only concern a more thorough analysis of how these power relations actually play out, which only recently has seen more attention, but also the potential power of the audience to decide whether to accept a securitization move or not (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 501–2).

2.2.3.2 The Importance of Context

Power relations are only one, albeit a very important, aspect of the broader structural and sectoral context in which securitization takes place. Again closely related to the questions of why and under what conditions securitization comes to be, shortcomings have been identified on the ontological (components of the context) and even more so on the epistemological level (the extent to which the context intervenes in the securitization process) (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 502). Regarding ontological considerations, Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde (1998b, 21–33) only touch on how the nature of threats and the grammar of securitization differs across different sectors (e.g. military, societal, environmental). However, due to the immense importance of the context, one should spend more time tackling the question of how the securitizing move is embedded in the socio-cultural and political-institutional environment (Balzacq 2010b, 36–38). In particular the lack of discussing the latter has seen criticism due to the original CS's self-restraint to Western liberal democratic contexts. Noting that the CS itself did not rule out the use of securitization theory in non-democratic contexts, Vuori (2008, 66) criticizes this democratic bias and the associated preference for de-securitization. He points out that far from believing that non-democratic regimes stand above the need to legitimize their rule, "[l]egitimacy is perhaps the most significant element in the survival of any social institution" (Vuori 2008, 68). To implement his and others' call for applying securitization theory to non-democratic contexts, he argues for softening the idea of extraordinary non-democratic politics ensuing successful securitization (Wilkinson 2007). This concerns taking into account social rules constraining decision making in any regime which might get broken to legitimize actions following securitization, but also invoking security speech as part of the "normal", short-term objective to guarantee the survival of the political regime through raising issues on the agenda, deterrence, or control (Vuori 2008, 69, 75–76; for a more detailed discussion on the logic of security see below). Owing to greater secrecy in policymaking present in many non-democratic states, identifying relevant actors and audiences as well as prevalent power constellations is far from an easy endeavor. Interestingly, since constructing an envisaged security reality can hardly be done covertly, official documents and laws can be reasonable sources for the analysis of securitization processes even in non-democratic regimes. After Vuori's widely cited protest, securitization theory has been more regularly applied to non-Western and non-democratic states, especially also to non-traditional security issues. As will

be demonstrated below, this scholarship really only has started to be more thoroughly developed in recent years.

Based on the discussion above, the context is understood to play the key role in affecting the securitization of climate change. Regretfully but necessarily, the notion of context has to be artificially narrowed down, leading to the daunting task of limiting something that is possibly limitless. Besides the factor of regime type, possibly relevant components include but are not limited to socio-cultural factors (in particular regarding their effect on how language is used), the level of development, the extent of public debt, the economic situation (i.e. recent economic growth), the vulnerability to climate change, demographic factors, the relevance of high emitting industries and fossil fuel producers, the natural resource situation and associated energy security considerations, or common difficulties of any international cooperation in the provision of public goods as discussed in game theory. Grasping the undoubted effects of these variables in detail, will not be attempted here for reasons of difficult measurability or limited capacity. Moreover, although regime type is only one component, it is arguably the most urgent one to be addressed since more and more works attempt to apply the concept of securitization to non-democratic states, only superficially discussing the complex effects differences in regime type might have on securitization processes. Accordingly, context will be boiled down to essentially refer to the political system shaping the securitization of climate change. The respective political system warrants greater attention as its impact on securitization processes has often been assumed, yet remains unquestioned and untested.

2.2.3.3 The Logic of Security

When it comes to epistemological considerations regarding contexts, Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde (1998b, 31–33) treat their narrowly defined concept of context as an intervening, facilitating condition increasing or decreasing the probability of successful securitization. This view has been challenged as it conflicts with a separate claim regarding a logic of security that remains fixed across different contexts (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 503–4). Therefore, the argument followed here is that context should be approached in a way that pays greater attention to what Balzacq (2005, 181–84) calls the externalist approach to connecting securitization and context (as opposed to the internalist approach through which securitization shapes the context). This view holds that the context has an independent status and greatly affects the securitization process and its effectiveness (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 504).

As a matter of fact, discussing the ontological and epistemological perspectives on context directly leads to looking at this logic of security and what it entails. Huysmans (1998, 501) and Stritzel (2007, 359–60) believe that paying greater respect to the contents and impact of context prevents from falsely universalizing a rigid logic of security. In essence, what has been widely criticized is that while the CS asserts that their framework is applicable beyond traditional military-related threats, securitizing an issue is universally equivalent to tackling it through undesirable “panic politics”, characterized by urgency and secrecy (Buzan, Wæver,

and Wilde 1998b, 27–35). This logic is fundamentally borrowed from Carl Schmitt's classical realist understanding of political order based on friend-enemy distinctions and the existential threats underlying security politics (Williams 2003, 514–16). Rightfully, this view symbolizes that some aspects in the CS understanding of securitization are rather unconstructivist in that they are considered inevitable and consistent (McDonald 2008a, 71). Other approaches to security studies have come up with divergent views. For instance, the so-called Welsh or Aberystwyth School of Critical Security Studies, focusing on human security and emancipation, rather treats security as a positive tool to address human insecurities and thus sees de-securitization not necessarily as preferable to securitization (Bilgin 2008, 98–100; Corry 2012, 240). But even scholars more closely attached to securitization theory have taken up this point of criticism, noting the marginalization of alternative security discourses and by extension a large part of actual securitization processes through focusing on exceptionality alone (McDonald 2008b, 567–73; Trombetta 2008, 587–91). In their opinion, the context ultimately conditions the respective logic of security (Ciută 2009). As will be discussed in more detail below, this holds specifically true for those interested in applying the theory to questions concerning the environment or climate change. What is important to be noted here, the CS's fixity to a single, universal logic of security stems from its preoccupation with threats to national security, as opposed to the human security of individuals which might lead to a different set of imposed measures (Oels 2012, 192). To solve problems associated with an exclusive logic of security that predetermines how securitization looks like, it might be wise to generally focus on how securitization enables actors to adopt those measures that would not have been adopted otherwise or what Balzacq (2011, 3) calls a customized policy to block the threatening complexion of an issue (Trombetta 2019, 102). This again requires a greater contextualization of securitization to move beyond the conception of a singular, militarized grammar of securitizing moves (Guzzini 2011; Stritzel 2007). As touched on above, it is also helpful to extend the focus to other perlocutionary aims than that of legitimizing future actions alone. In this thesis, this concerns the aim to raise an issue on the agenda, legitimize past acts, or secure obedience.

2.2.3.4 The Role of Risk

Enlarging the focus to cover a greater breadth of securitization processes that are not exclusively conditioned by the existence of exceptional emergency measures opens up another part of the literature about the concept of risk. This literature has for a long time been adjacent to the securitization literature, but some scholars have tried to bridge the divide and work on a more integrated discussion of both concepts. They base their arguments on the observation that many contemporary security practices deal with threats that are not on a level of exceptionality. Even though scholars find it difficult to agree on a widely accepted definition of what a risk is, they mostly agree on the assertion that it is a potential threat situated in the longer term (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016a, 9). Beyond that, there are generally two distinct views on this issue. One side is arguing for incorporating risk into securitization theory by treating it as an amplifier of securitization processes which facilitates introducing a whole range of measures to tackle potential or non-existential

dangers, whereas others see fundamental differences between risks and threats and thus believe that risk politics are to be separated from securitization theory (Corry 2012, 235–36). The former view conceives risks to be replacing threats as the concept at the core of security, essentially expanding securitization theory to account for less drastic, everyday surveillance and governance techniques part of risk management that, despite being preferable to the CS logic of security centered on danger, are to be similarly approached with skepticism and de-securitization efforts (Aradau and van Munster 2007, 107–9; Corry 2012, 243–45; van Munster 2005, 10–12). In the latter case, threat-based security is distinguished from risk-security promoting preventative risk-mitigating measures to deal with constitutive rather than direct causes of harm through what Corry (2012, 238) coins riskification. This is done out of fear that subordinating risk to securitization theory and its preference for de-securitization would result in the strict refusal of precautionary, non-adversative politics, which are necessary to effectively deal with issues like climate change. According to this understanding, referent objects are thus not to be guarded against threats but to be governed and changed to make them more resilient against risks that can be managed but not eradicated (Corry 2012, 247–48). Building on their earlier distinction between risk-based securitization and security-based securitization (von Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez 2014), Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann (2016b, 13–20) take a less deterministic approach about whether the securitization of a certain issue is good or bad. This results from a slightly different understanding of the relation between securitization and riskification (see von Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez 2014, 863 for a list of key words associated with security or risk discourses). Rather than treating securitization as being only linked to existential threats, they distinguish between threatification (invoking existential threats) and riskification (invoking more diffuse threats) and consider both as variations of securitization, which itself is contrasted from politicization (as defined by Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998b, 23-24). The authors consider both to be capable of legitimizing policies that would otherwise not have been viewed as legitimate. Yet, they assume articulations combining risk and threat to be of the most interest considering that their effects may be particularly far-reaching, being targeted both at the short-term threat and the remaining, more long-term risks (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016b, 14). The actual treatment of risks as part of securitization theory followed in this thesis will be discussed more thoroughly below. Still, it should be noted here that security practices built on preventative risk management and resilience building have been highly relevant in climate security discourses in the past (Trombetta 2008; 2011). As a matter of fact, Balzacq (2016, 512) even holds the view that the main contribution of studies on the environment to securitization theory has been to remind scholars of the necessity to further explore the relationship between risk and securitization.

2.2.3.5 The Centrality of the State

Closely related to the issues touched on above are questions about the centrality of the state in the CS understanding of securitization. On the one hand, this concerns the fact that relevant actors who initiate securitizing moves have almost exclusively been understood and analyzed as those who represent the state (i.e. the government, the bureaucracy, or political

leaders). Again, the founders of the CS have not outright ruled out other individuals or groups as relevant actors. However, the propositions and assumptions almost naturally render the emergence of others as impactful actors rather implausible (with the exception of lobbyists and pressure groups that are also accounted for by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998b, 40)). As a matter of fact, even those who have tried to develop securitization theory in fundamentally different ways, such as the proponents of a sociological securitization approach (for a more thorough discussion see below in the section on the relevance of non-discursive practices), hold "those in power" to be the actors to focus on when analyzing securitization processes. It is not for nothing that Hansen (2000, 287) has used the terms "silent security dilemma" and "security as silence" to describe a potential actor who is in a situation in which "raising something as a security problem is impossible or might even aggravate the threat being faced." Problematically, the framework does not only neglect marginalized individuals and groups, but does even serve to perpetuate their fate as those without a voice.

On the other hand, this also refers to the question of whose security (referent object) is ultimately at stake. Here, the original CS approach to securitization theory has been criticized by those calling for a greater focus on human security (mainly those associated with Critical Security Studies and its Aberystwyth or Welsh School in particular). Following a normative approach, these scholars argue for treating individuals and their lives as referent objects instead of nation-states pre-occupied with threats to their national security, such as societal security or identity security (Buzan and Hansen 2009c, 212–13; C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 452–53; Oels 2012, 194). At its core, key contributors to this approach believe that the emancipation of individuals should be the concern of security studies (Booth 2005; Wyn Jones 2001). Understandably, this also broadens the perspective on what might be a threat (referent subject) and how to counter it. Some have even identified the state as a major cause of human insecurity rather than an actor in reducing it (Wyn Jones 1995). Even more importantly, focusing on human security brings along a fundamentally different understanding of security as something good and desired by everyone in their daily lives (Hoogensen Gjørv 2016, 109–10). As a consequence, the human security agenda has been greatly pushed by those working on environmental and climate security as will be discussed in more detail below. Similarly, the concept has transcended its Eurocentric origin and has become popular in other areas like Southeast Asia (Caballero-Anthony 2016, 6–7). At the same time, a human security perspective is not unproblematic (Hoogensen Gjørv 2016, 108; Oels 2012, 196–97). Having difficulties in freeing itself from traditional understandings of security structured around power and the military, placing emphasis on human security might lead to preferring the security of certain humans over those of others. And even if no distinctions are made in this regard, ensuing actions might not have the intended result and could even justify military means. More broadly, scholars still struggle to formulate a widely accepted definition of the term human security (Hoogensen Gjørv 2016, 106). Nevertheless, as McDonald (2008b, 580) correctly points out, overall focusing exclusively on negative aspects of security only serves those benefiting from whatever is done to tackle them and

ultimately only plays a part in further silencing alternative views on what security is supposed to mean and how to realize it. Therefore, the concept of human security will be taken into account as one referent object to be threatened by climate change in this thesis. For this purpose, human security shall be understood closely to the still widely-followed United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) definition as the possibility of individuals to live free from military and non-military sources of threats to food, health, economic (in the sense of job security), personal, community, political, and environmental security (Joshi 2009, 75–76; Oels 2012, 194; United Nations Development Programme 1994, 22–25).

2.2.3.6 The Relevance of non-discursive Practices

Many scholars working on a more comprehensive securitization theory have called for greater attention to another question, that is the extent to which practices have to be taken into consideration to detect securitization beyond its occurrence through speech acts. This practice-based or sociological approach to securitization (Balzacq 2010a, 1), sometimes also referred to as the Paris School, intends to shift the focus somewhat away from a purely linguistic understanding of securitization. As outlined by McDonald (2008b, 568–69), the restriction to only one possible way of constructing something as a security threat is problematic for at least two reasons. First, meaning can be communicated via other means than language, for instance images (Hansen 2011). Second, bureaucratic practices can themselves construct threats in addition to being a consequence of securitizing speech acts. The second point can be better explained when borrowing key concepts from Bourdieu and Foucault.

In Bourdieu's case it is the idea of fields constituting socially constructed areas of interest in which certain agents in a position of power develop regimes and practices as part of the habitus, their routine system of behaviors and discourses (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 504–5; Bigo 2002, 75–78). Foucault (1980) has mainly lent his idea of dispositif which describes the system of relations between different textual and non-textual policy practices and instruments, which in the case of security contribute to the emergence of a security field shaped by its inherent power relations (Balzacq 2010a, 15–16). Following from the focus on more routine practices, the sociological strand of securitization questions the existence of exceptional emergency measures and other felicity conditions as a prerequisite for establishing securitization and rather gives priority to strategic processes (Balzacq 2010a, 1; Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 506–7). In addition, its underlying concepts require a thorough examination of prevalent power constellations of agents in the security field, suggesting that this variant of securitization goes hand in hand with a contextual view of securitization (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006, 457).

A greater emphasis on practices part of securitization processes begs the question of what these practices incorporate. In this regard, Balzacq (2008, 78–80) suggests focusing on policy tools and instruments through which security practices are enacted. In general, instruments of securitization follow successful securitization to curb an established threat. Securitizing tools, on the other hand, turn an issue into a threat, i.e. securitize something.

Accordingly, instruments of securitization are not necessarily but may become securitizing tools and are mutually reinforcing with discourse. Balzacq (2008, 80) understands tools not directly as policies but as a kind of institution, meaning a "routine set of rules and procedures". These may also be continuous (Huysmans 2006, 5). Understandably, to implement tools one needs to have a certain background knowledge about a threat and the means necessary to tackle it. This demonstrates why they are believed to be exclusively applied by so-called professionals of (in)security and by being applied can make their use a normality (Balzacq 2010a, 15–16). When analyzing the use of security-related instruments, one can distinguish between regulatory and capacity instruments (Balzacq et al. 2017, 6–7). Regulatory instruments define which practices are permitted and which are not (e.g. laws and regulations), whereas capacity instruments are designed to build purposeful skills (e.g. information, technology (e.g. for surveillance), or force (e.g. nuclear weapons)). Again, all these instruments can also be securitizing tools in their own right. To satisfy the understanding that a thorough analysis of securitization moves has to incorporate both discursive and non-discursive acts, this thesis makes the compromise of accounting for non-discursive securitizing tools as a means to signal audience acceptance. As will be discussed in more detail below, in the realm of climate security, this includes certain regulatory and capacity tools used to specify climate-related targets and actions or create respective policy competencies.

2.2.3.7 Concluding Remarks

At this point, it is necessary to take stock of the debates touched on so far and discuss the position this thesis takes to lay the groundwork for the Analytical Framework tailored to answer the research question. When it comes to the question of what securitization entails, this approach holds that non-discursive practices play an important role in determining whether securitization can be deemed successful, and their analysis thus has to supplement that of speech acts. To account for both the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts of speech act theory, securitization is understood to be composed of securitizing moves (self-referential speech acts) identifying a threat and respective countermeasures, and actions by the audience signaling their acceptance of the securitizing move. Acceptance is established by assessing whether the respective categorization of an issue as threat or risk and the suggested countermeasure are reproduced in speech acts or through the use of regulatory (definition of new plans, the targets set in them, as well as actual actions and negotiation positions defined by them) or capacity (founding of new climate-specific bodies) instruments, voting behavior or opinion polls. Neither countermeasures nor practices have to be of an exclusively extraordinary nature. Softening the view that security is inherently linked to negatively connotated exceptionality to an understanding that it simply enables actors to adopt measures that would not have been adopted otherwise, allows for covering a broader range of securitization processes, including those associated with risks (following Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann (2016b), securitization is understood to cover the concepts of riskification and threatification). This also means that context becomes the ultimate factor influencing what securitization means. As one key component of context, discussing the political regime

type thus warrants ample attention, particularly to depict power relations underlying decision making and the enabling audiences in the two cases of Japan and China, which are still very much outside of the classic focus of securitization theory. Noting the problems that go along with this decision, focusing on these two cases and the issue of climate change also necessitates treating the state as the relevant actor. However, in terms of the referent object, the empirical part will look beyond threats to national security alone (national security is also not restricted to the traditional association with conflict and military responses) and also focus on human and planetary security.

2.2.4 Discourse Analysis

Despite the importance of analyzing practices to better account for the full breadth of securitizing moves, examining speech acts through discourse analysis is still by far the most widely accepted method of choice. Therefore, it will also be performed as part of the empirical part in this thesis and thus has to be addressed in more detail here. First of all, it is necessary to mention that there does not exist only one account on how to conduct discourse analysis. Even the concept of discourse itself is highly disputed and there exists a multitude of attempts to define it (Balzacq 2010b, 39). It is safe to say, though, that analyzing discourses is a method well-suited to be applied in securitization theory, heavy on the constructivist interest in unearthing how ideas are socially created and reality is produced. It is undeniably interpretative and subjective as well as inconclusive in that one can only identify parts of but never an entire discourse (Hardy 2001, 26–27). Hardy, Harley, and Philipps (2004, 20) conceive discourses as systems or interrelated bodies of text that are creating a material reality in the ideas and practices they invoke. This explains the relevance of analyzing both intratextuality (internal coherence of one text) and particularly intertextuality (the interplay between different texts to create coherent storylines) (Balzacq 2010b, 43; Hajer 1995, 56; Hardy 2001, 27). Here, text does not exclusively refer to written or spoken words, but also symbols or pictures, all capable of conveying meaning (Balzacq 2010b, 39). Still, speeches and written documents are by far the most widely analyzed types of text and will also be crucial for this thesis. Discourses are embodied in text and are at the same time created by it (Hardy 2001, 26). However, the meaning discourses convey is fully shaped by the respective historical and social context. This understanding should guide its application in securitization theory, which has not been the case more often than one would expect (Balzacq 2010b, 40). In this sense, it also comes close to what critical discourse analysis is calling for, that is focusing on societal power relations and their immense impact in discourse generation (Huckin, Andrus, and Clary-Lemon 2012, 18). However, for accessibility reasons, its ensuing application of non-textual methods, such as participant observations or interviews, for triangulation cannot be followed here. This constraint does not mean that the selection of relevant data is not to be guided by the research question. Being convinced that both contexts and non-discursive practices matter to fully grasp securitizing moves, this thesis will pay sufficient attention to both aspects.

The key concepts of discourse analysis described so far, position it almost on the diametrical opposite of content analysis, another widely used method to analyze texts. Content analysis adopts a positivist approach using statistical analysis to test hypotheses (Hardy, Harley, and Philipps 2004). Underlying this approach is the idea that one can objectively measure the meaning of text which remains constant, independent from context. This makes it well-suited to be conducted with the help of special software like NVivo or KH Coder. Still, there is room for complementary uses of both in that "the more structured and formal forms of discourse analysis are compatible with the more interpretive forms of content analysis" (Hardy, Harley, and Philipps 2004, 22). More interpretive here means somewhat loosening positivist assumptions, allowing for words to have changing meanings across contexts that cannot be measured in an objective sense. In practical application, analytical categories emerge from data, but existing literature and theoretical considerations can help to identify them (Hardy, Harley, and Philipps 2004, 21). Moreover, these categories enable the quantitative counting of certain occurrences of meaning, that then have to be interpreted. This thesis follows the view that merging both approaches can significantly increase validity, reliability, and the amount of data covered while staying true to crucial underpinnings of discourse and its analysis. Although being the superior tool, NVivo is not cost-free for which reason its use was ruled out. Therefore, the use of KH coder for counting word frequency and co-occurrence will be combined with an ensuing qualitative investigation of the resulting patterns (see Liu 2022; Yamada 2021 for examples of the use of KH Coder).

This leads to addressing another question that is similarly difficult, yet important: how much data to collect. Here, the research question has to act as a first narrowing frame. Making oneself familiar with the secondary literature discussing a particular question can also be of great help to identify relevant data (Neumann 2008, 67). Generally, the answer is to stop searching when observed representations show repetition and do not fall outside of the main positions established (Balzacq 2010b, 42; Neumann 2008, 70). For further details on how this and the other issues touched on above are dealt with, see the respective section in the Analytical Framework (3.2.3).

Shifting attention to empirical works focusing on the securitization of climate change in China and Japan to add the practical component to the discussion of an appropriate research method is surprisingly inconclusive. Many works simply do not transparently discuss how they understand the concept of discourse and conduct its analysis (Bo 2016; Kameyama and Ono 2021; McDonald 2012; Trombetta 2019). Accordingly, while they can offer valuable insights into securitization processes, the validity of their results is significantly reduced by (supposedly) randomly selecting data and analyzing discourses. Koppenborg and Hansen (2021) offer an insightful exception, clearly stating how they understand discourses in general and securitizing discourses in particular, what kind of data they include in their analysis and why, and how they combine counting key words with a broader interpretation of the texts.

2.2.5 Climate Change as a non-traditional Security Concern

2.2.5.1 Non-traditional Security

Normalizing a greater concern for human security and risk discourses is part of a push for establishing non-traditional security as a new framework which refers to those security concerns that "arise primarily out of non-military sources" (Caballero-Anthony 2016, 10), and "characteristically require non-military (but not necessarily non-state) responses to address" (Caballero-Anthony 2016, 7). They can affect and be countered by both states and non-state individuals or groups domestically and abroad. Critically, these threats could still result in conflicts. Non-traditional security threats are overall believed to be more severe for a greater number of people than traditional threats, i.e. interstate wars (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013, 1). In fact, many non-traditional security challenges are often of transboundary nature which makes them difficult to be resolved without cooperation efforts across borders between states as well as non-state actors (Caballero-Anthony 2016, 8). Examples of non-traditional security problems are broadly considered to include, amongst others, infectious diseases, transnational crime, or environmental pollution leading to global warming and climate change (Caballero-Anthony 2016, 10). Nonetheless, owing to the denial of a singular, universal logic of security by scholars working on non-traditional security, they take note of varying understandings of what is part of the traditional security sphere and what is not (Caballero-Anthony and Cook 2013, 5). This is especially important when turning to issues like climate change that while being predominantly considered to count as non-traditional security problems are themselves inextricably linked to issues whose allocation to this category is less straightforward (e.g. energy security, technology supremacy). Accordingly, this section preoccupies itself with scrutinizing how the issue of climate change can be understood against the underpinning of securitization theory and how scholars have connected both in practice. The Literature Review is thus entering the realm of empirical research applying securitization theory which allows for their critical discussion.

2.2.5.2 Climate Change as a Threat in Securitization Theory

Nowadays, climate change and environmental concerns more broadly are widely discussed issues by securitization scholars. This follows from the observation that the security implications of climate change have frequently featured in the political debate and, to a smaller extent, the scientific debate since the 1980s and especially in the 2000s (Oels 2012, 186–90; Scott 2012, 220–22). In fact, already in their CS foundational work on securitization theory, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998c, 82–83) noted two extraordinary aspects related to the environmental sector. First, in the environmental realm, successful securitization does not intend to secure the survival of the referent object (e.g. the identity or society of a given country), but rather suggests reshaping it to reduce the likelihood and scope of natural disasters and protect against them. Second, while those rooting for greater action have made securitizing moves, the abstract nature regarding the scope and timeframe of the disastrous consequences of climate change makes its successful securitization unlikely. Bo (2016, 97–98) points to another aspect that makes the securitization of climate change different: the

extent to which a country's level of development may impact its securitization choices. In any way, following the inherent preference for de-securitization of most working with securitization theory, the majority of scholars has warned against the securitization of the environment, or climate change more specifically (see Scott 2012 for an exception) (Corry 2012, 238). Their worries are driven by the concern that securitization would result in the militarization of the fight against climate change and an overly restrictive and short-term focus on and response to threats to national security posed by climate-induced conflicts (Trombetta 2008, 587–89). Some go even as far as seeing climate policies as direct causes of socio-environmental conflicts (Lamain 2022). This concern is rooted in the general rejection to attach security to environmental issues that surfaced in reaction to the broadening of security to also cover non-military problems (Kameyama and Ono 2021, 272). It is worth noting that this understanding widely held in academia does not fall short of providing practical backing for their view. For example, at the first United Nations Security Council (UNSC) debate on climate change in 2007, climate change was defined as a "threat multiplier" which is dangerous not foremost due to its direct consequences but because of its potential to aggravate existing tensions (Scott 2012, 221–22). Similar assessments were replicated by others such as the European Council (Scott 2012, 221–22). Understandably therefore, even authors in the Global South held a pessimistic view on climate security as it seemed all too centered on how rich countries from the Global North could secure their security and way of living (Trombetta 2008, 586).

Owing to their one-sided and overly pessimistic nature that is believed to be detrimental to actual mitigation and adaptation efforts, conflict-centered discourses have been widely criticized (Detraz and Betsill 2009; McDonald 2013; Oels 2012). To broaden the securitization debate of climate issues, scholars have turned to the link to human security. Ultimately, combined with fundamentally different understandings of what amounts to successful securitization, this has resulted in varying views on how often and to what extent climate change has been securitized (von Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez 2014, 858–60). For instance, Dupont (2019, 385) asserts that the collective securitization in the European Union (EU) can be deemed successful, even though the actual measures have fallen short of what the speech acts would suggest. Applying content analysis allows her to cover a number of documents and the respective speech acts sufficient to make her case, but Dupont fails to systematically distinguish between different discourses. As a consequence, she can make only general statements about the state of securitization in the EU, rather than demonstrating that it seems to have been mainly concerned about the global impacts of climate change on human security rather than threats posed by climate-induced conflicts. However, this is necessary to contrast it with how climate security is perceived and constructed in other countries like the USA, where state-centric and military-related approaches have been the norm (Floyd 2010b, 188–93). Significant differences regarding security discourses in the context of climate change between the USA and the EU are also identified by Hayes and Knox-Hayes (2014) who see contrasting political structures and cultural identity as the core drivers.

On the contrary, Corry (2012, 256) makes the case that climate change has generally not been securitized (though it might have been riskified) and thus argues against efforts to portray climate change as any other "normal" policy topic. Trombetta (2008; 2011) comes up with a different conclusion, arguing that the securitization of climate change can be considered successful but that the respective discourses have themselves transformed the concept of security at the core of securitization to also pay attention to early intervention and preventive measures as well as non-state actors. Following her argument, it is wrong to treat preparatory risk management as the opposite of securitization and the result of a pushback against "exaggerated" speech acts like Warner and Boas (2019) have done (Trombetta 2008, 589–91; 2011, 142–43). McDonald (2012, 589–91) even goes as far as saying that a multitude of factors can result in a situation in which climate change is accepted as a major threat by a relevant audience but does not lead to the acceptance of even moderate responses to it.

Importantly, some scholars have attempted to classify climate security discourses to allow for their more systematic discussion and to move beyond the mostly ad-hoc allocation done before. In an important contribution to this literature, Detraz and Betsill (2009, 306–8) distinguished between security discourses centered on conflict (what they call environmental conflict discourse) and those centered on human security (environmental security discourse). Refining the categorization of different climate security dialogues, McDonald (2013, 45–49) distinguishes between national, international, human, and ecological security discourses. The former two dialogues are essentially about the threats of (armed) conflicts flaring up as a consequence of climate change and endangering the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state or the stability of the international society respectively (McDonald 2013, 45–49). Accordingly, both are interested in upholding some form of status quo. Human security dialogues, on the other hand, see the livelihood of individuals being threatened by climate change more directly, whereas ecological security dialogues, the least discussed ones by far, are about threats to the biosphere (McDonald 2013, 45–49). Linking these categories to Corry's (2012) distinction between riskfication and securitization as elaborated on above, Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann (2016b, 20–24) come up with six different climate security discourses. To construct their matrix, they define two dimensions: the referent object (is climate change perceived to threaten nation-states, the planet, or individuals) and the construction of a security problem as either a threat or a risk. Their typology can be of great help when attempting to analyze the securitization of climate change over time and across countries. Moreover, the authors also address the normative implications of their classification in an earlier publication (von Lucke, Wellmann, and Diez 2014, 871–75). In this regard, they make clear that while the concept of risk is in theory less prone to be used for legitimizing overly exceptional measures, it can still be used to stigmatize others, result in a less extreme but permanent state of emergency, or simply in not doing enough. In a similar vein, there is a point to conceiving individuals and the planet as preferable referent objects. However, questions remain about who decides whose human security is to be protected and whose might constitute a risk in itself as well as the fact that planetary security

discourses might not be compelling enough to cause sufficient action. At the same time, and usual for these kinds of classifications, the authors exclude important aspects. These concern for instance looking exclusively at the use of discourses for legitimacy, ignoring other purposes of securitization (as those raised by Vuori 2008 mentioned above), or restricting discourses about nation-states to conflict-related security concerns rather than accounting for other indirect consequences of climate change which states might regard as being problematic for their national security (e.g. green technology leadership, energy security). While only partially resolving these shortcomings, Kameyama and Ono (2021, 272–74) further extend and refine the framework of Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann, distinguishing between discourses about long-term planetary security, short-term human security, climate change as a cause for conflict, and about the direct impacts of sudden (i.e. natural disasters) and long-term (e.g. sea level rise) impacts to military-related national security.

In general, categorizing climate security discourses is necessary to allow for their systematic comparison across countries. Combining the approaches of Kameyama and Ono (2021) as well as Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann (2016b), an eight-fold matrix will be created to allocate climate security discourses along the two dimensions referent object (nation-states, planet (long-term), individual human (short-term)) and logic of securitization (riskification and threatification). An important adjustment is to understand threats posed by climate change to national security not only as being related to conflicts requiring military responses, but also in the sense of political survival of the parties, and in the case of China their leader. More details on this will be provided in the Analytical Framework.

2.2.5.3 The Securitization of Climate Change in China

As already mentioned above, securitization theory has only recently been more broadly applied to non-Western and non-democratic states. This is particularly true for cases in which non-traditional security issues, including climate change, are of interest. Nyman and Zeng (2016) were among the first to review the securitization of climate and energy issues in Chinese academia and politics. They share Vuori's view that securitization theory is applicable to Chinese contexts, but that this requires paying great attention to the relevant audience (Nyman and Zeng 2016, 3–4). In that respect, Zeng (2021, 422) notes that "in the Chinese context the principal audience of the securitizing move is not the general public, but elites who have the power to shape the security agenda." Concerning the academic debate, the authors identify a division between literature focusing on the national and the international level. While the former mainly concentrates on the issue of human security, the latter tends to oppose the securitization of climate change in international fora as they fear negative implications for China's economic and energy security (Nyman and Zeng 2016, 8–9). Overall however, the authors note that securitization theory has not been widely used to study Chinese politics, though it has been applied to aspects adjacent to climate change like energy security (Leung et al. 2014; Nyman 2014). When it comes to the political debate, Nyman and Zeng (2016, 10–12) point out that this distinction is somewhat upheld and climate change seems to be primarily constructed as an economic or developmental issue.

These claims are backed by others (Bo 2016). Still, Nyman and Zeng (2016, 310–13) assert that there is increasing urgency in broadening the notion of national security, which in the non-traditional realm has often been primarily understood as sustained economic growth and energy security (Sahu 2021, 202), and linking it more closely to climate concerns. In addition, the authors point out that the scarce use of the explicit security label for climate issues by the government might be intentional. Trombetta (2019, 112–15) updates Nyman and Zeng's review and notes that as of 2019, climate change was perceived as a security rather than a development issue in China. Besides that, she makes similar remarks regarding the applicability of securitization theory to China provided that certain conceptions about why actors do securitize, what audiences can be relevant, and especially what the use of security language entails (i.e. the logic of security) are adjusted (Trombetta 2019, 99–104). Regarding the latter, she emphasizes that in China's treatment of non-traditional security concerns security speech acts are used not to legitimize extraordinary measures but, on the contrary, to justify standard, trust-building governmental actions that would not have been undertaken otherwise. In this context, the prevalence of state-centric national security remains. However, national security is more holistically understood to cover the state's role as a "guarantor of a 'Sinicized' human security" (Trombetta 2019, 104), which focuses on the people rather than on the individual itself. Her analysis of the securitization of climate change in China lacks clarity about how and based on which standards she collected evidence. This somewhat reduces the validity of her claims. Nevertheless, Trombetta (2019, 111, 116) makes important conclusions when noting that climate change has been securitized in China since 2014, when it was no longer regarded as being secondary to economic growth and energy security, but sustainability and the energy transition became part of the objective to realize broader economic restructuring. The accelerated economic restructuring under Xi Jinping is picked up on by Hernandez and Misalucha-Willoughby (2020, 10–12). They rightfully point out that the role of socio-linguistic and socio-political context and the positional power of agents is equally important to that of the audience. Moreover, the authors demonstrate that process-tracing can be an appropriate tool to bring these three aspects into play and better understand why climate change was securitized. Even though the exact application of process-tracing should have been discussed more thoroughly to increase validity, Hernandez and Misalucha-Willoughby (2020, 33) can reveal that recentralizing governance and gaining legitimacy were key drivers amid slowing economic growth. Sahu (2021) shifts the focus a little to treat economic development itself (instead of national security) as the referent object. In contrast to the other works mentioned, the author holds a very pessimistic view about the observed securitization as he sees it as a direct precursor of a militarized response through strengthening security institutions. In most of the literature on securitization in China, the state acts as the securitizing actor. As has been discussed above, speech acts can be also made by others. However, it is arguably more difficult in China to identify relevant speech acts by actors who are not endorsed by the government, such as experts or media (Zhang and Orbie 2021). Another peculiarity that concerns the securitization of climate change is the exceptional relevance of scientific expert knowledge necessary to make impactful securitizing moves (Trombetta 2011, 141; 2019, 101). Understandably, this knowledge is not

readily available to the broader public, thus further narrowing down the list of potential securitizing actors.

2.2.5.4 The Securitization of Climate Change in Japan

Despite an arguably greater similarity of its political system to those along which securitization theory was defined, Japan has also only become a study object in recent years. Kameyama and Ono (2021, 275–78) claim that climate security discourses are almost nonexistent in Japanese politics and academia. In their review of literature on the topic, they find that in Japan climate discourses are uttered without reference to security. More specifically, climate change seems to play a limited role only in considerations about its impact on the planet and individuals, where it has, however, for a long time not been part of the concept of comprehensive security covering food or energy security. In contrast to that, there are almost no attempts to discuss the impacts of climate change on conflicts and the operation of the Japanese military. Kameyama and Ono (2021, 275–78) believe that this is mainly related to the fact that climate change is still considered to be outside of the traditional military-related notion of security (separate from the concept of comprehensive security). Kameyama and Ono's claim about the joint discussion of climate change and security being rare in Japan is backed by other authors (Koppenborg and Hanssen 2021; Odeyemi and Sekiyama 2022; Yamada 2021). In their analysis of Japan's climate security discourse, Koppenborg and Hansen (2021, 54) take up Detraz and Betsill's distinction between a discourse highlighting climate-induced conflicts and a discourse linking climate change and human security. They note that especially the former is almost absent in Japan, where so far only traditional security issues related to threats posed by other powers to national security have been securitized (see for example Schulze 2018). This is also reflected in Japan's lack of interest in backing a more extensive dialogue on the implications of climate change on international peace at the UNSC. On the other hand, Koppenborg and Hansen (2021, 54) note that the latter discourse has long been stalled by power constellations within the Japanese government, mostly favoring the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and its interest in supporting (heavy) industry and securing stable energy supplies. On the contrary, the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) and members of the Japanese parliament, have attempted to securitize climate change since 2020, but have not gotten great support from the relevant audience, including PMs who have mainly shown interest in the positive aspects of mitigation efforts for economic growth, until spring 2021. Overall, climate change was thus still primarily framed as an economic and energy problem. There remain some questions about the authors' assumptions about who can be a relevant actor or audience which could be explained by a more thorough discussion of peculiarities of the Japanese context. For instance, they notably exclude the Japanese business community, which has been described as a significant actor in Japan's climate policymaking process or overlook the role of other ministries in joining a securitizing coalition (Yamada 2021). Still, Koppenborg and Hansen (2021) importantly disclose the importance of paying attention to governmental power constellations as defining factors impacting securitization processes. Besides the underwhelming circulation of climate security discourses in politics, Odeyemi

and Sekiyama (2022, 11–12) point out that research output on this topic is also lacking behind. This is the case despite the fact that climate security discourses have continued to gain in popularity mainly driven by developments on the global level. The authors believe that the absence of a widely endorsed definition of climate security is a main reason for this lack. This situation is reflected in Hasui and Komatsu's (2021) inquiry into the development of Japan's climate and security policy. The authors demonstrate that a number of security concepts have accumulated over time, making it difficult to merge them into one conception of climate security (Hasui and Komatsu 2021, 85–87). The concrete way how this thesis deals with the issues touched on in the last two sections in the cases of China and Japan will be elaborated on below.

2.3 Structured, focused Comparison

Understandably, proponents of an approach to securitization theory that attributes a greater role to the social context in which the securitization takes place have called for the application of non-discursive analyses to complement discourse analyses and better grasp why certain issues are securitized or how successful securitizing moves can be. Methods that have been suggested in this regard include content analysis, ethnographic research, or process-tracing (Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka 2016, 519). While the latter is a good fit for analyzing the causal mechanisms between two variables, it best fits works attempting to understand the effects of a single event and the identification of sufficient variables for causality. Given that the main interest of this thesis is instead to unearth how political system type affects the securitization of climate change across the two cases of China and Japan, the method of structured, focused comparison is chosen.

This method allows for investigating how differing aspects of political systems might affect how the securitization of climate change plays out. Similar to the approach of discourse analysis, structured, focused comparisons are chosen to investigate processes in multiple-case studies involving only a few cases. So far, methods examining causal processes have often been deemed incompatible with constructivist and constitutive, non-causal securitization theory due to its close association with positivist inquiries into cause-effect relationships (Balzacq 2010b, 46). However, Guzzini (2011) has demonstrated how securitization theory is based on causal mechanisms that can be understood as being non-positivist, making them a suitable method of study. Similar to Elster's (1998, 5) definition of mechanisms as intermediate between universal, but unattainable laws and descriptions that can be used to explain retrospectively but not to predict, Guzzini (2011, 335) conceives them as "contingent or indeterminate, and applicable to many different contexts, yet not as a universal or regular cause". Moreover, he clarifies that securitization can be treated both as a process kicked off by something (i.e. the context) and something that can itself trigger effects (e.g. practices) (Guzzini 2011, 337). Accordingly, a structured, focused comparison is a suitable method of choice for analyzing the conditions under which securitization processes come to be and might be successful. This makes it an optimal addition to the method of discourse analysis which can shed light on how securitization comes about. More

specifically, it is well suited to be conducted after having examined whether a certain issue has been securitized, even if the answer to this question is negative.

When conducting a structured, focused comparison, one intends to answer a set of previously defined general questions *focusing* on certain aspects reflecting the research objective and theoretical propositions for each of the analyzed cases, so as to *structure* and standardize data collection (George and Bennet 2005, 45–46). In particular, the questions have to be "grounded in—and adequately reflect—the theoretical perspective and research objectives of the study" (George and Bennet 2005, 46), in order to help breaking down the cause-effect link (i.e. the mechanism) into narrower parts whose concrete manifestations can be evaluated through answering the questions. This enables one to bring to light the processes at work to gain a better understanding of how variables interact. Applying this method requires following a number of steps that will be elaborated on in the section on the Analytical Framework (George and Bennet 2005, 48–53): Specification of the research objective, specification of variables, case selection, describing the variance in variables, and formulation of general questions.

2.4 Measuring Regime Type

Assigning an important role to regime type necessitates defining a feasible way to qualitatively measure it. There exists a wide variety of attempts to classify political regime types in the literature. For a long time, scholars developed classifications consisting of a limited number of rigid categories based on the distinction between democracies and autocracies. Over time, this led to the development of a diverse set of subcategories of the two archetypes. Generally, many researchers concentrated on developing a classification for democratic systems, focusing on executive-legislative relations (Alvarez et al. 1996), or macro-institutional structures and party systems (Bernhard, Nordstrom, and Reenock 2001). Attempting to make up for the lack of efforts to provide a clearer picture on the opposite side of the spectrum, others distinguished between monarchic, military, and civilian dictatorships (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010), or personalist, military, and single-party authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999).

Overall, the rather simplistic nature of these classifications makes them less well-suited to depict nuances within the two broad categories of democracies and autocracies/dictatorships, which has led various scholars to rule out their use in works other than large-n quantitative analyses (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010, 72; Mainwaring and Bizzarro 2019, 41–45; Wedeen 2004, 275–80). Even though indices are typically also developed for and used in quantitative research in need of clear-cut aggregated figures, the indicators underlying these indices are well suited to develop a more expressive, continuous depiction of regime types. Accordingly, while it does not make sense to use highly aggregated indices in a small-n comparative case study, some of the mid-level indices and indicators included are well-suited to guide this research and will be defined in the Analytical Framework. To establish a first understanding of what a sufficiently in-depth, qualitative analysis of regime type has to account for, it is wise to take a look at the six conceptions of democracy as defined by

Coppedge et al. (2011, 253–55). They distinguish between electoral, liberal, majoritarian, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian conceptions. The former two will be of main interest here, but certain indicators measuring participatory and egalitarian components will also be included to depict the concept of regime type shaping the securitization of climate change.

Examples of indices that have been widely used are compiled by V-Dem Institute, Freedom House, or the Bertelsmann Stiftung which apply a set of indicators to calculate a final index score (Bertelsmann Stiftung n.d.; Freedom House n.d.; Marquardt 2023). Freedom House's FWI is compiled by a team of in-house and external analysts and advisers who awards scores from zero (low) to four (high) points for a number of 25 indicators related to political rights and civil liberties to measure the electoral and liberal components of democracy in 195 countries up to 2022 (Freedom House n.d., 2). The Bertelsmann Stiftung's BTI focuses exclusively on developing countries and countries in transition (137 countries in total), for which country experts define values (one (low) to 10 (high)) for 10 criteria (38 indicators) to measure the status of political transformation towards democracy (understood to also include participatory components) and quality of governance processes up to 2022 (Bertelsmann Stiftung n.d.). Finally, the V-Dem Institute provides measurements on a whole range of indexes and indicators based on expert assessments for 202 countries until 2022 (Coppedge et al. 2023a; Marquardt 2023). Of interest for this thesis are its mid-level indices and indicators capturing liberal, electoral, participatory, and egalitarian components of democracy, which are measured with different rating scales. The V-Dem Institute also provides measures for the level of corruption in China and Japan's political regimes (Coppedge et al. 2023a). Due to offering by far the most extensive set of applicable indicators, most of the measurements will be taken from the V-Dem Institute, but selected measures will be added from FWI and BTI respectively to increase validity (see section 3.2.2 for details).

3 Analytical Framework

3.1 Case Selection

In order to gain a better understanding of the complex relationship between political regime type and the securitization of climate change, this thesis applies an exploratory comparative case study analysis of China and Japan. Both are diverse cases when looking at regime type, being situated at opposite ends on the political regime spectrum. As a matter of fact, the most recent editions of the LDI and FWI list China as the second most autocratic and least free country behind North Korea, whereas Japan is listed as the most democratic and most free of all countries analyzed in East Asia respectively (Freedom House 2023; Papada et al. 2023, 44–45). Moreover, being Asian and in China's case non-democratic countries, both have for a long time been outside the study focus of securitization theory. Although this has recently changed somewhat, important aspects of how the theory can be used to explain policy outcomes are still under-researched. At the same time, the countries also share puzzling features. Both are highly vulnerable to the consequences of climate change, but seem not to be willing to adopt climate policies nor achieve emissions reduction to a degree that would significantly decrease vulnerability (Climate Action Tracker 2023a; 2023b; Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative n.d.). Accordingly, they were publicly pilloried by some at recent COPs (Gupta et al. 2022; Jiang 2021; Messner 2022). Yet, this has not prevented them from portraying themselves as green global actors through international initiatives, and especially in the case of China, becoming heavily invested in climate-relevant industries and practices (Abe 2015; China National Development and Reform Commission 2022a; Macro Polo n.d.; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 2021). Consequently, treating China and Japan as cases in this thesis is justified as they can help to probe for a new explanation and better understanding of the connection between regime type and the securitization of climate change.

3.2 Data Generation and Methodology

3.2.1 Structured, focused Comparison

At its core, this thesis conducts a structured, focused comparison, to unearth the mechanisms between political regime type and securitization of climate change (see Figure 2 for a depiction of the overall research structure). The notion that the type of political system as part of the broader context has an effect on securitization processes is a widely accepted, albeit often unquestioned and unobserved assumption. Accordingly, this thesis conducts exploratory, comparative, hypotheses-generating case studies to contribute to a better understanding of how exactly, that is through which paths, political regime type shapes the securitization of climate change, i.e. what is securitized and how, so as to verify that there exist concrete implications of this assumption that justify assuming a causal relationship between variations in both variables. China and Japan have been selected as the two cases of interest because they possess a number of characteristics making them suitable for achieving the research objective (see section 3.1). Both variables can fluctuate in complex

ways. On the one hand, measuring political system type is a difficult task and has often been done by simplistically classifying countries into sealed categories. As has been elaborated on in more detail in the Literature Review, these classifications fail to reflect the nuances in different components of political system type that need to be examined to allow for any substantiated claims about how it might affect real-world phenomena. Therefore, a number of mid-level indices and indicators from three attempts of measuring political system type by the V-Dem Institute, Freedom House, and Bertelsmann Stiftung will be combined with more country-specific aspects to allow for a greater degree of correctly reflecting these nuances. Similarly, as a deeply constructivist concept, securitization and its investigation based on the qualitative assessment of discourses and their acceptance cannot possibly be done in a fully objective way. However, adding aspects of content analysis, assorting discourses into clearly defined categories, and combining discursive with non-discursive means to reflect discourse approval, allows for a greater degree of structure and robustness. As has been laid out above, the core of structured, focused comparisons is formed by a number of theoretically grounded questions, the answers to which allow to make conclusions about the processes at work between variables. To comprehensively answer the research question, these sub-questions address the impact of regime type on actor-audience constellations, the perception of climate change effects on national, human, and planetary security, as well as the countermeasures proposed in the realm of climate diplomacy. These sub-questions, their theoretical underpinnings, and inferred propositions are discussed in section 4.3.2.

Figure 2 Research Structure



3.2.2 Measuring political Regime Type

Answering the sub-questions at the core of the structured, focused comparison and, by doing so, the overarching research question, requires the detailed disaggregated analysis of regime type. This analysis will be mainly based on mid-level indices and indicators taken from the V-Dem Institute's database, Freedom House's FWI, and Bertelsmann Stiftung's BTI. To build a sufficiently stable basis for argumentation when analyzing securitization over the years 2020 to 2022, the average of the most recent country-year data points will be used. In

the case of V-Dem and FWI, this refers to data for the years 2020 to 2022 (Coppedge et al. 2023b; Freedom House 2023). The Bertelsmann Stiftung only publishes data every second year, so the average of data published in 2022 and 2020 will be used (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2023). For a list of all indices, indicators, and the respective values, see Appendix 2.

In addition, important aspects of both political systems that cannot be adequately measured by the indices and indicators will be addressed, building on primary and secondary sources. In the case of China, this refers to the current trend from a single-party to a personalist type of authoritarian regime as well as the role censorship plays in shaping securitization discourses. For Japan, this concerns the underlying factors and implications of the de facto one-party democratic systems under a strong LDP-led executive which can act unchallenged by the public and the legislative branch to an extent extraordinary for liberal democracies. Only the combination of both allows for a sufficiently adequate and correct reflection of the nuances that offer a more complete account of a country's regime type.

3.2.3 Measuring Securitization of Climate Change

Next, the securitization of climate change in China and Japan will be analyzed. This first requires the definition of actors and audiences based on the country-specific characteristics of both cases. Subsequently, qualitative and interpretative discourse analysis will be conducted on open-access primary sources, such as speeches and written documents, to unearth whether and how actors securitize climate change and whether audiences accept these securitizing moves by reproducing them in their own speech acts. To identify relevant speech acts by the specified actors and audiences, the key words of "climate" and "warming" (as well as the respective words in Chinese (气候, 暖化/变暖) and Japanese (気候, 温暖化) will be searched for in official strategic documents and speeches published between September 2020 and December 2022. The time period of a little more than two years was selected to keep the number of observations in check. Moreover, September 2020 seemed like a suitable starting point, given that it was the month Xi Jinping announced China's dual carbon targets for 2030 and 2060 and Suga Yoshihide took over as Japanese PM. To allow for the highest degree of comparability as possible and avoid another layer of interpretation through translation, the official English versions of documents provided on the respective websites will be used where available. Should they not be available, professional translations or the original versions in Chinese and Japanese will be used.

After the specification of actors and audiences as well as relevant documents representing their speech acts, the analysis will proceed with identifying securitizing moves (identifying a threat and proposing countermeasures) on the side of potential securitizing actors. These moves will be categorized according to an eight-fold matrix built on the two dimensions referent object and logic of securitization (see Table 1). Important to note is again that in the understanding followed here, national security in the climate security context cannot only be endangered by violent conflicts requiring military responses. On the contrary, an important component to take into account is also the indirect danger climate change might pose for the

political survival of the parties or leaders in charge in the medium term. Staying in power is the ultimate objective of every state-governing leader or party, no matter if elected by the people or not. Generally, there is a whole range of non-traditional plausible dangers for this objective. Here, the focus will be on economic performance, energy supplies, and international image. At the same time, the construction of threats or risks for national security to ensure political survival looms large as leaders and parties feel tempted to portray dangers for themselves as dangers for national security. It is unlikely that the issue of climate change is exempted from this. Consequently, climate change might be constructed as a threat for national security in that it endangers social stability through its complex effects on ensuring economic growth, energy security, and the image of a responsible great power.

Table 1 Typology of Climate Security Discourses

Referent object	Logic of securitization	
	Threatification	Riskification
National Security	1. Climate change as imminently threatening economic growth, energy security, and a great power image and thus national security (read the political survival of parties/leaders) → non-traditional national security	1. Climate change as potentially threatening economic growth, energy security, and a great power image and thus national security (read the political survival of parties/leaders) in the longer term → non-traditional national security
	2. Climate change as endangering sovereignty or territorial integrity through inducing violent conflict, mass migration, or other events → traditional national security	2. Climate change as potentially contributing to violent conflicts, mass migration, or other events that might endanger sovereignty or territorial integrity → traditional national security
Human Security	Climate change as directly threatening the food, health, economic, personal, community, political, and environmental security of individuals at home and abroad	Climate change as increasing the long-term risk of impacts on the food, health, economic, personal, community, political, and environmental security of individuals at home and abroad
Planetary Security	Climate change as an imminent threat for the biosphere	Climate change as creating unforeseeable, long-term consequences for the biosphere

Source: Adapted from Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016b, 20–24; Kameyama and Ono 2021, 272–74; McDonald 2013, 45–49.

As conducting a discourse analysis is a highly subjective practice, adding aspects of content analysis (word frequency and co-occurrence measured by using KH Coder), categorizing discourses in an eight-fold matrix, and combining discursive with non-discursive ways to measure discourse acceptance allows for a greater degree of structure and robustness. More specifically, the identified documents will be analyzed by combining components associated with content analysis with those of discourse analysis. With regards to content analysis, the software KH Coder was used. It is worth noting that KH coder can be used to analyze texts in all three languages of interest (English, Chinese, Japanese) (Higuchi 2016, 78). To be able to efficiently use KH coder, all identified documents and speeches by a respective actor or audience will be grouped together in a plain text file which then will be analyzed collectively. Moreover, in the case of white papers or comparable strategic documents, it is also justified to extend the analysis and compare between individual publications. A list of key words will be used to allow for an initial overview of word frequency and co-occurrence in the same sentence using KH Coder along the lines of the eight-fold matrix. This list has been compiled individually, but based on a number of sources (Diez, von Lucke, and Wellmann 2016b, 20–24; Kameyama and Ono 2021, 272–74; McDonald 2013, 45–49). For a detailed list of terms subsumed under each of the codes used, see Appendix 3. Afterwards, in-depth discourse analysis will be conducted to qualitatively assess the language used in the documents and to allow for the correct classification of speech acts into the eight-fold typology of climate security discourses outlined above. This procedure will be guided by the same list of key words.

After having classified the respective discourses into how they portray climate change, proposed countermeasures will be addressed. As the proposed countermeasures are too diverse and multifaceted to be included in the analysis in their entirety, their investigation will be limited to those countermeasures that concern climate diplomacy. These refer to measures discussing the respective country's stance on international cooperation, including

- the overall position on whether international cooperation is desirable.
- the general principles guiding negotiation positions (e.g. fairness, recognition of a special status of developing versus developed countries (e.g. through the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), preference for bilateral or multilateral frameworks).
- references to four hot topics in the international climate change regime centered on the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement: climate finance, fossil fuel phase-out, methane reduction, and loss and damage.
- references to nationally determined contributions (NDC) or international commitments.

Following from the theoretical foundations of securitization, securitization moves can only be deemed successful if accepted by an enabling audience. As far as speech acts are concerned, acceptance can be established based on whether the audiences reproduce the identified securitizing moves (respective categorization of an issue as threat or risk and the

suggested countermeasure) in speech acts. To establish this, the same procedure as outlined above will be used. However, not all aspects of audience acceptance are discursive. On the contrary, the use of regulatory (definition of new plans, the targets set in them, as well as actual actions and negotiation positions defined by them) or capacity (act of founding new bodies specifically related to the issues addressed by the securitizing moves) instruments is a powerful non-discursive action that can signal acceptance of securitization moves. Yet, reproduction in speech acts and the use of new practical instruments can only grasp audience acceptance in cases in which the central government is functioning as the audience. Therefore, as far as the legislative is concerned (only relevant in Japan), voting behavior on matters concerning the securitization of climate change and countermeasures in the realm of climate diplomacy will be evaluated. When it comes to the general public, approval ratings of certain perceptions and concrete measures will be determined based on opinion polls.

It is worth noting that only the contents of plans and actions of government bodies as part of efforts to build capacity can indicate whether certain securitizing moves are accepted. However, the decision to update plans or establish new bodies is in itself indicative of a reassessment of climate policies taking place which is believed to be influenced by moves of securitizing actors. When assessing the targets set by plans as well as the actions based on them, the evaluation of NDCs and countries' actions to achieve them provided by Climate Action Tracker (CAT) will be used. To provide higher validity, the results for the time between September 2021 and December 2022 were accounted for, as there was a change in methodology in September 2021. Yet, there were no changes in the ranking of either of the countries across this time period. CAT distinguishes between the NDC target against modelled domestic pathways (how much is technically and economically feasible for countries alone) and against fair share (how much countries could do with their own resources as well as assistance by others/assistance for others to make a fair contribution to global efforts) (Climate Action Tracker n.d.). It also provides an evaluation of actual policies and action to achieve the NDCs (Climate Action Tracker n.d.).

As far as negotiation positions are concerned, they will be assessed for the four crucial topics of climate finance, fossil fuel phase-out, methane emission reductions, and loss and damage discussed in climate negotiations under the UNFCCC at COP 26 (2021) and COP 27 (2022) based on secondary sources. Parliamentary voting behavior will be assessed as far as made public on the websites of the two chambers of the Japanese parliament, the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

Finally, opinion polls that inquire about the public perception of climate change and countermeasures will be used to measure the perspective of the general public. Unfortunately, there is no survey that has been conducted in both countries over the years 2020 to 2022 using the same methodology and questions. The Earth Day survey series by Ipsos comes closest but did not ask the same questions across years. However, as their survey is the only topic-specific identified that is covering both countries, the Ipsos 2022 survey will be used as the central measure for public opinion in China and Japan. This survey was conducted

online in February and March 2022, covering at least 1,000 individuals aged 16 to 74 in both countries (Bailey 2022, 35). Yet, only in the case of Japan is the sample representative of the population, as those surveyed in China were more urban, educated, and affluent than the general population (Bailey 2022, 35)**.** The Ipsos survey was punctually complemented by other less well comparable survey results to add reliability. In the case of China, these concern Edition V of the climate survey conducted by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and a public opinion survey about Chinese views on international security conducted by the Tsinghua University Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS). The former was conducted online with a representative sample of 1,000 respondents aged 15 and over in August 2022 (European Investment Bank 2023b, 1). The latter was conducted online with a representative sample of 2,661 Chinese citizens aged above 18 in November 2022 (Da et al. 2023, 2). In the case of Japan, some results of the 2022 version of the International Public Opinion on Climate Change survey conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication in partnership with Meta were consulted. This survey collected data from 1,174 Japanese citizens aged 18 and older in March and April 2022 (Leiserowitz et al. 2022, 21–22).

4 Empirical Part

4.1 Regime Type

4.1.1 China

In the following, the regime type of China will be qualitatively assessed by taking the mid-level indices and indicators described above as a starting point (for a list of all indices, indicators, and the respective values, see Appendix 2). Assessing the electoral component of regime types first leads to the observation that while in China suffrage is theoretically universal, the chief executive and legislature are not appointed through popular elections (V-Dem). Consequently, there are no scores in V-Dem on vote buying, voting irregularities, intimidation of the opposition during elections, whether elections are multiparty or not, or the degree to which elections are free and fair. Both FWI and BTI list China in the lowest category on the latter indicator, confirming the fact that there are no elections on a national level for members of the executive or legislative. Similarly, this explains why V-Dem and FWI list all parties except the state-sponsored one and its close allies or co-opted parties as banned and impossible from being legally founded. In fact, V-Dem, BTI, and FWI agree that in China the government even substantially suppresses independent civil society organizations, monopolistically controls the activity of those organizations allowed (i.e. government-sponsored organizations), and very poorly respects media freedom and the freedom of expression of individuals without fear of retribution.

China performs similarly weakly when turning to liberal components of regime type. V-Dem and FWI agree that public officials operate with low transparency, predictability, or respect of non-arbitrary laws. Moreover, the executive is poorly held in check by the legislature, and even less so by an independent judiciary that guarantees secure and effective access to justice for all, reflecting the non-existent separation of powers (V-Dem, BTI). Finally, according to FWI and BTI, fundamental civil rights are significantly violated broadly, and when it comes to the freedom of assembly more specifically.

In addition to not offering universal rights as discussed above, they are also not evenly distributed across society. Citizens across social groups can be sure of equal rights and freedoms (V-Dem, FWI) or access to power (V-Dem) to a minor degree. Under the described circumstances, civil society is lacking ways to engage in the policymaking process. According to V-Dem, not only are most civil society organizations state-sponsored and virtually no one can be active in independent political interest groups (including for environmental matters), but even existing organizations are only sometimes consulted by policymakers and public deliberation is infrequent and limited to elite actors. Following BTI, civil society can thus be described as being at least neglected and large parts of its interests remain unrepresented. Moreover, BTI speaks of a very weak tradition of civil society in China. However, this does not mean that there are no ways for non-governmental actors to influence policymaking. As the government is described as only partly willing or able to contain corruption by BTI and safeguards against corruption are largely ineffective (FWI),

political actors still seem to not fully refrain from using their position for private or political gain (V-Dem).

In conclusion, China's performance regarding these and other mid-level indices and indicators leads to a categorization as a closed autocracy (V-Dem), hardline autocracy (BTI), or a country that is not free (FH) (Bertelsmann Stiftung n.d.; Freedom House 2023; Papada et al. 2023, 39).

Overall, the discussed aspects help to get a good idea of how the securitization of climate change might be affected by regime type. However, there are certain peculiarities of the Chinese political system that they do not depict. In particular, this refers to the increasing concentration of power in Xi Jinping as the core of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that leads some to describe China as a personalist authoritarian regime. In addition, it also concerns the role censorship plays in what public discourses are permitted to take place and which are not. Geddes (1999) distinguished between three types of authoritarian regimes: military regimes, personalist regimes, and single-party regimes. Following this classification, most observers concur that China has gradually moved from a single-party regime, characterized by institutions of collective leadership, toward a personalist regime since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 (Frantz et al. 2020, 372; Shirk 2018, 23). Taking repeated measures to strengthen the CCP's control over state, military, judiciary, business, and the general public, Xi Jinping's efforts to concentrate power within the party-state on himself culminated in his success in making the CCP's highest bodies (Politburo and its Standing Committee) highly submissive during the 20th Party Congress of the CCP in October 2022 (Asia Society Policy Institute 2023). This suggests that promotion within the party-state is increasingly attached to personal loyalty to Xi Jinping rather than competence. There are other developments likely to be influenced by trends towards personalist rule. Particularly interesting for the analysis of discourses is the notion that levels of repression, a key feature of authoritarian regimes, tend to increase along with rising personalism that goes along with a decreasing number of non-coercive measures to cultivate regime support (e.g. a strong party narrative) and a security apparatus that is personally linked to an individual leader (Frantz et al. 2020). In fact, while the CCP is still the crucial instrument for ensuring regime stability in China, Xi Jinping's successes in becoming the epitome of the CCP and in ensuring his grip on the security apparatus, signal that there is a case for expecting higher levels of repression. Being especially relevant for the analysis of discourses, censorship is a form of non-violent repression that warrants further attention since it is particularly widely applied by the Chinese party-state leadership (Freedom House n.d.). Research focusing on the early years of Xi Jinping's rule reveals interesting aspects of how censorship is used to guide public opinion. Two publications by King, Pan, and Roberts (2014; 2017) demonstrate how Chinese censors use preventive and reactive censorship, while also proactively fabricating social media posts to distract attention away from certain discussions. Interestingly, both articles suggest that posts critical of the state or its leader are only censored or distracted from if they possess collective action potential, that is a real threat for being taken to the streets. Potential targets for censorship and distractive efforts have

arguably broadened in scope in recent years. This is reflected by Tai and Fu (2020) who demonstrate that language pointing to internal or external conflicts, thus invoking a sense of crisis, has become a factor that increases the likelihood of being censored. Interestingly, there are two unintended consequences of a trend towards greater censorship, and repression in general. Firstly, Chang et al. (2022) demonstrate that events of crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic increase censorship circumvention in highly censored environments, enabling the public to gain access to censored information, including such that they have not initially sought. Secondly, Chen (2022) suggests that as China's regime has become increasingly personalist, the less likely Xi Jinping is to even be aware of criticism concerning decisions associated with him. While this speaks to the belief that personalist leaders tend to become trapped in a self-enforcing bubble, this also means that those voicing dissenting opinions might not even have to fear any reprisals. Consequently, repressive efforts, including those about censoring information online, are thought to have increased with the progression of Xi Jinping's time at the head of China's party-state. Yet, this does not preclude that the Chinese public might still have a number of means to both gather and share sensitive information regarding critical issues such as climate change.

4.1.2 Japan

Japanese citizens elect their chief executive and national legislature in universal, free, and fair multiparty elections with very limited occurrences of vote buying or irregularities (V-Dem, FWI, BTI). This includes that no opposition parties are banned, nor are there any substantial barriers to forming opposition parties autonomous from the ruling regime and free from any kind of repression or intimidation by the ruling regime. Similarly, civil society organizations can be founded and be active almost fully unconstrained by the government and without fear of repression (V-Dem). A fundamentally free political scene is also reflected in greatly respected freedom of expression, even though FWI suggests some minor shortcomings in terms of the degree to which the media is free and independent (V-Dem, FWI).

Turning to the liberal component of regime type, V-Dem lists a very strong legal transparency and predictability, with laws being mostly respected and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion by public officials. FWI is confirming the former point. Moreover, the judiciary can mostly act independently to control the executive, and men and women almost always have effective access to justice (V-Dem, FWI). Similarly, the legislature can also effectively exercise oversight over the executive, reflecting an overall separation of powers (V-Dem). Japan's legislature, the National Diet, consists of the lower House of Representatives and the upper House of Councillors, the members of both are selected through national elections (Nillson-Wright and Wallace 2022). The leader of the party that gained the most seats in the House of Representatives is the PM of Japan and head of the government formed by his or her party. Finally, V-Dem and FWI agree that fundamental civil rights, such as the freedom of assembly are respected to a very high degree.

After having described to what degree citizens in Japan can take certain rights and freedoms for granted, it is now worth looking at how evenly this is the case across the population. The applied sources assert that Japanese citizens enjoy a very high degree of equality here and a fairly equal treatment through laws, policies, and practices, while access to power is also very equal (V-Dem, FWI). Despite this being the case, civil society organizations are not always integrated in the making of policies relevant to their members and public deliberation, though being actively encouraged, is not readily accessible to a large part of autonomous, non-elite groups (V-Dem). This might be closely correlated to the observation by V-Dem that only a moderate share of the population (about five to 15 %) is regularly active in independent and diverse political interest groups (including those on environmental issues). Nevertheless, there seem to be strong and effective safeguards against corruption by public officials and the extent to which they use their position for private or political gains is minimal (V-Dem, FWI).

In conclusion, Japan's performance regarding these and other mid-level indices and indicators explains its categorization as a liberal democracy (V-Dem) or a free, multiparty parliamentary democracy (FWI) (Freedom House 2023; Papada et al. 2023, 39).

Again, Japan exhibits a number of more country-specific characteristics that need to be discussed in order to provide a more complete picture of its political system. Most scholars agree that the electoral system in Japan established in 1955 was key in guaranteeing what effectively was a one-party democracy under the rule of the LDP until a brief period of 10 months in 1993 and 1994 (Krauss and Pekkanen 2011). Only changes to the political landscape kicked off with electoral system reforms in 1994 enabled the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to take over power from the LDP for the first time in 2009 (Schoppa 2011, 3–13). However, after the 2011 Fukushima disaster, the LDP was able to regain power in the 2012 elections which it has been able to hold onto comfortably with Kōmeitō as its junior coalition partner ever since (Sofer 2016, 6). One important aspect in explaining the LDP's successes is the fact that opposition parties have remained divided, allowing the LDP to repeatedly secure major election victories and push through controversial decisions despite at times weak public support (D'Ambrogio 2020, 9; Incerti and Lipscy 2018, 611–12). Another aspect that has been mentioned is the LDP's adaptability in a political system in which economic self-interest is still the largest selling point (Nillson-Wright and Wallace 2022). In this system, it has continuously managed to co-opt popular ideas from the opposition and represent a large spectrum of ideas through its intraparty factions. Both aspects are represented in and are reinforced by voter apathy also reflected in the V-Dem results discussed above, with a voter turnout that is relatively low compared to other countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (ranking 33 out of 38 OECD countries in the most recent national elections) (Pew Research Center 2022). Moreover, novel research indicates that many LDP voters even prefer policies proposed by opposition parties, but still vote for LDP due to its valence advantage, "a party-specific (or candidate-specific) vote-mobilizing attribute that is independent of policy" (Eshima et al. 2023, 1), which is arguably based on the LDP's reputation and trust in its

ability to deliver on its promises. Both apathy towards the political process and the LDP's valence advantage suggest that it does not need to adapt to voter preferences as much as parties in other democratic systems have to. This in turn contributes to a lack of robust investigative journalism and a decreasing "vitality of the democratic process in Japan" (Solís 2021).

Many scholars share the view that especially the governments under Abe Shinzo (2012-2020) with economic growth as their priority number one, established a close policy triangle consisting of the LDP, bureaucracy (mainly represented by METI), and the business community (Tiberghien 2023, 58). In the early years, this constellation managed to shift "public attention away from climate change toward more urgent priorities like securing a stable energy supply and managing nuclear safety" (Incerti and Lipscy 2018, 611). Former PM Abe also attempted to further strengthen the executive powers by the Cabinet headed by the PM, which today is also a strong actor in shaping legislation with most of its bills being made into law in contrast to those initiated by the Parliament (D'Ambrogio 2020, 4, 9).

4.2 Measuring Securitization of Climate Change

4.2.1 Relevant Actors and Audiences

4.2.1.1 Preliminary Remarks

This section will establish an understanding of the relevant actors and audiences based on the respective country-specific conditions. As discussed above, restricting actors to those representing the state is not unproblematic. In particular, it excludes and by doing so contributes to further marginalizing the securitization attempts of non-state groups (especially environmental organizations) and individuals mainly interested in highlighting the threats and risks climate change poses for human and planetary security. It also prevents from taking into account the important voices of the business community, academia, policy institutes, or the media. Still, it is not far-fetched to claim that states and their representatives play the key role in international and national climate policymaking in that they are those who draft laws and sign treaties in the end. This is arguably even more the case in China (Wang, Liu, and Wu 2018, 666). It should be noted that this constellation might not be the most desirable or efficient in the fight against climate change. However, given the time-sensitive nature of climate change, their overarching position is to be considered a given for the time being. Accordingly, it is the power relations underlying their speech acts that should be at the center of any analysis of the securitization of climate change. Moreover, to allow for some initiative of non-governmental (legislative in the case of Japan) and non-state actors (general public), they will be included on the side of the audience.

To create comparable cases, the analysis of climate security discourses has to be based on a theorized understanding of actor-audience structures that is applied to both China and Japan. This structure is understood to consist of three levels, the composition of which is based on discussions of relevant actors and discourses in the literature (see Table 2 for an illustration of relevant actors and audiences in both countries that already takes into account the ensuing

discussion). On level one, national-level ministries and associated ministers, party secretaries (in the case of China), and high-level representatives are thought to be actors who have the relevant expert knowledge to initiate securitizing moves. Level two encompasses heads of state or government and other high-level leaders believed to occupy decision-making positions in matters related to climate change. These figures ultimately need to sign off national-level strategic documents on climate change, including those submitted under the UNFCCC. In some cases, they also shape discourses through specific bodies, at times operating in the background with limited transparency about their actual influence. Through their unique position on level two, these actors and bodies are believed to serve as the audience for securitizing moves initiated on level one and, simultaneously, as securitizing actors that can themselves construct security dialogues. Finally, level three encompasses the general public as a possibly important audience. In the case of Japan, the national parliament is also included as a possible audience on level three. The de jure legislature in China is broadly understood to not serve as a relevant audience and its role has mostly remained unaddressed in works on securitization in China (Bo 2016; Nyman and Zeng 2016; Trombetta 2019).

Table 2 Relevant Actors and Audiences in China and Japan

Level	China	Japan
1	• Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) • MEE minister and party secretary • Special Envoy for Climate Change Xie Zhenhua • Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and MFA minister Wang Yi • Permanent Representative to the United Nations Zhang Jun • National Development and Reform Commission • Ministry of National Defense	• Ministry of the Environment (MOE) • MOE ministers • Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ishikane Kimihiro • Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry • Ministry of Defense
2	• Xi Jinping • Han Zheng • National-level strategic documents • Documents submitted under the UNFCCC	• Suga Yoshihide • Expert Panel on Climate Change • Kishida Fumio • National Security Council • National-level strategic documents • Documents submitted under the UNFCCC
3	• General public	• Parliament (Diet) • General public

4.2.1.2 China

According to Vuori (2008, 70–72), the CCP and particularly its paramount leader are those in the authoritative position to define security issues in China. Turning to environmental policymaking, Ran (2017, 640–42) clarifies that it is centralized at the central party and state institutions in Beijing. In this relationship, the State Council and its subordinated bodies and ministries often act as the bodies translating more abstract political ideas and strategies set by the highest party institutions (Central Committee, Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee) into practical policies. In the climate realm, top-level decision making is coordinated by the national Leading Group on Climate Change, Energy Conservation, and Emission Reduction (LGCEE) established in 2007 (Sandalow et al. 2023, 256). This leading group was headed by former Premier Li Keqiang from 2013 till the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 and helps bringing together high-level party and government officials to "develop national major strategies, policies and countermeasures on climate change […]" (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2018, 25). In 2021, another Leading Group on Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality (LGCPN) headed by then Vice-Premier Han Zheng was established (You 2021). It is hardly possible to determine the role both leading groups play in the publication of lower-level documents by ministries and commissions. Their involvement in the formulation of national-level strategic documents, however, is highly likely. Still, their position as the bodies that make the final call regarding which perception of climate change is followed and what countermeasures should be taken accordingly, puts them on the side of the audience first.

Functioning under the State Council, the ministerial-level National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has dominated climate policymaking at the central government level since its establishment in 2003 (Sahu 2021, 196–201; Trombetta 2019, 105; Bo 2016, 105). The NDRC is overseeing the National Energy Administration (NEA) in charge of energy policies and has a major influence over macro-economic policy. However, since the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE) has replaced the Ministry of Environmental Protection, the former has taken over most competencies in climate policymaking from the NDRC, which is still in charge of energy policies through the NEA (Kostka and Zhang 2018, 772). Accordingly, the MEE, its minister, and party secretary are now theoretically in a position to be powerful actors in the securitization of climate change (Sandalow et al. 2023, 256). This only puts them in constant struggle for influence with the NDRC, other ministries, or powerful state-owned enterprises (Voïta 2018). Owing to its formal responsibility for international matters, covering aspects of climate diplomacy, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and its minister must also be included in the analysis (Sandalow et al. 2023, 257). Topic-related seniority also necessitates taking into account MEE-affiliated Special Envoy for Climate Change Minister Xie Zhenhua and MFA-affiliated Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations (UN) Zhang Jun. Finally, the role of climate change as an important non-traditional security problem and its possible

impacts on national security also indicates that the security apparatus needs to be considered as a possible securitizing actor. In China, the implementing bodies of the security apparatus consist of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which officially is the armed wing of the CCP and is greatly involved in non-combative operations like disaster relief, and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense (MOND) (Lin-Greenberg 2018). Ultimate decision making concerning affairs of national defense and command over the military is held by the CPC's seven-member Central Military Commission (CMC) led by Xi Jinping (Morris 2022). In this institution, the MOND minister only holds a subordinate role, demonstrating the secondary rank of the MOND compared to the CMC.

Other institutions that have been mentioned in some works on climate security discourses in China are not covered due to accessibility constraints (in the case of the China Meteorological Administration whose bluebooks are not publicly available) or for capacity reasons and the need to concentrate on those institutions that are thought to be most relevant (in the case of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the Ministry of Science and Technology) (Bo 2016; Sahu 2021).

After having discussed relevant potential securitizing actors and the power relations among them, it is now time to turn to the respective audiences. Kluver (1996, 130–34) defines three relevant audiences for general policy discourses in China: government officials, intellectuals, and the general public. To be a little more specific, one should distinguish between central and local government officials. All these groups might be relevant audiences even though policy decisions at the highest level are centrally made. However, the group of intellectuals was excluded from further analysis due to capacity constraints. Accordingly, the audience was generally considered to include the central government and the general public. Local governments are indeed powerful as they have to implement policy decisions made at the center and attempt to influence these in various ways. However, especially against the backdrop of recent trends towards ever more centralization of decision making around Xi Jinping as the core of the CCP, local governments and their leaders can be considered to be rule-takers more than rule-shapers. To account for the unique conception of the Chinese party-state, the central government is here considered to be represented by President and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, the State Council (as the highest-ranking central government body), and current Vice-President Han Zheng. While the latter might seem like an odd choice, Han Zheng was a member of the highest party decision-making body, the Politburo Standing Committee till October 2022, and has been described as the highest-level authority working directly on energy and environment issues (Liu and Liu 2021; You 2021). LGCEE and LGCPN decision making is not made public online and can thus not be assessed. Classifying Xi Jinping, the State Council, and Han Zheng as members of the audience does not mean that their speech acts and actions cannot themselves have powerful securitizing force. In fact, these individuals and bodies are determining the way lower levels have to follow in the future. However, given their high authority, their approval for securitizing moves initiated by those state actors working most exclusively on climate change is key to establishing whether these moves can be deemed successful.

Finally, the general public constitutes the audience for the securitizing moves of the central government. Vuori (2008, 71) claims that securitizing actors in non-democratic countries also have to appeal to the support of the general public. Moreover, despite lacking direct means to influence politics, the general public is capable of rejecting securitization attempts if a critical mass is achieved as exemplified by protests against COVID-19 measures and their subsequent removal in 2022.

4.2.1.3 Japan

In Japan, the authority to define security issues and decide on climate policies is also located at the central government in Tokyo. Moreover, scholars have been more successful in unearthing the role of different state institutions. The MOE has been clearly identified as the main actor pushing for stronger national and international climate action in this regard in the past (Hasui and Komatsu 2021, 85; Kameyama and Ono 2021, 275). However, it has been in constant struggle with the METI (formerly Ministry of International Trade and Industry), which is acting as the communicator of business interests and is also in charge of securing stable and cheap energy supplies (Yamada 2021, 74–75). In this role, METI often succeeded in framing climate change as an energy saving challenge and mitigation efforts as an unnecessary financial burden (Kameyama and Ono 2021, 275). The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is also repeatedly mentioned as a relevant actor, especially in Japan's position on climate issues at the international level (Kameyama and Ono 2021, 277; Odeyemi and Sekiyama 2022, 10). For each of the ministries, the respective ministers might also play a relevant role, as does MOFA-affiliated Permanent Representative to the UN Ishikane Kimihiro. For the same reasons as stated in the section on China, the security apparatus also has to be taken into account. In Japan, national security policy at the ministerial level is under the authority of the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MOD).

Having addressed the relevant potential securitizing actors and the power relations among them, it is again necessary to elaborate on the respective audiences. On level two, this concerns the central government as being represented by the PM and bodies under their leadership, that is a special Expert Panel on Climate Change founded under former PM Suga and the National Security Council (NSC) which has overseen the publication of Japan's second National Security Strategy (NSS) in 10 years in late 2022 under PM Kishida. It is believed that the PM is the ultimate arbiter on inter-ministerial disputes on official positions on climate change communicated in national-level strategic documents, including those submitted under the UNFCCC. This understanding has been followed by a range of scholars (Incerti and Lipscy 2018; Koppenborg and Hanssen 2021; Sofer 2016). Again, defining PMs to be a part of the audience does not prevent them from being powerful securitizing actors at the same time.

On the third level, securitizing moves are again evaluated by different audiences. In Japan, there is an even greater case for considering the general public as an important audience (Kameyama and Ono 2021). Moreover, the parliament's approval of certain perceptions of climate change or the countermeasures proposed to deal with it in climate diplomacy is also

highly relevant. The group of intellectuals was again excluded from further analysis due to capacity constraints.

4.2.2 Discourse Analysis

4.2.2.1 Relevant Texts

As described above, securitization is deemed successful if an illocutionary speech act (securitizing move) is followed up by certain actions of the audience signaling their acceptance of the securitizing move. Investigating speech acts by the use of discourse analysis is usually done by concentrating on speeches and written documents as the predominant bodies of text that both convey and create the discourses against the background of political-institutional contexts. In this thesis, the observed time period is September 2020 to December 2022. However, for level one actors, there occasionally was the need to rely on documents from before September 2020, in order to include texts for each actor that predate important level two texts. As the list of identified documents and speeches was still too long after following the procedure as described in 3.2.3, secondary sources and subjective judgement were combined to narrow down the scope of analyzed texts. The preselection process resulted in a number of 28 English-language and 12 Chinese-language files being selected for inclusion in the in-depth analysis on the Chinese side. For Japan, the preselection led to 29 English-language and five Japanese-language files being identified for in-depth analysis. For a full list of all relevant documents and speeches (including sources), see Appendix 4.

China

Following from the elaboration on the context in China, relevant as an actor is first and foremost the MEE through its white paper and strategic documents, as well as the remarks by its minister and party secretary as well as associated climate envoy Xie Zhenhua. In accordance with scholars who have worked on the securitization of climate change in China, the NDRC will also be covered. The only regular publications of the NDRC with relations to climate are the Five-Year Plans (FYP) on Energy Development and Renewable Energy Development, for which the versions of 2016 and 2022 are included to cover the whole timespan. China's MFA does not publish a White Paper or comparable document, for which reason only self-identified texts by the ministry as well as speeches by MFA minister Wang Yi and MFA-associated UN representative Zhang Jun could be analyzed. When it comes to the security apparatus, it is worth mentioning here that no relevant document including key words on climate change could be identified for either the CMC, PLA, or MOND in the observed time frame. Therefore, the prevalent view of these bodies can only be approximated by the most recent MOND white paper published in 2019 in which there is no mention of words related to climate change.

When it comes to level two, press releases about meetings or summits in which Xi Jinping made official remarks will be first in line, followed by those on Han Zheng. National-level strategic documents that have arguably been developed under the coordination of LGCEE

and LGCPN, or at least with the approval of Xi Jinping, such as a number of white papers and documents published by the State Council and other central government agencies on behalf of its behalf are important, just like China's documents submitted under the UNFCCC. There is no official proof for the involvement of both leading groups as their work is not publicized. However, as described above, their leading role in any issues related to climate change is a widely accepted understanding.

Japan

In Japan, the analysis of securitizing moves by relevant actors will first concentrate on white papers and other strategic documents published by the MOE and ministerial remarks. It will then move on to look at the same kind of documents by MOFA as well as remarks by MOFA-affiliated UN representative Ishikane Kimihiro. Thirdly, METI white papers on energy are of interest. Finally, the yearly MOD white papers and its 2022 Response Strategy on Climate Change are taken into account.

Turning to level two, the analysis will first focus on press releases about occasions at which Japanese PMs Suga Yoshihide and Kishida Fumio held speeches. Secondly, documents published by bodies closely associated with these individuals (i.e. the Expert Panel on Climate Change active under former PM Suga and the NSC publishing a NSS in 2022 under PM Kishida) are of interest. Thereafter, national-level strategic documents and documents submitted under the UNFCCC framework will be analyzed.

4.2.2.2 Results China – Level one

MEE

MEE documents covered in the analysis (2019, 2020, and 2022 White Paper) include references to climate change in 381 sentences (27.33 % of total). Looking at co-occurrence shows that climate change appears with words coded as risk (73) and threat (52). Moreover, KH Coder identifies 53 sentences in which references to climate change co-occur with those to planetary security (10 sentences directly with threats to planetary security and 13 with risks to planetary security), 36 with those to human security (12; 11), 28 with those to non-traditional national security (nine; five), and 14 with those to traditional national security (two; two). This reflects a greater use of risk language and suggests a greater concern for planetary and human security. The three versions show limited variation in co-occurrences across time, with a decrease in the relative co-occurrence of climate change and risks, but an overall higher number in sentences in which climate change is linked directly to threats or risks to specific referent objects in 2019 and 2022 compared to the 2020 version.

When looking at the 2019 White Paper (published in November 2019), it stands out that climate change was only once acknowledged to be a challenge (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2019, 27). As far as adverse effects of climate change on extreme weather events and natural disasters (and through them on human health and primary sectors like agriculture) or ecosystems were noted, this was done to assure that the Chinese government had already reacted accordingly (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2019, 12–16).

Consequently, there is a case for considering this white paper as an attempt to riskify climate change, only indirectly identifying all three notions of security in China to be referent objects. Regarding countermeasures on climate diplomacy, the white paper emphasized the importance of multilateral (with UNFCCC being the most crucial) and bilateral cooperation, in particular taking into account CBDR (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2019, 1, 24–29). However, it did not include any commitments and only elaborated on how much China had already done in contrast to the insufficient support provided by developed countries.

The 2020 White Paper (only published in June 2021) did not directly mention how climate change is perceived, except for a section that recited a speech by Xi Jinping in which he had mentioned the "global climate challenge" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021b, 5). Even though the document again acknowledged that climate change has impacts on natural disasters, human health, primary industries, as well as ecosystems and used militaristic jargon when it promised even greater efforts to combat or fight climate change (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021a, 32), it also relativized climate change insofar as it listed a number of other pressing challenges, such as economic development or poverty eradication, against which any climate action of China should be considered (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021a, Foreword, 34-41). Explicit risk language was used in instances in which the extent of negative consequences following from climate change is not fully clear, necessitating risk assessments and preventative measures to better guard against them in the future (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021a, 41–45). Accordingly, while noting the unclarity of the exact extent of climate change consequences is scientific standard, the other remarks also mainly paint a picture of climate change as more of a risk than a threat, indirectly specifying all three notions of security in China as reference objects. With regards to proposed countermeasures, the white paper only legitimized and praised what already had been done to reflect China's willingness to take international responsibility and actively participate in the international governance of climate change in multilateral (mainly under UNFCCC) and bilateral (South-South Cooperation) frameworks (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021a, 69–75). It stressed that internationally all actions are targeted at constructing a "fair and reasonable global climate governance system" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021a, 69), which is based on the concept of CBDR, emphasizing the special status it is demanding.

The 2022 White Paper on Climate Change (published in October 2022; only the Chinese version was accessible for analysis; the 2021 version was extraordinarily published by the State Council and is thus discussed below) was the first to use the term climate crisis once, thus clearly determining climate change to be a threat (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2022, 52). However, when linking climate change to reference objects, it used less drastic language, speaking of climate change as a "challenge for all mankind" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2022, 1), or a "matter of sustainable human development" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2022, 1), mingling rather indirect references to human and national security. Some more details on what referent object

is to be protected were only provided in association with risk language promising to strengthen domestic countermeasures regarding mitigation as well as ecological and human adaptation to climate change (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2022, 6–29). Accordingly, while overall determining climate change to be a threat, when it comes to concrete reference objects, the 2022 White Paper again reverted to riskification. The document mainly talked about measures that had already been implemented in the past, emphasizing its independent contributions and, again, the interest in "a fair and reasonable global climate governance system" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2022, 41). At the same time, the 2022 White Paper also included calls for greater international cooperation, both in multilateral (with UNFCCC as the main channel) and bilateral (mainly touching on own initiatives regarding South-South cooperation and a green Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)) frameworks (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2022, 41–52).

MEE Minister Huang Runqiu and Party Secretary Sun Jinlong

In personal remarks on climate change (110 sentences; 49.11 % of total) by MEE minister Huang Runqiu and MEE party secretary Sun Jinlong made on various occasions, they linked climate change with words coded as risks (16) and threats (10). KH Coder suggests a relatively similar focus on human security (14 sentences overall, six on threats, three on risks), non-traditional national security (13; two; four), and planetary security (10; one; four), while traditional national security is only marginally addressed (four; zero; one).

In contrast to the MEE, its minister Huang Runqiu clearly identified climate change as an urgent and serious threat. In his 2020 remarks, he used the term "climate crisis" and spoke of a global challenge (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020b). Huang also reverted to threat language when talking about adverse effects of climate change as "one of the most important non-traditional security threats facing the human community today" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020c). Accordingly, he constructed climate change as a threat for humanity without making a clearer statement about what exactly is at threat. Only in remarks made in 2021 did Huang link the notion of threat to "human survival, development, and security" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021c), which in many developing countries is already causing "major disasters and losses" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021d). These are both references connected to the non-traditional national and human notion of security. Moreover, Huang only indirectly linked climate change to planetary security when saying that there is "only one earth for mankind and only one common future for mankind" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021e). Words coded as risk were used when elaborating on the long-term challenges posed by climate change, including for the global economy and sustainable development, or suggested countermeasures (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021e). Sun Jinlong (2022) brought risk perceptions of climate change more directly into the realm of China's national security when deeming climate change to be "a matter of the sustainable development of the Chinese nation" and "the economic and social development of all countries". Moreover, he was explicitly portraying climate change as a threat to human and

planetary security, noting the serious challenges climate change poses to natural ecosystems and human survival all across the planet (Sun 2022). He, too, used words coded as risk when elaborating on the long-term challenges posed by climate change or countermeasures (Sun 2022).

Moving on to suggested countermeasures shows consistency across the observed documents and period of time. Huang Runqiu called for multilateralism, adherence to the UNFCCC, and the Paris Agreement as cornerstones of international cooperation necessary to tackle climate change, and even global adaptation targets (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021d). He also aimed at securing obedience to what China conceives to be key aspects of these treaties, that is CBDR, self-determined national contributions, and financial support by developed countries to achieve fair and reasonable cooperation (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020b; 2021e; 2021d; 2021c). Sun Jinlong (2022, 9) also emphasized the crucial role of the UN-led climate change regime in which China is to "actively participate and lead", but not without mentioning CBDR.

Xie Zhenhua

The covered remarks by Climate Envoy Xie Zhenhua are short, but topic-specific as demonstrated by the high number of words related to climate change (28 sentences, 37.84 % of total). Xie Zhenhua also used language on climate change directly with words coded as risks (seven), threats (five), human security (four, including twice with risks and once with threats), planetary security (three), and non-traditional national security (three, including once with risks).

In both of his statements, Xie Zhenhua (2021, 38) clearly created climate change as a threat, referring to it as "a real, pressing and serious threat", or "the climate crisis which must be addressed with the seriousness and urgency that it demands" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021b). He briefly touched on human security and arguably national security to be protected when linking the threat to "the survival, development and security of humankind" (Xie 2021, 38). Even more importantly for the notion of national security, Xie clarified that China perceives climate change to be a development issue and is especially worried about conflicts stemming from a lack of sustainable development (Xie 2021, 38). Accordingly, Xie Zhenhua constructed climate change as a threat to human and national security, including for traditional national security. With regard to countermeasures, Xie referred to the Paris Agreement as the foundation and centerpiece of any international cooperation on climate change in his address to the UN (Xie 2021, 38). This cooperation should, however, be mainly targeted at helping developing countries and should strongly adhere to CBDR. In the same speech, Xie also directly encouraged other countries to integrate climate change responses in their economic and social development plans, so as to eliminate any reason for conflicts, while not promising any concrete, new action. This is different in the joint statement with the US, in which Xie pledged to enhance cooperation under the UNFCCC and "raise ambition in the 2020s in the context of the Paris Agreement

[…] and cooperating to identify and address related challenges and opportunities" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021b).

MFA and MFA Minister Wang Yi

In the selected documents and speeches by the MFA and MFA minister Wang Yi, there are 70 sentences including words related to climate change (13.05 % of all sentences). In terms of co-occurrences, KH Coder identified 15 sentences in which words coded as climate change are linked to threats and 11 in which they are linked to risks. Moreover, KH Coder also lists a similar number of sentences in which climate change co-occurs with references to planetary security (14, including six linking them to threats and four to risks) and human security (12; four; one), with a slightly lower number for non-traditional national security (eight; one; two).

In its position paper on the UN Climate Action Summit (September 2019), the MFA referred to climate change as a challenge that poses risks (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). However, it only specified impacts on human and planetary security in sections presenting how much China was already doing in terms of adaptation and mitigation to demonstrate that everything is under control and manageable. The paper even considered addressing climate change to be a "great opportunity to achieve high-quality economic development" (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019). Consequently, climate change was overall only constructed as a risk to human and planetary security. In terms of countermeasures in the climate diplomacy realm, the position paper promised China's active contribution to the multilateral UNFCCC-based climate change regime, stressing CBDR and urging developed countries to live up to their commitments on climate finance.

In the same month, MFA minister Wang Yi held a speech at the UN Climate Action Summit. In this speech he described climate change as a common challenge, tackling of which to protect the planet will be difficult and "critical to the future and destiny of humankind" (Wang 2019). Consequently, it can be concluded that Wang Yi riskified climate change, indirectly identifying planetary and human security as referent objects. To counter this challenge, Wang Yi promised that China would honor its commitments and would double down on bilateral (BRI) and multilateral cooperation in the UN-centered climate change regime, similarly urging developed countries to fulfil their climate finance pledges and emphasizing CBDR. Regarding the latter, Wang Yi (2019) clarified that a "response to climate change does not have to be made at the expense of [economic] development," reserving the right to develop for developing countries.

In the MFA Position Paper on UN cooperation (October 2020) and Wang Yi's remarks about China's diplomatic achievements in 2021 (December 2021), climate change was not identified as either a threat or risk. Still, both texts used similar language on countermeasures as before, emphasizing how much China had already done for international climate governance, including through its carbon peaking and carbon neutrality targets, and promising to remain committed to the UN-centered climate change regime structured around

CBDR, while at the same time strengthening own initiatives like BRI and the Global Development Initiative (GDI) (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021b; Wang 2021).

Zhang Jun

The speeches by UN Representative Zhang Jun also clearly revolve around climate change as a major topic (23 sentences; 32.86 % of total). According to KH Coder, Zhang Jun linked climate change to language about general risks (eight) and threats (one). It also identifies a small number of sentences linking words on climate change with those on human security (four, with two on human security risks and one on human security threats), non-traditional national security (two, both of which also linked to risk language), traditional national security (two, with one on risks) and planetary security (one).

Looking at Zhang Jun's remarks in more detail reveals that while also using risk language, he raised threats to human and non-traditional national security when reciting the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) referring to climate change as "a real threat to the survival and development of mankind" (Zhang 2021a). He, too, elaborated on the importance of addressing climate change as a grave challenge to sustainable development (Zhang 2021a). In addition, Zhang acknowledged that climate change can be a risk contributing to conflicts, i.e. traditional national security risk (Zhang 2021b). Zhang Jun (2021a) determined the UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, and CBDR as the "cornerstones of global climate governance," in order to legitimize China's opposition to give the UNSC greater authority in tackling climate change. Apart from that, he mainly concentrated on calling out developed countries for their lack of action and support, while urging developing countries to treat climate change more holistically as a developmental challenge (Zhang 2021a).

NDRC

The four documents include only 22 sentences with words related to climate change (1.55 % of total). Moreover, KH Coder identifies a small number of sentences in which references to climate change co-occur with those to threats (three) and risks (one). In addition, there are some sentences linking climate change to non-traditional security (five, including two with threat and one with risk language), planetary security (three; one; one), human security (one; one; one), and traditional national security (one; one; zero). Interestingly, the two NDRC FYPs on energy development, published in December 2016 and March 2022, only put climate change into connection to planetary and non-traditional national security twice without using any securitization language. The two NDRC FYPs on renewable energy development, published in December 2016 and June 2022, showed a somewhat greater interest in climate change and its connection to non-traditional national (three, including two adding threat and one risk language), human (two; one; zero), and traditional nation security (one; one; zero) with a slight upward trend overall.

Analyzing the 2016 documents in more detail reveals that only the plan on renewable energy noted that climate change is something to cope with and address without providing any

further details (China National Development and Reform Commission 2016a, 1). In terms of countermeasures, both 2016 plans only signaled approval of international cooperation on (renewable) energy without drawing any connection to climate change (China National Development and Reform Commission 2016a, 25–26; 2016b, 39–40). The few remarks on climate change in both of the 2022 FYPs reiterated that it is something to be combated and addressed and called for China taking a leading role in addressing climate change through the development of renewable energy and deepened international cooperation, particularly with developing countries (China National Development and Reform Commission 2022c, 1; 2022b, 37). While the plan on renewable energy development did not further specify international cooperation, the modern energy system plan mentioned a number of bilateral (BRI, South-South cooperation, Sino-EU cooperation on clean energy) and multilateral (UNFCCC) frameworks in which China intends to be actively contributing (China National Development and Reform Commission 2022c, 36). Moreover, both documents again underlined the importance of CBDR and independent contributions (China National Development and Reform Commission 2022c, 36; 2022b, 1).

MOND

As mentioned above, the 2019 National Defense White Paper did not include a single reference to climate change (China Ministry of National Defense 2019). Therefore, it must be assumed that as far as Xi Jinping is not directly in charge, the security apparatus in China still rejects any securitization of climate change.

4.2.2.3 Results China – Level two

Xi Jinping

Moving on to press releases about remarks made by Xi Jinping at various meetings and summits, it is worth mentioning that climate change was mentioned a smaller number of times (53 sentences; 3.13 % of total). This is because the speeches were not all exclusively on climate change. Still, climate change co-occurs with words coded as risk (12) and threat (10). According to KH Coder, some remarks also included sentences linking climate change to planetary security (six, with two adding language on threats and risk respectively), human security (five; two; one), non-traditional national security (four; zero; zero), and traditional national security (one; zero; zero).

Looking at the covered remarks by Xi Jinping in more detail reveals that in his speeches at the 75th Session of the UNGA (September 2020) and at the Climate Ambition Summit (December 2020), he was rather unspecific when it comes to climate change, only talking about it as something to be tackled and from which Earth needs to be protected (risk to planetary security) (Xi 2020a; 2020b, 6). Still, besides emphasizing the importance of the UN-centered climate change regime, Xi set concrete targets, updating climate targets for 2030 in place since 2015 and adding a long-term carbon neutrality target for 2060 for the first time (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2021; Xi 2020a; 2020b, 6). In conclusion, in his early remarks, Xi Jinping reproduced only the riskification of

planetary security invoked by the MEE and MOFA. Despite this, he translated demands for an active Chinese role in the international UN-centered climate change regime into concrete pledges.

In his statements at the 2021 Leaders' Summit on Climate Change initiated by US President Biden (April 2021), Xi (2021b) urged to address climate change as something that "poses pressing, formidable and long-term challenges to us all." More specifically, he raised concerns about the impact of climate change putting human survival and development in danger and disrupting "the balance in the Earth's ecosystem" (Xi 2021b), thus applying threat language to all three notions of security. In the lead-up to COP 26 in November 2021, Xi (2021c, 1) again started to directly use threat vocabulary, mentioning "acute challenges of climate change", when speaking at the 2021 G20 Leaders' Summit. At COP 26 itself, he upheld this language, saying: "[A]dverse impacts of climate change have become increasingly evident, presenting a growing urgency for global action. How to respond to climate change and revive the world economy are challenges of our times that we must meet" (Xi 2021a). Still, on both occasions, Xi (2021a) refrained from clearly stating what reference object to protect, only making one comment on protecting the planet as "the shared home of us all" (risk for planetary security). Turning to proposed countermeasures in the realm of climate diplomacy, Xi Jinping declared multilateralism under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement to be the foundation for greater cooperation on climate change (Xi 2021a; 2021b). He also emphasized the key importance of building a climate change regime which is equitable, just, reasonable, and fair (i.e. built on CBDR, "own" initiatives, and the "right to develop" of developing countries) and, related to this, urged developed countries to take the lead and scale up their actions and support (Xi 2021b; 2021c, 5). Beyond that, Xi mainly attempted to prove that China is a responsible great power that is independently doing as much as it can through South-South cooperation or its dual carbon goals (Xi 2021b). In summary, Xi's April 2021 remarks most closely reproduced Xie Zhenhua's and Huang Runqiu's threatification with the addition of planetary security and the exception of threats to traditional national security while even surpassing the level of urgency and extent of other securitization moves. The two latter remarks made in 2021 only reproduced threat language by Xie and Huang insofar as no referent object was identified. In general, the suggested countermeasures reflect what had been proposed by the securitizing actors.

In 2022, Xi Jinping was less direct in his remarks on climate change. Notably, in his speech to report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi did not bring climate change into connection to threats or risks (Xi 2022a). Still, in his speech at the 2022 G20 Summit (November 2022), he settled for calls to tackle climate change (Xi 2022b). Turning to proposed countermeasures in the realm of climate diplomacy, Xi Jinping again emphasized building a fair and reasonable UN-centered climate change regime built on CBDR. In stark contrast to that, he did not specify any countermeasure in the 20th Party Congress Report other than staying actively involved in global governance (Xi 2022a, 45). Accordingly, in 2022 Xi Jinping also opted to accept threatification moves of climate change, as long as no referent object is mentioned. Overall, Xi refrained from putting more emphasis on the issue

of national security as he did not bring up the link between climate change and conflicts. He also used risk language to specify the unclear nature of the consequences of climate change.

Han Zheng

In the selected speeches by Han Zheng, he clearly focused on climate change as a key theme (32 sentences; 42.11 % of total). KH Coder also suggests that Han was linking climate change with language on general threats (seven) and risks (four), and also with language on planetary security (five, including three linking it to threat language) as well as human security (three; one; two) more specifically.

Han Zheng clearly defined climate change as a threat only once, referring to the climate crisis as well as the existential challenge climate change poses to humankind and "the urgency of taking immediate action to fight climate change" (Directorate-General for Climate Action 2021). The document also specified planetary security as a referent object when noting that climate change contributes to biodiversity loss. In the two other speeches, he was less specific, only once referring to climate change as a "common challenge facing humanity" (China State Council 2021d). In terms of countermeasures, Han portrayed China as already being a contributor and leader that is valuing the importance of cooperation with the UNFCCC "as the primary international, intergovernmental forum" (Directorate-General for Climate Action 2021), but only on the basis of CBDR (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021a). He also urged developed countries to offer more support to developing countries (China State Council 2021d). At the same time, he also called on China to come up with concrete plans to tackle climate change, and even made concrete pledges about the country's National Adaptation Plan, the 1+N policy, and an end to financing coal-fired power plants abroad (Directorate-General for Climate Action 2021). In conclusion, Han Zheng acknowledged and reproduced the threat language only insofar as no referent object is involved. Similar to Xi Jinping, however, he went beyond reproducing what the securitizing actors suggest and proposed concrete pledges for China's climate diplomacy.

National-level Strategic Documents

KH Coder reveals words related to climate change occur in 398 sentences (15.69 % of all sentences) in the six documents. When it comes to co-occurrences, KH Coder suggests that words related to climate change co-occur with words coded as risk (138) and threat (103). More specifically, climate change co-occurs most frequently with words connotating human security (65, including 32 with threat and 34 with risk language) and planetary security (64; 23; 27). According to KH Coder, there are about half the number of sentences linking climate change to non-traditional national security (31; nine; 17) and considerably less to traditional national security (10; five; seven). The analysis with KH Coder suggests that the 2021 Climate Change White Paper and the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035 included by far the most potential securitization language, with the former linking climate change to general threats (28) and risks (21) as well as human security (15; six; six), planetary security (14; four; two), non-traditional national security (10; two; one) and

traditional national security (one; zero; zero). The latter did so to an even greater extent to general threats (72) and risks (108), as well as human security (49; 26; 27), planetary security (49; 19; 24), non-traditional national security (17; six; 14) and traditional national security (nine; five; seven).

Looking at the six documents in more detail brings more clarity to the different climate security discourses applied. The Energy White Paper (December 2020), published by the MEE but considered to be a national-level strategic document reflecting the view of the whole of government, referred to the severe impacts of climate change and spoke of the task of addressing it and maintaining energy security as "major challenges confronting the whole world" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020a). While this amounts to portraying climate change as a threat, the document did again not clearly specify any referent object and also only listed climate change as one of a number of severe global problems next to energy and resource constraints. When it comes to countermeasures the document mainly talked about past actions that demonstrated China's active international participation in addressing climate change. Still, it also called for "a global community of shared future, greater international cooperation" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020a), and "join[ing] forces to tackle global climate change" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020a). It also pledged to guide global multilateral cooperation on climate change and work on "deeper South-South climate cooperation" (China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020a). It is worth noting that there was no reference to the UN climate change regime when making these pledges. In conclusion, the white paper went beyond the securitizing moves of MEE and MOFA in declaring climate change a threat, but only did so in a way most closely done by MEE minister Huang Runqiu without clarifying what exactly is at threat. The proposed countermeasures were generally in line with what the securitizing actors had suggested.

Moving on in the list of documents, the 14th FYP only included one reference to human security, mentioning regions in China vulnerable to climate change, without details on what or who exactly was believed to be at risk (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021c, 94). Turning to countermeasures, the FYP urged China to participate in and lead international cooperation on climate change based on the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, the concept of CBDR, and South-South cooperation (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021c, 94–95). It also pledged to implement (the updated) NDCs by 2030 with the help of the Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030 (see next paragraph) and restated the carbon neutrality goal for 2060, both goals that were not included in the previous FYP (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021c, 94). Consequently, the FYP can be said to reject securitization moves while still proposing countermeasures raised by the securitizing actors on level one.

Interestingly, the Guiding Principles for the 1+N strategy (October 2021) and the associated Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030 (October 2021) did not include any attempts to securitize (China State Council 2021b; 2021a). When it comes to

countermeasures, they again stated the importance of China's active participation in the international cooperation on climate change and, in fact, called for enhancing China's influence on the world stage, including in "formulating international rules and standards" (China State Council 2021a, 33–34; 2021b, 18). Moreover, they agreed on the centrality of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement for multilateral cooperation, as well as on the necessity to hold onto the concept of CBDR (China State Council 2021a, 33; 2021b, 17–18).

In contrast to that, the 2021 White Paper on Climate Change (October 2021) right in the first two sentences determined climate change to be "a challenge for all of humanity" (China State Council 2021c, 1), and a global threat for the "sustainable development of the Chinese nation and the future of the planet" (China State Council 2021c, 1). By doing so, it invoked a clear security threat on the national and planetary level as well as less straightforward risk to global human security which becomes more pronounced as a threat in a later section of the document in which addressing climate change was described as a task of great urgency for the challenges global warming poses "for the very survival of humanity and […] long-term major threats to the security of global food, water, ecology, energy and infrastructure, and to people's lives and property" (China State Council 2021c, 27). Even though the threat posed by climate change to every country was certainly acknowledged, the document also once more emphasized the greater vulnerability of developing countries, and China as one of them more specifically (China State Council 2021c, 17–18). Overall, climate change was repeatedly created as a threat. Risk language was mainly included in contexts in which the consequences of climate change are addressed (China State Council 2021c, 18–19). Regarding countermeasures, the 2021 White Paper was first and foremost portraying China as a responsible major country that is already making every effort to "building a global climate governance system that is fair, rational, cooperative, and beneficial to all" (China State Council 2021c, Preface), and is doing so on the basis of the centrality of the UNFCCC and the concept of CBDR, making it a frontrunner in the fight against climate change (China State Council 2021c, 30–34). These claims were backed up by pointing to its updated NDCs, its pledge to stop financing coal-fired carbon plants abroad made in 2021, or support it provides to other developing countries through South-South Cooperation or greening its BRI (China State Council 2021c, 7–8, 32–33). Regarding China's own future actions, there only was a remark regarding bilateral and multilateral cooperation, promising to "remain committed to improving global climate governance and taking solid actions" (China State Council 2021c, 44). The white paper also called for consensus-based international climate negotiations and urged other countries to also treat climate change as a development issue (China State Council 2021c, 32). In summary, in the 2021 White Paper, the State Council reproduced language that declares climate change to be a threat to all three notions of security, even determining China to be particularly vulnerable. Threats to national security were again only related to China's sustainable development and there was no reference to its contribution to conflicts. Moreover, risks were addressed in the context of the unclear consequences of climate change. Accordingly, the white paper most closely reproduced Xie Zhenhua's and Huang Runqiu's threatification while even surpassing the level of urgency

and extent of other securitization moves. On the side of countermeasures, the white paper was generally in line with what the securitizing actors had proposed, adding the concrete pledge to stop financing coal-fired power plants abroad.

Finally, the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035 (June 2022) spoke of "serious threats and challenges climate warming poses to the present and future survival and development of mankind" (Government of the People's Republic of China 2022, 4), as well as the adverse impacts climate change had already had on "China's natural ecosystems" (Government of the People's Republic of China 2022, 5), and increasingly also on "economic and social systems" (Government of the People's Republic of China 2022, 5). Accordingly, climate change was once more identified as a direct and imminent threat. In this document, however, adverse impacts of climate change that had already materialized were predominantly related to planetary and human security, even though concentrating on China itself. Risk language was often included in the document, but generally only as much as it referred to future consequences of climate change, whose extent and probability cannot be exactly pinned down but against which protective measures have to be strengthened (Government of the People's Republic of China 2022, 5–7, 10–11, 16–17). Still, these statements were made on the clear foundation that climate change was accepted as an immediate threat. This means that the Adaptation Strategy, too, most closely reproduced threatification moves by Xie Zhenhua and Huang Runqiu while even surpassing the level of urgency and extent of other securitization moves. Moving on to proposed countermeasures, the document restated the importance of China's active participation in the international cooperation on climate change, emphasizing the centrality of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement for multilateral cooperation (Government of the People's Republic of China 2022, 9, 47–48). As far as actions are concerned, the document mainly lauded China's past achievements that demonstrated that it is already doing its utmost as a responsible great power and key player in global climate governance (Government of the People's Republic of China 2022, 7–9). Pledges remained rather vague and concerned greater efforts in multilateral (UN-centered regime and beyond) and bilateral (South-South cooperation) cooperation, especially on adaptation (Government of the People's Republic of China 2022, 47–48). Accordingly, the Adaptation Plan followed what had been repeatedly proposed by securitizing actors.

Documents submitted under the UNFCCC

In the two documents China submitted to the UNFCCC, words related to climate change (317 sentences; 24.52 % of total) were linked to general risks (67) and threats (54). KH Coder suggests that among the four notions of security, climate change is most frequently co-occurring with references to human security (48, with 15 sentences also adding threat and 10 adding risk language) and planetary security (47; nine; 14). There is also a slightly smaller number of sentences connecting climate change to non-traditional national security (31; eight; five) and a small number of sentences linking it to traditional national security (six; one; five). Out of the two relevant documents, the one communicating China's Achievements,

New Goals and New Measures for Nationally Determined Contributions was more extensively linking climate change to general threats (38) and risks (44) as well as to planetary security (36; seven; 10), human security (31; eight; six), and traditional national security (five; one; four) specifically. Only when it comes to non-traditional national security (22; three; two), this was not always the case.

In the communication of its NDCs to the UNFCCC secretariat (China's Achievements, New Goals and New Measures for Nationally Determined Contributions (October 2021)), climate change was right at the outset referred to as "a grim challenge facing all mankind […] posing a huge threat to global ecosystem security and socio-economic development of developing countries" (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021a, 1). These speech acts identified climate change as a threat. Here and in other references ("earth is our shared home, […] we must never relax our efforts to tackle climate change" (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021a, 1)) planetary security was clearly designated as one referent object. The reference to socio-economic development was less straightforward. While it may be related to the wellbeing of individuals and communities (human security), it is more likely to be a note to concerns about social stability and economic growth being under threat which might endanger the referent object of non-traditional national security. The mingling of references to national and human security is also present in other passages of the texts where climate change was blamed for having "already brought serious threats to its food, water ecology, energy, and urban operation security, as well as people's safety and property" (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021a, 1). At the same time, the document made clear that climate change is but one of a number of challenges China is facing and that issues like economic development or the improvement of people's livelihood are of similar concern (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021a, 2). The fact that climate change can pose various risks was acknowledged in some parts of the text regarding planetary and human security. However, these risks were rarely specified and language on risk was mainly raised in sections on countermeasures taken against climate change (e.g. resilience building as part of adaptation) (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021a, 22–30). In another document submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat (China's Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy (October 2021)), climate change was similarly constructed as a threat to ecosystems, human survival, as well as economic and social development (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021b, 1). While it upheld the observation that climate change is affecting everyone, developing countries were identified as being particularly vulnerable to these threats (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021b, 1, 3, 29). In fact, China was explicitly described as "one of the countries most adversely affected by climate change" (Government of the People's Republic of China 2021b, 4), but these effects were reduced to the proportion of direct economic losses caused by climate change, clarifying that the toll climate change has on economic growth (and by extension national security) was of superior concern. Accordingly, the language in China's UNFCCC documents came most closely to Xie Zhenhua's and Huang Runqiu's threatification with the addition of planetary security and

excluding threats to traditional national security while even surpassing the level of urgency and extent of other securitization moves.

As far as countermeasures are concerned, the documents called for China's active participation in the international cooperation on climate change. They also stressed the centrality of the UNFCCC for multilateral cooperation based on the concept of CBDR, so as to not infringe on China's development rights and interests (including concerns about energy or food security). The documents, too, concentrated on lauding China's past achievements to demonstrate that it was already doing its utmost as a responsible great power and key player in global climate governance. Again, pledges remained rather vague and concerned greater efforts in multilateral (in UN-centered regime and beyond) and bilateral (greening BRI, South-South cooperation) cooperation, especially on adaptation.

4.2.2.4 Results Japan – Level one

MOE

Identified white papers and strategic documents published by Japan's MOE over the years 2019 to 2021 included references to climate change in 526 sentences (23.47 %). Looking at co-occurrences shows that climate change was used in the same sentence as words coded as risks (218) and threats (160). Moreover, KH Coder suggests that of the four notions of security, climate change was by far most frequently linked with words related to human security (83, with 38 sentences also including language on threats and 29 on risks) and planetary security (52; 28; 16). Still, there also were a number of sentences linking it to non-traditional national security (15; four; eight) and traditional national security (five; three; three). Of the analyzed documents, the Assessment Report on Climate Change Impacts in Japan was most extensively discussing climate change and its relation to human security (70; 27; 26), planetary security (39; 19; 12), non-traditional national security (10; two; five) and traditional national security (four; two; two). As far as the white papers are concerned, KH Coder suggests that climate change was equally linked to threats (30) and risks (28). It also identifies an emphasis on threats to human security (13; 11; three) and planetary security (13; nine; four), when compared to other co-occurrences. Of the three White Papers analyzed, the 2020 version (December 2020) most often linked climate change to general and concrete threats and risks by a narrow margin before the 2019 version (October 2019). Interestingly, the 2021 version (November 2021) was markedly less specific in linking climate change to the four notions of security.

The 2019 White Paper (October 2019) noted that climate change is already impacting Japan through more extreme weather and natural disasters which in turn affect ecosystems, a number of primary industries, and human health (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2019, 9). Moreover, the document also clarified that "there is a high probability that these effects will continue and become more severe over an extended period" (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2019, 9). However, there was no urgency or emergency situation invoked, meaning that climate change was only constructed as a risk to the three notions of security in Japan. This transfers to countermeasures where there was a lot of time spent on explaining

how damages from climate change could be reduced or even avoided through adaptation (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2019, 9–15). The focus on domestic issues explains why there was only little attention given to the international level. When it comes to suggestions for climate diplomacy, the white paper only noted that Japan is already cooperating on a bilateral and multilateral level, mainly with developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2019, 14–15).

As the name is suggesting, the Assessment Report on Climate Change Impacts in Japan (December 2020) focused solely on impacts on Japan (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b). Therefore, even threats or risks to ecosystems or the natural environment were only assessed in relation to the Japanese territory. Risk language was applied to demonstrate that the extent to which climate change directly causes meteorological disasters cannot be pinned down to exact numbers and other factors also play a role (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 4). Still, the report acknowledged that climate change has a high, intensifying effect on their frequency and scope (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 1–4). In fact, the document stated that "impacts of climate change are significant and urgent" (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 1), and brought climate change into relation with human security (water supply, human health) and planetary security (ecosystems) throughout the text (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 54–60, 67–69). Notably, it then pointed out "enormous damage to occur from meteorological disasters intensified by climate change" (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 6), also demonstrating the growing recognition of economic and financial risks from climate change (non-traditional national security), which thus seems to increasingly come on the radar, even though not yet as a threat (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 70–71). Agriculture and fisheries, as primary industries, were, however, already considered to be under threat (threat for non-traditional national security) (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 50–54). Moreover, the report claimed that the impacts climate change poses on national security from a traditional conflict-related and military-related perspective could not be assessed (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 71). Accordingly, climate change was constructed as a threat to human and planetary security in Japan and a risk to non-traditional national security. Turning to proposed countermeasures, the focus on domestic affairs means that there was little attention on climate diplomacy. The Assessment Report only raised the need for technological cooperation and information sharing without making any concrete commitments (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b, 92–95).

The 2020 White Paper (December 2020) was more extensive in its discussion of climate change than the 2019 version (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020a). The authors acknowledged that climate change can also be referred to as the climate crisis two times (threatification) (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020a, 4, 6). However, when it comes to referent objects, they were careful not to be too direct and generally refrained from making explicit statements: "As climate change increases the risk of meteorological disasters and other calamities, it may not only cause great damage to the economy and society, but could shake the very foundations of survival for humanity and all life on earth" (Japan Ministry of

the Environment 2020a, 5). Accordingly, while the plausibility of wide-ranging impacts of climate change on all three notions of security through its aggravating effect on natural disasters was accounted for, the language used was again in the realm of riskification. Still, the 2020 White Paper urged Japan to "to lead the way of the international community in efforts to reduce emissions, according to the abilities of each of the principal emitters" (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020a, 9). Interestingly, it also raised the hope for a fair and practical international framework, attaching fairness to the active participation of all major emitters and consideration for the need for economic growth (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020a, 9).

Finally, the 2021 White Paper (November 2021) was more directly speaking of the "climate change crisis" (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2021a, 3), and linked climate change to the emergence of infectious diseases (human security) (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2021a, 5). It also emphasized its role in the intensification of natural disasters, but then did not specify what these natural disasters put at threat other than a secure energy supply (non-traditional national security) (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2021a, 7, 15). The concern about economic growth voiced in the 2020 White Paper was taken up again in the 2021 version that expanded on this by urging humanity to kick off a "radical socioeconomic redesign" (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2021a, 3), and integrate climate actions into economic and social development as well as energy plans (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2021a, 3). However, it did not include explicit pledges other than a reference to the country's NDCs and a call for drastic disaster risk reduction measures as part of adaptation efforts (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2021a, 4, 11).

MOE Ministers Koizumi Shinjiro and Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi

In speeches on climate change (22 sentences, 50.00 % of total) the two MOE ministers between 2020 and 2021 held on a number of occasions, they paired references to climate change with those to threats (six) and risks (three). However, KH Coder suggests that there are only two co-occurrences with traditional national security and one each on human and planetary security.

In his remarks at the June Momentum Opening Session (June 2020) and the IPCC Assessment Report (August 2021), then-MOE minister Koizumi Shinjiro identified climate change as a crisis (Koizumi 2020; 2021). However, only in the latter Koizumi (2021) expanded on its consequences stating that it is "already having devastating impacts," with life-threatening extreme weather events becoming even "more frequent and more intense in every region across the globe" (threat to human security). When it comes to countermeasures, in both speeches Koizumi emphasized the necessity to enhance inclusive international cooperation and to ensure that actions regarding economic recovery should not be made at the expense of climate action. He furthermore urged all countries to engage in meaningful and effective action and mentioned concrete national and international actions to substantiate this claim in both remarks.

His successor Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi (2021) also used the term climate crisis and referred to climate change as "an issue that all people around the world, across generations and national borders, should urgently tackle," without specifying what is at threat (October 2021). Minister Yamaguchi (2021) also promised to "foster cooperation with the international community". Other than that, he only called for all-out efforts to reach the mitigation and adaptation goals set in a number of national-level documents published in October 2021.

MOFA

Understandably, the covered MOFA white papers only marginally addressed climate change (287 sentences; 0.55 % of total) given that they generally look at a range of internationally relevant issues. Still, according to KH Coder climate change was linked to general risks (69) and threats (45), while being associated most frequently with human security (39, including with threats in 17 and risks in 19) among the four notions of security. Less co-occurrences are identified for traditional national security (17; seven, four), traditional national security (nine; five; six), and planetary security (nine; four; three). Looking at variation across time, the 2022 White Paper spent the most time on addressing climate change, including almost three times as many references to it as the 2020 version and more than twice as many as the 2021 version. This also translates into a greater number of co-occurrences with references to risks and threats in general (more than twice as many sentences than the 2020 and 2021 versions), and to a smaller degree even those to the four notions of security more specifically. The emphasis on human security as the most prominent notion of security is stable across time.

The 2020 White Paper (April 2020) noted the aggravating effect climate change has on the severity of natural disasters which will become especially troubling for "people in vulnerable environments" (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020, 11). Moreover, climate change was listed as only one of a number of global challenges "directly connected to the peace and prosperity of Japan and the rest of the international community" (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020, 21). Accordingly, the 2020 White Paper can be said to have only created climate change as a risk for the national security of Japan as well as human security in other parts of the world.

The 2021 White Paper (April 2021) equally mentioned the effect climate change has on the severity of natural disasters which will have an impact, especially on "people in vulnerable environments" (human security risk) (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021, 17). In addition, while not putting it into connection with Japan itself, the 2021 version noted that on the international stage, climate change is the most important issue to address, with its significance still rising further (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021, 214). Interestingly, the 2021 White Paper also used drastic language to indicate that transforming the economic development model to better integrate concerns for climate change is highly urgent (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021, 301). In summary, the 2021 White Paper more explicitly constructed climate change as a threat, even though it did not specify what is at threat except for future economic growth in the case of inaction (non-traditional national security).

The 2022 White Paper (February 2022) held that while addressing climate change remains urgent, the international community shares a common understanding of the seriousness of climate change whereas the interest in the topic in Japan is only growing (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022, 16, 22). In contrast to the 2020 and 2021 versions, it also covered the UNSC discussions about the threats climate change poses to traditional national security (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022, 175, 233–34). The fact that the text did not explicitly pick a side can only be interpreted in a way that suggests MOFA did not want to make the call. As far as the link to economic growth is concerned, the 2022 White Paper put a rather positive light on climate change, naming countermeasures to climate change "an engine for recovering from the COVID-19 crisis and for creating a new era of growth" (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022, 22). Overall, the 2022 version spent considerably more time on discussing climate change than the previous two versions, with almost three times as many references to climate change as the 2020 White Paper and about twice as many as the 2021 edition. In conclusion, the 2022 White Paper generally considered climate change as being an urgent issue to be addressed (threatification), but was less concrete when turning to actual referent objects (riskification of traditional national security).

When it comes to countermeasures, all three white papers raised very similar aspects, agreeing that international cooperation and a united response is the only way to solve the problem and "will be the focus of the international community's political and economic resources for a long time to come" (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022, 16). Cooperation can generally be achieved through multilateral (UNFCCC and Paris Agreement) and bilateral means (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020, 258–59; 2021, 300–302; 2022, 273–74). However, the fact that the three white papers mainly reported about diplomatic actions in the previous year means that they emphasized past actions. Here, the predominant objective was to demonstrate how much Japan is already doing in terms of financial and technical support for developing countries, cooperation with other major emitters, or domestic carbon-neutrality efforts, leading efforts of the international community. Besides pledging to uphold Japan's contributions, the papers only raised the objective to play a role in the socio-economic transformation, strengthening the US-Japan alliance specifically on climate change, and becoming even more active in assisting other countries in the realm of disaster risk response (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020, 252–53, 258–59; 2021, 106, 300–302; 2022, 98–101, 273–75).

Ishikane Kimihiro

In the two climate-related speeches by Japan's Permanent Representative to the UN Ishikane Kimihiro (26 sentences; 41.94 % in total), KH Coder identifies a number of sentences in which references to climate change were used with those to threats (nine) and risks (eight). According to KH Coder, climate change was also directly connected to traditional national security (seven, including twice adding threat and three times using risk language) and human security (four; four; one).

In his remarks to the UNSC in March 2021, Representative Ishikane recognized that climate change is an existential threat to the most vulnerable regions on the planet that has indirect impacts on peace and security, through its amplifying effect on natural disasters which in turn act as multipliers of risks for conflict (Ishikane 2021a, 83–84). At the same time, he called for looking at this link "through a human-security lens" (Ishikane 2021a, 83), defining conflicts to threaten human security first and only then traditional national security (of other countries). In terms of countermeasures, UN Representative Ishikane (2021a, 83) stressed the importance of UN-centered international cooperation on climate change, calling for ambitious measures and promising an ambitious Japanese 2030 target to be presented by COP 26. As far as the link of climate change to conflict is concerned, Ishikane identified adaptation and institution-building as crucial responses, but limited himself to emphasizing Japanese achievements in this regard (Ishikane 2021a, 83).

In his second statement to the UNSC in September 2021, Representative Ishikane again referred to climate change as an existential threat to vulnerable countries and their people (Ishikane 2021b). Moreover, he spoke more frankly about the indisputable role of climate change in multiplying risks to peace and traditional national security in these countries by inducing violent conflicts. Accordingly, Ishikane once more constructed climate change as a threat to human and national security in vulnerable countries. Turning to countermeasures, Ishikane reiterated Japan's belief in the centrality of the UN for necessary cooperation on climate change as well as in adaptation and capacity building to counter threats to human and traditional national security. However, without stating a clear position on whether the UNSC should be more active on climate security, he urged to "focus on people when analyzing the impacts of climate change on conflict" (Ishikane 2021b).

METI

The three METI white papers only covered climate change as a side issue (228 sentences; 0.25 %). KH Coder also identifies a relatively small number of sentences in which words coded as climate change co-occur with those coded as general threats (seven) and risks (28). Finally, there seem to be only two sentences in which climate change was directly linked to planetary security (including one also including threat language) and one sentence in which language on climate change co-occurs with that on non-traditional national security.

The three METI white papers (June 2020, June 2021, June 2022) share a common perception of climate change. All three spoke of climate change as a problem, while only the earlier two versions recognized aggravating effects of climate change on the frequency and severity of natural disasters and link these climate change-induced natural disasters to high economic losses (Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2020, 53, 272; 2021, 29, 342; 2022, 113–14). However, as these remarks were missing language of urgency and did not directly refer to Japan, climate change was here constructed only as a risk to non-traditional national security. With regards to traditional national security, the white papers all showed more explicit concern about natural disasters (no reference to climate change; provided examples are only earthquakes) damaging domestic oil and gas stockpiles or unspecified international

crises endangering the supply with fossil fuels (Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2020, 323–24; 2021, 309–10; 2022, 233–34).

To minimize the adverse effects of climate change, the white papers mainly highlighted what has to happen on the domestic front. Here, they called for cheap and secure energy as a guiding principle in greening the energy system while also calling for a socio-economic transformation integrating climate change as a main driver of innovation and future growth potential, for instance in the area of energy efficiency (improving efficiency instead of phasing out fossil fuels) (Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2020, 282–88; 2021, 266–70; 2022, 200–205).

MOD

Overall, climate change was not a key theme in the included MOD documents, with only one of the documents being especially about climate issues (212 sentences; 0.69 % of total). According to KH Coder, climate change was linked to risks (83) and threats (72). Moreover, among the four notions of security, there was a clear focus on traditional national security (100, including 38 sentences invoking threats and 36 invoking risks). A lot less emphasis was put on connecting climate change to human security (34; 14; 20) and non-traditional national security (21; seven; 13), while planetary security (five; three; two) was only marginally covered. The MOD's 2022 Response Strategy included by far the most co-occurrences of climate change with general threats and risks or more specific ones to one of the four notions of security. As far as the white papers are concerned, climate change was equally linked to risks (43) and threats (41), with both being most frequently connected to traditional national security (14; 20) and only a few co-occurrences with human security (seven; three), non-traditional national security (six; five) and planetary security (one; one). Across time, there was a significant increase in references to climate change in the latter two white papers compared to the 2019 version, with more than six times as many sentences involving these references. In accordance with this uptick, there also was a similar increase in general co-occurrences with risks and threats, while the number of sentences linking climate change to threats or risks to concrete referent objects increased to an even greater degree.

The 2020 White Paper (no date; covers information until June 2020) did not include a single reference to the MOD's perception of climate change, nor did it suggest any countermeasures on the international level (Japan Ministry of Defense 2020). In contrast to that, the 2021 (May 2021) and 2022 White Papers (May 2022) as well as the MOD Response Strategy on Climate Change (August 2022; the first of its kind) all listed a number of ways climate change can infringe on the traditional national security of Japan and other countries (Japan Ministry of Defense 2021; 2022a; 2022b). As far as other countries are concerned, the two white papers equally emphasized its role in increasing the risk of conflicts over land and resources or social and political tensions, which is especially troubling in vulnerable countries (risk to national security abroad) (Japan Ministry of Defense 2021, 201; 2022a, 187). In the Response Strategy, the MOD even went beyond this and referred to climate

change as “an existential threat to global security” (Japan Ministry of Defense 2022b, 1). Even though the document still used no definite language to link climate change to conflicts, the links were laid out more clearly, amounting to a threatification of climate change to traditional national security abroad. This pattern is not observable when it comes to impacts on Japan. The 2021 and 2022 White Papers mainly noted the impact of increasingly frequent and more devastating natural disasters that could affect military equipment and bases as well as increase the need to participate in national and international missions (Japan Ministry of Defense 2021, 201; 2022a, 187). Although the Response Strategy acknowledged that impacts of climate change on Japan’s traditional national security are inevitable, it did not treat this as an urgent, worrying concern. Therefore, the language used in all three documents still only portrayed climate change as a risk more than a threat (risk to domestic traditional national security).

Regarding countermeasures, the 2021 and 2022 White Papers and Response Strategy again agreed on the need for active and multi-faceted international security cooperation (Japan Ministry of Defense 2021, 201–3; 2022a, 187–89; 2022b, 20–22). The two white papers also stressed that Japan had already made great efforts, especially through establishing the MOD Climate Change Task Force in May 2021 (Japan Ministry of Defense 2021, 490; 2022a, 497). Apart from that, they mainly discussed how the military itself can operate in a more sustainable way, with the Response Strategy providing the most detail (Japan Ministry of Defense 2022b, 23–26). Concerning countermeasures with regard to climate diplomacy, both the 2022 White Paper and the Response Strategy referred to Japan’s international commitments as communicated in its NDCs (Japan Ministry of Defense 2022a, 188; 2022b, 1).

4.2.2.5 Results Japan – Level two

Suga Yoshihide

Given that three of the four speeches included by Suga Yoshihide were not explicitly on climate issues, there only was a relatively small number of terms related to climate change (10 sentences; 1.14 %). Accordingly, KH Coder only identifies three sentences in which words coded as climate change co-occur with those coded as risks and one with those coded as threat. Moreover, it lists three sentences each connecting climate change to human security (including one adding threat language) and non-traditional national security as well as two linking it to planetary security.

In his first policy speech to the Diet (October 2020), Suga did not make any remark about his perception of climate change (Suga 2020). However, besides clarifying that he considers action on climate change as a prerequisite for economic growth and that he will do his utmost to realize a green society, he committed Japan to reach net-zero emissions in 2050. Similarly, his second policy speech to the Diet did also not include securitizing language on climate change, even though Suga (2021c) doubled down on his commitment towards realizing a green society, pledging to “realize a decarbonized society ahead of the rest of the world,” and cooperating with the US on climate change. Accordingly, no securitizing moves were

accepted in these speeches, while calls for international leadership and greater cooperation with the US on climate change voiced by the MEE and MOFA were reiterated.

Only in his speeches at the Leaders' Summit on Climate Change (April 2021) and the 76th Session of the UNGA (September 2021) did Suga identify climate change as an imminent challenge that should be urgently addressed (Suga 2021a; 2021b, 1). However, other than noting its effect on extreme weather events at the Leaders' Summit, Suga did not specify how climate change might be of security concern (general threatification). As far as countermeasures are concerned, he was clear that all countries have to cooperate in solidarity in multilateral and bilateral frameworks to be able to tackle it (Suga 2021a; 2021b, 3). Moreover, in both speeches, Suga promised great Japanese devotion and leadership in this cause, including by setting concrete emissions reductions and climate finance targets as well as government policies to achieve these goals (Suga 2021a; 2021b, 1–3). Besides again noting the importance of conceiving climate change as a chance for future economic growth rather than a constraint on it, he pledged greater Japanese action on the international stage (Suga 2021a; 2021b, 1–3). Only once, Suga also called on other major emitters to make further efforts (Suga 2021a). Considering that Suga did not specify a referent object for his threatification of climate change, he seems to most closely follow the language used by MOE minister Koizumi and in the 2020 MOE White Paper, while not being as explicit as the MOE and MOFA in their other documents and seeing climate change as a greater concern than METI and MOD. Regarding countermeasures, he concurred with MOE minister Koizumi, MOE, and MOFA in believing in the importance of an active Japanese role in the multilateral, UN-centered regime and bilateral frameworks (mainly with the US) as well as greater contribution by other major emitters. Furthermore, Suga also reproduced remarks about the need to conceive climate change as a driver for innovation and economic growth through being integrated into a novel socio-economic development model, aspects emphasized by the MOE and METI.

Expert Panel on Climate Change

On top of reproducing securitizing moves as outlined above, former PM Suga Yoshihide also established an Expert Panel on Climate Change in March 2021. While the securitizing power of the mere decision of its creation will be discussed later, the panel published its only report in October 2021. In the report, climate change (84 sentences, 5.62 % of total) was directly linked to general threats (two) and risks (13). Besides this greater focus on risks, climate change was also co-used with planetary security (four, with two sentences also including threat language and one also including risk language), human security (three; zero; zero), and traditional national security (one; zero; zero).

In the report, the panel made clear that it considers climate change to be a threat, acknowledging climate change to amount to a global crisis and speaking of a "turning point in human history" (Japan Expert Panel on Climate Change 2021, 1). The report also provided some details on what the panel considered to be under threat. Here, it warned of irreversible changes to the earth or, contrary to what KH Coder suggested, the impacts of natural disasters

on ecosystems, food security, poverty, and health around the world and in Japan, defining climate change as a threat to planetary and human security both in Japan and beyond (Japan Expert Panel on Climate Change 2021, 2). Moreover, it also put climate change into connection to national security, both in the traditional conflict-related sense and concerning the danger of missing out on economic growth opportunities should no climate action be taken (national security risk) (Japan Expert Panel on Climate Change 2021, 3–4, 8). To counter these threats and risks, the report emphasized the need for international cooperation in multilateral (UN; G7) and bilateral (US) constellations and noted Japanese determination to do its part through commitments made regarding climate finance, technical assistance, or its 2030 and 2050 climate goals (Japan Expert Panel on Climate Change 2021, 3–4, 8). Again, in order to be able to achieve the latter, the report called for treating climate change as an investment opportunity and a wide-ranging socio-economic transformation (Japan Expert Panel on Climate Change 2021, 6–7). In conclusion, the Expert Panel on Climate Change mostly accepted securitizing moves by the MOE in its Assessment Report, adding the notion of METI and MOD that national security is at risk. When it comes to countermeasures regarding climate diplomacy, the remarks mainly followed what MOFA and MOE ministers had suggested, while also adding METI's call for treating climate change as a key component of a socio-economic transformation.

Kishida Fumio

The fact that the speeches by PM Kishida included in the analysis were not all specifically on climate issues, explains why KH Coder only identifies a small number of sentences including references to climate change (17; 2.68 % of total). According to KH Coder, climate change also co-occurs with references to general risks (11) and threats (four). KH Coder identifies some sentences linking climate change to human security (seven, including three on explicit threats and five on risks), non-traditional national security (three; zero; one), planetary security (two; zero; two), and traditional national security (two; one; two).

At COP 26 in November 2021, PM Kishida (2021a, 1) described climate change as a "common challenge of humankind," and an issue to be confronted in this "critical" decade, without providing any details of what is at risk. This suggests Kishida did not consider climate change as pressing as other challenges faced by Japan. Still, PM Kishida (2021a, 1) urged every nation to do as much as possible and promised that Japan will assume a leadership role in contributing to the "clean energy transition, with a particular focus on Asia." Kishida also made a number of concrete pledges concerning climate finance or methane emission reductions (Kishida 2021a, 2–3). Overall, it can be concluded that with this speech Kishida reproduced risk language raised by MOE, METI, or MOD only insofar as no concrete reference object is mentioned. With his proposed countermeasures, he generally followed the suggestions of MOE and MOFA and even transferred them into concrete pledges.

At the GZERO Summit one month later, Kishida (2021b) identified climate change as a risk to national security when he referred to it as a problem and "risk that threatens the

sustainability of our socioeconomic [sic] activities." To counter this risk, Kishida pledged to transform climate change into a field for economic growth and to base climate change actions on strong ties with the US. With this speech, Kishida predominantly accepted the riskification of national security attempted by METI, focusing exclusively on the economic factor. This is also true for the proposed countermeasure regarding a socio-economic transformation, adding the importance of the US-Japan alliance raised by MOFA.

In his first policy speech to the Diet (January 2022), Kishida (2022a) noted that climate change is a challenge that has become more serious and should be taken on "for the sake of our children's and grandchildren's generations." However, the absence of any reference to the urgency or severity of the problem (in contrast to other problems), again only puts these remarks in the general riskification category. In the area of countermeasures, PM Kishida (2022a) pledged to "contribute to the decarbonization of the world, especially Asia, and lead the world in technical standards and international infrastructure development, together with the countries of Asia." A novel growth strategy is again a crucial part of this endeavor. Therefore, it can be concluded that with his first policy speech to the Diet, Kishida reproduced risk language by MOE, METI, or MOD only insofar as no concrete reference object was mentioned, while for countermeasures he took up proposals from the MOE, MOFA, and METI.

Finally, in his third speech to the Diet (October 2022), PM Kishida listed a number of international crises, of which the climate crisis is a part, without providing any more detail, thus reproducing threat language by MOE, MOFA, and MOD only insofar as no referent object was mentioned (Kishida 2022b).

National Security Council

KH Coder suggests that climate change was only of minor relevance for the NSC in the NSS (14 sentences; 3.44 % of total). When it comes to co-occurrences with climate change, KH Coder identifies a number of sentences in which climate change is linked to risks (eight) and threats (seven). Of the four notions of security, it seems to equally co-occur with human security (10, including six adding threat or risk language respectively) and traditional national security (nine; six; five). In a smaller number of sentences, climate change also co-occurs with non-traditional national security (three; two; two).

The NSS (December 2022) was really clear that climate change can threaten Japan's national security in a number of ways, including more frequent and severe natural disasters or energy supply problems (Japan National Security Council 2022, 16). It even acknowledged effects on its traditional military-related national security, which are not caused by an increased number of climate change-induced conflicts but a higher number of deployments in the case of disaster or an increased use of Arctic Sea routes (Japan National Security Council 2022, 16). Moreover, it also saw the national security of so-called vulnerable countries in the Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific Islands as well as the existence of humankind in general at threat (human security) (Japan National Security Council 2022, 7). To counter these

threats, the NSS primarily suggested multilateral, international cooperation including through the UN-centered framework, using drastic language when raising that there is a "greater imperative than ever before for the international community to rally together in cooperation" (Japan National Security Council 2022, 2), even across ideological camps. In this endeavor, the NSC pledged that Japan would take a leading role through formulating rules and regulations or providing assistance to developing countries, without making any more concrete pledges (Japan National Security Council 2022, 11, 16–17). Finally, the NSS also explicitly urged China "to make further efforts to address global issues, including climate change" (Japan National Security Council 2022, 8). In conclusion, the NSS clearly defined climate change as a threat to the national security of Japan and other countries as well as, less directly, to human security in general. This means that the NSC reproduced and extended securitizing moves made by the MOE (2021), MOFA (2021, 2022), and METI, but was not accepting the securitizing attempt by the MOD. As far as human security is concerned, it interestingly came closest to former MOE minister Koizumi.

National-level Strategic Documents

The two national level strategic documents on the issue of climate change (853 sentences, 4.95 % of total) included sentences linking it to threats (44) and in particular risks (143). Among the four notions of security, the texts most frequently linked climate change to planetary security (49, with two sentences also adding threat language and six adding risk language) and human security (43; eight; nine). KH Coder identifies a considerably smaller number of sentences linking climate change to traditional (11; one; two) and non-traditional (seven; zero; two) national security. It is worth mentioning that the adaptation plan included clearly more securitization attempts concerning climate change (753 to 100), both regarding general threats and risks (49 and 125 to five and 18) and specific notions of security. Here, the adaptation plan more often linked climate change to human security (37; seven; eight), traditional national security (eight; one; one), and non-traditional national security (six; zero; two). Only with regards to planetary security (32; one; two), this relation does not always hold.

The Global Warming Countermeasures Plan (October 2021) stated that climate change is "an unavoidable and urgent challenge for each and every one of us and all living creatures on this planet" (Japan Cabinet Office 2021a, 1). It continued to specify far-reaching and irreversible impacts on people and ecosystems worldwide (threat to human and planetary security) as well as the risk consequences of climate change pose for businesses (non-traditional national security risk) (Japan Cabinet Office 2021a, 1–2). Regarding climate diplomacy, it called for international cooperation, noting past achievements and promising to take a leading role in multilateral and bilateral frameworks working towards global decarbonization and in rulemaking (Japan Cabinet Office 2021a, 9–10, 12, 24). This is to be achieved through implementing the country's emission reduction and net-zero targets for 2030 and 2050, including through concrete GHG emission reduction targets, as well as further measures like phasing out government support for carbon-intensive fossil fuel abroad

(Japan Cabinet Office 2021a, 10–12). In conclusion, the Plan reproduced threatification moves of the MOE (Assessment Report) and UN representative Ishikane (human security) as well as the riskification of national security by MOE and METI. Moreover, it generally followed the MOE and MOFA proposals for countermeasures, adding concrete measures.

In the Climate Change Adaptation Plan (October 2021), the focus was mainly on Japan, repeatedly referring to negative impacts on its economy, society, human lives, public health, food and water security, and less often on ecosystems and the natural environment already felt across Japan, as well as serious concerns about them becoming increasingly severe in the future (see for example Japan Cabinet Office 2021b, 1–2, 13–14). This suggests that concerns were greatest about the threats posed by climate change to Japan's national and human security, while the threat for planetary security in Japan was considered less severe. The plan noted that the threats can also originate from disruptions in other countries even more affected by climate change, where threats to human security could instigate conflicts (Japan Cabinet Office 2021b, 13). However, while mass migration was raised as one of the consequences of these tensions, Japan was not mentioned as being directly affected and the risk to traditional national security was thus created for other countries. Overall, the plan acknowledged that negative impacts of climate change are a direct driver for the loss of biodiversity and indeed amount to speak of a climate crisis "that shakes the foundations of human survival and the survival of all other living things" (human and planetary security threat) (Japan Cabinet Office 2021b, 1). While climate change was also repeatedly constructed as a risk whose impacts can be prevented or reduced, most risk language was used in sections on unspecific impacts and suggested countermeasures (see for example Japan Cabinet Office 2021b, 6, 26–27, 91–93). Due to its focus on domestic affairs, the plan was only addressing countermeasures concerning climate diplomacy in limited sections. As far as mitigation efforts and climate finance commitments under the UNFCCC are concerned, the plan referred to Japan's standing pledges (Japan Cabinet Office 2021b, 2). Still, it also called for upgrading technological and scientific cooperation, as well as information sharing with developing and vulnerable countries and general participation in international frameworks (Japan Cabinet Office 2021b, 7, 18–19). In summary, the Adaptation Plan was overall broader in its threatification language than any of the securitizing actors. Specifically, it combined and extended moves by the MOE (Assessment Report) and MOFA (2021 White Paper), while toning down UN representative Ishikane's threatification of climate change for military-related national security abroad and only reproducing the MOD's riskification of the same as far as other countries are concerned. When it comes to countermeasures, the Adaptation Plan most closely followed the MOE's Assessment Report and UN representative Ishikane's suggestions.

Documents submitted under the UNFCCC

Japanese submissions under the UNFCCC included in the analysis covered climate change as a key issue (810 sentences; 17.64 % of total). Interestingly, KH Coder identifies a comparatively high number of sentences in which references to climate change co-occur

with those on risks (269), in contrast to co-occurrences with general threats (97). This ratio is upheld to a smaller degree in linkages between climate change and concrete notions of security, where the greatest focus was on human security (90; 30; 48) and planetary security (72; 14; 30). Non-traditional (31; nine; 23) and especially traditional national security (10; six; eight) were addressed less frequently. Overall, the Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report (December 2022) was by far most explicitly linking climate change to general risks (222) and threats (88), as well as to human security (81; 27; 41), planetary security (64; 13; 27), non-traditional (23; eight; 18), and traditional national security (nine; six; seven).

In Japan's Long-Term Strategy under the Paris Agreement (October 2021), climate change was defined as a global and urgent challenge which "allows no time to lose" (Government of Japan 2021b, 9). However, the document did not give any details about what is under threat. This is different when it comes to countermeasures for which the Long-Term Strategy promised that Japan will further expand international cooperation, for instance in the wind power or nuclear power industry, and lead global decarbonization as well as the "formulation of frameworks and standards in the area of climate change" (Government of Japan 2021b, 3–4, 74, 79, 97–98). It also restated the pledge to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 (Government of Japan 2021b, 3–4). Accordingly, the Long-Term Strategy only accepted threat language raised by MOE and MOFA insofar as no explicit referent object was mentioned while generally following their proposal for countermeasures.

In its NDC (submitted in October 2021), Japan indirectly specified planetary security to be at risk when acknowledging that action is necessary to "prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system" (Government of Japan 2021a, 13). As far as countermeasures on climate diplomacy are concerned, it only included a pledge to lead international discussions and contribute proactively to cooperation on decarbonization and resilience-building on top of specifying Japan's contributions under the UNFCCC (Government of Japan 2021a, 11). In summary, the NDCs only partially accepted the riskification of planetary security attempted by MOE, while replicating some countermeasures proposed by MOE and MOFA.

Finally, the Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report noted adverse effects of climate change on various primary industries, ecosystems, natural disasters, and diseases inside and outside of Japan, surmounting to be called a "'climate crisis' shaking the foundations of human survival and the survival of all other living things" (Government of Japan 2022, 235). This description identified climate change to be a threat to all notions of security except for traditional national security, particularly stressing the effects on human and planetary security. Risk language was again mainly invoked in sections on climate change impacts that cannot yet be specified or the countermeasures taken against them (Government of Japan 2022, 236–60). As the document elaborated mainly on domestic efforts to meet Japan's international commitments and past achievements, there was few information on countermeasures regarding climate diplomacy. It specified that efforts have

to focus on a socio-economic transformation as well as active assistance for developing countries in the areas of climate finance, technological support, and capacity building (Government of Japan 2022, 10, 105–8, 268–69). Accordingly, the Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report accepted and expanded on the threatification moves by MOE, MOFA, and METI as it made them concrete to three notions of security. However, it is worth mentioning that no link to conflict was discussed. In terms of countermeasures, the document generally followed MOE, MOFA, and METI, being a little more concrete on how international support can look like.

4.2.3 Non-discursive Acceptance of Securitizing Moves

4.2.3.1 Preliminary Remarks

As mentioned above, it is important to also pay attention to non-discursive ways through which an audience can signal acceptance of a particular securitizing move by a securitizing actor. These non-discursive means vary from audience to audience. As far as the central government (level two) is concerned, apart from reproducing securitizing moves in own speech acts, acceptance can also be signaled through the use of regulatory (definition of new plans, the targets set in them, as well as actual actions and negotiation positions defined by them) or capacity (founding of new climate-specific bodies) instruments that demonstrate a shift in governmental priorities. When turning to level three, parliamentary voting behavior on relevant issues can be used as a proxy for measuring the approval of a country's legislative to respective securitizing moves. Lastly, the perspective of the general public can be best approximated by looking at opinion polls that measure the public perception of climate change and countermeasures.

4.2.3.2 Results China – Level two

The Chinese government officially submitted its updated NDCs under the UNFCCC in 2021. As this is a mandatory action under the provisions of the Paris Agreement, this cannot be counted as a capacity instrument in itself. However, the government also published new documents in its Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality as well as the Action Plan for Carbon Peaking Before 2030 in October 2021, building the core of its domestic actions towards achieving its international commitments (United Nations Development Programme 2021). This was followed up by releasing a new National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035 in May 2022, updating the previous strategy published in 2013 (Sandalow et al. 2023, 209). The mere act of publication of new documents on future mitigation and adaptation efforts signals some commitment to previously set targets.

CAT has consistently ranked China's NDCs as insufficient against modelled domestic pathways and highly insufficient against fair share, reflecting that they need substantial improvements to be consistent with the provisions of the Paris Agreement or are even less consistent and might, in fact, lead to rising emissions (Climate Action Tracker 2023a; n.d.). Even when keeping these targets in mind, China's climate actions and policies are ranked as insufficient for achieving them (Climate Action Tracker 2023a). As far as UNFCCC

discussions on climate finance are concerned, China holds that as a developing country, it has no financial obligations towards other countries (following from the concept of CBDR), in contrast to developed countries which China urged to finally fulfil their commitment to collectively pay US$100 billion in climate finance a year from 2020 (Chandrasekhar et al. 2022). Following from this position, China voiced support for a loss and damage fund at COP 26 and COP 27, without itself wanting to be a mandatory funder (Chandrasekhar et al. 2022; Evans et al. 2021; Schalatek and Roberts 2021). On the issue of fossil fuels, China backed proposals to water down language on the phase-out of coal-fired power at COP 26, and did not follow proposals for phasing down all fossil fuels at COP 27 (Singh, Sheldrick, and Browning 2021; Theseira 2022). Moreover, while it promised to stop providing international finance for building coal-fired power plants, it continues to finance fossil fuel projects abroad and invests in expanding coal capacity domestically (Heinrichs 2021; Levy, Roberts, and Heinrichs 2021). Finally, on the issue of methane, China decided not to sign up for the Global Methane Pledge proposed at COP 26 under which participants attempt to reduce global methane emissions by at least 30 % from 2020 levels by 2030, only drafting its own, yet unpublished action plan on reducing methane emissions (Lee 2022). It is worth noting that while these negotiation positions were mostly communicated through climate envoy Xie Zhenhua, his statements are here considered to belong to level two as this section focuses not on securitizing moves to impact climate security discourses but only suggested countermeasures.

In China, there is one case of a new governmental body being founded specifically to work on climate policies. In May 2021, the Chinese leadership established the LGCPN headed by then Vice-Premier Han Zheng (You 2021). While the exact influence of the leading group can hardly be determined, it is expected to work as an interministerial body bringing together top-level officials like then-vice premier Liu He, foreign minister Wang Yi, then-director of the NDRC He Lifeng, or Xie Zhenhua for better coordination of China's work towards achieving its 2030 carbon peaking and 2060 carbon neutrality targets. Accordingly, the founding of this body has not officially been connected to securitizing moves and cannot be ascribed to the eight-fold matrix. Still, China's leadership wants to signal that it is serious about keeping its 2030 and 2060 targets set by Xi Jinping in 2020.

4.2.3.3 Results China – Level three

The Ipsos survey suggests that climate change was of relatively little concern to Chinese citizens in Spring 2022 (66 % identifying it as a little or no concern, ranking last in a list of 30 countries) (Bailey 2022, 6). A majority of people also voiced to be unconcerned about its impacts on China (49 %, ranking last), with a greater number of respondents stating concern about global climate change impacts (58 %) (Bailey 2022, 7–8). The fact that survey results can only paint a momentary picture and are also highly dependent on survey design is exemplified by results from the EIB survey conducted in August 2022 in which 55 % of respondents listed climate change as one of the three biggest challenges that people in China were facing back then (ranking second after COVID-19) and a majority identified it as an

issue that has a high or some impact on their everyday life (91 %) (European Investment Bank 2023a). On first look, these results suggest a higher level of urgency attached to climate change. However, they are not only reflecting a different way of asking but were also received in a time of a combination of intense heat waves, power shortages, and floods in summer 2022 which likely impacted the perception of respondents. Only three months later, CISS asked the Chinese public how greatly they perceive certain international security threats are affecting China and concerns about climate change seemed to be overshadowed by other issues. The survey suggests that compared to eight other international security threats, such as a global pandemic, a conflict with the USA, or an international financial crisis, climate change was perceived as a relatively secondary threat (ranking second to last, even though 57 % saw it as a great or relatively great threat) (Da et al. 2023, 15). Accordingly, it is theorized that in light of other challenges, climate change is usually not yet perceived as a great threat to their everyday life by Chinese citizens. 75 % of respondents of the Ipsos survey saw a need for climate action by their government, while 88 % of respondents to the EIB survey agreed with the statement that drastic reductions of energy and goods consumption are necessary to avoid global climate catastrophe (Bailey 2022, 11; European Investment Bank 2023a). At the same time, a great majority of people seemed to both know and agree with their government's climate policies (82 %, ranking first) and were confident in its capabilities to act on climate change (85 %, ranking first) (Bailey 2022, 19, 21). The latter is also reflected in the EIB survey, in which 91 % of respondents were confident in that the Chinese government will keep its 2030 carbon goals (European Investment Bank 2023a).

Overall, the results reflect that the Chinese general public is predominantly not conceiving climate change to pose a threat to any of the three notions of security. However, the results suffice to speak of climate change being considered a general risk. The great approval of government measures on climate change suggests that the public is predominantly supporting the countermeasures proposed by the government.

4.2.3.4 Results Japan – Level two

In the case of Japan, regulatory instruments applied in the observed period of time concern updated plans under the Suga Administration in 2021. More specifically, the Suga Cabinet approved updates to the Global Warming Countermeasure Plan and the Climate Change Adaptation Plan in October 2021 to account for the updated 2030 and 2050 targets under the UNFCCC. The updated Climate Change Adaptation Plan (previous version from 2018) was drafted by the MOE and explicitly based on its 2020 Assessment Report on Climate Change Impacts in Japan (Japan Ministry of the Environment 2021b). This suggests a general willingness by Suga's Cabinet to grant MOE greater agency. The Global Warming Countermeasure Plan was published by the Cabinet and was only the second version after the original plan was published in 2016 (Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 2016).

In the observed period of time, CAT classified Japan's NDCs as almost sufficient against modelled domestic pathways and insufficient against fair share, reflecting that moderate or

substantial improvements could make them consistent with the provisions of the Paris Agreement respectively (Climate Action Tracker 2023b; n.d.). Moreover, Japan's actions and policies are deemed insufficient to reach its NDC targets, let alone stay consistent with Paris provisions (Climate Action Tracker 2023b). When it comes to major issues of contention under the UNFCCC, Japan has acknowledged its duty to provide climate finance as a developed country and has done so to a level exceeding its fair share of the total, even though most was provided in loans rather than grants (Gabbatiss and Evans 2022). At the same time, it reportedly blocked the establishment of a loss and damage instrument during COP 26 and only agreed to contribute after other rich countries had moved first at COP 27 (Chandrasekhar et al. 2022; Take and Bartlett-Imadegawa 2022; Third World Network 2021). In addition, even though Japan, too, pledged to stop financing unabated coal power abroad, it has not made similar moves on other fossil fuels where it is still heavily invested at home and abroad, nor does it seem to have signed up for a pledge to phase down all fossil fuels at COP 27 (Chandrasekhar et al. 2022; Fenning 2021; Heinrichs 2021). In contrast to that, Japan became a participant in the Global Methane Pledge proposed at COP 26 (Global Methane Pledge n.d.).

In Japan, too, there is one case of a new governmental body being founded to be integrated into the climate policymaking process. Then-PM Suga Yoshihide created an Expert Panel on Climate Change working on the promotion of climate change countermeasures in March 2021 (Global Warming Prevention Headquarters 2021, 1). The panel met on a monthly basis to "discuss climate change measures across sectors and consider policies to realize a green society from the perspective of a virtuous cycle between economy and environment" (Global Warming Prevention Headquarters 2021, 1). Therefore, while not being directly connected to securitizing moves in the texts accompanying the founding, the mere act of founding can be interpreted as an effort to strengthen political determination towards achieving countermeasures proposed by PM Suga at the time. Moreover, the report published by the expert panel in October 2021 provides a clearer picture of the message it was trying to send. It is worth noting that the Expert Panel on Climate Change seems to have been dissolved under Suga's successor PM Kishida Fumio.

4.2.3.5 Results Japan – Level three

In the observed time period from September 2020 to December 2022, there were only three bills to be debated in the Japanese Diet which concerned the perception of or proposed countermeasures against climate change. Already in November 2020, the Japanese parliament declared a "climate emergency" in a non-binding resolution with a majority vote in the House of Representatives and a unanimous vote in the House of Councillors (House of Councillors 2020; House of Representatives n.d.). The resolution directly spoke of the climate crisis and unprecedented damages caused by climate change-induced natural disasters in general, and for individuals in Japan and around the world specifically (threat to human security). It also called for greater Japanese action on the national and international level as soon as possible. Overall, the climate emergency declaration goes beyond any of the

securitizing moves initiated by actors before November 2020, signaling a willingness to accept more drastic securitization moves than had so far been raised. In March 2021, the Suga Cabinet proposed an amendment bill to the Act on Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures aiming at making the 2050 carbon neutrality target legally binding and confirming the targets set by the Paris Agreement. The bill was unanimously approved by the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors in April and May 2021 which thus approved then-PM Suga's proposed countermeasures regarding carbon neutrality and Japan's commitments under the UNFCCC (House of Councillors 2021). In February 2022, the Kishida Cabinet proposed another amendment bill to the Act on Promotion of Global Warming Countermeasures. With this move, it intended to establish a partially state-owned funding vehicle for financing decarbonization efforts of businesses. The bill was passed by a majority vote of the House of Representatives and a unanimous vote of the House of Councillors, who thus demonstrated approval at least to parts of PM Kishida's proposed countermeasures to perceived risks posed by climate change to national security (House of Councillors 2022). Interestingly, there seems to have been little objection to the discourses and countermeasures proposed by the government on the side of the legislative. It is worth mentioning, however, that updated national plans at the core of the government's action on climate change in 2021 were not to be voted on by the parliament and were directly approved by the Cabinet. This adds to remarks made about the marginal role of the LDP-dominated parliament made under 4.1.

The results of the Ipsos survey reflect that as of Spring 2022, the majority of the Japanese public was not concerned about climate change in their lives (56 % replied that they personally are only a little or not at all worried about climate change) (Bailey 2022, 6). While 69 % and 66 % of respondents voiced concern about the current impacts of climate change in Japan and abroad, only 48 % (ranking last among 30 surveyed countries) saw the need for government action to counter climate change (Bailey 2022, 7–8, 11). Moreover, only 51 % of respondents in Japan replied that they believe Japan is likely to make significant progress in fighting climate change in the coming 10 years (Bailey 2022, 21). In fact, the survey finds that only 55 % of respondents had an opinion on government policies to tackle climate change (Bailey 2022, 19).

Overall, the results reflect that a majority of the general public in Japan is not worried about climate change negatively affecting their individual lives. Accordingly, only a minority sees the need for climate actions by the government while many seem to not even be familiar with current government policies or Japan's international commitments. This suggests that a majority of citizens in Japan is still rejecting any construction of climate change as a threat to their own, national, or planetary security, and only accepts it as a general risk. This is backed by another study conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication in spring 2022 suggesting that while a majority is somewhat (53 %) or very worried (35 %) about climate change and believes that climate change will be a very serious (42 %) or somewhat serious (47 %) threat to Japan over the next 20 years, they are predominantly convinced that climate change will directly harm them only moderately, a little, or not at all

(62 %) and that it is mainly an issue of future generations (65 % believe that climate change will greatly harm future generations) (Leiserowitz et al. 2022, 49, 55, 61, 73). These perceptions might be partially explained by concerns about climate change being overshadowed by other issues (only 52 % believe that climate change action should be a very high or high priority for the government, second to last among 20 countries in the Asia-Pacific region) and by the fear that climate actions will have negative effects on the economy and job situation (48 %, the highest number among 20 countries in the Asia-Pacific region) (Leiserowitz et al. 2022, 97).

4.2.4 Preliminary Conclusion

4.2.4.1 China

In conclusion, the theorized securitizing actors on level one have made a number of threatification and riskification moves in the observed period of time (for an overview, see Table 6 in Appendix 5). It can hardly be determined to which degree they really have the agency to initiate novel and potentially disruptive discourses. However, the fact that the most detailed and urgent securitization attempts were made by experts working in the fields of climate change, diplomacy, or climate diplomacy, suggests that they are at the very least senior enough to make qualified statements on sensitive issues. Nevertheless, the individuals (Xi Jinping and Han Zheng) and bodies influenced by them analyzed on level two are most important. They do not only constitute the enabling audience whose approval is necessary for level one actors to take specific action but are in themselves powerful securitizing actors of the state. Accordingly, they will be of main interest in the ensuing analysis.

For those level two documents that are comparable across countries (national-level strategic documents and UNFCCC documents), KH Coder suggests a slightly greater prevalence of riskification in general and when it comes to the four notions of security, of which human (113; 47; 44) and planetary security (111; 32; 41) are more often invoked than non-traditional (66;17; 22) and especially traditional national security (17; six; 12). However, the qualitative analysis on level two reveals a more accurate picture. Risk language is mostly used in sections on the unclear consequences of and countermeasures against climate change, while language is repeatedly used to construct climate change as a threat, including directly for China's non-traditional national security, human security, and planetary security, but not for traditional national security as was done by Xie Zhenhua. Consequently, the analysis will mainly concentrate on threatification from now on. With KH Coder not allowing for valid number-related claims, climate change is created as a threat to non-traditional national security as it is associated with negative impacts on economic and social development. Little detail is provided about how exactly this is meant, except for two references to economic losses and endangered energy security. While not always directly referring to China itself, the threat is considered particularly large for developing countries, of which China is thought to be a part. In contrast to that, neither a threat nor a risk to traditional national security is identified on level two. As far as human security is concerned, climate change is constructed as a threat both globally and domestically. Most speech acts settle for a general reference to

human survival, while some specifically note threats to the supply of food, water, or people's property. Interestingly, there is no connection being made between climate change and infectious diseases. Finally, when it comes to planetary security, climate change is constructed as a threat for China's and global ecosystems and biodiversity several times.

Moreover, level two actors have proposed countermeasures that mainly concurred with those voiced on level one. These concern a commitment to international cooperation in bilateral and multilateral frameworks, with the latter clearly being centered on the UNFCCC and an explicit emphasis on the concept of CBDR. Pledges about carbon peaking and carbon neutrality were made in 2020 and further substantiated in 2021 and China is considered to already do its utmost, while developed countries are failing to live up to their commitments concerning financial support and technological assistance. Moreover, the definition of new NDCs and related plans and the founding of a new government body reflect some commitment to international cooperation. At the same time, China's NDCs and associated policies have been deemed insufficient, and it is unwilling to end fossil fuel support at home and abroad, to move on its position concerning mandatory climate finance and loss and damage funding by invoking CBDR, or to cooperate on the reduction of methane emissions. Accordingly, there is a case for concluding that China finds it difficult to cooperate on key issues of recent COPs and to comply with the Paris Agreement to an extent satisfying its core provisions, casting doubts on the credibility of proposed countermeasures and securitization moves overall.

So far, the general public (level three) does not seem to approve of threatification moves, while it predominantly supports the proposed measures. This in turn indicates one of two things: Either proposed countermeasures are not drastic enough to cause pushback by a public that is not feeling the same sense of urgency, or the countermeasures are sufficient enough to give the public a sense of security in the face of climate change. In any case, the actors on level two do not seem to need public approval for their attempts to portray climate change as a threat at least as long as the public is on board with the countermeasures they propose.

4.2.4.2 Japan

In Japan, too, there have been multiple attempts by actors on level one to construct climate change as a threat or risk (for an overview, see Table 7 in Appendix 5). While often settling for riskification when directly linking climate change to referent objects, a number of actors also initiated threatification moves, mainly focusing on human and national security in Japan and abroad. Confirming existing literature, the two PMs Suga and Kishida have been identified as the enabling audience for level one securitizing moves as well as powerful securitizing actors. Texts associated with them do not only concern speeches they made on various occasions, but also national-level documents published during their time in office and, in the case of former PM Suga, the report of the Expert Panel on Climate Change active during his time in office. These level two texts will be of key interest in the analysis following this section.

Interestingly, both Suga and Kishida are careful not to be too concrete in their personal remarks with the former only referring to climate change as a general threat while the latter even confines himself to riskification, only once bringing it into connection to national security (sustainability of socio-economic activities). For those level two documents that are comparable across countries (national-level strategic documents and UNFCCC documents, of which all except one were published under former PM Suga), KH Coder suggests a greater emphasis on riskification in general and when it comes to the four notions of security, of which human security (133; 38; 57) is slightly more often invoked than planetary security (121; 16; 36) and considerably more often invoked than non-traditional (48; 11; 28) and especially traditional national security (31; 14; 17). However, the qualitative analysis on level two again reveals a more complete picture. While there are occurrences of climate change being portrayed as a risk, in Japan, too, risk language is mostly used in sections on the unclear consequences of and countermeasures against climate change. Moreover, some of the documents published during the Suga Administration clearly constructed climate change as a threat to human and planetary security in Japan and abroad as well as a threat to Japan's non-traditional national security (economy and society) and a risk to other countries military-related national security. The documents published under PM Kishida add a greater concern for domestic non-traditional national security (energy supply and economy) while being rather unspecific about threats posed for military-related national security at home and abroad. Accordingly, overall, the enabling audiences in Japan sign off on attempts by MOFA and particularly MOD to portray climate change as a risk or threat to Japan's national security in a military-related sense only in single cases and do not go into detail about how exactly Japan might be affected. Climate change is more regularly portrayed as a risk or even threat to Japan's socio-economic development or energy supply. Regarding human security, climate change is repeatedly linked to human survival generally, and to adverse effects of climate change-induced natural disasters on food security, poverty, and public health in Japan and abroad more specifically. Finally, climate change is also constructed as a threat for planetary security a number of times despite being only invoked by the MOE, linking it to its impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity in Japan and globally. As a result of this discussion, for Japan, too, the focus in the upcoming chapter will mainly be on threatification.

Regarding countermeasures, the enabling audiences have generally accepted what had been proposed on level one. This included commitments to international multilateral (in particular under UNFCCC) and bilateral cooperation, calls on other major emitters to up their game, and promises to continue to take a leading role, especially through assistance, focusing on adaptation (technological and scientific cooperation as well as information sharing) and institution building. Moreover, they also reproduced calls for a broad socio-economic transformation initiated by METI and later MOE, also extending them to other countries and adding concrete pledges. Notably, the NSS published only in December 2022 is directly calling on China to do more in the realm of climate change while also urging countries to cooperate more closely through the UN-centered framework across ideological boundaries. On the one hand, Japan's favorable position on cooperating on methane emissions reductions

and strong position as an international climate financier substantiate some of the proposed countermeasures. On the other hand, its NDCs (against fair share) and associated policies have been ranked as insufficient, it is hesitant to agree to a loss and damage fund, and opposes ending support for the use of fossil fuels domestically and abroad. Therefore, Japan seems to struggle with defining NDCs in line with key provisions of the Paris Agreement and to be willing to cooperate on key issues of recent COPs only in so far as they are not considered as conflicting with other, more important goals (e.g. stable and cheap supply of energy) or help to promote broader policy objectives (e.g. socio-economic transition with progress on green technologies seen as a contributor to economic growth). This raises questions about the credibility of proposed countermeasures and securitization moves overall.

On level three, parliamentary voting behavior showed approval of proposed government measures and, through the 2020 climate emergency declaration, direct threatification of climate change for human security in Japan and beyond. However, part of the story also is that the parliament seems not to have been involved in drawing up any of the national level strategies published under Suga or Kishida. On the other hand, the majority of the general public does not conceive climate change to be an imminent threat to any of the referent objects, only accepting it as a general risk that does not warrant greater government action at the moment, though it might become an issue in the future. In fact, many people either disapprove of (25 %) or are unaware of (45 %) their government's climate policies in light of more pressing threats and a negative perception of climate change for Japan's economic situation. This suggests that the Japanese government is either slowed down by a lethargic public or, on the contrary, does not need public approval for its securitization moves and derived countermeasures.

4.3 Structured-focused Comparison

4.3.1 Preliminary Remarks

When applying the method of structured, focused comparison, the research objective is to be achieved by answering a set of general questions across cases. Consequently, these questions need to be guided by the data necessary to answer the research question of this thesis. Moreover, they need to be solidly grounded in theoretical considerations about the relationship between the variables of interest. This in turn also allows for defining a number of propositions concerning the answers that might be expected. It is worth mentioning here that none of the sub-questions focus on the relationship between political regime type and general securitization of climate change that does not mention a referent object as this has been deemed a key requirement for achieving successful securitization. Building on the sub-questions about actor-audience constellations, reference objects, and countermeasures as well as their theoretical underpinnings, and inferred propositions elaborated on in the following, sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 will answer the sub-questions in a comparative manner. This will be done under the assumption of all other independent and intervening variables staying equal.

4.3.2 Development of Sub-questions

4.3.2.1 Actors and Audiences

Following from the deliberations about the concept of securitization in the Literature Review, it is first and foremost important to turn to the relevant actors and audiences. As has been described under 2.3.3, most works on securitization processes treat the state and the institutions and individuals representing it as natural securitizing actors. While being potentially problematic, this decision has not been questioned by those who have tried to use the concept of securitization in non-democratic contexts (Hernandez and Misalucha-Willoughby 2020; Zeng 2021). They have also spent less time dissecting the potential of different state actors representing the executive (Head of State/Government, ministers, ministries) to act as securitizing actors. Accordingly, there is little foundation provided by the literature to make claims about the diversity and power constellations on the side of state actors in non-democratic systems. However, while even authoritarian regimes see the need for input from a number of state actors more familiar with certain subjects, previous research generally suggests that their potential to make honest suggestions diminishes as does their ability to convince the leader of potentially novel ideas the greater the level of personalism is (Frantz et al. 2020, 373–74; Weeks 2012, 329–31). On the contrary, in democracies, decision makers are believed to be confronted with potentially differing perceptions of a number of actors as part of the state apparatus (Kameyama and Ono 2021, 275–78; Koppenborg and Hanssen 2021, 54–56).

In contrast to that, the audience has seen more attention from those applying securitization to non-democratic contexts. Here, researchers have generally acknowledged that the enabling audience can be the state or party elite as others are not in a position to serve in this role (Nyman and Zeng 2016, 303; Trombetta 2019, 103). Previous research suggests that it is particularly difficult for societies in personalist regimes to form environmental non-governmental organizations, while it is comparatively easier for those in single-party regimes (Böhmelt 2014, 459–64). On the contrary, works focusing on democracies have generally acknowledged a greater number of potential audiences, including the general public or the legislative (Roe 2008). This reflects the conception that the spectrum of potentially competing opinions is considerably larger in democracies, for which reason decision makers have to take into account a greater number of audiences.

Based on these considerations, two sub-questions will be asked about actor-audience constellations. *Firstly, how does political system type affect which state actors are in a position to be securitizing actors? And secondly, how does political system type affect who can be part of the enabling audience, i.e. the audience who is in a position to enable the securitizing actor to take specific action?*

4.3.2.2 Climate Change and National Security

When contemplating perceptions of national security, it is reasonable to start with discussing what scholars hold to be ultimate concerns of the regimes in power. In this regard, Debs and

Goemans (2010, 432–34) demonstrate that overall, democratic leaders are less likely to face punishment after leaving office compared to non-democratic leaders who often lose office through violent means. Adding to this insight, Escribà-Folch (2013, 172–78) distinguishes between different types of authoritarian regimes and shows that among authoritarian regimes, personalist leaders are most likely to be killed, go into exile, or be imprisoned than other types of regimes, whereas leaders of single-party regimes are most likely to enjoy non-violent replacement without subsequent punishment. In addition to facing a greater cost of losing office, leaders in non-democratic countries are also believed to be confronted with a greater number of non-institutionalized domestic threats to their political survival (Pilster and Böhmelt 2012; Svolik 2012). Therefore, those in power go to great lengths to maintain domestic stability and secure national security. With violence and repression being believed to constitute key features of authoritarian regimes, Chestnut Greitens (2016, 30–36) argues that only if regimes have sufficiently guarded against coups do they create more unitary and inclusive coercive institutions to protect against popular unrest. The former can in particular be achieved by linking the fate of security elites more closely to that of the leader or increasing the informational advantage of the leader over security elites (Song 2022, 212–14). Again, there are also differences among authoritarian regimes. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014, 322–26) and Geddes (1999, 140–42) assert that leaders in personalist regimes need to be particularly concerned about some form of mostly domestic overthrow. Moreover, they also claim that a change in personalist leadership almost always leads to regime change (including to other types of authoritarian regimes) while single-party regimes can often survive with different leaders. Therefore, personalist leaders tend to invest more in coop-proofing, including through more fragmented and dependent security apparati (Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster 2020, 374–75).

Understandably, these differences are believed to affect decision making in a wide variety of policy fields. Especially in cases in which the greatest internal security threat stems from the public rather than the elite, strong government performance (including on economic growth or access to basic necessities) is necessary to ensure legitimacy and continued support for the regime (Nathan 2020, 164–66). Moreover, authoritarian regimes are particularly vulnerable to sudden drops in legitimacy in the face of national and international crises, while democratic systems often experience chronic public dissatisfaction that is only seldomly reaching worrying levels (Nathan 2020, 164–66). Again, economic downturns are believed to be of greater concern to personalist regimes when compared to single-party regimes (Geddes 1999, 135–38). As a consequence, closed authoritarian regimes (no elections, ban on the opposition, use of repression, no free media and civil society) are believed to rely heavily on performance-based (i.e. fulfilment of societal demands regarding material welfare or security) and identity-based (i.e. ideology (e.g. related to nationalism or religion) or personalism) legitimation strategies (von Soest and Grauvogel 2017, 298–99). Performance, in particular, has been identified as key for the Chinese party-state's legitimacy in the past (Yang and Zhao 2015).

The points made above indicate that authoritarian regimes, and in particular personalist ones, are preoccupied with domestic threats to their political survival to a greater degree than democracies. Therefore, they arguably have a greater need for ensuring their legitimacy which is closely dependent on their performance in fulfilling demands for material well-being and security. Consequently, authoritarian regimes are likely to consider the effects of climate change on national security mainly on the domestic level, where it might affect fulfilling these legitimacy-related demands. Depending on the regime's needs, this can result in portraying climate change as a concerning or supporting factor. On the other hand, democracies might be expected to show greater concern for the destabilizing effects of climate change on social orders abroad which might also become problematic for their own national interests through aggravating large-scale migration movements or terrorism.

Following from the discussions in this section, the following sub-question will be discussed in the structured, focused comparison: *How does political regime type affect the perception of climate change effects on national security?*

4.3.2.3 Climate Change and Human Security

Theorizing the extent to which regime type affects the perception of climate change effects on human security leads to the question of how great the concern for human security is thought to be in general. Previous research has found that democracies should fare better in ensuring human security within their borders (Joshi 2009). This relationship is relatively weak overall, but significant when comparing regimes with strong institutions and bureaucracies (Piccone 2017b, 9–11). Reasons provided for this proposition are related to greater degree of integration of different groups of the civil society in the policymaking process as well as a more transparent, accountable, and uncorrupt bureaucracy based on the rule of law (Norris 2012, 187–88; Piccone 2017a, 2–3). Accordingly, there is a case for expecting a greater concern for the consequences a non-traditional and cross-national security issue like climate change can have for human security at least on the domestic level in democracies compared to autocracies.

The case is more complicated when considering the concern for human security abroad. Acharya (2001, 15–18) raised the notion that actions targeted at advancing human security abroad can be difficult to accept for regimes that see it as undermining the principle of non-interference through its association with humanitarian intervention, that is military intervention in another state unauthorized by local authorities with the objective of preventing human security infringements. There have also been concerns about democracies' overarching interest in foreign interference to promote democracy (Kutz 2014). However, even if human security of individuals and communities is of interest, there is a case for expecting greater concern by democracies. In fact, while there has been scarce evidence for actively connecting financial or diplomatic support to reforms of governance in the recipient country by authoritarian regimes that promote the norm of non-intervention like China, their actions still have an effect on recipients, in that they do not push for transparency, human rights, or the rule of law, all aspects that speak for a top-down approach focusing on leaders

instead of a real interest in human security of individuals and communities (Ginsburg 2021). Consequently, democracies are again expected to show greater concern for the consequences of climate change on human security abroad.

Based on these deliberations, the following sub-question will be addressed in the structured, focused comparison: *How does political system type affect the perception of climate change effects on human security?*

4.3.2.4 Climate Change and Planetary Security

There is no direct way of measuring to what degree regime type affects the perception of climate change effects on planetary security. As planetary security is concerned with a healthy environment and intact biodiversity and ecosystems, some conclusions can be drawn by looking at how regime type is connected to climate policy actions and their outcomes (e.g. emission levels). Here, Bättig and Bernauer (2009, 302–3) find that while democracy has a positive effect on levels of political commitment to climate change mitigation (policy output), there is very limited support for the claim that higher levels of democracy result in lower levels of emissions. These findings are backed by Lachappelle and Paterson (2013) and Hu et al. (2021). Based on these findings using emission levels as a proxy for concerns about planetary security, there cannot be made conclusive predictions on how regime type affects the perception of climate change effects on planetary security. The findings for policy output only indicate that democracies show greater commitment to counter climate change on paper. However, this does not suffice to expect greater concern for the impacts of climate change on planetary security.

Based on this section's discussion, the structured, focused comparison will include the sub-question: *How does political system type affect the perception of climate change effects on planetary security?*

4.3.2.5 Countermeasures in the Realm of Climate Diplomacy

While democracies are in general seen as faring better in international cooperation (Hartmann 2022), Mattes and Rodríguez (2014) argue that there are also differences among authoritarian regimes. More specifically, they claim that single-party regimes are advantaged in international cooperation with other authoritarian regimes and democracies compared to personalist regimes as they show greater resemblance with democracies in characteristics like greater leader accountability or lower policy flexibility. Kneuer (2022, 98–100) adds the observation that the phenomenon of eroding democracy seems to correlate with exiting international cooperation frameworks which suggests a smaller interest in multilateralism. However, authoritarian regimes, too, engage in international cooperation. Von Soest (2015, 628–30) claims that when doing so they are driven by self-serving considerations regarding geopolitical concerns about spheres of influence or access to energy and natural resources, so as to secure regime survival. This suggests a marked difference in underlying factors of international cooperation compared to active and normative, democracy-promoting involvement seen by democracies.

When it comes to international negotiations, some believe that authoritarian regimes have broader win-sets as they face less domestic opposition in what they can agree to (Garriga 2009, 705–7; Odell and Tingley 2013, 155). This is the case even though audience costs, the punishments leaders have to expect from their citizens when backing down from international commitments or threats, also exist in authoritarian regimes (Li and Chen 2021; Weeks 2008). What follows from this is that authoritarian regimes, and in particular party-based personalist regimes with weak domestic audiences, might have a disadvantage during negotiations (meaning that they can more easily enter into agreements) and might find it easier to pull out of agreements (meaning that they are less likely to comply with what they have signed) (Chyzh 2014, 21–22). On the contrary, democracies should be in a less favorable position to sign agreements but in a better position to stick to the commitments they have made.

At this point, it makes sense to become more specific and focus on international cooperation on the issue of climate change, that is climate diplomacy, in particular. For the purposes of this thesis, climate diplomacy is understood to encompass the negotiation of and compliance with international climate agreements. The former refers to the negotiation positions concerning four key topics of the two COPs that took place during the observed period of time (COP 26 in November 2021 and COP 27 in November 2022), i.e. the issues of climate finance, loss and damage, fossil fuel phase-out, and methane emissions reductions. The latter covers the evaluation of actual policy outputs, i.e. a country's NDCs under the UNFCCC and the policies and actions taken to achieve these NDCs. In this realm, scholars have found that democracies show better commitment and compliance when it comes to multilateral environmental agreements (Carbonell and Allison 2015, 89; Neumayer 2002, 156). However, these agreements are less likely to be characterized by hard law (obligatory and precise commitments) (Böhmelt and Butkutė 2018, 363–65). Similarly, Bailer and Weiler (2015, 57–60) found that while democracies have shown greater willingness to cooperate on less costly issues like compensation funds, they are more unwilling to commit to explicit emission reduction targets. Finally, democracies also tend to use fewer hard negotiation strategies if their economic status is accounted for, but can still be pressured to use them by powerful domestic interest groups (Bailer 2012, 546). Another factor that has been repeatedly raised as impacting the willingness of countries to enter into and comply with international agreements on climate change is pressure faced by third countries (Harrison and McIntosh Sundstrom 2010, 18–20; Rong 2010, 4587–90; Wu 2018, 61–63, 75). However, these works have not tried to measure the extent of pressures, let alone compare them across regime type. Still, regime type is also likely to affect the decision of third countries to put pressure on countries to adopt favorable climate policies.

In summary, a number of conclusions can be drawn about the effect of regime type on the willingness to internationally cooperate on climate change. In general, democracies are expected to show greater interest in multilateral cooperation compared to single-party regimes and in particular personalist authoritarian regimes, whose interest is mainly driven by concerns about regime survival. At the same time, personalist regimes are thought to be

in a better position to enter into and in a worse position to comply with international agreements when compared to single-party regimes and democracies. However, this does not seem to transfer into the realm of environmental issues, where democracies have shown more commitment (also through negotiation strategies) and better compliance, even though the agreements they signed are characterized by less hard law and a focus on measures they deem to be less costly to themselves. Consequently, democracies are expected to show greater willingness to enter into and comply with international agreements on climate change, whereas authoritarian regimes might be willing to sign more hard-law treaties. Foreign pressure is expected to play a key role in the willingness to cooperate.

Following from the discussion above, the sixth and final sub-question the structured, focused comparison will answer is: *How does political system type affect the willingness to internationally cooperate on climate change?*

4.3.3 Discussion of Sub-questions

4.3.3.1 Actors and Audiences

China

Given the highly opaque nature of policymaking in China, assessing power relations within the party-state and between the party-state and the public is far from easy. Nevertheless, looking at various aspects of the type of regime in China allows for explaining and substantiating the claims made on how it might affect actor and audience constellations.

As described above, public officials in China operate with low transparency, predictability, or respect of non-arbitrary laws. Moreover, the executive is poorly held in check by the national legislature, and even less so by an independent judiciary, reflecting that there is no separation of powers. These indicators alone reflect the immense power held by the executive which can make decisions relatively independent from the scrutiny of other institutions of the state. Within the executive, the trend from single-party to personalist rule observed is likely to reduce the number of state actors that are in the position to be relevant securitizing actors. Even in regimes with a growing number of personalist traits, there is the need for expert input. However, to avoid cases of public disagreement, deliberations between experts and their superiors tend to take place behind closed doors to an even greater extent and opinions held by potential securitizing actors are likely to more and more converge with what actors believe their superiors want to hear, forming a self-enforcing bubble. These trends even cover the security apparatus, which is increasingly dependent on the leader, both because of the latter's information advantage and through being linked to the leader's fate. Consequently, agency to initiate securitizing moves shifts to an ever-smaller number of individuals higher up the party-state hierarchy.

A similar trend can be observed with regard to the enabling audience, where the power to make decisions about whether concrete actions to counter a threat or risk should be taken is also increasingly held in the hands of the few. Without free and fair elections of the chief executive or legislative, the suppression and exclusion of independent political interest

groups, let alone opposition parties, and poor media freedom and freedom of expression, non-state actors already lose most of their channels to credibly influence securitization processes through signaling their interests in elections or other ways. This is only aggravated by the violation of civil rights, access to justice, and the overall unequal access to power and rights. Influencing policymaking processes through corruptive practices, which are arguably still present in China, is unlikely to be a means broadly accessible to the general public. Again, even leaders in authoritarian regimes have to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. However, discussed regime characteristics indicate that the public cannot act as an enabling audience in China, who can make honest judgements about securitization moves that can initiate or prevent far-reaching climate policies.

Processes linking regime type and actor-audience constellations might become more pronounced along with the shift from single-party to personalist rule underway in China, which is thought to result in more repression, including through censorship. This leads to the situation of the most important securitizing actors and the enabling audience being essentially part of the same group, which is getting increasingly smaller as a result of Xi Jinping's drive for centralization.

Japan

Even within the powerful executive, decision makers are confronted with differing perceptions of a number of actors. While in the past, input regarding climate policies mainly came from MOE and METI, MOFA and MOD now also seem to be increasingly interested in shaping the perception of climate change as a security issue. Given high levels of governmental transparency and a low probability of corruption, they also are in a better position to actually have an influence and pursue non-selfish objectives. In this way, MOE, MOFA, METI, and, to a lesser extent, MOD succeed in adding to the climate security discourse in Japan. Still, like in the past, the final call about the securitization of climate change in the Japanese executive is made by the PM and his Cabinet Office (Koppenborg and Hanssen 2021; Yamada 2021). Through their speech acts, they then become powerful potential securitizing actors themselves.

On the side of the audiences to these speech acts, the mid-level indices and indicators suggest an important role to play by the legislative and public. Concerning the former, the Japanese executive is held in check by the legislative to a large degree. Moreover, there are free and fair multiparty elections featuring independent opposition parties that are free from repression or intimidation by the ruling regime. This suggests that the executive is not the only institution of the Japanese state that is relevant in securitization processes and is at least in theory bound to approval for some of its securitization moves by a legislative that depicts the whole spectrum of perspectives held by the public. However, an exceptionally strong role played by the LDP-led executive in initiating and shaping legislative processes alongside the LDP-dominated and relatively weak legislative explains its capability to decide on securitization processes and related policies without fear of being denied by the parliament. Accordingly, in practice, the position of the legislative as an enabling audience

for securitizing moves initiated by the government is severely restricted. Regarding the latter, the indices and indicators also suggest a strong role of the public as an audience. In the face of an almost fully free and unconstrained landscape for civil society organizations, respected freedom of expression and civil rights, and broad access to justice as well as legal transparency, predictability, and equal treatment of most groups of society, the general public should be in a good position to actively communicate their views and impact securitization processes. However, in reality, voter apathy, the LDP's valence advantage, and a moderate share of politically active citizens, lead to a not fully independent media landscape and fewer citizens being integrated into the policymaking process. It also explains why the government is in no dire need to gain public approval for its securitization moves, implying a diminished role of the public as an enabling audience.

In summary, while there is indeed a greater number of relevant securitizing actors in Japan, the parliament and general public only play a limited role in accepting securitizing moves by the government due to country-specific peculiarities diminishing their importance in the light of a powerful executive.

4.3.3.2 Climate Change and National Security

China

Following from the analyzed indicators of the electoral and participatory components of regime type, one can conclude that in the authoritarian Chinese regime without free and fair elections, banned opposition parties, and the general repression of the freedom of independent expression of large parts of the civil society, including through censorship, there are few channels for those unsatisfied with decisions made by the leadership to express their grievances. This does not mean that these grievances just wither away. On the contrary, combined with a situation in which at least leaders higher up the hierarchy cannot be sure about the authenticity of the information they get, they have to fear an increasing risk of sudden, domestic outbursts of disagreement in the event of a crisis that might threaten regime survival. This makes them particularly concerned about their legitimacy and explains their focus on performance-based and identity-based legitimation strategies. Again, with the rise of personalism, these fears and counterstrategies are believed to increase along with decision making becoming more directly bound to personal preferences of a shrinking circle or individuals. As a matter of fact, Xi Jinping has made national security a key paradigm in the light of increasingly severe threat perceptions (Drinhausen and Legarda 2022, 2). This includes paying greater attention to other non-traditional security concerns besides economic growth and energy security. Climate change has been acknowledged as being part of these both directly and in relation to societal development through what China calls ecological security addressed by the concept of ecological civilization (生态文明) introduced at the 18th Party Congress in 2018 (Joseph and Karackattu 2022, 13062; Xinhua 2017).

Overall, this might help to understand the focus on impacts of climate change on economic and social development, covering economic growth and energy security, understood to be

worrisome for China. Performance-related indicators are largely considered to have been the most important tool to guarantee regime stability in China for several decades (Hernandez and Misalucha-Willoughby 2020, 16–20). For much of this time, efforts to reduce emissions were seen primarily as an unwelcome cost factor. However, the significant contribution of these priorities to immense environmental degradation and the associated pushback by civil society resulted in a certain change of thinking and a greater willingness to consider their security implications (Trombetta 2019, 107–11). Similarly important here was the realization that China could not possibly uphold double-digit growth dependent on investments and exports. Domestic innovation in high-end technologies and efficiency upgrading is now hoped to be the driving force of the next phase of economic development. In addition, it is also hoped to alleviate long-held concerns about energy security, allowing for a larger concern for sustainability in industry and energy.

On the contrary, threats or risks posed by climate change for traditional, military-related national security have not been invoked by the enabling audience in China. This suggests that they were still considered as secondary to issues more directly threatening regime survival by decision makers. Besides those situated on the domestic level, this of course also includes traditional national security concerns related to an increasingly tense relation with the USA and its allies, including the situation regarding Taiwan.

Japan

Japan's performance on the indicators measuring its performance on electoral, liberal, and egalitarian components of democracy suggests that the state should represent a great portion of societal groups in an impartial, transparent, and verifiable way. Moreover, the country's leaders can be relatively unconcerned about being ousted from power through other means than peaceful elections, which would also only have consequences for the professional careers of individuals. As a consequence, state leaders should have relatively great capacities to also shift their focus to international security issues and less on mainly convincing the public of their legitimacy through legitimation strategies emphasizing their performance regarding the provision of material welfare and basic necessities alone. However, the actual outcome can be partially explained by looking at the unique role of the LDP. Its position at the head of a strong executive, its dominance of a legislative characterized by weak opposition, as well as its relatively uncontested stance in elections, imply that the LDP is facing only limited legislative and public constraints and a generally low probability of losing power.

Under these circumstances, the LDP-led executive can follow its preferences, which can even go against public opinion (Incerti and Lipscy 2018). The LDP has been described as a conservative, nationalist party, which is prioritizing concerns about economic growth and a strong relationship with the US in the light of domestic economic troubles, a challenging energy security situation, and traditional security concerns (D'Ambrogio 2020, 9). With regards to economic and energy issues, this has led to policy being made in a triangle consisting of the business-friendly METI, Keidanren (the largest and most influential

Japanese business federation), and the state bureaucracy, which often resulted in seeing action on climate change as a burden for the economy through increasing costs for businesses, including through driving up energy prices (Tiberghien 2023, 58–59). Only toward the end of the Abe administration in 2020, there were efforts to demonstrate that mitigation can be compatible with economic growth and that Japan could assume a greater role in the international fight against climate change (Koppenborg and Hanssen 2021, 55). This more positive framing of climate change mitigation as a driver of economic growth seems to have been upheld by former PM Suga and current PM Kishida, even though they are still struggling to form an unambiguous stance on climate change (Johnston 2022; Tiberghien 2023, 55–58). In any case, the LDP leadership is still looking at climate change actions mainly through the lens of its effects on businesses and energy supply. On the other hand, the US-Japan alliance is both a crucial part of and determinant driving Japan's perception of its military-related security environment. Here, it feels traditionally uncomfortable due to its vicinity to nuclear-armed powers North Korea and China. In recent years the outlook on both has grown even more grim, culminating in the publication of an updated NSS in 2022 framing the significant increase of Japan's defense budget to 2 % of GDP by 2027 (Sakaki 2023). Overall, the existence of these aspects has likely contributed to rendering climate change a minor concern in a military-related sense.

4.3.3.3 Climate Change and Human Security

China

In general, China's performance on the four components of regime type with lacking representation and integration of the civil society in the policymaking process as well as low transparency or regard for civil rights, paired with circumstances that can still allow corruption to take place all suggest a limited concern for the concept of human security putting individuals first. As a matter of fact, in their efforts to promote its own version of socialist democracy, China's leaders clarify that they are acting according to the true will of the majority of people (i.e. providing order, prosperity, and security) rather than emphasizing the personal interests of each and every individual (Holbig 2023, 269–75). The trend towards personalist rule is expected to further put a strain on human security with an ever-smaller self-enforcing bubble of leaders putting their own interests first. Moreover, China's more dominant posture on the international stage under Xi Jinping came along with a shift away from strict adherence to the concept of non-interference (Duchâtel, Bräuner, and Hang 2014). However, any foreign involvement that is not targeted at inducing changes in the target country is likely to operate in support of the regime and institutions in place, demonstrating an explicitly state-centered, top-down approach even in the case of humanitarian actions (Gonzalez-Vicente 2016; Po and Sims 2022).

Still, the actual outcome shows that the Chinese government is actively linking climate change to human security and is repeatedly constructing climate change as a threat to human security in China and abroad. To understand this puzzle, it helps to draw on observations by Breslin (2015, 259–60) and Trombetta (2019, 104) who argue that human security has been

taken up in Chinese politics and academia but not without being "sinicized" first. In this process, the focus of human security on the individual and its rights was replaced with that on the collective group of people or even humanity. In addition, the state is portrayed as the only actor who can guarantee human security which is not conceived as separate from national security but a key component of it. While it is not fully clear what kind of measures might be taken in the face of this domestically and internationally, they are thought to be guided by concerns about regime stability in the light of challenges to its capability to deliver on behalf of the public rather than about those of individuals and their everyday lives.

Japan

Japan's ranking on indicators measuring the electoral, liberal, and egalitarian components of regime type as well as the extent and likelihood of corruption suggests a broader representation of more social groups in policymaking, and greater transparency and accountability on the side of the government. As elaborated on in section 4.3.2.3, these are all aspects that have been connected to better human security levels before. At the same time, its weaker ranking on values measuring the participatory component of regime type and country-specific peculiarities with a strong LDP-led government that can govern without great concern about the opposition or public grievances could cast doubt on this relationship. Yet, under the influence of the MOE, MOFA, and their ministers, Japan's government seems to have made the decision to connect climate change to human security and even construct it as a threat in Japan and abroad.

It is worth noting that ever since the UNDP defined human security for the first time in 1994, Japan has been a strong promoter of this concept, including in its role as a provider of humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters (Kameyama and Ono 2021, 276). Human security was welcomed as a reconceptualized, explicitly non-militaristic notion that suited the wish of the Japanese government to strengthen its image as a responsible international actor (Dollah et al. 2023, 156–57). Even today, with the principle of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific guiding Japan's foreign policy, the protection of human security plays a key role (Odeyemi and Sekiyama 2022, 16–17). However, in the past, the Japanese government did not specifically draw the line between natural disasters and climate change (Kameyama and Ono 2021, 278). The fact that this has now changed might be most closely related to peer-pressure from other liberal democracies and a successful case by the MOFA and MOE about low costs associated with further developing the concept of human security to keep the role of a key player in humanitarian aid provision in the Indo-Pacific. Still, suggested countermeasures mainly focus on adaptation instead of mitigation (see section 4.2.2.3). This also helps understand why the securitization of climate change for human security is extended to the domestic level. Here too, adaptation is the main response of choice, building on a strong foundation of natural disaster response mechanisms without directly necessitating tougher action on mitigation.

4.3.3.4 Climate Change and Planetary Security

China

Inferring how the securitization of climate change for planetary security in authoritarian regimes might differ from that in democracies is not straightforward. As elaborated on below, there have not been identified significant differences across regime type when it comes to emission cuts. At the same time, some expect that democratic advantages identified for climate policy outputs will translate into better performance on policy outcomes in the longer term (Bättig and Bernauer 2009, 304–5; Hu et al. 2021, 257–60). They base their claims on the greater need for the government to take into account the interests of a broader number of social groups as well as greater freedoms for environmental NGOs to influence policymaking. Adding to this, the observed performance of China on liberal, electoral, participatory, and egalitarian components of regime type as well as the indicators measuring the extent to which corruption can exist, also suggest that ways to impact policymaking via the legal system are hardly accessible while opaque means to do so exist but are more likely to be used by groups representing emitter interests with access to greater financial resources. Along with the personalist rise of Xi Jinping, the leadership group will arguably further lose the capacity to act on the true grievances of the public and thus increasingly prefer to act on more direct threats to regime survival. Accordingly, there is a theoretical case, albeit a less clear one, for expecting weaker concern for the consequences of climate change for planetary security in authoritarian regimes, at least on the domestic level.

Consequently, the actual situation observed is likely to be caused by other factors. Here, the regime's need for legitimizing its rule might again help to find an explanation. Already in 2014, then-Premier Li Keqiang declared a "war on pollution" after the extent and consequences of severe air pollution became more visible to the Chinese public (Trombetta 2019, 108–9). However, the securitization of air pollution was not driven by concerns about planetary security per se, but explicitly by its potential to negatively affect social stability and in turn national security (Nyman and Zeng 2016, 5–6). Similarly, the observed securitization of climate change for planetary security seems to be, in fact, part of the CCP's efforts to promote the "securitization of everything" (Drinhausen and Legarda 2022, 4), as pushed for under Xi Jinping's framework of comprehensive national security. Being a key component of identity-based legitimation strategies, a broad national security concept covering planetary security pays note to China's position as a country highly vulnerable to climate change and suggests that the Chinese government feels certain that it is an issue that could cause public dissatisfaction and that it can deliver on it. As a consequence, even though the underlying cause for securitizing the impact of climate change on planetary security is unlikely to be real concern for the natural environment, the Chinese government should now be compelled to deliver visible results in countering this threat. Against this backdrop, extending the securitization of climate change for planetary security to other countries is a relatively cheap action. Not only does it signal China's attention to concerns faced by other countries, but it also does not increase pressure on China to act. Instead, through its

messaging in climate diplomacy, blame is shifted to other countries, while China is portrayed as a common victim.

Japan

Looking at Japan's good performance on electoral, liberal, and egalitarian components of regime type and the possible prevalence of corruption, one could expect a relatively high concern for planetary security. These claims are based on a better representation of more diverse interests, greater freedoms to formulate and communicate opinions deviating from government positions, and the possibility to transparently influence the government via an independent legal system as opposed to opaque, and possibly corrupt means (Bättig and Bernauer 2009, 285–91; Hu et al. 2021, 257–60). At the same time, Japan's relatively weak civil society which is governed by a strong LDP-led government virtually unchallenged by other political actors, is believed to weaken considerations about climate change effects on planetary security by affecting both demand-side and institutional factors (Hu et al. 2021, 260–64; Lachapelle and Paterson 2013, 555–60).

How then does Japan's regime type help to understand the willingness of its government to construct climate change as a threat for domestic and international planetary security? Given that domestic incentives apart from pleasing the MOE seem to be rather low, pressures to behave in the observed way seem to come mainly from abroad. In its desire to be perceived as a responsible global actor, the Japanese government does not want to come across as outright ignoring the impact climate change can have on the planet and living beings. Besides, as long as it can uphold its preference for adaptation over mitigation, constructing a threat for planetary security on the domestic level is likely to be caused by low costs associated with adding the climate change factor to previously existing policies targeted at protecting planetary security from natural disasters, instead of a real change in threat perceptions on the side of the government.

4.3.3.5 Countermeasures in the Realm of Climate Diplomacy

China

China's performance on the four determinants of democracy included in the analysis of regime type indicates that large parts of society and of the de jure state apparatus are in no position to have a direct, transparent influence on government decision making, while there still seem to be ways for impacting policymaking without public scrutiny offered by the channel of corruption. What is more, repressions on civil society, control of the media, and opaque governance all curtail the free forming of opinion and make it difficult to even have a subjective opinion that is not significantly shaped by government propaganda. These circumstances suggest that the Chinese government is generally in a good position to both control and navigate public opinion on climate change and that it can act more freely according to its own preferences. As a consequence of the personalist rise, these capabilities can be affected in complex ways, but the government's behavior is generally expected to be

guided by preferences of an ever-smaller circle of individuals detached from the real concerns of the public.

These preferences in turn are believed to be defined by the ultimate concern about issues considered to more directly threaten regime survival and less by concerns about providing public goods and general welfare, i.e. taking into consideration the benefits of climate actions for the whole society (Bailer and Weiler 2015, 46–48; Chyzh 2014, 8–9). This can help understand why the Chinese government has been rather uncooperative on specific issues like fossil fuel phase-out or methane emission reductions, and has defined NDCs that can be defined as insufficient for reaching the targets of the Paris Agreement. Grasping why it still conforms with the basic provisions of the UNFCCC framework and, in fact, emphasizes the importance of international cooperation and its own proactive contributions, again requires focusing on the means applied to achieve regime legitimacy. As previously mentioned, with slowing economic growth and a rise in personalism, there comes a greater need to rely on identity-based legitimation strategy. As a matter of fact, calling on nationalist pride and demonstrating international strength, including through recognition as a responsible global actor and taking a more unwavering position in international negotiations, can be a means to achieve legitimacy. This helps understand the language on countermeasures in the realm of climate diplomacy used in Chinese securitization discourses. Here, the Chinese government consistently points to its position as a developing country that is strongly committed to international cooperation on climate change, is already doing as much as it can, and is not obliged to do more on some issues and allowed to do less on others by the concept of CBDR. It also shifts the blame for the lack of progress in climate negotiations and actions to developed countries. Internationally, this language is also used to counter pressures by developed democracies and prevent those from developing countries. Moreover, legitimacy concerns also explain why the Chinese government should be interested in defining NDC targets it can achieve. The observed shortcomings in achieving set goals are thus likely to be cleared out in the coming years.

Japan

Japan's strong performance on most indicators included for the elective, liberal, and egalitarian components of regime type suggests that large parts of society, the legislative, and judiciary are in a position to influence policymaking in a transparent way through freely communicating their opinions and express their will that can theoretically conflict with the position of the government. This would imply the need for greater government responsiveness to larger parts of the population, suggesting pressure to provide public goods and less conflictive negotiation positions on climate change (Bailer 2012, 538–39, 544–46). At the same time, this would also suggest greater audience costs, compelling the Japanese government to only select itself into agreements it can fulfil. These are thus likely to be characterized by less hard law (Böhmelt and Butkutė 2018, 363–65). However, these considerations can only partially explain Japan's climate diplomacy countermeasures as part of its securitization moves.

There are a number of aspects working against the effects described above. Japan's weaker position concerning the participatory component of regime type shows that policymaking lacks inclusiveness in Japan, decreasing the pressure for the government to pay attention to the preferences of the median voter (Bailer and Weiler 2015, 47–50). This effect is exaggerated by an executive that is outpowering the legislative characterized by weak opposition, voter apathy (in general and about governmental climate policies in particular), and the LDP's valence advantage that result in a situation in which the LDP-led government has relatively great leeway to make decisions without constantly worrying about the opinion of the general public. It also means low audience costs when making decisions on its climate policies, which should make it easier for the government to neglect provisions set by the agreements it signed up to but also enable it to more easily sign up for international agreements. This latter effect, however, is offset by less pressure to achieve international agreements on the public good of climate change and specific preferences by the LDP-led government. Despite a more positive framing of climate change actions and their effects on economic growth under former PM Suga and PM Kishida, willingness to cooperate on and comply with climate agreements seems to still be present only in so far as they are not considered to conflict with other, more important goals (e.g. stable and cheap supply of energy) or help to promote broader policy objectives (e.g. socio-economic transition with progress on green technologies seen as a contributor to economic growth). Ironically, government action may also be slowed down by efforts of previous LDP governments to portray climate action as negatively affecting economic growth and job stability in Japan, still a widely held perception of the public.

Simultaneously, the Japanese government, too, sees the need to conform with the basic provisions of the UNFCCC framework and to communicate its commitment to international cooperation. It even opts to promise taking a leading role and to call on other major emitters to double down on their actions against climate change. As the government faces limited domestic pressure to gain legitimacy, these messages are likely to be targeted at an international audience. More specifically, Japan seems to mainly care about the views, actions, and pressures of the US, as can be seen by a rare instance of directly calling out China to be more proactive on climate change, and to a lesser degree other G7 member states and Northeast Asian neighbors (Koppenborg and Hanssen 2021, 55; Tiberghien 2023, 61).

4.3.4 Summary and Comparison

As demonstrated above, analyzed aspects of the securitization of climate change in China have been influenced in complex ways. As far as relevant state actors are concerned, weak values on the liberal component of regime type clarify that the executive is virtually free to decide on whether to initiate securitization moves. Moreover, the personalist rise under Xi Jinping is arguably limiting the number of relevant actors within the executive to an ever-smaller group of people higher up the party-state hierarchy. At the same time, China's performance on the four components of regime type indicates that neither the de jure legislative nor the public can act as enabling audiences, similarly narrowing them down.

Accordingly, as a byproduct of the personalist rise, relevant actors and the enabling audiences tend to be part of the same shrinking group of individuals and institutions representing it. Leaving aside the personalist rise that has not yet been recognized by scholars applying the concept of securitization to China, the dual role of political elites as both actors and audiences has been noted in the literature (Zeng 2021, 422–24). In Japan, too, regime type has been found to have a complex impact on securitization processes regarding the issue of climate change. Firstly, being a liberal democracy there is a greater number of state actors that can play a relevant role in securitizing climate change. However, the roles of the most powerful actors as well as the enabling audiences are held by the PM and his Cabinet Office, including through their influence on the publication of important national-level documents. Despite its strong performance on the electoral, liberal, and egalitarian components of regime type, the role of the legislative as an enabling audience is severely restricted by a strong LDP-led executive that is virtually unchallenged in the parliament. Similarly, the general public can also hardly be perceived as an enabling audience given its weak integration in the policymaking process amid voter apathy and the LDP's valence advantage. This is an interesting result that challenges widely held, but often unquestioned assumptions of actor-audience constellations in liberal democracies that are supposedly characterized by the need to at least convince either the legislative or the public, if not both.

China's weak ranking on electoral and participatory components of regime type is also related to its securitization of climate change for national security. Here, leaders have to constantly worry about sudden outbursts of disagreement in an environment in which there are few unsanctioned channels to express grievances. Along with the personalist rise, these fears are bound to increase, implying a strong dependence on performance-based and identity-based legitimation strategies. This helps understand why climate change is constructed as a threat for economic and social development as well as attempts to shed a more positive light on industrial innovation in the field of green technologies and energy efficiency. On the contrary, climate change is not constructed as a traditional, military-related threat to national security, suggesting that other aspects are considered as more immanent dangers for regime survival. At first sight, Japan's regime type, theoretically characterized by a broader representation of social groups and lower fear of losing office, should allow for a greater focus on international security issues. However, being able to govern without major constraints by the legislative and public allows the LDP to concentrate on its own preferences. Here, a core priority for economic growth and energy security might explain why climate change impacts on national security are primarily perceived in the non-traditional realm. Moreover, being interested in a strong alliance with the USA, traditional national security concerns related to China and North Korea have become increasingly prevalent, overshadowing the effects climate change might have on traditional national security.

Linking China's performance on the four observed components of regime type and indicators measuring the likelihood of corruption to its securitization of climate change for human and planetary security is more complex. Regarding the former, one should expect a limited concern for the individual which becomes even more pronounced as a result of the

personalist rise. Moreover, involvement abroad has been found to be state-centered and top-down. Still, threats stemming from climate change for human security in China and abroad have been repeatedly invoked. This might be explained by China's government essentially promoting a "sinicized" version of human security that is subsumed under national security, is putting the collective before the individual, and is portraying the state as the only capable guarantor of it. Regarding the latter, there is a weak case for expecting regimes with similar values on the measured indicators to show weaker concern for domestic planetary security, a trend that might increase under personalism. The observation that China's planetary security has been securitized is thus another indication that the concept of national security has been significantly broadened under Xi Jinping and that the leadership circle has identified planetary security to be of concern to its citizens. In this light, extending the securitization also to planetary security abroad is a cheap add-on, signaling concern without increasing pressure to be proactive.

The similar outcome in Japan's case is connected to different processes. Despite the possibly diminished concern for human and planetary security caused by a relatively weak civil society faced with a strong LDP-led government that can govern without great concern about the opposition or public grievances, the Japanese government has decided to portray climate change as a threat for human and planetary security at home and abroad. As far as human security is concerned, this seems to be related to its traditional positioning as a recognized provider of humanitarian assistance, especially in the aftermath of natural disasters. Only recently, the Japanese government has added the factor of climate change, arguably as a result of peer pressure from other liberal democracies and the MOFA's and MOE's success in pointing out the benefits associated with keeping its position as a frontrunner in the cause of human security in the Indo-Pacific. Assistance offered by Japan is mainly situated in the areas of ex-post actions and adaptation. As these are also the dominant ways to deal with climate change on the domestic level, the securitization of human security can be easily extended to the own population without requiring greater action on mitigation. When it comes to planetary security, pressures behind the decision to construct climate change as a threat seem to be coming from the MOE, but mainly from abroad. Again, as long as the Japanese government can uphold its preference for adaptation, securitizing moves can be easily extended to the domestic level without requiring a major overhaul of climate policies.

Finally, countermeasures proposed and implemented by Chinese and Japanese governments reflect that they do not have to be extraordinary, yet are part of what Trombetta (2019, 102) calls measures that "otherwise would not have been undertaken." The observed indicators and the personalist rise can help understand the Chinese government's unwillingness to cooperate on key issues of recent COPs. Here, a cooperative position is outranked by aspects deemed more directly threatening regime legitimacy. Still, the government sees the need to conform with the basic provisions of the UNFCCC and to promise its adherence to the framework. All this is again connected to the regime's need for identity-based legitimation, founded on claims to unwaveringly protect the interests and rights of the developing world against selfish developed countries on the issue of climate change. Japan's strong

performance on most indicators measuring the elective, liberal, and egalitarian component of regime type as well as the extent to which corruption can be prevalent would suggest that the government is under pressure to provide public goods, take less conflictive negotiation positions on climate change, and sign up only to agreements it can fulfill. The situation of an exceptionally strong LDP-led executive faced with a weak legislative and public softens all these pressures and helps to comprehend why Japan is willing to cooperate and comply with agreements only if they do not conflict with policy objectives deemed more important or help to promote broader goals. Language promising to take on a leading role and calling out other major emitters like China is arguably mainly targeted at pleasing an international audience, not least the USA.

5 Conclusion

5.1 Research Question, Reasoning, Case Selection, Method

This thesis set out to answer the research question: *How is political regime type shaping the securitization of climate change by state actors?* It has been established that governments' climate goals and actions are insufficient to achieve internationally determined climate goals set by the Paris Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2022a). This indicates that climate change is not yet perceived as a threat great enough to justify possibly drastic measures that might be to the detriment of other policy objectives by many governments. As we lack the means to truthfully depict governmental threat perceptions regarding the issue of climate change, they can only be approximated. Based on the understanding that certain actors can construct security threats by declaring them to be exactly that in speech acts, the concept of securitization allows to do this by reflecting proactive governmental decisions. This is not to claim that these processes cannot be initiated for tactical reasons. However, since successful securitization generally implies more stringent action to counter the self-constructed threat, the securitization of climate change can serve as a reasonable proxy.

Against this backdrop, it is highly problematic that we lack knowledge about how securitization processes are shaped by country-specific contexts. These contexts encompass a variety of aspects. In this thesis, regime type has been selected as the variable of interest, given that it is believed to be crucial in understanding how climate policies come to be and, equally important, to be key to verify the applicability of the concept of securitization beyond narrow environments it was originally defined for. Yet, we are missing a detailed account of how exactly regime type affects securitization processes of climate change. Accordingly, this thesis sought to unearth the paths and processes in this relationship for the two cases of China and Japan. These cases were selected because they are diverse when looking at the variable of regime type. As East Asian countries both have also been outside of the traditional study focus of those applying the euro-centric concept of securitization. Lastly, China and Japan are both highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and portray themselves as green actors invested in the fight against climate change. Yet, both have also been repeatedly called out for failing to adopt climate policies in line with these circumstances and claims. The method of structured, focused comparison was used to answer the research question, asking a set of general, theoretically founded questions of each case to enable the systematic collection of comparable data. To comprehensively grasp all aspects of the research question, these sub-questions concerned the impact of regime type on actor-audience constellations, the perception of climate change effects on national, human, and planetary security, as well as the countermeasures proposed in the realm of climate diplomacy. Prior to answering these questions, the regime types of China and Japan were dissected in a sufficiently disaggregated and nuanced way by consulting a set of mid-level indices and indicators from V-Dem, BTI, and FWI, and describing country-specific aspects that cannot be captured by these indices and indicators. Subsequently, aspects of discourse analysis and content analysis were

combined with non-discursive ways of measuring discourse acceptance to depict climate security discourses and actions along an eight-fold matrix.

5.2 Findings

Following from the structured, focused comparison, it can be concluded that regime type plays a complex role in answering all the sub-questions and, by extension, the main research question. In the following, the results of the structured, focused comparison will once more be laid out to comprehensively answer the research question.

In China, weak values on all components of democracy accounted for can help explain that the core executive is virtually free to initiate securitization processes and enable countermeasures, while the personalist rise observed under Xi Jinping is further decreasing the number of people part of the core executive. In Japan, there is a greater number of state actors that is in a position to partake in securitization processes. Yet, despite being a liberal democracy, the role of most powerful actor and enabling audience is again held by a core group centered on the PM. He is heading a strong LDP-led executive that is able to decide on what to securitize and what countermeasures to take relatively freely from pressures of the weak legislative and an apathetic public.

The concentration of Chinese securitization processes on non-traditional instead of traditional national security can be understood by looking at legitimacy concerns. Performing well on providing economic growth and energy security are key in this regard, in particular in authoritarian regimes that face a high risk of sudden outbursts of repressed grievances in the event of crises. Therefore, climate change is constructed as a threat for non-traditional national security whereas traditional national security is not conceived as endangered amid more pressing traditional security concerns. In Japan, the LDP-led executive can act according to its own preferences which are related to ensuring economic growth and energy security. Thus, climate change is mainly considered as affecting aspects of non-traditional instead of traditional national security. Besides, the latter is also overshadowed by concerns about China and North Korea regarding which Japan has become increasingly outspoken, arguably also in its desire for a strong alliance with the USA.

Looking at human and planetary security, the decision by the Chinese government to portray both as being under threat from climate change can be understood to be related to both notions being proactively incorporated into the concept of national security, a domain that, according to the CCP, can only be addressed by the national government. Extending securitization moves to the international level is a conscious, easy decision since it demonstrates China's attention to similar concerns faced by other countries without requiring it to significantly increase its assistance or challenging its understanding of non-interference. In the case of Japan, the similar outcome is connected to different processes. Without facing strong domestic pressures, the Japanese government seems to have mainly reacted to pressures from abroad, in addition to the desire to uphold its leading position in advocating for the notion of human security in the Indo-Pacific. Considering that pressures to act that

come along with this decision are limited, the respective discourses could be easily extended to the domestic level.

When it comes to proposed countermeasures in the field of climate diplomacy, China's performance on the components of democracy and the personalist rise arguably reduce domestic pressures and push other issues to the top of the agenda, thus helping to understand uncooperative negotiation positions. The fact that China is cooperating with the basic provisions of the UNFCCC and is calling for greater cooperation indicates that legitimacy concerns are again an influential factor. Here, portraying China as a strong international actor that is cooperative, yet equally willing to protect the interest and rights of the developing world is believed to be designed as an identity-based legitimation strategy for the domestic audience while also hoped to help preventing pressure from developing countries. In the case of Japan, the exceptionally strong position of the LDP-led executive, unchallenged by the legislative and general public, takes away much of the domestic pressure to cooperate on climate change and allows the government to ponder on whether to cooperate based on its own preferences and policy objectives. Its decision to comply with the basic provisions of the UNFCCC, cooperate on some key issues of recent COPs, and use ambitious language is likely to again be a reaction to pressures from abroad.

5.3 Reliability of Findings

Selecting the method of structured, focused comparison is reasonable as it is asking a set of theoretically founded questions to a small number of cases that allow for identifying the paths and processes linking two variables in a systematic and precise way. By doing so, the in-depth descriptive analysis of securitization discourses, key for unearthing how security threats and risks are created, can be complemented with a greater focus on the social context in which they take place, a necessary addition to better understand the conditions that shape what is securitized and how successful securitization moves can be. Likewise, measuring regime type through combining an extensive number of mid-level indices and indicators from three different sources is sensible to enable a disaggregated and reliable depiction of different components of regime type. Adding aspects of regime type that these indices and indicators could not reflect might be considered difficult for systematic replicability. However, it is necessary as the aspects covered are fundamental for a sufficiently complete measurement of regime type. Considering that regime type was identified as the key variable of interest, selecting diverse cases that could allow for a possibly great number of interesting insights by representing opposite ends on the political regime type spectrum was a sensible decision. Since the region of East Asia is of particular interest, China and Japan are obvious choices. They represent the least free and most autocratic as well as most free and most democratic countries in the region respectively when excluding North Korea, that is not a relevant climate actor as it is not involved in any international efforts to counter it. In addition, China and Japan have not seen a lot of attention by those applying securitization theory in the past and share puzzling features as large, powerful countries that are highly vulnerable to climate change and are highly invested in green industries and initiatives, yet have been

repeatedly blamed for adopting climate policies that are detrimental to their situation and contradict their assertions.

Apart from implementing the structured, focused comparison, analyzing the securitization of climate change in the two cases was the most challenging part of this thesis and arguably the component of the thesis including most shortcomings. To start with, staying true to its original definition, it is justified to understand securitization as being composed by securitizing moves (identifying security threat/risk and proposing countermeasures) and audience acceptance, which can also be established through non-discursive actions in addition to replication in speech acts. Moreover, it makes sense to incorporate the concept of risk, ascribe a crucial role to context in shaping securitization processes, distinguish between different referent objects, and restrict observed countermeasures only to those that concern the area of climate diplomacy. When it comes to the implementation of this framework, first difficulties were faced with defining relevant actors and audiences, as well as their respective speech acts. Decisions in this regard are first and foremost highly subjective and thus prone to personal bias. Artificially limiting the group that can serve as actors to those representing the state is in line with most applicants of the concept of securitization, yet contributes to the further marginalization of those without a strong voice. Moreover, it also neglects the influence of other important groups, such as the business community, academia, policy institutes, or the media. However, depicting diverse state actors and their position in actor-audience constellations was challenging enough, especially given that the constellation had to enable the systematic comparison of two countries with different regime types without introducing aspects that would contribute to further biasing the results. This is particularly problematic in the case of China, where it is difficult to determine how much agency different parts of the state apparatus really have to make policy suggestions rather than just replicating what has already been determined at the top of the CCP. Therefore, the role of other actors and audiences needs to be addressed in further research. Similarly, the exclusive focus on written and spoken texts included in publicly available documents can be criticized. Not only can their selection not be claimed to be all-encompassing and without bias, but by using texts, language can also only be taken at face value without knowing real intentions or what has been prevented through censorship or self-censorship. However, conducting interviews or taking in other means of expression was not feasible for lack of accessibility and capacity. In addition, using documents written in three different languages is not optimal due to differences in wording and difficulties associated with translating the key words underlying the analysis of discourses. However, these drawbacks were considered to be outweighed by the benefits of including important text documents that were only available in Chinese or Japanese. Moreover, in one case (MOE white papers), the decision was made to include the English versions even though they are considerably shorter and less extensive than the Japanese versions. This might have led to certain securitizing moves remaining unaddressed, but was done to ensure a certain level of consistency.

Further shortcomings have to be pointed out concerning the analysis of the identified speech acts. Here, conducting discourse analysis is still by far the most widely accepted method of choice. Equally reasonable is the decision to also incorporate aspects of content analysis to increase reliability and validity. KH Coder was selected as a tool to bring in this component as it is an easy-to-use, freely accessible tool to measure word frequency and word co-occurrence in sentences. However, this only allowed for a very simplistic approximation of securitizing moves. As the subsequent qualitative analysis showed, word frequency and co-occurrence alone do not suffice to speak of securitization, nor do they allow to identify more complex securitizing moves. Thus, the value added from using KH Coder was limited and the results provided by it were of low benefit for the ensuing structured, focused comparison. More complex, yet fee-based tools like NVivo or the use of large language model could arguably lead to better and more detailed results, for instance on the relationship of regime type and the overall prevalence of securitization, the ratio between threatification and riskification, or the relative significance of different referent objects.

Conducting the discourse analysis itself is highly time intensive. At the same time, even with using the eight-fold matrix, the highly subjective practice of identifying and classifying speech acts makes it difficult to speak of easily replicable results. When it comes to establishing the acceptance of securitizing moves through non-discursive means, the evaluation of climate targets and associated policies as well as the assessment of negotiation positions, parliamentary voting behavior and opinion polls are prone to error. For the daunting task of assessing climate targets and policies, one has to rely on expert assessments that are not fully transparent with regards to the criteria used and can only depict parts of the whole picture (e.g. through focusing on policies and actions under the UNFCCC alone). Putting negotiation positions, voting behavior, and opinion polls to use is challenging due to limited accessibility, quality, and comparability of data.

Finally, shortcomings also have to be addressed with regards to the implementation of the structured, focused comparison. First of all, albeit being arguably the most important, regime type is but one of a large number of variables that play into the securitization of climate change. However, due to time and capacity constraints and the need to guarantee logical coherence, they could not be taken into account as much as would be necessary for providing the full picture. Moreover, answering the set of questions at the core of this method is again highly subjective and very challenging if the outcome is as fluid and impalpable as the concept of securitization. Furthermore, while being an unavoidable evil, certain aspects of the structured, focused comparison cannot be sufficiently substantiated with sources or reason and thus remain educated guesses. This concerns the unknown nature of the true preferences of the increasingly personalist leadership bubble in China or the decision-making core of a relatively unchallenged LDP in Japan. Other aspects include the true impact of normative considerations about just cooperation and compliance within the international climate change regime or foreign pressures.

5.4 Relevance and Research Contribution

Climate change is widely recognized as being one of the most urgent non-traditional security threats to be addressed in academia and real-world politics. Its complex impacts on every place on earth indicates that international cooperation is required to find ways to reduce emissions and enhance adaptation in order to prevent the most devastating consequences. Yet, bilateral and multilateral negotiations have not resulted in national policies and actions which could keep targets in reach that have been set by the international community in the UN-centered climate change regime based on the UNFCCC. Accordingly, it seems like many governments do not consider climate change as a security threat that is grave enough to be addressed through immediate and substantial measures possibly infringing on the achievement of other policy objectives. Unfortunately, we are in no position to measure and verify governmental threat perceptions beyond doubt, considering the complex web of factors impacting policymaking, consisting of actual perceptions and convictions as well as pragmatic choices driven by power considerations. Nevertheless, the concept of securitization allows us to depict how governments attempt to shape public perceptions to legitimize past and future behavior. Accordingly, applying this concept provides us with a powerful means to examine the underlying drivers of governmental climate policies and why they are lagging behind what would be necessary.

However, when it comes to the concept of securitization in general and its use for understanding climate policies in particular, it is problematic that we do not have a detailed account on how country-specific contexts are affecting securitization processes. While being only one of a whole range of relevant aspects in this regard, a country's regime type can be considered the most urgent one to be addressed since it is at the center of a discussion about the very applicability of the concept beyond the European liberal democratic environment it was originally defined for. Moreover, its effects are an unquestioned assumption significantly reducing the explanatory power its application has in both non-democratic and democratic contexts. To be able to conduct an in-depth analysis of the conditions under which securitization of climate change takes place and why it plays out in the way it does, the method of structured, focused comparison was chosen.

This method allows for asking a set of general sub-questions across cases to discuss a number of propositions about assumed probabilistic relations and define initial, contingent mid-level generalizations. As elaborated on above, regime type was found to play a complex role in answering all of the sub-questions, offering interesting insights on how it shaped actor-audience constellations, the referent object of securitizing moves, and suggested climate diplomacy countermeasures in the years 2020 to 2022, including in rather unexpected and previously undescribed ways. In the case of China, many observed aspects regarding the consolidation of shrinking groups of relevant actors and enabling audiences or the prevalence of national security overshadowing concerns for other referent objects, like human and planetary security, might be similarly observed in other closed authoritarian regimes and especially those undergoing a personalist trend. These regimes face special

needs to ensure regime stability by turning to performance-based (i.e. economic well-being and security) and identity-based (e.g. nationalism) legitimation strategies. Yet, the securitization of climate change by Chinese state actors is also shaped by their perception of China's position as the most powerful developing country, compelled to provide a voice to the developing world and push back against unfair claims by rich countries. This argumentation is in turn based on ambiguous concepts like CBDR and the distinction between developing (Non-Annex I) and developed (Annex I) countries inscribed into the UNFCCC in 1992. Japan, on the other hand, is an equally interesting case as the effects of electoral and liberal democratic qualities on actor-audience constellation and securitization processes are largely offset by the strong position of a single party leading an executive relatively unconstrained by a weak parliamentarian opposition and a civil society weakly integrated in policymaking processes due to voter apathy and the LDP's valence advantage. Specifically, in liberal democracies possessing similar country-specific circumstances, the public and legislative can be expected to lose their role as an enabling audience. Moreover, the choice of referent objects and suggested countermeasures are also likely to be predominantly shaped by party preferences and foreign pressures.

Still, following its exploratory approach, this thesis could only make a small contribution to a more complete understanding of the paths and processes connecting country-specific contexts and the construction and perception of climate change as a security issue. Future efforts thus have to concentrate on applying different research methods, including those based on a more positivist ontology and epistemology, extending beyond the framework of securitization. These can help to define and test more robust and generalizable hypotheses regarding regime type and other important independent and intervening variables at play without simplifying too much.

Moving beyond the research contribution of this thesis, discussing the implications of regime type on the securitization of climate change and, by extension, the making of climate policy is timely as we face democratic backsliding paired with a rising number of autocracies. While the effects of this trend on climate action have yet to be better understood, autocracies are generally thought to be more likely to be pre-occupied with other threats and to perform worse on provision of public goods and commitment to cooperate on climate change. Even apart from these concerns, the bifurcation of the international community into a democratic and autocratic camp will only increase disagreements about the right way to tackle climate change. There is a real risk that differences in regime type become a stumbling block hindering concerted climate action that is equally troubling as the often-entertained distinction between developing (Non-Annex I) and developed (Annex I) countries. Accordingly, pro-climate politicians, environmental NGOs, and those in the civil society advocating for more climate action, who are in need for improved ways to overcome negotiation barriers in climate diplomacy, can profit from knowledge about whom to approach, drivers underlying argumentations and actions, and noteworthy leverage points highlighted by this thesis and future research. In addition, companies, financial institutions, and investors seeking to profit from the undergoing transformation of energy systems and

industrial sectors can make better decisions based on more thoroughly comprehending risk factors and security considerations in the context of climate policymaking in China and Japan.

5.5 Outlook

There is no doubt about the fact that leaders around the world need to perform well on a long list of often conflicting interests defined by themselves and their constituencies. Moreover, in a world in which non-traditional security threats have arguably become as important as traditional, military-related ones endangering national sovereignty and territorial integrity, tackling the issue of climate change through efforts to mitigate emissions and adapt to its consequences is but one of a number of pressing concerns. Ironically, it is precisely the unfathomable extent of its immense adverse impacts and required countermeasures that make the issue of climate change so exceptionally frightening and, at the same time, so difficult to be addressed through ambitious, concerted international action. Consequently, climate diplomacy in many ways has reached an impasse. Yet, even if calls for a more solidary way of living and more radical socio-economic transformations continue to lack persuasiveness in the eyes of many, the long-term nature of the problem at the very least necessitates to further work on solutions that are viable in a state-centric international climate change regime.

In the case of China and Japan, these efforts take place in the context of dynamic processes. As touched on above, a personalist trend as it is underway in China is unlikely to lead to more ambitious climate actions and further decreases the number of relevant actors in policymaking processes, possibly resulting in increasingly unpredictable choices bad for international cooperation. At the same time, it also tends to shut leaders off from the opinions of the public, enabling sudden outbursts of disagreement as seen with regard to the Zero-COVID policy in 2022. These in turn again increase the likelihood of making erratic decisions, including those on whether and what to securitize. Simultaneously, China's leadership is also confronted with ever-increasing international pressures. Some scholars believe that not least the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement in 2017 fostered China's desire to take a more pro-active role within the international climate change regime (Hernandez and Misalucha-Willoughby 2020; von Lucke 2023; Yang 2022). So far, large parts of the Global South still unite behind its criticism about unmet climate finance commitments made by rich countries that fit into China's general desire to be perceived as a responsible great power following a development model that is fundamentally different from the hegemonic Western-style liberal democratic one. However, its support has seen first cracks at COP 27 when the PM of Antigua and Barbuda, speaking on behalf of the Association of Small Island States, for the first time urged major emitters like China to also finance a loss and damage fund (Volcovici and Lewis 2022). In any case, its increasing cumulative emissions and continued investment in fossil fuel extraction abroad suggest that pressure to act on emissions reductions will only rise (Ma and Ma 2023; Stevens 2023). Overall, his might have wide-ranging implications for how climate change is perceived, what

climate actions are taken, and how they are legitimized on the national and international level. It might, however, also make China a more unstable partner in international climate negotiations. Despite this, other large emitters like the G7 also have to live up to their climate diplomacy commitments made in the past and take on more cooperative negotiation positions in current debates, in order to work on a more sustainable future in a way that is integrating China as much as feasible.

In Japan's unique one-party democracy, the executive core around the PM is still most relevant in serving as the ultimate arbiter of inter-ministerial conflicts about the prevalent climate security discourse. As such, current PM Kishida has upheld a more positive framing of climate change mitigation as a driver of economic growth (Johnston 2022). At the same time, he appointed a pro-nuclear and pro-fossil fuel politician as new minister heading the METI after taking office and subsequently granted METI great leeway in formulating the crucial Green Transition Strategy approved by the government in February 2023 (Hasegawa 2022, 12; Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2023; Tiberghien 2023, 52). Kishida is thus upholding a rather ambiguous stance on the MOE-METI rivalry which still seems to decisively tilt to the MOE's favor in limited instances only. The MOFA is another actor attempting to shape discourses and countermeasures alongside the MOE and METI, while only recently, the MOD has also become more vocal reflecting processes that might result in greater concern about climate change as a traditional security threat at some point. In any case, climate actions taken by the Japanese government are widely considered not to be in line with its commitments made under the Paris Agreement. As shown above, this is also related to Japan's unique existence as a one-party democracy. In this regard, the public is still in the best position to achieve more ambitious climate action. Barriers to a stronger legislative with a more powerful opposition to governmental decision making are not enforced through repression and could possibly be overcome by a more vocal public society. Yet, achieving this is easier said than done. As was demonstrated above, public opinion is not always in favor of tougher action, let alone interested in climate change. On the international level, the Japanese government seems to mainly care about the views and actions of the USA and to a lesser degree other G7 member states and Northeast Asian neighbors (Koppenborg and Hanssen 2021, 55; Tiberghien 2023, 61). This negatively impacted the degree to which it wanted to be an important contributor to the climate cause and delayed a more welcoming view on climate mitigation or the financing of coal-fired power plants abroad to a time when others had already moved first (Incerti and Lipscy 2018, 630). Therefore, it is again mainly on other G7 countries to move first and increase pressure on Japan. Unfortunately, the sustained threat of right-wing, populist forces uninterested in fulfilling these tasks getting an even greater say on policymaking in a number of G7 countries makes this endeavor even more difficult.

References

Abe, Shinzo. 2015. "'The Future of Asia: Be Innovative' - Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 21st International Conference on the Future of Asia." Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, May 21, 2015. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201505/0521foaspeech.html.

Acharya, Amitav. 2001. "Human Security: East versus West?" *RSIS Working* Papers 17, no. 1: 1–18. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/91391.

Alvarez, Mike, José A. Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski. 1996. "Classifying Political Regimes." *Studies In Comparative International Development* 31, no. 2: 3–36. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02719326.

Aradau, Claudia, and Rens van Munster. 2007. "Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (Un)Knowing the Future." *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1: 89–115. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107074290.

Asia Society Policy Institute. 2023. "Top Leadership." Asia Society, June 1, 2023. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/decoding-chinese-politics.

Austin, J.L. 1975. *How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University in 1955*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245537.001.0001.

Bailer, Stefanie. 2012. "Strategy in the Climate Change Negotiations: Do Democracies Negotiate Differently?" *Climate Policy* 12, no. 5: 534–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2012.691224.

Bailer, Stefanie, and Florian Weiler. 2015. "A Political Economy of Positions in Climate Change Negotiations: Economic, Structural, Domestic, and Strategic Explanations." *The Review of International Organizations* 10, no. 1: 43–66. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9198-0.

Bailey, Pippa. 2022. *Earth Day 2022: Public Opinion on Climate Change*. Ipsos. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2022-04/Ipsos%20-%20Global%20Advisor%20-%20Earth%20Day%202022%20-%20Release%202.pdf.

Baldwin, David A. 1995. "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War." *World Politics* 48, no. 1 (October): 117–41. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25053954.

Balzacq, Thierry. 2005. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context." *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2: 171–201. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066105052960.

———. 2008. "The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, no. 1: 75–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00768.x.

———. 2010a. "A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions, and Variants." In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 1–30. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203868508.

———. 2010b. "Enquiries into Methods: A New Framework for Securitization Analysis." In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 31–54. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203868508.

———. 2014. “The ‘Essence’ of Securitization: Theory, Ideal Type, and a Sociological Science of Security.” In *Forum: What Kind of Theory – If Any – Is Securitization?* edited by Thierry Balzacq, Stefano Guzzini, Michael C. Williams, Ole Wæver, and Heikki Patomäki, *International Relations* 29, no. 1: 8–18. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814526606.

Balzacq, Thierry, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka. 2016. “‘Securitization’ Revisited: Theory and Cases.” *International Relations* 30, no. 4: 494–531. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815596590.

Balzacq, Thierry, Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, and Christian Olsson. 2017. “Security Practices.” In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, edited by Robert A. Denemark, and Renée Marlin-Bennett, 1–14. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1093/acref/9780191842665.001.0001.

Bättig, Michèle B., and Thomas Bernauer. 2009. “National Institutions and Global Public Goods: Are Democracies More Cooperative in Climate Change Policy?” *International Organization* 63, no. 2: 281–308. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309090092.

Bernhard, Michael, Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock. 2001. “Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and Democratic Survival.” *The Journal of Politics* 63, no. 3 (August): 775–803. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2691713?typeAccessWorkflow=login.

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2023. “BTI 2006–2022 Scores (Excel).” Bertelsmann Transformation Index. https://bti-project.org/en/downloads.

———. n.d. “Methodology.” Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Accessed September 4, 2023. https://bti-project.org/en/methodology.

———. n.d. “China.” Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Accessed July 8, 2023. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-dashboard/CHN.

Bigo, Didier. 2002. “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease.” *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 1S: 63-92. https://link-gale-com.uaccess.univie.ac.at/apps/doc/A84338226/AONE?u=43wien&sid=bookmark-AONE&xid=624dd8eb.

Bilgin, Pinar. 2008. “Critical Theory.” In *Security Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Paul D. Williams, 89–102. London: Routledge.

Bo, Yan. 2016. “Securitization and Chinese Climate Change Policy.” *Chinese Political Science Review* 1: 94–112. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-016-0003-5.

Böhmelt, Tobias. 2014. “Political Opportunity Structures in Dictatorships? Explaining ENGO Existence in Autocratic Regimes.” *The Journal of Environment & Development* 23, no. 4 (December): 446–71. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26197940.

Böhmelt, Tobias, and Edita Butkutė. 2018. “The Self-Selection of Democracies into Treaty Design: Insights from International Environmental Agreements.” *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 18: 351–67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-018-9391-3.

Booth, Ken, 2005. “Critical Explorations.” In *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, edited by Ken Booth, 1–20. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685857356.

Breslin, Shaun. 2015. “Debating Human Security in China: Towards Discursive Power?” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 45, no. 2: 243–65. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2014.907926.

Buzan, Barry, and Lene Hansen. 2009a. “Defining International Security Studies.” In *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 8–20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817762.

———. 2009b. “The Key Questions in International Security Studies: The State, Politics and Epistemology.” In *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 21–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817762.

———. 2009c. “Widening and Deepening Security.” In *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, 187–225. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511817762.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998a. “Introduction.” In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 1–20. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685853808.

———. 1998b. “Security Analysis: Conceptual Apparatus.” In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 21–48. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685853808.

———. 1998c. “The Environmental Sector.” In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 71–95. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685853808.

Caballero-Anthony, Mely. 2016. “Non-traditional Security Concept, Issues, and Implications on Security Governance.” *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs* 3, no. 1: 5–13. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/145776.

Caballero-Anthony, Mely, and Alistair D.B. Cook. 2013. “NTS Framework.” In *Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Issues, Challenges and Framework for Action*, edited by Mely Caballero-Anthony, and Alistair D.B. Cook, 1–14. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814414609.

Carbonell, Joel R., and Juliann E. Allison. 2015. “Democracy and State Environmental Commitment to International Environmental Treaties.” *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 15: 79–104. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-013-9213-6.

Carothers, Thomas, and Benjamin Press. 2022. “Understanding and Responding to Global Democratic Backsliding”. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 22, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/10/20/understanding-and-responding-to-global-democratic-backsliding-pub-88173.

C.A.S.E. Collective. 2006. “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto.” *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 4: 443-87. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606073085.

Chandrasekhar, Aruna, Daisy Dunne, Josh Gabbatiss, Joe Goodman, Simon Evans, and Zizhu Zhang. 2022. “COP27: Key Outcomes Agreed at the UN Climate Talks in Sharm El-Sheikh.” Carbon Brief, November 21, 2022.

https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop27-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-sharm-el-sheikh/.

Chang, Keng-Chi, William R. Hobbs, Margaret E. Roberts, and Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld. 2022. "COVID-19 Increased Censorship Circumvention and Access to Sensitive Topics in China." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 119, no. 4: e2102818119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2102818119.

Cheibub, José A., Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143, no. 1/2 (April): 67–101. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40661005.

Chen, Ge. 2022. "Xi Jinping and China's Censorship Trap." *Diplomat,* December 13, 2022. https://thediplomat.com/2022/12/xi-jinping-and-chinas-censorship-trap/.

Chestnut Greitens, Sheena. 2016. "A Theory of Coercive Institutions and State Violence." In *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*, 17–72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316489031.

China Ministry of Ecology and Environment. 2019. *China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2019)*. https://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/Reports/reports/201912/P020191204495763994956.pdf.

———. 2020a. "Energy in China's New Era." December 22, 2020. http://english.mee.gov.cn/Resources/publications/Whitep/202012/t20201222_814160.shtml.

———. 2020b. "Dì sì jiè qìhòu xíngdòng bùzhǎng jí huìyì zhàokāi 第四届气候行动部长级会议召开" [The 4th Ministerial Conference on Climate Action was held]. July 7, 2020. https://www.mee.gov.cn/xxgk2018/xxgk/xxgk15/202007/t20200707_788099.html.

———. 2020c. "Shēngtài huánjìng bù bùzhǎng huángrùnqiū zuò yìngduì qìhòu biànhuà hé bǎohù shēngwù duōyàng xìng kēxué bàogào 生态环境部部长黄润秋作应对气候变化和保护生物多样性科学报告" [Huang Runqiu, Minister of Ecology and Environment, delivered a scientific report on addressing climate change and protecting biodiversity]. December 11, 2020. https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywdt/hjywnews/202012/t20201211_812480.shtml.

———. 2021a. *China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2020)*. http://www.ncsc.org.cn/yjcg/cbw/202111/P020211117418821628432.pdf.

———. 2021b. "China-U.S. Joint Statement Addressing the Climate Crisis." April 18, 2021. http://english.mee.gov.cn/News_service/news_release/202104/t20210418_829135.shtml.

———. 2021c. "Dì 30 cì 'jīchǔ sìguó' qìhòu biànhuà bùzhǎng jí huìyì zhàokāi 第 30 次'基础四国'气候变化部长级会议召开" [The 30th BASIC Climate Change Ministerial Meeting was held]. April 9, 2021. https://www.mee.gov.cn/xxgk2018/xxgk/xxgk15/202104/t20210409_827875.html.

———. 2021d. “Shēngtài huánjìng bù bùzhǎng huángrùnqiū shìpín chūxí dì shí'èr jiè bǐdé sī bǎo qìhòu duìhuà bùzhǎng jí huìyì 生态环境部部长黄润秋视频出席第十二届彼得斯堡气候对话部长级会议” [Minister of Ecology and Environment Huang Runqiu attended the 12th Petersburg Climate Dialogue Ministerial Conference via video]. May 8, 2021. https://www.mee.gov.cn/xxgk2018/xxgk/xxgk15/202105/t20210508_832130.html

———. 2021e. “Shēngtài huánjìng bù bùzhǎng huángrùnqiū shìpín chūxí shìjiè jīngjì lùntán ‘dá wò sī yìchéng’ duìhuà huì ‘yìngduì qìhòu biànhuà’ fēn lùntán bìng zhìcí 生态环境部部长黄润秋视频出席世界经济论坛‘达沃斯议程’对话会‘应对气候变化’分论坛并致辞” [Minister of Ecology and Environment Huang Runqiu attended the World Economic Forum’s Davos Agenda Dialogue’s “Coping with Climate Change” sub-forum via video and delivered a speech]. January 27, 2021. https://www.mee.gov.cn/xxgk2018/xxgk/xxgk15/202101/t20210127_819046.html.

———. 2022. *Zhōngguó yìngduì qìhòu biànhuà de zhèngcè yǔ xíngdòng 2022 niándù bàogào 中国应对气候变化的政策与行动 2022 年度报告* [China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2022)]. https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywgz/ydqhbh/syqhbh/202210/W020221027551216559294.pdf.

China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2019. “UN Climate Action Summit: China’s Position and Action.” September 16, 2019. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/201909/t20190916_679583.html.

———. 2021a. “Han Zheng Meets with U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry via Video Link.” September 2, 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3376_665447/3432_664920/3435_664926/202104/t20210419_9169425.html.

———. 2021b. “Zhōngguó liánhéguó hézuò lìchǎng wénjiàn 中国联合国合作立场文件” [China United Nations Cooperation Position Paper]. October 22, 2021. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/tytj_674911/zcwj_674915/202110/t20211027_10283542.shtml.

China Ministry of National Defense. 2019. “China’s National Defense in the New Era.” July 24, 2019. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4846452.html.

China National Development and Reform Commission. 2016a. *Kě zàishēng néngyuán fāzhǎn ‘shísānwǔ’ guīhuà 可再生能源发展’十三五’规划* [The 13th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy Development]. http://www.nea.gov.cn/135916140_14821175123931n.pdf.

———. 2016b. *Néngyuán fāzhǎn ‘shísānwǔ’ guīhuà 能源发展’十三五’规划* [The 13th Five-Year Plan for Energy Development]. http://www.nea.gov.cn/135989417_14846217874961n.pdf.

———. 2022a. “Guójiā fāzhǎn gǎigé wěi děng bùmén guānyú tuījìn gòng jiàn ‘yīdài yīlù’ lǜsè fāzhǎn de yìjiàn 国家发展改革委等部门

关于推进共建‘一带一路’绿色发展的意见”[National Development and Reform Commission and other departments - Opinions on promoting the green development of the Belt and Road Initiative]. March 16, 2022. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/tz/202203/t20220328_1320629.html?code=&state=123.

———. 2022b. ‘*Shísìwǔ’kě zàishēng néngyuán fāzhǎn guīhuà’十四五’可再生能源发展规划* [The 14th Five-Year Plan for Renewable Energy Development]. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/202206/P020220602315308557623.pdf.

———. 2022c. *‘Shísìwǔ’xiàndài néngyuán tǐxì guīhuà ‘十四五’现代能源体系规划’* [The 14th Five-Year Plan for Modern Energy System]. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfb/ghwb/202203/P020220322582066837126.pdf.

China State Council. 2021a. “Full Text: Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030.” Xinhua. 27 October, 2021. http://www.news.cn/english/2021-10/27/c_1310270985.htm.

———. 2021b. “Full Text: Working Guidance For Carbon Dioxide Peaking And Carbon Neutrality In Full And Faithful Implementation Of The New Development Philosophy.” October 25, 2021. https://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latestreleases/202110/25/content_WS61760047c6d0df57f98e3c21.html.

———. 2021c. *Responding to Climate Change: China's Policies and Actions*. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202110/27/content_WS617916abc6d0df57f98e3f3b.html.

———. 2021d. “Vice-Premier Urges Joint Efforts to Tackle Global Climate Change.” January 26, 2021. http://english.www.gov.cn/statecouncil/hanzheng/202101/26/content_WS600f4d03c6d0f725769447d8.html.

Chyzh, Olga. 2014. “Can You Trust a Dictator: A Strategic Model of Authoritarian Regimes’ Signing and Compliance with International Treaties.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31, no. 1: 3–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213501132.

Ciută, Felix. 2009. “Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of Securitisation Theory.” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (April): 301–26. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20542791.

Climate Action Tracker. 2023a. “Japan.” https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/japan/.

———. 2023b. “China.” https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/.

———. n.d. “CAT Rating Methodology.” Accessed June 20, 2023. https://climateactiontracker.org/methodology/cat-rating-methodology/.

Collins, Alan, ed. 2022a. *Contemporary Security Studies*. 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1093/hepl/9780198862192.001.0001.

———. 2022b. “Introduction: What Is Security Studies?” In *Contemporary Security Studies*, 6th ed., edited by Alan Collins, 1–10. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1093/hepl/9780198862192.001.0001.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, et al. 2023a. *V-Dem Codebook V13*. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://www.v-dem.net/documents/24/codebook_v13.pdf.

———. 2023b. *V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset V13*. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds23.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Steven Fish, Allen Hicken, et al. 2011. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach." *Perspectives on Politics* 9, no. 2 (June): 247–67. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41479651.

Corry, Olaf. 2012. "Securitisation and 'Riskification': Second-Order Security and the Politics of Climate Change." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 40, no. 2: 235–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829811419444.

Da Wei, Xiao Qian, Dong Ting, Sun Chenghao, Wang Yexu, Yan Yongqi, et al. 2023. '*Zhōngguó rén de guójì ānquán guān': mínyì diàochá bàogào 2023 '中国人的国际安全观': 民意调查报告 2023* [Chinese People's View of International Security: Public Opinion Survey Report]. Tsinghua University Center for International Security and Strategy. https://ciss.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/qb/6140.

D'Ambrogio, Enrico. 2020. *Japan's Parliament and Other Political Institutions*. European Parliamentary Research Service. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/651951/EPRS_BRI(2020)651951_EN.pdf.

Debs, Alexandre, and H.E. Goemans. 2010. "Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War." *The American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3: 430–45. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40863762.

Detraz, Nicole, and Michele M. Betsill. 2009. "Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts." *International Studies Perspectives* 10, no. 3: 303–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1528-3585.2009.00378.x.

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit. 2021. "China's Updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)." Mobility Transition in China, November 1, 2021. https://transition-china.org/mobilityposts/chinas-updated-nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/.

Diez, Thomas, Franziskus von Lucke, and Zehra Wellmann. 2016a. "Introduction." In *The Securitisation of Climate Change: Actors, Processes and Consequences*, 1–12. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315665757.

Diez, Thomas, Franziskus von Lucke, and Zehra Wellmann. 2016b. "Analysing Climate Security Discourses." In *The Securitisation of Climate Change: Actors, Processes and Consequences*, 13–35. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315665757.

Directorate-General for Climate Action. 2021. "Joint Press Communiqué Following the Second EU-China High Level Environment and Climate Dialogue." European Commission. October 10, 2021. https://climate.ec.europa.eu/news-your-voice/news/joint-press-communique-following-second-eu-china-high-level-environment-and-climate-dialogue-2021-10-10_en.

Dollah, Ramli, Diana Peters, Wan Shawaluddin Wan Hassan, Marja Azlima Omar, Md Saffie Abdul Rahim, and Adi Jafar. 2023. “Japan’s Advocacy for Human Security in Global Politics: Case Study of Japan’s Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots Human Security Projects (GGP) in the State of Sabah, Malaysia, 2000–2021.” *East Asia* 40: 151–74. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09399-4.

Drinhausen, Katja, and Helena Legarda. 2022. Confident Paranoia: *Xi’s ‘Comprehensive National Security’ Framework Shapes China’s Behavior at Home and Abroad*. Mercator Institute for China Studies, MERICS China Monitor. https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/Merics%20China%20Monitor%2075%20National%20Security_final.pdf.

Duchâtel Mathieu, Oliver Bräuner, and Zhou Hang. 2014. *Protecting China’s Overseas Interests: The Slow Shift Away from Non-Interference*. *SIPRI Policy Paper* 41. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2014/sipri-policy-papers/protecting-chinas-overseas-interests-slow-shift-away-non-interference.

Dunn Cavelty, Myriam, and Thierry Balzacq, eds. 2016. *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315753393.

Dupont, Claire. 2019. “The EU’s Collective Securitisation of Climate Change.” *West European Politics* 42, no. 2: 369–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2018.1510199.

Elster, Jon. 1998. “A Plea for Mechanisms.” In *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, edited by Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, 45–73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511663901.003.

Escribà-Folch, Abel. 2013. “Accountable for What? Regime Types, Performance, and the Fate of Outgoing Dictators, 1946–2004.” *Democratization* 20, no. 1: 160–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738866.

Escribà-Folch, Abel, Tobias Böhmelt, and Ulrich Pilster. 2020. “Authoritarian Regimes and Civil–Military Relations: Explaining Counterbalancing in Autocracies.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 37, no. 5: 559–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219836285.

Eshima, Shusei, Yusaku Horiuchi, Shiro Kuriwaki, and Daniel M. Smith. 2023. “Winning Elections with Unpopular Policies: Valence Advantage and Single-Party Dominance in Japan.” *SSRN Scholarly Paper*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4371978.

European Investment Bank. 2023a. *Edition V: 2022-2023: Dataset Part 1.* Climate Survey Resources, EU/USA/China. https://www.eib.org/en/surveys/climate-survey/all-resources.htm.

———. 2023b. *Edition V: 2022-2023: Methodology*. Climate Survey Resources, EU/USA/China. https://www.eib.org/en/surveys/climate-survey/all-resources.htm.

Evans, Simon, Josh Gabbatiss, Robert McSweeney, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Ayesha Tandon, Guiliana Viglione, et al. 2021. “COP26: Key Outcomes Agreed at the UN Climate Talks in Glasgow.” Carbon Brief, November 15, 2021. https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop26-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-un-climate-talks-in-glasgow/.

Fenning, Camilla. 2021. “Coal @ COP26: Existing Coal Power Heads for the Exit.” E3G, November 11, 2021. https://www.e3g.org/news/coal-cop26-existing-coal-power-heads-for-the-exit/.

Floyd, Rita. 2007. “Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security: Bringing Together the Copenhagen and the Welsh Schools of Security Studies.” *Review of International Studies* 33, no. 2 (April): 327–50. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40072168.

———. 2010a. “A Revised Securitisation Theory.” In *Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy*, 43–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511730146.

———. 2010b. “Conclusion.” In *Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy*, 188–193. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511730146.

———. 2011. “Can Securitization Theory Be Used in Normative Analysis? Towards a Just Securitization Theory.” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5: 427–39. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611418712.

Foucault, Michel. 1980. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*. Edited by Collin Gordon. London: Harvester Press.

Frantz, Erica, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Joseph Wright, and Xu Xu. 2020. “Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships.” *The Journal of Politics* 82, no. 1: 372–77. https://doi.org/10.1086/706049.

Freedom House. 2023. *All Data, FIW 2013-2023* (Excel Download). Freedom in the World. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world#Data.

———. n.d. “China: Freedom on the Net 2021 Country Report.” Accessed July 17, 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/freedom-net/2021.

———. n.d. “Freedom in the World Research Methodology.” Accessed August 4, 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology.

Gabbatiss, Josh, and Simon Evans. 2022. “Analysis: US Falling $32bn Short on ‘Fair Share’ of $100bn Climate-Finance Goal.” Carbon Brief, November 7, 2022. https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-us-falling-32bn-short-on-fair-share-of-100bn-climate-finance-goal/.

Garriga, Ana C. 2009. “Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Soup?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 5: 698–726. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709341403.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. “What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 1: 115–44. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.115.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (June): 313–31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43279909.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennet. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Ginsburg, Tom. 2021. “The BRI, Non-interference, and Democracy.” *Harvard International Law Journal* 62, special issue: 40–66. https://journals.law.harvard.edu/ilj/wp-content/uploads/sites/84/BRI-Non-interference-and-Democracy-Ginsburg.pdf.

Global Methane Pledge. n.d. “Participants.” Accessed August 16, 2023. https://www.globalmethanepledge.org/#pledges.

Global Warming Prevention Headquarters. 2021. *Kikō hendō taisaku suishin no tame no yūshikisha kaigi no setchi ni tsuite* 気候変動対策推進のための有識者会議の設置について[Establishment of the Expert Council for the Promotion of Climate Change Countermeasures]. Cabinet Secretariat. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kikouhendoutaisaku/pdf/siryou1.pdf.

Gonzalez-Vicente, Ruben. 2016. “The Limits to China’s Non-Interference Foreign Policy: Pro-State Interventionism and the Rescaling of Economic Governance.” In *The Contested Rescaling of Economic Governance in East Asia*, edited by Shahar Hameiri, and Jeffrey Wilson, 97–116. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315668291.

Government of Japan. 2021a. *Japan’s Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/JAPAN_FIRST%20NDC%20%28UPDATED%20SUBMISSION%29.pdf.

———. 2021b. *The Long-Term Strategy under the Paris Agreement*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Japan_LTS2021.pdf.

———. 2022. *Japan’s Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/NC8_BR5-JPN-E%20%281%29.pdf.

Government of the People’s Republic of China. 2021a. *China’s Achievements, New Goals and New Measures for Nationally Determined Contributions*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/China%E2%80%99s%20Achievements%2C%20New%20Goals%20and%20New%20Measures%20for%20Nationally%20Determined%20Contributions.pdf.

———. 2021b. *China’s Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy*. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/China%E2%80%99s%20Mid-Century%20Long-Term%20Low%20Greenhouse%20Gas%20Emission%20Development%20Strategy.pdf.

———. 2021c. *Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó guómín jīngjì hé shèhuì fāzhǎn dì shísì gè wǔ nián guīhuà hé 2035 nián yuǎnjǐng mùbiāo gāngyào* 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十四个五年规划和 2035 年远景目标纲要. Translated by Center for Security and Emerging Technology as *Outline of the People’s Republic of China 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range*

Objectives for 2035. https://cdn.climatepolicyradar.org/navigator/CHN/2021/outline-of-the-people-s-republic-of-china-14th-five-year-plan-for-national-economic-and-social-development-and-long-range-objectives-for-2035_a2ad3e061fca627d9a44d7b91f7aa210.pdf.

———. 2022. *Guójiā shìyìng qìhòu biànhuà zhànlüè 2035 国家适应气候变化战略 2035.* Translated by Center for Security and Emerging Technology as *National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2035*. https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0453_climate_strategy_2035_EN.pdf.

Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. 2016. *Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures*. Climate Change Laws of the World. https://climate-laws.org/document/plan-for-global-warming-countermeasures_daa8.

Gupta, Joydeep, Tom Baxter, Fermín Koop, Temwani Mgunda, and Lin Zi. 2022. "UN Climate Summit Set for Tough Negotiations in Final Week." China Dialogue, November 15, 2022. https://chinadialogue.net/en/climate/un-climate-summit-set-for-tough-negotiations-in-final-week/.

Guzzini, Stefano. 2011. "Securitization as a Causal Mechanism." *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4–5: 329–41. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010611419000.

Hajer, Maarten A. 1995. "Discourse Analysis." In *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process*, 42–72. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hansen, Lene. 2000. "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2: 285–306. https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290020501.

———. 2011. "Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis." *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 1: 51–74. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066110388593.

Hardy, Cynthia. 2001. "Researching Organizational Discourse." *International Studies of Management & Organization* 31, no. 3: 25–47. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40397507.

Hardy, Cynthia, Bill Harley, and Nelson Philipps. 2004. "Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?" *Qualitative & Multi-Method Research* 2, no. 1: 19–22. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.998649.

Harrison, Kathryn, and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom. 2010. "Introduction." In *Global Commons, Domestic Decisions: The Comparative Politics of Climate Change*, 1–22. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hartmann, Hauke. 2022. "Autocratization and the Decline of International Cooperation." Bertelsmann Transformation Index, March 10, 2022. https://blog.bti-project.org/2022/03/10/autocratization-and-the-decline-of-international-cooperation/.

Hasegawa Uiko. 2022. *The Feasibility and Future of Japan's Climate Policy.* Heinrich Böll Stiftung Hong Kong. https://hk.boell.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/EN%20-%20The%20Feasibility%20and%20Future%20of%20Japan%27s%20Climate%20Policy%20V3.1.pdf.

Hasui, Seiichiro, and Hiroshi Komatsu. 2021. “Climate Security and Policy Options in Japan.” *Politics and Governance* 9, no. 4: 79–90. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4414.

Hayes, Jarrod, and Janelle Knox-Hayes. 2014. “Security in Climate Change Discourse: Analyzing the Divergence between US and EU Approaches to Policy.” *Global Environmental Politics* 14, no. 2: 82–101. https://muse-jhu-edu.uaccess.univie.ac.at/article/545869.

Heinrichs, Pauline S., and Leo Roberts. 2021. “Coal @ COP26: Ending International Public Fossil Finance – Oil Going, Gas Going, Coal Gone.” E3G, November 11, 2021. https://www.e3g.org/news/coal-cop26-ending-international-public-fossil-finance-coal-done-oil-and-gas-began/.

Hernandez, Ariel M., and Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby. 2020. “Securitization of Climate and Environmental Protection in China’s New Normal.” *SSRN Scholarly Paper*. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3686466.

Herre, Bastian. 2022. “The World Has Recently Become Less Democratic.” Our World in Data, September 6, 2022. https://ourworldindata.org/less-democratic.

Higuchi, Koichi. 2016. “A Two-Step Approach to Quantitative Content Analysis: KH Coder Tutorial Using Anne of Green Gables (Part I).” *Ritsumeikan Social Sciences Review* 52, no. 3: 77–91. https://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/file.jsp?id=325881.

Holbig, Heike. 2023. “Official Visions of Democracy in Xi Jinping’s China.” In *Securitization and Democracy in Eurasia: Transformation and Development in the OSCE Region*, edited by Anja Mihr, Paolo Sorbello, and Brigitte Weiffen, 267–77. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16659-4_18.

Hoogensen Gjørv, Gunhild. 2016. “Human Security: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan.” In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, 2nd ed., edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty, and Thierry Balzacq, 106–116. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315753393.

House of Councillors. 2020. “Dai 203-kai kokkai (rinji-kai) 第 203 回国会（臨時会）” [203rd National Diet (extraordinary session)]. https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/gian/203/meisai/m203600203001.htm.

———. 2021. “Dai 204-kai kokkai (tsūjō-kai) 第 204 回国会（常会）” [204th National Diet (Regular Session)]. https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/gian/204/meisai/m204080204047.htm.

———. 2022. “Dai 208 kokkai (tsūjō-kai) 第 208 回国会（常会）” [208th National Diet (Regular Session)]. https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/gian/208/meisai/m208080208025.htm.

House of Representatives. n.d. “Ketsugi dai 203-kai kokkai 1 kikō hijō jitai sengen ketsugi-an 決議 第 203 回国会 1 気候非常事態宣言決議案” [Resolution 203rd National Diet 1 draft resolution to declare a state of climate emergency]. Accessed

July 10, 2023. https://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/keika/1DD0C5A.htm.

Hu, Haiqing, Di Chen, Chun-Ping Chang, and Yin Chu. 2021. "The Political Economy of Environmental Consequences: A Review of the Empirical Literature." *Journal of Economic Surveys* 35, no. 1: 250–306. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12396.

Huckin, Thomas, Jennifer Andrus, and Jennifer Clary-Lemon. 2012. "Critical Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric and Composition." *College Composition and Communication* 64, no. 1 (September): 107–29. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23264919.

Huysmans, Jef. 1998. "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe." *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4: 479–505. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066198004004004.

———. 2006. *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*. 0 ed. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203008690.

Incerti, Trevor, and Phillip Y. Lipscy. 2018. "The Politics of Energy and Climate Change in Japan under Abe: Abenergynomics." *Asian Survey* 58, no. 4: 607–34. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.4.607.

Ishikane Kimihiro. 2021a. "Statement by the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, Ishikane Kimihiro." In *Letter Dated 25 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the Members of the Security Council*. United Nations Security Council, 83-84. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3908204?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header.

———. 2021b. "Statement by H.E. Ambassador Ishikane Kimihiro, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, at the Security Council Open Debate on 'Maintenance of International Peace and Security - Climate and Security.'" Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. September 23, 2021. https://www.un.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/ishikane092321.html.

Japan Cabinet Office. 2021a. *Chikyū ondanka taisaku keikaku 地球温暖化対策計画* [Global Warming Countermeasures Plan]. https://www.meti.go.jp/policy/energy_environment/global_warming/ontaikeikaku/keikaku_honbun.pdf.

———. 2021b. *Climate Change Adaptation Plan*. https://www.env.go.jp/content/000081210.pdf.

Japan Expert Panel on Climate Change. 2021. *Kikō hendō taisaku suishin no tame no yūshikisha kaigi hōkoku-sho 気候変動対策推進のための有識者会議報告書* [Report of the Expert Panel on the Promotion of Climate Change Countermeasures]. Cabinet Secretariat. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/kikouhendoutaisaku/pdf/houkokusyo.pdf.

Japan Ministry of Defense. 2020. *2020 Defense of Japan*. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2020/DOJ2020_EN_Full.pdf.

———. 2021. *2021 Defense of Japan*. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2021/DOJ2021_EN_Full.pdf.

———. 2022a. *2022 Defense of Japan*. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2022/DOJ2022_EN_Full_02.pdf.

———. 2022b. *Ministry of Defense Response Strategy on Climate Change*. https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/meeting/kikouhendou/pdf/taishosenryaku_202208_e.pdf.

Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 2020. *Ryō Kazu moto nendo enerugī ni kansuru nenji hōkoku (enerugī hakusho 2020) 令和元年度 エネルギーに関する年次報告（エネルギー白書 2020)* [Annual Report on Energy for 2019 (Energy White Paper 2020). https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/whitepaper/2020pdf/.

———. 2021. *Ryō wa 2-nendo enerugī ni kansuru nenji hōkoku (enerugī hakusho 2021) 令和 2 年度エネルギーに関する年次報告 （エネルギー白書 2021)* [Annual Report on Energy for 2020 (Energy White Paper 2021)]. https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/whitepaper/2021/pdf/.

———. 2022. *Ryō wa 3-nendo enerugī ni kansuru nenji hōkoku 令和 3 年度 エネルギーに関する年次報告* [Annual Report on Energy for 2021]. https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/about/whitepaper/2022/pdf/whitepaper2022_all.pdf.

———. 2023. *GX jitsugen ni muketa kihon hōshin GX 実現に向けた基本方針* [Basic Policy for realizing GX]. https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2022/02/20230210002/20230210002_1.pdf.

Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2020. *Diplomatic Bluebook 2020*. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100116875.pdf.

———. 2021. *Diplomatic Bluebook 2021*. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2021/pdf/pdfs/2021_all.pdf.

———. 2022. *Diplomatic Bluebook 2022*. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2022/pdf/pdfs/2022_all.pdf.

Japan Ministry of the Environment. 2019. *Annual Report on the Environment in Japan 2019*. https://www.env.go.jp/content/900457451.pdf.

———. 2020a. *Annual Report on the Environment in Japan 2020*. https://www.env.go.jp/content/900457464.pdf.

———. 2020b. *Assessment Report on Climate Change Impacts in Japan*. https://www.env.go.jp/content/000047546.pdf.

———. 2021a. *Annual Report on the Environment in Japan 2021*. https://www.env.go.jp/content/900457474.pdf.

———. 2021b. “The Cabinet’s Approval of the Climate Change Adaptation Plan and the Results of the Call for Public Comments on the Plan.” October 22, 2021. https://www.env.go.jp/en/headline/2560.html.

Japan National Security Council. 2022. *National Security Strategy of Japan*. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf.

Jiang, Yifan. 2021. “China at COP26: Coal, 1.5C and Short-Term Actions.” China Dialogue, November 16, 2021. https://chinadialogue.net/en/climate/coal-1-5c-and-short-term-actions-china-at-cop26/.

Johnston, Eric. 2022. “With One Notable Exception, Kishida’s Climate Policy Is Similar to His Predecessors’.” *Japan Times*, October 19, 2022. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/10/19/national/kishida-government-climate-policy-continuation/.

Joseph, Justin, and Joe T. Karackattu. 2022. “State Actions and the Environment: Examining the Concept of Ecological Security in China.” *Environment, Development and Sustainability* 24: 13057–82. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-021-01982-0.

Joshi, Devin K. 2009. “Do We Have a Winner? What the China-India Paradox May Reveal about Regime Type and Human Security.” *Asian International Studies Review* 10, no. 1: 73–98. https://doi.org/10.1163/2667078X-01001004.

Kameyama, Yasuko, and Keishi Ono. 2021. “The Development of Climate Security Discourse in Japan.” *Sustainability Science* 16: 271–81. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-020-00863-1.

Keohane, Robert O. 1988. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4: 379–96. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600589.

King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2014. “Reverse-Engineering Censorship in China: Randomized Experimentation and Participant Observation.” *Science* 345, no. 6199: 1251722. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1251722.

———. 2017. “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument.” *American Political Science Review* 111, no. 3: 484–501. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000144.

Kishida, Fumio. 2021a. *COP26 World Leaders Summit Statement by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100255025.pdf.

———. 2021b. “Opening Speech by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the GZERO Summit 2021.” Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, December 8, 2021. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202112/_00006.html.

———. 2022a. “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to the 208th Session of the Diet.” Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, January 17, 2022. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202201/_00009.html.

———. 2022b. “Policy Speech by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to the 210th Session of the Diet.” Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, October 3, 2022. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202210/_00003.html.

Kluver, Alan. 1996. “Chinese Political Discourse and the Rhetoric of Legimitacy.” In *Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms: A Rhetoric of Myth and Orthodoxy*, 121-39. Albany, NY: SUNY Press

Kneuer, Marianne. 2022. “Democratic Erosion and Multilateralism: When Authoritarian Leaders Challenge the Liberal International Order.” In *Does the UN Model Still Work? Challenges and Prospects for the Future of Multilateralism*, edited by Kim Fontaine-Skronski, Valeriane Thool, and Norbert Eschborn, 87–110. Leiden: Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004516489_008.

Koizumi, Shinjiro. 2020. *June Momentum Opening Session Video Message by Koizumi Shinjiro, Minister of the Environment, Japan*. Ministry of the Environment. https://www.env.go.jp/content/900451335.pdf.

———. 2021. "Statement by Koizumi Shinjiro, Minister of the Environment, Japan, on the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)." Ministry of the Environment, Government of Japan, August 9, 2021. https://www.env.go.jp/en/focus/statement/statement12.html.

Koppenborg, Florentine, and Ulv Hanssen. 2021. "Japan's Climate Change Discourse: Toward Climate Securitisation?" *Politics and Governance* 9, no. 4: 53–64. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4419.

Kostka, Genia, and Chunman Zhang. 2018. "Tightening the Grip: Environmental Governance under Xi Jinping." *Environmental Politics* 27, no. 5: 769–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2018.1491116.

Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2011. "The Liberal Democratic Party in Time." In *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP: Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions*, 1–28. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801460029.

Kutz, Christopher. 2014. "Democracy, Defence, and the Threat of Intervention." In *The Morality of Defensive War*, edited by Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar, 229-246. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682836.003.0010.

Lachapelle, Erick, and Matthew Paterson. 2013. "Drivers of National Climate Policy." *Climate Policy* 13, no. 5: 547–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2013.811333.

Lamain, Corinne. 2022. "Conflicting Securities: Contributions to a Critical Research Agenda on Climate Security." *Globalizations* 19, no. 8: 1257–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2022.2057093.

Lee, Chermaine. 2022. "China Could Cut Methane Emissions Through Monitoring, Diet Changes, Experts Say." *VOA,* November 20, 2022. https://www.voanews.com/a/china-could-cut-methane-emissions-through-monitoring-diet-changes-experts-say/6842280.html.

Leiserowitz, Anthony, Jennifer Carman, Nicole Buttermore, Liz Neyens, Seth Rosenthal, Jennifer Marlon, et al. 2022. *International Public Opinion on Climate Change*. Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/international-public-opinion-on-climate-change-2022a.pdf.

Leung, Guy C. K., Aleh Cherp, Jessica Jewell, and Yi-Ming Wei. 2014. "Securitization of Energy Supply Chains in China." *Applied Energy* 123 (June): 316–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2013.12.016.

Levy, Samora, Leo Roberts, and Pauline S. Heinrichs. 2021. "Coal @ COP26: No New Coal Is Now the Norm." E3G, November 11, 2021. https://www.e3g.org/news/coal-cop26-no-new-coal-is-now-the-norm/.

Li, Xiaojun, and Dingding Chen. 2021. “Public Opinion, International Reputation, and Audience Costs in an Authoritarian Regime.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38, no. 5: 543–60. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220906374.

Lin-Greenberg, Erik. 2018. “Non-Traditional Security Dilemmas: Can Military Operations Other than War Intensify Security Competition in Asia?” *Asian Security* 14, no. 3: 282–302. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2017.1414044.

Liu, Hongqiao, and Jianqiang Liu. 2021. “Q&A: Could an Environmental Inspector’s Criticisms Accelerate China’s Climate Policies?” Carbon Brief, February 5, 2021. https://www.carbonbrief.org/qa-could-an-environmental-inspectors-criticisms-accelerate-chinas-climate-policies/.

Liu Ming. 2022. “Discursive Constructions of China’s Ecological Images: A Corpus-Assisted Discourse Study.” *Modern Foreign Languages* 1: 83–96. https://doi.org/10.20071/j.cnki.xdwy.2023.01.004.

Ma, Ziyi, and Yu Ma. 2023. “What’s After Coal? Accelerating China’s Overseas Investment in Renewables.” World Resources Institute, January 31, 2023. https://www.wri.org/insights/whats-after-coal-accelerating-chinas-overseas-investment-renewables.

Macro Polo. n.d. “Influencers: The New Geopolitics of New Energy.” Accessed June 18, 2023. https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/new-energy-influencers/.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Fernando Bizzarro. 2019. “The Fates of Third-Wave Democracies.” *Journal of Democracy* 30, no. 1: 99–113. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0008.

Marquardt, Kyle L. 2023. “V-Dem Methodology: Aggregating Expert Assessments.” In *Defiance in the Face of Autocratization. Democracy Report 2023*, edited by Evie Papada, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Lisa Gastaldi, Tamara Köhler, Martin Lundstedt, et al., 48. University of Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem Institute). https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf.

Mattes, Michaela, and Mariana Rodríguez. 2014. “Autocracies and International Cooperation.” *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 3 (September): 527–38. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24014613.

McDonald, Matt. 2008a. “Constructivism.” In *Security Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Paul D. Williams, 59–72. London: Routledge.

———. 2008b. “Securitization and the Construction of Security.” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 4: 563–87. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066108097553.

———. 2012. “The Failed Securitization of Climate Change in Australia.” *Australian Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 4: 579–92. https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2012.731487.

———. 2013. “Discourses of Climate Security.” *Political Geography* 33: 42–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2013.01.002.

Messner, Philippe. 2022. “COP27: Japan Awarded ‘Fossil of the Day,’ Again, for Its Lack of Involvement on Climate.” *Le Monde*, November 14, 2022.

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/environment/article/2022/11/14/cop27-japan-awarded-fossil-of-the-day-again-for-its-lack-of-involvement-on-climate_6004179_114.html.

MIT Technology Review. 2023. "The Green Future Index 2023." https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/04/05/1070581/the-green-future-index-2023/.

Morris, Lyle J. 2022. "What China's New Central Military Commission Tells Us About Xi's Military Strategy." Asia Society. October 27, 2022. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/what-chinas-new-central-military-commission-tells-us-about-xis-military-strategy.

Mutimer, David. 2016. "Critical Security Studies." In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, 2nd ed., edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty, and Thierry Balzacq, 106–116. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315753393.

Nathan, Andrew J. 2020. "The Puzzle of Authoritarian Legitimacy." *Journal of Democracy* 31, no. 11: 158–68. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2020.0013.

Neumann, Iver B. 2008. "Discourse Analysis." In *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, edited by Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash, 61–77. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230584129.

Neumayer, Eric. 2002. "Do Democracies Exhibit Stronger International Environmental Commitment? A Cross-Country Analysis." *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 2 (March): 139–64. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1555296.

Nillson-Wright, John, and John Wallace. 2022. "Democracy in Japan." Chatham House, September 8, 2022. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/09/democracy-japan.

Norris, Pippa. 2012. "Conclusion." In *Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace*, 187–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139061902.

Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative. n.d. "Country Rankings: Vulnerability." University of Notre Dame. Accessed June 15, 2023. https://gain.nd.edu/our-work/country-index/rankings/.

Nyman, Jonna. 2014. "'Red Storm Ahead': Securitisation of Energy in US–China Relations." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 43, no. 1: 43–65. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814525495.

Nyman, Jonna, and Jinghan Zeng. 2016. "Securitization in Chinese Climate and Energy Politics." *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change* 7, no.2: 301–13. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.387.

O'Brien, Ross. 2023. *The Green Future Index 2023*. 3rd ed. MIT Technology Review Insights. https://mittrinsights.s3.amazonaws.com/GFI23report.pdf.

Odell, John S., and Dustin Tingley. 2013. "Negotiating Agreements in International Relations." In *Negotiating Agreement in Politics: Report of the Task Force on Negotiating Agreement in Politics*, edited by Jane Mansbridge, and Cathie J. Martin, 144–182. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dtingley/files/negotiating_agreement_in_politics.pdf.

Odeyemi, Christo, and Takashi Sekiyama. 2022. "A Review of Climate Security Discussions in Japan." *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 19, no. 14: 8253. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19148253.

Oels, Angela. 2012. "From 'Securitization' of Climate Change to 'Climatization' of the Security Field: Comparing Three Theoretical Perspectives." In *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability*, edited by Jürgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, Hans G. Brauch, Peter M. Link, and Janpeter Schilling, 185–205. Berlin: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28626-1_9.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2021. "Japan." In *Integrating Environmental and Climate Action into Development Co-Operation: Reporting on DAC Members' High-Level Meeting Commitments*. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/integrating-environmental-and-climate-action-into-development-co-operation_285905b2-en.

Papada, Evie, David Altman, Fabio Angiolillo, Lisa Gastaldi, Tamara Köhler, Martin Lundstedt, et al. 2023. *Democracy Report 2023: Defiance in the Face of Autocratization*. University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem Institute). https://www.v-dem.net/documents/29/V-dem_democracyreport2023_lowres.pdf.

Patomäki, Heikki. 2015. "Absenting the Absence of Future Dangers and Structural Transformations in Securitization Theory." In *Forum: What Kind of Theory – If Any – Is Securitization?* edited by Thierry Balzacq, Stefano Guzzini, Michael C. Williams, Ole Wæver, and Heikki Patomäki, *International Relations* 29, no. 1: 128–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814526606.

Pew Research Center. 2022. "U.S. Voting-Age Population Turnout Is Still behind Many Other Countries despite Its Recent Rise, Though Registered-Voter Turnout Is Remarkably Higher." November 1, 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2022/11/01/turnout-in-u-s-has-soared-in-recent-elections-but-by-some-measures-still-trails-that-of-many-other-countries/ft_22-10-17_globalturnout_dot/.

Piccone, Ted. 2017a. "Democracy and Human Security." *Brookings Policy Brief*: 1–5. https://community-democracies.org/app/uploads/2018/06/fp_20170905_democracy_human_security-1.pdf

———. 2017b. "Democracy and Human Security in Developing Countries." *Democracy and Security Dialogue Working Paper Series*: 1–14. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/fp_20170905_democracy_human_security_working_paper.pdf.

Pilster, Ulrich, and Tobias Böhmelt. 2012. "Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil—Military Relations." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8, no. 4: 355–71. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00160.x.

Po, Sovinda, and Kearrin Sims. 2022. "The Myth of Non-Interference: Chinese Foreign Policy in Cambodia." *Asian Studies Review* 46, no. 1: 36–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2021.1887813.

Ran, Ran. 2017. “Understanding Blame Politics in China’s Decentralized System of Environmental Governance: Actors, Strategies and Context. *China Quarterly* 231: 634–61. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741017000911.

Roe, Paul. 2008. “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision To Invade Iraq.” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 6 (December): 615–35. http://www.jstor.com/stable/26299819.

Rong, Fang. 2010. “Understanding Developing Country Stances on Post-2012 Climate Change Negotiations: Comparative Analysis of Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa.” *Energy Policy* 38, no. 8: 4582–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.04.014.

Rudolf, Peter. 2021. “The Sino-American World Conflict.” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 63, no. 2: 87–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1905980.

Sahu, Anjan Kumar. 2021. “From the Climate Change Threat to the Securitisation of Development: An Analysis of China.” *China Report* 57, no. 2: 192–209. https://doi.org/10.1177/00094455211004259.

Sandalow, David, M. Meidan, Philip Andrews-Speed, Anders Hove, Sally Y. Qiu, and Edmund Downie. 2023. *Guide to Chinese Climate Policy 2022*. Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. https://chineseclimatepolicy.oxfordenergy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Guide-to-Chinese-Climate-Policy-2022.pdf.

Schalatek, Liane, and Erin Roberts. 2021. “Deferred Not Defeated: The Outcome on Loss and Damage Finance at COP26 and Next Steps.” Heinrich Böll Stiftung, December 16, 2021. https://us.boell.org/en/2021/12/16/deferred-not-defeated-outcome-loss-and-damage-finance-cop26-and-next-steps.

Schoppa, Leonard J. 2011. “Introduction: From the 1955 System to the ‘2000 System’.” In *The Evolution of Japan’s Party System: Politics and Party in an Era of Institutional Change*, edited by Leonard J. Schoppa, 3–13. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442695429.

Schulze, Kai. 2018. “Japan’s New Assertiveness: Institutional Change and Japan’s Securitization of China.” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 18, no. 2: 221–47. https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcw018.

Scott, Shirley V. 2012. “The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close Have We Come and Would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change Policy?” *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law* 21, no. 3: 220–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12008.

Shirk, Susan L. 2018. “China in Xi’s “New Era”: The Return to Personalistic Rule.” *Journal of Democracy* 29, no. 2 (April): 22–36. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0022.

Singh, Shivani, Aaron Sheldrick, and Noah Browning. 2021. “‘Down’ and ‘out’? COP26 Wording Clouds Way Ahead on Climate.” *Reuters*, November 15, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/business-usual-global-fossil-fuel-firms-now-after-un-climate-deal-2021-11-15/.

Sofer, Ken. 2016. “Climate Politics in Japan.” *Sasakawa USA Forum* 1: 1–24. https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Sofer-Climate-Politics-in-Japan.pdf.

Solís, Mireya. 2021. “Japan’s Democratic Renewal and the Survival of the Liberal Order.” Brookings. January 22, 2021. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/japans-democratic-renewal-and-the-survival-of-the-liberal-order/.

Song, Wonjun. 2022. “Dictators, Personalized Security Forces, and Coups.” *International Interactions* 48, no. 2: 204–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1977638.

Stevens, Harry. 2023. “The U.S. Has Caused the Most Global Warming. When Will China Pass It?” *Washington Post*, March 1, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/interactive/2023/global-warming-carbon-emissions-china-us/.

Stritzel, Holger. 2007. “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond.” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3: 357–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107080128.

Suga, Yoshihide. 2020. “Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 203rd Session of the Diet.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, October 28, 2020. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/99_suga/statement/202010/_00006.html.

———. 2021a. “Address by Prime Minister Suga at the Seventy-Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 24, 2021. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp_a/page4e_001176.html.

———. 2021b. *Leaders Summit on Climate Remarks by H.E. Mr. Suga Yoshihide, Prime Minister of Japan*. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100181623.pdf.

———. 2021c. “Policy Speech by the Prime Minister to the 204th Session of the Diet.” Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, January 18, 2021. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/99_suga/statement/202101/_00013.html.

Sun, Jinlong. 2022. “Shēngtài huánjìng bù dǎngzǔ shūjì sūn jīnlóng: Wèi quánqiú qìhòu zhìlǐ gòngxiàn zhōngguó zhìhuì zhōngguó fāng'àn zhōngguó lìliàng 生态环境部党组书记孙金龙：为全球气候治理贡献中国智慧中国方案中国力量” [Sun Jinlong, Secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment: Contributing Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese power to global climate governance]. Ministry of Ecology and Environment, June 9, 2022. https://www.mee.gov.cn/ywdt/hjywnews/202206/t20220609_985058.shtml.

Svolik, Milan W. 2012. “Introduction: The Anatomy of Dictatorship.” In *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 1–18. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139176040.

Tai, Yun, and King-wa Fu. 2020. “Specificity, Conflict, and Focal Point: A Systematic Investigation into Social Media Censorship in China.” *Journal of Communication* 70, no. 6: 842–67. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqaa032.

Take, Sayumi, and Rhyannon Bartlett-Imadegawa. 2022. “Nations Agree on COP27 Deal with Landmark ‘Loss and Damage’ Fund.” *Nikkei Asia*, November 20, 2022. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Environment/Climate-Change/COP27/Nations-agree-on-COP27-deal-with-landmark-loss-and-damage-fund.

Theseira, Julian. 2022. “China at COP27: ‘Loss and Damage’ and Fossil Fuels Take Center Stage.” China Observers, November 24, 2022. https://chinaobservers.eu/china-at-cop27-loss-and-damage-and-fossil-fuels-take-center-stage/.

Third World Network. 2021. “Loss and Damage Fight at COP26.” *Glasgow Climate News Update*, 2021 17: 1–8. https://www.twn.my/title2/climate/news/glasgow01/TWN%20Climate%20News%20Update_No17_19Nov2021.pdf.

Thomson, Catarina, and Stephane Baele. 2022. “Securitization Theory.” In *Contemporary Security Studies*, 6th ed., edited by Alan Collins, 173–85. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1093/hepl/9780198862192.001.0001.

Tiberghien, Yves. 2023. “Kishida’s Climate Policy and Opportunities for U.S.-Japan Cooperation.” *Asia Policy* 18, no. 1: 49–65. https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2023.0007.

Trombetta, Maria J. 2008. “Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the Discourse.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 4: 585–602. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557570802452920.

———. 2011. “Rethinking the Securitization of the Environment: Old Beliefs, New Insights.” In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, edited by Thierry Balzacq, 135–49. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203868508.

———. 2019. “Securitization of Climate Change in China: Implications for Global Climate Governance.” *China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies* 5, no. 1: 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1142/S2377740019500076.

Tuchman Mathews, Jessica. 1989. “Redefining Security.” *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 2 (Spring): 162–77. https://doi.org/10.2307/20043906

United Nations. 1992. *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/application/pdf/conveng.pdf.

United Nations Development Programme. 1994. *Human Development Report 1994*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/hdr1994encompletenostatspdf.pdf.

———. 2021. “China’s Climate Policy Documents - 1+N and Updated NDC.” *UNDP Issue Brief* 6: 1–6. https://www.undp.org/china/publications/issue-brief-chinas-climate-policy-documents-1n-and-updated-ndc.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 2018. *The People’s Republic of China Third National Communication on Climate Change.* https://unfccc.int/documents/197660

———. 2022a. “Climate Plans Remain Insufficient: More Ambitious Action Needed Now.” October 26, 2022. https://unfccc.int/news/climate-plans-remain-insufficient-more-ambitious-action-needed-now.

———. 2022b. “United in Science: We Are Heading in the Wrong Direction.” September 13, 2022. https://unfccc.int/news/united-in-science-we-are-heading-in-the-wrong-direction.

van Munster, Rens. 2005. “Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror.” *University of Southern Denmark Political Science Publications* 10: 1–19.

https://findresearcher.sdu.dk/ws/portalfiles/portal/153456109/PolSkr_Rens10_2005.pdf.

Voïta, Thibaud. 2018. “Xi Jinping’s Institutional Reforms: Environment over Energy?” *French Institute of International Relations Édito Énergie*: 1–6. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/voita_xi_jinping_institutional_reforms_2018.pdf.

Volcovici, Valerie, and Aidan Lewis. 2022. “COP27: Island Nations Want China, India to Pay for Climate Damage.” *Reuters*, November 8, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/cop27-island-nations-want-china-india-pay-climate-damage-2022-11-08/.

von Lucke, Franziskus. 2023. “The EU and China in the Climate Regime: Exploring Different Pathways towards Climate Justice.” *Asia Europe Journal* 21: 429–35. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-022-00654-6.

von Lucke, Franziskus, Zehra Wellmann, and Thomas Diez. 2014. “What’s at Stake in Securitising Climate Change? Towards a Differentiated Approach.” *Geopolitics* 19, no. 4: 857–84. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2014.913028.

von Soest, Christian von. 2015. “Democracy Prevention: The International Collaboration of Authoritarian Regimes.” *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4: 623–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12100.

von Soest, Christian von, and Julia Grauvogel. 2017. “Identity, Procedures and Performance: How Authoritarian Regimes Legitimize Their Rule.” *Contemporary Politics* 23, no. 3: 287–305. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2017.1304319.

Vuori, Juha A. 2008. “Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders.” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1: 65–99. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066107087767.

———. 2016. “Constructivism and Securitization Studies.” In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, 2nd ed., edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty, and Thierry Balzacq, 64–74. London: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315753393.

Wæver, Ole. 1995. “Securitization and Desecuritization.” In *On Security,* edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz, 46–86. New York: Columbia University Press.

———. 2014. “The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as Seen from Securitization.” In *Forum: What Kind of Theory – If Any – Is Securitization?* edited by Thierry Balzacq, Stefano Guzzini, Michael C. Williams, Ole Wæver, and Heikki Patomäki, *International Relations* 29, no. 1: 26–32. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117814526606.

Wæver, Ole, and Barry Buzan. 2022. “After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies.” In *Contemporary Security Studies*, 6th ed., edited by Alan Collins, 437–57. Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi-org.uaccess.univie.ac.at/10.1093/hepl/9780198862192.001.0001.

Wang, Pu, Lei Liu, and Tong Wu. 2018. “A Review of China’s Climate Governance: State, Market and Civil Society.” *Climate Policy* 18, no. 5: 664–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2017.1331903.

Wang Yi. 2019. “A Joint Response to Climate Change A Better Environment for Our Planet.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 24, 2019. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201909/t20190924_678772.html.

———. 2021. “China’s Diplomacy in 2021: Embracing a Global Vision and Serving the Nation and Its People.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. December 20, 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/202112/t20211220_10471930.html.

Warner, Jeroen, and Ingrid Boas. 2019. “Securitization of Climate Change: How Invoking Global Dangers for Instrumental Ends Can Backfire.” *Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space* 37, no. 8: 1471–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654419834018.

Wedeen, Lisa. 2004. “Concepts and Commitments in the Study of Democracy.” In *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, 274–306. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492174.013.

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve.” *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (Winter): 35–64. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40071874.

———. 2012. “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict.” *The American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (May): 326–47. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41495081.

Wilkinson, Claire. 2007. “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?” *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (March): 5–25. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26299738.

Williams, Michael C. 2003. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics.” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 4 (December): 511–31. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3693634.

Williams, Paul D., ed. 2008a. *Security Studies: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.

———. 2008b. “Security Studies: An Introduction.” In *Security Studies: An Introduction*, edited by Paul D. Williams, 1–12. London: Routledge.

Wu, Fuzuo. 2018. “Shaping Energy and Climate Policy Behavior: Wealth, Status, and Asymmetrical Independence.” In *Energy and Climate Policies in China and India: A Two-Level Comparative Study*, 31–76. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108333498.

Wuebbles, Donald J. 2018. “Climate Change in the 21st Century: Looking Beyond the Paris Agreement.” In *Climate Change and Its Impacts: Risks and Inequalities*, edited by Colleen Murphy, Paolo Gardoni, and Robert McKim, 15–38. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77544-9_2.

Wyn Jones, Richard. 1995. “‘Message in a Bottle’? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies.” *Contemporary Security Policy* 16, no. 3: 299–319. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523269508404119.

———. 2001. “Introduction: Locating Critical International Relations Theory.” In *Critical Theory and World Politics*, edited by Richard Wyn Jones, 1–22. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781588269577.

Xi Jinping. 2020a. “Building on Past Achievements and Launching a New Journey for Global Climate Actions.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. December 12, 2020. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202012/t20201213_678958.html.

———. 2020b. “Full Text of Xi’s Statement at the General Debate of the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly.” Xinhua. September 23, 2020. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-09/23/c_139388686.htm.

———. 2021a. “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Statement at COP26 Climate Summit.” Nikkei Asia. November 2, 2021. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Environment/Climate-Change/COP26/Full-text-of-Xi-Jinping-s-statement-at-COP26-climate-summit.

———. 2021b. “Full Text: Remarks by Chinese President Xi Jinping at Leaders Summit on Climate.” Xinhua. April 22, 2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-04/22/c_139899289.htm.

———. 2021c. “Remarks by Xi Jinping at Session I of the 16th G20 Leaders’ Summit.” State Council Information Office. October 31, 2021. http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2021-10/31/content_77842502.htm.

———. 2022a. “Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. October 25, 2022. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202210/t20221025_10791908.html.

———. 2022b. “Full Text of Xi’s Remarks at Session I of G20 Summit in Bali.” State Council Information Office. November 16, 2022. http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2022-11/16/content_78521457.htm.

Xie Zhenhua. 2021. “Statement by the Special Envoy for Climate Change of China, Xie Zhenhua.” In *Letter Dated 25 February 2021 from the President of the Security Council Addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the Members of the Security Council*. United Nations Security Council, 38–39. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_198.pdf.

Xinhua. 2017. “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind.” Xinhua, January 19, 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/19/c_135994707.htm.

Yamada, Takahiro. 2021. “Transforming the Dynamics of Climate Politics in Japan: Business’ Response to Securitization.” *Politics and Governance* 9, no.4: 65–78. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4427.

Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi. 2021. “Statement by Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, Minister of the Environment, Japan, on the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures, the National Government Action Plan, the Long-Term Strategy under the Paris Agreement and the Climate Change Adaptation Plan (Oct.22,2021).” Ministry of the Environment,

Government of Japan. October 21, 2021. https://www.env.go.jp/en/focus/statement/statement10.html.

Yang, Hongxing, and Dingxin Zhao. 2015. “Performance Legitimacy, State Autonomy and China’s Economic Miracle.” *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 91: 64–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.918403.

Yang, Jilong. 2022. “Understanding China’s Changing Engagement in Global Climate Governance: A Struggle for Identity.” *Asia Europe Journal* 20, no. 4: 357–76. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-021-00643-1.

You, Xiaoying. 2021. “Explainer: China Creates New ‘Leaders Group’ to Help Deliver Its Climate Goals.” Carbon Brief, June 3, 2021. https://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-china-creates-new-leaders-group-to-help-deliver-its-climate-goals/.

Zeng, Jinghan. 2021. “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China.” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 14, no. 3: 417–45. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poab005.

Zhang Jun. 2021a. “Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun at Security Council Open Debate on Climate and Security.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. September 23, 2021. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/202109/t20210924_9580180.html.

———. 2021b. “Remarks by Ambassador Zhang Jun at the High-Level Open Debate on the Theme ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Security in the Context of Terrorism and Climate Change’.” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN. December 9, 2021. http://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202112/t20211210_10466246.htm.

Zhang, Yunhan, and Jan Orbie. 2021. “Strategic Narratives in China’s Climate Policy: Analysing Three Phases in China’s Discourse Coalition.” *The Pacific Review* 34, no. 1: 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2019.1637366.

Appendix 1 – Abstract

English version

Current global climate action suggests that many governments do not consider climate change as a security issue threatening enough to justify taking drastic countermeasures. While reproducing actual threat perceptions by governmental actors is hardly possible, the concept of securitization, following the understanding that certain actors can construct security threats through language and actions, is a suitable tool for their approximation. This makes it all the more problematic that the processes through which a country's regime type shapes the securitization by state actors are frequently entertained yet unquestioned and untested assumptions. To fill this void and contribute to a better understanding of how climate policies come to be, a structured, focused comparison of China and Japan is conducted, focusing on actor-audience constellations, referent objects, and proposed countermeasures in the realm of climate diplomacy. This thesis finds that regime type is shaping state-driven securitization processes concerning climate change in complex ways in both countries. More specifically, China's regime type leaves a shrinking core-executive free to construct climate change as a threat to what it considers to be part of national security and to combine cooperative and uncooperative bargaining positions in climate diplomacy. In the case of Japan, liberal democratic qualities do not prevent the securitization of climate change and climate diplomacy to be shaped by the preferences held and pressures faced of an LDP-led executive without much leverage from the legislative or general public. The findings contribute to the refining of the concept of securitization and its use for developing a better understanding of climate policy determinants, necessary for overcoming stumbling blocks to more ambitious international action. They also allow for defining initial, contingent propositions concerning countries with similar regime types. Yet, further research is necessary to come up with more robust explanations of the effects of country-specific contexts on the securitization of climate change.

German version

Derzeitige globale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen legen nahe, dass viele Regierungen den Klimawandel nicht als ein Sicherheitsproblem betrachten, welches bedrohlich genug ist, um drastische Gegenmaßnahmen zu rechtfertigen. Während die Reproduzierung der tatsächlichen Wahrnehmung staatlicher Agierender kaum möglich ist, kann das Konzept der Versicherheitlichung, gemäß dem bestimmte Personengruppen Sicherheitsbedrohungen durch Sprache und Handlungen konstruieren können, ein geeignetes Instrument für deren näherungsweise Bestimmung darstellen. Umso problematischer ist es, dass die Prozesse, durch die der Regimetyp eines Landes die Versicherheitlichung durch staatliche Agierende prägt, häufig unhinterfragte und ungetestete Annahmen sind. Um diese Wissenslücke zu schließen und zu einem besseren Verständnis der Entstehung von Klimapolitik beizutragen, wird im Rahmen der Thesis ein strukturierter, fokussierter Vergleich zwischen China und Japan durchgeführt, der sich auf Machtkonstellationen zwischen initiierenden und Ziel-Gruppen, Referenzobjekte und vorgeschlagene Gegenmaßnahmen im Bereich der

Klimadiplomatie konzentriert. Diese Arbeit kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass in beiden Ländern die staatlich initiierten Versicherheitlichungsprozesse in Bezug auf den Klimawandel auf komplexe Weise durch deren Regimetyp geprägt werden. So führt Chinas Regimetyp zu einer Situation, in der eine kleiner werdende Kern-Exekutive die Freiheit besitzt, den Klimawandel als Bedrohung für das zu konstruieren, was sie als Teil der nationalen Sicherheit betrachtet, sowie kooperative und unkooperative Verhandlungspositionen in der Klimadiplomatie zu kombinieren. Im Falle Japans verhindern liberal-demokratische Qualitäten nicht, dass die Versicherheitlichung des Klimawandels und die Klimadiplomatie von den Präferenzen und Zwängen der LDP-geführten Exekutive geprägt werden, ohne dass die Legislative oder die breite Öffentlichkeit einen großen Einfluss ausüben können. Die Ergebnisse tragen zur Verfeinerung des Konzepts der Versicherheitlichung und seiner Verwendung für die Entwicklung eines besseren Verständnisses der klimapolitischen Einflussfaktoren bei, die für die Überwindung von Hindernissen für ehrgeizigere internationale Klimaschutzmaßnahmen notwendig ist. Sie ermöglichen auch die Formulierung erster Annahmen über Länder mit ähnlichen Regimetypen. Allerdings sind weitere Forschungsarbeiten erforderlich, um robustere Erklärungen für die Auswirkungen des länderspezifischen Kontexts auf die Versicherheitlichung des Klimawandels zu erarbeiten.

Appendix 2 – Measuring Regime Type

Table 3 List of mid-level Indices and Indicators

Conception of Democracy	Mid-level Index	Indicator	Question	Measurement	Source	Value China	Value Japan
Electoral		Share of population with suffrage	What is the percentage of the population with suffrage?	Percent	V-Dem (v2elsuffrage)	100	100
Electoral		Election vote buying	In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?	0 (yes) to 4 (none)	V-Dem (v2elvotbuy_ord)	-	3.67
Electoral		Election other voting irregularities	In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?	0 (yes) to 4 (none)	V-Dem (v2elirreg_ord)	-	4.00
Electoral		Election government intimidation	In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?	0 (yes) to 4 (none)	V-Dem (v2elintim_ord)	-	4.00
Electoral		Election free and fair	Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?	0 (no, not at all) to 4 (yes)	V-Dem (v2elfrfair_ord)	-	4.00
Electoral			Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FWI (A1)	0	4.00
Electoral			Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FWI (A2)	0	4.00
Electoral			Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FWI (A3)	0	4.00
Electoral			To what extent are political representatives determined by general, free and fair elections?	1 (national elections, if held at all, are entirely unfree and unfair) to 10 (there are no constraints on free and fair elections)	BTI (2.1)	1.00	-
Electoral	Elected officials index		Is the chief executive and legislature appointed through popular elections?	0 (low) to 1 (high)	V-Dem (v2x_elecof)	0	1.00
Electoral		Party ban	Are any parties banned?	0 (yes, all except the state-sponsored one) to 4 (no one)	V-Dem (v2psparban_ord)	0	4.00

Conception of Democracy	Mid-level Index	Indicator	Question	Measurement	Source	Value China	Value Japan
Electoral		Barriers to party	How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?	0 (parties are not allowed) to 4 (no substantial barriers)	V-Dem (v2psbars_ord)	1.00	4.00
Electoral		Opposition parties autonomy	Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?	0 (opposition parties not allowed) to 4 (all opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime)	V-Dem (v2psoppaut_ord)	0.67	4.00
Electoral		Elections multiparty	Was this national election multiparty?	0 (no) to 4 (yes)	V-Dem (v2elmulpar_ord)	-	4.00
Electoral		Civil society organizations entry and exit	To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?	0 (monopolistic control) to (unconstrained)	V-Dem (v2cseeorgs_ord)	0	4.00
Electoral		CSO repression	Does the government attempt to repress CSOs?	0 (severely) to 4 (no)	V-Dem (v2csreprss_ord)	1.00	4.00
Electoral		Freedom of party	Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FWI (B1)	0	4.00
Electoral		Association/assembly rights	To what extent can individuals form and join independent political or civic groups? To what extent can these groups operate and assemble freely?	1 (association and assembly rights are denied. Independent civic groups do not exist or are prohibited.) to 10 (association and assembly rights are guaranteed against interference or government restrictions. Residents and civic groups can fully exercise these rights.)	BTI (2.3)	2.00	-
Electoral	Expanded freedom of expression index		To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?	0 (low) to 1 (high)	V-Dem (v2x_freexp_altinf)	0.06	0.88
Electoral			Are there free and independent media?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FWI (D1)	0	3.00
Electoral			Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FWI (D4)	0	4.00

Conception of Democracy	Mid-level Index	Indicator	Question	Measurement	Source	Value China	Value Japan
Electoral			To what extent can citizens, organizations, and the mass media express opinions freely?	1 (no freedom of expression and independent media) to 10 (freedom of expression for everyone is guaranteed)	BDI (2.4)	1.50	-
Liberal		Rigorous and impartial public administration	Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?	0 (the law is not respected by public officials) to 4 (the law is fully respected by public officials)	V-Dem (v2clrspct_ord)	1.00	3.00
Liberal		Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	Are the laws of the land clear, well publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?	0 (transparency and predictability almost non-existent) to 4 (transparency and predictability very strong)	V-Dem (v2cltrnslw_ord)	1.00	4.00
Liberal		Transparent government	Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FIW (C3)	0	4.00
Liberal		Access to justice for all	Do women and men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?	0 (secure and effective access to justice is non-existent) to 4 (secure and effective access to justice is almost always observed)	V-Dem (v2clacjstm_ord, v2clprptyw_ord)	2.00	4.00
Liberal	Judicial constraints on the executive index		To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?	0 (low) to 1 (high)	(v2x_jucon)	0.04	0..82
Liberal	Legislative constraints on the executive index		To what extent are the legislature and government agencies e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?	0 (low) to 1 (high)	(v2xlg_legcon)	0.11	0.89
Liberal		Independent judiciary	Is there an independent judiciary?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FIW (F1)	1.00	4.00
Liberal			To what extent does an independent judiciary exist?	1 (not independent) to 10 (independent)	BTI (3.2)	2.00	-
Liberal		Separation of powers	To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)?	1 (no separation of powers) to 10 (clear separation of powers)	BTI (3.1)	1.00	-
Liberal		Freedom of assembly	Is there freedom of assembly?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FIW (E1)	1.00	4.00

Conception of Democracy	Mid-level Index	Indicator	Question	Measurement	Source	Value China	Value Japan
Liberal		Civil rights (broad)	To what extent are civil rights guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations of these rights?	1 (civil rights are systematically violated) to 10 (civil rights are codified by law and respected by all state institutions)	BIT (3.4)	2.00	-
Egalitarian	Equal protection index		How equal is the protection of rights and freedoms across social groups by the state?	0 (low) to 1 (high)	V-Dem (v2xeg_eqprotec)	0.32	0.98
	Equal access index		How equal is access to power?	0 (low) to 1 (high)	V-Dem (v2xeg_eqaccess)	0.48	0.86
Egalitarian		Equal judicial treatment	Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FIW (F4)	0	3.00
Participatory		CSO consultation	Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?	0 (no) to 2 (yes)	V-Dem (v2cscnsult_ord)	1.00	1.00
Participatory		CSO participatory environment	Which of these best describes the involvement of people in CSOs?	0 (if CSOs exist, they are mainly state-sponsored) to 3 (many diverse CSOs and many are active in them)	V-Dem (v2csprtcpt_ord)	0	2.00
Participatory		Engagement in independent political associations	What share of the population is regularly active in independent political interest associations, such as environmental associations, animal rights groups, or LGBT rights groups?	0 (virtually no one) to 4 (very large share of the population)	V-Dem (v2capolit_ord)	0	2.00
Participatory		Engaged society	When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?	0 (almost never allowed) to 5 (deliberation is common and unconstrained)	V-Dem (v2dlengage_ord)	2.00	4.00
Participatory			To what extent does the political leadership enable the participation of civil society in the political process?	1 (civil society participation obstructed) to 10 (civil society participation actively enabled)	BTI (16.4)	3.00	-
Participatory		Interest groups	To what extent is there a network of cooperative associations or interest groups to mediate between society and the political system?	1 (present only in isolated social segments) to 10 (broad range of interest groups)	BTI (5.2)	2.00	-
Participatory		Civil society traditions	To what extent are there traditions of civil society?	10 (very weak) to 1 (very strong)	BTI (13.2)	9.00	-

Conception of Democracy	Mid-level Index	Indicator	Question	Measurement	Source	Value China	Value Japan
	Regime corruption index		To what extent do political actors use political office for private or political gain?	0 (low) to 1 (high)	V-Dem (v2xnp_regcorr)	0.31	0.06
		Anti-corruption safeguards	Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	0 (low) to 4 (high)	FWI (C2)	1.00	4.00
			To what extent does the government successfully contain corruption?	1 (government fails to contain corruption) to 10 (government successfully contains corruption)	BTI (15.3)	5.00	-

Source: Data adapted from Bertelsmann Stiftung 2023; Coppedge et al. 2023b; Freedom House 2023.

Appendix 3 – Key Words for Discourse Analysis

Table 4 List of Key Words used for Classification into eight-fold Matrix[1]

Code	**Key words**
English	
*climate_change	climate | warming
*threat	threat | threaten | crisis | danger | endanger | short-term | immediate | serious | urgent | urgency | existential | extraordinary | direct | certain | instant | imminent | unavoidable | clear | inevitable | emergency | survival | destruction | eradicate | extreme | disaster | disastrous | pressing | great | grim | very | now | drastic | abrupt | deeply | damage | grave | hazard | harm | harmful | radical | unprecedented | severe | fight | combat | insurmountable | significant | formidable | acute
*risk	risk | resilience &! <*threat> | long-term | probability | probable | likely | maybe | uncertain | uncertainty | contingency | possibility | possible | diffuse | unclear | indirect | scenario & planning | precautionary | precaution | preparedness | prepare | manageable | manage | avoid | avoidable | safeguard | potential | may | might | unforeseeable | trend | project-->Verb | projection | later | at & some & point | in & the & future | prevent | preventative | expect-->Verb | challenge &! <*threat> | challenges &! <*threat> | concern &! <*threat> | forecast | problem &! <*threat> | issue-->noun &! <*threat>
*national_security_military	national+security | nation | social+stability | violent | violence | conflict | border | territory | territorial | instability | destabilize | mass+migration | unrest | military | defense | defend | national+interest | national+interests | terrorism
*national_security_non-traditional	national+security | economic & growth | economy & growth | sustainable & development | socio-economic & development | economic & development | image | energy & security | secure+energy | stable+energy | national+interest | national+interests
*human_security	human+security | human | humanity | humankind | mankind | vulnerable | vulnerability | wellbeing | dignity | individual | communities | poverty | food | water | disease | illness | inequality | oppression | social+exclusion | displacement | health
*planetary_security	earth | planet | planetary | globe | ecological | ecology | ecosystem | biodiversity | atmosphere | nature | biosphere | natural+environment | plants | animals | living
*national_security_military_threat	<*threat> & <*national_security_military>
*national_security_military_risk	<*risk> & <*national_security_military>
*national_security_non-traditional_threat	<*threat> & <*national_security_non-traditional >
*national_security_non-traditional_risk	<*risk> & <*national_security_non-traditional >
*human_security_threat	<*threat> & <*human security >
*human_security_risk	<*risk> & <*human security >

[1] To combine multiple conditions, a number of logical operators have been used: | (equals or), + (words are considered as one), & (and), &! (and not), <*…> (reuse of previously defined codes)

*planetary_security_threat	<*threat> & <*planetary security >
*planetary_security_risk	<*risk> & <*planetary security >
Chinese	
*climate_change	气候 | 暖化 | 变暖
*threat	威胁 | 危险 | 害 | 危害 | 危及 | 危机 | 危急 | 短期 | 立刻 | 即时 | 立即 | 严重 | 紧急 | 存在的 | 非凡 | 直接 | 一定 | 特定 | 必然 | 瞬间 | 一瞬 | 紧迫 | 迫切 | 急迫 | 濒危 | 免不得 | 未免 | 明显 | 清楚 | 无法避免 | 急难 | 应急 | 存活 | 生存 | 破坏 | 毁灾 | 消灾 | 根除 | 极端 | 灾难 | 灾害 | 非常 | 严峻 | 严酷 | 此时 | 此刻 | 立时 | 现在 | 激烈 | 过激 | 突然 | 意外 | 深切 | 极其 | 损坏 | 损失 | 损伤 | 激进 | 空前 | 绝无仅有的 | 严厉 | 剧烈 | 惨重 | 打击 | 打败 | 斗争 | 战斗 | 明确 | 不可逾越 | 重大 | 艰巨 | 厉害 | 急性 | 特殊意义 | 难对付的 | 极度
*risk	风险 | 复原 &! <*threat> | 长远 | 长期 | 概率 | 几率 | 多半 | 可能 | 渺茫 | 怀疑 | 未定 | 暗 | 未详 | 不+明确 | 不+清楚 | 含糊 | 弥漫 | 不+直接 | 扩散 | 间接 | 整备 | 预备 | 预防 | 准备 | 防止 | 可控的 | 免除 | 阻止 | 避免 | 逃避 | 维护 | 潜力 | 潜在 | 也许 | 无法预料 | 趋势 | 倾向 | 趋向 | 计算 | 预测 | 推测 | 后 | 未来 | 预报 | 预测 | 预期 | 挑战 &! <*threat> | 问题 &! <*threat> | 担心 &! <*threat>
*national_security_military	国安 | 国家 & 安全 | 民族 | 维稳 | 社会 & 稳定 | 暴力 | 冲突 | 争端 | 矛盾 | 国境 | 边界 | 边境 | 领土 | 动摇 | 动荡 | 动乱 | 不+稳性 | 迁移 | 迁徙 | 军队 | 军事 | 国家利益 | 国防 | 防务 | 恐怖主义 | 保卫 | 捍卫
*national_security_non-traditional	国安 | 国家 & 安全 | 可持续 & 发展 | 社会 & 发展| 经济 & 发展 |民族 | 经济 & 成长 | 经济 & 增长 | 经济 & 发展 | 国际地位 | 能源 & 安全 | 能源 & 稳定 | 国家利益
*human_security	人性 | 人类 | 弱势 | 易受 | 脆弱 | 易损性 | 幸福 | 安康 | 庄重 | 端庄 | 个人 | 个体 | 社群 | 贫困 | 贫穷 | 食品 | 食物 | 粮食 | 水 | 疾病 | 病症 | 病 | 不+平等 | 压迫 | 社会排斥 | 卫生 | 保健 | 健康
*planetary_security	地球 | 星球 | 大地 | 行星 | 世界 | 生态 &! (部 & 文明) | 生态系统 | 生物多样性 | 生命多样性 | 气象 | 大气 | 大自然 | 生物圈 | 自然环境 | 水土 | 植物 | 草木 | 花木 | 动物
*national_security_military_threat	<*threat> & <*national_security_military>
*national_security_military_risk	<*risk> & <*national_security_military>
*national_security_non-traditional_threat	<*threat> & <*national_security_non-traditional >
*national_security_non-traditional _risk	<*risk> & <*national_security_non-traditional >
*human_security_threat	<*threat> & <*human security >
*human_security_risk	<*risk> & <*human security >
*planetary_security_threat	<*threat> & <*planetary security >
*planetary_security_risk	<*risk> & <*planetary security >
Japanese	
*climate_change	気候 | 温暖化 | ウォーミング

*threat	脅威 | 恐れ | 脅かす | 危機 | 危険 | 危険物 | 短期 | 即時 | 即刻 | すぐに | 重大な | 由々しい | 緊急 | 早急な | 実存 | 存在 | 並外れた | 特別な | 直接 | ダイレクト | 特定 | インスタント | 差し迫った | 差し迫る | 避けられない | クリア | 明確 | 不可避 | 生存 | 破壊 | ぶち壊す | 根絶する | 過激 | 激しい | 災害 | 壊滅的な | 悲惨な | プレス | 圧迫 | 大量の | 厳しい | 心配すら | とても | 非常に | 今 | 現在 | 劇的な | 激烈な | 突然 | 深く | ダメージ | 損害 | 危害 | 危害を与える | 有害 | ラジカル | 前例のない | 前代未聞 | ひどい | 厳し | 戦う | 乗り越えられない | 重要な | 恐ろしい | 急性
*risk	リスク | 回復力 &! <*threat> | 長期 | 確率 | ありそう | 可能 | おそらく | 多分 | 不確かな | 不確実性 | 不測の事態 | 可能性 | 拡散 | 不明 | 間接 | シナリオと計画 | 予防策 | 準備 | 準備する | 管理可能 | 管理 | 避ける | 回避可能 | 避けられる | 保護 | 潜在的 | そうかもしれない | 傾向 | トレンド | 計画する | 予想 | 推定 | 後で | ある時点で | 将来 | 未来 | 防ぐ | 予防 | 期待する | チャレンジ &! <*threat> | 挑戦 &! <*threat> | 課題 &! <*threat> | 懸念 &! <*threat> | 心配する &! <*threat> | 予報 | 問題 &! <*threat>
*national_security_military	国家 & 安全保障 | ナショナル+セキュリティ | 社会 & 安定性 | 暴力的 | 暴力 | 対立 | 国境 | 地域 | 領土 | 不安定 | 不安定になります | 集団移動 | 不安 | 軍隊 | 国防 | 防衛 | 国益 | テロリズム
*national_security_non-traditional	国家 & 安全保障 | ナショナル+セキュリティ | 社会 & 発展 | 社会 & 開発 | 持続可能な & 開発| 持続可能な & 発展| 経済 & 発展 |経済 & 開発 | 国際 & 地位 | 経済 & 成長 | 画像 | エネルギ & 安全保障 | エネルギ & 保障する | 安定したエネルギー | 国益
*human_security	人間 | 人間性 | 人類 | 脆弱 | 脆弱性 | 幸福 | 尊厳 | 個人 | コミュニティ | 貧困 | 食べ物 | 水 | 疾患 | 病 | 病気 | 不平等 | 抑圧 | 圧迫 | 社会 & 排除 | 転置 | 置換 | 健康
*planetary_security	地球 | 惑星 | グローブ | 生態学 | エコロジー | 生態系 | 生物多様性 | 生態 | 雰囲気 | 自然 | 生物圏 | 自然 & 環境 | 植物 | 動物
*national_security_military_threat	<*threat> & <*national_security_military>
*national_security_military_risk	<*risk> & <*national_security_military>
*national_security_non-traditional_threat	<*threat> & <*national_security_non-traditional >
*national_security_non-traditional _risk	<*risk> & <*national_security_non-traditional >
*human_security_threat	<*threat> & <*human security >
*human_security_risk	<*risk> & <*human security >
*planetary_security_threat	<*threat> & <*planetary security >
*planetary_security_risk	<*risk> & <*planetary security >

Source: Data adapted from Diez, Lucke, and Wellmann 2016, 20–24; Kameyama and Ono 2021, 272–74; McDonald 2013, 45–49.

Appendix 4 – Securitizing Actors and Audiences

Table 5 List of all securitizing Actors and Audiences

Country and Level	Language	Actor	Name of Publication, Speech, or Event	Date	Source
China Level one	English	MEE	2019 White Paper	November 2019	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2019)
	English	MEE	2020 White Paper	June 2021	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021a)
	Chinese	MEE	2022 White Paper	October 2022	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2022)
	Chinese	MEE Minister Huang Runqiu	Fourth Ministerial Conference on Climate Action	July 2020	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020b)
	Chinese	MEE Minister Huang Runqiu	Scientific Report on Addressing Climate Change and Protecting Biodiversity	December 2020	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020c)
	Chinese	MEE Minister Huang Runqiu	World Economic Forum Davos Sub-forum on Climate Change	January 2021	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021e)
	Chinese	MEE Minister Huang Runqiu	30th Basic Ministerial Conference on Climate Change	April 21	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021c)
	Chinese	MEE Minister Huang Runqiu	Petersburg Climate Dialogue Ministerial Conference	May 2021	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021d)
	Chinese	MEE Party Secretary Sun Jinlong	Contributing Chinese wisdom, Chinese solutions and Chinese power to global climate governance	June 2022	(Sun 2022)
	English	Xie Zhenhua	Statement by the Special Envoy for Climate Change of China, Xie Zhenhua	February 2021	(Xie 2021)
	English	Xie Zhenhua	China-U.S. Joint Statement Addressing the Climate Crisis	April 21	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2021b)
	English	MFA	UN Climate Action Summit: China's Position and Action	September19	(China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2019)
	English	Wang Yi	UN Climate Action Summit	September 19	(Wang 2019)

Country and Level	Language	Actor	Name of Publication, Speech, or Event	Date	Source
	Chinese	MFA	China's Position Paper on United Nations Cooperation	October 2020	(China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021b)
	English	Wang Yi	China's Diplomacy in 2021: Embracing a Global Vision and Serving the Nation and its People	December 2021	(Wang 2021)
	English	Zhang Jun	Security Council Open Debate on Climate and Security	September 21	(Zhang 2021a)
	English	Zhang Jun	High-level Open Debate on the Theme "Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Security in the Context of Terrorism and Climate Change"	December 2021	(Zhang 2021b)
	Chinese	NDRC	13th Renewable Energy Development Five Year Plan (2016-2020)	December 2016	(China National Development and Reform Commission 2016a)
	Chinese	NDRC	13th Five-Year Plan for Energy Development	December 2016	(China National Development and Reform Commission 2016b)
	Chinese	NDRC	14th Five-Year Plan for Modern Energy System	March 2022	(China National Development and Reform Commission 2022c)
	Chinese	NDRC	14th Five-Year Renewable Energy Development Plan	June 2022	(China National Development and Reform Commission 2022b)
	English	MOND	2019 White Paper	July 2019	(China Ministry of National Defense 2019)
China Level two	English	Xi Jinping	General Debate of the 75th Session of The United Nations General Assembly	September 20	(Xi 2020b)
	English	Xi Jinping	Climate Ambition Summit	December 2020	(Xi 2020a)
	English	Xi Jinping	Leaders' Summit on Climate Change	April 21	(Xi 2021b)
	English	Xi Jinping	16th G20 Leaders' Summit	October 2021	(Xi 2021c)
	English	Xi Jinping	COP 26	November 21	(Xi 2021a)
	English	Xi Jinping	Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China	October 2022	(Xi 2022a)
	English	Xi Jinping	17th G20 Summit	November 22	(Xi 2022b)

Country and Level	Language	Actor	Name of Publication, Speech, or Event	Date	Source
	English	Han Zheng	Climate Adaptation Summit 2021	January 2021	(China State Council 2021d)
	English	Han Zheng	Meeting with U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry	April 2021	(China Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021a)
	English	Han Zheng	Second EU-China High Level Environment and Climate Dialogue	October 2021	(Directorate-General for Climate Action 2021)
	English	MEE (published on behalf of the government)	Energy White Paper	December 2020	(China Ministry of Ecology and Environment 2020a)
	English	Government of the People's Republic of China	14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives for 2035	March 2021	(Government of the People's Republic of China 2021c)
	English	State Council	Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030	October 2021	(China State Council 2021a)
	English	State Council	Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality in Full and Faithfull Implementation of the New Development Philosophy	October 2021	(China State Council 2021b)
	English	State Council	2021 Climate Change White Paper	October 2021	(China State Council 2021c)
	English	MEE (published on behalf of the whole government)	National Strategy on Climate Adaptation 2035	June 2022	(Government of the People's Republic of China 2022)
	English	Government of the People's Republic of China	China's Achievements, New Goals and New Measures for Nationally Determined Contributions	October 2021	(Government of the People's Republic of China 2021a)
	English	Government of the People's Republic of China	China's Mid-Century Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy	October 2021	(Government of the People's Republic of China 2021b)
Japan Level one	English	MOE	2019 White Paper	October 2019	(Japan Ministry of the Environment 2019)

Country and Level	Language	Actor	Name of Publication, Speech, or Event	Date	Source
	English	MOE	Assessment Report on Climate Change Impacts in Japan	December 2020	(Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020b)
	English	MOE	2020 White Paper	December 2020	(Japan Ministry of the Environment 2020a)
	English	MOE	2021 White Paper	November 2021	(Japan Ministry of the Environment 2021)
	English	MOE Minister Koizumi Shinjiro	June Momentum Opening Session	June 2020	(Koizumi 2020)
	English	MOE Minister Koizumi Shinjiro	Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)	August 2021	(Koizumi 2021)
	English	MOE Minister Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi	Statement on the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures, the National Government Action Plan, the Long-Term Strategy under the Paris Agreement and the Climate Change Adaptation Plan	October 2021	(Yamaguchi 2021)
	English	MOFA	2020 White Paper	April 2020	(Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020)
	English	MOFA	2021 White Paper	April 2021	(Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2021)
	English	MOFA	2022 White Paper	February 2022	(Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2022)
	English	Ishikane Kimihiro	Statement by the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations, Ishikane Kimihiro	March 2021	(Ishikane 2021a)
	English	Ishikane Kimihiro	Security Council Open Debate on “Maintenance of International Peace and Security - Climate and Security”	September 2021	(Ishikane 2021b)
	Japanese	METI	2019 Energy White Paper	June 2020	(Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2020)
	Japanese	METI	2020 Energy White Paper	June 2021	(Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2021)
	Japanese	METI	2021 Energy White Paper	June 2022	(Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 2022)
	English	MOD	2020 White Paper	June 2020	(Japan Ministry of Defense 2020)
	English	MOD	2021 White Paper	May 2021	(Japan Ministry of Defense 2021)

Country and Level	Language	Actor	Name of Publication, Speech, or Event	Date	Source
	English	MOD	2022 White Paper	May 2022	(Japan Ministry of Defense 2022a)
	English	MOD	Response Strategy on Climate Change	August 2022	(Japan Ministry of Defense 2022b)
Japan Level two	English	Suga Yoshihide	First Diet policy speech	October 2020	(Suga 2020)
	English	Suga Yoshihide	Second Diet policy speech	January 2021	(Suga 2021c)
	English	Suga Yoshihide	Leaders' Summit on Climate Change	April 2021	(Suga 2021b)
	English	Suga Yoshihide	76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly	September 2021	(Suga 2021a)
	Japanese	Expert Panel on Climate Change	Expert Panel on the Promotion of Climate Change Countermeasures – Report	October 2021	(Japan Expert Panel on Climate Change 2021)
	English	Kishida Fumio	COP 26	November 2021	(Kishida 2021a)
	English	Kishida Fumio	GZERO Summit 2021	December 2021	(Kishida 2021b)
	English	Kishida Fumio	First Diet policy speech	January 2022	(Kishida 2022a)
	English	Kishida Fumio	Third Diet policy speech	October 2022	(Kishida 2022b)
	English	National Security Council	National Security Strategy of Japan	December 2022	(Japan National Security Council 2022)
	Japanese	Cabinet Office	Global Warming Countermeasures Plan	October 2021	(Japan Cabinet Office 2021b)
	English	Cabinet Office	Climate Change Adaptation Plan	October 2021	(Japan Cabinet Office 2021a)
	English	Government of Japan	The Long-Term Strategy under the Paris Agreement	October 2021	(Government of Japan 2021b)
	English	Government of Japan	Japan's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)	October 2021	(Government of Japan 2021a)
	English	Government of Japan	Japan's Eighth National Communication and Fifth Biennial Report	December 2022	(Government of Japan 2022)

Appendix 5 – Climate Security Discourses

Table 6 Climate Security Discourses in China (Level one and two)

Referent object	MEE	MEE Minister and Party Secretary	Xie Zhenhua	MFA / Wang Yi	Zhang Jun	NDRC	MOND	Xi Jinping	Han Zheng	National-level strategic Documents	UNFCCC
Non-traditional National Security Threat		X (2021)	X (2021)		X (2021)			X (2021)		X (2021, 2022)	X (2021)
Non-traditional National Security Risk	X (2019, 2020, 2022)	X (2021, 2022)									
Traditional National Security Threat			X (2021)								
Traditional National Security Risk					X (2021)						
Human Security Threat		X (2021, 2022)	X (2021)		X (2021			X (2021)	X (2021)	X (2021, 2022)	X (2021)
Human Security Risk	X (2019, 2020, 2022)			X (2019)							
Planetary Security Threat		X (2021, 2022)	X (2021)					X (2021)	X (2021)	X (2022)	X (2021)
Planetary Security Risk	X (2019, 2020, 2022)			X (2019)				X (2020)			

Table 7 Climate Security Discourses in Japan (Level one and two)

Referent object	MOE	MOE Ministers	MOFA	Ishikane Kimihiro	METI	MOD	Suga Yoshihide	Expert Panel on Climate Change	Kishida Fumio	National Security Council	National-level strategic Documents	UNFCCC
Non-traditional National Security Threat	X (2020, 2021)		X (2021)	X (2021)						X (2022)	X (2021)	X (2022)
Non-traditional National Security Risk	X (2019, 2020)		X (2020, 2022)		X (2020, 2021)			X (2021	X (2021)		X (2021)	
Traditional National Security Threat						X (2022)				X (2022)		
Traditional National Security Risk			X (2022)			X (2021, 2022)		X (2021)			X (2021)	
Human Security Threat	X (2020, 2021)	X (2021)		X (2021)				X (2021)		X (2022)	X (2021)	X (2022)
Human Security Risk	X (2019, 2020)		X (2020, 2021)									
Planetary Security Threat	X (2020)							X (2021)			X (2021)	X (2022)
Planetary Security Risk	X (2019, 2020											X (2021)